Court Opinion

ID: 9953441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 05:06:31.671977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:27.082984
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ABDALLAHALIED YUSEF,                                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 365972
                                                                      Washtenaw Circuit Court
DURHAM SCHOOL SERVICES, INC, and                                      LC No. 21-000438-CD
EDWARD GALLAGHER,

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff appeals from an order of the circuit court granting summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact) on plaintiff’s claims for retaliatory
discharge under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., and
under the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.1 We
affirm.

         Plaintiff claims to have suffered a lower back injury when the bus he was driving for
defendant, Durham School Services, Inc. (Durham), hit a bump. According to plaintiff, he has
suffered lower back pain “throughout the years.” A fellow bus driver informed the dispatcher that
a relief driver was necessary to finish the route. Plaintiff was on medical leave, with his doctor
giving him a note that would allow him to return to work on January 8, 2019, but with a “no lifting”
work restriction. Plaintiff claims that he was constructively discharged on January 9, 2019, when
Edward Gallagher, Durham’s general manager, told him that he had to be 100% healthy and have
no work restrictions in order to return to work. He claims that this was done in retaliation for

1
  Plaintiff had also raised claims alleging racial and national origin discrimination and intentional
infliction of emotional distress but does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing
those claims as well.

                                                 -1-
exercising his rights under the WDCA. But plaintiff did not file his claim for compensation
benefits until March 2019.

        Plaintiff provided multiple forms of documentation from himself and physicians assessing
the need for his medical leave and ability to return to work. Beginning on October 8, 2018, he
provided a Michigan Medical note that stated that plaintiff could return to work on October 11,
2018. Following that was a note from Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA) dated October 11,
2018, that stated he could return to work on October 15, 2018. Then plaintiff provided another
note from Michigan Medical on November 15, 2018, stating that he could return to work on
November 16, 2018. On January 6, 2019, a note from plaintiff to “Mr. Charlie”2 stated that his
doctor advised him to return to work on January 7, 2019, “and to perform certain work with my
current situation until the end of January.” Then a note dated January 7, 2019, from plaintiff’s
treating physician, Dr. Breakey, said plaintiff could return to work on February 4, 2019. A January
21, 2019, Michigan Medical note was then provided that stated plaintiff could return to work on
February 21, 2019. And then a February 25, 2019, Michigan Medical note stated that plaintiff
could return to work on March 11, 2019; it did not note any restrictions upon his return to work
and, in fact, said that he “should be able to resume duties . . . .” A December 2019 Independent
Medical Exam (IME) declared that plaintiff was able to return to work without restrictions.
Plaintiff had not returned to work in March 2020 when he was terminated for job abandonment.

      The standard for a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was summarized in Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999):

                 A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the
         complaint. In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under this
         subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
         and other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most
         favorable to the party opposing the motion. Where the proffered evidence fails to
         establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled
         to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4). Quinto v Cross &
         Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).

This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Maiden, 461
Mich at 118.

        Turning first to plaintiff’s claim that defendants retaliated against him for exercising his
rights under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, plaintiff’s argument is lacking. MCL
418.301(13) provides as follows:

                 A person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate
         against an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused
         to be instituted a proceeding under this act or because of the exercise by the
         employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right afforded by this act.

2
    “Mr. Charlie” is presumably Charles Bugg, Durham’s operations supervisor.

                                                 -2-
This Court in Cuddington v United Health Services, Inc, 298 Mich App 264, 275; 826 NW2d 519
(2012), summarized the approach to analyzing a retaliation claim:

                In Phillips v Butterball Farms Co, Inc. (After Second Remand), 448 Mich
       239, 248–249; 531 NW2d 144 (1995), our Supreme Court held that an action for
       wrongful discharge for filing a workers’ compensation action sounds in tort.
       Accordingly, we draw upon the structure of other statutorily created retaliation
       torts, including claims brought under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, MCL
       15.361 et seq., and the Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. To establish
       a prima facie case of retaliation under the WDCA, an employee who has suffered a
       work-related injury must present evidence: (1) that the employee asserted a right
       to obtain necessary medical services or actually exercised that right, (2) that the
       employer knew that the employee engaged in this protected conduct, (3) that the
       employer took an employment action adverse to the employee, and (4) that the
       adverse employment action and the employee’s assertion or exercise of a right
       afforded under MCL 418.315(1) were causally connected. See DeFlaviis v Lord &
       Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997) (noting the elements
       of a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation that the plaintiff must prove to establish
       a violation of the CRA).

Once a plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
a legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation for the adverse employment action. Cuddington, 298 Mich
App at 276. If the defendant does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff:

       If the defendant produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “the
       plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence in the case, when construed in the
       plaintiff's favor, is ‘sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
       [retaliation] was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer
       toward the plaintiff.’ ” Id. at 465, quoting Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458
       Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). A plaintiff can establish that the employer's
       proffered reasons for the adverse employment action qualify as pretextual by
       demonstrating that the reasons (1) had no basis in fact, (2) were not the actual
       factors motivating the decision, or (3) were insufficient to justify the decision.
       Dubey v Stroh Brewery Co, 185 Mich App 561, 565–566; 462 NW2d 758 (1990).

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden on a number of points.

        While we are not convinced that plaintiff has established a causal connection between his
filing for worker’s compensation benefits and his discharge, we will accept, without concluding,
for purposes of this appeal that plaintiff has advanced a sufficient showing to survive summary
disposition. But that does not end the analysis, as we must now look to whether defendants
provided a legitimate reason for the discharge and whether plaintiff can make a case that the stated
legitimate reason was not the real reason supporting plaintiff’s discharge.

      The reason defendants offered is that plaintiff abandoned his job. Plaintiff presents no
argument that job abandonment is not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate
someone’s employment. Accordingly, we conclude that that it is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

                                                 -3-
reason to terminate an employee, and the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show evidence that the
rationale defendants offered is pretextual and that retaliation was the true motive. Cuddington,
298 Mich App at 277.

      This Court in Cuddington, 298 Mich App at 277, explained how a plaintiff may rebut the
employer’s proffered reasons for the termination:

        A plaintiff can establish that the employer’s proffered reasons for the adverse
        employment action qualify as pretextual by demonstrating that the reasons (1) had
        no basis in fact, (2) were not the actual factors motivating the decision, or (3) were
        insufficient to justify the decision.

Plaintiff fails to provide evidence to establish any of these factors.

        As for the first factor, the uncontroverted evidence shows plaintiff did not return to work
for several months after the last doctor’s note saying he could return to work; the February 2019
note had no restrictions upon plaintiff’s return to work. And it was three months after December
2019 IME determined that plaintiff was able to return to work without restriction that he was
terminated from his employment in March 2020 due to job abandonment.

       As for the second factor, plaintiff argues that he would have returned to work had he been
offered a light-duty assignment. But what is lacking is any meaningful evidence in support of a
claim that plaintiff was terminated because he claimed worker’s compensation benefits, and not
because he failed to return to work. That is, at most plaintiff is arguing that he was unable to return
to work without a light-duty assignment (although that is contradicted by both his own doctor’s
note and the IME). But that does nothing to establish that defendants’ motivation in terminating
him was not his failure to return to work (i.e., job abandonment) and instead was in retaliation for
claiming worker’s compensation benefits.

        As for the third factor, plaintiff presents no compelling argument why discharge cannot be
justified by a failure to report to work a year after being cleared by the physician to return to work
and three months after a similar conclusion is reached in an IME.

        In sum, plaintiff focuses on what he believes he was entitled to under the WDCA, rather
than focusing on whether he was terminated in retaliation for making those claims. In essence,
plaintiff’s position comes down to the argument that he can establish a retaliatory discharge when,
17 months after the injury, nearly a year after he applied for worker’s compensation benefits, and
three months after receiving an IME report that stated that plaintiff was able to return to work
without restriction (and to which plaintiff points to no contradictory evidence), defendants
suddenly decided to terminate his employment because he had applied for benefits a year earlier
and then falsely claim that it was due to job abandonment.

         Turning to plaintiff’s claim under the PWDCRA, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what is
his basis for the claim as plaintiff’s complaint consists of 4 substantive paragraphs. The first
merely recites that plaintiff has a disability and is entitled to protection under the act. The second
states that his disability is “unrelated to Plaintiff’s ability to perform Plaintiff’s job with or without
reasonable accommodations.” The third alleges that the act was violated “in numerous ways,
including denying Plaintiff work which Plaintiff could perform.” And the fourth merely sets forth

                                                   -4-
a list of claimed injuries resulting from the alleged violation. But in looking to plaintiff’s briefs,
both in this Court and in the trial court, it appears that plaintiff’s primary argument is based on a
failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.

        Turning to the briefing in the trial court, defendants’ motion for summary disposition
claimed that summary disposition was appropriate on three grounds. First, that plaintiff was not
disabled as defined under the act. Second, that plaintiff had to request an accommodation in
writing as required by the act. And, third, that even if a medical slip from plaintiff’s doctor satisfies
the writing requirement, it would have required placing plaintiff in a new job which is not a
required accommodation under the act, citing Ashworth v Jefferson Screw Products, 176 Mich
App 737, 744; 440 NW2d 101 (1989). Again, notably, the trial court granted summary disposition
for the reasons stated in defendants’ briefs. Plaintiff’s brief in response focused on the
accommodation issue with respect to the PWDCRA claim.

       We will accept, without deciding, that plaintiff is disabled as defined in the act. Even so,
we are not persuaded that plaintiff has made an adequate showing to survive summary disposition
based upon a failure to provide an accommodation. Section 210(18) of the PWDCRA provides:

                 A person with a disability may allege a violation against a person regarding
         a failure to accommodate under this article only if the person with a disability
         notifies the person in writing of the need for accommodation within 182 days after
         the date the person with a disability knew or reasonably should have known that an
         accommodation was needed. [MCL 37.1210(18)]

Defendants argue that plaintiff did not make such a request in writing within 182 days as required
by the statute. In his reply brief, plaintiff argues that the requirement was met through his
physician’s statement in a medical examination report.

         The medical statement appears to be a form from the Unemployment Insurance Agency
(UIA) of the Michigan Department of Talent and Economic Development regarding
unemployment insurance. It bears the title of “MEDICAL STATEMENT” and indicates that it
was mailed by the UIA on December 19, 2018. The directions on the form require it to be returned
to the Unemployment Insurance Agency. It appears that plaintiff’s attending physician prepared
the form inasmuch as it lists July 10, 2018, as the date of first treatment or examination and
December 17, 2018, as the date of the most recent treatment or examination. It does not detail
plaintiff’s medical history or even the history of present illness. Rather, it is focused solely on
plaintiff’s ability or inability to perform work and any limitations. It does state that plaintiff had
“limitations and/or restrictions” on his ability to work full-time. It stated that the period of inability
began on November 26, 2018,3 and would conclude on February 1, 2019. In response to the
direction to indicate what jobs the patient is unable to perform, the response states “has aide—no
lifting.” The form is dated December 26, 2018.

       There is also a second “MEDICAL STATEMENT” that is the same form with a mailing
date of January 4, 2019. Plaintiff does not refer to this form in his brief on appeal. Although

3
    Elsewhere on the form, it stated that the date the limitations began was December 17, 2018.

                                                   -5-
signed by the same physician, Robert Breakey, MD, it is slightly different in detail. First, it states
that the first date of treatment or examination was October 7, 2018. Second, the box to be checked
regarding whether plaintiff has any limitations or restrictions is not checked either “yes” or “no.”
In one area where it asks for an explanation of the restriction, it states “no lifting.” In the section
where it asks if the patient is able to work full-time, the “yes” is again checked; in the area to
indicate what jobs the patient is able to perform, it states “bus driver but no lifting.” In the area to
indicate the dates of the periods of inability to work, it lists five different date ranges, with gaps
between ranges. The earliest date is now October 7, 2018, and the latest range starts on January
7, 2019 (the day before the date of the signature on the form and approximately 3 weeks after the
doctor last saw plaintiff) and now ends on February 4, 2019.

        The question becomes whether this UIA form satisfies the statutory requirement. Plaintiff
argues that it does satisfy the request for accommodation requirement per MCL 37.1210(18). We
conclude that it does not. The phrase “has aide—no lifting” on a UIA form, if delivered to the
employer (which plaintiff states that it was), may inform the employer of a restriction, but that
does not specifically inform the employer of a need for an accommodation (nor what
accommodation may be needed). It also demonstrates a contradiction in plaintiff’s positions. On
the one hand, plaintiff is claiming that the form stating “no lifting” sufficiently informs defendants
of the need for an accommodation. On the other hand, part of plaintiff’s argument is that lifting is
not an essential job function for the position of bus driver. If the latter is the case, then there would
be no need for an accommodation.

        For these reasons, we conclude that plaintiff failed to satisfy the statutory requirement for
a written request for an accommodation. MCL 37.1210(18).

       Finally, we turn to plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration based upon newly discovered and concealed evidence. We conclude that it did
not.

        Plaintiff supported his motion with the attachment of five unsigned “affidavits.”4 Plaintiff
stated that the affidavits were being presented under MCR 2.116(H). That rule provides:

        Affidavits Unavailable.

        (1) A party may show by affidavit that the facts necessary to support the party’s
        position cannot be presented because the facts are known only to persons whose
        affidavits the party cannot procure. The affidavit must

            (a) name these persons and state why their testimony cannot be procured, and

4
  In fact, these documents are not signed, there is no signature line on the “affidavits,” and none of
them is notarized. Referring to these pieces of paper as “newly discovered evidence” is beyond
comprehension.

                                                  -6-
           (b) state the nature of the probable testimony of these persons and the reason
           for the party’s belief that these persons would testify to those facts.

       (2) When this kind of affidavit is filed, the court may enter an appropriate order,
       including an order

           (a) denying the motion, or

           (b) allowing additional time to permit the affidavit to be supported by further
           affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or other discovery.

Plaintiff’s submission fails to meet the requirements of the rule. First, the plain language would
require that there actually be an affidavit, presumably by plaintiff, and that that affidavit set forth
the reasons why the necessary persons cannot be procured and what their anticipated testimony
would be. Second, at that point the trial court’s options are either (a) deny the motion or (b) grant
additional time before deciding the motion for summary disposition.

        In this case, plaintiff submitted no such affidavit, and the “unavailable affidavits” are
nothing but unsigned sheets of paper. These unsigned documents are not affidavits that can be
offered in opposition to defendants’ motion based on MCR 2.116(C)(10) because they are clearly
inadmissible as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the motion. MCR 2.116(G)(6).
Moreover, this newly discovered “evidence” was not presented as part of the response to
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. And, finally, the reason given in the “unavailable
affidavits” for the affiants not being available to sign them is that discovery had closed. This
statement only establishes that plaintiff’s effort was untimely, not that it was impossible to procure
the proposed affiants’ signatures.

       In sum, plaintiff did not provide a sufficient basis for the trial court to grant the motion for
reconsideration.

        For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary
disposition to defendants. In light of our conclusions in this case, we need not address the
alternative arguments raised by the parties.

       Affirmed. Defendants may tax costs.

                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                               /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                               /s/ Christopher P. Yates

                                                 -7-