Court Opinion

ID: 9760509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:58:16.996537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.050892
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
concurring.
The divorce decree between Lonnie Jordan and Helen Thompson (W2) states they were married. A valid marriage to Helen Thompson could have happened only after June 22, 1965, when Lonnie divorced Wl, and before July 19, 1965, when he ceremonially married W3 (appellee). Lonnie and Helen were not divorced until July 29, 1985. Thus, I believe the marriage to W3 (appellee) was void at its inception on July 19, 1965. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.22 (Vernon 1996). The parties agree there was no common-law marriage between Lonnie and W3 (appellee) after July 29, 1985. Moreover, I believe appellee (W3) is estopped from claiming otherwise by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Dreyer v. Greene, 809 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), aff'd, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.1993) (wife barred by statutory res judicata from asserting parentage contrary to trial court’s findings in her divorce decree)); Espree v. Guillory, 753 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (common-law doctrine of collateral estoppel barred an attack on divorce court’s findings that child was legitimate); Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1955, writ ref d n.r.e.) (res judi-cata barred parents of deceased worker from attacking a divorce decree finding that their son fathered a son during marriage). Lonnie Jordan, having consented to the divorce decree from Helen Thompson (W2), would not have been allowed to collaterally attack it except for voidness, nor should anyone claiming through him, such as appellee, be allowed to do so. That leaves the question of the proper remedy.
In her “Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment,” appellant asked the court to declare Lonnie’s marriage to W3 (appellee) void because of the prior existing marriage of Lonnie and Helen. However, appellant’s “Amended Application to Determine Heir-ship” does not mention voidness, nor does appellant’s “First Amended Original Petition for Declaratory Judgment.” These later pleadings control over and completely replace the original petition, which, along with its allegations of voidness, “shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the record of the cause.” Tex R. Civ. P. 65. Appellant later alleged voidness in her “Contentions,” “Contested Issues of Fact,” and “Proposed Jury Charge Questions, Instructions and Definitions,” but she made no request for rendition in the trial court based on voidness, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The latter doctrines, res judicata and estop-pel, are affirmative defenses that must be pleaded and asserted. Tex R. Civ. P. 94. Although appellant requests the remedy of rendition on appeal, I cannot conclude that these issues were tried by consent, under Tex R. Civ. P. 67, because the trial judge was not asked to render judgment due to res judicata, collateral estoppel, or voidness. For that reason, I concur in remanding the *181cause, rather than rendering judgment for appellant.