Court Opinion

ID: 9954115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:10.247307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.098554
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Stare v. Grange Indemn. Ins. Co., 2024-Ohio-1097.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 MAHONING COUNTY

                                     JERRY STARE ET AL.,

                                        Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                                     v.

             GRANGE INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.,

                                       Defendants-Appellee.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 23 MA 0027

                                   Application for Reconsideration

                                            BEFORE:
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment,
                           Cheryl L. Waite, Mark A, Hanni, Judges.

                                              JUDGMENT:
                                                Denied.

Atty. J. Michael Goldberg, Law Office of J. Michael Goldberg LLC, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants and

Atty. Atty. Belinda S. Barnes and Atty. James R. Gallagher, Gallagher, Gams, Tallan,
Barnes & Littrell LLP, and Atty. Andrew J. Kielkopf, for Defendant-Appellee.

                                        Dated: March 22, 2024
                                                                                                –2–

PER CURIAM.

         {¶1}   On March 4, 2024, Appellants, Jerry and Karen Stare (together “the
Stares”), filed an application requesting that this court reconsider our decision in Stare v.
Grange Indemnity Ins. Co., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 23 MA 0027, 2024-Ohio-654, in which
we affirmed the judgment of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas awarding
them prejudgment interest upon jury verdicts against Appellee, Grange Indemnity
Insurance Company (“Grange”), on an uninsured motorist (“UM”) policy involving an
automobile accident.1 The Stares posit the date of the accident (November 10, 2017)
must be the date upon which prejudgment interest began calculating, not the date they
refiled their complaint in Mahoning County (November 10, 2020), as found by the trial
court.    Thus, the Stares contend that this court’s decision affirming the trial court’s
judgment was in error and that we should, therefore, reconsider the opinion pursuant to
App.R. 26(A).

         App.R. 26, which provides for the filing of an application for reconsideration
         in this court, includes no guidelines to be used in the determination of
         whether a decision is to be reconsidered and changed. Matthews v.
         Matthews, 5 Ohio App.3d 140, 143, 450 N.E.2d 278 (10th Dist.1981). The
         test generally applied is whether the motion for reconsideration calls to the
         attention of the court an obvious error in its decision or raises an issue for
         our consideration that was either not at all or was not fully considered by us
         when it should have been. Id. An application for reconsideration is not
         designed for use in instances where a party simply disagrees with the
         conclusions reached and the logic used by an appellate court. State v.
         Owens, 112 Ohio App.3d 334, 336, 678 N.E.2d 956 (11th Dist.1996).
         Rather, App.R. 26 provides a mechanism by which a party may prevent
         miscarriages of justice that could arise when an appellate court makes an
         obvious error or renders an unsupportable decision under the law. Id.

D.G. v. M.G.G., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0165, 2019-Ohio-1190, ¶ 2.

1 Grange filed a Memorandum Contra on March 11, 2024.   The Stares filed a Reply on March 18, 2024.

Case No. 23 MA 0027
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        {¶2}     In their application, the Stares assert:

        This Court has applied an incorrect standard of review; it has resorted to
        making findings outside the record, relying upon appellee’s twisted version
        of the parties’ negotiations; and it has taken a legal entitlement and judicially
        conditioned that entitlement on a standard of conduct that, among other
        things, punishes the appellants for having exercised rights protected by the
        Ohio Constitution, by legislative statutes, and by judicial rules.

(3/4/2024 Appellants’ Application for Reconsideration, p. 1).

        {¶3}     Contrary to the Stares’ assertion, the record establishes this court did not
make any obvious errors or render a decision that is not supported by the law. This court
did not apply an incorrect standard, did not make findings outside the record, and did not
unduly punish the Stares by affirming the trial court’s judgment.
        {¶4}     In Stare, we stated the following:

        The Stares contend this court must apply a de novo standard of review and
        claim that Landis v. Grange Mutual Ins. Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 339 (1998) “has
        no precedential value.”[2] (9/5/2023 Appellants’ Reply Brief, p. 2). We
        disagree.

        In Ohio, the leading case on the issue of prejudgment interest in an UM/UIM
        claim is Landis v. Grange Mutual Ins. Co. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 339, 695
        N.E.2d 1140. In Landis, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that UM/UIM
        claims are contractual in nature and therefore subject to R.C. 1343.03(A)
        with respect to the award and calculation of interest. Id. at 341, 695 N.E.2d
        1140. R.C. 1343.03(A) provides in pertinent part: “(W)hen money becomes
        due and payable upon any (* * *) instrument of writing (* * *) and upon all
        judgments (* * *) for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or

2 The Stares now attempt to retract that claim in their application.See (3/4/2024 Appellants’ Application for
Reconsideration, p. 6). However, the Stares did in fact clearly state on appeal in their reply brief that Landis
“has no precedential value.” (9/5/2023 Appellants’ Reply Brief, p. 2).

Case No. 23 MA 0027
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      a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate
      per annum determined pursuant to section 5703.47 of the Revised Code(.)”

      In Landis, the insured was covered by the UM provisions of his employer’s
      automobile insurance policy, with limits of $1,000,000. The insured was
      walking in Sandusky, Ohio, when he was struck by an underinsured
      motorist. The tortfeasor’s insurer paid the liability limit of $100,000 to Mr.
      Landis, and he presented a UM claim to Grange. Grange denied the claim,
      and Mr. Landis filed a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage.
      The trial court eventually ruled in Mr. Landis’ favor and the case was
      submitted to an arbitrator to determine damages pursuant to the terms of
      the insurance policy. The arbitrator awarded the full policy limits as
      damages. Mr. Landis then filed a motion for prejudgment interest, which
      was denied. The prejudgment interest issue was appealed to the Ohio
      Supreme Court.

      Landis held that a UM/UIM claim sounds in contract rather than tort and is
      governed by the section of the prejudgment interest statute dealing with
      contract claims, R.C. 1343.03(A). The Landis Court further reasoned that
      whether prejudgment interest “should be calculated from the date coverage
      was demanded or denied, from the date of the accident, from the date at
      which arbitration of damages would have ended if Grange had not denied
      benefits, or some other time based on when Grange should have paid
      Landis is for the trial court to determine.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 342, 695
      N.E.2d 1140. (* * *)

      (* * *)

      Landis further explained that “(* * *) (insurance companies) will be subject
      to a prejudgment interest award, not as a punishment but as a way to
      prevent them from using money then due and payable to another for their
      own financial gain.” Id. at 341, 695 N.E.2d 1140.

Case No. 23 MA 0027
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      A motion for prejudgment interest is committed to the discretion of the trial
      court. Pruszynski v. Reeves, 117 Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-510, 881
      N.E.2d 1230, ¶ 14. Therefore, a reviewing court may not reverse that
      decision absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Abuse of discretion
      (* * *) implies that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
      unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5
      OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 1140.

      An award of prejudgment interest is intended to encourage prompt
      settlement and discourage defendants from opposing and prolonging,
      between injury and judgment, the resolution of legitimate claims. Royal
      Elec. [Constr. v. Ohio State Univ.,] 73 Ohio St.3d [110] at 116, 652 N.E.2d
      687 [(1995)]. A party seeking interest under R.C. 1343.03(A) need not
      demonstrate that the insurer acted in bad faith. Craig v. Grange Ins. Co.
      (Nov. 5, 1999), 2d Dist. No. 17675. Prejudgment interest is not intended to
      punish the party responsible for the underlying damages. Rather, it acts to
      compensate and ultimately to make the aggrieved party whole. See,
      McCormick, Damages (1935), 205, Section 50 et seq.; 3 Restatement of
      the Law 2d, Contracts (1981), 150-151, Section 354(2).

      To determine the amount of prejudgment interest warranted in a particular
      case, the trial court must inquire whether the aggrieved party has been fully
      compensated. Royal Elec. at 116, 652 N.E.2d 687. The award of
      prejudgment interest is intended to compensate the plaintiff for the period
      of time between accrual of the claim and judgment. Id. at 117, 652 N.E.2d
      687. R.C. 1343.03(A) applies even when the judgment arises from a
      disputed claim and when the sum due was not capable of being ascertained
      until determined by the court. Yuhanick v. Cooper (March 14, 2001), 7th
      Dist. 99 CO 37.

Stare, 2024-Ohio-654, ¶ 18, quoting Persello v. Allstate Ins. Co., 7th Dist. Mahoning No.
10 MA 18, 2011-Ohio-3230, ¶ 7-9, 12-15 (applying R.C. 1343.03(A)).

Case No. 23 MA 0027
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      {¶5}   In Stare, this court further stated:

      In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
      the date of accrual for prejudgment interest should be the date the Stares
      refiled their complaint in Mahoning County (November 10, 2020) as trial
      courts have discretion in determining a reasonable date of accrual. Landis,
      supra, at 342 (Whether prejudgment interest should be calculated from the
      date coverage was demanded or denied, from the date of the accident, or
      from some other time is for the trial court to determine.); Persello, supra, at
      ¶ 9, 13.

      As stated, the trial court determined the following: “to award prejudgment
      interest from the date of the accident would be unjust”; the Stares’ “conduct
      in prosecuting this litigation caused unusual and unnecessary delay as a
      result of which they should not experience a windfall”; and “the appropriate
      accrual date for purposes of calculating an award of prejudgment interest is
      November 10, 2020[,]” the date the case was refiled in Mahoning County.
      (11/3/2022 Magistrate’s Entry and Award of Prejudgment Interest, p. 2);
      (11/21/2022 Judgment Entry).

      The automobile accident occurred on November 10, 2017 in Columbus,
      Franklin County, Ohio. On November 8, 2019, two days before the two-year
      statute of limitations ran as to Neal, the Stares filed a complaint in Cuyahoga
      County, an improper venue. The case was subsequently transferred to
      Franklin County. The Stares later voluntarily dismissed the case. On
      November 10, 2020, three years after the accident, the Stares refiled the
      case in Mahoning County. As addressed, throughout this action, numerous
      documented delays occurred at the trial court level. The Stares refused to
      negotiate from their initial demands of $100,000 each (the “each person”
      UM coverage limit) despite attending mediation. Even at the final pretrial
      conference held on June 22, 2022, the Stares still refused to lower their

Case No. 23 MA 0027
                                                                                      –7–

      demands under the policy limits. As a result, Grange had no meaningful
      ability to work toward a settlement with the Stares for nearly five years.

      The Stares’ position that the date of accrual for an award of prejudgment
      interest is always the date of the accident is both misplaced and unfounded
      under Ohio law. Landis, supra, at 342 (Whether prejudgment interest should
      be calculated from the date coverage was demanded or denied, from the
      date of the accident, or from some other time is for the trial court to
      determine.); Persello, supra, at ¶ 9, 13. * * *

      ***

      The purpose of prejudgment interest is not to punish a defendant.
      “[P]rejudgment interest does not punish the party responsible for the
      underlying damages * * *, but, rather, it acts as compensation and serves
      ultimately to make the aggrieved party whole.” Royal Elec., supra, at 117.
      An award of prejudgment interest dating back nearly five years due to
      delays the trial court determined were caused solely by the Stares would
      certainly serve to punish Grange.

      It was within the trial court’s discretion to determine a reasonable date for
      prejudgment interest. Landis, supra, at 342; Persello, supra, at ¶ 9, 13.
      Based on the facts presented and the record before us, the court did not
      abuse its discretion in determining November 10, 2020, the date the action
      was refiled in Mahoning County, to be a fair and equitable date to start the
      running of prejudgment interest.

Stare, 2024-Ohio-654, ¶ 19-24.

      {¶6}   Upon consideration of the App.R. 26(A) application filed in the present
matter, it is apparent that the Stares have not demonstrated any obvious errors or raised
any issues that were not adequately addressed in our previous opinion. This court is not
persuaded that we erred as a matter of law.

Case No. 23 MA 0027
                                                                                   –8–

      {¶7}   An application for reconsideration is not designed to be used in situations
wherein a party simply disagrees with the logic employed or the conclusions reached by
an appellate court. Owens, supra, at 336. App.R. 26(A) is meant to provide a mechanism
by which a party may prevent a miscarriage of justice that could arise when an appellate
court makes an obvious error or renders a decision that is not supported by the law. Id.
The Stares have made no such demonstration.
      {¶8}   For the foregoing reasons, the Stares’ application for reconsideration is
hereby denied.

JUDGE WILLIAM A. KLATT,
RETIRED, SITTING BY ASSIGNMENT

JUDGE CHERYL L. WAITE

JUDGE MARK A. HANNI

                                NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.

Case No. 23 MA 0027