Court Opinion

ID: 9629357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:41:16.740771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:10.742507
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ERWIN, Justice.
Appellant, Pope, was convicted of second degree murder in connection with the death of one David Silva on July 9, 1968. According to his own testimony, he arose on that date at his usual hour and prepared himself for work. While driving to work he began to feel sick and decided to have only coffee in place of his usual breakfast. As appellant continued towards his job, the sickness became more severe and he decided to turn around and drive back to his motel. He testified that this condition of nervousness and sickness at his stomach had occurred with frequency in the period of time shortly before the shooting occurred.
After returning to his motel room, appellant consumed a little less than one-half of a pint of alcoholic beverage, remaining in his room and watching television. He made several attempts to reach his former wife, Irma Pope, and was at last successful. *802However, Mrs. Pope refused to speak with him, slamming down the telephone. Appellant stated that the reason that he had attempted to call his former wife was that he felt really sick .and was looking for help from someone.
After being rejected over the telephone, appellant described a strange feeling, “like something was spinning around the top of my head, from right to left, right underneath the skin against the skull and when you closed your eyes you could see — could see a streak of light coming around and around. * * * ” He described the light as not being mean or anything, but the light said “kill him, kill him, kill him”— just kept repeating it; and finally he said it to himself and as soon as he did he felt very good and was not sick any more. Appellant further stated that after the lights had stopped in his head, he felt very sorry for David Silva because of what was go-' ing to happen; he did not think there was anything that he could do to prevent the killing of David Silva, and he knew he was going to do it, but he didn’t yet know just how. When appellant finally agreed with the light in his head which told him to kill Silva, the nervousness disappeared, as did his upset stomach.
Appellant’s recollection of the events that occurred after he left the motel was hazy and vague. He recalled only being near the parking lot at Anchorage Bedding and Furniture and next seeing the gun in his hand on the door ledge of his automobile. Appellant did not recall shooting the decedent, but only remembered watching the decedent sitting down and then lying backwards on the ground.
Officer Pavlovich was the first law enforcement officer to arrive on the scene. Upon arriving he observed the deceased, a woman at the head of the decedent, and another man, later identified as the appellant, alongside the decedent in either a squatting or kneeling position. Officer Pavlovich went over to the decedent, checked his pulse, and pronounced him dead. He next asked the woman what had happened. The woman, Mrs. Silva, indicated that appellant had shot Mr. Silva. In response to this, Pavlovich stood the appellant up and started to search him for weapons.
At this point in the sequence of events there is a dispute as to the actual occurrences. A Mr. McConnell testified that he observed Officer Pavlovich going over to appellant and questioning him for a minute or two before finally searching him for a weapon. The officer, on the other hand, testified that after he had examined Silva he immediately started to search appellant. Appellant’s version of the story is that as he was being frisked by Officer Pavlovich, he was asked if he had a gun, to which he responded yes, that it was in the car. Officer Pavlovich claims that the information about the gun was volunteered by Pope and that no such question had been asked.
Mr. McConnell stated that after eliciting this information, Officer Pavlovich proceeded to appellant’s car, with his arm on appellant’s arm, to retrieve the weapon, which was located in the middle of the front seat. Officer Pavlovich stated that after Pope had volunteered the information as to the whereabouts of the gun, Pope proceeded to the automobile and Pavolich hurried to beat him to the car in an effort to retrieve the weapon.
On cross-examination Officer Pavlovich described the appellant’s appearance as being dazed and testified that his feeling at the time was that appellant was not drunk, but either dazed or at least under the influence of alcohol — but he could not tell which. Officer Pavlovich further testified that although he detected nothing radically wrong with appellant, that is, appellant walked normally and spoke clearly and distinctly, albeit very slowly, he nevertheless seemed to be preoccupied. At another point in his testimony Pavlovich stated that he thought appellant was either under the influence of alcohol or in a state of shock. Furthermore, he was not sure whether appellant was in possession of his faculties at this time.
*803On August 5, 1968, Pope was indicted by the grand jury for first degree murder and arraigned immediately thereafter. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty, and the trial date was set for December 12, 1968, before the Honorable Edward V. Davis, Superior Court Judge. Prior to trial, on November 29, 1968, at the request of the prosecutor, a competency hearing was held. On January 16, 1969, the Superior Court entered an order to the effect that the appellant was competent to stand trial.
Because of continuances, trial did not begin until February 10, 1969. At that time the defendant appeared before the Honorable Ralph E. Moody, Judge of the Superior Court, rather than Edward V. Davis, to whom the case had been assigned originally. Timely objection was made by appellant to the unannounced change. On February 18, 1969, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. Notice of appeal was duly filed.
Appellant raises four specifications of error in the trial below. His first specification is that the court committed prejudicial error in reassigning appellant’s case from Judge Davis to Judge Moody without giving appellant five days from the date of reassignment to consider and possibly file a peremptory challenge affidavit as provided in AS 22.20.022; his second, that the trial court erred in overruling the appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized by Officer Pavlovich from the appellant’s car prior to a lawful arrest; and his third, that the trial court incorrectly admitted the statements of appellant made prior to his being given the proper Miranda warnings and after he had become a suspect in the crime and had been substantially deprived of his freedom of action. Finally, he contends that the trial court should have ruled as a matter of law that the burden of proving sanity is on the state rather than the burden of proving insanity being upon the defendant, when there was some evidence in the record to indicate that sanity was at issue.
I
In his first claim of error, appellant contends that because of the assignment procedure used herein,1 he did not have sufficient opportunity to determine and if necessary file an affidavit alleging he believed that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial.
Trial proceeded on February 10, 1969, appellant making timely motion,2 which motion was denied.
*804Appellant correctly points out that the granting of the five-day period is to allow a party or his attorney an opportunity to investigate the judge to whom the case is assigned and if necessary file the requisite affidavit for disqualification, thus avoiding the waste of judicial time which would result if an affidavit or disqualification were not filed until the date of trial because this would mean that the case would have to be continued until another judge could be assigned and the disqualified judge would not be ready at that time to start the trial of another action.3 Appellant further correctly argues that the provisions of this statute have been interpreted by this court to mean that once the affidavit is filed, the judge involved is without power or jurisdiction to take any further action in the proceeding. Channel Flying Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969).
But appellant has not shown that any harm resulted to him from the denial of his motion. Instead, he invites us to speculate that he suffered some possible prejudice, even though he did not challenge the trial judge because he felt that any challenge he made might have a prejudicial effect on the jury. The gist of appellant’s argument appears to be that since any challenge might affect the jury he never seriously considered whether or not he should exercise the challenge because the reassignment made the choice more difficult. Since appellant could have exercised the challenge at any time within five days of reassignment, even during trial, we hold that his failure to do so was a waiver of his right to a peremptory challenge to the trial judge, and it was not error for the court to refuse to grant a continuance of five days to permit appellant to ponder this matter at length.
II
Appellant claims that the trial court committed error in refusing to suppress as evidence (1) appellant’s oral statement about the gun, and (2) the gun itself, which the officer seized in appellant’s car. The argument is that this evidence is tainted because the required warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) were not given by the officer until after the seizure of the gun, that appellant had already become a suspect in the crime, and that he had been substantially deprived of his freedom in a significant way. The test of when warnings must be given under Miranda is whether the accused has been “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning.” 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
We need not explore such problems as whether the “in custody” test of Miranda displaces the “focus” test of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed.2d 977 (1964), or whether the two tests can be regarded as alternatives to some extent.4 For it is plain to us that this case falls within an important exception stated by the court in its opinion in Miranda. After pointing out that it did not intend to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime, the court said:
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-*805finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present. 384 U.S. at 477-478, 86 S.Ct. at 1629-1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725-726.
In interpreting Miranda various courts have had to draw lines between what are permissible investigative interviews and custodial interrogations. The United States Supreme Court itself has made it plain that custodial interrogation could take place outside the station-house where one was “not free to go where he pleased but was ‘under arrest.’ ” Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 1096, 22 L. Ed.2d 311, 314 (1969). The courts must determine, therefore in each case whether the atmosphere and setting of an interrogation are of such coercive effect or indicate such significant restraint as to trigger the need for a Miranda warning. There is not always agreement about the criteria for such a determination.
But the case at bar is a strong one for applying the “on-the-scene questioning” exception to the Miranda warning requirement. The officer here was presented with a situation of great emergency. A crime of violence had occurred, the victim was lying on the ground dead. There was more than one person present. Both to protect his own safety and that of others, the officer had to elicit information about what had happened, and about the gun which had obviously been used in the killing. For the same reason the officer also had the right to conduct a strictly limited search (“frisk”) of Pope’s person for weapons under the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), which he did.5 To hold that, that while a policeman faced with an emergency such as the one which confronted Officer Pavlovich may “frisk” a suspect for weapons he may not simultaneously ask him whether he is armed, would be an unrealistic and unreasonable extension of the Miranda rule.
Appellant also contends that, because the revolver was seized from Pope’s automobile prior to the time he was placed under arrest, it was inadmissible because it was not the product of a search incident to arrest. The difficulty with this line of argument is that the gun was not the product of a “search” at all; it was lying on the front seat of the car in plain view. As soon as he saw it, Officer Pavlovich seized it and unloaded it, both to preserve it and its cartridges as evidence and to prevent appellant, who was standing beside him, from getting hold of it. His conduct was entirely justified.
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.6
Ill
The final point raised by appellant is a challenge to the burden of proof in insanity cases as set forth in the opinion of this court in Chase v. State.7 A review of the record reveals that the only testimony before this court in reviewing this point is the testimony of Officer Pavlovich, the appellant, Pope, Bill McConnell, and the cross-examination of appellant’s ex-wife. Testimony given by Dr. J. Ray Langdon, a psychiatrist, and Marie Doyle, a psychologist, at the trial, as well as the testimony of additional police officers and others at the scene of the crime, was not made a part of the record on appeal.
*806While proper objections were made at the trial concerning burden of proof in insanity cases, no objection was made to instructions on the test for insanity as given by the trial court, nor was any testimony presented nor instructions requested concerning such an issue.
Since in our opinion the burden of proof as to the defense of insanity and the actual test for insanity are inseparably intertwined,8 we are placed in the position of attempting to review the entire basis for the present rule on the defense of insanity in Alaska on an inadequate record without complete presentation of these issues to the trial court. This we decline to do.9
The importance of the defense of insanity has been underscored recently by a series of excellent opinions in federal courts which have considered, and in many cases adopted, the A.L.I. test for insanity,10 and a series of equally searching state court opinions which have noted more than one position, but have tended to retain the M’Naghten rule.11 These opinions note that there are presently four separate tests for insanity12 which have received varying degrees of judicial acceptance. They serve to underscore the difficulty of choosing a proper test for insanity and the corresponding burden of proof without complete presentation on the issue in the trial court and ultimately in this court.13
The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.

. There was no advance notice to counsel of the reassignment of this case from Judge Davis to Judge Moody on the day of trial. It should be noted that subsequent to the trial herein this court in the case of Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 346 (Alaska 1969) pointed out the potential problems of such a practice in suggesting that this method of reassignment of a case should be avoided in the future:
A method should be devised and utilized to make assignment of cases to judges sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing, with notice of the assignment being given to the parties, so that the parties can be afforded their rights under AS 22.20.022 without interfering with scheduled hearing or trial dates.

. The motion was as follows:
Mr. Clouse: Your Honor, for the record, at this time, I would like to state an objection to the Court’s requiring us to go to trial at this time and not be-for the — Judge Davis who was previously assigned this case. This deprives the defendant of the opportunity to investigate and exercise any challenge that he may have within the five day period as provided by rule and statute.
The Court: Motion’s denied since this is merely a procedural matter and it delays the — delays the carrying on of Court business if we give effect to that for the five days rule. Other than the objection, is defense ready to proceed? Mr. Clouse: Yes, your Honor.
AS 22.20.022 states in relevant part:
“Peremptory disqualification of a superior court judge, (a) If a party or his attorney in a superior court action, civil or criminal, files an affidavit alleging under oath that he believes that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial, the presiding judge shall at once, and without requiring proof, assign the action to another judge of that district, *804or if there is none, the chief justice of the supreme court shall assign a judge for the hearing or trial of the action. The affidavit shall contain a statement that it is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.”
* * * * *
“(c) The affidavit shall be filed within five days after the case is at issue upon a question of fact, or within five days after the issue is assigned to a judge, whichever event occurs later, unless good cause is shown for the failure to file it within that time.”

. Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 346 (Alaska 1969).

. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1969); Graham, What is Custodial Interrogation?: California’s Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 59, 114-15.

. See Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967).

. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1069 (1968); Creighton v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 406 F.2d 651 (1968); Klockenbrink v. State, 472 P.2d 958, 961 (Alaska 1970). See Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 602 (Alaska 1968).

. 369 P.2d 997, 1003 (Alaska 1962).

. Approximately one-half of the states put the burden on the defendant while the other half and the federal courts put the basic burden on the prosecution. See annot. 17 A.L.R.3rd 146 (1968).

. For a similar action by a federal court, see Ramer v. United States, 390 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1968).

. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2nd Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 1354, 12 L.Ed.2d 309 (1964); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968).

. FOR A.L.I.: State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969).
FOR M’NAGHTEN: State v. Malumphy, 461 P.2d 677 (Ariz.1969); State v. Moeller, 433 P.2d 136 (Hawaii 1967); State v. Harkness, 160 N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1968); Williams v. State, 451 P.2d 848, 851 (Nev.1969); State v. Gilmore, 242 Or. 463, 410 P.2d 240 (1966); Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969) (Aff’d by equally divided court).

. (1) The M’Naghten Test, Daniel M’Naghten case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
(2) Durham Test, Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
(3) American Law Institute Test, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Section 4.01(1) (Final Draft 1962).
(4) English Test, British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953, 1953 Report at page 116, quoted in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774, n. 32 (3rd Cir. 1961).

. Once before this court has refused to review the test for insanity for Alaska based on an inadequate record. See Dimmick v. State, 449 P.2d 774, 776 (Alaska 1969).