Court Opinion

ID: 9906567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 16:01:39.682304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:13.073309
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10538   Document: 23-1    Date Filed: 12/04/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-10538
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        PAIGE LAINE KHYEL TAYLOR,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus

        SHERIFF, PINELLAS COUNTY FL,
        in his oﬃcial capacity,

                                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                         ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10538

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-00687-CEH-MRM
                             ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                This case arose from events that followed a traffic stop by
        Deputy Wagner of a vehicle in which Paige Taylor occupied the
        passenger seat. Tayler was arrested at the scene and charged with
        battery on an officer and resisting an officer during the arrest. After
        both charges against Taylor were dropped, Taylor brought suit, al-
        leging a § 1983 excessive force claim against Deputy Wagner, a §
        1983 false arrest claim against Wagner, and also alleging a state law
        false arrest claim against Wagner as well as a state law battery claim
        against Wagner. Taylor also alleged a state law claim that Sheriff
        Gualtieri (“the Sheriff”) is vicariously liable for Wagner’s false ar-
        rest of Taylor, as well as a state law claim that the Sheriff is vicari-
        ously liable for Wagner’s battery (excessive force) against Taylor.
        This appeal requires discussion only of Taylor’s state law claims.
        However, the sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
        erred in denying the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment based
        on sovereign immunity with respect to Taylor’s claim for false ar-
        rest based on battery on an officer.
               The district court recognized that Wagner had arrested Tay-
        lor on two grounds: his perception that she had pushed him (i.e.
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        23-10538                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        battery on an officer), and for her alleged resistance while he was
        arresting her (i.e. resisting an officer). After development of the
        summary judgment record, the district court addressed the state
        law claims and granted, in part, and denied in part, the Sheriff’s
        motion for summary judgment based on Florida state law sover-
        eign immunity. The district court denied the Sheriff’s summary
        judgment motion with respect to Taylor’s claim for false arrest
        based on battery on a law enforcement officer, holding that a rea-
        sonable jury could believe Deputy Wagner’s testimony that he per-
        ceived that Taylor pushed him when she grabbed the license that
        Wagner was returning to her, thus creating a genuine issue of fact
        for the jury as to whether Wagner could have reasonably perceived
        that Taylor had committed a battery on an officer and creating ar-
        guable probable cause to arrest her. 1 However, the district court
        granted the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment as to Taylor’s
        claim that the Sheriff was vicariously liable for Wagner’s excessive
        force (i.e. battery) against Taylor, thus holding that the Sheriff was
        entitled to sovereign immunity because the videos demonstrated
        conclusively that Wagner had acted in bad faith in using excessive
        force. Similarly, with respect to Taylor’s claim that the Sheriff was
        vicariously liable for Wagner’s false arrest based on resisting an of-
        ficer, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

        1 The district court’s denial of the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment with

        respect to Taylor’s claim for false arrest based on battery on an officer consti-
        tuted a denial of the Sheriff’s sovereign immunity defense. Thus, the Sheriff
        is entitled to immediate review of this denial, and we have appellate jurisdic-
        tion. Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10538

        Sheriff because the videos demonstrated conclusively that Taylor
        offered no resistance to arrest. Thus, the Sheriff enjoyed sovereign
        immunity and was not vicariously liable for Wagner’s bad faith ar-
        rest of Taylor on the basis of Taylor’s non-existent resistance to ar-
        rest.

                                  I. DISCUSSION
        A. Florida Law of Sovereign Immunity
                To understand this appeal, it is necessary to understand Flor-
        ida’s law with respect to vicarious liability of a state agency (like
        the Sheriff here) for the tortious actions of an officer or employee
        (like Deputy Wagner here), and to understand, on the other hand,
        the dimensions of the state agency’s sovereign immunity. The
        Florida statute provides: “[T]he state, for itself and for its agencies
        or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for
        torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.” Fla. Stat. §
        768.28(1). Subsection (9)(a) of Fla. Stat. § 768.28 sets out when an
        officer of the state (like Wagner here) would be immune from per-
        sonal liability, and when not immune (i.e. personally liable); and
        when the state itself or its subdivisions (the Sheriff here) would be
        immune from liability for an officer’s or employee’s tort (like Wag-
        ner’s here), and when not immune (i.e. vicariously liable):
               An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any
               of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable in
               tort or named as a party defendant in any action for
               any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act,
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        23-10538               Opinion of the Court                         5

              event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his
              employment or function, unless such officer, em-
              ployee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious
              purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
              disregard of human rights, safety, or property. How-
              ever, such officer, employee, or agent shall be consid-
              ered an adverse witness in a tort action for any injury
              or damage suffered as a result of any act, event, or
              omission of action in the scope of her or his employ-
              ment or function. The exclusive remedy for injury or
              damage suffered as a result of an act, event, or omis-
              sion of an officer, employee, or agent of the state or
              any of its subdivisions or constitutional officers is by
              action against the governmental entity, or the head of
              such entity in her or his official capacity, or the con-
              stitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or
              agent is an employee, unless such act or omission was
              committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or
              in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
              of human rights, safety, or property. The state or its
              subdivisions are not liable in tort for the acts or omis-
              sions of an officer, employee, or agent committed
              while acting outside the course and scope of her or
              his employment or committed in bad faith or with
              malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton
              and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or prop-
              erty.
        Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In other words, an officer (like Wagner
        here) is immune from personal liability for his torts if he is acting
        within the scope of his employment, unless he acted in bad faith or
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10538

        with malicious purpose or with wanton and willful disregard of hu-
        man rights, safety, or property; and in such circumstances, the em-
        ploying agency (the Sheriff here) “alone remain[s] vicariously liable
        up to the limits provided by statute.” McGhee v. Volusia Cnty., 679
        So. 2d 729, 733 (Fla. 1996). On the other hand, if an officer (like
        Wagner here) committed the tort while acting outside the scope of
        his employment or if he acted in bad faith or with malicious pur-
        pose or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety,
        or property, then the officer (Wagner here) is personally liable, but
        the employing agency (the Sheriff here) enjoys sovereign immun-
        ity. Id. In other words, “[i]n any given situation either the agency
        can be held liable under Florida law, or the employee, but not
        both.” Id. As relevant to this appeal, the Florida statute provides
        that Sheriff Gualtieri shall not be vicariously liable for the tortious
        acts of Deputy Wagner (i.e. shall enjoy sovereign immunity) if
        Wagner was acting outside the course and scope of his employ-
        ment or if he committed the tort in bad faith or with malicious pur-
        pose or with wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety,
        or property. There is no dispute here that Wagner was acting
        within the scope of his employment. Thus, the issue on appeal—
        stated above as being whether the district court erred in denying
        the Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment based on sovereign im-
        munity with respect to Taylor’s claim for false arrest based on bat-
        tery on an officer—resolves into the issue of whether the summary
        judgment evidence is such that a reasonable jury would be re-
        quired, as a matter of law, to find that Wagner, in arresting Taylor
        on the basis of battery on an officer, acted in bad faith or with
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        23-10538                Opinion of the Court                           7

        malicious purpose or with wanton and willful disregard of human
        rights, safety, or property.
                In addressing the issue on appeal, the Sheriff argues that the
        district court improperly credited Wagner’s testimony that he per-
        ceived that Taylor pushed him when the videos showed that Tay-
        lor did not push or shove Wagner. He also argues that the district
        court erred in making inconsistent findings. Finally, he argues that
        the district court failed to recognize that the videos and Wagner’s
        post-arrest statements (i.e. continuing to insist that Taylor had
        pushed him) demonstrated that Wagner’s claim that Taylor
        pushed him was false, was a coverup, and was evidence of bad faith
        in arresting Taylor for battery on an officer. We address each ar-
        gument in turn.
        B. Improper Crediting of Wagner’s Testimony
               Sheriff Gualtieri argues that the district court erred when it
        found that Taylor did not shove Wagner but nonetheless denied
        summary judgment on the battery on an officer part of the false
        arrest claim because Wagner testified that he perceived that Taylor
        pushed or shoved him. Gualtieri argues that Wagner’s version of
        the facts should not be credited because he is not party to the mo-
        tion for summary judgment; rather, the version put forth by Taylor
        that she never pushed him should be credited because she is the
        non-moving party, or the videos, which clearly show she did not
        push him, should control.
               Florida courts have indicated that the determination of bad
        faith, with malice, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
        disregard of the victim’s rights, safety, and property involves a sub-
        jective inquiry into the officer’s state of mind. Butler v. Gualtieri, 41
        F.4th 1329, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2022). In that case, this court (in
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 23-10538

        another case in which Sheriff Gualtieri was a party), discussed the
        Florida courts’ interpretation of the meaning of “bad faith,” “with
        malicious purpose,” and “wanton and willful disregard of human
        rights [or] safety.” The term “bad faith” has been equated with the
        actual malice standard. Id. at 1336. The term “malicious purpose”
        has been interpreted as meaning that the conduct was committed
        with “ill will, hatred, spite, [or] an evil intent.” Id. The term “wan-
        ton and willful” has been interpreted as much more reprehensible
        and unacceptable than mere intentional conduct. Id. And “wan-
        ton” has been defined as acting with a conscious and intentional
        indifference to consequences with knowledge that damage is likely
        to be done, while “willful” is defined as acting intentionally, know-
        ingly, and purposefully. Id. at 1336-37. Thus it is clear that the
        officer’s subjective intent is key in determining the availability of
        sovereign immunity.
               Here, Wagner’s perception of a push or shove, and his reac-
        tion to it, are proper lines of inquiry because they inform Wagner’s
        subjective intent. Bulter, 41 F.4th at 1339. Neither the videos nor
        Taylor’s recitation of what actually happened answer the question
        of what Wagner thought he felt. Therefore, the district court did
        not err when it held that summary judgment should be denied on
        the sovereign immunity question on this part of the false arrest
        claim because a reasonable jury could believe Wagner’s testimony
        that he perceived a push or shove.

        C. Inconsistent Factual Findings
               Next, Sheriff Gualtieri argues that the district court’s find-
        ings are inconsistent when it held that he was entitled to sovereign
        immunity with respect to Taylor’s battery claim and her false arrest
        claim for resisting an officer with violence but not her false arrest
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        23-10538               Opinion of the Court                          9

        claim based on battery of a law enforcement officer. Where it
        found that sovereign immunity was appropriate, the court stated
        that no reasonable jury could find that Wagner did not act in bad
        faith, with malice, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
        disregard of Taylor’s rights, safety, and property. In other words,
        the district court held that the summary judgment evidence (the
        videos in particular) was such that a reasonable jury would be re-
        quired, as a matter of law, to find that Wagner acted in bad faith,
        with malice, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
        of Taylor’s rights or safety. In its order rejecting Gualtieri’s motion
        for reconsideration, the court rejected Wagner’s belief that Taylor
        resisted his efforts to handcuff her and found that no jury could
        believe him. However, with respect to Taylor’s claim based on
        battery on an officer, the court stated that a reasonable jury could
        believe that Wagner thought Taylor had pushed or shoved him.
               Regarding the different treatments accorded to Wagner’s
        subjective, but erroneous, beliefs that Taylor pushed him and that
        she resisted his efforts to handcuff her, the district court explained
        that the videos conclusively showed that Taylor did not resist Wag-
        ner at any time during his use of force. Further, she voluntarily
        cooperated once she was taken to the ground. Despite the videos
        showing this, Wagner testified that he ordered Taylor “to the front
        of the vehicle multiple times as she continued to try and forcibly
        pull away from [his] grip” and that she “refused to comply with
        multiple orders to get to the ground.” But the videos showed that
        after she took her drivers’ license back from Wagner and began to
        walk away, Wagner grabbed her from behind with both arms and
        threw her forcefully into the back of the pickup truck. He then
        held her arms behind her back, spun her around, and threw her
        face first onto the parking lot pavement. With Taylor on the
        ground, Wagner placed his knee on her back and smashed her face
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-10538

        into the pavement multiple times, even after she gave her hands
        for him to handcuff.
               By contrast, the interaction that the district court found to
        be one where Wagner may succeed in persuading a jury that he
        thought—we now know erroneously--he had been pushed or
        shoved was a short interaction, involving Taylor walking over to
        Wagner, grabbing her drivers’ license, and turning quickly to walk
        away. While we use a subjective measure to determine whether
        an action was done in bad faith, with malice, or in a manner exhib-
        iting wanton and willful disregard of the victim’s rights, safety, and
        property, the district court could properly determine from the clear
        and extended view on the video that there was no chance that
        Wagner could persuade a jury that Taylor resisted arrest. How-
        ever, given the brevity of the initial interaction, he might be able to
        persuade a jury that he thought he had been pushed or shoved.
        This is not inconsistent. 2

        D. Entitlement to Sovereign Immunity: The Videos and Wagner’s Post-
        Arrest Statements
              Finally, Sheriff Gualtieri argues that he is entitled to sover-
        eign immunity based on the facts in this case. In particular, he

        2 Although the Sheriff’s reply brief argues that the district court erroneously

        split the false arrest claim, we conclude that that argument was not fairly
        raised in the Sheriff’s initial brief on appeal. Although that initial brief men-
        tioned that the district court split the false arrest claim without providing any
        case law precedent, there was no argument or citation of authority to support
        the Sheriff’s implication that this was somehow error. We cannot conclude
        that the Sheriff fairly raised the argument in his initial brief on appeal. Timson
        v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
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        23-10538               Opinion of the Court                         11

        argues that the videos clearly show that Taylor did not push or
        shove Wagner. The Sheriff also points to Wagner’s post-arrest
        statements about receiving a push that, he argues, demonstrate
        Wagner’s bad faith or malice.
                While Sheriff Gualtieri argues that Wagner’s post-arrest
        statements that he received a push from Taylor evince an effort to
        conceal his false arrest, they could also be interpreted as a steadfast
        belief in the veracity of his statement. Indeed, his continued testi-
        mony in light of the videos could indicate that he sincerely believed
        he had been pushed or shoved. This is a question for the jury and
        thus the district court did not err. And we cannot disagree with the
        district court that the videos do not conclusively demonstrate that
        a reasonable jury might not believe Wagner’s testimony that he felt
        something on his chest and perceived that he had been touched in
        a manner that he could have perceived as a battery. In other words,
        the brief initial interaction on the video is not clear enough to elim-
        inate that possibility that a reasonable jury might believe Wagner’s
        testimony and believe that Wagner—in perceiving that he had
        been touched in a manner that could be perceived as battery—
        acted in the absence of bad faith, malicious purpose or wanton and
        willful disregard for Taylor’s rights or safety.
               For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
        is
        AFFIRMED.