Court Opinion

ID: 9847996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:11:02.902525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:53.732544
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice
(dissenting).
The legislature has determined a proportional sentence for a habitual criminal. SDCL 22-7-7 provides that “[w]hen a defendant has been convicted of one or two prior felonies under the laws of this state or any other state or the United States, in addition to the principal felony, the sentence ... shall be enhanced by changing the class of the principal felony to the next class which is more severe_” (Emphasis added.) SDCL 22-7-8 provides: “When a defendant has been convicted of at least three prior convictions in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to the sentence of a Class 1 felony.” (Emphasis added.)
This is in accord with the Modern Rules of Sentencing which are taught at the National Judicial College and which set out the following guidelines:
1. Probation on first offense
2. A short definite sentence on second offense
*143. Doubling of sentence for a third offense
4. Throw away the key on any further offenses
Rehabilitation is sought in the first three stages, and in the final stage the defendant is put away as being incapable of rehabilitation, and a menace to society.
I see no conflict in South Dakota’s statutes with the criteria set down in Gregg v. Georgia, where the Court stated: “In assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the Constitutional measure, we presume its validity.... And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people.” 428 U.S. 153, 175-76, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2926, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 876 (1976). Furthermore, specifications of punishments are “peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” A defendant is given every opportunity for rehabilitation through probation on a first offense, a short prison term on second offense, and a longer sentence on third offense. When a defendant is offered all of these opportunities to rehabilitate himself, and proceeds to commit three more crimes of even a more serious nature, there is no room for him to complain of a sentence that does not provide for rehabilitation, or to make a constitutional claim of “cruel and unusual punishment.” The time comes when courts must consider the victims, society in general, and put a stop order on a defendant who has spent most of his adult life in criminal activities.
I am certainly in agreement that this court must give due deference to the split decision of the United States Supreme Court which examined the life sentence without parole under our recidivist statute. Solem v. Helm, supra. In a five to four decision, the court struck down South Dakota’s statute as it applied to an alcoholic whose principal felony was the writing of a $100 bad check. However, we must not overreact to this decision. Rather, we should consider it only in the light of the standards set down as applied to the facts before us. The basic holding of Solem v. Helm, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), is that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. However, at the same time, the Court said that “reviewing courts should give substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.” — U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 3009 (emphasis added). It was pursuant to this broad authority that the legislature enacted the habitual offender statutes, and it was pursuant to his discretion that the circuit judge issued the life sentence.
The standards which the Supreme Court established in Helm for use in reviewing sentences are: 1) we must look to the gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; 2) we must compare sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; 3) we must compare sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Courts may also look to the harm caused to the victim or society and the defendant’s motive. — U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 3009.
A careful analysis of these standards shows that the trial court in the case at hand did not violate the standards, and thus Weiker’s life sentence should be upheld. First, in looking at the gravity of the offense: whereas Helm’s crime was called “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit,” — U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 3012, citing State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d at 501 (Henderson, J., dissenting), Weiker’s crime was drug dealing, a crime which destroys countless victims of all ages. As Justice Henderson stated in State v. Pettis, 333 N.W.2d 717, 720 (S.D.1983), “selling drugs is a harsh and unsavory business. Many drug dealers make handsome profits from their endeavors. Drug abuse has devastated countless American youth to include young South Dakotans. Drugs are a peril to our society.” Weiker’s “recipe box” shows that there were numerous vie-*15tims of his crimes. A harsh penalty is fitting for such a harsh and destructive crime as drug-dealing.
Second, in comparing sentences imposed on other criminals in South Dakota, it is important to note that Weiker’s prior felonies were all third-degree burglaries — class 4 felonies (SDCL 22-32-8). Burglary, even in the third degree, is considered by the legislature to be more serious than Helm’s class 5 “no account check” felony, probably since burglary always involves the possibility of great harm to any individuals who might be within the burglarized premises. Drug dealing such as Weiker’s is also a class 4 felony (SDCL 22-42-2). Therefore, all of Weiker’s felonies are more serious than Helm’s felony which was before the United States Supreme Court, and any criminal in South Dakota with Weiker’s record could be sentenced to life in prison — a sentence established by the legislature within its “broad authority” to determine types of punishment.
Third, an examination of the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime shows that drug dealers can get a life sentence in numerous states, either under habitual offender statutes like South Dakota’s or under punishment statutes in controlled substance acts. See KAN. STAT.ANN. § 65-4127a (1980); MO.ANN. STAT. § 195.200 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-10-101(4) (1981); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 4476-15, 4.03 (Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(b)(l), (d); 76-8-1001 (1981). (These come from an examination of the codes of only a few states in the central U.S.) Therefore, South Dakota is not alone in enacting statutes giving harsh penalties, including life sentences, to drug dealers.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that we may also look to the harm caused to the victim or society. We know for a fact that drug abuse is on the rise, and the harm to victims and society is appalling. As noted by Justice Henderson in Pettis, supra, drug abuse has “devastated” countless Americans. A harsh sentence is certainly in order for those who directly cause such devastation.
The result of such a careful application of the Helm standards to the present case shows that Helm should not apply here. We are dealing with a more serious crime, a crime which destroys lives. Therefore, the sentence issued by the trial court is proportionate to the crime which Weiker committed.
The legislature last amended these statutes in 1977 after a year’s study, volumes of statistics, and input from anyone interested. Until the legislature sees fit to repeal the Habitual Criminal Statutes, I do not feel that this court should “second guess” a trial judge on what sentence is “proportionate” to the crimes committed and as to whether there is still hope for rehabilitation. The legislature has spoken clearly on the subject and it is my opinion that the statutes pass constitutional muster. I would affirm.