Court Opinion

ID: 9479840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:30:26.090657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:18.802729
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority has carefully and objectively detailed the relevant facts in these combined appeals. Although I join the portion of the majority opinion affirming the conviction of defendant Ziebarth, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the officers had a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” justifying the seizure1 of defendant Bell’s package.
The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation, concluding that the officers had a “reasonable suspicion to believe the package contained either narcotics or money.” I R. at 36, 55. On the basis of Bell’s total conduct, the majority affirms the district court’s legal conclusion2 that the facts “supplied reasonable suspicion to seize Bell’s package for a limited examination by the dog.” I R. at 36; Maj. op. at 968. Reviewing all of the objective facts introduced at trial together, I do not believe that reasonable suspicion is established in this case. Of course, I recognize that individual acts consistent with innocent travel, when viewed together, may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Sokolow, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Nevertheless, I believe a review of Bell’s conduct demonstrates that this is not such a case.
After Ziebarth met Bell in the lounge, they rode down the escalator together. II R. at 10. Evidently, on the way down they turned away from each other and stopped speaking. II R. at 10. The defendants failure to sustain conversation is not particularly suspicious behavior. Cf., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2753-54, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (agent’s hunch that defendant and companion were attempting to conceal the fact that they were traveling together insufficient to support “reasonable and articula-ble suspicion” justifying seizure of defendant).
Similarly, the defendants walk through the airport was not suspicious. They walked first to the east end of the airport terminal and then turned and walked to the west end. Once outside, they returned to the east end of the terminal. II R. at 13. This behavior cannot be characterized as strange or peculiar, particularly in light of the officers testimony at trial that the terminal was small. Ill R. at 33-34. Occasionally they were “looking around” and looking over their shoulders. Ill R. at 13, *97040. Because that type of conduct is commonly observed at airports, it cannot fairly be considered suspicious.
Officer Whittaker then testified that while following the defendants toward the parking lot, “Mr. Bell turned around and noticed us walking up behind them. At that time he held back from Mr. Ziebarth, about five, ten feet behind him, and then turned and started walking to the east, as we had passed Mr. Bell and actually approached Mr. Ziebarth.” Ill R. at 14-15. Given the numerous imaginable reasons why two people might separate and walk in opposite directions in an airport parking lot, see United States v. Sokolow, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), it troubles me to attribute wrongful motive to this type of conduct simply because officer Whittaker testified that Bell did this after “noticing” the officers following them. There was no testimony that the defendants ran, quickened their pace, or otherwise attempted to flee. Cf., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 3-5, 105 S.Ct. 308, 309-10, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (reasonable, “articulable suspicion” based in part on defendant’s unsuccessful attempt to run). Characterizing such behavior as “suspect” will in too many cases permit a finding of a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of criminal activity based only on the subjective beliefs of an investigating officer.
Reliance on officer Steed’s testimony concerning Bell’s “nervousness” and increased breathing raises the same problem. Ill R. at 51-52. Such a characterization is too dependent on the subjective perceptions or “hunches” that may be colored by the subsequent investigation. That, combined with the fact that it is natural to display some degree of perceptible nervousness when one is stopped and questioned by a police officer, convinces me that this cannot be cast as the type of behavior giving rise to a “reasonable, articulable suspicion.”
For me, the critical distinction between the detention of Ziebarth and the seizure of Bell’s package is their respective responses to the officers’ questions. Although Zie-barth made a false representation to the officers about a matter material to the suspected criminal activity, Bell did not. Ziebarth told officers Palmer and Whittaker that he did not have large amounts of money, but he later acknowledged to officer Palmer that he was carrying about $7,000 in cash.3 II R. at 41. Although Ziebarth insisted this was not a lot of money for him, by reasonable standards it was a large sum. This additional fact,4 when added to the other facts, did give officer Palmer a “reasonable, articulable suspicion based on objective facts” that Zeibarth was engaged in criminal activity justifying his detention.5
By contrast, Bell did not make inconsistent or demonstrably untrue statements to the police officers before his package was seized. Officer Steed asked Bell if he was a friend of the “other gentleman”, while pointing at Ziebarth. Bell said no. Officer Steed then asked Bell, “Aren’t you a friend of his, aren’t you with him or a friend of his?” Bell said “not really.” Ill R. at 50. This was not the kind of material misrepresentation that Ziebarth made. Given the ambiguity of officer Steed’s second question, Bell’s two responses do not directly contradict one another.6 Moreover, the of*971ficers had no objective evidence that either statement was false.
Finally, officer Steed testified that Bell was turning his right shoulder in an attempt to hide the jacket that was covering the package. Once again, resting a finding of a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” on this type of conduct is too dependent on the subjective characterizations of an investigating officer. A harmless readjustment of a jacket can become a furtive attempt to conceal when viewed with the benefit of hindsight.
I recognize that the majority considered all of those facts together, rather than in isolation, in concluding that there was a “reasonable, articulable suspicion" justifying the seizure of Bell’s package. However, even considered as a whole, I do not see that Bell’s behavior was any different from that of thousands of other travelers who pass daily through air terminals. Likewise, his responses and behavior upon being confronted by the police officers was no different from that which could reasonably be expected of a law abiding citizen. Thus, I do not believe that the government established grounds for a “reasonable, ar-ticulable suspicion” that Bell was engaged in criminal activity at the time his package was seized.
I have not found any cases holding that there was a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” sufficient to justify an investigative seizure based on facts as neutral as those involved in Bell’s case.7 To the contrary, as the cases cited by the majority suggest, a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is typically based on behavior far more suggestive of criminal activity than that present here.8 Therefore, I respectfully dissent *972from the majority s decision affirming the denial of Bell’s suppression motion.

. Bell’s decision to surrender his package to the officers was not voluntary. Originally, Bell told officer Steed that he did not want him to inspect the package. Ill R. at 43. Officer Steed then summoned officer Whittaker. Ill R. at 52. In response to Bell's inquiries about whether the officers could legally detain his package and subject it to a dog sniff, officer Whittaker told Bell that they could. Ill R. at 16-17. Officer Whittaker told Bell he could either surrender the package in exchange for a receipt, or accompany it to the terminal. Ill R. at 17. Because Bell reasonably believed he had no choice but to comply at this point, his consent to the seizure was not voluntary. See United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (10th Cir.1985). Although Bell retained physical possession of his package while walking to the terminal, the actual seizure occurred in the parking lot once the officers announced their intention to take control of the package.

. Our review of the district court’s ultimate conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion to seize the package is a de novo review. “Whether reasonable suspicion ... exists to justify a seizure is a mixed question of fact and law. The findings with respect to the historical facts are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; the ultimate conclusion, however is subject to de novo review.” United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir.1988); People of the Territory of Guam v. Ichiyasu, 838 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1988) (same).

. Because officer Whittaker had departed from the Ziebarth interrogation prior to the discovery of the $7,000, Ziebarth’s misrepresentation cannot be aggregated with Bell's own conduct for purposes of determining whether agents Whit-taker and Steed had a "reasonable, articulable suspicion” justifying the seizure of Bell’s package. II R. at 30.

. While the mere possession of large sums of cash alone might not suggest criminal activity, Ziebarth had been informed that he was being questioned as part of a narcotics investigation. Therefore, at the time he made the misstatement of fact to the officers he was on notice that it was related to the suspected criminal activity.

. See United States v. Cooper, 873 F.2d 269, 275 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 118, 107 L.Ed.2d 79 (1989). (Fact that defendant lied to officer about the number of pieces of luggage she was traveling with contributed to reasonable suspicion that defendant's luggage contained narcotics).

. Officer Whittaker testified that while escorting Bell from the parking lot back to the terminal building, Bell told him that Ziebarth "was an old friend.” Ill R. at 18. This statement does *971contradict Bell's first statement to officer Steed denying that Ziebarth was a friend of his. However, because Bell made that statement after the officers seized the package, it cannot be considered in deciding whether there was a "reasonable, articulable suspicion” justifying the seizure.

. See United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82-84 (4th Cir.1982), and United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 856-58 (6th Cir.1981), where seizures were invalidated upon facts similar to those here.

. The majority relies primarily on United States v. Sokolow, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). In Sokolow, the defendant paid for two round-trip tickets costing $2,100 in twenty-dollar bills in order to travel from Hawaii to Miami, a source city for illegal drugs, in July. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1586. Sokolow traveled twenty hours round trip, with only carry-on luggage, and spent a mere forty-eight hours in Miami. Id. Sokolow appeared nervous and was apparently traveling under an alias. Id. The Supreme Court stated that Sokolow’s cash purchase of a ticket, and his travel from Honolulu to Miami for such a short stay were both "out of the ordinary.” Id. at 1586. The Soko-low Court held that these factors, in conjunction with Sokolow’s other more neutral conduct, supported a "reasonable suspicion.” Id. Because I do not find any of Bell’s behavior "out of the ordinary”, I conclude that Sokolow’s course of conduct is much more suspicious than the observed actions of Bell.
The majority also relies on United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Place was the first case in which the Supreme Court specifically extended the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to brief, investigative seizures of a traveler’s luggage. Id. 462 U.S. at 706, 103 S.Ct. at 2644. However, the Place Court found the seizure there to be unreasonable because of the length of the detention without ever discussing whether the investigating officers had a "reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Place’s luggage contained narcotics. See id. at 708-10, 103 S.Ct. at 2645-46. Therefore, I do not believe that Place can be relied on to conclude that officers Whittaker and Steed had a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that Bell’s package contained either narcotics or cash for the purchase of narcotics. Moreover, even if Place is read as implicitly recognizing a "reasonable, articulable suspicion”, I believe Place’s actions in listing fake addresses on the tags to his checked luggage is more suspicious than Bell’s apparently innocent activities. Id. at 698, 103 S.Ct. at 2639.
Finally, the majority relies on United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359 (10th Cir.1989). In Stone, this court held that the officer who stopped Stone for speeding had a reasonable suspicion justifying detention of the car for inspection by a narcotics dog. Id. at 362. The officer knew that Stone had been stopped earlier and that a fragrant oil commonly used to mask the smell of narcotics had been discovered. Id. at 361-62. Second, the officer knew that a DEA computer had indicated that Stone was suspected of drug involvement and was associated with known drug dealers. Id. at 362. Again, the facts in Stone were more suggestive of criminal activity than those leading up to the seizure of Bell’s package.