Court Opinion

ID: 9566945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:45:08.422676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:20.181616
License: Public Domain

I respectfully dissent. Today, the majority holds that the predicate act of violating a simple traffic statute is all that is required to support the award of punitive damages. Stated in its simplest terms, the law of South Carolina will now equate negligence per se with recklessness per se.
The Appellant asserts that the violation of a statute, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, is sufficient evidence, in and of itself, to warrant the submission of punitive damages to the jury. I strongly disagree. We have held that punitive damages should be submitted to the jury only when there is evidence that the tortfeasor's conduct was willful, wanton, or in reckless disregard of the rights of others.Cartee v. Lesley, 290 S.C. 333, 350 S.E.2d 388 (1986). We have also held that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se and may be evidence of reckless or willful conduct. Rhodes v. Lawrence, 279 S.C. 96,302 S.E.2d 343 (1983); Carraway v. Pee Dee Block, Inc., 275 S.C. 511,273 S.E.2d 340 (1980).
This rule is based on the presumption that all people have knowledge of the law, and are bound to act accordingly.Callison v. Charleston Western Carolina Ry. Co., 106 S.C. 123,90 S.E. 260 (1916). Therefore, the violation of a statute generally amounts to negligence, and may warrant a reasonable *Page 281 
inference that the defendant violated the statute due to indifference or conscious disregard of his statutory duty.Id.
As a general rule, the jury may consider negligence perse, together with all of the other circumstances presented in the case, to determine whether a party was willful or merely negligent. Jumper v. Goodwin, 239 S.C. 508, 123 S.E.2d 857
(1962). Where only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, however, the question becomes one of law for the court, and the court can refuse to submit punitive damages to the jury, even though the letter of some statute has not been observed by the defendant. Bell v. Atlantic Coast Line R.Co., 202 S.C. 160, 24 S.E.2d 177 (1943).
The record here was devoid of any evidence which supported the inference that Respondent acted with any conscious disregard of his statutory duty to the Appellant. This was a rear-end collision in misting rain where the parties were both traveling under the speed limit. Defendant's statutory violation, upon which punitive damages were predicated, was "following too closely." Although circumstances of a violation of law may evince such an utter disregard for the safety of others as to render the act of violation wanton and reckless, the simple violation of a statute does not, of itself, constitute willful and wanton misconduct. 57A Am. Jur. 2d,Negligence § 722 (1989).
Accordingly, I can see no error in the trial judge's striking Appellant's prayer for punitive damages. To hold otherwise undermines the evidentiary principle in South Carolina that if only one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence, it becomes a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury. See Cubbage v. Roos, 181 S.C. 188,186 S.E. 794 (1936).
I find further support for this positioning in the legislature's enactment of S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-135 (Supp. 1991), which provides that punitive damages in a civil action must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The legislation which created S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-135 also provides that the statute is applicable to any cause of action, "arising or accruing on or after April 5, 1988." Id. In the present case, the accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred on September 9, 1988, and was plainly within the ambit of the statute. *Page 282 
Clear and convincing evidence is an elevated standard of proof, which lies between the lesser standard of "preponderance of the evidence," used in most civil cases, and the higher standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt," which is required in criminal cases. Smith v. Dept. of Health and RehabilitativeSvcs., 522 So.2d 956 (Fla.Ct.App. 1988). In may view, the mere violation of the statute, without more, is insufficient to prove punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.
This dangerous new ground, upon which the majority now travels, will allow every minor accident and "fender bender" to become a punitive damages case. This alone is cause for concern; but by using a lessor standard of proof to present the punitive damages issue to the jury, the majority further exacerbates the problem by providing a vehicle for the complaining party to circumvent the intent of the legislature.
My dissent in Cooper v. County of Florence, 306 S.C. 408,412 S.E.2d 417 (1991), expressed the fear that the majority's rule placed a severe limitation on the directed verdict, and judgment non obstante verdicto. This concern appears to have been well founded. The majority in Cooper adopted the rule that a "[c]ausative violation of an applicable statute wasevidence of recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness." Id.
at ___, 412 S.E.2d at 418 [emphasis added]. With this decision, it is no longer evidence, but instead, a per se reckless violation which gets to the jury on a preponderance of the evidence. It is my opinion that the limitation imposed in Cooper, and expanded here, will destroy any exercise of discretion by the trial judge in granting a directed verdict or judgment non obstante verdicto for punitive damages in any minor accident.
For the reasons set forth above, I would affirm the trial court. *Page 283