Court Opinion

ID: 9846570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:43:49.3632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:38.970776
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although the majority recognizes that the governing statute requires the claim of lien to specify the date the claim became due (as well as the amount of the claim), the majority nevertheless finds that substantial compliance with this provision is all that is necessary to render the lien enforceable. With this result I cannot agree.
OCGA § 44-14-361.1 provides in pertinent part as follows: “To make good the liens specified in paragraphs (1) through (8) of subsection (a) of Code Section 41-14-361, they must be created and declared in accordance with the following provisions, and on failure of any of them the lien shall be not be effective or enforceable. . . .” Subsection (a) (2) of that section requires that the claim of lien specify both the amount of the claim and the date the claim became due. As I read the statute there can be but one result — if the materialman or mechanic fails to specify the date the claim became due, (or fails to follow any of the statutory mandates for creating and declaring liens of this type), the lien is unenforceable. Consequently, I disagree that a materialman seeking the protection afforded by OCGA § 44-14-361 need only substantially comply with that section by stating when the services or materials were furnished.
The majority cites the case of J. H. Morris Bldg. Supplies v. Brown, 245 Ga. 178 (264 SE2d 9) (1980) in support of its conclusion. In that case, the Georgia Supreme Court, construing the predecessor to OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (Ga. Code Ann. § 67-2002), held that “the lien is rendered ineffective against the property owner only in the event *684that there is not a substantial compliance by the party claiming the lien with his contract; or that the claim of lien is not filed for record within three months after the completion of the work or furnishing of material; or that the action for recovery of the amount of claim of lien is not commenced within 12 months from the time the claim became due. The failure to specify in the claim of lien the amount claimed due and the date the claim became due does ‘result in such lien not constituting notice for any purpose,’ but this does not render the lien ineffective.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 178-179. Morris was decided in 1980. In 1983 the provisions of the Code relating to the filing of materialmen’s and mechanics’ liens were amended. At that time the legislature deleted the language relied on by the court in Morris concerning the failure of a claim of lien which omits the amount of the claim or the date the claim became due to constitute notice for any purpose. Ga. L. 1983, p. 1450, § 1. Consequently, I believe the holding in Morris is inapplicable to cases involving claims of liens filed after the 1983 amendment. OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) as presently drafted clearly provides that those liens specified in OCGA § 44-14-361 “must be created and declared in accordance with the . . . provisions [of 44-14-361.1], and on failure of any of them the lien shall not be effective or enforceable.” “The lien statutes are strictly construed and strict compliance with them is required. [Cit.]” Roberts v. Porter, Davis &c., 193 Ga. App. 898, 902 (389 SE2d 361) (1989). Thus I would uphold the grant of summary judgment to defendant Whaley inasmuch as I believe the claim of lien in this case is ineffective and unenforceable because it does not comply with the requirements of OCGA § 44-14-361.1.
Decided November 21, 1990.
Stein & Cauthen, Robert H. Cauthen, for appellant.
Dickey, Whelchel, Brown & Readdick, J. Thomas Whelchel, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke joins in this dissent.