Court Opinion

ID: 9402304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:14:40.012239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.927081
License: Public Domain

J-S11008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 THOMAS A. GOODEN                           :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 1270 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 3, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0002482-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 15, 2023

      Appellant, Thomas A. Gooden, appeals from the order entered on May

3, 2022, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      We briefly summarized the facts of this case as follows:

      On July 13, 2013, at about 2:43 a.m., Appellant was driving his
      automobile on Lincoln Drive near Morris Street in Philadelphia. At
      a curve in the roadway, Appellant lost control of his vehicle (a
      Subaru), which crossed into the opposite bound lane and collided
      with a vehicle (a Nissan) driven by Angela Terry. As a result of the
      collision, Appellant’s passenger, Ashley Gant Madison, was killed
      and another passenger, Bria Staley, was injured. Angela Terry and
      her passenger, Harvey Stratton, were injured. A third vehicle, (a
      Honda) was involved in the accident, but Appellant was not
      charged with offenses relating to the third vehicle.

      A jury convicted Appellant of accident involving death or personal
      injury, accident involving death—not properly licensed, homicide
      by vehicle, involuntary manslaughter, three counts of aggravated
      assault by vehicle, and four counts of recklessly endangering
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        another person. Appellant received an aggregate sentence of
        eight to 16 years' imprisonment.

Commonwealth v. Gooden, 2018 WL 1789790, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(unpublished memorandum) (internal brackets and citation omitted).                 This

Court    affirmed    Appellant’s    judgment     of    sentence   in   an   unpublished

memorandum filed on April 16, 2018.              Id.   On September 18, 2018, our

Supreme Court denied further review. See Commonwealth v. Gooden, 194

A.3d 124 (Pa. 2018).

        On September 17, 2019, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended PCRA petition. The

PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on April 6, 2022 and May 3, 2022. By

order entered on May 3, 2022, the PCRA court denied relief. This timely appeal

resulted.1

        On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

____________________________________________

1 Upon review of the PCRA court docket, this Court recognized that the notice
of appeal was not properly timestamped despite a proper filing notation on
the docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(3). After further inquiry, this Court
confirmed that the notice of appeal was timely filed on May 4, 2022. On May
26, 2022, the PCRA court filed an order directing Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant complied timely on May 30, 2022. On August 1, 2022, the PCRA
court issued a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) generally citing the
notes of testimony from the PCRA evidentiary hearing as justification for its
decision, but noted that “[t]o the extent that the Superior Court believes the
[PCRA] court’s statements on the record do not adequately address any issue,
the PCRA court will file a supplemental opinion upon remand.” PCRA Order,
8/1/2022, at *1. Upon our review of the record, the PCRA court’s decision is
clearly delineated, no further opinion is necessary, and this case is ripe for
disposition.

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        1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition
           following an evidentiary hearing because trial counsel was
           ineffective for [advising] Appellant that if Appellant testified at
           trial[,] the [Commonwealth could impeach his testimony with
           evidence that he had a prior conviction for] receiving stolen
           property [involving a firearm and, thereby,] deprived
           [Appellant] of his constitutional right to testify, and a new trial
           should be ordered because of the resulting prejudice to
           Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

        Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for improperly

advising him about his right to testify at trial. Id. at 8-12. “Appellant avers

that he wanted to testify but [elected not to do so after] trial counsel informed

[him] that he would be confronted” with evidence that he had a prior

conviction for receiving stolen property “where the property at issue was a

gun.”     Id. at 10. Appellant acknowledges that while Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 609 permits a party to impeach a witness with evidence of the

witness’ prior crimen falsi convictions, or those crimes involving dishonesty or

false statements, trial counsel incorrectly advised Appellant that the

Commonwealth could specifically introduce evidence that the prior conviction

involved a firearm. Id. at 11, citing Pa.R.E. 609.2 Moreover, Appellant argues

that he “suffered prejudice because he could have explained his rate of speed

____________________________________________

2   Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in pertinent part:

        (a) In General. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of
        any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
        crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
        must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.

Pa.R.E. 609(a).

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and rebutted evidence against him.” Id. at 11. Appellant argues that he did

not understand trial counsel’s advice and, therefore, he did not voluntarily

waive his right to testify. Id. at 11-12.

      Our standard of review of a PCRA court's denial of a PCRA petition for

relief is well-settled:

      We review an order of the PCRA court to determine whether the
      record supports the findings of the PCRA court and whether its
      rulings are free from legal error. To be eligible for PCRA relief, a
      petitioner must plead and prove, by a preponderance of the
      evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or
      more of the reasons set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
      […I]neffective assistance of counsel [is] set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      In order to obtain relief under the PCRA premised upon a claim
      that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish beyond a
      preponderance of the evidence that counsel's ineffectiveness so
      undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
      adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. When
      considering such a claim, courts presume that counsel was
      effective, and place upon the appellant the burden of proving
      otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failure to assert
      a baseless claim.

      To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective, [an a]ppellant
      must demonstrate that: (1) the claim is of arguable merit; (2)
      counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or
      inaction; and (3) counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced him.

Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal

case citations and quotations omitted; brackets supplied).       “We view the

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a light most favorable

to the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa.

2015) (citation omitted).   “The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when

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supported by the record, are binding on [an appellate court]; however, we

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated:

      The decision of whether or not to testify on one's own behalf is
      ultimately to be made by the defendant after full consultation with
      counsel.

      In order to sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
      to advise the appellant of his rights in this regard, the appellant
      must demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his right to
      testify, or that counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to
      vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own
      behalf.

Commonwealth v. Nieves, 746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000) (internal

citations omitted).

      Our Supreme Court previously determined that a prior conviction for

receiving stolen property is admissible as crimen falsi for the purpose of

impeachment. See Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723 (Pa. 2014).

Moreover, this Court previously determined that when a prior crimen falsi

offense “does not require the use of a firearm,” it is irrelevant and prejudicial

to permit evidence that a firearm was involved in that prior crime when

impeaching credibility. See Commonwealth v. Ellison, 253 A.3d 264 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 277 A.3d 552 (Pa.

2022).

      Here, trial counsel testified that Appellant “had a prior conviction [with]

a stolen firearm” and explained that “if [Appellant] testified, on rebuttal, the

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Commonwealth would be able to admit the receiving stolen property

[conviction] because it was crimen falsi.”        N.T., 4/6/2022, at 9.     More

specifically, trial counsel stated that he discussed with Appellant that the

Commonwealth “could show [Appellant] had a prior conviction for crimen falsi

[for] receiving stolen property” but could not “get into the facts of the [prior]

case at all.”    Id. at 10. The PCRA court made a credibility determination on

the record at the second PCRA evidentiary hearing, based in part upon trial

counsel’s 25 years of experience defending criminal cases, concluding that

counsel testified credibly “when he [said] that he would have known that the

gun would [not be admitted into evidence at trial], and that only the crimen

falsi part of the theft would [be admitted].” N.T., 5/3/2022, at 11. Moreover,

the PCRA court determined that counsel “knew what the law was and would

not have intentionally or unintentionally told [Appellant] something wrong.”

Id. at 12.      Accordingly, the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel was

effective because he gave accurate advice based upon prevailing law, and that

Appellant was not entitled to a new trial. Id.

      Based upon this record, Appellant has not demonstrated either that

counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that counsel gave specific advice

so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and intelligent decision to testify on

his own behalf.     The PCRA credited trial counsel’s testimony that he gave

Appellant a proper recitation of the law pertaining to impeachment through

crimen falsi. We will not usurp that credibility determination. As such, we

                                      -6-
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find no arguable merit to Appellant’s sole collateral claim, and he is not entitled

to PCRA relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/15/2023

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