Court Opinion

ID: 9877102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 15:46:29.251216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:18.172602
License: Public Domain

Whalen, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my view, plaintiff’s deposition testimony raised triable issues of fact with respect to the existence of a partnership between the parties. Because that testimony was among defendant’s own submissions in support of his motion for summary judgment, I *1901conclude that defendant failed to meet his initial burden on the motion, and that Supreme Court erred in granting it (see Prince v O’Brien, 234 AD2d 12, 12 [1996]; see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Bianchi v Midtown Reporting Serv., Inc., 103 AD3d 1261, 1261-1262 [2013]).
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he and defendant reached an oral agreement to be partners in their business venture at some point prior to an October 2004 meeting with defendant’s attorney, and that defendant acquiesced in his request for a 50% share of the partnership (see generally Don v Singer, 92 AD3d 576, 577 [2012]). Plaintiff further testified that he thereafter voluntarily reduced his share to 20% in recognition of defendant’s greater contributions to the business, and that the two of them later agreed to bring a third person into the partnership, with plaintiff retaining his 20% share and the third person assuming a 10% share. In addition, plaintiff testified that defendant sought to end their business relationship by telling plaintiff that he “didn’t want to be partners anymore,” which suggests that defendant believed that they had been partners up to that point. Although the court characterized the evidence of an absence of mutual intent to be partners as “overwhelming,” and the majority points to evidence that it views as “undermining]” plaintiff’s testimony, I conclude that plaintiff’s testimony supports a reasonable inference that the parties shared the intent to form a partnership (see A.G. Interiors Unlimited v DiMaggio, 224 AD2d 466, 466 [1996]; Boyarsky v Froccaro, 131 AD2d 710, 712-713 [1987]; see generally Don, 92 AD3d at 577), and that the existence of contrary evidence merely raises an issue of credibility inappropriate for resolution on a motion for summary judgment (see generally Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631 [1997]; Harrington Group, Inc. v B/G Sales Assoc., Inc., 41 AD3d 1161, 1162 [2007]; Alvarez v New York City Hous. Auth., 295 AD2d 225, 226 [2002]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the majority is correct that certain factors tending to establish the existence of a partnership are lacking in this case (see generally Fasolo v Scarafile, 120 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2014], lv dismissed 24 NY3d 992 [2014]), I conclude that those factors are not determinative (see id. at 930), and that the competing inferences regarding the intent of the parties should be resolved by the trier of fact (see Cavezza v Gardner, 176 AD2d 911, 911-912 [1991]).
In any event, I conclude that defendant submitted conflicting evidence concerning whether the parties shared profits and losses and whether the parties combined their property, skill, *1902and knowledge (see Kyle v Ford, 184 AD2d 1036, 1036-1037 [1992]). With respect to the latter factor, plaintiff testified that his contributions to the business included goodwill, design and engineering expertise, and access to vendors and suppliers. With respect to sharing of profits and losses, although it is undisputed that defendant paid plaintiff for some of his services, plaintiff testified that he contributed a significant amount of unpaid services to the business, and that he did so “as an investment,” i.e., in anticipation of a share of future profits. In my view, that testimony is sufficient to establish that plaintiff may have been exposed to a risk of losses (see Ramirez v Goldberg, 82 AD2d 850, 852 [1981]; see generally Don, 92 AD3d at 577). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the absence of other evidence corroborating that plaintiff in fact performed unpaid services affects only the evidentiary weight of plaintiff’s testimony and does not warrant disregarding that testimony for purposes of defendant’s motion (see generally Alvarez, 295 AD2d at 226).
In sum, I agree with plaintiff that the court improperly resolved issues of fact in granting defendant’s motion (see Patel v Patel, 192 AD2d 357, 357-358 [1993]), and I would therefore reverse the order and deny the motion.
Present — Whalen, P.J., Centra, Lindley, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.