Court Opinion

ID: 9792558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:30:46.043636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.606055
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not concur in the majority’s analysis. The majority concludes that the marital assets1 should be equally divided. Its analysis is as follows:
*2451. The rebuttable presumption of equal contribution arising from the third sentence of ORS 107.105(1)(e) has been “overcome.”
2. “Although wife is not entitled to share in the husband’s house and acreage by virtue of the statutory presumption, other equitable reasons dictate the same result.” (Emphasis added.) 294 Or at 242.
3. “If a marriage is terminated before the parties’ financial affairs become commingled or committed to the needs of children to the point that the parties cannot readily be restored to their pre-marital situations, then property division is a relatively simple task in the nature of a rescission.” 294 Or at 242.
4. “Property is bought, sold, enhanced, diminished, intermixed and used without regard to ease of division upon termination of the marriage. * * * With each common financial act or decision, however, the finances of the parties may become more interrelated, and extrication upon dissolution becomes increasingly difficult.” 294 Or at 242.
5. “* * * [T]his donated property has been integrated into the common financial affairs of the parties and their children. We conclude that it is properly a part of the property division equation.” 294 Or at 243.
The majority opinion says that if the parties have “integrated” their financial affairs, particularly if there are children, for “equitable reasons” the property will be divided. The duration of the marriage is not a significant factor in the majority’s analysis. Focusing upon the confusion of marital assets is neither a straightforward nor a productive way to analyze the problem. A clearer and more logical analysis can and should be made. Irrespective of the length of the marriage, “integrated” financial affairs will have to be “disintegrated” or “unintegrated.”
I will assume, for the sake of argument, that the rebuttable presumption has been “overcome.”2 Even if the *246rebuttable presumption has been overcome, the second sentence of ORS 107.105(1)(e) still requires that “[t]he court shall consider the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as a contribution to the acquisition of marital assets.” That sentence requires that the court consider the 13 years of contribution by the wife as a homemaker. Because of the duration of the wife’s homemaking contribution, an equal division is appropriate in this case.
Suppose that the husband and wife in this case had lived in a rented house during the entire marriage, that a house and 10 adjoining acres were given to the husband as a gift, that an additional 67 acres were given to the husband as a gift the following year, and that the income from the rural properties was exactly enough to pay all expenses on those properties. Suppose further that the wife never had anything to do with the rural properties. Finally, suppose that the rural properties are the only substantial asset in the marriage. I suggest that this court would order that the properties be divided about evenly because the wife made a substantial “contribution * * * as a homemaker,” and because the marriage is of moderate duration, 13 years.
Even though ORS 107.105(1)(e) makes no explicit reference to “the duration of the marriage,”3 the quantum of a spouse’s contribution as a homemaker is directly related to the period of time the contribution was made. The extent to which “the finances of the parties * * * become more interrelated, and extrication upon dissolution becomes increasingly difficult” (majority opinion at 242), largely is a product of the duration of the marriage, and is not an independent justification or reason for dividing the *247assets equally. Were this a marriage of only one or two years, assuming a mixture of marital assets similar to those at bar, the result would be different. The division of property resulting from such a brief marriage would be markedly different from the result in this case because the wife’s contribution as a homemaker would be less than the wife’s contribution in this case, not because of the presence or absence of commingled assets.
The majority opinion gives little direction to judges, lawyers and parties in an area of the law in which guidance is needed. The extent to which the assets have been commingled has little relevance to the division of property.4 Our holding should be that in considering “the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as a contribution to the acquisition of marital assets” (which ORS 107.105(1)(e) requires us to do), the longer the homemaker spouse contributes, the greater is the homemaker’s entitlement to a share of the property.

 I use the term “marital assets” in the technical meaning it was given in Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117, 121-22, 653 P2d 1258 (1982).

 Strictly speaking, upon a showing that the property was received as a gift, the rebuttable presumption has been overcome as to both the husband and the wife. Neither spouse “contributed” anything to the acquisition of the donated property.

 Compare ORS 107.105(l)(c), which concerns support awards and which makes specific reference to “the duration of the marriage.” See Glatt and Glatt, 41 Or App 615, 598 P2d 1237 (1979), in which these statements were made:
“* * * We have stated that the factors ORS 107.105(l)(c) mentions with respect to spousal support determinations, while not controlling, provide useful guidance in property divisions. * * *
“In dissolution cases involving marriages of long duration, the courts have consistently been less concerned with identifying the relative contributions of the parties than they have been with ensuring that the parties separate on as equal a basis as possible, under the circumstances. * * *” 41 Or App at 621, 622.

 If a husband and wife each brought cash into a one-year marriage and an asset were purchased, with one spouse paying 90 percent of the purchase price, we would not divide the asset equally because their assets had become “interrelated and extrication * * * difficult.” We would attempt to restore them to their respective positions before marriage because of the short duration of the marriage.