Court Opinion

ID: 9737139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:17:03.190245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.812117
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
The trial court must find that the state has proven that the aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the trial court must find that the defendant intentionally killed the victim.
The aggravating cireumstances here was that " ... the victim of the murder was a ... law enforcement officer ... acting in the course of duty ..." I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6). Under 35-41-1-2 (Burns 1979 suppl.; now 85-41-1-17 as added by P.L. 811-1983, § 18), "Law enforcement officer means."
(1) A police officer, sheriff; constable, marshal, or prosecuting attorney:
(2) A deputy of any of those persons; or
(3) An investigator for a prosecuting attorney.
I hasten to point out that appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of evidence of the aggravating circumstance. However, it is appropriate to consider such issues sua sponte in a death case.
*956The victim's status as the Town Marshal of Avilla was established by the testimony of the President of the Avilla Town Board. Consequently, the victim was a law enforcement officer. However, the attempted arrest of the perpetrators and the subsequent killing of the Town Marshal occurred outside the town limits of Avilla.
Was the victim acting in the course of duty when the law enforcement action occurred outside the town limits? The powers and duties of a Town Marshal are set forth in 1.C. § 86-5-7-4.
36-5-7-4. Powers and duties,-The marshal is the chief police officer of the town and has the powers of law enforcement officers in executing the orders of the legislative body and enforcing laws. The marshal or his deputy: (1) Shall serve all process directed to him by the town court or legislative body: (2) Shall arrest without process all persons who commit an offense within his view, take them before a court having jurisdiction, and detain them in custody until the cause of the arrest has been investigated; ,
(8) Shall suppress breaches of the peace;
(4) May, if necessary, call the power of the town to his aid;
(5) May execute search warrants and arrest warrants; and
(6) May pursue and jail persons who commit an offense. [I.C. 18-8-1-20, 18-3-1-82, recodified as 1.0. 36-5-7-4 by Acts 1980, P.L. 212, § 4.]
In Warner v. State (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 971, the Second District of the Court of Appeals construed the former statute LC. § 18-8-1-82 which delineated the powers and duties of a town marshal.
18-8-1-82 [48-218]. Marshal-Powers and duties. In executing the orders of the town trustees and enforcing the ordinances of the town and the laws of the state, the marshal or duly appointed deputy marshal shall possess all the common-law and statutory powers of constables, except in relation to the service of civil process; and any warrant of search or arrest, issued by any judge, or magistrate, or justice of the peace of this state, may be executed in any part thereof by the marshal or deputy marshal subject to the laws of this state governing arrest and bail. The marshal or deputy marshal shall have the power, and it shall be their duty, to serve all process issuing from the town court. They shall be conservators of the peace in the town, and shall arrest, without process, all persons who within their view commit any crime or misdemeanor contrary to the statutes of this state or ordinances of the town, and take them before the court having jurisdiction of the offense with which the person is charged and retain them in custody until the cause of such arrest has been investigated, and shall suppress all breaches of the peace within their knowledge. Authority is hereby given for them to call to their aid the power of the town and to pursue and commit to jail all felons, persons guilty of misdemeanors or crimes in violation of the statutes of this state or the ordinances of the town. The marshal shall have the power, and it shall be his duty to serve all process issued by the town board of trustees. [Acts 1969, ch. 257, § 8305, p. 987.]
17-4-86-5 [49-8407]. Acts throughout county-Citizens to aid. Constables in the discharge of their duty, shall have power to act throughout their respective counties, unless specially restrained by law, and whenever necessary, may call upon any number of citizens to assist them in the discharge of their duties, who shall not refuse such assistance under such penalty as may be prescribed by the criminal law. [2 R.S. 1852, ch. 2, § 6, p. 480].
After examining these statutes, the Court of Appeals concluded, "And, in this regard, since constables 'have the power to act throughout their respective counties, I.C. § 17-4-86-5, a fortiori town marshals have the power to effect an arrest throughout the county in which their respective towns are located. Warner v. State, supra at 972, I.C. § 86-5-7-4 replaced I.C. § 18-3-*9571-82 in 1980, and it was the applicable statute at the time of this offense which occurred in 1983. The phrase "the marshal . shall possess all the common-law and statutory powers of constables" contained in 1.0. § 18-8-1-82 is absent from IC. § 36-5-7-4. A change in legislative purpose will be presumed from a change in the wording of a statute. See State v. Beal (1916), 185 Ind. 192, 113 N.E. 225; Hasely v. Ensley (1907), 40 Ind.App. 598, 82 N.E. 809, 26 I.L.E. Statutes § 161.
There is a presumption that a statutory amendment was intended to change existing law. Ware v. State (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 20; Gingerich v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 440, 93 N.E.2d 180. There is nothing to suggest that the omission of the key phrase "the Marshal ... shall possess all the common law and statutory powers of constables" meant anything else but that the town marshal's authority was being limited to the boundaries of the town except in the case of pursuit (see IC. § 36-5-7-4(6)). Moreover, it cannot be said that the legislature adopted the construction of Warner v. State, supra, because the legislature omitted the phrase that Warner construed and because the Court of Appeals handed down Warner one month after the legislature passed I.C. § 36-5-7-4. There is another rule of construction which leads us to this same conclusion.
"It is a fundamental rule in the construction of statutes that penal statutes must be construed strictly, or, as is otherwise stated, strictly construed against the state. The rule of strict construction means that such statutes will not be enlarged by implication or intendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used, and will not be held to include offenses and persons other than those which are clearly described and provided for although the court may think the legislature should have made them more comprehensive." Kelly v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 294, 298, 119 N.E.2d 322, 324.
Although I.C. § 86-5-7-4 is not a penal or eriminal statute, it does give content to a criminal statute, specifically I.C. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6), and its construction is decisive in this case as to whether the State proved the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, it must be strictly construed against the state.
In Warner, the Court of Appeals also relied on IC. § 85-1-21-1 for authority that a Town Marshal could arrest someone anywhere in the county. IC. § 385-1-21-1 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1978) provides:
All judges, coroners, and law enforcement officers may arrest and detain any person found violating any statute of this state, until a legal warrant can be obtained [Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 142, p. 584; 1978, P.L. 2, § 8514, p. 597.]
The Court of Appeals construed this statute to give " ... law enforcement officers the authority to arrest at any place within the state ...". However, this construction is illogical when I.C. § 17-4-86-5 specifically limits constables' powers of arrest to their respective counties. (Through I.C. § 18-3-1-82 Town Marshals were also limited to their respective counties). Nevertheless, I.C. § 35-1-21-1 was replaced by 1C. § $5-38-1-1 in 1981. The content of L.C. § 35-83-1-1 concerns when an officer may arrest and not where.
The majority relies on State v. Russ (1985), Ind.App., 480 N.E.2d 248 to support its position that the powers of law enforcement officers to arrest are not given territorial limitation. The Court of Appeals in Russ reasoned that since 1.0. § 85-38-1-1 and .C. § 34-4-82-2 do not state any jurisdictional limitations, there must be none. First, the obvious reason these statutes do not contain any jurisdictional limitations is because they refer to law enforcement officers in general and because they concern when they can arrest, not where. The specific jurisdictional limitations are contained in the statutes which designate the territorial jurisdiction of local governmental units. See I.C. § 86-1-38-9 and I.C. § 36-1-2-11.
It is an unreasonable construction to conclude that an officer of a particular local governmental unit has the power to act outside that unit in the absence of express *958statutory authorization. I.C. § 85-83-1-1 and LC. § $4-4-82-2, when viewed in this context, only grant powers to be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the appropriate local governmental unit. Again the strict construction doctrine leads to the conclusion, that a town marshal does not have the power to arrest outside of his town limits unless he is in pursuit of a perpetrator who committed an offense within the town limits.
The evidence supporting the aggravating cireumstance is as follows: the victim, William Miner, was the Town Marshal of Avil-12, Indiana. Under an arrangement with the Noble County Sheriff, his duties encompassed responding to any call in the area. On May 28, 1983, he responded to a call concerning an automobile being vandalized. The location of the offense was outside the town limits of Avilla. He attempted to arrest the perpetrators, and appellant intentionally shot and killed him.
This evidence is insufficient to support the existence of the aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that the Town Marshal had been deputized by the Noble County Sheriff, See I.C. § 86-2-16-2(b) (Oath of office), LC. § 86-2-16-8 (Power and duties) L.C. § 86-2-16-6 (Sheriff's deputies), I.C. § 86-8-10-6 (Appoint ment of additional deputies or assistants in emergencies), IC. § 86-8-10-9 (Powers and duties of sheriff's department), IC. § 36-8-10-10.5 (Special deputies). The fact that an arrangement existed between the town Board and the Noble County Sheriff's Department is not evidence which would lead a reasonable trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Town Marshal was a duly appointed sheriff's deputy acting within the course of duty involved therein.
II
I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e) (Jury trial) and I.C. § 35-50-2-9(g) (Bench trial) set forth what the trial court must find before it can impose a death sentence:
That the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists; and That any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.
Once the trial court finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one aggravating circumstance exists, it must engage in the most critical stage of the death sentence determination: the weighing of mitigating cireumstances and aggravating circumstances. He must find and assign a value to all mitigating cireumstances which exist, and then he must place the weighted mitigating circumstances, if any, on the mitigating side of the scale. Next, he must assign a value to the aggravating circumstance or circumstances, and then he must place the weighted aggravating cireumstance or circumstances on the aggravating side of the scale. Only if the mitigating side of the scale is outweighed by the aggravating side of the scale can a death sentence be imposed.
The separation of the valuations of the mitigating and the aggravating circumstances is crucial,. The separate valuation of the mitigating circumstances must be maintained so that the trial court will be able to view the defendant in his best light, undistorted at that moment by the impact of the aggravating circumstances. In this way, defendant's worth as a human being can be fairly valued to the extent that such a valuation is humanly possible.
The separation of the valuations in this case is not maintained; consequently, it cannot be said that the valuation of the mitigating circumstances was not distorted by the impact of the aggravating circumstance. The sentencing statement gives rise to the inference that the aggravating circumstance did distort the valuation of the mitigating circumstances of lack of a significant history of criminal conduct, and youth.
The trial court alluded to the following mitigating circumstances: age, lack of a significant history of prior criminal conduct *9591.C. § 85-50-2-9(c)(1), state of intoxication at the time of the offense, acting under an emotional or stressful situation, no advance plan or scheme to kill, cooperation with authorities, prospects for rehabilitation.
In dealing with appellant's lack of a significant history of prior criminal conduct, the trial court reasoned as follows:
"This is a positive mitigating factor." "It is depreciated, however, by the fact that because of age, lack of record, the comparative minor nature of the defendant's criminal act which brought the Marshal to the scene, make the killing even more aggravated and disproportionate when compared to the risk of the defendant from the standpoint of criminal punishment if he had submitted. Avoiding the situation by killing under all cireum-stances of this case deviates substantially from the response of the ordinary person in such a situation, even one inclined otherwise to act out in a criminal 19 way
The reasons given to depreciate this mitigating circumstance are irrelevant to the determination that this particular mitigating circumstance exists and to the determination of the weight to be given it. This mitigating circumstance is established by the actual absence of a significant history of prior criminal conduct. The weight to be assigned this circumstance must take into account the type, if any, of prior criminal conduct and be diminished accordingly, otherwise this mitigating circumstance should be given its full appropriate value and added to any other mitigating cireum-stances, and then it can be balanced against the aggravating circumstances that are proven beyond a reasonable doubt to exist. In so far as an aggravating cireum-stance impacts on the value of a mitigating circumstance, it does so when they are weighed together, not when the initial value of the mitigating circumstance is being determined.
Here, the trial court diminishes the value of this mitigating circumstance with erimi-nal conduct, including the killing, that occurred at the time of the instant offense. This was improper, and it gives rise to an inference that this mitigating cireumstance was not given any weight in the most critical stage when the aggravating circumstances were weighed against the mitigating cireymstances.
In dealing with appellant's age, the trial court reasoned as follows:
"The Defendant's youth certainly adds to the tragedy of this whole affair.
Youth can, in the proper circumstances, be a definite mitigating factor ..
But for one so young to be able to pick up a weapon and shoot a police officer in the back; an officer who he knew; with no provocation other than that that existed in this case wherein a police officer was defending himself in a fracas that the evidence establishes had been provoked by the defendant and with numerous alternatives with respect to use of a flashlight, the butt of the weapon, jumping the officer making two on one, or exiting the scene ... would seem more of a reflection of deficient character than the misjudgment of youth.
Youth under these cireumstances becomes almost more' aggravating than mitigating."
Youth's status as a mitigating circumstance has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, Robert v. Louisiana (1977), 431 U.S. 633, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 52 L.Ed.2d 687, and it would fall under 1.C. § 85-50-2-9(c)(7). The rationale which supports youth's status as a mitigating circumstance is a corollary to the general view that criminal liability is premised on rational actors who make blameworthy choices and who are thus responsible for the consequences of their acts. Immaturity is presumed to diminish the rational capacity of the criminal actor, and thereby lessens his moral culpability for criminal acts. Furthermore, responsibility for youthful misconduct may be widely distributed because the obligations to socialize, to educate young persons, and to teach them moral values and respect for the law, are shared by their families and communities. Another reason for youth's status as a *960mitigating circumstance is that youths are more susceptible to rehabilitation.
The weight to be assigned this mitigating cireumstance must take into account the offender's mental and physical development, education, and prior pertinent life experiences which shed light on whether the offender is the type of rational actor that the criminal law deems fully responsible for his actions.
Here, appellant was eighteen years old at the time of the offense. The trial court did not consider appellant's physical and mental development. The trial court did not consider appellant's educational background. The pre-sentence report reveals that he completed the eighth grade. The trial court did not surface any pertinent life experiences i.e. did he have experience with firearms?, was he living away from home and supporting himself?
The factors which the trial court used to discount youth as a mitigating circumstance do not support the trial courts implicit conclusion that this mitigating circumstance has no value in this case. The picking up of a revolver and shooting the police officer when he had ample time to escape does not support the inference that appellant's action was not the result of the misjudgment of youth. Rather, given the excitement of the arrest and the fight, the relatively instantaneous act of shooting with little time for deliberation, the gross disproportion of the means appellant used to effectuate his escape as compared to the offense for which appellant was initially stopped, and the fact that appellant returned home to his family, it is clear that the misjudgment of youth played a role in the killing. The trial court erred in not giving this mitigating cireumstance substantial value.
The valuation of the aggravating cireum-stance in this case is also flawed. The aggravating circumstance here is that "... the victim of the murder was a ... law enforcement officer acting in the course of duty ..." IC. § 85-50-2-9(b)(6). The trial court stated that this aggravating circumstance is deserving of "special weight". To support this conclusion, the trial court discusses the vulnerability of law enforcement officers in the course of duty and the law enforcement officer's representation of the community, authority and order. He further discusses that one who kills a law enforcement officer represents a more dangerous level of violence than do many others. These reasons are legislative policy considerations which account for the existence of the aggravating circumstance in the statute at all. They are not proper considerations to give added or "special" weight to the aggravating circumstance. The manner, the motivation, and other attendant circumstances of the offense are the type of considerations which may augment the value of this aggravating circumstance. The trial court also used two other considerations to support its conclusion that this aggravating circumstance deserves "special weight." First, the senselessness of the killing: it is true that all murders are senseless, but this murder was no more senseless than the many other murders which occur. The fact that murder can be a capital offense reflects a judgment on the part of the legislature that murders are senseless; however, the fact that the murder of the officer here was senseless does not provide a rational basis for giving this aggravating circumstance "special weight." Finally, the trial court deemed that this aggravating circumstance should have "special weight" because appellant committed the murder during the commission of a minor offense which might have caused the officer to lower his guard. This is a proper consideration to augment the weight of the aggravating circumstance due to its status as one of the attendant cireumstances of the offense; however, there is some question as to whether this consideration would promote this aggravating circumstance to the level of "special weight" if it could be determined what "special weight" is. Nevertheless, the valuation of this aggravating circumstance contains improper considerations; there*961fore, it is impossible to tell whether it outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
The trial court's actual weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstance is but one more example of the unreliability of the death sentence determination in this case.
"'The possible mitigating factors which have been discussed in detail when, in context, are weighed against the aggravating factor, in context, causes the Court to find and conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factor outweighs the possible mitigating factors." "
The use of the word "possible" to modify the word "mitigating" gives rise to two inferences. The first inference is that the trial court did not find that any mitigating circumstances existed. Given the trial Court's disposition of the mitigating circumstances, this may have been what the trial court meant. If it was, then the trial court erred because there was certainly evidence in the record to support the existence of several mitigating circumstances. The second inference is that the trial court assumed that all the mitigating cireum-stances presented by the appellant contained their full possible value, but nevertheless were outweighed by the aggravating circumstance. Given the mitigating circumstances presented, this is tantamount to concluding that no quantity or quality of mitigating cireumstances could equal the weight of this "special" aggravating circumstance. If this is the case, the trial court's action is the equivalent of a mandatory death sentence for the murder of a law enforcement officer which in its statutory form was held unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana, supra; see also Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944.
Having reviewed this sentence pursuant to Article 7, § 4 of the Indiana Constitution I judge that it is manifestly unreasonable and would order it reversed to a sentence of imprisonment appropriate to the crime of murder.