Court Opinion

ID: 9479859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:30:41.112504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:19.175512
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion with regard to Parts IIB and IIC. However, I respectfully disagree with the conclusions reached by the majority in Part IIA.
In my view this case is controlled by the holding in Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir.1988). Thus, the writ should not issue.
On February 3, 1983, petitioner’s case was set for trial. It was scheduled to commence on July 19, 1983. On July 18, the day before the trial was to begin, peti*1355tioner asked that his court-appointed counsel, who was fully prepared for trial with a previously agreed upon theory of defense, be discharged and that petitioner be declared co-counsel along with a newly appointed lawyer. Understandably, the trial judge refused this last minute request and gave petitioner the option to represent himself or to continue with his current counsel. Petitioner decided on self-representation. Obviously, a newly appointed lawyer, even functioning as co-counsel as requested by petitioner, could not be prepared for trial as scheduled or even as reasonably delayed.
In Meyer this court held that a “defendant has no right to manipulate his right [to counsel] for the purpose of delaying and disrupting the trial.” Id. at 1113 (quoting United States v. White, 529 F.2d 1390, 1393 (8th Cir.1976)). Meyer, during trial, sought to have his attorney dismissed. Like petitioner, he was given the option to proceed with appointed counsel or on his own behalf. He, also like petitioner, elected to represent himself. The court, in Meyer, unanimously determined that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion to provide substitute counsel. Id. at 1114.
It should also be noted here that petitioner represented himself at a trial at which a “hung” jury resulted. Even though a retrial occurred several months later, there is no indication in the record that petitioner sought appointment of a lawyer for the retrial. From this, it is clear that petitioner wanted to proceed, pro se, in the second proceeding. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, petitioner knowingly, voluntarily and intelligentlv waived his right to counsel. This was his right. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1980).
Accordingly, I dissent to that part of the majority opinion which requires retrial or release from custody because of the self-representation by petitioner.