Court Opinion

ID: 9665655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:53:57.666837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:17.460450
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the principal opinion, and file this concurring opinion because I believe there is an additional difficulty in appellant’s position in that his failure to object to being tried and convicted of multiple charges at the same trial effected a waiver of his right to rely on the general “Missouri rule that a defendant may not be convicted at the same trial of two distinct felonies. . . .” State v. Terry, 325 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo.1959). In Terry, this Court said :
“Thus, inasmuch as there is no express prohibition against the conviction of a defendant of two distinct felonies at the same trial, and inasmuch as there appears to be no reason for the established rule in Missouri which should prevent a waiver of that rule, and inasmuch, as heretofore noted, an information or indictment in which are joined two distinct felonies is not bad as a matter of law, we are of the view that a defendant’s failure to assign as error in his motion for new trial the action or inaction of the trial court which resulted in his conviction of two distinct felonies at the same trial, effects a waiver of his right to rely on the rule in question. In other words, if a defendant prefers that two distinct felonies with which he is to be charged be joined in one information, and if he prefers that he be tried on both those charges at one and the same trial, we perceive no reason why he may not so elect. We hold, therefore, that a defendant’s failure to raise any question in his motion for new trial about the fact that or the procedure whereby he was convicted of two distinct felonies at the same trial and separately sentenced for each, should have the same effect as though defendant had specifically elected to be tried on both felonies at the same time.”
The amendment of Rule 24.04 on December 7, 1970 (effective July 1, 1971), represented an effort to reconcile the “Missouri rule,” supra, the Terry holding, and the “double jeopardy — collateral estop-pel” holding in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469. I believe the ultimate effect of Rule 24.04, as amended, is as follows:
(1) When a defendant has been charged with more than one offense, other than burglary and stealing, in the same indictment or information, and moves for a severance of offenses before trial, the court shall order a severance of the offenses.
(2) When a defendant has been charged with more than one offense, other than burglary and stealing, in the same indict*551ment or information, and moves for a severance of offenses during trial but before or at the close of all the evidence, the court may order a severance of the offenses if it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of that defendant’s guilt or innocence of each offense. The court should consider whether, in view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law -intelligently as to each offense.
(3) If a severance is granted a defendant, the granting of the severance shall not bar a subsequent trial of that defendant on the offenses severed. (Cf. ABA Minimum Standards, Joinder and Severance, §§ 2.1, 2.2).