Court Opinion

ID: 1011201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 20:23:45.750752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:01.063745
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

      v.                                                 No. 02-5001

JUDITH BARFIELD CARTER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
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            Appeal from the United States District Court
      for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
              Graham C. Mullen, Chief District Judge.
                       (CR-01-141-3-MU)

                      Submitted: July 24, 2003

                       Decided: July 31, 2003

           Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
                  HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

____________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

____________________________________________________________
                             COUNSEL

Anthony G. Scheer, RAWLS, DICKINSON & SCHEER, P.A., Char-
lotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United
States Attorney, Jack M. Knight, Jr., Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

____________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

____________________________________________________________
                               OPINION

PER CURIAM:

   Judith Barfield Carter appeals the district court's order sentencing
her to fifty-four months imprisonment for uttering forged securities in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2000). Having reviewed Barfield's
claims, we affirm.

    Barfield first claims that the district court erred in departing
upward from the applicable sentencing guidelines range. Our review
of the record discloses that the upward departure was justified on sev-
eral grounds. Barfield's criminal activity resulted in "reasonably fore-
seeable, substantial non-monetary harm" to her former employer. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1, comment. (n.11(a)) (2000). It
also facilitated the continued distribution of cocaine to Barfield's son.
See USSG § 2F1.1, comment. (n.11(b)). Accordingly, we find that the
district court did not err in upwardly departing from the applicable
sentencing guideline range.*

    Barfield also claims that the district court erred by failing to notify
her of each potential ground warranting an upward departure. Because
this claim was not raised below, we review for plain error. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). Barfield was notified
of the possibility of an upward departure both by the presentence
investigation report and by the district court when it declined to
accept the plea agreement. Furthermore, our review of the record does
____________________________________________________________
    *We note that, while Carter's appeal was pending, Congress enacted
legislation changing the standard of review applicable to departure deci-
sions under the sentencing guidelines. See Prosecutorial Remedies and
Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(d), 117 Stat. 650, 670. We
need not decide whether the provisions of the PROTECT Act apply to
Carter's case because we would affirm under the new standard of review
or the more deferential standard applicable before the Act.

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not disclose any evidence that the district court's consideration of sev-
eral factors to support an upward departure amounted to error, much
less error that "`seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public rep-
utation of judicial proceedings.'" Id. at 736 (quoting United States v.
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). Accordingly, we deny this
claim.

   We affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

                                                              AFFIRMED

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