Court Opinion

ID: 9388785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:06:27.473589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.573060
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCormick, 2023-Ohio-1303.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                        :
                                                      :
       Appellee                                       :      C.A. No. 29607
                                                      :
 v.                                                   :      Trial Court Case Nos. 2021 CR 03814;
                                                      :      2021 CR 4209
 WHITNEY TAYLOR MCCORMICK                             :
                                                      :      (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
       Appellant                                      :      Court)
                                                      :

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                      Rendered on April 21, 2023

                                                 ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Attorney for Appellee

CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant

                                                .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant          Whitney        Taylor   McCormick   appeals   from   her

convictions following a guilty plea in Montgomery C.P. No. 2021 CR 3814 to one count of

involuntary manslaughter and a guilty plea in Montgomery C.P. No. 2021 CR 4209 to one

count of aggravated trafficking in drugs. On appeal, McCormick challenges the Reagan
                                                                                           -2-

Tokes Law, under which she was sentenced, as being unconstitutional. She further

asserts that the trial court failed to consider the applicable sentencing factors and,

therefore, her sentence is contrary to law. For the following reasons, we affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

         I.   Procedural History and Facts

       {¶ 2} On November 29, 2021, McCormick was indicted by a Montgomery County

grand jury in Case No. 2021 CR 3814 on one count of trafficking in cocaine (less than five

grams), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree; one count of

trafficking in fentanyl-related compound (equal to or exceeding one gram but less than

five grams), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree; one count of

trafficking in drugs (Schedule III, IV, or V), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a felony of

the fifth degree; two counts of corrupting another with drugs (Schedule I or II), in violation

of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), felonies of the second degree; and two counts of involuntary

manslaughter (felony), in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), felonies of the first degree.

       {¶ 3} Due to the fact that McCormick entered guilty pleas, the following

uncontested facts were garnered from the parties’ sentencing memoranda and the

presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The charges in Case No. 2021 CR 3814 were

predicated on events that occurred on April 11, 2021. In the early evening hours of April

11, 2021, Clinton Williams, with whom McCormick had been friends since childhood,

drove to McCormick’s residence in Dayton to purchase cocaine. After purchasing what

he believed to be cocaine from McCormick, he drove home and parked his car in his

driveway. While sitting in his car, Williams consumed some of the drugs he had just
                                                                                         -3-

purchased. Unbeknownst to Williams, McCormick had provided him with fentanyl, not

cocaine.    When Williams’ wife returned home several minutes after Williams, she

discovered him lying in the driveway next to his vehicle suffering from an apparent drug

overdose.

       {¶ 4} Despite the efforts of paramedics and medical intervention at a local hospital,

the doctors were unable to save Williams, who passed away later that evening. Autopsy

and toxicology reports revealed that Williams’ death was the result of consuming a

mixture of fentanyl.

       {¶ 5} After McCormick provided Williams with the fentanyl and he left her home,

she attempted to message Williams when she discovered that she had grabbed the wrong

bag and had given him fentanyl instead of cocaine. However, he did not receive the

messages in time. She also attempted to call Williams’ mother-in-law to contact Williams

as soon as possible without success.

       {¶ 6} Just over four months after Williams’ death, on August 17, 2021, the Dayton

Police Department executed a search warrant on McCormick’s home. Inside the house,

police recovered multiple firearms, a baggie containing a fentanyl mixture, numerous pills

of various Schedule I or II prescription substances, multiple cell phones, a scale with

apparent drug residue, and surveillance cameras. A subsequent search of McCormick’s

cell phones produced numerous messages reflecting McCormick coordinated the sale of

drugs to other individuals during July and August 2021.

       {¶ 7} As a result of the search warrant, McCormick was charged by way of bill of

information in Case No. 2021 CR 4209.           Pursuant to pre-indictment negotiations,
                                                                                           -4-

McCormick was only charged with one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs (Schedule

I or II) (more than bulk but less than five times bulk), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a

felony of the third degree.

         {¶ 8} On August 8, 2022, McCormick entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count

of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a felony of the first degree,

in Case No. 2021 CR 3814 and one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs (Schedule I

or II) (more than bulk but less than five times bulk), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a

felony of the third degree, in Case No. 2021 CR 4209.              Per the negotiated plea

agreement, McCormick agreed to plead guilty to the two charges in exchange for the

State’s agreeing to dismiss the remaining charges in Case No. 2021 CR 3814 and not to

pursue any additional charges arising out of the events related to Case No. 2021 CR

4209. Both of McCormick’s offenses carried a presumption for prison. Thus, the parties

further agreed that although sentencing would be determined by the court, if McCormick

were to receive a prison sentence, then the prison sentences in each case would run

concurrently. After accepting McCormick’s guilty pleas, the trial court ordered a PSI and

scheduled sentencing.

         {¶ 9} On September 7, 2022, the trial court imposed a prison term of 36 months in

Case No. 2021 CR 4209 and an indeterminate sentence of a minimum of 8 years up to a

maximum of 12 years in prison in Case No. 2021 CR 3814 in accordance with the Reagan

Tokes Law. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

         {¶ 10} McCormick timely appealed and raises the following three assignments of

error:
                                                                                             -5-

       I.         THE HEARING PROVISION IN R.C. 2967.271 IS VAGUE AND

                  VIOLATES MCCORMICK’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.

       II.        THE RE[A]GAN TOKES LAW IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

       III.       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED [TO APPLY] THE

                  FACTORS OUTLINED IN R.C. 2929.11 AND R.C. 2929.12 WHEN

                  IT IMPOSED SENTENCE ON MCCORMICK.

            II.   Constitutionality of Reagan Tokes Law

       {¶ 11} In her first assignment of error, McCormick does not allege any error on the

part of the trial court. Instead, she claims that R.C. 2967.271, which is part of the Reagan

Tokes Law, is unconstitutional because it is vague and denies her the right to due

process. The State contends that McCormick failed to raise any constitutional challenge

in the trial court and therefore forfeits all but plain error on appeal. The State further

responds that even if this Court were to consider the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.271,

the statute is constitutional. We agree with the State.

                     a. Plain Error

       {¶ 12} “[T]he question of the constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised

at the first opportunity and, in a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.” State

v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986), citing State v. Woodards, 6

Ohio St.2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966).           The acceptable procedure is to raise any

constitutional challenge to a statute in the trial court, generally by way of a specific motion,

with an opportunity for the State to respond and the trial court to rule on said motion.

State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 63, 512 N.E.2d 585 (1987). “Failure to raise at the trial
                                                                                           -6-

court level the issue of the constitutionality of a statute or its application, which issue is

apparent at the time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue and a deviation from this

state's orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for the first time on appeal.”

Awan at syllabus.

       {¶ 13} McCormick’s involuntary manslaughter offense fell under the Reagan

Tokes Law sentencing guidelines.           However, McCormick never filed a motion

challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law and never mentioned it in her

sentencing memoranda. During the sentencing hearing, McCormick’s defense counsel

stated the following: “I appreciate the Court's -- and by the way, I'm not going to substitute

my [judgment] for the Court's wisdom, but I can tell you in my years of doing this, I have

an issue -- quite a few issues regarding Reagan Tokes and -- which we object to, by

the way, Your Honor, for purpose of the record and the future appellate reasons --

and how everybody deserves a chance.” (Emphasis added.) Sentencing Tr. p. 24. This

vague general objection fell far short of any attempt to argue that a particular section of

McCormick’s sentencing was unconstitutional. Not only did she fail to specifically identify

what about the Reagan Tokes Law was unconstitutional, but she neglected to develop

any argument in support of her contention in a manner that would have permitted either

the trial court or this Court to conduct a meaningful review. McCormick’s failure to raise

a specific objection to the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.271 before the trial court forfeits

any challenge to the constitutionality of the statute on appeal. State v. Moore, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 21613, 2007-Ohio-2721, ¶ 4.

       {¶ 14} Nevertheless, this Court has discretion to review a forfeited constitutional
                                                                                           -7-

challenge to a statute under a plain error analysis. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d

464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16. The burden of demonstrating plain error is

on the appellant. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860,

¶ 22, citing Quarterman at ¶ 16. “In order for plain error to exist, there must be an obvious

defect in the trial proceedings that affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning

that the trial court's error must have affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Petticrew,

2d Dist. Clark No. 2022-CA-29, 2023-Ohio-159, ¶ 18, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio

St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 16. The question, therefore, is “whether,

but for the error, the outcome of the proceedings clearly would have been otherwise.”

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Hornbeck, 155 Ohio App.3d 571, 2003-Ohio-6897, 802 N.E.2d

184, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).

“Notice of plain error ‘is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” State v. Lang,

129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 108, quoting Long at paragraph

three of the syllabus.

       {¶ 15} This Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes

Law on numerous occasions. See e.g., State v. Leamman, 2d Dist. Champaign Nos.

2021-CA-30 and 2021-CA-35, 2022-Ohio-2057, ¶ 11 (finding the Reagan Tokes Law

constitutional and listing additional cases).         We previously rejected a similar

constitutional argument in State v. Compton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28912, 2021-Ohio-

1513. In that case, Compton argued, in addition to other things, that the statute is vague

because it does not provide the structure as to how the hearing should be conducted or
                                                                                          -8-

to what due process rights a defendant is entitled.        In rejecting his argument, we

concluded that “[b]ecause the procedures employed under the Reagan Tokes Law

provide for notice of a hearing at which an offender has an opportunity to be heard, and

because the Reagan Tokes Law does not give the ODRC [Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction] unfettered discretion to decide when an offender must

serve more than the minimum term, we once again hold that the Law does not violate an

offender's right to due process.” Id. at ¶ 18. The Supreme Court of Ohio has yet to rule

on the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, which is currently pending before the

Court. See State v. Simmons, 2021-0532 and State v. Hacker, 2020-1496. The trial

court, as an inferior court, was required to follow the controlling authority of this Court’s

precedent unless the Ohio Supreme Court renders a decision to the contrary. See In re

Schott, 16 Ohio App.2d 72, 75, 241 N.E.2d 773 (1st Dist.1968) (“A decision by the

Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals of a particular county binds the Common Pleas

Court of that county.”). Plain error cannot be found where, even if McCormick had

challenged the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in the trial court, the outcome

would not have been any different. We therefore overrule her first assignment of error.

                 b. McCormick’s Constitutional Challenge

       {¶ 16} Even if we were to consider McCormick’s argument, her argument lacks

merit, because we cannot conclude that R.C. 2967.271 is unconstitutional. McCormick

specifically argues in her first assignment of error that the “vague reference to ‘a hearing’

in R.C. 2967.271 violates McCormick’s right to due process under the U.S. and Ohio

constitutions.” Brief of Appellant p. 7. We have previously rejected arguments alleging
                                                                                         -9-

that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional, and we continue to do so.

                         i. Reagan Tokes Law Overview

       {¶ 17} “Effective March 22, 2019, the Reagan Tokes Law established indefinite-

sentencing provisions for people convicted of non-life-sentence felony offenses of the first

or second degree.” State v. Maddox, 168 Ohio St.3d 292, 2022-Ohio-764, 198 N.E.3d

797, ¶ 4. As a result of the new law, a trial court must impose indefinite prison terms for

the qualifying offenses consisting of a minimum term selected by the sentencing judge

from a range of terms set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A) and a maximum term calculated using

formulas set forth in R.C. 2929.144.

       {¶ 18} When a defendant is sentenced to a non-life felony indefinite prison term in

accordance with Reagan Tokes Law, “there shall be a presumption that the person shall

be released from service of the sentence on the expiration of the offender's minimum

prison term or on the offender's presumptive earned early release date, whichever is

earlier.” R.C. 2967.271(B). Although there is a presumption that a defendant will be

released on the expiration of their minimum prison term, the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) may rebut that presumption “if it determines, after

a hearing, that among other things, the prisoner has violated prison rules or the law

(thereby demonstrating that the prisoner has not been rehabilitated and poses a threat to

society), the prisoner has been placed in restrictive housing in the past year, or is

classified as a security level of three or above.” State v. Glaze, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

29431, 2022-Ohio-4549, ¶ 8, citing R.C. 2967.271(C).

       {¶ 19} If the ODRC rebuts the presumption for release, the ODRC may “maintain
                                                                                        -10-

the offender’s incarceration” for an additional “reasonable period” of incarceration, which

“shall not exceed the offender's maximum prison term.” R.C. 2967.271(D)(1). After the

additional period of incarceration, an offender is again presumed to be released unless

the department rebuts that presumption in a hearing as specified in R.C. 2967.271(C).

R.C. 2967.271(D)(2). The ODRC shall provide notices of hearings “in the same manner,

and to the same persons” as it provides “with respect to hearings to be conducted

regarding the possible release on parole of an inmate.” R.C. 2967.271(E). Finally, R.C.

2967.271(F) permits the director of the ODRC to recommend a reduction in the offender's

minimum prison term (except for sexually oriented offense convictions) “due to the

offender’s exceptional conduct while incarcerated.” A trial court is required to notify a

defendant at the time of sentencing of the rebuttable presumption of release as set forth

in R.C. 2967.271. State v. Massie, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-50, 2021-Ohio-3376,

¶ 22-23, citing R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

                          ii. Constitutional Analysis

       {¶ 20} “The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we consider de

novo.” State v. Weber, 163 Ohio St.3d 125, 2020-Ohio-6832, 168 N.E.3d 468, ¶ 7, citing

Cleveland v. State, 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 15.

Generally, de novo review allows an appellate court to independently review a trial court’s

decision without any deference to the trial court's determination. State v. Clay, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5.            However, because McCormick

never raised the constitutionality of the statute in the trial court, we consider the

constitutionality of the statute in the first instance.
                                                                                        -11-

      {¶ 21} “As a threshold matter, we are to presume that the state statute is

constitutional, and the burden is on the person challenging the statute to prove otherwise

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861

N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17, citing Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d

633, ¶ 4. “Thus, when evaluating constitutional claims, we must make every reasonable

presumption and resolve any doubt as to the statute's constitutionality in favor of the

validity of the statute.” (Emphasis sic.) Brandt v. Pompa, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-

Ohio-4525, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 90, citing State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St.

142, 149, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955).

      {¶ 22} “A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional on its face or as applied

to a particular set of facts.” Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836

N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37, citing Belden v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d

629 (1944), paragraph four of the syllabus. A facial challenge requires the challenger to

prove the constitutional defect beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas an as-applied

challenge requires only clear and convincing evidence of the statute’s constitutional

defect. State ex rel. Ohio Conglomeration of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Edn.,

111 Ohio St.3d 568, 2006-Ohio-5512, 857 N.E.2d 1148, ¶ 21. “Facial challenges to the

constitutionality of a statute are the most difficult to mount successfully, since the

challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would

be valid.” Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 132 Ohio St.3d 167, 2012-Ohio-2187, 970 N.E.2d

898, ¶ 21, citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d

697 (1987).    “The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some
                                                                                          -12-

plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” Harrold at ¶ 37,

citing Salerno at 745. Furthermore, “it is not enough to show that one plausible reading

requires the statute to be stricken as unconstitutional, when another plausible reading

permits it to survive.” Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio St.3d 303, 2009-Ohio-4872,

916 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 24.

       {¶ 23} In this case, McCormick raises a facial challenge to R.C. 2967.271, claiming

that the law is void for vagueness because the statute fails to delineate the due process

protections to which a defendant is entitled during the hearing permitted pursuant to R.C.

2967.271(C). McCormick argues that because the statute does not define the term

“hearing,” it is unclear what due process rights she will be entitled if, and when, she

receives a R.C. 2967.271 hearing.       Having made a facial challenge to the statute,

McCormick must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that there exists no set of

circumstances under which the statute would be valid.

       {¶ 24} In considering a void-for-vagueness challenge, “the statute at issue must

be written so that a person of common intelligence is able to determine what conduct is

prohibited, and the statute must provide sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement.” State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 532, 728 N.E.2d 342

(2000), citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67

(1999). “The void-for-vagueness doctrine does not require statutes to be drafted with

scientific precision. * * * Nor does the doctrine require that every detail regarding the

procedural enforcement of a statute be contained therein. Instead, it permits a statute's

certainty to be ascertained by application of commonly accepted tools of judicial
                                                                                            -13-

construction, with courts indulging every reasonable interpretation in favor of finding the

statute constitutional.” (Citations omitted.) Perez v. Cleveland, 78 Ohio St.3d 376, 378-

79, 678 N.E.2d 537 (1997).

       {¶ 25} R.C. 2967.271(C) does not prohibit any conduct. Rather, it provides an

administrative procedure for the ODRC to apply to determine whether an inmate should

continue to be held past the expiration of their minimum sentence, but not beyond their

maximum sentence.        Because these administrative proceedings are not a criminal

statute prohibiting certain conduct, the needed specificity required to uphold the

constitutionality of the statute is not as stringent. Salem v. Liquor Control Comm., 34

Ohio St.2d 244, 246, 298 N.E.2d 138 (1973).

       {¶ 26} It is true that the Reagan Tokes Law provides no details concerning the due

process procedures to be employed for the hearing. However, as other Ohio appellate

courts have held, “the Reagan Tokes Law may not be found to be unconstitutional, on its

face, as violating due process merely because the specific procedures for invoking an

additional period of incarceration are not set forth in the Law itself.” State v. Williams,

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1152, 2022-Ohio-2812, ¶ 22. See also State v. Guyton, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-190657, 2022-Ohio-2962, ¶ 43, appeal allowed 168 Ohio St.3d

1418, 2022-Ohio-3752, 196 N.E.3d 850 (the specific procedural requirements need not

be set forth in the language of the statute itself in order to withstand a facial constitutional

challenge).   This is because “the legislature is not required to codify all rules and

procedures under the statutory provision but instead can defer to the executive agency's

establishment of its own rules or procedures to safeguard constitutional concerns, which
                                                                                      -14-

must be challenged through the appropriate mechanisms.” State v. Delvallie, 2022-

Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.) (en banc), appeal allowed 166 Ohio St.3d

1496, 2022-Ohio-1485, 186 N.E.3d 830.

      {¶ 27} Although this Court has previously likened the presumptive minimum term

hearing as being “akin to the decision to grant or deny parole,” under a facial challenge

to the statute, we need not consider what level of due process the hearing requires or

compare the presumptive minimum term hearing to any other type of hearing, as

McCormick suggests. State v. Leet, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-Ohio-4592,

¶ 17. So long as the hearing can be said to satisfy due process under one plausible

reading, the statute may not be stricken as unconstitutional.

      {¶ 28} Notably, in State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-

4153, we commented that:

      “[T]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard

      in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Woods [v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d

      504, 513, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000)], citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90

      S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).       The Reagan Tokes Law satisfies these

      requirements.    The Law states that, in order to rebut the presumption of the

      minimum term, the [ODRC] must make a particular statutory determination “at a

      hearing.”   R.C. 2967.271(C) and (D).       The Law does not give the [ODRC]

      unfettered discretion to require an offender to serve more than the minimum term.

      And it affords an offender notice and an opportunity to be heard before more than

      the minimum may be required.
                                                                                          -15-

Id. at ¶ 25.

       {¶ 29} Having previously recognized that the Reagan Tokes Law provides at least

the minimum level of due process required, we necessarily conclude that the law is

capable of being enforced in a manner that would not violate an offender's right to due

process. Moreover, given that this is a facial challenge to the statute, it cannot be said

at this juncture that the statute cannot be applied constitutionally under any

circumstances. Because McCormick has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional, her first assignment of error is overruled.

        III.   App.R. 12(A)(2)

       {¶ 30} McCormick’s second assignment of error states the following in its entirety:

       The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. See e.g.[,] Andreyko

       [v. Cincinnati, 153 Ohio App.3d 108, 112, 2003-Ohio-2759, 791 N.E.2d

       1025 (1st Dist.)] McCormick asserts that every aspect of Re[a]gan Tokes

       law is unconstitutional in that it deprives her of her rights under the U.S. and

       Ohio constitutions.

Brief of Appellant at p. 7.

       {¶ 31} McCormick fails to make any argument or point to any particular

constitutional violation. She also does not cite supporting authority, statutes, or parts of

the record upon which she relies. App.R. 16(A)(7) provides that an assignment of error

must contain “the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities,

statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” App.R. 12(A)(2) provides

that “[t]he court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party
                                                                                           -16-

raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based

or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under App. R. 16(A).”

“This court is not obligated to formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties, because

acting as an appellate court, we preside as arbiters of the legal questions presented and

argued by the parties.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Brunson, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-

Ohio-4299, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 24, citing Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034,

19 N.E.3d 900, at ¶ 19. Because we decline to create any arguments on McCormick’s

behalf, we will disregard this assignment of error. Consequently, her second assignment

of error is overruled.

        IV.   Sentence is Not Contrary to Law

       {¶ 32} In her final assignment of error, McCormick challenges the imposition of her

indeterminate sentence of a minimum of 8 years in prison to a maximum of 12 years in

prison. While acknowledging that the trial court mentioned the purposes and principles

of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors at the sentencing hearing,

McCormick contends that the trial court failed to properly weigh the factors such that her

sentence should be reversed. Her argument lacks merit.

       {¶ 33} “When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Small, 2d Dist. Clark No.

2021-CA-30, 2022-Ohio-636, ¶ 7, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-

1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 7. “Under that statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce,

or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if

it clearly and convincingly finds either: (1) the record does not support the sentencing
                                                                                            -17-

court's findings under certain enumerated statutes, or (2) the sentence is otherwise

contrary to law.” Id., citing Marcum at ¶ 9. “Clear and convincing evidence is that

measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’

but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in

criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,

120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶ 34} McCormick did not challenge any specified findings enumerated under R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(a). Rather, she challenges that her sentence “is otherwise contrary to

law,” under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). “A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall

within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.12.”     (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99

N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.). Although a court imposing a felony sentence must consider

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, neither statute “requires a trial court to make any specific

factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729,

169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951

N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).

Moreover, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide a basis for an appellate court to

modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the

record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 39. Therefore, when reviewing

felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11
                                                                                         -18-

and 2929.12, we do not analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the record

but only whether those sentences are contrary to law.           State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18.

       {¶ 35} Under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), the sentence for McCormick’s first-degree felony

conviction was to be “an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum term selected by

the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum

term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code[.]” R.C.

2929.144(B)(1) instructs the trial court to calculate the maximum term of imprisonment

for the first-degree felony as being equal to the minimum term imposed plus fifty percent

of that term. Consistent with these statutes, the trial court imposed a stated minimum

term of 8 years and a maximum of 12 years (8 years plus 50 percent of 8 years).

McCormick was also advised of the rebuttable presumption that she would be released

at the expiration of her minimum prison sentence.

       {¶ 36} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), the sentence for McCormick’s third-

degree felony conviction was to be “a definite term of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four,

thirty, or thirty-six months.” Consistent with this subsection, the trial court imposed a 36-

month sentence.       Consequently, each of McCormick’s sentences fell within the

applicable sentencing guidelines and was not contrary to law on that basis.

       {¶ 37} Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court stated on the record that it had

considered the PSI, both the State’s and McCormick’s sentencing memoranda, the victim

impact statements, and the oral statements of McCormick and her counsel during

allocution.   The trial court explicitly stated that it had considered “the purposes and
                                                                                      -19-

principles of sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors” prior to imposing

sentence. Sentencing Tr. at p. 27. Furthermore, the record reflects that the trial court

did consider the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and weigh

the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12.       The trial court noted that

McCormick’s actions resulted in the untimely death of Williams and that she took

advantage of her “customers,” who were people suffering from addiction. Significantly,

the trial court noted that “one of the most influential factors” in imposing sentence was

that McCormick continued trafficking drugs even after her friend died from consuming

drugs McCormick had sold to him.

      {¶ 38} We note that both offenses carried a presumption for prison.         It was

discussed at the time of sentencing that McCormick had prior misdemeanor criminal

convictions, including menacing and possession of controlled substances according to

the PSI. Furthermore, McCormick acknowledged at sentencing that she had pending

drug-related cases in South Carolina. The PSI reflected that the pending felony cases

included trafficking in methamphetamine or cocaine base (10 grams or more but less than

28 grams); manufacture/possess other substance in Schedule I, II, or III or flunitrazepam

or analog; and trafficking in cocaine (10 grams or more but less than 28 grams). The

PSI further revealed that McCormick had been released on her own recognizance before

trial in the Dayton Municipal Court and was under felony indictment in South Carolina at

the time of her August 17, 2021 drug trafficking offense.

      {¶ 39} To the extent McCormick asks this Court to re-weigh the sentencing factors

to determine whether her sentence was “strikingly inconsistent” with the applicable
                                                                                          -20-

sentencing factors, we decline to do so.         As Jones explained, “[n]othing in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the

record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that

best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242,

2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 42. In other words, R.C. 2953.08 “precludes

second-guessing a sentence imposed by a trial court based on its weighing of the

considerations in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Toles, 166 Ohio St.3d 397, 2021-

Ohio-3531, 186 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 10 (Brunner, J., concurring), citing Jones at ¶ 39.

       {¶ 40} McCormick’s reliance on State v. Moore, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2022-

CA-3, 2022-Ohio-3460, is misplaced. In Moore, the trial court explicitly stated it had

considered R.C. 2929.11 but failed to specifically address the sentencing factors in R.C.

2929.12.   Id. at ¶ 11-12.    We explained that where a trial court fails to specifically

address the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12, “an appellate court will generally

presume that the trial court did consider the statutory factors. * * * This presumption may

be rebutted by an affirmative showing that the trial court failed to consider the factors, or

by demonstrating the chosen sentence is ‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the applicable

factors.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Money, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-

CA-119, 2010-Ohio-6225, ¶ 10. But we need not make any presumptions here. Unlike

Moore, this is not the case where the record is silent as to whether the trial court

considered either R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12. We can discern from the record that the trial

court engaged in a weighing of the factors. Significantly, a trial court need not identify

each factor individually and conduct the analysis on the record. This is because “[a] trial
                                                                                         -21-

court has full discretion to levy any sentence within the authorized statutory range, and it

is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing a maximum or more

than minimum sentence.” State v. Searls, 2022-Ohio-858, 186 N.E.3d 328, ¶ 38 (2d

Dist.), citing State v. Kelly, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-8, 2021-Ohio-325, ¶ 85. Because

the record demonstrates that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and

the sentence fell within the applicable sentencing ranges, McCormick cannot demonstrate

that her sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law.               We overrule

McCormick’s second assignment of error.

         V.    Conclusion

       {¶ 41} Having overruled all the assignments of error, we affirm the judgments of

the trial court.

                                     .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.