Court Opinion

ID: 9488734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:54:34.277001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:04.738778
License: Public Domain

*1212SILER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Part III of the majority opinion which affirmed the trial portion of Glenn’s conviction, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion in Part II, that Glenn was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase of his conviction. Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
As the majority describes, both the Ohio Court of Appeals and the United States District Court found no prejudice from the performance of defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, under the test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, the majority finds that the paucity of evidence introduced for Glenn in his sentencing trial failed to show certain factors outlined in Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B): (1) “the history, character and background of the offender”; (2) whether “the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law”; and (3) “[a]ny other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether [Glenn] should be put to death.” I respectfully disagree with that conclusion. Certainly, in hindsight, one can find experts and other witnesses who might have helped Glenn. Whether they could have helped him any better than the ones that were available is pure speculation.
Defense counsel had the videotape prepared for the sentencing phase of the trial. That showed foresight on his part. The majority suggests that counsel should have obtained an advance ruling on its admissibility, but whether the trial court would have made a preliminary ruling is again speculation, as some judges are reluctant to rule prospectively on evidentiary matters. There was at least some argument in favor of the videotape’s admissibility, for the Ohio Court of Appeals on direct appeal discussed it and then found the failure to admit it into evidence was harmless error at best. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, because, “those particular matters applicable to mitigation which were presented in the videotape were substantially included in the trial testimony of other defense witnesses.” State v. Glenn, 28 Ohio St.3d 451, 504 N.E.2d 701, 709 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3219, 96 L.Ed.2d 705 (1987). Therefore, the failure to call Glenn’s mother and the employer as witnesses was of little import to the Ohio Supreme Court, as their testimony would have been cumulative.
What was presented for Glenn in the sentencing phase of the trial? The jury had the reports from Drs. Ramani and Siddall, the presentence report, and testimony from a minister, a teacher and a lawyer. They also had the unsworn statement by Glenn.
As the Ohio Supreme Court found, many of the aggravating and mitigating factors in Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04(B) were not pertinent to this case. Of those factors which were pertinent, the jury knew the circumstances of the offense and the history, character and background of Glenn. Even though the information pertained to his earlier life, there was no evidence to suggest any significant changes in his later life. After all, he was only nineteen years old at the time of the offense. The Ohio Supreme Court found that:
Appellant also introduced evidence as to his poor environment and background. Appellant was raised in an environment of poverty. He received little attention from his natural father. He had been truant and had educational and disciplinary problems as a boy. Appellant had extensive contact with his church when he was younger. He also required special education classes.
Glenn, 504 N.E.2d at 711.
Although the majority is concerned with the fact that defense counsel had not spoken to any of Glenn’s brothers and sisters, nor examined his medical records or mental health counseling records, nor talked to his probation officer, nor examined the probation officer’s records, it appears that most of the information they would have garnered from those sources would only have corroborated the information presented to the jury in the reports of Drs. Ramani and Siddall and in *1213the presentence report. The jury had information that Glenn came from a poor environment, was retarded and was in special education classes. Moreover, had counsel called the defendant’s mother and siblings, their testimony may have been detrimental to Glenn’s case. For instance, Glenn claims that his mother beat him and the siblings regularly, but she probably would not have admitted that in her testimony. Perhaps her children would have testified about the beatings, but the post-conviction decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals indicates that the family members had signed affidavits containing negative information about Glenn.
Dr. Tanley, the neuropsychiatrist who examined Glenn in the post-sentence proceedings, corroborated the I.Q. finding from Ra-mani’s report. Dr. Ramani also reported that Glenn used to hit his head against the wall and was “nervous.” The theory expounded by Dr. Tanley and another expert, referred to in the majority opinion, that Glenn’s brain damage might have resulted from a surgical procedure performed on Glenn’s mother when she was under general anesthesia in her pregnancy seems also to be speculative. There is no physician yet who has stated that it was within reasonable medical certainty that such a surgical procedure on the mother caused any permanent problems to Glenn.
I do not understand how the evidence of brain damage is more mitigating than the fact that Glenn was retarded. Dr. Siddall concluded that the offense was not the product of retardation or any brain disease or other mental illness. Certainly, Dr. Tanley had a contrary view. The requirements of Strickland do not mandate that an attorney search out all potential favorable psychiatrists and psychologists, in order to find the one who would testify best for his client.
I do not think that it is significant that defense counsel first asked the court for a medical examination of the defendant under Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.024, but the experts were later appointed under Ohio Rev.Code §§ 2929.03(D)(1) and 2947.06. Section 2929.024 is a statute providing for expert services for indigents in general and applies to pre-trial, trial and post-trial services. However, § 2929.03(D)(1) “applies to all capital defendants, whether indigent or not.” State v. Esparza, 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 529 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1012, 109 S.Ct. 1657, 104 L.Ed.2d 171 (1989). Once the defendant chooses to undergo the mental examinations, he risks the jury’s knowledge of the conclusions of the experts under § 2947.06 in a death case. Id. “There is no constitutional infirmity in providing the defendant with such an option.” State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795, 808 (1986). Assuming that the court had authorized the appointment of Drs. Ramani and Siddall under § 2929.024, and defense counsel did not like the conclusions of the two experts, what were they to do? Would they ask the court to authorize two others?1 Or would they have been forced to have put into evidence what the experts had said? Had they decided against using the experts opinions at all, and the defendant would have been sentenced to death, we would be in the same position here, with Glenn on appeal asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because appointed counsel at trial failed to introduce into evidence the expert reports of Drs. Ramani and Siddall.
In the record are found two pretrial evaluations from Dr. Harvey Kayne, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Ami Nalluri, a psychiatrist, concerning a possible insanity defense and Glenn’s competency to stand trial. Neither of these reports was presented to the jury in mitigation during the sentencing phase of the trial. Yet they probably could have been introduced by defense counsel, and they would have corroborated the reports of Drs. Ramani and Siddall. Had they been read to the jury in the sentencing phase, present counsel no doubt would have asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, as the reports indicate that Glenn was competent to stand trial and did not suffer from a mental illness, although he had “borderline intellectual functioning.”
*1214I find no prejudice here. It does not appear to me that there were any material mitigating factors that were not introduced, except through experts who had been found after the trial who would have testified favorably for the defense. I do not have grave doubt concerning prejudice under O’Neal v. McAninch, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), so I would affirm.

. The trial court would have likely denied the request. See Esparza, 529 N.E.2d at 195 ("Appellant was not entitled to a ‘rebuttal’ ... mental examination prepared by a second psychologist or psychiatrist of his own choosing also at state expense.”).