Court Opinion

ID: 3947099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-06 10:09:47.433135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:06.662603
License: Public Domain

I am of the opinion that the motion for rehearing herein should be granted, for the following reasons: First, receivership is not authorized herein by subdivision 2, art. 2128, Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. for the reason that the parties herein are not jointly interested in the property or fund, and for the further reason that the property or fund is not shown to be in danger of being lost or removed or materially injured pending this suit.
By "jointly interested," as that term is used in this statute, I think there must be a joint ownership of the party seeking the receivership with the party against whom receivership is sought. An executor, as such, has no property interest in the estate. He does not hold the property for himself, but as trustee for the owners and creditors. He is entitled to exclusive possession, and such holding is not adverse to the heirs or legatees. V. S. art. 3235; Giddings v. Steele, 28 Tex. 748, 91 Am.Dec. 336; Laals v. Seidel, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 66 S.W. 871,68 S.W. 724; Id., 95 Tex. 442, 67 S.W. 1015; Northcraft v. Oliver,74 Tex. 167, 11 S.W. 1121.
There can be no contention, under the facts of this case, that Richardson had any interest in the property, or that he was holding the same except as executor. If Neill has a joint interest in the property, by reason of his being a legatee under the will of Mrs. McCloskey, this affords no ground for a receivership as against Richardson. The evidence does not sustain a finding that "the property or fund is in danger of being lost or removed or materially injured."
The statute referred to further provides for the appointment of a receiver "in all other cases where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of the court of equity." Under the usages and practices of the court of equity, a receiver will be appointed only when it is necessary for the future protection of the property.
The past conduct of the executors is referred to in the original opinion herein as being reprehensible in the following particulars:
"(1) The allotment to the estate of Laura McCloskey of a large amount of personal property without an entry on the books showing the amount, and without showing what was set aside to the estate of T. H. McCloskey."
If appellants cannot show what they have turned over to the estate of Laura McCloskey, they are entitled to no credit for same, and must account for all property which came into their hands belonging to the estate of T. H. and Laura McCloskey. It matters not how large an amount was turned over to the estate of Laura McCloskey, if enough remained to compensate the estate of T. H. McCloskey.
"(2) The executors refused to consent to follow the history of this property after Neill received it."
If any property was turned over to the estate of Laura McCloskey, it became the property of such estate, and the executors of the estate of T. H. McCloskey have no business to follow it for any purpose.
"(3) The books and memoranda of the estate were kept in a confused, inaccurate, and careless manner, and at the time of their oral examination they had practically ceased to give the estate any attention."
So far as I have been able to ascertain from a careful examination of the statement of facts, the criticism as to keeping the books applies only to the failure to make a proper entry as to what personal property was set aside to the estate of Laura McCloskey. It appears from the evidence that a partition of the personal property was agreed upon, and an itemized statement of the property turned over to the estate of Laura McCloskey, and entered on the *Page 332 
journal at the time of such partition, but that shortly afterwards some changes were made. In consequence of this, the journal entry referred to was not correct in so far as related to the changes made, and thereafter the bookkeeper was not furnished with an itemized statement as to such changes.
I find no evidence in the statement of facts that the appellants had ceased to give the estate proper attention. Nothing was left but money, which was deposited in the bank, and real estate, which was rented, insured, and kept in repair by a real estate agent employed for that purpose, and who rendered monthly accounts of such matters.
"(4) They had borrowed money from the estate without giving their notes for the same."
True, but the same was charged against them on the books, and they repaid all amounts borrowed, with 8 per cent. interest.
"(5) They also gave away to an old favorite of the McCloskey family money belonging in part to appellees without their consent."
The evidence indicates that this was a loan of several small sums, amounting in the aggregate to $31.
"(6) They delayed any attempt at an accounting for a long time, and the exhibits finally attached to their amended answer do not show the condition of the estate or the property handled by them, as a proper accounting should."
The exhibits attached to their amended answer are full and complete, and show a full accounting as to their management of the estate.
"(7) Even after the suit was brought, they sold part of the real estate, which the court held was beyond their authority as executors, and they are attempting to and threatening to sell the remainder."
The sale of a part of the real estate was made at the request of the attorney for appellees. As stated in the majority opinion herein on motion for rehearing, no attempt or threat to sell real estate was made after their right to do so was challenged by the pleadings in this cause.
"(8) They were hostile to defendants (appellees) and their claims; the animosity of Richardson especially being very marked while giving his testimony."
There is no evidence that Neill was hostile to any of the appellees. That Richardson was angry because he had been charged with improper conduct furnishes no reason for an appointment of a receiver.
"(9) They had excluded appellees from the possession and control as well as participation in the handling of the property or its proceeds."
This they had the legal right to do until the administration should be closed. Indeed, it was their duty so to do.
In this case appellees applied for the appointment of a receiver, alleging certain facts tending to show that they were entitled to the same under the rules of equity. Appellants denied specifically these allegations. Upon this state of the pleadings, appellees were not entitled to the appointment of a receiver, unless the evidence introduced by them should show that the answers of appellants were not true. The itemized exhibits, attached to appellants' answer and made a part thereof, were not questioned by any evidence, except in so far as relates to the personal property set aside to the estate of Laura McCloskey. The evidence in this regard shows only that certain property was set aside to the estate of Laura McCloskey, by agreement of parties, but that subsequently some of such property was returned to the estate of T. H. McCloskey, by the executor of the estate of Laura McCloskey. The answer of appellants shows that the entire estate coming into their hands was the community property of T. H. McCloskey and wife at the time of his death; that the same consisted of —
Real estate, appraised at ................................... $49,200.00 And all personal property, appraised at .....................  32,848.46
To which should be added:
Profits on stock sold .......................................   1,967.00 Real estate sold ............................................  11,000.00 Rents prior to Mrs. McCloskey's death .......................  11,602.01 Interest prior to Mrs. McCloskey's death ....................   4,395.26 Dividends on stocks .........................................   1,490.50 ---------- Total personal property ................................... $63,303.03
To which should be added amounts received since filing the answer, as admitted by appellants:
Rebate on insurance .........................................       1.90 Rents .......................................................     430.35 From other sources ..........................................     357.35 ---------- Total personal property coming into the hands of executors ............................................ $64,092.63
From this should be deducted:
Loss on stock sold .............................. $2,650.00 Loss on furniture sold ..........................    250.00 Loss on Franklin note ...........................    250.00 Loss on open accounts ...........................    800.00 Paid Mrs. McCloskey during life ................. 10,360.00 Paid Mrs. McCloskey's funeral and doctors' bills .........................................    900.00 --------- Total .........................................              15,210.00 ---------- Balance net value of personal property, as shown by inventory, including proceeds of real estate sold ......... $48,882.63 To this add receipts since Mrs. McCloskey's death ...........  14,832.39 ---------- Total personal property received .......................... $63,715.02
The itemized statement shows disbursements prior to the death of Mrs. McCloskey of $34,849.49, but, as this includes money loaned, which was repaid, $24,869.60, there should be credited on disbursements, for the purpose of showing property on hand, only the difference, which is $9,979.89. *Page 333 
Total personal property ................................... $63,715.02
Disbursements.
Prior to Mrs. McCloskey's death ................. $9,979.89 Since Mrs. McCloskey's death .................... 16,876.27 --------- Total .........................................              26,856.16 Balance personal property ................................... $36,858.86 Half belonging to Mrs. McCloskey's estate ................... $18,429.43 ---------- Half belonging to T. H. McCloskey's estate .................. $18,429.43
Paid from T. H. McCloskey's Estate.
Legacies ........................................ $8,500.00 To Mrs. Glick ...................................  1,250.00 Inheritance tax .................................    428.00     9,728.00 ---------   ---------- Balance personal property belonging to T. H. McCloskey's estate ........................................  $8,701.43
To meet this appellants have on hand:
Cash in bank .................................... $4,516.12 Unsold real estate, value not shown, but alleged to be worth $75,000 — one-half of this belongs to estate of Laura McCloskey .. 37,500.00 ---------- Total ........................................ $42,016.12
Or an excess of resources over liabilities to appellees of $33,314.69. This upon the theory that the $18,429.43 belonging to Mrs. McCloskey's estate has been turned over to Neill.
The burden was upon appellees to show that the estate would probably be wasted during the pendency of this suit. The court entered a restraining order to prevent appellants from selling any more of the real estate during the pendency of this suit. Appellants have not complained of this order. So far from showing any probability that the estate had been or would be wasted, I think the answer of appellants, which is not attacked by the evidence, except as to the item of personal property turned over to the estate of Mrs. McCloskey, shows conclusively that there is no danger of the estate being lost or removed during the pendency of this suit, and that appellees will not be materially injured by failure of the court to appoint a receiver.
In the opinion of the majority upon rehearing it is stated that the conclusion of the court is not based upon any one finding of fact, but upon all of them in the aggregate. I do not know how to weigh the aggregation of facts without determining the value of each. A careful examination of the record has led me to the conclusion that the findings of fact by the majority are either unsupported or immaterial.