Court Opinion

ID: 9571984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:37:06.192861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:17.245750
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
In the context of insurance law, it is apparent from Michigan case law that the. doctrine of equitable *381estoppel may apply in certain circumstances in which an insurer’s failure to object within a reasonable time to an insured’s request operates as a waiver of the breach of the insurance clause. See Rauch v Michigan Millers’ Mut Fire-Ins Co, 131 Mich 281; 91 NW 160 (1902).
In this case, there was a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ concerning whether defendant’s failure in responding to a facsimile of the May 25 letter by 2:00 P.M. on May 30, 1994, induced plaintiffs to believe that the settlement and the releases had been approved and that plaintiffs had justifiably relied upon this belief to their detriment. To establish factual support for their claim, plaintiffs rely upon their counsel’s statement in his affidavit in which he claimed to have sent a facsimile of the letter to defendant on May 25. Although defendant denied that plaintiffs’ counsel sent a fascimile of the letter, maintaining that there was nothing to support plaintiffs’ factual assertion apart from their former counsel’s self-serving statement in his affidavit, we must, solely for the purpose of reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), give plaintiffs the benefit of a reasonable doubt and assume that a fascimile of the letter was sent by plaintiffs’ counsel and was received by defendant on May 25, 1994.1 That being so, the issue *382is whether defendant’s failure to notify plaintiffs’ counsel by 2:00 P.M. on May 30, 1994, about its objection to the releases effected a waiver on defendant’s part of the condition requiring consent for any settlement for an underinsured motorist claim.
I agree with the majority’s holding that “where reasonable minds can differ, whether a reasonable time for the insurer’s response has been allowed or has expired is a jury question. However, where reasonable minds cannot differ, summary disposition is appropriate.” Ante at 379. Where I disagree with the majority is that I do not believe “that rational minds could not disagree that defendant was not allowed a reasonable time to respond to the letter from plaintiffs’ attorney.” Ante at 378. While it may be unreasonable to expect defendant to arrive at a final conclusion within the time limit set by plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ letter made clear the constraints involved, and I do not think it would be unreasonable to expect some response, by phone or fax, from defendant, even if that response was that defendant needed more time for a final response. However, defendant offered nothing. I do not think five days was a “patently inadequate” amount of time to expect some type of response.
I do not consider this holding to run contrary to Shelden v Michigan Millers’ Mut Fire-Ins Co, 124 Mich 303; 82 NW 1068 (1990), where the Supreme Court held that the insurer’s delay of eight days did not establish an estoppel claim. While the Court in Shelden appears to have held in that case that a claim of estoppel does not exist in regard to a delay of eight days, the key question is whether the insurer’s response was offered in a reasonable time, and, in my *383opinion, an answer to that question is fact specific. Therefore, I think it would be improper to read Shelden as establishing a bright-line rule and holding that, no matter what the factual circumstance, a claim of estoppel is precluded, as a matter of law, when the delay is less than eight days. The application of any temporal bright-line rule established nearly a century ago is questionable in light of the advances in technology and communications, and the increased complexity of the insurance industry, particularly the automobile insurance industry, since the turn of the century. While I am aware that this Court cannot disregard Supreme Court precedent on the basis that the precedent is obsolete, Boyd v W G Wade Shows, 443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), we are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent only in cases involving substantially similar facts and issues, see Pokriefka v Mazur, 3 Mich App 534, 536; 143 NW2d 151 (1966), rev’d on other grounds 379 Mich 348; 151 NW2d 806 (1967). In my opinion, the advancements in technology and the increased complexity of the insurance industry alone are sufficient to factually distinguish the case at bar from Shelden and preclude the necessity of applying any bright-line rule from that case. Any conclusion in this case is fact driven, and therefore, in my opinion, Shelden is of little value in the matter before us.
I do not think that every claim of untimeliness will create a jury question. There may be cases in which reasonableness can be determined as a matter of law. However, such a conclusion is fact specific, and, at least in this case, better drawn by a jury. The letter that plaintiffs’ counsel claimed to have faxed on May 25 contained specific information about the consent *384judgments to be entered on May 31 and called for immediate action on defendant’s part in advising plaintiffs’ counsel about whether defendant objected to the releases. While plaintiffs’ counsel allowed defendant only five days in which to respond to his specific request, there is nonetheless a question of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ whether, on the basis of the demands made by plaintiffs and the actions needed to be taken by defendant, defendant was allowed a reasonable time in which to offer some response. I do not wish to imply that I have concluded that defendant was actually given a reasonable time in which to reply,2 I simply do not think we should come to a conclusion regarding reasonableness, as a matter of law, on the basis of the record before us.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

 In actuality, the questions whether plaintiffs did send a facsimile of the letter to defendant on May 25, and, if so, whether and when defendant received the letter would be for the jury. It is only for purposes of review that it is assumed that plaintiffs did send and defendant did receive the facsimile of the letter on May 25. Obviously, if plaintiffs did not send the facsimile and defendant was not aware of the letter until May 31, then by not contacting plaintiffs before 2:00 p.m. on May 30, defendant could not have intended to waive, or be estopped from enforcing, the condition requiring consent.

 On the basis of the majority’s holding that “rational minds could not disagree that defendant was not allowed a reasonable time to respond,” ante at 378,1 am hesitant to arrive at such a conclusion because it would mean one of two things: either the majority is mistaken or I am of irrational mind. After great introspection and contemplation, I am confident, and indeed hopeful, it is not the latter, but simply that I have a different opinion regarding what to expect from rational minds.