Court Opinion

ID: 9475492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:56.575894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.891285
License: Public Domain

BORK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority reverses the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defend*1220ant. I would uphold the district court’s decision, for I can find no genuine issue of material fact about whether the information requested here is “confidential” commercial information within the meaning of the fourth exemption to the FOIA.
As the Supreme Court recently declared, the motion for summary judgment should not be treated as “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” for it serves as the principal tool “by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Although the majority opinion in this case correctly notes that the materials underlying a motion for summary judgment “ ‘must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,’ ” maj. op. at 1216 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)), the court must not go so far in its generosity to the nonmoving party as to manufacture hypothetical disputes on issues of fact about which no genuine dispute has been shown. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the nonmoving party is not alone in having a great deal staked on the outcome of such motions:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2555.1 For this reason, summary judgment can hardly be seen as a “drastic” remedy, maj. op. at 1215, 1219, and its usefulness should not be diminished by straining to find material issues of fact where none exists.
I.
The focus for this appeal is whether Technicare’s admittedly valuable and secret customer list is “confidential” information under FOIA Exemption 4. Under the law of this circuit, the question here reduces to whether disclosure of the list “is likely ... to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.” National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.Cir.1974).
In my view, the record amply demonstrates that disclosure of this customer list is likely to cause substantial harm to Technicare’s competitive position. The market for CAT scanners is small and highly competitive. In 1983, only about 650 units were sold in the entire United States, at an average price of $1 million. Technicare’s share of this market was approximately 14%. The list sought by appellant Green-berg contains the names of owners of older, obsolete models, who are the most likely customers to be in the market for newer machines. These repeat customers provide more than 40% of Technicare’s yearly business.
Technicare showed that it has always taken great pains to keep its customer lists confidential. See J.A. at 74-89. Technicare spends a considerable amount of time and money to that end. It spends more than $1 million annually on programs to maintain the secrecy of customer lists and *1221other trade information. Technicare has never made these lists publicly available. Inside the company, the lists are disclosed only to high-level employees with a genuine business need for the information. All employees are required to execute an employment agreement containing a provision binding them not to divulge any of Technicare’s confidential business information. Technicare has enforced these contractual commitments by legal action. Indeed, before the instant FOIA request, Technicare successfully brought suit against a former employee and others to enjoin their use of confidential business information, including the names and addresses of Technicare CAT scanner customers — some of the very same information that is at issue here. See Technicare Corp. v. John E. Murphy, Bridge C.A.T. Scan Associates, No. 83-C-2966 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1984) (consent judgment and order).
Given this evidence, the burden shifted to Greenberg to overcome Technicare’s prima facie showing of confidentiality and risk of substantial competitive harm. He could either come forward with evidentiary affidavits showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, see First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1591-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Smith v. Saxbe, 562 F.2d 729, 733-34 (D.C.Cir.1977); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), or demonstrate that he was entitled to a continuance to conduct further discovery pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), see Smith v. Saxbe, 562 F.2d at 733. He did neither.
A.
Under the language of Rule 56(e), Green-berg cannot overcome Technicare’s well-pleaded motion for summary judgment and establish that there were genuine material facts at issue unless he sets forth in his opposing affidavits “specific facts” such as “would be admissible in evidence,” and made on personal knowledge. Given these requirements, Greenberg’s affidavits and other materials fail to put at issue any of Technicare’s assumptions. His own affidavit is replete with vague and inadequate assertions of his beliefs that rest on no apparent factual basis. Conclusory statements, such as these, made solely on information and belief, are not sufficient to overcome a properly grounded motion for summary judgment. See 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.22[1], at 56-1306 to -1312 (2d ed. 1985); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738, at 486-89 (2d ed. 1983).
The majority, however, finds that Green-berg’s supporting evidence creates a dispute over two material issues. First, the majority reasons that because purchasers often may compare different manufacturers’ products before making a purchase decision, this fact creates a genuine dispute about whether disclosure of Technicare’s customer list is likely to cause substantial harm to its competitive position. In essence, the majority finds a dispute over whether maintaining the secrecy of this list is of much value to Technicare and whether disclosure of the list would be of much value to its competitors.
It strains credulity to argue that Technicare would go to such enormous trouble and expense to safeguard its customer list if that information were not extremely valuable. Here we are dealing with the release of a comprehensive and up-to-date nationwide list that would allow competitors to develop nationwide strategies. The market is small — Technicare sold less than 100 CAT scanners in 1983 — and repeat sales constitute almost half of Technicare’s business. If disclosure of this information would remove its competitive advantage with even a small number of these customers, Technicare’s position in the market could suffer substantial harm.
This inference is borne out by the practices of others who produce CAT scanners. Technicare’s jealous safeguarding of such sensitive information is typical of the participants in this market. In supporting affidavits, Technicare established that its competitors also consider their customer lists to be confidential. They too go to *1222great lengths and incur great expense to keep the lists secret. See J.A. at 78, 90-91, 92.
In light of the uncontroverted evidence, this issue is insufficient to prevent summary judgment. To suppose, in the face of these facts, that disclosure of Technicare’s list would not cause substantial harm to the company’s competitive position is necessarily to suppose that Technicare and the other members of this industry incur great expense and expend great efforts utterly foolishly, attempting to preserve a confidentiality that is either unimportant or nonexistent. Technicare need not establish that disclosure of the information is certain to cause substantial harm to its competitive position; such a rigid standard would destroy the exception for confidential commercial information. It is enough if disclosure would be likely to cause substantial harm to its competitive position. See National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770. There is no genuine dispute on this issue here.
A closely related issue raised by the majority is whether the information requested is available by other means. If it were, of course, Technicare and its competitors would not go to the trouble and cost they do to keep their lists secret. And appellant would not need this lawsuit to obtain the list. Technicare has acknowledged that competitors can construct partial customer lists through diligent effort; yet the time and expense necessary to compile a comprehensive and reliable list, and of keeping it updated, would be prohibitive. None of the evidence mentioned by the majority contradicts Technicare’s comprehensive showing on this point.
The majority points out that Greenberg has already obtained from the FDA a list of all CAT scanners ever installed by all manufacturers. This list differs from the list requested here in that it does not list the manufacturer, the age of the machine, or whether the establishment still maintains CAT scanners. Such a list can hardly be considered to provide essentially the same information as an up-to-date, manufacturer-specific list. The majority also suggests that the list possessed by Green-berg could be combined with other publicly available information, such as lists of hospitals and radiologists, to construct something that “might well provide a close facsimile of the disputed customer list.” Maj. op. at 1218. But this approach, if possible at all, would require Greenberg to make successful contact with hundreds of different agencies and thousands of individuals all over the country before he could even begin to approximate a list comparable to the one he has requested from the FDA. Greenberg offers no evidence to the contrary.
The majority also refers to the affidavit of Sidney M. Wolfe, which indicates that thirty-three state governments collect the information at issue here and would release it to the public on demand. This statement does not rebut, and indeed bolsters, Technicare’s contention that its customer list is not readily ascertainable by others. To begin with, it suggests that such information is not available in a considerable number of states. None of these sources, moreover, provides a complete list. Therefore, customer lists compiled by this means would require the searcher to expend substantial amounts of time and money to acquire the desired information, and would be only partial lists at best.
We should refuse to adopt a reading of FOIA Exemption 4 that would allow competitors, who ordinarily must expend considerable amounts of time and money to acquire even an extremely incomplete approximation of this list, to benefit from agency disclosure at the expense of the submitters. Accord, Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45, 51 (D.C.Cir.1981).2 Although the majority re*1223lies on the case of Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.1977), that case and the situation here are very different. In Continental Stock, the court refused to apply the exception for confidential commercial information where “almost all of the information on petitioners’ lists already is available to the public.” Id. at 375. In that case, however, at least 98% of the precise information requested could be obtained by the public from the listings in three identifiable sources that were already compiled and widely distributed (the Financial Stock Guide Service Director of Active Stocks, the CCH Stock Transfer Guide Directory, and Moody’s OTC Industrial Manual). Id. Here, by contrast, much less of the information requested is available to the public in any form. Such information as is available is not, for the most part, the precise information that has been requested, and considerable time and expense would be necessary to generate up-to-date, manufacturer-specific lists. The time and expense involved would also be greatly magnified because the information requested here is not gathered in a few common sources; it is “available” only by canvassing state and county files and contacting thousands of scattered hospitals and radiologists. See J.A. at 183-84, 211-13. Thus, the lists requested here are a far cry from the information that was held to be “available to the public” in Continental Stock. The FDA would not be justified in releasing a confidential customer list that would benefit competitors regardless of the ability of their salespersons or the willingness of the company to spend the time, money, and effort to make such an extensive market survey and keep it up to date. Once again, there is no genuine dispute on this issue.
B.
Greenberg also argues that he was denied adequate discovery to enable him to challenge the summary judgment motion. Under Rule 56(f), a plaintiff can seek a continuance in order to obtain essential discovery before being required to answer a summary judgment motion. The continuance was properly denied, however, because Greenberg failed to make the requisite showing under the rule.
This circuit has found that under Rule 56(f) a request for continuance must be supported by “good reasons for [the movant’s] complete inability to produce the evidence necessary to defeat the motion for summary judgment.” Donofrio v. Camp, 470 F.2d 428, 431 (D.C.Cir.1972); see Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 663 F.2d 120, 126-27 (D.C. Cir.1980). The rule was not created to act as “a shield that can be raised to block a motion for summary judgment without even the slightest showing by the opposing party that his opposition is meritorious.” Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Products, 520 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 1116, 47 L.Ed.2d 320 (1976). The burden under Rule 56(f) requires that
[a] party invoking its protections must do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a movant’s affidavits as otherwise required by Rule 56(e) and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the *1224movant’s showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.
Willmar Poultry, 520 F.2d at 297; accord SEC v. Spence & Green Chemical Co., 612 F.2d 896, 901 (5th Cir.1980) (“one must conclusively justify his entitlement to the shelter of rule 56(f) by presenting specific facts explaining the inability to make a substantive response as required by rule 56(e)”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082, 101 S.Ct. 866, 66 L.Ed.2d 806 (1981). If the court determines that the discovery sought appears irrelevant, or if discovery would be wholly speculative, relief under Rule 56(f) must be denied. See 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, supra, ¶ 56.24, at 56-1437 to -1438; 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2741, at 558-59; cf. First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 293-94, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1594-95, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968).
Rather than presenting factual reasons for needing a continuance, Greenberg made several unsubstantiated assertions. For example, Greenberg stated that he' did not
believe that disclosure of the FDA records containing the locations of Technicare ... [CAT] scanners is likely to cause Technicare any competitive injury whatsoever, and certainly not substantial competitive injury as required to justify withholding under the FOIA.
... Iam not presently prepared to file an opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, since I need to obtain certain additional factual information, which is largely in the possession of the defendants.
J.A. at 96. Such conclusory assertions are not acceptable under Rule 56(f). Indeed, “[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowledge or control of the facts by the moving party is not adequate: the opposing party must show to the best of his ability what facts are within the movant’s exclusive knowledge or control.” 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, supra, ¶ 56.24, at 56-1432; see Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, supra, § 2741, at 548. Greenberg has failed to show the court that any of his unanswered discovery requests, if answered, would lead to admissible facts pertinent to a genuine issue. Greenberg further contends that he was denied the opportunity to depose Technicare’s affiants. This assertion is without merit since he never sought this discovery. The only indication that he might be interested in this procedure came not in a deposition request but rather in an offhand comment in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time, which stated, “plaintiff may also wish to depose one or more of Technicare’s affiants.” J.A. at 99 (emphasis added). No actual attempt to depose Technicare’s affiants was made. All other questions were completely answered by Technicare. Greenberg, therefore, has completely failed to show that he was denied discovery to which he was entitled.3
II.
Technicare also notes that the district court’s grant of summary judgment can be upheld simply on the basis of Greenberg’s failure to meet the local pleading rules. To overcome Technicare’s motion for summary judgment and establish a genuine issue of material fact, Greenberg filed a Statement *1225of Genuine Issues, as required by Rule l-9(i) of the United States District Court Rules for the District of Columbia. That statement did not comply with the rule, which provides in relevant part:
A party opposing such a motion shall serve and file, together with his opposing statement of points and authorities, a concise “statement of genuine issues” setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated, and shall include therein references to the parts of the record relied on to support such statement. In determining a motion for summary judgment, the court may assume that the facts as claimed by the moving party in his statement of material facts are admitted to exist except as and to the extent that such facts are controverted in a statement filed in opposition to the motion.
United States District Court Rules — District of Columbia, Rule 1 — 9(i) (1983). The only issue propounded by Greenberg in his Rule 1 — 9(i) statement is whether “[disclosure of the FDA list would cause Technicare to suffer substantial competitive injury.” J.A. at 173. Greenberg failed, however, to provide specific references to the record; instead he stated, “plaintiff disputes that fact for the reasons set forth in the accompanying affidavits ... and explained more fully in plaintiff’s accompanying memorandum.” Id.
Failure to file a proper Rule 1 — 9(i) statement in opposing a motion for summary judgment may be fatal to the delinquent party’s position. See Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 6-7 (D.C.Cir.1982); Gardels v. CIA, 637 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C.Cir.1980); Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774, 776-77 & n. 9 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884, 89 S.Ct. 194, 31 L.Ed.2d 160 (1968). In Gardels, this court outlined the reasons for strict compliance with the rule:
Requiring strict compliance with the local rule is justified both by the nature of summary judgment and by the rule’s purposes. The moving party’s statement specifies the material facts and directs the district judge and the opponent of summary judgment to the parts of the record which the movant believes support his statement. The opponent then has the opportunity to respond by filing a counter-statement and affidavits showing genuine factual issues. The procedure contemplated by the rule thus isolates the facts that the parties assert are material, distinguishes disputed from undisputed facts, and identifies the pertinent parts of the record. These purposes clearly are not served when one party, particularly the moving party, fails in his statement to specify the material facts upon which he relies and merely incorporates entire affidavits and other materials without reference to the particular facts recited therein which support his view that no genuine issues of material fact exist.
637 F.2d at 773 (emphasis added). Although Greenberg did formulate one issue that he claimed was in dispute, his incorporation of whole affidavits and other materials by reference does not satisfy the rule.
Finally, Greenberg cannot excuse his failure to comply with Rule 1 — 9(i) merely by alleging that Technicare’s statement filed under the rule was also defective. Greenberg claims that “[t]he statement and its individual paragraphs are extremely lengthy; they are filled with assertions as to which there is plainly no consensus; and they contain conclusions that are unsupported by objective facts.” Brief of Appellant at 19. I would disagree. Technicare’s statement follows the rule by noting the facts it believes are not at issue, and by providing specific references to the parts of the record that support its view of the facts.
Moreover, to the extent Greenberg took issue with Technicare’s statement, he was under an affirmative duty under the rule to oppose those statements with a “concise *1226‘statement of general issues’ setting forth all material facts as to which it is contended there exists a genuine issue,” and with specific “references to the parts of the record relied on.” Rule l-9(i). Greenberg failed to meet this duty. His statement that he would “provide a detailed response, with specific references to his affidavits” only if the district court disagreed with his view that Technicare’s statement was de-
fective, J.A. at 174, is a manifest evasion of his obligations under the rule. The grant of summary judgment for Technicare was proper on this ground alone.

. In describing the background law on summary judgment, the majority also emphasizes that the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See maj. op. at 1215. Although this language is not really troublesome in disposing of the case at hand, where the moving party has presented ample evidence to support all points necessary to secure summary judgment, it is misleading insofar as it might be taken to suggest that the moving party must produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact even where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on that particular issue. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected any such suggestion, explaining that "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the District Court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case." Catrett, 106 S.Ct. at 2554 f(emphasis added).

. The majority’s use of Worthington Compressors is inapposite. In that case, the court overturned a summary judgment ruling against the manufacturers, a ruling that had required disclosure of allegedly confidential commercial information. The appellate court held that the trial court’s “key” error was adherence to too narrow a definition of "confidentiality,” 662 *1223F.2d at 52, one that could create “a potential windfall for competitors to whom valuable information is released under FOIA,” id. at 51. In sending the case back for trial, the appellate court stressed its concern that summary judgment might be giving competitors "quite a bargain” with "competitive consequences not contemplated as part of FOIA’s principal aim of promoting openness in government." Id. The Worthington Compressors case stands for the proposition that summary judgment requiring disclosure of information is not warranted by the mere fact that "the requested information is available, at some cost, from an additional source” without regard to how costly the information would be to obtain. Id. (emphasis in original). It does not stand for the proposition that summary judgment barring disclosure of information is never warranted when some of the requested information may be available from additional sources. Where it is clear, as in this case, that the information requested can be obtained from additional sources only partially, and only by expending tremendous amounts of time, money, and effort, the use of summary judgment to bar disclosure is appropriate.

. In objecting to Greenberg’s Rule 56(f) motion, Technicare also demonstrated that further discovery had the potential for abuse of the discovery process. J.A. at 116, 122-26. In esnce, Greenberg has failed to distinguish between the "comparatively limited discovery for the purpose of showing facts sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, rather than Rule 26, which provides for broad pretrial discovery." First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 265, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1581, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). Greenberg made his FOIA request to assist in his investigation of the hazardous health effects from use of Technicare CAT scanners. A review of his discovery requests shows that most of them were for information to further this investigation — information that has no bearing on the present action to determine whether the customer list could be protected from disclosure under Exemption 4.