Court Opinion

ID: 9464501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:35:17.521402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:40.374850
License: Public Domain

TONE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority on the plain error question.1 It is undisputed that the prosecution had the burden of proving absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See note 12 of the majority opinion. Although apparently not constitutionally required in view of the discussion of the status of affirmative defenses under the Federal Constitution in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), this rule is well established in federal criminal procedure; and the burden and standard of proof in a criminal ease are important matters, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
Given all this, I have trouble with the conclusion that it was not plain error to leave the jury in the dark as to which side had the burden of proving self-defense and what the standard of proof was. The error was not cured by defense counsel’s statement in closing argument that the prosecution had the burden of proving absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. It was the judge who was responsible for advising the jury on the law, and the jury was given the customary admonition to that effect. The prosecutor, in his argument, listed the propositions which the government was required to prove, and absence of self-defense was not one of them. Plainly, the jury was left with no reliable information on the burden and standard of proof as to the issue of self-defense.
There remains, therefore, only one basis on which the judgment might be affirmed, viz., that the evidence of self-defense was so weak, in light of all the other evidence, that the omission to instruct properly was very unlikely to have had any effect on the verdict. I must admit that I too think it very unlikely that the jury would have found this issue in the defendant’s favor even if they had been properly instructed. I have trouble, however, with “probable impact” as a test for plain error when the error in question was the failure to instruct the jury in such a way that they could properly decide a controlling issue in the case. Once it is conceded, as it is in this case, that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of self-defense,2 it follows that the issue was for the jury and not for us.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. I agree that defense counsel failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, as interpreted by our decisions, although he did at one point bring the matter of burden and standard of proof on the self-defense issue to the judge’s attention.

. As the majority points out, the defendant’s wife, corroborated by one witness, testified that the officer picked up a waste basket before the defendant initiated an assault. If the jury believed this and rejected other evidence, they could have concluded that the defendant’s initial battery was a response to a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. From the wife’s description of the ensuing two-way fight, the jury might have concluded that the officer was pursuing the fight aggressively and therefore it could not be determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had used excessive force. Although I would not have so found, and although I agree with the evaluation in the last paragraph of the majority opinion, the evidence would have permitted such a finding.