Court Opinion

ID: 9644692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:02:14.644796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:05.764883
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The principal opinion holds the Agreement void because it was coerced by an illegal method — a strike in January and February, 1973, by public school teachers in contravention of the no-strike provision of section 105.530, RSMo 1969. The strike was certainly illegal and it did coerce the original “Recapitulation of Understandings” (Agreement) of February 18, 1973.
No action was ever taken by the Board of Education of St. Louis to declare the Agreement invalid until after June 30, 1974, the expiration date of the Agreement and then only by way of defense to the instant case.
The trial court heard evidence as to the conduct of the parties reference the Agreement over the sixteen months of its existence and held, on the evidence presented, that the Board of Education was estopped from asserting duress because it had ratified the Agreement after the duress ceased. The court in its memorandum opinion found and held inter alia:
From the evidence produced on the trial of the instant Cause, it appears that from the time the Recapitulation was entered into on February 19, 1973, until the instant lawsuit no question was raised as to the binding character or legal effect of the Agreement. To the contrary it appears that in a series of exchanges between plaintiff and defendant the latter treated the document as binding, to-wit: On June 20, 1973, a letter was written wherein proposed language for amending the ‘formalized procedure for resolving teacher questions or grievances, to include an appropriate procedure for handling the grievances of substitutes’ was used, and again on January 24, 1974, in a letter, recognition was accorded the document in words to the purport, ‘as per agreement with these organizations signed on February 19, 1973,’ and acknowledging that the agreement was to remain in force through the 1973-74 school year, and finally on April 1, 1974, in a letter from defendant’s attorney reference was made to the ‘existing memo-randa signed in February, 1973, which are to endure until June 30, 1974.’ In fact it appears that effect was given to the document on one occasion (Pam Wallace). The recognition of the binding, valid and enforceable feature of this document by the defendant invokes the general rule as enunciated in 25 Am.Jur.2d Duress (Section 27, page 385):
“As a general rule, one entitled to rescind or repudiate a contract or transaction on the ground of duress should act promptly after the duress has been re*580moved, or he will be deemed to have elected to affirm it.”
Again, at Section 28, pages 386, 387, Am. Jur. states:
“Ordinarily, a contract entered into under duress is not considered void but merely voidable, and it is therefore capable of being ratified after the duress is removed. Such ratification results if the party entering into the contract under duress accepts the benefits growing out of it or remains silent or acquiesces in the contract for any considerable length of time after opportunity is afforded to avoid it or have it annulled, or if he recognizes its validity by acting upon it.” See Gallon vs. Lloyd Thomas Company [8 Cir.], 264 F.2d 821; [State ex rel. American Surety Company vs. Haid [325 Mo. 949], 30 S.W.2d 100]. Without question defendant not only accepted the agreement or document, but by its subsequent actions ratified it realizing the benefits therefrom for approximately 16 months, and now is estopped, or waiver if you will, to urge its invalidity on the basis of duress.
In my opinion the original “Agreement” was, at the most, voidable at the election of the Board of Education because of the illegal duress of the strike, but, the Board of Education, having operated under the provisions of the “Agreement” without protest for sixteen months, even seeking to amend it during its term, has ratified the Agreement without any illegal coercion and thereby is estopped from now having the Agreement declared invalid.
The only issue decided in the principal opinion is that the Agreement is void because the strike was illegal and, therefore, that is the only issue addressed to in this dissent. In my opinion, the Agreement that resulted from the illegal strike was voidable at the election of the Board of Education but the Board of Education, by its conduct, subsequently ratified the Agreement and, therefore, the Board is es-topped from contesting the validity of the Agreement on the basis that it was produced by the illegal strike.