Court Opinion

ID: 9854228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:34.105452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:59.080638
License: Public Domain

*79Chief Justice TOAL,
I respectfully dissent.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court finding Respondent ineligible for the death penalty. In my opinion, a charge of accessory before the fact to murder implicates the death penalty under South Carolina law.
I agree with the majority’s contention that the plain language of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (2003) allowing the State to seek the death penalty only applies upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, and that the statute does not provide any other crimes for which a defendant may be eligible for the death penalty. However, in my view, a conviction of accessory before the fact to murder is regarded by law as a conviction for murder and therefore § 16-3-20 applies.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1^40 (2003) defines an accessory as follows:
A person who aids in the commission of a felony or is an accessory before the fact in the commission of a felony by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the felony to be committed is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be punished in the manner prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon. (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, Respondent was indicted on two counts of accessory before the fact to the underlying felony of murder. To illustrate my interpretation of § 16-1-40 and its applicability to the issue here, if we were to replace each instance of the general term felony in § 16-1-40 with the specific felony of murder relevant in this case, the result is that a “person who ... is an accessory before the fact in the commission of a murder by counseling, hiring, or otherwise procuring the murder to be committed is guilty of a murder....” Therefore, if a jury convicted Respondent for accessory before the fact to murder, the plain language of § 16-1-40, in my view, would regard Respondent as guilty of the crime of murder. Accordingly, Respondent would be eligible for the death penalty under § 16-3-20.5
*80Furthermore, practical concerns dictate that an accessory-before the fact to murder be eligible for the death penalty under South Carolina’s statutory scheme. A person who counsels, hires, or otherwise procures a felony to be committed may be indicted and convicted as either an accessory before the fact or for the substantive felony. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-50 (2003). Under the majority’s conclusion then, whether a defendant who counseled, hired, or otherwise procured a murder is eligible for the death penalty ultimately comes down to whether the State decides to prosecute the defendant as an accessory before the fact to murder or for the murder itself. The General Assembly certainly did not intend such an illogical result.
Ultimately, the majority’s conclusion rests on hesitancy to apply the clear language of the accessory statute. However, § 16-1-40 clearly states that an accessory is guilty of the principal felony and is punished accordingly. I see no reason to depart from this reading of the plain language.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that a defendant who is an accessory before the fact to murder is guilty of murder by operation of law and is subject to the death penalty in accordance with § 16-3-20. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s finding that Respondent was ineligible for the death penalty and reinstate the State’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty.

. Interestingly, in 1977 when the General Assembly created a bifurcated trial structure consisting of a guilt phase and a sentencing phase for cases in which the death penalty is sought, § 16-1-40 read as follows:
*80Whoever aids in the commission of a felony or is accessory thereto before the fact by counseling, hiring or otherwise procuring the felony to be committed shall be punished in the manner prescribed for the punishment of the principal felon.
In 1993, the General Assembly amended § 16-1-40 to read in its present form. See 1993 S.C. Acts 3229, 3237-38. Although the 1993 amendment consisted mainly of grammatical changes, it is interesting to note the addition of the phrase that an accessory "is guilty of a felony" just before the language declaring the manner of "punishment" for an accessory. In my view, this alteration makes the statute easily applicable to the bifurcated trial structure created by the General Assembly fifteen years earlier.