Court Opinion

ID: 9491226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:07:29.081581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:35.725194
License: Public Domain

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Miller was stopped by a Randall County, Texas, Deputy Sheriff, consented to a search of his recreational vehicle, and was found to be transporting 80 kilograms of marijuana in' a secret compartment. The majority, interpreting the Texas Transportation Code, holds that the Deputy lacked probable cause to initiate the stop, concluding that the event he witnessed — driving for an extended distance in the right lane, including through an intersection, with the left turn signal flashing, but without ever turning or changing lanes — was not a violation of Texas law. Because the stop was based properly on a violation of Texas law, I respectfully dissent from Parts IIA and B of the opinion.
“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The Government, for its own reasons, supports the stop only on the ground that Texas law was violated. Hence, other possible supporting bases for such a violation, especially in the light of the avenues offered by Whren, await another day.
The Deputy testified at the suppression hearing that the violation Miller committed was that Miller “left his left-hand turn signal on for a period of time through an intersection, completely through the intersection, and for a distance without attempting to change lanes”. The Deputy testified further that, when initiating the stop, he relied upon §§ 545.104 and 547.305 (quoted in majority opinion) of the Texas Transportation Code.
According to § 545.104(a), Miller could only use an authorized turn signal to indicate either an intention to turn, or to change lanes, or to start from a parked position. *282See Tex. TRAns. Code § 545.104(a) (Vernon Supp.1997). Moreover, § 547.305(c) provides that Miller could not operate his vehicle with a flashing or alternating light, unless it was a turn signal lamp that was used as authorized by law. See Tex. TRANS. Code § 547.305(c) (Vernon Supp.1997).
Obviously, contrary to § 545.104(a), Miller was not using his turn signal as an indication of an intent to turn, or to change lanes, or to start from a parked position. Thus, his use of the turn signal was not authorized by law, and, accordingly, pursuant to § 547.305(c), constituted a violation of Texas law. In short, there was probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred; the stop was reasonable. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-10, 116 S.Ct. at 1772.
The majority would require the Texas legislature to expressly proscribe traveling with a turn signal on for an extended distance, including through an intersection, without ever turning or changing lanes, before such an act would be a violation of Texas law. By such reasoning, every conceivable unauthorized use of a turn signal must be expressly prohibited in the Code. Instead, the Texas legislature chose to state the limited, authorized uses of a turn signal. Consequently, the use of a turn signal in the manner used by Miller constituted an unauthorized use — a violation of Texas law.
Because I would hold that Miller’s stop was not unreasonable, I respectfully dissent from Parts IIA and B of the opinion.