Court Opinion

ID: 9519075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:08:20.564136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:23.264608
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). In its opinion today, the majority holds that the Lansing “storm water service charge is a tax, for which approval is required by a vote of the people,” ante at 154.1 respectfully dissent. Because the storm water disposal system benefits every landowner who uses the system and the Lansing ordinance reasonably calculates the fee on the basis of each landowner’s use, I find that the ordinance imposes a fee, not a tax, on Lansing residents. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
i
A rather complex procedural quagmire spawned this case. Section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the “Clean Water Act” (cwa), prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by any person, including municipalities, into navigable waters of the United States and mandates compliance with water quality standards. 33 USC 1311, 1362. A person or municipality responsible for a discharge of pollutants into any waters of the United States from a point source is subject to the cwa, which prohibits any discharge into United States waters without a permit. In order to avoid sanctions for discharging the pollutants, a discharger must obtain and comply with a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Standards (npdes) program. 33 USC 1342. Any discharge of pollutants without a permit or in violation of a permit’s conditions is subject to federal civil and criminal penalties and citizen suits.
*171The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (deq), formerly the Michigan Department of Natural Resources (dnr), administers the npdes permit program established under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. As a discharger of pollutants, the city of Lansing previously had to obtain a NPDES permit.1 *172According to the Federal Register, the Environmental Protection Agency likely will force the city to seek a new, specific “stormwater npdes permit” from the DEQ. 2
The city of Lansing derives its authority to impose a legitimate special assessment or user fee for storm water detention, transportation, treatment, and disposal under the home rule city act. MCL 117.1a-117.38; MSA 5.2071(1)-5.2118.3 The Lansing City Charter also provides that the city may take action to provide for the public welfare, health and safety,4 and grants the *173city the authority to impose special assessments to “make public improvements within the city.”5 The Lansing City Charter also allows the city to operate and maintain public utilities.6 To implement and maintain the public utilities, the city of Lansing may charge “just and reasonable rates” and “such other charges as may be deemed advisable for supplying all other municipal services to the inhabitants of the City and others.” Lansing City Charter, § 8-303.
Although nothing in the city charter defines “public improvement” or “public utilities,” the Revenue Bond Act proves a useful guide. MCL 141.101 et seq.\ MSA 5.2731 et seq. Under the Revenue Bond Act, the Legislature granted the city of Lansing, like any public corporation, authority “to purchase, acquire, construct, improve, enlarge, extend or repair 1 or more public improvements and to own, operate and maintain the *174same, within or without its corporate limits, and to furnish the services, facilities and commodities of any such public improvement to users within or without its corporate limits.” MCL 141.104; MSA 5.2734. The statute specifically states that the powers granted in the Revenue Bond Act “may be exercised notwithstanding that no bonds are issued hereunder.” MCL 141.104; MSA 5.2734. The Legislature further defined, post-Headlee, “public improvements” as including “storm water systems, including storm sewers, plants, works, instrumentalities, and properties used or useful in connection with the collection, treatment or disposal of storm water.” MCL 141.103(b); MSA 5.2733(b). In adding storm water language to the Revenue Bond Act in 1992, the Legislature notably aligned storm water treatment and disposal with other utilities listed under the term “public improvement,” including the light, heat, and power utilities, garbage collection and disposal, sewage treatment and disposal, transportation systems, cable television systems, stadiums, and other municipal activities that fall within the traditional thinking of “public improvements” and utilities. MCL 141.103(b); MSA 5.2733(b).
n
Determining whether a governmental exaction represents a tax, fee, or special assessment presents unique problems. This Court previously has addressed the distinction between a fee and a tax. In Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157; 146 NW 338 (1914), we focused on the “reasonableness” of the motor vehicle regulation and found that licenses, like regulations, “will be upheld by the courts when plainly *175intended as a police regulation, and the revenue derived therefrom is not disproportionate to the cost of issuing the license, and the regulation of the business to which it applies.” Id. at 167.
In Ripperger v Grand Rapids, 338 Mich 682; 62 NW2d 585 (1954), we determined that sewage charges for use of the sewage system did not constitute a “tax” on individual owners within the meaning of the Revenue Bond Act even though “the payment of a fee for the use of the sewer is, practically speaking, substantially like the enforced obligation of a tax. Id. at 686-687. We observed that “[a] public sewer system is a public utility the same as a water system” and that “ ‘[p]ayments by the users for the service rendered [was] not a tax ....’” Id. at 687 (citations omitted). We also stated that sewage fees are similar to the consumer’s gas, water, or electric bills and that the prices are set by various city boards and agencies, not consumers. Id.
Subsequently, in Merrelli v St Clair Shores, 355 Mich 575; 96 NW2d 144 (1959), we examined building permits for certain work performed in the construction of buildings and again distinguished user fees from taxes:
In short, we have considered 2 sources of municipal funds, differing in governmental theory, each having inherent limitations resulting therefrom. One involves an exercise of the municipal power of taxation. Its purpose is to raise money. The other is an exercise of the police power of the community. Its purpose is the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. True, certain moneys may be obtained in connection therewith, but such moneys are incidental to the accomplishment of the primary purpose of guarding the public. [Id. at 583. Accord Bray v Dep’t of State, 418 Mich 149, 162; 341 NW2d 92 (1983).]
*176The principles that emerge from this precedent identify two factors that are the focus for determining whether an exaction imposes a fee: the proportionality and reasonableness of the fee to the benefit conferred and the purpose of the regulation, specifically whether its purpose is to charge the user and not simply to raise revenue.7 The Court of Appeals recently considered this distinction in Saginaw Co v John Sexton Corp of Michigan, 232 Mich App 202, 209-210; 591 NW2d 52 (1998), finding that “[although no bright-line test exists for distinguishing one from the other, a fee generally is exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and some reasonable relationship exists between the amount of the fee and the value of the service or benefit.” Citing Merrelli, supra at 582-584.
However, the majority proposes a three-part test to distinguish a tax and a fee. Although I appreciate the majority’s efforts to devise a valid test for this legal conundrum, I remain unconvinced that the test the majority proposes is accurate. Even if it is, Lansing Ordinance 925 meets all three parts of the majority’s test.
A
First, the majority states that a user fee “must serve a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising *177purpose.” Ante at 161. Lansing Ordinance 925 does not raise revenue for a general revenue fund. The specific language of the ordinance restricts the use of the funds raised by the storm water fee:
All funds collected for stormwater service shall be placed in an enterprise fund and used solely for the administration, construction, operation, maintenance and replacement of the stormwater system. [Lansing Ordinance 925, § 1043.11.]
The funds collected under the ordinance are earmarked specifically for the storm water drainage system and do not serve to benefit the state by sending money into its general coffers. Even plaintiff acknowledges that the revenue derived from the exaction does not flow into a general revenue fund.8 Id.
Furthermore, this aspect of the tripartite test remains vague. At first blush, the criterion seems straightforward. Upon closer scrutiny, the test is problematic, leaving open the question whether all the funding must serve a regulatory purpose or whether only a portion of the funding used for regulatory purposes will suffice. The storm water management system at issue uses a significant portion of the regulatory fee for capital expenditures to implement the separated sewer system. However, the overall system will benefit each landowner who uses the system by increasing property values. The landowners here receive the benefit of having their storm water flow *178from their land into the sewer system, which prevents flooding in their basements.9 The value of the landowner’s property increases in the same manner that it does with a sewer or water system by increasing the value of the property when sold and ensuring that the landowner’s storm water will be properly disposed. In this sense, the ordinance serves a regulatory purpose by benefiting each parcel individually and, as part of the larger picture, the community.
B
Second, the majority states that the user fee must be proportionate to the necessary costs of the service. I agree. Although the ordinance uses the term “flat rate,” it does not impose a universal charge on all properties in the city of Lansing. The ordinance imposes a fee structure based entirely upon the amount of storm water runoff by establishing a system for computing annual bills on the basis of parcel size, pervious/impervious area, and parcel development. To collect the annual revenue requirement, the ordinance uses the equivalent hydraulic area (eha). Flat-rate parcels of land (residential parcels that are less than two acres) have a predetermined eha and landowners pay a flat fee that varies according to the parcel’s size and its development.
For commercial, industrial, or residential parcels over two acres, the city determines the EHA on an individual basis. For impervious areas, the ordinance *179states that out of every one hundred drops of rain, five drops are absorbed and ninety-five drops run off, ultimately to the storm water system. For pervious areas, eighty-five drops are absorbed and fifteen drops run off to the storm water sewer system. The city’s public service department calculates the “total billable equivalent hydraulic area” for every parcel in the city and divides the figure by 1,000 to determine the parcel’s eha, which is expressed in 1,000 square feet. These rate classifications thus are based on the determination that industrial, commercial, and residential properties of more than two acres contribute more storm water runoff, because of increased impervious surfaces, than do smaller, usually single family residence parcels. The smaller parcels pay a flat rate depending on the parcel size, to compensate each owner proportionally for the runoff, and the other properties pay according to the eha formula that applies equally to all properties in that category. Additionally, the ordinance allows both developed and undeveloped parcels to be billed on the basis of the impervious/pervious area test.
The public service department then calculates the annual storm water enterprise charge on the basis of an initial rate of $24 per 1,000 square feet of eha. This base rate is used to calculate the rain fee for all individual parcels in Lansing on the basis of whether the parcel is a “flat rate” parcel that consists of residential property or a “measured parcel,” consisting of commercial or industrial property or residential property over two acres.
Considering the fee method as a whole, the city used a logical system to compute the proportionate amount of runoff that each parcel contributes to the *180overall system. This established eha scheme represents a system that is proportional to each landowner’s “use” of storm water. The majority attacks the ordinance by arguing that other methods exist to better compute the quantity and quality of the runoff. This view ignores the substantial evidence in the record that consultants hired by the city proposed many alternatives before recommending the impervious-area method. The city considered three different alternatives for storm water treatment and disposal and found the eha method to be the most cost-effective and efficient. Furthermore, an analysis of the ordinance requires that the charges must be fair and reasonable and bear a substantial relationship to the cost of the services and the facilities. Vernor, supra at 167 (Courts will uphold regulations “when plainly intended as a police regulation, and the revenue derived therefrom is not disproportionate to the cost of issuing the license, and the regulation of the business to which it applies”). This standard implies that the city must charge the parcels proportionally, but that the parcels need not be measured with exact precision, a requirement that is a near impossibility.
c
Third, the majority claims that Ripperger established a “voluntariness” criterion. Aside from some cursory language quoted from an earlier case, nothing in Ripperger expressly dictates that the “voluntariness” factor was decisive in that case. Furthermore, our precedent does not establish that voluntariness somehow constitutes a determinative factor in con*181sidering a fee to be a tax.10 If this were the case, then other fees, such as 9-1-1 emergency charges, sewer charges, and recycling fees, would be open to attack. Simply put, in some instances, the payment of a fee is compulsory. Cincinnati v United States, 153 F3d 1375, 1378 (Fed, 1998) (“There may be some instances in which a municipal assessment is involuntarily imposed but would nonetheless be considered a permissible fee for services rather than an impermissible tax”). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in Detroit Water & Sewage Dep’t v Michigan, 803 F2d 1411 (CA 6, 1986), the federal government now mandates that cities maintain and operate clean water systems and cities deserve some flexibility and leniency when courts define “user” to compensate for the storm water systems.11
*182The majority engages in, distinctions without logical significance by stating that sewage treatment constitutes a fee because a property owner can control the amount of sewage disposed, but the same property owner cannot control the amount of rainwater that falls on the ground. Although it is doubtful that most property owners think to control their sewage disposal and treatment or their phone calls to the emergency service, even assuming arguendo that voluntariness is a factor, the fee imposed in this case falls within the “voluntariness” definition. Landowners, if they choose, may establish rainwater collection systems on their land for catching the water. If they do so, then they may appeal to the city appeal process to seek an exemption from the annual fee payment. Evidence in the record establishes that the city has granted one hundred percent credits to some landowners who have shown that they contribute no rainwater to the system.
Additionally, landowners can choose the amount of the fee they will have to pay on the basis of whether they build on the land. More buildings on the land contributes to an increase in the fee. Thus, the initial rain fee imposed on the residents is similar to the initial fee that landowners must pay to hook up to the sanitary sewer. Once the initial fee is paid in the periodic installment (every month, annually), the user can “control” the amount Of sewage disposed, thus making the sewage disposal voluntary. The same concept applies here. The landowner must pay an initial fee *183and then voluntarily can control the rainwater that flows from the property-
in
As additional support for its opinion, the majority lists two other factors that purportedly show the fee to be a disguised tax. First, the majority notes that “the ‘storm water enterprise fund’ replaces the portion of the program that was previously funded by the general fund revenues from property and income taxes.” Ante at 168. Simply because the storm water enterprise fund once was funded by property taxes does not necessarily invalidate the imposition of a regulatory fee now under Ordinance 925 and the Revenue Bond Act that allows the city to implement a sewer system.12 The majority makes much of the fact *184that the city funded the first seventy-five percent of the storm water system’s construction by using ad valorem taxes and special assessments. Although true, this argument ignores the fact that the question before this Court is the manner in which the city has chosen to fund the remaining twenty-five percent of the construction of the system and its maintenance and operation costs. Simply because the city may have improperly funded the construction earlier does not provide a legitimate legal argument for holding that the system in this present appeal is a tax rather than a user fee.
As an extension of this argument, the majority asserts that the seventy-five percent of the property owners who already benefit from a separated sewer program should not have to pay for the remainder of the construction that will serve the remaining twenty-five percent. However, this argument bifurcates the system into multiple parts, ignoring consideration of the system as a whole. In order to comply with the npdes permit and ensure clean water in the future, the city must complete the storm water system and have it benefit all residents.
The majority also contends that “the fact that the storm water service charge may be secured by placing a lien on property is relevant.” Ante at 168.1 agree with the rationale of the Court of Appeals that the observation is not persuasive:
*185The manner by which the city has chosen to enforce the fee does not establish that the fee is a tax merely because an unpaid fee results in a lien on property. Other Lansing ordinances provide that the city’s municipally owned and operated electric and drinking water distribution systems, entrusted to the Lansing Board of Water & Light, has the benefit of a lien on property for unpaid utility charges. At common law, liens arise in many situations in which a charge or fee remains unpaid, and Michigan jurisprudence recognizes mechanics liens, artisans liens, and garage keepers liens, among others. [221 Mich App 79, 87, n 6; 561 NW2d 423 (1997), citing Nickell v Lambrecht, 29 Mich App 191; 185 NW2d 155 (1970).]
The majority fails to cite any authority for the proposition that a lien somehow becomes relevant to this inquiry. Indeed, Ripperger itself states that a lien on real property in a sewage system context, although enforced in the same manner as a tax lien, does not imply that a sewage rate is tantamount to a tax.
IV
Storm water drainage systems are the wave of the future, and many cities are implementing special assessments and user fees to cope with the projected increasing cost and demand of sanitizing storm water. As the Stormwater Utility Ad Hoc Committee noted, “[t]he American Public Works Association (apwa) has concluded that ‘The User Charge and the Utility Concept are the most dependable and equitable approaches available to local governments for financing stormwater management.’ ” City of Lansing Stormwater Utility Ad Hoc Committee Report, Draft Report, August, 1994, p 2. Michigan cities, from St. Clair Shores and Ann Arbor to Marquette, have implemented or plan to implement storm water service *186programs that employ user fees and the eha method to fund their programs. The majority’s holding subjects these cities to future legal challenges and wreaks havoc with the state’s water sewage and water disposal system.13
The majority ignores that the storm water treatment is intimately related to the sewage fees that the residents already pay. The storm water and the sewage travel through one pipe and are eventually separated to comply with federal law. As the Court of Appeals noted, “storm water collection, detention, and treatment (which even plaintiff concedes was properly subject to a fee and not a tax when combined with sewage disposal), do not lose their character as a fee by virtue of being separated from sewage collection and disposal.” 221 Mich App 87. The storm water service charge does not lose its status as a user fee simply because the sewage and storm water flow *187through one pipe, but are eventually separated into two individual sewage pipes.14
When we examined the sewage charges at issue in Ripperger, we noted that the act in that case
established beyond all doubt the principle that the disposal of sewage into the streams of this State is a matter of importance to the public health, which concerns the health of the people of the State at large, and is so essential that, if the people of a city fail to meet their responsibility by bond issue, drastic steps may be taken. [Id. at 687.]
The storm water system here, like the sewage system at issue in Ripperger, benefits both the public health of the city and each resident. Every property owner in the area receives increased property rates by being connected to a storm water and sewage treatment and disposal system. I would join the Court of Appeals and the courts of virtually every other state that have addressed similar storm water charges and classified them as “user fees” or “special assessments,” thus facilitating the imperative of ensuring a clean water supply.
In sum, the storm water drainage system at issue here is a user fee because of its inherent connection to sewage treatment and disposal. Any further *188attempts to define taxes and user fees should be addressed to the Legislature.
For the stated reasons, I dissent, and I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Mallett, C.J., and Cavanagh, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 In 1977, the dnr (now the deq) issued the city of Lansing’s first npdes permit, but required the city to submit a facilities plan by June 30, 1978, to the dnr Water Resource Commission (wrc) to implement a combined sewer overflow (cso) control program. On September 27, 1978, the wrc issued to the city a notice of noncompliance and order to comply for failing to submit a complete facilities plan that would address combined sewer overflows by the June 30, 1978, deadline. On May 10, 1979, the dnr agreed to draft a npdes permit that included submission dates for the city’s final facilities plan, and on June 25, 1979, the city submitted its draft of the facilities plan to the dnr for review and comment.
On August 1,1979, the dnr-wrc issued a notice of violation and order to comply. Further, the dnr-wrc issued a citation to the city for failure to control its combined sewer overflows and submit its facilities plan addressing the combined sewer overflows by June 30, 1978. In conjunction with this notice, the dnr issued a notice of intent to place a moratorium on sewer construction permits within the city.
In response, the Lansing City Council passed a resolution calling for public hearing on the draft facilities plan, and in December, 1979, gave notice of public hearing. Finally, on January 21, 1980, the Lansing City Council passed a resolution authorizing submission of the final facilities plan, and on January 23, 1980, a public hearing was held on the facilities plan. The facilities plan included a recommendation for a long-term cso control plan, which was to be implemented as phase n after certain preliminary phase i sewer system improvements were completed. Phase i of the facilities plan was implemented between 1983 and 1989, bringing the city into compliance under its original npdes permit.
On August 14, 1987, the dnr-wrc issued public notice of its intention to issue a revised npdes permit, which it issued on October 1,1987, and later modified on August 17, 1989. The 1987 npdes permit required the city to develop a final cso control plan before December 1, 1991, that would eliminate or result in adequate treatment of combined sewage discharges containing raw sewage. After a public hearing, the Lansing City Council passed a resolution on April 25, 1991, adopted a cso project plan, which called for the separation of the city’s remaining combined sanitary and storm sewers. The dnr ultimately approved the city’s cso final project plan on March 9, 1992, and the plan was incorporated into the npdes permit given to the city on May 20,1993. This permit required that the city implement the final plan in accordance with certain compliance dates set forth *172in a six-phase construction schedule. In the absence of any revisions or amendments, the city must adhere to the plan.
In 1994, the city formed an ad hoc committee to assist the city in establishing a system to fund the project. In August, 1995, the committee recommended the creation of a storm water enterprise fund as the means to finance the plan. On October 9, 1995, the Lansing City Council, by Ordinance No. 925, created the Stormwater Enterprise Fund, presumably because the system proved the most cost-effective to meet the federal requirements. The ordinance provides that any person who owns a parcel of land within the city that uses the city’s storm water system must pay a user fee to support the cost of the storm water utility. The money from these user fees proceeds directly into the Stormwater Enterprise Fund, which the city uses to fund fifty percent of the cso separated sewer costs. A different fund, the Sewage Enterprise Fund, supplies the revenue for the remaining fifty percent.

 Although unclear, the parties state that, under proposed epa guidelines, once the city of Lansing implements the separated storm water/sewer system, it will result in a storm water system that serves more than 100,000 people and the city must request and obtain a specific storm water permit from the deq. See 40 CFR, parts 122 and 123.

 In implementing its powers under this act, the city of Lansing adopted the Lansing City Charter of 1978, which provides:
The City has the comprehensive home rule power conferred upon it by the Michigan Constitution, subject only to the limitations on the exercise of that power contained in the Constitution or this Charter or imposed by statute. The City also has all other powers which a city may possess under the Constitution and the laws of this state. [Lansing City Charter, § 1-201.]

 The City shall take such action, and adopt such ordinances, as shall be necessary to provide for the public peace and health and *173for the safety of persons and property within the City. [Lansing City Charter, § 3-310.]

 Section 7-401 of the Lansing City Charter provides:
The Ci1y Council shall have the power to make public improvements within the City and, as to public improvements which are of such a nature as to benefit especially any property or properties within a district, the Council shall have the power to determine, by resolution, that the whole or any part of the expense of any public improvement shall be defrayed by special assessment upon the property in districts especially benefitted, in proportion to the benefits derived or to be derived.

 Section 8-301 of the Lansing City Charter provides:
The City shall have all the powers granted by law to own, operate, improve, enlarge, extend, repair, and maintain public utilities . . . including, but not by way of limitation, public utilities for supplying water and water treatment, sewage disposal and treatment, electric light and power, gas, steam, heat, public transportation, or any similar service to the municipality and the inhabitants thereof ....

 The Court of Appeals has reached similar results. In Gorney v Madison Heights, 211 Mich App 265, 268; 535 NW2d 263 (1995), the Court of Appeals stated that “in order for a fee to be deemed a tax, there must be no reasonable relationship between the fee and the expense of the service provided. . . . However, where revenue generated by a regulatory ‘fee’ exceeds the cost of regulation, the ‘fee’ is actually a tax in disguise.” Citing Dukesherer Farms, Inc v Director, Dep't of Agriculture, 405 Mich 1; 273 NW2d 877 (1979). 211 Mich App 269. See also Saginaw Co v John Sexton Corp, 232 Mich App 202; 591 NW2d 52 (1998).

 In his brief, plaintiff Bolt states that he “readily concedes that the revenues derived from the Rain Tax do not flow into the City’s General Fund, but are segregated cosmetically in a fund designed to finance the stormwater share of the cso Control Program and the costs (in the future) of complying with the requirements of a stormwater npdes permit.”

 This litigation began because the city’s sewage system could not handle the combined overflow of storm water and sewage flowing through the same pipes. After a heavy rainfall, the sewage system would overflow, often into landowners’ basements. The cso program, according to the city, was implemented partly to resolve this problem.

 The Headlee Blue Ribbon Report implies that “[p]ayment of a tax is compulsory by law; whereas payments of user fees are only compulsory for those who use the service . . . .” Id., § 5, p 29. The majority seemingly gleans support from this report, even though it is not binding precedent. Notably, this section of the report spawned a minority report, which acknowledged that “a certain amount of ‘tightening’ is appropriate to insure that the fees collected are used only to support the services provided,” but still requested that the report recognize traditional user fees, such as recycling and emergency telephone fees. Id., § 5, p 42. The minority report “recommendjed] that the legislature define, in statute, ‘tax,’ ‘special assessment,’ and ‘user fee,’ but to do so in such a way that each of them may continue to be used where it is appropriate to do so to fund appropriate services and programs.” Id., § 5, p 43.

 In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit stated:
The storm water which constitutes the runoff from wcrc’s roads may have come from God or nature in the first place, just as all water entering the dwsd’s sewer system must have at one time or another. Nevertheless, the refuse or foreign matter that water accumulates as it courses through wcrc’s roads must now be subjected by law to primary and secondary treatment to the extent such runoff enters Detroit’s sewage treatment system. And to that extent, at least, wcrc is a user of the facility provided by dwsd. Any effort somehow to rely upon a different definition of “user” is *182essentially a matter of semantics more than of substance, given the state statutory scheme. [Id. at 1421.]

 See Sarasota Co v Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc, 667 So 2d 180, 186 (Fla, 1996) (“Although we do not find that the previous funding of stormwater services through taxation was inappropriate, we do find that the stormwater funding through the special assessment at issue complies with the dictates of chapter 403 and is a more appropriate funding mechanism under the intent of that statute”); Vernor, supra at 163-164 (finding the license fee for motor vehicles, which was previously classified as a user fee, to be a tax under the amended statute). See also Detroit, supra, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit approvingly quoted the following:
The rule of the above cited cases is that the original construction of a sewerage system does not bind the city to forever maintain it from general taxation, nor may it be implied that a citizen may forever use the sewerage system without charge, and that a charge may therefore be made for the use of the sewerage facility, “a benefit distinct from that originally conferred by building it.” The respondent city by heretofore maintaining its sewerage system through taxation did not impliedly or otherwise bind itself never to charge for its use. Such sewerage charges are but charges for a service rendered. . . . The 1951 Act . . . makes it the mandatory duty of a city which issues such revenue bonds “to fix and maintain rates and make and collect charges for the use and services of the (sewerage) system,” etc. and it is of no consequence whatever that *184the city had theretofore exacted no service charge for the use of such system. This contention is without merit and must be denied. [Id. at 1416-1417, citing Maryville v Cushman, 363 Mo 87; 249 SW2d 347 (1962).]

 Additional authority supporting the proposition that the storm water system in this case represents a true regulatory fee includes: Long Run Baptist Ass’n, Inc v Louisville & Jefferson Co Metropolitan Sewer Dist, 775 SW2d 520, 523 (Ky App, 1989) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that the storm water system was an “indirect” benefit to citizens and thus a tax); Smith Chapel Baptist Church v Durham, 348 NC 632, 636; 502 SE2d 364 (1998) (holding that the user fées, established by statute, were not based on the service to landowners, and the statute in question did not require proof of a benefit to the landowners); Roseburg School Dist v City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 380-381; 851 P2d 595 (1993) (finding that the storm water system did not impose a “tax” under the Oregon Constitution because the fee was not imposed against a specific property owner, but rather on the user of the water service); Twietmeyer v City of Hampton, 255 Va 387, 392; 497 SE2d 858 (1998) (holding that the city of Hampton’s storm water management fees system was not meant “to raise general revenue” and thus the ordinance requiring payment of storm water fees was a legitimate “regulation” rather than a “tax” on residents); Teter v Clark Co, 104 Wash 2d 227, 239; 704 P2d 1171 (1985) (holding the storm water control plan to be “tools of regulation” rather than a tax).

 Notably, even the Headlee Blue Ribbon Commission Report, which the majority mentions to support its claim that “voluntariness” is a factor in this equation, classified sewage treatment as a user fee:
A “fee for service” or “user fee” is a payment made for the voluntary receipt of a measured service, in which the revenue from the fees are used only for the service provided. Examples include municipal sewer charges .... [Report, supra, § 5, p 30.]
I would contend that sewage and storm water runoff are closely aligned and do not lose their characteristics by being separated.