Court Opinion

ID: 9625786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:51:10.51127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:15.023625
License: Public Domain

Hall, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. This case is illustrative of the extent this court has gone over the past few years to emasculate the remedy of summary judgment. If this ruling is allowed to stand, an appellate reversal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment has become an exercise in futility. The losing party will amend and be off on a new adventure under the "sporting theory” of justice.
In my opinion the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based upon the previous summary judgment rendered in favor of the appellee. I dissent to the basic premise upon which the majority opinion is grounded — the analogy of the old general demurrer to a motion for summary judgment. The analogy here is to the motion for directed verdict. "The trial court’s function in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is analagous to the function it performs when ruling on a motion for directed verdict. The essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by *291the trior of the facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts.” Pike v. Stafford, 111 Ga. App. 349 (141 SE2d 780); McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178 (1) (129 SE2d 408); One In All Corp. v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 108 Ga. App. 142, 144 (132 SE2d 116); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Ingalls Iron Works Co., 109 Ga. App. 574 (136 SE2d 505); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 (157 SE2d 524); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 (162 SE2d 743); Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513 (167 SE2d 697). "Functionally the theory underlying a motion for summary judgment is essentially the same as the theory underlying a motion for directed verdict.” 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 2043, § 56.02[10].
Since the enactment of the CPA, both this court and the Supreme Court have held that we now operate under "notice pleading” and that "a petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333 (163 SE2d 327); Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, 118 Ga. App. 498 (2) (164 SE2d 246); Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236 (1) (160 SE2d 260); Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) (166 SE2d 89). "The purpose of the Summary Judgment Act of 1959 [later incorporated into CPA] is to eliminate the necessity for a trial by jury where, giving the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1 (126 SE2d 442).
Thus we see that at the time for the decision on the motion for summary judgment the pleader opposing the motion has every benefit and inference that can be derived from the pleadings and the evidence. While he is given all these advantages, he also has a corresponding duty to either put up or shut up at the hearing on the question of additional pleadings or evidence. The one opposing the motion at the time of the hearing must "present same at that time, for the very purpose of the Summary Judgment Act is to afford either party litigant to a judgment forthwith if the record shows there is not a genuine issue existing between the parties, but only after each party has had opportunity to make out his case, or establish his defense, as the case may be. The summary judgment granted in this case places the plaintiff in error in no different position from where a verdict by a jury, or a directed verdict by the *292trial court would have placed him.” Studstill v. Aetna Casualty &c. Co., 101 Ga. App. 766, 768 (115 SE2d 374); Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 46 (118 SE2d 193); Montgomery v. Pickle, 108 Ga. App. 272 (3) (132 SE2d 818). He "had his choice of producing counter proof and thus make an issue of fact, or do nothing, that is, create no issue of fact and suffer judgment.” Crutcher v. Crawford Land Co., 220 Ga. 298, 304 (138 SE2d 580).
If it is too late after the hearing to amend or submit additional facts, it is axiomatic that it is too late after the appellate court has adjudicated that one party is entitled to a summary judgment. When the Supreme Court entered its judgment on September 27, 1971, the appellants had been given every right under the CPA, the merits of their case had been decided adversely and the mandate of that court cannot be changed by new pleading or affidavits. Summer-Minter & Assoc. v. Giordano, 228 Ga. 86 (184 SE2d 152).
"What judgment shall I dread?” A final one which is adverse on the merits.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Eberhardt and Judge Stolz concur in this dissent.