Court Opinion

ID: 9729346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:32:35.820732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.124789
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: I agree with the majority in this case that defendant’s convictions should be affirmed in part and vacated in part. This dissent is directed only to that portion of the majority’s opinion that resolves the issue of the State’s closing argument during the penalty phase of defendant’s sentencing hearing. Defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. The majority, however, chooses to review this issue pursuant to the plain error rule. 134 111. 2d R. 615(a). The majority concludes that two of the State’s remarks during closing argument, independent of each other, would warrant the reversal of defendant’s death sentence. I disagree with both the plain error analysis and the resolution of the substantive issues as to each of the challenged remarks. Before plain error can be considered as a means of circumventing the general waiver rule, it must be plainly apparent from the record that an error affecting substantial rights was committed. People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158, 196 (1996), citing People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 17 (1978). Even then, the plain error rule does not mandate review of all errors affecting substantial rights. People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280, 282 (1973). Although Supreme Court Rule 615(a) states that notice may be taken of “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance” which affects “substantial rights” even though such error was not brought to the attention of the trial court at the time of trial, this rule is not without limitations. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a); see also People v. Pickett, 54 Ill. 2d 280, 282 (1973); People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1995). Typical trial mistakes are not marked by “fundamental unfairness.” Rather, fundamental unfairness occurs in situations that reveal a breakdown in the integrity of our judicial process. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 17. Thus, we may review an unpreserved error only in two situations: (1) where the evidence is closely balanced or (2) where the error is of such magnitude that it denies the accused of a fair and impartial trial or sentencing hearing. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 18. This case presents an inappropriate circumstance in which to relax the waiver rule and consider the issues on the merits. See People v. Hamilton, 179 Ill. 2d 319 (1997). I agree with Justice Freeman’s special concurrence in People v. Kuntu, 188 Ill. 2d 157, 164 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (Kuntu I) where he cautioned against the “nonchalant invocation of our plain error rule.” Justice Freeman noted that neither “Rule 615(a)” nor the term “plain error” has “talisman-like effect” to transform claims which have been otherwise procedurally defaulted into claims which are automatically subject to substantive review. Kuntu I, 188 Ill. 2d at 164 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.); see People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 524 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.). Although Kuntu I involved the resolution of an issue different from the one before us, the principles of the plain error doctrine enunciated by Justice Freeman should apply with equal force in the present situation. The plain error rule should not have been invoked in this case because neither of the two situations that allow for the invocation of the rule existed. See Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 18. The evidence presented against defendant during the sentencing phase was substantial and not closely balanced. Absent the State’s remarks, the evidence presented was of such a nature that the jury’s verdict would have remained the same. Moreover, the State’s remarks in closing argument and rebuttal, when taken in context of the entire argument, did not cause a substantial injustice to defendant or reveal a breakdown in the integrity of our judicial process. The remarks were not of such magnitude as to deprive defendant of a fair hearing. The first challenged remark involves the State’s comment during rebuttal argument that the jury could consider defendant’s lack of a criminal record to determine whether defendant knew right from wrong, good from evil. Although the majority acknowledges that defendant’s intellectual capacity was a significant question during the death sentencing hearing, it nonetheless finds the State’s reference to the word “aggravation” as being improper, prejudicial and so inflammatory that defendant was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing. This conclusion, however, places more emphasis on the terminology than the context in which it was used. Remarks during closing argument must be reviewed in the context of the closing arguments as a whole. People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1998). Further, during the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor may properly contest the significance and weight of the defendant’s mitigating evidence. The State is not required to agree that the evidence offered in mitigation by defendant is indeed mitigating. See People v. Henderson, 142 Ill. 2d 258, 338 (1990). Nothing requires the prosecutor to agree with the defendant that the evidence offered in his behalf is sufficiently mitigating to preclude imposition of the death sentence, or that it is even mitigating at all. People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 279 (1993); see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982). Just as the sentencer or reviewing court “ ‘may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence’ [citations], so too may the prosecutor, during the sentencing hearing, contest the significance or weight of the defendant’s evidence.” Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 279; People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 124-27 (1990). Here, the majority focuses on the State’s use, during a single isolated instance, of the word “aggravation” in reaching its conclusion. This term, however, when viewed in the context of the entire argument and the issue raised by the defense at the sentencing hearing shows that the State did not argue that defendant’s lack of a criminal record was a fact to be considered in aggravation rather than mitigation. Instead, the State referenced defendant’s lack of a criminal record to counter defense counsel’s argument that defendant’s mental capacity prevented him from appreciating the danger and destruction he caused when he set the building on fire. The State contested the significance and weight of the mitigating factor (the lack of a criminal record) and offered -a different interpretation or inference that can be drawn from that factor. It appears that the majority would agree that if the State had commented on the fact that defendant’s lack of a criminal history showed that he knew right from wrong, this comment would have been a proper and fair assessment of the evidence. The majority itself notes that the State can draw legitimate inferences from the same fact as the defense. According to the majority’s analysis, however, the State’s use of the word “aggravation” when referring to a statutorily designated mitigating factor violated the legislative scheme because it changed a fact the legislature intended to be a mitigating factor into an aggravating factor. It was the use of the word “aggravation,” not the content of the argument, that the majority believes made the State’s entire closing argument prejudicial and improper. This conclusion, however, places undue emphasis on the word “aggravation” rather than the overall context in which that word was used. Had the actual word been factored out of the State’s argument, the State’s inference would have been appropriate in this case. The majority’s conclusion that use of the word “aggravation” converted the entire legislative scheme undercuts the fact that the State can draw legitimate inferences from the same fact that the defense uses in mitigation. See Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 279 (nothing requires the prosecution to agree with the defendant that the evidence offered in his behalf is sufficiently mitigating to preclude impositian of the death sentence, or that it is even mitigating at all). Despite the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, the record shows that the State did not argue that defendant’s lack of a criminal history transformed a statutorily mitigating factor into an aggravating factor. The mere reference to the word “aggravation” did not convert that portion of the State’s argument to a statutorily designated aggravating factor. To assume that it did is both contrary to the record and to logic. In Page, this court considered a similar argument as the one raised by the defendant in this case. The State argued, in Page, that defendant’s mitigation was “ ‘in the category of aggravation and *** [n]othing more and nothing less but plain, simple excuses, a cop out.’ ” Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 278. This court concluded that the prosecutor’s argument did not restrict or limit the defendant’s presentation of mitigating evidence in any way, or misstate to the jurors the applicable law governing their consideration of evidence. Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 280. The prosecutor “simply discounted the significance of the defendant’s mitigation, urging the jury to reject that evidence as grounds for declining to impose the death sentence.” Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 280. Similarly, in People v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 370 (1997), this court rejected the defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s comment about defendant’s antisocial personality disorder is a “double-edged sword for purposes of mitigation and aggravation.” The prosecutor stated in McNeal that defendant’s antisocial personality disorder was an aggravating factor that showed defendant’s potential for violence. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d at 368. We concluded that “the prosecutor merely disagreed with the defendant’s characterization of that evidence as mitigation, as he is permitted to do.” (Emphasis added.) McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d at 371. Here, the State’s reference to “aggravation” did not inject an extraneous inflammatory or prejudicial consideration before the jury. The State’s argument did not distort the aggravation evidence so as to imply that defendant’s lack of a criminal record must be considered as a factor in aggravation instead of mitigation. Instead, the prosecutor discounted the significance of defendant’s lack of a criminal record for mitigation and urged the jury to consider an alternative interpretation of that evidence, as relevant in this case, to show defendant’s mental capacity. The State did not suggest that the law did not allow it to consider defendant’s lack of a criminal record in mitigation. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed, in writing, that the lack of a criminal record is an inherently mitigating factor that weighs in favor of a defendant not being sentenced to death. It was further instructed that closing arguments are not to be considered as evidence. As such, the State’s comment and use of the word “aggravation” in its argument did not convert a legislatively mandated mitigating factor into one that must be considered in aggravation. The second comment that the majority finds would independently warrant reversal of the death sentence involves the State’s inartful comment during opening argument that if the jury failed to impose the death penalty, defendant would be given “five freebies,” “five free dead people,” “five murders for free.” The State argued to the jury that the law in Illinois states that if a person kills two people, that person can be sentenced to life in prison without parole. Because defendant killed seven people, in this case, if the jury sentenced defendant to life, the murder of five of the victims would be unvindicated because defendant would receive the same sentence as a person who killed only two victims. The tenor of the State’s argument was that defendant deserved to be punished to the full extent of the law— death — because of the nature of the crime he committed and the number of deaths that resulted from that crime. Initially, I point out that defendant did not preserve this issue for review by including it in his post-sentencing motion and the plain error doctrine should not apply in this situation. As discussed above, the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing was not closely balanced, and, further, the alleged error did not deprive defendant of a fair and impartial sentencing hearing. Thus, the plain error doctrine should not be extended in this case. The State’s comments, although questionable, did not rise to the level of error which is so prejudicial as to affect the overall fairness of the sentencing hearing. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (1988). The State may properly argue to the jury that each of the seven victims can be considered by the jury as a person with a name and a life that had value. See People v. Fair, 159 Ill. 2d 51, 94 (1994). The majority, however, construed the State’s reference to “five freebies” and “five murders for free” to mean that, as a matter of law, a person who kills more than two persons must automatically be sentenced to death . The State, however, at no time argued that the death penalty should always be imposed when more than two persons are killed. Instead, the State implied, through its comments, that the offense was particularly egregious and especially deserving of the death penalty. The State commented, as it has a right to do, that defendant’s crime was an atrocious crime that resulted in the senseless death of seven victims, including the death of four children. Thus, the State’s comments, although inartful, were not misstatements of the death penalty law and should not be construed in such a fashion. Additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the jurors misunderstood the instructions or that they believed that they had to sentence defendant to death because he killed more than two persons. The State’s comments were clearly indelicate. They were not, however, so flagrant as to threaten the judicial process. Notably, the jury was properly admonished about the law in Illinois and would have correctly understood the remarks not as statements of law but as comments on the evidence. Considering the prosecutor’s remark in context and against the background of evidence indicating that defendant showed a complete disregard for the men, women and children living in the building at the time he chose to set the building on fire, the State’s comment, even if improper, was not so inflammatory as to deny defendant a fair hearing; thus, any error was harmless. See Edgeston, 157 Ill. 2d at 241-42. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there is a need to conduct the second phase of the death sentencing hearing anew. In all other respects, I join in the majority’s decision in this case. JUSTICES THOMAS and GASMAN join in this dissent.