Court Opinion

ID: 9745006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:28:14.95677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.639135
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: I do not believe that section 3 — 8—10 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1003 — 8—10) was the applicable speedy trial statute. That section speaks of “untried complaints, charges or indictments pending in any county” and says “The state’s attorney shaU then procure the presence of said defendant for trial in his county by writ of habeas corpus.” (Emphasis added.) Crimes allegedly committed by a prison inmate in a prison, however, can be prosecuted only in the county where the prison is located. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1003 — 6—5.) This contrast demonstrates that section 3 — 8—10 of the Unified Code of Corrections does not deal with crimes allegedly committed in prison, but with crimes supposedly committed by an individual outside of prison before he is incarcerated. Since the charges against the defendants arose from an incident in prison, the charges were not within the scope of section 3 — 8—10 of the Unified Code of Corrections. Because section 3 — 8—10 of the Unified Code of Corrections was inapplicable to the defendants, they had to be prosecuted “in the same manner and subject to the same rules and limitations as are now established by law in relation to other persons charged with crime.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1003 — 6—5.) This means that the defendants had to be brought to trial within the 120-day period specified by section 103 — 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statutory period of section 103 — 5(a) starts to run when a defendant is taken into custody. (People v. Spicuzza, 57 Ill. 2d 152, 311 N.E.2d 112; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5(a).) When this section is applied to a prison inmate who has aUegedly committed a crime in prison, a problem exists in determining when the statutory period begins to run because the inmate cannot be taken into custody; he is already in custody. No decision of the IUinois Supreme Court clearly indicates when the period under section 103 — 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences for a prison inmate who is charged with committing a crime in prison. The State relies upon People v. Dery, 31 Ill. App. 3d 70,333 N.E.2d 259 (3d Dist. 1975), as authority for its argument that the segregation of an inmate for an alleged offense in prison does not start the statutory period running. Dery says that the period does not begin to run until the inmate is indicted. Another case, People v. Hundley, 13 Ill. App. 3d 935,301 N.E.2d 339 (4th Dist. 1973), holds that the period begins to run when the inmate is arraigned. Despite the authority supplied by Dery and Hundley, I believe we should follow our decision in People v. Vaughn, 4 Ill. App. 3d 51, 280 N.E.2d 253. Vaughn holds that the prosecution has a duty to take affirmative steps to bring a defendant to trial when it knows where the defendant is being held in custody. In Vaughn; this court held that the 120-day period of section 103 — 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure began to run when the administrator of the prison where the defendant was confined received a letter from the county sheriff containing warrants for the defendant’s arrest. The general principle which may be derived from Vaughn is that in the absence of an applicable statute to the contrary, such as section 103 — 5(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 103— 5(e)) or section 3 — 8—10 of the Unified Code of Corrections, the statutory speedy trial period on one charge, for a defendant who is in custody on another charge, begins to run when the defendant becomes accused under the first charge in some formal or official way. (Cf. People v. Love, 39 Ill. 2d 436, 235 N.E.2d 819.) We believe that an accusation sufficient to start the statutory period running on a charge against a prison inmate, for a crime allegedly committed in prison, occurs when the inmate is placed in segregation as punishment for the crime, or when the prison administrators request the local state’s attorney to prosecute the inmate for the crime. The defendants, Smith and Coleman, were placed in segregation on September 18, 1974, and remained there until at least March 31,1975, as punishment for their alleged battery of the officer. The 120-day period on the charges against the defendants, therefore, began to run on September 18, 1974, and expired on January 16, 1975, before the defendants were brought to trial. Even if the defendants’ placement in segregation is not regarded as enough to start the statutory period running, the letter from the prison administrator to the state’s attorney of Randolph County on September 20, 1974 requesting that the defendants be prosecuted was sufficient for that purpose. If September 20,1974, is considered as the date on which the 120-day period began to run, the period expired on January 18, 1975, before the defendants received a trial. The circuit court of Randolph County properly concluded that the defendants had been denied a speedy trial. The orders of the circuit court of Randolph County dismissing the indictments should be affirmed.