Court Opinion

ID: 9662594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:13:50.820762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:40.933678
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice STUMBO.
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion because I believe Appellant is entitled to a new trial due to the failure of juror Ernst to respond truthfully to a question that would have resulted in her dismissal for cause by the trial court.
Since Appellant was compelled to use one of his peremptory challenges against Ernst, when she should have been excused for cause, he should be granted a new trial. Appellant quotes from a recent opinion of this Court, wherein it states: “[I]t has always been the law in Kentucky ‘that prejudice is presumed, and the defendant is entitled to a reversal in those cases where a defendant is forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who should have been excused for cause.’ ” Gamble v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 367, 374 (2002) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (1993)).
Without question, Ernst should not have remained silent when the trial judge questioned the jury panel regarding Jones’ statement. If Ernst had appropriately responded, then she would have been struck for cause by the trial court. As noted in Gamble, supra: “All that is required is that ‘[a] party must exercise all of his peremptory challenges in order to sustain a claim of prejudice due to the failure of the court to grant a requested challenge for cause.’” I note that here the trial court excused for cause every other juror who acknowledged hearing Jones’ statement. None were asked whether they believed Jones’ statement prior to the court’s determination that they should be *222struck for cause. The juror withheld information that would have resulted in her being stricken. Thus, there was reversible error and this matter should be retried.
LAMBERT, C.J., joins this dissent.