Court Opinion

ID: 9513436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:35:34.92408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:51.629944
License: Public Domain

GERALD G. GLASER, Surrogate Judge,
dissenting.
[¶ 7] I don’t believe it necessary to invoke Rule 54(b) in this case.
[¶ 8] The trial court addressed and decided all the issues. In doing so, a sub-issue was created. It came into existence because Judge Riskedahl erroneously invoked § 14-03.1-06, N.D.C.C., in determining that the premarital agreement, while not unconscionable when it was executed, was unconscionable in result be*592cause the surviving widow would be entitled to some public assistance unless the court required the personal representative of a decedent’s estate to provide sufficient assistance to avoid such eligibility.
[¶ 9] The statute relied on by the trial court does contain an unconscionability component but subsection 1(b) specifies it must exist at the time the premarital agreement is signed. Unconscionability cannot exist or cease to exist or, like a phoenix, rise again as time and circumstances change. The trial court found no unconscionability involved in the agreement when it was executed and specifically found to the contrary.
[¶ 10] Subsection 2 does not address un-conscionability at all. It addresses spousal support. It specifies that a premarital agreement is not enforceable against a spouse if it modifies or eliminates a spousal support obligation which would otherwise make the spouse ineligible for public assistance at the time of separation or dissolution of the marriage. A deceased spouse cannot, by definition, have a spousal support obligation.
[¶ 11] In addition, even if subsections 1 and 2 were otherwise applicable, neither would support a finding of unconscionability because a spouse or widow, as the case may be, is in the same monetary position regardless of whether the support came from the estate of the deceased spouse or from the public treasury.
[¶ 12] It perhaps should also be noted that § 30.1-05-07(2)(a), N.D.C.C., does have a provision similar to subsection 2 of 14-03.1-06 which applies in the case of widows, but this provision did not exist at the time the documents in this case were signed and when Mr. Lutz died. It was added at a later session of the Legislature at the request of Blaine Nordwall, Counsel for the Department of Human Services, as an obvious corollary to § 14-03.1-06(2), N.D.C.C.
[¶ 13] Accordingly, I see no purpose for remanding and would proceed with determination of the other issues raised in the appeal.
[¶ 14] Gerald G. Glaser, S.J.