Court Opinion

ID: 9518808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:02:35.348133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:35.537466
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring: I concur with the holding that defendant’s petition “does not fall within the pale of Apprendi relief.” 318 Ill. App. 3d at 728. I write separately to say that I believe we should have reached this conclusion for the additional reason that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 — 1 et seq-. (West 1998)). As pointed out earlier in this opinion, another division of the First District has held that Apprendi should be applied retroactively to collateral proceedings. See People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 704-06. I disagree with the Beachem court’s analysis of our supreme court’s holding in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218 (1990). I completely agree with the analysis of another division of the First District in People v. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2000). Our supreme court in Flowers declined to apply its holding in People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988), retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court in Kizer succinctly described the holding in Reddick thusly: “In Reddick *** the court found that the instructions made it not just less likely, as the lower standard of proof made it in Apprendi, but impossible for a finder of fact following the burden of proof instructions to find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime rather than the greater. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d at 194-95.” (Emphasis in the original). Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 252. In spite of this, our supreme court found that the Reddick rule was not sufficiently fundamental so as to qualify under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), as an exception to the general proposition that new constitutional rules should not be applied to cases on collateral review. I agree with the Kizer court that the holding in Flowers indicates how narrowly our supreme court interprets any exceptions to the Teague doctrine. Consequently, I also agree with the Kizer court that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. As of the date of this concurrence, December 27, 2000, a search has turned up no case other than People v. Beachem, in which a court of appeals (state or federal) or state supreme court has held that Apprendi should be applied retroactively. As I believe that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively to collateral proceedings or review of the same, I concur in the holding in the instant case.