Court Opinion

ID: 9623873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:45:16.426268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:36.038247
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result and in Divisions 2, 4, and 5. While I agree *595generally with Divisions 1 and 3, I write to offer my rationale for the results obtained in those divisions.
1. In reaching the conclusion that judgment was improperly entered on the merits, thereby agreeing with the result reached in Division 3, I rely on my finding that no proper basis was shown for striking the appellants’ pleadings in their entirety. Motions to strike are not favored and should not be granted “if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue.” Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McGivern, 132 Ga. App. 297, 302 (3) (208 SE2d 258) (1974). While I can certainly agree with the trial court that appellants’ answer contains many extraneous matters, it also contains a germane averment that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between themselves and appellee. This is plainly a relevant matter and, in my opinion, should not have been stricken. See id. Had it not been improperly stricken, I must agree with appellants that an issue of fact would remain for trial whether such a relationship existed, since appellee produced no evidence of the alleged foreclosure proceeding in which it purchased the property to rebut appellants’ averments that appellee was not their landlord. See Harold v. Modern Homes Constr. Co., 104 Ga. App. 415, 416-417 (121 SE2d 809) (1961).
2. It is not clear from my reading of the record and briefs in this case that appellee seeks dismissal of the appeal, but it is clear that it does urge this court to find the issue of possession moot by virtue of appellee’s physical possession of the premises. I note initially that if that is the case, the record does not so reflect. Chronologically, the last document shown in the record is appellee’s application for a writ of possession based on appellants’ failure to pay rent into court pending this appeal.
Moreover, even if appellee is correct in its assertion that it is now in physical possession of the premises pursuant to a writ of possession issued because of appellants’ failure to meet the requirements of OCGA § 44-7-56, a trial of the issues on the merits must still be had because the writ was issued at the appellee’s request and at its peril. Hyman v. Leathers, 168 Ga. App. 112, 113 (1) (308 SE2d 388) (1983). Even if tenants have not paid rent into court and consequently have lost possession pending trial, see OCGA § 44-7-54, or pending appeal, see OCGA § 44-7-56, possession of the premises may still be restored to them when the issues are tried or considered on their merits on appeal. That is why the fact that appellee is in physical possession of the premises does not render moot the question of its ultimate legal right to that possession.
*596Decided July 5, 1991
Reconsideration denied July 23, 1991
Barry K. Thomas, pro se.
Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, John R. Grimes, for appellee.