Court Opinion

ID: 9599914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:22:18.111118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:47.469876
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, J.,
dissenting.
The defendant, driving the third vehicle in a procession of three, was evidently in a position to see past the second and observe the first. The defendant testified that he was travelling at approximately 35 miles per hour, 75 to 100 feet behind the second car, when he saw the first car give a left-turn signal and stop. Upon observing this state of affairs, it became the duty of the defendant to keep his truck under “complete control” in order to avoid a collision. Code § 46.1-219.*
In these circumstances, I think a contributory negligence instruction was unwarranted. The second car could not have been brought to an unreasonably sudden stop under the circumstances confronting its driver, the plaintiff, because the evidence shows that it did not stop until its front bumper was one to three feet from the first car. The plaintiff was able to bring his car to a safe stop without colliding with the car ahead, although he obviously *415had much less time and distance in which to accomplish that feat than the defendant had. After the plaintiff had come to a full stop, the defendant struck him. Granted, the jury had the right to believe the defendant’s testimony that the plaintiff “slammed on his brakes,” bringing his car to a sudden stop, but in the light of the circumstances confronting the plaintiff, as related by the defendant’s own testimony, the plaintiff’s conduct was not unreasonable or imprudent. Rather, it was compliance with the mandate of Code § 46.1-219 as a matter of law.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the promptness of the plaintiff’s response to his duty to avoid collision with the first car might somehow constitute a jury question, it could not, in the circumstances of this case, have constituted a proximate cause of the accident. The sole proximate cause of the collision in this case was the defendant’s failure, or inability, to bring his truck to a stop after seeing the first car in the procession signal a turn and stop.
The presence of the second vehicle between the first and third shortened the defendant’s available time to respond. That factor, as well as the defendant’s explanation that his brakes failed, might have caused the jury to absolve the defendant of primary negligence. But no negligence on the plaintiff’s part, under the facts of this case, could have contributed to cause the accident. The defendant had the burden of proving not only that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, but also that the plaintiff’s negligence was a proximate, direct, efficient, and contributing cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Unger v. Rackley, 205 Va. 520, 526, 138 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1964). The defendant offered no evidence tending to carry that burden, and no inferences can be drawn from the plaintiff’s evidence which would create a jury issue.
We cannot determine from the record whether the defendant prevailed below because the jury failed to find him negligent, or because it found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. Because I think it was error to grant a contributory negligence instruction, I would reverse and remand for a new trial in which the question of the defendant’s primary negligence would be the sole issue.
POFF and THOMAS, JJ., join in dissent.

 Code § 46.1-219 provides: “Drivers receiving a signal from another driver shall keep their vehicle under complete control and shall be able to avoid an accident resulting from a misunderstanding of such signal.”