Court Opinion

ID: 9884533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:00:48.564319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.268059
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring: Although I agree that the writ of mandamus must be denied, I cannot concur in the decision of the majority with respect to the passage and effective dates of the bills. In my opinion, correctly interpreted, sections 8, 9 and 10 of article IV of the constitution of 1970 require us to hold that the bills were passed on June 22, 1971, and became effective on October 28, 1971. It is apparent that section 8, entitled “Passage of Bills” means by the term “passage,” the concurrence of a majority of the members of each house, prior to presentation to the Governor as required by section 9. Section 10 deals with the effective date of laws and contains no reference to gubernatorial approval nor does it make mention of when a bill becomes law. All references are to laws or bills “passed,” and the effective date is controlled, not by date of approval but by date of passage. Paragraph (a) of section 9 provides that following presentation to the Governor within 30 days after its passage, if he approves a bill and signs it, “it shall become law.” There is no mention made of the effective date which, obviously, is determined by the date of passage. This case presents no questions arising under the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c), and (d), but it should be noted that both paragraphs (c) and (d) contain the phrase “shall become law”, as does paragraph (a), and that the methods by which the bills become law are alternatives to the method provided in paragraph (a). Paragraph (e) provides an alternative to gubernatorial approval or outright veto. It provides for legislative “acceptance” of the Governor’s recommendations, does not mention “passage” of a bill, and provides further that upon his certification it “shall become law.” Clearly the reference throughout the paragraph is to a bill passed in accordance with section 8 and presented to the Governor in accordance with paragraph (a) of section 9. What occurs when paragraph (e) is invoked is not passage of a bill but the exercise by the Governor, and acceptance by the General Assembly, of an alternative form of veto applicable to a bill previously passed and presented. Despite my disagreement with the majority with respect to the effective date of these bills, I am of the opinion that what was done here went far beyond the scope of “specific recommendations for change” permissible under paragraph (e), and I concur, therefore, that the writ must be denied. MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins in this special concurrence.