Court Opinion

ID: 9629408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:42:16.190124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:18.861611
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the evidence that defendant Garner was the carjacker was not “weak,” but overwhelming. Specifically, the proofs included: (1) co-defendant Bryce Smith’s testimony that he and Garner committed the carjacking; (2) Shalonda Melton’s eyewitness identification of defendant as the carjacker; (3) Kareem Dotson’s and Melton’s testimony that the carjacker identi*410fied himself as “Pel Pel”; (4) the testimony of several witnesses that defendant is known commonly in the community as “Pel Pel”; and (5) the cell phone record that the carj acker called a roommate of Garner’s girlfriend.
Also, the majority erroneously concludes that “[bjecause Dotson testified after Melton, defense counsel was unable to cross-examine Melton about the call.... ” Although Dotson testified after Melton, defense counsel was free to recall Melton to testify during defendant’s case. See e.g. United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 572 (8th Cir.2003), and United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33, 46-47 (1st Cir.2000). Defense counsel could have recalled Melton and made a motion to limit the scope of her testimony on recall, but chose to do neither. On appeal, Garner does not claim ineffective assistance of counsel.
My colleagues hold that a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), violation occurred because the police possessed the cell phone records for five days before they were given to defense counsel, and had they been timely disclosed, a “reasonable probability” existed that the jury would have rendered a different verdict.1 I disagree with both conclusions. First, I view the disclosure within five days to be timely. On this issue, I agree with the ruling of the district judge:
Dealing first with the issue of timeliness, the prosecution could have disclosed the phone records to defense counsel at a slightly earlier date. However, the delay was not egregious, as the government itself did not obtain the phone records until five days before the second trial. Moreover, the government maintains that it was unaware of any potential evidentiary value, let alone any exculpatory value, that the records may have held until the day before the trial was to commence. When it did determine that the records provided relevant evidence, the government provided copies of the phone log to the defense.
It is noteworthy that the majority cites no authority that a five-day delay in providing records under similar circumstances amounts to a Brady violation. Cf. United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir.1994) (“Brady generally does not apply to delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to a complete failure to disclose.”). “Delay only violates Brady when the delay itself causes prejudice.” Bencs, 28 F.3d at 561 (quoting United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir.1992), vacated and remanded on other grounds 507 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L.Ed.2d 754 (1993)).
On the issue of prejudice, I also agree with the trial judge:
Evidence is considered material only if there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,” the outcome would have been different. Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir.2003). The defendant is not necessarily required to show that the introduction of the evidence in question would have led to a different verdict. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is whether in the absence of the evidence the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). In the instant *411ease, the Court must answer this question in the affirmative.
Defense counsel, who was also trial counsel, has now possessed the cell phone records for over twenty-two months. However, no newly discovered evidence was cited to the trial court or to us on appeal that would affect the outcome of a new trial. Absent some showing of prejudice or evidence that the verdict was not worthy of confidence, no error requiring reversal occurred in the disclosure of the cell phone records. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555.
Next, we review the denial of a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir.2000). As the Supreme Court stated in Morris v. Sloppy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983):
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances....
Although I might have granted defendant’s motion for a continuance, I cannot conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to do so. At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that his investigator was available to assist him in evaluating the cell phone records. Thus, even if defense counsel was preoccupied in the trial of this case, his investigator was not and had over twenty-four hours to investigate the records. Before the conclusion of the trial, had defendant thought that the time to investigate the records was inadequate, a second motion for a continuance could have been filed. It was not.
Regarding the efforts of the defense investigator to track the persons to whom calls were made or received, the trial judge made the following findings:
[Djefense counsel had adequate time to investigate each of the numbers that appeared on the record for the relevant time period, and could have discovered that one of those numbers belonged to Melton through numerous sources. For example, defense counsel could have interviewed witnesses about their possible knowledge of the numbers or consulted a web-based telephone directory. While Garner claims that Defense Investigator Gambetta conducted an investigation into the numbers for which the prosecution provided identification information, he gives no indication of the investigator’s attempts to identify the holders of the remaining numbers. More importantly, Defendant Garner fails to show that the investigator was unable, or lacked the capability, to identify Melton’s number.
Moreover, defense counsel was aware from Melton’s testimony in the first trial that, on the night of the carjacking, she spoke to co-defendant Smith, who asked her not to press charges. A reasonable inference known to defense counsel, but never asked, is that the record of the call between Melton and Dotson’s cell phone was this phone conversation between Melton and co-defendant Smith. If an uncertainty exists on this factual issue, it arises from defense counsel’s strategic decision not to ask the question.
For these reasons, defendant has failed to sustain his burden of establishing that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for a continuance. Moreover, absent a showing of prejudice, error, if any, in refusing to grant the mo*412tion is harmless error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1057 (9th Cir.2006) (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance where petitioner did “not demonstrate[ ] that he suffered prejudice as a result of the failure to grant the continuance”); HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 544, 550 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that appellate court “will not substitute [its] judgment concerning the necessity of a continuance for that of the district court, unless the complaining party demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the denial”) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 792 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that “even if’ the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for a continuance, “the error was harmless”); see also United States v. Tinson, 23 F.3d 1010 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that “any error in [district court’s] granting the continuance was harmless”).
I would affirm and respectfully dissent. In my view, the reversal of defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial is an unwarranted futile exercise and a waste of valuable judicial resources.

. It is unclear whether the majority reviews the Brady issue de novo or for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.2007), and the cases cited therein, on the conflicting standards of review. Under either standard, I would hold that the trial court did not commit error requiring reversal.