Court Opinion

ID: 9929489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 19:02:27.349629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:41.753919
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/24 In re E.T. CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In re E.T., a Person Coming                                B321896 consolidated with
 Under the Juvenile Court                                   B326145
 Law.
                                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                            21CCJP02476,
                                                             21CCJP02476A)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,

           v.

 V.V. et al.,

      Defendants and
 Appellants.
      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Nancy A. Ramirez, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed
and remanded in part.
      Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant V.V.
      Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant M.T.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Kim Nemoy and Sally Son, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

      Father M.T. and mother V.V. appeal from multiple findings
and orders made by the juvenile court regarding their daughter,
E. In October 2021, the juvenile court found jurisdiction over
eight-year-old E. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b),1 sustaining allegations that father
and mother failed to provide proper medical care for E. and that
father abused marijuana. After multiple continuances of the
disposition hearing to obtain medical and educational reports, in
June 2022 the court ordered continued joint physical custody of
E. but granted sole legal custody to mother. Six months later, the
court terminated jurisdiction, with an exit order granting joint
physical custody of E. to mother and father and sole legal custody
to mother.
      Mother and father separately appeal from the October 2021
jurisdiction order, the June 2022 disposition order, and the
December 2022 custody exit order. Father first challenges the
juvenile court’s assertion of jurisdiction, arguing that the court

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
lacked substantial evidence to find a risk of harm to E. Second,
he contends that the court erred in failing to grant joint legal
custody. We find no error in these orders and therefore affirm
them.
       Mother no longer challenges the court’s jurisdiction or
disposition orders. Instead, her appeal focuses solely on the
December 2022 exit order. She argues that the court ignored her
request for primary physical custody of E. so that she could
relocate with the child to Colorado. We agree with mother that
by preserving the status quo and ordering joint custody, the court
failed to properly consider what custody order would be in E.’s
best interest if mother did relocate. This was error. We therefore
reverse the December 2022 custody order and remand the matter
to the family court for further proceedings.
                           BACKGROUND
I.     Prior Referral
       E. was born in 2013 and is the only child of mother and
father. Mother and father separated in approximately 2017.
Shortly afterward, E. began living with father in Los Angeles,
while mother lived in Colorado. The family came to the attention
of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) in December 2020, from a referral alleging
neglect by mother and father. At that time, father said E. had
not seen a pediatrician since she was a baby. At DCFS’s urging,
father took E. to the pediatrician in January 2021 and received a
referral to a specialist for congenital microtia, a condition in
which the outer ear is not fully formed.
       E. also received a psychological evaluation in February
2021 and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. The
psychologist recommended that E. participate “in a regular

                                3
education program with support services,” communication
therapy and social therapy. Father told DCFS that E. was not
enrolled in school because she was not verbal and could not
communicate. A DCFS children’s social worker (CSW) explained
to mother and father the importance of obtaining follow up care
for E. Father agreed to ensure E. was getting necessary services
and DCFS closed the referral.
II.    Referral and Petition
       DCFS received the referral leading to the instant case in
April 2021, alleging emotional abuse and medical and
educational neglect of E. by father. The reporting party stated
that father kept E. isolated in her room all day, E. did not attend
school, father refused to discuss E.’s care with mother, and father
did not allow mother to see E.
       DCFS reported that mother and father had been aware of
E.’s microtia since birth but the child had not received any
treatment, which could explain her limited verbal skills. The
parents had also failed to provide a medical case plan for E. and
father had not completed any of the indicated medical follow-up
appointments since the last referral closed early in 2021. DCFS
expressed concern as to whether father would continue to follow
through with medical care for E. and with E’s possible isolation
by father.
       A CSW visited father’s home on April 12, 2021. Father
reported that mother had a history of violence against him and E.
According to father, E. had been living with him for the past
three years, she was happy with him, and had only “bad
memories” of mother. Father told the CSW that in December
2020, mother began telling E., “I’m coming to get you.” After that

                                 4
contact, E. was scared of mother and did not want to speak to
her.
       Father stated that E. had been assessed by the Regional
Center earlier that year and that its representative told him that
E. was “getting whatever she needed.” When the CSW asked
about socialization for E., father stated that prior to the
pandemic, he would take her to the park and beach once a week,
and the desert every two weeks. Father told DCFS that his home
was a certified home school. He stated that E. had only twice
expressed wanting to go to public school. Father explained that
he was trying to prepare E. for high school by teaching her his
trade, using “hands-on observation and experience” and “project-
based learning.” As an example, father explained that E. had
helped him build houses in the desert, which he called
“experimental learning.”
       Father told DCFS that he last took E. to the doctor two or
three months ago; prior to that, he had never taken her to the
doctor because she was never sick. DCFS noted that father had
received a recommendation to schedule a follow up appointment
for E.’s microtia in January, but did not do so until prompted by
the CSW in the current investigation.
       Father denied being the aggressor in any domestic violence
incidents with mother, but stated that mother often accused him
in instances where she was the aggressor. He denied mother’s
other allegations, including that he had raped her. He denied
any substance abuse; he drank alcohol once a week and smoked
marijuana, but kept it out of reach of E.
       The CSW also spoke with E. but was unable to get clear
responses. When asked if she wanted to go to mother’s home, E.

                                5
replied “no.” The CSW observed that E. appeared to be very
attached to father.
      Mother emailed DCFS on April 26 with a link to a folder of
documents purportedly supporting her claims of abuse by father,
including recordings of phone calls with E. She stated that she
was moving back to Los Angeles and had already secured
employment there. Mother claimed that in 2020 father would not
let her see E. Conversely, father claimed that in December 2020,
mother threatened to take E. from him. Mother admitted
smoking marijuana daily for help with her epilepsy. She
reported that father drank alcohol and was a “marijuana addict.”
She also said father was very antagonistic toward medical care.
In late April 2021, both parents tested positive for marijuana.
      The CSW spoke with father again on May 5, 2021. Father
stated he did not plan to accept Regional Center services, that it
did not seem necessary, and was “for the less fortunate” and for
“problematic people.” Father submitted videos of E. to DCFS
that he contended showed she was “consistently happy and
outgoing.”
      E. had a routine medical examination on May 6, 2021,
which was normal except for noting the left ear congenital
microtia. Father declined mental health services and
immunizations. The doctor recommended a routine dental
examination, an optometry exam, and referral to an ear, nose and
throat specialist (ENT).
      On May 13, 2021, the Regional Center reported to DCFS
that E. was eligible for services based on her autism diagnosis.
The report recommended routine pediatric and dental care, an
individualized education plan (IEP), and a full cognitive
assessment.

                                6
       Father told DCFS that he did not schedule an appointment
with an ENT because E. had the “hearing of a safecracker in both
ears” and he wanted to wait until custody issues were resolved.
Father also claimed that E.’s doctor agreed that her microtia
“was not such an existential threat as the one she currently faces
with her mom.”
       DCFS filed a dependency petition on May 25, 2021 on
behalf of E. under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).2 In
counts a-1 and b-1, the petition alleged that mother and father
had a history of violent altercations in E.’s presence, including in
2016 when mother struck father’s head, causing him to lose
consciousness. Count b-1 further alleged that father failed to
protect E. by allowing mother to have unlimited contact with the
child.
       The petition alleged in count b-2 that mother and father
had failed to obtain necessary medical treatment for E.’s

2      Section 300 states, in relevant part, “A child who comes
within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a
dependent child of the court:[¶](a) The child has suffered, or
there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the
child’s parent or guardian. . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the following: (A)
the failure or inability of the child’s parent . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child. . . . [¶] (C) The willful or negligent
failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. [¶] (D) The inability of
the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the
parent’s . . . substance abuse.”

                                   7
microtia. Counts b-3 and b-4 alleged substance abuse by mother
and father, respectively, including that both parents had a
history of substance abuse and were current abusers of
marijuana, which rendered them incapable of caring for E.
       At the May 2021 detention hearing, the court found a
prima facie case for jurisdiction over E. under section 300. The
court ordered E. released to father, with visitation for mother. At
a continued detention hearing the following month, DCFS
clarified that it recommended releasing E. to both parents, not
just father, and the court modified the order accordingly. The
court also ordered the parents to ensure E. was receiving
Regional Center services, and to follow up as to all medical and
dental appointments.
III. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
       At a meeting on July 7, 2021, mother and father agreed to
an alternating three-day custody schedule. The CSW observed E.
play with mother and noted that they were affectionate with each
other.
       In its July 2021 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS
stated that E. appeared happy in the care of each parent. As to
the allegations of the petition, mother denied domestic violence
against father and contended that father was “the abusive one.”
She also denied abusing marijuana and stated that she had a
prescription to use marijuana for seizures.
       Father contended that mother had been abusive toward
him and E. and denied that he had engaged in any violence. He
denied any history of using drugs. Father claimed that he and
mother were told when E. was born that her microtia would not
need attention until she was seven years old. He also stated that

                                 8
E. had always been healthy so there was no need for her to see a
doctor.
       DCFS reported in August 2021 that mother and E. had
started conjoint counseling. The therapist observed that E. was
happy, comfortable, and affectionate with mother. Mother
reported domestic violence and concerns of father’s possible abuse
of E. to the therapist.
       DCFS also received the report from E.’s ENT examination.
The doctor stated that he had discussed options with father
regarding E.’s condition, including surgery and a hearing aid.
Father responded that E. did not have a hearing problem and he
was not interested in those options. The ENT staff told DCFS
that it would be unusual for a child with E.’s condition to have
normal hearing on the affected side, and that father was
informed that the hearing aid would help E. determine where
noise was coming from, but father refused further treatment.
Father had not made any follow-up appointments. Additionally,
father had not provided mother’s contact information to the ENT
or pediatrician. At mother’s request, a hearing test was
scheduled for E.
       DCFS recommended that the court order an evaluation
under Evidence Code section 730 (730 evaluation) “[d]ue to the
complexity of this case.” DCFS observed that the parents
continued “to be unable to co-parent” or agree on a plan for E.
DCFS reported that father “has been defensive and questions
every appointment,” and claimed E. had already had a hearing
test, although no records of such a test were found. DCFS also
observed that E.’s communication, eye contact, and ability to
socialize with other children was limited.

                                9
       DCFS reported that father was not following the previously
agreed upon schedule for exchanging custody of three days with
each parent. Each parent claimed that E. did not want to see the
other parent, and that the other parent was violating the
agreement.
IV. Adjudication and Disposition
       At a hearing on August 4, 2021, the court ordered father to
comply with the custody schedule and ordered both parents not to
discuss the case with E. The court also set the adjudication
hearing for contest on October 1, 2021. On August 12, 2021,
mother filed a request that the court allow mother to enroll E. in
in-person schooling. Mother stated that father was refusing to
cooperate, instead insisting that E. continue her home-schooling
with him.
       At the court’s request, DCFS filed a last-minute
information on September 3, 2021 addressing an education plan
for E. DCFS noted that both parents held educational rights for
E., but the department was concerned that father had not
provided a curriculum detailing what he was teaching E. DCFS
also noted mother’s objection to continued home schooling. DCFS
attached a “school report” submitted by father discussing his
“tailored education program” for E. Father also filed a motion
requesting that the court find that continued home schooling was
in E.’s best interest. E.’s counsel opposed this request.
       At a progress hearing on September 10, 2021, the court
ordered an IEP for E. At the request of E.’s counsel, the court
designated mother as the educational rights holder for the child
pending adjudication, so that mother could enroll E. in school and
start the IEP process.

                               10
       DCFS filed a last-minute information on September 20,
2021, reporting that E. had a dental examination on July 16,
which showed no cavities. The ENT who had seen E. in August
stated that E. currently did not need treatment but she was a
candidate for a hearing aid, which might or might not help her.
E. was scheduled for a hearing test on October 12. E. was also
seen by a pediatrician on August 19, 2021, who recommended
another follow up with an ENT specialist after the hearing test.
The doctor noted that E.’s immunizations were not up to date,
but that mother and father were not in agreement on this issue.
       E. was scheduled to start adaptive skills training with the
Regional Center in early September, but the coordinator reported
that the scheduled provider could not take the case because of the
need for toilet training. The coordinator was attempting to locate
another provider.
       DCFS also reported that the parents had been adhering to
the custody agreement of three days each, but that they
continued to “struggle to co-parent effectively.” On September
21, DCFS reported that E.’s IEP was not yet complete because
the parents had not submitted the required application. Mother
told DCFS that she had submitted her form on September 14. At
a progress hearing on September 24, 2021, the court again
ordered an IEP for E., and also ordered that E. must be enrolled
in school. Mother informed DCFS that she had completed
parenting, domestic violence, and drug and alcohol awareness
classes the same month.
       In an October 5 last-minute information, DCFS reported
that it was helping mother locate a special education advocate at
mother’s request. The parents had completed the IEP
application, but it remained pending. DCFS also reported that E.

                               11
started attending public school on September 28, 2021. In late
October, DCFS reported that E. continued attending public
school and had an incident of hitting herself at school on October
15. Father continued to request that mother allow him to home
school E., but mother refused. According to mother, father
repeatedly stated he would stop interfering in mother’s education
plan for E. if mother agreed to relinquish E.’s medical rights to
him.
       E. had a hearing test on October 12, which found that she
had “severe to moderate conduction loss” on her left side. The
doctor recommended annual monitoring, consideration of
preferential classroom seating at school, and consideration of a
hearing aid if there were communication concerns. E.’s
pediatrician also recommended that she be vaccinated. Mother
agreed; father did not. E. was otherwise developing well.
       Mother requested a mental health referral through E.’s
school on October 14. E. had a mental health screening on
October 20, with reported symptoms of hitting herself, hand
flapping, becoming tired and easily distracted, as well as worry
and sadness. E. was referred for autism services.
       In a last-minute information on October 25, 2021, DCFS
reported that father tested positive for marijuana on September
29. Father took E. to the police station on October 15, stating that
E. told him mother hit her. DCFS reported continued concern
with father’s mental health and substance abuse, noting
increasing marijuana levels.
       E.’s therapist reported seeing mother and E. for 12 conjoint
therapy sessions from July to October 2021. She stated that E.’s
overall demeanor was playful and happy, but she was unable to
acknowledge when she was upset and refused to answer

                                12
questions about school. The therapist reported that E.’s
concentration appeared improved after she started school.
       The court held the adjudication hearing on October 27,
2021. The court dismissed from the petition counts a-1 and b-1
alleging domestic violence, finding that mother and father were
no longer together and there was no evidence of a current risk to
E. from violence. The court also dismissed count b-3 alleging
substance abuse by mother, finding that although the court “has
concerns regarding mother’s substance abuse or use of
marijuana,” it did not rise to the level required to sustain the
count. The court sustained the petition as to count b-2 alleging
medical neglect and count b-4 alleging substance abuse by father,
finding that DCFS had proven the allegations by a
preponderance of evidence. As to father’s marijuana use, the
court stated it had “a significant concern” regarding father’s
ability to provide regular care for E. and the probability that his
marijuana use endangered E. The court also noted that father’s
marijuana levels during drug testing were “very high.” Thus, the
court found jurisdiction over E. under section 300, subdivision (b).
The court ordered a 730 evaluation, continued substance testing
for both parents, and gave mother authority to proceed with
vaccinating E. The court denied father’s request to reinstate his
educational rights, finding that “the parents are still in conflict”
and the court did not want to interrupt the progress of the
current evaluations or cause other issues. The court continued
disposition, and subsequently continued disposition several more
times while waiting for receipt of additional reports and further
testing.
       In a December 2 last-minute information, DCFS reported
that mother did not appear for scheduled drug testing on two

                                13
dates in November, and father twice tested positive for
marijuana. The principal of E.’s current school stated that father
had brought up concerns that E. was being abused by her
teacher, but the principal’s investigation found no abuse. The
principal told DCFS that he believed 95 percent of what was
happening was due to family issues, but that he thought E. would
do better at a school with additional support resources. He stated
that father was lobbying to home school E. for one or two days
per week, but that the school could not permit that. E.’s IEP
meeting was scheduled for the following week. E. was also
scheduled to begin individual therapy, and mother reported that
she had successfully requested to transfer E.’s Regional Center
services to the area where mother was living.
      The CSW also spoke to the ENT staff, who stated that
when the parents came in for the appointment, the staff was
“very close to contacting the social worker as the parents were
not on the same page.” Father “stormed out” of the office and
was not present for the referral to the audiology department for a
hearing aid.
      Mother reported to DCFS that there was an incident
during a custody exchange on November 14, during which father
restrained E. and prevented her from walking to mother. After
mother threatened to involve police, father let E. go and drove
away. Mother also stated that E. was distressed due to father’s
“aggressive behavior in the car,” and that there had been two
other “less volatile incidents” during the prior two exchanges,
including “a bribe attempt in addition to intimidation.” Mother
stated she and father had agreed to Monday school drop offs as
alternate exchanges, since father “seems particularly triggered by
my presence.” DCFS reported that the following exchange on

                               14
November 24 proceeded without incident, and E. appeared to be
doing well. DCFS advised the court that it continued to have
concerns about the parents’ behavior and “the extra stress they
are putting on the child,” as they continued to make allegations
against each other.
       At a progress hearing on January 10, 2022, the court
granted mother’s motion to appoint her as the holder of
educational rights for E.
       E. received her vaccinations in December 2021 and had a
follow up appointment in January. She was also scheduled to
have a forensic examination after mother reported to the doctor
that E. stated her vagina hurt. In January 2022, DCFS reported
that the police had completed the forensic investigation,
including observing E. around father, and concluded that the
allegations of abuse were unsubstantiated. Instead, the reporting
officer stated that there was a “feud going on and child custody
battle and that’s pretty much what we see.” Mother again
reported possible sexual abuse or “grooming” of E. by father on
January 5, 2022. DCFS reported that E.’s doctor and the CSW
found no indication of abuse.
       Mother tested positive for marijuana twice in December
2021. Father tested negative. Mother stated she was prescribed
marijuana by her doctor. DCFS also reported that each parent
continued to blame the other parent for the issues in the family.
       Mother told DCFS that she did not want father to be
present for E.’s IEP meeting given his ongoing objection to E.’s
schooling. Mother attended the initial IEP meeting on January
11, 2022. The assistant principal told DCFS that father was
excluded after mother and her counsel both told the school that
mother was the educational rights holder and did not want to

                               15
include father at the meeting. DCFS also reported that mother
had expressed her reservations about co-parenting with father
and that she preferred father not be involved, but she had
enrolled in parenting classes and a high-conflict parenting
program in an attempt to co-parent with father.
       On January 27, 2022, DCFS reported that mother
requested a deaf/hard of hearing evaluation, which would take
additional time to complete. The assistant principal stated that
father attended the second IEP meeting in January and both
parents were able to stay on topic. She stated that they
addressed with the parents the concern that E. was not doing
well academically and was not turning in homework, but the
parents did not want to discuss that issue. Father complained
that it took two hours to drive E. to school, and requested that
the custody exchange be modified so that he would have E. on the
weekend, while she would stay with mother during the week for
school. The court ordered this change.
       At a March 2022 IEP meeting, E.’s school stated that E.
had made progress in reading. E.’s teacher reported that E.’s
most challenging behaviors included when she was disruptive,
sometimes yelling and crying, that she had trouble with social
cues, and she did not want to complete schoolwork.
       Recently, the parents had each taken E. to a different
optometrist, with different results. Mother told the optometrist
that E. had been complaining of headaches and squinting and the
optometrist recommended glasses. Father did not report these
symptoms during E.’s second optometry examination. He claimed
no glasses were needed, that E. “has no problems seeing things,”
and accused mother of “medical abuse.”

                              16
       DCFS reported to the court that the parents continued to
be unable to co-parent. Mother had “shown commitment,
dedication and efforts to ensure that the child has needed
services and support,” but father “continued to have difficulties
with assisting [E.] in identified areas such as school.” Because E.
was having difficulties with transitions, DCFS recommended
both parents participate in helpful activities, including homework
and encouraging E. to go to school.
       In a last-minute information filed May 9, 2022, DCFS
reported that E. had recently transitioned to an autism core
program in a new school. DCFS also received the 730 evaluation
on April 24, 2022. The psychologist recommended that the
parents continue to share physical custody of E. She noted that
E. had been raised primarily in father’s custody and was securely
attached to father, so that any further separation would likely
lead to further emotional and behavioral problems. At the same
time, E. was also attached and bonded to mother. The report also
recommended fewer phone calls with the other parent during
their non-custodial time in order to assist E. in adjusting and
causing less emotional distress. She also recommended that
mother retain medical and educational rights for E., because the
parents were unable to come to an agreement on decisions and
mother had demonstrated awareness of E.’s special needs and an
ability to advocate for services. She noted that because of home
schooling, E. had missed “years of special education services that
may have made a difference in her overall development,” and
that father’s “view of Western medicine has kept [E.] from
receiving preventive health services” for the first seven years of
her life.

                                17
       In April, mother completed a high conflict co-parenting
program. The therapist reported in May that mother and E.
continued to attend conjoint therapy sessions and their
relationship appeared “healthy and typical.” When asked about
her new school, E. responded, “best school ever.”
       The court held the disposition hearing on June 27, 2022.
Father testified that E. was not vaccinated prior to DCFS
involvement because he was worried she had a high risk of an
allergic reaction. He also said E. had previously been diagnosed
as autistic by multiple people, including his mother, who was an
“expert in autism.” He decided to home school E. because he felt
she was “not quite ready for elementary school.” He thought that
E.’s current public school was “wonderful.” He was not opposed
to that school and felt it was able to meet her needs. He had
tried to stay involved in E.’s educational decisions. However, he
also expressed “concerns” with E.’s current education, testifying
that E. was “a savant” and a “standard public school education
cannot be tailored to her special abilities,” so he was requesting
partial home schooling.
       Father acknowledged that during the four years prior to
the case he did not seek a Regional Center assessment for E., did
not have E.’s hearing assessed, and did not take E. to see a
pediatrician. As of May 2021, E. had never seen a dentist. DCFS
suggested that E. see an optometrist in January 2021, but he did
not take her to see one until after mother did so, because he
disagreed with the prescription. He continued to insist that E.
had “the hearing of a safecracker,” but denied that he claimed
that was true as to both ears. Regarding the psychological
evaluation conducted in February 2021, he denied that the
psychologist recommended enrolling E. in a standard education

                               18
program with support services. He contended that the
psychologist told him orally that E. would not be suited for a “sit
down formal learning environment.” He also contended that the
Regional Center told him “over the phone” that there were no
beneficial services available for E.
       When asked during cross-examination what he and mother
were unable to agree on, he listed E.’s need for a hearing aid,
glasses, braces, timing of vaccinations, and enrollment in general
education. Father testified that on all of these topics his opinion
was “confirmed by professionals, medical experts.”
       Father’s counsel requested that the court reinstate joint
educational and medical rights for E. to father. Mother requested
that she retain sole educational and medical decision-making
rights. She also requested that she have custody one weekend
per month. E.’s counsel agreed with DCFS’s recommendation
that mother retain sole legal custody, so that E. could “continue
to receive consistent services in a structured setting.” Counsel
for DCFS pointed to the 730 evaluation’s recommendation for one
parent to hold decision making rights due to the parents’ inability
to work together and argued that mother had done an effective
job thus far.
       The court observed that both parents loved E., both were
bonded to her, and that E. had lived with both for “significant
periods of time.” However, the court found that the parents
“really struggle to get along and to put their differences aside in
the best interest of this child,” noting that father had testified to
disagreement with mother on “just about every aspect of the
child’s medical care.” The court stated it was also clear that E.
was “suffering from stress and anxiety, likely resulting from the
constant disagreement by the parents,” including mother and

                                 19
father accusing each other of abuse, calling the CSW and the
police, and recording E. The court also found that father had
delayed in getting services for E. to a degree that “could be
detrimental to her ability to benefit from these services.”
       The court found that continued jurisdiction was warranted
but that there were reasonable services available to prevent
removal. As such, the court indicated it would follow the
recommendation of the 730 evaluation to release E. into the
physical custody of both parents, but for mother to retain sole
medical and educational rights. The court also denied father’s
request to allow him to home school E. in place of at least one day
of weekly public school instruction. The court stated it was
considering mother’s request for some weekend custodial time, in
order to have some time with E. that was more relaxed, but
stated that counsel should discuss with both parents what
arrangement could be acceptable to them both.
       Mother and father timely appealed from the disposition
order.
V.     Termination of Jurisdiction
       In a December 2022 status review report, DCFS reported
that E. continued to “demonstrate significant progress in various
areas, including socialization, behavioral, and education.” DCFS
also stated that E.’s needs were being met by both parents and
there were “no further concerns for this child at this time.” E.
appeared to be happy and she enjoyed spending time with both
parents. Mother had been very supportive of E.’s needs and
made significant progress in her case plan. Mother stated that
communication with E.’s father continued to be extremely
limited. Father had also shown that he was “deeply concerned
and devoted to E[.]’s needs.” He had completed almost all of the

                                20
recommended court orders, including high conflict parenting
classes.
       DCFS also reported that E. was up to date on her medical
examinations and immunizations, and that mother had applied
for a hearing aid for E. E. also continued to benefit from Regional
Center services, including a social skills program. E. reported
enjoying school and her teacher confirmed that E. was excelling
academically. E. had also transitioned from conjoint therapy
with mother to individual therapy. E. remained living with
mother during the week and one weekend per month, and with
father from Friday afternoon until Monday morning.
       DCFS reported that father continued to feel that mother
exaggerated the need for various services for E., including
optometry, Regional Center services, and therapeutic services.
Mother reported that she tried to work with father and include
him, but father refused to participate.
       DCFS concluded that both parents were providing E. with
the loving care she needed, but they had been unable to
communicate effectively regarding issues related to E.’s care.
DCFS recommended terminating jurisdiction with the current
custody arrangement in place.
       In her trial brief, mother argued among other things that it
was in E.’s best interest to award sole physical custody to mother
and allow mother and E. to move to Colorado. She argued that
she had maternal relatives there and that the education system
and support systems available there were superior to those in Los
Angeles. Mother also submitted a ten-page “formal request for
court ruling re: relocation,” detailing the bases of her request to
return to Colorado with E.

                                21
       At a progress hearing on December 23, 2022, the court
indicated it had read and considered the reports submitted by
DCFS, as well as mother’s trial brief, in which she requested
“sole legal and sole physical custody as she wishes to move with
the child to Colorado.” E.’s counsel agreed with DCFS’s
recommendation to close the case, and requested sole legal
custody to mother and joint physical custody. Father’s counsel
asked the court to close the case with joint legal and physical
custody. Mother’s counsel argued that mother should be able to
move with E. to Colorado, as there were better services and
support available there. However, she also stated that if the
court was inclined to order joint physical custody, mother
requested that the current custodial schedule remain in place.
       The court noted that mother had held sole educational
rights since January, and during that time she had enrolled E.
into services and made sure E. was being properly assessed and
that her health and developmental issues were being addressed.
Thus, the court found it was in E.’s best interest for mother to
retain sole legal custody. As to physical custody, the court found
that E. “spends as much as . . . 50-50 time with the parents.
Granted it doesn’t work out perfectly 50-50 . . . [b]ut what the
court is saying is that the child spends a lot of time with both
parents. She is bonded to both parents. And the court is finding
that it would be in the child’s best interest for the parents to have
joint physical custody.”
       Accordingly, the court found that continued supervision
was no longer necessary. The court entered a final judgment
terminating jurisdiction with a custody order awarding sole legal
custody to mother and joint physical custody to mother and
father. The court ordered the physical custody arrangement to

                                 22
remain the same, with father having custody from Friday after
school to Monday morning, mother having custody during the
week, and mother having custody one weekend per month.
      Mother and father both appealed from the court’s
December 23, 2022 orders. We consolidated the appeals for the
purposes of briefing, oral argument, and decision.
                           DISCUSSION
I.    Jurisdiction
      In his appeal from the disposition order, father argues that
the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings because there was no substantial risk of
harm to E. due to father’s delay in seeking medical treatment for
her or his use of marijuana. We find no error and therefore
affirm.3
      A.     Governing Principles
      “‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the

3     Although mother initially appealed from the court’s
jurisdiction and disposition orders, she concedes that those issues
are moot given the court’s subsequent order terminating
jurisdiction. However, neither DCFS nor father addressed the
mootness issue as to father’s jurisdictional challenge. (See In re
Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [“[A] jurisdictional
finding good against one parent is good against both.”].) Because
father argues that the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
findings led to the erroneous custody order, we proceed to
consider father’s jurisdictional claim.

                                23
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.”’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773, citation omitted.)
“We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court. “‘[T]he [appellate] court
must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence ... such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that
the order is appropriate].”’” (Ibid., citations omitted; see also In
re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 [“The [order] will
be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though
substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court
might have reached a different result had it believed other
evidence.”].)
       As relevant here, a dependency court may determine a
child is subject to the court's jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b) if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
“[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness,” as a result of a
parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the
child or failure to provide medical treatment. (See § 300, subds.
(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C).) Where the child has not suffered actual
harm, the evidence must establish “‘that at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious
physical harm.’” (In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 683.)
       The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect
the child. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165.) “‘The
purpose of dependency proceedings is to prevent risk, not ignore

                                 24
it.’” (Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1074,
1104.) The court may consider past events in deciding whether a
child currently needs the court’s protection. (Ibid.) A parent’s
“‘[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions’ if there is
reason to believe that the conduct will continue.” (In re Kadence
P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383–1384, quoting In re S.O.
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461.) However, evidence of past
conduct, without more, is insufficient to support a jurisdictional
finding under section 300. “There must be some reason beyond
mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.
[Citation.]” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 135–136,
abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622,
628.) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings or orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
        B.   Analysis
        Father argues that the court erred in finding jurisdiction
over E. pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), premised on his
failure to obtain medical care for E. Specifically, he contends
that because E. did not require surgery or a hearing aid for her
microtia, his failure to timely seek treatment for that condition
did not establish a risk of harm. We disagree.
        Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
that father failed to seek recommended medical care for E. for the
majority of her life. At the time of DCFS’s initial intervention in
December 2020, E. (then seven years old) had not seen a
pediatrician since she was a baby and had never seen a dentist.
Mother also reported that father had been resistant to medical
treatment since she was pregnant with E. Further, although
father had been aware of E.’s microtia since birth, he never

                                25
sought a professional assessment of her ongoing needs or any
treatment. In January 2021, at the urging of DCFS, father
obtained a referral to an ENT for evaluation of E.’s microtia.
DCFS explained the importance of obtaining medical care for E.
and closed the referral when father agreed to follow up.
       Despite father’s promises, he had done nothing further
when DCFS received another referral in April 2021. He had not
followed up with recommendations by DCFS and medical
professionals that E. needed routine pediatric and dental care, as
well as immunizations and an optometry exam. E. had a medical
exam in May 2021 and the doctor again referred her to an ENT.
She did not see the ENT until August, at which time father
continued to insist that she had no hearing issues. The hearing
test was ultimately scheduled by mother and occurred in October
2021, revealing hearing deficits on E.’s left side, which father
continued to deny. Similarly, E. did not see a dentist until July
2021 and did not receive her immunizations until sometime in
2022, after mother obtained a court order allowing them.
       The evidence also demonstrated that father’s longstanding
failure to seek recommended medical care for E. was intentional.
Father was resistant to care throughout the case, insisting that
E. did not need medical care because she was healthy and never
sick, and therefore did not need immunizations, braces, hearing
support, or glasses. DCFS noted that father was defensive as to
every suggested appointment and repeatedly suggested that E.
did not need services. Father refused the recommendations of
medical professionals and insisted that he alone knew what care
E. required.
       Father suggests that he sufficiently followed DCFS’s
recommendations regarding treatment, pointing to E.’s visit to

                                26
the pediatrician in January 2021. But the record establishes that
visit was only for the purpose of obtaining an ENT referral; it did
not include a physical examination. E. did not have a routine
well-child examination until four months later, after DCFS
intervened a second time. Thus, substantial evidence supported
the court’s conclusion that without court oversight, father likely
would continue to resist obtaining any medical care for E.
       We also reject father’s contention that dependency
jurisdiction was unwarranted because E. had not been harmed by
father’s failure to obtain medical treatment. The court need only
find that E. was subject to a substantial risk of harm in order to
assume jurisdiction to protect the child. (See In re N.M., supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.) The evidence that father resisted all
medical care for E. for most of her life, despite contrary
recommendations and a known congenital condition, was
sufficient to allow the court to conclude that father’s neglect
placed E. at a substantial risk of serious harm. (See In re Petra
B. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169 [jurisdiction proper where
“[e]vidence in the record indicates the parents, at the time of the
hearing, were not capable of exercising or willing to exercise
proper medical care”].) As such, we find no error in the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction based on father’s medical neglect.4

      4 Because we affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

findings under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) based on the
allegations of medical neglect, we need not reach father’s
contention that the court lacked substantial evidence to sustain
the allegations of father’s marijuana abuse. (See In re I.A. (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“an appellate court may decline to
address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional
findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by

                                27
II.    Custody
       Both parents challenge the juvenile court’s custodial exit
order. Father argues that the court erred in granting sole legal
custody to mother at the time it terminated jurisdiction. Mother
contends that the court failed to consider her request to relocate
with E. to Colorado. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
order regarding legal custody. However, as to physical custody,
the court was required to determine what custodial arrangement
would be in E.’s best interest assuming mother relocated to
Colorado. Instead, the court ordered the parents to continue
their prior arrangement with mother having custody of E. during
the week, plus one weekend per month, and father having
custody the remaining weekends. Because the court failed to
properly analyze mother’s relocation request, we remand the
matter to the family court to make that determination.
       A.    Legal Principles
       Section 362.4 governs the termination of juvenile court
jurisdiction and related orders. The statute authorizes a juvenile
court to make custody and visitation orders upon terminating
dependency jurisdiction over a child. (§ 362.4, subd. (a).) These
exit orders remain in effect until modified or terminated by a
subsequent order of the superior court. (§ 362.4, subd. (b); see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.700.)
       “When making a custody determination under section
362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must always
be the best interests of the child.’” (In re T.S. (2020) 52

the evidence”]. We also find that father’s contention that the
court erred by granting sole legal custody to mother at the
disposition hearing is moot. We address this claim below in the
context of the court’s custodial exit order.

                                28
Cal.App.5th 503, 513, quoting In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112
Cal.App.4th 251, 268 (Nicholas H.).) The court must be guided
by the totality of the circumstances and issue orders that are in
the child's best interests. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196,
201 (Chantal S.).) “The juvenile court has a special responsibility
to the child as parens patriae and must look to the totality of a
child’s circumstances when making decisions regarding the
child.” (Ibid.) Because juvenile dependency proceedings arise
when children are subject to or at risk of abuse or neglect, “[t]he
presumption of parental fitness that underlies custody law in the
family court just does not apply. . . . Rather the juvenile court,
which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child,
is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best
interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.”
(In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 712 (Jennifer R.);
accord Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.)
       “[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case (§ 362.4).” (Nicholas H., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th
at p. 265, fn. 4.) We review the juvenile court’s exit orders for an
abuse of that discretion. (See, e.g., In re Maya L. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 81, 102; Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 711;
see also In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 [“[W]hen a
court has made a custody determination in a dependency
proceeding, ‘“a reviewing court will not disturb that decision
unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination.”’”].)

                                29
       B.    Father’s challenge
       Father contends that as of December 2022, it was not in
E.’s best interest to award sole legal custody to mother. He has
failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion.
       Father’s argument is premised on his assertion that he had
become cooperative with DCFS’s recommendations for E.’s
medical and educational needs over the course of the case and
that he had valuable insight to offer E.’s providers. The first
claim is not supported by the record. Up to the time of
termination, father continued to insist that E. did not need many
of the services or medical support provided, and that mother was
practicing medical abuse by, for example, obtaining glasses for E.
at the recommendation of an optometrist. The court granted sole
medical and educational rights to mother after the evidence
suggested that the parents could not work together to make
important decisions for E. and that father was resistant to most
recommendations regarding E.’s medical and educational needs.
Once mother assumed sole legal custody, she secured mental
health services for E., and Regional Center support for E.’s
autism; she followed up regarding E.’s medical needs, including
glasses and a possible hearing aid; and she followed the
recommendations by DCFS and the psychologist to enroll E. in
public school with an IEP in place. At the time of termination,
mother’s efforts had resulted in placement for E. in a school that
she loved, E. had begun to excel academically, she was up to date
on her medical examinations and immunizations, and she was
regularly receiving support for her special needs. As such, it was
not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that it was in
E.’s best interest for sole legal custody to remain with mother.

                                30
       Father’s second claim that he could not provide any insight
into E.’s needs without having shared legal custody is not
supported by any authority or the record. Notably, father’s
insistence that he was the primary authority into what was best
for E. and his refusal to consider the recommendations of others
led at least partly to the need for juvenile court jurisdiction.
Furthermore, although he was not a decisionmaker, father was
not prevented from providing information relevant to E.’s needs.
Indeed, he attended at least one of the IEP meetings and
communicated with mother about services for E.
       In sum, father has not established that the court abused its
discretion in awarding sole legal custody to mother at the time of
termination.
       C.    Mother’s challenge
       Mother contends that the court abused its discretion by
denying her request for sole physical custody of E. She argues
that the court was required to determine E.’s best interest based
on the assumption that she was moving to Colorado. Instead, by
maintaining the prior joint custody arrangement, the court failed
to conduct the proper analysis and therefore abused its
discretion. We agree.
       Where parents have joint custody of a child, the court may
grant a move-away request if it finds it is in the child’s best
interests. (Fam. Code, § 3087; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996)
13 Cal.4th 25, 40, fn. 12. (Burgess).) The relocating parent does
not have a presumptive right to change the child’s residence, and
the other parent does not have to show detriment. (Niko v.
Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 363–364 (Niko).) Rather,
the trial court determines de novo what physical custody
arrangement is in the child’s best interests. (Id. at p. 364.) As

                                31
our Supreme Court has explained, a trial court should ordinarily
consider a non-exhaustive list of factors in assessing a move-
away request, including the child’s “interest in stability and
continuity in the custodial arrangement,” the distance of the
move, the child’s age, the child's relationship with both parent,
the relationship between the parents, the wishes of the child
where appropriate, the reasons for the proposed move, and “the
extent to which the parents currently are sharing custody.” (In re
Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1101 (LaMusga).)
       “The value in preserving an established custodial
arrangement and maintaining stability in a child’s life is obvious.
But when the status quo is no longer viable and parents have
joint custody, a court must review de novo the best interest of the
child. It can fashion a new time-share arrangement for the
parents.” (Niko, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 364.) “In other
words, the de novo review that applies in a joint parenting
situation is, ‘in effect, a “reexamination” of the basic custody
arrangement’ because one parent’s relocation in a joint physical
custody arrangement will necessarily disrupt the status quo, and
will require the court to modify the existing custody
arrangement.” (Mark T. v. Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1115, 1126 (Mark T.).)
       “We review orders granting or denying move-away requests
for abuse of discretion.” (Jacob A. v. C.H. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
1591, 1598–1599; see Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th 25, 32; Mark T,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.) “A discretionary order that is
based on the application of improper criteria or incorrect legal
assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion, and is
subject to reversal even though there may be substantial

                                32
evidence to support that order.” (Mark T., supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1124–1125.)
       Mother argues that the juvenile court failed to properly
consider her relocation request because it failed to make findings
as to what custodial arrangement would be in E.’s best interests
if mother moved to Colorado. In a move-away request, “[t]he
court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement
would be in the child’s best interests, assuming that the
requesting parent will relocate.” (Mark T., supra, 194
Cal.App.4th at p. 1127.) A court misapplies this rule where it
denies a move-away request to preserve the status quo, or to
coerce the moving parent to abandon their plans. (Mark T.,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1128.)
       Here, the juvenile court found that it was in E.’s best
interest to maintain the joint custody arrangement under which
E. lived with mother during the week and with father on
weekends. The court based this conclusion on a finding that E.
was bonded to both parents and had spent substantial time living
with each of them. But the court was required to assume that
mother was moving to Colorado and to determine what custody
order would be in E.’s best interest under those circumstances.
The court did not expressly do so and did not address changes to
the custody order that would have to be made if mother moved to
another state. Although mother suggested in her argument
below that she would remain in Los Angeles if the court did not
grant her sole physical custody, the court was not allowed to
consider that statement. (See Mark T. supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1128 [court erred in considering mother’s statement that she
would not move if her request was denied]; Jacob A. v. C.H.,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1601 [“Faced with an admittedly

                               33
difficult decision, the trial court skirted the question entirely and
issued an order purporting to maintain the status quo”]; see also
LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1098.)
       Thus, the court abused its discretion in failing to assess E.’s
best interest under the LaMusga factors and based on the
premise that mother was relocating to Colorado. We therefore
remand the matter to the family court for reconsideration of
physical custody and mother’s relocation request.
                            DISPOSITION
       The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed. The
December 23, 2022 order is reversed as to the issue of physical
custody. The matter is remanded to family court for a
determination of physical custody.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

                                 34