Court Opinion

ID: 9466618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:21:09.48165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:50.038499
License: Public Domain

FAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Most respectfully, I dissent. Recognizing that this is a rather close case, I conclude its disposition is controlled by Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) and not Dugan v. United States, 521 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1975).
Judge Wisdom has fully and accurately set forth both the facts and legal authorities surrounding the issue before us. The key in this case is that McCord’s allegations as to a “broken plea agreement” are totally uncorroborated. In Dugan the petitioner submitted two affidavits confirming that specific promises were made by both state and federal officials that he would receive a sentence of only four years. Id. at 233. As the majority opinion points out, the affidavit of Agent Clark supports McCord’s allegations only so far as confirming that discussions were held and “that the government would consider allowing him to plead guilty to one count of the indictment” (majority opinion, 618 F.2d at 392). This is a far cry from confirming the existence of a pre-plea agreement.
A review of the records of our court convinces me that possible plea agreements are discussed in most cases. Indeed, it has become one of the most effective means of the government obtaining favorable witnesses in multi-defendant matters. If uncorroborated assertions of broken plea agreements are sufficient to require the holding of an evidentiary hearing, we have surely rendered the requirements of Rule 11 and Bryan nullities. Neither Blackledge1 nor Dugan intended such consequences.
I would affirm the denial of the petition.

. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977).