Court Opinion

ID: 9612320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:07:01.700848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:20.386775
License: Public Domain

*135PARKER, C.J.,
dissenting: This was stated in the majority opinion:
“The defendant was indicted for the murder of Granville Wayne Swinney, her husband. Upon arraignment she tendered, and the solicitor, with the approval of the Court, accepted a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of involuntary manslaughter."
Both the State and the defendant offered evidence, defendant testifying in her own behalf.
Before passing judgment upon defendant, the trial judge in open court made extended remarks concluding with this statement: “I’m not going to turn my back on law and order, I don’t ‘intent’ (intend) to.” The defendant voluntarily took the stand. Her purpose was to give the court her version of the case and of related matters so that the court might determine what sentence to impose. The defendant’s testimony was that there were about 20 people, including herself and her husband, at a party at her house, which she described as “a supper party, dancing, drinking,” in a 14x20 living room from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. The defendant testified: “I picked the liquor up myself the first of the week. ... I bought eight pints. ... I went to Charlotte to get the liquor. ... I made preparations for the party, but I was not looking forward to it.” She and her husband drank liquor and danced with their guests. The picture disclosed by defendant’s testimony in this case is not that of a quiet dinner party but of a drunken brawl, the sequel being an assault by the drunken husband upon the hostess and the fatal shooting of the host. Killing a man under those circumstances and the defendant entering a plea of nolo contendere to the crime of involuntary manslaughter is not a slight and trivial matter. I respectfully dissent from this statement in the majority opinion:
“When Judge McLaughlin acted as he said he did under the belief that it would be a dereliction of his duty to the community if he did not punish the defendant severely on account of the party, he exceeded his judicial power and committed error of law. His lengthy cross-examination of the defendant and the, statement in connection with and as a part of the sentencing procedure permitted no other reasonable conclusion or inference but that he was punishing not for involuntary manslaughter but because of the party in the Swinney home.”
In my opinion, the unanimous decision of this Court in S. v. Sullivan, 268 N.C. 571, 151 S.E. 2d 41, is in point and is controlling. In that case the defendant was charged in two indictments, Nos. *1369494 and 9495, with breaking, entering, larceny and receiving. Through his counsel and in his own proper person, he entered a plea of guilty to breaking and entering and larceny in both cases. The State offered testimony showing his guilt as charged. Defendant was a resident of the State of Maryland. Defendant offered no evidence. The trial court consolidated the two cases for judgment and entered a sentence of imprisonment for not less than five nor more than seven years. He appealed to the Supreme Court. The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court is as follows:
“The defendant’s sole exception is that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial before a fair tribunal, in support oí his claim he quotes the presiding judge at the time of sentencing him: 'North Carolina has been made a picking place for criminals from Maryland. They are riding down here regularly from Maryland, robbing people who are trying to make an honest living. I find this true in about every court I hold.’
“This Court does not intend to restrict informal remarks made by a judge at the time of pronouncing judgment, but there is nothing in Judge Burgwyn’s statements to justify the defendant’s exception, even though he be a resident of Maryland.
“The undisputed facts in the cases, plus the defendant’s plea of guilty in both, justified a substantial sentence. The fact that the court imposed only a 5-year sentence when a total of 40 years imprisonment was permissible, refutes his claim that' he was not treated fairly.
“No error.”
I entirely agree with this statement in the Sullivan case: “This Court does not intend to restrict informal remarks made by a judge at the time of pronouncing judgment. . . .” Every judge who has had experience on the trial court in criminal practice knows that often, and properly so, a defendant’s lawyer makes an impassioned plea before a crowded courtroom that the court should grant leniency to his client and impose a sentence of probation or suspend judgment, and the solicitor for the State as a rule does not reply. Quite often the trial judge feels that it is proper for him to give his reasons for not granting the request of defendant’s counsel, and at other times to give his reasons for imposing a severe sentence. In my opinion the trial judge here did not make a happy choice of words in his extended remarks before pronouncing judgment, but I think it can be fairly seen from his language that it was in reply to an impassioned plea for leniency from defendant’s'counsel and to explain his reason why he felt that punishment of imprisonment shotild be imposed.
*137WHat is said by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Spiers v. State, 231 Miss. 307, 94 So. 2d 803, is relevant here: “It may be conceded that the judge’s remarks evince a zeal for the maintenance of law and order. . . . We cannot, however, under the facts of this case, translate this laudable zeal into bias, prejudice and passion against the appellant, or construe it as a prejudgment of the appellant’s case.”
I think the language of the Court in People v. Clemmon, 51 Ill. App. 2d 216, 201 N.E. 2d 11 (1964), is apposite:
“The second question raised is the alleged prejudice of the trial judge. When the case was heard and the defendant found guilty, the judge in a hearing to determine the penalty asked if the defendant had a record. The State disclosed that he had been convicted in Arkansas of Grand larceny in 1950, burglary in 1954, and grand larceny in 1955, and had been discharged in January 1961, a month or so before the robbery in question. At that point the court said: ‘Why didn’t he stay down in Arkansas? The county and state here are paying for his keep. We have enough of our own problems here without getting some of these fellows coming up and staying a month and then getting into trouble.’ This remark made after the defendant was found guilty, affords no basis for the charge of prejudice.”
See United States v. Lattimore, 125 F. Supp. 295.
It is clear to my mind from the statement of the trial judge, that he thought defendant should receive a prison sentence because of her plea of nolo contendere- of involuntary manslaughter, and not be placed on probation or given a suspended sentence, or some lesser form of punishment. The sentence imposed upon defendant’s plea of nolo contendere to the crime of involuntary manslaughter was well within the maximum limits of punishment for that offense. Such being the case, it is not for the Court to say that it was excessive. That is a matter for those vested with the power to exercise clemency. While not approving of the trial judge’s extended remarks before sentencing, I can see no legal reason to disturb the judgment below. I vote to affirm the judgment below.
LAKE and Pless, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.