Court Opinion

ID: 9690923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:52:20.432182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:07.363918
License: Public Domain

R AY THORNTON, Justice, dissenting. In its analysis of the Rule 4-3 (h) error that was brought to our attention by the State, the majority today has concluded that the State has overcome the presumption of prejudice that arose from the trial court’s violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e) (1987) when it communicated its answer to the jury’s questions by means of a note without first bringing the jury into the courtroom. While I agree that the appellant’s other points on appeal have no merit, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion regarding the Rule 4-3(h) error. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. The majority correctly acknowledges the well-established line of cases where we have held that strict compliance with Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e) may be waived where the attorneys go with the judge to the jury room, everything that happens is reported in the record, and, thus, there is no possibility of prejudice. See Bledsoe v. State, 344 Ark. 86, 39 S.W.3d 760 (2001) (citing Martin v. State, 254 Ark. 1065, 497 S.W.2d 268 (1973)). However, I am unable to agree with an extension of this exception to our strict compliance rule to the circumstances of this case. Unlike the cases in which we have held that strict compliance had been waived where the attorneys go with the judge to the jury room and everything that happens is reported in the record, the trial judge and the attorneys here did not enter the jury room. In addition, while the trial court and the parties orally agreed to the language proposed for the note, and the discussion of such proposed language was reflected in the record, the written note is not included in the record because it has since been lost. The exact language of the note is not part of the record. Instead, we are told what the trial court intended to convey by means of a note. Additionally, what occurred in the jury room when the trial court’s response was received by the jury was not reflected in the record. See Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997). There is nothing in the record to indicate the language actually used in the note because because no court reporter was present in the jury room to record the reading of the trial court’s communication with the jury. In Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986), we held that the State had not met its burden of overcoming the presumption of prejudice by showing what occurred when the trial judge answered the jury’s questions because the record was incomplete regarding the trial judge’s actual communication with the jury. Id. As in the present case, the court reporter in Tarry, supra, did not record what happened when the trial judge entered the jury room to answer the jury’s questions. Id. Finally, the State’s reliance upon Houston v. State, 41 Ark. App. 67, 848 S.W.02d 430 (1993) is misplaced. In that case, the court of appeals held that the presumption of prejudice had been rebutted where the record clearly reflected what occurred when the jury sent the note to the judge, as well as the judge’s response, the note itself had been preserved for the record, and the trial court’s communication with the jury occurred after the jury had already finished its deliberations on guilt. Id. Here, unlike in Houston, supra, the note has not been preserved as part of the record and the jury was still in the midst of deliberations in the guilt phase when the trial court sent its response to the jury’s questions by means of a note. I am unwilling to accept that the presumption of prejudice arising from a violation of the statute prohibiting a trial court’s communication with the jury outside the confines of the courtroom may be cured by the trial court’s effort to reconstruct the language that a missing note contained. The creation of such an exception to the rifle established by statute will open the door to allow unrecorded communication with a jury that is in the midst of reaching a verdict. I cannot find that the State has rebutted the presumption of prejudice where the offending note is not available for our review. In my opinion, passing notes back and forth simply does not comply with the statutory requirement that all communication with a jury must be made of record in open court with all parties present. I do not think we should extend the narrow exception to full compliance with the statute to fit the circumstances of this case. , In reaching my conclusion, I am mindful of the policy reasoning behind Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e), which we discussed in Davlin v. State, 313 Ark. 218, 853 S.W.2d 882 (1993). We stated: The following quotation, which stresses the importance of strict compliance with section 16-89-125(e)’s predecessor, bears repeating here: The procedure set out in the statute is not difficult to follow and places no burden at all on the trial court or attorneys, and places very little burden on the jury. It simply recognizes that the courtroom, where the trial is being conducted, is the proper place for the giving of all instructions to the jury in open court and where all the jury and anyone else interested, including the defendant, can hear the instructions in the context given. The defendant, as well as the public, is entitled to know what goes on in the courtroom, but they are not entided to know what goes on in the jury room. We can think of many good reasons why a jury should receive all instructions in the public forum of the courtroom and we can think of no good reason why it should not. To strictly follow the simple procedure as set out in the statute, would avoid such difficulties that have arisen in th[is] . . . case. . . . Martin v. State, 254 Ark. 1065, 497 S.W.2d 268 (1973) (referring to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2139 (Repl. 1964), identical in all respects to section 16 — 89—125(e)). Davlin, supra. Trial in open court is a fundamental right, and a contemporaneous objection is not required. Goff v. State, 329 Ark. 513, 953 S.W.2d 38 (1997). Here, the trial court failed to follow the statute and erred in communicating with the jury by means of a note. The State faded to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from that error because the note is not available for our review, and I would conclude that the trial court’s violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-125(e) must be deemed prejudicial to appellant. I would reverse and remand the case to the trial court. As Justice George Rose Smith wrote in Tarry: Although we have not held, and do not intend to hold, that this right of defendant cannot be waived, we take this means of giving notice that we will carefully scrutinize every case tried after the date of our decision in Martin (July 23, 1973) to determine whether there has been a waiver of defendant’s right to have such proceedings held only in open court, and that all reasonable doubts will be resolved by us against waiver. Tarry, supra (citing Jackson v. State, 256 Ark. 406, 507 S.W.2d 705 (1974); Andrews v. State, 251 Ark. 279, 472 S.W.2d 86 (1971)) (emphasis added). Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the State has overcome the presumption of prejudice that arose from the trial court’s violation of the statute prohibiting the trial court from communicating with the jury outside the presence of the courtroom, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice BROWN joins in this dissent.