Court Opinion

ID: 9695520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:38.710566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.540706
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring. I concur, but point out that my vote to affirm the Board rests essentially on the standard of review that, in my view, is best suited to appeals of this nature.
The Board is akin to a jury, and must exercise judgment to temper arguably technical violations of the Code with a collective view of fairness. See In re Pressly, 160 Vt. 319, 322, 628 A.2d 927, 929 (1993) (Court gives deference to Board’s recommendations on sanctions); see also Administrative Order No. 9, Rule 1(F)(3) (version in effect prior to September 1, 1999 revision) (Board charged with responsibility to make findings concerning attorney conduct). This exercise of judgment by a majority of the Board could be ignored by this Court, as if we were the judges of the facts, but, in my view, that would be a mistaken exercise of appellate review. See Pressly, 160 Vt. at 322, 628 A.2d at 929 (this Court must uphold Board’s findings unless clearly erroneous).
The Court in this case has not defined the applicable standard of review. The dissenting members of the Court have essentially substituted their judgment for that of the Board’s, an improper standard, in my view I would pay deference to the Board’s assessment of the attorney’s conduct, and not second guess its conclusion unless clearly unreasonable. Where reasonable people might differ on the outcome, we should defer to the judgment of the Board.
Furthermore, even assuming that respondent violated the provision of the Code with which he was charged, the dissenting Justices overstate the severity of the violation and the need for sanctions. There was no evidence that the attorney here willfully committed fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Nor was there any evidence of a pattern of prior misconduct, or of a venal or dishonest motive. Indeed, the Board’s factual findings, which are not challenged by the dissenters, establish that the attorney believed, however foolishly, that he was giving sound legal advice. This amounts at most to negligence, not to intentional fraud and deceit.
Not every technical violation of the Code requires the imposition of discipline. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Dudman, 981 P.2d 314, 316 (Okla. 1999) (attorney’s unintentional violation of rule did not warrant imposition of discipline). Rather, the Board must consider whether discipline is required, and the degree to be imposed, through *324a reasonable and reasoned process, taking into account the seriousness of the transgression, the presence of a dishonest or- selfish motive, whether there has been a pattern of impropriety, and the effect of the violation on the public and the administration of justice. See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 10 cmt. (1996) (imposition of sanction may depend upon variety of mitigating and aggravating factors).
Therefore, even if the dissenting Justices were correct that a violation occurred in this case, I would not be persuaded that the Board’s decision should be reversed and the matter remanded for the imposition of sanctions.