Court Opinion

ID: 9562370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:27:09.629078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.503831
License: Public Domain

Malone, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the standard of review adopted by the majority in this case. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s sentence should be vacated.
In this case, the defendant allegedly set out to kill Willard LaGrange, who had recently stabbed the defendant’s brother in a gang fight. The police spotted the defendant’s car and followed him to LaGrange’s residence. The defendant left the car carrying a handgun and told the police he was going inside the house to kill LaGrange. The police ordered the defendant to surrender, but he refused. During the standoff, the defendant appeared calm and he requested that police officers give him a cigarette, which he smoked. After prolonged negotiations with police, the defendant surrendered his weapon.
Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion for departure. The motion cited the following mitigating factors: (1) The defendant was 17 years of age; (2) the defendant had not previously committed any offenses which would be deemed a felony if he had *214been an adult; (3) the victim was an aggressor, or at least a participant, in the incident which preceded the defendant’s crime; (4) the defendant’s brother was stabbed and seriously injured by the victim as a result of the incident which preceded the defendant’s crime; (5) the defendant’s judgment as to how to respond to the stabbing of his brother was impaired because of the defendant’s age and immaturity; and (6) no harm resulted from the defendant’s crime and that, as such, the harm was significantly less than typical for such an offense.
The victim in the case, Willard LaGrange, wrote a letter to the judge prior to sentencing. The letter minimized the defendant’s crime and recommended that the defendant receive leniency.
At sentencing, the judge stated a belief that the defendant should have been charged with aggravated assault rather than with attempted murder. However, the judge never expressly cited this belief as a reason for departure, although the judge imposed a sentence consistent with a conviction for aggravated assault.
At the conclusion of his remarks, the judge stated:
“And I’ll adopt those mitigating factors that were set out by Mr. Durr [defense attorney] in so departing in this case. I’ll also find that in this case as one of the mitigating factors, Mr. Durr, in case you didn’t set that out, that the degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime was significantly less than typical for such an offense. . . . And also the fact that the victim in this case was in fact an aggressor, or at least a participant that led to the criminal conduct of the defendant in this case that led to his conviction.”
The journal entry filed in this case sets forth only the two mitigating factors specifically cited by the court.
Our task on review is to determine whether the sentencing court’s findings of fact and reasons justifying departure (1) are supported by substantial competent evidence and (2) constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure as a matter of law. An appellate court’s review is limited to the findings of fact and reasons justifying departure specifically enunciated by the sentencing court. State v. Richardson, 20 Kan. App. 2d 932, Syl. ¶ 3, 901 P.2d 1 (1995).
This dissent will only address the two mitigating factors specifically cited by the sentencing court .and not the other factors in the *215departure motion. The two mitigating factors cited by the sentencing court are supported by substantial competent evidence. First, die court found that “the victim was an aggressor or participant in the criminal conduct associated with the crime of conviction.” (Emphasis added.) The evidence supports the fact that the victim in this case participated in a gang fight involving the defendant’s brother which caused the defendant to take action against the victim in the first place. Second, the court found that “the degree of harm or loss attributed to the crime of conviction was significantiy less than typical for such an offense.” In this case, the victim wrote a letter to the sentencing judge stating that he believed the defendant was being treated too harshly and asking that the defendant receive leniency. It is reasonable fhat a sentencing court could infer from this evidence that the degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime of conviction was significantly less than typical for such an offense.
Once we determine that the sentencing court’s findings of fact and reasons justifying departure are supported by substantial competent evidence, we must determine whether they constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure as a matter of law. The Kansas Legislature chose not to define “substantial and compelling.” Instead, to assist sentencing courts in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons exist, K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4716 provides a nonexclusive list of aggravating and mitigating factors fhat the sentencing court may consider. In this case, the two factors cited by the court are statutory mitigating factors pursuant to K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4716. Whether a sentencing court’s reasons justifying departure constitute substantial and compelling reasons as a matter of law must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Cases in which the sentencing court does not rely upon any statutoiy aggravating or mitigating factors to depart should be viewed with a stricter scrutiny. However, when the sentencing court relies upon statutoiy aggravating or mitigating factors to depart, these reasons should be given great deference by a reviewing court.
In this case, the sentencing judge chose unfortunate and improper language when he stated that he viewed the crime as an *216aggravated assault. In the final analysis, however, the court found two reasons justifying departure which are supported by substantial competent evidence and constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure as a matter of law.
This case presents an additional issue concerning the extent of a sentencing court’s departure. In other words, when a sentencing court’s findings justifying departure are supported by substantial competent evidence and constitute substantial and compelling reasons as a matter of law, what is the extent of departure which may be imposed by the sentencing court?
K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719 provides limitations for departure sentencing. A durational departure shall not total more than double the maximum duration of the presumptive imprisonment term. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719(b)(2). Also, if a sentencing judge imposes a prison term as a dispositional departure which is combined with an upward durational departure, the judge is required to set forth separate substantial and compelling reasons for each departure. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719(c)(2). The majority opinion concluded that the Kansas Legislature intended for sentencing courts to always provide separate reasons for both durational and dispositional departures. However, the statute makes it clear that this only applies if a prison term is imposed as a dispositional departure which is also combined with an upward durational departure.
There is no statutory limitation for a downward durational departure. The only statutory limitation for a nonprison dispositional departure concerns the length of probation granted by die judge. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719(d); K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4611(c).
In this case, the sentencing court’s combined dispositional and durational departure did not violate statutory limits. Also, the sentencing court was not required to provide separate reasons for the dispositional and durational departures in this instance.
In conclusion, I believe the sentencing court’s findings justifying departure (1) are supported by substantial competent evidence and (2) constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure as a matter of law. The extent of the sentencing court’s departure is within statutory limits. Accordingly, the departure sentence should be upheld.