Court Opinion

ID: 9378386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 08:11:02.190769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.968755
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-23-00011-CV
                               __________________

     IN RE CITY OF BEAUMONT, KENNETH R. WILLIAMS, IN HIS
    OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY MANAGER, AND EARL WHITE,
            IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FIRE CHIEF

__________________________________________________________________

                          Original Proceeding
            136th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
                       Trial Cause No. D-210950
__________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The City of Beaumont, Kenneth R. Williams, in his official capacity as City

Manager, and Earl White, in his official capacity as Fire Chief, filed a petition for a

writ of mandamus and prohibition. Relators contend the temporary restraining order

issued by the Judge of the 136th District Court enforces a judgment of the 60th

District Court that has been superseded due to the City’s appeal from that judgment.

Relators ask this Court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to

dissolve the temporary restraining order. Additionally, they ask this Court to issue a

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writ of prohibition enjoining the trial court from taking further action that may

interfere with this Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. The Real Party in Interest,

International Association of Firefighters Local 399 (“the Union”), argues the

mandamus petition is moot because the temporary restraining order expired and it

will not seek to compel the City and its officials to perform the actions ordered in

the 60th District Court’s judgment until that judgment is final.

                                    Background

      On December 2, 2022, the judge of the 60th District Court of Jefferson County

Texas signed two orders in Trial Cause Number B-210244, Caleb Fenter v. City of

Beaumont, et al. In one order, the judge of the 60th District Court granted the City’s

plea to the jurisdiction but denied the plea to the jurisdiction of the City Manager,

Kenneth R. Williams. In the other order, which was expressly made final and

appealable, the judge of the 60th District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment, found the plaintiff, Caleb Fenter, is a “firefighter” as that term

is defined by the Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 143, and is entitled to all

the rights and benefits provided under that chapter. In the judgment of the 60th

District Court, the court found the City Manager failed to provide Fenter with his

rights and pursuant to Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, found Fenter is

entitled to mandamus relief requiring the City Manager to provide Fenter with all

civil service rights pursuant to Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, and

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decreed that a writ of mandamus would issue to be served on the City of Beaumont,

Texas, Kenneth R. Williams, to carry out the court’s order, subject to the City

Manager’s right to appeal the order. This order decreed that, in the event of an

appeal, the Clerk of the Court would issue the writ of mandamus when the appeal

became final. The City and the City Manager perfected an appeal, which this Court

docketed as Appeal Number 09-22-00413-CV, Caleb Fenter v. The City of

Beaumont, et al. The judgment prohibits issuance of the writ until the appeal is

finally decided and the mandate issues.

      After the City filed its notice of appeal in Fenter, the Union filed an

application for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction on behalf of

its members. The Union alleged the City and its officials had announced the creation

of a new Emergency Medical Services Department to avoid the judgment in Fenter,

that the functions of the Department are already being performed by classified

firefighters in the Fire Department, and the actions of the City and its officials should

be enjoined because they violate the Civil Service Act, collective bargaining, and

the City Charter. The Union alleged its members were threatened by further injury

by the creation of a new department that performs firefighting job functions. The

Union asked the 136th District Court to issue a temporary restraining order and a

temporary injunction against Relators and their employees from directly or indirectly

creating, funding, staffing, advertising, marketing, hiring, recruiting, planning,

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promoting, reporting, or furthering in any way an Emergency Medical Services

Department without proper authority. The Union asked the 136th District Court to

order Williams and White to swear in all medics in the Fire Department who have

not already been so sworn, as civil service employees of that Department. The Union

asked the 136th District Court to order the City to properly classify the EMT

positions that have been occupied in the Beaumont Fire Department since March

2021.

        On December 27, 2022, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order

as requested by the Union and scheduled a temporary injunction hearing for January

10, 2023. Upon receiving Relators’ petition and motion for temporary relief, we

temporarily stayed all further proceedings in the trial court and requested a reply

from the Union. The Union contends this proceeding is moot because the temporary

restraining order expired and was not renewed. Relators contest the suggestion of

mootness. They argue we should address the merits of their petition because the

Union requests injunctive relief in the trial court and Relators’ petition in this Court

requests that a writ of prohibition issue to enjoin the trial court from taking actions

that implicate the outcome of the superseded judgment.

        Relators sought mandamus relief from the temporary restraining order. That

order expired without being extended. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. A temporary

restraining order cannot be extended after it expires. In re Hallas, No. 03-22-00413-

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CV, 2022 WL 3650090, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2022, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.). Accordingly, to the extent Relators requested mandamus relief, the

petition is moot. See In re Abbott, No. 01-21-00440-CV, 2021 WL 5056616, at *1

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

      An appellate court can protect the subject matter of an appeal by issuing a writ

of prohibition that limits or prevents action by a trial court. See Holloway v. Fifth

Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 682–83 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding). The date

set for the temporary injunction passed while this Court’s temporary stay was in

effect. Unless the trial court sets the Union’s application for a temporary injunction

for a hearing, we discern no need to issue a writ of prohibition. Accordingly, we lift

our order granting temporary relief and deny Relators’ petition without prejudice.

All pending motions are denied as moot.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                                           PER CURIAM

Submitted on January 23, 2023
Opinion Delivered March 9, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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