Court Opinion

ID: 9853855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:19.680183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:11.691113
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). {28} This is another in a series of United States Border Patrol fixed checkpoint detention and search eases in which we face the difficult task of balancing border-related federal law enforcement against the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. {29} A permanent Border Patrol checkpoint is an inland traffic-checking operation established for the purpose of minimizing illegal immigration. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). “[T]he need to make routine checkpoint stops is great, [and] the consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited.” Id. at 557, 96 S.Ct. 3074. Yet, particularly in this state, we must be ever mindful of the very important concern raised by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 572-73, 96 S.Ct. 3074: Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien lawfully in this country must know after today’s decision that he travels the fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop, but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists. To be singled out for referral and to be detained and interrogated must be upsetting to any motorist. One wonders what actual experience supports my Brethren’s conclusion that referrals “should not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature.” Ante, at 3084. In point of fact, referrals, viewed in context, are not relatively routine; thousands are otherwise permitted to pass. But for the arbitrarily selected motorists who must suffer the delay and humiliation of detention and interrogation, the experience can obviously be upsetting. And that experience is particularly vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the officers’ target is the Mexican alien. That deep resentment will be stirred by a sense of unfair discrimination is not difficult to foresee. (Footnotes omitted.) {30} Our role is to keep Justice Brennan’s concern very much in mind, to reprove present police abuse, and to curtail future police abuse, while deciding these difficult issues in a way that does not unreasonably restrict law enforcement officers from carrying out the proper government policies pursuant to which Border Patrol fixed checkpoint sites are established. The decision whether a particular Border Patrol detention is lawful is often a close one. Border Patrol cases tried in state court are unique in that we are judging the conduct of federal officers who are acting under federal policy and who believe that their conduct is governed by federal cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment. In these cases, we should “ ‘recognize the responsibility of state courts to preserve national uniformity in development and application of fundamental rights guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions.’” State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 21, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. “[W]e should avoid creating confusion and be particularly deferential to opinions of the ... Tenth Circuit.” State v. Fierro, 121 N.M. 398, 399, 911 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Ct.App.1996) (Hartz, J., specially concurring). {31} Federal constitutional law is to be applied in our Border Patrol search and seizure cases unless the particular right that is asserted is not protected under the United States Constitution, the discrete issue is preserved for decision under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, and we determine that the federal law is flawed or that some distinctive State characteristic requires a departure from federal law. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 18-22, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. In Border Patrol cases, only one such issue has been decided under Article II, Section 10 thus far. In State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 18, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843, we rejected the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in favor of a rule that precludes a warrantless search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle and any closed containers within that vehicle when the agent has probable cause, unless exigent circumstances exist justifying a warrantless search. {32} In the context of whether suspicious circumstances rather than reasonable suspicion is required to detain a motorist after an initial investigation is completed, the majority has determined that our State cases apply the Fourth Amendment differently than the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the Fourth Amendment. The majority also says that “New Mexico law regards movement to a secondary area as an extended detention requiring reasonable suspicion absent traffic congestion,” holds that “the move [of Defendant] itself [to secondary] was part of an illegal detention,” and reasons that “ ‘[t]he threat to fourth amendment interests’ occurs when ‘excessive detentions [are] not founded on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.’ ” Border Patrol law in New Mexico is puzzling. We purport to interpret the Fourth Amendment, but we depart from Tenth Circuit case law. In doing so, we apply a different— state — standard. This departure is impermissible without the preservation requirements of Gomez having been satisfied and the Gomez interstitial analysis having been made. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. See also, State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, n. 2, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477. {33} This case is simply one in which Defendant’s consent to search was within the scope of lawful detention under federal law. The time in secondary was brief with minimal intrusion. Consent to search was immediately requested and given, and the right to continue with routine investigation had not expired. The majority actually interprets federal case law for its holding in the present case. In my view, the majority interprets the federal law too broadly. I do not believe that the federal cases provide as much protection to motorists as the majority believes they do. {34} Neither the scope nor the propriety of the agent’s questions at prima'i'y is at issue in this case. Even were it at issue, federal law is clear that the questioning at primary in this case was proper. Border Patrol agents at fixed checkpoints are not required to “confine their activities to immigration-related matters.” United States v. Gonzalez-Acosta, 989 F.2d 384, 388 (10th Cir.1993). They may also look into possession of illegal drugs, vehicle ownership and registration, proof of insurance and driver’s license, and are permitted to inquire about point of origin and destination, cargo, and travel plans. See United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889 (10th Cir.1993) (“[T]he permissible scope of a routine border checkpoint stop extends beyond a mere inquiry into citizenship.... [A] few brief questions concerning such things as vehicle ownership, cargo, destination and travel plans may be appropriate if reasonably related to the agent’s duty to prevent ... the smuggling of contraband.”); United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 752 (10th Cir.1993) (Border Patrol agents may request documentation from motorists and may briefly question motorists about “vehicle ownership, cargo, destination, ... travel plans,” and citizenship and immigration status); United States v. Ludlow, 992 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir.1993) (A Border Patrol agent’s routine inquiry may include questions concerning citizenship, customs matters, and suspicious circumstances or behaviors). Cf. United States v. DiazAlbertini, 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir.1985) (State Police at roadblock may inspect driver’s licenses, insurance, and registration papers); State v. Reynolds, 119 N.M. 383, 384, 890 P.2d 1315, 1316 (1995) (“[Wjhen a vehicle is lawfully stopped ... an officer may reasonably detain the vehicle and its passengers for the purpose of asking for identification, registration, and/or proof of insurance.”); State v. Valencia Olaya, 105 N.M. 690, 692, 736 P.2d 495, 497 (Ct.App.1987) (New Mexico recognizes the validity of routine-roadblock stops to check driver’s licenses, registrations, and proof of insurance). Presumably, Border Patrol agents also have the right to conduct wants and warrants checks. Cf. State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 14, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (detention following initial investigatory stop by an officer to permit the officer to conduct wants and warrants check lawful as simply a continuation of ongoing investigation). Because the agent’s questions in primary did not stray from permissible areas, Defendant’s detention at primary was lawful at the point when the agent asked Defendant to go to the secondary inspection area. {35} The referral of Defendant from primary to secondary was also lawful under federal law. According to Ludlow, 992 F.2d at 263-64 (citations and footnote omitted): [N]o individualized suspicion is necessary to stop, question, and then selectively refer motorists to a secondary inspection checkpoint— ... Border Patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion to selectively refer ears to the secondary inspection area. Thus, a routine checkpoint inquiry may properly take place at a primary inspection area, a secondary inspection area, or both as long as the scope of the inquiry is appropriate. Accord Massie, 65 F.3d at 847; Sanders, 937 F.2d at 1499 (“No individualized suspicion is necessary to stop, question and then selectively refer motorists to a secondary inspection checkpoint. Border patrol agents have virtually unlimited discretion to refer cars to the secondary inspection area.”). (Citations and quotation omitted.) {36} Furthermore, no prohibition exists against an agent asking a driver for consent to search before or during the agent’s routine investigation, and even a momentary extension of the lawful detention for the purpose of requesting permission to search does not require reasonable suspicion. Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory technique of law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway... .. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances.... Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Law enforcement officers may ask for consent at any time during the lawful stop or immediately following the completion of routine investigation. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35-36, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (consent lawful when obtained following these occurrences: negative computer check for previous violations; the issuance of a verbal warning after being asked to step out of the car and while defendant was being videoed; the return of defendant’s license; the questions: “[A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?” and defendant’s negative answer); Diaz-Albertini 772 F.2d at 659 (“After the negative NCIC response it was permissible for the officer to ask to search”); State v. Pallor, 1996-NMCA-083, ¶ 16, 122 N.M. 232, 923 P.2d 599 (“Because there was a valid basis for the stop, it was permissible for the officers to ask permission to search the vehicle.”); Bolton, 111 N.M. at 42-43, 801 P.2d at 112-13 (explaining that the officer’s request for consent to search at secondary did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the request did not unduly prolong the detention); Valencia Olaya, 105 N.M. at 691, 696, 736 P.2d at 496, 501 (consent to search not tainted following detention during which officer requested and received license and registration, directed defendant to pull his car to the right shoulder based on a deodorizer smell and title irregularity, ran an NCIC check on defendant and vehicle that produced a negative response, asked defendant where hp was traveling from and where he was going, and then asked for consent to search.). {37} In this case, Defendant consented to the search as soon as he landed in secondary. The federal cases require that agents act diligently so that each detention is brief and therefore not intrusive. See Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d at 752 (“A routine checkpoint stop must be brief and unintrusive.”); cf. DiazAlbertini, 772 F.2d at 659 (“The interval between the initial taking of the ... driver’s license and the request to search was so short that it cannot be said the kind of implied duress recently condemned in Recalde took place.”). The record in this case does not disclose the period of time that elapsed from the point at which the agent directed Defendant to secondary and the agent’s request to search. It appears that the time was minimal. Certainly, if the time was more than a minute or two, Defendant would have raised the time element as evidence that the detention was impermissibly intrusive. Because Defendant does not raise this argument, I assume that the detention was not so long as to be even arguably unreasonable. {38} The agent in this case had not exceeded the scope of permissible investigation before sending Defendant to secondary. The agent had reason to continue investigation regarding the vehicle’s status since Defendant claimed it belonged to a friend, the vehicle had Mexican license plates, and the agent had not yet seen the vehicle’s registration or Defendant’s driver’s license. Surely the agent had lawful authority, if not good reason, to investigate further into these circumstances. Cf. United States v. Sukiz-Grado, 22 F.3d 1006, 1009 (10th Cir.1994) (referral to secondary for a dog sniff held lawful following agent’s having noticed a temporary license tag, the driver having said that the car belonged to a friend, the agent having noticed the driver’s nervousness, and after the driver gave permission at primary to a dog sniff of the exterior of the car); United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir.1985) (holding detention lawful when police referred driver to secondary to check ownership of the vehicle after the driver admitted that the car did not belong to him and the registration revealed that the car was owned by another); Diaz-AlbeHini 772 F.2d at 655 (lawful to order driver to move car from roadblock on to highway’s median in order to conduct NCIC check after officer learned that driver had Florida driver’s license, the car’s license and plates were from California, and driver was not registered owner). Because the agent had the right to continue investigating when Defendant was referred to secondary, and because an agent has broad discretion to make such a referral, I believe the referral was lawful. The referral to secondary did not exceed the boundaries of permissible detention for continuing investigation, and did not become a de facto arrest. Cf. State v. Flores, 122 N.M. 84, 89, 920 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Ct.App.1996) (“When a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.”). {39} Whether the agent subjectively intended to continue his routine investigation or only to immediately ask for consent in secondary is not material to the outcome of this case. “[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the [officer’s] subjective intent.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop did not depend on the actual motivation of the officer involved as long as the officer articulated a lawful reason for the stop) (emphasis added). In the present case the agent had authority to investigate further and the fact that his first inquiry immediately upon Defendant’s arrival in secondary was a request for consent does not change a brief and lawful detention into an intrusive, unlawful one. Cf. Porras-Fuerte, 119 N.M. at 186, 889 P.2d at 221 (explaining that the agent’s subjective reason for stopping a vehicle does not have to be the right reason, “as long as the facts known to the officer and articulated by him provide [the right] reasons”). {40} Whether Defendant’s detention was illegal under the Fourth Amendment is measured by the reasonableness of the detention. See United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir.1986) (the Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures). “The preeminent inquiry [under the Fourth Amendment] is whether the search and seizure was reasonable.” State v. Flores, 122 N.M. 84, 87, 920 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Ct.App.1996). Under the federal case law, this detention was reasonable and lawful. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. {41} In summary, the detention of Defendant was brief and unintrusive. It was also reasonable. The Fourth Amendment allows a Border Patrol agent to refer a motorist to secondary to conduct or continue routine investigation, and the agent had authority and reason in this case to refer Defendant to secondary. The United States Constitution does not forbid asking for and obtaining consent to search during routine investigation at primary or secondary, or even asking for consent within a moment following the investigation. Even were the Gomez-interstitial approach required and followed here, I see no reason to abandon federal law and adopt a new rule under our State Constitution in order to turn this legal United States Border Patrol detention into an illegal one. Finally, the reasonableness of “police activity ... is almost invariably a factbound inquiry.” United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 783 (1st Cir. 1991). The court below sees and hears the witnesses and is closer to the real circumstances than an appellate court, which is relegated to the “virtual reality” of the record. “Hence, appellate oversight is correspondingly deferential,” id., when reviewing the district court’s fact findings following a suppression hearing. Furthermore, I do not conclude that the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress was a misapplication of the law to the facts. See State v. Shaulis-Powell, 1999-NMCA-090, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 667, 986 P.2d 463 (appellate court considers whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts). I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.