Court Opinion

ID: 9771951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:03:07.446624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:40.322652
License: Public Domain

SHARPE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would sustain appellant’s sole point of error which asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining ap-pellees’ pleas of limitation and in thereafter dismissing appellant’s suit.
The record reflects that the dismissal of appellant’s suit resulted from the action of the trial court in sustaining a special ex*736ception contained in Paragraph I of ap-pellees’ (defendants’) answer to the effect that it appeared from the face of appellant’s (plaintiff’s) original petition that any cause of action appellant may have had against appellees accrued more than two years, and, in the alternative, more than four years, prior to the commencement of this suit, and that same is barred by the statute of limitation of such period of years, each respectively.
The Texas Supreme Court cases primarily involved are Stowers Furniture Company v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Com.App., 1929, holdings approved); Universal Automobile Ins. Co. v. Culberson, 126 Tex. 282, 86 S.W.2d 727, 87 S.W.2d 475 (1935); and Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1953). These decisions, along with others, are extensively discussed in Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Jernigan (5th Cir.App., 1969), 410 F.2d 718, a case appealed from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, decided after rendition of the trial court judgment in this case. Jernigan is squarely in point, in favor of appellant, on the issue presented here. The court said in part:
“ * * * On this appeal we are asked to determine whether the statute of limitations in a Stowers type suit begins to run: 1) on the date the claim against the insured is reduced to judgment, or 2) on the date or dates when the insured makes payment on the judgment to the injured claimant. The district court was of the view that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date or dates of payment, and for reasons hereinafter discussed, we agree.”
The opinion in Jernigan, following the above quotation extensively analyzes and discusses the decisions in Stowers, Culberson and Linkenhoger and particularly refers to the companion cases of Bostrom v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexi-cana de Seguros Generales (U.S.D.C., N.D. Tex., 1963) 225 F.Supp. 222, and Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania Mexicana v. Bostrom (5th Cir. 1965) 347 F.2d 168. It is apparent from such discussion that there has been much criticism of the prepayment rule, suggested alternatives, and the expressed hope that it might be abolished by the Texas Supreme Court. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Jernigan held that, under Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, it was bound to follow (considering Stowers, Culberson and Linkenhoger) the prepayment rule and applied it in that case by holding that limitation did not begin to run against Jernigan, the insured, until the date on which he made payment to Bostrom, the injured claimant who had recovered the judgment against Jerni-gan in excess of the policy limits.
In my view, the decision in Jernigan correctly declares the existing state of Texas law on the question presented in this case. In Jernigan the suit was filed more than two years after judgment was rendered against him and less than two years after he made payment to Bostrom. Similar facts exist here. The judgment here in favor of Baucum against Hernandez, appellant here, became final on May 24, 1961. On August 1, 1967, as the result of an execution sale of property belonging to Hernandez, the amount of $10,500.00 was credited on the judgment. Hernandez brought the present suit within two years of such payment on the judgment. If the prepayment rule, under Stowers, Culberson and Linkenhoger (as reiterated in Jerni-gan), is followed, which I feel bound to do, it appears that appellant’s suit was timely filed and is not barred by limitation. If the prepayment rule is to be changed or clarified, such action would be for the Supreme Court.
There is some language concerning Linkenhoger in Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153, 154 (Tex.Sup.1967), which when considered standing alone ap*737pears favorable to appellees. However, the case is distinguishable on several grounds. Among other things, Atkins did not involve a policy of insurance or the Stowers-Cvl-berson considerations nor some of the precise language in Linkenhoger. In my view, the decision in Atkins was not intended to include holdings or furnish guidance on the exact point with which we are here concerned.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for trial.