Court Opinion

ID: 9916554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:09:55.956487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:37.652547
License: Public Domain

Barrier Group Inc. v BMF Advance LLC
               2023 NY Slip Op 34578(U)
                     March 15, 2023
             Supreme Court, Orange County
       Docket Number: Indez No. EF004150/2022
            Judge: Elena Goldberg-Velazquez
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
 Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
 State and local government sources, including the New
  York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.
 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
  FILED: ORANGE COUNTY CLERK 03/21/2023 10:34 AM                                                             INDEX NO. EF004150-2022
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 83                                                                                    RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/16/2023

                To commence the statutory time period
                For appeals as of right (CPLR § 5513[a]),
                you are advised to serve a copy of this
                order, with notice of entry,
                upon all parties.

                SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                COUNTY OF ORANGE
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------x
                THE BARRIER GROUP INC. D/B/A DRIP DROP
                WATERPROOFING, FORTUNE REAL LLC D/B/A                                          DECISION & ORDER
                FORTUNE REAL, SUB ENTERPRISES INC. D/B/A                                       Index No. EF004150-2022
                SUB ENTERPRISES, 131 CLARK STREET LLC D/B/A
                131 CLARK STREET, FOAM RITE INC D/B/A                                          Motion Seq. 2
                FOAM RITE, SJP REAL LLC D/B/A SJP REAL,
                UPSTATE REAL LLC D/B/A UPSTATE REAL,
                AND JOEL REICH,
                                        Plaintiff(s),
                                    -against-

                BMF ADVANCE LLC, A NEW YORK LIMITED
                LIABILITY COMPANY, GAVRIEL TITZCHAKOV,
                AND STEVEN ZAHARYAYEV,

                                                   Defendant(s).
                ------------------------------------------------------------------------x
                Hon. Elena Goldberg-Velazquez, J.S.C.

                         The following papers numbered 1 - 4 were considered in connection with Defendants

                Notice of Motion (Motion #2) for an Order pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §§

                321 l(a)(l) and (7) dismissing the Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs based upon a defense

                founded upon documentary evidence and for failure to state a cause of action, and for such other

                and further relief as the Court deems just and proper:

                PAPERS                                                                                          NUMBERS

                Notice of Motion (Motion #1)/Affinnation of Steven W. Wells, Esq./
                Exhibits 1-9/Memorandum of Law in Support                                                            1

                                                                         1

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           Memorandwn of Law in Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss/Exhibit L                                   2

           Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of their Motion to
           Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint                                                                     3

            Supplemental Affinnation of Steven W. Wells, Esq./Exhibit 1                                              4

                                                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                    Plaintiff commenced the instant action with thee-filing ofa Summons and Civil

            Complaint on July 25, 2022. Plaintiff also e-filed an Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1) on July

           26, 2022, seeking to stay the Judgment in the case, BMF v. THE BARRIER GROUP INC. DIBIA

           DRIP DROPWATERPROOFING, FORTUNE REAL LLC DIB/A, FORTUNE REAL, SUB

           ENTERPRISES INC. DIBIA SUB ENTERPRISES, 131 CLARK STREET LLC DIB/A

            131 CLARK STREET, FOAM RITE INC DIB/A FOAM RITE, SJP REAL LLC DIB/A SJP REAL,

            UPSTATE REAL LLC DIB/A UPSTATE REAL.AND JOEL REICH, Index# EF004023-2022

            pending decision on the Complaint in the instant action. On July 26, 2022, The Honorable

           James L. Hyer, J.S.C. granted the stay pending a hearing and detennination on the motion and

            directed service of the Order and the supporting papers by overnight delivery. 1 Additionally,

           Defendants were directed that opposition was to be filed and served on Plaintiff via overnight

            delivery by August 12, 2022, and the parties were to appear on August 19, 2022, for oral

            argument on the Order to Show Cause.

                    Plaintiff's counsel filed an Affidavit of Service from "Olivia Merth" indicating that the

            Summons, Complaint and the annexed exhibits, the Order to Show Cause and the supporting

            1 A review of the Proposed Order to Show Cause and the supporting papers filed with it (NYSCEF DOCS# 14-16)

            indicate the application is "EXPARTE" but there is no Affidavit of Emergency or compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.7(f).
            Nonetheless, the Court granted the emergency relief on the same date that the Order to Show Cause was filed .
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            papers were mailed to "2 NE Third St Unit 6B, Cohasset, MN 55721," and sent to Defendants

           BMF ADVANCE LLX at 1820 Ave M Suite 125, Brooklyn, NY 11230, GAVRIEL

           YITZCHAKOVat 1820 Ave M Suite 125, Brooklyn, NY 11230 and STEVEN

           ZAKHARYAYEVat 1430 Broad Street Suite 402, New York, NY 10018 by "OvernightMail."2

                    On August 4, 2022, Attorney Steven W. Wells of Wells Law P.C. filed a Notice of

           Appearance in the instant action on behalf of all three Defendants. Subsequently, Attorney

           Wells on behalf of the Defendants filed opposition to the Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1) on

           August 12, 2022. Plaintiff filed an Affinnation of Reply on August 17, 2022, which was

           rejected by Defendants' counsel via a Notice of Rejection on August 18, 2022. Plaintiff's

            counsel objected to the Notice of Rejection via a letter on August 20, 2022.

                    On August 22, 2022, the parties appeared before the Honorable James L. Hyer, J.S.C. for

            oral argument as to the Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1). The transcript of the appearance was

            uploaded to NYSCEF on August 30, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc.# 34) as directed at the conference but

           was never "So Ordered" by the Court. A review of the transcript demonstrates that the stay

            sought in the Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1) was granted, and a discovery order was ordered

            by the Court.3 The discovery order was memorialized in a Preliminary Conference Order dated

            2 The instant Affidavit of Service is the only documentation indicating that the Defendants were served with the

           Summons and Complaint in this matter. The instant Affidavit of Service does not indicate compliance with Civil
           Practice Law and Rules§ 308. Additionally, the Plaintiff never e-filed any application for substituted service. Also,
           the Affidavit of Service indicates that "Olivia Merth" is signing the Affidavit of Service in the "State of New York,
           County of Orange," but the notary (which is on a separate page with an electronic signature and in a different font)
           indicates that the notary was present in the State of Florida, County of Pasco and the "Notarial Act [was]
           performed by Audio-Video Communication ." The Defendants have since appeared in this action, filed a Notice of
           Appearance, appeared at a conference before Judge Hyer and engaged in discovery and therefore any issue of
           personal jurisdiction has been waived .
           3 During the appearance there was no discussion or record made about the filing of an Answer by the Defendants

           and no application was made on the record for an extension to file an Answer . As of the date of this Decision and
           Order an Answer has not been filed by any of the Defendants, the Court has received no application for an
           extension for time to file an Answer and there has been no stipulation e-filed between the parties allowing same.
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           August 22, 2022, based upon a preliminary conference occurring on August 22, 2022.

                    On October 6, 2022, the Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss (Motion #2), and

           the parties continued to engage in discovery as directed by Judge Hyer's August 22, 2022, Order.

            Opposition was filed by Plaintiffs along with a Reply by the Defendants. Counsel for both

            parties submitted a joint letter to the Court dated November 7, 2022, seeking an extension of the

            discovery timelines set forth by the Court "for good cause shown." Specifically, both parties

            indicated that there was no prejudice to the Defendant in light of the fact that no Answer had

            been filed by the Defendants, there was a pre-answer Motion to Dismiss pending and discovery

           was not fruitful since the Defendant's affirmative defenses were unknown at this time. Further,

           the parties stated that they believed the Plaintiff would be prejudiced by continuing to engage in

           the discovery schedule without a decision as to the Motion to Dismiss and determination as to

           the necessity for the Defendants to file an Answer. As the basis for the good cause the parties

            indicated in the letter:

                    Defendants, therefore, have not yet filed their Answer, as such Answer will only be
                    due if the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss, in which case it will be due
                    within ten days after notice of entry of the order. See CPLR321 l(f). As Defendants
                    have not yet filed their Answer, Plaintiffs do not know what affirmative defenses
                    Defendants will assert. Plaintiffs, therefore, have not been able to serve a Bill of
                    Particulars specifically tailored to amplification of any affirmative defenses
                    asserted by Defendants in their Answer .... Nor have Plaintiffs been able to meet
                    and confer with Defendants regarding documents and infonnation that Defendants
                    may use to support any affirmative defenses.

            On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff's counsel sought a hearing for oral argument on Defendant's

           Motion to Dismiss. The requests were denied by the Court and a compliance conference was

            scheduled for January 2023. Subsequent to the scheduling of the January 2023 compliance

            conference counsel for the Defendants submitted a Supplemental Affirmation with a decision on

            a newly decided matter alleged to be similar to the instant action annexed to the Affinnation.
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                   The matter was heard virtually for a compliance conference on January 31, 2023, by the

            undersigned. At the appearance the parties renewed their application to stay discovery pending

            the decision on the instant Motion to Dismiss. Their application was granted and an Order

            granting same was issued on January 31, 2023.

                                              ARGUMENTS/ANALYSIS

                   This is an action to seeking to vacate a judgment of confession that Defendant obtained

            against Plaintiff on or about July 19, 2022, in the State of New York, Supreme Court, Orange

            County, in a prior action entitled BMF v. THE BARRIER GROUP INC. DIB/A DRIP DROP

            WATERPROOFING, FORTUNE REAL LLC D/B/A, FORTUNE REAL, SUB ENTERPRISES

           INC. DIB/A SUB ENTERPRISES, 131 CLARK STREET LLC DIB/A

            131 CLARK STREET, FOAM RITE INC DIB/A FOAM RITE, SJP REAL LLC DIB/A SJP REAL,

            UPSTATE REAL LLC D/B/A UPSTATE REAL,AND JOEL REICH bearing Index No. EF004023-

           2022. Plaintiffs commenced the instant action to vacate the July 19, 2022, confession of

           judgment due to usury, refusal to reconcile, fraud, unconscionability, violations of 18 U.S.C. §

            1962(c) (the RICO Act) and based upon a violation Judiciary Law§ 487.

                   Plaintiffs have alleged that the Confession of Judgment should be vacated as the

           Agreement it is based upon is usurious, that the reconciliation provisions in the Agreement were

            a sham designed to disguise the Agreement as a purchase accounts receivable rather than a loan

            and that the Defendants did not maintain a reconciliation department and refused to provide

           Plaintiff with reconciliation prior to filing the confession of judgment, that the Defendants

            engaged in fraud in inducing the Plaintiffs to enter into the Agreement including false

            representations regarding fees, that the Agreement is an unconscionable contract of adhesion not
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           negotiated at arms-length, that the debt owed to Defendant by Plaintiff is an unlawful debt

            pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6), that all Defendants unlawfully,

           knowingly, and willfully combined, conspired, confederated and agreed with members of the

           Enterprise to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d) and Defendant

            Steven Zakharyayev violated Judiciary Law § 487 by conspiring with other Defendants by

            participating in the "Enterprise" and submitting documents in support of the Confession of

           Judgment that omitted key facts in an effort to deceive the Court.

                   The Plaintiffs commenced the instant action seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon

           the filing of an affidavit of confession of judgment. Generally, a party seeking to vacate a

           judgment that has been entered upon the filing of an affidavit of a confession of judgment must

            commence a separate plenary action to obtain that relief. See Funding Metrics, LLC v. A & A

           Fabrication and Polishing Corp., 187 AD3d 857 (2d Dept 2020) quoting Moroncho v.

           Monterroza, 170 AD3d 710, 711 (2d Dept 2019); Regency Club at Wallkill, LLC v. Bienshi, 95

           AD3d 879 (2d Dept 2012); Rubino v. Csikortos, 258 AD2d 638 (2d Dept 1999); L.R. Dean, Inc.

           v. International Energy Resources, Inc., 213 AD2d 455,456 (2d Dept 1995); City of

           Poughkeepsie v. Albano, 122 AD2d 14 (2d Dept 1986). "The policy behind requiring a plenary

            action to vacate judgments by confession is that 'sharply contested issues of fact should not be

           resolved upon affidavits, but rather by trial in a plenary action"' NRO Boston, LLC v.

            Yellowstone Capital, LLC, 72 Misc3d 267, 277 (Rockland Cty., Sup. Ct., 2021) quoting

           Scheckter v. Ryan, 161 AD2d 344 (1st Dept 1990). However, a judgment by confession may be

           vacated upon a motion by the judgment debtor when they demonstrate that the judgment was

            entered without authority, which includes a challenge to the debtor's compliance with the

           requirements of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3218. See Ripoli v. Rodriguez, 53 AD2d 63 8 (2d
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           Dept 1976).

                    Here, Plaintiffs assert that the contract at issue is not what it purports to be, an agreement

           to purchase future accounts receivables, but rather is a disguised loan which contains hidden

            provisions in fees which looked at in the aggregate charge usurious interest far in excess of New

           York State's permitted civil rate of usury at 16% and criminal rate of usury at 25%. According

           to Plaintiff the instant Agreement is a usurious loan that is void on its face and relieves the

           Plaintiff of his obligations under the Agreement and invalidates the Confession of Judgment filed

            on July 1, 2022, by the Defendants.

             VACATUR OF CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
                         CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES § 3218(a)(2)

                    Plaintiffs also move to vacate the Confession of Judgment on the grounds that the

           Affidavit of Confession of Judgment does not comply with Civil Practice Law and Rules §

            3218(a)(2). Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to and emphasizes the language in section (a)(1)4 that

            states "showing that the sum confessed is justly due or to become due." According to Plaintiff

           the Affidavit ofGavriel Yitzchakov filed with and supporting Defendant's application for a

           judgment alleges that Plaintiffs breached the Agreement between themselves and Defendants.

           Plaintiff contends that Yitzchakov's Affidavit is insufficient and fails to comply with Civil

           Practice Law and Rules § 3218 because it does not mention the communication between Plaintiff

           Reich and Gavriel Yitzchakov5 regarding Plaintiffs request for reconciliation and the requests

           4 Plaintiff's incorrectly references§ (a)(l) but cites the language from § (a)(2).
                                                                                           The Court considers the incorrect
           reference a typographical error and references the correct section in further discussion of Plaintiffs' application.
           5 The emails submitted by Plaintiff as to the communication indicate that Plaintiff was communicating with a

           person named Gabriel lsaacov, not Gavriel Yitzchakov. The Court is left to assume that Gabriel lsaacov is an alias
           for Gavriel Yitzchakov, as Plaintiff has not clarified same.
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            denial. Plaintiffs cite an Appellate Division, Second Department matter, Cole-Hatchard v.

           Nicholson, 73 AD3d 834 (2d Dept 2010), which they assert states that judgment of confession

           that does not have sufficient factual description is subject to vacatur and may be deemed

            unenforceable in support of their argument. The Defendants did not address Plaintiffs

            allegation regarding Defendant's failure to comply with Civil Practice Law and Rules §

            3218(a)(2) in the instant Motion to Dismiss despite it being raised in the Amended Complaint

            (paragraphs 31 - 37) and incorporated in each cause of action.

                     Turning first to the Plaintiffs argument that the Confession of Judgment should be

           vacated based upon the Defendants failure to comply with Civil Practice Law and Rules §

            3218(a)(2). Plaintiffs concede that the judgment of confession entered was authorized by the

            Confession of Judgment signed by Plaintiff Joel Reich on April 27, 2022, but argue that the

           resultant Judgment is nevertheless void because Gavriel Yitzchakov failed to inform the Court in

           his Affirmation6 that there was a dispute between the parties regarding reconciliation. Plaintiffs

            appear to argue this omission in Gavriel Yitzchakov's Affidavit renders it "insufficient," not that

           the Confession of Judgment signed by Plaintiff Reich is "insufficient."

                     Civil Practice Law and Rules§ 3218(a)(2) provides requirements for the "Affidavit of

            defendant" including that the judgment that the defendant (Plaintiff in the instant action) is

            confessing is for money due and there is a statement with concise facts as to how the debt arose

            and that the sum confessed is justly due or to become due. The procedures of§ 3218 are in place

           to limit the necessity for litigation by identifying a claim at the beginning of a parties' agreement

            6 Plaintiff refers to an "Affirmation" submitted by Gavriel Yitzchakov in support of the entry of judgment.

           However, the document annexed to the Plaintiff's Complaint is entitled "Affidavit in Support of Entry of
           Judgment." (NYSCEF Doc# 9) .
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            and agreeing to a judgment at the outset. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3218 sets forth

           requirements for the affidavit executed by the debtor (the Plaintiffs in this matter) not the

            plaintiffs (creditor) in an action. In Plaintiffs' Complaint they seek vacatur of the Confession of

           Judgment by challenging the affidavit of the creditor, not the debtor. Plaintiffs' assertion that the

           Affidavit of Gavriel Yitchakov fails to comply with the requirements set forth in § 3218 is

           misplaced, as it is not the affidavit for which the requirements are set forth and cannot be the

           basis of vacatur of the Confession of Judgment. Plaintiff makes no argument that the Confession

            of Judgment signed by Plaintiff Joel Reich does not comply with the requirements set forth in

            Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3218. Plaintiff is mistakenly applying the requirements for

            Confession of Judgment to the affidavit of the creditor seeking the judgment asserting that they

           would have to explain efforts between the parties to cure or challenge a default by Plaintiffs.

           Nothing within the requirements of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3218 dictates that a plaintiff

            creditor must explain how a defendant debtor breached their agreement or defaulted. As such,

           Plaintiffs' argument seeking vacatur pursuant to § 3218 is a red herring that this Court finds

            insufficient as a basis for vacatur of the Confession of Judgment obtained in the related action,

            Index# EF004023-2022.

                   Nonetheless, since the Plaintiff has raised the issue, this Court has considered whether the

           Affidavit of Joel Reich signed on April 27, 2022, and filed in the related action EF004023-2022

            on July 28, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc #1) complies with the requirements set forth in Civil Practice

           Law and Rules§ 3218. The tenns of the confession indicate in paragraph twelve (12) that the

            "Confession" was executed in the event of default on the "Future Receivables Sale and Purchase

           Agreement dated April 26, 2022." There is no specific section within the agreement that

            precludes entry of the Confession until a default has occurred and Defendant could have filed the
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            Confession prior to the Plaintiff Debtor's default as a security without seeking a judgment until

            the default actually occurred. However, in the instant action Defendants (creditors) did not file

            the Confession of Judgment until July 2022, several weeks after the Plaintiffs were in default of

           the Agreement due to non-payment after June 16, 2022. Any argument by Plaintiffs for vacatur

            of the Confession of Judgment based upon insufficiency of Reich's Affidavit is ofno moment

            since § 3218 does not provide requirements as to the plaintiff creditors affinnation/affidavit and

            in the instant action the Defendants did not seek a judgment until the Plaintiffs had defaulted on

           the Agreement making their demand for reconciliation unnecessary infonnation as to the

            enforcement of the Confession of Judgment.

                   As stated previously, the Court has considered the documentary evidence annexed to the

            Complaint, Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1), Defendant's instant Motion to Dismiss

            and Plaintiff's opposition. The review has demonstrated that on June 14, 2022, the Plaintiff

            sought reconciliation after making a payment as part of an agreement with Defendant to cure a

            default that had occurred several times prior to June 13, 2022. The emails between Plaintiff and

           Defendant demonstrate that to remove Plaintiff from their "default" status they needed to submit

           two (2) payments on June 13 and have no further "bounces." Plaintiff complied on June 13,

           2022, and wired Defendant two (2) payments, but then again had insufficient payments (i.e.

            "bounces") beginning on June 16, 2022. Therefore, the Plaintiff failed to comply with both

           requirements agreed upon between the parties to remove Plaintiffs' "default" status. As such, at

           the time the Plaintiff filed the Confession of Judgment in July 2022 the statement in paragraph

            six (6) of the Affidavit of Gavriel Yitzchakov indicating that the Plaintiffs breached the

           Agreement was accurate and demonstrated that the sum confessed by Plaintiffs "is justly due" to

           the Defendants and in compliance with Civil Practice Law and Rules§ 3218(a)(2).
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            DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND
                                 RULES §§ 3211(a)(l) and (7)

                   In the first four causes of action, Plaintiff seeks affirmative relief of vacatur of the

            Confession of Judgment dated July 19, 2022, and invalidation of the underlying Agreement,

            based upon usury, a refusal to reconcile, fraud and unconscionability all predicated on the

            argument that the Agreement is a loan. Plaintiff also seeks restitution of moneys collected by

           Defendant, an accounting and reconciliation of all the funds remitted to Defendants, a finding

           that the fees set forth in the Agreement are in fact interest and assist in disguising the true nature

            of the Agreement which Plaintiff alleges is a loan and finding the tenns are unconscionable

            including the requirement for the Plaintiff to cover a set amount of attorney's fees if the

           Agreement is challenged.

                   Defendants have filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Civil Practice Law and

           Rules§§ 321 l(a)(l) and (7). In support of their motion Defendants have referenced the

            documents annexed to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, documents annexed to their opposition to

           Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1) and provided additional documents including seven

            (7) decisions of other courts they indicate address the same issues presented before the

           undersigned and a hearing transcript from a proceeding before the Supreme Court, Nassau

            County which they also assert addresses the same issues presented in the instant matter.

                   Civil Practice Law and Rules§ 321 l(a)(l) provides that "[a] party may move for

           judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that. .. a

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            defense is found upon documentary evidence ... " To successfully move to dismiss a complaint

            pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 321 l(a)(l ), the movant must present documentary

            evidence that resolves all factual issues as a matter oflaw, and conclusively disposes of the

            plaintiff's claim. See AGCS Mar. Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 102 AD3d 899, 900 (2d Dept

           2013) quoting Nevin v. Laclede Professional Prods., 273 AD2d 453 (2d Dept 2000); See Ruffino

            v. Serio, 206 AD3d 775 (2d Dept 2022); Goshen v. Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 314 (2002).

                   Civil Practice Law and Rules§ 3211 (a)(7) provides that a party may move to dismiss an

            action on the ground that "the pleading fails to state a cause of action." "On a motion to dismiss

            pursuant to CPLR § 3211, the complaint is to be afforded a liberal construction" and the facts

            alleged are generally accepted as true and afforded every possible favorable inference. Benitez v.

           Bolla Operating LI Corp., 189 AD3d 970 (2d Dept 2020); Gorbatov v. Tsirelman, 155 AD3d

            836 (2d Dept 2017); See Rushaid v. Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316 (2016). Further, "[i]n reviewing

            a motion pursuant to CPLR § 321 l(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of

            action, the facts as alleged in the complaint must be accepted as true, the plaintiff is accorded the

           benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court's function is to determine only

           whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory." Benitez v. Bolla Operating

           LI Corp., 189 AD3d at 970 quoting Mendelovitz v. Cohen, 37 AD3d 670,671 (2d Dept 2007);

           See Edelman v. Berman, 195 AD3d 995 (2d Dept 2021). In determining a motion to dismiss

            pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a)(7) the Court should not consider whether a

           plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations. See Kaufman v. Kaufman, 206 AD3d 805 (2d

           Dept2022).

           Plaintiff's First Cause ofAction (Defendant BMF Advance) - Vacate the Judgment Based
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            upon Alleged Usury

                   In the instant motion to dismiss one of the arguments made by Defendants is that the

           relief sought by Plaintiffs must be dismissed as a matter of law. The Defendants assert that the

            criminal usury statute is not a basis for an affinnative claim and that the documentary evidence

            presented demonstrates that the agreement between the parties was not a loan, and therefore the

            agreement was not subject to the usury statutes. Prior to determination of the applicability of

            usury to the instant Agreement the Court must determine the nature of the agreement; is it an

            agreement to purchase receivables or a loan. When detennining the nature of an agreement to

            purchase receivables, the language of the nature of the contract is not conclusive, rather the

            contract "must be considered in its totality and judged by its real character, rather than by name,

            color or form which the parties have seen fit to give it." LG Funding, LLC v. United Senior

           Props of Olathe, LLC, 181 AD3d 664 (2d Dept 2020). A court considering an agreement to

            purchase receivables must determine whether the party purchasing the receivables is entitled to

           repayment under all circumstances, since unless principal sum advanced is repayable absolutely,

           the transaction cannot be a loan. See Rubenstein v. Small, 273 AD 102 (1st Dept 1947). In

           making this determination a court must weight three (3) factors as to whether repayment is

            absolute or contingent: (1) whether there is a reconciliation provision in the agreement; (2)

           whether the agreement has a finite term and (3) whether there is any recourse should the

           merchant declare bankruptcy. See LG Funding LLC v. United Senior Properties of Olathe, LLC,

            181 AD3d at 666; K9 Bytes, Inc. v, Arch Capital Funding, LLC, 56 Misc.3d 807,816 (Sup. Ct.,

           Westchester Cty., 2017); See also Pirs Capital, LLC v. D & M Truck, Tire & Trailer Repair,

           Inc., 69 Misc3d 457 (Sup. Ct, NY Cty., 2020); Retail Capital, LLC v. Spice Intentions, Inc., 2017

           WL 123374 at *2 (Sup. Ct., Queens Cty, 2017). Unless a principal sum advanced is repayable
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            absolutely the transaction is not a loan." LG Funding, LLC v. United Senior Properties of

            Olathe, LLC, 181 AD3d at 666. Further, "[t]o determine whether a transaction constitutes a

           usurious loan, [the agreement] must be considered in its totality and judged by its real character,

           rather than by name, color, or form which the parties have seen fit to give it."

                   The record before this Court contains a copy of an agreement entitled "Secured Purchase

           Agreement" [hereinafter "Agreement"] dated April 26, 2022, a copy of the pleadings, the

            affinnation of Defendant's counsel, a copy of an affidavit of confession of judgment dated April

           27, 2022, a copy of a judgment of confession dated July 19, 2022 (Index# EF004023-2022), an

           Affidavit of Pacts of Gavriel Yitzchakov dated July 1, 2022 in support of the filing for a

           judgment, a copy of Plaintiffs remittance history filed August 12, 2022 (in opposition to Motion

           #1), Plaintiffs proof of wire transfer in the amount of$9,994.00 dated June 13, 2022, emails

            between counsel for the parties as to reconciliation and the Plaintiffs alleged default, and a letter

            from Plaintiffs attorney to Defendant dated June 14, 2022 requesting "reconciliation."

                   The first page of the Agreement states in the second paragraph "[m ]erchant is selling a

            portion of a future revenue stream to MBF at a discount, not borrowing money from BMF.

            Therefore, there is no interest rate or payment schedule and no time period during which the

           Purchased Amount must be collected by BMF." In a section entitled "Sale of Receipts," Section

            1.10, the agreement provides that "Merchant and BMF agree that the Purchase Price under this

           Agreement is in exchange for the Purchase Amount and that such Purchase Price is not intended

           to be, nor shall it be construed as a loan from BMF to Merchant." The Agreement further

            provides in section 1.10 that "[i]n no event shall the aggregate of all amounts or any portion

           thereof be deemed as interest hereunder and in the event it is found to be interest despite the

            parties hereto specifically representing that it is NOT interest, it shall be found that no sum
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            charged or collected hereunder shall exceed the highest rate pennissible at law." Furthennore,

            section 1.10 expressly provides that "[a]s a result thereof, Merchant knowingly and willingly

           waives the defense of usury in any action or proceeding." The Court must apply the three (3)

            factors set forth in forth in LG Funding, LLC to distinguish between loans and receivable

            purchases.

                   The first prong of the test is whether the contract has a reconciliation provision that

            allows the merchant to seek adjustments of the amount remitted to the purchaser. In this matter,

           the Agreement contains a reconciliation provision, Section 1.4 of the Agreement provides that

            "every two (2) calendar weeks after the funding of the Purchase Price to Merchant, Merchant

           may give notice to BMF to request a decrease in the Remittance. The amount shall be decreased

            if the amount received by BMF was more than the Purchased Percentage of all revenue of

           Merchant since the date of this Revenue Purchase Agreement." The calculation of the

           modification of the remittance in the reconciliation provision is determined "to more closely

           reflect the Merchant's actual receipts by multiplying the Merchant's actual receipts by the

           Purchased Percentage divided by the number of business days in the previous two (2) calendar

           weeks." Plaintiffs assert that no reconciliation ever occurred, and that the reconciliation

            provision was a sham to hide a usurious loan. Plaintiffs' support for this assertion is a letter

            dated June 14, 2022, from counsel to Defendants and an email "thread" beginning June 15, 2022

           with an email from Plaintiff Joel Reich to his counsel including bank statements and bank login

            infonnation and continuing "arguments" between Plaintiffs counsel (Isaac Stem of the

           Levenson Law Group) and Gabe Isaacov as to compliance with the reconciliation provision of

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           the Agreement. 7 The essence of the email exchange between Stem and Isaacov is that Defendant

            could not engage in reconciliation based upon the Plaintiffs' failure to provide Defendant with all

            of the accounts requested for reconciliation and that the reconciliation was sought after the

           Plaintiff complied with only one (1) requirement of the agreement to remove them from default

            (payment of two payments on Jtme 13, 2022). The evidence presented by Plaintiff does not

            demonstrate that there was no reconciliation provision in the Agreement or that it was a sham to

           hide a usurious loan. Rather, the emails demonstrate that the Plaintiffs and Defendants were

            operating under the belief that the Agreement contained a reconciliation provision but disagreed

           whether reconciliation was required based upon documents sought by Defendants and whether

           Defendants adjudged Plaintiffs in default at the time of the reconciliation request.

                     The next prong of the test is whether the transaction is for a fixed or finite term or for a

           non-finite term. Loans generally consist of a face value that must be repaid with interest over a

            specific finite time period. See Pirs Capital, LLC v. D & M Truck, Tire & Trailer Repair, Inc.,

            69 Misc3d at 463. An agreement for purchase of future receivables has a "non-finite term"

            because the time to complete the transaction contemplated by the agreement is contingent on an

            outside factor, which is customers shopping and paying the merchant for products or services

           which creates receivables that are available to be collected by the purchaser. See Id.; See also

           IBIS Capital Group, LLC v. Four Paws Orlando, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op. 30477 [U], at 5*, 2017

           WL 1065071 (Sup Ct, Nassau Cty, 2017). In this action the Agreement has repayment terms

           that are non-finite. Section 1.2 entitled "Tenn of Agreement" states "[t]his Agreement shall

            7 The emails contain numerous personal threats between counsel and Gabe lsaacov regarding advertisements

            indicating that if Gabe lsaacov "tried to abuse or extort you like he has abused or extorted our client please call the
            Law office of Levenson Law, LLC" and other personal attacks of lsaacov's character known to Plaintiff's counsel.
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           remain in full force and effect until the entire Purchased Amount and any other amounts due are

           received by BMF as per the terms of this Agreement."       Additionally, the terms are set forth in

           the first paragraph of the first page under the title PURCHASE AND SALE OF FUTURE

           RECEIVABLES: "Merchant hereby sells, assigns, and transfers to BMF ... in consideration of

           the "Purchase Price" specified below, the Purchased Percentage of all of the Merchant's future

            accounts, contract rights and other entitlements arising from or relating to the payment of monies

            from Merchant's customers' and/or other third party payors .... for the payments due to Merchant

            as a result of Merchant's sale of goods and/or services ... until the 'Purchase Amount has been

            delivered by or on behalf of Merchant to BMF. "' Therefore, there is no finite tenn for the

           transaction demonstrating a receivable purchase, not a loan.

                   The third prong of the test is whether the purchaser has any recourse in the event of a

           merchant's bankruptcy. An agreement may be treated as a loan if the purchaser has recourse,

            often through a personal guaranty. See K9 Bytes, Inc. v, Arch Capital Funding, LLC, 56 Misc3d

            at 816-818. Section 3 of the Agreement addresses events that result in default of the Agreement

            and remedies for the default by Plaintiff Section 3 .1 specifies events of default and does not

            include bankrnptcy as one of those events. Plaintiff Joel Reich also provided a personal guaranty

            under a document entitled "SECURITY AGREEMENT AND GUARANTY" which does not

           require that as part of his personal guaranty he be required to perform the merchant's obligations

            under the Agreement if the merchant files for bankruptcy. The personal guaranty is included in

           the section entitled "GUARANTY OF PERFORMANCE" and states "[a]s an additional

            inducement for BMF to enter into this Agreement, the undersigned Guarantor(s) hereby provides

           BMF with this Guaranty. Guarantor(s) will not be personally liable for any amount due under

           this Agreement unless Merchant commits an Event of Default pursuant to Paragraph 3.1 of this
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           Agreement." Bankruptcy is not an "Event of Default" as set forth in paragraph 3.1 of the

           Agreement. Further, Section 3.2 of the Agreement entitled "Limited Personal Guaranty"

            indicates that "[i]n the Event of a Default, BMF will enforce its rights against the guarantors of

           this transaction. Said Guarantors will be jointly and severally liable to BMF for all ofBMF's

            losses and damages, in additional [sic] to all costs and expenses and legal fees associated with

            such enforcement." Again, this section does not require Plaintiff Reich to guarantee anything in

           the event of the merchant's bankruptcy, since this section is only triggered by an "Event of

           Default," which does not include bankruptcy. Therefore, the recourse provision of the

           Agreement also demonstrates that this is a receivable purchase, not a loan.

                   Based upon the review of the documents submitted in this matter, specifically the

            language within the Agreement itself, which is unambiguous, the Court finds that the Agreement

            between the parties was a purchase of future receivables, not a loan.

                   After determination of the nature of the Agreement, the Court can now address Plaintiffs

            cause of action seeking vacatur of the Confession of Judgment and invalidation of the underlying

           Agreement based on usury. In New York there is a presumption that an arm's length transaction

            between negotiating parties is not usurious. See Giventer v. Arnow, 37 NY2d 305 (1975); K9

           Bytes, Inc. v. Arch Capital Funding, LLC, 56 Misc3d 807 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cty. 2017).

            The Appellate Division, Second Department has stated that "[t]he rndimentary element of usury

            is the existence of a loan or forbearance of money, and where there is no loan, there can be no

           usury, however unconscionable the contract may be." LG Funding, LLC v. United Senior

           Properties of Olathe, LLC, 181 AD3d 664,665 (2d Dept 2020). The evidence presented in this

           matter demonstrates that the Agreement was a receivables purchase, not a loan and as such the

           Agreement is not subject to New York's usury statutes, since usury is inapplicable in the absence
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            ofa loan. See Donatelli v. Siskind, 170 AD2d 433,434 (2d Dept 1991). "The rudimentary

            element of usury is the existence of a loan and where there is no loan, there can be no usury,

           however unconscionable the contract may be." Principis Capital, LLC v. I Do, Inc., 201 AD3d

            752 (2d Dept 2022).

                   Plaintiff cites Penal Law§ 190.40, criminal usury, as an affirmative defense and basis for

           vacatur of the Confession of Judgment and the underlying Agreement. However, it is well

            settled law that there is no private right of action for criminal usury pursuant to Penal Law §

            190.40. See FCI Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Capital Group, LLC, 2019 WL 1297984 (Sup

            CT, NY Cty 2019). Additionally, criminal usury under Penal Law§ 190.40 is only a defense to

            an action to recover repayment of a loan, not the basis for a cause of action where affinnative

           relief is sought. See Paycation Travel, Inc. v. Glob Merchant Cash, Inc., 192 AD3d 1040, 1041

            (2d Dept 2012).

                   The Court has considered the arguments presented by the parties and has already

            detennined that the Agreement between the parties is an agreement to purchase receivables, not a

            loan. Considering there is no private right of action for criminal usury as set forth in New York

           Penal Law and it can only be raised as a defense to an action for repayment of a loan, not

            affinnative relief and since this Court has determined that the Agreement between the parties is

           not a loan, Plaintiffs cause of action alleging that the underlying Agreement is a criminally

            usurious loan must fail as a matter oflaw pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §§

            3211 (a)(1) and (7). As such, Defendant has demonstrated an entitlement to dismissal of

           Plaintiff's first cause of action for vacatur of judgment due to usury tmder Civil Practice Law

           and Rules § 5015(a)(3) and all other relief sought.

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           Plaintiffs Second Cause ofAction (Defendants BMF Advance and Gavriel Yitzchakov) -
           Vacate the Judgment Based Upon Refusal to Reconcile

                   In the second cause of action the Plaintiffs seek vacatur of the Confession of Judgement

            and invalidation of the underlying Agreement based upon the Defendants failure to engage in

           reconciliation after requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that the fixed and absolute payments

            and provisions of the Agreement are a sham to disguise that the Agreement was really a loan.

            The Plaintiff alleges that the lack of the existence of a reconciliation department, the fact that

           there was no one trained or dedicated to performing reconciliation, that there is no contact

            infonnation for the reconciliation department in the Agreement and there are no tenns in the

           Agreement indicating how to request a conciliation demonstrate that the Agreement was a

            disguised loan.

                   In opposition the Defendant asserts that the provision entitled "[a]djustments to the

           remittance" is the reconciliation provision in the Agreement in that it allows adjustments to the

            amounts debited from the Merchant based upon cash flow or "lack thereof' citing K9 Bytes, Inc.

            v. Arch Corp. Funding, LLC, 56 Misc3d 807,817 (NY, Sup. Ct. 2017). Additionally, the

           Defendant compares the adjustment section in the Agreement with the reconciliation provision

           requirements set forth in K9 Bytes noting they are identical. Defendant asserts that the

            adjustment section contains all the requirements required to infonn Plaintiff of the basis for a

           reconciliation and the procedure to obtain same. Specifically, Defendant argues the adjustment

            section allows for the amount of a merchant's payments to be changed upon its receivables and

           therefore the payments are not fixed repayments of"principal", and any increase or decrease is

            based solely on receivables, not interest. The Defendant contends these terms also demonstrate

           that the Agreement is not a loan. This Court has already detennined that the Agreement contains

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            a valid reconciliation provision demonstrating that the Agreement is one for purchase of

           receivables, not a loan. Similarly, the Court finds that the instant Agreement has a valid

           reconciliation provision, which also demonstrates the Agreement between the parties is not a

            loan.

                    Turning to Plaintiff's alternative argument in the second cause of action, that the

           Defendants were required to reconcile when requested by Plaintiffs on June 13, 2022, as there

           was no "[ e]vent of [d]efault" that had occurred at the time of the request. In support of their

           Motion to Dismiss Defendant contends that the documentary evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff

           was not eligible for a reconciliation as Section 1.4 since that remedy it is only available if the

           merchant has not defaulted. According to Defendant the Plaintiff/Merchant defaulted "almost

            immediately after requesting a reconciliation" and was in default until the Confession of

           Judgment was filed a month later, July 2022. Therefore, Defendant states the valid

           reconciliation portion of the Agreement was inapplicable to Plaintiff's request on June 13, 2022,

            due to Plaintiff's default and as such cannot be the basis for vacatur of the Confession of

           Judgment.

                    A review of Section 1.4 of the Agreement demonstrates that there is a reconciliation

            portion of the Agreement, contrary to Plaintiff's argument. Section 1.4 sets forth terms of when

            an adjustment can be sought by the merchant. Specifically, the section states that the adjustment

            can occur every two (2) calendar weeks after the funding of the purchase price to the merchant

           as long as the merchant has not defaulted. The adjustment section also provides a process for

            a merchant to obtain an adjustment: Merchant to "give notice to BMF to request a decrease in

           Remittance." Section 1.4 defines the formula that BMF will use to determine if the merchant is

            eligible for an adjustment. Plaintiff is correct that there is no contact infonnation for a
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           reconciliation department within Section 1.4, but they have also failed to include any statute or

            case law indicating that lack of contact information invalidates an adjustment section or the

            entire Agreement. This Court has already determined that the instant Agreement is not a loan,

           therefore any argument asserting that the use of the adjustment terms was for the purpose of

            disguising the Agreement as a loan is moot.

                   According to Defendant the "adjustment" section of the Agreement, Section 1.4, only

           requires the Defendant to conduct a reconciliation or adjustment if the merchant has not

            defaulted. Defendant contends that the Plaintiff defaulted almost immediately after requesting

           reconciliation and that as a result reconciliation was not an available remedy to Plaintiff due to

           their default status. Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant accepted a wire transfer on June 13,

           2022, and payments for two (2) days after based upon an email exchange which indicated that

           the wire payment receipt would result in the Plaintiff not being considered in default. The

           Plaintiff therefore contends that they were not in default on June 14, 2022, when their counsel

            sought the reconciliation via a letter (also annexed to the Complaint).

                   In determining whether the reconciliation portion, Section 1.4, was triggered by

           Plaintiff's written request for reconciliation on June 14, 2022, the Court must consider the

            evidence submitted as to whether the Plaintiff was in default at the time of the request. The

           Defendant has included a remittance history that demonstrates that Plaintiffs payments from

           June 17, 2022, to July 1, 2022, were returned as insufficient. The same remittance demonstrates

           that Defendant received a payment on June 13, 2022, of$4,997, an "incoming wire" of $9,994, a

            payment on Jtme 14, 2022, of$4,997, and a payment on June 15, 2022, of $4,997. Plaintiff

            annexed to their Complaint an email exchange between Plaintiff Joel Reich and Gabe Isaacov on

           June 13, 2022, regarding the Plaintiffs default that was as follows:
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                          Joel Reich: "You agreed I should send you two payments now as long [sic]
                          nothing else bounces and that will take me out of default. So I can wire you
                          and cover?
                          Gabe lsaacov: "Yes confirmed. You'll need to make up the rest of the
                          bounces later this week." And no more bounces at all.
                          Joel Reich: "But as long as there are no more bounces I am out of default
                          please, correct?"
                          Gabe lsaacov: "Ok"
                          The next email includes the wire sent by Reich.
            (emphasis added)

           Based upon the list of remittance provided by Defendants and not challenged by Plaintiffs,

            subsequent to the wire being sent by Plaintiff on June 13, 2022, the Plaintiff sent payments on

           June 14 and 15 and again defaulted on June 16. The email exchange between Reich and Isaacov

            demonstrates that Reich was aware that he would only be considered "out of default" if there was

            an immediate payment on June 13, 2022, which included two (2) payments and there were no

           more "bounces." At the time counsel for Plaintiff requested reconciliation on June 14, 2022, the

           Plaintiff's payments from June 13 and 14 had cleared and were accepted by Defendant.

            Therefore, on June 14, 2022, when the reconciliation request was made by Plaintiff, they had

            satisfied the first condition set forth by Isaacov to ensure they were not considered in default.

           However, despite sending two (2) payments on June 13, 2022, and payments on June 14 and

           June 15, Plaintiffs again defaulted two (2) days later, on June 16 due to insufficient funds. The

            emails between Plaintiff Reich and Isaacov demonstrate that the Plaintiff would only be

            considered "out of default" if he made the requested payments and did not have any further

            payments returned for insufficient funds. Unfortunately, forty-eight (48) hours after the request

           the Plaintiff again had a returned payment due to insufficient funds. The return of the payment

            due to insufficient funds, an event of default under Section 3 .1 (a) of the Agreement, triggered

           the contingency set forth in the email exchanges between Reich and Isaacov and rendered the

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           Plaintiff in default as of June 13, 2022. Therefore, Plaintiff was retroactively in default on June

            14, 2022, based upon the insufficient funds on June 16, 2022. The default status continued due

           to insufficient funds being available for payments from June 16, 2022, until July 1, 2022, when

           the Confession of Judgment was filed. Based upon the Plaintiffs failure to complete both

           requirements set forth by Isaacov in his email to ensure they were not in default on June 14,

           2022, Plaintiff was in default of the tenns of the Agreement at the time the reconciliation was

            sought. As such, Section 1.4, Adjustment of Remittance, was not available to Plaintiffs based

            upon their status of"default" at the time of the written request on June 14, 2022. The

           Defendants have demonstrated through documentary evidence a basis for dismissal of the second

            cause of action for Defendants refusal to reconcile pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules §§

            3211(a)(l) and (7).

           Plaintiff's Third Cause ofAction (Defendant BMF) for Fraud

                   With regard to Plaintiffs third cause of action for fraud, Defendant has argued that

           Plaintiffs have no cause of action for fraud because the Plaintiffs claim of fraud is truly an

            allegation of breach of contract. The primary fraud claim presented by the Plaintiff is a

           misrepresentation as to the fees assessed the Plaintiffs and their application as to the Agreement.

            The Defendant assert that the fraud claim is made without any other breach of contract claim and

            as such is insufficient to maintain a cause of action for fraud. According to Defendant the fraud

            claim is insufficient since the fees were clearly disclosed in the Agreement with specificity as to

           their purpose and amount.     The Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs have failed to plead any

            separate duty other than the duty to perform under the Agreement, failed to pleas a fraudulent

            misrepresentation collateral or extraneous to the Agreement or special damages that were caused
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            by the misrepresentation and are wrrecoverable as contract damages.

                   The documentary evidence demonstrates the parties considered and entered into a

            legitimate merchant purchase advance agreement, not a loan. "Elements of a cause of action

            [alleging] fraud require a material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity, intent to

            induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the Plaintiff and damages." Garendean Realty Owner,

           LLC v. Lang, 175 AD3d 653,653 (2d Dept 2019) quoting Eurycleia Partners, LP v. Seward &

           Kissel, LLP, 12 NY3d 553, 559 (2009); See also Ferrarella v. Godt, 131 AD3d 563 (2d Dept

           2015); Nafash v. Allstate Ins. Co., 137 AD3d 1088 (2d Dept 2016). Additionally, a claim

            sounding in fraud must be plead in particularity pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules§

            3016(b).

                   The Plaintiff's third cause of action is not plead with particularity as to the required

            elements. Plaintiff's Complaint contains no specific actions as to how the Plaintiffs were

            fraudulently induced into signing the contract. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the "fraud" is the

           type of contract itself, that it is not an agreement to purchase receivables but rather a usurious

            loan. For the reasons set forth at length above, this Court has ruled, as a matter of law, that the

            contract at issue is not a loan and therefore is not usurious. As such, an argument that the fraud

            is a misrepresentation of the nature of the type of Agreement between the parties does not allege

            an actionable fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the Defendants. Additionally, the

            documentary evidence annexed to the Complaint, Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause (Motion # 1),

            and the instant Motion to Dismiss demonstrates there was not a misrepresentation of the basis of

           the fees or knowledge of falsity other than conjecture, assumption or speculation by the Plaintiff

            and his counsel. Based upon this Court's prior determination that the Agreement is not a loan,

            and based upon the allegations contained in the Complaint, affording the allegations a liberal
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            construction, accepting the facts alleged to be true, and granting Plaintiffs the benefit of every

            possible favorable inference, the Court concludes that the documentary evidence in this matter

            demonstrates there was not a misrepresentation of the basis of the fees or any other terms of the

            agreement as they were fully disclosed in the Agreement and plainly stated as an addendum to

           the Agreement. Therefore, based upon the evidence, Defendant has sufficiently demonstrated

           their entitlement of the dismissal of Plaintiff's third cause of action for fraud pursuant to Civil

           Practice Law and Rules §§ 321 l(a)(l) and (7).

           Plaintiff's Fourth Cause ofAction (Defendant BMF Advance) for Unconscionability

                   Next, Plaintiffs fourth cause of action seeks the Court vacate the Judgement and

            invalidate the underlying Agreement based upon unconscionability.        Plaintiffs allege in their

            Complaint that the Agreement is an "unconscionable contract of adhesion" that was not

           negotiated at arm's length as it contained "one-sided terms" that "prey upon the desperation of

            small business and their individual owners and help conceal the fact that each of the

           transactions ... are really loans." Plaintiff delineates those portions of the Agreement that are

            "one-sided terms" that render the Agreement unconscionable in addition to an allegation that

           there are "numerous knowingly false statements." Those "knowingly false statements" include

           that the transaction is really a loan, that the daily payment is a good-faith estimate of the

           merchant's receivables and that the fixed daily payment is for the merchant's convenience.

           Further, Plaintiff summarily states that the Agreement is unconscionable because "it is designed

           to fail." Additionally, Plaintiff states the Agreement is unconscionable since it contains

            "numerous improper penalties" such as entitling the Defendant to "exorbitant attorneys fees," the

           right to accelerate the entire debt upon an event of default and requiring the merchant to turn
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            over 100% of its receivables if it misses one fixed daily payment.

                   "An tmconscionable agreement has been described as one in which 'no [person] in his [or

           her] senses and not tmder delusion would make on the one hand, and [which] no honest and fair

            [person] would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the

            conscience and confotmd the judgment of any [person] of common sense." RTT Holdings, LLC

            v. Nacht, 206 AD3d 836, 841 (2d Dept 2022) quoting Christian v. Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 71

            (1977); See also Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,411 (1889). Unconscionability requires

            "some showing of 'an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together

           with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." Matter ofState of

           New York v. Avco Fin. Serv. ofN.Y., 50 NY2d 383,389 (1980) quoting Williams v. Walker-

            Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F2d 445,449 (D. C. Cir. 1965). Further, "[a] determination of

           tmconscionability generally requires a showing that the contract was both procedurally and

            substantively unconscionable when made." Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 NY2d 1

            (1988); See also State ofNew York v. Wolowitz, 96 AD2d 47, 67 (2d Dept 1983). "The

            procedural element of unconscionability concerns the contract formation process and the alleged

            lack of meaningful choice; the substantive element looks to the content of the contract, per se."

           State ofNew York v. Wolowitz, 96 AD2d at 67. Examples of the procedural element of

           tmconscionability "include ... high pressure commercial tactics, inequality of bargaining power,

            deceptive practices and language in the contract and an imbalance in the tmderstanding and

            acumen of the parties." Id. at 67-68. In contrast examples of contractual provisions that are

           tmconscionable include "inflated prices, tmfair termination clauses, tmfair limitations on

            consequential damages and improper disclaimers of warrant." Id.

                   The documentary evidence before this Court demonstrates that Plaintiff has not
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            established procedural unconscionability. Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Defendants

            engaged in actions that included high pressure commercial tactics or that there was an imbalance

            of bargaining power or deceptive practices in entering into the Agreement. Plaintiff makes

            conclusory statements such as the Agreement is one that was not negotiated at anns-length but

            does not provide any factual support demonstrating that imbalance.      The Complaint is replete

           with conclusory statements as to the procedural unconscionability of the agreement such as the

           terms are one-sided, and these types of agreements are used to "prey upon the desperation of

            small business and their individual owners" both sweeping statements with no factual support

            provided. This Court has no evidence before it that at the time the parties entered into the

           Agreement in April 2022 that Plaintiff business and their owner, Plaintiff Joel Reich, were not

            financially solvent or in "desperation." Rather, the evidence belies that belief. The Plaintiffs

            signed an Agreement that states in Section 2.9 that the business was not insolvent and did not

            contemplate filing for bankruptcy in the next six (6) months and had not consulted a bankrnptcy

            attorney or filed a bankrnptcy petition under Title 11 of the United States Code. Further, the

           Plaintiffs warranted to Defendants in Section 2.9 "that id [did] not anticipate filing any such

           bankrnptcy petition and it [did] not anticipate that an involuntary petition [would] be filed

            against it." The Court finds the Plaintiffs assertion in their cause of action that the agreement is

            "one-sided" and that the agreement was not arms-length is countered by Section 4.7 of the

           Agreement entitled Interpretation, which states "[a]ll parties hereto are sophisticated commercial

            parties and have reviewed this Agreement with attorney of their own choosing and have relied

            only on their own attorneys' guidance and advice or has [sic] had the opportunity to have their

            own attorney review this Agreement before executing it." As stated recently by two (2) Supreme

            Court Judges in differing counties, "[p]urchases and sales of future receivables and sales
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            proceeds are common commercial transactions expressly contemplated by the Uniform

            Commercial Code." IBIS Capital group, LLC v. Four Paws Orlando, LLC, 2017 WL 1065071,

            *2 (Nassau Cty Sup Ct 2017); See also American Water Restoration, Inc. v. AKF, Inc., 74

           Misc3d 12013(A) *2 (Ontario Cty, Sup Ct, 2022). The Plaintiffs entered into the Agreement

           warranting they were a "sophisticated commercial party" who reviewed the Agreement with their

            attorney knowing the types of provisions included in the Agreement and retroactively seeks this

            Court find the Agreement unconscionable because they do not agree with the result of the

            enforcement of the provisions of the Agreement, all of which were known to Plaintiffs when they

            signed the Agreement in April 2022. Remorse is not a factor for which a court can apply to a

            contract and find provisions in hindsight unconscionable. Based upon a review of the

            documentary evidence provided in this matter, Defendants have demonstrated their entitlement

           to dismissal of Plaintiffs fourth cause of action pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules§§

            3211(a)(l) and (7).

           Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh Causes ofAction 8 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
           Organizations [hereinafter "RICO"] Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1962(c)

                    Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants in the instant action are "persons" as defined

            by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) as they each is an individual capable of holding

            a legal interest in property. Further, Plaintiff asserts that all Defendants, except Steven

           Zakharyayev are agents or owners of Defendant BMF. As to Defendant Steven Zakharyayev,

           Plaintiffs contend that he has an ongoing business relationship with the Defendants as he

            "frequently represents the Defendants in these matters" and he "participated in the Enterprise."

           8 Plaintiff's Amended Compla int e-filed on August 30, 2022 fails to contain a Fifth Cause of Action .

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           According to Plaintiff the Defendants and their investors, including Defendant Steven

           Zakharyayev are an Enterprise as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4) and 1962(c). Plaintiff alleges

           the "enterprises" common goal is "soliciting, funding, servicing and collection upon usurious

            loans that charge interest at more than twice the enforceable rate under the laws of New York

            and other states which benefits BMF." Further, Plaintiff argues that the debt created as part of

           the instant Agreement is an unlawful debt as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) and 18

           U.S.C. § 1961 (6) because it violates criminal usury statutes, and the rates are more than "seven

            [sic] the legal rate pennitted under New York Penal Law § 190.40. As to the "enterprises"

            conduct, the Plaintiff asserts that their conduct constitutes "fraud by wire" as defined by 18

           U.S.C. § 1343, which is a "racketeering activity" as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1961(1).

                   In terms of the requirement of interstate commerce the Plaintiffs allege that the

            "enterprise" engages in daily business activities from their offices in New York to originate,

            underwrite, fund, and collect on the alleged usurious loans made in New York but disseminated

           throughout the United States via interstate emails, mail, wire transfers and bank withdrawals.

                   Plaintiffs contend that their injury due to the actions of this "enterprise" is the "thousands

            of dollars in improperly collected criminally usurious loan payments." They also argue they

            gave suffered damages by incurring attorneys' fess and costs in defending the Defendants'

            criminal activities. The Plaintiffs seek treble damages plus costs and attorneys' fees.

                   Defendant seeks dismissal of the sixth and seventh causes of action based upon Plaintiffs

            failure to establish a RICO claim that is predicated on collection of an unlawful debt, since the

           transaction between the parties is not a loan subject to usury laws. Plaintiff raises four (4) other

            basis for dismissal of these causes of action including: (1) Plaintiffs failure to plead with

            particularity their RICO claim predicated on a pattern of racketeering activity, (2) Plaintiffs
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            failure to plead the existence of a RICO "enterprise," (3) Plaintiffs inability to establish an injury

           to their business or property and (4) Plaintiffs failure to state a claim against Defendant

           Zakharyayev, Defendant BMF's attorney, as an outsider because he cannot be held liable under

           RICO.

                   Section 1962(c) ofRICO makes it unlawful for a person "employed by or associated with

            any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce to

            conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises affairs through a

            pattern ofracketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." RICO defines "unlawful debt"

            in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) as a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in

           violation of the law,,, or which us unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as

           to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in

            connection with ... the business oflending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State

            or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate." Further, RICO

            Section 1962(d) makes it ''unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of

            subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Offenses under RI CO "may be predicated on a single

            instance of collection of unlawful debt, as well as a pattern of racketeering activity." United

           States v. Grote, 961 F3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2020). In the sixth and seventh causes of action the

           Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have violated RICO in both ways; by collecting an unlawful

            debt and by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity.

                   "To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show:'(1) a violation of the RICO Statute 18

           USC§ 1962, (2) an injury to business or property and (3) the injury was caused by the violation

            of Section 1962." Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286,305 (2d Cir 2001) quoting Pinnacle

            Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat'[ Corp., 101 F3d 900,904 (2d Cir 1996); See also Hecht v,
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            Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F2d 21, 23 (2d Cir 1990). "To succeed on a RICO claim

            pursuant to§ 1962(c) a plaintiff must show '(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern

            (4) ofracketeering activity."' FCI Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Capital Group, LLC, 2019

           WL1297984 *2 (Sup Ct, Kings Cty 2019) quoting Defalco v. Bernas, 244 F3d 286 (2d Cir

           2001 ). The requirements of§ 1962 (c) must be established as to each individual defendant. See

            United States v. Persico, 832 F2d 705, 714 (2d Cir 1987).

                   A RICO claim can also be established by showing "any person employed by or

            associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign

            commerce, to conduct or participate directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprises'

            affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt." Id; See also

            Wade Park Land Holdings, LLC v. Kalikow, 2022 WL 657664 at *23 (SDNY 2022). Unlawful

            debt is defined in 18 USC§ 1961(6)(B) as any debt "which was incurred ... in connection with

           the business of.. .lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious tmder State or Federal law

           where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate."

                   The basis of the Plaintiffs' RICO claims is that the Purchase Agreement with Defendant

            is a loan and is subject to New York State usury laws. The arguments raised by Plaintiff are the

            same as asserted in the prior causes of action and again fail. This Court ahs previously

            determined that the subject Purchase Agreement is not a loan as Plaintiff asserts.      An element of

           the proof for the RICO claims made by the Plaintiffs is that the Purchase Agreement is a loan

            subject to the New York usury laws. As the Court has already detennined that argument fails,

            the Plaintiffs causes of action pursuant to RICO must also fail.

                   Plaintiffs also raise a wire fraud claim which similarly must be dismissed. "To allege

           wire fraud, the ... Plaintiffs must allege a pattern of racketeering: (i) at least two predicate acts of
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           racketeering occurring within a ten -year period (ii) that these predicate acts are related to each

            other and (iii) that these predicate acts amount to or pose a threat of continuing criminal

            activity." Spin Capital, LLC v. Golden Foothill Ins. Service, LLC, 2023 WL2265717 (Sup Ct,

           NY Cty 2023) citing Related Companies, L.P. V. Ruthling, 2017 WL6507759 at* 18 (SDNY

           2017). Further, to allege predicate racketeering the Plaintiff "must allege (i) a scheme to

            defraud, (ii) money or property that is the object of the scheme and (iii) the use of the wires to

            further the scheme." Id. citing Empire Merchants, LLC v. Reliable Churchill, LLP, 902 F3d 132,

            139 (2d Cir 2018). All of the Plaintiffs' arguments as to RICO claims must fail as they are

            predicated upon their argument that the Purchase Agreement should be "recharacterized" as a

            loan, which this Court has previously stated is an incorrect interpretation of the instant

           Agreement.

                   As to the causes of action for conspiracy to commit RICO they fail where no substantive

           RICO claims can be sustained. See Pluderman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. 40 AD3d 366,

            368 (1st Dept 2007). Therefore, all of the causes of action asserting conspiracy including the one

            as to Defendant STEVEN ZAHARYAYEV, the co-Defendants attorney, must be dismissed.

                   In arriving at this decision, the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all the

            issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any

            particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the

            Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

                   Accordingly, it is hereby

                   ORDERED that Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Motion #2) is granted in its entirety.

           Dated: Goshen, New York
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                 March 15, 2023

                                    HON. ELENA GOLDBERG-VELAZQUEZ, J.S.C.
           To:
           LEVENSON LAW GROUP
           SCOTT LEVENSON, ESQ.
           Attorney for Plaintiff
           (via e-file)

           WELLS LAW, LLP
           STEVEN WELLS, ESQ.
           Attorney for Defendant
           (via e-file)

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