Court Opinion

ID: 9599949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:27.464043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:47.854911
License: Public Domain

Goolsby, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The effect of the majority’s opinion reversing the trial judge is to turn this court into a zoning board.
Our Supreme Court stated in Rushing v. City of Greenville, 265 S. C. 285, 288, 217 S. E. (2d) 797, 799 (1975), that the action of a municipality in zoning property will not be overturned on appeal if the municipality’s decision is “fairly debatable.” This is because the municipality’s action is presumed to have been validly exercised and because it is not the appellate court’s prerogative to pass upon the wisdom of the municipality’s decision. Only where the municipality’s action is “so unreasonable as to impair or destroy constitutional rights” [Rush v. City of Greenville, 246 S. C. 268, 276, 143 S. E. (2d) 527, 531 (1965) ] will the court declare the municipality’s action unconstitutional. Rushing v. City of Greenville, supra.
In my view, the action of the respondent Richland County Council in declining to change the zoning classification of the property of the appellants A. G. Hampton and The Krystal Company from D-l transitional to C-3 general commercial and in changing the zoning classification of the subject property to C-l neighborhood commercial is not patently unreasonable.
Unlike the subject property in Rushing, the subject prop*517erty in this case is not surrounded by commercial property. Rather, as the record shows, the subject property lies adjacent to commercial property to the north, which is classified as C-3 heavy commercial, and it adjoins predominantly residential property to the south, which is classified as D-l transitional. The effect of the County Council’s decision to classify the subject property as C-l light commercial is to create a buffer of sorts between the two zones it lies between. This decision, it seems to me, is at least a fairly debatable one.
The record also discloses that, within a C-l zone, an owner may locate upon his property “offices [and] institutions,” including doctors and realty offices [and] antique shops.” A C-l zoning classification, therefore, permits a beneficial use of the subject property by its owners.
While the C-l classification may not permit the most profitable use of the subject property, “a property owner is not entitled to have his property zoned for its most profitable use.” 101A C. J. S. Zoning & Land Planning § 47b at 173 (1979); see Ohoopee Land Development Corp. v. Mayor & Council of Wrightsville, 248 Ga. 96, 281 S. E. (2d) 529 (1981) (a zoning classification is not unconstitutional simply because a developer is deprived of a more profitable use of his property).
A classification of property should be upheld as constitutional, absent evidence that the classification is either unnecessary or confiscatory. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N. Y. (2d) 359, 334 N. Y. S. (2d) 138, 285 N. E. (2d) 291, 63 A. L. R. (3d) 1157 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U. S. 1003, 93 S. Ct. 440, 34 L. Ed. (2d) 294 (1972) (ordinance limiting the use of property will not be held unconstitutional unless it is shown to be unreasonable in terms of necessity or to have caused such a diminution in value as to be tantamount to confiscation). Here, the owners, as it was their burden to do [see Bob Jones University v. City of Greenville, 243 S. C. 351, 133 S. E. (2d) 843 (1963), appeal dismissed, 378 U. S. 581, 84 S. Ct. 1913, 12 L. Ed. (2d) 1036 (1964) (burden of proving invalidity of zoning ordinance is on the party attacking it) ], offered no evidence that the *518classification suffered from either constitutional infirmity.1
I would affirm.

 Contrary to the majority’s opinion, the owners’ expert real estate witness Henry J. Ritmeester, Jr., was never asked on cross-examination or otherwise his opinion regarding the fair market value of the subject property if it were classified as C-l light commercial. The answer, “It’s a theoretical question,” was given in response to the question asked him on cross-examination, “[I]s it your testimony that the property has no market value zoned D-l?” There is no testimony or other evidence, as asserted by the majority, that the subject property would have no fair market value if it were classified as C-l light commercial.