Court Opinion

ID: 9953033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 14:08:24.550112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:37.001513
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1885-22

MARIA GUARTAN and
JOSE GUARTAN, her husband,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ORTANI PLACE CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION,

     Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________

                   Argued February 7, 2024 – Decided March 21, 2024

                   Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7193-20.

                   Paul Francis Darakjian argued the cause for appellants
                   (Lucianna & Lucianna, PA, attorneys; Paul Francis
                   Darakjian, on the briefs).

                   Renee Catherine Rivas argued the cause for respondent
                   (Law Offices of James H. Rohlfing, attorneys; Renee
                   Catherine Rivas, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      On February 13, 2019, plaintiff Maria Guartan slipped and fell on ice on

a public sidewalk abutting a residential condominium complex owned by the

members of defendant Ortani Place Condominium Association. Maria Guartan

and her husband, plaintiff Jose Guartan, filed a complaint claiming defendant

and other fictitiously-named defendants negligently failed to remove snow and

ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk and, as a result, plaintiffs suffered

injuries and damages.     Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting defendant

summary judgment. We affirm.

      Because this appeal requires that we review a summary judgment order,

we summarize the undisputed material facts as gleaned from the motion record

and afford all reasonable inferences of fact to plaintiffs as the parties who

opposed the summary judgment motion. 1 Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234

N.J. 317, 329 (2018).

      In the early evening hours of February 13, 2019, Maria Guartan slipped

and fell on a sheet of ice while walking on a sidewalk that abutted the

condominium complex in which defendant's members own residences. Maria

Guartan suffered injuries from her fall. It had snowed on February 11 and 12,

1
  In our summary of the facts, we consider only those facts that were established
in the motion record in accordance with Rule 4:46-2.
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2019, and snow had accumulated on defendant's property adjacent to the

sidewalk. Defendant maintained a short retaining wall on its property near the

sidewalk.

      The complaint alleged defendant negligently failed to maintain the

sidewalk "in a safe and non-hazardous condition . . . by failing to remove" or by

"negligently removing snow and ice which [had] accumulated on the sidewalk."

Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming the sidewalk on which Maria

Guartan fell was not on the condominium's property but instead was a public

sidewalk, and defendant therefore had no liability for injuries caused by the

natural occurrence of snow and ice on the sidewalk adjacent to its property.

      In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiffs asserted that it had snowed

on the days preceding Maria Guartan's fall, defendant "maintained a retaining

wall bordering" its property "and the sidewalk," snow had "accumulated

abutting the sidewalk . . . in a mound," "the snow on the incline is elevated and

in line to the ice patch that later formed from" melted snow, and "the ice that

formed was an artificial condition created by" defendant.

      At oral argument on the motion, plaintiffs' counsel informed the court that

plaintiffs had abandoned their claim—apparently made in their brief in

opposition to defendant's motion—there was a defect in the construction of what

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plaintiffs characterized as the retaining wall on defendant's property that caused

melting snow to flow onto the sidewalk and freeze. Instead, relying only on two

photographs of the alleged location of Maria Guartan's fall, plaintiffs' counsel

argued the retaining wall had caused an alleged slope on defendant's property

that caused melting snow to flow onto the sidewalk and freeze, and, in doing so,

resulted in the ice that caused Maria Guartan's fall.

      The court rejected plaintiffs' argument, noting they did not present any

evidence the retaining wall "played any part in or causing . . . or exacerbating

the freezing condition" on the sidewalk and explaining the photographs on

which plaintiffs exclusively relied provided no evidence "the retaining wall was

poorly constructed and improperly maintained." The court further determined

plaintiffs required expert testimony to support their newly-minted claim the

retaining wall caused the pooling of water on the sidewalk that froze .

      The court found it was beyond the ken of the average juror to determine

the retaining wall "caused ice to form on the sidewalk" based on a review of

plaintiffs' only proffered evidence—two photographs of the snow-covered site

of Maria Guartan's fall. Thus, the court concluded defendant was entitled to

summary judgment because Maria Guartan fell on a public sidewalk and

plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that an artificial condition on

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defendant's property caused water to flow onto the sidewalk that later froze. The

court therefore determined defendant had no liability for plaintiffs' asserted

cause of actions and entered an order granting defendant summary judgment.

This appeal followed.

      "[W]e review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under

the same standard as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). "The trial court's

conclusions of law and application of the law to the facts warrant no deference

from a reviewing court." W.J.A. v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 238 (2012).

      Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

4:46-2(c).   We must "consider whether the competent evidential materials

presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are

sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in

favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.

520, 540 (1995).

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      While "'genuine' issues of material fact preclude the granting of summary

judgment, R. 4:46-2(c), those 'of an insubstantial nature' do not." Brill, 142 N.J.

at 530. "An issue of fact is 'genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion

at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all

legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require

submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys.,

230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)); see

also R. 4:46-2(c).

      Plaintiffs' complaint asserts only that defendant's negligence caused Maria

Guartan's fall and plaintiffs' respective injuries and damages. "To sustain a

cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements: '(1) a

duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate cause, and (4) actual

damages.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty.

of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). It is well established that "it is ordinarily

a plaintiff's burden to prove negligence, and that it is never presumed." Khan v.

Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009).

      "A prerequisite to recovery on a negligence theory is a duty owed by

defendant to plaintiff." Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 109 N.J. 523,

529 (1988). "[A]t common law, property owners had no duty to clear the snow

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and ice from public sidewalks abutting their land," Luchejko v. City of Hoboken,

207 N.J. 191, 201 (2011), and were not liable for injuries resulting from clearing

a sidewalk "unless through [the owner's] negligence a new element of danger or

hazard, other than one caused by natural forces, [was] added to the safe use of

the sidewalk by a pedestrian[,]" ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Saco v.

Hall, 1 N.J. 377, 381 (1949)). Thus, "if a sidewalk had been cleared and the

melting snow subsequently froze into a layer of ice, the 'refreeze' would not be

an 'element of danger or hazard other than one caused by natural forces.'" Ibid.

(quoting Foley v. Ulrich, 94 N.J. Super. 410, 424 (App. Div.) (Kolovsky, J.,

dissenting), rev'd, 50 N.J. 426 (1967)). This rule "reflects the societal interest

in encouraging people to clear public sidewalks and the inequity of imposing

liability on those who voluntarily do so." Ibid.

      Plaintiffs acknowledge that residential property owners, including

condominium associations, have no duty to maintain public sidewalks abutting

their land as long as they do not affirmatively create a hazardous condition. See

id. at 210-11; Gellenthin v. J. & D., Inc., 38 N.J. 341, 353 (1962) (finding a

landowner liable for injuries caused by frozen water on a sidewalk resulting

from the use of drainpipes to funnel water onto the sidewalk adjacent to its

property). Stated differently, defendant owed a duty to plaintiffs only if it

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"create[d] or exacerbate[d] a dangerous sidewalk condition." Luchejko, 207

N.J. at 210.

      Plaintiffs claim the motion court erred by failing to recognize that a

residential landowner is liable for dangerous sidewalk conditions that are caused

by "the owner's actions [to] create an artificial dangerous condition" on the

property "abutting the sidewalk."       More particularly, plaintiffs argue the

retaining wall on defendant's property adjacent to the sidewalk permitted snow

to accumulate against it in a mound, thereby facilitating the melting and

discharge of the water down an "incline" that froze on the sidewalk.

      Plaintiffs rely on Deberjeois v. Schneider, 254 N.J. Super. 694 (L. Div.

1991), aff'd, 260 N.J. Super. 518 (App. Div. 1992), to support their claim the

existence of the retaining wall on defendant's property is sufficient to establish

a duty on defendant to prevent the icy condition on the sidewalk. We are not

persuaded.

      In Deberjeois, the question presented was "whether a property owner is

liable to a pedestrian who falls on a defective sidewalk where the defect is

caused by tree roots coming from a tree located in the front yard of the property."

254 N.J. Super. at 696. The plaintiff had fallen on a public sidewalk that had

been raised by roots from a tree on the defendant's property. Ibid. The defendant

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residential homeowner moved for summary judgment, claiming there was no

liability because the roots were the product of a natural process in the growth of

a tree, which is no less a naturally occurring matter "than would be a snow fall

from the sky or a natural deterioration of the sidewalk." Id. at 697.

      The Law Division explained the defendant's liability was dependent on

"whether the defect in the sidewalk was caused by a natural condition of the land

or by an artificial one." Id. at 698. The court looked to the Restatement (Second)

of Torts's meaning of a "natural condition," noting it is "[a] condition of land

that has not been changed by any act of a human being, whether the possessor

or any of his predecessors in possession" and includes "the natural growth of

trees, weeds, and other vegetation upon land not artificially made receptive to

them." Id. at 699 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363, cmt. (b) (Am.

L. Inst. 1965)). This also includes the "natural flow of surface water." Ibid.

(quoting Prosser on Torts § 364, at 390 (1st ed. 1941)). The court reasoned that

an artificial condition, is "one which comes about as a result of the property

owner's affirmative act." Ibid.

      The court focused its analysis on whether planting the tree was done by

the affirmative act of the defendant property owner, or whether the tree came to

be naturally with no human intervention. Id. at 703. In its application of that

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                                        9
analysis, the court found "one might well conclude that a property owner is

liable where he grades his land in such a manner so that in a heavy rain, water

runs run off onto a sidewalk causing a dangerous condition," and liability stems

from "the positive act—affirmative act—of the property owner in the actual

planting of the tree which instigated the process." Ibid. The Law Division

denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, ibid., and we affirmed the

trial court "substantially for the reasons set forth in" the Law Division's

"comprehensive opinion . . . ." Deberjeois, 260 N.J. Super. at 519.

      Here, plaintiffs' claim the retaining wall permits a finding of liability

against defendant is founded on the faulty assumption that the presence of the

retaining wall caused water from melting snow to discharge onto the sidewalk,

thereby creating the ice that caused Maria Guartan's fall. But the court in

Deberjeois did not hold that mere existence of an artificial condition on property

adjacent to a public sideway creates a duty on an adjacent residential landowner.

Rather, the Deberjeois court held that a residential property owner owes a duty

to pedestrians on an adjacent sidewalk if something that would otherwise be

considered a "natural occurrence" was the result of the property owner's

affirmative act, like the planting of a tree or construction of a wall. 254 N.J.

Super. at 704.

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                                       10
      Unlike in Deberjeois, where there was no dispute the roots of the tree on

the defendant's property caused the raised sidewalk that precipitated Maria

Guartan's fall, plaintiffs here failed to present any competent evidence the

retaining wall caused any water to flow onto the sidewalk in a manner different

than would have occurred due to a "natural occurrence." Plaintiffs' only proofs

concerning the alleged cause of the ice on the sidewalk offered in opposition to

the summary judgment motion were two photographs of the snow-covered area

where Maria Guartan fell and two weather reports detailing the snowfall on the

two days preceding her fall.2 The pictures show snow atop the short retaining

wall, but plaintiffs otherwise did not present any evidence as to the effect, if

any, of the retaining wall on the drainage of the melting snow, and plaintiffs did

not present any competent evidence establishing that the retaining wall in any

manner contributed to the flow of water that was frozen on the sidewalk.

      The failure to provide such evidence required the entry of summary

judgment in defendant's favor. That is because to survive summary judgment,

plaintiffs were required to establish their negligence claim was "viable." Cortez

2
  We also observe that even if it could be correctly inferred that the retaining
wall caused water to flow onto the sidewalk in a manner inconsistent with a
natural occurrence, the record is devoid of any evidence that flow of water
caused the ice on which Maria Guartan fell.
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                                       11
v. Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 598 (App. Div. 2014). "To defeat a motion

for summary judgment, the opponent must 'come forward with evidence' that

creates a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 605 (quoting Horizon Blue Cross

Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32 (App. Div. 2012)).

"'Competent opposition requires "competent evidential material" beyond mere

"speculation" and "fanciful arguments."'"         Ibid. (quoting Hoffman v.

AsSeenOnTV.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super. 415, 425-26 (App. Div. 2009)).

      Here, plaintiffs' claim the retaining wall played a role in an alleged flow

of melting snow onto the sidewalk that later froze and caused Maria Guartan's

fall is supported by nothing more than photographs showing a snow-covered

accident scene and the arguments of counsel made in opposition to defendant's

summary judgment motion. Neither is enough to sustain plaintiffs' burden of

establishing the retaining wall contributed to the creation of the ice on the

sidewalk plaintiffs claimed caused Maria Guartan's fall. See Cortez, 435 N.J.

Super. at 605. For that reason alone, the court correctly granted defendant's

summary judgment motion.

      Moreover, the court correctly determined plaintiffs' claim failed for the

separate but equally dispositive reason that to sustain their burden, plaintiffs

required expert testimony establishing the retaining wall caused the water to

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                                      12
flow in a such a manner that it resulted in the pooling of the water on the

sidewalk that froze and caused Maria Guartan's fall. In response to defendant's

motion, plaintiffs bore the burden of demonstrating either causation or a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether the retaining wall caused the water to flow

onto the sidewalk. See D'Alessandro v. Hartzel, 422 N.J. Super. 575, 580-81

(App. Div. 2011) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant where the

plaintiff "offered no proof that the condition of which she complain[ed] was

dangerous or involved an unreasonable risk of physical harm to visitors" and the

plaintiff's claim was "without some form of evidentiary support").

      In our view, competent evidence from an expert was required to satisfy

plaintiffs' burden—based on their singular negligence theory—of establishing

the retaining wall affected the otherwise natural water flow on the property such

that it caused the ice on which Maria Guartan fell. See State v. Fortin, 189 N.J.

579, 596 (2007) (noting expert testimony is "required . . . to explain complex

matters that would fall beyond the ken of the ordinary juror" or are otherwise

not common knowledge). It is simply beyond the ken of the average juror to

determine the effect of the retaining wall, if any, on the otherwise natural flow

of water on property adjacent to the sidewalk such that the flow of water from

the melting snow caused the ice on the sidewalk. Thus, plaintiffs' failure to

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submit any competent evidence from an expert establishing the retaining wall

caused the ice on the sidewalk required summary judgment in defendant's favor.

      Affirmed.

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