Court Opinion

ID: 9773929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:04:14.762937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:59.519512
License: Public Domain

*484EDWIN H. SMITH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that it was error for the trial court to permit the State to inquire about the appellant’s prior drug treatment. However, I disagree that the error was not prejudicial requiring reversal.
“When an appellate court determines that error resulted in a criminal matter, the state must overcome the presumption of prejudice by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” State v. Greene, 820 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo.App.1991). The majority is correct when it asserts that appellate courts of this state have recognized that “the presumption of prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence may be overcome when the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming as to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the defendant would have been found guilty even without the erroneously admitted evidence,” citing State v. Troupe, 863 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Mo.App.1993). The rationale for this is that even without the inadmissible evidence, the jury would have found the defendant guilty. This, however, ignores that in cases where the jury is required to assess and declare punishment, that the jury verdict has two components: 1) a determination of guilt; and, 2) an assessment and declaration of punishment. The majority would only assess the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence on the jury’s determination of guilt and ignore its prejudicial effect on the jury’s assessment and declaration of punishment. I would hold that in determining the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence, the appellate court should also assess its effect on the sentence imposed.
Initially I would reject the holding of the majority concurring opinion which would hold that the appellant’s objection to the inadmissible evidence did not preserve the issue of the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the punishment component of the jury’s verdict. I am unaware of any requirement in the law that requires the objecting party to articulate the prejudicial grounds for an otherwise valid objection. For example, we do not require a hearsay objection to articulate the specific prejudice in order to preserve the issue for appeal. I can think of no valid reason for imposing such a requirement for the objection in question here.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by a jury of his peers, who are impartial and free from bias and prejudice. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. banc 1995). This entitlement to jury impartiality logically applies to a jury deliberating on its verdict, which includes its assessment and declaration of punishment. Although this is technically a “judge-sentencing state,” unless otherwise provided by law, the jury, as part of its verdict, is required to assess and declare punishment. § 557.036; Rule 29.02. This is, in effect, akin to a recommendation with a cap in that the trial court in sentencing a defendant is free to go below the sentence declared by the jury within the range of punishment, but cannot exceed it, unless the jury failed to at least declare the minimum sentence required by law. § 557.036; Rules 29.04—29.06. As a practical matter and for obvious reasons, it is a very rare day that the trial court imposes any sentence other than that recommended by the jury. In other words, the punishment assessed and declared by the jury is, in all but a very few cases, identical to the sentence imposed by the trial court. Here, we need not wonder as to whether the jury’s verdict as to punishment affected the actual sentence imposed by the trial court—they are identical.
Although conceding that the jury’s assessment and declaration of punishment does have a substantial impact on what sentence is subsequently imposed, the majority holds that given the roles of the judge and jury in sentencing in this state, there is no need for appellate review of the effect of inadmissible evidence on sentencing in that the trial judge is already required to review the sentencing recommendation of the jury before imposing sentence. Thus, the majority contends that if, in fact, the recommended sentence of the jury was not an appropriate one under the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial judge would never have imposed it. This then is our assurance, so says the majority, that the sentence imposed was not unduly influenced by the inadmissible evidence, and voila, the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of this evidence. This rea*485soning overlooks the obvious in that the trial judge in reviewing the sentence accepts as fact that the inadmissible evidence in question was admissible. How then can he or she in sentencing the defendant act as a filter or safety net in determining whether the inadmissible evidence prejudicially affected the punishment recommended by the jury? Thus, I do not believe that the trial judge serves as an adequate filter or safety net against a defendant’s sentence being unduly and wrongfully affected by inadmissible evidence. And, because I agree with the majority that the punishment component of the jury’s verdict does substantially affect the sentence imposed in a criminal case, any analysis of the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on a jury verdict must logically include its effect on the punishment assessed and declared by the jury.
Although done in the context of the punishment phase of a death penalty case, the Missouri Supreme Court has recognized the concept of assessing the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence on punishment. State v. Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d 901, 911 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 948, 109 S.Ct. 380, 102 L.Ed.2d 369 (1988). The court has also recognized the necessity of a jury being fully informed in fixing punishment. State v. Cline, 808 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. banc 1991). In Cline quoting from State v. Bevins, 328 Mo. 1046, 43 S.W.2d 432, 435 (banc 1931), the Missouri Supreme Court held that:
The duty [fixing punishment] being thus imposed upon the jury, the defendant certainly has a corresponding right to have that duty properly and intelligently performed, and to the end that it may be so performed it is necessary that the jury be properly instructed as to the applicable law.
Cline, 808 S.W.2d at 826 (emphasis added). And, although grudgingly, the majority does admit that even in non-death penalty cases there is precedent in this state supporting a review of the prejudicial effect of erroneously admitted evidence on the sentence imposed. In State v. Hernandez, 815 S.W.2d 67, 71 (Mo.App.1991), the State, in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, was allowed to introduce inadmissible evidence consisting of bumper sticker slogans regarding the defendant’s views on drinking to excess. In reversing the conviction, the court noted that the prosecutor “argued, in effect, that the jury should assess a maximum sentence in this case because of the beliefs of this defendant regarding the use of intoxicants—and the jury assessed the punishment that the prosecuting attorney asked them to assess.” Id. at 71 (emphasis added). The court held, inter alia, that “[i]n order to find that the use of the drinking slogans was not prejudicial, this court would have to find ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).” Id. (emphasis added). In reading the majority and dissenting opinions in Hernandez, the court there, without question, held that regardless of the existence of strong evidence of guilt, other than the inadmissible evidence, the erroneous admission of evidence had a prejudicial effect on the punishment declared by the jury requiring reversal.
The majority, in refusing to assess the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence on appellant’s sentence, contends to do so would require us to engage in speculation. I disagree. Questioning whether character assassination, as occurred here, has a prejudicial effect on the assessment and declaration of punishment is tantamount to questioning whether one’s good health is adversely affected by being infected with a deadly virus. No speculation is necessary to divine the answer.
Further, the majority, in contending that it would be necessary to engage in impermissible speculation to assess the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence on the sentence, incorrectly hypothesizes that it would be necessary, in order to overcome the presumption of prejudice, for the State to show what the exact sentence would have been absent the inadmissible evidence. With this as a given, the majority then argues that the prosecution would have an impossible burden in demonstrating that the sentence imposed would not have been different had the inadmissible evidence been excluded without resorting to impermissible speculation. This is *486a straw argument in that in order to make its point, the majority recognizes a burden which it knows cannot be met without resorting to impermissible speculation. However, I would hold that the correct burden on the State in order to overcome the presumption of prejudice would be to require it to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the sentence imposed would have been substantially less had the inadmissible evidence been excluded. This is a similar standard to be used in other instances where our appellate courts are called upon to determine the prejudicial effect of trial error. See State v. Barton, 936 S.W.2d 781, 787 (Mo. banc 1996) (holding that to establish prejudicial error as to the prosecutor’s closing argument, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different absent the error); see also State v. Parker, 856 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014, 113 S.Ct. 636, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992) (holding in a postconviction relief case that “prejudicially affected” is defined as “a reasonable probability that counsel’s error affected the outcome of the trial”); Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d at 911 (holding that in the penalty phase of death penalty case there is no prejudice unless “there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different sentencing....”); State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 153, 136 L.Ed.2d 98 (1996) (holding that a due process violation occurs “‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,’ ” quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).
Surely, the majority does not believe that the appellate courts of this state are incapable of determining with reasonable certainty whether the State has met its burden of showing that absent the inadmissible evidence there is no reasonable likelihood the sentence would have been substantially less, especially when it agrees that the appellate courts are capable of determining whether the jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the inadmissible evidence. To say we can make one determination without engaging in impermissible speculation, but cannot make the other, is inconsistent at best. In any event, the review for prejudice suggested by the dissent would seem to be far preferable to simply throwing up our hands in defeat and saying we realize the inadmissible evidence in question is of such a character that there is a reasonable likelihood it did have a prejudicial effect on the defendant’s sentence, but because of an imaginary shield of speculation which we choose to employ, we are helpless to right the wrong inflicted by someone other than the defendant who, nonetheless, is required to bear the injustice it wreaks.
In addition, with respect to its speculation concern, the majority allows the State to escape any accountability for its error, intentional or otherwise, by completely destroying the burden of the State to demonstrate that its error was not prejudicial as to the sentence imposed. What the majority is saying, in effect, is that although it is the prosecution’s error and its burden to show no prejudice from it, because the State cannot carry its burden without resorting to impermissible speculation, the burden of nonpersuasion should be borne by the defendant. To relieve the prosecution of its burden and from any accountability simply because the burden would be difficult to bear, is illogical and defies principles of due process and fundamental fairness.
In order to insure accountability and to deter the State from risking the introduction of inadmissible evidence, which may only bear on the issue of sentencing, there have to be consequences. When there are no consequences for its actions, the State, in eases where there is already strong admissible evidence as to guilt, unless voluntarily and ethically constrained, is left undeterred to risk the introduction of inadmissible evidence in order to obtain a stiffer sentence.1 In this *487respect, the State argued in oral argument that there is a deterrent in the form of the threat of disciplinary proceedings for prosecutors who act intentionally and repeatedly in violating the right of defendants to a fundamentally fair trial. I suggest this threat offers little in the way of addressing the concern raised. Where the error complained of falls short of being intentional, the prosecutor does not operate under any perceived threat of disciplinary proceedings, yet the defendant is still harmed by the error. Further, even if the threat of disciplinary proceedings is real, what relief is afforded to a wronged defendant by an after-the-fact, ancillary proceeding which does nothing to address or change the outcome of the defendant’s case as it relates to sentencing?
I am mindful of the fact that there are those who would argue that the dissent’s position would cause an added flood of appeals seeking review of criminal sentences. This simply is- not true. This argument ignores the fact that the review envisioned by the dissent would only occur after trial error has been found by an appellate court. I am not aware of an abundance of appellate cases where trial error has been found as to inadmissible evidence which would arguably have any effect on sentencing. Even more importantly, I have always assumed that the touchstone in determining whether to grant appellate review in order to correct a wrong in a criminal proceeding is not the amount of work which it might inflict on the appellate courts of this state, but is to insure the defendant’s constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial.
Having determined that the correct standard of review for determining prejudice for the admission of inadmissible evidence includes a determination of whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s sentence would have been substantially less absent the inadmissible evidence, I now turn to the case at bar to determine the prejudicial effect on appellant’s sentence, if any, of the evidence of appellant’s prior drug treatment. In this respect, the following pertinent exchanges occurred on cross-examination between the prosecutor and the appellant:
Q: ... Okay. Ever been arrested before?
MR. MARSHALL: Object.
THE WITNESS: I’ve been—
THE COURT: Okay. She—
THE WITNESS: —arrested in my home six times with this.
(objection was sustained)
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Q. Had you consumed any type of narcotics at that time?
MR. MARSHALL: Objection. Improper question.
THE COURT: Sustained.
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Q. You ever receive treatment for drug abuse?
MR. MARSHALL: Objection.
THE WITNESS: I plead the Fifth.
MR. MARSHALL: Relevance.
THE COURT: I’ll overrule that objection.
Q. Have you ever received treatment for drug abuse?
A Yes.
Q. Where was that at?
A I went to Laughlin for two weeks right after they took my children. I’ve been in—I was court ordered to go to Mid-Mo and released; and I was court ordered to go to Fulton, and I was released. Twelve hours, March 13, ’95.
Q. Have you ever contacted anybody regarding termination of parental rights of your children?
MR. MARSHALL: Object. This is beyond the scope of this charge.
(objection sustained)
I understand that when objections are made to questions and sustained, we do not generally consider the mere asking of those questions in determining prejudice in a ease. However, I do not believe we can consider the prejudicial effect of questions asked and *488answered over a valid objection in a vacuum. To assess the true impact of what the majority found to be erroneously admitted evidence on the jury’s verdict as it relates to punishment, I believe it is appropriate to consider the theme the prosecutor was pursuing at the time the inadmissible evidence was introduced. To do that, I would look to the context in which the question which elicited the objectionable evidence was being asked. Although objections to three of the four questions set out supra were properly sustained, it appears this was a series of questions, the answers to which would have had no arguable relevance to a determination of guilt, did nothing more than inflame the jury by assailing the character of the appellant.
In this case, the prosecutor asked the jury to return a verdict assessing and declaring punishment at 90 days in the county jail. The jury followed this recommendation. The trial court then followed suit and imposed the 90-day sentence. The State’s burden is to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that this sentence would have been substantially less if the inadmissible evidence had been excluded. I would review the evidence in this manner.
Given the fact this was not a felony case of kidnaping and flight, but a misdemeanor case of a mother denied visitation who took matters into her own hands in order to see her child, it is highly unlikely that a jury or judge would have been inclined to impose any jail time, let alone 90 days. The only way this would reasonably occur was to inflame the jury by tainting the appellant as an undesirable, who was worthy of its wrath. The inadmissible evidence here, by its very nature, would do exactly that. The prosecutor, who the majority recognizes was armed with obviously admissible evidence sufficient to convict appellant twice over, nonetheless chose to risk reversal by attempting on at least four occasions to introduce clearly inadmissible evidence, finally being successful as to one of these attempts. From this and the fact the prosecutor made a specific recommendation to the jury for sentencing, I am forced to conclude that the prosecutor had evaluated his case as to an appropriate sentence, and by his foray into hazardous waters when the need to do so to obtain a conviction was unnecessary, was attempting to sway the jury in regard to sentencing and was quite successful in doing so. There is nothing in the record which would support a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the appellant’s sentence would have been substantially less had the inadmissible evidence of her prior drug treatment been excluded.
As stated previously, the State bears the burden of showing that the error in question was harmless, or in other words, not prejudicial. Greene, 820 S.W.2d at 347. I would find that it has failed in its burden. The State did not rebut the presumption of prejudice of the trial court’s error induced by the State in that it failed to demonstrate that there was no reasonable likelihood the sentence of appellant would have been substantially less absent the inadmissible evidence. Because the burden of nonpersuasion falls on the State, I would hold that the admission of the evidence of appellant’s prior drug treatment was not only error, but reversible error.
Although already quoted by the majority, it bears repeating.
It is unfortunate when prosecuting officials with otherwise strong evidence in support of a conviction choose to go beyond the legitimate evidence that is available to them and pursue other inflammatory and irrelevant triviality in quest of conviction. When this occurs, the result of appellate review is assured.
Hernandez, 815 S.W.2d at 71. And, as Judge Parrish observed in his concurring opinion in Greene:
Prosecuting officials have the duty to prosecute cases with vigor, but they have the duty to do so within the bounds of rules of evidence and within the procedural boundaries prescribed for the conduct of criminal trials.
Greene, 820 S.W.2d at 348. Finally, it goes without saying that a passion for law and order, which is admirable, should never be fed by pursuing convictions and tough sentences while sacrificing the right of accused citizens to a fundamentally fair trial. To do *489so, is to lose that which should be our goal, regardless of our labels—true justice.

. I recognize that the vast majority of prosecutors would never intentionally seek to introduce inadmissible evidence simply to obtain tougher sentences. However, just as in the case of police officers and the Exclusionary Rule, the creation of a deterrent is not for the vast majority who will comply with constitutional principles of fair*487ness without coercion, but for the very small minority who will not.