Court Opinion

ID: 9955857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:00:40.727754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:31.248851
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MAR 29 2024
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 22-30099

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00032-WFN-1

 v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
HOMERO RUIZ-CALDERON, AKA
Homero Calderon-Ruiz, AKA Homero Ruiz,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Washington
                 Wm. Fremming Nielsen, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before:      TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      Homero Ruiz-Calderon appeals his conviction, following a conditional

guilty plea, for being an alien in the United States after deportation, in violation of

8 U.S.C. § 1326. He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss the indictment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.

      A defendant charged with a criminal offense under § 1326 may challenge his

underlying removal order only if he “exhausted any administrative remedies that

may have been available to seek relief against the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1).

Ruiz-Calderon, who waived his administrative appeal of his removal order,

contends that he can nevertheless challenge it because the immigration judge

(“IJ”)’s incorrect advisement concerning his right to voluntary departure rendered

his waiver invalid. We recently rejected this precise argument, holding that an

administrative appeal is “available” to a defendant within the meaning of

§ 1326(d)(1) even if the IJ’s statements regarding voluntary departure affected the

defendant’s understanding of the value of an appeal. See United States v. Portillo-

Gonzalez, 80 F.4th 910, 919-20 (9th Cir. 2023). Because Ruiz-Calderon did not

file such an appeal, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies and was

accordingly precluded from challenging his underlying removal order. See id. at

920; see also United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 593 U.S. 321, 329 (2021)

(“[E]ach of the statutory requirements of § 1326(d) is mandatory.”).

      AFFIRMED.

                                         2                                    22-30099