Court Opinion

ID: 2689731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-01 20:22:05.992709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:19.563016
License: Public Domain

33

The     State ex rel. Maurer et al., Appellants, v. Sheward,          Judge,

Appellee.

Wilkinson, Dir., et al., Appellants, v. Maurer et al., Appellees.

[Cite       as State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward (1994), ___ Ohio        St.3d

___.]

Constitutional law — Commutations of death sentences by          Governor

        not    subject to application process outlined in R.C. 2967.07

        — Section 11, Article III, Ohio Constitution, construed.

         (Nos. 92-1350 and 93-1165 — Submitted September 20, 1994          —

Decided December 30, 1994.)

         Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos.

91AP-1442, 92AP-674, 92AP-675, 92AP-677 and 92AP-678.

                              Case No. 93-1165

        On January 10, 1991, two business days before the expiration

of    his     term in office, former Ohio Governor Richard F.     Celeste

commuted       the   sentences of eight inmates and   granted   one     full

pardon.        Two additional inmates also were granted clemency,        but

their appeals below were either withdrawn or properly found to be

moot.1
         Donald Lee Maurer, Leonard Jenkins, Debra Brown, Willie Lee

Jester,       Elizabeth Green, Lee Seiber and Rosalie Grant                          had       been

convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death.                               With        the

exception of Rosalie Grant, former Governor Celeste commuted                                     the

death     sentences             to     life imprisonment without          eligibility            for

parole.       The Governor commuted Rosalie Grant’s death sentence                                to

life     in     prison          with     no restriction as to parole              eligibility.

Ralph     DeLeo           had    been convicted of murder          and      was     serving        a

sentence        of        fifteen       years to life.      Former       Governor         Celeste

commuted        his        sentence       to time served.      John       Salim      had       been

convicted of felonious assault.                    He was serving a sentence of six

to     twenty-one years when former Governor Celeste granted                               him     a

full pardon.

          When            the        former   Governor   granted      the         pardon         and

commutations,              the Ohio Adult Parole Authority               (“APA”)         had     not

been asked to conduct investigations or formulate recommendations

for     seven        of     the applicants who had been sentenced                   to     death.

Instead, their applications for clemency were filed directly with

the former Governor.                   With respect to Ralph DeLeo and John Salim,
their        applications were submitted to the APA between December                                   6

and December 17, 1990.                 By January 9, 1991, the APA had taken                          no

final         action     on     the     two     applications.         On     that         day,         a

representative from former Governor Celeste’s office                                called           the

APA     to     request that it expedite review of the two applications.

The     APA     responded that it could not complete the review process

in two business days.

         On     January        29,     1991,     George     Wilson,        Director        of        the

Department           of Rehabilitation and Correction, and John Shoemaker,

Chief of the APA,2 filed a complaint for declaratory judgment                                         in

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking a determination

that     former Governor Celeste’s actions were in contravention                                      of

Section        11,     Article        III     of the Ohio     Constitution,           and        R.C.

Chapter        2967.      The        plaintiffs sought a        declaration           that           the

pardon        and     commutations          granted to the      defendants           by     former

Governor Celeste were void.                    Current Governor George V. Voinovich

successfully           petitioned the court for leave to                    intervene           as     a

plaintiff.

         On     March     6,     1991, the defendants moved                 to   dismiss             the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the matter                                      was

nonjusticiable,                because     any     judicial      declaration     as        to     the

validity           of executive clemency would unconstitutionally infringe

upon        the     Governor’s clemency power.                 The trial court        overruled

the        motion on September 26, 1991.                 Following a bench trial,                 the

trial        judge       issued a decision and entry granting a                  declaratory

judgment            to    plaintiffs.            The   court     explained      that            “full

compliance with the requirements of R.C. 2967.07 and R.C. 2967.12

is     a     condition precedent to the valid exercise of the                          clemency

power by the Governor * * *” and that the pardon and commutations

granted by former Governor Celeste were invalid.

            The     eleven defendants appealed in six separate notices                             of

appeal to the Tenth District Court of Appeals; their appeals were

consolidated             for     decision.        The court of appeals         reversed           the

decision           of the trial court.             After considering the language                  of

Section           11,    Article III, the court of appeals               found        that        the

clause        that       subjects        the Governor’s clemency         power        to        “such

regulations,             as     to the manner of applying for pardons”                     applies

only        to the Governor’s power to grant pardons.                    The court stated
that     the       constitutional provision does not provide the                   General

Assembly with authority to regulate the Governor’s power to grant

commutations.               The     court   of    appeals    also     determined         that

regulations             enacted by the General Assembly apply to individuals

applying          for     pardons     but   do not affect      the     ability     of     the

Governor          to grant a pardon on his own initiative.                Specifically,

the court of appeals held that nothing in Section 11, Article III

of     the       Ohio Constitution or R.C. Chapter 2967 could                   limit     the

Governor’s power to grant clemency on his own initiative, even if

he     chose to do so without first receiving a recommendation                           from

the APA.

         This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a

motion to certify the record.

                                      Case No. 92-1350

         The       second     cause submitted for review             emerged     from     the

underlying          declaratory        judgment     action    discussed        above.      On

December          10, 1991, after the trial court denied the                   defendants’

motion       to dismiss the action, but prior to trial, the defendants

sought       a     writ     of prohibition in the Franklin County                Court     of
Appeals.        Defendants urged the court of appeals to bar the                trial

judge      from        exercising   judicial   power    over    the    declaratory

judgment action, because the action did not present a justiciable

question.         On     January 28, 1992, a referee      concluded      that        the

defendants’ arguments lacked merit and recommended that the court

of   appeals dismiss the prohibition action on the basis                  of        this

court’s decision in State ex rel. Ney v. Governor (1991), 58 Ohio

St.3d     602,     567     N.E.2d 986.   The court of appeals         adopted        the

referee’s recommendation and dismissed the petition.

         This     cause is now before this court upon an appeal                as     of

right     and     has     been   consolidated with     case    No.    93-1165        for

purposes of final determination.

                                 ___________________

        Ken Murray, for appellant Debra Brown in case No. 92-1350.

        Barry W. Wilford and Dennis Pusateri, for Ralph DeLeo.

        S. Adele Shank, for Rosalie Grant.

        D. Shannon Smith and Timothy A. Smith, for Elizabeth Green.

         Elizabeth A. McNellie, Joy Maciejewski and Sean M.                McAvoy,

for appellant Leonard Jenkins in case No. 92-1350.
         Shaw,     Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Thomas C.   Hill,     Alvin

Dunn     and     Joseph Figini; Matan & Smith and Steven L. Smith,       for

Willie L. Jester.

         Sowash,     Carson & Shostak and Herman A. Carson, for     Donald

Maurer.

        Richard B. Igo, for Freddie Moore and John Salim.

        Gregory W. Meyers, for Lee Seiber.

         Michael     Miller, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney,       and

Bonnie L. Maxon, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee             in

case No. 92-1350.

         Lee     Fisher, Attorney General, John J. Gideon and     Jack    W.

Decker,        Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants in case       No.

93-1165 and urging affirmance for amici curiae, George Voinovich,

Reginald Wilkinson and Jill Goldhart in case No. 92-1350.

         K.     Ronald Bailey, for appellee Debra Brown in case No. 93-

1165.

         Melanie S. Corcoran, James W. Brown III and Christopher          P.

Thorman, for appellee Leonard Jenkins in case No. 93-1165.

         Steven     H.   Steinglass, urging dismissal or affirmance      for
amicus     curiae, Law Professors’ Brief Amicus Curiae Committee                         in

case No. 93-1165.

         Kevin Francis O’Neill, Peter Joy, Daniel T. Kobil and                         Paul

Moke;     Moots,     Cope     &    Stanton     and     Benson   A.     Wolman,       urging

affirmance for amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties                         Union     of

Ohio Foundation in case No. 93-1165.

Squire,        Sanders & Dempsey and David J. Young, urging                   affirmance

for     amicus curiae, Catholic Conference of Ohio in case                       No.    93-

1165.

         Law     Enforcement Legal Association, Inc., Paul L.                    Cox    and

Walter     T. Florence, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Fraternal

Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., in case No. 93-1165.

                                  ___________________

         Per Curiam.        Case No. 93-1165 requires this court to decide

three     issues:      (1) Does Section 11, Article              III     of    the     Ohio

Constitution         authorize       the     General     Assembly       to     prescribe

procedural        prerequisites       to     the     exercise   of     the    Governor’s

clemency        power?; (2) If so, does the General Assembly                   have     the

authority        to prescribe procedural prerequisites for commutations
as   well       as pardons?; and (3) Has the General Assembly                in     fact

imposed        procedural        prerequisites upon the     Governor’s       clemency

power?

         We     will address case No. 92-1350, which raises issues also

implicated by case No. 93-1165, in Part IV of this opinion.

                                            I

         Section        11, Article III of the Ohio Constitution             provides

the authority for the Governor’s clemency power:

         “He     [the Governor] shall have power, after conviction,                   to

grant     reprieves, commutations, and pardons, for all                   crimes     and

offenses,        except       treason and cases of    impeachment,         upon     such

conditions        as     he     may think proper; subject, however,          to     such

regulations, as to the manner of applying for pardons, as may                         be

prescribed        by law.        Upon conviction for treason, he may          suspend

the execution of the sentence, and report the case to the general

assembly,        at     its next meeting, when the general assembly                shall

either        pardon,     commute the sentence, direct its          execution,        or

grant     a     further reprieve.        He shall communicate to the          general

assembly,        at     every     regular session,   each    case    of     reprieve,
commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name and crime of the

convict, the sentence, its date, and the date of the commutation,

pardon, or reprieve, with his reasons therefor.”

         Section        11,     Article III was adopted as part of                 extensive

revisions        to the Constitution made in 1851.                  Prior to 1851,          the

Governor’s clemency power was set forth in Section 5, Article                                II

of the Ohio Constitution of 1802, which provided in its entirety:

“He     [the     Governor] shall have the power to grant reprieves                          and

pardons, after conviction, except in cases of impeachment.”                                This

section        was     modeled after Section 2, Article II of                    the     United

States     Constitution,              which gives the President            the    “Power     to

grant     Reprieves           and     Pardons for Offences         against       the     United

States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”

          Both         the     United        States   Constitution        and     the      Ohio

Constitution            of     1802     conferred        broad   powers     of     executive

clemency.            The only limitations on the clemency power were                       that

it    could      be exercised only after conviction (Ohio Constitution)

and     that     clemency could not be granted in cases of                       impeachment

(both      Ohio         and         United      States      Constitutions).             Neither
Constitution           authorized the enactment of     laws    to   curtail     the

executive’s           clemency   power.   However,    with    the   adoption     of

Section 11, Article III, Ohio significantly altered its provision

on executive clemency.

         Although the Ohio Constitution places the clemency power in

the     hands     of the Governor, that power clearly is not              absolute.

The Governor’s clemency power is subject to whatever restrictions

are     contained in Section 11, Article III.           See State     v.     Morris

(1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 101, 111, 9 O.O.3d 92, 98, 378 N.E.2d                    708,

714.      These        restrictions provide that clemency may        be     granted

only after conviction, may be granted only partially in cases                    of

treason, and not at all in cases of impeachment.

         Though        the Governor’s power to grant clemency is           limited,

the     only     limits     on   the clemency power are those       specifically

authorized        by Section 11, Article III.        Knapp v. Thomas        (1883),

39     Ohio     St.     377, 392.   The General Assembly may not          interfere

with     the     discretion of the Governor in exercising the              clemency

power.         Morris, 55 Ohio St.2d at 111, 9 O.O.3d at 98, 378 N.E.2d

at     714. Likewise, the Governor’s exercise of discretion in using
the     clemency power is not subject to judicial review.                    See State

ex    rel. Whiteman v. Chase (1856), 5 Ohio St. 528, 535; Knapp, 39

Ohio St. at 391.3

        The specific limitation at issue in this case comes from the

“subject to” clause of Section 11, Article III:

         “He        [the Governor] shall have power, after conviction,                    to

grant       reprieves, commutations, and pardons, for all                  crimes        and

offenses,           except       treason and cases of     impeachment,      upon        such

conditions           as     he    may think proper; subject, however,            to     such

regulations, as to the manner of applying for pardons, as may                             be

prescribed by law.”                (Emphasis added.)

         It is apparent from the structure of the first sentence                          of

Section        11     that       the   “subject to”    clause   modifies     the        word

“power.”            The     first clause of the first sentence        provides           the

Governor the power to grant executive clemency.                    The presence           of

the word “however” in the second clause indicates a limit on that

power.         Thus, the Governor’s power to grant clemency is                    limited

by    the      “subject to” clause.           However, the authority granted              to

the     General           Assembly under the “subject to”        clause     is        itself
limited        to regulating the application process.                  Furthermore,       as

we    conclude            below, the “subject to” clause          only    provides       the

General Assembly with the authority to regulate “as to the manner

of    applying            for        pardons.”   (Emphasis added.)     Consistent       with

Knapp       and Morris, the authority to issue regulations is                      further

limited        in     that           those regulations may not interfere         with    the

Governor’s discretion to grant or deny pardons.

         We     believe that the authority to prescribe regulations “as

to    the      manner           of     applying for pardons” provides      the     General

Assembly        with        the        authority to prescribe a      regulatory     scheme

governing           the     manner        and procedure of   applying     for     pardons.

Unlike        the court of appeals, we do not believe that the                     General

Assembly        has        the authority to regulate only the applicants                 for

pardons.        We interpret the language of the “subject to” clause as

providing the General Assembly with the authority to establish                             a

regulatory scheme that includes prerequisites to the exercise                             of

the     Governor’s              power to grant pardons.4      Our interpretation          is

consistent with the purpose of the “subject to” clause, which was

to    provide the General Assembly with the authority to                         establish
procedural           safeguards                 against the        granting         of        pardons.            The

drafters            of     Section              11     were     concerned      that           without         such

safeguards,              the        Governor might grant pardons                        without        thorough

consideration              or        might           be too easily influenced                  by     political

factors        to        grant or deny clemency for reasons                              other        than        the

merits     of        an inmate’s claim.                       See 1 Report of the               Debates           and

Proceedings               of         the        Convention        for   the        Revision            of         the

Constitution              of        the     State        of Ohio 1850-1851               (1851)        306-307.

Consistent           with           the language and purpose                  of        Section        11,        the

authority           to regulate the application process must also                                       include

the     authority              to     establish           prerequisites            to     the        Governor’s

exercise        of the power to grant pardons.                           To exempt the                 Governor

from     the        “subject              to”        clause     would   allow           the     Governor           to

circumvent           the        procedural safeguards for which the                                 clause        was

adopted, rendering the clause meaningless.

        For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the General Assembly

is authorized by Section 11, Article III of the Ohio Constitution

to     prescribe procedural prerequisites to the application process

for     executive              pardons.              In order to be valid, any                  grant        of     a
pardon     must        be based on an application that complies              with    the

procedural prerequisites.              The General Assembly is not authorized

to    prescribe         substantive regulations concerning the              Governor’s

discretion        in     the     use of the clemency power,     or     in     any    way

intrude     on     the     discretion of the Governor.        For     example,       the

General     Assembly           could not, acting under the limited           authority

provided     by        Section 11, Article III, enact a statute              requiring

the    Governor         to accept the recommendation of        the     APA     in    the

exercise     of his clemency power.              Likewise, the General        Assembly

could not enact a statute forbidding the Governor from exercising

the clemency power in any specific class of cases.

                                           II

         Having        determined that Section 11, Article III              authorizes

the    General Assembly to prescribe procedural regulations                     as    to

the    application         process for pardons, we next        consider        whether

that authority extends to any other types of clemency.

         The language of Section 11 expressly provides the extent of

the    General         Assembly’s     authority to regulate     the     application

process for executive clemency:                 “[The Governor] shall have power
*    *     *     to     grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons                         *     *     *;

subject,          however,        to such regulations,        as    to        the        manner        of

applying          for     pardons, as may be prescribed by law.”                          (Emphasis

added.)           The language of Section 11 clearly provides the General

Assembly          with the authority to regulate the application                               process

for pardons.             However, the “subject to” clause does not implicate

in       any way the Governor’s powers with respect to commutations or

reprieves.5              The     issue then becomes whether commutations,                            even

though they are not mentioned within the “subject to” clause, may

also be regulated.

               Plaintiffs        argue   that   the    authority         to     regulate              the

application process for “pardons” also includes the authority                                          to

similarly             regulate     commutations.      They    reach       that           conclusion

based          upon     their     perception that the        word     “pardons”                may     be

interpreted             broadly to include all types of executive                         clemency.

In       other        words,     the plaintiffs argue that commutations                         are     a

subset          of pardons, and by using the word “pardons” the                            drafters

intended          that     the General Assembly have the power                      to     regulate

commutations as well as pardons.
        We do not believe that commutations are a subset of pardons.

The     first     step        in determining the meaning of a           constitutional

provision        is     to     look at the language of the provision           itself.

Where     the meaning of a provision is clear on its face,                    we     will

not     look     beyond the provision in an attempt to divine what                       the

drafters        intended        it to mean.     Slingluff v. Weaver        (1902),        66

Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574.

         The meaning of Section 11 is obvious after a careful review

of that provision.              The first sentence provides the Governor with

the power to grant three different types of clemency — reprieves,

commutations           and     pardons.     The end of   the    first     sentence        is

equally        clear     in     providing     the   General    Assembly     with         the

authority to regulate the application process for only                       one     type

of     clemency — pardons.           The language of Section 11 could not                 be

clearer in limiting the General                 Assembly’s authority to regulate

only     pardons.            Moreover, any argument that commutations              are     a

subset of pardons is, as shown below, simply unsupportable.

         The     canons        of statutory interpretation, which           guide        our

interpretation of constitutional and statutory text, support                             the
conclusion           that     the word “pardons” in the “subject        to”     clause

does     not include commutations.           This court has consistently held

that     words        used more than once in the same provision           have        the

same     meaning        throughout the provision, unless        there     is        clear

evidence        to     the contrary.     State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus.              Comm.

(1946),        146     Ohio St. 618, 33 O.O. 92, 67 N.E.2d 536,           paragraph

one     of     the syllabus, overruled on other grounds, State ex                    rel.

Walker v. Indus. Comm. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 402, 12 O.O.3d                          347,

390     N.E.2d        1190.     The three types of clemency are     each        listed

together        four different times in Section 11.           In fact, the           only

time     one        type of clemency is mentioned alone is when           “pardons”

appears        within       the “subject to” clause.   To define        pardons        to

include        commutations        when the two types of     clemency     are        each

listed together so many times within the same small section would

be     nonsensical.           Additionally, interpreting “pardons” to include

commutations           has the problem of rendering the        presence        of     the

word     “commutations” useless.           Our prior cases     require        that     we

reject        that result, because if possible we must give meaning                    to

every        word     in a provision.     Steele, Hopkins & Meredith           Co.     v.
Miller (1915), 92 Ohio St. 115, 110 N.E. 648.

         The        argument that commutations are a subset of pardons            is

also     contrary to our previous decisions where we have held                  that

commutations              and   pardons are two entirely   different    types     of

clemency.            In     In re Victor (1877), 31 Ohio St. 206,      207,     this

court     defined           a commutation as “a change of punishment      from     a

higher        to     a lower degree, in the scale of crimes and         penalties

fixed     by the law * * *.”            In State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v.        Peters

(1885),        43     Ohio St. 629, 650-651, 4 N.E. 81, 87-88, this            court

defined pardons:

         “A pardon discharges the individual designated from all                  or

some     specified penal consequences of his crime.             It may be       full

or partial, absolute or conditional.

         “A        full and absolute pardon releases the offender from the

entire        punishment prescribed for his offense, and from            all     the

disabilities consequent on his conviction.

         “[A] commutation is ‘the change of a punishment to which                  a

person has been condemned into a less severe one.’

         “It is not a conditional pardon, but the substitution of                  a
lower for a higher grade of punishment * * *.”                                  (Citation omitted

and emphasis added.)

         The     Peters case conclusively established that pardons                                        are

different            from,         and        do     not    include,      commutations.                   The

interpretation              of     Section 11 ends here, with                   the        unmistakable

conclusion           that        the “subject to” clause does                   not        provide        the

authority to regulate commutations.

         Instead of approaching Section 11 by considering its                                           plain

language, the dissent attempts to justify its interpretation that

the      word         “pardons”              in     the    “subject     to”     clause            includes

commutations by wading into the morass of speeches                                        made     by     the

drafters of Section 11.                       The dissent bases its interpretation                         on

the   perception that because several drafters did not distinguish

between commutations and pardons in their speeches regarding                                              the

reporting        clause           of        Section 11, they intended                that        the     word

pardon     in the “subject to” clause include commutations.                                        Such     a

conclusion           is     simply incomprehensible.                   We do        not     agree        that

imprecise        speeches              by     individual drafters             give        courts        carte

blanche         to        ignore        the        plain    language     of     a     constitutional
provision.            Those     drafters were precise         when     they        wrote   the

reporting provision.              That provision, which is the last                  sentence

of    Section 11, precisely distinguishes among the three different

types      of     clemency:            “He     shall   communicate     to     the     general

assembly,        at     every     regular session,         each     case     of     reprieve,

commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name and crime of the

convict, the sentence, its date, and the date of the commutation,

pardon,     or        reprieve,        with     the reasons   therefor.”            (Emphasis

added.)     Moreover, as we stated in Slingluff, we will not look to

the     history of a provision where, as here, the language                           of   the

provision is clear.

          Given         our      tradition        of   interpreting        statutory       and

constitutional           language,           the only plausible      interpretation         of

Section     11        is the one we adopt today — the “subject to”                     clause

provides        authority        to     the General      Assembly     to     regulate      the

application process for pardons and not commutations.

                                                 III

         Because        we     have established that Section 11, Article                   III

authorizes        the        General     Assembly to      regulate     the        application
process        for     pardons,     we   must determine    whether      the        General

Assembly        has,     in fact, prescribed any regulations.                Plaintiffs

claim        that     the General Assembly, through R.C. Chapter                  2967    in

general         and      R.C.     2967.07   in   particular,     has        established

procedural           requirements that must be fulfilled before               a     pardon

may     be     granted.       Defendants argue that R.C. 2967          is     merely       a

directory statute setting forth procedures which the Governor

may choose to ignore.

        R.C. 2967.07 provides:

         “All        applications for pardon, commutation of sentence,                    or

reprieve        shall be made in writing to the adult parole authority.

Upon     the        filing    of such application, or when directed                by    the

governor in any case, a thorough investigation into the propriety

of     granting a pardon, commutation, or reprieve shall be made                          by

the     authority, which shall report in writing to the                     governor       a

brief        statement       of   the facts in the case,       together       with       the

recommendation of the authority for or against the granting of                             a

pardon,        commutation, or reprieve, the grounds therefor                     and    the

records or minutes relating to the case.”
         As we determined above, Section 11, Article III of the Ohio

Constitution           authorizes           the General Assembly            to     regulate              the

application           process       only         with     respect    to    pardons,           and        not

commutations           or     reprieves.           Because the grant of            the        clemency

power     with        respect to commutations and reprieves is unfettered,

any     regulation by the General Assembly that acts                              to        limit        the

Governor’s        power        to     grant        commutations       or    reprieves              is      a

violation of the Constitution.                          To the extent that the regulatory

scheme under R.C. Chapter 2967 places limits or preconditions                                             on

the     Governor’s power to grant commutations or reprieves,                                       it     is

unconstitutional              and void.           We are particularly            concerned              with

R.C.     2967.07.            As we note below, the General Assembly                           in        R.C.

2967.07 has provided a regulatory prerequisite to the granting of

commutations,           as     well        as     pardons and       reprieves:          a     clemency

application           must     be made to and acted on by                  the     Adult           Parole

Authority        before        the Governor may grant clemency.                         We     do        not

question        the     wisdom        of        this     legislation,      but     it         has         no

constitutional underpinnings beyond pardons.

          The         question         becomes           whether     we     may         sever            the
unconstitutional                references to commutations and          reprieves        from

the otherwise constitutional portions of R.C. 2967.07.                           R.C. 1.50

provides       that statutory provisions are presumptively                      severable:

“If    any     provision           of    a section of the     Revised     Code     or     the

application          thereof        to    any   person   or   circumstance        is     held

invalid,       the     invalidity          does not affect     other     provisions        or

applications          of        the section or related sections          which     can     be

given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to

this    end        the provisions are severable.”             In order     to     sever     a

portion       of     a statute, we must first find that such a                   severance

will not fundamentally disrupt the statutory scheme of which                              the

unconstitutional provision is a part.                    We set forth the test            for

determining whether an unconstitutional provision may in fact                              be

severed       in Geiger v. Geiger (1927), 117 Ohio St. 451,                      466,     160

N.E. 28, 33:

        “‘(1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts

capable       of separation so that each may be read and may stand                         by

itself?        (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with                         the

general       scope        of     the whole as to make it       impossible        to     give
effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause

or     part is stricken out?           (3) Is the insertion of words or terms

necessary in order to separate the constitutional part                        from     the

unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the                     former     only?’”

Id.,     quoting State v. Bickford (1913), 28 N.D. 36, 147 N.W. 407,

paragraph nineteen of the syllabus.

         The     references to commutations and reprieves meet the test

for     severability        provided in Geiger.       R.C. 2967.07       provides        a

regulatory        scheme     that imposes the same         regulations        upon     the

three types of clemency.              In other words, it is as if there               were

three separate but identical statutes each regulating one type of

clemency.        Therefore, the regulation of each type of clemency                     is

essentially           independent     of   the   others.     Because      of         their

independence,           the regulation of commutations and            reprieves        are

not     so     connected     to     the regulation of      pardons     that     without

reference        to     commutations and reprieves the         regulatory        scheme

will     not     give effect to the intention of the General                  Assembly.

The requirements of the regulatory scheme concerning pardons will

not     change.        We need only excise the constitutionally               offensive
references to commutations and reprieves in R.C. 2967.07 and need

not     add        any        other        language in order to          give    effect     to     its

regulatory           scheme.               Thus, we hold that, pursuant            to     the     Ohio

Constitution,                 R.C. 2967.07 may regulate the application                     process

for pardons only.

         Because              only     a        portion of the statute is constitutional,

only     the Governor’s grant or denial of a pardon is “subject                                    to”

the     application process outlined in R.C. 2967.07.                              His power        to

grant        or     deny commutations is not subject to those regulations.

Therefore, the commutations at issue in this case remain valid.

             The     validity              of     the     one   pardon   granted    without         an

application              in     compliance with the procedure outlined                     in     R.C.

2967.07           remains        at issue.              We must now determine      whether        this

noncompliance precluded the Governor from granting a                                    pardon.     As

we     noted        above,           the        Governor exercises       the    pardoning        power

“subject           to” these regulations, even though the General Assembly

is     not        authorized by Section 11, Article III to intrude in                              any

way upon the Governor’s discretion to grant or deny a pardon.

         The        exercise of the pardoning power involves two                           distinct
elements — the application process and the consideration process.

The     phrase “manner of applying” for pardons includes the                          entire

application              process,     which   encompasses    the   filing        of      the

application              itself,     the investigation, the recommendation,              and

the     full        report compiled by the APA.           We find that the        General

Assembly’s authority to regulate the application process                          extends

to    the      time        just     before the Governor     reaches     a     substantive

decision           concerning a pardon.         Once this point is          reached,     the

General Assembly’s constitutionally granted authority to regulate

procedurally the pardoning power of the Governor is at its end.

         By        its     clear     terms,   R.C. 2967.07 contemplates          that     an

investigation              by the APA that leads to a recommendation              for     or

against        a     pardon        may be initiated in two distinct           ways.      The

first       way      is     for an applicant (or someone on           the     applicant’s

behalf)        to        file a pardon request directly with           the     APA.      The

second        way        is for the Governor to direct that the investigation

occur.         The        real issue in this case is whether the Governor                 is

required to await the APA investigation and recommendation before

he may grant a pardon.
         The     first        sentence       of     R.C. 2967.07      requires        that     all

pplications           for pardons shall be made to the APA.                     The     General

Assembly has chosen the word “all” to indicate that every request

for a pardon must go to the APA for evaluation.                          In addition, the

General        Assembly        has    chosen to use the word            “shall”        in     R.C.

2967.07        three     times in connection with the APA’s                 role        in     the

pardon      application process.                  This indicates the mandatory nature

of the APA investigation and of the entire APA involvement in the

application process.

          We      hold        that    R.C.        2967.07   mandates     that         the      APA

investigation report and recommendation must be presented to                                   the

Governor        before        he may grant a pardon.           This     mandate        includes

those     situations           in    which        the   Governor    initiates         the      APA

investigation.

         The     requirement of APA involvement by the General Assembly

is   permissible,             because    it is within         the     General     Assembly’s

authority to “legislate in aid of the [pardoning] power.”                                   Knapp,

39   Ohio       St.     at 392-393.          The statute is meant to            ensure        that

information           about     each person for whom a pardon              is     considered
will     be        available to the Governor, so that an informed decision

may be made.           This is precisely the type of regulation “as to the

manner        of     applying     for pardons” contemplated     by    Section    11,

Article III.           The Governor’s power to grant pardons is subject to

this procedural mechanism, which requires the APA to investigate,

recommend and report before the Governor may grant a pardon.

         Because        the     Governor has ultimate substantive       discretion

whether        to grant or deny a pardon, there is no requirement               that

the      Governor        place     any   weight   whatsoever   on     either     the

investigative report or the recommendation of the APA.                    However,

the     power to disregard is not equivalent to the power to proceed

without        the procedural requirements first being fulfilled.                The

abuses        sought     to     be remedied by addition of the       “subject    to”

clause in Section 11, Article III are those that occur during the

application process.              Thus, the process is subject to regulation,

and procedural requirements may be placed on the Governor’s power

to     pardon.        To find otherwise would be to read the “subject            to”

clause out of Section 11, Article III, when it is clear that that

clause affects the power of the Governor to grant pardons.
         Defendants argue that if R.C. 2967.07 regulates                        in        a   way

which affects the Governor’s power to pardon, then the statute is

unconstitutional.               However,    the     regulations       placed         on       the

pardoning power are those authorized by the Constitution                              itself.

See     Knapp,     39 Ohio St. at 392.            Since R.C 2967.07           was     enacted

pursuant to the authority of Section 11, Article III, the statute

is constitutional to the extent that it regulates the application

process for pardons.

         We     recognize        that the pardoning power         conferred           on      the

Governor by the Ohio Constitution is essential to ensure                              justice

in particular cases.              Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton stated in The

Federalist        No.    74 (Cooke Ed. 1961) 500-501, in support                      of      the

broad     clemency power conferred on the President                     by     Section         2,

Article II of the United States Constitution:                     “Humanity and good

policy        conspire     to     dictate, that       the    benign     prerogative            of

pardoning         should         be   as   little     as    possible         fettered          or

embarrassed.        The criminal code of every country partakes so much

of    necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions

in    favor      of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance
too sanguinary and cruel.”

         However,           the     power to pardon is subject               to     abuse.         The

framers        therefore authorized the Ohio General Assembly to                                 enact

regulations           to     limit those abuses, thereby allowing                     procedural

requirements           which limit the Governor’s exercise of                        the        power.

In   R.C.       Chapter           2967,        the General Assembly        has      enacted        the

authorized           regulations           as     safeguards     against      abuse.             Those

safeguards           do not stand in the way of the Governor’s substantive

exercise        of the pardoning power.                 It would take an amendment                  to

Ohio’s         Constitution               to     authorize     substantive          limitations.

Nevertheless,              the     safeguards do impose procedural                  requirements

which were bypassed in this case.                       The pardon purportedly granted

was invalid from the outset.

         Amicus        curiae        American        Civil     Liberties      Union        of     Ohio

Foundation argues that if this court reverses the decision of the

court     of        appeals, the cause should be remanded to the court                              of

appeals        to     resolve        issues that court           did   not        reach     in     its

previous        opinion.           However, we have determined, as a                  matter        of

law, that former Governor Celeste acted outside the scope of                                       his
constitutionally           conferred clemency authority           in        granting       the

pardon.       The other assignments of error raised in the                         court    of

appeals cannot alter that finding.              The judgment of the court                   of

appeals      in    case     No. 93-1165 is affirmed with           respect           to    the

commutations         and    reversed as to the     pardon.         The        declaratory

judgment      of     the    trial     court that the   pardon          is     invalid       is

reinstated.

                                           IV

                                    Case No. 92-1350

        In    case     No. 92-1350, the defendants in case                   No.     93-1165

appeal from the court of appeals’ denial of their complaint for a

writ    of    prohibition.           Defendants contend   that          the        court    of

appeals erred in refusing to stop the trial court from exercising

jurisdiction         in the declaratory judgment action,                which        is    the

subject      of    the appeal in case No. 93-1165.           We        find        that    our

resolution of the issues in case No. 93-1165 is determinative                               of

the    issues raised in this appeal, and that any remaining                           issues

therefore are moot.           Accordingly, we affirm the judgment                    of    the

court of appeals in case No. 92-1350.
                                                          Judgment affirmed

                                                    in case No. 92-1350.

                                               Judgment affirmed in part

                                                    and reversed in part

                                                    in case No. 93-1165.

        A.W. Sweeney, Wright and Evans, JJ., concur.

        Moyer, C.J., concurs separately.

         Douglas, Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in part         and

dissent in part.

         John R. Evans, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting

for Resnick, J.

FOOTNOTES:

1.      In his application for clemency, Saram Bellinger stated that

he      was     convicted   of   aggravated     robbery      with   firearm

specifications and was sentenced to an indefinite term of five to

twenty-five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively            with

three     years’ actual incarceration.     Both former Governor Celeste

and     Governor George V. Voinovich commuted that sentence to         time

served.       Bellinger withdrew his appeal.
        According to his application for clemency, Freddie Moore was

convicted        of operating a gambling house and received a suspended

sentence.            Former        Governor Celeste granted      Moore     a     full     and

unconditional              pardon on January 11, 1991, after            which     Governor

Voinovich pardoned him on August 24, 1992.                     The court of        appeals

noted      that his appeal had been rendered moot by the pardon                          from

Governor Voinovich.

2.      Reginald Wilkinson was substituted as a party to this action

pursuant to Civ.R. 25(D)(1) when he replaced George W. Wilson                              as

the Director of Rehabilitation and Correction effective March 25,

1991.

         Jill        Goldhart        was   substituted as a     party     for     John     W.

Shoemaker when she became Acting Chief of the APA.

3.       Even        though courts may not review the substantive decision

of   the     Governor on whether to exercise clemency in a particular

case,      courts          may     consider whether constitutionally            authorized

limitations           on     the     clemency power have      been   respected.           For

example,        if     a Governor attempted to grant a pardon                  before     the

recipient        had        been     convicted, the   purported      grant       would     be
outside the scope of the clemency power conferred by Section                                       11,

Article        III     and     constitutionally          invalid        from     the        outset.

Similarly, a purported pardon is not really a pardon                                 at     all     if

constitutionally              authorized     procedural          limitations               on      the

pardoning       power        are ignored.        Knapp held that          a     pardon,           once

granted     and       delivered, is irrevocable.             Id., 39 Ohio                 St.     377,

syllabus.           However,     Knapp     did     not    consider        the         issue         of

constitutional limitations on the Governor’s power.                              An attempted

pardon     which       is     granted without adherence to                constitutionally

authorized          requirements     is     invalid,       and     is     not        immune         to

challenge.

4.       Interpreting          the “subject to” clause             as     authorizing              the

General     Assembly          to set up a regulatory scheme                   which        includes

prerequisites          to the exercise of the Governor’s pardoning                              power

is    consistent with our earlier analysis where we found that                                     the

clemency       power is subject to whatever limits are                         set        forth     in

Section 11, Article III.             In the case of the “subject to” clause,

the    limit        takes     the form of an authorization                to     the        General

Assembly       to     issue     regulations that will themselves                      limit        the
Governor’s pardoning power.

5.       Though the validity of a reprieve is not at issue                    in    this

case,     we     believe       that any interpretation of the         “subject       to”

clause is necessarily incomplete without considering each of                         the

three     types       of executive clemency.       In terms of       reprieves,       we

believe        that they are fundamentally different from              pardons.        A

reprieve        is    temporary; execution of a sentence is delayed                 when

the     Governor grants a reprieve.           A reprieve is not permanent             in

the way that a pardon is.             Reprieves, by their very nature, often

require        prompt,      totally   unfettered    action    by     the     Governor.

Consequently,          we     find that reprieves are not         governed     by    the

“subject to” clause and, consistent with our analysis below,                         the

General        Assembly       may not regulate the application         process       for

reprieves.

         Moyer,       C.J.,     concurring   separately.      I     concur     in    the

judgment        and    opinion     of the majority that      apply     Section       11,

Article        III, Ohio Constitution and R.C. Chapter 2967 as                 clearly

intended        by    the drafters of the Ohio Constitution            and     by    the

General Assembly.             I write separately to discuss an aspect of the
majority           decision       that demonstrates one of the                   very     difficult

responsibilities of being a judge.

             The        majority’s       careful   and        restrained          interpretation

produces the only conclusion that is faithful to the words of the

Constitution             and to R.C. Chapter 2967.                 We are not          required     or

even     requested to review the wisdom or the judgment of the                                    acts

of     Governor Celeste when he pardoned and commuted the                                 sentences

of     the     defendants two business days before he left office.                                  If

that     were the issue, my vote would be to invalidate all                                 of     the

Governor’s             actions.     That, however, is              not     the    issue     we     are

required           to decide.       Nor is there any dispute that even                      if     the

Governor           were required by the Constitution and the                           statutes     to

receive        a       report     from the Ohio Adult Parole                 Authority       before

granting           a    pardon     or    commutation,         he     could       disregard         the

recommendation contained in the report and grant                                 the     pardon     or

commutation.              Indeed,       the   manner     in        which     Governor       Celeste

granted        the       commutations and pardon              in     the     cases       before     us

suggests that even if he had followed the statutory procedure, it

is     unlikely he would have followed a recommendation of the Adult
Parole        Authority           that any of the defendants not        be     granted     a

commutation              or     pardon.   It appears that that is       precisely        the

reason        the        dissent advocates an amendment to        the        Constitution

that     would           limit     the power of the Governor to      grant       pardons,

commutations and reprieves beyond the limitations in Section                             11,

Article        III.           As Chief Justice Marshall observed, “[c]ourts              are

the     mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.”                        Osborn

v.     Bank of United States (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866,                          6

L.Ed. 204, 234.

         The        majority        opinion   reflects the   fundamental         role     of

judicial           responsibility and restraint.         Every judge faithful             to

the judicial oath of office must be able to separate the law from

his     or her personal views when deciding cases.                  That fundamental

aspect        of        judging     is a unique challenge to judicial           decision-

making.            In     separating personal opinion from the constitutional

issues before us, I am reminded of the observation that “[i]f the

provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they                          pinch     as

well     as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned.”                          Home

Bldg.     &        Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934), 290 U.S. 398,                 483,     54
S.Ct.     231,        256, 78 L.Ed. 413, 452 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).

There     is     no comfort in applying the plain language of the                                Ohio

Constitution to the facts in the case before us.                                The conduct        of

the     death-penalty defendants that produced their convictions and

death     sentences           is the lowest form of human behavior.                        If     the

death     penalty        is appropriate for anyone, it is appropriate                             for

them.      However,           that personal belief has no                 relevance        to     the

legal     issues        before us and must be separated from the                          judicial

decision         we     are     required        to     render.      The        words      of      the

Constitution can be given their plain meaning only as applied                                      by

the     majority        decision.         To     analyze     away        the     words     of     the

Constitution           is to engage in an act of corroborating                          one’s     own

belief that the Governor’s actions were unwise.

         The     distribution        of        power among the           three       branches      of

government        rests        on a delicate balance.              It     is     a     fundamental

element of American government.                       S. Euclid v. Jemison (1986),                 28

Ohio St.3d 157, 28 OBR 250, 503 N.E.2d 136.                             We are urged by           the

successor         in      the      office        of     governor         to      exercise         our

constitutional power to invalidate the commutations and a                                      pardon
of   his predecessor in office.               Restraint should characterize the

exercise        of     judicial power in such a case.           If we     abandon      the

words     of the Constitution as adopted by the citizens of Ohio                        in

1851,     we        invade both the authority of the executive branch                  and

the will of the people.

         For the foregoing reasons, I concur, albeit regretfully, in

the per curiam opinion.

         Alice        Robie Resnick, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part.

                                              I

         By     a     stroke of a pen a Governor is authorized by                  today’s

opinion        to     overturn the death penalty verdicts            of     judges     and

juries        which     have    been    upheld by       countless   state     appellate

judges, Supreme Court justices and federal court judges.                           Today’s

per curiam opinion says it is perfectly acceptable for a Governor

in      the     last     days    of    his   or   her     administration      to     grant

commutations to whomever he or she desires without first awaiting

the APA investigation and report. The basis of such a holding                           is

that the Constitution does not specifically authorize regulations
“as     to        the manner of applying for commutations.”                    As a     result,

only     full        and absolute pardons are “subject to” any regulations

enacted by the General Assembly.

        The per curiam opinion misconstrues Section 11, Article III,

and in the process engages in an inaccurate interpretation of the

scope of the Governor’s pardoning power.6                        While I agree that the

pardon        purportedly granted by former Governor Celeste should                          be

invalidated,              it     is   clear   to   me   that     the    commutations         he

purportedly              granted also should fail for the              very     same     reason

advanced           for the failure of the pardon.               The per curiam          opinion

proclaims           that        Section   11, Article     III     is    unambiguous,        and

essentially ends its analysis of the “subject to” clause at                                that

point.        However, this case involves constitutional interpretation

which        is     not        readily resolvable by resort solely              to     hornbook

rules        of construction, as if in a vacuum, but must be considered

with     an        eye     on the historical context underlying                 Section     11,

Article           III’s evolution into its current form.                 The     per     curiam

opinion, in focusing on a supposed semantical difference                                between

pardons           and commutations, does not grasp the importance of                       this
historical        development,      and thereby   fails    to     comprehend         the

entire scope of this issue.            Section 11, Article III is certainly

capable of more than one interpretation, and the reference to the

“manner     of     applying for pardons” is not so         clear       as     the    per

curiam     opinion      rashly presumes.     Given that the          constitutional

provision is ambiguous, resort to constitutional history                       is    not

only appropriate, it is crucial.            Even a cursory consideration of

constitutional         history reveals that the per        curiam       opinion       is

erroneous.

         The drafters of Section 11, Article III were concerned with

precisely        the   type     of abuse of pardoning     power       which     former

Governor        Celeste accomplished in his last days           in     office.        As

this     case graphically illustrates, the power to commute is                      just

as     easily     abused      as is the power to pardon.        Former        Governor

Celeste intentionally bypassed established procedures and flouted

the constitutional limits on his clemency authority, ignoring the

procedural        safeguards      the Constitution authorizes          the     General

Assembly to put into place regarding the application process                         for

executive clemency.            Members of this court are unwilling to               give
effect to the binding statutory prerequisite for exercise of                                     the

clemency        power,         finding        that     an    APA     investigation               and

recommendation               (along          with      the    accompanying               required

notifications           relating        to     victims’      rights)       are         conditions

precedent for the Governor’s grant of a pardon, but that                                  no     APA

involvement is necessary for a commutation.7

        This     seems an especially curious result when one considers

that    both     the     pardon and the commutation are                    aspects        of     the

Governor’s       clemency power, which has as its source                          Section        11,

Article      III.       Given the per curiam opinion, when                       the     Governor

considers       whether        to     pardon        an applicant     for       clemency,         the

Governor       must     wait        until the APA process           is     complete           before

acting,      but if the Governor contemplates a commutation,                              in     the

alternative,           for      that         same      applicant,        the           procedural

investigation          safeguards of the APA can               be    ignored.           The     near

schizophrenic          result engendered by the per curiam opinion                             makes

the    point     better than any other argument that the                          Constitution

does    in     fact     authorize the General Assembly                   to      regulate        the

application process for executive clemency, and allows that                                     body
to require APA involvement to ensure that the Governor is able to

make     an     informed     clemency decision, whether                      the        Governor       is

considering a pardon or a commutation.

         In     order to underscore the magnitude of this case, a brief

recapitulation of the circumstances of each defendant’s                                     criminal

conviction is in order and appropriate.

                                                    A

        Donald Lee Maurer confessed to the killing of seven-year-old

Dawn     M.     Hendershot.        The evidence presented at                      trial     revealed

that     on     September        29,        1982,       Maurer     drove     to     a     school       in

Massillon,        Ohio,     to     pick        up       his    stepchildren         and         a     few

neighborhood        children           at     the end         of   the     school        day.        Dawn

Hendershot        was the first to arrive.                     Rather than         wait     for       the

other     children        to appear, Maurer decided to depart                            alone       with

Dawn.         Maurer drove Dawn out into the country to a wooded                                    area,

where he stopped the vehicle, removed a twelve-gauge shotgun, and

led     Dawn     into the trees.              He then began to sexually molest                        the

girl.     At some point Maurer became frightened by his actions                                       and

attempted to strangle Dawn with her sweater.                               When she started to
struggle, Maurer shot Dawn in the back, covered her lifeless body

with twigs and leaves, and left the scene to return to his home.

         A     jury     found    Maurer guilty of aggravated murder               with     a

specification,           kidnapping,    and gross        sexual     imposition.          The

trial        court adopted the jury’s recommendation that the defendant

be executed.           His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct

appeal        to     the court of appeals and this court.                See    State     v.

Maurer (Feb. 13, 1984), Stark App. No. CA-6166, unreported,                             1984

WL   4469,         affirmed (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15                OBR    379,     473

N.E.2d        768.      On   January   10,       1991,   former     Governor      Celeste

purportedly           commuted    Donald Maurer’s        death     sentence      to     life

imprisonment without parole eligibility.

                                             B

                                                            Leonard       Jenkins        was

convicted of aggravated murder with specifications, eight                             counts

of   robbery,          one count of attempted murder and             five      counts     of

kidnapping.           The convictions stemmed from a robbery that occurred

in   Cuyahoga          County,    Ohio, on October 21,           1981.      Jenkins      and

another individual entered a branch office of National City                             Bank
and     held     bank     employees and patrons at gunpoint.                During           the

robbery,        Jenkins     observed      a police officer,        Anthony        Johnson,

approach the front door of the bank and peer inside.                        Upon seeing

the officer, Jenkins stated that he and his partner would have to

shoot     their     way out of the bank.         Officer Johnson was              mortally

injured by a gunshot to the head when Jenkins exited the bank and

the     two     exchanged gunfire.         A jury recommended        and     the           trial

court     imposed a sentence of death.            His conviction and              sentence

were     affirmed        on direct appeal to the court of appeals                  and        to

this     court.     See State v. Jenkins (Feb. 24, 1984), Cuyahoga App.

No.     45231, unreported, 1984 WL 14150, affirmed (1984),                        15        Ohio

St.3d     164,     15     OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264.         On January        10,           1991,

former        Governor     Celeste      purportedly     commuted     Jenkins               death

sentence to life imprisonment without parole eligibility.

                                             C

         A jury convicted Debra Brown of the murder of fifteen-year-

old     Tonnie     Storey.       The evidence showed that on the morning                      of

July     11,     1984,     Tonnie left her home in         Cincinnati        to        attend

summer        school.      She    was    last seen on     that     day     with        a     man
identified              as     Alton     Coleman        and   a     woman     matching      Brown’s

description.                  On July 19, 1984, a realtor entered                  an     abandoned

building that he was preparing to show to a prospective buyer and

found        a     partially decomposed body.                     Scrawled above the body           on

the         wall        were       the   words     “I     hate      niggers     death.”      Police

ultimately              identified the body as that of                  Tonnie     Storey.         The

evidence presented during trial included Brown’s fingerprints                                       on

a     Michael           Jackson button Tonnie had been wearing                     the     day     she

disappeared.                 Brown admitted to another individual that                     she     had

killed Tonnie “for her clothes” and that she, Brown, “had                                    to     do

what        [she]        had       to do.”    The state further introduced                 evidence

linking           Brown        to at least five other murders and several                        other

attempted           murders or assaults.                 After finding         Brown     guilty     of

Tonnie’s murder, the jury recommended and the trial judge imposed

a     sentence of death.                 Her conviction and sentence were                  affirmed

in     a     direct           appeal to the court of appeals and to this                     court.

See        State        v. Brown (Apr. 15, 1987), Hamilton App. No. C-850434,

unreported, 1987 WL 9743, affirmed (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528

N.E.2d           523.         On    January      10,     1991,      former     Governor     Celeste
purportedly          commuted Brown’s death sentence to life imprisonment

without parole eligibility.

                                                  D

           On the morning of August 5, 1983, Willie Lee Jester entered

an    AmeriTrust            Company      branch office in Cleveland,         Ohio,     soon

after       it    opened          for   the    day.   Jester    approached     Patrolman

Benjamin         Grair, the bank’s security guard, while he was                  sitting

at    a     desk speaking on the telephone and shot him in the                       chest.

Jester       then ran to the bank counter, leaped over it, and took                       a

total of $3,122 from a teller’s drawer. Patrolman Grair died as a

result of the gunshot wound to his torso.                      The fatal injuries        to

his       heart, right lung and liver were caused by a single, hollow-

point       bullet      —     a bullet specifically designed           to    cause     more

damage than a smooth-point bullet.                    Upon finding Jester guilty of

aggravated         murder with two specifications, the jury                  recommended

and       the trial court imposed a sentence of death.                  The conviction

and       sentence      were affirmed in a direct appeal to the                court     of

appeals and to this court.                    See State v. Jester (Sept. 26, 1985),

Cuyahoga         App.       No.     49065, unreported, 1985       WL   8631,    affirmed
(1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 512 N.E.2d 962.                               On January 10,              1991,

former       Governor Celeste purportedly commuted the death                                   sentence

to life imprisonment without parole eligibility.

                                                         E

         A    three-judge                panel     in        Hamilton   County        convicted           and

sentenced Elizabeth Green to death for aggravated murder and to a

consecutive             term        of    ten to twenty-five            years        for     aggravated

robbery.          The convictions stemmed from the killing and robbery of

Thomas       Willis,           a     neighbor of one of Green’s                 friends,           Belinda

Coulter.           On     January          4, 1988, Coulter sold            Willis           some     food

stamps       so     that           she and Green could in turn              use        the     cash        to

purchase          drugs.            Later that day, Green, with                 Coulter,           entered

Willis’s          apartment wearing socks on her hands                          so     as     to     avoid

leaving any fingerprints.                        Green then stabbed Willis and took his

money.       Thomas Willis died as a result of one hundred nine                                      knife

wounds       to     his        neck,       torso        and arms.       Green        admitted        to     a

psychologist that she had participated in the attack but                                           claimed

she   had stabbed Willis only three times.                              Green’s conviction and

sentence          of death were affirmed in a direct appeal to the                                   court
of    appeals         and     to this court.        See State v.     Green        (July        11,

1990),        Hamilton App. No. C-880504, unreported,                 1990        WL        95357,

affirmed (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253.                             On     January

10,     1991,     former Governor Celeste purportedly commuted                          Green’s

death sentence to life imprisonment without parole eligibility.

                                                F

         A     jury     convicted Lee “Crazy Horse” Seiber              of        aggravated

murder with three death penalty specifications in connection with

the killing of Stanton Norris.                  On May 21, 1985, Seiber entered a

Columbus bar for the second time that evening, carrying a loaded,

cocked        .38 caliber revolver.            An accomplice stood at the                   closed

front door, shotgun in hand, barring anyone from leaving.                                   Seiber

had     returned        to     the bar to confront two men, Alvie                 and        Louis

Schoenberger,           one     of     whom   had criticized       Seiber        during        his

earlier        visit        for making lewd remarks to a woman              in        the     bar.

After        forcing        the brothers to lie face down on           the        floor        and

holding        them at gunpoint, Seiber threatened the crowd and                             tried

to    find      out     who     were     friends of the Schoenbergers.                  Stanton

Norris,        who was drinking a beer at the bar, admitted to being                             a
friend of the Schoenbergers.                When Norris refused to comply                    with

his order to lie face down on the floor, Seiber grabbed Norris by

the     shoulders           and   fatally shot him        in   the     back.      The        jury

recommended           and     the trial court imposed a          sentence        of        death.

Seiber’s           conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct                         appeal

to    the      court of appeals and to this court.                   See State v. Seiber

(June       8, 1989), Franklin App. No. 87AP-530, unreported, 1989                             WL

61733,        affirmed        (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 564             N.E.2d     408.         On

January        10,     1991, former Governor Celeste purportedly                      commuted

the      death         sentence      to   life       imprisonment       without            parole

eligibility.

                                                 G

         Rosalie        Grant      was convicted by a jury of            two     counts        of

aggravated           murder,      each with two death penalty            specifications,

and     one        count of aggravated arson.            The evidence      presented           at

trial       revealed that around 6:00 a.m. on April 1,                    1983,        a     fire

ignited        in     the bedroom of Grant’s two infant sons, one-year-old

Donovan and two-year-old Joseph.                     The boys died in the fire as               a

result        of     severe burns and smoke inhalation.                 Grant,        however,
escaped        from the burning house entirely unharmed, fully                         dressed

in pants, jacket, shoes and socks, with unsinged hair, no soot on

her     face     or        eyes,     and free of any signs of smoke                inhalation.

Other     than        Grant’s claim that she had tried to save her                       babies

when     the     smoke first awoke her, there was no evidence presented

that     Grant        had        attempted to put out the fire or             to     save    the

children.        Arson investigators determined that the fire had                           been

intentionally              set     and    fueled     by   a   liquid     accelerant.          No

determination              was made as to the exact type of               accelerant        that

had     been used. The evidence also revealed that approximately two

weeks     before the fire, Grant had purchased $5,000 worth of                              life

insurance        for        each     of    the     boys   with   Grant     listed      as    the

beneficiary.           Grant had not purchased a policy for herself or for

her     three-year-old daughter Shylene, who was                       living       elsewhere.

Furthermore,           a     can of charcoal lighter fluid,               bearing      Grant’s

fingerprints, and a partially burned kitchen chair matching those

in     Grant’s home were found four days after the fire in a                             nearby

vacant     house.            The     conviction and sentence           were     affirmed      on

direct     appeal           to the court of appeals and to this                 court.       See
State        v.     Grant (Nov. 9, 1990), Mahoning App. No. 83             C.A.         144,

unreported, 1990 WL 176825, affirmed (1993), 67 Ohio                      St.3d         465,

620     N.E.2d           50.      On January 10, 1991, former     Governor        Celeste

purportedly              commuted Grant’s death sentence to life imprisonment

with no restriction as to parole eligibility.

                                                H

         According              to the court of appeals’ opinion, in       May      1979,

Ralph        F.     DeLeo        pled guilty to the murder of Dr.     Walter        Bond.

After        pleading           guilty, DeLeo was immediately     sentenced        to     an

indefinite term of fifteen years to life imprisonment.                       In     1989,

the     court        of        appeals affirmed the trial court’s     dismissal           of

DeLeo’s           petition for enforcement of a plea bargain as to parole,

or,     in the alternative, a petition to vacate the conviction                          and

sentence.           See State v. DeLeo (Sept. 19, 1989), Franklin App. No.

89AP-107,           unreported,        1989 WL 107559.    On    January    10,      1991,

former Governor Celeste purportedly commuted DeLeo’s sentence                             to

time served.

                                                I

         A        jury     convicted     John   Salim of felonious    assault           with
violence        and gun specifications in connection with     an   incident

that occurred on January 23, 1988.          The evidence, as set forth in

the     court     of appeals’ opinion, showed that on that     date      Salim

fired     a gun at William Terbrack as the latter prepared to            drive

out of a hardware store parking lot.          A bullet was retrieved from

the     window post on the passenger side of Terbrack’s car.             Salim

was     sentenced to three years’ actual incarceration for         the     gun

specification to be served prior to a three-to fifteen-year               term

for felonious assault.         The conviction and sentence were affirmed

on     appeal to the court of appeals.       See State v. Salim (May       17,

1990),     Cuyahoga App. Nos. 56925 and 57964, unreported,         1990     WL

66467.      On January 10, 1991, former Governor Celeste purportedly

granted Salim a full pardon.          As the above facts indicate,       among

those     who     purportedly received clemency    from   former   Governor

Celeste     were     some of the most notorious killers on     death      row.

Celeste     made     the   clemency decisions without awaiting     the     APA

investigation        and   report.   Yet, given the per   curiam   opinion,

only     the unfortunate John Salim, who supposed he had received            a

full pardon (as opposed to a commutation), must pay the price for
Celeste’s wholesale disregard of the Constitution.

                                               II

         While I agree with the per curiam opinion that Section                            11,

Article       III    of      the    Ohio Constitution authorizes           the       General

Assembly        to     prescribe          procedural   regulations        as        to     the

application process for executive clemency, my interpretation                               of

Section       11, Article III convinces me that the authority                        granted

by     the    “subject to” clause to regulate “the manner of                        applying

for     pardons” includes commutations.                The per curiam opinion pays

lip     service      to      the    history behind the       evolution         of    current

Section       11,    Article III, without realizing the consequences                        of

that     evolution.           A thoughtful analysis of the addition                  of    the

“subject to” requirement of the Ohio Constitution should                             include

consideration          of     the reason that clause         was   added.           The    per

curiam       opinion        fails    to     consider   and   put   into        effect      the

intention of the drafters of Section 11, Article III.

         At the 1850-1851 Ohio Constitutional Convention, the debate

on Section 11, Article III was limited to the so-called reporting

requirement,         the last sentence of Section 11,              Article          III.     A
delegate, Mr. Riddle, commenting on the insertion of the                        clause,

stated:        “It was known that the exercise of [the pardoning] power

was much complained of. * * * [I]t was but too easy to excite the

sympathies of men in behalf of the convicted criminal.                        Gentlemen

of    the committee were aware from their own experience that                         they

had    often         put     their names to papers soliciting         reprieves        and

pardons        on     the     representation of persons,      in     whom     they     had

confidence.           They knew also that persons in the same manner might

influence           the     governor;   and they    further   knew     that     on     the

strength of that influence brought to bear on him by the names of

persons standing high in society he often exercised that power in

instances           in which the public could not see any propriety.                   The

power,        no doubt, had been abused, but when they looked into                     the

entire matter they would find that no blame could be attached                           to

the    Governor.”            1 Report of the Debates and Proceedings            of     the

Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the                        State     of

Ohio 1850-1851(1851) 306-307.

         In     choosing        to   alter   its   constitutional      provision        on

executive           clemency, Ohio adopted a provision remarkably               similar
to     that        incorporated              by        the     state    of     New     York     into     its

Constitution of 1846.8                      Only a brief discussion of the                      New     York

debates       is     necessary              to     illustrate that             Ohio’s     drafters        of

Section       11,        Article III must have been motivated                            by     the     same

concerns       as        New        York’s drafters when                they     decided        to     place

restrictions             on        the Governor’s pardoning power.                       The     recorded

proceedings          of        the     New        York Constitutional                Convention        which

authored       the provision altering that state’s executive pardoning

powers     reveal             that the provision was extensively                         debated.         In

particular,              several            amendments           were    offered         relative         to

restrictions on the Governor’s pardoning power, including one, by

a Mr. Chatfield, that would have greatly curtailed the Governor’s

pardoning power by making it subject to “such restrictions as may

be    prescribed by law.”                    Report of the Debates and Proceedings of

the    Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State

of    New York (1846) 351.                       This Chatfield amendment ultimately was

rejected,          id.        at     353,        and     the     wording       “subject         to      such

regulations as may be provided by law relative to the                                          manner     of

applying       for pardons,” proposed by Mr. Taylor, was adopted.                                         In
support of his position, Mr. Taylor “agreed that there should                              be

some conditions relative to the manner of applying the power, and

he    would offer an amendment to carry his idea out in relation to

that.     This would leave the Legislature to provide rules for                           its

carrying out, leaving the exercise of the power entirely with the

Governor.”       Id. at 357.

         Since the “subject to” clause of Section 11, Article III of

the     Ohio    Constitution mirrors so closely the                language        of     New

York’s     comparable section, it is fair to assume                  that        the     Ohio

delegates of 1850-1851 shared New York’s concerns about abuses of

the     pardoning     power, while also sharing the conviction                     of     New

York’s     delegates     that        the Governor’s      ultimate     discretion           to

exercise       the   pardoning        power should      not   be    infringed.            The

“subject       to”   clause     is     a   compromise     which     reflects            those

concerns.

        Ohio’s 1802 Constitution, in Section 5, Article II, gave the

Governor “the power to grant reprieves and pardons.”                        No     mention

of    commutations      was included in this authorization.                      The     word

“commutations”        was added in 1851 to Section 11, Article                     III     at
the     Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851, which also added the

“subject to” clause at the end of the same sentence.

         “The        terms ‘pardon’ and ‘reprieve’ have been adopted                            into

the     constitution           of this state without defining                or     explaining

them.”        Sterling v. Drake (1876), 29 Ohio St. 457, 460.                          Just          as

“pardon”        and        “reprieve” are not defined        in        the     Constitution,

“commutation” also is not defined, so that we must                             look       to        the

common        law     for     its meaning.      Although current statutes                   define

these        terms,9        those statutory definitions           do     not       necessarily

control the consideration of their meanings in the Constitution.

         In     State ex rel. Gordon v. Zangerle (1940), 136                          Ohio          St.

371,     375,        16     O.O.   536, 538, 26 N.E.2d       190,        194,       the        court

considered           the     “scope     of   the executive    power”           conferred             by

Section        11, Article III, determining that the common-law meaning

of     the     terms “reprieves” and “commutations” are “not materially

different”           from the statutory definitions (which                   are      the       same

today).         Thus, the court noted, a reprieve was defined as                               “‘the

temporary           suspension        by the Governor   of    the        execution             of     a

sentence,’10 and commutation of sentence as ‘the substitution                                        of
a lesser for a greater punishment.’”                     Id.

         The        Gordon      court     went on to consider the          definition          of

“pardon” and the different forms of pardon:

         “A     pardon may be absolute or conditional, full or partial;

and a conditional pardon may be granted upon conditions precedent

or subsequent.

         “A     full      pardon        purges   away all      guilt     and     leaves       the

recipient           from a legal standpoint, in the same condition                      as     if

the crime had never been committed (Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St.,

377,     381,        48   Am.     Rep., 462); a partial pardon             releases          from

punishment without remission of guilt.                      Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22

Gratt.), 789, 12 Am. Rep., 563.                     The essential characteristics of

full and partial pardons are such that either may be granted with

or without conditions. * * *

         “ An absolute pardon sets the accused free from the custody

of     the     law, prevents further court action, terminates                         existing

probation and makes anticipated probation impossible. * * *

             “The     power      of     executive     pardon    carries        with    it,     as

incidental           thereto, the right to impose such                 valid     conditions,
precedent or subsequent, as the pardoning power may determine.* *

*”     Gordon, 136 Ohio St. at 376-377, 16 O.O. at 538, 26 N.E.2d at

194.

        The per curiam opinion appears to equate “pardon” with “full

and     unconditional pardon.”           However, as the passage from                    Gordon

illustrates, the word “pardon” encompasses several                       concepts.              A

“full     and     unconditional” pardon, which           purges        all        guilt       and

places the recipient in the same position as if no crime had been

committed,        is only one subset of the several types                    of     pardons.

Another     type of pardon, a “partial” pardon, which releases                               from

punishment        without       remitting guilt,      appears     to     be        virtually

synonymous with a “commutation,” which substitutes a lesser for a

greater punishment, but does not remit guilt.                    Any definition                of

“pardon”        which     limits its meaning to clemency           actions              of    the

Governor        that     remit guilt is a narrow definition.                  While          this

narrow      definition          may   appropriately     be      applied            in        some

situations, the common-law meaning of “pardon,” when                          applied          in

the     broader        sense,    also can easily encompass         the        concept          of

commutation, so that commutation is a subset of pardon.
         The       per     curiam opinion’s citation of State ex rel.                           Atty.

Gen.     v.    Peters        (1885), 43 Ohio St. 629, 4 N.E.                  81,     does        not

establish that pardons and commutations are in all cases mutually

exclusive          terms.        In     fact,    the per     curiam        opinion        includes

Peters’s definition of pardon among the material quoted from that

case:     “A pardon discharges the individual designated from all or

some     specified penal consequences of his crime.                          It may be           full

or partial, absolute or conditional.”

(Emphasis          added.)        Id. at 650, 4 N.E. at          87.         By     the     Peters

definition,          a     partial pardon (which discharges                  the     individual

from     “some * * * penal consequences of his crime”) is                             a     pardon

just     as    a     “full       and absolute pardon” is a pardon.                    The        very

language quoted belies the per curiam opinion’s conclusion.                                       The

constitutional             meaning of “pardon,” as well               as     the     common-law

meaning of the word, is by no means precise.                          It is not possible,

as     the per curiam opinion attempts, to conclude that pardons and

commutations             are two totally distinct concepts.                  Recognition           of

the      ambiguity          in    the     word    “pardon”     instead        leads        to     the

conclusion that commutation is a subset of pardon when pardon                                      is
used     in     the inclusive sense, and that the “subject                    to”     clause

clearly does provide the authority to regulate commutations.

         In this case, defendant Ralph DeLeo purportedly received                             a

commutation         to         time        served,   while    defendant      John         Salim

purportedly        received           a     full pardon.     The   per    curiam     opinion

upholds        DeLeo’s        purported commutation, but invalidates                 Salim’s

purported full pardon.                    Yet, under the definition of “pardon” set

forth     in     Peters and in Gordon, what DeLeo purportedly                       received

could     just as easily be termed a partial pardon, in which                             case,

presumably according to the per curiam opinion, Governor                             Celeste

would     have had to await the APA investigation and recommendation

before granting clemency to time served.                       This point, as much           as

any     other,     belies the per curiam opinion’s assertion                       that     the

word     “pardon”        is     used        with precision throughout        Section        11,

Article III.

         When     Section 11, Article III was adopted in 1851                       and     the

power     of     commutation was specifically mentioned as one                       of     the

Governor’s        clemency powers, the delegates to the                    Constitutional

Convention        of 1850-1851 were either conferring a new                    power        for
the     Governor           to exercise, or they were explicitly conferring                               a

power      which           had     been        implicit        in    the     1802     Constitution’s

conferral           of the power to grant pardons.                         If the delegates           were

conferring a new power, then it would be safe to assume that                                           the

power     to        grant        commutations was              considered       to     be   something

different from the power to grant pardons, and was not to be made

subject        to     regulations              “as     to     the    manner     of     applying        for

pardons.”            But        if the delegates were confirming a                      power        which

already existed under the power to grant pardons, then it may                                           be

fairly concluded that the use of the phrase “as to the manner                                           of

applying        for        pardons” in the “subject to” clause was                          meant       to

include the commutation power.                          If the latter is the case, and if

the      word        “pardon”           is     broad        enough    to     encompass      the       word

“commutation”              in     this way, then Section 11,                   Article      III       uses

“pardon”        in two senses:                 in a limited way as one aspect                   of     the

clemency        powers           in the first clause of the                   first     sentence        of

Section 11, Article III, and also, in the “subject to” clause, in

an expansive way that includes the concept of “commutation.”

         The        records        of        the     debates of the          Ohio     Constitutional
Convention of 1850-1851 give no insight into why the “subject to”

clause     of     Section 11, Article III uses the                words       “as     to     the

manner     of     applying       for pardons,” or into           whether        Section       5,

Article        II of the Ohio Constitution of 1802 conferred on                           Ohio’s

Governor the power to commute sentences.

         However,        the    discussions regarding the             addition        of     the

reporting requirement to the executive clemency provision of                                 the

Constitution at the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention do reveal

that     many     of     the    delegates       indiscriminately         used       the     term

“pardon” to refer generically to the Governor’s clemency power.

         One     delegate,       Mr. Riddle, stated that             “[t]he        [Executive

Department]            committee      inserted     that     clause     [the         reporting

requirement]            into    the    report     for     the   purpose,           that      the

legislature           at its annual or biennial sessions might                     know     what

the    Governor had done during the vacation in the exercise of the

pardoning        power.”       (Emphasis added.)          1 Debates and Proceedings,

supra,     at     306.     Because the reporting requirement                  as     proposed

required        the     Governor to communicate “each             case     of       reprieve,

commutation,           or pardon granted,” id. at 300,11 Mr.                  Riddle        thus
used     the inclusive term “pardoning power” to refer to the                                  power

to grant any type of executive clemency.

        Similarly, another delegate, Mr. McCormick, thought that the

provision            requiring          the    Governor     to   report      each     reprieve,

commutation,               or     pardon      granted     “required       nothing         to      be

communicated to the Legislature except the names of                             the       persons

pardoned.            If men had interfered improperly in getting reprieves

for criminals, there was nothing in that section as it now stood,

which required the naming of the persons who interfered to obtain

it     * * *.        The only object to be gained by this section was                            the

ascertainment              of     the    number of      prisoners     pardoned        *    *     *.”

(Emphasis added.)                 Id. at 307.      Mr. McCormick thus used the                  word

“pardon”        in     a        broad    sense to refer to any         act     of     executive

clemency.

        Another delegate, Mr. Stanton, opposed a proposal to further

require     the Governor to report the names of all persons who                                  had

applied for a reprieve, pardon or commutation.                            “He supposed that

the     latter        part of the section was intended for the purpose                            of

making the Governor accountable to the people for the exercise of
the     pardoning       power, and to inform them whom he had              pardoned.”

(Emphasis added.)             Id.

         Yet     another       delegate,   Mr. Larwill,    stated     that     “[t]he

Governor        would    no     doubt have good reasons for       exercising         the

pardoning power.”             (Emphasis added.)   Id.

         These delegates’ statements persuasively refute defendants’

argument        that the framers of Section 11, Article             III     used     the

word     “pardon” in a narrow sense that did not include the concept

of     commutation.           Many   of the delegates at    the     Constitutional

Convention        of 1850-1851 used “pardoning power” to mean                clemency

power.         Furthermore, the word “pardon” was used to refer to                   any

executive exercise of the clemency power.

        Not long after Ohio (in 1851) had amended its Constitution’s

executive clemency provision to specifically include the power to

grant     commutations, the United States Supreme Court                   decided     Ex

Parte Wells (1855), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 15 L.Ed. 421.                      In     the

words of the court:

         “The petitioner was convicted of murder in the District                      of

Columbia,        and    sentenced to be hung on the 23d of           April,        1852.
President        Fillmore           granted to him a       conditional        pardon.         The

material        part        of     it   is   as follows:      ‘For     divers        good     and

sufficient reasons I have granted, and do hereby grant unto                                  him,

the     said William Wells, a pardon of the offense of which he                               was

convicted        —     upon        condition that he be       imprisoned           during     his

natural        life; that is, the sentence of death is hereby                         commuted

to imprisonment for life * * *.’”                    Id. at 308, 15 L.Ed. at 423.

         Wells petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, pointing                               out

that     Section        2,        Article II of the United       States        Constitution

authorizes the President to grant pardons and reprieves, but does

not explicitly authorize the President to place conditions upon a

grant     of     pardon.            Wells    argued that     Section     2,        Article     II

authorizes           only        absolute pardons, and that since             he     had     been

pardoned under the authority conferred by that section,                               he     must

have     received such an absolute pardon with a void condition,                               so

that his sentence actually was remitted entirely.                         Id. at 309, 15

L.Ed.     at     423.            The Circuit Court of the District             of     Columbia

refused the application, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

         The court in Ex Parte Wells determined that the President’s
power            to        grant     “conditional       pardons”12      (commutations)                 was

implicit              within        the    power     to grant     “reprieves     and        pardons”

conferred              by     Section       2,     Article   II    of   the    United            States

Constitution.                  In     so    determining, the        court     found     that           the

petitioner’s argument was mistaken, “arising from the want of due

consideration                 of the legal meaning of the word                pardon.            It     is

supposed              that it was meant to be used exclusively with reference

to     an        absolute pardon, exempting a criminal from the punishment

which        the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”                                59        U.S.

(18 How.) at 309, 15 L.Ed. at 423.

            The        Ex Parte Wells court determined that the word “pardon”

is     not        so narrow as to include only an “absolute pardon”:                                   “In

the     law it has different meanings, which were as well understood

when        the        Constitution was made as any other legal word                         in        the

Constitution                 now is.”       Id. at 310, 15 L.Ed. at 423.               The        court

went        on        to     state that “[i]n this view of the constitution,                            by

giving           to        its words their proper meaning, the power                   to        pardon

conditionally                 is not one of inference at all, but one                   conferred

in terms.
         “The mistake in the argument is, in considering an incident

of     the     power to pardon the exercise of a new power, instead                of

its     being a part of the power to pardon.”            Id. at 315, 15         L.Ed.

at 425.

         If     the United States Supreme Court determined in 1855 that

the     President’s power to commute a sentence is implicit                in     the

power to pardon, it is reasonable to assume that Ohio’s Governors

operating           under    the authority of the state’s 1802     Constitution

also     had the implicit power to commute sentences, since the 1802

Ohio     Constitution’s          provision   on   executive   clemency     closely

resembled           that of the United States Constitution.       The delegates

to     the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention therefore did not add

a     totally        new    power to the Constitution    by   adding     the     word

“commutations” in adopting Section 11, Article III, but                   affirmed

a power the Governor already possessed.13

         It     is apparent that the inclusion of “commutations” in the

first        line     of Section 11, Article III as one of the         Governor’s

clemency powers was done to quiet doubt that the power to                      pardon

was so limited that it did not include the power to commute.                      The
meaning        of “pardon” was not thereby magically altered into                      some

precise        word with only one connotation.        The statements             of     the

delegates to the 1850-1851 Constitutional Convention indicate the

imprecision of the word “pardon.”              In addition, R.C. 2967.01(B)’s

provision        that     pardons may be “partial,”        and     the    Peters        and

Gordon         courts’      recognition   of     partial         pardons,        further

demonstrate that a “full and absolute pardon” is only one type of

pardon, and that there is an overlap between the generic sense of

the     word     “pardon” and the concept of commutation.                Thus,        since

the power of commutation can be understood to be contained within

the     power     to     pardon (in its broad sense) Section             11,     Article

III’s provision that the Governor’s power to commute (as well                            as

to     pardon)     is “subject * * * to * * * regulations,                as     to     the

manner     of     applying     for   pardons” is broad       enough       to     include

regulations as to the manner of applying for commutations.

        In short, even though the power to grant commutations may be

a     power distinct from the power to grant pardons, the common-law

meaning        of “pardon” included “commutation.”           Section 11, Article

III     clearly subjects the Governor’s power to grant commutations,
as     well     as the Governor’s power to grant pardons, to authorized

regulations.            Hence     the Governor’s power to grant                     commutations

pursuant        to     Section 11, Article III is subject                  to        regulations

enacted by the General Assembly as to the application process.

             Defendants         argue         that   the    omission       of         the        word

“commutations”           from     the        “subject to”     clause     of         Section       11,

Article III reflects a conscious decision by the drafters to make

only     the     manner of applying for pardons, and not                        commutations,

subject        to regulation.           Defendants claim that a pardon,                     because

it remits guilt as well as punishment so that the recipient is in

the     same     position        as if no crime had been            committed,              is    the

ultimate act and was meant to be singled out.                          They further claim

that     a     commutation,        which        merely reduces      punishment              without

remitting        guilt,     is     a lesser degree of            clemency           and     so    was

intentionally left out of the “subject to” clause.

         Defendants’ reasoning is specious.                     Although        a     “full       and

unconditional”            pardon        is     the   ultimate     pardon,            whether        a

commutation differs greatly from a pardon is in the                                 eye     of    the

beholder.            To the recipient of a full and unconditional                           pardon,
that     pardon           is     much   different   from    a   commutation          (even     a

commutation              to     time served, which would also remit               punishment)

because        the        full pardon relieves the recipient of               disabilities

associated with the finding of guilt and wipes the record                              clean.

However,           to society as a whole, there is virtually no difference

between        a        commutation to time served and          a     full    pardon.         As

mentioned           earlier, defendant DeLeo in this case was                     purportedly

granted        a        commutation to time served, and defendant                  Salim     was

purportedly              granted a full pardon, yet the             action    of     Governor

Celeste        allowed both offenders to receive clemency                     despite        the

determination of guilt in the judicial system which                           led     to     the

imposition of the original longer terms of punishment.                               Although

some     of the purported commutations in this case reduced a                              death

sentence           to     life imprisonment without parole, and               so     did     not

effect the release of the recipients, commutations, like pardons,

are     very        significant         actions by the     Governor.         To     permit     a

Governor           in     the     last hours of his term to          grant    commutations

without first applying to the APA would be a devastating blow                                 in

a     day when victims’ rights are finally being recognized.                           One of
the     most    important         factors under          R.C.     Chapter     2967     is     the

requirement        that at least three weeks before the APA                         recommends

any pardon or commutation, notice of the pendency of the clemency

application        must     be “sent to the prosecuting attorney                      and     the

judge     of    the court of common pleas of the county in                          which     the

indictment       against         the     convict       was     found.”      R.C.      2967.12.

Additionally,        under certain circumstances the APA                      must     send     a

similar notice to the victim of the crime, or to a representative

member of the victim’s family.                      R.C. 2967.12(B).        There are        very

good     reasons for these requirements.                     One is to avoid the            shock

the     families of the victims would encounter when they first hear

over     the news that the sentences of the convicts who senselessly

murdered their loved ones were commuted.

         Lastly,     the        doctrine       of     expressio     unius     est     exclusio

alterius       has no application regarding the “subject                       to”     clause.

Even     though the words “commutation” and “pardon” appear together

elsewhere       three times in Section 11, Article III, the fact                             that

the      “subject         to”         clause    does     not      specifically         mention

commutations        does        not     require a narrow          reading     of     the     word
“pardons”        in     that        clause.      It is readily          apparent       that    the

“subject to” clause was inserted into Section 11, Article III                                   as

a   compromise          to regulate the application process                     invoking       the

entire     clemency power, and not just the power to                           grant     pardons

(with     pardon        used        in its narrow sense).              More    significantly,

consideration               of      the     debates   of   the        Ohio     Constitutional

Convention        of        1850-1851 regarding the reporting requirement                       of

Section     11,        Article        III     makes it readily          apparent       that    the

drafters        did     not use the terms “pardon” and “commutation”                          with

the precision which would require a finding that “pardons” in the

Ssubject to” clause does not include commutations.

         Since        the        application process leading to               the   Governor’s

grant     of clemency was seen as subject to abuse, the drafters                                of

Section     11, Article III allowed regulations to be prescribed                                to

curb     that     abuse.            Those regulations were             authorized       for    the

application           process,        whether initiated          by     the    applicant       (or

someone     on the applicant’s behalf) or by the Governor,                              but    the

power of the Governor to act is specifically exercised subject to

the regulations.                 A Governor may in certain situations choose                    to
grant only a commutation when the applicant may have applied                                  for

a     full        pardon.        The interrelationship of the concepts of pardon

and commutation cannot be ignored, an interrelationship obviously

recognized              by     the reported statements of the delegates             to        the

Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851.                      It is inconceivable

that the omission of the word “commutation” from the “subject to”

clause was intended to exclude commutations from regulation.

                                                III

         From           the foregoing it is apparent that Section 11, Article

III     authorizes the General Assembly to regulate the                      application

process           for        executive clemency, whether it is       a     pardon        or     a

commutation              which is being considered.          I emphatically     disagree

with the per curiam opinion’s conclusion that Section 11, Article

III     authorizes regulations only with respect to pardons, and not

commutations.                  The    per curiam opinion’s     misguided     attempt           to

sever        the supposedly offending portions of R.C. 2967.07 is                         made

necessary by its equally misguided conclusion that the Governor’s

power        to     commute          sentences is unfettered by the        Constitution.

R.C. 2967.07 is constitutional in toto, and makes APA involvement
mandatory               before        the     Governor     may    grant        a    pardon         or      a

commutation.

         In view of today’s decision it should become a top priority

of     the        citizens        of        this state to ensure          that       such     reckless

behavior on the part of a Governor will not be repeated.                                           It     is

ironic        that the reasons for amending the Constitution today                                       are

similar           to        the reasons the 1850-1851 Constitutional                        Convention

amended the Constitution of 1802.                          The delegates to the 1850-1851

Constitutional                 Convention        felt     the    need     to        enumerate            the

Governor’s              pardoning powers.           Even though the 1802                  Constitution

did     give the Governor power to commute, there remained                                    a     small

degree        of doubt (later put to rest by the United States                                    Supreme

Court        in        Ex     Parte     Wells)     that     it    did     not,       so     the         Ohio

Constitution was amended to clarify the matter.                                    In much the same

way,     it appears that our Constitution must be amended to specify

that     the           manner of applying for clemency includes                           applications

for commutations as well as for pardons.                            While it is clear to me

that no such amendment should be necessary, members of this court

do     not agree.              After this case, I am strongly convinced that                              it
is    time         for        the    people of Ohio to consider     a   constitutional

amendment           placing          explicit and unavoidable limitations           on     the

Governor’s clemency power (including the power to pardon                            and     to

commute,           but not to reprieve), to go so far as to place specific

limits        on        the     Governor’s discretion in the use of           the    power.

While I agree that the pardoning power is an indispensable aspect

of    our      criminal             justice system, the   pardoning     power       is     too

important           to        be trusted with relatively few conditions             to     the

unfettered whims of a lame duck Governor.

       I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in case

No.    93-1165 and reinstate the declaratory judgment of the                             trial

court that the purported pardon and commutations are invalid.

         Douglas              and    F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur     in   the     foregoing

opinion.

FOOTNOTES:

6.       It        is     appropriate       to refer to the Governor’s         “pardoning

power”        synonymously with “clemency power.”                The power to commute

has historically been understood to be an aspect of the pardoning

power.        For a thorough discussion of the development and scope of
the     pardoning power of the President of the United                             States,        see

Hoffa v. Saxbe (D.D.C.1974), 378 F.Supp. 1221.

7.       With        respect to the manner in which the Ohio Adult                          Parole

Authority functions, the trial court found as follows:

          “When        the        APA   receives     a    clemency        application,            the

application is referred to the investigation section of the                                      APA,

which     prepares           a     report     on the details         of    the     crimes,        the

applicant’s           adjustment         to    prison or       the     community,         and     the

support     available to the applicant in the community.                              When        the

completed        investigation report is received by the Parole                             Board,

an initial vote is taken whether to immediately recommend against

granting clemency or to conduct a hearing.                           If a hearing is to be

conducted, notice is sent to the local Prosecutor, the sentencing

Judge, and those victims or victims’ family members designated to

receive     notice           by     R.C. §§ 4943.04(A) and             2945.07(A),         and     as

required         by     R.C.        §   2967.12(A)       and    (B).       These      obviously

interested individuals are then given the opportunity                                to     submit

comments        to     the        APA   on whether the applicant             should        receive

clemency.        Generally, these individuals are allowed three                             weeks’
time     within which to respond to the APA notice.            At the hearing,

consisting        of a panel of at least a majority of the            members          of

the     Parole Board, the Board will consider the investigation, the

microfiche        records of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation                    and

Corrections, and the testimony of the applicant.               After a vote is

taken,     a report is then prepared for the signature of the                    board

members.        See R.C. §§ 2967.07 and 2967.12.      Usually, there             is     a

two     to three week delay after the vote is taken to circulate the

recommendations         among the voting Board members,        who        travel       to

each     of Ohio’s 22 penal institutions attending hearings.                     After

signature,        the   APA submits the written report to           the     Governor

which     includes      a    brief statement of the   facts     in        the    case,

together        with the recommendation of the APA.         In such        instances

that an application is submitted directly to the Governor, it                          is

still     required      to    be   channeled back through     the     APA       review

process pursuant to R.C. § 2967.07.”

8.       Section 5, Article IV of the New York Constitution of                     1846

provided:

         “The     governor     shall have the power   to     grant        reprieves,
commutations,         and    pardons after conviction,      for     all     offenses

except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and

with    such restrictions and limitations, as he may think                   proper,

subject to such regulation as may be provided by law relative                           to

the    manner    of       applying for pardons. * * *      He     shall     annually

communicate         to      the    legislature   each    case      of      reprieve,

commutation, or pardon granted, stating the name of the                     convict,

the    crime of which he was convicted, the sentence and its                      date,

and    the date of the commutation, pardon or reprieve.”                   New        York

State Constitution Annotated (1938) 54.

       When Ohio’s Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851 discussed

the    substance of what was to become Section 11, Article                   III        of

the Constitution of 1851, the Standing Committee on the Executive

Department      presented         for debate a draft    version     on     executive

clemency     which very closely resembled Section 5, Article                     IV     of

the    New   York        Constitution of 1846.     For the language         of        this

draft version, see 1 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the

Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the                     State        of

Ohio    1850-1851         (1851) 300.    The text of the    draft        version        is
reproduced in footnote 6 of this opinion.

9.         R.C. 2967.01(B) provides:

            “‘Pardon’ means the remission of penalty by the governor in

accordance           with        the     power vested in him by                the       constitution.

Pardons           may be granted after conviction and may be absolute                                       and

entire,           or partial, and may be granted upon conditions precedent

or subsequent.”

           R.C. 2967.01(C) provides:

            “‘Commutation’              or     ‘commutation           of    sentence’             means     the

substitution              by     the     governor         of     a    lesser       for        a      greater

punishment.               A sentence may be commuted without the                              consent        of

the         convict,           except        when   granted          upon    the     acceptance             and

performance           by        the     convict      of        conditions      precedent.                 After

commutation,              the     commuted sentence shall be                   the       only        one     in

existence.            The commutation may be stated in terms of                                    commuting

from        a     named        crime     to a lesser included crime,                     in        terms     of

commuting from a minimum and maximum sentence in months and years

to     a        minimum        and maximum sentence in months and years,                              or     in

terms of commuting from one definite sentence in months and years
to a lesser definite sentence in months and years.”

       R.C. 2967.01(D) provides:

        “‘Reprieve’ means the temporary suspension by the                          governor

of    the    execution           of     a sentence.     A reprieve   may     be        granted

without the consent of and against the will of the convict.”

10.     I    agree        that        reprieves do not fall      within     the        broader

meaning      of     “pardons.”           Reprieves and pardons are recognized               as

being fundamentally different at common law because a reprieve is

temporary.          However, pardons and commutations are not recognized

as    fundamentally          different at common law, but are               interrelated

concepts.         Even though the power to grant reprieves often is said

to    come    within the scope of the Governor’s pardoning                        power,     a

constitutional provision allowing procedural regulation                            of     “the

manner of applying for pardons” does not allow for regulation                               of

the     manner       of     applying        for   reprieves.      Because         of      this

fundamental difference between reprieves and pardons, Section                               5,

Article II of Ohio’s 1802 Constitution, and Section 2, Article II

of    the    United        States        Constitution     each   conferred        upon     the

executive the power to grant both reprieves and pardons.
          The      General        Assembly    has     recognized      the     fundamental

difference between pardons and reprieves.                    R.C. 2967.08        provides

that “[t]he governor may grant a reprieve for a definite time                             to

a     person     under     sentence of death, with or without                 notices     or

application.”        This provision obviously recognizes the importance

of     prompt     action     in some reprieve cases and makes                 clear     that

procedural        requirements need not be fulfilled before a                    reprieve

may be granted.           In addition, R.C. 2967.03, authorizing the Adult

Parole     Authority to recommend a pardon, commutation, or reprieve

to     the Governor, provides procedural requirements which must                          be

fulfilled        before     the     authority       may   recommend     a     pardon      or

commutation,         but      any      such     requirements          regarding          the

recommendation of a reprieve are conspicuously absent.

11.     As reported by Mr. Leadbetter from the Standing Committee on

the     Executive Department, the provision later incorporated                          into

the     Constitution of 1851 as Section 11, Article                    III     originally

read:

         “Sec.     11.      The     Governor shall have the           power     to     grant

reprieves,        commutations and pardons after              conviction,        for     all
offenses,           except     treason, and cases of impeachment,           upon       such

conditions, and such restrictions and limitations as he may think

proper,        subject to such regulations as may be provided                   by     law,

relative        to the manner of applying for pardons.               Upon conviction

for     treason, he shall have power to suspend the execution of the

sentence, until the case shall be reported to the Legislature                            at

its     next        meeting,     when the Legislature      shall     either      pardon,

commute        the     sentence, direct the execution of the sentence,                   or

grant     a further reprieve.              He shall annually communicate to             the

Legislature           each     case   of    reprieve,   commutation,       or        pardon

granted; stating the name of the convict, the crime for which                            he

was     convicted, the sentence and its date, and the                    date    of     the

commutation,           pardon     or reprieve.”     1 Debates      and    Proceedings,

supra, at 300.

         The        report of the Executive Committee reached its                present

form as Section 11, Article III after proposed amendments to                            the

committee report were debated by the delegates and voted on.

12.      The        court of appeals in the case sub judice went                to     some

lengths        to     distinguish between a commutation and a              conditional
pardon,       basing            the distinction in part upon                       the       necessity           of

acceptance by the recipient before a conditional pardon is valid.

However,        one        major        factor        that    separates            the       two    is          the

attachment        of        a        condition, which is what makes                      a     conditional

pardon       “conditional.”                 In the same way that a pardon can have                                a

condition        attached,              a commutation can           also           be    subject           to     a

condition.            It        is     when     the condition           is        attached         that         the

recipient         must           consent        before       the   conditional                 pardon            or

conditional           commutation is effective.                    No        consent          is    required

when       no condition is attached to the pardon or commutation.                                                In

re     Victor     (1877),              31     Ohio St. 206,        paragraph             three        of        the

syllabus, recognized that in Ohio, a commutation is not the                                                 same

as     a    conditional pardon, even though the Ex Parte                                      Wells        court

stated that it was for purposes of interpreting the United States

Constitution.              Since Victor presumed that a commutation                                 is      “for

the        culprit’s            benefit,”        no     acceptance           of     an       unconditional

commutation is required for its validity.                                See 31 Ohio               St.      206,

at paragraph three of the syllabus.

13.        One researcher has determined that the power to commute                                               is
implicit within the power to pardon:

       “The [Ohio] Constitutional Convention of 1851 added the term

‘commutation’          to the pardon provision in present section                 11     of

Article III.          However, the term ‘commutation,’ although not                    used

in    early     constitutions,       has long     been   interpreted     as        being

included       within     pardon, and texts have often not         disassociated

the    power     to     commute    from   the    power   to   pardon.”        3        Ohio

Constitutional          Revision    Commission     1970-1977,    Proceedings              &

Research of the Legislative-Executive Committee (Mar. 31,                         1972),

Research Study No. 11.