Court Opinion

ID: 9636654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:36:51.973216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:47.774394
License: Public Domain

*16Markell, J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
I cannot agree that a verdict should have been directed for Childress.
All testimony as to speed or distance in an automobile case reflects frailties of human judgment, which the jury must weigh. Within the limitations of human frailty, the witness Lawrence had exceptional opportunity to observe the positions of the Wesley car and the Childress truck at the time the car pulled out of the crossover into the northbound lane. The “back end” of Lawrence’s truck “just cleared that lane” and Wesley’s “front wheels were very near the northbound lane”. Lawrence’s truck on the north side of the cross-over and the Wesley car on the south side were directly opposite each other, facing in opposite directions, neither moving. The truck was higher than the car. Lawrence could look down into Wesley’s face and could also look straight ahead (at a minutely different angle), beyond the car, at the Childress truck. When he first looked back, before he pulled into the place where he stopped, he saw the Childress truck about four-tenths of a mile away. “I am positive of that, it was four-tenths of a mile.” Wesley “stopped and turned his head and looked at me in the face.” “I could see the truck. My truck was a high truck and I could see his head, a man’s head in the car. I could look over the top and I could see his head and his face. They were at a lower level when he was sitting in the car than I was. Q. Now, the approaching truck was how far away at that time? A. Well, I would say he had covered about half the distance * * * Two-tenths of a mile. Q. And what did Wesley do at that time? A. Wesley took his gaze off of me and pulled out to cross the highway.”
In short, when the Wesley boy moved his car, full of human cargo, into a place of helpless peril, in full view of the Childress truck, the truck was about two-tenths of a mile — more than a thousand feet — away. If *17the jury believed this testimony, it might legitimately infer — how could it help inferring? — either that the truck was driven too fast (if that were possible) to stop within one thousand feet, or that the truck driver was not paying attention to the road ahead of him, or that his failure to stop was due to both excessive speed and inattention. Any such inference would be consistent with the near-complete slaughter — seven out of eight killed — and the other physical results of the accident. It is suggested that after the accident the truck driver may have lost control of the truck and the accelerator may have been jammed to the floor. If the latter is a possibility, it is a speculative possibility, unsupported by evidence.
This is not a prosecution for murder or manslaughter or even for the venial offense “manslaughter by automobile”. It is said that “this truck weighed more than thirteen tons and contained a load of bales of cloth. No evidence was introduced to show that the skid marks indicated excessive speed. No evidence was introduced to show the type of brakes on the truck, the condition of the road surface other than it was dry, the condition of the treads on the tires of the truck, or the reaction time of the driver”. Has any such evidence ever been held necessary to take a negligence case to the jury? What more could be shown about the condition of the road? Skid marks often speak for themselves, without further evidence to explain them. If these fifty foot skid marks before the collision do not indicate excessive speed, they may confirm alternative or cumulative neglect to make any effort in the first thousand feet to avoid the collision. If “the primary purpose of the statute is to speed the huge and growing volume of traffic”, there is no mandate to pursue this purpose utterly regardless of life or limb. No one is legally obliged to drive any motor vehicle at fifty-five miles an hour. The most alert driver, of a car in perfect condition, most easily controlled, is forbidden to drive at a greater speed than fifty-five miles per hour. If a thirteen ton truck is *18more difficult to control than a passenger car (as it doubtless is), if the brakes are unsuitable or out of repair, if the treads on the tires are worn, or the driver’s reaction time, by reason of age or ill health, is slow, any or all of these circumstances are not an excuse for negligence, but are a monition to greater care and less speed. It is said that “the driver here had no reason to believe that Wesley would disregard the boulevard law and pull out in the road in front of him”. But after Wesley had disregarded the boulevard law by pulling out in the road in front of him, in plain view for more than a thousand feet, the driver had no right to mow them down;
It is said that “the speed of the Childress tractor-trailer was not the proximate cause of this accident and its demurrer prayer was properly granted. To have submitted this case to the jury would have required ‘nice calculations of speed, time and distance’. Greenfeld v. Hook, * * *, which is forbidden in boulevard cases where the unfavored vehicle fails to give the right of way.” This conclusion is reached after a full review of cases in this court from Sun Cab Company v. Faulkner, 163 Md. 477, 163 A. 194, to Baltimore Transit Company v. O’Donovan, 197 Md. 274, 78 A. 2d 647, including Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888, 136 A. L. R. 1485. In the Faulkner case, the O’Donovan case, and similar cases, the unfavored driver (or pedestrian) had pulled (or stepped) in front of the favored vehicle without giving warning or reason to expect such an act, and too late for the favored driver to avoid collision after-wards. The difference between those cases and cases where excessive speed prevented the favored driver from avoiding accident after opportunity to see the peril of the unfavored vehicle, was pointed out in the recent case of Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609, 618, 78 A. 2d 220, 223. The difference, between the cases cited and the instant case is about one thousand feet — much greater than in Miller v. Graff.
*19Although “nice calculations of speed, time and distance” are said to be forbidden by Greenfeld v. Hook, the fact is that in Greenfeld v. Hook this court did submit to the jury the question whether “the plaintiff’s position was or should have been apparent to the defendant for nearly half a square” [italics supplied] 177 Md. 132, 8 A. 2d 895, 136 A. L. R. 1485. I recognize that the decision on the facts in Greenfeld v. Hook may perhaps be irreconcilable with later cases applying the principles of Greenfeld v. Hook. But no case before the instant case suggests that a favored driver is under no duty to see and avoid persons in peril, in plain view, anywhere near a thousand feet away. In State use of Frizzell v. Gosnell, 197 Md. 381, 79 A. 2d 530, both cars were in sight of each other for a thousand feet, but we held that the negligence of the deceased was concurrent up to the last moment and we did not decide that the defendant was free from negligence.
Unlike Greenfeld v. Hook the instant case does not involve the “last clear chance” doctrine, because there is no question of contributory negligence. In that respect the instant case is a simpler case. It is, however, a typical case of the kind of negligence of which the “last clear chance” doctrine furnishes an example, i.e., failure to see and avoid a person in peril after he is unable to help himself. No nice calculations are required in this case.