Court Opinion

ID: 9353399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 20:02:22.859556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:54.741049
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23 In re N.W. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re N.W., et. al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                  D080280
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,                                                          (Super. Ct. No. EJ4734A-C)

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

                   v.

M.W.et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary
M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

         Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Mother, M.W.
         Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Father, P.W.
      Claudia Silva, County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                INTRODUCTION
      M.W. (Mother) and presumed father, P.W. (Father), appeal from the
juvenile court dispositional orders requiring continued out-of-home placement
of their three daughters. The parents contend substantial evidence does not
support the removal orders because there were reasonable means available to
keep the children in the home. Additionally, the parents challenge the
requirements that they complete a 52-week child physical abuse parenting
class and visit with the children only when supervised. Mother also asserts
that the juvenile court abused its discretion in requiring her to submit to
drug testing.
      We conclude the court abused its discretion in ordering both parents to
complete the physical abuse parenting class, but otherwise affirm the orders.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The family came to the attention of the Health and Human Services
Agency (Agency) in 2015, and had been the subject of 11 referrals prior to the

ones resulting in detention.1
A.    Circumstances Leading to Removal of the Children
      On January 18, 2022, police conducted a welfare check and found that
all three children—N.W. (age eight), B.W. (age seven), and M.W. (age two)—
were infested with lice. The girls reported having lice in their hair, ears,
mouths, and bellybuttons. Having conducted a welfare check two months
earlier, the officer noted that the children’s lice had gotten worse, and the

1     “In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the
manner most favorable to the dependency court’s order.” (In re Janee
W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1448, fn. 1.)
                                        2
girls now had scabs and bug bites around their hairlines and ears. The
officer also reported concerns that B.W. had been seen wandering the
complex unattended on previous occasions.
      Upon entering the home, the officer noted that its condition had also
deteriorated since the last welfare check. It was dirty and cluttered, and the
officer observed cockroaches in the kitchen, living room, and bathroom.
Police removed the children from the home, arrested both parents for child
neglect, and contacted social workers.
      When the social workers arrived at the home, all three children had
matted hair infested with lice and lice crawling all over their bodies and
clothing. Their faces, nails, and clothes were dirty; they had flaky, dry
patches on their scalps; and they smelled strongly of a “foul odor.” As a social
worker interviewed them, the children scratched their heads, legs, arms, and
necks. The social worker observed several red marks on their bodies. She
also saw lice crawling on Mother’s hair and observed that Mother wore dirty,
tattered clothing and emitted a body odor.
      A strong foul smell also emanated from the home, and the couch where
the children slept was covered with lice. Blankets on the couch appeared
brown and unwashed. There was only a narrow space to walk through the
dirt and clutter on the floor, and the surfaces could not be seen because they
were piled with trash, rotting food, and dirty dishes. The refrigerator smelled
of rotting food and had dark brown spots inside. There were multiple bottles
of alcohol on the counter and in the refrigerator. The room where Father
indicated the parents slept was piled with mattresses, boxes, and clothing.
      Social workers attempted to craft a safety plan with the parents to
avoid having to remove the children, but the parents denied having any local
support system. As a result, the children were taken to Polinsky Children’s

                                         3
Center (Polinsky) where it was determined they had not eaten all day
(although Mother had allowed them to eat chips and water during the home
investigation). The next day, B.W. and M.W. were admitted to the Intensive
Care Unit at Rady Children’s Hospital (Rady) with anemia and low
hemoglobin levels. They were given immediate blood transfusions. A Rady
doctor explained that their low blood and hemoglobin levels were “mostly due
to sever[e] lice, sucking the blood out for years.” She noted that B.W.’s
pediatric records indicated a chronic lice infestation starting at age three and

classified the incident as a near fatality.2
      A social worker interviewed Mother after the children were removed.
When asked about the liquor bottles in the home, Mother said they were
“[o]ld” and indicated she had not consumed liquor in four to six months (and
even then, she said she had only one to two drinks at a time). Mother stated
that she did not use drugs, other than occasionally smoking marijuana in the
past, but did smoke cigarettes. She disclosed current diagnoses for
depression, anxiety, panic disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Mother indicated she last sought medical treatment for these
mental health conditions three years ago.
      The social worker then inquired about the children. Mother said she
had been treating their hair every six months. She explained that unless
Father took time off work to provide transportation, it was difficult for her to
take the girls to the dentist because they had to take multiple buses.
      At the conclusion of the interview, a social worker provided Mother
with information regarding lice treatment, free dental appointments, and

2      The doctor also noted that B.W. had an elevated lead level at age four,
but it did “not appear there was follow up on this even though reminder notes
were sent to mother.” B.W.’s chart revealed that her lead levels remained
elevated in November 2019, and the county was notified.
                                        4
counseling in their area. The social worker also offered to provide supplies
for cleaning and treating lice, but Mother stated she would reach out to the
homeless liaison at the children’s school. A social worker expressed concern
about the family’s home, but somewhat inexplicably indicated it did “not
reach [Child Welfare Services] concerns for safety.”
      During Father’s interview that day, he explained that they cleared up
the lice over the summer, but the children were infected again once they
returned to school. He acknowledged that B.W. had gotten out of the trailer
unsupervised two different times. He claimed to have ordered door alarms
after the first incident, but did not state whether he installed them.

According to Father, B.W. sees a doctor every month for ADHD3 medicine.
He indicated that the home smelled because their two dogs use the bathroom.
      When asked about substance abuse, Father said he “hardly ever”
drinks alcohol and that his last drink was at least a month ago. He said he
uses marijuana for his mental health issues. He denied any other drug use
and stated he did not attend therapy.
      A social worker also contacted the paternal grandmother, who had
moved from San Diego to Texas a few months earlier. She was aware of the
cleanliness issues, but confirmed that the parents had treated the lice
multiple times and said the father cleaned the trailer biweekly. She did not
have concerns about either parent abusing alcohol.
      The day after removing the children, the Agency contacted the parents.
Mother reported that she expected to be done cleaning the trailer and
treating her own hair for lice the next day. When asked if she gave the
children medicine at night, she stated that she used to give them chocolates

3    ADHD stands for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. (Stedman’s
Med. Dict. (28th ed. 2006) p.29, col.1.)
                                        5
containing melatonin, but when those stopped working she gave them
Nyquil. Later, she acknowledged having given them Nyquil every night for
the last three to four months. Mother agreed to drug test, but Father was
upset about the request. Paternal grandmother, who was also on the phone,
told him, “[d]o what you have to do to get the children back, go get tested.”
B.    Prior Contact with the Agency
      In early 2015, the family was homeless, and the Agency received
reports of the parents fighting and throwing things in their car. Additional
reports of frequent yelling were lodged twice in 2017, along with allegations
that the parents slapped one child on the rear and another child in an
unspecified location (though no marks or bruises were observed). In October
2017, Mother called the police because Father threw a television off a cabinet
while having what he described as “one of my mental health issues.” Because
Father scratched his arm in the process, Mother was determined to be the
primary aggressor and was arrested. A family sharing their home in 2018
called to report frequent verbal and physical fighting between the parents.
The Agency received another report of screaming in 2019.
      The neglect allegations began in 2017 when neighbors reported the
children frequently being left outside unsupervised near a busy intersection.
When the agency responded to the fighting call in 2018, there were “concerns
for the cleanliness of the home due to the children having lice for an extended
period of time.” Further reports of neglect in July and August of 2019
indicated that the children had suffered from lice for over a year and the
house was infested with roaches. The Agency expressed concern that Mother
did not know how to properly treat the lice after learning that she would
wash the sheets and then allow N.W. to sleep in them with lice in her hair.
The next morning, Mother would treat N.W.’s hair, but then let her sleep in

                                       6
the lice-infested bed. During the investigation, the parents accepted
assistance from the school district, which sent a “lice expert” to treat the
home and family. The Agency also purchased new beds and dressers for the
family to prevent further lice infestation in the home. But the parents’
follow-through afterwards was described as “questionable.”
         Accounts in January and September of 2020 again involved roaches
and lice. The children reportedly had bald patches in the front of their heads
and said that their mother was not treating the lice. Although the school
offered to pay for treatments, Mother would not accept help.
         In response to a neglect call in November of 2021, the Agency
discovered that the girls had missed school because of lice, despite school
staff members dropping off lice treatments. Police did not intervene at this
time because the family had adequate food and water and the children looked
clean.
         An ongoing investigation opened in December 2021 noted that B.W.
and N.W. missed 60 days of school due to lice. Both girls had rotten and
missing teeth. During an interview, Mother acknowledged having mental
health issues, but said she “does nothing” about her symptoms. Father
stated he was diagnosed with ADHD, intermittent explosive disorder,
depression, and bipolar disorder as a child, and was found to be
impulsive/compulsive. Although he denied currently taking any prescription
medication, he admitted using marijuana and drinking one to two beers a
day. Father said Mother occasionally used marijuana too but had not done so
in over six months. He explained that he had been working 60-70 hours a
week but planned to schedule some time off during the week so he could help
with doctor’s appointments, dental visits, and cleaning. He accepted the
social worker’s offer of lice treatments and cleaning products.

                                         7
      B.W. was found unattended at the trailer park twice in January 2022.
The officer who took her home the second time noted that all three children
scratched themselves continuously and complained of skin pain. Police
removed the children the next day.
C.    Preliminary Dependency Proceedings
      Based on its ongoing investigation, the Agency filed juvenile
dependency petitions for all three girls on January 20, 2022, alleging one

count under California Welfare & Institutions Code4 section 300, subd. (b).
During the subsequent detention hearing, the court found that a prima facie
showing had been made that the children were individuals described by
section 300. It ordered out-of-home placement, voluntary reunification
services, and supervised visitation.
      The Agency’s subsequent case plan recommended that both parents
undergo psychological evaluation, complete a parenting education class, and
participate in a 52-week long child physical abuse parenting group. The case
plan further called for Father to submit to on-demand drug testing.
      On February 15, 2022, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional hearing,
sustained the petitions, and made a true finding as to the allegations
contained in the petitions.
D.    Agency Investigation Following Removal
      Following removal, the children were medically evaluated. Eight-year-
old N.W. was diagnosed with anemia. She had a severe lice infestation and a
rash on both hands. Seven-year-old B.W.’s severe anemia required a blood
transfusion as well as blood pressure support. She appeared to have
extremely poor hygiene and needed extensive dental work. Finally, two-year-

4     Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
noted.
                                       8
old M.W. also received a blood transfusion for severe anemia. She too was
observed to have extremely poor hygiene and dental issues, and was referred
to be evaluated for possible autism.
      Over the next few weeks, teachers and therapists assessed the children.
A therapist diagnosed the oldest child, N.W., with acute stress reaction
disorder and noted that she soiled her pants constantly and had vivid
nightmares of her parents arguing. She could not write her name and was
referred for a learning disability evaluation. B.W. was diagnosed with an
adjustment disorder with depressed mood. She was unable to sleep at night
because she cried and missed her parents. A teacher indicated that B.W.
followed all school rules and seemed ok, while the therapist described her as
“very intellectual.” M.W. had been receiving services through an early start
program and was due for an evaluation near her third birthday.
      During a forensic interview, N.W. said she missed her parents “very
much” and that they tried all types of lice treatments. She said her parents
“fight with words” a lot and it makes her feel scared. She reported that she
takes two pills that help her sleep and that her “mom and dad take pills” too,
but she did not know what their pills were for. N.W. was anxious to finish in
time for her parents’ visit.
      A social worker interviewed B.W., who reported that the last time she
showered at her home was “[a] long time ago.” When asked about having lice
she said, “Mommy said she was going to treat it with treatment[,] but she
never did it.” She confirmed that her mother gave her “Nyquil because it
helps us calm down and go to sleep.” But B.W. reported that she loved her
family and that her mother helped her do her laundry and her “daddy
help[ed] cheer her up by talking to [her].”

                                       9
      During a call with the parents, Father indicated to a social worker that
the children should be placed with the paternal grandmother if they could not
return home, and that the parents would move to Texas if the children were
placed with her. A few days later, the parents met with a social worker in
person and explained that they had washed all the bedding and stuffed
animals, sprayed the furniture with lice repellant, and planned to fog the
home that day. Both parents had shaved their heads.
      When asked to describe a typical daily routine, Mother stated that the
girls would stay up all night and go to bed around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. She
would wake them around 11:00 a.m. for lunch and then they would play,
mostly on electronics, until they started their bedtime and shower routine at
7:00 p.m. Mother opined that the home deteriorated because she got no
sleep, Father was always at work, and she was a little overwhelmed because
all the work fell on her.
      Mother provided background information about her own childhood,
explaining that she and her brother were removed from her parents at age
six and placed in foster care. They were adopted together when she was 10,
but she stated that she was physically abused by her foster parents and
sexually abused by her brother.
      When asked about the children’s most recent doctor visits, Mother
mentioned that a pediatrician recommended follow-up blood work for B.W. at
a well-check visit in June of 2021. There is no indication Mother ever took
her to have the blood drawn.
      Father acknowledged having had lice problems in their prior home. He
agreed that he worked long hours as a general manager at a fast-food
restaurant, which left Mother primarily responsible for the childcare and
housecleaning. He said he stopped taking any prescription medication when

                                      10
Mother was pregnant with N.W., and copes with his mental health issues by
listening to music and smoking marijuana. He stated that he tried crystal
methamphetamine once when he was eighteen, he drinks alcohol one to two
times per week, and occasionally has a shot of “Everclear.”
      The Agency continued to work with the family in February 2022. All
three girls had dental appointments to have cavities filled. The Agency’s
addendum report indicated that paternal grandmother initially could not
take the girls because she was caring for an ill husband, but that he had
passed away and she wished to be considered for placement. Father was
informed that TERM would not assign him to classes until a psychological
evaluation was done and they ensured his mood disorders were stabilized.
      By March, Mother had completed her parenting classes and Father was
nearly done. The parents visited the children several times at Polinsky; they
were observed to have positive interactions with the children and to have
taken on a “parental role.” Neither parent had undergone a psychological
evaluation or started the child physical abuse classes.
      On March 7, 2022, the Agency asked Father to randomly drug test and
he tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. He denied use
and suggested that perhaps energy drinks, or a natural energy drink not sold
in stores that his friend gave him, caused the positive result. The Agency
then asked Mother to drug test. There is no indication in the record that she
has done so.
E.    The Disposition Hearing
      The juvenile court held a contested dispositional hearing on April 5,
2022. It found that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not apply and admitted
the Agency’s reports into evidence. The parents each submitted photos of the
family home, and Mother made an offer of proof that the parents received a

                                      11
pullout couch, so the home now had a bed for the parents and a bed for the
children.
      The court found by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety[,] protection[,] or physical or
emotional well[-]being of these children or would be if they were returned
home. . . .” and “[t]here are no reasonable means by which the physical health
can be protected without removing them from the parents’ physical custody.”
It authorized foster care pending possible placement with the maternal
grandmother and ordered the parents to comply with the case plan. The
court noted: “I am in agreement with the plan because I think it was said,
what’s going on here? I have to agree, I mean, 35 years I’ve been involved in
dependency, and I’ve never have seen kids hospitalized for blood transfusions
due to lice infestation. And that’s just kind of, you know, how does that
happen?”
      On the same day, N.W. and B.W. were removed from Polinsky and
placed in a foster home. The Agency placed M.W. with a different foster
family. The effort to coordinate with child welfare services in Texas so that
the children could be placed with paternal grandmother remained ongoing.
                                 DISCUSSION
A. The Removal Order
      Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
dispositional orders removing the children. She argues that because the
sanitation issues in the home had been addressed by the time of disposition,
the Agency should have returned the children and offered services to assist
the family in maintaining the cleanliness of the home and children. Mother
further contends that substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding

                                       12
that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Father joins in

Mother’s arguments.5
      1. The standard of review
      “The fundamental right to the care and custody of one’s child is
protected by constitution and statute.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 522, 525 (Henry V.); accord In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398,
419–420.) “A child may not be taken from a parent’s physical custody during
juvenile dependency proceedings, except for a temporary detention period,
unless clear and convincing evidence supports a ground for removal specified
by the Legislature.” (Henry V., at p. 525.)
      Section 361 is the governing statute, and it imposes restraints on the
juvenile court’s authority to remove a child from a parent’s physical custody.
(§ 361, subd. (c).) The statute provides that “[a] dependent child shall not be
taken from the physical custody of his or her parents . . . unless the juvenile
court finds clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a
substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there
are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be
protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical
custody.” (Ibid., italics added.)

5      Although language in Father’s brief could be read to challenge
jurisdiction, he makes no specific arguments to this effect and his entire focus
is on disposition. To the extent he intended to challenge jurisdiction, we deem
it abandoned due to his failure to present meaningful legal analysis. (See
Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119–20 [An appellate court is
not required to “consider alleged error where the appellant merely complains
of it without pertinent argument”].)

                                       13
      This heightened burden of proof for removal reflects a legislative effort
to keep children in their homes with their parents when it is safe to do so.
(In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288.) “By requiring clear and
convincing evidence of the risk of substantial harm to the child if returned
home and the lack of reasonable means short of removal to protect the child’s
safety, section 361, subdivision (c) demonstrates the ‘bias of the controlling
statute is on family preservation, not removal.’ ” (In re A.R. (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1115; see also In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 76
[“[b]ecause we so abhor the involuntary separation of parent and child, the
state may disturb an existing parent-child relationship only for strong
reasons and subject to careful procedures”].)
      We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for
substantial evidence, “keeping in mind that the trial court was required to
make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) “[A]ppellate review of
the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and
convincing proof must account for the level of confidence this standard
demands.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995 (O.B.).) In
applying this standard of review, “the question before the appellate court is
whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true.” (Id. at pp. 995–96.) We “view the record in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.)

                                       14
      2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
reasonable means did not exist to support the family in the home and that the
Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal

            a.    Reasonable means
      The parents contend the juvenile court’s orders were not supported by
substantial evidence. They acknowledge that the home was filthy and
infested with insects (lice and cockroaches), and that the children were
harmed as a result. But they argue that because they cleaned the trailer,
shaved their heads, and cooperated with Agency efforts prior to the
disposition hearing, no substantial risk to the children’s safety remained
should they be returned with strict Agency supervision and assistance.
Accordingly, they submit that reasonable means existed to safely maintain
the children in the home.
      This contention takes too narrow a view of the evidence. In fact, police
only removed the children after four years of regular and prolonged lice
infestations and frequent Agency interventions. The Agency, the school, and
doctors repeatedly worked with the parents to treat the lice, yet the parents
subsequently displayed a total lack of understanding as to how they could
prevent lice infestations in the future. Mother contends that if the Agency
provides sanitation services, a “lice expert,” regular lice checks, and oversight
of medical treatment, the home will not devolve into a “substantial danger”
overnight. But even before the lice infestation progressed to life-threatening
anemia, the parents’ neglect in treating the lice caused the children physical
harm in the form of pain, scabs all over their heads, constant itching, and
bald patches. Given that the parents have repeatedly failed to maintain a
lice-free home, and apparently already re-infected their children while at
Polinsky, the court could reasonably infer that these harms would promptly

                                       15
recur, and that Mother might again respond inappropriately, by drugging the
children or screaming at them.
      Moreover, the “reasonable means” proposed by the parents do not
address their other neglectful behavior. Pediatricians twice recommended
follow-up blood work for B.W. that the parents did not pursue: first for
elevated lead when she was three (which apparently was not rechecked until
she was five) and again in June 2021. The latter test likely would have
revealed the anemia before it endangered B.W.’s life. The parents also did not

take the girls to the dentist despite rotting and missing teeth.6 Although
B.W. wandered off unsupervised in dangerous locations within the trailer
park twice in the two weeks prior to removal, there is no indication Father
installed the promised door alarms. Further, it does not appear Mother made
any effort to address the eight-year-old’s persistent soiling issues or to dress
the children appropriately for cold weather. It is the trial court’s province to
weigh evidence, and the evidence supported an inference that the
circumstances presented a substantial ongoing danger to the children’s
physical health and safety. A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence,
indulge in inferences contrary to the trial court’s findings, or substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court. (In re G.C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 257,
269 (G.C.).) Considered together with the harm caused to the older girls’
emotional well-being by witnessing verbal altercations between their parents

6     Although the parents contend the Agency could provide oversight of
medical treatment, there is no evidence in the record to suggest the Agency is
able to offer the level of service the family requests. To avoid the medical and
dental neglect that occurred, the Agency would need to monitor each doctor’s
order and scheduling recommendation and then ensure the family appeared
for the recommended appointment or test. The fact that the Agency thus far
has recommended free dental services closer to the family’s home suggests
that this degree of monitoring is not a reasonable option.
                                        16
and missing months of school, we find substantial evidence supporting the
conclusion that reasonable means did not exist for maintaining the girls in
their parents’ custody.
      Furthermore, the evidence supported an inference that untreated

mental health or substance abuse issues contributed to the neglect7, and yet
the parents had done nothing by the time of the dispositional hearing to treat
these issues. The Agency referred the parents for psychological evaluations,
but both declined to participate. A trial court is entitled to consider the
parents’ unwillingness to comply with Agency attempts to provide
assessments and services geared towards making reunification possible. (See
In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 217 (E.E.).) The Agency also referred
the parents for drug tests, but there is no evidence in the record that Mother
has ever complied. While Father did submit to a drug test, he tested positive
for methamphetamine, then denied using the drug, offered implausible
excuses for the positive result, failed to disclose his positive test result to the
substance abuse specialist, and refused to test again. “The inference from his
denial is that he is less likely to change his behavior in the future.” (V.L.
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 156.) Thus, the juvenile court could conclude that
the neglect issues would recur because both parents failed to treat their
admitted psychological disorders or acknowledge evidence of substance abuse
issues.
      If neither parent will acknowledge that their mental health issues are
affecting their children, or take steps to assess and treat them, the juvenile

7      Although Mother notes that the Agency’s concerns about mental health
and substance abuse were not pled in the petition, the petition need not
recite the entire contents of the social worker’s report. (In re T.V. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 126, 131.) “The statute ‘merely requires the pleading of essential
facts establishing at least one ground of juvenile court jurisdiction.’ ” (Ibid.)

                                        17
court could find that no reasonable means existed to avoid continued
substantial danger to the children if they were returned home. (See In re
John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124–1125 [“in evaluating current
risk, court should consider evidence of parent’s current understanding of and
attitude toward the past conduct that endangered a child” and evidence that
the behavior is unlikely to change].) “[W]e cannot second guess an order
supported by substantial evidence” simply because a parent has engaged in
some, but not all, of the offered reunification services. (V.L., supra, 54
Cal.App.5th at p. 158.)
      Mother asks us to apply the dissent’s reasoning from what she
characterizes as the factually similar case of G.C., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th 257.
The children in that case were removed for neglect when protective services
discovered them in a filthy home that smelled like marijuana, with feces and
urine on the floor, expired food in the refrigerator, and moldy food in the
cabinets. (Id. at p. 259.) Because the father was deployed with the military
and the family had no local support, the agency removed the children. (Ibid.)
      By the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the mother was back on her
medications and felt better, the father was home, and the paternal
grandmother had come from New York to clean the house and help with the
children. (G.C., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 261, 266, 273.) But the trial
court upheld out-of-home placement and ordered reunification services
explaining, “ ‘simply cleaning up the home and getting involved in services
doesn’t alleviate the fact that this is the third time a social services agency
has been involved with the family and the issues are still unresolved.’ ” (Id.
at p. 264.) The reviewing court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. (Id. at
p. 266.) But the dissent suggested that removal was inappropriate because
“[e]very single safety risk identified at the time of the referral was gone” and

                                       18
“there was no showing of a substantial danger to the children in the parents’
home.” (Id. at p. 273 (dis. opn. of Menetrez, J.).)
      Even the reasoning of the dissenting justice in G.C. does not require a
reversal here. Unlike in G.C., many of the safety risks identified at the time
of removal are not gone. Mother is not taking prescription medication for her
admitted mental illness and has failed to attend scheduled appointments for
a psychological assessment. Whereas the father in G.C. was deemed a
suitable caregiver, Father is part of the problem and only increased Agency
concerns by testing positive for methamphetamines after removal. This
family has a paternal grandmother who has helped in the past, but she is not
able to come to California and help for “ ‘ “as long as she [is] needed for
support” ’ ” as in G.C. (G.C., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 266.) There is no
other outside support.
      Finally, Father attributed the strong smell in the home to “the two dogs
using the bathroom,” but there is no indication in the record that the parents
got rid of the dogs. As such, the dissenting justice’s reasoning does not
compel a conclusion that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
decision in this case. This is not just a “filthy home” case like the ones
Mother cites where simply cleaning the home will mitigate the risk of future
harm.
      Mother’s final argument is that the children’s placement in foster care
caused distinct harm that could and should have been avoided. The Agency
contends that because this assertion and the secondary sources on which
Mother relies were not presented to the juvenile court, Mother has forfeited
the argument.
      We do not find that forfeiture can be invoked. A party forfeits the right
to challenge a ruling on appeal if it could have objected in the trial court but

                                        19
did not. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) In discussing placement
with the Agency, Mother stated “I went through foster care and I know how
screwed up the system is.” She then expressed her desire to have the three
girls raised by their paternal grandmother. This information was included in
the jurisdiction/disposition report admitted into evidence at the contested
disposition hearing. The Agency plays a hybrid role in that it is required to
exercise executive functions, like investigating child abuse and neglect cases,
as well as judicial functions, including providing essential information to the
court in the form of social studies and other reports. (In re Ashley M. (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 1, 6-8.) Because the court must review the Agency’s reports
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690(b)), we conclude Mother sufficiently raised
the issue before the trial court. Furthermore, the Agency cites no authority
for the proposition that appellants must have presented specific secondary
sources to the trial court in order to have them considered on appeal. To the
contrary, the law requires only that the litigant raise the contention in the
trial court to preserve the issue for appeal. (See, e.g. In re S.C. (2006) 138
Cal.App.4th 396, 406 (S.C.).) We find that Mother satisfied this burden.
      Appellate counsel also is not prohibited from citing additional authority
on appeal in support of arguments first raised before the trial court. And
while secondary sources are not binding authority, they may be persuasive in
the absence of precedent. (Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco Instruments Inc. (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 360, 400.) Here, the law review articles and materials from the
California Human Services Agency provided by Mother speak to the trauma
of removal. The Legislature has implicitly acknowledged as much in
expressing its intent “to preserve and strengthen a child’s family ties
whenever possible, removing the child from the custody of his or her parents
only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of

                                       20
the public.” (§ 16000, subd. (a); see also § 361.3, subd. (a) [giving preferential
placement consideration to relatives].)
      Because of these legislative goals, the court is always tasked with
weighing the risk of returning the children to the home against the harm of
removing them. (See, e.g., § 361.2 [explaining safety, protection, and physical
and emotional health concerns the court must consider in placing a child]; In
re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 542 [the court must “weigh the
evidence of the harm which will be caused the children if they remain in
parental custody against the harm caused by placing the children in foster
care”].) In this case, the trauma of living at home caused two children to
suffer near-fatal anemia; N.W. to have ongoing nightmares of her parents
arguing; all three children to live with pain, rotting teeth, and constant
itching; and the two older girls to miss months of school. The parents
contend several of these problems will not recur because they rid the home of
lice, but the court could reasonably have inferred otherwise for the reasons

discussed above.8 On appeal, we “must indulge reasonable inferences that
the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence” and “accept the fact
finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence.” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008.)
Within this framework, we find no basis to reverse the trial court for
balancing the harm of removing the children against the risk of returning
them to the home. Moreover, it is undisputed that the Agency and the court

8     Furthermore, the parents attribute N.W.’s acute stress reaction
disorder and B.W.’s adjustment disorder to foster care placement, but
because these diagnoses were made within weeks of removal, it is not clear
whether they were triggered by removal or the conditions in the home.
Contrary to the parents’ assertion, N.W.’s soiling issues pre-dated removal.
Thus, the record supports an inference that any trauma caused by foster
placement was less than the trauma experienced by the children in the home.
                                        21
continued to actively pursue placement with the paternal grandmother in
order to comply with the statutory preference for familial placement.
             b.    Reasonable efforts
       The parents further submit that the court erred in finding that the
Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. We again disagree.
       A dependent child may only be removed from the parents’ custody if the
juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence that “there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected
without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.”
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “To aid the court in determining whether ‘reasonable
means’ exist for protecting the children, short of removing them from their
home, the California Rules of Court require [the Agency] to submit a social
study which ‘must include’ among other things: ‘A discussion of the
reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate removal[.]’ ” (In re Ashly
F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809 (Ashly F.) quoting Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).) Where applicable, this discussion should include “the
option of removing an offending parent . . . from the home.” (§ 361, subd.
(c)(1).)
       Mother cites to the detention report, which focuses on services provided
to the family roughly two and a half years prior, to suggest that the Agency
made insufficient efforts to offer services in the recent past. If we adopt a
broader perspective, however, the record paints a different picture. Indeed,
the school district offered to pay for lice treatments in September 2021, but

                                        22
Mother refused to accept them.9 In November of 2021, the school dropped off
lice treatments. The next month, the Agency offered—and Father accepted—
additional lice treatments. On January 18, 2022, a social worker provided
Mother information regarding how to treat lice and referrals for free dental
appointments and counseling in East County. And even as her children were
being removed, it appears Mother declined a social worker’s offer to provide
Mother with supplies for cleaning and treating lice. The Agency also
attempted to devise a safety plan for the family and only placed the children
at Polinsky because the parents had no one in San Diego County with whom
the children could stay. Thus, the record demonstrates that the Agency made
recent and continuing efforts to provide services.
      Additionally, because past efforts to aid the family resulted in the
parents cleaning up the home and ridding the family of lice for a short time,
only to have the problems reoccur, the Agency’s focus in the social study was
on addressing the underlying reasons why the parents were unable to
maintain a clean and lice-free home. To this end, the Agency referred the
parents for parenting classes and psychological evaluations.
      Ultimately, this was not a case where “[n]o discussion of reasonable
efforts appears in the record.” (Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 809.)

9      Of course, the Agency is responsible for providing services, but the
parents’ responses to offers of assistance from the school district services are
informative in that they demonstrate just a few of many documented
instances of outside entities providing lice treatment and instruction to this
family to no avail. In her review of B.W.’s pediatric records, the Rady
physician noted that the family was prescribed lice medication during B.W.’s
three-year-old well check. In 2019, Mother again received a prescription for
lice medication. A 2020 visit also reports ongoing problems with treating lice.
It was reasonable to conclude that these parents were unable to maintain a
lice-free home for reasons other than a lack of access to lice remediation
services.
                                      23
The law requires the Agency’s efforts to be “reasonable,” not perfect, and the
Agency did offer lice supplies, dental services, psychological evaluations,
counseling, drug testing, and parenting classes. After four years, the Agency
could reasonably conclude that simply providing more lice and cleaning
services would be futile (though they nonetheless continued to offer them).
Additionally, although the record does not reflect whether the Agency
considered removing Father from the home after he tested positive for
methamphetamine, the evidence demonstrates that Mother was the primary
caregiver leading up to removal and, thus, leaving the children alone with
her was hardly a viable option.
      In sum, when viewing the record as a whole in the light most favorable
to the Agency, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could have found it
highly probable that returning the children to Mother and Father would pose
a substantial risk of harm to them, and that there were no reasonable means
to protect the minors short of removing them from the parent’s physical

custody.10
B. Orders on Reunification Services
      The parents contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in
requiring them to submit to a 52-week child physical abuse parenting group
and supervised visitation. Mother also argues the court erred in ordering her
to drug test.

10     There is much to commend about the progress these parents have made
over a relatively short period of time. They went from being homeless to
having a consistent home and car. Father is not only gainfully employed, but
in a management position. They generally appear to have a loving
relationship with their children, and social workers at Polinsky have
repeatedly noted how caring and thoughtful the girls are when interacting
with each other. Although we affirm the trial court’s removal order, there is
reason for hope that this family will overcome the obstacles to reunification.

                                       24
      1. The standard of review
      “ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best
serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order
accordingly.’ ” (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 186 (Natalie A.).)
But the court’s authority to fashion reunification orders is not “unfettered,”
(In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1229 (Nolan W.)), as these orders
must be “designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding
that the child is a person described by Section 300” (§ 362, subd. (d)).
Further, the court-approved “ ‘reunification plan “ ‘must be appropriate for
each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.’
”[Citation.]’ ” (Nolan W. at p. 1229.) “We review the propriety of court-
ordered reunification services at this stage for abuse of discretion.” (In re
D.C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 41, 56.)
      2. The juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering child physical
      abuse classes for Mother and Father

      Mother and Father object to the juvenile court’s order that they
complete a 52-week child physical abuse parenting group class. The parents
claim the class is inappropriate because the petition and the record reflect
neglect, not physical abuse. We agree that the physical abuse class is not
justified on this record.
      Reunification services are intended to be a “benefit” to the parents (In
re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 475) to help them to eliminate the
conditions underlying the section 300 petition (§ 362, subd. (c)). As the
parents correctly assert, the juvenile court did not sustain the petition
pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a), which relates to physical abuse.
Rather, pursuant to subdivision (b), the court found true allegations of
neglect. And while “[t]he problem that the juvenile court seeks to address
need not be described in the sustained section 300 petition,” (In re Briana
                                       25
V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311 (Briana V.)), there must be some
relationship between the reunification services and the conditions the court
seeks to rectify (See § 362, subd. (d) [the program “shall be designed to
eliminate those conditions”].).
      The evidence of intentional physical abuse in this case is negligible, at
best, and none of it pertains to Father. In 2017, a neighbor observed Mother
spanking a child and neighbors heard what sounded like slapping sounds.

Mother admitted to spanking the children in the past11 and later tapping
them on the mouth when they started screaming (but not hard enough to
leave a mark). She has since ceased both forms of punishment. Arguably,
drugging the girls with Nyquil every night for three to four months falls
within the realm of physical abuse, though this alone does not support a
reasonable inference that the children were at risk of physical abuse because
it appeared intended as an imperfect method of helping the children cope
with the lice. As N.W. explained, after their mother gave them “medicine to
go to sleep . . . [w]e lay down and then sleep, the bugs don’t bother us.”
      The record is also devoid of even minimal detail about the content of
the physical abuse class. In every child welfare case, the Legislature requires
the Agency to prepare a case plan which ensures, among other things, “that
services are provided to the child and parents or other caretakers, as
appropriate, in order to improve conditions in the parent’s home, to facilitate

the safe return of the child to a safe home.” (§ 16501.1, subd. (a)(1)-(2)12.)

11    Section 300, subd. (a) states that “ ‘serious physical harm’ does not
include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks if there is
no evidence of serious physical injury.”
12    The code section in effect at the time the juvenile court issued its
dispositional order has since been amended, but the language of this
subsection did not change.
                                       26
“The case plan shall be included in the court report, and shall be considered
by the court at the initial hearing and each review hearing.” (§ 16501.1,
subd. (g)(14).) Further, the court must consider whether the case plan meets
the requirements of section 16501.1. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690, subd.
(c)(2)(A); In re M.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 412, 424 (M.R.)). If it does not,
“the court must order the agency to comply with the requirements of section
16501.1.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690, subd. (c)(2)(B).) And again,
because the court can cannot arbitrarily order parents to participate in
counseling and education programs that are “not reasonably designed” to
eliminate the behavior or circumstances that led to the court taking
jurisdiction of the child, “the case plan must identify specific goals and then
explain how the ‘planned services’ are designed to achieve those goals.”
(M.R., at p. 424.)
      In this case, the Agency identified the goal for the parents, but not how
the 52-week child physical abuse parenting group would achieve that goal.
Specifically, the Agency explained in the initial case plan that the objective of
the group was to: “gain and increase . . . knowledge of the health, safety and
emotional needs of [their] children. . . .Through this service, the [parents] will
be able to demonstrate an understanding of [their] role[s] that led to the
child[ren]’s removal from [their] care. The [parents] will be able to
demonstrate the steps [they] will take going forward to ensure [the]
child[ren]’s safety and well-being.” However, read within the context of a
physical abuse class, this suggests that the parents will gain an
understanding of why their physical abuse led to removal and what steps
they must take in the future to protect their children from themselves. The
parents, understandably, take issue with this explanation. The subject of the

                                       27
class also implies that the parents intentionally, as opposed to negligently,
inflicted harm on their children.
      The Agency provided no details about class content. Without any
further information before us about what the class entails, we conclude the
class does not appear appropriately targeted to resolving the neglect issues
facing this particular family. (Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1229
[requiring that reunification services “be based on the unique facts relating to
that family”].) The Agency’s task is to recommend services that are
“appropriate” to “improve conditions in the parent’s home” and facilitate the
children’s safe return. (§ 16501.1 subd. (a)(2).) Because the case plan
requiring the physical abuse class does not meet the requirements of section
16501.1 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.690, subd. (c)(2)(B)), we conclude that the
court abused its discretion in approving the case plan.
      It may be that the child physical abuse class the Agency recommended
generally encompasses issues that arise in severe neglect cases, such that it
would benefit these parents in recognizing how their actions harmed their
children and what steps they must take in the future to safeguard their
children’s health, safety, and emotional needs. The argument by Agency
counsel during the contested disposition hearing seems to suggest that it

does.13 But argument of counsel is not evidence (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11), and nothing else in the record before us explains

13    During the contested disposition hearing, Agency counsel explained
that “[i]t is protocol for the Agency, under the child abuse treatment
standards, to refer to child abuse group therapy in cases of severe neglect
resulting in injury to a child.” Counsel further explained that “the subject
matter of a child abuse group broaches all manners of abuse. It includes
content related to emotional and cognitive affects (sic) of abuse on children,
anger and stress management, developmental issues, effective parenting,
family dynamics, substance abuse prevention and relapse prevention.”
                                       28
what topics the class covers or how it educates neglectful—as opposed to
intentionally abusive—parents. Accordingly, on this record, it was not
reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that a child physical abuse class

would redress these parents’ neglect issues.14 (In re. Stephanie M. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 295, 318–319.) We reverse and leave it to the trial court’s sound
discretion on remand to make a record supporting this reunification class or

consider alternative options.15
      3. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering drug
      testing upon reasonable suspicion for Mother

      Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her
to submit to on-demand drug testing based on reasonable suspicion because
the record contains no evidence that a drug testing order was necessary to
eventually return the children to her care. We disagree.
      At the disposition hearing, Mother requested that the juvenile court
strike the drug testing requirement from her case plan, arguing that drug use
by Father “is not the basis alone for reasonable suspicion that mom is using.”
She further points out on appeal that she has produced no positive test
results, has no drug-related criminal history, and has never been witnessed

14    We also conclude that the error was not harmless because the court
actually authorized a service “for which the case plan has not identified a
connection to plan goals.” (M.R., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 429
[acknowledging that harmless error analysis generally applies in juvenile
dependency proceedings and concluding that a case plan error only causes
concrete harm if the service lacking connection to a goal is actually
recommended].)
15    Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not address Mother’s
arguments that the Agency did not consider her opinion regarding the case
plan and that a physical abuse class would be traumatic for her because of
her own childhood abuse.
                                       29
caring for the children while under the influence. Mother cites to In re Sergio
C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957 (Sergio C.) and In re Basilio T. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 155 (Basilio T.) in arguing that drug testing is not an
appropriate reunification plan requirement where there is no evidence of
drug use by the parent. Unfortunately, that is not the case here.
      In Sergio C., the court reversed a drug testing order because the only
evidence that the father used drugs was the “unsworn and uncorroborated
allegation of an admitted drug addict [the mother] who ha[d] abandoned her
children.” (Sergio C., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) Here, Mother has
admitted smoking marijuana and consuming liquor. Although she claims to
have stopped using both, the family’s trailer contained multiple liquor
bottles. Father also stated that he keeps marijuana, pipes, and a bong in the
closet, so there is evidence the drug is available in the home. Moreover, in
Sergio C. the father did not live with the drug-using mother. (Ibid.) In this
case, Mother and Father live together, and Father conceded using marijuana
and recently tested positive for methamphetamines. Given this ready access
to various substances and her admitted prior history, the court could
reasonably have inferred that some level of substance abuse may have
contributed to Mother’s inability to care for her children.
      Basilio T. is equally unpersuasive. In that case, the only evidence that
either parent had a substance abuse problem was the mother’s unusual
behavior and obsession with discussing an invention that would make them a
fortune. (Basilio T., 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 172.) But her counsel offered proof
that the couple had, in fact, patented a product and were attempting to
market it. (Id. at pp. 164, 172.) Because this left only the mother’s behavior
as justification for the order, which the court concluded was insufficient to

                                       30
show she had a substance abuse problem, the court reversed. (Id. at pp. 172–
173.)
        More than just unusual behavior is present here. As the Agency
acknowledges, Mother clearly loves her children, and it is reasonable to
assume she would not neglect them to the point where two of them nearly
died if she were not significantly impaired. Mother has admitted to having
untreated PTSD, depression, anxiety, and panic disorder. The court could
reasonably infer that she may have been self-medicating with drugs and
alcohol. At the very least, it was prudent under the circumstances to rule out
substance abuse in conjunction with mental illness as contributing to the
conditions underlying the petition.
        As discussed previously, these children have lived for four years, almost
continuously, with lice and roach infestations, and their health and education
have suffered as a result. It was within the juvenile court’s broad discretion
to conclude that an order targeted at deducing the underlying cause of this
neglect was in their best interest. (See Natalie A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 186 [the juvenile court has broad discretion to determine how best to
protect the child’s interests]; see also In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
641 [“abuse of discretion applies when a lower court must delicately balance
factual determinations to assess an uncertain future situation” and though
minds may differ, if the trial court’s inference was reasonable on the facts,
“ ‘ “ ‘the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of
the trial court.’ ” ’ ”]).) We find no abuse of discretion.
        4. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering supervised
        visitation for both parents

        The parents argue that because the children were removed due to the
unsanitary condition in the home and the resulting lice infestation, there was
no compelling reason to deny them unsupervised visitation outside the home.
                                         31
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering

supervised visitation for an initial period.16
      “In a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court has the power and
responsibility to define a noncustodial parent’s right to visit with his or her
child after the minor has been adjudged a dependent child of the court and
has been removed from parental custody.” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23
Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373 (Moriah T.).) To maintain ties between parents and
children, “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the
well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd (a)(1)(A).) The juvenile court is vested
with broad discretion to determine the best interests of dependent children.
(In re Gabriel L. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 644, 652.)
      Both parents stress that the home environment provided the basis for
jurisdiction. But as previously discussed, the court is not limited to the
confines of the section 300 petition in fashioning reunification measures. (See
Briana V., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“the court may consider the
evidence as a whole” when determining “what dispositional orders would be
in the best interests of the children”].) The evidence of neglect before the
trial court also demonstrated that the parents repeatedly failed to supervise
their children. “No visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child” (§
362.1, subd (a)(1)(B)) and, given the parents’ recent and repeated failures to
keep track of B.W. in areas presenting very real hazards like traffic and a

16    The Agency argues we should disregard Father’s argument because he
did not support it with legal authority or citation to the record. While it is
true an appellant must demonstrate error by presenting meaningful legal
analysis supported by citation to facts in the record and legal authority (S.C.,
supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408), this argument came late in the brief after
Father had already discussed the same facts. Regardless, Mother properly
argued the issue on appeal. And, as we find no abuse of discretion, the point
is moot.
                                       32
pool, the court could reasonably have concluded the circumstances warranted
supervised visitation.
      Furthermore, an initial order of supervised visitation is routine and
appropriate in cases where concerns for the children rose to the level of
requiring removal. Here, the level of neglect required hospitalization of two
of the girls following removal and there were concerns about the girls being
hungry. Both the Agency and court had reason to be concerned that mental
illness or drug use may have contributed to the neglect. All of these issues
raised red flags regarding leaving the girls unsupervised with the parents.
Given the totality of these circumstances, the court acted within its discretion
to protect the safety of the children. (§ 362.1, subd (a)(1)(B).)
      Of course, pursuant to the Agency’s “statutory mandate to
supervise each case in a manner consistent with the child[ren]’s best
interests” and adapt to changing circumstances within this family (Moriah
T., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376), the Agency may decide, if it has not
done so already, to allow unsupervised visits. The juvenile court granted the
Agency discretion to allow unsupervised visits with 48 hours’ notice to the
minors’ counsel. There is nothing improper about a court delegating
discretion to the Agency regarding “the time, place and manner of the visits”
(In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009), and we assume the
Agency will exercise this discretion with the goal of normalizing contact
between parents and children as soon as possible.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The portion of the April 5, 2022 disposition orders requiring the
parents to participate in a 52-week child physical abuse parenting group is
reversed and the matter is remanded for reconsideration of that issue. The
disposition orders are otherwise affirmed.

                                        33
                              DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                         34