Court Opinion

ID: 2964908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:50.944757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.470808
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1128

                                DENISE COUTIN, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                          YOUNG & RUBICAM PUERTO RICO, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Gibson,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               Jorge Miguel Suro Ballester for appellants.
               ___________________________
               Etienne Totti  Del Valle, with  whom Totti &  Rodriguez Diaz
               ________________________             _______________________
          was on brief, for appellee.

                              _________________________

                                  September 8, 1997

                              _________________________

          _______________
          *Hon.   John  R.  Gibson,  of  the  Eighth  Circuit,  sitting  by
          designation.

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.     Plaintiff-appellant  Denise
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Coutin,1  flush   with  victory   after  winning   an  employment

          discrimination suit, encountered disappointment when the district

          court awarded her only a fraction of the attorneys' fees to which

          she believed  herself entitled  under the Fees  Act, 42  U.S.C.  

          1988  (1994).    Coutin  appeals.   Because  the  district  court

          employed   a  flawed  methodology  and  relied  on  impermissible

          criteria, we vacate its order and remand for further proceedings.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    On December  30, 1993,  the appellant  sued her  former

          employer, defendant-appellee Young & Rubicam of Puerto Rico, Inc.

          (Y&R), an advertising agency, for over $1,500,000 in compensatory

          and punitive  damages.   Her complaint  advanced one  substantive

          federal  claim:   that Y&R had  violated Title  VII of  the Civil

          Rights  Act of  1964,  42  U.S.C.     2000e  to 2000e-17  (1994),

          including  the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.   2000e(k)

          (1994), by (1) assigning Coutin  (who was then pregnant) to tasks

          that were  detrimental to her physical and  emotional health, (2)

          requiring her to work under unsafe conditions, (3) condoning (or,

          at least, neglecting to curb) her coworkers' disparaging comments

          about her gravidity, and (4) constructively discharging her.  The

          complaint  also  included  several claims  under  local  law, the

          elements of  which were  subsumed, without  exception, under  the

                              
          ____________________

               1Coutin's  spouse  and their  conjugal partnership  are also
          plaintiffs  and appellants  in this  litigation.   Because  their
          rights derive from Coutin's, we  opt for simplicity and treat the
          appeal as if Coutin were the sole plaintiff and appellant.

                                          2

          broader federal claim.

                    Y&R denied  Coutin's allegations and defended  the suit

          with considerable vigor.  Along the way, the parties attempted to

          reach  an  accord, but  they  came  no closer  than  a demand  of

          $150,000 as against an offer of $15,000.  At trial, the appellant

          (who  had secured  and  retained  other  employment)  offered  no

          evidence of  lost income, and  that aspect of her  original claim

          was  pretermitted.  The  case went to the  jury, which found that

          Y&R had intentionally  discriminated against, and  constructively

          discharged, the appellant, thus violating both federal and Puerto

          Rico law.   The jury awarded the appellant and her spouse a total

          of $44,000 in  compensatory damages, plus an additional $1,538 in

          severance  pay under  Law  80, P.R.  Laws Ann.  tit.  29,    185a

          (1985).   The jury rejected  the appellant's prayer  for punitive

          damages.

                    Y&R, which had  moved unsuccessfully for judgment  as a

          matter of law on several occasions during the trial, renewed that

          motion and asked alternatively for a new trial.  See Fed. R. Civ.
                                                           ___

          P. 50,  59.   The district court  refused relief.   In  turn, the

          appellant  petitioned under  42 U.S.C.     1988 for  an award  of

          $52,793.75  in  counsel fees  and  related  expenses.    The  fee

          application contained  a sworn statement delineating her lawyer's

          two   decades  of  experience  in  personal  injury,  labor,  and

          discrimination  cases,  as  well  as  extensive,  contemporaneous

          billing  records  that  detailed  the  lawyer's  work  over  four

          calendar years.  At the bottom line, the reckoning reflected out-

                                          3

          of-court time (250.25 hours) billed at $175 per hour and in-court

          time (45 hours) billed at $200 per hour.

                    Despite this meticulous proffer, the judge eschewed any

          discussion  of  either  the  hours  spent  or the  billing  rates

          assigned and instead awarded the appellant a mere $5,000 in fees.

          The  judge  purported  to  base  his  decision  entirely  on  the

          "plaintiffs' limited  success on  their  claims, the  plaintiffs'

          willingness  to go  to  trial  despite  the  defendant's  earnest

          efforts to settle the case for a reasonable sum, and the equities

          involved."2  This appeal ensued.

          II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
          II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    We   review   fee   awards   deferentially,   according

          substantial  respect to  the  trial court's  informed discretion.

          See Brewster  v. Dukakis, 3  F.3d 488, 492  (1st Cir. 1993).   We
          ___ ________     _______

          will disturb such  an award only for  mistake of law or  abuse of

          discretion.   See United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847
                        ___ _____________    _________________________

          F.2d  12, 14  (1st  Cir. 1988).    In this  regard,  an abuse  of

          discretion occurs "when  a material factor deserving  significant

          weight is  ignored, when  an improper factor  is relied  upon, or

          when all  proper and  no improper factors  are assessed,  but the

                              
          ____________________

               2While the court did not elaborate upon the phrase "equities
          involved," it is apparently a euphemism for the judge's view that
          the appellant  had been fortunate to secure a verdict, and that a
          large  fee  award  therefore  "would  constitute  an  intolerable
          windfall."   We proceed on the  assumption that this is  what the
          judge meant.    In all  events,  if the  judge was  referring  to
          "equities" in a broader sense, those equities, to the extent that
          they  bear on attorney  compensation, are encompassed  within the
          standard   fee-adjustment  factors.     See  infra  note   3  and
                                                  ___  _____
          accompanying text.

                                          4

          court makes a serious mistake in weighing them."  Foster v. Mydas
                                                            ______    _____

          Assocs., Inc.,  943  F.2d  139,  143 (1st  Cir.  1991)  (internal
          _____________

          quotation marks and citation omitted).

                    Although  our  analytical  posture  is  respectful,  we

          nonetheless must engage the district court's decision critically.

          To facilitate this perlustration,  we require the lower  court to

          explain its  actions.  See id. at 141.   The explanation need not
                                 ___ ___

          be  painstaking,   and,  sometimes,   it  may   even  appear   by

          implication, but at a bare minimum, the order awarding fees, read

          against the  backdrop of the record  as a whole, must  expose the

          district  court's thought process and show  the method and manner

          underlying its  decisional calculus.   See  Blum v. Stenson,  465
                                                 ___  ____    _______

          U.S. 886,  898 (1984);  Hensley v. Eckerhart,  461 U.S.  424, 437
                                  _______    _________

          (1983).

                    This  principle is  especially important  when  the fee

          award  departs  substantially  from the  contours  shaped  by the

          application.  "As a general rule, a fee-awarding court that makes

          a   substantial   reduction   in   either  documented   time   or

          authenticated  rates should  offer reasonably  explicit findings,

          for  the court, in such circumstances, `has a burden to spell out

          the  whys and  wherefores.'"   Brewster, 3  F.3d at  493 (quoting
                                         ________

          Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d  at 18)).  An appellate court
          _________________________

          deprived  of meaningful insight  into the trial  court's thinking

          frequently  will be  unable to  conduct an  adequate review  of a

          significantly adjusted fee  award, and thus will be  compelled to

          remand  for  further findings.    See,  e.g.,  Riley v.  City  of
                                            ___   ____   _____     ________

                                          5

          Jackson, 99  F.3d 757, 760  (5th Cir. 1996); Freeman  v. Franzen,
          _______                                      _______     _______

          695 F.2d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 1982).

          III.  METHODOLOGY
          III.  METHODOLOGY

                     The lodestar method  is the strongly preferred  method

          by which  district courts  should determine  what  fees to  award

          prevailing  parties  in actions  that  fall within  the  ambit of

          section 1988.  See Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 937 (1st Cir.
                         ___ _______    ______

          1992).  This approach contemplates judicial ascertainment of "the

          number  of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied

          by  a   reasonable  hourly  rate"   as  the  starting   point  in

          constructing a fee award.  Hensley,  461 U.S. at 433.  While  the
                                     _______

          lodestar method  is a  tool,  not a  straitjacket    as  we  have

          acknowledged,  some deviation from an orthodox application of the

          method   is  permissible   in  highly  unusual   situations,  see
                                                                        ___

          Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n,  847 F.2d  at 15-16    a  fee-awarding
          _________________________

          court shuns this tried-and-true approach at its peril.  See Segal
                                                                  ___ _____

          v. Gilbert Color Sys., Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 87 (1st Cir. 1984).  As
             ________________________

          we have said, the lodestar method is a tool, but it is not merely

          a tool.   The method is also a device which enables courts to pay

          homage to  the fundamental reason  that Congress passed  the Fees

          Act:    its  resolve  that  certain  types  of  wrongs,  such  as

          discrimination on account of sex, should not be countenanced, and

          that  private suits  aimed  at redeeming  such  abuses should  be

          encouraged.  See City of Riverside  v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-
                       ___ _________________     ______

          75 (1986) (plurality opinion).

                    To  say  that  a  trial court  mulling  a  fee  request

                                          6

          ordinarily must fashion a lodestar  is not to say that  the court

          is  in thrall  to  an attorney's  time records.    The court  can

          segregate time spent  on certain unsuccessful claims,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Hensley, 461  U.S. at  435, eliminate  excessive or  unproductive
          _______

          hours,  see, e.g.,  Lipsett, 975  F.2d  at 937,  and assign  more
                  ___  ____   _______

          realistic rates  to time  spent, see, e.g.,  Brewster, 3  F.3d at
                                           ___  ____   ________

          492.   In these and other ways,  the trial court, though adhering

          to the time-and-rate-based method of fee calculation, may fashion

          a lodestar which differs substantially from the fee requested  by

          the  prevailing party.   Moreover,  the trial  court retains  the

          authority  to adjust the lodestar after  initially computing it  

          but it  must do so in  accordance with accepted  principles.  See
                                                                        ___

          Hensley,  461 U.S. at  429-31 (citing the  legislative history of
          _______

          the Fees Act and observing that it is appropriate to  adjust fees

          in accordance  with the  twelve factors set  forth in  Johnson v.
                                                                 _______

          Georgia Highway  Express, Inc.,  488 F.2d 714,  717-19 (5th  Cir.
          ______________________________

          1974)).3

          IV.  ANALYSIS
          IV.  ANALYSIS

                    In  this instance,  Coutin submitted  the documentation
                              
          ____________________

               3This  circuit has embraced  the Johnson factors  for use in
                                                _______
          sculpting fee  awards. See, e.g., Segal,  746 F.2d at 86.   These
                                 ___  ____  _____
          factors are:   (1) the time and  labor required; (2) the  novelty
          and difficulty  of  the questions;  (3)  the skill  requisite  to
          perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of  other
          employment by the attorney(s) due  to acceptance of the case; (5)
          the  customary  fee;  (6)  the   nature  of  the  fee  (fixed  or
          contingent); (7) the  time limitations imposed  by the client  or
          the  circumstances; (8)  the  amount  involved  and  the  results
          obtained;  (9) the  experience, reputation,  and  ability of  the
          attorney(s);  (10) the  "undesirability" of  the  case; (11)  the
          nature  and  length  of the  professional  relationship  with the
          client; and (12) the size of awards in similar cases.

                                          7

          needed to  permit the district  court to follow  the conventional

          approach,  but the court scarcely mentioned  that proffer and, in

          all events,  did not  engage in  any lodestar analysis  whatever.

          While  such  a   departure  from  preferred  practice   will  not

          necessarily  be fatal, spurning  all consideration of  a lodestar

          places a substantial  burden upon the  district court to  account

          for its  actions.  See Berg v. Gackenbach,  966 F.2d 731, 732 (2d
                             ___ ____    __________

          Cir. 1992); Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d at 12, 15.
                      _________________________

                    Here, the district  court did not  cite any reason  for

          abjuring  the lodestar  method.   Still,  the court  did make  an

          effort  to explain its decisionmaking process, indicating that it

          had  premised its  decision on  three factors:    the appellant's

          limited  success, the  parties' abortive  efforts  to settle  the

          case,  and  the equities  of  the  situation.   But  the  court's

          reliance on the first of  these factors is at best insufficiently

          explained, and its  reliance on the other two  factors is plainly

          wrong.   Moreover, none  of these  factors justifies  the court's

          failure to compute (and then adjust, if necessary) a lodestar.

                                 A.  Limited Success.
                                 A.  Limited Success.
                                     _______________

                    The district  court's  conclusion  that  the  appellant

          enjoyed  only "limited success" (and,  thus, deserved less in the

          way of counsel  fees) is too much of  a stretch.  To  be sure, as

          the  court pointed  out, there  was  a chasmal  gulf between  the

          damages requested in the complaint and the damages awarded.4  The
                              
          ____________________

               4In  making this  comparison, the  court  emphasized the  ad
          damnum.   The use of  the ad damnum  for this purpose  is suspect
          because the ad damnum is an inherently artificial construct.  See
                                                                        ___

                                          8

          court had a right to keep this discrepancy in mind, but it cannot

          amount to more  than one element in the  constellation of factors

          that  the court  considers when  determining the  quality  of the

          results  obtained.     Because  this   phenomenon  is   sometimes

          misunderstood, we take some pains to explain it.

                    As Judge  Casellas correctly noted,  the Supreme  Court

          has  identified results obtained as a preeminent consideration in

          the fee-adjustment process.   See Hensley, 461 U.S.  at 432, 440.
                                        ___ _______

          But  the term "results obtained"  has a variety  of meanings.  It

          can refer  to a  plaintiff's success  claim by  claim, or  to the

          relief actually  achieved, or to  the societal importance  of the

          right which has been vindicated,  or to all of these  measures in

          combination.  We think that the  last meaning is the best choice,

          and  that,  as  a  consequence,  all  three  types  of  "results"

          potentially bear upon  the amount of an  ensuing fee award.   See
                                                                        ___

          generally Norman v.  Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836  F.2d 1292,
          _________ ______     ___________________________

          1302 (11th Cir. 1988).

                    Although all three measures of success must be factored

          into the fee-reduction  calculus, they do not  lend themselves to

          identical treatment.   On the  one hand, to  the extent that  fee

          adjustments are  intended to  reflect the  success or failure  of

          severable  claims, they are relatively easy to calculate because,

          although some overlap  may muddy the waters, a  court usually can

                              
          ____________________

          Aggarwal v. Ponce Sch. of Med., 745 F.2d 723, 729 (1st Cir. 1984)
          ________    __________________
          (observing that  "[m]odern litigation  practices being what  they
          are, the  monetary demand which  caps a plaintiff's  complaint is
          likely to be sanguine at best").

                                          9

          determine the  extent to which  a plaintiff has prevailed  on her

          claims merely  by perusing the  docket (e.g., the  complaint, the

          verdict  form, etc.),  and  can  then filter  out  time spent  on

          unsuccessful claims.  See, e.g., Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 940-41.  On
                                ___  ____  _______

          the other hand,  a fee reduction in  response to a scanty  damage

          award  or  a  shortfall  in  other relief  entails  a  subjective

          evaluation  of damages  awarded and nonmonetary  relief obtained,

          and is substantially  more difficult to quantify.5   Seen in this

          light, the  computational principles  applicable to  claims-based

          fee reductions are relatively simple and straightforward, whereas

          the  computational  principles  applicable  to  relief-based  fee

          reductions are highly  ramified and, in some respects, operate at

          cross  purposes.    To visualize  how  these  sometimes competing

          principles may  affect a district  court's effort to  determine a

          "reasonable"  fee,  it  may be  helpful  to  catalog the  several

          possible configurations in which the issue may arise.

                    1.   If a plaintiff  prevails on only some  of multiple
                    1.

          claims,  then  a  fee reduction  may  be  in  order.    To  guide

          decisionmaking in this situation, the Justices have suggested two

          relevant questions:  "First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on

          claims that were  unrelated to the claims on  which he succeeded?

          Second, did the  plaintiff achieve a level of  success that makes

          the hours reasonably expended  a satisfactory basis for making  a

          fee award?"  Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
                       _______
                              
          ____________________

               5This  is equally true of  the vindication of rights (which,
          to the  extent it  may be relevant  here, plainly cuts  against a
          reduction in fees).

                                          10

                    When different claims for relief are not interconnected

            that  is, when  the claims  rest on  different facts  and legal

          theories    they  are  by  definition  severable  and  unrelated.

          Attorneys' fees normally should not  be awarded for time spent in

          litigating  (or preparing  to  litigate) unsuccessful,  severable

          claims.  See id. at 435; Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 940.
                   ___ ___         _______

                    2.   If a plaintiff prevails on an insubstantial subset
                    2.

          of her interrelated  claims and obtains only  limited relief, the

          trial  court  has  discretion  to  shrink  fees  to  reflect that

          inferior  result.   See  Hensley,  461 U.S.  at  436; Andrade  v.
                              ___  _______                      _______

          Jamestown Hous.  Auth.,  82  F.3d  1179, 1191  (1st  Cir.  1996).
          ______________________

          Withal, a plaintiff who has limited success from a claim-by-claim

          standpoint, but who nevertheless obtains substantial compensation

          or other important  relief, usually will fare much  better in the

          fee  wars, even  though some  of her  claims failed.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Hensley, 461  U.S. at 440  ("Where a lawsuit consists  of related
          _______

          claims, a  plaintiff who  has won  substantial relief  should not

          have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district court

          did not adopt each contention raised.").

                    3.   If  a prevailing  party is  successful on  all (or
                    3.

          substantially all) of her claims, and receives complete (or near-

          complete) relief,  it goes  without saying  that reasonable  fees

          should be  paid for time productively spent, without any discount

          for limited success.

                    4.     If  a  prevailing  party  succeeds  on  all  (or
                    4.

          substantially all)  of her  claims, but  receives no  significant

                                          11

          relief (e.g.,  the jury awards  only nominal damages),  the trial

          judge  sometimes may deny  fees altogether because  this scenario

          often  "highlights  the  plaintiff's  failure  to  prove  actual,

          compensable injury."   Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.  103, 115 (1992)
                                 ______    _____

          (denying fees in a case in which the plaintiff sought $17,000,000

          in damages and received $1); see also id. at 114 (affirming  that
                                       ___ ____ ___

          "the `technical' nature  of a nominal damages award  or any other

          judgment . . . does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under  

          1988").  Farrar,  then, signifies that fees need  not be bestowed
                   ______

          if the  plaintiff's apparent victory  is "purely technical  or de
                                                                         __

          minimis."  Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring).6
          _______    ___

                    5.  Sometimes,  the plaintiff will  prevail on all  her
                    5.

          claims,  but  will  receive  limited  (though  not insubstantial)

          redress.   In such circumstances,  it is appropriate for  a trial

          court to consider the skimpiness of the relief when adjusting the

          lodestar figure.   See  Rivera, 477 U.S.  at 574.   But  though a
                             ___  ______

          meager damage  award may be  taken into consideration,  the Court

          has squarely disclaimed "the proposition that fee awards under   

          1988 should necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages

          a  civil  rights  plaintiff  actually  recovers."  Id. (approving
                                                             ___

          $245,456.25 in fees  in a section 1983 action that  resulted in a
                              
          ____________________

               6Be that as it may,  obtaining only nominal damages does not
          negate  the possibility  of a  fee award.    For example,  if the
          plaintiff  receives another form  of meaningful relief,  then the
          "results  obtained"  may  be   substantial,  notwithstanding  the
          plaintiff's   failure  to  collect  compensatory  damages.    See
                                                                        ___
          O'Connor v. Huard, 117 F.3d  12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming
          ________    _____
          a substantial  attorneys' fee award  in a section 1983  action in
          which  the  plaintiff  received  nominal  damages and  injunctive
                                                            ___
          relief).

                                          12

          judgment  for  $33,350);  see  also   id.  at  585  (Powell,  J.,
                                    ___  ____   ___

          concurring) (noting that  "[n]either the decisions of  this Court

          nor the  legislative history of   1988"  lend credence to a "rule

          of  proportionality between  the  fee  awarded  and  the  damages

          recovered in a civil rights case"); Foley  v. City of Lowell, 948
                                              _____     ______________

          F.2d 10, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that although a trial  court

          is "entitled to take into account the relative size of the damage

          award  and the  fee award,"  the  former "does  not constitute  a

          dispositive criterion, or even a ceiling" on the latter).

                    It is readily apparent that some tension exists between

          these principles:   while a judge may not  automatically reduce a

          fee award in proportion to  a judgment that is significantly less

          than the plaintiff sought, the judge can take that small judgment

          into   reasonable  account  in  massaging  the  lodestar.    This

          dissonance makes it  all the more crucial that a nisi prius court

          provide a  clear explanation  when limited  relief furnishes  the

          ostensible justification for a departure from the lodestar.

                    Conscious of these differing configurations, we turn to

          the case  at hand.  The focus of our inquiry is the lower court's

          determination  that the  appellant's  success was  limited  (and,

          thus, justified a fee reduction).

                    We  start by  scrutinizing claims-based  success.   Y&R

          asserts that Coutin's victory was less than complete both because

          the  jury  declined to  grant  punitive damages  and  because the

          appellant did not pursue her original prayer for lost income.  We

          believe  that this riposte  blurs the distinction  between claims

                                          13

          and  damages.   In  the  fee-shifting context,  a  "claim" is  an

          allegation of  a legal injury  comprised of various  elements and

          equivalent to  a  cause  of action,  whereas  "damages"  are  the

          compensation  awarded to the  plaintiff who has  suffered a legal

          wrong and who therefore has  a valid claim against the defendant.

          In this case, punitive damages and loss of income (no matter  how

          they are denominated in the complaint) are not failed claims, but

          are  categories  of relief  that  the  jury and  the  appellant's

          subsequent employment history, respectively, have denied her.

                    We  need not linger.  From a claim-by-claim standpoint,

          the  appellant prevailed up and down  the line.  She triumphed on

          every  substantive claim asserted  under both federal  and Puerto

          Rico law.   In so doing, she  achieved a 100% success  rate   and

          complete  success is hardly  "limited."  Consequently,  a claims-

          based, results-obtained fee reduction is wholly inappropriate.

                    From the  standpoint of relief obtained,  the situation

          is more  ambiguous.   After all, it  remains within  the district

          court's discretion to  reduce a fee award in  response to limited

          relief even  in the  presence of  complete claims-based  success.

          See, e.g.,  Cartwright v. Stamper,  7 F.3d 106, 109-10  (7th Cir.
          ___  ____   __________    _______

          1993)  (declining to award fees  where plaintiff succeeded on all

          claims, but  received  only nominal  damages  for each).    Here,

          however, the damage award is substantial in absolute terms   over

          $45,000   and equals  roughly three times the  appellant's annual

          salary.  On its face, such relief does not seem "limited"  in any

          relevant sense.

                                          14

                    Moreover, to the extent   if at all   that the ratio of

          the damages requested to the  judgment received may be taken into

          account in  fixing an appropriate  award, see Foley, 948  F.2d at
                                                    ___ _____

          19-20 ("Often,  when the  amount sought is  large but  the actual

          recovery is  small, fees  may be  reduced  somewhat."); see  also
                                                                  ___  ____

          Loggins  v.  Delo,  999  F.2d  364, 369  (8th  Cir.  1993),  this
          _______      ____

          proportion may be  used only  as one facet  of the trial  court's

          determination of the quality of  the results obtained.  The court

          may not employ the derived ratio as an independent  justification

          for a fee  reduction.  See Rivera,  477 U.S. at 574.   Rather, in
                                 ___ ______

          the absence of special circumstances, the court must evaluate the

          data  submitted by the  fee-seeker, compute a  lodestar, consider

          the totality of the adjustment  factors approved by Congress  and

          the  Court,  see  supra  note  3,  and  make  specific,  reasoned
                       ___  _____

          adjustments if it is to arrive at a reduced fee award.

                    In  the instant  case, the  court  did not  analyze the

          appellant's time-and-rate data; it  ignored the appellant's broad

          claims-based success; and  it failed to explain why  the sum upon

          which it settled   $5,000   was itself  reasonable in relation to

          counsel's efforts, even given a perceived shortfall in the relief

          received.  Thus,  the more than 90% fee reduction  that the court

          imposed cannot be justified on the basis of limited success.7
                              
          ____________________

               7The district court's  reliance on Andrade (a  case in which
                                                  _______
          the trial judge ordered, and  this court approved, a reduction in
          fees  from  $26,487.50  to  $2,500)  is  misplaced.   There,  the
          plaintiffs  obtained  limited  claims-based success  and  limited
                                                               ___
          relief.   See Andrade,  82 F.3d  at  1191.   In contrast,  Coutin
                    ___ _______
          obtained substantial claims-based success and rather  substantial
          relief.  Hence, Andrade and this case are not fair congeners.
                          _______

                                          15

                              B.  Settlement Prospects.
                              B.  Settlement Prospects.
                                  ____________________

                    In  other   instances,  inquiry  into  the   course  of

          settlement negotiations may  yield information that is  useful in

          determining fees.   See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985)
                              ___ _____    ______

          (applying Fed. R. Civ. P.  68 in a civil rights context).  In the

          case at bar,  however, the defendant did not  invoke Rule 68 and,

          in any event, the judgment  that the plaintiff obtained more than

          trebled  the highest  settlement offer  available to  her.   This

          success  validates  the  appellant's rejection  of  the  tendered

          settlement and immunizes her  from detrimental consequences based

          upon that  rejection. See Corder  v. Gates, 947 F.2d  374, 380-81
                                ___ ______     _____

          (9th Cir. 1991).

                    Policy   considerations   militate   strongly   against

          relaxing this rule.  Permitting a district court to reduce  a fee

          award for failure  to settle when  the eventual judgment  exceeds

          the best  settlement offer  previously made by  the losing  party

          would put too large a club in the district court's hands.  In the

          bargain, endorsing that  praxis would create inordinate  pressure

          on plaintiffs to accept low settlement offers.  This result would

          inhibit the  bringing of civil  rights actions, and, in  the end,

          frustrate   Congress's  manifest  intention  that  the  Fees  Act

          facilitate  the prosecution of private actions aimed at deterring

          civil  rights abuses.    See  Rivera, 477  U.S.  at 574-75.    We
                                   ___  ______

          therefore hold that it is a mistake of law to reduce an award  of

          attorneys'  fees  in  a  civil  rights  case  in  response  to  a

          plaintiff's  rejection of a defendant's settlement offer when the

                                          16

          subsequent judgment exceeds that offer.8

                                    C.  Windfall.
                                    C.  Windfall.
                                        ________

                    The  district  court's  opinion  suggests  that  a  fee

          reduction is appropriate because the  appellant had a shaky  case

          and did not deserve to  prevail on the merits.  See supra note 2.
                                                          ___ _____

          Wholly apart  from the accuracy  vel non of the  district court's
                                           ___ ___

          assessment, this  criterion is not  a proper element of  the fee-

          award calculus.

                    Congress  intended  the  Fees Act  to  effect  attorney

          compensation in  virtually all  cases involving  successful civil

          rights claims.9    See  generally  S. Rep.  No.  94-1011  (1976),
                             ___  _________

          reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908; see also Williams v. Hanover
          _________ __                         ___ ____ ________    _______

          Hous. Auth., 113 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1st Cir. 1997).  After a jury's
          ___________

          verdict has been rendered  and has withstood whatever barrage  of

          post-trial motions may  ensue, the time  for debate has  expired.

          It is an  abuse of discretion for  the trial court thereafter  to

          vent  its skepticism  about the  claimant's right  to recover  by

          reducing the fee award to which the prevailing party is entitled.

          See Stefan  v. Laurenitis, 889  F.2d 363, 370-71 (1st  Cir. 1989)
          ___ ______     __________

                              
          ____________________

               8This  case does not present the somewhat different question
          of whether a  fee award in a civil rights action might be subject
          to   reduction,  apart  from  Rule  68,  because  the  prevailing
          plaintiff  received  a  damage  award  which  was  less  than the
          defendant had offered in settlement.   We leave that question for
          another day.

               9Despite this  policy  interest,  we  have  determined  that
          counsel  fees may be withheld altogether if special circumstances
          exist.   See Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 419 (1st Cir. 1992);
                   ___ _______    _____
          Lewis v. Kendrick,  944 F.2d 949, 957-58  (1st Cir. 1991).   Such
          _____    ________
          circumstances are rare.  They are not present here.

                                          17

          (refusing to  allow district courts  to balance equities  of this

          sort  when considering  whether to  award  attorneys' fees  under

          section 1988); see  also DeJesus v. Banco Popular,  918 F.2d 232,
                         ___  ____ _______    _____________

          235 (1st Cir. 1990).  In other words,  the time for a trial judge

          to express his doubts about the viability  of a claim occurs when

          the judge rules upon the full panoply of motions for judgment  as

          a  matter of law and/or for a new  trial.  Once a case has scaled

          those barriers    and  this case has    trimming  attorneys' fees

          cannot be employed  as a palliative  to assuage lingering  doubts

          about the legal viability of the claim.  See DeJesus, 918 F.2d at
                                                   ___ _______

          235.   Indeed, if a  plaintiff has  a thin  case but  nonetheless

          manages, as here, to secure a verdict for three times the largest

          settlement  offer, such  a  template suggests  skillful advocacy,

          perhaps worthy of an award of full fees.

                                    D.  Local Law.
                                    D.  Local Law.
                                        _________

                    Wholly apart  from the district court's  rationale, Y&R

          has  a  fallback   position.    It  posits   that,  whatever  the

          infirmities of the $5,000 fee  award under federal law, the award

          comports with  Puerto Rico  law and should  be sustained  on that

          basis.  This  thesis, which proposes that Puerto  Rico law should

          govern in respect to fees  because the appellant prevailed on her

          non-federal claims and  recovered double damages by  operation of

          Puerto Rico law, fails for two reasons.

                    First, under section 1988 "the plaintiff is entitled to

          fees for  hours worked  not only on  the successful  civil rights

          claims,  but also  on other  claims involving  a `common  core of

                                          18

          facts' or `related legal theories,'" and, therefore, a "plaintiff

          should receive significant fees when he has won a partial victory
                                                            _______

          on a civil  rights claim while receiving substantially the relief

          he  there sought,  though the  jury awards  it on a  factually or

          legally related pendent state claim."   Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d
                                                  _____    ______

          287, 291  (1st Cir. 1986)  (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S.  at 435).10
                                              _______

          Here, where the elements of  the various claims under Puerto Rico

          law  are  subsumed  by  the  Title  VII  claim,  the  claims  are

          unquestionably  interrelated.  Hence, the fact that the appellant

          also recovered under Puerto Rico  law is irrelevant vis- -vis her

          section 1988 recovery.

                    Second, as a  general matter, a plaintiff  who prevails

          on congruent  federal  and state  claims and  qualifies for  fee-

          shifting  under  two  or more  statutes  may  recover  fees under

          whichever  fee-shifting regime  she  chooses.    See  Freeman  v.
                                                           ___  _______

          Package  Mach.  Co., 865  F.2d 1331,  1347 (1st  Cir. 1988).   To
          ___________________

          constrain  the plaintiff's  choice would  withhold  from her  the

          deserved fruits  of her  victory and  would discourage  potential

          claimants from redeeming their civil rights.

          V.  CONCLUSION
          V.  CONCLUSION

                    We  need go  no further.   The  court below  offered no

          plausible reason for eschewing the  lodestar method, and no  such

                              
          ____________________

               10In Aubin, the plaintiff  prevailed on interrelated federal
                    _____
          and state claims,  recovering $501 on the former  and $300,000 on
          the  latter.  782  F.2d at 288.   The district  court reduced the
          requested attorneys' fees on a  theory much like that advanced by
          Y&R.   See id.  at 290.  We  overturned that ruling.   See id. at
                 ___ ___                                         ___ ___
          292.

                                          19

          reason springs spontaneously from the record.  It was, therefore,

          error to  forgo the lodestar.   In addition, the court  relied on

          impermissible  criteria in  making  its  non-lodestar fee  award.

          Consequently,  we vacate the  order appealed from  and remand for

          further  proceedings  consistent  with this  opinion.    Costs on

          appeal shall be taxed in favor of the appellant.  Upon the timely

          filing  of a  supplemental  application  in  suitable  form,  the

          district  court  shall  include  in  its  new  fee  award  a  sum

          sufficient  to compensate  the appellant's  counsel for  services

          rendered  in connection with  the successful prosecution  of this

          appeal.

                    It is so ordered.
                    It is so ordered.
                    ________________

                                          20