Court Opinion

ID: 9734335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:32:04.181209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.966016
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

dissenting:

Our cases are replete with statements to the effect that the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent; that in determining that intent the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification; that we may not insert or omit words to make a statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form; and that, absent a clear indication to the contrary, a statute, if reasonably possible, is to be read so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. See, for example, Dorsey v. Beads, 288 Md. 161, 175-76, 416 A.2d 739 (1980); Messitte v. Colonial Mortgage Serv., 287 Md. 289, 293-94, 411 A.2d 1051 (1980); In re James S., 286 Md. 702, 705, 410 A.2d 586 (1980); Board v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384, 388, 408 A.2d 1017 (1979); Harbor Island Marina v. Calvert Co., 286 Md. 303, 311, 407 A.2d 738 (1979); Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. Department, 284 Md. 216, 219, 395 A.2d 1174 (1979); Police Comm’r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418-19, 379 A.2d 1007 (1977); Comptroller v. Mandel Re-Election Com., 280 Md. 575, 578-79, 374 A.2d 1130 (1977); Harden v. Mass Transit Adm., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817 (1976); Baltimore City v. United Stores, 250 Md. 361, 368-69, 243 A.2d 521 (1968); and Thomas v. Police Commissioner, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A.2d 625 (1956). I submit that application of those principles to the statute in question compels an affirmance rather than a reversal here.
Maryland Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66V2, § 9-102 (applicable to this proceeding) provided in relevant part:
(a) Commandeering vehicle and directing participation in road block prohibited. — No police *594officer . . . shall direct or order any operator, owner, or passenger of any motor vehicle ... to assist him by commandeering the vehicle and directing the operator, owner, or passenger to participate in a road block in the apprehension of any person suspected of having committed or known to have committed a violation of law.
(b) Damages or injuries from negligence of police officer. — If any police officer ... directs the operator of any motor vehicle ... to assist him in the enforcement of the law or in apprehending any person suspected of having or known to have committed a violation thereof, the State or the political subdivision, as the case may be, shall be liable for damages or injuries proximately caused by the negligence of the police officer ....
(c) Damages or injuries from participation in road block. — If any police officer .. . directs the operator of any motor vehicle ... to participate in a road block to assist him in the enforcement of such law or in apprehending any person, suspected of having or known to have committed a violation thereof, the State or the political subdivision, as the case may be, shall be liable for damages or injuries directly resulting from, or directly attributable to the participation in the road block .... (Emphasis added.)
Code (1957, 1968 Repl. Vol.) Art. 1, § 18 provides that captions or headlines of the several sections of the Code "which are printed in bold type ... are intended as mere catchwords to indicate the contents of the sections” and "are not to be deemed or taken as titles of the sections ....” However, in this instance the title of § 9-102 as adopted by the General Assembly when it enacted the motor vehicle law by Chapter 534 of the Acts of 1970 was "Liability of State and local government for commandeered vehicles.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is a part of the act itself and not a heading inserted by the codifier. Accordingly, we may use it in our *595interpretation of the act. State Farm Mut. v. Ins. Comm’r, 283 Md. 663, 675, 392 A.2d 1114 (1978).
The term "commandeer” came from the Boer War. As originally used it meant 'Tt]o compel to perform military service; to seize for military purposes.” Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed. Unabridged 1959) 537 and The Oxford English Dictionary (Compact Ed. 1971) 478. Colloquially it was defined as "to take arbitrary or forcible possession of.” Webster at 537. More recently accepted definitions are "to take arbitrary or forcible possession of,” Webster’s New International Dictionary (3d Ed. Unabridged 1961) 455, and "to seize (private property) for military or other public use: The police officer commandeered a taxi and took off after the getaway car,” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged Ed. 1967) 295 (Emphasis in original.).
I need cite no authority for the fact that in the context here the word "direct,” which appears throughout the statute, means "to command.”
Subsection (a) is prohibitory, but it contains no provision authorizing payment of damages for its violation. It is patent, however, that to come within its prohibition two things must take place. First, a police officer must direct a person "to assist him by [the police officer’s] commandeering the vehicle ... .” Then, the police officer must direct that individual "to participate in a road block” for the purpose of apprehending a "person suspected of having committed or known to have committed a violation of law.”
The plain meaning of subsection (b) is that one may recover for the negligence of a police officer only if he "directs the operator of any motor vehicle ... to assist him in the enforcement of the law or in apprehending any person suspected of having or known to have committed a violation [of law] . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Recovery under subsection (c) is permitted only where an officer "directs the operator of any motor vehicle ... to participate in a road block to assist him in the enforcement of ... law or in apprehending any person ....” (Emphasis added.)
*596I agree, as I must under our cases, that when we determine whether a summary judgment was correctly entered the facts must be considered in a light most favorable to the person against whom judgment was entered (the appellant here) and all inferences must be resolved against the party who made the motion (the appellee here). I believe that under that standard there is no way "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits” (to use the words of Maryland Rule 610) can be interpreted as giving rise to an inference that the police officers in question commandeered the Keesling vehicle; directed Keesling "to participate in a road block” for the purpose of apprehending a "person suspected of having committed or known to have committed a violation of law”; directed Keesling to assist them in the enforcement of the law or in apprehending any person; or directed Keesling "to participate in a road block to assist [them] in the enforcement of... law or in apprehending any person ....” I note specifically that the word "direct” is an integral part of each of the statutes in question. There is no suggestion that the officers directed Keesling to do anything. Accordingly, in my view the trial judge and the Court of Special Appeals did not err.