Court Opinion

ID: 9741513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:57:05.894767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.490515
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
I dissent from the majority because I find that plaintiff offered sufficient proofs at trial to establish his case for fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. The majority has substituted its judgment for that of the jury, the trial judge, and a Court of Appeals panel that rejected defendant’s claims on *414two separate occasions. As the trial judge and the appellate panel recognized, the jury was the proper arbiter of the facts and of the witnesses’ credibility. Hence, I would leave the Court of Appeals decision and the jury verdict intact by denying leave to appeal.
i
The standard of review governing appellate oversight of decisions on directed verdict motions is well settled. More than a century ago, Chief Justice Thomas M. Cooley articulated the high threshold for granting a directed verdict, using words that ring as true today as then.
In determining this question [regarding the propriety of a directed verdict], we must look at the case as it appears from the plaintiff’s own testimony, unqualified by any which was offered on the part of the defendants, and must concede to him any thing which he could fairly claim upon that evidence. He had a right to ask the jury to believe the case as he presented it; and, however improbable some portions of his testimony may appear to us, we can not say that the jury might not have given it full credence. It is for them, and not for the court to compare and weigh the evidence.[1]
Indeed, parties have a right to a jury verdict, free of interference from the bench. In Hughes v John Hancock Mut Life Ins Co,2 we observed this obvious bedrock principle:
“[J]udges are pronouncing no mere rigmarole when, in law cases, they charge jurors that they are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. They are setting forth *415the very substance of a jury trial as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution. Its purpose and aim ‘is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure, but substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common-law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume, directly or indirectly, to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative.’ ”[3]
In this case, jurors faced a credibility contest. Either they believed plaintiffs allegations of fraud or they believed defendant’s explanations.
The elements that plaintiff had to prove to support his case for fraudulent misrepresentation were: (1) defendant made a material representation, (2) the representation was false, (3) defendant knew that it was false when made or made it recklessly, as a positive assertion, without knowledge of its truth, (4) defendant intended plaintiff to act upon the representation, (5) plaintiff acted in reliance on it, and (6) plaintiff suffered injury as a result. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Black, 412 Mich 99, 120-121; 313 NW2d 77 (1981).
n
Central to this case was defendant erim’s operating summary for fiscal year 1991 that Ciaron Swonger, an erim manager, provided to plaintiff during a job interview. The summary contained financial data, projections, profits margins and an overall reflection of the state of affairs at ERIM. There was sharp disagreement *416over Swonger’s intent in handing the summary to Hord.
The question of fact for the jury was whether Swonger’s use of the 1991 report at the 1992 interview constituted a material misrepresentation about the current financial viability of ERIM. At trial, Hord testified:
I took it as representative of the financial status of the organization, that if there had been any reason to caveat some of the indications in here, I would have heard them. I did not.
Swonger admitted that he had offered the 1991 report as evidence of erim’s “financial record.” The jury heard the following testimony:
Q. What was your purpose in giving Mr. Hord the annual report for 1991?
A. I wanted him to be able to read what the management philosophy of ERIM was as stated in that kind of a document and the material that was there, and to show him what the record had been of the company.
Q. And when you talk about “record,” you’re talking about the financial record?
A. Certainly including that. [Emphasis added.]
At the time of the interview, Swonger knew that erim had suffered an economic downturn since the summary was prepared. That knowledge, coupled with the testimony from Hord and Swonger, justified a jury determination that Swonger made an affirmative misrepresentation. Another interpretation of these facts strains credibility. The majority offers no plausible explanation why Swonger would give Hord the most recent financial report without comment, if *417his intentions were not to suggest it showed the company’s current financial status.
Suppose, for example, that the 1991 report had contained a financial picture worse than erim’s 1992 financial status. Would Swonger have given it to Hord without qualifications?
Common sense dictates that Swonger would not have provided Hord with a 1991 report under those circumstances. Such a negative report, conveyed so close to the time of publication, would clearly have given the impression that things remained the same in 1992. No company does business in a vacuum. To suggest that 1991 figures convey absolutely nothing about the period that immediately follows is unconvincing. Thus, I disagree with the premise adopted by the majority. The jury was entitled to conclude that Swonger gave Hord the report as a way of demonstrating financial strength that erim no longer possessed.
The jury heard Swonger testify that he knew about financial problems at ERIM when he met with plaintiff.
Q. Okay. So basically, certainly by December 17th when you met with Mr. Hord at erim you had the information that’s reflected in the 1992 report, didn’t you, about the diminution of revenues, the losses, or the decreases in contract income? You had that information, didn’t you?
A. I received it at least orally, yes.
Q. Okay. And you had been receiving that information all along during the year 1992 in the monthly and quarterly reports you got?
A. Monthly for my division.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
*418Indeed, Swonger, like all upper-level managers at erim, knew about plans already underway for a massive layoff. By the end of 1992, seventy-two employees had received layoff notices from erim management, and the company’s profits had dropped more than $4 million from those reflected in the 1991 report.
Defense witnesses offered explanations for the decrease in profits. However, the jury was entitled to choose which version of the facts to believe. As Chief Justice Cooley observed: Plaintiff “had a right to ask the jury to believe the case as he presented it . . . .” Detroit & Milwaukee R Co, supra at 117. “It is for them, and not for the court to compare and weigh the evidence.” Id.
The most troubling aspect of the view adopted by the majority is that the per curiam analysis glosses over the context surrounding Swonger’s decision to share the report with Hord. Instead, the majority strains to resolve the dispute within the four comers of the 1991 report. Taken as a whole, the facts suggest that Hord was on the receiving end of an old-fashioned sales pitch, and Swonger was pulling out all the stops to persuade him.
Erim was attempting to lure Hord, a nationally recognized expert in high-performance computing, from a job in New Jersey to a position in Michigan. Hord made efforts to gauge the offer in terms of job security and erim’s ability to provide a steady stream of work. He sought justification for his decision to relocate from New Jersey to Michigan. He testified that, had he known of erim’s financial downturn, he would not have accepted the position with erim.
*419Meanwhile, Swonger, in an apparent effort to assuage Hord’s concerns, sought to provide evidence of job stability. In so doing, he deliberately painted a misleading picture of the present viability of ERIM, hoping to obscure the truth: government cutbacks in the defense industry, a sketchy financial forecast, and inevitable layoffs.
m
Because a reasonable jury could have viewed these facts as sufficient to meet the elements of plaintiff’s fraud claim,4 I would deny defendant’s application for leave to appeal. The United States Supreme Court in Walker cautioned courts against usurping the well-settled role of jurors as the ultimate arbiters of factual and credibility issues. I cannot join the majority’s disregard for that caution.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Detroit & M R Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 117 (1868).

 351 Mich 302, 309; 88 NW2d 557 (1958).

 Hughes, supra at 309, quoting Reid v Maryland Casualty Co, 63 F2d 10, 11 (CA 5, 1933); Walker v New Mexico & S P R Co, 165 US 593, 596; 17 S Ct 421; 41 L Ed 837 (1897).

 Contrary to the per curiam’s conclusion, plaintiff also made out his case for fraudulent concealment or “silent fraud.” One who remains silent when fair dealing requires him to speak may be guilty of fraudulent concealment. Nowicki v Podgorski, 359 Mich 18, 32; 101 NW2d 371 (1960). A party has a duty to disclose subsequently acquired information that he recognizes as rendering untrue or misleading previous representations which, when made, were true or believed to be true. M&D, Inc v McConkey, 231 Mich App 22, 29; 585 NW2d 33 (1998).
Even assuming that ekim officials learned of the company’s grim financial outlook only after the interview with Hord, defendants had an affirmative duty to bring those facts to Hord’s attention. More than enough exists here for a jury to consider a claim of silent fraud.