Court Opinion

ID: 9369324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:05:21.960635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.197783
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 21-1594
                             Filed February 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DAGGER LE ERDMAN,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Daniel P.

Kitchen (waiver order), District Associate Judge, and Myron L. Gookin (trial and

sentencing), Judge.

      Dagger Erdman appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.

      Denise M. Gonyea of McKelvie Law Office, Grinnell, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                          2

DOYLE, Senior Judge.

       Dagger Erdman appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse for

touching the vagina of a nine-year-old child. Because Erdman was seventeen

years old when the act took place, the State first petitioned the juvenile court to

adjudicate Erdman delinquent. After the juvenile court waived jurisdiction to allow

the State to prosecute Erdman as an adult, he was tried in district court and a jury

found him guilty. On appeal, Erdman challenges both the waiver ruling and the

evidence of his guilt.

       I. Waiver of Jurisdiction.

       Erdman first challenges the juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction.        We

generally review juvenile proceedings de novo. State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440,

447 (Iowa 2005). Because Iowa Code section 232.45 (2019) vests the juvenile

court with discretion in deciding whether to waive jurisdiction of a juvenile offender,

we reverse only if the juvenile court abused its discretion. See id.

       The juvenile court can waive jurisdiction over a juvenile charged with

committing a delinquent act to allow prosecution as an adult when three

requirements are met:

               a. The child is fourteen years of age or older.
               b. The court determines, or has previously determined in a
       detention hearing under section 232.44, that there is probable cause
       to believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would
       constitute the public offense.
               c. The court determines that the state has established that
       there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the
       juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is
       adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver of
       the court’s jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of
       the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and the
       community.
                                          3

Iowa Code § 232.45(6). In determining whether the third element exists, the court

must consider:

              a. The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the
       circumstances under which it was committed.
              b. The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with
       juvenile authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat
       and rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.
              c. The programs, facilities and personnel available to the
       juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the
       programs, facilities and personnel which would be available to the
       court that would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court
       waives its jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.

Id. § 232.45(8). The court may consider other relevant factors. See id. (stating

that “the factors which the court shall consider include but are not limited to” those

outlined set out in paragraphs (a) through (c)); Tesch, 704 N.W.2d at 447 (noting

the factors in section 232.45(8) are “nonexhaustive”).

       In the ruling waiving jurisdiction, the juvenile court restated the requirements

of section 232.45. It found that Erdman met those requirements because he was

over fourteen, there was probable cause to believe he committed a delinquent act

that would constitute a public offense, and there were no reasonable prospects for

his rehabilitation if he remained in its jurisdiction.     In determining Erdman’s

prospects for rehabilitation, the court rejected Erdman’s claim that he could be

rehabilitated at the state training school if he began there before he turned

eighteen, finding the state training school was not an option for him. It also found

that even if Erdman were adjudicated delinquent, evaluated for a sex offender

program, and admitted into a program before he turned eighteen, there was “no

reasonable prospect of rehabilitation prior to the court losing jurisdiction and the

ability to enforce treatment.”
                                          4

       Erdman argues the juvenile court abused its discretion because it waived

jurisdiction without considering all the factors outlined in section 232.45(8). He

notes its ruling never discusses the nature and extent of his prior contacts with

juvenile authorities and engaged in “virtually no discussion” of the programs

available if jurisdiction were waived. He also complains there is no discussion

about the community’s best interests.

       The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction

over Erdman to allow him to be tried as an adult. The evidence presented at the

waiver hearing addressed the factors set out in section 232.45(8). The chief

concern was whether Erdman could be rehabilitated in the six months before he

turned eighteen, and the bulk of the hearing focused on that. A juvenile court

officer testified that more than six months of rehabilitation was needed because of

the seriousness of Erdman’s offense. But Erdman did not meet the placement

criteria for the state training school,1 which the officer testified was the only

available facility that would keep Erdman after he turned eighteen. Although

Erdman claimed other programs were available, he failed to present evidence of

any. The record supports a finding that Erdman could not be rehabilitated under

juvenile court jurisdiction, an appropriate basis for waiving jurisdiction. See State

1 Iowa Code section 232.52(2)(e) requires that three of four requirements be met
before transferring custody of a child to the state training school. Although
Erdman’s age and the act he was accused of committing satisfy the first two, see
Iowa Code § 232.52(2)(e)(1), (2), Erdman had no prior delinquencies as required
to meet either the third or fourth, see id. § 232.52(2)(e)(3), (4). See also In re
C.G.B., 643 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (“Cassie was not previously
found to have committed the delinquent act . . . . Absent this finding, the State
cannot prove three of the four conditions under section 232.52(2)(e) exist, and
Cassie’s placement at the state training school must fail.”).
                                           5

v. Bickell, 493 N.W.2d 100, 103 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding no abuse of

discretion in juvenile court’s waiver of jurisdiction where it “considered the

rehabilitation opportunities provided by both systems and concluded rehabilitation

could not occur under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court”). Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.

       II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

       We then turn to Erdman’s claim that insufficient evidence supports his

conviction. We review this claim for correction of errors at law. See State v. Lacey,

968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). “Under this standard, the court is highly

deferential to the jury’s verdict. We will affirm the jury’s verdict when the verdict is

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is substantial if it may convince

a rational person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In making

this determination, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can

be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State. Id. The question is

whether the evidence supports the finding the jury made, not whether it would

support a different finding. Id.

       Erdman argues the evidence fails to show he committed second-degree

sexual abuse, claiming that “the only evidence against [him] was the testimony of

[the child].” The child testified at Erdman’s trial about a visit to Erdman’s house

when she was nine. The child explained that she was lying underneath a blanket

while watching television with Erdman lying next to her. At one point, Erdman

moved closer and got underneath the blanket with her. The child testified that

Erdman put his hand down her shorts and beneath her underwear to touch her

vagina. She stated, “He was, like, patting, and then he was, like, touching around.”
                                          6

After he removed his hand, the child saw him put it down the front of his pants.

When the child left a short time later, Erdman asked if she “was going to tell

anyone.”

       The child’s testimony is substantial evidence that Erdman committed

second-degree sexual abuse. “A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may be

sufficient evidence for conviction.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Iowa

2021). Claiming that such evidence “is not credible enough to convince a rational

fact finder of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is unavailing for sufficiency of the

evidence purposes.” Id. Although Erdman disputed the child’s account, “it is for

the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence.” State v.

Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Iowa 1999).

       Because substantial evidence supports Erdman’s conviction, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.

       Ahlers, J., concurs; Tabor, P.J., partially dissents.
                                          7

TABOR, Judge. (concurring in part, dissenting in part)

       “It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically

important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.” Kent

v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).2 In Iowa, “[t]he juvenile court cannot

waive jurisdiction of a child charged with a public offense to allow criminal

prosecution as an adult unless the State establishes there are no reasonable

prospects for rehabilitation if the court retains jurisdiction.” In re M.M.C., 564

N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1997). Respectfully, I don’t think the majority holds the State

to that burden.

       When assessing whether the State met its burden, courts must focus on the

non-exhaustive list of factors in Iowa Code section 232.45(8) (2019), which

include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the act; (2) the child’s prior

involvement with juvenile authorities and response to past rehabilitation efforts;

and (3) the programs and facilities available for rehabilitation and treatment in the

adult and juvenile courts. In its waiver decision, the juvenile court listed these

factors, but did not analyze them. The majority excuses that shortcut, asserting

that the State presented evidence at the waiver hearing addressing those factors.

       While true, only the first factor supported waiver to adult court. On that first

factor, the State presented evidence on the seriousness of Erdman’s sexual

offense against a nine-year-old girl. But on the second factor, the State presented

evidence that this offense was Erdman’s first contact with juvenile authorities. A

2 This concept is enduring. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975) (“The
possibility of transfer from juvenile court to a court of general criminal jurisdiction
is a matter of great significance to the juvenile.”).
                                           8

factor he argues should have weighed heavily against waiver. That second factor

ended up obscured by the spotlight on the third factor. As the majority explains,

the State’s evidence focused on whether Erdman could be rehabilitated in the six

months between the waiver hearing and his eighteenth birthday in April 2020.3 To

that end, the juvenile court officer testified: “Due to the seriousness of the offense,

the rehabilitative efforts that the Juvenile Court Office [(JCO)] has available to them

would not be sufficient in the time frame that we have available to us.” She

continued: “The problem is that we only have placement facilities available to us

until a child turns eighteen.”

       On cross-examination, the officer clarified that timing drove her

recommendation that Erdman be waived to adult court:

               In a sex abuse case, normally a child is evaluated and then
       recommended for treatment. The treatment is an intense treatment
       that lasts at least six months; and at this point without an adjudication
       or a conviction, we don’t have six months in order to provide that
       treatment if the evaluation was even done.

       But the child’s counsel pointed out that under section 232.53(2),

“[d]ispositional orders entered subsequent to the child attaining the age of

seventeen years and prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday shall automatically

terminate one year and six months after the date of disposition.” And the officer

agreed the dispositional order could extend beyond Erdman’s eighteenth birthday.

So counsel then cited section 232.53(4), which allows a child committed to the

3 The short time frame was of the State’s own making. Erdman perpetrated the
sex offense in late May 2019, one month after his seventeenth birthday. The
sheriff’s office completed its investigation in early July. But the county attorney’s
office did not file its delinquency petition and motion to waive jurisdiction until mid-
September. And the waiver hearing did not occur until October 22.
                                         9

state training school to stay eighteen months past their eighteenth birthday, and

asked: “[I]f that’s the case and treatment lasts six months, how did the JCO’s office

not have sufficient time?”

       The officer answered: “If he would not be able to do the service within the

community, we don’t have a placement facility other than the State Training School

that he could go to and then he would have to meet the criteria for the State

Training School.” On redirect, the officer explained that although it has a program

for sex offenders, the State Training School is “not usually recommended as the

first placement for anyone.” At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court noted

that Erdman did not meet the criteria for placement at the State Training School

because he had no prior delinquency adjudications.                See Iowa Code

§ 232.52(2)(e)(3), (4).

       So because he was not a hard-core delinquent, Erdman could not go to the

State Training School and the juvenile court had no other choice but to waive him

to adult court. What a topsy-turvy result. And what about other alternatives? At

the hearing, Erdman’s counsel maintained that there were “programs available

involving intense treatment for adults in the JCO’s office that he could take

advantage of once he is on probation.” On appeal, the State argues: “While

[Erdman] believed there may be adult programs that could be utilized, he did not

present any evidence of their existence or whether [Erdman] qualified for them at

the hearing.” The majority echoes that refrain: “Although Erdman claimed other

programs were available, he failed to present evidence of any.”

       Problem is, it was not Erdman’s burden to search out a viable placement

outside the State Training School. It was the State’s burden to show Erdman had
                                           10

no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction.

The State failed to present evidence that Erdman could not be held accountable

beyond April 2020 if he did not complete sex offender treatment. In re T.D., 335

N.W.2d 638, 639 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (discussing section 232.53(2) and rejecting

argument that juvenile court had no leverage over child after they turned eighteen).

But neither the juvenile court nor the majority look past Erdman’s eighteenth

birthday.

       One more thing was missing from the waiver ruling. The juvenile court did

not say why waiver to adult court was in the best interests of the child or the

community as required by section 232.45(6)(c). See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d

440, 449 (Iowa 2005). Without that finding, even with our de novo review, it is

difficult to tell whether the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion.

       On this record, I would reverse the waiver order. As for the sufficiency of

the evidence, I agree with the majority’s analysis.