Court Opinion

ID: 9548745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:09.800118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:23.029134
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, Justice (dissenting). This is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding in the district court in which the trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. In reviewing the action of the district court, we are bound by the rules of appellate procedure and may not weigh the evidence as we do in original habeas corpus proceedings filed in the supreme court. The sole question before us is whether the trial court’s findings that Bouldin did not intelligently and understandingly waive the right to be represented by counsel or enter a plea of guilty are supported by substantial evidence. If they are, we are bound by those findings and must affirm. The majority statement, that because petitioner was only 18 years of age with a fifth-grade education, had no previous experience in criminal proceeding, together with his bare testimony that he did not understand his right to counsel are not sufficient reasons to show why he was not then capable of understanding, comprehending and exercising judgment, clearly indicates that the majority weighed the evidence rather than merely, reviewing it to determine whether it together with all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom support the trial court’s findings. The majority do not and I think will not say that those facts are insufficient as a matter of law to make a prima facie case, thus sustaining his burden of proving that his plea of guilty was not understandingly and intelligently made. The record of petitioner’s arraignment discloses that while the court advised him that a plea of guilty would require a sentence of imprisonment and that he was entitled to appointed counsel, it likewise discloses that he was not advised of his right to a jury trial or of a right to have possible defenses explained to him. This failure gives rise to an inference that the plea of guilty was not intelligently or understandingly entered. Cordova v. Cox, 351 F.2d 269 (10th Cir.). In my view, neither Sandoval v. Tinsley, 338 F.2d 48 (10th Cir.) nor Lovato v. Cox, 344 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.) support the position of the majority. Those cases merely affirmed the findings of the trial judge that in each of them an understandable explanation had been made to the accused of his rights. In Lovato, in addition to advising the defendant that the offense was a felony and that he had a right to appointed counsel, the court told him that he would be entitled to a jury trial and that the state had the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In that case the trial court repeatedly asked defendant if he understood what he was doing and again at the time of sentencing inquired in detail concerning defendant’s understanding of his rights. In Sandoval, the Circuit Court of Appeals said: “The finding by the United States District Court, adequately supported, shows appellant’s understanding of his right to counsel and a competent waiver of such right.” Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (10th Cir.) reversed the finding of the district court dismissing the writ, and there determined that the record at the arraignment, very similar in my view to the arraignment in the instant case, failed to reflect an understandable explanation to the accused of his rights. I disagree with the majority interpretation of Shawan and think it is much more nearly in point than Sandoval or Lovato. While in Cordova v. Cox, supra, there was only a conclusional statement in the court minutes that the accused had been fully advised of his constitutional rights. I think the language of the opinion supports the trial court’s findings of a lack of an understanding explanation of petitioner’s rights at the time of the arraignment and of the trial court’s determination that the petitioner did not understanding^ and intelligently enter his plea of guilty. I think the record substantially supports the findings made by the trial court and that on appeal this court is bound thereby.. I, therefore, dissent.