Court Opinion

ID: 9671821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:43:38.33071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:12.263418
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 84. {concurring). I strongly support the majority's conclusion that "physical evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional violation of Miranda is inadmissible under Article I, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution." Majority op., ¶ 83.1 write separately to emphasize that the majority opinion serves to reaffirm Wisconsin's position in the "new federalism" movement.1
*131¶ 85. As the majority notes, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the power of states to adopt higher standards to protect individual liberties than those mandated by the federal constitution. See majority op., ¶ 57. Indeed, this court frequently analyzes constitutional challenges in terms of both the Wisconsin and the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582; Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866; State v. Greve, 2004 WI 69, 272 Wis. 2d 444, 681 N.W.2d 479. While the analysis is often the same under both constitutions, it is not an idle exercise for the court — a consistent result is neither mandatory nor assured.
¶ 86. As early as 1977, United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. recognized and encouraged the emerging pattern of state court decisions interpreting their own constitutions, and declining to follow federal precedent they found "unconvincing, even where the state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased." William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 500 (1977)(footnote omitted). Justice Brennan emphasized the fact that the "decisions of the [U.S. Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not mechanically appli*132cable to state law issues, and state court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them." Id. at 502 (footnote omitted). This trend of state courts "assert[ing] a role for state constitutions in the protection of individual liberties and the resolution of legal disputes," has become known as "new federalism." Shirley S. Abrahamson, State Constitutional Law, New Judicial Federalism, and the Rehnquist Court, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 339, 341 (2004)(footnote omitted).
¶ 87. Over the past three decades, "new federalism" has gained increasing strength across the nation. In 1992, the Supreme Court of Texas referenced "new federalism" when it stated the following: "When a state court interprets the constitution of its state merely as a restatement of the Federal Constitution, it both insults the dignity of the state charter and denies citizens the fullest protection of their rights." Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tex. 1992). In 1993, the Ohio Supreme Court embraced "new federalism" when it "join[ed] the growing trend in other states ... [in recognizing] that the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force." Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993); see also State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992); State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994); State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d 225 (N.M. 2001)(hold-ing that while a prolonged checkpoint stop was not illegal under federal border search law, the stop was illegal under its state constitution); State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330 (Tenn. 2002) (rejecting the standard set by the Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) to determine when a person is seized, on state constitutional grounds); State v. Young, 957 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1998). In fact, between the years 1970 and 1989, "approximately six hundred published opinions relied on state constitutional grounds to provide protections *133broader than federally interpreted guarantees under the United States Constitution." Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 12 n.21, (citing Linda B. Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, Kaye and Abrahamson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism, 2 Emerging Issues in St. Const. L. 239, 246 (1989)).
¶ 88. "New federalism" is a concept embraced by both liberals and conservatives. "For the conservative, state constitutionalism represents the triumph of federalism; crucial decisions about the apportionment of rights and benefits are decided by state courts responsive to local needs, rather than by a distant United States Supreme Court. . . ." Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1081 (1985). Clearly, "new federalism" represents the intersection of "conservatives' concern over federalism and states' rights" with "the liberals' concern over safeguarding individual rights." Id. at 1092.
¶ 89. Perhaps the most significant case related to the majority opinion in the present case is Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198 (Mass. 2005), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently concluded that "the [U.S.] Supreme Court's construction of the Miranda rule [in Batane] ... is no longer adequate to safeguard the parallel but broader protections afforded Massachusetts citizens ..." by its state constitution. Id. at 200. In that case, police in Boston responded to a "911" call from a person who claimed a man had threatened him with a gun. Police determined it was likely that Martin, who had locked himself in his apartment, had threatened the caller. Id. at 201. Police eventually convinced Martin to surrender, and when he opened his apartment door and stepped into the hallway, he was handcuffed. Id. Police then conducted a *134protective sweep of Martin's apartment, and Martin was positively identified by the caller as the person who had threatened him. Id.
¶ 90. Although Martin was in custody at that point, he was not advised of his rights under Miranda. Id. Detectives then informed Martin that they would apply for a search warrant to locate the weapon, hut encouraged Martin to expedite the process and tell them where he had put the firearm. Id. Martin replied by telling the detective that he had had problems with the caller in the past. Id. "The detective responded by assuring Martin that the police 'would look into that,' but reiterated that his main concern was locating the firearm. Martin then told the detective that the firearm was in his bedroom closet." Id. The detective entered Martin's apartment and located a loaded firearm in the closet. It was only at this point that Martin was read his Miranda rights and formally placed under arrest. Id. "He was subsequently indicted for assault by means of a dangerous weapon (firearm), unlawful possession of a firearm while being an armed career criminal, and unlawful possession of ammunition." Id. (footnote omitted).
¶ 91. The Martin court similarly held that evidence obtained as a result of "unwarned statements where Miranda warnings would have been required by Federal law in order for them to be admissible, is presumptively excludable from evidence at trial as 'fruit' of the improper failure to provide such warnings." Id. at 200. Although its reasoning was based upon Massachusetts Constitution Article XII's protection against self-incrimination, the rationale of deterring police misconduct articulated by this majority is the same. See id. at 204; see majority op. ¶¶ 75-78. " 'To allow the police the freedom to disregard the require*135ments of Miranda and thereby risk losing only the direct product of such action, but not the evidence derived from it, would not only not deter future Miranda violations but might well tend to encourage them.'" Martin, 827 N.E.2d at 204 (quoting State v. Gravel, 601 A.2d 678, 685 (N.H. 1991)).
¶ 92. Here, the majority holding ensures our state's citizens the protections guaranteed to them by the Wisconsin Constitution. In refusing to apply mechanically decisions based on federal law to rights guaranteed by our state constitution, the court continues to place Wisconsin in good company with the many states which have embraced "new federalism."
¶ 93. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 94. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS BUTLER, JR. join this concurrence.

 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has "a long history of recognizing the vitality of the Declaration of Rights of the Wisconsin Constitution (article 1)...." State v. Pallone, 2000 WT 77, ¶ 92, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice went on to urge that the court "continue our traditional approach of examining our own constitution and our own precedents." Id. (citing Jokosh v. State, 181 Wis. 160, 163, 193 N.W 976 (1923); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923); John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitution — Recurrence to Fundamental Prin*131ciples, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 531 (1979); Comment, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 596 (1979); Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State Courts, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 483; Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence: A History of Wisconsin's Legal System 499-500 (1999)).