Court Opinion

ID: 9391197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 15:08:20.673957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.014665
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 25, 2023

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                            NO. 01-22-00121-CV
                          ———————————
                          RICK RIVAS, Appellant
                                      V.
   LAKE SHORE HARBOUR COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 458th District Court
                         Fort Bend County, Texas
                   Trial Court Case No. 21-DCV-288460

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellee Lake Shore Harbour Community Association filed suit against

several defendants, including Appellant Rick Rivas (“Rivas”), concerning the

design and condition of the bulkhead system surrounding three man-made lakes at

the Lake Shore Harbour subdivision in Missouri City, Texas. Rivas appeals from
an interlocutory order denying his motion to dismiss filed under Chapter 27 of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, also known as the Texas Citizens’

Participation Act, in which he sought to dismiss Appellee’s claims against him .

      In two issues, Rivas argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss and in denying his request for attorney’s fees because Appellee’s legal

action against him is based on or in response to his right of free speech and his

right of association. We affirm the trial court’s order.

                                    Background

      The underlying lawsuit stems from the alleged “deterioration and

misconstruction and post failure of the bulkhead[] system” surrounding three man-

made lakes at the Lake Shore Harbour subdivision in Missouri City, Texas.

Appellee, the Lake Shore Harbour Community Association (“Lake Shore” or

“Lake Shore Association”), filed suit against Rivas and several other defendants,1

claiming they failed to disclose significant problems with the bulkhead system and

took no corrective action to remedy the problems. As it concerns Rivas, Lake

Shore filed claims against him for negligent misrepresentation, fraud and

fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.

1
      Lake Shore also sued Greatmark International, Inc., Vickburg Estates, Ltd.,
      Skymark Development Co., Amvest Properties, Inc., Clinton Wong, Eric Ungar,
      Missouri City, Principal Management Group of Houston, R.G Miller Engineers,
      D&W Construction, Inc., and Addicks Services, Inc. Those parties are not
      involved in this appeal.

                                          2
A.    The Lake Shore Subdivision

      The Lake Shore Harbour subdivision (“Subdivision”) is a 270-acre planned

community in Missouri City, Texas. It has more than 900 single-family homes,

most of which are waterfront lots.       Greatmark International, Inc., Vicksburg

Estates Ltd., Skymark Development Co., Amvest Properties, and Clinton Wong

(collectively, “Developer”) were the developers of the Subdivision.

      Construction of the Subdivision began in 2003. According to Lake Shore,

the “plan was to construct three large man-made lakes which would serve as the

centerpiece of the development and would entice prospective homeowners to buy

into this community because this community would have 65 acres of lake front

property.” The lakes were to be enclosed with 45,150 feet of 12-inch concrete

bulkheads “to buttress the concrete separating the [l]akes from the shoreline.”

      The Lake Shore Association was created in 2004.           At the time of its

incorporation, the Lake Shore Association was controlled by a five-member Board

of Directors (“HOA Board”), including Clinton Wong (“Wong”), one of the

Subdivision’s developers.2 According to Lake Shore, what “transpired during the

next approximately 10 years was a concerted effort” by the Developer and its

“affiliated entities, agents, and employees to conceal the significance of the

construction defects” of the bulkhead system “as well as the forecast provided by

2
      The Lake Shore Association’s five-member board of directors consisted of Wong
      and four of his employees.

                                         3
engineers to the Developer-controlled Board that there would be continued

deterioration of the bulkhead system.” Lake Shore alleges that “neither Wong nor

any of his agents . . . told the Lake Shore Harbour Community about any

significant problems with the bulkead[] system” until 2019, when the HOA Board

announced for the first time that there were significant problems with the bulkhead

system and the community would have to bear the costs of repairs.

      According to Lake Shore, the Developer controlled the HOA from 2004 to

2021, until, when after much concerted effort, the “Developer finally allowed an

election in January of 2021” enabling the homeowners “to take control of the

[HOA] Board.”

B.    Problems with the Bulkhead System

      In 2016, the HOA Board commissioned Professional Engineering

Inspections, Inc. (“PEI”) to inspect and evaluate the performance of the bulkhead

system at the Subdivision.      PEI performed the inspection and prepared a

comprehensive report “detailing the severity of the problems with the bulkhead

systems.”    Lake Shore alleges that the PEI report described “significant

deterioration of the bulkhead systems and evidence of soil erosion across all phases

of the lake construction project.”    The PEI report stated that “more invasive

engineering and soil testing would be necessary to determine the feasibility of

repairs or the possible need for complete replacement.” In response, Lake Shore

                                         4
alleges that the “Developer-controlled Board” did nothing. The HOA Board took

no “action to remedy the problems or implement PEI’s recommendations.”

According to Lake Shore, the HOA Board “concealed the PEI report from the Lake

Shore Harbour Community for more than three and a half years.”

      In 2017, Reserve Advisors, Inc. prepared another report (“Reserve Report”)

concerning the bulkhead system at the Subdivision. According to Lake Shore, the

“Reserve Report relied upon the 2016 PEI report in confirming that extensive

bulkhead repairs would be necessary” and further “recommended [that] an invasive

engineering investigation be performed.” Once again, Lake Shore claims the HOA

Board did nothing. Lake Shore alleges that the HOA Board “took no action to

remedy the problems detailed in the Reserve Report” and failed to disclose this

subsequent report to the Lake Shore Harbour Community. “Instead, the Reserve

Report, like the PEI report, was concealed by the Developer-controlled Board.”

      According to Lake Shore, “[o]nly when the Developer-controlled Board

sought to assess the Subdivision” in 2019, “did the homeowners first learn that the

Developer-controlled Board had known that there was something terribly wrong

with the bulkheads and that these issues had not yet been addressed.” At that time,

the HOA Board informed the Lake Shore Harbour community that it would be

assessed for fixing “significant problems” with the bulkhead system.          This

                                        5
apparently was the HOA Board’s first effort to fix the bulkhead system and the

first time the Subdivision’s homeowners learned of any bulkhead issues.

      Lake Shore alleges that when individual homeowners raised questions about

their own properties prior to 2019, the HOA Board “concealed their knowledge of

the significant construction defects” and “intentionally misrepresented material

facts in an effort to conceal the true nature of the bulkhead defects,” subsequently

giving “homeowners the impression that the Board was actively working to

remedy such issues.” “In response to continued pressure from homeowners,” Lake

Shore alleges that the “Developer-controlled Board finally made the PEI Report

available through the HOA website on August 5, 2019.”

      Given the “alarming information contained in the PEI Report,” Lake Shore

alleges that the homeowners formed a “Bulkhead Committee” and retained

Tolunay Engineering Group (“TEG”) “to assess the bulkhead issues and provide

and engineering proposal.” In September 2020, TEG submitted its report to the

HOA Board concluding, among other things, that “the problems with the

bulkheads arose from deficiencies related to their design and construction.” In July

2021, based on the findings in the TEG report, Mason Construction, LLC issued a

quote to the HOA Board estimating that the cost of replacing the bulkheads would

be “approximately $23,000,000.00.”

                                         6
C.    Rivas and the Special Meeting of the Board

      Saratoga Homes is the real estate development company and homebuilder

for the Subdivision. Rivas is an Area Manager for the South Division of Saratoga

Homes. Lake Shore alleges that in April 2017, “Rivas was elected to serve as a

Director on the Developer-controlled Board.”3 According to Lake Shore, Rivas

“also served as the Vice President of the Board in 2019.”

      On March 2, 2020, the HOA board held a special meeting to “discuss the

TEG Report” (“Special Meeting”), at which Rivas was present.           Lake Shore

alleges that when asked at that meeting if he knew about the problems with the

bulkhead system, Rivas responded that “he and his company Saratoga Homes, had

been aware of the issues but stated that this information was not being disclosed to

new or prospective homeowners.”        Lake Shore’s pleadings identify no other

statement made by Rivas at the Special Meeting.

D.    The Lake Shore Lawsuit

      In 2021, Lake Shore sued several individual and corporate entities asserting

claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and fraudulent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, breach of contract,

3
      In its appellate brief, Lake Shore claims that Rivas was a Director and Vice
      President of the HOA Board from 2017 to 2019.

                                         7
and breach of restrictive covenant.4 Lake Shore asserted claims against Rivas for

negligent misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and constructive

fraud.

         Lake Shore alleged that Rivas negligently and falsely represented to the

homeowners that the Subdivision “was built in a good and workmanlike manner,

free of any substantial defects.” It alleged that as “a Director of the HOA Board,

Rivas was aware of the bulkhead issues but failed to use reasonable care in

communicating such information to homeowners.” Lake Shore further alleged that

“homeowners justifiably relied on these representations when making the decision

to purchase a home within the Subdivision.”

         Lake Shore also alleged that several of the named defendants committed

fraud by failing “to disclose the information contained in the PEI Report as well as

the information subsequently acquired.” It claimed they committed constructive

fraud     “through     the   prolonged     nondisclosure,    concealment,      and    false

representations made to Lake Shore . . . . regarding the nature and extent of the

issues with the bulkheads.” Lake Shore did not identify any specific actions taken

by Rivas. Instead, Lake Shore asserted its fraud allegations generally against

several defendants.

4
         Lake Shore later added claims against some of the corporate entities for breach of
         implied warranties.

                                              8
      Rivas filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Dismiss”) the claims against

him under Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, also known

as the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.003. Rivas argued that because Lake Shore’s legal action against him

for   “negligent   misrepresentation,   fraud/fraudulent   misrepresentation,    and

constructive fraud” was “based solely on the alleged statement [Rivas] made at the

Special Meeting” in March 2020, the TCPA required dismissal of the claims.

Rivas argued that the claims against him related directly to his “exercise of the

right of free speech” and that any “alleged statement made by [him] was in

connection with a matter of public concern” because it concerned the bulkhead

system and its deterioration, an issue of “very real concern among homeowners.”

      After Rivas filed his Motion to Dismiss, Lake Shore amended its petition to

add a claim against Rivas for breach of fiduciary duty. Lake Shore alleged that “a

fiduciary relationship existed between Lake Shore and . . . Rivas . . . regarding the

operation and control of the Lake Shore Homeowners Association” and that Rivas

breached his fiduciary duty “by denying homeowners access to bulkhead records,

withholding material information, and failing to take actions responsive to the

discovered defects.” As part of its breach of fiduciary claim, Lake Shore also

alleged that Rivas violated Texas Property Code Sections 209.005 and 209.0051(c)

“by refusing to provide homeowners with access to the records and documents that

                                         9
were requested and by failing to hold regular and special board meetings open to

all homeowners.”5

      Rivas filed a Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss addressing Lake Shore’s

new claims against him. It argued that Lake Shore’s “broad allegations” were

“based on, related to, or [were] in response to” his and the HOA “Board’s exercise

of their right to associate” because the March 2, 2020 Special Meeting “is where

the association met to discuss fixing the bulkheads.”

      Lake Shore filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that its claims

against Rivas were not brought in response to the exercise of his right to free

speech.   Lake Shore argued it was suing Rivas for his “concealment of the

bulkhead issues from the homeowners while serving as Director, and later as Vice

President, of the Developer-controlled Board.” It also argued that its claims did

not implicate Rivas’ right of free speech or his right of association because none of

his statements involved a matter of public concern. Finally, Lake Shore argued

that its claims against Rivas were not based on his participation on the HOA

Board, and thus, the claims were not based on Rivas’ right of association.

      Rivas replied arguing that his alleged statements concerned a matter of

public concern because they involved the possible collapse of the bulkhead system

5
      Lake Shore does not appear to advance a separate claim for violation of the Texas
      Property Code. Instead, it appears Lake Shore alleges Rivas committed these
      alleged violations in support of its breach of fiduciary claim against Rivas.

                                         10
around the lakes, which is an issue of “very real concern among homeowners.”

Rivas further claimed that Lake Shore’s claims “impinge[d] on his right of

association” because but for his association with the Lake Shore Board of

Directors, the claims against him would not exist.

      After a hearing, the trial court denied Rivas’ Motion to Dismiss. This

interlocutory appeal ensued.6

                                    Discussion

A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      The Texas Citizens’ Participation Act “is a bulwark against retaliatory

lawsuits meant to intimidate or silence citizens on matters of public concern.”

Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. 2019). The TCPA is

intended “to identify and summarily dispose of lawsuits designed only to chill First

Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d

579, 589 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). The TCPA’s purpose “is to ‘encourage

and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely,

associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent

permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file

6
      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12) (granting right of interlocutory
      appeal from order denying motion to dismiss filed under TCPA).

                                         11
meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.’”7        ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v.

Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 898 (Tex. 2017) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.002). We construe the TCPA liberally to effectuate its purpose and

intent. Id.

      The TCPA enables a party who claims a legal action was filed in response to

its exercise of a constitutionally protected right to seek dismissal of the underlying

action, attorney’s fees, and sanctions at an early stage in the litigation. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.003, .005, .009(a); Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v.

Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Tex. 2019); Gaskamp v. WSP USA,

Inc., 596 S.W.3d 457, 469–70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d).

The TCPA is applicable if the plaintiff’s legal action “is based on or is in response

to” the defendant’s exercise of “(A) the right of free speech, (B) the right to

petition, or (C) the right of association.”       TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.005(b); Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 586–87.8 A “legal action” can comprise a

petition, counterclaim, single cause of action, or an entire lawsuit. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(6); Creative Oil & Gas, 591 S.W.3d at 131.
7
      The TCPA is “considered to be anti-SLAPP legislation. SLAPP stands for
      Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation[.]” In re Lipsky, 411 S.W.3d 530,
      536 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citation omitted).
8
      The Texas Legislature amended the TCPA effective September 1, 2019. See Act
      of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, §§ 1–12 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
      REM. CODE §§ 27.001–.010). Because this suit was filed after the effective date of
      the amendments, all citations to the TCPA in this opinion refer to the amended
      statute.

                                          12
      To seek dismissal under the TCPA, a movant must first establish by a

preponderance of the evidence “that the conduct forming the basis of the legal

action filed against the movant falls within the purview of the TCPA.” Panton Inc.

v. Bees360, Inc., No. 01-20-00267-CV, 2021 WL 3868773, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Rivas sought dismissal of

Lake Shore’s claims against him arguing the claims were filed in response to the

exercise of his right to free speech and right of association. Rivas must thus

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Lake Shore’s lawsuit “is based

on or is in response to” his exercise of the right of free speech or free association.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003; Panton, 2021 WL 3868773 at *4. Both

the exercise of the right of free speech and the exercise of the right of association

must relate to a “matter of public concern” to fall within the purview of the TCPA.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2), (3).9

      If the movant makes this initial showing, the burden then shifts to the

nonmovant to establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each

essential element” of its claims. Panton, 2021 WL 3868773 at *4 (citing TEX. CIV.

9
      The 2019 amendment to the TCPA narrowed the scope of the statute. The
      amended version of the statute omitted the phrase “relates to” from the TCPA.
      Thus, we now consider the narrower question of whether Lake Shore’s claims
      were “based on or in response to” the TCPA protected rights of free speech and
      association. See Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, §§ 2–3, 2019 Tex.
      Sess. Law Serv. 684, 685 (noting removal of “relates to” in sections 27.003(a) and
      27.005(b) in the 2019 amendments).

                                          13
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c)); Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 586–87.                        If the

nonmovant establishes a prima facie case for each element of its claims, the burden

shifts back to the movant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence each

essential element of a valid defense. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.005(d)).10

      If the nonmovant establishes that one of the TCPA’s exemptions apply, it

can avoid the burden-shifting analysis.          Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.010(b)).11 If the movant is successful and the court orders dismissal,

the court “shall award to the moving party court costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees incurred in defending against the legal action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 27.009(a)(1).

      We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss filed under

the TCPA. Porter-Garcia v. Travis Law Firm, P.C., 564 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford,

472 S.W.3d 881, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). In our

10
      A “prima facie case” requires evidence that is “sufficient as a matter of law to
      establish a given fact if it is not rebutted or contradicted.” Landry's, Inc. v. Animal
      Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 54 (Tex. 2021). It refers to “the minimum
      quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation
      of fact is true.” Id.
11
      The applicability of an exemption is waived if not raised in the trial court.
      Thoman v. Roofing Contractors Ass’n of Tex., No. 03-19-00476-CV, 2020 WL
      3526352, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Elite Auto
      Body LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 206 n.75 (Tex. App.—
      Austin 2017, pet. dism’d).

                                            14
review, we view the evidence and the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. Dolcefino v. Cypress Creek EMS, 540 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi, 449 S.W.3d 210,

214 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). In so doing, we “favor[] the

conclusion that [the nonmovants’] claims are not predicated on protected

expression.” Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Dorsey, 651 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

B.    Right of Free Speech

      Rivas argues the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss because

Lake Shore’s legal action against him implicates his right of free speech. He

claims that Lake Shore’s “claims for negligent misrepresentation, fraud/fraudulent

misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud are based on or

in response to statements [] Rivas allegedly made regarding the state of the lake

bulkheads during a ‘Special Meeting of Lake Shore’s Board of Directors on March

2, 2020.” Lake Shore responds that it is not suing Rivas for statements he made,

but rather for his conduct in concealing “known information about the deteriorating

bulkheads from the Lake Shore community.”           It further argues that Rivas’

statement at the Special Meeting was not made in connection with a matter of

public concern because the statement “only affected the Lake Shore homeowners.”

                                        15
      The TCPA defines “exercise of the right of free speech” as a

“communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(3). A communication requires the “making or

submitting of a statement or document in any form or medium.” Id. § 27.001(1).

A “matter of public concern” is defined as “a statement or activity regarding: (A) a

public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn substantial public

attention due to the person's official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity; (B) a matter

of political, social, or other interest to the community; or (C) a subject of concern

to the public.” Id. § 27.001(7).

      Lake Shore filed claims against Rivas for negligent misrepresentation, fraud

and fraudulent misrepresentations, constructive fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.

In his Motion to Dismiss, Rivas argued that “[t]he entirety of [Lake Shore’s]

claims against [Rivas] [were] based on statements that he allegedly made to the

homeowners of the Lake Harbour [sic] Community Subdivision regarding the

design and condition of the bulkheads surrounding three man-made lakes located

within the Subdivision.”

      Lake Shore asserted several claims against Rivas related to the bulkhead

system and his alleged failure to disclose the condition of the bulkheads to the

Lake Shore Harbour Community. While Rivas contends that Lake Shore’s claims

are premised on Rivas’ alleged protected communications, Lake Shore’s pleadings

                                          16
reflect that is not the case. Lake Shore alleges that Rivas committed negligent

misrepresentation by

      negligently and falsely represent[ing] to homeowners that the
      Subdivision was built in a good and workmanlike manner, free of any
      substantial defects. Rick Rivas was aware of bulkhead issues but
      failed to use reasonable care in communicating such information to
      homeowners. Further, homeowners justifiably relied on these
      representations when making the decision to purchase a home within
      the Subdivision. As a result, homeowners suffered injury and
      substantial damages.

With respect to its fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and constructive fraud

claims, Lake Shore alleged that:

      Defendants failed to disclose the information contained in the PEI
      Report as well as the information subsequently acquired. By
      concealing this information from Lake Shore, who did not have an
      equal opportunity to discover the truth, Lake Shore was deprived of
      any opportunity to take action to repair or otherwise remedy the
      bulkhead issues. As a result, Lake Shore has suffered injury and
      substantial damages.

      ...

      Defendants made representations to Lake Shore in the course of
      business transactions which Defendants had a pecuniary interest and
      did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
      communicating material information. Thus, Defendants committed
      constructive fraud through the prolonged nondisclosure, concealment,
      and false representations made to Lake Shore, with which it had a
      fiduciary relationship, regarding the nature and extent of the issues
      with the bulkheads.

And in support of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Lake Shore alleged that “a

fiduciary relationship existed between Lake Shore and . . . Rivas . . . regarding the

                                         17
operation and control of the Lake Shore Homeowners Association” and that Rivas

breached his fiduciary duties “by denying homeowners access to bulkhead records,

withholding material information, and failing to take actions responsive to the

discovered defects.” As part of its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Lake Shore also

alleged that Rivas violated Sections 209.005 and 209.0051(c) of the Texas

Property Code “by refusing to provide homeowners with access to the records and

documents that were requested and by failing to hold regular and special board

meetings open to all homeowners.”

      According to Lake Shore’s pleadings, when asked at a March 2020 Special

Meeting of the Board if he knew about the “bulkhead issues,” Rivas “indicated that

he and his company Saratoga Homes[] had been aware of the issues but stated that

this information was not being disclosed to new or prospective homeowners.”12 It

is this alleged failure to disclose known information about the “bulkhead issues” to

the Lake Shore Harbour community that gives rise to Lake Shore’s claims against

Rivas, not the statement itself. As Lake Shore argues, Rivas’ statement made

during the Special Meeting is merely evidence of Rivas’ alleged knowledge of the

bulkhead issues and his failure to disclose information he possessed to the Lake

Shore Harbour community.        Indeed, Lake Shore’s pleadings are replete with

allegations concerning what Rivas failed to say or do: “Rick Rivas was aware of

12
      Lake Shore does not identify any other statements made by Rivas in its pleadings.

                                          18
bulkhead issues but failed to use reasonable care in communicating such

information to homeowners;” “Defendants failed to disclose the information . . . .;”

“Rivas . . . refus[ed] to provide homeowners with access to the records and

documents that were requested and [] fail[ed] to hold regular and special board

meetings open to all homeowners;” Rivas “den[ied] homeowners access to

bulkhead records, with[eld] material information, and fail[ed] to take actions

responsive to the discovered defects;” and Defendants engaged in “the prolonged

nondisclosure, concealment, and false representations made to Lake Shore.”

      Based on these allegations, we conclude that Lake Shore’s claims against

Rivas are not based on or in response to his protected communications, but rather

his alleged conduct in failing to disclose known information about the bulkhead

system and its alleged deterioration. Appellate courts, including our Court, “have

declined to rewrite the TCPA to extend the definition of ‘communication’ to

include [a failure] to communicate.” Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chenier, 649

S.W.3d 440, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (citing

Sanchez v. Striever, 614 S.W.3d 233, 246 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020,

no pet.) and Krasnicki v. Tactical Entm’t, LLC, 583 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2019, pet. denied)).     “The definition of ‘communication’ makes no

reference to the withholding of a statement or document.” Krasnicki, 583 S.W.3d

at 284; see also SSCP Mgmt. Inc. v. Sutherland/Palumbo, LLC, No. 02-19-00254-

                                        19
CV, 2020 WL 7640150, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2020, pet. denied)

(mem. op. on reh’g) (observing that TCPA’s definition of communication “does

not include a failure to communicate”). As our sister court observed, “construing

the definition of ‘communications’ to include non-communications would lead to

an absurd result as nothing would be outside the scope of the TCPA.” Krasnicki,

583 S.W.3d at 284.

      Union Pacific v. Chenier, 649 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2022, pet. denied) is instructive. That case stemmed from actions brought by Betty

Chenier and a dozen other plaintiffs who alleged the railroad failed to warn them

adequately about contaminants in the soil and groundwater from the railroad’s

facilities, causing them personal injuries and property damage. Id. at 442. The

plaintiffs alleged they were residents of two Houston neighborhoods that housed a

railroad plant where wood railroad ties were treated with creosote, a carcinogen.

Id. at 443. Even after Union Pacific stopped using creosote “because of safety

concerns” in the 1980s, it did not remove the creosote waste from the plant. Id.

An investigation by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality revealed the

soil, air, and water in the neighborhoods had been contaminated, causing property

and personal injury damages, including cancer, to the plaintiffs and others. Id.

The plaintiffs sought more than $50 million in damages, asserting “Union Pacific

was aware of the risks associated with the exposure to creosote and other toxic

                                       20
contaminants and it failed to disclose such risks to the plaintiffs, which caused

property damage and personal injuries.” Id. Union Pacific filed a TCPA motion to

dismiss the plaintiffs’ property damage claims for negligence, negligence per se,

negligent misrepresentation, and nuisance.13 Id. at 444. The railroad asserted the

plaintiffs’ claims were based on or in response to its exercise of free speech and

right to petition. Id. The trial court denied Union Pacific’s motion to dismiss. Id.

      On appeal, Union Pacific asserted the plaintiffs’ claims impinged on its right

to free speech because the claims involved communications about matters of public

concern and because the plaintiffs alleged the railroad “continued to represent to

community residents that there was no threat of contamination or human exposure”

to the contaminants. Id. at 446. This Court concluded Union Pacific did not

satisfy its burden of establishing the suit was based on or in response to its exercise

of free speech because

      The crux of the plaintiffs’ allegations was that Union Pacific
      concealed information and “communicated too little” about the
      creosote waste and other toxic contaminants. The plaintiffs sued
      Union Pacific for claims based on or in response to Union Pacific’s
      failure to adequately warn them of the known dangers associated with
      the toxic chemicals discharged from its facility. Stated simply, the
      plaintiffs primarily complained about Union Pacific’s conduct, not
      speech.

13
      Union Pacific did not seek to dismiss the fraud claims or personal injury claims.
      Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Chenier, 649 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston
      [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.010(a)(3),
      (12) (exempting from TCPA dismissal legal actions seeking injuries for bodily
      injury or based on common law fraud).

                                          21
Id. at 447.   We held there was only a “tenuous nexus” between the alleged

communication by Union Pacific and the plaintiffs’ negligence and nuisance

claims. Id. Thus, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of Union Pacific’s motion to

dismiss.

      Similarly, in another case involving Union Pacific’s alleged contamination

of “residential neighborhoods” with creosote, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held

a global allegation based on a “failure to disclose–a failure to communicate–[] does

not implicate protected activity.” Dorsey, 651 S.W.3d at 698 (“[T]he gravamen of

these claims is Union Pacific’s contamination of Houston neighborhoods with

creosote and Union Pacific’s failures to communicate regarding the scope and

dangers of the contamination.”)14; see also Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP v. Scurry

Cnty., No. 11-21-00205-CV, 2022 WL 120803, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan.

13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating “claims based on the alleged failure to

disclose or failure to communicate are not subject to the TCPA”); Elite Auto Body

LLC v. Autocraft Bodywerks, Inc., 520 S.W.3d 191, 207 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017,

pet. dism’d) (holding district court did not err in denying TCPA motion to dismiss

14
      In Dorsey, the court of appeals reversed a portion of the trial court’s order denying
      a TCPA motion to dismiss a negligent misrepresentation claim brought by certain
      plaintiffs. Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Dorsey, 651 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). The remainder of the trial court’s order,
      which denied the TCPA motion brought with respect to negligence, negligence per
      se, fraudulent concealment, and nuisance claims, was affirmed. Id.

                                           22
because claims were “predicated factually on conduct by appellants that [did] not

constitute ‘communications’ as defined by the TCPA”).15, 16

      Consistent with our opinion in Cheniere, we hold that Rivas did not satisfy

his burden to establish that Lake Shore’s legal action against him is based on or in

response to his exercise of free speech. The crux of Lake Shore’s allegations

against Rivas concern his alleged failure to disclose known information about the

bulkhead system to the Lake Shore Harbour community and thus the legal action

concerns his conduct and not his speech. In the absence of a communication

giving rise to a legal action, there can be no TCPA protection of Rivas’ right to

free speech.

C.    Right of Association

      Rivas also argues the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Dismiss

because Lake Shore’s legal action against him is based upon or in response to his

association with the HOA Board and thus the legal action impinges on his right of

association. Lake Shore responds that it is not suing Rivas because of his position

as Director on the HOA Board, but rather because of his “concealment of known

15
      The definition of “communication” was not revised when the TCPA was amended.
16
      Both parties discuss Ngo v. Ass’n of Woodwind Lakes Homeowners, Inc., No. 01-
      18-00919-CV, 2020 WL 7391696, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 17,
      2020) (mem. op.). After Ngo issued, the parties settled their dispute and the
      opinion was withdrawn and vacated. Ngo v. Ass’n of Woodwind Lakes
      Homeowners, Inc., No. 01-18-00919-CV, 2022 WL 3970068, at *1 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we do not
      address it.

                                        23
bulkhead issues.” Lake Shore also argues that Rivas’ association with the HOA

Board “was not connected to a matter of public concern.”

      The TCPA defines “exercise of the right of association” as joining “together

to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests relating to a

governmental proceeding or a matter of public concern.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.001(2).17 “Matter of public concern” is defined as a “statement or

activity regarding: (A) a public official, public figure, or other person who has

drawn substantial public attention due to the person's official acts, fame, notoriety,

or celebrity; (B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or

(C) a subject of concern to the public.” Id. § 27.001(7).

17
      This Court has held that in the context of a TCPA claim, “common” necessarily
      includes a “public component” because the “express purpose of the TCPA [is] to
      protect constitutional rights, while at the same time protecting the rights of persons
      to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Gaskamp v. WSP USA, Inc.,
      596 S.W.3d 457, 474 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d) (citing
      TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.002). Although Gaskamp was decided based
      on the pre-amendment version of the TCPA, it discussed the amended version in
      the context of the right to public association:
             In amending the statute, the Legislature chose to define “common
             interests” in a manner . . . which determined that tortfeasors,
             conspiring and colluding for their own private financial gain, are not
             entitled to protection under the right of association. By limiting
             “common interests” to those interests related to government
             proceedings or matters of public concern (as defined in the amended
             statute), the Legislature clarified that the exercise of the right of
             association was never intended to include an alleged tortfeasor’s acts
             taken in furtherance of private interests.
      Id. at 475–76 (internal citations omitted).

                                            24
      Rivas argues that “Lake Shore’s claims for negligent misrepresentation,

fraud/fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive

fraud are based on or in response to [] Rivas’ alleged association with the Lake

Shore Board of Directors,” and that “but for that alleged association, Lake Shore’s

claims against Mr. Rivas would not exist.” We disagree.

      While Rivas contends that Lake Shore’s legal action is based on his

association with the HOA Board, we have already concluded that Lake Shore’s

claims are based on Rivas’ alleged failure to act—his conduct in failing to disclose

alleged problems with the bulkhead system to the Lake Shore Harbour community.

That Lake Shore references Rivas’ statements as evidence of the alleged

concealment during his term as Director of the HOA Board does not turn Lake

Shore’s legal action into one based on Rivas’ right of association. On the contrary,

as Lake Shore argues, “[t]he mere fact that a homeowners association ‘is a group

of individuals who join together’ to collectively express the common interests of

the homeowners, does not mean that any claim involving a homeowners

association is protected under the TCPA.” See BusPatrol Am., LLC v. Am. Traffic

Sols., Inc., 05-18-00920-CV, 2020 WL 1430357, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar.

24, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Construing the TCPA to find a right of

association simply because there are communications between parties with a

shared interest in a private business transaction does not further the TCPA’s

                                        25
purpose to curb strategic lawsuits against public participation.”). If that were the

case, all claims involving homeowners’ associations would implicate the right of

association under the TCPA. Here, as Lake Shore argues, it was not Rivas’

association with the HOA Board or his communications made while on the Board

that were problematic, but rather “his [alleged] prolonged concealment from the

community” about the condition “of the bulkheads that caused Lake Shore’s”

alleged damages.

      The four cases on which Rivas relies are distinguishable. First, each of the

cited authorities rely on language from the less stringent pre-amendment version of

the TCPA allowing dismissal of a legal action when the legal action “relates to” a

TCPA protected right. See, e.g., Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 219 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (“We conclude the Judicial

Defendants have satisfied their statutory burden to show that the Parents’ lawsuit is

‘based on, relates to, or is in response to’ the Judicial Defendants’ exercise of the

right to free speech concerning communications ‘made in connection with a matter

of public concern, namely, the enforcement of truancy laws and the operation of

the Truancy Court, as well as the Judicial Defendants’ exercise of the right of

association . . . .”) (emphasis added); O’Hern v. Mughrabi, 579 S.W.3d 594, 603

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (holding claim “is based on,

relates to, or is in response to, appellants’ exercise of their right of association”)

                                         26
(emphasis added); Neyland v. Thompson, No. 03-13-00643-CV, 2015 WL

1612155, *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding the

record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellee’s suit against

Appellants for defamation because of oral and written statements made to HOA

members and statements made to a television reporter “is based on, relates to, or is

in response to Appellants’ right of association”) (emphasis added); Green v. Port

of Call Homeowners Ass’n, No. 03-18-00264-CV, 2018 WL 4100855, *9 n. 17

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The TCPA applies to

legal actions based on, related to, or in response to a party’s exercise of the right of

association.”) (emphasis added).

      The “tightening of the statutory language” under the amended version of the

TCPA is significant, because it “restricts” and narrows TCPA protection. ML Dev,

LP v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2022, pet. denied). That is, the deletion of the phrase “relates to” from the

statute effectively “removed the broadest category of connection, thereby requiring

future TCPA movants to establish a closer nexus between the claims against them

and the communications they point to as their exercise of protected rights.” Id.;

see also Welsh v. River Hollow Ass’n, 654 S.W.3d 505, 514 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2022, no pet. h.) (distinguishing O’Hern, Roach, Green, and Neyland

because they were “decided under the prior version of the statute that required the

                                          27
claims to merely ‘relate to’ a communication between individuals who joined

together, rather than to be ‘based on’ or ‘in response to’ a joining together”).

      Second, the cases Rivas cites are distinguishable. In Roach, for example, the

TCPA movants were government officials who were sued in their official capacity

for collective decision-making made while serving as members of a governmental

juvenile board. 557 S.W.3d at 218–19. The “factual core” of the legal action in

O’Hern concerned “oral remarks made in HOA meetings, written presentations,

and notices of the decisions.” 579 S.W.3d at 603. The claims at issue in Neyland

concerned alleged defamatory statements made by members of a homeowners’

association in emails to homeowners, flyers, a petition distributed to homeowners,

oral statements made to homeowners, and oral statements made to a television

reporter. 2015 WL 1612155 at *1. And in Green, the legal action was predicated

on alleged defamatory statements made by members of a homeowners’ association.

2018 WL 4100855 at *9.          In each case, the plaintiff’s allegations relied on

affirmative statements, whereas in the present case, Lake Shore’s claims are based

on an alleged failure to communicate or disclose.

      We thus hold that Rivas did not satisfy his burden to establish that Lake

Shore’s legal action against him is based on or in response to his right of

association.

                                          28
D.    Matter of Public Concern

      Rivas also argues that his statements during the Special Meeting and his

association with the HOA Board implicate his right of free speech and right of

association because the “Lake Shore board joined together to ‘express, promote,

pursue, or defend common interests relating to . . . a matter of public concern” and

his communications during the meeting also concerned a matter of public concern.

A matter of public concern is defined as a “statement or activity regarding: (A) a

public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn substantial public

attention due to the person’s official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity; (B) a matter

of political, social, or other interest to the community; or (C) a subject of concern

to the public.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(7).

      According to Rivas, the safety concerns of the Lake Shore community are a

“matter of public concern” because more than 900 single-family homes are in the

community; the three man-made lakes help with urban infrastructure; the lakes

entice prospective homeowners; the deterioration of the bulkheads could cause

damage to the neighborhood; the community may be assessed for fixing problems

with the bulkheads; and the cost of replacing the bulkheads could cost Lake Shore

and its homeowners more than $25 million. He claims that the very size of the

Lake Shore Harbour community—more than 900 homes—and “whether the lakes

were in disrepair or not” make the dispute a matter of public concern. Lake Shore

                                          29
responds that a matter of public concern under the TCPA must have relevance

“beyond the interests of the parties” and must be made “in connection with a health

or safety issue that affects the general public.”

      We have already concluded that Lake Shore’s legal action against Rivas

does not implicate his right of association or right of free speech, because it was

not his statement at the Special Meeting or his membership in the HOA Board that

gave rise to Lake Shore’s legal action, but rather his alleged failure to disclose the

bulkhead issues to the Lake Shore Harbour community. A failure to disclose does

not constitute a statement or an activity, either of which is required to “join[]

together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interest

relating to a . . . matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(7) (defining “matter of

public concern” as “statement or activity” regarding “a matter of . . . interest to the

community” or “a subject of concern to the public”); id. § 27.001(2) (defining

“right of association” as joining “together to collectively express, promote, pursue,

or defend common interests relating to a governmental proceeding or a matter of

public concern”). Thus, in the same way a failure to disclose cannot be the subject

of a TCPA motion to dismiss based on the right to free speech, it cannot be the

subject of a motion to dismiss based on the right of association. See Dorsey, 651

S.W.3d at 698 (citing DOJO Bayhouse, LLC v. Pickford, No. 14-20-00237-CV,

2021 WL 6050677, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2021, no pet.)

                                           30
(mem. op.)18; KIPP, Inc. v. Grant Me the Wisdom Found., Inc., 651 S.W.3d 530,

539 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (holding that “the failure

to do something, standing alone, generally is not joining ‘together to collectively

express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests’”).19

      Again, the cases upon which Rivas relies are distinguishable. In Adams v.

Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. 2018) the developer of a

neighborhood filed suit against Adams and his wife (“collectively, “Adams”), both

of whom resided in the neighborhood. Id. at 892. The developer and Adams had a

dispute over a common area in the subdivision. Id. The developer sued Adams

“asserting claims for threat of imminent bodily injury and business disparagement”

and seeking a declaratory judgment. Id. After Adams filed a TCPA motion to

dismiss the business disparagement claim, the developer dropped the business

18
      In DOJO Bayhouse, LLC v. Pickford, No. 14-20-00237-CV, 2021 WL 6050677, at
      *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), the
      appellate court concluded that “looking solely to the petition,” the appellant’s
      “articulated claims are not based on, related to, or in response to [the appellee’s]
      exercise of any TCPA-protected right because [the appellant] did not allege that
      [the appellee] made a communication . . . .” Although DOJO was decided based
      on the old version of the statute, we find it illustrative to the extent it holds that a
      TCPA-protected right is contingent on a communication.
19
      Rivas asserts that Lake Shore “seek[s] to avoid the requirements of the TCPA by
      asserting that their complaints are about another’s ‘conduct’ rather than TCPA-
      protected communications.” The issue here is not whether conduct is actionable.
      Rather, the issue is whether the failure to act or communicate is actionable.
      Indeed, one of the cases Rivas relies on held that extending “the reach of the
      TCPA [] to noncommunications” would be “contrary to the plain-language
      definitions in the TCPA.” Smith v. Crestview NuV, LLC, 565 S.W.3d 793, 798
      (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied).

                                             31
disparagement claim and added a claim for defamation. Id. The developer’s

pleadings alleged that Adams had defamed the developer in a blog and in an email

sent to the HOA president and others. Id. at 893. Adams filed a supplemental

motion to dismiss the defamation claim under the TCPA. Id. The trial court did

not rule on the motion to dismiss the defamation claim within the statutory period

and thus the motion was denied by operation of law. Id. at 894.

      The reviewing court affirmed, holding, among other things, that Adams had

not established that the developer’s defamation claim was “based on, relate[d] to,

or is in response to [Adams’] exercise of . . . the right of free speech.” Id. The

court of appeals “reached only the issue of whether Adams [had] established under

section 27.005(b) that his defamation claim” was “based on, relate[d] to, or in

response” to Adams’ right of free speech and “did not reach the merits of Adams’

argument that his statements related to community well-being.” Id.

      Reversing the intermediate court, the Supreme Court held that the alleged

defamatory communications in the blog and the email “raise[d] ‘issues related to’

[the developer’s] products or services in the marketplace as a homebuilder and

neighborhood developer.” Id. at 894. The Court noted that the blog “raise[d]

‘issues related to’ services in the marketplace” by complaining about the

development and management of the subdivision and that the email also raised

“issues related to [the developer’s] services as a neighborhood developer.” Id. at

                                        32
894–95. The Supreme Court also held that the allegedly defamatory comments

related to “an issue related to . . . environmental, economic, or community well-

being,” because the allegations suggested the homeowners’ association had “not

follow[ed] city ordinances on tree preservation.” Id. at 895–96

      In ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. 2017)

the Supreme Court held that communications about Coleman, a former

ExxonMobil Pipeline Company (“ExxonMobil”) employee who allegedly failed to

“gauge” a storage tank but reported that he did so, were “made in connection with

a matter of public concern.”20 Id. at 897. After Coleman was terminated, he sued

his former employer and supervisors for defamation.          Id.   He claimed that

statements made about his termination were untrue because he had gauged the tank

at issue and because, contrary to his supervisor’s statement, there were documents

to support his version of the incident. Id. ExxonMobil filed a TCPA motion to

dismiss.   The court of appeals held ExxonMobil did not establish the TCPA

applied to the suit.    Id.   The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he

statements, although private and among [ExxonMobil] employees, related to a

‘matter of public concern’ because they concerned [a former employee’s] alleged

failure to gauge tank 7840, a process completed, at least in part, to reduce the

20
      Coleman was assigned to perform preventative maintenance, “offload shipments
      from incoming trucks, and record the fluid volume of various petroleum products
      and additives in storage tanks each night.” ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman,
      512 S.W.3d 895, 897 (Tex. 2017). The process is called “gauging the tanks.” Id.

                                         33
potential environmental, health, safety, and economic risks associated with noxious

and flammable chemicals overfilling and spilling onto the ground.” Id. at 901.

The Court observed that “the challenged statements constitute speech the

Legislature intended to safeguard through the TCPA” because they were either

oral, written, or electronic. Id.21

      Adams and Coleman involved the former version of the TCPA, which

applied a less exacting standard and included a broader definition of the phrase a

“matter of public concern.” The amended statute no longer defines a “matter of

public concern” to include an issue related to “environmental, economic, or

community well being.”22 Moreover, unlike Adams and Coleman, the claims here

do not involve defamatory statements or statements at all. As we have already

concluded, the claims against Rivas arise from his alleged conduct in failing to

disclose problems with the bulkhead system. And they concern Rivas’ alleged

21
      The Supreme Court did not express an opinion on whether the communications
      “were made in the exercise of the right of association under the TCPA.” Id. at
      902.
22
      The definition of “public concern” changed in the amended version. See TEX.
      CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(2). The 2019 amendment defines “matter of
      public concern” as “a statement or activity regarding: (A) a public official, public
      figure, or other person who has drawn substantial public attention due to the
      person's official acts, fame, notoriety, or celebrity; (B) a matter of political, social,
      or other interest to the community; or (C) a subject of concern to the public.” Act
      of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 378, § 1, sec. 27.001(7), 2019 TEX. SESS.
      LAW SERV. 684, 685. Previously, a “matter of public concern” was defined as “an
      issue related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-
      being; the government; a public official or public figure; or a good, product, or
      service in the marketplace.”

                                             34
knowledge of the bulkhead issues, not his opinion or concern regarding such

matters.

      We thus hold that Rivas did not satisfy his burden to establish that Lake

Shore’s legal action against him is based on or in response to his right of

association or his right to free speech.23

      We overrule Rivas’ first issue.24

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s order denying Rivas’ TCPA motion to dismiss.

                                                  Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.

23
      Because we conclude there is no “statement or activity” giving rise to Lake
      Shore’s legal action against Rivas, we do not address whether the issues involved
      concern “(B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or (C)
      a subject of concern to the public.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
      § 27.001(7).
24
      Given our disposition, we need not address Rivas’ second issue that the trial court
      erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees.

                                             35