Court Opinion

ID: 9649273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:47:17.107798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.534865
License: Public Domain

*102KLEIN, Bankruptcy Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion and write separately (in the interest of providing guidance to parties in future situations) to note my understanding of practical aspects of our decision today.
While we correctly distinguish and con-fíne Colorirán to a context that does not involve the assertion of one of the statutory safe harbors of Bankruptcy Code § 362(b), we do not solve the three-faceted dilemma that arises whenever a creditor claiming lien rights has possession of property in which the estate claims an interest and wants to have turned over.
The conundrum for the various parties is what to do, at what risk, and on whose initiative? Mere incantation of Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(a), 362(b), 542, and 546 often leads into circular argument that does little to move parties from finger pointing to resolution and that confirms the accuracy of Benjamin Franklin’s observation that “many a long dispute may be thus abridged: It is so. It is not so. It is so. It is not so.” B. Franklin, Poor Richard’s Alamanack 1745.
In the interest of promoting predictability, I submit that the prudent course depends upon the relative nature of the rights that are in issue in each specific situation. One can profit by comparing this case with Colorirán and Whiting Pools.
In the present situation, the creditor can comfortably rely upon the safe harbor of § 362(b)(3) because, I suggest, the repairman’s lien under Idaho Code § 45-806 is unambiguous, arises contemporaneously with the repairs performed, and plainly would be difficult for a bankruptcy trustee to defeat. While the vehicle may have to be turned over, the creditor’s right to insist upon adequate protection is powerful.
In contrast, and looking beyond our formal distinction of the Colorirán decision (as not presenting a § 362(b)(3) question) to a broader functional sense, the putative lien rights that led our Colorirán panel to place the burden, risk, and obligation on the creditor were considerably more doubtful. They were ambiguous, supposedly contractual, and existed for the purpose of collecting antecedent debts in a fashion that would invite scrutiny by any competent bankruptcy trustee or competing creditor. If anything, the overall situation smacked of cynical overreaching by a creditor that thought it had the leverage to bludgeon the estate into paying an ante*103cedent debt without having to run the gauntlet of having its lien rights scrutinized.
The message here is that in the business of wresting control of estate property from the hands of creditors in the often-chaotic early days of reorganization situations (chapters 11, 12, and 18), bankruptcy courts give creditors sympathy in proportion to their respective rights: creditors with unquestioned hen rights that are not vulnerable to avoidance by a bankruptcy trustee and who are not overreaching receive more sympathy than creditors with more debatable rights.
The other message, which is illustrated by our assessment of this ease and by Whiting Pools, is that it behooves all parties to bring any disagreement promptly to court and to have comported themselves in a manner in which they appear to have been attempting to be reasonable, especially as to the key issue of adequate protection.