Court Opinion

ID: 9690251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:59:41.523829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:54.675096
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). By the terms of the written lease agreement the defendant agreed upon completion of *484its operations under the agreement to “clean up and restore to farming condition” any of plaintiff’s land which had been used by defendant in its operations.
In addition to the testimony of plaintiff on this point summarized in the majority opinion the plaintiff also testified that he had been able to operate farm machinery on the three acres in question including a six-foot mower sickle operated by a tractor. It is obvious that in its present condition, as left by the defendant, such equipment cannot be operated on the land.
A reasonable interpretation of the phrase “restore to farming condition” would seem to be that defendant was required to place plaintiff’s land back in substantially the same condition it was in before defendant occupied it in so far as its suitability for farming purposes is concerned. The majority opinion seems to give no significance to the employment of the word “restore” in the covenant of the defendant which is at issue in the case.
The testimony of the witness, Beil, which is quoted in the majority opinion, would not support a finding by a jury that the defendant had placed plaintiff’s three acres of land back in substantially the same condition, so far as their suitability for farming purposes is concerned, as they were in prior to defendant’s occupancy and operations. In substance all that Beil testified to on this issue was that he considered it possible to have harrowed and seeded this land in its present condition and that, if this had been done, a fair crop of hay would have resulted. His testimony was highly speculative at best. He did not testify that in his opinion the land in its present condition would produce the same good crop of alfalfa as it had produced prior to defendant’s occupancy nor that the same kind of farm machinery could be safely used in farming it that plaintiff had previously been able to use on this land.
*485I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that the admission into evidence over the objection of plaintiff’s counsel of testimony, that the original value of plaintiff’s land before defendant’s occupancy was $20 to $30 per acre, was not prejudicial. The admission of such testimony was entirely irrelevant on the issue of plaintiff’s damages, the only' conceivable basis for admitting it. Apparently it was defendant’s theory that in no event would it be held liable for damages in excess of the original value of plaintiff’s land, but the leasing agreement placed no such limit on defendant’s liability if it failed to restore plaintiff’s land to farming condition. The rule of damages applicable to ordinary personal property does not apply because here we have a contract relating to real estate.
The admission of such improper testimony could scarcely fail to be anything but prejudicial. Under the leasing agreement the defendant had paid to the plaintiff two hundred dollars rental for one season’s occupancy. The jury, upon hearing testimony that the three acres were only originally worth from sixty dollars to ninety dollars, might very readily have concluded therefrom that plaintiff sustained no damage, even though defendant had entirely failed to perform its covenant to restore the land to farming condition, and as a result thereof have returned the general verdict they did in favor of defendant.
I would reverse the judgment and remand with directions that a new trial be had.
I am ' authorized to state that Mr. Justice Broadfoot joins in this dissent.