Court Opinion

ID: 998257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:08:21.368559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:13.720569
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 98-4593

MARILYN HARPER SMITH STAFFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CR-97-28)

Submitted: January 19, 1999

Decided: March 22, 1999

Before WIDENER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William Arthur Webb, Federal Public Defender, Robert H. Hale, Jr.,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marilyn Harper Smith Stafford appeals from the district court's
order revoking her supervised release and imposing an additional
term of imprisonment. We affirm.

Approximately one month after Stafford's release from prison
where she was serving a sentence for possession of stolen property,
her probation officer filed a petition to revoke Stafford's supervised
release. The probation officer alleged that Stafford had violated four
conditions of her supervised release: (i) based on a positive urinalysis,
she possessed cocaine; (ii) she failed to report to the probation officer
as directed; (iii) she failed to report a change of employment within
seventy-two hours; and (iv) she absconded supervision. Stafford
admitted the violations at the revocation hearing. The court revoked
Stafford's supervised release and sentenced her to a twelve-month
term of imprisonment.

On appeal, Stafford challenges the district court's revocation of her
supervised release, contending that the court did not make an express
finding regarding whether the availability of a substance abuse treat-
ment program warranted an exception to the mandatory imprisonment
rule of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (1994). Because Stafford did not assert
her present claim in the district court, we review only for plain error.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).

The district court must revoke the supervised release of a defendant
who has violated one of the conditions of supervised release by pos-
sessing a controlled substance, and Stafford admitted to having pos-
sessed cocaine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). In such revocation cases,
district courts are to consider whether "the availability of appropriate
substance abuse treatment programs, or an individual's current or past
participation in such programs" warrants a departure from § 3583(g)'s

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mandatory revocation rule. See 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3583(d) (West Supp.
1998); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, com-
ment. (n.6) (1997). It was not plain error for the district court not to
have made an express finding as to this consideration. See United
States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A court need not
engage in ritualistic incantation in order to establish its consideration
of a legal issue. It is sufficient if . . . the district court rules on issues
that have been fully presented for determination. Consideration is
implicit in the court's ultimate ruling.").

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of supervised release and
the imposition of a twelve-month sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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