Court Opinion

ID: 9724253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:50:11.400522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:30.416320
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). The crux of this appeal involves a jury verdict in an action by Anthony White and his wife against McLouth Steel Corpo*433ration. I agree with Judge Gillis’ statement of the essential facts except for one sentence which reads as follows: "The jury was instructed to return a general verdict in favor of the prevailing party”. (Emphasis added.)
The pertinent portion of the instruction given by the trial judge is as follows:
"Your possible verdicts, then, members of the jury, and I say verdicts because you must render a verdict in the case of Anthony White and a verdict in the case of Ruby White, your possible verdicts, first in the case of Anthony White, would be, if you find in his favor, to assess damages as you feel he has proven to you by a fair preponderance of the evidence he is entitled to under the facts as presented to you in open court, guided by the law as the court has given it to you. If you find, of course, that the plaintiff Anthony White is not entitled to a verdict from the defendant McLouth Steel, your verdict would be no cause for action.
"In the case of Ruby White, if you find in favor of Anthony White then you will assess Ruby White’s damages in such an amount as you find that she has proven from the evidence by a fair preponderance of the evidence she is entitled to from this defendant. If you find either that she has not proven she is entitled to anything or if you find that the plaintiff Anthony White was not entitled to anything, then, of course your yerdict would be no cause for action as to Ruby White.”
Nowhere in the instructions was the jury told it should not specify upon which of plaintiffs’ three theories1 it had based its verdict. In view of the careful instructions by the judge on those theories, the action of the jury in returning a verdict specifically based on one of them (negligence) is entirely logical and in no way contrary to the instructions it received.

*434
Issue I

May the trial court order that the record as reported by the court reporter be altered?

I am not concerned here with the power of a trial judge to instruct a jury as to the proper verdict it should bring in. What does cause me concern is the alteration of the instant record by order of the trial judge, completely in violation of the sworn duty of the court reporter to report the proceedings and testimony in a case truly and correctly. (See footnote 1 of the majority opinion.) A judge should not in any way interfere with or cause the alteration of the true record as reported by the court reporter. The transcript of what occurred at trial is the court reporter’s responsibility, not the judge’s. If a trial judge had the power to alter the record, appellate courts would be stultified in their effort to review trial proceedings.
I would take this occasion to admonish both the trial judge and the court reporter, and to instruct the reporter in no uncertain terms that he has a separate, independent sworn duty faithfully to report the proceedings and the testimony taken. Under no circumstances, not even on the order of a judge, should he delete from the record that which actually took place.

Issue II

Is McLouth entitled to indemniñcation?

The situation in these cases illustrates the tremendous importance of a proper record in order that there may be intelligent review by an appellate court. The indemnity provision in the contract between McLouth and Anderson reads as follows:
"If this order covers the performance of labor for the *435buyer, the seller agrees to indemnify and protect the buyer against all liabilities, claims, or demands for injuries or damages to any person or property growing out of the performance of this contract. The seller further agrees to furnish a certificate from its insurance carriers showing that it carries adequate workmen’s compensation, public liability, and property damage insurance coverage. Said certificate must show the amount of coverage, number of policy and date of expirátion. If seller is self-insurer, he must have the Department of Labor and Industry of the state in which said labor is to be performed furnish certificates of the same direct from their offices to the buyer.”
The indemnity provision does not in specific language provide for indemnification to McLouth for its own negligence. See Geurink v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, 5 Mich App 154; 146 NW2d 111 (1966), leave den, 379 Mich 754. Geurink decided that liability for the negligence of an indemnitee will not be imposed on the indemnitor unless such intent is unequivocably expressed in the contract. The purpose of this holding was to prevent indemnitors from being made liable for something for which they had not contracted.
In the suit by Anthony E. White and Ruby T. White against McLouth, the judge charged the jury that plaintiffs’ claims were based upon theories of negligence, gross negligence, an inherently dangerous operation, and strict liability.
The judge charged the jury at considerable length with regard to negligence, contributory negligence, and gross negligence. In instructing the jury with regard to an inherently dangerous activity and with regard to strict liability, the judge at nó time spoke of negligence on the part of McLouth. He carefully pointed out that under these theories the negligence of some other person or party could be attributable to McLouth.
*436We must assume that the jury performed its duty by applying the law as given by the court to the facts as found by the jurors. The verdict of the jury was: "We the jury find the defendant Mc-Louth Steel guilty of negligence(Emphasis added.) In light of the judge’s charge to the jury, the only way this verdict can be read is that the jury found against McLouth on plaintiffs’ negligence theory which, under the judge’s charge, included the issue of proximate cause. While the jury could have brought in a general verdict, or could have been instructed by the judge to correct its verdict to a general one, in which case it would not be possible to determine on which theory McLouth was found liable, the verdict which the jury did bring in can be given only one interpretation.
McLouth’s right to indemnification by Anderson, if any, is based upon McLouth’s obligation to compensate the Whites as a result of the White v McLouth cases. Since that jury found McLouth guilty of negligence and awarded damages based upon such finding, the determination of the jury a fortiori included a finding that the negligence of McLouth proximately caused injury to the Whites. McLouth therefore may not receive indemnification from Anderson either by virtue of the indemnification provision of their contract, Meadows v Depco Equipment Co, 4 Mich App 370; 144 NW2d 844 (1966); Geurink v Herlihy Mid-Continent Co, supra, or on a theory of common-law indemnity, Husted v Consumers Power Co, 376 Mich 41; 135 NW2d 370 (1965).
Since my vote to reverse the trial judge would be dispositive of these cases, I do not consider the issue raised on the cross appeal by McLouth with regard to interest on the judgment.
I would reverse.

 Negligence and gross negligence, inherently dangerous activity, and strict liability.