Court Opinion

ID: 9499663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:54:16.056763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:38.839826
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I agree with the court that United States v. Montgomery, 462 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2006), requires a remand because the sentencing judge did not consider the views of counsel before affirming Fifield’s sentence on limited remand pursuant to United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). However, I write separately to express my concern that Montgomery transforms the role of the judge in a way that the decision in Ame-line does not require.
The crux of the problem is Ameline’s reference to the remand procedure established by the Second Circuit in United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir.2005). The Crosby decision states that a sentencing judge assessing the reasonableness of a pre-Booker sentence “should obtain the views of counsel, at least in writing,” prior to determining whether she would have chosen the same sentence under advisory guidelines. 397 F.3d at 120. This court’s Ameline decision cites Crosby and agrees “that the ‘views of counsel, at least in writing,’ should be obtained.” 397 F.3d at 120.
Like the Montgomery panel, I have no doubt that Ameline supports the right of counsel to have its written views considered on this type of limited remand. However, I disagree with the holding in Montgomery that Ameline places the burden on sentencing judges to notify counsel on pain of reversible error. Montgomery states: “Many district courts in this circuit have read the quoted statement as a requirement. ... We now explicitly restate what Ameline requires: that, on Ameline remand, a district court must obtain, or at least solicit, the views of counsel in writing before deciding whether resentencing is appropriate.” Montgomery, 462 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis added). I believe that this interpretation of Ameline mistakes ipse dixit for constitutional law and misapprehends the proper role of the judge.
In our adversarial legal system, Article III judges traditionally function as passive and neutral decisionmakers. Unlike the judges of the continental legal systems of Europe, who serve in both investigative and adjudicatory capacities, American judges are informed by the parties through an adversarial method. See Robert A. Kagan, Adversaeial Legalism: The AmeriCAN Way Of Law 9 (2003) (describing the American adversarial approach as one in which “the assertion of claims, the search for controlling legal arguments, and the gathering and submission of evidence are dominated not by judges or government officials but by disputing parties or interests, acting primarily through lawyers”). Thus, American judges play a limited role;1 the burden rests on the parties *1057(both private and governmental) to ensure that offenses are prosecuted and relevant issues come to light. Our system is willing to leave some wrongs unpunished to preserve the functional divide: the doctrines of waiver and procedural default represent this willingness.
Montgomery requires judges to overlook their limited role in a centuries-old American tradition of adversarial litigation. While Montgomery stops short of instating a rule that the court must successfully obtain the views of counsel — an impossible requirement — the decision shifts the burden of going forward to the judge.2 I cannot accept that our Ameline decision requires judges in this way to depart from traditional adversarial procedure. I read Ameline simply to require that a sentencing judge consider the written views of counsel if such views are filed by the parties.3 Due process requires no more.
I concur in the current remand but object to the active burden that Montgomery places on the judge.
Hopefully there will be an opportunity for an en banc court to reconsider the wisdom of this practice.

. Our law distinguishes the role of judges who decide cases from the role of magistrates and non-Article III judges who actively investigate cases.
See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ("Critical to the Court's decision[in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980) ] to uphold the Magistrates Act was the fact that the ultimate decision was made by the district court.”). In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988), the Court described the circumscribed role of judges in an adversarial system, although the Court remarked: "By way *1057of comparison, we also note that federal courts and judges have long performed a variety of functions that ... do not necessarily or directly involve adversarial proceedings within a trial or appellate court. For example, federal courts have traditionally supervised grand juries and assisted in their ‘investigative function’ by, if necessary, compelling the testimony of witnesses.” Id. at 681, 108 S.Ct. 2597 n. 20. Montgomery requires something different and incongruous in our adversarial system: courts must prod the parties themselves.

. Montgomery asserts in a conclusory footnote that failure to follow this procedure cannot be resolved by harmless error review. 462 F.3d at 1072 n. 3.

. Motions or objections often are the proper vehicles to catalyze judicial action. In a trial, parties may object to the admission of evidence or may move for a mistrial. If parties do not protest, even constitutional injustices may go uncorrected. Judges are not required to solicit the views of counsel in order to avoid such mistakes, though they must consider objections or motions if raised.