Court Opinion

ID: 9907832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 09:10:04.842261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:40.096157
License: Public Domain

In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-22-00314-CV

                                 JANA SHEPHERD, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

    HELEN PAINTER & CO., CATHERINE TAYLOR, AMY DEFOREST, YOUNGER
    RANCH, LLC, SCOTT REAL ESTATE, INC., AND SHILA MANLEY, APPELLEES

                             On Appeal from the 348th District Court
                                     Tarrant County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 348-295290-17, Honorable Megan Fahey, Presiding

                                         December 1, 2023
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
                    Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        Jana Shepherd, acting pro se, appealed from an order dismissing her claims

against several parties for want of prosecution and a final summary judgment. The

dispute arose from her failed attempt to acquire a parcel of realty owned by Younger

Ranch, LLC. Those sued were Scott Real Estate, Inc. and its employee Shila Manley

        1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
(together referred to as Scott), Helen Painter & Co. and its employees Catherine Taylor

and Amy DeForest (referred to as Painter), and Younger Ranch, LLC (Younger).

Shepherd asserted a myriad of contentions on appeal. Most concern the propriety of the

dismissal and summary judgment. Others implicate the trial court’s refusal to reinstate

her claims after dismissal and the attorney’s fees awarded her opponents. We affirm.

       Background

       The property in question consisted of six acres owned by Younger. Shepherd

contracted to buy it in July 2017. Painter acted as real estate agent for both parties.

       Per an addendum to the sales contract, consummation of the deal was contingent

upon Shepherd’s selling a separate parcel of realty. Consequently, Younger was free to

entertain and accept other offers in case Shepherd’s purchase came to naught. Yet, if it

received and accepted a subsequent offer during the interim, Younger was obligated to

afford Shepherd opportunity to waive the contingency and proceed with the acquisition if

she also deposited $1,000 in escrow. Failing to do both within three days of her receiving

notice resulted in the automatic termination of the agreement.

       Younger received another offer during the interim. Painter notified Shepherd of it.

At that point, Shepherd informed Painter that she would waive the contingency and pay

cash for the property. This was not followed by a deposit of $1,000 within three days,

though. Around that same time, Shepherd discharged Painter and retained Scott to

represent her in the transaction. Nevertheless, the sale never transpired, even though

Younger afforded Shepherd another opportunity to perform the conditions within the

addendum.

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        Believing herself aggrieved, Shepherd sued Painter and Younger in September

2017. So too did she sue Scott after they were joined as third-party defendants.

        Painter and Younger eventually moved to dismiss the action for want of

prosecution in July 2021. So too did those parties simultaneously seek reconsideration

of the earlier denial of their motion for summary judgment. Scott acted similarly. In

August 2021, they too moved to dismiss the cause for want of prosecution and,

alternatively for summary judgment.

        The trial court convened a hearing on the pending motions. Thereafter, it granted

1) Scott’s motion to dismiss and 2) Painter’s motions to dismiss and for summary

judgment. Shepherd moved to reinstate the proceedings, which motion the trial court

denied after conducting a live hearing upon it. So too did it grant motions for attorney’s

fees, thereby disposing of all claims and issues involved.

        Issues

        Needless to say, the number of parties, course of proceedings, and the multiple

trial court orders ultimately disposing of the cause render the issues before us somewhat

difficult to follow.   We divide them into three categories: 1) dismissal for want of

prosecution, 2) summary judgment on the merits, and 3) summary judgment on attorney’s

fees.

        Dismissal for Want of Prosecution

        Again, all defendants other than Younger moved to dismiss Shepherd’s suit for

want of prosecution. Shepherd contends that the trial court erred in granting their motions

and failing to conduct a hearing on her subsequent motion to reinstate. We overrule those

issues.

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       Due to its ease of disposition, we begin with her allegation that the trial court did

not conduct a live hearing on her motion to reinstate the causes after dismissing them.

Her argument is disingenuous.         The record before us contains the transcript of a

September 15, 2022 hearing whereat the motion was heard.                  Moreover, Shepherd

personally attended the proceeding, as did other parties through legal counsel. During

this very same hearing, the trial court also commented on Shepherd’s latest motion to

continue proceedings. Thus, it too was before the court at the time, contrary to her

allegations otherwise.

       Regarding the orders dismissing the claims for want of prosecution, same is

reviewed under the standard of abused discretion, Pence v. S&D Builders, LLC, No. 07-

21-00080-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9916, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 15, 2021

pet. denied) (mem. op.), as is the denial of a motion to reinstate. Cummings v. Billman,

634 S.W.3d 163, 166-67 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Furthermore, a trial court

has inherent power to dismiss a cause when the plaintiff fails to prosecute it with due

diligence. Pence, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 9916, at *6. Multiple factors may be considered

when assessing such diligence, or lack thereof. They include 1) the age of the case; 2)

the activity undertaken to develop it during its life, if any; 3) the requests for trial settings,

if any; and 4) the existence of reasonable excuses for the delay. Id. at *9-10.

       With those indicia in mind, we first note that the case was about four years old

when dismissed. That period is at least about 30 months longer than the time in which

our Supreme Court expects a trial court to dispose of non-family civil proceedings. See

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.1(a) (providing that civil cases other than family law matters be tried

within 18 months from appearance date for jury cases and within 12 months from

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appearance date in nonjury cases). Thus, its time had passed under the administrative

rule.

        As for activity, Shepherd had two different attorneys represent her since the

inception of the suit. Both withdrew. The most recent did so because she failed to pay

and effectively communicate with him, at least that is what the attorney represented to

the trial court when it granted leave to withdraw. That happened in June 2021, or a bit

over two months before the trial court signed its dismissal orders. Moreover, the particular

attorney also represented to the court that no depositions had been taken and little other

discovery had transpired. Shepherd cited us to nothing of record contradicting this.

        The record also illustrates that she failed to appear for a deposition set by the

opposing parties. Nor did Shepherd cooperate with effort to reschedule it. As said by

opposing counsel: “with respect to cooperation between Ms. Shepherd and her counsel,

we requested her deposition numerous times throughout the month of May and June.”

What they “kept getting back was, ‘Not available,’ ‘Can't do it,’ ‘Needs to be pushed off to

maybe August, September.’” So, the trial court heard not only that she conducted nominal

discovery but also hindered the ability of others to do so.

        Next, the record reflects that the cause had been set for trial several times. Those

dates were met with multiple motions for continuance, which motions were granted.

Though most were jointly filed between the parties, they, nonetheless, illustrate continuing

delay in which Shepherd intentionally acquiesced.

        Of further note is Shepherd’s comment about mediation at the hearing on the

motion to dismiss and her continuing attempt to pursue it. Her latest invitation to do so

was rejected in June 2021. Interestingly, effort to resolve the case through settlement

                                             5
negotiations or mediation served as the basis for many of the earlier motions to continue.

Obviously, those efforts proved fruitless, for whatever reason.          Nevertheless, her

persistent effort to follow a path which much earlier proved untenable tends to contradict

her interest in trying the cause. And, as those efforts at settlement proved fruitless,

discovery apparently remained stagnant.

       As for excuses, she placed the blame on her ex-attorneys. Allegedly, they refused

to heed her numerous pleas to conduct discovery. None of these attorneys were present

to confirm the allegation. Nor did she tender into the record any other evidence supporting

her contention, despite alluding to the existence of emails. Moreover, the latest withdrew

due to Shepherd’s refusal to pay and effectively communicate with him. The latter can

be viewed as some evidence that Shepherd impeded her attorney’s ability to answer her

purported pleas. Most importantly, though, ex-attorneys’ supposed inaction does not

explain her own failure to cooperate with the discovery efforts of others.

       Shepherd also interjected Covid and its widespread effect. No doubt, it caused

people to minimize physical interaction and impacted litigation.        Then again, Zoom

developed as a means by which people could overcome some obstacles created by the

germ and move forward. Shepherd did not address why that medium went unutilized in

preparation for trial.

       The trial court’s observations and questions to Shepherd best capture the situation.

It uttered:

       •      “I mean, the problem here is this case has been pending for four years,
              and there’s been no forward progress at great expense to the
              Defendants.”

       •      “I think you were back here 11 months ago asking for more time on your
              case. Eleven months have passed, nothing’s happened, and you failed
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           to show up for your deposition. What am I supposed to do with this
           case? It’s not moving forward after four years.”

       •   “Because your attorney was in here two months ago saying that you
           weren’t cooperating with them and they needed to be removed from this
           case . . . .”

       •   “But they asked you to show up for your deposition, and you just didn’t
           show up and didn’t reschedule it. So how can you go to trial when you’re
           not showing up for your deposition? You say that you have claims
           against them, and they’re trying to conduct discovery so they can get
           ready for trial, which is scheduled in less than three weeks, and . . . they
           don’t even understand what your claims are against them because you
           won’t show up for your deposition, and this case has been pending for
           four years.”

       •   “What I see is it looks like this is the ninth trial setting in this case. Is
           that correct? I’m just looking at my docket sheet.”

       •   “I see eight trial dates that have been scratched through.”

       Given the trial court’s perception of the circumstances and the evidence alluded to

above, its decision to dismiss is not unreasonable. Nor does it deviate from controlling

rules and principles. The same is no less true of the trial court’s refusal to reinstate the

four-year-old case. Her excuses for the delay and proof supporting same were tenuous,

or so the trial court could have reasonably concluded. Accordingly, no discretion was

abused in either instance. See Preslar v. Garcia, No. 03-13-00449-CV, 2014 Tex. App.

LEXIS 2156, at *6-8 (Tex. App—Austin Feb. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming the

decision to dismiss a case for want of prosecution when it was over 40 months old with

at least 21 months of inaction and no reasonable excuse was offered for the delay); In re

McBryde Family Trust, No. 13-20-00473-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8539, at *16-17 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding, among other things, that

Covid-19 was not a reasonable excuse for the delay given the “overall minimal” activity in

a case that had been on file for 18 months).
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       Summary Judgments

       As mentioned earlier, the trial court also entered summary judgments denying

Shepherd’s claims against Painter, Younger, and Scott. Having affirmed its orders of

dismissal, we need not consider the summary judgments awarded to anyone other than

Younger. Again, the claims against Younger were the only ones outside the umbrella of

the dismissal orders.

       Shepherd alleged only one cause of action against Younger. It consisted of

breached contract. It allegedly breached it by refusing to sell her the realty in question.

Younger moved for summary judgment on the claim, contending that her failure to

perform various conditions ended its contractual obligation to her. Those conditions were

1) waiving the contingency that her duty to buy depended upon selling her house and 2)

depositing $1,000 in escrow, which contingencies had to be completed within three days

of being notified of the decision to accept the second offer.

       Shepherd admitted that “[t]he standard written form contract unambiguously

required an additional deposit to escrow as part of waiving the contingency.” That is, the

addendum she executed contained the following:

       B. If Seller [Younger] accepts a written offer to sell the Property, Seller shall
       notify Buyer [Shepherd] (1) of such acceptance AND (2) that Seller requires
       Buyer to waive the Contingency. Buyer must waive the Contingency on or
       before the 3rd day after Seller’s notice to Buyer; otherwise the contract will
       terminate automatically and the earnest money will be refunded to Buyer.

       C. Buyer may waive the Contingency only by notifying Seller of the waiver
       and depositing $1,000.00 with escrow agent as additional earnest money.
       All notices must be in writing and are effective when delivered in accordance
       with the contract.

       So, within three days of being informed of Younger’s accepting a subsequent offer,

Shepherd had to waive the contingency. And, there was only one way to do it. The

                                              8
agreement obligated her by notifying Younger she waived the contingency “and

depositing $1000.00 with [the ] escrow agent as additional earnest money.” (Emphasis

added).

      No one disputes that Younger accepted a subsequent offer and twice afforded

Shepherd notice of it. Nor does anyone deny that Shepherd failed to perform both

conditions required of her within three days of either notification. Indeed, Shepherd

acknowledged her failure to timely deposit the $1,000 through an email and attachment

sent on August 28, 2017. The attachment, according to her, was a “[s]igned . . . response

to Notice regarding Contingency, indicating ‘Buyer waives the contingency and deposits

the additional earnest money with the escrow agent.’”       Following that, we find her

attestation that “l did not make the additional deposit to escrow.” Her thus having failed

to comply, the contract terminated per its own terms.

      Nevertheless, effort was made to excuse the default. It came in the form of waiver.

Purportedly, Younger waived the condition about depositing the additional $1,000. That

occurred, in her view, when Younger’s real estate agent only requested proof of financial

ability to buy the property when delivering notice of the second offer. According to

Shepherd, the real estate agent had “apparent authority” to waive the condition on behalf

of Younger.

      Yet, in urging the theory, she cited us to neither 1) legal authority specifying the

elements of apparent authority nor 2) evidence raising an issue of fact as to their

existence. Such was required by an appellant and one attempting to defend against a

summary judgment motion by interjecting some defense. See Hines v. Deutsche Bank

Nat’l Trust Co., No. 02-14-00368-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11715, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—

                                            9
Fort Worth Nov. 12, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting the nonmovant’s burden to

come forward with evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact on each element of the

defense to avoid summary judgment).            Similarly missing is substantive analysis

supporting her contention, that is, analysis applying legal authority to evidence of record.

We have no obligation to do any of that for her, sua sponte. Jackson Walker, LLP v.

Kinsel, 518 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 526 S.W.3d

411 (Tex. 2017); see Hornbuckle v. State Farm Ins., No. 02-15-00387-CV, 2016 Tex.

App. LEXIS 11197, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(stating that the court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant). It matters not that she

acted pro se. Such parties must also comply with the rules of appellate procedure.

Hornbuckle, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11197, at *7. And her omission is of particular

importance here since the doctrine of apparent authority normally does not apply to real

estate transactions. Huginnie v. Loyd, 483 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1972

writ ref’d n.r.e.); Bugh v. Word, 424 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1968, writ

ref’d n.r.e.) (quoting Goode v. Westside Developers, Inc., 258 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Together, this means that Shepherd did not carry

her appellate burden to establish the impropriety of summary judgment.

       In short, the contract to buy the realty ended when Shepherd failed to perform the

conditions required of her.     Thus, Younger established its entitlement to summary

judgment, as a matter of law, and we overrule her issue.

       Attorney’s Fees

       Lastly, Shepherd challenges the summary judgment through which the trial court

awarded attorney’s fees to her opponents. In support thereof, she asserts that 1) Younger

                                             10
did not plea for attorney’s fees and 2) everyone failed to prove the fees awarded were

reasonable and necessary. We overrule the issue.

       Regarding Younger’s purported failure to seek fees through a pleading, Shepherd

again misrepresents the record. Younger prayed for same in its original answer.

       As for proving the amount of fees recoverable, Shepherd said much about

applicable legal authority. Yet, no substantive analysis followed. As with her argument

about “apparent authority,” we are left to answer that on our own. But, again, that is not

our duty. So, her effort again constitutes inadequate briefing resulting in the waiver of the

complaint. Hornbuckle, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 11197, at *7-8 (holding that argument

must include substantive analysis and by omitting it, one waives the complaint).

       Possibly, her omission may be explained by the tenor of the evidence. Simply put,

it negated her conclusory allegations. Indeed, the trial court had before it affidavits from

legal counsel and their respective detailed bills for services provided. Those items

illustrated 1) the qualifications of those performing services; 2) the services performed,

who performed them, when they were performed, and the time necessary to perform

them; and 3) the reasonable hourly rates for each of the services by each professional.

More importantly, such addressed and satisfied the criteria deemed relevant by our

Supreme Court in Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469

(Tex. 2018). So too did and does it constitute ample evidence to establish, as a matter

of law, the fees awarded were reasonable and necessary. Those fees were $88,706.60

to Helen Painter & Co, Catherine Taylor, and Amy DeForest, $30,872.00 to Scott Real

Estate, Inc. and Shila Manley, and $6,237.50 to Younger.

                                             11
       To reiterate, we overrule each of Shepherd’s issues and affirm the judgments of

the trial court.

                                                     Brian Quinn
                                                     Chief Justice

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