Court Opinion

ID: 9656514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:50:00.961456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.936236
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
This case presents a quite unusual situation and calls for the exercise of a quite unusual remedy.
Plaintiff sued defendant for divorce on the ground of cruelty.
Defendant denied generally and by cross-petition sought a divorce on the grounds of cruelty and adultery.
*309The unusual situation to which I refer arises as a result of these facts.
On October 28, 1955, there was filed our opinion in Yost v. Yost, 161 Neb. 164, 72 N. W. 2d 689, where (quoting from the syllabus) we stated these three rules:
“9. Where a wife is conclusively found to be occupying an adulterous relationship with a man not her husband, she is an unfit person as a matter of law to have the care and custody of her minor children as against the husband she has wronged.
“10. Where in a suit for divorce adultery on the part of the defendant is conclusively proved, the trial court is required to grant a divorce to the plaintiff on that ground.
“11. Where adultery of a wife is established, she is not entitled to an award of alimony or' attorneys’ fees. The costs of the action in such a case are taxable to the wife.”
Yost v. Yost, supra, stated the rules to guide the trial court when this case was decided. Defendant cites it as controlling authority here.
The court now modifies syllabus point 10 in the Yost case and states the rule as follows:
“1. Where the evidence in a divorce action establishes adultery on the part of one of the parties thereto, the court is required to grant the prayer of the other party seeking a divorce on that ground unless prevented from doing so by applicable statutory provisions.”
As I see it the rule as modified contains error. I shall return to that later herein.
The court now modifies syllabus point 9 of the Yost case and states the rule as follows:
“2. Where a wife is found to be guilty of adultery she is ordinarily an unfit person to have the care and custody of her minor children as against the husband she has wronged.”
This makes the rule conform generally with our holding in Meredith v. Meredith, 148 Neb. 845, 29 N. W. 2d *310643, wherein we held that a mother, guilty of adultery, should have possession of her child of tender years. The children here are of tender years. The claimed unfitness of the plaintiff arises solely because of the “indiscretions” and an act of “adultery” (as in the Meredith case) of which she is found guilty.
The court now modifies syllabus point 11 of the Yost case and states the rule as follows:
“3. Where adultery by a wife is established, she is not entitled to an award of alimony and ordinarily will not be allowed an attorney’s fee or an award of costs.”
It will thus be seen that the rules of law applicable to this case have been changed materially since the trial and decision in the district court. The amelioration of the rigors of the rules is favorable to the plaintiff. The court has no way of knowing what the judgment of the trial court would have been had it heard and decided ■this case under the rules now announced — and yet its decision on every matter is affirmed.
I now return to syllabus point 1 of the court in the instant case. The rule as stated is that where adultery is established the court “is required” to grant a divorce “unless prevented from doing so by applicable statutory provisions.” My objection goes to the two quoted matters.
“Required” is a mandatory word meaning commanded. There is no command in the statute. Section 42-301, R. R. S. 1943, provides that a divorce “may be decreed” for any one of seven reasons, one of which is adultery. The permissive “may” is used also in sections 42-302 and 42-302.01, R. R. S. 1943. Neither reason nor authority is given for changing the statutory discretionary rule to a mandatory rule denying all discretion to the trial court save as permitted by the exception. It may be pointed out that the Legislature used the mandatory “shall” in section 42-304, R. R. S. 1943, to which I refer presently.
The exception is “unless prevented from doing so by *311applicable statutory provisions.” The exception is an improvement over the all-inclusive mandatory rule as stated in syllabus 10 of the Yost case above quoted. As a statutory provision it permits the court to deny a divorce where adultery is established and (1) where procurement or connivance of the complaining party is shown; (2) where there has been forgiveness or con-donation; or (3) where there has been knowledge of the adultery for 5 years before suit is brought. § 42-336, R. R. S. 1943. It permits a trial court to obey the mandatory “no divorce shall be decreed” of section 42-304, R. R. S. 1943.
The rule as now stated permits a trial court to recognize the recrimination rule “where the party complaining shall be guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged against the respondent.” § 42-304, R. R. S. 1943. It excludes all other application of the recrimination rule.
However, independent of statute, this court has long recognized the recrimination rule and that it was not limited to offenses of the same nature, and specifically holding that extreme cruelty may be shown in recrimination of a charge of adultery. See Wilson v. Wilson, 89 Neb. 749, 132 N. W. 401; or as put in Wilson v. Wilson, 93 Neb. 182, 139 N. W. 1043, extreme cruelty is a defense to adultery. See, also, Peyton v. Peyton, 97 Neb. 663, 151 N. W. 150, where a husband guilty of extreme cruelty was denied a divorce from a wife guilty of adultery who was described in the opinion as a “wholly abandoned character.” See, also, Egbert v. Egbert, 149 Neb. 227, 30 N. W. 2d 669, where these rules were quoted and approved.
I see no reason for overruling the recrimination rule save as it is provided for in a limited way in section 42-304, R. R. S. 1943. The rule, as now stated by the court in this case, has that effect. However, if that is to be done, it should affirmatively so appear in order that the *312bench and bar of the state may know, understand, and follow the law.
The rule as now stated denies the plaintiff the right to prove cruelty as a defense to adultery although all of our decisions, ■ excepting the Yost case and this one, accord that right to a party.
I refer now to syllabus point 3 of the present opinion. As stated in the Yost opinion, adultery on the part of the wife barred both alimony and attorneys’ fees, and costs. Acting when that rule of law was in force,- the trial court denied alimony, attorneys’ fees, and costs to the plaintiff. Concededly as now stated, the trial court has a discretion in the matter of attorneys’ fees, although section 42-318, R. R. S. 1943, bars alimony where adultery of the wife is established. Ordinarily attorneys’ fees are allowed a wife even though she is unsuccessful in the litigation. Here they were denied by the trial court in obedience to the rule as stated in the Yost case. Here the court affirms, although the mandatory rule is relaxed. The question comes: What would the trial court have done had the rule been .correctly stated?
Here, contrary to our usual practice, all the costs are charged to the wife, although that was done in the now modified Yost opinion.
The court says that the acts of cruelty charged by the plaintiff “are not sustained by the evidence, but even if they were” they are condoned. I submit that con-donation has a part in this opinion only if cruelty is established. We should be able to make up our minds which it is. The evidence establishes cruelty of the defendant. There are two corroborated incidents of physical assault by the defendant against the wife, made in public places when angry and in the presence of mutual friends. There is other corroborated evidence of the “acts of the defendant” constituting cruelty. Defendant did not deny them, and in part admitted them.
The court holds “plaintiff was drinking intoxicating liquor to excess.” The record shows it was largely done *313in companionship with defendant at places where he took her, and among people with whom defendant caused her to associate. That defendant was also drinking intoxicating liquor to excess is shown by his own witnesses as well as those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s use of intoxicants is held against her. The defendants like use is not mentioned by the court. We had a similar situation in Cowan v. Cowan, 160 Neb. 74, 69 N. W. 2d 300, where we arrived at a different result.
Section 42-304, R. R. S. 1943, bars relief to the defendant on the ground of cruelty because he is guilty of the same offense.
If there was condonation by the plaintiff, there was likewise condonation by the defendant, for the claimed condonation rests on cohabitation. So if plaintiff is barred from a divorce, the same rules bar a divorce to the defendant. Divorce laws should not be partial to husbands in these matters.
The cruelty and liquor above referred to did not wreck this marriage.
So far as the plaintiff was concerned the bale of hay that broke the camel’s back was the things said by the defendant about the plaintiff and their son and defendant’s totally ignoring the plaintiff with reference to the son’s care. That manifest cruelty was not condoned. However, under the rule as stated in the Yost case the only decision for the court, assuming adultery to have been proven, was the mandatory duty to grant the defendant a divorce, deny the custody of the children to the plaintiff, deny plaintiff alimony and attorneys’ fees, and tax all costs to her!
The question is: Was adultery of the plaintiff proven? According to this record, plaintiff engaged in indiscretions with one man not her husband. That testimony is corroborated by a detective and others partial to defendant, and goes to just what the word indiscretions signified, and no more. The wife of this third party testified as a witness for the plaintiff.
*314. Did the trial court consider this evidence sufficient to establish adultery? We have no way of knowing— and that because of other evidence that was admitted. I now refer to the “lurid facts recited in evidence,” as stated by the court.
The defendant produced a witness who prefaced his testimony by an assertion of his own uprightness. He knew his subject matter. He testified voluntarily to help his friend, the defendant. He testified to the “lurid facts” of one act of sodomy which he stated the plaintiff performed with him. This witness testified to things told him by plaintiff at that time regarding things done in her employment in Nebraska. It is clear from the testimony of both plaintiff and defendant that the employment 'had not then occurred. This admitted sodomist is the man who testified plaintiff was not fit to have the custody of her children.
What effect did that story have on the trial court? We have no way of knowing. Obviously it would be difficult to get a witness who would testify as an eyewitness to an act of sodomy. However, there are witnesses, including the defendant, who could have testified about the events immediately preceding the alleged act. They were not called. There is, then, no corroboration whatever of this “lurid” story.
Even if proven, does it establish adultery as a matter of law? Here there appears to be no dispute. The answer is that it does not. Sodomy is defined in section 28-919, R. R. S. 1943. Our statutes classify sodomy under “Crimes against nature.” In one way or another it is so classified by the text writers. The decisions all agree that sodomy is not adultery. All agree that it may constitute cruelty. I cite the only decisions and texts I have been able to find: Anonymous, 2 Ohio N. P. Reports 342; Crutcher v. Crutcher, 86 Miss. 231, 38 S. 337; Poler v. Poler, 32 Wash. 400, 73 P. 372; Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 426; Keezer, Marriage and Divorce (3d ed.), § 487, p. 525; Schouler Di*315vorce Manual, § 90, p. 119; 27 C. J. S., Divorce, § 28, p. 559; 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 83, p. 308.
I submit, then, that the finding in the court’s opinion that the plaintiff was guilty of adultery, based as we must assume it was on the testimony as to sodomy, cannot be sustained as a matter of fact because it was in nowise corroborated. It cannot be sustained as a matter of law because the act testified to constituted the offense of sodomy and not adultery.
Further, although it may be cruelty, the defendant here did not know of the alleged sodomy until after this divorce proceeding began. It in nowise contributed to the separation of the parties and the breakup of this marriage.
But cruelty or not, sodomy is not adultery and the whole base of the court’s opinion is accordingly erroneous.
It is quite apparent that counsel considered the evidence of sodomy as going to the issue of adultery. They so present it here. There is no indication that the trial court was otherwise advised. Obviously, also, this court has not put aside the “lurid” story of the sodomy. .
I would further correct the errors in what is syllabus point 1 of the court in this opinion.
The unusual remedy I invoke would be to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for a new trial under the rules of law now held applicable so that the trial court may weigh the. evidence in the light of hearing the witnesses testify, make full use of the advantages it has for determining the truth of the testimony, and the proper construction to be given to it— “advantages which this court does not possess.” Peyton v. Peyton, supra. The plaintiff has not had the trial in district court under proper rules of law that our system grants to her.
On trial de novo here, after such a hearing, we can act with a far better understanding of the case if we have *316the trial court’s determination of the issues presented based on the evidence and the law.
We are entitled to know whether the trial court received the evidence of sodomy as proof of adultery; whether it viewed the “indiscretions” as proof of adultery; whether it considered cruelty or intoxication a moving cause for divorce; whether it would accord the plaintiff alimony; whether it would accord her the custody of her young children; and whether it would award her costs and attorneys’ fees under the rules now announced.
I readily concede that we have the power to decide the issues on this record. But the whole theory of trial de novo here involves the element of our having the benefit of the judgment of the trial court. The parties are entitled to have that sort of a judgment here.
It is denied in this case because it is manifest that the trial court decided issues based on erroneous rules of law as stated by this court and likewise considered evidence as proof of adultery when it does not have that effect.