Court Opinion

ID: 9948764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:26.889213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.696956
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hayes, 2024-Ohio-845.]

                    Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District

                                        County of Cuyahoga
                                   Nailah K. Byrd, Clerk of Courts

STATE OF OHIO,

                                 Appellee,           COA NO.         LOWER COURT NO.
                                                     111927          CR-21-660865-A
        -vs-                                                         CR-21-665938-A
                                                                     CR-22-666541-A
JAYMARLON HAYES,                                                     CR-22-667269-A

                                  Appellant.         MOTION NO. 569977

Date: March 7, 2024
________________________________________________________
__________________Journal Entry_____________________________

Motion by appellee for reconsideration is granted. The journal entry and decision
released and journalized November 16, 2023, 2023-Ohio-4119, is hereby vacated
and substituted with the journalized entry and opinion issued this same date.

Judge Eileen A. Gallagher, Concurs

Judge Eileen T. Gallagher, Concurs
                                                            ________________________
                                                            Anita Laster Mays
                                                            Presiding Judge
                   COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                  EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                     COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                       :

         Plaintiff-Appellee,         :
                                                     No. 111927
         v.                          :

JAYMARLON HAYES,                     :

         Defendant-Appellant.        :

                    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

         JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART;
                   AND REMANDED
         RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

     Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
               Case Nos. CR-21-660865-A, CR-21-665938-A,
                  CR-22-666541-A, and CR-22-667269-A

                               Appearances:

         Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
         Attorney, and Eric Collins and Kristen Hatcher, Assistant
         Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

         James E. Valentine, for appellant.
ON RECONSIDERATION1

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.:

               Pursuant to App.R. 26(A)(1)(a), appellant, state of Ohio (“the state”),

has filed an application for reconsideration of this court’s opinion in State v. Hayes,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111927, 2023-Ohio-4119. Upon review, appellant’s motion

for reconsideration is granted. The opinion released by this court on November 16,

2023, State v. Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110132, 2023-Ohio-4119, is hereby

vacated and substituted with this opinion.

               Defendant-appellant Jaymarlon Hayes (“Hayes”) appeals the trial

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple counts arising from several

cases to which he pleaded guilty. We affirm the convictions but remand the cases to

the trial court to issue entries modifying the sentences pursuant to this opinion.

I.   Background and Facts

                Hayes was 18 years of age when the first act was committed, 19 years

of age when the remaining offenses occurred, and 20 years old at the time of

sentencing. Hayes has an IQ of 72, and a record of untreated mental health

problems. The events underlying the first case took place on June 24, 2021, the

second case on November 29, 2021, and the remaining two cases on December 2,

      1 The original announcement of decision, State v. Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110132, 2023-Ohio-4119, released November 16, 2023, is hereby vacated. This opinion,
issued upon reconsideration, is the court’s journalized decision in this appeal. See App.R.
22(C); see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 7.01.
2021, and December 3, 2021. On June 28, 2022, Hayes pleaded guilty to various

counts in the cases. Four of the counts were qualifying offenses under the Reagan

Tokes Law, and Hayes was advised of that fact at the plea hearing. Defense counsel

objected to the imposition of the Reagan Tokes Law arguing at the plea and

sentencing hearings that the law is unconstitutional. On August 5, 2022, Hayes was

sentenced to an aggregate term of 71 and one-half years. As sentenced, Hayes would

be 91 years of age upon release.

              In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660865-A, on or about June 24, 2021,

Hayes took his friend to the hospital for a gunshot wound. At some point, drugs

were discovered in Hayes’s car resulting in a ten-count indictment for possession

and trafficking of controlled substances. On June 28, 2022, Hayes pleaded guilty to

trafficking under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a low tier third-degree felony as charged in

Count 3. The remaining counts were nolled. On August 5, 2022, Hayes was

sentenced to a 24-month term to be served consecutively to the terms imposed in

the other three cases. Hayes had been released on a $5,000 personal bond in

Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-660865-A when the remaining three cases arose.

              In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-667269-A, at approximately 1:00 a.m.

on November 29, 2021, Jennifer Johnson was sitting in her car waiting for a friend

to come home. Hayes and codefendant Rontell Parks (“Parks”), bearing firearms,

banged on the victim’s car window, pulled her from the car, demanded her wallet,

and departed with the vehicle. Hayes and Parks were charged with aggravated

robbery with one- and three-year firearm specifications, robbery, grand theft, and
two counts of theft. On June 28, 2022, Hayes pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery

R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a first-degree felony with a one-year firearm specification under

R.C. 2941.141, as amended in Count 1 of the indictment. The remaining counts were

nolled. On August 5, 2022, Hayes was sentenced to a one-year firearm specification

to be served prior and consecutive to the maximum prison term of 11 years on the

base charge, and consecutive to the sentences in the other cases. The first-degree

aggravated robbery count is a qualifying offense under the Reagan Tokes Law.

              In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-22-666541-A, on the evening of

December 2, 2021, Hayes and Parks approached victim Nazir Clemons (“Clemons”)

who was sitting in his vehicle at 2802 Clark Avenue at approximately 7:00 p.m.

Hayes pointed a gun at Clemons and instructed him to get out of the vehicle.

Clemons exited the vehicle and handed the keys to Parks. Clemons was shot twice,

and the two drove away in Clemons’s vehicle. Hayes and Parks were indicted for

one count of attempted murder, two counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of

robbery, two counts of felonious assault, one count of having weapons while under

disability, and one count of grand theft. Nine of the ten counts carried one- and

three-year firearm specifications.

              On June 28, 2022, Hayes pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated

robbery, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), a first-degree felony, with a three-year firearm

specification, R.C. 2941.145, as amended in Count 2; one count of felonious assault,

R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony, with a three-year firearm specification,

R.C. 2941.145, as amended in Count 7; having a weapon while under disability,
R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), a third-degree felony, as charged in Count 9; and one count of

grand theft of a motor vehicle, R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony, as

amended in Count 10 of the indictment. The first-degree aggravated robbery and

the second-degree felonious assault are qualifying offenses under the Reagan Tokes

Law. Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 were nolled.

               On August 5, 2022, Hayes was sentenced to the maximum term of 11

years for aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification, an eight-year

maximum term for felonious assault with a three-year firearm specification, and a

maximum three-year term for having a weapon while under disability. The grand

theft count merged with the aggravated robbery charge. The aggregate 28-year

sentence was to be served consecutively to the sentences in the other cases.

               Finally, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-665938-A, on the afternoon of

December 3, 2021, Hayes was driving the stolen vehicle to the home of Hayes’s

fiancée to drop off infant formula for their child. Solon police observed the vehicle

proceeding on Solon Road, checked the plates, and discovered the vehicle was

stolen. Hayes pulled into a driveway and successfully evaded police attempts to

block it. Solon and Bentleyville police engaged in a car chase involving vehicle

speeds exceeding 80 m.p.h. until Hayes swerved to avoid stop sticks deployed by

police. Hayes lost control of the vehicle and struck two vehicles, one occupied by

Paul Lilley (“Lilley”) and a second vehicle occupied by Sally Schultz (“S. Schultz”)

and Norman Schultz (“N. Schultz”). S. Schultz complained of rib and stomach pain

and died at the hospital later that day.
              On June 28, 2022, Hayes pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter,

of S. Schultz, R.C. 2903.04(A), a first-degree felony, with a one-year firearm

specification, R.C. 2941.141, as charged in Count 1; failure to comply with an order

or signal of a police officer, R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony with a one-year

firearm specification, R.C. 2941.141, as charged in Count 3; aggravated vehicular

assault of N. Schultz and Lilley, R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(B), a third-degree felony with a

one-year firearm specification, R.C. 2941.141, as charged in Counts 4 and 5 of the

indictment; and carrying concealed weapons, R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), as charged in

Count 6 of the indictment. Count 2 was nolled.

              On August 5, 2022, Hayes was sentenced to the maximum term of 11

years for involuntary manslaughter, plus one-year gun specification, the maximum

term of 36 months for failure to comply plus the one-year firearm specification, the

maximum term of 60 months plus one-year firearm specification for each of the two

aggravated vehicular assault counts, and a maximum term of 18 months for carrying

a concealed weapon for a total of 29 and one-half years to run consecutively to the

other cases. The involuntary manslaughter count is a qualifying offense under the

Reagan Tokes Law.

              The drug conviction arose from the incident that occurred on

June 24, 2021, the second case on November 28, 2021, the third case on

December 2, 2021, and the fourth on December 3, 2021. The state referred to the

events of June 24, 2021, November 28, 2021, December 2, 2021, and December 3,

2021, as a crime spree. The state argued that Hayes’s conduct was more serious than
conduct normally constituting the offenses and urged the trial court to impose

maximum, consecutive terms that totaled 71 and one-half years because of Hayes’s

heinous conduct. The sum included 11 years of firearm specifications.

               The defense requested a reasonable sentence and suggested 15 to 18

years. The defense explained that Hayes’s determination to confess to the crimes

and face the consequences should be considered. Hayes was hospitalized after the

accident and transferred to a nursing home. Defense counsel was unable to visit

because of COVID restrictions, but a guard allowed Hayes to use the guard’s phone

to finally speak with defense counsel. Hayes next contracted COVID and was in

isolation until transferred to county jail without counsel’s knowledge.      Hayes

admitted to the charges during an interview by a detective without a Miranda

advisement. Counsel urged Hayes to seek suppression of the statement, but Hayes

insisted on moving forward and taking responsibility for his actions.

              The defense also offered that Hayes possessed an IQ of 72 and

attended seven schools before the eighth grade and six high schools. Hayes’s father

was incarcerated for most of Hayes’s childhood, but his mother was a constant.

Hayes’s special education individualized education program failed to place him in

classrooms where he could experience a degree of success.         A referral to the

Cuyahoga County Board of Developmental Disabilities was never completed so

Hayes could receive needed counseling and medication for several mental health

diagnoses.
                 The defense produced the increasingly widely known data that

juvenile brain development continues until the ages of 25 to 30 — sometimes beyond

— and that the types of life events and conditions experienced by Hayes slows

juvenile brain development. Finally, the defense stated that Hayes was remorseful

and desired to participate in prison programs, complete his education, and

eventually reunite with his daughter.

                 The trial court noted the defense suggestion that Hayes had the

potential to do good things and stated, “I hope that is true.” However, “any good

you do for a long time to come will be within the state prison.” (Tr. 125-126.) The

trial court added:

         You are going to have a very long time, Mr. Hayes, to carefully consider
         everything that you have done, the lives you affected, the life you took.
         You could be here on multiple murder charges had your driving been a
         little better, or had your driving rather been a little worse, or had your
         luck been a little worse.

         You had the good fortune, if it can even be called that, that only one
         person died as a result of all of your crimes. There could have been
         more.

         You must carefully consider all that you have done. You must resolve
         to make a better life for yourself in the years ahead of you. You must
         resolve to make good on the terrible things that you have done, the lives
         you affected, and to know that, although I am doing my best to mete
         out justice today, you will someday face judgment before a much higher
         court.

(Tr. 131-132.)

                 As stated above, the imposed aggregate sentence is 71 and one-half

years.    The sentences included postrelease control, and recommendations for
mental health counseling and to obtain a GED. Hayes was entitled to 245 days of

jail-time credit at the time of sentencing.

II. Assignment of Error

               Hayes poses a single assignment of error arguing that the trial court’s

imposition of consecutive sentences was clearly and convincingly contrary to law

and unsupported by the record.

III. Discussion

               It is axiomatic that a trial court may only impose sentences provided

by statute, and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is an exception to the R.C. 2929.14(A) directive

that multiple offenses “shall be served concurrently.” State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-

4202, 201 N.E.3d 1003, ¶ 18-19 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d

403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 22, citing State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d

92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 21-22.

               We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

1231, ¶ 16. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, an

appellate court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences where the

court “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) “the record does not support the

sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” The imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to

law if a trial court fails to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State

v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37.
               R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that in order to impose consecutive

sentences, the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are (1) necessary to

protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) that such

sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to

the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) that one of the following applies:

      The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the
      offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
      imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
      Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense.

      At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
      more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
      multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
      prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the
      courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
      conduct.

      The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crime by the offender.

               Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make

the statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, which means that ‘“the [trial] court

must note that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory

criteria and specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.”’ Bonnell at

¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999).

The reviewing court must be able to discern that the record contains evidence to

support the findings. State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102639, 2015-Ohio-

4501, ¶ 21, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. A trial court is not, however, required to state its

reasons to support its findings, nor is it required to precisely recite the statutory
language, “provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are

incorporated in the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.

              In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the trial court made

the required findings on the record.2 As such, our review is limited to whether the

record clearly and convincingly does not support the lower court’s findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).    R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).     Prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s

decision in State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607 (“Gwynne IV”) our

court applied an extremely deferential standard of review in considering the record

pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d 453,

¶ 21 (8th Dist.). In light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s plurality decision in State v.

Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851 (“Gwynne V”), wherein the Court

reconsidered and vacated Gwynne IV, and recent decisions by this court, we apply

our district’s pre-Gwynne IV standard of review pending further guidance from the

Ohio Supreme Court.

              Upon careful examination of the proceedings below, and mindful of

the deference due to the trial court, we find the record in this instance clearly and

convincingly does not support the lower court’s proportionality finding under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) as applied to the consecutive sentences imposed. In this case, the trial

court imposed the maximum sentence on all counts except for trafficking. The trial

      2 We note that the judgment entries in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-21-665938-A, CR-

22-666541-A, and CR-22-660865-A failed to incorporate the relevant findings and must
be corrected via nunc pro tunc entries.
court then ordered each individual prison term to run consecutively resulting in a

de facto life sentence of 71 and one-half years.

               This court agrees that Hayes should be punished, and this court does

not demean the impact on the victims for the loss of a beloved family member when

Hayes lost control of the vehicle attempting to avoid deployed stop sticks. However,

the record clearly and convincingly does not support Hayes’s permanent removal

from society. The consecutive sentences imposed in this case clearly exceed what is

necessary to protect the public and punish Hayes for his conduct. But more

importantly, the consecutive sentences imposed are plainly disproportionate to

Hayes’s conduct and the danger he poses.

                  Having found that the record clearly and convincingly does not

support the lower court’s findings in support of the consecutive sentences imposed

in this case, we modify Hayes’s sentence pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). As part of

the sentence modifications, this court reiterates that the Reagan Tokes Law

advisements were provided during the plea hearing and addressed during the

sentencing hearing. At the sentencing, the trial court announced that the first-

degree felony involuntary manslaughter count would carry an 11-year term. The

state inquired:

      State: Just to be clear on each — for an F1, for example, which was
      imposed on multiple cases that he has a prison sentence from anywhere
      from 11 to 16 and one-half years.

      Court: Yes.

      State: Because of Reagan Tokes.
      Court: That’s true. We discussed [it] at the time of the plea as well. Sir,
      do you understand, by nature, Reagan Tokes could result in additional
      time in essence being imposed if the prison chooses for the
      circumstances for the reasons we earlier discussed to keep you in
      prison longer? Do you understand?

      Hayes: Yes.

(Tr. 134-135.)

                 The defense objected to the law as unconstitutional at both hearings,

arguments that were recently resolved in favor of constitutionality in State v.

Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535. This court’s modification of sentences

also includes consideration of the Reagan Tokes Law requirements. Pursuant to

R.C. 2929.144(B)(2) for consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum term is

determined by the longest minimum term for the most serious felony being

sentenced. Here, that is the involuntary manslaughter count with the 11-year

minimum and 16 and one-half year maximum. The maximum term is determined

solely from the longest minimum term or definite term for the most serious felony

being sentenced.

                 The record supports the modification of Hayes’s aggregate prison

sentence as follows. The asterisks indicate that the offense is a qualifying offense

under the Reagan Tokes Law.

CR-21-660865-A

  Charge           Current Sentence          Modification              Total
Trafficking       24 months served         The sentence in       24 months served
                                           this case shall be
                consecutively to other    served concurrent      concurrently with
                cases.                    to the sentences in    other cases.
                                          all other cases.
CR-22-667269-A

   Charge          Prior Sentence            Modification                Total
*Aggravated     One-year firearm          11 to 16.5 years per   One-year firearm
robbery with    specification served      Reagan Tokes.          specification served
one-year        prior and                                        prior and
firearm         consecutively to                                 consecutively to
specification   11-year maximum                                  11-to-16.5-year
                base sentence served                             maximum base
                consecutively to other                           sentence.
                cases.
                                                                 The sentence in this
                                                                 case shall be served
                                                                 consecutively to the
                                                                 sentences imposed
                                                                 in CR 22-666541-A
                                                                 and CR-21-665938-
                                                                 A.

CR 22-666541-A

   Charge          Prior sentence            Modification                Total
*Aggravated     Three-year firearm        11 to 16.5 years per   Three-year firearm
robbery with    specification prior and   Reagan Tokes.          specification served
three-year      consecutive to                                   prior and
firearm         11-year maximum           The base sentence      consecutively to 11-
specification   base sentence.            for this count will    16.5-year maximum
                Consecutive to other      be served              base sentence.
                cases.                    concurrently with
                (Eighteen-month           the other counts in  The sentence in this
                sentence on grand         this case.           case shall be served
                theft charge merged                            consecutively with
                into the aggravated       However, the         the sentences
                robbery count.)           sentence in this     imposed in CR-22-
                                          case shall be served 667269-A and CR-
                                          consecutively with 21-665938-A.
                                          the sentences
                                          imposed in CR-22-
   Charge           Prior sentence           Modification                 Total
                                           667269-A and CR-
                                           21-665938-A.

 *Felonious      Three-year firearm        8 to 12 years per      Three-year firearm
 assault with    specification prior and   Reagan Tokes.          specification prior
 three-year      consecutive to 8-to-                             and consecutive to 8
 firearm         12-year maximum           The base sentence      to 12-year maximum
 specification   base sentence.            on this count will     base sentence served
                 Consecutive to other      be served              concurrently with
                 cases.                    concurrently with      the other counts in
                                           the other counts in    this case.
                                           this case.

 Having a        Three-year sentence       The sentence on        Three years
 weapon          served consecutive to     this count will be     concurrent with the
 while under     other cases.              served                 other counts in this
 disability                                concurrently with      case.
                                           the other counts in
                                           this case.

CR-21-665938-A

 Charge          Prior sentence             Modification           Total
 *Involuntary    One-year firearm           11-to-16.5-year        11-to-16.5-year
 manslaughter    specification prior and    term per Reagan        term served
 with one-year   consecutive to 11-year     Tokes.                 consecutive to the
 firearm         maximum base                                      sentence in this
 specification   sentence consecutive       One-year firearm       case for failure to
                 to other cases.            specification          comply. Firearm
                                            merges with one-       specification
                                            year firearm           merges with failure
                                            specification for      to comply
                                            failure to comply.     specification.
                                            R.C.
                                            2929.14(B)(1)(b).3

      3 Except as permitted under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), which does not apply in this

case, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) prohibits a court from imposing multiple consecutive prison
terms on multiple firearm specifications for “felonies committed as part of the same act
or transaction.” State v. Hardnett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107038, 2019-Ohio-3090, ¶ 7.
For purposes of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), “transaction” has been defined as “‘a series of
 Charge           Prior sentence             Modification           Total
                                                                    The sentence in
                                                                    this case shall be
                                                                    served
                                                                    consecutively to
                                                                    the sentences
                                                                    imposed in CR-22-
                                                                    667269-A and CR
                                                                    22-666541-A.

 Aggravated       One-year firearm           Sixty-month base       60 months
 vehicular        specification plus 60-     sentence served        concurrent with
 assault          month base sentence        concurrently with      other counts in this
                  consecutive to other       the other counts in    case.
                  cases.                     this case.
                                                                    Firearm
                                             One-year firearm       specification
                                             specification          merges with failure
                                             merges with one-       to comply
                                             year firearm           specification.
                                             specification for
                                             failure to comply.
                                             R.C.
                                             2929.14(B)(1)(b).
 Aggravated       One-year firearm           Sixty-month base       60 months
 vehicular        specification plus 60      sentence served        concurrent with
 assault          months base sentence       concurrently with      other counts in this
                  consecutive to other       the other counts in    case.
                  cases.                     this case.
                                                                    Firearm
                                             One-year firearm       specification
                                             specification          merges with failure
                                             merges with one-       to comply
                                             year firearm           specification.
                                             specification for
                                             failure to comply.
                                             R.C.
                                             2929.14(B)(1)(b).

continuous acts bound together by time, space and purpose, and directed toward a single
objective.’” State v. Adkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109184 and 109185, 2021-Ohio-
1294, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Wills, 69 Ohio St.3d 690, 691, 635 N.E.2d 370 (1994), quoting
State v. Caldwell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 14720, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5879 (Dec. 4, 1991).
Charge          Prior sentence          Modification       Total
Failure to      One-year firearm        No change.         One-year firearm
comply with     specification                              specification prior
one-year        prior and consecutive                      and consecutive to
firearm         to 36-month base                           36-month base
specification   sentence consecutive                       term.
                to other cases.
                                                           The sentence on
                                                           this count shall be
                                                           served
                                                           consecutively with
                                                           the sentence in this
                                                           case for
                                                           involuntary
                                                           manslaughter.

Carrying a      18 months consecutive 18 months            18 months
concealed       to other cases.       concurrent with      concurrent with
weapon                                other cases.         the other counts in
                                                           this case.

Summary

                       Firearm            Consecutive
                     Specifications      Terms for Base          Totals
                                            Charges
CR-21-660865-A      None                None               None (24 months
                                                           concurrent only)
CR-22-667269-A      One year            11 to 16.5 years   One year
                                                           specification plus
                                                           11 to 16.5 years
CR 22-666541-A      Six years           11 to 16.5 years   Six years
                                                           specifications plus
                                                           11 to 16.5 years
CR-21-665938-A      One year            11 to 16.5 years   One year
                                                           specification plus
                                        36 months          36-month definite
                                                           term plus 11 to 16.5
                                                           years consecutive
Thus, we modify Hayes’s prison sentences as set forth above.              The resulting

sentences in cases CR-22-667269-A, CR 22-666541-A, and CR-21-665938-A shall

be served consecutively to each other. The sentence in CR-21-660865-A shall be

served concurrently with all other cases.

              In addition, the trial court informed Hayes during the plea that the

failure to control count in CR-21-665938-A was subject to a Class one lifetime

driver’s license suspension and six points against his license. The trial court failed

to impose the suspension at sentencing.

              We sustain Hayes’s assignment of error and remand the case to the

trial court to (1) impose the sentences as modified; (2) impose the Class one driver’s

license suspension, and (3) issue sentencing entries in each case consistent with this

opinion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

IV. Conclusion

              The case is affirmed in part, modified in part, and remanded to the

trial court to impose sentence pursuant to this opinion.

      It is ordered that costs are divided equally between the parties.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY (WITH SEPARATE
OPINION)

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:

               I concur in judgment only with the majority opinion and its

determination that the record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial

court’s finding that Hayes’s aggregate prison term is not disproportionate to the

seriousness of his offenses or the danger he poses to the public. I further join the

majority’s application of R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-21-665938-

A. I write separately to address the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v.

Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851 (“Gwynne V”).

               In Gwynne V, the Ohio Supreme Court granted the state’s motion for

reconsideration and vacated its prior decision in State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No.

2022-Ohio-4607 (“Gwynne IV”). In doing so, the lead opinion in Gwynne V found

that (1) Gwynne IV’s conclusion that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court

to review the record de novo is contrary to the plain language of the statute, (2) R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) does not require express consideration of the aggregate prison term

that results from the imposition of consecutive sentences, and (3) the record did not
clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence

findings. Id. at ¶ 16, 18-24. Accordingly, the lead opinion granted the state’s motion

for reconsideration, vacated the prior decision in Gwynne IV, and affirmed the

appellate court’s judgment upholding the defendant’s 65-year sentence.

              As recognized by Justice Stewart in the dissenting opinion, the lead

opinion in Gwynne V consists of three justices, while the fourth justice determined

that the motion for reconsideration was justified on procedural grounds. Id. at ¶ 47

(Stewart, J., dissenting). In the absence of a majority on the issues of law developed

in the lead opinion, it is unclear what weight appellate courts should afford the lead

opinion’s discussion moving forward. Until further clarity and consensus is reached

by the highest court in this state, I believe certain philosophies articulated in

Gwynne IV remain persuasive, although not binding.

              In this regard, I do not disagree with Gwynne V’s recognition that a

plain reading of R.C. 2953.08(G) does not support a de novo standard of

review. And yet, consistent with the analysis contained in Gwynne IV, I adamantly

believe that the proportionality finding contained in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the

trial court to consider the aggregate prison term resulting from the imposition of

multiple, consecutive sentences. See Gwynne V at ¶ 81, 94 (Brunner, J.,

dissenting). As articulated by Justice Brunner:

      R.C. 2929.14(C)(3) requires a proportionality analysis, meaning that
      a sentencing court must consider the aggregate term of imprisonment
      to be imposed because, without such consideration, there is no
      coherent way to evaluate whether multiple, consecutive sentences are
       proportional to an offender’s overall conduct for which the sentences
       have been imposed.

       ***

       I would continue to hold, as this court did in Gwynne IV, the R.C.
       2929.14(C)(4)’s command that sentencing courts must find that
       “consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
       the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the
       public” means that those court must be able to articulate why the
       consecutive sentences that will actually be imposed, taken in the
       aggregate, are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct
       and the danger to the public.

Id. at ¶ 81, 94.

               Based on the foregoing, I agree that the lead opinion in Gwynne V

adopts a narrow interpretation of the proportionality requirement in R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) that will render it “virtually impossible for any defendant to ever

successfully challenge an aggregate sentence imposed as a result of running multiple

individual sentences consecutively.” Id. at ¶ 48 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The lead

opinion’s objective approach promotes boilerplate recitations above the overarching

purposes and principles of felony sentencing.

               Turning to the facts of this case, I do not wish to suggest that Hayes’s

conduct over the course of several days was somehow less serious than similarly

situated offenders. Unfortunately, Hayes’s conduct in this case reflects a growing

pattern of armed violence in this community. Perhaps more tragic, is the common

age these offenders tend to share. Consistent with this trend, there is no dispute that

Hayes, then a teenager, engaged in a heinous pattern of conduct that left a trail of

emotional and physical injuries. He facilitated a firearm to attack innocent
members of this community in their most vulnerable states and recklessly caused

the death of a woman while evading the police. The resulting harm caused by his

crime spree will be lasting, and the trial court was justified in utilizing R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) to severely punish Hayes.

              As previously discussed, however, a trial court must consider the

aggregate sentence that inherently results from its application of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

when multiple terms of imprisonment are ordered to run consecutively. Thus, while

the stacking of some consecutive sentences was warranted in this case, the trial court

was required to contemplate the significance of a sentence akin to a term of life when

making its proportionality finding for the imposition of consecutive sentences on all

counts — across multiple cases.

              In this case, the record reflects that the trial court did not contemplate

the total length of the defendant’s sentence until after the consecutive terms were

imposed and defense counsel sought clarification as to the court’s aggregate-

sentence calculations. At that time, the court sought the parties’ assistance and the

state suggested that its calculation amounted to “71.5 [years].” (Tr. 136.) I do not

wish to infer that the trial court did not consider the implications of its lengthy

sentence in this matter. Nevertheless, applying the tenets promoted in Justice

Brunner’s dissenting opinion, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the

aggregate sentence exceeded what is proportionate to the sentence necessary to

protect the public and punish Hayes for his conduct. Under the terms of the

sentence imposed by the trial court, Hayes would be released from prison following
his 91st birthday although he committed most of the underlying offenses when he

was just 18 years old. In my view, the modified sentence imposed by this court

carefully balances the relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved

in this case and imposes a prison term that is both proportionate to the severity of

Hayes’s conduct and consistent with sentences imposed on similarly situated

offenders in this state.

               As previously mentioned, there is an epidemic of violence taking place

in this county. Continued measures by community leaders, together with public

support, is necessary to address the heightening levels of gun-related violence that

has resulted in tragic outcomes such as those involved in this case. It is my position,

however, that stacking prison terms in order to impose what amounts to a life

sentence on such offenders is not a practical, governmental solution. It neither

addresses the issues underlying the growing violence in this community, serves the

rehabilitative goals of felony sentencing, nor promotes the best use of public

resources.