Court Opinion

ID: 9389301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 15:01:04.03337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.533417
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1035   Document: 51     Page: 1   Filed: 04/25/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

  LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY,
                Appellant

                            v.

          SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE,
                      Appellee
               ______________________

                       2022-1035
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
 peals in Nos. 62505, 62506, Administrative Judge J. Reid
 Prouty, Administrative Judge Brian S. Smith, Administra-
 tive Judge Craig S. Clarke, Administrative Judge James R.
 Sweet, Administrative Judge Richard Shackleford.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 25, 2023
                 ______________________

     SKYE MATHIESON, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by
 STEPHEN JOHN MCBRADY.

     AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by BRIAN
 M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; CHRISTOPHER JUDGE
 HILBOR, JEFFREY PAUL HILDEBRANT, CARYL POTTER, III, Air
 Force Commercial Litigation Field Support Center, United
Case: 22-1035    Document: 51     Page: 2    Filed: 04/25/2023

 2                LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                              SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 States Air Force, Joint Base Andrews, MD.

    JASON NICHOLAS WORKMASTER, Miller & Chevalier
 Chartered, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae National
 Defense Industrial Association.  Also represented by
 ALEJANDRO LUIS SARRIA.
                ______________________

     Before REYNA, MAYER, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 REYNA, Circuit Judge.
     To expedite work on pressing government projects, the
 government can issue what are called “letter contracts” or
 “Undefinitized Contract Actions” (“UCAs”). UCAs allow
 contractors to begin work before the parties have reached
 a final agreement on contract terms, like price. The price
 is expected to be converted into a firm price—or
 “definitized”—in a timely manner.
     This appeal involves two UCAs that the Air Force en-
 tered into with Lockheed Martin for upgrades to F-16 air-
 craft. Both UCAs include “definitization” clauses that
 provide that if the parties are unable to reach agreement
 on price by a certain time, the Contracting Officer or
 “CO”—the government’s agent who can negotiate, execute,
 modify, or terminate a contract on behalf of the govern-
 ment—may determine a reasonable price. After several
 years of negotiations, the Air Force and Lockheed Martin
 were unable to agree on the price terms for the UCAs. The
 CO assigned to each UCA unilaterally definitized their re-
 spective UCA at a price of about $1 billion.
     Lockheed Martin appealed directly to the Armed Ser-
 vices Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) under the Con-
 tract Disputes Act (“CDA”), asserting that the COs failed
 to definitize at a reasonable price as required under the
 UCAs. The government moved to dismiss, arguing that the
 ASBCA lacked jurisdiction over the appeals because Lock-
 heed Martin failed to submit a certified contractor claim to
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY      v.                 3
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 the COs requesting a final decision on its claims as re-
 quired under the CDA. Lockheed Martin asserted that the
 COs’ unilateral definitizations qualified as government
 claims under the CDA, which a contractor can directly ap-
 peal to the ASBCA without having to submit its own claim
 to the COs. The ASBCA disagreed with Lockheed Martin
 and dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
     Lockheed Martin appeals to this court, pressing the
 same “government claim” argument here. For the reasons
 below, we affirm the ASBCA’s dismissal.
                        BACKGROUND
      A. The statutory and regulatory basis for UCAs
     For much of the Nation’s history—stretching back to
 the Revolutionary War—federal agencies relied on their
 own distinct procurement and acquisition rules. See Fed-
 eral Acquisition Regulation for Government Contracts:
 Overview, Practical Law Practice Note Overview w-021-
 9160 (2023 Westlaw) (“Government Contracts Overview”).
 These rules were neither uniform nor transparent, creating
 an unpredictable procurement process. Id. So in the late
 1970s, Congress amended the Office of Federal Procure-
 ment Policy Act (“OFPPA”) to authorize the Administrator
 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to “issue policy
 directives . . . for the purpose of promoting the development
 and implementation of the uniform procurement system.”
 Pub. L. No. 96-83, § 4(e), 93 Stat. 648 (1979). Under the
 OFPPA, “the Administrator may prescribe Government-
 wide procurement policies,” which “shall be implemented
 in a single Government-wide procurement regulation
 called the Federal Acquisition Regulation.” 41 U.S.C.
 § 1121(b).
     The Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”)—48
 C.F.R. § 1.101 et seq.—provides the implementing regula-
 tions for the OFPPA. The FAR applies to executive agen-
 cies (like the Department of Defense) and their components
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 4                LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                              SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 or sub-agencies (like the Air Force). See Government Con-
 tracts Overview. The OFPPA also authorizes agencies to
 implement additional procurement regulations in order “to
 satisfy the specific and unique needs of the agency.” 41
 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2). The Department of Defense’s addi-
 tions to the FAR are set forth in the Defense Federal Ac-
 quisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”), 48 C.F.R.
 § 201.101 et seq.
      Relevant here, the FAR and the DFARS contemplate
 the government entering into UCAs. See 48 C.F.R.
 § 16.603; id. § 216.603. The government does so when it
 needs a contractor to begin performing work right away on
 urgent projects. See John Cibinic & Ralph C. Nash, Uni-
 lateral Definitization of a Letter Contract: Whose Claim?,
 35 Nash & Cibinic Rep. NL ¶ 60 (2021). “Because they al-
 low work to be started without establishing a firm price,
 they are expected to be converted into firm contracts
 (definitized) in a timely manner.” Id. As the DFARS ex-
 plains, a “[c]ontract action means an action which results
 in a contract”; a UCA “means any contract action for which
 the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed
 upon before performance is begun under the action”; and
 “[d]efinitization means the agreement on, or determination
 of, contract terms, specifications, and price, which converts
 the undefinitized contract action to a definitive contract.”
 48 C.F.R. § 217.7401. The specific process for definitization
 in government contracts is set forth in “Contract Definiti-
 zation” clauses in 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-25 (FAR) and 48
 C.F.R. § 252.217-7027 (DFARS).
       B. The Air Force and Lockheed Martin UCAs
     Around 2015 and 2016, the Air Force entered into two
 UCAs with Lockheed Martin for upgrades to F-16 aircraft:
 the 2015 Singapore contract (J.A. 56; J.A. 2013 ¶¶ 16–17);
 and the 2016 Korea contract (J.A. 1345; J.A. 2013–2014
 ¶¶ 18–19). The Singapore contract includes the FAR
 definitization clause and the Korea contract includes the
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY       v.                 5
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 DFARS definitization clause. See J.A. 101, 48 C.F.R.
 § 52.216-25 (Singapore contract); J.A. 1388, 48 C.F.R.
 § 252.217-7027 (Korea contract).
     For purposes of this appeal, the definitization clauses
 are identical in all material respects. Both require Lock-
 heed Martin to “begin promptly negotiating with the [CO]
 the terms of a definitive contract that will include (1) all
 clauses required by the [FAR] on the date of execution of
 the letter contract, (2) all clauses required by law on the
 date of execution of the definitive contract, and (3) any
 other mutually agreeable clauses, terms, and conditions,”
 and to submit a proposal including pricing data supporting
 its proposal. 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-25(a); see also id.
 § 252.217-7027(a).
     The clauses further provide a “schedule for definitizing
 th[e] contract.” Id. § 52.216-25(b); see also id. § 252.217-
 7027(b).
     Subparagraph (c) then states:
     If agreement on a definitive contract to supersede
     this letter contract is not reached by the target date
     in [the schedule] . . . the [CO] may, with the ap-
     proval of the head of the contracting activity, deter-
     mine a reasonable price or fee in accordance with
     subpart 15.4 and part 31 of the FAR, subject to
     Contractor appeal as provided in the Disputes
     clause.
 Id. § 52.216-25(c); see also id. § 252.217-7027(c). Subpara-
 graph (c) further states: “In any event, the Contractor shall
 proceed with completion of the contract.” Id. § 52.216-
 25(c); see also id. § 252.217-7027(c).
     After several years of offers and counteroffers, the par-
 ties were unable to agree on contract prices. Eventually,
 the COs definitized their respective UCAs at a price of
 roughly $1 billion. J.A. 639–640; J.A. 1673–1674.
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 6                 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                               SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

     Lockheed Martin contends that when the COs exercised
 their discretion to end negotiations and unilaterally estab-
 lish a definitized contract price, they failed to comply with
 the definitization clauses’ requirement to determine a “rea-
 sonable price” in accordance with subpart 15.4 and part 31
 of the FAR. J.A. 2027–2030. Lockheed Martin appealed
 directly to the ASBCA, asking it to declare that the COs’
 definitizations were inconsistent with the regulations re-
 quiring a reasonable price and to remand to the COs, di-
 recting them to provide Lockheed Martin with reasonable
 prices. J.A. 2009–2032. Lockheed Martin brought its ap-
 peals before the ASBCA under the CDA.
                         C. The CDA
     Like the OFPPA amendments, the CDA was enacted
 during the government procurement reform of the late
 1970s. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563,
 92 Stat. 2383. 1 The CDA is designed “to provide a fair, bal-
 anced, and comprehensive statutory system of legal and
 administrative remedies in resolving government contract
 claims.” Winter v. FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed.
 Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). It recognizes two types of “claims”:
 those brought by the government against a contractor (gov-
 ernment claims) and those brought by a contractor against
 the government (contractor claims). United States v. Am.
 States Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001).
     As for contractor claims, “[e]ach claim by a contractor
 against the Federal Government relating to a contract
 shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision”;
 shall “be in writing”; and, for claims of more than $100,000,
 shall be certified. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1). As for

     1   Initially codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–613 (1982),
 Congress reorganized the CDA in 2011, and it is now found
 at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109 (2012). Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub.
 L. No. 111-350, § 2, 124 Stat. 3677, 3816–26.
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY       v.                 7
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 government claims, “[e]ach claim by the Federal Govern-
 ment against a contractor relating to a contract shall be the
 subject of a written decision by the contracting officer.” Id.
 § 7103(a)(3). Once the CO issues a final decision on a con-
 tractor claim, the contractor can then appeal to the appro-
 priate board of contract appeals. Id. § 7104(a). 2 In
 contrast, a contractor may appeal a government claim di-
 rectly to the appropriate board of contract appeals without
 submitting a contractor claim to the CO. Garrett v. Gen.
 Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In all events,
 for a board of contract appeals to have jurisdiction under
 the CDA, there must be a CO decision on a claim.
      But it is not always clear whether a claim has been
 made and, if so, which party made it. John Cibinic, Jr. et
 al., Administration of Government Contracts 1182 (5th ed.
 2016) (“In some cases it is difficult to distinguish between
 government and contractor claims.”). The sole issue in this
 appeal is whether the COs’ definitizations were govern-
 ment claims under the CDA.
         D. The ASBCA dismisses for lack of jurisdiction
     In response to Lockheed Martin’s appeals to the
 ASBCA, the government moved to dismiss for lack of juris-
 diction, arguing that, because Lockheed Martin never sub-
 mitted a written certified contractor claim to the COs
 requesting a final decision, there was no jurisdiction over
 its appeals. Appellee’s Resp. Br. 6. And indeed, the record
 shows that, after the COs definitized the prices, Lockheed
 Martin did not challenge the definitizations before the COs
 or submit contractor claims under the CDA. In response to
 the government’s motion, Lockheed Martin recognized that
 it needed a CO final decision for the ASBCA to have juris-
 diction, but it argued that the CO’s definitization decision

     2  The contractor can also instead bring an action in
 the Court of Federal Claims. 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b).
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 8                 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                               SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 was a final decision on a government claim against Lock-
 heed Martin which may be directly appealed. J.A. 4.
     The ASBCA granted the government’s motion and dis-
 missed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. Lockheed Mar-
 tin Aeronautics Co., ASBCA Nos. 62505, 62506, 21-1 BCA
 ¶ 63 GC ¶ 215, 2021 WL 2912101 (J.A. 1–25). In doing so,
 the ASBCA framed the issue as follows: “[W]hether a uni-
 lateral contract definitization action by a [CO] constitutes
 a government claim that may be directly appealed to the
 [ASBCA] by the contractor (as happened here), or whether
 it is an act of contract administration, subject to a claim by
 the contractor, but not a direct appeal.” J.A. 1. The ASBCA
 majority concluded—over Administrative Judge Clarke’s
 dissent—that it had already addressed this issue in Bell
 Helicopter Textron, ASBCA No. 35950, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,656,
 1988 WL 44376, aff’d on mot. for recon., 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,048,
 1988 WL 83993, and that it was bound by that decision. Id.
 On grounds that the ASBCA must follow its own precedent,
 the majority held that “a unilateral contract definitization
 does not constitute a government claim and may not be di-
 rectly appealed to” the ASBCA. J.A. 2. As in Bell Helicop-
 ter, it concluded, the “CO’s decisions challenged here . . .
 established the contract price in accordance with the con-
 tracts’ terms, and are thus not government claims.” J.A. 4.
    Lockheed Martin appeals the dismissal to this court un-
 der 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(10).
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
     We review the ASBCA’s decisions on questions of law,
 including jurisdiction, de novo. Triple Canopy, Inc. v. Sec’y
 of Air Force, 14 F.4th 1332, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Place-
 way Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.
 Cir. 1990). Interpretation of a government contract and of
 applicable procurement regulations are questions of law
 subject to de novo review. Triple Canopy, 14 F.4th at 1338.
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY     v.                 9
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

                        DISCUSSION
     We hold that the COs’ definitizations of the contracts
 here were not government claims and that, as a result,
 Lockheed Martin has not shown that the ASBCA erred in
 dismissing its appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
     Although the classification of a claim as a government
 claim can affect jurisdiction and more, 3 the CDA offers
 minimal guidance on what constitutes one. Indeed, the
 “only guidance” that Congress has provided on the “defini-
 tion of a government claim” comes from § 7103(a)(3),
 Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1443 (Fed. Cir.
 1988), modified, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 4 which
 states: “Each claim by the Federal Government against a
 contractor relating to a contract shall be the subject of a

    3     For instance, if a CO decision is considered a gov-
 ernment claim, a dissatisfied contractor must appeal it to
 the appropriate board of contract appeals within the CDA’s
 90-day window or bring an action on it in the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims within the 12-month window. 41 U.S.C.
 §§ 7104(a) & (b). By contrast, a contractor generally has
 six years to decide whether to submit a contractor claim to
 the CO. Id. § 7103(a)(4)(A). The classification of the claim
 can also play a role in determining which party bears the
 burden of proof on the merits of the claim. See Lisbon Con-
 tractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 763–64 (Fed.
 Cir. 1987) (relying on the board of contract appeals’ prac-
 tice of treating termination for default as a government
 claim to hold that the government bears the burden to
 prove default).
    4     The Malone court analyzed the language under
 § 7103(a)’s predecessor, § 605(a), which, for our purposes
 here, is nearly identical to § 7103(a)’s language.
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 10                LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                               SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 written decision by the contracting officer,” 41 U.S.C.
 § 7103(a)(3).
      Because the CDA does not specifically define the term
 “claim,” “this court looks for guidance to its implementing
 regulations.” H.L. Smith, Inc. v. Dalton, 49 F.3d 1563,
 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Garrett, 987 F.2d at 749. The
 FAR—the “applicable regulation,” Garrett, 987 F.2d at
 749—defines a “claim” as a “written demand or written as-
 sertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a mat-
 ter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the
 adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other re-
 lief arising under or relating to this contract.” 48 C.F.R.
 § 2.101; see also id. § 52.233-1(c) (government contract dis-
 putes clause defining a claim). We have held that “the
 phrase ‘as a matter of right’ in the regulatory definition of
 a ‘claim’ requires . . . that the [party] specifically assert en-
 titlement to the relief sought”—“[t]hat is, the claim must
 be a demand for something due or believed to be due.” Al-
 liant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260,
 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60
 F.3d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (explaining that
 “the FAR requires a ‘claim’ to be a written demand seeking
 a sum certain (or other contract relief) as a matter of right,”
 which “is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term
 ‘claim’: ‘a demand for something due or believed to be due’”
 (citation omitted)).
     We hold that the COs’ decisions to definitize the con-
 tract prices here were not government claims because they
 were not demands or assertions by the government seeking
 relief against Lockheed Martin. When the COs definitized
 the contract prices, they were simply following the agreed
 upon procedures for determining the final contract price.
 See 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-25(c); id. § 252.217-7027(c). The
 COs were not making a demand or an assertion seeking
 entitlement to “something due or believed to be due.” Al-
 liant, 178 F.3d at 1265. Nor did the completion of the
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY      v.               11
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 definitization process result in the government seeking re-
 lief against Lockheed Martin.
     That the COs’ definitizations were not government
 claims becomes even more clear when we compare the COs’
 definitizations of the contract prices here to the COs’ ac-
 tions in cases in which we have found government claims.
 In Garrett, for instance, the Navy contracted for jet engines
 and accepted them. 987 F.2d at 748. The Navy later de-
 termined that there were defects in the engines, and the
 CO issued a decision revoking acceptance and directing GE
 to correct the defects at no cost to the government. Id. at
 748–49. GE appealed to the ASBCA, which determined
 that it had jurisdiction. On appeal to this court, we ana-
 lyzed whether the Navy’s directives under the contract’s in-
 spection clause were appealable CDA claims. Id. at 749.
 We determined that the inspection clause of the contract
 gave the government the right to seek certain remedies. Id.
 The government opted to pursue a non-monetary remedy—
 directing the contractor to correct or replace the defective
 engines—which we held to be non-monetary “other relief”
 within the FAR’s third category of “claims.” Id. Because
 the government had directed GE to provide that relief, it
 had asserted a government claim. Id. The CO’s decision
 thus amounted to a demand targeted at GE seeking to have
 GE correct or replace allegedly defective engines at no cost
 to the government.
     In Placeway, the Coast Guard contracted with Place-
 way to build residential housing. 920 F.2d at 905. “The
 CO decided that the contract price balance due would not
 be ‘released’ because Placeway had failed to complete the
 contract ‘in a timely manner[.]’” Id. We held that the CO’s
 decision was a government claim. Id. at 906. Specifically,
 we “characterized” the government claim as a claim di-
 rected at Placeway “seeking incidental and consequential
 damages for Placeway’s alleged breach of the contract, in
 particular, failure to complete performance on the date set
 in the contract.” Id. at 906 n.1.
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 12                LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                               SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

       And in Malone, the Air Force awarded Malone a con-
 tract to paint and refurbish houses. 849 F.2d at 1442. Af-
 ter disputes arose over Malone’s performance, the CO
 terminated the contract for default. Id. at 1443. Malone
 appealed directly to the ASBCA. Id. On appeal to this
 court, we rejected the government’s argument that the
 ASBCA lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 1443–44. We explained
 that case law supported that a government decision to ter-
 minate a contractor for default is a government claim. Id.
 at 1443. That “position,” we explained, followed directly
 from the CDA’s language: “The government issues [the de-
 fault termination] by CO decision, and it is both adverse to
 the contractor and relates to the contract because it in-
 volves a determination that the contractor has failed to ful-
 fill its contractual duties.” Id. And as one of the cases that
 the Malone court relied on explained, id., a CO’s default
 termination amounts to an “assertion” directed at a con-
 tractor seeking “to stop the contractor’s performance of the
 contract,” Reedom, ASBCA No. 30226, 85-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
 ¶ 17879, 1985 WL 16514 (describing default terminations).
      Simply stated, the COs’ actions in Garrett, Placeway,
 and Malone clearly amounted to a demand or an assertion
 seeking relief against the contractor based on the contrac-
 tor’s performance under the contract. The COs’ definitiza-
 tions here, by contrast, do not amount to demands or
 assertions seeking relief against Lockheed Martin based on
 Lockheed Martin’s performance under the contract. Ra-
 ther, as the ASBCA aptly characterized the definitization
 action in Bell Helicopter: The COs here “did no more than
 establish the contract price in accordance with the terms
 of” the definitization clauses and “merely perform[ed] the
 duty prescribed by the contract when the parties failed to
 reach agreement on a price.” 88-2 BCA at ¶ 20,656.
     Lockheed Martin’s various attempts to characterize
 the COs’ definitizations as demands or assertions that seek
 relief are unpersuasive. According to Lockheed Martin, by
 inserting new prices into the contracts, the COs made an
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 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY      v.               13
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

 “adjustment” “of contract terms” within the FAR’s second
 category of “claims.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 12. But even
 assuming that the COs’ actions were demands or asser-
 tions against Lockheed Martin, we do not think that the
 COs’ establishment of prices where none existed before can
 be legitimately characterized as an adjustment of contract
 terms.
      Lockheed Martin also argues that, by unilaterally
 definitizing the prices, the government sought “other re-
 lief” within the FAR’s third category of “claims” in the form
 of “impos[ing] prices and demand[ing] performance.” Ap-
 pellant’s Reply Br. 12–13. But the COs’ “imposing prices”
 is permitted under the definitization clauses and cannot be
 characterized as the government seeking something due or
 believed to be due from Lockheed Martin. Nor do we think
 that the COs’ definitizations can be accurately construed
 as a “demand” seeking something due in the form of “per-
 formance.” Indeed, the government had no reason to make
 that demand: The definitization clauses themselves ex-
 pressly require Lockheed Martin to “proceed with comple-
 tion of the contract” after the COs definitize the price, 48
 C.F.R. § 52.216-25(c); id. § 252.217-7027(c), and Lockheed
 Martin did not suggest that it would refuse to do so.
     Only one party here is making a demand or an asser-
 tion seeking relief: Lockheed Martin. Lockheed Martin as-
 serts that the government failed to set a “reasonable price”
 as required by the contracts and seeks relief against the
 government—namely, that the COs comply with the
 definitization clauses and set a reasonable price. J.A. 2028,
 2030. And Lockheed Martin can seek that relief by submit-
 ting a traditional contractor claim. 5

     5   Lockheed Martin reveals in its Opening Brief that
 it has already “submitted certified [contractor] claims to
 the Air Force regarding these two contracts.” Appellant’s
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 14                LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY v.
                               SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

      That, in fact, is precisely what the contractors did in
 two cases Lockheed Martin relies on in support of its “gov-
 ernment claims” position—Todd Construction, L.P. v.
 United States, 656 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Alliant,
 178 F.3d 1260. In those cases, we did not treat the govern-
 ment’s underlying actions as government claims; we
 treated the contractor’s responses to the government’s ac-
 tions as contractor claims. See Todd Constr., 656 F.3d at
 1311 (explaining that the dispute was whether Todd’s re-
 quested relief in response to the government’s performance
 evaluations “‘relat[ed] to the contract’” and was thus a
 “‘claim’ under the CDA”); Alliant, 178 F.3d at 1265 (ex-
 plaining that Alliant’s letter to the CO was “a written de-
 mand seeking adjustment or interpretation of a contract
 term”). Similarly, here, the COs’ definitizations are not
 government claims. Rather, Lockheed Martin’s responses
 to the COs’ definitizations are potentially contractor
 claims.
     Finally, we disagree with Lockheed Martin that the
 phrase “subject to Contractor appeal” in the definitization
 clauses means that the definitizations in this case are gov-
 ernment claims. Appellant’s Br. 26–29. The definitization
 clauses state that “the [CO] may . . . determine a reasona-
 ble price . . ., subject to Contractor appeal as provided in the
 Disputes clause.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.216-25(c) (emphasis
 added). According to Lockheed Martin, “subject to Contrac-
 tor appeal” must mean that the UCAs contemplate the ex-
 istence of an underlying government claim that can be
 directly appealed. After all, Lockheed Martin says, you
 cannot have an “appeal” without an underlying “claim.”

 Br. 39 n.25. Its counsel confirmed this at oral argument,
 explaining that Lockheed Martin has submitted contractor
 claims to the COs; that the COs have denied those claims;
 and that those claims have been appealed to the ASBCA.
 See Oral Arg. at 0:43–2:03.
Case: 22-1035   Document: 51    Page: 15     Filed: 04/25/2023

 LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICS COMPANY    v.               15
 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

      But even if “appeal” necessarily meant that there was
 an underlying “claim,” as Lockheed Martin contends, Lock-
 heed Martin’s argument would fail. That is because it is
 based on a flawed premise: that the underlying claim
 would be a government claim. If anything, the underlying
 claims on which the COs made their definitization deci-
 sions here would be contractor—not government—claims
 (for example, a Lockheed Martin demand for more money).
 Cf. James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d
 1537, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (analyzing the applicable
 FAR clause’s statement that the contractor has a “right of
 appeal” from a CO’s unilateral decision and determining
 that there was an appealable CO decision on a contractor
 claim). The phrase “subject to Contractor appeal” in the
 definitization clauses thus does not support Lockheed Mar-
 tin’s assertion that the definitizations are government
 claims.
    We have considered Lockheed Martin’s other argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive.
                       CONCLUSION
      We hold that the COs’ definitizations of the contract
 prices were not government claims because they were not
 demands or assertions by the government seeking relief
 against Lockheed Martin.       We therefore affirm the
 ASBCA’s judgment dismissing Lockheed Martin’s appeals
 for lack of jurisdiction.
                       AFFIRMED
                          COSTS
 No costs.