Court Opinion

ID: 9517762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:31:29.291206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:31.258189
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting:
After long reflection, I regret that I must respectfully disagree with my learned colleagues’ conclusion that the facts of the instant case do not fall within the confines of the No-fault Act. While the case relied upon by the majority, Crusco v. Insurance Company of North America, 292 Pa.Super. 293, 437 A.2d 52 (1981), is factually similar to the ease sub judice, when applied to the facts herein, its analysis runs counter to the liberal interpretation our Courts have always used when determining whether coverage existed under the Act. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
*37In order for an insured to be entitled to no-fault benefits, the injury or death must be causally related to the use of a motor vehicle. Crawford v. Allstate Insurance Company, 305 Pa.Super. 167, 451 A.2d 474 (1982). Section 103 of the No-fault Act defines a “maintenance and use of a motor vehicle” as a “maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a vehicle ...” (emphasis added). 40 P.S. § 1009.103. In discussing the intent of the legislature in drafting the No-fault Act, this Court in Dull v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, 278 Pa.Super. 569, 420 A.2d 688 (1980) noted:
The purpose of the No-fault Act is “to establish at reasonable cost ... a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims ...” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b). See Dubose v. McCoy, 277 Pa.Super. 149, 419 A.2d 705 (1980); Hayes v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 261 Pa.Super. 171, 395 A.2d 1370 (1978); Singer v. Sheppard, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 276, 381 A.2d 1007 (1978). The Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 et seq., which provides that “[wjords and phrases shall be construed ... according to their common and approved usage,” id. § 1903, also provides that statutes such as the No-fault act “shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.” Id. § 1928(c) ... In Heffner v. Allstate Insurance Co., 265 Pa.Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1979), our Court stated: “Historically, the courts of this Commonwealth have ... found coverage for the insured in close or doubtful insurance cases. The tendency has been that if we should err in ascertaining the intent of the legislature ..., we should err in favor of coverage for the insured.” Id. 265 Pa.Super. at 187, 401 A.2d at 1162-63 (footnote omitted).
Id., 278 Pa.Superior Ct. at 571-572, 420 A.2d at 689.
Typical of the kind of case in which a liberal approach is used in interpreting the provisions of the No-fault Act is Spisak v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 329 Pa.Super. 483, 478 A.2d 891 (1984). In Spisak, the plaintiff’s decedent was killed when he and a female companion *38engaged in “compromising activities” in the back of his vehicle which had been parked off the road. The engine had been running at the time and the occupants of the car were overcome by carbon monoxide poisoning due to a faulty exhaust system. In upholding an order awarding no-fault benefits, this Court distinguished the Crusco holding as involving a situation in which coverage was denied because the injury was caused by an instrumentality external to the vehicle itself. In Spisak, however, the Court determined that the harm arose directly from the carbon monoxide fumes emanating from the faulty exhaust system while the vehicle was parked and the engine running. Under those circumstances the Court was quick to find a causal connection between the death of the victim and the use of a vehicle as a vehicle.
Instantly, we are presented with a factual situation that is distinguishable from that presented in Crusco. Here, as in Crusco, we have an injury which occurred due to an explosion occasioned by a faulty propane system. Unlike Crusco, however, evidence appears on the record that the propane system in the present case could also be used to fuel the vehicle itself. While the trial court found this fact of no consequence, I find its reasoning to be tenuous at best.1 Nor does the majority offer sufficient justification for so finding. Because I believe this to be a close case, I would conclude, as in Spisak, that the auxiliary use of the propane system to propel the motor home provides the causal connection between the injury and the use of the motor home as a vehicle. To hold otherwise, in my opinion, would be to strictly construe against insureds an Act that historically has been liberally interpreted in favor of them. This, I am not prepared to do.
Motor homes are recognized as being “vehicles” under the No-fault Act. See 40 P.S. § 1009.103; 75 Pa.C.S.A. *39§ 102; Crusco, supra, 292 Pa.Super. at 295, 437 A.2d at 53. Moreover, their intended purpose is clear — to provide transportation as well as temporary living quarters. Since the insurer is surely cognizant of this dual role, the proper way for it to have excluded coverage for an accident such as the one herein, would be to expressly state as such in the policy of insurance. Because this was not done, and because the appellants could not possibly be aware of the consequences of the accident in terms of their no-fault coverage, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.

. The trial court reasoned that as the system was being used to heat the vehicle, much like one would use a furnace at home, the fact that the system could be used to propel the vehicle did not affect the outcome of their decision. This use, however, is arguably similar to that in Spisak.