Court Opinion

ID: 9551937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:02:18.420519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:07.490229
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with the majority of the Court in its treatment of the full faith and credit issue and the doctrine of res judicata which makes it operative.1
Res judicata precludes the assertion of an entire claim which was or should have been raised in a prior action.2 It is generally accepted in this, as in other jurisdictions, that the doctrine is properly applicable (1) as between the parties to the prior litigation; (2) where the prior action proceeded to judgment on the merits; and (3) where the subsequent dispute arises out of the same cause of action forming the basis of the prior litigation.3 In rendering its decision, the Colorado Court concluded that the parties and relief sought in that case were different from the previously decided federal case. Therefore, the federal decision was not res judicata as to the Colorado suit. However, the crucial question is whether the Colorado suit is res judicata as to the instant Utah suit.
Applying the foregoing analysis, it is my opinion that the Colorado decision is res judicata and therefore bars the present action. Clearly the parties are the same. Furthermore, there has been a judgment on the merits. The Colorado Court ruled that the statute of limitations in an action for wrongful death in Colorado is substantive, not procedural,4 inasmuch as the limitation period is contained within the very act providing for recovery.5 Therefore, the failure to commence an action within the statutory period resulted in a loss of the right and the dismissal of the action is on the merits. Finally, the present claim arises out of the same cause of action forming the basis of the prior litigation. In each instance, the theory of recovery was damages for the alleged wrongful death of plaintiff’s decedent.
Utah has traditionally adhered to the mandate of the full faith and credit clause that final judgments in sister states are to be given conclusive effect.6 Hence, we should abide by the Colorado decision which held that recovery for wrongful death was not warranted in the instant case. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s decision.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I deem it necessary to address two other points discussed by the majority.
My first concern is with the majority’s treatment of Utah’s borrowing statute.7 I agree with the principle that if a person is a citizen of Utah he is entitled to the benefits of the statute.8 However, such a determination is a factual matter to be decided by *353the trial court.9 Although plaintiff s living quarters were located in Utah, she apparently considered herself to be a resident of Colorado. Plaintiff voted in Colorado,10 received mail in Colorado and conducted her business in Colorado. In my view, there exists a factual question as to where plaintiff resided, upon which the trial court should have an opportunity to rule.
Second, I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the issue as to jurisdiction. In Shaffer v. Heitner,11 the United States Supreme Court held that to satisfy the demands of due process, the same standard applies for quasi in rem jurisdiction as for in personam jurisdiction. Therefore, the standard we have adopted with respect to our long-arm statute must apply. “Minimum contacts” is basically a factual matter best left to the trial court’s determination, especially when it has expressly deferred ruling upon the question of jurisdiction.12
At the very least, I would remand for a determination as to plaintiff’s residency, and whether jurisdiction lies.

. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 1226.

. See Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., Utah, 521 P.2d 379 (1974); Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Company, 71 Wash.2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967).

. Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962); East Mill Creek Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945); Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Everett, 340 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1965).

. That Utah looks to the law of a sister state as to whether a matter is substantive procedure, see Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118 (1947).

. For comparable holdings, see Gaston v. B. F. Walker, 400 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1968); Bengston v. Nesheim, 259 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1958); California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d 227 (1958).

. In Re Estate of Duquesne, 29 Utah 2d 94, 505 P.2d 779 (1973); Intermountain Association of Credit Men v. Watterson, 19 Utah 2d 212, 429 P.2d 818 (1967).

. U.C.A., 1953, 78-12-45.

. Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Utah, 583 P.2d 613 (1978).

. Id.

. To vote in Colorado, a person must be a resident of Colorado. C.R.S., 1973, 1-2-101.

. 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).

. Even plaintiff concedes that the jurisdictional questions should be remanded for further evidentiary hearing, inasmuch as she admits that the pleadings do not contain sufficient evidence to meet the Shaffer standard.