Court Opinion

ID: 9736148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:45:10.531128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.652842
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the reasoning and the result reached by my colleagues. In my opinion the remarks of the prosecutor during his final argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and consequently I believe a new trial should be granted to the defendant. The essence of Dr. Ziporyn’s testimony was that the defendant was constantly in a state of sexual desire. Under stress his control over his desires breaks down and he commits sexual acts. He has no control over these actions because they are the result of a chronic mental disturbance. On cross-examination, Dr. Ziporyn stated that this disturbance is manifested by repeated criminal activity. On redirect examination he stated that he had taken into consideration the fact that the Illinois statute states that a mental disease or defect does not include an abnormality that manifests itself only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial behavior (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 6—2(b)) but found it not to be pertinent because defendant was a sociopath with a sexual deviation based on emotional difficulties, not an anti-social personality. It is only the latter type of personality that is the subject of section 6—2(b). On re-cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Ziporyn: “Q. Let me get this straight, doctor. Now, while the socio-pathic personality in sexual deviation is one whose soul [sic] manifestations are criminal behavior, activity which regards criminal behavior, criminal sexual acts, you are making a distinction in your diagnosis based on the reasons behind that fact? A. That is correct.” On the basis of this testimony the prosecutor repeatedly stated during his closing argument and rebuttal that Dr. Ziporyn had testified that the particular abnormality from which the defendant suffers is manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial behavior and therefore, the prosecutor stated, the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect. Each time the prosecutor made these statements defense counsel objected that they were misstatements of Dr. Ziporyn’s testimony, and the court cautioned the prosecutor to keep his comments to the evidence to a reasonable inference therefrom. The majority contends the prosecutor’s statements were a reasonable and legitimate inference to be drawn from Dr. Ziporyn’s testimony. I find no basis for this contention. While Dr. Ziporyn did say that the defendant’s emotional problem manifested itself in criminal activity, nowhere in the record does he state that it only manifested itself in criminal behavior. Nor can support for the prosecutor’s statements be found in Dr. Ziporyn’s answer to the question on re-cross-examination. The prosecutor prefaced the question by attempting to define sociopathic behavior and then asking Dr. Ziporyn if he was making a distinction from that in his diagnosis of the defendant. Dr. Ziporyn simply answered that yes, he was making a distinction. It does not logically follow that he accepted the prosecutor’s premise that a sociopathic personality manifests itself solely by criminal behavior. Nor can the idea that Dr. Ziporyn said that the defendant’s illness was only manifested in criminal behavior be gleaned from that colloquy. In fact, the abovementioned colloquy, contrary to the majority’s contention, is strongly supportive of the defendant’s position. The most logical reading of the passage is that even if Dr. Ziporyn, for the sake of argument, accepted the prosecutor’s premise, he would still say that the defendant was insane, as defined by the statute. Therefore, the conclusion can only be reached that the prosecutor seriously misstated the testimony supplied by Dr. Ziporyn. It is indisputable that these misstatements prejudiced the defendant. They concerned the testimony of a key witness regarding defendant’s sole defense. They were made repeatedly by the prosecutor. The defense of insanity is a very complicated one to present and difficult for a jury to understand. For the prosecutor to misrepresent the testimony of the defendant’s key witness is indisputably prejudicial to defendant and requires a new trial. Although the prosecutor’s misstatements of Dr. Ziporyn’s testimony in and of themselves require a new trial, I also believe it necessary to comment on one other instance of prosecutorial misconduct which aggravates the foregoing improper arguments. During closing argument the prosecutor stated that Dr. Ziporyn “was hired from Chicago to come down and diagnose the Defendant as insane, establish an insanity defense.” The majority holds that because there was a prompt objection which was sustained and the jury was instructed to disregard the comment, any error was cured. I disagree. The statement was blatant misconduct which could serve no other purpose than to prejudice the jury. It was deliberate and inexcusable. In conjunction with the prosecutor’s previous misconduct, it served to exacerbate the prejudice the defendant suffered. Because the prosecutor’s misconduct was prejudicial to the defendant, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.