Court Opinion

ID: 9556854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 21:00:37.471196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:55.865550
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075     Doc: 20        Filed: 08/17/2023   Pg: 1 of 10

                                           UNPUBLISHED

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                             No. 21-1680

        PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY,

                           Plaintiff - Appellee,

                    and

        ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

                           Defendant - Appellee,

                    v.

        DONALD LADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeremy Ladue,

                           Defendant - Appellant.

                                             No. 21-2075

        PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY,

                           Plaintiff - Appellant,

                    v.

        DONALD LADUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jeremy Ladue;
        ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

                           Defendants - Appellees.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075      Doc: 20         Filed: 08/17/2023    Pg: 2 of 10

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:20-cv-03068-DCN)

        Submitted: April 27, 2023                                         Decided: August 17, 2023

        Before THACKER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: J.R. Murphy, MURPHY & GRANTLAND, PA, Columbia, South Carolina,
        for Appellants. A. Johnston Cox, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee Allstate Fire
        and Casualty Insurance Company.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

                                                    2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075      Doc: 20        Filed: 08/17/2023     Pg: 3 of 10

        PER CURIAM:

              In these consolidated appeals, Donald Ladue (“Ladue”), as the personal

        representative of the estate of Jeremy Ladue, seeks to appeal the district court’s order

        granting Progressive Northern Insurance Company’s (“Progressive”) and Allstate Fire and

        Casualty Insurance Company’s (“Allstate”) motions for judgment on the pleadings on one

        of two claims. Progressive also seeks to appeal the court’s subsequent order denying its

        motion for judgment on the pleadings on the second claim. We affirm.

              On April 13, 2020, Jeremy Ladue (“Jeremy”), a deputy for the Charleston County

        Sherriff’s Department, died in a car accident while on patrol in a vehicle owned by the

        County of Charleston, South Carolina. At the time, Jeremy owned an insurance policy

        with Progressive, which provided underinsured motorist (“UIM”) bodily injury coverage

        with a limit of $100,000 and UIM property damage coverage with a limit of $100,000.

        Jeremy’s parents owned an insurance policy with Allstate, which also provided UIM bodily

        injury coverage with a limit of $100,000 and UIM property damage coverage with a limit

        of $100,000. Jeremy qualified as an insured under the Allstate policy at the time of the

        accident.

              After Jeremy died, his estate made a claim for UIM coverage under the Progressive

        policy. After Progressive learned that Jeremy was also insured under the Allstate policy,

        Progressive provided the estate $50,000 in UIM bodily injury coverage and $50,000 in

        property damage coverage. In total, Progressive provided Jeremy’s estate $100,000, half

        of the Progressive policy’s UIM limit. Allstate similarly provided Jeremy’s estate $50,000

                                                    3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075        Doc: 20       Filed: 08/17/2023     Pg: 4 of 10

        in UIM bodily injury coverage and $50,000 in property damage coverage, for a total of

        $100,000, half of the Allstate policy’s UIM limit.

               In 2020, Progressive filed a diversity-based civil action against Ladue and Allstate

        seeking two declaratory judgments. First, Progressive sought a declaration that Ladue had

        already recovered the maximum amount of UIM coverage to which he was entitled as a

        result of the April 13, 2020, accident. Second, Progressive sought a declaration that its

        proportionate share of the maximum amount of UIM coverage Ladue was entitled to

        recover as a result of the accident was one-third of $100,000 in UIM bodily injury coverage

        and $100,000 in UIM property damage coverage.

               Allstate answered the complaint and asserted a crossclaim against Ladue and a

        counterclaim against Progressive. In its crossclaim, Allstate sought a declaration that

        Ladue was limited to a maximum UIM recovery of the single highest UIM limit from any

        one at-home vehicle.       In its counterclaim, Allstate sought a declaration that its

        proportionate share of the maximum amount of UIM coverage Ladue was entitled to

        recover as a result of the accident was one-half of $100,000 in UIM bodily injury coverage

        and $100,000 in UIM property damage coverage. Ladue also answered Progressive’s and

        Allstate’s claims and filed a counterclaim against Progressive. Ladue sought a declaration

        that he was entitled to the full amount of UIM coverage available under each policy, for a

        total of $400,000.

               Progressive and Allstate filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that

        Ladue had already recovered the maximum amount of UIM coverage to which he was

        entitled. The district court granted Progressive’s and Allstate’s motions for judgment on

                                                    4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075       Doc: 20          Filed: 08/17/2023      Pg: 5 of 10

        the pleadings and held that Ladue had received the maximum amount of UIM coverage to

        which he was entitled. The district court’s order is the subject of Appeal No. 21-1680.

        Progressive also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding its claim that it

        was only obligated to contribute one-third of the estate’s recovery on the insurance policies.

        The court denied Progressive’s motion, explaining that Progressive was obligated to pay a

        one-half share of the total recovery. In Appeal No. 21-2075, Progressive appeals the

        court’s order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings.

               In Appeal No. 21-2075, Allstate asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction over the

        district court’s order denying Progressive’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. This

        court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain

        interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.

        Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). “[A] final decision generally

        is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but

        execute the judgment.” Kinsale Ins. Co. v. JDBC Holdings, Inc., 31 F.4th 870, 873 (4th

        Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 301 (4th

        Cir. 2021) (“Ordinarily, a district court order is not final until it has resolved all claims as

        to all parties.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

               Although not raised by the parties in Appeal No. 21-1680, we first must additionally

        determine whether this court has jurisdiction over the district court’s first order granting

        Allstate’s and Progressive’s motions for judgment on the pleadings, given that Ladue’s

        notice of appeal was filed before the court resolved all of the claims. Williamson v. Stirling,

        912 F.3d 154, 168 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “independent obligation to verify the

                                                       5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075       Doc: 20          Filed: 08/17/2023       Pg: 6 of 10

        existence of appellate jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). When a notice of

        appeal is premature, the jurisdictional defect can be cured under the doctrine of cumulative

        finality if the district court enters a final disposition of all claims as to all parties prior to

        our consideration of the appeal. Id. at 170; Equip. Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Traverse Comput.

        Brokers, 973 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992). However, not all premature notices of

        appeal are subject to the cumulative finality rule; this doctrine applies only if a party

        appeals from an order that the district court could have certified for immediate appeal under

        Rule 54(b). Williamson, 912 F.3d at 170. A district court may certify an order for

        immediate appeal under Rule 54(b) when the court directs entry of judgment “as to one or

        more, but fewer than all, claims or parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Curtiss-Wright

        Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (recognizing that Rule 54(b) certification is

        appropriate if order represents “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in

        the course of a multiple claims action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the

        first order resolved the sole claim in which Ladue was a party, and the action involved two

        claims, the district court could have certified the first order for immediate appeal under

        Rule 54(b).

               To consider Appeal No. 21-1680 under the doctrine of cumulative finality, we must

        next assess whether the district court has entered final judgment. This in turn implicates

        the jurisdictional challenge raised in Appeal No. 21-2075. If we conclude that the district

        court’s second order is final, we have jurisdiction over both appeals.

               The Declaratory Judgment Act specifies that a declaratory judgment is a final order.

        28 U.S.C. § 2201. “Once a district court has ruled on all of the issues submitted to it, either

                                                        6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075      Doc: 20         Filed: 08/17/2023     Pg: 7 of 10

        deciding them or declining to do so, the declaratory judgment is complete, final, and

        appealable.” Henglein v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 260 F.3d 201, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).

        But see Kinsale Ins. Co., 31 F.4th at 874-75 (holding that judgment on liability that does

        not fix damages not a final judgment). Because the district court entered a declaratory

        judgment on both claims and no claims remain for the court to resolve, including claims

        raised in the crossclaim and counterclaims, we possess jurisdiction over both appeals.

               Turning to the merits, in Appeal No. 21-1680, Ladue argues that the provisions of

        the Progressive and Allstate policies that restrict the portability of UIM coverage to an

        insured injured in a non-owned vehicle are contrary to South Carolina’s public policy and

        unenforceable. In response, Progressive and Allstate assert that Ladue’s demand for an

        additional UIM limit amounts to stacking, which is not permitted because Ladue did not

        have a vehicle involved in the accident.

               This court reviews de novo a district court’s order granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)

        motion for judgment on the pleadings. Affinity Living Grp., LLC v. StarStone Specialty

        Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2020). The standard of review for Rule 12(c) motions

        is the same as the standard used to review a district court’s ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P.

        12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Butler v. United States, 702 F.3d 749, 751-52 (4th Cir.

        2012). In reviewing a court’s order granting a Rule 12(c) motion, “we recount the facts as

        alleged by Plaintiff, accepting them as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in

        Plaintiff’s favor.” Conner v. Cleveland Cnty., 22 F.4th 412, 416 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

        143 S. Ct. 523 (2022). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is properly granted if it

        appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim

                                                    7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075       Doc: 20          Filed: 08/17/2023      Pg: 8 of 10

        entitling it to relief.” Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cnty., 909 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir.

        2018) (cleaned up).

               Under South Carolina law, “[i]f none of the insured’s or named insured’s vehicles

        is involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one

        of the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage.” S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160;

        see Brown v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 434 S.E.2d 270, 272 (S.C. 1993) (“We find the plain and

        obvious meaning of § 38-77-160 prohibits stacking where none of the insured vehicles is

        involved.”). “Stacking is the insured’s recovery of damages under more than one policy

        until the insured satisfies all of his damages or exhausts the limits of all available policies.”

        Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Shives, 492 S.E.2d 808, 810 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997). “The critical question

        in determining whether an insured has the right to stack is whether he is a Class I or Class

        II insured.” Concrete Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 498 S.E.2d 865, 866 (S.C.

        1998). Only a Class I insured may stack. Nakatsu v. Encompass Indem. Co., 700 S.E.2d

        283, 287 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010). A Class I insured is someone who “has a vehicle involved

        in the accident,” and a Class II insured is someone “whose vehicle was not involved in the

        accident.” S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mooneyham, 405 S.E.2d 396, 397 n.1 (S.C.

        1991). A Class II insured is limited to the extent of coverage on any one of his at-home

        vehicles with UIM coverage. See Brown, 434 S.E.2d at 271-72.

               Because Jeremy did not have a vehicle involved in the accident, he was a Class II

        insured and could not stack UIM coverage limits. Ladue attempts to avoid the prohibition

        against stacking by arguing that Allstate and Progressive cannot place limits on the

        portability of UIM coverage under South Carolina law. “[P]ortability refers to a person’s

                                                       8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075      Doc: 20         Filed: 08/17/2023      Pg: 9 of 10

        ability to use his coverage on a vehicle not involved in an accident as a basis for recovery

        of damages sustained in the accident.” Nakatsu, 700 S.E.2d at 288. Because the accident

        did not involve a covered vehicle, the policies needed to be portable for Ladue to recover.

        Allstate and Progressive agreed that the policies were portable and provided coverage.

        However, as the district court found, the relevant issue is one of stacking, not portability.

        Because Ladue seeks to recover UIM limits from more than one at-home vehicle, he seeks

        to stack UIM coverages, which is prohibited for Class II insureds. Thus, we affirm the

        district court’s order in Appeal No. 21-1680 granting Progressive’s and Allstate’s motions

        for judgment on the pleadings.

               In Appeal No. 21-2075, Progressive argues that the district court erred in holding

        that its proportionate share of the UIM coverage owed to Ladue was one-half because

        Progressive only insured one of the three vehicles insured. In response, Allstate asserts

        that the district court properly found that Progressive owed one-half of the UIM coverage.

               The Progressive policy states that Progressive’s share will be determined according

        to all available coverage limits. As the district court explained, Progressive cannot argue

        that Ladue cannot stack coverages for the purpose of determining the estate’s recovery,

        while also contending that it may stack the same coverages for the purpose of determining

        the portion of the estate’s recovery it is required to pay. See Brown, 434 S.E.2d at 272.

        Although the Allstate policy covers two vehicles and the Progressive policy covers one

        vehicle, that does not change the UIM coverage available to Jeremy’s estate under South

        Carolina law. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Progressive’s motion for

        judgment on the pleadings in Appeal No. 21-2075.

                                                     9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-2075      Doc: 20         Filed: 08/17/2023      Pg: 10 of 10

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     10