Court Opinion

ID: 9564526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:02:16.267544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:28.303311
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I dissent.
This court has repeatedly said, in accord with prevailing judicial opinion elsewhere, that conflicts in labor-management relations can best be controlled, not by the courts but by the Legislature. (Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 599, 610 [98 P. 1027,16 Ann.Cas. 1165, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 550]; C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 389, 400, 403 [106 P.2d 414]; Magill Bros. v. Building Service etc. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506, 510 [127 P.2d 542] ; James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 729, 730 [155 P.2d 329,160 A.L.R. 900] ; Park & T. I. Corp. v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 609 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].) Since those decisions were rendered the Legislature has acted, not once but twice in declaring the “hot cargo” and “secondary boy*662cott” unlawful labor practices and has provided redress by civil action.
The first act was passed in 1941 (Stats. 1941, p. 2079). The referendum was invoked against it and the effective date of the act was postponed until its approval by the electors of the state at the general election in November, 1942. During the campaign for and against it the terms of the enactment were extensively discussed, and its meaning and effect were thoroughly understood. That act contained a provision limiting its effective duration until May 1, 1943, and thereafter during the period of war between the United States and any foreign power.
The last session of the Legislature (Stats. 1947, p. 844, ch. 278) eliminated the emergency provision but without changing the law as enacted in 1941. This was done after extensive discussion and hearings during the legislative session. Now, after the Legislature has twice so acted and the electors of the state have approved the law, this court proceeds to strike it down for reasons which I deem insufficient and not compelled by any constitutional provision or by any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The petitioner, W. T. Blaney, sought his release from restraint under a commitment for contempt of an injunctive order issued in an action for damages and injunctive relief brought in the Superior Court in Los Angeles County pursuant to sections 1131-1136 of the Labor Code commonly called the “Hot Cargo and Secondary Boycott Act” (Stats. 1941, p. 2079). The action had been brought by one Ramser, doing business as the Upholstery Supply Company, against specified drivers’ and teamsters’ unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, various freight lines, and other defendants including the petitioner individually and as business representative of one of the unions. I will refer to the parties in that action as “plaintiff” and “defendants.”
The plaintiff’s plant was being picketed because of a strike by his employees. The order, dated April 18, 1946, restrained the unions and their affiliates from making any combination or agreement which would cause or attempt to cause employees of any supplier or customer or carrier of the plaintiff to cease performing services for any such employer for the purpose of causing the latter to refrain from furnishing supplies to or purchasing supplies from the plaintiff, or carrying or shipping freight or merchandise for the *663plaintiff. The order excepted from its operation peaceful picketing when not done pursuant to the prohibited combination or agreement. The court thereby sought to enjoin combinations or agreements in aid of threatened “hot cargo” operations or “secondary boycott” of the plaintiff’s business, by which the employees of his carriers, suppliers and customers might be induced by picketing or otherwise to prevent their employers from carrying out their contracts with the plaintiff, without affecting the peaceful picketing of the plaintiff’s plant by his employees. After hearing on a citation for contempt, the court found that the petitioner, in combination with others, had committed acts in violation of the order, and imposed both fine and imprisonment.
The acts restrained and found to have been committed were within the definition of “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott” declared unlawful by sections 1131 et seq., of the Labor Code. This proceeding therefore presented for determination certain questions concerning the constitutionality of the Hot Cargo and Secondary Boycott Act.
By section 1131 of the Labor Code the “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott” are declared to be unlawful. Section 1132 also declares unlawful any act, combination or agreement which directly or indirectly causes, induces or compels a violation of any provision of the act, or inflicts loss, injury or damage to anyone because of his refusal to violate any provision of the act. Section 1133 provides for recovery of damages and injunctive relief.
Section 1134 defines (a) “hot cargo” as “any combination or agreement resulting in a refusal by employees to handle goods or to perform any services for their employer because of a dispute between some other employer and. his employees or a labor organization or any combination or agreement resulting in a refusal by employers to handle goods or perform any services for another employer because of an agreement between such other employer and his employees or a labor organization”; and (b) secondary boycott as “any combination or agreement to cease performing, or to cause any employee to cease performing any services for any employer, or to cause any loss or injury to such employer, or to his employees, for the purpose of inducing or compelling such employer to refrain from doing business with, or handling the products of any other employer because of a dispute between the latter and his employees or a labor or*664ganization. or any combination or agreement to cease performing, or to cause any employer to cease performing any services for another employer, or to cause any loss or injury to such other employer, or to his employees, for the purpose of inducing or compelling such other employer to refrain from doing business with, or handling the products of any other employer, because of an agreement between the latter and his employees or a labor organization.” The remaining subdivisions of that section define labor organization, employer and employee.
Section 1135 states that the act shall be in effect until May 1, 1943, and thereafter “ (a) During the continuance of the existence of the National emergency declared by the President of the United States to exist, by his proclamation issued under date of September 8, 1939. (b) During any period of war between the United States of America and any foreign power, legally declared to exist.”
Section 1136 is a severability clause, providing that if any provision, or the application of such provision to particular persons or circumstances should be held invalid, the remainder of the act, or its application to persons or circumstances otherwise shall not be affected thereby.
There is no attack upon the findings of the court, nor upon their sufficiency to support the judgment in the contempt proceeding if the statute be deemed a valid exercise of legislative power. Since the acts (combinations and agreements) restrained and found to have been committed come within the definitions of “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott” contained in section 1134, the court is not confronted with the necessity of determining the effect of section 1132. The validity of that section is not involved under the facts in this case.
The question then is whether combinations and agreements in furtherance of “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott” operations, as defined by section 1134, may be declared unlawful by the Legislature, and legal and equitable redress afforded for and to prevent injury therefrom. The petitioner contends that that legislative power does not exist because its exercise interferes with claimed freedom of speech in connection with a “secondary boycott,” including peaceably conducted picketing. In other words, the petitioner invokes the constitutional guarantee of free speech as an inherent right to pursue, in union disputes with an employer, secondary *665coercive measures against the employer’s business, including the picketing of his carriers, suppliers and customers if peaceably conducted. But, as stated in the early case of Pierce v. Stablemen’s Union (1909), 156 Cal. 70, at page 78 [103 P. 324], no sanctity attaches to a trade union which puts it above the law or which confers upon it rights not enjoyed by any other individual or association.
The alleged constitutional issue is provoked by judicial utterances that picketing is a form of free speech to be protected under constitutional guaranties. (Senn v. Tile Layers’ Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468 [57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229]; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104] ; American Fed. of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 [61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855]; In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488 [122 P.2d 22].) It does not follow, and the courts have not declared, that peaceful picketing may never become actionable or enjoinable.
The present statute declares tortious (with appropriate legal and equitable redress) conduct, which in the absence of statute, courts generally have held to be tortious, but which in a minority of jurisdictions the courts have, in the absence of a permissive statute, regarded as nonactionable and nonenjoinable. (See vol. 1, Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, §§ 123, 150 and cases cited; see, also, article, Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, reprinted in Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, April, 1947, Cumulative Supp., p. 70, tracing the emergence and history of the identification of picketing with the right of free speech.) Heretofore this court, in the absence of statute, has adopted the minority view in dealing with “secondary boycott” as a means of economic coercion in labor disputes. (Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, supra, 154 Cal. 581; Pierce v. Stablemen’s Union, supra, 156 Cal. 70.) But, as hereinbefore stated, this court has repeatedly and uniformly declared that such a matter was one for legislative cognizance, and that since the Legislature had not acted the courts were left without legislative guidance in the determination thereof.
Picketing for an unlawful purpose may be enjoined, (James v. Marinship Corp., supra, 25 Cal.2d 721; Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746 [155 P.2d 343]; Park & T. I. Corp. v. International etc. Teamsters, supra, 27 Cal.2d 599.)
*666Although generally, in the absence of statute, the court may not define the boundaries of an industrial dispute, the Legislature unquestionably has the power in the interests of the public welfare to prescribe reasonable limits upon the use of economic weapons by either side in industrial controversy. In In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91, at 101 [168 P. 2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675], it was definitely recognized that the constitutionally protected right of free speech is not an absolute right; that the right does not carry with it into the conduct of businesses and professions total immunity from regulation in the performance of acts as to which speech is a mere incident or a means of accomplishment; and that a right to speak for the purpose of profit may not be indulged in derogation of the police power of the state.
This court in approving “secondary boycott” or other coercive measures as lawful union activities has repeatedly recognized the legislative power to change the policy of the state. This is evidenced by the following quotations from our decisions:
“ [A]nd as with regard to other questions of economic or political aspect, the remedy, if a remedy is needed, must be found by the legislature.” (Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, supra, 154 Cal. 581, 599.) And at page 610, per Sloss, J. concurring, “But if there be, in such combinations, evils which should be redressed, the remedy is to be sought, as to some extent it has been sought, by legislation. If the conditions require new laws, those laws should be made by the law-making power, not by the courts.”
“It may very well be that combination and organization on one side or the other places in the hands of a few persons an immense power which, in the general welfare, ought to be limited and controlled. But these are considerations for the law-making power, not for courts.” (C. S. Smith, Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, supra, 16 Cal.2d 389, 400.) And at page 403, “The fear that they [labor unions] have grown so strong as to endanger vital civil liberties and disrupt the functioning of our economic system is an argument exclusively for the consideration of the legislature.”
“The basis for equity’s intervention in cases such as this [enjoining untruthful statements in picketing] rests upon the fact that picketing is one of the forms of collective labor activity which seeks to exert economic pressure upon an employer. (See Restatement, Torts, § 796, et seq.) . . . Such *667collective labor activity is permissible only when conducted according to the requirements imposed by law, and if in violation of such requirements, picketing is subject under ordinary circumstances to the restraint of a court of equity. . . . The standards imposed for determining whether picketing is lawful and permissible, or unlawful and enjoinable, are matters of state law which have varied from time to time and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” (Magill Bros. v. Building Service etc. Union, supra, 20 Cal.2d 506, 510.)
“Although recent decisions in the United States Supreme Court hold that a state cannot deprive labor unions of the right of free speech through peaceful picketing . . . these decisions do not deny a state the power to protect against abuses of the right. In two recent cases the court upheld the state’s power to limit peaceful picketing both as to place and as to the economic relationship of the industry picketed (Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin E. B. Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154]; Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143]). ...” (James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 729 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900].) And in the same case at page 730 it was said: “Thus a state may impose limits on picketing or other concerted action if the ‘end sought’ is not permissible under state law and public policy, though any such limitations are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court and will be annulled if they unreasonably interfere with labor’s right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute.”
Picketing involves more than speech. This was effectively demonstrated in Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143], where the union, endeavoring to obtain employment of union carpenters and painters in the construction of a building in Houston, Texas, picketed the “wholly unconnected” restaurant business of the owner of the building under construction. The Supreme Court, in upholding an injunction restraining the picketing in violation of a Texas anti-trust law, said (at p. 727) : “It is true that by peaceful picketing workingmen communicate their grievances. As a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute, peaceful picketing may be a phase of the constitutional right of free utterance. But the recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to the dispute. Re*668striction of picketing to the area of the industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other traditional modes of communication. To deny to the states the power to draw this line is to write into the Constitution the notion that every instance of peaceful picketing—anywhere and under any circumstances—is necessarily a phase of the controversy which provoked the picketing. Such a view of the Due Process Clause would compel the states to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose.
“In forbidding such conscription of neutrals, in the circumstances of the ease before us, Texas represents the prevailing, and probably the unanimous, policy of the states. [Citing Teller and other writers.] We hold that the Constitution does not forbid Texas to draw the line which has been drawn here. To hold otherwise would be to transmute vital constitutional liberties into doctrinaire dogma. We must be mindful that ‘the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the interests of the society in which they exist. This is but an instance of the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.’ Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,103,104 [60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093].
“It is not for us to assess the wisdom of the policy underlying the law of Texas. Our duty is at an end when we find that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny her the power to enact that policy into law.”
I note without extended comment other cases in which that power of the state has also been recognized, such as Bakery & Pastry Drivers, etc. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 [62 S.Ct. 816, 86 L.Ed. 1178] : “A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual,” and at page 776, “Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech”; Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154], upholding the board’s order to desist from mass picketing and other acts, under the Wisconsin Employment Peace (unfair labor practices) Act, as (at p. 751) “not basically different from the common situation where a State takes steps to prevent breaches of the peace in connection with labor disputes”; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 [41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349, 16 *669A.L.R. 196], recognizing the legislative power to declare the public policy in regard to restraints or combinations engaging in secondary boycott operations; Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 [47 S.Ct. 86, 71 L.Ed. 248], upholding a statute of Kansas making it unlawful to conspire to induce others to quit their employment for the purpose and with the intent to hinder, delay, limit or suspend the operation of mining, and making it a felony for an officer of a labor union wilfully to use the power or influence of his office to induce another to violate the act.
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-530 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430], relied on by the petitioner, it was said: “The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this Court to say where the individual’s freedom ends and the State’s power begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard governs the choice. . . . For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger.” That case involved what the majority considered to be the bare right to make a public address, purportedly restricted by a statute prohibiting solicitation of union membership by a labor union organizer without first obtaining an organizer’s card. The “present danger” test may be deemed appropriate to such a situation because no more than free speech or free assembly was involved. The present case, involving something more than mere speech, is therefore not ruled by that test but is governed by the considerations dwelt upon in the Ritter’s Cafe and other similar cases. For, as likewise said in the Thomas v. Collins, case, supra, at pages 537-538, “When to this persuasion other things are added which bring about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the right has been passed”; and, as Justice Douglas concurring, at pages 543-544, said: “No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech pro*670tected by the First Amendment. This is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he espouses.”
The statute in the present ease does not cut off other practicable, effective means whereby those interested—including the employees directly affected—may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute. It cannot be overemphasized that the act speaks against combinations and agreements as therein defined, and does not purport to include the activities of organized labor by direct attack and primary boycott (cf. In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488), against the employer with whom a dispute is in progress. Many anti-trust and similar laws attest the constitutional power of legislatures to protect the public from acts pursuant to combination, conspiracy or agreement, which otherwise would be deemed lawful. “The great preponderance of judicial authority holds that individual blameless acts may become illegal if done in combination.” (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, vol. 1, pp. 37-38, and cases cited.) Thus the means essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter of public concern are preserved and safeguarded by other modes of communication than the declared unlawful agreements and combinations. (Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. 88, at pp. 103-104) ; nor does the act prohibit peaceful picketing as such (cf. Carlson v. California, supra, 310 U.S. 106; In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488).
No one will deny that the right to carry on a business is a right to be protected under fundamental law. (Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra, 254 U.S. 443, 465; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 [42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254].) It is a right equally entitled to recognition under the law as the right of a worker to decide when and where and for what wages he will labor, and to organize with other workers for the protection of mutual interests. Those rights are correlative in the sense that neither may be carried on unbridled and without giving some heed to their effect upon the participants and upon the welfare of the community. The community has a direct and vital interest in the matter. The general principles were stated by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Traux v. Corrigan, supra (257 U.S. at pp. 355 et seq.) in the following language: “Practically every change in the law governing the relation of employer and employee must abridge, *671in some respect, the liberty or property of one of the parties— if liberty and property be measured by the standard of the law theretofore prevailing. If such changes are made by acts of the Legislature, we call the modification an exercise of the police power. And, although the change may involve interference with existing liberty and property of individuals, the statute will not be declared a violation of the due process clause, unless the court finds that the interference is arbitrary or unreasonable or that, considered as a means, the measure has no real or substantial relation of cause to a permissible end. Nor will such changes in the law governing contests between employer and employee be held to be violative of the equal protection clause merely because the liberty or property of individuals in other relations to each other (for instance, as competitors in trade or as vendor and purchaser) would not, under similar circumstances, be subject to like abridgment. Few laws are of universal application. It is of the nature of our law that it has dealt not with man in general, but with him in relationships. . . . That the relation of employer and employee affords a constitutional basis for legislation applicable only to persons standing in that relation has been repeatedly held by this court. . . . Nearly all legislation involves a weighing of public needs as against private desires, and likewise a weighing of relative social values. Since government is not an exact science, prevailing public opinion concerning the evils and the remedy is among the important facts deserving consideration, particularly when the public conviction is both deep-seated and widespread and has been reached after deliberation. . . . The divergence of opinion in this difficult field of governmental action should admonish us not to declare a rule arbitrary and unreasonable merely because we are convinced that it is fraught with danger to the public weal, and thus to close the door to experiment within the law.”
It should not be concluded that the state lacks the power to select for its citizens that one of the conflicting views regarding “secondary boycott” and “hot cargo” which the Legislature considers will best meet conditions and promote the public welfare. As said in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 296 [61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200], “That other states have chosen a different path in such a situation indicates differences of social view in a domain in which states are free to shape their local policy. . . . (At p. 299.) Just because these industrial conflicts raise *672anxious difficulties, it is most important for us not to intrude into the realm of policy-making by reading our own notions into the Constitution.”
The direction taken by the Legislature, within its power as in this case, is not a matter with which this court should interfere. The courts are not absolute architects of public policy. That function resides primarily in the Legislature, whose enactments the courts may not override except in cases of clear violation of constitutional guaranties.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Legislature may constitutionally adopt “the prevailing, and probably unanimous, policy of the states” (Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, supra, 315 U.S. 722, 728) when it determines that economic conditions point to the desirability of such a policy. Facts relating to the prevailing economic and social conditions and the desirability of the change in state policy to safeguard the welfare of the state, were presented to and fully considered by the Legislature. That this is so appears from the language of section 2 of the act which reads: “This act is enacted for the purpose of preserving tranquillity among the citizens of this commonwealth and to insure during this present critical period of National emergency and intensive armament the unobstructed production and distribution of the products of our factories and fields, for the continued protection and preservation of our democratic way of life and for the general welfare of the people of this State.” Both houses of the Legislature were so convinced of the necessity for the change that they passed the act of 1941 over the governor’s veto. That the change in policy represented the will of the people of the state is demonstrated by the fact that the act was adopted by referendum vote at the November, 1942, general election, after extensive public debate on the subject. The act is therefore clearly expressive of both the legislative and the popular determination. It is within common knowledge that the stopping of businesses which furnish vital services and essential commodities is adverse to the public tranquility, health and welfare. It would be anomalous indeed to hold that the Legislature had no power to regulate such matters because a labor dispute was involved. The Constitution does not freeze the use of economic weapons in industrial warfare beyond legislative control.
The act was in effect in accordance with its terms (§ 1135) at the time of the events occurring herein and the commitment of the petitioner, and until the expiration of the declared *673emergency (which may be deemed to have been July 25, 1947, when the President of the United States officially declared the termination of the wars which gave rise to the measure), prior to which the Legislature repealed section 1135 limiting the duration of the act to the war emergency and made the rest of the act permanent (Stats. 1947, p.---, ch. 278, Sen. Bill 342). By section 2 of the repealing act it was declared: “This act is enacted for the purpose of permanently preserving tranquillity among the citizens of this State and to insure the unobstructed production and distribution of the products of our factories and fields, for the continued and permanent protection and preservation of our democratic way of life and the public peace, health, safety and general welfare of the people of this State.”
According to the majority view, the California enactment and the restraining order issued pursuant thereto are “too sweeping, vague and uncertain,” with the main reliance on In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488. That case states familiar rules applicable to the consideration of criminal ordinances and statutes. Here we are not dealing with a criminal statute. There is no more difficulty in determining what conduct will be considered a wrong pursuant to the definitions contained in the statute (§ 1134) than is experienced in other cases involving a private actionable wrong. Difference of opinion as to whether facts amount in law to a breach of the duty or a standard set up by a statute are not infrequent. (See, for example, Truax v. Corrigan, supra, 257 U.S. 312, and Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, supra, 312 U.S. 287, holding that violence could not be made lawful by statute and showing that disagreement may ensue as to whether facts alleged amounted to violence; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 [61 S.Ct. 463, 85 L.Ed. 788], and Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 [65 S.Ct. 1545, 89 L.Ed. 1954], where there was disagreement as to whether the undisputed conduct constituted a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, or came within the exception of section 20 of the Clayton Act as redefined by the NorrisLaGuardia Act.) The difficulty asserted in this ease is not a proper ground for holding the act unconstitutional. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Petrillo, [June 23, 1947], --- U.S. --[67 S.Ct. 1538, --- L.Ed. ---], is especially noteworthy *674in this connection. The defendant in that case was charged with the violation of section 506 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stats. 1064, 1102, as amended), providing punishment by the imprisonment or fine of anyone who by the use of force, violence, intimidation or duress should coerce a licensee to employ persons “in excess of the number of employees needed” to perform actual services. One of the grounds of alleged unconstitutionality was that the act defined a crime in terms excessively vague. The court said: “Clearer and more precise language might have been framed by Congress to express what it meant by ‘number of employees needed.' But none occurs to us, nor has any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what appears to have been the Congressional purpose. The argument really seems to be that it is impossible for a jury or court ever to determine how many employees a business needs, and that, therefore, no statutory language could meet the problem Congress had in mind. If this argument should be accepted, the result would be that no Legislature could make it an.offense for a person to compel another to hire employees, no matter how unnecessary they were, and however desirable a Legislature might consider suppression of the practice to be.
“The Constitution presents no such insuperable obstacle to legislation. We think that the language Congress used provides an adequate warning as to what conduct falls under its ban, and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress. That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense. Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 285, 286 [65 S.Ct. 666, 89 L.Ed. 944]. It would strain the requirement for certainty in criminal law standards too near the breaking point to say that it was impossible judicially to determine whether a person knew when he was wilfully attempting to compel another to hire unneeded employees. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 [65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495]; United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 522, 524, 525 [62 S.Ct. 374, 86 L.Ed. 383]. The Constitution has erected procedural safeguards to protect against conviction for crime except for violation of laws which have clearly defined conduct thereafter to be punished ; but the Constitution does not require impossible stand*675ards. The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more.”
It may be noted that by the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (ch. 120, Public Law 101), including amendment of the National Labor Relations Act, the Congress has declared “secondary boycott” operations by concerted action to be an unfair labor practice with provisions for civil remedies. That legislation is cast in language the same in substance and effect as section 1134 here under consideration.
As stated, the statute here involved is not a criminal statute. It defines “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott” combinations and agreements in language which fits those operations as they are commonly practiced. As so defined they are declared to be actionable civil wrongs and enjoinable. In the present proceeding the trial court apparently experienced no difficulty in arriving at its findings that the petitioner with others had actually caused “employees of suppliers, customers and carriers of the plaintiff to cease performing services” for their employers; and had prevented such employers “from doing any business with plaintiff or purchasing any supplies from plaintiff or carrying, shipping or receiving any freight or merchandise to or from plaintiff and his place of business.” The court’s findings and order show a clear understanding of the legislative definitions. Likewise here, as in the Petrillo case, no one has suggested how the draftsmanship of those definitions might be improved. No contention is made that the petitioner’s acts, as found by the court, were not clearly embraced within the language of the definitions. There is therefore no such difficulty with the language as would prevent the administration of the act in accord with the legislative and popular intent. That intent is to prevent activities of persons in concert and combinations from bringing coercion to bear upon employees to stop work insofar as it would interfere with the rights of neutrals, that is, those who are not directly involved in the particular labor dispute. By the act the Legislature has determined, regardless of the prior declared emergency, and notwithstanding prior judicial declarations, that the carrying on of “secondary” operations by “com*676binations” of individuals as defined in section 1134 is contrary to the public interest and unlawful. In my opinion, it was within the constitutional power of the Legislature so to determine. The language of sections 1131 and 1134, the sections pertinent to the facts of this case, is certain and is readily understood. Those sections clearly and fully disclose the legislative intent and purpose to prohibit the activities which were enjoined, and there is therefore no reason at this time to resolve any question of severability arising under section 1136.
The writ should be discharged and the petitioner remanded.