Court Opinion

ID: 9856844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:01:42.076171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:26.434072
License: Public Domain

McGEE, Judge.
Cheyenne Saleena Stark (Cheyenne), Cody Brandon Stark (Cody), and Cory Christian Stark (Cory), through their then Guardian ad Litem, Ruby Squires Stark; and Gordon Walter Stark, Jr. (Gordon Stark), filed a complaint on 23 April 2004 against Ford Motor Company (Defendant) alleging, inter alia, that Cheyenne suffered a spinal cord injury caused by a defective design of the seatbelt she was using during an accident involving her parents’ 1998 Ford Taurus (the Taurus) on 23 April 2003. The complaint further alleged that Cody suffered “severe abdominal injuries, including damage to his spleen.” The claims of Gordon Stark and Cory were later dismissed, as discussed below.
*3Cheyenne and Cody were passengers in the back seat of the Taurus on 23 April 2003. At the time of the accident, Cheyenne was five years old and Cody was nine years old. Each was secured in the Taurus by a three-point seatbelt designed by Defendant. Neither Cheyenne nor Cody was sitting in a booster seat. Their three-year-old sibling, Cory, was sitting in the middle of the back seat.
Cheyenne’s mother, Tonya Stark, was driving the Taurus. Cheyenne’s father, Gordon Stark, was a passenger in the front seat. Tonya Stark was operating the Taurus in a parking lot at a speed of twenty-six miles per hour, when the vehicle suddenly accelerated. She lost control of the Taurus, and it collided with a light pole.
Following the collision, Cheyenne was dazed but able to walk. However, after Cheyenne was taken to the hospital a short time later, she complained of leg pain. Cheyenne later lost all feeling in her body below her rib cage.
The complaint alleged that Defendant engaged in “[w]illful, [w]anton and [r]eckless [m]isconduct” in designing the seatbelts in the Taurus and that Defendant’s actions caused physical and cognitive injuries to Cheyenne and Cody. The complaint also alleged that the engine in the Taurus was defectively designed in that it caused a “sudden unintended acceleration” which led to the collision. Defendant filed an answer generally denying negligence and defective design and asserting that Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark were the cause of any injuries. Defendant also alleged, inter alia, the affirmative defenses of unauthorized modification or alteration of the Taurus or its components and failure to follow instructions or warnings given by Defendant.
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on 17 February 2005. The trial court filed an order on 22 August 2005 granting Defendant’s motion as to: (1) the claim for cognitive injury to Cheyenne, and (2) the claim based on the sudden unintended acceleration of the Taurus. In its order, the trial court also dismissed personal injury claims asserted by Gordon Stark and Cory. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the remainder of claims, finding that there remained genuine issues of material fact.
Nicole Jacobsen, (Guardian ad Litem), filed a motion on 15 March 2005 seeking to be substituted as Guardian ad Litem in the action. The record is unclear as to when this motion was granted; however, at the time of trial, plaintiffs in the action were as follows: Cheyenne *4Saleena Stark and Cody Brandon Stark, by their Guardian ad Litem, Nicole Jacobsen (Plaintiffs).
At trial, Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that the injuries Cheyenne suffered were caused or enhanced by a design defect known as “film spool” in the seatbelt she was using. This defect allowed slack in the seatbelt to cause the shoulder portion of the belt to slip off Cheyenne’s shoulder and come to rest in a position lower on her body, such that she bent over the seatbelt during the accident. It was this “film spool” and the resulting movement by Cheyenne that Plaintiffs asserted as the cause of Cheyenne’s injuries. Plaintiffs further presented evidence that the use of certain devices may prevent “film spool” from occurring during accidents by retracting or otherwise restricting any excess belt material during a collision. The Taurus was not equipped with any of these devices.
At the close of Plaintiffs’ evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of “testing to show that any of their alleged alternative designs would have made the Taurus any safer in this crash.” Defendant renewed its directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both of Defendant’s motions.
Defendant presented evidence at trial that Cheyenne’s injuries were caused by her improper use of the seatbelt. Specifically, Defendant asserted that Cheyenne was wearing the seatbelt with the shoulder portion behind her back. Defendant argued that, because Cheyenne was not restrained by the shoulder portion of the belt, the “film spool” effect could not have been the cause of her injuries. Because “film spool” was not a cause, the use of the preventative devices offered by Plaintiffs would have made no difference as to Cheyenne’s injuries. Instead, Defendant presented three theories of causation for Cheyenne’s injuries: (1) the accident itself; (2) Cheyenne’s improper use of the seatbelt by wearing the shoulder belt behind her back; and (3) Cheyenne’s non-use of a booster seat, contrary to Defendant’s instructions.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for a directed verdict as to two of Defendant’s affirmative defenses. In their motion, Plaintiffs specifically requested a directed verdict as to Defendant’s affirmative defenses of “Alteration or Modification of Product” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3, and “Adequate Warnings or Instruction” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-4. With respect to their requested directed verdict based on N.C.G.S. § 99B-3, Plaintiffs argued that, *5because Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark were not parties to the action, and because Cheyenne was a minor under the age of seven years and was therefore legally incapable of negligence, N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 did not provide an affirmative defense to Defendant. After hearing arguments from Plaintiffs and Defendant, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion.
The trial court submitted questions to the jury. The jury answered those questions, in pertinent part, as follows:
4. Did the Defendant Ford Motor Company act unreasonably in designing the 1998 Ford Taurus and its component parts, proximately causing enhanced injury to Cheyenne Stark?
Answer: [Yes]
[If you answer “Yes” to this issue, then go to Issue 5; if you answer “no” to this issue, then do not consider any further issues.]
5. Were the enhanced-injuries to Cheyenne Stark caused by using the 1998 Ford Taurus in a manner contrary to any express and adequate instructions or warnings which were known or should have been known by the user?
Answer: [No]
[If you answer “Yes” to this issue, then do not consider any further issues; if you answer “no” to this issue, go to Issue 6.]
6. Were the enhanced injuries to Cheyenne Stark caused by an alteration or modification of the 1998 Ford Taurus?
Answer: [Yes]
[If you answer “yes’ [sic] to this issue, then do not consider any further issue; if you answer “no” to this issue, then go to Issue 7.]
The jury further determined that Defendant’s product, the Taurus, was not the proximate cause of enhanced injury to Cody. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant on 15 May 2007, ordering that Plaintiffs recover nothing from Defendant, dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint, and awarding costs to Defendant. The trial court retained jurisdiction for the purposes of determining costs and expert witness fees.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial on 24 May 2007. The trial court filed an order denying Plaintiffs’ motion on 23 April 2008.
*6Defendant filed a motion for costs in the amount of $135,634.74 on 8 August 2007 on the grounds of “its successful defense and jury verdict”. In an order entered 28 April 2008, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion in part but reduced the award to $45,717.92. The trial court stated that “after consideration of the motion, affidavits, materials submitted by the parties, arguments of counsel, and other matters of record, that [Defendant] was the prevailing party at trial and that certain costs should, in the [c]ourt’s discretion, be awarded to [Defendant].” The trial court awarded these costs “against Plaintiffs and Nicole Jacobsen as Guardian ad Litem, jointly and severally].]”
Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s judgment entered 15 May 2007, the trial court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for award of costs. Defendant cross-assigns error and argues that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motions for summary judgment and directed verdict as to Plaintiffs’ inadequate design claims.

Directed Verdict

Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of product alteration. Because Cheyenne was five years old at the time of the collision, Plaintiffs contend she was legally incapable of modifying or altering the product under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3. Because neither Tonya Stark nor Gordon Stark was a party to this action, Plaintiffs contend that no misuse or modification on their part would provide a defense under N.C.G.S. § 99B-3. Plaintiffs argue, therefore, that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict as to Defendant’s § N.C.G.S. 99B-3 defense as described injury question number 6, to wit: whether “the enhanced injuries to Cheyenne Stark [were] caused by an alteration or modification of the 1998 Ford Taurus[.]” We agree.
Our Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for directed verdict de novo. Denson v. Richmond County, 159 N.C. App. 408, 411, 583 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2003).
The standard of review of directed verdict is whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury. When determining the correctness of the denial for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the question is whether *7there is sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict in the non-moving party’s favor, or to present a question for the jury. Where the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a motion that judgment be entered in accordance with the movant’s earlier motion for directed verdict, this Court has required the use of the same standard of sufficiency of evidence in reviewing both motions.
Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322-23, 411 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1991) (internal citations omitted). Where a trial court errs in submitting an affirmative defense to a jury, our Court has the discretion to remand for a new trial. Cicogna v. Holder, 345 N.C. 488, 490, 480 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1997). However, “[i]f the issue which was erroneously submitted did not affect the entire verdict, there should not be a new trial on all issues.” Id.
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 99B-1 et seq., which govern products liability actions in North Carolina, provide a defense to a products liability claim in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3, as follows:
(a) No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a proximate cause of the personal injury, death, or damage to property was either an alteration or modification of the product by a party other than the .manufacturer or seller, which alteration or modification occurred after the product left the control of such manufacturer or such seller unless:
(1) The alteration or modification was in accordance with the instructions or specifications of such manufacturer or such seller; or
(2) The alteration or modification was made with the express consent of such manufacturer or such seller.
(b) For the purposes of this section, alteration or modification includes changes in the design, formula, function, or use of the product from that originally designed, tested, or intended by the manufacturer. It includes failure to observe routine care and maintenance, but does not include ordinary wear and tear.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3 (2009).
Our Court has held that a determination of whether an act was a proximate cause of an injury must include an analysis of “foreseeability.” Hastings for Pratt v. Seegars Fence Co., 128 N.C. App. 166, *8170, 493 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1997). Because the alteration or modification of a product must be a proximate cause of an injury in order to provide a viable defense under N.C.G.S. § 99B-3, we must analyze the issue of foreseeability. Id., 493 S.E.2d at 784.
Foreseeability of some injurious consequence of one’s act is an essential element of proximate cause, though anticipation of the particular consequence is not required. While the usual test is whether “a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen . . .” some injurious result from the unintended use of the product; where, as in the present case, the actions of a minor child are at issue, the test of foreseeability is whether a child of similar “age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experience” could have foreseen some injurious result from his or her use of the product.
Id., 493 S.E.2d at 785 (internal citations omitted). “As a matter of law, a child under 7 years of age is incapable of negligence.” State v. Harrington, 260 N.C. 663, 666, 133 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1963). See also Allen v. Equity & Investors Management Corp., 56 N.C. App. 706, 709, 289 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1982) (“An infant under 7 years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.”) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that, because Cheyenne was under seven years of age at the time of the accident, she was incapable of negligence and was therefore unable to “foresee” that any modification or alteration could be a proximate cause of her injury. We agree.
In Hastings, our Court held that N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 did not provide a defense to a manufacturer on the following facts. An eight-year-old child was injured while playing on a fence and gate constructed by the defendant. Hastings, 128 N.C. App. at 167, 493 S.E.2d at 783. While the minor plaintiff was hanging on the gate, another child caused the gate to roll. Id. When the gate rolled, two of the minor plaintiff’s fingers were caught in a roller and were amputated. Id. The minor plaintiff’s mother, as guardian ad litem for the child, filed a negligence action against the gate manufacturer. Id. The defendant argued that N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 provided a defense to the plaintiff’s claim in that the minor child “used the fence in a manner other than as it was originally designed, tested, or intended by the manufacturer to be used[.]” Id. at 169, 493 S.E.2d at 784. The trial court eventually dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 168, 493 S.E.2d at 783.
*9Our Court held that the defendant’s allegation of “the minor plaintiff’s contributory negligence ‘by engaging in horseplay on the fence and cantilevered gate . . . .’ was sufficient to raise the defense provided by G.S. § 99B-3[.]” Id. at 169, 493 S.E.2d at 784. We then cited the standard of care applicable to a minor child between the ages of seven and fourteen years and held that “[i]ssues of proximate cause and foreseeability, involving application of standards of conduct, are ordinarily best left for resolution by a jury under appropriate instructions from the court.” Id. at 170, 493 S.E.2d at 785.
We apply the same principles of negligence to the N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 analysis in the present case. While the minor plaintiff in Hastings was eight years old, in the case before us, Cheyenne was five years old and therefore subject to a different standard of care. As discussed above, the appropriate standard of care to apply, when analyzing the negligence of a child under seven years of age, is that such children are, as a matter of law, incapable of negligence. Harrington, 260 N.C. at 666, 133 S.E.2d at 455. Therefore, because Cheyenne was a child under seven years of age at the time of the alleged alteration or modification, Defendant is unable, as a matter of law, to prove the requisite element of foreseeability inherent in the proximate cause portion of its N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense. Because foreseeability, and therefore proximate cause, is lacking in Defendant’s defense as to Cheyenne, N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 is inapplicable to any alteration or modification alleged to have been performed by Cheyenne herself.

Party Modifier

Plaintiff next addresses Defendant’s argument that Gordon Stark or Tonya Stark modified the seatbelt by improperly placing Cheyenne in the seat with the shoulder belt behind her back. Plaintiffs argue that Cheyenne was still entitled to a directed verdict because neither Gordon Stark nor Tonya Stark was “a party” to the action, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3.
N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 provides in pertinent part that:
No manufacturer or seller of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action where a proximate cause of the personal injury, death, or damage to property was either an alteration or modification of the product by a party other than the manufacturer or seller, which alteration or modification occurred after the product left the control of such manufacturer or such seller. . . .
N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 (emphasis added).
*10Defendant argues that the trial court’s judgment, based on the jury’s verdict, was supported by evidence that Gordon Stark misused the rear seatbelt by putting Cheyenne in the backseat and buckling her seatbelt with the shoulder belt behind her back. Defending against Plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict, Defendant argued at trial that “[m]ore importantly, what is the specific evidence in this case about who used Cheyenne Stark’s belt; Gordon Stark. He put her in that belt on that day. He is the one who affixed her to this vehicle. He’s the one who used the product.” Plaintiffs argue that N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 is inapplicable to any alleged alterations or modifications performed by either Tonya Stark or Gordon Stark in placing Cheyenne in the seatbelt improperly, because neither Tonya Stark nor Gordon Stark is a party to this action.
At the time of trial, neither Tonya Stark nor Gordon Stark were parties to the action. Gordon Stark, originally a named plaintiff, had his personal injury claims dismissed on 22 August 2006 when the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark as third-party defendants on 21 August 2006. Defendant’s motion was granted in an order filed 27 October 2006, with the condition that, “if the third party defendants are unable to obtain counsel who can prepare for and participate in the trial scheduled for October 30, 2006, then . . . the third party action shall be SEVERED from the instant action and tried at a later date.” Defendant did not file a third-party complaint naming as third-party defendants Tonya Stark and Gordon Stark until January 2007. At the time of trial, the parties were as follows: Cheyenne and Cody, by their guardian ad litem, Nicole Jacobsen, as plaintiffs, and Ford Motor Company as defendant.
Plaintiffs rely on three cases involving the application of N.G.C.S. § 99B-3, contending that “[i]n all three cases, the ‘modifier’ was, or may have been, a party-defendant in the suit, and the cases do not address modification by a non-party as a defense.” These cases are: Edmondson v. Macclesfield L-P Gas Co., Inc., 182 N.C. App. 381, 642 S.E.2d 265 (2007); Phillips v. Restaurant Management, 146 N.C. App. 203, 552 S.E.2d 686 (2001); and Rich v. Shaw, 98 N.C. App. 489, 391 S.E.2d 220 (1990). We note that in Phillips, the plaintiff named three defendants in their action: a restaurant management company, Taco Bell Corp., and a restaurant employee. Phillips, 146 N.C. App. at 207, 552 S.E.2d at 689. The plaintiff sought to pursue a claim under Chapter 99B, and we held that he was precluded from pursuing this *11claim by N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 on the grounds that the product, a fast food item, was produced by the management company and Taco Bell and was modified when the defendant-employee spit into it. Phillips, 146 N.C. App. at 218-19, 552 S.E.2d at 696. Therefore, the modifier in Phillips was a party to the action.
Likewise, in Edmondson, the plaintiff filed an action against both the manufacturer of a heater and a company that performed a “negligent repair” on that heater. 182 N.C. App. at 386, 642 S.E.2d at 269. Our Court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the manufacturer was protected by the N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense on grounds that the heater had been improperly modified for use with liquified petroleum gas after it left the manufacturer’s control. Id. at 389-90, 642 S.E.2d at 271-72. The opinion is unclear on the issue of whether the modifier was a party to the action, but Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that we take judicial notice of a portion of the defendant manufacturer’s brief filed with our Court in Edmondson referring to the modifier as a party. We grant that motion and take judicial notice of the following statement: “the subject heater was sold . . . and left [defendant manufacturer’s] possession, but before it was installed at [the plaintiff’s] residence, it was modified by [the defendant repair company] so that it could be used with Liquified Petroleum (L-P) Gas instead of Natural Gas.” See Whitmire v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 730, 735, 570 S.E.2d 908, 911 n.4 (2002) (“this [C]ourt may take judicial notice of the public records of other courts within the state judicial system”) (citation omitted); see also State v. Benfield, 76 N.C. App. 453, 459, 333 S.E.2d 753, 757 n.1 (1985) (our Court taking judicial notice of “the records of this Court”). Therefore, the modifier in Edmonson was also a party to the action.
Defendant counters that this Court did not address whether the “modifier” was a party to the action in any of the three cases cited by Plaintiffs, because “the [N.C.G.S. § 99B-3] defense does not require it.” We note that in Rich, the third case upon which Plaintiffs rely, the opinion is unclear whether the modification was performed by a party or not. See Rich, 98 N.C. App. 489, 391 S.E.2d 220. However, the argument concerning the application of the defense in Rich did not turn, as here, on the requirement that the modifier be a party. See Id., 98 N.C. App. at 492, 391 S.E.2d at 222-23. This issue appears to have not been previously determined by our Courts. Defendant contends that the defense enumerated under N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 “is concerned only with whether the product was used properly and whether someone ‘other than the manufacturer’ altered or misused the product.”
*12Defendant’s argument overlooks the plain language of the statute. The statute does not provide a defense where “someone ‘other than the manufacturer’ altered or misused the product],]” as Defendant contends. Rather, N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 provides a defense where “a party other than the manufacturer or seller” causes the alteration or modification. N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 (emphasis added).
To the extent that Defendant contends the use of the term “party” in N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 is unclear, we note that in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-1, which provides the definitions for terms used in Chapter 99B, the terms “Claimant],]” “Manufacturer],]” and “Seller” are defined using the phrases “a person or other entity],]” “a person or entity],]” and “any individual or entity],]” respectively. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-1 (2009). Had the General Assembly intended N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 to apply to any person, individual or entity, it would have used such terms. See Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 174 N.C. App. 30, 42-43, 621 S.E.2d 19, 28 (2005) (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 24 (1983) (“We refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.”)). Instead, in the statute before us, the General Assembly used the term “party,” which has independent legal significance. We note that “party” is defined as “]o]ne who takes part in a transaction .... [or] [o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought].]” Black’s Law Dictionary 1231-32 (9th ed. 2009). Therefore, the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 states that the entity responsible for the modification or alteration of the product must be a party to the action in order for the defense to apply. Because Defendant asserts that the modification was performed by Gordon Stark, who is not a party to the action in this case, Defendant is unable to establish an N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense as to such an alleged modification.
As discussed above, a directed verdict is proper when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to submit the question to the jury. Davis, 330 N.C. at 322-23, 411 S.E.2d at 138. Because Defendant is unable, as a matter of law, to support an N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense as to either Cheyenne, Tonya Stark, or Gordon Stark, Plaintiffs are entitled to a directed verdict as to Defendant’s N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for directed verdict as to Defendant’s N.C.G.S. § 99B-3 defense.
In light of our holding, we need not address Plaintiffs’ arguments concerning judgment notwithstanding the verdict, entry of judgment, *13or motion for a new trial. Because the jury found that Defendant “act[ed] unreasonably in designing the 1998 Ford Taurus and its component parts, proximately causing enhanced injury to Cheyenne Stark,” we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Cheyenne Stark and for a trial on the issue of damages. Cicogna, 345 N.C. at 490, 480 S.E.2d at 637.

Costs

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in awarding court costs against the Guardian ad Litem individually. Because we reverse the trial court’s judgment, we vacate the trial court’s order awarding costs in favor of Defendant. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-1 (2009) (“To the party for whom judgment is given, costs shall be allowedf.]”).

Defendant’s Cross-Assignments of Error

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. We disagree. As discussed above, a directed verdict is proper when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is insufficient as a matter of law to submit the question to the jury. Davis, 330 N.C. at 322-23, 411 S.E.2d at 138. Summary judgment is proper where, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App. 663, 665-66, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994).
Defendant cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-6 and argues that North Carolina’s products liability act requires Plaintiffs to show, inter alia, that Defendant failed to “adopt a ‘safer, practical, feasible, and otherwise reasonable alternative design’ that would have prevented or minimized [Cheyenne’s] injuries, [or that] the Taurus’s design was ‘so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of the relevant facts, would not use or consume a product of this design.’ ” Defendant specifically argues that Plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding alternative designs “lacked any methodologically-sound support” because the experts cited to no testing to support their conclusions. However, Defendant cites no authority to support its contention that Plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient, nor that expert witness testimony of this nature required “testing” in order to withstand a directed verdict.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-6 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No manufacturer of a product shall be held liable in any product liability action for the inadequate design or formulation of the *14product unless the claimant proves that at the time of its manufacture the manufacturer acted unreasonably in designing or formulating the product, that this conduct was a proximate cause of the harm for which damages are sought, and also proves one of the following:
(1) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, the manufacturer unreasonably failed to adopt a safer, practical, feasible, and otherwise reasonable alternative design or formulation that could then have been reasonably adopted and that would have prevented or substantially reduced the risk of harm without substantially impairing the usefulness, practicality, or desirability of the product.
(2) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, the design or formulation of the product was so unreasonable that a reasonable person, aware of the relevant facts, would not use or consume a product of this design.
(b) In determining whether the manufacturer acted unreasonably under subsection (a) of this section, the factors to be considered shall include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) The nature and magnitude of the risks of harm associated with the design or formulation in light of the intended and reasonably foreseeable uses, modifications, or alterations of the product.
(6) The technical, economic, and practical feasibility of using an alternative design or formulation at the time of manufacture.
(7) The nature and magnitude of any foreseeable risks associated with the alternative design or formulation.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-6 (2009).
Plaintiffs counter by pointing out the weight of evidence offered at trial that supported their claims. Plaintiffs presented, inter alia, the testimony of Dr. Joseph Burton, a forensic pathologist. Dr. Burton testified that, based on the damage to the vehicle, he would have expected the passengers to suffer injuries, but not “catastrophic injury .... Maybe just a broken wrist.” Dr. Burton further testified that Cheyenne was paralyzed from the accident because her shoulder belt was not snug and had “slack in it[,]” causing the belt to “snap-load[] the chest for her to have this injury.”
*15Dr. Burton further testified that the injuries suffered by Cheyenne were the result of a process called “film spool.” When “film spool” occurs, excess webbing material in a seatbelt continues to extend after the spool to which the material is secured ceases to move. The use of certain devices may prevent “film spool” from occurring during accidents by retracting, or otherwise restricting, any excess belt material during a crash. He testified that though these devices were available when the Taurus was manufactured and were, in fact, used by Defendant in certain of its products sold outside of the United States, none of these devices was present in the Taurus involved in the collision that caused Cheyenne’s injuries.
Plaintiffs therefore offered evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, tended to show that Defendant manufactured a product which had the potential to cause the injury suffered by Cheyenne. Though there were alternative designs available at the time which were used by Defendant in similar products, the product used by Plaintiffs did not include these alternative designs. We hold that Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to survive Defendant’s motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. Defendant’s cross-assignments of error are therefore overruled.
Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Judge BRYANT concurs.
Judge WYNN concurs in the result with a separate opinion.