Court Opinion

ID: 9594119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:19.397195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:02.853273
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I write separately because I agree that plaintiff’s wrongful-discharge claim fails, but disagree with *52the lead opinion’s rationale. I would not conclude, as does the lead opinion, that plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment on the basis of the statements in the handbook. The contractual disclaimer in the employee handbook belies this expectation, and there is no other record evidence sufficient to create a question of fact with regard to plaintiff’s expectations of just-cause employment at the time she joined Howmet. With regard to plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims, I concur with Justice Riley’s statement of the legal standard a plaintiff must meet in order to survive summary disposition, but I dissent from her result. Because plaintiff did not present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact that her position would not have been eliminated “but for” her age, EEOC v Clay Printing Co, 955 F2d 936, 940 (CA 4, 1992), I agree with Justice Brickley that summary disposition for the defendant was appropriate.
i
The lead opinion concludes that plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment on the basis of a statement in the employee handbook, that stated, “No employee will be terminated without proper cause or reason and not until management has made a careful review of all facts.” Absent any qualifying language, this language would be sufficient to raise a legitimate expectation that employees would not be terminated without good cause. However, in an equally conspicuous segment, the final page of the handbook stated:
The contents of this booklet are not intended to establish, and should not be interpreted to constitute any con*53tract between the Misco Whitehall Division, Product Support Operations, Reactive Metal Operations or the Technical Center of Howmet Turbine Components Corporation and any employee, or group of employees.
The lead opinion apparently concludes that the disclaimer of contractual obligation was ineffective with respect to plaintiff because she was employed by Howmet in the human resources department, which is not specifically mentioned in the disclaimer. I disagree.
The handbook’s title appeared on the cover substantially as follows:
YOUR FUTURE WITH HOWMET
MISCO WHITEHALL DIVISION PRODUCT SUPPORT OPERATIONS REACTIVE METAL OPERATIONS TECHNICAL CENTER
These are the same divisions mentioned in the disclaimer. It is true that plaintiff’s department is not specifically mentioned in the disclaimer. However, plaintiffs department is also not mentioned anywhere else in the handbook. In short, plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Either the handbook applied to her employment relationship, in which case the just-cause language and the disclaimer must be read together, or it did not apply to her because the handbook was only intended to apply to those divisions specifically mentioned on the cover and in the disclaimer. In the latter case, of course, plaintiff could not assert the handbook as evidence of a just-cause policy for *54employees of the human resources department.1 Reading the handbook as a whole, I would conclude that no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of just-cause employment.
A
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff has not created a reasonable question of fact that the handbook was intended to *55apply only to the designated employees of one of the named divisions, as opposed to all employees of How-met Turbine Components Corporation. Instead, plaintiff contends that the just-cause language applied to her employment, which could be viewed as existing outside the specified divisions. Under these circumstances, she cannot assert that one part of the handbook applies to her while another does not. Thus, on the basis of a careful review of the record, I would conclude that there is no factual basis for the claim that plaintiff’s department is a separate division of the Howmet Corporation, rather than a department within the company intended to serve several of its divisions. I would therefore conclude that the handbook was intended to apply to all employees of How-met Turbine Components Corporation who received it, including plaintiff.
The handbook’s language indicates that it was intended to apply to plaintiff’s employment relationship with her employer, just as it was intended to cover defendant’s relationship with all employees to whom the handbook was distributed out of plaintiff’s human resources department. On page 4 the handbook states:
Welcome!
We are pleased to have you with Howmet Turbine Components Corporation. [Emphasis added.]
On page 5 the handbook states:
Our Pledge
We believe Howmet is a good place to work. We pledge that we will honor the following principles in our relations with you .... [Emphasis added.]
*56On pages 15-19, the handbook discusses “Plant Policies and Procedures,” with the following introduction:
Throughout this handbook we have outlined Howmet’s obligations to you and the methods by which the Company will fulfill these obligations. . . .
There axe regulations which govern our conduct as employees while on Company property, just as there are regulations governing us as citizens in the community in which we live or as members of clubs to which we belong. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Later, on page 24, the handbook states:
Your badge identifies you as an employee of Howmet and serves as your pass in and out of the plant. It must be worn in a visible position at all times while you are on Company property. [Emphasis added.]
Finally, just before the contractual disclaimer on page 25, the handbook states:
This handbook briefly outlines your privileges, benefits and responsibilities as an employee of Howmet. . . .
It is not possible in any one booklet to list all the benefits and mutually helpful regulations, which come to or govern all types of employees. If any portion of the information given is not completely clear to you, tell your foreman or supervisor what further information you want. [Emphasis added.]
Throughout the handbook, the terms “Howmet,” “the Company,” and “Howmet Turbine Components Corporation” are used interchangeably, indicating an intent to describe Howmet’s relationship with the industry, its neighbors, and its employees, without differentiating among the various divisions or depart-*57merits.2 Plaintiff provides no evidence that this was one handbook used for the employees in the specified divisions, while other similar handbooks applied to other divisions or departments. Rather, the fact that plaintiffs human resources department served several Howmet divisions located in Whitehall is uncontested.
B
I would conclude that the relevant statements in the handbook, the just-cause language and the disclaimer of contractual obligation, when read together, do not (1) “justify [an employee] in understanding that a commitment ha[d] been made,” and (2) “instill[] a legitimate expectation of just cause employment . . . .” Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 139; 507 NW2d 591 (1993). In Rood we stated, “[W]e need not reach the question whether a disclaimer of intent to create contractual liability contained in an employee handbook is sufficient to disclaim liability under the legitimate expectations theory of Toussaint.” Id. at 142. See Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). I would reach the question here and conclude that the disclaimer was effective to protect defendant from this type of liability.
*58As we recognized in Rood, “[t]he first step in analyzing a legitimate expectations claim under Toussaint, is to determine, what, if anything, the employer has promised.” Id. at 138. There, we quoted the Second Restatement of Contracts, § 2(1), for the proposition that “a ‘[p]romise [is] a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.’ ” Rood at 138-139. We also observed that “not all policy statements will rise to the level of a promise.” Id. at 139. We continued:
[W]e therefore hold that, in all claims brought under the legitimate expectations theory of Toussaint, the trial court should examine employer policy statements, concerning employee discharge, if any, to determine, as a threshold matter, whether such policies are reasonably capable of being interpreted as promises of just-cause employment. If the employer policies are incapable of such interpretation, then the court should dismiss .... If, however, the employer’s policies relating to employee discharge are capable of two reasonable interpretations, the issue is for the jury. [Id. at 140-141.]
In this case, the employer’s relevant manifestations amounted to two separate representations. One demonstrated its termination policy; the other demonstrated that it intended no expression of a binding obligation to adhere to any stated policy. Thus, it cannot be said that the employer’s actions were sufficient to justify an “ ‘understanding that a commitment ha[d] been made.’ ”3 Id. at 139. Moreover, although Rood *59leaves the question of determining the meaning of policies capable of two reasonable interpretations to the jury, it does not authorize the jury to simply choose between two clear representations. Rather, under these circumstances, where the employer clearly manifests an intent to avoid being legally obligated by its handbook, the court should find that the absence of a promise compels the conclusion that the employer did not create “a situation ‘instinct with an obligation.’ ” Rood at 138, n 30. The Toussaint legitimate-expectations approach, as an exception to the presumption of at-will employment, is an equitable approach to just-cause employment claims, which is rooted in public policy. Where the employer manifests a clear intent not to bind itself, however, the policy considerations in favor of binding the employer give way to its clearly manifested intent.
In Heurtebise v Reliable Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405; 550 NW2d 243 (1996), we held that an arbitration clause in an employee handbook was unenforceable where the handbook also included a disclaimer of contractual intent. A conclusion that similar language does not protect a defendant from a just-cause claim would be logically inconsistent. In Edwards v Whirlpool Corp, 678 F Supp 1284, 1291 (WD Mich, 1987), relying on Dell v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 811 F2d 970 (CA 6, 1987) (holding that a disclaimer of contractual intent and reservation of right to terminate at will is sufficient to overcome *60just-cause termination language in the employee manual), the federal district court explained:
The Toussaint holding created an exception to the general rule that employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party .... The Michigan Supreme Court suggested that a company could protect itself from liability by expressly disclaiming its intent to create anything but an at-will employment relationship. It did not find, however, that a company creates a just cause contract if it issues an employee handbook without including the magical phrase that the employment relationship remains an “at will” relationship. In this case, I find that defendant adequately protected itself by stating that it did not intend for the employee handbook to create a contract of employment.
Additionally, in Rowe v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627, 649-650; 473 NW2d 268 (1991), this Court approved the reasoning offered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Dell, while holding that a reservation of at-will termination is sufficient to defeat any language that might give rise to an expectation of just-cause termination. In Dell, the employer disclaimed contractual intent regarding a progressive discipline process, stating that “[t]his procedure does not form an employment contract.” Id. at 972. The employer’s clear disclaimer of contractual intent here, as in Edwards and Dell, was sufficient to defeat any expectation of just-cause termination arising out of other language in the handbook.
In In re Certified Question (Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co), 432 Mich 438, 441; 443 NW2d 112 (1989), “this Court held that a company’s written policy statements, which created legitimate expectations in the employee of discharge for cause only, could be *61unilaterally modified by the employer.” Rowe at 647-648. Such change is subject only to the requirement “that the employer gives affected employees reasonable notice of the policy change.” In re Certified Question at 441. Certified Question thus endorsed the proposition that an employer could prospectively limit its liability by expressly disclaiming contractual intent with regard to the policies and procedures outlined in its employment manual or handbook. Such a disclaimer is consistent with the policy based doctrine preventing an employer from disavowing the creation of “promises” instinct with obligation, because it provides the employees with actual notice of the employer’s clear intent not to obligate itself by the policies outlined in the manual in the same manner as the employees are notified of everything else in the manual. Under the instant circumstances, the employee cannot contend as a matter of law that she has a legitimate expectation that the employer should not be allowed to disavow.
Thus, I would conclude plaintiff is not entitled to assert a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment where the handbook on which she relies disclaims any intent on the part of the employer to bind itself to the contents of the handbook. In conjunction with the disclaimer of contractual obligation, the policy language is insufficient to overcome the presumption of at-will termination. Finally, I note again that if the disclaimer were found to be inapplicable because it does not expressly mention plaintiff’s department, then the entire handbook must be found inapplicable for the same reason.4
*62II
I concur with part in of Justice Riley’s opinion to the extent that she adopts the “intermediate position” set forth in St Mary’s Honor Center v Hicks, 509 US 502, 510-511; 113 S Ct 2742; 125 L Ed 2d 407 (1993), and explained in the excerpts she references from 1 Lindemann & Grossman, Employment Discrimination (3d ed), ante at 30-33. I also concur with Justice Brickley’s analysis of the civil rights claims. As noted by Justice Riley, the intermediate position we adopt today is the majority rule in the circuit courts of appeal. In Hicks, the Court stated:
The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required” .... [Id. at 511.]
I understand this language, especially the reference to “suspicion of mendacity,” and its application by both Justice Riley and Justice Brickley, to refer to the *63probative strength of the inference that a reasonable mind could draw from the proffered proof. As noted by Justice Riley, “[U]nder such circumstances, simply disproving the employer’s articulated reason will suffice if, and only if, disproving the employer’s reason also proves discrimination.” Ante at 37.5 Thus, in following the United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts in the area of employment discrimination, we apply the standard for summary disposition of Anderson v Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242; 106 S Ct 2505; 91 L Ed 2d 202 (1986). Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 178; 516 NW2d 475 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting).
While I generally concur with Justice Riley’s statement of the law, I dissent from her application of the law in this case. For unknown reasons, her opinion eschews any analysis of plaintiff’s proofs regarding pretext in the context of the civil rights claim. Ante at 28. The plaintiff’s evidence rebutting defendant’s presentation of its reasons for eliminating plaintiff’s position was the overall profitability of the parent organization. As the majority recognizes, it was insufficient, standing alone, to raise a triable issue of falsity. At this point in the analysis, the question becomes whether a reasonable trier of fact could find from plaintiff’s remaining proofs that, more likely than not, plaintiff’s age or gender was a reason for the elimination of her position, i.e., that defendant’s reduction in force was a pretext for discrimination.
*64In Smith v Stratus Computer, Inc, 40 F3d 11, 17 (CA 1, 1994), a gender discrimination case, the court found the plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory animus . inadequate to prove disparate treatment. The court aptly noted that “the plaintiff has the burden of showing that she was treated differently from ‘persons situated similarly “in all relevant aspects.” ’ ” Id. The court observed that in order “to compare [the plaintiff’s] treatment with that of terminated or transferred male executives in a meaningful way, [the plaintiff] would have to show that she was similarly situated to those men in terms of performance, qualifications and conduct, ‘without such differentiaiity or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish’ their situations.” Id. The court also observed that “[t]he biases of one who neither makes nor influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in an employment discrimination case.” Id. at 18. As in Smith, the plaintiff here has “utterly failed” to produce sufficient evidence.
Plaintiff’s proofs consisted at best of equivocal evidence that she was more qualified than younger persons who were paid from different budgets. While an employer may not hide behind a termination by parceling out plaintiff’s jobs, there is no dispute that defendant engaged in a work force reduction. Although some of plaintiff’s duties were reassigned among other employees, the younger persons she points to also performed some different tasks from those involved in the eliminated position. Some of plaintiff’s duties appear to have been assigned to persons other than those she references as evidence of discrimination, and some of plaintiff’s duties, for example, hourly training, appear to have been elimi*65nated altogether. Additionally, plaintiff has not shown that her qualifications were really similar to those of the other employees. As noted by Justice Brickley, for example, “Ms. Achterhoff received a degree in a human resources related field [while] [t]he plaintiff had no such degree . . . .” Post at 71. Moreover, the statistical evidence established that between 1987 and 1992, the number of employees in Whitehall declined almost fifty percent, from 4,100 to 2,450, and the RIF resulted in termination of ninety-one employees in 1991, fifty-four of whom were under the age of forty and sixty-eight of whom were men.6 Finally, with regard to the personnel decision itself, the decision to eliminate plaintiff’s position was not made by Mr. Malady, the alleged source of gender bias. Mr. Roof, who made the decision, is ten years older than plaintiff. Roof did not make the decisions to hire Achterhoff and Billingsley, or to promote Boczkaja. Thus, the evidence is too disjointed to warrant an inference that discriminatory animus, rather than economic factors, caused the elimination of plaintiff’s position. In light of these facts, I agree with Justice Brickley that plaintiff’s evidence “is irrelevant to Ms. Lytle’s termination and does not present evidence of discrimina[tion] . . . Id. at 73.
Certainly, if Justice Riley believed that the evidence produced by the plaintiff in Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675; 385 NW2d 586 (1986), was insufficient to show “age was a determining factor in [the plaintiff’s] discharge,” id. at 715 (Riley, J., dissenting), the *66considerably weaker evidence in this case could not support a finding of discriminatory animus. There, the plaintiff was originally referred to as “an ‘aggressive young man,’ ” but years later was nicknamed “Gramps” and given “an unwanted party ... to celebrate [his] fortieth birthday . ...” Id. at 680-681. When the plaintiff was discharged as a part of an RIF shortly after his forty-first birthday, he sued Amoco for age discrimination, alleging that Amoco’s termination plan divided employees by age, that he was told he was “low man in the over age 40 group,” that younger persons replaced him, and that “age discrimination was designed into the evaluation process . . . .” Id. at 713. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, Justice Riley was unable to conclude that the plaintiff had produced evidence of discriminatory animus.
I fail to understand how plaintiff’s evidence here shows discriminatory animus. Rather, because the evidence of the RIF proves “the discharge . . . would have taken place without regard to age [or gender] discrimination, age [and gender were] not . . . determining factor[s] in [plaintiff’s] discharge.” Matras at 691. Given the fact that Justice Riley concluded in Matras that the civil rights laws were “ ‘not intended as a vehicle for judicial review of business decisions,’ ” id. at 715, I am unable to understand how she can find this plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to survive summary disposition under the articulated standard. In short, plaintiff’s evidence does not create “a genuine dispute about [defendant’s] intent or motive . . . sufficient ... to permit a jury to find that the defendant’s proffered reason [the RIF] is *67merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.” Krenik v Le Sueur Co, 47 F3d 953, 959 (CA 8, 1995).
If the plaintiff chooses to rebut defendant’s offer of a legitimate business reason with evidence of falsity, she must do more than create a triable question of falsity. Stripped to its essentials, plaintiff’s proofs, when viewed in a light most favorable to her, consist of evidence that she was replaced during a reduction in force by employees who were younger and possibly less qualified than she was.7 The proofs raise no suspicion of mendacity and are not sufficient to survive summary disposition. Therefore, I dissent from the lead opinion’s result and would conclude that summary disposition was proper on all counts.
Weaver, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 The lead opinion erroneously relies on the rule of contract analysis that requires that ambiguous terms be construed against the drafter to find a question of fact regarding legitimate expectation. Ante at 18, n 17. The lead opinion thus unfortunately confuses the contract prong of Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980), with the pure legitimate-expectations public policy theory, impermissibly fusing two approaches which this Court so long sought to independently identify. In Rood v General Dynamics Corp, 444 Mich 107, 118; 507 NW2d 591 (1993), Chief Justice Cavanagh observed that legitimate-expectation analysis is not a contract analysis:
In other words, there are two alternative theories of enforceability that may support a claim of wrongful discharge in Michigan. While the first theory is grounded solely on contract principles “relative to the employment setting,” Rowe [v Montgomery Ward & Co, Inc, 437 Mich 627, 632; 473 NW2d 268 (1991)], the second theory is grounded solely on public policy considerations. As Justice Boyle noted in her concurring opinion in In re Certified Question (Bankey v Storer Broadcasting Co), 432 Mich 438, 458; 443 NW2d 112 (1989), “the pure legitimate expectations leg of Toussaint was founded on the Court’s common-law authority to recognize” enforceable obligations that arise “ ‘outside the operation of normal contract principles.’ ”
Whether a legitimate expectation arises is an equitable issue that inquires into whether it is unjust to allow the defendant to deny the existence of just-cause employment. The issue is whether the language of the handbook would permit reasonable jurors to find that the employer created an expectation that employees would not be discharged except for cause. By its own terms the handbook expressly stated that no binding obligation was created by any statement therein. Thus, since the defendant did not manifest a clear intent, the plaintiff could not have had a legitimate expectation on the basis of statements in the handbook.

 The handbook describes how Howmet relates to the industry at large, how its divisions are broken down, its relationship with the neighboring community, its equal opportunity/affirmative action program, and its policies and procedures as they relate to employees of Howmet. Nothing in the handbook indicates that terms apply to anything other than the corporation at large. Moreover, the handbook observes that the corporation was founded in 1950 in Whitehall, where plaintiff worked. I fail to understand how, when reading the handbook as a whole, the handbook or its various parts could be understood to apply to some employees and not to others. However, as noted above, if that were the case, plaintiff could not reasonably rely on one part of the handbook while ignoring another.

 Nor may it be said that a question of fact is created as to “what, if anything, the employer has promised.” Rood at 138. The unambiguous expression of intent manifested by the defendant in the disclaimer of contractual obligation was designed to prevent any statement in the handbook from being interpreted as a promise. The disclaimer of obligation *59does not contradict the termination policy any more than it contradicts any other policy statement in the handbook. Rather, it limits the statements in the handbook by expressly providing that no employee may reasonably interpret them as binding on the employer.

 I also disagree with the lead opinion’s treatment of the defendant’s *62claim that the plaintiff’s position was eliminated as part of a general reduction, insofar as it relates to the just-cause claim. We have not decided that a defendant must demonstrate economic reasons not only for the elimination of a just-cause employee position, but also for the termination of a plaintiff as an individual. McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 116; 469 NW2d 284 (1991).
Assuming arguendo the plaintiff had a legitimate expectation that she would be discharged only for cause, in my view the proofs were insufficient to permit a rational juror to conclude that the defendant’s proffered reason for the discharge was false. Therefore, if I were to reach the issue, I would concur with the lead opinion.

 Although Justice Riley states that Justice Brickley’s evaluation of the evidence “violates the principle that the reviewing court is not to . . . weigh credibility in deciding a motion for summary disposition,” ante at 38, n 39, I believe the intermediate approach adopted today requires the court, in employment discrimination cases, to fairly inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence, i.e., its probative strength.

 This evidence not only establishes that defendant’s rif was bona fide with regard to the plaintiff’s just-cause claim, but also considerably weakens the probative strength of the evidence plaintiff claims would establish discriminatory animus.

 While such evidence might be enough to raise the prima facie elements under McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973), in the presence of defendant’s legitimate nondiscriminatory defense, the rif, such evidence does not raise a question of fact with regard to discriminatory animus.