Court Opinion

ID: 9640706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:13:05.051749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.399401
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
dissenting.
Prior to 1988, Rule 74.05 provided:
If a defendant shall fail to file his answer or other pleading within the time prescribed by law or the rules of practice of the court, and serve a copy thereof upon the adverse party, or his attorney, when the same is required, an interlocutory judgment shall be given against him in default.
Judicial application of the prior rule uniformly held that where a defendant filed an answer, a trial court’s judgment rested on the merits and was hot a default judgment even where the defendant failed to appear for trial. See Ward v. Davis, 701 S.W.2d 192 (Mo.App.1985) (judgment entered in action on promissory note where maker failed to appear for trial was not a default where an answer had been filed); Ozark Mountain Timber Products, Inc. v. Redus, 725 S.W.2d 640 (Mo.App.1987) (where pleadings are filed, issues are framed, cause comes for trial, and defendant fails to appear, judgment entered by the court is on the merits); and Meyerhardt v. Fredman, 131 S.W.2d 916 (Mo.App.1939) (judgment for plaintiff was not a default where entered after defendant filed an answer).
In 1988, this Court adopted a new Rule 74.05(a).
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these Rules, an interlocutory order of default may be entered against that party.
[Emphasis added.] The majority holds that the language “or otherwise defend” does not change the prior rule and that Rule 74.05 does not apply in this case. I disagree. In my view, the new language of Rule 74.05(a) changed the rule to include a wide range of failures on the part of counsel and parties as bases for default judgments.
As the majority notes, the districts of the court of appeals have reached contrary interpretations of the new rule. In Herrin v. Straus, 810 S.W.2d 593 (Mo.App.1991), the southern district decided that the “otherwise defend” did not alter the meaning of Rule 74.05(a). Once a party files a responsive pleading, the southern district held that there can be no default judgment. The western district agreed in the case sub judice.
The eastern district reached a contrary result in Schulte v. Venture Stores, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo.App.1992). There, the court stated that “[d]efendant’s attorney failed to ‘otherwise defend’ when he failed to appear for trial” even though defendant filed an answer. See also Hoskin v. Younger Cemetery Corp., Inc., 838 S.W.2d 476 (Mo.App.1992) (failure to respond to discovery or appear at the default hearing was a failure to “otherwise defend” within the meaning of Rule 74.05(a)).
In Sprung v. Newger Materials, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Mo. banc 1987), this *240Court noted the inherent tension that exists in rules governing default judgments.
Default judgments have been particularly troubling to our appellate courts over the years. Fundamental and competing interests are at stake. One commentator observes that
[i]f the courts are too lenient with the party in default, the rules of procedure will not be complied with and litigation will become increasingly inefficient. Furthermore, a primary goal of the judicial system is finality.... On the other hand, a primary goal of the judicial system is to seek the truth and to do justice between the parties. To promote this goal a ease must be decided on the merits; procedural “niceties” should not pose insurmountable barriers.
Laughrey, Default Judgments in Missouri, 50 Mo.L.Rev. 841, 843-44 (1985). [Citations omitted.]
In my opinion, the new Rule 74.05 attempts to accommodate this tension in two ways. First, I do not believe the addition of the phrase “otherwise defend” to Rule 74.-05(a) and the deletion of the phrase “or other pleading” were acts of such narrow meaning as the majority does. I believe these changes signaled a broadening of this Court’s understanding of the phrase “default judgment” and a deliberate policy choice by this Court to lower procedural barriers — on proper, timely motion — to a judicial inquiry into the causes and validity of a judgment entered where a defendant does not plead, or does not appear for trial or otherwise defend. Thus, I had hoped that Rule 74.05(a) now accommodated appropriate judicial concerns that judgments be on the merits whenever possible. To that end, I read Rule 74.05 to include within the meaning of the phrase “default judgments” circumstances in which a party files an answer or other responsive pleading but fails to appear and defend at trial.
Second, I believe Rule 74.05(e) adequately considers the finality concerns that the majority finds so compelling that it refuses Ms. Cotleur the opportunity for a hearing. I believe Rule 74.05(c) erects a high barrier to a trial court setting aside a default judgment and permits the trial court to set aside a default judgment only
[u]pon motion stating facts constituting a meritorious defense and for good cause shown, an interlocutory order of default or a default judgment may be set aside.... Good cause includes a mistake or conduct that is not intentionally or recklessly designed to impede the judicial process.
Rule 74.05(c). Such a reading of the rule permits the judicial system to correct an erroneous decision with relative ease; the majority places the burden of error on the litigant whose counsel fails to appear for trial.
The majority admits that “interpretation of the rule calls simply for a policy decision.” (Maj. op. at 237.) Such an admission concedes that the language of Rule 74.05(a) is susceptible to an interpretation that permits Ms. Cotleur a judicial determination of the merits of her claim that the judgment entered against her should be set aside on the motion she filed.
I believe that the rules of this Court are designed to foster, not hinder, the search for justice and that that concern is paramount to “interests affecting the orderly conduct of judicial process and the stability of judgments.” (Maj. op. at 237). Indeed, I find it difficult to believe that interpreting Rule 74.05 as I propose — allowing a judicial inquiry into reasons behind a litigant suffering a judgment when her counsel fails to appear— detracts from the orderly conduct of the judicial process and the stability of judgments. Moreover, the interpretation I propose fosters judicial economy and the prompt resolution of claims. I do not believe the majority’s rule aids either.
In my view this Court should hold that the trial court entered a default judgment against Cotleur and that Rule 74.05 applies in this case. Because the record does not reveal the trial court’s reasons for overruling Cotleur’s motion to set aside the default judgment, I would remand to the trial court for the required Rule 74.05(c) hearing to determine whether Cotleur both had good *241cause for her failure to appear and a meritorious defense.
I respectfully dissent.