Court Opinion

ID: 9751928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:18:38.187381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:09.224161
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
dissenting:
A critical issue at Petitioner’s trial was the voluntariness of his confession to the police. Petitioner wanted the jury to know that before he confessed, the police told him that as a penalty for murder, he could be “put to death summarily or life.” The jury never learned that the detective falsely informed Petitioner that he was subject to being put to death summarily for the murder of Dion Williams, that he maintained his innocence for some period of time, and that he claimed that the circumstances of the interrogation caused him to admit the shooting. I would hold that the court abused its discretion at the jury trial of Petitioner in limiting the defense examination of the detective who obtained the confession.
Evidence showing that a defendant was told falsely by detectives that he faced a “summary” execution is appropriately included in the totality of the circumstances analysis that a *750jury employs in arriving at a determination of voluntariness. See, e.g., Green v. State, 91 Md.App. 790, 605 A.2d 1001 (1992) (holding statement involuntary where minor falsely told that he was subject to death penalty). A jury considers the question of voluntariness in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case. Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 511 A.2d 45 (1986). By repeatedly sustaining the State’s objections during the cross-examination of Detective Glenn, the trial court prevented the jury from hearing evidence that Baynor was told that he could be “put to death summarily.”
Courts around the country have held that the giving of false advice as to the possible penalties is a factor affecting the voluntariness determination. See, e.g., United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 24-25 (2d Cir.1976) (holding statement involuntary where prosecutor stated that defendant faced 100 years, under circumstances where no prosecutor would seek nor judge impose such a sentence); People v. Nicholas, 112 Cal.App.3d 249, 169 Cal.Rptr. 497, 506 (1980) (holding statement involuntary where detectives falsely implied to defendant that he faced death penalty where it did not have retroactive effect and did not apply to his case); State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202, 206-207 (1958) (holding statement involuntary where defendant was falsely told he did not face death penalty if he confessed). In addition, other courts have held that the threat of harsh punishment is an important factor in assessing voluntariness. See, e.g., People v. Hinds, 154 Cal. App.3d 222, 201 Cal.Rptr. 104, 114 (1984) (holding statement involuntary where appellant was told that if he did not tell the truth and explain to them mitigating factors, he might get the death penalty).
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced because he testified at the suppression hearing, thus adducing evidence of all the circumstances of the interrogation that he considered relevant and that he had the right and opportunity to do so at trial, but chose not to exercise that right. Maj. op. at 740. He was not required to testify at the trial to bring the detective’s false statement regarding the death penalty before the jury. At the suppression hearing, *751the detective testified that Petitioner asked him what he could receive for the crime; the detective conceded that he told Petitioner: “He can be put to death summarily or life.” Petitioner had the unfettered right to elicit this testimony on cross-examination of the detective.
The majority concludes that Petitioner has not shown that he was precluded by the trial court from presenting evidence that the detective gave him false information about the potential penalty. Maj. op. at 748. Somehow the majority concludes that Baynor never put the question squarely to the detective about summary capital punishment. Id. In support of its conclusion that Petitioner cannot now complain of any alleged restriction on the cross-examination, the majority notes that he never put forth a leading question incorporating that evidence, and that he never obtained for use at trial a transcript of that portion of the detective’s suppression hearing testimony. While a leading question or impeachment with prior testimony may have been a wise strategy, it is not required trial practice. Moreover, the transcript supports Petitioner’s position. The detective was specifically asked, “What exact words did you tell my client with respect to the death penalty?” An objection to that question was sustained improperly by the trial court, on the ground that the question had been asked and answered. In fact, it had never been answered. In this regard, all the jury knew regarding the death penalty was that the detective mentioned that the death penalty was a possibility. The trial court erroneously restricted Petitioner’s examination of the detective, improperly limiting the ability of the jury to consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the voluntariness of the confession.
In order to properly assess the voluntariness of Baynor’s confession, the jury should have been allowed to consider evidence that the detective told him that he faced being put to death summarily. Because the jury never heard this critical information, Petitioner was denied under Maryland nonconstitutional law his right to place before the jury evidence of the complete circumstances of the police interrogation. The judg*752ment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Chief Judge BELL and Judge ELDRIDGE have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.