Court Opinion

ID: 9402444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 19:00:51.744903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:59.769997
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0125p.06

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                                 ┐
PATTI JO CAHOO, KRISTIN MENDYK, and KHADIJA COLE,
                                                                 │
individuals and on behalf of others similarly situated;
                                                                 │
HYON PAK; MICHELLE DAVISON,
                                                                 │
                         Plaintiffs-Appellees (21-1407),         │
                                                                  > Nos. 21-1407/2672
                                                                 │
       v.                                                        │
                                                                 │
SAS INSTITUTE, INC. fka SAS Analytics Inc.,                      │
                                                 Defendant,      │
                                                                 │
                                                                 │
FAST ENTERPRISES, LLC; CSG GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS,                 │
                       Defendants-Appellees (21-2672),           │
                                                                 │
                                                                 │
                                                                 │
STEVEN GESKEY; SHARON MOFFETT-MASSEY,                            │
                    Defendants-Appellants (21-1407),             │
                     Defendants-Appellees (21-2672),             │
                                                                 │
                                                                 │
SUZETTE MARIE HEATHCOTE,
                                                                 │
              Proposed Intervenor-Appellant (21-2672).           │
                                                                 ┘

 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
                  No. 2:17-cv-10657—David M. Lawson, District Judge.

                            Case 21-1407 Argued: April 26, 2023

                              Decided and Filed: June 15, 2023

      Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
 Nos. 21-1407/2672              Cahoo, et al. v. SAS Inst., Inc., et al.                     Page 2

                                       _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jason Hawkins, Debbie K. Taylor, Kimberly K. Pendrick, OFFICE OF THE
MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Steven Geskey and Sharon
Moffett-Massey. Kevin S. Ernst, ERNST CHARAR & LOVELL, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for
Patti Jo Cahoo, Kristin Mendyk, Khadija Cole, Hyon Pak, and Michelle Davison. ON BRIEF:
Jason Hawkins, Debbie K. Taylor, Kimberly K. Pendrick, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Steven Geskey and Sharon Moffett-Massey.
Kevin S. Ernst, Hannah R. Fielstra, ERNST CHARAR & LOVELL, PLC, Detroit, Michigan, for
Patti Jo Cahoo, Kristin Mendyk, Khadija Cole, Hyon Pak, and Michelle Davison. David M.
Blanchard, BLANCHARD & WALKER PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Suzette Marie
Heathcote. Stephen J. Rosenfeld, MCDONALD HOPKINS LLC, Chicago, Illinois, for CSG
Government Solutions. Erik F. Stidham, HOLLAND & HART LLP, Boise, Idaho, Walter J.
Piszczatowski, HERTZ SCHRAM PC, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for Fast Enterprises, LLC.

      SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MURPHY, J., joined in full.
BATCHELDER, J. (pp. 19–38), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
                                       _________________

                                             OPINION
                                       _________________

       SUTTON, Chief Judge. The modernization of Michigan’s process for identifying fraud
in unemployment benefits, according to four residents of the State, came with a cost:               It
undermined their due process rights. The four residents all obtained unemployment benefits, and
the State’s new software for identifying unemployment fraud targeted them but did not
immediately deprive them of any benefits. They sued two Unemployment Insurance Agency
supervisors, among many others. In the first stage of this case, the complaint and proffered class
action covered claims in which the State terminated welfare payments without adequate notice
and a hearing. But at this stage in the case, after the denial of a motion to certify a class and with
just four plaintiffs remaining, the lawsuit covers only claims in which the State offers several
procedural protections before any elimination of benefits. Because the remaining plaintiffs have
failed to show that these procedures violate any clearly established law, the supervisors are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Suzette Heathcote separately appeals the denial of her
 Nos. 21-1407/2672               Cahoo, et al. v. SAS Inst., Inc., et al.                    Page 3

motion to intervene in the case. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
her motion untimely, we affirm that order.

                                                   I.

         According to the district court and the relevant statute, this is what happened. Cahoo v.
Fast Enters. LLC, 528 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (incorporating by reference
Cahoo v. Fast Enters. LLC, 508 F. Supp. 3d 162 (E.D. Mich. 2020)). Out-of-work residents of
Michigan may claim unemployment benefits if they meet certain eligibility criteria. Mich.
Comp. Laws § 421.28. The State’s Unemployment Insurance Agency oversees the benefits
system. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 726–27; Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 166.

         In 2011, with the help of private contractors, the Agency began to develop software to
administer the unemployment system. Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 168. The Agency sought to
equip the software to auto-adjudicate as many parts of the claims process as possible. See id. at
167. Clayton Tierney, the director of the office of technology and modernization, “spearheaded”
the project. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 728. Agency staff broke into teams, many of which fell
under Tierney’s oversight, to tackle different parts of the modernization effort. Id.; cf. id. at 749.
The non-monetary team was particularly prolific. See id. at 728–30. Headed by Susan Easton, it
drafted many of the forms that the software would automatically send to claimants over the life
cycle of a claim. Id. These included a fact-finding questionnaire to send to claimants after the
software flagged their claims for fraud, id. at 729; Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 167, and notices of
determination alerting claimants to fraud findings and outlining their right to appeal those
findings, Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 729; Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 167–68.

         The Agency programmed software that used logic trees to help process cases and identify
fraud.    Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 167.          A claimant’s failure to return the fact-finding
questionnaire, for example, led to a fraud finding, as did the claimant’s selection of certain
multiple-choice responses. Id.

         With these and other developments in place, the Michigan Integrated Data Automated
System—MiDAS for short—opened for claimants in October 2013. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at
729. Sometime around MiDAS’s launch, Stephen Geskey took over as director of the policies
 Nos. 21-1407/2672              Cahoo, et al. v. SAS Inst., Inc., et al.                    Page 4

and procedures group. Id. Sharon Moffett-Massey assumed the Agency director role in April
2014. Id. at 728.

       In August 2015, problems arose with some features of the system, prompting the Agency
to turn off the auto-adjudication feature for fraud claims. Id. at 729. Later, the U.S. Department
of Labor and Michigan Auditor General identified issues with MiDAS, ranging from the
questionable legality of auto-adjudication as a way to identify fraud to the merits of the logic-tree
fraud recommendations to the vagueness of the fraud notices. Id. at 728–29.

       All of this led to today’s case—or at least to today’s chapter of the case. Patti Cahoo,
Kristin Mendyk, Khadija Cole, and Michelle Davison (Cahoo for all) live in Michigan, they
obtained unemployment benefits, and sometime after they stopped receiving those benefits, the
Agency flagged their claims for fraud. Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 170–73.

       True to form, the Agency sent each plaintiff a fact-finding questionnaire with a multiple-
choice question and an opportunity to provide additional information. Id. at 169–73. Then the
Agency sent each plaintiff notices of determination. Id. at 170–73. These notices outlined the
fraud finding, the reason why the plaintiff lacked eligibility during the benefits period, the
relevant benefits period and employer, and a 30-day window to appeal the fraud finding. Cahoo,
528 F. Supp. 3d at 758–59.

       Under state law, each claimant had the right to a multi-level appeal process with respect
to this fraud finding. She could request a redetermination from the Agency. Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 421.32a (2011). Then she could appeal that redetermination to an administrative law judge.
Id. § 421.33(1). Then she could request a rehearing from that administrative law judge. Id.
Then she could file an appeal in the Michigan compensation appellate commission.                  Id.
§§ 421.33(2), 421.34. And then she could seek judicial review of the commission’s decision in
state court. Id. § 421.38.

       If the Agency did not receive a request for redetermination within 30 days, the fraud
finding became final, ending eligibility for benefits and imposing restitution and penalties.
Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 730; e.g., R.423-16 at 29 (“If a protest is not received within 30 days,
a decision will become final and restitution may be due and owing.”). But none of the plaintiffs
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suffered any immediate monetary consequences. See Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 170–73. The
deprivation occurred months or years later through collection efforts when the State denied the
plaintiffs new benefits, intercepted their tax refunds, or garnished their wages. See id.

       The plaintiffs filed a putative class action against three government contractors and
nineteen Agency staffers, raising claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
26 U.S.C. § 6402(f), and Michigan tort law. Extensive motions practice “whittled down” the
plaintiffs, defendants, and claims. Id. at 166. Any retelling of that story in full would require
many pages and the incorporation of many prior opinions. E.g., Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 728
(incorporating its prior opinion by reference). The key points for present purposes are these.
The Agency defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Cahoo v. SAS
Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2018). We affirmed in part and reversed in part,
leaving one procedural due process claim standing. Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887,
907 (6th Cir. 2019). At that stage, we determined that the plaintiffs’ due process rights clearly
existed because they had alleged a deprivation of their property interests without adequate notice
and without an opportunity for a pre-deprivation hearing. Id. at 903–05.

       After considerable discovery, the Agency defendants moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 727. The court granted the Agency
defendants’ motion in part, dismissing several of them. Id. at 763. But it declined to grant
qualified immunity to Agency supervisors Sharon Moffett-Massey and Stephen Geskey for their
involvement with MiDAS’s questionnaires and notice forms. Id. at 749–52, 754–60. The
district court reasoned that the questionnaires were constitutionally deficient because they did not
set forth the alleged wrongdoing with specificity. Id. at 757. As for the notices of determination,
the district court found that those did provide “an adequate description for why the [Agency]
believed it overpaid claimants.” Id. at 758. But “that communication came too late” because the
Agency “had already” deprived the plaintiffs of their property rights by terminating the right to
benefits, demanding restitution, and applying penalties. Id. at 759. That left genuine issues of
material fact, the court concluded, as to Moffett-Massey’s and Geskey’s role in developing these
documents that precluded granting summary judgment on supervisory liability. Id. at 749–52.
The two supervisors appealed.
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       Meanwhile, another would-be plaintiff tried to join the lawsuit. Cahoo v. Fast Enters.
LLC, 536 F. Supp. 3d 146, 150 (E.D. Mich. 2021). Like Cahoo, Suzette Heathcote applied for
and received unemployment benefits, then later received a fraud finding. Id. at 153. Nearly four
years after this lawsuit began—and one month after the district court denied class certification—
Heathcote moved to intervene, seeking to raise individual claims and to bring a renewed class
certification motion as class representative. See id. The district court denied that motion along
with Heathcote’s motion to reconsider. Id. at 161. Heathcote appealed.

                                               II.

                                               A.

       Moffett-Massey and Geskey seek qualified immunity from the claimants’ due process
claims. Two questions shape the appeal. Did Moffett-Massey and Geskey violate the claimants’
constitutional rights? If so, did they trespass on clearly established law? See Dist. of Columbia
v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). We “review de novo” each “legal question.” Jarvela v.
Washtenaw County, 40 F.4th 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2022). And we may review these questions in
any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

       This appeal comes to us at the summary judgment stage after considerable discovery.
With the benefit of discovery comes a burden. The plaintiffs now must identify evidence in the
record to substantiate each claim in their complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 256 (1986). In a qualified immunity case like this one, that means the plaintiffs bear the
burden of identifying record evidence showing a violation of their clearly established rights.
DiLuzio v. Vill. of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2015). The plaintiffs, in other
words, must substantiate their theories on both qualified immunity prongs with record support.
Instead of merely showing that each claim alleged in the complaint satisfies these two prongs, as
we decided the last time we looked at the case, they must point to record-based evidence backing
each theory.

       We need not decide today whether the questionnaires and notices violated the Due
Process Clause or whether a reasonable jury could find that Moffett-Massey and Geskey directed
the development of them. Either way, the plaintiffs’ due process claims do not clear step two of
 Nos. 21-1407/2672             Cahoo, et al. v. SAS Inst., Inc., et al.                  Page 7

the qualified-immunity test. Consider several key developments since our prior opinion. At the
motion to dismiss stage, we assessed a broadly framed, putative class action complaint. Cahoo,
912 F.3d at 892 n.1. Focusing on the complaint’s allegation that MiDAS failed to provide
claimants with pre-deprivation notice or process before automatically shutting off unemployment
benefits, garnishing wages, and seizing tax refunds, we held that the claimants had alleged a
clearly established right to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing. Id. at 903–04.

       That conclusion stemmed from several Supreme Court cases about the midstream
termination of welfare benefit payments and the like. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970) (requiring a hearing before terminating welfare payments); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1985) (requiring a hearing before firing a public employee
for cause); cf. Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (requiring
notice and a hearing before garnishing wages). In the face of these precedents, we ruled that the
novel characteristics of MiDAS—a computer prompted, as opposed to individual prompted,
sudden termination of benefits—did not alter the inquiry. Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904.

       Our holding also hinged on the case’s procedural posture. Courts, we pointed out,
sometimes benefit from waiting to resolve qualified immunity until summary judgment—with
the benefit of discovery—rather than settling the issue immediately through a motion to dismiss.
Id. at 899, 907. Patience can be especially prudent in the due process context, where courts
employ a three-part, broadly framed balancing test. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976). Discovery sometimes yields new insights about the public and private interests at stake,
impacting the qualified immunity inquiry.

       All things considered, we concluded in the first appeal that “any reasonable official
would have known that depriving Plaintiffs of their protected property interests in the manner
alleged violated their due process rights.” Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904. At the same time, we warned
Cahoo that she would “need to substantiate [her] allegations to survive a motion for summary
judgment.” Id. at 901. We have no second thoughts about these conclusions.

       But several features of the case have evolved over the intervening years and a “generous
discovery period.” Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 749. The district court denied class certification,
 Nos. 21-1407/2672             Cahoo, et al. v. SAS Inst., Inc., et al.                   Page 8

stripping claimants of their broad class claims and leaving four fact-specific individual claims.
Id. at 763. The district court then dismissed all of the Agency defendants save two: Moffett-
Massey and Geskey. Id. (The claims against two of the private defendants remain pending.)
The district court then confined the challenged features of MiDAS to these two Agency
defendants to just two—the fraud questionnaires and notices—and took the auto-adjudication
and delivery-of-notice claims off the table for purposes of this appeal. Id. at 757–60.

       Discovery also has changed the nature of the due process claim as to the remaining four
plaintiffs. What was once a termination-of-benefits case has evolved into what is a collection-of-
paid-benefits case. As to the remaining four plaintiffs, discovery has clarified that these forms
and appeal rights implicate pre-deprivation protections, not post-deprivation protections. We
now know that MiDAS did not immediately deprive these plaintiffs of their property rights. No
plaintiff lost ongoing benefit payments due to MiDAS. See Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 170–73.
Each of them instead received a fraud finding for a benefits period that had already ended, and
the attendant property deprivation—the denial of new benefits, the garnishment of wages, or the
confiscation of tax refunds—occurred months or years down the line, all implicating other
procedural protections in place under Michigan law. See id.; Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 421.32a
(2011), 421.33, 421.34, 421.38 (setting out a multi-stage appeal process).

       We now know that MiDAS provided the four specific plaintiffs with some notice and an
opportunity for a hearing before any of those later property deprivations occurred. It sent fact-
finding questionnaires and two notices of determination to each plaintiff. See Cahoo, 508 F.
Supp. 3d at 170–73. The questionnaires stated that claimants could submit information on top of
answering the multiple-choice question. See R.423-16 at 27 (“You may provide a statement and
evidence . . . .”). The two notices detailed the challenged benefits period, relevant employer,
fraud finding, and applicable statute. As the district court put it, these notices “provided an
adequate description” of the alleged wrongdoing. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 758. The notices
also specified the process for protesting the determination, which included seeking a
redetermination and a 30-day period before the finding became final. And if the Agency issued a
redetermination, the accompanying notice of redetermination instructed claimants that they could
seek a hearing before an administrative law judge, from which they had a right to appeal to the
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compensation appellate commission, Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.33(2), and then to a state court of
general jurisdiction, id. § 421.38.

       Now that we know MiDAS did not immediately terminate these plaintiffs’ ongoing
benefit payments without pre-deprivation process, cases like Goldberg and our prior opinion do
not tell us what to do with the remaining claims in the case. What was once relatively easy to
answer no longer is. In today’s distinct setting, we must keep in mind that due process’s
“flexible and fact intensive” nature makes it “less likely it will be clearly violated in a case
without similar facts.” Cunningham v. Blackwell, 41 F.4th 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2022). That is the
case here. The content of the two notices, the opportunity for a hearing, and the months- or
years-long delay before these plaintiffs faced a deprivation distinguish this case from existing
due process precedent. No case put Moffett-Massey and Geskey on notice that these pre-
deprivation forms and appeal procedures for these plaintiffs in this context did not stack up.
Quite a few cases suggested the contrary. See Rosen v. Goetz, 410 F.3d 919, 931 (6th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (finding notice sufficient even though information came in two separate letters);
Shoemaker v. City of Howell, 795 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding notice sufficient when it
listed the relevant ordinance and nature of the violation); DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180
F.3d 770, 787–88 (6th Cir. 1999) (reasoning inadequacy of notice was counterbalanced by
opportunity to attend hearing prior to deprivation of liberty); Herrada v. City of Detroit, 275 F.3d
553, 557 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding notices did not violate due process even though they “might
have contained false and misleading information” because they stated a hearing was available
and provided a phone number to call for more information).

       In resisting this conclusion, Cahoo begins in an understandable place: Hasn’t the Sixth
Circuit already identified the clearly established law for this case and haven’t we already
determined that she meets it? As support, she points to the district court’s opinion, which
reasoned similarly:

       The State defendants insist that each plaintiff nevertheless had the opportunity to
       participate in a full evidentiary hearing before the [Agency] deprived any of them
       of property, which, they say, cured any deficiency in earlier notices. But the Sixth
       Circuit rejected this exact argument by the same defendants:
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               The Individual Agency Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to
               allege a plausible due process claim because Agency procedures
               provided for a pre-deprivation hearing if claimants elected to
               appeal a fraud determination. The Court is unpersuaded by this
               argument.      Plaintiffs allege that the Agency terminated a
               claimant’s right to benefits before any appeal hearing took place;
               they allege the Agency terminated a claimant’s right to benefits
               immediately once MiDAS made a positive fraud determination.
               While claimants had the opportunity to appeal a fraud
               determination, “postdeprivation remedies alone will not satisfy due
               process if the deprivation resulted from conduct pursuant to an
               ‘established state procedure,’ rather than random and unauthorized
               conduct.”

Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 759 (quoting Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 902–03).

       We embrace the premise but not the conclusion. Yes, our prior decision shows that a
claim would go to a jury on the theory that the State terminated benefits without any of these
procedures.   But at this point the fraud determinations created collection issues for prior
payments, not a termination of current benefits. Another feature of the district court’s opinion
shows as much. The court acknowledges that the primary notice of determination would satisfy
due process had it been sent prior to the deprivation:

       The Primary Determination Notices provided an adequate description for why the
       [Agency] believed it overpaid claimants. . . . But that communication came too
       late. By the time the [Agency] issued the determination notices, it had already
       terminated the claimants’ rights to benefits, demanded repayment, and determined
       that the claimants were subject to penalties. The State defendants cannot rely on
       post-deprivation process to remedy the lack of pre-deprivation notice.

Id. at 758–59. For each of these four plaintiffs, as the evidence obtained in discovery now
shows, the Agency sent the notices of determination prior to any deprivation.

       Cahoo insists that the property deprivation occurred as soon as the Agency issued the
notices of determination, because the notices purported to strip eligibility for future benefits,
imposed restitution, and assessed penalties. But the notices themselves foreclose this argument.
They provide a 30-day period to protest the determination, only after which did the “decision
[become] final and restitution [become] due and owing.” R.423-16 at 38; cf. Cahoo, 528 F.
Supp. 3d at 730 (recognizing the 30-day period). After that, as noted, each beneficiary had
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several layers of administrative and court review available to them. Nor is there any support for
the argument that the deprivation of property occurred earlier. In the context of receiving
unemployment benefit payments, plaintiffs offer no case—or any clearly established law—
showing that the deprivation occurs before the actual deprivation—a minimum of 30 days later
by law and in this case months and years later.

       Cahoo claims that Hope v. Pelzer solves these problems. That case recognized that a
novel violation can be “so obvious” that it nevertheless oversteps clearly established law, it is
true. 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). And we relied on Hope in our prior opinion, it is true too.
Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904. But because our prior opinion focused on the alleged midstream
deprivation of property rights without pre-deprivation notice and a hearing, cases like Goldberg
naturally extended to the novel MiDAS setting. Those cases, in other words, gave Agency
supervisors “fair warning” that the midstream deprivation of benefits without process “violated
the Constitution.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. In today’s setting, however, Cahoo did not identify
any case in her appellee brief that fairly extends to this situation. Goldberg’s holding does not
“obvious[ly]” cover after-the-fact fraud findings accompanied by notices of determination and
multiple levels of appeal before any immediate consequences for property rights.

       At argument, Cahoo’s counsel proffered two more cases, neither of which we relied on in
our prior opinion and neither of which changes things. Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.
1988); Transco Sec., Inc v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1981). Take Cosby first. This out-
of-circuit case considered notices of interviews with claims adjudicators. 843 F.2d at 983. The
state agency sent these notices to claimants of supplemental unemployment benefits who had
performed inadequate work searches. Id. at 983–84. But because the notices did not tell
claimants that the issue stemmed from their work searches or that they had violated a rule for
receiving benefits, the court found them constitutionally inadequate. Id. That’s a distant cry
from this case, in which the notices flagged the fraud issue, benefits period, employer, relevant
statute, and gave “an adequate description” of the purported wrongdoing. Cahoo, 528 F. Supp.
3d at 758. Unlike the Cosby claimants who were immediately denied benefits, moreover, these
plaintiffs did not face any immediate deprivation of their property interests when the Agency
sent the fraud notices.
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       Transco Security does not close these gaps. The Government Services Administration
suspended a government contractor from doing business with the government due to fraud.
639 F.2d at 320. The notice of suspension did not suffice, we reasoned, because it did not
specify which of the company’s numerous government contracts contained the alleged errors.
Id. at 323. That makes Transco Security twice removed from this case, in which the notices had
no immediate impact on the plaintiffs’ receipt of benefits and outlined the specific benefits
period and employer.

       Cahoo worries that our holding paves the way for state officials to skirt liability simply
by using “new technologies to carry out unconstitutional conduct,” Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 904, or
by changing the language on notices. The short answer is that we would handle this case the
same way even if Agency personnel (rather than MiDAS) drove the process at every turn.
Technology has nothing to do with it now that we know that the only claims left in the case
involve individuals with state-law rights to challenge the Agency’s fraud finding before any
deprivation occurred. The entire process, including above all the delayed deprivations in this
instance, distinguishes the plaintiffs’ claims from due process precedent. Any other approach
creates notice problems in the other direction. Qualified immunity carefully balances between
the “vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights” and “officials’ effective performance of their
duties,” a balance maintained only by giving officials fair notice of the wrongfulness of their
conduct. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).

       Cahoo next points to state and federal laws requiring agency representatives to examine
claims. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.32(a) (2013). She argues that these laws made the
illegality of auto-adjudication apparent. True or not, this argument fails to respond to the only
features of MiDAS at issue in this appeal: the questionnaires and notices. The district court, as
noted, did not hold Moffett-Massey or Geskey responsible for any deficiencies related to auto-
adjudication.

       What of the plaintiffs’ argument that they did not receive the questionnaires and notices?
The Agency emailed generic notifications to Cahoo’s and Cole’s last-known email addresses that
instructed them to check their online accounts, where the full notices were posted. And the
Agency mailed the forms to Mendyk’s and Davison’s last-known addresses; some of the notices
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were returned as undeliverable. As to the former, Cahoo does not point to any case clearly
determining that the generic email notifications directing claimants to their accounts failed to
pass constitutional muster. And common sense suggests that the Agency’s email practices may
have been prudent. Think of a healthcare provider’s email notifications to a patient, which
generically provide that new information has been posted on the patient’s account (without
saying what information) in order to protect patient privacy.

       As to the latter, Cahoo provides no case clearly establishing that mailing a notice to a
claimant’s last-known address violates due process. Cf. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235–36
(2006) (finding no duty for agency to investigate an individual’s new address before mailing
notice of a tax sale of a property). Her argument that it was unreasonable for the Agency not to
follow up on mail returned as undeliverable fares better under existing precedent. See id. at 229–
30 (requiring agency to take reasonable further action when a notice of a tax sale sent by
certified mail was returned as undeliverable).

       But all of the plaintiffs’ arguments about the Agency’s manner of delivering the
questionnaires and notices—detailed in the last few paragraphs—are beside the point for another
reason, arguably the most critical reason. Recall that the Agency defendants moved for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity as to the plaintiff’s due process claims. Neither the
Agency defendants—nor the plaintiffs in response to the motion for summary judgment—put
forward any evidence linking Moffett-Massey or Geskey to the plaintiff’s allegations about the
delivery of the notices. As a result, the district court did not hold Moffett-Massey or Geskey
responsible (or find a lingering question of material fact) as to how MiDAS delivered notices or
how the Agency handled undeliverable mail. We cannot deny them qualified immunity based on
actions that they did not take. See Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir.
2006). Section 1983 prohibits supervisory liability in this setting. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

       In response to our colleague’s dissent, we offer the following thoughts. First, while we
agree that the MiDAS program is difficult to defend as a matter of policy, we do not think that
reality changes the clearly established inquiry.       Start with our agreement.    The MiDAS
program’s imperfections indeed are many. Take a few examples. It does not make sense to
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empower a computer program to make fraud findings, even for internal purposes, that require
assessing a claimant’s intent. Nor does it make sense to engage in income spreading, the practice
our colleague lays out in detail in her separate writing. And it does not make sense to impose
compound interest and excessive penalties on claimants who, having lost their jobs, already face
financial distress. That explains why we embrace our court’s initial clearly established ruling.
Had this program been used to deprive these individuals of benefits without any process, we
would rule the same way again. But in the aftermath of discovery, the remaining claims deal
solely with situations in which the program created an internal fraud red flag but did not deprive
benefits at that point or at any point without additional process, notice, and opportunities for
appeal.

          Now that the district court has declined to certify a class, each plaintiff’s individual due
process claim must stand on its own. See Cahoo v. Fast Enters. LLC, 508 F. Supp. 3d 138, 162
(E.D. Mich. 2020) (denying class certification). Today’s claims rest on theories that we did not
consider the last time around. The district court concluded that not one of the remaining four
plaintiffs immediately lost her ongoing benefits, immediately had her wages garnished, or
immediately had her tax refunds intercepted. See Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 170–73. And it
concluded that any deprivation would occur only after the 30-day period to appeal expired.
Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 730. Our precedents apply distinct requirements on pre-deprivation
process and post-deprivation process. See Cahoo, 912 F.3d at 902–03 (delineating between pre-
and post-deprivation process). Hence the prior opinion’s explanation that precedent patently
required “an individual [to] be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest,” id. at 903 (quotation omitted), remains true but irrelevant to the
remaining claims in the case.

          Yes, MiDAS’s logic trees spawned internal, interim fraud findings that marked
individuals for further review. But that internal step did not deprive a claimant of property. As
noted, those property deprivations came months or years later, following notices of deprivation
and a multi-level appeal process. The missing link, then, is a case that clearly established the
inadequacy of the questionnaires, notices of determination, and appeal processes available in the
run-up to the property deprivation. To this day, the plaintiffs have not provided that case. What
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precedent there was would not have clearly alerted Moffett-Massey and Geskey to the
constitutional inadequacies of the questionnaires and notices as to these plaintiffs and these
property deprivations. See Rosen, 410 F.3d at 931; Shoemaker, 795 F.3d at 560; DePiero, 180
F.3d at 788; Herrada, 275 F.3d at 557.

       Second, while we cannot disagree with our colleague’s assessment of many other defects
in the MiDAS system, we must note that neither party presented evidence linking Moffett-
Massey and Geskey to these defects at summary judgment and accordingly the district court did
not hold Moffett-Massey and Geskey responsible for them (or find that questions of material fact
existed for them). Hence concerns about the delivery of the notices or the staffing of the phone
lines may bring shame to the Agency. But they do not bear on the appeal. Because supervisory
liability does not exist under section 1983 and because the district court found material questions
of fact to exist only as to Moffett-Massey’s and Geskey’s involvement in the questionnaires and
notices, we cannot grant relief on any other basis. To deny them qualified immunity based on
wrongdoing for which they had no responsibility would run contrary to our precedent. E.g.,
Gregory, 444 F.3d at 751–52.

       All in all, while we share our colleague’s concerns about the MiDAS system, we
respectfully disagree with her conclusion as to the clearly established prong in this appeal.

                                                 B.

       Mandatory intervention. That brings us to Heathcote’s separate appeal. A collection of
multi-factor tests governs motions to intervene as of right under Civil Rule 24(a)(2). United
States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2001). Courts consider (1) timeliness,
(2) the movant’s legal interest in the case, (3) impairment of that interest absent intervention, and
(4) if the parties adequately represent it. Id. Timeliness is a “threshold issue.” Blount-Hill v.
Zelman, 636 F.3d 278, 284 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). It splits into five component
parts: (1) the stage of the litigation, (2) the intervenor’s purpose, (3) the length of time that the
intervenor knew about her interest, (4) prejudice to the original parties, and (5) unusual
circumstances. Id. The multi-factor tests generate multiple standards of review as well. The
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district court’s timeliness analysis enjoys deferential abuse-of-discretion review, while the rest of
it gets a fresh look. Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 2000).

       The district court found Heathcote’s motion untimely, a finding well within its discretion.
Heathcote hopes to act as a class representative to vindicate class claims and to pursue her own
individual claims.    Her attorney conceded at the motion hearing that he had represented
Heathcote in the auto-adjudication period, meaning Heathcote and her attorney knew about her
due process claim before Cahoo filed this lawsuit. That means Heathcote waited four years to
act. She offers no satisfactory reason for this delay. Her counsel explained that he was “willing
to sit back” and let others “pursue this on behalf of the tens of thousands of people.” R.551 at
20. But we have rejected such a “wait-and-see” approach before. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep’t,
679 F.2d 579, 584 n.3 (6th Cir. 1982). And while Heathcote “wait[ed] in the wings,” China
Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2018), the parties litigated motions to dismiss,
undertook an interlocutory appeal, completed discovery, moved (unsuccessfully) for class
certification, and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment. Adding Heathcote to the mix
now would require re-traveling these same roads and re-reaching these same milestones, all
while adding considerable delay and cost to the litigation.

       Put in terms of the five-factor test, the stage of the litigation was advanced. See Stupak-
Thrall, 226 F.3d at 474–75; Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 285. Heathcote’s purposes for intervening
were not “legitimate,” Linton ex rel. Arnold v. Comm’r of Health & Env’t, 973 F.2d 1311, 1318
(6th Cir. 1992), and they do not “excuse[]” the “lack of an earlier motion,” Stupak-Thrall, 226
F.3d at 479 n.15. The length of time between Heathcote’s motion and her knowledge of her
interest was vast.    Cf. China Agritech, 138 S. Ct. at 1810–11 (instructing would-be class
representatives not to wait to file). This delay, in turn, unduly prejudices the original parties by
requiring them to re-litigate key stages of this case. See Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186,
1194 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting an intervenor’s plan “to have the court reconsider its prior rulings”
exacerbates prejudice). No unusual circumstances support intervention. All told, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Heathcote filed this motion too late.

       Heathcote raises several counterarguments.
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       Her main argument turns on American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, in which the
Court held that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for the putative class
members. 414 U.S. 538, 552–53 (1974). As a result, Heathcote maintains, motions to intervene
filed after the denial of class certification necessarily satisfy the timeliness inquiry. But this
argument conflates two distinct doctrines about time: tolling and timeliness. See id. at 552 n.22
(declining to reach the separate question of the denial of intervention); Lindblom v. Santander
Consumer USA, Inc., 771 F. App’x 454, 455 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding American Pipe “irrelevant”
to intervention). American Pipe tolling sounds in efficiency. 414 U.S. at 551. Just because a
litigant has complied with a statute of limitations does not mean she has satisfied the distinct
imperatives of Rule 24’s timeliness requirements. E.g., Blount-Hill, 636 F.3d at 284–86.

       Multiple cases, she says, support her interpretation of American Pipe. But none binds
this court.   And none says anything about motions to intervene filed four years after the
complaint—and filed after the denial of class certification to boot. Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund
for N. Cal. v. Allstate Corp. (In re Allstate Corp. Sec. Litig.), 966 F.3d 595, 614–16 (7th Cir.
2020); Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 991 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir. 2021);
Pelletier v. Endo Int’l PLC, 338 F.R.D. 446, 475 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Byrd v. Progressive Direct Ins.
Co., No. 3:20-cv-119, 2021 WL 1225961, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2021).

       Also unhelpful is Potter v. Commissioner of Social Security, 9 F.4th 369 (6th Cir. 2021).
It applied American Pipe’s tolling principle to individual claims after the administrative denial of
class certification—at least two degrees of separation from today’s case. Id. at 371–72, 380.

       Heathcote insists that “the district court’s ultimate decision on the legality of Defendants’
conduct could have stare decisis effect on a future individual action.” Appellant’s Br. 23. But
this concern did not arise recently. It arose when Cahoo filed the lawsuit, pointing against
timeliness, not towards it. See Stotts, 679 F.2d at 583.

       Heathcote maintains that she could not have known about her class-representative interest
until after the denial of class certification. Only then, she says, did the inadequacy of the existing
class representatives become clear. But it’s far from apparent that Heathcote could vindicate her
class-representative interest through intervention at this point. The district court denied class
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certification for reasons on top of inadequacy; it also identified flaws with preponderance and
superiority. Heathcote touts herself as an adequate class representative but cannot explain how
her renewed class certification motion would fix these other problems embedded in this “fact-
intensive” due process claim. Cahoo, 536 F. Supp. 3d at 158; see Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at
476.

       Permissive intervention. Heathcote in the alternative sought permission to intervene
under Civil Rule 24(b). Like their mandatory counterparts, permissive intervention motions also
must be timely filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1); NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365–66
(1973). That Heathcote filed her mandatory intervention motion too late bodes poorly for,
indeed halts, her permissive intervention motion. Stupak-Thrall, 226 F.3d at 479.

                                               III.

       We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Moffett-Massey and
Geskey.   We affirm the district court’s denial of Heathcote’s motions to intervene and to
reconsider.
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                _____________________________________________________

                  CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
                _____________________________________________________

       ALICE M. BATCHELDER, CIRCUIT JUDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority decides two separate appeals in this opinion. I concur in the latter, an appeal from
a collateral judgment denying a motion to intervene. Maj. Op. § II.B. But I cannot concur in the
first appeal, which is an interlocutory appeal from the district court’s determination that genuine
disputes of material fact preclude Moffett-Massey’s and Geskey’s claims of qualified immunity.
Maj. Op. § II.A. I would affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

       Just to be clear, despite the language in its opinion, the district court did not make any
findings of fact or hold the current defendants, Moffett-Massey and Geskey, liable on any of the
plaintiffs’ claims—nor did it absolve them of liability on any claims. The district court merely
denied qualified immunity and set the case for trial by a jury. That is, if the jury were to find that
the form letters do not state the fraud accusation with particularity (or the means of delivery was
not reasonably calculated to reach the recipients, or the hearing process did not provide them a
reasonable opportunity to defend themselves) and if the jury were to find Moffett-Massey and
Geskey were directly responsible for those failings (or for refusing to correct them), then the jury
could find them liable. Or the jury might not. The point is that the plaintiffs have a story to
tell—and evidence to present—to a jury and that is all the district court held.

       We often say that “[q]ualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 64 F.4th 736, 750 (6th Cir. 2023)
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). This “is a rigorous
standard” to be sure. Guertin v. Michigan, 924 F.3d 309, 311 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); accord Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 589 (2018) (calling it a “demanding standard”). But, as the district court suggested,
Moffett-Massey and Geskey appear to argue their incompetence as an excuse, while a jury could
find that the totality of their actions demonstrates their knowing violation of the law. Either way,
qualified immunity was not intended for defendants like these.
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       The short story is this. The plaintiffs received unemployment benefits. Months or years
later, MiDAS auto-adjudicated them guilty of fraud and imposed staggering penalties. The
plaintiffs and thousands like them were unaware of the adjudication and penalties until afterward
and, for many, not until the Agency seized their tax refunds and garnished their wages—sending
already vulnerable people into renewed or further financial distress, including bankruptcy.
Agency Director Moffett-Massey and her favored advisor, Geskey, were the masters of the entire
MiDAS program. The plaintiffs contend that Moffett-Massey and Geskey, in conjunction with
certain others, deprived them of their right to due process by adjudicating them guilty and
imposing penalties without providing proper notice or an opportunity to defend themselves.

       Four statements of clearly established law are relevant to these due-process claims. One,
because the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies (i.e., to appeal
the Determination) or suffer the actual loss of their property, their injury (the deprivation)
occurred when the Agency rendered the Determination in the three-letter combo. Two, pre-
deprivation due process was required in this scenario, meaning notice and a hearing before the
Determination; post-deprivation process was insufficient and irrelevant as a matter of law.
Three, the pre-deprivation notice and process had to be constitutionally satisfactory—i.e., the
means of delivery had to be reasonably calculated to reach the recipients, the content of the
notice had to state the accusation and grounds for it with particularity, and the hearing had to
provide a reasonable time and opportunity to oppose the accusation. Four, the state defendants
had to be directly or actually responsible for the due process violations, or for refusing to remedy
those violations.

       As the district court determined based on its thorough assessment of the evidence, there
are material questions for decision by a jury, such as: whether the means and manner of
delivering the Questionnaire was reasonably calculated to ensure that the plaintiffs would receive
it; whether the content of the Questionnaire was sufficient for the plaintiffs to realize that they
were accused of fraud, know the bases for that accusation, and prepare the evidence necessary to
oppose or refute that accusation; whether the Questionnaire’s scheme (including the multiple-
choice questions for auto-adjudication, the caveat in the instructions that permitted the recipient
to submit additional information, the 10-day response deadline, etc.) comports with due process;
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and whether Moffett-Massey and Geskey were directly responsible for the Questionnaire. There
are other genuinely disputed issues, to be sure, but these are enough—in my view and the district
court’s—to show that the record contains evidence by which a jury could reasonably find that
Moffett-Massey and Geskey, via MiDAS, violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established rights to due
process.

                                                             I.

           Since its filing in March 2017, this case has generated over a dozen written opinions by
the district court (and one prior opinion by this court), exploring and discussing the underlying
events, the legal claims and defenses, and a legion of associated factual, legal, and technical
issues. Each of the district court’s opinions is thorough, detailed, and clear. More to the point,
these opinions demonstrate the court’s meticulous review of the record and its full understanding
of the claims, issues, and law. Everything in the summary that follows is attributable to the
district court’s impressive and commendable efforts in managing and documenting this case to
date.

           In October 2013, Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency (the “Agency”) started
using the MiDAS software to run its entire fraud-investigation process automatically, without
any Agency employee involvement. A fraud investigation typically began in one of two ways: a
former employer objected to the unemployment claim (which objection the Agency accepted
without question) or MiDAS flagged a suspect based on a database comparison of benefits to
quarterly taxable income, which MiDAS averaged (prorated) over the 13 weeks of the quarter.
For example, if Mary Doe received unemployment benefits in January, but later earned $1,300 at
a new job in March, MiDAS would take Doe’s total First Quarter income of $1,300, divide it by
13 weeks, treat that as if she earned $100 each and every week in the Quarter, including the
weeks in January when she was receiving unemployment benefits, and assume that the January
unemployment benefits were improper (due to the prorated $100 per week), and possibly
attributable to fraud.1

           1
               This is what happened to Suzette Marie Heathcote, the attempted intervenor in the other appeal here, No.
21-2672.
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       To initiate the fraud investigation, MiDAS would automatically send a form letter (or an
email, or place a notice in the related Agency account) to the recipient/suspect. We, like the
district court, refer to this first form letter as “the Questionnaire,” which was actually titled
“Request for Information Relative to Possible Ineligibility or Disqualification.”          Pause to
recognize that, at this point, many recipients were no longer receiving benefits and had not been
for months or years, so it is doubtful that a form letter about “Ineligibility” or “Disqualification”
from a program for which the recipient was no longer a participant would be of significant
interest or concern.

       More importantly, the Questionnaire did not announce that it concerned a fraud
investigation—in fact, that form letter does not contain the word “fraud” anywhere in it. Instead,
it opens with the statement: “A question of eligibility and/or qualification has been raised on this
claim. Please respond to the questions on the reverse side of this form.” Those two questions
are:

       Did you intentionally provide false information to obtain benefits that you were
       not entitled to receive?

       Yes        No

       Why do you believe you were entitled to benefits?

       1. I needed the money
       2. I had not received payment when I reported for benefits
       3. I reported the net dollar amount instead of the gross dollar amount paid
       4. I did not understand how to report my earnings or separation reason
       5. I thought my employer reported my earnings for me
       6. Someone else certified (reported) for me
       7. Someone else filed my claim for me
       8. Other

       The recipient’s answers to these questions—actually just the second question—triggered
MiDAS’s so called “logic tree.” The first question was virtually irrelevant; a “No” answer was
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ignored.2 The recipient’s choice on the second question was determinative. But recognize
that—as answers to the specific question asked—those eight options make no sense. The “real”
question to these “answers” would be: Why did you (lie and) understate your income?3 The only
“answer” that let the recipient out of the MiDAS auto-adjudication system was number 8,
“Other.” If the recipient chose 2, 3, 4, or 5, then MiDAS determined that benefits were improper
and necessitated repayment, albeit by mistake, not fraud. But if the recipient chose numbers 1, 6,
or 7 (or did not respond within ten days), then MiDAS automatically adjudicated the recipient
guilty of fraud. According to a subsequent U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) investigation,
“most” of the MiDAS auto-adjudications of fraud were due to the recipient/suspect’s failure to
respond to the letter.

        At the end of the list (after option number 8), the form had a blank space of about 1⅜
inches, beneath which was this paragraph, with its permissive opening sentence:

        You may provide a statement and evidence regarding this issue before a
        (re)determination is made on this matter. You must provide a response to the
        questions above and if you failed to previously report this information, explain
        why. This form must be received by the Agency within 10 calendar days of the
        mail date shown on [the reverse side]. Submit copies (not the originals) of any
        records which you believe support your position, such as pay stubs, layoff slip,
        federal income tax form, W-2, etc. If you require additional space, attach
        additional page(s). . . .

        Many things about this putative offer of an opportunity to respond are questionable, but I
will point out two. One, because the MiDAS software auto-adjudicated the decision based on
the option chosen in the second question, any additional explanation or information was ignored
unless the recipient chose Option 8. And two, the response deadline of “must be received by the
Agency within 10 calendar days of the mail date shown” includes any postal mail delivery time,

        2
           “When a claimant did respond to the [Q]uestionnaire, MiDAS’s programming, based on its logic trees,
found intentional fraud whenever a claimant chose certain multiple-choice options on the form, even if she indicated
[in question one] that she did not intentionally provide false information.” Cahoo v. FAST Enterprises LLC, 508 F.
Supp. 3d 162, 167 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Thus, MiDAS’s programming ignored a “No” answer in question one.
        3
          As the plaintiffs point out in their brief, the Questionnaire “contained no multiple-choice option that
would allow a claimant to select an answer indicating that they believed they were entitled to benefits because they
were qualified for the benefits.” Ape. Br. at 28. And Clay Tierney, the Agency Project Manager who created the
MiDAS system, testified at his deposition that the Agency presumed an overpayment, and likely fraud, before
sending that letter.
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thereby shortening the 10 days by two or more days, and it necessarily includes at least one
weekend.

        The next stage of the process was the Determination notification, which MiDAS sent
automatically, and which actually comprised three separate letters sent in three separate
envelopes. Although none of these three letters referred to the other letters in any way, they are
all form letters, in 10-point font, with the same Agency title block, mailed to the same recipient
address, on the same mailing date, and listing the same nine-digit CLM code in the information
block. The first letter, titled “Notice of Determination,” informed the recipient of its finding
(“Your actions indicate you intentionally misled and/or concealed information to obtain benefits
you were not entitled to receive.”) and its punishment: that she was “disqualified for benefits,”
that “[r]estitution [wa]s due,” and that she was “required to pay the penalty assessed.” The
second letter, also titled “Notice of Determination” but using a different “case number,”
informed the recipient of a different finding (e.g., “You quit your job with [employer] on [date]
due to other personal reasons.           Your leaving was voluntary and not attributable to the
employer.”) and stated an overlapping punishment: that she was disqualified for benefits until
she has satisfied a certain dollar amount of “rework requirements.” And the third letter, titled
“Restitution,” which has the same case number as the second letter, informed the recipient of the
amount due in repayment and penalty (e.g., “Claimant must pay to the Agency in cash, by check,
money order, EFT via MiWAM or deduction from benefits, restitution in the amount of $35,475
[i.e., $7,095 in principal and $28,380 in penalty] . . . . Interest accrues at the rate of 1% per
month (computed on a daily basis).”). The letter also says: “[s]hould your disqualification or
ineligibility be reversed, restitution shall cease.”

        To sum this up, if the claimant did not answer the Questionnaire within 10 days or
answered by choosing options 1, 6, or 7, then MiDAS automatically adjudicated that claimant
guilty of fraud and imposed severe penalties (recovery of benefits, a penalty of four times the
benefits,4 and interest at 1% per month compounded daily). So, returning to hypothetical Mary
Doe, suppose she received $400 in unemployment that MiDAS deemed fraudulent four years

        4
           According to Geskey, this penalty (four times or 400% of the benefits) was the highest penalty of any
State in the country. Most States had a fraud penalty of 10 to 15% of the benefits.
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later: MiDAS would assess her $3,232, based on repayment of the $400, a penalty of $1,600
(i.e., $400 x four), and interest of $1,232 (i.e., 1% monthly, compounded daily for four years).
Being unemployed in Michigan was awfully expensive.5                         If the recipient did not pay as
demanded, MiDAS initiated collection through interception of federal and state income tax
refunds and wage garnishment.

         As bad as this was in concept, it was even worse in practice. The Agency started using
MiDAS in 2013, but the MiDAS database search, comparing benefits to taxable income, looked
backward at every recipient for the prior six years. So, the compound interest was brutal, but
also many recipients were no longer claiming or receiving unemployment at the time of the
MiDAS Questionnaire and Determination. Unemployment was a distant (bad) memory to these
people, who likely had no concern for any Agency form letters. Meanwhile, the Agency made
no effort to establish the correct or current address for these suspects. No human involvement
meant that MiDAS just automatically printed the old address from its database onto the form
letters.6

         According to the record, many letters were never even mailed and merely accumulated at
the Agency. Thousands of letters were returned as undeliverable. And, presumably, even more
were simply discarded and never read. There was no Agency follow up on the undeliverable
returned letters or any effort to determine whether any letters were actually received. And the
letters had an additional latent defect.            The Determination letters—purportedly alerting the
recipient of the adjudication and the right to appeal—listed a phone number with instructions to
call that number for more information. In a subsequent audit, the Michigan Auditor General
(MAG) determined that over 90% of the calls to that number were never answered, including the

         5
         According to the DOL investigation, most of these recovery actions were for over $10,000. Many were
over $50,000. And some were over $180,000. And, as would be expected, many of these people ended up in
bankruptcy. Three of the four plaintiffs here ended up in bankruptcy, which was its own separate issue in the district
court.
         6
           Alternatively, MiDAS sent an email to the recipient/suspect at the email address that MiDAS had on
record. That email instructed the recipients/suspects to check their Agency account for a new notice. The email did
not reveal that the notice concerned a fraud investigation or the potential consequences. And, given that the
recipient was no longer participating in the unemployment program, and had not been for months or years, one
might reasonably question whether a nondescript, generic email about their dormant Agency account would be of
interest or concern.
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last 50,000 calls leading up to that audit. It was also reported that, of the 22,427 fraud auto-
adjudications that the MAG selected for review, 93% involved no fraud. That number has since
been called in to question, but in its opinion ruling on class certification, the district court cited
evidence provided by the State of Michigan that MiDAS was involved in 67,740 adjudications of
fraud; and the plaintiffs argued that at least 50% of those were faulty and involved no fraud.

        Meanwhile, if a recipient/suspect did actually receive the Determination letters,
understand them, and request an appeal, the appeal was assigned for a hearing before an ALJ.
But no Agency information was available because MiDAS was not accessible and there were no
paper copies of any of the materials. So, the recipient/suspect/appellant had no information
about the fraud determination and arrived at the hearing with no knowledge or preparation as to
what accusations to dispute or disprove. At some point, the Agency began to send ex parte
communications to the ALJs, stating the reasons for MiDAS’s fraud determination. When
certain ALJ’s expressed concern over that practice, the Agency removed them from hearing the
fraud appeals.

        During its brief use of MiDAS, the Agency’s operating fund increased by $152 million.

        The Agency discontinued MiDAS in August 2015, purportedly due to the discovery of
false-positive fraud determinations. The Agency denies that it was because the DOL had just
learned the Agency was using an automated system and—warning that auto-adjudication of
fraud claims violates due process and federal law—began a DOL investigation.7 The Agency
(namely Moffett-Massey and Geskey) denied that auto-adjudication was illegal, but they
discontinued it.      Three months later, the DOL reported that the MiDAS auto-adjudication
violated federal law:

        On November 13, 2015, the United States Department of Labor issued a
        Monitoring Report of the [Agency]’s adjudication practices. It found that the
        [Agency]’s practices violated section 303 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
        503(a), in six ways, [including that the form letter] . . . questionnaires and fraud

        7
          Also, the Zynda lawsuit was filed in April 2015. This precursor lawsuit led to a settlement agreement that
the Agency would no longer use MiDAS. Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (denying
motion to dismiss).
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       determination notices did not clearly state the issue or reason for the [Agency]’s
       suspicion. . . .

Cahoo v. Fast Enterprises LLC, 508 F. Supp. 3d 138, 149 (E.D. Mich. 2020).

       As mentioned, the two State-employee defendants in this appeal are Sharon Moffett-
Massey and Stephen Geskey. Moffet-Massey was the Agency’s Director from April 2014 to
January 2017, during which time she oversaw the entire Agency operation, including the MiDAS
auto-notification and auto-adjudication system, the Questionnaire and Determination forms used
in it, the decision tree, and the appeal process. She approved of it wholeheartedly, championed it
(and herself) in the press, disregarded internal warnings and the eventual negative press about
MiDAS, and insisted that auto-adjudication was legal and legitimate. Even when the DOL told
her it was inappropriate, she argued that no federal rule or regulation said so. Geskey was the
Agency’s Director from 2008 to 2011, and then the head of the Agency’s Policies and
Procedures Group, which reviewed and approved aspects of MiDAS, including the
Questionnaire and Determination form letters. Basically, Geskey’s role was as lawyer/advisor to
Moffett-Massey and the Agency. Even though he had advised Moffett-Massey to abolish the
logic tree, which she refused to do, he joined her argument (and drafted the letter for her
signature) against the DOL, claiming that no federal rule or regulation prohibited auto-
notification or auto-adjudication.

                                                 II.

       For various reasons, the Agency suspected that each of the four plaintiffs in this case had
committed fraud. These accusations or suspicions triggered MiDAS to send Questionnaires, but
because the plaintiffs did not actually receive them or appreciate their significance, none of these
plaintiffs responded. Consequently, MiDAS sent each a Determination, auto-adjudicating them
guilty of fraud, disqualifying them from eligibility for future benefits, and setting out their
individual monetary liability based on restitution of past benefits and the 400% penalty, which
ranged from $6,962 to $34,475, plus interest, for the four of them. Because they did not receive
or appreciate the significance of the Determination, none of these current plaintiffs sued back
then for declaratory or injunctive relief based on the current due process claim. Nor did any of
them pursue the administrative appeal, the availability of which expired after 30 days.
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         Cahoo first discovered her $34,475 liability when she found it listed on her credit report
as she was preparing to file for bankruptcy. Mendyk first discovered her $32,758 liability when
she attempted to file another claim for uninsurance benefits three years later, which was after the
Agency had seized her tax refunds and garnished her wages. Cole first learned of her $24,530
liability when she received a statement of debt from the State, about 18 months after the
Determination. And Davison first learned of her $6,962 liability when the Agency intercepted
her federal tax refund about 18 months after the Determination. Cahoo, Mendyk, and Cole
eventually declared bankruptcy and obtained a discharge of their debts from the bankruptcy
court.

         In 2017, these four plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court, which included, among its
several claims, a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Moffett-Massey and Geskey, acting
by and through MiDAS, deprived them of their constitutional right to due process by
adjudicating them guilty and imposing penalties without providing proper notice or an
opportunity to defend themselves.8 The plaintiffs also sought to prosecute this lawsuit as a class
action, which the district court denied. In its opinion denying class certification, the district court
explained that “[t]he plaintiffs argue that the manner of the notice was constitutionally deficient,
but they also insist that the substance was deficient as well.” Cahoo, 508 F. Supp. 3d at 161.
The court found that class certification was improper because “the manner of notice and the
[Agency]’s failure to provide a meaningful hearing and impartial process are fact-intensive
inquiries . . . [and] the resolution of those issues would depend on whether the individuals
received actual notice.” Id. at 162.

         Then, Moffett-Massey and Geskey moved for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, which the district court denied, ordering that a jury would decide the plaintiffs’ claims
at trial. The court did not hold Moffett-Massey and Geskey responsible for—or absolve them of
responsibility for—anything at that stage. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs had moved for partial

         8
          The district court explained that “the complaint alleges that the automated system afforded no pre-
deprivation process to the plaintiffs even though [such process] was required by state law, and post-deprivation
remedies were inadequate because the decision-making process lacks transparency and access to records to
determine the basis for the determination[.] The complaint also indicates that the appeals process was fraught with
impropriety.” Cahoo v. FAST Enterprises LLC, 508 F. Supp. 3d 162, 176 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citation omitted).
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summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that: “(1) the fraud questionnaires and
determinations did not provide adequate substantive notice, (2) the manner of notice—by
traditional mail and email—was constitutionally deficient, [and] (3) they were denied a fair
hearing through the inadequate notice in the questionnaires and determinations.” Cahoo, 528 F.
Supp. 3d at 727. But the court denied that motion because “fact questions preclude partial
summary judgment on liability in favor of the plaintiffs against any of the defendants.” Id. at
763.

        Moffett-Massey and Gesky appealed. Because the denial of summary judgment is not a
final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it is ordinarily not immediately appealable. But the
“denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an
appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of [] § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a
final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Thus, we have a certain, limited
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.

                                                       III.

        “Our jurisdiction in this interlocutory appeal extends only to questions of law, which we
review de novo. The legal question here is whether [the defendants] w[ere] entitled to qualified
immunity, on the facts as we must construe them in this appeal.” Jarvela v. Washtenaw Cnty.,
40 F.4th 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). We construe them by “tak[ing] the district
court’s view of the facts in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs].” Id. at 763 (citation
omitted).9 And when the district court determines that material questions of fact preclude
qualified immunity, as it did here, the defendants must “concede the most favorable view of the
facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.” Bey v. Falk, 946 F.3d 304, 312 (6th Cir. 2019)

          9
            “At the summary judgment stage, the [district] court determines whether there are genuine disputes of
material fact that should go to a jury; it does not find facts.” Marshall v. The Rawlings Co. LLC, 854 F.3d 368, 381
(6th Cir. 2017) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)); see also Upshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 592 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In considering a motion for summary judgment, the [district court]’s
function is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue a proper jury
question, and not to judge the evidence and make findings of fact.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Harris
v. Welch, 979 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Thus, the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may be reasonably resolved in favor of either party.” (quotation and
editorial marks omitted)).
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(citation omitted); see also Bunkley v. City of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552, 559-61 (6th Cir. 2018).
That is, in an interlocutory appeal from the denial of qualified immunity, the plaintiffs win any
material fact dispute.

        Qualified immunity shields government officials in the performance of discretionary
functions from standing trial for civil liability unless their actions violate clearly established
rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). A plaintiff who brings a § 1983 action against such an official bears the burden of
overcoming the qualified immunity defense. Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 760 (6th Cir.
2021). At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant violated a
constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established. Id. (citing Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at
589).

        “A right is clearly established if the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Baynes v.
Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks, editorial marks, and citation
omitted). Because “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
even in novel factual circumstances,” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002), there need not
be “a case directly on point,” so long as “existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (citation
omitted). The “unlawfulness can be ‘clearly established’ from direct holdings, from specific
examples describing certain conduct as prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court
employs.” Vanderhoef v. Dixon, 938 F.3d 271, 278–79 (6th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

        The district court framed the question in terms of three due process violations: (1) “the
defective notices that MiDAS generated—notices that defendants Moffet-Massey and Geskey
were responsible for crafting”; (2) “the presumptive logic tree fraud determinations”; and
(3) “the automatic fraud findings that resulted from a failure to respond to the questionnaires.”
Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 755. But the right in question is the same for all three violations: the
right to notice of and an opportunity to defend against Agency accusations that would lead to an
adjudication of guilt and imposition of punishment, namely the disqualification from the
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unemployment program and the monetary liability for restitution of past benefits, severe
penalties, and interest.

        “A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by state action
of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate state process.” Reed v.
Goertz, 143 S. Ct. 955, 961 (2023) (citation omitted). The first element is easily satisfied here.
As for the disqualification, the plaintiffs have a protected property interest in their access to the
State’s unemployment benefits program. Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 900 (6th
Cir. 2019) (“Recipients of unemployment compensation have constitutionally-protected property
interests in unemployment benefits.”) (citing cases). And as for the monetary liability, the
plaintiffs have a protected property interest in their own money, as they undoubtedly “have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972). And the Agency’s penalties deprived the plaintiffs of those interests.

        The question here concerns the process. Specifically, whether the right to adequate
notice and opportunity to defend was so clearly established under existing law that “a reasonable
official would understand that what he [wa]s doing violate[d] that right.” See Baynes, 799 F.3d
at 610. And the notice and process of concern in this analysis is limited to the Questionnaire
because everything in and after the Determination was post-deprivation and, therefore, irrelevant.

        The plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their state administrative remedies. Patsy v.
Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982) (“[W]e have on numerous occasions rejected the
argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted state
administrative remedies.); see also Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226,
2230 (2021) (reciting “‘the settled rule’ that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to
an action under § 1983” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Nor were the plaintiffs required
to wait to suffer a tangible injury. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 504 (explaining that “Congress
intended [§ 1983] to throw open the doors of the United States courts to individuals who were
threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights, and to provide
these individuals immediate access to the federal courts” (quotation marks and citation omitted;
emphasis added)).
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        If the plaintiffs had received and understood the Determination letters, they could have
filed this § 1983 action right then, seeking a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief based on
this same due process claim they raise here. The Determination was a final decision that offered
an administrative appeal, with the first two letters describing a “protest” of the Determination
(not a defense against the accusation or charge) and the third letter’s referring to the
Determination’s being “reversed”; it does not refer to an accusation’s being proven or disproven.

        Therefore, the Determination (three-letter combo) is the Agency action that caused the
plaintiffs’ injuries, i.e., the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights concerning their property interests.
The Questionnaire was the first (putative) contact with the suspected claimant, it comprised the
purported “notice” of the accusation and it described the “process” for defending against the
accusation. The next communication from, or contact with, the Agency was the Determination
(three-letter combo), which announced that the Agency had adjudicated the claimant guilty,
demanded restitution of the prior benefits, and imposed the 400% penalty. At some point later,
typically without further communication or contact, the Agency seized the claimants’ money
(with accumulated interest) by intercepting their tax refunds or garnishing their wages. The
effect of the disqualification and seizure of money would be relevant to questions of actual
notice and consequential damages, but it does not delay or negate the deprivation of the
plaintiff’s rights.

        Because the Determination effected the Agency’s deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights, the
plaintiffs could have brought a § 1983 action immediately, before pursuing any administrative
appeal or waiting for tangible harm. In fact, the statute of limitations would start upon receipt of
the Determination. Therefore, the Questionnaire comprises the totality of the pre-deprivation
process. The Determination’s offer of an appeal falls entirely under post-deprivation process.

        “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted;
emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court has “described the root requirement of the Due
Process Clause as being that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
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deprived of any significant property interest.”     Id. (quotation marks, citation, and footnote
omitted).

       Moreover, because this entire adjudication process was a preconceived and established
government procedure, the law required pre-deprivation due process—meaning notice and
hearing before the Determination—whereas post-deprivation process was insufficient (and
irrelevant) as a matter of law. See Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir.
2006) (explaining that “[w]hen a deprivation occurs through an established state procedure, then
it is both practicable and feasible for the state to provide pre-deprivation process, and the state
must do so regardless of the adequacy of any post-deprivation remedy” (quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436 (1982) ( “[A]bsent the
necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation
process, a post-deprivation hearing here would be constitutionally inadequate.” (quotation marks
and citation omitted)); Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused
by conduct pursuant to established state procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action.”
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984))). Nothing about the MiDAS adjudication
scheme suggests that “quick action” was even intended, much less necessary, or that pre-
deprivation process was impractical.

       Moreover, the law required that the Questionnaire’s pre-deprivation notice and process
had to meet certain standards. The notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all of the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections,” and it “must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(citations omitted). The manner or “means [of providing notice] must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 315; Jones v.
Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006). In substance or content, the notice “must set forth the
alleged misconduct with particularity.” Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1351 (6th Cir. 1974)
(quoting In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967)); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft,
436 U.S. 1, 98 (1978) (“[T]he purpose of notice is to apprise the affected individual of, and
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permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.”). “The need for more specific notice is
particularly critical when the regulations provide in lieu of an adversary hearing the opportunity
to submit information in opposition to [the accusation].” Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639
F.2d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 1981); accord ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Therefore, the content of the Questionnaire had to state the accusation of fraud and the
grounds for it with particularity such that the recipient would understand it; the means of
delivering the Questionnaire had to be reasonably calculated to reach the recipients (“such as one
desirous of actually informing the [recipient] might reasonably adopt to accomplish it”); and the
process afforded the recipient had to provide a reasonable time and opportunity to oppose the
accusation, particularly because it limits the recipient’s response to the submission information
in lieu of an adversarial hearing.

       Given those standards, the plaintiffs contend that the content of the Questionnaire does
not provide (1) notice of the fraud accusation, (2) the grounds for that accusation, (3) the
consequences of the impending Determination, (4) the information necessary to defend against
or produce contra-evidence to the accusation, (5) a hearing at which to question the accusation
and present a defense to the decisionmaker, or (6) a reasonable time to reply. See Cahoo v. Fast
Enterprises LLC, 528 F. Supp. 3d 719, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2021). The defendants’ contention that
the content of the Questionnaire form letters does provide that information creates a fact dispute.
There is no need to refer to any law to resolve that dispute; one need only read the Questionnaire.

       The district court explained its assessment of the evidence:

       The plaintiffs in this case challenge not only the manner that the [Agency]
       officials chose to deliver the notices to claimants, but also the adequacy of the
       notice’s contents.     They contend that the fraud questionnaires and the
       determination letters did not explain why the [Agency] suspected them of
       committing fraud, and that deficiency deprived them of their ability to make an
       informed response.

       1. Fraud Questionnaires

       Once MiDAS flagged a claim for overpayment, it automatically issued
       questionnaires to . . . claimants. A claimant’s failure to respond timely to a
       questionnaire resulted in a default determination that the claimant committed
       fraud.
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       Although a suspicion of fraud triggered the questionnaires, the basis for that
       suspicion was not communicated to the claimant. The questionnaire provided
       almost no notice whatsoever of the alleged misconduct, or that the failure to
       respond would result in a fraud determination. . . .
       There is no question that this [fraud] questionnaire woefully falls short of setting
       forth the alleged misconduct with particularity, or providing claimants a
       reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and meet them.
       The notice refers generally to a ‘question of eligibility’ and mentions that [the
       Agency] may determine that a claimant committed fraud based on its ‘available
       information.’ But the questionnaire does not state what that information is,
       thereby limiting the opportunity to present objections intelligently.

Id. at 756-57 (emphasis added; editorial marks, quotation marks, citations omitted).

       As mentioned, for purposes of deciding this peculiar interlocutory, qualified-immunity
appeal, we are bound to that assessment. See Bey, 946 F.3d at 312; Bunkley, 902 F.3d at 559. A
jury might agree, or a jury might disagree (and find that the Questionnaire did provide sufficient
notice and process), but that is a question for a jury. Our assessment of the Questionnaire—even
a strong belief that every juror would necessarily find that it provides notice and process—
cannot, under existing precedent and Supreme Court guidance, trump the district court’s
assessment.

       As for the two defendants here, Moffett-Massey and Geskey, the district court further
framed the issue, set out the controlling law, and identified specific questions of fact for each of
these two defendants that required determination by a jury. In framing the issue, it said:

       None of the plaintiffs allege that any of the State defendants were involved
       personally in their fraud adjudications or subsequent collections.
       Instead, the plaintiffs allege that these defendants were responsible for applying
       MiDAS’s system of defective notices, logic trees that led to presumptive fraud
       determinations, and automated collection procedures that deprived them of the
       right to be informed of the accusations against them and to present their side of
       the story.

       When an automated system is alleged to be the culprit behind a constitutional
       deprivation like this, the plaintiffs’ theory of liability is a viable one. After all, as
       the court of appeals pointedly observed, ‘MiDAS did not create itself.’

Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3d at 748 (paragraph breaks inserted; citation omitted).
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       As the district court explained, “[s]upervisors cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior theory for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” but must either “set[] in motion a
series of events that the [supervisor] knew or should reasonably have known would cause others
to deprive the plaintiff[s] of [their] constitutional rights,” or “abandon the specific duties of his
[or her] position in the face of actual knowledge of a breakdown in the proper workings of the
department.” Id. (quotation marks, editorial marks, and citations omitted) (citing or quoting
Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 487 (6th Cir. 2020), Conner v.
Reinhard, 847 F.2d 384, 396-397 (7th Cir. 1988), Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642,
647 (6th Cir. 2012), and Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 898 (6th Cir. 2018)).

       As for Moffett-Massey, the district court found that “the record allows an inference that
she actively encouraged, authorized, or acquiesced to the rote application of logic trees and use
of substantively deficient questionnaires and fraud determination notices.” Cahoo, 528 F. Supp.
3d at 751. The court cited several facts from the record: (1) her advisor, Geskey, had “repeatedly
recommended against the fraud finding decision trees . . . [and] insisted that fraud determinations
must be based on competent material and substantial evidence”; (2) Moffett-Massey “was aware
of the policy permitting the [Agency] commonly to adjudicate issues based on nothing but a
failure to respond to allegations”; and (3) “[t]he record does not show that Moffett-Massey did
anything to address this problem.” Id. at 750. If the jury were to believe that evidence, it could
reasonably “infer that [Moffett-Massey] approved the policy and thereby abdicated her duty with
active performance to ensure that the [Agency]’s process conformed with federal and State law.”
Id.

       The district court further found that “[t]he record also permits an inference that [Moffett-
Massey] actively approved the substance of the fraud determinations and questionnaires.” Id.
The court pointed to: (4) Moffet-Massey’s own testimony that “the [Agency] was aware . . . that
the forms might be deficient[] before she became director in April 2014”; (5) but “once she
became director, it does not appear that she took any action to modify the content of those
notices”; and that (6) “[h]er name appears on the form[s] . . . under the heading, ‘authorized by.’”
Id. at 750-51. Thus, a jury could find that Moffett-Massey’s actions and inactions directly
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violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established rights to due process, and she was not entitled to
qualified immunity.

       Moffett-Massey was the Agency Director, with full and final authority over every aspect
of the Agency’s operations, including MiDAS, as well as final say over the content of the
Questionnaire. The plaintiffs label it “confounding,” that she would contend that she did not
approve of the forms even though she was the Director and her name is at the top. In her
deposition testimony she admitted that she was aware of the substance of the forms, the use of
logic trees, and the auto-adjudications. And, despite her authority as Director, she took no action
to remedy or change any of those things. Overall, the evidence in the record allows an inference
that she actively encouraged, authorized, or acquiesced to violations of their due process rights.

       The theme of Moffett-Massey’s deposition testimony was a Sergeant Schultz defense: “I
see nothing! I hear nothing! I know nothing!” That is, although she was the Director in charge of
the entire Agency, with all the benefits and responsibilities that entails, she claims that she has
done nothing wrong nor did she know of any wrongdoing. If she testifies at trial, a jury could
believe her. Or it could believe that she was in charge and should have known—or likely did
know—and therefore disbelieve her denials. The point is, because the answer to the question of
her liability would turn on her credibility, it is not a proper subject for summary judgment.

       As for Geskey, the district court found questions for a jury concerning his “involvement
in creating or approving the defective forms.” Id. at 752. The court pointed to three record facts
to support this: (1) “Geskey was the director of the policies and procedures group up to the
implementation of MiDAS”; (2) “he should have reviewed the forms and noticed that they were
almost completely devoid of substantive notice (particularly the questionnaire)”; and (3) despite
this responsibility and authority, he “apparently found no fault with the notices that deprived
claimants of their ability to confront the [Agency]’s suspicions intelligently.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). The court held that these “fact questions about Geskey’s role in approving the
deficient questionnaires and fraud determination notices” precluded qualified immunity. Id.

       In this appeal, Geskey argues that the forms were already developed when he took over
the Policies and Procedures Group, and that he “did not have authority to make policies of
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significant import or to unilaterally make decisions of broad import . . . [or] to unilaterally
change forms or implement changes.” Nor did he review, develop, or approve any of the
specific forms—he claims someone else did. Thus, he disputes the district court’s assessment of
the record concerning his role in the development and approval of the forms, which is not
appropriate in this appeal.

        The plaintiffs answer that, while Geskey’s role may be muddled, he certainly played a
role—either in advancing the problematic MiDAS program or failing to correct it. As a lawyer,
former Agency Director, and then head of the Policies and Procedures Group, he was undeniably
in a position of either real or advisory authority, such that he was (or should have been) aware of
the problems. In his deposition, Geskey could not deny that he was employed at the Agency in a
responsible role at the time, but he insisted that he neither did anything wrong nor knew of
anything wrong, nor should he have known. A jury might believe him, or it might not. That is
for a jury.

                                                  IV.

        Ultimately, the district court determined that the evidence could permit a jury to find that
the Questionnaire and associated process did not provide notice and an ability to defend, and that
Moffett-Massey and Geskey were directly responsible for the MiDAS adjudication program. See
Cahoo, 528 F. Supp. 3 at 754-60. Consequently, the court denied qualified immunity.

        I agree with the district court and, therefore, I would affirm. Because the majority sees it
differently, I respectfully dissent.