Court Opinion

ID: 9912973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:37:55.510662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:36.033568
License: Public Domain

134 Nev., Advance Opinion 11
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   IN RE THE EXECUTION OF SEARCH                        No. 71536-COA
                   WARRANTS FOR: 12067 OAKLAND
                   HILLS, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89141;
                   54 CAROLINA CHERRY DRIVE, LAS
                                                                                  F   VMAI gl'A

                   VEGAS, NEVADA 89141; 5608 QUIET                                DEC 1 3 2018
                   CLOUD DRIVE, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA                                  ZAPETI         q.;:Crh"Pl
                   89141; AND 3321 ALCUDIA BAY
                                                                            BY-
                   AVENUE, LAS VEGAS, NEVADA                                                      CrEAR--
                   89141.

                   LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE
                   DEPARTMENT,
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   LAURA ANDERSON,
                   Respondent.

                               Appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees in the
                   context of a motion for the return of seized property. Eighth Judicial
                   District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.
                               Reversed.

                   Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Nicholas D. Crosby, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Kathleen Bliss Law PLLC and Kathleen Bliss Quasula, Henderson,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE SILVER, C.J., TAO and GIBBONS, JJ.

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                                                    OPINION

                   By the Court, TAO, J.:
                               NRS 18.010(2)(a) permits an award of attorney fees to a
                   "prevailing party" in a civil action when that party recovers a money
                   judgment in an amount less than $20,000. At issue here is whether that
                   provision permits a fee award against a police department ordered to return
                   a large amount of cash (and other property) seized pursuant to a criminal
                   search warrant.
                               We conclude that it does not because an order to return seized
                   cash is an order to return physical property, not a "money judgment," and
                   therefore we reverse the district court's award of fees. Further, we decline
                   to affirm the award under NRS 18.010(2)(b) and in so doing we clarify the
                   evidentiary burdens that parties litigating return-of-property motions
                   against a police department must meet under NRS 179.085.
                                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               Suspecting respondent Laura Anderson of running a secret
                   prostitution ring, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD)
                   obtained a series of search warrants allowing it to look for contraband in
                   five properties connected to her. Acting on those warrants, officers seized
                   automobiles, electronics, and other personal effects, including more than
                   $50,000 in cash.
                               Nine months then elapsed without any criminal charges being
                   filed against her and without any civil forfeiture proceedings being initiated
                   against the seized property. Anderson filed a civil motion under NRS
                   179.085 seeking the return of all property seized during the search. Her
                   motion did not challenge the legality of the search or the manner in which

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                   it was conducted, but only whether LVMPD's continued retention of the
                   property remained reasonable in the absence of criminal charges.'
                               LVMPD initially filed a written partial opposition to the motion
                   agreeing that it possessed a legal duty to return property that no longer had
                   any evidentiary value and stipulating to the immediate return of some
                   computer equipment and memory devices whose contents had been copied.
                   The written opposition asserted that the other seized evidence, including
                   the large amount of cash, could not yet be returned because it was relevant
                   to a federal criminal investigation that was ongoing at the time.
                               Something changed between the time the written briefs were
                   filed and the date of the oral argument on Anderson's motion. When counsel
                   for LVMPD appeared for the hearing, he abandoned the arguments made
                   in the written briefing and instead informed the district court that he had
                   recently learned that the federal investigation had terminated without the
                   filing of any charges. He therefore verbally stipulated that all property
                   could be returned to Anderson. Based on this non-opposition, the district
                   court granted Anderson's motion and ordered the property returned.
                               Anderson thereafter filed a motion seeking an award of
                   attorney fees against LVMPD pursuant to NRS 18.010(2). In her motion,
                   Anderson contended that she was a "prevailing party" entitled to fees under
                   NRS 18.010(2)(a) and, alternatively, that the police department mounted a
                   defense to her motion "without reasonable ground," entitling her to fees

                         "NRS 179.085 originally allowed individuals to seek return of seized
                   property only on grounds that the underlying search and seizure were
                   unlawful, but before Anderson filed her motion the Legislature amended it
                   to add the additional ground that law enforcement's continued retention of
                   the property was unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. See 2015
                   Nev. Stat., ch. 113, § 1, at 405-06.
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                    under NRS 18.010(2)(b). The district court issued a written order awarding
                    Anderson $18,255 in attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a) but did not
                    address Anderson's contention that an attorney fee award was warranted
                    under NRS 18.010(2)(b). LVMPD now appeals the district court's fee award.
                                                      ANALYSIS
                                The district court based its award of attorney fees upon NRS
                    18.010(2)(a). On appeal, LVMPD argues that this constituted legal error
                    because recovery of a money judgment is a prerequisite to an award of
                    attorney fees under that subsection. Anderson counters that the underlying
                    judgment was monetary in nature because some of the property she
                    recovered was cash. Alternatively, she argues that this court could affirm
                    the award under NRS 18.010(2)(b), under the doctrine of "right result,
                    wrong reason." See Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev.
                    592, 599, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010) (holding that appellate courts "will
                    affirm a district court's order if the district court reached the correct result,
                    even if for the wrong reason").
                    Standard of review
                                 This court reviews a district court's award of attorney fees for a
                    "manifest abuse of discretion." Thomas v. City of N. Las Vegas,         122 Nev.
                    82, 90, 127 P.3d 1057, 1063 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
                    omitted). "But when the attorney fees matter implicates questions of law,
                    the proper review is de novo." Id. Here, the question is whether a district
                    court may award attorney fees at all under NRS 18.010(2)(a) in a return-of-
                    property action brought under NRS 179.085, which is a question of law.
                    Thus, our review is de novo. See Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7,
                    8-11, 106 P.3d 1198, 1199-200 (2005) (reviewing de novo the question of
                    whether landowners in condemnation actions may be awarded attorney fees

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                   as prevailing parties under NRS 18.010(2)(a)); see also Arguello v. Sunset
                   Station, Inc., 127 Nev. 365, 368, 252 P.3d 206, 208 (2011) ("Questions of
                   statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a statute, are
                   questions of law, which this court reviews de novo." (internal quotation
                   marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).
                   NRS 18.010(2)(a) cannot support an award of attorney fees when no money
                   judgment has been entered
                               LVMPD argues that the district court's award of fees cannot be
                   justified under NRS 18.010(2)(a). As always, the proper place to begin is
                   with the plain text of the relevant statute, and if those words are
                   unambiguous, that is where our analysis ends as well. See Pawlik v. Deng,
                   134 Nev. „ 412 P.3d 68, 71 (2018).
                               NRS 18.010(2)(a) states that a district court may award
                   attorney fees to a "prevailing party" when that party "has not recovered
                   more than $20,000." The Nevada Supreme Court has explained that this
                   latter phrase represents an important limitation on the scope and reach of
                   the statute, restricting it "to situations where the prevailing party's
                   recovery was readily measurable against the standard set forth in the
                   statute," meaning that it "ha[s] effect only when a party recovered some
                   amount. . . in damages." Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs. of Am.,   111 Nev. 277,
                   282-83, 890 P.2d 769, 773 (1995); see Thomas, 122 Nev. at 93-94, 127 P.3d
                   at 1065-66 (reaffirming money judgment requirement and refusing to
                   overrule Crown Financial).         Such awards are permitted only in suits
                   involving money judgments, which excludes actions seeking only
                   declaratory or equitable relief.
                               A return-of-property action under NRS 179.085(5) is not an
                   action seeking an award of money damages. Rather, the plain text of the

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                     statute states that a motion for return of seized property "filed when no
                     criminal proceeding is pending. . . must be treated as a civil complaint
                     seeking equitable relief." NRS 179.085(5). Thus, a movant seeking relief
                     only under NRS 179.085(5) is not eligible for an award of attorney fees
                     under NRS 18.010(2)(a).
                                Anderson nonetheless counters that the underlying judgment
                     was not merely equitable but rather fundamentally monetary in nature
                     because some of the seized property was in the form of a large amount of
                     cash (around $50,000). But the terms of the judgment itself concern the
                     return of property. The mere fact that some of that property happened to
                     be in the form of cash does not convert the nature of the award itself into
                     one for a money judgment. Unlike a true money judgment, the judgment
                     here was not constructed to award money damages as compensation for
                     some injury inflicted upon Anderson, and she would not have been entitled
                     to satisfy it by attaching or executing against other assets of LVMPD until
                     paid in full. Quite to the contrary, in return-of-property actions like this
                     one, NRS 21.020(5) limits collection and execution to delivery of the
                     specified property and nothing more, unless the judgment itself itemizes
                     other costs or monetary damages. In any event, Anderson's argument fails
                     on its own terms because, even if we somehow considered the district court's
                     order to be a money judgment, the amount of cash seized exceeded $50,000.
                     This sum falls outside the scope of NRS 18.010(2)(a), which is limited to
                     cases involving judgments of $20,000 or less. Consequently, the district
                     court erred by awarding attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(a).

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                   The attorney fees award cannot be affirmed under NRS 18.010(2)(b) because
                   the district court did not enter the required findings
                               Alternatively, Anderson argues that she was entitled to
                   attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b). NRS 18.010(2)(b) permits an award
                   of attorney fees where a claim or defense was "brought or maintained
                   without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party." Anderson
                   contends that the district court's award of attorney fees can be affirmed
                   under NRS 18.010(2)(b) because LVMPD failed to present any "credible
                   evidence" with its opposition to her motion that justified the nine-month
                   retention of her property. 2
                         Anderson's argument
                               As an initial observation, Anderson's argument conflates two
                   very different things that must be sorted out. Anderson argues that
                   attorney fees are warranted because LVMPD failed to provide proof that it
                   had good reason to keep her property for so long without filing criminal
                   charges. But NRS 18.010(2)(b) targets only how the litigation itself is
                   conducted, not what the parties did before the litigation commenced.
                   LVMPD may or may not have had a good reason to keep Anderson's
                   property; either way, NRS 18.010(2)(b) permits an award of fees only if
                   LVMPD "brought or maintained" a defense during the litigation itself that
                   was either groundless or intended to harass.
                               Within the litigation, Anderson seems to argue that LVMPD
                   failed to provide "credible evidence" in support of the factual allegations
                   contained in its opposition to her motion. She cites Frantz v. Johnson, 116

                         2Anderson also argues that LVMPD's proffered defense was "legally
                   impossible," but offers little support for that proposition and we decline to
                   address it.
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                   Nev. 455, 999 P.2d 351 (2000), and Allianz Insurance Co. v. Gagnon, 109
                   Nev. 990, 860 P.2d 720 (1993), for the proposition that an award of fees
                   under NRS 18.010(2)(b) is tested by whether the opposing party presented
                   "credible evidence" to support its defense. From this, Anderson argues that
                   LVMPD's opposing brief consisted entirely of argument unsupported by
                   credible external "evidence" such as affidavits or exhibits, and consequently
                   NRS 18.010(2)(b) was satisfied and she is entitled to fees.
                               In effect, Anderson argues that those cases imposed an
                   affirmative burden of production upon LVMPD to immediately support
                   everything it said in its opposition with corroborating evidence• at peril of
                   being later subject to a fee award. But the cases say no such thing. In fact,
                   the language of those cases refers to the lack of any credible evidence being
                   presented "at trial" to support the initial allegations contained in the
                   pleadings. See Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for the Ethical Treatment of
                   Animals, 114 Nev. 1348, 1354, 971 P.2d 383, 387 (1998) (noting that Allianz
                   defined a claim as "groundless" if "the allegations in the complaint. . . are
                   not supported by any credible evidence at trial"). They say nothing about
                   whether any party possesses any affirmative burden of production on any
                   issue at the pleading stage of a return-of-property motion.
                               In the end, the scope of NRS 18.010(2)(b) is defined not by a few
                   words taken from isolated cases, but rather by the words of the statute
                   itself.   See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
                   Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012) (noting that "[Ole words of a
                   governing text are of paramount concern"). The ultimate inquiry under
                   NRS 18.010(2)(b) is whether a claim or defense was brought or maintained
                   "without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party," with the
                   stated goal of "deter [ring] frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses." What

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                   matters is whether the proceedings were initiated or defended "with
                   improper motives or without reasonable grounds." Bobby Berosini, 114 Nev.
                   at 1354, 971 P.2d at 387.
                               Here, the district court made no findings, and the record
                   contains no evidence, that would enable us to affirm an award of attorney
                   fees under this statute. The court never found that LVMPD asserted a
                   defense that was brought or maintained "without reasonable ground," was
                   intended to "harass" Anderson, or rendered the litigation "vexatious."
                   Indeed, it's difficult to see how those findings could have been made when
                   LVMPD immediately conceded part of the motion in writing in its response
                   and then a few weeks later conceded the rest of it at the very first hearing
                   on the motion. The litigation itself ended up lasting little more than a single
                   month and the docket consists of nothing more than Anderson's initial
                   motion, LVMPD's initial written opposition partly conceding the motion,
                   Anderson's reply brief, the oral hearing at which LVMPD conceded the
                   motion in its entirety, and then the proceedings surrounding Anderson's
                   request for attorney fees. Accordingly, the district court's award of fees
                   must be reversed.
                         The evidentiary burdens in return-of-property motions
                               Quite apart from whether Anderson was or was not entitled to
                   fees, both parties and the district court appeared confused as to how they
                   should have handled the underlying merits of Anderson's return-of-
                   property motion. Moreover, this confusion extended to the way Anderson
                   briefed her appeal, with Anderson arguing that fees should have been
                   awarded because LVMPD failed to present "credible evidence" at a time
                   when it never actually had any burden of production. Their confusion was
                   understandable considering the general language employed in NRS 179.085

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                   the statute or handle such motions. Consequently, we take this opportunity
                   to clarify the evidentiary burdens litigants bear in initiating and defending
                   return-of-property motions quite outside of, and apart from, any subsequent
                   request for attorney fees after the merits have been resolved.
                               NRS 179.085(1)(e) permits "[a] person aggrieved by. . . the
                   deprivation of property [to] move the court. . . for the return of the property
                   on the ground that . . . [r] etention of the property by law enforcement is not
                   reasonable under the totality of the circumstances." In resolving that
                   motion, the statute contemplates an expedited procedure with no formal
                   discovery mechanisms or eventual jury trial; instead, "[t]he judge shall
                   receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion."
                   NRS 179.085(1).
                               Here, LVMPD quickly conceded the merits of Anderson's
                   motion. Consequently, the district court was not required to do anything
                   more than grant Anderson's motion as unopposed. However, had things
                   been different and had LVMPD contested the motion substantively, the
                   district court may have been required to consider evidence to resolve the
                   matter. To do so, the district court would have followed a procedure well
                   established in federal courts.
                               NRS 179.085 largely mirrors Federal Rule of Criminal
                   Procedure 41(g), 3 and where Nevada statutes track their federal

                          'Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 was amended in 2002 "as part of a general
                   restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and
                   to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules." United
                   States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 279 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
                   marks and citation omitted). What was formerly Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)
                   became Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g), but the rule itself stayed largely the same.
                   Id.
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                   counterparts, federal cases interpreting the rules can be instructive.   Exec.
                   Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 46, 53, 38 P.3d 872, 876 (2002);
                   Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1107 & n.4, 968 P.2d 296, 309 & n.4
                   (1998) (citing a federal case interpreting Federal Rules of Criminal
                   Procedure that were "largely equivalent" to Nevada statutes).
                               Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) generally requires that factual disputes
                   in return-of-property motions be resolved through evidence, either
                   affidavits or other documentary evidence or, if documentary evidence is
                   insufficient, then by considering the testimony of witnesses during an
                   evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Stevens, 500 F.3d 625, 628 (7th
                   Cir. 2007); United States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 2004);
                   United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 378 (3d Cir. 1999).
                               During the consideration of such evidence, the moving party
                   bears the initial burden to show that the government's retention of his or
                   her property is facially unreasonable under the totality of all of the
                   circumstances that then exist.     See NRS 179.085(1)(e); In re Matter of
                   Search of Kitty's E., 905 F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1990) ("A movant must
                   demonstrate that retention of the property by the government is
                   unreasonable in order to prevail on a [Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g)] motion.").
                   When the movant initially files his or her motion, he or she may have little
                   idea of where any criminal investigation might stand. Nevertheless, the
                   burden can be met in a few ways based upon information already within the
                   movant's possession. For example, this can occur when a criminal case has
                   been completely resolved, either through a trial or a guilty plea, because
                   such a resolution suggests that any criminal investigation is likely over. See
                   United States v. Gladding, 775 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
                   the burden of proof shifts to the government when "the property in question

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                   is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, either because trial is
                   complete, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or. . . the government has
                   abandoned its investigation" (quoting United States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d
                   1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987))). It can also occur when no charges have been
                   filed even after the government has had more than enough time to conduct
                   its investigation. See Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1369 n.5 (recognizing that the
                   burden could shift to the government if it has retained property for an
                   extended period of time without filing charges); Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv.,
                   Inc. v. United States, 587 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1978) (remanding for an
                   evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government could reasonably
                   justify retaining plaintiffs cash for over 17 months without bringing any
                   charges).
                               If the movant fails to meet this initial burden, nothing more is
                   required and the motion may be denied even if the government produces no
                   evidence in response. If, however, the district court finds that the movant
                   has made an initial showing that the retention of the property appears
                   facially unreasonable, then the burden shifts to the government to
                   demonstrate that it has a legitimate reason to retain the property.
                   Martinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. The government could meet this burden in
                   several ways. It could, for example, show that the property was contraband
                   (such as drugs) that could not be legally returned. See id. Alternatively, it
                   could show that the seized property was not actually owned by the movant
                   (such as if it had actually been stolen from someone else). See United States
                   v. Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979). It could also show that the
                   property was the subject of civil forfeiture proceedings, or it could show that
                   the property was related to an ongoing criminal investigation. See id. In
                   any of these cases, the government would have the burden to prove its

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                   allegations through something more than a naked assertion of counsel. See
                   Stevens, 500 F.3d at 628 ("[A]rguments in a Government brief, unsupported
                   by documentary evidence, are not evidence.").
                               If the government intends to prove that it's keeping the
                   property pursuant to an active criminal investigation, then things become
                   interesting. The types of "evidence" that could prove the existence of an
                   ongoing law enforcement investigation are likely to be wholly unlike the
                   kinds of evidence that parties typically present in other types of lawsuits.
                   Many law enforcement activities—especially ones that do not result in the
                   filing of any criminal charges—are governed by a web of rules governing
                   confidentiality that do not exist in other contexts, including rules that
                   protect the secrecy of grand jury proceedings and the identities of
                   confidential informants. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e); 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.21-
                   .29. Rules aside, the disclosure of an active and ongoing criminal
                   investigation may jeopardize the integrity of the investigation itself by
                   revealing to a suspect that he or she is being investigated, how the
                   investigation is being conducted, and by whom. Indeed, when a federal
                   grand jury has been convened to investigate a target, unauthorized
                   disclosure of its existence may constitute the commission of a federal crime,
                   even when the disclosure is made in defense of a civil action like this one.
                   See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (allowing a federal court to punish contempt of its
                   authority by fine or imprisonment, including for "disobedience or resistance
                   to its lawful . . . rule"). The question thus becomes how parties and district
                   courts can determine whether keeping seized property is justified without
                   either jeopardizing an active criminal investigation or running afoul of
                   other statutes or rules requiring that such           investigations remain
                   confidential.

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                               To solve this conundrum, the district court may choose to
                   permit the government to supply its evidence in camera to preserve the
                   secrecy and integrity of any ongoing investigation, and to prevent such
                   motions from becoming a discovery tool through which a suspect can gather
                   intelligence through the back door on the progress of the government's
                   investigative efforts. See, e.g., Mr. Lucky Messenger Serv., 587 F.2d at 17
                   (remanding and directing the district court to, in its discretion, conduct the
                   evidentiary hearing in camera because the reasons for the government's
                   continued retention of property "may be integrally related to grand jury
                   proceedings"); In re Documents & Other Possessions at Metro. Ctr. of
                   Prisoner Hale, 228 F.R.D. 621, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding that the
                   government could submit more information to the court "ex parte and under
                   seal" if it wished "Ed]ue to the sensitive nature of the case and in the event
                   of an ongoing investigation that [it] does not wish to disclose").
                               In the instant case, had LVMPD contested Anderson's motion
                   in a substantive way, the district court would have had to resolve the merits
                   of the matter by weighing evidence. But because LVMPD quickly conceded
                   the motion, the district court was not required to consider anything more.
                   From this, Anderson seems to argue that merely because LVMPD produced
                   no evidence and lost the motion, its defense was unreasonable and fees were
                   appropriate. But LVMPD had no burden to produce anything yet, and even
                   if it had, Anderson's assertion is far from true. Not every unsuccessful
                   defense is ipso facto "unreasonable," "frivolous," or "vexatious." Merely
                   losing a motion on the merits does not mean that the losing defense was
                   utterly "without reasonable ground" for purposes of awarding attorney fees.
                   NRS 18.010(2)(b) does not create an automatic "loser pays" system, of the
                   kind found in England, in which the unsuccessful party always pays fees to

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                   the winning party. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 n.2 (1983)
                   (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
                   "English Rule" is one "under which the losing party, whether plaintiff or
                   defendant, pays the winner's fees"). Instead, whether the losing party's
                   defense went beyond merely unsuccessful into becoming "vexatious" and
                   "without reasonable ground" is a decision for the district court to make in
                   the first instance
                                  Here, LVMPD conceded the motion without much of a fight, and
                   therefore the district court did not weigh any evidence and did not make
                   any findings that LVMPD did anything to trigger NRS 18.010(2)(b).
                   Moreover, because the district court granted Anderson's motion as
                   unopposed, it never had to determine whether Anderson actually met her
                   initial burden. Thus, the burden never shifted to LVMPD to do anything
                   more or supply any evidence. Even if it had, that would not necessarily
                   mean that fees were warranted; to award fees, the district court must have
                   made a separate finding that LVMPD not only lost the motion, but
                   unreasonably fought it based upon grounds prohibited under NRS
                   18.010(2)(b). No such findings exist, and therefore the award of fees must
                   be reversed.
                                                    CONCLUSION
                                  For the foregoing reasons, the district court's award of attorney
                   fees was not proper under NRS 18.010(2)(a) and cannot be affirmed under
                   NRS 18.010(2)(b) in the absence of any relevant findings or any clear
                   evidence that LVMPD brought or maintained its defense without

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                      reasonable ground. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order
                      awarding attorney fees.

                                                                                   J.
                                                       Tao

                      I concur:

                      G
                       ,444
                       H
                          ;
                          L ITI
                                                  J.

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                   SILVER, C.J., concurring:

                              I concur in the result only.

                                                         1/4-1(i4a)
                                                      Silver

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