Court Opinion

ID: 9624472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:03:57.500144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:47.398334
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring specially with comments):
I concur in remanding this case for a trial and also agree to these propositions: that there is a dispute in material issues of fact which must be resolved in order to determine whether the will in question was the valid and existing will of Harvard L. Whea-don at the time of his death; and that it was therefore error for the trial court to take the case from the jury. But I think it would be improper for the decision of this Court to be regarded as indicating how the issue of fact should be resolved.
Under our law, the trial court does not comment on the credibility of the evidence, nor upon the effect thereof. It is my thought that, except to indicate that there is sufficient evidence to raise a jury question, this Court’s opinion should respect that same standard and leave determination of the credibility of the evidence and the effect thereof to the fact-trier.
The main opinion correctly states that where the testator had possession of the will and it cannot be found after his death, there is a presumption that he revoked it; but that this presumption can be rebutted by “sufficient evidence.”
The term “presumption” is but descriptive of a process of reasoning in determining facts. It means that from the showing of the existence of certain facts, viewed in the light of common sense and experience, it is reasonable to assume that the presumed fact exists;1 and that it should be so found to exist unless sufficient countervailing evidence is adduced that reasonable minds might find to the contrary, in which case there is a dispute for the fact-trier to resolve on the basis of judging where the greater probability of truth lies.2
It is my view that in this ease there is the presumption of revocation; and that there is contrary evidence, which the fact-trier (court or jury) may believe, but is not necessarily required to believe, is sufficient to overcome the presumption. I agree with the view expressed in the main opinion that it is not absolutely necessary that there be physical production of such a will.3 There is also a presumption that anything shown to be in existence at a given time continues to exist unless the contrary is shown. The fact-trier can properly also consider that *936presumption, along with the presumption of revocation above referred to, together with all of the other circumstances shown in the case in determining whether the greater probability of truth is that the decedent had a will at the time of his death than that he had revoked it. But I do not think the evidence in this case should be regarded by this Court as compelling a finding that there was such a valid will in existence. My opinion is that an opportunity should be given to both sides to fully present their evidence and their arguments and, without any directive as to prejudgment thereon, permit the jury (or trial court as fact-trier) to resolve the critical issue above stated.
HALL, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring opinion of CROCKETT, J.

. See 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, Sec. 160, P. 194.

. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 639, 2 S.E.2d 343; and Wigmore states that “In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a conclusive presumption.” Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd Ed.) Sec. 2492; also deprecating the idea of absolute presumptions, see discussion in Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, (2d Ed.) Sec. 42.

.See In re Frandsen’s Will, Footnote 1, Main Opinion.