Court Opinion

ID: 9779729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:41:26.832026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:39.331700
License: Public Domain

BRADFORD, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Thomas violated a protective order when she told Smith to stop calling her and called him a "fagot" [sic] while they were in court. Tr. 7, 10, 16. The State charged Thomas with invasion of privacy for the violation, and the trial court convicted her in a bench trial The majority reverses Thomas's conviction after concluding that the institution of direct contempt proceedings was a more appropriate action. Although I agree that direct contempt proceedings would have been the more efficient and preferred remedy, I find nothing in the statute that precluded the State from choosing to file the invasion of privacy charges. Specifically, Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1 provides in relevant part that a person who violates a protective order commits invasion of privacy. The court's primary goal when construing the meaning of a statute is to determine the Indiana General Assembly's intent. Briggs v. Griffin Wheel Corporation, 851 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (2006). An unambiguous statute is interpreted to mean what it plainly states, and its plain and obvious meaning may not be enlarged or restricted. Id. Here, the statute plainly states that a person who violates a protective order commits invasion of privacy. I find no error and would therefore affirm Thomas's conviction for invasion of privacy.