Court Opinion

ID: 9713051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:05:51.484517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.035838
License: Public Domain

Hallows, J.
(on motion for rehearing). A faulty and incomplete record was sent to this court on appeal. Among the missing records were a copy of the Racine county zoning ordinance and a stipulation that the proposed use of the premises by the respondent for a meat-distributing and processing plant was in the same classification under the zoning ordinance as the prior nonconforming use.
The duty to see that the clerk of the trial court transmits a proper record to this court is upon the attorney for the appellant. Estate of Eannelli (1956), 274 Wis. 193, 80 N. W. (2d) 240. A copy of the Racine county zoning ordinance has now been furnished and under sec. 328.02, Stats., this court will take judicial notice of it.
The Racine county ordinance provides in part, sec. IV, general provisions:
“A. . . . except as otherwise provided: . . .
“5. Nonconforming Uses:
“(a) The existing lawful use of a building or premises at the time of the enactment of this ordinance or any amendment thereto may be continued although such use does not *331bconform with the provisions of this ordinance for the district in which it is located, but such nonconforming use shall not be extended.
“The alterations of or additions to any existing building or structure for the purpose of carrying on any prohibited trade or industry within the district where such buildings or structures are located, is prohibited.
“(b) If no structural alterations are made, a nonconforming use of a building may be changed to another nonconforming use of the same or a more-restricted classification. Whenever a nonconforming use has been changed to a more-restricted nonconforming use or a conforming use, such use shall not thereafter be changed to a less restricted use.
“(c) If a nonconforming use of a building or premises is discontinued for a period of twelve months, any future use of the building or premises shall conform to the regulations for the district in which it is located.”
It is now contended by the respondent that the court did not and was not in a position to decide the real issue on appeal because of these missing documents. The position of the respondent is that to constitute an abandonment of a nonconforming use the owners must have voluntarily relinquished the original nonconforming use of cabinetmaking, and any other nonconforming use of the same classification, and any acts on the part of the owners showing an intention to resume any nonconforming use in the same classification, would preserve their right. We do not agree with this contention.
The nonconforming use existing at the time of the adoption of the county zoning ordinance is not in issue. That particular nonconforming use was abandoned in 1951 when the use of the property was changed to the substituted nonconforming use of paint spraying and enameling, which was not in existence on the premises at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance. Where the county permits another or several other nonconforming uses to be substituted for the nonconforming use in existence at the time of the adop*331ction of the ordinance, the county under its implied power may limit the right to such substituted nonconforming uses. The right to such substituted nonconforming uses is not protected by sec. 59.97 (7), Stats., but is created by and depends upon the ordinance.
This raises the question of the meaning of the words “discontinued for a period of twelve months” as used in this ordinance and as applied to a substituted nonconforming use. We construe these words to mean termination or cessation of the nonconforming use for the twelve months’ period. The doctrine of voluntary abandonment as applied in State ex rel. Schaetz v. Manders (1931), 206 Wis. 121, 238 N. W. 835, and in State ex rel. Morehouse v. Hunt (1940), 235 Wis. 358, 370, 291 N. W. 745, is not to be extended and applied to substituted nonconforming uses in a county zoning ordinance limiting discontinuance of such nonconforming uses to a definite time limit. The protection of sec. 59.97 (7), Stats., is extended only to the particular lawful use for which the building or premises is actually used at the time the ordinance takes effect. It does not extend to protecting other nonconforming uses substituted by virtue of a privilege or right given by county ordinance.
It is not necessary to decide whether twelve months is a reasonable period of time as the parties have stipulated that it is. The question of the validity of this ordinance as applied to the original nonconforming use is not before us on the facts of this appeal.
By the Court. — Motion for rehearing denied with $25 costs.