Court Opinion

ID: 9892751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 19:10:27.062617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:07.501406
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sweeney, 2023-Ohio-3854.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :               No. 22AP-719
                                                                  (C.P.C. No. 21CR-3234)
v.                                                   :
                                                                (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Jared Sweeney,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                              D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on October 24, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, Darren M.
                 Burgess, and Kimberly Bond, for appellee. Argued:
                 Kimberly Bond.

                 On brief: Charles A. Koenig, for appellant. Argued:
                 Charles A. Koenig.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

JAMISON, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jared Sweeney, appeals from the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas finding him to be a Tier II sex offender. For the
following reasons we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 2} This matter commenced when local law enforcement received a tip from the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that appellant was involved in the
uploading and dissemination of child pornography. The information revealed that an
online file hosting service account registered to appellant contained videos of child
pornography.
No. 22AP-719                                                                              2

       {¶ 3} After an investigation, appellant was charged with two violations of R.C.
2907.322, pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor or impaired person. Count
1 alleges that a minor was involved in the activities and is a second-degree felony; Count 2
alleges that an impaired person was involved and is a third-degree felony.
       {¶ 4} Appellant entered a plea of guilty to Count 2 to a stipulated lesser-included
charge of attempted pandering sexually oriented matter, in violation of R.C. 2923.02 as it
relates to 2907.322, a felony of the fourth degree.
       {¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, appellant argued he could not be classified as a sex
offender because he was exempt from classification by R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(a). Appellant
also asserted that because the offense he was convicted of involved consensual conduct
between an impaired person and not a minor, he should not be classified as a sex offender.
       {¶ 6} The trial court found that appellant was a Tier II sex offender, and sentenced
him accordingly. Appellant now brings this appeal.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
       {¶ 7} Appellant assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
               The Trial Court’s Finding That Appellant Was a Sex Offender
               Within the Meaning of Chapter 2950 of the Ohio Revised Code
               Was Not Supported by Sufficient Evidence and Was Against
               the Manifest Weight of the Evidence in Violation of Appellant’s
               Rights Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
               Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
               Article I, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
       {¶ 8} On July 27, 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act (“AWA”) to protect the public from sex offenders by establishing a
comprehensive national system for the registration of sex offenders. Pub.L. No. 109-248,
120 Stat. 587 (July 27, 2006). Ohio amended its classification and registration scheme to
conform to the new federal requirements through the passage of S.B. 10, which became
effective on January 1, 2008. 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10.
       {¶ 9} Before the AWA was enacted, sex offender classifications under Megan’s Law
were reviewed by an appellate court using a civil manifest weight of the evidence standard.
State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202; see also State v. Johnson, 8th Dist.
No. 108898, 2020-Ohio-3186. The AWA replaced the prior remedial scheme with a now
No. 22AP-719                                                                                 3

punitive scheme, but the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified that “neither the constitution nor
statutes nor rules of procedure treat civil cases differently from criminal cases with regard
to appellate review on the issues of sufficiency and manifest weight.” Eastley v. Volkman,
132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 17. Therefore, “the criminal sufficiency of the
evidence standard applies when a defendant challenges the State’s evidence in support of
his sex offender classification.” State v. Shockey, 9th Dist. No. 29170, 2019-Ohio-2417, ¶ 15.
        {¶ 10} The concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the
evidence are distinct. “ ‘Sufficiency’ challenges whether the prosecution has presented
evidence on each element of the offense to allow the matter to go to the jury, while ‘manifest
weight’ contests the believability of the evidence presented” and raises a factual issue. State
v. Shannon, 11th Dist. No. 2017-L-092, 2019-Ohio-421, ¶ 72, quoting State v. Schlee, 11th
Dist. No. 93-L-082 (Dec. 23, 1994).
        {¶ 11} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court examines the evidence at trial to
determine whether the evidence, if believed, supports a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991). “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio
St.3d 76, 2009-Ohio-5937, ¶ 34, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. “In essence,
sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
verdict is a question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
        {¶ 12} Under the AWA, sex offenders are automatically classified as Tier I, II, or III
offenders upon conviction of a predicate offense. State v. Elifritz, 12th Dist. No. CA2016-
02-002, 2016-Ohio-7193. “ ‘The new provisions leave little, if any, discretion to the trial
court in classifying an offender,’ and instead the law ‘requires the trial court to classify an
offender based solely on his or her conviction.’ ” State v. Adams, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-141,
2010-Ohio-171, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Omiecinski, 8th Dist. No. 90510, 2009-Ohio-1066,
¶ 29.
        {¶ 13} At sentencing, the trial court merely informs the sex offender which
classification and duties attach to his or her conviction.        R.C. 2950.03(A)(2).     The
classification, duty to register, and community notification requirements after a conviction
No. 22AP-719                                                                                 4

for a sexually oriented offense arise “as a matter of law, not by judicial determination.”
State v. Crawford, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1055, 2009-Ohio-4649, ¶ 16.
        {¶ 14} “Tier II sex offender” classification is mandatory under R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(a)
for those convicted of an attempted violation of R.C. 2907.322. State v. Eal, 10th Dist. No.
11AP-460, 2012-Ohio-1373, ¶ 109. Requiring a conviction under R.C. 2907.322 to serve as
the predicate to be classified as a Tier II sex offender “is no different than a mandatory
prison sentence, mandatory fine, or any other mandatory punishment that the General
Assembly deems necessary.” State v. Ritchey, 3d Dist. No. 1-15-20, 2016-Ohio-2878, ¶ 28.
        {¶ 15} However, R.C. 2950.01(B)(2)(a) provides that a person convicted of a
sexually oriented offense is not a sex offender “if the offense involves consensual sexual
conduct or consensual sexual contact” and other age and relationship criteria are met.
Appellant offers an unsupported argument that the possession of pornographic images
qualifies as consensual conduct, and that there is a presumption the exception applies
unless the state proves otherwise. We disagree.
        {¶ 16} Neither sexual conduct nor sexual contact appears in this case. R.C. 2907.01
provides the following definitions:
                  (A) “Sexual conduct” means vaginal intercourse between a
                  male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus
                  between persons regardless of sex; and, without privilege to do
                  so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body or any
                  instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal or anal
                  opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
                  complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

                  (B) “Sexual contact” means any touching of an erogenous zone
                  of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals,
                  buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for
                  the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.

        {¶ 17} Appellant possessed pornographic images of others and there is no evidence
that he ever engaged in any physical contact with a victim. Because there was no conduct
or contact as contemplated by the statute, appellant’s attempt to use R.C. 2950.01(B)(2) as
a shield fails.
        {¶ 18} Appellant pled guilty to a sex offense but intended to address classification at
sentencing. Appellant argues the trial court is required to conduct a hearing and make
No. 22AP-719                                                                                   5

findings that an offense is a sexually oriented offense, and that the offender is a sex offender
before being classified as a Tier II sex offender.
       {¶ 19} That is simply incorrect. Adult offenders are subject to offense specific,
automatic sexual offender classification. State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-
3374. Sexual offender classification hearings are no longer necessary under the AWA
because of the automatic classification. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-
2424, ¶ 20. Appellant’s guilty plea makes him a sex offender. R.C. 2950.01(B)(1).
       {¶ 20} Appellant argues that because he pled to an attempted offense in Count 2
which does not involve minors, he should not be classified as a sex offender. Further, he
complains that plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, “continually conflated pandering sexually-
oriented materials involving an impaired person with pandering sexually-oriented
materials involving a minor.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5.) If the victims
are minors or impaired persons and the violation involves one of the prohibited activities
listed in R.C. 2907.322(A), the person is “guilty of pandering sexually oriented matter
involving a minor or impaired person,” and is a sex offender. R.C. 2907.322(C).
       {¶ 21} Because there is no distinction in the level of offenses in R.C. 2907.322, “any
violation requires a Tier II classification.” State v. Stutz, 2d Dist. No. 29521, 2023-Ohio-
1082, ¶ 34. Appellant offers nothing to support his contention that pandering sexually
oriented matter involving an impaired person is not a sexually oriented offense.
       {¶ 22} Appellant asserts in his assignment of error that the trial court’s finding that
he was a sex offender was not supported by the evidence and was against the manifest
weight of the evidence in violation of his constitutional rights.
       {¶ 23} “A guilty plea is an admission that the defendant committed the crime
charged against him.” State v. Fortner, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-191, 2008-Ohio-5067, ¶ 7. The
guilty plea serves as a conviction and provides necessary proof of the elements of the crime
and relieves the trial court of the obligation to determine if the plea is supported by a factual
basis. Id. See also State v. Davis, 5th Dist. No. 22CA0067, 2023-Ohio-2703, ¶ 20 (a guilty
plea serves as a conviction and does not require findings of fact or verdict to support it).
       {¶ 24} A guilty plea by a defendant represented by counsel waives all non-
jurisdictional defects in the proceedings, including the “right to challenge sufficiency or
manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Jamison, 2d Dist. No. 21165, 2006-Ohio-4933,
No. 22AP-719                                                                                 6

¶ 38. Because there was no evidence for the trial court to consider, appellant’s “guilty plea
obviated the requirement of evidentiary support for the trial court’s finding of guilt.” Davis
at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 25} A guilty plea must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v.
Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509. The trial court engaged in a Crim.R. 11(C)
colloquy with appellant to ensure the plea was properly accepted. Appellant was informed
that he would be classified as a Tier II sex offender and indicated he was pleading guilty
freely and voluntarily.        Appellant makes no arguments regarding the trial court’s
jurisdiction in this matter.
       {¶ 26} “[T]he court need not take testimony upon a plea of guilty or no contest.”
Crim.R. 11(C)(4). The guilty plea relieves “the State of its burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.” State v. Williams, 2d Dist. No. 26635, 2016-Ohio-5655, ¶ 24. We find
appellant has waived his right to challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence by
pleading guilty to a sex offense. “[A] conviction resulting from a guilty plea is not subject
to a sufficiency of the evidence review, because the conviction depends upon the plea of
guilty and not upon any evidence submitted to, or before, the trial court.” State v. Fuller,
12th Dist. No. CA2008-09-240, 2009-Ohio-5068, ¶ 113.
V. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 27} Appellant was convicted of a violation of R.C. 2907.322 and is a Tier II sex
offender. The limited record below does not support the application of the R.C.
2950.01(B)(2) exemption, and therefore, it does not operate to exclude appellant from the
definition of sex offender.
       {¶ 28} For the reasons above, appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and
the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

                      BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and LELAND, J., concur.
                                      _____________