Court Opinion

ID: 9434808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:56:11.048911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:53.899418
License: Public Domain

Justice Souter,
dissenting.
After the Court of Appeals denied the certificate of ap-pealability (COA) necessary for Medellin to appeal the District Court’s denial of his claim for relief under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, we granted certiorari on two questions bearing on the order barring further appeal: (1) whether the judgment of the International Court of Jus*691tice (ICJ) in Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (Avena), supporting petitioner’s right to litigate a claimed violation of the Convention, and to litigate free of state and federal procedural bars, is preclusive in our domestic courts; and (2) whether Avena and the IC J’s earlier judgment in LaGrand Case (F. R. G. v. U. S.), 2001 I. C. J. 466 (Judgment of June 27), are at least entitled to enforcement for the sake of comity or uniform treaty interpretation. Prior to argument here, the President advised the Attorney General that the United States would discharge its international obligations under the Avena judgment “by having State courts give effect to the decision.” Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), App. 2 to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9a. Medellin accordingly has gone back to state court in Texas to seek relief on the basis of the Avena judgment and the President’s determination. Since action by the Texas courts could render moot the questions on which we granted certiorari (not to mention the subsidiary issues spotted in the per curiam and dissenting opinions), I think the best course for this Court would be to stay further action for a reasonable time as the Texas courts decide what to do; that way we would not wipe out the work done in this case so far, and we would not decide issues that may turn out to require no action. We would, however, remain in a position to address promptly the Nation’s obligation under the judgment of the IC J if that should prove necessary.
Because a majority of the Court does not agree to a stay, I think the next best course would be to take up the questions on which certiorari was granted, to the extent of their bearing on the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that there was no room for reasonable disagreement, meriting a COA, about Medellin’s right to relief under the Convention. The Court of Appeals understandably thought itself constrained by our decision in Breard v. Greene, 523 U. S. 371 (1998) (per *692curiam), which the court viewed as binding until this Court said otherwise. It is of course correct to face the possibility of saying otherwise today, since Medellin’s case now presents a Vienna Convention claim in the shadow of a final ICJ judgment that may be entitled to considerable weight, if not pre-clusive effect. This case is therefore not Breará, and the Court of Appeals should be free to take a fresh look.
That is one of several reasons why I join Justice O’Con-nor’s dissenting opinion, but I do so subject to caveats. We should not at this point limit the scope of proceedings on remand; the issues outlined in Part III-B of Justice O’Con-nor’s opinion are implicated here by Medellin’s request that domestic courts defer to the ICJ for the sake of uniform treaty interpretation. Whether these issues would be open for consideration by the Court of Appeals in their own right, independent of the IC J’s judgment, is not before us here, nor should our discussion of them and other matters in Part III be taken as limiting the enquiry by the Court of Appeals, were a remand possible. I would, however, limit further proceedings by providing that the Court of Appeals should take no further action until the anticipated Texas litigation responding to the President’s position had run its course, since action in the Texas courts might remove any occasion to proceed under the federal habeas petition. Taking Justice O’Connor’s proposed course subject to this limitation would eliminate the risk of further unnecessary federal rulings, but would retain federal jurisdiction and the option to act promptly, which petitioner deserves after litigating this far.
Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.
I agree with Justice Ginsburg that, in light of recent developments, this Court should simply grant Medellin’s motion for a stay. See ante, at 668 (concurring opinion); see *693also ante, at 691 (Souter, J., dissenting). But, in the absence of majority support for a stay, I would vacate the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remand the case rather than simply dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. I join JUSTICE O’Connor’s dissent, for she would do the same. See ante, at 677, 690.
For one thing, Medellin’s legal argument that “American courts are now bound to follow the ICJ’s decision in Avena” is substantial, and the Fifth Circuit erred in holding the contrary. Ante, at 682 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see 371 F. 3d 270, 279-280 (2004). By vacating its judgment and remanding the case, we would remove from the books an erroneous legal determination that we granted certiorari to review.
Nor would a remand “invite the Fifth Circuit to conduct proceedings rival to those” unfolding in the Texas courts. Ante, at 668 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Rather, I should expect the Fifth Circuit to recognize two practical circumstances that favor its entering a stay. See ante, at 690 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also ante, at 692 (Souter, J., dissenting).
First, the President has decided that state courts should follow Avena. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. No. 128 (Judgment of Mar. 31); George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), App. 2 to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9a. And that fact permits Medellin to argue in the Texas courts that the President’s determination — taken together with (1) the self-executing nature of the treaty, (2) the Nation’s signature on the Optional Protocol, (3) the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) determination that the United States give Medellin (and 50 other Mexican nationals) “judicial,” i. e., court, “review and reconsideration” of their Convention-based claims, “by means of [the United States’] own choosing,” and (4) the United States’ “undertaking] ” in the United Nations Charter to *694comply with ICJ judgments — requires Texas to follow the Avena decision in Medellín’s case. Avena, supra, ¶¶ 138-143, 153(9) (emphasis added); Charter of the United Nations, Art. 94.1, 59 Stat. 1051; cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 237 (1796) (treaties “superior to the Constitution and laws of any individual state” (emphasis deleted)); Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 188 (1993) (President possesses “unique responsibility” for the conduct of “foreign ... affairs”); see also American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 414-416 (2003) (President has a degree of independent authority to pre-empt state law); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Arts. 11.01,11.071 (Vernon 2005) (Texas courts possess jurisdiction to hear Medellin’s claims).
Second, several Members of this Court have confirmed that the federal questions implicated in this case are important, thereby suggesting that further review here after the Texas courts reach their own decisions may well be appropriate. See ante, at 672 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (it is “this Court’s responsibility” to address and resolve any significant legal IC J-related issues that may arise in the state-court proceedings).
The first consideration means that Medellin’s claims when considered in state court are stronger than when considered in federal court — and suggests the very real possibility of his victory in state court. The second consideration means that a loss in state court would likely be followed by review in this Court. Taken together they mean that, by staying the case on remand, the Fifth Circuit could well avoid the need for any further federal proceedings, or at least obtain additional guidance from this Court before taking further action. Given these practical circumstances, it seems to me unlikely that, were we to remand this case, the Fifth Circuit would move forward on its own, rather than stay its hand until the conclusion of proceedings in the state courts and possibly here.
*695For these reasons and those set forth by Justice O’Con-nor, I agree with the course of action she suggests and respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to dismiss the writ.