Court Opinion

ID: 9946103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 09:13:35.297233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.730645
License: Public Domain

In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                          Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-23-00149-CV

                             IN THE MATTER OF: H.R.-N., A CHILD

                              On Appeal from the 98th District Court
                                       Travis County, Texas
            Trial Court No. J38,767; PID 096835, Honorable Rhonda Hurley, Presiding

                                          February 27, 2024
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        Via an original petition filed in May 2021, the State alleged Appellant, H.R.-N., a

juvenile, engaged in delinquent conduct by murdering R.A.D., also a juvenile.1 The

original petition was approved for determinate sentencing by a Travis County grand jury

on June 23, 2021.2 Subsequent petitions were filed that added allegations of tampering

        1 Because the decedent was a minor at the time of death we will refer to him by initials.   See TEX.
R. APP. P. 9.8(c)(2).

         2 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.04, 53.045(d); In re X.A., No. 01-19-00227-CV, 2020 Tex. App.

LEXIS 425, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 16, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The
Texas Legislature created a system for prosecuting juvenile offenders for certain violent offenses and this
is called the determinate sentence system. To invoke this system, the prosecutor must obtain grand jury
approval of a juvenile court petition charging one of the covered offenses. If the petition is approved and
certified to the juvenile court, the case proceeds to adjudication and disposition. If the juvenile is found
with physical evidence and abuse of corpse. The consolidated allegations were tried to

a jury in November 2022, who found Appellant engaged in delinquent conduct by

committing murder, tampering with physical evidence, and abusing a corpse. Following

a disposition hearing the next month, the trial court committed Appellant to the care,

custody, and control of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department for 15 years for murder;

indeterminate sentences were imposed for the two other offenses tried. Appellant’s

motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.3

                                              Background

        Appellant was an acquaintance of Carla Escobar. Around noon on May 5, 2021,

Escobar allegedly sold a pink and silver Taurus brand handgun to Appellant. About two

hours after the purchase, Appellant arrived at the home of Escobar’s mother, Angelica

Perez, in Austin.4 Appellant, who was wearing a white t-shirt and blue jeans, asked for

Escobar.

        Upon entering Perez’s house, Appellant excused himself to the restroom; he

returned and began pacing back and forth. Perez testified she discovered a large amount

of blood on the back of Appellant’s shirt and asked if he had been stabbed. Perez said

Appellant answered affirmatively when she asked if he had been in a fight.

guilty of a specified violent offense, the trial court may commit him or her to the Texas Juvenile Justice
Department and may later transfer the juvenile to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice.” (cleaned up)).

        3 This appeal was originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by

a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the
event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
        4 According to video recorded from Perez’s doorbell, Appellant approached Perez’s front door at

1:58 p.m.

                                                     2
       Less than ten minutes after Appellant’s arrival, Escobar arrived at Perez’s home.

She noticed a “red car” in the driveway/parking lot of Perez’s home. Like Perez, Escobar

described Appellant as “filled with blood” on his clothing. Appellant told Escobar the blood

was from a fight, but Escobar testified she feared it might be related to the gun she had

just sold to Appellant. Escobar provided a different shirt for Appellant to wear.

       Escobar was pregnant with a daughter; she was also the parent of an infant

daughter. Escobar said Appellant told her she had no choice but to assist him; “if not, my

daughters would get hurt.” As she left the home, Escobar asked Perez to watch her

daughter, saying, “please don’t let anybody hurt my baby.”

       Escobar and Appellant left Perez’s home. Appellant was driving a red Hyundai

Sonata with heavily tinted windows; the vehicle’s description matches one that belonged

to R.A.D. Escobar said she initially thought she was going to ride in the red car with

Appellant. However, just as she was about to reach the passenger side door, “he yelled

at me not to.” Appellant instructed Escobar to drive a separate vehicle and to lead the

way to her uncle’s home in the Killeen area.

       In Killeen, Appellant and Escobar learned her uncle was not at home. Later that

day, Escobar followed Appellant to a nearby bridge. Appellant instructed Escobar to park

her vehicle on the driver’s side of the red car; he told her to stay in her vehicle “and not

look around.” Ignoring his command, Escobar looked into the red Hyundai and saw “a

body slumped in the passenger side with a cover thrown on top of it.”

                                             3
        Meanwhile, Appellant removed cleaning supplies and trash bags from the trunk of

Escobar’s vehicle.5 Appellant also asked if she had any matches or lighter fluid; Escobar

denied having any. She testified, “He said he wanted to blow up the car.” Escobar said

Appellant “went into . . . panic mode,” and she observed him wiping down the steering

wheel with cleaning wipes. After hearing a “thump,” Escobar saw Appellant carrying what

she believed to be a body; she observed a bare leg and white shoe dangling from under

the blanket as Appellant carried the load to the trunk of the vehicle. Appellant later

removed two backpacks from the red car, along with a trash bag containing the gun

Escobar had sold him, and placed them in Escobar’s vehicle.

        According to Escobar, Appellant entered her vehicle, removed a black handgun

from a backpack and placed it in his lap with the barrel facing Escobar, and told her to

drive him back to Austin. During the return drive, Escobar inquired about what Appellant

had done, but he replied it was better that she not know. Appellant eventually told

Escobar to drive to her apartment.6 While they were on the way, Appellant allegedly

“gave [Escobar] details about what he did”:

            •   “The boy,” i.e., the victim, had set him up, so Appellant devised a
                plan to get revenge;

            •   Appellant sent a message to the victim to drive to his home so that
                Appellant could purchase some marijuana. When the victim arrived,
                Appellant claimed he needed a ride to a house on 51st Street so that
                he could obtain funds to pay for the purchase;

        5 Escobar’s testimony on this subject is inconsistent with other evidence presented at trial.
                                                                                                    She
denied purchasing the items and claimed she denied Appellant’s initial request to use them. However,
during Appellant’s case-in-chief, videos were authenticated that show Escobar entering, shopping, and
leaving a Walmart store in nearby Harker Heights on May 5. According to a receipt entered into evidence,
Escobar purchased garbage bags, Armor All wipes, a lighter, and bleach at 3:30 p.m. on May 5.

        6 They initially stopped at Perez’s home, where Escobar recounted what she had observed.

                                                    4
             •   After the victim drove Appellant to 51st Street and parked, Appellant
                 shot the victim in the neck. Appellant pushed the victim’s body into
                 the passenger seat and assumed the driver’s seat.

After arriving at Escobar’s home, Appellant showered and changed into a pair of shorts.

Appellant then gave Escobar directions to drive him to “the house off 51st.”                          After

Appellant went inside the home for a brief moment, he returned and told Escobar, “This

is where I shot him at.”

       Escobar testified that later that night she returned to Perez’s home and related the

story of what had occurred. Escobar and Perez reported to the police station on May 6

and met with Detective Rolando Ramirez.                 During the multi-hour interview with the

detective, Escobar received an audio message she identified as from Appellant’s voice;

it said, “Cuz, you’re scaring the s--t out of me. You better answer or I,” before the

message terminated. Additional evidence was also obtained by law enforcement around

this time:

             •   Escobar directed police where to locate R.A.D.’s body; Bell County
                 law enforcement found R.A.D.’s body in the trunk of his vehicle.7

             •   Escobar consented to a police search of her vehicle, who recovered
                 two backpacks,8 blood-stained underwear and blue jeans9 allegedly
                 belonging to Appellant, and the pink Taurus handgun.10

             •   Police recovered a fingerprint identified as Appellant’s from the
                 passenger-side roof of Escobar’s vehicle.

       7 Autopsy confirmed that R.A.D.’s death was caused by a gunshot wound to the neck, and the

manner of death was homicide.

       8 Inside one of the backpacks was a substance believed to be marijuana.

       9 DNA evidence revealed the presence of R.A.D.’s DNA on the blue jeans.

       10 A projectile from R.A.D.’s vehicle was subsequently matched to being fired from the Taurus pistol.

                                                    5
        Detectives were unable to obtain Appellant’s cell phone records. However, the

State presented evidence of the historical cell phone data obtained for two of R.A.D.’s

mobile phones and Escobar’s phone.11 Per trial testimony, the State showed how mobile

phones attempt to choose the cell phone tower with the strongest available signal; data

reporting this connection can provide information on the general area in which a phone is

located at a particular time. Relevant here, a law enforcement officer testified that one of

R.A.D.’s phones “pinged” a cell phone tower near the alleged site of the murder at

approximately 1:28 p.m. on May 5.12 R.A.D.’s phone was later noted as traveling near

cell sites in the vicinity of Perez’s home, where the phone remained until approximately

2:13 p.m.13

        Escobar’s cell phone was described as initially following a different path until it

reached the vicinity of Perez’s home. Then, both of R.A.D.’s phones and Escobar’s phone

reportedly traveled roughly in sync with one another northbound on Interstate 35 from

Austin through Georgetown and Jarrell, Texas.                    Although R.A.D.’s phones ceased

connecting with cell phone towers sometime during the afternoon of May 5, Escobar’s

phone continued to connect; testimony indicated Escobar’s phone connected on towers

near where R.A.D.’s body was located, then at 8:09 p.m. near the area where the murder

was believed to have occurred. Later, Escobar’s phone reportedly returned to the area

        11 Escobar’s phone and one of R.A.D.’s phones operated on the AT&T network and accordingly

used similar cell phone service towers.

         12 Detective Ramirez opined the murder site to be at 5301 Tower Trail (in the vicinity of 51st Street

and Highway 185). Video recovered from home doorbell cameras depicts a red Hyundai Sonata identical
to that of R.A.D.’s passing 5301 Tower Trail at 1:30:54 P.M. on May 5, and then on nearby Bentsen Lane
at 1:31:10 P.M.

        13 As indicated above, Perez’s doorbell recorded Appellant standing on her front porch at 1:58 p.m.

                                                      6
near Perez’s home for approximately 30 minutes, before traveling to Escobar’s home for

the evening.

      Appellant unsuccessfully attempted to flee when police attempted to take him into

custody. While executing a search warrant at the home of Appellant’s mother, police

located under a mattress a black semi-automatic Glock pistol containing R.A.D.’s DNA,

as well as a pendant belonging to R.A.D. Police learned from Appellant’s family that

Appellant had stayed in this bedroom a portion of the night following the murder.

                                       Discussion

Issues One, Two, and Three: Corroboration of Testimony of Accomplice Witness
Carla Escobar
      Through three issues that we discuss jointly, Appellant challenges the sufficiency

of Escobar’s accomplice testimony.      The jury was instructed that Escobar was an

accomplice as a matter of law. The Texas Family Code, which covers the proceedings

in all cases involving delinquent conduct, provides as follows:

      An adjudication of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for
      supervision cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
      corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the child with the alleged
      delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision; and the
      corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the
      alleged conduct.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(e). We construe section 54.03 similarly to article 38.14 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See In re D.M.T., No. 11-21-00121-CV, 2022

Tex. App. LEXIS 7109, at *15–16 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 22, 2022, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (giving parallel construction). When examining the record for corroborating

evidence, a reviewing court disregards the accomplice’s testimony and examines the

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remaining record to determine if any evidence tends to connect the accused with the

commission of the crime. Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);

In re J. A. M., No. 03-02-00610-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 8662, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—

Austin Oct. 9, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.). Such evidence does not have to directly link the

accused to the crime, nor does it alone have to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;

it must merely tend to connect the accused to the offense. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d

607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “The tends-to-connect standard does not present a

high threshold, and we view the connecting evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict and judge each case on its own facts.” Fabian v. State, No. 03-19-00486-CR,

2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 6084, at *37 (Tex. App.—Austin July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (cleaned up).

   1. Corroborating Evidence: Murder

      The jury was charged, “a person commits the offense of Murder if he intentionally

or knowingly causes the death of an individual.” Surveillance video shows a car identical

to R.A.D.’s, passing the suspected murder location at 1:30 p.m. on May 5.              Then

approximately 30 minutes later, video reveals Appellant arriving in a vehicle matching

R.A.D.’s at Perez’s home. As Perez observed from this visit, Appellant’s shirt and blue

jeans were stained with so much blood that she believed he had been stabbed. Appellant

confirmed he had been in a fight. R.A.D.’s DNA was identified on Appellant’s blue jeans.

While in the home, Appellant paced back and forth while waiting for Escobar. When he

left Perez’s home, Appellant wore a different shirt than the one he wore on arrival.

                                            8
         Cell phone data associated with R.A.D.’s phones indicate being located near the

suspected murder site at the same approximate time the video captures the red car at the

same location. Then, one of the victim’s phones pings along a cell site path near Perez’s

home during approximately the same time Appellant is shown to be at Perez’s home. The

evidence shows that the phone then traveled in the same general direction as Escobar’s

phone: away from Perez’s home and north bound on Interstate 35. Escobar’s phone

continued to ping from cell tower sites, where it was found to be within the general vicinity

of where R.A.D.’s body was recovered. Evidence from about 3:30 p.m. on May 5 shows

Escobar entering, shopping, and leaving a Walmart in Harker Heights. A receipt revealed

she purchased bleach, wipes, garbage bags, and a lighter.

         On May 6, while Escobar and Perez spoke with police, Appellant sent a voice

message to Escobar, saying, “Cuz, you’re scaring the s--t out of me. You better answer

or I.”   A search by police of Escobar’s vehicle produced a pink Taurus handgun,

Appellant’s two backpacks, one containing blood-stained underwear and blue jeans, and

a substance believed to be marijuana. Police located Appellant’s fingerprint on the

exterior passenger roof of Escobar’s car. In addition, Bell County law enforcement

located R.A.D.’s car, where they found the decedent’s body in the trunk, which also

contained empty bleach bottles and smelled of bleach. The passenger compartment

contained blood and a bullet projectile eventually linked to the pink Taurus pistol.

         Beneath the mattress of the bed in a room where Appellant stayed on the night

following the murder, police located a black Glock pistol and R.A.D.’s pendant. The barrel

of the handgun and pendant contained R.A.D.’s DNA. When police attempted to take

                                             9
Appellant into custody, he fled. This evidence independent of Escobar’s testimony tended

to connect Appellant with the offense of R.A.D.’s murder.

   2. Corroborating Evidence: Tampering With Physical Evidence

       As charged by the court, “[A] person commits the offense of Tampering with

Physical Evidence if, knowing that an offense has been committed, alters, destroys, or

conceals any record, document, or thing with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or

availability as evidence in any subsequent investigation of or official proceeding related

to the offense.” The corroborating evidence shows the following: At Perez’s home on the

day of the murder, Appellant exchanged the blood-stained shirt for a different shirt.

Moreover, as noted above, police officers recovered a handgun and pendant containing

R.A.D.’s DNA, concealed beneath the mattress of the bed in which Appellant slept for a

portion of the night following the murder. We conclude this evidence tended to connect

Appellant with the offense of tampering with physical evidence.

   3. Corroborating Evidence: Abuse of a Corpse

       Per the court’s charge, “[A] person commits the offense of Abuse of Corpse if the

person, without legal authority, knowingly disinters, disturbs, damages, dissects, in whole

or in part, carries away, or treats in an offensive manner a human corpse.”                The

corroborating evidence shows the following: When Appellant appeared at Perez’s home

on the day of the murder, he was driving a vehicle identical to one that belonged to R.A.D.

(within which R.A.D.’s body was discovered in the trunk the day after the murder).14 Perez

reports that when Appellant arrived at her home his clothing was stained with blood.

       14 Evidence indicated the vehicle’s trunk also contained empty bottles of bleach.

                                                  10
Given this evidence, as well as the cell phone data tracking the path of where R.A.D.’s

phone moved from the alleged murder scene to Perez’s home to a route in the direction

of where R.A.D.’s body was found, the jury could reasonably infer that R.A.D. was dead

and that Appellant was carrying the corpse away in R.A.D.’s vehicle. This evidence

tended to connect Appellant with the offense of abuse of corpse.

      Appellant’s first, second, and third issues are overruled.

Issue Four: Limiting Offer of Proof

      By his fourth issue, Appellant complains that the trial court prevented him from

preserving error by denying him a full opportunity to examine Escobar outside the jury’s

presence on matters intended to impeach her character as a witness.             Appellant’s

presentation centered on claims that Escobar had cooperated with the district attorney’s

office and the Innocence Project in seeking a new trial for her father,15 as well as her

immunity for matters related to R.A.D.’s death. Before commencing a question-and-

answer offer of proof, Appellant’s counsel stated:

      We believe that all of that information is admissible because it’s, one,
      probative; two, it goes to impeachment, because my entire testimony is
      going to be that she was testifying even before she was given this grant of
      immunity. She has never been charged, and she continues to work with the
      District Attorney’s Office. And her whole basis for being here and making
      these implications against the Respondent is because that she is avoiding
      any prosecution for anything that she’s done; and, two, that her relationship
      with her father’s appeal is also biased because that goes to motive, intent
      of, one, why she was never charged--arrested, charged; and, two, why she
      is being able to testify here today.

      15 Her father had been convicted of capital murder for another offense.

                                                 11
During the question-and-answer presentation that followed, two objections by the State

were sustained by the trial court.

       A party may claim error in a ruling admitting or excluding evidence only if the error

affects a substantial right of the party and, if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs

the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from

the context. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2). However, when a cross-examiner intends, as here,

to call into question a witness’s character for truthfulness, that burden is relaxed. Holmes

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Appellant’s presentation at the

hearing outside the jury’s presence acquainted the trial court with his desire to impeach

Escobar’s character for truthfulness with evidence of her involvement with the district

attorney’s office, the Innocence Project, her father’s capital-murder case, and her receipt

of immunity. These matters would tend to impeach Escobar as a witness by showing her

bias and motivation for her testimony. We conclude Appellant’s presentation made

counsel’s intentions clear; thus, the trial court’s rulings on objections did not prevent

Appellant from preserving error or limit Appellant’s offer of proof.

       Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled.

Issue Five: Limitation of Cross-examination

       In related manner, Appellant’s fifth contention is that the trial court reversibly erred

by denying Appellant the opportunity to cross-examine Escobar on her cooperation with

the district attorney’s office and the Innocence Project in their effort to have her father’s

conviction for capital murder overturned. During the hearing outside the jury’s presence,

Escobar testified she did not know who was assisting her father with his effort to obtain a

                                             12
new trial and that she had not spoken with an attorney from the district attorney’s office

or any other organization about her father’s case.

       A proponent of evidence purporting to show bias of a witness must demonstrate

that such evidence is relevant. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004). This is accomplished by “demonstrating that a nexus, or logical connection, exists

between the witness’s testimony and the witness’s potential motive to testify in favor of

the other party.” Id. In other words, the record must demonstrate the witness “had the

expectation that [s]he would be rewarded for testimony favorable to the State or punished

for testimony that was unfavorable to the State.” Id. at 112; see also Nash v. State, No.

03-12-00456-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10480, at *10–12 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21,

2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (following Woods). Like the

trial court, we fail to see any nexus between Escobar’s testimony at Appellant’s trial and

her father’s effort at obtaining a new trial.

       Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred by limiting the scope of Appellant’s

cross-examination, such error would have been harmless. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); see

In re J.H., 150 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (“because of the

quasi-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings and the possibility with a determinate

sentence of imprisonment that extends into adulthood . . . the criminal-harm analysis

should govern in juvenile appeals concerning the imposition of a determinate sentence.”).

The jury had ample opportunity to question Escobar’s credibility. First, she was an

accomplice as a matter of law. Second, her denials of having any involvement were

undermined by independent footage and a receipt proving she indeed bought cleaning

                                                13
supplies at Walmart.16 Third, Escobar testified subject to her own immunity agreement

with the State. We fail to see how evidence of her father’s possible efforts would have

affected the jury’s assessment of Escobar’s credibility beyond what this evidence already

demonstrates.

        Appellant’s fifth issue is overruled.

                                              Conclusion

        Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

                                                                  Lawrence M. Doss
                                                                       Justice

        16 During Appellant’s cross-examination of Escobar, the following exchange took place:

       Q. Isn’t it true that those cleaning products which you say you had in your car, you actually
went and purchased them at that Walmart store?
       A. No.
       Q. Are you as sure about that as you are the rest of your testimony?
       A. Yes.
       (emphasis supplied).

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