Court Opinion

ID: 9769454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:51:18.782327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:03.954995
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
The only issue on this appeal is whether harmful jury misconduct occurred because of a discussion of the parole law.
John Ford Roberts, who was 56 years of age, suffered a fractured skull and blindness in one eye with a pool cue at the hands of James Sanders, the appellant, who was 24 years of age. On March 20, 1975, Bill Selfridge and Roberts, who was a tenant of Bell Place Apartments, went to the recreation area to play pool. Several men, including Sanders, were playing pool and continued to play. Roberts told them that a tenant in the apartments could have only two guests and asked them to take turns and the group became belligerent. After a heated exchange, Sanders jumped up with a pool cue and said to Roberts, “You old son-of-a-bitch, I am going to beat your brains out.” Five or six of the pool players restrained Sanders and took him with them and left. Sanders returned and ran toward Roberts and hit him with a pool cue knocking him face down on the floor.
Dr. William T. Price, an Amarillo neurosurgeon, examined Roberts after the injury. He testified that Roberts had multiple fractures of the skull and the nose. The optic nerve to the left eye had been severed as a result of the fractures and Roberts lost the sight of his left eye.
At the hearing on the amended motion for new trial, two jurors testified that some members of the jury discussed the parole law during the deliberations on punishment. Juror Erma Rigdon testified that there was a lengthy discussion involving what portion of any sentence appellant would have to serve. She stated that one juror, who was called “Colonel”, professed to be familiar with the penitentiary and parole systems because he had had prior experience with the military court-martial system. According to Rigdon, the “Colonel” stated that appellant would serve no more than eight months of a two-year sentence if he “behaved himself.”
Rigdon further testified that “a couple of other men said the same things as far as parole was concerned .”, and that after this discussion she agreed to change her vote from eight years probation to two years in prison.
Juror Konni Campbell testified that the men in general, and the “Colonel” in particular, discussed the parole law at length during the deliberations. She further testified that “Colonel” and others stated that if appellant was sentenced to two years in prison he would serve between six and eight months and then be eligible for parole.
Campbell stated that some arguments developed during the discussion and that the information regarding parole was utilized to persuade other members of the jury to assess a prison term rather than probation. She further stated that prior to this discus*354sion she had voted for probation for five years and that after such discussion she changed her vote and agreed to assess punishment at two years. Six other jurors were present at the hearing but they were not called to testify.
Article 40.03, V.A.C.C.P., provides in part:
“New trials, in cases of felony, shall be granted the defendant for the following causes,
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“(7) Where the jury, after having retired to deliberate upon a case, has received other evidence; .
“(8) Where, from the misconduct of the jury, the court is of the opinion that the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial. . . . ”
In Heredia v. State, 528 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we held that jury discussion of the parole law requiring reversal may constitute, depending upon the facts of the case, receipt of other testimony after retiring to deliberate or misconduct that has deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. We then observed that it is common knowledge that inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections are sometimes released on parole. Thus, a mere allusion to the parole law would not constitute the receipt of other evidence. But, we stated that “a misstatement of the law, by being incorrect, would constitute other evidence, since by being false it certainly could not be classified as ‘common knowledge.’ ” 528 S.W.2d at 853.
We further observed in Heredia that discussion of the parole law would constitute jury misconduct, but whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial must be determined upon the facts of the individual case.
In McCartney v. State, 542 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we stated that “[i]t is well established that issues of fact as to jury misconduct raised at a hearing on motion for new trial are for the determination of the trial judge, and where there is conflicting evidence there is no abuse of discretion where the motion for new trial is overruled. . . ” In the instant case, there was a conflict in the evidence. Juror Campbell testified that the “Colonel” and others said that appellant would be eligible for parole if he had good behavior. Juror Rigdon testified that the “Colonel” and others said that appellant would get out in eight months provided he had good behavior. This constitutes two different versions of the statements made by the jurors. The trial judge apparently chose to believe the juror Campbell who testified that the statements that appellant, upon good behavior, would be eligible for parole after serving six to eight months on a two-year term. This was in the province of the judge.
It is possible for one to be considered for parole after having been confined for six to eight months on a two-year sentence.
Article 42.12, Section 15(a), V.A.C.C.P., provides that an inmate may be released who has served one-third of the maximum sentence imposed.
Article 6181-1, V.A.C.S., provides that an inmate may earn good conduct time as follows:
“Sec. 3. (a) Inmates shall accrue good conduct time based upon their classification as follows:
“(1) 20 days for each 30 days actually served while the inmate is classified as a Class I inmate;
“(2) 10 days for each 30 days actually served while the inmate is classified as
a Class II inmate; and
“(3) 10 additional days for each 30 days actually served if the inmate is a trusty.”
Section 4 of the act provides that good conduct time applies to eligibility for parole as provided for in Section 15 of Article 42.12 of the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure as amended.
Article 6166x-l of Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes provides that inmates shall receive for parole purposes credit for overtime work “double the hours so worked.” Cf. Ex parte Weaver, 537 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), where the Court noted that overtime could not be deducted from the term of sentence for discharge purposes.
*355With all or part of the above possible credits, the statement that appellant could be considered for parole with good behavior after serving from six to eight months was not a misstatement of the law. See Howard v. State, 505 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and Jones v. State, 462 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
In Mays v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 339, 320 S.W.2d 13 (1959), this Court held that a statement of a juror that if given a five year sentence Mays would have to serve a year and three months on a five year sentence before being eligible for parole was a misstatement of the law.
It can be seen from the statutes cited that an inmate may be eligible for parole when less than one-third of the sentence has been served. The Mays case which held that a statement that an inmate may be eligible for parole when he has served less than a third of his sentence is incorrect and it should be overruled. We should adopt the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in that case.1
The State contends that the two jurors voted to decrease the punishment because they changed their vote for probation terms of five and eight years to two years’ confinement after the jurors discussed parole. It relies upon Lechuga v. State, 532 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), in which this Court held by a three to two vote that five years' probation was more punishment than three years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections.
The majority in this case is inconsistent. It holds in effect that two years’ confinement is a more severe punishment than eight or five years of probation. There is no logical way to distinguish this case from Lechuga. The majority should admit its error and overrule Lechuga because a term *356of confinement of three years is more punishment than five years’ probated. Also, Lechuga should be overruled for the additional reasons stated in the dissenting opinion therein.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling the motion for new trial.
There being no reversible error, the judgment should be affirmed.
Before the Court en banc.

. Mays was retried and he was again assessed a punishment of five years After Mays was released on parole, the late James Bowie, who was then Assistant District Attorney in Dallas County, wrote to the clerk what he designated "State’s Continuous Motion for Re-rehearing.” It is as follows:
“Now comes the State of Texas and respectfully moves that the Honorable Glenn Haynes, Judge Per Curiam, to set aside the opinion heretofore rendered by the lower Court of Criminal Appeals in the case styled State v. Mays, [167 Tex.Cr.R. 339], 320 S.W.2d 13, and to hold the same for naught.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
“The appellant, Willie Odell Mays, was convicted in Dallas County in the year 1958 and was sentenced to serve a 5-year term in our beautiful penitentiary for the unlikely offense of murder without malice.
“Not desiring to avail himself of the exercise and friendly atmosphere of our Department of Corrections, he appealed his case to the lower court — the Court of Criminal Appeals.
“To his surprise, as well as ours, the case was actually reversed — no kidding.
“The said lower Court found through some legal trickery that a juror during deliberations stated, ‘As I recall, it was mentioned under a five year sentence that he would be eligible for — after year and three months.” (See: [167 Tex.Cr.R. 339] 320 S.W.2d 13, 14).
“Judge Dice, in reversing this just conviction, held in said opinion:
“ ‘Under the provisions of this statute appellant would not have been eligible for parole and release under a five year sentence until he had served a year and 8 months which was for a longer period than that stated by the juror. The testimony of the three jurors shows that the statement was made while the jury was divided on the punishment to be assessed and prior to arriving at their verdict in the case.’
“The lower court therefore held that Willie Odell could not be at liberty (as a matter of law) until after he had served one year and 8 months i. e., 20 months, and the juror erred where he stated he could be sprung in 15 months.
“Motion for rehearing was overruled without written opinion.
“Willie Odell was again tried and again given 5 years, and again he appealed.
“However, the court below tired of Willie Odell and affirmed his second 5-year sentence.
“Yesterday, Willie Odell came to the office of the District Attorney of Dallas County. He was in good health and good spirits, having been released from the pen after having served his 5-year sentence in 13 months and 13 days, 6 months and 17 days less than Judge Dice guessed as a matter of law and some I month and 17 days less than the juror figured.
“We therefore respectfully request the lower appellate court be reversed and the case against Willie stricken from the South Western Reporter.
“If we are wrong in this regard, will you kindly explain how in the hell Willie got in my office.”