Court Opinion

ID: 9469182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:34:28.668907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:16.314075
License: Public Domain

WOODS, District Judge,
sitting by designation, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part IV of the majority opinion which addresses the issues presented by the letter of termination. In all other respects, I dissent.
Contrary to the underlying factual findings made by both the jury and District Court and the conclusions of law made by the District Court, the majority opinion concludes that the Mitchell patent is invalid. Applying the doctrine espoused in Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 23 L.Ed.2d 610 (1966), the majority opinion proceeds to vacate the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and remand the case to the District Court for a determination of the value of nonpatent rights from the date Fabcon ceased payment of royalties to the termination date of October 6, 1975. Additionally, the District Court is directed to determine damages for misappropriation of trade secrets after contract termination.
While I acknowledge that it is well settled that the ultimate question of obviousness is a question of law (Maj. Op. at 7), it is equally well settled that this determination is one which “lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966); Clark Equipment Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 789 (8th Cir. 1978). These factual inquiries, of course, are resolved either by the District Judge or a jury. The scope of review to be applied to the determination of obviousness at the trial level and the weight which should be given to the jury verdict or the District Court’s findings on these issues have given this Circuit great difficulty. Flour City Architectural Metals v. Alpana Aluminum Products, Inc., 454 F.2d 98 (8th Cir. 1972); and Clark Equipment Co. v. Keller, supra. In Contico Intern v. Rubbermaid Commercial Products, 665 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1981), the clearly erroneous standard was applied in reviewing the trial judge’s findings. Consistency with this decision dictates that a jury verdict on these same issues be tested by the substantial evidence test. However, the majority opinion acknowledges two different approaches to the obviousness vel non issue — substantial evidence test of a jury verdict and an independent analysis of the underlying facts by the appellate court — and states that the result would be the same in the instant case under either approach. The majority then focuses on an independent analysis of the evidence and arrives at the conclusion that the Mitchell patent must be invalidated. In reaching this conclusion, no weight was given to the special jury verdicts which dealt with the obviousness issue. Further, no consideration was given to the District Court’s independent evaluation of the evidence and conclusion that the Mitchell patent was valid. (Designated Record p. 147).
In E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247, 1264 (8th Cir. 1980), this Circuit, in an opinion written by the Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, emphasized that “[t]he parties are entitled to a consideration in the first instance of all the facts touching the obviousness issue, by a fact-finder who sees and hears the witnesses.... ” Surely, given this emphasis, the parties are entitled to have this factfinder’s consideration accorded some weight.
The majority’s concern with the difficulty of submitting the complex issue of obviousness to a jury has some logical appeal (Maj. Op. 1241). But, once a proper demand for jury trial has been made and a jury trial is conducted, the appellate standards of review of a jury verdict should not be compromised because of the complexity of the issues presented.
The majority also relies on Lear v. Adkins, supra, to hold that any alleged tortious inducement was justified as a matter of law. Given the majority’s opinion on the patent validity issue, the argument that *1251Rauenhorst was justified in inducing Fab-con to cease royalty payments has some force. But, in Minnesota, justification is peculiarly a fact issue to be determined by the jury. Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965); Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 196 N.W.2d 478 (1972). If the jury was not properly instructed on the Lear v. Adkins, supra, justification issue, the proper procedure would be to remand the case for a redetermination by the jury.