Court Opinion

ID: 9517666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:28:00.114137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:41.769031
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice House, specially concurring: I concur with the result in this case and most of what is said in the majority opinion, but I wish to make clear my position on one point which has been left uncertain. The defendant contended in the trial court, the appellate court and this court that plaintiff could not recover as a matter of law because plaintiff’s evidence failed to establish that defendant had any knowledge of the alledged hazardous nature of its premises. The trial court refused defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s rulings on these motions, the appellate court considered, of course, only the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff. The appellate court stated, “The testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was to the effect that he failed to detect any abrasive material on the surface of the floor, and that without abrasive material, exterior ‘terrazzo’ floors, when wet, become slippery and are ‘hazardous.’ ” (65 Ill. App. 2d 223-237.) This statement by the appellate court is not that a wet terrazzo floor without abrasive material is “hazardous,” but it is a statement of opinion by plaintiff’s expert witness which is considered alone only for the purpose of ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The majority opinion states that the appellate court correctly decided this point. It then goes on to say that, “* * * it was a jury question as to whether the defendant knew or should have known that the material used in the composition of the floor, upon becoming wet and damp, became very slippery and dangerous and that the defendant failed to warn the person lawfully on its premises of its unsafe condition. It is this feature of the condition of an outside terrazzo floor which distinguishes this case from those cases in which recovery has been denied as a result of slipping and falling on a wet floor.” I feel that this language can easily be interpreted to mean that a wet terrazzo floor without abrasive is “hazardous” as a matter of law. If we “know” this, certainly anyone with a terrazzo floor must “know” it, and if the person with such a “hazardous” floor invites the public upon it, I doubt that any warning of its “very slippery and dangerous” nature would relieve that person of liability. The truth of the matter is that the entry in question was undoubtedly used by many persons in its wet condition and there are many such floors exposed to wetting conditions presently in use. The language used in the majority opinion could make any one having such a floor in a wetted condition an insurer against any injury sustained by a person slipping on the floor. We certainly should not go this far on the basis of this record. As I read the appellate court opinion, it says no more than that whether a wet terrazzo floor without abrasive is “hazardous” at all, or hazardous enough to require a warning, is a jury question under the evidence presented in this case. With this I agree. Mr. Justice Klingbiel joins in this concurrence: