Court Opinion

ID: 9411151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 21:01:29.010979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:04.776025
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4165

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ROBERT LAMAR HUFFMAN,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00028-KDB-DSC-1)

        Submitted: June 29, 2023                                          Decided: July 24, 2023

        Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Charles Robinson Brewer, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J.
        King, United States Attorney, Elizabeth M. Greenough, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               In 2019, Robert Lamar Huffman pled guilty to possession of child pornography, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and the district court sentenced him to

        probation. Huffman now appeals the 48-month sentence imposed by the district court

        following the revocation of his probation, arguing that the court procedurally erred and

        violated due process. We affirm.

               “We affirm a revocation sentence so long as it is within the prescribed statutory

        range and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,

        656 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that we review probation revocation sentences and supervised

        release revocation sentences under same standard, that is, whether they are plainly

        unreasonable). To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we

        first consider whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,

        evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide our review of

        original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture than we do when

        reviewing original sentences.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (cleaned up). If we conclude that a revocation sentence is unreasonable, only then will we

        consider “whether it is plainly so.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 296.

               On appeal, Huffman argues that the district court erred by relying on the Sentencing

        Guidelines range corresponding to his underlying child pornography offense, rather than

        the policy statement range relating to his probation violations, and in finding that it could

        sentence him up to the statutory maximum for his underlying offense. Because Huffman

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        did not advance these claims below, we review them for plain error. United States v. Miller,

        41 F.4th 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2022). To demonstrate plain error, Huffman “must show that

        an error (1) was made, (2) is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id. (cleaned up). An

        “error is plain if it is clear or obvious.” Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               We discern no merit in Huffman’s claim that the district court could not sentence

        him up to the statutory maximum applicable to the child pornography offense. If a

        defendant violates the conditions of his probation, the district court may “revoke the

        sentence of probation and resentence the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2); United States

        v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). Upon the revocation of probation, “the

        sentencing court retains broad discretion to . . . impose a term of imprisonment up to the

        statutory maximum.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. Because Huffman faced a statutory

        maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment for his underlying offense under 18 U.S.C.

        § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), his 48-month sentence is clearly permissible.

               We also discern no merit in Huffman’s claim that the district court relied on his

        original Guidelines range, as opposed to the policy statement range for his probation

        violations. At the revocation hearing, the district court correctly calculated the policy

        statement range as three to nine months’ imprisonment, but found that this range was

        inadequate to satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Thus, we are satisfied that the district

        court adequately considered the policy statement range when selecting the sentence. See

        Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656 (noting that district courts are required to only consider policy

        statement range as “helpful assistance” when deciding appropriate sentence (internal

        quotation marks omitted)).

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               Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 48-month

        sentence. Although the sentence was more than five times longer than the high end of the

        policy statement range for Huffman’s probation violations, the district court was not

        restricted to considering only Huffman’s conduct on probation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2)

        (providing courts with authority to “resentence the defendant”); Schaefer, 120 F.3d at 507

        (noting that, upon revocation of probation, “a district court . . . begin[s] the sentencing

        process anew”). The presentence report created for Huffman’s original sentencing noted

        that law enforcement found him in possession of approximately 48,000 images and 1,200

        videos of child pornography. The district court stated that, although it had imposed a

        probationary sentence largely because of Huffman’s advanced age and poor health,

        Huffman had repeatedly violated the conditions of his probation, demonstrating that a more

        significant sentence was necessary to protect the public and provide adequate deterrence.

        The district court likewise acted within its discretion when finding that a significant

        sentence was necessary in part because of Huffman’s conduct following the court’s

        previous lenient sentence of probation. See United States v. Rios, 55 F.4th 969, 974 (4th

        Cir. 2022) (noting that, “in considering whether to vary upward, courts may (and often do)

        consider a defendant’s failure to comply with the law despite previous lenient

        punishments” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Huffman’s sentence is not

        unreasonable, much less plainly so.

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               Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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