Court Opinion

ID: 9892182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 20:01:00.951577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:45.171624
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14396    Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023   Page: 1 of 20

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14396
                           ____________________

        ROLAND EDGER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        KRISTA MCCABE,
        THE CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA,
        CAMERON PERILLAT,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-01977-LCB
USCA11 Case: 21-14396         Document: 48-1             Date Filed: 10/20/2023   Page: 2 of 20

        2                          Opinion of the Court                     21-14396

                                ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,* Dis-
        trict Judge.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
               We sua sponte vacate our previous opinion and substitute
        the following in lieu thereof.
                                            *        *        *
                Roland Edger brought both a § 1983 false arrest claim and a
        state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama police
        officers and the City itself. After the district court concluded that
        the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had
        arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Edger, he appealed. After
        careful review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified immunity.
                                                I.
                                                A.
               The facts of this case are not in dispute, as the entirety of the
        encounter between Mr. Edger and the police was captured on the
        police officers’ body-worn and dash cameras. Both Mr. Edger and
        the defendants agree that the video and audio evidence from these

        * Honorable Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Judge
        for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
USCA11 Case: 21-14396         Document: 48-1         Date Filed: 10/20/2023         Page: 3 of 20

        21-14396                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        cameras is authentic. Before turning to that evidence, we must first
        detail the events leading up to the start of the recordings.
               Mr. Edger is a mechanic in Huntsville, Alabama, where he
        manages the Auto Collision Doc store. One of Mr. Edger’s long-
        time clients is Kajal Ghosh, who owns a red Toyota Camry.1 The
        Camry is primarily driven by Mr. Ghosh’s wife, who works as a
        teacher at Progressive Union Missionary Baptist Church. One or
        two days before June 10, 2019, Mr. Ghosh called Mr. Edger and
        reported that the Camry had broken down while his wife was
        working at the Church. He asked Mr. Edger to fix the car and told
        him the keys would be waiting for him at the Church’s front office.
               On June 10, around 2 p.m., Mr. Edger went to the Church
        to pick up the keys and to inspect the Camry. He determined
        something was wrong with either the car’s steering or its tires, and
        he concluded he would need to come back later with tools to fix
        the car. That evening, he returned to the Church with his stepson,
        Justin Nuby, in tow, intending to either fix the Camry on-site or to
        take it back to the shop for further repairs. Mr. Edger and Mr.
        Nuby drove a black hatchback to the Church.
              After Mr. Edger and his stepson entered the Church’s lot,
        the Church’s security guard observed them and grew concerned.

        1 In the record, the owner of the car on which Mr. Edger was working is re-
        ferred to by various combinations of the names “Ghosh,” “Kajal,” “Ghosh Pa-
        tel,” and “Mr. Patel.” For consistency, we will refer to this individual as Kajal
        Ghosh, or Mr. Ghosh, as that is the name by which he identified himself in his
        deposition.
USCA11 Case: 21-14396       Document: 48-1        Date Filed: 10/20/2023      Page: 4 of 20

        4                        Opinion of the Court                     21-14396

        From here on, the facts of this case were captured by audio and
        visual recording devices. At about 8:05 p.m., the security guard
        called 911 and told dispatch: “I have two Hispanic males, messing
        with an employee’s car that was left on the lot.” He also noted that
        he observed them remove a tire from the car. During the 911 call,
        the guard identified himself as a security guard for the Church,
        gave his phone number, noted his employer, and gave a description
        of Mr. Edger and Mr. Nuby. About 30 minutes later, at 8:36 p.m.,
        Officer Krista McCabe arrived at the Church in her patrol car.
               As Officer McCabe’s body camera shows, she pulled into the
        Church parking lot and parked in front of where Mr. Edger and Mr.
        Nuby were working. McCabe Body Camera at 0:00:30. 2 As she
        stepped out of the squad car, Mr. Edger was laying on the ground
        next to the car, with the Camry’s tire removed. Id. at 0:00:36. Mr.
        Nuby greeted Officer McCabe as she exited her vehicle and ap-
        proached the Camry. Id. at 0:00:36–0:00:46. Mr. Edger continued
        to work, and the following conversation began:
               Oﬃcer McCabe: What are y’all doing?

               Mr. Edger: Getting the car ﬁxed.

               Oﬃcer McCabe: Is this your car?

               Mr. Edger: Yeah, well, it is one of my customer’s.

        2 Officer McCabe’s body camera footage is available online. See Video – In-
        vestigating     Officer       Body      Camera,            Doc.       28-9
        (https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/media-sources).
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1     Date Filed: 10/20/2023    Page: 5 of 20

        21-14396              Opinion of the Court                       5

              Oﬃcer McCabe: One of your customer’s?

              Mr. Edger: Ghosh Patel, yep. I was over here earlier.

        Id. at 0:00:47. At this point Officer McCabe gestured towards the
        black hatchback.
              Oﬃcer McCabe: Whose car is that?

              Mr. Edger: That’s mine.

              Oﬃcer McCabe: The black one?

              Mr. Edger: Yeah.

        Id. at 0:01:03. Officer McCabe then watched in silence as Mr. Edger
        attempted to jack the Camry up. Eventually the car slipped from
        the jack and slammed into the ground. Id. at 0:01:08–0:01:48. Im-
        mediately after the Camry slipped, Officer Perillat arrived at the
        scene in a squad car. He exited his car and approached on foot,
        positioning himself behind Mr. Edger, out of Mr. Edger’s line of
        vision. From here, the interaction rapidly escalated:
              Oﬃcer McCabe: Alright. Take a break for me real
              fast and do y’all have driver’s license or IDs on you?

              Mr. Edger: I ain’t going to submit to no ID. Listen,
              you call the lady right now. Listen I don’t have time
              for this. I don’t mean to be rude, or ugly, but . . .

              Oﬃcer McCabe: Okay. No, you need to—

              Mr. Edger: I don’t mean to be—
USCA11 Case: 21-14396      Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 6 of 20

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14396

               Oﬃcer McCabe: —give me your ID or driver’s li-
               cense.

               Mr. Edger: No. I don’t. Listen, I don’t want you to
               run me in for nothing.

               Oﬃcer McCabe: Are you refusing me—are you re-
               fusing to give me your ID or driver’s license?

               Mr. Edger: I’m telling you that if you will call this
               lady that owns this car—

                In the middle of Mr. Edger’s sentence, as he was attempting
        to explain the situation to Officer McCabe, Officer Perillat seized
        Mr. Edger from behind. He led Mr. Edger to the side of the Camry
        and started handcuffing him. As Mr. Edger protested, Officer Peril-
        lat told Mr. Edger: “We don’t have time for this,” and, “You don’t
        understand the law.” During this time, the video shows that Mr.
        Edger offered his driver’s license at least three times before the of-
        ficers could finish handcuffing him. Eventually, the officers man-
        aged to handcuff and search Mr. Edger, and then detain him in a
        squad car. Throughout this process, the officers never asked Mr.
        Edger or his stepson for their names or addresses. Id. at 0:00:44–
        0:02:16.
                                         B.
               Mr. Edger was charged with obstructing governmental op-
        erations in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-10-2(a)(1). The City
        of Huntsville dropped all charges relating to this incident.
USCA11 Case: 21-14396       Document: 48-1       Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 7 of 20

        21-14396                Opinion of the Court                          7

                After the dismissal of the charges, Mr. Edger filed a § 1983
        civil rights lawsuit, alleging a false arrest in violation of his Fourth
        Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures, as well
        as a state law false arrest claim. On cross-motions for summary
        judgment, the district court found that the defendants were enti-
        tled to federal and state law immunities. It reasoned that even
        though Mr. Edger committed no acts giving rise to actual probable
        cause, a reasonable but mistaken officer could nonetheless have be-
        lieved his refusal to produce physical identification was a crime,
        and the officers thus had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.
        This appeal followed.
                                          II.
               We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying
        the same legal tests as the district court. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d
        975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
                                          III.
                 We focus on the federal claims first. In general, when gov-
        ernment officials are performing discretionary duties, as all parties
        concede they were in this case, they are entitled to qualified im-
        munity. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). A plain-
        tiff may rebut this entitlement by showing that the government of-
        ficials (1) committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that this vi-
        olation was “clearly established” in law at the time of the alleged
        misconduct. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In
        theory, this judge-made doctrine is designed to protect govern-
        ment officials from the consequences of their reasonable mistakes
USCA11 Case: 21-14396       Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023      Page: 8 of 20

        8                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14396

        made in the exercise of their official duties. See id. at 231. The test
        is conjunctive, and if a plaintiff fails either prong of the qualified
        immunity analysis, his claim is barred.
                There are three recognized ways to show that a law is
        “clearly established.” First, a plaintiff may show that a “materially
        similar case has already been decided,” whose facts are similar
        enough to give the police notice. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598
        F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010). Second, he may show that a
        “broader, clearly established principle should control the novel
        facts” of his case. Id. This “broader” principle may be derived from
        “general statements of the law contained within the Constitution,
        statute, or caselaw.” Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159
        (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration adopted) (emphasis added) (quoting
        Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)). Fi-
        nally, a plaintiff may show that the officer’s conduct “so obviously
        violates [the] constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Keat-
        ing, 598 F.3d at 766 (quoting Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159). While we
        must be mindful of the “specific context of the case,” we “do[] not
        require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established.”
        Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (per curiam).
                Mr. Edger alleges that he was falsely arrested in violation of
        his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
        seizures. For Fourth Amendment purposes, arrests are seizures
        and are unreasonable unless supported by probable cause. See Skop
        v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). Furthermore,
        we have often said that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity
USCA11 Case: 21-14396       Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023      Page: 9 of 20

        21-14396                Opinion of the Court                          9

        if he had even “arguable probable cause.” Brown v. City of Hunts-
        ville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). However our inconsistent
        expositions of either standard—actual or arguable probable
        cause—complicates proper application on appeal. See, e.g., Wash-
        ington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022); Garcia v. Casey¸
        75 F.4th 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, we synthesize
        the standards’ formulations from Washington and Garcia below.
               In Washington, we adopted the probable cause standard ar-
        ticulated in District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018). After
        conducting our “well-established approach to resolving conflicts in
        our precedent,” we explicitly held that “the correct legal standard
        to evaluate whether an officer had probable cause to seize a suspect
        is to ‘ask whether a reasonable officer could conclude . . . that
        there was a substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Washington,
        25 F.4th at 899–902 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588) (emphasis
        added). However, this exposition is strikingly similar to our well-
        established arguable probable cause standard: whether “‘reasonable
        officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same
        knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause
        existed to arrest’ the plaintiff.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172,
        1181 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572,
        579 (11th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added). We continued to apply that
USCA11 Case: 21-14396         Document: 48-1          Date Filed: 10/20/2023          Page: 10 of 20

        10                          Opinion of the Court                        21-14396

        same arguable probable cause standard despite Washington’s publi-
        cation. 3
                Due to this confusion, we clarified the proper arguable prob-
        able cause standard in light of Washington’s holding. In Garcia, we
        explained that “[a]n officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a reason-
        able officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the
        arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.’”
        Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 593). We fur-
        ther confirmed that “the arguable probable cause inquiry in a false
        arrest case is no different from the clearly established law inquiry.”
        Id. at 1187. 4 Thus, if we conclude that the officers had arguable

        3 See, e.g., Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1181; Rickerson v. Jeter, No. 21-12563, 2022 WL
        2136017, at *2 (11th Cir. June 14, 2022) (per curiam); Jackson v. Cowan, No. 19-
        13181, 2022 WL 3973705, at *5 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2022) (per curiam); Boyette v.
        Adams, No. 22-10288, 2022 WL 7296567, at *5 (11th Cir. Oct. 13, 2022) (per
        curiam); Sosa v. Martin Cnty., No. 20-12781, 2023 WL 1776253, at *4 (11th Cir.
        Feb. 6, 2023) (per curiam); Duncan v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 20-13867, 2023
        WL 3862579, at *4 (11th Cir. June 7, 2023) (per curiam); Paulk v. Benson, No.
        22-11635, 2023 WL 5624537, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2023) (per curiam).
        4 See also Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining “ar-
        guable probable cause” exists if officer’s actions “did not violate ‘clearly estab-
        lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
        have known’”) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)); Scarbrough v.
        Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“Because [the defend-
        ant] had arguable probable cause to arrest [plaintiffs], he violated no clearly
        established law . . . .”); Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 1995)
        (explaining that the qualified immunity inquiry under “clearly established law”
        is whether there was “arguable probable cause”).
USCA11 Case: 21-14396      Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 11 of 20

        21-14396               Opinion of the Court                         11

        probable cause then we conclude that their violation of the law was
        not clearly established and vice-versa.
               Accordingly, probable cause exists where “a reasonable of-
        ficer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circum-
        stances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that
        there was a ‘substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Wesby, 138 S.
        Ct. at 588 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983));
        see Washington, 25 F.4th at 902. In the false arrest context, arguable
        probable cause exists where “‘a reasonable officer, looking at the
        entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have inter-
        preted the law as permitting the arrests.’” See Garcia, 75 F.4th at
        1186 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 593). However “[t]his inquiry
        must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not
        as a broad general proposition.” Rivas-Villegas, 142 S. Ct. at 8 (quot-
        ing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). Im-
        portantly, whether an officer possesses either actual or arguable
        probable cause “depends on the elements of the alleged crime and
        the operative fact pattern.” Brown, 608 F.3d at 735.
               Applying these principles to this case, Mr. Edger was
        charged with obstructing governmental operations in violation of
        Alabama Code § 13A-10-2(a)(1). A person violates this section if,
        “by means of intimidation, physical force or interference or by any
        other independently unlawful act, he” obstructs a governmental func-
        tion. Id. (emphasis added). Our inquiry therefore asks whether the
        officers had probable cause to believe Mr. Edger obstructed gov-
        ernmental operations in violation of this statute. If not, our inquiry
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 12 of 20

        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14396

        is whether no reasonable officer could interpret § 13A-10-2(a)(1) as
        permitting his arrest—or in other words, whether it was clearly es-
        tablished that there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Edger for
        this crime.
                The defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest
        Mr. Edger for violating § 13A-10-2(a)(1) on two theories. First, they
        argue that Mr. Edger used “physical force or interference” to ob-
        struct the officer’s investigation. Second, in the alternative, they
        argue that Mr. Edger committed an “independently unlawful act”
        by refusing to identify himself as Officer McCabe ordered. They
        propose two different statutes, the Alabama Stop-and-Identify stat-
        ute § 15-5-30, and the Alabama driver’s license statute § 32-6-9, for
        why Mr. Edger was required to produce his identification. The of-
        ficers are entitled to qualified immunity if they had arguable prob-
        able cause to arrest Mr. Edger based on any of these theories. We
        address whether the officers had arguable probable cause for each
        of these theories in turn.
                                         A.
                Turning first to the theory that Mr. Edger obstructed the of-
        ficers by using “intimidation” or “physical force.” First, the defend-
        ants suggest that Mr. Edger physically threatened Officer McCabe
        in the moments following the Camry slipping off the jack and hit-
        ting the ground because he “jumped up” and “waved his hands,”
        among other things. But the video evidence in this case speaks for
        itself. See Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n.3
        (11th Cir. 2009) (noting we review video evidence de novo); Scott
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 13 of 20

        21-14396               Opinion of the Court                        13

        v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (explaining that where one
        party’s account is contradicted by the video evidence “[t]he Court
        of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should
        have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”). The
        final interaction between Mr. Edger and Officers McCabe and Peril-
        lat is depicted from four separate angles on four separate cameras—
        two body-worn police cameras and two dash cameras. In each
        video, the Camry slips off the jack, slamming into the ground in
        front of Mr. Edger. In each, he stands up, slapping his leg, and turns
        to answer Officer McCabe’s questions. Though he is clearly frus-
        trated and gesturing as he speaks, his hands are empty. He stands
        in one spot without walking towards Officer McCabe. Looking to
        all the facts within the surrounding circumstances, no reasonable
        officer could have observed Mr. Edger and concluded he was using
        “intimidation” or “physical force” to “intentionally obstruct[]” Of-
        ficer McCabe’s investigation. Accordingly, no reasonable police of-
        ficer could conclude that Mr. Edger violated this portion of the ob-
        struction statute, and therefore there was no probable cause to sup-
        port Mr. Edger’s arrest.
               Second, the defendants argue that Mr. Edger’s noncompli-
        ance and “aggressive demeanor” obstructed Officer McCabe’s in-
        vestigation and provided her probable cause to arrest Mr. Edger.
        But “words alone fail to provide culpability under” Alabama’s ob-
        struction statute. D.A.D.O. v. State, 57 So. 3d 798, 806 (Ala. Crim.
        App. 2009). So, Mr. Edger’s statements and noncompliance with-
        out more do not begin to support arguable probable cause—much
        less actual probable cause—for arrest under § 13A-10-2(a)(1). This
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023   Page: 14 of 20

        14                    Opinion of the Court                21-14396

        theory does not support the grant of qualified immunity to the of-
        ficers.
                                         B.
               Turning now to the defendant’s theory that probable cause
        existed to support Mr. Edger’s arrest because he violated Alabama’s
        Stop-and-Identify statute, Alabama Code § 15-5-30. The Stop-and-
        Identify statute allows an Alabama police officer who “reasonably
        suspects” a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed to
        stop a person in public and “demand of him his name, address and
        an explanation of his actions.” Id.
               Mr. Edger argues that he cannot possibly have violated § 15-
        5-30, because it clearly delineates three things the police may ask
        him for: his name, his address, and an explanation of his actions.
        He argues nothing in the statute requires him to produce physical
        identification, and that Officer McCabe’s question, “Do y’all have
        driver’s license or IDs on you?” and repeated references to “IDs”
        were clearly demands for him to produce physical identification of
        some kind. He notes that physical identification is not one of the
        three enumerated things that the police may ask for under Ala-
        bama law, and that he was never asked for his name or address.
               We agree with the district court’s assessment that Mr. Edger
        did not actually violate § 15-5-30 and thus did not actually commit
        an “independently unlawful act” justifying arrest under § 13A-10-
        2(a)(1). Section 15-5-30 does not require anyone to produce an
        “ID” or “driver’s license” as Officer McCabe demanded. Indeed, it
        does not require anyone to produce anything. Instead, it grants
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 15 of 20

        21-14396               Opinion of the Court                        15

        Alabama police the authority to request three specific pieces of in-
        formation. Here, the video evidence is clear that neither Officer
        McCabe nor Officer Perillat asked for Mr. Edger’s name or address.
        Additionally, Mr. Edger’s objection was clearly related to the un-
        lawful demand that he produce physical identification. When
        asked, “What are y’all doing?” he responded to Officer McCabe and
        explained they were fixing the car and that it belonged to a cus-
        tomer. When he stood up to answer more of her questions, the
        video shows he continued explaining who the owner of the car was
        and began explaining how they could verify the information before
        he was abruptly arrested by Officer Perillat. Because the Alabama
        statute, by its plain text, does not permit the police to demand phys-
        ical identification, the officers lacked probable cause and thus vio-
        lated Mr. Edger’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him. The
        first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is therefore satisfied.
               Where we part ways with the district court is on the issue of
        arguable probable cause or the “clearly established law” prong of
        the qualified immunity analysis. We hold that the plain text of the
        Alabama statute is so clear that no reasonable officer could have
        interpreted it to permit Mr. Edger’s arrest for failing to produce his
        “ID” or “driver’s license” under § 15-5-30.
               Three related premises lead us to this conclusion. First, the
        broad background rule is that the police may ask members of the
        public questions and make consensual requests of them, Florida v.
        Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991) (collecting cases and examples),
        “as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance . . .
USCA11 Case: 21-14396      Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023      Page: 16 of 20

        16                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14396

        is required.” Id. at 435. But the person “need not answer any ques-
        tion put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to questions at all
        and may go on his way.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98
        (1983).
                Second, while the Fourth Amendment permits the police to
        briefly detain a person to investigate criminal activity, any obliga-
        tion to answer police questions arises from state—not federal Con-
        stitutional—law. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S.
        177, 187 (2004) (analyzing Nevada’s Stop-and-Identify statute and
        noting “the source of the legal obligation [to answer] arises from
        Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment”).
               Finally, as noted, the Alabama statute is clear. It lists only
        three things that the police may ask about. This is not an issue of
        “magic words” that must be uttered. There is a difference between
        asking for specific information: “What is your name? Where do
        you live?” and demanding a physical license or ID. The infor-
        mation contained in a driver’s license goes beyond the information
        required to be revealed under § 15-5-30. Compare Ala. Code § 32-6-
        6 (“Each driver license . . . shall contain a distinguishing number
        assigned to the licensee and a color photograph of the licensee, the
        name, birthdate, address, and a description of the licensee . . . .”),
        and Ala. Code § 22-19-72 (requiring that there be “a space on each
        driver’s license . . . to indicate in appropriate language that the [li-
        censee] desires to be an organ donor”), with Ala. Code § 15-5-30 (“A
        [police officer] may stop any person abroad in a public place whom
        he reasonably suspects is committing . . . a [crime] and may
USCA11 Case: 21-14396      Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023      Page: 17 of 20

        21-14396                Opinion of the Court                         17

        demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his ac-
        tions.”). Further, neither the parties nor our own research can
        identify any Alabama law that generally requires the public to carry
        physical identification—much less an Alabama law requiring them
        to produce it upon demand of a police officer. There simply is no
        state law foundation for Officer McCabe’s demand that Mr. Edger
        produce physical identification.
               So to summarize, it has been clearly established for decades
        prior to Mr. Edger’s arrest that the police are free to ask questions,
        and the public is free to ignore them. It has been clearly established
        prior to Mr. Edger’s arrest that any legal obligation to speak to the
        police and answer their questions arises as a matter of state law.
        And the state statute itself in this case is clear and requires no addi-
        tional construction: police are empowered to demand from an in-
        dividual three things: “name, address and an explanation of his ac-
        tions.” Ala. Code § 15-5-30. It was thus clearly established at the
        time of Mr. Edger’s arrest that she could not demand he produce
        physical identification. And because Officer McCabe’s demands for
        an “ID” or a “driver’s license” went beyond what the statute and
        state law required of Mr. Edger, she violated clearly established
        law. Under this set of facts and these precedents, no reasonable
        officer could interpret the law to permit Mr. Edger’s arrest for ob-
        structing governmental operations by violating § 15-5-30. And this
        theory cannot support the grant of qualified immunity to the offic-
        ers.
USCA11 Case: 21-14396        Document: 48-1        Date Filed: 10/20/2023        Page: 18 of 20

        18                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14396

                                              C.
                 Finally, the defendants also argue that Mr. Edger violated
        the Alabama driver’s license statute, Ala. Code § 32-6-9(a), which
        requires those “driving” to “display the [license], upon demand of
        a . . . peace officer.” Id. The defendants argue that because Mr.
        Edger admitted that the black hatchback was his, that he must have
        driven it there and he was therefore “driving” and subject to the
        requirement to display his license. They argue this constitutes an
        “independently unlawful act” under § 13A-10-2(a)(1) and a crime in
        and of itself justifying the arrest.
               The defendants argue that “driving” is a broad term also en-
        compassing those with “actual physical control” of the vehicle. Ap-
        pellee Br. at 33 (citing Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(14) (defining “driver”)).
        The test for “actual physical control” means the “exclusive physical
        power, and present ability, to operate, move, park, or direct” the
        vehicle under the totality of the circumstances. Davis v. State, 505
        So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). Assuming without decid-
        ing that this is the appropriate test for determining if someone is
        “driving” under § 32-6-9, 5 under the totality of the circumstances,
        Mr. Edger was not driving. When Officer McCabe arrived on
        scene, she found Mr. Edger partially under the Camry attempting
        to jack it up. The Camry itself had a wheel removed and was thus
        disabled and incapable of being driven. The black hatchback was

        5 We note that the defined term “driver” does not appear in § 32-6-9, and the
        term “driving” is undefined in § 32-1-1.1. Compare Ala. Code § 32-6-9, with id.
        § 32-1-1.1(14).
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 10/20/2023     Page: 19 of 20

        21-14396               Opinion of the Court                        19

        approximately two parking spaces away from where Mr. Edger
        was, and he was engaged in working on the Camry. No reasonable
        person could believe that Mr. Edger had the “present ability . . . to
        operate, move, park, or direct” the black hatchback from two park-
        ing spaces away and underneath another car. See Davis, 505 So. 2d
        at 1305. The only case analyzing § 32-6-9 cited by the defendants is
        from this court, Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1230 (11th
        Cir. 2020), where we concluded the police may have had probable
        cause to arrest someone for failure to display their license. But that
        case’s facts are materially different because, there, the arrest at-
        tempt occurred after the individual walked towards their vehicle
        and attempted to get in before being stopped by the officer. Id. at
        1223.
               In sum, there was not actual probable cause to conclude that
        Mr. Edger was driving a car without displaying his license at the
        time Officer McCabe arrived. Nor could any reasonable officer in-
        terpret the law as permitting arrest in this case, and therefore there
        was no arguable probable cause either. Thus, this final theory can-
        not support the grant of qualified immunity to the officers.
                                   *      *      *
               In summary, Officers McCabe and Perillat violated Mr.
        Edger’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they
        arrested him with neither actual, nor arguable, probable cause. Ac-
        cordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified im-
        munity to the officers and remand for further proceedings.
USCA11 Case: 21-14396     Document: 48-1       Date Filed: 10/20/2023    Page: 20 of 20

        20                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14396

                                         IV.
                The district court dismissed Mr. Edger’s state law claims
        against Officer McCabe, Officer Perillat, and the City because it de-
        termined that arguable probable cause was a defense to those
        claims as well. It did not conduct any independent analysis on
        these claims and instead linked its decision directly to the finding
        of arguable probable cause on the federal claims. Accordingly, be-
        cause we hold that there was no arguable probable cause—i.e., the
        lack of probable cause was clearly established—we VACATE the
        district court’s dismissal of the state law claims and remand for fur-
        ther proceedings.
              REVERSED and VACATED.