Court Opinion

ID: 9407165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 21:05:59.00109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.671187
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/5/23 Rogers v. DGE Investments CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 MICHELLE K. ROGERS,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                        A165420
 v.
 DGE INVESTMENTS, LLC,                                                  (Napa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 19CV001610)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff and appellant Michelle K. Rogers (appellant) appeals from the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent
DGE Investments, LLC (respondent) in this employment action. Appellant
contends respondent retaliated against her for reporting that an employee
she supervised was harassing female coworkers and physically abusing
horses in respondent’s trail riding business. Appellant has not shown the
trial court erred in concluding appellant failed to show there is a triable issue
of fact as to whether respondent’s reasons for the alleged adverse
employment action were pretextual, and we affirm the grant of summary
judgment.
                                     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In March 2020, appellant filed a First Amended Complaint (Complaint)
against respondent, alleging nine causes of action for age discrimination,

                                                               1
retaliation in violation of both the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)
and public policy, failure to prevent harassment, wrongful demotion, three
wrongful termination claims, and a Labor Code discrimination claim.
      In September 2021, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion in March 2022 and entered judgment in
favor of respondent in April.
      The present appeal followed.
                         FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
      Respondent operates a winery, trail riding, and horse boarding
business in Napa, California. In March 2017, respondent hired appellant to
manage the trail riding and horse boarding businesses. She managed seven
employees in the trail barn; her direct supervisor was Alice Alkosser, one of
respondent’s owners.
      In a declaration submitted in support of respondent’s motion for
summary judgment, Ms. Alkosser averred that problems with appellant’s job
performance “began to surface” during “the second-half of 2018.” Ms.
Alkosser learned that appellant had “frequent conflict” with a trail guide,
Tristan Borge, who had been hired in April 2017. He approached Ms.
Alkosser to complain about appellant in “mid to late 2018,” but Ms. Alkosser
told him he “needed to work things out with” appellant “unless he intended to
make a formal complaint about her.”
      According to Ms. Alkosser’s declaration, in September 2018, appellant
terminated another trail guide, Whitney Milby, “without any advance
warning” to any of respondent’s managing officers “and without following
proper termination procedures.” On September 12, following the

      1We summarize the factual background only as necessary to resolve
the present appeal.

                                       2
termination, Ms. Alkosser received an email from Ms. Milby, which was
included in support of respondent’s motion for summary judgment. In the
email, Ms. Milby expressed concerns about the health of various horses,
about her understanding that the horses were not sufficiently examined prior
to purchase, and about safety risks to guests and guides due to those issues.
Ms. Milby also complained that appellant “often brings her personal life to
work with her which makes the atmosphere of the barn miserable.” Finally,
Ms. Milby complained that appellant “does not respect her subordinate[s’]
confidentiality.” Ms. Alkosser averred she spoke to appellant and “told her
she did not have the authority to terminate employees without going through
the proper steps, including getting authorization to terminate the
employee. . . .”
      On September 14, 2018, two days after receiving Ms. Milby’s email, Ms.
Alkosser received an email from appellant, which also was included in
support of respondent’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant wrote,
“With your permission, I would like to implement a change in the barn to
keep drama away, quench gossiping, install better safety protocols, maintain
better cleanliness and basic horse husbandry practices.” She acknowledged a
previous “lack of supervision” but claimed she “had become more assertive
this last month and I’m sure [the employees] have not enjoyed my check ins
with micro management. My perfectionist style and zero tolerance for unsafe
practices, sloppy Horseman ship [sic], unsafe Horsemenship [sic], lazy
behavior, and complaining has not won me manager of the year.” She also
acknowledged, “I agree that I have in times been a part of the gossiping, the
talking out of line, the occasional wrong way of addressing an issue that was
taken wrong or out of context. I will from here on out, not be their friend, but
[their] supervisor who will demand great guest experiences, excellent safety

                                       3
measures and zero drama tolerance. . . . I will act professional and manager
worthy, enough to hopefully make you proud and respect me once again.”
The email ended with suggested policy changes to address “drama” (“no
gossiping”), safety, and cleanliness. Ms. Alkosser averred that, after
receiving the email, she “met with [appellant] and had a long coaching
session with her to discuss the importance of maintaining a professional
relationship with her subordinates and keeping personal matters out of the
workplace.”
      Ms. Alkosser also averred that on September 23, 2018, she “learned
that the family who had purchased a horse, [Jester], from [respondent] was
very upset about [appellant’s] conduct prior to sale.”2 The letter from the
purchaser was included in support of respondent’s motion for summary
judgment. The letter alleged that appellant had concealed information from
the buyer about Jester’s medical condition (a back injury that may have
caused seizures) and that two of respondent’s former employees had alleged
that appellant had kicked Jester. The letter requested a refund of 75% of the
purchase price for the horse, and respondent agreed to “refund a portion” of
the sales price.
      On October 15, 2018, Ms. Alkosser received an email from appellant
“complaining about interpersonal issues in the trail barn, among other
things.” The email was included in support of respondent’s motion for
summary judgment. In the email, appellant first updated Ms. Alkosser on
medical issues involving several horses. She then said that another

      2 Ms. Alkosser’s declaration refers to the horse as “Jasper,” but the
purchaser refers to “Jester.” Ms. Milby’s prior email also made reference to
the “neurological problems” of a horse named “Jester.” She wrote, “We were
told he had a seizure which would be a very dangerous animal for a client to
ride. Some of the guides felt unsafe and refused to ride him.”

                                       4
“wrangler,” Karen Shaw, was upset with Mr. Borge because it “makes her
uncomfortable when he starts to gossip and complain.” Specifically, the
email referenced Mr. Borge’s complaint about medication given to a horse.
Appellant also asserted in the email that Mr. Borge had “jerked” a horse’s
“bridal” [sic] and was “miss treating” [sic] another horse. Appellant’s email
commented, “[h]e has a very rough hand but has gotten much better when
he’s around me because he knows I won’t tolerate it.” The email continued,
reporting that Ms. Shaw said she “may not be able to work with [Mr. Borge]
because she feels that he is extremely toxic;” that he “fat shamed Allison on a
regular basis, he did the same with Desiree” (presumably other employees);
and that “as a coworker he is extremely difficult and is a bully.” The email
ended, “maybe you have some ideas on how to approach this with
[Mr. Borge].”
      In her declaration, Ms. Alkosser averred she was “disappointed that
[appellant] was continuing to report ‘drama’ at the trail barn, because it
seemed that she was not able to resolve that drama in a professional and
competent manner.” Ms. Alkosser also averred she was having “credibility
concerns” with appellant, due to the situation with the purchase of Jester and
her observation, “[w]hen I visited the barn personally, I didn’t witness any of
the drama or the issues [appellant] was reporting. I talked to one of the
employees, Karen Shaw, who [appellant] had reported was ‘very upset.’ I
asked Ms. Shaw if there was a problem going on between the trail guides,
what was happening and why she was upset. Ms. Shaw told me she wasn’t
upset.”
      Later on October 15, 2018, Ms. Alkosser sent appellant an email
stating, “I need to discuss this approach with you first. I was in the barn
today with both wranglers and non[e] of what you’re saying was

                                       5
happening. . . . I am not available by phone this evening, but want to proceed
as I have pointed out. Continue as originally planned & cut the drama.” Ms.
Alkosser averred, “it was clear to me that there were problems between
[appellant] and at least one trail guide, and possibly between trail guides,”
“[b]ased on [appellant’s] continued inability to resolve the ‘drama’ — coupled
with conflicting explanations from witnesses about the root cause of the
drama (i.e., Mr. Borge and Ms. Milby claimed [appellant] was the problem;
[appellant] claimed Mr. Borge was the problem; [appellant] said Ms. Shaw
was upset, but Ms. Shaw denied it) and my mounting uncertainty regarding
[appellant’s] credibility.” Ms. Alkosser averred that she “decided [she]
needed to investigate [appellant’s] management of the trail barn and its
employees more formally.” She continued, “In order to investigate
management of the barn, I decided to relocate [appellant] from the trail barn
to the winery offices on a temporary basis and focus on her [horse boarding]
barn responsibilities. There was a desk space in the Winery offices where
[appellant] normally did paperwork and computer work that were part of her
regular duties as equine manager where she could work temporarily. Having
[appellant] in the office would allow me to conduct confidential interviews of
the barn employees without interference by, or intimidation from,
[appellant].”
      Ms. Alkosser further averred that she met with appellant on October
16, 2018, “to discuss the terms of the investigation and [appellant’s] modified
working conditions during that investigation. . . . [Appellant’s] salary
was still the same; her benefits were the same; her title was the same; her
commute and hours of work were the same. The only thing that changed . . .
was that she was asked to focus on her [horse boarding] barn duties

                                       6
while I assessed the management of the trail barn.” At the meeting, “as soon
as [appellant] learned that [respondent] was investigating her management
— as opposed to investigating Tristan Borge — she became upset and quit on
the spot.”
      Ms. Alkosser averred it was ultimately unnecessary to conduct any
further investigation because “the barn immediately began running more
smoothly” after appellant’s departure. She also observed that, “If [appellant]
had simply waited for [respondent] to complete the investigation I
intended to conduct . . . she may well have been back to her regular duties
within the week. I had not made any final decisions about her employment, I
had not determined if any of her reports were true or untrue, and the
reassignment of her duties was temporary.”
      Appellant submitted her own declaration in opposition to respondent’s
motion for summary judgment. She averred that Mr. Borge was “ ‘hard
handed’ (inhumane, whipping, kicking, pulling, yanking) with the horses
from the beginning and was resistant to constructive criticism.” She also
averred that, starting in mid-2018, “he became more passive aggressive with
the female staff, fat shaming, derogatory comments, commenting on their
body parts, gossiping, challenging their sexual orientation, and bullying . . .
on a weekly basis, etc.” She averred that she shared “verbal and written
reports with” Ms. Alkosser, although only the September 14, 2018 email was
“produced in formal [d]iscovery.”
      Appellant further averred, “On October 15, 2018 I received a phone call
from a barn employee named Karen Shaw. Ms. Shaw told me she did not
want to work with Tristan again, that he was ‘toxic’ to staff and heavy
handed with the horses. . . . Tristan was continuing to fat shame and
generally harass and bully female staff, and Alice Alkosser removed me from

                                        7
the trail barn and ordered me not to speak to any employees or go to the barn
until we met the next morning.” She continued, “I walked into the room and
within 15 seconds (we never even sat down), Alice announced I was relieved
of my assigned duties at both barns, save for collecting rents from boarders
and entering payroll data from a desk in the winery building. I was not to go
into the trail barn for any reason and not to speak to the employees.”
      Regarding the horse Jester, appellant averred his back became sore
“[a]fter several weeks of riding, . . . which is not unusual for a horse not
having been ridden in a long time. A veterinarian examined Jester and he
was prescribed a common horse muscle relaxer for his tight muscles over his
back. Within a week of rest and medication he was fine and ready to ride
again.” When respondent received the letter from the horse’s buyer, no one
questioned appellant’s conduct around the sale of the horse.
      Appellant averred she “was never once reprimanded orally or in writing
by either of the owners.” With respect to the termination of Ms. Milby,
appellant averred she provided Ms. Milby “repeated verbal warnings” and
notified Ms. Alkosser “of the warnings prior to Milby’s termination.” Ms.
Milby’s email to Ms. Alkosser was an uninformed complaint by a
“disgruntled” former employee. Appellant averred she “was never written up
or criticized for the termination [of] Whitney Milby, or for any performance
while employed [by respondent].” Respondent did mention to her that Ms.
Milby should have been given her final paycheck prior to termination.3

      3Appellant’s brief on appeal also cites to a portion of her amended
response to respondent’s statement of undisputed facts in which she describes
an October 3, 2018 meeting between appellant, Ms. Alkosser, and another
employee. However, the trial court excluded that evidence, and appellant has
not shown the court abused its discretion. (See, post, at pp. 16-17.) Also,
appellant fails to provide record citations to the actual evidence supporting
the assertions in her response. (See Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019)

                                        8
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      “[I]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the
FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’
(2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action,
and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the
employer’s action. [Citations.] Once an employee establishes a prima facie
case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for
the adverse employment action. [Citation.] If the employer produces a
legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption of
retaliation ‘ “ ‘drops out of the picture,’ ” ’ and the burden shifts back to the
employee to prove intentional retaliation.” (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc.
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 (Yanowitz).)4
      “The plaintiff must ‘ “ ‘offer substantial evidence that the employer’s
stated [nonretaliatory] reason for the adverse action was untrue or
pretextual . . .’ ” [Citation.] An employee in this situation can not “simply
show the employer’s decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise. Rather, the
employee ‘ “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally
find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ [citation], and hence infer ‘that the
employer did not act for the [...asserted] non-[retaliatory] reasons.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”
(Batarse v. Serv. Emps. Internat. Union, Loc. 1000 (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th

36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.) Therefore, that alleged evidence is not properly
before this court.
      4 We focus on the FEHA retaliation claim because appellant has not
articulated a basis to reverse dismissal of any of her other claims. (See post,
at p. 16, fn. 11.)

                                          9
820, 834.) “ ‘Pretext may be demonstrated by showing “. . . that the proffered
reason had no basis in fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the
[adverse employment action], or, the proffered reason was insufficient to
motivate [the adverse employment action]. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ ”
(California Fair Emp. & Hous. Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1023.) “ ‘Pretext may also be inferred from the timing
of the company’s termination decision, by the identity of the person making
the decision, and by the terminated employee’s job performance before
termination.’ ” (Ibid.)
      “Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. [Citation.] A defendant seeking summary judgment bears the
initial burden of proving the ‘cause of action has no merit’ by showing that
one or more elements of plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or
there is a complete defense. [Citations.] Once the defendant’s burden is met,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists as
to that cause of action.” (Spitzer v. The Good Guys, Inc. (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385.) “[A]n issue of fact can only be created by a
conflict of evidence. It is not created by speculation or conjecture.” (Horn v.
Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 807.)
      “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the
evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which
objections were made and sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1037.)

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II.   Analysis
      In granting summary judgment, the trial court found that, assuming
appellant made a protected complaint, she “fail[ed] to set forth any fact
tending to show that [respondent] understood it as such and/or that its
decision to reassign her was motivated by reporting.” The court concluded,
“because [appellant] fails to set forth facts, supported by evidence, tending to
show either that [respondent’s] purported reasons for reassigning her were
pretextual or that [respondent] harbored any discriminatory animus toward
[appellant], she fails to make the showing required to defeat [respondent’s]
motion for summary judgment.”
      For purposes of appeal, we assume there are triable issues of fact as to
the elements of appellant’s prima facie case: appellant’s October 15, 2018
email was a protected complaint about harassment and animal abuse;
respondent subjected appellant to an adverse employment action by
reassigning her duties following receipt of the email; and a causal link
existed between appellant’s protected complaint and the reassignment.5
Further, there is no dispute that respondent has offered legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons for the alleged adverse employment action. We focus,
therefore, on whether the trial court erred in concluding appellant failed to
show there is a triable issue whether respondent’s reasons were pretextual.6

      5Appellant claims she complained about Mr. Borge on prior occasions
before October 15, 2018, but the only arguably protected complaint in
evidence is the October 15 email.
      6 We need not and do not address respondent’s contentions that there
also are no triable issues as to whether appellant made a protected
complaint, was wrongfully discharged, or suffered an adverse employment
action.

                                       11
      Appellant argues the trial court erred because “pretext may be inferred
[from] evidence that (1) the demotion occurred a mere day after [appellant’s]
latest complaint to Ms. Alkosser regarding Mr. Borge’s conduct; (2)
[appellant’s] personnel file did not show any history of admonishment
or discipline; (3) there is no indication that [appellant] was approached
with any performance deficiencies prior to the instant litigation; (4)
[respondent] failed to investigate [appellant’s] workplace complaints; and, (5)
the inconsistencies and contradictions in the stated justifications for
the adverse action undermine [respondent’s] proffered reasons . . . .”
Appellant’s arguments fail.
      First, appellant points to the circumstances that the reassignment of
duties occurred the day after she sent the October 15, 2018 email. But Ms.
Alkosser explained that the October 15 email was the impetus for her visit to
the trail barn the same day and her subsequent decision to reassign
appellant to permit an opportunity for a full investigation of appellant’s
management. She averred she was concerned about the continued “drama”
in the trail barn and about her inability to immediately confirm appellant’s
assertions in the email. Given that explanation, it made sense the
reassignment of duties would be close in time to receipt of the email, so the
proximity does not give rise to an inference of pretext.
      Appellant’s second and third points are based on appellant’s
employment record with respondent. Regardless of whether appellant’s
“personnel file” showed a history of “admonishment or discipline,” there was
ample evidence in the record that Ms. Alkosser expressed concern to

                                       12
appellant about the “drama” at the trail barn.7 Ms. Alkosser averred she
spoke to appellant regarding the proper procedures for termination following
Ms. Milby’s termination; more substantially, Ms. Alkosser averred that, after
receiving a September 14, 2018 email from appellant, she had a “long
coaching session with [appellant] to discuss the importance of maintaining a
professional relationship with her subordinates and keeping personal matters
out of the workplace.” And the September 14 email itself corroborated that
there had been concerns expressed about appellant’s management abilities.
Among other things, appellant acknowledged, “I agree that I have in times
been a part of the gossiping, the talking out of line, the occasional wrong way
of addressing an issue that was taken wrong or out of context. I will from
here on out not be their friend, but [their] supervisor who will demand great
guest experiences, excellent safety measures and zero drama tolerance. . . . I
will act professional and manager worthy, enough to hopefully make you
proud and respect me once again.” Thus, appellant’s employment record does
not give rise to an inference of pretext.
      Fourth, appellant argues respondent failed to investigate her
workplace complaints. In fact, Ms. Alkosser averred she conducted a
preliminary investigation on October 15, 2018 that failed to confirm
appellant’s assertions; she intended to conduct a more thorough
investigation, but the problems at the barn went away after appellant’s
departure. Furthermore, Ms. Alkosser testified in her deposition that she did
not understand appellant to be reporting unlawful conduct by Mr. Borge. We
have assumed appellant’s email could be considered protected conduct for the

      7Appellant cites no authority that employment history must appear in
a “personnel file” or constitute “admonishment or discipline” in order to be
considered as evidence justifying an employer’s action.

                                        13
purposes of her FEHA claim, but the October 15 email’s references to “fat
sham[ing]” and a “very rough hand” with horses were not clear allegations of
sexual harassment or illegal animal cruelty.8 If the email had presented
clearer or more substantial claims of illegal conduct, the failure to investigate
even after appellant’s departure might raise some questions about
respondent’s actual motivations. But, in light of the ambiguous nature of the
allegations and the results of Ms. Alkosser’s initial investigation,
respondent’s failure to investigate further does not give rise to an inference of
pretext.
      Finally, appellant argues “inconsistencies and contradictions in
[respondent’s] stated justifications” demonstrate pretext. For the most part,
appellant does not actually point to inconsistencies or contradictions; instead,
appellant points to evidence raising questions about the underlying merits of
the allegations against appellant. For example, appellant argues respondent
“did not produce any expert opinion to support a claim that [appellant] had
concealed any information or condition of Jester.” But Ms. Alkosser did not
aver she reassigned appellant because appellant actually did all that she was
accused of. Instead, Ms. Alkosser averred that the various incidents made
her concerned about appellant’s credibility and management, requiring
additional investigation. Accordingly, evidence the allegations against
appellant were untrue does not give rise to an inference of pretext. To the
extent appellant does identify arguable inconsistencies—for example,

      8  We agree with the trial court’s characterization of the email on this
issue: “It is far from clear to the Court that, objectively speaking, any of the
statements in [the] October 15, 2018 email could be construed as reporting
illegal, as opposed to potentially offensive or even odious, behavior. There is
no discussion, explanation or argument. . . that might suggest that the
complaints regarding [Mr. Borge’s] treatment of horses rose to the level of
illegality.”

                                       14
whether the problem with Ms. Milby’s termination was a failure to follow
proper procedures or the termination itself—they are not significant enough
to amount to meaningful evidence of pretext.
      Several additional factors also weigh against a finding of pretext. First,
the evidence Ms. Alkosser had good reason to investigate appellant’s
management was relatively strong. Although there are disputed facts as to
what really was happening at the barn and what really happened during the
sale of Jester, it is undisputed that a number of incidents raising questions
about appellant’s management and credibility occurred during a short period
of time. Second, the evidence respondent had any reason to retaliate against
appellant was relatively weak. Appellant’s allegations about Mr. Borge were
not particularly dramatic, the allegations were mixed together with a range
of other complaints about his performance, and the allegations did not
involve anyone in management.9 Finally, respondent’s alleged adverse action
was relatively modest. Although the duration of the investigation was
unspecified, it is undisputed Ms. Alkosser told appellant she was reassigned
so that Ms. Alkosser could conduct an investigation of appellant’s
management of the trail barn. Although appellant disputes the justification

      9 Appellant asserts Mr. Borge’s parents were “friends” with Alice and
David Alkosser. The evidence she cites to support that assertion is her own
declaration that does not disclose any personal knowledge and a statement
from Mr. Borge’s deposition that his parents and the Alkossers “run in kind
of the same circle.” That evidence does not permit an inference that the
relationship was such as to cause respondent to retaliate against appellant
for reporting Mr. Borge’s misbehavior.

                                      15
and motivation for the action, there is no evidence the alleged adverse action
was anything other than a temporary reassignment.10
       Resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of appellant, the
record demonstrates that respondent had substantial reasons to investigate
appellant’s management, had little reason to retaliate against appellant due
to any protected complaints, and implemented only a modest adverse action
against appellant. Given the absence of significant evidence supporting an
inference respondent’s reasons were pretextual, the trial court properly
concluded there was no triable issue of fact as to whether respondent’s
nonretaliatory reasons for its actions were pretextual.11
III.   Appellant’s Evidentiary Contentions
       In her opening brief, appellant argued that the trial court erred in
finding certain exhibits attached to her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment were not properly authenticated, that the court abused its
discretion in refusing to consider an amended declaration, and that certain
emails did not require authentication by declaration. Respondent
persuasively addressed those arguments in detail in its brief, but appellant

       10Appellant sometimes refers to the reassignment as a “demotion,” but
she cites no evidence the reassignment was permanent or that it involved any
change in title or salary.
       11In her opening brief, appellant also argued the trial court erred in
“relying on the primary rights doctrine” in granting summary judgment as to
all her causes of action. Appellant objects to the court’s reference to the
“primary right underlying” the complaint and the court’s comment,
“[a]lthough [appellant] purports to assert nine causes of action, a review of
the [c]omplaint leads to the conclusion that each is simply a variation on the
same fundamental claim: disparate treatment discrimination in
employment.” But appellant’s reply fails to address the arguments in
respondent’s brief, and appellant has not shown the trial court erred in
finding there was no triable issue of fact as to any other specific cause of
action. The argument merits no further discussion.

                                       16
failed to address the issue in her reply. We will not endeavor to respond to
respondent’s arguments on appellant’s behalf. (See LAOSD Asbestos Cases
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 939, 954; Burchett v. City of Newport Beach (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1481.) Suffice it to say appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the court erred or that any error was prejudicial. On the
prejudice issue, we observe that the excluded evidence referenced by
appellant on appeal was relevant only to support arguments already rejected
elsewhere in this decision.
      Appellant also argued in her opening brief that the trial court erred in
“disregarding” objections to Ms. Alkosser’s declaration. Again, appellant
failed to address respondent’s persuasive arguments in her reply brief.
Appellant has failed to show her hearsay objections had merit, because the
challenged statements were admitted to support the proposition that Ms.
Alkosser had reason to investigate appellant’s management of the barn, not
for the truth of the matters asserted. (See People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th
809, 863.) And appellant makes no showing of prejudice as to the other
portions of the declaration to which she objected.
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondent.

                                      17
                                                   SIMONS, Acting P. J.

We concur.

BURNS, J.

LANGHORNE, J.*

(A165420)

      *Judge of the Napa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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