Court Opinion

ID: 9915433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:09:28.988772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:01.716692
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Lauren Velkoff                             :
                                           :
                v.                         :   No. 23 C.D. 2023
                                           :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,              :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
Department of Transportation,              :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,                :
                  Appellant                :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
                HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                    FILED: January 5, 2024

                The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing (PennDOT) appeals from the December 8, 2022 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (trial court), which sustained the
statutory appeal of Appellee Lauren Velkoff (Licensee) from an 18-month suspension
of her operating privileges. PennDOT imposed the suspension pursuant to Section
1547(b)(1)(ii) of the Vehicle Code,1 commonly known as the Implied Consent Law,
due to Licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing after her arrest for driving under
the influence of alcohol or controlled substance (DUI). Upon review, we reverse the
trial court and reinstate Licensee’s suspension.
                     I.      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                On August 17, 2022, PennDOT sent Licensee an Official Notice of the
suspension of her operating privileges effective September 28, 2022. (Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 5a-7a.) Licensee filed a statutory appeal to the trial court, which held

      1
          75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii).
a de novo hearing on December 8, 2022. The evidence presented at the de novo hearing
can be summarized as follows.
              On May 28, 2022, Detective Robert Wiggen of the Dauphin County
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) observed a white Jeep driving erratically on U.S.
Route 322. The jeep was weaving in and out of its lane and nearly struck a guard rail.
(R.R. at 21a.) Based on Detective Wiggen’s report, Trooper Christopher Fritz of the
Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle, which was
being driven by Licensee. Trooper Fritz placed Licensee under arrest and transported
her to the PSP barracks. Id. at 22a.2
              Trooper Fritz testified that, after he arrived with Licensee at the barracks,
he obtained a DL-26B Form (Form) and read the written warnings on the Form,
verbatim, to her. (R.R. at 23a, 54a.)3 He also testified that he handed the Form to

       2
         Counsel for Licensee stipulated before the trial court that Trooper Fritz had reasonable
grounds to arrest Licensee for suspected DUI. (R.R. at 22a.)

       3
        Although Licensee contested in the trial court whether the warnings in the DL-26B Form
were provided to her word-for-word, the trial court nevertheless found that Licensee was adequately
informed of the consequences of refusing chemical testing. Licensee has not challenged that finding
on appeal. (R.R. at 37a; Licensee Br. at 9-10.) The Form advised Licensee of the following:
              1. You are under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a
                 controlled substance in violation of Section 3802 of the Vehicle
                 Code.
              2. I am requesting that you submit to a chemical test of blood.
              3. If you refuse to submit to the blood test, your operating privilege
                 will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously refused
                 a chemical test or were previously convicted of driving under the
                 influence, your operating privilege will be suspended for up to 18
                 months. If your operating privilege is suspended for refusing
                 chemical testing, you will have to pay a restoration fee of up to
                 $2,000 in order to have your operating privilege restored.
              4. You have no right to speak with an attorney or anyone else before
                 deciding whether to submit to testing. If you request to speak with
                 an attorney or anyone else after being provided these warnings or
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                2
Licensee so that she could read the warnings herself. Id. at 23a. Trooper Fritz then
asked Licensee to sign the Form, which she refused to do because she believed she was
“implicating” herself. Id. at 24a. Trooper Fritz testified that, during his exchange with
Licensee, she asked questions regarding the differences between Pennsylvania and
Delaware law.4 Id. at 26a. After reading the warnings and giving Licensee the Form
to read, Trooper Fritz requested that Licensee submit to a blood test. Trooper Fritz
testified that Licensee refused the test, after which he applied for a search warrant. Id.
at 24a-26a. According to Trooper Fritz, it took approximately 45 minutes to obtain the
warrant. Id. at 27a. Trooper Fritz advised Licensee that she could submit to the blood
test pursuant to the search warrant or she would go to jail. Id. at 26a. Trooper Fritz
also advised Licensee that the troopers could physically restrain her to the extent
necessary to obtain a blood sample. Id. at 27a.
                 Licensee testified on her own behalf. She stated that, when she arrived at
the barracks, she was confused about the differences between Delaware and
Pennsylvania law and was “asking a lot of questions [regarding] what is [going] to
happen as far as the consequences of me driving under the influence.” Id. at 29a. She
also testified that she felt “attacked” because Trooper Fritz and the other troopers
present in the barracks were dismissive of her questions. Id. Licensee denied that
Trooper Fritz read the Form to her verbatim and that she was asked to sign the Form to
indicate that she was refusing chemical testing. Id. at 29a, 32a. She acknowledged

                    you remain silent when asked to submit to a blood test, you will
                    have refused the test.
(R.R. at 54a.) The Form includes a signature line for licensees to acknowledge that they have been
advised of the written warnings in the Form. Id. Trooper Fritz testified that it was his standard
practice to read the Form to licensees and then give it to them to read for themselves. Id. at 25a.
After he believed Licensee had refused testing, Trooper Fritz acknowledged the refusal on the Form.
Id. at 54a.

       4
           Licensee is a Delaware resident. (R.R. at 28a.)

                                                   3
that he gave it to her to read, but denied knowing that it was a “straight-up refusal
form.” Id. at 29a.5 She also indicated that the writing was small, that she was in a
dark room, and that she was shaking during the process. Id. She nevertheless
acknowledged refusing to sign the Form, after which Trooper Fritz applied for the
search warrant. Id. After the warrant arrived at the barracks, Licensee testified that
she read the warrant and, “at that point, [she] was basically in compliance with giving
blood because that was a little more clear to [her] that they had to take it.” Id. at 30a.
Licensee explained that she “was just wanting to be all informed before [she] started
signing paperwork that [she] was unclear on.” Id. at 31a. She also testified that she
was frightened during the process because she had just come out of an abusive
relationship. Id. at 32a.
               After the close of testimony and argument, the trial court found as follows
regarding whether Licensee had refused chemical testing:
               I[ am] absolutely convinced that [Licensee] was properly
               placed under arrest. I [am] absolutely convinced that she was
               advised of the fact that if she refused her license would be
               suspended. I [am] absolutely convinced of that. I[ am]
               absolutely convinced that she was advised that if she refused
               to give blood pursuant to the warrant that it could be taken
               from her forcibly.
               But there[ is] a gap in the middle that, unfortunately, I
               can[not] figure out; and that is, it[ is] clear she was there for
               a[ ]while, at least 45 minutes, probably longer, while they
               went and got the search warrant.
               But it[ is very difficult for me to construct exactly what
               happened in the middle; that is, did she say [“]I[ am] not
               taking your test[;] if you want to get a search warrant, go

       5
          Both Licensee and her counsel characterized the Form as a “refusal” form that a licensee
signs to indicate his or her refusal of chemical testing. See R.R. at 29a, 32a, 33a-34a. But that is not
the purpose of the Form. Licensees sign the Form to indicate that they have been advised of the
warnings contained in it. Then, if a licensee refuses the testing, the officer signs to acknowledge the
refusal. (R.R. at 54a.)

                                                   4
               right ahead[”?] Did she say that? I did[ not] hear that
               evidence.
               But it’s pretty clear that once she was advised[,] [“]we[ are]
               [going to] get your blood and we[ will] do it by force if we
               have to,[”] she then said [she would] consent to the blood
               test; and, in fact, they got blood.
               ....
               As to whether she refused or did[ not] refuse before the
               search warrant phenomenon, I[ am] absolutely not convinced
               one way or the other. And the evidence in my view is dead
               even on those two. And whoever has the burden of proof, I
               think it[ is] [PennDOT], I[ am] not convinced that she
               refused before she gave the blood. And so I[ am] going to
               grant the appeal.
(R.R. at 37a-38a.)6 The trial court accordingly sustained Licensee’s appeal. PennDOT
now appeals to this Court.
                                           II.     ISSUES
               PennDOT raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial
court erred in concluding that PennDOT did not carry its burden to establish that
Licensee refused to submit to chemical testing.7

       6
          The trial court further explained in its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.)
1925(a) Opinion (Trial Ct. Op.) that PennDOT did not establish that Licensee refused chemical testing
because Licensee testified that she was confused about her options and because Licensee ultimately
complied with the testing after Trooper Fritz obtained the search warrant. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1.) The
trial court further noted that Licensee testified that she did not refuse, but rather cooperated, and that
PennDOT “made absolutely no effort to challenge or rebut her testimony that she did not refuse,”
other than Trooper Fritz’s obtaining the search warrant. Id. The trial court concluded that, “in the
absence of any corroborating testimony by [PennDOT], and because [Licensee] [ ] was a credible
witness, the Court could not conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [Licensee] knowingly
refused to submit to a blood test prior to the search warrant.” Id. at 2.

       7
         PennDOT actually addresses two issues in its brief, the first of which involves whether
Trooper Fritz adequately informed Licensee of the consequences of a refusal. However, the trial
court found that Licensee was advised of the consequences of a refusal, and she has not challenged
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                    5
                                       III.   DISCUSSION8
                Section 1547(a), (b) of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
                (a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in
                actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this
                Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one
                or more chemical tests of breath or blood for the purpose of
                determining the alcoholic content of blood or the presence of
                a controlled substance if a police officer has reasonable
                grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating
                or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in
                violation of [S]ection . . . 3802[9] (relating to driving under
                influence of alcohol or controlled substance) . . . .
                (b) Civil penalties for refusal.--
                    (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of
                    [S]ection 3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing
                    and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but
                    upon notice by the police officer, the [PennDOT] shall
                    suspend the operating privilege of the person as follows:
                        ....
                        (ii) For a period of 18 months if any of the following
                        apply:
                           ....
                           (B) The person has, prior to the refusal under this
                           paragraph, been sentenced for:
                                 (I) an offense under [S]ection 3802[.]

that finding on appeal. Thus, we need not address this issue, and we assume throughout our analysis
that Licensee received adequate warnings from Trooper Fritz.

       8
         In license suspension appeals, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law, or
whether the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. Pappas v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 669 A.2d 504, 507 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

       9
           75 Pa. C.S. § 3802.

                                                  6
75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(a), (b)(1)(ii)(B)(I). To justify the suspension of a licensee’s
operating privileges under the Implied Consent Law, PennDOT has the burden to prove
that the licensee (1) was arrested for DUI by an officer who had reasonable grounds to
believe that the licensee was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol; (2) was
asked to submit to chemical testing; (3) refused the testing; and (4) prior to refusing,
was warned by the officer that her operating privileges would be suspended if she
refused. Park v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 178 A.3d
274, 280 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Here, only the third element of PennDOT’s prima facie
case is at issue, namely, whether Licensee in fact refused the requested chemical
testing.
             Although the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole arbiter of the
credibility and weight of evidence, Stancavage v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 986 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), the question of
whether a licensee’s conduct constitutes a refusal is one of law for the Court. Lemon
v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 763 A.2d 534, 538 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2000). This legal determination is made based on the facts as found by the
trial court. Nardone v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130
A.3d 738, 748 (Pa. 2015). Once a police officer provides the implied consent warnings
to a motorist, the officer has done all that is legally required to fully advise the motorist
of the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing.             Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539, 546 (Pa. 1996).
The officer must only read the warnings to the motorist and give him or her a
meaningful opportunity to comply with the Implied Consent Law. Sitoski v.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 11 A.3d 12, 18 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2010). Anything substantially less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent to
submit to chemical testing constitutes a refusal. Id. at 19. A refusal need not be

                                             7
expressed in words; a licensee’s conduct may constitute a refusal.             Id.   The
determination of whether a licensee refuses to consent to chemical testing “turn[s] on
a consideration of whether the [licensee’s] overall conduct demonstrates an
unwillingness to assent to an officer’s request for chemical testing.” Nardone, 130
A.3d at 749. See also Walkden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 103 A.3d 432, 440 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (a general unwillingness to submit
to chemical testing demonstrated by a licensee’s overall conduct).
             The reading of a DL-26 Form sufficiently informs a driver, who either
hears the warnings or reads them herself, that if she refuses to submit to chemical
testing, her operating privileges will be suspended.        Quigley v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349, 353-54 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009). That a motorist hearing the warnings questions their interpretation will not
render any subsequent refusal to be not knowing and conscious, id., and a licensee’s
subjective beliefs will not justify a refusal to comply with the Implied Consent Law.
Scott, 684 A.2d at 543. An officer has no duty to answer a licensee’s questions.
McKenna v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 72 A.3d 294,
301 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). In particular, officers are not obliged to ensure that licensees
understand the warnings or the consequences of a refusal. Park, 178 A.3d at 281 (citing
Martinovic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d
30, 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)). Repeated questioning by a licensee following the receipt
of warnings may be deemed a refusal. Keenan v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 657 A.2d 134, 136 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Once a licensee
has refused, the refusal is not vitiated by the licensee’s later assent. McKenna, 72 A.3d
at 297 n.4 (citing cases).
             PennDOT argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding
that it did not carry its burden of proof to establish that Licensee refused chemical

                                           8
testing. PennDOT contends that Trooper Fritz offered adequate, credible testimony
that Licensee refused to submit to testing, after which refusal he applied for and
obtained a search warrant. PennDOT points out that Trooper Fritz’s testimony was
corroborated by Licensee’s testimony that she received the Form to read and would not
sign it or agree to give blood until after Trooper Fritz obtained, and let her read, the
search warrant. In response, Licensee does not argue that Trooper Fritz’s warnings
regarding the consequences of a refusal were insufficient; nor does she argue that she
was incapable of providing a knowing and conscious refusal. Rather, she argues that
she cannot be deemed to have refused chemical testing prior to Trooper Fritz’s
obtaining the search warrant because she asked some “clarifying questions” and was
not given a meaningful opportunity to consent to the blood draw. (Licensee Br. at 10.)
We disagree.
             In McKenna, a Buckingham Township police officer arrested the licensee
for suspected DUI after his involvement in a two-vehicle accident. 72 A.3d at 295-96.
After transporting the licensee to Doylestown Hospital, the officer requested that the
licensee submit to a blood test and advised that if he did not submit to testing, he could
lose his license for 12 to 18 months and face criminal penalties. Id. at 296. The licensee
expressed his belief that he had a right to speak with a lawyer, and the officer read him
a written DL-26 Form. Id. After the officer read the Form, the licensee continued to
ask questions regarding penalties for refusal and why he could not speak to an attorney.
Id. The licensee would not agree to submit to the blood test. Id. After approximately
two to three minutes, the officer deemed the licensee’s conduct to be a refusal. Id.
Then, after escorting the licensee back to the police car, the licensee agreed to the blood
test. Id.
             At a de novo hearing, the licensee in McKenna testified that, despite being
read the warnings in the DL-26 Form, he was still confused and was not getting

                                            9
satisfactory answers from the officer. Id. at 297. He also testified that he never
expressly stated that he would not take the test and was silent or asking questions the
whole time in the hospital. Id. The trial court sustained the licensee’s appeal, finding
that the licensee’s actions did not constitute a refusal. Specifically, the trial court found
that the licensee’s questioning of the officer was a legitimate and genuine attempt to
clarify his rights, that he never explicitly refused the test, and that the officer did not
adequately answer the licensee’s questions. Id. at 297-98. On appeal to this Court,
PennDOT argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the licensee’s confusion
excused his failure to give an unequivocal assent to the request for chemical testing.
Id.
             We agreed and reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding
that the licensee’s silence and questioning, even if sincere, did not constitute a refusal
to submit to chemical testing. We reiterated:
             Thus, [the officer] had no duty to answer [l]icensee’s
             questions to [the l]icensee’s satisfaction or spend time
             ensuring that the [the l]icensee fully comprehended the DL–
             26 Form, and [the officer] fulfilled his obligation once he
             read that form to [the l]icensee. Accordingly, whether [the
             officer] adequately answered [the l]icensee’s questions and
             whether [the l]icensee was legitimately confused as to his
             rights are irrelevant, and the trial court erred in relying on
             these factors to hold that [Penn]DOT failed to meet its
             burden of proof.
             Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, [Penn]DOT satisfied
             its burden of establishing the required elements to sustain an
             18–month suspension of [the l]icensee’s operating privilege.
             Once [Penn]DOT fulfilled this obligation, the burden shifted
             to [the l]icensee to establish that he was not capable of
             making a conscious and knowing refusal to submit to
             chemical testing. [The l]icensee does not argue that he was
             incapable of making a conscious and knowing refusal.
             Therefore, [Penn]DOT’s suspension was proper.

                                             10
Id. at 301.
              Here, we similarly hold that the trial court erred in concluding that
Licensee’s conduct after receiving adequate warnings from Trooper Fritz did not
constitute a refusal. It is undisputed, based on the trial court’s findings, that Trooper
Fritz requested that Licensee submit to chemical testing and that Licensee was
adequately advised of the consequences of a refusal. It further is undisputed that
Licensee did not expressly consent to the testing until after Trooper Fritz obtained a
search warrant and gave it to Licensee to read. Thus, the only legal question to be
answered is whether PennDOT established that Licensee had a meaningful opportunity
to comply with Trooper Fritz’s request and, at any point thereafter, gave something
“substantially less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent” to testing. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 938 (Pa. 1996).
Although the trial court accepted Licensee’s testimony as credible, it found only that
she credibly testified that she was advised that she could be forced to submit to the
blood test if a warrant was obtained, that she did not expressly refuse the test, and that
she ultimately cooperated. (Trial Ct. Op. at 1.) The trial court also concluded that
PennDOT did not present any evidence to corroborate Trooper Fritz’s testimony and,
therefore, did not carry its burden of proof. This was error.
              First, licensees need not expressly refuse chemical testing to be deemed to
have refused, and their general conduct, including the asking of questions and
remaining silent, can constitute a refusal. Second, any subsequent cooperation when
faced with a search warrant is irrelevant to the determination of whether prior conduct
constituted a refusal. Third, the trial court’s focus on whether Licensee had refused
testing as of the moment Trooper Fritz subjectively treated her conduct as a refusal and
applied for the warrant was misplaced. As our cases clearly demonstrate, the question
of whether a licensee’s conduct constitutes a refusal is a question of law, and Trooper

                                           11
Fritz’s subjective beliefs and application for a warrant are not controlling. It is
undisputed that Licensee gave no consent whatsoever until after she read the warrant.
Whether her conduct prior to that point was the result of a desire to ask additional
questions, a fear of the troopers, a wish to think more on her decision, or other reasons,
the evidence of record objectively demonstrates that she gave something far less than
an unequivocal assent to chemical testing for the better part of an hour before finally
agreeing to give blood. That conduct constitutes a refusal as a matter of law, and the
trial court erred in concluding to the contrary.
               Further, to the extent that the trial court concluded, or Licensee argues on
appeal, that she did not have a meaningful opportunity to consent to chemical testing
because she was not given an adequate opportunity to read and understand the written
warnings in the Form, we have rejected such an argument. The Implied Consent Law
contains no requirement that a licensee have the opportunity to read the DL-26 Form,
principally because the duty to inform the licensee of the consequences of a refusal
rests only with the officer. See Blyth v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 834 C.D. 2016, filed June 1, 2017), slip op. at 6.10
Moreover, the Commonwealth does not have a duty to ensure that a licensee
understands the implied consent warnings in order to give the licensee a meaningful
opportunity to comply. Rather, the Commonwealth need only convey the warnings
adequately and, if they are so conveyed, meaningfully permit the licensee to consent.

       10
          Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b) and Section 414(a) of this
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their
persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                 12
See Broadbelt v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 903 A.2d
636, 640-41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).11
               Here, the trial court found that Trooper Fritz conveyed the warnings
adequately and requested chemical testing. Licensee refused to sign the Form to
acknowledge her receipt of the warnings and would not consent to the blood test.
Trooper Fritz then applied for a warrant, which, after approximately 45 minutes,
apparently convinced Licensee to consent to the blood test. In these circumstances,
and given the significant passage of time, Licensee had a meaningful opportunity to
consent to the testing. Thus, and notwithstanding that we accept the trial court’s
credibility determinations, we nevertheless conclude that it erred in holding that
PennDOT did not carry its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Licensee refused chemical testing. Because Licensee presented no evidence indicating,
and does not argue on appeal, that she was incapable of giving consent, PennDOT’s
imposition of the suspension was proper.
                                    IV.     CONCLUSION
               The trial court erred in concluding that PennDOT did not carry its burden
to establish that Licensee refused chemical testing. We accordingly reverse the trial
court’s order and reinstate the 18-month suspension of Licensee’s operating privileges.

                                                 ________________________________
                                                 PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

       11
           It also is noteworthy that Licensee at no point stated that she did not understand the
consequences of refusing chemical testing. She indicated that she did not understand the differences
between Pennsylvania and Delaware DUI law, did not understand that the Form was a “refusal form”
(which it is not), and did not recall being advised that she was being asked to “sign that [she] was
refusing to give blood (she was not so asked). See R.R. at 26a, 28a-29a, 32a. The pertinent question
is not whether a licensee refuses to acknowledge receiving the warnings in the Form, but, rather,
whether a licensee, who nevertheless understands the warnings, refuses to submit to chemical testing.

                                                 13
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lauren Velkoff                        :
                                      :
            v.                        :    No. 23 C.D. 2023
                                      :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,         :
Department of Transportation,         :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,           :
                  Appellant           :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2024, the December 8, 2022 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County is hereby REVERSED, and the
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing’s 18-month suspension
of Lauren Velkoff’s operating privileges is REINSTATED.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge