Court Opinion

ID: 9531979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:47.411029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:38.570414
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(concurring). I would reverse the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board and award plaintiff compensation from the Second Injury Fund. (I do not, however, base this decision on provisions relied upon by the majority.) Although there is agreement with the result of the opinion of the Chief Justice, there is disagreement as to the reasoning.

FACTS

The facts are adequately detailed in the opinion of Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh. However, I spe*152cifically note this portion of the Appeal Board’s opinion citing certain
"concessions of the Second Injury Fund and the prior factual holdings of the Referee which were left uncontested on review there now can be only one finding and that is that the loss of plaintiffs right arm is traceable to an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Ford Motor Co. in 1930. Ford Motor Co. was subject to the provisions of the Compensation Statute which were in effect in 1930.”
I accept such a finding for purposes of this opinion only.

MCLA 412.10(b); MSA 17.160(b)

Plaintiff seeks compensation under the provisions of MCLA 412.9(a); MSA 17.159(a). As applicable that section provided that determinations of permanent and total disability were to be made in accordance with definitions contained in MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1) and MCLA 412.10(b); MSA 17.160(b).
The latter provision reads in part:
"Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9, means:
"(7) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.”
Plaintiffs present condition results from the effects of two separate injuries. His right arm was injured in 1930 but it remained industrially useful until 1961. In 1955 plaintiffs left arm was injured and rendered permanently industrially useless.
*153Under applicable law, plaintiffs compensation for the 1955 injury extended 500 weeks. At the end of that period he filed an application for further benefits claiming he was permanently and totally disabled. The referee found that plaintiffs right arm became industrially useless on April 15, 1961. Such result was attributed solely to the 1930 injury.
The opinion of my colleague assumes that a decision in this matter depends upon the interpretation of MCLA 412.10(b)(7). I do not believe that section is applicable.
It is my contention that any disability regarded as total and permanent under § 10(b)(7) must result from one injury and not successive injuries. Section 9, which relies in part upon the definition in § 10(b)(7) speaks of the worker’s "injury” and "the date of injury”. Section 10(b)(7) speaks of "the date of injury”.
A review of cases demonstrates that § 10(b)(7) should be applied to a disability resulting from a single work-related accident. See our recent decisions in DeGeer v DeGeer Farm Equipment Co, 391 Mich 96; 214 NW2d 794 (1974) (effects of back injury possibly resulting in industrial loss of the use of legs) and Burke v Ontonagon Road Commission, 391 Mich 103; 214 NW2d 797 (1974) (effects of injury to one leg resulting in permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs). Also see Louagie v Merritt Chapman & Scott, 382 Mich 274; 170 NW2d 13 (1969).
In Clark v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 140; 139 NW2d 714 (1966), plaintiff suffered an industrial accident resulting in the amputation of his left hand and the thumb, index and middle fingers of his right hand. He received compensation for the specific loss of each hand. This Court said that *154subsequent to the payments for the specific losses, plaintiff was entitled to benefits for being permanently and totally disabled. Also see Goss v Top O'Michigan Rural Electric Co, 34 Mich App 454; 191 NW2d 491 (1971).
The plaintiff in Paulson v Muskegon Heights Tile Co, 371 Mich 312; 123 NW2d 715 (1963) was injured in an automobile accident which occurred in the course of his employment. An ultimate result was that the worker experienced substantial internal pain whenever he stood up or walked. The Court rejected the employer’s argument that § 10(b)(7) required a direct injury to the legs and said plaintiff’s "disability would seem fairly within the scope of the statute”. Also see Lockwood v Continental Motors Corp and Second Injury Fund, 27 Mich App 597; 183 NW2d 807 (1970).
The Court in Springer v Reed Foundry & Machine Co, 346 Mich 11; 77 NW2d 252 (1956) noted that no question was raised "but that plaintiff is permanently and totally disabled due to an injury sustained on December 24, 1943”. The injury resulted from inhaling coke gas. As a result, he became insane. Also see Edwards v Michigan Light Alloys Corp, 346 Mich 169; 77 NW2d 567 (1956).
In Rench v Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co, 286 Mich 314; 282 NW 162 (1938), the plaintiff sustained an injury while operating a punch press. He lost both thumbs, two fingers of his right hand and three fingers of his left. After a review of cases discussing loss of industrial use, the Court agreed that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Also see Rupp v Hutter Construction Co, 288 Mich 105; 284 NW 662 (1939).
The plaintiff in Dubey v Brunswick Lumber Co, 272 Mich 445; 262 NW 284 (1935) was struck in the left eye, lost his vision and was compensated. *155He subsequently lost the sight of his right eye. This loss resulted from the previous injury to the left eye. This Court affirmed an order which found the worker permanently and totally disabled. Compare cases discussed in my dissent in Hilton v Oldsmobile Division of General Motors Corp, 390 Mich 43; 210 NW2d 316 (1973).
These cases indicate that § 10(b)(7) is concerned with total and permanent disability which results from a single work-related incident.
Further textual support for this interpretation of § 10(b)(7) is found in MCLA 412.10(c); MSA 17.160(c) which reads:
"The amounts specified in this clause are all subject to the same limitations as to maximum and minimum as above stated. In case of the loss of 1 member while compensation is being paid for the loss of another member, compensation shall be paid for the loss of the second member for the period herein provided, payments to begin at the conclusion of the payments for the first member.”
Only § 10(a) specifies amounts to be paid and prescribes limitations. Section 10(c) provides for payment of compensation when one member is lost while compensation is being paid for a prior loss of a member. The Legislature, by specifically providing payment for the results of successive injuries, indicated that such are not covered by § 10(b)(7).

MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1)

This does not mean that a worker rendered totally and permanently disabled by successive injuries is without remedy. In MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1) the Legislature provided:
"If an employee has at the time of injury permanent *156disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability after subtracting the amount of ■ compensation received by the employee for both such losses. The payment of compensation under this section shall begin at the conclusion of the payments made for the second permanent disability. Such payment shall be made upon the order of the department.”
This dovetails with the language of § 10(c) as payment for the total and permanent disability do not begin until "the conclusion of the payments made for the second permanent disability.”
The Appeal Board did not believe that the requirements of § 8a were satisfied. Such a decision does not under the facts of this particular case coincide with either the spirit or intent of the law.
Mr. Buchau has been twice injured while in the course of his employment. One injury resulted in the loss of the use of his right arm. The other resulted in the loss of the use of his left arm. The sum of these results equals total and permanent disability under § 8a. I believe that the Legislature clearly intended that section to encompass cases such as plaintiff’s. It is logically inconsistent to deny him benefits because the arthritic condition resulting from the prior broken bone did not completely disable the right arm until 1961 and after the second injury.
The broad language used in § 8a and subsequently the even broader language used in the 1969 Workmen’s Compensation Act and specifically in the provisions for the Second Injury Fund now appearing as MCLA 418.521; MSA 17.237(521) *157lead me to interpret the provision in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The intent was to compensate workmen for successive injuries which leave them totally and permanently disabled. To hold that plaintiff does not qualify because the first injury was not permanently disabling until after the second would promote inflexibility and deny legislative intent.
In § 2.20 of his treatise on Workmen’s Compensation Law, Larson says the social philosophy behind such laws
"is the desirability of providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source.”
See Whetro v Awkerman, 383 Mich 235; 174 NW2d 783 (1970), Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis, Division of National Lead Co, 358 Mich 510; 100 NW2d 226 (1960) and Crilly v Ballou, 353 Mich 303; 91 NW2d 493 (1958).
I believe Mr. Buchau is entitled to compensation for his total and permanent disability under the provisions of §§ 8a and 9a. I would remand to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for entry of the appropriate award.
The 1969 act also provides in subsection (3):
"Any person who prior to July 1, 1968, has been receiving or is entitled to receive benefits from the second injury fund pursuant to any prior provisions of the workmen’s compensation law shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such benefits from such fund * * * .”
Plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation *158from the Second Injury Fund. Under the facts of this case, payments should be made solely from the fund.
I would reverse and remand to Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for entry of an award not inconsistent with this opinion.
T. G. Kavanagh, Levin, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ., did not sit in this case.