Court Opinion

ID: 9868407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:34:13.244883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.214010
License: Public Domain

Otsr Petition To Rehear.
The questions presented were carefully examined on the original consideration of the cause. The chief contention of the petitioner is that the devise to the corporation is void because its charter did not empower it to erect a hospital and treat charity patients suffering with cancer. In other words, that such a use is ultra vires the corporation and therefore void.
In our original opinion we undertook to show that, by the weight of authority, as well as by the previous decisions of this court, such a devise is not void but voidable. In all events, after full consideration, we adopted that as the better and more equitable rule. It seems to be conceded that if the devise was only voidable, the State alone can complain. We cited, authorities to the *21effect that where a corporation is prohibited from receiving property a devise to it is only voidable. The power to nse involves the same principle. In the one case it is prohibited from receiving, in the other from nsing; both are ultra vires the corporation, and, in either case, the abnse of authority can only be questioned by the State. We further held that such a devise is void only where it is expressly so declared by statute.
Counsel undertakes to differentiate this cause from that of Barrow v. Nashville and Charlotte T. C., 28 Tenn., 306, upon the ground that the corporation had taken possession of the property in the latter case. The court made no such distinction, but said: “but this want of power in the corporation to contract for, and hold land, creates no equity in behalf of the vendor to rescind the contract. It is a matter of no concern to him whether the corporation exceeded its' powers or not. The State from whom they receive their existence, and by whose authority they exercise their powers, may institute proceedings against them for this excess of power.” In our original opinion we also cited authorities to the effect that in the absence of a statute declaring such a devise void the heir cannot attack it either before or after the corporation goes into possession thereof.
Since the Home for Incurables is a legal corporation, if the testatrix had directed that immediately upon her death her executor pay to it $250',000', to be used in erecting and maintaining a cancep hospital for white charity patients, its power to so use the fund could only be questioned by the State. The fact that the time for receiving the bequest was postponed for a period would not affect the rule.
We are further of the opinion that this bequest was to the Home for Incurables, in trust. Heiskell v. *22Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn., 685; Gibson v. Frye Institute, 137 Tenn., 452.
Mrs. Hunter stated definitely the use to which her residuary estate should he applied, and designated a legal corporation to administer the fund. If the State interposes no objection to the execution of this trust by the designated corporation, then the heir should not be permitted to do so.
The petition to rehear will be denied.