Court Opinion

ID: 9488299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:41:41.933883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:48.897819
License: Public Domain

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I would simply affirm the district court on the ground that a regulation promulgated by an Executive agency is not an “enactment of Congress” for purposes of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (“ACA”). The majority’s assumption otherwise, in my view, is untenable. Were I to agree that a regulation is a statute, I would dissent from the majority’s opinion because I believe that, through the Department of the Interior regulation at issue in this case, 36 C.F.R. § 4.2, the United States has adopted Virginia’s Habitual Offender Act for application to appellant’s offense on the George Washington Parkway.
Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment reached by the majority.
*186I.
The majority does not actually hold that a regulation is an enactment of Congress; it decides the case on the ground that the Habitual Offender Act is not adopted into federal law by 36 C.F.R. § 4.2. However, the majority assumes in dicta that several eases cited by appellant “are correct in holding that the Secretary’s traffic regulations for national parks, including 36 C.F.R. § 4.2,. qualify as an enactment of Congress for the purpose of the Assimilative Crimes Act.” Ante at 185. Because it offers no explanation for this assumption, other than the immaterial one that validly promulgated regulations “have the force and effect of law,” ante at 184 (citing United States v. Eubanks, 435 F.2d 1261, 1262 (4th Cir.1971)), I surmise that the majority finds convincing either, or both, of the rationales advanced by the other courts that have concluded that regulations can constitute enactments of Congress. I am persuaded by neither rationale.
First, some courts have held or assumed that a regulation promulgated by an Executive agency qualifies as an “enactment of Congress” for purposes of the ACA either because the Act requires only that the federal government have spoken on the subject in question, see, e.g., United States v. Adams, 502 F.Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.Fl.1980) (“The fact that the federal proscription is embodied in a regulation rather than a statute does not mean that the government stands mute on the point.”), or because the Act requires only that federal law exist on the subject, see, eng., United States v. Palmer, 956 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir.1992) (assuming that regulation constitutes enactment of Congress because regulation is “federal law”). These cases quite obviously ignore the unambiguous language of the ACA requiring that an “enactment of Congress” make punishable the act in question if prosecution under the ACA is to be disallowed. 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). An agency regulation is not an “enactment,” and it certainly is not an “enactment of Congress,” notwithstanding that the federal government speaks through regulations and regulations constitute binding law.
The second rationale, best evident in Adams, 502 F.Supp. at 24-25, and United States v. Baker, 603 F.2d 104, 105 (9th Cir.1979), is that agency regulations can be considered enactments of Congress because the power of agencies to issue regulations derives from enactments of Congress. Again, however, this rationale cannot be squared with the terms of the ACA; the broad enabling statutes from which agencies derive their regulatory power typically do not “make punishable” any acts whatsoever. In the present ease, for example, the Secretary of the Interior has issued 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 3, which simply directs the Secretary to “make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service.” Congress’ enactment thus neither proscribes particular conduct nor prescribes a particular punishment, and therefore can scarcely be said to “make punishable” any conduct.
United States v. Pardee, 368 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.1966), does not validate the majority’s assumption, although it appears that the court in that case likewise assumed that regulations are statutes for purposes of the ACA. This is presumably why not even the government cites us to this case.
In Pardee, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that state law should govern disposition of his charge for driving on the wrong side of the road, on the ground that 36 C.F.R. § 3.29 itself required the application of state law only if the federal regulations did not govern the conduct in question, and that a federal regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 3.32, in fact covered the conduct: “[T]he applicability of the State traffic laws is excepted by the very regulation, § 3.29, on which the appellant relies,” since “[t]hat section excludes the State law where it has been ‘otherwise provided for by ... the regulations contained in this part.’ ” 368 F.2d at 372 (emphasis added). The court did note that the ACA does not apply where, as in that ease, “the Federal Government has spoken.” Id. But there is little question that the court decided that federal law governed the driving on the wrong side of the road count on the ground that section 3.29 itself provided for applica*187tion of the federal regulation in section 3.32 rather than state law, and merely assumed that regulations can be regarded as congressional enactments. As the court stated: “§ 3.29[ ] deals specifically with traffic control laws and regulations, thus predominating over § 3.3 [the regulation providing for application of state law through the ACA] in this special matter.” Id. Indeed, when the court went on to address the manslaughter count, as to which it specifically held that the ACA was inapplicable because of the existence of a controlling federal statute, the court evidenced its understanding that state law applies only where a congressional enactment does not exist. Id. at 373 (“Obviously, then, the offense here is beyond the scope of the Assimilative Crimes Act since the latter by its terms embraces only ‘any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress ...’, and thereby excludes conduct made punishable by Congress.”).
Just as Congress may provide that a rose by another name is not a rose, it may define regulations as statutes. Until it so defines them, however, I would hold that an agency regulation is only that — a regulation of an agency — and not an enactment of Congress. I would not indulge the argument made by the government in its brief and accepted by the majority.
II.
If I agreed that a regulation promulgated by an Executive agency is an “enactment of Congress,” I would yet disagree -with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that Virginia’s Habitual Offender Act is not adopted by 36 C.F.R. § 4.2. The language of section 4.2 is broad: “traffic and the use of vehicles "within a park area are governed by State law. State law that is now or may later be in effect is adopted and made a part of the regulations in this part.” 36 C.F.R. § 4.2(a). The United States concedes as much: “[t]he purpose of Section 4.2 is to incorporate all state traffic regulations without regard to whether those offenses were characterized as criminal, civil or administrative in nature.” Appellee’s Br. at 9.
The conclusion, I believe, is inescapable that Virginia’s Habitual Offender Act, Va. Code § 46.2-357(B)(2), is a law governing “traffic and the use of vehicles,” or, in the words of the United States, is a “state traffic regulation.” The majority holds otherwise, reasoning that the Habitual Offender Act is of a different character than a traffic regulation because “the gravamen of a violation of the Habitual Offender Act is the act of operating a motor vehicle by a driver who has been formally adjudged to be a danger to others using the highway.” Ante at 185 (citing Edenton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 413, 316 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1984)).* Thus, according to the majority, the purpose of the Habitual Offender Act is to enforce judicial decrees. But even if the sole purpose of that Act was to enforce judicial decrees, which it is not, see ante at 183 (citing Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 808, 252 S.E.2d 299, 301 (1979), for the proposition that “[t]he purpose of the Habitual Offender Act is to promote highway safety”), the Act is no less a statute governing the use of a vehicle.
Title 46.2 of the Virginia Code, in which the Habitual Offender Act appears, is designated “Motor Vehicles.” Va.Code Ann. § 46.2, at p. 212 (Michie 1994). The Habitual Offender Act is included in Subtitle II, “Titling, Registration, and Licensure,” under the subheading “Licensure of Drivers.” Id. And the Act indisputably defines certain circumstances under which, in the interest of safety, an inhabitant of Virginia is not authorized to operate a motor vehicle. See Va. Code § 46.2-357 (“It shall be unlawful for any person to drive any motor vehicle ... on the highways of the Commonwealth while the order of the court prohibiting such operation remains in effect.”). See also ante at 183 (Habitual Offender Act “denies the privilege of operating a motor vehicle to ‘persons who by their record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety of others and their disrespect for the laws of the state and the *188orders of its courts.’ ”) (citing Whorley v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 740, 214 S.E.2d 447, 451 (1975)). As such, the Act unmistakably governs the use of vehicles, and, for that reason, is clearly within the scope of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2. Prosecution would therefore be barred under the Assimilative Crimes Act but for the fact that section 4.2 is not an enactment of Congress.
III.
Because I do not consider a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior to be an “enactment of Congress,” I would hold that the United States was not precluded from proceeding against appellant under the Virginia Habitual Offenders Act, as assimilated by the Assimilative Crimes Act, and I would affirm the convictions below on that ground.

The majority correctly rejects appellant’s argument that “the Habitual Offender Act is nothing more than a glorified driving on a suspended license statute," ante at 185, but the rejection of this argument is nonresponsive on the issue of whether the Habitual Offender Act is nevertheless a statute governing "traffic and the use of vehicles.”