Court Opinion

ID: 9665703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:19.067771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.009735
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P. J.
(dissenting). The contract signed March 1, 1966, by plaintiff and Slaggert, theatrical agent, provides in part:
“And in event any of the attractions above named shall fail or refuse to appear as hereinbefore agreed, for any cause which is not the fault of the party of the first part, the latter shall not be liable for any damages sustained by the party of the second part to such default and, in any such event, the party of the first part shall have the right to substitute another act or attraction of equal merit with *522the consent of the party of the second part. Or, otherwise, the party of the second part shall have the right, at their discretion, to deduct the amount of salary agreed by both parties, set opposite such defaulting attraction, from the total amount of this contract.”
Plaintiff now contends that although Slaggert Theatrical Agency acted only as an agent for the defendant and, therefore, plaintiff was really contracting with the defendant, that the above provision in the contract only served to relieve the theatrical agency from any liability resulting from defendant’s failure to appear.
However, assuming first that defendant was a disclosed principal, it is an elementary principle of the law of agency that an agent, acting on behalf of a disclosed principal, may never be held liable for a breach by the principal:
“If a contract is made with a known agent acting within the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the contract is that of the principal alone and the agent cannot be held liable thereon.”1
Plaintiff makes no claim that the theatrical agency is a joint principal or a surety. Plaintiff’s claim is based solely on the fact that the theatrical agency acted as agent on behalf of the defendant. It would, therefore, follow that since defendant is the only one that plaintiff can hold liable on the contract,2 the above-quoted portion of the contract would also enure to the defendant’s benefit.
Plaintiff retained $775 of the contract price pursuant to the above provision due to defendant’s failure to appear. Since the theatrical company could in no way be relieved from liability, because *523it had none, the retention of the funds must necessarily operate as a satisfaction of any claim against defendant.3
On the other hand, if it is assumed that defendant was not a disclosed principal, hut rather was undisclosed, as was pointed out in the majority opinion, the satisfaction against the agent would also serve to release the defendant-principal. I can see no way that defendant, as agent, whether disclosed or undisclosed, can he held liable for any damages other than those provided for in the contract, since plaintiff makes no claim that the damages are totally unrelated to its actual damages or that the contract provision is in the nature of a penalty.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.

 3 Am Jur 2d, Agency, § 294, p 654.

 ma.

 See 2 Restatement Agency, 2d, § 320, p 67.