Court Opinion

ID: 9756120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:08:37.335553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:12.604420
License: Public Domain

VOROS, Judge
(concurring in part and concurring in the result in part):
4 46 I concur in parts I and II of the lead opinion, but I concur only in result as to parts III, IV, and V of that opinion. Because Judge Orme concurs in part A of this opinion, it-not the lead opinion-expresses the rationale of the court as to the matters it addresses.
A.
147 On appeal, Iacono contends that but for Hicken's negligence, it was reason*131ably likely that Iacono would have prevailed on summary judgment in the Trust Case. Therefore, this court should limit its analysis to whether she has demonstrated that she would, under a correct view of the law, have prevailed on summary judgment. We need not consider, as the lead opinion does at paragraph 38, whether Iacono ultimately would have succeeded "in the Trust case as a whole" had summary judgment been denied.
$48 Second, because the only question of causation properly before us is whether, but for Hicken's negligence, Iacono would have prevailed on summary judgment, causation here presents a question of law. "[P Jroximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of law when a determination of the facts falls on either of two opposite ends of a factual continuum." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). Moreover, a malpractice plaintiff is not entitled to have a jury decide a legal question that only the judge could have decided in the underlying decision. See id. at 440. Summary judgment is appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, whether certain legal theories would have entitled Iacono to summary judgment in the Trust Case is a question of law. See 4 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 36:15, at 1898 (2011 ed.) ("[If causation depends on a legal ruling, the issue usually presents a question of law.").
149 In this respect, determining legal malpractice in the context of a summary judgment motion is akin to determining legal malpractice in the context of an appeal. And "the vast majority of courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action presents a question of law for the court and not a question of fact for a jury." Governmental Interinsurance Exch. v. Judge, 221 Ill.2d 195, 302 Ill.Dec. 746, 850 N.E.2d 183, 194 (2006) (collecting cases). By analogy, in a legal malpractice action claiming that, but for the lawyer's negligence, the client would have prevailed on summary judgment in the underlying action, the issue of causation is a question of law for the court.
" 50 Third, because causation is a question of law, expert testimony is superfluous. Deciding questions of law is the role of the judge, not a witness, even-as in this case-a highly qualified legal specialist, To determine what the law requires when applied to an uncontested set of facts, the parties need only brief and argue the matter to the court. Accordingly, we reject out of hand Iacono's contention that the district court erred in declining to adopt the opinions of her expert witness or in examining for itself the judicial opinions on which that expert relied. Cf. Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 841, 844-45 (Utah 1996) (affirming a legal malpractice decision without commenting on the appropriateness of the trial court's viewing expert testimony "in an advisory capacity" and reviewing the statutory and case law that formed the basis of the experts' testimony).
B.
51 Finally, the lead opinion affirms the court's finding that causation cannot be established because the state of the law was uncertain. It also declines to determine whether the trust was amendable. I do not believe the question of causation can be resolved without determining "what a reasonable judge should have done in the underlying case," see Harline, 912 P.2d at 440; that is, whether a reasonable judge should have granted Iacono's properly researched and framed summary judgment motion. Presented with uncontested facts and a claim that Iacono was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Trust Case court could not have denied Iacono's motion on the ground that the law was unclear. It would have had to decide the question of law. See id. at 440 {explaining that, as a legal malpractice case is a " 'trial-within-a-trial,'" "'[the objective is to establish what the result [of the underlying litigation] should have been ....'" (second alteration in original) (quoting 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 27.7, at 641-42 (3d ed. 1989))). Consequently, I do not believe the Malpractice Case court, or this court, can determine the issue of causation without deciding whether the Trust was amendable under *132-138West v. West (In re Estate of West), 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997), Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), and Kline ex rel. Kline v. Utah Department of Health, 776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Nevertheless, like the lead opinion, I would not decide whether as a matter of law the Trust was amendable. In fact, I would not decide the issue of causation. I would instead affirm on the alternative ground that Hicken did not breach the standard of care.
{ 52 If the plaintiff in a legal malpractice case "successfully shows that his attorney erred under applicable law, it is well recognized that the attorney may still avoid liability by showing that his error was the result of an uncertain, unsettled, or debatable state of the applicable law." Watkiss & Saperstein, 931 P.2d at 846. See generally 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice §§ 19:1, 19:4, 19:6, 19:8-10, 19:17 (ed. 2011). Moreover, "[mlJost courts hold that the issues of whether the lawyer erred and whether the error was caused by vagaries in the law raise questions of law to be decided by the court." Watkiss & Saperstein, 981 P.2d at 846. Although more receptive than my colleagues to the view that West, Clayton, and Kline allowed Father to amend the Trust, I do regard the question as "debatable." See id. I would thus affirm the judgment of the district court on the alternative ground that, under Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840 (Utah 1996), Hicken did not breach the standard of care by failing to construct and advance a legal argument based on these three cases. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158 (holding that an appellate court may affirm on any legal ground apparent on the record).1

. Our supreme court has stated that "[to qualify for immunity from liability for the consequences of an erroneous legal interpretation of unsettled and uncertain law, most courts demand that lawyers perform the research and investigation necessary to make an informed judgment." Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 851 (Utah 1996). And here, the district court found that Hicken's research fell below the standard of care. Nevertheless, I cannot see how Hicken could be liable for failing to find uncertain case law if, having found it, he would not be liable for failing to argue it. "If the law truly is debatable or unsettled, research will not necessarily lead an attorney to a correct conclusion." 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 19:6, at 1239 (ed. 2011).