Court Opinion

ID: 9772455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:18:34.734928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.671652
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(dissenting).
A Trial Judge in granting or refusing a motion for a new trial exercises judicial discretion. 41 Tex.Jur.2d, New Trial, Sec. 106, p. 255. It is my opinion that the Trial Judge improperly exercised his discretion in denying appellant a new trial based on the misconduct of juror, Thomas N. Stephens.
Rule 327, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in part, that one ground for a motion for a new trial is that “a juror gave an erroneous or incorrect answer on voir dire examination.”
Sec. 4 of Art. 2134, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., provides that, “Any person who has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against either of the parties” is disqualified to sit as a juror. In construing this statute the Supreme Court in Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, stated:
“Had it been established that Fugate was biased or prejudiced against this type of suit, Fugate would be disqualified from serving on this jury. It is well settled in this state that the statutory disqualification of bias or prejudice extends not only to the litigant personally, but to the subject matter of the litigation as well. * * * In cases involving juror disqualification the Complainant need not establish that probable injury resulted therefrom before a new trial may be granted.”
It is my opinion that juror Stephens violated Rule 327 in the particular above noted and that he was disqualified under Sec. 4 of Art. 2134, such violation and disqualification being shown by the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the testimony and that a presumed contrary finding by the Trial Judge is clearly wrong, manifestly unjust and an abuse of judicial discretion.
Juror, Mr. Donald Keith Kebodeaux, testified on the new trial hearing:
“Q * * * Well, first of all, let me ask you about the time when I questioned you before you got into the jury room and were selected on the Jury.
“Did you hear me ask whether any of the jurors had a bias or prejudice against the type of case where a child had been injured by a car while the child was on the street ?
“A There didn’t seem to be any prejudice at the time.
“Q Well, my question was, though, sir: Did you hear me ask that question of all the jurors?
“A Yes, sir; I did hear you ask those questions.
*372“Q At the time, although there was no reporter to take it down, did any juror answer that he did have a preconceived idea about the way the parties’ rights ought to be straightened out?
"A No.
“Q There wasn’t anybody who answered ?
"A Right.
“Q Now, when you got into the jury room, Mr. Kebodeaux, did any of tlie jurors make a statement that no child on any street who was injured had a right to recover damages?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Can you tell me, if you know, the name of that juror?
“A That was Mr. Stephens.
* * * * * *
“Q Did you hear Juror Stephens make a statement as to whether or not any child should recover any damages if they were injured while on a street ?
“A Yes, sir; I did.
“Q Can you tell me what statement you heard him make?
“A Mr. Stephens stated that any child on the street was responsible for being on the street and that they shouldn’t collect any damages at all. He stated — he meant any child on any street.
“Q Is this the way you took his statement to mean?
“A Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
“THE COURT: Yes, sir. What he [Stephens] did or what he said.
“THE WITNESS: Well, he stated soon after he got in the jury room that he felt the child shouldn’t collect any damages because of the previous statement that I made, that any child on the street was responsible; that children shouldn’t be on the street at all.
******
“Q Can you tell me generally what the vote was on all of the issues and how you were divided in the jury room in terms of numbers?
“A It was about eleven to one, with the exception of one vote, which was ten to two, I believe.
“Q And who was the one vote that was—
“A Mr. Stephens.
“Q In all of the deliberations except on one issue, it was eleven to one ?
“A Except on one issue, where it was ten to two. Mr. Stephens was the different party.”
On cross examination this juror testified
“Q Now, Mr. Kebodeaux, wasn’t it the argument of Mr. Stephens that it was because of Phillip crossing the Buffalo Speedway, a busy street, at the place where he was crossing, that caused him to believe that Phillip was at fault on this accident?
“Wasn’t that what he was arguing to you and to the others ?
“A No, sir; it wasn’t.
******
“Q Mr. Stephens wasn’t the only person talking in the jury room. Was there a full and complete discussion by most of the jurors ?
“A Yes, sir. He dominated the conversation, though I would say.”
On re-direct examination he testified:
“Q Did Mr. Stephens ever bang on the tabic or do anything unusual *373in the jury room that you could tell us about?
“A He banged on the table.”
Excluded by the Trial Court, but shown by bill of exceptions is the following testimony by Mr. Kebodeaux :
“Q By the conduct of Juror Stephens in the jury room in this trial, were you able to form an opinion as to whether or not Juror Stephens was reflecting a bias or attitude he carried into this trial and into this jury box, or whether his answers to the issues were based on his view of the evidence? In all fairness to him, now.
“A In all fairness, I felt that he was prejudiced prior to this case, with the statement that he made about any child being on the street, that is, hit on the street, that they are at fault and a person saying something like that, you can’t reason with him. I couldn’t reason with him, and no one else could. I felt that a man would definitely be prejudiced to make a statement like that, that any child that was hit on a street, they are at fault; they shoudn’t be in the street.
“Q All right, sir.”
Mr. Dickie Gilbert, a juror, testified:
“Q * * * May I ask, sir, whether or not you heard Juror Stephens make a statement concerning the rights of a child upon any street?
"A Yes, I did.
“Q Will you tell the Court and us what you heard Mr. Stephens say about that?
■“A Well, he indicated by his talk to me that he thought no child, any child should be out on the street, and if they should be injured, while they were on the street, they should not be entitled to collect damages.
j{C ijc ijc J-C ifs ‡
“Q Well, in order to be sure I understand you and the Court does, too, Mr. Gilbert, would you tell us as closely as you can the actual words Mr. Stephens used?
“A Well, he said that he didn’t think that any child playing on the street should be entitled to collect damages if they were injured while doing such, as well as I can recollect.
* * * * * *
“Q Did he discuss with you any of the facts in the case, the fact that this was Buffalo Speedway, a busy street? Did Mr. Stephens make any comment about that?
“A He made comment, not directly to me, now, but he did make a comment that — I don’t remember any street being designated. He just said that any child on any street, as well as I remember.
“Q Did you hear him say anything about this being Buffalo Speedway, a busy street?
“A No, sir. I don’t recall him mentioning a street at all.
“Q Did he mention anything about this being on a bridge, where the little boys were crossing? Did he mention that?
“A No, sir. He may have mentioned it sometime during the trial, but the point I am bringing out is that he did make a statement that any child on any street shouldn’t be allowed to collect damages.”
By bill of exceptions it is shown that Juror Stephens stated while the jury was deliberating:
“A Yes, the statement he made that he didn’t think that anj' child *374should be allowed to play on any street and if they were injured while doing so, they should not be allowed to collect any damages.”
Juror Kenneth D. Carmichael testified:
“Q Tell us what statements you heard, as best you remember.
“A Immediately after we got in the deliberation room, we were confronted with the opinion of this Mr. Stephens that he felt that the child had no right to be up there; that he had no right as a child to be confronted, actually, in Court, that he had no right as a child to be in Court on behalf of this accident.
“Q * * * First of all, let me ask you: Do you remember the issues that were concerned?
“A Yes, it was the negligence on the part of Marsha Lynn Eaton. I believe we started out with the first issue, and we saw we was having difficulty there. I believe the vote was eleven to one, if I recall, that she was negligent; and immediately he voiced his opinion that he wasn’t going to hang a rap, I believe is his words — that he wasn’t going to declare her guilty or negligent. Of course, that was all based on his opinion that the child had no right in Court and so forth and so on, the way I understood it.
******
“When we g*ot to the 8th Issue about the negligence on the part of the boy, I believe the vote was ten to two.
“Then, between us, all the way through, prevailing through all of this, he said that he would not give a penny or any money at all to the boy; that he had no right to it. He said the child had no right tO' be in the road, that he shouldn’t,, so forth and so on, and in this manner.”
Juror Mr. Thomas N. Stephens testified, for appellee as follows:
“Q Did you enter into the jury room with your mind made up that you., were going to answer all of the-issues contrary to Phillip Doran, and in favor of Miss Eaton?
“A Absolutely not.
“Q Did you hear my question in the-voir dire, or the discussion to the-Jury Panel before you were chosen, asking whether you had any feeling about a boy who was injured on the street and I explained the facts of this accident to you?
“A I have no feelings about that..
“Q Did you hear my question, sir P
“A Yes. I said I had no feelings.
“Q You did not raise your hand in-response to that question, saying-you did have any feeling against that at all ?
“A I did not.”
Jury Foreman W. T. Anderson testified :-
“Q Did you ever hear Mr. Stephens, one of the jurors, saying anything about no child having a right to be in Court?
“Did you ever hear any such statement as that, Mr. Anderson?'
“A Well, I couldn’t truthfully say. I mean, it is kind of foggy. From:, all the testimony that went on, it. is hard to say; and it has been-, some time ago.
*375“Q You can’t tell us just what statements were made or were not made.
“Is that what you are telling us ?
“A Right.”
On cross examination Mr. Anderson testified:
“Q If I remember you correctly, Mr. Anderson, you say you cannot truthfully say whether Mr. Stephens made a statement that any child in the position of Phillip Doran ought to recover any damages if they were injured?
"“A It was something to that nature; yes, sir.
'“Q You did hear him saying something about that ?
'“A In a way that he left the impression that he wasn’t to award any child or award him any money of any kind.”
Juror Stephens originally voted “no” to ■the damage issue when it was undisputed -that there were damages; he originally voted “no” to issue No. I inquiring if Marsha Lynn Eaton kept a proper lookout .and was the only juror so voting when the ■ evidence of Miss Eaton was that she did not •see the Doran boy before the impact between him and her car. The boy had •crossed two traffic lanes before he was struck by the Eaton car. It is obvious that •she kept no proper lookout.
The actions of Mr. Stephens convince me •that he was prejudiced against this boy. His words, as attributed to him by three of 'his fellow jurors, and denied by no one but 'himself, confirm his prejudice.
Eight and one half year old Phillip Doran may not have any right to recover for •damages from injuries sustained by him when he was struck by a Thunderbird car • driven by fifteen year old Miss Marsha JEaton, but he should have his right to recover determined by a fair and impartial jury. This right, in my opinion, has been denied him. I would remand this case. I therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.