Court Opinion

ID: 9585841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:04:21.941762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:15.483299
License: Public Domain

Legge, Justice
(concurring in result).
The authority of a municipality to enact a zoning ordinance restricting the use of privately owned property is founded not in eminent domain, but in the police power. Owen v. Smith, 216 S. C. 382, 58 S. E. (2d) 332. One is not entitled to compensation for the restriction of use, or for deprivation, of his property as the result of the proper exercise of the police power. 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, § 6, p. 784; Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 201 S. C. 523, 23 S. E. (2d) 735. But this power is not unlimited, and does not extend to the suppression or removal from a residence district of a lawful business already established there, in the absence of a factual showing that the continuance of such business would be detrimental to the *585public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 58 Am. Jur., Zoning, Section 148, page 1022; Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, 244 Ky. 362, 50 S. W. (2d) 960, 86 A. L. R. 648; Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14; Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 N. W. 86; State v. MacDuff, 1931, 161 Wash. 600, 297 P. 733; People v. Miller, 304 N. Y. 105, 106 N. E. (2d) 34; State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210, 86 A. L. R. 654. The contrary view expressed in Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, and in Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 5 Cir., 183 F. (2d) 410, cited in the Master’s report in the instant case, is not supported by the weight of authority.
The decision in Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald has been criticized as exhibiting “a confusion between the objects of zoning and nuisance regulation.” See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, supra. And in Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, supra, which involved the validity of a zoning law so far as it required the discontinuance of a filling station, there was a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Hutcheson, based upon the decision in Standard Oil Co. v. City of Bowling Green, supra, and the Florida cases of City of West Palm Beach v. Edward U. Roddy Corp., Fla., 43 So. (2d) 709, and City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., Fla., 45 So. (2d) 681.
“The power to declare an ordinance invalid because it is so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional rights is one which will be exercised carefully and cautiously, as it is not the function of the courts to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of municipal ordinances or regulations.” DeTreville v. Groover, 219 S. C. 313, 65 S. E. (2d) 232, 240. But where an ordinance is clearly violative of constitutional rights, it is our duty so to declare it, for in the final analysis the question of due process is a judicial, not legislative, one. City of Columbia *586v. Alexander, 125 S. C. 530, 119 S. E. 241, 32 A. L. R. 746; Fincher v. City of Union, 186 S. C. 232, 196 S. E. 1.
In the case before us we have nothing to uphold the ordinance in its application to appellant unless it be found in its entitlement as “An Ordinance To Promote The Health, Safety, Morals And The General Welfare,” etc., and the statement in Section 1 of Article XVIII that “in interpreting and applying the provisions of this ordinance, they shall be held to be the minimum requirements for the promotion of the public safety, health, convenience, comfort, morals, prosperity and general welfare.” If this be taken as a legislative declaration that appellant’s business is detrimental to the public safety, health, morals and general welfare, it is, as pointed out in the opinion of Chief Justice Baker, wholly without support in the evidence; on the contrary, it is thoroughly refuted by the facts as disclosed by the uncontradicted testimony. As applied to the particular locus the ordinance presents a clearly invalid exercise of the police power. Cf. State ex rel. Warner v. Hayes Investment Corp., 13 Wash. (2d) 306, 125 P. (2d) 262, where an ordinance prohibiting the continued operation of an established trailer camp by restricting the use of the land was held invalid, there being no evidence that it was, as applied to the particular business involved, in promotion of the public health, safety, morals or welfare. To the same effect is Richards v. City of Pontiac, 305 Mich. 666, 9 N. W. (2d) 885, 889, where the court said: “In our opinion the operation of a trailer park is not a nuisance per se. If the trailer park proves to be a nuisance per accidens, then regulation may be called for. The plaintiffs, having purchased the property, expended money thereon, and operated a trailer camp prior to the existence of either of the zoning ordinances, have a vested right to operate such trailer camp in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 255, Pub. Acts. 1941, or as such act may be amended.” For the rules and regulations governing the operation and maintenance of trailer parks in South Carolina, as promulgated by the State Board *587of Health, see Code of Laws 1942, Volume 3, Section 5002, pages 113-114, and Code of Laws, 1952, Volume 7, pages 675-677.
Stukes, Taylor and Oxner, JJ., concur.