Court Opinion

ID: 9587572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:49.475529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:44.630346
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
First, I do not agree with the majority’s modification of the established elements for a claim of constructive discharge in violation of public policy. The majority asserts that to succeed on such a claim, the employee must prove that the employer possessed actual and not merely constructive knowledge of the plaintiff’s allegedly intolerable working conditions. By excluding constructive knowledge, the majority leaves the employer free to turn a blind eye to blatant and pervasive workplace abuses and to discourage or refuse to entertain employee complaints about intolerable workplace conditions and then claim lack of actual knowledge of the intolerable conditions as a complete defense to a wrongful discharge action. Analogous federal and state law, and considerations of sound public policy, support the constructive knowledge component of the established test for wrongful constructive discharge.
Second, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the employer in this case is entitled to summary judgment. Fairly read, the record of the trial court proceedings provides no basis for summary judgment.
I. Constructive Knowledge
In Brady v. Elixir Industries (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1306 [242 Cal.Rptr. 324], the Court of Appeal identified the elements of a cause of action for wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public policy: “(1) the actions and conditions that caused the employee to resign were violative of public policy; [1] (2) these actions and conditions were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee’s resignation that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have resigned; and [1] (3) facts and circumstances showing that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the intolerable conditions and of their impact on the employee and could have remedied the situation.” (Italics added.)
*1261This definition of constructive discharge has met with unanimous approval in subsequent decisions of the Courts of Appeal. (See, e.g., Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 793]; Soules v. Cadam, Inc. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 390, 399 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 6]; Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1059 [282 Cal.Rptr. 726]; Zilmer v. Carnation Co. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 29, 36-37 [263 Cal.Rptr. 422].)
Nevertheless, the majority disapproves this definition to the extent that it would allow proof of the employer’s constructive rather than actual knowledge of the intolerable conditions that forced the employee to resign. I disagree.
At the outset, I note that the majority’s entire discussion of this point is unnecessary because plaintiff is not proceeding on a theory that his employer had constructive rather than actual knowledge of his allegedly intolerable working conditions. As the majority acknowledges, in this context the term “employer” includes “supervisory employees.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1255.) Thus, proof that plaintiffs immediate supervisors knew of his allegedly intolerable working conditions is sufficient. Here, plaintiff has alleged not only actual knowledge by his immediate supervisors, but also that they intentionally created the intolerable conditions in retaliation for his opposition to their actions and policies and for the purpose of forcing plaintiff’s resignation.
The issue of constructive knowledge could arise only in a case in which the employee’s plight is unknown not only to the employing company’s management, but also to the affected employee’s immediate supervisor, a situation that is not alleged in this case.
Nevertheless, because the majority has chosen to address the issue, and because its determination of the issue will no doubt be accepted as the law of California, I will respond.
Apart from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Brady v. Elixir Industries, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1299, and the unanimous acceptance of that decision by this state’s appellate courts, is there other substantial persuasive authority for the inclusion of an employer’s constructive knowledge within the elements of constructive wrongful discharge? There is.
As the majority explains, federal courts have considered the elements of constructive wrongful discharge in the context of actions brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), and a clear majority of the federal appellate courts has rejected a requirement that the *1262employer intend to force the employee to resign. Under the majority rule in title VII cases, “a constructive discharge occurs whenever the complainant’s resignation results from intolerable working conditions, for which the employer is responsible, that would have caused a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position to resign.” (Lindemann & Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law (1992) p. 260, italics added.) Thus, employer responsibility is an element of a title VII claim for constructive discharge. How is employer responsibility established under title VII?
To implement title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has issued a variety of regulations, including guidelines on discrimination because of sex (29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 et seq. (1993)) and discrimination because of national origin (id., 1606.1).1 With regard to harassment by coworkers because of sex or national origin, these guidelines provide that the employer is responsible for the harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) “knows or should have known of the conduct,” unless the employer “can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (Id., §§ 1604.11(d) [sexual harassment], 1606.8(d) [harassment because of national origin], italics added.) Thus, the EEOC guidelines impose liability on an employer who has constructive knowledge of abusive workplace conditions and fails to act promptly and appropriately to remedy the situation.
This test for employer responsibility for the abusive acts of coworkers has been widely adopted by the federal courts, which have applied the test not only to acts of sexual harassment, but also to harassment on the basis of race, ethnic origin, and other prohibited grounds. Indeed, every federal appellate court that has considered the question has held that, absent prompt and appropriate corrective action, an employer is liable for a hostile workplace environment of which the employer has constructive knowledge. (Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico (1st Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 881, 901 [applying title VII standard in a title IX case]; Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc. (2d Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 59, 63; Andrews v. City of Philadelphia (3d Cir. 1990) 895 F.2d 1469, 1486; Paroline v. Unisys Corp. (4th Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 100, 107; Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc. (5th Cir. 1993) 9 F.3d 401, 403; Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div. (6th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2d 178, 183; Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc. (7th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 317, 320; Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc. (8th Cir. 1988) 842 F.2d 1010, 1015; Ellison v. Brady (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.2d 872, 881; Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept. (10th Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 572, *1263577; Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. (11th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 1311, 1316; see also Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII (1984) 97 Harv.L.Rev. 1449, 1462-1463.)2
California law follows federal law on this point. Like title VII, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) prohibits workplace harassment on sexual, racial, and other grounds. When prohibited harassment by a coworker results in a hostile workplace environment, California law, like title VII, imposes liability on an employer who has constructive knowledge of the harassment, unless the employer has taken appropriate remedial action. In the words of the statute, “[h]arassment of an employee or applicant by an employee other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” (Gov. Code, 12940, subd. (h)(1), italics added.)
Under what circumstances might an employer (or its agents, including immediate supervisors) be said to have constructive knowledge of an employee’s intolerable working conditions attributable to the actions of coworkers or subordinates? First, constructive knowledge exists when the intolerable conditions, or the improper practices that result in the intolerable conditions, are so obvious and pervasive that any reasonably attentive employer would notice them. (See E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel (9th Cir. 1989) 881 F.2d 1504, 1516; Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div. (7th Cir. 1986) 797 F.2d 1417, 1422; Taylor v. Jones (8th Cir. 1981) 653 F.2d 1193, 1199; Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, supra, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 1449, 1462, fn. 69; Lindemann & Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law, supra, pp. 242-244.) Second, constructive knowledge exists when the employer declines to read or listen to employee complaints, otherwise discourages employee complaints, or gives the employee no reasonably available means to complain. (See Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., supra, 957 F.2d 59, 63; *1264Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc. (3d Cir. 1990) 909 F.2d 747, 753 [116 A.L.R.Fed. 653].)
The constructive knowledge component of the established test for wrongful constructive discharge is supported by logic, sound public policy, and analogous but persuasive authority under title VII. I would retain it.
II. Summary Judgment
Disagreeing with the Court of Appeal, the majority concludes that defendant was entitled to summary judgment because of “two fatal flaws” in plaintiffs claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1253.) The asserted flaws are, first, insufficient proof that plaintiff’s working conditions were intolerable at the time he resigned and, second, insufficient nexus between plaintiff’s complaints about illegal activities and his adverse performance evaluations. To explain why the majority’s conclusion is erroneous, I will review the pertinent facts and then discuss each of the claimed “fatal flaws.”
A. Facts
Plaintiff’s complaint includes a claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy. In support of that claim, the complaint makes these allegations:
In January 1984, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (ABI) hired plaintiff to work at its plant in Riverside. On or about January 31, 1989, plaintiff was forced to resign after his supervisors “lodged a campaign of harassment to create intolerable conditions and to constructively terminate plaintiff’ because of plaintiffs opposition to various practices that plaintiff regarded as illegal or otherwise improper. These improper practices included: (1) violations of “Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms laws”; (2) violations of collective bargaining agreement provisions concerning conflicts of interest, wages, benefits, and job security; (3) violations of company policies prohibiting family members and relatives working in the same department, and requiring temperature control of draught beer to prevent spoilage; and (4) manipulation of sales records to artificially improve the Riverside plant’s performance compared to other ABI facilities.
To justify punitive action against plaintiff, plaintiff’s supervisors solicited and encouraged coworkers to fabricate accusations against plaintiff and to document these false accusations, which could then be used in annual merit reviews. Plaintiffs’ supervisors also harassed plaintiff by changing his work shift schedule to affect his service on a federal jury panel.
*1265ABI answered the complaint with a general denial (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30, subd. (d)) and the assertion of various defenses. Eventually, after other proceedings not relevant here, ABI moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion for summary judgment, ABI relied upon excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition and upon declarations by two of plaintiffs supervisors, George Liakos and Bill Richards. In opposition to ABI’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff submitted a declaration by himself, excerpts from Liakos’s deposition, and additional excerpts from plaintiff’s own deposition. Considering all this evidence, the following picture emerges.
ABI employed plaintiff at its wholesale operations division (WOD) in Riverside from January 1984 until plaintiffs resignation on January 3,1989. The Riverside WOD serves as a distribution center for the sale of ABI’s beer and related products throughout Southern California. Plaintiff had previously worked for ABI as the industrial relations manager at its Los Angeles brewery in Van Nuys from 1975 to 1981.
George Liakos was the general manager at the Riverside WOD. He hired plaintiff in the position of branch off-premises coordinator with responsibility for the Riverside WOD’s beer sales to retailers, such as liquor stores and supermarkets, that sell alcoholic beverages for consumption away from the retailers’ premises. Plaintiff began work in January 1984. His immediate supervisor was William Schmitt, the sales manager, who reported directly to Liakos.
On his first performance appraisal, in June 1984, plaintiff received an overall rating of “good,” which the appraisal form defines as “consistently dependable and competent performance of the job.” The report was divided into 14 rating categories. Plaintiff received a “good” rating in 11 categories, a “very good” rating in 2 categories, and a “needs improvement” rating in 1 category. Schmitt performed the appraisal, and Liakos approved it.
On his next appraisal, in December 1984, plaintiff received an overall rating of “needs improvement,” which the appraisal form defines as “performance which does not meet minimum level of acceptability, and is not good enough to warrant recognition or greater responsibility.” He retained a “good rating” in five categories, and a “very good” rating in one category, but he received a “needs improvement” rating in eight categories. On this evaluation as well, Schmitt made the appraisal, and Liakos approved it.
The parties agree that the June 1984 evaluation was based solely on an objective evaluation of plaintiffs performance during the appraisal period, but they disagree about the reason for the “needs improvement” rating in the *1266December 1984 evaluation. The written appraisal states that the lower rating was caused primarily by plaintiff’s failure to timely and accurately complete important sales reports and to follow through on sales and marketing projects. In his declaration, Liakos states that the appraisal was based “solely on an objective review of Plaintiffs performance during the appraisal period.” By contrast, plaintiffs deposition reveals his belief that he had performed competently during the rating period and that the adverse rating was given in retaliation for his complaints about certain practices by his supervisor, Schmitt.
During his deposition, plaintiff testified about the following incidents:
(1) Plaintiff received information that Schmitt had directed one employee (Elledge) to have some Anheuser-Busch jackets made and to provide them as gifts to an ABI customer (a liquor retailer). Believing this conduct to be in violation of state or federal law,3 plaintiff reported the matter to Liakos. In a later conversation with plaintiff, Liakos said that Schmitt had admitted giving the jackets to retailers. According to plaintiffs declaration, Liakos told plaintiff he “had made arrangements for Schmitt to have the customers make payments for the material which was given in violation of the Alcohol and Beverage Commission regulations.”4
(2) Plaintiff received information that Schmitt had directed another employee (Newman) to give a different ABI customer tickets to professional baseball games. Plaintiff relayed this information to Bill Richards, the operations manager, who at the time was his supervisor.
(3) Schmitt encouraged ABI sales employees to remove competitors’ advertising displays from retail liquor stores. At the morning meeting of the sales department, Schmitt would initial the purloined displays and award the responsible employee points toward “salesman of the month.” During the course of the meeting, Schmitt would, in plaintiff’s words, “take these things, some of these things that were particularly good and he would hold them up as documentation, identify the person who brought them in and give him an ‘atta boy.’ ” Based on briefings by ABI attorneys, plaintiff believed *1267that handling or removing a competitor’s retail displays was illegal.5 Plaintiff mentioned his concern to Schmitt. According to plaintiff’s testimony, Schmitt responded with these words: “This is not a debating society. If I tell you to do it you do it.” Plaintiff then raised the problem with Liakos. According to plaintiff, Liakos’s response was: “Thank you for telling me. I’ll handle it.”
(4) Plaintiff also complained to Schmitt about fabrication of company documents reflecting the number of times ABI representatives had called on customers. Schmitt’s sarcastic reply, as related by plaintiff, was, “We’ll call in a priest.”
In July 1985, Liakos transferred plaintiff from the sales department to the delivery department, with no change in salary. The reason for the transfer is disputed. In his declaration, Liakos states that he transferred plaintiff because of plaintiff’s performance problems in the sales department and because he believed plaintiffs background would be better utilized in the delivery area. By contrast, plaintiffs deposition reveals his conviction that he had performed competently in the sales department and that the transfer, like the adverse performance evaluation, was in retaliation for his complaints about the previously mentioned practices by Schmitt.
In his new position, plaintiff supervised the day-to-day activities of delivery department employees. His immediate supervisor was Steve Garcia, the delivery manager, and his second level supervisor was Bill Richards, the operations manager. Garcia reported to Richards, who in turn reported to Liakos. In performance evaluations in December 1985, December 1986, and November 1987 plaintiff received an overall rating of “good.” Richards made the appraisals; Liakos approved them. It is undisputed that these evaluations were based solely on an objective evaluation of plaintiff’s performance during the appraisal periods.
In his December 1988 performance appraisal, plaintiff received an overall rating of “needs improvement.” The decline from the November 1987 appraisal was dramatic. In the earlier evaluation, plaintiff was rated “good” in eight categories, “very good” in six categories, and “excellent” in one category. He did not receive a single “needs improvement” rating in any of the 15 rating categories. In the December 1988 appraisal, by contrast, plaintiff was rated “needs improvement” in eight categories, and “good” in the remaining seven categories.
*1268Richards and Garcia prepared the December 1988 appraisal, which Liakos approved. The parties dispute the reason for the sudden decline in plaintiffs ratings. In his declaration, Liakos states that the ratings were based solely on an objective evaluation of plaintiffs performance during the appraisal period. More specifically, he states that plaintiffs performance began to deteriorate during mid-1988, in that plaintiff became uncooperative, confrontational with management, and failed to timely complete assigned projects. In Liakos’s words, plaintiff appeared to be “an embittered and disgruntled employee.” The Richards declaration echoes these allegations of plaintiffs “poor attitude and performance” during this time and provides some specific instances.
Plaintiff, by contrast, maintains that his performance never deteriorated below the level of “good” and that the “needs improvement” performance evaluation was part of a concerted effort of harassment in retaliation for plaintiffs continuing opposition to his superiors’ improper practices. He states in his declaration that his supervisors did not question him about the alleged instances of poor performance at the time they occurred, and that Richards raised them for the first time on December 28,1988. Plaintiff states that he denied the allegations when first confronted with them. As he explained in his deposition, he then believed he was being “set up” for termination; he testified that his supervisors had used similar tactics in the past with other employees, whom he named.6
During his tenure with the delivery department, plaintiff complained to Riverside WOD management about actions he believed were in violation of ABI’s union contracts. Specifically, he complained that ABI was violating its union contract by subcontracting the task of washing delivery trucks to a company owned by Garcia, the delivery manager, when this task should have been performed by ABI employees who were union members. Plaintiff complained to Garcia, Richards, and Liakos about this contract violation.
Plaintiff also informed Liakos about a provision of the union contract defining eligibility for what plaintiff described as “health and welfare benefits.” Plaintiff told Liakos that ABI could be “in jeopardy” for withholding *1269benefits under this provision. He recommended that the provision be revised when the union contract was renegotiated, but it was never changed. Plaintiff also believed that the company was violating a contract provision stating, in plaintiff’s words, that “clerical staff would be paid for 40 hours and work 37 and a half.” When plaintiff mentioned this problem to Liakos, Liakos replied, “We’ll live with it until we are caught.”
Plaintiff also complained that the Riverside facility was not following ABI policies requiring temperature control of draught beer, with the result that the beer was in danger of spoilage.
On January 3, 1989, approximately one week after the discussion with Richards about his performance evaluation, plaintiff tendered his letter of resignation, effective January 31.
B. Intolerable Conditions
The essential elements of a claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy are, as I have previously observed, the following: (1) working conditions so intolerable or aggravated that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign; (2) circumstances sufficient to establish the employer’s responsibility for the intolerable conditions, and (3) circumstances showing that the discharge violated public policy. (Brady v. Elixir Industries, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 1299, 1306.) The majority concludes that the state of the evidence relating to the first element—intolerable working conditions—warrants summary judgment for defendant ABI. I disagree. Although I would not characterize the evidence of intolerable conditions as “overwhelming,” I am convinced it was sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact.
By itself, a single adverse performance review does not constitute intolerable working conditions, even when the low evaluation is unjustified. But the record here, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46]), shows considerably more.
According to plaintiff, the adverse December 1988 performance review was not an isolated incident, but was part of a concerted campaign of harassment designed to force him to leave the company. He has provided some evidence to justify this assertion; defendant’s contrary evidence does no more than establish the existence of a triable issue of fact.
Plaintiff suffered two adverse performance reviews, both of which followed plaintiff’s complaints about actions of his supervisors that he considered illegal or otherwise improper. After the first adverse evaluation, he was *1270given a lateral transfer from the sales department to the delivery department. It is a reasonable inference, although disputed by defendant, that Liakos’s purpose in transferring plaintiff was to prevent him from observing and opposing activities by Schmitt, the sales manager, that were illegal but that Liakos was willing to tolerate or even encourage because they increased the company’s sales. It is also a reasonable inference that after plaintiff opposed certain practices in the delivery department, Liakos made a similar decision to prevent him from observing and opposing improper activities in that department; lateral transfer no longer being feasible, Liakos, in concert with Garcia and Richards, fabricated charges that would support adverse performance evaluations of plaintiff and eventually lead to his discharge or resignation.
It is striking that after some four years in the delivery department, during which plaintiff received uniformly favorable evaluations, he suddenly received a negative evaluation. Plaintiff has explained this anomaly by stating that his performance did not change and that the charges against him were fabricated in retaliation for his opposition to practices in the delivery department. Defendant, by contrast, has offered no explanation for the sudden deterioration in plaintiff’s performance that it claimed had occurred.
Plaintiff testified, without contradiction, that his supervisors had not discussed any of the instances of poor performance cited in the December 1988 evaluation at the time they allegedly occurred. This was contrary to normal and sound personnel practices, and it lends credence to plaintiffs belief that he was being “set up” for discharge.
Finally, plaintiff testified, again without contradiction, that Liakos had used the same or similar tactics with other employees who had opposed or reported improper activities at ABI’s Riverside facility. This testimony further supports the conclusion that plaintiff was being “set up” for termination or discharge.
The question, then, is not whether one, or even two, adverse performance reviews justify an employee’s decision to resign. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable employee would find working conditions intolerable, and feel compelled to resign, when the employee’s supervisors had launched a campaign to drive the employee out of the company by means of adverse performance evaluations, based on charges deliberately fabricated. Knowing that the poor evaluations would continue and would eventually lead to discharge, and knowing also that discharge would reduce the prospects of employment elsewhere, an employee of normal sensibilities might very well find the described situation intolerable. Because plaintiff presented substantial evidence to support this description of his predicament at the Riverside *1271WOD when he resigned, the existence of intolerable conditions presents a triable issue of fact.
C. Nexus
As to the third element of the claim for constructive discharge in violation of public policy—circumstances showing that the discharge violated public policy—the majority asserts that if there was a constructive discharge in December 1988, uncontradicted evidence establishes that it was unrelated to the illegal activities that allegedly occurred in the sales department in 1984.7 As I understand the majority opinion, it does not dispute that the alleged violations of alcoholic beverage control laws—including the alleged gifts to retailers and encouraging employees to remove competitors’ retail advertising displays—were themselves against public policy, or that discharging an employee in retaliation for opposition to these activities would likewise be against public policy. Rather, the majority concludes that ABI has carried its summary judgment burden of establishing the absence of any causal link between the discharge and the alleged illegal activities. Once again, I disagree.
Plaintiffs complaints about illegal activities in the sales department promptly resulted in an adverse performance evaluation (in December 1984) and a transfer to the delivery department. Whether plaintiff was thereafter a “marked man” within the company is properly a jury question. Assuming that he was, I do not find it implausible that his supervisors allowed an interval of time to pass before stepping up a campaign of harassment designed to force plaintiff to resign or be fired. Indeed, this is exactly how one might expect a legally sophisticated employer to treat an employee it regards as disloyal.
Moreover, the record shows that the period between plaintiffs transfer to the delivery department and his December 1988 adverse performance evaluation was not uneventful. Plaintiff continued to oppose activities he regarded as improper. Although these activities did not violate fundamental public policy (see fn. 7, ante), they gave his superiors, and particularly Liakos, continuing grounds to regard plaintiff as a disloyal employee and a troublemaker. Thus, there is sound evidentiary support for plaintiff’s belief that his final adverse evaluation was not based on an objective appraisal of his performance, but rather was made to force him out of the company in retaliation for his “disloyal” opposition to established practices at the Riverside WOD. If this is true, then the only issue as to “nexus” is whether the *1272negative appraisal was only in retaliation for plaintiff’s opposition to certain practices in the delivery department, or whether it was also, in significant part, in retaliation for plaintiffs opposition to law violations in the sales department. In my view, the answer to this question, and thus the existence of the required nexus, presents a triable issue of fact.
The majority offers unpersuasive reasons for denying plaintiff a trial on the merits of his wrongful discharge claim. In my view, the claim is not suitable for summary judgment and should proceed to trial.
III. Conclusion
An employer who reasonably should know of intolerable workplace conditions, and who does nothing to correct them, should not escape liability when the intolerable conditions force an employee to quit. As I have explained, in reaching out unnecessarily to strike down the constructive knowledge component of the established test for constructive discharge, the majority diverts our state’s employment jurisprudence from the judicial mainstream of American employment law.
In this case, moreover, the majority errs in directing summary judgment for the employer. Defendant employer failed to establish that plaintiff employee will be unable to prove any element of his constructive wrongful discharge claim at trial.
For these reasons, I dissent.
Woods (A. M.), J.,* concurred.

The EEOC has also issued guidelines for discrimination because of religion (29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 et seq. (1993)), but the guidelines for religious discrimination do not appear to define employer responsibility for harassment by coworkers.

In most instances, the language of the federal appellate court rulings closely tracks the language of the EEOC guidelines. (E.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 [“management-level employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action”]; Katz v. Dole (4th Cir. 1983) 709 F.2d 251, 255 [“the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile working environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial action”]; Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., supra, 9 F.3d 401, 403 [“the employer either knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action”].) The one exception is the Second Circuit, which has phrased the rule under which an employer is responsible for a hostile environment resulting from coworker harassment in terms of a requirement that the employer “either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.” (Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc., supra, 957 F.2d 59, 63.)

Plaintiff’s belief was well founded: By state law, a liquor wholesaler is generally prohibited from giving any gift to any off-premises retailer or in connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 25502, subd. (a)(2), 25600; see also, Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 510 [241 Cal.Rptr. 916]; Markstein Distributing Co. v. Rice (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 333 [135 Cal.Rptr. 255].)

In his declaration, Liakos admitted that plaintiff had informed him that Schmitt had provided an Anheuser-Busch jacket to a customer, but he stated that upon inquiry Schmitt had told him that the customer had paid for the jacket. Liakos declared that he had been satisfied with this representation and had terminated his investigation. He denied that plaintiff had ever complained to him about other alleged unlawful or improper activity.

Plaintiffs belief that it was illegal to handle the products or advertising displays of competing alcoholic beverage distributors was well founded. (See Smith v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 503, 510; Markstein Distributing Co. v. Rice, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 333.)

Plaintiff described the case of an employee named Van Hoy, who had reported to ABI’s head office in St. Louis that employees at the Riverside facility were fabricating sales documents “for accounts that never received the goods.” Van Hoy’s report triggered an investigation, as a result of which two employees were fired. But Van Hoy was given reduced responsibilities, his keys were taken away, and he was not allowed to handle cash any more. Plaintiff stated that Van Hoy “got the message and left.”
Plaintiff also testified that Bosman, Hocking, Dunez (or Dunaj), and Peterson were four Riverside WOD employees whose merit reviews had been fabricated to encourage them to “terminate rather than be fired.”

I do not challenge the majority’s conclusion that the alleged activities in the delivery department—violations of collective bargaining agreements and internal company policies— were not against fundamental public policy.

Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.