Court Opinion

ID: 9897357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:34.84122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.401182
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Jun 27 2023, 8:45 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel K. Whitehead                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Yorktown, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
                                                           David A. Arthur
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin Allen Holladay,                                      June 27, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-MI-2633
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Madison Circuit
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Scott A. Norrick,
Appellee-Respondent                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           48C05-2104-MI-159

                                Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                               Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023                                  Page 1 of 9
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Fifteen years ago, the Commonwealth of Kentucky required Kevin Holladay to

      register as a sex offender for 20 years for his conviction of a sex crime against a

      minor. Without registering in Kentucky, Holladay moved to Indiana and

      registered here. Thereafter, he petitioned the court to remove him from

      Indiana’s sex offender registry, arguing that his Kentucky crime does not render

      him a sex offender under the Indiana Code and that requiring him to register is

      both an ex post facto punishment and a violation of the Indiana Constitution’s

      Privileges and Immunities Clause. We affirm the trial court’s denial of

      Holladay’s petition for removal from Indiana’s sex offender registry.

      Facts
[2]   In 2008, Holladay was convicted in Kentucky of sexual abuse in the second

      degree. Under the Kentucky Penal Code, “A person is guilty of sexual abuse in

      the second degree when . . . [h]e or she is at least eighteen (18) years old but less

      than twenty-one (21) years old and subjects another person who is less than

      sixteen (16) years old to sexual contact.” KRS § 510.120(1)(a). A defendant

      convicted of this crime is required to register under Kentucky’s Sex Offender

      Registration Act. KRS § 17.500(5)(a)(2) (defining “registrant” as one who has

      committed “[a] criminal offense against a victim who is a minor”); KRS §

      17.500(3)(9) (specifying that a “criminal offense against a victim who is a

      minor” includes “[s]exual abuse, as set forth in KRS 510.120”).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023           Page 2 of 9
[3]   As Holladay describes his crime, “[t]here was no rape, no criminal deviate

      conduct, child molesting, child exploitation, vicarious sexual gratification, child

      solicitation or child seduction charged.”1 App. Vol. II, p. 49. Holladay pleaded

      guilty and received a one-year executed sentence with five months suspended to

      probation. Although the Kentucky court ordered Holladay to register for 20

      years, he never did so.

[4]   Holladay moved to Indiana at some point after his conviction. And once in

      Indiana, Holladay placed his name on the sex offender registry. In April 2022,

      Holladay petitioned an Indiana trial court to have his name removed from the

      Indiana sex offender registry. The trial court denied Holladay’s request.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Holladay makes three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that his registration

      as a sex offender in Indiana violates the strictures of Indiana Code § 11-8-8-5

      because the statute does not specifically delineate his Kentucky offense as a

      crime requiring registration. Second, he contends that his registration

      constitutes an ex-post facto punishment in violation of Article 1, Section 24 of

      the Indiana Constitution. And third, he asserts that his registration infringes the

      Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana

      Constitution. These claims present questions of law that we consider de novo.

      1
        As Holladay failed to include in the record any documentation of this crime beyond its Kentucky cause
      number—which, given that it yields no results when searched, is presumably incorrect—any further details of
      the crime are unknown.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023                               Page 3 of 9
      Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016). For his constitutional arguments,

      Holladay brings as-applied challenges, meaning “he need only show the statute

      is unconstitutional ‘on the facts of the particular case.’” State v. Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d

      368, 369 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Meredith v. Pence, 984 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 n.6 (Ind.

      2016)).

      I. Statutory Analysis
[6]   To begin, Holladay argues that because his Kentucky crime is unlike any of the

      specifically listed offenses in Indiana Code § 11-8-8-5(a), the Indiana Legislature

      did not intend him to be on the sex offender registry due to his out-of-state

      registration. Our reading of the statute, however, convinces us that the out-of-

      state registration requirement independently requires his registration, regardless

      of any similarities, or lack thereof, with the crimes specifically listed there.

[7]   We follow a well-trodden path when confronted with questions of statutory

      interpretation. “Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine and

      give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.

      2012). From the start, “[t]he best evidence of that intent is a statute’s text.” Id.

      And “when a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the plain and

      ordinary meaning of the language.” Id.

[8]   Indiana law requires that any “sex or violent offender” must be placed on the

      sex offender registry. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(a)(1). The definition of a “sex or

      violent offender” is provided by Indiana Code Section § 11-8-8-5. As explained

      by the Indiana Supreme Court:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023            Page 4 of 9
              Indiana Code section 11-8-8-5[] defines “sex or violent offender”
              in two parts. Subsection (a) lists twenty sex crimes in our Indiana
              Code that, if convicted of any one of them, result in such a
              classification; subsection (b) adds, “the term includes”:

                       (1) a person who is required to register as a sex or violent
                           offender in any jurisdiction . . . .

      Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 91 (Ind. 2016). Thus, in our Supreme Court’s own

      words, subsection (b) “adds” another, alternative registration requirement.

      Holladay cites no authority and offers no persuasive argument to the contrary.

      Indeed, his main argument, that reading Indiana Code § 11-8-8-7 “as a whole”

      reveals the legislature’s intent, works against him.

[9]   If the legislature had wanted to limit subsection (b) to only those out-of-state

      crimes comparable to the ones listed in subsection (a), it is fully aware of how to

      do so. For example, as recently as 2020, the definition of a “sexually violent

      predator” provided that the out-of-state registration requirement only attached

      so long as the registrant had committed an offense “substantially equivalent to

      any of the offenses” listed in the statute. Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5(k) (2020); see

      also Spencer v. State, 153 N.E.3d 289, 295-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (applying Ind.

      Code § 35-38-1-7.5). This is essentially the language Holladay asks us to insert

      into the statute. But because adding this language would unquestionably alter

      both the effect of the statute and the expressed intent of the legislature, we

      decline to do so. Ind. Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d

      371, 376 (Ind. 2017) (“We may not add new words to a statute which are not

      the expressed intent of the legislature.”).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023               Page 5 of 9
[10]   Holladay is thus a “sex or violent offender” per the terms of Indiana Code § 11-

       8-8-7(b)(1).

       II. Ex Post Facto Clause
[11]   Holladay next argues that his registration constitutes an ex-post facto

       punishment under Article 1, Section 24 of the Indiana Constitution.

[12]   Article 1, Section 24 provides that “No ex post facto law . . . shall ever be

       passed.” This provision serves to generally prohibit “laws that impose

       punishment for an act that was not punishable at the time it was committed or

       imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” Crowley v. State, 188

       N.E.3d 54, 58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “The underlying purpose of the Ex Post

       Facto Clause is to give effect to the fundamental principle that persons have a

       right to a fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal

       penalties.” Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 377 (Ind. 2009).

[13]   As Holladay admits, his Kentucky offense and subsequent move to Indiana

       both occurred in 2008. The legislature enacted SORA in 1994 and amended the

       statute to include the out-of-state registration requirement in 2006. State v. Zerbe,

       50 N.E.3d 368, 369 (Ind. 2016). In a pair of cases handed down together, the

       Indiana Supreme Court held that no violation of Indiana’s Ex-Post Facto

       Clause occurred when offenders had committed their offense before the

       enactment of SORA, were required to register in their original states, and had

       moved to Indiana after the out-of-state registration requirement went into effect.

       Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 90 (Ind. 2016); Zerbe, 50 N.E.3d at 368. In effect,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023           Page 6 of 9
       the Court found that “maintaining a registry requirement across state lines does

       not amount to a punitive burden.” Tyson, 51 N.E.3d at 90. By extension,

       Holladay is not punitively burdened here.

[14]   But undeterred by these cases, Holladay argues that his registration is punitive

       because, unlike the registrants in Tyson and Zerbe, he never registered in his

       original state. To Holladay, this fact transforms his registration requirement

       from the non-punitive act of merely “maintaining” the registration across state

       lines at issue in those cases into an additional, affirmative obligation.

[15]   Setting aside that there is no ex-post facto violation because Holladay’s crime in

       Kentucky and move to Indiana occurred after the current version of SORA

       went into effect, we find Holladay’s argument unavailing. He asks us to endorse

       a system in which recently convicted sexual offenders would be in a race to

       move to Indiana before they could be properly registered to avoid any

       registration requirement. This would also imply that a sex offender could duck

       their registration obligation in their original state, move to Indiana, and

       suddenly claim that registering as a sex offender would be a punitive burden.

       Holladay deserves no credit for his failure to register in Kentucky.

[16]   Given that Holladay faced no more of a punitive burden than the registrants in

       Tyson and Zerbe, we find no violation of Indiana’s Ex-Post Facto Clause.

       III. Privileges and Immunities Clause
[17]   Lastly, Holladay contends that his registration violates Indiana’s Privileges and

       Immunities Clause. Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution reads:
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023             Page 7 of 9
       “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens,

       privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong

       to all citizens.”

[18]   In his complaint, Holladay claimed only that his registration infringed his

       constitutional “right to travel” and cited a case involving the Federal

       Constitution. App. Vol. II, p. 61 (citing Hope v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 984

       F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2021), rev’d 9 F.4th 513 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc)). The State

       argues that Holladay waived this issue for failure to raise it before the trial

       court. We agree.

[19]   To avoid waiver, Indiana courts have long required litigants to first raise the

       issue before the trial court. Here, Holladay neither mentioned Article 1, Section

       23 nor offered legal analysis on the issue to the trial court. Indeed, in issuing its

       order, the trial court did not reference or even hint towards resolving any issue

       under Indiana’s Privileges and Immunities Clause—despite otherwise

       addressing and answering Holladay’s other statutory and Ex-Post Facto Clause

       arguments. Hence, Holladay waived any relief based on this claim for failure to

       raise it before the trial court. Plank v. Cmty. Hosp. of Ind., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind.

       2013) (recognizing the “general rule . . . that failure to challenge the

       constitutionality of a statute at trial results in waiver of review on appeal”); see

       also Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 429 n.17 (Ind. 1997) (requiring litigants to

       present “separate legal analysis” of Indiana Constitutional issues to avoid

       waiver).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023            Page 8 of 9
[20]   Holladay has failed to show reversible error in the trial court’s denial of his

       petition for removal from Indiana’s sex offender registry.

[21]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-2633 | June 27, 2023           Page 9 of 9