Court Opinion

ID: 9714384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:36:17.267541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.680878
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
In considering a judgment n.o.v., this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury verdict. Plaintiff is to receive the benefit of every inference, and each controverted fact must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
In order to recover damages in a legal malpractice case, a plaintiff must prove that a duty existed, that there was a breach of that duty, and that the plaintiff sustained damages as a proximate result of such breach of duty.
It is conceded that plaintiff had entrusted two legal actions to the defendant for the purpose of bringing suits; that suits were brought; and that failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the actions over a period of six years resulted in a dismissal of the actions by the circuit court. The court stated in its memorandum opinion:
Applying the general rules to the circumstances in these two cases, this Court must dismiss for failure to prosecute. There is no explanation as to Plaintiff’s failure to proceed; six years and thirteen calendar calls have elapsed; and Plaintiff’s Attorney, H. I. King, did nothing until the day after Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, at which time he withdrew as counsel.
In addition, counterclaims were filed by the defendants in these actions, and no replies were served or filed by the defendant in the present action for a period of six years, thus leaving the plaintiff vulnerable as to these counterclaims. The fact that the defendants did not take default judgments on their counterclaims in the original actions cannot excuse the defendant here. He had not even taken the rudimentary step of filing replies to protect his client.
There is no conflict in the record as to the duty imposed upon the defendant and his breach of that duty. This leaves only the question of the damages suffered by the plaintiff as a proximate result of this breach of duty. Here there was conflicting evidence as to the possibility of recovery on the original actions, but all of this conflicting testimony was submitted to the jury, and that conflicting testimony was resolved by the jury in favor of the plaintiff when it awarded a verdict of $6,000.
Now the majority holds that expert legal testimony was required to show the “applicable standard of care” required of the defendant before he can be held liable in damages. There was expert legal testimony-first by the learned trial judge who dismissed the cases, stating that there was no explanation as to plaintiff’s failure to proceed; that six years and thirteen calendar calls had elapsed and plaintiff’s attorney, H. I. King, had done nothing until the day after the defendants’ motions to dismiss, at which time he withdrew as counsel, and secondly, there was the testimony of George Rice, an attorney with some twenty-eight years’ experience, that defendant’s conduct did not live up to the applicable standards of an attorney given a duty to prosecute legal actions.
Finally, it does not take a Philadelphia lawyer to figure out that letting actions lie dormant over six years and thirteen calendar calls until they are dismissed for lack of prosecution is a breach of standards not only in the legal profession but in any walk of life. The jury really needed no expert testimony in that regard.
On the question of damages resulting to plaintiff as a result of the breach, the jury *916was only called upon to consider the conflicting testimony as to whether the original actions would have been successful in the first instance if properly prosecuted. This involved questions of whether the wells were drilled according to specifications and the rights and duties of the parties under the drilling contracts. This is nothing more than the jury would have been required to do if sitting in one of the original legal actions. This was a decision on the facts, and such a decision is historically reserved to the jury.
While expert testimony is generally required as to standards of practice and negligence, there is an exception when the matters at issue fall within the area of common knowledge and lay comprehension. Hill v. Okay Const. Co., Inc., 312 Minn. 324, 252 N.W.2d 107 (1977); House v. Maddox, 46 Ill.App.3d 68, 4 Ill.Dec. 644, 360 N.E.2d 580 (1977). There was substantial, credible, and understandable evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict. For the trial court to take this verdict away from the plaintiff was error and can only contribute further to the lay person’s misunderstanding and suspicions of the Bar.
I would reverse the judgment n.o.v. and reinstate the jury verdict.
I am authorized to state that Justice HENDERSON joins in this dissent.