Court Opinion

ID: 9961260
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Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:34.880883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:30.909710
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                                                    RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
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               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0459-MR

DONAVON I. SMITH                                                     APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM TODD CIRCUIT COURT
V.              HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
                            NO. 22-CR-00023

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      Donovan I. Smith was convicted by a Todd County jury for failing to

register as a sexual offender and being a first-degree persistent felony offender

(PFO I). He received a total sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment and

appeals to this Court as a matter of right. 1 Smith argues: (1) the trial court

erred by failing to instruct the jury on entrapment; and (2) the Commonwealth

committed flagrant misconduct by misstating the law during the penalty phase.

We affirm.

      In Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Donovan I. Smith, No. 21-CR-00010,

(Todd Cir. Ct. filed Mar.9, 2021), Smith entered a guilty plea to the amended

charges of second-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and second-degree

      1 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
sexual abuse, offenses that required him to register with the Kentucky Sex

Offender Registry. At final sentencing on January 5, 2022, the trial court

probated Smith’s five-year sentence. At this time, Smith was informed of his

duty to register. He was instructed to meet with the probation representative

in the courtroom to sign the probation order. Smith was also provided a form

outlining his duty to register. He signed the form and was instructed to call his

probation officer, Megan Goss, within a few days to set up an appointment.

      On January 11, 2022, Goss was informed that Smith had been added to

her caseload. She called Smith the same day, and he came to her office later

that afternoon. During the intake process for his registration, Smith told Goss

he intended to live in Tennessee. At that time, Goss was under the mistaken

impression that she would have to transfer Smith to Tennessee for supervision

through the Interstate Compact Offender Tracking System. After affirming the

exchange of correct contact information, Goss told Smith to await further

instructions regarding his registration in Tennessee.

      Two days later, Goss learned from the Kentucky State Police that Smith

was required to register in Kentucky, and that she needed to register him as

soon as possible. Goss attempted to call Smith, but he did not answer. Smith

texted Goss in reply later that day and asked to talk with her. Following a

subsequent phone conversation, Smith agreed to return to Goss’s office before

noon on January 18, 2022, to complete his registration.

      Smith did not appear at Goss’s office on the scheduled date, or at any

time thereafter. Goss called Smith, but he did not answer, and she was unable

                                       2
to leave a message. The next day, Goss called Smith at his place of

employment, but learned he no longer worked there. Based on his lack of

contact, Goss applied for a warrant to arrest Smith.

        On January 31, 2022, Smith texted Goss. He claimed he had been

“undergoing a lot” and had been recovering from COVID-19. Smith told Goss

he was intending to purchase a home in Kentucky after he received his tax

refund. He further indicated his awareness of a court date on February 16,

2022.

        After receiving these text messages, Goss called Smith and he answered.

Goss instructed Smith to turn himself in at the Todd County jail, but he

refused, stating that he would explain himself at the court date. Smith also

refused to give Goss his current address or any other information about his

living situation. He did not make any further contact with Goss prior to his

court date. Smith was arrested on the day of the court date pursuant to the

outstanding warrant.

        Smith was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender and PFO I.

Following a jury trial, he was convicted on both charges. He received a

sentence of five years’ imprisonment for failing to register, which the PFO I

conviction enhanced to a total of twenty years’ imprisonment. This appeal

followed.

        Smith first argues the trial court erred by denying his request for an

instruction on the defense of entrapment. Specifically, he contends Goss’s

failure to register him when she had the opportunity raised a jury issue

                                          3
regarding her intent to induce him into committing a criminal act. We

disagree.

      RCr 2 9.54(1) imposes a duty upon the trial court “to instruct the jury in

writing on the law of the case[.]” The law of the case encompasses “every state

of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony[,]” including

lesser-included offenses and any available affirmative defenses. Hargroves v.

Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth,

995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999). Thus, “[t]he jury instructions must be

complete and the defendant has a right to have every issue of fact raised by the

evidence and material to his defense submitted to the jury on proper

instructions.” Hayes v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1993). We

review “the trial court’s decision to instruct on a specific claim for an abuse of

discretion[.]” Hargroves, 615 S.W.3d at 6. An abuse of discretion occurs when

the trial court “acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly, or takes action

‘unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

      KRS 505.010 sets forth the defense of entrapment:

      (1) A person is not guilty of an offense arising out of proscribed
      conduct when:

      (a) He was induced or encouraged to engage in that conduct by a
      public servant or by a person acting in cooperation with a public
      servant seeking to obtain evidence against him for the purpose of
      criminal prosecution; and

      2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                         4
      (b) At the time of the inducement or encouragement, he was not
      otherwise disposed to engage in such conduct.

      (2) The relief afforded by subsection (1) is unavailable when:

      (a) The public servant or the person acting in cooperation with a
      public servant merely affords the defendant an opportunity to
      commit an offense; or

      (b) The offense charged has physical injury or the threat of physical
      injury as one (1) of its elements and the prosecution is based on
      conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than
      the person perpetrating the entrapment.

      (3) The relief provided a defendant by subsection (1) is a defense.

We have previously noted “[t]he law surrounding entrapment is well-defined in

Kentucky, having been amply set forth by both statutory and case law.”

Morrow v. Commonwealth, 286 S.W.3d 206, 209 (Ky. 2009). A defendant must

satisfy both subsections of KRS 505.010(1), inducement and the absence of

predisposition, to establish entitlement to an instruction on the defense of

entrapment. Id.

      Here, Smith tendered a proposed instruction on entrapment, which the

trial court denied. During the discussion before the trial court, Smith’s trial

counsel candidly admitted the evidence of entrapment “didn’t really develop.”

Nevertheless, Smith maintained he was entitled to the instruction because

Goss’s initial failure to register him subjected him to arrest because the time

for registration had expired by the time Goss instructed him to return for

completion of the registration process.

      The evidence of record does not support Smith’s arguments. There is no

indication Goss intended to induce Smith into failing to register for the purpose

                                          5
of a later criminal prosecution. On the contrary, Goss’s initial delay in

registering Smith was explained by her mistaken belief he was required to

register in Tennessee. After this misapprehension was corrected, Goss made

every reasonable effort to ensure Smith’s compliance with the registration

requirements. Smith evaded and rebuffed these attempts at every turn. We

cannot conclude the evidence supported a finding that Goss induced Smith

into failing to register. Further, even assuming inducement, Goss’s subjective

intent has no bearing on Smith’s criminal predisposition to commit the charged

offense, which was amply demonstrated by the evidence. Because Smith

cannot satisfy both elements of the entrapment defense, his claim must fail.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the requested

instruction on entrapment.

       Smith next argues the Commonwealth committed flagrant misconduct

during the penalty phase by misstating the law pertaining to the possibility of

early release from imprisonment. Specifically, he contends the following

statements were improper and prejudicial:

   •   [Y]ou will see that even a twenty-year sentence can end up being more
       like ten at the most if he doesn’t make parole.

   •   When we hear fifteen to twenty years, that’s not, for what is considered a
       nonviolent offense, that’s not actually fifteen to twenty years.

   •   [E]ven if somebody doesn’t make parole, even if they are told they have to
       serve out, that also doesn’t mean they serve an actual fifteen to twenty
       years if you give somewhere in that range.

                                        6
While we agree the Commonwealth’s statement that a twenty-year sentence

could end up being ten years at the most was improper, we cannot conclude

the misstatement amounted to palpable error.

      Prosecutorial misconduct has been defined as an “improper or illegal act

. . . involving an attempt to . . . persuade the jury to . . . assess an unjustified

punishment.” Noakes v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Ky. 2011)

(citing Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)). Admittedly, we have previously

held a prosecutor’s misstatement of law concerning parole eligibility may rise to

the level of palpable error. Beard v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Ky.

2019). Kentucky law demands our prosecutors adhere to the highest

standards of competence and integrity. Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533

S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1976), overruled on other grounds by Blake v.

Commonwealth, 646 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1983). Indeed, “[n]o one except for the

judge himself is under a stricter obligation to see that every defendant receives

a fair trial, a trial in accordance with the law, which means the law as laid

down by the duly constituted authorities, and not as the prosecuting attorney

may think it ought to be.” Id.

      At the same time, we have also recognized “a misstatement [of law] alone,

especially when it is not objected to at trial, does not automatically require

reversal.” Matheny v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006); see

also Barrett v. Commonwealth, 677 S.W.3d 326, 335 (Ky. 2023) (holding

misstatement concerning presumption of innocence did not amount to flagrant

misconduct). Specifically, in Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250, 270 (Ky.

                                          7
2020), we concluded a prosecutor’s misstatement that a defendant would have

to serve four more years than actually required to become parole eligible did

not amount to palpable error.

      The four-part test for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct is well-

established: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to

prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether

they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the

strength of the evidence against the accused.” Dickerson v. Commonwealth,

485 S.W.3d 310, 329 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Mayo v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d

41, 56 (Ky. 2010)). Additionally, when addressing issues raised during closing

argument in the penalty phase,

      [a]n appellate court’s review of alleged error to determine whether it
      resulted in “manifest injustice” necessarily must begin with an
      examination of both the amount of punishment fixed by the verdict
      and the weight of evidence supporting that punishment. Other
      relevant factors, however, include whether the Commonwealth’s
      statements are supported by facts in the record and whether the
      allegedly improper statements appeared to rebut arguments raised
      by defense counsel. Finally, we must always consider these
      closing arguments “as a whole” and keep in mind the wide latitude
      we allow parties during closing arguments.

Young v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 66, 74-75 (Ky. 2000) (footnotes omitted).

When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is unpreserved, this Court “will

reverse only if the conduct was both flagrant and constitutes palpable error

resulting in manifest injustice.” Barrett, 677 S.W.3d at 333 (emphasis added).

      Here, the unique and somewhat paradoxical procedure of combining the

opening statement with closing argument was undertaken by agreement of the

                                        8
parties. 3 At the outset of the penalty phase, the Commonwealth informed the

trial court that Smith had requested the parties to make an opening statement

and waive closing argument. The Commonwealth agreed, provided it would be

permitted leeway to make its argument and sentencing recommendation.

Smith’s counsel stated, “I will not be objecting to any argument.”

      The Commonwealth’s hybrid opening-closing argument lasted

approximately four minutes. The primary focus of the argument involved an

explanation of the PFO charge and predicate offenses in addition to Smith’s

general criminal history. 4 The Commonwealth emphasized the nature and

extent of the prior offenses, including a felony offense committed while on

probation, and

      that Mr. Smith has shown that he cannot be managed in the
      community, when he had an opportunity the first thing he started
      doing was falling off the radar, trying to explain his way out of it,
      not taking responsibility for his duties and so I think that the 15 to
      20 range is pretty fair given the circumstances.

      3 RCr 9.42 mandates the opening statement should precede closing argument

in a criminal jury trial “unless the court for special reasons otherwise directs.”
Because “Kentucky courts require that closing arguments . . . be predicated on
evidence introduced during the trial of the case,” it is difficult to conceive how counsel
can properly argue the evidence prior to the introduction of evidence. See Leslie W.
Abramson, 9 Ky. Prac., Crim. Prac. & Proc. § 29:12 (6th ed.). Nevertheless, in
consideration of the constitutional dimension of appropriate closing argument, “the
court should not restrict the reasonable decisions of the parties regarding the division
or order of the arguments.” Id. at § 29:11.
      4 Of the four-minute argument, approximately three minutes were devoted to

the subject of Smith’s recidivism while the remaining minute addressed the possibility
of early release.

                                            9
The prosecutor then segued into a discussion concerning the possibility of

early release. The alleged misstatements occurred in the context of the

following remarks:

      Now you’re going to hear from Karen Palmer, she’s with Probation
      and Parole, that when we hear fifteen to twenty years, that’s not—
      for, for what’s considered a non-violent offense—that’s not actually
      fifteen to twenty years; they become parole eligible at 20% of that.
      And so, for instance, just to make the math easy, if somebody was
      convicted at ten years, 20% parole eligibility would be two years.
      Now, if someone, as [defense counsel] said, nobody, we don’t know
      who’s going to make parole, that’s up to the Parole Board, they
      decide that whenever he comes, becomes eligible. But even if
      somebody doesn’t make parole, even if they’re told they have to
      serve out, that also doesn’t mean that they serve an actual fifteen
      to twenty years if you give somewhere in that range. People also get
      things like good time credits taken off their sentence and Miss
      Palmer’s going to testify more about that, and you’ll see that even a
      twenty-year sentence can end up being more like ten at the most if
      [Smith] doesn’t make parole.

The Commonwealth then concluded its argument by asking the jury “to just

listen to the witnesses that we have.”

      As this Court has previously held, the four-part test for flagrant

misconduct must account for the totality of the Commonwealth’s argument.

Young, 25 S.W.3d at 74-75. Under the first factor, we perceive the

Commonwealth’s remark, that Smith could only serve ten years at the most on

a twenty-year sentence, to have been misleading and weighs in Smith’s favor.

The wide latitude we afford to counsel in making responsive argument is not a

license to improvise on the law. It was highly speculative and unrealistic for

the Commonwealth to assume Smith could obtain such a radical reduction in

prison time despite the availability of good-time and educational credits.

However, the Commonwealth’s other statements that a fifteen-to-twenty-year
                                         10
sentence would not necessarily result in Smith serving a literal fifteen to twenty

years in prison were correct and permitted by KRS 532.055(2)(a), which allows

the introduction of evidence relating to both parole eligibility and potential good

time credit. As such, under the second factor, the objectionable comment was

isolated and weighs in the Commonwealth’s favor.

      Regarding the third factor, we do not view the Commonwealth as having

deliberately placed a misstatement of law before the jury. Given the isolation of

the remark and its responsiveness to Smith’s argument, it is equally plausible

that the Commonwealth’s misstatement was inadvertent as it is that the

prosecutor brazenly misrepresented the law. See Ray, 611 S.W.3d at 270; see

also Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 55 (Ky. 2017). For this reason,

we conclude the third factor weighs in neither party’s favor. Murphy, 509

S.W.3d at 55.

      Under the fourth factor relating to the strength of the evidence, we have

no doubt the evidence justifies the maximum enhancement on the PFO charge.

The propriety of a PFO enhancement does not depend on the relative severity of

the underlying crime and other predicate offenses. See Hardin v.

Commonwealth, 573 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Ky. 1978) (explaining the purpose of the

PFO statute is to homogenize “the treatment of recidivists with the new penal

code and uniform proceedings dealing with persistent felony offenders”),

superseded by statute as stated in Blair v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0834-

MR, 2005 WL 387274 (Ky. Feb. 17, 2005).

                                        11
      Here, rather than basing Smith’s sentence on the Commonwealth’s

misstatement, it is just as likely—if not more so—that the jury found Smith

deserving of maximum punishment on the PFO based on his overall criminal

history 5, and because he exploited the leniency of probation to commit an

additional felony offense. Moreover, this Court has routinely upheld, as

proportional punishment, maximum PFO enhancements predicated on

nonviolent Class D felonies. Turpin v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.3d 444, 449

(Ky. 2011); Riley v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622, 634 (Ky. 2003). Indeed,

“[r]ecidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased

punishment.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion).

Nevertheless, against the weight of this evidence, we must also acknowledge

the reasoning of Robinson v. Commonwealth, which emphasized the inherent

difficulty in discerning whether improper testimony “influenced the jury to

render a sentence greater than what it might otherwise have given absent the

incorrect testimony.” 181 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Ky. 2005). Thus, we conclude the

fourth factor also weighs in neither party’s favor.

      Having concluded the test for flagrant misconduct results in a “state of

relative equipoise[,]” we “use the general test for whether relief for prosecutorial

misconduct is proper: an examination of the trial as a whole to determine if

      5 The underlying offense was failure to comply with sex offender registration.

The predicate offenses for the PFO enhancement were second-degree unlawful
transaction with a minor and aggravated assault. Smith’s prior misdemeanor offenses
included second-degree sexual abuse, fourth-degree assault, third-degree criminal
trespass, drug possession, criminal impersonation, and failure to appear.

                                          12
the improper comments undermined the essential fairness of [Smith’s] trial.”

Mayo, 322 S.W.3d at 57. On the present record, we discern no indication the

Commonwealth’s misstatement subjected Smith to manifest injustice.

      In delineating the prejudicial effect of closing argument, this Court has

often noted that argument is not evidence, and here, Smith did not object to

any of the testimony presented during the penalty phase. See Slaughter v.

Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky. 1987). Further, the trial court

rectified Smith’s complaints regarding the sentencing instructions, except for

his claim—which has now been abandoned—that the PFO charge improperly

subjected him to a double enhancement. 6

      Importantly, Smith effectively cross-examined Palmer regarding her

testimony that no limitation exists on the amount of educational credit an

inmate can receive, with Palmer admitting educational credits were functionally

limited by the availability of classes at any given facility. Additionally, Smith

cross-examined Palmer on parole eligibility and good-time credit. Thus, the

Commonwealth’s misstatement did not stand entirely unrebutted. Further,

under the hybrid procedure to which the parties agreed, Smith’s ability to

cross-examine Palmer on the general subject-matter of the Commonwealth’s

misstatement distinguishes the present appeal from those decisions where the

Commonwealth’s improper closing argument remained the final word. See

      6  Smith has not raised any claims regarding the sentencing instructions on
appeal. Therefore, they have been abandoned. See Middleton v. Commonwealth, 198
Ky. 625, 249 S.W. 777 (1923).

                                        13
Beard, 581 S.W.3d at 546; Robinson, 181 S.W.3d at 38; and Evans v.

Commonwealth, 544 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Ky. App. 2018). Under these

circumstances, we cannot conclude the Commonwealth’s misstatement

amounted to manifest injustice or otherwise rendered the sentencing phase

fundamentally unfair.

      Certainly, any misstatement of the law is subject to correction upon a

timely objection. But relief for “palpable error ‘must involve prejudice more

egregious than that occurring in reversible error[.]’” Brewer v. Commonwealth,

206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d

744, 758 (Ky. 2005)). Moreover, palpable error review “is not a substitute for

the requirement that a litigant must contemporaneously object to preserve an

error[.]” Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ky. 2002). Indeed, “[w]e

can only wonder whether trial counsel erred or whether they deliberately failed

to object to prevent correction of the error and have an issue on which to

appeal in an otherwise error-free trial where proof of guilt was compelling.”

Young, 25 S.W.3d at 74 (quoting Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 121 (6th

Cir. 1979)). Thus, we remain unconvinced “the defect in the proceeding was

shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable” such that reversal is necessary to

avoid manifest injustice. See Payne v. Commonwealth, 681 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky.

2023) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2006)).

      To be clear, we “do not condone the portion of the Commonwealth’s

argument challenged by [Smith.]” Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 348. But for the

fortuity that Smith was able to cross-examine Palmer following the

                                       14
Commonwealth’s misstatement, we may well have reversed for a new

sentencing. Kentucky prosecutors should not risk reversal based on inartful

and ill-considered remarks of minimal utility.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur.

Thompson, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in

which Lambert, J., joins.

      THOMPSON, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART. I

concur with the majority opinion’s resolution of Smith’s first argument, that

the trial court did not err in failing to give the jury an entrapment instruction.

      I dissent from the majority opinion’s decision on Smith’s second

argument, that reversal is not required where the prosecutor drastically

misrepresented to the jury the amount of time Smith would spend incarcerated

if sentenced to the maximum term as a persistent felony offender in the first

degree (PFO-1), which thus encouraged the jury to recommend a longer term of

imprisonment. I conclude the Commonwealth’s misstatement that with “things

like good time credits taken off their sentence . . . you’ll see that even a twenty-

year sentence can end up being more like ten at the most if he doesn’t make

parole[,]” (emphasis added), constituted flagrant prosecutorial misconduct

under the four factor test. 7 I would determine such an error to be palpable and

reverse and remand for a new PFO penalty phase.

      7 I agree with the majority opinion that the other two statements which Smith

complained were errors were not improper as they were accurate.

                                         15
      In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30, 38 (Ky. 2005), our Court

concluded palpable error required reversal based on misstatements in

testimony which was repeated in the closing argument that “good time” credit

would reduce the minimum time needed for parole eligibility. The Court

explained:

      The use of incorrect, or false, testimony by the prosecution is a
      violation of due process when the testimony is material. Napue v.
      Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 272, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217
      (1959). This is true irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
      prosecutor. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194,
      1196–1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). When the prosecution knows
      or should have known that the testimony is false, the test for
      materiality is whether “there is any reasonable likelihood that the
      false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”
      United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49
      L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).

Id. In Robinson, our Court concluded that the false statement repeated in the

closing argument had a reasonable likelihood of “influenc[ing] the jury to

render a sentence greater than what it might otherwise have given absent the

incorrect testimony. We believe it did and, for sure, can’t say it didn’t.” Id.

      Robinson does not stand alone. Time and time again, misstatements that

a defendant will be released earlier than is correct under controlling law, which

encourage the jury to recommend a harsher sentence, have been determined to

be material and to therefore constitute palpable error. In Beard v.

Commonwealth, 581 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Ky. 2019), our Court determined there

was palpable error where the jury was told the defendant would be eligible for

parole earlier than was correct, because such an error was material and “had a

reasonable likelihood of influencing the jury’s decision regarding [the

                                         16
defendant’s] sentence.” In Ruppee v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 852, 852-53

(Ky. 1988), our Court determined that prosecutorial misconduct in advising the

jury inaccurately about when the defendant would be released on parole (as a

guarantee rather than mere eligibility) constituted a reversable error,

explaining “a jury should not be misadvised by the Commonwealth’s Attorney

as to the legal effect of its verdict, nor should a verdict based upon such a

misstatement of the law be allowed to stand.” See Evans v. Commonwealth, 544

S.W.3d 166, 170 (Ky. App. 2018) (following our precedent to determine a

misrepresentation during a closing argument that “if you gave him the

maximum, he’s only looking at three years to serve” constituted a palpable

error sufficient for reversal).

      The majority opinion decries the prosecutor’s misstatement, without

imposing any resulting consequences; this decision may encourage prosecutors

to speculate about how much time a defendant is likely to serve, rather than to

exercise appropriate caution. The majority opinion states that our Court has

recognized that a misstatement of law alone does not automatically require

reversal. It cites to Ray v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 250, 270 (Ky. 2020), as

an example of when a prosecutor’s misstatement about the law as to how long

a defendant would serve did not amount to palpable error, correctly recounting

that the misstatement was that the defendant would have to serve four more

years than required to become parole eligible.

      Ray does not alter the requirement that material misstatements require

reversal for palpable error. It is logical that a misstatement is not material, and

                                        17
a defendant is not thereby harmed by it, when the misstatement is likely to

benefit the defendant by encouraging leniency by the jury and might convince a

jury to recommend a lower sentence. It is difficult to imagine how such an error

which benefits a defendant rather than causing harm could be material, much

less constitute a palpable error. 8 It is another matter entirely to discount that a

misstatement which could convince a jury to recommend a higher sentence

and harsher penalty to achieve its desired result does not constitute a palpable

error.

         This foregoing precedent guides my evaluation of the prosecutor’s

remarks in terms of the four-part test for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct

and leads me to conclude that the Court should have reversed for a new

penalty phase.

         1. Whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice
            the accused.

         Our truth in sentencing law, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

532.055(2)(a), permits the Commonwealth Attorney to present evidence relating

to potential parole and good time credit. See Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 990

S.W.2d 609, 611 (Ky. 1999). However, in providing such information to the

jury, the Commonwealth Attorney is not permitted to make false

         8 Similarly, an error which has no impact cannot be material. See Cecil v.

Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 675–76 (Ky. 1994) (noting it would have reversed
had the sentence imposed been influenced by the error, but reversal for resentencing
was not required where the jury received correct information about parole eligibility for
the sentence it recommended). There is also no error where there is simply an
omission of testimony on a topic that the defendant later believes might have been
beneficial for mitigation purposes. See Kays v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 260, 273-
74 (Ky. App. 2016).
                                            18
representations about what length of time a defendant will actually serve on a

sentence based on such potential reductions.

      As the majority opinion agrees, the Commonwealth misstated the law

about the amount of time Smith could serve on a maximum twenty-year

sentence with credits subtracted from it. Such a misstatement is wholly

unacceptable, very misleading, and prejudicial. It was also not corrected

through the testimony of Probation and Parole Officer Karen Palmer.

      Palmer testified that “one year is not one year in the prison system”

because jail credit and good time credits could decrease an inmate’s sentence.

Palmer explained that Smith was eligible for two different kinds of good time

credit, “meritorious which grants him seven days per month” and educational

credit “which grants him ninety days for successful completion of each

qualifying program and there’s no limit to the amount of educational credit that

he could earn.” (Emphasis added). This reinforced the prosecutor’s

misrepresentation that Smith could lower his sentence to ten years and was

not corrected by their subsequent exchanges:

      CW: So, if we stand here today and we say he got a fifteen-year
      sentence, could you tell us if he never made parole exactly how
      many days he would serve?

      Palmer: I couldn’t tell you exactly.

      CW: Would that largely be up to him and what he does while in
      prison?

      Palmer: It would.

(Emphasis added).

                                        19
         On cross-examination, Palmer admitted that although there were no

limits on the quantity of educational credits which could decrease an inmate’s

time, the availability of such classes could be limited because some facilities do

not offer many classes. This clarified that there was no guarantee that Smith

could get out as soon as the prosecutor stated but did not clarify how close

Smith could get to that “ten at the most” years to serve. The jury was thus left

with the perception that Smith’s own actions could result in him serving ten

years.

         However, such a large reduction is patently absurd, a factual

impossibility even under ideal conditions, and not within Smith’s control. The

prosecutor’s error is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that Palmer’s testimony

did misstate the amount of good time credit Smith could earn to be at a rate of

seven days per month, rather than the correct rate of ten days per month. She

apparently confused the provisions of KRS 197.045(1)(b)1, which provides the

rate at which credit is earned for “[g]ood behavior[,]” with that of KRS

197.045(1)(b)2, which provides the rate at which credit earned for “[p]erforming

exceptionally meritorious service[.]”

         It is certainly true that Smith could attempt to further reduce his

sentence by completing educational courses. I assume that Palmer was

referring to both inmate programs and academic educational courses and will

refer to both as classes. However, it is impossible even if “all the stars aligned”

                                          20
that Smith could cut his sentence in half from a combination of credit for good

behavior and credit for taking classes. 9

      To accomplish such a reduction, Smith would have to take over a dozen

classes that each qualified for a ninety-day reduction in his sentence, a quite

unlikely scenario at most facilities. Additionally, there are a variety of other

limiting factors beyond an inmate’s control, including: only being qualified to

take certain classes based on “penological needs”; the demand for particular

classes; generally only being able to take two classes at a time; only being

eligible for certain classes at specific stages of a sentence; certain classes

taking a longer time to complete or needing to be taken in a particular

sequence; the requirement that certain prerequisites be met including having a

high school diploma or G.E.D. and meeting testing requirements; and

potentially lacking the intellectual capacity to complete classes.

      No matter how diligent Smith was in completing classes, and no matter

how ideal his prison facility might be in offering classes, it was simply

impossible for Smith to come anywhere close to the represented reduction. A

reduction of even a year in his overall sentence would be a highly ambitious

      9 Available courses are listed in the relevant course catalogues: Course

Catalogue of Offender Programs: Adult Institutions, Kentucky Department of
Corrections (2024), https://corrections.ky.gov/Divisions/programs/Documents/
2024/Q1/AI%20Full%20Catalog.pdf; Division of Education Course Catalogue: Adult
Institutions, Department of Corrections (2024), https://corrections.ky.gov/Divisions
/programs/Documents/2024/Q1/EDU%20Full%20Catalog.pdf. How these programs
are administered is specified in the Corrections Policies and Procedural Manual (CPP)
which is available at https://corrections.ky.gov/About/cpp/Pages/default.aspx. I rely
on my perusal of these materials to conclude that no matter an inmate’s efforts,
completing the requisite courses for such a reduction would be a Sisyphean task.

                                          21
goal. Thus, the prosecutor knew or should have known this statement was

demonstrably false. False statements of course qualify as misleading

statements for purposes of this factor. Ray, 611 S.W.3d at 270. This false

statement was not corrected later, so it remained material.

      It was also highly prejudicial as it justified the jury sentencing Smith to a

longer PFO-1 enhancement to give him the length of sentence it believed he

actually deserved, which may have only been ten years. Accordingly, this

misstatement of law was material and a violation of Smith’s due process rights.

Therefore, the first factor weighs heavily in Smith’s favor.

      2. Whether the remarks were isolated or extensive.

      The prosecutor’s comment presented during the combined opening

statement and closing argument was isolated in that it was only made once

during his brief statement. However, the misimpression the prosecutor created

through this misrepresentation of the law was never corrected by the testimony

that followed. Instead, Palmer’s testimony strengthened the impression that

Smith could vastly reduce his sentence based on his own hard work without

any limitation other than a particular facility having fewer available classes.

Still, this second factor weighs in favor of this remark being non-flagrant.

      3. Whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally placed
         before the jury.

      I believe this remark was deliberately placed before the jury. The

prosecutor used very specific and clear language as to the most time Smith

could serve in contravention of what should have been known to him, that

                                        22
such a large reduction was impossible. Whether the prosecutor acted in good

faith or bad faith in making such an incorrect pronouncement, such language

appears designed to absolve the jury from feeling any concern for the result of

enhancing Smith’s sentence to the maximum one possible, as was decried in

Ruppee, 754 S.W.2d at 853. This third factor weighs strongly in favor of Smith.

      4. The strength of the evidence against the accused.

      Finally, I consider the strength of the evidence against Smith both in

terms of his guilt and in terms of how his prior criminal history should have

influenced the PFO-1 enhancement he received. While evidence of Smith’s guilt

was substantial, he is not challenging his initial sentence but rather his PFO-1

enhanced sentence. As to this, it was his prior criminal history that was

primarily at issue regarding the appropriate amount of enhancement. I cannot

say that the jury would have necessarily imposed the maximum PFO-1

sentence on Smith without such a misrepresentation about the maximum time

he would serve if he behaved well and diligently completed classes.

      The Commonwealth argues that Smith’s sentence was the result of his

criminal history. While this is possible, although his criminal history was

sufficient for the PFO-1 enhancement as he had two prior felonies, these were

both low level felonies and his other criminal history consisted of

misdemeanors and violations.

      Smith’s last convictions were for unlawful transaction with a minor, a

Class D felony, and sexual abuse in the second degree, a misdemeanor. Smith

had been probated for these crimes. His failure to register as a sex offender was

                                       23
based on that underlying misdemeanor, with the failure to register constituting

a felony. Smith’s only other felony was an aggravated assault conviction out of

Tennessee which resulted in a three-year sentence. This would be a Class D

felony in Kentucky.

      As to Smith’s other Kentucky and Tennessee convictions, as testified to

by the circuit court clerk, they consisted of misdemeanors and a violation.

Smith had Kentucky convictions for: (1) a conviction for criminal trespassing-

third degree with no sentence indicated, 10 and (2) an assault in the fourth-

degree conviction which resulted in a thirty-day sentence. Smith had

Tennessee convictions for: (1) a conviction for simple possession, a Class A

misdemeanor for which he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine

days, with thirty-days to serve; (2) a conviction for simple possession which did

not indicate a sentence; and (3) a conviction for criminal impersonation, a

Class B misdemeanor, which resulted in a $50 fine.

      This fourth factor weighs in Smith’s favor because the evidence properly

before the jury did not indicate that he had such a serious criminal history as

to warrant a maximum twenty-year sentence.

      10 Criminal trespass in the third degree could only constitute a violation when

Smith was convicted of committing it. See KRS 511.080(2) (amended by 2022
Kentucky Laws Ch. 151 § 8 (SB 179) to elevate a violation to a Class B felony if it
occurs during a declared emergency). Therefore, he could only be sentenced to a fine
of up to $250. KRS 534.040(2)(c).

                                         24
      5. Overall Assessment of the Factors

      As three factors weigh strongly in favor of reversal for a flagrant error,

and one factor supports this error being non-flagrant, I conclude that Smith

has provided ample justification for reversal on this issue. The Commonwealth

Attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation about the maximum time Smith could

serve on a twenty-year sentence constituted a material and palpable error

because it had a reasonable likelihood of influencing the jury’s decision to

render a sentence greater than what it might otherwise have imposed absent

the incorrect information.

      While Palmer made one misstatement which indicated Smith would earn

less good time than KRS 197.045(1)(b)1 provides, her misstatement was still

dwarfed by the Commonwealth’s misrepresentation that Smith could reduce

his imposed sentence by half and Palmer’s misrepresentation that the time

Smith served would largely be up to him. Thus, we do not have a Ray type

error before us. Instead, the net result of the prosecutor’s misstatement would

serve to encourage the jury to recommend the maximum sentence to achieve a

longer than ten-year actual sentence to serve.

      Having considered all of the factors, I cannot say that the jury would

have sentenced Smith to the maximum PFO sentence had it understood that

even if he was placed at an ideal facility and put forth his best efforts to behave

and take classes, Smith was still likely to serve around fifteen years of his

sentence if not paroled. In accordance with my analysis of the four factors and

                                        25
our precedent, I consider such error palpable. Therefore, I would affirm Smith’s

conviction and reverse and remand for a new penalty phase.

      Lambert, J., joins.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Roy A. Durham
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General

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