Court Opinion

ID: 9963915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 15:07:17.031139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:04.242736
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 126,061

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                  In the Matter of the Marriage of

                                                 B.L.,
                                               Appellee,

                                                  and

                                                S.L.,
                                              Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Cheyenne District Court; SCOTT SHOWALTER, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed April 26, 2024. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

        Tessa French, of Miller & French, LLC, of Liberal, for appellant.

        Andrew J. Walter, of Walter, Walter & Peterson, of Norton, for appellee.

Before COBLE, P.J., GREEN, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: B.L. and S.L. were parties to a divorce action, at the conclusion of
which the district court issued a decree of divorce detailing the division of the couple's
property and the custody and parenting time of their minor children. S.L. sought relief
from judgment under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260, arguing B.L. did not tell the truth when
testifying in court, the district court did not divide the parties' property and debt
equitably, and he should be allowed additional summer parenting time with the children.
The district court denied S.L.'s motion. S.L. now appeals, claiming the district court
failed to properly consider all the statutory factors when dividing the property and debts

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and determining parenting time. After reviewing the record, we have determined we lack
jurisdiction over the review of the divorce decree and, therefore, dismiss the appeal
regarding the divorce decree itself and affirm the district court's order denying S.L.'s
motion for relief from judgment.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       B.L. petitioned for divorce from S.L. in Cheyene County District Court. B.L. and
S.L. agreed to a mediator to facilitate a resolution in all issues pertaining to the divorce,
including custody and parenting time of the children and the division of real and personal
property. The parties were able to reach an agreement on the custody and parenting time
of their minor children, although B.L. later filed a motion to enforce the resulting
mediation agreement, which the district court approved as the permanent parenting plan.
However, not all issues were resolved during mediation and the matter proceeded to trial.

       The district court held the divorce trial on August 29, 2022, hearing testimony
from both parties and the children's therapist and admitting and reviewing multiple
exhibits. Both parties were represented by counsel. On September 7, 2022, the district
court issued a decree of divorce that included the ordered child custody and parenting
time and the division of the parties' property and debts, along with an attached child
support worksheet and property and debts division table. Thirty days later, S.L. filed a
motion seeking relief from the Decree of Divorce under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260(b)(1),(3) and (6), to which B.L. objected. The district court denied the motion for
relief from judgment on November 17, 2022, finding "no evidence . . . support[ed] a
violation of K.S.A. 60-260(b)(1)."

       On December 16, 2022, S.L. filed a notice of appeal "from all adverse rulings" of
the district court, but specifically "the orders issued on September 7, 2022 and November

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17, 2022"—the decree of divorce and the district court's order denying his K.S.A. 60-260
motion.

             WE MUST ADDRESS OUR JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE APPEAL

       As a threshold matter, B.L. raises a jurisdictional challenge arguing we cannot
review this case because S.L.'s posttrial motion did not extend the time to appeal, and his
appeal—filed more than three months after the court's decree—is untimely. Whether
jurisdiction exists is a question of law, subject to our unlimited appellate review. City of
Wichita v. Trotter, 316 Kan. 310, 312, 514 P.3d 1050 (2022).

We have jurisdiction only to review the denial of the K.S.A. 60-260 motion.

       B.L. agrees S.L.'s motion for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260 was timely filed before the district court, but correctly argues K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260 does not extend his time to file an appeal from the district court's decree of divorce.
S.L. makes no reference in his posttrial motion to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-259—governing
a motion to alter or amend a judgment—which, unlike K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260, would
have conceivably tolled the time for filing an appeal. See In re Estate of Lentz, 312 Kan.
490, 497, 476 P.3d 1151 (2020) (A motion to alter or amend judgment, filed within 28
days of the entry of judgment, tolls the time for appeal.).

       S.L. neither addresses this issue in his appellate brief nor did he file a reply brief
rebutting B.L.'s arguments. As a result, it is undisputed that S.L.'s motion was presented
and decided under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260, and we review the timeliness issue only
under the requirements of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260.

       Because S.L. filed his motion for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
60-260(b) within 30 days of the filing of the decree, his motion for relief from judgment

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to the district court was timely. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(c)(1). But this does not save
his appeal of the divorce decree. Statutes governing appellate procedure, namely K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 60-2103(a), require an appeal to be filed within 30 days from the entry of
judgment. This same statute also provides a list of posttrial motions that toll the time for
appeal, but this list does not include a motion under K.S.A. 60-260. Although S.L.'s
motion for relief from judgment was timely, the motion did not toll the time for him to
file an appeal from the district court's decree of divorce. And since S.L.'s appeal of the
district court's decree of divorce was filed over three months after the decree was filed,
his appeal of the decree of divorce was untimely. We, then, lack jurisdiction to review his
appeal of the district court's decree of divorce. See In re Estate of Butler, 301 Kan. 385,
390, 343 P.3d 85 (2015) (citing that all Kansas appellate jurisdiction is statutory and
subject to time limits, and an appellate court that lacks jurisdiction is bound to dismiss an
appeal).

       But S.L. also appealed "from all adverse rulings in the District Court . . . to include
but not limited to the orders issued on September 7, 2022, and November 17, 2022 . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) And, his appeal was filed within 30 days of the district court's
November 17, 2022 order denying his motion for relief. Because S.L. specified that he is
appealing not only the decree of divorce but also the district court's order denying his
K.S.A. 60-260 motion, we still retain jurisdiction to review the latter.

                  THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
                        BY DENYING THE K.S.A. 60-260 MOTION

       S.L. argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in two ways: (1)
failing to consider the statutory factors for division of property required under K.S.A. 23-
2802, and (2) failing to consider the statutory factors when determining parenting time
under K.S.A. 23-3203. But as discussed above, our review is limited to the district court's

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denial of the K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b) motion, although in some respects, this does
beg some substantive review of the decree of divorce.

Legal principles which govern our decision

       "'A ruling on a motion for relief from judgment filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-260(b)
rests within the sound discretion of the [district] court. The [district] court's ruling will
not be reversed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.'" In re Marriage of
Johnston, 54 Kan. App. 2d 516, 521, 402 P.3d 570 (2017) (quoting In re Marriage of
Leedy, 279 Kan. 311, 314, 109 P.3d 1130 [2005]). A judicial action constitutes an abuse
of discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of
law; or (3) it is based on an error of fact. In re Spradling, 315 Kan. 552, 590, 509 P.3d
483 (2022).

S.L. does not meet his burden to show the district court abused its discretion.

       On appeal, S.L. does not argue the district court's decision was based on either an
error of law or fact. Therefore, this panel must review whether the district court's decision
was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. 315 Kan. at 590.

       In his motion, S.L. asked to be afforded relief from the divorce decree under
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(1), (3), and (6). These subsections permit relief for: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 60-260(b). S.L. claimed B.L. was not truthful during her testimony regarding the
presence of certain livestock and her investments. The remainder of his motion claimed
that the district court failed to make a fair, equitable, or just decision of the property,
assets, and debts, and argued S.L. should be allowed additional parenting time with the
children during the summer. S.L. then asked the court for relief based on its authority

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under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(a)—which only provides relief based on clerical
mistakes, oversights, and omissions.

       In its denial of S.L.'s motion, the district court found no evidence supporting "a
violation of K.S.A. [2022 Supp.] 60-260(b)(1)." For an unexplained reason, the district
court cited only (b)(1) and did not provide any further explanation on S.L.'s claims under
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(3) and (6).

       On our review of the district court record, we find S.L.'s motion for relief from
judgment was entirely conclusory and provided no grounds on which the district court
could provide him relief. The only allegation in his motion which fit under the umbrella
of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b) was his allegation of B.L.'s untruthfulness—that is,
misconduct or misrepresentation of the opposing party under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
260(b)(3). But aside from his conclusory allegation, S.L. furnished the district court no
evidence of such untruthfulness. B.L.'s response to the motion contended the arguments
regarding livestock and investments were raised by S.L. during the trial, and S.L.
produced no additional evidence to support his allegations of fraud by B.L. A review of
the trial transcript supports B.L.'s argument.

       S.L.'s motion also presented no argument regarding any mistake or excusable
neglect under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(1). And his general argument that the district
court's divorce decree was unfair as to the division of property and debts and parenting
time could, we suppose, be viewed under subsection (b)(6)—"any other reason which
justifies relief." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(6). But S.L. makes no such argument, and
we are not in the business of creating arguments for litigants. See In re J.D.D., 21 Kan.
App. 2d 871, 875-76, 908 P.2d 633 (1995) (holding it is not the role of this court to
search the record to find evidence in the party's favor); see also Young v. State, No.
114,693, 2017 WL 129895, at *4 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) ("This court

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has held that it is not proper for the court to make arguments for defendants who fail to
argue for themselves.").

       On appeal, S.L. offers no explanation whatsoever as to how the district court's
decision to deny his motion for relief, specifically, was incorrect or amounted to an abuse
of discretion. Instead, he repeats his dissatisfaction with the division of assets and debt
and the award of parenting time and claims the district court failed to consider the
statutory factors when considering the parties' property division and children.

       Not only does S.L. entirely fail to address the primary issue in this appeal—the
denial of his K.S.A. 60-260(b) motion—but like in his motion before the district court,
S.L. fails to present on appeal any evidence to underscore his claims. As the party
claiming an abuse of discretion, he bears the burden to establish such an abuse occurred.
Bicknell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 315 Kan. 451, 466, 509 P.3d 1211 (2022). But his
claims are again conclusory and unsupported by the record on appeal.

       As for the district court's determination of the division of the property, S.L. claims
the district court's ruling was problematic because it did not assess any value to the
property and debts in its filed order and did not specify which evidence the court weighed
or relied upon when making its decision. He argues the district court failed to explain
which factors under K.S.A. 23-2802(c) ("Division of property") it considered when
splitting the couple's property. But S.L. never articulates which factors should be
considered or specifically how the district court's determinations were unfair, unjust, or
inequitable.

       In his complaint regarding parenting time, S.L. asserts that the district court did
not weigh or analyze the evidence under K.S.A. 23-3203 ("Factors considered in
determination of legal custody, residency and parenting time of a child"), and failed to
support its findings under the best interests of the child standard. Because of the lack of

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findings by the district court, S.L. claims there is nothing for this court to review. But
S.L. fails to point this court to which specific factors the district court neglected to
consider and how the district court's decision was unreasonable.

       Even if the district court's decisions had been legally insufficient, S.L. did not
provide this court with the proper avenue—a timely appeal of the decree itself—or
adequate evidence with which to conduct a meaningful review. And as the appellant, it is
S.L.'s burden to designate a record sufficient to present his points to the appellate court
and to establish his claims. Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 296 Kan. 636,
644, 294 P.3d 287 (2013); Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(4) (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36).

       Finally, as mentioned above, we must note the district court's order denying the
motion for relief of judgment was incomplete because it only considered K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 60-260(b)(1) and did not address S.L.'s requests for relief under subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(6). Again, S.L. does not connect the dots as to which of his allegations entitled
him to relief based on which subsections of the statute, aside from stating in his motion
that B.L. did not truthfully testify under oath, suggesting K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(3)
may apply. And, as we infer above, his contentions that the district court did not make a
fair division of property and debt or reasonable determination of summer parenting time
suggest S.L. may be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(6). Yet, on
appeal, S.L. offers no argument how the district court violated those subsections. An
issue not briefed, or inadequately briefed, is deemed waived or abandoned. In re
Adoption of Baby Girl G., 311 Kan. 798, 803, 466 P.3d 1207 (2020); In re Marriage of
Williams, 307 Kan. 960, 977, 417 P.3d 1033 (2018).

       In addition to finding S.L.'s arguments lacking, we acknowledge the oft-repeated
maxim that if a district court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even
though it relied on the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. See
Gannon v. State, 302 Kan. 739, 744, 357 P.3d 873 (2015). Although the district court

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cited only K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(1) as a basis for its decision to deny S.L.'s
motion for relief from judgment, we find on our review of the record that its decision was
correct.

       For the preceding reasons, we find a reasonable person could conclude that S.L.
was not entitled to relief based on K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260(b)(1), (3), or (6). S.L. has
not met his burden to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion when it denied
relief based on K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-260.

       Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.

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