Court Opinion

ID: 9365995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 17:05:17.336944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.667295
License: Public Domain

ORIGINAL                                     01/24/2023

          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                                                                      Case Number: DA 21-0603

                                       DA 21-0603
                                                                        FILED
 SHALAINE LAWSON,
                                                                         JAN 2 4 2C23
                                                                      Bowen Greenwoca
        Plaintiff and Appellee/Cross-Appellant,                     C.- rk of Supreme Cour,
                                                                        State of ron,-,tar,

               v.
                                                                        ORDER
 NORVAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.,

        Defendant and Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

       Appellee/Cross-Appellant Shalaine Lawson has filed a petition for rehearing
following issuance of the Court's Opinion in this matter on December 20, 2022.
Appellant/Cross-Appellee Norval Electrical Cooperative, Inc., has filed an objection
opposing the petition.
       The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth limited grounds for rehearing.
See M. R. App. P. 20(1)(a). The Court will consider a rehearing petition only upon grounds
that (i) it overlooked some fact material to the decision, (ii) it overlooked some question
presented that would have been decisive to the case, or (iii) its decision conflicts with a
statute or controlling decision not addressed by the Court. M. R. App. P. 20(1)(a).
       Lawson appears to present her petition under Rule 20(1)(a)(iii), arguing this Court's
front-pay damages determination did not address or reconcile either § 39-2-912(1), MCA,
which provides that the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA) does not
apply to discrimination or retaliation claims, or § 49-2-506(1)(b), MCA, which does not
include a damage cap for discrimination claims. Given these statutes, Lawson argues at
length that it was error for the Human Rights Commission (HRC) to use or even refer to
the WDEA as guidance for a discrimination front-pay damage award.
       This issue was addressed in the Court's Opinion, and Lawson's rehearing argument
overlooks precisely what the Opinion explained the District Court had overlooked when it
increased the front-pay damage award: that the HRC, apart from any consideration of the
WDEA, "alternatively determined, based upon its review of the record, that the Hearing
Officer's four-year award was not clearly erroneous, but rather a correct determination of
front pay damages in the case." Opinion, ¶ 45 (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of any
error that could be ascribed to the HRC's reference to the WDEA, the agency determined
a four-year award was "otherwise justified by the record," a specific conclusion Lawson
does not challenge or address. Opinion, ¶ 45.
       Lawson has not established any conflict between the Court's decision and the cited
statutes or controlling precedent. M. R. App. P. 20(1)(a)(iii). Therefore,
       IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is DENIED.
       The Clerk is directed to mail copies hereof to counsel of record for the respective
parties.
       DATED this A"lay ofJanuary, 2023.

                                                        Chief Justice

                                                            Justices

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