Court Opinion

ID: 9370849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 20:02:21.665676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.148476
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

In re JAYDEN G., a Person              B321426
Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law.
_______________________________        Los Angeles County
                                       Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP00015A
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
        Plaintiff and Respondent,

        v.

S.G.,
        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charles Q. Clay, Judge. Reversed.
      Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _______________________
       Mother S.G. appeals after the juvenile court terminated her
parental rights to son Jayden G. She raises two challenges.
First, she faults the Los Angeles Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) for failing to exercise due diligence in
locating her son’s father, Cesar T. (Father). Mother argues this
failure to locate Father, which included ignoring information she
provided on how to locate him, invalidated the notice the court
deemed proper for Father. Second, she contends DCFS did not
comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 224.2,1 subdivision (b) when it failed to
ask maternal and paternal extended family members about
Indian ancestry within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
       This dependency proceeding lasted over two years. In that
time, DCFS made two attempts to locate Cesar T. and it did so
using databased search resources only. It made no attempt to
inquire about Indian ancestry after obtaining Mother’s denial of
such ancestry. We find DCFS did not exercise reasonable due
diligence in its attempts to locate Father. We also find DCFS
erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without inquiring
of available family members for whom it had contact information.
Because we must reverse and remand for proper notice to Father,
we also direct the juvenile court to order DCFS to conduct and
complete a proper inquiry into whether Jayden has Indian
ancestry.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                2
                        BACKGROUND

A.    Notice to Father
      On January 2, 2019, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging Jayden (born 2011), his half-sister (born 2014) and his
half-brother (born 2016) were at risk of physical harm, damage,
danger and physical abuse because of Mother’s physical abuse,
Mother’s failure to provide Jayden with his prescribed
psychotropic medication after emergency psychiatric
hospitalization in November 2018 and Mother’s failure to
supervise and protect Jayden who was found in a park in
December 2018 without adult supervision and care. Six days
before the petition was filed, the juvenile court issued an order
removing the children from Mother because of concerns about
general neglect.2 Jayden was placed with a foster parent.
       The reports prepared for the detention hearing concluded
Cesar T.’s whereabouts were unknown. They advised the court
that “Mother reported Jayden’s father is Cesar [C.]. He is not
involved and is in jail.” In the same reports Mother stated
Jayden’s father is Cesar T.
      At the January 3, 2019 detention hearing, Mother orally
advised the court that Jayden’s father is Cesar T. and he was
currently incarcerated. On the same date, Mother had also
completed a Parentage Questionnaire in which she named Cesar
Eduardo T. as Jayden’s father. She listed Cesar T.’s year of birth
as 1977 and stated she believed he was in local custody. At the
hearing the court detained Jayden. It also ordered DCFS to
prepare a due diligence report on efforts to locate Cesar T. and
the fathers of Jayden’s half-siblings. If the report was not filed

2     This appeal concerns Jayden only.

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before the adjudication hearing, DCFS was ordered to bring the
dependency investigator in for the adjudication hearing. On the
record, the court itemized what was known about Father: “Birth
year of 1977,” name “Cesar Eduardo T.,” “[h]e’s in local custody,”
and “February 11th for his arraignment from county jail.”
      The next hearing was the jurisdiction/adjudication hearing
on February 22, 2019. The jurisdiction/disposition report filed on
February 8, 2019 advised the court that Mother lived with
maternal grandmother and maternal aunt. Mother stated she
grew up with her mother with whom she has a good relationship.
She reported that she “broke up with Cesar [T.] due to his
continued methamphetamine use, although she quit using when
she found out that she was pregnant.”
      The report also indicated Cesar T.’s whereabouts were
unknown. According to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
website, he was not incarcerated.
      As ordered, DCFS filed a Declaration of Due Diligence
cataloguing its efforts to locate Cesar T. On January 29, 2019,
DCFS had searched internet law enforcement and prison
databases and AT&T telephone listings for the name Cesar T.
DCFS advised the court “A proper Due Diligence could not be
completed without a date of birth.” DCFS reported it made no
telephone calls, sent no letters, and contacted no relatives,
friends, or neighbors. The Declaration of Due Diligence
confirmed that most databased sources of information were not
useful because Cesar T.’s complete birthdate was unknown. It
appears DCFS did not use as leads the birth year of 1977, the
middle name Eduardo, or the February 11 date of local
arraignment.

                                4
       A last minute information (LMI) report filed March 4, 2019
advised that mother came into the DCFS office on February 25,
2019, accompanied by maternal grandmother, maternal aunt,
and maternal cousin. The LMI stated Mother disclosed Cesar T.
was “not incarcerated anymore and that she saw him the day he
got out of jail because his father lives on her street. Mother said
she told [Cesar T.] about Jayden and the case and that [he] said
he would go visit [maternal grandmother] to speak with her but
never did.” Mother stated she did not have “any of the fathers’
numbers or DOB.” The LMI also reported “A search of the
[Sheriff’s Department] website indicates no match to the [Cesar
T.] father. The Department of Corrections website notes 3
matches per the father’s name but the date of birth/age of father
is unknown. However, Mother has reported that Father has been
released from custody.”
       At the adjudication hearing on March 4, 2019, the court
struck the allegations of physical abuse and Mother entered a no
contest plea to the remaining allegations. The court found due
diligence had been completed as to Jayden’s father and his
whereabouts were unknown. On March 5, 2019, the court found
Jayden to be a dependent of the court, ordered him removed from
Mother, and ordered reunification services for mother and
monitored visitation. On May 1,2019 Jayden was placed with
maternal cousin A.L. On that same date, the juvenile court
signed an order finding Cesar T. to be Jayden’s alleged father.
       Eight months later, on January 3, 2020, DCFS filed a First
Amended Petition with allegations of domestic violence between
Mother and the newly located father of Jayden’s half-brother. It
also included allegations that Mother’s 16-year history of illicit
drug abuse rendered her incapable of regularly caring for and

                                 5
supervising the children. On January 16, 2020, the court
sustained the illegal drug abuse allegation.
       On September 29, 2020, the court terminated reunification
services for Mother, finding her case plan compliance
unsatisfactory. After this point, all future hearings focused on
permanency and adoption planning.
       On November 20, 2020, DCFS prepared an updated
Declaration of Due Diligence as to the search for Cesar T. The
Declaration stated that “[n]o telephone calls were made or
contact letters were mailed” to any relatives or friends or
neighbors because there was “no information” about anyone
falling into those categories. The Declaration ends with a
Summary: “The efforts to locate Cesar [T.] were initiated
through the State of California Department of Child Support
Statewide Service (SWS), the LEADERS search, and the
CWS/CMS search. Internet research was conducted through the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Inmate Information
Center, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, the Los Angeles County Department of Probation,
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Global-Locate.com, the AT&T
telephone listings, the Service Members Civil Relief Act website,
and the CLEAR search database. Contact letters were not sent
to Cesar [T.], the respective Postmasters, or the Los Angeles
County Registrar of Voters. A CLETS report was not searched
via the Department of Justice for a criminal record. A birth
certificate was attached, and did not list Cesar [T.] as the father
of Jayden [G.].”
       At the permanency planning hearing on January 20, 2021,
the court noted that “[n]otice is not proper for today’s hearing as
we need publication orders.” The court remarked that “the

                                 6
search was done without benefit of a social security number or
date of birth . . . . So no address was obtained as a result of the
search. The due diligence is found proper and complete, and the
court will now sign the publication orders.”
        At the next hearing on April 21, 2021, the court noted that
notice to Father was still not as required by law. The court
stated “[W]e need publication for Dad and a 75-day date.”
       On April 27, 2021 DCFS filed “Application for Order For
Publication of Citation or to Dispense With Publication For
Identity Unknown Parent Per WIC § 294 (For the WIC § 366.26
Hearing).” On April 27, 2021, the court granted the application
and ordered publication of the citation in a newspaper of general
circulation. The court also ordered that notice be given to all
“Grandparents of the child, if their identities and addresses are
known, by first-class mail.” Publication was effectuated on April
30, May 7, May 14, and May 21, 2021 in the Daily Commerce.
       However, the record does not show service by first-class
mail on Jayden’s grandparents, including Cesar T.’s father who,
according to Mother, lived down the street from her. Instead, the
status review report for April 19, 2022, states notice was given by
first-class mail to only Mother, Jayden, and the prospective
adoptive parent A.L. Actual proofs of service in the record for the
permanency planning hearings also show service was effectuated
on only Mother, Jayden, and the prospective adoptive parent A.L.
       At the next hearing on July 21, 2021, the court asked the
parties present whether there were objections to the notice DCFS
had given. Mother, through counsel, stated she had no objection.
On October 19, 2021, the court again reiterated “[G]ood notice to
continue. On July 21st when the court found notice proper to
parents.”

                                 7
      On January 18, 2022, the court again asked the parties if
anyone wanted to be heard regarding notice. Mother, through
counsel, observed notice was previously found proper and
proffered no objection to notice.
      On April 19, 2222, the court found Jayden adoptable,
terminated parental rights, and designated Jayden’s current
caretakers (A.L. and her partner) as his prospective adoptive
parents. This appeal followed.

B.     ICWA
       On January 3, 2019, Mother signed an ICWA-020 Form
declaring under penalty of perjury that she had “no Indian
ancestry” as far as she knew. At the initial detention hearing of
the same date, the juvenile court found no reason to know Jayden
is an Indian child as defined under ICWA and declined to order
notice to any tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. It advised the
parents to keep DCFS, counsel, and the court aware of any new
information relating to Jayden’s status under ICWA. On
January 24, 2019, Mother also orally denied Indian heritage.
Father was never asked about ICWA as his whereabouts were
always unknown.

                           DISCUSSION

A.      DCFS Failed to Conduct a Reasonable Due Diligence
        Inquiry as to Cesar T.’s Whereabouts.
        The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S.
Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) Because parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and

                                  8
management of their children, the due process clause requires
child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in
attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings.
(In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 569, 572; In re Mia M. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807.) This requires a thorough and
systematic investigation to protect a parent’s fundamental liberty
interest. (In re Mia M., at p. 808.)
       We review de novo whether inadequate notice violated a
parent’s due process rights. (In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th
174, 183.) Whether a due process violation in the dependency
context is structural error requiring automatic reversal is an
open question. (See In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063,
1083 [“We express no view on the cases that have applied a rule
of automatic reversal where there was a complete absence of
notice.”].) In declining to address the issue, the Court noted “The
Courts of Appeal that have addressed notice errors in the
dependency context have attempted to draw a line between cases
in which there was a complete deprivation of notice and cases in
which there was some lesser defect as to the notice, with only the
former requiring automatic reversal.” (Id. at p. 1082; see also, In
re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 387 [when there is no
attempt to serve a parent with notice the error is reversible per
se; when there is error in the notice the question is whether the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; Ansley v. Superior
Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 483 [“It is settled beyond
dispute that if a parent proves the absence of due process notice
to him in juvenile dependency proceedings, a ‘fatal defect’ exists
in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to have entered the
dependency judgment.”]; In re Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at

                                 9
p. 806 [“An error in attempted notice is subject to a harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.”].)
      Before we get to the merits of Mother’s argument, we must
address Cesar T.’s status as an alleged father.

      1.     Status as Alleged Father
      On May 1, 2019, the juvenile court found Cesar T. to be an
alleged father. Dependency law recognizes four categories of
fathers—biological, presumed, alleged, and de facto. (In re E.T.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436–437.) Generally a presumed
father is one who receives the child into his home and holds
himself out as the child’s father. (In re Jerry P. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801–802.) A presumed father is also one who
is married to the child’s biological mother and the child is born
during the marriage. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (a).) A biological
father is one whose paternity of the child has been established
but who has not qualified as the child’s presumed father under
Family Code section 7611. An alleged father is a man who may
be the father of the child, but whose biological paternity has not
been established, or, in the alternative, has not achieved
presumed father status. (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
1113, 1120.) “Due process for an alleged father requires only that
he be given notice and an opportunity to appear and assert a
position and attempt to change his paternity status.” (Ibid.)
Thus, Cesar T., as Jayden’s alleged father, was entitled to notice
and an opportunity to appear and participate in the dependency
proceedings.

                               10
       2.    Analysis of the Merits
       In juvenile dependency proceedings, due process requires
parents be given notice that is reasonably calculated to advise
them that an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to
defend. (In re Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 807.)
Reasonable diligence includes not only “ ‘ “standard avenues
available to help locate a missing parent,” but “ ‘specific ones
most likely under the unique facts known to the [Agency] to yield
[a parent’s] address.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 807–808.) “Social services
agencies, invested with a public trust and acting as temporary
custodians of dependent minors, are bound by law to make every
reasonable effort in attempting to inform parents of all hearings.
They must leave no stone unturned.” (In re DeJohn B. (2000)
84 Cal.App.4th 100, 102.)
        Here DCFS had more to go on in searching for Jayden’s
father than just the name Cesar T. It had a middle name, a year
of birth, and the information that Father had been arrested
recently, had been in local custody, and had a specific court date.
Significantly, it also knew Cesar T.’s own father lived down the
street from Mother’s residence.
       Notwithstanding these facts, DCFS did nothing more than
search certain computer databases, without exploring the more
specific information provided by Mother, information the juvenile
court expressly put on the record and exhorted DCFS to use when
it ordered the due diligence report. The most likely avenues for
finding Cesar T.—for example, tracking down his father in a
house located on the same street as Mother’s residence, adding a
middle name to differentiate Father from others with his same
common combination of first and last names, using a birth year to
narrow the pool of men with the name Cesar T., checking court

                                11
arraignment or LASD transport records for February 11 using his
complete name—were ignored. This was not a reasonably
diligent effort to locate Cesar T. Indeed, limiting searches to
generalized databases where there is more localized and specific
information from relatives has been found to be error in
numerous cases. (In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583 [relying
on government database searches when children were in contact
with father through social media]; In re Daniel F. (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 701 [limiting search to U.S. databases when
relatives told the agency father was in Mexico]; In re Mia M.,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 792 [running standard California and
federal databases when family told agency father lived in
Oklahoma].)
      Even publication does not save this search. DCFS
published notice for Father in a newspaper of general circulation,
the Daily Commerce. However, service by publication will not
satisfy due process if it is not the most likely means of notifying
the parent. (In re Mia M., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 808–809.)
Given the localized search alternatives described above, we
cannot find that publication by notice fulfilled DCFS’s duty of due
diligence.

       3.    Prejudice
       Assuming Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
applies, we find DCFS’s formulaic search for Cesar T. was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Father had
inadequate notice of the proceedings, he was unable to exercise
his right to come into court and assert his position with respect to
Jayden. It is not reasonable to assume Cesar T. would never
have appeared anyway, as Respondent argues. We do not know if
he truly failed to call maternal grandmother as he said he would

                                12
because DCFS did not follow up on that lead. There is no
evidence to suggest Cesar T. would have nonetheless failed to
assert his rights had he been given notice. The error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.     DCFS Failed to Conduct an Adequate Initial Inquiry into
       Jayden’s Indian Ancestry.
       Where, as here, the facts are undisputed, we independently
determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied. (In
re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051.
       In enacting the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
Congress found “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of
their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies
and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are
placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).) ICWA reflects the intent of Congress “to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
Indian children from their families and the placement of such
children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to
Indian tribes in the operation of child and family service
programs.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The court is obligated to ask each
“participant” in the proceedings whether they have reason to
believe the child is an Indian child and to instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides a reason to know the child is an Indian child. (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882–883.)

                                13
       ICWA authorizes states to provide even more protection
than the federal statute provides. In 2006, the California
legislature enacted parallel statutes to affirm ICWA’s purposes
and mandate compliance with ICWA in all Indian child custody
proceedings. (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706, fn. 3.)
In California, the child protection agency is obligated to ask “the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) The child protection
agency, in this case DCFS, must complete the Indian Child
Inquiry Attachment form ICWA-010(a) and attach it to the
petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
       Here, DCFS did not ask the maternal and paternal
extended family members about their Indian ancestry, despite
having contact with maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and
maternal cousin and information about paternal grandfather’s
residence. This was a violation of California law.
       Ordinarily the next question is whether the error was
prejudicial. A prerequisite to reversal of a trial court’s decision in
California is showing a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13.) However, because we must remand the matter in
any event to effectuate a complete and diligent search for Cesar
T., we also direct the juvenile court to ensure that DCFS
completes its duty of initial inquiry by asking available maternal
and paternal relatives about Indian ancestry.

C.    Reversal Is Warranted as to Both Parents
      Given the combination of due process notice violations and
ICWA error, we exercise our discretion to conditionally reverse
the orders terminating parental rights for both Mother and

                                 14
Father. (In re J.R., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 573.) Nothing in
our opinion requires the juvenile court to revisit its prior rulings
as to Mother unless new facts arising from the investigations on
remand into Cesar T.’s whereabouts and Jayden’s Indian
ancestry impact the bases of its prior decisions.

                        DISPOSITION
      The order terminating parental rights is conditionally
reversed with direction to the juvenile court to order DCFS to
complete its duty of due diligence to discover the whereabouts of
Cesar T. and complete its initial inquiry of available maternal
and paternal relatives into familial Indian ancestry.

      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

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