Court Opinion

ID: 9965638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 22:04:19.915126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.081079
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                2024 IL App (4th) 240270-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                 FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                     May 2, 2024
                                         NO. 4-24-0270
not precedent except in the                                                     Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                               4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                 IN THE APPELLATE COURT                           Court, IL

                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )     Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )     Circuit Court of
           v.                                                )     McLean County
LAWRENCE DUSHON JOHNSON,                                     )     No. 24CF59
           Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                             )     Honorable
                                                             )     J. Jason Chambers,
                                                             )     Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
                Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2              Defendant, Lawrence Dushon Johnson, appeals the trial court’s order denying him

pretrial release under sections 110-6.1(a)(1) and 110-6.1(a)(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (6) (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public

Acts 101-652, § 10-255 and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial

Fairness Act. We affirm.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4              On January 17, 2024, the State charged defendant with three offenses based on

events occurring on August 6, 2023: unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)

(West 2022)), two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (id. § 24-1.6(a)(2)), reckless

discharge of a firearm (id. § 24-1.5(a)), and violation of the Firearm Owners Identification
(FOID) Card Act (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2022)).

¶5             On January 24, 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial

release under sections 110-6.1(a)(1) and 110-6.1(a)(6) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1),

(6) (West 2022)). The State alleged defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community.

¶6             That same day, a hearing was held on the State’s petition. At the hearing, the State

read a probable-cause statement. According to the statement, around 3:30 a.m. on August 6,

2023, Normal Police Department officers responded to gunfire on Lindell Drive. A large group

of people congregated for an outdoor block party. Multiple shooters were reported. Eight nearby

vehicles and three apartments were struck by bullets. Two individuals suffered gunshot wounds.

One was shot in the thigh. The other’s head was grazed by a bullet. On August 9, 2023, an

employee of Enterprise Rent-A-Car reported a Ford Escape, rented by Donald Wheatley, was

returned with bullet-hole damage. Wheatley reported he rented the vehicle for a friend, Kelsey

Voehgtly. We note Kelsey’s last name appears in the record as “Voehgtly” and “Voeghtly”. For

this disposition, we will use “Voehgtly”, as that is how the State spelled her name at the

detention hearing. On August 24, 2023, police talked to Voehgtly, who reported she was

intoxicated that night and did not remember much. She recalled going with defendant,

defendant’s girlfriend Caravina Jones, and Iyeshia Anderson to bars and then to a block party.

¶7             The State further reported the GPS for the rented Escape revealed the Escape

went to Voehgtly’s residence and then to defendant and Jones’s residence on North Golfcrest

Road. The Escape next went to Pub II in Normal, Illinois, around midnight, and then to Huck’s

and Cadillac Jack’s. Videos show defendant, Anderson, Jones, Voehgtly, and Ayesha Yacub

walking from the rented Escape into Pub II and then, around 12:30 a.m., into Cadillac Jack’s.

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The videos further show the Escape at North Golfcrest at 2 a.m. and at Lindell Drive just before

3:30 a.m., the time of the shootings. Shortly after 3:30 a.m., the Escape returned to defendant’s

residence.

¶8             According to the State, two anonymous callers identified defendant as a shooter.

One identified defendant as the first to fire shots. Several video cameras captured images of the

shooting. Around 3:30 a.m., defendant exited a car and walked west on Lindell Drive. Around

that time, several men with guns exited a Dodge on Lindell Drive. Gunshots were heard.

¶9             On October 26, 2023, defendant admitted to police he was with Jones and Yacub

on August 6. He confirmed they went to Cadillac Jack’s and he was on Lindell Drive when the

shooting occurred. Defendant reported at least 10 shooters. Defendant denied being one of them.

¶ 10           On November 9, 2023, Yacub informed police she was with defendant, Jones, and

Voehgtly on August 6, 2023. They went to Eric Too’s but left after an altercation. Defendant

learned people with whom he had an altercation at Eric Too’s were at a party on Lindell Drive.

Defendant told Yacub he was getting his gun and going to Lindell Drive. Yacub reported at least

400 people were outside. Yacub exited the vehicle first. Defendant exited with his gun. Yacub

watched defendant fire his gun, which she described as “large” and equipped with a light.

Defendant emptied the clip and returned to the car. The State asserted defendant was ineligible

for a FOID card due to his conviction for mob action in McLean County case No. 16-CF-748.

¶ 11           The State reported defendant had a criminal history, which included the

following: misdemeanor theft in 2004, misdemeanor attempted resisting a peace officer in 2006,

driving without a valid license in 2007, driving on a suspended license in 2015, driving with a

revoked license in 2023 (McLean County case No. 23-MT-1511), a Class 4 felony conviction in

2007 for resisting a peace officer, a Class 3 felony conviction in 2008 for aggravated battery, a

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federal conviction in 2010 for cocaine possession, a Class 4 felony conviction in 2016 for a mob-

action offense, misdemeanor domestic battery in 2018, fleeing or attempting to elude a peace

officer in 2019, and a misdemeanor in 2018 for driving under the influence. At the time

defendant allegedly committed the charged offenses, he was on pretrial release for McLean

County case No. 23-CF-967, aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer and

driving while license suspended.

¶ 12           In response, defense counsel proffered defendant was 35 years old and a resident

of McLean County for over 20 years. Defendant was employed full-time at Rivian and provided

for his mother and his seven children, five of whom resided with him. Defendant had medical

issues, including insomnia and grief. Ten of his family members had died in a span of two years.

Defense counsel reported defendant successfully completed the sentences imposed for his

offenses, including court supervision in multiple cases, prison sentences, and probation. Defense

counsel highlighted he was not on conditional discharge for the 2023 driving-while-license-

revoked conviction when the alleged offenses were committed in August 2023. Counsel

proffered the conditional discharge for that case began on September 14, 2023. Defendant had no

instances of failing to appear in two years.

¶ 13           In argument, defense counsel emphasized the State overlooked police reports that

indicated the video evidence shows only what “appears to be” defendant with what “appears to

be” a gun. In addition, after officers read defendant his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966)), defendant stated he did not understand but the interview continued without

an explanation of those rights. Defendant denied possessing a gun. Yacub had a motive to

implicate defendant as a shooter as she and defendant were previously in a relationship.

Defendant also volunteered in the community, operating a nonprofit organization, “Growth

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Peace Unity.”

¶ 14            In granting the State’s petition, the trial court found the State clearly and

convincingly proved the proof evident or presumption great defendant committed a detainable

offense. The court found the State sufficiently proved defendant was a real and present threat to

the named victims and to the community and the threat could not be mitigated with conditions.

The court based its findings “on the specific articulable facts of this case.” The court granted no-

contact orders with Yacub and Voeghtly.

¶ 15            Using a preprinted form, the trial court entered a written order finding the State

proved the dangerousness standard by clear and convincing evidence. Under “Less Restrictive

Conditions Ineffective,” the court checked boxes finding “Community/Individual safety cannot

be meaningfully achieved with available conditions of pretrial release,” “There is a high

likelihood that Defendant will commit new criminal offenses if granted pretrial release,”

“Defendant has access to, and likely would attempt to use, a dangerous weapon against others if

released,” and “Defendant has a history of *** thwarting/frustrating release/supervision

conditions.”

¶ 16            This appeal followed.

¶ 17                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18            On February 14, 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal challenging the order

denying him pretrial release under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

Defendant’s notice of appeal is a completed form from the Article VI Forms Appendix to the

Illinois Supreme Court rules (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023)), by which he asks this

court to grant him pretrial release. The form lists several possible grounds for appellate relief and

directs appellants to “check all that apply and describe in detail.” Defendant checked three

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grounds for relief and inserted language after these grounds. Defendant also filed a supporting

memorandum.

¶ 19           The first checked ground for relief is “The State failed to meet its burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions can

mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” On

the lines under the preprinted text, defendant wrote the following:

                       “The State proffered evidence that [defendant] was a threat

               to the safety of the community because of video footage and a

               witness’ statement. According to the police report, footage only

               appears to show that [defendant] was holding a firearm. It is not

               definitive that he was. The footage also does not show [defendant]

               discharging the item that appeared to be a firearm. The witness

               who provided a statement to police was in a relationship with

               [defendant] that he has now ended. Defense proffered that the

               witness’ statements may be motivated by wrong motives.”

In his supporting memorandum, defendant argues the State failed to explain why the threat could

not be mitigated by any conditions of release and the trial court failed to explain in writing or

orally why certain conditions of release could not mitigate the threat. Defendant further

maintains the State misrepresented defendant was on pretrial release when the offenses in this

case were committed and the court, when ordering defendant detained, improperly relied on that

misrepresentation. Defendant contends he was placed on pretrial release in McLean County case

No. 23-CF-967 on September 14, 2023, but the offenses charged in this case occurred on August

6, 2023.

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¶ 20           Under the Code, all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release.

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Before the State may overcome that presumption and secure

pretrial detention of a criminal defendant under the dangerousness standard, the State must prove

multiple factors by clear and convincing evidence. One such factor is no condition or

combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community. See id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). Recently, we reaffirmed that we review a trial

court’s decision and findings on pretrial-detention issues under the abuse-of-discretion standard.

People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶¶ 18-23, 35 (finding the manifest-weight-of-the-

evidence standard inappropriate for review of pretrial-detention orders).

¶ 21           We disagree with defendant’s argument the trial court did not explain its reasons

for finding the State clearly and convincingly proved no condition or combination of conditions

can mitigate the threat defendant poses to a person or persons or the community. At the hearing,

the court stated it made the finding “based on the specific articulable facts of this case.” In the

written order, under the following preprinted text stating, “Less restrictive conditions would not

avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person(s) or the community, *** for the

following reasons:” the court checked four boxes, including finding a high likelihood existed

defendant would commit new criminal offenses if granted pretrial release, defendant had access

to and would likely attempt to use a dangerous weapon against others, and defendant had a

history of “thwarting/frustrating release/supervision conditions.” Given defendant’s history,

which includes violent offenses and the prohibition against him possessing a firearm, and the

circumstances of the offense, in particular defendant’s decision to retrieve a weapon, follow

individuals with whom he had an altercation, and fire a weapon into a crowd of people, the

court’s conclusions find support in the record.

                                                  -7-
¶ 22           Defendant cites People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶¶ 17-18, and

further alleges the failure to discuss whether orders of protection, electronic monitoring, and

home detention would mitigate the threat defendant poses to the community renders the trial

court’s order of detention deficient. In Atterberry, we found the “totality of the trial court’s

comments compels the conclusion that the court failed to, and refused to, consider and apply the

proper statutory criteria.” Id. ¶ 16. This court mentioned the trial court’s failure to discuss

electronic monitoring only in support of the conclusion the trial court did not consider proper

criteria. Id. ¶ 17. The Atterberry court did not find the Code requires explicit consideration of

each statutory condition before finding mitigation of the threat cannot be achieved.

¶ 23           We also disagree with defendant’s claim the State misrepresented he violated

pretrial-release conditions when the alleged offenses were committed. The record shows

defendant was charged in 2023 with two offenses related to his not being licensed to drive. In

McLean County case No. 23-MT-1511, defendant was convicted of driving with a revoked

license. In McLean County case No. 23-CF-967, defendant was charged with aggravated fleeing

or attempting to elude a peace officer and driving with a suspended license. When defense

counsel proffered defendant was sentenced to conditional discharge on September 14, 2023, she

mentioned “conditional discharge” and the offense of driving with a revoked license and made

no mention of “pretrial release.” When the State proffered defendant was on pretrial release on

August 6, 2023, when the shootings occurred, the State referred to the driving with a suspended

license charge. Defendant, by making this argument on appeal, misinterpreted or misconstrued

the lower-court record. There is no evidence to contradict the State’s proffer defendant was on

pretrial release on August 6, 2023. Thus, in addition to the proffer showing defendant possessed

a weapon, despite being barred from doing so, there is proffered evidence defendant has a history

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of not complying with pretrial conditions.

¶ 24           Defendant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in finding the State

clearly and convincingly proved the threat could not be mitigated by any condition or

combination of conditions. See, e.g., Insurance Benefit Group, Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life

Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44, 91 N.E.3d 950 (stating the appellant bears the

burden of persuasion as to his or her claims of error).

¶ 25           Defendant’s second checked ground for relief is irrelevant. The second box

checked by defendant asserts the trial court erred in finding no condition or combination of

conditions would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance for later hearings or prevent him

from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. This argument applies to

appeals from orders revoking pretrial release under section 110-6(a) of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-6(a) (West 2022)). Defendant was detained under section 110-6.1 of the Code (see id.

§ 110-6.1(a), (e)(2)-(3)), which does not require the State prove this factor before obtaining an

order denying defendant pretrial release.

¶ 26           For his third argument, defendant, on his notice of appeal, provided additional

information under a box for “Other.” Defense counsel wrote the following:

                       “Defense proffered evidence concerning [defendant’s]

               statements. According [to] the disclosure provided, the police

               officer advised [defendant] of his Miranda rights before the

               interview began. [Defendant] indicated he did not understand.

               However, the interview continued. Pursuant to statute, while this

               may not rise to the level of suppression, this issue goes to the

               weight of the State’s evidence.”

                                                -9-
¶ 27           At the hearing, defense counsel raised this issue, and the trial court noted it agreed

it went to weight. The Miranda rights issue only applies to defendant’s statement placing himself

at the scene of the shooting. According to the State’s proffer, video evidence, GPS evidence, and

witness testimony placed defendant at the scene. The State proffered more than sufficient

evidence to satisfy its burden. Even if defendant could prove error, which he did not, we would

find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 28                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29           We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 30           Affirmed.

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