Court Opinion

ID: 9459543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:23:39.149033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:12.690731
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
If the issue presented in this appeal were one of first impression; I would be inclined to distinguish “searches” from “seizures” for the purpose of determining to what extent, if any, the government may properly (1) detain a person’s suitcase (seizure), and (2) examine its contents (search), without first obtaining a warrant before either step (1) or step (2).
The Court here holds that under the “exigent circumstances” doctrine both the warrantless seizure of appellant’s suitcase and the warrantless search of its contents squares with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. My view, as applied to the present case, would be that while sufficient probable cause existed for the warrantless seizure of appellant’s luggage, the subsequent warrantless search of the suitcase’s contents by Agent Clements violated the Fourth Amendment.
As the majority so well states, the basis for the “exigent circumstances” doctrine is: “This exception to the warrant requirement, authorized for certain automobile searches, is premised on the theory that the mobility of the automobile presents a danger that contraband will move or disappear.” Bearing in mind that where the logic of a rule stops so should the application of the rule itself, my view, that in cases such as the present one a distinction should be made between warrantless seizures and warrantless searches, is bottomed upon the notion that the government’s valid interest in preventing the movement or disappearance of contraband is adequately and satisfactorily served by allowing the seizure of the property in question (here, a suitcase). At the same time, no legitimate interest in effective law enforcement would seem to justify the greater and further intrusion of a warrantless search of the already immobilized property, be it an automobile or a suitcase.
It appears, however, that the Supreme Court, in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), has rejected any such proffered distinction between warrantless searches and warrantless seizures.1 And, since Chambers is not, in my judgment, sufficiently distinguishable from the present case to permit either a different analysis or result here, I am impelled to concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.

. The Supreme Court not only rejected this distinction, but did so in the face of Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion that suggested an analytical approach similar to the view advanced in this concurring opinion. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61-65, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).