Court Opinion

ID: 9790944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:01:51.556626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.757958
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting from the majority opinion and joining in Justice CAR-DINE'S dissenting opinion.1
In the case at bar, I would dissent from what the Chief Justice holds as he authors the majority opinion. But I would hold with him when he wrote in State v. Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786, 788 (1981):
“A bill of exceptions is the exclusive means for the prosecution to seek review of an adverse ruling made during the trial. State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976); State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906). It is now a statutory proceeding, and the statutory requirements *531must be met. State v. Ginther, supra, and State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra.”
And I would hold with Chief Justice Raper (now retired) when he wrote in State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976):
“A bill of exceptions is the only way by which the State may challenge and have reviewed any adverse ruling of the district court in criminal prosecutions. State v. Benales, Wyo.1961, 365 P.2d 811; State v. Ginther, 1938, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803. Even then, as provided in § 7-291, W.S.1957 [now § 7-12-105, W.S. 1977]:
“ ‘The judgment of the court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar ease which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.’ ”
It is, therefore, my judgment in this appeal that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. I say this for the reason that it is my firm opinion, as I have previously expressed in State v. Heiner, 680 P.2d 478 No. 83-83, decided May 15, 1984, that this court lacks jurisdiction to in criminal proceedings consider trial-court rulings in criminal proceedings which are adverse to the State of Wyoming unless they are presented here through the statutory bill-of-exceptions procedure.2
In State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906), Chief Justice Potter, speaking for a unanimous court, wrote:
“⅜ ⅜ * It is only upon a compliance with the provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the District Court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions.” (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
Originally, in the case at bar, the Attorney General petitioned for a bill of exceptions in reliance upon §§ 7-12-102 through 7-12-105, W.S.1977, Wyoming’s bill-of-exceptions statutes. Thereafter, and for reasons which remain undisclosed — at least to me — he withdrew the petition and, in its stead, filed a petition for a writ of certiora-ri — a request which calls for the employment of an appellate remedy with respect to which only a bill of exceptions furnishes this court with jurisdiction and for which there is no other constitutional implementing authority contained anywhere in the criminal statutes of the State of Wyoming.
In Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 183, 83 P. 218 (1905), discussed infra, we held that the *532appellate authority contemplated for this court under Art. 5, § 2 must be implemented by legislatively enacted rules and regulations as conceived by Art. 5, § 2 and Art. 5, § 18.3 Mau holds unequivocally for the proposition that it was the intention of the legislature that rights and methods of appeal would be left to the legislature and that — absent implementing legislation — a litigant is possessed of no right of appeal. This would include the exercise of this court’s constitutional certiorari authority since certiorari is an instrument of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under Art. 5, § 3, supra n.2.
On June 28, 1983, and by authority of a majority of the court, the Chief Justice— again without implementing statutory authority and in spite of the exclusory characteristics of the bill-of-exceptions statutes, and thus without jurisdiction — signed an order granting certiorari in the case at bar to which I appended this dissenting statement:
“I would deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and would have voted to grant the Petition for Bill of Exceptions which was first submitted by the Attorney General and later withdrawn.”
In the majority opinion, the author writes:
“This matter is before us on a Writ of Certiorari,”
and one of the issues is identified as follows:
“ ‘Does a writ of certiorari lie to review the district court decision dismissing the charges based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction?’ ”
Concerning the propriety of granting cer-tiorari, the majority say:
“The propriety of a writ of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983), and in State v. Heiner, 680 P.2d 478 (Wyoming Supreme Court, No. 83-83, decided May 15, 1984). * * * The issue in this case involves a constitutional question and is of great public import. However, we do serve notice on the bar that we will exercise our discretion to grant certiorari only in unusual circumstances and upon rare occasions.”
I take issue (a) with the part of the above-quoted conclusion which says:
“The propriety of a writ of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel, * * * and in State v. Heiner * * *,”
because, in the case at bar, the petitioner is the State of Wyoming and not the City (as was the case in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983)), and, therefore, the bill of exceptions is the State’s only avenue of appeal, and (b) with the implication that this court is possessed of
“ * * * discretion to grant certiorari * * in unusual circumstances [such as those presented by the facts of this appeal by the State of Wyoming],”
because the court cannot exercise “discretion” where it has no jurisdiction.
City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, did not hold, as the majority assert, that this *533court would or could entertain writs of certiorari where the petitioner is the State of Wyoming as it is here. In the City of Laramie case, the City petitioned for a bill of exceptions — not the State — and we entertained the petition as though it were for certiorari. Where, however, the State seeks relief through certiorari, this court has no appellate jurisdiction since the State’s only method of reviewing a trial court’s ruling which is adverse to the State in a criminal prosecution is by way of the bill-of-exceptions procedure, supra n. 2.
We held in State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803, 807 (1938):
“Our view of the law accordingly is that the prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by statute no method of review of adverse rulings except through the medium indicated in the four above cited sections [the bill of exceptions proceeding], with the limitations there imposed.” (Emphasis added.)
In reliance upon Ginther, supra, we held to the same effect in State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976) and also in State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961).
In State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, 85 P. at 979, Chief Justice Potter said:
“ * * * ¾⅛ it is obvious, we think, that the bill⅜ ⅜ * is the basis of the jurisdiction of this court. It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed by the statute.” (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, under previously unassailed and well-reasoned authority of this court, where the State of Wyoming seeks certio-rari in a criminal appeal,4 it must be denied for lack of jurisdiction. Even though there was no statutory implementing authorization for granting certiorari in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra,5 we granted the writ under the precedent contained in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916).6 In the City of Sheridan case, the petitioner was the City and therefore was at least not precluded from seeking appellate relief by reason of the exclusory aspects of the bill-of-exceptions proceeding.
Calling up City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, as our authority, we said, in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, that the bill-of-exceptions provisions of the statute
“ * * * were not applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense against the laws of the State of Wyoming and this statutory proceeding [bill of exceptions] was not available with respect to a prosecu*534tion in a municipal court for violation of an ordinance.” Citing City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra. 671 P.2d at 343.
In City of Laramie v. Mengel, we then went on to assume that we had certiorari jurisdiction as we relied upon the following language from the opinion in City of Sheridan v. Cadle:
“This not being a civil case, there seems to be no provision giving the city a right of appeal to this court. We think, therefore, that the writ might be issued to determine the question of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the appeal in which the order complained of was made.” 157 P. at 895-896.
I do not for a moment suggest that this court may never exercise its certiorari appellate authority under the present condition of the Constitution, statutes and case authority of this state. We approved the following concept in Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954):
“ * * * In 14 C.J.S., Certiorari § 40, p. 189, it is said: ‘It seems to be the general rule that in a proper case a party entitled to appeal or to pursue some other remedy, who has lost the right through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, may have a remedy by certiorari, provided there is a showing of probable merits and freedom from fault.’ See also 10 Am.Jur. 531, 532, § 7.” 278 P.2d at 275.
Consistent with this proposition, I would hold that, in the circumstances described and where jurisdiction is conceded in that the right of appeal is statutorily authorized, this court could and should — in the furtherance of justice — call upon its discretionary authority to consider the utilization of certiorari.
I would refer to Bosler v. Morad, Wyo., 555 P.2d 567 (1976) as presenting an example of the situation in which the writ might well have been utilized instead of reversing the district court’s order denying a motion for an extention of time under Rule 73(a), W.R.C.P. This rule provides that the court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing of neglect. In Bos-ler, the notice was timely mailed but not received until after the expiration of the time permitted for appeal and therefore the appellant was possessed of a right of appeal which he had lost through no fault of his own. In these circumstances, a writ should issue rather than testing the trial court’s discretionary denial of the motion to extend the time for the filing of the notice of appeal on the grounds of excusable neglect.
I would, therefore, emphasize that, in the ease at bar, it is with the majority’s assumption that this court is possessed of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in spite of the exclusive remedy provided by the bill-of-exceptions statutes, supra n. 2, and the fact that no other certiorari-imple-menting statutes are in place, that I take issue with the majority opinion, and I do not address the question which asks whether or not — assuming jurisdiction — the writ was otherwise lawfully employed.7 It is, therefore, in the jurisdictional context of our difference that I charge the majority with taking unwarranted liberty with our holding in City of Laramie v. Mengel when the majority opinion in the case at bar says:
“The propriety of a writ of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel * * * and in State v. Heiner * * *."
This court is having a problem with writs of certiorari in criminal prosecutions right now and the reason is that the majority of the members — for whatever reason — have decided that the statutory bill of exceptions furnishes an inadequate State appellate remedy in any given prosecution in which an adverse decision to the State’s position is announced. It is, of course, conceded by all concerned that the defendant in whose prosecution the question is raised will be affected by this court’s holding in response *535to a writ of certiorari, while this is not so where we respond to issues presented to us within the framework of the bill of exceptions. This has led the court to wander off into the horse latitudes8 in its effort to impress its appellate decisions upon the particular defendant in whose prosecution the State has received its adverse ruling. The majority have pursued this course even though the court lacks jurisdiction since the bill-of-exceptions procedure is an exclusive remedy in these circumstances, State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, and for the further reason that other necessary statutes implementing the court’s constitutional certiorari authority are not in place as required by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 and articulated by Mau v. Stoner, supra, discussed infra.
The bedrock concept which this court has ignored in the course of contemplating the proper utilization of its constitutional cer-tiorari authority is the tenet which says that — given the provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, statutes and case law — a right of appeal to this court, even though constitutionally authorized, may not be given effect unless the constitutional authority is implemented by statute and, when so implemented, the right is exclusive and must be followed with particularity.
This court noted long ago that the common-law rule is that the State has no right to appeal adverse criminal rulings unless the right is expressly given. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659 holds the common-law rule to be:
“Under the common law as generally understood and administered in the United States, the state or federal government has no right to a writ of error, to an appeal, or to exceptions in a criminal case unless it is expressly conferred by * * * statute * * * ” (emphasis added),
citing Wyoming’s State v. Benales, supra, and State v. Ginther, supra, for the proposition that Wyoming is one of the states that holds to this rule of the common law.
In State v. Ginther we said:
“It seems generally held under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * *.” 77 P.2d at 803.
The rule is reported in Annot., 91 A.L. R.2d 1095, 1096, “Right of prosecution to writ of certiorari in criminal case,” where it is said:
“As a general rule the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.’’ (Emphasis added.)
To the same effect see 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763.
I find the applicable constitutional provisions, supra n. 3, in this state to say that the Wyoming Supreme Court possesses the “power” to issue writs of certiorari “in the exercise of its appellate * * * jurisdiction,” however, and except in those circumstances where the civil appellate process is legislatively in place, the “power” lives in a vacuum since there is no constitutional requirement for the issuance of such writs and no other statutory implementing “rules” and/or “regulations”9 have been adopted.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has historically — and with good reason — refused to even consider the merits of the State’s appeals in a criminal case, where the proffered appeal does not comply with the bill-of-exceptions procedure, on the oft-repeated ground that there is no common-law right of appeal (State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; Mau v. Stoner, supra), and, the bill-of-exceptions statutes, §§ 7-12-102 through 7-12-105, supra n. 2, being an exception to the common law, *536provide the only source of this court’s jurisdiction to review the State of Wyoming’s adverse criminal trial-court rulings, State v. Heberling, supra; State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra.
As early as 1905, when Wyoming Constitution Art. 5, §§ 2, 3 and 18 and the bill-of-exceptions statutes were in place, this court said in Mau v. Stoner, supra, 83 P. at 219, that unless the Constitution requires (“requirement”) an appeal “as a matter of right,” 10 it is the legislature that has the appellate implementing authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 of the Wyoming Constitution. We said:
«* * * js wep settled that, in the absence of a direct constitutional requirement, the right of appeal does not exist unless expressly conferred by statute. The right to have a judgment of an inferior tribunal reviewed by writ of error or appeal is not a natural or inherent right. It pertains merely to the mode of judicial procedure or the remedy. Unless it is guaranteed as a matter of right in the Constitution, the Legislature has power to pass laws not only regulating the mode of proceeding, but limiting the cases in which the right may be exercised. The remedy by appeal was unknown to the English common law, hence it may be said that in both England and the United States the whole matter of appellate review is regulated almost entirely by statute law.” (Emphasis added.)
This court again embraced this concept in 1975 where, in Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo., 531 P.2d 872, 875, cert. denied, Wind River Indian Educ. Association, Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 205, 46 L.Ed.2d 134 (1975), Justice Raper, writing for the court, quoted the above rule from Mau v. Stoner and observed:
“ * * * The right of an appeal is a privilege rather than a right.”
Writing for a unanimous court, he went on to observe:
“The legislature has authority to abridge or extend the right of appeal at its discretion and can determine in what cases and under what circumstances appeals may be taken, as well as regulate the manner of appeal. 4 Am.Jur.2d, (Appeal and Error), § 6, pp. 536-537.”
It was the court’s task in Mau v. Stoner to decide whether a right of appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court was denied by a statute which provided that a trial court’s decision would be “final” where it was contended that the Constitution of the state guaranteed appellant access to this court. We said:
“Since the Legislature has declared that the judgment of the district court shall be final * * *, it becomes important to determine whether, under the Constitution of this state, the right of appeal is guaranteed in all cases.” 83 P. at 218.
The author of the Mau opinion wrote that Art. 5, § 2 of our Constitution, supra, defines the appellate jurisdiction of this court
“ * * * without attempting to define the manner of appeal or the class of cases in which appeals may be taken,” 83 P. at 219,
and the court then held that the supreme court’s jurisdiction is limited by the following Art. 5, § 2 language:
“ ⅞ * ⅜ under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
The court said:
“ * * * We think the expression ‘under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law’ refers to and limits all the powers conferred by the section, in other words, prescribes how the exercise of these powers may be regulated and limited.” 83 P. at 219.
It was one of the court’s conclusions in Mau that it was the intention of the framers of our Constitution that the subject of *537appeals to this court would be left to the legislature, the court saying:
“ * * * It is quite clear from the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 that the framers of the fundamental law intended to leave the power over the subject of appeals to the Legislature, to be exercised in such manner as public policy and the best interests of the people might require.’ ” Quoting from McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 332, 73 N.W. 72, 43 L.R.A. 287 (1897). 83 P. at 220.
In emphasizing that the right of appeal, even though constitutionally authorized as an appellate tool, must nevertheless be “prescribed by law” (i.e., by the legislature), the Mau court referred to an earlier decision in In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), where the court said:
“ * * * [W]e have no direct constitutional provision allowing appeals as a matter of right in criminal cases, except that this court is clothed with appellate jurisdiction in criminal as well as in civil causes, and is vested with a general superintendence and control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as are prescribed by law (Const.Wyo., art. 5, § 2) * * *.” 39 p at 87g
It was the court’s conclusion in Mau that, since there had been no rules or regulations promulgated by the legislature under Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, the respondent had no right of appeal.

Bill of Exceptions Is An Exception to the Common-Law Rule

In State v. Ginther, supra, the defendant was charged with the theft of a cow, with receiving the animal knowing it to have been stolen, but no value of the property was alleged. Trial was had and the defendant found guilty, whereupon a motion in arrest of judgment was made and sustained. The State appealed and we held that this court had no -jurisdiction since there was no statutory provision for the appeal. In dismissing the appeal, we said:
“It seems generally held under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case, unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * * ” (emphasis added), 77 P.2d at 803.
and while noting that the courts of some states permit such review in limited circumstances — either by case rule or statute — we held that we would adhere to the common law in Wyoming.
We noted in Ginther that Wyoming has a statutory exception to this common-law rule which appears as our bill-of-exceptions statutes according to which the State’s attorney may take “any opinion or decision of the court” to this court for review. We then went on to hold, and cite with approval cases which hold that, where an appellate right is granted and is based upon specific statutes, such statutes are to be strictly construed and are not to be enlarged by construction. It is said in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1659, wherein the states’ right of appeal in criminal cases is discussed, that the common-law rule is as this court identified it in Ginther, supra. The encyclopedia then goes on to say that
“ * * ⅜ it is generally held that, being in derogation of the common law, they [statutes granting appellate rights] should be strictly construed, and that the authority conferred thereby should not be enlarged by construction. [Citations.]” 11
In State v. Weathers, 13 Okl.Cr. 92, 162 P. 239 (1917), cited in Ginther for the proposition that criminal-appeals statutes which are in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:
*538“ * * * In many jurisdictions the state has no right of appeal at all, and its right to appeal, where the right is granted, is based upon specific statutes, which statutes are not to be enlarged by construction.” 162 P. at 240.
See also State v. Arnold, 144 Ind. 651, 42 N.E. 1095 (1895), cited in Ginther, where, in referring to a statute similar to that considered in State v. Weathers, supra, it was said:
“These statutes, it is urged, deny the right of the State to appeal in other instances than those enumerated; and this, we have no doubt, is correct, as shown by the cases cited to that proposition. State v. Bartlett, 9 Ind. 570; State v. Hamilton, 62 Ind. 409; State v. Hallowell, 91 Ind. 377; State v. Evansville & T.H. Ry. Co., 107 Ind. 581, 8 N.E. 619.”
This court then held in Ginther:
“Our view of the law accordingly is that the prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by statute no method of review of adverse rulings except through the medium indicated in the four above cited sections [the bill of exceptions proceeding], with the limitations there imposed.” (Emphasis added.) 77 P.2d at 807.
To the same effect see State v. Heberling, supra, and State v. Benales, supra.

Bill of Exceptions

The Exclusive Source of This Court’s Jurisdiction

Since it is not possessed of a common-law right of appeal, the State has no right to appeal a district court’s adverse ruling or judgment in a criminal prosecution without strictly adhering to the bill-of-exceptions provisions of the statute, § 7-12-102 through § 7-12-105, supra n. 2. This being so, this court, except by bills of exceptions, has no jurisdiction to review any such rulings or judgments. State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, 85 P. 977. As has been previously noted, in Gibson, Chief Justice Potter, writing for the court, said:
“* * * It is only upon a compliance with the provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions. ” (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
In State ex rel. Gibson, the Attorney General argued that an exception to the ruling of the court should be sufficient to preserve the issue for this court’s consideration. This court rejected the contention, saying:
“ * * * But it is obvious, we think, that the bill in a case like this * * * is the basis of the jurisdiction of this court. It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
Having said this, the court struck the bill since it was not sealed as provided by what is now our § 7-12-102, W.S.1977, 1983 Cum.Supp.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I call attention to these following propositions:
The Constitution of the State of Wyoming authorizes this court to issue writs of certiorari in the exercise of its appellate power, Art. 5, § 3, supra, but this authority is restricted by such rules and regulations as “may be prescribed by law.” Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18. It is the legislature that has been given the authority to limit and define the appellate process, Mau v. Stoner, supra. The writ of certiorari being in aid of this court’s appellate jurisdiction, Art. 5, § 3, supra, in a criminal prosecution, statutory authority must exist to invoke the court’s certiorari authority, Annot., 109 A.L.R. 793, 794-795, since, in criminal matters, the State has no common-law right of appeal from adverse trial-court decisions. State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096; 4 *539Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659.
In Wyoming, the legislature has carved out an exception to the common-law rule of nonappealability of the State’s adverse criminal rulings through the passage of the bill-of-exceptions statutes. Since these statutes are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed and their authority cannot be enlarged by construction. State v. Ginther, supra; State v. Weathers, supra; State v. Arnold, supra; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659; and see State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 547-548 (1982) for reaffirmation of the rule pertaining to the necessity for strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law.
This court has held that, based upon these above propositions, the prosecution in Wyoming has “no method of review of adverse rulings except through [the bill-of-exceptions procedure],” State v. Ginther, supra, and, finally, we have said that it is only upon compliance with the bill-of-exceptions provisions that this court has “jurisdiction to review any ruling of the District Court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions.” State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra.
For the reasons given, I would hold that the majority commit grievous error in granting the writ of certiorari in this appeal because — this being a criminal prosecution — this court has, through certiorari, no jurisdiction to review a ruling or a judgment of the district court adverse to the State of Wyoming.
The writ was improvidently granted.

. Since this dissenting opinion was written, State v. Heiner, 680 P.2d 478, No. 83-83, decided May 15, 1984, has been published. I herewith, therefore, support the dissenting position that I took in Heiner with some of the same and with additional reasons.
Even though I hold in these opinions that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain writs of certiorari, by reason of the majority opinions in Heiner and the case at bar my position is no longer the law of this state, and, therefore, I will look to the merits of the instant matter by joining with Justice Cardine in his dissent and I will hereafter vote with the other members of the court on the merits of each petition for a writ of certiorari.

. The bill-of-exceptions statutes provide:
"§ 7-12-102 [W.S.1977]. Exceptions by prosecuting attorney; generally.
"The prosecuting attorney may take exceptions to any opinion or decision of the court during the prosecution of the cause; and the bill containing the exceptions upon being presented, shall, if it be conformable to the truth, be signed and sealed by the court, which shall be made a part of the record, and be in all respects governed by the rules established as to bills of exceptions in civil cases, except as herein provided."
“§ 7-12-103 [W.S.1977]. Same; proceedings on exceptions.
"The prosecuting attorney may present such bill of exceptions to the supreme court and apply for permission to file it with the clerk thereof, for the decision of such court upon the points presented therein; but prior thereto he shall give reasonable notice to the judge who presided at the trial in which the bill was taken, of his purpose to make such application, and if the supreme court shall allow such bill to be filed, such judge shall appoint some competent attorney to argue the case against prosecuting attorney, which attorney shall receive for his service a fee not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00), to be fixed by such court, and to be paid out of the treasury of the county in which the bill was taken.”
"§ 7-12-104 [W.S.1977]. Same; when bill to be filed and decision rendered.
"If the supreme court shall be of the opinion that the questions presented should be decided upon, they shall allow the bill of exceptions to be filed and render a decision thereon.”
"§ 7-12-105 [W.S.1977]. Same; effect of decision of supreme court.
“The judgment of the court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.”

. Article 5, §§ 2, 3 and 18 of the Wyoming Constitution provide:
"§ 2. Supreme court generally; appellate jurisdiction.
"The supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
"§ 3. Same; original jurisdiction.
“The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habe-as corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. Each of the judges shall have power to issue writs of habe-as corpus to any part of the state upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself or before the supreme court, or before any district judge of the state."
"§ 18. Appeals from district courts to supreme court.
"Writs of error and appeals may be allowed from the decisions of the district courts to the supreme court under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." (Emphasis added.)

. Certiorari is a writ "necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate * * * jurisdiction.” Article 5, § 3, Wyoming Constitution.

. The necessity for which was, I suggest, overlooked by all justices of this court. I also call attention to Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), which was not a criminal prosecution, but in which opinion another questionable statement is to be found where the court said:
" * * * We held in effect in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892, that a writ of certiorari might issue in some cases in which an inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction or acts in excess of jurisdiction. See also State ex rel. Loomis v. Dahlem, 37 Wyo. 498, 263 P. 708. And such writ would seem ordinarily not to be improper in cases in which no appeal has been provided from proceedings before a judicial as quasi judicial tribunal, at least in cases in which such tribunal had no jurisdiction or acted in excess of jurisdiction. 10 Am.Jur. 527, § 5, see annotation in 174 A.L.R. 194. Whether or not we should go beyond cases of that kind in face of the statute above mentioned is another question." 278 P.2d at 273.
This statement is subject to the same criticism that causes City of Laramie v. Mengel to be questionable — i.e., while the opinion properly identifies the common-law utilization of certio-rari, it ignores the necessity of certiorari-imple-menting statutory authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 and mandated by Mau v. Stoner, supra.

.Which is a questionable decision also, since certiorari was considered there without the implementing statutory authority required by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, which statutory implementation requirement is articulated in Mau v. Stoner, supra, discussed infra.

. I here preserve the position I took in my concurring opinion in City of Laramie v. Men-gel, supra, to the effect that, where the parameters of the writ are not specified by the Constitution, the common-law writ applies. See also my dissenting opinion in Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1099 (1983).

. Defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary as:
”[E]ither of two belts or regions in the neighborhood of 30° N. and 30° S. latitude characterized by high pressure, calms, and light baffling winds.”

. Sec Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, supra n. 3.

. City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, holds that the grant or denial of certiorari is discretionary with this court.

. We recently expressed the derogation-of-common-law rule for Wyoming when we said in State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 547-548 (1982):
" * * * A statute designed to change the common law must be strictly construed. Maha-ney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). It must speak in clear and unequivocal terms, for the presumption is that no change is intended unless the statute is explicit."