Court Opinion

ID: 9960393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 12:01:51.974754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:25.630006
License: Public Domain

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                                        Hepburn v. Brill

                 LAURIE HEPBURN v. CHANDLER BRILL
                            (SC 20832)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The plaintiff sought visitation with L, the minor child of the defendant
            and the plaintiff’s deceased sister, pursuant to the third-party visitation
            statute (§ 46b-59). The plaintiff had lived with L and L’s mother since
            L was born in 2010, while the defendant lived elsewhere. After the death
            of L’s mother in 2021, L initially continued to live with the plaintiff, but
            the defendant eventually took L to live with him full-time. The defendant
            moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s visitation petition for lack of subject
            matter jurisdiction, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing under
            § 46b-59 (b) because she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that
            she had a parent-like relationship with L and that L would suffer real
            and significant harm if visitation were to be denied. The plaintiff then
            filed an amended petition for visitation with L, in which she alleged
            that, in a series of video calls that occurred while L was living with the
            defendant, L appeared very stressed, sad, and anxious. During those
            calls, L reported, inter alia, that she was miserable living with the defen-
            dant and devastated to be cut off from the plaintiff. L stated that she
            was crying herself to sleep and had lost weight. L also told the plaintiff
            that the defendant had mocked her for crying about the loss of her
            mother and had thrown her up against a car. The defendant objected
            to the amended petition, arguing that it would be improper for the court
            to consider the amended petition while the motion to dismiss the initial
            petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was pending. Following
            a hearing, the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the initial
            petition, concluding, without elaboration, that it did not satisfy the
            requirements of § 46b-59. The court also dismissed, sua sponte, the
            amended petition, concluding that its allegations, if proven by clear
            and convincing evidence, would not establish the plaintiff’s parent-like
            relationship with L or establish that L would suffer real and significant
            harm if visitation were to be denied. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed
            from the trial court’s judgment.

         Held that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s amended petition
            for visitation with L, the plaintiff having adequately alleged therein both
            the existence of a parent-like relationship and that the denial of visitation
            would cause L real and significant harm, and, accordingly, this court
            reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further
            proceedings:
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                                     Hepburn v. Brill
       1. The trial court improperly treated the defendant’s motion to dismiss as
           implicating the court’s subject matter jurisdiction rather than its statu-
           tory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59:

          In Roth v. Weston (259 Conn. 202), this court applied a judicial gloss to
          a prior version of § 46b-59 to render the statute constitutional and, in
          doing so, concluded that the parent-like relationship and the real and
          significant harm requirements were matters of standing that implicated
          the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but the legislature’s subsequent
          amendment (P.A. 12-137, § 1) to § 46b-59, in accordance with the gloss
          adopted in Roth, created a new statute that carried with it a strong
          presumption of constitutionality such that the statute no longer required
          a gloss to function within the bounds of the constitution.

          The trial court has plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over
          legal disputes in family relations matters pursuant to statute (§ 46b-
          1), § 46b-1 (a) (12) defines family relations matters to include matters
          affecting or involving rights and remedies provided for in chapter 815j
          of the General Statutes, § 46b-59 falls within chapter 815j and expressly
          provides the court with the power to order visitation to any person
          who meets the statutory standard, and, accordingly, §§ 46b-1 and 46b-
          59 together provided the trial court in the present case with subject
          matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s third-party visitation petitions.

          Because the motion to dismiss implicated the trial court’s statutory
          authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59 rather than its subject matter juris-
          diction, this court treated that motion as raising the question of whether
          the plaintiff had sufficiently proffered specific and good faith allegations
          that both a parent-like relationship existed between her and L and that
          the denial of visitation would cause real and significant harm to L.

       2. Because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her
           initial petition for visitation, and because the trial court considered the
           plaintiff’s amended petition, it was permissible for this court to consider
           the allegations therein to determine whether the trial court properly
           had declined to exercise its statutory authority under § 46b-59:

          The defendant’s objection to the plaintiff’s amended petition was prem-
          ised on his claim that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the rule of
          practice (§ 10-60) governing amendments to pleadings in civil matters,
          but visitation is governed by the less restrictive rule of practice (§ 25-
          7) pertaining to amendments to pleadings in family matters, and, because
          the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff to amend her initial
          petition under the more liberal provision of Practice Book § 25-7, and
          the trial court actually considered the amended petition, this court also
          considered the amended petition to determine whether the plaintiff
          pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that she had a parent-like relation-
          ship with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
          were to be denied.
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         3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the amended petition did not
             include the specific and good faith allegations necessary to demonstrate
             the existence of the plaintiff’s parent-like relationship with L and that
             L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation were to be denied:
             With respect to the parent-like relationship requirement, the plaintiff
             alleged, inter alia, that she lived with L for more than ten years, was L’s
             primary caretaker, and was involved in every aspect of L’s day, including
             transporting L to school, assisting L with homework, enrolling L in
             extracurricular activities, and taking L to medical appointments, and
             that, after the death of L’s mother, she served as L’s primary provider
             of emotional support, comfort, and care, and those allegations establish-
             ing the duration, regularity, and magnitude of the care that the plaintiff
             provided to L were sufficient to plead a parent-like relationship pursuant
             to § 46b-59 (b) and (c).
             This court emphasized that the parent-like relationship and real and
             significant harm requirements should be analyzed separately and that
             the severance of emotional ties between a nonparent who has developed
             a parent-like relationship and a child, without more, should not be the
             end of the analysis with respect to the harm requirement, but it also
             recognized that there may be circumstances, such as when a child is
             coping with the death of a parent in addition to the severance of substan-
             tial emotional ties with a nonparent, that the denial of visitation with
             the nonparent itself could cause serious and immediate harm to that child.
             With respect to the real and significant harm requirement, the plaintiff
             alleged, inter alia, that she was L’s primary caretaker and provider of
             emotional support, that L was abruptly taken away from her home and
             had been very emotional since she was cut off from her former life, that
             L was very sad, anxious, fearful, crying excessively, experiencing suicidal
             ideation, and losing weight, and that the defendant’s actions compounded
             the emotional harm that he caused to L by depriving her of a relationship
             with the plaintiff, and those allegations were more than sufficiently
             specific to satisfy the statutory pleading requirement by demonstrating
             that L was suffering significant emotional harm, manifesting itself
             through her conduct, statements, and physical symptoms, as a result of
             the deprivation of her relationship with the plaintiff.
             Igersheim v. Bezrutczyk (197 Conn. App. 412), to the extent that it held
             that it is improper for a trial court to consider an amended third-party
             visitation petition that is filed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss
             the initial third-party visitation petition, overruled.
                 Argued October 26, 2023—officially released April 16, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Petition for third-party visitation with the defendant’s
         minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
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       district of Fairfield, where the court, Truglia, J., granted
       the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment
       thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed. Reversed;
       further proceedings.
         Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom were Thomas
       A. Esposito and Clifford C. Garnett, for the appellant
       (plaintiff).
          Bruce W. Diamond, for the appellee (defendant).
                                          Opinion

         ROBINSON, C. J. This appeal requires us to consider
       the jurisdictional effects of the 2012 amendments to
       the third-party visitation statute, General Statutes § 46b-
       59 (b); see Public Acts 2012, No. 12-137, § 1; on the
       judicial gloss articulated in Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn.
       202, 234–35, 789 A.2d 431 (2002), which imposed ‘‘high
       jurisdictional hurdles’’ that individuals petitioning for
       third-party visitation with a minor child must overcome.
       The plaintiff, Laurie Hepburn, appeals1 from the judg-
       ment of the trial court dismissing her amended verified
       petition for third-party visitation (amended petition)
       with her niece, L, who is the biological child of the
       defendant, Chandler Brill. On appeal, the plaintiff con-
       tends that the trial court improperly treated the defen-
       dant’s motion to dismiss as presenting a question of
       subject matter jurisdiction rather than the court’s statu-
       tory authority to act pursuant to § 46b-59. The plaintiff
       also contends that the trial court incorrectly determined
       that the amended petition failed to include the specific
       and good faith allegations necessary to demonstrate
       that (1) she had a parent-like relationship with L, and
       (2) L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
       were to be denied. We agree with the plaintiff and con-
       clude that, given the Superior Court’s plenary jurisdic-
         1
           The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate
       Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
       Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
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         tion over family relations matters under General
         Statutes § 46b-1; see, e.g., Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn.
         757, 776–77, 143 A.3d 578 (2016); and the 2012 amend-
         ments to § 46b-59 (b), the trial court incorrectly deter-
         mined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under
         Roth. We also conclude that the amended petition
         alleges facts sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing
         under § 46b-59. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
         judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s amended petition.
            The record reveals the following factual allegations
         asserted by the plaintiff, which we construe in her
         favor,2 and procedural history. The subject of this visita-
         tion action is the plaintiff’s niece, L, who was born
         in December, 2010. From the time of her birth until
         September, 2021, L lived with her mother, Hallie Hep-
         burn, her grandmother, Patricia Hepburn, and Hallie’s
         sister, the plaintiff. The defendant, who is L’s biological
         father, would regularly visit L at the home L shared
         with Hallie, Patricia, and the plaintiff, but the defendant
         and L would have only about one visit per year outside
         of the home.
            In 2015, Patricia suffered a stroke, and Hallie became
         her primary caretaker. Because Hallie was focused on
         taking care of Patricia, at this time, the plaintiff became
         increasingly responsible for L, acting as her parent by
         serving as her primary caretaker and provider of emo-
         tional support. Specifically, Hallie and the plaintiff
         shared the responsibility of transporting L to school,
         assisting with her homework, taking her to medical
         appointments, and engaging in recreational activities
         with her, among other tasks. The plaintiff was involved
            2
              See, e.g., Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542,
         550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011) (‘‘[i]n ruling [on] whether a complaint survives a
         motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the
         complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
         construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader’’ (internal quota-
         tion marks omitted)).
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       in all aspects of L’s day; she woke her up in the morning,
       provided her with meals, and got her ready for bed. L
       looked to the plaintiff for comfort and support by, for
       example, talking to the plaintiff about school issues and
       her feelings.
          In September, 2021, Patricia died, and, two days later,
       Hallie died by suicide. L looked to the plaintiff for com-
       fort and support during that difficult time, while contin-
       uing to live in the same house with the plaintiff. The
       defendant, who had been living in Massachusetts, even-
       tually moved to Connecticut and started taking L to
       live with him on the weekends. In November, 2021, the
       defendant revoked the plaintiff’s privileges to pick up
       L from school and took L to live with him full-time.
       After unsuccessfully attempting to arrange a visitation
       schedule with the defendant, the plaintiff filed in the
       Northern Fairfield County Probate Court (Probate
       Court) petitions for emergency temporary custody of
       L, temporary custody of L, removal of the defendant
       as L’s guardian, and her appointment as L’s permanent
       guardian. The Probate Court denied the plaintiff’s
       motion for emergency custody, and the plaintiff subse-
       quently withdrew the remaining petitions. On July 18,
       2022, the plaintiff commenced the present third-party
       visitation action by filing her initial verified petition for
       visitation (initial petition) with the trial court.
          The defendant, who had relocated back to Massachu-
       setts with L, moved to dismiss the initial petition for lack
       of personal jurisdiction. When the parties subsequently
       appeared before the trial court for an evidentiary hear-
       ing, that hearing did not go forward. Instead, counsel
       for the parties met with the court in chambers. During
       that meeting, the court questioned on its own whether
       the plaintiff had included sufficient facts in the initial
       petition to vest the court with subject matter jurisdic-
       tion pursuant to § 46b-59 (b). At the conclusion of the
       meeting in chambers, the plaintiff’s counsel indicated
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         that he would file an amended petition. The court did
         not issue an order with respect to the permissibility of
         amending the initial petition.

            Following the meeting, on October 6, 2022, the defen-
         dant filed a second motion to dismiss, claiming that the
         plaintiff lacked standing under § 46b-59 (b) because
         the initial petition failed to allege sufficient facts to
         establish both that she had a parent-like relationship
         with L and that L would suffer real and significant harm
         if visitation were to be denied. The following day, the
         plaintiff filed the amended petition, which alleged addi-
         tional facts with respect to the plaintiff’s parent-like
         relationship with L and the harm caused by the lack of
         visitation. The amended petition included additional
         factual allegations arising from thirteen video calls
         between the plaintiff and L, which occurred between
         December, 2021, and February, 2022, prior to the filing
         of the initial petition. The plaintiff described L as
         appearing ‘‘very stressed and very upset’’ during the
         video calls and alleged that L ‘‘was desperate to come
         home and didn’t understand why it was taking so long.’’
         During one call, L stated that ‘‘she was very dizzy, could
         barely walk . . . [had] a headache,’’ and had vomited
         several times. During another call, L said that, if it was
         not for the plaintiff, her friends, and school, ‘‘there
         would be ‘no point in living because [she would] just
         be miserable with [the defendant].’ ’’ L further stated
         that she could not cry in front of the defendant because
         he would mock her and swear at her. L ‘‘said that, when
         she [would cry] about [her] mom, [the defendant would
         tell] her to stop whining.’’ During later video calls, the
         plaintiff alleged that L ‘‘appeared exhausted, pale, and
         so very sad,’’ and that L had stated that she was ‘‘not
         feeling strong anymore’’ and had ‘‘lost eight pounds.’’
         In February, 2022, the defendant ended the plaintiff’s
         video access to L.
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           Subsequently, in July, 2022, the plaintiff received a
       phone call from L in the middle of the night, during
       which L sounded sad, depressed, and anxious. L made
       several statements during that call that caused the plain-
       tiff great concern with respect to L’s mental and emo-
       tional well-being. L told the plaintiff that (1) ‘‘she sleeps
       on the floor every night and prays to her mother in
       heaven to be her guardian angel and [to] get her out of
       this situation living with [the defendant],’’ (2) ‘‘she often
       cries herself to sleep,’’ (3) ‘‘she is devastated about
       being cut off from [the plaintiff],’’ (4) ‘‘she desperately
       wanted to return home to live with [the plaintiff], as
       she always did,’’ (5) ‘‘people think she is fine because
       she goes to school and looks fine, but she is not fine
       on the inside,’’ (6) the defendant yells and swears at
       her ‘‘all the time’’ and ‘‘completely ignores her feelings,’’
       (7) the defendant ‘‘shoved her up against his car’’ and
       screamed ‘‘the f-word at her,’’ (8) ‘‘she constantly tells
       [the defendant] that she wants to go home,’’ (9) she is
       ‘‘ ‘not doing well’ ’’ and does not want to live with the
       defendant, (10) ‘‘she wants to get away from [the defen-
       dant] and then [to] get a restraining order against him
       because she is scared of him,’’ (11) ‘‘her worst fear was
       staying with [the defendant] and going to school in
       Massachusetts,’’ and (12) the defendant ‘‘is an awful
       person and a terrible parent,’’ and she ‘‘ ‘never want[s]
       to see him again because of what he has done to [her].’ ’’
       The plaintiff further alleged in the amended petition
       that L ‘‘lost three major live-in, daily relationships and
       two attachment figures within one year. She has now
       lost her childhood home, her school, friends, providers,
       and more.’’ Finally, the plaintiff contends that she is
       ‘‘the only connection [L] currently has to her mother
       and her entire childhood before her mother died. Even
       though [the defendant] is aware of [L’s] critical emo-
       tional needs and the psychological necessity of continu-
       ing [their] relationship, he continues to refuse access
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                                Hepburn v. Brill

         or contact of any kind. Even more concerning, [L] is
         reporting that [the defendant] is emotionally insensi-
         tive, dismissive, neglectful, and even outright abusive.’’
            The defendant filed an objection to the amended peti-
         tion, arguing that, under Appellate Court case law, it
         would be improper for the court to consider the
         amended petition while a motion to dismiss for lack
         of subject matter jurisdiction is pending, even if that
         amended petition purports to cure the alleged jurisdic-
         tional defect. See Igersheim v. Bezrutczyk, 197 Conn.
         App. 412, 420, 231 A.3d 1276 (2020); Fennelly v. Norton,
         103 Conn. App. 125, 137–39, 931 A.2d 269, cert. denied,
         284 Conn. 918, 931 A.2d 936 (2007).
            Following a hearing, the trial court issued a memoran-
         dum of decision, granted the defendant’s motion to
         dismiss the initial petition, and dismissed the amended
         petition on its own. With respect to the initial petition,
         the trial court concluded, without elaboration, that it
         ‘‘did not satisfy the requirements of . . . § 46b-59
         . . . .’’ With respect to the amended petition, the trial
         court determined that (1) ‘‘[t]he allegations, if proven
         by clear and convincing evidence at trial, would estab-
         lish that the plaintiff assisted [Hallie] in caring for [L]’’
         but ‘‘would not establish that a [parent-like] relationship
         presently exists between the plaintiff and [L],’’ and (2)
         the allegations did ‘‘not set forth specific facts from
         which the court [could] conclude that denying the plain-
         tiff access and visitation [would] cause [L] to be neglected,
         uncared for, mistreated, or harmed in some way.’’ This
         appeal followed.
           On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
         improperly dismissed both of her petitions for third-
         party visitation. Relying on, for example, Amodio v.
         Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 729–30, 724 A.2d 1084 (1999),
         the plaintiff claims that the trial court has ‘‘plenary and
         general subject matter jurisdiction’’ over petitions for
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       third-party visitation because they are ‘‘family relations
       matters,’’ as defined by § 46b-1; according to the plain-
       tiff, this means that the defendant’s motion to dismiss
       concerned the trial court’s statutory authority to act
       pursuant to § 46b-59, rather than the plaintiff’s standing
       as a jurisdictional matter. See Practice Book § 25-1
       (defining ‘‘family matters’’ for purpose of rules of prac-
       tice).3 With respect to the merits of the trial court’s
       authority to act, the plaintiff argues that the trial court
       incorrectly determined that her allegations in both the
       initial petition and the amended petition concerning a
       parent-like relationship, when interpreted in the light
       most favorable to her, demonstrate only that she merely
       assisted L’s mother in caring for L. The plaintiff further
       contends that her allegations of specific instances of
       neglect, coercive control, and failure to care for L sup-
       port the statutory element of real and significant harm.
       Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the allegations in
       both her initial petition and her amended petition are
       sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of § 46b-
       59 (b) and that we should remand this case for an
       evidentiary hearing on its merits.
         In response, the defendant relies on Roth v. Weston,
       supra, 259 Conn. 202, and DiGiovanna v. St. George,
         3
           Practice Book § 25-1 provides: ‘‘The following shall be ‘family matters’
       within the scope of these rules: Any actions brought pursuant to General
       Statutes § 46b-1, including, but not limited to, dissolution of marriage or
       civil union, legal separation, dissolution of marriage or civil union after legal
       separation, annulment of marriage or civil union, alimony, support, custody,
       and change of name incident to dissolution of marriage or civil union, habeas
       corpus and other proceedings to determine the custody and visitation of
       children except those which are properly filed in the Superior Court as
       juvenile matters, the establishing of paternity, enforcement of foreign matri-
       monial or civil union judgments, actions related to prenuptial or pre-civil
       union and separation agreements and to matrimonial or civil union decrees
       of a foreign jurisdiction, actions brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-
       15, custody proceedings brought under the provisions of the Uniform Child
       Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and proceedings for enforcement
       of support brought under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family
       Support Act.’’ (Emphasis added.)
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          300 Conn. 59, 12 A.3d 900 (2011), to contend that ‘‘[a]
          consistent body of appellate case law makes it clear
          that the issue . . . before this court is one of subject
          matter jurisdiction’’ and, therefore, that ‘‘the trial court
          did not err in dismissing the petition.’’ Relying further
          on the Appellate Court’s decisions in Igersheim v. Bez-
          rutcyzk, supra, 197 Conn. App. 420, and Fennelly v.
          Norton, supra, 103 Conn. App. 137–39, the defendant
          contends that, because he moved to dismiss the initial
          petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
          is limited to considering the allegations of the initial
          petition. He argues that the plaintiff’s allegations in the
          initial petition, even when interpreted in the light most
          favorable to her, establish only that visitation might be
          in L’s best interest or simply beneficial to her, which
          does not meet the requirements of § 46b-59 (b). The
          defendant also argues that, even if we were to consider
          the allegations in the amended petition in deciding this
          appeal, those allegations also fail to meet the statute’s
          threshold requirements, and that having to continue to
          defend against either petition violates his parental rights
          as guaranteed by the due process clause of the four-
          teenth amendment to the United States constitution.
          We agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the trial
          court improperly dismissed this case because it had
          subject matter jurisdiction under § 46b-1 and that the
          allegations in the amended petition are sufficient to
          confer statutory authority to act under § 46b-59 (b).
             The plaintiff’s claims in this appeal, which concern
          the interpretation of pleadings and whether the trial
          court has subject matter jurisdiction or statutory authority
          to act under the statutory scheme governing petitions
          for third-party visitation, present a question of law over
          which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Carpenter v.
          Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 128, 287 A.3d 1027 (2023); Reinke
          v. Sing, 328 Conn. 376, 382, 179 A.3d 769 (2018); DiGio-
          vanna v. St. George, supra, 300 Conn. 70.
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                              Hepburn v. Brill

          We begin our analysis by recognizing that, ‘‘[w]hen-
       ever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice
       of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken
       and the matter passed [on] before it can move one
       further step in the cause . . . as any movement is nec-
       essarily the exercise of jurisdiction.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody
       N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).
       Because it affects whether we should consider the plain-
       tiff’s initial petition or her amended petition in determin-
       ing whether her allegations are sufficient to meet the
       pleading standard set forth in § 46b-59, we must first
       consider the distinction between a trial court’s subject
       matter jurisdiction and its authority to act pursuant to a
       particular statute. ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves
       the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of contro-
       versy presented by the action before it. . . . A court
       does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has
       competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once
       it is determined that a tribunal has authority or compe-
       tence to decide the class of cases to which the action
       belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is
       resolved in favor of entertaining the action. . . . It is
       well established that, in determining whether a court
       has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring
       jurisdiction should be indulged.’’ (Citations omitted;
       internal quotation marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio,
       supra, 247 Conn. 727–28; accord Reinke v. Sing, supra,
       328 Conn. 389.
          Our jurisdictional analysis is informed by a review
       of the constitutional principles governing petitions for
       third-party visitation, which reflect ‘‘the status of par-
       ents’ interest in the care, custody and control of their
       children’’ as being ‘‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamen-
       tal liberty interests recognized by [the United States
       Supreme] Court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 216. When a parent
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          is fit, ‘‘there will normally be no reason for the [s]tate
          to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
          further question the ability of that parent to make the
          best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
          children.’’ Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69, 120
          S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). ‘‘The essence of
          parenthood is the companionship of the child and the
          right to make decisions regarding [that child’s] care,
          control, education, health, religion and association.’’
          (Emphasis added.) Roth v. Weston, supra, 216–17. This
          court also recognized in Roth, however, ‘‘that there are
          circumstances in which interests arise that outweigh
          the parents’ fundamental right to make decisions relat-
          ing to their child.’’ DiGiovanna v. St. George, supra, 300
          Conn. 71. One such limitation occurs when otherwise
          fit parents deny their child ‘‘access to an individual who
          has a parent-like relationship with the child’’ and the
          ‘‘decision regarding visitation will cause the child to
          suffer real and substantial emotional harm . . . .
          Under such circumstances, the state has a compelling
          interest in protecting the child’s own complementary
          interest in preserving [parent-like] relationships that
          serve [the child’s] welfare by avoiding the serious and
          immediate harm to [the] child that would result from
          the parent’s decision to terminate or impair the child’s
          relationship with the third party.’’ (Citation omitted;
          footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
          Boisvert v. Gavis, 332 Conn. 115, 133, 210 A.3d 1 (2019).
            This constitutional limitation, which allows courts to
          grant visitation rights to grandparents and other third
          parties, is statutorily implemented in Connecticut by
          § 46b-59. See id., 134. This court’s 2002 decision in Roth
          considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s then
          governing third-party visitation statute in light of the
          United States Supreme Court’s then recent decision in
          Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57. See Roth v.
          Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 209–35. In Roth, this court
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       held that the statute was ‘‘unconstitutional as applied
       to the extent that the trial court . . . permitted [third-
       party] visitation contrary to the desires of a fit parent
       and in the absence of any allegation and proof by clear
       and convincing evidence that the children would suffer
       actual, significant harm if deprived of the visitation.’’
       Id., 205–206. To save the statute, this court applied a
       judicial gloss and concluded that, ‘‘to have jurisdiction
       over a petition for visitation contrary to the wishes of
       a fit parent . . . the petition must contain specific,
       good faith allegations that the petitioner has a relation-
       ship with the child that is similar in nature to a parent-
       child relationship. The petition must also contain spe-
       cific, good faith allegations that denial of the visitation
       will cause real and significant harm to the child. . . .
       [T]hat degree of harm requires more than a determina-
       tion that visitation would be in the child’s best interest.
       It must be a degree of harm analogous to the kind of harm
       contemplated by [General Statutes] §§ 46b-120 and 46b-
       129, namely, that the child is ‘neglected, uncared-for or
       dependent.’ The degree of specificity of the allegations
       must be sufficient to justify requiring the fit parent[s] to
       subject [their] parental judgment to unwanted litigation.
       Only if these specific, good faith allegations are made
       will a court have jurisdiction over the petition.’’
       (Emphasis added.) Id., 234–35. In concluding that the
       matters addressed in the judicial gloss in Roth impli-
       cated the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, this court
       followed its then recent decision in Castagno v. Who-
       lean, 239 Conn. 336, 338–40, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996),
       before casting the judicial gloss as a matter of standing.4
       See Roth v. Weston, supra, 209–19.
          4
            Approximately five years prior to Roth, in Castagno v. Wholean, supra,
       239 Conn. 336, this court ‘‘recognized that a literal reading would place
       [§ 46b-59] in constitutional jeopardy because of the protection traditionally
       afforded to a parent’s right to family integrity . . . .’’ Roth v. Weston, supra,
       259 Conn. 210. In order to save the statute, this court applied a judicial gloss
       that incorporated a threshold requirement ‘‘that plaintiffs must demonstrate
       disruption of the family sufficient to justify state intervention.’’ Castagno
       v. Wholean, supra, 338. Because the plaintiffs in Castagno did not satisfy
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             In 2012, the legislature enacted Public Acts 2012, No.
          12-137, § 1, which amended § 46b-59 in accordance with
          the judicial gloss articulated in Roth. See Boisvert v.
          Gavis, supra, 332 Conn. 134. Subsection (b) of the amended
          statute requires that ‘‘a verified petition,’’ which may be
          filed by any person, ‘‘include specific and good-faith
          allegations that (1) a parent-like relationship exists
          between the person and the minor child, and (2) denial
          of visitation would cause real and significant harm.’’
          General Statutes § 46b-59 (b). ‘‘In determining whether
          a parent-like relationship exists between the person
          and the minor child, the Superior Court may consider,
          but shall not be limited to, the following factors: (1)
          The existence and length of a relationship between the
          person and the minor child prior to the submission of
          a petition pursuant to this section; (2) [t]he length of
          time that the relationship between the person and the
          minor child has been disrupted; (3) [t]he specific parent-
          like activities of the person seeking visitation toward
          the minor child; (4) [a]ny evidence that the person seek-
          ing visitation has unreasonably undermined the author-
          ity and discretion of the custodial parent; (5) [t]he
          the threshold requirement, this court concluded that ‘‘the trial court lacked
          jurisdiction to decide the issue of visitation . . . .’’ Id. We note that this
          court framed its analysis in Castagno as a matter of subject matter jurisdic-
          tion, which was consistent with the arguments of the parties in that case
          both before the trial court and on appeal; it did not at all question whether
          the parties’ claims actually presented a question of subject matter jurisdic-
          tion, rather than the court’s authority to act. See id., 338–39, 352; see also
          id., 338 n.2 (observing that it was undisputed that ‘‘a motion to dismiss was
          the proper procedure in [Castagno, in which] the issue [was] whether, under
          any circumstance, any third party can satisfy the requirements of § 46b-
          59’’ (emphasis in original)).
             This court subsequently concluded in Roth, however, that ‘‘the threshold
          requirement articulated in Castagno fail[ed] to protect adequately the funda-
          mental right to rear one’s child and the right to family privacy.’’ Roth v.
          Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 217. Accordingly, in Roth, this court overruled
          Castagno to that limited extent, but we did not question or disturb the
          aspects of Castagno describing the requirements of § 46b-59 as subject
          matter jurisdictional in nature. See id.
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       significant absence of a parent from the life of a minor
       child; (6) [t]he death of one of the minor child’s parents;
       (7) [t]he physical separation of the parents of the minor
       child; (8) [t]he fitness of the person seeking visitation;
       and (9) [t]he fitness of the custodial parent.’’ General
       Statutes § 46b-59 (c). With respect to the second prong
       of the pleading requirement, subsection (a) (2) provides
       that ‘‘ ‘[r]eal and significant harm’ means that the minor
       child is neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, or
       uncared for, as defined in said section.’’ General Stat-
       utes § 46b-59 (a) (2). ‘‘A child may be found ‘neglected’
       who . . . is being denied proper care and attention,
       physically, educationally, emotionally or morally
       . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-120 (4) (B). ‘‘A child may
       be found ‘uncared for’ . . . whose home cannot pro-
       vide the specialized care that the physical, emotional
       or mental condition of the child requires . . . .’’ Gen-
       eral Statutes § 46b-120 (6) (B).
          With these principles in mind, we examine the source
       of the court’s jurisdiction to issue third-party visitation
       orders in order to determine whether the trial court
       properly treated the motion to dismiss in this case as
       implicating its subject matter jurisdiction. Section 46b-
       1 provides the Superior Court ‘‘with plenary and general
       subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family
       relations matters . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Reinke v. Sing, supra, 328 Conn. 389. Family
       relations matters are ‘‘matters affecting or involving,’’
       among other things, ‘‘all rights and remedies provided
       for in chapter 815j . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-1 (a)
       (12). Section 46b-59, which falls within chapter 815j,
       expressly provides the court with the power to order
       visitation to ‘‘any person’’ who meets the statutory stan-
       dard. General Statutes § 46b-59 (b). We conclude that
       these two statutes provide the trial court with subject
       matter jurisdiction over the third-party visitation peti-
       tions in the present case. See Reinke v. Sing, supra,
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          390 (concluding that trial court had subject matter juris-
          diction over claim seeking modification of dissolution
          agreement because trial court has plenary and general
          subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution actions pur-
          suant to § 46b-1, with authority to ‘‘assign to either spouse
          all or any part of the [marital] estate’’ under General
          Statutes § 46b-81 (a)); Sousa v. Sousa, supra, 322 Conn.
          760–61 (concluding that it was not ‘‘ ‘entirely obvious’ ’’
          that trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
          modify property distribution in dissolution of marriage
          judgment ‘‘given a conflict in the case law . . . and
          the Superior Court’s plenary jurisdiction over family
          relations matters’’ (emphasis added)); Amodio v.
          Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 729–30 (concluding that Gen-
          eral Statutes §§ 46b-1 (c) and 46b-86 (a) together pro-
          vide trial court with subject matter jurisdiction over
          modification claim).
             Describing it as a matter of standing, this court applied
          a judicial gloss in Roth to allow § 46b-59 ‘‘to continue
          to function within the bounds of the constitution.’’ Roth
          v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 233. By amending the statute
          to include the parent-like relationship and real and sig-
          nificant harm requirements, however, the legislature
          created a new statute that ‘‘carries with it a strong
          presumption of constitutionality . . . .’’ (Internal quo-
          tation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic
          Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 405, 119 A.3d 462 (2015).
          With no challenge to the constitutionality of the
          amended § 46b-59 in light of the due process principles
          explained in Troxel v. Granville, supra, 530 U.S. 57, the
          statute no longer requires a gloss to function within
          the bounds of the constitution. If the legislature had
          intended these requirements to implicate the court’s
          subject matter jurisdiction, it knew how to do so. See,
          e.g., Stafford v. Roadway, 312 Conn. 184, 194, 93 A.3d
          1058 (2014) (‘‘[i]t is a well settled principle of statutory
          construction that the legislature knows how to convey
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       its intent expressly’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
       ted)); Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278
       Conn. 751, 779, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (‘‘[w]e . . . require a
       clear showing of legislative intent that a failure to comply
       with a particular statutory requirement deprives the
       court of subject matter jurisdiction’’); Williams v. Com-
       mission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn.
       258, 269–70, 777 A.2d 645 (2001) (acknowledging that,
       although ‘‘mandatory language may be an indication that
       the legislature intended a . . . requirement to be juris-
       dictional, such language alone does not overcome the
       strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does such lan-
       guage alone prove strong legislative intent to create a
       jurisdictional bar’’). In the absence of any indication that
       the legislature intended these requirements to implicate
       the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, they serve only
       to guide the exercise of the court’s authority in a manner
       that protects the constitutional due process rights of fit
       parents to make decisions concerning the rearing of their
       children.
           Put differently, this ‘‘authority to act pursuant to a
       statute is different from its subject matter jurisdiction.
       The power of the court to hear and determine, which
       is implicit in jurisdiction, is not to be confused with
       the way in which that power must be exercised in order
       to comply with the terms of the statute.’’ (Internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247
       Conn. 728. ‘‘As we have stated, the trial court unques-
       tionably has the power to hear and determine [third-
       party visitation matters]. With subject matter jurisdic-
       tion established, the trial court’s task is to apply the
       statute to the facts of a particular case; indeed, interpre-
       ting statutes and applying the law to the facts before
       it [fall within] the traditional province of the trial court.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reinke v. Sing,
       supra, 328 Conn. 390. Accordingly, we conclude that the
       trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over the plain-
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          tiff’s petition for third-party visitation in the present
          case. We will therefore treat the motion to dismiss as
          raising the question of whether the plaintiff has suffi-
          ciently alleged specific and good faith facts that both
          (1) a parent-like relationship exists between her and
          L, and (2) denial of visitation would cause real and
          significant harm, as specifically defined in the statute.5
          See General Statutes § 46b-59 (a) (2).
             Before we consider whether the trial court properly
          declined to exercise its statutory authority under § 46b-
          59, we must determine whether it is permissible to con-
          sider the amended petition or if we must, as the defen-
          dant contends, consider only the initial petition to deter-
          mine if the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to
          demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff had a parent-like rela-
          tionship with L, and (2) L would suffer real and signifi-
          cant harm if visitation was denied. The trial court
          determined that the Appellate Court’s decision in Igers-
          heim v. Bezrutczyk, supra, 197 Conn. App. 420, pre-
          cluded it from considering the amended petition during
          the pendency of the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
          initial petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
                  Nevertheless,                             the
          trial court considered the allegations in the amended
          petition out of concern for fairness to the plaintiff. In
          Igersheim, the Appellate Court concluded that it was
          improper for the trial court to consider an amended
          petition filed during the pendency of a motion to dismiss
          an initial petition for third-party visitation. See id., 419–
            5
              Given our jurisdictional conclusion, we note that the proper vehicle to
          challenge the sufficiency of the allegations for third-party visitation would
          be a motion to strike under Practice Book § 25-16. We further note that,
          although not jurisdictional in nature, the ‘‘specific and good-faith allegations’’
          required by § 46b-59 (b) remain a ‘‘necessary [safeguard] to prevent families
          from having to defend against unjustified petitions for visitation’’ in the first
          instance. Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn. 222. In cases in which pleadings
          are insufficient to meet that standard, an evidentiary hearing should not
          be held.
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       20. In concluding that it was required to consider only
       the initial verified petition for visitation, the Appellate
       Court, consistent with this court’s decision in Roth,
       treated the statutory requirements of a parent-like rela-
       tionship and harm to the child as jurisdictional under
       § 46b-59 (b). See id., 416 (‘‘[t]he statutory jurisdictional
       requirements relevant to [Igersheim] are prescribed in
       . . . § 46b-59, the third-party visitation statute’’
       (emphasis added; footnote omitted)). The Appellate
       Court cited this court’s decisions in Federal Deposit
       Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., supra, 239 Conn. 99,
       and Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 545, 590 A.2d
       914 (1991), for the proposition that it would be improper
       to consider an amended petition during the pendency
       of a motion to dismiss an initial petition for lack of
       subject matter jurisdiction. See Igersheim v. Bezrutc-
       zyk, supra, 420.
         Given our conclusion that the amended statutory
       requirements presently set forth in § 46b-59 (b) do not
       implicate the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we
       overrule the Appellate Court’s decision in Igersheim.
       Although the defendant’s objection to the consideration
       of the amended complaint in this case was grounded
       on his claim that the plaintiff had failed to comply with
       Practice Book § 10-60,6 which is the rule of practice
       governing amendments to pleadings in civil matters,
       that rule of practice does not apply in this case. Rather,
       because visitation is a ‘‘family matter’’ governed by
       chapter 25 of the rules of practice, the trial court should
       follow those provisions, rather than chapter 10, which
       applies to civil matters generally, with respect to
       amending a petition for third-party visitation. See Prac-
         6
           Practice Book § 10-60 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[A] party may amend
       his or her pleadings or other parts of the record or proceedings at any time
       subsequent to that stated in the preceding section in the following manner:
       (1) By order of judicial authority; or (2) By written consent of the adverse
       party; or (3) By filing a request for leave to file an amendment together
       with the amended pleading or other parts of the record or proceedings. . . .’’
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          tice Book § 25-1 (providing that ‘‘[a]ny actions brought
          pursuant to . . . § 46b-1’’ are ‘‘family matters’’ under
          rules of practice). Specifically, Practice Book § 25-4
          requires that ‘‘[e]very application or verified petition in
          an action for visitation of a minor child . . . state the
          name and date of birth of such minor child or children,
          the names of the parents and legal guardian of such
          minor child or children, and the facts necessary to give
          the court jurisdiction.’’7 In contrast to the more restric-
          tive civil rule of Practice Book § 10-60, Practice Book
          § 25-7, which governs amendments to pleadings in fam-
          ily matters, provides in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]f . . .
          [Practice Book §] 25-4 is not complied with, the judicial
          authority, whenever its attention is called to the matter,
          shall order that the complaint or the application, as
          the case may be, be amended upon such terms and
          conditions as it may direct. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
          Because the trial court should have allowed the plaintiff
          to amend the petition under the more liberal provision
          of Practice Book § 25-7, and the plaintiff has indeed
          amended the petition and the trial court has considered
          it, we, too, will consider the plaintiff’s amended petition.
            We now turn to whether the amended petition
          includes the specific and good faith allegations neces-
          sary to demonstrate, as required by § 46b-59, that (1)
          the plaintiff had a parent-like relationship with L, and
          (2) L would suffer real and significant harm if visitation
          was denied. It is well established that the ‘‘interpreta-
             7
               Given our conclusion that the statutory requirements in § 46b-59 (b) are
          not a jurisdictional threshold, we observe that the text of Practice Book
          § 25-4 with respect to the court’s jurisdiction would benefit from the attention
          of the Rules Committee of the Superior Court to render it consistent with
          the doctrinal changes discussed in this opinion. See, e.g., Rules Committee
          of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 192 Conn.
          234, 237, 472 A.2d 9 (1984) (noting that ‘‘[the] function [of the Rules Commit-
          tee of the Superior Court] is to consider proposed changes in the rules of
          practice for the Superior Court, and to recommend amendments to the
          Practice Book’’).
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       tion of pleadings is always a question of law for the court
       . . . . Our review of the trial court’s interpretation of
       the pleadings therefore is plenary. . . . Furthermore,
       we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should
       be read in a hypertechnical manner. Rather, [t]he mod-
       ern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to con-
       strue pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than
       narrowly and technically. . . . [T]he complaint must
       be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect
       to the pleading with reference to the general theory
       [on] which it proceeded, and do substantial justice
       between the parties. . . . Our reading of pleadings in
       a manner that advances substantial justice means that
       a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain
       all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related
       proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way
       so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension.’’
       (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Carpenter v. Daar, supra, 346 Conn. 128.
          Guided by the Appellate Court’s decision in Jeanette-
       Blethen v. Jeanette-Blethen, 172 Conn. App. 98, 159 A.3d
       236 (2017), we first conclude that the amended petition
       adequately alleges the existence of care provided with
       sufficient duration, regularity, and magnitude to estab-
       lish a parent-like relationship between the plaintiff and
       L, as that term is defined by § 46b-59 (c). In Jeanette-
       Blethen, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s
       finding that a parent-like relationship existed in granting
       a grandmother’s motion to intervene, pursuant to § 46b-
       59, in a custody modification proceeding. See id., 99. In
       concluding that the trial court’s finding was not clearly
       erroneous, the Appellate Court observed that the chil-
       dren had lived with the grandparents for six years, dur-
       ing which time ‘‘the grandparents provided care for the
       children, including . . . preparing their meals, bathing
       them, getting them ready for school, caring for them
       when they were sick, and transporting them to [health-
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          care] appointments.’’ Id., 100; see id., 102–103. The trial
          court additionally ‘‘found that the grandparents ‘pro-
          vided a constant example of strength, discipline, sacri-
          fice, stability, and unconditional love on which [the
          children] . . . could rely.’ ’’ Id., 100; see also Boisvert
          v. Gavis, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham,
          Docket No. WWM-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 11, 2017)
          (65 Conn. L. Rptr. 81, 82, 84) (finding existence of par-
          ent-like relationship when grandmother provided vari-
          ous types of care, including feeding child, transporting
          child to day care, as well as school and doctor appoint-
          ments, and taking child on day trips and on vacation),
          aff’d, 332 Conn. 115, 210 A.3d 1 (2019); Germano v.
          Germano-Delorfano, Docket No. HHD-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-
          S, 2014 WL 1647094, *2, *7 (Conn. Super. March 26, 2014)
          (finding existence of parent-like relationship when child
          resided with plaintiffs for majority of first ten years of
          her life, and plaintiffs provided ‘‘regular daily care,’’ includ-
          ing feeding her, finding educational programs for her,
          enrolling her in activities, and transporting her).
             In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that (1) she
          lived with L for more than ten years, (2) she was L’s
          primary caretaker and was involved in every aspect of
          L’s day, from waking her up in the morning to getting
          her ready for bed at night, (3) she shared the responsibil-
          ity of transporting L to school, assisting with her home-
          work, enrolling her in extracurricular activities, and
          taking her to medical appointments, and (4) after Patri-
          cia’s stroke, she provided comfort and support to L as
          L’s primary giver of emotional support and care. Indeed,
          the petition alleges that, for all practical purposes, the
          plaintiff acted as a co-parent of L while Hallie was alive
          and was, perhaps, L’s most attentive parent following
          Patricia’s stroke. When construed in the light most
          favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations establishing
          the duration, regularity, and magnitude of the care that
          the plaintiff provided to L, which are akin to those found
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       proven by clear and convincing evidence in Jeanette-
       Blethen, are sufficient to plead a parent-like relationship
       pursuant to § 46b-59 (b) and (c). Accordingly, we con-
       clude that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to demon-
       strate that a parent-like relationship exists between her
       and L.
          We next consider whether the amended petition con-
       tains specific, good faith allegations to establish that
       the denial of visitation would cause L real and signifi-
       cant harm, namely, that L ‘‘is being denied proper care
       and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or
       morally . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-120 (4) (B). We
       conclude that it does. However, before examining the
       harm caused to L, we emphasize that it is important to
       analyze the two prongs of the threshold requirements
       separately. Although severance of the emotional ties
       between a nonparent and a child who have developed
       a parent-like relationship, without more, should not be
       the end of the analysis with respect to the harm prong,
       in Roth, this court concluded that there could be ‘‘cir-
       cumstances in which a nonparent and a child have
       developed such substantial emotional ties that the
       denial of visitation could cause serious and immediate
       harm to that child.’’ Roth v. Weston, supra, 259 Conn.
       225; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Howard, 661
       N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003) (‘‘when a grandparent has
       established a substantial relationship with a grandchild,
       as required under [the Iowa] statute, an emotional bond
       can be created that, if severed, can inflict harm on the
       child’’); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 664, 774 N.E.2d
       1052 (2002) (observing that bond between grandparent
       and grandchild may ‘‘become crucial to the child’s phys-
       ical or emotional security’’ and that state ‘‘intervention
       may be necessary to secure the child’s well-being from
       traumatic separation from the grandparent’’), cert. denied,
       537 U.S. 1189, 123 S. Ct. 1259, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (2003);
       Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117, 827 A.2d 203 (2003)
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          (‘‘the termination of a long-standing relationship between
          the grandparents and the child . . . [can] form the basis
          for a finding of harm’’), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1177, 124
          S. Ct. 1408, 158 L. Ed. 2d 78 (2004).
             It may be sufficient, however, when, as in the present
          case, the child is coping with the death of a parent in
          addition to the severance of substantial emotional ties
          with a nonparent.8 For example, in In re Estate of S.T.T.,
          144 P.3d 1083, 1095–96 (Utah 2006), the Supreme Court
          of Utah upheld an order of third-party visitation, con-
          cluding that the loss of a substantial relationship
          between a child, whose mother had recently died, and
          her grandparents would be harmful to the child. The
          Utah court relied on the trial court’s decision to credit,
          in its finding that the grandparents had rebutted the
          presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
          children, the conclusions reached by an expert that ‘‘(1)
          the child demonstrated an ‘emotional attachment to her
          grandparents [that] was as strong as [that] seen between
          parents and children’; (2) the attachment could be
          explained by the grandparents’ role as primary caregiv-
          ers; (3) the loss of her mother remained a deep emo-
          tional wound for the child that had not been resolved;
          (4) the child kept the memory of her mother alive
          through her relationship with her grandparents; (5) the
             8
               We find instructive several Superior Court decisions in the wake of
          the amended statute in which the court has concluded that the petition
          sufficiently alleged that denial of visitation would result in substantial emo-
          tional harm to the child, particularly in situations, such as that in the present
          case, in which the child had already experienced the death of a parent.
          See, e.g., Alexopoulous v. Alexopoulous, Superior Court, judicial district of
          Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. FBT-FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (August 7, 2013)
          (56 Conn. L. Rptr. 622, 626) (grandparents adequately alleged that children
          would be harmed if visitation was denied because (1) disruption in grandpar-
          ents’ ‘‘ability to continue to forge a strong bond with their grandchildren
          [would] cause substantial harm to the children’s emotional health,’’ and (2)
          removal of ‘‘caring, loving, consistent and supportive role models from [the
          children’s] lives’’ after death of their father would ‘‘cause them more pain
          and irreparable damage’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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       child would be unable to work through the loss of her
       mother without frequent access to her grandparents;
       and (6) the loss of contact with the [grandparents]
       would be devastating and cause the child to suffer.’’
       (Emphasis added.) Id., 1095; see also In re A.S.A., 21
       Wn. App. 2d 474, 486, 507 P.3d 28 (2022) (Pennell, J.,
       concurring) (‘‘[t]rauma might be especially likely when
       a child has experienced the death of a parent and contin-
       ued contact with the deceased parent’s family is neces-
       sary for grief and healing’’).
          In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that (1) she
       was L’s primary provider of emotional support and pri-
       mary caretaker, (2) L would look to her for comfort
       and support, (3) she is concerned about L’s emotional
       well-being following the deaths of Patricia and Hallie,
       (4) L was abruptly taken away from her home and her
       primary caretaker, and (5) L has been very emotional
       since being cut off from her former life. The plaintiff
       also alleges in the amended petition that ‘‘[L] has
       reported feeling stressed, sick, and rundown. She has
       been sad, anxious, fearful, and confused. She reports
       excessive crying and crying herself to sleep because
       she has been cut off from [the plaintiff]. She sleeps with
       objects that remind her of ‘home,’ even though these
       objects are not comfortable for sleep. She had lost a
       lot of weight. She stated that she isn’t doing well. She
       has made statements that show suicidal ideation.’’ The
       plaintiff further alleges that the defendant’s actions
       compounded the emotional harm that he caused to L
       by depriving her of a relationship with the plaintiff.
       During that time, the defendant mocked L for crying
       about the loss of her mother, yelled at her, cursed at
       her, and threw her up against a car. The allegations in
       the amended petition are more than sufficiently specific
       to satisfy the statutory pleading requirement by demon-
       strating that L is suffering significant emotional harm,
       manifesting itself through her conduct, statements, and
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          physical symptoms, as a result of the deprivation of her
          relationship with the plaintiff. Given our long-standing
          mandate to construe pleadings broadly and realistically;
          see, e.g., Carpenter v. Daar, supra, 346 Conn. 127; it is
          necessarily implied by the plaintiff’s allegations that
          L will be emotionally harmed—and is currently being
          harmed emotionally—from being cut off from the plain-
          tiff in such an abrupt and complete manner. If the plain-
          tiff produces clear and convincing evidence to support
          these allegations, a fact finder may well conclude that
          visitation is necessary to help L work through her grief,
          cope with the other significant changes imposed on her
          daily life, and otherwise overcome the suffering that
          she has experienced as a result of her mother’s death,
          among other things. Construing the allegations in the
          manner most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude
          that the amended petition adequately pleads facts that
          would establish that L ‘‘is being denied proper care and
          attention . . . emotionally . . . .’’ General Statutes
          § 46b-120 (4) (B). Accordingly, the trial court incor-
          rectly determined that the amended petition does not
          contain specific, good faith allegations that the denial
          of visitation would cause real and significant harm.
             The defendant relies on the Appellate Court’s deci-
          sions in Fuller v. Baldino, 176 Conn. App. 451, 168 A.3d
          665 (2017), and Romeo v. Bazow, 195 Conn. App. 378,
          225 A.3d 710 (2020), in arguing that the trial court prop-
          erly dismissed the petition. This reliance is misplaced.
          With respect to the second prong of § 46b-59 (b), the
          petitions in Romeo and Fuller contained only the most
          general and conclusory allegations of harm, without the
          supporting factual basis found in the amended petition
          in the present case. Specifically, in Romeo, the Appellate
          Court concluded that the only harm alleged in the plain-
          tiffs’ petition was that ‘‘ ‘[t]here can be no greater harm
          to a child than the neglecting to promote and foster a
          child’s roots in family [and] friends which directly affect
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       the child’s emotional growth and moral compass. The
       harm to the children, by deracinating their family roots
       is real and significant because it undermines a substan-
       tial part of who they are.’ ’’ Romeo v. Bazow, supra,
       392. Similarly, in Fuller, the plaintiff alleged only that
       he had ‘‘a ‘very strong bond’ with the child and that the
       child ‘suffers’ and is ‘very emotional’ when unable to
       see [the plaintiff] . . . .’’ Fuller v. Baldino, supra, 459.
       In contrast, the amended petition in the present case
       contains specific factual allegations of harm, namely,
       that L is being harmed emotionally by being denied the
       ability to work through the death of her mother and
       grandmother, and the disruption of her entire life, with
       her primary provider of emotional support, the plaintiff.
          Because the plaintiff adequately had alleged both the
       existence of a parent-like relationship and that the
       denial of visitation would cause real and significant
       harm, we conclude that the trial court improperly dis-
       missed the amended petition. On remand, the plaintiff
       is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which she must
       prove by clear and convincing evidence that she has a
       parent-like relationship with L and that denial of visita-
       tion would cause L real and significant harm. See Gen-
       eral Statutes § 46b-59 (b).
         The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
       for further proceedings according to law.
         In this opinion the other justices concurred.