Court Opinion

ID: 9840340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-16 06:08:39.261248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.755780
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed September 14, 2023

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00147-CV
                                  __________

    ESTELLA G. BARRIENTOS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
  INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DONATO LUJAN BARRIENTOS; VIVIAN BARRIENTOS; EVA
  BARRIENTOS; AND EUSEBIO BARRIENTOS, Appellants
                                       V.
                 MODESTO L. BARRIENTOS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                            Ector County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 19,744-09

                                   OPINION
      This appeal presents a unique issue—whether an unsigned order setting a
hearing for a motion for summary judgment that, when filed and served, recites and
specifies a definitive date and time (1) that meets the twenty-one-day notice
requirement and (2) that a trial court will proceed to hear and consider the motion,
provides sufficient notice of the hearing date to the nonmovant.
      Appellee, Modesto L. Barrientos, originally filed suit against Estella G.
Barrientos, individually and as independent administratrix of the Estate of Donato
Lujan Barrientos, Vivian Barrientos, Eva Barrientos, and Antonio Barrientos, to
quiet title to certain property located in Ector County (the property); Modesto also
sought a declaration of the parties’ ownership interest in the property. Modesto
subsequently joined Appellant, Eusebio Barrientos, as a defendant to the suit. The
property was encumbered by a lis pendens that had been initiated during the
administration of Donato’s estate. Modesto filed a traditional and no-evidence
motion for summary judgment on his claims, which the trial court granted. Estella,
Vivian, Eva, and Eusebio (Appellants) challenge the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Modesto. We affirm.
                      I.   Factual and Procedural Background
      Donato and Modesto are brothers; they purchased the property on May 13,
1998, from Grey Wolf Drilling Company and a warranty deed was executed. Shortly
thereafter, Donato and Modesto began operating a scrap metal recycling business
(the business) on the property. Donato and Modesto have another brother, Eusebio.
Donato died in Ector County on March 31, 2009, and Estella was soon thereafter
appointed as the independent administratrix of Donato’s estate. As the independent
administratrix, Estella was granted the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the
estate, defend claims against the estate, pay debts owed by the estate, and sell or
dispose of any and all estate assets, which included both personal and real property.
      Estella filed a lis pendens on the property on May 13, 2009. During the
administration of Donato’s estate, issues arose regarding the appraisal and operation
of the business. On June 22, 2009, the trial court, sitting as a court in probate, signed
an order that (1) granted complete access and control of the business to Estella,
                                           2
(2) ordered Modesto to surrender the premises where the business was located and
to produce all records that pertained to the business, and (3) enjoined Modesto from
entering the premises where the business was located or in any way hindering the
operation of the business. The appraisal of the business was completed in November
2009.
        In 2012, Modesto reached out to Estella to address his ownership interest in
the business. Estella subsequently transferred the property to Modesto to settle his
interest in the business. The property transfer was executed by a general warranty
deed on April 30, 2012; however, the lis pendens from the estate remained on the
property after the transfer. In May 2019, Modesto sought to clear the cloud on the
title to the property and in turn submitted a written demand to Estella to release the
lien. Despite Modesto’s request, Estella did not remove the lien from the property.
        On July 10, 2019, Modesto filed suit to quiet title in the property and for a
declaratory judgment to declare that (1) he owned one hundred percent (100%) of
the fee simple interest in the property and (2) Estella and her and Donato’s
children—Vivian, Eva, and Antonio Barrientos—do not have a fee simple
ownership interest in the property. Estella answered and asserted that the business
was a joint venture that had been created by Donato, Modesto, and Eusebio, and that
Eusebio had purchased the property for use by the joint venture. As a result of
Estella’s assertions, Modesto filed an amended petition on April 17, 2020, and joined
Eusebio as a defendant.
        Two years later, on April 5, 2022, Modesto filed a traditional and no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. For his traditional grounds, Modesto contended that
he had conclusively established all the essential elements to prevail on his claim to
quiet title, namely that: (1) he possessed the entire ownership interest in the property;
(2) the lien created by lis pendens had not been removed; and (3) the lien continued
to cloud the title on the property. For his no-evidence grounds, Modesto contended
                                           3
that there was no evidence to establish any of Appellants’ affirmative defenses.
Additionally, Modesto requested that the trial court determine and declare that
(1) the notice of lis pendens was null and void, (2) Eusebio did not have an
ownership interest in the property, (3) the general warranty deed executed by Estella
on April 30, 2012, vested the remaining ownership interest (50%) in the property to
Modesto, and (4) he was entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees.
      Modesto’s motion for summary judgment was e-filed and contemporaneously
served on all parties to this dispute on April 5, 2022. Further, an unsigned order
setting and specifying a hearing date on Modesto’s motion accompanied the motion
when it was e-filed and served. The unsigned order recited and specified that the
hearing date for Modesto’s motion was set for April 28, 2022, twenty-three days
after the unsigned order and Modesto’s motion were e-filed and served. On April 8,
2022, the trial judge signed the Order Setting Hearing.
      Appellants filed their response to Modesto’s motion on April 27, 2022, one
day before the scheduled hearing. In their response, Appellants asserted that there
was sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding the
enforceability of the 2012 deed executed between Estella and Modesto, Eusebio’s
interest in the property, and the children’s interest in the property. Appellants also
filed a motion to participate in the hearing by video and/or telephonic means,
because “problems with [trial counsel’s] calendaring system” indicated that the
summary judgment hearing was to be a video hearing and Appellants’ trial counsel
had not arranged and could not travel to Ector County to attend the hearing in-person
because of “work commitments.”
      Modesto filed an objection to Appellants’ response because the response was
untimely—it was filed one day before the date of the summary judgment hearing.
One hour before the scheduled hearing was to commence, Appellants then filed a
“MOTION FOR FILING RESPONSE UNDER LEAVE OF THE COURT NUNC
                                          4
PRO TUNC” and requested that the trial court consider their response as part of the
summary judgment record. In this motion, Appellants claimed that their trial
counsel’s “calendar system did not work correctly and an error on the filing
deadlines was not detected until a later time.”
      At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court first considered Appellants’
motion for leave to file their late response. 1 Appellants’ trial counsel again stated
that there was a calendaring issue that caused her to discover “very late” Modesto’s
motion and the hearing date that were “so close to whenever [they] got the first
motion to be here.” However, Appellants did not present any evidence at the hearing
of the alleged calendaring issue, nor did they attach any evidence to support their
motion for leave to file the late response. Modesto’s trial counsel argued that
Appellants’ response was untimely and their motion for leave to file the late response
failed to establish good cause for the late filing or to include any evidence to support
their request.
      After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Appellants’
motion for leave to file the late response and stated, among other things, that
Appellants’ request did not provide adequate time for Modesto and his trial counsel
to review Appellants’ response before the April 28 hearing. The trial court also
noted that Appellants could have filed a motion for continuance and requested a
postponement of the hearing, but that they did not.
      The trial court then considered the merits of Modesto’s motion for summary
judgment.        The trial court granted Modesto’s no-evidence motion because
Appellants had produced no controverting evidence in a timely response. The trial
court, after considering the summary judgment evidence before it, also granted
Modesto’s traditional motion.

      1
       We have the benefit of a reporter’s record from the summary judgment hearing.
                                                 5
        In its judgment granting Modesto’s motion for traditional and no-evidence
summary judgment, the trial court stated that it did not consider Appellants’
untimely response or the evidence attached to it. The trial court further found,
declared, and ordered that (1) the notice of lis pendens dated April 13, 2009, was
invalid and of no force and effect, (2) the title to the property was quieted in favor
of Modesto, and (3) the deeds dated May 13, 1998, and April 30, 2012, constituted
a valid transfer of 100% of the ownership interest in the property to Modesto.
        Estella filed a motion for new trial contending that she was acting pro se at
the time that Modesto’s motion was filed and on the date of the scheduled hearing,
which, due to her unfamiliarity with the court system and the applicable rules,
prevented her from asserting a meritorious defense to Modesto’s claims. 2 The trial
court denied Estella’s motion. This appeal followed.
                                              II. Analysis
        Appellants have filed two briefs in this appeal. Estella’s brief raises a single
issue—that notice of the summary judgment hearing was insufficient. Vivian, Eva,
and Eusebio jointly filed a brief that raises three issues, that (1) notice of the
summary judgment hearing was insufficient, (2) the trial court erred when it granted
Modesto’s traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and (3) the
trial court erred when it declared and granted 100% of the ownership interest in the
property to Modesto.
        A. Notice of the Summary Judgment Hearing
        The sole issue raised by Estella and the first issue raised by Vivian, Eva, and
Eusebio are the same; therefore, we will address them together.

        2
         Although Estella is not pro se on appeal, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed
attorneys and require them to be familiar with and comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure.
Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Aaron v. Fisher, 645 S.W.3d 299,
312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.).
                                                     6
      Appellants collectively contend that notice of the summary judgment hearing
was insufficient because the trial court did not sign the order setting hearing until
April 8, 2022, twenty days before the summary judgment hearing was scheduled and
ultimately held. Modesto asserts that Appellants received actual notice on April 5,
2022, or at a minimum had constructive notice as of that date, that the hearing on
Modesto’s motion would proceed on April 28, 2022—the date recited and specified
in the e-filed and served unsigned order setting hearing.
             1. Applicable Law
      Notice is “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process.”
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The United
States Constitution’s Due Process Clause and the Texas constitution’s Due Course
of Law Clause require that adequate procedural due process be afforded to all parties
to a judgment, which includes notice of trial court proceedings. Mitchell v. MAP
Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 188–89 (Tex. 2022). Such notice must be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [all] interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. That opportunity “must be granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
When parties are not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, “the remedy for
a denial of due process is due process.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than,
901 S.W.2d 926, 933 (Tex. 1995).
      The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe guidelines to ensure that all
parties to the proceeding receive adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. A motion for summary judgment must be served on the opposing party at
least twenty-one days before the date and time that is specified for a hearing on the
motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). The purpose of Rule 166a’s notice provision is to
provide the nonmovant with an opportunity to respond to the motion within the
                                          7
deadline that the rule prescribes for a response. Id. (stating that the nonmovant must
file a response to a motion for summary judgment within seven days prior to
scheduled hearing); Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357,
359 (Tex. 1998) (“The [specified] hearing date determines the time for [filing a]
response to the motion [for summary judgment]; without notice of hearing, the
[nonmovant] cannot know when the response is due.”); Winn v. Martin
Homebuilders, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied)
(“The notice provisions of Rule 166a are intended to prevent [the] rendition of
summary judgment without the non-movant having full opportunity to respond on
the merits of the motion.”). Therefore, notice of a summary-judgment hearing must
inform the nonmovant of the exact date and time of the motion’s hearing or other
submission date. Martin, 989 S.W.2d at 359. A trial court errs when it grants
summary judgment if the nonmovant has not received proper notice of the hearing
to be held on the motion. Id.
               2. Discussion
      Before we discuss the merits of Appellants’ insufficient notice complaint, we
must first address whether Appellants have preserved this complaint for our review.
Modesto argues that Appellants did not raise this complaint in the trial court and
thus have failed to preserve it for appellate review. Conversely, Appellants contend
that their complaint is preserved for our review because Appellants’ trial counsel
advised the trial court at the summary judgment hearing that she had discovered the
timing of the hearing “very late” and “so close to whenever [they] got the first motion
to be here.”
      A nonmovant who complains of receiving less than twenty-one days’ notice
of a summary judgment hearing but also admits to knowing and being aware of the
scheduled hearing date before it actually occurs waives the defense of insufficient
notice if he fails to bring the complaint to the trial court’s attention at or before the
                                           8
scheduled hearing or submission date. Clarent Energy Servs. Inc. v. Icon Bank of
Tex., N.A., No. 01-18-00854-CV, 2019 WL 5792190, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Nguyen v. Short, How, Frels &
Heitz, P.C., 108 S.W.3d 558, 560 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied); May v.
Nacogdoches Mem’l Hosp., 61 S.W.3d 623, 626 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.).
Thus, to preserve error for a complaint regarding late or insufficient notice of a
summary judgment hearing, a nonmovant who receives notice that is claimed to be
untimely but is nonetheless sufficient to enable the nonmovant to attend the hearing
must move for a continuance or raise a late-notice complaint in writing. Clarent,
2019 WL 5792190, at *2. To hold otherwise would allow a party who participated
in the hearing to “lie behind the log” until after summary judgment is granted and
then raise the complaint of late notice for the first time in a post-judgment motion.
May, 61 S.W.3d at 626.
      Appellants filed the following with the trial court prior to their appearance at
the summary judgment hearing: (1) their untimely response to Modesto’s motion for
summary judgment; (2) a motion to appear and participate in the hearing by
video/telephonic means; and (3) a motion for leave to file their late response “nunc
pro tunc.” Despite these filings, Appellants did not request a postponement or file a
verified motion for continuance of the scheduled summary judgment hearing. Nor
did Appellants raise a late-notice complaint in any of these filings. Instead, the
motion to appear and participate by video/telephonic means and the motion for leave
to file nunc pro tunc only state that there were “problems” with Appellants’ trial
counsel’s calendaring system that resulted in Appellants “late” discovery of the
hearing date.
      Significantly, the explanation presented to the trial court is substantially
different than the argument that Appellants’ now advance on appeal—that notice of
the summary judgment hearing was received by them only twenty days before the
                                          9
hearing date that was specified and recited in the order setting hearing. Further,
Appellants’ untimely response does not address the issue of “late-notice,” nor does
it acknowledge in any way that the response itself was untimely. At the summary
judgment hearing, the trial court entertained argument from trial counsel concerning
Appellants’ motions. Appellants’ trial counsel again reiterated the “glitches” with
her calendaring system and stated that when the issue was discovered it was “very
late” and “so close to whenever [they] got the first motion to be here.”
      For a complaint to be properly preserved for appellate review, the complaining
party must present a specific, timely objection or motion to the trial court which
states the specific grounds for the desired ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).
Here, the complaint raised by Appellants in the trial court below concerned only a
calendaring discrepancy, not one of having received untimely or insufficient notice
of the hearing date that was specified and recited in the unsigned setting order.
Although we could properly conclude, based on the record before us, that Appellants
did not preserve their complaint of insufficient notice for our review, we nonetheless
believe that the issue raised by Appellants—whether the notice Appellants received
here was sufficient to apprise them of the specified and scheduled hearing date—
should be addressed.
      Rule 166a(c) requires that the motion and any supporting affidavits be filed
and served on the opposing party at least twenty-one days before the date and time
specified for the hearing on the motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Although
Rule 166a(c) prescribes no explicit requirement for when a summary judgment
movant must provide notice to the nonmovant of either the motion’s hearing or
submission date, Texas courts, including our court, have consistently held that the
twenty-one-day requirement also applies to the notice of hearing on the motion.
Gonzales v. Williams, No. 11-17-00130-CV, 2019 WL 2710046, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Eastland June 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Winn v. Martin Homebuilders,
                                         10
Inc., 153 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, pet. denied)); Chadderdon v.
Blaschke, 988 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)); see
also Lewis v. Blake, 876 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. 1994) (a party’s right under
Rule 166a(c) is to have the minimum notice of the hearing); Birdwell v. Texins
Credit Union, 843 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ)
(referring to a twenty-one-day requirement to be from the date of notice to the
hearing date); Brown v. Cap. Bank, N.A., 703 S.W.2d 231, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (the notice of hearing must be given at least
twenty-one days before the date the hearing is to be held).
      The situation that we confront here is whether an unsigned setting order that
recited and specified April 28, 2022 as the hearing date for Modesto’s motion—a
date that was twenty-three days after the motion and the unsigned order that
accompanied it were e-filed with the court and served on and received by
Appellants—is sufficient to meet the twenty-one-day notice of hearing requirement,
even though the order setting hearing on the motion was not signed by the trial court
until twenty days before the scheduled and specified hearing date. As such, may
only an order setting hearing that is signed by the trial court determine when the
twenty-one-day notice period commences? Stated differently, may the calculation
of the twenty-one-day notice period only be ascertained from the date that the trial
court signs the setting order?
      Appellants argue that because the order setting hearing was not signed by the
trial court until April 8, 2022, the signed order was effectively served on them that
day. Appellants further argue that, for purposes of notice of the hearing date, the
signed order controls. Appellants point to the county clerk’s file-stamp for the
assertion that the order setting hearing was not served on them until the date it was
signed—April 8, 2022. However, the certificate of service that accompanied the
unsigned order setting hearing confirms that the specified hearing date—April 28,
                                         11
2022—was recited in this order, which, along with Modesto’s motion, was e-filed
and served on Appellants on April 5, 2022.
      It is undisputed that the order setting hearing was not signed by the trial court
until April 8, 2022. Therefore, we must determine whether the unsigned order
setting hearing, which Appellants received on April 5, 2022, was sufficient to
convey notice to them that the hearing on Modesto’s motion would occur on
April 28, 2022. In West, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals considered a similar
issue—whether an unsigned notice of hearing which referred only to a “proposed”
date and time for the summary judgment hearing provided the appellant with
adequate notice of the hearing date. West v. Maint. Tool & Supply Co., Inc., 89
S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.). In holding
that the unsigned order provided sufficient notice of the hearing date, the court noted:
      [A] letter requesting a specific date for a trial or hearing, at least when
      a copy of that letter is sent to the opposing parties, is itself sufficient
      notice of the setting on that date; it is generally reasonable to assume
      that if a particular setting is requested [and denoted in the setting
      notice], the litigants are put on notice that trial or hearing may be had
      on that requested date.
Id. (citing Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 185 (Tex. 1978)).
Similarly, the First Court of Appeals has held that an unsigned order setting hearing
was sufficient to provide notice of the hearing date when the order was attached to
the filed motion for summary judgment and had been signed as approved by the
movant’s attorney. See Goode v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).           We agree with the rationale
expressed by our sister courts in West and Goode.
      Here, the unsigned order setting hearing recites and specifies that “Plaintiff’s
[Modesto’s] Traditional & No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
set for hearing on April 28, 2022 at 1:30 p.m., in the County Court at Law No. 2 of

                                          12
Ector County, Texas.” As with the unsigned orders in West and Goode, in this case,
the specific date and time for the hearing on Modesto’s motion was recited in the
unsigned order. See West, 89 S.W.3d at 102; Goode, 832 S.W.2d at 204. Moreover,
the unsigned order in the case before us effectively “set” the hearing and
communicated a more definitive date and time for the hearing on Modesto’s motion
when compared to the setting notice in West which only “proposed” the date and
time for the hearing. See West, 89 S.W.3d at 102.
        Importantly, we have previously observed that under Rule 166a(c), “a motion
for summary judgment must be filed at least twenty-one days ‘before the time
specified for the hearing[,]’ [which suggests] that the deadline for filing the motion
is tied to the date of the hearing that is anticipated at the time the motion is filed.”
PDG, Inc. v. Abilene Vill., LLC, 668 S.W.3d 947, 952 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023,
pet. filed) (second emphasis added) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)). Because we
believe that the reasoning that we espoused above in PDG is equally applicable here,
it necessarily follows that the twenty-one-day notice of hearing requirement is also
tied to, and commences on, the date it is anticipated that the motion will be heard
and considered by the trial court—namely, the date and time for the hearing that is
recited and specified in the order setting hearing at the time that the setting order is
filed and served on the nonmovant.3 See id.

        3
         We note that it is common motion practice for an attorney, when filing a motion that requires a
hearing before the trial court, to request, coordinate, and confirm an available hearing date with the trial
court prior to serving notice of the specific date and time for the hearing upon all parties. While it is unclear
whether this occurred in this instance, it is reasonable to assume, and the parties and their trial counsel
should expect, that the specified date and time recited in an order setting hearing, irrespective of whether
the order is signed or unsigned, will in fact be the date and time upon which the filed motion will be heard
and considered by the trial court. As such, when a party contemporaneously submits with their filed motion
for summary judgment an unsigned order that recites a specific date and time for the hearing on said motion,
it would be prudent for the party who has received this “setting” order to act under the presumption that the
requested hearing will proceed before the trial court on the date and time that is recited and specified in the
setting order.
                                                       13
      Despite this, Appellants argue that we should follow the Sixth Court of
Appeals holding in Okoli v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 117 S.W.3d 477, 479 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). In Okoli, the court held that a setting notice stating
that the motion would be “presented” to the trial court on a specific date was
insufficient notice of the hearing date because there was nothing to suggest that the
trial court had agreed to set the motion for a hearing. Id. The instant case is
distinguishable from Okoli because the unsigned order clearly specified the date and
time that the hearing on Modesto’s motion would be held, not just the date that the
motion would be “presented” to the trial court. The rules that govern summary
judgment practice require that notice must be provided to the opposing party of either
the date the hearing on the motion will be held before the trial court or the date that
the trial court will consider the motion only by submission. Martin, 989 S.W.2d at
359. Thus, a situation where a party serves notice of a motion’s presentment, as in
Okoli, is certainly distinguishable from a situation where the nonmovant is served
with notice of a definitive hearing date and time via an unsigned court order, as was
done here. See Okoli, 117 S.W.3d at 479.
      Finally, we cannot say that Appellants were harmed or prejudiced by what
they contend constitutes insufficient notice of the summary judgment hearing.
Under any scenario, and irrespective of which date that Appellants claim constitutes
notice to them of the hearing date—April 5 or April 8—their response to Modesto’s
motion was untimely. We cannot assume, and based on the record before us it is
unlikely, that Appellants would have filed a response sooner than the day before the
scheduled and specified hearing date, as they did here, if the order setting hearing
had been signed by the trial court on April 5. Despite Appellants’ notice argument,
they had sufficient time to file a timely response. Unfortunately, they did not.
Moreover, Appellants did not avail themselves of the necessary remedy—filing a
verified motion for continuance—and have provided no justifiable reason for failing
                                          14
to do so. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g), 251–53; see also Tenneco, Inc. v. Enter.
Products Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996) (a party who requires additional
time to respond to a motion for summary judgment must request it).
        For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the unsigned order setting
hearing which recited a definitive and specified date and time for the hearing on
Modesto’s motion for summary judgment, both of which were filed and served upon
Appellants twenty-three days before the date that Modesto’s motion was heard and
considered by the trial court, provided sufficient notice to Appellants of the specified
hearing date, if not the anticipated hearing date. 4 Here, Appellants were apprised of
both. Further, and at a minimum, Appellants had constructive notice of the hearing
date and should have reasonably anticipated, as they did here given their attempt to
participate in the hearing via Zoom, that the hearing on Modesto’s motion would
proceed on the date and time as recited and specified in the unsigned setting order—
April 28, 2022—that Appellants received on April 5, 2022. Accordingly, we
overrule Appellants’ first issue on appeal.
        B. Modesto’s Motion for Summary Judgment
        Because we have concluded that Appellants received sufficient notice of the
hearing date for Modesto’s motion, we now turn to the merits of Modesto’s motion.
        Vivian, Eva, and Eusebio, contend in their second issue that the trial court
erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Modesto because (1) there is
more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding
the grounds raised in the no-evidence motion and (2) genuine issues of material fact

        4
         Rule 166a(c) does not explicitly require that, for notice of the specified hearing date to be
sufficient, the trial court must have signed an order setting hearing on the movant’s motion. Because the
movant has no control as to when, or even if, the trial court will sign any order that the movant submits, it
would be impractical, if not unnecessary, to impose a requirement that, for notice of the summary judgment
hearing to be effective, an order setting hearing must be signed by the trial court and, if signed, it must be
served on the nonmovant at least twenty-one days in advance of the hearing date that is specified in the
submitted setting order. Therefore, we decline to impose such a requirement.
                                                     15
exist regarding the grounds raised in the traditional motion. In their third issue, these
Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it declared that Modesto owns
100% of the property.
             1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
      We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Merriman v.
XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). When the trial court does not
specify the grounds for its ruling, as is the circumstance here, a summary judgment
must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which summary judgment was sought are
meritorious. Id.
      To defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must produce at least a
scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged
elements. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex.
2019); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003); see TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(i). A no-evidence challenge will be sustained when:
      (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court
      is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only
      evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove
      a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence
      conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.
Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (quoting King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751).
      A party moving for a traditional summary judgment bears the burden of
proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). For a trial court to grant a traditional
motion, a plaintiff must conclusively prove all essential elements of its asserted
claim. MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). “Evidence is conclusive
only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions. . . .” City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). If the movant initially establishes a right

                                           16
to summary judgment on the issues expressly presented in the motion, then the
burden shifts to the nonmovant to present to the trial court any issues or evidence
that would preclude the grant of summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear
Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979).
      In reviewing either a traditional or a no-evidence summary judgment, we take
as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable
inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d
at 181; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.
2003). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could do
so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Samson
Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 2007).
      Ordinarily, when a party moves for summary judgment on both no-evidence
and traditional grounds, we address the no-evidence grounds first. See Merriman,
407 S.W.3d at 248 (“if the non-movant fails to produce legally sufficient evidence
to meet [its] burden as to the no-evidence motion, there is no need to analyze whether
the movant[s] satisfied [their] burden under the traditional motion”); Ford Motor
Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). The reason for this is to avoid
redundancy.
              2. Analysis
      Modesto moved for traditional summary judgment on his claim to quiet title
and on his counter defenses—statute of frauds and statute of limitations—to
Appellants’ affirmative defense of fraud on the transfer of assets; he also moved for
no-evidence summary judgment on this affirmative defense and Appellants’ other
affirmative defenses—accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, and waiver—to his
quiet title claim. On appeal, Appellants argue that: (1) Modesto’s no-evidence
motion was improperly granted, and fact issues exist, because there was more than
                                         17
a scintilla of probative summary judgment evidence in the record—namely,
affidavits and testimony of several individuals—to controvert Modesto’s version of
events; (2) Modesto’s traditional motion was improperly granted because there
exists genuine issues of material fact regarding whether (a) there was consideration
to support the transfer of the property from Estella to Modesto in 2012, (b) Eusebio
owns an interest in the property, and (c) the parties’ dispute falls within an exception
to the statute of frauds; and (3) under the Duhig principles, 5 Estella could not convey
a greater interest in the property than she owned.
                        a. No-Evidence Summary Judgment
      We first address Appellants’ arguments regarding Modesto’s no-evidence
motion. Appellants argue that adequate time for discovery had not passed because
Modesto was deposed only six weeks before the no-evidence motion was filed and
the transcripts from the parties’ depositions were “barely available.” See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 166a(i) (“After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting
summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that
there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which
an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.”). When a party contends
that, under Rule 166a(i), it has not been afforded an adequate opportunity to pursue
discovery before a summary-judgment hearing is held or that there has not been
adequate time to complete the necessary discovery, the complaining party must file
either an affidavit explaining the need for further discovery or a verified motion for
continuance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); see also Tenneco, 925 S.W.2d at 647;
Sibley v. Bechtel, No. 11-21-00133-CV, 2023 WL 4628528, at *3, *6 (Tex. App.—
Eastland July 20, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Lindsey Constr., Inc. v. AutoNation
Fin. Servs., LLC, 541 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no

      5
          Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940).
                                                 18
pet.). Appellants did neither. Therefore, because Appellants did not complain of or
properly raise the issue of “inadequate time for discovery” in the trial court, they
failed to preserve this complaint for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
      Appellants next argue that there was more than a scintilla of evidence to raise
an issue of material fact as to the relief requested in Modesto’s no-evidence motion.
To defeat Modesto’s no-evidence motion, Appellants had the burden to produce at
least a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements
of Appellants’ affirmative defenses that Modesto challenged in his no-evidence
motion. See KMS Retail Rowlett, LP, 593 S.W.3d at 181 (“To defeat a no-evidence
motion, the nonmovant must produce at least a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine
issue of material fact as to the challenged elements.”). Appellants, in an attempt to
create fact issues, filed an untimely “shotgun” response, with a myriad of documents
attached, one day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing.                 Due to
Appellants’ late filing, the trial court did not consider Appellants’ response and the
attached evidence when it made its summary judgment rulings. See Benchmark
Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996) (“Summary judgment evidence
may be filed late, but only with leave of court.”); INA of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d
614, 615 (Tex. 1985) (where nothing appears in the record to indicate that a late-
filed summary judgment response was considered with leave of court, it is presumed
that the trial court did not consider the response). Although such a “shotgun” effort
is not uncommon, we note that the quality of the evidence, not the quantity of
evidence, that is submitted with a motion for summary judgment, a response, or both,
is determinative of whether the motion should be granted.
      Accordingly, because the trial court did not consider Appellants’ untimely
response, or the evidence submitted with it, there was no evidence produced by
Appellants to controvert the challenges in Modesto’s no-evidence motion to their
affirmative defenses. Because Appellants had the burden to produce some evidence
                                           19
to defeat Modesto’s no-evidence motion and because they produced no evidence for
the trial court to consider, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it granted
Modesto’s no-evidence summary judgment.
        Nonetheless, Appellants argue that “the affidavits and testimony of several
individuals contradicting [Modesto’s] version of the occurrence are enough to raise
an issue of fact.” This global, generalized statement constitutes the totality of
Appellants’ analysis of the evidence as it relates to Modesto’s no-evidence motion.
Even though Appellants submitted Estella’s and Eusebio’s conclusory affidavits
with their untimely response, in their brief, Appellants have failed to direct us to any
specific or competent evidence in the record to support any of the elements of their
affirmative defenses that Modesto challenged in his no-evidence motion; nor have
Appellants included any citations to the record. 6 See Nguyen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
404 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“Merely citing
generally to voluminous summary judgment evidence in response to either a no-
evidence or traditional motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to raise an
issue of fact to defeat [the grant of] summary judgment”); see also Elizondo v. Krist,
415 S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tex. 2013) (conclusory statements in affidavits are not proper
summary judgment evidence); McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749–50 (Tex.
2003) (same).
        Further, Appellants failed to make any connection between the evidence
referenced in their brief and the affirmative defenses challenged by Modesto. In the
absence of any guidance from the nonmovant (Appellants here) as to where
controverting summary judgment evidence can be found in the record, we are not

        6
          As we have said, Appellants’ brief does not include any citations to the record. The Texas Rules
of Appellate Procedure require that an appellant’s brief must “contain a clear and concise argument for the
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)
(emphasis added). Such a broad statement, with no citations to the record, does not acquaint our court with
the issues in the case or enable us to decide the case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9. Accordingly, Appellants
brief is substantially deficient on this issue which may constitute a waiver of the argument presented.
                                                    20
required to sift through voluminous deposition transcripts, conclusory affidavits, and
other documents in search of evidence to support the nonmovant’s argument that a
fact issue exists. See Nguyen, 404 S.W.3d at 776; see also Aguilar v. Morales, 162
S.W.3d 825, 838 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied); Brookshire Katy Drainage
Dist. v. Lily Gardens, LLC, 333 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); Shelton v. Sargent, 144 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). Such is the case here.
                  b. Traditional Summary Judgment
      We next address Appellants’ arguments regarding Modesto’s traditional
motion. First, Appellants argue that there is sufficient evidence in the record to raise
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Modesto acquired 100% of the
ownership interest in the property. Specifically, Appellants contend that (1) the 2012
deed transfer between Modesto and Estella is unenforceable due to a lack of
consideration, and (2) Eusebio provided consideration for the 1998 purchase of the
property and thus owned a one-third interest in the property. Second, Appellants
challenge the grant of summary judgment in favor of Modesto based on his counter-
affirmative defense of statute of frauds because Eusebio’s provision of consideration
for the 1998 purchase of the property falls within the partial performance exception
to the statute of frauds. Third, Appellants argue that the trial court erred when it
granted summary judgment in favor of Modesto and declared that Modesto owned
100% of the interest in the property because, under the Duhig doctrine, Estella could
not convey a greater interest in the property than she owned through the 2012 deed.
See Duhig, 144 S.W.2d at 879–81.
      The arguments that Appellants now advance on appeal were not raised or
presented to the trial court because Appellants made no response to Modesto’s
traditional motion. If a nonmovant does not file a written response to a traditional
motion for summary judgment but then on appeal desires to contend that summary
                                          21
judgment was improperly granted, the only issue the reviewing court may consider
on appeal is whether the grounds expressly presented to the trial court in the
movant’s motion are sufficient as a matter of law to support the grant of summary
judgment. See Fisher v. Capp, 597 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1980,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discussing Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 678–79). To be considered,
any other issue raised on appeal by the nonmovant must have first been expressly
presented to the trial court for determination in a written, specific response or answer
to the motion for summary judgment. Id.
      As we have discussed, Appellants submitted an untimely response which the
trial court, in its discretion, refused to consider. Thus, Appellants failed to present
any arguments or evidence to the trial court for its determination that would
challenge Modesto’s motion.         Accordingly, and again, Appellants have not
preserved the arguments presented in their brief for our review. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1. As a consequence, we may only consider whether the grounds asserted
by Modesto in his motion are sufficient as a matter of law to support the summary
judgment that the trial court granted in his favor.
      Modesto moved for traditional summary judgment on his claim to quiet title.
To prevail on a claim to quiet title the plaintiff must prove, as a matter of law, that
(1) he has a right, title, ownership, or an interest in a specific property, (2) the title
to the property is clouded or affected by a claim asserted by the defendant, and
(3) the defendant’s claim, though facially valid, is invalid or unenforceable.
Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 739 (Tex. 2018); Montenegro v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, 419 S.W.3d 561, 572 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied)
(citing Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet.
denied). The purpose of a suit to quiet title is to remove a cloud on the title that has
been created by an invalid claim. Teon Mgmt., LLC v. Turquoise Bay Corp., 357
S.W.3d 719, 726–27 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. denied). When it determined
                                           22
that Modesto was entitled to summary judgment based upon the grounds raised in
his traditional motion, the trial court found, declared, and ordered that (1) the notice
of lis pendens was invalid and of no force and effect, (2) the property was quieted in
favor of Modesto, and (3) both the 1998 and 2012 deeds constituted a valid transfer
of 100% ownership of the property to Modesto.
      In his traditional motion, Modesto asserted that: (1) he acquired the first half
of the ownership interest in the property by warranty deed from Grey Wolf Drilling
on May 13, 1998, and the second half of the ownership interest by general warranty
deed from Estella on April 30, 2012; (2) a lien created by a notice of lis pendens was
filed on April 13, 2009, as a part of the administration of Donato’s estate; and (3) the
lien continued to cloud the title on the property because Estella refused to release the
lien. In support of his arguments, Modesto attached the following evidence to his
motion: (1) the 1998 deed from Grey Wolf Drilling; (2) the 2012 warranty deed from
Estella; (3) the notice of lis pendens; (4) his affidavit attesting that the notice of lis
pendens was filed as a part of the administration of Donato’s estate, that a release of
the lis pendens was mailed to Estella and she did not sign it, and that the notice of
lis pendens still appeared in the deed records of Ector County; and (5) two letters
sent to Estella requesting that the lis pendens be released. This summary judgment
evidence was not refuted.
      We have thoroughly reviewed the record and we conclude that the summary
judgment evidence submitted by Modesto in support of his claim to quiet title is
sufficient as a matter of law to support the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in his favor on this claim. See Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 678–79. We further
conclude that the same evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment and declaration that Modesto owns 100% of the
interest in the property. Appellants’ untimely response and attachments, even if
considered, is insufficient to defeat Modesto’s motion and does not create genuine
                                           23
issues of material fact, as Appellants suggest. Accordingly, because the trial court
did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Modesto, we overrule
Appellant’s second and third issues on appeal.
                                   III. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                W. STACY TROTTER
                                                JUSTICE

September 14, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

                                           24