Court Opinion

ID: 9579612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:44.945082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:37.803589
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result of the opinion of Mr. Justice Bussey. I would not, however, rule that Mae B. Jeanes and Jesse M. Swygert are now husband and wife by reason of a common law marriage. I am basically in accord with the apparent reasoning of the lower court, which refused to make such a finding. Such a ruling is not necessary to the determination of the issues before the court.
Common law marriages are not recognized at all in many States. Such came into being in order to legitimatize inno*169cent children and adjust property rights between the parties who treated each other the same as husband and wife. Seldom, if ever, should a common law marriage be declared to aid one who is no longer a member of the family, as in this case.
It has not been determined by any court that Swygert is not married to Elsie as testified to by him. If such a marriage took place, then any attempt by Swygert to marry, with the aid of a marriage license or by way of a common law marriage, would be void, and accordingly, the opinion of this court marrying them would be correspondingly void.
The majority opinion holds that Mae B. Jeanes is a common law wife; it necessarily follows that Jesse Swygert is a common law husband, even though he is not a party to this action.
Both Mrs. Jeanes and Mr. Swygert denied under oath that they are married, and specifically dispute that they have intention to enter into that arrangement.
In order to affirm Judge Mason’s order it is not necessary for this court to hold that misconduct on the part of a divorced wife entitles a husband to stop payments of alimony. After it was determined by the lower court that a divorce should be granted, it became the duty of the judge to adjust the property rights and settle all disputes relative thereto. The fact that the parties agreed and made a recommendation to the judge which terminated in a decree did not divest the order of its judicial nature. The judge could have accepted the agreement or rejected it or modified it.
We have held in Porter v. J. H. Hydrick Realty Co., 134 S. C. 34, 131 S. E. 768 (1926), that a consent decree may be enforced by contempt proceedings. The agreement, once it became a decree, came to have all the characteristics of a judicial decree conceived in the mind of the judge without consent of the parties.
I would hold that the decree was subject to the provisions of Section 20-116, which is a part of the divorce law of this *170State. That section provides that the judge may change the terms of an alimony decree and may terminate alimony when the circumstances of the parties change. It was obviously within the contemplation of the parties and of the judge that support money be given to Mrs. Jeanes until support became available, which would normally be upon her remarriage. She is not technically married, but her relationship with Mr. Swygert is tantamount to marriage and the relationship has continued over more than two years. She has entered into a sphere of living which involves a change of circumstances as contemplated by the legislative act.