Court Opinion

ID: 9571211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:52.369176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:28.306082
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the portion of the State’s cross-examination of appellant called into question was proper impeachment of appellant’s earlier testimony.
1. During the State’s cross-examination of appellant, a former officer at a correctional institution, he admitted he considered himself a “peace officer” and agreed with the assistant district attorney’s query that he “followed] the law.” The prosecutor then inquired: “Why then on April 23 did the police find dope in your car?” which prompted an objection from appellant’s counsel that appellant’s character was being impugned. The trial court overruled the objection, apparently believing that the discovery of marijuana in the car appellant was driving at the time of his arrest was admissible as part of the circumstances of appellant’s arrest.
*829The majority holds that the State’s cross-examination was valid impeachment of appellant’s statement that he followed the law. The Georgia Supreme Court discussed the issue of impeachment of a criminal defendant’s testimony in Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 761, 763 (363 SE2d 535) (1988). “Upon the making of [the] assertion [that he was a law-abiding, certified peace officer], he became subject to impeachment as to its veracity. ‘If a defendant testifies, he may be cross-examined by the prosecution like any other witness.’ [Cit.] That impeachment may proceed in the following manner: (1) If the defendant in fact [was not a law-abiding, certified peace officer], then evidence establishing such a fact would be admissible for the purpose of impeaching his credibility; and (2) If he had been convicted of such a crime, then a certified copy of such conviction would be admissible . . . to establish the falsity of the assertion.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case at bar, the State did not offer evidence that appellant was not law-abiding, and the assistant district attorney’s question itself did not qualify as testimony or evidence. See Jones v. State, 116 Ga. App. 624 (158 SE2d 301) (1967). It is undisputed that the State did not attempt to impeach appellant by proffering a certified copy of a conviction. Thus, the prosecutorial query did not qualify as impeachment of appellant’s testimony that he was a law-abiding, certified peace officer.
Focusing on the testimony of the officer who stated that he “inventoried” the interior of the vehicle appellant was driving at the time of his arrest, the majority theorizes that “[i]t may reasonably be inferred” (p. 827) that the officer found marijuana in appellant’s car and was available to so testify. The fact of the matter is that the officer did not testify that he found marijuana in appellant’s vehicle. Thus, the officer’s testimony does not provide an evidentiary basis for the prosecutorial query at issue.
The majority also relies on the “admission” by appellant’s trial attorney that a small amount of marijuana was found in appellant’s car when it was inventoried. That remark was made outside the presence of the jury in the discussion which followed the objection to the State’s cross-examination. It certainly cannot serve as evidence upon which the prosecutorial query at issue might be based since “statements of the attorneys (are) not evidence. . . .” Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226 (3) (336 SE2d 757) (1985). See also Combined Contractors v. Welch, 160 Ga. App. 790 (2) (288 SE2d 229) (1982); Jones v. State, 116 Ga. App. 624, supra.
In light of the above, I cannot agree with the majority that the State’s unsubstantiated inquiry about marijuana allegedly found in appellant’s car constituted valid impeachment of appellant’s testimony that he was a law-abiding man. Since I believe the majority’s conclusion to be incorrect, ! will address the additional grounds for *830admission offered by the State.
2. The State maintains that its cross-examination of appellant was proper because appellant had placed his character in issue by calling witnesses who testified as to his good character. Appellant did place his character in issue by calling witnesses who testified to his good reputation in the community. Fuller v. State, 178 Ga. App. 725 (344 SE2d 698) (1986). “[Wjhere the defendant offers testimony of a witness as to his general good reputation in the community, the State may prove the defendant’s general bad reputation in the community, and may additionally offer evidence that the defendant has been convicted of prior offenses under the authority of OCGA § 24-9-20 (b). . . . [However,] [t]he rule remains that the State may not prove the defendant’s general bad character by specific acts of bad conduct.” Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 758 (363 SE2d 529) (1988). Thus, in the case at bar, the State could have rebutted appellant’s evidence of his general good reputation in the community by offering evidence of appellant’s general bad reputation in the community or by offering evidence of prior convictions of appellant. However, neither method was followed. Instead, under the State’s theory, the State responded to appellant’s good character evidence by using an unsubstantiated charge of possession of marijuana, a specific bad act (not a conviction), to prove appellant’s bad character. Use of a specific bad act to prove general bad character is a method specifically prohibited by Footnote 8 in Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, supra. Thus, the assistant district attorney’s query was not appropriate as proper rebuttal evidence under OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) to appellant’s evidence of his general good character.
3. The State also argues that the prosecutorial query was admissible as part of the circumstances connected with appellant’s arrest. I wholeheartedly agree that the circumstances connected with an arrest is proper evidence and admissible as part of the res gestae of an arrest, even though it may incidentally place a defendant’s character in issue. Fudge v. State, 184 Ga. App. 590 (2) (362 SE2d 147) (1987); Wolke v. State, 181 Ga. App. 635 (2) (353 SE2d 827) (1987). See also Bishop v. State, 155 Ga. App. 611 (2c) (271 SE2d 743) (1980). However, it is the testimony of a witness who has firsthand knowledge of the circumstances, i.e., the arresting officer, the searching officer, an eyewitness, etc., that is admissible. See Preston v. State, 257 Ga. 42 (7) (354 SE2d 135) (1987) (testimony of the arresting officer); Cooper v. State, 188 Ga. App. 629 (1) (373 SE2d 796) (1988) (testimony of the undercover officer/purchaser); Fudge v. State, supra (testimony of the arresting officer); Wolke v. State, supra (testimony of the victim). In the case at bar, there is no testimony concerning the search of appellant’s vehicle and the purported discovery of contraband. The assistant district attorney’s question was not testimony or evidence (see *831Jones v. State, 116 Ga. App. 624, supra); therefore, he could not have been permitted to introduce in this manner the highly prejudicial evidence that appellant was involved in another crime at the time of his arrest.
Decided December 5, 1989.
Michael H. Lane, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Doris L. Downs, William L. Hawthorne III, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Inasmuch as the State introduced the subject of appellant’s possible bad character in an impermissible manner and attempted to impeach appellant in an impermissible way, I believe the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection. Since “[i]t is essential that the jury be not improperly influenced or prejudiced against persons on trial” (Anderson v. State, 206 Ga. 527 (2) (57 SE2d 563) (1950)), I would reverse the judgment of conviction entered against appellant and remand the case for a new trial. See Dukes v. State, 256 Ga. 671 (352 SE2d 561) (1987).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.