Court Opinion

ID: 9363361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 23:00:42.012768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.489012
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-1766
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                               Carl T. Beckwith, Jr.

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                for the Western District of Arkansas - Hot Springs
                                 ____________

                           Submitted: October 17, 2022
                             Filed: January 13, 2023
                                   [Published]
                                 ____________

Before COLLOTON, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Carl Beckwith admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release. The
district court1 sentenced him to nine months in prison. Beckwith appeals, claiming
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

      1
        The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas.
        Beckwith pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography and
was sentenced to 50 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release in 2010. In
2017, his supervised release was revoked and he was sentenced to another six
months in prison and six years of supervised release. In 2022, his supervised release
was again revoked after he admitted to six violations, including eight separate
incidents of using controlled substances. The district court sentenced him to nine
months in prison with no supervised release. Beckwith appeals his sentence, arguing
that it is substantively unreasonable.

      We review the reasonableness of a sentence imposed upon a violation of
supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d
910, 914–16 (8th Cir. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion by failing to
consider a relevant factor, giving significant weight to an irrelevant factor, or
committing a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors by arriving at
a sentence outside the range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Jones, 507 F.3d 657, 659 (8th Cir. 2007). We presume that a sentence
within the Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Perkins, 526 F.3d 1107,
1110 (8th Cir. 2008).

       Beckwith argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is
greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although
Beckwith’s sentence is within the applicable Guidelines range, 2 he insists that a
sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range would have been more appropriate.
Beckwith argues that the district court failed to properly consider the following
mitigating factors in determining his sentence: (1) the two-year period of supervised
release where he didn’t commit any violations, (2) his substance abuse and addiction,
and (3) his confusion about the government’s role in his life. The district court did
not discuss any of these factors at sentencing.

      2
       Beckwith’s Guidelines range was between three and nine months in prison
and not less than five years of supervised release, though optional.
                                         -2-
       “Although the district court is required to consider certain factors set forth in
§ 3553(a) in a supervised-release-revocation sentencing, there is no requirement that
the district court make specific findings relating to each of the factors considered.”
United States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 606 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation and footnote
omitted). Evidence that the district court was aware of the relevant § 3553(a) factors
is sufficient and can be inferred from the record. Id. at 607. “[W]here the district
court heard argument from counsel about specific § 3553(a) factors, we may
presume that the court considered those factors.” United States v. Keating, 579 F.3d
891, 893 (8th Cir. 2009); see, e.g., United States v. Miles, 499 F.3d 906, 909 (8th
Cir. 2007).

       The district court explained the applicable Guidelines range, and that
Beckwith’s supervised release was being revoked because he used a controlled
substance more than three times in the past year. The district court also heard
Beckwith’s counsel talk about Beckwith’s substance abuse, the fact that he hadn’t
violated his supervised release for two years, his difficulty understanding the court’s
authority over him, and more. This is enough to infer that the court considered the
factors.

       The district court also properly considered Beckwith’s history and
characteristics in determining his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court
explained that this was the second time Beckwith appeared before it for a revocation
of his supervised release and that it “believe[d] that [Beckwith] knew that there were
certain conditions and that [Beckwith] consciously decided that [he was] not going
to comply with those conditions.” It imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range
accordingly. See United States v. Moua, 895 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2018) (“The
district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign
some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.”
(citation omitted)).

      We affirm.
                        ______________________________
                                          -3-