Court Opinion

ID: 9675787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:05:47.553437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.155745
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
I reluctantly agree that the trial court properly set aside the original judgment for irregularity and entered a proper judgment on the verdict.
My reluctance arises because the trial court literally rubber-stamped a judgment entry prepared on the court’s usual form, which was signed by counsel for all parties before it was presented to the court. I stand by my statement in Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245, 254 (Mo. banc 1991) (Blackmar, J. concurring), that “it is the responsibility of counsel for the party in whose favor a judgment runs to make sure that there is a proper judgment entry which will accomplish the client’s purpose.” We hold not infrequently that counsel cannot complain about an error to which they consented.
But the judgment irregularity is patent and the application to correct was timely, and so I am not disposed to disturb the action of the trial court.
I also agree that there was no basis for judgment against the defendant J.R. Green Properties, Inc., and that that judgment is properly reversed outright.
II.
After careful reflection, and contrary to my initial view, I believe that the judgment for $1,800,000 against Union Electric should be affirmed.
Comparative fault in Missouri is a judicial creation. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1983). The adoption of comparative fault invites problems when there is a partial reversal. There is little guiding precedent since Gustafson.
I believe that we should attempt to evolve rules which will avoid the necessity for a partial retrial such as is directed by the principal opinion. Any solution to the problems presented by a partial reversal is somewhat arbitrary. The assessment of percentages of fault, indeed, is an arbitrary process, even if it may be utilitarian.
The jury is expressly instructed that it must determine the percentage of fault to be attributed to the plaintiff independent of its decision as to the fault of any defendant. MAI-Srd 37.02 reads as follows:
In your verdict you must assess a percentage of fault to plaintiff [whether or not defendant was partly at fault] if you believe: ...
Instruction Number 12 in this case stated in relevant part:
In your verdict you must assess a percentage of fault to decedent Kevin Kib-*493bons, whether or not either defendant was partly at fault, if you believe: ...
It is appropriate to assume that the jury followed the instructions and determined the total percentage of the plaintiffs contribution, without regard to the percentages assessed against the particular defendants. There is no reason to think that the jury which heard the case would have returned a different percentage as to these plaintiffs, had the case not been submitted against two defendants.
Defendant Union Electric is liable for the entire amount of the judgment, under principles of joint and several liability. The assessment of percentages as between it and defendant J.R. Green Properties, Inc., did not concern the plaintiff.
The solution I suggest represents, in my view, the most probable expectation of the jury. It has the virtue of disposing of the entire case, and its consistent application will relieve burdens on the judicial system.
I would affirm the judgment as to Union Electric and would reverse the judgment as to J.R. Green Properties, Inc.
RENDLEN, J., joins.