Court Opinion

ID: 9475727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:36:36.623448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:53.845276
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur in the majority’s view that Spagnola is precluded from maintaining a section 1985(1) suit, I disagree with the majority’s analysis of that issue. I also disagree with the majority’s decision to grant Spagnola a Bivens remedy against his supervisors, and therefore dissent from Part II of the majority opinion. As these conclusions would dispose of Spagnola’s lawsuit, I do not reach the official immunity issue discussed in Part IV.
The disputes before us today, both in this case and in Hubbard v. EPA, et al., 809 F.2d 1, represent additional links in a lengthening chain of cases in which federal employees have sought to challenge supervisory actions and recover damages from their superiors under various theories of liability. Each of these decisions has in large part turned on the questions: (1) whether the claims advanced have ever been available in the context of federal employment, and (2) insofar as these claims were previously available in such a context, to what extent the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 has eclipsed them.
This case concerns the availability and scope of claims under a provision of .the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (1982), and under the Bivens1 doctrine. For the reasons set forth below, I would affirm the district court’s holding regarding Spagnola’s first amendment Bivens claim and reverse the holding regarding the section 1985(1) claim. This disposition would render it unnecessary to review the district court’s treatment of the defense of qualified immunity.
I.
The district court certified to us the question of “the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) to [Spagnola], a Federal civil service employee, to state a claim for money damages and a jury trial against defendants, his former supervisors, in the context of [his] federal employment.” J.A. at 44. This is a case of first impression in this Circuit. Although I agree with the majority that, in the end, section 1985(1) provides no cause of action to Spagnola against his supervisors, I take a different path to reach that conclusion.
Interpreting the provision we must, of course, begin with its language. Sections 1985(1) and (3) provide:
(1) If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties;
(3) ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section [1985], if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or proper*33ty, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(1), (3) (1982) (emphasis added).
Quite evidently, then, even where the alleged injury for purposes of section 1985(3) is unambiguous,2 the object of the conspiracy for purposes of section 1985(1) must be obstruction of, or retaliation for, the lawful discharge of the duties of the plaintiffs office (except where the complaint alleges a conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff from even accepting or holding federal office). Indispensable to the cause of action, therefore, is an available definition or determination of those duties.
If a federal officer sues persons outside the federal service under this statute, normally the scope of his duties would not be in issue; and even if it were — if, for example, a defense could be based on a claim of ultra vires or unlawful action on the officer’s part — one would look to the Government (i.e., his supervisors) for an authoritative description of the plaintiff’s duties. To recognize a suit by a federal officer under section 1985(1) against his supervisors for interference with his official duties would create an anomaly under the statutory language: supervisors by their very direction of subordinates, both general and specific, define the scope of their subordinates’ duties.3 Indeed, in 1871 — over a decade before the creation of the civil service, and long before the advent of such modern personnel innovations as the “position descriptions” on which appellee would have us rely4 — normally the only definitions of a federal officer’s duties would come from his supervisor’s direction. How then, it may be asked, could Congress possibly have intended section 1985(1) to be used as appellee suggests here?
Surely the Reconstruction Congress could not have wished the federal courts, in the context of a damage action, to referee disputes between federal supervisors and their subordinates as to the appropriate scope of the latter’s duties. Even today (let alone in 1871) that would be seen as striking deep into the capacity of the Executive Branch to perform its functions.5 *34Nothing in the Civil Service Reform Act, nor in any other statute of which I am aware, authorizes the federal courts to determine the “appropriate” official duties of a federal officer. That determination has always been regarded as within the Executive’s managerial discretion.6
The appellee would have us conclude that the Forty-Second Congress desired the federal judiciary to play a role in defining Executive Branch officers’ duties far more intrusive than that which Congress directed over a hundred years later. See supra note 6. I find the argument far-fetched but nonetheless turn to the origins of the statute to determine whether it provides support for plaintiff’s interpretation.
The language of section 1985(1) was taken from a Civil War enactment, the Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284 (1861), now codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (1982).7 The wartime wording was incorporated by the Forty-Second Congress as part of the Act of April 20, 1871, which became popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. This enactment was one of the last of the so-called Force Acts designed to effectuate the Reconstruction Amendments and secure federal authority in a South still under military occupation. It was prompted by President Grant’s report to Congress that a “condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous,” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871), and by an alarming 600-page report on the Klan by a Joint Select Committee of Congress. S.Rep. No. 41, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-13 (1871). See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. at 656-58, 71 S.Ct. at 939-40; McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 615 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 2314, 68 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981).
Although the 1871 Act was a comprehensive remedial measure serving a variety of purposes, the greater part of the Act “relate^] to the preservation of the institutions and processes of the Federal Government,” Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724-25, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 75 L.Ed.2d 413 (1983). The nature of these provisions reveals an overarching congressional concern to protect the authority, institutions and processes of the Federal Government from external, usually coercive, disruption. Section 2 of the Act applied, inter alia, to conspiracies to overthrow or levy war against the United States or hinder the execution of its laws; conspiracies by force or threat to deter or punish parties, witnesses or jurors in federal courts; conspiracies by force or threat to prevent any legally-qualified U.S. citizen from participating in federal elections; and the conspiracies now detailed without material change in the provision at issue in this case, section 1985(1). Further sections of the 1871 Act authorized the President actually to use troops to suppress civil disorder and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
The structure and origins of section 1985(1) reveal a grave congressional concern to protect the authority and institutions of the Federal Government from outside interference. The provision’s origin as a war measure, its re-enactment under conditions deemed by Congress to be virtually insurrectional, and the harsh penal and military character of the remainder of the statute persuade me that this singularly powerful instrument was intended by Congress as a shield to protect federal officials from external coercion in a hostile environment, not a tool for resolving personnel disputes between members of the federal service.
*35The majority nevertheless adopts Spagnola’s argument that the Supreme Court, in interpreting other civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction era, has generally “ ‘accorded] [them] a sweep as broad as [their] language.’ ” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 408 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1796, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)). But, as I have already indicated, appellee urges a strained interpretation of the actual language in section 1985(1). In any event, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly warned against the dangers of an approach to statutory construction which confines itself to the bare words of a statute, for ‘literalness may strangle meaning.’ ” Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 1067, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) (Harlan, J.) (quoting Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44, 66 S.Ct. 889, 892, 90 L.Ed. 1071 (1946)) (other citations omitted). In Griffin v. Breckenridge itself, the Court held that Congress intended another subsection of the statute, section 1985(3), to reach only conspiracies motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus,” although the language of the subsection is more general. 403 U.S. at 101-102, 91 S.Ct. at 1797-98.
Congressional enactments in the civil service field from the Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”) support this reading of the earlier statute. If section 1985(1) applies to disputes between federal officers, it must perforce apply without regard to the extent of remedies made available by Congress in later civil service enactments. Therefore, it would be impossible to hold that section 1985(1) applied only to those complaints by subordinates against their superiors not “adequately” remedied by CSRA.8 Although I find no discussion of section 1985(1) claims in the legislative history of the CSRA,91 conclude that Congress could not have intended such overlapping coverage of civil service disputes. The Supreme Court has “in a variety of contexts ... held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts more general remedies.” Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1967, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth’y v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2625-27, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981).
Here, too, I find no specific manifestations of congressional intent in enacting the civil service statutes to pre-empt the earlier provision. Here, too, however, elaborate legislative schemes like the CSRA could, under the appellee’s interpretation, be displaced “by perverse application of Gresham’s law ... were immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes permissible.” Brown, 425 U.S. at 833, 96 S.Ct. at 1968. As in Brown, “[i]t would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading.” Id. I cannot infer a Congressional intent to produce such anomalous results. See Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d 1319, 1328 (D.C. Cir.1981) (Wald, J., concurring) (“It would be inconsistent with the carefully crafted Congressional scheme in this area to imply a new cause of action under an old statute____”); Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 631-32 (9th Cir.1983) (military subordinates may not sue superiors under section 1985(1) because court infers from unique character of the military that “[Congress] obviously did not intend to supplement ... internal military [review] procedures through enactment of § 1985(1)”), *36cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 126 (1984).
The other courts of appeals that have considered the statute have reached similar conclusions as to its scope. See, e.g., Santistevan v. Loveridge, 732 F.2d 116, 118 (10th Cir.1984) (legislative history of section 1985(1) “clearly indicates that the Act was not enacted to develop a forum within the federal courts whereby dissatisfied federal employees could resolve internal personnel problems”); Windsor v. The Tennessean, 726 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.) (dictum), denying petition for rehearing in 719 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 105, 83 L.Ed.2d 50 (1984); Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d at 631 (military subordinate may not sue superior under section 1985(1)).10
The majority’s reliance upon Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975, 98 S.Ct. 533, 54 L.Ed.2d 467 (1977), is misplaced. The court in Stern stated that an IRS agent was not barred from stating a claim under section 1985(1) against corporate officers who allegedly conspired to defame him to his superiors in order to disrupt his audit of their company. This is a clear instance of the sort of external interference with government officers that section 1985(1) was designed to prevent. I agree with the Stem court that “Congress, in enacting what became § 1985(1), did not fashion a narrow and limited remedy applicable only to the southern states in 1871,” and that it is not dispositive that “the immediate attention of the Forty-Second Congress was focused on circumstances which bear little resemblance to the facts alleged in [the] complaint.” Id. at 1335. See also Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d at 1328 (Wald, J., concurring) (“[Section] 1985(1) should not be so restricted that it applies only in those precise situations contemplated in 1871 by its framers.”). Undoubtedly, section 1985(1) is applicable to external interference with federal officers coming within its terms, whether or not “any member of [the Forty-Second] Congress ever specifically contemplated the application of the provisions which became § 1985(1)” to the precise form that interference takes. Stern, 547 F.2d at 1335. This survey of the origins of section 1985(1) is for the purpose of determining the evil at which it was directed, not the specific manifestations of that evil that were before the framers’ minds at the time. I would simply hold that the evil Congress addressed in enacting section 1985(1) is interference with federal officers by persons outside the Federal Government, and not the very different abuses that arise in the internal operation of the federal bureaucracy, and which Congress has independently regulated through comprehensive statutory enactments. See Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d at 1328.11
II.
In his cross-appeal, Spagnola seeks a reversal of the district court’s dismissal of his claim for monetary and injunctive relief against the appellants, grounded on their alleged violations of his rights under the first amendment. The majority holds, and I agree, that because appellants no longer supervise him, Spagnola’s claim for injunctive relief against them in their individual capacities is moot. But as to the majority’s decision to allow his Bivens claim, I must part company.
*37Another case decided today, Hubbard v. EPA, et al., 809 F.2d 1, addresses this same issue: whether, in light of Congress’ enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), a Bivens remedy should be made available to persons who suffer adverse federal personnel decisions. My reasons for answering this question in the negative are set forth in the majority opinion in that case, and apply with equal weight here. However, the majority’s discussion of this issue compels me to offer some additional thoughts.
The majority’s analysis of the controlling case, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), begins correctly enough by observing that Bivens actions are precluded in two situations: when Congress explicitly declares an equally effective remedy to be a substitute for a Bivens remedy, and when “special factors” exist that counsel courts to hesitate before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation. The majority goes on to say that because Congress did not explicitly preclude Bivens claims in enacting CSRA, the so-called “alternative remedy” test is not applicable here; the availability of a Bivens remedy in this case turns on whether special factors exist that counsel us not to create a Bivens remedy.
That said, however, the majority proceeds to ignore the important special factors that virtually dictate judicial restraint here, and to instead base its holding on the same “alternative remedy” analysis that it already conceded was irrelevant to the case. The majority begins this analysis by, in my view, misinterpreting Bush v. Lucas. Properly read, Bush holds that because the CSRA remedial system in its entirety is a “comprehensive procedural and substantive provision[] giving meaningful remedies ... it would be inappropriate for [courts] to supplement that regulatory scheme with a new judicial remedy.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. at 2406. Yet the majority fixes upon the Bush Court’s occasional use of the terms “meaningful remedies” and “constitutionally adequate remedies” to justify a close examination of the efficacy of the specific CSRA remedies offered to Spagnola, and accordingly rejects as inadequate Spagnola’s appeal to the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”).12
The Bush Court’s refusal to recognize a Bivens remedy did not rest on a finding that the specific CSRA remedies offered the plaintiff in that case were “meaningful” or even “constitutional.” Indeed, the Court began its analysis by observing, and dismissing as irrelevant, the fact that “civil service remedies were not as effective as an individual damages remedy and did not fully compensate [the plaintiff] for the harm he suffered.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 372, 103 S.Ct. at 2408 (footnote omitted). Nor was the Court moved by the plaintiff’s argument that “civil service remedies against the Government do not provide for punitive damages or a jury trial and do not adequately deter the unconstitutional exercise of authority by supervisors.” Id. at 372 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 2408 n. 8. The Court’s refusal to create a new Bivens remedy rested not on the meaningfulness of the CSRA remedies available to Bush, but instead on the notion of judicial restraint. The Court felt it was not its job to *38pass judgment on the adequacy of various remedies offered by CSRA. Instead, it believed the task of resolving the conflicting policy considerations involved in the “federal employee rights versus litigation costs” debate belongs exclusively to Congress:
The question is not what remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go unredressed. It is whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed [by Congress] step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violations at issue. That question obviously cannot be answered simply by noting that existing remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff.
... In all events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service____
Id. at 388-89, 103 S.Ct. at 2416-17. Bush v. Lucas does not permit this court to measure the various remedies available to federal employees against some self-defined yardstick of “meaningfulness.”
An analysis of Circuit precedent shows that this court has remained faithful to the holding of Bush v. Lucas. Before Bush applied the “special factor” test to civil service disputes, our analysis of such cases was controlled by the “alternative remedies” test of Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). Under that test, we had a clear obligation to examine the remedy offered by the government as an alternative to the Bivens remedy to see if it was equally as effective as the constitutional remedy. In Borrell v. U.S. International Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C.Cir.1982), we responded to the government’s claim that CSRA preempted Bivens claims by applying the Carlson alternative remedy test to determine whether “Congress meant [by enacting CSRA] to take away from probationary employees preexisting rights of action to pursue constitutional rights in district court actions.” Id. at 989. Under this test, we concluded, first, that Congress was not sufficiently explicit about its alleged intent to displace judicially-created remedies for constitutional violations, id., and second, that the proffered CSRA remedy was not adequate to serve as a substitute for constitutional remedies, id. at 990. In Cutts v. Fowler, 692 F.2d 138 (D.C.Cir. 1982), we performed a similar analysis under the “alternative remedies” test, with a similar result. Id. at 140.
As the majority recognizes, Bush changed the analysis of this issue when it turned away from the alternative remedies test and instead gave substance to the special factors test. Yet until today, this court has not squarely considered whether the special factors test counsels us to deny a constitutional damages claim to remedy an alleged prohibited personnel practice.. Although the majority attempts to analogize from other civil service cases considering different issues, in the end, Bush is the only case that matters.
In the immediate aftermath of Bush, we held in Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C.Cir.1983), that the CSRA remedial scheme precludes other statutory remedies, but (as the majority notes) did not decide whether it is a special factor that counsels us to avoid creating other constitutional remedies. In Bartel v. F.A.A., 725 F.2d 1403 (D.C.Cir.1984), we observed that under the special factors test, CSRA preempts civil servants’ Bivens claims based on conduct remediable under CSRA, and remanded to the district court so it could decide whether the alleged violations were remediable under CSRA. Id. at 1415. Bartel left open the issue we address today. In Williams v. IRS, 745 F.2d 702 (D.C.Cir.1984), a case where the plaintiff-employee sought equitable relief only, we applied Borrell (which also involved only equitable relief) and recognized the plaintiff’s right to seek equitable relief in federal courts. Williams merited a different analysis than the one required in the instant case because the courts’ power to impose equitable remedies against agencies is broader than its power to impose legal remedies against individuals. In Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. *39denied, — U.S. 106 S.Ct. 62, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985), we described the CSRA remedial system as “a comprehensive statutory forum” that, under Bush, precludes a Bivens claim. The majority makes much of dicta contained in a footnote that implied that a statutory right to petition the OSC, without more, would not preclude a Bivens claim for damages. But as that observation was not necessary to the resolution of the case, it should not be used to support a deviation from otherwise consistent precedent.
The conclusion I draw from this review of Circuit precedent is that while scrutiny of specific CSRA remedies was certainly proper before Bush was decided, and may still be proper when we consider extending equitable remedies for constitutional violations, such scrutiny is no longer proper when considering whether to extend a Bivens remedy to the subjects of adverse federal employment decisions.13
Having disagreed with the majority’s view that a constitutional analysis of Spagnola’s remedy is necessary, I must also disagree with the assumption that guides that analysis. The majority analyzes the case as if Congress had specifically sought to bar the judiciary from employing a constitutionally required remedy — an Ex Parte McCardle-type situation.14 But that is not the case with which we are presented. Instead, the question is: can and should the Federal judiciary — led by the Supreme Court — as a matter of policy15 decline to extend a Bivens remedy to federal employees in light of congressional adoption of a comprehensive scheme that governs federal personnel practices. We ask not what Congress may do, but what courts may do; surely it cannot be argued that the Supreme Court may not constitutionally exercise judicial restraint.
The majority is also wrong in implicitly equating the denial of a particular remedy with the denial of federal jurisdiction itself. I do not suggest that the presence of CSRA precludes federal jurisdiction over civil servants’ constitutional claims. Indeed, in Hubbard we declined to extend the plaintiff a Bivens remedy, but at the same time held he is entitled to pursue his constitutional claim seeking equitable relief.
Under my view of the law, federal employees alleging constitutional violations are entitled to pursue whatever administrative remedies CSRA offers. If they fail to obtain satisfactory resolution of their claim, they may seek equitable relief in federal court. Of course, some people (Spagnola, for example) will be unable to seek equitable relief because their claims are not justiciable (for example, the case is moot). But as Judge Wald notes in her concurrence in Hubbard, the number of cases in which a civil servant will be completely barred from federal court “should not be substantial.” Hubbard, (Wald, J., concurring) at 15 n. 3.
Finally, I think the majority overlooks what was for the Bush Court a crucial special factor that compels judicial restraint. The Court analyzed the effect that damage actions would have on the incentive structure of civil service management *40as a “special factor[ ] counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 378, 103 S.Ct. at 2411. Presented with strong arguments from the government as to the negative effect on legitimate supervision of the threat of subordinates’ damage actions, Justice Stevens said:
The costs associated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant — not only in monetary terms, but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who must defend their decisions____ [I]t is quite probable that if management personnel face the added risk of personal liability for decisions that they believe to be a correct response to improper criticism of the agency, they would be deterred from imposing discipline in future cases.
462 U.S. at 388-89, 103 S.Ct. at 2416-17 (emphasis added). The Court declined to impose a new form of legal liability on supervisors, reasoning that Congress is in a far better position than a court to establish the proper balance between governmental efficiency and the rights of employees.
The Court’s recognition of the undesirable side effects of creating a new Bivens action as a “special factor counseling restraint” applies with equal force to the case at bar. If inflicting minor discipline (or harassment) redressable only by petition to the OSC could give rise to a damage action whereas inflicting stronger penalties could not, supervisors would have an obvious incentive to choose the more draconian punishment when it might not be appropriate.16 Since a 15-day suspension will immunize a supervisor against a damage action (by creating a CSRA right of judicial review)17 it is hard to imagine a supervisor ever choosing a lesser suspension — even if the lesser penalty would otherwise be called for.18
Clearly then, a Bivens remedy is not an appropriate supplement to the CSRA remedial system. Such a remedy is inconsistent with the congressional plan because it would induce federal supervisors to behave in a fashion inconsistent with what CSRA contemplates. Moreover, it subjects federal employees to the likelihood of unjustifiably severe punishment. Under these circumstances, invoking judicial power to impose Bivens litigation on the civil service seems disdainful of the legislative branch. I would therefore decline the invitation to second-guess Congress.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
The sua sponte suggestions for en banc consideration have been circulated to the full Court. A majority of the judges of the Court in regular, active service have voted in favor of the suggestions. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that the issue at Part II of the opinion of December 5,1986 in Spagnola and at Part III of the December 5, 1986 opinion in Hubbard v. EPA, 809 F.2d 1, will be considered and decided by the Court sitting en banc. It is
*41FURTHER ORDERED, by the Court en banc, that Part II of the December 5, 1986 opinion in Spagnola and Part III of the December 5, 1986 opinion in Hubbard be, and the same hereby are, vacated. All other parts of the opinions remain as issued on December 5, 1986.
A future order will govern further proceedings herein.

. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).

. I would not reach the question whether Spagnola could, on the facts he alleges, have been "injured in his person or property" or "deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 660, 71 S.Ct. 937, 941, 95 L.Ed. 1253 (1951).

. The district court, while ultimately holding that Spagnola could state a section 1985(1) claim, was evidently troubled by this aspect of applying section 1985(1) between federal officers:
Mr. Chuzi [Appellee’s counsel]: He v/as taken out of a position of authority, and reassigned to a position of lesser authority. He was removed—
The Court: Any diminution in pay?
Mr. Chuzi: No, Your Honor ... but, essentially, that reassignment ended. His authority to act in that position, [sic] He was sent out to this ... Federal Acquisition Research Project, where he was writing these regulations and kept there for 18 months____
The Court: I understood you to say that writing regulations is one of [Spagnola’s] responsibilities.
Mr. Chuzi: It was one of his responsibilities. The Court: And he was transferred to a place where that was his prime duty?
Mr. Chuzi: That was his prime duty but the problem is that he was taken out of his own office not at his request and assigned some place else----
The Court: What was the office charged with doing to which he was transferred? You said writing regulations. That is his prime function, isn’t it?
Mr. Chuzi: That was one of his functions, Your Honor. Was responsible [sic] for writing regulations, implementing those regulations and overseeing the manner in which contracts were let by the FAI. That was his job, yes. They transferred him out of FAI where he could no longer perform the latter parts of his duties and they transferred him to a job where he would be required to draft regulations.
J.A. at 64, 74-75.

. See the colloquy between appellee’s counsel and the district court, J.A. at 74.

. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135, 47 S.Ct. 21, 31, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926).

. Although a change in an officer’s duties could be relevant to certain claims ultimately reviewable in the federal courts, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(x) (1982), the change would be relevant only to determine whether an employee suffered an improperly motivated action, Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 174 n. 3 (D.C. Cir.1983) — not because the official has, in the sense Spagnola suggests, a statutory right to a job with certain prescribed and defined duties.

. Section 1985(1) as originally enacted subjected conspirators to both civil and penal liability. The 1861 Act imposes only penal liability.

. To accept the appellee’s view that both the CSRA and section 1985(1) govern the civil service would make a mockery of the Supreme Court’s holding in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). We would have to infer that the same evils ascribed by the Bush Court to allowing Bivens claims to co-exist with CSRA remedies were sanctioned by the Congress which enacted the CSRA in 1978. See infra at pp. 39-40.

. Congress was careful to enumerate those preexisting statutory remedies which it intended to survive the enactment of the CSRA. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(d) (1982).

. But see Stith v. Barnwell, 447 F.Supp. 970 (M.D.N.C.1978) (dictum); Perry v. Golub, 400 F.Supp. 409 (N.D.Ala.1975) (granting TRO against federal employee’s supervisor, without discussion of section 1985(l)'s applicability in federal employment context, on grounds that there was substantial likelihood employee would prevail on either section 1985(1) ground or on two others).

. The appellee also argues that Congress could not have intended to immunize from section 1985(1) liability federal officials who, in league with those outside the service who were conspiring against federal authority, threatened or injured subordinates. It is not necessary to decide today whether section 1985(1) could support such a claim where there is no question concerning the scope of duties of the subordinates and where the conspiracy was related to the core concerns of Congress when it passed section 1985(1).

. The term "meaningful remedies” appears in the Supreme Court opinion twice. Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 386, 103 S.Ct. at 2406, 2415. In both cases, the context in which the term is used appears to suggest that the Court meant to describe as "meaningful” the entire set of remedies provided by the comprehensive CSRA system.
The term "constitutionally adequate [remedies]” appears in a footnote to the opinion. Id. at 378 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. at 2412 n. 14. Although there the Court found Bush’s specific civil service remedy "clearly constitutionally adequate,” it reserved the question whether the Constitution requires a Bivens remedy in the absence of any other remedy to vindicate an underlying right. Spagnola had a remedy, so we are not even faced with the question the Supreme Court reserved.
The majority in effect adopts Justice Marshall's concurring opinion which, if it were governing law, would require courts to determine, before deferring to CSRA, that the plaintiff has a remedy under that statute which is "substantially as effective as a damages action.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 390, 103 S.Ct. at 2418 (Marshall, J„ concurring). Had the full Court meant to impose a remedy-specific inquiry upon the federal courts, it would have said so; Justice Marshall’s separate concurrence would then not have been necessary.

. Four other Circuits that have addressed the issue presented in this case have reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 2019, 85 L.Ed.2d 301 (1985); Hallock v. Moses, 731 F.2d 754 (11th Cir.1984); Braun v. United States, 707 F.2d 922 (6th Cir. 1983); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982). The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, recently granted a Bivens remedy to a similarly situated plaintiff after analyzing Bush in much the same way the majority in the instant case does today. Kotarski v. Cooper, 799 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1986). I find the Kotarski decision no more persuasive than the majority opinion.

. To be sure, the majority ultimately concludes that Congress could not have intended to foreclose Bivens remedies for civil servants. But the majority’s logic is (A) Congress could not constitutionally preclude civil servants’ Bivens claims by simply giving them a right to petition OSC; (B) Congress does not want to do unconstitutional things; therefore (C) Congress must have intended to allow Bivens claims to remedy prohibited personnel practices. The key step in the majority’s analysis is clearly the first one.

. The Supreme Court considers policy implications when deciding whether to extend the availability of the Bivens remedy. See Hubbard at 7 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010 (Harlan, J., concurring)).

. The Merit System Protection Board ("MSPB”) may impose as sanctions "removal, reduction in grade, debarment from federal employment for a period not to exceed five years, suspension, reprimand or an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000" on an employee against whom the OSC has brought a complaint of prohibited personnel practices. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1206(g) and 1207(b) (1982) (emphasis added). But undoubtedly almost any supervisor would prefer to take his chances with the OSC and the MSPB rather than face the hazards of a damage action, with or without a jury trial.

. An employee suspended for 15 days or more has suffered an "adverse action,” entitling him to appeal the action to the MSPB, and seek judicial review if necessary. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d), 7703 (1982). An employee suspended for 14 days or less has still suffered an “adverse action," but has no right of appeal to the MSPB or judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7504 (1982).

. Of course, it is possible that, under the majority's approach, the damage action will not lie if an injunctive remedy turns out to be available. Indeed, Judge Wald takes this position in her Hubbard concurrence. But I doubt the possibility of injunctive relief precluding a Bivens action will give a supervisor much comfort. The mere prospect of a damage action will condition the supervisor’s behavior to avoid the risk. See Hubbard at 8-10.