Court Opinion

ID: 9774246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:12:45.778953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:04.401874
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the objection at trial was not proper and that, even if the objection was proper, the extraneous offense was admissible under Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). I dissent.
I.
The majority, by holding that the objection at trial does not comport with the objection raised on appeal, is in actuality holding that when an objection is based on a violation of a rule of evidence, the appellant must also orally argue that the exception^) to the rule are inapplicable in order to preserve error.
In Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), delivered November 9, 1977, this Court stated that:
“The generally acknowledged policies of requiring specific objections are twofold. First, a specific objection is required to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and afford him the opportunity to rule on it. Second, a specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Sec. 52, pp. 113, 115 (2d ed. 1972); 4 Jones, The Law of Evidence, Sec. 28:2, p. 276 (6th ed. 1972). In accordance with these policies, a number of exceptions to the general rule that a party cannot complain on appeal to the overruling of a general objection or an imprecise specific objection have been created. 1 McCormick & Ray, Evidence, Sec. 25, p. 25 (2d ed. 1956). Thus, where the correct ground of exclusion was obvious to the judge and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise objection. McCormick & Ray, supra.”
The general rule excludes extraneous offenses; the exceptions to the rule permit their introduction. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The error was called to the trial court’s attention when appellant’s counsel objected to the State’s introduction of an extraneous offense. The specific rule of evidence violated was stated. It was the State’s duty to urge the applicability of the exception, not the appellant’s duty to urge its inapplicability.
In Walls v. State, 548 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), the defendant objected “to any testimony of this nature” and moved for a mistrial, stating, “this has nothing to do with the case in question.” We held that “. . . the objections were sufficient to apprise the court that appellant was objecting to the admission of the evidence of an extraneous offense whose materiality was not established . . . .” Id., at 40.
In Mallicote v. State, 548 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), the defendant objected as follows:
“Your Honor, we would object to the testimony of this witness. One, the State, I think, is trying to get this in under, you know, a prior type offense showing a course of conduct, which this does not meet the requirements of the law . . . ”
We held that this objection raised the issue of the admissibility of an extraneous offense.
The majority requires scrupulous specificity by a defense lawyer in order to preserve the rights of the criminally accused. However, the majority condones extreme laxity by a defense lawyer when a claim of ineffective assistance is raised. Ewing v. State, 549 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The majority’s decision incorrectly magnifies the State’s inherent advantage in criminal prosecutions. Cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960). I would hold that the objection properly preserved the error.
*522II.
Moreover, the majority incorrectly concludes that if the objection was proper, the extraneous offense was admissible.
The record reveals that at approximately 11:30 p. m., on December 31,1974, two men entered a Denny’s Restaurant on Gulf Freeway in Houston. The two men approached the cash register, and one man drew a chrome-plated pistol from the left side of his waistband. The other man pulled a sawed-off shotgun out of his pants.
The two men informed the thirty to forty customers that there was a holdup, and told everyone to put their purses and billfolds on their tables. The two men then proceeded to stuff money, rings and watches from the customers and the money from the cash register into their pockets. The two men then told everyone to lie down in the booths or on the floor until after they had left.
The appellant was described by the complainants, two victims of the robbery, as approximately 6' 1", slim and weighing 150 pounds. He had a small goatee and wore brown trousers, a brown jacket, and either a brown or black cap. Both complainants identified the appellant at a pretrial lineup as the robber with the chrome pistol. They also made an in-court identification of the appellant.
The appellant took the stand and denied any participation in the offense. He insisted that on the night of the offense he was at a New Year’s Eve party at a relative’s house.
The State then attempted to rebut the appellant’s defensive theory by offering testimony concerning an extraneous robbery allegedly committed by the appellant at a Howard Johnson’s Restaurant eleven days prior to the robbery at Denny’s.1 After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge, over a timely objection, admitted the testimony of Charles Portier.
Mr. Portier testified that on December 20, 1974, at approximately 9:00 p. m., he was employed as a cook at a Howard Johnson’s Restaurant at 6165 Gulf Freeway in Houston. He noticed the appellant talking to a girl at the cash register. When the manager approached the register, the appellant pulled a black handgun, and told them he wanted the money from the register. The girl placed the money in a paper sack and the appellant then took the girl and the manager to the manager’s office. The appellant then left. He encountered Portier outside and said that everything was “cool” and put his gun away. Portier described the appellant as having a full beard, moustache, long sideburns, a lot of hair, and wearing a cap.
It is well established that evidence of unrelated offenses is not generally admissible. This limitation is imposed not because such evidence is without legal relevance to the general issue of whether the accused committed the act charged, but because such evidence is inherently prejudicial, tends to confuse the issues in the case, and forces the accused to defend himself against charges which he had not been notified would be brought against him. Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In the present case, the State contends that the evidence of the extraneous offense was offered to prove identity. The State asserts that although direct evidence of the appellant’s identity was offered, the appellant’s alibi raised the issue. Cf. Cameron v. State, 530 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
In Cobb v. State, 503 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court stated that:
“The rule is that evidence of another crime is admissible to prove identity if identity is in issue and if there is some distinguishing characteristic common to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial. See Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. *523Cr.App.1972); Lancaster v. State, 82 Tex.Cr.R. 473, 200 S.W. 167 (1918). We reiterate: (1) identity must be in issue; and (2) there must be distinguishing characteristics common to both the extraneous offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial.”
Since the appellant concedes that his identity was in issue, the task is limited to ascertaining whether there are distinguishing characteristics common to both the extraneous offense and the robbery at Denny’s Restaurant.
In Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727, 729-730 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this Court stated that:
“The common distinguishing characteristic may be the proximity in time and place of the extraneous offense to the offense for which the accused is being tried. Or, the common element may be the mode of commission of the crimes, or the mode of dress of the perpetrator, or any other element which marks both crimes as having been committed by the same person.” (Footnote omitted).
In Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court noted that the exact “modus operandi” need not be repeated.2
In the present case, the robbery at Howard Johnson’s Restaurant was eleven days prior to the robbery at Denny’s Restaurant. Both robberies were at restaurants located on the Gulf Freeway in Houston. The two offenses were indeed proximate in time and place. See Mitchell v. State, 503 S.W.2d 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Roberts v. State, 495 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The method by which the extraneous and primary offenses were committed, however, are dissimilar. At Denny’s, the two perpetrators approached the cash register and drew their weapons, a chrome pistol and a sawed-off shotgun. They gave explicit orders to all the customers to place their valuables on their tables. They collected the valuables and stuffed them in their pockets. When the two men left, they ordered everyone to lie down until after they were gone. At Howard Johnson’s, the perpetrator initially talked with a girl at the cash register. When the manager approached, he pulled a black handgun. The perpetrator did not disturb the customers or inform them of the robbery and he had the girl put the money from the cash register into a paper sack. He then took the girl and the manager into the manager’s office before he left. When he left, he ignored the customers, and upon seeing Mr. Portier, he put his gun away and said that everything was “cool.”
Finally, the dress and appearance of the appellant during the primary offense and the dress and appearance of the perpetrator of the robbery at Howard Johnson’s reveal both similarities and dissimilarities. The appellant was identified by victims of the robbery at Denny’s as having a small goatee. He wore a cap, either brown or black, a brown jacket, brown pants and a shirt. The perpetrator of the robbery at Howard Johnson’s had a full beard, moustache, long sideburns, and a lot of hair. He likewise wore a cap. Neither the color of the cap nor the remainder of his clothes were developed in the record.
The only distinguishing characteristic common to both the extraneous offense and the primary offense, other than the proximity in time and place, is that the appellant, while at Denny’s, and the perpetrator of the robbery at Howard Johnson’s each wore a cap. While this Court has stated that
“. . the presence or absence of similarity is not entirely determinative of the admissibility of the extraneous offense,” Halliburton v. State, 528 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Opinion on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing),
the similarities are not sufficient to sanction the introduction of the extraneous offense. Cameron v. State, supra. Cf. Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). After all, although “[a]ll evidence of a defendant’s commission of collateral *524crimes has some slight relevancy towards the likelihood of his committing an alleged crime, and especially so where the collateral crime is similar in nature to the one charged against the accused,” Mallicote v. State, 548 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), “[t]he test for determining admissibility of any type of evidence is whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its inflammatory aspects, if any.” Albrecht v. State, supra at 99.
I would hold that given the lack of common characteristics, the probative value of the extraneous offense was outweighed by its inflammatory nature. This cannot be characterized as harmless error, and the admission of the extraneous offense was reversible error. Ford v. State, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the disposition of this case by the majority.

. The State contends that the extraneous offense was admissible on the issues of the appellant’s identity and his alibi. The appellant’s alibi concerned only the date of the commission of the present offense. His alleged participation in a crime eleven days earlier does not refute his alibi. The evidence, if relevant at all, was admissible only on the issue of identity. Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727, 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).

. My dissent in Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) is equally applicable to the present case.