Court Opinion

ID: 9686771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:05:41.766295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:11.794847
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion, like the court of appeals decision, begins with the assumption that sec. 48.415, Stats. 1993-94, creates a rebuttable presumption. In other words, both opinions determine that if the petitioner proves the elements set forth in sec. 48.415(l)(a)l, 2, or 3, abandonment must be presumed unless rebutted.
Cally argues that sec. 48.415 "does not create a presumption. Instead, the presumption was created by the Court of Appeals in Interest of T.P.S., [168 Wis. 2d 259, 483 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1992)]." I agree with Cally that sec. 48.415 does not create a presumption.
First, the word "presumption," or any variation of that word, is conspicuously absent from sec. 48.415. In contrast, the legislature has used the word "presumption" or its variations in several provisions of ch. 48. See, e.g., sec. 48.18(6) ("[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, the judge shall presume that it would be contrary to the best interests of the child... to hear the case if the child" allegedly violated the criminal statutes on or after the child's 16th birthday); secs. 48.432(8), 48.433(10) and 48.981(4) ("good faith . . . shall be presumed"); sec. 48.839(3)(d) ("[t]he court shall presume that the instrument" has a specified effect "unless there are substantial irregularities on the face of the document"); sec. 48.85(2) ("guardian [ad litem]'s *382recommendation shall be presumed to be in the best interests of the child unless the fair preponderance of the credible evidence is to the contrary").
A search of the Wisconsin Statutes, 1993-94, reveals that the legislature has used the words presume, presumes, presumed, presumption, presumptions, presumptive, and presumptively 490 times. The legislature appears not to hesitate to create a presumption by express language when it so intends.
Second, the legislative history supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to establish a presumption. An early version of 1979 Assembly Bill 656 which became ch. 330, Laws of 1979, established a "presumption" of abandonment as a ground for terminating parental rights. This early version created sec. 48.415(2) to read as follows: "Grounds for termination of parental rights shall be one of the following: .... (2) Abandonment. A presumption of abandonment, which may be rebutted by competent evidence . . . may be established by a showing that. . . the child has been removed from the parent's home ... and the parent for a period of 6 months or longer has failed to visit or communicate with the child...." Drafting record, Laws of 1979, ch. 330, Wisconsin State Law Library microfiche (emphasis added). The Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of this early version of Assembly Bill 656 indicated that the bill created a presumption. See majority op. at 377.
The legislature rejected this early version of the bill. Rather, the legislature adopted a substantially different bill which made no mention of a presumption. The Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of this bill also omitted any reference to a presumption. Thus, the legislative history evidences that the legislature dis*383carded the presumption approach to abandonment in favor of a different tack.
Third, sec. 48.415(l)(a) does not fit comfortably into the framework of sec. 903.01 governing presumptions. In a true presumption, "the presumed fact" is to be rebutted by evidence that the presumed fact does not exist. According to the majority, the presumed fact of sec. 48.415(1) is abandonment, and it is acceptable that the evidence to rebut that "presumed fact" is not nonabandonment, but rather nondisassociation. Relying on legislative history, the majority concludes that evidence of nondisassociation "goes directly to rebut the factual presumption of abandonment." Majority op. at 376-77. This is an accurate reading of part of the legislative history, the part relating to the proposal the legislature rejected. The repudiated version of the bill defined abandonment to include a parent's "intent to disassociate himself or herself from the child." Drafting record, Laws of 1979, ch. 330, Wisconsin State Law Library microfiche. The statute, however, does not' so define abandonment. Thus, evidence that a parent did not disassociate from a child may be different from evidence of nonabandonment.
Fourth, the notion that sec. 48.415(1) embodies a presumption was brought into the law of involuntary termination of parental rights in In Interest of T.P.S., 168 Wis. 2d 259, 483 N.W.2d 591 (Ct. App. 1992), and that case stands alone in suggesting that sec. 48.415 creates a presumption. The court of appeals in T.P.S. was not asked to determine if sec. 48.415 created a presumption.1 It invoked the word "presumption" with *384no discussion of presumptions or the consequences of such a characterization, and with no reference to sec. 903.01. None of the briefs iii T.P.S. raised sec. 48.415(l)(c) or discussed the issue of presumption.2
Fifth, unless the legislature clearly establishes a presumption, I think the court should assume that the legislature did not intend to establish a presumption, especially when a presumption can operate against a party with a significant constitutional right at risk. The concept of presumptions has plagued courts and scholars for years primarily because the law uses the word "presumption" in many different ways.3 As a leading text explains, "one ventures the assertion that 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.'" McCormick on Evidence, sec. 342 at 449 (4th ed. 1992). Professor Lansing has written in a similar vein that "the domain of presumptions has been called 'a place fraught with danger,' 'an impenetrable jungle,' 'a mist láden morass' — where more than one academician has *385been known to lose his way and, once returned, is never quite the same."4
On the basis of the factors set forth above, I conclude that the legislature did not intend to establish a presumption in sec. 48.415. This conclusion only partially resolves this case. It remains to be decided which party has the burden of persuasion on the issue of disassociation. No provision in ch. 48 expressly assigns the burden of persuasion under sec. 48.415(l)(c) either to the person petitioning for termination of parental rights or to the parent objecting to the termination.
I conclude that the parent has the burden of producing evidence to place disassociation in issue and the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent did disassociate from the child. I reach this conclusion based primarily on the significant constitutionally protected right of parents to rear their children. The majority imperils that right by shifting the burden of persuasion to a parent, with a presumption bound to result in confusing jury instructions allotting different burdens of persuasion on different subjects to different parties. The majority opinion has provided no persuasive reason for creating this dynamic. Furthermore, requiring the petitioner to maintain the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence does nothing to endanger the best interest of the child at issue. Accordingly, I cannot join the majority opinion.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 The primary issue in T.P.S. involved whether the one-year period under sec. 48.415(l)(a)3 must immediately precede the filing of the termination petition. The court of appeals concluded that the petition need not immediately follow the one *384year of alleged abandonment. The court of appeals only cursorily discussed sec. 48.415(l)(c), the subsection that allows a parent to rebut evidence of abandonment.

 The Civil Jury Instruction Committee apparently has not concluded that sec. 48.415(1) creates a presumption. The committee did not in its 1994 revision of Wis. JI-Civil 7042 (relating to involuntary termination of parental rights on the basis of abandonments) refer to T.P.S. and did not treat sec. 48.415(1) (a)3 as if it created a presumption.
For examples of jury instructions when presumptions are involved, see Wis. JI-Civil Nos. 349-354.

 Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195, 196-207 (1953).
For discussions of presumptions and burdens of proof, see Symposium on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 613 (1994).

 Ronald B. Lansing, Enough is Enough: A Critique of the Morgan View of Rebuttable Presumptions in Civil Cases, 62 Or. L. Rev. 485, 485 (1983) (note omitted) (discussing the difficulties presented at trial by a rebuttable presumption).