Court Opinion

ID: 3141063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-10-22 17:53:05.220774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:12.711191
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                          NO. 5-05-0208
 Decision filed 03/29/06. The text of
 this decision may be changed or                     IN THE
 corrected prior to the filing of a
 Petition   for    Rehearing   or   the   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
 disposition of the same.
                             FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
                                       ) Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,             ) St. Clair County.
                                       )
v.                                     ) Nos. 04-CF-1307 & 04-CF-1309
                                       )
BRIAN HAMILTON,                        ) Honorable
                                       ) Annette A. Eckert,
      Defendant-Appellee.              ) Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE McGLYNN delivered the opinion of the court:

            The State appeals from a pretrial order that precluded the State from introducing the
now-deceased victim's bond revocation hearing testimony at the defendant's trial. The State

filed its certificate of impairment and appealed the decision. We affirm.

            Brian Hamilton (the defendant) was charged in late September 2004 with two felony

counts of domestic battery, pursuant to section 12-3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961

(720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2002)), for causing harm to Faith Hodges, a family or

household member. A bond revocation hearing related to one of the domestic battery charges
(which were at that time filed as misdemeanors) was held on June 11, 2004. At that hearing,

the defendant was not represented by counsel. Faith Hodges testified at the hearing and was
briefly cross-examined by the defendant. Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 2004, Faith
Hodges died. On March 9, 2005, the State filed a notice of intent to use Faith Hodges' bond

revocation hearing testimony at the defendant's trial. The defendant filed a motion to
suppress this testimony. Following a hearing, on March 31, 2005, the trial judge suppressed

the testimony, finding in part that the defendant had not adequately exercised his cross-

                                                       1
examination rights.
       At issue is whether the testimony of Faith Hodges, given in the context of a bond

revocation hearing, can be utilized in her absence, at the defendant's subsequent trial. An
argument advanced by the defendant in the trial court, but not specifically addressed by the
trial judge, was that section 110-6(f)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the

Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6(f)(3) (West 2002)) specifically precludes the use of any transcript
of a bond revocation hearing in the State's case in chief. Because a determination of this
issue could be outcome determinative, we turn to this issue first.

       While we review a trial court's decision to disallow the introduction of hearsay

testimony on an abuse-of-discretion standard (see People v. Boyd, 307 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997,
719 N.E.2d 306, 310 (1999)), statutory language interpretation requires a de novo review (see

People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 590, 708 N.E.2d 350, 353 (1999)).

       Section 110-6(f)(3) of the Code specifies that if a defendant is out on bond for

domestic battery against a family or household member, as statutorily defined, and the
defendant commits another domestic battery against the same victim, "the court shall revoke

the bail of the defendant and hold the defendant for trial without bail." 725 ILCS 5/110-

6(f)(3) (West 2002). The statute further provides, "Neither the finding of the court nor any
transcript or other record of the hearing shall be admissible in the State's case in chief, but

[they] shall be admissible for impeachment[] or [as a prior inconsistent statement] or in a
perjury proceeding." 725 ILCS 5/110-6(f)(3) (West 2002).
       The State admits that factually this case is in line with the requirements of section

110-6(f)(3). The defendant was charged with domestic battery on a second occasion
involving the same victim. The victim was a household member. The defendant had been
out on bond in between the acts resulting in the two charged crimes. However, the State

argues that this statute does not apply to this case because the trial judge did not revoke the

                                              2
defendant's bail bond as the statute contemplated. The State theorizes that the prohibition
would only become effective if the State prevailed at the bond revocation hearing. Because

the trial judge did not revoke bond in this case, the State argues that it cannot be precluded
from using the witness's testimony at the defendant's trial.
        We find the State's argument to be unpersuasive. Whether or not the trial court

complied with the dictates of this statute relative to bond revocation, we find that the express
wording and intent of the statute would preclude the State's requested use, at the defendant's
trial on the domestic battery charges, of the victim's testimony taken during the bond

revocation hearing. The statute clearly precludes the State from using the hearing transcript

at the trial.
        Section 115-10.4 of the Code authorizes the use of prior hearsay statements when the

witness is deceased. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.4 (West Supp. 1999). This section was enacted on

July 30, 1999, and was in effect on August 5, 2003, when the legislature amended section

110-6(f)(3) to include the reference to felony domestic battery. 725 ILCS 5/110-6(f)(3)
(West Supp. 2003). Consequently, if the legislature intended to allow bond revocation

testimony in the situation when the witness is deceased, that exception could have easily been

included. That exception was not included, and where, as here, the meaning of the statutory
language is clear, we will give effect to that language (Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439,

444-45, 764 N.E.2d 19, 23 (2002)).
        We realize that the trial court's decision on the admissibility of the testimony was
reached using different grounds. We reach this decision on slightly different grounds than

the trial court used, but because our review is de novo, we can affirm the trial court's decision
on other grounds (People v. Dakuras, 172 Ill. App. 3d 865, 870, 527 N.E.2d 163, 167 (1988);
Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill. 2d 496, 502, 520 N.E.2d 37, 39

(1988)).

                                               3
      Because of our decision, we do not reach the issue of whether the statement would
have been admissible in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
      For the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County is hereby
affirmed.

      Affirmed.

      WELCH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

                                             4
                                         NO. 5-05-0208
                                             IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                  FIFTH DISTRICT
___________________________________________________________________________________
      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
                                            ) Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellant,             ) St. Clair County.
                                            )
      v.                                    ) Nos. 04-CF-1307 & 04-CF-1309
                                            )
      BRIAN HAMILTON,                       ) Honorable
                                            ) Annette A. Eckert,
           Defendant-Appellee.              ) Judge, presiding.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed:   March 29, 2006
___________________________________________________________________________________

Justices:          Honorable Stephen P. McGlynn, J.
                 Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J., and
                 Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,
                 Concur
___________________________________________________________________________________

Attorneys        Hon. Robert Haida, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, 10 Public Square,
for              Belleville, IL 62220; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy
Appellant        Director, Patrick D. Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys
                 Appellate Prosecutor, 730 E. Illinois Highway 15, Suite 2, P.O. Box 2249,
                 Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys        Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Dan W. Evers, Assistant Defender, Office
for              of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial District, 117 North Tenth Street,
Appellee         Suite #300, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864
___________________________________________________________________________________