Court Opinion

ID: 9586867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:01.037229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:54.511076
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Watsons, who were the owners/operators of the tavern and who allegedly served the excessive alcohol to the tortfeasor Perry Bisher, must be reversed and the case remanded *379for further proceedings. That result follows from our recent decision in Bergman v. Henry, 115 Idaho 259, 766 P.2d 729 (1988).
As to Part II, however, I respectfully dissent. Although the majority correctly recognizes that the issue in Part II is “whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Coopers on the basis that the Coopers exercise no control over the operation of the Rainbow Inn,” ante at 376, 775 P.2d at 1218, it then errs in its analysis of the issue. As the affidavits of the Coopers and other evidence filed with the trial court show, the Coopers sold the Rainbow Inn on February 21, 1984, retaining no power to control the Watsons’ activities subsequent to the sale. Under that scenario, the Watsons then took possession of the Rainbow Inn and its inventory, hired their own employees, and commenced operation of the business as its owners. They continued to own and operate the business, free of the Coopers’ control or supervision, through May 13, 1984, the date of the Bisher/Lloyd accident spawning this action. Accordingly, under the actual terms of the sale, and consistent with the Watsons’ modus operandi, the Coopers had no opportunity to prevent the harm alleged in the appellants’ complaint. They simply had no connection with the Rainbow Inn after its sale on February 21, 1984. The business had been sold and the Coopers exercised no control, either constructively or legally, over the Watsons subsequent to the sale. Therefore, there is no legal basis for holding the Coopers liable and the trial court’s grant of the Coopers’ summary judgment motion should be affirmed.
Nevertheless, the majority purports to hold both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper liable simply because Mrs. Cooper continued to hold the liquor license after the Rainbow Inn was sold, stating, ante at 377, 775 P.2d at 1219, that “Mrs. Cooper cannot escape responsibility for the activities of a tavern which is operated under a license issued to her on her application.” The majority further states, ante at 377, 775 P.2d at 1219, “that the right to operate a tavern pursuant to a liquor license is personal to the record holder of the license.” Even though Mrs. Cooper’s license was only issued to her, and even though the majority states that a liquor license is personal to the holder of record, the majority, without any explanation, reverses the summary judgment as to both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper, apparently finding both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper liable under Mrs. Cooper’s license.3 The majority holds Mr. Cooper liable notwithstanding its conclusion that “only named licensees [here Mrs. Cooper] may operate under the authority of the license.” Ante at 377, 775 P.2d at 1219.
Neither theory for holding the Coopers liable advanced by the majority is supported by the law or the facts: (1) the “control” theory fails because, as is explained above, the Coopers exercised no actual control over the Watsons’ actions subsequent to the sale on February 21, 1984; and (2) holding Mr. Cooper liable on Mrs. Cooper’s liquor license is fatally flawed because, as the majority acknowledges, “the right to operate a tavern pursuant to a liquor license is personal to the record holder of the license,” which here was Mrs. Cooper only. If, as the majority states, “Mrs. Cooper cannot escape responsibility for the activities of a tavern which is operated under a license issued to her on her application,” ante at 377, 775 P.2d at 1219 (emphasis added), then upon what basis does the majority reverse the summary judgment as to Mr. Cooper? Since the majority reverses the summary judgment *380as to both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper’s liability, the legal rationale has to be something other than the claim that liability is imposed on the person who is “the record holder of the license,” because Mr. Cooper is not the “record holder of the license.” Accordingly, neither theory for holding the Coopers liable under this scenario is based in law or fact and the trial court’s grant of the summary judgment as to both Mr. and Mrs. Cooper should be affirmed.

. The court’s order granting the Coopers’ motion for summary judgment reads in part as follows:
“This matter came before the court for hearing on defendant Marilyn J. Cooper and defendant Robert Cooper’s motion for Summary Judgment____
‘IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the claims and causes of action asserted by the plaintiff in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Cori Lloyd on behalf of the minor children of Cori Lloyd, Alan Lloyd and Alicia Lloyd, against defendant Marilyn J. Cooper and defendant Robert Cooper are hereby dismissed with prejudice."