Court Opinion

ID: 9682181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:06:43.483724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.950675
License: Public Domain

PUDLOWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
This matter was retransferred to this court from the Supreme Court after transfer from this court after certification by this writer.
After review of this appeal and the majority panel opinion, I respectfully dissent from the issuance of the permanent writ of mandamus.
In J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. banc 1996) a franchisor-franchisee case, the Supreme Court stated, “Many factors are included in the calculus for determining if one person is the servant of another for purposes of establishing vicarious liability. However, the touchstone is whether the party sought to be held liable has the control or right to control the conduct of another in the performance of an act.”
The majority opinion relies on State ex rel. Bunting v. Koehr, 865 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. banc 1993) and asserts:
There are three attributes of agency.1
First, ‘[a]n agent ... holds a power to alter legal relations between the principal and third persons and between the principal and himself.’ Restatement (Second) Agency, § 12. Second, ‘[a]n agent is fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.’ Id. § 13. Third, the ‘principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.’ Id. § 14. The absence of any one of the three elements of agency defeats a claim that agency exists. Id. at 353.
The opinion then concludes that two of the three attributes do not exist and, therefore, an agency is not present. As a result, the opinion concluded it did not have to discuss the “touchstone” of a vicarious relationship, i.e., control of another. I have reviewed all of the pleadings and documents and conclude that there are sufficient facts to support the respondent’s allegations that the relator had control or right of control of respondent to sustain an agency relation and, therefore, the writ of mandamus should be denied.
I respectfully suggest that the standard in Shell is the correct analysis of vicarious liability of a franchisor and applicable to this case. I also believe that said Shell rule is in conflict with the rule set out in State ex rel. Bunting v. Koehr, 865 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. banc 1993).
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Cf. Restatement (Second) Agency, § 1(1). Agency is the fiduciary relation [Cf. 13] which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his .behalf [Cf. 12] and subject to his control [Cf. 14], and consent by the other so to act.