Court Opinion

ID: 9411369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 17:07:28.864175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.315571
License: Public Domain

J-S18033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PATRICK T. HUGHES                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1068 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001892-2015

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED JULY 26, 2023

       Appellant Patrick T. Hughes appeals the order of the Court of Common

Pleas of Northampton County denying his petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After careful review, we affirm.

       This Court summarized the factual background of the case as follows on

direct appeal:

       On November 23, 2012, the narcotics division of the Easton Police
       Department was involved in an ongoing investigation targeting the
       home of Corey Reavis. That day, officers conducted a controlled
       purchase of heroin from Appellant using a confidential informant.
       Police officers observed Appellant leave Reavis's home, walk to
       the informant, engage in a brief hand-to-hand transaction, and
       return to Reavis's home. When Appellant returned to Reavis's
       home, police observed Appellant interact with individuals on the
       front porch, including Omar Robinson. Police took photographs of

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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     Appellant, Robinson, and the transaction. Police also observed
     Robinson's minivan parked outside the residence.

     Later that day, Appellant and Robinson shot and killed Ervin
     Holton (“Victim”) in Easton.[FN2] A witness who was driving near
     the scene called 911 to report the shooting. She stated that, after
     hearing the gunshots, she saw two individuals in dark clothing
     running toward a nearby minivan. The Victim died from multiple
     gunshot wounds; ballistics evidence confirmed that there were
     two shooters.

        [FN2: The Victim and Appellant were rival drug dealers and
        may have been in a dispute about Nicole Greene, a woman
        they both dated.]

     During the subsequent investigation, detectives from the Easton
     Police Department obtained consistent surveillance video that
     showed two individuals exit a minivan one block from the crime
     scene, walk towards the location of the shooting, and shortly
     thereafter, run back towards the minivan and drive away. Police
     officers also learned that Robinson's girlfriend, Lisa Doorley,
     owned the minivan.

     When police officers located the minivan at Robinson's home,
     which he shared with Doorley, Robinson confirmed that only he
     and Doorley drive the minivan, and that he did not allow anyone
     else to drive the minivan. Upon confirming that he had been
     driving the minivan on the night of the murder, Robinson started
     crying. Police searched the minivan with Doorley's consent and
     found gunshot residue on the steering wheel and the driver's side
     interior door handle.

     Homicide detectives also learned that Appellant and Robinson had
     spent much of the day together before the murder. Reavis
     confirmed that he had been hanging out with Appellant and
     Robinson that day. Reavis admitted that he had driven and
     dropped off the Victim at a store near the scene of the murder
     shortly before Appellant and Robinson murdered him.

     Also, cell phone records from Appellant and Robinson confirmed
     their whereabouts in south Easton, where the shooting occurred,
     and their close proximity to the area and each other when they
     placed the calls. The eyewitness called 911 at 5:39 P.M., and the
     cell phone records showed that Appellant and Robinson made
     numerous calls to Reavis before and after the murder. All calls

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      stopped at the precise time of the shooting, consistent with the
      surveillance video.

      During the investigation, Appellant provided several different,
      inconsistent, and unsubstantiated alibis to police investigators.
      After his arrest, Appellant made several incriminating statements
      to fellow inmates (1) regarding his motive for the murder, and (2)
      claiming that he and his men were responsible for the murder.
      Relevant to this appeal, Appellant provided two recorded
      statements to police after reading and waiving his Miranda rights
      greeon December 5, 2012, and December 4, 2014.

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 2853 EDA 2017, at *1–2 (Pa.Super. Apr. 3,

2019) (unpublished memorandum).

      Appellant and Robinson were charged with homicide and criminal

conspiracy in relation to the victim’s shooting death. Thereafter, Appellant and

Robinson were jointly tried in an eight-day trial at which the Commonwealth

presented numerous witnesses including Reavis, Greene, Gregory Mack, as

well as Appellant’s two fellow inmates (James Martin and Timothy Graves).

      On January 20, 2017, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree

murder and conspiracy. On February 28, 2017, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to life imprisonment without parole. Appellant filed a timely post-

sentence motion, which the trial court denied on August 4, 2017. This Court

affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 3, 2019, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on

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September 10, 2019, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied

Appellant's petition for Writ of Certiorari on February 24, 2020.2

       On December 11, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition.3

Thereafter, the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition

on Appellant’s behalf on April 22, 2021. Appellant claimed he discovered that

the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) as it

failed to disclose the defense before trial that one of the Commonwealth’s

witnesses, Gregory Mack, received favorable treatment in exchange for his

testimony against Appellant. Mack had testified at Appellant’s trial that

Appellant had bragged to him that the murder of Ervin Holton was “his work.”

Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Trial, 1/13/17, at 177-79.

       On October 7, 2021, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. The

Commonwealth first presented Attorney Patricia Mulqueen, an Assistant

District Attorney in Northampton County who was the assigned prosecutor for

Mack’s drug charges docketed at CP-48-CR-0002398-2014. ADA Mulqueen

recalled that although Mack was originally charged with two felony drug

charges, Mack was permitted to plead to a misdemeanor possession charge,

____________________________________________

2 Robinson was also convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy; both
men were sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. This Court affirmed
the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 2790 EDA 2017
(Pa.Super. April 2, 2019) (unpublished memorandum).
3
  Appellant’s petition was timely filed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)
(providing that generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent
petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence
becomes final”).

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and Mack received a probationary sentence. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), PCRA

hearing, 10/7/21, at 5-8, 23.

      However, ADA Mulqueen averred that her decision to give Mack a plea

deal was not based on his agreement to testify for the prosecution at

Appellant’s subsequent murder trial. ADA Mulqueen testified that Mack’s

cooperation with the prosecution in Appellant’s homicide case had “nothing to

do with the guilty plea, the reasons why I gave him the misdemeanor offense.”

Id. at 8-10. ADA Mulqueen asserted that if Mack’s guilty plea had been

conditioned on his testimony at Appellant’s trial, he would not have been

allowed to enter his guilty plea before Appellant’s trial began. Id. at 24-25.

      Instead, ADA Mulqueen averred that she permitted Mack to enter this

negotiated plea deal as she believed that Mack did not normally sell drugs,

but only started to sell drugs due to financial difficulties he experienced after

losing his job. Id. at 18-19. ADA Mulqueen characterized Mack was an “older

gentleman” and a “nice guy” without any prior drug charges, who had been

remorseful and cooperative with authorities in his own prosecution. Id. at 23-

24. ADA Mulqueen remembered that the investigating detective had agreed

with her decision to allow Mack to plead to the lesser charge. Id.

      ADA Mulqueen was able to independently recall the circumstances of his

plea arrangement as she found Mack’s case to be “unique.” Id. at 18. She

explained that she had debated whether to drop the felony charges out of

mercy towards Mack as there was a risk that he could reoffend. Id. at 18-19.

ADA Mulqueen found Mack’s case had been memorable because, upon her

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decision to allow Mack to plead to the misdemeanor charge, Mack’s wife had

expressed gratitude to ADA Mulqueen in court and personally thanked her on

behalf of her family. Id.

      Upon questioning by the trial court, ADA Mulqueen agreed that Mack’s

sentencing sheet states that a condition of Mack’s probation was to “cooperate

with police in criminal matter.” Id. at 26; Defendant’s Exhibit 1. ADA Mulqueen

noted that Mack’s criminal docket sheet was made accessible to the public,

including trial counsel. N.T. at 27.

      The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Appellant’s trial

counsel, Attorney Brian Monahan. As Attorney Monahan had not reviewed

Appellant’s file before the PCRA hearing, he could not recall Mack’s testimony

at Appellant’s trial and was not aware of whether he was notified that the

prosecution had given Mack a plea deal on unrelated charges. Id. at 28, 31,

34. Nevertheless, Attorney Monahan claimed that if he had received

information that a prosecution witness had received a favorable plea deal from

the Commonwealth, he would have used such information to impeach that

witness’s credibility on cross-examination. Id. at 32-33.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s

petition. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with the PCRA court’s

directions to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      On July 25, 2022, Appellant filed an application to proceed pro se on

appeal. On August 22, 2022, this Court remanded this case for the PCRA court

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to conduct a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81

(Pa. 1998) to determine whether Appellant’s waiver of counsel was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary. Thereafter, the trial court determined that

Appellant’s decision to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

The parties subsequently filed briefs on appeal.4

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

       I.     Did the PCRA court erred [sic] in denying the Amended
              Motion for Post-Conviction Relief?

       II.    Did the PCRA court erred [sic] in failing to conclude that the
              Commonwealth committed a Brady violation in not
              disclosing the beneficial negotiated plea afforded to key
              witness Gregory Mack. (B) Failing to conclude that the
              Commonwealth suppressed the evidence, either willfully or
              inadvertently. (C) In failing to conclude that [A]ppellant
              established that the negotiated plea affored to key witness
              was in possession of the [C]ommonwealth but never was
              disclosed to [A]ppellant[?]

       III.   Did the PCRA court erred [sic] in allowing Attorney Eyer
              (who announced his retirement as a conflict counsel, on
              January 21, 2021) to represent Appellant after he
              represented his co-defendant on his PCRA[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

       Our standard of review is as follows:

       When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine
       whether the PCRA court's order is supported by the record and
       free of legal error. Generally, we are bound by a PCRA court's
       credibility determinations. However, with regard to a court's legal
       conclusions, we apply a de novo standard.

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth filed an application for an extension of time to file its

brief as appellee and subsequently               filed   that   brief.   We   grant   the
Commonwealth’s request for relief.

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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (quotation

marks and quotations omitted).

       First, Appellant claims he is entitled to a new trial based after-discovered

evidence.

       After-discovered evidence is a recognized ground for relief under
       the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). Relief is due when the
       proponent can “demonstrate that the evidence: (1) could not have
       been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise
       of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or
       cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility
       of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a
       new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 597 Pa. 69,
       950 A.2d 270, 292 (2008). Failure to satisfy any one prong is fatal
       to the claim. See Commonwealth v. Solano, 634 Pa. 218, 129
       A.3d 1156, 1180 (2015) (“As this test is conjunctive, failure to
       establish one prong obviates the need to analyze the remaining
       ones.”).

Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1178 (Pa.Super. 2022).5

       To support his claim of after-discovered evidence, Appellant relies on

his allegation that the prosecution committed a Brady violation by failing to

disclose that one of its witnesses was afforded favorable treatment in

exchange for his trial testimony. In Brady, the Supreme Court of the United

States held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to

____________________________________________

5 We acknowledge that the trial court and Appellant conflate the standards
employed to review a claim for collateral relief pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9543(a)(2) and the newly-discovered fact PCRA timeliness exception as set
forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). As it is undisputed that the instant
petition was timely filed, the PCRA court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked
and there is no need to determine whether a timeliness exception applies.
Nevertheless, the PCRA court reached the correct conclusion that Appellant
has not pled and proven that he is entitled to collateral relief.

                                           -8-
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an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

      Our Supreme Court has provided that, in order to establish a Brady

violation, a defendant has the burden to prove that: “(1) evidence was

suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was

favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it

could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the evidence was material,

in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant.” Commonwealth

v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court

has found that “no Brady violation occurs where the parties had equal access

to the information or if the defendant knew or could have uncovered such

evidence with reasonable diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d

1075, 1091 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684,

696 (Pa. 2003)).

      In this case, Appellant failed to establish that there was a Brady

violation as Appellant did not show the prosecution had agreed to treat Mack

with leniency if he testified for the Commonwealth at Appellant’s homicide

trial. The trial court found ADA Mulqueen was credible in testifying that Mack’s

negotiated plea agreement was not based on his cooperation in with the

prosecution at Appellant’s trial, but instead on a multitude of other reasons

including Mack’s cooperation in his own prosecution, expression of remorse,

lack of a prior record of drug offenses, and the fact that the investigating

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detective had agreed with ADA Mulqueen’s decision to allow Mack to plead to

a misdemeanor.

      The trial court noted that Mack had already received the benefit of his

bargain when he was sentenced on this plea agreement in November 2014,

which was well before Appellant’s trial on homicide charges in January 2017.

Given the timing of Mack’s guilty plea, the trial court found credible ADA

Mulqueen’s assertion that she would not have permitted Mack to enter this

plea before Appellant’s homicide trial if Mack’s plea offer was contingent on

his cooperation in testifying against Appellant.

      We acknowledge that Mack’s docketed sentencing sheet at CR-2398-

2014 indicates that a condition of his probation was to “cooperate with

Commonwealth on homicide case.” The sentencing sheet does not specify

which criminal matter it was referring to and the terms of Mack’s cooperation.

      Even assuming arguendo that the Commonwealth violated Brady in

failing to disclose this arrangement with Appellant’s defense, Appellant has

not demonstrated this violation constitutes after-discovered evidence that

entitles him to a new trial.

      Appellant has failed to show that trial counsel could not have obtained

this information prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of

reasonable diligence. Mack was sentenced on his guilty plea more than two

years before he testified at Appellant’s trial. Mack’s docketed sentencing sheet

was available to view as part of Mack’s publicly filed criminal docket

information. Appellant has not attempted to explain when he discovered this

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information or why his counsel could not have discovered this information

through the exercise of due diligence.

      In addition, any information regarding an alleged plea agreement that

the Commonwealth had with Mack would be used solely to impeach Mack’s

credibility. Appellant has offered no reason for which this evidence could be

used other than the impeachment of Mack.

      Further, Appellant has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the

Commonwealth’s failure to inform his defense of the details of Mack’s plea

agreement before trial. We agree with the trial court’s assessment that in light

of the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, any evidence presented

regarding Mack’s negotiated guilty plea would not have changed the outcome

at Appellant’s trial. The trial court specifically found that:

      [a]bundant additional evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was offered at
      trial. In addition to vast circumstantial and forensic evidence, the
      jury heard testimony concerning several different, inconsistent,
      and unsubstantiated alibis [Appellant] made to police
      investigators, as well as admissions that [Appellant] made to
      other witnesses. The credibility of these witnesses is completely
      unaffected by the testimony of Mack. Rather, [Appellant’s]
      statements to Mack were corroborated by independent admissions
      made to these other witnesses and by the extensive circumstantial
      and physical evidence of guilt offered at trial.

PCRA Court Opinion (P.C.O.), 3/15/22, at 14-15.

      Therefore, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in finding that

Appellant failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to a new trial based on his

claim of after-discovered evidence.

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      In addition to the claim of after-discovered evidence raised in his

counseled   PCRA    petition,   Appellant     raises   three   allegations   of   the

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel’s representation for the first time on appeal.

Appellant claims PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) call Gregory

Mack to testify at his PCRA hearing, (2) obtain letters written by

Commonwealth witnesses James Martin and Timothy Graves, and (3) reveal

that he had previously represented Appellant’s co-defendant Omar Robinson.

      In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme

Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denied relief, and

after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401.

To be entitled to a remand, an appellant “must provide more than mere

boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness. That is, he must

establish that there are issues of material facts concerning claims challenging

counsel's stewardship and that relief may be available.” Commonwealth v.

Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1006 (Pa. 2022) (citing Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402)).

      As Appellant’s challenges to PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness were not

raised before the PCRA court, we must determine whether the record is

sufficient to address Appellant’s claims or whether it is necessary to remand

for the PCRA court to resolve these claims with a more developed record.

      In addressing Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims, we are guided by the

following principles:

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        It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have
        provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner
        pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying
        legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or
        inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to
        effectuate his client's interest; and (3) prejudice, to the
        effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different
        outcome if not for counsel's error. See Commonwealth v.
        Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975–76 (1987);
        Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
        80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may deny an
        ineffectiveness claim if “the petitioner's evidence fails to
        meet a single one of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.
        Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000)....
        Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it
        is the petitioner's burden to prove otherwise. See Pierce,
        supra; Commonwealth v. Holloway, 559 Pa. 258, 739
        A.2d 1039, 1044 (1999).

     [Commonwealth v. Natividad, 595 Pa. 188, 207–208, 938 A.2d
     310, 321 (2007);] see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 582 Pa.
     526, 537, 872 A.2d 1177, 1184 (2005) (stating an appellant's
     failure to satisfy any prong of the Pierce ineffectiveness test
     results in a failure to establish the arguable merit prong of the
     claim of ineffectiveness).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018).

     Appellant claims that PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing to call

Gregory Mack to testify at his PCRA hearing. In reviewing similar claims, our

courts have recognized that:

     [w]hen raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a
     potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and
     prejudice requirements of the Strickland test by establishing
     that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to
     testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known
     of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to
     testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of
     the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a
     fair trial. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d
     523, 536 (2009); Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 204, 961

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      A.2d 80, 90 (2008). To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a
      petitioner “must show how the uncalled witnesses' testimony
      would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.”
      Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134
      (2008). Thus, counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to
      call a witness unless the petitioner can show that the witness's
      testimony would have been helpful to the defense.
      Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1319
      (1996). “A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective
      assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of
      trial strategy.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 616 Pa. 1, 22–23, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108–1109

(2012).

      In this case, PCRA counsel knew of Gregory Mack’s existence as he had

testified at trial. However, Appellant has not claimed that Mack was available

to testify at the time of Appellant’s PCRA hearing or that he was willing to

testify on Appellant’s behalf. Appellant has neither set forth the substance of

Mack’s proposed testimony or asserted that the absence of Mack’s testimony

was so prejudicial as to have denied Appellant a fair trial. As such, this claim

of ineffectiveness fails.

      In Appellant’s second ineffectiveness claim, Appellant argues that PCRA

counsel failed to obtain letters that the Commonwealth allegedly possesses

from prosecution witnesses James Martin and Timothy Graves. Appellant has

not provided any further explanation as to the contents of such letters, how

the letters would have been helpful to the defense, and whether Martin and

Graves would be available and willing to testify in his defense. Further,

Appellant has not alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to obtain

these letters. Thus, we decline to further review this undeveloped issue.

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      Lastly, Appellant claims PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing to

disclose that he had a conflict of interest as he previously represented

Appellant’s co-defendant, Omar Robinson. This Court has held that “dual

representation alone does not create a conflict of interest. While the mere

existence of a conflict of interest vitiates the proceedings, a defendant still has

the burden of demonstrating that a conflict of interest actually did exist.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 972 A.2d 529, 530 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations

omitted). “To show an actual conflict of interest, the appellant must

demonstrate that: (1) counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’; and

(2) those conflicting interests ‘adversely affected his lawyer's performance.’”

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 260 A.3d 272, 278 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1147 (Pa. 2012)).

      In his appellate brief, Appellant baldly asserts that a conflict of interest

existed from PCRA counsel’s representation of Appellant and Robinson and

does not attempt to explain how such conflict adversely affected PCRA

counsel’s performance. As such, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim

based on boilerplate allegations.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s decision to deny

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed. Commonwealth’s application for extension of time to file

brief granted.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/26/2023

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