Court Opinion

ID: 9740022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:25:55.409822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.465720
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to admit evidence concerning the victim’s alleged practice of trading sex for money to get drugs. A key element of this case is the question of whether Ford consented to having sex with Morris. Morris claims that Ford agreed to have sex with him in exchange for money to buy crack cocaine. The state offered evidence that Ford disliked, feared, and was not attracted to Morris and that she would not have voluntarily had sex with him. Morris wanted to offer the evidence of Ford’s practice of exchanging sex for drug money as an explanation of why she would have engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with him, a man she allegedly disliked, feared, and was not attracted to. Although not specifically stated, this court seems to rely on Minnesota’s rape shield law, Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 3 (1998), and Minn. R. Evid. 412 to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence of Ford’s sex-for-drugs transactions. Minnesota’s rape shield law does, not, however, prohibit all evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct. We held in State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn.1992) that “[i]n certain cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.” (citing State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn.1986)).
Moreover, a criminal defendant must be “afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992). That includes the right to present relevant evidence, except when the “probative value [of that evidence] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury * * Minn. R. Evid. 403, 402. Evidence of a victim’s past sexual conduct is generally not admissible unless its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the victim’s consent is an issue in the case, and the evidence tends to establish a “common scheme * * * of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at issue * * *.” Minn. R. Evid. 412.
In excluding evidence of Ford’s alleged practice of trading sex for drug money, the district court deprived Morris of his right to due process and the right to present a defense. In this case, Ford’s consent was clearly at issue. The jury heard testimony from Lillian Beard, one of Ford’s neighbors, that she • witnessed Ford purchase crack cocaine for Morris two hours before her murder. The jury also heard, through another witness, Morris’ claim that Ford engaged in consensual sex with him in order to receive cocaine. Without the excluded evidence of Ford’s practice of trading sex for drug money, the value of the admitted evidence is limited and results in *440Morris being deprived of a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”
Further, evidence of Ford’s alleged practice of trading sex for money for drugs is not barred by the rape shield law. The excluded testimony is relevant and material and when limited to that specific evidence, its probative value would not be substantially outweighed by its possible inflammatory or prejudicial nature. Therefore, its exclusion was an abuse of discretion.