Court Opinion

ID: 9779723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:40:10.587203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:23:48.982843
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions regarding the date of Courtney’s emancipation and Father’s obligation to contribute to Courtney’s post-secondary educational expenses.

Date of Emancipation

First, as to the date of Courtney’s emancipation, I observe that the relevant purpose of Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6(a)(3) is to ensure that children are cared for until they no longer require support. Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ind.2002). I can only assume that the General Assembly intended there to be an implicit requirement that parents and ehild(ren) act in good faith. Here, the trial court heard evidence that Courtney withdrew from all classes after only two weeks and later told Father that college was not for her and that she did not foresee returning to school. Having heard this evidence, the trial court must have concluded that Courtney’s two weeks of classes did not constitute attending school in good faith during the preceding four months. I *971believe that this evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion on this issue.
As to whether Courtney was still enrolled in Ivy Tech after withdrawing from all classes, I note that although the relevant statute does not define “enroll,” this court has set forth its own definition of the term in this context: enrolled “means more than being involved in the application process; rather, it means that one has been accepted to the institution and is officially registered at the institution as a student.” Butrum, 803 N.E.2d at 1145. While I do not quarrel with this definition of the term, I believe that under certain circumstances — such as those herein — it does not go far enough. Accepting such a broad definition of the term means that a student could conceivably be “enrolled” in a postsecondary educational institution in perpetuity without ever actually taking any classes.
As noted above, I believe that the General Assembly intends there to be a requirement that all parties act in good faith. Thus, I would add to the Butrum definition of enrolled as follows: enrolled, in the context of subsection (a)(8), means that one has been accepted to the institution, is officially registered at the institution as a student, and in good faith is attending or intends to attend the institution in the foreseeable future.
Here, the trial court heard testimony that Courtney dropped all of her classes after attending school for only two weeks. She then told her Father that college was not for her and that she did not foresee returning to school. Although Courtney re-enrolled in classes in January 2010 and was still taking those classes at the time of the hearing in February 2010, the trial court explicitly noted its skepticism that she would complete those classes. It is evident that the trial court assessed her credibility and found it wanting, and I believe that we should not second-guess that assessment on appeal. Consequently, I would find that the trial court did not err by finding that Courtney was not enrolled in Ivy Tech on September 23, 2009.
Turning to whether Courtney is capable of supporting herself, the trial court heard evidence that Courtney maintained employment on weeknights and weekends during her last two years of high school. And during the summer following her graduation from high school, Courtney was employed by Big League Barbers and L.A. Fitness. Mother focuses on Courtney’s alleged anxiety disorder, but failed to offer any expert evidence supporting that claim. Consequently, the trial court was free to discount the testimony to that effect. I believe that the result reached by the majority necessarily requires reweighing the evidence, and respectfully dissent from its conclusion on this issue. I would find that the evidence regarding Courtney’s employment history supports the trial court’s conclusion that she was capable of supporting herself through employment on September 23, 2009.
Inasmuch as I believe that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that on September 23, 2009, Courtney was at least eighteen years old, had not attended post-secondary classes in the previous four months and was not enrolled in a postsec-ondary institution, and was capable of supporting herself, I would find that the trial court did not err by finding her emancipated as of that date.

Post^Secondary Educational Expenses

Second, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusions regarding Father’s responsibility to contribute towards Courtney’s post-secondary educational expenses. Indiana Code section 31-16-6-2 provides that it is within the trial court’s discretion to award educational support after taking *972into account the following factors set forth in the statute:
(A) the child’s aptitude and ability;
(B) the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses through:
(i) work;
(ii) obtaining loans;
(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid reasonably available to the child and each parent; and
(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses.
I.C. § 31 — 16—6—2(a)(1).
Here, the trial court heard evidence that Courtney was able to work through her junior and senior years in high school while attending school full-time. She had received a 100% tuition scholarship. She had continued to work after high school, and held two jobs during the summer following her graduation.
Additionally, Father’s income decreased significantly in 2009. In 2008, his gross income was $111,000. In 2009, Father, who is a trucker facing a significant decrease in available work and a threefold increase in the cost of fuel, had a gross income of $50,000 as of September 2009. Father also testified that Courtney told him, after withdrawing from all classes after two weeks, that college was not for her and she did not foresee returning to college.
All of this evidence is relevant to the above statutory factors. The trial court weighed the evidence, assessed the situation, and concluded that Father’s obligation to contribute to Courtney’s educational expenses was terminated. I believe that by reversing on this issue, the majority is necessarily reweighing the evidence. Consequently, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s ruling on this issue. As to the remaining issues — healthcare expenses and attorney fees — -I fully concur with the majority.