Court Opinion

ID: 9645139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:13:53.411444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:23.947269
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

concurring and dissenting:

I agree that Loscomb’s conviction of violating Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 388A must be reversed. I concur with that result, but not with that portion of the opinion. I do not agree relative to the conviction of violating Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 388, manslaughter by automobile.
*438I find nothing ambiguous in Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.) § 10-302, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, nor do I agree that §§ 10-302 to -309 are applicable to a prosecution for a violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 388, manslaughter by automobile.
Section 10-302 provides in its entirety:
In a prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article, a chemical test of his breath or blood may be administered to the person for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood.
Code (1977) § 21-902, Transportation Article, makes it unlawful for a person to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while intoxicated; while his driving ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol; while he is so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or any combination of drugs and alcohol that he cannot drive a vehicle safely; and while he is under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance as the term is defined in Code (1957) Art. 27, § 279. Thus, as the saying goes, to me the section is as plain as the nose on one’s face. It means that in a prosecution of a person charged with driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated, while his driving ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol, or where he is so far under the influence of any combination of drugs and alcohol that he cannot drive a vehicle safely, a chemical test of his breath or blood may be administered to him for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, subject, of course, to the statute’s provisions. The statute is plain and unambiguous. The General Assembly simply saved words by incorporating the reference to § 21-902.
Art. 27, § 388, manslaughter by automobile, by its terms requires proof of gross negligence. To hold this subtitle applicable to such a prosecution fails to give due weight to either the present wording of the statute or its historical background.
*439The first statutory provision relative to examination of blood for its alcoholic content was enacted as Code (1957, 1959 Cum. Supp.) Art. 35, § 100 by Chapter 769 of the Acts of 1959. It must not be forgotten, however, that prior to that enactment there were instances of Maryland prosecutions where chemical analysis of blood alcohol content was received into evidence. See, e.g., Lilly v. State, 212 Md. 436, 440, 129 A.2d 839 (1957), where the Court quoted from the testimony on April 16, 1956, of the Chief State Toxicologist as to the result of analysis of blood for alcohol content of an individual charged with manslaughter by automobile. By its terms, as stated in subsection (a), § 100 was applicable "[i]n any criminal prosecution for a violation of § 206 of Article 66¥2 of this Code (1957 Edition, as amended from time to time) or for a violation of any other law of this State concerning a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor driving or attempting to drive any vehicle as specified in such other laws . . . Section 206 was the statute which then made it unlawful "for any person who is an habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive or attempt to drive any vehicle, streetcar or trackless trolley within this State.”
Chapter 595 of the Acts of 1961 amended § 100 by adding a new subsection to the effect that an arresting officer "who charges a person with the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor” must advise the person so charged "that he may, but need not, submit to a chemical analysis as provided for in [§ 100].” It in no way changed § 100 (a).
The statute was revised again by Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1962. Although subsection (a) was changed, no change whatever was made in that portion of the language which specified to what the statute was applicable.
Further changes were made in the statute by Chapters 16 of the Acts of 1963 and 166 of the Acts of 1964. However, no change was made in the beginning specifying that as to which it was applicable.
*440Extensive changes were made in 1969 as a result of the report to the Legislative Council of the Committee to Study Revision of the Motor Vehicle Laws, chaired by Judge S. Ralph Warnken. Although that committee recommended the enactment of an implied consent law, such enactment was-not contained in Chapter 157 which amended Art. 35, § 100. Subsection (a) opened, as did its predecessors, by saying. "In any criminal prosecution for a violation of Section 206 of Article 66x/2 of this Code (1957 Edition, as amended from time to time) or for a violation of any other law of this State concerning a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor driving or attempting to drive any vehicle as specified in the other laws . . . .” Chapter. 156 of the Acts of 1970 made a correction in § 100 but did not change this provision. Yet another change was made by Chapter 783 of the Acts of 1971 without changing the reference to Art. 66V2, § 206, or the provision relative to violation of any other law concerning a person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor driving or attempting to drive.
When Art. 35, § 100 was recodified by Chapter 2 of the Acts of the First Special Session of 1973 as Code (1974) §§ 10-302 to -309, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 10-302 stated:
In a prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 11-902 of Article 66V2 of the Code a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or other bodily substance may be administered to the person for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content in his body.
Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66V2, § 11-902 then provided in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or attempt to drive or to be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while he is in an intoxicated condition.
*441(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or attempt to drive or to be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while his driving ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol.
Chapter 164 of the Acts of 1977 substituted "breath or blood” for "breath, blood, urine, or other bodily substanfe” in the statute. Chapter 14 of the Acts of 1977 substituted § 21-902 of the Transportation Article for the prior provision relative to Art. 66V2, § 11-902.
When changes were made, as the Revisor’s Note indicates, "in [the] style and language” of Art. 35, § 100 (a) by the enactment of § 10-307, subsection (a) was made to read:
(a) In general. — In a proceeding in which a person is charged with driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or while his ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol, the amount of alcohol in the person’s breath, blood, or urine shown in chemical analysis as provided in this subtitle is admissible in evidence and has the effect set forth in subsection (b) through (e).
Section 10-307 is concerned with the admission into evidence of the results of chemical analysis to ascertain blood alcohol content. Subsection (a) currently reads:
(a) In general. — In a proceeding in which a person is charged with a violation of § 388A of Article 27 or with driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article, the amount of alcohol in the person’s breath or blood shown in chemical analysis as provided in this subtitle is admissible in evidence and has the effect set forth in subsections (b) through (e) of this section.
I have previously set forth the prohibitions contained in § 21-902, Transportation Article. Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 388A was enacted by *442Chapter 454 of the Acts of 1978. It makes it unlawful for a person to cause "the death of another as the result of his negligent driving, operation or control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated . . . .” The latter term is said to have "the same meaning as indicated in and is subject to the same presumptions and evidentiary rules of § 10-307 of the Courts Article regarding intoxication under the vehicle laws of this State.” Thus, § 388A differs from § 388 which by its terms requires proof of gross negligence. It is to be noted that the General Assembly thought the passage of Chapter 454 of the Acts of 1978 creating the new crime of homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated required an amendment to this statute to insert a reference to that crime, yet at no time has the statute ever contained a, reference to Art. 27, § 388, manslaughter by automobile, where proof of gross negligence is required.
I recognize that evidence that one is under the influence of intoxicating liquor is relevant in a prosecution for manslaughter by automobile. Section 10-302 refers to a "prosecution for a violation of a law concerning a person who is driving or attempting to drive a vehicle in violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article . . . .” The fact that evidence of blood alcohol content is relevant to a prosecution for manslaughter by automobile does not convert the proceeding into one involving the type of prosecution specified in the statute here in question. Likewise, the relevance of such evidence in a prosecution for manslaughter by automobile does not convert the proceeding into one for violation of Art. 27, § 388A. The statute does not indicate that only under its provisions could evidence as to blood alcohol content be admitted in a proceeding in Maryland. Lilly, 212 Md. 436, would be contrary to that.
I agree that the evidence of blood alcohol content was not admissible on the charge of violating Code (1957,1976 Repl. Vol., 1978 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 388A. Since, however, I am strongly of the view that the exclusionary provision of Code (1974) § 10-309, Courts and Judicial Proceedings *443Article, was not applicable to the prosecution for violation of Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 388, I would affirm those convictions.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cole concurs in the views here expressed.