Court Opinion

ID: 9387979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:08:09.341769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.611468
License: Public Domain

[J-2-2023] [MO: Mundy, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 MIDDLE DISTRICT

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     :   No. 70 MAP 2022
                                                   :
                       Appellee                    :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                   :   Superior Court dated December 21,
                                                   :   2021, at No. 161 EDA 2021
               v.                                  :   Affirming the Judgment of Sentence
                                                   :   of the Chester County Court of
                                                   :   Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
 JOSEPH MELVIN ROLLINS,                            :   dated December 3, 2020 at
                                                   :   No. CP-15-CR-0003756-2019
                       Appellant                   :
                                                   :   SUBMITTED: January 18, 2023

                                   CONCURRING OPINION

JUSTICE BROBSON                                                   DECIDED: April 19, 2023
       I agree that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S.

§ 1543(b)(1)(iii), is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process principles, but

my path to that conclusion differs somewhat from the Majority’s. As this Court has time

and again reiterated, the object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate

the intention of the General Assembly,” 1 Pa. C.S. 1921(a), and the plain language of a

statute “provides the best indication of legislative intent.” Goodwin v. Goodwin, 280 A.3d

937, 943 (Pa. 2022) (quoting Miller v. Cnty. of Centre, 173 A.3d 1162, 1168 (Pa. 2017)).

Presently, there are three statutes that must be applied: Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the

Vehicle Code; Section 106(b)(8) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 106(b)(8) (relating to

misdemeanors of the third degree); and Section 9756(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.

C.S. § 9756(b)(1) (“The court shall impose a minimum sentence of confinement which

shall not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed.”).
       When these statutes are read in pari materia, as required when interpreting

statutes that “relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or

things,” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1932(a), it becomes clear that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle

Code provides a minimum sentence of 6 months, Section 106(b)(8) of the Crimes Code

provides a maximum sentence of 12 months, and the minimum/maximum rule in

Section 9756(b)(1) of the Judicial Code tells us that the only permissible sentence is 6 to

12 months. Thus, this is not a circumstance where we have to “infer” a sentence due to

the General Assembly’s silence or speculate as to what sentence the General Assembly

intended; rather, when we apply the relevant provisions of law, it becomes clear that the

General Assembly intended to impose a sentence of 6 to 12 months for a violation of

Section 1543(b)(1)(iii). As such, there are no due process concerns regarding notice of

the potential punishment for a violation of Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), because these statutory

provisions convey, in precise terms, the sentence of imprisonment the General Assembly

intended courts to impose.

       The General Assembly’s intent as imparted in the foregoing statutes also

distinguishes this case from Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), as Eid

concerns purported superfluous statutory language. Appellant essentially argues that “if

this Court were to infer a maximum sentence of one year, the only sentence available

would be six months to one year, in which case the legislature could have merely said so

in the first place.” (Majority Op. at 7.) But Appellant fails to recognize that the General

Assembly did say so when it enacted Section 106(b)(8) of the Crimes Code and capped

the sentence for a misdemeanor of the third degree at 12 months. Thus, this Court is not

inferring anything. Further, if the General Assembly decides to amend the Crimes Code

and increase the maximum sentence for a misdemeanor of the third degree, the

permissible range of sentences may change. At such time, there would be no need to

                              [J-2-2023] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 2
amend Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) because the minimum sentence is already set. In either

circumstance, the “not less than” language merely indicates that the General Assembly

intended that a violation of Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code carry a minimum

sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment, and the language, therefore, is not superfluous.

      Presently, Appellant was convicted of violating Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the

Vehicle Code, and the trial court sentenced Appellant to 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment.

Because the General Assembly provided sufficient notice to Appellant in the foregoing

statutes that he would receive a sentence of 6 to 12 months’ imprisonment for such a

violation, I agree with the Majority that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally

vague in violation of due process principles.

                             [J-2-2023] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 3