Court Opinion

ID: 9884670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:05:28.771952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:25.371098
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J.
(dissenting) : The decedent Olive R. Lyon was born in New Jersey in 1882. She was married in New Jersey, maintained her marital home at Pompton Plains and lived there at least until 1965. After her husband’s death in March 1965 she went to live at her son’s home in Maryland but did not sever her New Jersey ties. Thus she at all times until her death continued to maintain her Pomp-ton Plains home in good living condition, spent a month there during the latter part of 1965 and also spent a month there during 1966. She spent the summers of 1965 and 1966 at her son’s home at the New Jersey shore. Iier only bank accounts and her safe deposit boxes containing all of her corporate stocks were continued at all times in New Jersey and her ownership of New Jersey real estate parcels, in addition to her Pompton Plains home, were also continued. She died in a Maryland hospital on March 30, 1967. Her death certificate listed her “usual residence” as “721 Turnpike, Pompton Plains, New Jersey” and she was buried in Pompton Plains. Her 1953 will, which remained unaltered at the time of her death, was executed in New Jersey, recited her New Jersey home and named her son as beneficiary and executor.
Her executor claims that the decedent’s admittedly longstanding domicil in New Jersey was terminated in favor of a Maryland domicil in 1965 when she went to live with him. *280Under the cases he clearly has the burden of establishing such change of domicil. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 427, 59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817, 836 (1939); In re Dorranee, 115 N. J. Eq. 268, 274-275 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 13 N. J. Misc. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 N. J. L. 362 (E. & A.), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 678, 56 S. Ct. 949, 80, L. Ed. 1399 (1936); In re Michelsohn, 136 N. J. Eq. 387, 389 (Prerog. Ct. 1944); Trust Co. of N. J. v. Spalding, 125 N. J. Eq. 66, 70 (Ch. 1939); Cromwell v. Neeld, 15 N. J. Super. 296, 301 (App. Div. 1951). While the aforecited cases did not specifically state that they meant to shift the ultimate burden of establishing domicil, I would so apply them at least in circumstances such as those presented here. See Report, New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence (March, 1963) at 49-50:
There is the rather anachronistic dogma that “the burden of proof never shifts.” But it is widely recognized that the burden of proof does shift, in many cases and for many reasons. In civil cases the allocation of burden of proof is determined by reasons of policy, fairness and convenience. Legislatures and courts have traditionally shifted the burden of proof by the use of such devices as presumptions and affirmative defenses. In some jurisdictions res ipsa loquitur shifts the burden of proof; in others it does not. In New Jersey our courts have not hesitated to shift the burden of proof where the situation seemed to warrant it. See, e. g., Swain v. Neeld, 28 N. J. 60, 145 A. 2d. 320 (1958).
See In re Lundvall’s Estate, 242 Iowa 430, 46 N. W. 2d 535, 539 (1951); cf. Psaty v. United States, 442 F. 2d 1154, 1158-1161 (3 Cir. 1971).
In Swain this Court held that the statutory presumption with respect to gifts in contemplation of death not only shifted the burden of going forward with evidence but operated “to shift the burden of ultimate persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence from the State to the taxpayer.” 28 N. J. at 64. In the course of his opinion Justice Burling pointed out that, as here, “[t]he salient facts to the inquiry are almost entirely in the possession of the taxpayer, and the witnesses are often interested parties”; and he noted *281that the creation of the presumption “was in aid of achieving the policies of the contemplation of death provision which were to contain the evasion of inheritance taxes and promote equality of the incidence of the tax burden.” 28 N. J. at 66. So here, the shifting of the burden of establishing á transfer of long-standing New Jersey domicil may serve towards containing some of the evasions which impose so unfairly on other New Jersey domieiliaries. Towards the same goal declarations of domicil motivated by tax considerations may he carefully scrutinized and readily rejected when negated by the objective circumstances. See Texas v. Florida, supra, 306 U. S. at 425, 59 S. Ct. at 576, 83 L. Ed. at 834-835:
While one’s statements may supply evidence of the intention requisite to establish domicile at a given place of residence, they cannot supply the fact of residence there; * * * and they are of slight weight when they conflict with the fact. * * * This is the more so where, as here, decedent’s declarations are shown to have been inspired by the desire to establish a nominal residence for tax purposes, different from his actual residence in fact. * * * In such circumstances the actual fact as to the place of residence and decedent’s real attitude and intention with respect to it as disclosed by his entire course of conduct are the controlling factors in ascertaining his domicile. * * * When one intends the facts to which the law attaches consequences, he must abide the consequences whether intended or not.
See In re Benjamin’s Estate, 176 Misc. 518, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 948, 958 (Sur. Ct. 1941), aff’d, 263 App. Div. 981, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 394, aff’d, 289 N. Y. 554, 43 N. E. 2d 531 (1942); Note, “Self-Serving Declarations and Acts in Determination of Domicile,” 34 Geo. L. J. 220 (1946); Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws at 82 (1971).
The record before us contains no testimony at all in support of the claim by the executor. He relies instead on affidavits by himself and others friendly towards him. These affidavits consist largely of self-serving explanations and declarations which have never been subjected to cross-examination. I could not with any confidence rest any final *282determination on them and would therefore remand the entire matter to the Transfer Inheritance Tax Bureau for a full trial-type hearing in conformity with its current regulations. N. J. A. 0. 18:26-154-57 (1969). I see no justice in invoking at this juncture the discretionary appellate power of making an independent factual finding contrary to the administrative finding below. Cf. D., L & W. R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N. J. 418, 424-425 (1952).
I vote to reverse and remand.
For reversal: Chief Justice Weinteaub and Justices Feancis, Peoctoe, Hall, Sohettino and Mountain—6.
For reversal and remandment: Jacobs—1.