Court Opinion

ID: 9384612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 15:00:38.880107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.019511
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2301    Document: 75     Page: 1   Filed: 04/04/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  CHARLES BERTINI,
                      Appellant

                             v.

                      APPLE INC.,
                         Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2021-2301
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
 91229891.
                  ______________________

                  Decided: April 4, 2023
                  ______________________

    JAMES BERTINI, Denver, CO, argued for appellant.

     ADAM HOWARD CHARNES, Kilpatrick Townsend &
 Stockton LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for appellee. Also repre-
 sented by WILLIAM BRYNER, Winston-Salem, NC;
 THEODORE H. DAVIS, JR., Atlanta, GA; JOHN D. MAYBERRY,
 SARA K. STADLER, New York, NY; JOSEPH E. PETERSEN,
 Menlo Park, CA.
                 ______________________

  Before MOORE, Chief Judge, TARANTO and CHEN, Circuit
                        Judges.
Case: 21-2301    Document: 75      Page: 2    Filed: 04/04/2023

 2                                       BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

 MOORE, Chief Judge.
     Charles Bertini appeals from a final decision of the
 Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dismissing his opposi-
 tion to Apple Inc.’s application to register the mark APPLE
 MUSIC. For the following reasons, we reverse.
                        BACKGROUND
      Apple filed Trademark Application No. 86/659,444 to
 register the standard character mark APPLE MUSIC for
 several services in International Class 41, including, inter
 alia, production and distribution of sound recordings and
 arranging, organizing, conducting, and presenting live mu-
 sical performances. Bertini, a professional jazz musician,
 filed a notice of opposition to Apple’s application. Bertini
 has used the mark APPLE JAZZ in connection with festi-
 vals and concerts since June 13, 1985. In the mid-1990s,
 Bertini began using APPLE JAZZ to issue and distribute
 sound recordings under his record label. Bertini opposed
 Apple’s registration of APPLE MUSIC on the ground that
 it would likely cause confusion with Bertini’s common law
 trademark APPLE JAZZ. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
     The Board issued a final decision dismissing Bertini’s
 opposition. Bertini v. Apple, Inc., 2021 WL 1575580
 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 16, 2021) (Board Decision). The Board found
 Bertini’s common law mark APPLE JAZZ is inherently dis-
 tinctive and that Bertini may claim a priority date of June
 13, 1985 for APPLE JAZZ in connection with “[a]rranging,
 organizing, conducting, and presenting concerts [and] live
 musical performances.” Id. at *9–12. These findings are
 undisputed on appeal. The parties also agreed there was a
 likelihood consumers would confuse Bertini’s use of APPLE
 JAZZ with Apple’s use of APPLE MUSIC. Id. at *8. The
 parties only dispute priority of use. Id.
     Apple began using the mark APPLE MUSIC on June
 8, 2015, when it launched its music streaming service,
 nearly thirty years after Bertini’s 1985 priority date. Apple
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 BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.                                    3

 argued, however, it was entitled to an earlier priority date
 of August 1968 based on trademark rights it purchased
 from Apple Corps, the Beatles’ record company. Apple pur-
 chased Apple Corps’ Registration No. 2034964 in 2007.
 The ’964 registration covers the mark APPLE for
 “[g]ramophone records featuring music” and “audio com-
 pact discs featuring music” and claims a date of first use of
 August 1968.
     The Board found Apple Corps continuously used its
 APPLE mark on gramophone records, and other recording
 formats, since August 1968. Id. at *13–17. It further found
 Apple was entitled to tack its 2015 use of APPLE MUSIC
 onto Apple Corps’ 1968 use of APPLE and thus had priority
 over Bertini. Id. at *18–21. The Board accordingly dis-
 missed Bertini’s opposition and denied Bertini’s subse-
 quent motion for reconsideration. Id. at *21. Bertini
 appeals.     We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(4)(B).
                           DISCUSSION
     Bertini challenges the Board’s determination that Ap-
 ple’s use of APPLE MUSIC has priority over Bertini’s use
 of APPLE JAZZ. We hold Apple cannot tack its use of
 APPLE MUSIC for live musical performances onto Apple
 Corps’ use of APPLE for gramophone records and that its
 application to register APPLE MUSIC must therefore be
 denied. Accordingly, we reverse.
                               I
     We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its
 factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Pacer Tech.,
 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The tacking inquiry
 is a question of fact. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574
 U.S. 418, 422–23 (2015).
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 4                                      BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

                              II
     Trademark rights arise from the use of a mark in com-
 merce. Hana, 574 U.S. at 419. The party who first uses a
 distinctive mark in connection with particular goods or ser-
 vices has priority over other users. Id. “Recognizing that
 trademark users ought to be permitted to make certain
 modifications to their marks over time without losing pri-
 ority,” trademark owners may, in limited circumstances,
 “clothe a new mark with the priority position of an older
 mark.” Id. at 419–20. This doctrine is known as “tacking.”
 Id. at 420.
     We permit tacking because, without it, “a trademark
 owner’s priority in his mark would be reduced each time he
 made the slightest alteration to the mark, which would dis-
 courage him from altering the mark in response to chang-
 ing    consumer       preferences,    evolving    aesthetic
 developments, or new advertising and marketing styles.”
 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d
 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999). Trademark owners often mod-
 ernize and update their trademarks in response to a chang-
 ing marketplace. See Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
 586 F.3d 487, 496 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the need for
 trademark owners and their licensees to make “modest
 changes in the appearance or wording of the trademark” to
 respond to “unpredictable fluctuations in consumer re-
 sponse”).
      The standard for a trademark owner to invoke tacking
 is strict. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926
 F.2d 1156, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1991), abrogated on other
 grounds by Hana, 574 U.S. 418. The party seeking to tack
 bears the burden to show the old mark and the new mark
 “‘create the same, continuing commercial impression’ so
 that consumers ‘consider both as the same mark.’” Hana,
 574 U.S. at 422 (quoting Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at
 1159).     In other words, the marks must be “legal
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 BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.                                     5

 equivalents.” 1 Id. This standard requires showing more
 than a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. Van
 Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at 1159. The commercial impression
 of a trademark is “the meaning or idea it conveys or the
 mental reaction it evokes,” including the information it
 conveys with respect to source. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana
 Bank, 735 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gideon
 Mark & Jacob Jacoby, Continuing Commercial Impression:
 Applications and Measurement, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
 REV. 433, 434 (2006)), aff’d, 574 U.S. 418; see also Spice Is-
 lands, Inc. v. Frank Tea & Spice Co., 505 F.2d 1293, 1296
 (CCPA 1974) (finding two marks create the same commer-
 cial impression because they “convey to prospective pur-
 chasers the same idea, same mental reaction, and same
 meaning”).
      Our cases demonstrate the limited reach of the tacking
 doctrine. For example, in Van Dyne-Crotty, we rejected the
 trademark owner’s attempt to tack its use of CLOTHES
 THAT WORK for clothing apparel onto CLOTHES THAT
 WORK. FOR THE WORK YOU DO for the same goods in
 the wholesale rather than retail market. 926 F.2d at 1158–
 60. We affirmed the Board’s finding that the marks create
 different commercial impressions because consumers
 “would clearly differentiate them” based simply on the vis-
 ual appearance of the marks. Id. at 1159–60. In Ilco Corp.
 v. Ideal Security Hardware Corp., our predecessor court de-
 termined the trademark owner was not entitled to tack its
 use of HOME PROTECTION CENTER for display racks
 onto its prior use of HOME PROTECTION HARDWARE
 for the same goods. 527 F.2d 1221, 1224–25 (CCPA 1976).
 The two marks created different commercial impressions

     1   Although the terminology “legal equivalents” is
 typically used, the Supreme Court has made clear this is a
 factual question. Hana, 574 U.S. at 422–23 (abrogating
 prior decisions holding this was a legal question).
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 6                                       BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

 even when applied to the same goods because the former
 mark “signifies a unitary aggregation of goods related to
 home protection,” while the latter mark “refer[s] to the
 hardware itself.” Id.
     Other circuits uniformly apply the tacking doctrine
 narrowly. For example, in Jim O’Neal, the trademark
 owner could not tack its angular O’ mark onto its rounded
 O’ mark because the two marks were materially different
 in appearance. One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib.,
 Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2009). In Data Con-
 cepts, “DCI” and the stylized mark “dci” were not legal
 equivalents because “the two marks do not look alike.”
 Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digit. Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620,
 623–24 (6th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
 Hana, 574 U.S. 418; see also George & Co. v. Imagination
 Ent. Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 402 (4th Cir. 2009) (determining
 the mark LEFT CENTER RIGHT and the abbreviated
 mark LCR are not legal equivalents for tacking purposes
 because the marks are not confusingly similar and “look
 and sound different”).
      While rare, tacking can apply in situations where the
 marks are sufficiently similar such that a consumer would
 understand the two marks identify the same source. For
 instance, in American Security Bank v. American Security
 & Trust Co., the trademark applicant could tack its use of
 AMERICAN SECURITY BANK for banking services onto
 its prior use of AMERICAN SECURITY for the same ser-
 vices. 571 F.2d 564, 567 (CCPA 1978). The court deter-
 mined the two marks were legal equivalents because “the
 word ‘bank’ is purely descriptive and adds nothing to the
 origin-indicating significance of AMERICAN SECURITY.”
 Id. Similarly, in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, the
 Ninth Circuit held the jury reasonably concluded Hana
 Bank could tack its use of the mark HANA BANK for fi-
 nancial services onto its prior use of HANA OVERSEAS
 KOREAN CLUB for the same services. 735 F.3d at 1166.
 Hana Bank (a well-known Korean bank) had previously
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 BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.                                     7

 used its HANA OVERSEAS KOREAN CLUB mark in Eng-
 lish next to its HANA BANK mark in Korean on advertise-
 ments in the United States. Id. at 1166–67. In this
 context, it was reasonable for a jury to find that ordinary
 consumers (i.e., Korean-speaking consumers familiar with
 Hana Bank’s presence in Korea) would associate HANA
 BANK with the same source as HANA OVERSEAS
 KOREAN CLUB. Id. at 1167 (“‘Hana’ was arguably the
 most significant portion of the trade name, as the ordinary
 purchasers would have then made the association between
 the English word ‘Hana’ and the Bank’s Korean name.”).
                              III
     This case raises a question of first impression regard-
 ing the appropriate tacking standard in the registration
 context: whether a trademark applicant can establish pri-
 ority for every good or service in its application merely be-
 cause it has priority through tacking in a single good or
 service listed in its application. We hold it cannot. Bertini
 argues the Board erred by only considering whether Apple
 can tack its use of APPLE MUSIC for production and dis-
 tribution of sound recordings—one of several services listed
 in Apple’s application. Apple responds that its application
 should be granted as to all listed goods or services if it can
 establish priority through tacking in any one of those goods
 or services. We do not agree.
     Apple seeks to register its APPLE MUSIC mark for 15
 broad categories of services, from the production and dis-
 tribution of sound recordings, to presenting live musical
 performances, to providing websites featuring entertain-
 ment and sports information. Apple attempts to claim pri-
 ority for all of these services by tacking onto Apple Corps’
 1968 use of APPLE for gramophone records. The Board
 found Apple was entitled to tack its use of APPLE MUSIC
 for production and distribution of sound recordings onto
 Apple Corps’ 1968 use of APPLE for gramophone records
 and thus may claim priority for all of the services listed in
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 8                                         BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

 its application. Board Decision, 2021 WL 1575580, at *18–
 21; see also id. at *8 (“It is sufficient to find priority as to
 any goods or services encompassed by the application or
 registration.”). It made no findings regarding the other
 services listed in the application.
     The Board legally erred by permitting Apple to claim
 absolute priority for all of the services listed in its applica-
 tion based on a showing of priority for one service listed in
 the application. Tacking a mark for one good or service
 does not grant priority for every other good or service in the
 trademark application. Cf. Van Dyne-Crotty, 926 F.2d at
 1160 (“[I]t would be clearly contrary to well-established
 principles of trademark law to sanction the tacking of a
 mark with a narrow commercial impression onto one with
 a broader commercial impression.”). A trademark owner
 must show tacking is available for each good or service for
 which it claims priority on that ground.
     In holding otherwise, the Board conflated the tacking
 standard with the standard for oppositions under 15 U.S.C.
 § 1052(d). See Board Decision, 2021 WL 1575580, at *8
 (“Neither Opposer nor Applicant need prove, and we need
 not find, priority as to each service listed in the respective
 recitations of services.”). An opposer can block a trademark
 application in full by proving priority of use and likelihood
 of confusion for any of the services listed in the trademark
 application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp.,
 Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336 (CCPA 1981) (affirming Board
 decision sustaining opposition where opposer showed the
 applicant’s use of the mark on T-shirts would likely cause
 confusion with opposer’s mark, where the registration in-
 cluded T-shirts, dresses, skirts, coats, scarves, etc.); 3
 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 20:17
 (5th ed.). The reverse is not true. The trademark applicant
 cannot establish absolute priority for the full application
 simply by proving priority of use for a single service listed
 in the application.
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 BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.                                     9

     To sustain his opposition, Bertini therefore only needs
 to show he has priority of use of APPLE JAZZ for any ser-
 vice listed in Apple’s application. Bertini’s use of APPLE
 JAZZ overlaps with two of the services in Apple’s applica-
 tion: production and distribution of sound recordings; and
 arranging, organizing, conducting, and presenting live mu-
 sical performances. The Board improperly focused only on
 Apple’s ability to tack its use of APPLE MUSIC for produc-
 tion and distribution of sound recordings and did not con-
 sider live musical performances. Even assuming Apple is
 entitled to tack its use of APPLE MUSIC for production
 and distribution of sound recordings onto Apple Corps’
 1968 use of APPLE for gramophone records, this does not
 give Apple priority as of 1968 for live musical perfor-
 mances. Nor does it give Apple a 1968 priority date for the
 laundry list of other services in its application. 2
      The Board found, and Apple does not dispute, that Ber-
 tini may claim priority of use of APPLE JAZZ in connection
 with “[a]rranging, organizing, conducting, and presenting
 concerts [and] live musical performances” as early as June
 13, 1985. Board Decision, 2021 WL 1575580, at *12. To
 defeat Bertini’s showing of priority, Apple must at mini-
 mum show it is entitled to tack its use of APPLE MUSIC

     2    There is a question as to whether Apple—to suc-
 cessfully defeat Bertini’s opposition—must establish that
 the full scope of the goods and services listed in its current
 application is entitled to tacking, or whether simply tack-
 ing just to the services overlapping with Bertini’s use of
 APPLE JAZZ is sufficient. We need not decide that ques-
 tion because, here, it is enough to conclude that Apple, as
 explained infra, is unable to tack back for live musical per-
 formances.
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 10                                       BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

 for live musical performances 3 onto Apple Corps’ use of
 APPLE for gramophone records.
     This raises a question regarding the scope of the tack-
 ing inquiry. Trademark rights arise from the use of the
 mark in connection with particular goods or services. See
 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138,
 142 (2015); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918). We therefore cannot evaluate
 whether two marks create the same commercial impres-
 sion without considering the goods or services on which the
 marks are used. Our tacking cases have focused on
 whether a trademark owner can tack two different marks
 which have been used for the same goods or services. We
 have not addressed the appropriate standard for tacking
 uses on different goods or services.
     The Board has held tacking requires the new and old
 goods or services be “substantially identical.” See Big Blue
 Prods. Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 1991 WL 326549, at
 *3 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 1991); see also C.P. Ints., Inc. v. Cal.
 Pools, Inc., 238 F.3d 690, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting
 “substantially identical” goods or services is the “dominant
 terminology” for tacking). Both parties urge us to apply
 this standard. We agree the goods or services must be sub-
 stantially identical for tacking to apply. This standard

      3     In determining tacking in an opposition, we look to
 the full scope of goods and services described in the appli-
 cation, rather than the goods and services actually used by
 the applicant. Stone Lion Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap.
 LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“It was proper
 . . . for the Board to focus on the application and registra-
 tions rather than on real-world conditions, because ‘the
 question of registrability of an applicant’s mark must be
 decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth
 in the application.’” (quoting Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston
 Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed Cir. 1990))).
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 BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.                                   11

 does not require complete identity of the goods or services.
 Such a rule would fail to account for technological innova-
 tion which impacts how products evolve over time. For ex-
 ample, music recording formats have changed over time as
 technology has improved—from gramophone records, to
 cassettes, to compact discs. A trademark owner should not
 lose priority simply because it updates the medium
 through which it distributes musical recordings, so long as
 consumers would associate these various music formats as
 emanating from the same source. See Marlyn Nutraceuti-
 cals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878
 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Trademark owners are permitted to make
 small changes to their products without abandoning their
 marks.”); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competi-
 tion § 17:24 (5th ed.) (“[N]ormal product changes do not dis-
 turb the priority of a trademark owner.”). To do so would
 discourage brand innovation.
     Goods and services are substantially identical for pur-
 poses of tacking where the new goods or services are within
 the normal evolution of the previous line of goods or ser-
 vices. This inquiry depends, at least in part, on whether
 consumers would generally expect the new goods or ser-
 vices to emanate from the same source as the previous
 goods or services. See J. Wiss & Sons Co. v. W. E. Bassett
 Co., 462 F.2d 567, 569–70 (CCPA 1972) (determining
 trademark applicant could not tack its use of TRIMLINE
 for hair cutting shears onto its prior use of QUICK-TRIM
 for grass shears because hair cutting shears are not in the
 normal expansion from grass shears); see also 4 McCarthy
 on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:21 (5th ed.)
 (“When the issue is not enjoining an intervening user, but
 priority and registration rights of one of the parties to an
 inter partes proceeding, the issue is whether customers are
 likely to link a mark in its expansion market with the orig-
 inal, senior usage.”).
    To establish tacking, Apple must therefore show live
 musical performances are substantially identical to
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 12                                      BERTINI   v. APPLE INC.

 gramophone records. There is no need to vacate and re-
 mand for the Board to make a finding on this issue in the
 first instance. No reasonable person could conclude, based
 on the record before us, that gramophone records and live
 musical performances are substantially identical. Nothing
 in the record supports a finding that consumers would
 think Apple’s live musical performances are within the nor-
 mal product evolution of Apple Corps’ gramophone records.
     Accordingly, Apple is not entitled to tack its use of
 APPLE MUSIC for live musical performances onto Apple
 Corps’ 1968 use of APPLE for gramophone records. Be-
 cause Apple began using the mark APPLE MUSIC in 2015,
 Bertini has priority of use for APPLE JAZZ as to live mu-
 sical performances. We therefore reverse the Board’s dis-
 missal of Bertini’s opposition to Apple’s application to
 register APPLE MUSIC. 4
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons given above,
 we reverse the Board’s dismissal of Bertini’s opposition.
                        REVERSED
                             COSTS
 Costs awarded to Bertini.

      4  We do not and need not consider whether the pro-
 priety of tacking here, an inquiry that considers the
 “origin-indicating significance” of marks, Am. Sec. Bank,
 571 F.2d at 567, is affected by the fact that Apple (the com-
 puter company) is not the same company as Apple Corps
 (the Beatles’ record label).