Court Opinion

ID: 9560659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:25.204005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:05.250062
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
concurring in result only.
Believing, as I do, that this Court should not decide this case on the basis of N.C.G.S. § 25-2-608(2) of the UCC (revocation of acceptance), but rather on the basis of N.C.G.S. § 25-2-314 (implied warranty: merchantability), and that summary judgment should have been entered for the defendant, I concur only in the result that the decision below should be reversed and the case remanded. Like the majority, I would reverse and remand this case, but for *266an entirely different reason, which would produce an entirely different resolution of the case.
The “revocation of acceptance” theory is simply inapplicable here. Revocation requires a twofold finding:
Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
N.C.G.S. § 25-2-608(2) (emphasis added). The latter element cannot be found in this case. There had been a definite “substantial change” in the goods by the time the defect was discovered. The fertilizer was spread and absorbed into the earth and, indeed, by the season’s crops, the animals that consumed the crops, the water in the pond, and the fish in the water.
N.C.G.S. § 25-2-608(2) (revocation of acceptance) protects sellers by allowing revocation where the buyer “returns” the merchandise to the seller. See Village Mobile Homes v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (statute intended to protect the seller from changes which deteriorate the value of the goods). This contention is supported by the plain language of the statute and the first sentence of comment 6, which states that the policy of the section is to seek substantial justice in regard to the condition of goods “restored to the seller.” We do not have that situation here. It is true that comment 6 states that “[worthless goods . . . need not be offered back.” In such a situation, the central issue of fact becomes whether the goods here were worthless. Unless the worthlessness of the goods is stipulated to or found as a fact (and it was not here), revocation of acceptance has not been proven.
Defendant has also pled failure of consideration as a defense. His forecast of evidence on the issues of breach of implied warranty and failure of consideration is unrefuted. The implied warranty of merchantability has been breached, and the consideration for the contract has failed.
Therefore, under either the theory of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability or failure of consideration, summary judgment should have been entered for defendant. Although the defendant, Mr. Marsh, did not move for summary judgment, he *267was nevertheless entitled to the entry of such a judgment in his favor on the forecast of evidence presented here. Under Rule 56 of our Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary judgment may be entered in favor of “any party.” Rule 56 specifically provides that: “Summary judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party.” N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(c). I would reverse the decision below and remand the case for entry of summary judgment for the defendant.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this concurring opinion.