Court Opinion

ID: 9692237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:06.287252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.414631
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This appeal proves that easy cases, no less than the great cases and hard cases that were the subject of Justice Holmes’ famous dictum, can make bad law. Northern Securities Co. v. U.S. 193 U.S. 197, 400-403, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting). This case should be easy. The statute at issue here clearly and unambiguously states that the voter can write in only “the name of any person not already printed on the ballot for that office.” 25 P.S. § 3031.12(b)(3). Despite the fact that there is no ambiguity in the wording of this statutory provision, and hence, nothing to “construe,” the Majority eviscerates the only meaning this plain language can have, without articulating any jurisprudential basis for doing so.
Because there is no ambiguity, the Majority’s holding amounts to a judicial negation of a legislative act. This Court clearly has the power, and occasionally the duty, to strike *408down a statute. However, we may do so only on grounds of unconstitutionality. See Gustine Uniontown Associates, Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., L.P., 842 A.2d 334, 347 (Pa. 2004) (citing Commonwealth, Dept. of Transportation v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 113 (Pa.2004) (“Absent a valid constitutional objection ... it is not our role to second-guess th[e] legislative judgment.”)). Notwithstanding the entertaining expressions found in this Court’s decision in Appeal of James, 377 Pa. 405, 105 A.2d 64 (1954), we do not possess a free-ranging power to strike down legislation that a Court majority finds contrary to amorphous “principles of democracy.” A respect for the separation of powers should command the Majority to identify the specific constitutional provision that requires us to strike down the instant legislation. When nullification of the product of a co-equal branch of government is at stake, our jurisprudence should consist of more than reliance on noble platitudes.
The Majority never identifies the constitutional infirmity that requires it to construe this statute as if it said the opposite of what it plainly provides. Acts of the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional, and the party alleging unconstitutionality has the heavy burden to prove otherwise. See Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004). “[A] statute will only be declared unconstitutional if it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.” Id. at at 928. (quoting Erfer v. Commonwealth, 568 Pa. 128, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (2002)). The Majority neither acknowledges nor discusses these salutary principles requiring judicial restraint.
In addition to the Court’s failure to articulate a constitutional basis for striking down this legislation, the Majority Opinion fails as a matter of “statutory construction.” When interpreting statutory language, “the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of [the] statute.” Commonwealth v. Gilmour Manufacturing Co., 573 Pa. 143, 822 A.2d 676, 679 (2003) (citing Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609, 807 A.2d 830, 835 (2002)). Statutory “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar,” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903, and “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of *409pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); see also Scheipe v. Orlando, 559 Pa. 112, 739 A.2d 475, 478 (1999). Moreover, courts must view the language of a statute in such a way as to give effect to all of its provisions. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2); see, also, Gilmour Manufacturing, 822 A.2d at 679. While this Commonwealth’s tradition of protecting the elective franchise may oblige courts to liberally construe election laws in favor of the right to vote, that is so only where there is an ambiguity in the statutory language triggering statutory construction. See In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of November 4, 2003 General Election, 577 Pa. 231, 843 A.2d 1223 (2004)(collecting cases). Indeed, in Canvass of Absentee Ballots, we expressly rejected a contention that the “well-settled practice of construing the Election Code liberally in favor of the right to vote” required this Court to torture the meaning of the word “shall” as it appeared in the section of the Code at issue there. Id. at 1231,. Canvass of Absentee Ballots reaffirms that “all things being equal, the law will be construed liberally in favor of the right to vote but, at the same time, we cannot ignore the clear mandates of the Election Code.” Id. at 1231. The Majority is correct that there is a longstanding and overriding policy in this Commonwealth to protect the elective franchise,” Petition of Cioppa, 533 Pa. 564, 626 A.2d 146, 148 (1993). But this alone does not empower this Court to invalidate Section 1112-A(b)(3) of the Code. Rather, where there is no ambiguity in a statute, it must be enforced according to its terms unless it violates a provision of the constitution. See Gustine; Taylor.
Section 1112-A(b)(3) provides voters with a clear and logical choice between casting a vote for any candidate actually listed on the ballot or, in the alternative, writing-in a vote for a person whose name does not appear on the ballot. 25 P.S. § 3031.12(b)(3). The statute thus unambiguously limits write-in votes to candidates whose names are not already on the printed ballot. This is not an unusual or arcane restriction: indeed, it is found throughout the Code. See id. § 3031.12(a)(3) (in districts using electronic voting systems where votes are registered electronically, write-in votes for candidates whose *410names appear on ballot shall not be cast or counted); id. § 2963(a), (e) (on paper ballots, voter may write-in name of person not already appearing on ballot); id. § 3056(e) (in voting machine districts, voter may cast irregular ballot in order to write-in name of candidate not already appearing on ballot). The legislative intent behind such a restriction seems manifest. In addition to promoting efficiency in vote tabulation, limiting write-in votes to persons whose names are not listed on the ballot is a safeguard against confusion and double-voting. There is no reason to write-in names that already appear on the ballot. Moreover, in a state with millions of voters, many people have the same name. The system in place provides a means by which voter intent can be discerned where an identified candidate has a common name.
The restriction is particularly sensible where electronic voting and tabulation is employed. Machine counting offers the prospect of greater speed and accuracy than manual counting: the more ballots that must be reviewed by human means, the less efficient the system. Also, in elections (such as the one here) where more than one seat is contested, confining write-in votes to candidates not listed is one way of ensuring that a voter cannot cast one vote for a named candidate electronically, and a second vote for the same candidate via the write-in option.
Notwithstanding the lack of ambiguity in Section 1112-A(b)(3) and its obvious salutary purpose, the Majority tortures the language of the provision until it permits a voter to do exactly what its language plainly forbids—i.e., to write in the name of a person whose name is already printed on the ballot. The Majority’s reading results from its ignoring the actual language of the provision under the apparent pretext of pursuing some non-constitutional object according to which we must construe the election laws as a whole. I join in Mr. Justice Eakin’s view in his dissenting opinion that the “plain, lucid, unambiguous” language of this provision should control the outcome, and that the Majority’s radical reconstruction of the statute is entirely inappropriate here. See Appeal of Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902, 906 (1975) (“ ‘[t]he technical*411ities of the Election Law (and they are many) are necessary for the preservation of the secrecy and purity of the ballot and must, therefore, be meticulously observed’ ”) (quoting Weber Appeal, 399 Pa. 37,159 A.2d 901, 905 (I960)).
Instead of abiding by our obligation to enforce statutes as actually written, the Majority re-writes this statute to serve the perceived needs of an individual case. Statutes generally are not, and cannot be, written with a myopic eye to a single scenario. The fact that the Majority believes that it can determine the intent behind the ten anonymous, miscast votes here does not mean that the General Assembly overstepped its constitutional bounds in seeking to erect a general system of voting that ensures reliability, efficiency, and the absence of fraud. I do not know—nor does the Majority know—how may citizens in Snyder County are named “Shambach” and how many are named “Bickhart.” But, write-in voters are not limited in whom they may name. They may write in a name of a person not even eligible to hold office: a minor; a nonresident; or a fictional character. Indeed, nothing exists to prevent them from voting for Elmer Fudd, as a joke, protest, or an act of civil disobedience.
The Majority’s misplaced confidence that it can read the mind and intention of these unnamed voters who deliberately chose not to vote for the Bickhart actually listed and identified on the ballot hardly is a reliable ground for establishing a general, statewide approach to the question presented. The next contest may involve thousands of write-in votes and more common candidate names. We can assume that the General Assembly considered this prospect, and in negating the statute, the Majority has lost sight of the prospect. In its place, the Majority has reposed power in the courts to substitute their own judgments as to what individual voters intended. Under the legislative scheme, there is a logical presumption that a voter who writes a name in intends to vote for a different candidate than the one listed. That presumption should be permitted to operate.
The sole authority supporting today’s judicial negation of the only possible meaning of Sectionlll2-A(b)(3) is our 50-*412year-old decision in James, 377 Pa. 405, 105 A.2d 64. In James, the challenger opposed certain “sticker votes” that were duplicative of the name of a candidate already listed on the ballot. The challenger in James relied on a provision of the Election Code, Section 1003(e), which stated that a voter may write-in the name of a person not already listed on the ballot. 25 P.S. § 2963. Proceeding from an asserted presumption that election laws are to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the intent of the voter and protect the right to vote, this Court held that the challenged votes were valid. As support, the Court cited only to a treatise. James, 105 A.2d at 65-66 (quoting 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 7, p. 27). The effect of the decision in James was to hold that, although Section 1003(e) did not permit the sticker votes in question, those votes were nonetheless valid because the intention of the voter was clear and the challenger did not allege or show voter fraud. James, 105 A.2d at 66.
Notably absent from James was (1) any discussion of whether the language of Section 1003(e) was ambiguous, and (2) any expression of the constitutional grounds upon which this Court was empowered to nullify unambiguous language. As with so many opinions of the late Justice Michael A. Musmanno, the broad language in James makes for an entertaining read. But unfortunately, the opinion is sorely lacking in sensitivity to the separation of powers and the important constitutional issues implicated by the holding. The James Court did not dispute that the plain language of Section 1003(e) prohibited the votes in question. Rather, the Court, in an act of judicial imperialism, simply refused to permit the statute to operate. Likewise, the Majority today simply negates Section 1112-A(b)(3) without a finding of ambiguity or an identification of the constitutional basis for such activism. I would like to think that, in the half-century that has passed since James, this Court has developed a greater understanding and respect for judicial restraint and separation of powers concerns.
That greater understanding and respect was actually manifest in our 1975 decision in Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902. In terms of its jurisprudential approach, Yerger is the opposite *413of James. Unlike James and today’s Majority Opinion, Yerger both applied principles of statutory construction and recognized that a measure of deference to the legislative judgment is required before a statute may be struck down. This is particularly notable because in Yerger—unlike James and this case—the statute was challenged on specific constitutional grounds. Yerger involved a voting machine system, and the section of the Code at issue there, Section 1216(e), contains a restriction identical to both Sections 1003(e) and 1112-A(b)(3). See 25 P.S. § 3056(e). As in James and as here, the Yerger Court was faced with the question of whether certain write-in votes, allegedly cast in violation of Section 1216(e), were valid. The appellees in Yerger argued that the write-in votes cast in violation of Section 1216(e) must be counted because, in light of James, a different conclusion would violate the requirement of uniformity in laws regulating elections found in Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.1 This Court found Section 1216(e) to be unambiguous and concluded that it was “to be given full effect in accordance with its words unless that result is prohibited by the Constitution.” 333 A.2d at 905.
Turning to the appellees’ uniformity challenge, the Court noted that the uniformity clause only requires like treatment where the “same circumstances” are present, emphasizing that “the Legislature is not forbidden to draw distinctions where difference in treatment rests on some substantial basis.” 333 A.2d at 906, (citing Kerns v. Kane, 69 A.2d 388, 393 (1949)). Although Yerger did not question the validity of the paper ballot holding in James, the Court found that there was indeed a substantial basis for affording different treatment to write-in votes where machine ballots are at issue:
It is easy to find ... a basis for the difference in treatment of write-in votes on paper ballots and machines. Allowing write-in votes for those [candidates already] appearing on the machine would increase the time and effort required to count the votes. By ignoring the speedy and efficient *414means of voting for such candidates provided by the regular operation of the machine, the voter casting an irregular vote would, to that extent, defeat the very purpose of using voting machines.
Yerger, 333 A.2d at 906. In addition, the Yerger Court noted that there is a danger of double-voting when a machine is involved, whereas this danger is simply not present in a paper ballot system. Precautions against double-voting “are unnecessary when dealing with paper ballots, because it is easily determined if any ballot contains more votes for a given office than there are persons to be elected.” Id. However, in the case of machine voting, restricting write-in candidates to persons not already on the ballot is a salutary protection against double-voting. Id. (“By forbidding write-in votes for candidates appearing on the machine, the Legislature has erected a considerable safeguard against the failure of the locking mechanism.”).2 Accordingly, Yerger held that the write-in votes in question, cast for the appellee despite the fact that his name already appeared on the ballot as a candidate, were invalid.
The Majority distinguishes Yerger because it involved a voting machine system rather than an optical scanning system employing paper ballots, as here. The Majority posits that, unlike the system used in Yerger, the paper balloting system here always requires an election official to review the ballot. As such, the Majority finds that the concerns animating Yerger do not exist in the instant case. But the Majority misses the more fundamental jurisprudential point—Yerger evidenced, where James and today’s Majority Opinion do not, judicial restraint. It is ironic, to say the least, that a specifically identified constitutional challenge failed in Yerger, while *415amorphous, non-constitutional challenges succeeded in negating the legislation at issue in James and apparently have again succeeded today. If ours were not a system of separated powers, the Majority’s distinction might have currency. As is, the Majority’s approach is a jurisprudential step backwards from Yerger.
Whether voter fraud or “double voting” in fact exists in a given case was not dispositive in Yerger.3 The statutory provisions at issue in James, Yerger and here do not repose in ballot examiners or courts the free-ranging power to attempt to ascertain voter intent or rule out fraud when a vote has been cast in violation of an explicit election statute. While voter intention is paramount in the realm of the fundamental right to vote, ascertaining that intent necessarily assumes a properly cast ballot. By enacting the proscription at issue here, the General Assembly presumably weighed the factors bearing on that question. What the General Assembly decidedly did not do is vest discretion in the executive or the judiciary to reweigh those factors in determining whether or not to count a particular vote. To distinguish among substantially identical provisions in the Code on the basis of the judiciary’s assessment of the potential, or lack thereof, for fraud; the ability, or lack thereof, to accurately ascertain voter intent; or the nature and practicality of examining the ballot depending upon the type of voting system used, is to ignore the fact that the General Assembly has not provided for such an inquiry. Absent constitutional infirmity—and none has been argued here—we have no authority to reshape the election system adopted by the Assembly.
The Majority also distinguishes Yerger based on a factual difference in the verbiage of the statutory provisions at issue. Section 1216(e), which was at issue in Yerger, includes the additional instruction with respect to write-in ballots that duplicate the name of a listed candidate: “any ballot so cast shall be void and not counted.” 25 P.S. § 3056(e). The *416Majority concludes that, because Section 1112 A(b)(3) does not contain similar language—as Section 1003(e) did not in James—it does not plainly require write-in votes for listed candidates to be invalidated. But the Yerger Court did not discuss this statutory disparity or consider it grounds for distinction. Moreover, the distinction is illusory. Even though Section 1112-A(b)(3) does not say “void and not counted,” the explicit proscription it enacts can have meaning only if improper votes are not counted. It is absurd to say that the statute does not permit write-in votes for a listed candidate, but that those votes must be counted despite a violation of the proscription. The redundancy in Section 1216(e) does not somehow operate to create ambiguity in Section 1112-A(b)(3). Finally, this factual distinction, even if it had currency, does not create power in this Court to strike down otherwise constitutional legislation.
The Election Code was enacted to ensure the accurate and efficient ascertainment of voter intention while simultaneously erecting protections against the dangers of confusion and vote fraud. When faced with an ambiguity or uncertainty in the Code, our task is to strike the proper balance between protecting the elective franchise and enforcing the salutary directives of the Code. When, however, the statute is unambiguous and does not suffer from constitutional infirmity, our task is to enforce the clear mandates of the Code. For, as we stated in Yerger,
When dealing with a comprehensive and carefully drawn legislative scheme for the conduct of elections, we must take care not to consider the particular elements of the scheme without regard to their place in the entire structure. Otherwise, the legislative plan may be frustrated by deviations, each seemingly reasonable in itself but destructive of the carefully designed structure.
Id. at 906.
Section 1112-A(b)(3) unambiguously states that a voter cannot write-in a vote for a listed candidate. The Majority Opinion nonetheless holds that a voter may do so. In negating the statute, the Majority does not find ambiguity nor does *417it identify the constitutional violation that might permit judicial negation of the provision. Absent such essential predicates, this Court lacks the power to negate the plain meaning and effect of the instant provision. I respectfully dissent.

. Article VII, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides, with exceptions not relevant here, that "[a]ll laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens ... shall be uniform throughout the State....”

. The "locking mechanism” adverted to in Yerger prevented double-voting as follows. Above the line on the machine listing the candidate’s name was a slide which, when pushed up, enabled the voter to case a write-in vote. When that slide was raised, it was also supposed to lock the machine, i.e., to prevent registering a vote by activating the lever for any of the listed candidates for the office. Notwithstanding this mechanical safeguard, the Yerger Court deemed the proscription against write-in votes for listed candidates to be a considerable, if additional, safeguard against double-voting.

. Indeed, Yerger did not discuss whether it was possible to ascertain if the eight contested votes there involved any double-votes, or even any attempt to double vote.