Court Opinion

ID: 9775036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:41:30.201738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:19.193346
License: Public Domain

Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s analysis of this case. Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (1987) addresses evidence at trial in general and provides that “[a] conviction cannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof.” In Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983), we noted that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated by other independent evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime; it is not sufficient to prove that the crime was committed and the circumstances of the crime. The test for determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Corroboration must be evidence of a substantive nature since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with the crime and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice’s testimony; in addition to being substantive, the corroborating evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is stronger evidence than that which merely raises a suspicion of guilt; it is evidence which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense charged; however, it is something less than that evidence necessary in and of itself to sustain a conviction. The corroborating evidence may be circumstantial, but it must be of a material nature and legitimately tend to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, and it may be furnished by the acts, conduct, declarations, or testimony of the accused. In this case, the State presented three statements made by Hill, Daniels’ co-defendant. Hill’s first statement was oral and exculpatory. Hill’s second statement was written and stated as follows: Last night the, twenty-seventh, me and (blanked out) and Ray were kidding. Ray got serious about it. (Blanked out) and Ray came into the store and (blanked out) called me on the pay phone and said he was scared after I told him I was scared. He said Ray was in the car. Ray came in and gave me a sack and to the money and left. Hill’s third statement, two hours later, was also written and stated as follows: Ray Crutchfield told me where the money was at. I, Rhonda, went and asked where it was and he said over at (blanked out) mother’s. Rhonda Hill, Sgt. Poe and myself, Sgt. Bouwknegt, went over to North Little Rock to (blanked out) mother’s house. I, Rhonda Hill, run up and got the money. I brought it back and give it to Sgt. Bouwknegt. The State also presented the testimony of Sgt. Bouwknegt, who stated that he went with Hill to 44 Eastgate in North Little Rock and watcher her as she went up to the residence, knocked on the door, went inside, and returned with a brown purse containing money. Sgt. Bouwknegt further testified that Daniels gave 44 Eastgate as his home address when he was arrested.According to his records, Sgt. Bouwknegt stated that Daniels’ mother lived at the residence, but that he did not know if anyone else lived there, particularly Daniels. To test the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence in this case, we eliminate the testimony of Rhonda Hill, the accomplice, and. determine whether the corroborating evidence is sufficient. Henderson v. State, supra (citing King v. State, 254 Ark. 509, 494 S.W.2d 476 (1973)). By Officer Bouwknegt’s own admission, he did not know whether Daniels lived at the address where Hill retrieved money in an amount approximating the amount stolen from the convenience store. Daniels was arrested at 12:30 a.m. on the same night as the reported incident, and Officer Bouwknegt went to 44 Eastgate with Hill at 2:00 a.m. There is no indication who was inside the house, if anyone, when Hill retrieved the money, nor is there testimony as to who placed the money in the residence. Indeed, we are left with nothing more than circumstance that money in an amount approximating the amount stolen from the convenience store where Hill worked was recovered from the residence of Daniel’s mother, the address which Daniels listed as his home address at the time of his arrest. This fact, standing alone, is not sufficient corroboration. See generally Olles & Anderson v. State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976) (the mere fact that stolen property was found, after the accused had been incarcerated on another charge for several days, in a house jointly occupied by the accused and one who is an accomplice in its theft is not sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice.) It is just as consistent with the evidence presented that Crutchfield stored the money, since he was the one who actually took it from Hill, at Daniels’ mother apartment. Consequently, I respectfully dissent. Newbern, J., joins in this dissent.