Court Opinion

ID: 9724453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:57:05.731247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:00.532615
License: Public Domain

*482QuINN, J.
Appellant was tried and convicted in the circuit court of G-enesee county in January, 1960, on a two-count information charging him with violation of PA 1952, No 266, §~ 2 and 3 (OLS 1961, §~ 335.152 and 335.153 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §~ 18.1122 and 18.1123]).  He was sentenced to terms of 20-30 years and 8-10 years respectively. Contending his detention is illegal due to unconstitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted, he asks this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.  It has been stipulated that the alleged unconstitutionality is the sole issue before this Court.
The gist of appellant's argument to establish unconstitutionality is that because a licensed person who sells narcotics unlawfully is subject to a maximum penalty of 10 years (PA 1952, No 132 [OLS 1961, § 335.70 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1090)]), and an unlicensed person who does the same thing is subject to a minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum of life (section 335.152 supra), the latter is denied equal protection of the law as guaranteed by US Const, Am 14 and Const 1908, art 2, § 1.  Appellant is not licensed. The precise question for de~ cision is whether the classification "licensed" and "unlicensed" is reasonable. Appellee's contention that In re Wright (1960), 360 Mich 455, controls is untenable; it did not deal with this classification Problem.
The basic rule, stated in People v. Babcock (1955), 343 Mich 671, 679: 
*483“ ‘In approaching the consideration of a legislative enactment with the purpose of passing upon its constitutionality, courts usually do and always should strive to sustain its validity, if that may he done without doing actual violence to the language used in the act. Every intendment favorable to a conclusion sustaining the law must he indulged in’ ”,
and the specific rule with respect to standards of classification, as found in Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Company (1960), 360 Mich 510, 514:
“ ‘The standards of classification are:
“ ‘ “1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can he conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must he assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, hut is essentially arbitrary.” Citing cases.’ ”
must control the approach to the question presented. The statutes here involved were enacted to control manufacture, possession, and distribution of narcotic drugs. In order to facilitate and regulate the legitimate trade in these products, certain people are licensed. (CL 1948, § 335.54 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 18.1074].) By licensing this group, the legislature places severe controls over their contact with nar.*484cotíes. (CL 1948, §§ 335.55-335.57 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §§ 18.1075-18.1077].) Every transaction that they make is governed by law and the records that they keep are subject to close scrutiny by the appropriate authorities. (CL 1948, § 335.66 [Stat Ann 1957 Rev §18.1086].) The licensing act is aimed primarily at safeguarding and regulating legitimate trade of narcotics. The act under which defendant was convicted and sentenced is directed solely at suppressing illegal traffic in narcotics. The purpose of the two acts is entirely different, and it is a reasonable basis for the classifications “licensed” and “unlicensed”.
The statutes involved are not unconstitutional. Writ denied.
J. H. Gillis, P. J., concurred with Quinn, J.