Court Opinion

ID: 9861746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:26:06.406578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:55.132838
License: Public Domain

PROCTOR, J.
(dissenting). State v. Pontery, 19 N. J. 457 (1955), declares that it is improper for a trial court to ask the jury how it stands numerically. The majority agrees that this mandate should be followed. The trial court disregarded this mandate and learned through his interrogation of the jury that they stood deadlocked by a vote of 11 to 1. In my opinion it was reversible error to send the jury back for further deliberation in such circumstances without cautionary instructions as set forth in State v. Williams, 39 N. J. 471, 481 (1963) (quoted in the majority opinion). This case is controlled by the express language in Pontery, 19 N. J., at p. 477:
“This form of specific inquiry easily lends itself to suggested or apparent compulsion and should be avoided, especially where, as here, the trial judge returned the jury for further deliberation after having ascertained that they were divided eleven to one. Under the circum*103stances present, the absence of any cautionary instructions was closely akin to unlawful compulsion as set forth in In re Stern, 11 N. J. 584 (1953)
I agree with the following language of the Appellate Division:
' “When, after it has been announced that there is only one holdout, a judge sends a jury back without a cautionary instruction, it may appear to the dissenter that the judge wants him to agree and will be displeased if he does not. This, to borrow from Póntery, is ‘closely akin to unlawful compulsion.’ It is probably never easy for a juror to stand alone, even when he is convinced he is right and it must be very much more difficult when it appears to him that his dissent may be looked upon with disfavor by the judge. * * *
For four hours, one juror held out; forty minutes after the above colloquy, he capitulated. We cannot avoid the conclusion that it is highly probable that he was finally influenced to vote to convict not only by the arguments of his fellow jurors, but by his impression that the judge wanted him to agree within an hour. So feeling, we must set aside the verdict.”
For the above reasons I would reverse the convictions.
Mr. Justice Francis joins in this dissent.
For reversal — Chief Justice WeiNTRAub, and Justices JACOBS, Hall, Schettlcto and PIaNemaN — 5.
For affirmance — Justice FRANCIS and PROCTOR — ■%.