Court Opinion

ID: 9411785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 21:00:50.317316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:12.501705
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4286

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        DANA JAHMAL STEVENSON,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. Joseph R. Goodwin, District Judge. (2:21-cr-00161-1)

        Submitted: June 22, 2023                                          Decided: July 26, 2023

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Nowles H.
        Heinrich, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Dana Jahmal Stevenson pled guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to being

        a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)

        (2018), * and possession with the intent to distribute fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Stevenson to 105 months’ imprisonment, at the

        high-end of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Stevenson contends that

        the district court erred in counting his prior 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) conviction as a

        “controlled substance offense,” see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)

        (2021), and in failing to address one of his arguments for a lesser sentence. Finding no

        error, we affirm.

               In considering Guidelines challenges, we review the district court’s legal

        conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Dennings, 922

        F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2019). The district court applied an enhanced base offense level

        after finding that Stevenson’s prior § 841(a)(1) conviction qualified as a “controlled

        substance offense.” See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) & cmt. n.1. A “controlled substance

        offense” is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term

        exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or

               *
                Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
        convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
        maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
        Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
        year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Stevenson
        committed his offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.

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        dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . .

        with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG § 4B1.2(b).

        While this appeal was pending, we held that a 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) conviction qualifies

        as a “controlled substance offense.” See United States v. Groves, 65 F.4th 166, 174 (4th

        Cir. 2023). Thus, the district court correctly applied USSG § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

               Turning to Stevenson’s other argument, in evaluating a sentencing court’s

        explanation of a selected sentence, we have consistently held that, although a court must

        consider the statutory factors and explain the sentence, “it need not robotically tick through

        the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148, 153 (4th Cir.

        2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).         “Regardless of whether the district court

        imposes an above, below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an

        individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.” United States

        v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]

        sentencing judge must explain each sentence that [he] imposes by addressing all non-

        frivolous mitigation arguments raised by the defendant.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d

        480, 485 (4th Cir. 2018). “The sentencing court’s explanation need not be extensive, but

        the record must make clear that the judge actually listened to, considered, and rendered a

        decision on these arguments such that [we] can conduct a meaningful review of the

        sentence imposed.” Id. Although it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s

        rationale from the context surrounding its decision, we will not “guess at the district court’s

        rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for

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        any other clues that might explain a sentence.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 521

        (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The district court adequately addressed Stevenson’s argument concerning his fear

        motivating his offense conduct. The court explicitly noted the argument, but immediately

        rejected it by underscoring that his offense conduct involved shooting at another individual.

        It then implored the probation officer to work with the Bureau of Prisons to ensure

        Stevenson would not suffer another attack while in custody. And, at the end of the hearing,

        the court returned to this argument when it personally addressed Stevenson. Moreover, the

        court did exactly what Stevenson asked regarding his other arguments—recommending

        medical and substance abuse treatment while Stevenson was incarcerated.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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