Court Opinion

ID: 9764534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:26:13.071099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.936870
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting.
On 13 January 1986, at about 6 p.m. John Tornillo completed his work for Alitalia at his Washington, D.C. office, and left for his home in Rockville, Maryland. On Interstate Route 270 in Maryland, Tornillo lost consciousness, his car overturned, and he was severely injured.
Tornillo’s work for Alitalia on that day took place entirely within the Washington, D.C. office. He made no customer calls on the way to work or in returning home, nor did he intend to make any such calls. Tornillo concedes that he was not entitled to compensation or cost reimbursement for his travel to and from the office on that day. In short, Tornillo was “coming from” work when the accident occurred—he was not working. Under these circumstances, he should not be awarded workers’ compensation benefits— benefits intended for employees who suffer accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of their employment.
As the Court’s opinion acknowledges, the general rule is that employees are not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for accidents occurring when they are going to or coming from work. This Court has recognized an exception to this rule when the transportation to work is by means of a conveyance provided by the employer—an exception that I believe stretches the legitimate aim of workers’ compensation, but which may be justified by the employer’s control of *50the conveyance. We have also recognized a further exception to the general rule, which treats the employee as being within the course of his employment when going to and coming from work if the employer reimburses the employee for those transportation expenses, even though the employee is “not working” while traveling, and is driving his own vehicle. This is an exception of dubious validity, but has been so long and so widely accepted that I would not dissent from the affirmance of an award based upon it. I would, however, treat that questionable doctrine as the high-water mark of exceptions to the perfectly sound rule that an employee is not in the course of his or her employment when going to or coming from the ordinary workplace and is not on the employer’s premises.
I cannot accept the further exception approved today, which holds that any person who is required by the conditions of his employment to have a vehicle at the workplace is in the course of employment when driving to or from work. Workers’ compensation benefits were intended for employees who were injured while working. Tornillo was not working, and he was not at work. His work day had ended and he was not on any mission for his employer. Workers’ compensation insurance premiums constitute a significant cost of doing business today, and this Court should not aggravate that expense by stretching good social legislation beyond its intended and logical bounds.
Moreover, I fear the majority’s position places us on a slippery slope of “required transportation” litigation. Will we limit this exception only to those employees who can demonstrate explicit requirements for transportation as a condition of employment, or does the new exception logically require coverage of any employee whose work necessarily requires access to immediate means of personal transportation? And, what of the employees required to work in an office or plant not served by public transportation; will the implicit requirement of personal transportation suffice to provide them with portal to portal coverage?
*51I would halt the expansion of exceptions to this rule at the present generous posture and reverse the allowance of benefits in this case.
Judge CHASANOW has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.