Court Opinion

ID: 9661336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:35:51.119624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:27.298058
License: Public Domain

Hallows, J.
(dissenting). The majority view of what constitutes the crime of attempted rape depends too much on the fact the defendant did not succeed in committing rape rather than on what he attempted. How close the defendant came to succeeding is not the test. Sec. 939.32 (2), Stats., attempted crimes, is couched in more-intelligent terms of dangerous propensities requisite to the commission of the crime rather than the concept of defining a point beyond mere preparation or dangerous proximity of success or the place in which an actor may repent and withdraw. State v. Damms (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 183, 100 N. W. (2d) 592. In Damms, we upheld the conviction for attempted murder with an unloaded gun. It was impossible for the actor to commit the crime of murder but yet we found the necessary intent.
An attempted rape begins with the initial act on a woman, not with the act of penetration. State v. Johnson (1954), 243 Minn. 296, 67 N. W. (2d) 639. What is required for a crime of attempt to commit rape is the intent plus acts evincing such intent. The question of resistance by the victim is not important as it is in the crime of rape. It is admitted the defendant had the intent to have intercourse *311with the prosecutrix, but the majority holds that while the defendant’s acts were gross, obscene, and highly reprehensible, they only reached the stage of solicitation. I do not agree. The revolting and depraved acts went beyond the ordinary case of solicitation; that the prosecutrix was successful in dissuading the defendant is not to his credit but to hers.
The prosecutrix was a young married mother who had taken her husband to an airport on an early Sunday morning. The defendant was a total stranger to her. He stopped her car on a public highway, forced himself into the car, drove her to a secluded area, and spoke strongly of intercourse. At all times he had his hand on her and she was so forced in such a position in the car that she could not get out. Although he made no express threats of physical violence, she testified that the situation and his overpowering presence and actions frightened her and made her afraid of her life. We cannot say this was an unreasonable fright. Women minding their own business have a right to use the public highways without expecting to be molested by men roaming the highways and byways in search of sex gratification. In addition to the foregoing, the defendant exposed himself and to say the least forcefully attempted an act of sex perversion in spite of the resistance of the prosecutrix.
If the intent to commit rape and the acts toward that end, which are clearly evident here, coincide, it matters not that the defendant did not complete the act of rape which in this case would have undoubtedly resulted except for “some other extraneous factor.” Such other extraneous factor need not be a policeman but can be any factor which prevented the actor from committing rape; nor need such factor be a force which prevents the actor against his will. It is sufficient that the extraneous factor causes the actor to change his mind.
The majority relies on three cases, none of which in my opinion supports its position. In Taylor v. State (1923), *312180 Wis. 577, 193 N. W. 353, this court in upholding a conviction for assault with intent to commit rape pointed out that if there is an assault with the present intention to commit rape the defendant may be convicted of the assault with the intent although he desists before the purpose is accomplished. If the assault and the intent coincide, it is not a defense that a woman has not used the same utmost resistance required of her for a conviction of the charge of rape. The formed intention to rape may be abandoned. We believe it was in the instant facts. The case of Garrad v. State (1927), 194 Wis. 391, 216 N. W. 496, is clearly not in point. The majority opinion would lead one to believe the defendant in that case could not be convicted of attempted sodomy because he only “by force and violence” attempted to drag the complaining witness across the street while making a solicitation. The case did not turn on any evidence insufficient to sustain an attempt but on the fact the subject matter of the solicitation did not constitute sodomy. State v. Hoffman (1938), 228 Wis. 235, 280 N. W. 357, a four-to-three decision, involved the crime of rape and it is likewise not in point. Hoffman merely decided on the facts that the resistance of the complaining witness was insufficient to prove the crime of rape and the fear entertained by the complaining witness was not sufficient to excuse her act of submission.
The instant facts are not unlike those in Skulhus v. State (1915), 159 Wis. 475, 479, 150 N. W. 503, an attempted rape case, where this court stated, “Where a jury faces a situation characterized by a hostile assault having been unquestionably committed, as in this case, and, especially, by an utter stranger of intelligence and middle age, upon a young married woman, alone and in the ordinary performance of her domestic duties, they cannot be expected to draw any very fine line in respect to whether the assaulter purposed forcibly conquering and securing submission or only *313of obtaining consent.” In Bishop v. State (1916), 163 Wis. 359, 157 N. W. 1100, the defendant entered a store of which the prosecutrix was in charge just as she was locking the door and after a few words seized her and attempted to force her upon a pile of sacks of flour. The determined resistance of the woman caused him to desist and leave the store. It was argued unsuccessfully that the evidence failed to show an attempt to violate the witness and against her will.
On appeal, this court does not retry the case on the facts in the record to determine if each of its members is convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is our duty to determine whether the evidence adduced, believed, and rationally considered by the jury, was sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 130, 104 N. W. (2d) 379; Johns v. State (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 119, 109 N. W. (2d) 490. Here, the jury was correctly instructed on the crime of attempting to commit rape, the verdict had the approval of the trial court, and I cannot say that those who saw and heard the witnesses could not draw inferences from such testimony which would reasonably lead them to believe beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was guilty of attempted rape. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice GORDON joins in this dissent.