Court Opinion

ID: 9914245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:11.76522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:47.987370
License: Public Domain

J-S33002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  COREY BREWER                                 :   No. 451 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0007039-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: December 29, 2023

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on

April 20, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which

denied the Commonwealth’s motion in limine seeking permission to introduce

at trial evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of Appellee, Corey Brewer,

pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).1 After careful review, we reverse and remand

for further proceedings.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth may appeal an interlocutory order precluding evidence

when it provides a certification with its notice of appeal that the order
terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution. Commonwealth v.
Whitlock, 69 A.3d 635, 636 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 311(d)).
As the trial court’s ruling in this case had the effect of excluding prosecution
evidence, and the Commonwealth has certified that the ruling substantially
handicaps the prosecution, this appeal is properly before this Court.
J-S33002-23

       Appellee has been charged with three counts of strangulation; two

counts each of sexual assault and simple assault; and one count each of

aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, and terroristic threats.2 These charges

are based on the following allegations:

       [B]etween May 1, 2021 and July 11, 2021[, Appellee] violently
       sexually assaulted [B.S. (the “Victim”)], with whom he had been
       having a consensual[,] romantic relationship.         [Appellee] is
       accused of preventing the [V]ictim from leaving his residence,
       strangling her[,] and threatening her with a knife. [Appellee] is
       accused of taking the [V]ictim’s cell phone to prevent her from
       communicating with others. He’s also accused of threatening her
       [with a deadly weapon and threatening to] kill her children and
       [the] father [of her children] if she did not do what [he] wanted.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 12/2/22, at 4.

       On December 16, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a notification of its

intention to present Rule 404(b)(2) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

(“motion in limine”), pursuant to Rule 404(b)(3).3            Specifically, the

Commonwealth sought to introduce testimony from three of Appellee’s former

intimate partners, whom he allegedly victimized, in order to establish a

common scheme or plan, which the Commonwealth asserts is critical to

proving “motive, intent, knowledge, and/or lack of mistake or absence” in the

present case.      Commonwealth’s Brief at 12.     Appellee filed a responsive

pleading, in which he countered that the Commonwealth intends to introduce

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2718(a)(1); 3124.1; 2701(a)(1); 2702(a)(4); 2902(a)(1);
and 2706(a)(1), respectively.

3 The Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b)(2) evidence is also referred to as “other-

acts evidence” and “prior bad acts evidence” throughout this writing.

                                           -2-
J-S33002-23

this evidence merely “as propensity evidence, to overwhelm the finder of fact

with allegations that [Appellee] is a domestic abuser so that [the jury is] more

likely to find that he committed domestic abuse in this case.” Appellee’s Brief

at 3-4 (internal citation and emphasis omitted).

      After a hearing on the motion in limine and a subsequent status

conference, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s request to present Rule

404(b)(2) evidence. See Order, 4/20/22 (single page). The Commonwealth

filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s order to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On

December 2, 2022, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, the

Commonwealth presents a single issue for our review: “Whether the trial court

erred in denying the Commonwealth’s motion in limine which sought to

introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Pa.R.E.

404(b)(2)?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 5.

      In reviewing the denial of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine, we

apply the following standard of review:

      Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
      court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See
      Commonwealth v. Arrington, … 86 A.3d 831, 842 ([Pa.] 2014).
      “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
      rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise
      of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
      prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”
      Commonwealth v. Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 163 (Pa. Super. 2016)
      (en banc) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Lynn, 192 A.3d 165, 169 (Pa. Super. 2018).

                                       -3-
J-S33002-23

      Additionally, we remain mindful of the following well-established

principles of law and rules of evidence:

      Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. See
      Commonwealth v. Cook, … 952 A.2d 594, 612 ([Pa.] 2008).
      “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material
      fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less
      probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption
      regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Drumheller, …
      808 A.2d 893, 904 ([Pa.] 2002) (citation omitted). “All relevant
      evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.”
      Pa.R.E. 402.

      One such law that limits the admissibility of relevant evidence is
      Rule 404. Under Rule 404, evidence of “a crime, wrong, or other
      act” is inadmissible “to prove a person’s character in order to show
      that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
      the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). However, this evidence may
      be admissible when relevant for another purpose, such as
      “providing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
      knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
      Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).

Id.

      Moreover, “evidence of other crimes or acts may be admitted if such

evidence proves ‘a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of

two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to prove

the others.’” Commonwealth v. Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 967 (Pa. Super.

2006) (quoting Leonard Packel and Anne Bowen Poulin, PENNSYLVANIA

EVIDENCE § 404-9(a) (2d ed. 1999)). “A common scheme may be relevant

to establish any element of a crime, where intent may be shown through a

pattern of similar acts.” Id. (citations omitted). “Evidence of a prior crime

may also be admitted to show a defendant’s actions were not the result of a

                                     -4-
J-S33002-23

mistake or accident, where the manner and circumstances of two crimes are

remarkably similar.”   Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 359 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).      See id. (citing Commonwealth v.

Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75 (Pa. 2004) (holding that evidence of the

defendant’s murder of his former wife was admissible to show absence of

accident in the prosecution for murder of the defendant’s second wife, where

both victims were found dead in a bathtub or hot tub in highly similar

circumstances)).

      We emphasize that “[i]n a criminal case, … evidence [of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts] is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.”   Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (emphasis

added).   “In this context, ‘unfair prejudice’ means a tendency to suggest

decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its

duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Lynn, 192 A.3d at 170 (citing

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007)).            Hence, the

applicable rule is that “other-acts evidence is by default inadmissible unless

a Rule 404(b)(2) category or similar justification applies, and the probative

value of that evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice.”    Id. at 171

(citation omitted; emphasis in original). “The burden is on the party seeking

admission to demonstrate the applicability of the exception to the general

rule….” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, the Commonwealth seeks to introduce at trial the following

evidence regarding Appellee’s former intimate partners to establish a common

                                    -5-
J-S33002-23

scheme or plan to exert complete control and domination over his female

partners:

     (a) Towards the end of 2008, [22-]year-old, white, female[]
     victim, B.M., entered into an intimate relationship with [Appellee].
     After a few weeks into the relationship, [B.M.] indicated [Appellee]
     would regularly lose his temper, scream at her, and assault her,
     including strangulation. [B.M.] also would testify that when she
     declined to have intercourse with [Appellee], that would enrage
     him[,] and he would forcibly engage in sexual acts with her
     anyway. [Appellee] threatened [B.M.] with a deadly weapon[]
     and threatened to kill her immediate family members if she left —
     even listing … the addresses of [B.M.’s] sister and other relatives.
     [Appellee] installed locks on the doors that required a key to
     unlock from the inside to leave — [Appellee] would keep these
     keys on his person. [Appellee] would routinely block [B.M.’s] car
     in[] the garage. [Appellee] took [B.M.’s] cell phone and would
     only allow her to use it to text family and friends while under his
     supervision. [B.M.] managed to escape [Appellee’s] residence
     once, but was ultimately[] chased, tackled, and carried back into
     [Appellee’s] residence. This abuse continued until March of 2009,
     when [B.M.] escaped.

     (b) In November of 2011, [Appellee] engaged in an intimate
     relationship with a 38[-]year-old, white, female[] victim[,] A.S. A
     few weeks into the relationship, [Appellee] began to regularly lose
     his temper, scream at [A.S.], and assault her (including strangling
     her). Specifically, if [A.S.] would disagree with [Appellee], he
     would become angry and assault her. [Appellee] would physically
     stop [A.S.] from leaving his residence — at one point [Appellee]
     chased [A.S.] while she tried to escape, tackled her[,] and carried
     her back into his residence. [Appellee] took [A.S.’s] cell phone to
     limit her communication. [Appellee] threatened [A.S.] with a
     deadly weapon. [Appellee] threatened to kill [A.S.’s] children if
     she did not do what [he] ordered. During one … assault[, A.S.]
     was forced to go to the hospital after [Appellee] assaulted her[.
     W]hile at the hospital[, Appellee] would not leave [A.S.] alone,
     and continually threatened her until she made up a story about
     how she was injured.

     (c) On December 29, 2017, [Appellee] was in an intimate
     relationship with a 36-year-old, white, female[] victim, A.B.
     [Appellee] saw photos of [A.B.’s] husband on her computer so

                                    -6-
J-S33002-23

      [he] became angry and assaulted her. [Appellee] strangled [A.B.]
      until she became unconscious. The next day[, A.B.] could not call
      police because [Appellee] followed her around until she was able
      to escape on December 30, 2017, by running to a neighbor’s
      house. Leading up to this incident, the local police routinely would
      be dispatched to [Appellee’s] residence for similar instances.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11 (citing Motion in Limine, 12/16/21, at ¶ 5)

(brackets in original omitted).

      The Commonwealth explained in its motion in limine that the testimony

from Appellee’s prior victims would establish a common plan or scheme:

      The common scheme or plan is evidenced by [Appellee’s] choosing
      to engage in the same specific assaultive action to exercise his
      power and control over his victims when a disagreement between
      the parties occurs. [Appellee] chooses white, female victims,
      under 40-years-old. [Appellee] strangles each of his victims.
      [Appellee] beats all of his victims. [Appellee] cuts off the victims’
      communication to the outside. [Appellee] restricts the victims’
      movement. [Appellee] monitors all his victims. All these unique
      signatures, in the specific way he chooses to execute them, all
      show a common scheme or plan[] to control his intimate partners.
      Furthermore, [Appellee] continues to execute the same common
      scheme or plan because he knows it worked on prior occasions.
                                        …

      The prior bad acts the Commonwealth seeks to introduce in the
      instant case also go to the motive and intent of [Appellee] —
      abusing an intimate partner to intimidate and maintain control
      over her. [Appellee’s] prior bad acts … prove [Appellee] knew
      the actions alleged in the instant case would successfully
      reestablish dominance over the victim — again, going to motive
      and intent. [Appellee’s] prior bad acts also prove [Appellee] could
      not have mistaken his conduct in the course of his relationship to
      be anything other than intentionally causing physical and mental
      injury.

      The probative value of evidence of such other crimes, wrongs, or
      acts outweighs its potential for prejudice. Having the full context
      of   [Appellee’s]   approach     to   intimate    relationships   is
      extraordinarily probative in domestic violence cases and this case
      largely comes down to [Appellee’s] credibility verses the [V]ictim’s

                                      -7-
J-S33002-23

       credibility. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 673 A.2d 866, 870
       (Pa. 1996) (reversing the trial court’s decision to exclude prior bad
       acts proving common scheme or plan as overly prejudicial, noting
       “without doubt, the other crimes evidence would be prejudicial to
       [the defendant]. That is what it is designed to be. On the facts
       of this case, however, it is not unduly prejudicial, as it is required
       for the Commonwealth’s case.”).

Id. at 12-13 (citing Motion in Limine at ¶¶ 7, 10-13) (emphasis in original;

some spacing altered; paragraph numbers omitted).

       Conversely, Appellee argued that:

       The Commonwealth’s identified common scheme or plan amounts
       to little more than a recitation of the crimes for which [Appellee]
       is charged. [The Commonwealth] accuse[s] him of exercising
       power and control over him [sic] victims through physical
       violence, including strangulation, threats of violence, as well as
       restricting their movement and monitoring them.              These
       allegations are not the “unique signatures” which [the
       Commonwealth] claim[s] them to be, but rather, would be
       common to any other defendant charged with the same set of
       crimes.
                                         …

       Importantly, in this case, these allegations by [Appellee’s] former
       intimate partners are unproven. [Appellee’s] only conviction
       relating to any of these women was an Alford plea[4] to a single
       count of assault relating to [A.S.] A single count of assault does
       not amount to the long-term kidnapping and abuse alleged for
       which he is charged in this case, and an Alford plea does not
       amount to an admission of guilt. This severely impacts the
       probative value of these accusations.

Appellee’s Brief at 4 (citing Answer to Motion in Limine, 1/19/22, at ¶¶ 10,

20) (paragraph numbers omitted).

____________________________________________

4 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  “[A] person entering an
Alford plea claims innocence, but consents to the imposition of a prison
sentence.” Commonwealth v. Pasture, 107 A.3d 21, 23 n.1 (Pa. 2014).

                                           -8-
J-S33002-23

      Appellee further suggested:

      Even if the other act evidence “would not be introduced for
      propensity purposes, it should still be deemed inadmissible for risk
      of undue prejudice.” Stressing the dated and unproven nature of
      the former girlfriends’ accusations, the probative value of their
      testimony “is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue
      prejudice because the jury is likely to improperly use the
      testimony for propensity purposes.” He also pointed out that
      “admission of these accusations will have the effect of cramming
      three additional min-trials [sic] into this one, and would force the
      parties to litigate years-old accusations.”

Id. at 5 (citations to record and brackets in original omitted).

      As the trial court explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, it denied the

Commonwealth’s      motion    in   limine   because   it   agrees   with   Appellee

that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial nature of the evidence. It opined:

      The [c]ourt’s overarching concern about the admission of the
      [Commonwealth’s] proffered evidence is that it … mirrors
      precisely the conduct charged against [Appellee] in this case and
      it is emotionally charged evidence. The Commonwealth argues
      that the evidence should be admissible because it qualified as one
      of the exceptions to Rule 404(b). In this [c]ourt’s view, however,
      this evidence is severely prejudicial propensity evidence. The real
      impact this evidence will have is that it virtually implores the jury
      to convict because [Appellee] allegedly committed virtually
      identical acts against prior paramours. A jury will most certainly
      view this evidence as propensity evidence. The jury will certainly
      determine that [Appellee] acted in conformity with that evidence
      when evaluating [Appellee’s] guilt rather than base its verdict on
      the direct evidence of the case. One of the incidents occurred
      approximately 12 years ago. The other incidents are dated as
      well. Because the conduct of the prior incidents is so graphic and
      virtually identical to the facts of the instant case, this [c]ourt does
      not believe that a limiting instruction will cure the substantial
      prejudice that will occur if this evidence is admitted at trial.
      Accordingly, in this [c]ourt’s view, the probative value of this

                                       -9-
J-S33002-23

      evidence is substantially outweighed by the severely prejudicial
      nature of the evidence.

      A second, important[] reason that this evidence should not be
      admitted is the risk of confusion of issues. The jury will, in effect,
      be put in a position to deliberate on four different cases, with four
      alleged different victims, concerning what happened in each
      episode of each of the four relationships. The risk of confusion of
      issues is substantial.

TCO at 5-6.

      On appeal, the Commonwealth claims that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying its motion in limine. It notes that the trial court found

the other-acts evidence to be relevant and probative here, yet the court

excluded the evidence over a concern with prejudice and possible confusion

for the jury. Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. In doing so, the Commonwealth

argues that the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating effect of a jury

instruction, noting that “[t]he law presumes that the jury will follow the

instructions of the court.    Absent evidence to the contrary, the jury is

presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions.” Id. at 24 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Chiemel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1184 (Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted)).    The Commonwealth proffers that the proper instruction could

prevent confusion for the jury and the need for the jury to deliberate on four

different cases. Id.

      Additionally, the Commonwealth claims that:

      The trial court was overly concerned with how consensual sexual
      relations at the start of each relationship established a unique
      situation as to [the] variety of sexual activities that would be
      tolerated or engaged in with approval, without giving due
      deference to the similar pattern of strangulation, forced isolation,
      threats to kill family members, threats with a deadly weapon, and

                                     - 10 -
J-S33002-23

     total control of communication with the world outside of
     [A]ppellee’s residence, which [A]ppellee imposed upon his
     victims.

Id. In support of its argument, the Commonwealth points us to the following

excerpt from the notes of testimony of the March 28, 2022 hearing on its

motion in limine:

     THE COURT: … So your side of the case is [Appellee] has the same
     motive to treat this Victim the way [he] has treated other people?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: That’s correct, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: What is his motive?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Exercise power and control over his intimate
     partner.

     THE COURT: So, in order to do that, you have to proffer evidence
     that that is something [Appellee] wants to do.

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, Judge.

     THE COURT: And what is your evidence that he wants to exercise
     power and control … over female intimate partners…?
                                   …

     [COMMONWEALTH]: The conduct in this case. He does things to
     isolate his intimate partners. He does things to impose physical
     pain, as well as mental constrictions.

     THE COURT: Do you have any evidence from prior incidents that
     he made statements to that effect? … That he made statements
     that he wants to control them?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: No.

     THE COURT: Okay. Anything else under [Rule] 404(b)?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Common scheme and plan.

     THE COURT: Why would you think that he has a common scheme
     or plan in relation to these other people as opposed to he had prior
     relationships, he treated people in a certain way in prior
     relationship [sic]? What is the common plan that they are all

                                    - 11 -
J-S33002-23

     connected?   Is there anything that suggests that they are all
     connected?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, Judge. Again, these are the acts of a
     domestic abuser. The way he engages in this conduct consistently
     across all of his relationships is —

     THE COURT: But what’s the common plan, scheme or design to –
     let’s say, again, victim 1, prior relationship, victim 2, prior
     relationship, what is the connection between 1 and 2, 2 and 3, 1
     and 3? What is it that makes it a common plan, scheme or design?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: He knows what he can get from each
     intimate partner as a submissive as he continues to do this
     relationship to relationship. That’s how they are all linked. One
     builds on the other, Judge. He is building on past experience to
     engage in the same conduct again, and then to do it more
     effectively.

     THE COURT: Any other category?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: I think to that same end, knowledge comes
     to mind where he knows this conduct was [sic] worked in the past
     to keep his survivors, victims, former intimate partners quiet or
     to not cooperate with authorities or to do his every will and
     whimsy. And the final category, Judge, that I have included in my
     motion would be an absence of mistake, specifically as it relates
     to —

     THE COURT: Let me just stop you there, and I don’t want to get
     too deep into this. But isn’t the sexual conduct between two
     consenting people and second people unique to that relationship?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: I don’t understand the question.

     THE COURT: You said earlier that there was consensual conduct;
     did you not?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, over the course of the conduct entirely,
     yes.

     THE COURT: So, again, I don’t get too factual about it, but let’s
     just assume the month of June of a given year, the first day of …
     their physical relationship was totally consensual. A little later,
     things are still consensual. In between that, events occur that
     you contend were not consensual. But that one might otherwise
     look at that conduct and say it could have been consensual since

                                   - 12 -
J-S33002-23

     the first one was and that last one; as opposed to somebody grabs
     somebody from behind and physically assaults them every single
     time. There is no consensual issue. Once you get into consensual,
     isn’t it unique to that relationship? What people agree to between
     them and what they —

     [COMMONWEALTH]: I don’t think I can agree with that, Your
     Honor. It’s subjective.

     THE COURT: It is subjective. That’s my point. It’s not common
     plan. These two agree that this high is the limit, and anything
     other than that is not consensual. These two people say this high
     is the limit. There might be some commonality at the very top of
     each of these relationships, but they are very unique in it [sic] of
     themselves; aren’t they?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, to a point. So, my point is each — it’s
     subjective insofar that each relationship is unique. I appreciate
     that. But what is objective is at some point, if somebody tells you
     no, and you continue to do something anyway, in this case as
     alleged, anal sex, that is no longer consensual. That is across the
     board with any relationship.
                                       …

     THE COURT: I am having trouble…. I haven’t excluded anything
     you’re proffering, but I am … having trouble accepting it at face
     value to the extent that … because once you concede that there
     was consensual sexual conduct in relationships, variations on the
     theme are problematic, in my view. If you put victim 1 — let’s
     say going back in time, again, I am using three. … So, if you go
     to victim 1 and that person says that he did this and I objected,
     but he did it anyway, it seems to me the nature of — if there is
     consensual conduct and how closely does the first case match the
     given case? How closely does the second case match the given
     case, as to make it 404(b)? … That’s the trouble with this.

     [COMMONWEALTH]: I went into specific facts in Paragraph 5 of
     our brief. A few of them are unique, so I will state them on the
     record. All victim[s are] white females in intimate relationships
     with [Appellee].

     THE COURT: Let me stop you. What does race have anything to
     do with it?

     [COMMONWEALTH]: I appreciate that, Judge. If it was an
     independent fact that I am solely relying on, I agree it would be

                                    - 13 -
J-S33002-23

      irrelevant, but in viewing these motions, their totality of the
      circumstances, and it is an additional fact that makes it consistent
      across his victimology. That is also something else I have to say
      after I go through the specifics of each of these cases. But in each
      case, [Appellee] is limiting their access to people outside of his
      residence. He is monitoring their communications or is blocking
      their access to them for people outside of the home. He uses
      assaults, threats and strangulation throughout each of these.
      There are some additional specific facts that relate to each of the
      victims that are unanimous throughout all of them, but are
      consistent with this case. One, a deadly weapon is threatened, as
      in this case. On two of these, … the victim’s family [is threatened]
      if they were to leave him or call police, as in this case. In one
      instance, … the victim had been tackled and carried back into
      [Appellee’s] residence when she ran out. In another case, … the
      victim ran to the neighbor’s house for her to finally call police.
      And in this case, … the Victim had to leave two separate notes in
      public places — in the women’s bathroom, where [Appellee] did
      not follow her in before she could finally break free. I think these
      are quite unique sets of facts.

                                       …

      THE COURT: I am having trouble with this….           I think it’s
      dangerously close to propensity. You could say, he is … a person
      who treats women badly. Every time he gets into a relationship
      with a woman, he treats her badly. He is disrespectful. He is
      abusive. He calls her names, whatever. That sounds like
      propensity, not anything else.

Id. at 14-20 (quoting N.T., 3/28/22, at 18-27, 30-31) (cleaned up).

      In its appellate brief, the Commonwealth clarifies:

      The pattern sought to be established is not so much one of sexual
      attack or proclivity for certain deviant sexual conduct as it is
      complete control and domination of a female partner and daily
      infliction of physical and psychological abuse in order to reduce
      her to an abject object stripped of any courage to protest or
      disclose the indignities and violence inflicted by [A]ppellee.

Id. at 24.

                                     - 14 -
J-S33002-23

     Moreover, the Commonwealth argues that because the uncorroborated

testimony of the Victim in the present case might reasonably lead the jury to

determine that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Appellee

committed the crimes charged, the other-acts evidence is necessary for the

prosecution of this case and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion in

denying the Commonwealth’s motion. Id. at 28 (citing Gordon, 673 A.2d at

869-70 (Pa. 1996) (determining that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying the Commonwealth’s motion for admission of other-crimes evidence

where such evidence was relevant to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake

or accident, and a common scheme or plan, and such evidence would not be

unduly prejudicial to the defendant)). We agree with the Commonwealth.

     As we stated in Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372 (Pa. Super.

2019), reversed on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Cosby, 252 A.3d 1092

(Pa. 2021):

     A   determination  of   admissibility     under    the   common
     plan/scheme/design exception

        must be made on a case[-]by[-]case basis in accordance
        with the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
        However, we recognize that in each case, the trial court is
        bound to follow the same controlling, albeit general,
        principles of law. When ruling upon the admissibility of
        evidence under the common plan exception, the trial
        court must first examine the details and surrounding
        circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that
        the evidence reveals criminal conduct which is
        distinctive and so nearly identical as to become the
        signature of the same perpetrator. Relevant to such
        a finding will be the habits or patterns of action or
        conduct undertaken by the perpetrator to commit
        crime, as well as the time, place, and types of victims

                                   - 15 -
J-S33002-23

         typically chosen by the perpetrator. Given this initial
         determination, the court is bound to engage in a careful
         balancing test to assure that the common plan evidence is
         not too remote in time to be probative. If the evidence
         reveals that the details of each criminal incident are nearly
         identical, the fact that the incidents are separated by a lapse
         of time will not likely prevent the offer of the evidence unless
         the time lapse is excessive.

Id. at 398 (quoting Commonwealth v. Frank, 577 A.2d 609, 614 (Pa. Super.

1990) (emphasis added).

      Of course, we further recognize

      the courts must make sure that evidence of such circumstances
      have some relevance to the case and are not offered solely to
      inflame the jury or arouse prejudice against the defendant. The
      court is not, however, required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all
      unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts
      are relevant to the issues at hand and form part of the history and
      natural development of the events and offenses for which the
      defendant is charged….

Commonwealth v. Bidwell, 195 A.3d 610, 617 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 501 (Pa. 1988) (emphasis added)).

      In the case sub judice, the record reveals the following similarities

between the underlying charged crimes in the present matter and the prior

bad acts proffered by the Commonwealth.           In each case, Appellee was

involved in an intimate relationship with the victim. All the victims were white

females, under the age of forty. In each instance, Appellee became angry

with the victims at some point, and then began physically and/or sexually

assaulting them.    Appellee strangled each of his victims.      He cut off their

communication to the outside world, restricted their movement, and closely

monitored them. In all but one case, Appellee threatened the victim with a

                                     - 16 -
J-S33002-23

deadly weapon and threatened to kill her family if she did not do what he

wanted.

      In determining the admissibility of the evidence regarding Appellee’s

prior relationships, we are guided by our Supreme Court’s decision in

Arrington, supra, in which the Commonwealth similarly sought to introduce

evidence of prior bad acts committed by the defendant against three other

girlfriends “for the … purpose of proving a common scheme to control

girlfriends through violence and intimidation.” Arrington, 86 A.3d at 842.

The testimony concerning Arrington’s treatment of other girlfriends

      [d]emonstrated       repeated     efforts to    preserve   intimate
      relationships through harassment, intimidation, and physical
      violence culminating in the use of a deadly weapon. In each
      instance, [Arrington]: (1) monitored his girlfriend’s daily
      activities; (2) resorted to violence when his partner wanted to end
      a relationship or interacted with other men; (3) inflicted head or
      neck injuries with his fist, a handgun, or an edged weapon; and
      (4) harmed or threatened to harm members of his girlfriend’s
      family or male acquaintances that he viewed as romantic rivals.

Id. (footnote omitted).

      In   Arrington,     the   trial   court    allowed   the   admission   of   the

Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b)(2) evidence and — after being convicted, inter

alia, of first-degree murder and sentenced to death — Arrington appealed,

arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his

other crimes. Id. at 840-41. See also id. at 842 (Arrington’s claiming that

“[t]hese matters were completely irrelevant and served only to inflame the

passions of the jury”).    On direct appeal, the Court determined that “the

aforementioned evidence was not introduced in an attempt to portray

                                        - 17 -
J-S33002-23

[Arrington] as a habitual criminal with a propensity for violent behavior[,]” but

rather, “to establish that [he] acted pursuant to a common plan or scheme.”

Id. at 844. “Given the shared characteristics of each relationship,” the Court

concluded that the evidence fell within the purview of Rule 404(b)(2), and that

Arrington’s claim failed. Id. at 844-45.

      We are further guided by Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114

(Pa. 2017), in which our Supreme Court acknowledged that it “has long

recognized an exception to the general inadmissibility of other crimes evidence

where there is a striking similarity — or logical connection — between the

proffered prior bad acts and the underlying charged crimes.” Id. at 1125. In

explaining the logical connection standard, the Court noted, “much more is

demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class,

such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual or

distinctive as to be like a signature.” Id. at 1125-26 (citation omitted). The

Hicks Court determined that evidence regarding the appellant’s prior

relationships with, and assaults upon, other women was “strikingly similar” to

the circumstances surrounding his relationship with the victim, her injuries,

and her subsequent death, such that there was a logical connection between

them for the purpose of a common plan or scheme where:

      In each case [the] appellant: (1) was introduced to drug-
      dependent women of similar body types for purposes of using
      drugs; (2) showed a sexual interest in the women, sometimes
      involving prostitution; (3) resorted to violence when the women
      behaved in a way he found disagreeable; (4) inflicted injuries on
      each woman by targeting her neck area with his hands, a sharp[-

                                     - 18 -
J-S33002-23

      ]edged object, or both; and (5) verbally threatened to kill each
      woman.

Id. at 1127 (footnote omitted). It explained that these similarities “are not

mere insignificant details of crimes of the same class, where there is nothing

distinctive to separate them from, for example, common street crimes.” Id.

at 1128.     See also id. (noting that these similarities constitute “a ‘virtual

signature’ for purposes of proving common scheme, intent and identity”).

      Having concluded that a logical connection existed between the other

crimes and the underlying charged crime, the Hicks Court stated that it must

next determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed any

unfair prejudice.      Id. (citations omitted).        “Obviously, the impact of

introducing evidence of other crimes is significant and may be highly

prejudicial.    However, such evidence is also highly probative when the

Commonwealth’s case is otherwise based largely on circumstantial evidence.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).     The Hicks Court deemed the evidence

regarding the appellant’s assaults on other women to be “relevant and

probative to show lack of accident, and that [the] appellant acted intentionally

in all instances with a common scheme: violently attacking a woman with

whom he engaged in drug use and sex, in the neck, after a disagreement.”

Id. at 1129.      Moreover, it stated, “the trial court’s detailed instructions

properly informed the jury of the limited and narrow purpose for which the

evidence was admitted and thus restricted any unfair prejudicial effect.” Id.

(citing Arrington, 86 A.3d at 845 (comprehensive limiting instructions to be

considered     when   balancing   probative    value    and   prejudicial   impact);

                                      - 19 -
J-S33002-23

Boczkowski, 846 A.2d at 89 (limiting instructions weigh in favor of upholding

admission of other bad acts evidence)).          Accordingly, the Hicks Court

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Rule

404(b)(2) evidence regarding other crimes, wrongs or acts by the appellant.

Id.

      Applying the foregoing case law to the instant matter and taking into

consideration Appellee’s habits and patterns of behavior, as well as the

characteristics of his chosen victims, we believe that the similar, relevant

details surrounding each incident demonstrate criminal conduct on the part of

Appellee that is sufficiently distinctive so as to establish that he engaged in a

common plan or scheme.       See Hicks, supra; Arrington, supra; Cosby,

supra.    See also Tyson, 119 A.3d at 360 n.3 (“The common scheme

exception does not require that the … scenarios be identical in every

respect.”); Cosby, 224 A.3d at 402 (“It is the pattern itself, and not the mere

presence of some inconsistencies between the various assaults, that

determines admissibility under [the Rule 404(b)(2)] exceptions.”).           The

evidence demonstrates that Appellee acted with a common scheme to control

and dominate his female, intimate partners through fear and intimidation,

isolating them from communication with family and friends, restricting their

movements, and inflicting violence — including strangulation.

      As such, we reject Appellee’s argument that the allegations made by his

prior victims “would be common to any other defendant charged with the

same set of crimes.”    Appellee’s Brief at 4.   See Tyson, 119 A.3d at 360

                                     - 20 -
J-S33002-23

(concluding that evidence of the appellee’s sexually assaulting two different

women was not “generically common to many sexual assault cases” but,

rather reflected “a clear pattern where [the a]ppellee was legitimately in each

victim’s home; [the a]ppellee was cognizant of each victim’s compromised

state; and [the a]ppellee had vaginal intercourse with each victim in her

bedroom in the middle of the night while the victim was unconscious”); but

see Bidwell, 195 A.3d at 618, 626-27 (affirming the trial court’s denial of the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of the

defendant’s prior violent behavior toward other women on the grounds that

“it was improper propensity evidence of [the defendant’s] prior, dissimilar

assaults on other women[,]” where the other women’s testimony did not

“evidence any particular distinctive pattern of behavior by [the defendant])”

(emphasis added).5

____________________________________________

5 The defendant/appellee in Bidwell was charged with criminal homicide of a

woman with whom he had been involved in a sexual relationship for
approximately one year prior to her death. In upholding the trial court’s
exclusion of evidence of Bidwell’s prior bad acts toward four other women, the
Bidwell Court reasoned that:
       The Commonwealth’s evidence failed to show that each woman
       was assaulted in the same manner or had been involved in a
       sexual relationship with [Bidwell,] or that [Bidwell] was under the
       influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of [each of] the
       encounters with the women. To the contrary, the women’s
       testimony establishes, at most, the commission of crimes or
       conduct in the past “of the same general class,” namely physical
       and/or sexual assaults. Their testimony does not evidence any
       particular distinctive pattern of behavior by [Bidwell] in that
       [Bidwell’s] allegedly abusive behavior appears to have been
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 21 -
J-S33002-23

       We further deem Appellee’s emphasis on the fact that the allegations of

his former intimate partners are “unproven” to be of no moment here. See

Appellee’s Brief at 4 (stating that this “severely impacts the probative value

of these accusations”). “Rule 404(b) is not limited to evidence of crimes that

have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in court. It encompasses both

prior crimes and prior wrongs and acts, the latter of which, by their nature,

often lack ‘definitive proof.’” Commonwealth v. Lockcuff, 813 A.2d 857,

____________________________________________

       triggered in each incident by different causes. For instance, it is
       alleged that [Bidwell] assaulted his [two ex-]wives during the
       course of their marriages, but he spontaneously attacked [another
       woman] whom he had just met while she interviewed for a job.
       [A fourth woman] indicated [Bidwell] did not physically accost her.
                                               …
       As the trial court found herein, the proposed testimony of [the
       four other women] does not establish a pattern of conduct on the
       part of [Bidwell] so distinctive that proof of one tends to prove the
       others. Instead, the prior bad acts testimony demonstrates that
       [Bidwell] was a domestic abuser of women, some of whom he was
       involved in ongoing romantic relationships in the past, but it does
       not show a unique “signature” modus operandi relevant to the
       [v]ictim’s murder.

Bidwell, 195 A.3d at 626-27. Unlike Bidwell, the Commonwealth’s evidence
in the instant matter establishes a distinctive pattern of behavior by Appellee,
in that after beginning a consensual intimate relationship with each of the
women, he became angry with them and began assaulting them; he strangled
each of them; he restricted their movement and cut off their communication
with friends and family; and in all but one case, he threatened to kill the
woman’s family. See Cosby, 224 A.3d at 404 (concluding that prior bad acts
evidence “established a distinct, signature pattern[ where the a]ppellant
presented himself as a mentor or potential mentor to much younger women
in order to establish trust, and then he abused that trust by drugging those
women in order to sexually assault them”); Id. (“This constitutes far more
distinctive behavior than the [prior bad acts] evidence of prior domestic abuse
considered by the Bidwell Court.”).

                                          - 22 -
J-S33002-23

861 (Pa. Super. 2002) (emphasis in original).             Essentially, Appellee’s

argument goes to the weight accorded to the evidence — not to its

admissibility — a decision which is clearly left to the fact-finder.     See id.

(noting that the appellee would be free to cross-examine the other-acts

witness on the facts surrounding her allegations and her memory of the

incident).

       Additionally, we do not deem the other-acts evidence so remote in time

as to negate its probative value.          The Commonwealth seeks to introduce

evidence from incidents that occurred in 2008, 2011, and 2017, and in the

present matter, 2021. Thus, although the total time span is fourteen years,

the time in between each incident is not more than six years. This Court has

held evidence admissible under the common scheme exception in the context

of even longer time lapses. See Commonwealth v. Aikens, 990 A.2d 1181,

1185 (Pa. Super. 2010) (determining that a ten-year lapse was not

excessive); Commonwealth v. Luktisch, 680 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(declaring that a six-year time lapse was not excessive).         Moreover, the

similarities of the prior bad acts with the instant matter render the time gap

between incidents even less important.6            See Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359

____________________________________________

6 The trial court acknowledges that the alleged conduct of Appellee in the prior

incidents is “virtually identical” to that alleged in the present case. See TCO
at 5 (noting “the conduct of the prior incidents is so graphic and virtually
identical to the facts of the instant case”). See also id. (stating that the
evidence proffered by the Commonwealth regarding the prior victims “mirrors
precisely the conduct charged against [Appellee] in this case”).

                                          - 23 -
J-S33002-23

(“Although remoteness in time is a factor to be considered in determining the

probative value of other crimes evidence under the theory of common scheme,

plan or design, the importance of the time period is inversely proportional to

the similarity of the crimes in question.”) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). See also id. at 361 (recognizing that the time gap between

incidents is only one factor in the common scheme analysis, but not the

dispositive factor).

      Finally, while we recognize that the other-acts evidence would be

prejudicial to Appellee, on the facts of this case, we do not believe it would be

unduly prejudicial, as it is vital to the Commonwealth’s case. See Gordon,

673 A.2d at 870 (concluding that the other crimes evidence would not be

unduly prejudicial where such evidence was required for the Commonwealth’s

case). See also id. (“[S]ince the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged

victim in this case might reasonably lead a jury to determine that there was a

reasonable doubt as to whether Gordon committed the crime charged, it is

fair to conclude that the other crimes evidence is necessary for the prosecution

of the case.”); Commonwealth’s Brief at 28 (stating that its case is largely

based on the uncorroborated testimony of the Victim). We agree with the

Commonwealth that the prejudicial effect of allowing the Rule 404(b)(2)

evidence can be mitigated by the trial court’s issuing cautionary instructions

to the jury. See Hicks, 156 A.3d at 1129 (declaring that the prejudicial effect

of the Commonwealth’s Rule 404(b) evidence was properly limited by the trial

court’s cautionary instructions to the jury); Boczkowski, 846 A.2d at 89

                                     - 24 -
J-S33002-23

(recognizing that limiting instructions weigh in favor of upholding admission

of other bad acts evidence); Commonwealth v. LaCava, 666 A.2d 221, 228

(Pa. 1995) (presuming that jurors will follow the court’s instructions).

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth has met

its burden of establishing that the testimony of Appellee’s former, intimate

partners is relevant to proving a common scheme or plan and that the

probative value of this evidence outweighs any potential for prejudice.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s April 20, 2022 order denying the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine and remand for further proceedings.

      Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

12/29/2023

                                     - 25 -