Court Opinion

ID: 9942555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:02:15.681873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:14.648753
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6194     Document: 010111003348      Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                          Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 21, 2024
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _______________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 22-6194

  JUANITA VIRIDIANA GARCIA
  RODRIGUEZ,

        Defendant - Appellant.

                      __________________________________________

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
           FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
                      (D.C. No. 5:20-CR-321-F-2)
                 __________________________________________

 Gregory M. Acton, Acton Law Office, PC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
 Defendant-Appellant.

 Thomas B. Snyder, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester,
 United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
 for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                      __________________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
              ___________________________________________
Appellate Case: 22-6194   Document: 010111003348   Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 2

        This appeal stemmed from two individuals’ cross-country car trip.

 Inside the car were secret compartments containing bundles of

 methamphetamine. But to the casual observer, the car looked like any other

 car.

        The driver apparently knew about the secret compartments of

 methamphetamine, but did the passenger? It’s possible, but there was no

 evidence that

             the driver had told the passenger about the methamphetamine or

             the passenger had detected the secret compartments.

 Without such evidence, could a reasonable jury find the passenger guilty of

 crimes that required her knowledge of the drugs? We answer no.

 1.     Methamphetamine is hidden inside secret compartments.

        The driver was Mr. Tony Garcia; the passenger was Ms. Juanita

 Viridiana Garcia-Rodriguez. The two had been a couple and had three

 children together.

        Mr. Garcia and Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez lived in California, and

 Mr. Garcia apparently agreed to transport methamphetamine from

 Bakersfield, California to Oklahoma. Mr. Garcia had planned to take Ms.

 Garcia-Rodriguez’s brother on the trip and had arranged to pay him. At the

 last minute, however, Mr. Garcia told the brother that the trip was

 cancelled. Mr. Garcia then invited Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez, and she

 accepted.
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       After they reached Oklahoma, the police stopped Mr. Garcia for

 traffic violations. The stop led police officers to search the car, and they

 eventually found

             a bag of methamphetamine hidden inside the rear fender well,

             two bundles of methamphetamine hidden in the panels for the
              rear passenger-side door, and

             eleven bundles hidden in the panels for the rear door on the
              driver’s side.

 The methamphetamine weighed about 29 pounds.

 2.    Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez is convicted.

       Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez went to trial on charges of

             conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the intent to
              distribute (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846) and

             interstate travel in aid of a drug-trafficking enterprise
              (18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)).

 After the prosecution rested, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez moved for a judgment

 of acquittal. The district court denied the motion. Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez

 did not testify at trial, and the jury found her guilty on the conspiracy and

 interstate travel charges. 1

 1
      Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez was also charged with possession of
 methamphetamine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1)) and
 possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
 (18 U.S.C. § 942(c)(1)(A)). The jury found her not guilty on these charges.

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 3.    The standard of review requires more than speculation.

       Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez appealed on the ground that the evidence was

 insufficient to show guilt. In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, we

 engage in de novo review. United States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 430 (10th

 Cir. 2019). This review entails consideration of the evidence in the light

 most favorable to the prosecution. Id. We may reverse only if no

 reasonable factfinder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

 To find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the factfinder could rely on the

 evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, but couldn’t

 speculate or resort to conjecture. United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071,

 1073–74 (10th Cir. 2004). We thus can’t “uphold a conviction obtained by

 piling inference upon inference.” United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162

 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).

 4.    To convict, the prosecution needed to prove Ms. Garcia-
       Rodriguez’s knowledge of the methamphetamine.

       On the charge of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, the

 prosecution needed to show that (1) at least two individuals had agreed to

 violate the law, (2) Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had known the essential

 objectives of the conspiracy, (3) she had knowingly and voluntarily

 participated in the conspiracy, and (4) the alleged co-conspirators had been

 interdependent. See United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1287

 (10th Cir. 2009).

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       On the charge of interstate travel, the prosecution needed to show

 that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had “(1) traveled or used facilities in interstate

 commerce; (2) with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on or

 facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on of a

 prohibited activity; and (3) thereafter attempted to or did in fact engage in

 one of the proscribed activities.” United States v. Johnson, 961 F.2d 1488,

 1491 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498,

 502 (10th Cir. 1991)).

       Both convictions required proof that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had

 known about the methamphetamine hidden inside the car. Otherwise,

 Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez wouldn’t have known the essential objective of the

 conspiracy or have intended to help carry out a conspiracy to distribute

 methamphetamine. See United States v. Corrales, 608 F.3d 654, 657

 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that knowledge is an element of the crime of

 conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute); United States v.

 Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 415 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that conviction of

 interstate travel required a specific intent to promote a business enterprise

 involving marijuana and “the major proof” of that intent would involve

 “knowledge of the load they were carrying”). 2

 2
       Knowledge alone may not have been enough to convict Ms. Garcia-
 Rodriguez: “Mere knowledge that drugs are present in a vehicle, without
 additional evidence to support a reasonable inference of a knowing
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 5.    The prosecution failed to show that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had
       known about the secret compartments of methamphetamine.

       Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez rode across the country in a car containing

 roughly 29 pounds of methamphetamine. “But mere presence, as a

 passenger, in a car found to be carrying drugs is insufficient to implicate

 the passenger in the conspiracy.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865

 (10th Cir. 1995). The issue here is whether any other proof existed on

 Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s knowledge of the methamphetamine.

       a.     The jury could only speculate about Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s
              knowledge.

       It is possible that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez knew about the

 methamphetamine. For example, Mr. Garcia might have told Ms. Garcia-

 Rodriguez about the methamphetamine. Or Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez might

 have learned about the secret compartments by investigating the rear doors.

 In fact, the police ultimately discovered the secret compartments by

 manipulating the rear doors. For example, when the rear door on the

 driver’s side wouldn’t open, an officer manipulated the door from the

 inside and the panel fell off. And when an officer grabbed at the paneling

 on the rear passenger door, the interior panel fell off.

 agreement to distribute them, is insufficient to sustain a conspiracy
 conviction.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir. 1995).

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         But the prosecution didn’t present evidence that Mr. Garcia had said

 anything to Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez about the secret compartments, that Ms.

 Garcia-Rodriguez had tried to open the rear door on the driver’s side, or

 that she had grabbed at the paneling of the rear passenger door. So the jury

 could only speculate on whether Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had known about

 the secret compartments of methamphetamine.

         Such speculation isn’t enough, for we and other circuits have

 uniformly regarded the evidence as insufficient to convict when a

 third-party hides drugs and the jury can only speculate on what a traveling

 companion knows. For example, we addressed this issue in United States v.

 Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). There the charge

 involved possession of ephedrine with knowledge that it would be used to

 make methamphetamine. Id. at 1257–58. The defendant rode in a truck with

 a camper shell. Id. at 1258. The police stopped the truck for violating

 traffic laws and later found ephedrine concealed in a hidden compartment

 in the ceiling of the camper. Id. The defendant was convicted; but we

 reversed, concluding that the prosecution had failed to show that the

 passenger knew about the ephedrine hidden in the camper. Id. at 1257,

 1262.

         We also addressed a passenger’s knowledge in United States v.

 Jones, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995). There a car was stopped for traffic

 violations; inside were the driver and a passenger. Id. at 863. A later

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 search revealed over 200 kilograms of cocaine in luggage in the back seat

 and in the trunk. Id. at 864. The passenger was convicted of (1) possessing

 cocaine with intent to distribute and (2) conspiring to possess cocaine with

 intent to distribute. Id. at 862. We reversed both convictions, concluding

 that the evidence wasn’t sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

 the passenger had known about the cocaine in the car. Id. at 866, 870.

       We noted that the two individuals had “drive[n] together for a

 considerable length of time.” Id. at 867. But the cocaine wasn’t in plain

 view and didn’t carry an odor. Id. at 864, 866–67. So we concluded that the

 jury would need to speculate in order to infer the passenger’s knowledge of

 the cocaine. Id. at 865–67.

       In declining to allow speculation of a passenger’s knowledge, we’ve

 followed the approach taken in other circuits. For example, the D.C.

 Circuit addressed similar circumstances in United States v. Teffera,

 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993). That case also involved two individuals

 traveling together. Id. at 1084. One of them had hidden cocaine in his

 pants, but the government charged his traveling companion. Id. at 1086.

 The government had reason to suspect complicity on the part of the

 traveling companion because he had lied to the police about where he was

 going and whether he was traveling alone. Id. These lies led to the

 traveling companion’s conviction for possessing cocaine base with intent

 to distribute. Id. at 1084.

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       The D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the evidence was

 insufficient for guilt. Id. at 1087. The traveling companion might have

 known that criminal activity was afoot, but that possibility wasn’t enough

 to convict on a particular crime:

       There are innumerable reasons why [the companion] might have
       wanted to distance himself from [the individual with the hidden
       cocaine base]. For example, [the companion] may have known
       that [the other individual] was frequently in trouble with the law
       and wished to avoid getting caught up in the same net with [him].
       Or, [the companion] may have suspected that [the other
       individual] was currently involved in some sort of criminal
       venture, but did not know what the specific venture was—an
       inference that is particularly plausible here since the only direct
       evidence of [the other individual’s] criminal activity was hidden
       beneath [the other individual’s] clothes. Courts have found that
       evidence that implies this sort of general knowledge of
       criminality afoot is insufficient to sustain a conviction for aiding
       and abetting a specific crime.

 Id. at 1086–87.

       The Fifth Circuit took the same approach in United States v. Ferg,

 504 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1974). There the defendant was a passenger in a car

 that had drugs (marijuana) concealed between the back seat and the frame

 of the car. Id. at 916. Based on the presence of marijuana in the car, the

 passenger was convicted of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute.

 Id. at 915. The Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the prosecution had

 failed to prove that the passenger had known about the marijuana

 concealed in the car. Id. at 917.

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        Other circuits have reached similar conclusions, reversing

  convictions built on assumptions that a passenger knew about drugs hidden

  inside a vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Larios, 416 F.3d 872,

  873–74 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to

  find knowledge that cocaine had been concealed in the car by the

  individual who owned the car); United States v. Pena, 983 F.2d 71, 72–73

  (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to convict a

  passenger of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to

  distribute when fifteen packages of cocaine had been hidden in a secret

  compartment in the bottom of the trunk and the passenger felt that

  something illegal was probably going on); United States v. Terselich,

  885 F.2d 1094, 1098–99 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the evidence was

  insufficient to support a passenger’s conviction of possessing cocaine with

  intent to distribute when the cocaine had been hidden in the car’s gasoline

  container); United States v. Bonds, 435 F.2d 164, 164 (9th Cir. 1970)

  (per curiam) (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the

  passenger’s knowledge of a substantial quantity of narcotics concealed

  under the back seat).

        Like the passengers in these cases, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez was riding

  in a vehicle that contained a large quantity of drugs hidden in secret

  compartments. The prosecution had suspicion—but no proof—that Ms.

  Garcia-Rodriguez had known about the drugs hidden in the car.

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        b.    Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s implausible statements don’t
              constitute evidence that she knew about the
              methamphetamine.

        Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez might have known that criminal activity was

  afoot. After all, she didn’t offer a credible explanation for the car trip. She

  and Mr. Garcia had driven over 1300 miles in roughly 21 hours. When

  stopped by the police, they explained that they were going to an Oklahoma

  casino to gamble. Mr. Garcia added that they had $200 to spend. Why

  would two individuals drive over 20 hours to spend $200 gambling in an

  Oklahoma casino and then turn around and drive over 20 hours to return

  home? And when stopped, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez

             had a small amount of methamphetamine hidden inside her bra
              and

             appeared increasingly nervous throughout the traffic stop.

  Lastly, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez may have known that Mr. Garcia was up to

  something. When the police asked her if she was committing a crime, she

  replied: “Not me.” Supp. R. vol. 2, at 63.

        From these pieces of evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that

  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had suspected Mr. Garcia’s participation in some

  sort of criminal mischief:

             Maybe he planned to commit some crime once he reached
              Oklahoma.

             Maybe he planned to buy drugs in Oklahoma and take them to
              California.

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             Maybe Mr. Garcia had hidden contraband on his person or in
              the car.

  All of these were possibilities. But which crime was Mr. Garcia

  committing? The jury could only speculate on what Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez

  may have thought. 3 Though she may have suspected some criminal activity,

  the prosecution lacked evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez knew what

  Mr. Garcia was doing. See United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786,

  795–96 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that inconsistent accounts of travel plans

  aren’t enough to connect the defendant to a particular drug venture);

  accord United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

  (concluding that the evidence was insufficient to convict a passenger, who

  lied to the police about traveling alone, because he might have had many

  reasons to distance himself from his traveling companion).

  3
         In oral argument, the government argued that the jury could infer that
  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had known about the secret compartments of
  methamphetamine because she had a small bag of methamphetamine tucked
  in her bra. But the government hadn’t made this argument in its response
  brief. There the government had argued more generally that the value and
  quantity of methamphetamine “together with the other evidence” could
  have led the factfinder to infer Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s knowledge of the
  hidden drugs. Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 57. Oral argument was too late for
  the government to rely on the small bag tucked in Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s
  bra. See United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1160 (10th Cir. 2021)
  (stating that it was too late for the government to raise harmlessness for
  the first time in oral argument); United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793,
  800–01 (10th Cir. 2019) (“We typically decline to consider an appellee’s
  contentions raised for the first time in oral argument.”).

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        We addressed similar circumstances in United States v. Valadez-

  Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Jones,

  44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995). As noted above, we concluded in these

  opinions that the prosecution hadn’t proven the passenger’s knowledge of

  the hidden substances (ephedrine and cocaine). See p. 7–8, above. The

  ephedrine had been hidden in the camper shell, and the cocaine had been

  hidden in luggage in the back seat and trunk.

        In Valadez-Gallegos, we recognized that the passenger had given

  “inconsistent and contradictory statements concerning the dates and time

  of travel, night-time accommodations, weather, and the presence of another

  passenger on the trip.” 162 F.3d at 1262. But the inconsistencies and

  contradictions in the passenger’s “stories” created only suspicion of some

  illegal activity. Id. at 1263. This suspicion was not enough to uphold a

  conviction for the specific crime of possession of ephedrine with

  knowledge that it would be used to make methamphetamine. Id.

        Similarly, the passenger in Jones had

             flown from Detroit to Los Angeles on a one-way ticket
              purchased with cash and

             told the officers that their destination and the contents of the
              car were whatever the driver had said.

  44 F.3d at 864, 866. These facts could lead a jury to infer the passenger’s

  suspicion of illegality. Id. at 866. But we concluded that “suspicion of

  illegality” wasn’t enough “to prove participation in a conspiracy.” Id.
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        Here too, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s implausible explanation could

  create suspicion. But that suspicion was not enough to find that Ms.

  Garcia-Rodriguez had known about the secret compartments of

  methamphetamine.

        c.    The value of the methamphetamine doesn’t constitute
              evidence of Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s knowledge.

        The government points out that the methamphetamine was expensive,

  carrying a wholesale value of roughly $75,000. And a jury can often

  assume that someone wouldn’t plant expensive drugs in a car without

  informing the occupants. United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124,

  1130 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir.

  1986). Whenever we’ve recognized this assumption, however, other

  evidence suggested that the occupant had known about the secret

  compartment.

        For example, we recognized this assumption in United States v.

  Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2004). There expensive drugs

  were found in a car’s secret compartment attached to the gas tank. Id.

  at 1128. We concluded that the evidence was sufficient to implicate two

  passengers, pointing out that the jury could infer that no one would have

  put the drugs in the car without informing the occupants. Id. at 1130. But

  there were three other pieces of evidence showing knowledge. First, one

  passenger had paid to repair the engine and a speaker box. Id. Second, the

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  other passenger had $1210 in cash and had been paid to go on the trip. Id.

  Third, the car had to stop frequently for fuel and would hold only a small

  amount of gasoline. Id.

        We also recognized this assumption in United States v. Hooks,

  780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1986). There the defendant’s truck was stopped

  with PCP valued at $10,000. Id. at 1528–29, 1532. The defendant denied

  knowledge of the PCP; but the truck had reeked from the smell of PCP, the

  defendant had carried a substance used to purify PCP, he had given the

  police a false name, he had slurred his speech and had bloodshot eyes

  (though he didn’t smell of alcohol), and he had appeared to keep the police

  away from the truck by immediately walking to the police car. Id. at 1532.

        This kind of evidence was lacking here. The value could suggest that

  Mr. Garcia had known about the methamphetamine. But how would the

  value of the methamphetamine suggest Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s

  knowledge? See United States v. Ramirez, 176 F.3d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir.

  1999) (stating that the value of the marijuana hidden in a spare tire could

  reasonably support an inference of knowledge on the part of the driver, but

  not the passenger). Mr. Garcia apparently needed someone to go on this

  quick road trip and invited Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez. But there wasn’t any

  evidence that Mr. Garcia had told Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez about the

  methamphetamine. Without such evidence, the value of the

  methamphetamine doesn’t suggest that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez knew the

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  nature of Mr. Garcia’s crime. See United States v. Aponte, 619 F.3d 799,

  808 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that “we are unaware of any case in which the

  drugs’ value was the only circumstantial evidence to indicate the occupants

  were aware of drugs in their vehicle”).

        d.      The appearance of the rear doors doesn’t constitute
                evidence of Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s knowledge.

        The government points not only to the value of the methamphetamine

  but also to the possibility that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez might have

  recognized that someone had modified the rear doors. Here the government

  argues that

               the rear door on the driver’s side could not open and

               the rear door panel on the passenger side was so loose that it
                came off when a police officer opened the door.

  This argument rests on speculation because the government didn’t present

  any evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had ever tried to open either of

  the rear doors.

        We addressed a similar issue in United States v. Valadez-Gallegos,

  162 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). As noted above, we held there that the

  evidence was insufficient to show the passenger’s knowledge of the illegal

  substance (ephedrine). See p. 7, above. There the defendant was riding in

  the cab of a truck, and “massive quantities” of ephedrine had been hidden

  in the ceiling of a camper. Id. at 1263. We noted that the camper had

  reeked of perfumed dryer sheets. Id. So if the defendant had opened the
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  camper door, he presumably would have noticed the unusual odor. But we

  relied on the absence of any evidence that the passenger had opened the

  camper’s door. Id.

        Here too, the prosecution presented no evidence that Ms. Garcia-

  Rodriguez had ever tried to open either of the rear doors. Mr. Garcia had

  just bought the car days earlier, and there wasn’t any evidence to suggest

  that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had ridden in the car before their road trip. And

  there’s no evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had opened the rear doors.

        The government also failed to present any evidence suggesting that

  the doors looked suspicious. If Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had looked at the

  outside or inside of either car door, she would not have noticed anything

  unusual. For example, this is what the police saw when they later opened

  the rear door on the passenger side:

  It looked like any other car door.

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         The government suggests that this door panel immediately fell off

  when the police opened it. Appellee’s Resp. Br. at 53 (stating that “the

  passenger-side rear door panel was so loose it fell off when an officer

  opened that door”). But there’s no evidence for this suggestion because the

  police officer admitted that he had grabbed at the paneling before it fell

  off:

         Q:   Did you in any way pull the molding to make it come off, or
              did it just come off when you opened the door?

         A:   I did grab ahold . . . to see if there was any wiggle room at all,
              like it had been manipulated, and that is how fast it came off.

  Supp. R. vol. 2, at 186–87.

         The videotape of the traffic stop shows the officer opening the door

  and grabbing the top of the door panel. After the officer had grabbed the

  door panel, it fell off.

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        If Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had grabbed the rear passenger door the way

  that the officer did, she too might have seen the paneling fall off. But there

  wasn’t any evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had grabbed the door this

  way. Speculation doesn’t substitute for evidence, and there wasn’t any

  evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had recognized something amiss with

  the doors to the back seat.

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        e.    Mr. Garcia’s text messages don’t show Ms. Garcia-
              Rodriguez’s knowledge of the purpose for the road trip.

        The government also relies on text messages between Mr. Garcia,

  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez, and her brother. These text messages preceded the

  road trip. For example, hours before the trip, Mr. Garcia sent separate texts

  with a photograph of the car. One text went to Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez, the

  other to the individual who was apparently orchestrating the trip. In a

  separate exchange, Mr. Garcia asked Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez if she would go

  on the trip. She responded by asking which car they were taking, and Mr.

  Garcia replied that they would take the Malibu.

        From these text messages, the government argues that Mr. Garcia was

  conveying to Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez that the Malibu had been rigged and

  loaded with methamphetamine. That’s a possibility, of course, but there

  wasn’t any evidence that this is what Mr. Garcia meant. Ms. Garcia-

  Rodriguez was about to ride 1300 miles each way and asked the driver

  which car they were going in, and the driver answered. The text exchange

  didn’t say anything more. The jury could speculate that Mr. Garcia was

  sending Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez a coded text message, informing her that the

  Malibu had been packed with methamphetamine. But there was no evidence

  that this is what the text messages meant.

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        f.    Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s apparent nervousness may arouse
              suspicion, but doesn’t supply evidence that she knew about
              the secret compartments of methamphetamine.

        Finally, the government relies on Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s nervous

  behavior during the traffic stop. An officer testified that Ms. Garcia-

  Rodriguez had breathed heavily, bounced her foot up and down, and

  experienced shaking of her hands and face.

        Extreme, persistent nervousness may supply relevant evidence of

  involvement in a drug trafficking scheme. See United States v. West, 219

  F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Although normal nervousness exhibited

  by those stopped for a traffic citation is usually entitled to limited

  significance in the probable cause analysis, in this case it is entitled to

  somewhat more weight because of the extreme and continued nervousness

  exhibited by [the defendant].”). But even when the nervousness is extreme,

  it doesn’t show knowledge of a particular scheme. See United States v.

  Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 795–96 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that

  evidence of nervousness did not permit an inference of the defendant’s

  participation in a drug trafficking scheme).

        The government argues that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s nervousness

  shows that she knew that some crime was being committed. There’s little

  question about that, as she had a small bag of methamphetamine hidden in

  her bra. But the government didn’t prosecute her for the methamphetamine

  hidden in her bra; the government instead prosecuted her for the many bags

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  of methamphetamine hidden in the fender well and in the door panels. And

  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s nervousness didn’t supply any evidence that she

  was aware of those bags of methamphetamine. See United States v.

  Terselich, 885 F.2d 1094, 1098 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the

  evidence was insufficient to convict a passenger, despite his nervousness,

  because it may have been attributable to the normal anxiety that a foreign

  individual could experience when stopped by the police).

        We addressed a similar issue in United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860

  (10th Cir. 1995). There the passenger reacted nervously when the police

  said that the car would be seized. Id. at 866. As noted above, the police

  ultimately found over 200 kilograms of cocaine in the car. See pp. 7–8,

  above. We concluded that the jury couldn’t reasonably find knowledge of

  the cocaine from the passenger’s nervous reaction:

              We view her reaction as a natural one for a cross-country
        traveler who had been detained by the police for close to two
        hours and who found herself in the custodial environment of a
        police station with no money and about to lose her mode of
        transportation.

  Jones, 44 F.3d at 867.

        Like the passenger in Jones, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez was about to lose

  her mode of transportation while over 1000 miles from home. She also had

  a small baggie of methamphetamine in her bra. Like the defendant in

  Jones, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had a “natural” explanation for her nervous

  reaction. Id. We thus conclude that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s nervousness

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  was no more suggestive of knowledge than the Jones passenger’s nervous

  reaction to the loss of her ride back to Detroit.

                                       * * *

        The government presented evidence suggesting that the driver knew

  about the methamphetamine hidden in the car’s secret compartments. But

  there wasn’t any evidence that the driver had shared this knowledge with

  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez. The methamphetamine was hidden in the fender

  well and the panels to the rear doors, and there wasn’t any evidence that

  Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had looked in the fender well or knew that the rear

  doors had secret compartments in the panels.

        The jury could infer that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had reason to suspect

  some crime. But there wasn’t any evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had

  known that the crime involved a large amount of methamphetamine. The

  methamphetamine was hidden in secret compartments of a car, but the

  government presented no evidence that Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had ridden in

  the car before her road trip with Mr. Garcia.

        Her explanation for the road trip was implausible, so she might have

  assumed that Mr. Garcia was plotting some crime. But what crime was he

  plotting? Even if Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez had suspected a criminal plot, her

  implausible explanation wouldn’t have shown knowledge that the plot

  involved a large amount of methamphetamine.

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        She was nervous when questioned. But she was over 1000 miles from

  home with methamphetamine hidden in her bra and may have suspected

  that Mr. Garcia was involved in some criminal scheme. In these

  circumstances, Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s nervousness didn’t constitute

  evidence that she knew about the secret compartments filled with

  methamphetamine.

        With no evidence of such knowledge, the jury had insufficient

  evidence to find Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez guilty of conspiracy to distribute

  methamphetamine or interstate travel associated with a drug-trafficking

  enterprise. We thus reverse her convictions and remand with instructions to

  enter a judgment of acquittal. 4

  4
        Because we reverse Ms. Garcia-Rodriguez’s convictions for
  insufficient evidence, we do not address her other appellate arguments.

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