Court Opinion

ID: 9489917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:27:50.423527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:47.958860
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The order as written and explained did not clearly prohibit McMahon’s conduct. The order’s failure to specify anything other than exclusion from the courtroom cannot be salvaged by evi*646dence suggesting that McMahon believed the order to be broader in scope. This is a criminal contempt case, and the existence of a clear and specific order was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. I would therefore reverse McMahon’s conviction.
I.
The written sequestration order, entered pretrial, provided that “the Defendant’s witnesses will be excluded from the courtroom.” Just before opening statements were to begin, the prosecutor noticed that McMahon, who was listed as a defense witness, was in the courtroom. The prosecutor, after telling the court he believed McMahon’s “role in this case will become ... somewhat critical,” asked that McMahon be excluded. The court agreed and its oral order was simply, “He will have to leave the courtroom.” McMahon obeyed and later testified for the defense. McMahon was convicted of criminal contempt for violating the sequestration order because he got reports of the trial proceedings from his secretary and read the daily transcript.
As the majority recognizes, to convict McMahon- for criminal contempt the government had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a willful (2) violation (8) of “a decree which was definite, clear, specific, and left no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it was addressed.” Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 129 (4th Cir.1977). The problem here is that the majority believes (as did the district court) that because there was evidence to show that McMahon believed he was guilty, he necessarily violated an order that was definite, clear and specific. Thus, the majority conflates the specificity and willfulness elements with the result that specificity drops out of the picture. The majority confirms its error when it says that to determine whether the order has the requisite specificity, “[t]he question we must resolve is whether the district court clearly erred in concluding that McMahon ... knew that his conduct violated the sequestration order.” Ante at 642-43.
Because of the potency of the contempt power, I believe it is dangerous to ease the government’s burden of proof in such a significant way. Moreover, there is really no precedent for it. Our Richmond Black Police Officers case plainly requires both that the defendant act willfully and that the order be sufficiently specific. Other cases cited by the majority also separate these two requirements. See Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 800, 808 (2d Cir.1981) (“[A] person cannot be held in contempt of an order if he does not have knowledge of the order or if the terms of the order are unclear or ambiguous_”) (citations omitted), aff'd after remand, 673 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832, 103 S.Ct. 73, 74 L.Ed.2d 71 (1982); United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.1974) (stating that the court must determine “whether the order is sufficiently specific and ,.. whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was wrongful”); United States v. Hodge, 894 F.Supp. 648, 651 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“To hold a person in criminal contempt, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the court entered a reasonably specific order; (2) defendant knew of that order; (3) defendant violated that order; and (4) his violation was willful.”).
The district court here glossed over the specificity problem with findings such as “[t]he sequestration order is a product of common sense,” “an instruction that [McMahon] could not circumvent the sequestration order by reviewing trial transcripts or receiving reports from his secretary would simply have stated the obvious,” McMahon “is no dummy,” and his explanations were “unworthy of credence.” In other words, McMahon believed he was doing wrong, so the order was therefore specific enough. But proving that McMahon believed his conduct was wrongful should go to the willfulness element; it should not be sufficient to prove specificity. By affirming the district court’s approach, the majority improperly endorses the conflation of the willfulness and specificity elements, with willfulness counting for both.
In using the evidence that McMahon acted willfully to confirm that the order was clear, the majority makes the same error as the *647district court in United States v. NYNEX Corp., 814 F.Supp. 133 (D.D.C.1993). In that criminal contempt case the district court found NYNEX to be in violation of an earlier consent decree that prohibited regional telephone companies such as NYNEX from providing “information services.” The district court concluded that because several NYNEX employees had feared that the company was in violation of the decree, the decree was undoubtedly clear. See id. at 139-40. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the employees’ belief of violation was “insufficient evidence to support the District Court’s conclusion that the clarity element was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. NYNEX Corp., 8 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C.Cir.1993). The court analyzed the district court’s error as follows:
From our vantage point, the heart of the problem in this case is that the District Court apparently assumed that, because several NYNEX officials feared that the MCI service bureau might be a prohibited information service, the Consent Decree was undoubtedly clear with respect to the question at issue.... In other words, the District Court seemed to think that if NYNEX officials acted willfully they necessarily violated a clear order of the court. This reasoning improperly conflates the elements of criminal contempt, and it unacceptably alters the Government’s burden of proof.
Id. at 54 *
At bottom, the majority’s approach avoids any critical examination of the actual language of the sequestration order. I turn to that -in the next part.
II.
The district court issued its sequestration order under Fed.R.Evid. 615, which states: “At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion.” The text of the rule only prohibits prospective witnesses from entering the courtroom to hear testimony of other witnesses. See 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, and Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1029 (6th ed. 1994) (“In our view, Rule 615 by its terms applies only to the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom.”). Despite the narrowness of the text, trial courts are free to broaden the scope of their orders beyond courtroom exclusion. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1176 (1st Cir.1993) (“In sum, [Rule 615] demarcates a compact procedural heartland, but leaves appreciable room for judicial innovation beyond the perimeters of that which the rule explicitly requires.”), cert. denied 512 U.S. 1223, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994); Michael Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence § 6611, at 216-28 (interim ed. 1992) (“While Rule 615 provides solely for the exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom, the court may take further measures of separation designed to prevent communication between witnesses, such as ordering them to remain physically apart, ordering them not to discuss the case with one another or with any *648attorney, and ordering them not to read a transcript of' the trial testimony of other witnesses.”); 1 John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 50, at 191 (4th ed.1992) (same).
I recognize that on the “question of whether a trial court abused its discretion in permitting [or failing to permit] a witness who arguably violated a sequestration order to testify,” ante at 643 n. 3, some cases have held that a Rule 615 sequestration order does cover more than courtroom exclusion, even if the order only mentions exclusion. See e.g., United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 375 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that Rule 615 prohibits discussion of the ease between witnesses), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that Rule 615 prohibits the reading of trial -transcripts). However, as the majority recognizes, such cases “concern [a] very different question” from that of finding criminal contempt. In this “very different” context, courts have still struggled over the extent to which conduct other than courtroom attendance is barred by a simple sequestration order barring witnesses from the courtroom. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1176 (holding that Rule 615 only requires that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom proper); United States v. Scharstein, 531 F.Supp. 460, 463 (E.D.Ky.1982) (holding that a Rule 615 order need not prohibit witnesses from discussing the case with one another). Moreover, even the Tenth Circuit, which construes the invocation of Rule 615 to prohibit discussion between witnesses, also requires that the trial court specify this prohibition in its order. See United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 484-85 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to state “clearly” in its sequestration order that witnesses are not to discuss the case), rev’d on other grounds after remand, 891 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1829, 108 L.Ed.2d 958 (1990); United States v. Johnston, 578 F.2d 1352, 1355 (10th Cir.1978) (admonishing trial courts to instruct sequestered witnesses that they are not to discuss their testimony with other witnesses), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 321, 58 L.Ed.2d 325 (1978).
This confusion about how far the scope of a bald Rule 615 order extends for the sanction of excluding testimony underscores the necessity of a specific order when criminal contempt is charged. In this case, the district court’s written order stayed within the narrow text of Rule 615. The order states only that “the Government’s motion to sequester the Defendant’s witnesses will be granted, and the Defendant’s witnesses will be excluded from the courtroom.” In enforcing the order against McMahon in open court at the beginning of trial, the court said simply, “He will have to leave the courtroom.” There is no mention of any prohibited activity other than entering the courtroom. In fact, even the majority recognizes that the order was “stunningly simple: prospective witnesses were barred from the courtroom.” Ante at 643.
There is not sufficient evidence to establish that the order was clear enough to prohibit the reading of daily transcript or receiving reports from an observer. The text of the written order does not support an expansion to prohibit these activities. The court’s oral command to McMahon, “He will have to leave the courtroom,” actually emphasizes that only courtroom exclusion was required. The court did nothing to communicate the existence of a broader scope to the order. To find specificity the court could only go to McMahon’s state of mind — McMahon had to know what the order meant because “he [was] no dummy” and the scope of the order was “obvious.” However, as I point out in part I, McMahon’s belief of guilt is not sufficient to prove the order’s clarity (the specificity element) beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, the majority’s acceptance of the district court’s finding that the scope of the order was “obvious” raises questions about what other activities might be “obvious” violations. What if Mrs. McMahon, without any prompting from McMahon, had reported on the trial proceedings each evening at supper? What if McMahon had read newspaper accounts of the trial? What if he had seen or heard reports about it on television or radio? What if he had overheard someone giving a firsthand account in a res*649taurant? The point is that there is no predictable line between “obvious” and “not obvious.” For criminal contempt purposes, I would draw the line at the actual text of the order, which was exclusion from the courtroom.
The majority has opened a dangerous path in criminal contempt cases. If the government can offer evidence that allows an inference that the defendant believes himself to be guilty, the specificity element is no check against use of the contempt power. As the Supreme Court recognized in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 208, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967): “The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one.”

 The D.C. Circuit’s United States v. NYNEX is right on point, unlike United States v. Trudell, 563 F.2d 889, 892 (8th Cir.1977), and United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529, 532 (7th Cir.1974), two cases relied on by the majority for its specificity analysis. Trudell said: "In order to successfully challenge a statute [or order] on vagueness grounds, a litigant must make a showing that the challenged statute [or order] lacks specificity as to his own behavior and not as to some hypothetical situation." 563 F.2d at 892. This does not mean that behavior determines specificity, as the majority suggests. See ante at 642. Instead, Trudell is only making clear that an order's vagueness as applied to hypothetical situations is irrelevant if the order clearly prohibits the defendant’s behavior. McMahon never claims that the order fails the specificity requirement because it is vague in its hypothetical application to others even though it might cover his own conduct. Greyhound Corp., which involved a ten-paragraph order requiring Greyhound to cooperate with another bus company, did indicate that the same list of factors should be considered in determining specificity and willfulness. But Greyhound Corp. did not focus on specificity. The question there was whether the proof was sufficient to establish willfulness, that is, "determining whether the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct was wrongful.” 508 F.2d at 529. In any event, I believe that United States v. NYNEX is a better-reasoned decision.