Court Opinion

ID: 9696244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:42:00.552155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:36.125172
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
R. B. Burns, P. J.
Defendants filed a motion for rehearing1
2which was granted. The sole issue is:
“Does the agricultural labor camps act8 violate defendants’ state and/or federal constitutional rights of due process and equal protection?
Relying on the equal protection clause of the state3 and Federal constitutions4 defendants argue that the labor camps act subjects “non-agricultural” migratory workers to arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination.5 Defendants also contend that the act, since it does not apply unless “5 or more migratory workers [are] engaged in agricultural ac*119tivities”, discriminates against smaller numbers of “agricultural” migratory workers.
Defendants, who seek to avoid complying with the act as “operators” of an agricultural labor camp,6 do not argue that they are the subject of any discrimination. In effect defendants are urging this Court to strike down the labor camps act on the ground that it discriminates against people who are not involved in this suit. Such a decision would be premature and unnecessary. One cannot attack a statute on the ground that its application denies constitutional protection to others.7
Defendants’ due process argument is based on their contention that the meaning of “migratory worker” is so vague and indefinite that they, as farm owners, must act at their peril.8
The act provides that one must obtain a license to operate an agricultural labor camp. “Agricultural labor camp” is defined in the act (MCLA § 286-.621 [a] [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.424(1)(a)]) as:
“A tract of land and all tents, vehicles, buildings or other structures pertaining thereto, and part of which is established, occupied or used as living quarters for 5 or more migratory workers engaged in agricultural activities, including related food processing.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendants argue that since the act does not define the term “migratory workers”, they are unable *120to determine whether or not the people who harvest their cherries are migratory workers. We cannot agree with defendants’ assertion that the term “migratory worker” is “so vague, that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”.9 Men of commonsense intelligence know that migratory workers are those workers who move in response to the demand for seasonal labor.10 The meaning of the term “migratory worker” is reasonably certain and therefore does not constitute a denial of due process.
Affirmed.
All concurred.

Defendants’ motion for rehearing was granted June 23, 1971.

 PA 1965, No 289, MOLA § 286.621 et seq. (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.424[1] et seq.).

 Const 1963, art 1, § 2.

 US Const, Am 14, § 1.

 Only “agricultural” migratory workers receive the enforced health and sanitation benefits provided by the act. See MCLA § 286.624 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.424 [4]).

 We note that the financial burden which may be associated with compliance with the act is somewhat lessened by PA 1970, No 197, MCLA 1971 Cum Supp § 286.611 et seq. (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 17.425[11] et seq.) which makes grants up to $5,000 from the state available to the employers of migratory farm workers.

 United States v. Raines (1960), 362 US 17 (80 S Ct 519, 4 L Ed 2d 524). See, also, Wade v. Wilson (1970), 396 US 282 (90 S Ct 501, 24 L Ed 2d 470).

 Violation of the act’s provisions may result in a misdemeanor. MOLA 1971 Cum Supp § 286.633 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 17.424 [13]).

 Quotation taken from Connally v. General Construction Co. (1926), 269 US 385, 391 (46 S Ct 126, 127; 70 L Ed 322, 328).

 See definition given “migratory” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 1432.