Court Opinion

ID: 9906788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 13:06:08.141723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:21.117750
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                       No. COA23-115

                                 Filed 5 December 2023

Wake County, No. 19CRS223407

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.

ANDRE EUGENE LESTER

        Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 July 2022 by Judge Thomas H.

Lock in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September

2023.

        Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Deputy General Counsel Tiffany Y. Lucas,
        and General Counsel Fellow Zachary R. Kaplan, for the State.

        Mark L. Hayes, for the defendant-appellant.

        TYSON, Judge.

        Andre Eugene Lester (“Defendant”) appeals from judgments entered upon the

jury’s verdicts of guilty of statutory rape of a child, statutory sex offense with a child,

and indecent liberties with a child. The State has failed to show the Constitutional

confrontation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant is entitled

to a new trial.

                                  I.     Background

        Thirteen-year-old Riley lived in an apartment in Cary with her father and her
                                   STATE V. LESTER

                                   Opinion of the Court

fifteen-year-old brother. (Pseudonym is used to protect the identity of minors. N.C.

R. App. P. 42(b). Riley’s father worked during the day and left his children at home

alone after school.   Riley’s mental health diagnoses included major depressive

disorder without psychosis, which had previously required “several inpatient

psychiatric hospitalizations.” Riley also exhibited signs of cutting herself.

      Riley’s father took her to a Duke Hospital Clinic (“Duke”) in the summer of

2019. Riley privately met with Kristen Russell (‘Russell”), a social worker. Russell

inquired of Riley about her sexual health and experiences. Riley asserted she had

previous sexual experiences with a man around thirty years old. Riley told Russell

she did not believe this experience was wrong and did not want to tell an adult. Duke

is a mandatory reporter of alleged sexual assaults and reported her allegations to

Riley’s father and to law enforcement officers. Riley was referred to and interviewed

at the SAFEchild Advocacy Center.

      Cary Police Corporal Armando Bake received Russell’s report on 12 September

2019 at the Juvenile Crimes Unit. Corporal Bake spoke with Riley, her father, and

her brother. Riley’s brother identified the alleged perpetrator as “Ray-Ray,” and he

informed Corporal Bake “Ray-Ray” was currently in jail for an alleged robbery.

      Riley told Corporal Bake that she and “Ray-Ray” had communicated via text

messages and cellular phone calls. Riley also gave Corporal Bake her and “Ray-Ray’s”

cell phone numbers. Corporal Bake contacted Cary Police Detective Jim Young, who

was investigating the alleged robbery.       Detective Young identified “Ray-Ray” as

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                                  Opinion of the Court

Defendant and also confirmed his date of birth and his cell phone number.

      Corporal Bake and Detective John Schneider obtained a court order requesting

Defendant’s cell phone records from Verizon from May 2019 until July 2019. The

officers used PenLink, a computer program, to create a derivative record showing

communications between Defendant’s and Riley’s cellular phones. PenLink derived

“over 100 communications . . . between the two phones” within the May to July 2019

time period.

      Riley testified she and her brother used their apartment as a “crack house,”

bringing people over for “drugs and sex,” while their father was away working. Riley

initially met then thirty-two-year-old Defendant at a hotel through her brother. Riley

later encountered Defendant outside near the family’s apartment, while she was

walking her dog during the summer of 2019. After “small talk,” Defendant told Riley

that he was waiting to meet her brother. Riley “offered to let [Defendant] wait in the

house because it was hot outside.”

      Riley and Defendant talked, which “led to [Riley] doing a tarot card reading”

for Defendant. Riley displayed a tarot card, which “had a naked lady on it,” and which

steered the conversation towards the topic of sex.       Riley produced and showed

Defendant her “pleasure toys.” Riley asked Defendant if he wanted to have sex.

Defendant agreed, and the two went into Riley’s brother’s bedroom and allegedly

engaged in multiple acts of fellatio and intercourse.

      Riley allegedly told her brother what had occurred when he arrived home a

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                                  Opinion of the Court

short time later. Neither Riley nor her brother told their father or any other adult

about the allegations until her visit at Duke, because she was “scared.” Defendant

received Riley’s cell phone number from her brother and began to communicate with

her.

       Defendant was indicted for statutory rape of a person fifteen years or younger,

statutory sexual offense with a child fifteen years or younger, and indecent liberties

with a child.

       During pre-trial proceedings on the day trial was scheduled to begin,

Defendant’s attorney stated: “Your honor, the defendant requests that I move to

withdraw, so I move to withdraw.”        Defendant’s attorney stated he had been

representing Defendant for several years in multiple different cases. Defendant’s

attorney asserted this representation had begun cordially, but their relationship had

become difficult after Defendant had “refused to talk to him.” Defendant’s attorney

stated he had received all discovery materials and an offer of a plea agreement from

the State, which he had forwarded to Defendant. Defendant’s attorney stated he was

familiar with the case and was fully prepared to try the case.

       Defendant stated his counsel had not come to see him much and had “yelled”

at him during a visit.     Defendant disagreed with his counsel’s trial strategy,

specifically his counsel’s refusal to challenge the indictment and to file a motion for

discovery. Defendant acknowledged receipt of all materials provided by the State,

including a plea offer and agreement.

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                                     Opinion of the Court

      The trial court denied Defendant’s counsel’s motion to withdraw, trial

proceeded, and a jury convicted Defendant of all three charges. The trial court

consolidated his convictions for statutory rape of a person fifteen years or younger

and statutory sexual offense with a child fifteen years or younger and sentenced

Defendant to an active sentence of 317 to 441 months imprisonment. Defendant was

also sentenced to 21 to 35 months active imprisonment for the indecent liberties with

a child conviction, the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant appeals.

                               II.      Jurisdiction

      Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).

                                     III.   Issues

      Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) admitting phone records, which

were hearsay and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, (2) admitting

hearsay evidence to link him to a phone number; (3) allowing an in-court

identification based on an impermissibly suggestive pretrial procedure; (4) denying

his motion to have his attorney withdraw as counsel; and, (5) denying his motion for

a new attorney.

                         IV.    Confrontation Clause

      Defendant asserts the admission of State’s Exhibit #2 of the Verizon records

showing calls made to and from cell number (984)-328-XXXX from 1 May 2019 to 13

July 2019 and State’s Exhibit #3 showing calls to Defendant’s purported cell number

ending in 1545 and (984)-328-XXXX were inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth

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Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and challenge the

evidence admitted against him.

                               A. Standard of Review

      “A violation of the defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United

States is prejudicial unless [the State proves] . . . it was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Lewis, 361 N.C. 541, 549, 648 S.E.2d 824, 830 (2007) (citing N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2005)). Whether a defendant’s right to confrontation has

been violated is reviewed de novo. State v. Jackson, 216 N.C. App. 238, 241, 717

S.E.2d 35, 38 (2011) (citation omitted).

      “When the State fails to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt, ‘the violation is deemed prejudicial[,] and a new trial is required.’” State v.

Glenn, 220 N.C. App. 23, 25, 725 S.E.2d 58, 61 (2012) (citation omitted).

                                     B. Analysis

                     1. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

      Defendant argues he suffered Constitutional and prejudicial error when the

trial court admitted the hearsay cellular phone data records as direct evidence

without any prior or in-court opportunity for him to confront and cross-examine the

source and assertions. U. S. Const. amend VI.

      The Supreme Court of the United States held: “The Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause provides that, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. We have held

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                                   Opinion of the Court

that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state

prosecutions.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, 187 (2004)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Justice Scalia cited a very early decision from the Court in North Carolina in

support of the original meaning and understanding of the right of confrontation:

             Early state decisions shed light upon the original
             understanding of the common-law right. State v. Webb, 2
             N.C. 103 (1794) (per curiam), decided a mere three years
             after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, held that
             depositions could be read against an accused only if they
             were taken in his presence. Rejecting a broader reading of
             the English authorities, the court held: “[I]t is a rule of the
             common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall
             be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to
             cross examine.” Id., at 104.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 191,

      Justice Scalia also reasoned:

             Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not
             think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s
             protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much
             less to amorphous notions of reliability. . . . Admitting
             statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at
             odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the
             Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence,
             but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.

Id. at 42, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Our Supreme Court more recently held the Sixth Amendment Confrontation

Clause within the Constitution of the United States, and applicable to the states, bars

admission of direct testimonial evidence, “unless the declarant is unavailable to

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testify and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” State

v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 452, 681 S.E.2d 293, 304 (2009).

      Courts employ a three-step inquiry to determine whether a defendant’s right

to confront a witness has been violated: (1) whether the evidence admitted was

testimonial in nature; (2) whether the trial court properly ruled the declarant was

unavailable; and, (3) whether defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the

declarant. See State v. Clark, 165 N.C. App. 279, 283, 598 S.E.2d 213, 217 (2004);

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203.

      The trial court made oral findings to support its ruling to admit State’s Exhibit

#2:

             The court does not find that it is admissible under the
             express terms of Rule 801 - - I’m sorry, 803(6). However,
             the court will accept the document under Rule 803(6) read
             in conjunction with Rule 803(24), the so-called catch-all
             exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, in that the
             document is not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
             exceptions under the rule, but does have equivalent
             circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, in that the
             statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; it is more
             probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
             evidence which the proponent could procure through
             reasonable efforts; and the general purposes of these rules
             and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
             of the statement into evidence.

             The court, moreover, does find, and I believe there is no
             dispute as to this, that the proponent did give written
             notice stating its intention to offer this statement and the
             particulars of it, including the name and address of the
             declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
             offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
             (emphasis supplied).

      The trial court’s findings answered the first and second factors and steps above

in the affirmative and the third factor in the negative and these statements are

testimonial. Clark, 165 N.C. App. at 283, 598 S.E.2d at 217; Crawford, 541 U.S. at

68, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203.

      These findings contravene Crawford’s admonition, “we do not think the

Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules

of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of reliability. . . . Admitting statements

deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.”

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187. Crawford forbids testimonial evidence

not subject to confrontation, and the evidence should have been excluded. Id.

                              2. Rule of Evidence 803(6)

      The trial court erroneously admitted this evidence under a combination of

hearsay rules, “under Rule 803(6) read in conjunction with Rule 803(24).” Hearsay

is a “statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2021) (emphasis supplied).

      The State initially attempted to admit State’s Exhibits #2 and #3 solely as

business records pursuant to Rule 803(6). No official or agent from Verizon appeared

in court to authenticate them, and the cover letter purporting to authenticate the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

records were not sworn, under seal nor notarized, to qualify them as an affidavit, nor

were any of these record subject to prior confrontation by Defendant. Id.

      While Verizon’s hearsay records, which are produced and kept in the ordinary

course of business, may have been qualified a custodian and sought admission as non-

testimonial ordinary course of business records, the State failed to authenticate them

to justify admission under that specific exception. Id.; State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76,

93, 337 S.E.2d 833, 844 (1985). The trial court correctly concluded, “[t]he court does

not find that it is admissible under the express terms of Rule 801 - - I’m sorry, 803(6).”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(6) (2021),

      State’s Exhibit # 3 was also inadmissible as a business record after Detective

Schneider testified the document was expressly made for the purpose of litigation and

not produced or retained in the regular course of Verizon’s business.           Id.   The

documents were compiled, derived, and presented for the upcoming litigation, and

the Exhibits were not compiled nor maintained in the regular course of Verizon’s

business nor presented by a qualified custodian. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 803(6).

      No one was present at trial with knowledge or authority to validate or testify

to and to be subject to cross-examination concerning their maintenance, retention,

compilation, chain of custody, or authenticity. Id. The trial court, after objection,

correctly denied their admission as business records, given as the trial court properly

found, “the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact.” Id.

                        3. Rule of Evidence 803(24) Catch all

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                                   Opinion of the Court

      The trial court then erroneously admitted both the challenged documents and

exhibits over objection “under rule 803(6) read in conjunction with Rule 803(24), the

so-called catch-all exception.”   Rule 803(24) governs the admission of a hearsay

statement, as a “catch all”, which is not covered by another exception, but the

evidence carries sufficient indicia of reliability. The residual or “catch all” exception

to the rule against the admission of hearsay statements is codified by N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 8C-1, Rule 803(24) (2021).

      The residual hearsay exception allows the admission of:

             [a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
             exceptions     but having        equivalent circumstantial
             guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
             (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
             (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
             it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
             can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
             purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
             be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
             However, a statement may not be admitted under this
             exception unless the proponent of it gives written notice
             stating his intention to offer the statement and the
             particulars of it, including the name and address of the
             declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
             offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a
             fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

      In order for hearsay statements to be admissible under Rule 803(24), our

Supreme Court, in a pre-Crawford opinion, held the trial court must also determine

and conjunctively find:

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             (1) whether proper notice has been given, (2) whether the
             hearsay is not specifically covered elsewhere, (3) whether
             the statement is trustworthy, (4) whether the statement is
             material, (5) whether the statement is more probative on
             the issue than any other evidence which the proponent can
             procure through reasonable efforts, and (6) whether the
             interests of justice will be best served by admission.

State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 518, 591 S.E.2d 846, 852 (2003) (citations omitted)

(emphasis supplied). See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187.

      The trial court is also mandated to “make adequate findings of fact and

conclusions of law sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine whether the trial

court [erred] in making its ruling.” State v. Sargeant, 365 N.C. 58, 65, 707 S.E.2d

192, 196 (2011) (citation omitted). “If the trial court either fails to make findings or

makes erroneous findings, we review the record in its entirety to determine whether

that record supports the trial court’s conclusion concerning the admissibility of a

statement under a residual hearsay exception.” Id. (citation omitted).

      As noted, the trial court made findings purporting to support its ruling to admit

State’s Exhibit #2:

             The court does not find that it is admissible under the
             express terms of Rule 801 - - I’m sorry, 803(6). However,
             the court will accept the document under Rule 803(6) read
             in conjunction with Rule 803(24), the so-called catch-all
             exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803, in that the
             document is not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
             exceptions under the rule, but does have equivalent
             circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, in that the
             statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; it is
             more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
             other evidence which the proponent could procure through

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             reasonable efforts; and the general purposes of these rules
             and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
             of the statement into evidence.

                    The court, moreover, does find, and I believe there is
             no dispute as to this, that the proponent did give written
             notice stating its intention to offer this statement and the
             particulars of it, including the name and address of the
             declarant, to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
             offering the statement to provide the adverse party with a
             fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.

      When the State sought to introduce their Exhibit #3 at trial, Defendant

renewed and objected on the same grounds as previously asserted, and the trial court

again overruled Defendant’s objection.

      The primary purpose of the court-ordered production of and preparation of the

data records retained and provided by Verizon was to prepare direct testimonial

evidence for Defendant’s trial. The trial court specifically found “the statement is

offered as evidence of a material fact.” Exhibits #2 and #3 were offered and admitted

for consideration by the jury as substantive and testimonial evidence. Defendant was

not given the prior opportunity or at trial to challenge or cross-examine officials from

Verizon, who had purportedly accumulated this evidence, and their admission as such

violated Defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. U. S. Const. amend VI.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187; State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103, 104

(1794) (per curiam) (“no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the

liberty to cross-examine”).

                                  4. Harmless Error

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                                  Opinion of the Court

       The State recognizes the potential Confrontation error and argues their

erroneous admission was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lewis, 361 N.C. at

549, 648 S.E.2d at 830 (citation omitted). The trial court found the phone records

were direct evidence of the State’s case and submitted them to the jury. Without

these records, and in the absence of other physical or corroborative evidence, the

State’s case relies solely upon Riley’s allegations and testimony.     Without these

records, the jury was left to adjudicate Defendant’s guilt solely upon Riley’s

credibility.

       The State has failed to carry its burden to prove the erroneous admission of

the hearsay phone records in violation of the Confrontation Clause was “harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). The purported cellular phone

contacts between Defendant and Riley after the alleged assaults gave corroboration

and credibility to her testimony. No other physical or direct evidence was admitted

to support the State’s case.

       The State cannot demonstrate, absent the cellular phone data hearsay or

without other physical or direct evidence, the jury would have found Riley’s

allegations as credible to reach its verdicts to meet and carry its burdens to

demonstrate the Constitutional error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

                                V.    Conclusion

       This challenged evidence was testimonial, and the trial court correctly ruled

they did not quality to be admitted as business records. The State failed to carry its

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                                  Opinion of the Court

burden to demonstrate the error in the admission of the admittedly hearsay cell

phone records in State’s Exhibits #2 and #3 was “harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id.

      We reverse the trial court’s rulings on Defendant’s motions, vacate the trial

court’s judgment entered on Defendant’s convictions for statutory rape of a person

fifteen years or younger, statutory sexual offense with a child fifteen years or

younger, and indecent liberties with a child, and remand for a new trial.

      In light of our disposition on these issues, we need not address Defendant’s

remaining arguments. It is so ordered.

      NEW TRIAL.

      Judges COLLINS and WOOD concur.

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