Court Opinion

ID: 9722778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:49:55.783754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.997805
License: Public Domain

T. M. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff sued defendants in the circuit court for Genesee county for money allegedly due under an oral contract to build a residence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff was not licensed as a residential builder as required by PA 1953, No 208, as amended (CLS 1961, § 338.971 et seq. [Stat Ann 1957 Kev and Stat Ann 1961 Cum Supp §18.86(1), et seq.]),1 and that, therefore, plaintiff was barred from recovery by the statute.
*293The motion for summary judgment was granted. Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, challenging the constitutionality of the cited statute. The summary judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 3 Mich App 494. Leave to appeal to this Court was granted. 378 Mich 733.
Plaintiff raises three questions:
(1) "Whether the residential builders law is unconstitutional for the reason that said act is discriminatory and class legislation.
(2) Whether the residential builders law is unconstitutional because of the fact that by the provisions of this act allowing the boards of supervisors of counties to make the act effective, there has been an unreasonable and illegal delegation of the powers of the legislature to the county boards of supervisors.
(3) Whether the residential builders law is ambiguous, uncertain, and unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.
This Court has dealt with this subject many times. In Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores (1956), 344 Mich 693, dealing with the subject of a zoning decision which denied the construction of a gasoline station in an area zoned as business B, this Court said (p 698):
“There is no doubt that a legislative body may not delegate to another its lawmaking powers. It must promulgate, not abdicate. This is not to say, however, that a subordinate body or official may not be clothed with the authority to say when the law shall operate, or as to whom, or upon what occasion, provided, however, that the standards prescribed for guidance are as reasonably precise as the subject madt&r requires or permits" (Emphasis added.)
*294Again, in Certain-Teed, Products Corporation v. Paris Township (1958), 351 Mich 434, dealing with a zoning board’s denial of a permit to extract gypsum deposits, the Court said (p 444):
“This Court has previously held that such a requirement which places the existence or nonexistence of a particular business or industry wholly at the discretion of the administrative board represents an unreasonable and unconstitutional invasion of property rights in the absence of standards for the exercise of such discretion previously determined by legislative action in the zoning ordinance itself.” (Emphasis added.)
In Palmer Park Theatre Company v. City of Highland Park (1961), 362 Mich 326, 346, dealing with a fee on air conditioners that were nonrecirculating, the Court quoted with approval the following language from Cook Coffee Co. v. Village of Flushing (1934), 267 Mich 131, 134:
“ ‘These constitutional provisions do not mean that there can be no classification in the application of statutes and ordinances, but only that the classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
In Beauty Built Construction Corporation v. City of Warren (1965), 375 Mich 229, this Court held that a tap-in fee by the city of Warren for those in the process of building and who had failed to tap-in to its waterline, but excluding those who had completed their buildings, was unconstitutional, stating (p 236):
“Where an ordinance fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immunities or privileges to one part and denies them to others of like kind by unreasonable or *295arbitrary classification, the same is contrary to the equal protection guarantees of the State and Federal Constitutions.”
In dealing with the subject matter of the instant case, the statute has attempted to regulate and license all residential builders or residential maintenance and alteration contractors. Presumably all other building contractors are exempt. Our examination of the statutes of other States discloses that contractor licensing laws in each instance apply to all contractors regardless of the type of structure being built.
Justice T. E. Brennan in affirming the Court of Appeals cites 10 typical residential building contract situations which would have certain common incidents. But each of the 10 cited situations is equally applicable to the commercial contractor as well as to the residential builder. This criteria are distinctions without a difference.
, The consumer, as Justice T. E. Brennan intimates, deserves protection from all unscrupulous building contractors. This statute was intended to carry out that purpose. But the means chosen cannot be viewed as reasonably related to this end.. Under this statute the classification bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of the act but is an arbitrary and discriminatory treatment as to some of the contractors in the building business and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
An examination of the statute shows that a “residential builder” is defined in section 2(b) of the statute as amended,2 as follows:
“(b) ‘Residential builder’ means any person engaged in the construction of residential structures or a combination of residential and commercial *296structures who, for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage, valuable consideration or other compensation, other than wages, undertakes with another or offers to undertake or purports to have the capacity to undertake with another for the erection, construction, replacement, repair, alteration or any addition to, subtraction from, improvement, movement of, wrecking of or demolition of, a residential structure or combination of residential and commercial structure, or any person who erects a residential structure or combination of residential and commercial structure except for his own use and occupancy on his own property, and who is skilled in the planning and superintending of residential construction or a combination of residential and commercial structure except for his own use and occupancy on his own property, and who is skilled in the planning and superintending of residential construction or a combination of residential and commercial construction, and has a practical knowledge of the same, and who is familiar with the housing laws of Michigan and other laws, rules and, regulations governing residential construction or a combination of residential and commercial construction.” (Emphasis added.)
The term “residential maintenance and alteration contractor” is defined in section 2(c) of the statute as amended,3 as follows:
“(e) ‘Residential maintenance and alteration contractor’ means any person who, for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage, valuable consideration or other compensation, other than wages, undertakes with another for the repair, alteration or any addition to, subtraction from, improvement of, movement of, wrecking of or demolition of a residential structure or combination of residential and commercial structure, or building of a garage, or laying of concrete on residential property, except for his own use and occupancy; and who is skilled in the *297planning and superintending of residential maintenance and alteration construction, or a combination of residential and commercial maintenance and alteration construction, and has a practical knowledge of same, and who is familiar with the housing laws of Michigan and other laws, rules and regulations governing residential maintenance and alteration construction or a combination of residential and commercial maintenance and alteration construction. The provisions of this act shall not be construed to prevent a duly licensed residential maintenance and alteration contractor from constructing an addition to an existing residential structure, or any other structure accessory to an existing residential structure.” (Emphasis added.)
The term “residential structure” or “combination of residential and commercial structure” is not in any way defined, and the Michigan corporation and securities commission (which is the agency charged with administering the act) has absolutely no standard by which to determine what constitutes a “residential structure” or a “combination of residential and commercial structure.”
Because this act carries criminal penalties, it is most important that those required to be licensed under it as well as the agency charged with administering it have definite information as to whom and how the act is to apply. Given the present ambiguity of this statute’s classification, it is, indeed, strange to impose upon threat of criminal sanctions the requirement that the “residential builder” be “familiar with the housing laws of Michigan, and other laws, rules, and regulations governing residential construction or a combination of residential and commercial construction” without indicating specifically the laws, rules, and regulations with which the contractor must comply. This lack of definiteness leaves the contractor without any *298information as to what violations will make him subject to criminal penalties and leaves the act impossible to administer.
We hold, as did Justice Kelly in City of Saginaw v. Budd (1968), 381 Mich 173, that the statute discloses there is an improper delegation of authority without definable standards. Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, supra; Hoyt Brothers, Inc., v. City of Grand Rapids (1932), 260 Mich 447; O’Brien v. State Highway Commissioner (1965), 375 Mich 545.
See, also, Fox v. Employment Security Commission (1967), 379 Mich 579, as well as authorities cited herein.
The statute involved in this case is unconstitutional in that it arbitrarily and diseriminatorily attempts to regulate only a part of the class of contractors in the building business. It is also unconstitutional for the reason the legislature has not provided any standards for the corporation and securities commission to determine what is and what is not a “residential structure” or a “combination of residential and commercial structure.”
We hold PA 1953, No 208, as amended, and PA 1965, No 383, as amended, were from the beginning constitutionally invalid, and are now invalid, in that they constitute a denial to this plaintiff and others like him of equal protection of the laws under the Michigan and United States Constitutions.
Having reached the above conclusion, it is not necessary for us to pass on the other questions raised by plaintiff.
The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court should be reversed, the trial court’s summary judgment should be vacated and set aside, and the cause should be remanded for further proceedings.
Plaintiff shall have costs.

 Repealed and superseded by PA 1965, No 383, as amended by PA 1966, No 12 (MCLA § 338.1501 et seq. [Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 18.86(101) et seq.]).

 Section 2(b) as amended by PA 1961, No 215 (CLS 1961, § 338.972 [Stat Ann 1961 Cum Supp § 3 8.86(2)]).

 See footnote 2.