Court Opinion

ID: 9615601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:38:57.986981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:22.989112
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I dissent. Appellant was tried for two separate burglaries charged in a single information, said burglaries being alleged to have occurred on December 22, 1980 and February 25, 1982 in Laramie, Wyoming. The court received in this trial evidence of three other unsolved burglaries, one which occurred March 20, 1981 and two which occurred September 30, 1981. The facts concerning the five burglaries are as follows.
The first burglary with which appellant was charged occurred at the Burgess residence the afternoon of December 22, 1980. The back door had been forcibly opened and left ajar. Other than the broken door, the house looked in order and did not seem to be disturbed. Silverware, jewelry, and two pistols were taken. The back yard was fenced. The second burglary with which appellant was charged occurred at the McNiff house during the night of February 25, 1982 or the morning of February 26, 1982. A window in the back door had been broken. A pistol, two watches, a set of meerschaum pipes, a music box and three beers were taken. The house was left in disarray. The back yard was fenced.
The three unresolved burglaries received in evidence occurred at the Boswell, Bentley and McCue residences in Laramie, Wyoming. In the burglary at the Boswell house, entry was through an unlocked bedroom window in the basement sometime during the day of March 20, 1981. The house was not damaged. Silverware, jewelry and a set of candlesticks were taken. The back yard was fenced. The Bentley and McCue burglaries occurred the afternoon of September 30, 1981. Entry at the Bentley residence was through the back door; at the McCue residence, entry was through a dining room window. The houses were not disturbed. Silverware and jewelry were taken from the Bentley residence. Jewelry and a camera were taken from the McCue residence. Both back yards were fenced. Appellant was not identified as the perpetrator of the three unresolved burglaries.
We have previously held that the reason for not allowing inquiry into charges and accusations in which convictions did not result is that:
“ ‘It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another.’ ” Gabrielson v. State, Wyo., 510 P.2d 534, 536 (1973) (quoting from Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952, 953 (1925)).
We also stated that:
“[I]t is settled law in this jurisdiction that mere charges, accusations, and arrests are consistent with innocence; and they should not be inquired into if the purpose of the prosecution is to discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury and convey to the jury knowledge that such witness was charged with a crime.” Id. at 536.
We have previously upheld the introduction of other crimes, wrongs, or acts in connection with Rule 404(b), W.R.E., when submitted for purposes other than that the accused has criminal characteristics. Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982) (motive); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981) (motive); Hatheway v. State, Wyo., 623 P.2d 741 (1981) (knowledge); Vasquez v. State, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1205 *249(1981) (past pattern of conduct); Elliott v. State, Wyo., 600 P.2d 1044 (1979) (motive). We have allowed extrinsic evidence during rebuttal regarding identification and intent in Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802 (1980), and when the defendant has opened the door by first offering testimony. Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 (1979). In all of those cases the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the other acts received in evidence was not in dispute.
In the vast majority of cases which deal with the propriety of receipt of evidence of crimes other than the crime charged, the identity of the perpetrator of those other crimes is undisputed. In this case, however, the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes was in dispute. Thus, the problems involved in determining admissibility were compounded: first, the evidence must make a prima facie case that the defendant was the perpetrator of the other burglaries; second, the evidence must be admissible under a Rule 404(b) exception; and third, if admission were proper, the probative value must not be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Appellant was not charged with nor convicted of the three unsolved burglaries. With respect to the two burglaries of September 30, 1981, all that could be said was that appellant was in the town of Laramie on the date they occurred. So were approximately 20,000 other people in town on this date. The only testimony relating to appellant’s involvement in the Boswell burglary was testimony from a motel clerk which placed him in Laramie at the time of the incident and the fact that he had candlesticks similar to those stolen which he had given to a friend. This evidence does not rise to the level of the requisite prima facie1 case that appellant was in fact the perpetrator. State v. Jones, 27 Wyo. 46, 191 P. 1075 (1920). But even assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was sufficient to identify appellant, I would still find this evidence improperly admitted.
Two concerns are expressed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b) in that (1) the jury may convict a “bad man” who deserves to be punished, not because of the crime charged, but because of prior or subsequent misdeeds, and (2) that the jury might infer that because the accused has committed other crimes, he probably also committed this crime. United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.1979).
A defendant must be tried for what he did and not for who he is. United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517 (D.C.Cir.1980).
“Rules 403 and 404(b) are not obstacles to be cleared at all costs, even by cutting around corners whenever it is possible to do so. These rules were designed to ensure a defendant a fair and just trial based upon the evidence presented, not upon impermissible inferences of criminal predisposition or by confusion of the issues.” Id. at 525.
For other-acts evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to an actual issue of the case tried. The probative value must not be outweighed by unfair prejudice. There is no presumption that other-crime evidence is relevant. United States v. DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2nd Cir.1979). See, United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir.1978). There must be a logical nexus between the crimes. United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361 (1st Cir.1978). The evidence must be offered for an issue that is in question. United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.1975), 30 A.L.R.Fed. 860.
“Too often we lose sight of the fact that the rule is primarily a rule of exclusion of evidence and not one of admission, and, although there are many exceptions, these do not detract from the general exclusionary approach which the rule demands.
“Several factors have contributed to formulation of a cautious judicial attitude.
*250“First, the accused is required to defend charges which are not described in the information or indictment. As a result he is required to defend past actions [for] which he may have in the past answered and with respect to which he may have even served his sentence. Thus, he is in effect tried as a recidivist though such a charge is not a part of the federal criminal code.
“Secondly, although such evidence may have at least some relevance to the offense being tried, its predominant quality is to show up the defendant’s character as a car thief or a bad check artist, for example. Proof of defendant’s socio-pathic disposition is not a valid object. Showing that a man is generally bad has never been under our system allowable. The defendant has a right to be tried on the truth of the specific charge contained in the indictment.
“Third, an obvious truth is that once prior convictions are introduced the trial is, for all practical purposes, completed and the guilty outcome follows as a mere formality. This is true regardless of the care and caution employed by the court in instructing the jury.
“Thus, it is clear that the problem is not a simple evidentiary one, but rather goes to the fundamental fairness and justice of the trial itself.” (Footnote omitted.) United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204-205 (10th Cir.1972).
The district court allowed the evidence on the theory that it related to identity. Rule 404(b) was incorrectly invoked on this basis. Admitting evidence for the purpose of identity requires an inference that if the defendant committed one crime, then in all probability, because of the unusual or distinctive nature of the crimes and the close similarity between them, he committed the second. These burglaries bore no special signature such as unusual mode of entry, time of occurrence, or special circumstances. They were so common as to be entirely unhelpful. Thus, the houses were entered when no one was at home, the entrances were not observed, the back yards were fenced, and easily “fenced” items were taken. These characteristics do not rise to the level of a “signature,” and the evidence has been held not admissible where
“[t]he conduct was not sufficiently ‘peculiar, unique or bizarre,’ * * * nor was it so unusual or distinctive as to constitute * * * personal ‘signature’ on each crime * * (Citations omitted.) United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1981).
“Where the alleged similarities between the crimes reveal little in common other than a sequence of time from the crime charged, the acts are not unusual and distinctive enough to come within the purview of the similarity element of the exception.” State v. Case, Mont., 621 P.2d 1066, 1071 (1980).
The State, recognizing the weakness of relying on “identity” as a proper ground for admitting the other-crimes evidence, contends that the evidence was properly admissible under the “common plan” exception. When extrinsic acts are admitted to show a common plan, scheme or design, the evidence is admissible only if it is
“ * * * ‘so linked together in point of time and circumstances with the crime charged that one cannot be shown without proving the other.’ * * * Courts have admitted extrinsic act evidence to show a defendant’s design or plan to commit the specific crime charged, but never to show a design or plan to commit ‘crimes of the sort with which he is charged. ’ * * * Thus, proof of design or plan by showing the commission of similar acts requires more than
“ ‘merely a similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations. * * * (Emphasis added; emphasis in original omitted.) United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 502 (11th Cir.1982).
The common-plan theory must warrant an inference that if the defendant committed the other acts introduced, he committed the *251act charged. People v. Hunt, 72 Cal.App.3d 190, 139 Cal.Rptr. 675 (1977). A common scheme or plan embraces the commission of two or more crimes which are so related to each other that the proof of one crime tends to establish the proof of the other. United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.1977). These burglaries were totally separate incidents occurring over a fifteen-month period and not interrelated to the crimes charged. Proof of one did not relate to proof of the others.
“In permitting evidence of prior offenses to be received as a part of a common plan or scheme, we have come perilously close to putting the defendant’s character and record in issue notwithstanding his failure to take the witness stand, as in the instant case.” State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167, 171 (1965).
I would agree with United States v. Phillips, supra:
“For the purpose of showing ‘intent and plan,’ the district judge admitted testimony connecting the defendant with several bank robberies other than the robbery for which he was on trial. Something more than repeated performance of the same class of crimes is required in evidencing a ‘design’ or ‘plan’ which, if proved, may raise the inference that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime in question.” 599 F.2d at 136.
The State attempts to bolster its argument by the theory that the other-crimes evidence was relevant to show a “complete story” and that the jury was entitled to know the complete story of appellant’s activities during the period of December 1980 through February 1982. The State relies on the case State v. Tharp, 27 Wash.App. 198, 616 P.2d 693 (1980) for this proposition. However, they misread that case. In State v. Tharp, evidence was admitted of other criminal activity because the criminal acts were inseparable from the whole criminal scheme. The evidence was allowed because it consisted of a string of connected offenses and without it the prosecution could only present a fragmentary version of the entire transaction. The other acts admitted took place in a twenty-four hour period. In the present case the five burglaries took place over a fifteen-month period. They were not part of one transaction; admission of one crime did not present a more complete version of another burglary. Reliance upon this theory for admission of this other-crimes evidence is totally misplaced. And, it is impossible to tell which theory the majority relied upon for upholding the admission of evidence concerning the Boswell burglary since their entire analysis of that evidence consists of:
“We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit into evidence the Boswell burglary * *
I would find that the evidence in this case is in the nature of character evidence introduced to prove that appellant acted in conformity with his character on these occasions. Admission for this purpose is clearly proscribed by Rule 404(a), W.R.E. United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir.1983). The evidence was simply evidence of other burglaries by someone. Its predominant quality was to show the defendant’s character as a burglar and his propensity for crime. United States v. Biswell, supra.
The majority concedes that the admission into evidence of the Bentley and McCue burglaries was error, but holds it to be harmless error. The trial judge carries with him during trial considerable credibility in the eyes of the jury. When he approves the admission of evidence of other crimes, he is saying the evidence is relevant and may be considered in determining defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged. The limiting instruction was not sufficient to overcome the prejudice. Here the jury heard evidence of two unsolved, unrelated burglaries — evidence held by the majority of this court to have been improperly admitted. I cannot, under any credible legal theory, find that to be harmless error. The result is appalling. In United States v. Parker, 604 F.2d 1327, 1329 (10th Cir.1979), the court held that:
*252“Improper admission of evidence of a prior crime or conviction, even in the face of other evidence amply supporting the verdict, constitutes plain error impinging upon the fundamental fairness of the trial itself.”
It is generally held that such error consistently requires reversal “even in the face of other evidence ample to support the verdict.” United States v. Gilliland, 586 F.2d 1384, 1391 (10th Cir.1978); United States v. Burkhart, supra. And where there was a reversal because of improperly admitted evidence, the court stated that it was ironic that, although the evidence did not add to the case of the prosecution, they were still unable to say the evidence was harmless. United States v. Mann, supra. Other cases have resulted in reversal even though the admitted evidence was found not necessary for the prosecution. United States v. Foskey, supra. See, United States v. Ring, supra; United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.1969).
Evidence of three uncharged and unrelated burglaries was presented. These burglaries were not connected with appellant nor were they properly admitted under any of the exceptions of Rule 404(b). Appellant was foreclosed from having a fair trial on the merits; I can only describe the affirmance of this case as a travesty of justice and a denial of the safeguards which are designed to ensure a defendant a fair trial.

. "Prima facie” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979) as:
"At first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be judged from the first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. * * * ”