Court Opinion

ID: 9559938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:38:55.082869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:52.568583
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI, Justice,
dissenting.
This court has previously held,1 and repeats today,2 that the appointment of a discovery master is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court in this case, accurately anticipating that the discovery disputes would quickly degenerate into near-chaos,3 appointed a discovery master. In a clear attempt to meet any concern that an individual litigant suing a large company might be disadvantaged by the order of appointment, the trial court provided that the master’s fees for any particular dispute would be borne by the party losing the dispute. I would leave undisturbed the trial court’s management of this case.
The court justifies its interlocutory intrusion into this ease by referring to “our judicial duty to determine whether appointment of a master was appropriate in this case.”4 With respect, I disagree: our inquiry is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a master. And the court’s justification for acting now — the need for “timely” resolution of this issue given that the trial court stayed all discovery pending the outcome of this petition5 — must seem ironic indeed to litigants whose case has been *876stayed because review was granted.6 - There is no need for action by this court now except that need occasioned by the improvident grant of the petition for review.
That is not to say that Rule 53 might not appropriately be amended, nor that such amendment might not include several of the provisions the court adopts today. But it strikes me that these issues are particularly apt for prior consideration by this court’s Civil Rules Advisory Committee, input from the bar, and final determination by this court in its rulemaking function.
Such an approach would have the advantage of informing more fully this court’s analysis in an area of today’s opinion which I regard as potentially problematic. That is, in determining “whether master’s fees in any given case infringe upon the guaranteed right of access to the justice system,” trial courts are told only that they “may take into account the possibility that the costs to the litigants are offset by the efficiency of master-assisted litigation.”7 This is problematic for several reasons.
First, the “costs to the litigants” — that is, the master’s fees — will be entirely unknown at the beginning of the case. That amount will be a function of several factors truly unknowable to the trial court from its pre-litigation perspective: the amount of contentiousness to come, the future willingness of opposing counsel to try to work within the spirit of the rules, the complexity of legal issues which arise in the course of discovery, and the like.
Second, whether those costs will be “offset by the efficiency of master-assisted litigation” is likewise extremely difficult to assess. If by “the efficiency of master-assisted litigation” the court means, for example, savings to the parties in lower attorney’s fees resulting from quicker discovery decisions, how can the trial judge even remotely quantify those calculations?
Third, the court refers to “potentially viable alternatives” to the appointment of a master,8 but they are not true alternatives. Instead, in suggesting that the trial court might limit the purpose or duration of the appointment or the amount of money to be spent on it, the court merely posits limiting the appointment in various ways. Trial courts presently have that authority and presumably exercise it.
Last, and most importantly, I do not know that the court’s assumption that the expense of the discovery master would or should be borne by the parties — as opposed to counsel' — is necessarily correct. In the great majority of instances, the client does not participate actively in the formulation and execution of discovery strategy. Because counsel make the decisions which lead to increased expenses, it appears neither unfair nor punitive to require counsel to bear those expenses. The assumption that the master’s costs would be borne by the parties rather than counsel — an assumption almost completely unexamined by the court today9 — should be referred to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. Reference would allow a full airing of the relevant facts and an examination of the assumptions underlying the various positions which have been presented to the court.10
*877The court acknowledges, at the end of a long and scholarly opinion, that “we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in appointing a master given the circumstances of this case.”11 I agree. That is why the petition should be dismissed as improvidently granted.12 Because I believe the standards for appointment of masters under Civil Rule 53 and the conditions of appointment can more properly be developed through amendment of the rule, I would refer these issues to the court’s standing Civil Rules Advisory Committee for action.

. See Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321, 327 n. 8 (Alaska 1984).

. See Op. at 867-868.

. Progressive, alleging that the Peters' initial twelve interrogatories (which Progressive has termed "extremely broad, unduly burdensome, and, as a practical matter, virtually impossible to respond to”) called for proprietary documents, moved for a protective order precluding the Peters from "disclosing to third parties any confidential or proprietary information produced” in discovery. In response to this motion, the Peters filed a 41-page brief and 138 pages of exhibits. The trial court appointed a discovery master soon afterwards.
Shortly after appointment of the discovery master, plaintiffs within a ten-day period filed a total of 125 requests for admission and 238 requests for production.

. Op. at 868.

. See Op. at 868 n. 9.

. This court granted the petition for review on May 22, 1998. The trial court stayed all discovery on September 11, 1998.

. Op. at 874.

. Id. at 874.

. The court acknowledges Progressive’s argument concerning master's fees being paid by counsel, see Op. at 873-874 n. 51, citing Malvo v. J.C. Penney Co., 512 P.2d 575 (Alaska 1973), but then assumes that master's fees would be treated the same as attorney’s fees. I believe that the assumption is unwarranted. The court cites Malvo to support the argument that a high award might discourage lawsuits by low income plaintiffs. But Malvo concerned attorney's fee awards. Progressive’s argument was that master’s fees have come to be treated generally as an item of expense advanced by counsel for plaintiff and only recovered by counsel from plaintiff if plaintiff prevails. An opponent’s attorney's fees are not treated in this fashion. Accordingly, an attorney's fee award could well have a chilling effect, but a master's fee award, if it is in fact treated as an item which is advanced by counsel (and is not recovered by the opponent as a cost), would not have a chilling effect.

.The Rules of Professional Conduct were amended in 1993 to provide that counsel may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, "the repayment of which may be contingent upon the outcome of the matter.” Alaska R. *877Prof. Conduct 1.8(e)(1) (as amended by Alaska Supreme Court Order No. 1123 (July 15, 1993)). Reference of this issue to the appropriate advisory committee would allow consideration of whether discovery master expenses should be considered as "costs and expenses” subject to this rule. Reference would also allow exploration of whether the rules on cost recovery should be amended to allow inclusion of discovery master costs. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 79.

. Op. at 875.

. The argument that “a remand is necessary in any event to resolve the Peters' claim of financial hardship," Op. at 875, gives more credit to the claim than it is due: Both before the superior court and before this court the claim was nothing more than unsupported assertions in briefs. This court has consistently found unsupported assertions of counsel to be insufficient to raise factual issues. See, e.g., French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 26 (Alaska 1996)("Mere assertions of fact in pleadings and memoranda are insufficient for denial of a motion for summary judgment.”) (quoting State, Dep’t of Highways v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 606 n. 32 (Alaska 1978)).