Court Opinion

ID: 9898321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:56.319289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:02.463354
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                         August 8, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,

                               Respondent,                          No. 56878-1-II

        v.                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 TED NATHANIEL JENSEN,

                               Appellant.

       CHE, J. ⎯ In February 2006, a jury convicted Ted Jensen of one count of first degree

assault, one count of felony harassment, and one count of first degree vehicle prowling. The jury

found a deadly weapon enhancement on each count. Jensen was originally sentenced with an

offender score of 6 on his highest count, and 5 on his remaining counts. Jensen’s judgment and

sentence has since been amended several times. Jensen appeals his most recent resentencing

arguing that the State failed to prove that his 1984 second degree theft conviction did not wash.

Jensen raises additional claims in a statement of additional grounds (SAG).

       We hold that: (1) the State did not meet its burden in proving Jensen’s criminal history

and (2) Jensen did not affirmatively acknowledge his prior convictions. We conclude that none

of the issues raised in Jensen’s SAG have merit or are within our scope of review. Accordingly,

we remand the case for resentencing, allowing the State the opportunity to introduce evidence to

establish the defendant’s criminal history.
No. 56878-1-II

                                               FACTS

         In February 2006, a jury convicted Ted Jensen of one count of first degree assault, one

count of felony harassment, and one count of first degree vehicle prowling. The jury further

determined that Jensen was armed with a deadly weapon other than a firearm on each count.

         Prior to sentencing, the State filed a sentencing memorandum. The State agreed that the

three convictions were the same criminal conduct and therefore were not other current offenses

for scoring purposes. The memorandum listed Jensen’s prior felony convictions, sentencing

date, county, and cause number.1 The State argued that none of Jensen’s felony convictions

“wash due to 60+ misdemeanor convictions.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 163. The State listed in its

memorandum five of Jensen’s misdemeanor convictions that occurred between his 1985 and

1997 felonies, providing the year and a descriptive title of each offense. In its memorandum, the

State asserted that

         After the jury’s guilty verdicts, the defense agreed with the prosecutor’s statement
         of the defendant’s criminal history with three exceptions, which were issues that
         the defense asked the state to provide documentation in support of: (1) whether the
         defendant’s 1985 felony conviction existed, (2) whether his 1997 VNCO
         conviction was a felony, and (3) whether the defendant was on community custody
         at the time he committed the current crimes.

CP at 164. Further, the State asserted that it provided Jensen “certified copies of the judgments

and sentences from both the 1985 and 1997 convictions” and that the “only criminal history in

1
    Excerpt from state’s sentencing memorandum. Clerk’s Papers at 163.

                                                  2
No. 56878-1-II

dispute [was] whether the defendant was on community custody at the time he committed the

current crimes.” CP at 164. In light of Jensen’s current and prior offenses, the State argued that

Jensen’s offender score was 7 and that his sentencing range, including his deadly weapon

enhancements, was 226-284 months of total confinement. CP at 166-67.

       Subsequently, the sentencing court calculated Jensen’s offender score as 6 for the first

degree assault and 5 for both the felony harassment and vehicle prowling convictions. The

sentencing court did not add a point for committing the current offenses while on community

custody. The sentencing court imposed 240 months of total confinement, apparently running

each of the deadly weapon enhancements concurrently based on total months of confinement

ordered.2

       Jensen timely appealed his convictions and the State cross appealed. State v. Jensen, 144

Wn. App. 1017, 2008 WL 1875945 (2008) (unpublished). The State contended the sentencing

court erroneously calculated the offender score by not including a point for community custody

in light of State v. Jones, 159 Wn.2d 231, 247, 149 P.3d 636 (2006). Jensen, 144 Wn. App. at

*10. This court vacated Jensen’s sentence and remanded to recalculate his offender score and

resentence accordingly. Jensen, 144 Wn. App. at *15.

       In August 2006, the State moved for relief from final judgment. The State argued that the

sentencing court did not have authority to enter a judgment and sentence running Jensen’s

sentence enhancements concurrently. The State asserted that Jensen’s sentence must include

2
  Jensen had a prior conviction with a deadly weapon enhancement, which required the current
deadly weapon enhancements to double in length. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(a), (c), and (d). For the
first degree assault, Jensen’s subsequent deadly weapon enhancement was 48 months. For the
other two offenses, his subsequent deadly weapon enhancements should have been 12 months
each, however, Jensen’s 2006 judgment and sentence incorrectly reflects 48 months each.

                                                 3
No. 56878-1-II

three consecutive deadly weapon enhancements. While Jensen’s appeal was pending, the

sentencing court amended Jensen’s judgment and sentence and ordered 264 months of total

confinement. The sentencing court explained that Jensen’s sentence was comprised of a

192-month base sentence on Count I at 6 points, plus 3 consecutive deadly weapon

enhancements comprised of 48 months on Count I, and 12 months each on Counts II and III.

       In April 2009, pursuant to this court’s remand, the sentencing court filed a second

amended judgment and sentence. Jensen’s offender score increased to 7 for the assault

conviction and 6 for both the felony harassment and vehicle prowling convictions. The

sentencing court ordered 255 months of confinement on Count I, 41 months on Count II, and 26

months on Count III. The sentencing court imposed 279 months of total confinement explaining

that the confinement time on Count I included a 48 month deadly weapon enhancement and that

both Counts II and III included 12 month deadly weapon enhancements.

       In November 2021, Jensen filed a CrR 7.8(b) motion requesting to be resentenced with a

corrected offender score. Jensen argued that in light of State v. Blake, his “offender score

include[d] point(s) that should not have been counted in the original score.” CP at 69, 197

Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Jensen explained that under Blake, his 1985 unlawful

possession of a controlled substance (UPCS) conviction was void and should not be included in

his offender score. Accordingly, Jensen argued that his new offender score on Count I should be

                                                 4
No. 56878-1-II

6 with a standard sentence range of 210 to 264 months,3 which includes the deadly weapon

enhancement of 48 months. Jensen further argued that his new offender score on Count II would

be 5 with a standard sentence range of 29 to 34 months,4 which includes a 12 month deadly

weapon enhancement. On Count III, Jensen argued that his new offender score would be 5 with

a standard sentence range of 16 to 24 months,5 which includes a 12 month deadly weapon

enhancement.

       On November 23, 2021, the sentencing court held a sentencing hearing. The State argued

that pursuant to Blake, Jensen’s offender score is 6, the same score the sentencing court “thought

[Jensen] was being sentenced to at the time of the original sentencing.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 3.

Accordingly, the State requested that the sentencing court impose the same sentence as originally

3
  The standard range for first degree assault with 6 points is 162–216 months. RCW 9.94A.510,
515. The “deadly weapon other than a firearm” enhancement for a class A felony is 24 months.
RCW 9.94A.533(4)(a). The “deadly weapon other than a firearm” enhancement is doubled when
a defendant has a prior conviction with a deadly weapon enhancement, which Jensen had, for a
total of 48 months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(a) and (d).
4
 The standard range for harassment with an offender score of 5 is 17–22 months. RCW
9.94A.510, 515. The “deadly weapon other than a firearm” enhancement for a class C felony is
6 months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(c). The enhancement is doubled when, like Jensen, a defendant
has a prior conviction with a deadly weapon enhancement, for a total of 12 months. RCW
9.94A.533(4)(c) and (d).
5
  The standard range for first degree vehicle prowling with an offender score of 5 is 4–12
months. RCW 9.94A.510, 515. The “deadly weapon other than a firearm” enhancement for a
class C felony is 6 months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(c). The enhancement is doubled when, like
Jensen, a defendant has a prior conviction with a deadly weapon enhancement, for a total of 12
months. RCW 9.94A.533(4)(c) and (d).

                                                5
No. 56878-1-II

ordered in 2006.6 Jensen sought a mid-range sentence, asking that the court “grant him the 237

months on Count I, instead of the 240 months that the State [was] asking for.” RP at 12-13.

Jensen further requested that the sentencing court find him indigent, “suspend as much of the

fines or fees as possible,” and “follow the rest of the recommendation on the other Counts.” RP

at 13.

         The sentencing court adopted Jensen’s recommendation and ordered 237 months on

Count I; 70 months on Count II; and 60 months on Count III for a total of 261 months of

confinement. The sentencing court also corrected Jensen’s judgment and sentence to reflect that

Counts I-III “encompass the same criminal conduct and count as one crime in determining

[Jensen’s] offender score.” CP at 126.

         On November 29, 2021, Jensen filed an amended CrR 7.8(b) motion to amend his

judgment and sentence. Jensen argued that during the November 2021 resentencing hearing, the

“sentence imposed on Count II and Count III were above the standard sentencing range and

should be corrected to reflect the correct sentence range.” CP at 100. Subsequently, Jensen and

the State jointly moved for an order amending Jensen’s judgment and sentence to reflect the high

end of the standard range on Counts II and III.

6
  During this sentencing hearing, the court was unable to access Jensen’s original judgment and
sentence. In the absence of the original judgment and sentence, Jensen agreed with the State’s
representation of his original sentence and clarified that he received a “sentence of 240 [months]
on Count I; 70 months on Count II; and 60 months on Count III. . . . And [that] the actual
number of months of total confinement ordered was 264 months, which included all of the
enhancements.” RP at 8.

                                                  6
No. 56878-1-II

       At the resentencing hearing in December 2021, Jensen asked “the Court to correct or fix

Count II and Count III in accordance with his actual sentence range on those two matters.”7 RP

at 29. Jensen explicitly acknowledged that at the previous resentencing, “Defense and the

State . . . were essentially telling the Court [what sentence to impose on Counts II and III] and

[that] the Court followed that recommendation.” RP at 29. Jensen proposed a corrected

sentence range stating:

       And I believe--and [the State] can correct me if I’m wrong, [Jensen’s] sentence
       range on Count II should be 29 to 34 months, and on Count III, I believe it’s 16 to
       24 months. So, we’d ask the Court on those two Counts to, essentially, sentence
       [Jensen] somewhere within that range and run that concurrent with Count I, where
       he was previously, at his last hearing, given 237 months, I believe, and that did
       include the enhancement.

RP at 29-30. The sentencing court entered an order amending Jensen’s judgment and sentence to

impose 34 months of confinement on Count II and 24 months of confinement on Count III, both

of which include the 12 month deadly weapon enhancement, subsequent offense.

       Jensen seeks relief from his judgment and sentence filed on December 14th, 2021.

                                           ANALYSIS

       Jensen argues that the “State failed to prove that [his] 1984 second degree theft

conviction did not wash out.” Br. of Appellant at 8. Accordingly, Jensen contends that we

“should reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing.” Br. of Appellant at 8. We agree.

7
  Additionally, Jensen requested that the sentencing court “go back to the spirit of [his] first
Judgment and Sentence and” run his deadly weapon enhancements concurrent with his other
counts because the acts were part of the same criminal conduct. RP at 31. The State argued that
the sentencing court did not have authority to run the sentence enhancements concurrently. The
sentencing court declined to decide the issue determining that it “would be something to go to
the Court of Appeals.” RP at 48.

                                                 7
No. 56878-1-II

1.     Proof of Criminal History & Affirmative Acknowledgment

       Jensen argues that during his resentencing hearings the State failed to prove his criminal

history between 1984 and 1990.8 Jensen contends that in the absence of his void 1985 simple

possession conviction, his 1984 second degree theft conviction washes out. As a result, Jensen

argues that his offender score should be reduced to 5.

       The State argues that Jensen waived the issue concerning the calculation of his criminal

history by “‘affirmatively acknowledg[ing]’” his offender score. Br. of Resp’t at 8. We disagree

with the State.

       Under RCW 9.94A.500(1), a trial court must conduct a sentencing hearing before

imposing a sentence on a defendant. A defendant’s offender score influences their sentencing

range “and is generally calculated by adding together the defendant’s current offenses and the

prior convictions.” State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 908-09, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). Under RCW

9.94A.525, only certain prior convictions are included in a defendant’s offender score.

Specifically, the statute provides that

       Class C prior felony convictions other than sex offenses shall not be included in the
       offender score if, since the last date of release from confinement . . . pursuant to a
       felony conviction, if any, or entry of judgment and sentence, the offender had spent
       five consecutive years in the community without committing any crime that
       subsequently results in a conviction.

Former RCW 9.94A.525(2) (2006). Second degree theft is a class C felony. RCW

9A.56.040(2).

8
 Jensen does not argue that any other period prior to his 2006 crimes, including 1991 to 1997,
constituted a wash out period for the 1984 second degree theft conviction.

                                                 8
No. 56878-1-II

       For sentencing purposes, the State carries the burden to prove a defendant’s criminal

history by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 9.94A.500(1); Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 909-10

(holding that the 2008 amendments to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 unconstitutionally

shifted the burden of proof to the defendant). Although “the preponderance of the evidence

standard is ‘not overly difficult to meet,’ the State must at least introduce ‘evidence of some kind

to support the alleged criminal history.’” Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 910 (quoting State v. Ford, 137

Wn.2d 472, 480, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)). Bare, unsupported assertions do not satisfy the State’s

burden to prove a prior conviction. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 910.

       A certified copy of the judgment is the best evidence of a prior conviction; however, the

State may provide other comparable documents to prove prior convictions. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d

at 910. Alternatively, a defendant can “affirmatively acknowledge [their] criminal history and

thereby obviate the need for the State to produce evidence.” State v. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d 913,

920, 929, 205 P.3d 113 (2009) (disapproved of on other grounds).

       In Hunley, the State submitted “a written statement of prosecuting attorney (prosecutor

summary), summarizing its understanding of Hunley’s criminal history.” 175 Wn.2d at 905.

The summary “was an unsworn document listing six of Hunley’s alleged prior convictions, their

cause numbers, and the sentencing court.” Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 905. The State did not provide

a certified judgment and sentence or other comparable evidence. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 913.

Instead, Hunley’s prior convictions “were established solely on the prosecutor’s summary

assertion of the offenses.” Hunley, 175 Wn.2d at 913. Our Supreme Court explained that “it

violates due process to base a criminal defendant’s sentence on the prosecutor’s bare assertions

or allegations of prior convictions. And it violates due process to treat the defendant’s failure to

                                                  9
No. 56878-1-II

object to such assertions or allegations as an acknowledgment of the criminal history.” Hunley,

175 Wn.2d at 915.

       In State v. Mendoza, the court focused its inquiry “on what is required for an

[affirmative] acknowledgement [of a defendant’s criminal history] to occur.” 165 Wn.2d at 920.

The State submitted a statement summarizing “the evidence at trial, a list asserting Mendoza’s

criminal history, the prosecutor’s calculation of Mendoza’s offender score and appropriate

sentencing range, and a sentencing recommendation.” Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 917. In

referencing Mendoza’s criminal history, the statement “listed the sentencing court and date of the

crime.” Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 917-18. The State argued that “the defendants stipulated to

their criminal history by either acknowledging the [prosecutor’s] Statement or recommending a

sentence in the range calculated by the prosecuting attorney.” Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 925. The

court rejected this argument and “emphasized the need for an affirmative acknowledgment by the

defendant of facts and information introduced for the purposes of sentencing.” Mendoza, 165

Wn.2d at 928. The court explained that neither a defendant’s “failure to object to a prosecutor’s

assertions of criminal history” nor a defendant’s “agreement with the ultimate sentencing

recommendation” constitute affirmative acknowledgment. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 928-29.

       Where an offender score is based on insufficient evidence, we must remand the case for

resentencing, allowing the State the opportunity to introduce evidence to establish the

defendant’s prior convictions. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 930.

       Here, the State did not meet its burden in proving Jensen’s criminal history by a

preponderance of the evidence, nor did Jensen affirmatively acknowledge his criminal history.

In the absence of Jensen’s void 1985 simple drug possession conviction, there appears to be at

                                                10
No. 56878-1-II

least one five-year gap between Jensen’s theft conviction and subsequent convictions. In

reviewing the record of Jensen’s 2021 resentencing hearing, it is not clear what evidence, if any,

the State provided to support Jensen’s alleged criminal history such that no other conviction used

for points washed.

       Furthermore, the record provided does not show that the State provided sufficient

evidence to support its 2006 sentencing memorandum. The sentencing memorandum lists

alleged misdemeanor convictions between 1988 and 1991 and it lists alleged felony convictions

from 1984 to 2002, with a large gap of no felonies between 1984 and 19979 (when removing the

void 1985 UPCS conviction). Even presuming the State’s recitation of Jensen’s criminal history

in its memorandum is correct, it appears that Jensen spent five years in the community, between

his second degree theft and current convictions, without committing any crime that subsequently

resulted in a conviction. While the memorandum mentioned that the felony convictions did not

wash due to “60+ misdemeanor convictions,” the memorandum did not list misdemeanor

convictions that covered every five-year period between his second degree theft and his current

convictions. CP at 163.

       Moreover, while Jensen filed an amended motion to resentence pursuant to Blake,

wherein his counsel declared, “Attached as ‘Appendix A’ is a true and correct copy of the

defendant’s Felony Judgment and Sentence, including Criminal History in this cause,” the

attachment was Jensen’s second amended felony judgment and sentence, which only listed the

9
 Although the State’s sentencing memorandum lists Jensen’s VNCO conviction as occurring in
1997, his May and August 2006 judgment and sentences list the date of sentence as August 1990,
and the date of crime as June 1997. Jensen’s 2009 judgment and sentence lists the date of
sentence as August 1997 and the date of the crime as June 1997. Jensen’s 2021 judgment and
sentence lists the date of sentence as August 1990.

                                                11
No. 56878-1-II

five felony convictions from 1984 to 2002 and his community custody status at the time of the

current offenses. CP at 67. It is clear that Jensen does not argue that he was never convicted of

second degree theft, instead Jensen argues that the State failed to prove that Jensen’s second

degree theft did not wash.

       We conclude that Jensen proposing a sentence within the standard range for his offender

score of 6 points does not amount to affirmative acknowledgement. There is no evidence that

Jensen was asked to affirmatively acknowledge his criminal history nor did Jensen take any

affirmative action concerning the facts and information of his criminal history. Jensen did not

list out what constituted the points in the offender score calculation other than to note that the

UPCS conviction was void. Additionally, there is no indication in the record provided that the

court or parties considered the possibility of the second degree theft conviction washing out at

Jensen’s Blake resentencing. Just as a defendant is not “deemed to have affirmatively

acknowledged the prosecutor’s asserted criminal history based on [their] agreement with the

ultimate sentencing recommendation,” Jensen is not deemed to have affirmatively acknowledged

his alleged criminal history by merely proposing a sentence within the standard ranges for the

offender scores used at the resentencing. Mendoza, 165 Wn.2d at 928-29.

       Accordingly, the State failed to meet its burden in proving Jensen’s criminal history so as

to preclude his 1984 theft conviction from washing out. Thus, remand for determination of

Jensen’s offender score is necessary.

                                                 12
No. 56878-1-II

                         STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

       In Jensen’s SAG, Jensen argues that (1) the sentencing court improperly imposed

$30,000 restitution beyond the time limit to set restitution and without determining the actual

amount of the victim’s loss; (2) the sentencing court’s May 2006 judgment and sentence

improperly imposed discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs); (3) his August 2006

amended judgment and sentence erroneously includes an additional 24 months of confinement;

(4) the State erred in its recommendation that Jensen’s two deadly weapon enhancements run

consecutively and that such error influenced Jensen’s 2021 amended judgment and sentence; (5)

he did not receive 40-days’ credit for time served pending his trial; (6) his appellate counsel and

the State filed frivolous briefing that should be stricken; and (7) appellate counsel was ineffective

in presenting Jensen’s claims for review. We reject or decline to consider the issues raised in

Jensen’s SAG.

1.     Restitution

       Jensen argues that the sentencing court improperly imposed $30,000 restitution. Jensen

contends that the sentencing court erred by: (1) imposing the restitution beyond the 180-day time

limit to set restitution and (2) failing to determine the actual amount of the victim’s loss. Jensen

further argues that during the April 10, 2009 resentencing, the State submitted, and the

sentencing court adopted, an amended judgment and sentence that improperly imposed “interest

[on] the $30,000 [restitution amount] over three years after the sentencing judge entered the

order without interest applying to any (LFO’s).”10 SAG (Dec. 30, 2022) (1 SAG) at 4.

10
  Imbedded in Jensen’s argument is a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Jensen appears to
argue that the State introduced false statements during resentencing that impacted his judgment
and sentence. This argument relies on facts outside the record.

                                                 13
No. 56878-1-II

       Jensen’s argument relies on facts outside the record. The record before us does not

include the report of proceedings for either Jensen’s April 2009 resentencing or his restitution

hearing. We do not address claims based on facts outside the record on direct appeal. State v.

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 335, 338, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Accordingly, we decline to

consider this claim.

2.     Discretionary Fees

       Jensen argues that the sentencing court’s May 2006 judgment and sentence imposed

“discretionary Legal Financial Obligations . . . without statutory authority . . . [and] without first

determining his financial status, homelessness, and indigency and ability to pay.” 1 SAG at 18.

Jensen contends that “the assessments should be reversed . . . and sums paid/received todate [sic]

returned to [him] which were taken above the principle owed for [the] Victim Assessment of

$500.” 1 SAG at 18.

       Jensen’s argument relies on facts outside the record. Under former RCW 10.01.160,11

“the court shall not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to

pay them.” When “determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take

account of the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of

costs will impose.” RCW 10.01.160(3) (2006). The record before us does not include a

transcript of Jensen’s prior sentencings when the legal financial obligations were initially

imposed. Without such records it is not possible to determine what inquiry, if any, the

11
  Jensen appears to argue that the sentencing court should have engaged in an individualized
inquiry in imposing his LFOs. State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 839, 344 P.3d 680 (2015)
(holding that “RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the record to reflect that the sentencing judge make an
individualized inquiry into the defendant’s current and future ability to pay before the court
imposes LFOs”).

                                                  14
No. 56878-1-II

sentencing court engaged in when imposing Jensen’s LFOs. Accordingly, because Jensen’s

claim relies on facts outside the record, we decline to consider the claim. RAP 10.10 (a), (c);

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335, 338. This ruling does not prevent a sentencing court from

considering this issue upon remand.

3.     Sentencing Error—August 2006 Amended Judgment and Sentence

       Jensen argues that his August 2006 amended judgment and sentence erroneously includes

an additional 24 months of confinement. Jensen contends that the sentencing court imposed the

24 months “based on false information by the [S]tate that a firearm was used” in the commission

of Jensen’s offense. 1 SAG at 37. Relatedly, it appears that Jensen is arguing that statements

made regarding the enhancement being a firearm biased the judge such that it impacted his

original sentence length. Jensen further argues that “in relation to Counts I and II even the

existence of a pocket knife is missing” rendering his deadly weapon sentence enhancement void.

1 SAG at 37.

       The issue of Jensen’s 2006 amended judgment and sentence is outside the scope of our

review. Jensen’s 2006 judgment and sentence has since been amended and is no longer the

controlling judgment and sentence. Furthermore, Jensen’s 2021 judgment and sentence indicates

that his sentence enhancements were based on Jensen’s use of “a deadly weapon other than a

firearm.” CP at 125 (emphasis added). Moreover, the record shows that the jury found by

special verdict form that Jensen committed each count armed with a deadly weapon. The record

on review does not provide any evidence for this court to determine whether a pocket knife

existed to support the deadly weapon enhancements, nor would such an inquiry be within the

scope of this review.

                                                15
No. 56878-1-II

       Similarly, Jensen’s argument concerning the State’s statements during his original

judgment and sentence relies on facts outside our record and is beyond the scope of our review.

       Accordingly, we decline to consider this claim.

4.     Sentencing Error—April 2009 & November 2021

       Jensen argues that “the sentence imposed on April 10, 2009, was improperly entered as

being 279 months.” 1 SAG at 39. Jensen argues that the State erred in its recommendation that

Jensen’s two deadly weapon enhancements run consecutively. Jensen further contends that the

State’s recommendation resulted in an additional 24 months being added to his sentence. Jensen

contends that the sentencing court miscalculated his sentence at the November 2021 sentencing

hearing by relying on the sentence imposed in April 2009.

       We address Jensen’s November 2021 sentence above. Furthermore, Jensen’s arguments

concerning his April 2009 resentencing rely on facts outside the current record. Accordingly, we

decline to address this issue. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335, 338.

5.     Time Served

       Jensen argues that he did not receive 40-days’ credit for time served pending his trial.

The record before us does not contain Jensen’s Incarceration Time Credit Form or other evidence

concerning how Jensen’s time served was calculated. Accordingly, this issue depends on facts

outside the current record and we decline to address it. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335, 338.

6.     Frivolous and Erroneous Briefing

       Jensen argues that both his counsel and the State filed “frivolous and erroneous briefs

misrepresenting the facts of the appeal now before this court.” 2 SAG (Dec. 30, 2022) at 4.

Jensen contends that briefing filed by defense counsel and the State “must be stricken from the

                                                16
No. 56878-1-II

record in order to preser[ve] [Jensen’s] right to appeal.” 2 SAG at 1. Jensen further requests that

he be reimbursed for the costs of production and service and that this court impose sanctions on

defense counsel and the State.

       An appeal is frivolous where “considering the action in its entirety, it cannot be supported

by any rational argument based in fact or law.” Dave Johnson Ins. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758,

785, 275 P.3d 339 (2012). An appeal may also be frivolous where the issues presented “are so

devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage of Healy, 35

Wn. App. 402, 406, 667 P.2d 114 (1983).

       Under RAP 14.3(a), only “statutory attorney fees and the reasonable expenses actually

incurred by a party for the [specific] items which were reasonably necessary for review may be

awarded to a party as costs.”

       Here, Jensen’s appellate counsel and the State do not raise issues devoid of merit.

Furthermore, in reviewing the action in its entirety, we do not find that law or fact cannot support

counsels’ arguments.

       In addressing Jensen’s request for costs of production and service, it is not clear to us that

Jensen’s expenses were reasonably necessary for review. Although Jensen submitted a cost bill

it is not clear which documents Jensen requested and whether the documents were appropriately

before this court as part of the record on review.

       Accordingly, we decline to impose sanctions, strike counsel’s briefing, or reimburse

Jensen’s costs.

                                                 17
No. 56878-1-II

7.     Supplemental Reply: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

       Jensen argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective. Jensen appears to argue that

appellate counsel failed to raise the arguments that Jensen wanted presented on appeal. Jensen

further contends that he provided appellate counsel with exculpatory evidence and that appellate

counsel disregarded this evidence in filing Jensen’s appeal.

       To succeed on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, an appellant must

show that the issues not raised by appellate counsel had merit and that the appellant was

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issues. In re Pers. Restraint of Netherton,

177 Wn.2d 798, 801, 306 P.3d 918 (2013).

       Furthermore, in raising his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Jensen relies on facts

outside the record. Such claims must be resolved through a personal restraint petition.

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. Thus, we decline to consider Jensen’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.

       Accordingly, we conclude that none of the issues raised in Jensen’s SAG entitle Jensen

to relief. Thus, Jensen fails to establish that the legal issues identified in his SAG have merit and

that appellate counsel’s failure to raise these issues prejudiced Jensen.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We hold that the State did not meet its burden in proving Jensen’s criminal history, nor

did Jensen affirmatively acknowledge his criminal history. Accordingly, we remand the case for

resentencing, allowing the State the opportunity to introduce evidence to establish the

defendant’s prior convictions and for the court to determine Jensen’s offender scores.

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No. 56878-1-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be published in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                     Che, J.
 We concur:

 Glasgow, C.J.

 Veljacic, J.

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