Court Opinion

ID: 9909558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:02:30.10594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:39.434392
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 Walters v. Warner CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

ASHLEY WALTERS,                                            B322186

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct.
         v.                                                No. 21STCV18680)

BRIAN WARNER et al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
      Hadsell Stormer Renick & Dai, Dan Stormer, Tanya
Sukhija-Cohen; Valli Kane & Vagnini and James Vagnini for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Don Willenburg, Debra
Ellwood Meppen and Gene F. Williams for Defendants and
Respondents.
                   __________________________

       Ashley Walters appeals from the order of dismissal
entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend
the demurrer filed by defendants Brian Warner and Marilyn
Manson Records, Inc. (Manson Records; collectively, Manson
defendants) to Walters’s second amended complaint. Walters
asserted causes of action for sexual assault, sexual harassment,
sex discrimination, and related claims based on allegations that
Warner, a successful recording artist and the chief executive
officer of Manson Records, subjected her to sexual, physical, and
psychological abuse while she was employed by Manson Records
as Warner’s personal assistant in 2010 and 2011. In sustaining
the demurrer, the trial court found each of Walters’s causes of
action was barred by the statute of limitations.
       On appeal, Walters contends she alleged sufficient facts to
support application of the delayed discovery rule, which
postponed accrual of her claims until 2020, when she joined a
support group and was able to recover suppressed memories of
Warner’s abuse. Walters also contends the Manson defendants
are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
because they coerced her into silence. Walters’s allegations of
delayed discovery were sufficient to withstand demurrer, and we
reverse.

         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Second Amended Complaint
      Walters filed this action on May 18, 2021. After the trial
court sustained the Manson defendants’ demurrer to the first

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amended complaint with leave to amend, Walters filed the
operative second amended complaint (complaint). The complaint
alleged eight causes of action based on the same underlying
factual allegations: (1) sex discrimination in violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§ 51, 51.5, & 52); (2) sexual
harassment (Civ. Code, §§ 51.9 & 52); (3) sexual assault (Code
Civ. Proc. § 340.16);1 (4) interference with Walters’s exercise of
her civil rights in violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ.
Code, § 52.1); (5) sexual battery (Civ. Code, § 1708.5);
(6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) battery; and
(8) assault.

      1.    Walters’s pre-employment encounters with Warner
            (March through August 2010)
      As alleged, Warner is a successful recording artist who has
achieved considerable fame with his notorious stage persona
“Marilyn Manson,” which is an allusion to film star Marilyn

1      Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16, subdivision (a),
establishes a 10-year statute of limitations for “any civil action
for recovery of damages suffered as a result of sexual assault”;
sexual assault is defined in subdivision (b)(1) as “any of the
crimes described in Section 243.4, 261, 264.1, 286, 287, or 289, or
former Sections 262 and 288a, of the Penal Code, assault with the
intent to commit any of those crimes, or an attempt to commit
any of those crimes.” Walters’s third cause of action, although
styled as a claim for violation of section 340.16, alleges “Warner
committed a sexual assault of [Walters] as more fully described
in Section 243.4, 261, 264.1, 286, 287, 289, or former
Section 288a, of the California Penal Code, and/or sexual assault
with the intent to commit any of those crimes, and/or an attempt
to commit any of those crimes.” Further undesignated statutory
references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                 3
Monroe and cult leader and serial killer Charles Manson. The
complaint alleges that over several decades, Warner has been
involved in music, production, film, and television, and he holds
power and influence in the entertainment industry. Manson
Records, founded by Warner in 1999, employs staff to facilitate
Warner’s personal and professional endeavors.
       In March 2010 Warner contacted Walters, an aspiring
photographer, through her social media to compliment her on her
photography. In subsequent messages, he invited her to his
home studio in West Hollywood to discuss opportunities for
collaboration. Walters came to his home on May 10, and once
they were alone, Warner asked Walters if he could photograph
her. He then requested Walters remove her shirt; she hesitantly
agreed. When he finished taking photographs, he pushed her on
the bed, pinned down her arms, and tried to kiss her. Walters
turned her head and moved away from him. Warner then bit her
ear and placed her hand in his underwear. Walters again moved
away and left the home.
       After the May 10 encounter, Walters felt “confusion and
fear,” but she felt she had a creative connection with Warner and
wanted to collaborate with him. A short time later, Walters
modeled for another photo shoot for Warner in which she was
topless. Warner’s communications were professional, and he did
not make any sexual advances, which induced her to trust him.
       Warner subsequently invited Walters to perform in a video
shoot as an “‘audition’” to be his director of photography. The
scene required Walters to get into bed with an actor and kiss
him, but Walters soon realized the actor was touching his penis,
and Warner instructed Walters to “‘help’” the actor. When
Walters got up to leave, the actor threw her against a wall and

                                4
shoved his tongue in her mouth. Walters later disclosed to
Warner that she was a survivor of a prior sexual assault.
      In August 2010 Warner asked Walters to be his personal
assistant, telling her he would double her current salary, she
would travel with him around the world, and he would introduce
her to other directors and artists. Walters “unconsciously ignored
the red flags,” and relying on Warner’s promises, she accepted
the position with Manson Records. Warner and Manson Records
required Walters to sign a confidentiality agreement regarding
any private or confidential information she might acquire during
their working relationship.

      2.    Walters’s employment at Manson Records
            (August 2010 through July 2011)
             (a)   Allegations of physical and psychological abuse
       As alleged, Warner subjected those around him, including
Walters and other Manson Records employees, to physical and
psychological abuse. He would routinely “push, whip, spit,
charge at, kick and forcibly touch” those with whom he quarreled,
often while brandishing weapons such as whips, hatchets, axes,
and baseball bats. He frequently destroyed furniture, electronics,
and fixtures in his home during fits of rage, and he punched holes
in the walls and ripped doors off their hinges.
       Warner talked constantly about his ability to stalk, kill,
and ruin the lives of those who disobeyed him. Walters observed
Warner orchestrate elaborate plans to embarrass or blackmail
those he perceived to be disobedient, for example, by hacking into
their computers to find damaging information or by recording
embarrassing conversations. To control Walters, Warner took
and maintained photographs and videos of her posing nude,

                                5
wearing Nazi memorabilia, or ingesting drugs, and he recorded
her phone conversations, all with the implicit threat of
publicizing them. Walters was “petrified” Warner would release
a photograph that would be damaging to her. Warner routinely
encouraged Walters to “‘please’” his friends, and he warned her
that male artists and celebrities would blacklist her if she did not
please them. Warner boasted to Walters that he had gotten away
with raping women, and made comments and jokes about rape
despite knowing Walters had experienced a previous sexual
assault.

             (b)    Allegations of suppressed memories of abuse
       The complaint also alleged Walters suppressed memories of
numerous instances of abuse and harassment she suffered during
her employment at Manson Records. Walters only recalled these
incidents in the fall of 2020 or later, after she joined a support
group and started therapy.
       Walters recovered memories that Warner commonly
“offered up” Walters sexually to friends and associates in the
entertainment industry. At an awards show in September 2010,
Warner pushed Walters onto the lap of an actor, saying the actor
could “‘have her.’” The actor then kissed Walters and held her on
his lap. On another occasion at Warner’s home, the same actor
demanded Walters urinate in front of him, after which he denied
her toilet paper, licked her vagina, and then kissed her on the
mouth. Warner also “‘offered’” Walters to a director, who
cornered her in Warner’s home and shoved his hand up her skirt
while covering her mouth. Walters was routinely required to
drive the director home, and the director would expose himself to
her, request oral sex, and tell Walters he masturbated to

                                 6
thoughts of her. Warner also forced Walters to flirt with a
musician; the musician bit her nipple with Warner’s
encouragement while Warner took photographs. On another
occasion Warner sent an image of Walters’s worn underwear to
colleagues and bandmates.
      Walters also recovered memories that Warner physically
abused her on multiple occasions, including whipping her and
throwing her against a wall during a drug-induced rage. Warner
forced her to stay awake for 48 hours straight, one time requiring
her to stand on a chair for 12 hours, and he fed her cocaine to
keep her awake. There were further instances when Warner
subjected her to his abuse of other women. For example, he
showed her a video in which he stripped and whipped a young
female fan until the fan screamed and cried. The video portrayed
Warner forcing the fan to drink urine, pointing a gun at her, and
placing the gun inside her underwear. During an overseas trip
with Walters, Warner sent Walters a text message from his hotel
room bragging about having just taken a young girl’s virginity.
Warner told Walters that he wanted to kill the women he was
involved with, and he showed her a video in which he referred to
men who “‘rape women but don’t get away with it like I do.’” In
May 2011 he sent her a photograph of a former girlfriend’s
scarred back with the subject line “‘Do you see what happens?!’”

      3.     Walters’s separation from Manson Records and
             subsequent threats (July 2011 through January 2022)
       In June 2011 Warner and his then-girlfriend Esme Bianco
ended their relationship, and Bianco sent a message to Walters
telling her to leave Warner’s house because he was dangerous.
Walters later got in a car accident while driving with Bianco in

                                7
Warner’s car (and Walters was arrested for driving under the
influence). Warner then terminated Walters’s employment.
      Warner rehired Walters one week later, telling her he
considered her family and would change his behavior. Walters
“was terrified about the repercussions she would face if she
refused to return,” and she needed the money. But within two
weeks of her return, Warner was regularly berating her, and he
accused her of trying to sabotage his career. In October 2011
Warner again terminated Walters’s employment. Following her
termination, Warner told Walters he planned to “‘ruin her’”; he
hacked into her social media account and changed her profile to a
pornographic image; and he threatened to take legal action
against her.
      In 2015, in an effort to sabotage Walters’s touring career,
Warner told other artists and musicians that Walters had been
denied entry into Canada because of her conviction for driving
under the influence. In 2019, when women began to come
forward with stories of abuse by Warner, he sent Walters a text
message stating, “‘Just curious if you are still a friend? After all
the car and whatnot I got past. I’m a great friend. Not the
opposite so much. Hope you are good.’” Walters, who continued
to work in the entertainment industry, perceived this as a threat
to stay quiet. In February 2021 Walters learned that Warner
threatened to go to the homes of women who made public claims
against him.

      4.     Walters’s support group, therapy, and suppressed
             memories (October 2020)
       In October 2020 Walters met with a group of women who,
as alleged, had also been victimized by Warner. These and other

                                 8
women who came forward publicly shared detailed accounts of
sexual assault, rape, and physical and psychological abuse that
“resonated deeply” with Walters. Hearing their experiences
“began to unlock new memories [Walters] repressed long ago as a
result of her psychological trauma by being manipulated and
threatened by Warner during and after her employment . . . .” In
November 2020 Walters began to see a licensed clinical social
worker regarding the memories that had begun to resurface, and
in December 2020 Walters was diagnosed with complex
posttraumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and
generalized anxiety disorder.
      As alleged, “the culture of manipulation, abuse, violence,
praise, coercion, power and influence as celebrity implemented by
Warner,” combined with Walters’s vulnerability as a victim of a
prior sexual assault, caused her to “unknowingly and almost
immediately repress[] at least some of the abuse she was
subjected to by Warner.” Even after she left her employment at
Manson Records, Walters “continued to remain disconnected from
the memories of abuse she suffered and could not exercise any
diligence in uncovering them as they were blocked from her
memory. She unconsciously avoided any steps that would enable
her to uncover her memories and determine any legal claims she
may have had regarding the treatment and abuse she suffered.”
      The complaint asserted Walters’s claims were therefore
“timely and actionable under the discovery rule because the
abuse and trauma [Walters] endured triggered a psychological
response whereby she suppressed certain memories, and she did
not remember many of them” until late 2020 when she joined the
support group and entered therapy. At that time she
“immediately exercised reasonable diligence to pursue her

                               9
claims” by reporting the abuse to the police in February 2021 and
filing the lawsuit in May.
       The complaint asserted in the alternative that the Manson
defendants were barred by equitable estoppel from asserting the
statute of limitations. Their “violence, threats, intimidation,
coercion and other unconscionable conduct deterred [Walters]
from pursuing her legal claims as to the unlawful conduct she
could recall for years following the termination of her
employment,” and the deterrence “did not diminish until the
public exposure of [the Manson defendants’] behavior,” criminal
investigations into Warner’s conduct, and the support Walters
gained from other survivors “altered the threat level and helped
[Walters] feel safe enough to come forward.” Although Walters
“repressed many of the actual events that would cause her to
take steps to assert her claims or investigate the nature of her
claims,” the “environment of fear and coercion” created by the
Manson defendants “furthered the suppression of memories of
abuse and also created an innate sense of fear of physical abuse,
stalking, legal action or blackmail which further served to silence
[Walters.]”

B.     Defendants’ Demurrer and the Trial Court’s Order
       On April 12, 2022 the Manson defendants filed a demurrer
to all eight causes of action in the complaint on the ground that
Walters’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of
limitations under section 335.1. The Manson defendants argued
the alleged misconduct occurred between May 2010 and
October 2011 (when Walters’s employment was finally
terminated), and thus, her claims accrued no later than late
2011, when the last injury occurred. Moreover, the allegations of

                                10
delayed discovery were inadequate to toll accrual of the claims
because Walters alleged she first recalled the abuse when she
learned in 2020 that Warner abused other women, but she
admitted in her complaint she was aware of Warner’s abusive
behavior towards women during and shortly after her
employment. The demurrer also argued equitable estoppel did
not apply because Walters did not allege any overt threats by
Warner to discourage Walters from filing suit, only vague threats
Warner made about ruining or killing other people, and the
alleged threats and coercion ended after her termination in 2011.
       In her opposition, Walters argued the complaint adequately
alleged grounds to estop the Manson defendants from asserting
the statute of limitations based on Warner’s alleged frequent
physical violence against Walters and others, his surveillance
and collection of compromising material about them, and his
threat to ruin perceived enemies. These threats and their
coercive impact did not abate until shortly before Walters filed
the lawsuit. As to delayed discovery, Walters argued the
complaint alleged with specificity the acts of abuse and
harassment that Walters suppressed until 2020 and the
mechanisms by which her recollection of these acts was
suppressed and later recovered.
       In their reply, the Manson defendants countered,
“[Walters] relies on entirely contradictory theories to avoid the
inevitable result that her claims are time-barred: first she argues
that Mr. Warner is equitably estopped from asserting the statute
of limitations because he made threats during [her] employment
to discourage her from bringing the present claim. Then she
simultaneously argues that she blocked out her memory of these

                                11
events until 2020, in an effort to assert the delayed discovery
rule.”
       After a hearing, on May 25, 2022 the trial court sustained
the demurrer without leave to amend and ordered the case
dismissed. In its oral ruling, the court found “in light of the
factual nuances that have been pled in the amended complaint
versus the one we first saw, . . . I come to the same conclusion
that I did the first time that the statute of limitations bars the
action and that the discovery rule is not applicable—the delayed
discovery rule is not applicable here because I don’t feel based on
the factual pleadings that there are sufficient facts to invoke the
rule.” The court did not address equitable estoppel.2
       On June 8, 2022 the trial court entered an order dismissing
the action with prejudice. Walters timely appealed.3

2     The trial court also found, in response to the Manson
defendants’ alternative argument, that the 10-year statute of
limitations for damage claims based on adulthood sexual assault
under former section 340.16, which was adopted pursuant to
Assembly Bill No. 1619 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018,
ch. 939), effective January 1, 2019, did not apply retroactively.
3     Walters’s notice of appeal states she is appealing from a
judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer.
Although no judgment was entered, “[t]he order of dismissal,
signed by the trial court and entered by the court clerk,
constitutes a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure
section 581d.” (Moorer v. Noble L.A. Events, Inc. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 736, 741, fn 3; see § 581d [“All dismissals ordered
by the court shall be in the form of a written order signed by the
court and filed in the action and those orders when so filed shall
constitute judgments and be effective for all purposes . . . .”].)

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                             DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review
       “‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’”
(Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, T.H. v.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the
allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204,
209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.) “‘We
accept as true even improbable alleged facts, and we do not
concern ourselves with the plaintiff’s ability to prove [the] factual
allegations.’” (Marina Pacific Hotel and Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s
Fund Ins. Co. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104-105 (Marina Pacific);
accord, Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [“[i]n considering the merits of a
demurrer, however, ‘the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed
to be true, however improbable they may be’”]; see Smith v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700,
711[“[w]e do not concern ourselves with whether the plaintiff will
be able to prove the facts that he or she may allege in the
complaint”].) However, “we are not required to accept the truth
of the factual or legal conclusions pleaded in the complaint.”
(Marina Pacific, at p. 105; see Mathews, at p. 768 [“‘“‘We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.’”’”].)
       “‘“‘[A] demurrer based on an affirmative defense will be
sustained only where the face of the complaint discloses that the
action is necessarily barred by the defense.’”’” (Silva v. Langford

                                 13
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 710, 716; accord, Heshejin v. Rostami
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 984, 992.) If “‘the complaint’s allegations
or judicially noticeable facts reveal the existence of an affirmative
defense, the “plaintiff must ‘plead around’ the defense, by
alleging specific facts that would avoid the apparent defense.”’”
(Esparza v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 452,
459.) The application of an affirmative defense on demurrer
based on facts alleged in the complaint, such as the statute of
limitations, is subject to de novo review. (See Aryeh v. Canon
Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.)
       “Ordinarily, a general demurrer does not lie as to a portion
of a cause of action, and if any part of a cause of action is properly
pleaded, the demurrer will be overruled.” (Fire Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 446, 452; accord, PH II,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1681-1683
[where each cause of action “allege[d] several distinct incidents of
alleged malpractice,” only one of which was barred by the statute
of limitations, trial court erred in sustaining demurrer in part].)

B.    The Delayed Discovery Rule
      “The limitations period, the period in which a plaintiff must
bring suit or be barred, runs from the moment a claim accrues.
[Citations.] Traditionally at common law, a ‘cause of action
accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements”—those
elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’ [Citation.]
This is the ‘last element’ accrual rule: ordinarily, the statute of
limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last element essential
to the cause of action.’” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191; accord, Howard Jarvis Taxpayers

                                 14
Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 815; Garcia v.
Rosenberg (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1060.)
       An exception to the general rule of accrual is the delayed
discovery rule, “which postpones accrual of a cause of action until
the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of
action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
797, 807 (Fox); accord, Stella v. Asset Management Consultants,
Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 191-192 (Stella).) Under the
delayed discovery rule, “the statute of limitations begins to run
when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was
caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong
to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110;
accord, Stella, at p. 192; see Derose v. Carswell (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1017 (Derose) [“In personal injury cases,
the wrongful act often causes immediate harm. But in some
cases where injury was inflicted without perceptible trauma
courts have held that the statute does not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, all of the facts which are essential to the
cause of action.”]; G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975)
49 Cal.App.3d 22, 25 [“An exception is presented when the
pathological effect occurs without perceptible trauma and the
victim is ‘blamelessly ignorant’ of the cause of injury; in that case,
the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the person
knows or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
discovered the cause of injury.”].)
       “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’
necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated
by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of
wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide

                                 15
whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion
exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she
cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1111; accord, Stella, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th
at p. 192.) “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the
plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of
action. . . . [P]laintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable
investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged
with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed
by such an investigation.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 807-808;
accord, Jolly, at p. 1114 [“the limitations period begins when the
plaintiff suspects, or should suspect, that she has been
wronged”].)
       “In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of
a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face
that his [or her] claim would be barred without the benefit of the
discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time
and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made
earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’” (Fox, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 808; accord, Holman v. County of Butte (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 189, 197-198 (Holman) [survivor of child abuse
adequately alleged delayed discovery of claims against welfare
agency for breach of reporting duties where the survivor alleged
he had suffered trauma-induced amnesia until memories of
childhood abuse were triggered by parent’s violent outburst nine
years later].)
       “When a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered facts
for purposes of the accrual of a cause of action or application of
the delayed discovery rule is generally a question of fact, properly
decided as a matter of law only if the evidence (or, in the case of a

                                 16
demurrer, the allegations in the complaint and facts properly
subject to judicial notice) can support only one reasonable
conclusion.” (People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery
Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 552;
accord, Stella, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 193.)

C.    The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Demurrer Because
      Walters Adequately Alleged Delayed Discovery
      On appeal, Walters contends her complaint adequately
alleged she was not aware of many of her claims due to trauma-
induced memory suppression until 2020, and each cause of action
was therefore timely under the delayed discovery rule. As to
claims based on conduct that Walters did not suppress, Walters
argues equitable estoppel applies to prevent the Manson
defendants from asserting the statute of limitations. Walters
does not dispute that without the benefit of the delayed discovery
rule or equitable estoppel, her claims accrued in 2011 and are
time-barred (insofar as they are governed by the two-year statute
of limitations in section 335.1 for assault, battery, or other
personal injury claims).4 Further, the Manson defendants

4     Walters contends, the Manson defendants concede, and we
agree her third cause of action for sexual assault under
section 340.16 is not time-barred based on recent amendments
made by Assembly Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 442), effective January 1, 2023, that extended
the 10-year limitations period retroactively to revive lapsed
claims. (See Jane Doe #21 (S.H.) v. CFR Enterprises, Inc. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1209-1210 [finding Assembly Bill No. 2777’s
amendment to section 340.16 revived lapsed claims for sexual
assault based on conduct occurring after January 1, 2009].)

                               17
demurred solely on the basis of the statute of limitations and do
not dispute that the allegations of the complaint are otherwise
sufficient to state a claim. Accordingly, the narrow issue before
us is whether Walters adequately alleged a basis for applying the
delayed discovery rule. We conclude she did.
       As discussed, to allege delayed discovery, Walters had the
burden to plead facts showing the time and manner of the
discovery and the inability to have discovered the wrongdoing
and injury despite reasonable diligence. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at p. 808; Holman, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 197-198.) As to
the first element, the complaint alleged over 20 occurrences that
Walters recalled “[i]n the fall of 2020 or later, through therapy”
or “through the support group.” The complaint described the
support group Walters joined in October 2020 and recounted the
stories shared by the other abused women that “began to unlock
new memories [Walters] repressed long ago as a result of her
psychological trauma by being manipulated and threatened by
Warner during and after her employment.” The complaint also
described how Walters began therapy in November 2020 and was
diagnosed the following month with complex posttraumatic stress
disorder, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety
disorder. Further, the combination of the support group and

Because we hold that delayed discovery was adequately alleged
and reverse on that basis, we do not reach Walters’s contention
that section 340.16 applies to and revives all her causes of action
against both Warner and Manson Records. We also do not reach
Walters’s contention the complaint adequately alleged conduct by
the Manson defendants that equitably estopped them from
asserting that the two-year statute of limitations under
section 335.1 barred Walters’s claims.

                                18
therapy helped her “understand the extent and wrongfulness of,
and recall all of the abuse by Warner.” The Manson defendants
do not argue these allegations were inadequate as to time and
manner.
       As to the second element, the complaint alleged the
psychological mechanisms by which Walters suppressed the
memories of Warner’s conduct and failed to perceive any harm
from his conduct. As a victim of a previous sexual assault,
Walters alleged she unconsciously used defense mechanisms to
survive Warner’s abuse, and as a result of “manipulation, abuse,
violence, praise, coercion, [and] power and influence as a celebrity
implemented by Warner,” she repressed her memories of the
abuse. Until she received diagnosis and treatment, Walters was
unable to remember the repressed events, and “once she did
recall them, she was unable to immediately identify these events
as abuse.” These allegations of suppressed memories and
psychological blocking are sufficient to withstand a demurrer.
(See Holman, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 192-193 [allegations
victim “‘was suffering from trauma induced amnesia, as
diagnosed by his mental health provider,’” and the “‘trauma
induced amnesia prevented him from remembering the consistent
and repeated abuse that he suffered at the hands of his father
and mother years earlier’” were sufficient to invoke delayed
discovery]; cf. Derose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018 [“If
[plaintiff] could and did allege that she repressed her memories of
the sexual assaults until one year before filing her complaint, she
might be able to invoke the delayed discovery rule.”].)5

5     In Derose, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at page 1018, the court
reasoned allegations of repressed memories of childhood sexual

                                19
      The Manson defendants make three related arguments
why Walters was on inquiry notice of her claims, precluding
application of the delayed discovery rule. First, they argue
Walters is bound by the allegations of her first amended
complaint, which described Warner’s alleged misconduct but did
not allege her memory of any particular act was suppressed.
      Contrary to the Manson defendants’ contention, the first
amended complaint (like the operative complaint) alleged
Walters “developed psychological blocking mechanisms . . . such
that she blocked at least some of the events from her conscious

assault could support application of the delayed discovery rule
because the plaintiff “could not logically be charged with
awareness of the harm if she had not been aware of the assaults.
In fact, there are allegations in the complaint that might be read
to suggest that this was the case.” But the court affirmed an
order sustaining the defendant’s demurrer because the plaintiff
took the position in the trial court and on appeal that she recalled
the sexual assaults but repressed the emotional harm she
suffered. (Id. at pp. 1018-1019.) The court concluded the delayed
discovery rule did not apply because as a matter of law an assault
causes harm when it takes place, and thus the cause of action for
sexual assault was complete at the time of the assault. (Id. at
p. 1018.) The Manson defendants argue Derose supports their
position because Walters was aware of “at least some of these
assaults” at the time they occurred. This is true as to the pre-
employment sexual assault, as to which Walters’s claim for
sexual assault would have been barred but for the extended
limitations period under section 340.16. But even if the pre-
employment sexual assault was time-barred, that does not mean
Walters would have been barred from bringing a claim for a later
sexual assault (or sexual harassment) that is not time barred but
included within a single cause of action. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior
Court, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1682-1683.)

                                20
memory.” The Manson defendants do not identify any admission
in the first amended complaint that was omitted from the second
amended complaint or a prior allegation that was directly
contradicted by a new allegation. (See Deveny v. Entropin, Inc.
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425 [“Under the sham pleading
doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded from amending complaints to
omit harmful allegations, without explanation, from previous
complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for
summary judgment. [Citation.] ‘If a party files an amended
complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the original
complaint by either omitting facts which made the previous
complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with those of
previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of prior
pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.’”].)
      Second, the Manson defendants argue Walters alleged
potentially actionable sexual abuse and harassment by Manson
that she had not suppressed, which would have placed her on
inquiry notice of her injury and claims.6 They point to Walters’s
allegations that in May 2010 when she first met Warner and
during the video shoot for Manson Records prior to Warner hiring
her, Warner and an actor sexually assaulted her. And after she

6      The Manson defendants do not argue that if Walters could
have brought viable claims based on the non-suppressed conduct,
this precluded her from splitting her causes of action and later
filing a lawsuit based on the suppressed conduct. And it may
well be that at trial Walters will not be able to recover damages
based on the 2010 and 2011 alleged conduct that Walters did not
suppress unless equitable estoppel applies. But because we
conclude Walters alleged conduct that is not time-barred in
support of each cause of action, that question is not before us on
appeal from the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer.

                                21
was hired, she was subjected to sexual harassment, emotional
abuse, and manipulation. Then, after she was terminated in July
2011, she still returned to work because she was “terrified about
the repercussions she would face if she refused.” The Manson
defendants point out that these are the same allegations that
Walters describes as being so extreme that the Manson
defendants should be equitably estopped from relying on the
statute of limitations. We agree the alleged conduct Walters did
not suppress was egregious, but it is a factual question not
appropriate at the demurrer stage whether these allegations
should have placed Walters on inquiry notice of the claims based
on her suppressed memories.
       Although Walters recalled sexual abuse when she met
Warner and at the video shoot, this was prior to her employment
by Warner and Manson Records, and it would not necessarily
have placed Walters on notice of the sexual abuse committed
after she was hired. And most of the alleged conduct Walters did
not suppress was directed at other people, including Warner
subjecting employees to physically violent rages, verbal abuse,
brandishing weapons, and bragging about stalking, killing, and
ruining the lives of people who were disobedient. With respect to
conduct directed at Walters that she did not suppress, this
included Warner keeping compromising photographs of Walters,
boasting and joking about rape despite knowing Walters had
suffered a sexual assault, and encouraging Walters to “‘please’”
his friends (without elaboration), warning that artists and
celebrities would blacklist her if she did not.
       The allegations Walters recalled differ from those she
suppressed, in that they involved sexual and physical abuse of
her. These include Warner throwing her against a wall, feeding

                               22
her cocaine while forcing her to stand on a chair for 12 hours, and
his involvement in multiple sexual assaults by three men in the
entertainment industry. As discussed, Walters alleged Warner
told an actor he could “‘have her,’” resulting in the actor forcing
her to urinate in front of him, licking her vagina, and kissing her
on the mouth. Warner also allegedly forced her to repeatedly
drive a director home, who exposed himself to her, requested oral
sex, and told Walters he masturbated to thoughts of her. And
Walters alleged Warner forced Walters to flirt with a musician,
who then bit her nipple with Warners’s encouragement as
Warner took photographs.
       Finally, the Manson defendants argue, “It simply beggars
credulity that [Walters] could remember none of the extensive
litany of alleged outrageous behavior. It is too memorable, and
happened too many times, for her to have remembered none of
it.” This is a factual issue that cannot be resolved on a demurrer.
At the pleading stage “‘we do not concern ourselves with the
plaintiff’s ability to prove [the] factual allegations.’” (Marina
Pacific, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104-105; see Hacker v.
Homeward Residential, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 280
[“[i]n considering the merits of a demurrer, however, ‘the facts
alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however
improbable they may be’”].)

                                23
                           DISPOSITION

      The order of dismissal is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order
sustaining the demurrer to the second amended complaint
without leave to amend and to enter a new order overruling
the demurrer. Walters is to recover her costs on appeal.

                                   FEUER, J.
We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     MARTINEZ, J.

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