Court Opinion

ID: 9704494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:37:15.935137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.907657
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the correct disposition of appellant’s due process claim turns on whether appellant did in fact receive written notice of the claimed violations of probation. I also share the majority’s disapproval of the Superior Court majority’s consideration of evidence de hors the record. However, I disagree with the majority that the notice issue can be resolved on the present state of the record. In my view, proper resolution of this claim requires a hearing limited to the question of notice.1 For this reason, like Judge Price in his dissenting opinion, I would remand for the limited purpose of determining whether the notice requirement was satisfied.2

. I note that two of the Superior Court judges expressed the view that the letter which allegedly satisfied the notice requirement was completely illegible. (Hoffman, J., dissenting, joined by Spaeth, J.).

. I note also that the Commonwealth’s brief does not ask this Court to consider the “no waiver” rule created in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 232 Pa.Super. 57, 331 A.2d 836 (1974). Therefore, like the majority, I reserve judgment on whether this rule is mandated by Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973), or whether it is inconsistent with this Court’s well-established policy of requiring preservation of objections for appeal. See e. g., Dilliplane v. Lehigh Valley Trust, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).