Court Opinion

ID: 9677652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:44.7045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.405826
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice
(concurring).
Appellees have filed a motion for rehearing in which they urgently contend that we were in error in our disposition of this case, and, in particular, point to the provisions of the Harris County Road Law in support of their position. This Act, H. B. No. 282, Acts of the 33rd Leg. 1913, Ch. 17, p. 64 et seq., contains certain provisions pertinent to this case, a summary of which follows:
Sec. 1. The Commissioners Court shall have control of all roads “heretofore laid out or constructed, or that may hereafter be laid out or constructed by Harris County, or under its direction.”
Sec. 12. (Condemnation power granted.)
Sec. 22. “The Commissioners Court shall have the right to lay out roads to a width of not more than 120 feet, provided same shall connect with main roads leading into the City of Houston.”
Sec. 29. “Whenever in the Act, or any general law, the word ‘Road’ is used, the same is hereby defined to mean in so far as Harris County is concerned, all road beds, ditches, drains, bridges, culverts and every part of every road, whether inside or outside of any incorporated city or town in Harris County, or not.”
Sec. 33. “The provisions of this Act are, and shall be, held and construed to be cumulative of all General Laws of this State, on the subject treated of in this Act, when not in conflict therewith, but in case of such conflict this Act shall control as to Harris County.”
This Act was amended by H.B. No. 579, Acts of 50th Leg., Ch. 205, p. 358 — effective May 14, 1947.
Sec. 6. “Sec. 12 of Acts, 1913, Regular Session, Special Laws, Page 64, Ch. 17, relating to the exercise of the power of eminent domain is hereby repealed. Eminent domain proceedings shall be governed by the General Statutes authorizing counties to institute and maintain such proceedings.”
Sec. 12. Harris County Road Law amended by adding Sec. 31-C. “Hereafter, in acquiring right of ways for roads in Harris County, the Commissioners Court shall determine the width of the right of way required, and establish the lines and alignment of the road.” (Field notes of such roads must be filed with auditor and recorded on road log.)
The Harris County Road Law must be construed to authorize the Commissioners Court to lay out roads whether inside or outside of incorporated cities or towns if they connect with main roads leading into the City of Houston. The proposed road is a continuation of a main road leading into the City of Houston, and connects with Memorial Drive and Voss Road which are also main roads leading into that city. Sections 22 and 29, Acts of the 33rd Leg., 1913, Ch. 17, p. 64. Section 33 of the same Act provides that the provisions of this Act will control as to Harris County when in conflict with the general laws of the state.
*369In 1955, when Harris County and the City of Piney Point entered into the contract in question here, Article 1146, V.A. T.S., was applicable to the City of Piney Point. It provided that the Board of Aldermen should “have and exercise exclusive control over the streets and alleys . within the corporate limits; provided that with the consent of the Board of Aldermen, where streets are continuations of public roads, the Commissioners Court shall have the power to construct bridges and other improvements thereon which facilitate the practicality of travel on said streets.”
In 1957, when Piney Point became a general law city Article 1016, V.A.T.S., became applicable, and it provides that such a city “shall have the exclusive control and power over the streets, alleys . . . and highways of the city or town . . . ”
In Adams v. Rockwall County, 280 S.W. 759 (Tex.Com.App., judgment adopted), the court considered the local road law for Rockwall County in relation to the general statutes granting cities the exclusive control over their streets. There the court said:
“It becomes manifest, therefore, that the local road law must be given an effect which would repeal (more accurately speaking, introduce an exception into) the terms of what is now article 1016, R.S.1925, before it can be said that a county may assume such power over highways, actual or proposed, within an incorporated city as that now claimed by Rockwall county. For present purposes, we assume the power of the Legislature, through a local or special act, to repeal (pro tanto) or to ingraft upon the general law an exception . . . ”
The court stated that a repeal by implication would not be presumed, and held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the general laws and the special act under consideration. It then held that the special act did not authorize the county to construct the road in question within the limits of the City of Royse.
The court also stated that the general law was reenacted in 1925, and thus was the most recent expression of the legislative will, and that this circumstance, together with the legislative intent on the subject gathered from other statutes, would require a holding that the general law must prevail in the event an irreconcilable conflict did appear.
Here we have a clear expression of the legislative intent that the Harris County Road Law should prevail over the contrary provisions of general law. At least since 1895 the general law of this state granted cities exclusive control over their streets and highways. Art. 419, Rev.St.1895; Ex Parte Drake, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 233, 116 S.W. 49 (1909). The Harris County Road Law was enacted in 1913 and amended in 1963, and on several previous occasions. It is a special law applicable only to Harris County roads and as such controls general laws on the same subject. Gabbert v. Brownwood, 176 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App.— Eastland 1943, writ ref.).
In American Surety Co. of New York v. Axtell Co., 120 Tex. 166, 36 S.W.2d 715 (1931, opinion adopted), the court quoted from 36 Cyc. Par. 10, p. 1165, as follows:
“ . . . An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form. . . . ”
In Culver v. Miears, 220 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1949, writ ref.), the court said:
“ . . . Under the rules of statutory construction, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and where one statute deals with a subject in gener*370al terms and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized, if possible. However, if there is any conflict the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior or subsequent to the general statute, unless it appears that the Legislature intended to make the general act controlling.

While the court in Adams v. Rockwall County, supra, pointed out reasons which might well be persuasive that the better policy is to forbid a county from interfering with a city in its control of its streets, effective planning of major streets is undoubtedly hindered by lack of power in any governmental body to form enforceable overall plans. In any event in Board of Insurance Com’rs. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 630, 180 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.1944), we are admonished:
“Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, and its meaning is clear, the statute must be given effect according to its terms, and ‘we are not at liberty to speculate upon the intention of the Legislature in its enactment.’ Vaughn v. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co., 109 Tex. 298, 206 S.W. 920, 921. The proper function of the court is to declare and enforce the law as made by the Legislature without regard to the policy or wisdom of the act nor to the disastrous or mischievous results it may entail. Gaddy v. First Nat. Bank of Beaumont, 115 Tex. 393, 283 S.W. 472.”
It is urged that because these general statutes gave exclusive control of the streets within a city to the governing body of the city, and because questions such as determining the location of a street is a governmental function, the city lacked authority to enter into the contract.
The Harris County Road Law authorized the Commissioners Court to lay out roads within the city limits of cities in Harris County (with the possible exception of the City of Houston), and granted the Commissioners Court “control” of roads so laid out. Because of the provisions of the Harris County Road Law the agreement with the City of Piney Point was unnecessary. This Act is Constitutional and a valid exercise of the legislative power. Tarrant County v. Shannon, 129 Tex. 264, 104 S.W.2d 4 (1937). The County is authorized by its provisions to lay out and construct the proposed extension of San Felipe Road.
Nevertheless in 1955 the County and the City entered into a contract whereby the City granted to the County the right and authority to extend San Felipe Road “to a point within the town limits of Piney Point Village from its intersection of Buffalo Rayou to the intersection of Memorial Drive” provided that the “lines of said extension are set in accordance with the plat attached to this Ordinance and made a part thereof, ...” The contract granted the County, for a period of ten years with an option to extend same for an additional ten years, “the absolute right and authority to widen, to set building lines, to construct, to improve, maintain, control and take into the County Road System, all of that part of San Felipe Road, extension lying within the town limits of Piney Point Village, ...”
It would appear that when this contract became effective by the acceptance of Harris County, that part of San Felipe Road lying within the boundaries of the Village was laid out and designated by the ordinance of the Village.
Under the general law the Commissioners Court has the authority to expend its funds for the improvement of city streets where such streets “form integral parts of county roads or state highways, when such improvements are made without conflicting with the jurisdiction of the municipality, or with its consent or approval.” City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 120 Tex. 318, 40 S.W.2d 43 (1931). The court also said:
“. . . The commissioners’ court has the right to expend county road bond *371funds on county roads and highways in any part of the county. If a street of an incorporated town or city forms a connecting link in the county road or state highway, we think it is a county road within the meaning of the statutes to the extent that county funds may be spent for the improvement thereof. Of course, the town or city governing board primarily has paramount jurisdiction of the streets and highways thereof, and the commissioners’ court would have no authority to improve streets or highways within municipalities in conflict with the jurisdiction of the city to improve the same. . . . ”
The court held that the city was entitled to enforce a contract made with the county whereby the county agreed to pay the cost of paving a city street which was a “connecting link and integral part of a county road and state highway.” The court expressly approved Cannon v. Healy Construction Co., 242 S.W. 526 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana, 1922, writ ref.), and quoted from Smith v. Cathey, 226 S.W. 158 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas, 1920). In the case last cited the.court said: “ . . . But where the city or town does not deem it proper to exercise such jurisdiction, and does not object to the county keeping up such road or street, the county has the right to do so.”
By the contract between Harris County and Piney Point Village, the Village agreed to grant to the County the right to build and maintain the road in consideration of the agreement of the County to maintain it in good condition without cost to the Village. Both the County and the Village were authorized to enter into the contract pursuant to their respective powers to lay out and construct streets and roads. The manner in which the Village exercised its power to construct streets in this instance was a matter within its discretionary powers. The purpose of the contract was to provide for the construction and maintenance of the street, and the power of control granted to Harris County should not be construed to grant rights beyond that necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose. So construed the contract did not involve the contracting away of governmental powers on the part of the Village. A reasonable construction of the contract consistent with its validity must be adopted in preference to a different construction which would render it invalid.
Section 12 of the Harris County Road Law as originally enacted gave the County the right to condemn land, when it became necessary for the purpose of opening or constructing a public road, in the same manner that a railroad company might condemn land for a right of way. The right to open roads by a jury of view as authorized by general law was preserved. After the question of the power of counties to condemn land for right of way purposes under Article 3264a, R.C.S., had been clarified by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Tarrant County v. Shannon, supra, the Road Law was extensively revised in 1947 by the 50th Legislature and Section 12 was repealed, and it was provided that eminent domain proceedings shall be governed by the general statutes authorizing counties to institute and maintain such proceedings. H.B. No. 579, Acts of the 50th Leg., Ch. 205, p. 358.
Section 12 of the original version of the Harris County Road Law, when the definition of “Road” contained therein is considered, authorized the condemnation of land for right of way “whether inside or outside of any incorporated city or town in Harris County.” It appears that the amendment of 1947 was intended to expand the authority of the County with reference to condemnation by eliminating restrictions applicable to railroad companies rather than to restrict that authority. It is also probable that the legislature intended by specifically granting the power to condemn, in view of the fact that the County already had that power under general law, to make that power co-extensive with the right to lay out and construct roads through incorporated cities and towns *372which was granted Harris County by the Act. Aransas County v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., 108 Tex. 216, 191 S.W. 553 (1917).
In Benat v. Dallas County, 266 S.W. 539 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas, 1924, writ ref.), the opinion reads:
“ . . . except in cases coming within the scope of some general or special statute in which authority is explicitly conferred, counties are without authority to lay out or control streets and highways of the incorporated cities and towns, or to have property condemned for such purposes. State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874; Norwood v. Gonzales County, 79 Tex. 222, 14 S.W. 1057; Echols v. State, 12 Tex.App. 616; Reuter v. State, 43 Tex.Cr.R. 572, 67 S.W. 505; Cowand v. State, 83 Tex.Cr.R. 298, 202 S.W. 961.”
The cases cited support the holding that counties are without authority to lay out or control streets and highways of incorporated cities. While these cases do not deal with the right of counties to condemn right of way within incorporated cities, a denial of that right would follow where the county had no authority to lay out or construct a street. While a writ of error was refused in this case, it was acted upon in 1925 when the refusal of a writ did not necessarily mean approval of the opinion.
The county court was held without jurisdiction in a condemnation action instituted by Rockwall County to condemn right of way for a road within the limits of the City of Royse. Adams v. Rockwall County, 280 S.W. 759 (Tex.Com.App.1926, judgment adopted). This case was decided on the basis that the special law upon which the County relied did not expressly or by implication, repeal or ingraft an exception upon the general laws granting to cities the exclusive right to control their streets. It is clearly the opinion of the court that the County had no right to condemn under the general law because the streets within a city are within its exclusive control. In this case the judgment, not the opinion, was adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas.
Both of these cases must be reviewed in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court in City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 120 Tex. 318, 40 S.W.2d 43 (1931), where the court held that Stephens County was authorized to spend county road bond funds for the improvement of streets within incorporated towns, “where such streets form integral parts of county roads or state highways, when such improvements are made without conflicting with the jurisdiction of the municipality, or with its consent or approval.” In this case the court held that a county could be required to pay part of the costs of the construction of a city street where it formed an integral part of a state highway and it had contracted to do so. The court said: “ . under the Constitution and laws of this state the county in the instant case had the right to make the improvement in question here. Of course, if the county had the right to make the improvement, it had the right to make the contract so to do.”
The Village had the right to improve its streets, so it had the right to contract with the County to improve the street. The County had a right to enforce the contract to the same extent as did the Village. Since the County has the right to construct the proposed road, the decisions in Benat and Adams restricting the power of counties to condemn property for right of way are not applicable. Art. 3264a, V.A.T.S., grants counties the power to condemn in general terms. There is no specific statutory provision restricting the right of a county to condemn land within the limits of an incorporated city or town. In all cases where a county has the right to lay out and construct roads, it has the power to condemn right of way for that purpose.
On November 3, 1955, Harris County set the building lines and defined the right of way for the extension of San Felipe in accordance with the agreement. At this time *373the extension connected Voss Road and Memorial Drive, both County roads. In 1963 Harris County purchased a portion of the right of way within the Village. With the full concurrence of the Village Harris County exercised its option to extend the agreement on September 23, 1965. On August 4, 1967, the County bought additional right of way. On July 10, 1969, the County received a letter from the Mayor of Piney Point written at the direction of the Council advising the County that the agreement to permit the County to construct the extension of San Felipe was void, in effect withdrawing their consent. Prior to that time a subdivider had constructed 998 feet of the street under the supervision of the County, and less than one-half of the proposed improvement within Piney Point remained to be constructed. The County had spent large sums of money extending San Felipe, within the City of Houston, from the east to Voss and had made financial arrangements for segments of the right of way westward from Voss to the corporate limits of Piney Point, although this right of way had not been actually purchased. It appears, therefore, that prior to the attempt on the part of Piney Point to withdraw their consent, the County had commenced operations under the contract and had expended large sums of money in reliance on the agreement. Thereafter the County continued the project and completed the street to the city limits of Piney Point. The County directed the engineer to secure the remaining right of way needed in Piney Point and authorized condemnation proceedings.
The extension of San Felipe through Piney Point was a part of an extensive and expensive program of road construction. The benefits anticipated for the citizens of the county from the large expenditures made will be substantially curtailed if the program cannot be completed. It is apparent that Piney Point does not intend to complete the construction of the road. It has asserted its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing the completion of the road. In effect it seeks to abandon part of a road which has been designated, but not built. Since Piney Point is not asserting its jurisdiction to improve the street there is no conflict of jurisdiction between the City and County as contemplated by City of Breckenridge, supra. In any event the trial court correctly concluded that the City had no right to rescind the agreement with Harris County; that the City is es-topped from rescinding the agreement; and that the City was guilty of laches and did not come into court with clean hands. Under these conclusions the City was not entitled to an injunction.
At the time the agreement at issue was made and at the time the County purchased the first segment of right of way in Piney Point for the extension of San Felipe, and at the time the County defined the right of way for that road, it unquestionably formed a connecting link in the county road system. It ran between two roads “heretofore laid out or constructed” by Harris County. Section 1 of the Harris County Road Law provides that the County “shall have control of all” such roads. The fact that county roads become city streets does not mean that they are no longer parts of the county road system. With the consent of the city the county could resume the use of county funds for the maintenance of such roads. City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, supra.
Art. 6674n-2, V.A.T.S., grants counties the right of eminent domain within the limits of incorporated cities “with prior consent of the governing body of such municipality,” to acquire land, rights of way or easements where the land is, in the judgment of the Commissioners Court, “necessary or convenient to any road which forms or will form a connecting link in the county road system or a connecting link in a state highway.” The language used contemplates that the land to be condemned must form an interior link in the county road system as contrasted with an addition to the system connecting at one end only. The Commissioners Court of *374Harris County has found that the proposed extension of San Felipe is necessary or convenient to such a road. This constitutes a recognition of the fact that Memorial Drive is a part of the County Road System. The fact that it was removed from the County Road Log for maintenance purposes does not mean that it is no longer a part of the system. See Acts of 58th Leg. — Regular Session, Ch. 369, p. 940. At the time the Village gave its consent to the construction of the road by Harris County, it impliedly agreed that the County should have its consent to take such action, including condemnation, as might be necessary to secure the needed right of way. Harris County was authorized to condemn the land in question by Art. 6674n-2, V.A.T.S.
For the reasons stated I concur in the action of the court in granting the motion for rehearing, and in affirming the judgment of the trial court.