Court Opinion

ID: 9445773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:38:03.849101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:24.424137
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge
(concurring) .
The issue of whether Matles may refuse to be sworn as a witness is of such importance in the administration of justice in all civil cases that I take this occasion to make my own position clear. On reason and precedent, Matles, like any ■other party or witness in a civil suit, and not under indictment on similar charges, may not refuse to be sworn as a witness.
It is undisputed that denaturalization is a civil proceeding, Schneiderman v. United States, 1943, 320 U.S. 118, 160, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Chief Justice CLARK’S opinion, 247 F.2d 380. It is also clear that Rule 26 (a) requires a party in such a case to submit to an examination before trial. United States v. Jerome, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1954, 16 F.R.D. 137.
Rule 1 of the Civil Rules provides that "“these rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81.” From an examination of Rule 81, it is apparent that Congress and the Supreme Court have already considered the extent to which denaturalization proceedings are not to be governed by the Civil Rules and have provided for only two exceptions which are specifically set forth in Rule 81(a) (6) as follows: “The provisions for service by publication and for answer in proceedings to cancel certificates of citizenship under the Act of October 14, 1940, c. 876, § 338 (54 Stat. 1158), U.S.C.Title 8, § 738, remain in effect.” This specific reference indicates not only that denaturalization is a civil action within the scope of Rule 1 of the Civil Rules but also that the exceptions noted in Rule 81 (a) (6) are the only exceptions intended.1 United States v. Jerome, supra.
In any event, this defendant, not being under indictment on charges similar to those at issue in this denaturalization proceeding, is not in a position similar to that of an accused in a criminal prosecution. While it cannot be said that the denaturalization defendant faces no dangers, they are different in nature and degree from those faced by an accused, and are such as must be faced by any defendant in a civil suit if our methods of seeking and finding the facts are to function fairly and effectively.
The danger underlying the accused’s right not to take the stand and to be sworn is that a refusal by him to answer might emphasize in a particularly prejudicial way that the accused considers certain questions incriminatory and the jury may consider his refusals to answer as the equivalent of damaging answers. See 8 Wigmore § 2268 (3d ed. 1940); United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 113, 115-116, certiorari denied *3831955, 350 U.S. 897, 76 S.Ct. 156, 100 L. Ed. 788; Grünewald v. United States, 77 S.Ct. 963.
But no such prejudice attaches to the refusal to answer questions at an examination before trial in a civil case. The fact that denaturalization cases are tried by the court and not to juries, Luria v. United States, 1931, 231 U.S. 9, 27, 34 S.Ct. 10, 58 L.Ed. 101, only serves to emphasize the point.
Moreover, as in any civil action, the denaturalization defendant has notice in advance regarding the issue and the assistance of counsel at every step of the way, for every question. He can claim his privilege as to each alleged incriminatory question as it is asked. This is all the protection which is necessary.
I do not believe that the possibility of inadvertent waiver, which is reduced to a minimum where counsel is present, justifies the extension of the privilege in violation of the rights of the other party and in derogation of the fact-finding policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No court has yet accepted or even suggested such a doctrine. Even in grand jury proceedings where the dangers of such waiver are far greater because the witness does not have the assistance of counsel in the grand jury room, the witness must still be sworn even though he might be indicted for the matters under investigation. See O’Connell v. United States, 2 Cir., 1930, 40 F.2d 201, 205; Mulloney v. United States, 1 Cir., 1935, 79 F.2d 566, 578-579 ; cf. Grunewald v. United States, supra, 77 S.Ct. at page 982; see also Scully v. United States, supra, which holds that the possibility that the witness may later be indicted does not require that he be warned of his Fifth Amendment rights when called as a witness before a grand jury.
Furthermore, fear of inadvertent waiver would justify a refusal to be sworn in any civil case where the main charge could also be ground for criminal prosecution, e.g., a suit in negligence where the charge is reckless or drunken driving or a suit for conversion or embezzlement. In each case it could be argued that most questions could be incriminatory and that there is a danger that a party may waive his privilege and be forced to answer a series of incriminatory questions. I doubt that anyone would be willing to allow such a frustration of the fact-finding process in these other contexts, but the logic of such reasoning is not limited to denaturalization — it would extend to any civil action where the main charges could be the basis of a criminal prosecution. I find it hard to believe that this far reaching result is at all necessary, especially in view of the defendant’s existing protection.
Finally, we cannot say in advance of the examination whether any non-incriminatory questions may be asked. Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was designed to permit broad and searching examination of all matters which would assist a party in discovering evidence. Thus Rule 26(b) provides:
“Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
This language is clearly designed to be broad enough to cover almost anything that will help the examining party to discover any leads to evidence. In practice the district court is not asked to rule on the availability of the privilege to refuse *384to answer until a number of questions have been asked and refused. The district court is thus in a position to determine the incriminatory nature of the question or questions in .the context of the whole case and the nature of the information sought to be elicited. Until that moment, it cannot be known which of the many possible questions will require answers which may be incriminatory. Thus it seems to me that in all civil cases as long as it is possible that one question may be answered, the spirit of the Federal Rules requires that the witness be sworn and the district court must make the determination whether particular questions must be answered, and not the party himself. See United States v. Jerome, supra.
Without the power to seek and find the facts through the swearing and questioning of witnesses, the administration of justice would be seriously obstructed. This most fundamental power, as recognized and developed through our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should not be diminished or frustrated unless and until it is clear to the district court that the answer to a particular question may incriminate the witness. Clearly, we do not reach that point when the party is called upon to take the oath; we reach it only when the court can judge the possible effect of a particular question.
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring) .
I concur in the result reached here. I join in the holding that the substantive nature of these proceedings is civil and that Matles may be punished for contempt if he refuses to be sworn and to take the witness stand. At this time I do not subscribe to any discussion indicating advance approval or disapproval of the use of discovery procedures ordinarily permissible in civil cases under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Questions raised by adjective maneuvers and procedures can abide the event.

. The only other exception peculiar to denaturalization is that the complaint may not be amended to accord with the proof, despite Civil Rule 15(b). See Schneiderman v. United States, 1943, 320 U.S. 118, 160, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796. But the existence of Rule 15(b) was evidently not brought to the attention of the Court, for it was not mentioned in the opinion by Justice Murphy.