Court Opinion

ID: 9542043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:51.216464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:02.036982
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the decision of my distinguished colleague, Judge Kelly, to affirm the Order of the PCHA court denying appellant relief under the Act. I also would grant counsel for appellant’s Motion to withdraw because of the frivolity of the instant appeal.
However, I write separately to express my disagreement with Judge Kelly’s conclusion that appellant’s “Anders brief” does not comply with the standards set forth by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and adopted as controlling by this Court in Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988). Judge Kelly asserts, specifically, that “the purported Anders brief fails to adequately detail counsel’s review of the record and fails entirely to list the issues which appellant wished to be reviewed, ie.[,] that his [appellant’s] plea was involuntary as the result of threats alleged to have been made by court-appointed counsel.” Majority Opinion 8; emphasis in text. In other words, Judge Kelly finds technical fault in the lack of substance in the wording of issue number three as set forth by counsel in the “Anders Brief,” which reads as follows:
3. the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
The Turner “no merit” letter is not to be construed as the functional equivalent of an “Anders Brief.” So, while counsel’s statement of the issues which could arguably support appellant’s appeal might not survive the Anders test, it does, nevertheless, and in my view, fully comply with Turner. In collateral proceedings where counsel seeks to withdraw, Anders is no longer the law to be followed in Pennsylvania.
*220Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court decided in Pennsylvania v. Finley, [481] U.S. [551] 107 S.Ct. 1990 [95 L.Ed.2d 539] [1988] that the federal constitutional considerations underlying the tortuous procedures of Anders do not apply under the PCHA, we deem these less rigid requirements for withdrawal of counsel to satisfy Pennsylvania law in collateral attacks on criminal convictions.
Turner, 518 Pa. at 495, 544 A.2d at 929.
Thus, any withdrawal of counsel matters in collateral proceedings must now be judged in terms of what is required under Turner and Finley without any further reference to Anders.1
Nonetheless, the majority seeks to fault counsel for failing “to adequately detail counsel’s review of the record” in addition to failing “entirely to list the issues which appellant wished to be reviewed” as discussed, supra. Majority Op., 212. Additionally, the majority notes the absence of a “no merit” letter “detailing the nature and extent of his review and listing each issue the petitioner wished to have raised____” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. at 494, 544 A.2d at 928; emphasis in text.
Instantly, the “Anders Brief” filed on behalf of appellant, by any other name, fully comports, in my view, with the current state of the law for the withdrawal of court-appointed PCHA counsel. More specifically, I would hold that the Brief filed on behalf of appellant, regardless of the label one chooses to affix to it, possesses all the criteria minimally necessary to meet “the relaxed Turner/Finley standard for withdrawal of counsel in collateral appeals.” Majority Op. 213.
In light of the foregoing, I concur in the result.

. Were this a direct appeal in which counsel has sought withdrawal, the submission of an "Anders Brief’ would still remain the required procedure. See Penson v. Ohio, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).