Court Opinion

ID: 9369975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:04:34.746205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.126733
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0591-ME

BRETT LUCKABAUGH                                                    APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE DAVID A. LANPHEAR, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 22-D-00015-001

MARCIA LUCKABAUGH                                                     APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Brett Luckabaugh (“Brett”) appeals from the Warren Circuit

Court’s order, entered on March 16, 2022, which granted an order of protection,

specifically a domestic violence order (“DVO”), to his mother, the Appellee,

Marcia Luckabaugh (“Marcia”). Appellant argues the circuit court erred by

entering the DVO. Finding no error, we affirm.
             I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On December 29, 2021, Marcia filed a petition for order of protection

in the Marshall Family Court against her son, Brett. In the petition, Marcia alleges

Brett threatened to kill her during a phone call, which took place on December 25,

2021. The Marshall Family Court granted an emergency protective order on

December 29, 2021, and that court set a hearing for January 11, 2022.

             On January 4, 2022, an order transferring was entered, sending the

case to Warren County. There is no indication of any objection to this transfer.

Brett had not been served with the initial summons. The Warren Family Court

issued a subsequent summons with a new court date of January 19, 2022. Brett

was served with this summons on January 7, 2022.

             After a first continuance at the request of Brett’s counsel and a second

continuance due to illness of Marcia’s counsel, the court held an evidentiary

hearing on March 16, 2022. Both parties testified. After the evidentiary hearing,

the trial court granted Marcia a DVO against Brett for six (6) months, to expire on

September 16, 2022. In addition to AOC Form 275.3, the trial court issued

findings of fact and conclusions of law, which stated the court announced its

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record and incorporated them into

the written order.

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                II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

                We review the issuance of a DVO by the trial court for abuse of

discretion. Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021). The trial

court’s findings of fact shall not be set aside unless they were clearly erroneous.

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01. A trial court’s findings of fact

are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente,

110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

                We note Marcia did not file a brief after her counsel withdrew from

his representation of her in this matter, although she did file a pro se document.

We are permitted discretion in how to address this failure under RAP1 31(H)(3).

We decline to sanction Marcia for failure to file a brief. The factual and legal

issues were fairly presented by the record itself, which was not voluminous.

                III.   ANALYSIS

                Brett argues the trial court erred in granting the DVO. His argument

is two-fold. First, the trial court was influenced by inappropriate bias or prejudice

when assessing the credibility of the parties. Second, the facts do not support a

finding that domestic violence is likely to occur in the future.

                We find no basis for Brett’s assertion the trial court demonstrated any

bias or prejudice during the proceedings. Brett relies upon one particular remark

1
    Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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made by the judge after the hearing when the judge explained his reasoning for his

decision: “I don’t know of any reason why a mother would create a fiction that her

child intended to kill her. I just, I cannot . . . I cannot imagine that.” Brett argues

this statement illustrates an inherent bias applied to this case. We disagree.

              First, we will not usually address issues not raised with the trial court.

Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Ky. 1989). Brett did not

seek recusal of the judge after the supposedly offending comment. Even if

considered, the single statement, taken out of the context of the entire statement of

the court does not show a sufficient bias to justify disqualification. The court’s

comments would have to be of such a nature to indicate a fair decision by the court

was impossible. Brown v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 557, 563-64 (Ky. 2009).

              The comment was not made at the beginning of the court’s

comments. It was made after approximately seven minutes of explanation. It was

followed by the judge commenting on Marcia’s lack of motive to make up the

allegation, not the motive of all mothers. The record here does not support any

finding of partiality or bias to justify the relief Brett requests.

               As for Brett’s second contention, we begin with the requirements for

a valid order of protection. “A trial court is authorized to issue a DVO if it ‘finds

by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred

and may again occur[.]’” Castle v. Castle, 567 S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky. App. 2019).

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Domestic violence includes not just acts of violence but words or actions creating a

fear of such violence. KRS 403.720(2)(a). In the present case, the trial court filled

out AOC Form 275.3, and checked the box under “Additional Findings” which

stated: “For the Petitioner against the Respondent in that it was established, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that an act(s) of domestic violence and abuse . . .

has occurred and may again occur[.]”

             The trial court made additional oral findings on the record, which

were then incorporated into written findings of fact and conclusions of law, also

dated March 16, 2022. The Court has reviewed these oral findings. The oral

statements support the written summary. Brett admits he was very angry during

the phone call at issue. Brett admits he called Marcia a bitch as well as using a

more vulgar term of a c***. Brett further admits he told Marcia to f*** herself.

While Brett denied the spoken statement of an intent to kill Marcia, he admits he

told her it was “nice knowing you.” He admits expressing frustration over people

talking about his friend Dan. Marcia testified the threat to kill was related to

anyone who might say something about Dan.

             The trial court was entitled to accept any part of the testimony as true.

In doing so, the trial court here could accept Brett’s admission of being very angry

and making various insults. The judge could also accept Marcia’s statement of the

threat to kill. Marcia also commented on the influence of Brett’s friend Dan as a

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reason to believe the threats would be repeated. It was supposed comments about

Dan which led to the first threat. Given the anger in the situation and the history

between these parties, including a recent hospitalization of Brett for mental health

observation upon Marcia’s petition, the judge was justified in finding the required

likelihood of further threats being made.

              When reviewing an order of protection, “the test is not whether we

would have decided it differently, but whether the court’s findings were clearly

erroneous or that it abused its discretion.” Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842

(Ky. App. 2008). We give great deference to the trial courts as the finders of fact.

“It has long been held that the trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence

presented by one litigant in preference to another.” Commonwealth v. Anderson,

934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). “The trier of fact may take into consideration all

the circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the witness[es].” Id. The

trial court acted within its discretion in this case.

              IV.    CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Warren Family Court.

              ALL CONCUR.

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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:       NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Tim Hendrix
Bowling Green, Kentucky

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