Court Opinion

ID: 9941652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 17:11:34.859865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.545723
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ADRIAN K. AMARA                          :
                                          :
                      Appellant           :   No. 943 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 10, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0006270-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED: FEBRUARY 16, 2024

      Adrian K. Amara appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his second

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

      Appellant was charged with various offenses related to an illicit drug

distribution conspiracy investigated by the York County Drug Task Force. His

first trial resulted in a mistrial because Appellant appeared in court “impaired

and unable to remain conscious,” testing positive for opioid use and unable to

aid in his defense.    Commonwealth v. Amara, 216 A.3d 372, 2019 WL

1556215, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (cleaned up).

A second trial ended in a mistrial when police officers improperly referenced

Appellant’s election to remain silent rather than cooperate. Id.

      The trial court summarized the third trial as follows:

           Appellant was brought to trial a third and final time on May
      10, 2017.   The Commonwealth first called Sergeant Adam
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     Bruckhart to testify. In June and July of 2015, Sergeant Bruckhart
     was coordinating a drug investigation with a confidential informant
     pertaining to a suspected drug dealer, Alana Clark, who lived at
     30 North Broad Street in York, Pennsylvania. Sergeant Bruckhart
     had the confidential informant conduct [three] controlled drug
     buys of heroin from Ms. Clark. Each time, the confidential
     informant was searched before the transaction, was given an
     amount of official funds, and returned from the transaction with a
     quantity of heroin. These buys occurred on June 30th, July 7th,
     and July 14th of 2015. During the phone call to set up the buy on
     July 7th, Sergeant Bruckhart overheard the confidential informant
     speaking to a male voice on the other end of the call. As a result
     of these controlled buys, Sergeant Bruckhart obtained a search
     warrant for the residence at 30 North Broad Street, and executed
     this warrant on July 15, 2015.

           A team of officers entered 30 North Broad Street pursuant
     to the warrant. They gathered all the residents in the kitchen.
     Ms. Clark and Appellant were discovered together in a bedroom
     on the second floor. In that bedroom, the officers found sandwich
     bags, magazine clippings, and packages of heroin. The envelopes
     for the heroin were fashioned out of magazine clippings folded
     around a quantity of heroin. Sergeant Bruckhart testified that this
     method of packaging was extremely rare.

           The police also discovered identification evidence for the
     occupants of the bedroom, including an Access card with Ms.
     Clark’ s name on it, and a voter registration card and paystub with
     Appellant’s name on it. The paystub was from August of 2013,
     almost two years prior to the search, suggesting Appellant had
     resided there for some[ ]time. Also located was $305 in cash, and
     three cellphones, two of which were submitted for analysis. None
     of the cash found matched the official funds used in the three
     controlled drug buys by the confidential informant. Also located
     in the home were Appellant’s children.

           The Commonwealth then presented testimony from
     Sergeant Travis Shearer. Sergeant Shearer participated in the
     execution of the search warrant at 30 North Broad Street, in which
     he interviewed Appellant. During this interview Appellant stated
     that he was a drug user, that there were drugs in the upstairs
     bedroom of the residence where he had been located, and that
     those drugs were his. Sergeant Shearer also recalled Appellant

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     telling him that often times those with drug habits have to sell
     drugs to fund their addiction.

           The Commonwealth next presented the testimony of
     Trooper Shawn Wolfe. Trooper Wolfe assisted in the controlled
     drug buys on July 7th and 15th by providing surveillance and
     taking photographs. Trooper Wolfe also assisted in the execution
     of the search warrant on July 15th, in which he was the first to
     enter the bedroom and observe Appellant standing near the door,
     and Ms. Clark by the windowsill. Trooper Wolfe then went outside
     to see what, if anything was thrown out of the window. He
     observed on the ground directly below the window a clear plastic
     sandwich bag with drug residue in it and apparent packaging
     material. When re-entering the house, Trooper Wolfe heard
     Appellant exclaim, “well you found it, that’s it.”

           The Commonwealth then called Jess[e] Coy, a qualified
     expert in cell phone data analysis.        [The Commonwealth
     introduced through Mr. Coy, over Appellant’s objections, evidence
     of text messages taken from Ms. Clark’s phone and the
     unidentified Samsung phone, which discussed arranging drug
     transactions.]

           ....

           [After the Commonwealth rested, Appellant testified in his
     defense, indicating that all the contraband belonged to Ms. Clark,
     that he did not know that she was dealing rather than just using
     heroin, and that he never used heroin.]

           The Commonwealth then presented the testimony of Karen
     Sipe, the confidential informant, on rebuttal. Ms. Sipe testified
     that prior to July 15, 2015, she had purchased heroin from
     Appellant, and that during the time period around July 15, 2015,
     she worked with Detective Bruckhart to set up heroin buys with
     Appellant. At this point, the Commonwealth closed its case, and
     then both parties presented closing arguments. The jury then
     retired to deliberate, and returned with a verdict of guilty for
     possession with the intent to distribute, criminal conspiracy to
     possession with the intent to distribute, and possession of drug
     paraphernalia.

Id. at *1–3 (cleaned up).

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      Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of eleven to twenty-two

years of imprisonment. On direct appeal, he contended, inter alia, that the

text message exhibits were improperly admitted because they were not

properly authenticated as being authored by him.        Id. at *4.   This Court

agreed, concluding “there was no authentication of the messages, no evidence

that Appellant had any involvement with the telephones in question, and no

evidence of Appellant’s involvement in the conversations.”           Id. at *6.

However, we ruled that the error was harmless because “the evidence against

Appellant was overwhelming.” Id. at *7. In particular, we highlighted the

inculpatory testimony from Ms. Sipe, Sergent Bruckhart, and Trooper Wolfe,

as well as the physical evidence seized during execution of the search warrant.

Id.

      Accordingly, we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, which

became final in 2019 when Appellant failed to seek allowance of appeal from

our Supreme Court. Id. Appellant’s first, timely PCRA petition was dismissed

as meritless after his counsel was permitted to withdraw pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Appellant did not appeal

that dismissal.

      Appellant pro se filed the PCRA petition at issue in this appeal on January

21, 2022, alleging therein that he had recently discovered that Sergeant

Bruckhart, Sergeant Shearer, and Trooper Wolfe were dismissed from the York

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County Drug Task Force for misconduct, and that this after-discovered

evidence entitled him to a new trial. See PCRA Petition, 1/21/22, at 41. The

PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a Turner/Finley no-merit letter,

opining that, while Appellant’s petition was timely filed pursuant to the newly-

discovered-facts timeliness exception, his substantive claim lacked merit

because the evidence Appellant discovered was solely impeachment evidence

and would not be admissible at trial. See Petition to Withdraw, 6/6/22, at

¶¶ 24-32, Exhibits A-B.

      The PCRA court granted counsel’s withdrawal request and dismissed

Appellant’s petition three days later without first issuing Pa.R.Crim.P. 907

notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant filed this

timely appeal. The PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.P.A.P. 1925(b) and Appellant

timely complied. Thereafter, Appellant filed requests in both the PCRA court

and this Court to file an amended Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant claimed

that he had received additional documents in response to subpoenas that gave

rise to issues that were not preserved in the original statement but that “go

hand in hand with other issues that are preserved and a couple that are alone

on their own.” Petition to File Amended 1925(b) Statement, 12/20/22, at ¶ 4.

Appellant contended that he did not wish “to have to argues [sic] these issues

at a latter [sic] date under a new PCRA.” Id. at ¶ 5.

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      This Court denied Appellant’s application without prejudice and directed

the PCRA court to rule on the request to amend. The PCRA court did not

timely comply. Appellant then filed his brief in this Court asserting the issues

raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement plus two instances of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness that he did not include in the statement. Specifically, Appellant

argued that PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing “to subpoena records . . .

in order to further enhance the Appellant’s argument.” Appellant’s brief at 4.

Given the procedural irregularities, we ourselves granted Appellant’s still-

pending request to file an amended Rule 1925(b) statement, remanded for

him to do so, and instructed the PCRA court to provide a new Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing any new issues not discussed in its prior opinion.

      Having received the new opinion, supplemental certified records, and

new briefs from the parties, we are now prepared to address Appellant’s

issues:

      1)    Is the PCRA court erroneous in [its] position that Appellant’s
      after-discovered evidence is both inadmissible and for
      impeachment purpose only?

      2)    Could inadmissible text message evidence admitted to the
      Appellant’s trial establish further the relation, relevancy, and
      admissibility of his after-discovered evidence?

      3)    Was PCRA counsel’s assistance ineffective?

Appellant’s post-remand brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization and articles

omitted, apostrophes added, spelling corrected).

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      We begin with a review of the governing legal precepts. “In general, we

review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the

findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court

erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157,

161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      As an initial matter, we observe “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition

is jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the petition and cannot grant relief.”     Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275

A.3d 986, 994 (Pa.Super. 2022). Any PCRA petition must be filed within one

year of when the underlying judgment of sentence became final unless it

alleges and offers to prove that the claim raised therein: (1) was not raised

earlier due to governmental interference; (2) is based upon newly-discovered

facts that could not have been uncovered earlier through the exercise of due

diligence; or (3) is founded upon a newly-recognized, retroactively-applicable

constitutional right. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking

a timeliness exception “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

      As noted, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2019 and

the instant petition was filed in 2022. The PCRA court made no ruling on the

timeliness of the petition, but appears to have accepted PCRA counsel’s

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assessment that the petition was filed within one year of Appellant

discovering, upon the exercise of due diligence, the fact that members of the

York County Drug Task Force were discharged for misconduct. See Petition

to Withdraw, 6/6/22, at ¶¶ 24-32, Exhibits A-B.

      On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant’s petition was

untimely because he failed to specifically plead and prove that an exception

applies. See Commonwealth’s brief at 20-21. The Commonwealth further

asserts that Appellant did not establish an adequate connection between the

new facts that he discovered and his substantive after-discovered evidence

claim, which is, in any event, supported by inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 22-

23.

      We are not persuaded that the PCRA court erred in treating Appellant’s

petition as timely pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant expressly

invoked that provision in his pro se petition. See PCRA Petition, 1/21/22, at

3. He attached a March 26, 2019 newspaper article from the York Daily Record

reporting on the aggressive civil asset forfeiture procedures of the York County

Drug Task Force that had prompted his subsequent inquiries. He detailed and

documented in his accompanying memorandum of law, and in a self-titled

“diligence timeline” and copies of correspondence appended thereto, his

efforts to learn of Sergeant Bruckhart’s discharge through information and

records requests to multiple government agencies and appeals from their

denials.

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      This culminated in his discovery by correspondence mailed to him in

February 2021 that Sergeant Bruckhart had been discharged because “[t]here

had been some problems amongst the personnel” and “an incident had

occurred.” Id. at Exhibit 25 (email from Beth A. Jacobs, Open Records Officer

for the West Manchester Township Police Department, to Ryan Liggitt,

Pennsylvania Office of Open Records Appeals Officer). He then filed instant

PCRA petition less than one year later, alleging that the new information

entitled him to a new trial. This scenario supports application of the newly-

discovered-facts   timeliness   exception.      Accord    Commonwealth        v.

Blakeney, 193 A.3d 350, 362 (Pa. 2018) (holding exception was satisfied

where the petitioner exercised due diligence in discovering the content of

offensive emails associated with a jurist of our Supreme Court and his

promptly-filed claim of judicial bias had a sufficient nexus with the new facts).

Accordingly, we turn to whether the PCRA court erred in rejecting Appellant’s

substantive claims.

      Appellant’s first two questions concern the PCRA court’s conclusion that

he failed to establish a meritorious claim of after-discovered evidence. In this

vein, our High Court has observed:

      In order to be granted a new trial based on an after discovered
      evidence claim a [d]efendant must show the evidence: (1) has
      been discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or
      prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable
      diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will
      not be used solely to impeach a witness’s credibility; and (4) is of
      such a nature and character that a different verdict will likely
      result if a new trial is granted.

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Commonwealth v. Perrin, 291 A.3d 337, 340 n.3 (Pa. 2023) (some

punctuation marks added).        “After-discovered evidence is ‘peculiarly’ a

question in the trial court’s discretion, because that court is uniquely

positioned and qualified to appraise the reliability of the original trial and the

proposed evidence’s impact upon it.” Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d

14, 19 (Pa.Super. 2021).

      Here, the PCRA court ruled that Appellant satisfied the first two prongs

of the test, but not the last two. Specifically, the court found that, although

the evidence of Sergeant Burkhart’s discharge could not have been discovered

earlier and was not cumulative of other evidence, it would be solely used for

impeachment purposes and was not likely to result in a different verdict at a

new trial given all the other evidence against Appellant.       See PCRA Court

Opinion, 8/25/23, at 11-12.

      Appellant argues that “his after-discovered evidence of the officers’

dismissals surrounding untruthful misconduct, is admissible impeachment

evidence” tending to show the officers were corrupt. Appellant’s brief at 9-10

(some capitalization and punctuation altered). He maintains that the evidence

is not only admissible to impeach Sergeant Bruckhart, but also “to attack the

veracity of [his] incident report, witnessed only by Trooper Wolfe and Trooper

Dembowski whom [sic] had also been dismissed a[long]side Sgt. Bruckhart,”

thus supporting Appellant’s claim that the evidence against him was falsified.

Id. at 13. He further contends that, since this Court held on his direct appeal

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that the text message evidence was erroneously admitted, the quantum of

evidence against him is no longer so great that it is clear that a new trial would

result in the same verdict. Id. at 14-16.

      The Commonwealth responds by reasserting that Appellant has

proffered no actual admissible evidence to support his claim, let alone

evidence that would do more than impeach. See Commonwealth’s brief at

27. It argues that the instant case is akin to Commonwealth v. Griffin, 137

A.3d 605 (Pa.Super. 2016), in which the Superior Court reversed the grant of

a new trial under similar circumstances. We agree.

      In Griffin, the defendant was arrested after Philadelphia police

conducted surveillance and controlled buys through a confidential informant,

and thereafter obtained and executed a search warrant. He was convicted

following a trial at which Officer Stephen Dmytryk testified.      Griffin filed a

post-sentence motion raising a claim of after-discovered evidence founded

upon: (1) a recently unsealed federal indictment charging several Philadelphia

police officers with racketeering, which included an allegation that officer

“S.D.” falsified a report against an unrelated defendant; (2) the unrelated

defendant’s civil rights complaint against Officer Dmytryk alleging that the

officer obtained a search warrant through false allegations; and (3) a

newspaper article reporting on the accusations against Officer Dmytryk. Id.

at 607. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Griffin a new trial, and the

Commonwealth appealed.

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       The Commonwealth argued that no new trial was warranted because

Griffin proffered no actual evidence, only allegations of misconduct unrelated

to Griffin’s case that would not be admissible at a new trial, that the

information would be used for impeachment only, and that the result would

not likely be different because there were multiple officers involved. Id. at

609.   Griffin countered that the new information would not be solely for

impeachment, but also used to compel the identity of the confidential

informant, and that a new verdict was indeed likely to result. Id.

       This Court held that the trial court erred in granting the new trial

because the items proffered by Griffin “[we]re not “evidence” and [we]re, in

all events, not relevant [to Griffin’s] case.”   Id.   First, the accusations in

indictments and civil complaints were just that, accusations, not evidence of

wrongdoing. Second, the alleged wrongdoing was in an unrelated case that

had “nothing to do with [Griffin]’s guilt or innocence and ha[d] no connection

to the instant case.” Id. at 610. Third, newspaper articles are not admissible

to prove the facts asserted therein, but may merely “alert a party to the

possible existence of evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Hence, Griffin had failed

to identify any evidence that would be relevant and admissible at his trial.

Further, we noted that, even if any of the items were relevant, they would be

used solely to impeach Officer Dmytryk or as part of “a fishing expedition” to

uncover support for Griffin’s claim.   Id.   For an after-discovered-evidence

claim to succeed, “there must be actual discovery of actual evidence, not

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merely the possibility of such evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we

reversed the order granting a new trial.

      In the case sub judice, Appellant has not discovered any relevant

evidence that would be admissible for anything but impeachment. Regarding

Sergeant Bruckhart, Appellant has information that he was discharged

because “[t]here had been some problems amongst the personnel” and “an

incident had occurred” See PCRA Petition, 1/21/22, at Exhibit 25. Appellant

has no evidence what the “incident” was or what “problems” there were, let

alone any indication that they had any bearing on his case. The newspaper

article that Appellant submitted to the PCRA court, which does not name any

member of the York County Drug Task Force, suggests not that Sergeant

Bruckhart’s discharge related to fabricated evidence of criminal drug activity,

but possibly to a pattern of “overzealous forfeiture actions” that amounted to

a “shopping spree” in which items were seized based upon their value rather

than connection to criminal activity.       Id. at Exhibit 1.   Stated plainly,

Appellant’s evidence leaves us with mere speculation about whether Sergeant

Bruckhart was terminated based upon performance of his job, an interpersonal

incident, or something else entirely.      What is clear is that Appellant has

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established no connection between the cause of Sergeant Bruckhart’s

discharge and Appellant’s case.1

       As to the other officers who were involved in his case, Appellant has

produced even less “evidence,” as he has admittedly acquired no information

about them. Appellant stated as follows in the memorandum filed along with

his petition:

       [Appellant] is caught between a hard place and another hard
       place. He can’t risk being time-barred while waiting to see if the
       Pennsylvania State Police will comply with the Final Determination
       by the Office of Open Records that ruled in favor of the Petitioner
       on appeal. . . . [T]he Pennsylvania State Police refuses to comply
       with the law and release information concerning the discharge of
       Troopers Wolfe and Dembrowski. It should also concern the
       District Attorney’s Office and the Court that the West Manchester
       Township Police Department also refuses to comply with the law
       and release further information concerning Detective Bruckhart.

Memorandum of Law, 1/21/22, at 31-32.

       Hence, Appellant acknowledges that he has no evidence to warrant a

new trial, but instead is in the process of searching for it. If his diligent efforts

ultimately uncover admissible evidence related to wrongdoing in his case, then

he may file a PCRA petition seeking relief promptly after discovering the new

____________________________________________

1 Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019, 1027 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(holding after-discovered evidence of officer’s misconduct warranted a new
trial where the officer who engaged in misconduct was the only one to testify
against the defendant at trial, was no longer a witness the Commonwealth
was willing to utilize, and another officer who was present during the
defendant’s arrest swore an affidavit contradicting the disgraced officer’s
testimony).

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evidence. In the meantime, all he has discovered are new facts about officers

involved in his case that have alerted him to the possible existence of evidence

that could support an after-discovered evidence claim.2 As such, no relief is

due.   See Griffin, supra at 610 (quoting Commonwealth v. Castro, 93

A.3d 818, 828 (Pa. 2014) (“There must be actual discovery of actual evidence,

not merely the possibility of such evidence.” (cleaned up)).

       Appellant’s remaining claim relates to the performance of PCRA counsel.

In particular, he argues that PCRA counsel failed to subpoena documents

related to the Drug Task Force officers’ misconduct and “specific cell phone

data” to prove the falsification of evidence. Appellant’s brief at 17. Appellant

maintains that PCRA counsel did not participate meaningfully in advancing his

position. Id.

       Appellant’s claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness was not raised prior

to this appeal.      However, pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), “a PCRA petitioner

may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or

acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first

opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401. Since, as noted above,

____________________________________________

2 Although Appellant claimed in his petition to file an amended Rule 1925(b)

statement that he had obtained additional evidence in response to subpoenas,
see Petition to File Amended 1925(b) Statement, 12/20/22, at ¶ 4, he has
not delineated that evidence in his brief or sought remand based upon the
acquisition of new evidence.

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the PCRA court did not issue Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice before dismissing

Appellant’s petition and granting counsel’s request to withdraw, this appeal

was his first opportunity to raise the claim.

      As such, PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness is properly before us.

Consequently, we must next determine whether “the record before the

appellate court [is] sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised

ineffectiveness claims,” or whether we must “remand to the PCRA court for

further development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such

claims as an initial matter.” Bradley, supra at 402.

      To prevail on his claim, Appellant must establish the following elements:

      (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that
      counsel’s course of conduct was without a reasonable basis
      designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was
      prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable
      probability that but for the act or omission in question the outcome
      of the proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up). “The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness

will cause the claim to fail.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595–

96 (Pa.Super. 2021).

      As we have discussed at length hereinabove, Appellant has failed to

establish that there is any relevant, admissible evidence that was or is

available by subpoena in this case. Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for

failure to conduct a particular investigation unless the petitioner establishes

that the investigation would have yielded a benefit to the defense.          See

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Commonwealth v. Bishop, 266 A.3d 56, 68 (Pa.Super. 2021).                   Accord

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278 A.3d 336, 343 (Pa.Super. 2022) (noting

relief is not available for counsel’s failure to call a witness unless the petitioner

establishes that the witness existed and would have offered beneficial

testimony). Since Appellant has no proof that the desired investigation would

have produced beneficial evidence, he has not established that PCRA counsel

was ineffective in not conducting that investigation.

      Appellant’s further assertion that PCRA counsel did not participate

meaningfully in these proceedings is belied by the certified record. Counsel

filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and Turner/Finley letter detailing her

examination of the record and the issues Appellant wished to pursue in his

petition. Counsel explained that, although timely, the petition did not merit

relief because the facts he had learned about Sergeant Bruckhart did not

qualify as admissible after-discovered evidence, but pertained only to

impeachment. See Petition to Withdraw, 6/6/22, at Exhibits A & B. Hence,

counsel did not abandon Appellant to the detriment of the pursuit of a

meritorious petition. Rather, she fulfilled her obligation to the court in the

face of claims unsupported by the facts and law. See Turner, supra at 928-

29 (explaining that a petitioner’s right to counsel is fulfilled when counsel files

a no-merit letter detailing the nature and extent of her review, explains why

each issue the petitioner wishes to raise is meritless, and the court concurs

after an independent review).

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      Therefore, the record before us demonstrates that Appellant’s Bradley

claims must fail, and no remand is necessary. Furthermore, Appellant has

failed to convince us that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition for

lack of merit. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/16/2024

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