Court Opinion

ID: 9772502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:20:11.647284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.898168
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
It is, to me, regrettable that the majority of this court announce, by the affirmance of this case, a direct and contrary holding to that of our Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals upon the same question.
The charge against appellant was that he operated his automobile while his license was suspended. It was for that offense and none other that he was convicted. He was not charged with operating a motor vehicle without a license.
The undisputed evidence shows that appellant’s license expired, according to its own terms, six months prior to the time the offense was alleged to have been committed.
So then, the majority of the court hold that one may be convicted of driving a motor vehicle while his license is suspended, notwithstanding the fact that the license expired by its own terms six months prior thereto.
The holding of our Supreme Court and two Courts of Civil Appeals in this state is directly to the contrary, for those courts hold that the license dies with its expiration date and that any suspension of the license ceases to exist with its expiration.
Indeed, it is the holding of those civil courts that the pendency of an appeal does not extend the license beyond the term *189for which it is issued. Boston v. Garrison, et al, 256 S.W. 2d 67; Stogner v. State, (Ct. Civil Appeals) 309 S.W. 2d 470; Bryant v. State, 163 Texas Cr. Rep. 544, 294 S.W. 2d 819.
Under those authorities and the facts of this case, appellant could not have been guilty of operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended.
In the interest of harmony between the holdings of this court and the Supreme Court, this court should follow the latter court and the Courts of Civil Appeals, first: because their holding is correct, and second: because they were first to pass upon and adjudicate the question.
In Jernigan v. State, No. 29,705, delivered April 9, 1958, (page 302, this volume), 313 S.W. 2d 309, we applied that rule followed the prior holding of the Supreme Court upon the same subject.
I dissent.