Court Opinion

ID: 9680897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:40:42.048242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.037082
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The plaintiff, Allen J. Scott, contends that since this suit was brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., § 51 et seq., his substantive rights are governed by federal law and cannot be interfered with, lessened or destroyed by a State rule of practice or procedure. Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889 (1957); Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957); Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100 (1949); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Younger, 262 S.W. 557 (Tex.Civ.App.1953, writ ref’d n. r. e.); 79 A.L.R.2d 553, 559. We agree with this basic premise. We do not agree, however, that any of the plaintiff’s substantive rights have been denied by this remand for a new trial in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Our decision does not relate to burden of proof, the sufficiency of evidence, the right to a jury determination, or any of the other “substantive” rights which have been held to be governed by federal law in F.E.L.A. cases. On the contrary, it deals solely with rules of procedure relating to the form, necessity, and effect of jury issues and instructions. These have been recognized to be procedural rather than substantive when they do not interfere with a right or defense provided by the Act. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310, 36 S.Ct. 564, 60 L.Ed. 1016 (1916); Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.1973); Thompson v. Robbins, 157 Tex. 463, 304 S.W.2d 111 (1957); King v. Schumacher, 32 Cal.App.2d 172, 89 P.2d 466 (1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 593, 60 S.Ct. 123, 84 L.Ed. 496; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Strickland, 87 Ga.App. 596, 74 S.E.2d 897 (1953); Renn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 N.C. 128, 86 S.E. 964 (1915), aff’d 241 U.S. 290, 36 S.Ct. 567, 60 L.Ed. 1006.
Our decision has put no end to Scott’s alleged rights, and it does not defeat them. It merely requires the assertion and adjudication of those rights to be in accordance with the rules of procedure of the forum which he chose. His principal complaint is that the broad finding of negligence was sufficient to support a judgment under federal law in an F.E.L.A. case. See Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., supra, and other cases referred to therein. In Arnold a sharply divided Court held that a favorable answer on the broad issue of whether the railroad was negligent in failing to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to do his work was sufficient in spite of unfavorable answers to alleged conflicting specific issues. We would have followed that decision in this case if that broad issue had been requested and the jury had answered it in favor of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff alleged negligence of the railroad “in failing to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to do his work,”1 but he requested no jury finding on that issue. Scott’s evidence of an unsafe place in which to ride or work related to a defective door latch on the locomotive in which he was riding. There was some evidence that the failure of the latch to hold the door shut resulted in plaintiff’s being injured when he was thrown against the open door at the time of the derailment. Instead of requesting the broad form of issue as to unsafe place in which to work, the plaintiff requested a specific issue about the defective latch, and the jury answered *282it against him.2 The plaintiff also alleged several other specific acts and omissions as negligence on the part of the defendant. A problem in this case arose by reason of the presence in the case of considerable evidence which went far beyond the plaintiffs allegations of the facts upon which he was relying. It was for this reason that we determined that a plaintiff may have a broad negligence issue, but by the wording of the issue or by complementary instructions the jury will be precluded from considering matters that go beyond what he alleged and what he thus put the defendant upon notice as his grounds for recovery. This is the procedure required by Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 277 and 279.
Texas Rule 277
Plaintiff also contends that our decision is contrary to our own Rule 277 and our statement concerning the broad submission of negligence in Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1974). We disagree. On the contrary, we recognized that Rule 277 gives the trial court discretion “to submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case or to submit issues broadly.”
While the writer considers the checklist system authorized by Rule 277 to be preferable in ordinary negligence cases involving multiple acts and omissions,3 the court said in Mobil, and we reaffirm, that:
The rule (Rule 277) means that in- an ordinary negligence case, where several specific acts of negligence are alleged and evidence as to each is introduced, the submission of a broad issue inquiring generally whether the defendant was negligent is not error and is not subject to the objection that the single issue inquires about several elements or issues. 517 S.W.2d at 255.
If there is a variance between the pleadings and the proof, we have now held further that, upon proper request, the trial court should limit a broad issue to those acts or omissions which are included within the pleadings and supported by some evidence. Rules 277 and 279. As clearly stated in our opinion, this does not require separate questions as to each of such acts or omissions. The limitation may be accomplished by including in a single issue all of the alleged negligent acts or omissions which are raised by the pleadings and evidence, as: “Was the defendant negligent in _ or _ or _?” We have further set forth an alternative method of complying with this requirement by submitting a broad negligence inquiry and following it with a complementary instruction which would limit the jury to consideration of the specified acts or omissions raised by the pleadings and the evidence. Or, as heretofore indicated, the checklist form may be used as another means of broad submission.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

. At the time of the accident plaintiff was riding in the cab of one of the engines on his way back to his residence in Silsbee, having completed his hours of work as a brakeman prior to the train’s departure from Somerville.

. Special Issue No. 3, requested by plaintiff, read:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the door iatch on the locomotive in question was not in proper and safe condition on the occasion in question?” To this the answer was “We do not.”

. See paragraph 4 of Rule 277 and Sample Charge “A” in the 1973 Cumulative Supplement of Vol. I of Texas Pattern Jury Charges, pages 11-12.