Court Opinion

ID: 9763033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:35:47.644771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:15.060098
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree that the trial judge had authority to impose the sentence of 40-120 months after we remanded the matter to him, and I join in Part II of the majority opinion.1 I *773disagree with the majority, however, when it concludes that the trial judge erred in redesignating Count D as CDW (rifle and knife).
When this case was first before us, we held that “Bean’s conduct constituted a single violation of the statute.” Bean v. United States, 576 A.2d 187 (D.C.1990). In short, we held that his act of carrying both a knife and a rifle amounted to one offense only. The effect of that holding was to convert the two separate convictions into one, and we remanded to the trial judge with directions to vacate one of the convictions. The sentencing judge’s designation of the remaining offenses as CDW (rifle and knife) conformed precisely to the instruction we gave him.
Further, the grand jury originally charged appellant with CDW (knife) and CDW (rifle) as separate offenses for the single act of carrying both weapons. We concluded that the act.of carrying both weapons constituted a single violation of that statute. This conclusion was, in effect, a finding that the action by the grand jury amounted to the return of a charge of CDW (rifle and knife). See Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 491 (D.C.1985) (a case involving two pistols, a single count of Carrying a Pistol without a License, in effect, charged appellant with carrying both pistols). Appellant, therefore, has no grounds to complain of any defect in the charging process or that the sentencing judge blended the offenses in a way depriving him of his right to be indicted by a grand jury.
Still another objection to the majority’s resolution of this issue is that it results in an inaccurate picture of what actually occurred. The majority’s solution means that appellant’s conviction will be recorded as a conviction of Carrying a Dangerous Weapon (rifle). The fact that the grand jury charged and the trial jury found that appellant violated the statute by carrying a rifle and a knife will be lost. Thus, when the parole authorities view this matter in the future, as they must, any decision they make will be based upon an inaccurate picture of appellant’s conduct which may or may not affect the decisional process.
Further, appellant will eventually be released, and we all hope that he will never be seen again in the criminal justice system. We could be disappointed on that point, however. If so, some judicial officer in the future, when considering bail, will see the prior conviction for CDW (rifle) but will likely not be informed that another weapon was also involved. The same is true, if, at some point, a judicial officer is called upon to impose a sentence for some future law violation. It’s conceded that the difference between record and reality is not significant; however, bail and sentencing decisions often turn on seemingly minor points especially when the call is a close one. The point, however, is not whether an accurate record would make a difference. Rather, the real question is, should the future decision maker have available an accurate picture of what occurred so that he or she can decide whether or not the additional information makes a difference? With the majority’s resolution of this issue a complete picture will not be presented.
As a result, I see no need to remand this matter again. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. I do not agree, however, that still another sentencing proceeding is necessary. I see no reason why we could not simply remand with instructions to amend the Judgment and Commitment Order to reflect that Count D should be labeled as CDW (rifle) rather than CDW (rifle and knife) as the majority has held. The trial judge can accomplish that without convening *773another sentencing hearing unless he wishes to. If appellant believes that he may be able to persuade the trial judge to impose a sentence less than 40 to 120 months, he can proceed by filing a motion to reduce sentence pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 35.