Court Opinion

ID: 9854624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:10:20.376207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:11.126736
License: Public Domain

Judge PARKER
dissenting.
Believing as I do that the facts of this case are not distinguishable from Thomas-Yelverton Co. v. Insurance Co., 238 N.C. 278, 77 S.E. 2d 692 (1953), Inman v. Woodmen of the World, 211 N.C. 179, 189 S.E. 496 (1937) and McCrimmon v. N.C. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 69 N.C. App. 683, 317 S.E. 2d 709, disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 84, 322 S.E. 2d 175 (1984), I respectfully dissent.
*293In Thomas-Yelverton, supra, the Court stated:
The rule with respect to the knowledge of an agent being imputable to his principal is well stated ... in the following language: “In the absence of fraud or collusion between the insured and the agent, the knowledge of the agent when acting within the scope of the powers entrusted to him will be imputed to the company, though a direct stipulation to the contrary appears in the policy or the application for the same.” However, it is otherwise when it clearly appears that an insurance agent and the insured participated in a fraud by inserting false answers with respect to material facts in an application for insurance. The knowledge of the agent in such instances will not be imputable to his principal, (citing cases).
In the instant case, when the insured signed the application he knew the agent had written the answers to the questions contained in it; and by signing it in the form submitted, he represented that the answers were true.
Id. at 281-83, 77 S.E. 2d at 694-95.
In her brief, plaintiff cites a number of cases beginning with Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N.C. 589, 53 S.E. 354 (1906) to support the position that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the insurance carrier. However, Fishblate, supra, and Northern Nat’l Life Ins. v. Miller Machine Co., 63 N.C. App. 424, 305 S;E. 2d 568 (1983), aff’d, 311 N.C. 62, 316 S.E. 2d 256 (1984), relied upon by the majority, are distinguishable in that in those cases there is either a question or no showing as to the insured’s knowledge of the contents of the application. There is no evidence that the insured signed the application. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in Thomas-Yelverton, supra, where there was no dispute that insured signed the application after the answers were inserted by the agent, the Court acknowledged Fishblate and its progeny, but rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s argument. Accordingly, in this case I do not agree with plaintiffs oral argument that this Court in McCrimmon, supra, misinterpreted Inman, supra.
In the instant case from the uncontradicted evidence, plaintiff would have been uninsurable and rejected for insurance had *294the questions been answered truthfully. The rule is, and plaintiff does not dispute, that misrepresentations as to questions affecting insurability are material as a matter of law. Tolbert v. Insurance Co., 236 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 2d 915 (1952).
The sole purpose of the application is to obtain accurate information for underwriting purposes. Without the false statement inserted by the agent, the uninsurable applicant would not have received a policy. Plaintiff has made no showing that her husband was prevented or prohibited from reading the application before he signed. When Mr. Ward signed the application, he adopted the statements and represented that they were true. If Mr. Ward had corrected the false statements, he would not have obtained the insurance; by signing, he benefited from the agent’s action. Defendant has tendered the return of the premiums with interest thereon, and in my view owes nothing more.
Furthermore, even under the majority’s theory of the case, I do not think the evidence is sufficient to raise an inference that insured was induced not to give a truthful application by statements of the agent. According to plaintiffs affidavit, the agent told plaintiff and her husband that because Mr. Ward’s conviction and treatment for high blood pressure had occurred more than two years before the date of the application, “this was all right and would not prevent [Mr. Ward] from obtaining insurance with [defendant].” Although this statement may have led plaintiff and her husband to believe that the omitted information was not especially important, the agent did not expressly state that they were not required to report it. Plaintiff did not aver that the agent told them that the questions only required information from the past two years, nor did she aver that the agent advised or suggested that her husband not include the omitted information in the application.
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to affirm.