Court Opinion

ID: 9861400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:57:19.237899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:22.903585
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WEBBER, dissenting: With all due deference to my colleagues, I respectfully dissent from their holding that an employer-employee relationship existed here. The reliance on Morgan Cab Co. and Globe Cab Co. is misplaced. In both of those cases the supreme court stated unequivocally that no one factor may determine what the relationship of the parties is in a given situation. To state the matter another way, each case must stand on its own facts, and I find considerable factual differences between the instant case and Morgan and Globe. In Morgan the driver was required to take 10 calls per day from the company; most drivers worked shifts, although some were purchasing their cabs on a lease-with-option basis; the driver was required to take his radio to a designated shop for repair and was required to bring the cab itself in for repair when called for; the manager could refuse to allow a driver to take a cab; the driver was required to purchase $2 worth of gasoline when turning the cab in. In Globe the driver was required to pay for six days, regardless of the number of days on which the cab was actually used; as in Morgan the drivers worked shifts; all repairs were to be made by the company; and the driver had to pay a late fee of $5 if he turned the cab in tardily. None of this is present in the instant case. For all the record shows, a driver for Yellow Cab could keep his cab at home in the garage during the rental period. Only the profit motive kept him on the street, and such motive is more clearly characteristic of an entrepreneur than a workman. There were no shifts, no mandatory suppliers of gasoline, no late fees. What is at stake here is interference with the manner in which Yellow elected to do business. The question is not Professor Larson’s “relative nature of the work.” The nature of Yellow’s business, obviously, was to conduct a taxicab operation, but how it determined to do that is its own business and should be free from judicial inter-meddling. The question is not what Yellow was doing, but how it did it: it could employ drivers directly for wages, or it could lease cabs to independent contractors, or it could do both, or any other combination which resulted in the greatest advantage to it. There is nothing to indicate that this was anything other than an arm’s length transaction at its inception. The claimant knew exactly what he was getting into; it was not until after an injury that he sought to disclaim his leasing arrangement and obtain that for which he had not bargained. The totality of the circumstances as set forth in the lease indicates that no employment relationship was intended; in fact, it was specifically avoided, for which no criticism can be leveled. The document appears to have been knowingly drawn to avoid the pitfalls of Morgan and Globe. The record is barren of any indication that Yellow forced the claimant into the position of lessee, and one can speculate at length as to why the claimant elected a 24-hour lease instead of some more permanent arrangement. I would affirm the circuit court.