Court Opinion

ID: 9854812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:14:28.492427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:25.918095
License: Public Domain

HARNSBERGER, Justice
(dissenting).
I must dissent from the opinion of the majority except as to the holding with respect to Part A Count III which is affirmed by the majority.
The conclusions reached in the opinion stem in principal part from the factual determinations by this court in substitution for those findings which were made by the trial court and were supported by substantial evidence. There was positive testimony showing that none of the three sites for bridge construction were available to the plaintiff to commence the performance of his contract at the time the same was awarded.. Some of the sites were not made available for more than 11 months after the contract was signed, although plaintiff made numerous requests that the sites be readied for the bridge construction work. These requests were made both to the state highway department and to the dirt contractor. When these requests were made, the plaintiff was given a definite day by the highway department when the sites would be ready. Notwithstanding, the sites .were never made ready at the appointed time. In addition, the plaintiff was prevented from performing certain activities necessary in connection with his bridge building contract, such as pile driving, and was ordered by the defendant not to do that work, and was in fact prohibited by the highway department from performing that necessary part of the plaintiff’s contract. Through the actions of the State and of the dirt contractor, who was under the control and direction of the state highway department, the plaintiff was prevented from fulfilling its contract and was caused not only delay but also major additional expenses.
Under these circumstances it was the exclusive province and right of the court to believe the testimony in behalf of the plain*27tiff and to exclude from consideration all conflicting testimony offered in behalf of the state highway department. As the favorable testimony to the plaintiff was positive and substantial, this court should accept its findings and determinations, and we are violating a precept religiously adhered to in the past and for which there is shown no valid excuse now to change.
From my examination of §§ 105.1, 105.2, 105.4, 105.5, 105.7, and 105.8, State of Wyoming Highway Department, Standard Specifications (1956 ed.), all of which appear in the record, there is no doubt whatever that the highway department had complete and specific authority sufficient to require the dirt contractor to have the sites available when the bridge contractor was ready to proceed with his work.
Furthermore, the highway department knowingly contracted with the dirt contractor simultaneously and at the same time it contracted with the bridge contractor. The contract of the plaintiff on its face gave the bridge contractor the right to immediately proceed with the fulfillment of his contract inasmuch as -the time limited within which to complete the same dated from the date of that contract. Inasmuch as the highway department knew that it was necessary for a considerable portion of the dirt work to be done before the bridge work could be undertaken, when upon the same day the State contracted with the dirt contractor for the performance of its work and gave that dirt contractor 360 days from that date to complete its work, the highway department knowingly created an impossible condition for which it should not escape liability. The highway department could not help but know that it was requiring the bridge builder to perform a contract under an impossible condition. On the other hand, the bridge contractor was only concerned with its engagement to build bridges and in accepting the contract as it was written, the contractor was entitled to believe and understand that the sites where the bridge work was to be conducted would be immediately available upon the date the contract was entered into and from which the time limitation of 160 days would run.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.