Court Opinion

ID: 9604736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:26:03.188926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:38.947260
License: Public Domain

LAVENDER, Justice,
dissenting:
Because I am unable to find any Constitutional, statutory or inherent authority which would support the actions of the Respondent Administrative Judge as reflected in his orders AD 7-87-6, AD 7-87-19, AD 7-87-20 and AD 7-87-30,1 I would hold such orders to be void.
Neither can I agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion: “In ministerial matters, the District Court Clerk is subject to the authority of the Administrative Judge.”
If I were writing for the court I would confine the authority of the Administrative Judge over the Court Clerk to those instances where the Court Clerk has failed to act, or is acting in such a manner as to effectively thwart the administration of justice or the operation of the courts. These would be instances where, as in Hirsck v. Twyford, 40 Okl. 220, 139 P. 313 (Okla.1913), the Clerk refused to enter a court’s judgment of record. See also Barrett v. Barrett, 207 Okl. 234, 249 P.2d 88 (Okla.1952).
I would agree that if the Court Clerk refused to assign a deputy court clerk to a court upon request of the judge of that court, or having furnished one, arbitrarily removed the deputy against the wishes of the judge, or supplied the judge with an incompetent deputy that, in these instances, the authority of the judge to control his court and to see that the business of the judicial department is done expeditiously and without unnecessary delay or interference by others, would permit the issuance of appropriate directive orders by the Administrative Judge to the Court Clerk, to correct such problems. The above concerns were involved in Rutledge v. Workman, 332 S.E.2d 831 (W.Va.1985).
In Rutledge the Clerk was found to be subject to an order of the judge prohibiting the transfer of the judge’s courtroom deputy without the court’s approval. A long history of conflict in this area had occurred during which the court’s efficiency was impaired by the Clerk’s assignment of incompetent clerks to the judge’s courtroom. Transfer out of her courtroom of competent clerks, without approval of the judge, had also occurred.
But compare State of Missouri ex rel. Geers v. Lasky, 449 S.W.2d 598 (Mo.1970) in which it was held that where a similar (Rutledge) order was entered, the same was void as not authorized by either a statute or by the inherent power of the court. It is interesting that in Geers “inherent power” of a court was confined to “(the power) to do things necessary for administration of justice ... (which are) reasonably necessary to preserve the court’s existence and protect it in the orderly administration of its business....”
There is no allegation here that the challenged orders were required because the Clerk had failed to perform the duties of his office, which failures were preventing *1125the Judges of the District Court of Oklahoma County from effectively performing their functions.2 Without these compelling considerations I am unable to see the authority or the necessity for controlling the functions of the County Court Clerk, who was, of course, elected by and is as responsible to the voters of Oklahoma County as is Respondent.
In my view the Court’s opinion effectively transfers all court related functions (not specifically enjoined by statute upon the Clerk to perform) from a constitutionally established officer (Olda. Const. Art. 17 § 2) to an Administrative Judge. Notwithstanding the Constitutional provision does not spell out the duties of the county court clerk, he is nevertheless a Constitutional officer with those duties essential to the nature of the office. See St. John v. Superior Court, etc., 87 Cal.App.3d 30, 150 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Calif.App.1978).

. The orders attacked here directed the Clerk to return "no file bonds” to the bondsman without collecting a charge for costs — these were instances where no criminal charge was filed. Another order directed the Clerk to "immediately” assign a deputy court clerk to the Juvenile Bureau to serve full time. Another prohibits the Clerk from accepting cost deposits from landowners in condemnation actions when they request a jury trial notwithstanding a statutory command to the contrary. The last order No. AD 7-87-30 advised the Court Clerk that courtroom clerks would, in the future, no longer be under the control of the Clerk but would henceforth be under the exclusive control of their assigned judge as to their hours, reporting, duties, responsibilities and as to when they may take vacations.

.According to petitioner’s brief when an opening occurs for a courtroom deputy the judge actually conducts the interviews and when he has selected the person he desires, the clerk employs that individual. If the judge is unhappy with the clerk serving him that person is reassigned or replaced. When a courtroom clerk becomes eligible for a merit pay increase the judge participates in the pay raise decision. It is difficult to see how more cooperative the clerk could be.