Court Opinion

ID: 9766084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:47.678565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.369632
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, (dissenting). I have read many decisions of our court dealing with testamentary language similar to that contained in the third and fourth paragraphs in the will under consideration and I am driven to the conclusion that the law is now in a state of uncertainty. The majority opinion certainly does nothing to clarify that uncertainty. In my opinion it is desirable to put an end to this confusion. I submit this can be done simply and only by adhering strictly to a rule of law relative to the construction of wills that has been clearly and repeatedly announced by this court. That simple rule, briefly, stated is that the courts should determine the intent of the testator from the four corners of the will. See: Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431, 112 S. W. 2d 417; Piles v. Cline, 197 Ark. 857, 125 S. W. 2d 129; Ellsworth v. Arkansas Nat’l Bk., Trustee, 194 Ark. 1032, 109 S. W. 2d 1258; Dyer v. Lane, 202 Ark. 571, 151 S. W. 2d 678; Dickens v. Tisdale, 204 Ark. 838, 164 S. W. 2d 990; McLane v. Chancey, Adm., 211 Ark. 280, 200 S. W. 2d 782, and; Thompson v. Ark. Nat’l Bank, 220 Ark. 802, 249 S. W. 2d 958. Applying the above rule only one conclusion can be reached in this case, and that is that Robert Lee Collie meant for his heirs and his wife’s heirs to have any property not disposed of by his wife at her death. The same rule would likewise determine the effect to be given to similar wills in the future. Any attempt to make a distinction, under the above rule between the case under consideration and the Piles case, supra, as the majority has done, is tenuous and strained and lends itself to uncertainty and confusion. In the first case the devise of a fee was in one paragraph and the qualification was in another, while in the second case the devise of a fee is in one sentence and the qualification is in another sentence. This difference, I submit is one of rhetoric and literary composition which with many of us is not an exact science. The difference is not one of substance which should control the disposition of property. In advocating the simple rule of intent I am not unmindful that it has some limitations. For instance we have said the intent must be determined from the words of the will and not from what the testator might have had in mind. Also, as was said in the Jackson case, the intent must not be contrary to some rule of law (not to some rule of construction). These limitations, however, have no bearing on the case under consideration.