Court Opinion

ID: 9908670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:03:21.945878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:25.860792
License: Public Domain

IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 22S-DI-254                            FILED
                                                                     Dec 11 2023, 11:11 am

                  In the Matter of                                        CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
              Angela Sallee Field Trapp,                                   and Tax Court

                           Respondent.

                   Decided: December 11, 2023

                    Attorney Discipline Action

                 Hearing Officer David J. Hensel

                       Per Curiam Opinion
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
        Justice Molter concurs in part and dissents in part.
Per curiam.

   We find that Respondent, Angela Trapp, committed attorney
misconduct by impermissibly communicating with a represented person
about the subject of the representation and knowingly making false
statements to a court about the impermissible communication. For this
misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be suspended for 30
days with automatic reinstatement.

  The matter is now before us on the report of the hearing officer this
Court appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court
Disciplinary Commission’s verified disciplinary complaint. Respondent’s
2007 admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary
jurisdiction. See Ind. Const. art. 7, § 4.

Procedural Background and Facts
   Respondent represented “Husband” in consolidated marital dissolution
and protective order proceedings (hereinafter the “Divorce Case”)
initiated in the wake of a domestic dispute. Respondent also represented
Husband in a criminal proceeding (hereinafter the “Criminal Case”)
arising from the same domestic dispute. Wife was represented by counsel
in the Divorce Case, and Respondent knew this.

   In early April 2019, Wife’s protective order petition was granted by
agreement and Husband’s protective order petition was dismissed. An
agreed provisional order entered in the Divorce Case around the same
time indicated that issues remaining to be resolved included attorney fees,
valuation of marital assets, and division of the marital estate. The marital
assets included several firearms allegedly in the home at the time the
domestic incident occurred that police did not find when they searched
the property.

   Without notifying Wife’s counsel, Respondent subpoenaed Wife in the
Criminal Case and took a taped statement from her in August 2019.
During that interview Respondent questioned Wife about the domestic
incident and asked her several questions about the firearms and other

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-DI-254 | December 11, 2023      Page 2 of 6
marital property over the objection of the deputy prosecutor, who
referenced the Divorce Case and Wife’s right to have her counsel present.

   When later confronted about this by Wife’s counsel, Respondent stated
“We asked zero questions about the divorce case.” And when Wife’s
counsel filed a motion for an order to produce the taped statement,
Respondent filed an objection inaccurately stating that “Wife’s Counsel
had one (1) month[’s] notice of the taped statement” and the taped
statement was not relevant to matters at issue in the Divorce Case. The
court issued the order to produce and denied Respondent’s subsequent
motion to reconsider, noting that in an earlier pleading Respondent had
represented that trial in the Criminal Case would impact the outcome of
the Divorce Case. The court added that Respondent “should be prepared
to discuss Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 and its comments at the final
dissolution hearing.” Respondent emailed the recorded statement to
Wife’s counsel the following day.

   In November 2020, Wife’s successor counsel moved for Respondent to
be disqualified in the Divorce Case due to Respondent’s questioning of
Wife without her counsel present. In February 2021, successor counsel
appeared for Husband in the Divorce Case, Respondent withdrew her
appearance, and the motion to disqualify was denied as moot.

  In July 2022, the Commission filed a disciplinary complaint alleging
Respondent violated the following Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct:

        3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a
        tribunal.

        4.2: Improperly communicating with a person the lawyer knows to
        be represented by another lawyer in the matter.

        8.4(d): Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
        justice.

An evidentiary hearing was held in March 2023. Following the submission
of proposed findings by the parties, the hearing officer issued a 17-page
report finding that Respondent violated all three rules as charged and
recommending a short suspension with automatic reinstatement.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-DI-254 | December 11, 2023     Page 3 of 6
Respondent has petitioned for review of that report, responsive briefs
have been filed, and the matter is now ripe for our consideration.

Discussion and Discipline
   Respondent concedes she violated Rule 4.21 but seeks review of the
hearing officer’s findings and conclusions that she violated Rules 3.3(a)(1)
and 8.4(d). The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate
attorney misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. Admis. Disc. R.
23(14)(g). And while the review process in disciplinary cases involves a de
novo examination of all matters presented to the Court, a hearing officer’s
findings nevertheless receive emphasis due to the unique opportunity for
direct observation of witnesses. See Matter of Gabriel, 120 N.E.3d 189, 190
(Ind. 2019).

   The hearing officer expressly found that Respondent “was not a
credible witness” at the final hearing and was “evasive and combative.”
(Report at 10, 17). We will not second-guess this credibility determination,
and our own review of the transcript amply supports the evasiveness
finding. This credibility determination in turn undercuts many of
Respondent’s arguments on review, which rely to a large extent on her
own discredited testimony.

   We agree with the hearing officer’s ultimate conclusions that
Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). Respondent points to her own
testimony that the reference to “Wife’s counsel” having been given notice
of the taped statement was a scrivener’s error. But Respondent’s
testimony was not credited and finds little circumstantial support in the
record. Moreover, Respondent does not explain why she failed to correct

1 Although Respondent quibbles at the margins regarding the scope of her violation, the
parties appear to agree that the precise contours of Respondent’s Rule 4.2 violation have little
ultimate bearing on sanction. (See Resp. at 11; Reply at 1 n.1). Respondent concedes she
crossed the Rubicon in her questioning of Wife, and that concession is sufficient for our
purposes today. See Matter of Martin, 166 N.E.3d 345 (Ind. 2021); Matter of Litz, 894 N.E.2d 983
(Ind. 2008).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-DI-254 | December 11, 2023                       Page 4 of 6
this false statement, which Rule 3.3(a)(1) also required her to do. See
Matter of Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ind. 2017). Respondent’s challenges to
the hearing officer’s determination that additional statements Respondent
made to the trial court were false similarly invite a reweighing of
testimony, find little circumstantial support, and are undercut by
Respondent’s contemporaneous pattern of deception in her
communications with Wife’s counsel.2

  We are similarly unpersuaded by Respondent’s challenge to the
hearing officer’s finding of a Rule 8.4(d) violation. Respondent’s acts of
misconduct unduly prolonged the litigation in the Divorce Case, required
the court and Wife’s counsel to expend additional resources to force
Respondent to turn over the taped statement, and led to disqualification
proceedings that ultimately compelled Husband to retain new counsel.
This easily meets the threshold for prejudice under Rule 8.4(d). See Matter
of Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194, 1197 (Ind. 2017).

   Turning to the question of sanction, we have regularly imposed
reprimands for similar violations of Rule 4.2. See, e.g., Matter of Steele, 181
N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. 2022); Martin, 166 N.E.3d at 347; Litz, 894 N.E.2d at
984; Matter of Baker, 758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 2001). Were Respondent’s
misconduct so limited, we might be inclined to do so here as well. But we
agree with the Commission that Respondent’s additional acts of
dishonesty toward the court in the Divorce Case elevate this to a more
serious level that warrants a short suspension. See, e.g., Matter of Lynn, 918
N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ind. 2009); Matter of Gaydos, 738 N.E.2d 276, 277 (Ind.
2000); Matter of Chovanec, 640 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ind. 1994).

2Respondent’s argument that dishonesty toward opposing counsel is not encompassed
within Rule 3.3, while true, misses the point. Respondent’s broader pattern of deception is
probative of her mens rea underlying the statements to the court that are subject to Rule 3.3
and undercuts her assertions of inadvertence and lack of knowledge.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-DI-254 | December 11, 2023                       Page 5 of 6
Conclusion
   The Court concludes that Respondent violated Professional Conduct
Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.2, and 8.4(d). For Respondent’s professional misconduct,
the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a
period of 30 days, beginning January 22, 2024. Respondent shall not
undertake any new legal matters between service of this opinion and the
effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties
of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26). At
the conclusion of the suspension period, provided there are no other
suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to
the practice of law, subject to the conditions of Admission and Discipline
Rule 23(18)(a). The costs of this proceeding are assessed against
Respondent, and the hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged
with the Court’s appreciation.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Molter, J., concurs in part but dissents from the sanction, believing a
public reprimand is warranted.

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
Nicholas W. Levi
Michael E. Brown
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
Greg N. Anderson, Acting Executive Director
Angie L. Ordway, Staff Attorney
Indianapolis, Indiana

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