Court Opinion

ID: 9522145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:31.759036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:20.297805
License: Public Domain

Reiber, C.J.,
¶ 35. dissenting. The majority reverses an aggravated sexual assault conviction on the basis of a claim that was waived. Although defendant never raised — indeed never even mentioned — a sex-in-exchange-for-drugs defense at trial, the majority concludes that the court’s pretrial ruling excluding evidence of complainant’s drug use a month or so before and after the incident forced defendant “to choose a defense strategy” different from the one he planned. Ante, ¶ 15. With respect, the majority’s reasoning is flawed. Nothing in the court’s ruling prevented defendant from asserting a sex-in-exchange-for-drugs defense. Indeed, ample evidence adduced at trial supported such a defense, had defendant only chosen to raise it. He chose not to. The court’s ruling, therefore, could not have prejudiced defendant and should not result in a reversal of the judgment.
¶ 36. As the majority observes, this was a credibility contest, and a vigorous one at that. The record shows that defendant cross-examined complainant intensively about her drug use on the evening in question, eliciting an admission that she had originally informed the police that her use of cocaine was voluntary, not compelled as she claimed on direct examination. Asked to explain the discrepancy with her earlier and more contemporaneous statement, complainant acknowledged that “[b]ack then it was more clear, everything was more clear.” Complainant further acknowledged informing the police that she had inhaled the first hit of cocaine that evening and held it in her lungs, and later took a second hit. Complainant ultimately conceded, “I don’t remember taking the hits voluntarily, but I guess I did.”
¶ 37. Complainant’s concession corroborated defendant’s testimony that he did not force complainant to inhale cocaine and that she voluntarily consumed a considerable amount of the drug that evening. The admission was also consistent with the testimony of defendant’s companion, who recalled that “it seemed like [complainant] was doing it [smoking] because she wanted to do it” and that “a lot” of crack cocaine was consumed by the parties. The record thus provided ample support for an argument that complainant not only inhaled the cocaine offered by defendant voluntarily, but was readily familiar with the drug and the drug culture; *255she acknowledged having smoked and purchased marijuana on the evening in question, gave a false name to defendant because she thought he was an undercover police officer, immediately recognized the white chalky substance that defendant produced as crack, and admitted to being “wowed” by the amount.
¶ 38. What is not in evidence is any assertion by defendant that complainant exchanged sex for drugs. In his opening statement, defense counsel declared that the evidence would clearly show complainant consented to having sexual relations with defendant. He did not, however, assert that it would show that her consent was motivated by a desire for access to defendant’s substantial supply of crack cocaine. In his cross-examination of complainant, defense counsel did not ask: Did you agree to enter defendant’s car in order to obtain the drug? Did you accept a ride to defendant’s apartment, enter the bedroom where you assumed that he and his companion “were smoking crack cocaine,” and engage in sexual relations over an extended period of time because doing so provided a means to obtain and satisfy your craving for the drug? In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that complainant may have been motivated to claim coercion because she “didn’t want her mother to know about anything” or possibly because defendant refused her request for additional drugs. He did not argue, as he now emphatically claims on appeal, that crack cocaine is “a powerful motivator,” that its “euphoric effects” are well known, and that complainant was therefore motivated — explicitly or implicitly — by a desire for the drug.
¶ 39. Evidence that complainant used or purchased cocaine on other occasions may have supported a sex-for-drugs defense, but it was not essential to such a defense. The exclusion of such evidence certainly did not prevent defendant from raising it where substantial other evidence showed that complainant was not only familiar with the drug but inhaled it that night. Nothing in the several drug studies cited by defendant suggests that frequent use of, or even addiction to, crack cocaine is necessary to stimulate a desire for “the sense of euphoria” they describe, and nothing in the court’s ruling prevented defendant from so arguing based on the record evidence described above. Cf. State v. Cartee, 161 Vt. 73, 77, 632 A.2d 1108, 1111 (1993) (holding that trial court erred when it “allowed no inquiry into the possibility that complainant . . . was motivated to fabricate” allegation of sexual assault *256(emphasis added)). One can only assume, therefore, that defendant’s choice not to pursue the defense was a tactical one and a voluntary waiver of the issue. See State v. Koveos, 169 Vt. 62, 71, 732 A.2d 722, 728 (1999) (“Defendant’s choice of a strategic path amounts to a waiver of objections based on what might have occurred had he chosen the alternative.”). Even if erroneous, therefore, the trial court’s exclusion of evidence to buttress an argument that defendant otherwise could have, but never raised, cannot be prejudicial. Accordingly, any error in the trial court’s ruling must be deemed harmless. See State v. Jackson, 2008 VT 71, ¶ 18, 184 Vt. 173, 956 A.2d 1126 (explaining that an erroneous evidentiary ruling, even if it is of constitutional dimension, will not compel reversal if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶ 40. Although not separately captioned or argued as such, defendant also implies that evidence of complainant’s cocaine use on other occasions should have been admissible for purposes of impeachment. Whether complainant’s prior or subsequent drug use was relevant to her credibility was not presented to, or ruled on, by the trial court in limine. Furthermore, the State did not inquire into complainant’s prior or subsequent drug use at trial, and she did not affirmatively deny it, although she did testify at one point that the “hit” made her feel “sick, nauseous.” To the extent that this statement could have been understood by the jury to imply that complainant was a novice drug user, defendant could have moved — on the new ground of misleading testimony — to have the court amend its pretrial ruling to allow rebuttal of the implication. Defendant did not so move, however, and therefore waived any claim of error. See State v. Senecal, 145 Vt. 554, 558, 497 A.2d 349, 351 (1985) (stating that, because pretrial rulings are necessarily “tentative and subject to revision,” new facts and circumstances that arise at trial require that defendant apprise the court of any new claim or objection).
¶ 41. The court’s pretrial evidentiary ruling did not prejudice defendant at trial, thus obviating the need to reach the merits addressed by the majority. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.
¶42. I am authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this dissent.