Court Opinion

ID: 9645946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:40:48.825493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:33.422812
License: Public Domain

Melvin Mayfield, Judge, dissenting. In Wright v. American Transportation, 18 Ark. App. 18, 709 S.W.2d 107 (1986), this court reversed and remanded a case decided by the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission for its failure to make “specific findings upon which it relies to support its decision.” In our opinion we relied, in part, upon Clark v. Peabody Testing Service, 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court pointed out that the Commission’s findings had to be in sufficient detail that [T]he reviewing court may perform its function to determine whether the commission’s findings as to the existence or non-existence of the essential facts are or are not supported by the evidence. 265 Ark. at 507. It therefore follows that the decision of the Commission cannot be affirmed unless itsfindings are supported by substantial evidence. This appears to be the general rule in appeals from administrative agencies. An administrative determination, however, may only be sustained on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency, even where evidence in the record may be sufficient to support the determination for different reasons (see 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise [2d ed], § 14:29, p. 128; see, also, 6 N.Y.Jur.2d, Article 78, §240, p. 132.) Al-Co Properties, Inc. v. Department of State of the State of New York, 452 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). In the present case, it is my view that the findings of the Commission are not supported by substantial evidence. For example, the Commission stated that one of the reasons it did not find that appellant had established a change in his physical condition sufficient to support an award for additional benefits was because the only two physicians whose opinions were placed in evidence disagreed as to the amount of the increased disability. Another reason for denying appellant’s claim was that the increased disability rating given by appellant’s primary treating physician was made simply “to placate counsel.” This first finding, I submit, is not relevant on the issue involved since both doctors stated that appellant had an increased disability even though they did not agree on the amount. The second finding is based on sheer speculation and conjecture; there is no evidence in the record to support it. It would serve no purpose to make an extended discussion of the evidence; however, I do not believe the findings made by the Commission are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, I would reverse and remand this matter to the Commission for another hearing and for findings based upon the evidence presented.