Court Opinion

ID: 9764856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:42:04.24105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:49.224364
License: Public Domain

ZAZZALI, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court. I write separately from Justice Verniero’s thoughtful opinion to add the following.
I would find that when, as here, evidence suggests that an employer disabled or knowingly tolerated the disabling of a safety device, it creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer knew harm to an employee was substantially certain to result. Under that rule, the employer would have the burden of coming forward at trial with evidence tending to disprove that known substantial certainty of harm. In the absence of such evidence, if the jury found that an employer disabled or knowingly tolerated the disabling of a safety device, it would have to conclude that a known substantial certainty of harm existed. Conversely, if an employer introduces evidence tending to show that it did not know harm was substantially certain to result, the presumption would be rebutted. The jury then would determine whether the employer in fact possessed such knowledge regarding the likelihood of harm. See generally N.J.R.E. 301 (setting forth procedures by which rebuttable presumption applies at trial).
When an employer decides to permit the disabling of a safety device, divining the presence of a known substantial certainty of harm requires evidence of an employer’s appreciation of the risk *394presented by its decision. It is the rare case in which an employee will have access to such evidence. See Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1983)(“In cases where ... the state of mind of one of the parties is crucial to the outcome of the case, resort to summary judgment is vested with more than the usual difficulty.”). By contrast, the employer enjoys unfettered access to its own history of workplace injuries, OSHA citations, precautionary measures taken, and cost-benefit analyses conducted and therefore is better prepared to explain why it concluded that the risk of harm presented by a disabled safety device is less than a substantial certainty. A rebuttable presumption properly places on the employer the burden of coming forward with evidence to support that explanation. See United States v. One Parcel of Prop., 85 F.3d 985, 990 (2nd Cir.1996)(“Burden-shifting where one party has superior access to evidence on a particular issue is a common feature of our law.”).
The rule I propose also deters the indiscriminate disabling of safety devices by making tort liability likely when an employer permits a safety device to be disabled but lacks evidence to show ignorance of a substantial certainty of harm. See Sidney Shapiro and Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 Admin. L.Rev. 97, 153 (2000)(“The threat of tort liability creates incentives for firms to prevent accidents and illnesses.”). Although the prospect of workers’ compensation liability presents some level of employer deterrence, it is less than optimal because such liability “does not fully compensate for injuries and employers insure against such losses.” Ibid. Without the protection of an employer’s potential liability in tort, “employees are generally left to the inadequate remedies of workers’ compensation, virtually sacrificed on the altar of production quotas with no downside risk to the employer.” Calderon v. Machinenfabriek Bollegraaf Appingedam BV, 285 N.J.Super. 623, 636, 667 A.2d 1111 (App.Div.1995), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 174, 675 A.2d 1122 (1996). As a rash of litigation in this and other jurisdictions indicates, disregard for compliance with OSHA requirements, including the disabling of devices designed to *395ensure the safety of employees, is a phenomenon endemic to the modern workplace. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly and Mary Ann Donnelly, 1997-1998 Survey of New York Law: Commercial Law, 49 Syracuse L.Rev. 271, 278 (1999)(recognizing “the enormous number of cases in our state where safety devices have been removed or modified”). A rebuttable presumption that promotes tort liability when an employer cannot justify the disabling of safety devices provides a welcome deterrent to employer misconduct.
A rebuttable presumption also encourages a fairer distribution of the costs of workplace injury between manufacturers and employers. Under Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc., 170 N.J. 602, 790 A.2d 884 (2002), and Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 501 A.2d 505 (1985), an employer is immunized from suit under N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 for the disabling of a safety device in the absence of a known substantial certainty of harm. That immunity also extends to actions brought by manufacturers seeking indemnification from employers when employees successfully sue those manufacturers on the basis of product liability. Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 185, 510 A.2d 1152 (1986). Our product liability jurisprudence provides, however, that a manufacturer may be held liable for injuries resulting from the disabling of a safety device or other misuse of a product when a jury concludes that such misuse was “objectively foreseeable.” Jurado v. Western Gear Works, 131 N.J. 375, 385, 619 A.2d 1312 (1993). Consequently, product manufacturers often bear all of the costs of the employee injuries that result from such misuse, including injuries caused by an employer’s modification of an otherwise safe product. William A. Dreier and Lawrence N. Lavigne, Untying the Laidlow Knot: Shifting Liability from Machine Manufacturers to Employers That Continue to Use Machines That Have Known Design Defects, 170 N.J.L.J. 810, 812 (Dec. 9, 2002). The rule I propose helps to mitigate that unfairness by facilitating indemnification for manufacturers, thereby promoting a more equitable distribution of the costs of employee injury.
*396Finally, it is important to note that my proposal, consistent with the Court’s decision in Laidlow, supra, does not establish a per se rule “that an employer’s conduct equates with an ‘intentional wrong’ within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 whenever that employer removes a guard or similar safety device from equipment or machinery, or commits some other OSHA violation.” 170 N.J. at 622, 790 A.2d 884. As noted, a rebuttable presumption permits the employer to introduce evidence at trial tending to show that a known substantial certainty of harm did not exist and then allows the jury to make that factual assessment. It does not trigger automatic liability for an employer on a finding that a safety device has been disabled. Instead, it properly places on employers the burden of coming forward with evidence regarding their state of mind, deters employers from maintaining a workplace in which safety devices are removed as a matter of course, and promotes more equitable distribution of the costs of workplace injuries between manufacturers and employers. For those reasons, I believe application of such a presumption is appropriate on the facts of this appeal and in all cases in which an employer’s decision to tolerate the removal of a safety device results in harm to an employee.