Court Opinion

ID: 9700222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:16:33.72068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:05.540957
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). “Within the scope of employment” or “in the course of employment” or “in the performance of duty” cannot be equated *433with, “arising out of the employment” as the majority opinion holds. “Within the scope of employment” and “arising out of the employment” call for substantially different standards: the former requiring only a showing that the injury occurred within the course of or scope of employment; the latter imposing a further burden of showing a causal connection between the injury and some risk involved in the employment.
This court has repeatedly differentiated the two terms. An injury arises in the course of employment when it takes place (a) within the period of employment, (b) at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and (c) while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental to it. An injury is said to arise out of the employment, on the other hand, when it (a) occurs in the course of employment and (b) is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which it is required to be performed. Dombach v. Olkon Corporation, 163 Conn. 216, 221-22, 302 A.2d 270; Farnham v. Labutis, 147 Conn. 267, 269, 160 A.2d 120; Labbe v. American Brass Co., 132 Conn. 606, 609, 46 A.2d 339; Iliff v. Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co., 127 Conn. 248, 249, 16 A.2d 481; Ryerson v. A. E. Bounty Co., 107 Conn. 370, 372, 140 A. 728.
Section 5-144 of the Greneral Statutes, a part of chapter 65, provides death benefits to the dependents of a state employee who suffers an injury resulting in death provided that certain conditions enumerated in the statute are met. Those conditions are: (1) that the injury be sustained while acting within the scope of employment; (2) that *434the injury not result from the employee’s wilful or wanton act; (3) that the employee die as a result of the injury; and (4) that the employee be survived by a spouse, a dependent child or a dependent parent. The statute by its own terms makes its benefits payable if the injury occurs “within the scope of his employment.” Section 5-144, therefore, must be differentiated from traditional workmen’s compensation statutes where the injury must be shown to arise out of the employment and from some risk involved therein.
My colleagues construe § 5-144 as requiring not only a showing that the injury occurred within the scope of employment but also a showing that the injury arose out of the employment as is required in workmen’s compensation statutes. There is nothing in the statute to suggest such an additional requirement. It is fundamental that the meaning or intent of a statute is to be ascertained from the language of the statute itself. Where the language is clear and unambiguous, as here, there is no need for statutory construction. Hartford Hospital v. Hartford, 160 Conn. 370, 375-76, 279 A.2d 561; Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 455, 262 A.2d 174; State ex rel. Cooley v. Kegley, 143 Conn. 679, 683, 124 A.2d 898. Courts are not permitted to read into a statute what is not there. “ ‘We cannot “search out some intent which we may believe the legislature actually had and give effect to it, . . . we are confined to the intention which is expressed in the words it has used.” Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128.’ ” Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 110, 374 A.2d 133, quoting from United Aircraft Corporation v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 401, 410-11, 311 A.2d 65; Madison Education Assn. v. Madison, 174 Conn. 189, 192, 384 A.2d 361.
*435Only one statute in all of chapter 65 refers to causation: section 5-143 places all state employees under the workmen’s compensation statutes for any injury “arising out of and in the course of . . . employment.” If the legislature had intended to require traditional workmen’s compensation causation in § 5-144 as it required in § 5-143, it could easily have done so by simply adding the term “arising out of the employment” to the statute.
It should be noted that §§ 5-145a, 5-145b and 5-145e create a presumption in favor of state employees in certain stressful occupations. Those statutes create a presumption to the effect that any condition of impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in total or partial disability or death is suffered in the performance of duty. Thus, the employee seeking compensation under the statutory provisions of chapter 65 is aided by the presumption that the injury occurred in the service of the state rather than outside his employment. The statutes, however, prohibit that presumption from applying to workmen’s compensation statutes.
In essence, chapter 65 provides protection and benefits for state employees outside of, and in addition to, those contained within the traditional workmen’s compensation framework and the causal requirement contained therein. It cannot be questioned that the legislature can confer additional benefits to state employees beyond workmen’s compensation benefits, and in so doing, can dispense with the requirement of traditional causation.
The parties stipulated that at the time of the decedent’s injury, which resulted in death, the decedent was at the college where he was employed; *436that he was lecturing at a scheduled class which was a part of his regularly assigned duties; and that a spouse and dependent children survived him. It follows that the decedent was acting within the scope of his employment as required by the statute when he suffered the injury and death. All conditions imposed by the statute have been fulfilled.
I would, therefore, find no error on the part of the trial court.