Court Opinion

ID: 9395163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:02:47.727169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:05.998366
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 295
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION III
                                      No. CR-22-572

                                            Opinion Delivered   May 17, 2023
JONATHAN WALKER
                            APPELLANT       APPEAL FROM THE CLARK
                                            COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V.                                          [NO. 10CR-20-107]

                                            HONORABLE BLAKE BATSON, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
                              APPELLEE      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

                             KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

       Appellant Jonathan Walker was convicted in a jury trial of thirty counts of

distributing, possessing, or viewing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a

child and Walker was sentenced as a habitual offender to thirty consecutive fifteen-year

prison terms. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-602(a)(2) (Repl. 2013), a person commits

this offense “if the person knowingly possesses or views through any means, including on

the Internet, any photograph, film, videotape, computer program or file . . . or any other

reproduction that depicts a child or incorporates the image of a child engaging in sexually

explicit conduct.”1 Walker’s convictions arose from a cyber tip from an internet-service

provider that resulted in a police search of Walker’s computer equipment on which they

       1
        A “‘Child’ means any person under seventeen years of age.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-
601(1) (Repl. 2013).
found images of juvenile males in sexually explicit poses and juvenile males engaged in

sexually explicit conduct with adult males. On appeal, Walker does not challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions; rather, Walker raises these seven

arguments: (1) the trial court erred in not recusing; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the

items seized from his home because the search was illegal; (3) the trial court erred in

admitting his prior convictions from Oregon during the guilt phase of the trial; (4) the trial

court erred in admitting images from his computer for which he was not charged; (5) the

trial court erred in allowing the State to play a portion of Walker’s statement to the police

wherein his sex-offender status was discussed; (6) the trial court erred in admitting Walker’s

Oregon “pen pack” during the guilt phase of the trial; and (7) the trial court erred in refusing

Walker’s affirmative-defense jury instruction that he reasonably believed five of the persons

depicted in the images were seventeen years of age or older. We affirm Walker’s convictions,

and we modify the sentencing order as explained below.

                                            I. Facts

       On April 28, 2020, an image or file from Walker’s computer was uploaded to a

Microsoft OneDrive account. Microsoft’s internal algorithm program 2 determined, based

on the “hash value” of the file, that the image was a known catalogued image of child

       2
       Neither the mechanics nor the accuracy of the Microsoft internal algorithm program
was challenged at trial and neither is an issue in this appeal.

                                               2
pornography.3 Without viewing the image and based solely on the hash value, Microsoft

reported the image, the Internet Protocol (IP) address, and the date uploaded to the National

Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). 4 The IP address was associated with

Suddenlink Communications. NCMEC then forwarded this information, along with the

image, to the Arkansas State Police.

       The Arkansas State Police has an internal task force referred to as the Internet Crimes

Against Children Task Force (ICAC). Special Agents Adam Pinner and Corwin Battle are

assigned to the task force and investigated the cyber tip from NCMEC. Agent Pinner

reviewed the image and determined it constituted child pornography.               Through its

investigation, the ICAC determined that the account name associated with the IP address

was Jonathan Walker with a service and billing address at an apartment in Arkadelphia.

       3
         In technical terms, a hash value is an “algorithmic calculation that yields an
alphanumeric value for a file.” United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
More simply, a hash value is a string of characters obtained by processing the contents of a
given computer file and assigning a sequence of numbers and letters that correspond to the
file’s contents. In the words of one commentator, “[t]he concept behind hashing is quite
elegant: take a large amount of data, such as a file or all the bits on a hard drive, and use a
complex mathematical algorithm to generate a relatively compact numerical identifier (the
hash value) unique to that data.” Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power
of the Hash, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 38, 38 (2005).
       4
         NCMEC is a nonprofit private entity. NCMEC’s Cyber Tipline is the nation’s
centralized reporting system for the online exploitation of children. The public and
electronic service providers can make reports of suspected online enticement of children for
sexual acts, child sexual molestation, child-sexual-abuse material, child sex tourism, child sex
trafficking, unsolicited obscene materials sent to a child, misleading domain names, and
misleading words or digital images on the Internet.

                                               3
Agent Pinner swore out an affidavit for a search warrant for Walker’s apartment and

computer equipment. The affidavit set forth the facts constituting probable cause, which

included information that the uploaded image was of a prepubescent male depicting nudity

in a sexually suggestive pose. Based on the information in the affidavit, a search warrant was

issued.5

       During the search of Walker’s apartment, the police seized several laptop computers,

including a Dell computer with a Toshiba hard drive. While Walker’s apartment was being

searched, Walker was Mirandized and gave a statement. In his statement, Walker admitted

that he lived alone at the apartment, that his wireless Internet was password protected, and

that the computers belonged to him. Walker denied possessing any child pornography.

       Agent Battle subsequently conducted a forensic examination of the Toshiba hard

drive in the Dell computer seized from Walker’s apartment. According to Agent Battle’s

trial testimony, the Windows operating system had the username “Jonathan.” Agent Battle

testified that the hard drive was divided into seven partitions and that the seventh partition

of the hard drive contained hundreds of images and videos of child-sexual-abuse material,

which he stated is synonymous with child pornography.            The seventh partition also

contained images of Walker, his car, and his marriage license. Agent Battle testified that

       5
         As will be discussed, infra, Walker filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the
affidavit for search warrant lacked probable cause, and after a suppression hearing, Walker’s
motion was denied.

                                              4
State’s exhibits 1–30 contained images of child-sexual-abuse material retrieved from Walker’s

computers, and these exhibits were admitted into evidence at the jury trial.6

       From this evidence, the jury found Walker guilty of thirty counts of distributing,

possessing, or viewing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child, and the

jury sentenced Walker to a total of 450 years in prison. Walker now appeals.

                                     II. Points on Appeal

                      A. The Trial Judge’s Refusal to Recuse Himself

       Walker’s first argument on appeal is that the trial judge abused his discretion in

refusing to recuse himself. During a pretrial hearing, Walker’s attorney raised the issue of

Circuit Judge Blake Batson’s former law partnership with the prosecutor, Dan Turner. At

the pretrial hearing, Walker’s counsel argued:

       My client feels that he’s being prejudiced about the fact that you and the prosecutor
       used to be in business together. And he believes that . . . representation of Arnold,
       Batson, Turner, and Turner is still showing up on the Internet, even if it’s not on the
       sign.

Prosecutor Turner responded:

       I think this court has dealt with this very issue numerous times over the last twenty
       months. I don’t think that’s a basis for a requirement that the court recuse.

Judge Batson declined to recuse himself and stated:

       Mr. Walker, there are specific rules this court complies with. And the fact that there
       may be something on the Internet that indicates our past business relationship, it’s
       not sufficient for disqualification.

       6
        Several of the charged counts were video files, and in support of these counts, the
State offered screen shots from the videos rather than the videos themselves.

                                              5
Walker now assigns error to the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself due to the trial judge’s

former partnership with Turner and the alleged appearance of impropriety.

       Canon 2.11(A)(1) of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge

shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might

be reasonably questioned, including . . .” when “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice

concerning a party or a party’s lawyer[.]”      Walker argues that because there was still

information online that the trial judge and the prosecutor were practicing law together

twenty months after the judge took the bench, the trial judge’s impartiality was reasonably

questioned, and there was at least an appearance of impropriety. Walker cites Burrows v.

Forrest City, 260 Ark. 712, 543 S.W.2d 488 (1976), for the proposition that a trial judge

should not remain on a case where there exists even an appearance of impropriety.7 Walker

further asserts that the trial judge’s adverse rulings indicated bias or an appearance of bias.

For these reasons, Walker contends that the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself constituted

reversible error. We disagree.

       In Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 654–55, 128 S.W.3d 445, 451–52 (2003), the

supreme court set forth these standards:

              A trial judge has a duty not to recuse from a case where no prejudice exists.
       Thus, if there is no valid reason for the judge to disqualify himself or herself, he or
       she has a duty to remain on a case. There is a presumption that judges are impartial.
       The person seeking disqualification bears the burden of proving otherwise. The trial

       7
        Burrows was a revocation case, and the supreme court reversed and remanded for a
new trial with a new judge because, prior to the revocation hearing, the sitting judge had
requested that appellant bring his toothbrush and also made numerous other comments
during the proceedings that created the appearance of partiality.

                                               6
       judge’s decision not to recuse from a case is a discretionary one and will not be
       reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion can be
       shown by proving bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. To decide whether
       there has been an abuse of discretion, this court reviews the record to determine if
       prejudice or bias was exhibited. It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate such bias
       or prejudice.

(Citations omitted.)

       We conclude that Walker failed to prove that the trial judge exhibited prejudice, and

we hold that the trial judge’s decision not to recuse himself was not an abuse of discretion.

In Carmical v. McAfee, we stated that a trial judge is not required to recuse himself or herself

if his or her former law partner is counsel in the proceeding at hand. 68 Ark. App. 313, 7

S.W.3d 350 (1999) (citing Dolphin v. Wilson, 328 Ark. 1, 942 S.W.2d 815 (1997)). Moreover,

absent some objective demonstration by the appellant of the trial judge’s prejudice, it is the

communication of bias by the trial judge that will cause us to reverse his or her refusal to

recuse. Carmical, supra. The mere fact that there were adverse rulings is not enough to

demonstrate bias. Id. The fact that the trial judge and the prosecutor were former law

partners did not require the trial judge’s recusal, nor was there any demonstration of bias by

the trial judge. Therefore, we reject Walker’s argument that the trial judge was required to

recuse from the case or that he abused his discretion in not recusing.

                                 B. Suppression of Evidence

       Walker next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

incriminating evidence based on his claim that the search of his apartment and computer

equipment therein constituted a violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable

                                               7
searches and seizures. Walker’s narrow argument is that, although Microsoft and NCMEC

(both private entities) had observed a hash value of a file that was catalogued as child

pornography, neither of those private entities actually opened the file to view and confirm

that the file image contained child pornography prior to providing the cyber tip to the

Arkansas State Police. Walker argues that when Agent Pinner opened the file and viewed

the image, he exceeded the scope of the private search and that the search warrant was invalid

because it was based almost entirely on this illegally obtained information.

       In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court conducts a de

novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts

for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. Lewis v. State, 2023

Ark. 12. A finding is clearly erroneous, even if there is evidence to support it, when the

appellate court, after review of the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We defer to the superiority of the trial court

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing. Id.

       In the affidavit for search warrant, Agent Pinner stated:

       Microsoft OneDrive made the report to NCMEC on April 28, 2020. The cyber tip
       reported that one (1) image of apparent child pornography (unconfirmed) was
       uploaded to a Microsoft OneDrive Account. Microsoft OneDrive provided the image
       to NCMEC and I was eventually provided the image that was uploaded. The image
       is of a prepubescent minor male depicting nudity in a sexually suggestive pose.

Agent Pinner’s affidavit went on to state that, with the IP address that had been provided in

the cyber tip, it was later determined that the account associated with the IP address belonged

                                               8
to Walker. Based on Agent Pinner’s affidavit, a search warrant was issued, and the illicit

images were found on Walker’s computer during the search.

       A hearing was held on Walker’s motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing,

both Agents Pinner and Battle testified about the investigation and the process by which

hash values are instrumental in detecting and investigating child pornography.

       Agent Pinner testified that he was assigned to investigate the cyber tip received from

NCMEC. Pinner stated that he commonly works with such cyber tips in his investigative

duties with the ICAC. Agent Pinner explained that the cyber tip was the result of hash-value

identification from a known catalogue of images that had been previously determined to be

child-sexual-abuse material. He compared a hash value to the DNA of a person. Agent

Pinner stated that, although Microsoft and NCMEC had identified the file as containing

known child pornography by the hash value and were in possession of the file before

forwarding it to the Arkansas State Police, neither Microsoft employees nor NCMEC

employees had actually viewed the image. Agent Pinner opened the file and confirmed its

content as child pornography.

       Agent Battle similarly testified that he is familiar with the cyber tipline used by

NCMEC. Agent Battle stated that it is customary for him to receive cyber tips from NCMEC

and, through those cyber tips, initiate an investigation and swear out an affidavit for a search

warrant. Agent Battle stated that hash-value identification is instrumental in the cyber tips

generated by NCMEC. Agent Battle explained that a hash value is a “digital fingerprint” of

a file, which is unique to the file and the image it contains. Agent Battle stated that NCMEC

                                               9
maintains a database of hash values that are known to contain child-sexual-abuse material.

Thus, NCMEC is able to compare a known hash value to a file and, if the hash values match,

determine that the file contains child pornography.

       Both the United States and Arkansas Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches

and seizures not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. U.S. Const. amend.

IV; Ark. Const. art. II, § 15. Such limitations do not apply to searches conducted by private

parties because, under the private-search doctrine, the prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures does not apply to searches conducted by private citizens. Whisenant v.

State, 85 Ark. App. 111, 146 S.W.3d 359 (2004). However, the government agency may not

then exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent

search. Id.

       Walker argues that when law enforcement received a cyber tip from NCMEC

regarding an unopened file that was alleged—but not visually confirmed—to contain child

pornography, law enforcement exceeded the scope of the private search by opening the file.

Walker argues that law enforcement lacked probable cause from the hash value itself, and

that only by viewing the contents of the file did they have probable cause of criminal activity.

When a search warrant is based on illegally obtained information, the appellate court

examines the search warrant by excising the offending information from the search warrant

and determines whether the affidavit nevertheless supports the issuance of a search warrant.

Lauderdale v. State, 82 Ark. App. 474, 120 S.W.3d 106 (2003). Walker argues that, when

excising from Agent Pinner’s affidavit his statement that the file image was of a prepubescent

                                              10
minor male depicting nudity in a sexually suggestive pose, there was no probable cause to

issue the search warrant. Walker thus argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress was clearly erroneous. For the following reasons, we disagree.

       In discussing the private-search doctrine in Whisenant, supra, we stated that there is

no additional intrusion by the government agency during its inspection of the materials

where the agent learned nothing that had not previously been learned during the private

search. The critical inquiry is whether the authorities obtained information with respect to

which the defendant’s expectation of privacy had not already been frustrated. United States

v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018). When the government’s conduct merely confirms

information gleaned in a private search and does not enable the government to discover

information that had not previously been learned during the private search, it does not

constitute a subsequent search. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). In Jacobsen,

the Supreme Court observed that protecting the risk of misdescription by the private party

hardly enhances any legitimate privacy interest and is not protected by the Fourth

Amendment.

       Both Microsoft and NCMEC determined from the hash value of one of Walker’s files

that the file contained child pornography.        Agents Pinner and Battle testified at the

suppression hearing about hash-value technology and its accuracy and effectiveness in

investigating internet crimes against children.        Agent Pinner compared hash-value

identification to a DNA match, and Agent Battle compared it to a fingerprint match. After

both private entities observed the hash value and determined from the hash value that the

                                             11
file contained child pornography, the information was forwarded to the Arkansas State

Police. By opening the file and viewing its contents, Agent Pinner merely confirmed what

had already been learned in the private search; therefore, no constitutional violation

occurred.

       In reaching our decision on the suppression issue, we are strongly persuaded by the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Reddick, supra. In Reddick, the defendant

uploaded digital-image files to Microsoft SkyDrive. SkyDrive uses a program to automatically

scan the hash values of user-uploaded files and compare them to the hash values of known

images of child pornography. When a match is detected between the hash value of a user-

uploaded file and a known child-pornography hash value, it creates a cyber tip and sends

the file—along with the uploader’s IP address information—to NCMEC. Microsoft sent cyber

tips to NCMEC based on the hash values of files that the defendant had uploaded to

SkyDrive. NCMEC then forwarded the cyber tip to the Corpus Christi Police Department.

Upon receiving the cyber tip, a police officer opened the suspect files and confirmed that

each contained child pornography. The police officer then applied for and received a

warrant to search the defendant’s home and seize his computer. The defendant argued that

the police officer’s warrantless opening of the files associated with the cyber tip—which were

not first opened and viewed by Microsoft or NCMEC—was an unlawful search. The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed.

                                             12
       Before addressing the merits of the suppression issue in Reddick, the federal appeals

court set forth the following observations regarding hash-value technology and its usefulness

in combating child pornography:

               Private businesses and police investigators rely regularly on “hash values” to
       fight the online distribution of child pornography. Hash values are short, distinctive
       identifiers that enable computer users to quickly compare the contents of one file to
       another. They allow investigators to identify suspect material from enormous masses
       of online data, through the use of specialized software programs—and to do so rapidly
       and automatically, without the need for human searchers. Hash values have thus
       become a powerful tool for combating the online distribution of unlawful aberrant
       content.

       ....

               In technical terms, a hash value is an “algorithmic calculation that yields an
       alphanumeric value for a file.” United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir.
       2013). More simply, a hash value is a string of characters obtained by processing the
       contents of a given computer file and assigning a sequence of numbers and letters
       that correspond to the file’s contents. In the words of one commentator, “[t]he
       concept behind hashing is quite elegant: take a large amount of data, such as a file
       or all the bits on a hard drive, and use a complex mathematical algorithm to generate
       a relatively compact numerical identifier (the hash value) unique to that data.”
       Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash, 119 Harv. L.
       Rev. F. 38, 38 (2005).

               Hash values are regularly used to compare the contents of two files against
       each other. “If two nonidentical files are inputted into the hash program, the
       computer will output different results. If the two identical files are inputted, however,
       the hash function will generate identical output.” Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures
       in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, 541 (2005). Hash values have been used to
       fight child pornography distribution by comparing the hash values of suspect files
       against a list of the hash values of known child pornography images currently in
       circulation. This process allows potential child pornography images to be identified
       rapidly, without the need to involve human investigators at every stage.

Reddick, 900 F.3d at 636–37.

                                              13
       The Reddick court concluded that the police officer did not conduct an illegal search

when he viewed images that had not been actually viewed by Microsoft or NCMEC but had

been identified by the private entities as child pornography by their hash values. The appeals

court began by stating that, under the private-search doctrine, “the critical inquiry under the

Fourth Amendment is whether the authorities obtained information with respect to which

the defendant’s expectation of privacy had not already been frustrated.” Reddick, 900 F.3d

at 638 (citing United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 2001)). The Reddick court stated

that when the police officer first received the defendant’s files, he already knew their hash

values matched the hash values of child-pornography images known to NCMEC. Reddick,

900 F.3d at 639. The court went on to state that hash-value comparison allows law

enforcement to identify child pornography with almost absolute certainty because hash

values are specific to the makeup of a particular image’s data, which can be described as a

unique digital fingerprint. Id. The court held that when the police officer opened the files,

there was no significant expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a

private party and that his visual review of the images merely dispelled any residual doubt

about the contents of the files. Id. The federal appeals court in Reddick stated that the

government effectively learned nothing from the police officer’s viewing of the files that it

had not already learned from the private search, and that under the private-search doctrine,

the government did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 640.

       We also find the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Miller,

982 F.3d 412 (2020), to be instructive. In Miller, the appeals court also dealt with the issue

                                              14
of whether a police officer could view images that had been identified by private entities as

child pornography only by hash identification and not by visual inspection. The Miller court

focused on the level of certainty of the hash identification. The court wrote:

       The magistrate judge, whose findings the district court adopted, found that the
       technology was “highly reliable—akin to the reliability of DNA.” United States v. Miller,
       2017 WL 9325815, at *10 (E.D. Ky. May 19, 2017). The evidence in one cited case
       suggested that “[t]he chance of two files coincidentally sharing the same hash value is
       1 in 9,223,372,036,854,775,808.” United States v. Dunning, 2015 WL 13736169, at
       *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 1, 2015) (citation omitted). (That is 1 in 9.2 quintillion in case you
       were wondering.) Another cited source suggested that the common algorithms “will
       generate numerical identifiers so distinctive that the chance that any two data sets will
       have the same one, no matter how similar they appear, is less than one in one billion.”
       Barbara J. Rothstein et al., Managing Discovery of Electronic Information: A Pocket Guide
       for Judges 38 (2d ed. Federal Judicial Center 2012).

Miller, 982 F.3d at 430. The Miller court concluded that, through the information available,

“a computer’s ‘virtual’ search of a single file creates more certainty about the file’s contents

than a person’s ‘manual’ search of the file.” Id. The Miller court applied the private-search

doctrine and rejected the defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge. Id. at 431.8

       The testimony by Agents Pinner and Battle at the suppression hearing showed that

the hash-value match that resulted in the cyber tip from private entities was akin to a DNA

match or fingerprint match. The reliability of hash-value matching to identify known child

pornography was explained at length in both Reddick and Miller, discussed above. By visually

       8
         We observe that Walker relies on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
United States v. Wilson, 13 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021), asserting that the appeals court in that
case reached a different result than in Reddick or in Miller on similar facts. However, as
stated, we are persuaded by the analysis in Reddick and Miller, and we apply those holdings
to the facts herein.

                                              15
inspecting the image provided by the private entities, Agent Pinner learned no more than

had already been learned from the hash-value analysis of the private search, and his review

of the image merely confirmed what was already known and dispelled any residual doubt

about the contents of the file. See Reddick, supra. Therefore, we conclude that under the

private-search doctrine, Agent Pinner’s opening of the file did not violate Walker’s

constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and we hold that the trial

court’s denial of Walker’s motion to suppress was not clearly erroneous.

                                C. Admission of Prior Crimes

       Walker’s next argument is that the trial court erred by admitting Walker’s prior

convictions during the guilt phase of the trial. Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent

to introduce evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. This

evidence consisted of Walker’s three 2009 Oregon convictions for encouraging child sexual

abuse in the first degree. Walker subsequently filed a motion in limine to exclude the

convictions, arguing that they were inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and also that the

evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. After a hearing on Walker’s

motion in limine, the trial court denied the motion and allowed the State to introduce the

convictions at trial.

       Rule 404(b) provides:

       Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
       admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
       conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
       proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
       absence of mistake or accident.

                                                16
The State is not entitled to introduce evidence of other offenses to persuade the jury that

the accused is a criminal and likely to commit the crimes he has been charged with. Green

v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638 (2006). However, if the evidence of another crime,

wrong, or act is relevant to show that the offense of which appellant is accused actually

occurred and is not introduced merely to prove bad character, it will not be excluded. Lindsey

v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994). In dealing with issues relating to the

admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), a trial court’s ruling is entitled to great

weight, and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Green, supra.

       Walker argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior

convictions under Rule 404(b) because this evidence was not independently relevant to prove

some material point at issue but was rather introduced merely to prove he is a criminal. We

disagree.

       The statutory elements of distributing, possessing, or viewing matter depicting

sexually explicit conduct involving a child—with which Walker was charged in this case—are

very similar to the elements of encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree under the

2009 version of the Oregon statute upon which Walker was convicted. 9 Moreover, the

record reveals factual similarities between Walker’s Oregon convictions and the charges

herein. Here, the proof showed that Walker possessed multiple images on his computer of

       9
       At the time of Walker’s 2009 Oregon convictions, the elements of Or. Rev. Stat. §
163.684 prohibited possessing photographs or other visual recordings of sexually explicit
conduct involving a child.

                                             17
juvenile males in sexually explicit poses and juvenile males engaged in sexually explicit

conduct with adult males. In the Oregon case, the investigation began when a public library

reported that a printed copy of an adult male sodomizing a juvenile was discovered in a

restroom. The police confirmed that Walker’s fingerprints were on the photograph, and a

subsequent search of a flash drive in Walker’s possession uncovered 120 images of nude

juveniles, juveniles in sexually explicit poses, and a juvenile engaging in sexual acts. Walker

admitted to the Oregon authorities that he had downloaded these images from a computer.

       We conclude that the Oregon convictions were probative of Walker’s knowledge and

intent under Rule 404(b). Walker’s defense at trial was that he simply did not possess any

of the illegal images attributed to him, as he stated in his opening argument and argued in

his directed-verdict motion and closing argument. In Walker’s custodial interview with the

police, Walker denied possessing child pornography on his computer equipment. Therefore,

the prior convictions for similar conduct were relevant to establish Walker’s knowledge and

intent to commit these crimes. The supreme court has held that Rule 404(b) evidence is

admissible to prove knowledge and intent of the criminal defendant due to similar conduct.

See, e.g., Davis v. State, 362 Ark. 34, 207 S.W.3d 474 (2005) (similar incident of sexual assault

admitted to show intent); Fells v. State, 362 Ark. 77, 207 S.W.3d 498 (2005) (victim of similar,

but earlier, rape by defendant allowed to prove intent, motive, or plan); see also Nelson v. State,

365 Ark. 314, 229 S.W.3d (2006) (affirming the admission of multiple prior drug

convictions to show intent when Nelson claimed he was simply in the car and the drugs

                                                18
found there belonged to another passenger.) For these reasons, we hold that the trial court’s

decision to admit the prior convictions under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion.

       However, as Walker points out in his brief, even if evidence is relevant under Rule

404(b), Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The standard

of review for the admission of Rule 403 evidence is whether the trial court abused its

discretion. Harmon v. State, 286 Ark. 184, 690 S.W.2d 125 (1985). Walker argues that, even

if the evidence of his prior convictions had some probative value, the evidence was unfairly

prejudicial under Rule 403. We, however, disagree with this argument as well. In Rounsaville

v. State, 374 Ark. 356, 288 S.W.3d 213 (2008), the supreme court stated that evidence

offered by the State in a criminal trial is likely to be prejudicial to the defendant to some

degree, otherwise it would not be offered. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s determination that the probative value of Walker’s prior convictions was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Therefore, we find no error in

the admission of the prior crimes.

                            D. Admission of Uncharged Images

       In Walker’s pretrial motion in limine, he also argued that the State should be

prohibited from introducing other images seized from his computer for which he was not

charged. After the hearing on Walker’s motion, the trial court denied that portion of

Walker’s motion and ruled that these other images were admissible, and Walker now asserts

that this was erroneous.

                                             19
       During Agent Battle’s trial testimony, he explained that child-sexual-abuse material is

the same thing as child pornography. Agent Battle testified that State’s exhibits 1–30

contained images of child-sexual-abuse material, and these exhibits were admitted as evidence

of Walker’s guilt on the charged offenses. Agent Battle explained further that child-

exploitative material is material depicting a child that may be in a provocative or sexual pose,

but the child is clothed. Over Walker’s objection, the State was permitted to admit exhibits

31–45, for which Walker was not charged and that consisted of fifteen images from Walker’s

computer containing child-exploitative material.

       Walker argues that the introduction of these uncharged images violated Rule 404(b)

because they served no legitimate purpose and were introduced only to show his propensity

for viewing child-exploitative material.      Walker also argues that this evidence was

inadmissible because it was extremely prejudicial.

       The mere fact that a photograph is inflammatory or is cumulative is not, standing

alone, sufficient reason to exclude it. Lewis v. State, 2023 Ark. 12. However, if a photograph

serves no valid purpose and could be used only to inflame the jurors’ passions, it should be

excluded. Id.

       The State argues that the images of child-exploitative material were relevant to show

Walker’s predilection for sexualized images of prepubescent boys and to show knowledge,

intent, absence of mistake, or accident under Rule 404(b), and we agree. In Lewis, supra, the

supreme court affirmed the admission of additional uncharged pornographic images, stating

that “[g]iven Lewis’s defense that he lacked knowledge, the admission of the additional

                                              20
images was relevant to show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident.” Lewis,

2023 Ark. 12, at 19–20; see also Steele v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 257 (holding that evidence of

computer images of child pornography, for which Steele was not charged with possessing,

was relevant to show knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake and was thus properly

admitted in prosecution for distributing, possessing, or viewing child pornography on his

computer). Moreover, the fifteen additional images introduced in this case that contained

child-exploitative material were not unfairly prejudicial because they were less inflammatory

than the thirty images depicting child-sexual-abuse material that had already been introduced

and for which Walker was being charged. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in admitting the uncharged images at trial.

                     E. Admission of Walker’s Statement to the Police
                         Pertaining to Sex-Offender Registration

       Walker next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to play the portion

of his custodial statement to the police where the officer incorrectly alleged that Walker was

delinquent in his sex-offender registration. Walker again cites Rule 404(b) and argues a

violation of that evidentiary rule and further argues that any probative value of this evidence

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

       During the search of Walker’s apartment, Walker gave a Mirandized statement to

Agent Pinner. Prior to the introduction of the recording of the statement at trial, Walker

objected to the portions in which his sex-offender status was discussed, and the trial court

overruled the objection. In the custodial interview that was played to the jury, Agent Pinner

                                              21
asked whether Walker had ever been arrested for child pornography, and Walker replied no.

Agent Pinner then asked whether Walker was a registered sex offender and whether he had

failed to register in Arkansas, and Walker replied no to both questions. Later in the

interview, Agent Pinner again questioned whether Walker was a sex offender in Oregon and

whether he was delinquent there, and Walker denied that accusation, indicating that he was

current on his Oregon sex-offender registration. Agent Pinner then suggested that “your

problem right now” is that “you have not registered in the state of Arkansas.” Walker replied,

“Okay.”

       We conclude that any error in admitting the discussion pertaining to Walker’s sex-

offender status was harmless. We may declare an evidentiary error harmless if the evidence

of guilt is overwhelming and the error is slight. Johnston v. State, 2014 Ark. 110, 431 S.W.3d

895. As we have already explained, the trial court committed no error in admitting Walker’s

three prior Oregon convictions for encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree, so the

jury knew about Walker’s sex-offender status from competent evidence independent of the

police interview. Moreover, any possible error with respect to whether Walker had registered

as a sex offender in this state was slight when compared to the overwhelming evidence of his

guilt for the crimes charged. Therefore, no reversible error occurred under this point.

                        F. Admission of Walker’s Oregon Pen Pack

       Walker next argues that the trial court erred in admitting his Oregon “pen pack”

during the guilt phase of the trial. Walker argues that any marginal probative value of the

contents of the pen pack was grossly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and

                                             22
confusing the issues. In particular, Walker points out that his pen pack contained a reference

to a drug-possession case, information that he was indigent, and information about his

mandatory mental-health treatment for sexually deviant behavior.

       We conclude that this argument is not preserved for review. When the State

introduced evidence of Walker’s convictions at trial (which had already been ruled

admissible prior to trial) it stated, “[I]t is in the form of a pen pack.” Walker objected,

arguing:

       With regard to this, the court did make a decision that it could be admissible. Our
       objection would be to the way it’s being admitted at this point in time . . . . Whether
       or not the document could come in is not an issue, but how it comes in . . . . I believe
       the keeper of the records would have to be here for this to be introduced.

At trial, Walker’s only objection to the pen pack was, in effect, for lack of foundation and

that it should not be admitted without the record keeper to introduce it. Walker does not

make that argument on appeal; rather, his argument on appeal is that the specific

information in the pen pack was unduly prejudicial. Our law is well established that in order

to preserve a challenge for our review, the movant must apprise the trial court of the specific

basis on which the motion is made. Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75, 894 S.W.2d 930 (1995).

Parties may not change their arguments on appeal and are limited to the scope and nature

of their arguments made below. Id. Because Walker has changed his argument on appeal,

we will not address it.

                          G. Affirmative-Defense Jury Instruction

                                              23
       Walker next argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an affirmative-

defense jury instruction based on Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-602(c), which provides, “It is an

affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant in good faith

reasonably believed that the person depicted in the matter was seventeen (17) years of age or

older.” Walker requested this jury instruction with respect to only five of the thirty images

for which he was charged. Walker argues that the jury instruction should have been given

with respect to those five charges because, at the very least, those images contained the

slightest evidence that they could involve persons seventeen years of age or older.

       A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and

when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Vidos v. State,

367 Ark. 296, 239 S.W.3d 467 (2006). We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to give an

instruction unless the court abused its discretion. Id.

       We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the affirmative-

defense jury instruction. Walker’s defense at trial was that he did not possess any of the

illegal images attributed to him, as he stated in his opening argument and argued in his

directed-verdict motion and closing argument. In Walker’s custodial interview with the

police, Walker denied possessing child pornography on his computer equipment. From the

evidence presented, there was no basis in the evidence to conclude that Walker reasonably

believed that some of the images found on his computer depicted persons seventeen years of

age or older. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

                     H. Illegal Sentence – Sexually Dangerous Person

                                              24
           Finally, in his reply brief, Walker raises an issue that a portion of his sentence was

illegal. Normally, an appellant may not raise an issue for the first time in his reply brief. See

Adams v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 501, 612 S.W.3d 191. However, we may address an illegal

sentence sua sponte, Muhammad v. State, 2021 Ark. 129, 624 S.W.3d 300, and when an error

has nothing to do with the issue of guilt or innocence and relates only to punishment, it may

be corrected in lieu of reversing and remanding. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d

294 (1992). For the following reasons, we conclude that a portion of Walker’s sentence was

illegal.

           In the sentencing order, the trial court checked the yes box for: “Defendant is alleged

to be a sexually dangerous person and is ordered to undergo an evaluation at a facility

designated by A.D.C. pursuant to A.C.A. § 12-12-918.” However, this designation in the

sentencing order was erroneous. Arkansas Code Annotated section 12-12-918 (Supp. 2021

2021) provides, in relevant part:

              (a)(1) In order to classify a person as a sexually dangerous person, a prosecutor
           may allege on the face of an information that the prosecutor is seeking a determination
           that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person.

               (2)(A) If the defendant is adjudicated guilty, the court shall enter an order
           directing an examiner qualified by the Sex Offender Assessment Committee to issue
           a report to the sentencing court that recommends whether or not the defendant
           should be classified as a sexually dangerous person.

(Emphasis added.) Here, the State did not allege on the face of the original information or

on the face of the amended information that it was seeking a determination that Walker is

                                                 25
a sexually dangerous person. Therefore, we modify and correct the sentencing order to delete

this designation.

                                         III. Conclusion

       In conclusion, we find merit in none of Walker’s arguments on appeal, and we affirm

his convictions for thirty counts of distributing, possessing, or viewing matter depicting

sexually explicit conduct involving a child. However, we modify the sentencing order as

explained above.

       Affirmed as modified.

       MURPHY and BROWN, JJ., agree.

       Lassiter Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.

       Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., and Karen

Virginia Wallace, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

                                                26