Court Opinion

ID: 9943645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 23:00:59.430108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:42.648440
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                    Plaintiff,

    v.                                   Crim. Action No. 09-354 (EGS)

    NGOZI POLE,

                    Defendant.

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

     I.     Introduction

          On February 1, 2011, Defendant Ngozi Pole (“Mr. Pole”) was

convicted by jury of five counts of wire fraud in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1343 and one count of theft of government property

worth more than $1,000 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. See

Verdict Form, ECF No. 54 at 1-3. 1 He was sentenced to twenty

months incarceration and ordered to pay $75,042.37 in

restitution. See J., ECF No. 102 at 2, 5. Mr. Pole appealed, and

on December 20, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) remanded various claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, as well as the Court’s

restitution order, for further proceedings. See United States v.

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum
Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the
original page number of the filed document.
                                     1
Pole, 741 F.3d 120, 123, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Following the

D.C. Circuit’s decision, Mr. Pole filed a motion for a new

trial, alleging that his trial counsel committed several errors

that “either individually or collectively” require a new trial.

See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 3.

     While this motion was pending, the Court settled a series

of disputes between the parties regarding the proper scope of an

evidentiary hearing on Mr. Pole’s motion, see United States v.

Pole, No. 09-354, 2021 WL 5796518 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2021); 2 and it

then referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Zia M. Faruqui for

a hearing and recommendation for the disposition of Mr. Pole’s

motion, see Min. Order (Dec. 21, 2021). Magistrate Judge Faruqui

issued a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”), recommending

that the Court deny Mr. Pole’s motion for a new trial based on

ineffective assistance of counsel. See R. & R., ECF No. 193 at

1. Mr. Pole raises several objections to the R. & R. See Def.’s

Objs. to R. & R. (“Def.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 195.

     Upon careful consideration of Mr. Pole’s pending motion,

the R. & R., the objections and response thereto, the applicable

law, and the entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS IN

PART Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s R. & R., see ECF No. 193; and

DENIES Mr. Pole’s Motion for a New Trial, see ECF No. 139.

2 The Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated December 7,
2021, is docketed at ECF No. 182.
                                2
    II.   Background 3

          A. Factual Background

      From 1998 to 2007, Mr. Pole served as Senator Edward M.

Kennedy’s (“Senator Kennedy”) Washington, D.C. office manager.

Pole, 741 F.3d at 123. During that time, he served under four

chiefs of staff: (1) Gerard Kavanaugh (“Mr. Kavanaugh”); (2)

Mary Beth Cahill (“Ms. Cahill”); (3) Danica Petroshius (“Ms.

Petroshius”); and (4) Eric Mogilnicki (“Mr. Mogilnicki”)—and one

interim chief of staff, Michael Myers (“Mr. Myers”). Id.

      As office manager, Mr. Pole was responsible for submitting

“payroll action authorization” forms (“PAAs”), “which raised or

lowered the salaries of office employees.” Id. “According to the

government, [Mr.] Pole needed approval from [Senator] Kennedy or

the chief of staff for any salary adjustments, but neither the

Senator nor the chiefs of staff regularly reviewed PAAs prior to

submission.” Id.; see also R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 1-2 (“[T]he

ultimate authority to approve said raises and bonuses belonged

to the chief of staff, superseded only by the Senator.”).

      Mr. Pole was also responsible for maintaining current

information on the office’s budget, including projected expenses

and projected surpluses or deficits, and serving as the office’s

3 This Background section closely tracks the factual sections in
the R. & R., see ECF No. 193 at 1-6; and in the D.C. Circuit’s
opinion deciding Mr. Pole’s appeal, see United States v. Pole,
741 F.3d 120, 123-24 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
                                  3
point of contact for the Senate Disbursing Office, “which sent

periodic updates about how much money the office had left to

spend.” Pole, 741 F.3d at 123. “Because Senator Kennedy wanted

the office to spend every last cent every fiscal year, [Mr.]

Pole was responsible for . . . making recommendations about how

to reach the magic zero-balance point.” Id.

     Because of a surplus at the end of fiscal year 2002, Mr.

Pole devised a plan for spending down the budget by awarding

annual bonuses to himself and other staffers, even though it was

against Senate rules. See R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 2 (citing U.S.

Senate Rule 41). “His plan took advantage of a Kennedy office

practice, condoned by the Senator and chiefs of staff,” to award

annual employee bonuses and exit bonuses, notwithstanding the

official Senate ban, so long as the Senator or the chief of

staff gave approval. Pole, 741 F.3d at 123. However, using his

role in the PAA submission process, Mr. Pole granted himself and

others various “bonuses that neither the Senator nor the chief

of staff authorized.” Id. at 124. Mr. Pole continued this

practice of awarding bonuses until January 2007, when he gave

himself an exit bonus before leaving to take a new position as

Senator Sherrod Brown’s deputy chief of staff. Id. In total, Mr.

Pole “awarded himself $77,608.86 in unapproved bonuses.” Id.

     Mr. Pole casually mentioned his exit bonus to Mr.

Mogilnicki, the Senator’s then chief of staff, which led Mr.

                                4
Mogilnicki to review payroll records for all employees. Id. Upon

“[r]ealizing the extent of [Mr.] Pole’s scheme,” he contacted

Gregory Craig (“Mr. Craig”), the Senator’s former senior aide

and counselor, and together they confronted Mr. Pole on January

26, 2007. Id.; see Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at

95:25-96:9. Mr. Craig testified that during this confrontation,

Mr. Pole defended his actions by claiming that he was “entitled”

to the salary raises and that he could have earned more money

working in the private sector. Pole, 741 F.3d at 124 (citing

Trial Tr. (Jan. 25, 2011), ECF No. 86 at 58:1-20 (testimony of

Mr. Craig)). Towards the end of this interaction, Mr. Mogilnicki

testified that Mr. Pole offered to pay the money back and that

he said: “If that’s what it takes to, you know, to get this

behind me, I’ll see if I can –- if I can pay the money back.”

Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at 104:6-9. Ultimately,

Mr. Craig and Mr. Mogilnicki referred the matter to the FBI, and

Senator Brown dismissed Mr. Pole. Pole, 741 F.3d at 124.

       B. Procedural Background

     Following the FBI investigation, Mr. Pole was charged with

five counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and

one count of theft of government property worth more than $1,000

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. See Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2-

12. During Mr. Pole’s ten-day jury trial in January 2011, during

which Rudolph Acree (“Mr. Acree”) served as his trial counsel,

                                  5
see Notice of Attorney Appearance, ECF No. 2 at 1; “the basic

dispute was over whether [Mr.] Pole knew he needed authorization

to award bonuses[,]” Pole, 741 F.3d at 124. Because of “Senator

Kennedy’s instruction to spend the budget to zero and the

absence of clear rules and procedures, [Mr.] Pole maintained

that he had implicit authority to spend down the budget however

he saw fit.” Id.; see also R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 4 (explaining

that the basis for Mr. Pole’s claimed authority to issue the

bonuses without prior approval stemmed from “past practice” and

because “he received little input from his bosses on how exactly

to spend down the budget”).

     The government contested this account and used Mr. Pole’s

own statements and testimony from all four chiefs of staff

indicating both that Mr. Pole “knew that he needed approval for

salary adjustments” and that none of the chiefs of staff had

ever authorized Mr. Pole to make the bonus payments he awarded

himself. 4 Pole, 741 F.3d at 124; R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 4. In

defense, Mr. Acree cross-examined the government’s various

witnesses, argued objections, and presented testimony from six

witnesses, including Mr. Pole, who testified in his own defense.

See R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 4-5; Trial Tr. (Jan. 26, 2011), ECF

4 Michael Myers, who served as Senator Kennedy’s interim chief of
staff for three months, also testified but did not offer
testimony about Mr. Pole’s authority to award bonuses. Gov’t’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 1 n.1.
                                6
No. 87 at 3:1-10. Mr. Acree’s “main defense was that Mr. Pole

believed he had the authority to spend the budget down to zero”—

in other words that he had acted in good faith and had not

intended to defraud or steal from the government. See R. & R.,

ECF No. 193 at 5-6; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 8.

     Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Pole on all five counts

of wire fraud and on the one count of theft of government

property. See Verdict Form, ECF No. 54 at 1-3. The Court then

sentenced Mr. Pole to twenty months in prison, followed by three

years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $75,042.37

in restitution—the full amount of money the government alleged

he stole in unapproved bonuses to himself, $77,608.86, minus

$2,566.49 that Mr. Mogilnicki managed to recover through the

Senate Disbursing Office. See J., ECF No. 102 at 2-3, 5; Pole,

741 F.3d at 124, 127. Mr. Pole began serving his sentence on

July 27, 2012, see Second Consent Mot. to Modify Conditions of

Release to Allow Travel, ECF No. 111 at 1; and on April 19,

2016, the Court granted his motion for early termination of

supervised release, see Min. Entry (Apr. 19, 2016).

     Mr. Pole appealed his conviction, challenging three

evidentiary rulings and arguing that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel and that the Court miscalculated

restitution. Pole, 741 F.3d at 124. The specific ineffective

assistance of counsel claims Mr. Pole raised on appeal were:

                                7
          that [his] trial counsel should have (1)
          produced unredacted copies of [Mr.] Pole’s
          budget   memos;   (2)   ‘through   documentary
          evidence    and   additional    discovery   or
          otherwise’ demonstrated that ‘[Mr.] Pole
          routinely issued exit bonuses without specific
          chief of staff approval’; (3) ‘demonstrate[d]
          that [Mary Beth] Cahill instructed [Mr.] Pole
          to spend the budget to zero, or to impeach her
          testimony that she did not do so’; and (4)
          attempted to impeach [Danica] Petroshius by
          introducing evidence about employee bonuses
          she denied issuing and by ‘question[ing] [Ms.]
          Petroshius regarding a memoranda from [Mr.]
          Pole’ containing budgetary information she
          claimed never to have received.

Id. at 126 (citation omitted). On December 20, 2013, the D.C.

Circuit rejected Mr. Pole’s evidentiary challenges and remanded

his ineffective assistance claims. Id. at 129. As to the

restitution order, the D.C. Circuit concluded that this Court’s

factual findings about the duration of Mr. Pole’s scheme to

defraud were insufficient to support the restitution amount, and

it vacated and remanded “the restitution order for further

proceedings consistent with [its] opinion.” See id. at 127-29.

     On May 4, 2015, Mr. Pole filed a motion for a new trial, in

which he raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claims

that were remanded by the D.C. Circuit, as well as several new

ineffectiveness claims. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139. The

ineffective assistance claims asserted for the first time in

this motion are that trial counsel: (1) should have presented a

good faith defense but did not; (2) failed to object to the

                                8
admission of Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony regarding Mr. Pole’s

offer to repay the unapproved bonuses, thereby neglecting to

properly consider Federal Rule of Evidence 408 governing

compromise offers and negotiations; (3) failed to object to the

admission and use of Mr. Pole’s oath of office in the

government’s closing argument; (4) failed to call James McCarthy

(“Mr. McCarthy”), who was issued a bonus by Mr. Pole, to testify

that he did not consider Mr. Pole a friend, thereby disproving

the government’s “central” argument at trial that Mr. Pole only

awarded bonuses to himself and office friends; and (5) failed to

call Kathleen Kruse (“Ms. Kruse”), who was also issued a bonus

by Mr. Pole, to testify that she informed Ms. Petroshius of the

bonus she received, thereby impeaching Ms. Petroshius’ testimony

on the issue of whether she knew about high year-end bonuses.

See id. at 2-3, 16-24; see also R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 6

(explaining that most of Mr. Pole’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims allege “that Mr. Acree failed to object to

testimony, introduce evidence, or impeach” witnesses).

     The government filed its opposition to Mr. Pole’s motion

for a new trial on June 15, 2015, see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No.

142; and Mr. Pole filed his reply on August 3, 2015, see Def.’s

Reply, ECF No. 144. The Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on

Mr. Pole’s motion “[i]n the interest of having the most complete

record upon which to render its decision,” see Min. Order (Apr.

                                9
18, 2017); Min. Order (May 26, 2017) (setting the evidentiary

hearing for November 14, 2017); but due to various disputes

between the parties regarding the proper scope of the hearing

and the extent of the Court’s authority to rule on some of Mr.

Pole’s claims, see, e.g., Joint Status Report, ECF No. 176 at 1-

7; and to allow the Court time to resolve those disputes, the

evidentiary hearing was vacated, see Min. Order (Nov. 12, 2017).

Thereafter, on January 16, 2018, Mr. Pole filed a supplement to

his motion for a new trial based on allegedly newly discovered

evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. See Def.’s Suppl. Mot. New

Trial, ECF No. 168. He simultaneously filed a petition for a

writ of coram nobis “on the grounds that he received

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in violation

of the Sixth Amendment and/or that the government committed

prosecutorial misconduct before and during [his] trial.” See

Def.’s Pet. Writ Coram Nobis, ECF No. 169 at 1.

     On December 7, 2021, the Court concluded that it could

“consider the entirety of Mr. Pole’s motion for a new trial

during the upcoming evidentiary hearing, but [that] it [could]

not consider the contents of Mr. Pole’s supplement as it was

untimely filed.” Pole, 2021 WL 5796518, at *1, *11. The Court

also denied Mr. Pole’s petition for a writ of coram nobis. Id.;

see Order, ECF No. 181 at 1. The Court then referred the matter

to Magistrate Judge Faruqui to conduct an evidentiary hearing

                               10
and issue a recommendation regarding the disposition of Mr.

Pole’s motion for a new trial. See Min. Order (Dec. 21, 2021).

     On April 7, 2022, Magistrate Judge Faruqui conducted the

evidentiary hearing, during which Mr. Acree testified about his

trial representation of Mr. Pole, including his “strategic

reasons for objecting (or not) to testimony, introducing (or

not) evidence, and impeaching (or not) a witness.” R.& R., ECF

No. 193 at 6; see Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at

24:22-88:23. During the hearing, Mr. Acree explained his

objection strategy, noting that “there are definitely times”

when he could but would not object in a trial, for example when

doing so would “highlight a piece of evidence for the jury that

would be problematic” or would “make [him] seem afraid of” a

piece of evidence, and if the evidence in question would be

“helpful” and “not harmful” to the defense. See Hearing Tr.

(Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 52:20-53:23. He further explained

that his “strategy” or “philosophy” “at any trial” entails not

necessarily “trying to get [his] objections right or wrong,” but

reacting in ways that will “help [him] win[.]” Id. at 54:6-18.

Additionally, Mr. Acree “testified that he had an open line of

communication with Mr. Pole” and always discussed strategy and

major decisions with him. R.& R., ECF No. 193 at 6 (citing

Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 43-48).

                               11
     Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted

their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. See ECF

Nos. 189 & 190. On September 9, 2022, Magistrate Judge Faruqui

recommended that the Court deny Mr. Pole’s motion for a new

trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See R. & R.,

ECF No. 193 at 1, 26. On November 22, 2022, Mr. Pole submitted

his objections to the R. & R., see Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195; to

which the government responded on December 2, 2022, see Gov’t’s

Resp., ECF No. 196. Mr. Pole’s objections are now ripe and ready

for the Court’s adjudication.

  III. Standard of Review

       A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and
          Recommendation

     Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-

(2). A district court “may accept, reject or modify the

recommended disposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.”). A district

court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3). “If, however, the party makes only conclusory or

                                12
general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments,

the [c]ourt reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.”

Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the

clearly erroneous standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is

entitled to great deference and is clearly erroneous only if on

the entire evidence the court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of

Columbia, No. 16-1920, 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12,

2019) (citing Graham v. Mukasey, 608 F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

     Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections which

merely rehash an argument presented [to] and considered by the

magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are

therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991

F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).

       B. Motion for a New Trial Based on Ineffective Assistance
          of Counsel

     The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance

of counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. Claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel are governed by a two-step standard set

                               13
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To succeed, a defendant must show

both deficient performance by his attorney and prejudice to the

trial outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Strickland requires

a party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show that:

(1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness . . . [measured] under prevailing professional

norms[,]” (the performance prong); and (2) the “deficiencies in

counsel’s performance [were] prejudicial to the defense” (the

prejudice prong). Id. at 688, 692.

     To establish deficient performance, the defendant “must

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not

to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.”

Id. at 690; see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 666,

104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984) (requiring defendants

to “point[] to specific errors made by trial counsel”). To

establish prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. The defendant thus bears the burden of proof as

to both prongs, and a “[f]ailure to make the required showing of

either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the

ineffectiveness claim.” Id. at 687, 700. Furthermore, in

deciding such a claim, courts need not “approach the inquiry in

                               14
the same order” or “address both components of the inquiry if

the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

     “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential[,]” and the defendant must overcome “a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant

must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”

Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.

Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955)). “[E]very effort” must therefore

“be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,

and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the

time[,]” as the “benchmark” for a successful ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is that “counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just

result.” Id. at 686, 689. Ultimately, “[u]nder established law,

it is very difficult for a convicted defendant to prevail on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” United States v.

Moore, 703 F.3d 562, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

  IV.   Analysis

     Mr. Pole advances nine ineffective assistance of trial

counsel claims, four of which were remanded by the D.C. Circuit,

                               15
see Pole, 741 F.3d at 126; and five of which were raised for the

first time in his motion for a new trial before the Court, see

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 2-3, 16-24. Mr. Pole argues in his

motion that each of the nine alleged failures by Mr. Acree

“standing alone, [are] sufficient to provide [Mr.] Pole with a

new trial[,]” and that in addition, their cumulative effect

“plainly warrants vacating [Mr.] Pole’s conviction.” Id. at 24.

     Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected all of Mr. Pole’s claims

and concluded that he did not receive ineffective assistance of

counsel. See R. & R., ECF No. 193. First, Magistrate Judge

Faruqui rejected Mr. Pole’s claim that Mr. Acree failed “to

present a good faith defense” and “request a good faith jury

instruction” because he concluded that “the underpinnings of Mr.

Acree’s defense was . . . good faith reliance by Mr. Pole[,]”

and that the jury instructions adequately explained the concept

of good faith. See id. at 9-12. Second, Magistrate Judge Faruqui

rejected Mr. Pole’s claims that Mr. Acree failed to object to or

introduce testimony, instead determining that Mr. Acree’s

failures to object to Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on Mr. Pole’s

offer to repay the unapproved bonuses and the government’s use

of Mr. Pole’s oath of office in its closing argument, and his

failure to call Mr. McCarthy as a witness, could all be deferred

to as strategic, non-prejudicial choices. See id. at 12-17.

Third, Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected Mr. Pole’s claims that

                               16
Mr. Acree’s decisions not to impeach the testimony of Ms. Cahill

and Ms. Petroshius, including by calling Ms. Kruse to testify

for the purpose of impeaching Ms. Petroshius, were ineffective

because he concluded that choosing not to impeach or call

certain witnesses is “sound trial strategy” rather than

prejudicial or deficient performance. See id. at 17-20. Lastly,

Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected Mr. Pole’s claims that Mr.

Acree was ineffective for not using and introducing into

evidence unredacted copies of Mr. Pole’s budget memoranda and

employment history transcripts, allegedly showing that Mr. Pole

“routinely issued exit bonuses without specific chief of staff

approval,” because he determined that these decisions were non-

prejudicial and “sound trial strategy.” See id. at 20-24.

     Mr. Pole “objects to each of the R. & R.’s conclusions” and

claims that the R. & R. is most critically erroneous with regard

to: (1) its findings that Mr. Acree’s “failures to make certain

objections were ‘strategic[;]’” (2) its failure “to grasp the

central issue at trial, which [was] whether Mr. Pole believed he

needed approval from his bosses to issue bonuses” in an effort

to spend down the budget, specifically exhibited by its improper

conclusion that Mr. Pole was not prejudiced by Mr. Acree’s

failure to use and introduce into evidence unredacted budget

memoranda and employment transcripts; and (3) its failure to

consider the cumulative effect of Mr. Acree’s alleged errors at

                               17
trial. Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 21-22. Mr. Pole also takes

issue with the R. & R.’s recommendation that this Court’s

original $75,042.37 restitution order be confirmed. Compare R. &

R., ECF No. 193 at 24-26, with Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 45-

46. The government responds that Mr. Pole’s objections “are

simple regurgitations of arguments he has already made and fail

to accurately consider the trial record and Mr. Acree’s credible

testimony at the April [7], 2022 evidentiary hearing.” Gov’t’s

Resp., ECF No. 196 at 1. The Court first addresses in turn Mr.

Pole’s various objections to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s

conclusions as to Mr. Acree’s trial performance before turning

to Mr. Pole’s objection to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s conclusion

as to the proper restitution amount.

       A. Magistrate Judge Faruqui Did Not Err in His Conclusion
          That Mr. Pole Did Not Receive Ineffective Assistance
          of Counsel

             1. Mr. Acree Was Not Ineffective for Not Lodging
                Certain Objections During Trial

     The Court first addresses Mr. Pole’s objections to

Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s conclusion that Mr. Acree’s failures

to lodge certain objections during trial, specifically to: (1)

the admission of Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on Mr. Pole’s offer

to repay the unapproved bonuses; and (2) the government’s use of

Mr. Pole’s oath of office during its closing argument, were

“strategic” decisions entitled to deference under Strickland.

                               18
Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 22. He argues that the R. & R.

ignores evidence that these failures were not “decisions”

because Mr. Acree stated in a sworn declaration and testified

during the evidentiary hearing that he did not realize he had a

legal basis to make those objections. Id. at 22, 24, 27. As a

result, Mr. Pole argues that “[t]rial counsel could not possibly

have ‘deci[ded]’ not to lodge an objection of which he was

completely unaware[,]” and that even if these errors could be

considered “strategic,” they were “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 22. The government responds that Magistrate Judge

Faruqui’s labeling of these alleged failures as “strategic

decisions” was correct and consistent with the trial record and

Mr. Acree’s testimony. Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 196 at 2. Because

the Court agrees with Mr. Pole that the R. & R. does not

consider Mr. Acree’s sworn declaration where he admitted that he

“had no strategic reason for not objecting to Mr. Mogilnicki’s

testimony regarding Mr. Pole’s offer to [re]pay the money” or

“to the government’s use of” his oath of office in its closing

argument, see Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 10-12 ¶¶

7, 10-11 (admitted into evidence during the April 7, 2022

evidentiary hearing); the Court reviews de novo these two

objections.

     “Criminal defendants do not have a right to perfect

assistance of counsel, but to ‘reasonably effective

                               19
assistance.’” United States v. Gibson, 577 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324

(D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “There are

countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given

case[,]” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would

not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689. Therefore, trial counsel’s “strategic decisions . .

. are entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ of reasonableness[,]”

especially since “[d]efense lawyers have ‘limited’ time and

resources, and so must choose from among ‘countless’ strategic

options.” Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 739, 141 S. Ct. 2405,

210 L. Ed. 2d 812 (2021) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 104, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (some

internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, strategic

decisions can be “particularly difficult because certain tactics

carry the risk of ‘harm[ing] the defense’ by undermining

credibility with the jury or distracting from more important

issues.” Id. (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 108).

     Although the strategic choices of a defendant’s counsel are

presumed to be “sound trial strategy” absent the defendant

successfully rebutting this presumption, id.; Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689; “‘strategic choices made after less than complete

investigation are reasonable’ only to the extent that

‘reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation[,]’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 512, 123 S.

                               20
Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 690-91). However, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. As

such, “even if there is reason to think that counsel’s conduct

‘was far from exemplary,’ a court may still not grant relief if

‘[t]he record does not reveal’ that counsel took an approach

that no competent lawyer would have chosen.” Dunn, 594 U.S. at

739 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 23-24, 134 S. Ct. 10,

187 L. Ed. 2d 348 (2013)).

                 a. Mr. Mogilnicki’s Testimony Regarding Mr.
                    Pole’s Offer to Repay the Unapproved Bonuses

     Mr. Pole’s first objection centers on testimony from Mr.

Mogilnicki, the final chief of staff under whom Mr. Pole worked

and the government’s first witness in its case-in-chief. See

Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at 7:2-23. Mr. Mogilnicki

testified about the January 26, 2007 meeting in which he

confronted Mr. Pole following his discovery of the unapproved

bonuses scheme. See id. at 92:9-96:9. Mr. Mogilnicki also asked

Mr. Craig, “a former Kennedy staffer[ and] a very experienced

and skilled lawyer,” to attend the meeting as “reinforcements,”

i.e., “a lawyer to ask for . . . an independent view of what was

happening here.” Id. at 93:3-4, 95:7-11. During his testimony,

Mr. Mogilnicki recounted the various reasons Mr. Pole gave to

                               21
try to explain discrepancies between spreadsheets he had created

detailing bonus/salary amounts and the Senate Disbursing

Office’s account of the amount of money he was actually paid.

See id. at 96:15-19, 97:20-98:14, 101:6-17. One explanation Mr.

Pole gave was that “he had been told by prior chiefs of staff

that the Senator wanted to get to zero on the budget, so if

there was extra money, he should just spread it around.” Id. at

98:11-14. According to Mr. Mogilnicki, Mr. Pole also explained

that he felt “entitled” to the money because he was “underpaid”

and his previous requests for raises were rejected. Id. at

101:18-102:2. Additionally, Mr. Mogilnicki testified that

“[t]here came a time in that conversation when [Mr. Pole]

offered to try to pay the money back. He said, ‘If that’s what

it takes to, you know, to get this behind me, I’ll see if I can

. . .   pay the money back.” Id. at 104:6-9. When asked what his

“understanding” of that offer was and what he took it “to mean,”

Mr. Mogilnicki testified:

           You know, that was when I lost my last hope
           that this wasn’t what it seemed to be. I -–
           you know, I went to the meeting thinking maybe
           there was an explanation, but that sort of –-
           that was the –- that was sort of the last straw
           in my mind as to whether he had actually taken
           the money or not. I couldn’t imagine someone
           who had an honest right to that money would
           offer to pay it back. That didn’t make sense.

Id. at 104:17-105:2. Mr. Pole argues that Mr. Acree’s failure to

object to Mogilnicki’s testimony on: (1) Mr. Pole’s offer to

                                 22
repay the money, and (2) Mr. Mogilnicki’s understanding of that

offer, or what Mr. Pole argues was testimony about “the moment

[Mr. Mogilnicki] became convinced of Mr. Pole’s guilt[,]” was

ineffective assistance of counsel because Mr. Acree did not

properly consider Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which governs

the admissibility of evidence pertaining to compromise offers

and negotiations. See Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 7-8, 23-27;

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 16-18.

     On remand from the D.C. Circuit, Mr. Pole’s post-conviction

counsel interviewed Mr. Acree and obtained a declaration from

him in which he stated: “I had no strategic reason for not

objecting to Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony regarding Mr. Pole’s

offer to pay the money back under Federal Rule of Evidence 408.

I did not consider the applicability of Rule 408 during Mr.

Pole’s trial.” Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11 ¶ 7.

In addition, during the evidentiary hearing before Magistrate

Judge Faruqui, Mr. Acree testified that he did not consider Rule

408 in his analysis of these two contested portions of Mr.

Mogilnicki’s testimony, and that if he had “know[n] that [Rule]

408 is saying that [Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony regarding his

understanding of Mr. Pole’s repayment offer] doesn’t come in,”

then he “probably would have had that part taken out[.]” See

Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 86:20-87:21.

                               23
     However, Mr. Acree also testified that he was not concerned

about the admission of Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on Mr. Pole’s

offer to repay the money enough to object because he did not

think it detrimentally “impact[ed]” his “arguments in the case,”

see id. at 54:19-58:11, 74:5-17, 81:2-12; which focused on

positively depicting Mr. Pole’s character and his desire “to act

in the best interest of the office” rather than “steal money[,]”

id. at 56:1-2, 22-25. Mr. Acree further testified that from his

perspective, Mr. Pole’s offer to repay the money “wasn’t

inconsistent with who he was and how he acted throughout, which

is what we were trying to portray.” Id. at 58:2-4. Instead, Mr.

Acree saw Mr. Pole’s offer, not with “a negative attached to”

it, but rather as demonstrating Mr. Pole’s realization that his

actions had not aligned with what the office “wanted [him] to

do,” and that he would try to fix his mistake by repaying the

money. See id. at 56:22-58:11 (“In that moment, at a minimum, I

didn’t see it as something that was harmful or problematic.”).

Mr. Acree also testified that not objecting to this line of

testimony aligned with his strategic “philosophy” to “listen”

and “respond” to the evidence as he sees “fit, in terms of

winning and losing[.]” Id. at 58:16-21.

     Based on this testimony, Magistrate Judge Faruqui concluded

that Mr. Acree’s “decision not to object to [Mr. Mogilnicki’s]

testimony was part of his strategy to show Mr. Pole’s good

                               24
character[,]” and that although it was “debatable” whether Mr.

Pole’s offer to repay the money “constituted a settlement

negotiation under Rule 408[,]” it was irrelevant “because Mr.

Acree made a reasonable strategic decision to admit” the

testimony as part of his “sound trial strategy.” R. &. R., ECF

No. 193 at 13-14. However, the R. & R. did not consider Mr.

Acree’s sworn declaration admitting that he had “no strategic

reason for not objecting to Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony” under

Rule 408. Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11 ¶ 7.

Although Mr. Acree’s testimony indicates that there was some

strategic reasoning for not objecting to the contested parts of

Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony, his declaration clearly indicates

that this “strategy” failed to consider Rule 408. As a result,

the Court begins its analysis of this ineffective assistance of

counsel claim by determining whether Mr. Pole’s offer to repay

the money was inadmissible under Rule 408.

     Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states that evidence of

“furnishing, promising, or offering . . . a valuable

consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise” a

“disputed claim” and “conduct or a statement made during

compromise negotiations about [that] claim” are not admissible

“either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of [that]

disputed claim . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 408(a). In other words,

Rule 408 excludes evidence of compromise offers and negotiations

                               25
when the evidence is offered to prove a defendant’s “liability”

or guilt for a “disputed claim.” See id. (“Committee Notes on

Rules—2006 Amendment”). “Offers to settle are excluded even if

no settlement negotiations follow[,]” and since Rule 408 is

“meant to promote settlements[,] . . . [i]f one party attempts

to initiate negotiations with a settlement offer, the offer is

excluded from evidence even if the counterparty responds: ‘I’m

not negotiating with you.’” United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d

852, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 408 advisory

committee’s note (1972 proposed rule)), rehearing en banc

denied, 711 F.3d 174 (D.C. Cir. 2013). In sum, for Rule 408 to

apply, “an actual dispute must exist, preferably some

negotiations, and at least an apparent difference of view

between the parties as to the validity or amount of the claim.”

MCCORMICK ON EVID. § 266 (8th ed.).

     In the R. & R., Magistrate Judge Faruqui stated that Mr.

Pole’s offer to repay the money “may not have been a settlement

offer under Rule 408 because Mr. Pole was not negotiating a

disputed civil claim when he made the statement, nor was he in

plea negotiations with a prosecutor.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 13

n.3. However, in United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir.

2010), the D.C. Circuit concluded that “[t]he 2006 amendment to

Rule 408 . . . made clear that the rule applie[s] to both civil

and criminal proceedings” so as to bar the use of a defendant’s

                                  26
compromise offer and statements in negotiation, except when

permissibly used “to prove the defendant’s attempt to obstruct a

criminal investigation.” Id. at 860.

     Here, Mr. Pole was never charged with obstruction, and at

the time of his conversation with Mr. Mogilnicki, “there was no

date identifying the beginning of a criminal investigation,” or

evidence that Mr. Pole “knew of any criminal investigation when

he talked to” Mr. Mogilnicki, nor did Mr. Mogilnicki testify

that he thought Mr. Pole was trying to “bribe” him with the

repayment offer. See id. As such, the Court concludes that Mr.

Pole’s offer “to get this behind” him and “pay the money back,”

and Mr. Mogilnicki’s accompanying testimony that this offer was

“the last straw in [his] mind as to whether [Mr. Pole] had

actually taken the money or not[,]” Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011),

ECF No. 82 at 104:6-9, 20-24; were inadmissible “as evidence of

[Mr. Pole’s] knowledge of his own guilt, which is to say his

‘liability[,]’” see Davis, 596 F.3d at 860-61 (“Consciousness of

guilt proves ‘liability’ for a disputed claim under Rule

408(a).”). As Mr. Pole explains, Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony of

his understanding of Mr. Pole’s repayment offer “was important

because it was the moment when he believed Mr. Pole was

conscious of guilt, because he ‘couldn’t imagine that someone

who had an honest right to that money would offer to pay it

back.’” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 25 n.1 (emphasis in

                               27
original). Rule 408 should therefore have barred the use of this

testimony for the purpose of establishing Mr. Pole’s guilt.

     Mr. Pole directs the Court to the D.C. Circuit’s decision

in Davis to support his argument that Rule 408 should have

prohibited Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on his offer to repay the

money, and that Mr. Acree’s failure to object was both deficient

performance and prejudicial. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 17-

18; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 25-27. Despite “similar” facts,

Magistrate Judge Faruqui declared Davis inapposite here because

of a differing “posture,” as Davis involved the D.C. Circuit’s

conclusion that “the district court erroneously allowed

testimony of [a] repayment offer over defense counsel’s

objections.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 13 n.3. The Court

disagrees, instead concluding that Davis dictates that Mr.

Mogilnicki’s contested testimony was prohibited under Rule 408,

and that Mr. Acree should have objected to its admission.

     In Davis, the defendant, Mr. Davis, was accused of stealing

over a period of years from the fraternity for which he served

as national treasurer. 596 F.3d at 853-54. At trial, the new

treasurer of the fraternity, Mr. Hammock, testified about a

conversation he had with Mr. Davis in which he confronted Mr.

Davis after evidence of his misconduct surfaced. Id. at 854,

859. Mr. Davis responded by asking what it would “take to make

this go away” and offered to repay a portion of the money he had

                               28
stolen from the fraternity. Id. at 859. The D.C. Circuit

concluded that this was an offer to compromise a claim that “was

disputed as to validity or amount,” as Mr. Davis did not confess

to taking the fraternity’s money but rather tried to provide an

explanation for his actions, which Mr. Hammock in turn rejected.

Id. Because the government had sought to introduce Mr. Davis’

settlement offer to prove his guilt, contrary to Rule 408’s

direction, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the district court

abused its discretion in permitting Mr. Hammock’s testimony over

defense counsel’s objection, and it vacated his convictions and

remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 860-61.

     Here, Mr. Pole similarly offered to repay the unapproved

bonuses to put the situation “behind” him, but he never

confessed to stealing the money and tried to provide Mr.

Mogilnicki with explanations for the discrepancies in the salary

and bonus spreadsheet numbers, which Mr. Mogilnicki ultimately

rejected. See Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at 104:6-9,

105:3-8. The “validity” of the claim was therefore “disputed” at

the time Mr. Pole made his repayment offer, especially since Mr.

Mogilnicki ensured that a lawyer, Mr. Craig, attended the

meeting as legal “reinforcements,” and thereafter suspended Mr.

Pole, taking away his key and remote access to his computer. Id.

at 104:10-16; see, e.g., Weems v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 665 F.3d

958, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that “a dispute need not

                               29
‘crystallize to the point of threatened litigation’ for the 408

exclusion rule to apply . . . so long as there is an ‘actual

dispute or difference of opinion’ regarding a party’s liability

for or the amount of the claim,” which was evidenced by the

employee being placed on administrative leave and offered a

separation agreement). As a result, introducing Mr. Pole’s offer

as evidence of his guilt was prohibited by Rule 408.

     Thus, although the “posture” of this case is different from

Davis because Mr. Acree never objected to the now contested

parts of Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony, Davis dictates that Mr.

Acree “performed deficiently in failing to challenge [compromise

offer] testimony by [Mr. Mogilnicki] that violated Rule [408].”

United States v. Glover, 872 F.3d 625, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2017). The

“requirement[s] of Rule [408] on which the objection[]” should

have been based were “clear,” and therefore, Mr. Acree “was

deficient for not raising the issue,” or at a minimum

considering it. Id. at 634. As Mr. Acree has stated, he “did not

consider the applicability of Rule 408 during Mr. Pole’s

trial[,]” Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11 ¶ 7; and

had he known the parameters of Rule 408, he “probably would have

had” parts of Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony “taken out” from the

record, Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 87:17-21. The

Court therefore disagrees that “it does not matter if Mr. Pole’s

offer was protected by Rule 408” because Mr. Acree has admitted

                               30
that his “strategic” thinking on this testimony did not extend

to considering the requirements of this applicable evidentiary

rule. R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 13 n.3; see also Def.’s Objs., ECF

No. 195 at 26 n.3 (contending that the R. & R. “mischaracterizes

the record, since trial counsel never testified that he had

‘several reasons’ not to object [to Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony]—

the reason was that he just did not consider Rule 408”).

     Accordingly, the Court concludes that objectively

reasonable trial counsel assistance “under prevailing

professional norms[,]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; requires

familiarity with and consideration of the Federal Rules of

Evidence, and Mr. Acree’s failure to consider a relevant rule

constituted deficient performance, see, e.g., United States v.

Soto, 132 F.3d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (requiring defense

counsel to have “familiarity” with the structure and content of

the federal Sentencing Guidelines and concluding that ignorance

of a relevant Guideline provision can amount to ineffective

assistance of counsel); United States v. Carthorne, 878 F.3d

458, 469 (4th Cir. 2017) (concluding that “counsel’s failure [ ]

to demonstrate a grasp of the relevant legal standards” can

amount to deficient performance).

     Having concluded that Mr. Acree “performed below the

constitutional standard” in failing to consider Rule 408 when

deciding whether to object to the contested portions of Mr.

                               31
Mogilnicki’s testimony, the Court next considers whether Mr.

Pole was “prejudiced by this deficiency.” Glover, 872 F.3d at

634. Mr. Pole argues that “[i]t defies belief that the jury

would not have been swayed by Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony” on Mr.

Pole’s repayment offer and his impressions of the “significance”

of that offer, and that the admission of this testimony was

therefore “extremely prejudicial.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at

26; Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 18. The government responds that

Mr. Pole’s “offer of repayment pales in comparison to the

overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt before the jury[,]” and

that “when considered alongside all the evidence, [Mr.] Pole’s

statement that he could pay the money back could not have

affected the jury’s verdict.” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 16.

The R. & R. does not address Strickland’s prejudice prong in its

analysis of this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, so the

Court does so for the first time here.

     Based on Mr. Mogilnicki’s remaining permissible testimony,

in addition to the strength of the testimony from Senator

Kennedy’s other chiefs of staff all “indicating that [Mr.] Pole

knew that he needed approval for salary adjustments[,]” Pole,

741 F.3d at 124; the Court concludes that the jury would have

convicted Mr. Pole “even absent the problematic testimony by”

Mr. Mogilnicki, Glover, 872 F.3d at 634. Specifically, Mr.

Mogilnicki testified that “it was clear from [his] conversation

                               32
[with Mr. Pole] that he didn’t have authorization to make”

changes related to the awarding of bonuses and that it “was

clear that [Mr. Pole] had . . . done what he felt like doing.”

Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at 105:3-8. Mr. Mogilnicki

further testified that neither he nor Senator Kennedy authorized

Mr. Pole to award himself bonuses and that what Mr. Pole did

“was so incredibly inconsistent with the work [they had] done

together to get these bonuses just right that it was . . . clear

to [him] that this was . . . something [Mr. Pole] did on his

own[,]” as opposed to something he had claimed the implicit or

explicit “right” to do. Id. at 105:9-106:12. In addition, Ms.

Petroshius testified that while she was chief of staff, Mr. Pole

never had authority to authorize bonuses. Trial Tr. (Jan. 24,

2011), ECF No. 85 at 5:2-7, 40:14-25. She stated that she had no

reason to believe that Mr. Pole did not understand his role at

the office or that only the Senator and chiefs of staff could

approve bonuses, as she never told Mr. Pole to spend around the

budget surplus without talking to her first. Id. at 41:22-42:19,

93:12-17. Likewise, Ms. Cahill testified that when she was chief

of staff, she also never told Mr. Pole that he had authority to

spend down the budget on his own. Trial Tr. (Jan. 21, 2011), ECF

No. 84 at 47:16-21. All of this testimony regarding what Mr.

Pole calls “the fundamental issue”—whether he could have

reasonably believed he had authority to spend down the budget by

                               33
awarding bonuses without authorization, Def.’s Objs., ECF No.

195 at 8; was provided separately from Mr. Mogilnicki’s

testimony on Mr. Pole’s offer to repay the money, see Trial Tr.

(Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 18:1-4 (noting in the

government’s closing that Mr. Pole “repeated [the] claim that he

was just spending down the budget” but later “admitted that no

one ever told him to pay bonuses out on his own”).

     That Mr. Mogilnicki had “sterling credentials” and was one

of the government’s main witnesses, see Def.’s Objs., ECF No.

195 at 26; does not negate “the quantity of evidence” that

existed independently of his inadmissible testimony, Glover, 872

F.3d at 635; see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 10-12

(summarizing “the overwhelming evidence” that Mr. Pole “knew

that he did not have authority to award bonuses without approval

from [a] [c]hief of [s]taff[,]” which includes Mr. Pole’s “own

statements” in “extensive correspondence” such as emails and

memoranda to the chiefs of staff). In addition, the Court is not

persuaded by Mr. Pole’s argument that the harm here is “greater

than it was in Davis,” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 26; as the

D.C. Circuit in Davis declined to assess, sua sponte, whether

the error to admit Mr. Davis’ compromise offer over trial

counsel’s objection was “harmless,” 596 F.3d at 861.

     Thus, although the jury may have been “swayed” to some

degree by Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony, Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195

                               34
at 26; even if Mr. Acree “had made the objections that [Mr.

Pole] now, in hindsight, insists were essential, there is no

reasonable probability that the results [of his trial] would

have been any different[,]” United States v. Thomas, 797 F.

Supp. 19, 25 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693

(explaining that “[e]ven if a defendant shows that particular

errors of counsel were unreasonable, . . . the defendant must

show that they actually had an adverse effect . . . on the

outcome of the proceeding[,]” not just “some conceivable

effect”). In fact, “any single failure to object usually cannot

be said to have been error unless the evidence sought is so

prejudicial to a client that failure to object essentially

defaults the case to the state.” Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d

754, 774 (6th Cir. 2006). To the contrary, it is plausible that

Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony aided the jury in seeing Mr. Pole in

a positive light. For example, although Mr. Acree stated that he

had no strategic reason for not considering Rule 408, he also

testified that his thought-process on not objecting to Mr.

Mogilnicki’s testimony stemmed from his belief that Mr. Pole’s

repayment offer aligned with his strategy to positively depict

Mr. Pole’s character and desire “to act in the best interest of

the office,” rather than an intention to steal money. Hearing

Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 56:1-2, 22-25, 58:2-4.

Regardless, Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on Mr. Pole’s offer to

                               35
repay was “limited to a small portion of the trial[,] . . . took

place on the very first day in the morning, and then was not

discussed again.” Id. at 19:20-20:6. It is not reasonably

probable that “after ten days of trial, during which the

government presented an overwhelming amount of evidence against

Mr. Pole,” that “this short testimony about the offer to repay

could have impacted the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 20:7-11.

     Ultimately, because the Court concludes that Mr. Pole has

not met his burden in showing that the decision reached by the

jury “would reasonably likely have been different absent [Mr.

Acree’s Rule 408] errors[,]” and because he has not shown “that

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair

trial,” it rejects Mr. Pole’s ineffectiveness claim regarding

Mr. Acree’s failure to object to certain portions of Mr.

Mogilnicki’s testimony. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 696. 5

5 Mr. Pole newly argues in his objections that “the government
capitalized on counsel’s error” regarding Rule 408 “in its
closing argument, directly referencing the meeting between Mr.
Pole and Mr. Mogilnicki as the moment Mr. Pole was ‘caught.’”
Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 27. The Court finds this argument
misleading, as the portions of the government’s closing using
the word “caught” do not reference Mr. Mogilnicki’s testimony on
Mr. Pole’s offer to repay the unapproved bonuses or his
impressions of that offer. See, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011),
ECF No. 121 at 9:8-13, 12:15-18, 17:16-18:4, 26:5-27:6, 74:4-12,
77:17-21, 80:1-9, 94:17-23. In fact, the government’s closing
never once mentions Mr. Pole’s offer to repay the money.
                                36
                 b. The Government’s Use of Mr. Pole’s Oath of
                    Office in Its Closing Argument

     Mr. Pole’s second objection centers on the government’s use

of his oath of office in its closing argument at trial. Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 27-29. The government began its closing by

displaying Mr. Pole’s signed oath of office on the courtroom’s

projector and reading it aloud to the jury in its entirety:

          I, Ngozi Pole, do solemnly swear or affirm
          that   I   will   support  and   defend   the
          Constitution of the United States against all
          enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
          bear true faith and allegiance to the same,
          that I will take this obligation freely
          without any mental reservation or purpose of
          evasion, and that I will well and faithfully
          discharge the duties of the office on which I
          am about to enter, so help me God.

Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 8:2-9; Def.’s Hearing

Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11 ¶ 8. The prosecutor then told the

jury that Mr. Pole “violated that oath time and time again . . .

by stealing, by lying, by using the Senator’s office as his own

personal bank.” Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 8:14-

18. The parties dispute whether the oath of office was admitted

into evidence at trial, as the government’s final exhibit list

indicates that it was admitted as the government’s Exhibit 2 on

January 19, 2011, but the trial transcripts do not reflect its

admission. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 18 n.11; Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 18 n.6; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 11, 27

n.4. Mr. Acree has stated that he does “not specifically recall

                               37
whether [the] Government’s Exhibit 2 was admitted into

evidence[,]” and that “[i]f it was admitted,” he did “not recall

objecting.” Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11 ¶ 9.

     Nonetheless, the R. & R. concluded that Mr. Acree’s

“decision not to object” did not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel because it was “strategic” and should not

be “second-guess[ed].” See R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 14-16. As

noted, the R. & R. did not consider Mr. Acree’s sworn

declaration obtained by Mr. Pole’s post-conviction counsel, in

which Mr. Acree admitted that he “had no strategic reason for

not objecting to the government’s use of unadmitted evidence in

its closing argument[,]” and that to the extent the oath of

office was admitted at trial, he “had no strategic reason for

not objecting to its admission under Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403.” Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11-12 ¶¶

10-11. The R. & R. also made no findings regarding the

admissibility of the oath of office, instead stating that “the

admissibility of this evidence is debatable, but ultimately

irrelevant.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 14.

     The Court disagrees with the R. & R., as “the merits of the

underlying claim,” here being the admissibility of certain

evidence, “control the resolution of the Strickland claim

because trial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing

to raise a meritless objection.” Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d

                               38
1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted); accord United States v. Marshall, 946 F.3d 591,

596 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (concluding that counsel’s performance

cannot be deficient if objecting “would have been meritless

under the applicable legal standard”). Thus, the Court begins

its analysis of this second objection by assessing Mr. Pole’s

argument that Mr. Acree’s performance was deficient because “the

admission of the oath was improper” under Rule 401 for being

“irrelevant” and under Rule 403 for being “unduly prejudicial”

and causing “confusion of the issues.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195

at 27; Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 20.

     In making closing arguments, “a prosecutor has an

obligation to avoid making statements of fact to the jury not

supported by proper evidence introduced during trial[.]” United

States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “The sole purpose of closing

argument is to assist the jury in analyzing the evidence,” and

thus, in closing, “counsel may not refer to, or rely upon,

evidence unless the trial court has admitted it.” Id. at 52-53

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Although the

government’s final exhibit list indicates that Mr. Pole’s oath

of office was admitted as Exhibit 2, the Court is persuaded by

both Mr. Pole’s and the government’s acknowledgements that the

trial record never indicates “when and how [Mr. Pole’s] oath of

                               39
office was admitted[,]” see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 18

n.11; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 27 n.4; into concluding, for

the purposes of this motion, that the oath was not properly

admitted into evidence. Accordingly, the Court considers whether

Mr. Pole’s oath of office would have been admissible had it been

objected to and considered at trial.

     The Court is persuaded by the caselaw provided by Mr. Pole

that had the issue been raised at trial, it would have excluded

the use of Mr. Pole’s oath of office as evidence by the

government. For example, in United States v. Jefferson, 623 F.

Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Va. 2009), the District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia determined in a multi-count bribery, RICO,

money laundering, and honest services wire fraud prosecution

that the defendant’s congressional oath of office, which

included the phrase, “I will well and faithfully discharge the

duties of the office on which I am about to enter[,]” was

inadmissible. Id. at 680-81. Without considering the defendant’s

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 objection, that court concluded

that the oath was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible under

Rules 401 and 402 because the government had failed to explain

how the oath had “‘any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.’” Id. at 681 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401).

                               40
     Similarly, in a case involving two American Samoan public

officials on trial for federal procurement fraud, another judge

from this court determined that the American Samoa oath of

office must be excluded as irrelevant under Federal Rules of

Evidence 401 and 402. Order, United States v. Sunia, No. 07-225

(RBW) (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2009), ECF No. 194 at 1-2. In Sunia, the

government sought to introduce the oaths for the purpose of

“asserting that the defendants’ knowledge of and actions

inconsistent with their oaths . . . ma[de] it more probable that

they possessed the requisite criminal intent[,] . . . [and] that

the structuring of the procurement documents was the result of

their fraud[.]” Id. at 1 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). However, the district court judge concluded that there

was “nothing in the plain language of the American Samoa oath

that [would] make[] it ‘more probable’ that the defendants

possessed the requisite criminal intent to be found guilty of

the crimes alleged,” as “the oath of office itself [did] not

proscribe or compel any specific behavior on the part of the

defendants.” Id. at 2 (citing Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676,

678 n.1, 684, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 31 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1972)). Because

“a fact-finder could not possibly infer from the oath that the

defendants knew that any specific behavior was unlawful[,]” the

judge deemed the fact that the defendants had taken the oath

upon assuming office irrelevant and thus inadmissible. Id. at 3.

                               41
     Following the reasoning in Jefferson and Sunia, the Court

concludes that Mr. Pole’s oath of office should have been

excluded as irrelevant evidence because it does not “proscribe

or compel any specific behavior on the part of” Mr. Pole in

terms of spending down the budget or otherwise conducting his

job duties. Id. at 2. Equivalent to the oath in Jefferson, Mr.

Pole’s oath of office includes the following phrase: “I will

well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which

I am about to enter . . . . ” Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No.

121 at 8:7-9. The oath’s plain language thus has no bearing on

whether Mr. Pole could have known it was unlawful for him to

spend down the budget by awarding bonuses without approval, and

it therefore could not have “any tendency to make a fact [of

consequence in determining the action] more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)-

(b). The government argues that there was “nothing impermissible

about [its] use of [Mr.] Pole’s oath” because it was evidence

that “‘is essentially background in nature[,]’” see Gov’t’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 16-17 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401 advisory

committee’s note); but for the above reasons, the Court

disagrees, concluding instead that because the oath was not

relevant, it was also inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 402.

     The Court next considers whether Mr. Acree’s failure to

object to the government’s use of Mr. Pole’s inadmissible oath

                               42
of office in its closing argument was objectively unreasonable

and therefore deficient performance. “Generally, a tactical

decision by counsel to [with]hold an objection at trial is not

deficient[,]” United States v. Browne, 619 F. Supp. 3d 100, 112-

13 (D.D.C. 2022) (citations omitted); and whether to object

during a closing argument is often viewed as “‘a matter of trial

strategy, which is ill-suited to second-guessing[,]’” R. &. R.,

ECF No. 193 at 14 (quoting Richie v. Thaler, No. H-11-3674, 2012

WL 1067224, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2012)). Although Mr.

Acree has testified that “it can be a loud thing when you object

during a closing” and that his general strategy focuses on

objecting during a closing argument only to something he feels

is “problematic,” which he did not think was the case for the

oath of office, see Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at

53:24-54:5, 60:9-24, 61:22-62:11 (“I just didn’t see what impact

[the oath] had on what was at issue in the case.”); he has also

stated in a sworn declaration that he had “no strategic reason”

for not objecting to: (1) the government’s use of the oath as

“unadmitted evidence” in its closing argument; and (2) the

admission of the oath under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and

403, Def.’s Hearing Ex. 220, ECF No. 186-1 at 11-12 ¶¶ 10-11.

This statement therefore disproves the R. & R.’s conclusion that

Mr. Acree was “clear” in that “his decision not to object was

strategic.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 14.

                               43
     The Court finds the evidentiary record to be conflicting,

since although Mr. Acree testified to some “strategic” thinking

behind why he did not think there was a legal need to object to

the government’s use of Mr. Pole’s oath of office in its

closing, he has also stated that this thinking did not extend to

considering the admissibility of the oath under Rules 401 and

403. Although there is a strong presumption in favor of trial

counsel’s decisions to withhold objections, including to

statements “in a prosecutor’s summation,” see, e.g., Browne, 619

F. Supp. 3d at 112-13; Bussard v. Lockhart, 32 F.3d 322, 324

(8th Cir. 1994); Zapata, 788 F.3d at 1115; Mr. Acree’s failure

to consider the admissibility of the oath of office thereby

enabled the government to impermissibly refer to evidence that

the trial court never admitted in the first place, see Moore,

651 F.3d at 53. There is therefore some credence to Mr. Pole’s

argument that Mr. Acree performed below an objective standard of

reasonableness “under prevailing professional norms,” see Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 27-28; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688;

especially since he failed to object to inadmissible evidence

due to failure to consider the applicable Federal Rules of

Evidence on not one, but two occasions, see supra section

IV.A.1.a.; Browne, 619 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (“[A] constitutional

defect occurs when counsel repeatedly fails to object to

inadmissible evidence or misapprehends the law.”).

                               44
     Regardless, given the contradictory record, the Court need

not decide Strickland’s deficient performance prong here because

it concludes that even if Mr. Acree’s failure to object to the

use of Mr. Pole’s oath of office in the government’s closing was

faulty, Mr. Pole has not shown a reasonable probability that

“but for” this error, the result of his “proceeding would have

been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

     First, although Mr. Pole refers to the government’s use of

his oath of office as “the centerpiece of its closing argument,”

see Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 19; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at

28; the Court’s review of the trial transcript indicates that

references to the oath are “limited to relatively small portions

of” the government’s entire closing argument, Moore, 651 F.3d at

54. Although the government began its summation by reciting Mr.

Pole’s complete oath of office, it never referenced the oath

again throughout the remainder of its closing argument. See

Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 8:2-29:15. Neither did

the government list the oath among the types of “evidence in

this case” that the jury should consider in deliberating,

including “the testimony, the e-mails, the memos, [and] the

charts,” which it argued demonstrated that Mr. Pole was “guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of all counts.” Id. at 29:8-14. As

such, assuming the government impermissibly referenced evidence

not admitted during trial in the beginning of its closing, this

                               45
misconduct—not objected to by Mr. Acree—was limited in nature,

as opposed to a situation where “[i]nadmissible evidence and

highly inflammatory statements c[o]me rolling in unimpeded

throughout the trial in such a pervasive manner [so] as to

undermine the soundness of the jury verdict.” Moore, 651 F.3d at

54 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the D.C.

Circuit has stated, “absent consistent and repeated

misrepresentation to influence a jury, [i]solated passages of a

prosecutor’s [closing] argument . . . do not reach the same

proportions of severe misconduct” that, not objected to, is

likely to “impermissibly and prejudicially interfere with the

jury’s ability to assess the evidence.” Id. (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). 6

6 Magistrate Judge Faruqui also cited the D.C. Circuit’s opinion
in United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 51-55 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
in concluding that “closing arguments rarely satisfy the second
Strickland prong.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 16. In his
objections, Mr. Pole argues that “Moore is wholly inapposite”
because it reviewed a prosecutorial misconduct claim based on
improper opening and closing arguments, as opposed to a Sixth
Amendment claim involving the same. Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at
28. He further argues that Moore is irrelevant here because
“prosecutorial misconduct claims are reviewed for ‘substantial
prejudice,’ which is not the standard under Strickland.” Id. The
Court rejects this argument because prosecutorial misconduct
claims and Sixth Amendment claims involving trial counsel’s
failure to object are often interrelated. In fact, all of the
cases to which Mr. Pole cites following his rejection of Moore,
see id.; discuss an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
the context of a failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct,
see, e.g., Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that “a failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct
can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel”); Zapata v.
                                46
     Second, the Court instructed the jury prior to the

beginning of summations that closing arguments “are not

evidence” and are only “intended by the attorneys to be a

summation of what the attorneys believe the evidence shows.”

Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 7:14-18. Following the

completion of summations, the Court told the jury that during

deliberations, it could “consider only the evidence properly

admitted in trial[,]” which consisted of “the sworn testimony of

the witnesses, the exhibits that were admitted into evidence,

and the facts and testimony stipulated to by the parties.” Id.

at 98:6-10. The Court then instructed the jury on the essential

elements of the charged offenses—wire fraud and theft of

government property—and the requirement that the government

prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 106:12-

111:10. Despite the Court’s “cautionary instructions to the

Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1122-24 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that
defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
misconduct during closing, which included “inflammatory,
fabricated and ethnically charged epithets,” constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel); Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d
743, 756-60 (6th Cir. 2007) (assessing whether prosecutorial
misconduct during closing, in conjunction with trial counsel’s
failure to object, warranted a new trial). In addition, in
Moore, the D.C. Circuit stated that “review of allegedly
improper prosecutorial arguments is for substantial prejudice
where the defendants lodged an objection, but [that courts must]
apply the plain error standard where they failed to object.” 651
F.3d at 50. Since Mr. Acree failed to object to the government’s
improper use of Mr. Pole’s unadmitted oath of office in its
closing argument, the higher “substantial prejudice” standard
would not have applied, contrary to Mr. Pole’s argument.
                               47
jury” at the beginning of closing arguments and its “clear,

concise, careful” instructions on the elements of the

substantive offenses, United States v. Jackson, 627 F.3d 1198,

1213 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mr. Pole argues that the use of the oath

in the government’s closing implied to the jury that it should

“hold [him] to a higher standard than other defendants who do

not take such oaths” and “suggest[ed] to the jury that it should

convict [him] for violating his oath, as opposed to convicting

him only after carefully considering the elements of wire fraud

and/or theft[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 20.

     However, because “[a] jury is presumed to follow a trial

court’s instructions[,]” Jackson, 627 F.3d at 1213 (citing

Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 367, 83 S. Ct.

448, 9 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1963)); and because the Court has

concluded that the oath of office was irrelevant in proving the

elements of the charged offenses, the Court agrees with the

government that the use of the oath in its closing argument “was

hardly a linchpin of [its] case” that could have “caused the

jury to hold [Mr.] Pole to a higher standard than other

defendants or to convict him simply for violating the oath[,]”

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 18; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693 (noting that just “some conceivable effect” on the trial

outcome is insufficient to establish prejudice).

                               48
     Finally, “[t]here was a wealth of additional evidence of

guilt” in Mr. Pole’s case that also indicates that Mr. Pole has

failed to prove prejudice regarding his oath of office. See R. &

R., ECF No. 193 at 15-16. Testimony from all four chiefs of

staff that Mr. Pole did not have, nor was ever given, authority

to award himself unapproved bonuses, combined with his

acknowledgement that “no one ever told him to pay bonuses out on

his own,” see Trial Tr. (Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 121 at 18:1-4;

is strong evidence negating the reasonableness of whether he

could have “understood” and believed that he had authority to

award bonuses on his own accord, Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at

29; see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 26 (explaining that this

“unequivocal[]” chief-of-staff testimony “[w]ith respect to

actual authority,” coupled with Mr. Pole’s “own words and

actions,” such as his budget memoranda and other correspondence

requesting chief-of-staff review and approval of his recommended

bonus and salary adjustments, “confirm that he did not have the

authority to issue bonuses on his own, and he knew it”).

     The Court therefore concludes that there is “no ‘reasonable

probability’ that a better closing argument without [the oath of

office] defects would have made a significant difference” in the

outcome of Mr. Pole’s trial. Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 151,

130 S. Ct. 676, 175 L. Ed. 2d 595 (2010); see also Glover, 872

F.3d at 635 (balancing “the quantity of evidence” against the

                               49
appellants and “the minimal impact” of the error to conclude

that there was no prejudicial impact in counsel’s failure to

object); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] verdict or conclusion

only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been

affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”);

cf. Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 386-87 (6th Cir. 2005)

(finding a reasonable probability of prejudice when the failure

to object occurred in “a close case at the trial level”).

Accordingly, the Court rejects Mr. Pole’s ineffectiveness claim

regarding Mr. Acree’s failure to object to the government’s use

of his unadmitted oath of office in its closing argument.

             2. Mr. Acree Was Not Ineffective for Not Using and
                Introducing Certain Pieces of Evidence During
                Trial

     The Court next addresses Mr. Pole’s objections regarding

the R. & R.’s alleged misapprehension of “the core issue at

trial,” specifically in relation to its conclusions that Mr.

Acree was not ineffective for not using or introducing into

evidence copies of Mr. Pole’s unredacted budget memoranda and

employment history transcripts obtained by Mr. Pole’s post-

conviction counsel from the U.S. Senate, reflecting the salary

histories of various former employees of Senator Kennedy. See

Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 13, 17, 22, 29-38.

     The Court begins by assessing the “backdrop” issue of

whether Magistrate Judge Faruqui incorrectly “grasp[ed] the

                               50
central issue” of Mr. Pole’s trial, id. at 22, 32; which as

stated by the D.C. Circuit, was “whether [Mr.] Pole knew he

needed authorization to award bonuses[,]” i.e., whether “he

reasonably believed he had authority to award himself unapproved

annual bonuses[,]” Pole, 741 F.3d at 124, 127. Thus, as Mr. Pole

contends, the “central issue” was what he “understood about his

authority, not whether he actually had authority.” Def.’s Objs.,

ECF No. 195 at 30 (emphasis in original). At one point in the R.

& R.’s analysis, Magistrate Judge Faruqui states that the “issue

at trial was . . . about whether Mr. Pole had the authority to

issue bonuses without chief of staff approval.”   R. & R., ECF

No. 193 at 21. In addition, in the factual and procedural

background section, the R. & R. “makes a passing assertion that

‘Mr. Pole understood that he needed final approval from the

chief of staff for all bonuses[,]’” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at

31 (quoting R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 4); and that “everyone

understood that [the bonuses] process required approval by the

chief of staff[,]” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 4. The Court agrees

with Mr. Pole that these statements are problematic specifically

because they speak conclusively, early on in the R. & R., “on

the issue that was critical to Mr. Pole’s guilt or innocence” at

trial. See Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 30-31.

     However, the Court’s review of the R. & R. does not

indicate that it is entirely permeated by the same error. For

                               51
example, in summarizing the details of Mr. Pole’s trial,

Magistrate Judge Faruqui writes that “Mr. Acree’s main defense

was that Mr. Pole believed he had the [implicit] authority to

spend the budget down to zero.” Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). In

addition, the R. & R. discusses Mr. Acree’s good faith defense

strategy at trial, which aimed to show that Mr. Pole’s “specific

intent was not to steal,” but rather that he reasonably believed

he was “compl[ying] with what the Senator wanted.” 7 See id. at 9-

7 Mr. Pole challenges—in a footnote—Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s
rejection of Mr. Pole’s claim in his motion for a new trial that
Mr. Acree was ineffective for failing “to pursue a good-faith
defense . . . , including the failure to request a jury
instruction on good faith.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 30 n.6.
He objects to the R. & R.’s statement that “Mr. Acree’s strategy
at trial was to show that [Mr. Pole’s] specific intent was not
to steal, but rather to ensure the office complied with what the
Senator wanted[,]” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 9; as he argues if
evidence existed indicating that the Senator approved of Mr.
Pole’s actions, then “presumably the government would not have
tried this case[,]” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 30 n.6. The
Court is unpersuaded by this argument and agrees with the
reasoning behind Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s determination that
Mr. Acree’s defense “in essence was a good faith defense” that
sought to negate the specific intent elements of the charged
crimes, i.e., that Mr. Pole did not intend to defraud or steal
from the government. R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 10; Gov’t’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 142 at 8; see United States v. Pole, 741 F.3d 120, 124
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (explaining that Mr. Pole’s defense at trial
was “that he had implicit authority to spend down the budget”
and that he therefore lacked the requisite criminal intent). Mr.
Pole also objects to the R. & R.’s conclusion regarding the good
faith jury instruction but proffers no specific arguments as to
why it should be rejected. See Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 30
n.6. Because Mr. Pole “makes only conclusory or general
objections, [and] simply reiterates his original arguments” on
these points, the Court reviews this objection only for clear
error. Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Finding no
                                52
11. Furthermore, even though Mr. Pole argues that the R. & R.’s

repeated citations to testimony from the chiefs of staff that

Mr. Pole “did not have authority to issue spend-down bonuses”

was irrelevant to the actual issue, such testimony directly

speaks to the reasonableness of Mr. Pole’s beliefs regarding his

understanding of that authority. Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at

32. Thus, in many respects, the R. & R. properly assesses Mr.

Pole’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims against a

“backdrop” where the primary issue was whether Mr. Pole could

have reasonably believed that he had authority to spend down the

budget by awarding to himself and other staffers unapproved

bonuses. See Gov’t’s Resp., ECF No. 196 at 3 n.1.

     Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court

reviews de novo Mr. Pole’s objections to Magistrate Judge

Faruqui’s conclusions that Mr. Acree was not ineffective for not

using and introducing into evidence: (1) unredacted budget

memoranda; and (2) employment history transcripts. See R. & R.,

ECF No. 193 at 20-24. Mr. Pole argues that Mr. Acree’s failure

to use both the unredacted budget memoranda and the employment

history transcripts was prejudicial to his defense “that he

genuinely believed he had authority to spend-down the surplus by

error, the Court ADOPTS the portion of the R. & R. pertaining to
Mr. Pole’s good faith defense argument. See R. & R., ECF No. 93
at 9-12.
                               53
issuing extra bonuses” without prior authorization. Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 32. The Court addresses this argument in

relation to these two forms of evidence in turn below.

                 a. Mr. Pole’s Unredacted Budget Memoranda

     In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Pole argues that Mr.

Acree was ineffective in failing “to obtain and use during

trial” Mr. Pole’s unredacted budget memoranda that showed he

“continuously and accurately informed the chiefs of staff about

budget surpluses.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 20. He states

that while on the stand, he “testified that he routinely

informed his supervisors about high budget surpluses,” and that

these memoranda would have substantiated this testimony, as they

“put the budget surplus numbers front and center for [the

jury’s] attention.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 11, 17.

However, as Mr. Pole states, he was prevented by the Court,

following an objection from the government, from testifying to

the contents of the memoranda, which were “heavily redacted,

including with respect to the surplus numbers.” Id. at 11-12.

     Mr. Pole similarly argued on appeal to the D.C. Circuit

that this Court erred in refusing “to permit him to testify

about the contents of certain [redacted] budget memos.” Pole,

741 F.3d at 124. The D.C. Circuit set the stage for this

argument as follows:

                               54
          The issue arose when [Mr.] Pole testified that
          he ‘let Ms. Cahill know that the surplus
          numbers were high [in fiscal year 2002].’
          Trial Tr. 67 (Jan. 26, 2011 Afternoon
          Session). Noting that some budget memos he
          sent [Ms.] Cahill had been entered into
          evidence, [Mr.] Pole then attempted to testify
          that the ‘place where I traditionally would
          put [the projected surplus] number is redacted
          so it’s hard to see.’ Id. The government
          objected, arguing that [Mr.] Pole should not
          be allowed to testify about redacted contents.
          Sustaining the objection, the district court
          stated only that the redacted contents are
          ‘not a part of the evidentiary record.’ Id. at
          68-69.

Id. at 125. This Court then twice instructed the jury that the

information beneath the redactions “ha[d] nothing to do with

this case.” Trial Tr. (Jan. 26, 2011), ECF No. 87 at 69:12-17,

70:6-10. Mr. Pole alleges that Mr. Acree did not object to this

instruction or “attempt to introduce unredacted memos[,]” and

that before trial, Mr. Acree stipulated to the government’s use

of the redacted budget memoranda and instructions to the jury to

disregard the redactions. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 21; Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 12; R. &. R., ECF No. 193 at 5.

     Mr. Pole argues that “[t]he evidence beneath the

redactions,” including those which covered the budget surplus

amounts, “was material, exculpatory, and should have been

admitted into evidence” because he contends that they were

“crucial” to his claims that the chiefs of staff were “informed

of surpluses, failed to spend them, and that [Mr.] Pole

                               55
concealed neither surpluses nor spend-down bonuses.” Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 21-22. However, during the evidentiary

hearing, Mr. Acree testified that he did not seek to admit

unredacted versions of the budget memoranda because he did not

view the budget surplus numbers “as a contested issue[.]”

Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 66:13-21. Mr. Acree

stated his belief that there was other evidence introduced at

the trial “that showed there was a budget surplus,” a fact which

the government was not disputing, and that “the whole crux of

[his] argument” was “not whether it was a surplus,” but rather

“Mr. Pole’s state of mind and [the] circumstances” surrounding

his understanding of his “authority or lack thereof . . . to

act” to spend down the budget by awarding unapproved bonuses.

See id. at 66:22-70:22. Mr. Acree further explained his belief

that “the documents were not our friend on the crux of . . . the

issue” and his strategy to try and focus the jury’s attention on

the central issue “as much as possible because the [documents]

didn’t speak favorably for us so much.” Id. at 70:18-22.

     Based on this testimony, the Court concludes that Mr.

Acree’s various decisions surrounding his alleged “failure” to

obtain and use Mr. Pole’s unredacted budget memoranda were

informed by strategic analysis. Mr. Acree correctly noted that

the central issue at trial was “not whether Mr. Pole kept the

chiefs of staff informed about the budget surplus numbers[,]” R.

                               56
& R., ECF No. 193 at 21; especially since the government did not

take the position “that there was not a surplus or that Mr. Pole

was spending beyond the budget itself[,]” Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7,

2022), ECF No. 188 at 69:18-21; but rather the issue was whether

Mr. Pole “reasonably believed he had authority to award himself

unapproved annual bonuses[,]” Pole, 741 F.3d at 127. As Mr.

Acree explained, his strategy was to deemphasize the documents

and focus on “Mr. Pole’s state of mind,” the “crux” of the case,

rather than present additional evidence on an undisputed point.

Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 70:7-22. Given the

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance[,]” the Court

concludes that Mr. Acree’s strategy was “sound,” “reasonable,”

and entitled to deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

     Mr. Pole nonetheless argues that Mr. Acree’s performance

was deficient because he alleges that the government’s objection

to Mr. Pole testifying about the redacted documents was based on

a false representation from the prosecutor “that she had never

seen what lay underneath the redactions,” when in fact “both the

government and trial counsel were in possession of unredacted

budget memos by the time of Mr. Pole’s trial[.]” Def.’s Objs.,

ECF No. 195 at 12, 32. Mr. Pole contends that had Mr. Acree done

a proper investigation, he would have known that his law firm

possessed and produced copies of the unredacted budget memoranda

                               57
to the government during discovery and therefore objected to the

prosecutor’s representation that she had not seen the material

beneath the redactions, instead of taking the prosecutor “at her

word,” see Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 34:10-22;

and stipulating to the instruction to the jury that they not

“speculate or concern themselves with the redacted information,”

Joint Request for Suppl. Jury Instruction, ECF No. 40 at 2; see

Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 32-33.

     Even assuming the truth of Mr. Pole’s claims that Mr. Acree

“missed” the unredacted budget memoranda, Def.’s Objs., ECF No.

195 at 33; the Court concludes that Mr. Pole has failed to

demonstrate that Mr. Acree’s performance was deficient. Mr.

Acree testified that his defense strategy, aimed at showing the

reasonableness of Mr. Pole’s understanding of his authority to

award unapproved bonuses, was focused less on using documents

such as the budget memoranda, which he generally viewed as

unfavorable to proving this issue, see Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7,

2022), ECF No. 188 at 70:7-22; and thus the Court deems it

logical—and strategic—that Mr. Acree devoted less time and

attention to such documents during his review of discovery and

preparation for trial, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 512 (concluding

that “‘strategic choices made after less than complete

investigation are reasonable’” when within the “‘limitations’”

placed on that investigation by “‘reasonable professional

                               58
judgments’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)); Dunn, 594

U.S. at 739 (acknowledging that “[d]efense lawyers have

‘limited’ time and resources” and must make “difficult” choices

when “choos[ing] from among ‘countless’ strategic options”

(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 106-07)). Thus, “even if there

is reason to think that counsel’s conduct ‘was far from

exemplary’” by not: (1) recognizing that his law firm was in

possession of the unredacted budget memoranda prior to trial;

(2) challenging the prosecutor’s representations on objection;

and (3) attempting to use the unredacted budget memoranda as

evidence, the Court “still may not grant relief [since] ‘[t]he

record does not reveal’ that [Mr. Acree] took an approach that

no competent lawyer would have chosen.” Dunn, 594 U.S. at 739

(quoting Burt, 571 U.S. at 23-24).

     Furthermore, even if Mr. Acree’s above strategic decisions

could be construed as “objectively unreasonable,” Mr. Pole’s

objection still fails because he cannot show prejudice to the

outcome of his trial from Mr. Acree’s failure to introduce into

evidence the unredacted budget memoranda. When the D.C. Circuit

remanded this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it noted

that “[h]ad [Mr.] Pole’s counsel introduced unredacted memos

demonstrating that [Mr.] Pole kept [Ms.] Cahill informed about

surpluses, the jury might have found [Mr.] Pole a more credible

witness.” Pole, 741 F.3d at 127. Mr. Pole points to this

                               59
language in his objection, arguing that it proves that there was

“no adequate substitute” for the unredacted budget memoranda as

evidence since “the D.C. Circuit presumably would not have

remanded in the first place.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 34,

36. The Court disagrees, since the D.C. Circuit remands

“colorable” ineffectiveness claims to the district court to make

necessary factual findings under a “forgiving standard,” which

thus does not mean that the remanding of a claim automatically

entitles Mr. Pole to relief. Pole, 741 F.3d at 126-27 (citing

Moore, 651 F.3d at 85, 87). As the D.C. Circuit stated: “To be

clear, we conclude only that [Mr.] Pole’s claims of ineffective

assistance are colorable, not that he has likely demonstrated

ineffective assistance. Indeed, the government offers several

plausible arguments suggesting that [Mr.] Pole has shown neither

error nor prejudice.” Id. at 127.

     Following a review of the record, the Court concludes that

Mr. Pole has failed to demonstrate that the unredacted budget

memoranda were indispensable pieces of evidence such that he was

prejudiced by their omission. First, on the topic of budget

surpluses, Mr. Pole “was allowed to testify that he kept chiefs

of staff informed about budgetary matters and in fact did

testify that he ‘let Ms. Cahill know that the surplus numbers

were high.’” Id. at 125; see also Trial Tr. (Jan. 26, 2011), ECF

No. 87 at 62:24-63:5, 66:14-67:17; Trial Tr. (Jan. 28, 2011),

                               60
ECF No. 89 at 22:19-23:2, 31:20-25. Mr. Pole’s testimony was

also corroborated by correspondence admitted at trial indicating

that he conveyed projected surplus numbers to the chiefs of

staff. See R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 22 (listing the government’s

trial exhibits 3, 6, 11, 27, 30, and 38 as examples of such

correspondence); Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at

67:11-69:9 (highlighting some of these exhibits during the

evidentiary hearing to show that they “project[ed] the fact that

there was a budget surplus in the office”). Thus, although the

unredacted budget memoranda may have additionally corroborated

Mr. Pole’s testimony, the record disproves his contention that

without them, “his ability to” prove that he reported surplus

numbers to his bosses “was significantly limited.” See Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 34, 36. The Court therefore agrees with

Magistrate Judge Faruqui that the unredacted budget memoranda

“did not differ in a substantial way—in strength and subject

matter—from the evidence actually presented at trial,” and that

their admission as evidence “would have been cumulative,”

thereby negating any prejudice to Mr. Pole. R. & R., ECF No. 193

at 21-22 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

     This conclusion is buttressed by the D.C. Circuit’s

conclusion on appeal that any error by this Court in refusing to

allow Mr. Pole to testify to the contents of the redacted budget

memoranda was “harmless” and “did not contribute to the verdict

                               61
obtained.” See Pole, 741 F.3d at 125 (concluding that “if the

jury found that [Mr.] Pole lacked credibility, it would have no

reason to believe his assertions about what lay under the

redactions; if the jury found [him] generally credible, it would

have learned nothing new from the excluded testimony” (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted)). The same finding is true

for the unredacted versions of the memoranda themselves, since

if the jury had found Mr. Pole to be generally credible, it

would have learned nothing new from the unadmitted, unredacted

memoranda, as Mr. Pole’s testimony on the budget surplus numbers

was already substantiated by other correspondence. And again,

because the main issue at trial was not whether Mr. Pole

“routinely and accurately informed the Chiefs of Staff that the

office was running substantial projected budget surpluses,” see

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 21; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 34;

but rather whether he reasonably believed he had authority to

spend down those surpluses by issuing himself unapproved

bonuses, Pole 741 F.3d at 127; the omission of the unredacted

budget memoranda could not be “extremely prejudicial” to Mr.

Pole’s defense, Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 32. 8

8 Mr. Pole adds a new argument in his objections that the R. & R.
ignores “testimony from chiefs of staff who testified that they
would’ve spent funds on other resources, had they known about
large surpluses[,]” and that the unredacted budget memoranda are
important because they show, contrary to this testimony, that
the chiefs of staff “did know about the surpluses[.]” Def.’s
                                62
                 b. Employment History Transcripts Reflecting
                    the Salary Histories of Former Employees of
                    Senator Kennedy’s Office

     Mr. Pole next argues in his motion for a new trial that Mr.

Acree “was ineffective in failing to demonstrate through the

available documentary evidence that [Mr.] Pole routinely issued

exit bonuses without specific Chief of Staff approval.” Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 22. He claims that this evidence should

have included employment history transcripts obtained from the

U.S. Senate following remand of his case from the D.C. Circuit,

which he contends “fully corroborate [his] testimony that exit

bonuses were [a] routine” office practice during his tenure and

“that Mr. Pole regularly issued them.” Id.; see Ex. 4 to Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139-4 at 1-36 (employment history transcripts for

various former employees of Senator Kennedy). As such, he argues

that the transcripts would have discredited the chiefs of staff

who sought to “downplay the practice of issuing exit bonuses”

and impeached their testimony that Mr. Pole “was not allowed to

issue exit bonuses.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 22. Mr. Pole

thus argues that these transcripts would have supported his

defense that he had a reasonable belief in his authority to

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 36. The Court does not consider this
argument, since, in the section of Mr. Pole’s motion for a new
trial regarding the unredacted budget memoranda, he did not
dispute that the chiefs of staff were “informed of surpluses[.]”
Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 21.
                               63
spend down the budget by awarding bonuses himself, and that Mr.

Acree’s failure to obtain and introduce them into evidence was

both objectively unreasonable and prejudicial. Id.; Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 36-38. As the D.C. Circuit stated in

remanding this “colorable” ineffectiveness claim: “Had [Mr.]

Pole’s counsel been able to demonstrate that [Mr.] Pole had

authority to issue exit bonuses without prior approval, [Mr.]

Pole might have avoided conviction on the wire fraud count

arising from his exit bonus and even convinced the jury that he

reasonably believed he had authority to award himself unapproved

annual bonuses.” Pole, 741 F.3d at 127.

     Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected these arguments because

he found that the employment history transcripts do not actually

show that Mr. Pole was the individual “responsible for issuing

any of the exit bonuses supposedly reflected therein[.]” Gov’t’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 20; see R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 23.

Following its own review of the employment history transcripts,

the Court agrees. The transcripts reflect the salary histories

for twenty-seven former Kennedy employees, including former

chiefs of staff Mr. Kavanaugh and Ms. Petroshius and former

Political Director Tracy Spicer (“Ms. Spicer”), all of whom were

government witnesses. See Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 37.

However, the Court agrees with the government that the

transcripts are unclear as to “what salary changes, if any, were

                               64
exit bonuses[,]” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 20 n.13; and only

reflect incremental salary changes associated with various dates

throughout the employee’s period of employment, see Ex. 4 to

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-4 at 1-36. The transcripts also do not

include Mr. Pole’s name, thus never specifically indicating that

if a certain number was meant to reflect an exit bonus, Mr. Pole

was the one who issued it, “let alone that he did so without

authorization from the [c]hief[s] of [s]taff.” Gov’t’s Opp’n,

ECF No. 142 at 20.

     Rather, the Court views the employment transcripts as

bolstering facts about Mr. Pole’s case that were not disputed at

trial. First, as the D.C. Circuit has noted, it was an office

practice in Senator Kennedy’s office, “condoned by the Senator

and chiefs of staff,” to award annual bonuses and exit bonuses

notwithstanding the official Senate ban. Pole, 741 F.3d at 123.

To do this, the “office would, with the Senator’s or chief of

staff’s approval, submit PAAs that increased an employee’s

salary for a period of time—two or three weeks or even a month—

sufficient to produce the intended [annual] bonus[,]” and to

award exit bonuses, employees were either kept on payroll for a

few weeks after their departure or “for an indefinite period at

a salary just high enough to cover the employee contribution for

Senate-subsidized health care.” Id. at 123-34. As such, there

was “no dispute that departure bonuses were awarded to certain

                               65
staff during [Mr.] Pole’s tenure[,]” Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142

at 20 n.14; see, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 20, 2011), ECF No. 83 at

109:22-116:17 (Ms. Cahill’s testimony); Trial Tr. (Jan. 24,

2011), ECF No. 85 at 97:3-12 (Ms. Petroshius’ testimony); R. &

R., ECF No. 193 at 23 (citing the government’s trial exhibit 42,

an email from Mr. Pole stating that Mr. Mogilnicki “signed off”

on two exit bonuses); Ex. 5 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-5 at 8

(reflecting a phone conversation between Mr. Mogilnicki and Ms.

Spicer in which Ms. Spicer said she received severance pay and

that “it had been done over the past 8-10 years, but there

wasn’t a formal policy”); which is only confirmed by reference

to the employment history transcripts if certain numbers in

those transcripts are taken to reflect exit bonuses, as Mr. Pole

contends, see Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 37.

     It was also not disputed that Mr. Pole was the employee

responsible for submitting the PAAs to the Senate Disbursing

Office, which would trigger payment of the salary raises or

bonuses. See Pole, 741 F.3d at 123-24. Rather, the central

dispute at trial was whether Mr. Pole reasonably believed he

could submit PAAs initiating the payment of bonuses without

prior authorization from the Senator or chiefs of staff. Id. at

124. Thus, although the employment history transcripts may show

that exit bonuses were a “routine” Kennedy office practice,

nothing in them details the proper authorization protocols for

                               66
such bonuses and who specifically could give authorization.

Instead, as the R. & R. states, the record evidence was

overwhelming in showing that “approval was needed from someone

at a higher level than Mr. Pole[,]” ECF No. 193 at 23; even if

there was some confusion among the chiefs of staff as to whether

that higher authority was themselves, Senator Kennedy, or both

given the lack of official or written policies on the bonus

procedure, see, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 85 at

98:6-17 (testimony from Ms. Petroshius indicating that “the

chief of staff and up the same chain-of-command” had authority

to approve departure bonuses while Mr. Pole did not); Trial Tr.

(Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82 at 8:3-8 (testimony from Mr.

Mogilnicki indicating that only the Senator and himself had

authority to approve bonuses); Trial Tr. (Jan. 20, 2011), ECF

No. 83 at 17:13-22, 103:22-104:5, 113:12-114:1 (equivalent

testimony from Mr. Kavanaugh and Ms. Cahill, who also explained

that Mr. Pole would provide her with suggested bonuses for

staffers that she would review and approve, in conjunction with

Senator Kennedy, before Mr. Pole “put the bonuses into practice

with the Senate Disbursing Office”).

     Therefore, the Court disagrees with Mr. Pole’s argument

that the employment history transcripts were “critical” to

corroborating his good faith defense because they do not speak

to who had authority to approve bonuses, only that such bonuses

                               67
occurred, which was not disputed by the chiefs of staff who

testified (and thereby the transcripts do not impeach their

testimony as Mr. Pole argues). See, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 20,

2011), ECF No. 83 at 17:13-28 (testimony from Mr. Kavanaugh

stating that he awarded bonuses to staffers when he was chief of

staff), Trial Tr. (Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 85 at 97:20-98:9

(testimony from Ms. Petroshius that it was “common practice”

when she was chief of staff to award departure bonuses through

the appropriate “chain-of-command”).

     Accordingly, the Court concludes that, in conjunction with

Mr. Acree’s above-delineated strategy to focus less on the

documents themselves and more on proving Mr. Pole’s “state of

mind,” Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 70:5-22;

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 20 (contending that there is no

admissible documentary evidence in existence that proves Mr.

Pole “had the authority” to issue unapproved bonuses); Mr.

Acree’s alleged “failure” to obtain and use the employment

history transcripts was neither deficient performance nor

prejudicial to the outcome of Mr. Pole’s trial. Mr. Acree did

elicit testimony from Mr. Pole that during his employment with

Senator Kennedy’s office, he routinely issued exit bonuses

without specific approval, see, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 28, 2011),

ECF No. 89 at 72:3-23; and while the employment transcripts may

have bolstered this testimony to a degree, their contents do not

                               68
specifically corroborate Mr. Pole’s statements that he was the

employee who both issued and authorized any bonuses contained

therein, i.e., without approval from any higher office

authority. Because Mr. Pole has not met his burden in showing a

reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted on the

wire fraud count arising from his exit bonus had the employment

history transcripts been introduced as documentary evidence, see

Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 37-38; the Court concludes that

this ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail, see

United States v. Doost, 3 F.4th 432, 443-44 (D.C. Cir. 2021)

(stating that “[d]etermining how a hypothetical jury would have

analyzed additional evidence . . . ‘is inherently a speculative

exercise,’” and concluding that the defendant fell short of

“showing a reasonable probability that introducing” additional

documentary evidence “would have resulted in acquittal” on the

particular charge in question (citation omitted)).

             3. Mr. Acree Was Not Ineffective Because He Did Not
                Commit Any Errors with Cumulative Prejudicial
                Effect

     The Court turns to Mr. Pole’s final group of objections

centering on the R. & R.’s alleged failure “to consider the

cumulative effect of the numerous errors” allegedly committed by

Mr. Acree. Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 38. Specifically, Mr.

Pole argues that Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s rejection of his

claims that Mr. Acree was ineffective for failing to: (1)

                               69
impeach the testimony of Ms. Cahill and Ms. Petroshius; and (2)

call Mr. McCarthy as a witness, was improper because “each

individual error was ineffective,” and also “the cumulative

effect of those errors plainly warrants vacating [his]

conviction.” See id. at 38-45. “Viewing these alleged errors

cumulatively,” for the reasons discussed below, the Court

concludes that Mr. Pole “has not shown ‘a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s [alleged] errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’” Browne, 619 F. Supp. 3d

at 113 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

                 a. Failure to Impeach Mary Beth Cahill’s
                    Testimony

     As stated by the D.C. Circuit, Mr. Pole argues that Mr.

Acree should have “demonstrate[d] that [Ms.] Cahill,” a former

chief of staff, “instructed [Mr.] Pole to spend the budget to

zero, or [should have] impeach[ed] her testimony that she did

not do so.” Pole, 741 F.3d at 126 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Mr. Pole’s argument is based on an FBI

interview report indicating that Mr. Mogilnicki told the FBI

about certain conversations he had with Ms. Cahill. See Ex. 5 to

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-5 at 10. The report states that after

his meeting with Mr. Pole and Mr. Craig, Mr. Mogilnicki called

Ms. Cahill “to check [Mr.] Pole’s story.” Id. Mr. Mogilnicki

reported to the FBI that in this phone conversation, Ms. Cahill

                               70
told him that “she told [Mr.] Pole to zero out the budget, but

did not think she approved any of [Mr.] Pole’s extra bonuses.”

Id. Mr. Pole uses the first portion of Mr. Mogilnicki’s

statement to argue that Ms. Cahill’s “directive to [him to zero

out the budget] was never elicited from [her] at trial.” Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 22. He contends that this was “an extremely

damaging omission by” Mr. Acree because it undermined his good

faith defense and caused a missed opportunity for both

impeachment of Ms. Cahill and corroboration of his statement to

Mr. Mogilnicki and Mr. Craig in their January 26, 2007 meeting

that it was Ms. Cahill who told him to spend down the budget.

Id. at 22-23 (citing Mr. Craig’s testimony, Trial Tr. (Jan. 25,

2011), ECF No. 86 at 57:18-24, 60:2-10).

     Although the D.C. Circuit concluded, in remanding this

“colorable” ineffectiveness claim, that “had [Mr.] Pole’s

counsel successfully impeached [Ms.] Cahill . . . , [Mr.] Pole

might have undermined [her] testimony that he needed [Ms.

Cahill’s] approval before making salary adjustments[,]” Pole,

741 F.3d at 127; following his review of the record, Magistrate

Judge Faruqui rejected this claim for lack of deficient

performance and prejudice, see R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 18-19.

The substance of Mr. Pole’s objection to this conclusion raises

proper, specific arguments against the R. & R.’s findings, so

the Court reviews this objection de novo. See LCvR 72.3(b).

                               71
     During Mr. Pole’s trial, Ms. Cahill testified that she

never told “Mr. Pole that he could spend down the budget without

checking with [her]” or “that he had the authority to spend down

the budget on his own.” Trial Tr. (Jan. 21, 2011), ECF No. 84 at

47:16-21 (emphasis added). In the R. & R., Magistrate Judge

Faruqui summarized this testimony by stating that Ms. Cahill

“testified that while she may have asked Mr. Pole to spend the

budget down to zero, she never permitted him to do so alone and

without approval.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 18 (emphasis added).

After comparing this testimony that Ms. Cahill never instructed

Mr. Pole to spend down the budget “on his own” with Mr.

Mogilnicki’s statement in the FBI report that Ms. Cahill only

told Mr. Pole “to zero out the budget,” Magistrate Judge Faruqui

concluded that “the two statements were consistent” and that

“impeachment was unnecessary,” and as a result Mr. Acree’s

“strategic choice[]” to not impeach Ms. Cahill was “not

deficient.” Id. However, Mr. Pole argues that Magistrate Judge

Faruqui’s characterization of Mr. Acree’s failure to impeach Ms.

Cahill as “strategic” is “misplaced” because during the

evidentiary hearing, Mr. Acree was never asked about “his

decision not to impeach Ms. Cahill” and only generally testified

about his overall impeachment “strategy.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No.

195 at 40. As such, Mr. Pole contends that without any specific

testimony from Mr. Acree on the issue, Mr. Acree’s inaction in

                               72
regard to impeaching Ms. Cahill is not entitled to deference as

a “strategic” choice. Id.

     Based on the evidentiary hearing transcript, the Court

agrees with Mr. Pole that there is not sufficient evidence in

the record to determine that Mr. Acree’s failure to impeach Ms.

Cahill was a strategic decision. Mr. Acree only testified about

his general “strategy for impeaching witnesses,” which is to

impeach when “in the end it’s helpful,” as opposed to when it

“might do more harm than good” or “might highlight a bad fact.”

See Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 62:12-64:4.

However, even assuming, as Mr. Pole contends, that Mr. Acree was

deficient for failing to investigate and prepare for impeaching

Ms. Cahill, see Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 40-41; for the

below reasons, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s

conclusion that “there was no prejudice to Mr. Pole” in this

regard, R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 18.

     The Federal Rules of Evidence provide procedures governing

how to attack the credibility of witnesses, including by using a

witness’s prior inconsistent statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 607,

613; United States v. Stock, 948 F.2d 1299, 1301 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (“One may impeach a witness by asking him about prior

inconsistent statements.”). “It is the well settled rule in this

circuit that a prior inconsistent statement used to impeach a

witness is admissible solely to affect credibility of the

                               73
witness and is not to be considered as support for the truth of

its contents.” United States v. Gilliam, 484 F.2d 1093, 1096

(D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d

1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“[P]rior inconsistent statements

are admissible only for impeachment purposes, not as substantive

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and the jury

should be instructed to this effect.”). “Prior statements that

omit details covered at trial are inconsistent if it would have

been ‘natural’ for the witness to include them in the earlier

statement.” Stock, 948 F.2d at 1301.

     Here, the Court concludes that Ms. Cahill’s testimony is

not sufficiently inconsistent with the prior statement she

allegedly made in a phone conversation with Mr. Mogilnicki, such

that had Mr. Acree attempted impeachment, it would have been

unsuccessful. Ms. Cahill testified that she told Mr. Pole to

spend down the budget but not on his own and without checking

with her first. See Trial Tr. (Jan. 21, 2011), ECF No. 84 at

47:16-21. According to Mr. Mogilnicki in his statement to the

FBI, Ms. Cahill told him that she told Mr. Pole “to zero out the

budget” but that she did not “approve[] any of [Mr.] Pole’s

extra bonuses.” Ex. 5 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-5 at 10. Not

only does this statement by Ms. Cahill in the FBI’s report

qualify as “triple hearsay,” see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at

21; but also, it does not differ substantially from her

                               74
testimony during trial, as Ms. Cahill indicated in both

instances that she instructed Mr. Pole to spend down the budget

but not without approval. Thus, the Court does not conclude that

there was an “unnatural” or crucial omission or contradictory

detail in Ms. Cahill’s statements on the stand that might lead a

reasonable jury to conclude that her prior statement referenced

in the FBI report was inconsistent with her trial testimony, and

that she was therefore a less credible witness. See Stock, 948

F.2d at 1301. As such, there was no value in impeaching Ms.

Cahill in this way, nor could it have established the truth of

Mr. Pole’s contention that Ms. Cahill in fact instructed him to

spend the budget down to zero. See Wright, 489 F.2d at 1187. Mr.

Pole is therefore incorrect that impeaching Ms. Cahill’s

testimony would have substantively “corroborated Mr. Pole’s

testimony that he understood it was his responsibility to spend

down the budget and that he did not need [Ms. Cahill’s]

permission to award bonuses as part of doing so.” Def.’s Objs.,

ECF No. 195 at 41.

     Based on this analysis, and Mr. Mogilnicki’s and Ms.

Petroshius’ consistent testimony to that of Ms. Cahill that Mr.

Pole was not authorized to issue bonuses “on his own” without

their approval, see, e.g., Trial Tr. (Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 82

at 8:3-8, 30:19-20; Trial Tr. (Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 85 at

4:21-5:7, 40:3-25, 93:12-17; the Court concludes that there is

                               75
no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a

different result had Mr. Acree impeached Ms. Cahill’s testimony

with her alleged statements referenced in the FBI report. 9

                 b. Failure to Impeach Danica Petroshius’
                    Testimony

     Mr. Pole next objects to the R. & R.’s conclusions that Mr.

Acree was not ineffective for failing to impeach Ms. Petroshius,

another former chief of staff, by: (1) calling Ms. Kruse “to

impeach Ms. Petroshius’ testimony that Mr. Pole needed her

approval to issue bonuses; and (2) using a memorandum Mr. Pole

sent to [Ms. Petroshius] informing her that the projected

surplus was over $200,000 and that there would be money left

over[.]” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 41. The substance of Mr.

Pole’s objections to these conclusions raises proper, specific

arguments against the R. & R.’s findings, so the Court reviews

each of these two arguments de novo. See LCvR 72.3(b).

9 In his motion for a new trial, Mr. Pole raises two ineffective
assistance of counsel claims regarding Ms. Cahill—that Mr. Acree
should have: (1) called her as a defense witness; and (2)
impeached her testimony while she was on the stand as a witness
for the government. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 22-23. Mr.
Pole does not challenge Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s conclusion
that it was “sound trial strategy” to not call Ms. Cahill as a
defense witness, so the Court ADOPTS that portion of the R. & R.
See ECF No. 193 at 19.
                                76
                          i. Failure to Call Kathleen Kruse to
                             Impeach Danica Petroshius

     Mr. Pole argues in his motion for a new trial that Mr.

Acree should have called Ms. Kruse as an impeachment witness “to

demonstrate that she informed [Ms.] Petroshius [that] she had

received a bonus of either $15,000 or $17,800, as indicated by a

memorandum of her FBI interview the government produced in

discovery.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 23 (citing Ex. 7 to

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-7 at 2-3). He contends that Ms. Kruse’s

testimony would have impeached Ms. Petroshius “on the critical

issue of whether she knew of high year-end bonuses.” Id. at 23-

24. Although the D.C. Circuit concluded, in remanding this

“colorable” ineffectiveness claim, that “had [Mr.] Pole’s

counsel successfully impeached . . . [Ms.] Petroshius, [Mr.]

Pole might have undermined [her] testimony that he needed [Ms.

Petroshius’] approval before making salary adjustments[,]” Pole,

741 F.3d at 127; Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected this claim

because he concluded that impeachment was “immaterial” in this

situation, and that Mr. Acree’s “decision not to impeach” Ms.

Kruse was a “strategic choice . . . entitled to substantial

deference[,]” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 20 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). For the reasons explained below, the

Court agrees with the former but not the latter R. & R.

                               77
conclusions, even though it ultimately agrees with Magistrate

Judge Faruqui that this ineffectiveness claim must fail.

     At trial, Ms. Petroshius testified that all bonuses needed

to be approved by the proper “chain-of-command,” and that Mr.

Pole could not issue bonuses, including exit bonuses, “without

getting the approval of the chief of staff.” Trial Tr. (Jan. 24,

2011), ECF No. 85 at 98:6-17. During her testimony, Ms.

Petroshius was asked about a particular employee of Senator

Kennedy’s office, Ms. Kruse, and she described how Ms. Kruse’s

salary had been historically low despite her long tenure, value,

and seniority at the office, and how she worked with Ms. Kruse

to increase her salary over a period of years to get it “more in

line with [that of] other senior staff.” See id. at 32:24-33:15,

128:2-8. Although Ms. Petroshius was never asked whether she

knew if Ms. Kruse had received a “high year-end bonus[],” Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 23-24; Mr. Pole argues that a memorandum

from the FBI’s interview with Ms. Kruse could have impeached Ms.

Petroshius’ testimony, as it states that Ms. Kruse “remembered

having one conversation with Danica Petroshius . . . about a big

bonus and a raise” that she received in 2003, see Ex. 7 to

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-7 at 3.

     The Court rejects Mr. Pole’s argument, as it does not find

any inconsistent statements between Ms. Petroshius’ testimony

and what Ms. Kruse told the FBI regarding her conversation with

                               78
Ms. Petroshius. First, contrary to Mr. Pole’s claims, the FBI

memorandum does not make it “clear that the bonuses the FBI was

asking” Ms. Kruse about were ones allocated and approved by Mr.

Pole, Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 192 at 42-43; as the cited portion

of the report only indicates that Ms. Kruse and Ms. Petroshius

discussed “a big bonus and a raise[,]” Ex. 7 to Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 139-7 at 3. This aligns with Ms. Petroshius’ testimony that

she “sat down with [Ms. Kruse] and worked out” a way for her to

receive “significant [salary] increases to get her more in line

with other senior staff.” Trial Tr. (Jan. 24, 2011), ECF No. 85

at 33:12-15. Thus, because Ms. Petroshius never testified that

she did not approve bonuses or salary increases for Ms. Kruse

“over a period of years,” id. at 33:14; the extrinsic evidence

cannot undermine any testimony from Ms. Petroshius “that she did

not know about bonuses being awarded” from Mr. Pole “that she

had not approved[,]” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 192 at 42 n.8.

     Moreover, “Ms. Petroshius never denied being told about Ms.

Kruse’s bonus[.]” ECF No. 193 at 20. In fact, she was never

asked to testify about her knowledge of any specific year-end

bonuses that Ms. Kruse may have been awarded. Therefore, her

testimony does not contradict any proffered testimony from Ms.

Kruse regarding the FBI’s report; rather, the report bolsters

Ms. Petroshius’ testimony, as it indicates that Mr. Pole told

Ms. Kruse “that he would ask the Chief of Staff for a raise for

                               79
[Ms.] Kruse.” Ex. 7 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-7 at 3. Overall,

it would not have been feasible for Mr. Acree to use Ms. Kruse

to rebut or impeach Ms. Petroshius’ testimony regarding: (1)

“whether she knew of high year-end bonuses[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 139 at 23-24; and (2) “that Mr. Pole needed her approval to

issue bonuses[,]” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 41.

     Nor would Ms. Kruse’s potential testimony have served any

other purpose since it could only be used to impeach Ms.

Petroshius and could not be “treated as having any potential

substantive or independent testimonial value.” United States v.

Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Instead, the

Court views Ms. Kruse’s testimony as irrelevant because it does

not speak to the central issue at trial—whether Mr. Pole

reasonably believed he had authority to award bonuses without

approval from a higher authority—particularly when none of the

charges against Mr. Pole stemmed from any bonus Ms. Kruse may

have received. See United States v. Marshall, 935 F.2d 1298,

1300 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring impeachment evidence to bear on

“a material disputed issue at trial” and be “inconsistent” with

the relevant testimony); Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 23.

     Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Acree’s

performance was not deficient, nor was Mr. Pole prejudiced in

Mr. Acree’s failure to call Ms. Kruse to impeach Ms. Petroshius’

testimony. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court

                               80
rejects the R. & R.’s conclusion that Mr. Acree’s “decision not

to impeach” Ms. Petroshius was “strategic,” see R. & R., ECF No.

193 at 20; as there is no record evidence that Mr. Acree

specifically considered impeaching Ms. Petroshius with Ms.

Kruse’s testimony related to the FBI’s memorandum. Nonetheless,

for the reasons stated above, Mr. Pole’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim centering on Ms. Kruse must fail because there

is no reasonable probability that using her as an impeachment

witness would have changed the outcome of his trial. 10

                          ii. Failure to Impeach Danica
                              Petroshius with a Budget
                              Memorandum

     Mr. Pole next argues in his motion for a new trial that Mr.

Acree should have impeached Ms. Petroshius by questioning her

about an undated budget memorandum that she received from Mr.

Pole advising her that the office’s projected surplus was over

$200,000, with “money left over” after “giv[ing] out as much of

10Mr. Pole repeatedly cites Smith v. Wainwright, 799 F.2d 1442,
1444 (11th Cir. 1986) for the contention that “failure to
impeach key government witness[es] with prior inconsistent
statement[s] [is] prejudicial error.” See Def.’s Objs., ECF No.
195 at 40-43. However, the Court concludes that Smith is
inapposite here because: (1) Mr. Pole did not similarly identify
inconsistencies between earlier statements allegedly made by Ms.
Cahill or Ms. Petroshius and their testimony at trial; and (2)
unlike here, in Smith, “the only way for the defendant to
prevail would have been successfully to impeach” the witness, as
his conviction “rested upon” the witness’s testimony, so the
fact that prior inconsistent statements were not disclosed to
the jury was prejudicial error. 799 F.2d at 1444.
                                81
[the office’s] surplus as bonuses as possible.” Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 139 at 24; Ex. 8 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-8 at 2-3. He

further informed Ms. Petroshius in the memorandum that “[i]t

would be ideal to decide on dollar amounts and who will be

getting bonuses no later than mid-month[,]” which would

“maximize [his] ability to spend down the money efficiently.”

Ex. 8 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-8 at 2. Mr. Pole contends that

had Mr. Acree sought to impeach Ms. Petroshius’ testimony with

this extrinsic evidence, “it would have supported [Mr.] Pole’s

defense that he did not conceal spend-down bonuses from the

Chiefs of Staff[.]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 24; Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 43. Because the Court has reviewed de novo

Mr. Pole’s similar objection regarding Mr. Acree’s failure to

use and introduce into evidence unredacted budget memoranda, it

does the same de novo review here.

     As with the unredacted budget memoranda, the Court notes

that the central issue at trial was not whether Mr. Pole kept

the chiefs of staff informed about budget surpluses and spend-

down bonuses, but rather whether he reasonably believed he could

spend down the budget by awarding such bonuses without theirs or

the Senator’s approval. See Pole, 741 F.3d at 127. The Court

agrees with Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s finding that this budget

memorandum does “not show that Mr. Pole was authorized to spend

down the budget without [Ms. Petroshius’] approval.” R. & R.,

                               82
ECF No. 193 at 22; see also Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 24

(arguing that this memorandum “contains no evidence that [Mr.]

Pole informed [Ms.] Petroshius about spend-down bonuses he

issued without her approval”). To the contrary, the memorandum

supports the government’s position that Mr. Pole lacked

authority to issue bonuses on his own and that he knew so. For

example, Mr. Pole appears to be asking for Ms. Petroshius’

approval in “decid[ing] on dollar amounts and who will be

getting bonuses” from the budget surplus by “no later than mid-

month.” Ex. 8 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-8 at 2. As the

government notes, and the Court agrees, Mr. Pole uses language

throughout the memorandum seemingly acknowledging “that he

cannot single-handedly make decisions about bonuses[,]” Gov’t’s

Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 24 (emphasis in original); such as Mr.

Pole “recommend[ing]” that Ms. Petroshius look at historical

bonus patterns in discerning present bonus numbers, asking her

to make “a decision on bonuses by July 15th,” requesting that he

and Ms. Petroshius “discuss ways that we may spend down any

additional surplus,” and advising her to “be aware” of certain

concerns “if [she was] planning a larger bonus” for certain

employees, Ex. 8 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139-8 at 2-3.

     Given the damaging effects this document could have had on

Mr. Pole’s good faith defense, the Court concludes that Mr.

Acree’s failure to question Ms. Petroshius about this memorandum

                               83
as a means of impeachment was not deficient performance, nor

prejudicial to the outcome of the jury’s verdict in Mr. Pole’s

trial. Instead, the information contained in the memorandum

supports viewing Mr. Acree’s decisions to generally deemphasize

the documents in Mr. Pole’s case as “strategic” and as a means

of “sound trial strategy.” Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No.

188 at 70:7-22; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

                 c. Failure to Call James McCarthy as a Witness

     Finally, Mr. Pole argues in his motion for a new trial that

Mr. Acree should have called Mr. McCarthy, a former co-worker of

Mr. Pole, to testify as a witness since he previously told the

FBI in an interview that he received an $11,000 bonus in 2006

that was processed by Mr. Pole even though Mr. McCarthy “was not

close with [Mr.] Pole and did not consider [Mr.] Pole a friend.”

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 23; see Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 139-6 at 2-3 (explaining to the FBI that Mr. McCarthy “would

have been surprised if [Mr.] Mogilnicki didn’t approve [Mr.]

McCarthy’s 2006 bonus because [Mr.] Pole would have been the

last person to do [Mr.] McCarthy a favor”). Mr. Pole contends

that Mr. McCarthy would have testified to this effect, which he

argues would have undermined the government’s arguments that Mr.

Pole acted in bad faith by only awarding bonuses to himself and

his close friends at the office. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 23.

                               84
     The Court reviews Mr. Pole’s objection to the R. & R.’s

conclusion that Mr. Acree was not ineffective for not calling

Mr. McCarthy as a witness for clear error because Mr. Pole only

reiterates his original arguments that Magistrate Judge Faruqui

considered and rejected. Houlahan, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 88;

compare Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 23 (arguing that Mr.

McCarthy’s “testimony would have severely undermined a central

tenet of the government’s case, i.e., that [Mr.] Pole only

awarded bonuses to his friends at the office”), with Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 44-45 (calling Mr. McCarthy’s testimony

“crucial evidence” for negating “the government’s very theory of

this case that [Mr.] Pole allocated bonuses to himself and his

friends only” and arguing that “given the centrality of this

theory to the government’s case[,] . . . failure to call [Mr.]

McCarthy was ineffective assistance”).

     The Court’s review of the R. & R. indicates that it

mischaracterizes Mr. Acree’s testimony from the evidentiary

hearing. The R. & R. states that “Mr. Acree concluded that

whether Mr. Pole only awarded bonuses to his friends did not

affect the legality of the bonus.” ECF No. 193 at 17 (citing

Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF No. 188 at 71-72). However, the

cited portion of the evidentiary hearing does not match this

statement, and the transcript indicates that Mr. Acree was never

specifically asked whether he considered calling Mr. McCarthy as

                               85
a witness. Instead, when asked about his “strategy with respect

to which witnesses to call to testify,” Mr. Acree responded that

he “take[s] into account the totality of the testimony, not just

the part that [he] want[s] to get out” and that he tries to be

“protective” in anticipating any harmful testimony that might be

elicited on cross-examination. Hearing Tr. (Apr. 7, 2022), ECF

No. 188 at 71:2-16, 72:14-19. Based on that strategy and his

“best judgment,” Mr. Acree testified that “it didn’t come to

mind for [him] that there [were any] witness[es] beyond the ones

that [he] called that [he] felt comfortable in putting on the

stand.” Id. at 71:12-22. This reflective statement presumably

extends to Mr. McCarthy, thereby negating Mr. Pole’s argument

that Mr. Acree failed to consider calling Mr. McCarthy. See

Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 43-45.

     Therefore, despite the R. & R.’s mischaracterization of Mr.

Acree’s testimony, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge

Faruqui that Mr. Acree’s testimony supports concluding that he

made “‘strategic decision[s]’” regarding which witnesses to

call, decisions which are to be afforded “‘great deference’” by

the Court. R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 16-17 (quoting United States

v. Campbell, No. 92-cr-0213, 2004 WL 5332322, at *14 (D.D.C.

Sept. 1, 2004) (citing United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795,

813 (7th Cir. 1993)), aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 463 F.3d

1 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). And, even if Mr. Acree wholly failed to

                               86
investigate Mr. McCarthy as a potential witness, see Campbell,

2004 WL 5332322, at *14 (“Failure to interview potential

witnesses in the entirety is not a strategy decision . . . and .

. . may give rise to a claim for ineffective assistance.”); Mr.

Pole cannot show that having Mr. McCarthy testify would have

produced a different trial result. As the government notes, Mr.

McCarthy could not testify to Mr. Pole’s view of their

relationship, Mr. Pole’s beliefs regarding his authority to

award bonuses, or even if his bonus was awarded without Mr.

Mogilnicki’s authorization. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at

22. To the contrary, Mr. McCarthy’s statement to the FBI

demonstrates his belief that Mr. Mogilnicki was aware of and

approved the bonus he received. See Ex. 6 to Def.’s Mot., ECF

No. 139-6 at 2-3 (telling the FBI that Mr. McCarthy remembered

thanking Mr. Mogilnicki for his 2006 bonus and that he “would

have been surprised” if Mr. Mogilnicki did not approve his

bonus). Thus, it appears likely that Mr. McCarthy’s potential

testimony would have indicated that his bonus was not an

unauthorized action by Mr. Pole, and therefore, it would not

have been relevant to whether Mr. Pole reasonably believed he

had authority to issue himself and others (friends or not)

unapproved bonuses. Accordingly, without any finding of

prejudice, the Court denies this ineffectiveness assistance of

counsel claim.

                               87
     Accordingly, because none of the individually alleged

actions, or inactions, by Mr. Acree constitute deficient errors

that prejudiced the outcome of Mr. Pole’s trial, the Court

rejects Mr. Pole’s argument that Magistrate Judge Faruqui

“failed to consider cumulative error.” See Def.’s Objs., ECF No.

195 at 38-39; Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 139 at 24-25. 11

       B. Magistrate Judge Faruqui Did Not Err in His Conclusion
          That the Court’s Original Restitution Order Can Be
          Confirmed

     Mr. Pole’s final objection is to the R. & R.’s conclusion

that the Court’s original $75,042.37 restitution order can be

confirmed. Compare R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 24-26, with Def.’s

Objs., ECF No. 195 at 45-46. Because Mr. Pole objects to

Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s determination that caselaw from this

circuit related to the calculation of restitution amounts,

specifically the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v.

11Mr. Pole argues that the totality of Mr. Acree’s errors caused
him “Strickland prejudice,” especially given “the closeness of
this case,” which he alleges is exemplified by two notes from
the jury during deliberations indicating that they were having
“difficulty reaching unanimity on all counts.” See Def.’s Mot.,
ECF No. 139 at 24; Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 14, 32. The
Court rejects Mr. Pole’s argument, as it does not view the
jury’s notes as evidence that “there is a reasonable likelihood
that [any] additional evidence counsel should have introduced
would have led the jury to” rule in his favor. Def.’s Mot., ECF
No. 139 at 24; cf. Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 25-26 (“The
evidence against [Mr.] Pole . . . was so overwhelming that even
if [Mr. Acree] had done everything [Mr.] Pole contends he should
have done, it would not have made a difference in the
outcome.”); Govt’s Resp., ECF No. 196 at 5.
                                88
Udo, 795 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015), is non-dispositive in the

instant case, the Court reviews this objection de novo.

     Following sentencing, the Court ordered Mr. Pole to pay the

government $75,042.37 in restitution—Mr. Pole’s “total gains

from all unauthorized bonuses he awarded himself,” $77,608.86,

“minus the small amount [Mr.] Mogilnicki managed to recover[,]”

$2,566.49. Pole, 741 F.3d at 124, 127; see J., ECF No. 102 at 5.

The total amount covered eight unapproved bonuses that Mr. Pole

issued to himself every year from 2003 to 2007 until he departed

Senator Kennedy’s office: $10,720.65 (2003 year-end); $3,000.00

(2003 holiday); $21,253.10 (2004 year-end); $9,007.37 (2004

holiday); $11,678.95 (2005 year-end); $11,526.48 (2005 holiday);

$8,026.48 (2006 year-end); and $2,395.83 (2006 holiday). R. &

R., ECF No. 193 at 25; Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 29 n.17.

Mr. Pole awarded himself all of these bonuses over this period

of three and a half years in the same manner—by issuing PAAs to

the Senate Disbursing Office to temporarily increase his salary

“by more or for longer than authorized by the Chiefs of Staff.”

Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at 30 (citing Gov’t’s Trial Exs. 11,

32, 39, 51, 53A-53L); R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 24 (citing Gov’t’s

Trial Exs. 53A-53N, 69).

     On appeal, Mr. Pole disputed the correct restitution

amount. He argued, as he does now, that he should only be

required to pay back $11,233.24, “the total gains from five

                               89
unauthorized bonuses underlying the counts of conviction minus

what [Mr.] Mogilnicki recovered.” Pole, 741 F.3d at 127; Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 139 at 26 n.7 (arguing that this is “the full

amount authorized by the Jury’s verdicts”). This argument stems

from the fact that although Mr. Pole’s indictment “alleged a

scheme to defraud dating from July 2003, the five-year statute

of limitations prevented the government from charging fraud for

wire transfers occurring prior to December 15, 2004.” Pole, 741

F.3d at 124. As a result, on appeal, the parties primarily

debated, “whether, under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act

[(“MVRA”)], 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, courts can order restitution for

all losses resulting from a scheme to defraud, where as here,

some of those losses occurred outside the statute of

limitations.” Id. at 127. However, the D.C. Circuit did not

reach this question because it concluded that the restitution

order was not supported by record evidence indicating that

either the jury or this Court had made factual findings to

support “a scheme to defraud extending to conduct outside the

statute of limitations[.]” See id. at 127-28. Accordingly, the

D.C. Circuit remanded the restitution order so the Court could

make “factual findings regarding the duration of [Mr. Pole’s]

scheme” to defraud the government that could support the

restitution order. See id. at 128-29.

                               90
     Magistrate Judge Faruqui did just that on remand, stating

that a court ordering restitution must “articulate a factual

basis for its restitution amount by pointing to evidence in the

record.” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 24 (citation omitted); see also

Pole, 741 F.3d at 129 (requiring restitution orders to “rest[]

on adequate findings” or “an adequate factual basis”). He cites

various government trial exhibits supporting the veracity of the

amounts of the eight unapproved bonuses that Mr. Pole awarded to

himself between 2003 and 2007, totaling over $77,000. See R. &

R., ECF No. 193 at 24-25 (citing Gov’t’s Trial Exs. 53A-53N, the

PAA forms Mr. Pole submitted between 2003 and 2007 detailing his

salary increases; Gov’t’s Trial Ex. 69, the government’s summary

chart of Mr. Pole’s unauthorized bonuses between those years).

Following a comparison of this record evidence, including

testimony from the chiefs of staff that they did not approve

these bonuses, to Mr. Pole’s indictment, see id. at 26 (citing

Indictment, ECF No. 1 at 2-10 ¶¶ 9-23); Magistrate Judge Faruqui

concluded that the eight improper bonuses were all “part of the

[same] scheme to defraud . . . for which Mr. Pole was charged

and convicted” and could “form[] the basis for the restitution

order.” See id. at 24-26 (concluding that the $75,042.37 total

amount “was attributable to the same underlying [unauthorized

bonus] scheme, and the [five] counts of wire fraud on which [Mr.

Pole] was convicted” (citation and internal quotation marks

                               91
omitted)). Mr. Pole does not object to Magistrate Judge

Faruqui’s factual findings and instead argues that the R. & R.’s

application of the law based on the MVRA to the facts is

incorrect. See Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 45-46. Accordingly,

the Court adopts the R. & R.’s factual findings regarding the

duration of Mr. Pole’s scheme and proceeds to analyze whether it

also correctly concludes that convictions for “scheme-based

offense[s],” like wire fraud, enable an award of restitution for

all losses resulting from that scheme, “regardless of whether

the defendant is convicted for each criminal act within the

scheme[.]” R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 25-26 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

     Mr. Pole argues that restitution must be limited to the

offenses on which he was convicted—the specific wires charged in

Counts One through Five—based on: (1) the MVRA, and (2) the D.C.

Circuit’s decision in Udo. Id. at 25. For the reasons discussed

below, the Court disagrees with both arguments.

             1. Where a Defendant Is Convicted of a Crime of
                Which a Scheme to Defraud Is an Element, the
                MVRA Requires Restitution in the Amount of Total
                Losses Incurred in the Course of the Scheme,
                Including Those That Occurred Outside the
                Statute of Limitations

     The MVRA states that a district court “shall order, in

addition to, . . . any other penalty authorized by law, that the

defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense.” 18

                               92
U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,

110 S. Ct. 1979, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1990), “the Supreme Court

held that where a defendant pleads guilty to a single count,

restitution under the Victims and Witness Protection Act

[(“VWPA”)] is limited to damage caused by that single count[,]”

United States v. Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d 176, 202 (D.D.C. 2012)

(citing Hughey, 495 U.S. at 420); i.e., “the loss caused by the

specific offense that is the basis of the offense of

conviction[,]” United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469, 473 (5th

Cir. 1995) (citing Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413). However, Congress

subsequently amended the VWPA and included identical changes

when it later enacted the MVRA, see Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d at

202; such that today, “[f]or ‘an offense that involves as an

element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity,’

the MVRA defines a victim entitled to restitution as ‘any person

directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the

course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern[,]’” United States

v. Parnell, 959 F.3d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2)). “Wire fraud is such an offense, requiring

a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ as an element of the crime.”

Id. at 540 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343); see also Pepper, 51 F.3d

at 473 (explaining that “a fraudulent scheme is an element” of

the offense of wire fraud). Ultimately, the MVRA requires that

courts order restitution “to each victim in the full amount of

                               93
each victim’s losses,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A); which raises

the question of whether that includes “all losses resulting from

a scheme to defraud, where . . . some of those losses occurred

outside the statute of limitations[,]” Pole, 741 F.3d at 127.

     Several courts of appeal to consider the issue have

concluded that “restitution under the MVRA encompasses losses

arising from criminal conduct in the course of a scheme,

including acts outside the statute-of-limitations period, as

long as those losses are attributable to the same underlying

scheme, and as long as some part of that scheme for which the

defendant was convicted occurred within the statute of

limitations.” Parnell, 959 F.3d at 540; see also United States

v. Ellis, 938 F.3d 757, 763-65 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that

the MVRA requires restitution “for all losses attributable to

[the defendant]’s scheme to defraud,” which in a wire fraud

case, includes conduct that was part of the scheme beyond the

five-year statute of limitations); United States v. Anieze-

Smith, 923 F.3d 565, 573 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.,

Garba v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 613, 205 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2019)

(reading the MVRA to conclude that “Congress intended the

district court to compensate victims of scheme-based crimes for

all losses incurred throughout the entire scheme,” which

includes “restitution for acts outside the reach of the

indictment”); United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1342

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(11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 937, 125 S. Ct. 343,

160 L. Ed. 2d 244 (2004) (“[W]here a defendant is convicted of a

crime of which a scheme is an element, the district court must,

under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, order the defendant to pay restitution

to all victims for the losses they suffered from the defendant’s

conduct in the course of the scheme, even where such losses were

caused by conduct outside of the statute of limitations.”);

United States v. Williams, 356 F. App’x 167, 170 (10th Cir.

2009) (same). 12 Thus, in these circuits, federal courts may order

restitution encompassing losses from an entire scheme to defraud

so long as the victims’ losses are a direct result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct or are “closely related to the

scheme, rather than tangentially linked.” Dickerson, 370 F.3d at

1342-43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see

also Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03 (citations omitted).

     In line with this caselaw, the Court concludes that

“although the statute of limitations may prevent the government

from charging [Mr. Pole] for acts that occurred outside the

12The government also cites several cases in which courts of
appeal have upheld restitution orders encompassing total losses
from multi-year schemes to defraud that fell partly outside of
the statute of limitations. See Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 142 at
27-28. The R. & R. incorporates many of these cases in support
of its conclusion that the MVRA requires restitution for the
eight improper bonuses that “were all part of the same scheme
for which Mr. Pole was charged and convicted.” See R. & R., ECF
No. 193 at 25-26.
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statute of limitations, it poses no bar to imposing restitution

under the MVRA for damages occurring from [his] full scheme.”

Anieze-Smith, 923 F.3d at 573. The Court therefore concludes

that $75,042.37 is the proper amount of restitution to be paid

by Mr. Pole, who was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud,

which includes as an element “a scheme . . . to defraud.” 18

U.S.C. § 1343. As demonstrated by the above factual findings,

the unapproved bonuses that fell outside of the five-year

statute of limitations were directly related to the fraudulent

transfers for which Mr. Pole was charged and convicted, as they

were accomplished in the same manner. $75,042.37 is therefore

“all attributable to the same underlying scheme” that Mr. Pole

conducted from 2003 to 2007 while working in Senator Kennedy’s

office and represents “the total amount of losses suffered by

the government over the course of” Mr. Pole’s fraudulent

unapproved bonuses scheme. Parnell, 959 F.3d at 540-41.

             2. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in United States v.
                Udo Does Not Bar Restitution in the Full Amount
                of Mr. Pole’s Entire Underlying Scheme to
                Defraud the U.S. Senate

     Lastly, Mr. Pole argues that the above analysis is

incorrect because he contends the D.C. Circuit’s decision in

United States v. Udo, 795 F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 2015) makes “clear”

that “‘uncharged relevant conduct’ . . . may not be a basis for

restitution.” Def.’s Objs., ECF No. 195 at 45 (citing Udo, 795

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F.3d at 33-34). Magistrate Judge Faruqui rejected this argument

and concluded that “Udo is factually distinct” because it

involves “a standalone offense”—preparing false tax returns—

rather than “a scheme-based offense” such as wire fraud, for

which Mr. Pole was convicted. R. & R., ECF No. 193 at 25. The

Court agrees with this conclusion. Mr. Udo was indicted and

convicted of “twenty-five counts of violating [Internal Revenue

Code] § 7206(2), which makes it a felony to ‘[w]illfully’ help a

taxpayer file a materially false tax return.” Udo, 795 F.3d at

27-28. Although the D.C. Circuit concluded that he could not be

ordered to pay restitution for “uncharged relevant conduct,”

i.e., “the losses generated from more than a dozen other returns

that [Mr.] Udo was not convicted of helping prepare[,]” id. at

34; this is not analogous to Mr. Pole’s case, as Internal

Revenue Code § 7206(2) does not include as an element a scheme

to defraud like wire fraud does in 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Thus, in

Udo, the D.C. Circuit never had an occasion to distinguish

between what Magistrate Judge Faruqui called “a standalone

offense” and “a scheme-based offense” like wire fraud involving

criminal conduct both within and outside of the relevant statute

of limitations. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Pole’s

reliance on Udo is misplaced, and that the amount of restitution

that Mr. Pole owes to the government, now supported by factual

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findings from the record, is $75,042.37, the total harm caused

by his fraudulent scheme.

  V.     Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART

Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s R. & R., see ECF No. 193; and DENIES

Mr. Pole’s Motion for a New Trial, see ECF No. 139. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

       Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
                 United States District Judge
                 February 23, 2024

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