Court Opinion

ID: 9840467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 18:03:41.153386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:32.745599
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/18/23 P. v. Drake CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yolo)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096568

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. CRF120143)

           v.

 FLOYD KEVIN DRAKE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Floyd Kevin Drake appeals the trial court’s order resentencing him
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pursuant to what is now Penal Code section 1172.75 (then § 1171.1). At the
resentencing hearing, the trial court struck two prior prison term enhancements
previously imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), but failed to orally
pronounce the sentence again on the record. The trial court further failed to provide an

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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update of the defendant’s credits. We conclude that under the facts of this case, the trial
court effectively reinstated the rest of the sentence that had been previously imposed after
striking only the prior prison terms and denying further relief. Accordingly, the judgment
is affirmed. We do agree that remand is necessary for the trial court to prepare an
updated abstract of judgment to include a calculation of the actual time spent in custody
after the initial sentencing to the date of resentencing.
                                      BACKGROUND
       In 2012, defendant pled guilty to committing second degree robbery and admitted
allegations that he used a deadly or dangerous weapon, caused great bodily injury, had
previously been convicted of a serious felony, and had served two prior prison terms.
The trial court sentenced him to 17 years in state prison, comprising: (1) the three-year
midterm for second degree robbery (§ 213, subd. (a)(2)), doubled to six years due to his
prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)); (2) a one-
year enhancement for using a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); (3) a
three-year enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); (4) a
five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1); and
(5) two one-year enhancements for prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)).
       In November 2021, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his sentence recalled
and to be resentenced in accordance with section 1172.75, which makes defendant’s prior
prison term enhancements “legally invalid” and requires the trial court to recall
defendant’s sentence and resentence him. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a), (c).)2 The trial court set
a hearing and referred defendant to the public defender’s office. Through appointed

2 We recognize that the trial court could have denied this petition. Under the statute, the
Legislature provided an express system for the orderly implementation of relief that did
not include the defendant being able to initiate such relief by way of a petition.
(§ 1172.75, subds. (b), (c); People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375.)

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counsel, defendant then filed a motion seeking the same relief as his petition. The People
filed a document indicating they did not oppose defendant’s request to have the two
legally invalid enhancements eliminated from his sentence but asserting defendant was
not entitled to any other changes to his sentence.
       After the Legislature amended section 1385, effective January 1, 2022, (see Stats.
2021, ch. 721, § 1), defendant filed a supplement to his petition, asking the trial court to
dismiss all but one of his enhancements and, specifically, to dismiss the five-year
enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. The People opposed defendant’s
supplemental request, arguing dismissal of additional enhancements was not in the
interest of justice and would endanger public safety.
       The trial court recalled defendant’s sentence and held a resentencing hearing in
accordance with section 1172.75.3 The trial court reviewed the evidence and heard
argument from both parties, including evidence of defendant’s disciplinary record while
incarcerated. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).) The court first dismissed the two prior
prison term enhancements, as required by section 1172.75. The court then considered
defendant’s request to dismiss the five-year prior serious felony enhancement because
recent changes to section 1385 added new mitigating circumstances that weigh in favor
of dismissing enhancements. After considering the age of the prior serious felony
conviction (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)) and that multiple enhancements were alleged in the
case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)), the court ultimately denied defendant’s request because

3 The trial court’s authority to recall the sentence was contingent upon receiving the
information as specified in section 1172.75, subdivision (b), from the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that included the defendant’s
name, date of birth, and case number. The record is silent as to whether the CDCR
provided such information. In any event, we can presume the trial court followed the
proper procedures: “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1390.)

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defendant’s history of substance abuse and violence and his numerous rule violations in
prison indicated dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety.
       The trial court said nothing further about defendant’s sentence. However, it was
also clear from the record that the parties and the court understood that the remaining
portion of the initial sentence that had been imposed should remain intact. Neither the
defendant who was present nor his counsel objected to the court’s failure to state the full
sentence on the record or requested further clarification. After the ruling, the parties
agreed the trial court should prepare a new abstract of judgment, and the court assented.
The court then adjourned the hearing. A new abstract of judgment was in fact prepared,
imposing a 15-year sentence.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief asking this court to conduct an
independent review of the record to determine whether there were any arguable issues on
appeal, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We requested supplemental
briefing addressing whether the trial court erred by failing to pronounce a sentence at the
resentencing hearing and whether any such error required remand. In the appellant’s
supplemental brief, he argues that the matter must be reversed and remanded due to the
trial court’s failure to orally pronounce sentence. The People agree that the trial court
erred but argue that it was harmless under the facts of this case. Both parties further
identified a credits error that required remand. We shall affirm the judgment, but remand
to correct the credits.
A.     Pronouncing Judgment Upon Resentencing Under Section 1172.75
       The trial court recalled defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 1172.75 and
conducted a resentencing hearing under that statute. At the conclusion of the
resentencing hearing, the court dismissed the two invalid prior prison terms but did not
formally resentence the defendant and state on the record the full sentence to be imposed.

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As the parties recognize, at a sentencing hearing the court must orally pronounce the
sentence on the record. (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9; see
§§ 1191, 1202; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.433(c)(5).) The question here is whether the
trial court complied with the resentencing requirements as proscribed under section
1172.75, and whether its failure to pronounce a new sentence at the conclusion of the
hearing requires remand.
       In interpreting section 1172.75, we examine the text “ ‘ “ ‘ “to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” ” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “We consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related
provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory
scheme.” (McHugh v. Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227; see also
Busker v. Wabtec Corp. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1147, 1159 [“The words say what they say:
their meaning is understood from the context in which they are used”].) “We also
generally avoid a reading that renders any part of a statute superfluous.” (People v.
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1030.)
       Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) provides in part that “[i]f the court determines
that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court
shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” Initially, we note the trial court
recalled defendant’s prior sentence pursuant to section 1172.75 because the sentence
included sentence enhancements “imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5,” which were not imposed for sexually violent offenses
defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 660, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subds.
(c), (a).) The statute does not define what is meant by the term “recall.” Recall can mean
“cancel, revoke,” “to call back,” “to bring back to mind,” or “restore, revive.” (Merriam-
Webster’s Unabridged Dict. Online (2023) <https://unabridged.merriam-
webster.com/collegiate/recall, par.1> [as of Sept. 13, 2023], archived at:
<https://perma.cc/N6RY-HRJW>.)

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       Once the trial court has recalled a sentence, section 1172.75 provides four
directives for resentencing:
       (1) Resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed
as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
       (2) Resentencing “shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally
imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
       (3) “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply
any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).)
       (4) “Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose
a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those
facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd.
(d)(4).)
       These directives indicate the Legislature intended that the recall and resentencing
hearing should result in a lesser sentence unless there is clear and convincing evidence
that it will endanger public safety and should not result in a longer sentence.
Additionally, the Legislature intended that the trial court conduct the resentencing
hearing and apply changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.
       Upon review of the record in this case, the trial court complied with the statutory
requirements of section 1172.75, subdivision (d). The trial court struck the two invalid
prior prison terms, resulting in an overall reduction of the total sentence. The court knew
of its discretion in light of the recently enacted changes to section 1385, and ultimately

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denied striking the enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) after conducting a
hearing as to whether or not that enhancement should be stricken. As explained above, a
court must orally pronounce the sentence on the record, and here the court failed to do so
at the resentencing hearing. The best practice for all resentencing hearings under section
1172.75 should be for the trial court to orally pronounce judgment upon the conclusion of
the resentencing hearing, if even just to confirm the prior sentence imposed absent the
invalid enhancement. However, in this case, it is clear that the trial court was in effect
reinstating the previously imposed sentence that had been orally pronounced on the
record, absent the two invalid prior prison terms. Neither party objected or sought
clarification at the conclusion of the hearing, and an abstract of judgment was ultimately
prepared consistent with everyone’s expectations. Accordingly, under these facts, the
judgment is affirmed.
B.     Updated Custody Credits
       In their supplemental briefing, the parties agree the trial court should have updated
defendant’s custody credits when preparing an amended abstract of judgment. We agree
with the parties.
       Pursuant to section 2900.1, “[w]here a defendant has served any portion of his
sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently
declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be
credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the
same criminal act or acts.” As such, the sentencing court must credit the defendant “with
all actual days he had spent in custody, whether in jail or prison, up to that time.”
(People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37; §§ 2900.1, 2900.5; see generally
Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter Group 2023) §§ 15:15, 15:20,
15:24, 26:6.) The updated total of credits must then be added to the abstract of judgment.
(People v. Phoenix (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125, 1130; § 2900.5.) Because
defendant’s conviction was not reversed, defendant was not eligible to earn additional

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presentence conduct credits (see § 4019) while awaiting resentencing. (People v.
Johnson (2004) 32 Cal.4th 260, 268.) Conduct credits earned by defendant during his
prison sentence (see §§ 2930-2935) are the responsibility of the CDCR and need not be
added to the updated abstract. (In re Martinez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 29, 37; Cal. Const., art.
I, § 32, subd. (a)(2).)
       Here, the trial court did not update defendant’s custody credits when it prepared a
new abstract of judgment, but instead specified the same credits for time spent in custody
and for presentence conduct awarded at the initial sentencing. Upon remand, the trial
court will need to, in addition to restating the initial presentence credits awarded as of the
initial sentencing date, include on the new abstract of judgment the actual days spent in
CDCR custody after the time of the initial sentencing to the date of the resentencing.

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                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an updated
abstract of judgment, including a calculation of the actual time spent in custody after the
initial sentencing to the date of resentencing, and forward a certified copy to the
Secretary of the CDCR.

                                                      /s/                      ,
                                                  HORST, J.*

We concur:

    /s/                      ,
RENNER, Acting P. J.

    /s/                      ,
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

* Judge of the Placer County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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