Court Opinion

ID: 9427982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:29.757253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.126850
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
The Court concludes that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner due process of law by refusing to vacate the sentence imposed at his trial for unlawful dis*348tribution of heroin. That conclusion, in turn, depends on the Court’s assertion that petitioner was impermissibly denied his state-created right to be sentenced by a jury. Because I believe that the Court either mischaracterizes the right conferred by state law or erroneously assumes a deprivation of that right, I dissent.
The Court is undoubtedly correct that Oklahoma law does confer a right to have a sentence imposed by a jury. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 926 (1971). But it is equally true that petitioner was sentenced by a jury. The question is whether that sentence was validly imposed, either as a matter of state or federal law. For if the petitioner was constitutionally sentenced by his jury in the first instance, he has been afforded the process the State guaranteed him. The Oklahoma court found that petitioner was not properly sentenced. If this conclusion rested on an interpretation of state law, or a correct interpretation of federal law, then I would have less difficulty agreeing with the Court that petitioner was entitled to a new jury sentencing under principles of due process. But the Court fails to inquire into the basis of the Oklahoma court’s conclusion that petitioner was improperly sentenced in the first instance. That question is central to the resolution of the due process issue presented by the case. The Court simply assumes that the Oklahoma court found that petitioner had not been sentenced in conformity with state law. This is an assumption, however, that cannot be divined from the available state cases. Those cases in fact strongly indicate that the decision of the state court here rested on an erroneous interpretation of federal law, not state law. If so, the Oklahoma court decision refusing to afford petitioner an opportunity to be resentenced by a jury would be correct, albeit for the wrong reason.
The issue in this case, then, is whether petitioner’s original sentence denied him equal protection. The Oklahoma sentencing statute in effect at the time of petitioner’s trial was designed to provide for increased sentences to multiple offend*349ers of the criminal laws.* Under Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 51 (A) (Supp. 1977) a defendant who is found guilty of an offense punishable by a term of imprisonment in excess of 5 years, after having been convicted of one offense punishable by imprisonment, is subject to sentence, fixed by the jury, ranging from 10 years to apparent infinity. (Oklahoma juries have apparently exercised this discretion with great relish, imposing sentences as long as 1,500 years in prison for second-time offenders. See Collins v. State, 500 P. 2d 1333 (Crim. App. 1972).) Defendants convicted of more than one *350prior offense were subject to sentencing under § 51 (B). Section 51 (B) did not invest the jury with discretion to determine the length of the term of imprisonment. Instead the section provided a formula for determining the length of the mandatory sentence to be imposed by a jury pursuant to instruction. This statutory scheme permitted the jury to impose sentences on defendants with only one prior conviction far in excess of those which were specified for defendants with two or more prior convictions. In Thigpen v. State, 571 P. 2d 467 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), decided after petitioner’s mandatory sentence was imposed by the jury, a defendant with only one prior conviction challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The court concluded that this potential for disparate sentences rendered § 51 (B) “unconstitutional,” and struck that section.
The Thigpen opinion does not indicate whether this conclusion is based on an interpretation of the State or Federal Constitution. The opinion does indicate, however, that in determining the constitutionality of the Act, the court had relied on an advisory opinion submitted by an Oklahoma state district judge. 571 P. 2d, at 471, n. 3. That advisory opinion is attached as an appendix to the court opinion. The position advocated in the advisory opinion is that the Oklahoma sentencing statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because of the potential for longer terms of imprisonment to those convicted of only one prior offense. The author of the advisory opinion relies exclusively on federal law in reaching this determination.
In this case, the Oklahoma court thought the federal equal protection holding in Thigpen applied to petitioner’s sentencing as well. I cannot agree. Petitioner was a third-time offender who was given the benefit of the more lenient mandatory sentencing provisions before the decision in Thigpen. Thus he was not within the class of one-time offenders subject to more burdensome treatment under the statute. Since *351petitioner was a member of the favored class, I cannot agree that petitioner’s sentencing denied him equal protection or any other rights guaranteed under the Federal Constitution, I am unable to agree that due process required the State to afford him any additional opportunity to be sentenced by another jury, and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

The text of Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §51 (Supp. 1977), provides:
“(A) Every person who, having been convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, commits any crime after such conviction is punishable therefor as follows:
“1. If the offense of which such person is subsequently convicted is such that upon a first conviction an offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term exceeding five (5) years, such person is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than ten (10) years.
“2. If such subsequent offense is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for five (5) years, or any less term, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten (10) years.
“3. If such subsequent conviction is for petit larceny, or for any attempt to commit an offense which, if committed, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five (5) years.
“(B) Every person who, having been twice convicted of felony offenses, commits a third, or thereafter, felony offenses within ten (10) years of the date following the completion of the execution of the sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of twenty (20) years plus the longest imprisonment for which the said third or subsequent conviction was punishable, had it been a first offense; provided, that felony offenses relied upon shall not have arisen out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of events closely related in time or location; provided, further, that nothing in this section shall abrogate or affect the punishment by death in all crimes now or hereafter made punishable by death.”