Court Opinion

ID: 9787745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:23:41.812521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:00.143596
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, J.,
specially concurring.
T1 Given the current state of the law concerning the standard of review applicable to review of decisions by a Three-Judge Panel of the Workers' Compensation Court which vacate a trial judge decision after finding it to be "contrary to law and against the clear weight of the evidence," I must coneur. I write only to suggest that the result in this case could cause one to question the wisdom of allowing such panels unfettered power in applying their statutory standard of review in the intra-court review process.
12 All of the evidence concerning the onset of Claimant's symptoms established they first appeared shortly after Claimant began working for Direct Staffing and principally after she began lifting the 65-pound spools. The record contains no specific evidence of the precise manner in which Claimant used her hands and arms in her janitorial duties while employed by Defender. With the exception of a single medical report from Dr. Young, all of the expert medical evidence attributed her injury to the work for Direct Staffing. Dr. Young's report, without discussing in any detail how she used her hands while employed by any previous employer, attributes her problems to her "diabetes" or to "prior employment."
4 3 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe Claimant's testimony, including her denial that she had any problems before she began her more strenuous work for Direct Staffing, chose to reject Dr. Young's opinion, and accept the opinion of the other experts that her short time of employment by Direct Staffing, given its increased stress on Claimant's hand, was the major cause of her injuries. The panel order rejected that conclusion as "against the clear weight of the evidence."
14 Having reviewed the evidence in this record, I do not understand how that conclusion could be reached under any reasonable definition of "against the clear weight of the evidence." Dr. Young's report was the least reasoned, most general, of any of the medical reports and lacked explanation of why these problems would just have suddenly arisen when Claimant's duties with Direct Staffing required increased lifting with her hands.
T5 Nevertheless, Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 1984 OK 53, 684 P.2d 548, prevents any appellate review of the manner in which a three-judge panel applies the standard of review required by 85 O.S.2001 § 3.6(A). Our task is limited to determining whether there is any competent evidence to support the panel's order or whether it is *502otherwise "contrary to law."1 I must agree that Dr. Young's report provides competent evidence to support the order.
T6 I conclude with the observation that this case, and others like it, simply bear out the foresight of Justice Wilson's prediction that this approach could lead to the rather anomalous result of "affirming an en bane's reversal of the trial court where the court en bame's decision was supported by some competent evidence, even though the trial court's decision may have been overwhelmingly supported by the evidence." Parks, 1984 OK 53, ¶ 2, 684 P.2d at 553, (Wilson, J., dissenting) (Emphasis in original).

. Justice Wilson unsuccessfully argued in her dissent that the failure of the panel to properly apply its standard of review was legal error. Parks v. Norman Municipal Hospital, 1984 OK 53, 684 P.2d 548, (Wilson, J., dissenting).