Court Opinion

ID: 9684025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:09.237529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.453616
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Judge,
concurring.
At trial Brian Taylor testified to appellant’s commission of an extraneous offense. In his 19th ground of error appellant urges that the extraneous offense was inadmissible because it was never shown that appellant committed the extraneous offense. The majority correctly overrules appellant’s contention; in doing so, however, it applies an incorrect standard for determining the admissibility of extraneous offenses.
The majority holds that “the accused’s connection with an extraneous offense must be shown before evidence of that offense may be admitted,” citing Tippins v. State, 530 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Fentis v. State, 528 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Tomlinson v. State, 422 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). The majority goes on to note that “[t]his is not a case in which there was a total absence of evidence connecting the defendant to the extraneous offense,” citing Carmean v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 218, 290 S.W.2d 240 (1956), in addition to the above cases.
The standard for determining the admissibility of an extraneous offense is not whether an accused is connected with the offense, but whether the accused is shown to have committed the offense:
. even though evidence of another crime may be relevant to the instant proceeding, such evidence should not be admitted unless the commission of the other crime is clearly proved and the accused is shown to have been its perpetrator.
28 Tex.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 195, p. 302. See Eanes v. State, 546 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Landers v. State, 519 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1974, Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing).
It is error to admit evidence of another offense when [the] defendant is not shown to be the party guilty of that offense. .
1 Branch’s Ann.P.C. 2d ed., Sec. 188, p. 204.
where the State seeks to admit extraneous offenses, the' transactions should not be allowed into evidence unless the State is prepared to prove that the accused committed the same. .
Shaver v. State, 496 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
., it seems to be well settled in this state that evidence of extraneous offenses shall not be received unless the accused is satisfactorily shown to be a party to the commission of such offense, even though proof of extraneous offenses comes within some of the exceptions.
Shepherd v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 387, 158 S.W.2d 1010 (1942).
*897. Before this character of evidence could be admitted against appellant, there should have been some testimony indicating with a reasonable degree of certainty that appellant was guilty of the theft of the Darnell cattle. .
Walton v. State, 41 Tex.Cr.R. 454, 55 S.W. 566 (1900). See Fountain v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 474, 241 S.W. 489 (1921).
Two of the cases relied on by the majority, Tippins, supra, and Tomlinson, supra, applied this stricter standard. In Fentis, however, it was stated that “an accused’s connection with an extraneous offense must be shown with some degree of certainty before evidence of that offense can come in, assuming it is relevant.” Fentis cited Car-mean, supra, also relied on by the majority. This Court in Carmean concluded that in the absence of any testimony connecting the appellant with the extraneous offense, the admission of that offense was error. Carmean relied on Glenn v. State, 76 S.W. 757 (Tex.Cr.App.1903), which applied the following standard of admissibility:
. But in every case where such extraneous crimes are admissible there must be pertinent testimony tending to show that appellant was guilty of the extraneous offense. . . . [Emphasis added.]
The Court in Glenn relied on Williams v. State, 38 Tex.Cr.R. 128, 41 S.W. 645 (1897), and therein lies the source of the confusion:
. In this case, however, as previously stated, there is no proof pertinently connecting defendant with the commission of the burglary on the 31st of March. In this regard it would seem that, before evidence of an extraneous crime can be offered, some cogent evidence should be adduced of appellant’s connection therewith; .
Id. 41 S.W. at 648.
This language in Williams was quickly discarded in Walton, supra, in favor of the stricter language set forth previously. Walton did not overrule Williams, and in fact cited Williams as its sole authority. It is clear, however, that the Court in Walton rewrote the Williams standard.
The Walton language became the prevailing standard, and for good reason. An accused is entitled to be tried solely on the accusation brought against him by the State’s pleading; he should not be tried for a collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Evidence of other crimes is admissible only for certain limited purposes because it is inherently prejudicial, tends to confuse the issues in the case, and forces the accused to defend himself against charges of which he was given no notice. Albrecht, supra; Cameron v. State, 530 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Given its limited probative value and inherent prejudicial impact, an extraneous offense should not be admitted in evidence unless the trial court is assured that the defendant actually committed the offense.
Despite the general application of the stricter language set forth in Walton, et al., this Court occasionally has used the language from Williams in its decisions. See the cases cited previously; see also Perez v. State, 310 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Cr.App.1958); Hooks v. State, 261 S.W. 1053 (Tex.Cr.App.1924). In most of these cases there was no evidence to even connect the defendant with the extraneous offense; hence the offense was inadmissible under either standard and it did not matter much which standard was used. In this case, however, a fact issue is raised and the extraneous offense is held admissible; thus the standard applied achieves much greater importance.
This Court should not operate under two standards of admissibility for extraneous offenses. The time has come to overrule or clarify the offspring of Williams, to the extent they apply a standard of proof for admissibility of extraneous offenses that conflicts with the prevailing standard. I hereby propose that this Court do so. It is not sufficient to merely show that a defendant is connected with an extraneous offense in order to admit evidence of that offense; it must be shown that the defendant committed the offense.
I concur in the result reached in this case because the State showed that appellant *898committed the extraneous offense of theft of stamps from the San Diego Independent School District. In addition to his testimony referred to in the majority opinion, Taylor testified that appellant asked him if the school could help mail out some of his campaign literature. This testimony establishes that appellant knew and expected that the mailing costs were to be borne by the school. Taylor further testified that appellant came in from time to time to check on the progress of the campaign work, as he had with the Benavides School District. The evidence was sufficient to show that appellant committed the extraneous offense.
I concur in the result reached on appellant’s 19th ground of error.
ROBERTS, J., not participating.