Court Opinion

ID: 9908703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:10:08.833593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:26.989416
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued December 7, 2023

                                          In The

                                  Court of Appeals
                                         For The

                             First District of Texas
                              ————————————
                                 NO. 01-23-00530-CV
                              ———————————
                        IN RE K.W. A/K/A K.D., A CHILD

                     On Appeal from the 306th District Court
                            Galveston County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 21-CP-0103

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is a suit by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

(“DFPS”) to terminate a parent-child relationship. After a bench trial, the trial court

terminated the parental rights of appellant B.D. (“Father”) to his minor child, K.W.,

also known as K.D. (“Kevin”),1 based on its findings under subsections

1
      We use an alias to refer to the child and his parent. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2) (in
      parental-rights termination cases, “the court must, in its opinion, use an alias to refer
161.001(b)(1)(N), and (O) of the Texas Family Code and its finding that termination

of the parent-child relationship was in the child’s best interest.2 The trial court

appointed DFPS as the managing conservator of the child.

      In this accelerated appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s order terminating

his parental rights. In his sole issue, he contends that the evidence at trial was legally

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that he engaged in the

predicate acts set forth in subsections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O), and that termination

of his parental rights is in Kevin’s best interest.

      We affirm.

                                      Background

      Kevin was born in a prison hospital in October 2021. DFPS was appointed

his temporary managing conservator,3 and Kevin was placed in a foster home with

his siblings.

      One year later, on September 13, 2022, Father was formally adjudicated as

Kevin’s father. After a hearing on that date, the trial court issued an agreed order

stating that Father was to have supervised visitation with Kevin on the specific dates

      to a minor, and if necessary to protect the minor’s identity, to the minor’s parent or
      other family member”). In its brief, DFPS refers to the child as “Kevin.”
2
      See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N) (constructive abandonment), (O) (failure
      to comply with terms of family service plan), (b)(2) (best interest).
3
      Kevin’s mother, D.P., executed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights. The
      trial court found her relinquishment to be in Kevin’s best interest and signed an
      order terminating her parental rights. She is not a party to this appeal.
                                            2
set forth in September, October, and November 2022, absent mutual agreement. It

ordered Father to show proof of income or an ability to support Kevin; demonstrate

safe and stable housing; participate in case-related hearings and visitation with the

child; and complete a psychosocial evaluation, drug testing, and, if positive, a drug

and alcohol assessment. The trial court stated in its order that Father’s compliance

with these terms was required to obtain Kevin’s return and that a failure to comply

could result in the termination of his parental rights.

      At trial, DFPS caseworker Colin Grey testified that Father did not provide

evidence of income or an ability to support Kevin, or of a stable home life. Father

stayed in a trailer with his father or stayed with his mother.

      Grey testified that Father did not attend any of his scheduled visits with Kevin

and did not attend the permanency hearing in December 2022. Instead, Father texted

Grey over a borrowed cell phone each time, stating that he could not attend for

various reasons, e.g., he was in the hospital with his girlfriend and new baby, his

girlfriend had overdosed, the appointment time was confusing, or he lacked

transportation. Grey provided Father with bus passes and attempted to reschedule

visitations. Father had very little communication with DFPS after December 2022.

      In April 2023, Father met Kevin for the first time. However, there were no

additional visits because Father was arrested and jailed a few days later on charges

                                           3
of smuggling and evading arrest. And Father was incarcerated at the time of trial in

June 2023.

      With respect to Father’s criminal history, the trial court also admitted

evidence that Father was charged on March 8, 2023 with the offenses of family-

violence assault causing bodily injury, evading arrest, and criminal trespass. He was

jailed and then released. The trial court also admitted a July 15, 2021 judgment of

conviction for family-violence assault causing bodily injury, for which Father was

jailed for 45 days, and a May 3, 2021 order of deferred adjudication for felony

criminal negligence, involving abandoning or endangering a child, for which Father

was placed on community supervision for two years.

      DFPS also presented evidence that Father’s drug tests on September 15, 2022

and December 8, 2022 were positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and

marijuana. Grey testified that he made “at least four” attempts, including traveling

to Father’s house and while Father was incarcerated, to schedule Father for the court-

ordered drug and alcohol assessment, but was unsuccessful. Grey was concerned

that Father had “a pattern stemming back from years [of] drug use” and that there

had not been “any therapeutic services to address those concerns.”

      Grey further testified that Kevin had lived since birth in a stable foster home

that intended to permanently adopt him. He was bonded with his foster mother, his

physical and emotional needs were being met, and he was a happy child. In addition,

                                          4
Kevin’s two older siblings lived with him, and together the children were thriving.

Grey noted that although DFPS had investigated whether Kevin’s paternal

grandmother could provide a suitable placement for Kevin, it had learned that the

grandmother had criminal history and had recently been incarcerated.

      DFPS requested that the trial court terminate Father’s parental rights to Kevin

under subsections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O) of the Family Code. Grey opined that

termination of Father’s parental rights was in Kevin’s best interest.

      Father testified that he and Mother were in a relationship from 2020 to 2021.

According to Father, he and Mother had used methamphetamine together during that

time. Father noted that he began using methamphetamines when was he was 12 or

13 years old and had never undergone substance abuse treatment. He admitted to

having a drug addiction and that he had failed to complete the court-ordered drug

and alcohol assessment, despite his attorney and Grey having come to his home to

assist him with setting it up. He asserted that he had not used drugs since his positive

test in December 2022.

      Father also admitted that he had agreed to the times and locations for visitation

in the trial court’s agreed order and that he had told the trial court that he did not

have a vehicle but could get rides from his girlfriend. He admitted that he did not

visit Kevin as agreed, but asserted that he had texted Grey each time to explain the

reason. For instance, he missed the first visit, scheduled for September 16, 2022,

                                           5
because his girlfriend gave birth to his new baby on September 15, 2022. He missed

the October 2022 visits because his girlfriend was getting her driver’s license on one

of the days. And he asserted that Grey had failed to tell him where the November

2022 visit would take place. He did not appear for the permanency hearing in

December 2022 because his girlfriend overdosed on alcohol and drugs.

      Father stated that he met Kevin for the first time in April 2023 and was

arrested days later on charges of smuggling and evading arrest in Kinney County.

And he was incarcerated at the time of trial and unsure of when he would be released.

He also noted that he had been involved in “multiple incidents” of domestic violence.

He admitted that he could not provide Kevin with a safe and stable home but asserted

that he could do so “through [his] mother.”

      Kevin’s paternal grandmother testified regarding her criminal history, which

included felony forgery and possession of a controlled substance in 2019. In

September 2021, she was arrested for the felony offense of unauthorized use of a

motor vehicle and for possession of methamphetamine, which constituted violations

of the terms of her community supervision, and she was incarcerated for eighteen

months. She was released on parole two months prior to her testimony at trial and

noted that she would be on parole for “two more years.” She testified that she had

found employment and had been living in her new home for “a couple weeks.” She

noted that she had strong support from relatives.

                                          6
      CASA advocate supervisor Y. Ramirez testified that she had visited Kevin at

his foster home monthly since this case began. Kevin was bonded to his foster

mother and attached to his biological siblings, who also lived there. He was in a

stable environment, attended day care, and the family took many vacations together.

      Ramirez was concerned about Father’s history of criminal conduct, substance

abuse, and domestic violence—as some of these events took place even after Father

had taken parenting classes. She was concerned about placing Kevin with his

paternal grandmother based on her recent history of criminal conduct and substance

abuse. Although the grandmother had taken strides to improve herself, it had only

been for a short time. And Ramirez was not provided with the names of any other

relatives who could provide placement for Kevin.

      In its Order of Termination, the trial court found that Father had constructively

abandoned Kevin and had failed to comply with a court order establishing the actions

necessary for him to obtain Kevin’s return. It also found that termination of the

parent-child relationship between Father and Kevin was in Kevin’s best interest.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights and appointed DFPS as Kevin’s

permanent managing conservator.

                                          7
                     Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

      In his sole issue, Father argues that the evidence at trial was legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that he engaged in the

predicate acts set forth in subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N) of the Family Code and that

termination of his parental rights was in Kevin’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 161.001(b)(1)(N), (b)(2).4

A.    Standard of Review

      A parent’s “right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his

or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right.” Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). “When the

State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe

that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” Id. at 759. “A parent’s interest in the

accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is,

therefore, a commanding one.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, we strictly

scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe the involuntary termination

statutes in favor of the parent. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

4
      Because we conclude below that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
      support the trial court’s finding under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N), we
      do not address Father’s challenge to the termination of his parental rights under
      section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; see also In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d
      355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (requiring only one predicate finding under section 161.001
      to support termination when there is also finding that termination is in child’s best
      interest).
                                            8
      “[T]he rights of natural parents are not absolute,” however, “protection of the

child is paramount,” and “[t]he rights of parenthood are accorded only to those fit to

accept the accompanying responsibilities.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.

2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994)). As a parent may

forfeit his parental rights based on his actions or omissions, the primary focus of a

termination suit is protection of the child’s best interests. Id.

      Accordingly, “[i]n parental-rights termination cases, due process mandates a

clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235

(Tex. 2019); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). “Clear and convincing” is “the

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm

belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX.

FAM. CODE § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). “This

heightened burden of proof affects the standard of review in an evidentiary challenge

on appeal.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022).

      “To that end, in reviewing a legal-sufficiency challenge, we must determine

whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

its finding was true.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). We consider all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and

disregard all evidence that the factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We may not,

                                            9
however, disregard “undisputed facts that do not support the finding. Id. (quoting In

re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (internal quotations omitted)).

      In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in this context, we determine

whether, considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and

contradicting the finding, a factfinder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that the finding was true. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002).

“If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder

could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could

not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually

insufficient.” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (internal quotations

omitted).

      Under these standards, the factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (internal

quotations omitted). Thus, in a bench trial, the trial court weighs the evidence and

resolves evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies. In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 117

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied).

B.    Law

      Section 161.001(b) of the Family Code authorizes an “involuntary termination

of parental rights if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence both that a parent

engaged in one or more enumerated predicate grounds for termination and that

                                           10
termination is in the best interest of the child.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 701–02

(Tex. 2022); see TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b). Generally, only one predicate

ground and a best-interest finding are necessary for termination, even if the trial

court based the termination on more than one ground. In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 702.

      Here, the trial court found that:

      (N)    [Father had] constructively abandoned the child who has been in
             the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of
             [DFPS] for not less than six months, and:
             (i)     [DFPS had] made reasonable efforts to return the child to
                     the parent;
             (ii)    [Father had] not regularly visited or maintained significant
                     contact with the child; and
             (iii)   [Father had] demonstrated an inability to provide the child
                     with a safe environment[.]

TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N). The first element focuses on DFPS’s conduct,

and the second and third focus on the parent’s conduct. In re A.K.L., No. 01-16-

00489-CV, 2016 WL 7164065, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 8, 2016,

pet. denied) (mem. op.).

C.    Discussion

      Father does not dispute that Kevin was in the temporary conservatorship of

DFPS for at least six months. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N). Rather, he

disputes that the evidence supports that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return

Kevin to him, that he did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with

                                           11
Kevin, and that he demonstrated an inability to provide Kevin with a safe

environment. See id.

      1.     Reasonable efforts to return the child

      Under section 161.001(1)(N)(i), efforts by DFPS to return the child to the

parent do not require that the child be “physically delivered” to the parent. In re

G.C.S., 657 S.W.3d 114, 132 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied). This Court

and others have held that DFPS’s implementation of a family service plan, “standing

alone,” constitutes a reasonable effort to return a child to the parent. In re S.M.M.,

No. 01-22-00482-CV, 2022 WL 17981669, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.); A.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., 673 S.W.3d 704, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.).5 The inquiry is

whether DFPS made “reasonable efforts, not ideal efforts.” In re F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d

752, 766–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

      Here, DFPS filed a service plan with respect to Father within 45 days after it

was appointed the temporary managing conservator of the child, as required. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.101.         And DFPS provided the plan to Father and

communicated with him about its terms. At that time, however, he was only an

5
      See also In re I.M., No. 01-21-00123-CV, 2021 WL 3868764, at *5 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.M.E., No. 01-21-
      00214-CV, 2021 WL 4533262, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 5, 2021,
      no pet.) (mem. op.); M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d
      305, 309 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied),

                                         12
alleged father. See In re S.M.M., 2022 WL 17981669, at *7 (noting that service plan

applies only to “parent,” not to alleged father). Accordingly, once Father was

formally adjudicated as Kevin’s father, Father and DFPS agreed on the specific

provisions constituting an amended service plan, and the trial court issued an agreed

order listing the services with which Father was required to comply to obtain the

return of the child.

      These terms included that Father was to participate in supervised visitation

with Kevin on the specific dates set forth in September, October, and November

2022, unless otherwise agreed. Father was also ordered to show proof of income or

an ability to support Kevin; to demonstrate safe and stable housing; to participate in

case-related hearings and visitation with the child; to complete a psychosocial

evaluation, a drug test, and, if positive, a drug and alcohol assessment. The trial

court’s order also specified that a failure to comply with these terms could result in

the termination of Father’s parental rights.

      Grey testified regarding DFPS’s implementation of the amended service plan

and the efforts to assist Father with compliance. See In re I.M., No. 01-21-00123-

CV, 2021 WL 3868764, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.). Father did not attend any of his scheduled visits with Kevin, with

the exception of one, and he failed to maintain contact with DFPS. Father was

without a telephone, although Grey attempted to reach him through his girlfriend.

                                          13
In addition, Grey’s efforts included going to Father’s home to communicate with

him, providing Father with bus passes, and attempting to reschedule visitation.

      In addition, after Father’s failed drug tests, Grey made “at least four” attempts,

including traveling to Father’s home and during Father’s incarceration, to assist him

with scheduling the court-ordered alcohol and drug assessment, but was

unsuccessful.

      Further, DFPS explored the possibility of placing Kevin with his paternal

grandmother but determined that she was not equipped to provide him with a safe

and stable home. And DFPS determined that Father had no other relatives who could

care for Kevin. Such efforts to place Kevin with a relative, though unsuccessful,

constitute evidence that reunification was attempted. See In re G.C.S., 657 S.W.3d

at 132; In re K.J.T.M., No. 06-09-00104-CV, 2010 WL 1664027, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana Apr. 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (attempts, “although futile,” to place

child with relative supported finding of reasonable effort to return child to father).

      From the evidence presented, a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm

belief or conviction that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return Kevin to Father.

See In re G.P., 503 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied).

      2.     Regularly visiting or maintaining significant contact with the child

      Kevin was born in October 2021, and Father was formally adjudicated as his

father in September 2022. Father admitted that he had agreed to the times and

                                          14
locations for visitation in the trial court’s agreed order and that he had represented

that he had a means of transportation to the visits. He admitted at trial, however,

that he did not visit Kevin as agreed. And Grey testified that Father failed to

maintain contact with DFPS after December 2022. Father’s only visit during the

seven-month period between his adjudication and trial was in April 2023, when he

met Kevin for the first time.

      This Court has found sufficient evidence of constructive abandonment despite

greater levels of contact with a child than Father had in this case with Kevin. See In

re J.Q.J., No. 01-18-01094-CV, 2019 WL 2292991, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] May 30, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding reasonable factfinder could have

formed firm belief or conviction that parent who visited three times during seven

months that child was in DFPS care had failed to regularly visit or maintain

significant contact).6

      Here, the evidence shows that Father had no relationship with Kevin at all.

See In re S.C.M., No. 01-22-00964-CV, 2023 WL 3873342, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] June 8, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

6
      See also In re T.G., No. 14-09-00299-CV, 2010 WL 1379977, at *7 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent who visited “only
      sporadically” for nine months and did not visit at all for seven months after failed
      to regularly visit or maintain significant contact); M.C., 300 S.W.3d at 310 (mother
      who visited six to eight times during twelve-month period failed to regularly visit
      or maintain significant contact); In re H.R., 87 S.W.3d 691, 699 (Tex. App.—San
      Antonio 2002, no pet.) (parent visited “intermittently” during four-month period).
                                           15
      Father testified that he texted Grey each time to explain the reason that he

could not attend the scheduled visit. Father missed the first visit, scheduled for

September 16, 2022, because his girlfriend gave birth to his new baby the day before,

on September 15, 2022. He stated that he missed the October 2022 visits because

his girlfriend was getting her driver’s license on one of the days. And he asserted

that Grey had failed to tell him where the November 2022 visit would take place.

Father additionally did not appear for the permanency hearing in December 2022

because his girlfriend had overdosed on alcohol and drugs.

      Based on this record, the trial court could have reasonably found Father’s

explanations to be inadequate. See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (factfinder remains

“the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor” (internal quotations

omitted)); In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 117 (factfinder weighs evidence and resolves

evidentiary conflicts).

      A reasonable factfinder could have therefore formed a firm belief or

conviction that Father failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with

Kevin. See In re J.Q.J., 2019 WL 2292991, at *5.

      3.     Safe environment

      Factors relevant to a parent’s ability to provide a safe environment include

(1) the degree to which the parent participated in services; (2) whether the parent has

steady housing and employment; and (3) whether the parent missed opportunities

                                          16
for counseling and a psychological evaluation. In re S.M.M., 2022 WL 17981669, at

*9. “The factfinder should also consider a parent’s financial resources, employment

history, home environment, parenting skills, and demonstrated past ability or

inability to care for a child.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The burden is not on

the parent to prove that he can provide a safe environment for the child; rather, the

burden is on DFPS, as the party seeking a termination of parental rights, to prove

that the parent is unable to provide a safe environment for the child. Id.

      With respect to participating in services and missed opportunities for

counseling and evaluation, the evidence shows that Father did not participate any of

his scheduled visits with Kevin, with the exception of one. In addition, he failed

drug tests in September and December 2022, and admitted that he was an addict, yet

failed to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment as ordered. See id. The failure

to complete a family service plan demonstrates an inability to provide a child with a

safe environment. See In re A.K.L., 2016 WL 7164065, at *7.

      Additionally, the evidence shows that Father lacked an ability to support

Kevin and was without stable housing. See In re S.M.M., 2022 WL 17981669, at *9.

Father admitted that he could not provide Kevin with a safe and stable home but

asserted that he could do so “through [his] mother.” However, the evidence shows

that his mother had a recent history of criminal conduct and substance abuse.

Although she testified that she had, a couple weeks prior to trial, moved into a home

                                          17
of her own and had obtained employment, “[e]vidence of a recent improvement does

not absolve . . . a history of irresponsible choices.” In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 226

(Tex. App.—Waco 2015 pet. denied).

      Further, the evidence shows that Father had a pattern of engaging in criminal

conduct and domestic violence, and he was in jail at the time of trial. Conduct that

exposes a parent to incarceration is conduct that endangers the physical and

emotional well-being of a child and supports a conclusion that Father cannot provide

a safe environment. See id.; see also In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Avery v. State, 963 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) (parent’s past criminal conduct, before and

after child’s birth, relevant to showing of inability to parent).

      From the evidence presented, a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm

belief or conviction that Father was unable to provide Kevin with a safe

environment. See In re S.C.M., 2023 WL 3873342, at *9–10; M.C. v. Tex. Dept. of

Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet.

denied) (holding evidence that parent had no permanent housing or employment

demonstrated inability to provide child with safe environment).

      Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

and considering undisputed contrary evidence, we conclude that a reasonable

factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father constructively

                                           18
abandoned Kevin. See In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; In re I.M., 2021 WL 3868764,

at *5–6; In re J.Q.J., 2019 WL 2292991, at *5; In re S.C.M., 2023 WL 3873342, at

*9–10 (holding evidence that father had no relationship with child, visited only one

time, had no employment, financial resources, or stable housing, and had engaged

in criminal conduct sufficient to support trial court’s conclusion that he had

constructively abandoned his child).

       Furthermore, considering the entire record, including evidence both

supporting and contradicting the finding, the trial court reasonably could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that Father constructively abandoned Kevin. See

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25–26; In re I.M., 2021 WL 3868764, at *5–6; In re J.Q.J.,

2019 WL 2292991, at *5; In re S.C.M., 2023 WL 3873342, at *9–10. Therefore, we

hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

finding pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N) of the Family Code. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Best Interest

       Father also contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in Kevin’s

best interest.

                                          19
      The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and

development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).7 A best-interest

determination is guided by several non-exclusive factors, including: (1) the child’s

emotional and physical needs; (2) present and future emotional and physical danger

to the child; (3) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (4) the plans

for the child by those individuals and the stability of the home; (5) the plans for the

child by the agency seeking custody and the stability of the proposed placement;

(6) the parent’s acts or omissions that may indicate the existing parent–child

relationship is improper; and (7) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.

(the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).

We may also consider the statutory factors set forth in section 263.307 of the Family

Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 n.29.

      Proof of each of these factors is not a condition precedent to termination. In

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The analysis may include direct and circumstantial

evidence, the totality of the evidence, and subjective factors. In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d

615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

7
      Proof of acts or omissions providing grounds for termination under section
      161.001(b)(1) does not relieve the petitioner from proving the best-interest element,
      but the same evidence may be probative of both. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631–
      32 (Tex. 2018).
                                           20
      Based on these standards, several factors support the trial court’s finding here

that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Kevin’s best interest.

      At the time of trial, Father had met Kevin one time and had no relationship

with him, and Father did not maintain contact with DFPS. Unless a parent has a

valid excuse for his absence from a child’s life, we have long considered evidence

of little or no contact with the child to be proof that weighs heavily in favor of a trial

court’s best-interest finding. See In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813, 824 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (“Parental absence or lack of involvement is

especially telling with respect to the best interest of very young children, like babies

and toddlers, due to their inherent vulnerability and particular need for parental

attention and nurturing.”).

      Father presented evidence that he texted Grey each time that he was scheduled

to participate in visitation and explained that he could not attend for various reasons,

e.g., he was in the hospital with his girlfriend and new baby (born the day before),

his girlfriend had overdosed, the appointment time was confusing, or he lacked

transportation. The trial court could have chosen to disbelieve some of Father’s

explanations or could have reasonably found them inadequate for his failing to have

any contact with his child, apart from one time, for seven months. See In re J.W.,

645 S.W.3d at 741 (factfinder remains “the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility

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and demeanor” (internal quotations omitted)); In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 117

(factfinder weighs evidence and resolves evidentiary conflicts).

      In addition, Father failed to attend the permanency hearing in December 2022.

When a parent fails to attend termination proceedings without a valid excuse, “the

factfinder may reasonably infer that the parent is indifferent to the outcome.” In re

A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 826. “[I]ndifference implicates all of the Holley factors.”

Id. at 827.

      Father asserted that he was absent from the hearing through no fault of his

own, but because his girlfriend—who had just given birth to Father’s new baby 90

days prior—had overdosed. Apart from whether the trial court reasonably found his

excuse to be valid, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that Kevin’s safety

would be at risk in such an environment. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631.

      Drug use is relevant, not only to parenting abilities and to the stability of the

home a parent would provide, but also to the emotional and physical needs of the

child, now and in the future, and to the emotional and physical danger in which the

child could be placed, now and in the future. See In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at

631–32 (holding that same evidence may be probative of both section 161.001(b)(1)

and best-interest grounds). A factfinder may afford great weight to the significant

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factor of drug-related conduct. In re M.L.G.J., 14-14-00800-CV, 2015 WL 1402652,

at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

       Here, Father admitted that he had a long-established history of using

methamphetamines and had never undergone substance abuse treatment. Despite

failing drug tests and admitting that he was an addict, Father failed to participate in

a drug and alcohol assessment as ordered. And evidence of Father’s past drug use,

coupled with evidence that Father failed drug tests during the pendency of this suit—

while he was aware that his parental rights to Kevin were at issue—supports an

inference that Father is at risk for continuing substance abuse. See In re R.J., 579

S.W.3d at 118 (trial court may measure parent’s future conduct by his past conduct).

       Further, there was significant evidence presented of Father’s history of

engaging in criminal conduct—including child endangerment—and domestic

violence. See In re J.W., 113 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)

(“[E]vidence of . . . arrests and pending prosecutions [is] relevant in determining

whether allowing [parents] to retain their parental rights would be in the children’s

best interest.”).

       Conversely, with respect to the foster parent’s ability to parent Kevin and

provide a stable home, Grey and Rodriguez testified that Kevin is in a safe, stable

home and that he is bonded with his foster parent and siblings. At the time of trial,

Kevin was eighteen months old. “When children are too young to express their

                                          23
desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster

family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent.” In

re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

      Here, the record shows that Kevin has spent his entire life with his foster

family. See id. Grey and Rodriguez testified that Kevin is a happy child, his physical

and emotional needs are being met, and he is thriving. See id.; see also In re D.M.,

452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (considering, in

assessing child’s physical and emotional needs, that child was “healthy, happy, and

well-adjusted” after approximately eighteen months in care of foster family). Grey

also testified that the foster family intends to adopt him. See In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d

470, 476 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (stating that stability and

permanence are important to upbringing of child and affirming finding that

termination was in child’s best interest when child was thriving in foster care).

      Thus, viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s

best-interest finding, and considering undisputed evidence to the contrary, we

conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that a termination of Father’s parental rights is in Kevin’s best interest. See In re

S.M.M., 2022 WL 17981669, at *12.

      Furthermore, considering the entire record, including evidence both

supporting and contradicting the trial court’s finding, a factfinder reasonably could

                                         24
have formed a firm belief or conviction that a termination of Father’s parental rights

is in Kevin’s best interest. See id. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. See id.

      We overrule Father’s sole issue.

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all things.

                                                Terry Adams
                                                Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

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