Court Opinion

ID: 9919175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 17:07:08.913049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:41.035708
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
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Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41492

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KERRY BEGAY a/k/a
KERRY BEGAY, JR.,

       Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
Karen L. Townsend, District Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1}     This matter was submitted to this Court on the brief in chief, pursuant to the
Administrative Order for Appeals in Criminal Cases from the Second, Eleventh, and
Twelfth Judicial District Courts in In re Pilot Project for Criminal Appeals, No. 2022-002,
effective November 1, 2022. Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing
submitted to this Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this
case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the
following reasons.
{2}     A jury convicted Defendant of battery upon a peace officer, contrary to NMSA
1978, Section 30-22-24 (1971). [RP 190, 201] On appeal, Defendant contends the
district court erred in denying his request that a self-defense instruction be given to the
jury. For the reasons that follow, we are unpersuaded. We therefore affirm.

{3}    Because this is an unpublished memorandum opinion written solely for the
benefit of the parties and the parties are familiar with the relevant particulars, we omit a
background section and proceed directly to the legal challenges raised on appeal.
Where appropriate, we reference the factual and procedural history in our analysis.

DISCUSSION

{4}    Defendant contends he was entitled to an instruction on self-defense.
Specifically, Defendant argues the district court committed reversible error by not
recognizing that reasonable minds could differ about whether the officer’s conduct—
quickly and aggressively approaching Defendant and raising his hand to Defendant—
could constitute excessive force. [BIC 8, 15] We disagree.

{5}     The district court’s rejection of Defendant’s requested jury instructions is
reviewed de novo, “because it is closer to a determination of law than a determination of
fact.” State v. Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 144 N.M. 253, 186 P.3d 245 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] person has only a qualified right to assert
self-defense against a police officer” and is therefore “entitle[d] to assert self-defense
only when the officer is using excessive force.” Id. ¶¶ 15-16 (emphasis omitted); see UJI
14-5185 NMRA (providing that “[a] defendant has the right to defend [themselves]
against an officer only if the officer used excessive force” and defining excessive force
as “greater force than reasonable and necessary”). “The burden is on the defendant to
persuade the [district] court that reasonable minds could differ on whether the officer’s
use of force was excessive.” UJI 14-5185 comm. cmt.; Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 34.
“Police officers act with excessive force when they use more force than is necessary to
effect an arrest, as viewed objectively from a reasonable officer’s perspective.” State v.
Lymon, 2021-NMSC-021, ¶ 32, 488 P.3d 610 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A court may determine the reasonableness of the actions of an officer, as a
matter of law, “when the minds of reasonable jurors could not differ under the
circumstances as they appear to the officer at the time.” Ellis, 2008-NMSC-032, ¶ 17
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In other words, if the district
court “concludes that reasonable minds could not find that the officer used excessive
force, the matter ends there, and the [district] court should not instruct the jury on the
elements of self-defense.” Id.

{6}    Defendant argues that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction because he
presented evidence that the officer in this case acted with excessive force. Even if we
were to accept the premise that the officer used force against Defendant, the evidence
that Defendant points to does not allow reasonable minds to differ as to whether the
force used was excessive.
{7}      The officer’s interactions with Defendant occurred near, and just after, a
disturbance involving another inmate. The officer gave Defendant verbal directives,
including giving Defendant the choice between submitting to a search or being forcibly
detained in a manner similar to the individual who had caused the disturbance.
Defendant responded by asking the officer, “You want some of this?” and punching the
officer. [BIC 1-4] According to Defendant’s testimony, the officer had walked toward him
quickly and aggressively, waving his arms and putting his hand in Defendant’s face.
Defendant testified that the officer threatened to use military training on Defendant to
severely injure Defendant if Defendant failed to cooperate with the search. Defendant
testified that the officer startled Defendant by putting his hand in Defendant’s face.
Defendant claims he punched the officer in self-defense because he felt threatened.
[BIC 4-5; RP 179] The State presented testimony from the officer that protocol requires
that inmates be subject to pat-down searches before returning to their cell, that officers
are required to give three directives to inmates who do not submit to a search, and that
if the inmate does not comply the officer has discretion to use force. [BIC 6]

{8}    Even assuming the officer’s approach, gestures, and words constituted “force” as
contemplated by our self-defense jurisprudence, Defendant presented no evidence
indicating that the officer’s use of force was excessive under the circumstances.
Moreover, the only evidence that the application of actual physical force occurred
indicates it originated from Defendant himself when he punched the officer. Based on
our review of the record, the evidence that Defendant points to does not allow
reasonable minds to differ as to whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable.
See id. ¶ 26.

{9}     In Ellis, an officer’s decision to twice draw his weapon during an encounter with
the defendant was deemed reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case.
Id. ¶ 41. There, the defendant was stopped for a seatbelt violation and refused to sign
the citation, repeatedly disobeyed law enforcement’s commands, threatened the officer,
actively resisted law enforcement’s attempts to regain control of the situation, and
disregarded law enforcement’s authority. Id. ¶ 40. Asked to consider whether the law
enforcement officer used excessive force in drawing his weapon during the encounter,
the Ellis court concluded that “reasonable minds could not differ and that [the law
enforcement officer] used only reasonable and necessary force to protect himself given
the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances with which he was faced.” Id. ¶
41. As such, the Court concluded, as a matter of law, that the amount of force used was
reasonably necessary given the circumstances and the defendant was therefore not
entitled to a self-defense instruction. Id.

{10} When compared to the conduct scrutinized in Ellis, the officer’s actions here were
equally—if not more—reasonable under the circumstances. The officer approached
Defendant quickly and with authority while an active disturbance was happening nearby,
directed Defendant to comply with a search, and was met with Defendant’s
noncompliance. Defendant, meanwhile, responded by asking, “You want a piece of
this?” and punching the officer. Under the circumstances, we conclude that reasonable
minds could not differ that the officer in this case used an amount of force that was
reasonably necessary, “given the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving circumstances
with which he was faced.” Id. Accordingly, Defendant was not entitled to a self-defense
instruction, and the district court’s determination that the officer did not use excessive
force against Defendant did not amount to reversible error. See id. ¶ 17 (stating that if
the district court “concludes that reasonable minds could not find that the officer used
excessive force, the matter ends there” and the jury should not be instructed on the
elements of self-defense).

{11} Insofar as Defendant asserts the district court committed reversible error by
making a “factual finding” that the officer did not use excessive force instead of
addressing “whether reasonable minds could differ on the question of excessive force,”
Defendant seeks to create a distinction without a difference. [BIC 14] Like in Ellis, the
district court here was entitled to determine, as a matter of law, that the officer used an
amount of force that was reasonably necessary, rather than excessive, and that
Defendant was therefore not entitled to a self-defense instruction. See id. ¶ 41; see also
UJI 41-5185 (providing a defendant has the right to defend themselves against an
officer “only if the officer used excessive force).

{12} For the foregoing reasons, we reject Defendant’s challenge to the denial of his
requested self-defense jury instruction and affirm Defendant’s conviction.

{13}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge