Court Opinion

ID: 9675555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:57:42.955326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.471478
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530; MSA 28.798. He subsequently pled guilty to a supplemental information charging him as a habitual offender pursuant to MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084 and was sentenced to a prison term of 15 to 30 years. He now appeals as of right.
On July 20, 1976, a lone gunman entered Val’s Pizzeria in Brighton, Michigan, and demanded that the contents of the cash register be placed in his hat. The gunman fled the store and entered a red Chevrolet Nova, which left the area. This car was spotted by Trooper Gary Groth of the Michigan State Police and he pursued and stopped the vehicle. After a back-up unit arrived, the occupants were told to leave the car. The officers then *424saw a gun in the car and the occupants were placed under arrest. Defendant was one of these occupants, although the testimony at trial established that he was not the gunman who had entered Val’s. A subsequent search of the car uncovered a hat containing cash and a Val’s menu card.
At trial, defendant objected to the admission of various exhibits offered by the prosecution on the ground that there were breaks in the chain of custody. The trial court overruled the objection. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. The fact that there are breaks in the chain of custody does not require that the evidence be excluded. To be admissible, the prosecution must merely lay a foundation identifying the articles as what they are purported to be and showing that they are connected with the crime or the accused. People v Kremko, 52 Mich App 565, 573; 218 NW2d 112 (1974), People v Burrell, 21 Mich App 451, 456-457; 175 NW2d 513 (1970). In the present case there was sufficient evidence of the exhibits’ identity and connection to the crime to support their admission at trial.1 Any breaks in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. People v King, 58 Mich App 390, 398-399; 228 NW2d 391 (1975), People v Mitchell, 37 Mich App 351, 356; 194 NW2d 514 (1971). Thus, no error occurred.
*425Defendant next contends that his guilty plea to the habitual offender information should be vacated because the plea proceedings did not comply with the requirements of the guilty plea rule, GCR 1963, 785.7. The prosecution contends that compliance with the guilty plea rule is not mandatory, and a plea proceeding is proper as long as the trial court has complied with the procedures set forth in the habitual offender act.2 For the reasons stated below, we hold that GCR 1963, 785.7 is applicable to proceedings in which a defendant pleads guilty to a habitual offender information.
As the dissent points out, unlike a regular criminal information, a supplemental information charging defendant as a habitual offender does not charge a defendant with a separate crime, but instead provides for enhanced punishment for the current conviction. People v Hendrick, 398 Mich 410; 247 NW2d 840 (1976). This distinction is not determinative.
Perhaps the most appropriate method of addressing the question of the applicability of the guilty plea rule in these situations is to compare a *426habitual offender proceeding with a regular criminal trial, where the guilty plea rule is applicable, Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), and a probation revocation hearing where the rule is not applicable, People v Rial, 399 Mich 431; 249 NW2d 114 (1976).
The habitual offender proceeding is similar to a probation revocation hearing in that in neither case is defendant charged with a criminal offense, and in both situations the proceeding is concerned with a fairly narrow factual issue. At this point, however, the similarities end.
The habitual offender proceeding, like an ordinary criminal trial, is a critical stage of a criminal prosecution. See People v Johnson, 386 Mich 305; 192 NW2d 482 (1971), People v Burton, 44 Mich App 732; 205 NW2d 873 (1973).3 Defendants in both instances have the right to a trial by jury, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085, and the prosecution must prove the charges by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Covington, 70 Mich App 188, 191; 245 NW2d 558 (1976), lv den 402 Mich 843 (1977). Furthermore, the habitual offender proceeding is subject to the same evidentiary and procedural rules as a regular trial, MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. A probation revocation hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, Rial, supra, at 435. Defendant does not have the right to a jury trial, People v Gladdis, 77 Mich App 91, 96; 257 NW2d 749 (1977), and the violation need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. People v Miller, 77 Mich App 381, 387; 258 NW2d 235 (1977). Moreover, the revocation proceeding is *427deemed to be summary and informal, and the normal evidentiary and procedural rules of a criminal trial are not applicable. Rial, supra, at 436.
Taking all these factors into consideration, it seems clear that the habitual offender proceeding is much closer to a regular criminal trial than a probation revocation hearing, and also that a guilty plea to a habitual offender charge involves the waiver of substantial criminal trial rights not afforded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing. For these reasons, the guilty plea rule should apply to habitual offender proceedings. To hold otherwise merely because the proceeding does not technically charge defendant with any crime appears to exalt form over substance. A defendant pleading guilty to a recidivist charge is waiving substantial rights and is subjecting himself to the possibility of enhanced punishment. From the defendant’s point of view such a charge is no different from any other criminal charge. In order to establish that the plea is intelligently, understandingly, and voluntarily given, compliance with GCR 1963, 785.7 is required.
Because the sentencing consequences can be more severe than the individual convictions upon which the habitual offender charge is premised, it is imperative that the defendant understand his rights when pleading guilty to the habitual charge.4 Therefore, the defendant should be advised of the possible maximum sentence, right to be tried by the court or jury, his presumption of *428innocence, the people’s burden of proof, his right to confrontation and compulsory process, his right to testify or remain silent without having the silence used against him as well as his rights under subsections (2) and (3) of GCR 1963, 785.7.5
We realize that People v Parker, 50 Mich App 537; 213 NW2d 576 (1973), held that a defendant need not be informed of his Jaworski rights6 prior to pleading guilty to a supplemental information charging him with being a habitual offender. This case was decided prior to the promulgation of the guilty plea rule, GCR 1963, 785.7. We feel that due to the increased judicial awareness of the problems which may arise at a guilty plea proceeding and the greater scrutiny of these proceedings which has been engendered by the guilty plea rule and subsequent cases, the rule announced in Parker is no longer controlling. However, since trial judges may have justifiably relied on Parker when taking pleas to habitual offender charges, the rule announced in this opinion is to be given prospective application.
Defendant’s conviction for unarmed robbery is affirmed. His guilty plea to the recidivist charge is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Cynar, J., concurred.

 The pistol was identified by the robbery victim as similar to that used by the robber and was identified by police officers as the pistol found in the car and placed in the box. The menu card was identified by a pizzeria employee as one used at the store. The hat was identified by the robbery victim as similar to that used by the robber and was further identified by police officers as the hat found in the car. The envelopes were identified by the officers as those in which the money found in the hat and in the car had previously been placed. Furthermore Chief Eugene Alii of the Brighton State Police Post testified that he retained custody of all eight exhibits commencing July 23, 1976, with the exception of one day when they were subjected to tests at the State Police laboratory.

 "If at any time after conviction and either before or after sentence it shall appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of crimes as set forth in any of the 3 foregoing sections, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such conviction was had, in his discretion, may file a separate or supplemental information in such cause accusing the said person of such previous convictions. Whereupon the court in which such conviction was had shall cause the said person whether confined in prison or otherwise, to be brought before it and shall inform him of the allegations contained in such information, and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require such offender to say whether he is the same person as charged in such information or not If he says he is not the same person, or remains silent, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty, and a jury of 12 jurors shall be empanelled from the petit jurors serving at the then or a following term of said court to determine the issues raised by such information and plea. The accused may waive trial by jury in the manner provided by this act. The usual practice in the trial of criminal cases shall be followed * * (Emphasis added.) MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085.

 Since these cases hold that sentencing is a critical stage and the habitual offender proceeding is a procedure for determining what sentence defendant is to be given, see Hendrick, supra, it necessarily follows that the habitual offender proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution.

 This Court realizes that whenever it mandates requirements for the trial court to follow, an extra burden is thrust upon the trial court’s already burgeoning dockets. However, considering compliance with the guilty plea rule is required before accepting a plea to even a six-month misdemeanor (GCR 1963, 785.10), it is not reasonable to ask the trial courts to spend a few extra minutes to comply with the guilty plea rule before it accepts a habitual offender plea which could subject defendant to life imprisonment.

 Since we perceive no set of facts under which a defendant could be further charged as a recidivist or have his probation or parole revoked as a result of pleading guilty to a habitual offender charge, subsections (c) and (e) of GCR 1963, 785.7(1) need not be followed.

 In People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972), the Michigan Supreme Court held that before a trial court could accept defendant’s guilty plea, it must inform the defendant of his right to' trial by jury, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination.