Court Opinion

ID: 9833748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:59:36.772485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.416929
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
At a former date, we reversed and rendered this cause in favor of the appellant on the ground that the undisputed testimony showed that the appellant had purchased the mechanic’s lien note in good faith, believing that the improvements had been completed according to.the terms of the contract. On motion for rehearing, and a more careful examination of the 'record, we find that we were in error. It is undisputed that the improvements called for in the mechanic’s lien contract were never completed according to the terms of the contract. The appellant alleged that the appellees had represented that the improvements had been completed according to the'terms of the contract and that appellant had purchased said note and lien believing that said representations were true. The burden was on the appellant to prove this defense. The only evidence offered by the appellant on this issue was that of its agents and employees. They were interested witnesses and their credibility and the weight of their evidence was for the jury to determine. In H. E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Runnels, 92 Tex. 307, 47 S. W. 971, at page 972, the court said:
“It is the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and they may disregard the testimony of a witness who has neither been impeached nor contradicted, if they believe his statements to be untrue from his manner of testifying, prejudice exhibited towards the opposite party, or his interest in the result of the litigation, or other things indicating that the evidence is not reliable.” Pope v. Beauchamp, 110 Tex. 271, 219 S. W. 447; Moore v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S. W. 322; Crosby v. First Presbyterian Church, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 111, 99 S. W. 584; Burleson v. Tinnin (Tex. Civ. App.) 100 S. W. 350.
The witness Washington testified that Bee Boekwood, ,the agent of appellant, visited the premises from time to time and that the witness, at about the time the loan papers were signed, probably told Boekwood that the improvements had not been fully completed. These statements were denied by Boekwood. Under the state of the record, the appellees were entitled to have submitted to the jury the question of whether or not the appellant took up the note and lien from Trautschold in good faith, believing that the improvements had been fully completed, it therefore becomes necessary to reverse and remand the case for a new trial.
In view of another trial, we deem it proper to discuss other assignments of error presented by appellant. The appellant complains of the refusal of the trial court to admit the testimony of the witness Washington to prove the amount necessary to complete the improvements according to the contract. The mechanic’s lien contract provided:
“It is further agreed that a failure to complete said improvements or a failure to complete the same according to contract shall not defeat said indebtedness and lien, but in such case the indebtedness and lien upon said premises and improvements shall exist in favor of said party of the second part (meaning Trautschold), his heirs and assigns, for said contract price, less such an amount as would be reasonably necessary to complete said improvements according to the plans and specifications.”
If the appellant purchased the note and lien on the representations of the appellees that the improvements had been completed according to the contract and if appellant ac*323tually believed and relied on such representations and did not know that the improvements had not been so completed, then the amount necessary to complete the improvements would be immaterial; but if appellant did not so purchase said note and lien, then the appellees, in view of the above stipulation in the mechanic’s lien contract, would not be entitled to defeat the entire lien, but would be entitled to a credit on the note for the amount necessary to complete the improvements according to the terms of the conract. Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. v. Long (Tex. Civ. App.) 5 S.W.(2d) 162 (writ refused). The evidence of the witness Washington, if offered on another trial, should be admitted.
The appellees sought to recover from appellant damages for the loss of the use of the premises on account of the failure to complete the improvements according to the terms of the mechanic’s lien contract. The appellant, by the purchase of the note and lien, did not assume the obligation to construct the improvements, and therefore the appellant would not be liable in damages for failure to so construct such improvements. Gollnick v. Fry (Tex. Com. App.) 23 S.W.(2d) 677, at page 681; Galbraith-Foxworth Lumber Co. v. Long (Tex. Civ. App.) 5 S.W.(2d) 162, supra; Lancaster v. Whaley Lumber Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 18 S.W.(2d) 796.
The appellees made various allegations to the effect that at the time they signed the loan papers they did not know that the contract provided for the purchase of stock in the appellants’ association, nor that the contract provided for certain penalties and the manner of the application of the payments to be made thereunder, and further alleged that they did not know the contents of the affidavits signed by them. They offered evidence to support these allegations. The appellant directed special exceptions to appel-lees’ pleading on the ground that the appel-lees did not allege that they were in any wise overreached nor that they were prevented from reading said papers, nor that any fraud was perpetrated which induced them to execute the instruments without knowing the contents thereof. Without discussing these exceptions in detail, it is sufficient to state that in the absence of allegations that the appellees were in some way prevented from reading the instruments, or from knowing the contents thereof through the fraud, misrepresentations or overreaching of the appellant, or its agents, the court should have sustained said exceptions, and excluded the evidence. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Peck (Tex. Civ. App.) 296 S. W. 338; Petterson v. Yellow Cab Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 298 S. W. 918; Keystone Pipe & Sup. Co. v. Kleeden (Tex. Civ. App.) 299 S. W. 671.
The motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment heretofore entered is set aside, and the judgment of the trial' .court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.