Court Opinion

ID: 9513590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:38:10.502299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:55.487360
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 31] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 32] The opinion of the majority reaches a result that would be logical if the legislature had requbed it. However, it reaches this result only by the most strained interpretation of the statute. N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2(7) (1999), requbes:
The bureau shall deduct, on a whole body impairment basis, from an award for impairment under this section, any previous impairment award for that same member or body part under the workers’ compensation laws of any jurisdiction.
The majority’s result depends upon its interpretation that this section does not prohibit the result it imposes and uses that lack of prohibition to create a mandate. The majority also strains the language of the statute when it holds that the language “that same member or body part” actually means the whole body. It is a strain the plain language of the statute simply won’t support.
[¶ 33] The above quoted subsection (7) is the subsection which dbectly addresses *733combining prior awards with a present award. It does not pertain to Shiek’s right knee award and does not require converting prior awards for other body parts to be combined with the award to the right knee.
[¶ 34] Neither subsection (6) nor subsection (10) of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2 relied upon by the majority directly relate to combining prior awards with later awards. Subsection (10) does require “[i]f the injury causes permanent impairment, the award must be determined based on the percentage of whole body impairment in accordance with [the statutory schedule]
[[Image here]]
[¶35] Shiek’s right knee injury was evaluated as a whole body impairment. Shiek does not challenge the analysis in isolation but challenges the failure of the Bureau to analyze all prior permanent impairment awards in combination with the right knee injury. However, no statute requires this result and subsection (7) is inconsistent with such an approach.
[¶ 36] Although the majority purports to be relying on the legislative intent in switching to a whole body impairment system in 1995, majority at ¶21, legislative intent regarding successive awards to the same claimant was expressed when the Legislative Assembly amended N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2(7) in 1999, and required set-off of past awards against current awards for the “same member or body part.”
[¶ 37] I believe the Bureau and the trial court were correct. N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2 does not require the Bureau to convert past awards to whole body impairment basis when the past awards are not for the same body part. The conclusions of the ALJ, which were adopted by the Bureau, provide:
In accordance with Section 65-05-12.2[7], N.D.C.C., the plain and ordinary language of the statute requires the Bureau to deduct “any previous impairment award” only “for the same member or body part under the workers compensation laws of any jurisdiction.” Id. The greater weight of the evidence has established that Shiek had received no previous PPI award for his right knee. Therefore, Section 65-05-12.2[7] is not applicable to Shiek’s award of permanent partial impairment benefits for his right knee. There is nothing within the language of Section 65-05-12.2[7] or [10] that requires the conversion of all prior impairments to a “whole body” basis before awarding benefits for a member or body part not previously the subject of an impairment award.
[[Image here]]
This hearing officer concludes, as a matter of law, that Section 65-05-12.2[7] is not applicable to Shiek’s award of permanent partial impairment benefits for his right knee and that there is nothing within the language of Section 65-05-12.2[7] or [10] which requires the conversion of all prior impairments to a “whole body” basis before awarding benefits for a member or body part not previously the subject of an impairment award. As such, it is the conclusion of the undersigned that the Bureau’s Amended Order Awarding Permanent Partial Impairment Benefits dated January 22, 2001, should be affirmed.
[¶ 38] The district court affirmed, noting that Shiek’s interpretation of the statute, which is partially adopted by the majority opinion, was not rational and the interpretation was not supportable by the language of the statute.
Shiek’s interpretation would require the Bureau to add in every old injury for every single person who qualified for a PPI award based on a new injury. If the legislature had intended such a scheme, it should have written an explicit statute setting out that process. The simple phrase “on a whole body impairment basis” is not sufficient to create *734the complicated process Shiek advocates. Shiek’s interpretation is not rational; therefore this statute is not ambiguous. Western Gas Resources, Inc., 489 N.W.2d at 872 (stating that a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to different rational interpretations).
[¶ 39] Because I believe the Bureau and the trial court have correctly interpreted the statute, I would affirm the decision of the district court. Therefore, I dissent.
[¶ 40] SANDSTROM, J., concurs. .
MARING, Justice,