Court Opinion

ID: 9352096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 21:04:06.234045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:53.745700
License: Public Domain

2022 IL App (1st) 220919-U

                                             No. 1-22-0919

                                      Order filed January 4, 2023
                                                                                 THIRD DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                                 IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                              )   Appeal from the
                                                                   )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellant,                                    )   Cook County.
                                                                   )
     v.                                                            )   No. 17 CR 16524 01
                                                                   )
 DARIUS MOORE,                                                     )   Honorable
                                                                   )   Ursula Walowski,
           Defendant-Appellee.                                     )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE DEBRA B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1        Held: We vacate the trial court’s judgment granting defendant’s petition at the second
          stage of postconviction proceedings and remand the matter for a third-stage evidentiary
          hearing.

¶2        Plaintiff, the People of the State of Illinois, appeal from the trial court’s decision to grant

defendant Darius Moore’s petition at the second stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)), and allow defendant to file a late notice
No. 1-22-0919

of appeal. The court found that defendant had made a substantial showing that his counsel

performed deficiently when counsel failed to file a notice of appeal after defendant was convicted

and sentenced. The State contends that counsel had no duty to consult with defendant about an

appeal where the trial court’s admonishment regarding defendant’s right to appeal was “clear and

informative,” and counsel had no reason to believe that defendant was interested in filing an

appeal. Alternatively, if defendant had made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting relief without conducting a third-

stage evidentiary hearing. For the following reasons, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and

remand for further proceedings.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4       The State charged defendant with one count of being an armed habitual criminal, four

counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and four counts of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon. Defendant’s bench trial was held on December 6, 2018. Three Chicago

police officers, Joseph Lisciandrello, Thomas Bishop, and Alain Aporongao, testified at the trial.

¶5     On the evening of October 24, 2017, the officers were on patrol in an unmarked police

vehicle. Each wore a protective vest bearing Chicago Police identification. As Officer Aporongao

drove on the 1100 block of North Springfield Avenue, the other officers observed defendant

walking south on the east side of the street. The area was illuminated by streetlights. When

defendant saw them, he turned around and walked in the opposite direction. Defendant then

attempted to conceal himself behind a parked vehicle.

¶6     Finding defendant’s behavior suspicious, Officer Lisciandrello exited the vehicle to

conduct a field interview. Defendant fled south on Springfield and Officer Lisciandrello ran after

him. From 30 to 40 feet away, the officer observed defendant with “a black handgun in his right

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No. 1-22-0919

hand.” Officer Lisciandrello shouted “gun” to alert his partners. Officer Aporongao stopped the

vehicle at the intersection of Springfield and Thomas, where he and Officer Bishop joined in

chasing defendant.

¶7     On the 1000 block of North Springfield, defendant attempted to jump a fence and fell. After

successfully jumping that fence, he ran through the yard and jumped over another fence as Officer

Bishop chased him. Officer Lisciandrello continued to run south on Springfield. When defendant

ran through a gangway onto Springfield, Officer Lisciandrello was waiting for him and placed him

into custody.

¶8     Officer Bishop retraced defendant’s steps to the backyard of 1057 North Springfield where

he recovered a black semiautomatic firearm near the south fence line. The weapon appeared to be

the same one Officer Lisciandrello observed as he chased defendant. Although the magazine was

missing, the weapon contained one live round. Officer Aporongao recovered the missing

magazine, which also contained live ammunition, in the area where defendant fell as he attempted

to jump over the first fence. Neither Officer Bishop nor Officer Aporongao observed defendant

with a firearm during the chase.

¶9     Defendant was transported to the police station where he was given Miranda warnings.

Defendant told officers that he had the firearm for protection “because the block was into it.” He

obtained the weapon from a “person named Ant.” Defendant’s statement was not recorded.

¶ 10   After the officers testified, the State moved to include, as evidence, certified copies of

defendant’s prior convictions for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and armed violence.

Defendant rested without testifying or presenting evidence.

¶ 11   The trial court found “the officers’ testimony credible, corroborated, [and] consistent,” and

convicted defendant of one count of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC) and two counts of

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No. 1-22-0919

unauthorized use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and on

January 7, 2019, he filed an amended motion. In the amended motion, defendant alleged that the

evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where only one officer

observed defendant with a firearm and that officer did not see defendant discard the firearm. The

trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.

¶ 12   On January 17, 2019, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, defense

counsel argued that because defendant’s convictions involved nonviolent offenses, and his only

prior violent offense occurred when he was 19 or 20 years old, the court should impose a lesser

sentence. Defendant also addressed the court, offered his apology, and stated that he was young

when he was convicted of the prior offenses. Now, he is “grown” with a job and an eight-month-

old baby.

¶ 13   The trial court noted that defendant received his GED while imprisoned and he “had a job

at a manufacturing plant.” However, defendant also had prior felony convictions and was found

with a firearm. Considering the facts of the case, the court did not believe the minimum sentence

was appropriate. It did find, however, that “close to the minimum is appropriate” and sentenced

defendant to 8 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 14   The trial court then admonished defendant concerning his right to appeal:

       “Mr. Moore, even though I sentenced you, you do have the right to appeal the sentence.

       You already have the right to appeal the trial because your lawyer has already filed for a

       motion for a new trial. You have 30 days from today to file an appeal and whether or not

       you’d like to appeal your verdict. But as to the sentence, you need to file a motion for a

       new sentencing hearing within 30 days. If that motion is denied, then you would have the

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No. 1-22-0919

       30 days from then to appeal. If it’s granted, then you would get a new sentencing

       hear[ing.]”

When the court asked defendant whether he understood his appeal rights, defendant answered,

“Yes, your Honor.”

¶ 15   On October 28, 2020, defendant filed, through counsel, a petition for postconviction relief

pursuant to the Act and section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401

(West 2020)). In the petition, defendant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because

counsel failed to file a notice of appeal and a motion to reconsider sentence, thereby preventing

defendant from exercising his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. Defendant “wished to

pursue all of his appellate rights to challenge his conviction and sentence,” and “believed that trial

counsel [had] filed a motion to reconsider sentence and notice of appeal on Defendant’s behalf.”

However, when defendant’s family inquired about the progress of the appeal, they discovered that

no notice of appeal or motion to reconsider sentence had been filed. Defendant requested that the

trial court vacate his sentence and allow him to file a motion to reconsider sentence as well as “a

Notice of Appeal nunc pro tunc to January 7, 2019.”

¶ 16   The trial court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and on October 20, 2021,

the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. The State argued, inter alia, that defendant’s

petition was defective where it was not verified by an affidavit, and that defendant failed to make

a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel because his allegations were unsupported

by affidavits, records, or other evidence as required by the Act.

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No. 1-22-0919

¶ 17    On February 9, 2022, the court held a hearing on defendant’s petition. 1 At the hearing,

defendant’s counsel requested leave to file defendant’s affidavit. Due to the pandemic and

counsel’s inability “to bring a notary to the Illinois Department of Corrections,” counsel asked the

court to “swear” defendant regarding the facts in the affidavit. Although the State objected, the

court allowed the affidavit based on defense counsel’s difficulty having contact with defendant,

and because the affidavit “basically restates what’s in the motion to dismiss.” Defendant signed

and swore as to the contents of his affidavit.

¶ 18    The affidavit stated that after defendant’s trial, counsel “never discussed” defendant’s right

to appeal or his right to file a motion to reconsider his sentence. Defendant, however, “wished” to

appeal his case and challenge his sentence, and he incorrectly believed that a notice of appeal had

been filed.

¶ 19    On March 4, 2022, the court granted defendant’s petition and allowed him to file a notice

of appeal nunc pro tunc. The court reasoned that the “higher courts” viewed the issue as one of

“fundamental fairness regarding a constitutional right which is a right to appeal.”

¶ 20    The State filed a motion to reconsider arguing, in relevant part, that the trial court could

not grant relief under the Act at the second stage of postconviction proceedings. On April 12, 2022,

the trial court held a hearing on the motion. The court asked if the State would “call somebody” at

a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The assistant state’s attorney responded that he would call

defendant’s trial counsel and would “probably file motions for discovery and answers to

discovery.”

1
  At the hearing, defendant acknowledged that he was not entitled to relief under section 2-1401 of the
Code.

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No. 1-22-0919

¶ 21   The trial court denied the motion, however, because it was “satisfied” that defendant had a

right to appeal, and it did not “see that there [are] any issues here that an evidentiary hearing would

support or be dispositive of.” The court entered an order memorializing its oral ruling and the State

filed a timely notice of appeal on May 5, 2022.

¶ 22                                         II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23   We first address the State’s argument that the trial court failed to follow proper procedure

under the Act. The State argues that by granting defendant’s petition at the second stage of

proceedings, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court failed to comply with the

provisions of the Act. We review the trial court’s determination at the second stage de novo. People

v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006).

¶ 24   The Act is a “legislative creation” that allows an incarcerated defendant to assert a

substantial violation of his constitutional rights at trial. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 17. A

postconviction proceeding is not a substitute for a direct appeal but instead “offers a mechanism

for a criminal defendant to assert a collateral attack on a final judgment.” People v. Robinson, 2020

IL 123849, ¶ 42. “The purpose of a postconviction proceeding is to permit inquiry into

constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and sentence that were not, and could not

have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal.” People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22.

Therefore, issues raised and decided on direct appeal or in a prior proceeding are barred as res

judicata, and issues that could have been raised, but were not, are forfeited. People v. Daniels,

2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 21. The “Act delineates the process for litigating all postconviction

petitions.” Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 17.

¶ 25   Proceedings under the Act are divided into three stages. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d

410, 418 (1996). At the first stage, the trial court may dismiss a postconviction petition that is

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No. 1-22-0919

“frivolous or *** patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). A petition is

frivolous or patently without merit if it has no arguable basis either in law or fact. People v.

Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 11 (2009). If the trial court does not dismiss the petition, it advances to the

second stage where the court may appoint counsel to represent the defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122-

2.1(b) (West 2020); Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 18.

¶ 26     At the second stage, the defendant must make a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. Such a showing is made when the petition’s

well-pled allegations, if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would entitle the defendant to relief. Id.

¶ 35. The trial court does not engage in fact-finding or credibility determinations at this stage;

rather, all well-pleaded facts not positively rebutted by the original trial record are taken as true.

Id. Also, the State may file a motion to dismiss or answer the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122–5 (West

2020).

¶ 27     If the petition fails to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, it is

dismissed. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001). “If not dismissed, however, the

petition advances to the third stage, where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing

before deciding whether to grant relief.” Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 18. At the third stage, the

court functions as the factfinder by determining witness credibility and resolving conflicts in the

evidence. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34.

¶ 28     The second stage of postconviction proceedings tests only the legal sufficiency of the

petition. See Id. ¶ 35. “In other words, the ‘substantial showing’ of a constitutional violation that

must be made at the second stage *** is a measure of the legal sufficiency of the petition’s well-

pled allegations of a constitutional violation, which if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would

entitle [defendant] to relief.” (Emphasis added.) Id. This inquiry does not require the trial court to

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No. 1-22-0919

make findings of fact or assess the parties’ credibility. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385

(1998). A motion to dismiss filed at the second stage “raises the sole issue of whether the petition

being attacked is proper as a matter of law.” Id.

¶ 29   Accordingly, where the petition and trial record present questions of fact or credibility

concerns, granting postconviction relief at the second stage without a third-stage evidentiary

hearing is improper. See People v. Wheeler, 392 Ill. App. 3d 303, 310-11 (2009) (finding the trial

court’s grant of postconviction relief at the second stage without an evidentiary hearing

“premature,” because the State’s motion to dismiss raised the issue of the defendant’s credibility);

People v. Cleveland, 2012 IL App (1st) 101631, ¶¶ 52-53 (refusing to grant the defendant’s request

for relief at the second stage of proceedings without an evidentiary hearing, where fact questions

existed regarding his conflict of interest claim).

¶ 30   Here, defendant alleged in his petition and affidavit that “he wished to pursue all of his

appellate rights” and his trial counsel “never discussed” his right to appeal with him. The trial court

granted his petition at the second stage based on these statements.

¶ 31   The third stage, however, is where the trial court generally determines whether the

petition’s allegations entitle him to relief. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 18. Although defendant’s

well-pled allegations are taken as true at the second stage of postconviction proceedings, defendant

“no longer enjoys” such a presumption at the third stage. People v. Gacho, 2016 IL App (1st)

133492, ¶ 13. At a third-stage evidentiary hearing, the State is permitted to challenge the

defendant’s allegations and present its own evidence. Cleveland, 2012 IL App (1st) 101631, ¶ 37.

The State confirmed that if the petition advanced to the third stage, it would call defendant’s trial

counsel as a witness. Given the opportunity to testify, trial counsel may contradict defendant’s

allegations. “Assessments of credibility are better suited to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.”

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No. 1-22-0919

Wheeler, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 310. Like Wheeler, we find that the trial court’s grant of defendant’s

petition at the second stage was premature.

¶ 32   Defendant contends that a third-stage hearing is unnecessary because his ineffective

assistance claim is based on counsel’s duty to consult with defendant. Defendant argues that this

claim involves “an objective test” to determine whether “a rational defendant would want to

appeal.” As such, the trial court had no credibility or factual issues to resolve and an evidentiary

hearing “would only waste judicial resources.” Defendant cites Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.

470 (2000), as support. However, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument.

¶ 33   In Flores-Ortega, the United States Supreme Court held that “counsel has a constitutionally

imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either”

1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal, or 2) that “this particular defendant reasonably

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id. at 480. This determination

required courts to consider “all the information counsel knew or should have known.” Id.

¶ 34   Even if a defendant sufficiently established that counsel had a constitutional duty to consult

about an appeal, he or she must also show that counsel breached that duty to merit relief on an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 487. In Flores-Ortega, evidence showed that the

defendant believed, after a conversation with his counsel, that his counsel would be filing an

appeal. Id. at 474-75. Counsel, however, had no recollection of that conversation with the

defendant. Id. at 475. The Court could not determine whether counsel breached her duty to consult

without resolving whether counsel advised the defendant “about the advantages and disadvantages

of taking an appeal and made a reasonable effort to discover his wishes.” Id. at 487. It therefore

vacated the Court of Appeals’ grant of relief to defendant and remanded the case “for further

proceedings consistent with” its opinion. Id.

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No. 1-22-0919

¶ 35   Similarly, the record in this case does not indicate whether counsel breached his duty.

There is no statement from counsel regarding whether he advised defendant about the advantages

and disadvantages of filing an appeal, or that he made a reasonable effort to discover defendant’s

wishes. See Id. We have only defendant’s recollection of what occurred after his sentencing, which

trial counsel may contradict if given the opportunity to testify. Flores-Ortega instructs that in this

circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is required. Id. Flores-Ortega does not support defendant’s

argument here.

¶ 36   Defendant also cites People v. Gutierrez, 376 Ill. App. 3d 182 (2007), People v. Torres,

2021 IL App (1st) 181175-U, People v. Judeh, 2017 IL App (1st) 153528-U, and People v. Smith,

2018 IL App (1st) 170008-U, as cases where the lower court granted post-conviction relief without

an evidentiary hearing. Judeh and Smith, however, are unpublished orders under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 23(e) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021), entered before the effective date of the amended rule. Such

orders are nonprecedential and may not be cited as persuasive authority. Katz v. Hartz, 2021 IL

App (1st) 200331, ¶ 41.

¶ 37   The other cases are distinguishable. In Gutierrez, the trial court granted the defendant’s

petition “with the agreement of the State.” Gutierrez, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 183. In Torres, the trial

court granted the petition where the defendant demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a notice of appeal. Torres, 2021 IL App (1st) 181175-U, ¶ 24. Here, the State does

not agree with the trial court’s decision to grant the petition, nor has defendant established his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

¶ 38   Resolution of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires consideration of

matters outside the record, such as trial counsel’s testimony, and assessments of the parties’

credibility. In postconviction proceedings, the trial court engages in these functions only at a third-

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No. 1-22-0919

stage evidentiary hearing. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. Following the course outlined in Flores-

Ortega, we vacate the trial court’s judgment granting the petition and remand for an evidentiary

hearing. See Wheeler, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 311 (vacating the trial court’s judgment granting the

defendant’s postconviction petition at the second stage without conducting an evidentiary hearing

and remanding the case for a third stage hearing).

¶ 39   While the State also contends that defendant failed to make a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation as required in a second stage proceeding, this issue is not properly before

us. The State essentially argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss

defendant’s petition. The State has not provided, nor have we found, any authority finding that it

may appeal from the court’s denial of its motion to dismiss at the second stage of postconviction

proceedings. Instead, our supreme court has unequivocally stated that if a postconviction petition

is not dismissed at the second stage, it advances to the third stage where the trial court conducts an

evidentiary hearing. See Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 18; Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246; and Gaultney,

147 Ill. 2d at 418. We therefore decline to consider this contention.

¶ 40                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41   For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order granting postconviction relief

and remand the cause to the trial court for a third-stage evidentiary hearing on defendant’s petition.

¶ 42   Vacated and remanded with instructions.

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