Court Opinion

ID: 9840865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 16:01:47.868928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:07.763680
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11357    Document: 21-1      Date Filed: 09/20/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11357
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        RICHARD V. HARRISON,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MACY'S INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-03257-TCB
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11357

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:

               Richard Harrison, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former em-
        ployer, Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc. (“Macy’s”), in his civil action
        brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
        42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Em-
        ployment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (“ADEA”). No reversible er-
        ror has been shown; we aﬃrm.
                                                  I.
               This appeal is the second time this case has come before us;
        we summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal. Harrison
        worked as a seasonal employee at a Macy’s store in Douglasville,
        Georgia, during two separate periods. Harrison ﬁrst worked as a
        seasonal sales associate between October 2015 and January 2016.
        After his seasonal employment ended, Harrison applied for various
        positions at Macy’s but was not hired. In pertinent part, Harrison
        applied for a part-time seasonal position on 19 September 2016.
        Harrison was interviewed on 26 September but was not oﬀered a

        1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants.See Timson v.
        Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se
        pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
        1998).
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        22-11357                  Opinion of the Court                               3

        position. Harrison also says he was passed over for a permanent
        position in the Men’s Department in September 2016.
               On 21 October 2016, Harrison was oﬀered a “seasonal-ﬂex”
        position for the 2016 holiday season. Harrison worked in that po-
        sition from 21 October 2016 to 20 January 2017. After his second
        seasonal position ended, Harrison again applied for other positions
        at Macy’s but was not hired.
               In 2017, Harrison ﬁled this civil action against Macy’s.
        Brieﬂy stated, Harrison alleged that Macy’s failure to hire him on
        several occasions constituted unlawful discrimination on account
        of Harrison’s race (black), sex (male), national origin ( Jamaican), 2
        and age (date of birth 8 November 1960). Harrison also alleged
        that Macy’s decision not to hire him was made in retaliation for
        Harrison’s having ﬁled an earlier Title VII lawsuit against his for-
        mer employer, Belk.
                In March 2018, the district court granted Macy’s motion to
        compel arbitration and dismissed without prejudice Harrison’s
        claims. Harrison appealed that decision. Following oral argument,
        we vacated the district court’s order compelling arbitration and re-
        manded the case to allow Harrison to litigate his claims before the
        district court. See Harrison v. Macy’s Inc., 789 F. App’x 843, 845 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (unpublished).

        2 Harrison later dismissed voluntarily his claims based on national-origin dis-

        crimination and retaliation.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11357

               On remand, the district court ordered discovery and referred
        the case to a magistrate judge. Following discovery, Macy’s moved
        for summary judgment.
                A magistrate judge issued a 64-page report and recommen-
        dation (“R&R”). The magistrate judge recommended that the dis-
        trict court grant Macy’s motion for summary judgment.
                Harrison objected to the R&R. In a detailed order, the dis-
        trict court overruled Harrison’s objections, adopted the R&R, and
        granted summary judgment in favor of Macy’s.
                                             II.
               A.     Case Management
                On appeal, Harrison ﬁrst contends that the district court
        mismanaged the case and caused him material prejudice. We re-
        view a party’s claim that he was materially prejudiced by the district
        court’s mismanagement of his case under an abuse-of-discretion
        standard. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367
        (11th Cir. 1997). Generally speaking, “district courts enjoy broad
        discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them.”
        See id. at 1366.
                The district court abused no discretion in managing Harri-
        son’s case. Harrison ﬁrst contends that the district court misman-
        aged the case by failing to assign the case immediately to a magis-
        trate judge upon remand. Harrison, however, has failed to present
        evidence showing that the delay in referring his case to a magistrate
        judge delayed impermissibly the proceedings or otherwise caused
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        22-11357               Opinion of the Court                         5

        material prejudice. To the contrary, Harrison argues chieﬂy that
        discovery was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic: a reason
        unrelated to the timing of the magistrate-judge assignment.
                Harrison also contends that the district court abused its dis-
        cretion by ruling on a discovery dispute via email, instead of by
        formal written order. We disagree. The record demonstrates that
        the district court followed the procedures outlined in the district
        court’s case-management instructions for resolving discovery dis-
        putes. These instructions were provided to the parties at the be-
        ginning of litigation. Harrison has not shown that the district court
        acted outside its “broad discretion” by establishing such proce-
        dures. Nor has Harrison presented evidence showing how the dis-
        trict court’s email ruling materially prejudiced him.
                We also reject Harrison’s argument that Chief Judge Thrash
        -- a judge not assigned to Harrison’s case -- mismanaged the case by
        not adjudicating personally Harrison’s motions for recusal of the
        assigned district court judge and for reconsideration of the emailed
        rulings.
              B.     Judicial Estoppel
               Harrison next challenges the district court’s determination
        that he was judicially estopped from raising claims about employ-
        ment applications Harrison submitted while he was employed by
        Macy’s. The district court’s judicial-estoppel ruling focused on as-
        sertions Harrison made to this Court during his ﬁrst appeal in this
        case.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11357

              We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s appli-
        cation of the judicial-estoppel doctrine. See Smith v. Haynes &
        Haynes, P.C., 940 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect
        the integrity of the courts from “parties who seek to manipulate
        the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the ex-
        igencies of the moment.” Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174,
        1176 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). The Supreme Court has identiﬁed
        a non-exhaustive list of factors that might inform a district court’s
        decision to apply judicial estoppel: (1) whether “a party’s later po-
        sition [is] ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position”; (2)
        “whether the party succeeded in persuading a court to accept that
        party’s earlier position”; and (3) “whether the party seeking to as-
        sert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or
        impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.”
        See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001).
                We reject Harrison’s contention that the district court failed
        to consider the appropriate factors in making a decision about ju-
        dicial estoppel. Because the party invoking judicial estoppel in this
        case (Macy’s) was also a party to the earlier proceeding in which
        Harrison took a purportedly inconsistent position (Harrison’s ﬁrst
        appeal in this case), the district court applied properly the factors
        outlined by the Supreme Court in New Hampshire. Cf. Slater, 871
        F.3d at 1182 (distinguishing the circumstances involved in New
        Hampshire from cases in which the party seeking to invoke judicial
        estoppel was not a party to the prior proceeding).
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        22-11357               Opinion of the Court                        7

                During Harrison’s ﬁrst appeal, Harrison asserted clearly that
        his claims in this case arose solely from the denial of employment
        applications submitted when Harrison was not employed by
        Macy’s. See Harrison, 789 F. App’x at 844. To the extent Harrison’s
        complaint referenced requests Harrison made for permanent em-
        ployment while he was working for Macy’s as a seasonal employee,
        Harrison conﬁrmed that those references “were included only as
        background information” and that he was asserting no claim for
        relief based on the denial of those requests. See id. Despite Harri-
        son’s explicit representations in this case to this Court on appeal,
        on remand Harrison sought to raise claims based on the denial of
        his requests for permanent employment made while he was a
        Macy’s employee.
                Applying the New Hampshire factors, the record supports the
        district court’s determination that Harrison’s current position --
        seeking to pursue failure-to-hire claims arising from employment
        requests made during his employment -- is clearly inconsistent with
        the position Harrison took during his ﬁrst appeal. The record
        demonstrates further that Harrison’s prior position in this case was
        accepted by this Court. The district court also committed no clear
        error in determining that Harrison would gain an unfair advantage
        if allowed to proceed on his newly-asserted claims because Macy’s
        -- in reliance on Harrison’s earlier inconsistent position -- had not
        fully investigated those claims.
               In sum, the district court abused no discretion in applying
        the judicial-estoppel doctrine to preclude Harrison from asserting
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11357

        claims related to the denial of employment applications submitted
        during Harrison’s employment with Macy’s.
               C.     Evidentiary Rulings
               Harrison next challenges two of the district court’s eviden-
        tiary rulings. First, Harrison argues that the district court erred by
        admitting into evidence “sham” declarations from three Macy’s
        employees ( Jan Saunders, Cynthia Davis-Bennett, and Michelle
        Cantor). Second, Harrison challenges the district court’s determi-
        nation that investigation notes prepared by Kim Bass constituted
        inadmissible hearsay.
               We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s eviden-
        tiary rulings, including the exclusion of evidence at summary judg-
        ment. See Lebron v. Sec’y of the Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 772
        F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2014). “Evidence inadmissible at trial can-
        not be used to avoid summary judgment.” Id. at 1360.
               i. Sham Declarations
               An aﬃdavit may be excluded as a “sham” when the district
        court ﬁnds that the aﬃdavit “contradicts previous deposition testi-
        mony and the party submitting the aﬃdavit does not give any valid
        explanation for the contradiction.” See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc.,
        601 F.3d 1224, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010). We have stressed that the
        “sham” aﬃdavit rule is to be applied “sparingly”: exclusion is ap-
        propriate only when there exists an “inherent inconsistency be-
        tween an aﬃdavit and a deposition.” See id. (citing Allen v. Bd. of
        Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007)).
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        22-11357               Opinion of the Court                        9

               The district court abused no discretion in declining to ex-
        clude the three complained-of declarations as “shams.” First -- be-
        cause Cantor was never deposed -- Harrison can show no inherent
        inconsistency between Cantor’s declaration and her sworn testi-
        mony.
               About the declarations of Saunders and Davis-Bennett, Har-
        rison argues that the declarations failed to cite to record evidence
        and contained “self-serving and conclusionary statements.” Harri-
        son also contends that Saunders’s and Davis-Bennett’s deposition
        testimony raised “serious credibility issues.” In essence, Harrison’s
        arguments focus chieﬂy on the credibility and weight to be aﬀorded
        the challenged declarations and deposition testimony. These kinds
        of credibility issues are insuﬃcient to mandate exclusion. Cf. Allen,
        495 F.3d at 1316-17 (noting that minor discrepancies between a dec-
        laration and deposition testimony do not require exclusion and, in-
        stead, raise credibility issues that should be tested through cross-
        examination and submitted to the jury).
              Harrison has identiﬁed no inherent inconsistency between
        Saunders’s and Davis-Bennett’s declarations and their respective
        deposition testimony. The district court acted within its discretion
        by concluding that the challenged declarations were not “shams”
        subject to exclusion.
              ii. Hearsay
               Bass -- a member of Macy’s associate relations department -
        - was assigned to investigate Harrison’s internal complaints about
        unlawful discrimination. As part of her investigation, Bass took
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11357

        notes summarizing her conversations with various employees.
        Harrison seeks to rely on statements contained within Bass’s inves-
        tigation notes -- statements indicating that some managers were
        “concerned” about Harrison’s lawsuit against Belk and about Har-
        rison’s discussing his lawsuit with his Macy’s co-workers -- as pur-
        ported “direct evidence” of retaliatory animus.
                The district court abused no discretion in determining that
        the statements within Bass’s investigation notes constituted inad-
        missible hearsay. The statements are out-of-court statements,
        made by non-testifying declarants, and were being oﬀered to prove
        the truth of the matter asserted: that managers were “concerned”
        about Harrison’s Belk lawsuit. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (deﬁning
        hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
        testifying at the trial or hearing, oﬀered into evidence to prove the
        truth of the matter asserted).
                D.      Summary Judgment
               On appeal, Harrison challenges only the district court’s
        grant of summary judgment in favor of Macy’s on Harrison’s
        claims for unlawful retaliation under Title VII and under section
        1981 related to Macy’s failure to hire Harrison in September 2016
        for a part-time seasonal position and a permanent position in the
        Men’s Department. 3 Brieﬂy stated, Harrison contends that Macy’s

        3 Construed liberally, Harrison’s appellate brief raises no substantive challenge

        to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Macy’s on Har-
        rison’s claims based on the denial of employment applications filed on 10 Feb-
        ruary, 25 March, and 31 March 2016, or the applications filed in May and June
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        22-11357                  Opinion of the Court                             11

        refused to hire him in retaliation after learning about Harrison’s
        lawsuit against Belk: a lawsuit in which Harrison asserted claims for
        unlawful race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and
        section 1981.
               We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment. See Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th
        Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence,
        viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents
        no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter
        of law in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 836-37.
              The district court cited to and applied correctly the pertinent
        summary-judgment standard. We reject Harrison’s assertion that
        the magistrate judge and the district court “cherry-picked” the ev-
        idence or construed improperly the evidence in favor of Macy’s.
               Employers are barred from retaliating against an employee
        because of the employee’s opposition to an employment practice
        made unlawful under Title VII or section 1981. See 42 U.S.C. §
        2000e-3(a); Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1257-58
        (11th Cir. 2012). A plaintiﬀ may prove a claim for unlawful retalia-
        tion using either direct or indirect evidence. Generally speaking, 4

        2017. Nor does Harrison challenge the district court’s determination that Har-
        rison abandoned his claims for unlawful discrimination arising out of Macy’s
        failure to hire Harrison for the two positions in September 2016. Those claims
        are thus not properly before us on appeal.
        4 A plaintiff may also avoid summary judgment by presenting “a convincing

        mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer” unlawful
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11357

        we examine retaliation claims that rely only on circumstantial evi-
        dence using the burden-shifting framework set forth by the Su-
        preme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
        (1973). See Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.
        2020).
                On appeal, Harrison contends that -- because he presented
        direct evidence of retaliatory animus -- the district court erred in
        applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to his claims. We disa-
        gree. Harrison presented no evidence that demonstrates unambig-
        uously that Macy’s failure to hire him was motivated by Harrison’s
        lawsuit against Belk. See Jeﬀerson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911,
        922 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that direct evidence of unlawful dis-
        crimination includes “only the most blatant remarks, whose intent
        could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of
        some impermissible factor” (quotation omitted)). Instead, each of
        the statements identiﬁed by Harrison as “direct evidence” are sus-
        ceptible to more than one interpretation and would require an “in-
        ferential leap between fact and conclusion.” See Carter v. Three
        Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998)
        (stressing that “statements that are open to more than one inter-
        pretation do not constitute direct evidence” of unlawful discrimi-
        nation). Because Harrison has presented only circumstantial

        retaliation. For background, see Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321
        (11th Cir. 2011). Here, the magistrate judge concluded -- and Harrison does
        not challenge -- that Harrison abandoned any argument based on a convinc-
        ing-mosaic theory.
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        22-11357               Opinion of the Court                        13

        evidence of unlawful retaliation, the district court applied properly
        the McDonnell Douglas framework in reviewing Harrison’s claims.
               Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiﬀ must
        ﬁrst establish a prima facie case of retaliation, which creates a pre-
        sumption of unlawful retaliation against the employee. See Johnson,
        948 F.3d at 1325. The employer may then rebut that presumption
        by articulating legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse
        employment acts. See id. The burden then shifts to the employee
        to produce evidence suﬃcient to create a genuine issue of material
        fact that the employer’s articulated reasons are a pretext for unlaw-
        ful retaliation. See id.
               To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII
        or section 1981, a plaintiﬀ must show that he engaged in statutorily
        protected activity and that he suﬀered a materially adverse employ-
        ment act that was causally related to the protected activity. See
        Chapter 7 Tr., 683 F.3d at 1258.
               “To establish a causal connection, a plaintiﬀ must show that
        the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that
        the protected activity and the adverse actions were not wholly un-
        related.” Shannon v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716
        (11th Cir. 2002). Causation may be inferred when a close temporal
        proximity exists between the protected activity and the materially
        adverse act. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364
        (11th Cir. 2007). “But mere temporal proximity, without more,
        must be ‘very close.’” Id.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11357

                Harrison has not established a prima facie case of retaliation.
        Harrison has failed to produce evidence suﬃcient for a reasonable
        factﬁnder to infer a causal connection between Harrison’s Belk law-
        suit and the complained-of adverse employment acts. Nearly ten
        months elapsed between the time Macy’s ﬁrst learned of Harri-
        son’s lawsuit in December 2015 and Macy’s failure to hire Harrison
        for the two positions in September 2016. The two events are too
        far removed in time to infer a causal connection based on temporal
        proximity. See Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (noting that three to four
        months between the protected activity and the adverse employ-
        ment act is not enough, by itself, to establish a causal connection).
                Nor has Harrison presented evidence suﬃcient to demon-
        strate that Macy’s proﬀered reasons for not hiring Harrison were a
        pretext for unlawful retaliation. Harrison has not rebutted head-on
        Macy’s evidence that -- at the time Harrison interviewed for the
        part-time seasonal position on 26 September -- all open positions
        had already been ﬁlled. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th
        Cir. 2012) (explaining that to demonstrate pretext, a plaintiﬀ “can-
        not recast the reason but must meet it head on and rebut it”). Nor
        has Harrison disputed that he, in fact, never applied for the perma-
        nent position in the Men’s Department. Because Harrison has
        demonstrated no “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, in-
        coherencies, or contradictions” in Macy’s proﬀered reasons, he has
        failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating pretext. See id. at 1055-
        56.
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        22-11357            Opinion of the Court                   15

               We aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
        in favor of Macy’s.
              AFFIRMED.