Court Opinion

ID: 9543511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:02.239301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:30.387742
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(concurring in the result) — Because he was misinformed about the punitive consequences of his plea of guilty to first degree murder, Ronald Miller seeks to withdraw the plea. No one denies that the erroneous legal advice Miller received vitiates his plea and entitles him to relief. See Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1973) (discussing similar situation). The question presented here is what form that relief should take.
The law of remedies for invalid pleas is not well settled. With respect to pleas such as Miller's which are determined to be invalid because entered in reliance on an "unfulfillable promise", several questions arise:
Should the defendant simply be permitted to plead anew to the original charges? Should the bargain be enforced? Should the defendant have his druthers? Should the trial judge determine which remedy better satisfies due process in each case?
J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas § 7.19, at 7-54 (1983).
The majority suggests some answers. "We hold now that the defendant's choice of remedy controls, unless there are compelling reasons not to allow that remedy." Majority opinion, at 535. "We decline to hold here that withdrawal of a plea is the only legal remedy where the plea agreement clashes with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981." Majority opinion, at 533. Because I disagree completely with the latter statement, and question the wisdom of the former, I cannot join in the opinion of the majority.
*538I
In support of its assertion that "the specific terms of a plea agreement based on a mistake as to sentencing consequences may be enforced despite the explicit terms of a statute", majority opinion, at 532, the court relies on State v. Cosner, 85 Wn.2d 45, 530 P.2d 317 (1975). In Cosner, this court ordered the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles to reduce the sentences of two defendants who, when pleading guilty, had been misinformed as to the length of the mandatory minimum terms for their crimes. The upshot of this ruling was that the defendants could receive minimum terms which were lower than those mandated by law.
To my mind, this is an impossible result. There simply is no credible legal argument that can be made for the proposition that a court — or, as in Cosner, another sentencing agency — may exceed its statutory sentencing authority in order to enforce the terms of a plea agreement. See In re Gardner, 94 Wn.2d 504, 507, 617 P.2d 1001 (1980). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Cosner opinion cites no authority and offers no explanation for its holding. See Cosner, at 51-52. Nor is it astounding that, other than those cases which rely on Cosner, none can be found proclaiming the radical principle the majority today asserts.3
The majority offers that " [defendants' constitutional rights under plea agreements take priority over statutory provisions”. Majority opinion, at 533. I fail to see any constitutional reason why a plea agreement that conflicts with *539a valid statute should be enforced, however. The fact that entering a plea "involves the waiver of several constitutional rights", In re James, 96 Wn.2d 847, 849, 640 P.2d 18 (1982), is no reason. Those rights are restored when the plea is permitted to be withdrawn.4 Nor may the sentencing laws be overlooked in favor of a putative constitutional right "to protection of the reasonable expectations created in [defendants] by plea agreements with the state." Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 471, 528 (1978). Recent cases refute the existence of any such right. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510 n.11, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984); Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1985).
There being no constitutional right or rule that would supersede RCW 9.94A.120(4), the trial court has no authority to ignore that statute. That is why the only remedy for Miller's invalid plea is rescission.
II
Because rescission is the only permissible remedy in this case, it is unnecessary for this court to discuss what factors might influence the choice of remedies in other cases where a plea agreement is breached or the validity of the defendant's plea is otherwise impaired. Insofar as the majority's opinion does issue dicta on this question, however, I feel it appropriate to offer some observations of my own.
The majority holds that "the defendant's choice of remedy controls, unless there are compelling reasons not to allow that remedy." Majority opinion, at 535. I find this rule at once too rigid and too vague. As the majority itself acknowledges by its "compelling reasons" limitation, a strict rule of "defendant's choice" is impracticable. There is a wide variety of reasons why improvident guilty pleas *540might need remedying. Thus, most courts leave to trial court discretion the task of fashioning relief tailored to the circumstances of each case.5 J. Bond § 7.19(d); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971); Correale v. United States, supra at 949-50.
The rigidity of the "defendant's choice" rule is not usefully mollified by the "compelling reasons" exception the majority posits. What constitutes a "compelling reason" will vary greatly according to the circumstances of each plea bargain. Thus, the majority's new rule will not effectively limit trial courts' discretion to fashion appropriate remedies, except to the extent it affords appellate courts a catch-phrase mechanism for undoing remedies of which they disapprove.
I agree with the majority that the law of remedies for broken plea bargains needs development and clarification. See generally J. Bond § 7.9(e); Specific Performance of "Unfulfillable" Plea Bargains, 14 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 105 (1980). However, I believe it is unnecessary and unwise in this case to declare a rule of "defendant's choice".
Ill
Miller's plea is not valid because he "was not fairly apprised of its consequences". Mabry v. Johnson, supra at 509. Thus, he is entitled to some form of relief. Specific performance of the plea agreement is impossible, in that the court has no authority to impose the sentence Miller was led to believe he might receive. Therefore, rescission is the only remedy available. For these reasons, I believe the *541Court of Appeals decision ordering rescission should be affirmed.
Brachtenbach, Andersen, and Goodloe, JJ., concur with Durham, J.

In several cases, courts have ordered that promises a prosecutor had no legal authority to make should be enforced. See Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977), and cases cited therein; Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453, 353 A.2d 441 (1976). But in none of these cases did enforcement violate positive law. Indeed, even courts taking an expansive view of defendants' rights under plea agreements have refused specific performance when enforcement would be unlawful. See, e.g., People v. World, 121 Misc. 2d 148, 467 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1983).

There is no evidence that Miller compromised any of his constitutional rights after entering his plea. See People v. Carter, 134 Misc. 2d 878, 886, 513 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1987).

Indeed, in its original formulation, the "defendant's choice" approach was written narrowly, to apply only when the validity of a plea has been impaired by the prosecutor's breach of a plea agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); see State v. Pope, 17 Wn. App. 609, 614, 564 P.2d 1179 (defendant's choice of remedy to be given weight "where bad faith is found to exist"), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1009 (1977).