Court Opinion

ID: 9839055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 15:10:00.903187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:36.255819
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dawn Rowles,                            :
                  Petitioner            :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Pennsylvania Department of Military     :
and Veterans Affairs (Workers’          :
Compensation Appeal Board),             :   No. 1074 C.D. 2022
                  Respondent            :   Submitted: July 14, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                     FILED: September 11, 2023

             Dawn Rowles (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the decision of a workers’
compensation judge (WCJ). The WCJ granted a modification petition filed by the
Pennsylvania Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (Employer) and modified
Claimant’s disability status from total to partial.    Claimant posits that the
modification unconstitutionally limits her workers’ compensation (WC) benefits.
Upon review, we affirm the Board’s order.

                                 I. Background
            The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. On May 29, 2018,
Claimant sustained a work-related injury to her left elbow. On October 22, 2018, a
Notice of Compensation Payable was issued acknowledging an injury of left elbow
inflammation. By a decision dated February 23, 2021, the description of injury was
expanded to include chronic myofascial pain and cubital tunnel syndrome.
              On July 3, 2021, Employer obtained an impairment rating evaluation
(IRE) of Claimant pursuant to Section 306(a.3) of the Workers’ Compensation Act
(WC Act),1 77 P.S. § 511.3 (enacted as part of Act 111 of 2018 (Act 111) to replace
former IRE provisions). Employer filed a modification petition seeking to change
Claimant’s disability status from total to partial based on the IRE.                 Such a
modification does not reduce the weekly WC benefits paid to Claimant, but while
total disability weekly WC benefits do not automatically terminate, partial disability
weekly WC benefits are limited to 500 weeks. Whitfield v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Tenet Health Sys. Hahnemann LLC), 188 A.3d 599, 602 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018).
              In a decision and order dated February 16, 2022, a WCJ granted
Employer’s petition and modified Claimant’s benefits to partial disability. Claimant
appealed to the Board, arguing that Act 111 cannot be retroactively applied to her
claim because her rights were established prior to its passage. Claimant argued that
the IRE process set forth in Act 111 is inapplicable to her and that the resulting
modification of her WC benefits is a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision and order. Claimant then filed a petition for
review in this Court.

       1
         Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L.
714, No. 111 (Act 111).

                                              2
                                          II. Discussion
                On appeal,2 Claimant asserts that she acquired a vested right in her WC
benefits that predated the enactment of Act 111; therefore, she insists that applying
Act 111 to limit her benefits is a violation of article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, known as the Remedies Clause.3 We disagree. “A party challenging
the constitutionality of a statute must meet a heavy burden. We presume legislation
to be constitutional absent a demonstration that the statute ‘clearly, palpably, and
plainly’ violates the Constitution.” DiPaolo v. UPMC Magee Women’s Hosp.
(Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 278 A.3d 430, 434 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (quoting
Konidaris v. Portnoff L. Assocs., Ltd., 953 A.2d 1231, 1239 (Pa. 2008)). Applying
this standard, we reject Claimant’s constitutional challenge to Act 111.
                Under former Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act,4 IREs were based on the
current edition of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides).                        However, in Protz v. Workers’

       2
          “This Court’s review in [WC] appeals is limited to determining whether necessary
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or
whether constitutional rights were violated.” DiPaolo v. UPMC Magee Women’s Hosp. (Workers'
Comp. Appeal Bd.), 278 A.3d 430, 433 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (additional citation and quotation
marks omitted).
       3
           The Remedies Clause provides:
                All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in
                his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
                course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial
                or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such
                manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by
                law direct.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
       4
         Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act was added by Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L.
350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, and repealed by Act 111.

                                                  3
Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827, 835-36
(Pa. 2017), our Supreme Court struck Section 306(a.2) from the WC Act in its
entirety.5
                Act 111 replaced former Section 306(a.2) with Section 306(a.3), 77 P.S.
§ 511.3. Like the previous provision, Act 111 enabled an employer to require a
claimant to undergo an IRE6 once the claimant had received at least 104 weeks of
total disability benefits after sustaining a work-related injury. See Rose Corp. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Espada), 238 A.3d 551, 561 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). Act
111 also reduced the threshold impairment rating for modification of disability status
from 50% (compared to that of a whole and unimpaired person) to 35%, making it
more difficult for employers to change total disability status to partial disability
status. Id. at 562. Under Section 306(a.3), as under the previous provision, total
disability status has no time limit, but partial disability status after modification via
an IRE is limited to 500 weeks of benefits.7 Id. at 558.

       5
         Our Supreme Court concluded that by designating the “current” edition of the AMA
Guides, the former IRE provision impermissibly delegated legislative authority to a private entity,
the AMA, without safeguards to ensure either General Assembly supervisory authority over the
AMA Guides used to calculate the results of IREs or accountability of the AMA authors. See
Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), 161 A.3d 827, 835-36 (Pa. 2017).
       6
           Act 111 specified that IREs must now be conducted using the 6th Edition of the AMA
Guides.
       7
          The 500-week period for partial disability benefits, based on a showing that the claimant
has recovered some degree of earning power, predated the 1996 enactment of the previous IRE
provision, which also adopted the 500-week period. See Goodrich v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Shenango China), 645 A.2d 302, 303-04 & nn.3-4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (explaining that,
“[p]ursuant to [former] Section 306(b) of the [WC] Act, 77 P.S. § 512, the statutory period for
partial disability [was] up to 500 weeks”).

                                                4
               Regarding retroactive application of statutes, “retrospective laws which
have been deemed reasonable are those which impair no contract and disturb no
vested right, but only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and
do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and
when prosecuted.” Bible v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 696 A.2d 1149, 1156 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1997) (quoting Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. 1983)). In
this context, a vested right is “something more than a mere expectation based upon
an anticipated continuance of existing law”; it must constitute a legal or equitable
right to “present or future enforcement of a demand, or a legal exemption from a
demand made by another.” Bible, 696 A.2d at 1156 (quoting Lewis v. Pa. R.R. Co.,
69 A. 821, 823 (Pa. 1908)).
               Since our Supreme Court’s decision in Protz and the legislature’s
enactment of Act 111, this Court has repeatedly rejected claimants’ arguments that
they had vested rights in their total disability status that precluded retroactive
application of Act 111’s IRE provisions to them. See DiPaolo, 278 A.3d at 435
(observing that “this Court has consistently held that Act 111 does not abrogate or
substantially impair a claimant’s vested rights in [WC] benefits because there is no
right to ongoing [total disability] status”) (first citing Hutchinson v. Annville Twp.
(Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 260 A.3d 360, 367 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); and then
citing Sochko v. Nat’l Express Transit Serv. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 490 C.D. 2021, filed Mar. 16, 2022)8).
               We recently confirmed this holding again in DiPaolo, explaining:

       8
         This unreported opinion is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of this
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                 5
             [E]ven during the time when the previous IRE provisions
             had been invalidated by the Protz cases but before Act 111
             became effective, employers were not devoid of a means
             to modify a claimant’s benefit status. Section 413(a) of
             the [WC] Act, which has been part of our [WC] legislation
             since its beginning over 100 years ago, has always
             provided employers (as well as claimants) with the general
             ability to seek a change in benefits at any time based on
             “proof that the disability of an injured employe has
             increased, decreased, recurred, or has temporarily or
             finally ceased.” 77 P.S. § 772. Section 306(b) of the [WC]
             Act, which also has roots in the early decades of [WC] law,
             specifically enables employers to modify a claimant’s
             disability status from total to partial by showing that the
             claimant has regained some earning power. 77 P.S. §
             512(2). Since the 1996 onset of more cost-efficient IREs,
             employers were less likely to challenge a claimant’s status
             via litigation, but the option was always available. Thus,
             while it is true that a claimant retains a certain right to
             benefits until such time as he is found to be ineligible for
             them, claimants do not acquire a vested right in total
             disability status at any given time because that status has
             always been subject to potential litigation by employers.

278 A.3d at 435-36 (quoting Sochko, slip op. at 13) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Further, we explained that “Act 111 only enables an employer to
seek an IRE, which, depending on the results, may or may not allow the employer
to seek modification of the claimant’s status from [total disability] to [partial
disability].” Id. Although Claimant asserts that this Court’s well-developed line of
binding authority on this specific issue is “deeply flawed,” Claimant’s Br. at 9, we
rejected a similar assertion in DiPaolo that this line of cases was “wrongly decided.”
278 A.3d at 436. We likewise reject Claimant’s assertion here.
             Further, we have previously rejected claimants’ assertions that they
acquired vested rights to total disability benefits because Protz made the prior IRE

                                          6
provision void ab initio. See, e.g., DiPaolo, 278 A.3d at 438 (citing and discussing
other decisions). We reject Claimant’s similar argument here.
             Finally, Claimant asserts that the language of Act 111 is not sufficiently
specific to make its application retroactive. We reject Claimant’s contention that
Act 111 does not specifically indicate a legislative intent to apply Section 306(a.3)
retroactively to claimants with injuries predating its enactment. Act 111’s credit
provision allows employers who paid partial disability benefits under prior law to
credit the amount of those payments toward the total 500 weeks of allowable partial
disability WC benefits; it also allows employers who made total disability payments
to credit the amount of pre-Act 111 total disability payments toward the 104-week
waiting period before requesting an IRE. In DiPaolo, we concluded the plain
language of the credit provisions expressed a clear intent to apply to claimants
injured before Act 111’s enactment. 278 A.3d at 436.
             Claimant suggests that Act 111’s language is not specific because it
does not clearly state whether the retroactive credit for partial disability payments
applies to payments “achieved as a result of unconstitutional IREs or partial
disability which the claimant received because of modified work or litigation . . . .”
Claimant’s Br. at 14-15. However, Claimant does not explain why such a distinction
has any relevance. This Court has previously held that “[t]hrough the use of very
careful and specific language, the General Assembly provided employers/insurers
with credit for the weeks of compensation, whether total or partial in nature,
previously paid.” Pierson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Consol. Pa. Coal Co.
LLC), 252 A.3d 1169, 1180 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Rose
Corp., 238 A.3d at 562 (additional quotation marks omitted)). As the General
Assembly did not distinguish between total and partial payments in allowing

                                          7
retroactive credit to employers, we discern no reason to distinguish among different
reasons for partial payments in concluding that credits for all such payments are
retroactive.
               For all of these reasons, we reject Claimant’s arguments and conclude
that Act 111’s IRE provisions apply to her.

                                   III. Conclusion
               Based on the foregoing discussion, the Board’s order is affirmed.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                           8
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dawn Rowles,                            :
                  Petitioner            :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Pennsylvania Department of Military     :
and Veterans Affairs (Workers’          :
Compensation Appeal Board),             :   No. 1074 C.D. 2022
                  Respondent            :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2023, the order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board dated September 9, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                                      __________________________________
                                      CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge