Court Opinion

ID: 9561840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:17:17.864536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:35.416068
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom RAPER, Justice, joins.
I concur in the result in this case and with substantially all of the majority opinion. I cannot agree with the proposition stated in the last paragraph of the majority as follows:
“ * * * In making its argument, appellant ignores the fact that it can seek a compliance schedule which will give additional time to comply with the turbidity standard. Section 85~502.19(a)(vii), supra. This result is essentially the same as is obtained by the grant of a variance— which is limited in duration and subject to renewal. Sections 35-502.45(e) and (f), . W.S.1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. * * * ”
For me the holding that the appellant has not been denied equal protection under the law adequately is justified by its failure to meet its burden to show that it has been subjected to disparate treatment, and by the rule that water quality is a rational classification permitting a special legislative treatment. I am convinced that a person or firm given the benefit of a compliance schedule which does nothing more than grant additional time to comply with a standard is in a far different position than a person or firm granted a variance. For example, specific procedural steps are to be followed when a variance is being considered for renewal. Once the additional time granted under a compliance schedule has expired no similar rights are incorporated in the statute. It follows that a person who is given the right to seek a compliance schedule, which is granted, is not in essentially the same position as a person who seeks and is granted a variance. For me the quoted language is an incorrect statement of the law. Since I find it to be unnecessary to the result in this case I am compelled to protest the inclusion of this proposition, and to state that I do not agree with it.