Court Opinion

ID: 9637867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:24:23.220487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:01.381664
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that it was an abuse of discretion for the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) to award penalties to Renee Snizaski (Claimant), widow of Randy Snizaski, deceased, for the period in which the request for supersedeas filed by Rox Coal Company (Employer) was pending before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB). In so holding, the majority overrules Hoover v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (ABF Freight Systems), 820 A.2d 843 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). However, unlike the majority, I believe that Hoover was correctly decided.
Section 428 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act1 (Act) provides that an employer violates the Act if it fails to make payments within thirty days of the date on which its obligation to pay arises. Section 430(b) of the Act provides that any employer who refuses to make any payment provided for in a decision without filing a petition and being granted a super-sedeas shall be subject to a penalty under section 435 of the Act. 77 P.S. § 971(b). Section 435(d) of the Act2 authorizes the imposition of penalties for violations of the Act. 77 P.S. § 991(d). Here, there is no *144question that Employer violated section 428 of the Act by failing to make payments within thirty days of the date on which its obligation to pay arose. Thus, the WCJ had a proper basis for the imposition of penalties.
Because the imposition of penalties is discretionary, we will not overturn a penalty on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Hoover. An abuse of discretion is demonstrated when the penalties are manifestly unreasonable or show partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will toward a litigant. Jetson Direct Mail Services, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 782 A.2d 631 (Pa. Cmwlth.2001), appeal denied, 568 Pa. 727, 797 A.2d 917 (2002).
The majority does not suggest that the record contains evidence that the WCJ showed partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will toward Employer in imposing the penalties. Evidently, the majority believes that it was manifestly unreasonable to impose penalties in this case because Employer’s failure to make timely payment was a result of Employer’s reliance on the WCAB’s supersedeas regulations. I do not agree that Employer’s reliance on those regulations renders the penalties manifestly unreasonable.
At the time relevant to these proceedings, the WCAB’s regulations essentially provided that: (1) a request for supersede-as must be filed within twenty days of the WCAB’s order; (2) the opposing party may file a response within ten days of service of the request; and (3) the WCAB will rule on the request within twenty days thereafter. 34 Pa.Code §§ 111.22-111.24. Thus, the regulations allow fifty days to elapse before a petitioner knows whether the WCAB has granted the request for supersedeas. However, the WCAB’s regulations cannot supersede the statute. Although they may create a dilemma for employers seeking a supersedeas from the WCAB, the regulations cannot alter the thirty-day requirement in section 428 of the Act. I submit that the effect of the majority’s holding in this case is that employers now can wait fifty days instead of thirty days to begin paying their obligations to claimant, without penalty. This is manifestly unreasonable.
Accordingly, I would reverse.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, added by the Act of June 26, 1919, P.L. 642, as amended, 77 P.S. § 921.

. Section 435(d) of the Act, added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, as amended, 77 P.S. § 991(d).