Court Opinion

ID: 9894719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:10:46.948458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:25.260924
License: Public Domain

J-S31023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 THOMAS M. BUSH                          :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1019 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
            Criminal Division at No.: CP-09-CR-0000171-2013

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2023

     Appellant Thomas M. Bush pro se appeals from the March 21, 2023 order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Buck County (“PCRA court”), which dismissed

as untimely his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

     The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed.          As

recounted by the PCRA court:

     On August 20, 2012, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Officer
     Katherine Deppenschmidt of the Bensalem Township Police
     Department received a call from a trailer unit within the Top of the
     Ridge complex in Bensalem Township.           The call reported a
     burglary to the residence of Linda Phillips, Unit D1. When Officer
     Deppenschmidt arrived at the scene of the burglary, she noticed
     damage to the front doorframe of the residence. She also
     observed markings on the door and debris on the ground in the
     vicinity of the front door, consistent with someone having pried it
     open.
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     Upon entering the residence, Officer Deppenschmidt observed a
     pair of red-handled clippers that were lying on the porch close to
     the front door. Officer Deppenschmidt swabbed the clippers for
     DNA evidence, as well as the door handle to the front door. While
     at the residence, Linda Phillips informed Officer Deppenschmidt
     that there was a Maverick cigarette butt in her bathroom sink
     which did not belong to anyone in her household. The Maverick
     cigarette butt was secured and submitted for DNA testing.

     Detective John Monaghan of the Bensalem Township Police
     Department arrived at the scene soon after Officer
     Deppenschmidt. When Detective Monaghan first arrived, he
     spoke with Officer Deppenschmidt and noticed that the front door
     of the residence had been damaged and appeared to be forced
     open. Upon entering the residence, Detective Monaghan noticed
     that many of the drawers of the bedroom were open. Linda
     Phillips, the owner of the residence, stated to police that when she
     arrived home on the night of August 20th, 2012, her front door
     was ajar and the back door was wide open. It appeared that her
     belongings had been ransacked, and that her jewelry box and a
     32-inch flat screen television were missing. Linda Phillip’s niece,
     Tawny Phillips, who had been living at the residence, stated to
     police that her jewelry box, Nook, two laptops, and Desktop were
     also missing from the residence.

     Officer Deppenschmidt and the other police officers on the scene
     talked to a juvenile witness, who advised police that he was
     walking around the area of the residence several hours prior and
     observed the Appellant at the front door with a crow bar. Based
     on that information, Detective Monaghan went to the residence
     where Appellant was staying in the same Complex. While en route
     to find Appellant, Detective Monaghan found a pack of Maverick
     cigarettes on the floor of a parked car, situated in front of the
     residence that Appellant was reported to have been staying.

     Detective Monaghan and Detective Jackson, another Detective
     from Bensalem Township Police Department, met with the
     Appellant at a residence in the Top of the Ridge Complex. The
     residence was a little over one hundred yards away from the site
     of the burglary. Appellant voluntarily gave Detective Jackson and
     Detective Monaghan a swab of his DNA. The DNA tests of the wire
     clippers and the cigarette butt revealed a consistent match with
     Appellant.

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     During the ongoing investigation of the burglary, Detective
     Jackson was contacted by Kimberly Shupe, an acquaintance of
     Appellant’s girlfriend, Kimberlee Martin.      Ms. Shupe advised
     Detective Jackson that she was in possession of a computer that
     she received from Kimberlee Martin. Kimberlee Martin had asked
     Ms. Shupe to wipe the computer clean. Detective Jackson went
     to Ms. Shupe’s residence, took possession of the computer, and
     brought it to the police station. Tawny Phillips came to the police
     station and identified the computer as the one that had been
     stolen.

     On August 7, 2013, [following a jury trial before the trial court],
     Appellant was found guilty on count one (1) - burglary, count
     three (3) - criminal trespass, count five (5) - theft by unlawful
     taking, count seven (7) - receiving stolen property, and count
     eight (8) - conspiracy to commit receiving stolen property.
     Appellant was found not guilty of criminal mischief, conspiracy to
     criminal mischief, conspiracy to burglary, conspiracy to criminal
     trespass, and conspiracy to theft by unlawful taking.

     On December 17, 2013, th[e trial c]ourt sentenced Appellant to
     ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for burglary; five (5)
     to ten (10) years’ imprisonment for criminal trespass; one and a
     half (1½) to five (5) years’ imprisonment for theft by unlawful
     taking; and three and a half (3½) to seven (7) years’
     imprisonment for conspiracy to receive stolen property. These
     sentences were ordered to run consecutively to one another and,
     in the aggregate, Appellant’s term of incarceration totaled twenty
     (20) to forty-two (42) years. On December 24, 2013, Appellant
     filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which
     affirmed th[e trial court]’s judgment of sentence on April 1, 2015.

     On May 6, 2015, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. Following
     a hearing, the Commonwealth and Appellant agreed to relief in
     the form of resentencing as the parties agreed that the theft count
     merged with the burglary count and that as the jury made no
     finding as to the value of the items sold, that the receiving stolen
     property count should be graded as a misdemeanor of the third
     degree.     Therefore, on January 18, 2017, Appellant was
     resentenced to ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for
     burglary; five (5) to ten (10) years’ imprisonment for criminal
     trespass; and twelve (12) months’ probation for receiving stolen
     property. The sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run
     consecutively to one another but concurrently with the sentence

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     of probation. Therefore, in the aggregate, th[e trial c]ourt
     resentenced Appellant to fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years’
     imprisonment.

     On January 24, 2017, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration
     of sentence, which th[e] court denied, on January 27, 2017.
     Appellant filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court of
     Pennsylvania challenging the discretionary aspects of the
     sentence imposed and the Superior Court denied those claims on
     February 9, 2018. Appellant’s request for allowance of appeal to
     the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was denied on January 2,
     2019.

     On March 11, 2019, Appellant filed his second PCRA Petition
     challenging the legality of his sentence and alleging ineffective
     assistance of counsel for failing to raise same. Specifically,
     Appellant alleged the counts of burglary and criminal trespass
     merged for sentencing purposes. Th[e] [c]ourt appointed counsel
     and on May 22, 2019, counsel filed as “no merit” letter pursuant
     to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and
     Commonwealth v. Finley, 479 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. 1984) and
     a request to withdraw his representation. On June 21, 2019, th[e]
     [c]ourt formally dismissed Appellant’s second PCRA petition. On
     July 11, 2019, Appellant filed notice of appeal to the Superior
     Court. However, that appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court
     on September 16, 2019 for Appellant’s failure to comply with
     Pa.R.A.P. § 3517.

     On January 31, 2023, over three years after his prior appeal was
     dismissed, Appellant filed a “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence”
     [(“Motion”)] with th[e] [c]ourt. This motion alleged the same
     errors outlined in Appellant’s second PCRA petition: th[e] [c]ourt
     erred in imposing sentence because the burglary and criminal
     trespass counts merge and counsel is ineffective for failing to raise
     same. The court construed this Motion as a third PCRA petition
     and formally dismissed it on March 21, 2023. On April 17, 2023,
     Appellant [pro se] filed notice of appeal to the Superior Court.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/17/23, at 1-4 (unnecessary capitalizations and internal

record citations omitted). Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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       On appeal,1 Appellant presents a single issue for our review.

       [I.] Did the resentencing court abuse its discretion, erred when it
       imposed on Appellant an unlawful, impermissible and illegal
       sentence of consecutive cumulative separate sentences for
       burglary and criminal trespass to each other that should have
       merged for sentencing purposes, in violation of 42 Pa. C.S.A.
       §9765; double jeopardy, due process and equal protection under
       both the Pa. and U.S. Constitutions.

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted) (sic).

       Preliminarily, we agree with the PCRA court’s determination that the

Motion should have been treated as one falling under the PCRA. Indeed, the

plain language of the PCRA provides that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole

means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law

and statutory remedies for the same purpose.”             42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.

Cognizant of the stated purpose of the PCRA, we have held that any petition

filed after an appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final must be treated

as a PCRA petition where the PCRA provides for a potential remedy.           See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“all motions

filed after a judgment of sentence is final are to be construed as PCRA

petitions”) (citation omitted).       Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in

treating the Motion as a PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

1 “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s

determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).

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       Having established that the Motion properly was treated as a PCRA

petition, we now must determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to

entertain it. A court cannot consider a PCRA petition unless the petitioner has

first satisfied the applicable filing deadline. The PCRA contains the following

restrictions governing the timeliness of any PCRA petition.

       (b) Time for filing petition.--

       (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
       subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
       judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
       petitioner proves that:

       (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
       interference by government officials with the presentation of the
       claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
       or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

       (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
       the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
       of due diligence; or

       (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
       by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
       of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
       has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

       (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1)
       shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been
       presented.[2]

       (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at
       the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
       the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court

____________________________________________

2 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended, effective December 24, 2018, to extend

the time for filing from sixty days of the date the claim could have been
presented to one year. The amendment applies only to claims arising on or
after December 24, 2017

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      of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
      review.

42   Pa.C.S.A.    §   9545(b).   Section    9545’s   timeliness   provisions   are

jurisdictional.   Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).

Additionally, we have emphasized repeatedly that “the PCRA confers no

authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA

time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.”

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa. 2003) (citations

omitted).

      Here, as stated above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final

on April 2, 2019—90 days following our Supreme Court’s denial of his petition

for allowance of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a);

U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Thus, because Appellant had one year from April 2, 2019,

to file a timely PCRA petition, the Motion is facially untimely given it was filed

on January 31, 2023, nearly three years later.

      The one-year time limitation, however, can be overcome if a petitioner

alleges and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d

714, 719 (Pa. 2008). Here, Appellant has failed to allege, let alone prove, at

any stage of the proceeding any exceptions to the one-year time bar. The

Motion, treated properly as a PCRA petition, was untimely. Accordingly, the

PCRA court did not err in denying the Motion.

      Order affirmed.

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Date: 11/2/2023

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