Court Opinion

ID: 9764081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:09:23.993407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:53.205057
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DALLY, Chief Judge.
The State in its motion for rehearing correctly points out that the error for which the judgment was reversed was not a ground of error urged by the appellant in his brief on appeal filed in the trial court. Art. 40.09, V.A.C.C.P. Art. 40.09, Sec. 13, V.A.C.C.P., provides that the Court of Criminal Appeals shall review “. all grounds of error and arguments in support thereof urged in defendant’s brief in the trial court ... as well as any unassigned error which in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals should be reviewed in the interest of justice.”
The State asserts in this instance the error, if any, is concerned only with a ruling on the admissibility of evidence and it is not such an error as should be reviewed in the interest of justice as unassigned error.
We quote from the record the matter on which the panel based its reversal:
“Q. Do you have the receipt?
“A. Yes, sir, I do.
“Q. May I see it?
“A. (Witness hands paper to counsel.)
“MR. FLORES: May we have this marked as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1, your Honor? (Court Reporter marks receipt as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for identification).
“Q. Who gave you this receipt?
“A. My roommate, Ruben.
“Q. Where did he get it from?
“A. Mr. Adrian Sanchez.
“Q. You are sure that is the receipt you got?
“A. Yes, sir, I am positive.
“Q. And you agreed to pay five hundred dollars, for this furniture?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And you were going to pay one hundred dollars a month-?
“MR. BORCHERS: Objection to his testifying or to obtaining testimony from an exhibit that has not been admitted in evidence.
“MR. FLORES: At this time, I will introduce the Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 into evidence.
“THE COURT: You are offering it?
“MR. FLORES: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Are there any objections?
“MR. BORCHERS: At this time the State would object; Ruben Sa*96lazar is a witness available to the defendant to verify the authenticity of that very exhibit.
“THE COURT: The objection will be sustained.”
The appellant’s former roommate, Ruben Salazar testified when shown the exhibit marked as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for Identification that he had never before seen that exhibit. The purported receipt (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 for Identification) was never again offered in evidence even for the purposes of a bill of exception. See Art. 40.09, Sec. 6(d). Since the exhibit that the court refused to admit was not offered for a bill of exception and brought to us in the record nothing was preserved for review. Mutscher v. State, 514 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Toler v. State, 546 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Deary v. State, 510 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). We were in error on original submission in reviewing this matter in the interest of justice when the error, if any, was not even preserved in the trial court.
We now turn to consideration of the grounds of error raised in appellant’s brief. Appellant, in five grounds of error, claims that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use a prior “conviction” for impeachment during the cross-examination of appellant and further argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. On the impeachment issue, the relevant portion of the cross-examination was as follows:
“Q. Have you ever been convicted of a felony before, Mr. Van Sickle?
“MR. FLORES: Your Honor, objection. May we approach the Bench?
“THE COURT: Yes, you may approach the Bench.
(CONFERENCE at the Bench outside the hearing of the jury, between all counsel and the Court:)
“MR. FLORES: I would like to have a hearing on this outside the presence of the jury. We have talked to the Judge in Oklahoma and he told us it was a deferred judgment and that the record has been expunged.
“MR. BORCHERS: Unless it is a conviction for purposes of probation—
“THE COURT: He is on the stand, and for the purpose of impeachment-here is a case; it is Simmons vs. State. Do you want to read it?
“MR. BORCHERS: I would like to look at it.
“MR. FLORES: No, sir, that’s fine.
“MR. BORCHERS: May I proceed?
“THE COURT: You may proceed, counsel.
(WITHIN the hearing of the jury, to-wit:)
(Cross examination continued by Mr. Borchers:)
“Q. Mr. Van Sickle, did you ever live in Oklahoma?
“A. No, sir, I didn’t.
“Q. You never did?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Were you ever convicted of a felony?
“A. Sir, I don’t know how to answer that, as far as-
“Q. You’ve had a lot of difficulty answering my questions, Mr. Van Sickle, but go ahead and give it a try.
“A. As far as I know, I haven’t.
“Q. Try and explain that to me, because I have some information that clearly indicates otherwise. Why is that a problem?
“A. Well, sir, I got in trouble one time, and-
“Q. Let’s get specific, Mr. Van Sickle. In January of 1975?
“A. No, sir, it was sometime in 1973.
“Q. Okay. You are sworn under oath. Go ahead Mr. Van Sickle.
“A. And-(hesitation.)
*97“Q. It was for grand larceny, was it not?
“A. Yes. It was 1973 and 1974. I am not really sure. As far as I knew there was never a trial, a hearing, or anything.
“Q. But you were convicted on a plea of guilty and placed on probation on January 23, 1975?
“A. No, sir, there was never any probation.
“Q. Your lawyer has just informed me that he talked to the Judge and you were placed on probation, a deferred type of judgment.
“A. Sir, I don’t know what probation is, but I suppose my attorney should know.
“Q. I would think that he would be correct over you, is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir, he would.”
As rebuttal evidence, the prosecutor subsequently introduced an F.B.I. “rap sheet” which stated that appellant had been convicted of grand larceny in Guymon, Oklahoma in January, 1975. The evidence was admitted without any objection by defense counsel. After the jury found appellant guilty, the prosecutor again cross-examined appellant during the punishment phase about his plea of guilty to grand larceny in Oklahoma without any objection from defense counsel. Prior to trial, appellant was told by the prosecutor that he would be prosecuted for perjury if he did not tell the truth about the Oklahoma plea.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant for the first time introduced an authenticated copy of the relevant court order from Oklahoma. The order stated that appellant pleaded guilty to grand larceny in January, 1975, and the judgment was deferred pending the outcome of probation, that appellant had completed his probation, and that in August, 1976, the case was discharged without judgment of guilt and with the plea being expunged from the record. It is undisputed that the Oklahoma charges did not amount to a final conviction under Art. 38.29, V.A.C.C.P., and that the prosecutor should not have used these charges to impeach appellant.
The issue, however, is whether appellant properly objected to the admission of this evidence at the time of trial. The defendant must specifically object to the wrongful introduction of a prior conviction to preserve the error for review. McClinton v. State, 338 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.Cr.App.1960). No such objection was made in this record. Appellant requested that the court consider the matter outside the presence of a jury. This was not a specific objection to the introduction of the evidence and appellant did not secure a ruling even on this request. There was also no objection to this evidence when it was again introduced both in the guilt and punishment stages of the trial. Finally, no effort was made to present documentary evidence at the time of trial to show that the plea of guilty was expunged and did not result in a final conviction. Introduction of this documentary proof was necessary to obtain exclusion of the evidence. Poore v. State, 524 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The error was not preserved for appellate review.
Appellant makes two further arguments. Initially, he claims that this court should review the error because the prosecutor had prior knowledge that the conviction was not valid and thus acted in bad faith. The evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed that the prosecutor obtained his knowledge of the conviction from the F.B.I. “rap sheet” admitted into evidence during the trial, which made no mention of the 1976 dismissal of the Oklahoma charges. Defense counsel and appellant repeatedly told the prosecutor that the judgment was never entered and that the plea had been expunged, but they never substantiated their assertions with documentary proof.
A prosecutor cannot inquire in good faith about a prior conviction if he knows that conviction is not final. Goad v. State, 464 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); see also Cohron v. State, 413 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). However, the prosecutor must have actual knowledge that the conviction is not final in order to support a *98finding of bad faith. See Smith v. State, 409 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). Nor is the prosecutor obligated to inquire into whether the conviction was final. Id. In this case, defense counsel told the prosecutor that the conviction was invalid. Nevertheless, in the absence of documentary proof, the prosecutor was free to disbelieve these statements. In Poore v. State, supra, the court held that such documentary proof was necessary before a trial court must exclude evidence of a witness’ prior conviction, since the interested party’s own statements were not enough.
“. . . any witness being impeached by prior convictions could simply claim that such convictions had been reversed, suspended, probated, appealed, etc. and were therefore unavailable for impeachment, despite the inherent unreliability of such self-serving declarations. Such testimony is exculpatory and self-serving and it is more likely that such testimony would be given falsely. Hence, the rationale for the rule we adopt today: that documentary evidence is required to deny the finality of a conviction introduced for impeachment purposes.”
524 S.W.2d 296-97. The prosecutor testified that he did not believe appellant’s claims that his conviction was invalid. The circumstances in this case are insufficient to show that the trial court abused its discretion in believing this testimony.
Second, appellant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel on appeal contends that appellant’s retained trial counsel breached a legal duty to appellant by failing to obtain a copy of the Oklahoma court order of dismissal and expungement in time for use at trial, and by failing to object to the admission of the P.B.I. “rap sheet” into evidence. There was no apparent tactical justification for these actions. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that he made no effort to obtain a copy of the Oklahoma court order because he had been retained to handle the case only two weeks before trial and because he did not think the prosecutor would use the prior conviction with only the “rap sheet” to substantiate it.
The sufficiency of an attorney’s assistance must be gauged by the totality of the representation of the accused and an isolated failure to object to improper evidence does not affirmatively demonstrate the counsel’s overall ineffectiveness. Ewing v. State, 549 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Ineffective assistance sufficient to deny a fair trial has been found where counsel failed to object to introduction of a series of prejudicial and inadmissible extraneous offenses. Cude v. State, 588 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Ruth v. State, 522 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). However, where the errors are less flagrant the failure to object is generally not enough to show deprivation of the constitutional right. Ewing v. State, supra; Williams v. State, 535 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Long v. State, 502 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). “We interpret counsel to mean not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance.” MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877, 82 S.Ct. 121, 7 L.Ed.2d 78 (1961).
There is no set standard for deciding whether the facts of this particular case demonstrate ineffective assistance. In other facets of the trial, trial counsel adequately represented appellant. We find, based on the totality of circumstances, that the failure to timely obtain documentary evidence of the dismissal and expungement of the Oklahoma charge along with the consequent failure to properly object to admission of these matters at trial are not alone sufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant was convicted for the theft of furniture from the teacher’s lounge of the high school which employed him as an assistant football coach. The stolen furniture was found in appellant’s apartment. School officials gave evidence showing that *99appellant had had the opportunity to accomplish the theft. Appellant’s defense was that he purchased the furniture through an arrangement set up by his roommate. The roommate testified that this was false and that he had, on occasion, even asked appellant where the furniture had come from. Although the evidence is circumstantial, it is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted; the judgment is affirmed.