Court Opinion

ID: 9541116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:22:55.216631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:35.852618
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I dissent. The ordinance in question constituted a proper exercise of the police power aimed at preserving and protecting Carmel’s parks and other public property from injury and destruction. That ordinance, applicable to residents and transients alike, should not be rendered nugatory and unenforceable merely because the city council maligned certain members of society in explaining the reasons which justified giving the ordinance immediate effect.
First of all, the majority do not purport to challenge Carmel’s power to enact an ordinance regulating the use of its parks and other public property. Indeed, it is well settled that such ordinances are valid “to the extent necessary to prevent interference with the municipality’s interest in protecting the public health, safety, or order or in assuring the efficient and orderly use of streets and parks for their primary purposes.” (In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 849 [64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d 353], and cases cited; see In re Cox, ante, pp. 205, 218-220 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 [18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 1216, 87 S.Ct. 1824]; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405 [97 L.Ed. 1105, 1113, 73 S.Ct. 760, 30 A.L.R.2d 987]; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-294 [95 L.Ed. 280, 283-284, 71 S.Ct. 312]; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 [85 L.Ed. 1049, 1052, 61 S.Ct. 762, 133 A.L.R. 1396].) Accordingly, our state Constitution and statutes expressly permit municipal bodies to enact ordinances regulating conduct affecting public parks and other public property. (See Cal. Const, art. XI, § 11; Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (c); Pub. Res. Code, § 5193.)
In the instant case, the city council declared that Carmel’s parks and beaches were “in many cases, rendered unfit for normal public use,” and that unless the ordinance in question were adopted, “the use and enjoyment of public property will be jeopardized if not entirely eliminated.” According to the city, the park in question was designed to accommodate only small groups of people, but that due to the influx of “hippies,” “the mass of humanity that occupied the park smothered the grass by their very numbers.” For purposes of discussion, we must presume the foregoing facts to be true; indeed, the majority apparently concede that point. Accordingly, that por*872tion of the ordinance which prohibits persons from lying or sitting on park lawns is clearly a reasonable and proper means of protecting the grass.1
Nevertheless, the majority conclude that the ordinance is void “on its face,” solely by reason of the assertedly “hostile raison d’etre” disclosed in the declaration of urgency which accompanies the ordinance. According to the majority, we are entitled to assume solely from the hostile tone of the declaration, and contrary to the words of the ordinance itself, that “the operative sections of the statute are intended to be limited to hippies in their application.” As we shall see, this doubtful premise runs counter to every rule and presumption applicable to judicial review of statutes or ordinances, and has the unfortunate effect of sanctioning continued acts of damage and destruction to Carmel’s parks and property.
Initially, it is clear that in ascertaining the constitutionality of legislation, the courts should not attempt to determine the motives which led to its enactment, for even an improper motive will not render void an otherwise valid law. (United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-384 [20 L.Ed.2d 672, 683-684, 88 S.Ct. 1673]; Serve Yourself Gas etc. Assn. v. Brock, 39 Cal.2d 813, 819 [249 P.2d 545]; In re Sumida, 177 Cal. 388, 390 [170 P. 823].) This point.was made in the article upon which the majority rely, wherein the authors state that “the consideration of motive is complicated by the fact that it is altogether possible for a law which is the expression of a forbidden motive to be a good law. What is to be done with a law which, passed with the most questionable of motives, still makes a positive contribution to the public good? Suppose the Legislature decides to ‘get’ Standard Oil, or Lovett, or Petrillo, but does so through a law which hits all monopolies, all government employees, or all labor unions.” (Italics added; Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws (1949) 37 Cal.L. Rev. 341, 360.) In the instant case, even if we assume that Carmel’s ordinance was enacted to “get” hippies (or at least to get them off the grass), that ordinance by its terms applies to “any person” violating its provisions. In spite of its assertedly improper motives, it is a “good law,” in the words of Messrs. Tussman and tenBroek.
Of course, the foregoing rule does not prevent the courts from examining the immediate objectives and ultimate effect of legislation for purposes of determining its validity, and laws which have a clear discriminatory purpose *873and effect will be held invalid as a denial of equal protection. (See, e.g., Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal.2d 529, 533-536 [50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825], affd. sub nom. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 [18 L.Ed.2d 830, 87 S.Ct. 1627], and Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 [60 L.Ed. 131, 36 S.Ct 7], cited by the majority.) A statute which is seemingly valid on its face may violate equal protection principles if applied or enforced in a discriminatory manner. (Brock v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 605, 610 [86 P.2d 805]; City of Banning v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 209 Cal.App.2d 152, 154 [25 Cal.Rptr. 621].) However, “A discriminatory intent or purpose is not presumed. [Citations.] To the contrary, the good faith of those enforcing the law and the validity of their action in the premises are presumed. [Citation.] The burden of proving discrimination is upon the complaining party. [Citation.]” (City of Banning, supra, p. 155; see 11 Cal.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, §§ 74-79, and cases cited.)
The majority would ignore the foregoing rules and presumptions, and would presume instead that the city officials and law enforcement officers have restricted or will restrict the applicability of the ordinance to hippies only. However, that premise is not even remotely supported by the declaration of urgency upon which the majority rely. The declaration simply recites the facts which induced city to conclude that the ordinance should take immediate effect, namely, that city had become inundated by persons (i.e., “hippies”) who were destroying public property. Government Code section 36937 required the city to state “the facts constituting the urgency” in order to permit the ordinance to take immediate effect The city council complied with that section, stated the facts, and enacted an ordinance which applies to, and is enforceable against, any person who violates its provisions. Neither the city council, the city itself, nor its inhabitants, should be penalized and their ordinance rendered totally void merely because the declaration harmlessly, though perhaps unfairly, characterized as “undesirable” and “unsanitary” those persons who, by their conduct, created the urgent situation which the ordinance was designed to correct. In the absence of any evidence whatsoever that Carmel’s ordinance has been unevenly applied against them, and in the face of a presumption to the contrary, it seems apparent that the majority’s holding is totally unfounded.
Of course, the unfortunate result of this rash holding is to invalidate, in its entirety, comprehensive and urgently needed legislation aimed at preserving one of California’s most attractive communities. Although the majority do not so state, it seems implicit in their contention that Carmel ultimately may undo the taint created by its declaration of urgency by repealing the ordinance and declaration, and thereafter enacting identical legislation in its place, without derogatory references to the youthful visitors of whom the majority appear to be so solicitous. To rule otherwise would be unthinkable, *874for we would tie Carmel’s hands indefinitely and prevent the city from ever protecting its parks and property from an assault which, giving city’s declaration the credence it deserves, is imminent, continuing and devastating. Thus the ultimate effect of the majority’s holding in this case will be to require the City of Carmel to repeal, and thereupon to reenact, the same ordinance. In my view, the Constitution does not require such an unproductive result.
Wright, C. J., and McComb, J., concurred.

 The majority suggest (fn. 4) that it is significant that the ordinance does not prohibit standing or running on the grass. However, the city council could legitimately conclude that the greater danger of suffocating the grass would be from persons lying or sitting thereon. “ ‘The Legislature ... is free to recognize degrees of harm and to confine its regulation to those classes of cases in which the need is deemed to be the most evident.’” (In re Ricky H., 2 Cal.3d 513, 521-522 [86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204], quoting an earlier case.)