Court Opinion

ID: 9836904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:28.402274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.253241
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(concurring):
I agree completely with the majority opinion. I write separately to set out in greater detail my reasons for upholding the military judge’s ruling on the challenge of MAJ R.
In my view, the military judge should not have allowed the defense to ask questions on voir dire that asked for a sentencing commitment from court members based solely on the nature of the offenses. See United States v. McLaren, 38 MJ 112, 118 (CMA 1993) (recognizing that responses to “artful” questions and inaccurate responses do not require that a challenge for cause be granted). Thus, it is not surprising that the court members’ responses required clarification.
This Court has long recognized that “[a]n unfavorable inclination toward an offense is not automatically disqualifying.” United States v. Giles, 48 MJ 60, 63 (1998), quoting United States v. Bannwarth, 36 MJ 265, 268 (CMA 1993), and citing United States v. Reynolds, 23 MJ 292, 294 (CMA 1987), and United States v. Cosgrove, 1 MJ 199 (CMA 1975). “[T]he test is whether the member’s attitude is of such a nature that he will not yield to the evidence presented and the judge’s instructions.” McLaren, supra, quoting United States v. McGowan, 7 MJ 205,206 (CMA 1979).
In this case, the defense voir dire included the following:
Q. Shall we start again?
A. [MAJ R] Well, your question is, if he was found guilty on all charges should he stay in the Army?
Q. Yeah — I mean, you read these five specifications, or whatever they are called — pretty lengthy stuff — now, knowing that and he is convicted of them, do you want somebody in the Army like that? Do you think there is a place in the Army for people who do those things?
A. Well, if he is found guilty, I would say no.
*115Q. So, in your opinion he shouldn’t be in the Army?
A. If he is guilty — if he is found guilty.
Q. And then, if he — you’d consider everything, but basically, your opinion, if he is convicted, he ought to be removed from the Army?
A. That’s correct.
The military judge recognized what the defense was doing. He first explained that the court-martial was “not an administrative elimination board.” He explained that “a dismissal for an officer is like a dishonorable discharge for an enlisted person,” and that “it’s a very severe punishment, you could never erase the effects of it.” He discovered upon questioning MAJ R that he did not understand that the adjudication of guilt was separate from the determination of a sentence. The military judge then asked the following clarifying questions:
Q. Well — but, there is guilty or not guilty, and then there is mitigating and extenuating circumstances. What I’m saying is, is that based upon the mere fact that he is guilty, you would feel compelled to vote for a dismissal, regardless of any of the other evidence?
A. Well, no, I guess I need — when you said that there is mitigating or other — I guess, I would need to hear that first, that would come out in the trial.
Q. So, you could envision that there might be some mitigating or extenuating circumstances that wouldn’t warrant a dismissal — a punitive separation?
A. Can I envision any? No, but I might hear some.
Q. All right. Could you consider everything from zero punishment to the maximum, whatever that is?
A. Yes, sir, I’ve done that before when I’ve given Article 15’s and other nonjudicial — but, I guess, if you’re asking at face value, without hearing any of the other things — could I weigh it between the two? I would weigh it.
Q. But it would be hard for you to envision any extenuating or mitigating circumstances so extreme as to allow you to keep the accused in the service?
A. That’s correct.
Trial counsel then asked the following questions:
Q. Major [R], if we could just touch on this issue just a little bit more, with respect to any punishment, do you feel that there is any automatic punishment that you must give to the accused, if you found him guilty of anything?
A. No.
Q. Do you believe that you would be able to consider evidence in the sentencing phase of the trial, that would allow you to determine whether or not a dismissal was appropriate? For example, do you believe there might be evidence, although you might not be able to imagine in your mind right now—
A. Okay, I understand what you’re— yeah, I think that if I heard something that I’m not aware of right now, that, yes, I could take that into consideration.
Q. You just can’t think of anything because you don’t know the facts of the case?
A. At the — that’s correct.
Q. Okay. So, if you heard it — you would wait to determine whether or not to assess a dismissal or any other type of punishment?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Until you’ve heard the evidence?
A. [Affirmative response]
Q. So, do I understand you to say, you don’t feel compelled to do that?
A. No, I wouldn’t be compelled to do that.
Q. Just because of the charges?
A. That’s correct.
We recognize that a military judge has a “superior position in evaluating the demean- or of court members.” Thus, we grant a military judge “great deference” and we “will not reverse a ruling on a challenge for cause absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. McLaren, supra. I agree with the majority that the military judge did not abuse his discretion.
Finally, I agree with the majority that this case is distinguishable from our recent decision in United States v. Giles, supra. In *116Giles, the court member in question was adamant. He agreed to listen to the evidence before deciding on a sentence, but said that he was “necessarily set on a bad-conduct discharge.” 48 MJ at 61. In this case, once the military judge cleared up the confusion, the member unqualifiedly stated that he would reserve judgment on whether to vote for a dismissal until he heard all the evidence.