Court Opinion

ID: 9948732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 20:04:02.969227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.444979
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Duenas CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B330378

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. KA088051)
           v.

 JULIO DUENAS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
     Jennifer Peabody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                             ____________________________
        Because this appeal is determined by well-settled legal
principles, we decide the matter by memorandum disposition.
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
        In 2011, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
Julio Duenas of one count of first degree murder, three counts of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder, and one
count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and found true
numerous enhancement allegations. Defendant admitted to
suffering prior convictions subjecting him to sentencing under the
“Three Strikes” law. The trial court sentenced him to 275 years
to life plus 46 years. On appeal we identified errors with two of
the enhancements. On remand the trial court resentenced
defendant to 275 years to life plus 40 years.
        In May 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
under Penal Code1 former section 1170.95.2 The resentencing
court appointed counsel for defendant and received a response to
the petition from the prosecutor. The court then held a hearing
at which defendant’s counsel submitted on defendant’s petition
and the prosecutor submitted on the response. The court denied
the petition, finding defendant was “the sole shooter,” and “[t]he
jury was not instructed on any theory of liability which would
otherwise make Mr. Duenas eligible for relief.”
        Defendant appealed, and appointed counsel filed a brief
identifying no arguable issues. We invited defendant to file a
supplemental brief, which he did.

      1   Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
      2 The Legislature has since renumbered former
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, without substantive change.
(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1174 (Lee).)

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       Because this is an appeal from a denial of postconviction
relief under former section 1170.95, we are not required to
conduct an independent review of the record, as we might be in a
direct appeal from a criminal conviction. (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222; see People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436.) When a defendant files a supplemental brief,
however, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.”
(Delgadillo, at p. 232.)
       In his supplemental brief, defendant argues he did not
commit the murder of which he was convicted and was not “the
actual shooter.” He further argues his sentence was excessive in
light of recent legislative enactments. He argues that because his
resentencing petition was “facially sufficient,” he was entitled to
discovery and review of the entire record. He also contends he
was unable to take the stand at his trial because he had been
accused by someone of snitching, and testifying would put
defendant’s and defendant’s family’s lives in danger.
       These arguments do not compel reversal. “Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437)
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) amended sections 188 and 189 of the
Penal Code to ‘eliminate[ ] natural and probable consequences
liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and [to]
limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.’ [Citation.]”
(Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173.) The bill also added
former section 1170.95, now numbered section 1172.6, “which
creates a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be
convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) Relief is potentially
available for “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder

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under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       We have reviewed the jury instructions from defendant’s
trial. The trial court did not instruct the jury on felony murder,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other
theory of aiding and abetting or imputed malice. The
resentencing court therefore correctly found defendant ineligible
for relief, and defendant was not entitled to further discovery or
evaluation of the record. Defendant’s arguments that the jury
wrongly found he was the actual shooter, that his sentence is
excessive, and that he was unable to testify at his trial are
beyond the scope of a proceeding under section 1172.6 or former
section 1170.95, which looks solely to whether the petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a
theory invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437.

                         DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, J.

We concur:

      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                   WEINGART, J.

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