Court Opinion

ID: 9536861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:08:19.936661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:25.462163
License: Public Domain

MACY, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion in which the Court affirms the district court’s grant of a summary judgment on Wilder’s defamation claim.
Wilder pleaded defamation with an adequate degree of specificity, including special damages to his professional reputation. A fact finder might conclude that the alleged defamatory language, i.e., that Wilder might “steal” work and that he was “sneaky,” “lazy,” “good-for-nothing,” and a “son-of-a-bitch,” was peculiarly harmful to a person engaged in Wilder’s profession, especially given the setting and the circumstances in which the words were uttered. The recitation of Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 573 cmt. e (1977) in the majority opinion is sound as far as it goes. However, numerous other sections in that chapter of the Restatement are also applicable here. See generally §§ 558 to 581 A. When all the chapters are considered in the light of this case, many others temper the apparent harshness of § 573.
I have noted on at least two occasions that members of society must cope with life’s indignities and failures. Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 242 (Wyo.1993) (Macy, C.J., dissenting); Skane v. Star Valley Ranch Association, 826 P.2d 266, 270 (Wyo.1992). What occurred in this instance is not one of those indignities which an individual should be required to absorb without redress. The context in which these statements were made is as important as any other factor in this case. These statements were made at a trade association meeting where persons in Wilder’s profession may do their “networking,” seek advancements in their profession, and tout their skills and accomplishments. Indeed, the record demonstrates that Wilder was involved in a fight to salvage his professional life. I cannot *228disagree that some of the epithets used in this ease, including “son-of-a-biteh,” might be considered as being mere disparagement — or a statement of opinion — in some contexts, but this was not office gossip or banter or a social situation where such language might pass as “loose talk.” See Rarnbo v. Coken, 587 N.E.2d 140 (Ind.Ct.App.1992); Petula v. Mellody, 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 411, 588 A.2d 103 (1991); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Commission, 428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn.Ct.App.1988); Paul Alexander & Vanessa Wells, Employee, Business & PROFESSIONAL Defamation § 7.02 (1991); C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Actionability of Charge of Being a “Slut,” “Bitch,” or “Son of a Bitch,” 13 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1967); R.P. Davis, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Charge of Being a “Crook,” 1 A.L.R.3d 844 (1965); and Jonathan M. Purver, Liability for Abusive Language, 16 P.O.F.2d 493 (1978).
Given the circumstances present in this case, I would also reverse the summary judgment as to the defamation issue and remand that matter for further proceedings as well.