Court Opinion

ID: 9373300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:03.098667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.810402
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DEBRA DRAKE,                                      DOCKET NUMBER
                           Appellant,                  SF-0432-17-0272-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: October 21, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kevin Keaney, Esquire, Portland, Oregon, for the appellant.

           Anna Roe, Esquire, Portland, Oregon, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                        REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal from the agency for unacceptable performance under
     5 U.S.C. chapter 43. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     Western Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand
     Order and Santos v. National Aeronautics & Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355
     (Fed. Cir. 2021).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2           The appellant worked for the agency as an Outdoor Recreation Planner.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 4. In August 2016, the agency placed her on a
     30-day performance improvement plan (PIP) due to her unacceptable performance
     in three critical elements of her performance standards. Id. at 51-55. To improve
     her performance to the minimally successful level and pass the PIP, the appellant
     could fail to complete a task as described in the PIP no more than once under
     each critical element. 2 Id. at 53-55. When the PIP concluded, the appellant had
     not raised her level of performance to at least minimally successful on two
     critical elements, as she failed two tasks in the recreation permitting critical
     element and failed three tasks in the public events critical element . Id. at 42-45.
     These failures related to missing established deadlines and not showin g
     satisfactory progress on assignments. Id. As a result, the agency removed the
     appellant. Id. at 4-10.
¶3           The appellant filed a Board appeal contesting her removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an in itial
     decision sustaining the appellant’s removal for unacceptable performance, finding
     that the agency met its burden of proving by substantial evidence each of the
     required elements of a chapter 43 removal action. IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision
     (ID).    The appellant filed a petition for review, and the agency responded in
     opposition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.

     2
      Minimally successful is the lowest level of acceptable performance in the appellant’s
     performance standards. IAF, Tab 6 at 76-77.
                                                                                          3

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶4         At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
     in a performance-based action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, an agency must
     establish by substantial evidence that:       (1) OPM approved its performance
     appraisal system; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the performance
     standards and critical elements of her position; (3) the appellant’s performance
     standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1); (4) the agency warned the
     appellant of the inadequacies of her performance during the appraisal period and
     gave her a reasonable opportunity to improve; and (5) the appellant’s
     performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element.          White v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013). 3 As discussed
     below, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s findings.          As
     discussed at the end of our analysis, this appeal must nevertheless be remanded t o
     address an additional element of the agency’s burden of proof as set forth in
     Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61.

     The appellant has not established any error in the administrative judge’s finding
     that the agency provided her with a reasonable opportunity to dem onstrate that
     her performance improved to an acceptable level.
¶5         On review, the appellant only challenges the administrative judge’s finding
     that the agency provided her with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that
     her performance improved to an acceptable level.           PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6.
     Specifically, the appellant contends that her opportunity to improve was not
     reasonable since it was possible for her to fail the PIP before the full 30 days
     elapsed due to the interim deadlines on some of the required tasks. Id. Regarding
     the other elements of a chapter 43 action, the appellant does not refute the
     administrative judge’s findings, and we discern no reason to disturb the initial

     3
       Although White provides that criterion 3 requires that performance standards be valid
     under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1), the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
     2018 redesignated subsection 4302(b) as subsection 4302(c). Pub. L. No. 115-91,
     § 1097(d)(1)(A), 131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017).
                                                                                         4

     decision, as it is supported by the evidence, the inferences are appropriat e, and
     the credibility determinations are reasoned. 4 See Clay v. Department of the Army,
     123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016); see also Broughton v. Department of Health
     & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987).
¶6        When assessing whether an agency afforded an empl oyee a reasonable
     opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, relevant factors include the
     nature of the duties and responsibilities of the employee ’s position, the
     performance deficiencies involved, and the amount of time given to the employee
     to demonstrate acceptable performance. See White, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5. The
     Board also has considered the level of assistance provided to the employee during
     the PIP period.      See Bare v. Department of Health & Human Services,
     30 M.S.P.R. 684, 687-88 (1986).
¶7        In this instance, the agency informed the appellant through the PIP notice o f
     her unacceptable performance in three critical elements, listed the required tasks
     that she had to perform to demonstrate minimally successful performance, and
     informed her that, if she did not improve her performance on each of the critical
     elements to the minimally successful level at the conclusion of the PIP, her
     removal was possible. IAF, Tab 6 at 51-55. The appellant served as an Outdoor
     Recreation Planner for 15 years and had familiarity with many of the tasks
     assigned to her during the PIP period. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony
     of first-line supervisor), (testimony of the appellant). The tasks correlated with
     the core duties of the appellant’s position and broke down larger assignments into
     short-term, measurable steps. IAF, Tab 6 at 53-55; HCD (testimony of first-line
     supervisor). The Board has held that a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
     acceptable performance can contain interim deadlines that expire before the end
     of a PIP period. See, e.g., Luscri v. Department of the Army, 39 M.S.P.R. 482,

     4
       The administrative judge did not sustain the agency’s allegation that the appellant
     failed a third task under the public events critical element. ID at 21 -22. The agency
     does not contest this finding on review, and we find no reason to discuss it further.
                                                                                          5

     487, aff’d, 887 F.2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Table). The evidence, which includes
     the hearing testimony from the appellant’s first-line supervisor, supports the
     finding that the tasks and associated deadlines set within the 30 -day PIP period
     provided the appellant with a reasonable opportunity to show improvement to a
     minimally successful level.     HCD (testimony of first-line supervisor).         The
     administrative judge found the appellant’s first-line supervisor’s testimony
     “credible and compelling” when he described how the deadlines within the PIP
     set tasks into measurable steps, providing the appellant with the opportunity to
     display improvement. ID at 9; see HCD (testimony of first-line supervisor). The
     appellant does not raise any issues with the credibility of her first -line
     supervisor’s hearing testimony.     The Board must defer to an administrative
     judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly,
     on observing the demeanor of a testifying witness.          Haebe v. Department of
     Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Board may overturn such
     determinations only when it has sufficiently sound reasons.        Id.    There is no
     sufficiently sound reason for doing so in this matter.
¶8        The    appellant’s   yearly   standards    described     minimally     successful
     performance on each critical element as failing to perform at the fully successful
     level on two occasions through the entire performance appraisal year. IAF, Tab 6
     at 66-67, 70-71. The PIP, in contrast, permitted the appellant to attain minimally
     successful performance with one failure in a month.         Id. at 53-55.   Thus, the
     standard that the agency set forth in the PIP provided the appellant a greater
     margin for error to perform at the minimally successful level compared to the
     standard for the entire appraisal year, further establishing the reasonableness of
     the PIP period. Additionally, the appellant’s first-line supervisor provided her
     assistance by meeting with her weekly during the PIP period to discuss her
     performance, provide feedback, and answer questions. Id. at 47-50. This also
     supports the finding that the agency afforded the appellant a reasonable
     opportunity to improve. See Bare, 30 M.S.P.R. at 687-88. Finally, the Board has
                                                                                            6

     held that a 30-day PIP period is sufficient to satisfy the reasonable opportunity to
     demonstrate acceptable performance requirement. See Melnick v. Department of
     Housing & Urban Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 101 (1989), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228
     (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table). 5

     Remand is necessary to afford the parties an opportunity to su bmit evidence and
     argument regarding whether the appellant’s placement on a PIP was proper.
¶9         Although the appellant has identified no basis for us to disturb the
     administrative judge’s findings below, we nonetheless must remand this appeal
     for another reason. During the pendency of the petition for review in this case,
     the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Santos, 990 F.3d
     at 1360-61, that in addition to the five elements of the agency’s case set forth in
     the initial decision, the agency must also justify the institution of a PIP by
     proving   by   substantial    evidence   that   the   employee’s    performance     was
     unacceptable prior to the PIP. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to
     all pending cases, including this one, regardless of when the events took place.
     Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. Although the record
     in this appeal already contains evidence suggesting that the appellant’s
     performance leading up to the PIP was indeed unacceptable, we remand the
     appeal to give the parties the opportunity to present argument and additional
     evidence on whether the appellant’s performance during the period leading up to
     the PIP was unacceptable in one or more critical elements. See id., ¶¶ 15-17. On

     5
       On review, the appellant argues that the Board’s decision in Bare supports her
     position that the agency did not afford her with a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate
     acceptable performance. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6. The appellant’s argument is
     inapposite to the holding in Bare and provides no basis to overturn the initial decision.
     The administrative judge in this case considered many of the same factors that the
     Board did in Bare when determining that the agency provided the appellant with a
     reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, including the amount of
     assistance provided, the nature and duties of the position involved, and the cited
     performance deficiencies. See Bare, 30 M.S.P.R. at 688-89; ID at 7-12.
                                                                                       7

      remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on this issue
      and shall hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.
¶10        The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent
      with Santos. See id. If the agency makes the additional showing required under
      Santos on remand that the appellant’s performance in at least one critical element
      was at an unacceptable level prior to her placement on the PIP, the administrative
      judge may incorporate her prior findings on the other elements of the agency’s
      case in the remand initial decision. See id.

                                           ORDER
¶11        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Western
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.