Court Opinion

ID: 9638075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:32:37.776789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:03.503501
License: Public Domain

HOOD, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
It is my opinion that ’the trial court should have vacated the default judgment for lack of proper service of process. Accepting the return of the marshal as true, it is readily seen that all it states is that service was made on defendant by leaving copies at her usual place of abode with a Mr, Singh. This is not enough. The rule requires that the copies be left -at the dwelling house or usual, place of abode “with some person of suitable age ■and discretion then residing therein.”
The marshal’s return does not state that Mr. Singh was a person of suitable age and discretion, and more importantly does not state that he was then residing at defendant’s usual place of abode. From all that appears on the return, Mr. Singh could have been a total stranger to defendant who simply chanced to have been on the premises when the marshal arrived.
The trial court’s Rule 4, modeled after Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for a form of substituted service and “all forms of substituted service in actions purely in personam, constitute departures from the rule of the common law and the statutory authority therefor should be strictly followed.” Wise v. Herzog, 72 App.D.C. 335, 338, 114 F.2d 486, 489 (1940). Not only must the statutory authority be strictly followed in effecting service, but the return also should show such compliance. 42 Am.Jur., Process § 121; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 94a and 95. Thus it was said in State ex rel. Stone v. Sears, 111 W.Va. 42, 43, 160 S.E. 297 (1931): “In order that substituted service of original process shall have the effect of actual service upon the party in person, the return must show that all essential provisions of the statute authorizing such substituted service have been strictly complied with.” 1 The only case found dealing with this question under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that of Scheerger v. Wiencek, D.C.W.D.N.Y., 34 F.Supp. 805 (1940), where it was said: “The certificate here should show where the service was made and that the person served was one of suitable age and discretion.”
I do not believe, as the majority opinion indicates, that because the return states that service was made under Rule 4, it can *205be implied that all requirements of Rule 4 were complied with. The statement of the marshal that service was made under Rule 4 is simply his conclusion. “ * * * a return of service may not be aided by presumptions or intendments, and it must show on its face that every requisite of the statute has been complied with.” State ex rel. Boll v. Weinstein, 365 Mo. 1179, 295 S.W.2d 62, 65 (1956).
In conclusion it may be noted that following the adoption of Rule 4 by the trial court the marshal’s form of return under that rule showed full compliance with all its requirements. See the form of return set forth in Brooks v. Concord Factors, Inc., D.C.App., 194 A.2d 134 (1963) and Hoaney v. Liss, D.C.App., 194 A.2d 668 (1963), dealing with returns made in 1951 and 1957. For some reason the marshal has adopted the abbreviated form of return used in this case, and in my opinion it is completely inadequate to show proper service. For these reasons I dissent.

. See also, Chiaro v. Lemberis, 28 Ill.App.2d 164, 171 N.E.2d 81 (1960); Hicks v. Hamilton, Okl., 283 P.2d 1115 (1955); Carter v. Carter, 147 Conn. 238, 159 A.2d 173 (1960).