Court Opinion

ID: 9405841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:08:00.496433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.266510
License: Public Domain

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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                                    RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2021-SC-0584-MR

ROY SHERMAN BUNCH                                                       APPELLANT

               ON APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE KAELIN G. REED, JUDGE
                            NO. 19-CR-00105

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

             On October 24, 2019, Appellant Sherman Bunch fired gunshots at

his former girlfriend Julee Gribbins1 and his cousin Tim Marple as they fled

into Marple’s home. Marple’s eight-year-old daughter Veda was in the home at

the time. Bunch also fired shots into Gribbins’ unoccupied vehicle parked near

the home. None of Bunch’s shots struck Marple, Gribbins, or Veda.

       A jury in Washington Circuit Court convicted Bunch of two counts of

attempted murder, one count of wanton endangerment in the first degree, and

two counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The jury recommended a total

sentence of thirty-five years and the trial court sentenced in conformity with

      1 The Commonwealth identifies Julee’s surname as “Gribbons.” However, the
record below and Bunch refer to her as “Gribbins” and we therefore adopt that spelling
herein.
that recommendation. Bunch now appeals to this Court as a matter of right.

KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Following a careful review, we affirm.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Julee Gribbins and Sherman Bunch were in a romantic relationship

beginning in 2014. The relationship was tumultuous and involved numerous

incidents of domestic violence. Gribbins moved out of Bunch’s home in July

2019 and ended her relationship with him by October 2019.

      On the night of October 24, 2019, Gribbins visited the home of Bunch’s

cousin and neighbor Tim Marple. During the visit Gribbins, Marple, and Veda

went onto the porch and saw a car driving down the road. Gribbins told

Marple it was Bunch’s vehicle. Veda went back inside, followed later by

Gribbins and Marple. Gribbins then went back outside to start her car before

returning to the home to use the restroom. Gribbins was scared and Marple

therefore accompanied her as she prepared to walk back to her car.

      While heading back to her car with Marple, Gribbins opened Marple’s

basement storm door and saw Bunch standing about twenty feet away.

Gribbins screamed “run” and began to run back through the house with

Marple. As they ran Bunch fired shots through the basement doorway and

through a window above the basement door. One shot passed between

Gribbins and Marple. Bunch also fired shots into Gribbins’ vehicle.

      Gribbins and Marple barricaded themselves in an upstairs bedroom and

were eventually able to get Marple’s eight-year-old daughter Veda, who had

been in an upstairs bathroom when Bunch began shooting. None were hit by

                                       2
the gunfire, though Gribbins was struck by exploding glass during the

shooting. In fact, she told a 911 operator she may have been struck by a bullet

in the back.

         There was no evidence at trial that Bunch ever entered the house. Police

eventually located him after the shooting and took him to the hospital for a

possible overdose of nitroglycerin. While at the hospital Bunch gave a

voluntary statement to Deputy Ryan White in which he stated, among other

things, that he only intended to scare rather than kill Gribbins and Marple,

that he did not know Veda was in the home at the time of the shooting, and

that he would have waited until a different time if he had known Veda was

there.

         A grand jury indicted Bunch on three counts of attempted murder, one

count of tampering with physical evidence, and two counts of first-degree

criminal mischief. Bunch’s defense at trial was that he fired the shots with the

intent only to scare rather than kill Gribbins and Marple, and that he did so

under extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”) due to their tormenting of him.

The trial court instructed the jury on EED and gave attempted first-degree

manslaughter and first-degree wanton endangerment instructions as lesser-

included offenses of the attempted murder charges. The trial court refused

Bunch’s request for lesser-included offense instructions as to second-degree

wanton endangerment or attempted first-degree assault under EED.

         The jury convicted Bunch on one count of attempted murder as to

Gribbins, one count of attempted murder as to Marple, one count of first-

                                         3
degree wanton endangerment as to Veda, and two counts of first-degree

criminal mischief. The jury recommended a sentence of fifteen years on each of

the attempted murder convictions and five years on the wanton endangerment

conviction to run consecutively, along with concurrent one-year sentences on

the criminal mischief convictions, for a total sentence of thirty-five years. The

trial court sentenced Bunch in accordance with this recommendation.

                                    ANALYSIS

      Bunch raises three issues for our review: (1) whether he was

substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s admission of the investigating

deputy’s testimony regarding his reasons for charging Bunch with attempted

murder; (2) whether he was substantially prejudiced by the trial court’s

admission of evidence of prior domestic violence and related convictions; and

(3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct as to second-degree

wanton endangerment and attempted first-degree assault under extreme

emotional disturbance. We review each issue in turn, providing additional

facts as necessary.

      I.     The trial court did not err in admitting the investigating
             deputy’s testimony regarding his reasons for charging Bunch
             with attempted murder.

      Bunch argues the trial court erred in allowing Deputy White, the

investigating sheriff’s deputy, to testify as to the reasons for his decision to

charge Bunch with attempted murder. We generally review an allegation of

nonconstitutional evidentiary error for abuse of discretion. Mason v.

Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky. 2018). That is, we ask whether the

                                         4
trial court’s ruling was “‘arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting Lopez v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867,

872-73 (Ky. 2015)). A nonconstitutional evidentiary error “‘may be deemed

harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment

was not substantially swayed by the error.’” Id. at 339-40 (quoting Murray v.

Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Ky. 2013)).

      At trial, the Commonwealth played a recording of Bunch’s voluntary

interview with Deputy White in the hospital shortly after the shooting. Bunch’s

counsel then cross-examined Deputy White, eliciting the deputy’s

acknowledgement that Bunch repeatedly said during that interview he

intended only to scare Gribbins and Marple, despite not then knowing he

would be charged with attempted murder. On re-direct examination the

Commonwealth then asked Deputy White what factors caused him to charge

Bunch with attempted murder.

      The defense objected and a bench conference was held. The

Commonwealth argued that in cross-examining Deputy White, Bunch’s counsel

challenged the propriety of his decision to charge attempted murder and thus

opened the door to Deputy White’s explanation of his basis for those charges.

The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and overruled the defense

objection. Deputy White then offered the following testimony regarding the

factors that led him to charge Bunch with attempted murder:

      So based upon the evidence that was on the scene at [the location
      of the shooting], as well as evidence that was recovered [at the
      location where Bunch was found], being the mask, the gloves, the
      flashlight, binoculars, the bullet casings, where they was [sic] in
                                       5
      the doorway as to where he was. The fact that the bullets,
      generally most wanton endangerment cases are, you know,
      someone shooting into the ground, into the air, it’s generally not
      directly at where the victims were standing. Due to the fact that
      they were standing in that threshold of that doorway and bullets
      came through the threshold of that doorway, as well as the mask
      and gloves, and the jacket you know which showed premeditation.
      You know and the fact that he said, “If I knew Veda was there I
      would’ve did it a different night,” you know. Due to those things
      that’s why I decided to go with criminal intent to commit murder.

      A. Deputy White did not state conclusions of law or opine as to the
         ultimate issue of guilt.

      Bunch first contends Deputy White’s testimony regarding his reasons for

charging Bunch with attempted murder was an impermissible conclusion of

law and opinion that Bunch was guilty of attempted murder rather than

wanton endangerment. Before proceeding to the merits, however, we first note

we have no occasion here to consider whether Bunch “opened the door” to

Deputy White’s testimony. Also known as the doctrine of curative

admissibility, “‘opening the door’ . . . is a form of waiver that happens when one

party’s use of inadmissible evidence justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of

that evidence with equally inadmissible proof.’” Id. at 343-44 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009)) (emphasis added).

Here, Deputy White’s testimony arose because the Commonwealth played

Bunch’s recorded interview for the jury. That recorded interview was not

inadmissible evidence.2 On cross-examination, Bunch then elicited Deputy

White’s acknowledgement that Bunch stated during the interview he only

      2 Bunch’s statement to Deputy White was not inadmissible hearsay given Bunch’s
status as a party-opponent to the Commonwealth. KRE 801A(b)(1).
                                         6
intended to scare Gribbins and Marple, and that he did not know at the time of

that statement that he would be charged with attempted murder. This too was

not inadmissible. The Commonwealth then asked Deputy White to explain the

basis for charging attempted murder. Thus, because Deputy White’s testimony

explaining the basis for his attempted murder charges was not precipitated by

inadmissible testimony, we need not consider whether Bunch “opened the

door” to Deputy White’s explanation.

       As to the merits of Bunch’s contention that the trial court erred in

admitting Deputy White’s testimony, it is well-recognized that “a witness

generally cannot testify to conclusions of law.” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973

S.W.2d 13, 32 (Ky. 1998). The admission of a witness’s opinion as to the

defendant’s guilt or innocence is likewise improper. Nugent v. Commonwealth,

639 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Ky. 1982) (“The issue of guilt or innocence is one for the

jury to determine, and an opinion of a witness which intrudes on this function

is not admissible . . . .”).

       Here, however, Deputy White offered no conclusion of law or opinion as

to Bunch’s guilt or innocence. Rather, he testified to the facts he believed

warranted a charge of attempted murder. Those facts included his location of

items suggesting premeditation in Bunch’s car, Bunch’s firing of bullets

through the doorway where the victims had been standing and the casings

found nearby, the fact Bunch fired the bullets directly at the victims rather

than at the air or ground, Bunch’s statement he would have waited if he had

known Veda was home, and Bunch’s history of domestic violence against

                                         7
Gribbins. At no point did Deputy White either state or imply that the proper

conclusion from these facts was that Bunch was guilty of attempted murder.

Nor did Deputy White opine that he believed Bunch was guilty. His testimony

therefore did not violate the prohibitions against a witness offering conclusions

of law or opinions as to guilt or innocence.

      B. Deputy White did not misstate the law regarding wanton
         endangerment.

      Bunch also argues Deputy White misstated the law in testifying that

“generally most wanton endangerment cases are, you know, someone shooting

into the ground, into the air, it’s generally not directly at where the victims

were standing.” The Commonwealth first responds that although Bunch

objected generally to Deputy White explaining the reasons for charging

attempted murder, this issue is not preserved because Bunch did not

thereafter specifically object to Deputy White’s statement regarding wanton

endangerment. When the Commonwealth asked Deputy White to give his

reasons for charging attempted murder, Bunch objected before Deputy White

could answer and a bench conference was held. At the bench conference

Bunch asserted the question was improper because the trial was not a

probable cause hearing, the jury was tasked with determining Bunch’s intent

rather than the basis for his charges, and the question essentially allowed the

Commonwealth to make a closing argument. Bunch thus offered specific

objections to the question before it was answered, and he was not required to

later rearticulate his objections to specific testimony made in response to that

question to preserve the error. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Rowland’s Adm’r,
                                         8
215 Ky. 663, 286 S.W. 929, 930 (1926) (“The law does not require idle

formalities, and, the court having ruled the evidence admissible, and proper

exceptions having been reserved, further objection to the same line of

interrogation is not required.”). We thus conclude Bunch’s original objection

was sufficient to preserve this issue.

      Bunch contends Deputy White misstated the law regarding wanton

endangerment because shooting into an occupied building is a classic example

of wanton endangerment. Unquestionably there are circumstances where

shooting into an occupied building constitutes wanton endangerment. See

KRS3 508.060, Commentary (1974) (explaining that shooting into an occupied

building with neither the intent nor effect of causing death or injury may

constitute wanton endangerment). We have even previously recognized that

the firing of weapons into occupied buildings is a “prototype” example of first-

degree wanton endangerment. Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 102

(Ky. 2012).

      Deputy White’s testimony cast no doubt on that assertion. Indeed,

Deputy White made no reference whatsoever to occupied buildings in

discussing wanton endangerment. Rather, he testified that wanton

endangerment generally does not involve firing directly at victims. Deputy

White did not testify that firing into an occupied building cannot constitute

wanton endangerment. Nor did he testify that firing into the air or the ground

are the only times in which a finding of wanton endangerment would be

      3   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
                                         9
appropriate. Rather, he simply stated that “generally most” wanton

endangerment cases do not involve shooting directly at the victims but rather

involve shooting into the air or the ground. While there are certainly many

circumstances other than shooting into the air or ground that may constitute

wanton endangerment, we do not find that Deputy White’s testimony rose to

the level of a misstatement or mischaracterization of the law.

      We further note that even if Deputy White’s testimony had been a

misstatement of the law, any such error would have been harmless. The jury

instructions properly set forth the required elements under KRS 508.060 for a

finding that Bunch was guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment. In

considering an appeal, we “presume that the jury followed the instructions

before it.” Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s Healthcare, Inc. v. House, 563 S.W.3d

626, 636-37 (Ky. 2018). We have no reason here to question that presumption.

Thus, because we presume the jury followed the trial court’s correct instruction

regarding the elements of first-degree wanton endangerment, there is no basis

to conclude Deputy White’s testimony had a substantial influence on the jury’s

findings and any alleged error in his brief reference to wanton endangerment

would have been harmless. See Mason, 559 S.W.3d at 339-40.

      C. Deputy White did not opine as to the nature of Bunch’s crimes.

      Bunch further argues Deputy White’s testimony regarding his reasons for

charging attempted murder also impermissibly created an impression of expert

law enforcement opinion that a verdict on a lesser-included offense of wanton

endangerment was not warranted. Bunch contends the admission of this

                                       10
testimony was thus contrary to our holding in Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391

S.W.3d 762 (Ky. 2013). We conclude that Ordway is clearly distinguishable

from the facts here.

      In Ordway, the defendant Ordway was riding in a car with the two

victims. 391 S.W.3d at 772. A scuffle erupted and Ordway shot them. Id. The

car then crashed and Ordway exited. Id. Witnesses testified that Ordway then

returned to the car and again fired at the victims multiple times. Id. Witnesses

testified Ordway also unsuccessfully tried to commandeer the vehicles of

passing motorists at gunpoint. Id. at 772-73. While in jail, Ordway

spontaneously told an investigating detective prior to the initiation of any

custodial interrogation that he had “‘nothing for [him].’” Id. at 773.

      Ordway was charged with two counts of intentional murder. Id. at 771.

At trial he claimed self-defense. Id. at 772. The investigating detective testified

over Ordway’s objection that people who legitimately exercise self-defense

typically do not leave the scene of the crime, but rather put their weapon down,

call 911 or otherwise request assistance, and cooperate fully with police. Id. at

775. He further testified “‘[t]hey certainly don’t leave the scene’” and they

“‘don’t try to commandeer vehicles with force with a gun in their hand.’” Id.

      We noted that the detective in Ordway thus “opined that [Ordway] did

not act like those who had lawfully protected themselves but, had instead acted

like those who were fabricating a self-protection defense.” Id. We further noted

this “opinion of an experienced and respected police detective that [Ordway’s]

conduct did not match the stereo-typical conduct of an innocent person acting

                                        11
in self-defense authoritatively portrayed [Ordway’s] defense as a fabrication.”

Id. at 777. We therefore reversed for a new trial given the error was not

harmless but rather “clearly devastating to [Ordway’s] claim of self-defense.”

Id.

      The facts before us here are starkly different. Deputy White simply

testified that generally, most wanton endangerment cases do not involve

shooting directly at a victim. He did not offer a broad-sweeping assessment of

the elements of wanton endangerment and then testify that Bunch’s conduct

did not fit within those elements. He did not testify that the facts did not fit the

profile of a typical wanton endangerment crime. Nor did he otherwise opine as

to the nature of Bunch’s crimes. His brief statement simply did not rise to the

level of an express or implied opinion that Bunch’s conduct could not

constitute wanton endangerment. We therefore find no error in the admission

of Deputy White’s testimony.

      II.   The trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding
            prior domestic violence incidents.

      Bunch next argues the trial court erred in admitting prior bad acts

evidence of previous domestic violence perpetrated by Bunch against Gribbins.

That evidence included Gribbins’ testimony that Bunch physically assaulted

her during a Fourth of July Party in 2018 and that in August 2018 he

forcefully pushed her into a jacuzzi causing her to badly bite her tongue.

Gribbins further testified to a January 2019 incident in which Bunch verbally

and physically attacked her for wearing a knee-length nightgown during a brief

visit by Marple.
                                        12
      Gribbins recorded the January 2019 incident on her phone and the

prosecution played that audio recording for the jury. Gribbins testified that

though the recording was muffled, Bunch stated at one point during the

incident that he would “blow [her] f’ing brains out.” The day after this incident,

Gribbins recorded a phone call with Bunch in which she informed him she was

leaving. Bunch told Gribbins during the call “you bring the fucking law and I

will put a bullet through your goddamn head personally.” The prosecution

played this recording for the jury as well.

      The trial court admitted evidence regarding these July and August 2018

and January 2019 incidents under KRE4 404(b) for the purpose of proving

intent and motive. The trial court also read a statement informing the jury that

Bunch was convicted of one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, three

counts of terroristic threatening, and four counts of fourth-degree assault as a

result of the incidents. The prosecution elicited testimony that Bunch had pled

guilty to those charges.

          Gribbins also testified to other domestic violence beyond the scope of

the trial court’s KRE 404(b) ruling, including an incident in which Bunch

became extremely angry after she overfilled a cat food bowl, his efforts to

isolate her by giving her van to his parents, and his accusations that Gribbins

was having sex with numerous other men including her brothers. Gribbins

also testified she continued to have sex with Bunch even after ending her

relationship with him because she knew based on his explosive behavior she

      4   Kentucky Rule of Evidence.
                                         13
would get hurt if she did not. She also told the jury she ultimately blocked

Bunch on all platforms because he was harassing and stalking her. She

further testified she also made efforts to keep her location secret from Bunch

because she knew he would hurt her children and her family.

      Bunch moved for a mistrial because Gribbins’ testimony as to these

additional incidents went beyond the trial court’s ruling that the July and

August 2018 and January 2019 incidents were admissible under KRE 404(b).

The trial court agreed the evidence should have come in but denied the motion.

Bunch did not seek an admonition to the jury to disregard the evidence

regarding these additional incidents.

      A. Bunch’s allegation of error is preserved.

      Before proceeding to the merits we must again address the

Commonwealth’s contention that Bunch has failed to preserve an alleged error,

this time as to admission of the July and August 2018 and January 2019

incidents. Before trial, the Court heard argument via Zoom regarding the

Commonwealth’s intention to introduce that evidence pursuant to KRE 404(b).

However the trial court did not record the hearing. Nor did Bunch prepare a

narrative summary of the hearing for use in this appeal as permitted by Civil

Rule (“CR”) 75.135. The Commonwealth now contends Bunch therefore has not

      5  CR 75.13 applied at the time Bunch could have prepared a narrative summary
for use in this appeal. That Rule was superseded by Rule of Appellate Procedure
(“RAP”) 25 on January 1, 2023. RAP 25 now sets forth the procedure for inclusion of a
narrative statement in the record on appeal as a supplement to or in lieu of an
unavailable or insufficient official record of trial court proceedings. Pursuant to our
Order In re: Applicability of the New Rules of Appellate Procedure (Dec. 29, 2022), all
                                          14
preserved his objection because the record contains neither a recording of the

pre-trial Zoom hearing nor a narrative summary of that hearing.

      We will find an objection as to the admission or exclusion of evidence

preserved only if “a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record,

stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent

from the context.” KRE 103(a)(1). Here, the trial court noted on the record at

trial that Bunch’s objection to the admission of the KRE 404(b) evidence was

preserved. While the argument of Bunch’s counsel as to the specific grounds

for their objection does not appear in the record, the trial court noted the

morning of trial that they argued at the Zoom hearing the evidence was too

temporally remote to be admitted under KRE 404(b). Thus, because the record

indicates both Bunch’s objection to admission of the KRE 404(b) evidence and

the specific grounds for that objection, we conclude that this issue is

preserved.

      We briefly pause to note however that Bunch was not without recourse

for the trial court’s failure to record the Zoom hearing. Both our Civil Rules

then in effect and our new Rules of Appellate Procedure afford litigants the

ability to prepare a narrative summary to cure a deficiency or omission from

the record. CR 75.13; RAP 25. Curiously, Bunch’s counsel did not avail

themselves of this remedy. Though we were nonetheless able to find the

statement and nature of Bunch’s objection in the record, preparation of a

matters pending on or filed after January 1, 2023 are governed under the new Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
                                         15
narrative statement is the strongly preferred procedure to cure deficiencies,

insufficiencies, or omissions from the record. This is particularly so given that

in considering an appeal, we are under no obligation to search the record for a

party’s preservation of error. See Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46,

53 (Ky. 2003).

      B. The July and August 2018 and January 2019 domestic violence
         incidents, recordings, and convictions were admissible under KRE
         404(b) to show intent.

      Having determined the issue is preserved, we now consider the merits of

Bunch’s argument. Bunch contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence

of the July and August 2018 and January 2019 incidents and Bunch’s

resulting convictions. Bunch asserts the prejudicial effect of that evidence

substantially outweighed its probative value given the temporal separation of

nine to fifteen months between those incidents and the crime at issue here.

Bunch maintains the trial court also admitted too much evidence regarding

these incidents, and in particular should have excluded the two recorded

phone calls because they were inflammatory and difficult to hear.

      KRE 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs,

or acts. It provides that such evidence is “not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”

However, the Rule also provides two circumstances in which evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible. First, such evidence may be

admissible if “offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

                                       16
mistake or accident.” KRE 404(b)(1). Second, such evidence may also be

admissible if it is “so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to

the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without

serious adverse effect on the offering party.” KRE 404(b)(2).

      In determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts under KRE 404(b), a trial court must consider the three factors of

relevance, probativeness, and prejudice as set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth,

875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1994). That is, the trial court must consider 1) whether

the proffered evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the

defendant’s criminal disposition, 2) whether evidence of the other crime, wrong,

or act is sufficiently probative of its commission by the defendant, and

3) whether the potential prejudice from admission of the proffered evidence

substantially outweighs its probative value. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 889-91. In

considering these factors, the trial court “must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously,

with an eye towards eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an

accused’s propensity to commit a certain type of crime.” Id. at 889. We review

a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under KRE 404(b) for abuse of

discretion. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).

      We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of KRE

404(b) here. As to the first Bell factor of relevance, the trial court must

determine whether admission of the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

would be in furtherance of one of the permissible purposes under KRE

404(b)(1). Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32, 49 (Ky. 2014). The

                                        17
trial court must also find that the evidence materially bears on an element of

the charged offense or some other fact in dispute. Jenkins v. Commonwealth,

496 S.W.3d 435, 457 (Ky. 2016).

      The trial court did not err in finding the Bell relevance factor satisfied

here. We have long held that “threats against the victim of a crime are

probative of the defendant’s motive and intent to commit the crime.” Sherroan

v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 7, 18 (Ky. 2004). Likewise, “‘evidence of similar

acts perpetrated against the same victim are almost always admissible’” under

KRE 404(b). Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Ky. 2008) (quoting

Noel v. Commonwealth, 76 S.W.3d 923, 931 (Ky. 2002)).

      Such was the case here. The July and August 2018 and January 2019

domestic violence incidents, recordings, and subsequent related convictions

were unquestionably relevant to the charged offense of attempted murder

insofar as they supported the Commonwealth’s case that Bunch shot at

Gribbins with an intent to kill her. In the July 2018 incident Bunch physically

assaulted Gribbins. In August 2018 he again physically assaulted her, this

time pushing her into a jacuzzi and causing her to badly bite her tongue. In

January 2019 he struck Gribbins and threatened to “blow her f’ing brains out.”

The next day he was recorded telling her he would “put a bullet through [her]

goddamn head personally.” This evidence of Bunch’s past violence and threats

to kill Gribbins was plainly relevant to show his intent to kill her on the day of

the shooting. The evidence was also materially related to the disputed issue of

Bunch’s intent, given his raising of a defense that he intended only to scare

                                        18
rather than kill Gribbins and Marple. Thus, because the evidence served a

proper purpose under KRE 404(b) of proving intent and bore directly on a

material issue in the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

the Bell factor of relevance satisfied.

      The second Bell factor requires a trial court to consider whether the

evidence is sufficiently probative of the defendant’s commission of the other

alleged crimes, wrongs, and acts, i.e. whether “the jury could reasonably

conclude that the act[s] occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Davis

v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 724-25 (Ky. 2005). Here the evidence

included Bunch’s criminal convictions after pleading guilty to the conduct at

issue. There was thus no question that Bunch engaged in the prior bad acts

the Commonwealth sought to introduce.

      We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of

the third Bell factor of prejudice. This factor requires the trial court to ask

whether “the tendency of the evidence [is] so strongly to lead the jury into

improper character inferences that that tendency ‘substantially outweigh[s]

[the evidence’s] probative value’ with regard to its proper uses.” Jenkins, 496

S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890). Here, evidence of the July

and August 2018 and January 2019 domestic violence was undoubtedly

prejudicial to Bunch, given its depiction of his pattern of repeated death

threats and physical violence against Gribbins. However, evidence of that

domestic violence was also highly relevant to the issue of Bunch’s intent in

firing at the victims, particularly given both that it involved the same

                                          19
perpetrator and victim and his adoption of a defense that he intended only to

scare rather than harm or kill Gribbins and Marple.

      Nor were the incidents so temporally remote that their prejudicial effect

substantially outweighed their probative value. See Woodlee v. Commonwealth,

306 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Ky. 2010) (noting that temporal remoteness “is a factor

to be considered ‘when balancing the probative value of [the bad act evidence]

and the undue prejudice it caused.’”) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 223

S.W.3d 90, 100 (Ky. 2007)). The incidents occurred over a period of six to

seven months beginning little more than a year before the crime at issue. We

cannot find under the facts of this case that the introduction of evidence of

such recent death threats and physical violence resulted in undue prejudice to

Bunch. In sum, while the prior bad acts evidence was undoubtedly prejudicial

to Bunch, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the

resulting prejudice did not substantially outweigh the significant probative

value of these acts of domestic violence.

      Finally, Bunch contends that at a minimum the recordings of the

January 2019 incidents should have been excluded. More particularly, Bunch

argues the recordings are difficult to hear and there is a lack of trustworthiness

in Gribbins’ testimony that Bunch said he would “blow [her] f’ing brains out”

during one of the recorded incidents.

      A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a recording is

of sufficient quality to permit its admission as evidence. Gordon v.

Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ky. 1995). We have reviewed both

                                        20
recordings and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion they

were of sufficient quality to permit admission.

      Nor do we find Gribbins’ testimony in conjunction with the playing of one

of the recordings improper. A witness may provide narrative testimony in

conjunction with the playing of a recording, but such testimony may not

become interpretive. Id. (“It is for the jury to determine as best it can what is

revealed in the tape recording without embellishment or interpretation by a

witness.”). Thus, a witness may not testify (and a proffered transcript may not

indicate) that the recording reveals statements not otherwise intelligible from

the recording itself. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730, 744 (Ky. 2020).

Otherwise a party’s proffered interpretation of inaudible or unintelligible

portions of the recording would give that party “an unfair advantage in swaying

the jury in favor of one interpretation” of the recording. Id. Rather, the witness

or transcript should acknowledge that the portion is simply inaudible or

unintelligible. See Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Ky. App.

1994). And of course, “[a]s with any participant in a conversation, [the] . . .

witness [is] entitled to testify as to his recollection of what was said.” Gordon,

916 S.W.2d at 180 (emphasis added).

      Here, Gribbins did just that. When the recording of the January 2019

incident concluded, the prosecutor asked Gribbins if she was assaulted and

what happened. Gribbins responded “he hit me, and then he went in the other

room and he got a gun. And it’s muffled. He told me he’d blow my f’ing brains

out.” Gribbins did not purport to inform the jury the recording revealed Bunch

                                         21
making such a statement. To the contrary, she acknowledged the recording

was difficult to hear and then proceeded to testify as to what she heard Bunch

say at the time the recording was made. This was entirely permissible evidence

of Gribbins’ recollection of Bunch’s statement based upon her participation in

the conversation. There was no error in the admission of that testimony.

      C. The accidental admission of additional prior bad acts by Bunch
         does not mandate reversal.

      Gribbins also testified to additional prior bad acts by Bunch that were

beyond the scope of the trial court’s ruling regarding evidence admissible under

KRE 404(b). First, Gribbins testified that Bunch was explosive and violent,

that he stalked her and she felt the need to protect her family from him, and

that she had sex with him out of a fear of violent repercussions for refusing to

do so. Bunch acknowledges that he did not object at trial to the admission of

these statements and therefore requests palpable error review. RCr6 10.26.

      Under RCr 10.26, “[a] palpable error which affects the substantial rights

of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though

insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be

granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the

error.” In determining whether an error is palpable, we consider

      “whether on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that
      the result would have been any different.” To be palpable, an error
      must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.”
      A palpable error must be so grave that, if uncorrected, it would
      seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. “It should be so
      egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.”

      6   Rule of Criminal Procedure.
                                        22
Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted).

Even where an error is palpable, relief is warranted only where it results in

manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Ky. 2018).

An error results in manifest injustice if it “so seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding as to be ‘shocking or

jurisprudentially intolerable.’” Conrad v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 779, 783

(Ky. 2017) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006)).

      We do not find that Gribbins’ testimony seriously affected the fairness of

the trial or that without such testimony there is a substantial possibility the

result would have been any different. Her descriptions of Bunch’s explosive,

violent, threatening, and controlling behaviors were merely cumulative. Those

traits were evident from the July and August 2018 and January 2019

incidents, recordings, and convictions. Gribbins’ testimony added nothing the

jury could not already glean from the duly admitted KRE 404(b) evidence. We

therefore find no palpable error or manifest injustice in the accidental

admission of these additional prior bad acts.

      Bunch also contends reversible error occurred when Gribbins testified he

became angry with her for overfilling a cat food bowl, took her van and gave it

to his parents, and accused her of having sex with numerous men including

her brothers. This testimony exceeded the scope of evidence found admissible

by the trial court under KRE 404(b) and Bunch immediately objected.

However, he failed to request an admonition to the jury to disregard the

testimony.

                                         23
      “The cure for accidental admission of prior bad acts is an admonition to

the jury to disregard the testimony.” Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126,

132 (Ky. 2014). “When an admonition is sufficient to cure an error and the

defendant fails to ask for one, we will not review the error.” Id. at 133. An

admonition is sufficient unless either 1) there is overwhelming probability that

the jury is incapable of following the admonition and a strong likelihood the

impermissible evidence would be devastating to the defendant, or 2) the

testimony was made in response to a question that was both not premised on a

factual basis and inflammatory or highly prejudicial. Sherroan, 142 S.W.3d at

17.

      Here, Gribbins’ testimony regarding these additional incidents was brief

and there is no basis to conclude the jury could not have followed an

admonition to disregard it. Though certainly not flattering, the evidence also

was not devastating to Bunch given the other properly admitted evidence of his

pattern of domestic violence. The testimony was responsive to very general

questions that were not inflammatory, prejudicial, or lacking in factual basis,

including “tell me about your relationship,” “tell me about your van,” and “what

began to happen [later in the relationship]?” An admonition thus would have

been sufficient to cure the error. As we have noted, a mistrial should be

granted only “when the error ‘is of such magnitude that a litigant would be

denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in

no other way.’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 416 S.W.3d 302, 312 (Ky. 2013)

(quoting Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky.

                                       24
2005)). Moreover, a mistrial is “‘an extreme remedy and should be resorted to

only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings and there is a

‘manifest necessity for such an action.’” Id. (quoting Woodward v.

Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Ky. 2004)). Thus, because an admonition

would have cured the error and because the testimony in any event was brief

and not devastating given the other properly admitted evidence of Bunch’s

pattern of domestic violence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

denial of the motion for mistrial.

      III.   Bunch was not entitled to lesser-included offense instructions
             for wanton endangerment in the second degree or attempted
             first-degree assault under EED.

      Finally, Bunch argues the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury

lesser-included offense instructions on second-degree wanton endangerment

and attempted first-degree assault under EED. A trial court should instruct on

a lesser-included offense if, and only if, under the evidence presented a

reasonable juror could have reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt for the

greater charge but find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty

of the lesser charge. Allen v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Ky. 2011).

On appeal, we review allegations that a trial court erred in refusing a requested

jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d at 367. In so

doing, we construe the evidence in favor of the proponent of the instruction

and ask “whether a reasonable juror could acquit of the greater charge but

convict of the lesser.” Allen, 338 S.W.3d at 255.

                                        25
      Bunch contends he was entitled to a second-degree wanton

endangerment instruction as to Gribbins and Marple given his statements that

he intended only to scare rather than kill them and because he was a good

shot. First-degree wanton endangerment differs from second-degree wanton

endangerment in

      the mental state and degree of danger created. As to the mental
      state, both crimes require wanton behavior, but first-degree also
      requires “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
      value of human life,” which has been described as “aggravated
      wantonness.” As to the danger created, first-degree requires a
      substantial danger of death or serious physical injury, whereas
      second-degree requires only a substantial danger of physical
      injury.

Swan, 384 S.W.3d at 102 (citation omitted). The evidence at trial was that

Bunch fired shots directly through the doorway where Gribbins and Marple

had just been standing as they ran back into the home. At least one shot flew

between Gribbins and Marple and Gribbins was struck by exploding glass.

Even crediting evidence that Bunch was a “good shot,” no reasonable juror

could have reasonable doubt that in firing directly at the victims and nearly

hitting them, Bunch manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life

or that his conduct created a substantial danger of death or serious physical

injury rather than mere physical injury. See Combs v. Commonwealth, 652

S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Ky. 1983) (holding that trial court properly refused to

instruct on second-degree wanton endangerment where defendant fired at and

in the immediate vicinity of victims). The trial court therefore did not abuse its

discretion in refusing Bunch’s request for lesser-included offense instructions

on second-degree wanton endangerment as to Gribbins and Marple.
                                        26
      Bunch contends he was also entitled to a second-degree wanton

endangerment instruction as to Veda given both his statements that he did not

know she was in the home at the time of the shooting and her distance from

his firing of the shots. We disagree.

      First, Bunch’s alleged lack of awareness that Veda was in the home is

immaterial because liability for his knowingly wanton creation of danger to

Gribbins and Marple transfers as a matter of law to his creation of danger to

Veda, whether he was aware of the risk to her or not.7 KRS 501.060 provides

that “[w]hen wantonly . . . causing a particular result is an element of an

offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk

of which the actor is aware . . . unless [t]he actual result differs from the

probable result only in the respect that a different person [is] affected.” KRS

501.060(3)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, in the context of wanton endangerment,

if a defendant engages in wanton conduct creating a substantial danger of

injury to persons he is aware will face such risk, he may also be held liable for

the same resulting danger to other persons he does not know he has placed at

risk. Id.; KRS 508.060-070; see also Leslie W. Abramson, 10 Kentucky

Practice, Substantive Criminal Law, § 2:25 (3d ed. 2010) (“Where the actual

result involves harm [or danger] to a different person or different property than

was risked, and the defendant was aware of the risk, his wanton conduct is

      7In considering the propriety of lesser-included offense instructions, we
construe the evidence in favor of Bunch as the proponent of those instructions. Allen,
338 S.W.3d at 255. We therefore accept for purposes of this analysis his statement to
Deputy White that he was unaware Veda was in the home, despite the fact she may
have been on the front porch when he drove by the home shortly before the shooting.
                                         27
regarded as the cause of the result.”). As such, because Bunch knowingly

engaged in conduct creating a substantial danger of death or serious physical

injury to Gribbins and Marple, he also may be held liable for the resulting risk

to Veda even if he did not know she was in the home.

      Second, no reasonable juror could have found that in shooting blindly

into the home, Bunch did not manifest extreme indifference to human life. Nor

could a juror have reasonable doubt that in shooting into the upstairs window

on the same floor as Veda, Bunch created a substantial danger of death or

serious physical injury to her. We recently noted that in cases involving

shootings, there are “many variables affecting the risk that a bystander will be

seriously injured, including movement of the target, distraction of the shooter,

and environmental elements such as wind.” Hall v. Commonwealth, 645

S.W.3d 383, 394 (Ky. 2022). We also acknowledged that while the skill of the

shooter may be relevant, other factors may outweigh that consideration. Id.

Here, Veda was an eight-year-old child separated from her father in a different

part of the home when shooting broke out. Such circumstances presented a

significant risk that Veda would run to find her father. Bunch blindly shot into

the level of the home where Veda was located and through which she might

have run. He thus also created a substantial danger that Veda would run

directly into the line of gunfire. Had she been shot, it is highly likely her

injuries would have been serious or fatal. Given these facts, no reasonable

juror could have had reasonable doubt that Bunch created a substantial

danger of death or serious physical injury to Veda. As such, the trial court did

                                        28
not abuse its discretion in refusing Bunch’s request for a lesser-included

offense instruction on second-degree wanton endangerment as to Veda.

      Bunch also argues the trial court erred in refusing his request for a

lesser-included offense instruction on attempted first-degree assault under

EED. Bunch asserts the attempted first-degree manslaughter instruction

encompassed only the theory that he intended to kill under EED, and that an

attempted first-degree assault instruction would have allowed for a finding that

he intended only to harm. Under the facts of this case, the jury could have

found Bunch guilty of attempted first-degree assault under EED only if it found

1) he intended to cause serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument, 2) he intentionally took a substantial step in a course of

conduct planned to culminate in that result, and 3) he did so under the

influence of extreme emotional disturbance. KRS 508.010; KRS 506.010; KRS

508.040. However, there was no evidence at trial to support a finding that

Bunch intended to cause serious physical injury. Bunch shot directly at

Gribbins and Marple multiple times with a gun, with at least one bullet flying

directly between them as they ran in fear. The Commonwealth presented

previous threats by Bunch to kill Gribbins. Bunch defended by arguing he

only meant to scare Gribbins and Marple, pointing to his repeated statements

to that effect during his statement to Deputy White. However there was no

proof that in shooting directly at his victims, Bunch had an intention to

seriously injure but not kill them. Thus, because a jury could not have found

the required element of an intention to cause serious physical injury as

                                       29
required for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the trial court

properly denied Bunch’s request for such an instruction.

                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Washington Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur. Conley, J., also concurs by separate opinion in

which Thompson, J., joins.

      CONLEY, J., CONCURRING: I fully concur with the Court’s conclusion. I

write separately to briefly address any seeming contradiction between my

affirming the denial of the second-degree wanton endangerment instruction in

this case, and the reversal of the trial court on that very same issue in Dwight

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 2021-SC-0483, also rendered today.

      Kentucky law has held that firing a weapon wantonly in the immediate

vicinity of a person is an act that “manifested an extreme indifference to the

value of human life and, likewise, a reasonable juror could not doubt that his

conduct created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to

another person.” Combs v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky. 1983).

Similarly, we have held firing a gun into a closed door with a person behind it

merited a first-degree wanton endangerment instruction. Paulley v.

Commonwealth, 323 S.W.3d 715, 724 (Ky. 2010). And in like manner, firing

blindly into a residential home was also held to warrant a first-degree wanton

endangerment charge for every person in the homes at the time of the shooting.

West v. Commonwealth, 161 S.W.3d 331, 336-37 (Ky. App. 2004). Finally, we

                                        30
have stated that wantonly firing a weapon in the immediate vicinity of a person

or blindly into a house are “quintessential examples of first-degree wanton

endangerment.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 103 (Ky. 2012).

Therefore, I agree with the Court’s analysis that Bunch’s actions did not merit

a second-degree wanton endangerment instruction.

      Thompson, J., joins.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General

                                       31