Court Opinion

ID: 9479401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:17:09.2869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:00.511528
License: Public Domain

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I hesitate to join the panel majority in the jury box to consider the credibility of witnesses and evidence in resolving conflicts of material fact in disposing of the summary judgment motion confronting this court in this appellate review and because I am compelled to accept and apply this circuit’s pronouncements of law to this action and because I am committed to according full faith and credit to the current decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court, I must respectfully dissent.
Initially, I would concur with the majority opinion in its conclusion that the single issue presented by the factual scenario of this appeal is the determination of the date on which the one-year Ohio statute of limitations accrued in this action for legal malpractice. I would also concur with the *1054panel majority’s observations “that Ohio law governs the resolution of this case.”
From the evidence disclosed by the record, the limitations period could have conceivably commenced to accrue on February 16, 1982 when the plaintiffs advised the defendants by letter that the Brownfield firm would “no longer represent L.F.P. Inc., any of its affiliated entities or you [Flynt] personally from this day forward” and that Flynt should “take steps to acquire new counsel here and elsewhere as soon as possible,” or on September 20,1982 when plaintiffs replaced the defendants as legal counsel of record in the Guccione proceedings. In the event that plaintiffs’ February 16,1982 letter is to be considered as the critical date of accruing the statute, it must be considered within the context of contemporaneous events including the caveat, critically significant under Ohio law, incorporated into the announcement of February 16, whereby the Brownfield firm voluntarily committed itself to uninterrupted representation of the plaintiffs in the Guccione case which had precipitated this action in malpractice between the parties. The letter stated “We will take steps to insure that your appellate rights are preserved in our Guccione case by filing the requested notices and applications for certiorari.” Defendants continued to diligently pursue their commitment to the plaintiffs until September 20, 1982, when LFP notified Brownfield and the Brownfield firm that they had retained John Duffy and Alan Isaacman, together with their respective law firms, to replace the defendants as counsel of record in the Guccione proceedings. It should be noted that defendants’ volunteered commitment of continued representation to protect the plaintiffs’ rights occurred seven days before plaintiffs’ house counsel, by letter, insisted upon defendants’ continued representation in Guccione under threat of legal action. Moreover, the record disclosed that the defendants’ representation of the plaintiffs was continuing and was so intended and characterized by the parties in LPF’s letter of March 10, 1982 which was styled “Re: Representation of LPF, Inc., Hustler Magazine, Inc., Chic Magazine, Inc., Larry Flynt and Althea Flynt,” wherein the first paragraph stated: “This will serve to confirm our understanding of the terms upon which you and your law firm agree to continue to represent the above-named parties.” Nowhere does the record allude to or characterize defendants’ continued legal representation of the plaintiffs as a new contract for limited legal services.
Needless to say that in the event that February 16, 1982 is considered to be the date which accrued the one-year statute of limitations the majority is correct and the defendants must prevail. However, the conclusion of the majority derived from its interpretation of the conflicting material facts implicit in the March 10, 1982 document is arguably unwarranted and unsupported by the manifested composition of the letter. Considered in pari materia, the language of defendants’ February 16, 1982 commitment volunteering continued uninterrupted legal representation in the Guccione case with defendants’ March 10, 1982 letter, coupled with plaintiffs’ subsequent good faith implementation of that volunteered commitment until September 20,1982, when defendants were replaced as legal counsel, could have prompted reasonable minds to more justifiably conclude, as a matter of law, that the statute of limitations accrued on September 20, 1982 instead of February 16, 1982.
Moreover, the majority avoids the Ohio Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987); Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989), and misconceives Ohio law enunciated in Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988). The majority anchors its logic in arriving at its disposition upon the following: “[T]he tolling of the statute of limitations should be limited to continuous legal representation regarding a particular undertaking or transaction.” Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 387, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added). By isolating the word “continuous” the majority demeans the balance of the equally significant crucial language of the phrase emphasized by *1055the Ohio Supreme Court decision in Omni-Food, i.e., “legal representation regarding a particular undertaking or transaction.” Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 387, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added). Mindful of the pivotal language “regarding a particular undertaking or transaction,” the majority invaded the jury’s domain by assigning credibility and weight to conflicting material facts implicit in the February 16 and March 10,1982 letters of the respective parties and formulated its arguably unwarranted and factually unsupported conclusion that “[t]he legal representation provided by the defendants was clearly not, in the language of Omni-Food, ‘continuous,’ given the explicit termination of the attorney-client relationship by Brownfield’s letter of February 16 and the subsequent creation of a new, limited relationship by the March 12 letter.” Apart from the majority’s arbitrary interpretation of the March 12 letter creating a new “limited relationship,” an examination of Omni-Food militates against the panel majority’s unwarranted and impermissible conclusions.
In context, Omni-Food succinctly posits the issue confronting this appellate review as “our next consideration as raised by defendant, is whether continued general representation should toll the statute of limitations, or whether the statute should be tolled with respect to acts of malpractice relating to a particular undertaking or transaction.” Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 387, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Ohio court answered the query in the following equally concise language: “We believe that appellee’s assertion in this regard is well-taken, and therefore hold that a standard should limit the tolling of the statute of limitations to continuous legal representation regarding a particular undertaking or transaction. ... In our view, a different standard could defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations where, for example, a client with knowledge of the attorney’s malpractice may unduly perpetuate the attorney’s potential liability and exposure to suit.” 1 Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 387-88, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added). Of equal significance to the case at bar, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: “[I]t should be pointed out that the question of when an attorney-client relationship for a particular undertaking or transaction has terminated is necessarily one of fact.” Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 388, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added); see also Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987); Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989).
The instant case is within the four corners of Omni-Food. It is apparent from the record that defendants volunteered to and did continue to represent the plaintiffs in Guccione until September 20,1982 when they were terminated and replaced by other legal counsel for which uninterrupted services they received $23,000 through July of 1982 and additional sums thereafter, from which reasonable minds could have justifiably concluded, as a matter of Ohio law, that the attorney-client relationship, in Guccione, was not concluded as between the parties until the September 20, 1982 date.
A continuing attorney-client relationship between the parties is supported by defendants’ concession that they continued to provide uninterrupted appellate representation to plaintiffs in Guccione until September 20, 1982, during which time they attempted to correct their initial errors, if any, by perfecting a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and by appeals to Ohio courts from the denials of the Rule 37 and Rule 60 motions, which, if successful, could have vindicated them of their malpractice.
Apart from the ambiguity raised by the February 16 and March 10 letters, the defendants’ concessions would, at the very least, dictate that it would have been appro*1056priate to permit a jury to resolve the controversial facts and to decide if the Brownfield firm’s attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs survived during the entire period of the pending Rule 37 and Rule 60 motions and the perfection of the certiorari petitions. See Vail v. Townsend, 29 Ohio App.3d 261, 263, 504 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (1985) (While attorney is attempting to correct his initial error, the attorney-client relationship continues.); Muir v. Hadler Real Estate Management Co., 4 Ohio App.3d 89, 91, 446 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1982) (“As the [Ohio] Supreme Court noted, the termination rule strengthens the attorney-client relationship in that there is continued faith in the attorney to correct any errors that he has made during that relationship.”) (citing Keaton Co. v. Kolby, 27 Ohio St.2d 234, 271 N.E.2d 772 (1971)).
Prevailing precedent endorses the principle that continuity of legal representation is not disrupted during the time interval between the conclusion of legal proceedings in a trial court and the initiation and exhaustion of an appeal. Legal representation throughout this entire period is deemed continuous. The reason for the rule is apparent: a client should not be required to initiate legal proceedings against his attorney while the attorney is pursuing an appeal. A client could hardly be assured of the attorney’s zealous representation if the attorney is forced to simultaneously pursue the client’s appeal and to defend a malpractice suit brought by his client. In any event, this circuit has squarely decided the issue in Woodruff v. Tomlin, a case construing an analogous limitations statute, when it specifically rejected the majority’s advanced position. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (6th Cir.1975), mem. decision on remand, 423 F.Supp. 1284 (W.D.Tenn.1976), rev’d, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir.1979), aff'd in part, rev’d in part en banc, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 114 (1980). In Woodruff, as in the instant case, the plaintiff complained of malpractice committed by an attorney during his trial court representation. The attorney continued to represent the plaintiff client in subsequent appeals from the adverse jury verdict. The Court ruled that the limitations period did not begin to run until the appellate process had concluded:
The relationship of attorney and client did not end on the date of the oral argument; it certainly continued until after the Court of Appeals decided the case ... Until the case was finally terminated and a final judgment rendered the plaintiffs could not prove damage, because the Court of Appeals might have granted a new trial, and on retrial a different result could possibly have occurred.
511 F.2d at 1020.
If the rule Woodruff is applied to the instant case, it directs a continuation of the attorney-client relationship at least until the Guccione pending appeals had been exhausted and the case had been finally decided adversely to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Osborne, 573 F.Supp. 1045, 1050 & n. 20 (E.D.Ky.1983) (legal malpractice not accrue until appeals exhausted), on remand, 610 F.Supp. 126 (E.D.Ky.1985), aff'd without opinion by unpublished order, 675 F.2d 592 (6th Cir.1986); Bowman v. Abramson, 545 F.Supp. 227, 228-29 (E.D.Pa.1982) (legal malpractice action does not accrue until appeal decided adversely to client); Semenza v. Nevada Medical Liab. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 184 (Nev.1988) (same); Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1987) (same); Amfac Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792 (1983) (same); Olivier v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 499 So.2d 1330, 1336-37 (La.Ct.App.1986) (attorney-client relationship terminated when Louisiana Supreme Court’s writ denial became final); Barrios v. Duran, 496 So.2d 239, 239 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1986) (legal malpractice claim did not accrue until adverse judgment against client affirmed on appeal); Diaz v. Piquette, 496 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) (same); Gurkewitz v. Haberman, 137 Cal.App.3d 328, 187 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1982) (same).
Mindful of the Brownfield firm’s post-March 1982 representation of the same *1057client, on the same case, and plaintiff’s refusal to retain defendants’ new counsel, legal representation of plaintiffs was arguably not a “second” attorney-client relationship but could have reasonably been considered as a continuation of an existing ongoing relationship in the Guccione appeal. Cf. Zimmie, 43 Ohio St.3d at 58, 538 N.E.2d at 401 (Attorney-client relationship terminated and cause of action for legal malpractice against appellees accrued when client “terminated his relationship of all subsequent domestic relations matters ... and [when client ] retained another attorney") (emphasis added). The Brownfield firm’s February, 1982 “termination,” at least as it applied to the Guccione case, was of no effect given the subsequent legal representation the defendants continued to provide in that action between March and September 1982. See Bucaro v. Keegan, Keegan, Hecker & Tully, 126 Misc.2d 590, 591-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566-67 (Sup.Ct.1984) (“As long as defendants represented plaintiff on the same issue or a related issue in a continuous manner, no termination of the attorney-client relationship occurred.”) Accordingly, to characterize the volunteered, continuing, uninterrupted representation afforded by defendants in Guccione between March and September, 1982 as a new limited relationship is totally misplaced and inappropriate. At the very least, as mandated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Frysinger, Omni-Food, and Zimmie, the date of the actual termination and the accrual date of the statute of limitations was in conflict and should have been resolved by a jury.
The reliance of the majority opinion upon Brown v. Johnstone, 5 Ohio App.3d 165, 450 N.E.2d 693 (1982) is equally misplaced for a number of reasons. Initially, it is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. The Brown decision surfaced no conflict of material fact since Brown had conceded that he never contacted Johnstone or had any relationship whatsoever with him after his communicated grievance against Johnstone to the Akron Bar Association sometime in 1977. Brown, 5 Ohio App.3d at 167, 450 M.E.2d at 696; id. at 168, 450 N.E.2d 697 (Hofstetter, J., dissenting). Consequently, the issue of “continuous legal representation" in a “particular identifiable transaction ” was never joined, considered, or decided by the Brown opinion.
Secondly, even though the cardinal issue in the instant case was not joined or considered in Brown, I take no exception with its non-dispositive general observations that “the attorney-client relationship is consensual in nature and the actions of either party can affect its continuance,” and that “[¡Initiating grievance proceedings before the local bar association evidences a client’s loss of confidence in his attorney such as to indicate a termination of the professional relationship.” Brown, 5 Ohio App.3d at 167, 450 N.E.2d at 695 (emphasis added). However, the panel majority stops short of addressing the central dispositive element of the decision when it fails to consider the next succeeding sentence of the paragraph wherein the court rationalized its previous statements in the following terms: “This conclusion is supported by the fact that Brown had [admittedly] no further contact with Johnstone after he contacted the bar association.” Brown, 5 Ohio App.3d at 167, 450 N.E.2d at 695. The Ohio Court of Appeals unquestionably conditioned the language of the two sentences relied upon by the panel majority upon overt action which manifested Brown’s “loss of confidence in his attorney such as to indicate a termination of the professional relationship,” as reflected by the observation that “Brown had no further contact with John-stone after he contacted the bar association.” Brown, 5 Ohio App.3d at 167, 450 N.E.2d at 695.
Thirdly, Brown is an isolated dated Court of Appeals disposition which had not been reviewed by the Ohio Supreme Court which, through subsequent dispositions, has been eroded. See Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987); Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988); Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989).
Lastly, appellate court dispositions in Ohio do not constitute legal precedent. *1058Only Supreme Court opinions rise to the level of binding legal pronouncements.
Assuming, arguendo, the interpretation imposed upon the above language by the majority, the evidence available to this court when considered in context disclaims the majority’s conclusions. At the very least, the facts are in conflict and should be resolved by a jury.
The majority’s suggestion that by February, 1982, plaintiffs no longer had “confidence” in the Brownfield firm’s ability is less than convincing. See Brown v. Johnstone, 5 Ohio App.3d 165, 167, 450 N.E.2d 693, 695 (1982). Despite the conjectured lack of confidence after March, 1982, plaintiffs continued to insist upon legal representation and advice from the Brownfield firm to the point of threatened legal action. Indeed, plaintiffs voluntarily paid more than $23,000 to the Brownfield firm for services rendered in the Guccione case between March and July, 1982 and additional sums thereafter. Certainly, plaintiffs’ conduct and action did not reflect an objective loss of confidence in the Brownfield firm and it is difficult to believe that plaintiffs would have continued to rely so heavily on — and pay so much for — the services of defendants. Although plaintiffs, prior to March, 1982, certainly questioned the Brownfield firm’s representation until they had actually retained other attorneys in September, 1982, it cannot be reasonably concluded (at least as a matter of law) that the confidence between attorney and client had completely “dissolved,” as the Brown test required. Brown, 5 Ohio App.3d at 167, 450 N.E.2d at 695. See also Bucaro, 126 Misc.2d at 592, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (client’s frustration, questioning of tactics, and suggestion of alternative tactics did not signal the end of attorney-client confidence where clients continued to rely on attorney for representation).
The majority alternatively contends that the firm was “threatened” into continued legal representation of plaintiffs and that the attorney-client relationship should not be deemed to have continued during the period of coercion. However, the attorney-client relationship cannot be deemed terminated, at least as a matter of law, merely because the client pressures the attorney to continue his representation. Only if the client’s pressure is in bad faith and designed largely to extend the attorney’s exposure to liability should such coercion automatically terminate the attorney-client relationship. In the instant case, by contrast, plaintiffs insisted that the Brownfield firm remain as counsel because they required the firm’s expertise, background, and knowledge to exhaust the appeal of Guc-cione and not because they sought to prevent the limitations period from running. A jury could justifiably conclude that plaintiffs would not have expended $23,000 on legal services if their primary purpose was merely to continue the attorney-client relationship and forestall running of the limitations period.
In considering the liability of Sturtz, I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that he is liable with the Brownfield firm for all acts of alleged malpractice committed by said firm while he, Sturtz, was an active partner.
If I am to respect the mandate of the Supreme Court by construing the evidence most favorable on behalf of the party opposing the summary judgment motion, in this case the plaintiffs, and refrain from assigning credibility to the witnesses and the evidence developed by the record and, if I am to apply the existing precedent enunciated by this Circuit in Woodruff v. Tomlin, 511 F.2d at 1020-21, and the Ohio Supreme Court in Zimmie, and conclude that the attorney-client relationship is continuous and uninterrupted during the appellate process, and, if I am to assign full faith and credit to the pronouncements of the Ohio Supreme Court in Frysinger v. Leech, 32 Ohio St.3d 38, 512 N.E.2d 337 (1987); Omni-Food & Fashion, Inc. v. Smith, 38 Ohio St.3d 385, 528 N.E.2d 941 (1988); and Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, 43 Ohio St.3d 54, 538 N.E.2d 398 (1989), and adopt Ohio precedent which teachers that:
We [the Ohio Supreme Court] believe that the appellee’s assertion in this regard is well-taken, and therefore hold *1059that a similar standard should limit the tolling of the statute of limitations to continuous legal representation regarding a particular undertaking or transaction.
... [I]t should be pointed out that the question of when an attorney-client relationship for a particular undertaking or transaction has terminated is necessarily one of fact.
Omni-Food, 38 Ohio St.3d at 387-88, 528 N.E.2d at 944 (emphasis added), I am compelled to remand this case to the district court with instructions to proceed to trial so that a jury may resolve the conflicts of material fact and decide, pursuant to appropriate instructions from the court, the date upon which the one-year Ohio statute of limitations applicable to actions in legal malpractice commenced to accrue.

. The Supreme Court of Ohio has obviously distinguished between continued general legal representation and continued legal representation related to, as in the instant appeal, a particular undertaking or transaction. Accordingly, this court must disregard the defendants’ withdrawal of its legal representation of the plaintiffs generally and must limit its consideration to defendants’ legal representation of the plaintiffs in the ongoing Guccione case.