Court Opinion

ID: 9762911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:44.953548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.423731
License: Public Domain

CHAPMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The State was only required to compensate the Heals for the diminution in the value to the remainder that was the effect of the condemnation. The State was not required to compensate the Heals for the effects of its use of the land of others for the North Central reconstruction project. By permitting the jury to consider traffic projections for the year 2010 and the barricading of the roads, the trial court allowed the jury to consider factors in assessing severance damages that were not caused by the taking of the Heals’ strip of land. This was error.
In State v. Schmidt, the State condemned a portion of two tracts of land. Schmidt v. State, 867 S.W.2d 769, 777-78 (Tex.1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 2741, 129 L.Ed.2d 861 (1994). The land condemned was tó be used in the reconfiguration of Highway 183. The property owners argued that evidence of diversion of traffic, increased circuity of travel, lessened visibility to passersby, and the inconvenience of construction activities were appropriate factors a jury could consider in determining the decreased value to the remainder. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed.
The majority distinguishes Schmidt by asserting that the factors the jury was permitted to consider in Schmidt were not the same factors in this case. The majority fails to distinguish Schmidt’s holding that a landowner cannot recover for the State’s use of property acquired from adjoining landowners. While the factors considered by the jury in this case are not the “Schmidt factors,” I nevertheless believe Schmidt to be applicable and controlling.
In Schmidt, the Texas Supreme Court, adopting the rule enunciated by the United *872States Supreme Court in Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 372, 45 S.Ct. 115, 116-17, 69 L.Ed. 328 (1924), stated:
The rule supported by better reason and the weight of authority is that the just compensation assured by the Fifth Amendment to an owner, a part of whose land is taken for public use, does not include the diminution in value of the remainder caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining lauds of others for the same undertaking.
Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 778 (citing Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. at 372, 45 S.Ct. at 116-17 (emphasis added)).
The Supreme Court, applying the Campbell rule to the condemnation of land for highway purposes, held:
Section 21.042(c) requires consideration of “the effect of the condemnation on the value of the property owner’s remaining property.” The effect of the State’s condemnation on each tract in the present case — that is, the taking of a small strip of property — is different from the effect of the State’s change in Highway 183. The statute allows recovery for only the former.
Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 777-78. (emphasis added).
The Campbell rule should apply unless:
(1) the land taken from the eondemnee landowner was indispensable to the ... project; (2) the land taken constituted a substantial (not inconsequential) part of the tract devoted to the project; and (3) the damages resulting to the land not taken from the use of the land taken were inseparable from those to the same land flowing from the condemnor government’s use of its adjoining land in the project.
Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 778 (citing United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Circ.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 1435, 75 L.Ed.2d 793 (1983)).
Thus, three elements, indispensability, substantiality, and inseparability are necessary to negate the application of the Campbell rule. United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F.2d at 1332.
Traffic Volume in 2010
The Heals introduced evidence concerning traffic projections for Southwestern Boulevard in the year 2010. The issue is whether the increased projections were the effect of the taking of the Heals’ strip of land. . The majority asserts that we look to the “purpose” of the take in order to determine what factors a jury is permitted to consider in determining the diminution in value to the remainder. The majority asserts that because the purpose of the take was to widen the bridge on the Southwestern overpass, the increased traffic density is the result of the take.
However, by merely looking to the purpose of the take to determine what factors a jury is permitted to consider nullifies the Campbell rule and ignores the Supreme Court’s holding in Schmidt. If we merely look to the purpose of the take, a property owner could always recover for the diminution in value caused by the acquisition and use of adjoining lands of others for the same undertaking. The Campbell rule assumes the land taken from adjoining landowners was for the same undertaking. Therefore, the “purpose” of the take would always include damages flowing from the State’s use of the land of adjoining landowners.1
The Constitution only requires compensation for all damages that are the natural, necessary, or reasonable incident of the take. In assessing these damages, the jury is to consider the uses to which the land taken is put. A landowner cannot recover for damages caused by the manner in which the project is to be constructed or operated on the land of others. The take in the Heals’ ease is the State’s condemnation of a 436-square-foot strip of land. The Heals are not *873entitled to all damages that result from the expansion of Central and Southwestern, but rather only the damages that resulted from the taking of their strip of land. See Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 778.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the increased traffic projections were the effect of the taking of the Heals’ strip of land. While the record is not entirely clear, it appears that no part of the land taken will actually be used as a lane of traffic. The projections at best showed the project as a whole would increase traffic flow past the remainder. Permitting the jury to consider the increased traffic caused by the expansion of Central Expressway and Southwestern allowed the jury to consider damages caused by the State’s use of adjoining lands acquired from other landowners and its new use of its existing right of way.
Furthermore, the exception to the Campbell rule does not apply in this ease. The Heals have not shown the land taken was a substantial part of the reconfiguration of Southwestern, much less the North Central reconstruction project.
The jury was permitted to consider the effects of the State’s change in Southwestern and North Central Expressway. I believe Schmidt dictates that the jury was permitted to consider only the effect of the State’s taking of the Heal’s small strip of property. Therefore, I disagree with the majority that the trial court did not err in admitting the traffic projections.
Barricading of City Streets
Similarly, the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider the barricading of the side streets between Southwestern and Lovers Lane in assessing the diminution in value to the remainder. The majority concludes that these damages were the effect of the taking of the Heals’ strip of land because the State could not have re-routed the inner streets but for the expansion of Southwestern.
The appropriate question is whether the Heals’ land was used to barricade the streets. The rule in Campbell dictates that if it was not, no damages caused by the barricading are owed to the Heals.2 No part of the Heals’ property was used to barricade the inner streets. The damages flowing from the barricading of the streets are entirely the result of the State’s use of the land of others or its use of its existing right of way. Therefore, permitting the jury to consider the barricading of the streets as a factor in assessing damages allowed the Heals to recover damages for the State’s use of the land of others and/or their use of an existing right of way.
Finally, I believe the admission of evidence relating to factors not the effect of the take was harmful error. The jury awarded the Heals $43,147 in damages to the remainder. The evidence at trial concerning damages to the remainder centered around the effects of the project as a whole. The jury sent a note to the trial court explicitly asking the trial court whether it was to consider only the effects of the “take” or the effects of the project as a whole. The trial court did not answer the question. The evidence concerning the effects of the project as a whole was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1).
Because I believe the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the assessment of damages that were not the result of the condemnation, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, I dissent.

. To illustrate, if the majority’s rationale was applied to the facts of Schmidt, the Campbell rule would not have prohibited the jury from considering evidence concerning damages resulting from the loss of traffic density. The "purpose” of the take in that case was to effect a change in Highway 183. Therefore, under the majority’s reasoning, the jury could consider all damages that naturally flow from the change in Highway 183. The Supreme Court held to the contrary.

. Of course, if the barricading of the streets was considered a "taking” in and of itself, the jury would be permitted to consider the damages caused by the barricading.