Court Opinion

ID: 9847238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:56:22.531937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:04.020730
License: Public Domain

ROONEY,* Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with that portion of the dissent of Justice Brown which points out the inconsistency of finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge while at the same time finding a “failure of justice.” I consider such to be sophistry and illusory reasoning.
I do not agree with the suggestion of Justice Brown that the writ of certiorari should not be available for our use. My concurring opinion in State v. Heiner, Wyo., 683 P.2d 629 (1984), reflects my position relative thereto. It need not be repeated here except to quote that pertinent to the disposition of Wright’s petition for certiorari:
“One of the primary conditions for issuance of a writ of certiorari is that it will not lie when another remedy is available. State ex rel. Pearson v. Hansen, supra [Wyo., 409 P.2d 769 (1966)]; Call v. Town of Afton, supra [73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954)]; City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916). * * * ” Id., at 642.
Wright had his appeal, Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090 (1983). For that reason, the petition for certiorari should be denied.
The certiorari proceedings are not mysterious. They have been used for years. They are included in that set forth in the constitution as available to this court. They did not commence as “a twinkle in the eye of the author of a concurring opinion in State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983)” as recited in Justice Brown’s opinion. Justice Raper’s specially concurring opinion in State v. Faltynowicz, supra, analyzing the availability of review at the request of the state in criminal matters is quite lengthy and thorough — hardly a “twinkle in [his] eye.” As said in State v. Sodergren, Wyo., 686 P.2d 521, 528 (1984), « * * * [wje win exercise our discretion to grant certiorari only in unusual circumstances and upon rare occasions.” However, it is a necessary and useful proceeding in such circumstances and occasions. This case concerns only usual circumstances and regular occasions. Even if its use in this case were not barred by the accepted procedural proposition that it have no function when an appeal is available, it does not meet the “unusual circumstances” and “rare occasions” test.
I would deny the petition for certiorari.

 This case was assigned to Chief Justice Thomas for opinion on June 25, 1984. His opinion was circulated August 16, 1985. Justice Brown’s dissent was circulated August 29, 1985, and this dissent was circulated September 4, 1985.