Court Opinion

ID: 9599622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:20:07.529252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:40.260863
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice:
I concur as to the majority’s discussion of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, but dissent as to the validity of the prior restraint.
At the outset, it is essential to understand that all prior restraints are not equal. It is also important to understand what the present prior restraint is, and what it is not. The prior restraint here is a judicial restraint on the disclosure by the press of an attorney’s private consultation with his client. By restraining publication, the trial court has attempted to protect and preserve the integrity of a criminal trial and the constitutional values which inhere therein. What this prior restraint is not is an executive, legislative, or judicial prior restraint of the expression of an opinion. It is also not a permanent restraint on the publication of the attorney-client conference.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press-” U.S. Const, amend. I. On its face, the provision seems to apply only to legislative *360abridgements of free speech, restricting as it does congressional action.1 The application of the First Amendment to judicial prior restraints is a late twentieth century phenomenon.2 Although the history of the drafting of the First Amendment, as well as the literal language of the amendment itself, suggest that it was intended solely as a limitation on legislative restraints of speech and the press, today it is assumed that this language encompasses judicial restraints. In modern First Amendment litigation no 'one questions whether or not the prohibition against judicial prior restraints might be limited to orders based on statutes. Perhaps the time has passed when such a question could be seriously addressed by an appellate court. But what should legitimately be revisited in the view of the majority, and in my view, is whether or not the same analysis should be applied to all judicial prior restraints.
A fair trial is guaranteed to litigants in both civil and criminal disputes. Does it make a difference whether the judicial prior restraint is simply a device to prevent premature publicity of matters at issue in a civil or criminal trial as opposed the prior restraint at issue in the instant capital murder case where the court also seeks to safeguard such constitutional values such as the protection against self-incrimination, the right to an attorney of the defendant’s choosing, and the right to a speedy trial?
*361Presently, the rigid Nebraska Press test is the only tool trial judges have to address questions of prior restraint, whether legislative or judicial, whether in the criminal or civil context, and whether in the high-profile capital murder ease or misdemeanor traffic court. While there is a certain elegant simplicity in “bright line” tests from the standpoint of appellate judges, such tests really do not give meaningful and practical guidance to trial judges.
In high-profile criminal cases, trial judges frequently encounter a media frenzy which they must deal with in a matter of hours. In this case, the police taped defendant’s very first conversation with his lawyer, just after he was arrested for murder. The prosecution retained this tape for over a year unbeknownst to defendant or his lawyer. The tape was leaked to the largest television station in the area from which defendant’s jury would be selected. The possibility of a tainted jury venire was very real. The trial judge proposed to solve this dilemma by restraining the media from publishing the attorney-client conversation until the jury had been empaneled. The television station involved here was responsible enough to voluntarily restrain publication of the surreptitiously taped attorney-client conference until a hearing could be held.
The Nebraska Press test requires the trial court to make detailed findings on all available alternatives. This may be unrealistic in the real world of high-profile criminal trials. Additionally, it forces the trial judge to make choices between other constitutional values. It may always be possible to posit other “possible” alternatives to judicial prior restraints. If a trial judge has to eliminate all other alternatives (a crystal ball exercise since none of the “alternatives” will have been put into play), then in reality there exists an absolute prohibition against any prior restraint. Are the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments thus sacrificed to the demands of the modern day media for instant public dissemination of any information to which it falls privy no matter the impact on the fairness of the trial? In the final analysis, Nebraska Press, for all its language to the contrary, may have effectively established the constitutional doctrine that the First Amendment trumps the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
*362The majority opinion is a scholarly and thoughtful review of the leading authorities on the question of whether a prior restraint of the press can ever be ordered by a trial judge in this country. The majority argues that the application of the Nebraska Press test here damages the defendant’s most fundamental due process rights in three important respects. First, the sanctity of his attorney-client privilege has been invaded. Second, his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination has potentially been compromised. Finally, the selection of the normal alternatives to the prior restraint, including continuance of the case until public attention abates, change of venue to a locale not so infected with the pre-trial publicity, and voir dire questioning of the jury to eliminate any biased jurors, impairs the defendant’s right to a speedy trial by a jury of his peers.
As noted above, I agree with the majority that the Nebraska Press test should be revisited by the Supreme Court. A standard must be formulated that adequately addresses the pressures and complex constitutional concerns that accompany a high-profile murder case. That said, I find myself compelled to dissent under the current state of the law. Further, the majority’s proposed standard falls short of the kind of sophisticated test required in this situation. Although more flexibility in issuing a prior restraint may be deserving in a case such as this, it should not result in a “rubber stamped” restraint whenever there is any potential prejudice to the defendant. An examination of less restrictive alternatives must remain part of the analysis.
As discussed by the majority, in this century the United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the First Amendment as mandating a “heavy presumption” against the constitutional validity of prior restraints. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 91 S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). This presumption is largely the result of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous declaration in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907): “[T]he main purpose of [the First Amendment] is to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had *363been practiced by other governments.”3 The question before this Court is at what point must this “heavy presumption” give way to a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), the United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue. The defendant was charged with murdering six members of a family in the small town of Sutherland, Nebraska, a town of about 850 people. Due to the notoriety of the case, the trial court issued an order prohibiting the press from pubhshing specific aspects of the trial. The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the restraint with some modifications. The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding the prior restraint invalid under its three-prong test.
In this case, the majority questions the second prong of the Nebraska Press test. The majority states that under this prong no situation can be conceived of in which a prior restraint would be justified because alternative measures would almost always be likely to mitigate the effects of pretrial publicity. The majority asserts that such a standard is untenable as it would be impossible for a court to ensure a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. I share the majority’s concern and agree that the second prong of the Nebraska Press test should not be read in isolation. The test itself does not require invalidation of a prior restraint solely because other measures might mitigate the effects of the pretrial publicity. It is a balancing test. A court must consider the degree to which other measures will mitigate the adverse effects of the pretrial news coverage in light of the nature and extent of that publicity. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569, 96 S.Ct. at 2807, 49 L.Ed.2d at 703 (“We cannot say on this record that alternatives to a prior restraint on petitioners would not have sufficiently mitigated the adverse effects of pretrial publicity so as to make prior restraint *364unnecessary.”). The presumption, however, is heavily in favor of using alternative measures. As noted by the Court in Nebraska Press, “our conclusion [that the prior restraint is invalid] is not simply a result of assessing the adequacy of the showing made in this case; it results in part from the problems inherent in meeting the heavy burden of demonstrating, in advance of trial, that without prior restraint a fair trial will be denied.” Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569, 96 S.Ct. at 2807-08, 49 L.Ed.2d at 703.
In this case, there is little doubt that other measures might mitigate the effects of the pretrial publicity. The pertinent question under Nebraska Press is whether such alternatives would sufficiently mitigate those effects. Under the current state of the law, I am compelled to answer yes to this question.
The Supreme Court’s first prior restraint decision was Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, which involved a legislative restraint on publication. By invalidating the restraint, the Court in Near echoed Holmes’s earlier proclamation in Patterson that the primary objective of the First Amendment was to avoid prior restraints. Quoting James Madison, the Court stated, “ ‘This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but from legislative restraint also.’ ” Near, 283 U.S. at 714, 51 S.Ct. at 630, 75 L.Ed. at 1366. The Court further observed, “The preliminary freedom [of the press] extends as well to the false as the true.” Id.
It was not until 1968 that the Supreme Court added to its First Amendment jurisprudence a presumption against judicial prior restraints. See Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325. The Court’s invalidation of judicial prior restraints came without an explanation of why the First Amendment was applicable to such orders. Id. (simply concluding that there is a “heavy presumption” against prior restraints under the First Amendment). In New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), the government sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified study of the *365Vietnam war. Despite the weighty countervailing interest of national security, the Supreme Court refused to sustain the judicial prior restraint. In a concurring opinion, Justice Black borrowed James Madison’s remarks concerning the Bill of Rights: “ ‘the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.’ ” New York Times, 403 U.S. at 716, 91 S.Ct. at 2142, 29 L.Ed.2d at 826.
The majority emphasizes that the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press declined to assign priorities between the First and Sixth Amendments. As such, the majority seeks to take advantage of this apparent indecision by suggesting the primacy of the Sixth Amendment. The majority notes that “a number of lower courts have held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is superior to the right of free speech and that, where the two rights collide, the latter must give way to the former.” However, none of the cases cited by the majority involved prior restraints.4 In fact, these cases explicitly distinguished prior restraints from other restrictions on freedom of expression and acknowledged the virtual per se invalidity of the former.
*366In News-Journal Corporation v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit faced the question of whether a trial court could limit extrajudicial commentary of trial participants. Citing Nebraska Press, the Eleventh Circuit noted that such orders were less restrictive than prior restraints on the press for averting the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity. The court further recognized that there was a “heavy presumption” against prior restraints. See Foxman, 939 F.2d at 1512 (citing Nebraska Press). The court reiterated the Supreme Court’s recommendation to use measures other than prior restraints in mitigating the effects of pretrial publicity. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found the restriction on extrajudicial statements to be an acceptable alternative.5
Like the court in Foxman, the Second Circuit in Application of Dow Jones & Company 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946, 109 S.Ct. 377, 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988), addressed the constitutionality of a lower court order restricting extrajudicial statements by trial participants. In distinguishing prior restraints from the restriction before it, the court stated,
[Tjhere is a substantial difference between a restraining order directed against the press — a form of censorship which the First Amendment sought to abolish from these shores — and the order here directed solely against trial participants and challenged only by the press. The distinction is critical.
The most offensive aspect of a prior restraint is the censorship involved by forbidding the dissemination of information already known to the press and therefore public. A prior restraint deprives the public of specific news because it prevents publication. Although the restraining order in this case limits the flow of information readily available to the news agencies — and for that reason might have an effect similar to that of a prior restraint — the fact that the order is not directed at the news agencies and that they therefore cannot be haled into court for violating its terms deflates what would otherwise be a serious concern regarding judi*367cial censorship of the press. For this reason the order is considerably less intrusive of First Amendment rights than one directly aimed at the press.
Application of Dow Jones & Company, 842 F.2d at 608.
These cases demonstrate that while it may be permissible for a court to restrict some First Amendment freedoms in order to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, it is almost never acceptable for a court to impose a prior restraint.6 At most, the two interests share equal prominence in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court in Nebraska Press sought to reconcile these interests without creating an arbitrary hierarchy. First, the Court recognized that “[a] prior restraint, ... by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction.” Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2808, 49 L.Ed.2d at 697-98. Conversely, pretrial publicity does not inflict an immediate injury but only poses “a risk that [the publicity will] have some adverse impact on the attitudes of those who might be called as jurors.” Id. at 569, 96 S.Ct. at 2807, 49 L.Ed.2d at 703 (emphasis added). In other words, any injury to the defendant is measured by probability; whereas, the prior restraint is a present transgression of a core constitutional right. By employing the remedial measures suggested in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966),7 the prior restraint is immediately rectified and any future risk of not having a fair trial is cured. This is exactly what the second prong of the Nebraska Press test attempts to achieve. See U.S. v. Noriega, 752 F.Supp. 1045, 1054 (S.D.Fla.1990) (“If nothing else, Nebraska Press stands for the *368proposition that speculative harm falls well short of the showing necessity for the imposition of a prior restraint.”).
As discussed above, any injury to Quattlebaum is measured solely by probability. All the while, the constitutional infirmity of the prior restraint persists. Therefore, to justify such an immediate and profound infringement of the First Amendment, Nebraska Press requires a finding that, absent the prior restraint, the defendant will be denied a fair trial. The record here simply does not support such a conclusion. The trial court’s consideration of alternative measures was, at best, cursory. The trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the degree to which other measures would mitigate the effects of the pretrial publicity.8 Such findings are basic to the balancing required by Nebraska Press. If the trial court had explored each of the alternatives, it would have had to conclude that the prior restraint was not necessary.9
Finally, the majority asserts that its decision to affirm the restraining order is “bolstered by the uncertainty of the precise standard necessary to justify a prior restraint in cases in which the defendant claims, not only that pretrial publicity threatens his right to a fair trial, but also that his attorney-client privilege has been violated, thereby jeopardizing his right to effective assistance of counsel.” Again, I join the majority’s frustration in not having a more suitable test with which to address the unique and profound constitutional concerns presented in this case. Nevertheless, under current case law, I remain compelled to conclude that the prior restraint here must be struck down.
In United States v. Noriega, 752 F.Supp. 1032 (S.D.Fla. 1990) (Noriega I), the federal district court faced the question of whether to restrain the publication of privileged conversations between Noriega and his defense team. The court imposed a temporary restraining order until it could review *369the tapes. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1990) (Noriega II). The majority suggests that Noriega I and Noriega II create doubt as to the applicability of the Nebraska Press test in cases involving privileged communications. In Noriega III, the district court explicitly sought to dispel such an interpretation. 752 F.Supp. 1045 (S.D.Fla.1990). The court stated that “[i]n order to make the factual findings mandated by Nebraska Press, it was necessary to review the subject tapes.” 752 F.Supp. at 1049. The court further noted that it had to contend with CNN’s refusal to produce the tapes, and as a result, the court imposed the temporary restraining order. However, the court emphasized that its decision was not a comment on the priority between Noriega’s First and Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 1051 (“the court had not then concluded that Noriega’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial out-weighed CNN’s First Amendment right to be free of prior restraints on publication.... ”).
In Noriega III, the district court summarized the inquiry mandated by the Eleventh Circuit in Noriega II:
[T]he fact that conversations may or may not fall within the protections of the [attorney-client] privilege has no bearing on whether Noriega’s right to an impartial jury will be clearly and irreparably harmed by publication.... Guaranteeing Noriega’s right to counsel involves an equally serious but much narrower inquiry. There, the court is concerned only with the extent to which the publication of legitimately privileged communications would prejudice Noriega’s defense were those protected conversations to fall into the hands of the prosecution.
Id., 752 F.Supp. at 1051-52 (emphasis added). Thus, the significance of the attorney-client privilege is limited to a determination of whether the prosecution would be prohibited from obtaining the communications; and if so, whether the communications would have prejudiced the defendant’s case if actually viewed by the prosecution. Even if a defendant could establish prejudice as a result of the prosecution gaining access to the conversations, a court would be required to explore less intrusive alternatives in order to avoid the prior restraint. Id. at 1054. (“Even if Noriega were able to meet his burden of establishing demonstrable prejudice upon the *370prosecution’s gaining access to these conversations, the court would in all likelihood refrain from imposing a prior restraint on the press.”).10
Freedom of the press from prior restraints is the quintessential right under the First Amendment. However, the presumption against prior restraints must not eviscerate those rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. A more sophisticated test is required in order to effectively address the complex constitutional concerns that may arise in any given criminal trial. The prerogative to change the prior restraint standards is the province of the United States Supreme Court. The majority makes a thoughtful and practical challenge to the current Nebraska Press test. I join the majority’s plea for a change, but until the Supreme Court revises the current test, it binds us.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. See Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1156 (1986) (arguing that a First Amendment basis for striking down judicial prior restraints rests on a "shaky foundation” and that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause would be the better source for restricting state courts in this regard).

. The Supreme Court’s first case involving a judicial prior restraint was Carroll v. President and Com’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). In Carroll, the trial court issued an order restraining a white supremacist organization from holding, for more than ten months, rallies or meetings that would tend to disturb and endanger the citizens of the county. The judicial proceedings held to consider the order were conducted ex parte with no notice being given to the white supremacist group. The Supreme Court ultimately struck down the judicial prior restraint, stating, "The issuance of an injunction which aborts a scheduled rally or public meeting, even if the restraint is of short duration, is a matter of importance and consequence in view of the First Amendment’s imperative.” 393 U.S. at 184, 89 S.Ct. at 353, 21 L.Ed.2d at 333.

. Holmes’s interpretation of the First Amendment had its origins in Blackstone’s Commentaries: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 151; see G. Edward White, Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 Cal.L.Rev. 391, 398 (1992).

. The majority’s references to Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) are also unavailing. In Estes, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether television cameras in the courtroom violated the defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue had nothing to do with the validity of a prior restraint. The only remedy available to the defendant was a reversal of his conviction. Finding the defendant’s due process rights were violated, the Court stated, "We have always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation of a fair trial — the most fundamental of all freedoms — must be maintained at all costs.” 381 U.S. at 540, 85 S.Ct. at 1632, 14 L.Ed.2d at 549. The Court then observed, "Our approach has been through rules, contempt proceedings and reversal of convictions obtained under unfair conditions.” Id. The Court in no way intimated that it intended to elevate an accused’s right to a fair trial above the well established presumption against prior restraints.
In Press-Enterprise, the Court dealt with the right of the public to attend voir dire proceedings in a criminal case. The case did not deal with a prior restraint. The Court invalidated the trial court’s order to close the proceedings and vindicated the public’s right to attend the proceedings. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to consider alternatives to closure and did not make findings sufficiently specific for review by an appellate court.

. See also Stabile, Free Press — Fair Trial: Can They Be Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 Geo.L.J. 337 (1990).

. See also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.1975) (finding that there was no prior restraint, and therefore, the court did not have to begin its examination with a "heavy presumption” against validity); United States v. Davis, 904 F.Supp. 564 (E.D.La.1995); Stabile, 79 Geo.L.J. at 341 ("While it may be permissible to restrict freedom of expression in order to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial, not all means of restriction are acceptable.”).

. These measures include: (1) change of trial venue to a place less exposed to the publicity; (2) postponement of the trial; (3) questioning of prospective jurors; (4) jury sequestration; and (5) clear instructions to the jury to decide issues only on the evidence. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 563-64, 96 S.Ct. at 2805, 49 L.Ed.2d at 700.

. The trial court simply concluded, "The publication or the transmission of that privileged communication, or its characterization would make it much more unlikely that the defendant could obtain a fair and impartial trial, given even all the protections that our system has in place to ensure a fair and impartial trial.”

. Even the majority admits that this case is not "extremely sensational.”

. The court noted that other less drastic alternatives included sequestration of the prosecution and dismissing members of the prosecution team or excluding evidence and witnesses.