Court Opinion

ID: 9586025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:24.12801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:18.783020
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, E disto did not exceed its power in enacting Ordinance § 58-138 because the Ordinance did not set aside any statewide criminal laws.
South Carolina Constitution Article VIII, § 14, provides: “In enacting provisions required or authorized by this article, general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside: ... (5) criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression thereof....”
When construing the Constitution, the Court applies rules similar to those relating to the construction of statutes. Davis v. County of Greenville, 313 S.C. 459, 463, 443 S.E.2d 383, 385 (1994). In construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation. First Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin, 308 S.C. 226, 229, 417 S.E.2d 592, 593 (1992).
As I explained in Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 161, 480 S.E.2d 718, 721 (1997) (Burnett, J., dissenting):
Article VIII, 14 does not require statewide uniformity of general law provisions regarding “criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression thereof.” Instead, the preamble to Article VIII, § 14, provides “general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside.” (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this provision requires local enactments “set aside” some existing provision of the general law before a constitutional violation occurs.
In my opinion, Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution does not prohibit local governments from criminalizing conduct which is not unlawful under state law. Until *55the Gambling Cruise Prohibition Act was enacted, there was no legislative action that made a gambling day cruise a legal activity. Further in Stardancer Casino, Inc. v. Stewart, 347 S.C. 377, 387-91, 556 S.E.2d 357, 362-64 (2001) (Burnett, J., dissenting), I would have held “boats located within South Carolina and its territorial waters are subject to the same laws concerning gambling as any other premises in this state.” I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion that gambling day cruises are lawful. Ordinance § 58-138 could not and did not set aside any statewide criminal laws.
The majority also relies on Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251, 442 S.E.2d 608 (1994) for the proposition that conduct which is not unlawful under state laws cannot be made unlawful by local enactment. In my opinion the Connor Court erred because the Court effectively held all conduct is lawful unless made unlawful by enactment of the General Assembly. Article VIII, § 14 does not yield to such an interpretation. I would overrule Connor to the extent it holds that local governments may not criminalize conduct which is not unlawful under statewide criminal law.
Edisto’s Ordinance § 58-138 does not set aside any criminal laws enacted by the state because the ordinance is not inconsistent with any state law. Therefore, I would hold Edisto did not exceed its power in enacting Ordinance § 58-138. I conclude the circuit court improperly granted summary judgment to Palmetto Princess.