Court Opinion

ID: 9890101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 15:04:31.388778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:14.490160
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 140
          SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                           No. CV-23-468

                                   Opinion Delivered: October 12, 2023
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION; JACOB OLIVA, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ARKANSAS      APPEAL FROM THE
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION;            PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT
RANDY HENDERSON, JEFF WOOD,        COURT, FOURTH DIVISION
ADRIENNE WOODS, STEVE              [NO. 60CV-23-3267]
SUTTON, O. FITZGERALD HILL,
OUIDA NEWTON, SARAH MOORE,         HONORABLE HERBERT WRIGHT,
KATHY MCFETRIDGE, AND LISA         JUDGE
HUNTER, IN THEIR OFFICIAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE
                                   REVERSED AND DISMISSED.
ARKANSAS STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION; FRIENDSHIP
EDUCATION FOUNDATION; AND
MARVELL-ELAINE SCHOOL
DISTRICT
                    APPELLANTS

V.

DORIS IVY JACKSON; LAVERNE
SIMS; JESSELIA MAPLES;
DIAMACIOUS SIMS; DARRYL
HARRIS; SYLVIA MOORE;
DANIELLE WRIGHT; DERASHAUN
MCGHEE; VIVIAN DAVIS; JAMES
CARRUTH; IOLA HOSKINS;
STEVEN GRAPPE; VERONICA
MCCLANE; AND CITIZENS FOR
ARKANSAS PUBLIC EDUCATION
AND STUDENTS (CAPES), A BALLOT
QUESTION COMMITTEE
                       APPELLEES

                     BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice
       Appellants Arkansas Department of Education, Jacob Oliva, in his official capacity as

Arkansas Secretary of Education, Randy Henderson, Jeff Wood, Adrienne Woods, Steve

Sutton, O. Fitzgerald Hill, Ouida Newton, Sarah Moore, Kathy McFetridge, and Lisa

Hunter, in their official capacities as members of the Arkansas State Board of Education

(collectively, “State appellants”), Friendship Education Foundation, and Marvell-Elaine

School District, appeal the circuit court’s declaratory judgment in favor of appellees Doris

Ivy Jackson, Laverne Sims, Jesselia Maples, Diamacious Sims, Darryl Harris, Sylvia Moore,

Danielle Wright, DeraShaun McGhee, Vivian Davis, James Carruth, Iola Hoskins, Steven

Grappe, Veronica McClane, and Citizens for Arkansas Public Education and Students

(“CAPES”), a ballot-question committee. At issue is the circuit court’s finding that the

emergency clause contained within Act 237 of 2023 (the “LEARNS Act”) did not receive

a separate roll-call vote as required by the Arkansas Constitution, rendering the clause

procedurally invalid. For reversal, appellants argue (1) this case presents a nonjusticiable

political question; (2) the LEARNS Act emergency clause received a separate roll-call vote;

and (3) sovereign immunity bars appellees’ complaint. We reverse the circuit court’s ruling

and dismiss the case below.

       This case has been before this court in Arkansas Department of Education v. Jackson,

2023 Ark. 105, 669 S.W.3d 1 (“Jackson I”), wherein we provided a full recitation of the

facts. The relevant facts are as follows. During the 2023 legislative session, the Arkansas

General Assembly passed the LEARNS Act. The legislation was then sent to the Governor,

who signed it into law on March 8, 2023. Because section 73 of the LEARNS Act contained

                                             2
an emergency clause, certain provisions became effective on the date of the Governor’s

approval.

       Appellees thereafter filed a complaint against appellants seeking a declaratory

judgment that the LEARNS Act’s emergency clause was invalid and ineffective under the

Arkansas Constitution. They also requested a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or,

alternatively, a motion for preliminary injunction. Appellees’ claims were brought under

the Administrative Procedure Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 25-15-201 et seq. (Repl. 2014 &

Supp. 2021), the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-101 et

seq. (Repl. 2016 & Supp. 2021), and article 16, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution.

Appellees alleged that the emergency clause was defective under article 5, section 1 of the

Arkansas Constitution on three separate grounds. First, the General Assembly failed to pass

the emergency clause by a separate roll-call vote. Second, the emergency clause fails to state

facts sufficient to establish an emergency. Third, the emergency clause attempts to declare

an emergency as to certain provisions of the Act, rather than the Act as a whole.

       On May 26, 2023, the circuit court entered an order granting appellees’ motion for

TRO pending a full hearing scheduled for June 20, 2023. The circuit court concluded that

appellees would suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief and had demonstrated a

likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Appellants then brought an interlocutory

appeal pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(6). In Jackson I, we

reversed the circuit court’s order, vacated the TRO, and remanded. We concluded that

appellees had failed to demonstrate irreparable harm as their claims could be either

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compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law and were speculative in

nature. Id. at 8–9, 669 S.W.3d at 12–13.

       On remand, the circuit court held a full hearing on the merits of appellees’ claims.

The circuit court heard witness testimony on the General Assembly’s voting procedures for

bills with emergency clauses as well as testimony on the LEARNS Act adoption itself. Those

witnesses included State Senator Clarke Tucker, State Representative Tiffany McCullough,

former Senate Parliamentarian Steve Cook, and then-current House Parliamentarian Finos

B. Johnson. State appellants also submitted witness affidavits and journals of the Arkansas

House of Representatives and Arkansas Senate, which reflected that the LEARNS Act and

its emergency clause were passed by separate roll call. Over State appellants’ objections,

appellees introduced video recordings of each chamber voting on the LEARNS Act and its

emergency clause simultaneously.

       Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order on June 30, 2023, declaring

the LEARNS Act emergency clause invalid because it did not receive a separate roll-call

vote. The circuit court concluded that it was not required to treat the legislative journals as

dispositive of two separate votes having occurred and instead could “look beyond the text

of the journals of the legislature to determine whether an act has been duly passed.” The

circuit court in turn observed that “the video of the proceedings . . . clearly show[s] that

only one vote was taken” and that “testimony from sitting [legislators] . . . corroborated the

video and testified that it accurately reflected the proceedings in each chamber, regardless

of what was recorded in the journals.” Accordingly, the circuit court held that the LEARNS

Act and its emergency clause were not voted on by separate roll call in either chamber as

                                              4
required under the Arkansas Constitution and, as a result, all provisions of the Act purported

to be effective immediately were now effective on the default date for legislation of this

session, August 1, 2023. Having found the emergency clause was not properly enacted, the

circuit court declined to reach appellees’ remaining arguments regarding the sufficiency of

the emergency or the Act’s varying effective dates. This appeal followed.

       As a threshold matter, we must first address appellees’ contention that this court lacks

jurisdiction over this appeal because the circuit court’s order is not final. They claim that

the order is not final because the circuit court did not resolve their remaining arguments for

finding the emergency clause unconstitutional. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil

(2)(a)(1) provides that an appeal may only be taken from a final judgment or decree entered

by the circuit court. For an order to be final and appealable, “it must . . . conclude [the

parties’] rights to the subject matter in controversy.” Convent Corp. v. City of North Little

Rock, 2016 Ark. 212, at 5, 492 S.W.3d 498, 502. In contrast, an order that contemplates

further action by a party or the court is not a final, appealable order. Ark. Dep’t of Fin. &

Admin. v. Naturalis Health, LLC, 2018 Ark. 224, at 6, 549 S.W.3d 901, 905.

       Appellees brought an action for declaratory judgment, seeking an order invalidating

the LEARNS Act emergency clause. The circuit court recognized that although appellees

advanced distinct legal theories in their complaint, “the deciding factor” for each would be

the emergency clause’s validity. The circuit court then declared the emergency clause invalid

because it was passed without a separate roll-call vote. As such, the circuit court pointed out

that it was unnecessary to rule on appellees’ remaining arguments. The circuit court’s order

                                              5
concluded the controversy by granting appellees declaratory relief, and it contemplated no

further action. This appeal is now properly before this court.

       Appellees also assert that this case should be dismissed as moot now that the default

date of August 1, 2023, has passed and the LEARNS Act is effective regardless of the

emergency clause. A case is moot when any judgment rendered would not have any practical

legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood,

2019 Ark. 100, at 2, 571 S.W.3d 1, 2. We agree with appellees that, given the timing of

this appeal, our decision would have no effect on the underlying controversy of this case––

the effective date of the LEARNS Act.

       Nevertheless, we may still review the issues on appeal if a recognized exception to

the mootness doctrine applies. One such exception is for matters involving a substantial

public interest that are likely to be litigated in the future. Gray v. Thomas-Barnes, 2015 Ark.

426, at 5, 474 S.W.3d 876, 879. We have held that when “[g]uidance is needed for the

public in pursuing litigation against the State” and “for the legislative and executive branches

in conducting their business,” the substantial-public-interest exception obliges our court to

address the issues raised in an otherwise moot case. Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville,

2019 Ark. 28, at 4–5, 566 S.W.3d 105, 108. The present matter falls squarely within this

exception because it calls into question the decades-long process of both the House and the

Senate for voting on emergency clauses. To be sure, if the circuit court’s order stands,

countless State actions made in reliance on effective emergency clauses will be cast in doubt

and potentially be subjected to collateral attacks. The substantial interest of both the public

                                                6
and our coordinate branches of government necessitates that we resolve the issues raised in

this appeal.

       On appeal, the State argues this case presents a nonjusticiable political question that

our courts may not decide. Alternatively, it argues that the LEARNS Act emergency clause

received a separate roll-call vote as required under the Arkansas Constitution and, as a result,

appellees’ claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.1 Sovereign immunity is

jurisdictional immunity from suit, and jurisdiction must be determined entirely from the

pleadings. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n v. Hurd, 2018 Ark. 397, at 9, 564 S.W.3d 248, 253. The

pleadings in this case sufficiently raised factual allegations of illegal and unconstitutional State

action, and the suit sought only declaratory and injunctive relief. Consequently, this matter

is not barred by sovereign immunity. See Osage Creek Cultivation, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Fin.

& Admin., 2023 Ark. 47, at 6, 660 S.W.3d 843, 847 (noting that lawsuits seeking declaratory

or injunctive relief against the State for ultra vires, unconstitutional, or illegal acts can

surmount sovereign immunity).

       At issue is whether the General Assembly complied with article 5, section 1 of the

Arkansas Constitution when it enacted the LEARNS Act emergency clause. In considering

this question, we look to our constitutional text. It is our responsibility to decide what a

provision of the Arkansas Constitution means, and we have said that provisions that are plain

and unambiguous will be given their obvious and common meaning. See, e.g., Zook v.

Martin, 2018 Ark. 293, at 4, 557 S.W.3d 880, 883. Neither rules of construction nor rules

       1
         Separate appellants Friendship Education Foundation and Marvell-Elaine School
District adopt State appellants’ arguments on appeal.

                                                 7
of interpretation may be used to defeat the clear and certain meaning of a constitutional

provision. Id.

       To enact an emergency clause, the constitution requires “two-thirds of all members

elected to each house . . . shall vote upon separate roll call in favor of the measure going

into immediate operation.” Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1. However, the roll-call vote does not

become law until “the names of the persons voting for and against the same be entered on

the journal; and a majority of each house be recorded thereon as voting in its favor.” Ark.

Const. art. 5, § 22. And in a separate provision, the constitution mandates that “[e]ach house

shall keep a journal of its proceedings.” Ark. Const. art. 5, § 12. In consideration of these

constitutional commands, this court recognized over a century ago that the “journal entry

[is] the sole evidence of [legislative] proceedings.” Niven v. Road Improv. Dist., 132 Ark.

240, 242, 200 S.W. 997, 997 (1918). Today, we reaffirm this precedent and conclude that

the plain language of the constitution designates the journal of each chamber as the official

record of the General Assembly’s votes.

       In this instance, the legislative journals reflect that the LEARNS Act and its

emergency clause were adopted by separate votes. The House Journal indicates a separate

roll call and vote for the emergency clause. Likewise, the Senate Journal indicates a separate

roll call and vote for the emergency clause. Thus, according to the official record, the

emergency clause was passed in compliance with article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas

Constitution.

       In reaching the opposite conclusion, the circuit court ignored the face of the record

and instead relied on parol evidence––video recordings of House and Senate proceedings–

                                              8
–to find that the General Assembly’s process for adopting emergency clauses is

constitutionally infirm. As explained, the journals are the official record, and it was

erroneous for the circuit court to look to parol evidence in reaching its decision. Because

the plain text of our constitution supports the General Assembly’s adoption of the LEARNS

Act, we need not consider the validity of internal legislative procedures or whether such

review presents a political question. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s order and

dismiss the case.

       Reversed and dismissed.

       BAKER, WOOD, and WOMACK, JJ., and Special Justice CORY COX concur.

       KEMP, C.J., dissents.

       HILAND, J., not participating.

       KAREN R. BAKER, Justice, concurring. While I concur in the majority’s decision

to reverse and dismiss, I write separately for the reasons stated in my concurrence in Arkansas

Department of Education v. Jackson, 2023 Ark. 105, at 9, 669 S.W.3d 1, 8 (“Jackson I”) (Baker,

J., concurring). The lead opinion’s limited sovereign-immunity analysis conflicts with the

broad language of Board of Trustees of University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 535

S.W.3d 616, and until Andrews is overruled, suit against the State is barred. In the present

case, the lead opinion states,

       The pleadings in this case sufficiently raised factual allegations of illegal and
       unconstitutional State action, and the suit sought only declaratory and
       injunctive relief. Consequently, this matter is not barred by sovereign
       immunity. See Osage Creek Cultivation, LLC v. Ark. Dep’t of Fin. & Admin.,
       2023 Ark. 47, at 6, 660 S.W.3d 843, 847 (noting that lawsuits seeking

                                              9
       declaratory or injunctive relief against the State for ultra vires,
       unconstitutional, or illegal acts can surmount sovereign immunity).

       However, as I explained in my dissent in Arkansas Oil & Gas Commission v. Hurd,

2018 Ark. 397, at 18–19, 564 S.W.3d 248, 258–59,

       In Andrews, the court held that “never means never,” therefore . . . suit is
       barred based on the broad language in Andrews . . . because Andrews did not
       identify exceptions, exemptions or the like. Again, the State may never be
       sued[.]

       This appeal stems from the circuit court’s order declaring the emergency clause

contained within the LEARNS Act invalid because the General Assembly failed to pass the

emergency clause by a separate roll-call vote in either chamber as required under the

Arkansas Constitution. A review of the General Assembly’s voting procedures constitutes a

review of State action, and as I stated in my concurrence in Jackson I, any claims that seek

to control the actions of the State are barred pursuant to Andrews. Jackson I, 2023 Ark. 105,

at 10, 669 S.W.3d at 8.

       For the reasons stated in my discussion above, I concur with the result reached by

the majority to reverse and dismiss.

       RHONDA K. WOOD, Justice, concurring. I agree that we should reverse and

dismiss, but my analysis differs from the lead opinion. The lawsuit below challenged how

the General Assembly voted, not where it kept its records. Because assessing how the

General Assembly conducted its proceedings would violate separation of powers, I would

decline to answer this political question.

                                             10
       The circuit court explained that the appellees sued, challenging “the constitutionality

of the Act’s enaction” because they contended the emergency clause was invalid because

there was not a separate roll-call vote. The circuit court agreed and ruled that “the

Emergency Clause of the LEARNS Act was not enacted pursuant to the requirements of

that Constitution.” Thus, the issue is not whether the official records of the General

Assembly’s proceedings are journals or videos. Rather, the issue is how the General

Assembly procedurally operates and conducts its voting. The journal and videos are evidence

used to determine the issue of whether the vote was proper.

       We cannot resolve a legislative procedure-and-process issue without exceeding our

judicial role by answering a political question. The Arkansas Constitution gives each house

authority to determine its own rules and procedures.1 Answering a political question about

how the legislature conducts its proceedings would violate separation of powers. We cannot

usurp the legislative branch’s core functions or threaten its independent institutional

integrity.2 The only way to decide this issue would be to pass judgment on the legislative

branch’s internal procedural method of voting. This is not our role.

       Like the eight other state courts that have considered challenges based on the legality

of internal legislative processes, we should conclude that this issue presents a nonjusticiable

political question.3 I would end our review here. The circuit court did not rule on the

       1
           Ark. Const. art. 5, § 12.
       2
      Ark. Const. art. 4; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Ark. State Bd. of Elec.
Comm’rs v. Pulaski Cty. Elec. Comm’n, 2014 Ark. 236, 437 S.W.3d 80.
       3
       See, e.g., Sumner v. New Hampshire Sec’y of State, 136 A.3d 101, 106 (N.H. 2016);
Brown v. Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 722 (2009); Jefferson Cty. Comm’n v. Edwards, 32 So. 3d

                                              11
remainder of the emergency-clause claims. Our analysis should begin and end with the

political-question doctrine. Nor should we address any illegal-exaction claim because the

appellees did not cross-appeal from the denial of their illegal-exaction claim.

       Special Justice CORY ALLEN COX joins.

       SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority’s disposition

to reverse and dismiss. While for reasons I have stated previously in this case, I agree with

its conclusion as to the validity of the adoption of the emergency clause and the recognition

of the journal as the official record, I would not have reached the merits.1 I write separately,

because dismissal of the case is proper pursuant to article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas

Constitution.2

       Without an express constitutional provision to the contrary, the State can never

properly be a defendant in any of its courts.3 There are few clearer commands in our

constitution than article 5, section 20. For these reasons, I would reverse and dismiss the

572, 584 (Ala. 2009); Smigiel v. Franchot, 978 A.2d 687, 701 (Md. 2009); Brady v. Dean, 790
A.2d 428, 433 (Vt. 2001); Mayhew v. Wilder, 46 S.W.3d 760, 773 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001);
Philpot v. Haviland, 880 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Ky. 1994); Sweeney v. Tucker, 375 A.2d 698, 705
(Pa. 1977).

     See Ark. Dep’t of Educ. v. Jackson, 2023 Ark. 105, at 20–21, 669 S.W.3d at 14
       1

(Womack, J., concurring, in which Webb, J., joins).
       2
      See Thurston v. League of Women Voters of Ark., 2022 Ark. 32, at 17, 639 S.W.3d 319,
327 (Womack, J., dissenting).
       3
           Id.

                                              12
case and base the disposition solely on article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution. I

respectfully concur.

       JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice, dissenting. The Arkansas LEARNS Act—Act

237 of 2023—became operative law on August 1, 2023. Because that date has passed and

the LEARNS Act has since been implemented, the present appeal is now moot. For this

reason, I respectfully dissent.

       As a general rule, this court will not review issues that are moot. Terry v. White, 374

Ark. 387, 391, 288 S.W.3d 199, 202 (2008). A case becomes moot when any judgment

rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id.,

288 S.W.3d at 202. In other words, a moot case presents no justiciable issue for

determination by the court. Id., 288 S.W.3d at 202. We also do not issue advisory opinions

in anticipation of future litigation. Walker v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 516, 886 S.W.2d 577,

582 (1994). Courts do not sit for the purpose of determining speculative and abstract

questions of law or laying down rules for future conduct. Flow Doc, Inc. v. Horton, 2009 Ark.

411, at 6, 334 S.W.3d 865, 870.

       We have, however, recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Lott v.

Langley, 2013 Ark. 247, at 2. The first exception involves issues that are capable of repetition,

yet evading review, and the second exception concerns issues that raise considerations of

substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. Id.

       I am convinced that the issues presented in this case are moot, that the lead opinion

issued on the merits is wholly advisory, and that this case does not fall within one of our

recognized exceptions. After this court reversed and remanded in Arkansas Department of

                                               13
Education v. Jackson, 2023 Ark. 105, 669 S.W.3d 1, the circuit court entered an order, dated

June 30, 2023, ruling,

              The Court finds that the Emergency Clause of the LEARNS Act was
       not enacted pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution. Since that
       provision of the law is not effective, all provisions of the Act purported to be
       immediately effective due to the invalid clause are now effective as of the
       default date the Act would be effective—August 1, 2023.

Throughout this litigation, both the parties and the circuit court have limited this case to

the time frame before August 1, 2023. Because that date has passed and the LEARNS Act

has remained in effect since August 1, this court now renders an advisory opinion on the

Act’s emergency clause. In my view, the public-interest exception does not apply because

any future litigation on emergency clauses is speculative. Therefore, I would dismiss the

appeal as moot.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Nicholas J. Bronni, Solicitor Gen.; Dylan L. Jacobs, Dep.

Solicitor Gen.; and Michael A. Cantrell, Ass’t Solicitor Gen., for State appellants.

       Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Devin R. Bates, for

appellant Friendship Education Foundation.

       Bequette, Billingsley & Kees, P.A., by: W. Cody Kees and Phillip M. Brick, Jr., for

appellant Marvell-Elaine School District.

       Nolan Law Firm, PA, by: Ali Noland, for appellees.

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