Court Opinion

ID: 9845187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:16:25.671814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.995737
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Agreeing with the majority opinion on a reversal on the tape issue, I would also *707vote for a reversal and a new trial for appellant upon these grounds:
1. Failure of the trial court to grant a change of venue. This Court cannot now escape its language of Wellner, 318 N.W.2d at 331, for this appellant did exhaust all of his peremptory challenges. A motion was made thereafter to change the place of trial which was duly refused. When so ruling, the trial court had at hand the professional jury study conducted by the National Jury Project for the Wellner defense reflecting a 99% acquaintance with the facts. The record reflects that the trial court formally took notice of said study. This case should not have been tried in Hand County; it appears the case was so notorious that appellant could not receive a fair trial. It is significant to note that the State produced no evidence refuting the bias showing by the defense. Rather, the State attacked the method and mode of the evidence gathered by the defense. An investigator employed by appellant obtained comments of prejudice of 128 Hand County residents; rather than to document each one of these witnesses, appellant advised the trial court that each name would be tied in with each statement. Appellant further advised that the trial court need only ask and this full information would be divulged. Many of the 128 Hand County residents were fearful of having their names openly disclosed. The composite information given to the trial court was out of respect to the wishes and feelings of these Hand County people. In Wellner, this Court did not reject the jury study which was accomplished for that case; said jury study, by judicial notice, became a part of this record. Therefore, there was sufficient prejudice and bias in the minds of the Hand County people which raised a reasonable apprehension that appellant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Hand County. Hand County is a small rural county in central South Dakota with a static population. When 99% of the people have knowledge of the facts, coupled with the courtroom scene that many jurors did not wish to and could not serve on the jury because of their opinions, there is a reasonable apprehension created in the reasoned mind that an impartial jury is unlikely. I would hold that there was an abuse of discretion in denying the change of venue. It is the duty of this Court, as the highest Court in this state, to partake in meaningful review. We must meaningfully address the abuse of discretion test or the order of the trial court becomes the final order relegating this Court into a superstructure perched on a foundation of nebulous perspective.
2. Failure of the trial court to remove the special prosecutor in this case when motioned to do so. It is highly improper in a criminal prosecution to permit an individual to testify to the principal facts of the case, thereafter examine witnesses and later argue the case before the jury. An attorney might well be a competent witness but he or she should disassociate that advocative role, once called as a witness. See Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816 (1949), and a host of authorities thereunder collected. See also, Newman v. Sigler, 421 F.2d 1377, 1379 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 2267, 26 L.Ed.2d 808 (1970), for general thesis that a jury is confused when an attorney argues in a dual capacity, not knowing if the argument is from a prosecutor or from a witness. For this reason, most courts have held that a prosecuting attorney should not be allowed to testify except in most extraordinary circumstances. 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 99 at 140 (1976). Here, the special prosecutor was a witness to *708fundamental facts and particularly, appellant’s state of mind at the time he allegedly gave perjured testimony. Pretrial motions, exposing the great probability of the special prosecutor’s direct knowledge of an element of perjury, were presented with respect to this conflict and denied by the trial court.
This was error. The defense knew and the State knew that the special prosecutor had specific knowledge of the facts and possessed evidence bearing on the alleged crime. Grounded in reason, it was foreseeable that the special prosecutor would testify and that his personal involvement in the investigative gathering would come to light. As such, and other Assistant Attorney Generals being available to conduct the prosecution, the special prosecutor should not have undertaken representation of the State. See Code of Professional Responsibility, CANON DR 5-101, REFUSING EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THE LAWYER MAY IMPAIR HIS INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT. See also, CANON DR 5-102, WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL WHEN THE LAWYER BECOMES A WITNESS. SDCL 16-18, Appx. True, the special prosecutor was not called to the stand by his client, but he and his client, and the defense, knew he was a witness to certain facts in the case; therefore, he should have recused himself in favor of another Assistant Attorney General who could prosecute the action in a more objective, proficient and detached atmosphere.