Court Opinion

ID: 9463841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:17:33.996866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:18.143542
License: Public Domain

BLUMENFELD, District Judge,
concurring:
Appellant has been convicted of criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) for obstruction of the administration of justice. As with most crimes, criminal contempt occurs only when there is a concurrence of a prohibited act and some form of criminal intent. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). This case requires an articulation of the precise nature of both of these elements of the offense. I agree that a conviction for criminal contempt in the context of this case cannot be based on a communication made solely with “wilful and wanton disregard of whether the jurors might hear it.” However, the standard for determining what conduct is prohibited merits further explication.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) prohibits misbehavior which rises to the level of an obstruction of the administration of justice. I do not agree that this element of the offense is satisfied merely because Smith’s conversations “had the tendency to influence improperly the actions of the jury.” Because the allegedly contemptuous conduct is comprised solely of speech, it is my view that a “tendency to influence” standard of wrongful conduct does not comport with the protections afforded by the First Amendment.1
In defining the proscribed conduct, the court’s opinion relies on Kelly v. United States, 250 F. 947 (9th Cir. 1918), cert, denied, 248 U.S. 585, 39 S.Ct. 182, 63 L.Ed. 433 (1919), in which two defense attorneys conversed with and bought drinks for two jurors during the course of the trial of their clients. However, the Kelly court was not dealing with pure speech as is involved in this case; as such, it did not consider the First Amendment implications that most be coped with here.2
At one time, the Supreme Court did find that speech having a “bad tendency” was not protected by the First Amendment, see, *253e. g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925); but, this test has been replaced by one affording greater First Amendment protection. The distinction between earlier and later cases may be narrow and nice, but it ought not be ignored.
In a series of cases beginning with Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941), continuing with Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946) and Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947) and culminating in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962), the Supreme Court has held that there must be a “clear and present danger” to the administration of justice before an out-of-court publisher of a statement may be punished for contempt. “Clear and present danger” has been described in the following way: “The fires which [the expression] kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.” Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. at 385, 82 S.Ct. at 1370, quoting, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. at 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249.
Of course, unlike any of the above cited cases, we are concerned here with communications to petit jurors, rather than to a judge or to a grand jury. I recognize that outside communications to a juror involve a greater vulnerability to the impartial administration of justice. The evil which may be engendered is that the jury will be so influenced as to be unable to render an impartial verdict after a complete trial solely on the evidence presented and on the law in conformity with the instructions of the court.3 However, this added risk of danger has no bearing on the proper First Amendment standard, but only on the proper application of that standard to the instant facts. Thus, while a clear and present danger to the administration of justice may be more easily found in a juror contact case than in other situations, the applicable First Amendment standard remains constant. Cf. Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972); see also, Nebraska Press Ass’n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).4
We deal here with a public trial which had some political overtones. The allegedly contemptuous conduct was comprised solely of speech expressing a view about the desirability of an income tax. The First Amendment requires speech constituting a clear and present danger to the administration of justice before a contempt sanction can be imposed. Therefore, in my opinion, a finding of a mere “tendency” to improperly influence jurors is not adequate to support a contempt conviction.

. Appellant argues that the First Amendment affects the requisite level of intent. However, the impact of the First Amendment is more properly directed to the type of conduct that may be deemed wrongful.

. The trial court relied upon Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 49 S.Ct. 471, 73 L.Ed. 938 (1929), in which the Court upheld criminal contempt convictions for detective surveillance of jurors. There, the Court found that it was not essential to show actual contact with a juror or that a juror had knowledge of being observed. Rather, “[t]he reasonable tendency of the acts done is the proper criterion.” Id. at 764, 49 S.Ct. at 476.
However, much like Kelly, Sinclair did not involve contemptuous conduct comprised solely of speech and the Court did not have to deal with the impact of the First Amendment on the appropriate standard of wrongful conduct. Therefore, the trial court’s reliance on Sinclair was misplaced. We are concerned here with ° speech expressing a political view on the desirability of an income tax, as distinguished from statements offering threats or bribes to a juror which are more akin to acts and, therefore, beyond the protection of the First Amendment.

. As Judge Learned Hand put it, the question to be asked is whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951).

. In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962), the Court distinguished the dangers involved in communications to a grand jury and to a petit jury. However, as I read its opinion, the Court did not reject the “clear and present danger” standard as being the proper test, but only commented that its application might result in a different conclusion in the highly sensitive context of contact with a petit juror.
Nor does the Court’s opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965), upholding a narrowly drawn Louisiana statute prohibiting picketing near a courthouse, lead to the conclusion that the “clear and present danger test” is inapplicable here. There, the Court was dealing with mixed speech and conduct, that is, picketing. In any event, the Court did not have to decide whether the clear and present danger test was applicable because it concluded that even if applied the test was met in the circumstances of that case.