Court Opinion

ID: 9581915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:20:28.870445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:20.309537
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The judgment of conviction must be affirmed because we cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Curtis v. State, 208 Ga. App. 720, 721 (431 SE2d 719) (1993).
Of course, the telephone tip, even if it may be inferred to have advised that defendant was selling drugs because this is what was relayed to the drug squad, was not probative of defendant’s intent, as the majority reasons. Its source was not even identified, much less subject to cross-examination on the issue of what defendant was doing when the police arrived.
The testimony of the arresting officer did qualify, however, as expert opinion. The officer had been on the drug squad for two years and had been involved in “probably over 150 or 200” drug arrests. About 95 percent of them involved cocaine. He explained how, based on his experience, he determines the street value of cocaine. He gave his opinion that the two smaller pieces in this case would probably be $20 pieces and the large piece $100 or $150. He also testified that in his experience, the amount of cocaine in the bag in this case would not normally be held by a user.
Although the court did not expressly qualify the witness as an expert under OCGA § 24-9-67, the court permitted the opinion on the basis that the underlying facts on which it was based were given. DCGA § 24-9-65. See Peterson v. RTM Mid-America, 209 Ga. App. 391, 692 (1) (434 SE2d 521) (1993). Opinion of the type given by the efficer was qualified as expert testimony in Davis v. State, 200 Ga. App. 44, 45 (2) (406 SE2d 555) (1991). Here, the officer’s experience, Rvhich was greater than that in Davis, qualified him as an expert, and fthe court charged the jury on expert testimony, stating that such had *766been given in this case. The court did not confine this instruction to the scientific evidence of the nature of the substances seized and of defendant’s urinalysis results, the latter of which was negative for cocaine. The court did not expressly qualify these witnesses as experts either, see Hudson v. State, 175 Ga. App. 692, 693 (4) (334 SE2d 20) (1985), so the charge was not limited to their testimony.
Decided September 9, 1994
Reconsideration dismissed October 5, 1994.
Ernie M. Sheffield, for appellant.
Ronald James, pro se.
J. Brown Moseley, District Attorney, Robert R. Auman, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I conclude that the officer’s opinion testimony that the three pieces of crack cocaine of a total value of $140-$190 would not normally be held by a user, together with all of the other circumstances, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed cocaine with intent to distribute it.
I note that the jury gave particular attention to this element of the case. Within 20 minutes of beginning its deliberations, it sought additional instructions on the definition of intent, the absence of evidence, and what there must be to prove intent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.