Court Opinion

ID: 9549111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:13:30.592368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:52.192141
License: Public Domain

*330Stafford, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I do not attempt to pass judgment on the subject of homosexuality per se or on the overtones of societal opinion concerning morality or immorality. These issues are not before this court. Rather, the question is whether the trial court, in the context of the facts herein, abused its discretion by giving primary consideration to homosexuality in its ultimate disposition of the case.
In its desire to avoid actually coming to grips with specific application of the correct law, the majority has resorted to a rather transparent discussion of "abuse of discretion." By concluding that the record provides an insufficient basis from which to evaluate the trial court's exercise of discretion, the majority has given judicial con-donation to the personal feelings of the trial judge.
Even a broad grant of discretion does not excuse a trial court's failure to consider relevant issues within the established statutory framework. In making the father's homosexuality its primary consideration, the trial court lost sight of the duties owed both to the child and to his father. While I agree with the majority that a parent's sexual preference, standing alone, cannot be used to restrict visitation rights, I cannot agree with the majority's disposition of the visitation issue. I therefore must dissent.
The majority correctly notes the broad discretion granted to trial courts in domestic relations cases. Andersen v. Andersen, 75 Wn.2d 779, 782-83, 453 P.2d 856 (1969). Indeed we have consistently deferred to trial courts in such cases except where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wn.2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971). Where there is such abuse, however, this court has a duty to reverse the trial court. Munoz v. Munoz, supra; Norman v. Norman, 27 Wn.2d 25, 27, 176 P.2d 349 (1947). See also Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wn. App. 425, 575 P.2d 1092 (1978).
Under the domestic relations law of this State, the best interests of the child must be the paramount concern of the court. In re Becker, 87 Wn.2d 470, 477-78, 553 P.2d 1339 *331(1976). As important as this consideration is, however, it must nevertheless be balanced against a parent's fundamental right to be a parent. This right is of constitutional magnitude and cannot be restricted without a rational reason for doing so. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). Further, our State Legislature recognized the necessity of balancing the rights of the parent with the best interests of the child by providing:
The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child but the court shall not restrict a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger the child's physical, mental, or emotional health.
(Italics mine.) RCW 26.09.240.
This statute requires that a court make a finding of specific harm to the child before restricting a parent's visitation rights. The majority suggests that as long as Mr. Cabalquinto had the alternative of visiting his son in Seattle, his visitation rights were not unreasonable. I cannot agree. In totally prohibiting Michael from visiting his father in California, the trial court clearly restricted Mr. Cabalquinto's visitation rights. Moreover, this restriction was imposed without the requisite concurrent finding of harm to the child.
If the course of action chosen by a particular court is based on unreasonable or erroneous grounds, the court has abused its discretion. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). We cannot avoid overturning a decision such as this in which the trial judge clearly allowed his personal feelings to dictate the result. A decision which is based on untenable or erroneous grounds rather than upon objectivity and impartiality must, by definition, be the product of manifest abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances of this case, I would find that not only was the basis for the trial court's decision inherently unreasonable, but its chosen course of action clearly was unsupported by the evidence or the law.
*332An examination of the record below leaves no doubt the trial judge allowed his declared views on homosexuality to color his evaluation of the evidence. In finding of fact 6, the trial court states in part:
Therefore, because the father is living in a homosexual relationship in California and because he has reasonable rights of visitation here, the court finds it is not necessary to direct that the child be removed from the jurisdiction and be placed in the father's home in California in order to fulfill the visitation.
The majority correctly holds that homosexuality is not in and of itself a bar to either custody or reasonable visitation rights. Majority opinion, at 329. See also Schuster v. Schu-ster, 90 Wn.2d 626, 585 P.2d 130 (1978). The majority nevertheless holds that because it is unable to determine the basis for the trial court's ruling, it is thus unable to determine whether the ruling is an abuse of discretion. Majority opinion, at 329. I might agree if the trial court had not clearly declared that Mr. Cabalquinto's avowed homosexuality was a deciding factor. Unlike the majority, I do not choose to sweep this difficult problem under the rug. I am willing to accept the trial court's findings of fact and oral opinion at face value and therefore have no problem finding an abuse of discretion.
In its oral opinion, the trial court repeatedly commented on the immorality of homosexuality while at the same time acknowledging that "everything about" Mr. Cabalquinto had made a favorable impression. The trial court stated:
The father frankly states he wants his boy to choose the kind of life he wants to live. Well, in my view a child should be led in the way of heterosexual preference, not be tolerant of this thing. God Almighty made the two sexes not only to enjoy, but to perpetuate the human race. And after all, that is the most valuable aspect of sexual behavior, perpetuating the human race.
I certainly can't find that the boy's best interest would be served by being subjected to this tolerant attitude, in view of the fact that I do think also that the rights of the father have to be considered, and he can in all reason *333come to know this boy, enjoy his company, free from this environment which could be harmful to him.
The court's comments on homosexuality must be juxtaposed against the trial court's findings which clearly favor the proposed visitation. As noted above, the trial court failed to make any finding indicating that a visit to Mr. Cabalquinto's home in California' would in any way be harmful to the child. To the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence clearly shows Mr. Cabalquinto is a loving father with a stable home environment. A psychologist specializing in gender identification testified that a child's sexual preference is developed early in life and that a child of Michael's age would not be influenced by his father's homosexuality provided the father did not flaunt his sexuality. The trial court accepted this testimony as well as that of the social worker who, after investigating both Mr. Cabalquinto and his partner, recommended that Michael be allowed to visit in California. Mr. Cabalquinto emphasized his belief that a display of affection should be left behind closed doors and promised not to be indiscreet in his conduct. Finally, the trial court disagreed with the former Mrs. Cabalquinto and found that Michael was old enough to spend 2 weeks with his father 1,000 miles away from his home in Seattle.
Despite the overwhelming evidence supporting the proposed visitation, however, the trial court nevertheless found that a visit to the father's home was not in the child's best interests. This conclusion is unsupportable absent the trial court's finding of some specific harm to the child. The trial court found only that the child might be harmed by exposure to a homosexual environment, which standing alone does not comply with the law concerning homosexual parents. The trial court's decision restricts the liberal visitation rights granted in the original Colorado decree with virtually no evidence in the record to support the restriction. The State may not restrict a parent's reasonable visitation rights merely because that parent's lifestyle is not within the societal mainstream. Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. *334563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
Under the circumstances of this case, I cannot agree with the majority that the record provides an insufficient basis from which to determine an abuse of discretion. The trial court misconstrued the law and improperly relied on that misconception in denying the requested visitation. In the absence of evidence or findings suggesting any particular harm to the child, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion. Further, nothing would be gained by the wholly undirected remand employed by the majority. This is particularly true if the case is to be remanded to the trial judge who clearly relied on his own personal views to arrive at incorrect reasons for the ultimate ruling. I would specifically direct that the cause be reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with the law of this State as expressed herein.
Williams, C.J., Brachtenbach, J., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tem., concur with Stafford, J.