Court Opinion

ID: 9854234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:42.315214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:59.478416
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 155. {dissenting). Luann Gehin is a sympathetic figure, but her victory in this court comes at a heavy cost. My purpose in this dissent is to illuminate that cost.
¶ 156. The dissent is divided into three parts. Section I laments the majority's decision to take Wisconsin out of the mainstream of administrative law and predicts some of the consequences that will flow from the decision. Section II challenges the majority’s interpretation of a key piece of evidence in the record. Section III outlines the majority's disturbing disregard of the waiver issue and the standard procedures of the Wisconsin Group Insurance Board.
I
¶ 157. In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the Supreme Court held that written reports prepared by physicians who have examined a claimant for disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act constitute "substantial evidence" supporting a finding of non-disability, notwithstanding the hearsay character of the reports, the absence of cross-examination (through the claimant's failure to exercise subpoena rights), and directly opposing testimony by *182the claimant and the claimant's medical witness. This landmark decision validated reliance on some uncorroborated hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings by taking into account the nature of the proceedings, "the reliability and probative worth of written medical reports," and the claimant's unutilized opportunity for cross-examination. The decision seriously undercut the validity and scope of the so-called legal "residuum rule."
¶ 158. The majority opinion in this case represents a frontal assault on the holding in Perales. The opinion adheres to the precepts of the residuum rule despite a growing body of contrary decisions and the modern trend in scholarship advocating the rule's abolition.
¶ 159. The residuum rule provides, in essence, that "uncorroborated hearsay alone does not constitute substantial evidence [in administrative proceedings]." Majority op., ¶ 56. In other words, there must be some "residuum" of non-hearsay evidence upon which an agency bases its factual findings.
¶ 160. The better rule, as many courts and scholars now recognize, is that hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings if the hearsay evidence bears inherent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness.
¶ 161. Wigmore's treatise on evidence asserts that: "The residuum rule ... is decidedly not the wise and satisfactory rule for general adoption." John Wig-more, 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 4b at 122 (Tillers rev. 1983) (hereinafter Wigmore). The majority admits that the residuum rule "has been criticized by commentators" because it "ignores the reliability of evidence incompetent under the hearsay rule." Majority op., *183¶ 60. The wisdom behind these criticisms is manifest. As the Wigmore treatise summarizes:
Plausible as the residuum rule seems from the liberal point of view, it is not acceptable. ... [T]he residuum rule rests logically on [a] fallac[y] ... that this "residuum of legal evidence," which is to be indispensable, will have some necessary relation to the truth of the finding. But the "legal" rules have no such necessary relation. In the mass, they do tend to secure a reliable body of evidence; but, taking each rule individually, it is obviously fallacious to assume that one or more pieces of "legal" evidence are per se a sufficient guarantee of truth.
Wigmore, supra, at 120-21.
¶ 162. To illustrate this point, consider two potential pieces of evidence. First, consider the medical reports by Dr. Whiffen and Dr. Lemon in this case, recalling that Dr. Whiffen was Gehin's treating physician. Second, consider oral testimony from someone like a claimant's spouse that the claimant is "totally disabled." The majority opinion concludes that because the latter evidence is "legal," it may serve as substantial evidence, but because the medical reports are technically "hearsay," they may not. Does this make sense? As Wigmore's treatise points out,
[B]oth may be true, or both may be false; truth or falsity depends on the circumstances in each case. But truth or falsity does not depend on the one type of evidence being "legal" and the other being "illegal" .... Yet the rule for a "residuum of legal evidence" rests on the assumption that the "legal" evidence is always credible and sufficient but the "illegal" evidence is never credible or sufficient.
Wigmore, supra, at 122.
*184¶ 163. In 1971 the Supreme Court decided that the residuum rule does not apply to social security disability proceedings in which the agency relies on medical records. The Court said:
We conclude that a written report by a licensed physician who has examined the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical findings in his area of competence may be received as evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its hearsay character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing examiner adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of the physician.
Perales, 402 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
¶ 164. As courts fell into line behind the Perales approach,1 Wigmore's treatise noted: "The residuum *185rule generally has been abandoned." Wigmore, supra, at 122. The National Judicial College predicted that even in jurisdictions still favoring the residuum rule, "any evidence that an Administrative Law Judge finds to be trustworthy and reliable should meet the exception to the hearsay rule and thus satisfy the legal residuum rule in those jurisdictions that apply the rule." Melvin Goldberg, Goldberg's Deskbook on Evidence for Administrative Law Judges, IV-16 (1993) (published in cooperation with the National Judicial College).2 The majority opinion bludgeons this prediction.
¶ 165. Wigmore's treatise further notes that the residuum rule has been replaced by the "substantial evidence" standard. Wigmore, supra, at 122-23. In Wisconsin, the "substantial evidence" test is statutory. Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6) ("The court shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the agency if it finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record."). Wisconsin courts evaluate whether "reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the agency." Kitten v. DWD, 2002 WI 54, ¶ 5, 252 Wis. 2d 561, 644 N.W2d 649. "Many courts and almost all scholars agree that hearsay and other 'incompetent' evidence may constitute 'substantial evidence.'" Wig-more, supra, at 123-24.
¶ 166. Despite the modern trend against the residuum rule, Wigmore's treatise admits that "[s]ome courts ... have effectively subverted the original purpose of the substantial evidence standard by holding *186that hearsay evidence in and of itself cannot constitute 'substantial evidence.'" Wigmore, supra, at 124-25.
¶ 167. The approach advocated by Wigmore's treatise and approved by the Supreme Court in Perales could hardly be more apposite to this case. In fact, the Perales Court resolved exactly the same issue we face today — namely, whether written medical reports by licensed physicians may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court held that medical reports do constitute substantial evidence. Today the majority holds that they do not. I would follow Perales, not because we are bound to do so, but because the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision, coupled with the modern trend of authority and scholarship, convinces me that we should do so.
¶ 168. The Perales Court cited nine factors it believed established the inherent reliability of the medical records in that case. Most, if not all, are present in this case as well.
¶ 169. First, the Court noted that each hearsay medical report was prepared by a practicing physician who had examined the claimant. Perales, 402 U.S. at 402. The Court refused to "ascribe bias" to any of these doctors. Id. at 403. In the present case, the medical reports relied on by the Board — that is, the Whiffen and Lemon reports — were prepared by medical doctors who examined Gehin at the time of the disability determination. Some reports were prepared by Gehin's own physician (Whiffen). By contrast, Dr. Shannon's examination of the claimant came two years after the determination at issue. Ironically, the relevance of Dr. Shannon's testimony, which was contested at the hearing, depended in large part upon the written "hearsay" *187reports of others. There is no reason for this court to ascribe bias to the medical reports relied on by the Board.
¶ 170. Second, the Perales court cited the impartiality of the administrative agency evaluating the claim. Id. at 403. Similarly, in this case, there is nothing in the record to cause this court to believe that the Wisconsin Group Insurance Board (the Board), which employed a hearing examiner to conduct a hearing and review evidence, was biased.
¶ 171. Third, the Court hailed the process by which medical reports are generated.
One familiar with medical reports and the routine of the medical examination, general or specific, will recognize their elements of detail and of value. The particular reports of the physicians who examined [the claimant] were based on personal consultation and personal examination and rested on accepted medical procedures and tests.
Id. In the present case, the majority has not suggested that the character of medical reports is today less reliable than it was at the time the Supreme Court decided Perales. Accordingly, that factor is also present here.
¶ 172. Fourth, the Court cited the range of examinations to which the claimant submitted. Id. at 404. In this case, Gehin's examinations were relatively similar, with each designed to determine whether Gehin was "totally disabled" within the meaning of the ICI policy. Concededly, the fourth Perales justification is not present in this case.
¶ 173. Fifth, the Court noted the consistency among all the medical reports. Id. In this case, the majority goes to some lengths to show that hearsay *188cannot be corroborated by other hearsay, majority op., ¶¶ 92-101, thus rejecting consistency between independent medical reports as evidence showing the reliability of such reports. This conclusion is hard to defend.
¶ 174. Sixth, the Court noted that the claimant had the opportunity to cross-examine the doctors by requesting subpoenas for them, but did not do so. Perales, 402 U.S. at 404-05. Gehin had the same opportunity. The majority cites a treatise by Professor Bernard Schwarz stating that claimants rarely subpoena physicians due to the expense. Majority op., ¶ 84 n.88. But that is exactly what the majority's opinion will force claimants to do. Claimants will have to foot the bill for their own experts to appear in person, if the opposing party makes an expected objection to "hearsay" medical reports.
¶ 175. Seventh, the Court noted that even in formal trials before competent courts, medical records are admitted and considered despite their hearsay character, as an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 405. The same is true in Wisconsin. See Wis. Stat. §908.03(6m).
¶ 176. Eighth, the Court noted that prior decisions have recognized the "reliability and probative value" of medical reports. Perales, 405 U.S. at 405. The Court found that these decisions "demonstrate traditional and ready acceptance of the written medical report in social security disability cases." Id. at 406. Although the Court referenced social security disability cases, the character of the medical report does not change based on the type of administrative proceeding in which it is used. Rather, the character of the report is grounded in the process used to generate the report. See id. at 403-04.
*189¶ 177. Ninth, the Court recognized the sheer magnitude of the administrative process, and reasoned that requiring live testimony by doctors would "be a substantial drain" both financially and on the energy of physicians. Id. at 406. Both reasons apply here as well.
¶ 178. Commentators in the wake of the Perales decision approved the Court's change in focus from a per se rule that hearsay cannot be substantial evidence to an evaluation of the reliability of the hearsay evidence. "Such a direct look at the reliability of the evidence makes far more sense than a per se rule that hearsay cannot be substantial evidence." The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 328 (1971-72) (citing 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law, §§ 14.10, 14.11 (1958); I J. Wigmore, Evidence § 4(b)(3d ed. 1940)).
¶ 179. Hearsay rules originally developed as protections in the jury trial context to preclude laypersons from placing too much evidence on arguably unreliable hearsay evidence. Id. at 329 (citing Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 180, 181 (1896); I J. Wigmore, Evidence § 4(b) (3d ed. 1940)). That concern is not present in administrative hearings. "[W]here the jury is supplanted by a trained hearing examiner3 or administrative board, often with expertise in evaluating evidence, the rationale for the use of hearsay standards disappears." Id.
¶ 180. The Court decided Perales 33 years ago. Since then, many courts have relied on its reasoning. Today this court becomes one of the few, if not the only, *190court to disagree substantively with the rationale and rule of law announced in Perales.
¶ 181. The majority provides several reasons for distinguishing Perales, majority op., ¶ 66, none of which withstands close examination. First, the majority distinguishes Perales based on the vast scope of the Social Security Administration (SSA). Majority op., ¶ 66. The majority cites a 1992 law review article which stated that the SSA considers more than one million disability applications a year. Majority op., ¶ 66. However, this figure of "one million... applications" is irrelevant. The relevant consideration is the number of cases involving a contested hearing. At the time of the Supreme Court's decision, the SSA conducted only 20,000 claim hearings annually — a number one-fiftieth the size of the amount the majority uses as justification. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406. Our record does not reveal how many cases the Wisconsin Group Insurance Board considers each year, so that there is no way to compare the scope of the two programs.
¶ 182. In any event, although the Supreme Court noted the scope of the SSA as one of the nine reasons supporting its holding, id., this scope was not the principal reason for its decision. As the Court put it:
The matter comes down to the question of the procedure's integrity and fundamental fairness. We see nothing that works in derogation of that integrity and of that fairness in the admission of consultants' [medical] reports, subject as they are to being material and to the use of the subpoena and consequent cross-examination.
Id. at 410.
¶ 183. The Court was ultimately persuaded by the "underlying reliability and probative value" of the medical reports, not by the sheer scope of the SSA. This *191makes sense, because if the only goal were to make it easy to process an immense number of claims quickly, the practical approach would be to give the decision-maker broad autonomy to dispose of claims quickly. Instead, the Court wisely promulgated a rule based on the underlying reliability and probative value of the medical reports.
¶ 184. Second, the majority distinguishes Perales because in claim hearings before the SSA (at issue in Perales), "most claimants are not represented by counsel." Majority op., ¶ 66. Later in the opinion, the majority poses an excellent question:
[I]f hearsay is admissible in court as an exception to the hearsay rule and a fact-finder in a judicial proceeding may base its decision on admissible hearsay, why then apply what appears to be a more restrictive rule barring an administrative agency from basing its decision on uncorroborated hearsay that falls within a hearsay exception?
Majority op., ¶ 90.4
*192¶ 185. The majority answers its own question by stating that the "primary reason" for imposing stricter evidentiary standards on administrative agencies than on criminal courts is that "in administrative hearings the claimants are often not represented by counsel... ." Id. In this case, however, Gehin was represented by counsel, the hearing examiner was an attorney, and the Group Insurance Board collectively had substantial experience and expertise. Thus the facts were similar to the facts in Perales. Imposing an evi-dentiary standard for administrative hearings higher than the standard applied in courts does not assist a person who is not represented by counsel.
¶ 186. Third, the majority distinguishes Perales because "procedures must be kept as simple and inexpensive as possible for the system to work." Majority op., ¶ 66. This is really just a restatement of the majority's first ground for distinguishing Perales — the scope of the SSA. As already discussed, that was not the impetus behind the Supreme Court's holding. The majority provides no reason that proceedings before the Group Insurance Board should not also be simple and inexpensive.
*193¶ 187. The majority also distinguishes Perales on factual grounds because in that case "the doctors' written reports were corroborated by in-person testimony. The evidence in Perales consisted of [the written medical reports, oral testimony for the claimant, and] a government-paid doctor's testimony that corroborated the substance of the written hearsay reports." Majority op., ¶ 67. This summarization overstates what the "government-paid doctor" actually did. The government-paid doctor never examined the claimant. Perales, 402 U.S. at 396. He simply summarized the hearsay medical reports, and provided the hearing examiner with a "consensus" of the medical reports. Id. In effect, he explained to the examiner what the medical reports said.
¶ 188. In the case at bar, the Group Insurance Board examiner had the benefit of the detailed forms completed by the doctors. The examining doctors had to answer a simple question: Is Luann Gehin "totally disabled" within the meaning of the ICI policy? The doctors simply checked "yes" or "no" after providing their findings and reasoning. The examiner did not need another medical doctor to provide the "consensus" of these reports. The examiner could simply count how many doctors answered "yes" and how many answered "no."
¶ 189. Instead of relying on Perales, a Supreme Court case directly on point, the majority chooses to rely on Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Board, 232 Wis. 170, 285 N.W. 851, 286 N.W. 875 (1939). It thereby disregards the remarkable similarity of the factual situation in Perales and turns to the fundamentally different factual situation in Folding Furniture.
*194¶ 190. Folding Furniture is a case about unfair labor practices in the context of collective bargaining between a labor union and an employer. 232 Wis. at 178-79. The employer in Folding Furniture objected to the Wisconsin Labor Relations Board's admission of and reliance on employee testimony about what the owner's motivation was in certain statements he made and actions he took and what the owner’s sons' opinion was about wage increases. Id. at 188. Statements such as these fall within the heart of the prohibition on hearsay. See Wis. Stat. §§ 908.01(3) (definition of hearsay), 908.02 (hearsay inadmissible unless otherwise excepted from the general rule). In the instant case, the evidence at issue is not oral statements by laypersons of "mere opinion," but medical reports prepared by doctors after personal examinations. This court has already ratified the trustworthiness inherent in medical reports by expressly exempting "Health Care Provider Records" from the operation of the general rule prohibiting hearsay. Wis. Stat. § 908.03 preamble and (6m).5
¶ 191. Despite the factual differences, the majority cites Folding Furniture because it quotes the United States Supreme Court opinion in Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 (1938), which stated "Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence." Id. at *195230. In Folding Furniture, this court did not analyze the statement from Consolidated Edison, but merely quoted it. See Folding Furniture, 232 Wis. at 189.
¶ 192. Had Perales not addressed this language from Consolidated Edison, this court might have reason to struggle with the two cases. But it need not do so because the Perales Court expressly clarified and distinguished the quoted statement from Consolidated Edison:
The contrast the Chief Justice was drawing, at the very page cited, was not with material that would be deemed formally inadmissible in judicial proceedings but with material "without a basis in evidence having rational probative force." This was not a blanket rejection by the Court of administrative reliance on hearsay irrespective of reliability and probative value. The opposite was the case.
Perales, 402 U.S. at 407-08 (emphasis added). The Court makes plain that its paradigm for evaluating hearsay evidence is not based on its hearsay nature, but rather on the inherent reliability of the hearsay evidence.6
*196¶ 193. Unable to ignore this express language in Perales, the majority is forced to admit that "Perales casts doubt on the continued viability of Consolidated Edison." Majority op., ¶ 64. Yet the majority persists that "many states continue to operate under rules that function like the legal residuum rule." Majority op., ¶ 62. The majority punctuates its analysis with a substantial footnote purporting to show the vast number of jurisdictions that do not follow Perales. Majority op., ¶ 62 n.76. Close inspection of the material therein reveals that much of it does not support the majority's conclusion.7 The majority later admits that "some cases *197and . . . some commentators" support the opposing position as advanced by the court of appeals. Majority op., ¶ 85. Notably, most of the authority that favors the court of appeals' Perales-based result is more recently *198minted than the authority favoring the majority's approach. Compare majority op., ¶ 85 n.89 (all cases cited are 1998 or newer) with majority op., ¶ 62 n.76 (all cases cited are 1986 or older).
¶ 194. Even the majority's preferred Consolidated Edison test only restricts reliance on "uncorroborated hearsay." Here, there is evidence in the record to corroborate the medical reports. The Board's "Finding of Fact #7" states that Gehin participated in a job-retraining program through the State of Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Her duties included "typing on both a typewriter and a computer, filing, answering the telephone, and other clerical duties."
¶ 195. Gehin's participation within the job retraining program shows that she was not "totally disabled" within the meaning of the ICI contract, thereby corroborating the hearsay medical records. The majority has recited that definition in full, majority op., ¶ 14 n.18, including the language "complete inability by reason of any medically determinable, physical or mental impairment, to engage in any substantial gainful activity" (emphasis added). Suffice to say that Gehin was not "totally disabled" within the meaning of the ICI contract if she was capable of earning an amount at least equal to her ICI benefit. Id. Gehin's monthly ICI benefit was $979.37. Id. If, as the Board found, Gehin was capable of working a minimum of 24 hours per week for four weeks each month, she could work a minimum of approximately 96 hours each month. The Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development maintains average salary statistics for a myriad of professions in Wisconsin, broken down by job title and *199by locality.8 In Madison, "secretaries" now earn an average of $14.17 per hour.9 If Gehin had worked 96 hours at $3.50 per hour less than that rate, she would have earned in excess of her monthly ICI benefit of $979.37. This factual finding by the Board corroborates the conclusion that Gehin was not totally disabled as expressed in the medical reports. The majority disregards this evidence, instead finding that "if the uncorroborated written hearsay medical reports are eliminated from consideration, no evidence exists in the record to support the [Board's] findings" about the claimant's physical condition. Majority op., ¶ 47 (emphasis added).
¶ 196. The majority's opinion helps the claimant in this case. But in many future cases, the shoe will be on the other foot. The court's decision will force financially struggling claimants to pay the bills for expert testimony. The majority recognizes this concern. Majority op., ¶¶ 102-03. The majority claims that its decision should not be read to require corroboration by non-hearsay evidence in all instances. Majority op., ¶ 103; but see majority op., ¶ 81 ("[Ujncorroborated hearsay alone does not constitute substantial evidence in administrative hearings."). The majority suggests that the parties may stipulate to some or all of the facts or to the submission of and reliance upon the contents of written hearsay reports. Majority op., ¶ 104. The majority also suggests that the parties may stipulate that the agency may base its findings of fact on uncorroborated hearsay. Id.
*200¶ 197. It should be obvious that when a claimant decides against appealing a decision based on adverse medical reports, the claimant willingly or unwillingly accepts the judgment in the reports. The issue at hand arises when a claimant does not accept the judgment in one or more medical reports, or when a respondent party does not accept the conclusion in a claimant's medical reports.
¶ 198. As the majority recognizes, many claim - ants in proceedings before the Board are not attorneys. See majority op., ¶ 90. Non-attorneys might understandably be suspicious of their adversaries in such administrative proceedings and probably would not be willing to stipulate. When claimants are represented by attorneys, the point is more pronounced: what attorney worth her salt will stipulate to a fact against the interest of her client? Thus, both parties and attorneys will likely press the other side to bring in the doctors for presentation of live testimony, as this court in essence requires today.
¶ 199. The court's decision may even lead to the perverse result that a government agency might refuse to quickly dispose of a claim in which it knows the claimant's position has merit. For instance, the Department of Employee Trust Funds could decide to force the claimant to provide live testimony to corroborate her doctor's records when it knows that the claimant's financial resources are thin. Conversely, claimants in similar positions might decide not to contest termination of benefits because they know they cannot afford the live expert testimony that the majority today demands.
¶ 200. The Perales case does not authorize administrative agencies to make factual findings based solely on hearsay irrespective of the nature or reliability or *201probative value of the hearsay. The Perales case recognizes that some uncorroborated hearsay constitutes substantial evidence in an administrative proceeding because of its reliability and probative worth and because of the opportunity a party has to subpoena a witness for cross-examination. Medical records are widely regarded as reliable, probative, and worthy of acceptance. If uncorroborated medical records do not constitute substantial evidence, then, arguably, no uncorroborated hearsay records or statements constitute substantial evidence. This is the staggering consequence of the majority's decision.
¶ 201. In the future, participants in administrative hearings will be required to provide live, in-person testimony to corroborate reliable hearsay evidence. Wisconsin Stat. § 908.03(24) allows the admission of all hearsay statements having "comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." "Comparable" presumably means "comparable" to the other 23 exceptions enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 908.03. Yet under the majority's rule, none of these trustworthy pieces of evidence may serve as the basis for an administrative agency's finding without corroboration. Business records, birth certificates, property deeds — none of these commonly-relied upon documents constitutes substantial evidence under the majority's approach without sufficient corroborating non-hearsay evidence.
¶ 202. Wisconsin Stat. § 908.03(6m)(b) specifically provides that in the case of medical records, an authentication witness is unnecessary as long as copies of the records have been served upon opposing parties at least 40 days before trial. This is another indication of our common-sense conviction of the inherent trustworthiness and integrity of medical records. The majority opinion is inconsistent with this conviction.
*202II
¶ 203. The majority admits that medical reports are "generally" reliable, but discounts the reliability of Dr. Whiffen's evaluation without explicitly explaining why. Majority op., ¶ 91. Presumably, the majority is referring to Dr. Whiffen's "Attending Physician's Statement" on which Dr. Whiffen initially checked both "yes" and "no" in response to Question 5(a) on the form, which inquires whether the patient is "totally disabled." See majority op., ¶ 74. The majority fails to note that question 5(a) is actually divided into two parts: first, inquiring whether the patient is totally disabled as that definition applies to the "Patient's Job," and, second, inquiring whether the patient is totally disabled as to "Any Other Work." Even if Dr. Whiffen's answer to the first part of the question is debatable, his response to the second part is not. Dr. Whiffen clearly checked the "no" box, indicating that in his professional opinion, Gehin was not "totally disabled" such that she could not undertake "Any Other Work." The clarity of Dr. Whiffen's response to the second part of the question undercuts the majority's conclusion that the allegedly questionable marking renders his report "not reliable as a basis for the [Board's] findings of fact... [or] conclusions of law." Majority op., ¶ 79.
III
¶ 204. The majority opinion disregards the established procedures of the Group Insurance Board. Gehin's case was reviewed first by the United Wisconsin Group, then by the Department of Employee Trust Funds. Gehin appealed to the Group Insurance Board, *203making the Department the opposing party.10 In that appeal, Gehin had the burden of proof to show that she was entitled to the previously denied benefit. Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.03(8). On appeal, Gehin did not object to the admission of the medical reports11 or to the Department's reliance on the reports. Before the Board issued its final decision, it issued a proposed decision, as it is required to do by rule. Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.09(1).
¶ 205. The majority admits that "Arguably the claimant had an opportunity to object to the Findings of Fact being based on uncorroborated hearsay evidence when the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were released." Majority op., ¶ 107. Actually, Gehin's chance to object was more than "arguable." By rule, when the Board issues its proposed decision, the losing party (Gehin) has 20 days to file an objection to the proposed decision. Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.09(3). Gehin, represented by counsel, filed a 23-page written objection to the Board's proposed decision. However, Gehin's objection was ñot to the Board's rebanee on the medical reports. On the contrary, Gehin relied on the reports to attempt to show that the Board's *204Proposed Decision that she was not "totally disabled" was factually incorrect. Gehin failed to object to the Board's reliance on the reports despite the ETF code provision that "The aggrieved party shall specify, in detail. . . each provision of the proposed decision to which the party objects and the basis for each objection .. . [including] each change the party requests the board to make in the proposed decision and the legal grounds for the change." Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.09(3)(a)-(b).
¶ 206. The majority skates over the Board's argument that Gehin waived any right to challenge the Board's reliance on the medical reports because she raised no objections on those grounds despite the noted multiple opportunities to do so. Perplexingly, the majority relies on the circuit court's ruling that Gehin "was not required to object and that the claimant therefore did not waive her objections," majority op., ¶ 107, despite its earlier correct statement that "This court reviews the decision of the Group Insurance Board, not the circuit court's order or court of appeals' decision." Majority op., ¶ .5. The majority concludes that it "need not decide whether the claimant waived her right in the present case to challenge the bases of the Findings of Fact." Majority op., ¶ 109. The majority cites no authority that allows it to completely fail to address the Board's argument. In fact, the majority provides no reason at all why Gehin has not waived her arguments as to the Board's reliance on the medical reports.
¶ 207. Instead, the majority simply asserts that the Board's Perales-based argument would constitute "abandoning] the rule long used in this state that uncorroborated hearsay evidence alone does not constitute substantial evidence." Majority op., ¶ 8. The majority terms its rule "long used," yet United Wisconsin *205Group, the Department of Employee Trust Funds, the Group Insurance Board, and the court of appeals all operated under the impression that the applicable "rules" allowed the Board to rely on the medical reports.12 It is the majority that is changing the rules. At a minimum, the majority should remand this case to the Board to allow it to reconsider the case in light of the "residuum rule" standard the majority resurrects.
CONCLUSION
¶ 208. Professor Kenneth Davis has written that the reasons supporting abandonment of the residuum rule are "overwhelming — so overwhelming as to give rise to the question whether courts that have given lip service to the residuum rule have done so on the basis of misunderstanding instead of through an exercise of informed judgment." Kenneth Davis, 3 Administrative Law Treatise, § 16.6 at 239 (2d ed. 1980). Apparently the majority is not "overwhelmed" by the courts' and scholars' criticisms of the residuum rule. I am persuaded and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals relying on the reasoning of Perales. I would adopt the rule that hearsay evidence may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings if the hearsay evidence bears inherent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness and the opposing party has full notice of the evidence and the opportunity to challenge it by subpoenaing a witness. In addition, I believe this court should be more attentive to the waiver issue and the procedures employed by adminis*206trative agencies in general, and the Board in particular. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 209. I am authorized to state that Justice JON E WILCOX joins this dissent.

 See, e.g., Compton v. D.C. Bd. of Psychology, 858 A.2d 470, 476 (D.C. 2004) (hearsay alone can be substantial evidence if reliable); Cole v. Driver and Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 87 F.3d 1120, 1123 (Or. 2004) (Oregon has "expressly rejected" the residuum rule, and "hearsay evidence alone, even if inadmissible in a civil or criminal trial, is not incapable of being 'substantial evidence'"); 49th Street Mgmt. Co. v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 716 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (App. Div. 2000) (Hearsay "may constitute substantial evidence where it is sufficiently relevant and probative.").
The Florida court of appeals, although noting that "in Florida, the residuum rule is statutory," admitted that the rule "has now been rejected in most jurisdictions and most scholars are highly critical of it." BellSouth Advertising & Pub. Corp. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 654 So. 2d 292, 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

 This standard parallels the court of appeals' approach: that the hearing examiner may rely on any evidence admissible under a hearsay exception, such as Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6m). Gehin v. Group Ins. Bd., No. 03-0226, unpublished slip op., ¶ 14 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003).

 The hearing examiner is required to "perform all functions in an impartial manner. An examiner shall disqualify himself or herself with respect to a particular appeal if... he or she is unable to act fairly or impartially." Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.04(3).

 The majority's question is well taken because Wis. Stat. § 227.45(1) provides in part that in agency proceedings, "Basic principles of relevancy, materiality and probative force shall govern the proof of all questions of fact." Generally, § 227.45 relaxes evidentiary standards in administrative proceedings. Accord Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 272, ¶ 20 n.8, 240 Wis. 2d 209, 621 N.W.2d 633. The majority's decision today increases the standards for reliance on hearsay in administrative proceedings beyond even the standard employed in criminal cases, as the majority admits. See majority op., ¶ 90.
The majority steadfastly contends that "the relaxed eviden-tiary standard is not meant to allow the proceedings to degenerate to the point where an administrative agency relies only on unreliable evidence." Majority op., ¶ 51. Apparently, the majority characterizes medical records as "unreliable evidence." This *192is odd, given this court's adoption of an evidentiary rule expressly providing for the admission of health care provider records despite their hearsay character, Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6m), the Supreme Court's holding and accompanying reasoning in Perales, and the holding of this court in Hagenkord v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 452, 469-71, 302 N.W.2d 421 (1981) extolling the reliability of medical records. Yielding slightly, the majority later admits that "Medical reports arguably have indicia of reliability... they are furnished by independent, impartial experts.. . ." Majority op., ¶ 69.

 The majority contends that medical reports "arguably have indicia of reliability and therefore seem to have probative force," majority op., ¶ 69, but refuses to decide whether the reports are actually admissible. Majority op., ¶ 89. The plain language of § 908.03(6m) provides that "records" prepared by a "health care provider" are admissible. It is difficult to imagine how the medical reports in this case would not fall within the scope of that rule. See generally Hagenkord, 100 Wis. 2d at 469-71.

 Even the Folding Furniture court made clear that it was not relying on a single sentence in Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). The court stated:
Hearsay may doubtless be received, if corroborative of other evidence or otherwise of such nature as to have some reasonable bearing on a fact for determination. Letters and documents from a party may be received without authentication such as is necessary in courts. But nonlegal evidence to be admissible must have some substantial probative force and not be a mere opinion except in fields where the opinion of experts is proper for consideration and the person giving it is shown to have some special knowledge reasonably entitling his opinion to some weight.
*196Folding Furniture Works, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor Relations Bd., 232 Wis. 170, 188, 285 N.W. 851 (1939) (emphasis added).

 For example, the majority cites an Alabama Administrative Code provision: "Hearsay is not sufficient to prove any material fact" unless that hearsay would be admissible under a court-recognized exception. Ala. Admin. Code r. 482-1-065-.04(9)(b) (2004) (emphasis added). The medical reports at issue here are admissible under a court recognized exception. See Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6m). Therefore, the Alabama Administrative Code provision cited by the majority actually contradicts its conclusion. The same analysis applies to the Minnesota rule cited by the majority: "Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining any direct evidence but is not sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions." Minn. R. 5601.3145(3) (2003) (emphasis added). Medical records that comply with Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6m) are "admissible" over objection in civil actions. The Montana Rule provides that "Hearsay evidence may be received and considered to supplement other evidence, but such hearsay evidence may not be considered to support a finding unless it would otherwise be admissible over objection in civil actions or under the Montana Rules of Evidence." Mont. Admin. R. 2-4-604(4) (2004) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Utah rule provides that "Hearsay *197evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible in a judicial proceeding." Utah Admin. Code 51-2-12(0 (emphasis added). Finally, the majority cites the Wisconsin Administrative Code: "Hearsay evidence is admissible if it has reasonable probative value but no issue may be decided solely on hearsay evidence unless the hearsay evidence is admissible under ch. 908, Stats." Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 140.16 (emphasis added). In all of these states, medical records are admissible under the hearsay rules. See Ex Parte American Color Graphics, Inc., 838 So. 2d 385, 388 (Ala. 2002) (Ala. R. Evid. § 803(6) allows admission of hearsay medical records unless prepared exclusively in anticipation of litigation); State v. Dick, 419 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (Medical records are considered reliable and are specifically excluded from the hearsay rule by Minn. R. Evid. § 803(4)); Mason v. Ditzel, 842 E2d 707, 713 (Mont. 1992) (Medical records made by examining physician are excepted from the hearsay rule by Mont. R. Evid. § 803(4)); Utah R. Evid. 803(4); Wis. Stat. § 908.03(6m).
The majority believes that the admissibility of the evidence under the evidentiary code "confuses" the issue. Majority op., ¶ 89. Yet that is exactly the standard espoused in many of the codes the majority cites in support of its view.
As for the cases the majority cites in footnote 76, only one of them — Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Alaska Industrial Board, 12 Alaska 584 (1950) — concerns medical records. The Alaska court in that case did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Perales because Libby was decided in 1950 — more than 20 years before Perales.
In summary, little of the authority in footnote 76 controverts the fundamental premise of Perales — that hearsay medical reports, because of their inherently reliable nature, may constitute substantial evidence in administrative proceedings.

 See Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development Occupational Employment Statistics Survey, available at www.dwd.state.wi.usloealwages.htm (Nov. 2003).

 Id.

 See Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.02(3) (" 'Appeal' means the review of a determination made by the department... ■under s. 40.03(l)(j), (6)(i), (7)(f), or (8)(f), Stats." This appeal was pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 40.03(6)(i) ("[The Board] may accept timely appeals of determinations made by the department affecting any right or benefit under any group insurance plan provided for under this chapter.")); see also Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.03(7)(a) ("The department shall be a party to each appeal of a determination made by the department.").

 Wis. Admin. Code § ETF 11.06(2) provides that "Failure of a party to object on the record to admission of any evidence shall be deemed a waiver of that objection."

 Wis. Admin. Code § 11.12(2) sets out the "Standards" the Board uses to make findings. Section (2) (a) allows the Board to base its findings on "evidence in the record which proves the findings to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence." Hearsay is not excluded.