Court Opinion

ID: 9538706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:40:18.879216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:06.158939
License: Public Domain

Wines, D. J.,
concurring:
To the contention that the ruling of the Nevada court on July 6, 1964, determined the same issues raised by the motion in the Kansas court and is res ad judicata as to the question of custody and should be given full faith and credit, the Kansas Supreme Court answers and, I think, correctly:
“Again, reference must be made to the sequence of events. After Robert filed his motion of December, 1963, the Nevada court continued hearing thereon until after the end of the school year, and this continuance was still in effect on July 2, 1964, when the present action was commenced in Crawford County, Kansas.
*256“Meanwhile, however, and after Robert left Las Vegas with Bobby in June, 1964, Peggy had filed a motion in Nevada to cancel Bobby’s visit to Kansas that year so that he might enroll in Elsinore’s summer camp program. This motion was accompanied by affidavits of school officials attesting to Bobby’s school record and the advisability of his attending camp. On July 6, 1964, four days after Robert’s motion was filed in Crawford County, the Nevada District Court, without notice to Robert, entered the order which Peggy claims is res ad judicata.
“The phrasing of this order, viewed in the context of all attendant circumstances, permits little if any, doubt that it was made in response to Peggy’s motion to terminate the summer visit. The limitations of space preclude us from reproducing the order in full but, in brief summary, it may be said that its pertinent provisions relate to summer visitation rights, to the parents’ dispute over their son attending summer camp, and to affidavits and reports from Elsinore officials.
“We believe the Nevada court made no pretense of ruling on Robert’s motion for change of custody, since its order contains no reference whatever thereto'. Nor are we entitled to infer from any language used that the court intended to deal with the problem of permanent custody. Indeed, the presumption is quite the contrary, for Robert had not been advised that his motion was to be heard, although, as an interested party, he would be entitled to notice. The presumption is that public officers will perform their duties in a rightful manner and will not act improperly. We may not assume that the district court in Nevada would take the liberty of conducting a hearing on Robert’s motion without giving him an opportunity to appear and be heard.”
Despite my agreement with these findings and the rule on this issue, I am in accord with the conclusion appearing in Justice Thompson’s opinion: “* * * Kansas should have abstained on the principle of comity for Nevada had become the child’s established home. The welfare of Bobby is the paramount consideration in deciding custody. Bobby moved from Kansas in 1961 and has since been living in Nevada. The evaluation of *257Ms physical, emotional, and educational needs should now be made by the court having maximum access to the relevant evidence.”
This was the case law of Kansas prior to the enactment of K.S.A. 60-1610 except that the court spoke of domicile rather than “established home.” See Lyerla v. Lyerla, 195 Kan. 259, 403 P.2d 989, 992.
I choose the “established home doctrine” not because it is the answer. Courts may disagree as trenchantly on what facts show an established home as they now do on what constitutes a change of circumstances. It has the virtue, however, of “maximum access to relevant evidence.” Nor does it prevent a court having jurisdiction of the parents and the child, providing peremptory or emergency relief. Finally, finding the established home is a simple task when compared with the perplexities of finding a change of circumstances.
I concur in the orders made in Justice Thompson’s opinion.