Court Opinion

ID: 2964502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:36.779743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.773161
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1271

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.
                             SOHIEL OMAR, a/k/a SAM OMAR,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1272
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,
                                          v.

                                  BURTON A. FERRARA,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The  opinion of  this court  issued  January  23, 1997,  should be

        amended as follows:

            On page 9, line 6, replace "(1990)" with "(1st Cir. 1990)".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1271

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.
                             SOHIEL OMAR, a/k/a SAM OMAR,

                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1272
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,
                                          v.

                                  BURTON A. FERRARA,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________
                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________
                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
                                    Circuit Judges
                                    ______________

                                 ____________________

            Stephen Hrones, by Appointment of the  Court, with whom Michael A.
            ______________                                          __________
        Goldsmith  and  Hrones  &  Garrity  were  on  consolidated  brief  for
        _________       __________________
        appellants.
            Timothy Q.  Feeley, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with  whom
            __________________
        Donald K.  Stern, United States Attorney, and James F. Lang, Assistant
        ________________                              _____________
        United  States Attorney,  were on  consolidated brief  for the  United
        States.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 23, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.  Burton Ferrara  and Sohiel Omar
                         ______________

            appeal  from  their  convictions  for  bank   larceny,  money

            laundering and conspiracy.   The single issue  is whether the

            district court  erred  in  excluding,  over  the  defendants'

            objection, grand  jury testimony  of a  witness who  had died

            prior to the  trial.  The issue  turns on the application  of

            the hearsay exception  for "former testimony."  Fed. R. Evid.

            804(b)(1).  

                 On  March  27,  1991,  a  Brinks  armored  truck  making

            deliveries in Boston was robbed of about $900,000.  The truck

            was found in nearby Somerville with the money missing and the

            driver, Burton Ferrara, handcuffed  in the rear  compartment.

            Ferrara told  police that he had been hijacked in Boston by a

            gunman who, while  Ferrara was parked on  the street awaiting

            the return  of  messengers,  stuck  a gun  through  a  portal

            (actually a  gunport) in the driver's  compartment and forced

            Ferrara to open the door.        

                 After  an  extensive   investigation,  the   authorities

            concluded that the  robbery had been  carried out by  Ferrara

            and his friend Sohiel  Omar.  In February 1994,  almost three

            years  after  the  robbery,  a federal  grand  jury  indicted

            Ferrara  and Omar,  charging  them with  bank larceny,  money

            laundering the  stolen funds, and conspiracy  to commit those

            substantive offenses.   18 U.S.C.      371, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),

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            2113(b).  The defendants were tried by a jury  in October and

            November of 1994.

                 At trial,  the government's evidence  was extensive but,

            with  one exception,  largely circumstantial.   Its witnesses

            testified that  prior to the  robbery, Ferrara and  Omar were

            friends and  former co-workers  at an  automobile dealership.

            In 1990, they had sought to renovate a house in South  Boston

            but had  fallen into financial difficulties,  and were unable

            to pay their contractors.   Ferrara then obtained a job as  a

            Brinks  driver and began work in March 1991 on a regular run;

            messengers  accompanied  him to  deliver  the  cash from  the

            truck.  The robbery occurred about three weeks later.

                 The government  also offered  evidence that  the portal,

            through which the assailant's  gun had allegedly been thrust,

            was closed when  the messengers had  left the truck.   It was

            shown that  the  portal cover--easily  controllable from  the

            inside--could  be opened  from  the outside  only with  time,

            tools  and effort.   Two  witnesses said  that there  were no

            scratch-marks outside the portal.   The jury could  thus have

            regarded Ferrara's version of events as doubtful.

                 More  damaging  was   testimony  from  contractors  that

            beginning soon  after the robbery, Ferrara and  Omar began to

            pay them  with large  sums--the first payment  was $5,200--in

            cash and  new  bills,  some  with serial  numbers  almost  in

            sequential order.  Much of the money was shown to derive from

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            Federal  Reserve  shipments to  the  bank whose  cash  was in

            Ferrara's  truck  on  the day  of  the  robbery.   After  the

            robbery, Ferrara  also bought money orders  and made payments

            to others.  

                 One of the contractors testified  that he told Omar that

            he  preferred to  be  paid  by  check;  Omar  paid  the  next

            installments  with  checks  drawn   on  the  account  of  Lee

            Services, a defunct trash hauling firm.  Lee Najarian was the

            bookkeeper for  Lee Services.   In 1991, Najarian  was living

            with Raymond Femino, who  was the proprietor of  Lee Services

            and a friend  of Omar.  Najarian's evidence at  the trial was

            especially  damning  and  led  directly to  the  ruling  that

            provoked this appeal.

                 Testifying at trial under  a grant of immunity, Najarian

            told the jury that she remembered Omar bringing a large green

            trash  bag to her home on the  night of the robbery, and that

            Femino  later showed her that the bag was filled with stacked

            bundles  of cash.    She  testified  further  that  Omar  had

            regularly returned during the spring of 1991 to retrieve cash

            and that  she had put some  of the money in  the Lee Services

            bank  account and  written  checks to  Omar  and one  of  his

            contractors.

                 Finally, Najarian  testified  that she  had  heard  Omar

            boasting that he had worn a ski mask and had stuck a gun into

            the truck and had taken the money out of the truck and thrown

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            it in his car.  According to Najarian, Omar also said that he

            had buried some of the  money.  Najarian also said  that Omar

            had implicated "Burt"--a likely reference to Ferrara--in  the

            robbery.

                 In cross-examining Najarian, the defense brought out the

            fact that she had given contrary testimony to a grand jury in

            August 1993; on that  occasion, Najarian had generally denied

            any  pertinent knowledge of  the Brinks  robbery and  had not

            disclosed Omar's delivery of  cash or his admissions.   After

            entering  into   a  written  immunity   agreement  with   the

            government,   Najarian testified  again to the  grand jury in

            January  1994.  This time  she gave testimony  similar to her

            later trial testimony.

                 As part of its own case, the defense sought to undermine

            Najarian's  testimony  further by  introducing  a  portion of

            Femino's  grand jury  testimony.   Femino  had testified  for

            about 10 to  20 minutes at an  earlier grand jury session  in

            November  1991.    There,  while being  questioned  on  other

            aspects of the case,  he briefly but flatly  denied receiving

            money  from Omar,  either in  a trash  bag or  otherwise, and

            denied putting cash for Omar into bank accounts.   

                 Because  Femino died  in  1993, he  was unavailable  for

            trial.   The  defense sought  to offer  his prior  grand jury

            testimony  under Fed.  R.  Evid. 804(b)(1)  which--where  the

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                                         -5-

            declarant is unavailable--permits  as evidence in a  criminal

            trial prior

                 [t]estimony given  [by the declarant]  as a witness
                 at  another  hearing  of   the  same  or  different
                 proceeding .  . .  if  the party  against whom  the
                 testimony is now offered  . . . had an  opportunity
                 and  similar  motive  to develop  the  testimony by
                 direct, cross, or redirect examination.    

            The district court excluded  Femino's grand jury testimony on

            the  ground  that the  government  did  not have  a  "similar

            motive" in November 1991 to develop Femino's testimony.

                 The jury  ultimately convicted  Ferrara and Omar  on all

            counts.  The district court later sentenced each defendant to

            48  months in prison, three  years of supervised release, and

            restitution in the amount of $908,750.  On this appeal, which

            has  been  ably  briefed by  both  sides,  the  only question

            presented is whether  it was  error and,  if so,  prejudicial

            error, to exclude Femino's grand jury testimony.

                 If the exclusion of Femino's testimony clearly could not

            have made a difference, we would dispose of the  case on that

            ground,  but  we  think  that  this  course  is  not  readily

            available.  Whether a mistaken evidentiary ruling is harmless

            depends, in  the ordinary  case, primarily on  the likelihood

            that it did or did not affect  the jury.  This in turn hinges

            both upon the  evidence at  issue and  on the  weight of  the
                                              ___

            other evidence in the case.  See Rossetti v. Curran, 80  F.3d
                                         ___ ________    ______

            1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1996).

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                 It  is true,  in the  government's favor,  that Femino's

            grand jury testimony was not especially credible.  That small

            piece  of  the  testimony  that  helped  the  defendants  and

            contradicted  Najarian  was brief,  lacking  in corroborative

            detail  and   highly  self-serving   (since  Femino  had   no

            immunity).   Other testimony  at trial suggested  that Femino

            was  drug  addicted, an  alcoholic,  and a  seller  of drugs,

            making  his boilerplate denials  in the grand  jury even less

            likely to be credited.

                 On  the other  hand, the  government's case  was largely

            circumstantial.   Najarian's testimony about the  bag of cash

            may  not  have been  essential, but  it  was very  helpful in

            making  the  circumstantial  case fit  together  tightly,  by

            describing how  the money was  conveyed to Femino.   Najarian

            also  testified to  Omar's alleged  incriminating admissions.

            The government says  that the defendants were able to impeach

            Najarian  with her own  original grand jury  testimony; but a

            little thought suggests that this argument cuts both ways.

                 A fairly strong case  against both defendants would have

            been   much  weaker   if   Najarian's   testimony  had   been

            disbelieved.    Of  course, Najarian's  testimony  had  other

            support  while Femino's  grand  jury denials  were brief  and

            self-serving.   But, together with Najarian's  own grand jury

            perjury (one of her two versions was false), Femino's denials

            could have helped to raise a reasonable doubt for the jury as

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                                         -7-

            to both defendants.  In sum, the exclusion of  the grand jury

            testimony was not clearly harmless; whether it was error is a

            different matter.

                 In addressing the merits, we begin with a general  issue

            of law--how  to construe Rule 804(b)(1)--which  is subject to

            de  novo review.  But  in considering the  application of the
            ________

            rule  to particular  facts,  the district  court's ruling  is

            normally tested  by an "abuse of  discretion" standard, which

            favors the  prevailing party.   United States v.  Lombard, 72
                                            _____________     _______

            F.3d  170, 187 (1st Cir. 1995), appeal after remand, 102 F.3d
                                            ___________________

            1  (1st  Cir. 1996).   And,  the  evidence in  question being

            hearsay, it was the defendants'  burden to prove each element

            of  the  exception  they  invoked.    Cf.  United  States  v.
                                                  ___  ______________

            Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180  (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
            _________                                       _____ ______

            114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994).

                 Turning to  Rule 804(b)(1),  we think that  this hearsay

            exception  for prior  testimony  does extend,  where all  its

            conditions are  met, to  grand jury  testimony  taken at  the

            government's  behest  and  later  offered  against  it  in  a

            criminal trial.  A grand jury proceeding can be regarded as a

            "hearing," especially in  the context of a  rule that applies

            as well  to depositions.   And--assuming  "an opportunity and

            similar  motive to develop  the testimony"--the rationale for

            an  exception to the hearsay  rule is made  out, namely, that

            the  party against whom the  testimony is now offered earlier

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                                         -8-

            had  the  opportunity and  similar  motive  to discredit  the

            testimony, and  so did then whatever  it would do  now if the

            declarant were on the stand.

                 It  is unclear  whether  Rule 804(b)(1)  is intended  to

            apply where the present opponent of the evidence had no prior

            motive to discredit the testimony but instead sponsored it in

            the earlier proceeding as worthy of belief.  In such a  case,

            the  rationale  for  a   hearsay  exception  would  be  quite

            different, namely, a kind  of quasi-estoppel.1  Arguably, the

            motive  to develop would not be "similar" in the second case,

            so the rule would not apply.   As we will see, even a broader

            view of the rule would not alter the result here.

                 In all events, in United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650,
                                   _____________    ______

            654 (1st Cir. 1990), this court said that the prior-testimony

            exception  did not  apply  at all  to  grand jury  testimony.

            Whether  or not  this was  dictum, Donlon's  statement cannot
                                               ______

            stand  against the  Supreme  Court's own  decision two  years

            later  in United  States  v. Salerno,  505  U.S. 317  (1992).
                      ______________     _______

            There, the Supreme  Court all  but held  that Rule  804(b)(1)

            could  embrace grand jury testimony; and on remand the Second

                                
            ____________________

                 1The  advisory committee  note on Rule  804(b)(1) leaves
            the matter in confusion.  It describes the estoppel rationale
            as archaic but  then, instead of flatly  rejecting it, shifts
            the  discussion to  the proposition  that in  the case  of an
            adverse witness, the direct and redirect examination of one's
            own witness can be the equivalent of the cross-examination of
            an opponent's witness.

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            Circuit  took the same view of  the matter.  United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Dinapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
            ________                                  _______

                 There has been confusion on  this issue in the circuits.

            No one knows whether the drafters of the rule had  grand jury

            proceedings  in mind.   In  fact,  it is  likely  to be  very

            difficult  for defendants  offering grand  jury testimony  to

            satisfy the  "opportunity and  similar motive" test;  and the

            reasons  why this is  so probably underlie  the doubts courts

            have  expressed as to whether  the rule should  ever apply to

            grand  jury testimony.  E.g., United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d
                                    ____  _____________    ____

            1453, 1462  (7th Cir.),  cert. denied, 510  U.S. 858  (1993).
                                     ____________

            But the government concedes that  it could in principle apply

            and  (yielding to Salerno) we  agree, if and  when the quoted
                              _______

            condition is met.  

                  This concession  by the United  States is not  meant to

            stretch very far.   The government's bedrock position is that

            the  prosecution   ordinarily  does  not  in   a  grand  jury
                                                 ___

            proceeding have  the kind of motive to develop testimony that

            it would in an ordinary trial or that is required to meet the

            express  test and rationale of Rule 804(b)(1).  And, it says,

            in  this case the prosecutor  at the grand  jury stage lacked

            the requisite "similar motive" as to Femino's testimony.   We

            agree  provisionally   with   the  former   proposition   and

            completely with the latter.

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                 In an ordinary trial, the positions  of the parties vis-

            a- vis  a witness are likely to be clear-cut:  the witness is

            normally presented by one side to advance its case and cross-

            examined  by the other to discredit the testimony.  Each side

            usually has reason to treat the  trial as a last chance  with

            the witness.  If a new trial  later becomes necessary and the

            witness  proves unavailable, it may be a fair guess that each

            side  has already  done at  the original  trial all  that the

            party  would do if  the declarant were now  present for a new

            trial.  

                 Grand  juries  present a  different  face.   Often,  the

            government neither aims to discredit the witness nor to vouch

            for him.  The prosecutor may want to secure a  small piece of

            evidence  as part of an ongoing investigation or to compel an

            answer by an unwilling witness or to "freeze" the position of

            an adverse witness.  In particular, discrediting a grand jury

            witness  is rarely  essential, because  the government  has a

            modest burden  of proof, selects  its own witnesses,  and can

            usually call more of them at its leisure.

                 In the case at hand,  we think that it is fair  to apply

            the  "opportunity and  similar motive"  test to  the specific

            portion of the testimony at issue; there might be a motive to

            develop some testimony of a witness but not other parts.  Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434-36 (1994).
            __________    _____________

            Here, our focus is upon Femino's exculpatory denial.  And our

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            main  concern  is  whether,  in  the  prior  proceeding,  the

            government  (the  party against  whom  the  testimony is  now

            offered) had "an opportunity and similar motive" to undermine

            it.

                 There  is  no indication  that  the  government had  any

            evidence available  in November  1991 with which  to confront

            and contradict Femino  when he denied receiving the cash from

            the defendants.  Najarian was still denying  any knowledge of

            the  matter in August 1993  in her own  grand jury testimony.

            Not until November 1994,  in an interview with an  FBI agent,

            did  Najarian change her story and begin to cooperate.  Thus,

            it  is  arguable  that   the  government  had  no  meaningful

            opportunity to discredit Femino at the time.2

                 In any case,  it certainly lacked any  evident motive to

            do so.  If  the government had had Najarian's  cooperation in

            1991, it could  well have  preferred to keep  it secret  from

            Femino.   The prosecutor might  have wished to  protect a key

            witness for the time  being or to bargain later  with Femino,

            armed with a  perjury charge  against him.   Given the  other

            evidence against the defendants, the government surely had no

            reason  to fear that Femino's  terse denials, if  he were not

                                
            ____________________

                 2Just how  equivalent the  "opportunity" need be  is not
            made clear by the rule or advisory committee note.  There are
            obviously issues of  degree and may be  other variables (like
            fault) that bear upon the answer, which is probably best left
            to case-by-case development.   Compare United States v. Koon,
                                           _______ _____________    ____
            34 F.2d 1416, 1427  (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd on  other grounds,
                                                 _______________________
            116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).  

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

            directly confronted, would lead  the grand jury to  refuse to

            indict.

                 The outcome is the same even if we assume dubitante that
                                                           _________

            a party who previously sponsored a witness could be deemed to

            have a  "similar motive"  when later opposing  the testimony.

            The government has never had any reason to "develop" Femino's

            exculpatory denial as worthy  of belief.  In the  grand jury,

            the government  called Femino to elicit  testimony on several

            other points; the prosecutor  seems to have asked about  cash

            from  the defendants simply to  lock the witness  into a firm

            position  or to  make  clear  to  the  grand  jury  that  all

            reasonable questions had been asked.

                 An  argument  can certainly  be  made  that the  fairest

            outcome  here   would  be   to  admit   Femino's  exculpatory

            statement.   His grand jury  testimony was  important to  the

            defendants on this  issue; it was  pure happenstance that  he

            died and was not  available at trial (although he  might have

            refused  to testify).    And while  his  testimony was  self-

            serving and suspect, the government's ability to undermine it

            at  trial, through  Najarian,  was  substantial even  without

            having Femino to cross-examine.

                 Conflicts between rule and equity are common.  If  every

            ruling is ad hoc, it is hard to implement  policy and predict
                      ______

            outcomes.  And rules themselves are debatable:  one respected

            evidence code proposed that "hearsay . . . is admissible if .

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            . . the declarant . . . is unavailable."   ALI, Model Code of
                                                            _____________

            Evidence Rule 503  (1942).   But our own  federal rules  stop
            ________

            with  a broad  catch-all exception  for hearsay  supported by

            "circumstantial  guarantees of  trustworthiness."    Fed.  R.

            Evid. 803(24), 804(b)(5).  

                 In  this  case,  the  defendants  did  not  invoke  this

            exception, probably  believing that they could  not show that

            Femino's self-serving denials were trustworthy.  Thus viewed,

            the defendants were deprived of helpful but not very credible

            evidence  which--for this  very  reason--might well  not have

            been given great weight  by the jury, quite apart  from other

            evidence  tending to  corroborate Najarian's  story.   In all

            events,  the exclusion  of the  evidence was  consistent with

            Rule 804(b)(1).

                 Affirmed.
                 ________

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