Court Opinion

ID: 9483241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:15:09.468035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:30.650785
License: Public Domain

ALITO, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the court’s decision except insofar as it holds that an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 could not be based on the defendant’s alleged false statement to the probation officer that he did not use drugs.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 requires a two-level increase in offense level if a defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.” As an example of conduct falling within this provision, Application Note 3(h) lists “providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presen-tence or other investigation for the court.” Thus, the defendant’s alleged conduct in this case appears to fall squarely within U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The court seems to suggest that U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 does not apply here because the defendant’s false statement did not relate to the “instant offense.” I agree that the false statement did not occur during and could not have affected the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, but it did occur during and, if believed, could have affected the sentencing of the instant offense. While substance abuse is generally not an appropriate reason for a downward departure at sentencing (U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4; see also United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 133 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2274, 114 L.Ed.2d 725 (1991)), the Guidelines highly recommend that a defendant who is a drug abuser be sentenced to a period of supervised release or probation with a requirement that he participate in an appropriate substance abuse program. Id. Thus, every presentence report, including Belleti-ere’s, contains a section on drug dependence and alcohol abuse. Accordingly, I think that Belletiere’s alleged false statement about drug use could well have constituted an attempt to impede proper sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
The court also holds that the false statement “was not material to the probation officer’s investigation in this particular case.” Maj. at 968. The court reasons that the probation officer had the ability to verify the defendant’s statement by conducting drug tests and in fact did so. I respectfully disagree with this analysis.
A “material” statement is defined in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 5, as a statement that “if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination” (emphasis added). Thus, it is not necessary that the statement be believed or even believable. This definition is the same as that applicable in prosecutions for false statements. In such cases, a false statement is material if it “has a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper” the fact-finder or to “cloud” the facts. United States v. Lardieri, 497 F.2d 317, 319 (3d Cir.1974). It is not necessary to show that the false statement actually influenced, impeded, or hampered the factfinder. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 666 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108, 102 S.Ct. 2908, 73 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1982); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1980). Moreover, it is well settled that a false statement may be materia] even if the investigating body already knows the truth or can readily learn the truth from other sources. See, e.g., United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453, 465 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1196, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986), 476 U;S. 1104, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986); United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980); United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 165 (6th Cir.1979).
*974I therefore believe that an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 may be proper when a defendant lies about drug use to a probation officer. In the present appeal, however, I do not believe that we can affirm the enhancement on this ground because the defendant’s attorney may not have had the opportunity to raise all of his factual or other objections to the enhancement before the trial judge cut him off by granting the enhancement on the other ground discussed in the court's opinion. Thus, I would direct the district court to entertain any such objections on remand.