Court Opinion

ID: 9674509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:02.844744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:32.862529
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. I have no doubt that the majority court is sincere in its belief that justice would be served by its abandoning settled Arkansas case law in favor of a 1972 California decision on the issue of enforcement of contingent fee contracts. See Berry v. Nichols, 227 Ark. 297, 298 S.W.2d 40 (1957); Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545 (1878); and Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal.3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972). The court’s decision today, however, will assuredly and inevitably increase the instances of collusion and solicitation in cases and, for all practical purposes, destroy the use of contingency contracts. Under the majority holding, A can enter into a contingency contract with lawyer B, who diligently and professionally develops A’s case for trial. Before trial, A may, without cause, dismiss lawyer B because lawyer C has offered to perform and complete the case for less money. Thus, instead of A being bound by the contingency fee contract signed by A and B, A, through his unilateral actions, effectively changed the parties’ agreement to one based upon quantum meruit. While the majority declares that its decision does not affect the validity and enforceability of contingency contracts, such contracts now will only be as good as a client wishes them to be. If presented with a better deal by a second or third attorney, why, if not bound by his or her contingent contract, would the client not opt for an arrangement to pay less for legal services? So what, one might ask, is wrong with that? The answer, I submit, lies in the unique purpose which is served by contingency contracts, viz., such contracts provide people of modest means with an affordable way to prosecute their claims for injuries they have sustained; without contingency contracts, those parties will find it difficult to employ competent counsel to protect their legal rights. After this court changes the rules which affect agreements between attorneys and clients, I have no doubt that attorneys will design an agreement which will best protect their own interests when being employed to prosecute a claim. In the end, I have little doubt, as well, that persons (clients) of modest means will, in some measure, ultimately be required to pay for services rendered for the preparation and development of their cases prior to obtaining any recovery. Thus, while the majority believes public policy will be served by its decision, I believe the decision will impact adversely on the interests of the public, generally, and on persons of poor and modest means, specifically. The irony presented by the instant case is that it presents a worst-case scenario where the appellee-client appeared to be obligated under two contingent fee contracts, each of which provided for a fee in the amount of one-third of the recovery. This resulted in the prospect that appellee was obligated to pay $66,000 in attorneys’ fees out of a $ 100,000 recovery. I first would point out that the record clearly shows the appellee knowingly and voluntarily breached his contract with the appellant-law firm after being apprised of the enforceability of the contract by both appellant as well as the attorney who took over appellants’ claim. In addition, appellee breached his agreement with appellants without legal cause or justification. Nonetheless, the court rewards such action by rewriting the parties’ contract to benefit the appellee. I believe the majority court’s sympathies are misplaced in favoring a party who breached an agreement under these circumstances. On the other hand, if a law firm fails to meet its contracted obligations, a party-client has his or her remedy, as in any contract case, to obtain a judicial declaration on whether the party can set aside the agreement and engage other counsel to pursue the claim. Apparently, the majority feels this is much too onerous a task to place on one who must hire and contract with an attorney. In my opinion, the long-term effect of today’s decision will not serve the best interests of the working and injured claimant in this state, much less the state’s broad public policy. Accordingly, I would reject the view or rule expressed in the California decision that the majority now adopts, and, instead, adhere to the rule our courts have followed since the court’s holdings in Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, and Berry v. Nichols, 227 Ark. 297, 298 S.W.2d 40. Therefore, I would reverse this cause. Hays, J., joins in this dissent.