Court Opinion

ID: 9906088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 21:04:24.667151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.923112
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                       2023 IL App (3d) 220526-U

                                Order filed November 30, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 IN THE

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                   2023

      In re MARRIAGE OF                      )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                             )     of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
      PHYLLIS BONZANI, n/k/a PHYLLIS         )     Will County, Illinois,
      SPORLEIN,                              )
                                             )
            Petitioner-Appellee,             )     Appeal No. 3-22-0526
                                             )     Circuit No. 10-D-1062
            and                              )
                                             )
      ROBERT ANTHONY BONZANI,                )     Honorable
                                             )     Dinah Archambeault,
            Respondent-Appellant.            )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Peterson and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                ORDER

¶1          Held: The trial court erred in limiting its maintenance review to duration when it should
                  have also reviewed amount. It did not, however, abuse its discretion in extending
                  maintenance indefinitely. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.

¶2          Robert Bonzani appeals from a postdissolution order extending a $3000-per-month

     maintenance award indefinitely in favor of his ex-wife, Phyllis Sporlein. He argues the court

     improperly limited its review of the original maintenance award to duration when it should have
     also considered amount. He also argues the court erred in extending the award indefinitely and

     failed to consider Phyllis’s efforts to become financially independent. For the reasons that follow,

     we reverse in part and affirm in part.

¶3                                            I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The parties were married in April 1993 and divorced in June 2012. The dissolution

     judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA) requiring Robert, a practicing

     physician, to pay unallocated support to equalize the parties’ base income. Citing the parties’

     respective net incomes at the time of dissolution, section 3(a) of the MSA required Robert to pay

     Phyllis approximately $2750 on a semimonthly basis to equalize the parties’ base income. Section

     3(b) of the MSA provided, in part,

                    “Said payments shall continue until December 31, 2018, and shall be subject to

                    review upon proper petition and notice filed by Wife (Petition to be filed prior to

                    12/31/18 or will be barred) to determine if, and to what extent, the Wife shall be

                    entitled   to   any    additional    unallocated    family   support    payments     (or

                    maintenance/child support), consistent with all applicable law.”

     The final provision of section 3(b) stated: “Other than hereinabove provided, unallocated family

     support shall be subject to modification or termination as provided pursuant to Section 510 of the

     Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.”

¶5          In June 2014, the trial court entered an agreed order modifying the MSA (Agreed Order).

     Robert was unrepresented at the time.1 The Agreed Order replaced Robert’s unallocated support

     obligation with fixed child support and maintenance obligations. Expressly abrogating the MSA’s

            1
              The record shows Robert was not present in court on June 26, 2014, when the Agreed Order was
     entered. On the nearest court dates when Robert’s court presence was noted—February 21, July 31, and
     September 8, 2014—he appeared pro se. It was only on October 1, 2014, that Robert appeared with counsel.

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     income equalization requirement, the Agreed Order set maintenance payments at $3000 per month

     and child support payments at $3000 per month. The order described the new maintenance

     obligation as “non-modifiable and non-terminable.” Nevertheless, it stated, “Maintenance shall

     continue and shall be subject to review as provided for in the existing [MSA] entered in this cause.”

     Its final sentence provided, “[A]ll other terms and conditions of the [MSA] previously entered in

     this cause, not specifically modified by this agreement, shall remain in full force and effect.” The

     trial court indicated “[t]he parties reached the agreement independent of counsel, with [Phyllis’s]

     counsel then drafting the parties’ agreement and entering the Agreed Order.” 2

¶6          In September 2018, Phyllis petitioned the court to extend the $3000 monthly maintenance

     on a permanent basis. Her petition highlighted Robert’s noncompliance with various MSA

     provisions and court orders. Robert responded to her petition and, in January 2019, petitioned the

     court to “terminate, abate and/or reduce” his maintenance obligations. He argued his request was

     warranted by a substantial change in circumstances—namely, that his income had since

     plummeted due to bouts of unemployment and underemployment. Further, he alleged Phyllis had

     failed to take reasonable steps to become self-supporting, despite both of their children no longer

     being minors.

¶7          The cross-petitions led to an August 2022 hearing in which the parties disputed the scope

     of the court’s review. Phyllis argued the court’s maintenance review was limited to duration only,

     as the maintenance amount was nonmodifiable. In September 2022, the trial court agreed with

     Phyllis, finding its review limited to duration. “If extended,” the court stated, “maintenance shall

            2
              The trial court conveyed this information in its written December 2022 decision, from which
     Robert now appeals.
                                                      3
       continue at $3,000.00 per month as the parties agreed.” Robert moved to reconsider, and the court

       took his motion under advisement.

¶8            The matter proceeded to a five-day evidentiary proceeding in October and November 2022.

       Both parties testified at this proceeding. In December 2022, the court denied Robert’s motion to

       reconsider along with his petition to terminate, abate, or reduce maintenance. Emphasizing that

       the $3000 monthly amount was nonmodifiable under the Agreed Order, the court granted Phyllis’s

       petition to extend maintenance, and provided that “[m]onthly maintenance of $3,000.00 is

       continued indefinitely, subject to statutory termination factors as set forth in the parties’ MSA.”

¶9            This appeal followed.

¶ 10                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11          On appeal, Robert contends the trial court erred in declining to review the monthly

       maintenance amount and in awarding permanent maintenance without considering Phyllis’s efforts

       to become financially independent. We address each contention in turn.

¶ 12                                    A. Scope of Maintenance Review

¶ 13           Robert argues the $3000 maintenance amount was nonmodifiable for only a fixed term,

       which was set to expire on December 31, 2018. Phyllis, on the other hand, argues the Agreed Order

       did not limit nonmodifiability to a specific term, and the court correctly declined to review the

       maintenance amount.

¶ 14          The parties’ dispute requires that we construe their MSA and the subsequent Agreed Order.

       Both instruments are subject to the rules of contract interpretation. In re Marriage of Tutor, 2011

       IL App (2d) 100187, ¶ 13; In re Marriage of Doermer, 2011 IL App (1st) 101567, ¶ 27. Contract

       interpretation aims, principally, to effectuate the parties’ intent. In re Marriage of Woodrum, 2018

       IL App (3d) 170369, ¶ 108. That intent is best communicated by the contract’s language, given its

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       plain and ordinary meaning. Id. A contract is construed as a whole, bearing in mind that words

       derive meaning from their context. Id. Where a written contract is unambiguous, the parties’ intent

       is determined from the writing itself. Frydman v. Horn Eye Center, Ltd., 286 Ill. App. 3d 853, 858

       (1997). “Contracts which specifically incorporate other documents by reference are to be construed

       as a whole with those other documents.” Kirschenbaum v. Northwestern University, 312 Ill. App.

       3d 1017, 1029 (1999). Also, when possible, contracts are construed so that different provisions are

       harmonized and not conflicting with one another. Henderson v. Roadway Express, 308 Ill. App.

       3d 546, 549 (1999). Contract interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo.

       Id. at 548.

¶ 15           The Agreed Order specifically incorporated the MSA by reference: “Maintenance shall

       continue and shall be subject to review as provided for in the existing [MSA] entered in this cause.”

       It further provided, “[A]ll other terms and conditions of the [MSA] previously entered in this cause,

       not specifically modified by this agreement, shall remain in full force and effect.” Accordingly,

       we construe the Agreed Order and MSA together. Kirschenbaum, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1029.

¶ 16           Phyllis maintains that, under the Agreed Order, the $3000 maintenance amount was not

       subject to modification under any circumstances. We disagree. Phyllis’s construction does not give

       due regard to the MSA’s review provision. We begin by considering that provision in context.

       Section 3(b) of the MSA provides three triggers which terminate Robert’s support obligation and

       one trigger which subjects his support obligation to court review. Section 3(b) provides, in

       pertinent part,

                         “(b) Said payments [i.e., unallocated support payments] shall terminate upon the

                         first to occur of the following events:

                                (1) The death of either party;

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                       (2) The remarriage of the Wife;

                       (3) Should the Wife cohabitate with another person on a resident,

                           continuing conjugal basis;

                       (4) Said payments shall continue until December 31, 2018, and shall be

                           subject to review upon proper petition and notice filed by Wife (Petition

                           to be filed prior to 12/31/18 or will be barred) to determine if, and to

                           what extent, the Wife shall be entitled to any additional unallocated

                           family support payments (or maintenance/child support), consistent

                           with all applicable law. Until the Court modifies and/or terminates the

                           existing order, the current support obligation shall remain in full force

                           and effect with any modification or termination retroactive to the date

                           of [sic] scheduled for termination.

                                                        ***

                       Other than hereinabove provided, unallocated family support shall be

                       subject to modification or termination as provided pursuant to Section 510

                       of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.”

Under this section of the MSA, support payments terminate upon one of three triggers: (1) the

death of either party, (2) Phyllis’s remarriage, or (3) her cohabitation. The fourth trigger is found

in section (b)(4), the review provision. It provides that (a) upon Phyllis’s timely petition and

(b) after December 31, 2018, Robert’s support obligation shall be subject to review “to determine

if, and to what extent, [Phyllis] shall be entitled to any additional unallocated family support

payments (or maintenance/child support), consistent with all applicable law.” (Emphasis added.)

Crucially, the extent of any additional support subsumes both duration and amount. See Merriam-

                                                 6
       Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/to%20what%20extent

       (last visited Nov. 6, 2023) (defining “to what extent” as “how far; how much”). Thus, under the

       MSA, the court’s maintenance review is not limited to duration; it includes amount as well.

¶ 17          Section 3(b)’s final provision (prefaced by “[o]ther than hereinabove provided”) states that

       Robert’s support obligation is modifiable and terminable pursuant to the considerations of section

       510 of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act). See 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2012)

       (maintenance order may be modified or terminated only upon showing of substantial change in

       circumstances). Notably, however, the possibility of section 510 modification or termination under

       the final provision is not associated with a specific timeframe and is “[o]ther than hereinabove

       provided.” Thus, the final provision’s operation is separate from, and secondary to, the four event-

       specific triggers for termination or review. Upon death, remarriage, or cohabitation, support

       payments terminate without regard for section 3(b)’s final provision. Further, upon Phyllis’s timely

       petition to extend maintenance, the final provision must give way for the court’s general

       maintenance review after December 31, 2018, “consistent with all applicable law.”

¶ 18          We now move to the Agreed Order, which twice describes Robert’s maintenance as “non-

       modifiable and non-terminable.” Sections B and C of the Agreed Order provide, in pertinent part,

                      “B. Effective June 1, 2014, [Robert] shall pay to [Phyllis], as and for non-

                      modifiable and non-terminable maintenance, the sum of THREE THOUSAND

                      AND NO/100 ($3,000.00) DOLLARS per month. By express agreement of the

                      parties, said maintenance shall not be deductible by [Robert], nor includable in

                      [Phyllis’s] income. Maintenance shall continue and shall be subject to review as

                      provided for in the existing Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage/Marital

                      Settlement Agreement entered in this cause. Said payments shall be made and

                                                        7
                      delivered to [Phyllis] twice a month based on [Robert’s] pay schedule ($1,500.00

                      every pay period). ***

                      C. Based upon the parties’ agreement with respect to the payment of non-

                      modifiable and non-terminable maintenance payments to be reviewed consistent

                      with the terms and conditions of the existing Judgment for Dissolution of

                      Marriage/Marital Settlement Agreement, [Phyllis] agrees that the prior Order of

                      Court requiring [Robert] to equalize income shall be vacated and the payments

                      hereinabove provided for shall be substituted in its place.”

¶ 19          Because Phyllis’s counsel drafted the Agreed Order, we construe its terms strictly against

       Phyllis. Carvallo v. Carvallo, 62 Ill. App. 3d 394, 399 (1978). The “non-modifiable and non-

       terminable” language abrogated the final provision of section 3(b) of the MSA, which expressly

       allowed for both modification and termination of Robert’s support obligation. The “non-

       modifiable and non-terminable” language did not, however, modify the four triggers listed in

       section 3(b). Those triggers did not expressly raise modifiability and terminability in a manner that

       would lead one to conclude the Agreed Order was meant to affect them in any way. Indeed, if

       either party were to die, or if Phyllis were to remarry or cohabit, even a nonmodifiable and

       nonterminable support obligation would terminate. Similarly, upon Phyllis’s timely petition and

       after December 31, 2018, a nonmodifiable and nonterminable support obligation would be subject

       to review to determine “if, and to what extent” Phyllis is entitled to additional support payments.

       The Agreed Order concludes with the following language: “[A]ll other terms and conditions of the

       [MSA] previously entered in this cause, not specifically modified by this agreement, shall remain

       in full force and effect.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, because the Agreed Order did not

       specifically modify section 3(b)’s four triggers, they “remain in full force and effect.”

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¶ 20           Phyllis stresses the term “non-modifiable” in the Agreed Order is evidence of the parties’

       intent to exclude the maintenance amount from later review. She argues, “Non-modifiable, without

       qualification, means non-modifiable. It does not mean non-modifiable until December 31, 2018,

       it does not mean non-modifiable during the initial maintenance term, nor does it mean non-

       modifiable subject to general review.” Phyllis’s rhetoric is belied by the Agreed Order’s express

       incorporation of the MSA’s review provision. Section B of the Agreed Order provides,

       “Maintenance *** shall be subject to review as provided for in the existing [MSA].” In addition,

       section C reiterates that review is “to be consistent with the terms and conditions of the existing

       [MSA].” Thus, even if we did not construe the Agreed Order strictly against Phyllis, it clearly

       defers to the MSA’s review provision, without limiting the extent of review. We find the Agreed

       Order leaves the scope of review entirely to the MSA’s terms.

¶ 21          Moreover, we observe that Phyllis’s rhetoric is unduly fixated on the word “non-

       modifiable.” The Agreed Order, as Robert points out, describes the maintenance obligation as

       “non-modifiable and non-terminable.” Thus, if Phyllis’s unrestrained reading of “nonmodifiable”

       is to be accepted, it must logically extend to “non-terminable” as well. It does not. Phyllis’s

       reasoning quickly unravels when “non-terminable” is substituted for “non-modifiable.” Consider,

       for example: “Non-terminable, without qualification, means non-terminable. It does not mean non-

       terminable until December 31, 2018.” Phyllis recognized that maintenance was, in fact, terminable

       after December 31, 2018. Her petition to extend maintenance indicated as much. Accordingly, we

       reject Phyllis’s selective emphasis on “non-modifiable.”

¶ 22          In short, Robert’s $3000 maintenance obligation was nonmodifiable and nonterminable

       only insofar as none of the four conditions in section 3(b) of the MSA were triggered. In this case,

       the fourth condition was triggered. Because Phyllis filed a timely petition to extend maintenance,

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       the trial court was required, after December 31, 2018, to review Robert’s maintenance obligation,

       both its duration and amount, “consistent with all applicable law.” The court’s finding that it was

       precluded from reviewing the maintenance amount was in error. We therefore reverse that portion

       of its order and remand for the trial court to consider the proper amount of maintenance.

¶ 23           Finally, we observe that Phyllis filed her petition to extend maintenance in September

       2018, after the effective date of section 504(b-8) of the Act. See Pub. Act 99-763 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017)

       (amending 750 ILCS 5/504). Section 504(b-8) provides, “Upon review of any previously ordered

       maintenance award, the court may extend maintenance for further review, extend maintenance for

       a fixed non-modifiable term, extend maintenance for an indefinite term, or permanently terminate

       maintenance in accordance with subdivision (b-1)(1)(A) of this Section.” (Emphasis added.) 750

       ILCS 5/504(b-8) (West 2018). Section 504(b-1)(1)(A) establishes guidelines for setting the

       maintenance amount. 3 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A) (West 2018). Consequently, because subsection

       504(b-8) was in effect at the time Phyllis petitioned to extend maintenance, the court’s

       maintenance review is informed by section 504(b-1)(1)(A)’s guidelines. See In re Marriage of

       Burdess, 2020 IL App (3d) 190342, ¶ 21. We therefore direct the trial court, on remand, to conduct

       a review of the maintenance amount consistent with section 504(b-1)(1)(A) of the Act.

¶ 24                                        B. Permanent Maintenance

¶ 25           Next, Robert argues the trial court improperly awarded Phyllis permanent maintenance.

       According to him, Phyllis failed to demonstrate a continued need for maintenance and the trial

               3
                Under a plain reading of section 504(b-8), only amount guidelines apply in a review proceeding;
       duration guidelines do not. Section 504(b-8) references subsection (b-1)(1)(A), which establishes amount
       guidelines, but does not reference subsection (b-1)(1)(B), which establishes duration guidelines. It is
       unclear why this is the case. Nevertheless, we must interpret the statute as written and may not, under the
       guise of statutory construction, correct perceived omissions or defects. Spear v. Board of Education of
       North Shore School District No. 112, 291 Ill. App. 3d 117, 119 (1997).

                                                           10
       court’s decision to extend maintenance did not consider evidence that Phyllis had achieved financial

       self-sufficiency and was effectively rehabilitated. “We will not reverse a trial court’s determination on

       review, modification, or termination of maintenance absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Marriage of

       Burdess, 2020 IL App (3d) 190342, ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person

       would take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriage of Cheger, 213 Ill. App. 3d 371, 378

       (1991).

¶ 26             Robert’s argument is premised on his claim that the parties agreed to rehabilitative maintenance

       when they signed the MSA. Rehabilitative maintenance is intended to assist and encourage dependent

       spouses to become financially independent. In re Marriage of Van Hoveln, 2018 IL App (4th) 180112,

       ¶ 30. A recipient of rehabilitative maintenance is “under an affirmative obligation to seek appropriate

       training and skills to become financially independent in the future.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

       Id. “Permanent maintenance, however, is appropriate where it is evident that the recipient spouse is

       either unemployable or employable only at an income that is substantially lower than the previous

       standard of living.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 27             Robert acknowledges that neither the MSA nor the Agreed Order explicitly stated the

       rehabilitative nature of the maintenance award. He argues, however, that both instruments reference

       Section 510 of the Act, which addresses the goal of financial self-sufficiency. He further argues that

       the “public policy” behind the maintenance award’s fixed term supports its rehabilitative nature. See

       In re Marriage of Rodriguez, 359 Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2005) (“The purpose of a time limit on the

       award is generally intended to motivate the recipient spouse to take the steps necessary to attain self-

       sufficiency.”).

¶ 28             Robert’s contention is governed by familiar principles of contract interpretation. Where an

       agreement’s terms are clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent must be determined from the

       language of the agreement alone. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Watts Regulator Co., 2016

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       IL App (2d) 160275, ¶ 27. “A court may resort to rules of construction only where the language

       of the agreement is ambiguous.” Id. Robert does not argue that the MSA or Agreed Order is

       ambiguous. In fact, the parties agree that neither the MSA nor the Agreed Order placed an affirmative

       obligation on Phyllis to make efforts to become self-sufficient. Robert argues, instead, that we can

       infer the parties intended to make maintenance rehabilitative. We will not do that. “There is a strong

       presumption against provisions that easily could have been included in the contract but were not.”

       Klemp v. Hergott Group, Inc., 267 Ill. App. 3d 574, 581 (1994). “A court will not add another term

       about which an agreement is silent.” Id. Robert, moreover, fails to provide case law support for his

       claim that the mere reference to section 510 is enough to impute a rehabilitative character to the

       maintenance award. Absent MSA language requiring Phyllis to become self-sufficient, we will not

       presume that her maintenance award was rehabilitative. The trial court was therefore not precluded

       from extending maintenance on a permanent basis.

¶ 29          Robert argues the trial court failed to consider Phyllis’s efforts to become self-sufficient.

       We disagree. In its December 2022 ruling, the court outlined how Phyllis went from being a stay-

       at-home mother during the parties’ 19-year marriage, to earning a $55,000 yearly salary as an

       insurance agent. The court concluded, however, that Phyllis “has not and cannot maintain any

       semblance of the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage, despite commendable efforts

       to become self-sufficient.”

¶ 30          The court’s decision highlighted the parties’ lavish lifestyle during their marriage, and

       juxtaposed it with Phyllis’s diminished standard of living after the divorce. While married, the

       parties lived with no money worries, in a large, custom-built home, and traveled domestically and

       internationally. After the divorce, Phyllis rented a three-bedroom house for herself and the parties’

       two children. She later downsized to an 800-square-foot apartment when the children moved out.

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       She drove a 2011 Ford Escape and was now driving a 2008 Hyundai Tucson. Her adjusted gross

       income was $46,818 in 2021, $40,232 in 2020, and $35,798 in 2019. At the time of the hearing,

       Phyllis was 55 years old and earned a net monthly income of $3860.22 with a monthly deficit of

       $973.78. She testified her salary had plateaued at $55,000 and she would have to own or buy into

       an insurance agency to increase her income. Permanent maintenance is appropriate where the

       recipient spouse is employable only at an income substantially lower than her previous standard of

       living. In re Marriage of Van Hoveln, 2018 IL App (4th) 180112, ¶ 30. Based on the record before

       this court, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in extending maintenance on a

       permanent basis.

¶ 31                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and

       remanded for proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 33          Reversed in part and affirmed in part; remanded with directions.

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