Court Opinion

ID: 9697698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:27:03.278371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.634840
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
Dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. The Majority has determined that George Kubis’s petition for reinstatement nunc pro tunc of his right to appeal the denial of his first PCRA petition is itself an untimely second petition. The Majority reaches this conclusion despite the failure of Kubis’s counsel to advocate his first PCRA petition, see Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d 848, *202852-53 (Pa.Super.2002), and dereliction by prison authorities, who failed to forward notice to Kubis of the denial of his first petition in sufficient time to allow him to file an appeal, cf. Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa.Super.2000). In my opinion, both occurrences denied Kubis his right to a complete and counseled review of his first PCRA petition and the post-conviction claims he raises in this appeal. Consequently, Kubis’s untimely “second” petition should be treated as an extension of his first petition and the matter remanded for appointment of new counsel.
¶ 2 Our cases recognize limited circumstances under which an untimely “second” post-conviction petition asserting claims raised but not advocated in the first petition must be treated as an extension of the first petition. See Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Pa.2001); Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368; Commonwealth v. Leasa, 759 A.2d 941, 942 (Pa.Super.2000), Commonwealth v. Peterson, 756 A.2d 687, 689 (Pa.Super.2000). Although the Majority acknowledges the “extension of litigation” or “relation-back” doctrine these cases apply, it refuses to apply that doctrine here under substantially similar circumstances and, in fact, attempts to limit the available remedy to much narrower circumstances than a fair reading of the cases suggests. Op. at 200 (concluding that doctrine of “relation-back” does not apply because appointed post-conviction counsel “did not abandon appellant on appeal by failing to file a court-ordered document or brief’).
¶ 3 In Peterson, we concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing a defendant’s “second” PCRA petition as untimely because the petitioner suffered ineffective assistance of counsel appointed to amend his first PCRA petition. Peterson’s counsel did not file an amended petition and although he filed a Finley letter with the trial court, see Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa.Super 390, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super.1988), he failed to await leave of court before withdrawing representation. See Peterson, 756 A.2d at 689. The trial court then denied the defendant’s first petition. When the defendant filed a second PCRA petition merely restating the allegations of the first, we concluded that considerations of simple justice compelled recognition of the second petition as the defendant’s inartful attempt to secure appellate review of the allegations he previously raised. See id. Because that second petition was facially untimely, we related it back to the first and remanded the matter for appointment of new counsel. See id.
¶ 4 Similarly, in Leasa, we recognized that where appellate review of the denial of a defendant’s first PCRA petition is precluded by counsel’s inaction resulting in dismissal of the appeal, his second petition, although untimely, is merely an “extension of litigation” of the first. See Leasa, 759 A.2d at 942. Accordingly, we determined that the second petition must be related back to the first and required reinstatement nunc pro tunc of the defendant’s right to appeal the denial of his first petition. See id.
¶ 5 Contrary to the Majority’s rationale, neither Leasa nor Peterson nor any of their progeny have limited the “relation-back” doctrine to counsel’s abandonment “by failing to file a court-ordered document or brief;” nor have we required that counsel’s action effectively waive substantive claims. Op. at 200. In point of fact, we have applied the doctrine under varied circumstances, some of which did not implicate the performance of counsel. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1261-62. Accordingly, in Jerman, we applied both Leasa and Peterson to relate back a second PCRA petition where *203court staff refused to accept the defendant’s petition because it did not appear on an approved form. See 762 A.2d at 368. When the defendant then filed a subsequent petition, reasserting the grounds he had previously raised, the trial court deemed that petition a “second” petition, refused to appoint counsel, and dismissed the defendant’s claims as untimely. See id. at 368. Upon review, we recognized the defendant’s subsequent petition as an extension of the first to assure that the defendant was accorded his entitled review of post-conviction claims. See id. Consequently, we vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for appointment of counsel. See id. at 369. See also Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1261-62 (relating back untimely second PCRA petition where court employees refused to accept first petition that did not appear on approved form).
¶ 6 Although our decision in Jerman makes no express analogy to the facts in Leasa or Peterson, our rebanee on those cases, coupled with the circumstances in Jerman, compels recognition of a principal broader than that acknowledged by the Majority. These cases do not premise a petitioner’s right to relief through the “relation-back” doctrine strictly on abandonment by counsel. Rather, they require that every defendant who petitions for relief under the PCRA is entitled to one meaningful evaluation of his claims where circumstances for which he bears no responsibility prevent his access to timely and effective review. Although the extreme acts of dereliction by counsel on which the Majority rebes establish a clear violation of this right, our cases recognize also that the right is just as surely undermined by less extreme derebetion by counsel and by the nonfeasance of system personnel. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1261-62. Simply stated, these eases focus on the harm sustained to the petitioner’s legal right and not merely on the cause of that harm.
¶ 7 In this case, Kubis suffered clear harm through both ineffectiveness of counsel and nonfeasance by prison authorities. Although the trial court appointed counsel to advance Kubis’s first PCRA petition, counsel failed to address the petition’s apparent untimebness, and the court concluded that the petition was indeed untimely. Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/01, at 3-4. Although the Majority concedes that this omission rendered counsel’s representation ineffective, it denies its importance, concluding that “this error does not rise to the level of severity needed to come within the bmited exception created by Leasa and Peterson.” Op. at 199. I find this conclusion untenable. As I have discussed, the “relation-back” doctrine, as appbed in Peterson and followed in Leasa, Jerman and Kutnyak, is not, as the Majority contends, confined to the most egregious malfeasance of counsel. Rather, it applies under varied circumstances to assure the petitioner’s right to meaningful counseled review of his post-conviction claims.
¶ 8 We have held expressly that “[wjhen counsel is appointed to represent a petitioner on a PCRA petition that is untimely on its face, appointed counsel’s first duty is to consider the timeliness of the [petition].” Commonwealth v. Perez, 799 A.2d 848, 853 (Pa.Super.2002). Accordingly, “counsel appointed to assist an indigent petitioner on an apparently untimely PCRA petition must at least investigate whether the petition is indeed untimely, and if so, whether the petition fits one of the exceptions to the PGRA’s timeliness provisions.” Id. If counsel fails to discuss the timeliness issue “his representation is virtually meaningless.” Id. “[Vjirtuaby meaningless” representation does not fulfill Kubis’s right to an effectively counseled first PCRA petition any more than the *204wholesale abandonment the Majority would establish as a threshold for application of the “relation-back” doctrine. See id. at 852 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hampton, 718 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (Pa.Super.1998) (“[Wjhen appointed counsel fails to amend an inarticulately drafted pro se [post-conviction] petition, or fails otherwise to participate meaningfully, this court will conclude that the proceedings were, for all practical purposes uncounselled and in violation of the representation requirement.”)) (emphasis in Perez).
¶ 9 In consideration of the trail of malfeasance evident in this case, I can only conclude that Kubis has been deprived of his right to an effective counseled review of his post-conviction claims. Kubis’s appointed counsel failed to provide even plausible representation during the pen-dency of his first petition, failing entirely to discuss why the facially untimely petition might be considered timely. See Perez, 799 A.2d at 853. When, as a result, the trial court dismissed the petition, prison authorities allowed more than thirty days to elapse before providing Kubis with the court’s notice of dismissal and effectively extinguished his right of appeal. See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1261-62. Although the trial judge responded correctly by restoring Kubis’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc, the Majority now disavows Kubis’s appeal, declining to apply the “relation-back” doctrine and declaring Kubis’s appeal nunc pro tunc an untimely second PCRA petition.
¶ 10 In my opinion, these circumstances compel us to acknowledge Kubis’s appeal nunc pro tunc by relation back to his first PCRA petition and to remand the matter to the trial court for appointment of new counsel to discuss the timeliness exceptions to the PCRA that should have been discussed by prior counsel. See Perez, 799 A.2d at 853; Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368; Kutnyak, 781 A.2d at 1261-62. Only in this manner can Kubis be afforded the right to effective counseled review of post-conviction claims to which he is entitled. Because the Majority refuses to adopt this course, I am compelled to dissent.