Court Opinion

ID: 9478604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:52:56.649986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:30.802737
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
As I believe the majority’s decision, which permits a trial court to dismiss a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as an abuse of the writ without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to the petitioner, is ill-founded, I must respectfully dissent.
It is unnecessary to repeat the majority’s recitation of the facts and procedural history of Oliver’s repeated attempts to attack his sentence on constitutional grounds. Indeed, it is more beneficial to a correct legal analysis of Oliver’s appeal to focus here on the precise issue presented, rather than the probable weakness of the merits of Oliver’s underlying claim.
The district court found Oliver’s § 2255 motion successive and thus an abuse of the “procedure governed by the rules of Habe-as Corpus.” The court summarily dismissed the motion under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. 28 U.S.C. foil. § 2255. The court did not notify Oliver or permit him an opportunity to respond to its determination prior to dismissing his motion. The majority found that course fully justified by the clear language of § 2255 and Rule 9(b). I must disagree.
In Johnson v. Copinger, 420 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.1969), we laid out the procedural requirements that a district court must follow before it may dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22541 on the ground of abuse of the writ. In reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the defendant’s successive petition,2 we explained as follows:
*606[I]n a case in which the district judge believes, after examining the petition for habeas corpus, that the petitioner may have in an earlier petition deliberately withheld grounds then available to him, the judge may not dismiss the petition on the ground of abuse of the writ without first giving notice to the petitioner that such action is contemplated and affording him an opportunity to amend his petition to offer any explanation he may have which would justify his earlier omissions or show that the omission was not deliberate, or that the grounds were not then known to him.
Copinger, 420 F.2d at 399.
The majority summarily dismisses Co-pinger as inapplicable to a § 2255 determination, yet ignores the substantial similarities between the language, policies and practical effects of the two provisions. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-14, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1075-1077, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (finding § 2254, § 2255 and common law principles the same); cf. Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 163 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc) (Sanders’ § 2255 analysis of successive motions is applicable to § 2254 cases).
Subsequent regulatory provisions have not affected the validity of Copinger’s analysis or rendered it inapplicable to a case under § 2255. In 1976, Congress promulgated rules governing proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2255. Rule 4 for § 2254 provides in part as follows:
Rule 4. Preliminary consideration by judge
The original petition shall be presented promptly to a judge of the district court in accordance with the procedure of the court for the assignment of its business. The petition shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified. Otherwise the judge shall order the respondent to file an answer or other pleading within the period of time fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge deems appropriate. In every case a copy of the petition and any order shall be served by certified mail on the respondent and the attorney general of the state involved.
In language that is similar, Rule 4(b) for § 2255 provides as follows:
(b) Initial consideration by judge. The motion, together with all the files, records, transcripts, and correspondence relating to the judgment under attack, shall be examined promptly by the judge to whom it is assigned. If it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified. Otherwise, the judge shall order the United States Attorney to file an answer or other pleading within the period of time fixed by the court or to take such other action as the judge deems appropriate.
Rule 9 for § 2254 is as follows:
Rule 9. Delayed or successive petitions
(a) Delayed petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
(b) Successive petitions. A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.
Similarly, Rule 9 for § 2255 is as follows:
*607Rule 9. Delayed or Successive Motions
(a) Delayed motions. A motion for relief made pursuant to these rules may be dismissed if it appears that the government has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the motion by delay in its filing unless the movant shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the government occurred.
(b) Successive motions. A second or successive motion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the movant to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the procedure governed by these rules.
It is clear that the 1976 rules did not supersede Copinger, at least with regard to § 2254 petitions. The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 9 (§ 2254) explicitly state that the rule and the annexed form3 conform with Johnson v. Copinger. Moreover, in 1985, we reaffirmed the procedural safeguards set forth in Copinger. Miller v. Bordenkircher, 764 F.2d 245, 250 n. 5 (4th Cir.1985). Other circuits have recognized the continuing validity of such notice requirements for § 2254 petitions. See Manning v. Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 786 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir.1986); Miller v. Solem, 758 F.2d 144, 145 (8th Cir.1985); Robinson v. Fairman, 704 F.2d 368, 370 (7th Cir.1983).
The primary question here is whether Copinger should be limited to § 2254 petitions and not extended to § 2255 petitions. The absence of a significant distinction dictates § 2254 and § 2255 should be treated in a similar manner with regard to the Copinger notice requirement. See United States v. Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 651-52 (10th Cir.1988). The language of the two provisions, though differing linguistically, when read in context is substantially the same both in meaning and effect. The rules following § 2254 and § 2255 are highly similar. Moreover, Form No. 9 following § 2255, like the Form No. 9 following § 2254, allows the petitioner to explain why his petition should not be dismissed for prejudice or for abuse. Id. at 652. The Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules Governing § 2255 cases stated that the Form No. 9 “is intended to serve the same purpose as the comparable one included in the § 2254 rules.”
In addition, the rationale behind the notice requirement is applicable to § 2255 petitions as well as to § 2254 petitions. Regardless of whether the petitioner was initially sentenced by a state judge or a federal judge, such a notice requirement would ensure a full airing of the abuse issue. Fundamental fairness necessitates that a habeas petitioner, often pro se and consequently often legally inarticulate, or at best imprecise, not be summarily foreclosed from relief without an opportunity to respond. The time and effort consumed is minimal; the overall appearance, and hopefully effect, of justice and fair-dealing is preserved. While there is some merit to the majority’s argument that the federal judge who initially sentenced a § 2255 petitioner would have a better recollection of the trial, and may not need further comments by the petitioner, there is no guarantee that, as here, the same judge would preside over the habeas petition. Notice should still be required under § 2255. See Walker v. United States, 587 F.Supp. 1043, 1044 (D.Md.1984) (noting the Copinger notice requirement under § 2255); United States v. Berryman, 558 F.Supp. 120, 121 (E.D.Va.1988) (same).
Indeed, those courts who have dealt with the issue have had no difficulty in finding a Copinger notice requirement fully applicable to § 2255. See Walker, 587 F.Supp. at 1044; Berryman, 558 F.Supp. at 121. See also Gutierrez, 839 F.2d at 651-52 (finding notice requirement of Rule 9(a) (§ 2254) fully applicable to Rule 9(a) (§ 2255); citing *608cases). No court has yet held to the contrary.
Furthermore, the Copinger requirement of notice is not left to the discretion of the district judge. See Copinger, 420 F.2d at 399 (“the judge may not dismiss the petition on the ground of abuse of the writ without first giving notice to the petitioner ... ”) (emphasis added). By failing to give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to show that he did not abuse the writ, the district court committed reversible error.
The majority also maintains that the district court was justified in any event by dismissing the writ under Rule 4(b), as it was apparent from the face of the motion that the movant was not entitled to relief. The district court, however, clearly based its decision on Rule 9(b). While probably a fairly safe bet, it is still speculation to presume the court’s actions will be identical under a 4(b) analysis.4 Oliver’s case, while it may be weak, is not prima facie invalid. The district court focused here on Oliver’s knowledge of all facts bearing on his second motion at the time he filed his first. The issues alleged on each motion, however, though covering much common ground, do represent distinct legal theories. The district court, with all the previous and intimate knowledge of Oliver’s litigation emphasized by the majority, did not rule on the facial invalidity of the merits of Oliver’s claims. We should hesitate to do so now.
Admittedly, notice and the opportunity to respond may only rarely assist a petitioner whose motion is so deficient it appears successive. Yet, it is important to remember that the appearance of even-handedness and scrupulous adherence to rules may cover some aspects not touched by actual, even-handedness scrupulously applied.

. Section 2254 is utilized by those prisoners who are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. Section 2255, on the other hand, is utilized by the prisoners, like the one in the instant case, who are in custody pursuant to the judgment of a federal court.

. The dismissal was based on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b):
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ.

. Form No. 9 allows the petitioner to respond as to why his petition should not be barred under Rule 9 for abuse of the writ or for prejudice.

. Although I would readily concur with my colleagues’ determination that Judge Dupree's intimate knowledge of Oliver’s factual and legal circumstances may certainly qualify him to take such action under Rule 4(b), he has not done so.