Court Opinion

ID: 9373982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:10:56.947607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.502067
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  FEB 3 2022
                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION                                SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
                                                                               U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
                                                                               OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

          UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
                    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 In re:                                             BAP No. CC-21-1163-FLS
 AGUINA AGUINA,
             Debtor.                                Bk. No. 6:17-bk-17472-WJ

 AGUINA AGUINA,
             Appellant,
 v.                                                 MEMORANDUM*
 CHOONG-DAE KANG; MYUNG-JA
 KANG; KWANG-SA KANG; KARL T.
 ANDERSON, Chapter 7 Trustee,
             Appellees.

               Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                    for the Central District of California
               Wayne E. Johnson, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: FARIS, LAFFERTY, and SPRAKER, Bankruptcy Judges.

                                 INTRODUCTION

      Chapter 71 debtor Aguina Aguina has been embroiled in contentious

dissolution proceedings and other state court litigation with his ex-wife,

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
      1
        Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
appellee Choong-Dae Kang, for over thirteen years. He filed for

bankruptcy protection, and the dispute continued in the bankruptcy court.

Four years after he filed his bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy court

approved a compromise between the bankruptcy trustee and Ms. Kang and

her siblings.

      Mr. Aguina appeals the compromise order. We discern no error and

AFFIRM.

                                    FACTS

A.    Prepetition events

      Mr. Aguina and Ms. Kang were married in 1999. In 2008, Mr. Aguina

filed an action for marital dissolution in state court. The parties finalized

the divorce, but issues remained as to child and spousal support and

property division.

      The disputes engendered additional litigation in state court.

Ms. Kang and her siblings, appellees Myung-Ja Kang and Kwang-Sa Kang

(collectively, the “Kang Parties”), sued Mr. Aguina in state court on a loan

that the Kang Parties’ late mother had made to Mr. Aguina. The state court

entered judgment in favor of the Kang Parties and against Mr. Aguina in

the amounts of $497,500 for fraud and $77,000 for breach of contract.

      The dissolution proceedings were extremely contentious. Mr. Aguina

accused Ms. Kang of failing to disclose all of her assets and of using

various corporate entities to conceal community property. Among other

things, Mr. Aguina claimed that an inheritance that Ms. Kang received in

                                       2
2011 at her father’s passing was community property.

      Ms. Kang did not comply with some of the family court’s orders,

including an order to disclose her assets. In December 2016, the family

court found that Ms. Kang had failed to comply with mandatory disclosure

requirements, awarded monetary sanctions against her, and issued

terminating sanctions preventing her from presenting evidence on issues

about which she should have made disclosures.

      In 2020, the family court stated, at least preliminarily, that some of

the disputed assets were no longer within its jurisdiction, including four

condominium units in Japan.

B.    Mr. Aguina’s chapter 11 petition and conversion to chapter 7

      Meanwhile, in September 2017, while the divorce proceedings were

ongoing, Mr. Aguina filed a chapter 11 petition. Soon thereafter, the

bankruptcy court converted the case to one under chapter 7. Chapter 7

trustee Karl T. Anderson (“Trustee”) was appointed trustee to administer

Mr. Aguina’s estate.

      The Kang Parties filed five proofs of claim. The first three claims

(Claim 9 filed by Myung-Ja Kang, Claim 10 filed by Kwang-Sa Kang, and

Claim 11 filed by Ms. Kang) asserted a secured claim for $781,454.51, based

on the state court judgment described above.2 (The judgment amount had

      2
         The bankruptcy court later determined that the fraud portion of the judgment
that the Kang Parties had recovered against Mr. Aguina was nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(2). The district court affirmed.

                                           3
increased due to the accrual of postjudgment interest.) In Claim 12,

Ms. Kang asserted a priority unsecured claim for $9,762.80, based on a

domestic support obligation. In Claim 13, Ms. Kang asserted a general

unsecured claim for $500,000, based on a pending state court lawsuit. Other

creditors asserted general unsecured claims totaling about $11,000.

      In January 2019, the bankruptcy court granted limited relief from the

automatic stay for the state court dissolution proceedings to continue. The

stay relief order stated that the stay was lifted so that the family court

could determine “the characterization only of the assets of the Debtor and

Ms. Kang as community property, separate property of the Debtor, or

separate property of Ms. Kang.” It specified that “[a]ll community property

and separate property of the Debtor shall remain property of this

bankruptcy estate and subject to the Trustee’s administration in this case.”

      The Trustee joined the divorce proceedings as a party in interest and

took the position that some of the assets at issue were community property

and therefore were property of the estate. In a Rule 2004 examination,

Ms. Kang provided documents and testimony to the Trustee supposedly

establishing that the assets at issue were separate property. Ms. Kang

began making monthly payments to the Trustee toward the family court

sanctions.

C.    The Trustee’s motion for compromise

      The Trustee filed a motion for an order approving settlement and

compromise of disputes between the Trustee and the Kang Parties

                                       4
(“Compromise Motion”). The salient terms of the settlement agreement

were as follows: (1) Ms. Kang would pay the Trustee $49,726.77; (2) the

Kang Parties would waive and withdraw all claims against the estate and

would not receive any distribution in the bankruptcy case; (3) the parties

would exchange releases concerning certain assets; and (4) the settlement

agreement would not affect anything in the state court dissolution action

other than the division of assets.

      The Trustee asserted that the compromise agreement comported with

the standard set forth in Martin v. Kane (In re A & C Properties), 784 F.2d

1377, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1986), and Woodson v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.

(In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988).

      Mr. Aguina opposed the Compromise Motion. He argued that he had

cooperated with the Trustee but that the Trustee had never shared with

him the information obtained from the Rule 2004 examination of Ms. Kang,

and he had been unable to get necessary information about Ms. Kang’s

assets in any forum. He also contended that the Kang Parties’ offer to

withdraw and waive their proofs of claim was of little value to the estate.

      Mr. Aguina offered to purchase the estate’s interest in the community

assets for $53,000. He argued that, because this amount was more than the

cash portion of the settlement, his proposal was superior.

      Mr. Aguina also argued that it was unfair for Ms. Kang to hide her

assets from the family court and the bankruptcy court and then seek to

settle with the Trustee without ever having to disclose her assets.

                                       5
      Finally, he argued that the proposed settlement would interfere with

proceedings in the state court. He pointed out that the bankruptcy court

had granted partial stay relief and left to the family court all issues

concerning the characterization of the parties’ assets.

      In a reply brief, the Trustee argued that Mr. Aguina did not refute his

position that Rule 9019 weighs in favor of the compromise and did not

address many of the considerations raised in A & C Properties. He

contended that Ms. Kang had provided sufficient information

demonstrating that the assets at issue were her separate property. He

argued that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over estate

property and did not need to abstain or defer to the family court.

      Ms. Kang joined in the Trustee’s reply brief. She attached her

declaration in which she discussed her interests in the various assets at

issue and explained how she had inherited most of those assets from her

parents after she separated from Mr. Aguina. She also traced the ownership

of the condos in Japan, as well as the fraud judgment against Mr. Aguina.

She attached corporate documents of her business interests and documents

concerning the condo units.

D.    The hearings and supplemental briefing on the Compromise
      Motion

      At the hearing on the Compromise Motion, Mr. Aguina objected that

the Kang Parties’ joinder introduced new arguments and evidence to

which he had no opportunity to reply.

                                       6
      The bankruptcy court continued the hearing to allow Mr. Aguina an

opportunity to respond. It also directed the settling parties to clarify some

provisions of the proposed settlement agreement.

      The Trustee filed a revised version of the settlement agreement, and

the parties filed additional briefs. 3 Among other things, Mr. Aguina argued

that the court should hold an evidentiary hearing. He did not address

Ms. Kang’s factual assertions concerning the assets.

      At the continued hearing, the bankruptcy court granted the

Compromise Motion. It analyzed each of the four A & C Properties factors

and held that they favored the compromise. The bankruptcy court

concluded that the compromise was “an elegant solution, a peaceful

solution, a common solution.” Mr. Aguina timely appealed.

                                  JURISDICTION

      The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and

157(b)(2)(A). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.4

      3
         A few days before the hearing, Mr. Aguina filed objections to the Kang Parties’
five proofs of claim. The bankruptcy court later overruled the objections as moot, given
that it had approved the compromise and the Kang Parties had withdrawn their claims.
      4  The Trustee argues that Mr. Aguina lacks standing to prosecute this appeal,
because there is no reasonable possibility of the estate having any surplus available to
pay him. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that, if we reverse on appeal, the
state court might recognize Mr. Aguina’s interests in enough community property to
pay all administrative claims, unsecured claims, and exemptions and result in a surplus.
Thus, he is a “person aggrieved” who has standing to appeal. Fondiller v. Robertson (In re
Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983).
                                            7
                                      ISSUE

      Whether the bankruptcy court erred in approving the compromise

between the Trustee and the Kang Parties.

                          STANDARD OF REVIEW

      “The bankruptcy court’s decision to approve a compromise is

reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Goodwin v. Mickey Thompson Ent. Grp.,

Inc. (In re Mickey Thompson Ent. Grp., Inc.), 292 B.R. 415, 420 (9th Cir. BAP

2003); see In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1380. Similarly, “[a] court’s decision

whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is also reviewed for an abuse of

discretion.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int'l Fibercom, Inc. (In re Int'l Fibercom,

Inc.), 503 F.3d 933, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2007).

      To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion,

we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the

bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief

requested” and (2) if it did, we consider whether the bankruptcy court's

application of the legal standard was illogical, implausible, or without

support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262-63 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc).

                                         8
                               DISCUSSION

A.    The bankruptcy court properly identified the A & C Properties
      factors to evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of the
      compromise.

      Rule 9019(a) provides that, “[o]n motion by the trustee and after

notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement.”

      “The bankruptcy court has great latitude in approving compromise

agreements.” In re Woodson, 839 F.2d at 620. The Ninth Circuit has directed

that the bankruptcy court must determine that the compromise is “fair and

equitable” based on four factors:

            In determining the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy
      of a proposed settlement agreement, the court must consider:

            (a) The probability of success in the litigation; (b) the
            difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of
            collection; (c) the complexity of the litigation involved,
            and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily
            attending it; (d) the paramount interest of the creditors
            and a proper deference to their reasonable views in the
            premises.

In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1381 (citation omitted). The law favors

compromise, “and as long as the bankruptcy court amply considered the

various factors that determined the reasonableness of the compromise, the

court’s decision must be affirmed.” Id. (citations omitted).

      “Each factor need not be treated in a vacuum; rather, the factors

should be considered as a whole to determine whether the settlement

                                       9
compares favorably with the expected rewards of litigation.” Grief & Co. v.

Shapiro (In re W. Funding Inc.), 550 B.R. 841, 851 (9th Cir. BAP 2016), aff’d,

705 F. App’x 600 (9th Cir. 2017). Ultimately, “[t]he trustee, as the party

proposing the compromise, has the burden of persuading the bankruptcy

court that the compromise is fair and equitable and should be approved.”

In re A & C Props., 784 F.2d at 1381.

      Moreover, the bankruptcy court “need not rule upon disputed facts

and questions of law, but only canvass the issues. A mini trial on the merits

is not required.” Burton v. Ulrich (In re Schmitt), 215 B.R. 417, 423 (9th BAP

1997) (citations omitted). Otherwise, “there would be no point in

compromising; the parties might as well go ahead and try the case.” Suter

v. Goedert, 396 B.R. 535, 548 (D. Nev. 2008) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

B.    The bankruptcy court did not err in applying the A & C Properties
      factors.

      1.    Probability of success

      The bankruptcy court properly considered the Trustee’s probability

of success in the dissolution action. The Trustee represented that he had

reviewed evidence and testimony from Ms. Kang that he thought likely

established her assets as separate property. As a result, he was not

confident that he could prevail in state court. The parties were highly

combative, they had drawn out the dissolution litigation for over a decade,

and any further litigation would likely require application of foreign law.

                                        10
Given these uncertainties, it was not error for the bankruptcy court to find

that this factor weighed in favor of the compromise.

      Mr. Aguina argues that the court could not have properly assessed

the probability of success because Ms. Kang never fully disclosed her

assets. He faults the Trustee for failing to share with Mr. Aguina or the

bankruptcy court the limited information that Ms. Kang had provided. He

also complains that the Trustee’s evaluation of the assets was insufficiently

detailed.

      While the Trustee could have provided more information to the

bankruptcy court to support his assessment, we find no reversible error.

The bankruptcy court needed only to canvass the issues and was not

required to consider evidence and make factual findings as to the nature

and value of each asset. See id.

      It is also significant that, after Ms. Kang filed her declaration about

her assets, the bankruptcy court continued the hearing so Mr. Aguina

could respond. Inexplicably, Mr. Aguina did not take advantage of this

opportunity.

      Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in relying on the Trustee’s

assessment as to the probability of success.

      2.    Difficulty of collection

      The bankruptcy court properly considered the difficulty of collecting

any judgment from the Kang Parties if the Trustee prevailed. Their

attorney represented that the settlement funds were in his account, so there

                                       11
would be no difficulty in collecting the settlement from the Kang Parties.

Conversely, the Trustee had argued that recovery in the state court

litigation would likely be extremely difficult, given that most of the assets

were located abroad. The bankruptcy court did not err.

      Mr. Aguina argues that the bankruptcy court could not have properly

evaluated the difficulty of collection because it needed Ms. Kang’s

disclosure as to her assets and interests. But the bankruptcy court did not

need to hold a mini-trial on the compromise; for the reasons discussed

above, we reject this argument.

      3.    Difficulty of continuing litigation

      Third, the bankruptcy court considered the litigation involved and

the attendant expense, inconvenience, and delay. It noted that the

contentious dissolution proceedings had been pending for many years and

that Mr. Aguina would likely continue the litigation indefinitely if he

could. Particularly in light of the parties’ mutual animosity and the

Trustee’s estimate that it would cost at least $50,000 to resolve the state

court litigation (with doubtful chances of success), the bankruptcy court

did not err in concluding that continued litigation would have been

expensive and difficult.

      Mr. Aguina fails to address any of the bankruptcy court’s well-

founded concerns. Rather, he simply concedes that the complexity,

difficult, and expense “might be true as to the assets the Trustee identified”

yet argues it might not be true as to unknown assets. The bankruptcy court

                                       12
did not abuse its discretion when it credited the Trustee’s views based on

his investigation and rejected Mr. Aguina’s speculation.

      4.     Best interests of the creditors

      Finally, the bankruptcy court considered the best interests of the

creditors. Although Mr. Aguina argued that he could pay more than what

the Kang Parties offered in settlement, the Trustee pointed out that he

offered nothing comparable to the Kang Parties’ waiver of their sizeable

claims. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the compromise

was in the best interests of the creditors.

      Mr. Aguina does not contest this factor. 5 Instead, he only complains

that the compromise was unfair to him. As discussed below, this is not a

relevant consideration, and the bankruptcy court was correct to ignore it.

      Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

evaluating the A & C Properties factors and holding that the compromise

was reasonable.

C.    We reject Mr. Aguina’s attempt to augment the A & C Properties
      factors.

      The bankruptcy court properly identified and applied the A & C

Properties factors. Mr. Aguina incorrectly attempts to impose additional

      5
         In his reply brief, Mr. Aguina argues that the creditors did not benefit from the
compromise because he had already paid all remaining creditors before the second
hearing on the Compromise Motion. This argument ignores the fact that the Kang
Parties were also creditors, with presumptively allowed claims based in large part upon
a state court judgment. Mr. Aguina offered nothing on account of those claims.

                                           13
requirements.

      1.    Sale of estate assets under § 363

      Mr. Aguina argues that the bankruptcy court erred by failing to

evaluate the compromise as a sale under the more rigorous standard of

§ 363. He is wrong.

      We have held that a settlement agreement transferring estate assets

must be evaluated both as a compromise under Rule 9019 and a sale under

§ 363. See In re Mickey Thompson Ent. Grp., Inc., 292 B.R. at 421 (“[T]he

disposition by way of ‘compromise’ of a claim that is an asset of the estate

is the equivalent of a sale of the intangible property represented by the

claim . . . .”). However, we made this ruling because the claims in Mickey

Thompson ran in only one direction:

      [T]his settlement is in essence a sale of potential claims to the
      Settling Parties. While the Agreement purports to act as a
      mutual release of claims, no party has identified any claims
      which the Settling Parties could assert against the estate or
      Trustee. The record does not contain any evidence that a release
      of claims by the Settling Parties has value.

Id.

      Conversely, in the present case, the Trustee and the Kang Parties

agreed to execute a mutual release of claims, and each party had claims

against the other. Cf. Fuchs v. Snyder Tr. Enters. (In re Worldpoint Interactive,

Inc.), 335 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We are not persuaded by

[appellant’s] contention that the settlement amounted to an asset sale

                                        14
under [Mickey Thompson], because both parties to the settlement here

released claims.”); Morris v. Davis (In re Morris), BAP No. SC-15-1222-FJuKi,

2016 WL 1254357, at *7 (9th Cir. BAP Mar. 29, 2016) (“[B]oth parties

released claims, rendering the settlement a mutual compromise, rather

than a sale. Accordingly, the court did not need to analyze the proposed

settlement under § 363.”).

      The Kang Parties held large claims against the estate. The claims had

substance; some of them had already been reduced to judgment. The Kang

Parties agreed to waive their claims in return for (among other things) the

Trustee’s waiver of sanctions claims and the estate’s claims to the alleged

community property. Because this settlement resolved mutual claims, it

was not a sale requiring scrutiny under § 363.

      2.    Fairness to Mr. Aguina

      Mr. Aguina further argues that, in addition to the A & C Properties

factors, the bankruptcy court was required to assess the fairness of the

compromise to not only creditors, but also the debtor. There is no authority

for this proposition because it would create an irreconcilable conflict of

interest for trustees.

      All litigation is risky. Plaintiffs settle cases to gain the certainty of

recovering something and avoid the risk of recovering nothing. But when

the plaintiff is a bankruptcy trustee, creditors and the debtor have different

tolerance for litigation risk. The rewards and risks of litigation fall

unequally on creditors and debtors, because creditors must get paid in full

                                        15
before the debtor receives any distribution. Therefore, a settlement that

produces money for creditors may be worthless to the debtor. This means

that debtors often want the trustee to pursue risky litigation, rather than

settle, in the hope that the recovery will be big enough to pay all creditor

claims in full and leave something for the debtor. If the gamble does not

pay off and the litigation is unsuccessful, the creditors have lost the benefit

of the settlement, while the debtor is no worse off (the debtor would have

gotten nothing under the settlement and still gets nothing when the

litigation fails).

       The bankruptcy court correctly understood that A & C Properties

avoids this conflict. In the context of a settlement, the trustee and the court

must consider the paramount interest of creditors and need not consider

the debtor’s interest. 6

       3.      Public policy

       Mr. Aguina also contends that the bankruptcy court failed to consider

public policy when evaluating the compromise. He acknowledges that the

Ninth Circuit authority does not require the bankruptcy court to examine

this factor.

       6
         DeBilio v. Golden (In re DeBilio), BAP No. CC-13-1441-TaPaKi, 2014 WL 4476585
(9th Cir. BAP Sept. 11, 2014), has nothing to do with fairness of a settlement to the
debtor. Rather, we reversed in that case because the bankruptcy court “approved the
settlement and sale motion at the hearing without reference to the A & C factors or any
findings to support its decision.” Id. at *5. The bankruptcy court in this case explicitly
addressed each of the A & C Properties factors.

                                            16
      Even if we were to consider public policy concerns, we would find no

error. The law favors the peaceful resolution of disputes through

compromise. This settlement promoted the amicable resolution of

protracted and acrimonious litigation between Mr. Aguina and Ms. Kang.

If anything, public policy favors the settlement over that wasteful and

destructive course of action. Mr. Aguina argues that the settlement

circumvented the public policy in favor of open disclosure of assets in

dissolution proceedings and repeatedly references the family court’s

comments that “millions” in assets went missing under Ms. Kang’s watch.

But that was only a preliminary comment, it has never been substantiated,

and the Trustee concluded after an investigation that he was satisfied with

the disposition of the assets.

D.    The settlement agreement had adequate consideration.

      Mr. Aguina argues that the settlement agreement lacked sufficient

consideration to constitute a binding contract, because Ms. Kang did not

offer anything of value that she was not already obligated to provide. We

are not persuaded by this argument.

      As the Trustee pointed out, the Kang Parties were waiving about $1.3

million in claims against the estate, most of which had already been

reduced to judgment. This is more than enough consideration to support a

contract.

      Mr. Aguina’s argument that the waiver was illusory is misguided. He

claims that his objections to the Kang Parties’ claims (filed a few days

                                      17
before the continued hearing) demonstrated that the claims were worthless

and that the bankruptcy court should have forced the Trustee to prove that

the claim objections lacked merit. The fact that Mr. Aguina did not file the

objections until just days before the hearing, and four years after he

commenced his bankruptcy case, raises serious questions about his own

confidence in his objections and his motives. In any event, the bankruptcy

court was only required to canvass the issues, and, at the time it decided

the Compromise Motion, the Kang Parties’ claims were deemed allowed

and presumptively valid. See Garner v. Shier (In re Garner), 246 B.R. 617, 622

(9th Cir. BAP 2000).

E.    The bankruptcy court did not need to defer to the family court.

      Mr. Aguina argues that the bankruptcy court erred in making a final

determination on the nature of the disputed property, because it had earlier

lifted the automatic stay to allow the family court to decide whether the

property was community or separate. He is wrong.

      All of Mr. Aguina’s assets, including any community property, were

property of the bankruptcy estate and subject to the bankruptcy court’s

exclusive jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1); § 541(a)(2); In re DeBilio,

2014 WL 4476585, at *3 (“The bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction

over property of the estate, including community property. This is so even

when there is a concurrent dissolution proceeding in state court.” (citations

omitted)). The grant of stay relief to allow the family court to determine the

nature of the disputed assets does not change this conclusion. Granting
                                        18
relief from the stay permitted the family court to make certain

determinations, but it did not remove any property from the estate or limit

the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.

      In any event, the bankruptcy court did not make a final

determination that the property at issue was Ms. Kang’s separate property,

nor did it need to. Rather, it canvassed the issues and determined that the

compromise was fair and reasonable.

F.    The bankruptcy court did not err in declining to hold an
      evidentiary hearing.

      Finally, Mr. Aguina argues that the bankruptcy court erred in

rejecting his request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.

      The bankruptcy court was within its discretion when it declined to

draw out the proceedings any further with discovery and an evidentiary

hearing. It was not required to make factual determinations on every

disputed issue, which would defeat the point of settlement. See In re Int’l

Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d at 946 (holding that, where there was an adequate

factual basis for the bankruptcy court’s decision, an evidentiary hearing

was unnecessary); In re Kent, Case No. 07-BK-03238-SSC, 2008 WL 5047821,

at *1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 25, 2008) (“Rule 9019 does not require an

evidentiary hearing on every settlement agreement presented to the

Court.”).

                              CONCLUSION

      The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in approving the

                                       19
compromise between the Trustee and the Kang Parties. We AFFIRM.

                                 20