Court Opinion

ID: 9517716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:29:43.486563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:11.819767
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: The defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on juror Welsch’s failure to disclose an ongoing dispute she had with the defendant’s wife and children. The majority agrees with the defendant and has reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. I disagree with the reasoning and result reached. Initially, the majority should have determined that the defendant waived consideration of the alleged error by failing to bring it to the attention of the trial court during the proceedings at a time when the court could have easily investigated the matter and ascertained whether curative measures were needed. In his motion for a new trial, the defendant admitted that he became aware of juror Welsch’s possible bias late on the final day of trial and that his counsel was aware of the situation after the case was submitted to the jury. Inexplicably, however, the defendant and his attorney sat idly by and raised the issue of juror Welsch’s potential bias only after the jury returned a guilty verdict. Since the defendant failed to bring the matter to the court’s attention before the jury, completed its deliberations, when he could and should have done so, he has waived the point for review. See Zukosky v. Grounds (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 355. With regard to the merits of the appeal, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and result. The relevant legal rules are correctly stated by the majority. The first rule is that in cases such as this, involving information which is not disclosed by a juror during voir dire, a motion for a new trial will not be granted unless it is established that prejudice resulted. (People v. Porter (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 386, cert. denied (1986), 479 U.S. 898, 93 L. Ed. 2d 272, 107 S. Ct. 298.) Mere suspicion of bias or partiality is not sufficient to disqualify a juror. The second rule is that whether the motion for a new trial is granted is a matter resting within the trial court’s sound discretion. (Porter, 111 Ill. 2d at 403.) The trial court’s decision denying the motion for a new trial in the case before us does not represent an abuse of discretion; the defendant did not sustain his burden of proof on this issue. The majority stated that the defendant presented evidence that the juror had “significant hidden reasons for being prejudiced” against the defendant. (180 HI. App. 3d at 873.) The majority also determined that the juror’s relationship with the defendant was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice arose. The record is void of support for either of these findings. In fact, the defendant concedes in his brief that “the dispute between Juror Welsch and the defendant’s wife does not mean Welsch was not impartial.” Thus, there is no presumption of prejudice here, and the majority has based its decision on the mere suspicion of bias or prejudice. As noted above and as the majority acknowledged, mere suspicion is not sufficient. Furthermore, during voir dire, juror Welsch indicated she felt she could be fair and impartial. The juror acknowledged that she had heard neighborhood talk about the case, but indicated it would not interfere with her ability to give the defendant a fair trial. Additionally, in response to a question from defense counsel, juror Welsch indicated that if the State failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she would not hesitate to return a verdict of not guilty. Finally, the dispute was between the juror and the defendant’s wife, not the defendant, whom the juror characterized only as an acquaintance. In summary, the defendant failed to establish that his relationship with the juror was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice arose, and the defendant did not show that he was actually prejudiced. This court should have ruled that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.