Court Opinion

ID: 9493270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:03:06.478352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:44.901715
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
with whom ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc.
I respectfully dissent from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc because this case presents an issue of exceptional importance with respect to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim that he premised on Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986). Turner holds that “a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Id. at 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683. The Illinois Supreme Court, in construing Turner, rejected Petitioner’s claim in part because he did not ask his lawyer to question prospective jurors about racial bias. In Turner, however, Justice White, writing for a majority of justices, only indicated that the court need not make the inquiry sua sponte if it is not requested by the defendant’s counsel. See id. at 37 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1683. Based on my reading, Turner does not stand for the proposition that a capital defendant himself must demand the inquiry into racial bias. Instead, the defendant’s counsel is expected to make the request for the defendant, and his failure to do so must be analyzed under the traditional test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Illinois Supreme Court misapprehended the Turner holding by preliminarily determining whether Petitioner first requested that his lawyer assert his Turner rights. A lay defendant should not have to bear the obligation to protect his own constitutional right to an impartial jury when represented by counsel, and we should not tolerate this material misapprehension of Turner.
Turning to the Strickland test, the Illinois Supreme Court ultimately concluded that counsel’s failure to make a Turner inquiry was a matter of trial strategy and the panel endorsed that determination. In order for counsel’s decision to be “strategic,” in my view, counsel must have at least been aware of Petitioner’s entitlement to a Turner inquiry and consciously decided to ask “general questions about bias without focusing on race.” I am unconvinced by the record that counsel’s failure to make a Turner inquiry was indeed strategic. To be sure, the record lacks sufficient facts to suggest that counsel was even aware of Petitioner’s entitlement to a Turner inquiry. Counsel, armed with only two years of legal experience, had never before been assigned to a capital case and testified that he had no reason for failing to request the Turner inquiry even though he was concerned about racial bias. If, as the record suggests, counsel was unaware *833of the Turner right, his failure to make a Turner inquiry could not have been a matter of trial strategy. Therefore, Petitioner was denied his right to question prospective jurors on the subject of racial bias, and counsel’s failure to make a Turner inquiry without tactical reason given the “tough circumstances” that confronted him fell below minimum professional standards under the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
I am further troubled by the panel’s suggestion that Petitioner must establish actual prejudice. “Turner explicitly rejected the dissent’s suggestion that the death sentence should stand because no actual jury prejudice was evident from the record.” Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (Stevens, J. concurring). Here, as in Turner, the likelihood that the jury was biased constitutes sufficient harm to the Petitioner. Accordingly, I would grant the petition for rehearing en banc in order to clarify Turner in the context of an ineffective of assistance of counsel claim.