Court Opinion

ID: 9629344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:40:57.481764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:47.633442
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting: The majority opinion has the effect of approving a distribution of the property of Newell A. and Bertha O. Thompson as if both died intestate, without a will. In such case the property passes to their child and grandchildren. Naturally, I would like to be able to concur in that result but I am unable to do so for the reason there is no evidence, circumstantial or direct, which will sustain a finding that the 1929 will was executed by the parties as a result of an agreement or compact not to revoke that will. Therefore the husband’s 1966 will should be given effect.
*293A joint will is one in which the same paper is executed by two persons as their respective wills. Mutual wills are the separate testaments of two persons, more or less reciprocal in their provisions. These instruments may or may not be accompanied by or result from a compact not to revoke them, though some courts imply such a compact in the case of certain joint wills. (Atkinson on Wills [Second Edition] p. 222.)
In Kansas an agreement not to revoke has been implied under certain circumstances. Such an agreement has been implied by our court when the joint will shows on its face and by its terms that it is contractual in nature and its provisions imply a pre-existing agreement not to revoke. (In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 454 P. 2d 438.)
However, the fact that a will is jointly executed does not and should not establish, in and of itself, that it is the product of a preexisting agreement not to revoke. (In re Estate of Chronister, supra.)
In the present case there was no direct evidence of a preexisting agreement not to revoke the will. Therefore, if we say an agreement existed, it must be implied from the face of the will based upon its terms and provisions. Further it must be implied regardless of the fact that the husband revoked the former will by executing a later will making final disposition of his property after his wife became incapacitated. The joint will executed in 1929 merely contains reciprocal provisions giving the property of the parties to the survivor.
In the will there is no ultimate or final disposition made of the property to third parties. In fact, the will by its terms recognizes the right of the survivor “to make such (later) provision as he or she sees fit”. (Third paragraph.)
Although there has been some confusion arising from our opinions, it is generally agreed in Kansas that a contractual will is one which is the result of a pre-existing agreement to make an ultimate and final disposition of the property of both parties. When a joint will is executed under such an agreement the execution renders the agreement complete and irrevocable. In such case neither party may breach the agreement unless there is mutual consent to do so. The early Kansas cases on this subject, including In re Estate of Pennington, 158 Kan. 495, 148 P. 2d 516, are collected in an article in *294the April 1946 Kansas Judicial Council Bulletin prepared by former Justice William A. Smith of the Kansas Supreme Court. The article is helpful.
It has been generally held in Kansas that a contract to make an irrevocable disposition of property may be shown by extrinsic evidence. (In re Estate of Wade, 202 Kan. 380, 449 P. 2d 488; In re Estate of Tompkins, 195 Kan. 467, 407 P. 2d 545; Eikmeier v. Eikmeier, 174 Kan. 71, 254 P. 2d 236.)
Where no evidence is available or introduced the will by its terms and provisions may establish by implication agreement not to revoke based upon a presumption that such a will had to be the product of a pre-existing agreement to make a final irrevocable disposition of the property. (In re Estate of Chronister, supra.)
However, a mere agreement to jointly execute a single paper disposing of property does not render the will irrevocable. It is necessary that the evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, establish a compact to make an ultimate and final disposition of the property.
In this case neither the trial court nor this court finds that the will was to be an ultimate and final disposition of the property. The trial court’s judgment and this court’s decision rests on a finding that the will “is contractual in nature”.
When two parties sign a single paper, such as a will, they naturally have agreed to use a single paper to dispose of property, but that does not establish an agreement to make the will irrevocable. A finding that the present will is “contractual in nature” is not controlling. It does not support the judgment of the trial court which had the effect of finding and enforcing a pre-existing agreement to make an irrevocable disposition of the property.
It is a general rule that a will jointly executed by two persons is revocable by either of them. (See Atkinson on Wills [Second Edition] p. 224, and In re Estate of Pennington, supra.) A joint will in effect is the separate will of each of the parties. An exception arises when there is a compact between the parties that the joint will shall be a final disposition of the property.
In the present case there was no extrinsic evidence of such an agreement. If such an agreement is determined it must be based upon the wording in the will itself.
Let us consider the present will. It was executed by two persons. It was a single paper. It purported to dispose of the property belonging to the parties. Therefore, it was a joint will. The use of *295plural pronouns (we, our and us) is standard procedure dictated by the very nature of the joint execution of a single paper. This use of plural pronouns does not establish a presumption of a preexisting contract not to revoke the will.
A joint will although executed by two persons and stated to be their joint will but disposing only of property owned solely by one of them is not the joint will of both. It is the individual will of the party owning the property. (97 C. J. S. Wills §1364 [c] p. 286; 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 681 pp. 459, 460.)
In the present case no evidence appears in the record to establish that Bertha O. Thompson owned any property in 1929 when she executed the will. In the annotation in 169 ALR 20 it is stated:
“An instrument in the form of a joint will may be sustained as the valid separate will of one of the testators, where he owns all the property bequeathed, on the theory that the joinder of the other in the execution of the instrument is without legal significance. Especially is this true in the case of a will executed by husband and wife where the former owned all the property and the latter appended her signature for the purpose of showing her assent to the will. . . .”
It follows that if Bertha O. Thompson owned no property in 1929 the execution of the instrument was without legal significance as to disposition of her estate, for she had no estate.
The will contained a reciprocal provision that the survivor was to take all property of the first to die. This does not raise a presumption that there was a pre-existing agreement not to revoke. The parties were husband and wife. The mutual love and concern for each other may well have been the motivating factor for such a reciprocal provision. It is a common occurrence for one spouse to leave his or her property to the surviving spouse. Surely such a common occurrence, although carried out by means of a joint will, raises no presumption that an agreement not to revoke the will was entered into by the parties.
In 97 C. J. S., Wills § 1364 e (2) it is stated:
“Mutual wills, if they contain no provision for third persons, constitute a single will, which is the will of the first to die and has no further existence as the will of the survivor.” (Emphasis added.)
(See also In re Estate of Croulek, 252 Iowa, 700, 107 NW 2d 77.)
The above rule is also applied to jointly executed wills. In Atkinson on Wills (Second Edition) at p. 223 it is said:
“If the provisions of reciprocal wills — whether joint or separate — are solely *296in favor of the co-testator, the survivor takes all and he may then make any will he wishes or may die intestate. . . .”
The parties to the present will went a step further by inserting the third paragraph. The intention of the parties is clearly stated therein. Each intended the surviving party to make a later disposition of the property. The third paragraph clearly presupposes that no agreement existed which prevented the parties from changing the disposition of property they had made. Where such an intention is expressed, as in the present will, it militates against any presumption that the will was intended to be irrevocable.
In 1966, after the wife became incompetent, Newell A. Thompson made a separate will. This will set up a testamentary trust in favor of this wife during her lifetime and on her death made a final disposition of his property. If the wife had predeceased Newell A. Thompson the 1966 will would in no way constitute a change in the disposition of property contemplated by the prior 1929 will. Therefore, the execution of the 1966 will would not have violated the agreement or the terms of the 1929 will for the 1929 will authorized a final disposition of the property by the survivor. The present decision of the court is untenable because it has the effect of enforcing the prohibitive effect of such an agreement based on which party dies first. That is, if the husband dies first (as in the present case) an agreement not to revoke is implied and enforced in favor of the wife, but if the wife dies first the husband would then have been authorized by the third paragraph of the 1929 will to make a final disposition of his property. This court should hold either the husband is authorized to make final disposition of his property under these circumstances or he is not. It should never be left to depend on future circumstances.
An examination of our former decisions indicates that this court has never construed the terms of a joint will to imply an agreement not to revoke unless the will under consideration made ultimate disposition of the property to third parties. See In re Estate of Chronister, supra; In re Estate of Wade, supra; In re Estate of Tompkins, supra; Parsons v. Smith, Trustee, 190 Kan. 569, 376 P. 2d 899; In re Estate of Jones, 189 Kan. 34, 366 P. 2d 792; In re Estate of Buckner, 186 Kan. 176, 348 P. 2d 818; In re Estate of Miller, 186 Kan. 87, 348 P. 2d 1033; In re Estate of Weidman, 181 Kan. 718, 314 P. 2d 327; Beall v. Hardie, 177 Kan. 353, 279 P. 2d 276; Eikmeier v. Eikmeier, supra; Berry v. Berry, 168 Kan. 253, 212 P. 2d 283; In *297re Estate of Adkins, 161 Kan. 239, 167 P. 2d 618; In re Estate of Pennington, supra.) In each of these cases the will provided for a final disposition of the property to third persons. None of the wills contained the express provision contained in the third paragraph of the Thompson will.
In our present case there is no extrinsic evidence of a contract. The absence of a final disposition of the property to third parties militates against any presumption that an agreement not to make a later will existed. The third paragraph of the will expressly authorizes the survivor to make a later final disposition of the property.
There should be no contract presumed in this case where the joint will contains only reciprocal provisions for the two parties and makes no final disposition of the property to third parties.
Accordingly I would reverse the judgment of the district court and direct the court to deny the claim of the administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Bertha O. Thompson.