Court Opinion

ID: 9497612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:55:41.440797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:18.394739
License: Public Domain

BYBEE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I am unable to join the majority opinion because, in my view, the 2001 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines squarely address Lopez-Zamora’s situation. The district court did not have discretion to grant the downward departure Lopez-Zamora sought and thus did not err when it declined to grant it. Hence, I agree with the majority that the judgment should be affirmed, but I disagree with the majority’s construction of the 2001 Amendments to § 2L1.2.
The 2001 amendments do not leave us the discretion the majority finds. The majority’s reading of the changes in the Commission’s instructions from the 1995 Guidelines to the 1997 Guidelines and the 2001 Guidelines follows a twisted path. I take a very different set of inferences from that history, so I am going to recap it here, showing where my perspective diverges from the majority.
Under the 1995 Guidelines, we were instructed to increase the base offense for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States if the defendant was deported after conviction for a felony. Section 2L1.2 drew two distinctions: (1) if the defendant had been deported after an aggravated felony, increase the base offense level by 16 levels; (2) if convicted of any other felony (other than a violation of the immigration laws) increase by only four levels. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l), (2) (1995). The term “aggravated felony” encompassed a broad array of crimes,1 and the term failed to account for substantial differences in the nature and quality of aggravated felonies for which one could have been convicted, such as differences between murder and assault. We recognized this in our decision in United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). Quoting Koon v. United States, 518, U.S. 81, 109, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), we held that “we must ask only ‘whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor’ at issue.” Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d at 560. We rec*1099ognized that “aggravated felony” included trafficking in a controlled substance, but we found that “the Guidelines were silent as to what consideration, if any, the district court should give to the nature of the previous controlled substance offenses.” Id. at 562. Accordingly, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it held that “a $20 heroin sale is different in kind and degree from, or outside of the norm, of other offenses, including murder and large-scale drug operations, that similarly trigger the 16-level enhancement.” Id. at 561.
If Lopez-Zamora were subject to the 1995 Guidelines, he could seek a downward departure under Sanchez-Rodriguez. Like Sanchez-Rodriguez, he could argue that his conviction for transportation of methamphetamine, for which he received a sentence of four years, “is different in kind and degree from, or outside of the norm, of other offenses, including murder and large-scale drug operations.” I cannot determine whether any district court would have granted such a departure, but Lopez-Zamora could properly make such an argument after Sanchez-Rodriguez.
We would have reached a different conclusion, however, under the 1997 version of the Guidelines. Section 2L1.2(b)(l) was not amended in any way that seemed to affect our analysis in Sanchez-Rodriguez2 That section continued to distinguish between an aggravated felony (which still received a 16-level enhancement) and other felonies (which still received a 4-level enhancement). U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l) (1997). What was different in the 1997 version was a new Application Note, which read:
5. Aggravated felonies that trigger the adjustment from subsection (b)(1)(A) vary widely. If subsection (b)(1)(A) applies, and (A) the defendant has previously been convicted of only one felony offense; (B) such offense was not a crime of violence or firearms offense; and (C) the term of imprisonment imposed for such offense did not exceed one year, a downward departure may be warranted based on the seriousness of the aggravated felony.
In United States v. Machiche-Duarte, 286 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.2002), we held that the 1997 amendments altered the Section 2L1.2 scheme on which Sanchez-Rodriguez was based. A defendant still might seek a downward departure, but “if and only if all three requirements [in Application Note 5] are met.” Id. at 1156. After Machiche-Duarte, the Guidelines prescribed the sentence and must be followed unless the defendant could demonstrate that he had satisfied each of the three criteria listed in Application Note 5.
In contrast to his treatment under the 1995 Guidelines, under the 1997 version, Lopez-Zamora could not have sought a downward departure, as the majority noted. Slip op. 17493 n.3. Indeed, it is questionable whether Lopez-Zamora could have satisfied any one of the three prerequisites. Thus, the 1997 Guidelines treated Lopez-Zamora more severely than the 1995 Guidelines and would have eliminated any possibility of him receiving a downward departure.
To this point, my reading of the Guidelines is largely consonant with the majority opinion. But, according to the majority, the 2001 amendments to Section 2L1.2 restored the district court’s power to issue a downward departure in Lopez-Zamora’s case. The majority reads the 2001 amendments as backing off the 1997 version of the Guidelines. Accordingly, the majority *1100finds that the district court’s failure to consider Lopez-Zamora for a downward departure under Scmchez-Rodriguez was error, although it ultimately concludes that it was harmless error. With all due respect, I cannot read the 2001 amendments in this way.
The 2001 amendments, unlike the 1997 amendments (which only amended the comments to § 2L1.2) amended Section 2L1.2 itself. Under Section 2L1.2(b)(l), the district court is instructed to “Apply the Greatest: (1) If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after — (A) a conviction for a felony that is (I) a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceed 13 months ..., increase by 16 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) (2001). By contrast, if the “conviction for felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or less, increase by 12 levels.” If the defendant has been convicted of an aggravated felony not enumerated in (A), then the base offense level is increased by eight levels; convictions for other felonies or three or more misdemeanors, increase by four levels. Id. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B), (C), and (D) (2002).
The 2001 amendments did three things. First, they changed the rule itself, not just the comments. Second, for the first time, the rule distinguished between aggravated felonies and a list of enumerated felonies, which included drug trafficking. Third, the rule drew a distinction among drug trafficking offenses based on the length of the sentence imposed. Drug trafficking offenses are treated differently from other felonies; within the class of drug trafficking offenses, an offense will receive either a 16- or a 12-level enhancement based on whether the sentence was greater or less than 13 months.
In addition, the 2001 amendments eliminated Application Note 5, which was the basis for our decision in Machiche-Duarte. But the Commission added an explanatory note (which is quoted at length in the majority opinion, supra, at op. 1093-95). The Commission explained that the amendment addressed concerns over the disproportionate penalties resulting from “the breadth of the definition of ‘aggravated felony,’ ” which did not distinguish, for example, between murder and simple assault. U.S.S.G. Supp., App. C, Amend. 632 (2001). Concerned that the courts had “been addressing this inequity on an ad hoc basis” through departures, the Sentencing Commission was “respond[ing] to these concerns by providing a more graduated sentencing enhancement depending on the seriousness of the prior aggravated felony and the dangerousness of the defendant.” Id. Significantly, “the Commission determined that the 16-level enhancement is warranted if the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for certain serious offenses, specifically, a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months.” Id. (emphasis added). The Commission noted that it was deleting Application Note 5 because “the graduation of the 16-level enhancement based on the seriousness of the prior conviction negated the need for this departure provision.” With this amendment, the Commission wrote, “this amendment may have the indirect result of reducing the departure rate for cases sentenced under § 2L1.2.” Id. (emphasis added).
Inexplicably, the Commission added the following:
In addition, this amendment renders moot a circuit conflict regarding whether the three criteria set forth in the application note are the exclusive basis for downward departure from the 16-level enhancement. Compare United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th *1101Cir.1998) (holding that Application Note 5 to § 2L1.2 does not limit the circumstances under which a downward departure from the 16-level enhancement is warranted); and United States v. Alfaro-Zayas, 196 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.1999) (same), zoith United States v. Tappin, 205 F.3d 536 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that a defendant must satisfy all three criteria set forth in Application Note 5 in § 2L1.2 to receive a downward departure from the 16-level enhancement).
U.S.S.G., Supp., App. C, Amend. 632 (2001). The majority notes, supra, op. at 1095 n. 4, that the reference to Sanchez-Rodriguez is “misplaced.” It is not misplaced; it is demonstrably wrong. Not only did Sanchez-Rodriguez not deal with Application Note 5, but in Machiche-Duarte we expressly adopted the Second Circuit’s analysis in Tappin that the three criteria in Note 5 are prerequisites to a departure. See 286 F.3d at 1158 (“We agree completely with the analysis contained in the Tappin opinion”). The view the Commission attributed to us was obviously incorrect. The confusion may stem from the fact that the Eleventh Circuit in Alfaro-Zayas appeared to accept the three criteria in the 1997 amendments as prerequisites to a downward departure, but then went on to say that a district court could still determine if the case was removed from the heartland of the Sentencing Guidelines, proposition for which the court cited our decision in Sanchez-Rodriguez. Alfaro-Zayas, 196 F.3d at 1342-43.3
The Commission simply blew it. Its “Compare ” citation should have compared the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Alfaro-Zayas with the Second Circuit’s decision in Tappin and our decision in Machiche-Duarte. Had it done so, the purpose for its 2001 amendments would have been manifest: it was to clear up any lingering doubt whether the Commission intended to provide sufficient guidance on how to treat “certain serious offenses, specifically, drug trafficking for which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months.” U.S.S.G., Supp., App. C, Amend. 632 (2001). The result was a “more graduated sentencing enhancement” in which the Commission went to the trouble of specifying the base level enhancements for enumerated felonies. The Commission could not have been more clear: If Lopez-Zamora had been convicted of drug trafficking and he received a sentence of more than 13 months, then he receives a 16-level enhancement. If he was convicted of drug trafficking and he received a sentence of 13 months or less, then he receives a 12-level enhancement. At least with respect to drug trafficking, we no longer have to worry whether the Commission had given “consideration ... to the nature of the previous [drug]'offenses” (Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d at 562); after the 2001 amendments, there was no longer any “need for [a] departure provision.” U.S.S.G., Supp., App. C, Amend. 632 (2001). On this point, at least, the Commission has spoken plainly.
In light of this history, I cannot understand the majority’s inference that when Application Note 5 was eliminated, “the explicit bar to departure in Lopez-Zamora’s case was eliminated from the Guidelines.” Op. at 1094. That seems exactly backwards to me. The Commission was not restoring the option of departure. It was eliminating it. Application Note 5 was deleted because it had not been sufficiently clear to prevent a conflict between *1102the Eleventh Circuit and the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Commission did not simply delete Application Note 5; it rewrote Section 2L1.2 itself, and it did not do so to reinvigorate Sanchez-Rodriguez. The Commission did not amend the Guidelines to give us greater discretion to depart from the Guidelines, but to cabin our discretion in this developing area.
I am joined in my conclusion by, ironically, the Second and Eleventh Circuits. In United States v. Stultz, 356 F.3d 261 (2d Cir.2004), the defendant argued that the court should take into account that his prior drug offenses involved marijuana, and not more dangerous drugs. The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not have discretion to issue a downward departure. Citing the 2001 amendments, the court observed that the Commission had “explicitly addressed the severity of prior convictions and specified how such convictions would affect sentencing. In light of the conscious choices the Commission made, the absence of any distinction between various types of controlled substances is plain.” Id. at 267. To sanction distinctions based on the nature of the drugs would “contradict! ] the clear language of the Guidelines.” Id. at 267. The court concluded that “the Commission intended the 16-level enhancement to apply to all felony convictions for trafficking controlled substances that resulted in imprisonment for period greater than 13 months.” Id.; see also United States v. Leiva-Deras, 359 F.3d 183 (2d Cir.2004). Similarly, in United States v. Ortega, 358 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the district court could base a downward departure on differences in the severity of aggravated felonies. Citing the 2001 amendments, the court found that the Commission had “determined that a drug trafficking crime for which the sentence exceeded thirteen months was serious enough to warrant a sixteen level enhancement.” Accordingly, the “mitigating circumstance that Ortega seeks to apply was adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 2001 amendment.” Id. at 1280; see also id. at 1280 n. 4 (noting that the Commission “specifically deleted the application note included in the 2000 Sentencing Guidelines that previously allowed for downward departures based upon seriousness of the aggravated felony”). The Commission’s 2001 amendments successfully brought the Second and Eleventh Circuits back in line.
Regretfully, we have strayed. The majority opinion recognizes that the Commission has been ever-more specific in its guidance. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the 2001 amendments did not “totally eviscerat[e] judicial discretion” because although “the 2001 amendments will have the effect of decreasing departures ... a decrease in departures does not mean that a minor nature departure can never be warranted.” Op. at 1097. The majority thus concludes that the 2001 amendments, while more focused, had the effect of resurrecting Sanchez-Rodriguez rather than eviscerating it.
The Commission stated, as the majority properly points out, that the 2001 amendments might reduce the number of departures. But that observation alone cannot resurrect Sanchez-Rodriguez. That case was specifically addressed to the claim that a district court may “consider! ] the nature of the aggravated offense when deciding whether to depart from the Guidelines’ sentencing range.” 161 F.3d at 563. But there are other grounds noted by the Commission, which do not involve an inquiry into the nature of the offense that might suggest a departure because the defendant’s criminal history over-represents the seriousness of that history. The Commission has, for example, specifically suggested that a significant passage of time be*1103tween convictions and no other evidence of criminal conduct in the intervening period might permit a downward departure. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.& (2001); but see Stultz, 356 F.3d at 268-69 (rejecting passage of time as a basis for departure under § 2L1.2).
In sum, in the 2001 amendments, the Commission fully considered the nature of the offenses that should receive an enhancement. It specifically .singled out drug trafficking and specifically identified drug traffickers who received sentences greater than 13 months. At some point, unless we demand that the Sentencing Commission use some formulaic terms to identify when it really means what it plainly says, we must admit that the Commission has constrained our discretion. To do otherwise, and to continue to permit a Sanchez-Rodriguez inquiry into the nature of a drug trafficking offense, risks using Sanchez-Rodriguez as a device for collaterally attacking a prior sentence in an effort to avoid its present consequences. I believe the Sentencing Commission intended to avoid that result. I join the court’s judgment but, respectfully, I cannot join its opinion.

. A comment defined “aggravated felony” as murder, illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, drug trafficking, illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices, money laundering, and any other crime of violence punishable by at least five years. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 n. 7 (1995).

. In fact, we considered the 1997 amendment in Sanchez-Rodriguez but concluded that ''[t]he new amendment does not affect our decision,” which was based on the 1995 Guidelines. 161 F.3d at 563 (footnote omitted).

. The Commission may also have read our discussion in Sanchez-Rodriguez whether Application Note 5 was "clarifying” or "substantive.” We expressed the view that the amendment was clarifying, although we also stated that the amendment "[did] not affect our decision.” Id. at 563 (footnote omitted). In Mac-hiche-Duarte we rejected our comments on Application Note 5 in Sanchez-Rodriguez as “dictum.” 286 F.3d at 1157.