Court Opinion

ID: 9863804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:54:20.862625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:19.723929
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
I concur. It is apparent from reading the foregoing opinion, together with the recent cases which are cited therein, that a painstaking attempt has been made to *145clarify the law with respect to the distinctions between first degree murder, second degree murder and volunary manslaughter, and to indicate the nature of the instructions which should be given to juries concerning such distinctions and also concerning other matters. It would appear, however, that something more than judicial clarification is required in order that clear, concise, and understandable instructions may be given in this important class of cases where the accused is charged with the unlawful killing of a fellow human being. I believe that the real difficulty is inherent in our statutory provisions and that the time has come for a legislative reexamination of all code sections relating to homicides in the light of the decisions construing those sections.
The substantive law relating to homicides is found mainly in sections 187 to 199 inclusive of the Penal Code. A mere reading of those sections demonstrates the difficulty which the ordinary layman, sitting as a juror, must encounter in grasping their significance when the substance of those sections is given in the form of instructions. Perhaps instructions covering the distinction between murder, defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought” (Pen. Code, § 187), and voluntary manslaughter, defined as “the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion” (Pen. Code, § 192), should be easily understood. But when a further attempt is made to instruct upon the distinction between the two degrees of murder (Pen. Code, § 189) and upon the effect of provocation either in reducing the grade or degree of the offense or in rendering the homicide wholly excusable or justifiable (Pen. Code, §§ 195, 197 and 199), it is practically impossible to give adequate instructions in clear, concise, and understandable form because of the unavoidable complexity of the instructions dealing with those subjects. Nevertheless, it is the duty of a trial judge, under our existing statutory law, to instruct upon all these subjects, as well as many others, in practically every case involving a charge of murder.
When an accused is placed on trial for his own life following the taking of the life of another, it is important from the standpoint of the accused, as well as that of the state, that the jury, which is entrusted with the often perplexing problem of determining the facts, should not be embarrassed by complicated and confusing instructions concerning the law to be applied to the facts as found. In my opinion, the present *146inevitable complications and confusion could be eliminated, at least in part, if the degrees of murder were abolished, leaving only the distinction between murder and voluntary manslaughter and permitting the jury to fix the punishment in the event that the accused is found guilty of murder, in the same manner that the jury is now permitted to fix the punishment in the event the accused is found guilty of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 190.) There appears to be little, if any, reason for dividing into degrees the offense defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought” (Pen. Code, § 187), so long as the jury is permitted to fix the punishment to be imposed upon one found guilty of such offense. On the other hand, the simplification of the law and the resulting simplification of the instructions dealing with the subject of homicides would appear to be of paramount importance. The question of whether the degrees of murder should be abolished is but one of several questions which might be considered by the Legislature in the event that it attempts to accomplish such simplification.