Court Opinion

ID: 9533996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:09.182782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:15.481468
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. A. Affidavit of Disqualification was Effective. Section 21-5-9, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, Supp.1973) provides: The affidavit of disqualification shall be filed within ten (10) days after the cause is at issue or within ten (10) days after the time for filing a demand for jury trial has expired, whichever is the later. [Emphasis added]. In civil cases, a case is at issue at that stage of procedure when an answer is filed which requires no further pleadings by the plaintiff. Atol v. Schifani, 83 N.M. 316, 491 P.2d 533 (Ct.App.1971). Procedure-wise, a plea of not guilty is the same as an answer. This cause was at issue on November 30, 1972 when defendant pleaded not guilty. The affidavit of disqualification was filed December 4, 1972, four days after the cause was at issue. This affidavit was timely filed and the trial judge was disqualified. In criminal cases, the defendant is not required to file a demand for jury trial. “Criminal cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant, in writing, waives a jury trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.” Section 41-23-38 (Rule 38), N.M. S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1973 Supp.). It is doubtful whether the “demand for jury trial” part of the statute is applicable to criminal cases under the new Rule 38. Before amendment, § 21-5-9, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4) read as follows: Such affidavit shall be filed not less than ten (10) days before the beginning of the term of court, if said case is at issue. The cases cited in the majority opinion were decided under this statute. Under the former statute, if the case was at issue, the affidavit had to be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term of court. The amended statute requires the affidavit to be filed within ten days after the cause is at issue. The purpose of the amended statute is obvious. It speeds the time limit for filing the affidavit. It fixes a definite time and deletes the uncertainty of “the beginning of the term of court”. When the affidavit was filed, the trial court had no jurisdiction to act in the case, unless the disqualification was waived. Waiver may be accomplished by requesting a continuance of trial. State v. Latham, 83 N.M. 530, 494 P.2d 192 (Ct.App.1972). In the instant case, the defendant did not waive disqualification. The affidavit was filed December 4, 1972. The trial began the following day, December 5, 1972. The record does not disclose any notice of date of trial. It was five days after arraignment. On the morning before trial began, the defendant objected to the court proceeding in face of the affidavit of disqualification. The court said: “Let’s proceed.” The trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. Having proceeded with trial, reversible error occurred. B. The Failure to Arraign Defendant Within Time Limit of Rule Was Erroneous. Rule 37(a) set forth in the majority opinion is unique. It provides that the defendant shall be arraigned within 15 days after the date of the indictment. This is a mandatory rule. It has no relationship to the remaining subsections of Rule 37 which deal with “time for commencement of trial”. Rule 37(a) does set a time limit for arraignment. In this case, arraignment took place 56 days after the indictment was filed. These 56 days do not reduce the time for commencement of trial. The commentary on this rule does not explain its purpose or the penalty for its violation. It merely states that Rule 37(a), (d) and (e) are substantially the same as Federal Rule 45 (Alternative No. 2) as proposed to be amended by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. We do not have access to this information. The burden of setting time for arraignment is placed on the State, not the defendant. The burden of showing why arraignment was delayed rests on the State, not the defendant. The long delay between indictment and arraignment “. . .is unusual and calls for explanation as well as justification . . .’’by the State. United States v. Strunk, 467 F. 2d 969 (7th Cir. 1972), reversed and dismissed for failure to give defendant a speedy trial, 412 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 2260, 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). On the morning before trial, defendant moved to dismiss for failure to arraign within 15 days. The motion was denied. Was denial within the discretion of the trial court without a hearing? The violation of a mandatory rule by the State is not a “technical” violation. Mandatory rules of civil and criminal procedure should not be degraded, as they have been in some instances, by terming the violation “technical.” What rights are defendants denied when the State delays arraignment — the right to plea bargaining? The right to seek and obtain witnesses? The right to prepare for trial? Is prejudice presumed until the State shows justification? The least the defendant is entitled to is a hearing (1) for explanation and justification by the State; (2) to show lack of prejudice, if any, caused by the delay. The most defendant is entitled to is dismissal. I leave the answer to the Supreme Court.