Court Opinion

ID: 9929134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 20:00:53.984523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:28.619581
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11043    Document: 23-1      Date Filed: 02/01/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11043
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DEMETRIUS RENDER,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00058-TES-CHW-1
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                23-11043

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Demetrius Render was sentenced to 36 months in prison
        after pleading guilty to the unlawful use of a communication
        facility to facilitate the commission of a felony. In this appeal,
        Render argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
        because it exceeded the six-to-twelve-month sentence
        recommended by the guidelines. Because the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in varying upward as it did, Render’s sentence
        is not unreasonable, and we affirm.
                                  I.    Background
                  A. The Arrest
               According to the stipulated facts in the plea agreement, a
        police officer pulled Render over for speeding in 2020.
        Approaching the car, the officer could smell marijuana. The officer
        asked to see Render’s identification. “While apparently searching
        for his identification card, Render started to produce wads of cash
        from the pocket of his door” and “his pocket, and shove it at his
        female passenger,” Randi Johnson, who “stuffed it in a backpack on
        the passenger floorboard.”
               The officer told Render to step out of the car multiple times.
        When Render finally did, the officer informed him that he would
        be detained for failing to produce identification and because the car
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        23-11043                Opinion of the Court                            3

        smelled like marijuana. Render gave the officer a false name, age,
        and driver’s license state.
                The police later searched Render’s car. They found several
        drugs and drug paraphernalia, including: a bag of marijuana, a box
        of sandwich bags, a Xanax pill, a pill bottle containing nine Percocet
        pills, and a digital scale. They also found a loaded gun and $1,235
        in cash, “at least part of which belonged to Render.” 1
               At the Byron Police Department, a fingerprint test
        confirmed Render’s identity and revealed that he was a felon with
        a suspended driver’s license. He was arrested for possession of a
        firearm by a convicted felon; possession of a firearm during certain
        crimes; possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance;
        illegal possession of a controlled substance; and giving false
        information to a law enforcement officer.
                     B. The Charges
                Render was initially charged with one count of possession of
        a firearm by a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
        He pleaded not guilty. While he was out on bond, Render tested
        positive for marijuana and methamphetamine.
              The government later charged Render with one count of an
        unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate the
        commission of a felony, 28 U.S.C. § 846, namely, “conspiracy to
        possess with intent to distribute and to distribute controlled

        1 The police found two other firearms in the car, but Johnson claimed they

        were hers.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     23-11043

        substances, [28 U.S.C. §§ 813, 841 (a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C),] all in
        violation” of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
                Render agreed to plead guilty to the communications charge
        in exchange for dismissing the felon-in-possession indictment. As
        part of the stipulations in the plea agreement, Render admitted
        “that . . . he was engaged in a conspiracy . . . to distribute controlled
        substances” and that “he . . . knowingly and intentionally use[d] a
        communications device . . . to facilitate the commission of” the
        conspiracy. The agreement noted that Render faced a maximum
        sentence of four years in prison.2
                   C. The PSI
              The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) concluded
        Render’s offense level was six. Render scored a criminal history
        category IV. The guidelines range was six to twelve months’
        imprisonment, with a statutory maximum penalty of forty-eight
        months. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(d)(1).
               The PSI noted several factors that might warrant an upward
        departure or variance from the guidelines. First, “[t]he guideline
        range account[ed] for [Render’s] possession of dangerous weapons
        (firearms) during the offense,” but did not consider “the number of
        firearms possessed” because “only one firearm is required to trigger
        the preceding enhancement.” Second, Render faced significantly
        less time because the plea bargain secured the dismissal of the

        2 The plea agreement also contained a sentence appeal waiver, but it permitted

        Render to appeal a sentence in excess of the advisory guidelines range.
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        23-11043                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        felon-in-possession charge. Third, Render possessed a firearm “in
        connection with another felony[.]” And fourth, Render had “prior
        convictions for a controlled substance offense and crime of
        violence.” 3 In sum, the probation office indicated that, “[d]espite
        numerous probation and diversion options afforded to him,
        Render ha[d] repeatedly shown ineffective management of his
        behavior.”
               Render submitted no objections to the PSI.
                   D. Sentencing
              Prior to sentencing, Render submitted character references
        and a brief sentencing memorandum, asking for a sentence that

        3 The PSI recounted several such state convictions:

           •   a 2011 conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute;
           •   a 2016 simple battery conviction for which he received 12 months’
               probation;
           •   a 2017 conviction for possession of less than an ounce of marijuana for
               which he paid a fine;
           •   a 2020 conviction for simple battery (family violence) for which he
               received 12 months’ probation;
           •   a 2012 conviction for aggravated assault, for which Render was
               sentenced to ten years in prison, four to serve, and the remainder on
               probation, which was revoked four times.
        And, though it was not a drug or violent crime, the PSI also noted a 2019 con-
        viction for possession of a firearm as a felon, for which Render served 24 days
        confinement.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11043

        was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” under the
        sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among other things, the
        letters explained that Render cared for his sick mother before she
        died, that he had stable employment at Walgreens, and that he had
        successfully obtained his G.E.D.
               At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the
        probation office had correctly calculated the guideline range, and
        confirmed that there were no objections, so the district court
        adopted the PSI’s findings. The government asked the district
        court to “consider an upward departure and upward variance” of
        24 months’ imprisonment based on the offense conduct (notably
        including the possession of drugs and a firearm), Render’s
        “significant” criminal history, a positive test for methamphetamine
        while on pretrial release, and the fact that Render “is prone to the
        unlawful carrying of firearms . . . [as] a felon.” Render, in turn, told
        the court that he had “changed drastically” and had been working,
        going to school, and providing for his children. He also insisted
        that much of his criminal history occurred when he was young. So
        Render proposed an “alternative sentence” of community
        confinement, home detention, or intermittent confinement.
               The district court saw things differently. “[W]hat I hear you
        saying is you want another chance,” the court told Render. But
        “[y]ou’ve had a bunch of chances” and “you’ve wasted them . . .
        that’s the only honest answer that there is.” “This is the second
        time you’ve been caught with guns.” “[Y]ou are not getting it . . . .
        The system has bent over backwards for you. You rarely get any
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        23-11043                Opinion of the Court                            7

        punishment.” Finally, the district court told Render that it was
        “shocked” that Render’s lawyer managed to secure a plea
        agreement for just the use of a communications facility, since the
        gun charge “would have been 100 to 120 months . . . minimum.”
        “Everybody in your situation gets 8 or 9 years. Everybody . . . . You
        have gotten such a break.”
               So the district court announced that it would vary upward
        from the guidelines. The court explained that it had “considered
        the advisory sentencing range and the sentencing factors found at
        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” and, based on “an individualized assessment
        of the facts presented,” found that “the advisory guideline range
        [was] insufficient[.]” Six to twelve months was “insufficient to
        achieve the sentencing factors of adequately reflecting [Render’s]
        history and characteristics, promoting respect for the law, affording
        adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protecting the public
        from further crimes that [he] may commit[.]” The district court
        then sentenced Render to 36 months’ imprisonment, followed by
        a year of supervised release. Render appealed.
                               II.    Standard of Review
               We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
        only for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
        (2007). A district court abuses its sentencing discretion if it “(1) fails
        to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
        weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
        factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
        proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11043

        2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The defendant bears the
        burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the
        record, the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and “the
        substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
               We will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if we are left
        with the ‘definite and firm’ conviction that the district court
        committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
        factors by arriving at a sentence that is outside the range of
        reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States
        v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Irey, 612
        F.3d at 1190). Thus, “there will be occasions in which we affirm
        the district court even though we would have gone the other way
        had it been our call.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189.
                                   III.   Discussion
              Render argues that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable because (1) the district court based its decision to
        vary upward on factors already considered in his guidelines range,
        and (2) the district court gave especially great weight to the
        criminal history factor. We reject both arguments.
               “A district court has considerable discretion in deciding
        whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the extent of
        one that is appropriate.” United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262,
        1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). The “overarching”
        instruction to sentencing courts in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is that any
        sentence, within the guideline range or not, must be sufficient but
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        23-11043                Opinion of the Court                          9

        not greater than necessary to comply with the goals of sentencing
        listed in § 3553(a)(2). Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101
        (2007) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (stating
        that whether a sentence falls inside or outside the guideline range,
        the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors).
                The relevant factors under § 3553(a) include, for example,
        “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” the personal
        “history and characteristics of the defendant,” “the seriousness of
        the offense,” and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
        promote respect for the law,” provide “just punishment,” and
        afford “adequate deterrence[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The
        district court does not have to give all the factors equal weight, and
        the court has discretion to attach great weight to one factor over
        another. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. “[N]or must it discuss
        each [§ 3553(a)] factor and the role that it played in sentencing.”
        United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). And
        the mere fact that the court does not discuss mitigating evidence
        does not indicate “that the court erroneously ignored or failed to
        consider this evidence[.]” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833
        (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted).
               The court must also consider the applicable guidelines
        range, any pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing
        Commission, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
        disparities, as well as the ability to provide restitution to any of the
        defendant’s victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3)–(7). “We do not
        presume that a sentence outside the guideline range is
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       23-11043

        unreasonable,” and we “must give due deference to the district
        court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify the
        extent of the variance.” Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222.
                We see nothing unreasonable about Render’s sentence. The
        district court considered the § 3553(a) factors. It announced that
        the guidelines range was “insufficient to achieve the sentencing
        factors of adequately reflecting [Render’s] history and
        characteristics, promoting respect for the law, affording adequate
        deterrence to criminal conduct, and protecting the public from
        further crimes that [he] may commit[.]” It explained that Render
        had a long criminal history and had not (in the district court’s view)
        reformed his behavior. See United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349,
        1355 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The court may . . . impose an upward
        variance if it concludes that the Guidelines range was insufficient
        in light of a defendant’s criminal history.”). And it added that
        Render got a significant benefit from plea bargaining down from
        more serious charges. These conclusions are supported by the
        record.
               Render makes (essentially) two counterarguments, and we
        reject them both.4 First, he contends that the district court

        4 Render also briefly analyzes how his arguments would fare under the plain-

        error standard. But because Render proposed that a shorter sentence would
        be sufficient, he preserved the substantive reasonableness issue for our review.
        See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 767 (2020) (“A defendant
        who, by advocating for a particular sentence, communicates to the trial judge
        his view that a longer sentence is ‘greater than necessary’ has thereby
        informed the court of the legal error at issue in an appellate challenge to the
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        23-11043                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        wrongfully based its decision to vary upward on factors already
        considered in his guidelines range. But “we have held that the
        district court may vary upward based on conduct that was already
        considered in calculating the guideline range.” Oudomsine, 57 F.4th
        at 1268 (quotation and brackets omitted). Second, Render seems
        to suggest that the district court gave too much weight to the
        criminal history factor. But the weight given to the § 3553(a)
        factors is “committed to the sound discretion of the district
        court[.]” United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007)
        (quotation omitted). The district court “is permitted to attach
        great weight to one factor over others[.]” United States v. Overstreet,
        713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). We “will
        not second guess the weight given to a § 3553(a) factor so long
        as”—as we have already explained is true here—“the sentence is
        reasonable under the circumstances.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.
               Thus, because we find nothing unreasonable in the sentence
        the district court chose, and Render’s arguments are answered by
        well-settled principles, we conclude that Render’s sentence is not
        substantively unreasonable.

        substantive reasonableness of the sentence. He need not also refer to the
        standard of review.”)
        To the extent that Render argues that “[t]he district court . . . failed to take
        into consideration the steps to rehabilitation that Mr. Render had taken” under
        either standard of review, we reject that argument. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at
        833 (failing to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate “that the court
        erroneously ignored or failed to consider this evidence” (quotations omitted)).
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        12                   Opinion of the Court                23-11043

                                IV.    Conclusion
              We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
              AFFIRMED.