Court Opinion

ID: 9928928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:01:07.980398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:34.499277
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12504    Document: 78-1      Date Filed: 02/01/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12504
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        TORRIEO MONTE JOHNSON,
        a.k.a. Torrieo Corker,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cr-00009-HL-TQL-1
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12504

                             ____________________

        Before BRANCH, BRASHER, AND ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              While patrolling one evening, Oﬃcer John Meredith
        encountered a Honda with a suspended registration improperly
        stopped in the middle of the street. Meredith lost sight of the
        Honda but radioed other oﬃcers to help locate the vehicle, noting
        two violations of Georgia law. After the Honda was found in a
        driveway, Meredith approached the vehicle and the driver, Torrieo
        Monte Johnson, who was standing outside the car. Smelling
        marijuana, Meredith searched the car and found three guns.
              A federal grand jury indicted Johnson for two counts related
        to gun possession. Johnson moved to suppress all evidence
        obtained from the search of his vehicle. The district court denied
        his motion. Johnson then pleaded guilty.
               On appeal, Johnson challenges the district court’s denial of
        his pretrial motion to suppress the three guns. He argues that the
        stop that preceded the search was not supported by reasonable
        suspicion and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because
        we conclude that the stop was justiﬁed at its inception, the district
        court did not err. We thus aﬃrm the district court’s decision.
                                  I.    Background
            Oﬃcer Meredith, while patrolling one summer evening in
        Thomasville, Georgia, came across a Honda that was stopped
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        22-12504                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        facing against traﬃc in the middle of a two-way street. 1 Meredith
        saw a known narcotics traﬃcker approach the car, and he testiﬁed
        that he believed he saw a hand-to-hand drug deal.
               To avoid hitting the Honda, Meredith crossed into the
        opposite, oncoming lane of traﬃc. As he did so, he made eye
        contact with both occupants of the car—Johnson, who was the
        driver, and his passenger. Meredith drove ahead to turn his patrol
        car around. In the process, he managed to identify the Honda’s
        license plate information and run it through his in-car computer.
        The search showed that the Honda’s registration was suspended.
               After completing a three-point turn further down the road
        and returning to the scene, Meredith lost sight of the Honda.
        Noting two violations of Georgia law—(1) improperly stopping a
        car in the middle of the street, and (2) operating a vehicle with a
        suspended registration—Meredith radioed to other oﬃcers,
        requesting help locating the Honda.
               Soon, another oﬃcer relayed that the car was parked in a
        driveway. Together, that oﬃcer and Meredith approached the car
        and its occupants, who now stood outside the vehicle. Meredith
        “could immediately smell the odor of marijuana coming from the
        [Honda].” He told Johnson and the passenger about the suspected

        1 The facts recounted here are drawn from the suppression hearing and

        presented in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party
        in the district court. See United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
        2022) (explaining the standard for reviewing a district court’s ruling on a
        motion to suppress).
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                         22-12504

        violations of Georgia law and the smell of marijuana. Meredith
        then searched the vehicle and found three guns. 2
               A federal grand jury indicted Johnson for two counts:
        (1) possession of guns while a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g)(1); and (2) possession of a stolen ﬁrearm in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The government ultimately dismissed the
        second count. Johnson moved to suppress all evidence obtained
        from his detention and the search of his vehicle and requested an
        evidentiary hearing.
              At the suppression hearing, Johnson argued that the guns
        should be suppressed because Oﬃcer Meredith lacked probable
        cause to stop and seize him, violating his Fourth Amendment
        Rights. 3 The government responded that Meredith had probable
        cause because he “believe[d] two traﬃc violations had been
        committed” when he stopped Johnson—(1) improperly parking in
        the middle of the road, 4 and (2) operating a vehicle with a

        2 The officers did not find any marijuana in the car.

        3 During the suppression hearing, Johnson further argued that the officers

        exceeded the scope of an investigatory detention. Because Johnson does not
        make this argument on appeal—he solely argues that the officers lacked
        reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop—we need not address it. Sapuppo v.
        Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
        4 At the suppression hearing and in its briefing below, the government cited

        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203, which makes it unlawful to stop a car in front of a public
        or private driveway. O.C.G.A § 40-6-203(a)(2)(A) (stating it is illegal to “[s]tand
        or park a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except momentarily to pick up or
        discharge a passenger or passengers . . . [in] front of a public or private
        driveway” unless it is necessary to do so “to avoid conflict with other traffic,
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        22-12504                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

        suspended registration. 5 The government also asserted that
        Meredith had reasonable suspicion “to suspect Mr. Johnson . . . was
        conducting a hand-to-hand [drug] deal.” At the end of the hearing,
        the district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress.
               Johnson then pleaded guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) without
        a written agreement, intending to appeal the denial of his motion.
        The district court sentenced him to 260 months in prison, followed
        by ﬁve years of supervised release.
               Johnson appealed. He asks this Court “to reverse the district
        court’s decision and remand the case so he may withdraw his plea.”

        or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-
        control device[.]”). On appeal, the government argues that Johnson violated
        Section 40-6-200(a)—not Section 40-6-203—when he stopped in the middle of
        the road. Section 40-6-200(a) requires that “every vehicle stopped or parked
        upon a two-way roadway shall be stopped or parked with the right-hand
        wheels parallel to and within 12 inches of the right-hand curb or as close as
        practicable to the right edge of the right-hand shoulder.” Id. § 40-6-200(a).
        Because we ultimately determine that Meredith had reasonable suspicion to
        stop Johnson based on the second perceived violation of Georgia traffic laws—
        operating an unregistered vehicle—we do not address whether there was
        reasonable suspicion for violation of Section 40-6-203 or 40-6-200(a).
        5 Georgia law makes it unlawful to “knowingly drive[]” a car with a suspended

        registration. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15(a) (“Any person who knowingly drives a
        motor vehicle on any public road or highway. . . at a time when the vehicle
        registration of such vehicle is suspended[]. . . shall be guilty of a
        misdemeanor.”).
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                22-12504

                             II.     Standard of Review
               When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e
        apply a mixed standard of review . . . , reviewing [the district
        court’s] factual findings for clear error and reviewing de novo its
        application of the law to those facts.” Cohen, 38 F.4th at 1368
        (emphasis added). “Factual findings are construed in the light most
        favorable to the prevailing party.” Id.
                                   III.   Discussion
               Johnson argues that the district court improperly denied his
        motion to suppress because Meredith “lacked the reasonable
        suspicion . . . necessary to justify a stop.” We agree with the
        government that Meredith had reasonable suspicion to justify the
        stop because he believed Johnson violated Georgia traﬃc laws.
        Because discovery of the guns was supported by a reasonable
        suspicion, the district court properly denied Johnson’s motion to
        suppress.
                The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
        people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects,
        against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
        and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause[.]” U.S.
        Const. amend. IV. If an oﬃcer obtains evidence in violation of the
        Fourth Amendment, “including the direct products of police
        misconduct and evidence derived from the illegal conduct, or ‘fruit
        of the poisonous tree,’” that evidence “cannot be used in a criminal
        trial against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” United
        States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003).
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        22-12504                   Opinion of the Court                                7

               We note that Johnson and the government characterize
        Meredith’s seizure of Johnson diﬀerently. Johnson calls his
        detention a “traﬃc stop,” while the government labels it a “Terry
        stop.”6 Regardless of the encounter’s characterization, our
        analytical framework is the same. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575
        U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (explaining that “a routine traffic stop is ‘more
        analogous to a so-called “Terry stop” . . . than to a formal arrest.’”).
        A police oﬃcer may lawfully detain an individual in a traﬃc stop or
        Terry stop if they have “reasonable suspicion” to believe criminal
        activity occurred or will occur. See United States v. Campbell, 26
        F.4th 860, 880 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (stating an oﬃcer must
        have “reasonable suspicion” to conduct a traﬃc stop); Gibbs, 917
        F.3d at 1294 (explaining the “reasonable suspicion” standard for a
        Terry stop).
              To establish reasonable suspicion, there must be “a
        suﬃciently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to
        make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.”
        United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (quotations omitted). Courts “must look at the totality of the
        circumstances of each case” to determine whether the oﬃcer had
        a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal

        6 A traffic stop generally occurs “when a law enforcement officer stops a

        vehicle travelling on the roadways, pulls the car over, and may direct the
        driver and any passenger to exit the car.” United States v. Gibbs, 917 F.3d 1289,
        1296 (11th Cir. 2019). A Terry stop is “a brief, investigatory stop” that occurs
        “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
        is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12504

        wrongdoing.” Id. (quotations omitted). “The oﬃcer must be able
        to point to speciﬁc and articulable facts which, taken together with
        rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” a stop. Id.
        (quotations omitted). “Even minor traffic violations qualify as
        criminal activity” to provide an officer with reasonable suspicion to
        make a stop. Campbell, 26 F.4th at 880.
               So the question becomes: did Johnson’s actions “create[]
        reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation . . . occurred[]”? Id. If
        the answer is yes, the stop “was justified at its inception[.]” Gibbs,
        917 F.3d at 1294.
               We begin by considering whether Johnson’s actions in
        driving an unregistered vehicle qualiﬁed as criminal activity for
        which Meredith could make a traﬃc stop with reasonable
        suspicion. O.C.G.A § 40-6-15(a) provides that it is unlawful for a
        person to drive a vehicle when its registration is suspended.
        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15(a). Meredith testiﬁed that a search of the
        Honda’s license plate showed that the car’s registration was
        suspended. This fact alone provided Meredith with reasonable
        suspicion to believe Johnson violated Georgia law by driving the
        Honda. Campbell, 26 F.4th at 880.
               Johnson disagrees, arguing that Meredith needed to show
        that Johnson knew the Honda’s registration was suspended. [Id. at
        12, 16–17.] But Johnson’s argument is unavailing. True, the
        Georgia statute says that a crime is committed when a person
        “knowingly drives a motor vehicle” with a suspended registration.
        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15(a) (emphasis added). But as the government
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        22-12504                 Opinion of the Court                            9

        argues, reasonable suspicion does not require that an oﬃcer have
        proof of every element of a suspected crime to conduct an
        investigative detention. We have explained that “[p]robable cause
        does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element
        of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” Holmes
        v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Adams v.
        Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)). It follows that reasonable
        suspicion, as “a less demanding standard[,]” does not either.
        Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion
        is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]”). This is also
        true of mens rea elements of perceived crimes. Jordan v. Mosley, 487
        F.3d 1350, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n arresting officer does not
        need evidence of the intent for probable cause to arrest to exist.”);
        United States v. Everett, 719 F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (“While
        intent is an element of the crime which must be proved at trial, it
        is not necessary in order to establish probable cause to arrest.”).
        Thus, to have reasonable suspicion allowing him to stop Johnson,
        Meredith was not required to have specific proof of every element
        of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15(a), including whether Johnson “knew” of the
        suspended registration. 7 Meredith’s knowledge of the suspended
        registration was enough.

        7  Johnson also argues that Meredith did not know who drove the car,
        suggesting he did not establish who violated the law. But Meredith testiﬁed
        that he made eye contact with both occupants of the Honda as he drove past
        it and identiﬁed Johnson as the driver.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12504

               Johnson’s argument fails for another reason. Knowingly
        driving a car with a suspended registration is a general intent crime.
        See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (“‘[K]nowledge’
        corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.”). And we
        have said that “in Georgia, a person can be convicted for a general
        intent offense without direct evidence of intent because ‘general
        intent may be inferred from the conduct of the accused.’” Mosley,
        487 F.3d at 1356 n.6 (quotations omitted). So the government “can
        indirectly prove the requisite ‘intent’ by proving that the accused
        did the pertinent act.” Id. In sum, the fact that Meredith saw the
        Honda on the road with a suspended registration was enough to
        provide Meredith with reasonable suspicion to institute a stop.
               On top of arguing that Johnson violated Georgia law by
        driving an unregistered vehicle, the government also pointed to
        speciﬁc articulable facts that supported Meredith’s belief that other
        criminal activity had occurred. See Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311.
        Meredith saw a known narcotics traﬃcker approach Johnson’s car
        and testiﬁed that he believed he saw a hand-to-hand drug deal.
        These facts also provided Meredith with reasonable suspicion to
        stop the Honda because there was “a suﬃciently high probability
        that criminal conduct [was] occurring to make the intrusion on the
        individual’s privacy interest reasonable.” See id.; Delaware v. Prouse,
        440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stating it is reasonable to detain a driver
        when there is “articulable and reasonable suspicion . . . that [a
        vehicle’s] occupant is . . . subject to seizure for violation of law”).
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        22-12504               Opinion of the Court                       11

               Because we conclude that Meredith had reasonable
        suspicion that Johnson violated Georgia law by driving a vehicle
        with a suspended registration and engaging in a hand-to-hand drug
        deal, we need not address whether Meredith also had reasonable
        suspicion that Johnson violated Georgia law by stopping the Honda
        in the middle of the road.
                                  IV.    Conclusion
               Meredith’s stop of Johnson’s vehicle was justiﬁed at its
        inception because it was based on reasonable suspicion. Thus, the
        stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment and did not taint the
        subsequent search of Johnson’s vehicle that revealed the ﬁrearms.
        See Gibbs, 917 F.3d at 1294; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
        487–48 (1963). We therefore conclude that the district court did not
        err in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we
        aﬃrm.
              AFFIRMED.