Court Opinion

ID: 9486956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:04:41.819317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:01.746821
License: Public Domain

NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of due process for a trial judge to impose the death penalty on the basis of information which was not disclosed, and which the defendant was given no opportunity to deny or explain. In his habeas petition, McKenzie claims that the pre-sentencing ex parte discussion between the special prosecutor and the sentencing judge violated his due process rights under Gardner.
Judge Ryan rejected McKenzie’s Gardner claim on the ground that McKenzie had failed to carry his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that matters were discussed that did or could have influenced the judge’s sentencing decision. Order of 11/23/92, ER 106-07; see McKenzie v. Risley, 915 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir.1990). On appeal McKenzie contends that Judge Ryan erred as a matter of law in placing the burden of proof on him. He argues that once he made a threshold showing that the prosecutor and the judge had a pre-sentenc-ing meeting concerning his case, the burden shifted to the state to prove that the ex parte contact was harmless. He reads Gardner as treating “the sentencing Judge in a capital sentencing proceeding much like a juror,” and argues that Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), establishes that “undisclosed ex parte communications with trial jurors are constitutionally prejudicial, unless shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 44. Thus reasoning by analogy, he argues that the same “presumptively prejudicial” standard the Supreme Court applied to juror contacts in Remmer should be applied to ex parte contacts with sentencing judges in capital cases. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451 (“In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial. ... The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Myers, 626 F.2d 365, 366 (4th Cir.1980).
I am persuaded by McKenzie’s argument that the Remmer “presumptively prejudicial” standard logically should apply to pre-sen-tencing contacts with sentencing judges in capital cases as well as to juror contacts in criminal eases generally. Gardner’s strict prohibition against undisclosed communications to sentencing judges in death cases is predicated on the reality that “death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country.” 430 U.S. at 357, 97 S.Ct. at 1204. Accordingly, “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice and emotion.” Id. at 358, 97 S.Ct. at 1204.
The application of the Remmer standard in Gardner-type eases satisfies this vitally important purpose. In allocating the burden of proof, we must look to the interests of both the state and the defendant. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1889-90, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (mandating “an analysis that looks to the ... interests of both the State and the defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of proof’). The state’s interest at stake is in avoiding a resentencing proceeding; the defendant’s interest is in avoiding execution without due process. Shifting the burden to the state when the defendant makes a threshold showing that his case was the subject of an ex parte discussion between the prosecutor and the sentencing judge strikes a reasonable balance between these competing interests.
This case illustrates how onerous it can be for the defendant to carry the burden of proving what was said years earlier at a meeting between a prosecutor and a sentenc*1423ing judge. McKenzie did not learn about the meeting until well after he was sentenced to death. By the time the first hearing was held, 10 years after the meeting took place, there was precious little evidence available about what was said at the meeting. The conversation was off the record, the judge was unavailable as a witness because of illness (and later death), and the prosecutor had great difficulty remembering what was said other than that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss his fee for prosecuting McKenzie. To top matters off, the prosecutor died prior to the second hearing before Judge Ryan. The only hard evidence is the prosecutor’s personal diary in which he logged 45 minutes for a meeting with the judge about McKenzie’s case, without any more specific indication of the purpose of the meeting or what was discussed.
I believe that McKenzie has met his burden of showing, as a threshold matter, that the sentencing judge and the prosecutor discussed the “matter pending” during their pre-senteneing ex parte meeting. In addition to the undisputed evidence that the prosecutor logged 45 minutes for the meeting in his personal diary, it is also undisputed that the subject of this ex parte meeting was McKenzie’s ease. To be sure, the specific purpose of the meeting was to discuss the prosecutor’s bill, but it certainly would not be surprising for an attorney to talk about the ease when presenting his request for fees. And, in fact, the prosecutor here “conceded that his discussions with the judge ‘may have included’ conversation about the brutality of the murder, evidence that the victim was raped, McKenzie’s psychiatric defenses, as well as other matters directly related to the merits of the case. See Order Certifying Record at 4.” McKenzie, 915 F.2d at 1398. While this evidence is plainly insufficient to prove by a preponderance that they discussed matters that “did or could have influenced the judge in his sentencing decision,” id., it should be sufficient to make a threshold showing that the ex parte communication involved “the matter pending,” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451, and to shift to the state the burden of showing that the communication was harmless. See id.
Shifting the burden to the state once McKenzie has made this threshold showing would not unfairly burden the state because the state bears the responsibility for making the ex parte contact in the first instance, and was in a superior position to make a record that the discussion did not involve issues that might influence the judge in sentencing. Indeed, the application of the Remmer standard to a prosecutor’s ex parte contact with a sentencing judge about the case would serve as a reasonable inducement to prosecutors to make written records of such constitutionally sensitive contacts.
For its part, the majority is unresponsive to McKenzie’s argument that the Remmer standard should be applied to Gardner-type cases when a prosecutor makes a presentenc-ing ex parte contact with the sentencing judge. Indeed, the majority opinion fails to even mention Remmer. The basis for the majority’s rejection of McKenzie’s Gardner claim is a tortuous chain of reasoning. My colleagues say that Gardner offers McKenzie no support for his argument that the burden of proof was misallocated by the district court. See Majority Opinion at 1419. True enough, but what the majority fails to recognize is that nothing in Gardner precludes McKenzie’s burden-shifting argument either. As the majority itself notes, it was undisputed in Gardner that the sentencing judge read and relied upon facts relevant to sentencing that Gardner had no opportunity to deny or respond. See id. at 1419. As a result, the Gardner Court had no reason to address the question whether the Remmer standard should apply in Gardner-type cases. Here, in contrast, the facts of the meeting are “hotly contested.” Majority Opinion at 1419.
The majority effectively sidesteps McKenzie’s Remmer argument by accepting as not clearly erroneous Judge Ryan’s finding of fact that “no information relevant to sentencing was communicated during the course of the meeting.” Majority Opinion at 1419. This is classic bootstrap reasoning. The issue is not whether Judge Ryan’s finding was clearly erroneous as the majority holds. Rather, the issue is whether Judge Ryan committed legal error in predicating his finding on McKenzie’s failure to prove, “by a *1424preponderance of the evidence, that [the prosecutor] and [the judge] ... discussed any matters that ‘did or could have influenced the judge in his sentencing decision.’ ” Order of 11/23/92, ER 107 (quoting McKenzie, 915 F.2d at 1398).
In sum, the majority rejects McKenzie’s appeal on the basis of a finding of fact that McKenzie claims is fatally defective because it is the product of the very legal error that lies at the heart of his appeal. In disposing of the appeal on the strength of this circular logic, the majority fails to come to grips with the merits of McKenzie’s legal argument that Judge Ryan erred in finding that McKenzie did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that anything was said at the meeting that could have been prejudicial. In other words, the majority never decides whether the Remmer “presumptively prejudicial” standard applies to ex parte contacts between the prosecutor and the sentencing judge in death cases, thereby leaving untouched McKenzie’s appellate claim that Judge Ryan committed legal error in failing to shift to the state the burden of proving that the ex parte meeting between judge and prosecutor was harmless. Thus, the majority rejects McKenzie’s appeal by relying on a finding of fact that would be fatally defective if McKenzie were to prevail on his Remmer argument — the argument that the majority fails to decide.1
I dissent.

. As if to highlight the defects in their reasoning, my colleagues stress that not one, but two judges found that because "no information relevant to sentencing was communicated during the course of the meeting, [the judge] couldn't have relied on it.” See Majority Opinion at 1419. In making this argument, they cite Judge Battin's findings in the original hearing, findings that we set aside because Judge Battin applied the wrong legal standard. See McKenzie, 915 F.2d at 1398.