Court Opinion

ID: 9915166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 18:07:22.759326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:42.800178
License: Public Domain

J-A29045-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 THOMAS WILLIAM STEVENSON, JR.             :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 439 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
               Criminal Division at CP-10-CR-0001689-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                         FILED: January 4, 2024

      Thomas William Stevenson, Jr. (Appellant), appeals from the order

denying his first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA), see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      This Court set forth the factual history in a prior appeal:

      Corporal Michael Lewis testified that on September 9, 2015, he
      used a confidential informant [], Amanda Beck, to perform a
      controlled buy of drugs from [Appellant]. Beck performed several
      controlled buys for Corporal Lewis in exchange for anticipated
      leniency for her own pending drug arrest. On this occasion,
      Corporal Lewis asked Beck to call her dealer, [Appellant], and set
      up a heroin buy. She then went to the police barracks. Corporal
      Lewis confirmed that she was not carrying drugs[.] Corporal Lewis
      provided Beck with $240 in marked cash and a video camera
      disguised as a key fob, which he asked Beck to use to record a
      picture of [Appellant] and his apartment number, as well as
      anything else that she could capture without detection. Corporal
      Lewis then drove Beck to the apartment building where she was
      to conduct a drug buy.
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            Beck testified that when they arrived[,] she walked up the
     stairs in the apartment building, knocked on the door, and
     [Appellant] answered. She gave him the money and then went to
     retrieve the heroin bags[,] which [Appellant] had hidden behind a
     fire extinguisher in the hall outside of his apartment. When she
     picked up the heroin [Appellant] had set aside for her, Beck
     realized that [Appellant] had shorted her a couple of bags, and so
     [she] went back to the apartment. There[, Appellant] retrieved
     the extra bags and gave them to [Beck]. Beck then walked back
     to Corporal Lewis’s car, and gave the bags of heroin to him.

           During [Appellant’s jury] trial, the Commonwealth
     introduced the video recording that Beck captured of the sale,
     without any objection. The Commonwealth provided evidence
     that the drugs purchased were identified as 28 stamp bags of
     heroin.

            At the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, defense
     counsel orally moved for judgment of acquittal, stating simply, “I
     would like to make a motion for judgment of acquittal based upon
     the facts …. I defer to Your Honor on the testimony and evidence
     that’s been presented.” The court denied the motion.

            During jury deliberations, the court received a note from
     jurors asking to watch the video of the controlled buy, and asking,
     “Does everyone confirm person male [sic] in video is [Appellant?]”
     The trial court declined to answer the question regarding the
     identity of the male. However, [the court] brought the jury back
     into the courtroom to watch the video. After watching the video
     in the courtroom, the prosecutor offered to send his laptop
     containing a copy of the video back with the jury into the jury
     room:

        District Attorney: Your Honor, do you want the video to go
        back with them?

        THE COURT:     If you want to send your laptop back with
        them?

        District Attorney: I’m okay with that.

        Defense Counsel: Do you have any files on there?

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            THE COURT: It is an exhibit, so, they’re welcome to look at
            it.

            District Attorney: All right. Can you set it up so they can
            play it?

            THE COURT: Okay. We’re adjourned.

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 237 A.3d 1075, 558 WDA 2019 (Pa. Super.

filed June 9, 2020) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (citations and some

brackets omitted). Pertinently, Appellant did not testify.

       The jury convicted Appellant of possession of heroin, possession with

intent to deliver heroin, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 The trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 33 to 132 months in prison. On direct

appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See id. (unpublished

memorandum). Appellant did not seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court.

       On June 23, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant timely PCRA

petition.    The PCRA court appointed counsel who, after receiving several

extensions of time, filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf. The PCRA

court held a hearing.       Appellant’s trial and direct appeal counsel, Komron

Maknoon, Esquire (Attorney Maknoon), testified.       On March 24, 2023, the

PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30) and (31).

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     Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The PCRA court and Appellant

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     Appellant raises the following issues for review:

     I. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel provided ineffective
     assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular
     case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no
     reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

        a. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to properly plead Appellant’s issues on direct appeal and/or
        properly preserve the issues for appeal, thus waiving all issues
        for direct appeal.

        b. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to object or request a mistrial during the Commonwealth’s
        opening and closing arguments when the prosecutor injected
        his personal opinion as to the credibility of the Commonwealth
        witness.

        c. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to request a no adverse-inference jury charge, and Appellant
        was prejudiced as a result of the omission.

        d. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to lodge an objection to the prosecutor providing his laptop to
        the jury in the deliberation room to review the video of the
        alleged drug transaction.

        e. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to object to the numerous comments made at trial by
        Commonwealth witnesses regarding alleged prior bad acts
        committed by Appellant when no notice was provided by the
        Commonwealth under Pa.R.E. 404(b).

        f. Appellant’s trial/appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
        to seek a motion to strike the jury panel at the time of jury
        selections after learning that one of the jurors was the aunt of
        the Commonwealth witness as said prospective juror was left
        alone with the jury panel[,] thus potentially tainting the jury.

     II. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.

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Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (some capitalization altered).

      “Our standard of review in PCRA appeals is limited to determining

whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and free

from legal error.”   Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa.

2009).

      Appellant raises numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We

presume that counsel is effective, and the appellant bears the burden of

proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa.

2012). The appellant must demonstrate

      (1) The underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s
      action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis
      designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to
      the effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different
      outcome if not for counsel’s error.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted). Failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to an ineffectiveness

claim. See id.

      First, Appellant asserts Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to

preserve various claims for appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 16-22. On direct

appeal, Appellant argued 1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain his

convictions; 2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; 3) the trial

court erred by permitting the jury to view a video of the controlled buy on the

prosecutor’s laptop during deliberations; and 4) the trial court erred by

denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. This Court concluded

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Appellant waived all four issues.              See Stevenson, 558 WDA 2019

(unpublished memorandum).

       In his argument, Appellant points only to Attorney Maknoon’s

acknowledgement, during the PCRA hearing, that these four issues were

waived on direct appeal, and counsel had no reasonable basis for his failure

to properly preserve the claims. Appellant’s Brief at 21 (citing N.T. (PCRA),

11/17/22, at 7-9). Appellant states,

       In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the
       evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support that
       Appellant constructively and/or actually possessed the narcotics
       and paraphernalia in question nor possessed them with the intent
       to deliver.

Id. Appellant does not address the merits of the underlying sufficiency claim,

or discuss potential merits of the other three issues that were waived on direct

appeal. See generally Commonwealth v. Cannavo, 199 A.3d 1282, 1289

(Pa. Super. 2018) (“We shall not develop an argument for an appellant, nor

shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument….” (citation

omitted)). Absent an adequate discussion of the previously waived claims,

Appellant fails to establish that the issues would have entitled him to relief,

had Attorney Maknoon properly preserved them for review.2 Thus, Appellant’s

first claim fails.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also challenges the jury’s access to the controlled-buy video in a

separate issue, which we discuss infra.

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      Appellant also argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to

object to the prosecutor’s comments about Beck’s credibility during opening

and closing statements, or to request a mistrial on that basis. Appellant’s

Brief at 22.     Specifically, Appellant challenges the prosecutor’s comment

during opening statements: “And I’m telling you now -- and I met with [Beck]

and I have talked with her, she is telling the truth. She is going to tell you

the truth.” Id. at 22 (citing N.T (Trial), 2/26/19, at 18). Appellant further

cites the following statements from the prosecutor’s closing argument:

      •    “But I don’t think [Beck] had the wherewithal to get those
           drugs planted in there before she met with the State Police that
           day. I don’t think she would leave $240 just sitting somewhere
           in there and then get the drugs, come out and say, okay, I got
           him set up, I got the drugs, he sold me the drugs.”

      •    “It’s not a question of whether or not she came in and told the
           truth today. It’s a question of whether or not you believe that
           she was capable of faking this deal to set him up. Do you really
           think she could do that[?] I don’t -- I don’t think she could do
           that.”

Id. (citing N.T., 2/26/19, at 90-91). Appellant points to Attorney Maknoon’s

testimony at the PCRA hearing that if he were to try the case again, he would

object to the prosecutor’s statements because Beck’s credibility was central

to the case. Id. at 23-24.

             A claim of ineffective assistance grounded in counsel’s
      failure to object to a prosecutor’s comments may succeed when
      the petitioner demonstrates that the prosecutor’s comments
      violated a constitutionally or statutorily protected right…. The
      touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the
      prosecutor.

      ….

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            Not every unwise, intemperate, or improper remark made
      by a prosecutor mandates the grant of a new trial. Reversible
      error occurs only when the unavoidable effect of the challenged
      comments would prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a
      fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors
      could not weigh the evidence and render a true verdict.

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 692, 720-21 (Pa. 2014) (citations

and brackets omitted).

      A prosecutor may not express a personal belief concerning the credibility

of trial witnesses.   Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1020 (Pa.

Super. 2009). “However, the prosecutor may comment on the credibility of

witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Further, a prosecutor is allowed to respond to defense arguments
      with logical force and vigor. … If defense counsel has attacked
      the credibility of witnesses in closing, the prosecutor may present
      argument addressing the witnesses’ credibility.                See
      Commonwealth v. Fisher, 572 Pa. 105, 813 A.2d 761, 768
      (2002) (rejecting defense contention that the prosecutor
      improperly vouched for the credibility of prosecution witnesses
      since “the prosecutor was reviewing the testimony of several
      prosecution witnesses after defense counsel had attacked their
      testimony, in an effort to counter the argument of defense
      counsel”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 527 Pa. 118, 588 A.2d
      1303, 1305 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s comments stating
      that a defendant had lied were neither unfair nor prejudicial when
      given in response to the comments of defense counsel in relation
      to the credibility of witnesses, and when they were supported by
      the evidence).

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 544-45 (Pa. 2005) (brackets and

some citations omitted).

      As Appellant suggests, the prosecutor made one statement during oral

argument tending to indicate he believed Beck would be credible. See N.T.,

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2/26/19, at 18. However, we will not ignore the greater context within which

that statement was made. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655,

668 (Pa. 2007) (“A challenged statement by a prosecutor must be evaluated

in the context in which it was made.”). Before describing the testimony Beck

would offer, the prosecutor explained Beck’s role as a confidential informant

and acknowledged that confidential informants often have “checkered pasts.”

Id. at 17. The prosecutor conceded that Beck had prior arrests and pending

charges.    Id.; see also id. (“So, [Beck] doesn’t come in here with clean

hands.     And she’s going to own that, she’s going to admit to that.”).

Additionally, the prosecutor reminded the jurors that they were responsible

for deciding Beck’s credibility. Id. at 18 (“[Y]ou make your determination on

whether or not she is credible.”).   On this record, we conclude Appellant’s

comment, within the context of the prosecutor’s entire opening argument,

would not “prejudice the jurors and form in their minds a fixed bias and

hostility toward the defendant such that the jurors could not weigh the

evidence and render a true verdict.” Watkins, 108 A.3d at 721.

      Moreover, the record reveals that Attorney Maknoon attacked Beck’s

credibility in his closing argument. Attorney Maknoon described Beck as a

“dishonest drug dealer who is addicted to drugs….” N.T., 2/26/19, at 81; see

also id. (“What would she be willing to do to stay out of trouble[?] Anything.

Anything. So, she’s dishonest.”); id. at 82 (arguing, “[S]he’s a hustler….”).

Attorney Maknoon also stated that Beck “is worth zero for credibility.” Id. at

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85.   Because Attorney Maknoon repeatedly attacked the credibility of the

Commonwealth’s primary witness, the prosecutor’s statements were fair

rebuttal. See Chmiel, 889 A.2d at 544-45. Appellant’s claim therefore lacks

merit, and his ineffectiveness claim fails.

      In his third claim, Appellant argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective

for failing to request a no adverse inference jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at

25. According to Appellant, the jury likely drew an improper adverse inference

against him based on his decision not to testify at trial. Id. at 26.

      “A ‘no adverse inference’ instruction directs the jury that they may not

draw any adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to testify in his own

defense, because the defendant has the absolute right not to testify if he so

chooses.” Commonwealth v. Stanley, 830 A.2d 1021, 1022 n.1 (Pa. Super.

2003). This instruction must be given unless a defendant expressly waives

the jury charge through an on-the-record colloquy.         Id. at 1025 (citing

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 674 A.2d 217, 222 (Pa. 1996)). Counsel’s

failure to request either a no adverse inference instruction or a colloquy to

waive the jury charge is not per se prejudicial. Id. at 1026.

      It is undisputed that Appellant declined to testify in his defense. The

trial court conducted an on-the-record colloquy regarding Appellant’s right to

testify. N.T., 2/26/19, at 72-73. Before charging the jury, the trial court

reviewed all relevant jury instructions with Attorney Maknoon and the

prosecutor.   See id. at 76-79. The court did not mention the no adverse

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inference charge, and Attorney Maknoon did not request it. Further, Attorney

Maknoon did not object to the absence of a no adverse inference instruction

during the final charge to the jury.

      Appellant argues, “it is clear that the jury drew an improper adverse

inference” from his decision not to testify. However, our review discloses that

during preliminary instructions, the trial court advised the jury of Appellant’s

right not to testify:

      At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, the attorney for the
      defendant may present evidence for the defendant. But as I told
      you before, the defendant has no obligation to offer
      evidence or to testify. Under the law, every defendant’s
      presumed to be innocent [and] has a right to remain silent.
      The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove the defendant guilty
      beyond a reasonable doubt.

N.T., 2/26/19, at 4 (emphasis added). During the final jury charge, the trial

court reiterated that the burden of proof lies exclusively with the

Commonwealth:

      A fundamental principle of our system of criminal law is the
      defendant’s presumed to be innocent. … [A] defendant’s
      presumed to remain innocent throughout the trial unless and until
      you conclude based upon careful and impartial consideration of
      the evidence that the Commonwealth has proven him guilty
      beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges made against him. It’s
      not the defendant’s burden to prove that he’s not guilty. … A
      person accused of a crime is not required to present evidence or
      to prove anything in his own defense.

Id. at 94-95.

      Although the trial court did not expressly give a no adverse inference

charge, its instructions were sufficiently equivalent.         See generally

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Commonwealth v. Milliard, 260 A.3d 143, 1363 WDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed

July 13, 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 12-13) (appellant was not

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request a specific no adverse inference

charge or object to its omission where the trial court provided a sufficiently

similar charge).3 “The law presumes the jury will follow the instructions of the

court.”    Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 846 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted).      Appellant’s claim fails because he failed to establish

prejudice to a degree that would have altered the outcome of trial.4

       Next, Appellant argues Attorney Maknoon was ineffective for failing to

object to the provision of the prosecutor’s laptop to the jury to review the

video of the controlled buy. Appellant’s Brief at 27; id. at 20 (acknowledging

this Court previously found the underlying claim waived because Attorney

Maknoon failed to object at trial). Appellant raises concerns with the jury’s

“unfettered access” to the prosecutor’s laptop, which could have included

other inadmissible files. Id. at 27-28.

       Appellant fails to support this claim with citation to Rules of Evidence or

relevant case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (the argument shall include “such

____________________________________________

3 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential decisions of the

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value.

4 We acknowledge Attorney Maknoon’s testimony that he did not request the

no adverse inference instruction because “It’s standard and I missed it.” N.T.,
11/17/22, at 14. While this statement arguably supports a finding that
counsel lacked a reasonable basis for failing to object, failure to establish any
prong of the ineffectiveness test defeats a claim. Franklin, 990 A.2d at 797.

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discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). Accordingly,

we could deem this issue waived. See Commonwealth v. Samuel, 102 A.3d

1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding appellant waived his claim by failing

to adequately develop his argument or cite and discuss relevant authority).

      Nonetheless, we note that the trial court has discretion to permit an

exhibit to go to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Farkas, 276 A.3d 814, 819

(Pa. Super. 2022). The court’s “decision will not be overturned absent an

abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 646, “[u]pon retiring, the jury may take with

it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper, except as provided in

paragraph (C).” Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A).

      (C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:

         (1) a transcript of any trial testimony;

         (2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession by
         the defendant;

         (3) a copy of the information or indictment; and

         (4) except as provided in paragraph (B), written jury
         instructions.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C).

      This Court has explained,

      The underlying reason for excluding certain items from the jury’s
      deliberations is to prevent placing undue emphasis or credibility
      on the material, and de-emphasizing or discrediting other items
      not in the room with the jury. If there is a likelihood the
      importance of the evidence will be skewed, prejudice may be

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      found; if not, there is no prejudice per se and the error is
      harmless.

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation

omitted).

      Appellant does not contest the video’s admission as an exhibit during

trial. The jury viewed the video twice during Beck’s testimony. See N.T.,

2/29/19, at 33; id. at 37 (noting video was saved on disk). Rule 646(C) does

not expressly prohibit the jury’s use of a video in evidence during

deliberations, nor does it restrict the medium through which a jury may view

exhibits. We are sympathetic to Appellant’s general concerns about allowing

a jury “unfettered access” to a prosecutor’s laptop. However, in this case,

Appellant offers no evidence that the jurors had access to the laptop without

supervision; how long the jurors had access to the laptop; or what, if any,

additional files the jurors might have seen on the laptop. Appellant has neither

argued nor established that permitting the jury to view the video on the

prosecutor’s laptop placed undue emphasis on its contents or skewed its

importance. Cf. Dupre, supra. Because Appellant has failed to establish he

was prejudiced by Attorney Maknoon’s failure to object, this ineffectiveness

claim fails.

      In his fifth claim, Appellant contends Attorney Maknoon was ineffective

for failing to object to comments made by Commonwealth witnesses

concerning Appellant’s prior bad acts, where the Commonwealth did not

provide notice under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). Appellant’s Brief at 29. Appellant

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also claims a reference to him as a drug dealer “in and of itself insinuates prior

bad acts on the part of Appellant.” Id. at 30.

      Rule 404(b)(3) provides:

      In a criminal case the prosecutor must provide reasonable written
      notice in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair
      opportunity to meet it, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
      notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature, permitted use,
      and reasoning for the use of any such evidence the prosecutor
      intends to introduce at trial.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).

      Appellant fails to support his argument with citations to relevant case

law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Further, Appellant does not detail the specific

testimony he wishes to challenge. Appellant instead cites various pages of

trial testimony without further explanation. The cites reference Beck’s prior

dealings with Appellant, and Beck having been to Appellant’s apartment

building on more than one occasion. See N.T., 2/26/19, at 26-27, 29, 30-31,

44, 53. Importantly, Appellant advances only a bald claim that he was “clearly

prejudiced” as a result of Attorney Maknoon’s failure to object.                 See

Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 386 (Pa. 2005) (boilerplate

assertion that prejudice “is self-evident” was insufficient to establish counsel’s

ineffectiveness).

      The PCRA court observed that Beck made only one specific reference to

Appellant as a “drug dealer.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. The court

further concluded “an objection by trial counsel would not have changed the

outcome    of   the   trial   given   the   strong   evidence   presented   by   the

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Commonwealth.”        Id.   We discern no error in this determination, which is

supported by the record. As Appellant failed to establish prejudice to a degree

that would have altered the outcome of trial, this claim fails.

         In his sixth and final claim, Appellant asserts Attorney Maknoon was

ineffective for failing to file a motion to strike the jury panel. Appellant’s Brief

at 32.

         Appellant avers that at the time of jury selection[], it was brought
         to their attention that one of the prospective jurors was the aunt
         of the Commonwealth witness[, Beck]. Appellant further avers
         that although the juror was not selected, she had access to the
         other prospective jurors and could have tainted the jury panel.

Id.; see also id. (stating the prospective juror was alone with the jury panel).

         Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Harkins, 328 A.2d 156 (Pa.

1974), where the appellant claimed he was prejudiced when a prospective

juror accused him of stealing the juror’s car (an offense for which appellant

was not charged) in the presence of other prospective jurors. Harkins, 328

A.2d at 156-57. The trial court dismissed the prospective juror who made the

statement, but others who heard the statement served on the jury. Id. Our

Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by denying the defense motion

to strike the panel, “[s]ince the other prospective jurors also could have

reasonably understood that the accusation was directed at the appellant….”

Id. at 157. “The fact that a reasonable inference of a prior criminal record is

present in the minds of the jurors in and of itself mandates a new trial.” Id.

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

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       Here, there is no indication the juror made comments about Beck or

Appellant, and Appellant does not cite the record or any statements made by

the juror.5 “[T]he juror was struck for cause and was not part of the impaneled

jury for trial.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. Appellant suggests the

juror might have spoken to other prospective jurors at the end of the day,

some of whom were chosen for the jury. See N.T., 11/17/22, at 21 (PCRA

counsel asking Attorney Maknoon, “And do you recall if [the juror] … left with

other p[ro]spective jurors at the end of the day and could have had unfettered

access to talk to them about something, the case or whatever? Do you recall

seeing her leave with the other members of the jury panel including people

who were picked with this jury?”). As the PCRA court stated, this is “pure

speculation.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/24/23, at 4. Appellant’s final claim fails

for lack of arguable merit. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191,

1223 (Pa. 2006) (stating “counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to

raise a meritless claim”).

       For the above reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

5 The record does not contain transcripts of voir dire. “[T]he ultimate
responsibility of ensuring that the transmitted record is complete rests
squarely upon the appellant and not upon the appellate courts.”
Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 905 A.2d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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DATE: 1/4/2024

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