Court Opinion

ID: 9854953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:25.408558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.469165
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur in the judgment reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, I do not agree with the majority’s holding that a director of a nonprofit corporation may resign only by giving written notice.
*249Two sets of “resignations” are central to this case: those of Moon Sik Kwon and Clinton Kim, who apparently moved away from Georgia, and that of Byung Kook Kang, who allegedly resigned at a meeting. Because all of these directors were appointed in the original articles of incorporation, they could be removed only by amending the articles. That leaves the question of whether, in fact, they resigned.
The statute regarding resignations by directors of nonprofit corporations, OCGA § 14-3-807 (a), states: “A director may resign at any time by delivering written notice to the board of directors, its presiding officer, or to the president or secretary, or in such other manner as the articles or bylaws may provide.” Its interpretation presents a case of first impression in this state. Although the majority opinion’s holding finds persuasive support in the federal case of Dillon v. Berg, 326 FSupp. 1214, 1222-1224 (D. Del.), aff’d, 453 F2d 876 (3rd Cir. 1971), it does not discuss that case. See also Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 FSupp. 26, 31-32 (SDNY 1975). But several other courts, interpreting nearly identical language, have found the “in writing” language to be permissive rather than mandatory.
These opinions point out that this particular statute, found in numerous corporation codes, was designed primarily to allow directors to resign without the board’s approval, not to dictate the form of their resignation. Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F2d 1463, 1467-1470 (10th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 561 P2d 1299, 1310-1311 (Idaho 1977). At common law, for example, a director could resign orally. Veg-Mix, Inc. v. USDA, 832 F2d 601, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987). At least one leading corporate authority seems to agree the “written notice” provision provides permission, not a mandate. See Fletcher Cyc. Corps., § 3:10. The corporation’s articles or bylaws may dispose of this “requirement,” demonstrating its permissive character. OCGA § 14-3-807 (a). Construing the “written notice” language to be permissive rather than mandatory would prevent nonprofit corporations from having to secure the written resignation of directors who have otherwise clearly shown their intent to resign and would harmonize our interpretation of this law with the weight of authority.
Even under this reading of the statute, a director must take some action showing he intends to resign, and whether he has resigned is a question of fact. Smith, 561 P2d at 1310-1311. If he has, he may not revoke that resignation without being re-elected to the board. In re Hawaii Times Ltd., 53 BR 560, 563 (Bkrtcy. Hawaii 1985). Therefore, a jury should determine whether, by moving away and abandoning the church, Clinton Kim and Moon Sik Kwon intended to resign. A jury should further determine whether Kang intended to resign at the heated meeting or was, in all likelihood, simply sulking, with his verbal resignation capping the matter. Thus, I concur in the majority’s holding.
*250Decided May 2, 1996.
Forrester & Brim, Weymon H. Forrester, Richard C. Bellows, for appellants.
David W Graybeal, Jr., for appellees.