Court Opinion

ID: 9965883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 17:09:34.353458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:49.533711
License: Public Domain

J-S01023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOHN ROBERT CURTIS                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1030 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2011
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0003035-2011

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: MAY 3, 2024

       John Curtis appeals from the judgment of sentence after he pled guilty

to retail theft and conspiracy.1 He claims, and the trial court concedes, that

it abused its discretion when it denied his motion to file a post-sentence

motion nunc pro tunc. Upon review, we reverse and remand.

       In August 2011, Curtis, along with two co-defendants, was arrested for

stealing multiple video games from a Walmart in Berks County. On September

28, 2011, Curtis entered an open guilty plea to retail theft and conspiracy to

commit retail theft.

       On November 4, 2011, the trial court held Curtis’ sentencing hearing.

The court determined that the total restitution amounted to $3,777.36. As a

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3929(a)(1) and 903(a)(1).
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result of this finding, the offense gravity score for both offenses was graded

as a 5.    Based on this and Curtis’ prior record score of 3, the applicable

sentencing guidelines recommended a standard range sentence of 6 to 16

months incarceration for each offense. The trial court sentenced Curtis to an

aggregate sentence of 28 months to 14 years’ incarceration: 16 months to 7

years’ incarceration for retail theft; and a consecutive sentence of 12 months

to 7 years’ incarceration for conspiracy. Additionally, the court ordered that

Curtis was prohibited from being on any property owned or operated by

Walmart, and that he pay restitution in the amount of $3,777.36 and a fine of

$500.00.

       Following imposition of sentence, Curtis was informed of his post-

sentence rights. Counsel discussed with Curtis at that time whether he wanted

to file a post-sentence motion, but he indicated that he did not, stating “no,

no, no, I just want it to be done. It's fine. I just want it to be done.”

       Curtis changed his mind three days later, and, on November 7, 2011,

he filled out a “Request for Information/Assistance” form at the jail, indicating

his desire to appeal. On November 14, 2011, Curtis sent this form to the

public defender's office.2

       On November 16, 2011—two days after the 10-day deadline for filing a

post-sentence motion, Curtis’ counsel filed a motion for leave to file a post-
____________________________________________

2 Curtis sent the form there even though his attorney was not employed by

that office and the court notified him of counsel’s contact information, which
he received.

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sentence motion nunc pro tunc. Therein, counsel indicated that she did not

learn of Curtis’ letter to the public defender's office until November 15, 2011,

shortly after she returned from vacation. On November 18, 2011, the trial

court denied Curtis’ motion as untimely and therefore did not consider the

merits of it. Counsel took no further action because Curtis’ only issue related

to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, which had not been preserved.

       On October 22, 2012, Curtis filed a timely pro se Post Conviction Relief

Act3 petition. Less than one week later, the court received a letter from the

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole indicating that Curtis was being

considered for parole.       Curtis was released on state parole, and the court

received no further communication from him.          The court did not address

Curtis’ PCRA petition.

       Eight years later, in October 2020, the court discovered that Curtis was

reincarcerated for allegedly violating the terms and conditions of his parole in

this case. The court appointed PCRA counsel who filed an amended PCRA

petition principally claiming that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file

an appeal.      After a hearing, the PCRA court denied Curtis’ petition on

December 14, 2021.

____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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      Curtis timely appealed the denial of his request for PCRA relief to this

Court. Counsel filed an Anders brief and application to withdraw as counsel.

The only issue PCRA counsel identified was whether plea counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal.

      Upon review, a panel of this Court observed that when plea counsel

learned Curtis wanted to appeal, she filed a nunc pro tunc post-sentence

motion instead of an appeal. When that motion was denied, counsel took no

further action. We noted however that Curtis’ attorney could have “challenged

the trial court’s denial of the nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion on direct

appeal, regardless of the merits of any potential discretionary aspects of

sentencing claims[]” or filed an Anders brief if she believed there were no

meritorious issues. Commonwealth v. Curtis, 287 A.3d 855, *5 fn. 8, 9

(Pa. Super. 2022). We therefore concluded that Curtis’ plea counsel was per

se ineffective, and that the PCRA court erred in denying Curtis relief. Id. at

*5.

      We further disagreed with PCRA counsel’s determination that Curtis’

appeal was frivolous.      Consequently, we vacated the PCRA court’s order,

denied counsel’s request to withdraw, and remanded to the PCRA court to

reinstate Curtis’ direct appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Id.

      Following reinstatement of those rights, Curtis filed this timely direct

appeal. He and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 1925.

      On appeal, Curtis raises the following two issues:

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      A. Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by not allowing
      the post-sentence motion to be heard on the merits, as it was only
      two days late and that lateness was not the fault of the defense?

      B. Whether the sentencing court abused [its] discretion in
      sentencing [Curtis] using the wrong offense gravity score, in
      sentencing him consecutively, and by refusing to consider his
      rehabilitative needs?

Curtis’ Brief at 5.

       In his first issue, Curtis claims that the trial court abused its discretion

when it originally denied his request to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro

tunc in 2011. Specifically, Curtis argues that the motion was only two days

late. He further maintains that the delay was due to the difficultly he had in

contacting his attorney who did not work for the public defender’s office, his

attorney’s vacation, and a court holiday. Curtis’ Brief at 20-21. According to

Curtis, given these circumstances, the court should have granted his motion.

      Initially, we note that the requirements to request nunc pro tunc relief

are distinct from the underlying post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth

v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128–29 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). A post-

sentence motion must be filed within ten days of sentencing.             Pa.R.C.P.

720(A)(1). A party seeking to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc must

adhere to the following:

      To be entitled to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, a
      defendant must, within 30 days after the imposition of sentence,
      demonstrate sufficient cause, i.e., reasons that excuse the late
      filing . . . When the defendant has met this burden and has shown
      sufficient cause, the trial court must then exercise its discretion in
      deciding whether to permit the defendant to file the post-sentence
      motion nunc pro tunc. If the trial court chooses to permit a
      defendant to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, the court

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      must do so expressly. In employing the above line of reasoning,
      we find instructive cases dealing with the restoration of direct
      appeal rights nunc pro tunc. In Commonwealth v. Stock, 679
      A.2d 760, 764 (Pa. 1996) for instance, our Supreme Court opined
      that in order for an appeal nunc pro tunc to be granted, the
      appellant would have to show an extraordinary circumstance
      wherein a direct appeal by right was lost.                Accord,
      Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 n. 7 (Pa. 1998).
      Similarly, in order for a petition to file a post-sentence motion
      nunc pro tunc to be granted, a defendant must, within 30 days
      after the imposition of sentence, demonstrate an extraordinary
      circumstance which excuses the tardiness.

Dreves, 839 A.2d at 1128. “[T]he decision to allow the filing of a post-trial

motion nunc pro tunc is vested in the discretion of the trial court and that we

will not reverse unless the trial court abused its discretion.” Id.

      Here, as noted above the trial court concedes that it should have

entertained Curtis’ post-sentence motion given the circumstances of this case.

It explained, “In making this determination we rely on the position that

consideration must be given to the overall circumstances surrounding the late

submission of the post-sentence motion, and whether efforts have been made

to correct the late filing [] soon after the deadline. . . .” Trial Court Opinion,

8/15/23, at 4. The court observed that Curtis made a timely request and plea

counsel — who had just returned from vacation -- immediately filed the nunc

pro tunc request, just two days after it was due. Consequently, the court

concluded that neither Curtis nor counsel was “negligent” in seeking to

preserve his sentencing claim and the delay in filing Curtis’ post-sentence

motion was excused. Id. at 5.

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      We agree that the trial court’s initial denial of Curtis’ nunc pro tunc

request was manifestly unreasonable and therefore an abuse of discretion. As

such, we reverse the trial court's order denying Curtis’ motion for leave to file

a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. The trial court shall permit Curtis to

file his post-sentence motion, nunc pro tunc, and consider the merits of it.

Based on this disposition, we do not reach Curtis’ second appellate issue.

      Order reversed.      Case remanded with instructions.          Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2024

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