Court Opinion

ID: 9907514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:05:43.862364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:40.496228
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40207

NANCY HENRY,

      Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW MEXICO LIVESTOCK BOARD,
and JESSICA BACA, in her official
capacity as Records Custodian for
the New Mexico Livestock Board,

      Respondents-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Bryan Biedscheid, District Court Judge

Nancy Henry
Albuquerque, NM

Pro Se Appellant

Long, Komer & Associates, P.A.
Nancy R. Long
Jonas M. Nahoum
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees

                                      DECISION

ATTREP, Chief Judge.

{1}    Petitioner Nancy Henry appeals the district court’s order in this Inspection of
Public Records Act (IPRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 14-2-1 to -12 (1947, as amended through
2023),1 enforcement action against Respondents New Mexico Livestock Board and
Records Custodian Jessica Baca (collectively, NMLB). Henry challenges the district
court’s denial of her request for statutory damages under Section 14-2-11(C). We affirm.

DISCUSSION

{2}    Henry argues that the district court “erred in refusing to award mandatory
statutory damages to her” and that she is “entitled to damages under both Sections [14-
2-11(C) and 14-2-12(D)].” Section 14-2-12(D), however, “does not permit punitive or
statutory damages,” and only allows for an award of actual damages. Faber v. King,
2015-NMSC-015, ¶ 41, 348 P.3d 173. Because Henry contends only that the district
court erred in not awarding her statutory damages, and concedes that she did not
request actual damages below pursuant to Section 14-2-12(D), we limit our review to
whether she was entitled to statutory damages under Section 14-2-11(C)—an award of
which she acknowledges is not mandatory.

{3}    In relevant part, Section 14-2-11(C) provides,

       A custodian who does not deliver or mail a written explanation of denial
       within fifteen days after receipt of a written request for inspection is subject
       to an action to enforce the provisions of [IPRA] and the requester may be
       awarded damages. Damages shall . . . be awarded if the failure to provide
       a timely explanation of denial is determined to be unreasonable.

This Court has concluded that “Section 14-2-11 does not entitle a requester to statutory
damages in every case where the public body has failed to comply with IPRA,” and that
the provision “only mandates their award where the district court has determined that
the public body’s failure is unreasonable.” Britton v. Office of Attorney Gen., 2019-
NMCA-002, ¶ 38, 433 P.3d 320 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he
question of reasonableness . . . is one that must be answered as a matter of fact” by the
district court. Id. ¶ 40. “If a district court determines that a public body’s failure to allow
for inspection of responsive records was reasonable, it may properly refuse to award
statutory damages.” Id. ¶ 38. If, however, the public body’s failure is found to be
unreasonable, “the district court must award statutory damages,” but the court has
“broad discretion in determining the amount of the award.” Id.

{4}       We understand Henry to argue that the district court erred by not finding NMLB’s
actions unreasonable. On appeal, both parties appear to agree that our review is for an
abuse of discretion only. See Rio Grande Sun v. Jemez Mountains Pub. Sch. Dist.,
2012-NMCA-091, ¶ 10, 287 P.3d 318 (“If the trial court has correctly applied the law to
the facts, we review a discretionary decision for an abuse of discretion and reverse only
if it is contrary to logic and reason.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation
omitted)). Given that this Court has held that the question of reasonableness is a
question of fact, Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 40, this appeal also raises a question of

1Some sections of IPRA were amended after Henry’s request was made. See §§ 14-2-1, -1.2, -6.
Because those amendments do not impact this appeal, we cite the most recent version of the statute.
substantial evidence. See In re Camino Real Env’t Ctr., Inc., 2010-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 22-
23, 148 N.M. 776, 242 P.3d 343 (characterizing the appellant’s argument that the
hearing officer disregarded certain evidence “as a challenge based on abuse of
discretion or substantial evidence”). “We emphasize . . . that it is the appellant’s burden
to persuade us that the district court erred” because “there is a presumption of
correctness in the rulings and decisions of the district court.” See Hall v. City of
Carlsbad, 2023-NMCA-042, ¶ 5, 531 P.3d 642 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{5}     On the record and briefing before us, we are not persuaded that the district court
erred. Apparently accepting NMLB’s proffer that the production of records was
inadvertently delayed due to its counsel being out of the country and the intervening
holidays, the district court found that NMLB’s actions were not unreasonable. Although
Henry repeatedly makes the blanket assertion that NMLB’s explanation for the untimely
denial was unreasonable, she fails to argue that the district court’s finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. Because Henry does not mount a proper substantial
evidence challenge, we are bound by the district court’s finding of reasonableness. See
In re Camino Real, 2010-NMCA-057, ¶ 22 (holding that the appellants waived any
argument that a hearing officer’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence
because they did not appropriately challenge the findings); see also Crutchfield v. N.M.
Dep’t of Tax’n & Revenue, 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 17, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273
(providing that because an appellant did not appropriately attack a court’s finding of fact,
and did “not appeal on the ground that any of the court’s findings of fact [were]
unsupported by substantial evidence,” “[t]he court’s finding [was] essentially
unchallenged, and it [was], therefore binding on appeal”); Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA
(providing that a brief in chief’s “argument shall set forth a specific attack on any finding,
or the finding shall be deemed conclusive”).

{6}    Given the district court’s unchallenged finding that NMLB’s failure was
reasonable, we cannot say the district court’s denial of statutory damages under Section
14-2-11(C) was “clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and
circumstances of the case.” See Am. Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Duran, 2016-
NMCA-063, ¶ 24, 392 P.3d 181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This is
because a district court “may properly refuse to award statutory damages” if it
“determines that a public body’s failure to allow for inspection of responsive records was
reasonable.” Britton, 2019-NMCA-002, ¶ 38; see also In re Camino Real, 2010-NMCA-
057, ¶ 23 (“Given the unchallenged findings of fact, we cannot conclude that the . . .
order was contrary to the facts and circumstances of this case.”).

{7}    Lastly, Henry appears to maintain in her reply brief that she was entitled to
statutory damages under Section 14-2-11(C) because NMLB did not act in full
compliance with IPRA. To the extent that is her position, it is a misunderstanding of the
law. As discussed, “Section 14-2-11 does not entitle a requester to statutory damages in
every case where the public body has failed to comply with IPRA.” Britton, 2019-NMCA-
002, ¶ 38. Instead, it “only mandates their award where the district court has determined
that the public body’s failure is unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In this case, the district court found that NMLB’s failure was not unreasonable,
and thus, the district court could “properly refuse to award statutory damages.” Id.

CONCLUSION

{8}     For the foregoing reasons, Henry has not presented a viable argument that the
district court erred. Accordingly, we affirm.

{9}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge