Court Opinion

ID: 9399800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 15:11:55.560093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.460120
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 57

                                                                    APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                              June 6, 2023

  DAVID WAYNE HEMBREE,

  Appellant
  (Defendant),

  v.                                                                 S-22-0230

  THE STATE OF WYOMING,

  Appellee
  (Plaintiff).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County
                          The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
      Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Francis H. McVay,* Senior
      Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
      General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton,
      Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Burton.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
* An Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel was entered on February 10, 2023.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] David Wayne Hembree was charged with one count of stalking in violation of a
protective order, prohibited by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) & (e)(iv), and one count of
criminal entry, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-302. A jury found him guilty on both
counts. Mr. Hembree appeals, asserting the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct, in closing argument, by commenting on his silence in violation of his
constitutional right. He asserts the district court erred in admitting testimony defining
“spying distance,” a term not referenced to in the stalking statute, and that the judgment
recites an incorrect date of the offense. We affirm and remand for correction of the date in
the Judgment and Sentence.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2]   We rephrase the issues:

              1. Did the prosecutor’s comments during closing improperly
                 reference Mr. Hembree’s exercise of his constitutional right
                 to silence and amount to plain error?

              2. Did the district court plainly err when it allowed the State’s
                 witness to discuss “spying distance”?

              3. Should the Judgment and Sentence be remanded to correct
                 a conceded error?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] TB dated Mr. Hembree from fall 2017 through May 2019, when she broke up with
him. After the breakup, the two remained friends and had a “physical” relationship from
August 2019 until TB ended the physical relationship in December 2019. Mr. Hembree
and TB continued to communicate, with Mr. Hembree vacillating between agreeing to be
friends and wanting more. On February 14, 2020, TB made clear she did not want a
relationship with him. Mr. Hembree persisted in contacting her and asking questions. He
told her if she did not answer his questions, he would come to her house and ask them. TB
initially responded to his communications to appease him. She did not want him at her
house. By summer 2020, Mr. Hembree’s communications had not waned, and TB became
more adamant. She repeatedly told Mr. Hembree to leave her alone.

[¶4] Mr. Hembree became more relentless. In addition to calling and texting TB, he
began driving by her house, frequently and at all hours. TB confronted Mr. Hembree,
telling him again and again to leave her alone and to stop driving by her house. In
September 2020, TB stopped responding to Mr. Hembree’s text messages. Mr. Hembree

                                             1
continued texting. Through the fall and winter he drove by her house “almost every single
night” and he began driving by her work. After receiving a particularly inappropriate text
from Mr. Hembree, TB blocked his number. Mr. Hembree persisted with phone calls and
began sending Snapchats.

[¶5] On December 18, 2020, at around 11 p.m., Mr. Hembree drove by TB’s home. TB
had gone to bed and was talking on the phone. She rolled over and found Mr. Hembree
standing next to her bed. She got out of bed, “pulled [Mr. Hembree] out of the room,
shoved him down the hallway [and] shoved him out the door.” TB reported the incident to
the Riverton Police who determined Mr. Hembree had entered TB’s home through the dog
door.

[¶6] On December 29, 2020, shortly after that encounter, TB obtained a protection order
which prohibited Mr. Hembree from contacting her and from approaching her, her
residence, her employment, or her mother’s home. Mr. Hembree was served with the
protection order on December 30, 2020. On January 7, 2021, TB saw Mr. Hembree drive
by her house. She reported the incident to the police, who responded but did not locate
Mr. Hembree. A couple of hours later, TB saw Mr. Hembree drive by her house a second
time. Again, she called the police.

[¶7] Deputy Aaron Lane responded to this call. Deputy Lane located Mr. Hembree’s
vehicle in TB’s neighborhood and pulled him over. Deputy Lane eventually arrested Mr.
Hembree and placed him in his patrol vehicle.

[¶8] At trial, the State called a number of witnesses including Deputy Lane. Relevant to
this appeal, Deputy Lane testified regarding what happened when he pulled Mr. Hembree
over:

             I asked [Mr. Hembree] to step out of the vehicle. He said
             something to the effect of “I wasn’t even drinking,” I said
             something to the effect of “okay, sounds good,” or “sounds
             good,” something like that. And then I walked to the driver’s
             side of the vehicle, David Hembree stepped out of the driver’s
             side, and I said, “Where did you just come from?” He said he
             was dropping off a friend, I said, “where?” He wouldn’t tell
             me or didn’t want to tell me. I asked again, still wouldn’t tell
             me, and I said, “Riverview?” and he said, “Yeah – no.” And I
             said, “All right. Turn around, you’re under arrest.”

[¶9] Deputy Lane’s patrol vehicle dash video recorded a conversation between Deputy
Lane and Mr. Hembree while Mr. Hembree was in the patrol vehicle. This recording was
played for the jury. Mr. Hembree initiated a conversation with Deputy Lane and asked,

                                            2
“So the paperwork[1] says spying distance, what does that even mean?” Deputy Lane
responded, “It means that you parked your vehicle with your lights off close to her house.”
After a lengthy pause, Hembree stated, “Cuz I didn’t do that.” Mr. Hembree did not testify
at trial.

[¶10] After closing, the case was submitted to a jury which returned a guilty verdict on
both the stalking and criminal entry counts. Additional facts relevant to Mr. Hembree’s
complaints about the closing argument are addressed in the analysis. Mr. Hembree appeals.

I.     The prosecutor’s comments during closing did not improperly reference Mr.
       Hembree’s exercise of his constitutional right to silence and were not plain error.

[¶11] Mr. Hembree asserts that the prosecutor made statements in closing that violated his
right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming
Constitution and therefore amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.

A.     Standard of Review

[¶12] We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct with reference to the entire trial
record. Drennen v. State, 2013 WY 118, ¶ 10, 311 P.3d 116, 121 (Wyo. 2013). “Likewise,
the propriety of any comments made by the prosecutors during closing argument is
measured in the context of the entire argument.” Id. (citing Strange v. State, 2008 WY
132, ¶ 4, 195 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 2008)). “We have long said that a prosecutor is
afforded ‘[g]reat latitude’ when arguing a case to the jury.” Watkins v. State, 2016 WY
108, ¶ 14, 383 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106,
1115–16 (Wyo. 1992)).

[¶13] Mr. Hembree did not object to the prosecutor’s statements or the questions he now
claims to be improper. Accordingly, the plain error standard of review applies. To
establish plain error, Mr. Hembree bears the burden of showing that (1) the record is clear
as to the alleged error; (2) the error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3)
the violation adversely affected a substantial right which resulted in material prejudice.
Dixon v. State, 2019 WY 37, ¶ 27, 438 P.3d 216, 228 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Garriott v.
State, 2018 WY 4, ¶ 21, 408 P.3d 771, 780–81 (Wyo. 2018)). “[O]ur review is focused on
whether the error affected the accused’s substantial right to a fair trial.” Id. ¶¶ 39–40, 438
P.3d at 231 (citing McGinn v. State, 2015 WY 140, ¶ 13, 361 P.3d 295, 299 (Wyo. 2015)).

[¶14] “We are reluctant to find plain error in closing arguments ‘lest the trial court
becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object.’” Dixon,
¶ 39, 438 P.3d at 231 (quoting Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 4, 44 P.3d 22, 24 (Wyo.

1
  The Court assumes the paperwork to which Mr. Hembree referred is the order of protection. However,
that order does not contain the term, “spying distance.”

                                                 3
2002)). Timely objection is the proper way to correct improper closing arguments, because
it “allows the trial court to weigh the impact of the comments and assess curative
measures.” Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1992). “Under the plain error standard
of review, we reverse a district court’s decision only if it is so plainly erroneous that the
judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties failed to raise
the issue.” Dixon, ¶ 27, 438 P.3d at 228 (quoting Garriott, ¶ 21, 408 P.3d at 780).

B.     Analysis

[¶15] During closing, the prosecutor made three statements that Mr. Hembree asserts were
improper comments on his right to remain silent. The first statement occurred when the
prosecutor discussed the elements of the stalking charge:

              [T]he stalking statute requires a specific intent to harass. It’s
              not like the general intent to commit criminal entry, it takes a
              specific intent to harass, and requires proof that the defendant,
              with the intent to harass, engaged in a course of conduct
              reasonably likely to harass. Well, how would we really know
              what specifically he intended or what he was thinking
              unless he told us. How would you know that about anyone for
              that matter. How would you know what somebody really
              intends or is thinking.

(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor then outlined the trial evidence elicited to prove the
stalking charge. The second statement was the prosecutor’s discussion of Mr. Hembree’s
refusal to tell Deputy Lane where he had dropped his friend. In rebuttal, the prosecutor
summarized Mr. Hembree’s statements:

              “Where you been?”

              “Oh, I was dropping off a friend.”

              “Where?”

              “I won’t say.”

              “Riverview?”

              “Yeah—no.” What’s that? He knew what he was doing, he
              was just doing it four minutes earlier. A guilty state of
              mind, guilty conscience. He knew what he was doing, and
              he knew he wasn’t supposed to be doing it more
              importantly.

                                             4
(Emphasis added.) The third statement is the prosecutor’s description of Mr. Hembree’s
lengthy pause during the spying distance discussion in Deputy Lane’s patrol vehicle.

[¶16] All three alleged errors are clearly reflected in the record. The first prong of plain
error is met. Hartley v. State, 2020 WY 40, ¶ 11, 460 P.3d 716, 719 (Wyo. 2020). To
satisfy the second prong, Mr. Hembree must demonstrate the existence of a clear and
unequivocal rule of law which was transgressed “in a clear and obvious, not merely
arguable, way.” Brown v. State, 2019 WY 102, ¶ 13, 450 P.3d 208, 211 (Wyo. 2019)
(quoting Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 30, 228 P.3d 874, 885 (Wyo. 2010)).
Clearly and unequivocally under the law a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s
exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent. See Ridinger v. State, 2021 WY 4,
¶ 35, 478 P.3d 1160, 1168 (Wyo. 2021) (“prosecutor may not directly or indirectly
comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify”); Hartley, ¶ 12, 460 P.3d at 719 (“a
prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent” (citing
Bogard v. State, 2019 WY 96, ¶ 28, 449 P.3d 315, 322 (Wyo. 2019))). In determining
whether a prosecutor has commented on a defendant’s right to remain silent, we consider
the prosecutor’s statements in context.

                     Whether a prosecutor has improperly commented on a
              defendant’s refusal to testify turns on “whether the language
              used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the
              jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment
              on the failure of the accused to testify.” Oldham v. State, 534
              P.2d 107, 112 (Wyo. 1975) (quoting Knowles v. United States,
              224 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1955)). “[W]e consider the entire
              context in which the statements were made to decide whether
              there was an impermissible comment upon the defendant’s
              exercise of his right of silence.” Hartley, ¶ 13, 460 P.3d at 720
              (quotations omitted). Importantly, “[i]t is not improper for the
              [prosecutor] to draw attention to the failure or lack of evidence
              on a point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of
              the defendant to testify.” Oldham, 534 P.2d at 112 (quoting
              Knowles, 224 F.2d at 170). See also, Larkins v. State, 2018
              WY 122, ¶ 95, 429 P.3d 28, 50 (Wyo. 2018) (“In closing
              arguments, a prosecutor has ‘wide latitude’ to argue the
              evidence in the record and all reasonable inferences which can
              be drawn from that evidence.”) (citations and quotations
              omitted); Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884
              (Wyo. 2003) (“Prosecutors, just like defense counsel, may
              review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based
              thereon.”) (citation omitted).

                                               5
Ridinger, ¶ 36, 478 P.3d at 1168–69.

[¶17] The first two statements Mr. Hembree complains of were not improper comments
on his right to remain silent. The prosecutor’s rhetorical question, “how would we really
know what . . . he was thinking unless he told us,” was followed by the prosecutor’s
recitation of circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer the specific intent
required for a stalking conviction. See, e.g., Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶¶ 12–14, 184 P.3d
687, 693 (Wyo. 2008) (prosecutor’s discussion of the fact that there was no confession was
explanation as to why defendant’s state of mind could be inferred from circumstances and
not an impermissible comment on silence).

[¶18] The prosecutor’s account of Mr. Hembree’s refusal to tell Deputy Lane where he
had dropped his friend accurately described the evidence of Mr. Hembree’s encounter with
Deputy Lane. It emphasized a gap in Mr. Hembree’s defense and called into question his
credibility regarding a critical fact—Mr. Hembree’s reason for being in TB’s
neighborhood. It also described the circumstances leading to his arrest. See, e.g., Hartley,
¶ 11–12, 460 P.3d at 719 (prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s lack of explanation for
how victim’s injury occurred did not violate clear and unequivocal rule of law).

[¶19] Viewed in context, these statements in the prosecutor’s closing argument were not
“manifestly intended” or “of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily
take” them to be comments “on the failure of the accused to testify.” Ridinger, ¶ 36, 478
P.3d at 1168–69 (quoting Oldham v. State, 534 P.2d 107, 112 (Wyo. 1975)).

[¶20] The third statement Mr. Hembree complains of occurred when the prosecutor
discussed Mr. Hembree’s recorded response to Deputy Lane’s explanation of spying
distance. The prosecutor stated:

              And when Deputy Lane explained the allegation against him
              from that night about going down there, parking across the road
              and turning his lights off across from her house, his response
              was “Did you see me do that?” and there’s four seconds, four
              long seconds [then] “I didn’t do that.”

(Emphasis added.) Mr. Hembree contends that the prosecutor used Mr. Hembree’s pause
against him, yet he does not explain how this pause could be an exercise of his right to
silence. The reflective pause occurred between Mr. Hembree’s voluntary question and his
answer to his own question. The pause was not an exercise of Mr. Hembree’s right to
remain silent and the prosecutor’s discussion of this evidence was not a comment on
silence, rather it was a description of the conversation between Mr. Hembree and Deputy
Lane.

                                             6
[¶21] Mr. Hembree has not established that the prosecutor violated a clear and
unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious way in making any of the three statements.
He has not established plain error and his claims of prosecutorial misconduct fail.

II.        The district court did not plainly err when it allowed the State’s witness to discuss
           “spying distance.”

[¶22] Mr. Hembree next argues that plain error occurred when Deputy Lane testified
regarding his understanding of the definition of spying distance and its relationship to
surveillance. Because no objection to this testimony was raised at trial, our review is for
plain error. As with his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, to establish plain error, Mr.
Hembree must show the record is clear as to the alleged error, the error violated a clear and
unequivocal rule of law which affected a substantial right and materially prejudiced him.
Supra ¶ 13.

[¶23] Mr. Hembree satisfies the first prong of plain error because Deputy Lane’s
discussion of spying distance and surveillance and the jury instruction that refers to
surveillance 2 appear in the record. The jury first heard the term “spying distance” when

2
    In its entirety, Jury Instruction 14 reads:
                              “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of a
                     series of acts over any period of time evidencing a continuity of purpose.
                              “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct, including but
                     not limited to verbal threats, written threats, lewd or obscene statements
                     or images, vandalism or nonconsensual physical contact, directed at a
                     specific person or the family of a specific person, which the defendant
                     knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to suffer
                     substantial emotional distress, and which does in fact seriously alarm the
                     person toward whom it is directed.
                              A person commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to harass
                     another person, the person engages in a course of conduct reasonably
                     likely to harass that person, including but not limited to any combination
                     of the following:
                                       Communicating, anonymously or otherwise, or causing a
                              communication with another person by verbal, electronic,
                              mechanical, telegraphic, telephonic or written means in a manner
                              that harasses;
                                       Following a person, other than within the residence of the
                              defendant;
                                       Placing a person under surveillance by remaining present
                              outside his or her school, place of employment, vehicle, other
                              place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence
                              of the defendant;
                                       Otherwise engaging in a course of conduct that harasses
                              another person.

                                                         7
viewing video of the conversation between Mr. Hembree and Deputy Lane in the patrol
vehicle. In the video, Mr. Hembree referred to “spying distance” and asked Deputy Lane
what the term meant. Deputy Lane told Mr. Hembree that someone is within spying
distance when they park outside of someone’s house with their lights off. Deputy Lane
testified about the exchange. During cross examination, Mr. Hembree’s attorney and
Deputy Lane had the following exchange:

               Q:      And you would agree with me that spying distance is
               not a legal term?

               A:    It is in the definition of stalking, surveillance and
               spying.

               Q:      Okay. Well, let me—spying is found in that definition?

               A:      Yes, sir.

               Q:      Or is it surveillance?

               A:      It could be both, I think it’s both.

               Q:     Okay. So when you gave this definition of a legal term,
               the one found in the statute, was that a legal definition you gave
               or more of a layman’s explanation?

               A:     I would say layman’s because it’s not a full detail of the
               legal definition, yes.

[¶24] We turn to the second prong of plain error. Mr. Hembree contends that this
discussion, when considered with Jury Instruction 14, supra note 2, which referred to
“surveillance,” clearly transgressed an unequivocal rule of law. Mr. Hembree cites Cecil
v. State. Cecil held that a trial court “need not give an instruction defining a term unless it
has a technical legal meaning so different from its ordinary meaning that the jury, without
further explanation, would misunderstand its import in relation to the factual
circumstances.” Cecil v. State, 2015 WY 158, ¶ 14, 364 P.3d 1086, 1090 (Wyo. 2015)
(quoting Butz v. State, 2007 WY 152, ¶ 19, 167 P.3d 650, 655 (Wyo. 2007), abrogated on
different grounds in Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶¶ 18–19, 193 P.3d 266, 271–72
(Wyo. 2008)).

                       A “‘course of conduct’ may encompass acts of harassment
              occurring prior to the issuance of an order proscribing contact with the
              victim.”
(Emphasis added.)

                                                  8
[¶25] Mr. Hembree’s argument as to how the rule in Cecil was violated is unclear. He
seems to contend that Deputy Lane’s testimony on spying distance intermingled with
Instruction 14, creating jury confusion on the definition of “surveillance.” Therefore the
district court erred in admitting Deputy Lane’s testimony on “spying distance” because,
under Cecil, surveillance required no further explanation. However, he does not explain
how Deputy Lane’s lay definition of “spying” or “spying distance” conflicted with the
instruction language, the stalking statute, or the ordinary meaning of surveillance.
Wyoming’s stalking statute does not contain the term “spying” or “spying distance.” 3 See
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506. Because Mr. Hembree presents no cogent argument as to how
a clear and unequivocal rule of law has been violated, he has not established plain error.
See, e.g., Person v. State, 2023 WY 26, ¶ 34, 526 P.3d 61, 72 (Wyo. 2023).

III.   The Judgment and Sentence should be remanded to correct a conceded error.

[¶26] Mr. Hembree contends that the district court’s written Judgment and Sentence
contains a clerical error and requests an order nunc pro tunc to correct it.

[¶27] The district court’s Judgment and Sentence states the “Date of Offense” for Count
I was “February 14, 2020.” Mr. Hembree argues that this is a clerical error and contends
the correct date of offense for Count I was “On or between February 14, 2020 & January
7, 2021,” as stated in the Judgment of Conviction & Order After Jury Trial. 4 Mr. Hembree
asks us to remand to the district court for entry of an order nunc pro tunc modifying the
date in the Judgment and Sentence. The State concedes that the Judgment and Sentence
contains only the beginning date for the stalking charge, but argues that remand is not
necessary because W.R.Cr.P. 32 does not require the inclusion of the date or date range for
the charged crime in a judgment or sentence.

[¶28] Whether a written judgment or sentence complies with the Wyoming Rules of
Criminal Procedure is subject to de novo review. Washington v. State, 2011 WY 132, ¶ 12,
261 P.3d 717, 721 (Wyo. 2011). W.R.Cr.P. 32 sets forth the required contents of a
judgment and sentence. As pointed out by the State, the rule does not require the date (or
dates) of a charged offense. 5 However, “[a] party may request an order nunc pro tunc when

3
  The statute contains examples of conduct that can be considered a stalking course of conduct. One of
those examples is “[p]lacing a person under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her . . .
residence[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b)(iii).
4
  We note that the Information and the Order After Arraignment provide a date of January 7, 2021, for
Count I.
5
  W.R.Cr.P. 32 provides:
                (b) Judgment.—
                                                .  .    .

                                                  9
an order contains an inaccuracy.” Johnson v. State, 914 P.2d 810, 812 (Wyo. 1996) (citing
Christensen v. State, 854 P.2d 675, 682 (Wyo. 1993)). “A nunc pro tunc order serves to
rectify omissions from the record so as to make it speak the truth.” Christensen, 854 P.2d
at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d

                 (2) Except for forfeit offenses for which citations have issued, other
                 misdemeanors where the penalty imposed does not exceed a fine of
                 $200.00, and pleas entered under Rule 43(c)(2), a judgment of
                 conviction after a trial shall include:
                     (A) The plea and the verdict for each offense for which the
                     defendant was tried;
                     (B) A statement as to whether the defendant testified and whether
                     or not the defendant was advised by the court with respect to the
                     defendant’s right to testify or not to testify;
                     (C) An adjudication as to each offense including the name and
                     statute number for each convicted offense and whether such
                     offense is a felony or a misdemeanor; and
                     (D) The name of the defendant’s attorney or a statement that the
                     defendant appeared pro se.
                                               .    .    .
             (c) Sentence.—
                                               .    .    .
                 (2) Contents.—A written sentence shall be signed by the judge and
                 entered by the clerk of court without delay. The sentence may be
                 included in the judgment or separately entered. Except for forfeit
                 offenses for which citations have issued, other misdemeanors where
                 the penalty imposed does not exceed a fine of $200.00, and pleas
                 entered under Rule 43(c)(2), as a minimum the sentence shall:
                     (A) State each offense for which sentence is imposed, including
                     the statute number and whether the offense is a felony or a
                     misdemeanor;
                     (B) State the sentence imposed for each convicted offense
                     including for felonies the minimum and maximum term and state
                     whether multiple sentences are to run concurrently or
                     consecutively;
                     (C) State whether the sentence is to run concurrently with or
                     consecutive to any other sentence being served or to be served by
                     the defendant;
                     (D) If probation is not granted, state whether probation was
                     considered by the court;
                     (E) Include a finding of all time served by the defendant in
                     presentence confinement for any sentenced offense;
                     (F) State the extent to which credit for presentence confinement
                     is to be given for each sentenced offense;
                     (G) Include an assessment for the victims of crime compensation
                     fund as required by W.S. 1-40-119; and
                     (H) Include a finding as to whether the defendant is able to make
                     restitution and if restitution is ordered fix the reasonable amount
                     owed to each victim resulting from the defendant’s criminal acts.

                                                10
949, 956 (Wyo. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31,
86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004)).

[¶29] While the date(s) of the charged offense is not required, the Judgment and Sentence
specifies the date of offense for Count I (stalking in violation of a protective order) as
February 14, 2020. 6 It contains a clerical error. It fails to accurately reflect the date range
in which the conduct that violated the protective order occurred. It is subject to
clarification. See Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank N.A.-Lander, 713 P.2d 228, 235 (Wyo.
1986) (finding that because the judgment failed to reflect the exact dates of appellant’s
liability to appellee, it contained a clerical error and was subject to clarification). We
remand to the district court for entry of an order nunc pro tunc to omit the date or to
accurately reflect the date of the offense for Count I.

                                        CONCLUSION

[¶30] The prosecutor’s comments in closing did not improperly reference Mr. Hembree’s
exercise of his constitutional right to silence, and the district court did not plainly err when
it allowed the State’s witness to discuss “spying distance.” We remand for an order nunc
pro tunc to correct the date of offense in the Judgment and Sentence. We affirm in all other
respects.

6
 TB made it clear she no longer wanted contact with Mr. Hembree on February 14, 2020. The Protection
Order was served on December 30, 2020. Mr. Hembree was arrested after parking outside TB’s home on
January 7, 2021. Supra ¶¶ 3, 6, 7.

                                                11