Court Opinion

ID: 9769124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:34:14.39285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:55.208810
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is the fifth time this court has reviewed the offense of retaliation. In Brown v. State, No. 09-96-027-CR, 1997 WL 111994 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, March 12, 1997, pet.ref'd)(not designated for publication), Justice Stover affirmed a retaliation conviction and I dissented. My dissent relied upon In re M.M.R., 932 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1996, no writ). *870In Wilson v. State, No. 09-96-086-CR, 1997 WL 137420 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, March 26, 1997, pet.ref'd)(not designated for publication), the court, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed a retaliation conviction. Speaking for the court, I stated at page 5:
We recognize there is a distinction between proving Wilson assaulted Piper while Piper was performing an official duty as a public servant and proving Wilson assaulted Piper because Piper had performed an official duty as a public servant.
In Hanson v. State, No. 09-96-234-CR, 1997 WL 354738 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, June 25, 1997, no pet.)(not designated for publication), a unanimous court affirmed a retaliation conviction. The per curiam opinion, at page 4, stated:
We recognize the distinction, noted by the court in In re 932 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1996, no pet.) [sic], between proving Hanson assaulted Beach while performing an official duty and proving Hanson assaulted Beach because Beach performed an official duty.
In McCleskey v. State, No. 09-96-228-CR and No. 09-96-229-CR, 1998 WL 106180 (Tex.App. — Beaumont, March 11, 1998, pet. refd)(not designated for publication) Justice Stover, writing for the majority, did not note our previous writings, but merely stated, at pages 8-9:
Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant attacked Evans “in retaliation for or on account of’ Evans services as a public servant. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.App.—Fort. Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).
I dissented and stated, at pages 3-4:
Having acknowledged, and I believe accepted, the reasoning of M.M.R., we should not retreat from that position. The facts show McCleskey assaulted Bunting and Evans while they were performing their official duties as public servants rather than because they had performed any official duties as public servants. There is no evidence in the record the assault was in retaliation for or on account of Evans’ performance of any official duty.
In Riley v. State, 965 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. refd), Justice Nuchia1 stated:
The State argues the facts in this case are analogous to those in McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, [pet. refd]). In McCoy, a police officer was assaulted by a person he was attempting to arrest. The court concluded a rational trier of fact could have found that, under those circumstances, the officer was struck on account of his services as a public servant. Appellant, however, urges us to follow the reasoning articulated by the El Paso Court of Appeals in In re M.M.R., 932 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1996, no writ). In M.M.R., a supervisor in a juvenile half-way house attempted to break up a fight. He was assaulted by one of the two juveniles involved in the fight attempting to get away from the supervisor and continue fighting.
Both the El Paso court in M.M.R., and the Fort Worth court in McCoy, acknowledged the victims in those cases were carrying out their duties as public servants when assaulted. The El Paso court concluded, however, that Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.06(a)(1) (Vernon 1994) requires proof of a retributory element — that is, proof that the unlawful act was committed in retaliation for, or on account of, another person’s service as a public servant. See M.M.R., 932 S.W.2d at 115. The M.M.R. court also observed that proof that an accused harmed a public servant who was lawfully discharging an official duty, without more, fails to establish the required retributory element. See Id.2
*871We find the reasoning of the M.M.R. court persuasive, and conclude that, to support a conviction under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.06(a)(1), it is not enough that the State demonstrate a public servant was harmed while lawfully discharging his official duties. It must prove the harm inflicted resulted from a retributive attack for duties already performed.
Justice Nuchia’s reasoning and analysis should be persuasive to this court.
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it is clear Wright assaulted Bynum while Bynum was performing his duties as a public servant not as retribution for duties already performed. Therefore, the evidence being insufficient to sustain the retaliation conviction, the judgment should be reversed and an acquittal ordered. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).

. Prior to being elected to the First Court of Appeals Justice Nuchia served as the Police Chief of Houston.

. But cf. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon 1994 & Supp.1997). To conclude otherwise would be to disregard the notion that former section 22.01 was directed at harm to a public servant in the process of discharging his official duty, and section 36.06 addresses harm to a public servant for a duty discharged previously. The present version of section 22.01 recognizes the distinction between a public servant harmed while performing his official duty, and a public servant harmed in retaliation for, or on account of, past performance of an official duty.