Court Opinion

ID: 9387159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-15 00:02:09.326951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.879632
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/14/23 P. v. Miller CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B297558

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
        v.                                                      BA226937)

TYRONE MILLER et al.,

        Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
      Leslie Conrad, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Tyrone Miller.
      Daniel G. Koryn, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Derrick Patton.
      Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance
E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan
Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Senior
Deputy Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

       A jury convicted defendants and appellants Derrick Patton
(defendant Patton) and Tyrone Miller (defendant Miller) of first
degree felony murder. Following enactment of Senate Bill No.
1437 (Senate Bill 1437), defendants separately filed uncounseled
petitions for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
(former Penal Code section 1170.95).1 The trial court denied their
petitions without first appointing counsel.
       On appeal from that denial order, we issued an opinion in
December 2020 concluding the trial court erred in denying both
petitions. As to defendant Miller, we concluded (as the Attorney
General conceded) that he was entitled to section 1172.6 relief
based on this court’s prior holding that he was not a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
within the meaning of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
Pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, we issued our remittitur as
to defendant Miller just 13 days after our decision. As to
defendant Patton, we held the trial court erred in denying his
section 1172.6 petition without first appointing counsel and
receiving the submissions contemplated by the statute.
       The Attorney General petitioned for review by our Supreme
Court—but only as to defendant Patton. The Supreme Court

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                2
granted the petition and held the matter pending its decision in
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). That opinion
holds major participant and reckless indifference to life findings
made by a jury before (respectively) Banks and Clark will not
defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6. (Id. at 721.) After deciding Strong, the Supreme Court
issued an order in this case that says only the following: “The
above-captioned matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Five, with directions to vacate
its decision and reconsider the cause in light of [Strong]. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).)”2
       Having vacated our prior opinion and considered the cause
in light of Strong, we now reissue our opinion largely in its prior
form.

                        I. BACKGROUND
       Defendants and Melvin Tate (Tate) were members of the 4-
Deuce Crips street gang and they had participated in a number of
“follow-home” robberies as part of the gang’s activities. (In re
Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 964.) These robberies were
conducted in a similar fashion: a “spotter” would go into a bank,
locate a person withdrawing a large amount of cash, and identify
that person for the others involved in committing the robbery; the

2
      The direction was to vacate our prior opinion without
qualification even though there was no petition for review as to
defendant Miller nor a grant review on the court’s own motion as
to defendant Miller. In addition, our prior opinion relied on
authority cited with approval in Strong (see, e.g., Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at 712, 713 [citing People v. York (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 250, 264]) in concluding reversal was required.

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“driver” would tail the victim to his or her destination; and the
“getter” would take the money. (Ibid.)
       In May 2000, defendants met Tate at his residence and
planned a follow-home robbery that led to the murder convictions
at issue in this appeal; defendant Miller would serve as the
spotter, defendant Patton the driver, and Tate the getter. (In re
Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 965.) When they later put their
plan into practice, defendant Miller spotted Ana Saravia
(Saravia) withdrawing $7,500 at a bank while accompanied by
Rene Franco (Franco). (Ibid.) After Saravia and Franco exited
the bank, defendant Miller instructed defendant Patton and Tate
to follow them, advising Saravia had a lot of money in her purse.
(Ibid.)
       Defendant Patton and Tate tailed Saravia and Franco to a
car dealership. (In re Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 965.)
Defendant Patton handed Tate a loaded pistol and told him,
“[m]ake sure you get the purse.” (Ibid.) Tate approached Franco
and Saravia, grabbed Saravia’s purse, and knocked her to the
ground. (Ibid.) When Franco moved to intervene, Tate shot him
in the chest, killing him. (Ibid.) Defendant Patton and Tate
drove off and later rendezvoused at defendant Miller’s home,
where the three men divided the $7,500 they stole from Saravia.
(Ibid.)
       A jury found defendants guilty of murdering Franco. (In re
Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at 965.) The jury also found true
an allegation that the killing occurred in the commission of a
robbery within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17)(A)—a “special circumstance” that required a sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole (§ 190.2, subd. (d)).
That is the sentence the trial court imposed (plus additional

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prison terms for certain other allegations the jury found true).3
(Id. at 965-966.) This court affirmed the convictions on direct
appeal in a 2003 opinion.
       More than a decade later, following our Supreme Court’s
decisions in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th 522 that explain when a felony murder aider and abettor
may be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole, defendant Miller petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
this court. We granted the petition and vacated the special
circumstance true finding against him.4 (In re Miller, supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at 966-967 [“[T]he evidence against defendant
[Miller] would not permit a jury to rationally conclude he
exhibited a reckless indifference to human life”].) In 2017,
Defendant Patton also sought habeas corpus relief in this court,
similarly relying on Banks and Clark, but we summarily denied
his petition.
       Most recently, and key for purposes of this appeal,
defendants separately filed section 1172.6 petitions for
resentencing pursuant to newly enacted Senate Bill 1437, which
“amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable

3
       Section 190.2, subdivision (d) states “every person, not the
actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as
a major participant,” aids, abets, or assists in a robbery that
results in the death of some person or persons and is found guilty
of first degree murder shall be punished by death or life in prison
without the possibility of parole.
4
      The superior court later resentenced defendant Miller to 25
years to life for murder under section 187, subdivision (a) plus 25
years to life for a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d).

                                 5
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
       The trial court denied both petitions without appointing
counsel for defendants and without soliciting opposition from the
People. As to defendant Miller, the court recognized he was
“seemingly” entitled to relief under the provisions added to the
Penal Code by Senate Bill 1437, but the court concluded Senate
Bill 1437 was unconstitutional and denied his petition on that
basis. The trial court likewise denied defendant Patton’s section
1172.6 petition on constitutional grounds, but the court also
found, in the alternative, that defendant Patton was ineligible for
relief because he was a “major participant [in the crime] who
acted with reckless indifference.”

                         II. DISCUSSION
      The trial court denied defendants’ section 1172.6 petitions
because the court believed Senate Bill 1437 is unconstitutional.
That is wrong. (See, e.g., People v. Bucio (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
300; People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762, 769 [“Senate Bill
No. 1437 addresses the elements of the crime of murder and is
directed to the mental state and conduct of those accused of
murder. [Citation.] It does not authorize anything [two voter-
approved] initiatives prohibited, nor prohibit anything they
authorized”]; People v. Cruz (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740; People v.
Superior Court (Gooden) (2020) 42 Cal.App.5th 270; People v.
Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 246 [“[W]e conclude the
resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 does not contravene

                                  6
separation of powers principles or violate the rights of crime
victims”].) We need say no more about that.
        More does need to be said, however, about defendants’
statutory eligibility for relief. The bottom line is that reversal is
required because neither defendant is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law.
        That is obvious when it comes to defendant Miller, as to
whom this court has already reached a post-Banks and Clark
conclusion that he did not act with reckless indifference to human
life. (Miller, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 975 [“[W]e are convinced the
evidence was insufficient to show defendant [Miller] acted with a
reckless indifference to human life”].) As the Attorney General
concedes, that post-Banks and Clark finding means he is entitled
to resentencing under section 1172.6 without further ado.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(2) [“If there was a prior finding by a court or
jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to
human life or was not a major participant in the felony, the court
shall vacate the petitioner’s conviction and resentence the
petitioner”]; see also People v. Ramirez (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
923, 932-933.)
        The conclusion that reversal is required is less obvious as
to defendant Patton, given his apparent role in Franco’s killing.
But obvious or not, the conclusion still obtains. Defendant
Patton’s eligibility turns on an evidentiary assessment of whether
he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference
to life and—critically—such an assessment can be made only
after counsel is appointed for defendant Patton and has an
opportunity to proffer additional evidence and argument that
might alter an assessment of his role in Franco’s killing. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at 719-720.)

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                          DISPOSITION
      The orders denying defendants’ section 1172.6 petitions are
reversed. The trial court is directed to vacate defendant Miller’s
murder conviction and resentence him consistent with section
1172.6, subdivisions (a) and (d)(2). The remittitur as to
defendant Miller shall issue forthwith. The trial court is directed
to appoint counsel for defendant Patton and thereafter proceed as
required by section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d).

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            BAKER, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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