Court Opinion

ID: 9738858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:34.111039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.855891
License: Public Domain

*102Dissenting Opinion
Givan, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons:
1. The opinion of the Court appears to be based entirely upon the proposition that evidence was erroneously admitted concerning conditions prior to August 25,1966, the same being the date of a prior order for custody and support. It is apparently the majority opinion’s position that it was reversible error for the trial court to hear any evidence other than evidence of a change in the condition subsequent to August 25, 1966. However, the opinion does not cite any authority for this position. In fact, the opinion is completely devoid of authority of any sort, either cases or statute. There is case law in Indiana that where no vital change in condition was averred in the petition nor shown in the evidence on a petition to modify it would be improper for the trial court to enter a judgment changing custody or increase support payments. See Abair v. Everly (1959), 130 Ind. App. 192, 163 N. E. 2d 34. However, the entire group of cases setting forth this well-known proposition of law are confined to the modification of final divorce decrees, whereas the question in the case at bar is concerned with an interlocutory appeal from an order pendente lite. It has been specifically held by this Court that orders pendente lite made under the provisions of Burns’ 3-1216 do not dispose of the cause. They leave the question of custody and support for final determination in the decree of divorce. They are clearly interlocutory. Haag v. Haag (1959), 240 Ind. 291, 163 N. E. 2d 243.
2. The appellant’s brief although mentioning the point upon which the majority opinion decides the case, cites absolutely no authority for its proposition. This in itself is a violation of Eule 2-17 of the Eules of this Court. The appellant does not even make a philosophic argument on his contention that the change of condition rule should be applied in this case. In fact, there is nothing in the brief by which the appellant *103draws any distinction between the two situations of a final decree as against the decree pendente lite.
3. The only proposition in appellant’s brief which is supported by the citation of authority begins in his brief at page 99 and is directed to the general proposition that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the amended order for support pendente lite, and even in the cases cited by the appellant it is clearly stated that the discretion of the trial court will be interfered with only when a clear abuse is shown. However, in the review of the evidence which follows his general citation of authority, I find no evidence which would indicate that the trial court was unfair or arbitrary in its action to the extent that this Court would be justified in holding that there was an abuse of discretion.
The trial court should, therefore, be affirmed.
Hunter, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 245 N. E. 2d 831.