Court Opinion

ID: 9752012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:29:07.824345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:05.631220
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In finding that the tortious acts of Hancock “can only be intentional and the injuries resulting therefrom expected,” the Court not only fails to grant proper deference to the Superior Court in its factfinding rule, but also determines that as a matter of law the issue is precluded from litigation in the present civil action. After considering the evidence, the trial court found that:
*1314[T]he events which followed Hancock’s trip to the basement were acts committed while he was in a blackout from having consumed eight to ten drinks of equal parts of rum and coke as well as the added effects of smoking marijuana. His acts were not committed intentionally or knowingly. They were not committed with any conscious awareness. His mental state at best was reckless.
We will not overturn a trial court’s finding of fact unless the finding is clearly erroneous, i.e., not supported by competent evidence in the record. Morin Building Products v. Atlantic Design and Construction, 615 A.2d 239, 241 (Me.1992). In this case, while a reasonable factfinder might have reached a different conclusion than that of the trial court, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding on this issue. Accordingly, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the trial court erred in so determining. Fournier v. Rochambeau Club, 611 A.2d 578, 579 (Me.1992).
In arguing to the contrary, Mutual relies on the fact that Hancock pleaded guilty to the offenses of gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253 (Supp.1992), and aggravated assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983). In Beale v. Chisholm, 626 A.2d 345 (Me.1993), we held that a criminal conviction for manslaughter did not preclude a defendant from litigating the issues not essential to that eon--vietion in a subsequent civil proceeding. Id. at 347. We so held on the well-established principle that it is only issues essential to the conviction that are precluded from litigation in an ensuing civil action. Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment h (1982) (if judgment not dependent on issues determined, relitigation not precluded and such determinations have characteristics of dicta); 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4421 (1981) (critical distinction between findings essential to a judgment and those that are not, for purposes of issue preclusion).
Here, intent was not essential to Hancock’s conviction for either offense and, accordingly, neither conviction was predicated on a determination of that issue. The statute governing the gross, sexual assault charge recites that “[a] person is guilty of gross sexual assault if that person engages in a sexual act with another person and ... [t]he other person submits as a result of compulsion.” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(A). “Compulsion” is explicitly defined as:
the use of physical force, a threat to use physical force or a combination thereof that makes a person unable to physically repel the actor or produces in that person a reasonable fear that death, serious bodily injury or kidnapping might be imminently inflicted upon that person or another human being.
“Compulsion” as defined in this paragraph places no duty upon the victim to resist the actor.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 251(1)(E) (Supp.1992). Notably missing from this statutory language is any requirement that the State prove that a defendant had formed any intent or even acted with any degree of recklessness. This is in sharp contrast to the statutory definitions of such other Class A crimes as murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 (1983 and Supp. 1992) (requiring that the defendant act “intentionally or knowingly” or “with a depraved indifference to the value of human life”), kidnapping, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (1983) (requiring that the defendant restrain another “knowingly”), and robbery in cases where force is used or bodily injury is inflicted, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651(1) and (2) (1983) (requiring intent to overcome resistance or inflict injury).
The Legislature opted not to require intent in cases of gross sexual assault in order to focus the proof in such cases on whether the victim has been subjected to certain specified conduct by the defendant providing a specified state of mind in the victim without regard to the state of mind of the defendant. We have consistently held that no proof of mental culpability or specific intent is required to sustain a conviction pursuant to Section 253. See, e.g., State v. Taplin, 489 A.2d 1107, 1108 (Me.1985); State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 251 (Me.1981).1 Mutual cannot *1315rely on Hancock’s conviction for gross sexual assault, or on Hancock’s conclusory and nonswom statements made when entering his guilty plea, to establish as a matter of law that Hancock acted intentionally during his violent, alcohol and marijuana-induced blackout.
Nor does Hancock’s conviction for aggravated assault establish that Hancock acted intentionally. The statute pursuant to which Hancock was prosecuted provides:
1. A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes:
A. Serious bodily injury to another; or
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C. Bodily injury to another under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983) (emphasis added). In her complaint against Hancock, the victim alleged that Hancock “intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently assaulted [the victim] under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and causing serious bodily injury to her.” Thus, neither Hancock in his plea of guilty to the aggravated assault charge, nor the victim in her complaint against Hancock, admit or establish that Hancock’s conduct was intentional.2
When an insurer seeks a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify an insured, we have permitted the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel based on a criminal conviction when “the identical issue necessarily was determined by [the pri- or criminal] judgment” and “the party es-topped had a fair opportunity and incentive to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.” State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 37 (Me.1991). At issue in Bragg was an insured’s guilty plea to a charge of murder, where the insured “had ample incentive vigorously to litigate the issue of his intent in his criminal prosecution.” Id. We therefore held that the insured’s convictions for murder and attempted murder were “sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of [the insured’s] subjective intent.” Id. at 38; see also Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 568 A.2d 1100, 1101 (applying similar reasoning to a case involving a criminal conviction for unlawful sexual contact, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255, which requires intent, and civil litigation with claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, both intentional torts). Because proof of intent is absent from the crimes for which Hancock was convicted, Bragg and Beale require us to sustain the trial court’s finding that Hancock did not act intentionally.

. The Court relies on State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me.1984) for the proposition that *1315"[o]ne person cannot accidentally or innocently compel another to submit to sexual intercourse.” We made that observation in the context of noting that a culpable state of mind was not required for the offense of rape in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 252, since repealed. Reed, 479 A.2d 1296. We therefore found no error in the trial court’s refusal to include a culpable state of mind requirement in its instructions to the jury. Id. at 1295. Our holding in Reed does not establish that a person convicted of rape or gross sexual assault acted with intent. To the contraiy, it is in line with our other cases stating that intent simply is not at issue in such a criminal proceeding.

. As the Court notes, the homeowner’s policy Mutual issued to Hancock excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage that is "expected or intended by the insured.” It is clear that Mutual’s liability on any claim could have been limited by contract language explicitly excluding certain conduct, regardless of intent, pursuant to the policy of insurance.