Court Opinion

ID: 9916860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 19:01:09.218298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:04.674437
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50337     Document: 00517028123       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/10/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                             FILED
                                                                  January 10, 2024
                                 No. 22-50337                      Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                             Clerk

   National Press Photographers Association; Texas
   Press Association; Joseph Pappalardo,

                                        Plaintiffs—Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

                                     versus

   Steven McCraw, in his official capacity as Director of the Texas
   Department of Public Safety; Dwight Mathis, in his official capacity as
   Chief of the Texas Highway Patrol; Kelly Higgins, in his official capacity
   as District Attorney of Hays County, Texas,

                                Defendants—Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:19-CV-946
                  ______________________________

   Before Clement, Elrod, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
         Our prior panel opinion, National Press Photographers Association v.
   McCraw, 84 F.4th 632 (5th Cir. 2023), is WITHDRAWN and the following
   opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor:
         Chapter 423 of the Texas Government Code governs the operation of
   unmanned aerial vehicles—drones—in Texas airspace. In this case, the
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                                     No. 22-50337

   plaintiffs claim a sweeping First Amendment right to use unmanned aerial
   drones to film private individuals and property without their consent. They
   also assert a constitutional right to fly drones at low altitudes over critical
   infrastructure facilities like prisons and large sports venues.
          We disagree. Though we do not foreclose any as-applied constitutional
   defenses to any hypothetical future prosecutions under the drone laws, we
   hold that these facial challenges fail. Accordingly, we REVERSE and
   REMAND with instructions to enter judgment in the defendants’ favor on
   the constitutional claims. We also reject the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal claiming
   that federal aviation law preempts state drone regulation. Quite the contrary,
   federal law expressly contemplates concurrent non-federal regulation of
   drones, especially where privacy and critical infrastructure are concerned.
   On this issue, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
   preemption claims.
                                          I
                                          A
          Roughly a decade ago, the Texas Legislature enacted Chapter 423 as
   part of its efforts to regulate the use of drones in Texas airspace.1 Two sets of
   Chapter 423’s provisions are at issue in this lawsuit:
          First, we have what the parties have nicknamed the “Surveillance”
   provisions. These provisions make it unlawful to use a drone to “capture an
   image” of someone or private property with an intent to surveil the subject
   of the image:
          A person commits an offense if the person uses an unmanned
          aircraft to capture an image of an individual or privately owned

          1
          Texas Privacy Act, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 1390, §§ 1–2 (2013), 2013 Tex. Gen.
   Laws 3691, 3691–3694 (codified at Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 423.001–423.008).

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          real property in this state with the intent to conduct
          surveillance on the individual or property captured in the
          image.2
   Depending on how you count them, there are at least twenty-one statutory
   exemptions to the Surveillance Provisions.3 For instance, law enforcement
   and the military are allowed to conduct aerial surveillance using drones. 4 So
   can professors and students, if they do it for an “academic purpose.” 5 It’s
   also fine to use a drone to capture images from under eight feet—roughly the
   height of someone holding a camera above his or her head. 6 Importantly—it
   is lawful to use a drone to capture images of public property or persons on
   public property,7 and one can always take drone images with the consent of
   the subject.8 What is not among the twenty-one exceptions, however, is a
   specific exemption for the press.
          Second, we have what the parties have dubbed the “No-Fly
   Provisions.” The No-Fly provisions make it illegal to fly a drone above
   sensitive sites like critical infrastructure facilities, prisons, and large sports
   venues:
          A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or
          knowingly:

          2
              Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.003(a).
          3
              Id. § 423.002(a)(1)–(21).
          4
              Id. §§ 423.002(a)(3) & (8).
          5
              Id. § 423.002(a)(1).
          6
              Id. § 423.002(a)(14).
          7
              Id. § 423.002(a)(15).
          8
              Id. § 423.002(a)(6).

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           (1) operates an unmanned aircraft over a critical infrastructure
           facility and the unmanned aircraft is not higher than 400 feet
           above ground level;
           (2) allows an unmanned aircraft to make contact with a critical
           infrastructure facility, including any person or object on the
           premises of or within the facility; or
           (3) allows an unmanned aircraft to come within a distance of a
           critical infrastructure facility that is close enough to interfere
           with the operations of or cause a disturbance to the facility.9
   Critical infrastructure facilities include airports, petroleum refineries, power
   generators, and military installations, so long as they are enclosed by a fence
   or barrier, or otherwise indicate that entry is forbidden.10 There is a nearly
   identical No-Fly provision barring flights directly above correctional facilities
   and detention centers,11 and one that applies to large sports venues:
           A person commits an offense if the person intentionally or
           knowingly operates an unmanned aircraft over a sports venue
           and the unmanned aircraft is not higher than 400 feet above
           ground level.12
   Just like the Surveillance provisions, the No-Fly provisions contain several
   exemptions. Most relevant here is one that allows a drone operator to violate
   the No-Fly provisions “for a commercial purpose” so long as the operator

           9
                Id. § 423.0045(b).
           10
                Id. § 423.0045(a)(1-a).
           11
               Tex. Penal Code § 38.115(b). The No-Fly provisions relating to correctional
   facilities and detention centers previously were codified in the same section of the Texas
   Government Code as the No-Fly provisions relating to critical infrastructure sites. Tex.
   Gov’t Code § 423.0045. Effective September 1, 2023, however, the Texas Legislature
   moved those provisions to the Penal Code. See Operation of an Unmanned Aircraft Over a
   Correctional Facility or Detention Facility; Creating a Criminal Offense, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law
   Serv. Ch. 591 (H.B. 3075).
           12
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.0046(b).

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   complies with the applicable Federal Aviation Administration rules and
   authorizations.13 Again, though: there is no specific exemption for the press.
           Violating the Surveillance or the No-Fly provisions is a criminal
   offense under Texas law,14 and it also subjects the violator to the possibility
   of civil liability.15
                                              B
           The plaintiffs in this case are one drone-owning journalist and two
   media-related organizations (Plaintiffs).
           Joseph Pappalardo is a self-employed journalist. He owns a small
   aerial drone and is qualified to operate the drone in the national airspace. He
   is “concerned that using a [drone] for journalistic purposes would put [him]
   at risk of criminal penalties and subject [him] to liability in a civil lawsuit” in
   Texas. In 2017, he was informed by one of his “corporate bosses” at the time
   that, should he take images in violation of Chapter 423, the company would
   not pay for a legal defense in any resulting court proceedings. After that
   conversation, he has refrained from using a drone for image capturing in
   Texas “due to [his] concern about possibly violating Chapter 423.” As a
   result, he has missed out on opportunities to take aerial photographs to
   include in his reporting, including stories on Hurricane Harvey, house fires,
   storm damage, removal of homeless encampments, and illegal poaching in
   urban areas. He believes that Chapter 423 prevents him from being able to do
   “complete reporting that journalists in other states are able to do.” “As a

           13
             Id. §§ 423.0045(c)(5), 423.0046(c)(5). As of September 1, 2023, the provisions
   relating to correctional facilities and detention centers no longer appear to have a
   commercial-purpose exception. See Tex. Penal Code § 38.115(c).
           14
           Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 423.003(b), 423.0045(d), 423.0046(d); Tex. Penal
   Code § 38.115(d).
           15
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.006(a).

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   freelancer, being able to provide aerial imagery can be the difference between
   selling a pitch or being denied.”
          National Press Photographers Association (NPPA) is a national
   association that represents the interests of visual journalists, including news
   photographers in Texas. According to NPPA, drones provide its members
   with a cheap and safe alternative to renting a helicopter to obtain aerial
   images. Two NPPA members, both photojournalists, are especially relevant
   to this appeal.
          The first is Guillermo Calzada. In July 2018, he flew his drone near
   the site of an apartment fire in San Marcos, Texas, to capture images for his
   employer, the San Antonio Express-News. An unnamed federal agent at the
   scene approached him and told him that he was interfering with a federal
   investigation. The agent then called the San Marcos police. An unnamed
   police officer arrived and told Calzada that he had violated state law by taking
   pictures with his drone and that, if he published them, he would be violating
   the law again. The officer also told Calzada that she wouldn’t cite him for the
   incident.
          The second is Brandon Wade. He is a freelancer who, though qualified
   to fly a drone, does not use one for journalism due to the risk of enforcement.
   He believes the threat of enforcement is costing him “thousands of dollars”
   because one of his clients, The Dallas Morning News, has not given him any
   drone-photography assignments. In 2018, another client, the Fort Worth
   Star-Telegram, offered Wade an assignment to document the construction of
   a new ballpark for the Texas Rangers. Although the Rangers refused to grant
   permission to Wade’s client, the Rangers did hire Wade to film the
   construction for them for public-relations purposes. As a result, Wade says,
   the Rangers own the copyright to the footage, and he cannot share it with the
   media. Wade “lost thousands of dollars” due to the Rangers’ refusal.

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          The other organizational plaintiff is the Texas Press Association
   (TPA). It exists to promote the welfare of Texas newspapers, encourage
   higher standards of journalism, and advocate for First Amendment liberties.
   TPA represents approximately 400 member newspapers, and its members
   include The Dallas Morning News, the San Antonio Express-News, and the Fort
   Worth Star-Telegram. Some of TPA’s member newspapers have enacted
   policies avoiding the use of drone photography in response to Chapter 423’s
   restrictions. Its members would be able to more cheaply and safely cover the
   news if drone photography were permitted.
          The defendants in this case are high-ranking state- and county-level
   officials: two Texas heads of law-enforcement agencies and one county
   district attorney (Defendants).
          Steve McCraw is the Director of the Texas Department of Public
   Safety (DPS). As the “head of the Department of Public Safety,” he is “the
   highest law enforcement official in the state of Texas.” 16 The other state
   official is Dwight Mathis. He is the Chief of the Texas Highway Patrol
   (THP).17 The record evidence indicates that, while DPS has issued warnings
   and citations to drone operators on a few occasions, neither DPS nor THP
   has ever arrested anybody for violating Chapter 423 specifically.
          Kelly Higgins is the district attorney of Hays County, Texas.18 Unlike
   the state defendants, the Hays County district attorney’s office has initiated
   at least one prosecution “for drone-related activities” The record evidence
   indicates that this prosecution, which resulted in a deferred disposition, was

          16
               Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868, 873 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996).
          17
            Ron Joy previously was Chief of the Texas Highway Patrol and was the defendant
   named in the complaint. Mathis has been substituted in this litigation.
          18
            Wes Mau previously was the Hays County district attorney and the county-level
   defendant named in the complaint. Higgins has been substituted in this litigation.

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   for violating Chapter 423. Though it is not in the record, at oral argument
   Higgins’s counsel indicated that the prosecution did not involve members of
   the press but instead an individual who surreptitiously photographed his
   neighbor.
                                                 C
            Plaintiffs filed this pre-enforcement facial constitutional challenge to
   Chapter 423 against Defendants, seeking to enjoin them from enforcing the
   Surveillance and No-Fly provisions. Plaintiffs asserted five claims, arguing
   that the Surveillance provisions violate the First Amendment and the Due
   Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the No-Fly
   provisions violate the First Amendment, Due Process, and federal
   preemption principles. In essence, their position is that Chapter 423
   unlawfully infringes on their right to film and gather news, that the statutory
   prohibitions are so vague that they violate Due Process, and that Texas has
   no authority to promulgate drone regulations because the federal government
   has expressly preempted all state and local drone regulations.
            The district court ruled on all five claims. In 2020, the court dismissed
   Plaintiffs’ claim that the No-Fly provisions are preempted by federal law.19
   In 2022, ruling on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the
   court entered a final judgment favoring Plaintiffs on all of their remaining
   theories and enjoined Defendants and all of their subordinates from enforcing
   Chapter 423.20 The court held that both challenged provisions violate both
   the First Amendment and Due Process.

            19
                 Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568, 591 (W.D. Tex.
   2020).
            20
                 Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 594 F. Supp. 3d 789, 813 (W.D. Tex.
   2022).

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           Both sides appealed. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims fail on
   standing, sovereign immunity, and merits grounds. Plaintiffs, on the other
   hand, say the district court should have enjoined enforcement of Chapter 423
   on the additional ground that it is preempted by federal law.
                                                   II
           We review summary-judgment rulings de novo, applying the same
   standard as the district court.21 “Cross-motions must be considered
   separately, as each movant bears the burden of establishing that no genuine
   issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.”22 Legal issues, including jurisdictional issues like standing and
   sovereign immunity, are reviewed de novo.23
           Our discussion proceeds as follows: (A) Article III standing; (B) the
   Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity; (C) the First Amendment;
   and (D) preemption under the Supremacy Clause.24
                                                   A
           Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this pre-
   enforcement challenge to Chapter 423 against them. We agree—in part.
           “Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts
   to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”25 “The basic inquiry is whether the
   conflicting contentions of the parties present a real, substantial controversy

           21
                Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Eng’rs, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538 (5th Cir. 2004).
           22
                Id. at 538–39.
           23
                Texas All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2022).
           24
              See Davis v. Sumlin, 999 F.3d 278, 279 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[F]ederal courts must
   do jurisdiction first.”).
           25
           Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (quoting U.S.
   Const., art. III, § 2).

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   between parties having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and
   concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.”26
           To show associational standing, NPPA and TPA must show that “(a)
   its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
   interests [each entity] seeks to protect are germane to [each] organization’s
   purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
   the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” 27 It is undisputed
   that the second two elements are met, so the only question is the first:
   whether the individual members would have standing in their own right.28
           For the individual members and Pappalardo “[t]o have standing,
   [they] must (1) have suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to
   the challenged action of the defendant, and (3) that will likely be redressed by
   a favorable decision.”29 Primarily at issue here are the injury and traceability
   elements. As the parties invoking standing, Plaintiffs “bear the burden to
   demonstrate standing for each claim they seek to press.” 30
           We address injury first.
                                                    1
           “An injury sufficient to satisfy Article III must be concrete and
   particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. An

           26
             Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (alteration
   accepted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
           27
             Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Oct. 30,
   2020) (citation omitted).
           28
             See Speech First, 979 F.3d at 330 (citing Lujan v. Def’s of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
   560–61 (1992)).
           29
                Id.
           30
                Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Tex., Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 209 (5th Cir. 2011).

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   allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly
   impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.”31
           The parties disagree on whether Plaintiffs have carried their burden
   to show an injury for standing purposes. After all, no Plaintiff has ever been
   arrested or prosecuted for violating Chapter 423. Defendants McCraw and
   Mathis produced evidence showing that they have not arrested or prosecuted
   anybody for violating Chapter 423. And while the Hays County District
   Attorney’s office prosecuted a claim under Chapter 423, that case resulted
   in a deferred disposition and did not involve any members of the press. Thus,
   Defendants say, Plaintiffs have not been injured by any enforcement of
   Chapter 423 and any future injury is purely hypothetical.
           Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their Due Process claims. They have
   never been arrested or prosecuted for violating Chapter 423. And the
   available evidence suggests that Defendants have never enforced Chapter
   423 against Plaintiffs (or anybody else). The issue of whether the Surveillance
   and No-Fly provisions are unlawfully vague in their proscriptions is therefore
   a mere hypothetical dispute lacking the concreteness and imminence
   required by Article III.32 In the absence of any imminent or even credible
   threat of prosecution under Chapter 423, Plaintiffs lack standing to

           31
                Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 158 (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
           32
               See id. at 158. We note that vagueness may be grounds for a pre-enforcement
   challenge insofar as it chills protected speech under the First Amendment. See Roark &
   Hardee LP v. City of Austin, 522 F.3d 533, 546–47 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Many times void-for-
   vagueness challenges are successfully made when laws have the capacity to chill
   constitutionally protected conduct, especially conduct protected by the First
   Amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But as we explain later, see infra § C,
   Plaintiffs’ challenge to the No-Fly provisions do not implicate the First Amendment, so we
   need not reach this issue.

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   preemptively challenge Chapter 423 under the Due Process Clause.33 We
   therefore vacate the district court’s judgment on the Due Process claims.
          The First Amendment claims, however, are another matter. This is
   because “standing rules are relaxed for First Amendment cases so that
   citizens whose speech might otherwise be chilled by fear of sanction can
   prospectively seek relief.”34 “In pre-enforcement cases alleging a violation of
   the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court has
   recognized that chilled speech or self-censorship is an injury sufficient to
   confer standing.”35 In this context, “[a] plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact
   if he (1) has an ‘intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected
   with a constitutional interest,’ (2) his intended future conduct is ‘arguably
   . . . proscribed by [the policy in question],’ and (3) ‘the threat of future
   enforcement of the [challenged policies] is substantial.’”36 Unlike in other
   constitutional contexts, in the speech context, we “may assume a substantial
   threat of future enforcement absent compelling contrary evidence.” 37
   “Controlling precedent thus establishes that a chilling of speech because of
   the mere existence of an allegedly vague or overbroad statute can be sufficient
   injury to support standing.”38

          33
               See id. at 159.
          34
               Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 294 (5th Cir. 2014).
          35
               Barilla v. City of Houston, 13 F.4th 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2021).
          36
               Speech First, 979 F.3d at 330 (citing Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 161–64).
          37
               Barilla, 13 F.4th at 433 (emphasis added).
          38
               Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2006).

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           Here, Plaintiffs have evidence that their use of drones (which they call
   “speech”39) was chilled because of Chapter 423. Pappalardo, for instance,
   violated Chapter 423 but stopped using a drone after his boss told him he
   would not be provided a legal defense for violating the law. NPPA member
   Calzada, on assignment for the San Antonio Express-News, was told by San
   Marcos police that his use of a drone in July 2018 violated state law. Calzada
   continues to violate Chapter 423 but does not do so if law enforcement is
   around. NPPA member and freelance photojournalist Wade testified that he
   “often [doesn’t] use [his] drone because of the risk of enforcement.” As a
   result, he has missed money-making opportunities with The Dallas Morning
   News and the Texas Rangers because of his (and their) unwillingness to
   violate Chapter 423. TPA member The Dallas Morning News enacted policies
   prohibiting its photographers from using drone photography. Finally, in their
   briefs, Plaintiffs represent to us that, after the district court enjoined the
   enforcement of Chapter 423 in this litigation, The Dallas Morning News
   reversed its no-drone policy, and Pappalardo and another NPPA member
   began to use drones to capture images for news purposes.
           The above facts are sufficient to show chill. Plaintiffs have restricted
   their use of drones for newsgathering purposes due to the threat of Chapter
   423’s enforcement, which would open them up to criminal and civil
   liability.40 The facts speak for themselves. We are therefore justified in our
   conclusion that a substantial threat of future enforcement exists absent
   “compelling contrary evidence.”41

           39
                 “In analyzing standing, we assume that [Plaintiffs are] correct on the
   merits . . . .” Young Conservatives of Tex. Found. v. Smatresk, 73 F.4th 304, 309 (5th Cir.
   2023) (citing Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 447 (5th Cir. 2019)).
           40
                See Speech First, 979 F.3d at 330.
           41
                Barilla, 13 F.4th at 433.

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          There’s more, though. We highlight the monetary injury NPPA
   member Wade suffered due to his clients’ compliance with Chapter 423. In
   KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, we found First Amendment standing when a plaintiff
   news organization “offered evidence that it suffered actual monetary losses
   during the time it obeyed the law and that it has in fact violated the statute”
   upon the challenged law’s being enjoined.42 Here, the evidence confirms that
   photojournalists like Wade “suffer[] actual monetary losses during the time
   [they] obey[] the law,” and Plaintiffs represent that they have “violated the
   statute” upon its enjoinment.43 Our precedent thus holds that they may file
   suit to challenge Chapter 423 on First Amendment grounds.
          In response, Defendants stress that they have never enforced Chapter
   423 and that Plaintiffs’ chill is therefore a subjective self-chill, detached from
   any objective likelihood of the law’s enforcement. But their argument does not
   overcome our precedent, nor does their theory match the evidence here—
   photojournalists and press organizations are restricting drone photography,
   to their financial detriment, out of fear of Chapter 423. “That the statute has
   not been enforced and that there is no certainty that it will be does not
   establish the lack of a case or controversy.”44 This is particularly so when, as
   here, “the State has not disavowed any intention” of invoking the law against
   Plaintiffs.45 While Defendants’ point is well taken, it fails in the First
   Amendment context.
          Defendants also argue that Calzada’s encounter with the San Marcos
   police in 2018 is legally insufficient to support standing to seek prospective
   injunctive relief under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, which held that a single

          42
               709 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1983).
          43
               Id.
          44
               KVUE, Inc., 709 F.2d at 930.
          45
               Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302.

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   chokehold incident is not enough to confer standing to seek prospective relief
   against all future chokeholds.46 Again, under ordinary circumstances, this is
   likely a winning argument—isolated incidents of past unconstitutional acts
   generally cannot confer standing to seek prospective relief against future
   unconstitutional acts.47 But Defendants’ point falls short in this First
   Amendment case because Plaintiffs have provided evidence of ongoing chill
   and financial injury. Indeed, in the speech context, past prosecutions are
   often “good evidence” that the likelihood of a future prosecution is not
   “chimerical.”48
          In sum, the injury-in-fact element is satisfied by Plaintiffs’ evidence of
   their chilled drone usage—including lost financial opportunities and their
   conduct after Chapter 423 was enjoined.
          On to traceability.
                                                  2
          Even if Plaintiffs suffered an injury, Defendants argue that such injury
   is not fairly traceable to their conduct. After all, Defendants have never
   enforced Chapter 423. Again, we must disagree—with one small exception.
          To establish traceability, Plaintiffs must show “a causal connection
   between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly
   traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the
   independent action of some third party not before the court.” 49

          46
               461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
          47
               See id.
          48
               Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S. at 164.
          49
               Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (cleaned up).

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            Traceability is satisfied with respect to McCraw and Mathis. DPS is
   required to “enforce the laws protecting the public safety.”50 Any chill from
   the threat of enforcing Chapter 423 is thus fairly traceable to McCraw, as
   head of DPS. Indeed, we have on more than one occasion found litigants to
   have standing to sue Director McCraw in federal district court when Texas
   statutes or DPS are alleged to have violated the federal Constitution. 51 The
   Highway Patrol, too, has statewide law-enforcement and arrest authority.52
   As the person in charge of the Texas Highway Patrol, Chief Mathis is thus a
   proper defendant as well. Neither Director McCraw nor Chief Mathis denies
   that they have the authority to enforce Chapter 423. Plaintiffs’ chilled
   “speech” is thus fairly traceable to those who would arrest them for violating
   Chapter 423.53 Calzada, for example, violates the statute only when law-
   enforcement agents are not around. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ chill is fairly
   traceable to these defendants.
            Plaintiffs’ chill is also fairly traceable to District Attorney Higgins. As
   the district attorney, he is charged with prosecuting individuals who violate

            50
                 Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.002(a).
            51
               E.g., Fontenot v. McCraw, 777 F.3d 741, 746–47 (5th Cir. 2015) (approving
   litigants’ standing to bring Due Process claim seeking injunctive relief against Director
   McCraw as head of DPS, though ultimately dismissing the claims on mootness grounds);
   Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2013) (approving
   litigants’ standing to bring pre-enforcement Second Amendment challenge to Texas
   firearms law).
            52
                 Tex. Gov’t Code § 411.032; Graf v. State, 925 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. App.
   1996).
            53
             See Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507,
   514 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding traceability satisfied where “state defendants oversee the
   [challenged] process,” reasoning that the “state defendants’ oversight” of the challenged
   program “places state defendants among those who cause [the plaintiff’s] injury”).

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   criminal laws.54 For this reason, courts have long recognized that prosecutors
   are “natural targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state officers
   who are threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law.”55 Indeed, the
   Hays County DA’s office prosecuted at least one drone-related case relating
   to Chapter 423. An injunction against future enforcement is therefore likely
   to redress Plaintiffs’ claimed injury.
          We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their First
   Amendment claims—though not their Due Process claims—against all three
   Defendants. With one exception: Plaintiffs can’t sue Defendants to enjoin
   enforcement of Chapter 423’s civil penalties because Defendants do not
   enforce those provisions—only private individuals harmed by a violation of
   Chapter 423 may sue to enforce the civil penalties.56 The district court lacked
   jurisdiction to order Defendants not to enforce § 423.006, and its order on
   that front must be vacated.
          Satisfied on standing, at least partly, we turn to the next jurisdictional
   question: whether Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity.
                                                 B
           “Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the
   Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” 57
   “[S]overeign immunity also prohibits suits against state officials or agencies

          54
            Tex. Gov’t Code § 44.205(b); cf. Lewis v. Scott, 28 F.4th 659, 664 (5th Cir.
   2022) (“[I]t is local prosecutors, not the Secretary, who are specifically charged with
   enforcement of the criminal prohibition on possessing a voter’s mail-in ballot.”).
          55
               Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736 (1980).
          56
             See Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.006 (civil enforcement provisions); Whole
   Women’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 534 (2021) (plaintiffs cannot sue the Texas
   Attorney General to enjoin civil actions enforced by private individuals).
          57
               Whole Woman’s Health, 142 S. Ct. at 532.

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   that are effectively suits against a state.”58 “As an exception to the general
   rule of state sovereign immunity, Ex parte Young permits plaintiffs to sue a
   state officer in his official capacity for an injunction to stop ongoing violations
   of federal law.”59 Importantly: “The officer sued must have ‘some
   connection with the enforcement of the [challenged] act.’” 60
           While the “some connection” test is amorphous, we have identified
   three guideposts to guide the analysis. “First, an official must have more than
   ‘the general duty to see that the laws of the state are implemented.”61
   Second, “the official must have ‘the particular duty to enforce the statute in
   question and a demonstrated willingness to exercise that duty.’” 62 “Third,
   ‘enforcement’ means compulsion or constraint.’”63
           Two of these considerations are easily met here. As heads of Texas
   law-enforcement agencies, Director McCraw and Chief Mathis have more
   than just the general duty to see that the state’s laws are implemented—they
   are directly responsible for enforcing Texas’s criminal laws, including those
   set forth in Chapter 423. DPS and THP officers arrest people for violating
   Texas law, exercising “compulsion or constraint” in service of the law. 64
           But one key component of the analysis is missing—Defendants lack
   “a demonstrated willingness to exercise [their] duty” to enforce Chapter

           58
                City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019).
           59
                Lewis, 28 F.4th at 663.
           60
                Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)).
           61
             Tex. All. for Retired Americans v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
   City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 999–1000).
           62
                Id. (quoting Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 179 (5th Cir. 2020)).
           63
                Id. (quoting City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1000).
           64
                Id.

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   423.65 While the record shows that DPS issued six warnings and one citation
   for conduct involving drone operators, none of these incidents was for
   violating Chapter 423 specifically. Thus, in the decade or so that Chapter 423
   has been on the books, the record evidence shows that Director McCraw,
   Chief Mathis, and their respective agencies have never enforced it. We have
   held that even “a scintilla of enforcement by the relevant state official with
   respect to the challenged law will do,”66 but here there is not even a scintilla
   of enforcement. Not even an iota of a scintilla. Zilch.
           We recognize, of course, that we have already concluded that
   Plaintiffs sustained an injury for purposes of their First Amendment pre-
   enforcement challenge because the assumed substantial threat of future
   enforcement has chilled their use of drones.67 But this conclusion does not
   necessarily conflict with the fact that Defendants have not shown a
   demonstrated willingness to exercise their enforcement duties under Ex parte
   Young. To be sure, we have suggested that, in some cases, “an official’s
   ‘connection to enforcement’ is satisfied when standing has been
   established,”68 and we have similarly observed that there can be “significant
   overlap” between the standing and Ex parte Young inquiries.69 Those
   inquiries, however, are not completely coterminous,70 and the mere fact that

           65
                Id.
           66
              Tex. Democratic Party, 978 F.3d at 179 (quoting City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1002)
   (internal quotation marks omitted); see Speech First, 979 F.3d at 335 (distinguishing between
   facial and as-applied challenges for purposes of addressing “pre-enforcement challenges to
   recently enacted . . . statutes”).
           67
                See supra § II.A.1.
           68
                City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019).
           69
             E.g., Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex., Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d
   507, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2017).
           70
                See Paxton, 943 F.3d at 1002 (stating that they are “not identical”).

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   standing requirements may be relaxed for First Amendment pre-
   enforcement challenges does not mean that “the requirements of Ex parte
   Young have in any way been relaxed or vitiated.” 71 Thus, because Plaintiffs
   have provided no evidence that Defendants will enforce Chapter 423, we
   hold that the Ex parte Young exception does not apply to Director McCraw
   or Chief Mathis and that they are entitled to sovereign immunity.
           We cannot, however, extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to Kelly
   Higgins, the Hays County District Attorney. This is because “state sovereign
   immunity applies only to states and state officials, not to political subdivisions
   like counties and county officials.”72 Indeed, we have “held that Texas
   district attorneys [are] not protected by the Eleventh Amendment” precisely
   because they are county officials, not state officials.73 Granted, a couple of
   unpublished opinions have suggested that a district attorney’s entitlement to
   Eleventh Amendment immunity may depend on whether he or she is
   performing in a local or state capacity.74 But we understand our precedent to

           71
                Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 n.17 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
           72
                Russell v. Jones, 49 F.4th 507, 512 (5th Cir. 2022).
           73
                Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1999).
           74
              See Spikes v. Phelps, 131 F. App’x 47, 49 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Texas district
   attorneys are shielded by Eleventh Amendment immunity for acts performed as state
   officers in the scope of criminal prosecution, but they are not so shielded when they act
   with respect to local policies.”); Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (“[D]istrict attorneys . . . in Texas are agents of the state when acting in their prosecutorial
   capacities.”).

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                                          No. 22-50337

   employ a more categorical approach,75 informed by various factors76 that
   Higgins does not otherwise argue support his position that he is protected by
   the Eleventh Amendment.
           Accordingly, while Defendants McCraw and Mathis are entitled to
   state sovereign immunity, Defendant Higgins is not.
                                                C
           Moving to the merits, we now consider whether the Surveillance and
   No-Fly provisions facially violate the First Amendment. They do not.
                                                 1
           We start with the No-Fly provisions, which make it unlawful to fly a
   drone under 400 feet above a correctional facility, detention facility, critical
   infrastructure facility, or sports venue—subject, of course, to numerous
   statutory exceptions, such as the one for commercial purposes. 77
           But Plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to the No-Fly provisions
   falters because “only conduct that is ‘inherently expressive’ is entitled to
   First Amendment protection.”78 The operation of a drone is not inherently
   expressive—nor is it expressive to fly a drone 400 feet over a prison, sports
   venue, or critical infrastructure facility. And nothing in the No-Fly provisions

           75
              E.g., Hudson, 174 F.3d at 691 (“After carefully weighing these factors against one
   another, we conclude that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office is not an arm of
   the state.”); Chrissy F. Medley v. Miss. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir.
   1991) (holding that “the Mississippi District Attorney is a state official” for Eleventh
   Amendment purposes because state law provides that the district attorney’s office would
   be “primarily state-funded” and its authority would extend to “statewide concerns”).
           76
              See Clark v. Tarrant Cnty., 798 F.2d 736, 744–45 (5th Cir. 1986) (outlining six
   factors to determine “whether an entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity”).
           77
                Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 423.0045 & 423.0046; Tex. Penal Code § 38.115.
           78
               Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rumsfeld
   v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006)).

                                                21
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   has anything to do with speech or expression. These are flight restrictions,
   not speech restrictions.
          Plaintiffs attempt to convert the No-Fly provisions into speech
   regulations by noting that drones are often used for photography. By making
   it illegal to fly drones over sensitive sites like prisons, they say, Chapter 423
   necessarily prohibits photojournalists from capturing images from the air
   directly over those facilities. They claim that this prevents them from
   capturing newsworthy subjects cheaply and safely. Plaintiffs take issue with
   the absence of a specific exemption for the press and argue that “Chapter 423
   directly targets speech.”
          We are not persuaded. The Supreme Court put it this way nearly 60
   years ago:
          There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed
          by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For
          example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White
          House diminishes the citizen’s opportunities to gather
          information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the
          country is being run, but that does not make entry into the
          White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak and
          publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather
          information.79
   Because the No-Fly provisions have nothing to do with speech or even
   expressive activity, they do not implicate the First Amendment. Accordingly,
   we reverse the district court’s judgment that the No-Fly provisions facially
   violate the First Amendment.
          We turn next to the Surveillance provisions, which, unlike the No-Fly
   provisions, implicate at least some First Amendment protections.

          79
               Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).

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                                                   2
           To refresh, the Surveillance provisions make it unlawful to use a drone
   to “capture an image” of private individuals or property, without their
   consent, “with the intent to conduct surveillance on the individual or
   property captured in the image.”80 And just like the No-Fly provisions, the
   Surveillance provisions have several express exceptions that do not include
   the press.81 Plaintiffs characterize aerial surveillance as “speech” and assert
   that, by letting some people use drones to capture images but not others, the
   Surveillance provisions violate the First Amendment.
           Courts have long held that, unlike flight restrictions, restrictions on
   filming can implicate the First Amendment, at least to some extent. And the
   extent of constitutional protections for the right to film is subject to ongoing
   and vigorous debate—particularly when, as in this case, third parties’ privacy
   rights are threatened. For example, the Fourth Circuit recently held that
   undercover animal-rights activists have a First Amendment right to infiltrate
   companies and clandestinely film them notwithstanding a North Carolina
   property-protection law.82 Judge Rushing dissented, stressing the point
   that, even though newsgathering is afforded some First Amendment
   protection, “an interest in newsworthy information does not confer a First
   Amendment right to enter private property . . . and secretly record” because
   “the mere act of recording by itself is not categorically protected speech.” 83
   In another recent case, the Ninth Circuit held that an Oregon law prohibiting
   the secret recording of conversations violates the First Amendment,

           80
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.003(a).
           81
                Id. § 423.002(a).
           82
             People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc.,
   60 F.4th 815, 824–834 (4th Cir. 2023) (PETA).
           83
                See id. at 845–47 (Rushing, J., dissenting).

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                                              No. 22-50337

   reasoning that, under its clear and binding precedent, the act of recording is
   itself an inherently expressive activity.84 Judge Christen dissented,
   arguing, among other things, that the right to free speech does not necessarily
   include an unrestrained right to record others’ speech.85
           These debates are not new. The Seventh Circuit in ACLU of Illinois v.
   Alvarez held more than a decade ago that “[t]he act of making an audio or
   audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s
   guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate
   the resulting recording.”86 That court reasoned that the “right to publish or
   broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely
   ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly
   unprotected.”87 Following that premise, the Seventh Circuit went on to hold
   as likely unconstitutional an Illinois anti-eavesdropping statute. Judge
   Posner dissented, warning that such novel “interpretations” of the First
   Amendment have no foundation in the text or original understanding of the
   First Amendment,88 and urging courts to tread carefully when elevating the
   right to record private individuals above the privacy rights of those
   individuals.89
           In our own circuit, the leading case is Turner v. Lieutenant Driver.
   There, we held that “the First Amendment protects the right to record the

           84
             Project Veritas v. Schmidt, 72 F.4th 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Animal Legal
   Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018)).
           85
                See id. at 1069 (Christen, J., dissenting).
           86
                679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012).
           87
                Id.
           88
                Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting).
           89
                Id. at 614.

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                                             No. 22-50337

   police.”90 In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned that the Supreme Court
   has held that newsgathering and the right to receive information are entitled
   to First Amendment protection, “even though this right is not absolute.”91
   Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Alvarez, we also suggested that “the
   First Amendment protects the act of making a film, as ‘there is no fixed First
   Amendment line between the act of creating speech and the speech itself.’” 92
   Finally, in recognizing a right to film the police in the course of their public
   duties, we reasoned that the underlying principles of the First Amendment
   counseled us to safeguard the right of the people to hold government officials
   accountable—filming them in the course of their duties being one way to do
   that.93 We emphasized, however, that the right to film the police is not
   unqualified. The right extends only to filming police performing their public
   duties in public places.94 And even then, the right is “subject to reasonable
   time, place, and manner restrictions.”95 Following Turner’s lead, we hold
   that restrictions on the right to film—not just police but in general—are
   subject to at least some level of First Amendment scrutiny.
          The obvious question then becomes: How much scrutiny?
          “In an abundance of caution,” “we apply the intermediate scrutiny
   test,” “which balances the individual’s right to speak with the government’s
   power to regulate.”96 While aerial surveillance is not inherently expressive,
   and even though the non-expressive aspects of the Surveillance provisions

          90
               848 F.3d 678, 690 (5th Cir. 2017).
          91
               Id. at 688.
          92
               Id. at 688–89 (quoting Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596).
          93
               Id. at 699.
          94
               Id. (citing Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011)).
          95
               Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
          96
               Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2010).

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   predominate over any expressive component, intermediate scrutiny strikes
   us as appropriate in this context for several reasons.
          First, it is the default level of scrutiny applicable to laws like the
   Surveillance provisions, which do not directly regulate the content of speech
   and which “pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints
   from the public dialogue.”97 This is particularly appropriate given the reality
   that the Surveillance provisions do not directly or even primarily regulate
   speech and expression—nor do they target any particular message, idea, or
   subject matter—but neither are they pure drone-operating laws. Second, it is
   the level of scrutiny suggested in our landmark right-to-film case, Turner v.
   Lieutenant Driver.98 Third, it is the level of scrutiny we applied in an
   analogous case. In Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., we considered a First
   Amendment challenge to anti-wiretapping laws prohibiting the disclosure of
   illegally intercepted telephone conversations. 99 Reasoning that the laws were
   content-neutral and restricted communication based solely on the means by
   which it was acquired, we held that intermediate scrutiny applied.100
          The Surveillance provisions here are similar to the anti-wiretapping
   laws in Peavy in that they regulate not what images can be captured but
   instead the means by which those images can be captured. They are also
   similar in that they call for us to balance First Amendment values against
   third parties’ right to privacy. Finally, while the Surveillance provisions no
   doubt have an incidental effect on speech, they more closely resemble
   conduct regulations (aerial surveillance), not regulations of expression, or
   time, place, and manner restrictions (using a drone from a height above eight

          97
               Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
          98
               See 848 F.3d at 690.
          99
               221 F.3d 158, 188 (5th Cir. 2000)
          100
                Id. at 191.

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   feet)—both of which fall under the umbrella of intermediate scrutiny. 101
   Intermediate scrutiny thus respects the First Amendment values attached to
   photography while remaining cognizant of the obvious fact that recording
   from the sky—something the average private person cannot avoid and from
   where the average photographer would not be able to reach—is simply not
   the same thing as expressing one’s views.
           Plaintiffs argue that strict scrutiny should apply. So, before we apply
   intermediate scrutiny, we explain why we disagree with Plaintiffs’ position.
   They offer three “paths” to strict scrutiny, none of which is persuasive.
           First, like the district court, they reason the Surveillance provisions
   are content-based restrictions on speech (filming, more precisely) because
   they “require the enforcing official to inquire into the contents of the image
   to determine whether it is prohibited.”102 “An official must first ascertain the
   subject matter of the drone image to determine whether it is permissible
   under the statute. Therefore, it is the content of the image that determines
   its permissibility—the definition of a content-based restriction.”103 But the
   Surveillance provisions are not content-based. They classify images as lawful
   or unlawful based not on what is in the picture, but on the basis of how the
   picture is taken. The very same aerial image can be unlawfully captured using
   a drone but lawfully captured using a helicopter, a tall ladder, a high building,
   or even a really big trampoline. Indeed, the same image could be captured

           101
               See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that intermediate
   scrutiny applies to regulations “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in
   the same course of conduct”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457
   U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982) (“Of course, limitations on the right of access that resemble
   ‘time, place, and manner’ restrictions on protected speech would not be subjected to such
   strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
           102
                 McCraw, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 805.
           103
                 Id. at 806.

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   using a drone, so long as the drone is flown at a height below eight feet—
   roughly the height of a person standing on the ground holding a camera above
   his or her head.104
          Separately, the district court’s analysis cannot be upheld in light of
   recent developments in First Amendment law. At the time it issued its
   decision in this case, the district court did not have the benefit of City of
   Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, which held that a law is
   not content-based simply because one must read a sign to determine whether
   it is lawful under the challenged rule.105 Here, the district court concluded
   that the Surveillance provisions are content-based simply because one must
   look at the image to determine whether it violates Chapter 423.106 That is
   (now) an incorrect conclusion of law. We thus reject the notion that the
   Surveillance provisions are content-based restrictions on speech.
          Second, Plaintiffs take the position, as did the district court, that the
   Surveillance provisions discriminate on the basis of content because they are
   speaker-based, again triggering strict scrutiny.107 They argue that Chapter
   423 impermissibly favors certain speakers—well, drone operators—and
   disfavors others by excepting some operators from the Surveillance
   provisions. For instance, despite the blanket no-drone-surveillance rule, the
   law exempts scholars who use drones for their academic research and the
   military for its exercises and missions.108

          104
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.002(a)(14).
          105
                142 S. Ct. 1464, 1474 (2022).
          106
                Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 805.
          107
                See id. at 806.
          108
                Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 423.002(a)(1), (3).

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           While the law certainly favors some drone operators over others, the
   Surveillance provisions are not for that reason automatically subject to strict
   scrutiny. The reason that speaker-based distinctions often trigger strict
   scrutiny is that restricting speakers can be a facially content-neutral loophole
   to suppress certain content or viewpoints disfavored by the government. 109
   But concerns over content and viewpoint discrimination are not present in
   the Surveillance provisions’ preference for certain drone operators. While
   the law distinguishes among photographers, it does not distinguish among
   photographs—Chapter 423 cares not for the content of the image. For
   Chapter 423, what’s in the photograph is irrelevant. It is not enough to say
   that the law distinguishes between speakers; to trigger strict scrutiny, the
   distinction must be based on the speaker’s message, not just the manner in
   which the speaker communicates.110 The latter situation applies here. “Thus,
   the fact that the provisions benefit [some photographers] and not [others]
   does not call for strict scrutiny under our precedents.”111
           Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Surveillance provisions are subject to
   strict scrutiny because the law imposes a direct burden on newsgathering and
   journalism. Drones, they say, “have become quintessential tools for
   documenting newsworthy events.” Indeed, the undisputed record evidence
   shows that photojournalists like Calzada and Wade find drones to be a very
   helpful technology in their trade.

           109
                 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 170 (2015).
           110
              Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 645 (“It is true that the [challenged] provisions
   distinguish between speakers in the television programming market. But they do so based
   only upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon
   the messages they carry. . . . So long as they are not a subtle means of exercising a content
   preference, speaker distinctions of this nature are not presumed invalid under the First
   Amendment.”).
           111
                 Id. at 659.

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           But this argument also fails to trigger strict scrutiny. The Supreme
   Court has stated, in no uncertain terms, that “the First Amendment does not
   guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
   available to the public generally.”112 In Branzburg, the High Court refused to
   create a First Amendment privilege for journalists to keep them from having
   to participate in grand jury investigations on the ground that revealing
   confidential informants would hinder the press’s ability to gather news. In
   rejecting that claimed privilege, the Court reasoned that “the First
   Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that
   may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general
   applicability.”113 “The Court has emphasized that” the press “has no special
   immunity from the application of general laws. . . . no special privilege to
   invade the rights and liberties of others.”114 “Although stealing documents
   or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither
   reporter nor source is immune for conviction for such conduct, whatever the
   impact on the flow of news.”115 And journalists “have no constitutional right
   of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is
   excluded.”116 Thus, while drones are no doubt a helpful tool in the
   journalist’s toolkit, restrictions on drone usage do not trigger strict scrutiny.
   “From the beginning of our country the press has operated without
   constitutional protection for [drones], and [yet] the press has flourished.” 117

           112
              Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); see also Davis v. E. Baton Rouge
   Par. Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 928 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he news media have no right to discover
   information that is not available to the public generally.”).
           113
                 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
           114
                 Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)).
           115
                 Id. at 691.
           116
                 Id. at 684–85.
           117
                 Id. at 698–99.

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          In short, “generally applicable laws do not offend the First
   Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
   incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.” 118 While
   newsgathering is no doubt critical to a free society, the right to gather news
   affords no right to compel others to supply information.119 Here, Plaintiffs
   claim a First Amendment right to use aerial drones to conduct
   “surveillance” on private persons and property without consent. 120 But in
   light of the authorities above, no such right exists. The press “has no special
   privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.” 121 We stress that the
   Surveillance provisions protect only private individuals and property.122 They
   expressly permit using drones to capture images on “public real property or
   a person on that property.”123 This makes good sense because there is an
   important and obvious “distinction between recording in public spaces and
   unauthorized recording on private property.”124
          At most, then, intermediate scrutiny applies to the Surveillance
   provisions. After all, the Surveillance provisions regulate not what image is
   captured, but where it is taken from (above eight feet in the air) and how it is
   taken (from a drone, without permission, and with the intent to conduct
   surveillance).125 Such an approach comports not just with Turner but also

          118
                Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
          119
                Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality op.).
          120
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.003(a).
          121
                Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 683.
          122
              Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.003(a) (“individual or privately owned real
   property”).
          123
                Id. § 423.002(a)(15).
          124
                PETA, 60 F.4th at 845 (Rushing, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
          125
                Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 423.003(a), 423.002(a)(14), 423.002(a)(6).

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   with Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., where we held that a First Amendment
   challenge to anti-wiretapping statutes were subject to intermediate scrutiny
   by reasoning along similar lines—that the anti-wiretapping laws regulated
   “the manner in which the information is acquired.”126
          We now apply that standard.
          Under intermediate scrutiny, “[a] content-neutral regulation will be
   sustained if it furthers an important governmental interest; if the
   governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
   if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
   greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.127 “To satisfy this
   standard, a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of
   advancing the Government’s interests.”128 “Rather, the requirement of
   narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the regulation promotes a substantial
   government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
   regulation.’”129 “Narrow tailoring in this context requires, in other words,
   that the means chosen do not ‘burden substantially more speech than is
   necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’”130
          Peavy is particularly pertinent. As previously discussed, there we held
   that anti-wiretapping statutes—laws prohibiting surreptitious surveillance—
   survived intermediate scrutiny.131 Relevant here, we held that the
   government has “a substantial interest in protecting the confidentiality of

          126
                Peavy, 221 F.3d at 188–89 (emphasis added).
          127
                Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks omitted).
          128
                Id.
          129
                Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)) (alteration
   accepted).
          130
                Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
          131
                221 F.3d at 193.

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   private wire, oral, and electronic communications,” that this privacy interest
   is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression,” and that by making
   unlawful the interception and disclosure of private wire transmissions, the
   anti-wiretapping acts were narrowly tailored to the governmental interest in
   protecting privacy.132
          We follow Peavy here. As that case held, the government has a
   substantial interest in protecting the privacy rights of its citizens. Indeed, we
   noted that the privacy interests at stake “are of constitutional dimension.”133
   Though most drone operators harbor no harmful intent, drones have singular
   potential to help individuals invade the privacy rights of others because they
   are small, silent, and able to capture images from angles and altitudes no
   ordinary photographer, snoop, or voyeur would be able to reach. And as for
   tailoring—as in Peavy, the government’s ability to accomplish its goal of
   protecting privacy rights would be “achieved less effectively” absent the
   Surveillance provisions.134 The law is also tailored to bar only surveillance
   that could not be achieved through ordinary means—the law contains an
   exception for images captured “from a height no more than eight feet above
   ground level in a public place, if the image was captured without using any
   electronic, mechanical, or other means to amplify the image beyond normal
   human perception.”135 We therefore conclude that the law survives
   intermediate scrutiny.
          For similar reasons, we reject Plaintiffs’ catchall contention that the
   Surveillance provisions violate the overbreadth doctrine. “To show
   overbreadth, plaintiffs must establish that [the Surveillance provisions]

          132
                Id. at 192–93.
          133
                Id. at 192.
          134
                See id. at 192–93.
          135
                Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.002(a)(14).

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   encompass[] a substantial number of unconstitutional applications ‘judged in
   relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”136 Plaintiffs have not done
   so. To the contrary, as we have explained, the Surveillance provisions are
   narrowly tailored to Texas’s substantial interest in protecting her citizens’
   right to privacy. Plaintiffs have identified no unlawful applications of Chapter
   423, and their arguments to the contrary simply assume Chapter 423 is
   unlawful to begin with. We therefore reverse the district court’s holding that
   Chapter 423 is facially overbroad.137
             In sum, the district court erred in holding that Chapter 423 facially
   violates the First Amendment. We hasten to emphasize that the Surveillance
   provisions are geared only toward protecting private individuals and
   property—they expressly permit aerial surveillance and photography of
   public property and persons thereon.138 This distinction between public and
   private subjects is critical, because there is a key “distinction between
   recording in public spaces and unauthorized recording on private
   property.”139 It is where we drew the line in Taylor—there is a qualified right
   to film public officials performing public duties in public places. And it is why
   a different outcome exists both in Peavy and in this case, where the subject of
   the surveillance is private. We are more likely to find the government’s
   interest in privacy to be substantial where the subject is private rather than
   public.
             Having resolved Defendants’ appeal, we turn now to Plaintiffs’ cross-
   appeal, which challenges the dismissal of their field-preemption claim.

             136
             Seals v. McBee, 898 F.3d 587, 593 (5th Cir. 2018), as revised (Aug. 9, 2018)
   (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010)).
             137
                   See Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, 594 F. Supp. 3d at 808.
             138
                   Tex. Gov’t Code § 423.002(a)(15).
             139
                   PETA, 60 F.4th at 845 (Rushing, J., dissenting).

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                                                 D
          Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claim
   that the No-Fly provisions are preempted by federal regulation of the national
   airspace.140 Plaintiffs offer two theories of preemption: field preemption and
   obstacle preemption. We find that neither applies here.
          Before proceeding to the merits of these claims, though, we must first
   assure ourselves that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the No-Fly
   provisions on preemption grounds.141 Ordinarily, Plaintiffs’ preemption
   challenge to Chapter 423’s enforcement would meet the same fate as their
   Due Process challenge: dismissal for lack of any imminent or concrete threat
   of enforcement or prosecution. In a recent opinion, however, we held that
   ongoing pecuniary harm—specifically, paying more than others because of
   the challenged law—can confer standing to challenge a state regulation on
   preemption grounds, since enjoining the state law “erases” future pecuniary
   harm resulting from the challenged law.142
          Here, at least one Plaintiff has an ongoing pecuniary injury similar to
   that in Young Conservatives. NPPA member Wade testified that Chapter 423
   is costing him “thousands of dollars” in lost photojournalism opportunities,
   as his clients are unwilling to violate Chapter 423 or pay for him to do so.
   Chapter 423 places law-abiding Texas photojournalists like Wade at a
   disadvantage to competitors from out of state and those who do not know of
   or do not follow Chapter 423. As Pappalardo testified, for freelance
   journalists like him, the ability to enhance a story with “aerial imagery can be
   the difference between selling a pitch or being denied.” Plaintiffs’

          140
                See Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
          141
                See Keyes v. Gunn, 890 F.3d 232, 235–36 (5th Cir. 2018).
          142
                Smatresk, 73 F.4th at 310.

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   compliance with Chapter 423 is costing them real money. Because this
   ongoing financial injury is fairly traceable to the likelihood of Chapter 423’s
   enforcement, and because an injunction is likely to redress the injury, we hold
   that Plaintiffs have standing to raise their preemption claim.143
           Nevertheless, Plaintiffs’ preemption claims fail on the merits.
           We start with field preemption. “Field preemption occurs when
   States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting
   within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive
   governance.”144 “Although the Supreme Court has recognized field-
   preemption claims, it has indicated that courts should hesitate to infer field
   preemption unless plaintiffs show that complete ouster of state power
   including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws was
   the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”145 When Congress has not
   expressly preempted state law, as here, field preemption may still “be inferred
   from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the
   inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, or where
   an Act of Congress touches a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
   that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
   on the same subject.”146
           Field preemption of state law is disfavored. Courts should not infer
   field preemption in “areas that have been traditionally occupied by the
   states,” in which case congressional intent to preempt must be “clear and

           143
                 See id.
           144
             City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 176 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
   marks omitted).
           145
                 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
           146
                 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (cleaned up).

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   manifest.”147 States’ police powers, including those necessary to safeguard
   the protection of citizens, fall into this category.148 Additionally, “where, as
   in this case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating
   regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute, as part of the preemption
   analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy
   a field completely. Preemption should not be inferred, however, simply
   because the agency’s regulations are comprehensive.” 149 And importantly,
   field preemption is not to be found where federal “regulations, while
   detailed, appear to contemplate some concurrent state regulation.”150
           Here, Plaintiffs have not shown that Congress or the relevant agency,
   the Federal Aviation Administration,151 intended to occupy the entire field of
   drone regulation. They point out—correctly—that there are some federal
   regulations relating to unmanned aerial vehicles. But as the district court
   astutely observed, “federal law has not completely preempted the field
   regarding [drones] flying over certain buildings and structures.”152
           In fact, the FAA has expressly declined to preempt all state regulation
   of drones. In promulgating a final agency rule on drone regulation, the agency
   stated, “The FAA . . . reviewed the comments and . . . decided that specific

           147
                 Id. (cleaned up).
           148
               Cipollone v. Ligget Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,
   529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (“[E]fforts to protect public health and safety are clearly within
   the city’s police powers”).
           149
              R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cnty., 479 U.S. 130, 149 (1986) (emphasis
   added) (internal citation omitted).
           150
                 Id.
           151
                 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103.
           152
                 Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. 3d at 589 (emphasis added).

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   regulatory text addressing preemption is not required in the final rule.” 153
   “The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption provision in the final
   rule is warranted at this time. Preemption issues involving small UAS
   necessitate a case-specific analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of general
   applicability. Additionally, certain legal aspects concerning small UAS use
   may be best addressed at the State or local level. For example, State law and
   other legal protections for individual privacy may provide recourse for a
   person whose privacy may be affected through another person’s use of a
   UAS.”154 These statements unequivocally show that the applicable federal
   “regulations, while detailed, appear to contemplate some concurrent state
   regulation.”155 That is sufficient, but there is more.
          Shortly before oral argument, the parties alerted the court to a recently
   issued “Fact Sheet” from the FAA. The fact sheet, though it reasserts
   federal sovereignty over issues of “aviation safety or airspace efficiency,”
   nonetheless confirms our conclusion today.156 For in it, the FAA again
   expressly contemplates concurrent regulation with States and localities. That
   ends the matter.157 But even more importantly, as an example of a permissible
   concurrent state regulation, the fact sheet states that “security-related
   restrictions over open-air water treatment facilities or certain types of critical
   infrastructure” are likely not to be preempted, particularly if the restrictions
   are “limited to the lower altitudes.” The No-Fly provisions, which prohibit

          153
              Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 FR 42064-
   01, 42194 (June 28, 2016).
          154
                Id.
          155
                R.J. Reynolds, 479 U.S. at 149.
          156
             State and Local Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact Sheet, Fed.
   Aviation Admin. (July 14, 2023), https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/State-Local-
   Regulation-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
          157
                See R.J. Reynolds, 479 U.S. at 149.

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   drone flights less than 400 feet over critical infrastructure, are thus expressly
   permitted, not preempted, even under the fact sheet.
           Plaintiffs’ other theory of preemption, that Chapter 423 poses an
   obstacle to federal objectives,158 fails for similar reasons.159 So-called obstacle
   preemption exists when “the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
   accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of and objectives of
   Congress.’”160 Plaintiffs contend that Chapter 423 meets that formulation
   here because it undermines the federal government’s twin goals of
   uniformity and exclusivity in the national airspace. As we have already
   observed, however, the FAA expressly contemplates concurrent state
   regulation of drones. So, as far as we can tell, Chapter 423 cannot pose any
   obstacle to national uniformity or exclusivity with respect to drone regulation
   because the FAA has never pursued such goals.161

           158
               According to Defendants, Plaintiffs forfeited this theory of preemption because
   it was not raised in their complaint below. Legal theories, however, need not be raised in a
   complaint to be considered. Plaintiffs raised their obstacle-preemption argument to the
   district court, and that is sufficient to preserve it for our review. See Thomas v. Aneritas Life
   Ins. Corp., 34 F.4th 395, 402 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10,
   12 (2014) (per curiam) (“The federal rules effectively abolish the restrictive theory of
   pleadings doctrine, making it clear that it is unnecessary to set out a legal theory for the
   plaintiff’s claim for relief.” (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
   Practice & Procedure § 1219, at 277–78 (3d ed. 2004)).
           159
                This is perhaps unsurprising given that “the categories of preemption are not
   rigidly distinct.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 n.6 (2000).
           160
               Oneok v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (quoting California v. ARC Am.
   Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989)). Another way in which obstacle preemption can exist is if
   “compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.” Id. Plaintiffs do not argue that
   compliance with Chapter 423 and FAA regulations is impossible, however, so we do not
   address it.
           161
             See Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir.
   2002) (“[S]tate law cannot by its mere existence stand as such an obstacle when the federal
   government contemplates coexistence between federal and local regulatory schemes.”).

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          Accordingly, Chapter 423 is not preempted, and we affirm the district
   court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ preemption claims.
                                                 III
          Plaintiffs picked an uphill battle by styling this litigation as a facial, pre-
   enforcement challenge. “A facial challenge . . . is, of course, the most difficult
   challenge to mount successfully.”162 And the “speech” right they demand is
   sweeping: an unqualified First Amendment right to conduct aerial
   surveillance on non-consenting private individuals on private property, and a
   First Amendment right to fly drones at low altitudes directly over critical
   infrastructure.
          Nothing in the original understanding of the First Amendment or in
   our binding precedent permits such a result. In fact, nothing in the
   Constitution permits an individual to film his neighbor in the privacy of her
   own home—stealthily from the air—for purposes of conducting
   “surveillance.” Under Plaintiffs’ novel theory of the First Amendment, laws
   prohibiting stalking—and even voyeurism—would fall in the name of “free
   speech.”
          We emphasize that our holding today does not foreclose all First
   Amendment and Due Process challenges to Chapter 423. It is possible that,
   in an as-applied challenge, a plaintiff or defendant may persuasively show
   that a particular enforcement of Chapter 423 runs afoul of free speech or
   fairness principles. But it is not this case.
          We therefore

          • VACATE the portion of the district court’s order that
            enjoins Defendants from enforcing the civil provisions of
            Chapter 423 and REMAND with instructions to dismiss

          162
                United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

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            that portion of Plaintiffs’ claim for lack of Article III
            standing;

         • VACATE the portion of the district court’s order that
           enjoins Defendants from enforcing Chapter 423 on Due
           Process grounds and REMAND with instructions to
           dismiss the Due Process claims for lack of Article III
           standing;

         • VACATE the portion of the district court’s order that
           enjoins Director McCraw and Chief Mathis from enforcing
           Chapter 423 on First Amendment grounds and REMAND
           with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
           claims against them on grounds of sovereign immunity.

         • REVERSE the portion of the district court’s order that
           enjoins Defendant Higgins from enforcing Chapter 423 on
           First Amendment grounds and REMAND with
           instructions to enter judgment in favor of Defendant
           Higgins on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims; and

         • AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’
           preemption claims.

                                     41