Court Opinion

ID: 9751163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:09:53.460333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.953222
License: Public Domain

J-S07039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  THOMAS SIDERIO                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1324 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 6, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008742-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED AUGUST 28, 2023

       Appellant, Thomas Siderio, appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition brought

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

          At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
          Philadelphia police officers Gabriel Gutner, Lamont Fox,
          William Bengochea, Gregory Giacomelli, and Daniel Cha,
          Philadelphia police detective Thorsten Lucke, Philadelphia
          assistant medical examiner Dr. Khalil Wardak, Jalil Caesar,
          and Steven Busch. [Appellant] testified on his own behalf.
          The evidence established the following.

          Shortly after midnight, in the early morning of April 1, 2017,
          [Appellant] arrived at the Uncut Lounge, a club located at
          3017 N 22nd Street in Philadelphia, in order to meet his best
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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        friend, Daquan Foster, for a night out. (N.T. 11/27/18 at
        84-87; N.T. 11/29/18 at 40, 42-43). [Appellant] arrived
        with his cousin, Joseph Hastings, his girlfriend, Yarissa
        Rivera, his friend, Brian Johnson, and Johnson’s girlfriend.
        (N.T. 11/29/18 at 40-43, 55-56). While [Appellant] was
        drinking in the club, Johnson approached him and told him
        that Foster was in a fight in the back of the club. (N.T.
        11/29/18 at 43). [Appellant] attempted to go to the back
        of the club to see what was going on, but people were
        pushing and shoving and [Appellant] could not find Foster.
        (N.T. 11/29/18 at 43). As a result, [Appellant] decided to
        leave the club, retrieve a gun that he had left in the trunk
        of his friend’s car, and then return to the club to help Foster.
        (N.T. 11/29/18 at 44, 51-52). When he got to the car he
        also grabbed a hoody from the car and pulled the hood up
        over his head in an effort to conceal his identity. (N.T.
        11/29/18 at 50, 72-73). [Appellant] did not have a license
        to carry the firearm. (N.T. 11/29/18 at 50).

        By the time [Appellant] got back to the club with his gun,
        Foster was out of the bar and in the street. (N.T. 11/29/18
        at 44-45). When Foster saw [Appellant’s] gun, Foster told
        [Appellant] that the fight was over, and both started running
        from the scene. (N.T. 11/29/18 at 45). At that time, Steven
        Busch, a security guard from the club, saw [Appellant] with
        the gun, and yelled out, “gun” to his partner, Mikal Crump.
        (N.T. 11/28/18 at 148). Both security guards then began
        firing at [Appellant]. (N.T. 11/28/18 at 138, 148). One of
        the bullets they fired at [Appellant] struck and killed
        Hastings, who was out on the street following [Appellant].
        (N.T. 11/28/18 at 92-93, 11/27/18 at 142). At the same
        time, [Appellant], hearing gunshots, fired his gun, striking
        a parked car that contained Joseph Hickson, Jalil Caesar,
        and Clinton Cotton. (N.T. 11/28/18 at 39-43, 11/29/18 at
        103). As a result, the car window was shot out and Caesar
        was shot in the leg. (N.T. 11/28/18 at 41-43). During the
        exchange of gunfire, [Appellant] was shot in the back. (N.T.
        11/29/18 at 48).

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 6/21/22, at 3) (quoting Trial Court Opinion, filed

9/18/19, at 2-3) (record citation formatting provided).

     Procedurally:

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          On November 30, 2018, following a jury trial before this
          [c]ourt, [Appellant] was convicted of one count each of
          carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106) and
          carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia (18
          Pa.C.S. § 6108). [Appellant] was acquitted of three counts
          each of attempted murder (18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502) and
          aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)) regarding …
          Joseph Hickson, Jalil Caesar, and Clinton Cotton. He was
          also acquitted of one count of possessing an instrument of
          crime (18 Pa.C.S. § 907). In addition, the [c]ourt granted
          [Appellant’s] motion for judgment of acquittal for
          possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (18 Pa.C.S.
          § 6105). (N.T. 11/30/18 at 99). The case was joined for
          trial with the charges at Docket Number CP-51-CR-
          0008741-2017, where [Appellant] was charged with the
          murder of … Joseph Hastings (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502).
          [Appellant] was acquitted of all charges regarding Mr.
          Hastings.

          On January 25, 2019, the [c]ourt imposed consecutive
          sentences of 3½ to 7 years [of] incarceration for the
          carrying a firearm without a license charge and 2½ to 5
          years[’] incarceration for the carrying a firearm on a public
          street in Philadelphia, for an aggregate sentence of 6 to 12
          years[’] incarceration.      [Appellant] filed post-sentence
          motions, which the [c]ourt denied on May 20, 2019.
          [Appellant] was represented at trial and through the filing
          of post-sentence motions by David Walker, Esquire. Gary
          Server, Esquire, was appointed to represent [Appellant] on
          appeal. Mr. Server filed an Anders[2] brief with the Superior
          Court, stating that [Appellant’s] appeal was frivolous. On
          October 19, 2020, the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s]
          judgment of sentence.

          On May 11, 2021, [Appellant] filed a pro se [PCRA petition.]
          On May 24, 2021, Peter Levin, Esquire, was appointed to
          represent [Appellant], and filed an amended petition on
          November 20, 2021. The Commonwealth filed a motion to
          dismiss the petition on March 4, 2022. On March 23, 2022,
          the Court issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“907
          Notice”) of its intent to dismiss [Appellant’s] petition.
____________________________________________

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

                                           -3-
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           [Appellant] filed a response to the 907 Notice on April 12,
           2022, which did not raise any new issues. The [PCRA c]ourt
           dismissed the petition on May 6, 2022.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 1-2) (internal footnote omitted; record citation

formatting provided). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 12,

2022.    That same day, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant

complied and filed his concise statement on June 2, 2022.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

           I. Whether the PCRA court was in error in not granting relief
           on the following issues:

              A. Whether Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
              preserve a claim challenging Appellant’s discretionary
              sentence?

              B. Whether the prosecutor distorted the facts at
              Appellant’s sentencing?

              C. Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial based
              upon after discovered evidence which would likely
              change the outcome of his case[?]

           II. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s
           PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing?

(Appellant’s Brief at 7) (questions reordered for purposes of disposition).

        “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218

A.3d 850 (2019). This Court grants great deference to the factual findings of

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the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.

Commonwealth v. Dozier, 208 A.3d 1101, 1103 (Pa.Super. 2019). “[W]e

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021). Further, “we must defer to the PCRA court’s findings of fact and

credibility   determinations,     which     are    supported    by       the   record.”

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa.Super. 2018), aff’d, 657 Pa.

618, 226 A.3d 995 (2020).

      In his first sub-issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to preserve a claim challenging the discretionary aspects

of Appellant’s sentence. Specifically, Appellant insists that his sentence of 2½

to 5 years’ imprisonment for carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia was

an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines. Appellant maintains that

counsel had no reasonable justification for failing to preserve the issue for

appeal and, if counsel had preserved it, this Court could have reviewed the

sentence and granted relief.      Appellant concludes that counsel’s failure to

preserve his sentencing claim for appeal constitutes ineffective assistance,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      “Counsel    is   presumed    to     have    rendered   effective    assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

          [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
          defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

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         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

                                     -6-
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         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).             “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)

(citation omitted).

      To succeed on an ineffectiveness claim for failure to preserve a challenge

to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, the petitioner must demonstrate

the   underlying      sentencing   claim   entitles   the   petitioner   to   relief.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied,

598 Pa. 764, 956 A.2d 433 (2008). See also Commonwealth v. Reaves,

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592 Pa. 134, 923 A.2d 1119 (2007) (providing claim of ineffectiveness for

failure to preserve discretionary sentencing issue requires showing of

reasonable probability that sentencing court would have imposed lesser

sentence).

     This Court will not disturb the judgment of the sentencing court absent

an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843 (Pa.Super.

2006).

         [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
         judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
         discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
         exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
         partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive
         terms, …: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
         because an appellate court might have reached a different
         conclusion,    but    requires    a    result  of     manifest
         unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
         such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.

         The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
         concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is
         that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine
         the proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an
         evaluation of the individual circumstances before it. Simply
         stated, the sentencing court sentences flesh-and-blood
         defendants and the nuances of sentencing decisions are
         difficult to gauge from the cold transcript used upon
         appellate review. Moreover, the sentencing court enjoys an
         institutional advantage to appellate review, bringing to its
         decisions an expertise, experience, and judgment that
         should not be lightly disturbed. Even with the advent of the
         sentencing guidelines, the power of sentencing is a function
         to be performed by the sentencing court. Thus, rather than
         cabin the exercise of a sentencing court’s discretion, the
         guidelines merely inform the sentencing decision.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 564-65, 926 A.2d 957, 961-62

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(2007) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations omitted). “If the

court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines, it must provide

a written statement setting forth the reasons for the deviation and the failure

to do so is grounds for resentencing.” Id. at 566-67, 926 A.2d at 962-63.

      Pursuant to Section 9721(b), “the court shall follow the general principle

that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with

the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the

impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See also Commonwealth

v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating where court had benefit

of pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, we can presume it was aware of

relevant information regarding defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors).

      Here, the trial court explained its sentencing rationale as follows:

         Here, the [c]ourt’s sentence for carrying a firearm without
         a license was in the standard range of the Sentencing
         Guidelines. While [Appellant’s] sentence for carrying a
         firearm on a public street in Philadelphia was an upward
         departure from the guidelines, the sentence was well-
         justified for the reasons explained by the [c]ourt on the
         record during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, the record
         demonstrates that the [c]ourt’s aggregate sentence was
         completely reasonable.

         In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the [c]ourt explicitly
         considered the following: everything presented throughout
         the history of the case; [Appellant’s PSI] report and mental
         health evaluation; the investigation into [Appellant’s] prior
         record score; all of the submissions from defense counsel
         regarding    sentencing;    the     sentencing    guidelines;

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       [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs; the need for the
       protection of the public; and the gravity of the offense in
       relation to the impact on the victim and on the community.
       In particular, the [c]ourt first noted that [Appellant’s] prior
       record score of four understated his degree of criminality.
       [Appellant] was 25 years old and had been arrested 22
       times. While the [c]ourt acknowledged that many of these
       arrests did not result in convictions, this “very large and
       actually extraordinary number of arrests” may appropriately
       be considered at sentencing. [S]ee Commonwealth v.
       Craft, 450 A.2d 1021, 1024 (Pa.Super. 1982) (in imposing
       a sentence, a court may consider prior arrests as long as
       the court does not give undue weight to those arrests or
       treat those arrests as prior criminal conduct). Along with
       [Appellant’s] 22 arrests, [Appellant] also had 13 violations
       of probation, and was on probation at the time of the
       incident related to these charges. As the [c]ourt noted,
       [Appellant’s] numerous probation violations, while not
       reflected in the prior record score, clearly demonstrated a
       pattern of general disregard for the rule of law. The [c]ourt
       also noted that [Appellant’s] willingness to unlawfully
       possess a firearm while on probation supervision was an
       important aggravating factor supporting a sentence outside
       of the guidelines.

       Moreover, [Appellant’s] conduct giving rise to his unlawful
       possession of a firearm on the night of the incident was not
       typical behavior contemplated by the Guidelines for
       possession of a firearm. Knowing that he was on probation,
       [Appellant] stashed an unlicensed firearm in the trunk of his
       friend’s car for ready access during a night out at a club.
       When [Appellant] believed that his friend might have been
       in a bar fight, [Appellant] readily retrieved the weapon and
       returned to the club, ready to go inside to and use it in the
       fight. The [c]ourt fully recognizes that [Appellant] never
       entered the bar with the weapon and was acquitted of the
       murder, attempted murder and aggravated assault charges.
       However, it is not contested that his unlawful possession of
       a gun that evening started a chain of events that led to
       [Appellant’s] cousin being shot and killed by a security
       guard, and led to an innocent bystander in a parked car
       being shot. In addition, as the [c]ourt noted, consecutive
       sentences were appropriate in order to achieve an
       aggregate sentence that would be fair under the

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          circumstances.

          Finally, there is no merit to [Appellant’s] argument that the
          [c]ourt failed to consider the mitigating evidence presented
          at sentencing. The [c]ourt explicitly reviewed and noted all
          of the substantial mitigating evidence submitted by the
          defense, and weighed and considered it in arriving at an
          appropriate sentence.

          Accordingly, the record establishes that there were
          compelling reasons for the departure above the Guidelines
          and the consecutive sentences in this case, and that the
          aggregate sentence was fully commensurate with
          [Appellant’s] criminal conduct. As a result, the sentence
          was reasonable and should not be disturbed.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/18/19, at 5-7) (internal footnote and record

citations omitted).3

       In light of the broad discretion afforded to sentencing courts and the

court’s thorough explanation of its rationale for the sentence imposed, we

cannot say that Appellant would have been entitled to sentencing relief on

appeal had trial counsel preserved such a challenge for appellate review. See

Fullin, supra. See also Reaves, supra; Jones, supra. The record makes

clear the trial court considered Appellant’s prior record, the circumstances of

the altercation, and the impact Appellant’s actions had on the victims.

Additionally, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, so we can presume the

court was aware of and considered the relevant mitigating factors.        See

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court similarly referenced the September 18, 2019 trial court
opinion for its explanation as to the reasons for the sentence imposed. (See
PCRA Court Opinion at 5).

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Fowler, supra. Further, the court adequately explained on the record why it

chose to depart from the sentencing guidelines. See Walls, supra. Thus,

we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant failed to establish that he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to preserve a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of the sentencing, and Appellant’s first sub-issue merits no relief. See

Spotz, supra.

       In his second sub-issue, Appellant claims the Commonwealth “distorted

the facts” at Appellant’s sentencing and made material misrepresentations

concerning Appellant’s criminal history.           (See Appellant’s Brief at 20).

However, as this claim could have been raised in Appellant’s direct appeal, but

was not, we conclude that Appellant waived the claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9544(b) (stating “an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but

failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a

prior state postconviction proceeding”). Thus, Appellant waived his second

sub-issue.4

       In his third sub-issue, Appellant argues that he recently discovered

evidence of Detective James Pitts’ police misconduct concerning a pattern and

practice of falsifying evidence and using coercive interrogation tactics.

____________________________________________

4 Moreover, Appellant failed to develop this one paragraph argument with
citation to pertinent authority, and failed to include citations to the certified
record where the alleged misrepresentations were made. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a)-(c). Accordingly, Appellant’s second sub-issue is waived on this
ground as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

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Appellant asserts that information regarding Detective Pitts’ misconduct was

not available at the time of trial, but if it had been, Appellant’s case could have

been dismissed.     (See Appellant’s Brief at 22).      In support of this claim,

Appellant highlights that Detective Pitts (1) spoke to Daquan Foster’s mother,

who identified Appellant in a security video; (2) probed Appellant for

information outside of the probation officer’s office, without his attorney,

before arresting him on gun charges; and (3) intimidated and coerced

Appellant’s grandfather for information about the case. Appellant insists that

Detective Pitts’ testimony was instrumental at the preliminary hearing and

formed the basis for the charges against Appellant.           Although Appellant

acknowledges that he admitted at trial to possessing the guns and that he had

no license to carry a firearm, Appellant claims that “he would never have been

arrested on any of the charges, including the weapons charges, but for the

misconduct of Detective Pitts.” (Id. at 25). Appellant submits that based on

Detective Pitts’ misconduct in other cases, “one cannot be certain that

Detective Pitts did not engage in similar misconduct with the evidence of this

case….” (Id. at 24). Appellant concludes that Detective Pitts’ misconduct

constitutes after-discovered evidence, and this Court must grant relief. We

disagree.

      To prevail on an after-discovered evidence claim, an appellant must

prove: (1) the new evidence could not have been obtained at or prior to trial

through     reasonable   diligence;   (2)   the   new   evidence   is   not   merely

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corroborative or cumulative of evidence that was admitted at trial; (3) the

new evidence is not being used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness;

and (4) the new evidence would likely result in a different verdict.

Commonwealth v. Small, 647 Pa. 423, 442, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (2018). All

four of these requirements must be proved; if an appellant fails to establish

any one of these, the after-discovered evidence claim fails. Id. at 442, 189

A.3d at 972.    In determining whether introduction of the proffered new

evidence would likely result in a different verdict, the PCRA court “should

consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered evidence, the motive of

those offering the evidence, and the overall strength of the evidence

supporting the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365

(Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 609 Pa. 687, 14 A.3d 826 (2010).

      Here, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s claim of after-discovered

evidence, reasoning:

         Assuming arguendo that all of [Appellant’s] allegations
         regarding Detective Pitts are true, [Appellant] would still not
         be entitled to relief. [Appellant] was only convicted of one
         count each of carrying a firearm without a license … and
         carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia[.] When
         [Appellant] testified at trial, he readily admitted that he
         committed both of these crimes.             In particular, he
         acknowledged that he drove in a car with his gun, that he
         removed his gun from the car, hid it under his body, carried
         it in the street and fired it. (N.T. 11/29/18, at 44-46, 48,
         50, 52, 62-63, 69-72, 74-75, 98, 100-102, 104, 110-112,
         116-117). He also acknowledged that he had no license to
         carry the gun. (Id. at 69). This was enough to prove both
         of the firearms violations independent of all of the
         Commonwealth’s evidence.

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(PCRA Court Opinion at 8) (record citation formatting provided; internal

footnote omitted).

       We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to show his

proffered after-discovered evidence of Detective Pitts’ misconduct in other

cases would likely result in a different verdict in this case. Although Appellant

alleges that based on evidence of Detective Pitts’ misconduct in other cases,

Detective Pitts might have engaged in similar misconduct in this case,

Appellant has produced no evidence whatsoever to substantiate this claim.

       Further, our review of the record shows that Detective Pitts assisted in

the investigation of this case by taking several witness statements. At the

preliminary hearing, Detective Pitts did not testify, but the parties stipulated

that his testimony would be that he interviewed three witnesses, in addition

to the two security guards, and they all identified themselves in the

surveillance video. The Commonwealth introduced the stipulated testimony

at the preliminary hearing to identify people in the video. (See N.T. Hearing,

10/10/17, at 19-20). Based on other evidence presented at the hearing, the

trial court identified Appellant as the individual in the hoodie who was firing

shots.5    (Id. at 25).        Although Appellant asserts that Detective Pitts’

preliminary hearing testimony “was tainted by a likelihood of habitual police

misconduct,” Appellant has not cited to which parts of the stipulated testimony

____________________________________________

5 The court heard testimony from another officer, who identified Appellant in

the video, and the judge also could see that it was Appellant in the video.

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he is referring. (See PCRA Petition, filed 11/10/21, at 20). On this record,

we see nothing to support Appellant’s speculative argument that Detective

Pitts committed misconduct in this case which formed the basis of Appellant’s

arrest. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097, 1109 (Pa.Super.

2016), appeal denied, 636 Pa. 657, 145 A.3d 161 (2016) (holding appellant

was not entitled to new trial where evidence offered against Detective Pitts

was not specific to appellant’s case; although appellant sought to subpoena

testimony of individuals who would testify that Detective Pitts used aggressive

and violent tactics to coerce their statements in other murder cases, none of

those witnesses could provide any new evidence concerning Detective Pitts’

misconduct in this case and such testimony would be used solely to impeach

Detective Pitts’ testimony; denying appellant’s request for evidentiary hearing

on his proposed after-discovered evidence). Thus, Appellant cannot succeed

on his third sub-issue.

      In his final issue, Appellant claims the PCRA court erred when it denied

his request for relief without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant concedes that

the right to an evidentiary hearing is not absolute, but he suggests that there

were genuine issues of material fact in controversy and the PCRA court should

have granted an evidentiary hearing to provide the forum to demonstrate such

“manifest injustice.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16-17). Appellant concludes this

Court must vacate and remand for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.

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      A petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the

PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue

concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and no

purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v.

Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa.Super. 2012).        “A reviewing court on appeal must

examine each of the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record in

order to determine whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there

were no genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an

evidentiary hearing.”     Commonwealth v. Smith, 121 A.3d 1049, 1052

(Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 635 Pa. 763, 136 A.3d 981 (2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal

denied, 594 Pa. 685, 934 A.2d 72 (2007)).

      On this record, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any of the

claims presented to the PCRA court raised a genuine issue concerning any

material fact. See Smith, supra; Wah, supra. Therefore, the PCRA court

did not err when it denied Appellant’s claims without an evidentiary hearing.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

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J-S07039-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/2023

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