Court Opinion

ID: 9897402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:07.328611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.136011
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     May 12 2023, 8:47 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
Christopher S. Wolcott                                     ICE MILLER LLC
The Wolcott Law Firm LLC                                   Daniel D. Trachtman
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Daniel R. Kelley
                                                           Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           OLD NATIONAL BANCORP
                                                           Lucy R. Dollens
                                                           Sarah Thompson Parks
                                                           Quarles & Brady LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           BMO HARRIS BANK N.A.
                                                           Anna-Katrina S. Christakis
                                                           James J. Morrissey
                                                           Pilgrim Christakis LLP
                                                           Chicago, Illinois

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           FIFTH THIRD BANK, INDIANA
                                                           Jordan T. Steiner
                                                           Victor A. Walton
                                                           Wesley R. Abrams
                                                           Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease
                                                           LLP
                                                           Cincinnati, Ohio

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE – JP
                                                           MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
                                                           Jayna M. Cacioppo
                                                           Nadine E. McSpadden

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                              Page 1 of 18
                                                           Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Matthew J. Cannon
                                                           David S. Repking
                                                           Greenberg Traurig, LLP
                                                           Chicago, Illinois

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           PNC BANK NA
                                                           Robert D. MacGill
                                                           Matthew T. Ciulla
                                                           MacGill PC
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Robert J. Conlan
                                                           Frank R. Volpe
                                                           Sidley Austin LLP
                                                           Washington, DC

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON
                                                           J. Richard Kiefer
                                                           Gregory A. Neibarger
                                                           Joshua J. Burress
                                                           Dentons Bingham Greenbaum
                                                           LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.
                                                           Sally Franklin Zweig
                                                           Kristopher N. Kazmierczak
                                                           Diana Brooke Smith
                                                           Stoll Keenon Ogden PLLC
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Stacie Knight
                                                           Winston & Strawn, LLP
                                                           Charlotte, North Carolina

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                       Page 2 of 18
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK
                                                           Daniel E. Pulliam
                                                           Daniel R. Roy
                                                           Susanne A. Johnson
                                                           Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath
                                                           LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           PUBLIC TRUST ADVISORS LLC
                                                           Mary Katherine Hetzel
                                                           Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Patrick M. Hagan
                                                           Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
                                                           Cincinnati, Ohio

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES –
                                                           KELLY MITCHELL, JILLEAN
                                                           BATTLE, RYAN LOCKE,
                                                           MICHAEL FRICK, KIMBERLY
                                                           LOGAN, AND CYNTHIA BARGER
                                                           James J. Ammeen
                                                           Mark J. Liechty
                                                           Ammeen Valenzuela Assoc. LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                     Page 3 of 18
State of Indiana, ex rel. James                            May 12, 2023
Holden,                                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       22A-PL-2760
                                                           Appeal from the Marion Superior
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable John M.T. Chavis,
Ice Miller, LLC, Old National                              II, Judge
Bancorp, BMO Harris Bank,                                  Trial Court Cause No.
N.A., Fifth Third Bank, Indiana,                           49D05-2007-PL-22005
JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
PNC Bank, N.A., Bank of New
York Mellon Corp., Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., Huntington
National Bank, Public Trust
Advisors, LLC, Kelly Mitchell,
in her individual capacity, Jillean
Battle, in her individual capacity,
Caitlin Larson, in her individual
capacity, Ryan Locke, in his
individual capacity, Michael
Frick, in his individual capacity,
Kimberly Logan, in her
individual capacity, and Cynthia
Barger, in her individual
capacity,
Appellees-Defendants.

                                 Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                            Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                       Page 4 of 18
                                              Case Summary
[1]   James Holden (“Relator”) appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his qui tam

      claims brought under the Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower Protection

      Act (“IFCA”), Indiana Code Chapter 5-11-5.5. Relator, a former employee of

      the Indiana Treasurer of State (“Treasurer”), claims that Treasurer Kelly

      Mitchell and members of her staff (“Individual Defendants”)1 conspired with a

      law firm, several banks, and an investment advisory firm (“Business

      Defendants”)2 to award state contracts that were not approved under the

      Financial Reorganization Act (“FRA”), Indiana Code Chapter 4-13-2.

[2]   The trial court dismissed Relator’s complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule

      12(B)(1) and Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The trial court found, in part, that it lacked

      jurisdiction to hear Relator’s action because the action was based upon

      information learned in a deposition and upon the Treasurer’s written responses

      to a public records act request. On appeal, we address one dispositive issue—

      whether the trial court properly dismissed the action pursuant to the public

      disclosure bar provisions of Indiana Code Section 5-11-5.5-7(f). We conclude

      that the trial court properly dismissed the action but should have dismissed the

      1
       These staff members include Jillean Battle, Caitlin Larson, Ryan Locke, Michael Frick, Kimberly Logan,
      and Cynthia Barger.
      2
       These defendants include Ice Miller LLC, Old National Bank, BMO Harris Bank N.A., Fifth Third Bank,
      Indiana, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A., PNC Bank N.A., Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Wells
      Fargo Bank N.A., Huntington National Bank, and Public Trust Advisors LLC.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                             Page 5 of 18
      action under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) rather than Trial Rule 12(B)(1).

      Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                                                       Issue
[3]   Relator raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial

      court properly dismissed Relator’s complaint.

                                                      Facts
[4]   Relator was employed as Chief Deputy Treasurer and General Counsel by the

      Treasurer from January 2007 to June 2011 and from November 2012 to

      November 2013. Kelly Mitchell became the Treasurer on November 18, 2014,

      and terminated Relator’s employment. In March 2015, Relator filed a

      complaint against the Treasurer and Mitchell as a result of his termination.

      During the course of discovery, Relator obtained a copy of an agreement

      between the Treasurer and Ice Miller. During a deposition, Mitchell confirmed

      that the agreement was not signed by the State Budget Agency, the Indiana

      Department of Administration, and the Indiana Attorney General’s Office

      pursuant to Indiana Code Section 4-13-2-14.1(a) of the FRA. This litigation

      was settled in August 2017.

[5]   Mitchell was re-elected as Treasurer in November 2018. In 2019, Holden

      checked the Indiana Transparency Portal website to review contracts the

      Treasurer had submitted for approval by the State Budget Agency, the Indiana

      Department of Administration, and the Indiana Attorney General’s Office, and

      he found no such contracts on the Transparency Portal. Holden then sent

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023        Page 6 of 18
      requests under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act, Indiana Code

      Chapter 5-14-3, to the Treasurer to obtain a copies of all contracts executed

      during Mitchell’s term as Treasurer, and Holden received multiple responses to

      his requests. According to Relator, “[t]hese documents showed that during

      Defendant Mitchell’s time in office, the [Treasurer] has approved numerous

      contracts worth millions of dollars, mostly to Defendant Mitchell’s campaign

      donors and supporters, without obtaining the approval of the State Budget

      Agency, the Indiana Department of Administration and the Indiana Attorney

      General’s Office, as required by Ind. Code § 4-13-2-14.1(a).” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. II p. 58.

[6]   In July 2020, Relator filed a complaint under seal and alleged that the Treasurer

      and Individual Defendants conspired with the Business Defendants to award

      the Business Defendant state contracts in violation of the FRA. In June 2021,

      the Indiana Attorney General and the Indiana Inspector General declined to

      intervene and prosecute the action. Relator then moved to unseal the action,

      which the trial court granted, and Relator served his complaint on the

      defendants.

[7]   In December 2021, Relator amended his complaint to add allegations that the

      Individual Defendants had acted outside the scope of their employment and

      engaged in criminal conduct. The Individual Defendants filed a motion to

      dismiss Relator’s amended complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1)

      and 12(B)(6), and the Business Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss

      Relator’s amended complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023         Page 7 of 18
      12(B)(6). Some of the defendants then filed separate motions to dismiss and/or

      supplemental memorandums. After briefing was complete, the trial court held

      a hearing on the motions in July 2022.

[8]   On October 19, 2022, the trial court granted the motions to dismiss. The trial

      court concluded, in part, that Relator’s claims against all of the defendants

      failed as a matter of law because the trial court lacked “subject matter

      jurisdiction” pursuant to the “public disclosure bar” of Indiana Code Section 5-

      11-5.5-7(f) and Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401 (2011).

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40. The trial court, thus, dismissed Relator’s claims

      pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1). The trial court also concluded, in part,

      that the Relator’s claims failed because the Treasurer is not subject to the FRA

      “when conducting the State’s banking business.” Id. at 43. The trial court

      determined that the “underlying contracts” were valid “because they are within

      the statutory powers enjoined to” the Treasurer. Id. at 45. The trial court, thus,

      also dismissed Relator’s claims pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

      Relator now appeals.

                                      Discussion and Decision
[9]   Relator appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his amended complaint under

      Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) and Rule 12(B)(6). Trial Rule 12(B)(1) allows

      dismissal for “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Ind. Trial Rule

      12(B)(1). “In determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we

      ask whether the action or claim falls within the general scope of authority

      conferred upon the court by the constitution or by statute.” Payne-Elliott v.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023            Page 8 of 18
       Roman Cath. Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 193 N.E.3d 1009, 1013 (Ind. 2022)

       (citing State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d 705, 711-12 (Ind. 2018)). Where the trial

       court ruled on a paper record, which it did here, “we review its factual findings

       as well as its legal conclusions de novo.” Walczak v. Lab. Works-Ft. Wayne LLC,

       983 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2013).

[10]   A Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion, however, tests the legal sufficiency of the

       plaintiff’s claim, not the facts supporting it. Payne-Elliott, 193 N.E.3d at 1013

       (citing Bellwether Properties, LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 466

       (Ind. 2017)). “Dismissal under 12(B)(6) is not proper ‘unless it appears to a

       certainty on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled

       to any relief.’” Id. (quoting Bellwether Properties, 87 N.E.3d at 466). We review

       “a 12(B)(6) dismissal de novo, giving no deference to the trial court’s decision.”

       Bellwether Properties, 87 N.E.3d at 466. We take “the complaint’s allegations as

       true and consider[] them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

       drawing every reasonable inference in that party’s favor.” Payne-Elliott, 193

       N.E.3d at 1013. “Dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) is rarely appropriate when the

       asserted ground for dismissal is an affirmative defense; but where a plaintiff has

       pleaded himself out of court by alleging, and thus admitting, the essential

       elements of a defense, his complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be

       granted.” Id.

[11]   Relator’s claims were brought under the IFCA, which is similar to the federal

       False Claims Act (“FCA”) statutes. See Ind. Code ch. 5-11-5.5; 31 U.S.C. §

       3729-33; State ex rel. Harmeyer v. Kroger Co., 114 N.E.3d 488, 492 (Ind. Ct. App.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023           Page 9 of 18
       2018) (discussing the IFCA and noting that “[t]he substance of this section

       corresponds to the substance of its federal counterpart”), trans. denied. Under

       both statutes, citizens, referred to as “relators,” may file qui tam 3 actions on

       behalf of the government. United States ex rel. Uhlig v. Fluor Corp., 839 F.3d 628,

       633 (7th Cir. 2016).

[12]   The IFCA provides that:

                A person who knowingly or intentionally:

                (1) presents a false claim to the state for payment or approval;
                [or]

                                                       *****

                (7) conspires with another person to perform an act described in
                subdivisions (1) through (6);

                                                       *****

                is, except as provided in subsection (c), liable to the state for a
                civil penalty of at least five thousand dollars ($5,000) and for up
                to three (3) times the amount of damages sustained by the state.
                In addition, a person who violates this section is liable to the

       3
        “Qui tam actions are those brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, a part
       of which the government or some specified public institution will receive. Thus, an action is called a qui tam
       action when the penalty is given in part to the one who brings it, and the remainder to the sovereign or other
       public use.” 70 C.J.S. Penalties § 10 (footnote omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                                 Page 10 of 18
               state for the costs of a civil action brought to recover a penalty or
               damages.

       Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b).

[13]   A relator may bring a civil action under seal for a violation of Indiana Code

       Section 5-11-5.5-2(b). See I.C. § 5-11-5.5-4(a), 4(c). After a relator files a qui

       tam action under the IFCA, the Indiana Attorney General and Inspector

       General have the authority to “intervene in the case and proceed with the

       action.” I.C. § 5-11-5.5-4(e)(1); I.C. § 5-11-5.5-3. If the Attorney General and

       Inspector General “elect not to proceed with the action, . . . the person who

       initially filed the complaint may proceed with the action.” I.C. § 5-11-5.5-

       4(e)(2). If the action prevails, the person who initially filed the complaint is

       entitled to a percentage of the proceeds of the action or settlement. I.C. § 5-11-

       5.5-6. “[T]he relator’s recovery can be substantial.” Harmeyer, 114 N.E.3d at

       490.

[14]   Such actions, however, are subject to certain limitations. See I.C. § 5-11-5.5-7.

       At issue here is Indiana Code Section 5-11-5.5-7(f), which provides:

               A court does not have jurisdiction over an action brought under
               section 4 of this chapter if the action is based upon information
               contained in:

               (1) a transcript of a criminal, a civil, or an administrative hearing;

               (2) a legislative, an administrative, or another public report,
               hearing, audit, or investigation; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023            Page 11 of 18
               (3) a news media report;

               unless the person bringing the action has direct and independent
               knowledge of the information that is the basis of the action, and
               the person bringing the action has voluntarily provided this
               information to the state.

[15]   The trial court here found that Relator’s action was based upon responses

       received through public records requests and through discovery in Relator’s

       employment litigation against the Treasurer. The trial court concluded that

       “information learned in a deposition” and “the government’s written responses

       to a public records act request” fell under the language of Indiana Code Section

       5-11-5.5-7(f). Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 40, 40 n.6. Accordingly, the trial

       court found that it did not have “jurisdiction” and dismissed the action under

       Trial Rule 12(B)(1). Id. at 41.

[16]   On appeal, Relator makes no argument regarding the information learned in

       the deposition. Relator, thus, has waived any argument that the information

       learned in Treasurer Mitchell’s deposition did not fall under Indiana Code

       Section 5-11-5.5-7(f). Relator, however, argues that the information he learned

       in his public records act requests does not qualify as “a legislative, an

       administrative, or another public report, hearing, audit, or investigation.” I.C.

       § 5-11-5.5-7(f)(2).

[17]   Indiana courts have not interpreted the “legislative, an administrative, or

       another public report, hearing, audit, or investigation” language. I.C. § 5-11-

       5.5-7(f)(2). “Without any Indiana precedent addressing the [IFCA], we may

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023            Page 12 of 18
       look to the federal courts for guidance on interpreting the statute.” Harmeyer,

       114 N.E.3d at 492 (citing Ind. Civil Rights Comm’n v. Sutherland Lumber, 182 Ind.

       App. 133, 140, 394 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1979)). Accordingly, we may look to the

       similar provisions of the federal FCA for guidance on interpreting this

       provision, which is commonly referred to as the “public disclosure” bar.

[18]   The corresponding provision of the federal FCA was interpreted under similar

       circumstances in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 131 S.

       Ct. 1885 (2011). There, the United States Supreme Court considered a suit

       brought under the FCA. Kirk brought a suit against his former employer and

       alleged that the former employer “had submitted hundreds of false claims for

       payment under its Government contracts.” Schindler Elevator, 563 U.S. at 405,

       131 S. Ct. at 1890. Kirk’s action was based upon information that his wife

       received from the Department of Labor in response to three Freedom of

       Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. The former employer moved to dismiss

       the action because it alleged that an agency’s response to a FOIA request is

       barred by the public disclosure provisions of the FCA. The district court agreed

       and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the Second

       Circuit vacated and remanded, and the United States Supreme Court granted

       certiorari.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023          Page 13 of 18
[19]   The Supreme Court considered 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), which, at the time,

       provided: 4

                  (A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
                  section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
                  transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
                  congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
                  Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
                  media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
                  the person bringing the action is an original source of the
                  information.

                  (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
                  individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the
                  information on which the allegations are based and has
                  voluntarily provided the information to the Government before
                  filing an action under this section which is based on the
                  information.

       4
           The statute was revised in 2010 to eliminate the “jurisdiction” language and now provides:
                (A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by the
                Government, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or
                claim were publicly disclosed--
                  (i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent
                  is a party;
                  (ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing,
                  audit, or investigation; or
                  (iii) from the news media,
                unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an
                original source of the information.
                (B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who either (i) prior to
                a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the
                information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge
                that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,
                and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an action
                under this section.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023                                    Page 14 of 18
       (Emphasis added).

[20]   The Court analyzed the meaning of “report” and concluded that “[a] written

       agency response to a FOIA request falls within the ordinary meaning of

       ‘report.’” Id. at 410, 131 S. Ct. at 1893. The Court then determined that “[t]he

       DOL’s three written FOIA responses to Mrs. Kirk, along with their attached

       records, are thus reports within the meaning of the public disclosure bar.” Id. at

       411, 131 S. Ct. at 1893.

[21]   In discussing the policy behind the public disclosure bar, the Court noted that

       “the public disclosure bar was ‘an effort to strike a balance between

       encouraging private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.’”

       Id. at 413, 131 S. Ct. at 1894 (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation

       Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294-95, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 140 (2010)).

               The sort of case that Kirk has brought seems to us a classic
               example of the “opportunistic” litigation that the public
               disclosure bar is designed to discourage. Although Kirk alleges
               that he became suspicious from his own experiences as a veteran
               working at Schindler, anyone could have filed the same FOIA
               requests and then filed the same suit. Similarly, anyone could
               identify a few regulatory filing and certification requirements,
               submit FOIA requests until he discovers a federal contractor who
               is out of compliance, and potentially reap a windfall in a qui tam
               action under the FCA.

       Id., 131 S. Ct. at 1894 (internal citations omitted).

[22]   Relator, however, argues that we should not rely upon Schindler Elevator and,

       instead, we should rely upon the dissent in Schindler Elevator. We decline

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023          Page 15 of 18
       Relator’s invitation. Although the language in the FCA and IFCA is slightly

       different—“a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office

       report, hearing, audit, or investigation” versus “a legislative, an administrative,

       or another public report, hearing, audit, or investigation”—the statutes serve the

       same purposes of encouraging persons to “root out fraud” while discouraging

       “opportunistic” litigation. Id. We find Schindler Elevator persuasive, and we

       conclude that the Treasurer’s responses to Relator’s Indiana Access to Public

       Records Act requests are “public reports.” Anyone could have filed those same

       requests and then filed the same suit. Relator did not have “direct and

       independent knowledge” of the information. Accordingly, under Indiana Code

       Section 5-11-5.5-7(f), the trial court did not have “jurisdiction” over the action.

[23]   Although not raised by the parties, we must note, however, that the term

       “jurisdiction” in the statute at issue here does not refer to subject matter

       jurisdiction. Trial courts possess two kinds of “jurisdiction”—subject matter

       jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind.

       2006). “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s constitutional or statutory

       power to hear and adjudicate a certain type of case.” D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d

       1210, 1213 (Ind. 2020). The trial court here had subject matter jurisdiction to

       hear a qui tam action. “Other phrases recently common to Indiana practice,

       like ‘jurisdiction over a particular case,’ confuse actual jurisdiction with legal

       error[.]” K.S., 849 N.E.2d at 540.

[24]   In Packard v. Shoopman, 852 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court

       considered the use of the term “jurisdiction” in Indiana Code Section 33-26-6-2,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023           Page 16 of 18
       which provided: “If a taxpayer fails to comply with any statutory requirement

       for the initiation of an original tax appeal, the tax court does not have

       jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” The Court concluded that compliance with the

       statutory requirements for initiation of an original tax appeal did “not affect the

       subject matter jurisdiction of the Tax Court” and, when Indiana Code Section

       33-26-6-2 was passed, “the General Assembly used ‘jurisdiction’ to refer to the

       now abolished ‘jurisdiction over the particular case[.]’” Packard, 852 N.E.2d at

       930.

[25]   Similarly, here, the use of the term “jurisdiction” in Indiana Code Section 5-11-

       5.5-7(f) refers to the now abolished “jurisdiction over the particular case.”

       Accordingly, dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) for lack of subject

       matter jurisdiction was improper. See, e.g., Payne-Elliot, 193 N.E.3d at 1013

       (holding that the trial court erred by dismissing under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) for

       lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the trial court was “not ousted of

       subject-matter jurisdiction just because the defendant assert[ed] a religious

       defense”). Rather, the trial court should have dismissed the action under Trial

       Rule 12(B)(6) for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”

[26]   When an action is dismissed under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), however, “the pleading

       may be amended once as of right pursuant to [Trial] Rule 15(A) within ten [10]

       days after service of notice of the court’s order sustaining the motion[.]” Id. at

       1015. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal as to all defendants

       under Trial Rule 12(B)(6), but we modify the judgment to reflect the dismissal is

       without prejudice. See id. Because the trial court properly dismissed pursuant

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023            Page 17 of 18
       to Indiana Code Section 5-11-5.5-7(f), we need not address the parties’

       remaining arguments.

                                                  Conclusion
[27]   We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Relator’s action pursuant to Indiana

       Code Section 5-11-5.5-7(f). We conclude, however, that the trial court should

       have dismissed the action under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) rather than Trial Rule

       12(B)(1). Accordingly, the action should have been dismissed without

       prejudice. As a result, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with

       instructions to dismiss the action without prejudice.

[28]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2760 | May 12, 2023       Page 18 of 18