Court Opinion

ID: 9701852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:40:34.185939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.142975
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellants’ convictions arose from the arrest of appellant Burch for possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, and the subsequent seizure of various controlled substances in the Burch residence after a search pursuant to a warrant. Appellant Riberdy was present at the time of the search. Appellants were tried together and were represented by the same attorney. They now contend that a conflict of interest existed, with the result that the attorney was ineffective.- In my opinion this contention cannot be resolved on the present record. I would therefore remand for an evidentiary hearing.
1
The Majority states that “[t]he question of a conflict of interest was discussed by the trial court and both appellants agreed to have the same attorney represent them.” (Majority at 1293) The implication is that appellants waived their right to claim that the attorney was ineffective because of a conflict of interest engendered by his dual representation.
*20It is well settled that by virtue of the Sixth Amendment a person accused of crime has the right to be represented by counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). An essential element of this right is the right to the “effective assistance of counsel.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). “Inherent in the right to effective assistance of counsel is the correlative right to be represented by counsel unburdened by any conflict of interest.” Commonwealth v. Breaker, supra 456 Pa. at 343, 318 A.2d at 355, citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Commonwealth ex rel. Whit-ling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 176 A.2d 641 (1962).
It is possible to- waive the right to be represented by counsel. Commonwealth v. Grant, 229 Pa.Super. 419, 323 A.2d 354 (1974). It is therefore also possible to waive the right to representation by counsel who is unburdened by any conflict of interest. However, in order for a waiver of a constitutional right to be valid, it must be a voluntary and intelligent act of the defendant. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A.2d 877 (1971).
To assure that a waiver is in fact voluntary and intelligent, the trial judge should question the defendant as to his comprehension of the potential harms of dual representation:
Whenever two or more defendants who have been jointly charged, or whose cases have been consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.
ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The Function of the Trial Judge § 3.4(b) (Approved Draft 1972).
The Commentary to these Standards suggests that “[a] waiver of the right to separate representation should not be *21accepted unless the defendants have each been fully informed of the probable hazards; and the voluntary character of their waiver is apparent.” IdCommentary at 45. Because “the question ultimately is the subjective understanding of the accused, rather than the quality of the explanation given him, the court should question the accused in a manner designed to reveal that understanding, rather than framing questions which call for a simple ‘yes’, or ‘no’ response.” ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services § 7.2, Commentary at 63 (Approved Draft 1968). Here, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Your name is James Allen Burch, and you are Sue Ann Riberdy?
DEFENDANT BURCH: Yes.
DEFENDANT RIBERDY: Yes.
THE COURT: Both willing to have Mr. Myerson represent both of you?
DEFENDANT BURCH: Yes, sir.
DEFENDANT RIBERDY: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: No conflict, no possibility of conflict of interest between you? The interests are not necessarily inconsistent between each other in the charges?
DEFENDANT BURCH: No, sir.
DEFENDANT RIBERDY: No, sir.
THE COURT: All right.
N.T. 3
I submit that this colloquy was plainly inadequate and cannot support the suggestion by the Majority that appellants voluntarily and intelligently waived their right to the effective assistance of counsel. The contents of an adequate colloquy will vary according to the particular circumstances of the case. There may be special factors requiring the judge’s attention. For example, it may appear that the district attorney has offered one defendant a plea bargain in return for testimony against the other, or the charges may vary in a manner suggestive of possible conflict, as where one defendant is said to have committed the criminal act, *22while the other is said to have acted as a conspirator. In all instances, however, the judge must inform the defendants that each one has a constitutional right to his own attorney. The judge should explain that an attorney’s strategy may help one defendant but not necessarily the other, and that even if this does not seem so before trial, something unforeseen may occur during trial that makes it so. The judge should also explain that if one attorney represents both of the defendants, it will not be possible during the trial for one defendant to make a statement to the attorney in the expectation that it will be kept in confidence as regards the other defendant. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 3.5, Commentary at 211-212 (Approved Draft 1971). Finally, the judge should ascertain from the attorney whether he has discussed the potential conflict with the defendants before accepting the dual representation. The questions should disclose whether the attorney knows and has fulfilled his obligation to consider the potential conflicts and to inform his clients of them. “If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation.” ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Considerations 5-15 (Final Draft 1969). “In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. If there are present other circumstances that might cause any of the multiple clients to question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all of the clients of those *23circumstances.” (Footnotes omitted) Id., Ethical Considerations 5-16.
2
It may be that in fact appellants understood their position with respect to each other because their attorney did “explain fully to each . . . the implications of the common representation . . ..” In that case, there may well have been a voluntary and intelligent waiver. Given the inadequate colloquy, however, we cannot tell. Where ineffectiveness is claimed, and it is not possible to resolve the issue on the record, it is appropriate to remand for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). On remand it must be remembered that a finding of waiver may not be made lightly. Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964). If after a full evidentiary hearing it is determined that appellants made an effective waiver, then the inquiry is over. If, however, the hearing judge determines that the waiver was not voluntary and intelligent, as to one or both of appellants, then a second inquiry must follow: Was there in fact a conflict of interest due to dual representation at appellants’ trial?
The law on conflict of interest was recently summarized in Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318 A.2d 354 (1974), as follows:
First, “[i]f, in the representation of more than one defendant, a conflict of interest arises, the mere existence of such a conflict vitiates the proceedings even though no actual harm results. The potentiality that such harm may result, rather than that such harm did result, furnishes the appropriate criterion [citation omitted].” Second, a defendant must demonstrate that a conflict of interest actually existed at the trial because “dual representation alone does not amount to a conflict of interest [citations omitted].” Third, “[t]o make the dual representation arise to a true conflict, appellant need not show that actual harm resulted . . . but must at least show the possibility of harm . . .. [citation omitted].” Fourth, appellant will satisfy the requirement of demonstrating possible *24harm if he can show, inter alia, “that he had a defense inconsistent with that advanced by the other client, or that counsel neglected his case in order to give the other client a more spirited defense [citations and footnote omitted].”
Id. 456 Pa. at 344, 318 A.2d at 356.
Here, two persons were charged with possession with intent to sell various controlled substances, seized in a search of what was apparently a common residence. Appellants correctly assert that a disclaimer by either appellant as to possession of the controlled substances would necessarily result in a conflict of interest. “How could counsel for Riberdy argue that Burch’s conduct at the car wash gave rise to a strong inference that he possessed the items found in the home without seriously prejudicing Burch?” (Appellants’ Brief at 16.)1 The only defense presented at trial was the testimony of a drug expert. It is perfectly conceivable that this defense strategy was advantageous to one of appellants at the expense of the other. Also, the motion to suppress was directed entirely to the events that preceded the search of the house, and to the warrant itself. No contention was made that appellant Riberdy’s Fourth Amendment rights, as distinguished from appellant Burch’s, had been violated. If there was such a violation, this was prejudicial to appellant Riberdy. However, it is equally conceivable that appellants desired joint representation, and expressed to their attorney an unwillingness to blame each other or to testify on their own behalf. Questions such as these should be examined on remand.
The Majority states that “[i]n order to vitiate the proceedings, a conflict must appear from the facts of the proceedings as they exist on the record.” (Majority 248 Pa.Super. at 14, 374 A.2d at 1293) It is true that in order to vitiate prior proceedings, as for example by awarding a new trial, a conflict must appear of record. However, the “record” at issue is not limited to that which we have now; we are not prevented from remanding for an evidentiary hearing when it appears of record that further proceedings are warranted.
*25To be sure, a given case may, on the record, be seen to be frivolous so that no further proceeding is necessary. Or, at the other extreme, a case may, on the record, be seen to demonstrate a conflict so clearly that no further proceeding is necessary. See Commonwealth v. Burns, 215 Pa.Super. 333, 257 A.2d 74 (1969), allocatur refused (joint representation; one defendant pleaded guilty and one went to trial; conflict of interest inherent). Usually, however, a further proceeding is necessary. The most frequently encountered case where conflict of interest is alleged to have resulted from dual representation has been on appeal from a denial of PCHA relief, following a hearing. The case cited by the Majority, Commonwealth v. Smith, 228 Pa.Super. 256, 323 A.2d 838 (1974), is such a case. In such a case, obviously the appellant is limited to the record made at the hearing. In cases where PCHA relief has been denied without a hearing, remand for further proceedings is common. Commonwealth v. James, 429 Pa. 250, 240 A.2d 368 (1968); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 211 Pa.Super. 79, 234 A.2d 61 (1967); Commonwealth v. Brown, 210 Pa.Super. 136, 232 A.2d 10 (1967).2
I would therefore remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an effective waiver of the claim that counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interest arising from dual representation. If the hearing judge determines that the waiver was not voluntary and intelligent, he should proceed to ascertain whether a conflict of interest arose from the dual representation at trial. If he finds a conflict, he should award appellants a new trial. One additional comment appears necessary. On this appeal appellants were again represented by the same attorney. On remand, this attorney should be permitted to represent one of appellants, but not both.
HOFFMAN and CERCONE, JJ., join in this opinion.

. We have no brief from the Commonwealth.

. It is true that relief has been denied on direct appeal, where the record was insufficient to support the allegation of conflict, and the defendant has been advised that the denial of relief did not preclude his seeking a PCHA hearing to reveal the alleged conflict. Commonwealth v. Armbruster, 225 Pa.Super. 415, 311 A.2d 672 (1973). However, Armbruster preceded Commonwealth v. Twiggs, supra.