Court Opinion

ID: 9461344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:11:56.428423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:00.628506
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I believe that in the circumstances presented here the majority of the Court has adopted an overly rigid and technical view with respect to this Court’s jurisdiction over a pro se prisoner’s appeal.1 Although I do not dissent in view of the limited action taken by the majority, I nevertheless believe it important to note my disappointment with the restricted reading by the majority concerning both jurisdiction and the district court’s disposition of the merits.
As to jurisdiction: while I do not advocate lessening our jurisdictional requirements, I believe it a waste of judicial time and effort under these circumstances not to address Rothman’s petition on its merits. I believe Rothman has set forth a prima facie showing of *654this Court’s jurisdiction on appeal. Accordingly, although more detailed development of jurisdictional facts would be helpful, I believe that a remand for such purpose is not necessitated where:
(1) The petitioner is a pro se prisoner litigant;
(2) The petitioner has alleged a prima facie jurisdictional basis; 2
(3) The government has not contested or contradicted the underlying jurisdictional fact asserted; 3 see, e. g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d Cir. 1972);
(4) We could retain jurisdiction, remanding to the district court for action on a (pro forma) application for a 30 day extension of time for appeal; 4
(5) There is no bar to the petitioner reinstituting the application.5
As to the merits: the majority opinion restricts reference to the merits to footnote 27 where the mojority indicates that the district court may wish “to afford Rothman’s pro se petition a broad reading and consider whether, under the circumstances of this case, Rothman is entitled to a writ of coram nobis . . . ”. In my view, the district court is required to afford the petition a broad reading. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). I see no justification for the district court dismissing the petition on “non-custody” grounds under § 2255 without first determining if there exists other bases for relief. Here, even-*655though Rothman had styled his action under § 2255, his motion to vacate sentence should have been treated as an application for a writ of coram nobis by reason of his having been unconditionally released from custody under the challenged sentence.6 See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22-23, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). On an initial motion seeking a collateral remedy, as here, a district judge is not obliged to limit his examination to the grounds narrowly alleged, but is free to, and I believe is required to, adopt any appropriate means to ascertain all possible grounds on which the petitioner might claim relief. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505, 74 S.Ct. 247; cf. Johnston v. United States, 424 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Coke, 404 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968) (motion labelled as § 2255 treated under Rule 35). As such, based upon the allegations presented before the court below, I am of the opinion that Rothman, although labelling his application as a § 2255 petition, in effect sought a writ of coram nobis so as to vacate his 1960 federal conviction after service of the full term.
Rothman alleges in his petition that he was denied his rights to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because his co-defendant, with whom Rothman allegedly shared counsel, was before and during trial a Government agent. Such an allegation, if proven, demonstrates that conflict of interest or prejudice as would deprive the defendant of effective assistance of counsel. We have held joint representation under analogous circumstances to be constitutionally defective. See United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir. 1972); Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 2219, 26 L.Ed.2d 573 (1970). Rothman further contends that because of his prior conviction in 1960, he has been and is subject to greater punishment upon sentencing for his subsequent convictions. I note that in similar circumstances such an allegation was held to be sufficient to support application for a writ of coram nobis. E. g., United States v. Forlano, 319 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1963); Wharton v. United States, 348 F.Supp. 1026 (D.Ark.), aff’d, 470 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1972).
Reviewing the allegations presented here, it appears that the appropriate remedy might well be the issuance of a writ of coram nobis. Coram nobis is an extraordinary writ, which permits a court to correct its own judgment in light of a substantial error of fact not appearing on the record. The writ is designed to correct errors of fact of “the most fundamental character, that is, such as to rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 509 ri. 15, 74 S.Ct. at 251; United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1963). Where the petition, as here, alleges compelling constitutional circumstances arising from facts not appearing of record at the time of Rothman’s 1960 conviction, a proceeding in coram nobis is appropriate. See, e. g., United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511, 512, 74 S.Ct. 247; United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d at 184.
In light of the petition revealing on its face prima facie jurisdiction and facts asserting a cognizable claim for relief, I would reverse not for the limited purpose of ascertaining additional jurisdictional facts but rather with the direction *656that the district court treat the petition as an application for a writ of coram nobis and conduct appropriate proceedings. Ultimately, this Court must reach this issue on the merits. I see no reason why we should not reach it now.

. Compare Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142-144, 84 S.Ct. 1689, 12 L.Ed.2d 760 (1964); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442 n. 5, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962); Williams v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 212, 188 F.2d 41 (1951).

. Rothman has stated, without contradiction, that his notice of appeal was duly mailed in the federal penitentiary in Atlanta on January 4, 1974. In the normal course of events the letter should have been received by the District Court Clerk on Monday, January 7, 1974, within the 60 day time period allowed for appeal. See note 3, infra.

. The Government’s challenge was predicated on a 30 day period for appeal as it argued that the notice of appeal, received January 17, 1974, was received more than 30 days after the November 8, 1973 order. Under Fed.R. App.P. 4(a), however, petitioner had 60 days to appeal. As noted previously, see note 2, supra, Rothman stated that he mailed his notice of appeal within time sufficient for it to be received before the 60 day period expired. Rothman’s statement that he “mailed” the letter on January 4, 1974 is not controverted by the Government.
Although, as noted by the majority, the notarization of Rothman’s letter by a parole officer is dated January 10, 1974, I do not believe the difference in the dates of notarization, and mailing necessarily makes suspect Rothman’s statement that on January 4, 1974 he deposited his notice of appeal to be mailed. My concern here is whether Roth-man continued to exercise sufficient control over the letter’s disposition so that delays in its mailing may be chargeable to him. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. at 143-144, 84 5. Ct. 1689. Consequently, I believe there is no reason to conclude, on the basis of what this record discloses, that the subsequent delay was necessarily chargeable to Rothman. Id.

. I recognize that in similar circumstances, the problem of filing delays by prisoners has been dealt with by other appellate courts by remanding the action to the district court to allow the petitioner to move for a 30 day extension of time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a). E. g., Cramer v. Wise, supra, Tuley v. Heyd, 492 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1966). I note, however, that where remand has been ordered, the particular court of appeals retained jurisdiction pending a determination of excusable neglect by the district court. Moreover, in Weaver v. State of Texas, 469 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1972), not only was jurisdiction retained but the petition for rehearing was granted.
I believe that on the present record, limited to the factual and procedural situation presented here, the initial jurisdictional burden has been carried by Rothman and that there is no present need to remand for an excusable neglect determination. Accordingly, in this situation, I prefer not to follow the procedural remand device ordered in the above cases.

. Even if it were to be decided that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the appeal was untimely filed, there would be no bar to reinstitution of an action by Rothman to collaterally attack his 1960 conviction and sentence. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10, 14, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); Arrington v. United States, 425 F.2d 244, 245 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 835, 91 S.Ct. 72, 27 L.Ed.2d 68 (1971).

. As the challenge here is to the conviction itself, and not to the sentence imposed, a motion under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 is not the appropriate vehicle for relief:
“Sentences subject to correction under that rule are those that the judgment of conviction did not authorize.”
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506, 74 S.Ct. at 250. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959).