Court Opinion

ID: 9544749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:25.364289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:07.539612
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 7 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THERESA BROOKE, a married woman                 No. 22-55682
dealing with her sole and separate claim,
                                                D.C. No. 2:22-cv-02941-MCS-E
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

247 HOTELS BEVERAGE, LLC, DBA
Cambria Hotel Calabasas, a California
limited liability company,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 18, 2023**

Before:      SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

      Theresa Brooke appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing for

lack of standing her disability discrimination action alleging claims under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California’s Unruh Act. We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. D’Lil v. Best W. Encina

Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Brooke’s ADA claim for lack of

standing because Brooke failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that she

planned to return to defendant’s hotel. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc.,

631 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2011) (to establish Article III standing, an ADA

plaintiff must show either an “inten[t] to return to a noncompliant accommodation”

or that the noncompliant accommodation deterred the plaintiff from visiting and

the plaintiff “plans to visit [the] noncompliant accommodation in the future”); see

also Civ. Rts. Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.

2017) (“[C]oncrete travel plans would be sufficient to show that a disabled plaintiff

intends to visit a facility . . . .”). Although the district court did not notify Brooke

of its intent to dismiss her ADA claim or provide her leave to amend her

complaint, on appeal Brooke does not specify what additional facts she would have

pleaded to establish standing.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining supplemental

jurisdiction over Brooke’s Unruh Act claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); Vo v.

Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171-73 (9th Cir. 2022) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining when a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over Unruh

Act claims under § 1367(c)(4)). Contrary to Brooke’s contention, the clerk’s entry

                                            2                                     22-55682
of default did not require the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over her Unruh Act claim. See id. at 1168 (noting the district court declined

supplemental jurisdiction after the clerk entered default).

      AFFIRMED.

                                           3                                    22-55682