Court Opinion

ID: 9963733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 05:06:11.746171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:58.603111
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   April 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 365667
                                                                   Ingham Circuit Court
MARQUAVIAN JAVON BURTON,                                           LC No. 21-000975-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), and
domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2). The trial court departed from the minimum sentencing
guidelines range of 36 to 71 months and imposed a sentence of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for
second-degree home invasion, and it imposed a concurrent jail sentence of 93 days for domestic
violence. Defendant appeals by leave granted,1 challenging the trial court’s upward departure
sentence. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
the trial court to further articulate its justifications for the departure sentence imposed or to
resentence defendant.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The victim in this case was defendant’s ex-girlfriend, whom defendant began dating in
January 2021. Defendant became increasingly jealous as the relationship progressed, and the
victim alleged that defendant was physically violent toward her on two separate occasions, one of
which resulted in multiple facial fractures. The victim ended the relationship and told defendant

1
 People v Burton, unpublished amended order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 8, 2023
(Docket No. 365667).

                                               -1-
to leave her home in early November 2021, which he did. Defendant continued to regularly contact
the victim in an attempt to maintain their relationship, but the victim repeatedly declined.

        On November 27, 2021, defendant sent the victim a message stating that he wanted to give
her gifts. The victim responded that she did not want to see or speak with defendant, and she told
him to leave the items on her porch. Defendant then messaged the victim from an unknown
number asking if she had received the gifts. Believing that defendant had left, the victim opened
the front door and discovered defendant standing on her porch. The victim attempted to shut the
door, but defendant pushed his way into her home. Defendant demanded to see the victim’s cell
phone, and he raised his fist at her several times and threatened that he would “beat the f*** out
of her” if she did not comply. The victim handed her phone to defendant, who then began looking
through it. The victim believed that she could escape the home if she first distracted defendant
with sex, but, after having sex, defendant continued to look through the victim’s phone. Defendant
discovered that the victim had been talking to other men and became angry, so he pinned the victim
down on the bed, yelled at her, and refused to let her leave. After several hours had passed,
defendant released the victim, returned her phone, and left.

        Defendant pleaded no contest to second-degree home invasion and domestic violence.
Defendant’s plea was part of a Killebrew2 agreement, which encompassed three separate cases and
included a recommendation for a minimum sentence of 36 to 53½ months, which was at the bottom
half of the 36-to-71-month sentencing guidelines range.3 The trial court rejected defendant’s
Killebrew agreement, departed from the recommended guidelines range, and sentenced defendant
to serve 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by departing from the advisory
guidelines range of 36 to 71 months and imposing a minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered his plea agreement and
conduct associated with the separate cases that were part of the agreement, improperly relied on
factors that were given adequate weight by the guidelines, and failed to adequately justify the
extent of the departure. We conclude that the trial court properly considered the plea agreement
and defendant’s conduct associated with separate cases; however, the trial court did not sufficiently
articulate its justifications for the departure, and remand is appropriate.

       “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an
appellate court for reasonableness.” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502
(2015). “[T]he relevant question for appellate courts reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is
whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality.” People
v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 490, 520; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (quotation marks, citation, and

2
    People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 206-210; 330 NW2d 834 (1982).
3
 In exchange for the prosecution’s dismissal of several charges in his three active lower-court
cases, including this case, defendant pleaded no contest in the other two cases to various other
charges, none of which are at issue on appeal.

                                                -2-
ellipsis omitted). “Resentencing will be required when a sentence is determined to be
unreasonable.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392.

         Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory, but they
“remain a highly relevant consideration” during sentencing, and sentencing courts must continue
to consult them. Id. Courts may exercise their discretion and depart from the applicable guidelines
range, but the departure must be reasonable. Id. at 391-392. “[A] sentence is reasonable under
Lockridge if it adheres to the principle of proportionality set forth in Milbourn.[4]” People v
Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351; 901 NW2d 142 (2017). “[T]he principle of proportionality . . .
requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the
circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453,
460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When applying this principle,
the trial court may consider several factors including, but not limited to:

         (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
         the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
         relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct
         while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s
         potential for rehabilitation. [Walden, 319 Mich App at 352-353 (quotation marks
         and citation omitted).]

When departing from the advisory guidelines range, “a trial court must justify the sentence
imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, which includes an explanation of why the sentence
imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have
been.” Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525 (quotation marks and citations omitted). A trial court’s
decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines should not be based on factors that are
“contemplated by at least one offense variable” (OV) if the trial court offers no reasoning as to
why the scoring of that OV was “insufficient to reflect the nature of” the case’s circumstances. Id.
at 526-527.

      In this case, the trial court stated the following reasons for departing from the applicable
minimum sentencing guidelines range:

                 So this case is not about your prior offense, but it does indicate such an
         escalation. The prior offense was [third-degree criminal sexual assault (CSC-III)]
         is what you pled to. . . .

                 Now what we have is breaking into your former girlfriend’s house,
         threatening her with a knife, raising your fists on multiple occasions, continuing to
         search her phone, and you didn’t do it once, but you did it twice. You stated you
         would kill her. You attempted to have sexual intercourse by telling her to roll over
         and lay face down, but she refused, and she was scared because of the knife. You
         have multiple times of threatening her with a knife. Medical records verify she

4
    People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).

                                                 -3-
       suffered a fractured right maxillary sinus, right mandibular fracture, and a right
       zygomatic arch fracture.[5]

               As to the 14-year-old, you asked her to perform sexual acts. . . .[6]

               This presentence investigation report [(PSIR)] indicates an escalation, no
       real acknowledgement of responsibility, more like an I’m sorry I’m wasting time
       because, like, you know, I have problems and so what I did should be okay with
       just a sorry. It doesn’t really matter because I’m going to do it again because I
       don’t really think I was wrong. That’s how I read what you’ve said, sir. . . .

                                              * * *

              I have to consider if the sentence is proportional to the acts. I also have to
       consider your rehabilitation, and it appears there has been none.

               Protection of society, I think when you walk out of prison you’re going to
       do the same thing again. I have seen no healing. I have seen an escalation.

              Punishment of offender, 52 months, I’m sorry, that is not enough. That
       sends no message. It doesn’t give you the time in prison to heal and go through
       whatever treatment they have.

               And deterrence of others, I also don’t think that this deters anyone at all.

               So, no, I am not honoring your agreement. I can’t. There are a number of
       things that the prosecutor, not you—you do an excellent job—but [the county
       prosecutor] really needs to think about the charges and the consequences in our
       community, and she doesn’t do any of that. I don’t even know if she shows up at
       the office. I don’t know what she’s doing. She has fallen asleep at the wheel, and
       she has allowed the assistant prosecuting attorneys in this town, in this
       community, . . . to carry her unfortunate decisions before this Court.

               I am not going to allow it. What I see here may be a good plea deal for all
       of you, but it is not a good plea deal for the victims. It is not a good plea deal for
       the community.

                                              * * *

5
 The referenced facts relate to defendant’s separate first-degree home invasion and domestic
violence charges arising from Lower Court Case No. 21-000974-FH. This case was included in
defendant’s plea agreement, but it is not at issue on appeal.
6
 The referenced facts relate to defendant’s separate charge of accosting a child for immoral
purposes arising from Lower Court Case No. 21-000169-FH. This case was included in
defendant’s plea agreement, but it is not at issue on appeal.

                                                -4-
               So I’m going to give a sentence. You all know what you can do with it. He
       can withdraw his plea. He can accept it. He can appeal me. But when I look at the
       escalation here, the lack of remorse, the lack of consideration for others, the power
       and control, the threatening lives with a knife, the breaking in not once but twice
       very shortly—well, I, actually, he was on parole. Couldn’t even flop him back
       because he did all his time. And he gets this deal on top of another deal? That is
       the wrong message in this community. That is the wrong message to these victims.
       Well, I’m not buying it.

                                               * * *

       [Defendant] is getting 120 to 180 months. That’s 10 to 15. That’s what is deserved
       here. He already got his deal by not having a home invasion-first, by dismissing
       the habituals, by not issuing on the habituals, by not noticing the escalation here,
       the threats, the sheer mayhem he caused in women’s lives who had said no
       repeatedly, not once not twice, but repeatedly.

                                               * * *

               All right. I just find this sentence that I am imposing today is proportional
       to the escalation, to the violence on these current victims in this file, to what I have
       read, to the circumstances, to the threats, and the fact that he’s just not getting it.
       He got his deal on the plea. I’m not doing anything further.

       We first note that defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly considered his plea
agreement and conduct associated with separate cases included in the agreement is without merit.
“[A] sentencing court may consider the nature of a plea bargain and the charges that were
dismissed in exchange for the plea for which the court is sentencing,” People v Coulter (After
Remand), 205 Mich App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994), and “conduct beyond the sentencing
offense can be considered for purposes of departing from the guidelines,” People v McGraw, 484
Mich 120, 130 n 30; 771 NW2d 655 (2009). The trial court was therefore permitted to consider
both defendant’s plea deal and conduct beyond the sentencing offense when it departed from the
guidelines, and it did not abuse its discretion by doing so. See id.; Coulter, 205 Mich App at 456.

         With regard to the identified factors in support of the departure, the trial court identified
several appropriate factors. The trial court referred to an “escalation” in defendant’s criminal
behavior and “no real acknowledgment of responsibility,” as exhibited by defendant’s continued
criminal behavior, despite being on probation. Indeed, the prosecution noted at sentencing that
defendant had violated his parole 23 times and “was sent back to prison three times.” Given
defendant’s continued criminal behavior and repeated probation violations, the trial court
concluded that defendant had shown little to no potential for rehabilitation and that it would not
be protecting society if it did not impose a departure sentence. The trial court also determined that
defendant’s plea agreement was inadequate to punish and deter criminal behavior, noting
defendant’s “lack of remorse,” “lack of consideration for others,” apparent need for “power and
control,” two recent home invasions within a brief period of time, and threatening behavior using
his fists and weapons. A defendant’s “prior criminal history,” “recidivist history,” and “conduct
while on probation” may be considered by the trial court at sentencing and may constitute an

                                                 -5-
appropriate justification for departing from the applicable guidelines range. People v Hendrick,
472 Mich 555, 564 n 10, 565; 697 NW2d 511 (2005). Furthermore, “substantive findings
regarding reformation or rehabilitation, society’s protection, punishment, and deterrence” are
appropriate considerations supporting a departure sentence. People v Masroor, 313 Mich App
358, 392; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by Steanhouse, 500
Mich 453.

         The trial court also identified several additional factors that were contemplated by the
guidelines, but it did not explain why the guidelines did not adequately account for those factors.
See Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App at 525. The trial court justified the departure sentence, in part, on
defendant’s CSC-III conviction. Prior offense variable (PRV) 1 addresses “prior high severity
felony convictions.” MCL 777.51(1). A trial court must assess 25 points for PRV 1 if “[t]he
offender has 1 prior high severity felony conviction,” MCL 777.51(1)(c), and the trial court did so
in this case because of defendant’s CSC-III conviction. A defendant’s “prior criminal history” is
a factor that is “included in the scoring of the prior record variables and offense variables and,
thus, [is] insufficient to support an upward departure absent a finding by the trial court that the
[factor was] given inadequate weight when scored.” Hendrick, 472 Mich at 564 n 10. While the
court substantially discussed the details of defendant’s CSC-III conviction, it did not articulate
why PRV 1 did not adequately account for this prior felony conviction. See id.

        Furthermore, the trial court failed to articulate why OV 4 and OV 10 did not adequately
consider the victim’s psychological injury and defendant’s exploitation of his domestic
relationship with the victim. In this case, 10 points were assessed for OV 4, “psychological injury
to a victim,” MCL 777.34(1), because “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional
treatment occurred to a victim,” MCL 777.34(1)(a). Ten points were assessed for OV 10,
“exploitation of a vulnerable victim,” because “[t]he offender exploited a victim’s physical
disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused
his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). The trial court acknowledged defendant’s dating
relationship with the victim and his repeated harassment and attacks of her, but it failed to articulate
why the scores for OV 4 and OV 10 did not adequately account for the victim’s psychological
injury and defendant’s exploitation of his domestic relationship with the victim. See Dixon-Bey,
321 Mich App at 526-527.

        Moreover, despite providing some justifications for its departure, the trial court did not
adequately justify the extent of the particular departure in this case, which resulted in the
imposition of the maximum minimum sentence permissible under the established two-thirds rule.
See People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972); MCL 769.34(2)(b) (“The court
shall not impose a minimum sentence, including a departure, that exceeds 2/3 of the statutory
maximum sentence.”). In this case, the trial court failed to explain how its articulated reasons and
the circumstances of the offense and the offender rendered the maximum possible sentence more
proportional and reasonable than another sentence would have been. See Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich
App at 525. Indeed, beyond stating it believed that the departure was proportional to defendant
and the circumstances of the case, the trial court did not engage in any meaningful analysis of why
the departure sentence was more proportional than any other sentence would have been, and
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate rationale for the

                                                  -6-
extent of its departure sentence. See id.7 The trial court did not provide its own justifications for
the departure, and this Court may not “substitute its own judgment about why the departure was
justified.” People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 304; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). We therefore conclude
that remanding is necessary for the trial court to either resentence defendant or to further articulate
its justifications for the departure sentence imposed and to address the proportionality of the extent
of the particular departure sentence imposed. See Steanhouse, 504 Mich at 469.

        Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand for the trial court to resentence
defendant or further articulate its justifications for the departure sentence imposed. We retain
jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray

7
  Defendant also argues that his sentence was disproportionate and unreasonable. However, we
decline to address this issue because we conclude that the trial court failed to articulate sufficient
reasoning for imposing the departure sentence and remand the case to readdress sentencing.

                                                 -7-
                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                                Michael J. Kelly
 PEOPLE OF MI V MARQUAVIAN JAVON BURTON                                            Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     365667                                                          Kathleen Jansen

 LC No.         21-000975-FH                                                    Christopher M. Murray
                                                                                   Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

                 Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 35 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, we vacate defendant's sentence and remand for the trial court to further
articulate its justifications for the departure sentence imposed or to resentence defendant. The proceedings
on remand are limited to this issue.

               The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

                                                            /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                              Presiding Judge

                                 April 25, 2024