Court Opinion

ID: 9960921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:05:05.38876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:03.525357
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                         Oct 24 2023, 8:43 am

                                                                                             CLERK
                                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Public Defender of Indiana                                 Attorney General of Indiana
Daniel G. Foote                                            Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Public Defender                                     Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Termination of the                              October 24, 2023
Parent-Child Relationship of                               Corrected
C.C. and De.C. (Minor                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
Children);                                                 23A-JT-848

D.C. (Mother),                                             Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
Appellant-Respondent
                                                           The Honorable Ryan K. Gardner,
        v.                                                 Judge
                                                           The Honorable Beth L. Jansen,
                                                           Magistrate
The Indiana Department of
                                                           Trial Court Cause Nos.
Child Services,                                            49D10-2204-JT-3335
Appellee-Plaintiff,                                        49D10-2204-JT-3336

and

Kids’ Voice of Indiana,
Appellee-Guardian Ad-Litem.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023                       Page 1 of 15
                                              Opinion by Judge Pyle

                                      Judges Vaidik and Mathias concur.

      Pyle, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   In this consolidated appeal, D.C. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the

      parent-child relationships with her children C.C. (“C.C.”) and De.C. (“De.C.”)

      (collectively “the children”). Concluding that the orders terminating Mother’s

      parental rights were void for lack of personal jurisdiction because the

      Department of Child Services (“DCS”) did not properly serve Mother as

      required by the Indiana Trial Rules and due process, we reverse the trial court’s

      judgment and remand these two cases to the trial court for further proceedings.1

[2]   We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

      Issue
                 Whether the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights were
                 void for lack of personal jurisdiction because DCS did not
                 properly serve Mother as required by the Indiana Trial Rules and
                 due process.

      1
          C.C.’s father is unknown, and De.C.’s father died before De.C. was born.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023             Page 2 of 15
      Facts
[3]   Mother is the parent of son C.C., who was born in April 2020, and daughter

      De.C., who was born in April 2021. DCS removed C.C. from Mother’s care

      two days after his birth because he had been “born drug exposed” and Mother

      had lacked safe and stable housing. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). The trial court

      adjudicated C.C. to be a CHINS in December 2020 and ordered Mother to

      participate in services. DCS removed De.C. from Mother’s care two days after

      De.C.’s April 2021 birth because she had been “born drug exposed” and

      Mother had lacked safe and stable housing. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). Mother

      admitted that De.C. was a CHINS in August 2021, and the trial court ordered

      Mother to participate in services.2

[4]   In April 2022, the trial court held a permanency hearing in the children’s

      CHINS cases. During the hearing, DCS recommended that the plan for the

      children be changed from reunification to adoption. Mother did not attend the

      hearing; however, according to the trial court’s permanency hearing order,

      Mother’s counsel attended the hearing and objected to DCS’ recommendation.

      The trial court approved DCS’ plan.3

      2
        Although, as set forth below, the trial court took judicial notice of the children’s CHINS cases, DCS did not
      include any of the CHINS documents, including the CHINS petitions, the CHINS dispositional orders, or
      the CHINS progress reports, in the Exhibits Volume that it tendered to this Court.
      3
       We note that although the trial court’s permanency plan order included the cause numbers for the children’s
      cases and mentions the children and Mother by name in certain parts of the order, the order further provides
      as follows: “The permanency plan for [C.] to change to Third party Custody, [Ka.]’s plan to change to
      adoption and [Ke.]’s plan to change to Guardianship.” (App. Vol. 2 at 40). C., Ka., and Ke. are not the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023                                Page 3 of 15
[5]   Later in April 2022, DCS filed separate petitions to terminate Mother’s parental

      relationships with C.C. and De.C. DCS also filed motions to set the initial

      hearings on the termination petitions. The trial court issued orders scheduling

      an initial hearing on the termination petitions for May 19, 2022. When Mother

      was not present at the May 19 initial hearing, the trial court asked DCS if it had

      served Mother. DCS responded that it did “not have good service yet” and

      requested a continuance. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 4). The trial court told DCS to “get [its]

      house in order” and to “be prepared to fish or cut bait with regard to the

      parents.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 4, 5). The trial court rescheduled the initial hearing for

      June 16, 2022, but did not mention Mother’s right to counsel or ask whether

      Mother had counsel.

[6]   On June 9, 2022, DCS filed a summons directed to Mother at her home

      address. The summons provided that an initial hearing on two termination

      petitions would be held on June 16, 2022. The summons further provided that

      a process server would serve it. When Mother was not present at the June 16

      hearing, the trial court asked DCS if it had served Mother. DCS responded that

      it had “sent out service and [had] not received . . . anything back[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2

      at 6). DCS did not request another continuance for the initial hearing. Rather,

      DCS requested a “default hearing” in ninety days. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 6). The trial

      names of the children in this case. We expect CHINS orders to be correct and to include only the names of
      the children who are included in those cases.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023                             Page 4 of 15
      court scheduled a default hearing for September 15, 2022, but did not mention

      Mother’s right to counsel or ask whether Mother had counsel.

[7]   On September 1, 2022, DCS filed a summons directed to Mother at her home

      address. The summons provided that a default hearing on two termination

      petitions would be held on September 15, 2022. The summons further provided

      that a process server would serve it. On September 9, DCS filed a motion to

      continue the default hearing because it still did “not have good service for

      [Mother.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 76). The trial court granted DCS’ motion and

      rescheduled the default hearing for November 17, 2022, but did not mention

      Mother’s right to counsel or ask whether Mother had counsel.

[8]   On September 13, 2022, DCS filed a summons for service by publication. The

      summons specified that service would be accomplished by publication in the

      Indianapolis Star once each week for three consecutive weeks. The summons

      further specified that a virtual hearing would take place on November 17, 2022,

      and provided a Webex link to the hearing.

[9]   On November 14, three days before the scheduled default hearing, DCS filed

      another motion to continue the default hearing. In this motion, DCS explained

      that the “[p]ublication service contained Webex links to the court that no longer

      work[ed].” (App. Vol. 2 at 85). The trial court granted DCS’ motion and

      rescheduled the default hearing for February 23, 2023, but did not mention

      Mother’s right to counsel or ask whether Mother had counsel.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023       Page 5 of 15
[10]   On December 20, 2022, DCS filed a summons for service by publication. The

       summons specified that service would be accomplished by publication in the

       Indianapolis Star once each week for three consecutive weeks. The summons

       further specified that a virtual hearing would take place on February 23, 2023,

       and provided a Webex link to the hearing. However, there is no evidence in the

       record that this summons was published.

[11]   On February 13, 2023, DCS sent Mother a ten-day notice of the termination

       hearing as required by INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-6.5. DCS sent the statutory

       notice to Mother’s home address.

[12]   Four days later, on February 17, 2023, DCS filed a summons directed to

       Mother at her home address. The summons provided that a default hearing on

       two termination petitions would be held on February 23, 2023, and provided a

       Webex link to the hearing. The summons further provided that Mother had a

       right to counsel. In addition, the summons provided that a process server

       would serve it.

[13]   On February 20, 2023, DCS filed a copy of the summons, which included the

       following hand-written notation: “[Mother] refused to sign. Served @ St.

       Vincent Women[’]s Hospital on February 18[,] 2023 @ 4:40 p.m.” (App. Vol.

       2 at 97). “Talia Anderson – DCS” (“Anderson”) signed the summons as the

       process server. (App. Vol. 2 at 97).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023      Page 6 of 15
[14]   Mother did not appear at the February 23, 2023 default hearing. Additionally,

       Mother was not represented by counsel. At the beginning of the hearing, DCS

       explained as follows:

               [T]he preliminary matter is this, um, DCS found out that
               mother’s last known address burnt down on the eighth. I was
               unaware of that, so, we sent a TPR letter out, um, to that
               address, per statute regulations and um, essentially that was no
               longer a good address. Um, subsequent to that, you have service
               that I’ve, I’ve sent there that I’ve submitted to the Court where
               she was served in the hospital over the weekend with the actual
               service instead of doing a publication default, we’re here for,
               now, basically, a default with service there. That’s where we’re
               at. I don’t know if the Court, and she has provided a new
               address since she was in the hospital. So, I don’t know if the
               Court would still entertain this default. We are ready to go.

       (Tr. Vol. 2 at 8).

[15]   “[F]or appellate purposes,” the trial court asked the Guardian Ad Litem if she

       objected to proceeding that day. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). When the Guardian Ad

       Litem responded that she did not object, the trial court proceeded with the

       hearing and took judicial notice of the children’s CHINS cases. The trial court

       also admitted into evidence a copy of the summons with the hand-written

       notation that Mother had refused to sign it, a copy of the required statutory

       notice that had been sent to Mother’s home address on February 13, 2023, and

       an affidavit from the Guardian Ad Litem recommending termination of

       Mother’s parental relationships with the children.

[16]   Also, during the cursory hearing, DCS family case manager Jessica Rubio

       (“FCM Rubio”) testified that the children had been removed from Mother’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023      Page 7 of 15
       care because the children had been “born drug exposed” and Mother had

       lacked safe and stable housing. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). FCM Rubio further testified

       that Mother had been personally served while she was in the hospital giving

       birth to her third child. However, FCM Rubio did not mention who had served

       Mother or the circumstances of the service. In addition, FCM Rubio testified

       that DCS had provided services to Mother but that Mother had not completed

       any of them. According to FCM Rubio, Mother had not been in contact with

       DCS since June 2022 and was “still struggling with using illegal substances.”

       (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). When asked if it would “be reasonable to believe that these

       conditions that led to the removal of these children would be remedied if

       [M]other were given more time[,]” FCM Rubio responded, “No.” (Tr. Vol. 2

       at 14). When asked if there would “be a risk of harm to the child if [M]other

       were allowed to continue a parental relationship with the child[,]” FCM Rubio

       responded, “Yes.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14). FCM Rubio further testified that

       termination was in the children’s best interests and that the plan for the children

       was adoption by a relative.

[17]   Anderson did not testify at the termination hearing, and DCS did not seek to

       admit at the hearing a deposition from Anderson. Further, although it appears

       that Mother had counsel during the CHINS proceedings, at no point in the

       termination proceedings did the trial court mention Mother’s right to counsel or

       appoint counsel for Mother.

[18]   At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that Mother had received

       “personal service[]” and had failed to appear at the hearing. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 17).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023        Page 8 of 15
       The trial court stated that it would “be granting um, the termination [and]

       defaulting [M]other in these proceedings.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 17). In March 2023,

       the trial court issued orders terminating Mother’s parental relationships with the

       children.

[19]   Mother now appeals.

       Decision
[20]   At the outset, we note that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

       Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and to

       raise her children. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d

       143, 147 (Ind, 2005). A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of her

       children “‘is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” Id.

       (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). “Indeed the parent-child

       relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Bester, 839

       N.E.2d at 147 (cleaned up).

[21]   Mother argues that the orders terminating her parental rights were void for lack

       of personal jurisdiction because the DCS did not properly serve her as required

       by the Indiana Trial Rules and due process. “Ineffective service of process

       prohibits a trial court from having personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”

       Grabowski v. Waters, 901 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. A

       judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction violates due process and is

       void. Id. We review a trial court’s determination regarding personal

       jurisdiction de novo. Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023        Page 9 of 15
[22]   “The question as to whether process was sufficient to permit a trial court to

       exercise jurisdiction over a party involves two inquiries: whether there was

       compliance with the Indiana Trial Rules regarding service, and whether the

       attempts at service comported with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

       Amendment.” D.L.D. v L.D., 911 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.

       denied.

[23]   Here, Mother specifically argues that DCS failed to establish service of process

       upon her because “the claimed service was not verified by the DCS employee

       who claims to have served as process serv[]er and did not comply with the

       applicable Trial Rules.” (Mother’s Br. 11). We agree.

[24]   Indiana Trial Rule 4.12(A) provides as follows:

                 Whenever service is made by delivering a copy to a person
                 personally or by leaving a copy at his dwelling house or place of
                 employment as provided by Rule 4.1, summons shall be issued to
                 and served by the sheriff, his deputy, or some person specially or
                 regularly appointed by the court for that purpose. Service shall be
                 effective if made by a person not otherwise authorized by these rules, but
                 proof of such service by such a person must be made by him as a witness
                 or by deposition without allowance of expenses therefor as costs. The
                 person to whom the summons is delivered for service must act
                 promptly and exercise reasonable care to cause service to be
                 made.

       (Emphasis added).

[25]   Neither party has directed us to a case discussing the emphasized portion of this

       trial rule, and our research has revealed none. We, therefore, turn to rules of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023                Page 10 of 15
       statutory construction, which are applicable to the interpretation of trial rules.

       See Carter-McMahon v. McMahon, 815 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

       Specifically, as with a statute, our objective when construing the meaning of a

       rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent underlying the rule. Id. Further,

       where a rule has not previously been construed, the express language of the rule

       controls the interpretation. Id. If the language of a rule is clear and

       unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation. Id.

[26]   Applying these rules of statutory construction to Indiana Trial Rule 4.12(A), we

       conclude that this rule is unambiguously mandatory. Specifically, the rule

       states that when a person not otherwise certified by these rules serves a

       summons, proof of such service “must” be made by the process server as a

       witness or by deposition. The parties appear to agree that Anderson was not

       otherwise certified by the trial rules when she served Mother. Further, the

       parties agree that Anderson was not called as a witness and that DCS did not

       admit a deposition from Anderson into evidence.

[27]   Because DCS failed to comply with the clear and unambiguous language of

       Trial Rule 4.12(A), either by calling Anderson as a witness or introducing

       Anderson’s deposition into evidence at the termination hearing, service upon

       Mother was defective under the Trial Rules and the requirements of due

       process. Accordingly, the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over

       Mother and the orders terminating Mother’s parental relationships with C.C.

       and De.C. are void.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023        Page 11 of 15
[28]   To the extent that DCS relies on Trial Rule 4.15(F) to support its argument that

       Mother received adequate service, said reliance is misplaced. Trial Rule

       4.15)(F) provides that a defective summons or service thereof shall not be set

       aside or adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the

       person to be served of the action and relevant information. However, the

       “savings provision” contained in Rule 4.15(F) “is meant to excuse minor,

       technical defects in the method of service where actual service has been

       accomplished.” Cotton v. Cotton, 942 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)

       (cleaned up). Trial Rule 4.15(F) “does not cure service of process when there

       has been no service on a party.” Overhauser v. Fowler, 549 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1990) (cleaned up); see also LaPalme v. Romero, 621 N.E.2d 1102, 1106

       (Ind. 1993) (explaining that Rule 4.15(F) cures only technical defects in service

       of process, “not the total failure to serve process.”). Here, where there is no

       statutorily required proof of service and where Mother never appeared before

       the trial court in the termination proceedings, DCS’s complete failure to

       provide proof of service is not a “minor defect” that can be cured by Trial Rule

       4.15(F).

[29]   Additionally, though cited by neither party, Trial Rule 4.16(A) provides that

       “[i]t shall be the duty of every person being served under these rules to

       cooperate, accept service, comply with the provisions of these rules, and, when

       service is made upon him personally, acknowledge receipt of the papers in

       writing over his signature.” Trial Rule 4.16 (A)(1) further provides that

       “[o]ffering or tendering the papers to the person being served and advising the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023          Page 12 of 15
       person that he or she is being served is adequate service.” However, where the

       process server is not called as a witness or her deposition is not admitted into

       evidence to provide the proof of service required by Trial Rule 4.12(A), Trial

       Rule 4.16(A) simply does not apply.

[30]   Mother also argues that DCS failed to timely serve the ten-day statutory notice

       of the termination hearing required by INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-6.5 and that

       the trial court violated her right to due process when it held the termination

       hearing without first appointing her counsel. We need not address these issues

       because we have reversed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental

       relationships with C.C. and De.C. based upon DCS’ failure to properly serve

       Mother. Nevertheless, we are compelled to note that we agree with Mother

       that the trial court violated her right to due process when it held the termination

       hearing without first appointing her counsel. Thus, had we not reversed the

       trial court on the service of process issue, we would have reversed the trial court

       because it violated Mother’s right to due process when it held the termination

       hearing without appointing counsel for Mother.

[31]   In an action seeking to involuntarily terminate a parent’s relationship with her

       children, the parent is entitled “(1) to cross-examine witnesses; (2) to obtain

       witnesses or tangible evidence by compulsory process; and (3) to introduce

       evidence on behalf of the parent[.]” IND. CODE § 31-32-2-3(b). Pursuant to

       INDIANA CODE § 31-32-2-5, a “parent is entitled to representation by counsel in

       proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship.” The trial court “shall”

       appoint counsel for the parent “at the initial hearing or at any earlier time” in a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023       Page 13 of 15
       termination of a parental rights case if the parent “does not have an attorney

       who may represent the parent without a conflict of interest” and “the parent has

       not lawfully waived the parent’s right to counsel[.]” I.C. § 31-32-4-3.

[32]   Here, our review of the record reveals that Mother was never advised of her

       right to counsel and therefore could not have waived that right. Indeed, it

       appears that throughout the proceedings, the trial court ignored Mother’s right

       to counsel. We specifically note that although INDIANA CODE § 31-32-4-3

       states that the trial court shall appoint counsel for the parent at the initial

       hearing or at any earlier time, the trial court never held an initial hearing in the

       termination proceedings. Rather, after continuing the initial hearing one time,

       the trial court granted DCS’ request to proceed directly to a “default hearing.”

       We further note that at the default hearing, the trial court did not mention

       Mother’s right to counsel. Further, FCM Rubio testified at the hearing that

       Mother had not successfully completed any services and was still struggling

       with using illegal substances. Because Mother did not have counsel at the

       termination hearing, Mother was not able to cross-examine FCM Rubio or to

       present any evidence on her own behalf.

[33]   We have previously explained that “[w]hile the State’s interest in Children’s

       welfare and need for permanency are significant, they are not more important

       than Mother’s right to counsel.” In re D.C., 201 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022). Here, the record contains no evidence to support a determination that

       Mother knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel in the

       termination proceedings. Accordingly, the trial court violated Mother’s right to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023          Page 14 of 15
       due process when it held the termination hearing without first appointing her

       counsel. See id. (explaining that where the evidence did not support a

       determination that the mother had waived her right to counsel in the

       termination proceedings, the trial court violated the mother’s right to due

       process when it conducted the termination hearing without first appointing

       counsel for Mother).

[34]   We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with Mother’s due

       process rights.

       Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JT-848| October 24, 2023       Page 15 of 15