Court Opinion

ID: 9947882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 20:11:22.069654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:40.185373
License: Public Domain

03/05/2024
                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT KNOXVILLE
                                      February 28, 2024 Session

                      JEROME PENDZICH v. LAUREN WOODALL

                        Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Johnson City
                            No. 53904 Sharon M. Green, Judge
                           ___________________________________

                                  No. E2023-01235-COA-R3-JV
                             ___________________________________

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

                   Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J.; D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J; and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J.

Jerome Pendzich, Johnson City, Tennessee, Pro Se Appellant.

Grace E. Studer, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellee, Lauren Woodall.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION1

       The pro se appellant, Jerome Pendzich (“Appellant”), filed a notice of appeal with
this Court in August 2023, which states that Appellant is appealing the August 24, 2023
order of the Juvenile Court for Johnson City (“the Trial Court”). Upon receiving the
appellate record in this appeal, this Court reviewed the record on appeal to determine if the
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b).
Based on that review, we determined that the order appealed is not a final judgment subject
to an appeal as of right under Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Specifically, the order appealed provides

1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides:

          This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
          or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
          would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
          shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not
          be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
that several petitions seeking contempt against the appellee’s counsel remain pending
before the Trial Court. A party is entitled to an appeal as of right only after the trial court
has entered a final judgment that resolves all the claims between all the parties, leaving
nothing else for the trial court to do. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a); In re Estate of Henderson, 121
S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003); State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The trial court may also direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties. But the trial court may do so “only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.

        In this case, the Trial Court attempted to certify the August 24, 2023 order as final.
In its order, the Trial Court stated as follows: “This is a final order and any appeal from
this order must be made to the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the entry of this
order.” The order, however, does not state that there is no just reason for delay when
attempting to certify the order as final. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. This Court entered an
order on January 26, 2024, directing Appellant to obtain a final judgment or show cause
why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant filed documents
in response to the show cause order that did not address this Court’s concern regarding lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.

       The appellee, Lauren Woodall, thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. In
the motion, the appellee requested this Court dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and/or Appellant’s failure to comply with this Court’s show cause order.
Appellant filed a response to the motion to dismiss but appeared to believe that he could
proceed with his appeal despite the lack of subject matter jurisdiction without
demonstrating that a final judgment exists in the Trial Court or obtaining a final judgment
from the Trial Court during the timeframe provided by this Court. Appellant states in his
response as follows with regard to this Court’s show cause order:

       [T]he choice of the appellant is either to obtain a final judgment from the
       trial court OR Show Cause in this Court why the appeal should not be
       dismissed. I, Jerome Pendzich (Pro Se) have chosen to show cause.

       ***

       I, Jerome Pendzich did not attempt to obtain a finalized judgment from the
       Trial Court because it was Not mandatory to do so as opposition implies.
       Only one option provided to an appellant. Due to evidence of Fraud upon
       the Trial Court which also shows evidence of bias by default, I Jerome
       Pendzich, Do Not see a clear path to justice through the Trial Court.

       Appellant misconstrues this Court’s direction in the January 26, 2024 show cause
order. As stated in the order, this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction to consider this
                                            -2-
appeal without a final judgment. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Riverland, LLC v. City of Jackson,
No. W2017-01464-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 741679, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2018)
(“Except where otherwise provided, this Court only has subject matter jurisdiction over
final orders.”). This Court’s invitation for Appellant to show cause why this appeal should
not be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction allowed Appellant to produce evidence
demonstrating that a final judgment exists, which would provide this Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal. Appellant failed to demonstrate that a final judgment exists and failed to
obtain a final judgment from the Trial Court during the time provided in this Court’s order.
Appellant also did not request an extension of time to obtain a final judgment but instead
states that he did not even attempt to obtain a final judgment from the Trial Court during
the time provided.

        The Trial Court’s August 24, 2023 order does not contain the required determination
and direction and thus does not constitute a final appealable judgment under Rule 54.02.
Although the August 24, 2023 order may direct the entry of a final judgment, it does not
contain an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. The finding of “no
just reason for delay” is “an absolute prerequisite” to an appeal. Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d
747, 749 (Tenn. 1983); see also Duffer v. Lawson, No. M2009-01057-COA-R3-CV, 2010
WL 3488620, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2010) (holding that an order omitting “magic
language” under Rule 54.02 “is not a final and appealable judgment”). Absent the finding,
“the order is interlocutory and can be revised at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and rights and liabilities of all parties.” Fox, 657 S.W.2d at 749.
Without a final judgment, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
an appeal as of right. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990)
(“Unless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute,
appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.”).

       The court order from which Appellant seeks to appeal does not constitute a final
appealable judgment. We, therefore, grant the appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal for
lack of jurisdiction; however, we deny the request that such dismissal be with prejudice.
This appeal is hereby dismissed without prejudice to Appellant’s ability to file a notice of
appeal when a final judgment is entered in the trial court proceedings either resolving all
issues below or properly certifying the order as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02.
Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Jerome Pendzich, for which execution may
issue.

                                                          PER CURIAM

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