Court Opinion

ID: 9883913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:25:20.191275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:33.029103
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I believe the claimed errors do not require a reversal and because the ultimate result upon any retrial will be the same.
No question is raised about the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury verdict of conviction. Adcock presents ten rather technical legal arguments related to the conduct of the trial. My review of the record indicates that the alleged errors are marginal, judgmental trial situations which should not be magnified into reversible error on appeal. In my view the trial was fundamentally fair.
The result in this case will not be any different upon an ultimate retrial. Considering the entire case there is no substantial possibility that the result would be any different and the alleged errors are nonprejudicial. RCr 9.24; Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949 (1969).
Therefore, reversal serves no useful purpose.
The crucial argument on which the majority opinion is based is the right of the defendant to cross-examine a prosecution witness about the parole status in order to demonstrate bias or prejudice. In my view the trial judge properly excluded all evidence of parole status. Adcock concedes that ordinarily probation or parole status is not to be mentioned during trial. See Payne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867 (1981).
Here, the witness who was a new neighbor of the victim, identified Adcock as running out of the victim’s house. Adcock argues that the witness may have had an interest in pleasing the police because he was on active parole supervision.
The prior felony of the witness was not an offense subject to comment under Cotton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 698 (1970). The trial judge ruled that Ad-cock could not question the witness about his criminal record but could ask why he gave information to the police. The prosecution witness testified that he did not try to help the police, he just wanted to help himself and his family because they lived across the alley from where it happened and his home had been previously burglarized. Consequently, it would appear that Adcock was free to inquire as to any other motive for possible bias by the witness in testifying.
An examination of the record indicates that a later witness who was also a neighbor of the victim testified that the witness in question did not want to talk to the police at all because he did not want to get involved. In my opinion the record indicates that the witness was not trying to obtain any favorable treatment from police but did not want to get involved in any respect. I do not believe there is any reasonable basis under the facts of this case to permit inquiry into parole status.
Use of the federal case of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), is inappropriate for witnesses on parole in Kentucky. Davis v. Alaska, supra, is related to the possibility of favor*447able treatment and the reasonable expectation by the witness of obtaining favorable treatment from police and prosecutors.
In Kentucky, parole and probation are totally distinct concepts. Probation may be granted by the judicial system whereas parole is a function of the admmistrative branch of government. A probationer remains subject to the trial court and adverse comment by the local prosecutor, but the parolee is under the jurisdiction of the State parole board insulated from local pressure. In Davis v. Alaska, the chief prosecution witness was on probation; this witness was on parole.
I do not believe this Court should be in the position of a precursor of United States Supreme Court in expanding the rights of criminal defendants. If anything, our obligation is to follow the direction of the highest federal court and not to provide new means for erosion of existing Kentucky legal principles and procedures.
It is interesting to note in the concurring opinion in Davis v. Alaska, Mr. Justice Potter Stewart finds that the right to cross-examine a particular prosecution witness about his status as a probationer is only a qualified right and is not conferred in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness.
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.
AKER and STEPHENSON, JJ„ join in this dissent.