Court Opinion

ID: 9662934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:23:44.302902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.072211
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Accepting the court of appeals’ recitation of the facts, appellant arguably invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on two separate occasions — once before entering the video room, and then again when specifically asked by Officer Mock in the video room whether he had been drinking. In its petition for discretionary review the State vigorously asserts that the court of appeals relied only upon the latter invocation in holding on the basis of unassigned error that the trial court erred in failing to suppress not only the videotape, but also the results of the blood test. My reading of the court of appeals’ opinion bears out the State’s assertion. Because the court of appeals did not purport to address whether appellant's request to call a lawyer before he entered the video room constituted an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel before submitting to custodial interrogation, or, if so, whether that right was violated, I would not review that question today. Especially where a court of appeals has reversed a case on the basis of unassigned error, this Court’s review ought not to exceed the scope of that court’s holding.
Nevertheless, the majority today “in-dúlgela] in the assumption that this initial plea to call an attorney was tantamount to a request to have counsel present prior to or during any custodial interrogation.” At p. 375. The majority then decides that, having invoked the right, appellant subsequently waived it by failing to avail himself of the opportunity to call an attorney in the video room, with the video machine running. In view of appellant’s avowed, and not altogether unreasonable fear that calling his attorney on video could eventually come back to haunt him, at p. 375, I can hardly subscribe to the majority’s bald conclusion appellant voluntarily relinquished any right to counsel he may have asserted. At any rate, whether appellant actually invoked his right to counsel before entering the video room is a question fairly presented in context of appellant’s fifth point of error on appeal. I would leave the entire issue for the court of appeals’ decision upon remand.
Turning to appellant’s invocation of counsel which actually appears on the videotape, and upon which the court of appeals expressly relied in its holding, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this invocation was limited to the single question whether appellant had been drinking. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987). Because appellant never answered that question, the only potential error I can see arises from the bare fact the jury was allowed to view appellant invoking his right, and could have drawn an inference of guilt therefrom. This was not the court of appeals’ concern, however, and I would not affirm a reversal by a lower court in a petition for discretionary review on the basis of error not contemplated by that court.
As the State urges in a separate ground for review, the court of appeals erred in another respect. Even had appellant’s invocation of right to counsel in the video room been a broad one, justifying suppression of any subsequent evidence that was the product of custodial interrogation, it was unnecessary to suppress either the visual portion of the videotape depicting the physical tests for sobriety, or the results of the blood test. A request to submit to such testing does not constitute “interrogation” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. See Bass v. State, 723 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
We granted yet a third ground for review in this cause. There the State argues that, assuming the court of appeals was otherwise correct that both videotape and blood test results should have been suppressed, the court erred in failing to inquire whether admission of that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Our disposition of the State’s other grounds for review makes resolution of this one unnecessary.