Court Opinion

ID: 9712627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:57:30.184639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.375567
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Price, J.:
To the extent that the majority opinion holds that all installment payments must be charged against financial resources in a determination of “inability to pay” as *565provided in Rule 1137, I disagree. Such a holding may, and probably will, be construed to qualify persons for relief under the rule in the most outrageous of situations, and would, to my view, further encourage personal deficit financing and credit card living. The distinction attempted by the majority between present inability to pay versus ability to pay in the very near future is, to me, impossible to achieve. Further, although the distinction is noted, it is later ignored in the majority holding when it is said: “All we hold is that if a judge finds that a petitioner is required to make installment payments as alleged in the petition, then he is to charge those payments against the petitioner’s resources, and after that, determine ‘inability to pay all or part of the costs of the action.’ ” (Majority Opinion, page 563).
Perhaps this concurring opinion conjures visions of disaster which will never become reality and assumes a defect in human nature that in truth does not exist. Perhaps! Nevertheless, in order to avoid that risk, however slight, the majority conclusion would better be qualified if its holdings were confined to the circumstances here presented by appellant. As Judge JACOBS has said, in speaking for the dissenting members of this Court in Gerlitzki v. Feldser, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 142, 145-146, 307 A.2d 307 (1973), there is considerable discretion vested in the lower court in examining such a petition so that unworthy persons who are not indigent may not enjoy the privileges extended to them without the payment of fees and costs. To that I would add further that this judicial exercise of discretion is granted in part to prevent abuses that may or may not be conjured visions.
I agree with the majority conclusions as to appellee’s status and the ultimate responsibility for the payment of waived costs, and further agree that based upon the circumstances here presented the order of the lower court must be reversed, since under the circumstances *566here presented the denial of relief was an abuse of discretion.
Watkins, P.J., joins in this concurring opinion.