Court Opinion

ID: 9707966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:26:10.015119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.580814
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
concurring in result only.
Where the evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not the owner is directing or controlling the operation of the automobile, the question is for the jury. See Davis v. Spindler, 156 Neb. 276, 56 N. W. 2d 107.
On the facts here, it seems apparent that Robert N. Hickman’s conduct as a matter of law did not amount to direction and control of the operation of the car at the time the accident actually occurred. He had finished the task for which he had requested Mrs. Grassmeyer to drive slowly and stop. When he had counted the calves, he said: “They are all there” and then leaned over and began to move some tools under his feet. From that point on, he was only a passenger. Even if his conduct should be held to constitute an exercise of control or the temporary assumption of the operation of the automobile, that control of operation was clearly over before Mrs. Grassmeyer began to drive the automobile again. If a request to drive slowly or to stop for a few moments at a designated location constitutes assuming control and directing the operation of an automobile, then virtually any statement which includes such a request would constitute not only an immediate assumption of control, but would also extend that control to the end of whatever journey the parties were taking, under the theories advanced by the majority opinion. This is neither logical nor reasonable. A request by an owner *613passenger for a stop to permit him to get a newspaper at the start of a journey would then raise a jury issue as to whether any negligence of the driver coming after the request had been complied with should or should not be imputed to the owner. Even a stop request necessitated by an owner’s urgent need for service station facilities would raise a jury question as to assumption of control of the automobile thereafter.
A more important problem here arises over the basic issue of imputation of negligence. The individual for whose death this action was brought apparently took no action, and did not even utter a word from the time the journey began. Yet it is left to the jury to determine whether or not her husband’s requests to the driver made the negligence of the driver imputable to him, and then, because the husband is the sole beneficiary, barred him from any recovery against the defendant for her death.
The doctrine of imputed contributory negligence, which developed largely in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, was based on theories of fictitious agency relationships. It is now generally recognized that such theories of agency are entirely fictitious and the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence has been largely discredited. See Restatement, Torts 2d, § 485, p. 541, et seq.
Section 485, Restatement, Torts 2d, states: “Except as stated in §§ 486, 491, and 494, a plaintiff is not barred from recovery by the negligent act or omission of a third person.” Comment a under section 485 states.: “The rule stated in this Section rejects, except as indicated by the reference to other Sections, the doctrine of ‘imputed contributory negligence,’ under which the plaintiff is barred from recovery against the defendant because the negligence of a third person, with whom the plaintiff stands in some relation, has contributed to his harm. * * *” Comment b outlines the exceptions referred to in section 485. These exceptions do not apply here. Comment c then states: “With these exceptions, the common law no longer imputes the negligence of a *614third person to the plaintiff to bar his recovery for the harm he has suffered, even in situations where he would be liable for that negligence as a defendant in an action brought by a third person.”
The major change in judicial position occurring between the First and Second Restatement is clearly reflected in section 485. There is a definite turn around as to imputed contributory negligence and the old “both-ways test.” See, Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 Yale L. J. 831; 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, c. 23, p. 1264; Prosser, (4th Ed.) Torts, § 72, p. 475; Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N. W. 2d 540 (1966).
In addition to the fundamental imputed negligence problem, the majority opinion also applies the rule that under our death statute, where the sole beneficiary is guilty of negligence more than slight as a matter of law, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. That rule in itself is quite correct, but the Nebraska cases cited, and indeed virtually all of the cases supporting the point, involve the personal negligence of the sole beneficiary. With that principle there can be little quarrel. However, the majority opinion assumes that a sole beneficiary is personally negligent whenever he is vicariously responsible for the negligence of the driver. This simply does not follow and it constitutes an even more obvious misapplication of the discredited imputed contributory negligence doctrine. The majority opinion on policy issues may be generated partially from the constricting provisions of the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Guest Act. Nevertheless, the opinion does not march to the beat of the modern judicial drum.