Court Opinion

ID: 9839383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 22:03:32.16705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:15.680524
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/12/23 Riley v. County of Los Angeles CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

NATHANIEL VAUGHN                                             B317901
RILEY,
                                                             (Los Angeles County
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No.
                                                             18STCV06789)
         v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

     Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Reversed.
      Alon, Edward E. Alon and Jonathan A. Alon, for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
      Collins + Collins, Tomas A. Guterres, David C. Moore, and
Christian M. Chung, for Defendant and Respondent.
                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      Angela Connor went into cardiac arrest while in the
custody of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD).
She was transported to the hospital where she was pronounced
dead. Connor’s son, plaintiff Nathaniel Vaughn Riley (plaintiff),
brought a wrongful death and survivor action1 against defendant
County of Los Angeles (defendant) and others.2 The trial court
granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, ruling that
defendant was immune from liability under the public entity
immunities for injuries to prisoners in Government Code sections
844.6, subdivision (a)(2) and 845.6.3 Plaintiff appeals and we
reverse.

               II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on June 28, 2016,
Connor pleaded no contest to petty theft and was placed on
deferred entry of judgment for 12 months, subject to certain

1     Plaintiff later dismissed his survivor action without
prejudice.

2     The other named defendants were LASD, LASD Sheriff
Jim McDonnell, the City of Long Beach, the Long Beach Police
Department, and Long Beach Police Department Chief Robert
Luna. At some point, these defendants were dismissed from
plaintiff’s action. Only plaintiff and defendant are parties to this
appeal.

3    All further statutory references are to the Government
Code unless otherwise stated.

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terms and conditions. On October 28, 2017, Long Beach Police
Department officers arrested Connor for a diversion violation in
her petty theft case. When arrested, Connor possessed a
hypodermic needle with heroin.
         After her arrest, Connor complained that she felt “ill, cold,
and discomfort.” Despite knowing or having reason to know that
Connor needed immediate medical care, defendant failed to take
reasonable action and summon medical care.
         On November 2, 2017, Connor appeared in the trial court at
the Bellflower Courthouse for sentencing on her diversion
violation (the sentencing court). Connor had been in custody
from her October 28 arrest until her November 2 sentencing
hearing.
         At the November 2 hearing, the sentencing court “proposed
to place [Connor] on probation for 24 months with time served
. . . .” The court stated that it was sentencing Connor to 12 days
in county jail and giving her credit for 12 days served. Connor
asked the court, “I have credit for 12?” The court responded,
“Yes. Six, plus six, so that’s why I said twelve.” Connor asked
the court, “What does that mean?” The court responded, “That
means you’re done with the jail time.” The court then suspended
imposition of Connor’s sentence and placed her on 24 months of
summary probation on various terms and conditions including
that she serve 12 days in Los Angeles County Jail with 12 days of
credit.
         Following her court appearance, Connor was taken to a
holding cell at the courthouse. Two other women were in the cell.
Connor “complained of feeling cold and vomiting.” Thereafter,
Connor became unresponsive, went into cardiac arrest, and was
later pronounced dead. The “County of Los Angeles Department

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of Medical Examiner—Coroner” identified Connor’s death as an
accident and “listed ‘heroin addiction,’ ‘methamphetamine,’ and
‘possible heroin withdrawal syndrome’ as ‘conditions contributing’
to her cause of death.”
      Connor was in defendant’s exclusive custody from her
arrest on October 28, 2017, until her death on November 2, 2017.
Defendant knew of Connor’s serious medical condition that
required immediate medical care, but failed to take reasonable
action to summon medical care. Connor died as a result.

            III.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Defendant moved for summary judgment, or alternatively
summary adjudication.4 It argued it was entitled to summary
judgment on plaintiff’s wrongful death action because it was a
public entity immune from liability under sections 844.6 and
845.6 because, respectively, Connor was in LASD custody and a
“prisoner” “at the time of the alleged incident,” and defendant’s
employees took reasonable actions to summon medical care for
Connor, a prisoner, after they knew or had reason to know she
was suffering a potentially “‘serious and obvious medical
conditions requiring immediate medical care’ with the ‘man
down’ notification on November 2, 2017 at the Bellflower
Courthouse.”
      Plaintiff opposed defendant’s summary judgment motion in
part on the ground that there was a triable issue of fact about
whether defendant’s employee knew or had reason to know that

4     Because plaintiff dismissed his second cause of action for
survival action prior to defendant’s motion, the trial court treated
the motion as a summary judgment motion only.

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Connor was in need of immediate medical care and failed to take
reasonable action to summon such medical care. For this
asserted triable fact, plaintiff relied on video footage of the area
around the holding cell in which Connor was held that purported
to show that Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Custody Assistant
Maria Rivera, who was working outside of the cell, delayed over
three minutes in responding to knocks on the holding cell door
indicating a need for assistance.
       In granting defendant’s summary judgment motion, the
trial court ruled that defendant “proffered sufficient evidence to
show that the custody personnel took reasonable actions to
summon medical care after the ‘man down’ notification was
received.” “No evidence has been proffered to show that
[defendant] had knowledge that [Connor] was suffering from a
serious and obvious medical condition requiring immediate
medical care prior to receipt of the ‘man down’ notification.
Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to the timeliness of the custody
personnel’s response are based on speculation and conjecture, not
controverting facts. Evidence that gives rise to no more than
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork is insufficient to establish a
triable issue of material fact.”

                       IV.   DISCUSSION

       Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment based on the public entity immunities for
injuries to prisoners in sections 844.6 and 845.6. He asserts, in
part, there is a triable issue of fact about whether an employee of
defendant knew or had reason to know that Connor was in need

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of immediate medical care and failed to take reasonable action to
summon such medical care. We agree.

A.    Standard of Review

        “‘“A trial court properly grants a motion for summary
judgment only if no issues of triable fact appear and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c); see also id., § 437c, subd. (f) [summary
adjudication of issues].)”’” (State of California v. Allstate Ins. Co.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1017.) “We review the trial court’s
decision [on a summary judgment motion] de novo, considering
all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the
motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the
uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports.
[Citation.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.)
“[I]n moving for summary judgment, a ‘defendant . . . has met’ his
‘burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if’ he ‘has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot
be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of
action. Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or
more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto. The plaintiff . . . may not rely upon the mere allegations
or denials’ of his ‘pleadings to show that a triable issue of
material fact exists but, instead,’ must ‘set forth the specific facts
showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that
cause of action or a defense thereto.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (o)(2).)” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 849.)

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B.    Background

       On October 29, 2017, while in custody, Connor informed a
nurse that she was “‘kicking heroin’” and had high blood
pressure. Defendant knew that Connor was on medication for
methamphetamine and heroin withdrawal and high blood
pressure. On October 30, 2017, Connor complained that she felt
cold, weak, and nauseous and that she had thrown up her food
and medications. On October 31, 2017, Connor signed a form
declining medication or treatment because she was “[n]ot kicking
anymore.” On November 1, 2017, Connor complained of
headaches and insomnia and was treated by a doctor who cleared
her to attend a court hearing.
       In a declaration in support of defendant’s summary
judgment motion, Custody Assistant Rivera stated she was
working at the Bellflower Courthouse on November 2, 2017.
Connor was being held in Cell D. Danielle Silva was the only
inmate in Cell D with Connor.
       At about 12:18 p.m. that day, Rivera assisted in giving
lunch to the inmates in Cell D. Connor did not then appear to be
in distress and did not complain that she was in distress.
       At about 12:38 p.m., Rivera heard a knocking coming from
Cell D. She asked, “[W]hat do you need[?]” “[T]here was no
response after the initial knock.” (In her deposition testimony,
Rivera testified she heard multiple sequences of multiple knocks.)
She again asked, “[W]hat do you need[?]” Rivera heard a voice
inside Cell D respond, “[H]elp.” Rivera characterized that
response as a “‘“man down” notification.’”
       Rivera went to Cell D and opened the window flap. She
saw Silva and asked her what was wrong. Silva responded that

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Connor had been lying on the bench and had rolled over and
fallen to the floor.
       Rivera opened the door to Cell D and stepped into the cell’s
sally port.5 She again asked Silva what had happened and Silva
responded that Connor had fallen off the bench and onto the
floor. Rivera called out to Connor who did not respond. Rivera
stepped out of the sally port and into the main lockup area and
informed a Deputy Sheriff that there was a “‘man down’” in Cell
D and they needed “‘rescue’” to respond to their location.
       In an interview with homicide detectives, Silva said that
after Connor fell to the floor she (Silva) first attended to Connor
and then “knocked on the door and . . . asked for help, but it took
them a minute to come.” When no help was forthcoming, Silva
returned to check on Connor. Silva could not find Connor’s pulse
and determined Connor was not breathing, so Silva “knocked
again,” “asked for help,” and said “medic.” Silva did not “know
why they [took] so long to come and check . . . .”
       Video footage of the lockup area outside Cell D depicts
what a factfinder can readily conclude was Rivera turning her
head and attention toward Cell D at least two times in the three
and a half minutes before she walked over to that cell.

C.    Analysis

       Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) provides immunity from
liability to the State for injuries to prisoners. (Castaneda v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212
Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070 (Castaneda).) Section 844.6, subdivision

5     A “sally port” is a caged area outside a cell that allows
Sheriff’s Department personnel to see inside the cell.

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(a)(2) provides, “(a) . . . except as provided in this section and in
Section[] . . . 845.6, . . . a public entity is not liable for: [¶] . . .
[¶] (2) An injury to any prisoner.”6
      Section 845.6 creates an exception to the State’s immunity
under section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2). (Castaneda, supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.) Section 845.6 provides in relevant part,
“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury
proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or
obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as
otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee,
and the public entity where the employee is acting within the
scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has
reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical
care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such
medical care.”
      Section 845.6 imposes a duty on public employees to
summon medical care when “there is actual or constructive
knowledge that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical
care.” (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.) Whether
a public employee has “reason to know” a prisoner is in need of
immediate medical care is judged by the objective standard.7
(Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 288.)

6     For purposes of our analysis, we assume without deciding
that Connor was a “prisoner” within the meaning of sections
844.6 and 845.6 while held in Cell D.

7     The objective standard looks at an issue from a reasonable
person’s perspective. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d
637, 649.)

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      Rivera’s declaration suggests she heard knocking from Cell
D at 12:38 p.m. After she inquired about the knocks to the cell’s
inmates and received a call for help, she responded. Silva’s
statement to the homicide detectives is inconsistent with Rivera’s
declaration. Silva stated that she knocked on the door and asked
for help. When she did not receive help, she returned to check on
Connor. After determining that Connor was not breathing, she
again knocked and asked for help and said “medic.” Silva
believed that it took a long time for someone to “come and check.”
The video footage outside Cell D permits a factfinder to conclude
Rivera turned her head and attention toward Cell D more than
once beginning at least three and a half minutes before she
walked over to Cell D. Defendant and the trial court characterize
plaintiff’s reliance on the videotape evidence as speculative and
conjectural. Instead, it is concrete, time-specific evidence upon
which a factfinder could conclude that defendant delayed in
responding when Silva attempted to summon aid for Connor.
Accordingly, there is a triable issue of fact about whether an
employee of defendant knew or had reason to know that Connor
was in need of immediate medical care and failed to take
reasonable action to summon such medical care and the trial
court erred in granting defendant’s summary judgment motion.

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                      V.   DISPOSITION

     The judgment is reversed. Plaintiff is awarded his costs on
appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                         KIM, J.

We concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             MOOR, J.

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