Court Opinion

ID: 9742361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:11:36.234293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:31.559830
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no evidence to warrant giving the instruction on pandering. “Pandering” in the context of a prosecution for distributing obscene materials is a term of art of constitutional dimension. As Justice Givan points out, “pandering” is “the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of .. . customers.” Pinkus v. United States, (1978) 436 U.S. 293, 303, 98 S.Ct. 1808, 1815, 56 L.Ed.2d 293, 302, citing Ginzburg v. United States, (1966) 383 U.S. 463, 467, 86 S.Ct. 942, 945, 16 L.Ed. 31, 35, in turn citing Roth v. United States, (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 495-496, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1314-1315, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (Warren, J., concurring). The evidence relied upon by the State consisted of signs on the building (“Adult News and Bookstore”, “Swingers World Bookstore”, and “Films and Peep Shows”), and inside the store on a magazine rack (“Asses, Tits, and Other Things”). None of these signs constitutes “textual or graphic material openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of ... customers,” in the sense intended in Roth, supra (mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene *212book); Ginzburg, supra (mailing obscene publications and advertising telling how and where the publications might be obtained; and Pinkus, supra (mailing brochures illustrating sex books, magazines, and films).
A state has a “legitimate interest in prohibiting disseminating or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or exposure to juveniles.” (Emphasis added.) Miller v. California, (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 18-19, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2612, 37 L.Ed.2d 419. The mere advertising of the name “Swingers World Bookstore” and a plain description of the nature of the materials sold there as “adult” is not evidence of the kind of obtrusive advertising contemplated by the United States Supreme Court as a factor to be considered “to aid a jury in its determination of whether materials are obscene.... ” Splawn v. California, (1977) 431 U.S. 595, 598, 97 S.Ct. 1987, 1990, 52 L.Ed.2d 606. There is no evidence of the kind of representation of the materials as “would tend to force public confrontation with the potentially offensive aspects of the work.... ” (Emphasis added.) Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S., at 470, 86 S.Ct., at 947. On this basis, the conviction should be reversed.
I also dissent from the majority’s independent determination of obscenity as it is not based upon application of the constitutional test for obscenity set out in Miller v. California, supra, and embodied in the obscenity statute under which Sedelbauer was charged.