Court Opinion

ID: 9895861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:39.414254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:43.182156
License: Public Domain

J-S21043-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SAQUANA TAWANE LAYER                         :   No. 1489 MDA 2022
                                               :

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 13, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0005925-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                       FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2023

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) granting the motion

to suppress evidence filed by Saquana Tawane Layer (Layer).               The

Commonwealth challenges the trial court’s application of the protective sweep

and plain view exceptions to the search warrant requirement. We affirm.1

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 This interlocutory appeal is taken as of right pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule

of Appellate Procedure 311. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
J-S21043-23

                                        I.

                                        A.

      This case arises from the arrest of Layer’s co-defendant, Dominique

Tashawn-Tyrell Hightower (Hightower), on November 3, 2021, on the front

porch of their two-story rowhome on outstanding charges of fleeing or

attempting to elude a police officer.        Police conducted surveillance on the

property for five days before the arrest and observed only Hightower, Layer

and their two young children entering and exiting the house.

      During a protective sweep of the residence incident to Hightower’s arrest

after he had been detained, the arresting officer, York City Police Officer Peter

Fouad, observed a small amount of loose marijuana, foil bags, a box of

sandwich baggies and gelato resealable bags on top of a dresser located in

the second-floor master bedroom. These observations formed the basis for

the application of a search warrant for the residence. During execution of the

search warrant, police recovered quantities of marijuana, numerous individual

packages of crack/powder cocaine, fentanyl packed for sale, a significant

amount of cash, packaging material, a digital scale and a key fob for a Honda

Accord parked directly in front of the home. A handgun and loaded magazine

were later recovered from the Honda Accord after police obtained a warrant

to search it. Layer was charged with four counts of possession with intent to

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deliver a controlled substance (PWID) and one count of criminal conspiracy to

commit PWID.2

                                               B.

       Layer filed a motion to suppress the evidence and the trial court held a

hearing on April 8, 2022, at which Detective Kyle Pitts and Police Officers

Adam Northstein and Peter Fouad appeared as witnesses.          Detective Pitts

testified that he has worked for the police department for 14 years and that

he assisted in arresting Hightower on November 3, 2021. Before the arrest,

Detective Pitts had developed information from multiple confidential sources

indicating that Hightower was involved in the distribution of illegal narcotics

and was likely in possession of a firearm.

       The detective advised that the U.S. Marshalls Fugitive Task Force and

various city officials were involved in execution of the arrest warrant. The

police team knocked and announced their presence and one of the officers

observed movement at a second-floor window when someone moved the

blinds. They continued to announce their presence for several minutes until

Hightower said on the other side of the door that he was coming out.

Hightower was taken into custody after a brief struggle where he failed to

____________________________________________

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1). Co-defendant
Hightower was charged with four counts of PWID and one count each of
criminal conspiracy to commit PWID and person not to possess a firearm. He
has filed an appeal at J-S21044-23 and we have issued a nearly identical
Memorandum in that case.

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comply with verbal commands. While he was being taken to the ground and

handcuffed, someone from inside the residence attempted to shut the front

door.

        The police team continued into the residence to conduct a security

sweep. Detective Pitts explained that protective sweeps are always conducted

when executing an arrest warrant to “look for any other persons within the

residence that could potentially harm officers on scene.” (N.T. Suppression,

4/08/22, at 9). Layer and two young children were quickly located within the

house and they were not handcuffed as they were not considered a safety

threat. (See id. at 20-21).

        On cross-examination, Detective Pitts explained that police surveillance

of the residence before the arrest was limited to the front door and did not

include the back door because of positioning and manpower constraints. He

clarified that during the arrest, Hightower was pulled out of the residence and

was arrested on the front porch. Police used some degree of force to pass

through the door to conduct the protective sweep, as someone was shutting

the front door from inside the residence. (See id. at 32). Detective Pitts

relayed that police immediately encountered Layer on the first floor, that one

of the children was with her and another child was coming down the stairs.

(See id. at 33). He testified that police proceeded upstairs to look for persons

that could cause harm, and while upstairs, another officer pointed out to him

loose marijuana on a dresser in the master bedroom.

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      Officer Northstein testified that he has been a police officer for

approximately five years and that during execution of the arrest warrant he

was at the front of the residence watching the second-floor windows.       He

stated that upon the initial knock and announcement, a set of blinds on a

second-floor window moved and a person looked out and immediately shut

the blinds again. The officer participated in conducting the protective sweep,

as was customary when making an arrest “to make sure there are no other

threats immediately inside that residence.” (See id. at 43).

      Officer Fouad testified that he has worked for the police department for

four years and was part of the entry team in executing the arrest warrant.

Because Hightower initially stood at the front door and ignored commands

that he come out, the officers pulled him away from the door and took him to

the ground to handcuff him. During this time, Hightower appeared to be trying

to talk to someone inside the residence to his left. (See id. at 52). Officer

Fouad arrested Hightower, patted him down and searched him. Officer Fouad

then handed Hightower off to another officer and he entered the residence to

join the police team already conducting the protective sweep. Officer Fouad

proceeded to the master bedroom to make sure it was clear and observed foil

bags, a box of sandwich baggies, gelato resealable bags and loose marijuana

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sitting on top of a dresser.3 As a result of the items he observed during the

sweep, police obtained a search warrant for the residence.

       Officer Fouad testified that he executed the search warrant and that a

black hoodie collected in the search held a key fob for the Honda Accord

parked in front of the residence. Officer Fouad averred that when standing

outside the vehicle, he observed the grip of a handgun sitting under the

driver’s seat. He seized the firearm and cleared it, but did not perform any

other search of the vehicle at that time. A search warrant was obtained for

the vehicle after a canine hit on it. (See id. at 57).

       On cross-examination, Officer Fouad testified that after Hightower was

handcuffed and Layer and the children were located in the residence, he

believed there were other potential threats or dangers within the home “based

on the movement that they called out when we were outside the house.” (Id.

at 59-60). He agreed with defense counsel that no person could fit within the

drawers of the dresser in the master bedroom and that no one could have

positioned themselves behind the dresser because it was against a wall. (See

id. at 62). Officer Fouad testified that he believed based on his training and

____________________________________________

3 Officer Fouad also testified that the top drawer of the dresser was open and

he observed wads of cash in the drawer in plain view. (See id. at 54).
However, the trial court did not find this testimony credible because it was
inconsistent with the evidentiary photographs of the dresser showing the
drawer closed. (See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/22, at 9). The Commonwealth
is not contesting the trial court’s finding concerning the cash on appeal. (See
Commonwealth’s Brief, at 10 n.1).

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experience that the baggies and other materials he observed alongside the

loose marijuana were packaging for marijuana. When asked to identify the

marijuana in an evidentiary photograph of the dresser taken at the scene, he

circled two small “specks.” (Id. at 65).

       The trial court deferred ruling on the motion pending the submission of

briefs. On October 13, 2022, the court entered an Order and Opinion granting

suppression of the evidence seized during the search of the residence and the

vehicle. The trial court held as an initial matter that under the circumstances

of Hightower’s arrest, there was a need for police to conduct a limited

protective sweep to ensure officer safety and pointed to police observation of

movement in the upstairs window blind, the resistance they faced from

Hightower at the front door during his arrest, the attempt of someone within

the residence to close the door, and the fact that the officers could not see

the back of the house. (See Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/22, at 7-8). However, the

court went on to hold that “the protective sweep exceeded the cursory

inspection allowed under such conditions as there were not enough articulable

facts and inferences to give rise to reasonable suspicion to conduct a more

thorough search of the dresser area.” (Id. at 8).4 The court additionally found

that because the loose “tiny specks” of marijuana and the wads of cash were

____________________________________________

4 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (outlining parameters for lawful

protective sweep).

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the probable cause given to obtain the search warrant for the residence which,

in turn, led to the search warrant for the vehicle, the warrants were invalid

and the evidence seized must be suppressed. (See id. at 9-10).

       With regard to the Commonwealth’s position that the items on the

dresser including the loose marijuana were in plain view, the court indicated

in its Rule 1925 opinion that it did not find credible the proposition that “a

reasonably cautious man conducting a protective sweep to search for persons

would have spotted tiny specks of loose marijuana” among a variety of items.

It reiterated that “the cursory inspection allowed under a protective sweep

was surpassed because law enforcement overstepped and abused the

protective sweep to conduct an evidentiary search.”       (See Trial Ct. Op.,

12/22/22, at 9-10). The Commonwealth timely appealed and it and the trial

court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

                                               II.

       The Commonwealth contends that the trial court erred in granting

Layer’s suppression motion where the protective sweep and plain view

doctrine justified the search of her residence and seizure of items therein.

(See Commonwealth’s Brief, 10-19).5 It maintains that because the trial court

____________________________________________

5

             When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order,
       we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only
       the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
       evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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determined that the protective sweep of the residence incident to Hightower’s

arrest was constitutional,6 the marijuana detritus and packaging material

observed on top of the dresser was admissible pursuant to the plain view

exception to the warrant requirement. (See id. at 11, 15).

       We begin by observing that “both the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

guarantee individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en

banc), appeal denied, 279 A.3d 38 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). “As a general

rule, a warrant stating probable cause is required before a police officer may

____________________________________________

       entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
       findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
       findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
       not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
       the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

              Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether
       the record supports the suppression court’s factual findings;
       however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s
       legal conclusions.

              Further, it is within the suppression court’s sole province as
       factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
       be given their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Ross, 2023 WL 4068547, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed June 20,
2023) (citations omitted).

6 The Commonwealth’s assertion that the trial court found the protective
sweep constitutional ignores the court’s ultimate conclusion that the scope of
the sweep exceeded what is lawfully permissible.

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search for or seize evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent the application

of one of a few clearly delineated exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure

is presumptively unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). “One well-recognized

exception     to   the    warrant     requirement   is   the   protective   sweep.”

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2001).

             Police may perform a ‘protective sweep’ as an incident to a
       lawful arrest, in order to protect the safety of police officers and
       others. See Buie v. Maryland, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). In such
       circumstances, officers may look into spaces immediately
       adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be
       immediately launched without any degree of suspicion other than
       that necessary to support the arrest. A protective sweep
       beyond such ‘immediately adjoining’ areas is proper if
       police can ‘articulate specific facts to justify a reasonable
       fear’ for the safety of police officers or others. We consider
       the information available to police at the time of the sweep from
       the perspective of a reasonably prudent police officer.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 959 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some

citations and quotation marks omitted).7

       In Buie, the United States Supreme Court emphasized:

              . . . that such a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the
       arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless
       not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory
       inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The
       sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the
       reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer
       than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the
       premises.

____________________________________________

7 The Pennsylvania Constitution applies the same standards to protective
sweeps as the United States Constitution. See id. at n.3.

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Buie, supra at 335 (emphasis added).

      In Taylor, supra, our Supreme Court explained:

             Buie sets forth two levels of protective sweeps. The
      two levels are defined thus: [A]s an incident to the arrest the
      officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable
      cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces
      immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack
      could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we
      hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken
      together with the rational inferences from those facts,
      would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing
      that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a
      danger to those on the arrest scene.

            Pursuant to the first level of a protective sweep, without a
      showing of even reasonable suspicion, police officers may make
      cursory visual inspections of spaces immediately adjacent to the
      arrest scene, which could conceal an assailant. The scope of the
      second level permits a search for attackers further away from the
      place of arrest, provided that the officer who conducted the sweep
      can articulate specific facts to justify a reasonable fear for the
      safety of himself and others.

Id. at 1267 (emphasis added).       Thus, “the scope of a protective sweep

extends only to a visual inspection of those places in which a person might be

hiding and lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the fear of danger.” Id.

at 1268 (citation omitted).

      “The logic behind a protective sweep or security check is simple and

straightforward. Where the safety of the arresting officers can be jeopardized,

their safety outweighs the minimal intrusion a properly executed sweep may

have upon an individual’s privacy.” Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d

588, 598 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 364 (Pa. 1999).

Protective sweeps envision a sweep for persons and “cannot be used as a

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pretext for an evidentiary search.”    Id.   However, if an officer discovers

contraband while conducting a proper protective sweep, he is not required to

ignore it and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression. See

Commonwealth v. Potts, 73 A.3d 1275, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2013); see also

Commonwealth v. Witman, 750 A.2d 327, 336 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating

evidence observed in plain view during lawful and appropriate protective

sweep is admissible).

      As noted supra, in order for the police to conduct a protective sweep

incident to arrest beyond the immediate vicinity of the arrest, i.e., a second

level sweep permitting a search for attackers further away from the place of

arrest, the police must be able to articulate specific facts that would cause a

reasonably prudent police officer to believe that there was a danger to the

officer’s safety on the premises. See Taylor, supra at 1267. In Buie, the

Supreme Court emphasized that the duration of the sweep must “last[] no

longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in

any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the

premises.” Buie, supra at 335 (emphasis added).

      In this case, at the time the officers conducted the second level sweep

beyond the immediate vicinity of the arrest, when police entered the master

bedroom, Hightower was outside the home in handcuffs and all likely

occupants of the residence were secured. Layer and the two children were on

the first floor and were not handcuffed because they did not present a safety

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concern. Although the police witnesses testified that they proceeded to the

second floor of the house to check for persons who may have posed a danger,

they failed to articulate sufficient facts to justify the second level search

beyond the areas immediately adjoining the arrest.

      First, the record does not support an inference that someone potentially

hiding in the master bedroom presented a threat to the officers’ safety, given

that Hightower’s arrest was complete, he was outside the house and police

were free to depart the premises. Second, as the police officers recognized,

the Hightower residence had been under surveillance for five days preceding

his arrest on the fleeing/eluding charge and the only individuals who had been

seen entering or exiting the premises in addition to Hightower were Layer and

the two children. The more reasonable inference is that the officers entered

the master bedroom to search for the narcotics they believed were at the

premises based on information developed through confidential informants in

a separate investigation. Accordingly, we conclude that the officers’ actions

went beyond the scope of conducting a proper protective sweep incident to

Hightower’s arrest.

      Additionally, even if we were to find that police were permitted to

conduct a sweep of the second floor for hidden persons, we would conclude

that the search of the dresser was outside the scope of a protective sweep.

As previously noted, Officer Fouad testified that he observed “cherry gelato,

foil bags, a box of sandwich baggies, loose marijuana” on the dresser and the

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“top drawer of the dresser was cracked open, and I could see inside the drawer

wads of cash in plain view.” (N.T. Trial, at 54). He further testified that he

obtained a search warrant based on these observations. However, the trial

court did not find Officer Fouad’s testimony as to the wads of cash visible in

the top drawer credible because the crime scene photographs depicted the

drawer was closed. (See id. at 61-62). Officer Fouad also acknowledged that

no one could hide behind the dresser because it was positioned against a wall,

nor could anyone fit within the dresser drawers. (See id. at 62). Under these

circumstances, we would conclude that a limited protective sweep of the

second floor for hidden persons would not have led to police observation of

tiny loose specks of suspected marijuana on top of a dresser.

      With regard to the Commonwealth’s companion argument that the plain

view doctrine operates to prevent suppression, it also fails. “The plain view

doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized

without a warrant.”   Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). However, “inherent in the plain view doctrine

is the principle the seized object must not have been put in plain view as a

result of unlawful police conduct.”    Heidelberg, supra at 504 (citation

omitted). Under the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of an item is

only permissible when “(1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage

point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating;

and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.” Id. (citation

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omitted). Here, since the extended search of Layer’s house was an unlawful

protective sweep, the officers did not observe the seized contraband from a

lawful vantage point nor have a lawful right of access to it. Thus, the plain

view doctrine is not applicable.

       In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in granting Layer’s pretrial suppression motion and,

therefore, affirm its October 13, 2022 Suppression Order.8

       Order affirmed.

       Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

       Judge Nichols files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/8/2023

____________________________________________

8 The Commonwealth originally raised sub-claims regarding the suppression

of items seized pursuant to the search warrants for the residence and vehicle.
However, the Commonwealth and the trial court acknowledge that the issue
of the legality of the warrants is controlled by this Court’s disposition of the
arguments concerning the protective sweep and plain view doctrine. (See
Commonwealth Brief, at 4, 9, 20; Trial Court Op., 12/22/22, at 10). The
claims concerning the warrants are rendered moot by our disposition affirming
suppression.

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