Court Opinion

ID: 9696962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:02:30.276463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.088613
License: Public Domain

Dieterich and Gordon, JJ.
(dissenting). We respectfully dissent. It appears to us that there were a number of circumstances in the instant case from which a jury could reasonably have concluded that there was negligence on the part of the defendant.
Ordinarily, one is not liable for the intentional acts of third persons. However, this should not relieve a storekeeper from the duty of using reasonable care to protect his customers from injury at the hands of those whom he might reasonably anticipate will be dangerous. This would be especially true when the storekeeper himself has provoked the dangerous course of action.
In the instant case, the thief was a large man who had previously informed the storekeeper of his fear that “he would be ganged up on.” The defendant’s employees marched him through the store in a manner which suggested that they were aware of his dangerous, propensities. Under these circumstances it was appropriate, in our opinion, that the trier of fact evaluate whether there was a breach of duty on the part of the defendant.
We contrast this with Knight v. Powers Dry Goods Co. (1948), 225 Minn. 280, 285, 30 N. W. (2d) 536, 539, where the suspected thief was described as follows: “. . . well-bred and looked like an educated man ... he acted *237athe part of a perfect gentleman.” When the suspected thief was asked to pay for the goods, “he said in a soft, gentle voice, T guess I will,’ walked calmly back into the store, and proceeded quietly until he reached the elevator.”
We can appreciate that such demeanor would not give rise to any concern on the part of the store manager. How» ever, in the case at bar the culprit’s actions were vastly different; we are not prepared to rule as a matter of law that the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen dan» ger to its customers. See Landowner Owes Invitee No Duty To Provide Police Protection Against Criminal Attack, 63 Columbia Law Review (1963), 766.
In our opinion, the jury’s findings should be allowed to stand, as the trial court determined.
The following opinion was filed October 10, 1963: