Court Opinion

ID: 9950947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 13:02:33.555606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:52.753951
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D22-2558
                   LT Case No. 2020-CA-0026
                 _____________________________

SARAH S. SONA,

    Appellant,

    v.

FOUNDATION SERVICES OF
CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC., STONE
CREEK COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION, INC., PULTE HOME
COMPANY, LLC, CIRACO
UNDERGROUND, INC., ANDREYEV
ENGINEERING, INC., et al.,

    Appellees.
                 _____________________________

On Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion County.
Steven G. Rogers, Judge.

Darylaine Hernandez, of Law Office of Darylaine Hernandez,
LLC, Orlando, for Appellant.

Michael J. Roper and Derek J. Angell, of Roper, P.A., Orlando, for
Appellees, Stone Creek Community Association, Inc. and Pulte
Home Company, LLC.

Brendan N. Keeley and William M. Blume, III, of Baumann,
Gant & Keeley, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee, Foundation
Services of Central Florida, Inc.
No Appearance for Other Appellees.

                          March 15, 2024

LAMBERT, J.

     Sarah S. Sona timely appeals the final summary judgments
entered by the trial court in her negligence action in favor of three
of the defendants, Foundation Services of Florida, Inc.
(“Foundation”); Stone Creek Community Association, Inc. (“Stone
Creek”); and Pulte Home Company, LLC (“Pulte”). Sona also
challenges the order entered by the trial court just before the entry
of these final summary judgments denying her motion to amend
her second amended complaint to add an entirely new party to the
litigation. As the final summary judgments totally disposed of the
entire case as to these three defendants, but not as to all of the
defendants, we have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.110(k).

     Applying the de novo standard of review to the final summary
judgments, see Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,
760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (applying the de novo standard of
review to the review of final summary judgments), we affirm. See
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(5), (e)(2)–(3) (2022).1

     Addressing Sona’s remaining claim that the trial court
reversibly erred in denying her leave to amend her second
amended complaint, for the following reasons, we dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction.

    1 Sona also argues that the trial court erred in denying her

motion for rehearing. We conclude, without detailed elaboration,
that no abuse of discretion has been shown in the denial of the
rehearing motion. See Beacon Hill Homeowners Ass’n v. Colfin Ah-
Fla. 7, LLC, 221 So. 3d 710, 712 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“The standard
of review on appeal of a [denial of a] motion for rehearing is abuse
of discretion.” (citing Villas at Laguna Bay Condo. Ass’n v.
Citimortgage, Inc., 190 So. 3d 200, 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016))).

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     First, under rule 9.110(k), while the scope of appellate review
of a partial final judgment may include any ruling or matter that
occurred before the filing of the notice of appeal, the ruling or
matter must be directly related to an aspect of the partial final
judgment under review. Here, the record shows that the denial of
Sona’s motion to add an entirely new defendant into the litigation
was not directly related to the final summary judgments entered
in favor of the appellees, Foundation, Pulte, and Stone Creek.
Accordingly, rule 9.110(k) does not provide the requisite
jurisdiction to allow review of this ruling.

    Next, because the entire case below has not concluded, we
separately lack jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.130(a)(3) to review the order. Simply stated, the
nonfinal order denying Sona leave to amend to add a defendant is
not one of the enumerated nonfinal orders separately appealable
under this rule.

     Lastly, Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c) provides,
in pertinent part, that when a party seeks an improper remedy,
the cause must be treated as if a proper remedy had been sought.
Under this rule, we construe Sona’s appeal of the order denying
her motion to amend as if she is seeking certiorari relief from the
order. Cf. Trucap Grantor Tr. 2010-1 v. Pelt, 84 So. 3d 369, 373
(Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (granting a petition for writ of certiorari and
quashing a nonfinal order denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend
its complaint).

     For this court to grant certiorari relief, a petitioner, such as
Sona, must show the following familiar elements: (1) the lower
court order departed from the essential requirements of the law,
(2) causing material injury for the rest of the case, and (3) there is
no adequate remedy on post-judgment appeal. Mims v. Broxton,
191 So. 3d 552, 553 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Holmes Reg’l Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)).
These last two requirements are often combined into the concept
of irreparable harm. Id. (citing Dumigan, 151 So. 3d at 1284).
Because irreparable harm is required for this court to have
certiorari jurisdiction, irreparable harm must be first found before
addressing whether the lower court’s order is a departure from the
essential requirements of the law. Id. (citing Dumigan, 151 So. 3d

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at 1284).

     Here, Sona will have an adequate remedy through a post-
judgment plenary appeal when the case concludes against the
remaining defendants. See Hawaiian Inn of Daytona Beach Inc. v.
Snead Constr. Corp., 393 So. 2d 1201, 1201–02 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
(holding that certiorari relief was not available to “reverse” the
trial court’s order denying leave to file a second amended
complaint where plenary appeal after final judgment provided an
adequate remedy). Accordingly, because Sona has not shown the
requisite irreparable harm or injury resulting from the trial court’s
denial of her motion to amend her second amended complaint, we
dismiss this aspect of her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Bared
& Co. v. McGuire, 670 So. 2d 153, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (holding
that, if an appellate court “determine[s] that there has been an
insufficient showing of irreparable harm or injury, [it] will enter
an order dismissing the petition”).

    AFFIRMED, in part; DISMISSED, in part.

EISNAUGLE and PRATT, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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