Court Opinion

ID: 9834507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:38:47.2036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:16.621593
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
After a careful consideration of appellant’s motion we have finally concluded, in accordance with its prayer, that we erred in remanding this cause, and that it was and is our duty to reverse the judgment below and here render judgment in appellant’s favor upon the facts and conclusions announced in our original .opinion. As shown therein, and about which there is no dispute, appellee shipped his goods at Littlefield consigned to himself at Albany, Tex., on or about the 26th day of March, 1915. Appellee must have known that by due course of transportation those goods would soon arrive at Albany, where they in fact did arrive on the 27th day of March, 1915. .The record wholly fails to show that he made any effort to notify his father or other person of the probable arrival of his goods, that they might be taken from the custody of the carrier, and that he pursued his way by horseback from Little-field to his father’s home near Albany, where he did not arrive until the evening of April 4th, some six or eight days after his goods had been shipped at Littlefield. He failed to testify that on that day he made any inquiry. I-Ie did, however, on the following day, to wit, April 5th, receive actual notice of the arrival of his goods in ample time to have on that day gone and taken them into his own custody. It was further shown without dispute that the goods were lost by fire on Monday night, April 5th, after appel-lee had notice of the arrival of his goods and after the time within which he might have received them into his own custody. As shown in our original conclusions, after notice the burden was upon the appellee by law to use diligence in the removal of the goods, or to show that the fire which destroyed them was attributable to the negligence of the appellant company. See, also, Thornton v. Daniel, 185 S. W. 585. Appellee was represented upon the trial below by able counsel, and he testified in person, as did also his father, and full opportunity apparently afforded to offer any and every fact upon the issues indicated that could be truthfully presented, and yet, as disclosed by the record before us, no sufficient or lawful excuse was shown for appellee’s failure to take his goods before the fire, nor was any effort made to show that the fire was attributable to the negligence of the appellant company. Under such circumstances there can be no legal justification for remanding the case' for a new trial. The only apparent reason therefor would be to afford appellee an opportunity to amend his evidence, and this, it is well understood, is rarely, if ever, done by an appellate tribunal. Of course, the loss of ap-pellee’s goods is regrettable, but under the facts as proven appellant was liable only as a warehouseman, and the record shows that it also suffered severe loss by a fire not shown to arise from fault or negligence on its part. It therefore, in a court of justice and by the rules of law formulated for the protection of all civil rights, cannot be held liable to compensate appellee for a misfortune that it suffered in common with him.
We conclude that our former order remanding this cause should be set aside, and that the judgment below be reversed and now rendered in favor of appellant.