Court Opinion

ID: 9797353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:53.011215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:31.477755
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
We have not previously analyzed the relationship between rulings that are reviewable only for an abuse of discretion and "the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way." Hampton v. State, 558 P.2d 504, 507 (Wyo.1977). I have pondered for some time the logical cohesiveness of a rule that depends for its invocation on "the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way" and any discretionary ruling of a court. Id. The product of my reflection is that a ruling that is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard is of a different character and quality from a ruling that is subject to de movo review. I am satisfied that when a trial judge can exercise a choice with respect to a ruling, so long as the choice is reasonable, there is not present a "clear and unequivocal rule of law," particularly one that is transgressed "in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way." Id.
I suggest a more appropriate rule for addressing the request for a continuance in this case. The discretionary ruling does not enjoy the status of an unqualified, absolute, conclusive or categorical principle that may be applied without exception, which is how I would define a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The absence of these indicia means that the discretionary ruling fails to qualify as one that manifests transgression "of a clear and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way." Id. The disposition of an issue that is subject to the exercise of discretion always is uncertain, and, by its very nature, is inherently equivocal. It follows that any attack upon a discretionary ruling cannot logically be rested upon a claim of plain error because there is no clear and unequivocal rule of law that can be identified. In my view, any claim of plain error that must rest upon an abuse of discretion should be denied summarily without further analysis. Such a ruling by a trial court inherently is equivocal and its transgression can be presented only in an arguable way.
I would. apply this suggestion to affirm with respect to Clearwater's claim that it was error to refuse to grant a continuance.