Court Opinion

ID: 9909018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 15:05:20.001304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:54.288747
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13387

   WILLIAM J. PAPP, THIRD vs. WESTBOROUGH GARDENS LLC/BVF-V
                        WESTBOROUGH LLC.

                       December 12, 2023.

   Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

     The plaintiff, William J. Papp, III, appeals from the
judgment of a single justice of this court denying, without a
hearing, his complaint for declaratory relief pursuant to G. L.
c. 231A, § 1; relief in the nature of certiorari pursuant to
G. L. c. 249, § 4; and a stay of eviction. We affirm.

     Papp's request for relief relates to a complaint that he
previously filed against the defendant landlord in the Superior
Court, alleging unfair and deceptive acts in violation of G. L.
c. 93A. The landlord filed a document in the Superior Court
matter entitled "notice of transfer," representing that the
"action [was] within the jurisdiction of the Central Division of
the Housing Court Department," and the case was then transferred
there, where a summary process case was already pending between
the same parties.

     Papp takes issue with this transfer. He contends that the
transfer occurred in violation of the requirements of G. L.
c. 185C, § 20, and further, that the transfer deprived him of
due process insofar as it was effected without a motion and
without an opportunity for Papp to be heard. Based on these
arguments, he brought the claims at issue in the county court,
seeking declaratory relief, relief in the nature of certiorari,
and a stay of eviction.

     But in order to have qualified for the relief he sought,
Papp "b[ore] the burden [of] alleg[ing] and demonstrat[ing] the
                                                                   2

absence or inadequacy of other remedies." Kim v. Rosenthal, 473
Mass. 1029, 1030 (2016). Indeed, G. L. c. 231A, § 1, does not
provide declaratory relief "in lieu of pursuing . . . available
appellate remed[ies]" (citation omitted). Levine v. Chief
Justice of the Dist. Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 434 Mass.
1014, 1015 (2001). And "[t]he purpose of a civil action in the
nature of certiorari is to correct errors that 'are not
otherwise reviewable by motion or by appeal.'" Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 1006, 1007 (2012), quoting G. L. c. 249,
§ 4. To the extent that Papp's request for a stay of eviction
was a request for extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211,
§ 3, the same burden applied. See Lasher v. Leslie-Lasher, 474
Mass. 1003, 1004 (2016).1

     Papp has not carried that burden here. On the contrary, as
the single justice correctly observed, adequate alternative
means were available to Papp to challenge the transfer of his
case. Papp could have sought interlocutory review by a single
justice of the Appeals Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118,
first par., of the Superior Court's order transferring the case.
The same route for interlocutory review was available following
issuance of the Housing Court's order denying Papp's request to
transfer his case back to the Superior Court. See id. Finally,
Papp could have appealed the order of transfer as part of an
appeal from the final judgment of the Housing Court. See G. L.
c. 239, § 5 (a); Adjartey v. Central Div. of the Hous. Court
Dep't, 481 Mass. 830, 835 (2019); id. at 857 (Appendix).
Because Papp failed to demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of
other remedies, the single justice did not err or abuse her
discretion in denying relief.

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     The case was submitted on briefs.
     William J. Papp, III, pro se.

     1 Papp represents that the eviction at issue has since
occurred. Therefore, the request is moot, and Papp is not
entitled to such a stay. See Lumber Yard Northampton Ltd.
Partnership v. Hudson, 490 Mass. 1030, 1030 (2022).