Court Opinion

ID: 9827447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:33:31.097244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:31.487787
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
As stated in our former opinion, there are no assignments which specifically attack any of the findings of the jury as being without evidence to support them.
The first assignment complains of the action of the court in refusing the motion of ■defendant to peremptorily instruct the jury to return a verdict for defendant, the reason stated being that the undisputed evidence showed that the local secretary and collector of defendant was appointed for the convenience of the members only, and had no power to waive any of the provisions or conditions contained in the policy. No reason was given in the motion for a peremptory instruction as to why defendant considered itself entitled to such action by the court.
The second assignment complains that the verdict and judgment are contrary to the law and the evidence, because the authority of the local collector is limited by the contract, with notice of which the insured and beneficiary were charged.
[2] The issues submitted are copied in our former opinion. No objection was made to the submission of any of the same, and the trial court was therefore not apprised until the motion for new trial was filed, of the reasons relied upon by defendant. Those reasons are set out in the two assignments of error, which, in order to justify us in considering them, have been held to be substantial copies of the paragraphs of the motion for new trial. Appellant has conceived the idea that this court is of the opinion that the entire judgment must rest upon the truth of the finding that Duncan, the general manager, knew of the method in which the local collector transacted business. It therefore contends, on motion for rehearing, that the evidence is insufficient to support the fifth finding, and that this is a fundamental error. It is not apparent to us that the judgment cannot be sustained upon the first three findings of the jury. In fact, in order to determine whether or not it can be sustained thereon, we would be required to read all of the evidence. The error, therefore, if error there be, in the answer to the fifth finding, cannot be said to be one going to the foundation of the ease. Aside from that, the question whether such answer is supported by the evidence is purely a question of fact, the examination of which requires a careful study and weighing of all the evidence. We conclude that under the authority of the following cases we should hold that no question of fundamental error is presented: Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 95, 122 S. W. 533, 124 S. W. 85; M., K. & T. Ry, v. Maxwell, 104 Tex. 632, 143 S. W. 1147; Oar v. Davis, 105 Tex. 479, 151 S. W. 795.
[3] We believe, however, that, were we authorized to go into the questions argued by appellant, we would not be justified in holding the evidence insufficient to support the verdict and judgment. As we understand the cases, there can be no doubt that, even where the contract or benefit certificate is such that failure to pay premiums or dues within the designated time terminates it without affirmative action on the part of the insurer, there may be an.estoppel by reason of conduct on the part of the insurer misleading the insured to his expense or harm.
In the case, of Hawkins v. Lone Star Ins. Union, 146 S. W. 1041, the same contract as is herein sued upon was construed and the provision relating to forfeiture of membership for nonpayment of assessments held to be self-executing. The decision of such question was perhaps not necessary, as the evidence showed that a letter had been sent to the insured which showed that it would be necessary for her to be reinstated, thus showing that a forfeiture had actually been entered. A very similar provision was held not self-executing in the case of Northwestern Traveling Men’s Ass’n v. Sehauss, 148 Ill. 304, 35 N. E. 747.
[4] The evidence discloses a very strong case of the general manager of the company construing the provision in regard to forfeiture of membership as not self-executing, for he invariably sent second notices just like the first notice, and, although Mrs. Bran-nan was often delinquent, he never notified her she had forfeited membership, but always treated her as still a member, and in fact, indorsed on the proof of death the words, “Lapsed 10/18,” showing that she was treated as a member until five days after her death. But if it be conceded that the provision - was self-executing, still the course *693oí conduct with reference thereto - by the general officers is very pertinent upon the issue of estoppel; for it is well calculated to mislead the insured. In addition, we notice that, while the general manager in a general way seeks to repudiate the acts of Murray, he does not contend that he ever instructed Murray to notify members they were suspended or to use anj»- different method with regard to collection of delinquent assessments than those not delinquent. He furnished no blanks for reinstatements, the receipts were general, and neither such receipts nor the reports to him by Murray contained any statement concerning reinstate-ments.
The motion is overruled.