Court Opinion

ID: 6974497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 02:08:34.689296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:08:55.588262
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Vickers, dissenting: I am not in accord with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion. The judgment is reversed because the trial court refused to direct a verdict for appellant. The conclusion is based on the assumption that there is no evidence fairly tending to show that the injury might reasonably have been anticipated from the negligence of appellant. The majority opinion, after stating the facts and reviewing numerous authorities, proceeds as follows: “Applying the rules of law to this case, it is clear that the defendant might reasonably anticipate, in case a wire should fall upon the sidewalk or where persons using the sidewalk or roadway would be likely to be injured, that a policeman or some other person might attempt to remove it to prevent injury, and if in so doing, or as a result of the policeman’s act, some other person should be injured the defendant would be liable, since such effort to remove the cause of danger might naturally be anticipated.” With the rule announced in the above quotation I have not the slightest quarrel. It is difficult to see' how it is legally or logically possible to avoid a conclusion directly opposite to the one reached in the majority opinion consistent with the rule laid down in the quotation which I have made. The sentences immediately following the quotation show the manner in which the majority opinion seeks to avoid the logical conclusion which seems to me ought necessarily to follow from the premises previously laid down. Those sentences are as follows: “The defendant would be liable although there was some intervening-cause, if it were such as would naturally be anticipated as the result of the wire falling to the ground, but it seems inconceivable that the defendant ought to have anticipated that a policeman would throw the wire upon the plaintiff by striking- it with his club when it was lying where no injury would be done by it either to a person on the sidewalk or the roadway. * * * The wire was lying between the sidewalk and the roadway, where it would injure no one, and the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff is, that the policeman struck it with his club and threw it upon the plaintiff as he was passing upon the sidewalk.” I am wholly unable to see how this language can be reconciled with the quotation first made from the majority opinion. In the first quotation it is said that the defendant ought to anticipate that the policeman might attempt to remove the wire and injure someone, and for an injury thus caused the defendant would be liable. In the second quotation it is said that if a policeman should strike the wire with his club while it was lying where it would do no injury to anyone on the sidewalk, it is inconceivable that the defendant could have anticipated an injury thus brought about. What is it that distinguishes the situation presented in the first quotation from that implied in the second ? Certainly the fact that the policeman used his club instead of his hands or feet to remove the live wire is not sufficient to render the liability “inconceivable” in the last proposition and “clear” in the first. Does the fact mentioned in the second proposition, that the wire was lying where no injury would be done by it to a person on the sidewalk, make the liability inconceivable ? While the majority opinion does not say so in so many words, yet there is an intimation that the wire was not immediately on the sidewalk, and for this reason the policeman should not have attempted to remove it. If this be conceded it does not help the situation. Suppose the policeman did use poor judgment in deciding to remove the wire or in selecting the means to accomplish that purpose,— or, to put it still stronger, suppose the policeman was guilty of negligence in attempting to remove the wire,—then the utmost that can be claimed is that the policeman’s negligence operated jointly with the negligence of appellant in producing the injury, and if this view be taken, under the authorities cited in the majority opinion appellant is liable. If the policeman, of his own malice or wantonness, threw the wire on appellee and intentionally injured him appellant would not be liable. There is, however, not a particle of evidence to sustain that theory and I do not understand the majority opinion to proceed upon that hypothesis. The negligence of appellant is conclusively settled by the judgment of the Appellate Court. There is no pretense that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence. At least, if that question was ever in the case, it is likewise settled by the judgment of affirmance by the Appellate Court. The only thing left, then, is the question of fact whether the injury resulted from causes which ougdit to have been reasonably anticipated by appellant. Under the rule first above quoted from the majority opinion there ought to be no doubt as to this question. The injury occurred by the attempt of a policeman in good faith to remove a danger from a public highway, placed there by the negligence of appellant. Applying the law to these facts, I think appellant is liable. Mr. Justice Carter, also dissenting.