Court Opinion

ID: 9373465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:13.835456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.200344
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BLAKE YOUNG,                                    DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  NY-0752-17-0024-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: August 26, 2022
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Blake Young, White Plains, New York, pro se.

           David S. Friedman, Esquire, New York, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal of his placement in an off-duty status
     without pay for less than 14 days. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
     only in the following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error af fected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We
     FORWARD to the New York Field Office for docketing as a new appeal the
     appellant’s claim that he has been suspended for more than 14 days since the time
     that he filed this appeal.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant holds a City Carrier position at the agency’s Port Chester
     Post Office in Port Chester, New York. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 16.
     On October 18, 2016, the appellant failed to complete a scheduled medical
     examination that was necessary to be certified to drive the agency’s new postal
     vehicles. Id. at 18-22. After an alleged confrontation between the appellant and
     the Postmaster partly concerning his failure to complete the medical examination,
     the Postmaster placed him in an emergency off-duty status without pay effective
     October 20, 2016, until further notice. Id. at 16-18.
¶3         On October 25, 2016, the appellant filed a Board appeal of his placement in
     an emergency off-duty status without pay. IAF, Tab 1 at 6-7, 14-17. He disputed
     the agency’s reasons for placing him in such status and raised claims of harmful
     procedural error and discrimination. Id. at 14-16. In a letter dated October 27,
                                                                                            3

     2016, the agency notified the appellant that he had been rescheduled for a medical
     examination on November 1, 2016, and that he was obligated to complete it . IAF,
     Tab 11 at 15.
¶4         In an Order to Show Cause, the administrative judge informed the appellant
     that jurisdiction was an issue in his appeal because it appeared that he had been
     placed in an off-duty status without pay for less than 14 days, which is not an
     appealable action. IAF, Tab 3 at 1. She apprised him of his burden of proving
     jurisdiction over his appeal and ordered him to file evidence on the jurisdictional
     issue. Id. at 2. In response, the appellant alleged that he has remained in a leave
     without pay (LWOP) status, has taken annual and sick leave, and was denied
     holiday pay. As proof, he submitted pay stubs for pay periods 23 of 2015, and
     22 and 23 of 2016, covering October 17 through 30, 2015, and October 15
     through November 11, 2016. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, 26, Tab 9 at 1, 4; 2016 Pay Dates
     and    Leave      Year,      Postal         Bulletin     22429   (Nov.     26,    2015),
     https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2015/pb22429/html/info_001.htm               (last
     visited Aug. 25, 2022) (2016 Pay Dates); 2015 Pay Dates and Leave Year, Postal
     Bulletin     22403        (Nov.       27,       2014),     https://about.usps.com/postal-
     bulletin/2014/pb22403/html/info_001.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2022) (2015 Pay
     Dates). 2 He also submitted, among other things, documentation concerning his
     request for a reasonable accommodation in 2016, his claims for workers’
     compensation benefits that were denied in 2011 and 2016, the former
     Postmaster’s apology to Port Chester letter carriers for the workplace climate in
     August 2016, customer complaints in 2015, a letter of warning in 2013 that was
     based partly on his conduct towards the former Postmaster, his grievance of the
     letter of warning that was denied in 2013, his off-duty arrest in 2012, and an
     arbitration decision in 2000 that mitigated a 7-day suspension to a 3-day
     suspension. IAF, Tab 5 at 8-9, 11-12, 14-16, 18-23, 27-29, 31-35, Tab 9 at 3.
     2
       Pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.64, we take official notice of the time periods covered by
     these pay periods.
                                                                                          4

     The agency replied to the appellant’s response and moved to dismiss the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-11.
¶5         Based on the written record, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.        IAF, Tab 12, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 2, 4.    In particular, she found that the record was devoid of
     evidence that, as of the date the appellant filed his appeal, he was suspended for
     more than 14 days. ID at 4. She further found that the appellant’s allegations
     regarding stale claims, a reasonable accommodation request, a denial of holiday
     pay, and mistreatment by the current and former Postmasters failed to list any
     action within the Board’s jurisdiction.       ID at 2-3.    She concluded that the
     appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous claim that he was suspended in excess of
     14 days or otherwise was subjected to an appealable adverse action. ID at 4. One
     day after the issuance of the initial decision, the appellant filed a response to the
     agency’s motion to dismiss. 3 IAF, Tabs 13-14.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has not filed a response to his petition for review.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant has failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of the Board’s
     jurisdiction over his appeal.
¶7         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.          Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A suspension for more than
     14 days is an appealable action.        5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(2), 7513(d); Abbott v.

     3
       Because the Board could not locate the appellant’s response to the agency’s motion to
     dismiss, the Clerk of the Board directed the agency to submit its copy of the pleading
     on review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 4. The agency submitted its copy of
     the appellant’s pleading, which we have included in the official record. PFR File,
     Tab 5; IAF, Tab 14. The appellant has not filed any comment on the missing pleading
     as submitted by the agency. In reaching our decision, we have considered the
     appellant’s response to the agency’s motion, which was filed only 1 day after the
     issuance of the initial decision. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(c)(2).
                                                                                             5

     U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 6 (2014).              A “suspension” is the
     temporary placement of an employee in a nonpay, nonduty status.                 5 U.S.C.
     §§ 7501(2), 7511(a)(2); Abbott, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 6. The appellant bears the
     burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).     Generally, an appellant is entitled to a jurisdictional
     hearing if he raises a nonfrivolous allegation 4 of the Board’s jurisdiction over his
     appeal. Edwards v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 6 (2013).
¶8         Here, it is undisputed that the appellant was placed in a nonpay, nonduty
     status on October 20, 2016, and he filed his appeal on October 25, 2016. 5 IAF,
     Tab 1 at 17, Tab 11 at 16.          Moreover, the agency did not reschedule the
     appellant’s medical examination until after he filed his appeal .          IAF, Tab 11
     at 15. As properly noted by the administrative judge, the Board’s jurisdiction is
     determined by the nature of an agency’s action against an appellant at the time his
     appeal is filed.   Lefavor v. Department of the Navy, 115 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 10
     (2010); ID at 3. When the appellant filed his appeal, he had been suspended for
     only 6 days, which is not an appealable action. See Lefavor, 115 M.S.P.R. 120,
     ¶ 5 (recognizing that a suspension of 14 days or less is not an appealable action ).
     Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant
     failed to raise a nonfrivolous claim that he was suspended for more than 14 days .
     ID at 4.
¶9         In addition, we agree with the administrative judge’s findings that the
     appellant’s claims made in response to the Order to Show Cause failed to list any

     4
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
     5
       The appellant mailed his initial Board appeal on October 25, 2016, to the Office of the
     Clerk of the Board, which then forwarded his appeal to the Board’s New York Field
     Office. IAF, Tab 1 at 17-18. A pleading submitted by mail generally is considered
     filed on the postmark date, even when submitted to the wrong Board office. Branch v.
     Department of the Army, 110 M.S.P.R. 663, ¶¶ 6-7 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(l). Thus,
     we find that the filing date of the appellant’s initial appeal is the October 25, 2016
     postmark date contained on his mailing to the Clerk of the Board. IAF, Tab 1 at 17.
                                                                                          6

      action within the Board’s jurisdiction and that he failed to raise a nonfrivolous
      claim that he was subjected to an appealable adverse action. ID at 2-4; IAF,
      Tabs 5, 9; see Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 117 M.S.P.R. 665,
      ¶ 7 (2012) (stating that the Board does not have jurisdiction over discrimination
      claims absent an otherwise appealable action); Marks v. U.S. Postal Service,
      78 M.S.P.R. 451, 454 (1998) (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction over an
      appeal of a letter of warning or a suspension of 14 days or less), overruled on
      other grounds by Abbott, 121 M.S.P.R. 294; Lee v. Department of Labor,
      76 M.S.P.R. 142, 146 (1997) (finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction to review
      decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs regarding an
      employee’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits); Wren v. Department
      of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980) (explaining that prohibited personnel
      practices under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are not an independent source of Board
      jurisdiction), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). To the extent the
      appellant attempted to appeal the grievance decision concerning a letter of
      warning and the arbitration decision concerning a 7-day suspension, we find that
      Postal Service employees may not request Board review of such decisions
      because 5 U.S.C. § 7121 does not apply to the Postal Service. IAF, Tab 5 at 22,
      32-34; see Anderson v. U.S. Postal Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 558, ¶ 4 (2008).
¶10         For the following reasons, we find that the arguments raised in the
      appellant’s petition for review fail to provide a reason to disturb the initial
      decision. Specifically, he disputes the administrative judge’s finding that he had
      a confrontation with the Postmaster before his placement in an emergency
      off-duty status without pay. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1; ID at 2, 4. However, the
      appellant has not described how any factual error in that regard is material to the
      dispositive jurisdictional issue in his appeal or is of sufficient weight to warrant a
      different outcome. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(a)(1). Next, he asserts that he was
      denied a hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. We note that he did not request a hearing
      below. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(e) (explaining that the right to a hearing before
                                                                                           7

      the Board is waived if an appellant fails to timely request a hearing).         In any
      event, we find that he is not entitled to a jurisdictional hearing because he has
      failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of the Board’s jurisdiction over his
      appeal. See Edwards, 120 M.S.P.R. 307, ¶ 6.
¶11         Additionally, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erroneously
      separated from his appeal the March 20 “false [confrontation] charge” involving
      the former Postmaster. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. It appears that he is referring to his
      allegation that his claim for workers’ compensation benefits, based on a
      March 20, 2015 injury, was denied because the former Postmaster submitted a
      “false” challenge letter. IAF, Tab 5 at 1, 8-9, 15-17, 23, Tab 9 at 1, 5. He further
      contends on review that the administrative judge failed to investigate why the
      former Postmaster was relieved of her duty for mistreating employees and
      violating their rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1; IAF, Tab 5 at 2, 10, 12. We find that
      the administrative judge did not separate any of the appellant’s claims from the
      instant appeal and did not have an obligation to investigate his claims .          See
      Moody v. Department of the Air Force, 30 M.S.P.R. 9, 11 (1985) (explaining that
      the Board does not solicit, investigate, or prosecute appeals, and it is the parties’
      obligation to create the record upon which the Board will adjudicate the appeal ).
      As described above, the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s
      allegation that he was mistreated by the former Postmaster and found that he
      failed to list any action within the Board’s jurisdiction or make a nonfrivolous
      claim of an appealable adverse action. ID at 2-4. Based on our review of the
      record, we find no reason to disturb that finding.
¶12         Further, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to admit
      his rebuttal to the agency’s motion to dismiss.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 2.       As
      explained supra n.3, the rebuttal has been included in the record.               A fter
      considering the appellant’s rebuttal on review, we find that it presents no reason
      to disturb the initial decision. In his rebuttal, the appellant alleged that he did not
      receive paperwork informing him that his suspension had ended and that his pay
                                                                                            8

      stubs show that he was suspended for 6 weeks.           IAF, Tab 14 at 1.      He also
      responded on the merits of his claims, including his allegation that he suffered
      compensable work injuries. Id. at 1-4. We find that these assertions fail to raise
      a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction.     In particular, his submission of pay
      stubs for pay periods 23 of 2015, and 22 and 23 of 2016, does not support a
      finding that, when he filed his appeal on October 25, 2016, he had been
      suspended for more than 14 days. 6 IAF, Tab 1 at 17, Tab 5 at 26, Tab 9 at 4. The
      appellant reiterates on review his assertion that he was suspended for 6 weeks.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. In addition, for the first time on review, he claims that he
      has over 800 hours of missing pay, but he does not specify from which time
      periods he is missing pay. 7 Id. We find that these assertions, without more, fail
      to nonfrivolously allege the Board’s jurisdiction over his appeal at the time he
      filed his appeal.
¶13         Next, the appellant claims that the Board is “getting revenge for the
      2013-2014 decision to grant [him] back pay” because “it has denied all [his]
      charge[s]” since then.     Id.   It is unclear to which decision the appellant is

      6
        The appellant’s pay stub for pay period 23 of 2015 shows that, from October 17 to 30,
      2015, he worked 15.15 hours and 0.56 hours of overtime, and he took 8.85 hours of
      annual leave and 56 hours of LWOP. IAF, Tab 5 at 26; 2015 Pay Dates. To the extent
      he is arguing that he was suspended in pay period 23 of 2015, we find that he has failed
      to nonfrivolously allege that he was suspended for more than 14 days . We further find
      that there is no basis upon which to combine such an alleged suspension with the 6-day
      suspension in 2016 at issue in this appeal when the suspensions are nonconsecutive and
      the circumstances surrounding his LWOP status in October 2015, are unclear. See
      Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service, 112 M.S.P.R. 196, ¶¶ 7-8 (2009) (recognizing that,
      although there exists no precedent for combining nonconsecutive suspensions for
      purposes of finding Board jurisdiction, the Board has left open the possibility that
      nonconsecutive suspensions may be combined when they are based on the same reason
      and there is evidence that the agency attempted to circumvent Board jurisdiction by
      imposing multiple suspensions of 14 days or less).
      7
        To the extent the appellant is referring to the sum of the cumulative amounts of LWOP
      and annual and sick leave taken in 2015 and 2016 as reflected in his pay stubs in the
      record, we note that the cumulative amounts in pay period 23 of 2016 already include
      the amounts in pay period 22 of 2016. IAF, Tab 5 at 26, Tab 9 at 4. Nevertheless, his
      cumulative amounts of leave do not provide a reason to disturb the initial decision.
                                                                                            9

      referring; however, we note that the Board has dismissed all of his prior Board
      appeals. MSPB Docket No. NY-752S-16-0232-I-1, Final Order at 1-2 (Sept. 22,
      2016) (affirming the initial decision that dismissed his appeal for lack of
      jurisdiction); MSPB Docket No. NY-3443-16-0181-I-1, Initial Decision at 1-2
      (Mar. 25, 2016) (dismissing the appeal as withdrawn) ; MSPB Docket
      No. NY-0752-15-0248-C-1, Compliance Initial Decision at 1-2 (Nov. 9, 2015)
      (dismissing the petition for enforcement           as withdrawn); MSPB Docket
      No. NY-0752-15-0248-I-1, Initial Decision at 2-3 (Aug. 19, 2015) (dismissing the
      appeal as settled); MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-14-0166-I-1, Initial Decision at 2,
      5 (May 5, 2014) (dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction) . To the extent the
      appellant is asserting retaliation for filing a prior Board appeal, we note that
      prohibited personnel practices are not an independent source of Board
      jurisdiction, Wren, 2 M.S.P.R. at 2, and Postal Service employees may not file an
      individual right of action (IRA) appeal because they are not covered under the
      Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C); Matthews v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 93 M.S.P.R. 109, ¶ 13 (2002). 8
¶14         Moreover, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge allowed the
      agency representative to mistreat him and that both the administrative judge and
      the agency representative took management’s side. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. We
      find that these broad allegations of bias are insufficient to rebut the presumption
      of the administrative judge’s honesty and integrity. See Oliver v. Department of
      Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980) (observing that, in making a claim of
      bias or prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the
      presumption    of   honesty    and   integrity   that   accompanies     administrative
      adjudicators). Further, the Board will not infer bias based on an administrative

      8
       Although this appeal was filed after the effective date of the Whistleblower Protection
      Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, we find nothing in the
      Act that would permit a Postal Service employee to file an IRA appeal.
                                                                                      10

      judge’s case-related rulings.      Vaughn v. Department        of the Treasury,
      119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 18 (2013).
¶15         Finally, the appellant requests the Board to combine all of his cases and to
      determine why the agency and the union have not rendered a decision on his
      claims involving the issues of “back pay, false charges, and denied medical care”
      on March 20 and October 20, 2016. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. To the extent the
      appellant is requesting the Board to combine any ongoing equal employment
      opportunity complaint, claim for workers’ compensation benefits, or grievance
      with his Board appeal, we decline his request because we do not have such
      authority. IAF, Tab 5 at 36, Tab 14 at 4; see 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a). Alternatively, if
      he is requesting the Board to reopen and to join his prior Board appeals with this
      case, we deny his request because the circumstances do not warrant doing so.
      See, e.g., Metallo v. Department of Defense, 110 M.S.P.R. 229, ¶¶ 15-17 (2008)
      (denying the appellant’s request to reopen and to join her appeals). Moreover, we
      decline to investigate the agency and the union because the Board does not have
      investigative authority. See Moody, 30 M.S.P.R. at 11.
¶16         Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to dismiss this
      appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

      We forward to the field office for docketing as a new appeal the appellant’s claim
      that he has been suspended for more than 14 days since the time that he filed the
      instant appeal.
¶17         The appellant submitted below pay stubs for pay periods 22 and 23 of 2016
      showing that, from October 15 to 28, 2016, he worked 18.46 hours and 2.69 hours
      of overtime, and he took 61.54 hours of LWOP, and that, from October 29 to
      November 11, 2016, he took 76 hours of LWOP and 4 hours of sick leave. IAF,
      Tab 5 at 26, Tab 9 at 4; 2016 Pay Dates. The administrative judge and the agency
      did not address these hours of LWOP and sick leave. Moreover, the appellant
      submitted below a letter in which the agency scheduled a meeting on
      November 22, 2016, to discuss his reasonable accommodation request, IAF, Tab 9
                                                                                     11

at 3, and he has alleged that he was suspended for 6 weeks, he did not receive
written notification that his suspension had ended, and he has over 800 hours of
missing pay, PFR File, Tab 1 at 2; IAF, Tab 14 at 1. We find that his allegations,
when viewed in light of the aforementioned evidence, constitute a claim that,
since the time that he filed the instant appeal, he might have been suspended for
more than 14 days. See Abbott, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 6 (finding that a suspension
covers both unpaid absences and an employee’s placement on sick or annual leave
against his will). In order to adjudicate the appellant’s claim, we forward the
matter to the Board’s New York Field Office for docketing as a new appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 9
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

9
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        12

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                 13

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).           If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative rece ives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national or igin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court ‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                          Office of Federal Operations
                   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                P.O. Box 77960
                           Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     14

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 10 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

10
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed int o law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              15

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.