Court Opinion

ID: 9953560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:20:49.768368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:55.171767
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1058-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LUIS MAISONET, a/k/a
LUIS A. MAISONET,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided March 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright and Whipple.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 16-11-2635.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   William E. Reynolds, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Matthew T. Mills, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Luis Maisonet appeals from an October 6, 2022 order denying

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm, substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Donna M. Taylor, J.S.C.

in her cogent written opinion.

      The circumstances leading to defendant's convictions and sentence are set

forth in our unpublished opinion from defendant's direct appeal.         State v.

Maisonet, No. A-3513-17 (App. Div. May 31, 2019) (slip op. at 1-3). Therefore,

we need only summarize the salient facts.

      Judge Taylor presided over defendant's jury trial in 2017. At trial, the

State established that on September 1, 2016, defendant shot and killed his former

girlfriend's boyfriend, Christopher Romero, while Romero was working at a

mall in Atlantic City. Maisonet, slip op. at 2. Defendant was convicted of: first-

degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); second-degree possession of a

firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and

fourth-degree aggravated assault, pointing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4).

Id. at 1. He was tried and convicted separately on the charge of second-degree

certain persons not to have a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). Ibid.

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      Following defendant's direct appeal, we affirmed his convictions and

sentence. Id. at 13. The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed his convictions

and sentence. State v. Maisonet, 245 N.J. 552, 572 (2021).

      In May 2021, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, claiming trial

counsel failed to communicate with him, "only visited [him] once at the jail,

and . . . failed to properly update [defendant] on [his] case." Subsequently,

assigned counsel submitted a brief incorporating defendant's arguments and

alleging trial counsel was ineffective for "fail[ing] to withdraw as counsel when

communications between [defendant and trial counsel] broke down."

      After hearing argument on the petition, Judge Taylor entered an order on

October 6, 2022, denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing. In a

written opinion accompanying the order, the judge rejected defendant's

ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims and concluded he failed to

establish a prima facie case of IAC under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 671 (1984) and State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 44 (1987). 1

1
  In Fritz, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Strickland test. 105 N.J.
at 58.
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      Initially, Judge Taylor found defendant failed to satisfy the first Strickland

prong because he did not demonstrate trial counsel's performance was deficient.

She explained:

            defendant . . . provided [no] evidence that trial counsel
            was deficient []or fell below competency. . . . [Also],
            defendant . . . provided no evidence of [a] breakdown
            in comm[unication] with trial counsel.

                    Conversely, there is evidence of trial counsel's
            efforts to confer with defendant throughout the
            trial. . . .

                   Additionally, there is ample evidence to support
            that trial counsel provided competen[t] representation
            during the trial. . . . [T]rial counsel filed various
            motions to preclude evidence that could be prejudicial
            and refuted the State's motions to introduce
            evidence. . . . Trial counsel was also attentive during
            the presentation of the State's case [and] on at least nine
            occasions[,] objected to questions, statements, and
            evidence presented by the State.

                  Defendant . . . failed to provide evidence . . . trial
            counsel was ineffective in her representation of
            defendant and, therefore, . . . failed to satisfy the first
            prong of Strick[la]nd.

      Turning to the second Strickland prong, Judge Taylor found defendant

failed to show trial counsel's alleged deficient performance prejudiced his

defense.   She specifically rejected defendant's claim that a "breakdown in

communication between defendant and trial counsel" undermined their "ability

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to effectively communicate strategies and discuss important decisions," thereby

"depriv[ing] defendant of a fair trial." Moreover, the judge concluded:

            there [wa]s ample evidence to support that defendant
            had a fair trial with competen[t] counsel, despite
            counsel not being to . . . defendant's choosing.

                   Further, this case had overwhelming evidence
            against . . . defendant, which included multiple
            witnesses to the shooting of the victim, the autopsy
            report confirming the gunshot wounds as the cause of
            death, forensic evidence connecting the revolver found
            in defendant's possession with the bullet recovered
            from the victim's back, a clear motive confirmed with
            statements and text messages from . . . defendant, and
            prior violent behavior from . . . defendant to[ward] the
            victim. There was no confusion about what occurred in
            this case[,] . . . nor the jury' s verdict at the end of trial.
            There was no prejudice and no unjust result and,
            therefore, the second prong of Strickland has not been
            met by . . . defendant.

      Finally, Judge Taylor found "no evidentiary hearing [wa]s required as

defendant ha[d] not established a prima facie case in support of [PCR]." She

also determined "[t]he evidence against defendant [wa]s overwhelming and any

issues of disputed facts c[ould] be resolved by reference to the existing record."

Further, the judge concluded:

            [t]his was a murder with a clear motive, a clear victim,
            multiple witnesses, forensics, and a murder weapon.
            There [wa]s no confusion about what occurred[,] . . .
            nor was the[re] prejudice or an unjust result. . . .
            [D]efendant's allegations are baseless, vague, and

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            conclusory, and a hearing will not aid in this [c]ourt's
            analysis of [his] entitlement to [PCR].

      On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:

            [DEFENDANT]   IS   ENTITLED    TO    AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
            COUNSEL      RENDERED       INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO COMMUNICATE
            WITH HIM ADEQUATELY AND PROVIDE AND
            REVIEW DISCOVERY.

This argument fails.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo, but generally

defer to its factual findings when those findings are "supported by adequate,

substantial[,] and credible evidence." State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415 (2004)

(quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549 (2004)). When

an evidentiary hearing has not already been held, we may "conduct a de novo

review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id.

at 421. However, we review a trial court's decision to deny a PCR petition

without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. State v. Preciose, 129

N.J. 451, 462 (1992).

      To succeed on a claim of IAC, a defendant must satisfy the two-prong test

enunciated in Strickland by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan,

209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). Under the first Strickland prong, a defendant must

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show    counsel's   performance     "fell       below   an   objective   standard   of

reasonableness" and "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Because a reviewing court "must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance," "the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel]

'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation

omitted). "The quality of counsel's performance cannot be fairly assessed by

focusing on a handful of issues while ignoring the totality of counsel's

performance in the context of the State's evidence of defendant's guilt." State v.

Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 165

(1991)).

       To satisfy the second Strickland prong, a defendant must show counsel's

alleged "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687. This

means "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,

a trial whose result is reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show

the errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. "An error

by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside

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the judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id.

at 691. Importantly, failure to satisfy either Strickland prong requires the denial

of a PCR petition. Id. at 700.

      A defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing by

simply raising a PCR claim. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App.

Div. 1999). To obtain an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, "a prima facie case" for relief, "material issues

of disputed fact," and show "that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve

the claims." R. 3:22-10(b).

      "A 'prima facie case' requires that a defendant 'demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits[,]' . . . and must

be supported by 'specific facts and evidence supporting his [or her] allegations.'"

State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016) (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013)). "If the [PCR] court

perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of

whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need

not be granted." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)

(omission in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997)).

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Also, if a defendant's "allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative[,]"

the defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Porter, 216 N.J. at 355

(quoting Marshall, 148 N.J. at 158). A defendant "must do more than make bald

assertions . . . . [A defendant] must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate

counsel's alleged substandard performance." Ibid. (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J.

Super. at 170).

      Guided by these standards, we have no reason to disturb the October 6,

2022 order. Accordingly, we affirm the order substantially for the reasons set

forth in Judge Taylor's thoughtful written opinion.

      Affirmed.

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