Court Opinion

ID: 3147887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-10-22 18:38:40.983947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:44.205755
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DIVISION
                                                     February 10, 2011

No. 1-10-1224

In re MARRIAGE OF                )   Appeal from the
                                 )   Circuit Court of
DAVID P. MOLLOY,                 )   Cook County.
                                 )
     Petitioner-Appellant,       )
                                 )   No. 07 D 8119
           and                   )
                                 )
ROJEAN M. MOLLOY,                )   The Honorable
                                 )   Gerald C. Bender,
     Respondent-Appellee.        )   Judge Presiding.

     PRESIDING JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

     Justices Cahill and McBride concurred in the judgment and

opinion.

                              OPINION

     The petitioner David P. Molloy presents what he contends is

an interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (Ill.

S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1)(eff. Mar. 20, 2009)) based on the circuit

court308 Ill. App. 3d

198, 719 N.E.2d 375 (1999).   In Divelbiss, the court noted the

difference between a discovery evaluation under Supreme Court

Rule 215 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 215(eff. July 1, 2002)) and a custody

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No. 1-10-1224

evaluation.    In Divelbiss, the respondent's argued "that she had

a right to seek a custody evaluation."       Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App.

3d at 211.    The circuit court replied that she had requested "a

215 examination," which it granted.      Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d

at 211-12.    The respondent did not request a custody evaluation

under section 604.5 of the Act.       Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d at

212.    The circuit court here noted the same distinction between a

discovery evaluation and a custody evaluation.      The purpose of a

section 604.5 evaluation is to determine the best interests of

the children, in contrast to one seeking to determine the extent

of a party274 Ill. App.

3d 696, 698, 654 N.E.2d 535 (1995) (written order was not a final

order though drafted by the newspaper "with language to support a

characterization of finality").   As an order regulating the

conditions under which one of the parties will be interviewed by

a licensed social worker in relation to the children127 Ill. 2d 247,

260, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989) (the substance of the action, not its

form, determines whether an order is an appealable injunctive

order under Rule 307(a)(1)); Reynolds, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 698

(order denying newspaper immediate access to transcripts of

sidebars was "a ministerial and administrative implementation of

the court's previous oral ruling").

     To further support its position, the public guardian notes

that section 604.5 expressly provides that "conditions" for the

evaluation be determined by the circuit court.    "An order for an

evaluation shall fix the time, place, conditions, and scope of

the evaluation and shall designate the evaluator."    (Emphasis

added.)   750 ILCS 5/604.5(b) (West 2008).   According to the

public guardian, the circuit court below set a "condition" for

the petitioner's evaluation that it be done without the presence

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No. 1-10-1224

of his attorney.

     Our supreme court has informed lower courts of review to

first determine whether jurisdiction exists to address the merits

of an appeal.     Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical

Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 210, 642 N.E.2d 1264 (1994) ("the

appellate court has an independent duty to consider its

jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the case").    The

Public Guardian properly raises the question of our jurisdiction

in this appeal.    Accordingly, we must first determine whether the

order appealed from falls within the provisions of Supreme Court

Rule 307(a)(1) to vest us with jurisdiction.     That this would be

the first application of Rule 307(a)(1) to the circumstances in

this case is not a bar to its application.    See Mitchell v. Palos

Community Hospital, 317 Ill. App. 3d 754, 762, 740 N.E.2d 476

(2000) (novelty of argument alone is not a bar to its acceptance)

(citing M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois

Evidence §702.4, at 563 (6th ed. 1994)).

                            Rule 307(a)(1)

     Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) governs interlocutory

appeals from an order "granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving,

or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction."     Ill. S. Ct. R.

307(a)(1)(eff. Mar. 20, 2009).    The petitioner claims the circuit

court127 Ill. 2d at 260.    "Not every nonfinal order of a court

is appealable, even if it compels a party to do or not do a

particular thing."     In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 261-62, 537

N.E.2d 292 (1989).     Court orders that are ministerial or

administrative cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal.

In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262.     An order is deemed

ministerial or administrative if it regulates only procedural

details of the litigation before the court.     In re A Minor, 127

Ill. 2d at 262.    Such an order "do[es] not affect the

relationship of the parties in their everyday activity apart from

the litgation, and are therefore distinguishable from traditional

forms of injunctive relief."     In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262.

"To determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order

under Rule 307(a)(1) we look to the substance of the action, not

its form."     In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260.

     Here, despite the language in the order, we find the aim of

the circuit court's order to be ministerial; the order places a

"condition" of the custody evaluation of the petitioner as

provided under section 604.5 of the Act.    750 ILCS 5/604.5(b)

(West 2008).    We agree with the public guardian that the purpose

of the circuit court397 Ill. App. 3d 137, 143, 922

N.E.2d 36 (2009) (citing Postma v. Jack Brown Buick, Inc., 157

Ill. 2d 391, 397, 626 N.E.2d 199 (1993)).

     With no reply brief from petitioner, we are persuaded by the

public guardian's claim that the respondent383 Ill. App. 3d 954, 973, 890 N.E.2d 1154 (2008) (expert's

evaluation "compromised" when "she allowed defense counsel to be

present during clinical interview of defendant," which cast doubt

on evaluation being independent and objective).   On its face, the

order addressed a procedural matter related to the pending

litigation under section 604.5 of the Act.   We are unpersuaded

that the order contravened the petitioner's statutory right under

section 2-1003(d) of the Code.

     Accordingly, because this court