Court Opinion

ID: 9845119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:15:28.349249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.213654
License: Public Domain

EAGLES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Our Courts have not previously applied the Pickrell presumption to a non-death case. However, consistent with the historically liberal interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act, I believe that the rationale supporting the Pickrell presumption is also applicable here. See Adams v. AVX Corporation, 349 N.C. 676, 680, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998) (citing Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968)). The majority notes that the Pickrell Court considered the presumption fair in part because “[e]mployers may be in a better position than the family of the decedent to offer evidence on the circumstances of the death.” Pickrell, 332 N.C. at 370, 368 S.E.2d at 586. The majority, however, declines to adopt the presumption here reasoning that “[t]he same cannot be said *408for an employee who has survived his injury, even an employee who cannot remember the details of his accident.” I disagree.
The record indicates that the nature of plaintiffs injury prevented him from offering any relevant testimony as to the cause or circumstances surrounding his injury. The plaintiff had no recollection of the events leading up to and resulting in his injury. Plaintiff testified that “[a]ll I can say is one minute I was grading boards and then the next minute I was hearing my supervisor calling my name.” Plaintiff could not remember feeling ill, falling or striking his head. Dr. Lloyd Hitchings testified that “it was like a typical light switch. I’m minding my own business, doing my job and then wham — I wake up and there’s the ambulance looking at me.” This evidence shows that the nature of plaintiffs injury, like the deceased plaintiff, prevents him from offering testimony supporting his claim. Accordingly, I vote to apply the Pickrell presumption to factual situations like this one.
Though my research has not disclosed a case where our Courts have determined whether or not this presumption may be applied in a non-death context, I would hold that the plain language in Pickrell allows for application in non-death cases. In crafting this presumption, the Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption or inference will be indulged in that injury or death arose out of employment where the employee is found injured at the place where his duty may have required him to be, or where the employee is found dead under circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and space limits of the employment. . . . Such presumptions are rebuttable and they disappear on the introduction of evidence to the contrary.
Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 367, 368 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1988) (quoting 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 513 (1958) (emphasis added)). By using this language, the Supreme Court clearly indicates that there are situations other than death cases where a presumption would be appropriate. I believe that the facts here present this type of occasion. Accordingly, I would apply Pickrell to plaintiffs claim.
The majority also holds that plaintiffs claim would fail even with the benefit of the Pickrell presumption. According to the majority, the defendants offered evidence that the plaintiff fell due to a seizure or a syncope. Further, the majority holds that the “question of *409whether plaintiff struck the control console as he fell has no bearing on the issue of the compensability of plaintiffs injury.” Again, I disagree.
Our Courts have consistently held that “the effects of such a fall are compensable if the employment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous effects of a fall, such as on a height, near machinery or sharp corners or in a moving vehicle.” Allred v. Allred-Gardner, Inc., 253 N.C. 554, 557, 117 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1960) (emphasis added). Notably, the majority concedes that there was sufficient evidence for the Commission to find that plaintiff had hit his head on the. control console and the Commission made findings to that effect. Findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission “are conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, even though there be evidence that would support findings to the contrary.” Russos v. Wheaton Indus., 145 N.C. App. 164, 166, 551 S.E.2d 456, 458 (2001) (citation omitted). In its discussion, the majority seems to hold that the plaintiffs injury may be compensable only if the plaintiff fell due to striking his head on the control console. However, our case law shows that so long as the employment places the employee “in a position increasing the dangerous effects of a fall,” the injury is com-pensable. Allred, 253 N.C. at 557, 117 S.E.2d at 479. Here, the employee was required to sit on a stool near the conveyor line with the control console behind him. There was competent evidence to show that plaintiff fell and hit his head on that console. Therefore, plaintiffs employment here exposed him to increased dangers from a potential fall.
For these reasons I would affirm the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission.