Court Opinion

ID: 9912511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:09:06.00719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:47.964565
License: Public Domain

J-S42012-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 ERIC WILLIAM                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 2294 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0003947-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 22, 2023

      Eric William appeals pro se from the order that dismissed as untimely

his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).       We

affirm.

      While Appellant was in prison awaiting trial on charges of murder, he

snuck into the cell of the murder victim’s stepfather and stabbed him in the

face, neck, and testicles. For that assault, Appellant pled guilty on March 5,

2018, to attempted murder and received a negotiated sentence of ten to

twenty years of incarceration to run concurrently with his life sentence for the

murder.

      On direct appeal, Appellant contended that he had been coerced into

pleading guilty and the trial court erred in failing to appoint substitute counsel

at Appellant’s request. On August 27, 2019, this Court affirmed the judgment
J-S42012-23

of sentence. See Commonwealth v. William, 221 A.3d 313, 314 (Pa.Super.

2019) (non-precedential decision). Specifically, we held that Appellant waived

his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary by not raising it in the

trial court.   Id. (non-precedential decision at 4-5).       We addressed his

challenge to the court’s refusal to appoint new counsel as follows:

            Here, during the guilty plea hearing, the court addressed
      Appellant’s motion to substitute counsel. Appellant explained that
      he was dissatisfied with counsel’s representation because he did
      not receive full discovery and did not adequately discuss defense
      strategy. Appellant characterized the relationship as “eroding”
      and “not a good relationship.”

             The trial court informed Appellant that if that were true [it]
      would not accept the plea.         Counsel then stated that he
      represented Appellant during the unrelated murder trial, talked
      about this incident extensively during the trial, and went over
      photographs, videos, and other discovery.           The court then
      explained that it did not hear anything indicating that counsel was
      not prepared, so it denied the motion to substitute counsel.
      Finally, the trial court again asked Appellant whether he was
      satisfied with counsel’s representation, to which Appellant
      responded “Yes.”

             Upon review, we conclude that because Appellant did not
      show irreconcilable differences between himself and counsel, the
      trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
      motion to substitute counsel.

Id. (non-precedential decision at 5-6 (cleaned up).

      Since Appellant did not seek review in our Supreme Court, his judgment

of sentence became final on September 26, 2019. On October 31, 2020, more

than one year after his judgment of sentence became final, Appellant filed a

motion for an extension of time to file a PCRA petition, citing his limited access

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to the prison library due to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Motion for Extension

of Time, 10/31/20, at 1.1 No action was taken upon the motion.

       On February 10, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition raising

claims that plea counsel was ineffective.2 The PCRA court appointed counsel,

followed by substitute counsel, who filed a request to withdraw and no-merit

letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).3

Therein, counsel tacitly acknowledged that Appellant’s petition was untimely

pursuant to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. See Finley Letter Brief, 5/9/22,

at 2-3 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545). Rather than address the possible application

of timeliness exceptions, counsel opted to “proceed as though the court

____________________________________________

1 Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, “a pro se prisoner’s document is
deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”
Commonwealth v. DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074 (Pa.Super. 2019).
Here, the certificate of service for the motion is dated October 31, 2020, and
the envelope in which it was mailed is postmarked November 3, 2020. The
envelope was stamped as having been received by the Office of Judicial
Records on November 9, 2020. The motion was received by the Prison Liaison
Unit of the Office of Judicial Records on November 24, 2020, and it was finally
docketed on November 25, 2020. While it does not alter our disposition, we
opt to use the earliest possible filing date, namely October 31, 2020, in
conducting our analysis.

2 Since the petition is not dated, we use the postmark date as the filing date

in this instance.

3 The appointment and substitution orders are not contained within the
certified record but are noted on the docket.

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granted the [motion for an] extension of time to file,” and explained the lack

of merit in Appellant’s substantive claims. Id. at 3.

       The PCRA court issued notice of its intention to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA

petition as untimely, stating that the circumstances related to the pandemic

and the various emergency orders concerning the suspension of filing

deadlines in the spring of 2020 did not prevent Appellant from filing a timely

PCRA petition.4     See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 6/17/22, at ¶¶ 15-20. The

PCRA court further agreed with counsel that the substantive issues Appellant

sought to raise were meritless.          Id. at ¶¶ 21-27.   Accordingly, the court

purported to notify Appellant that it intended to dismiss his petition without a

hearing as both untimely and meritless and advised him that he had twenty

days to file a response. Id. at ¶ 30-31. However, the docket does not indicate

that the notice was served upon Appellant, and he filed no response.

       On July 19, 2022, the PCRA court signed two orders dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition, one of which included the required notice informing

Appellant that he had thirty days to appeal the dismissal. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

907(4). The other noted counsel’s absence from that day’s proceeding, but

did not address the pending withdrawal request. There is no indication on the

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court also indicated that the law library at Appellant’s correctional

institution “was contacted” and that its records indicated that Appellant used
it on Wednesdays in August and September 2020. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
Notice, 6/17/22, at ¶ 20. We do not consider the substance of this apparent
ex parte hearsay in conducting our review.

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docket that either order was served upon Appellant by certified mail, return

receipt requested, as mandated by Rule 907(4).            However, the docket

indicates that service in some form was made upon Appellant on August 16,

2022.

        Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal no later than August 24,

2022.5 The PCRA court issued an opinion on September 7, 2022. The docket

does not reflect that the opinion was served upon Appellant or his counsel,

who had not yet received permission to withdraw. Although not ordered to

do so, the following week, Appellant pro se filed a statement of errors

complained of on appeal claiming, inter alia, that the PCRA court erred in

ruling his petition untimely and that PCRA counsel was ineffective in filing to

amend the petition to assert a timeliness exception. The PCRA court did not

file a new opinion in response to Appellant’s concise statement.

        This Court remanded the case for the PCRA court to rule upon counsel’s

withdrawal request, which it granted by order of February 15, 2023.6 The

parties thereafter filed their respective briefs. Appellant presents the following

questions for our review:

____________________________________________

5 Appellant filed an appeal before the dismissal order was entered which this

Court dismissed as duplicative. Further, since the non-compliant service was
not issued until August 16, 2022, Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2); Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d).

6 The docket does not state if or when the order was served upon the parties

or counsel.

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      1.     Whether guilty-plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
             obtain [Appellant]’s case discovery prior to advising the
             defendant to plea[d] guilty?

      2.     Whether guilty-plea counsel was ineffective when he failed
             to investigate?

      3.     Whether guilty-plea counsel was ineffective when he
             advised [Appellant] to commit perjury in order to receive
             Commonwealth’s plea offering?

      4.     Whether PCRA counsel was ineffective when he failed to
             amend [Appellant]’s PCRA petition to include a timeliness
             exception provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

      We begin with a review of the applicable law. “In general, we review an

order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the findings of the

PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred

and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161

(Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      It is well-settled “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional

and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition

and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994

(Pa.Super. 2022). Therefore, we must first consider whether the PCRA court

correctly ruled that Appellant’s claim was untimely filed.

      The PCRA provides as follows, in pertinent part, regarding the time for

filing a petition:

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      Any petition [filed pursuant to the PCRA], including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation of
         the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
         to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
         exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
         Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
         in this section and has been held by that court to apply
         retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking a timeliness exception

“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

      Appellant did not plead an exception in his pro se PCRA petition.

Instead, he addresses the timeliness of his petition on appeal by asserting

that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not amending the petition to assert that

the governmental interference timeliness exception applied. See Appellant’s

brief at 20-25.   Therefore, we address that claim before examining the

timeliness of the underlying petition.

      Pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA

court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise

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claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even

if on appeal.” Id. at 401. Since, as detailed above, there is no indication that

Appellant was served with the PCRA court’s Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, and

Appellant did not realize pro se status until after this appeal was filed, this

appeal was his first opportunity to raise the claim.

      Therefore, PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness is properly before us.

Our next task is to determine whether “the record before the appellate court

[is] sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness

claims,” or whether we must “remand to the PCRA court for further

development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such claims as

an initial matter.” Bradley, supra at 402.

      In this vein, we observe that, to prevail, Appellant must establish:

      (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that
      counsel’s course of conduct was without a reasonable basis
      designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) that he was
      prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness, i.e. there is a reasonable
      probability that but for the act or omission in question the outcome
      of the proceeding would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(cleaned up). “The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness

will cause the claim to fail.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595–

96 (Pa.Super. 2021).

      Here, Appellant contends that, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,

his “access to legal reference materials was completely restricted for several

weeks, followed by a subsequent period in which [his] access to legal

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reference materials was regulated to one hour per week.” Appellant’s brief at

21. Appellant asserts that “[t]his complete restriction from the legal reference

materials and subsequent limited access to the law library fell within the one-

year time limit in which [he] had to file his petition for post-conviction relief.”

Id.   He maintains that, by “completely restricting [his] access to legal

reference materials,” the state, “admittingly [sic] without malice and as the

direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic,” infringed upon his Fourteenth

Amendment right to court access, rendering his petition timely pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). Appellant’s brief at 22.

      Upon thorough review, we conclude that we need not remand the matter

for its further development, as we are able to determine from the certified

record that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit. Even assuming arguendo

that his constitutional rights were illegally infringed upon by the prison’s

pandemic mitigation measures, there is no indication that the lateness of the

filing was a result of governmental interference.

      This Court has acknowledged that “allegations of restrictions on access

to law libraries or legal resources do not completely prevent an inmate from

preparing legal filings.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 296 A.3d 605, 2023 WL

2489952, at *6 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision).            We have

rejected interference claims “where no research is required to complete the

form PCRA, sign it, and deliver it to authorities for mailing; and where the

courts are given latitude in deeming even non-conventional filings after

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judgments of sentence become final as PCRAs.” Commonwealth v. Cruz,

290 A.3d 681, 2022 WL 17687850, at *2 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential

decision) (cleaned up).

       In the case sub judice, the claims Appellant raised in his petition were

based upon plea counsel’s alleged (1) failure to prepare for trial by reviewing

and investigating the Commonwealth’s discovery materials and (2) advice to

“just agree to whatever they say” at the plea hearing that coerced him into a

guilty plea agreement that he did not want to take. See Appellant’s brief at

10-11, 18-19.      It is plain that these are fact-based claims that Appellant

attempted to assert on direct appeal which could have been raised

immediately after his judgment of sentence became final in September 2019.

He does not indicate what additional research was required for him to file his

PCRA petition, or how the restrictions on his library access that occurred in

the middle of the full year following the conclusion of his direct appeal were

the cause of the untimely filing.

       Accordingly, there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s contention that his

PCRA    petition   qualified   for   the    governmental   interference   timeliness

exception. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to plead the exception must fail. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis,

262 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Counsel cannot be found ineffective for

failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” (cleaned up)).

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      Furthermore, because Appellant’s petition was untimely, neither the

PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction to address the substance of his PCRA

petition.   See Fantauzzi, supra at 994.       As such, we do not consider

Appellant’s remaining arguments, but instead affirm the dismissal of his

petition as untimely.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 12/22/2023

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