Court Opinion

ID: 9528585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:42:13.140627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:03.863139
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting.
For the purpose of this case, I will assume that the court’s decision on federal preemption is correct. I will assume also that the Covenant Not to Sue and Indemnity Agreement should be construed according to state law. However, I am unpersuaded that the covenant is ambiguous, and therefore dissent.
The covenant, signed by Otto Schmierer, Alan Jonsen and Ernest LeBlanc, provides:
I, for myself, my heirs, administrators, executors, and assignees, hereby covenant and agree that I will never institute ... any demand, claim, or suit against ... Aero Club members, participants, [or] users, ... for any loss, damage, or injury to my person or my property which may occur from any cause whatsoever as a result of my participation in the activities of the Aero Club.
The statute under which the personal representatives of the estates of each of the above signators are suing the estate of Aero Club member Michael W. Kissick, AS 09.55.580, provides for recovery of an amount exclusively for the benefit of the decedent’s spouse, children or other dependents, if there are any, or the decedent’s estate, if there are not. If there is a spouse, children or other dependents, the award should fairly “compensate for the injury resulting from the death” considering at least the following factors: “(1) deprivation of the expectation of pecuniary benefits to the beneficiary or beneficiaries ...; (2) loss of contributions for support; (3) loss of assistance or services ...; (4) loss of consortium; (5) loss of prospective training and education; (6) medical and funeral expenses.” As is clear from the statute and cases construing it, see, e.g., Tommy’s Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986), it is injury to beneficiaries for which compensation is being awarded, the compensation representing losses of various kinds reduced to dollars and cents.
In construing the covenant, the court declines to apply the “reasonable construction” rule articulated in Manson-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 659 (Alaska 1976), and similar cases. Op. n. 4.' However, reasonable construction is intended to resolve ambiguities (“unambiguous language ... as ‘reasonably construed’ ”). Here the court strictly construes “injury” to create an ambiguity, implicitly conceding that the language in the covenant, reasonably construed, is not ambiguous. Otherwise, Manson-Osberg adds nothing to the debate. Furthermore, “injury” is construed without reference to the language preceding and following it, and without reference to the statute under which the suit has been brought.
I am incredulous that the phrase “any loss, damage, or injury to my person or my property” can be construed, whether “reasonably” or “strictly,” to exclude death. This is particularly so in the context of AS 09.55.580. For this reason alone I do not agree that the covenant does not state a viable defense.
Even if the language in this covenant is ambiguous, it is to be strictly construed only against the party who prepared it. However, it must be remembered that Michael W. Kissick did not prepare the covenant at issue; the United States Air Force did. It is Michael W. Kissick’s estate, not the United States Air Force, that is seeking to enforce this covenant. Thus I question application of the strict construction rule at all. If the strict construction rule is inap*193plicable, the covenant should be upheld as stating a viable defense to the wrongful death actions.