Court Opinion

ID: 7947925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 23:22:51.47603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:34:00.660253
License: Public Domain

Kuhn, J.
(after stating the facts). It is the complainants’ contention that under section 29, article 8, of the Constitution, the grant in question is invalid, because it contains no maximum term limit beyond which it cannot run, although the right of revocation is reserved to the grantor. What is the grant in question? The most that can be claimed for it is that it is a revocable right. It is immaterial whether it is termed a grant, license, franchise, or permit. Its important feature in this discussion is that whatever it is termed, it is revocable at the will of the city, whenever the public interest requires its termination. By its terms this is to be determined by the common council or the people of the city of Detroit, at their pleasure or caprice. The resolution clearly provides that no term right shall be acquired by the railway company because of the acceptance of the grant by it, and by virtue of the provisions of said section 29, article *3488, of the Constitution, which is a clear limitation on the power to grant franchises or licenses, this grant of power could not extend beyond the period of 30 years fixed by the section, even if it should not be revoked by the granting power before the expiration of that time. In the absence of a time limitation in the grant, it must be assumed that it cannot extend beyond the term fixed by the Constitution. Boise, etc., Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84 (33 Sup. Ct. 997). Not being a grant for a longer period than 30 years, which is prohibited by the Constitution, and, complying with section 25 of article 8 in that it is “subject to revocation at the will of the city,” we are clearly of the opinion that the resolution making the grant was not in violation of any constitutional prohibition.
It is also contended that the council’s resolution should be held void because it contains a proviso that, in case the city shall engage in municipal ownership and operation of street railways, and shall desire to operate on the streets mentioned in the resolution, it shall purchase the tracks and equipment therefor at a price to be fixed by agreement or arbitration. This provision cannot be construed to be a limitation upon the power to revoke the .permit. This power can be exercised without complying with any conditions. It can be exercised at the will of the common council or the city, and is independent of any other provision. The question of whether or not the city could be compelled to purchase the property and equipment of the railroad as provided for in the resolution, in case the right of revocation is exercised, is a question not involved here.
The decree of the court below dismissing the bill of complaint is affirmed, with costs to defendants.
McAlvay, C. J., and Brooke, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.