Court Opinion

ID: 9897348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:28.288125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:52.283568
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   Jul 07 2023, 8:59 am

                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
      Jason E. Salerno                                            Rosemary L. Borek
      Nashville, Indiana                                          Knight Hoppe Kurnik & Knight
                                                                  Carmel, Indiana

                                                   IN THE
           COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      John Simpson and Monroe LLC,                                July 7, 2023
      Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  22A-PL-3102
              v.                                                  Appeal from the Bartholomew
                                                                  Circuit Court
      Brown County Board of                                       The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin,
      Commissioners; Chuck Braden,                                Judge
      in his official capacity; Diana                             Trial Court Cause No.
      Biddle, in her official capacity;                           03C01-2209-PL-4330
      and Jerry Pittman, in his official
      capacity,
      Appellees-Defendants

                                         Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                       Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   John Simpson and Monroe LLC (collectively “Simpson”) appeal the

      Bartholomew Circuit Court’s dismissal of their complaint against the Brown

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                                Page 1 of 7
      County Board of Commissioners and its members Chuck Braden, in his official

      capacity; Diana Biddle, in her official capacity; and Jerry Pittman, in his official

      capacity (collectively “the Board”). Simpson raises two issues for our review,

      which we consolidate and restate as a single issue: whether the trial court erred

      when it dismissed his complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). We

      affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Simpson owns and operates a “site-work” contracting company. Appellant’s Br.

      at 6. Between 2014 and 2018, Simpson and the Board were engaged in

      “complex” and “bitter” litigation related to the Board’s denial of Simpson’s

      application for a septic contractor’s license. Id. That litigation ended in a

      settlement agreement.

[3]   In April 2020, the Board “invited bids for a public works project” to construct a

      hiking trail. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 12. Simpson “prepared and submitted a

      responsive bid,” and his bid “was the lowest of the four bids received.” Id. The

      Board “rejected all bids for the expressed reason that they were ‘too

      expensive.’” Id. In April 2021, the Board again invited bids for the project but

      added a requirement that bidders be “INDOT certified.” Id. Simpson is not

      INDOT certified, but he submitted a bid for the project anyway. Simpson’s bid

      was the only bid, but the Board rejected it because of his lack of INDOT

      certification. The Board then invited additional bids and added a requirement

      that “bidders must be pre-qualified or certified by the Indiana Department of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023            Page 2 of 7
      Administration (IDOA).” Id. Simpson was neither pre-qualified nor certified by

      the IDOA. But he again submitted a bid and asserted that he was “exempt from

      the [IDOA] statutory requirement,” and his bid was the “lowest of three bids.”

      Id. at 13. On September 1, the Board awarded the contract to another bidder.

[4]   On May 4, 2022, Simpson filed a complaint against the Board alleging two

      counts: (1) “ill will” in rejecting his bids and (2) violation of the Indiana

      Antitrust Act. Id. at 12. Simpson sought damages, including punitive damages

      and attorney’s fees. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Simpson’s complaint

      under Trial Rule 12(B)(6). The Board alleged that “Indiana law does not permit

      an antitrust action against a governmental entity” and the complaint “does not

      otherwise satisfy the requirements of a public lawsuit” under the Indiana Public

      Lawsuit Statute. Id. at 19-20. Following a hearing, the trial court found that

      Simpson had “failed to comply with the Public Law[suit] Statute” and granted

      the motion to dismiss.1 This appeal ensued.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Simpson contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his complaint

      pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6). As our Supreme Court has stated:

                 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal
                 sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it. When ruling
                 on a motion to dismiss, the court must view the pleadings in the
                 light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every

      1
          The parties jointly moved the trial court to dismiss the antitrust count.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                Page 3 of 7
                 reasonable inference construed in the non-movant’s favor. We
                 review a trial court’s grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6)
                 motion de novo. We will not affirm such a dismissal unless it is
                 apparent that the facts alleged in the challenged pleading are
                 incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances.

      Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation marks and

      citations omitted). We may affirm the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

      if it is sustainable upon any theory. Sims v. Beamer, 757 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind.

      Ct. App. 2001).

[6]   Simpson argues that the trial court erred when it found that his complaint is

      barred by the Public Lawsuit Act, Indiana Code sections 34-13-5-1 to -12 (“the

      Act”).2 Simpson maintains that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, he did not

      bring his claim under the Act. Rather, he contends that his “claims seek to

      protect his private interest only, not public interests.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. He

      asserts that his complaint “states a claim for which relief may be granted under

      2
          A public lawsuit is defined by Indiana Code Section 34-6-2-124(a) in relevant part as:

                 (1) any action in which the validity, location, wisdom, feasibility, extent, or character of
                 construction, financing, or leasing of a public improvement by a municipal corporation is
                 questioned directly or indirectly, including but not limited to suits for declaratory
                 judgments or injunctions to declare invalid or to enjoin the construction, financing, or
                 leasing; . . . .

      Plaintiffs in a public lawsuit “may sue in their capacity either as citizens or taxpayers of the municipal
      corporation.” Ind. Code § 34-13-5-2(a).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                                          Page 4 of 7
      tort theory, as it alleges sufficient facts, conduct and damages sounding in

      tort.”3 Id.

[7]   Again, we may affirm the trial court on any theory supported by the record.

      Sims, 757 N.E.2d at 1024. Doing so, we will assume for the sake of argument

      that the trial court erred when it dismissed Simpson’s complaint for not meeting

      the requirements of the Public Lawsuit Act. However, even under that

      assumption, we are obliged to affirm. While the trial court did not address

      Simpson’s contention that his complaint states a claim for relief due to the

      Board’s alleged tortious conduct, dismissal was still warranted under that

      theory.

[8]   The Board cites case law holding that unsuccessful bidders like Simpson cannot

      bring claims for damages outside of the Public Lawsuit Act. In particular, in

      Shook Heavy and Environmental Construction Group v. City of Kokomo, our Supreme

      Court considered a certified question from the United States District Court of

      the Southern District of Indiana and held that

               an unsuccessful bidder does not have a cause of action under
               Indiana law for an injunction prohibiting a city from awarding a
               public contract to the selected bidder if the unsuccessful bidder’s
               legal theory is that the selected bidder is not the lowest

      3
        Notably, Simpson admits that he cannot identify any specific tort that applies here. Rather, Simpson asserts
      that his complaint “describe[s] conduct sounding sufficiently in tort that it should survive under the standard
      of review applied to a T.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Simpson does not cite case law to
      support that assertion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                                    Page 5 of 7
               responsible and responsive bidder as required [by since-repealed
               public purchasing laws].

      632 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ind. 1994). And we have interpreted Shook to preclude

      “any cause of action” by an unsuccessful bidder other than a claim under the

      Public Lawsuit Act or a claim that the governmental body used “illegal

      procedures” in awarding a bid. See Hamrick’s Diesel Serv. & Trailer Repair, LLC v.

      City of Evansville ex rel. Bd. of Public Works, 935 N.E.2d 764, 769 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2010), trans. denied.

[9]   In Shook, the Court stated that

               Gariup[ v. Stern4] makes clear that a bidder spends considerable
               money, time, and effort in preparing a bid under competitive
               bidding statutes and is “pecuniarily damaged if illegal procedures
               are used to his disadvantage.” 254 Ind.[ 563,] 566, 261 N.E.2d
               [578,] 581 [(1970)]. While it might be argued that this court’s
               recognition of such damages implies the existence of a common
               law tort, we believe the damage of which Gariup speaks is a result
               of the governmental entity employing “fraud or other illegal
               procedures,” id., in awarding the contract. The unsuccessful
               bidder does have a cause of action in such circumstances under
               [the Indiana Antitrust Act]. In the absence of a violation of [the
               Antitrust Act], the bidder has nothing more than “a unilateral
               expectation or abstract desire.” See Rice v. Scott County, 526 N.E.2d at
               1197. This conclusion is buttressed by considering its application

      4
        In Gariup, the Indiana Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful bidder who sued a school board to enjoin
      the award of a public contract for construction of a new school building “did not have a cause of action under
      the public lawsuit statute” because he did not sue as “a citizen or taxpayer of the municipality.” Shook, 632
      N.E.2d at 359-60. As the Court noted in Shook, the Court in Gariup “dismissed the entire cause of action for
      failure to comply with the technical requirements of the Public Lawsuit Statute.” Id. at 360. That was the
      basis for the trial court’s dismissal of Simpson’s complaint here.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                                  Page 6 of 7
               in the case of a non-governmental entity seeking competitive bids
               on a project. Clearly an unsuccessful bidder has no common law
               cause of action against the party soliciting bids if another bidder
               is chosen. However, an unsuccessful bidder on a private project
               does have a cause of action under [the Antitrust Act] if fraud or
               collusion is alleged. In the absence of legislative direction, we see no
               reason why the common law rules in this regard should not be the same
               for bids on public and private projects.

       632 N.E.2d at 360 n.7 (emphases added).

[10]   Here, although Simpson originally stated a claim under the Antitrust Act, he

       agreed to dismiss that claim, and he does not raise that issue on appeal. And,

       again, we assume for the sake of argument that Simpson is correct that he made

       no claim under the Public Lawsuit Act. Because those are the only two theories

       upon which Simpson may seek damages, we agree with the Board that

       Simpson’s claim sounding in tort is barred as a matter of law. The trial court

       therefore did not err when it dismissed Simpson’s complaint.

[11]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-3102 | July 7, 2023                   Page 7 of 7