Court Opinion

ID: 9684729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:09:36.594193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:56.336021
License: Public Domain

Westermark, District Judge,
dissenting.
The child, Sandra Kay Houghton, involved in this action was born during wedlock. She is presumed to be the child of the defendant in this case unless the presumption is overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Nebraska recognizes this presumption of parentage. Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N. W. 2d 254. As recently as in 1963, Volume 10 Am. Jur. 2d was published. Under the title of “Bastards” section 11, page 852, we find the following rule: “While the former arbitrary rule has been relaxed so that the presumption of legitimacy of a child begotten or born in wedlock is now rebuttable by practical methods and substantial evidence, it remains one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known to the law, and the interests of society require that it be given effect unless overcome by the strongest sort of evidence, in the absence of which the presumption remains conclusive.”
The opinion adopted by the court holds that the findings of the pathologist, who conducted the blood tests that were made as shown by the opinion, were conclusive and by reason thereof were sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. In my opinion the evidence relating to the blood tests does not support such a conclusion nor does it support the conclusion that the *293presumption of legitimacy has been overcome by the strongest sort of evidence.
The courts seem to agree that before blood tests may be considered in determining nonpaternity the accuracy of the testing methods must be established. See 46 A. L. R. 2d 1005. In Beach v. Beach, 72 App. D. C. 318, 114 F. 2d 479, 131 A. L. R. 804, which was decided in construing a statute, the appellant alleged pregnancy caused by the defendant, which he denied. A child was born pending suit and the district judge, on motion of the defendant, ordered that the mother and child submit to blood grouping tests to compare with the blood of the defendant. The court said: “The value of blood grouping tests as proof of non-paternity is well known. On this point it is enough to cite the report of the American Medical Association’s Committee on Medicolegal Blood Grouping Tests, which shows that although such tests cannot prove paternity, and cannot always disprove it, they can disprove it conclusively in a great many cases provided they are administered by specially qualified experts.” (Emphasis supplied.) In 46 A. L. R. 2d 1005, we find the following statement: “As to the weight to which evidence consisting of blood grouping test results is entitled, the courts are divided. Some, but not all, have ruled that such results are conclusive on the question of paternity where they show nonpaternity and where the accuracy of the testing methods is established.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the pathologist who supervised the tests' admitted on cross-examination that one Doctor Philip Levine, who first discovered Rh antigen, in 1946 had written an article in the Journal of American Medicine headed, “Medico-Legal Application of Blood Grouping Tests”; and agreed with his statement in the article, “These tests have numerous pitfalls and accurate results can be obtained only by specialists with regular and continuous experience with these tests.” He further admitted that these tests were the first blood grouping *294tests to determine nonpaternity that he had supervised. By these admissions we have no assurance that the,tests conducted under his supervision carry the weight which are conclusive and which are sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
, The importance of .blood grouping tests and the necessity of obtaining accurate reports by competent experts has been a matter of consideration by the National Con-. ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It may be noted that in 1952 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity. The uniform act has been adopted in California, Michigan, New Hampshire, and in Oregon, and possibly some other states. The purpose of the act is to provide certain procedures relative to' blood tests before the findings of the experts may be considered conclusive.
In my opinion the matter of determining paternity or nonpaternity of children born in wedlock is of such importance that the tests should not be considered conclusive unless it is so provided by legislative enactment.
• We all recognize the advances made in medical science. The procedures and tests performed as a result of the advances in the medical field are entitled to every consideration. The courts recognize and accept the new procedures. Yet the duty of preserving the home and protecting children born during the marriage relationship from the stigma of illegitimacy is one of the most important responsibilities of society and the courts. To meet this responsibility the courts have adopted the rules relating to the presumption of legitimacy. These rules must not be changed or modified by new medical procedures and tests unless such tests are shown to have been accurately made; or unless the Legislature has enacted appropriate statutes relative to such tests.
. From a strict legal standpoint, it may be said that there was condonation on the part of the plaintiff which would deny her the right of divorce. Technically, she should *295have dismissed her action for divorce after the alleged condonation and filed a new action alleging nonsupport to conform to the facts in this case. However, the facts in this case certainly indicated that the only solution to the problems is a decree of divorce. The husband by his acts of cruelty commenced the series of incidents which led to the problems of these parties. The trial court no doubt considered all of the circumstances in this light in granting the divorce to the plaintiff.
Further, I'do not agree with the provision in the judgment of the court which provides that legal custody of the minor child, Alice Marie Houghton, be placed in the chief juvenile probation officer of Douglas County with instructions to leave the physical custody with her mother. No doubt this requirement wás to provide a proper moral atmosphere for the child. This of course is important. But' it should not be the. sole consideration. In too many cases the courts overlook the fact that minor children are not chattels. They are personalities with definite and various needs and should be treated as such. One of the common legal expressions in divorcé actions is that one or the other parent is “entitled to custody” overlooking the most important matter which is, what are the minor children entitled to.
The record in this case shows that the mother did not neglect the child, Alice Marie- Houghton. ' Bécause the husband failed to provide support, the mother was employed steadily, except for a short time before Sandra Kay was born; but she provided for the material and physical needs of the children, kept a neat home, and kept the children clean. The child, Alice Marie, depended upon the mother for all her physical needs. From the record we can infer that the, only feeling of security and love and affection she got was given by the mother. There is no showing that she will not continue to provide these vital needs of the child. The record shows that no other person was prepared to or would provide the child with the material necessities of life, and also *296what is so important to a child, a feeling of security, love, and affection. Certainly a probation officer cannot provide these important requirements.
This court has said in several cases that the custody and care of minor children is to be determined by what will be for the welfare and best interests of the child. This of course should include future welfare as near as it can be reasonably foreseen.
To me it is rather difficult to distinguish between legal custody and physical custody as applied to this case. In a sense it is a split custody. Applying it to all the problems of caring for children, including discipline, it suggests many situations wherein a reasonable and honest misunderstanding may arise. These situations will have the tendency of creating in the child a feeling of uncertainty and insecurity. It may haunt her until she reaches the age of maturity. For instance, if she should desire to get married upon reaching marriageable age, before attaining the age of 21 years, she must obtain the consent for marriage under the provisions of section 42-105, R. R. S. 1943. Under the provisions of the decree, the mother cannot sign the consent because she does not have legal custody and the probation officer cannot sign the consent because he does not have the actual custody. For these reasons I conclude that the provisions as to custody of Alice Marie Houghton are not for the welfare and best interests of the child.
Certainly, we are interested in the moral atmosphere for the child. This need could be assured by providing that the home be visited by the probation officer, who may be directed to report to the district court having jurisdiction of this case and the minor child any failure of the plaintiff in meeting the responsibilities of caring for the child or failing to rear the child in a proper moral atmosphere.
In my opinion the trial court was correct in determining that the plaintiff was entitled to a divorce and in *297awarding custody of the minor children to the plaintiff, and I would affirm the lower court’s findings and decree.