Court Opinion

ID: 9382737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:35.922324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.257628
License: Public Domain

J-S40029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
               v.                         :
                                          :
                                          :
 ANDREW J. ALLAM SR.                      :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 1530 EDA 2022

                   Appeal from the Order Entered May 3, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
               Criminal Division at No.: CP-52-CR-0000469-2009

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                           FILED MARCH 28, 2023

      Appellant Andrew J. Allam Sr. pro se appeals from the May 3, 2022 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County (“PCRA court”), which denied

his “Motion to Dismiss Criminal Action.” Treating the motion as a petition for

collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-46, we affirm.

      The facts and procedural history of this case are uncontested. Briefly,

between May 1, 2007 and August 21, 2009, Appellant had a sexual

relationship with KS, a minor daughter of Appellant’s paramour at the time.

Both the paramour and KS lived with Appellant throughout the time of these

offenses. KS, who was born in 1995, was between twelve (12) and fourteen

(14) years old during this period. KS became pregnant with Appellant’s child

and gave birth in her residence. Upon arriving at the hospital, the state police

were called.    Following statements by KS to the police that Appellant had
J-S40029-22

impregnated her, a further investigation revealed multiple sexual encounters

occurred between Appellant and KS.        The Commonwealth then filed the

appropriate charges. A jury trial was eventually held over a two-day period,

commencing on November 18, 2010. The jury convicted Appellant of three

counts of Rape of a child, twenty counts of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse, seventeen counts of statutory sexual assault, fifteen counts of

indecent assault, and one count of corruption of minors.

     On February 11, 2011, Appellant was sentenced to a term of forty to

eighty years of incarceration, and Appellant was ordered to register with the

state police as a sex offender pursuant to Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9795.1 et seq. Post-sentence motions were filed and denied, and on March

22, 2011, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. In a memorandum filed

on December 2, 2011, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Allam, 40 A.3d 182 (Pa. Super. filed December 2,

2011) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s

petition for allowance of appeal on August 7, 2012. See Commonwealth v.

Allam, 50 A.3d 124 (Pa. 2012). Appellant’s judgment of sentence became

final on November 5, 2012. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a);

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.

     On August 27, 2012, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, and the

PCRA court appointed counsel. On December 6, 2012, counsel filed a motion

to withdraw and no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

                                    -2-
J-S40029-22

Super. 1988) (en banc). On December 12, 2012, the PCRA court granted

counsel’s motion to withdraw, informed Appellant of its intent to dismiss his

PCRA petition within twenty days pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and directed

Appellant that he had twenty days in which to respond. When the PCRA court

received no response from Appellant, it entered an order on January 7, 2013,

dismissing his PCRA petition. Appellant appealed to this Court, raising thirty

assertions of error.   In deciding the appeal, we observed that Appellant’s

“statement of the issues presented is merely a rambling attack on multiple

facets of the trial court’s proceedings” and “that nearly all of Appellant’s issues

presented were previously litigated in his direct appeal, were waived, or they

are not cognizable claims under the PCRA.”          Allam, No. 959 EDA 2013,

unpublished memorandum, at 6. Ultimately, on March 7, 2014, we affirmed

the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition, concluding, inter alia, that

Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims, his only viable issues on appeal, lacked

merit. On September 3, 2014, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition

for allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Allam, 99 A.3d 75 (Pa.

2014).

      Thereafter, Appellant filed and litigated several additional PCRA petitions

and various other pro se filings, all of which ultimately were unsuccessful.

Following our June 22, 2021, affirmance of the denial of his serial petition,

see Commonwealth v. Allam, 258 A.3d 542 (Pa. Super. filed June 22, 2021)

(unpublished memorandum), Appellant on April 22, 2022 filed the instant

petition, which he titled as a “Motion to Dismiss Criminal Action No. 469-2009,

                                       -3-
J-S40029-22

for Unsigned Probable Cause and Warrant of Arrest” (the “Motion”). On May

3, 2022, the PCRA court denied the Motion. Appellant pro se timely appealed.

Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal,1 Appellant presents two issues for our review, reproduced

verbatim below.

       [I.] Appellant’s unsigned arrest warrant does not constitute a
       written order of the court, because the warrant was unsigned
       there is no record determination of probable cause and the
       warrant is constitutionally defective.

       [II.] Appellants probable cause is not signed by Alan B. Cooper
       the issuing authority the “eee” on the document is not a signature
       of any kind nor is it identified as Alan B. Cooper, thus a forgery
       and violating Appellant’s right against illegal search and seizure of
       the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Const. thus no judicial
       determination of probable cause was made nor was the officer
       sworn by the issuing authority.

Appellant’s Brief at v (unnecessary capitalizations omitted) (sic).

       Preliminarily, as we alluded to earlier, the Motion should have been

treated as one falling under the PCRA.           The plain language of the PCRA

provides that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral

relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the

same purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. Cognizant of the stated purpose of the

PCRA, we have held that any petition filed after an appellant’s judgment of

sentence becomes final must be treated as a PCRA petition where the PCRA
____________________________________________

1“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s
determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).

                                           -4-
J-S40029-22

provides for a potential remedy. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d

462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“all motions filed after a judgment of sentence is

final are to be construed as PCRA petitions”) (citation omitted). Accordingly,

the Motion should have been treated as a PCRA petition.

       Having established that the Motion should be treated as a PCRA petition,

we now must determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to entertain

it.   A court cannot consider a PCRA petition unless the petitioner has first

satisfied the applicable filing deadline.     The PCRA contains the following

restrictions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition.

       (b) Time for filing petition.--

       (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
       subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
       judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
       petitioner proves that:

       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
       or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
       the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
       of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

                                       -5-
J-S40029-22

       (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
       shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
       presented.[2]

       (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
       the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
       the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
       review.

42   Pa.C.S.A.    §   9545(b).        Section    9545’s   timeliness   provisions   are

jurisdictional.    Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).

Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers no

authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA

time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations

omitted).

       Here, as stated above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final

on November 5, 2012—90 days following our Supreme Court’s denial of his

petition for allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P.

903(a); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.         Thus, because Appellant had one year from

November 5, 2012, to file a timely PCRA petition, the Motion is facially

untimely given it was filed on April 22, 2022, nearly ten years later.

       The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner

alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section

____________________________________________

2 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended, effective December 24, 2018, to extend
the time for filing from sixty days of the date the claim could have been
presented to one year. The amendment applies only to claims arising on or
after December 24, 2017

                                           -6-
J-S40029-22

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d

714, 719 (Pa. 2008). Here, Appellant has failed to allege, let alone prove, at

any stage of the proceeding any exceptions to the one-year time bar. The

Motion, treated properly as a PCRA petition, was untimely. Accordingly, the

PCRA court did not err in denying the Motion.3

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

____________________________________________

3While our rationale differs from the PCRA court insofar as it did not conduct
a jurisdictional analysis, it is well-settled that we may affirm on any basis.
See Commonwealth v. Clouser, 998 A.2d 656, 661 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 26 A.3d 1100 (Pa. 2011).

                                           -7-