Court Opinion

ID: 9597046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:55:10.742141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:36.597739
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting.
Defendant’s primary defense was alibi. Indeed, even after verdict and judgment he proclaimed his total innocence. This was a jury question resolved by the jury against defendant under proper instructions.
There was, however, another jury question raised by the evidence upon which the jury was not properly instructed. The majority opinion accurately states the evidence of the prosecu-trix. One reasonable interpretation of that evidence is that the intruder intended to persuade the prosecutrix to engage in consensual, albeit illicit, sexual intercourse. The factual basis for this interpretation is that upon the slightest resistance by the prosecutrix the intruder desisted from his attempt saying, “All I wanted was some sex.”
The indictment for first degree burglary charged that defendant broke and entered with the intent to commit the crime *500of rape. With regard to the mens rea of this crime the trial judge charged the jury that it must find that defendant “intended to commit the felony of rape, that is to have forcible sexual intercourse with [prosecutrix] against her will.” No further explanation of the nature or quantum of force defendant intended to use was given.
Where the element of the force intended to be used is not really contested this bare bones definition might be enough. On the evidence in this case, however, it is prejudicially insufficient. “General Statute 1-180 requires the trial judge to ‘declare and explain the law arising on the evidence . . . . ’ How much the law needs to be explained depends on what evidence is presented. State v. Cole, 270 N.C. 382, 154 S.E. 2d 506 (1967). Merely to define an element of a criminal offense may be an insufficiency which prejudices the defendant when that element is the very nub of the case. State v. Lawrence, 262 N.C. 162, 136 S.E. 2d 595 (1964); State v. Lunsford and Sawyer, 229 N.C. 229, 49 S.E. 2d 410 (1948). See also State v. Thomas, 118 N.C. 1113, 24 S.E. 431 (1896).” State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 575, 220 S.E. 2d 600, 616 (1975) (Exum, J., dissenting).
The very nub of this case is the intent of defendant as he broke and entered. How much force, if any, did he intend to use to obtain sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix? Under the instructions as given the jury might have believed that the force involved in merely kissing and putting a hand over prosecutrix’s mouth was the force referred to in the judge’s instruction. The jury may have understood that if defendant intended to use only that “force” which was in fact used then he had the intent to rape necessary for conviction of burglary in the first degree. The law is, of course, otherwise; for if defendant intended to do only what was in fad done, i.e., kissing, putting a hand over prosecutrix’s mouth and desisting upon her slightest resistance, he would not have had the requisite intent to rape.
The trial judge should have put the principal question in the case in clearer focus for the jury. He should have instructed that defendant, at the time he broke and entered, must have had the intent to have forcible sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix against her will and that the force he intended to use must have been force sufficient to overcome any resistance *501she might make. State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504 (1923); cf. N.C.P.I.—Crim. 207.11 (April 1974).
In Allen, a prosecution for burglary with intent to rape, the evidence was that prosecutrix was awakened at night by a cold hand touching her thigh under the bed covering. Her husband was also in bed with her. Defendant’s evidence was that he was in a drunken condition and did not know what he was doing. The trial judge refused a requested instruction that the State must show an intent by defendant to accomplish his purpose, notwithstanding any resistance the prosecutrix might make. This was held to be reversible error. This Court said, State v. Allen, supra at 307, 119 S.E. at 506:
“So, under the charge of a felonious and burglarious breaking and entering of the presently occupied dwelling-house or sleeping apartment of another, in the night-time, with intent to commit the crime of rape upon the person of any female therein, it is necessary, before the prisoner can be convicted of burglary in the first degree, to show the requisite, specific intent on his part, at the time of the breaking and entry, of gratifying his passions on the person of the woman, and that he intended to do so, at all events, notwithstanding any resistance on her part.”
The specific intent required to be proved in this case is identical to the specific intent required to be proved in prosecutions under General Statute 14-22 for assault with intent to rape. Justice Stacy cited as authority in Allen just such a case, State v. Massey, 86 N.C. 658 (1882). In prosecutions under General Statute 14-22 this Court has consistently held it to be reversible error to fail to instruct the jury that defendant must intend to use whatever force might be necessary to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix notwithstanding any resistance she might make. State v. Moose, 267 N.C. 97, 147 S.E. 2d 521 (1966); State v. Heater, 229 N.C. 540, 50 S.E. 2d 309 (1948); State v. Walsh, 224 N.C. 218, 29 S.E. 2d 743 (1944); cf. United States v. Short, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11 (1954) and N.C.P.I.—Crim. 207.30 (June 1972). In Moose and Walsh there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that defendant requested that such an instruction be given and the instructions as given were construed to permit a guilty verdict upon a jury’s finding of an intent to use some lesser degree of force or persuasion.
*502State v. Allen, supra, is distinguishable only in that here there was no request at trial for the correct instruction. I believe, however, that a defendant is entitled to full and complete instruction on an essential element of the offense charged even without request. N. C. Gen. Stat. 1-180; State v. Ardrey, 232 N.C. 721, 723, 62 S.E. 2d 53, 55 (1950); State v. Merrick, 171 N.C. 788, 795, 88 S.E. 501, 505 (1916); cf. State v. Hunt, 283 N.C. 617, 197 S.E. 2d 513 (1973).
Taken together, General Statute 1-180, State v. Allen, supra, State v. Moose, supra, and State v. Walsh, supra, require that defendant be given a new trial for failure of the trial court adequately to declare and explain the law relative to the requisite specific intent notwithstanding defendant’s failure to make a request for such an instruction.
I vote for a new trial.