Court Opinion

ID: 9369386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 17:08:51.117751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.774966
License: Public Domain

J-S44031-22

                                   2023 PA Super 20

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                   :
                v.                                 :
                                                   :
                                                   :
    ALFRED C. CARRERA II                           :
                                                   :
                       Appellant                   :   No. 694 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 6, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0000132-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                         FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2023

        Alfred C. Carrera II (Carrera) appeals from the order of the Court of

Common Pleas of Dauphin County (PCRA court) denying his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

He argues that the court erred in denying his petition because his sentence

was illegal where it was based on Pennsylvania’s Three Strikes Law.1          We

affirm and grant counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1Section 9714 of the Sentencing Code, Sentences for Second and Subsequent
Offenses, provides, in pertinent part:

                                        *      *   *

              (2) Where the person had at the time of the commission of
        the current offense previously been convicted of two or more such
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S44031-22

       We take the relevant factual background and procedural history from

the PCRA court’s April 4, 2018 memorandum opinion and our independent

review of the record.

____________________________________________

       crimes of violence arising from separate criminal transactions, the
       person shall be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least 25
       years of total confinement, notwithstanding any other provision of
       this title or other statute to the contrary. Proof that the offender
       received notice of or otherwise knew or should have known of the
       penalties under this paragraph shall not be required. …

                                        *      *   *

       (d) Proof at sentencing.— … The applicability of this section
       shall be determined at sentencing. The sentencing court, prior to
       imposing sentence on an offender under subsection (a), shall have
       a complete record of the previous convictions of the offender,
       copies of which shall be furnished to the offender. If the offender
       or the attorney for the Commonwealth contests the accuracy of
       the record, the court shall schedule a hearing and direct the
       offender and the attorney for the Commonwealth to submit
       evidence regarding the previous convictions of the offender. The
       court shall then determine, by a preponderance of the
       evidence, the previous convictions of the offender and, if
       this section is applicable, shall impose sentence in
       accordance with this section. …

                                        *      *   *

       (g) Definition.—As used in this section, the term “crime of
       violence” means … aggravated indecent assault … robbery … or
       robbery of a motor vehicle ….

42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2), (d), (g) (emphasis in original).

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                                               I.

        On November 17, 2016, the Middletown Police Department charged

Carrera with one count each of robbery of a motor vehicle, 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3702(a), and terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).2      The charges

stemmed from a November 13, 2016 incident at the Hardee’s in Middletown.

That night, Doris Louey was driving a 2006 Dodge Durango when she stopped

to get food at the restaurant. Ms. Louey was sitting with her keys and wallet

on the table in front of her.        Carrera and his ex-fiancé, Lisa Dawn Smith

(Smith), were at the table behind Ms. Louey. Carrera rushed over, grabbed

the keys and wallet and he and Smith ran out of the Hardees and got into Ms.

Louey’s car, with Carrera in the driver’s seat and Smith in the passenger’s

seat.

        Ms. Louey ran after them and grabbed the passenger side door, telling

the couple they could not take her car. Carrera yelled at Ms. Louey to get

away or he would shoot her. Ms. Louey did not see a gun but saw Carrera

motioning toward his side as if reaching for one. He and Smith then sped

away.

____________________________________________

2 A charge of theft by unlawful taking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a), was later
withdrawn.

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J-S44031-22

        Police recovered the damaged Dodge Durango, which Ms. Louey was

able to identify. She also identified Carrera and Smith in a photo array from

her recollection of what had happened.

        At trial, Carrera testified that he and Smith were high on crack on the

day of the incident and, before Ms. Louey came into the Hardees, were joking

about needing a car. When they saw Ms. Louey, Carrera decided to take her

vehicle. He admitted that he “did everything [he was] accused of except for

threaten her. That’s the only thing I didn’t do. Everything else I did.” (N.T.

Trial, 12/04/17, at 145).

        On December 5, 2017, a jury convicted Carrera with one count each of

robbery of a motor vehicle and terroristic threats.3 In his January 16, 2018

sentencing memorandum, Carrera maintained that the Commonwealth

informed him prior to trial that the robbery conviction was his third strike.

Carrera argued that the robbery conviction should not be considered a third

strike because: (1) his 1996 aggravated indecent assault conviction was not

included in the Three Strikes legislation until 2000; (2) the Commonwealth

waived the personal injury elements from a 2014 robbery conviction; and (3)

Carrera was not given notice of his first or second strike and was not

sentenced to a second strike.

____________________________________________

3   Smith pleaded guilty to charges related to the incident.

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        On January 31, 2018, the court sentenced Carrera to not less than 25

nor more than 50 years’ incarceration on the robbery conviction as a third-

time offender pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, and five years’ probation on

the terroristic threat’s conviction. Carrera filed a direct appeal challenging the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence and the legality of his sentence due to

the court’s application of the Three Strikes Law, raising the same arguments

as he did in his sentencing memorandum. (See Commonwealth v. Carrera,

2018 WL 4844711, unreported memorandum, at *4-*7 (Pa. Super. filed Oct.

5, 2018)). This Court affirmed,4 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied

____________________________________________

4   In pertinent part, this Court found:

               The imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant
        to Section 9714, which counts a conviction that occurred before
        the enactment of the statute as a strike, is not an unlawful
        retroactive application of law. Commonwealth v. Ford, 947
        A.2d 1251 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith,
        866 A.2d 1138 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Therefore, [Carrera]’s 1996
        aggravated-indecent-assault conviction was correctly counted as
        a strike pursuant to Section 9714, and [Carrera]’s argument to
        the contrary is meritless.

                                        *      *   *

            In 2014, [Carrera] pleaded guilty to and was convicted of
        committing robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), an offense
        enumerated as a strike under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). Nothing in
        the record reveals that the Commonwealth waived an element of
        the 2014 robbery making it a nonviolent crime; rather, the
        Commonwealth waived the crime-of-violence prohibition for
        sentencing purposes and [Carrera]’s ineligibility for State
        Intermediate Punishment.       Accordingly, we conclude that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                            -5-
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further review on April 17, 2019. (See id. appeal denied, 206 A.3d 1030 (Pa.

2019)).

       Carrera filed a timely5 pro se PCRA petition on March 23, 2020, raising

eight claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, including, in pertinent part,

counsel’s failure to argue in his direct appeal that Pennsylvania’s Three Strikes

Law violated his Constitutional rights pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that, with the exception of a prior conviction,

“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491. Appointed counsel filed an

amended petition on January 5, 2021.

       The amended petition addressed all the pro se ineffectiveness claims,

declining to advance most of them further because they lacked merit. (See

Supplemental Petition Pursuant to the PCRA, 1/05/21, at ¶¶ 57-96). It raised

two issues. First, it argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge

the weight of the evidence, thus waiving it for appellate review. (See id. at

____________________________________________

       [Carrera]’s 2014 robbery conviction counted as a strike under
       Section 9714.

(Carrera, 2018 WL 4844711, at *6).

5 There is no argument that Carrera’s petition was untimely because he filed
it within one year of the date his judgment became final. See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1), (3).

                                           -6-
J-S44031-22

¶¶ 41-56). Second, it conceded that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing

to argue Apprendi on appeal because settled Pennsylvania law was stated

that the Three Strikes Law was constitutional and Apprendi did not apply

where a defendant’s prior criminal history provided the basis for a sentence

higher than that ordinarily applicable. (See Supplemental Petition Pursuant

to the PCRA, 1/05/21, at ¶ 96); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491.

      However, the amended petition argued that Carrera’s sentence is now

illegal because, since his sentencing, the federal district court decided Roselli

v. Smith, 2020 WL 6449267, unpublished memorandum, at *1 (E.D. Pa. filed

Nov. 2, 2020), which held that the imposition of a sentence under the Three

Strikes Law does implicate Apprendi, comparing it to the federal court’s

consideration of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and, therefore, it was

for the jury to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether his prior

convictions were crimes of violence. (See Supplemental Petition, at ¶¶ 97-

99); see also Roselli, 2020 WL 6449267, at *4-5. Carrera requested the

court vacate his illegal sentence and hold a new sentencing hearing without

application of the Three Strikes Law. (See Supplemental Petition, at ¶ 100).

      On December 29, 2021, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

The court explained, in pertinent part, that Roselli is a non-binding district

court case and that, “therefore, this court stands by its evaluation of the third

strike issue as presented in [Carrera]’s direct appeal and found meritless by

                                      -7-
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both this court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court.” (Memorandum Opinion,

12/19/21, at 6) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Carrera did not respond

to the Rule 907 notice, and the court formally dismissed the petition on April

6, 2022. Carrera timely appealed6 and complied with the PCRA court’s order

that he file a statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b).

       Carrera raises one issue for our review:      “Whether the [PCRA] court

erred by denying [his] resentencing based upon the unconstitutionality of

Pennsylvania’s Three Strikes Law?” (Carrera’s Brief, at 4).7

                                               II.

       Carrera argues that the court erred in denying his PCRA petition because

the Pennsylvania Three Strikes Law is unconstitutional as applied to him, and

because he challenged “the legal and factual basis for [its] imposition,” 8 the

____________________________________________

6 In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is limited to
whether the record supports the PCRA court’s factual determinations and
whether its decision is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Lopez,
249 A.3d 993, 998 (Pa. 2021). “The determination as to whether the trial
court imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review
in cases dealing with questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Atanasio, 997 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2010).

7 To be eligible for PCRA relief, an appellant must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence: “That the conviction or sentence resulted from one or more
of the following: … the imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful
maximum.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii).

8We disagree with Carrera’s statement that his challenge is one of fact.
Whether a 1996 conviction for aggravated indecent assault is properly
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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jury should have made the determination about whether his predicate offenses

were “crimes of violence” to which it applied.       (See id. at 10, 12-17). In

support of his claim, he relies on Roselli, an unpublished federal district court

decision.9 (See id.).

       To understand Roselli’s federal habeas corpus case on which Carrera

relies, we provide the following limited background.

                                               A.

       In his direct appeal to this Court, Roselli argued that the Three Strikes

Law violates Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),10 and is

____________________________________________

included as a predicate offense under the Three Strikes statute where it was
not included in the legislation until 2000 is a question of law; as is whether
Carrera’s 2014 robbery conviction was a strike under the statute where the
Commonwealth waived the crime of violence prohibition for sentencing
purposes only. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 173 A.3d 1219, 1221 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (interpretation of statute “implicates a question of law.”).

9 We agree with the Commonwealth and the PCRA court that Carrera’s claim
fails because Roselli, a trial level federal district court decision, is not binding
on this Court. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 11); (PCRA Ct. Op., 12/29/21,
at 6); see also NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296,
303 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“federal court decisions do not control the
determinations of the Superior Court. Our law clearly states that, absent a
United States Supreme Court pronouncement, the decisions of federal courts
are not binding on Pennsylvania state courts[.]”). Carrera is unable to identify
any state cases, binding or otherwise, which have applied Roselli.

10 Alleyne held that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Alleyne, 99 U.S. at 103. “The
Alleyne decision ... renders those Pennsylvania mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions
constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge to automatically increase
a defendant’s sentence based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.”
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -9-
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unconstitutional (facially and as-applied) because it “permits an automatic

increase of a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum, without

notice and without a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt for its

application.” Commonwealth v. Roselli, 2015 WL 7722264, unpublished

memorandum, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 13, 2015).         He argued that his

predicate burglary offenses were only qualifying offenses under the Three

Strikes Law if the intruder enters a building or structure while another person

is present and if the building or structure is adapted for overnight

accommodations. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). However, we observed that

Alleyne was inapplicable because it did not overrule the narrow exception for

the fact of a prior conviction. After setting forth the language of Section 9714,

the Court found that the jury was not required to make this decision for

sentencing purposes. We explained:

              [T]he [Three Strikes] law requires that the trial court must
       make a determination, based upon evidence before it, whether
       the defendant has previous convictions for crimes of violence as
       defined by subsection (g). At sentencing in the present case, the
       Commonwealth offered a certified copy of Roselli’s conviction of
       first-degree felony burglary from 1989 in Delaware County and a
       copy of the affidavit of probable cause associated with that
       conviction. The Commonwealth similarly offered a certified copy
       of Roselli’s 1998 first-degree felony burglary conviction from
       Dauphin County as well as the affidavit of probable cause in that
       matter. Roselli objected to the affidavits (which were the only
       documents stating that another person was present in the home
       at the time Roselli burglarized them) as hearsay. The trial court
____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 804 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(emphasis added).

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        overruled Roselli’s objection upon its rationalization that it is not
        bound by the rules of evidence in a sentencing proceeding, and
        further that the documents presented by the Commonwealth were
        “self-certifying, reliable documents.” We can see no error in that
        determination.

Id. at *6 (record citations omitted).              We concluded that Roselli’s facial

constitutional challenge failed because the Three Strikes statute’s directive

that the sentencing court and not the jury shall determine whether the

mandatory minimum is applicable and does not violate Alleyne or the

constitution. The Commonwealth established probable cause to support the

sentence by offering proof in the form of the convictions and the affidavits of

probable cause that showed he had been convicted for crimes of violence

enumerated in the statute. We also concluded that his as-applied challenge

lacked merit because a jury is not required to find a crime of violence, so its

failure to do so in his case was constitutional. See id. at *8. We affirmed the

trial court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further review.11

____________________________________________

11   Judge Strassburger concurred in the result, stating:

        We are dealing with an issue of what the convictions involve, i.e.,
        were the burglary convictions crimes of violence because the
        buildings were occupied. Certainly an argument can be made that
        this issue involves a factual question that requires a jury to decide
        it beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately for Roselli, that
        argument has been repeatedly rejected by the courts. See U.S.
        v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3rd Cir. 2013):

          Blair’s arguments fail, however, because Almendarez–
          Torres has not been narrowed and remains the law.
          Alleyne, [560 U.S. at 111] n.1. Descamps and Alleyne do
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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                                               B.

       Roselli then filed a federal writ of habeas corpus raising the same issues.

He argued that his predicate convictions for burglary were only qualifying

offenses under subsection (g) of the Three Strikes law only if the intruder

enters a building or structure while another person is present and if the

building or structure is adapted for overnight accommodations. He argued

that the application of § 9714 in his case is unconstitutional because the jury

did not make the finding that he has two prior convictions for crimes of

violence. Having rejected his claim that the jury was required to make this

finding, this issue fails.

       The district court found that the federal “categorical approach” utilized

to determine when an out-of-state conviction may serve as a predicate offense

____________________________________________

         nothing to restrict the established exception under
         Almendarez–Torres that allows judges to consider prior
         convictions. When the pertinent documents show, as they do
         in this case, that the prior convictions are for separate crimes
         against separate victims at separate times, Alleyne does not
         somehow muddy the record and convert the separateness
         issue into a jury question. Alleyne was written against the
         backdrop of Almendarez–Torres and existing ACCA
         jurisprudence. Had the Supreme Court meant to say that all
         details related to prior convictions are beyond judicial notice,
         it would have said so plainly, as that would have been a
         marked departure from existing law.

Roselli, 2015 WL 7722264, at *9.

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for the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),12 should be applied to considerations of

whether a prior conviction was a “crime of violence” for Third Strike purposes.

Pursuant to this approach, “the underlying state’s statute’s elements must be

the same as or narrower than those of the generic offense.        According to

Roselli, in conducting this analysis, the sentencing court must ignore the

particular facts of the case and focus solely on whether the elements of the

convicted crime sufficiently match the elements of the generic offense.

       Roselli observed that there is only one circumstance in which a court

may depart from the categorical approach and, there, a court may consult

“the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or

transcript of a colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual

basis was confirmed by the defendant, or some comparable judicial record of

information.”      Should any further evidence be required, it should be

considered by a jury. Because the sentencing court had to rely on material

that was extrinsic to the crime itself, i.e., whether the building was occupied,

to which the defendant did not confirm, the district court held that we erred

in not upholding the as-applied challenge.

       Now back to this appeal.

____________________________________________

12 The ACCA requires imposition of a mandatory minimum 15-year term of
imprisonment for recidivists convicted of prohibited possession of a firearm
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), who have three prior state or federal convictions
for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.

                                          - 13 -
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                                      C.

     At the outset, we note that Roselli is not binding on this Court.       It

conflicts with our decisions that it is the sentencing court that makes the

decision whether a prior crime is a crime of violence for purposes of the

statute, and “the court may receive any relevant information for the purposes

of determining the proper penalty.” Commonwealth v. Maroney, 193 A.2d

640, 642 (Pa. Super. 1963).

     [T]he Supreme Court explicitly exempted the existence of prior
     convictions from the mandate of jury consideration when
     sentencing enhancement is an issue. When considering the
     propriety of a sentencing enhancement in the wake of Apprendi,
     supra, this Court has determined that it is appropriate to employ
     a multi-part analysis. Commonwealth v. Lowery, 784 A.2d
     795, 799 (Pa. Super. 2001). First, we must ascertain whether the
     enhanced sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for the
     crime for which the defendant was convicted. If it did, the next
     question is whether the enhanced sentence was based upon the
     fact of a prior conviction. If it was, then the sentence is
     constitutional. If it was not, then the sentence is unconstitutional.
     Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 n. 4
     (3d Cir.2000)).

Commonwealth v. Harris, 888 A.2d 862, 872 (Pa. Super. 2005).

     Moreover, even if Roselli applied, the facts here are significantly

different in that no extrinsic evidence was needed to determine whether

Carrera committed three enumerated crimes that made the Third Strike

sentencing enhancement applicable.         At sentencing, the Commonwealth

produced a sealed and certified file from the clerk of courts that evidenced

that Carrera pleaded guilty to aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.

                                    - 14 -
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§ 3125(1),13 on February 6, 1996, and a sealed and certified docket that

reflected Carrera pled guilty to robbery, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii),14 on

August 29, 2014. (See N.T. Sentencing, 1/31/18, at 3-4). Both exhibits were

moved into the record as self-authenticating, and the convictions were for

enumerated crimes of violence under the Three Strikes legislation. (See id.

at 4); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(g). No extrinsic evidence such as an affidavit of

probable cause was used in determining whether any of the crimes were

qualifying crimes in applying the enhancement.

       As this Court explained in his direct appeal, the sentencing court

properly found that his 1996 conviction for aggravated indecent assault was

a first strike despite it not being included in the Three Strikes Law until 2000,

and the Commonwealth did not waive the personal injury element of his 2014

robbery; therefore, it was a second strike. (See Carrera, 2018 WL 4844711,

at *6). Carrera’s reliance on Roselli is neither legally binding nor persuasive.

Moreover, even if Roselli was either, the application of the enhancement was

constitutional.    Unlike in that case, Carrera’s sentencing as a third-strike

____________________________________________

13  18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “a person who
engages in penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a
complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other than good
faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures commits aggravated
indecent assault if: (1) the person does so without the complainant’s
consent[.] …”

14  18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(ii)(1) provides that “A person is guilty of robbery
if, in the course of committing theft, he: … (ii) threatens another with or
intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury[.] …”.

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offender was based on his prior convictions, without the use of any extrinsic

evidence such as a probable cause affidavit, making the enhancement

constitutional even if Roselli was applicable.

      Accordingly, because Carrera’s sentencing as a third-strike offender was

based on the fact of his prior convictions, which were offenses enumerated in

the Three Strikes Law, the enhancement was constitutional. See Harris, 888

A.2d at 872. For all these reasons, we affirm the order of the PCRA court

dismissing his petition. The motion for leave to withdraw of Amanda A. Batz,

Esq. is granted and the trial court is directed to appoint new counsel for any

further appellate proceedings.

      Order affirmed. Motion for leave to withdraw is granted. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/8/2023

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