Court Opinion

ID: 9579025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:46.125706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:11.931969
License: Public Domain

Justice WHICHARD
dissenting.
I am convinced that the majority in the Court of Appeals correctly held that the adoption proceeding was improperly dismissed and could have gone forward without the consent of the child’s putative father. In holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the adoption petition instead of allowing the affidavit required by N.C.G.S. § 48-13 to relate back to the date the petition was first filed with a copy of the termination order, the majority has mistaken evidence for pleadings, and it has ignored the strong expression of legislative intent set out in the statute. While the machinations of Family Services and of the child’s mother to avoid meaningful notification of the putative father are not laudable, in view of the plain language and express purpose of the controlling statutory provisions, neither are they determinative. What ought to determine this case and others like it is the clear, simple, legislative purpose to put the rights and welfare of the adoptive child above the rights of his absent or incapable biological parent.
The statutory scheme for the transfer of parental responsibilities from biological to adoptive parents includes a means of terminating the rights and duties of the former in order to assure that the rights and duties of the latter will be exclusive with regard to the adoptive child. The legislative intent underlying this scheme reflects the following priorities:
*70[T]he primary purpose of this chapter is to protect children from unnecessary separation from parents who might give them good homes and loving care, . . . and to protect them from interference, long after they have become properly adjusted in their adoptive homes[,] by biological parents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure. . . . The secondary purpose of this Chapter is ... to prevent later disturbance of [the adoptive parents’] relationship to the child by biological parents whose legal rights have not been fully protected.
N.C.G.S. § 48-1(1), (2) (1984). This provision concludes with guidance as to how the chapter is to be read and applied: “When the interests of a child and those of an adult are in conflict, such conflict should be resolved in favor of the child; and to that end this Chapter should be liberally construed.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1(3) (1984).1
At the time Family Services filed its adoption petition, the parental rights of the biological parents of an illegitimate child could be foreclosed in one of three general ways: by consent under N.C.G.S. § 48-7(a) or § 48-9(a)(l); by “termination” under Article 23 (now repealed) or Article 24B of Chapter 7A; or by adjudication of abandonment under Article 24B of Chapter 48. Family Services initially filed a copy of a termination order with its adoption petition on 16 February 1984. As the culmination of the action to terminate parental rights under Article 24B of Chapter 7A, the order established the facts that Family Services had complied in good faith with all pertinent provisions of the statute, including a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether notice was to be served by publication, court-sanctioned notice by publication, and an adjudicatory hearing prior to the issuance of the order itself on 18 January 1984. See N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-289.26(a), (d), 7A-289.30(a), (d), 7A-289.32(6), and 7A-289.33 (1989). The order specified as grounds for terminating the parental rights of the putative father that the father had “not done any of the acts listed in G.S. 7A-289.32(6).” In addition to the termination order, Family Services attached a consent form signed by the agency itself and a “Parent’s Release, Surrender, and Consent” form signed by the child’s mother, in compliance *71with N.C.G.S. §§ 48-7(b) and 48-9(a)(3). When an order terminating parental rights has been filed with the adoption petition, a licensed child-placing agency such as Family Services has the right to give written consent to the adoption of a child in its custody. N.C.G.S. §§ 48-5(f), 48-9(a)(3) (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989). Such consent, filed with the petition for adoption, is sufficient for purposes of making such an agency a party to the adoption proceeding. N.C.G.S. § 48-9(a) (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
Under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 7A-289.32(6), the circumstances under which the parental rights of a putative father may be foreclosed are “virtually identical” to those under which an adoption may proceed without the consent of the putative father, in effect terminating his parental rights. In re Adoption of Clark, 95 N.C. App. 1, 7, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1989). See also N.C.G.S. §§ 48-5 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989), 48-6(a)(3) (1984). Among the enumerated acts, the nonfeasance of which may result in the termination of a putative father’s rights, is the circumstance whether he has “[l]egitimated the child pursuant to provisions of G.S. 49-10, or filed a petition for that specific purpose.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-289.32(6)(b) (1989). Cf. N.C.G.S. § 48-6(a)(3) (1984) (“The child has been legitimated either by marriage to the mother or in accordance with provisions of G.S. 49-10, a petition for legitimation has been filed.”). By filing a petition to legitimate Daniel James Clark on 4 May 1984, the putative father clearly intended belatedly to nullify such a finding in the termination order and to preclude any subsequent finding under N.C.G.S. § 48-6(a) that he had not performed any act that would have made his consent necessary to the child’s adoption. The holding of the majority gives the putative father’s belated filing the effect he desires because it affirms the trial court’s decision not to allow the affidavit to be substituted for the termination order filed with the adoption petition. In this the majority misapplies the Rules of Civil Procedure and misconstrues the letter and spirit of the adoption statute.
Although the Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to adoption proceedings, see In re Adoption of Searle, 74 N.C. App. 61, 64, 327 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1985), the termination order or affidavit required to obviate a putative father’s consent to adoption is not, properly considered, a pleading. A pleading setting forth a claim for relief is “a short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the parties and the court notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intend*72ed to be proved.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 8(a)(1) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1989). Detailed fact pleading is neither required nor prohibited under our “notice theory” of pleading. Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 104-05, 176 S.E.2d 161, 167 (1970). However, the facts underlying a party’s statement of its claim should not be confused with the pleading itself, particularly in a case such as this where the evidence underlying the particular averment, attached as a “consent form” to the petition for adoption, was identical in the termination order and the later affidavit.
Properly considered, the pleading involved is the allegation in the petition for adoption that “all necessary parties to this proceeding are properly before the court; and there has been full compliance with the law in regard to the Consent to Adoption filed with this Petition . . . .” The affidavit is not a pleading, but statutorily required evidence supporting the foregoing allegation. The majority thus goes astray in viewing introduction of the affidavit as an amendment to pleadings, which is discretionary with the trial court.
In general, “all relevant evidence is admissible.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 402 (1988). The only issue before the trial court here was whether the putative father’s consent to the adoption was required. Thus, an affidavit averring that the putative father had performed none of the acts set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7A-289.32(6) that would make his consent to the adoption necessary was clearly relevant and admissible. Ordinarily, a court order terminating the putative father’s parental rights for failure to perform any of the acts set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7A-289.32(6) would constitute even more persuasive evidence than a mere affidavit to the same effect. Thus, in attaching the termination order to the petition for adoption, rather than an affidavit, petitioners were offering the evidence required by the statute, but in a more persuasive form.
The termination order, while ruled invalid on procedural grounds, was not invalidated as to its evidentiary substance, to wit, that the putative father had failed to perform in any of the ways necessary to require his consent to the adoption. The affidavit and the contents of the termination order were evidentiary underpinnings to the same averment in the petition for adoption and consent form accompanying it: that the putative father had taken none of the steps described by statute prior to the filing of either the termination or the adoption petition that would indicate an *73interest in the child or in the corporeal consequences of his amorous liaison. The substance of the averment did not vary from one document (the termination order) to its proffered substitute (the affidavit): the latter was merely evidence in an admissible form (the affidavit) substituted for the same evidence in a form rendered inadmissible by the invalidation of the termination order. Admitting the substituted evidence in no way would have altered the legal status of the proceeding. The adoption petition, filed on 16 January 1984, was still before the court, as was the consent form signed by the agency in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 48-9(a)(3). The affidavit simply repeated for the record the reason the father’s consent was not required: that prior to the filing of the adoption petition, he had not taken any of the steps enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 48-6(a)(3). This evidence was relevant and admissible, and in dismissing the adoption petition for improper filing where the same admissible, relevant evidence in a form different from the invalidated order was before the court, the trial court “truly exalt[ed] form over substance.” Power Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 68, 265 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1980). In light of the clear legislative mandate that the adoption statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the child and its stability in its adoptive home, N.C.G.S. § 48-1, I would hold that it erred in doing so.
The legislature has expressly stated that in adoption proceedings under Chapter 48, the child’s interests are to take precedence over the conflicting interests of an adult and the intervention of a biological parent in the child’s relationship with his adoptive parents is to be prevented, even when the legal rights of that biological parent may “not have been fully protected.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1(1), (2) (1984). The majority’s view that relation back of the affidavit was precluded by potential prejudice to the putative father inaccurately characterizes evidence supporting averments as to parental consent as pleadings and exalts form over substance in allowing the exclusion of relevant and admissible evidence. More important, it ignores the stated purpose of the adoption statute, which clearly favors the child’s interests over those of his putative parent and promotes the stability of the child in his adoptive home. The child in this case approaches his seventh birthday ignorant of the efforts of his putative father to sever the child’s lifelong bond with his adoptive parents and to assume custody. The result reached by the majority does not place the child’s interests over the conflicting interests of his biological parent and undermines the stability of *74the child in his adoptive home, contrary to clear legislative intent. “[T]he primary purpose of [the adoption statute] is to protect children . . . from interference, long after they have become properly adjusted in their adoptive homesf,] by biological parents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure.” N.C.G.S. § 48-1(1), (2) (1984).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Justices MITCHELL and Webb join in this dissenting opinion.

. In holding that the adoption petition had been improperly filed and dismissing it without prejudice, the trial court erroneously stated that the adoption statute was to be strictly construed. The statute prescribes that it is to be liberally construed in favor of the child and in favor of the stability of the child in its adoptive home.