Court Opinion

ID: 9721172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:50:14.172726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.735179
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.
I concur in the judgment.
As the majority points out, the necessity defense has an uncertain status in California law. On one hand, the California Supreme Court has broadly stated that just as there are no common law crimes in this state, “ ‘likewise with excuses or justifications—if no statutory excuse or justification apply as to the commission of the particular offense, neither the common law nor the so-called “unwritten law” may legally supply it.’ [Citation.]” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 632 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420].) As more than one commentator has pointed out, while this state’s Penal Code includes a number of common law defenses, such as duress, unconsciousness, and self-defense, there is no code provision recognizing the defense of necessity. (Comment, Necessity Defined: A New Role in the Criminal Defense System (1981) 29 UCLA L.Rev. 409, 417, fn. 45; Berry, Jr., The Mysterious Defense of Necessity (1979) 54 State Bar J. 384, 385; Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from Prison—A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault (1975) 49 So.Cal.L.Rev. 110, 133-134.) When the court in People v. Lovercamp (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 823 [118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 69 A.L.R.3d 668] held that a limited defense of necessity is available to a defendant charged with escape from prison, it did not discuss the effect of the absence of statutory authority for that defense. Most subsequent cases considering whether the defense applies to offenses other than prison escapes have also ignored this issue. (See, e.g., People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952 [179 Cal.Rptr. 276]; People v. Weber (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4-7 [208 Cal.Rptr. 719]; cf. People v. Velasquez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 418, 421-422 [204 Cal.Rptr. 640] [stating that necessity defense in Lovercamp based on public policy].)
On the other hand, however, those commentators fail to acknowledge or recognize that the principle that there is no nonstatutory justification or excuse for a criminal act in this state is apparently not an absolute rule. (1 *51Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) § 7, pp. 10-11.) For example, entrapment is a well-recognized defense, and appears to rest on public policy grounds rather than on any statute. (See People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 686-690 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]; see also LaFave & Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law (1972) p. 372.)
In addition, those courts analyzing the “necessity defense” in this state have been uncertain about its elements, and at least one court has discussed the defense as if it were indistinguishable from the defense of duress. (People v. Pena (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14 [197 Cal.Rptr. 264] [characterizing Lovercamp as a “duress” case and using the terms “duress,” “coercion,” “necessity,” “compulsion,” and “justification” interchangeably].)
It is apparent from a reading of the cases and commentaries that reasonable minds are in a state of confusion as to nonstatutory defenses and in particular as to the existence and/or scope of the so-called “necessity defense.” The law in this area needs to be straightened out by the Legislature. The courts as yet do not appear to be overwhelmed by urgings of a “necessity defense”; however, the fertile minds of the criminal defense bar can be expected to move in this direction. The Legislature should act now, rather than wait until the courts are forced to “legislate” their own solution.
As to this case, however, it is clear that there is no defense by whatever name available to those who trespass or engage in other unlawful conduct to protest governmental policy. Whether the defense is characterized as “necessity” or “duress” or some hybrid of the two, “[u]nder any definition of these defenses one principle remains constant; if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law . . . the defenses will fail.” (United States v. Bailey (1980) 444 U.S. 394, 410 [62 L.Ed.2d 575, 100 S.Ct. 624]; see, e.g., United States v. May (9th Cir. 1980) 622 F.2d 1000, 1008-1010 [necessity defense not available to defendants who protest against Trident missile system at naval submarine base by trespassing].) There were other lawful forms of protest available to petitioners, and the trial court correctly rejected their defense of necessity.
Barry-Deal, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 22, 1985, and petitioners’ applications for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied April 25, 1985. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the applications should be granted.