Court Opinion

ID: 9858836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:55:56.464059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:55.580401
License: Public Domain

Hannon, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Primarily, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the termination of Suzette’s parental rights was pled and obtained solely on the basis of her refusal to incriminate herself. I also do not agree with that portion of the majority’s opinion which essentially holds that Suzette is not collaterally attacking the dispositional order requiring her to participate in Parents United. I apologize for the length of the analysis, but it is necessary to demonstrate my position.

Sufficiency of Pleadings.

The majority opinion glosses over the fact that one of the alleged grounds for termination was Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(7) (Reissue 1993), that is, that parental rights may be terminated when
[t]he juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for eighteen or more consecutive months and the parents have failed to correct the conditions leading to the juvenile’s out-of-home placement in spite of reasonable efforts and services to the parents ordered by the court or offered by the Department of Social Services or other designated agency.
*776For completeness, we set forth the allegations in the guardian ad litem’s petition as they apply to subsection (7). The guardian ad litem alleged that
Suzette [M.] has failed to correct the conditions leading to the juvenile’s [sic] out-of-home placement in spite of reasonable efforts and services to the parent ordered by the Court or offered by the Nebraska Department of Social Services.
A. Since March, 1994, said children have been in the Nebraska Department of Social Services for out-of-home placement.
B. Since March, 1994, Suzette M[.] has gained no insight regarding her children’s care and protection with respect to having been subjected to sexual contact by herself and [her live-in boyfriend],
C. Due to Suzette [M.’s] denial of the sexual contact to which she and [her live-in boyfriend] subjected said children, she has effectively barred her participation in the children’s therapy as ordered by [the juvenile court].
I believe these allegations are sufficient to raise issues under § 43-292(7). They do not, as the majority opinion repeatedly suggests, “put Suzette on notice only that she was being accused of failing to waive her privilege against self-incrimination.” Rather, they put her on notice that her children had been in out-of-home placement for 18 or more consecutive months and that she had failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement. As discussed below, relevant authority holds that parental rights may be terminated based on the parents’ refusal to acknowledge sexual or other abuse of their children as part of effective therapy without violating the Fifth Amendment. Such is the case here.
Concerning § 43-292(2), the allegations in the guardian ad litem’s petition are organized in such a fashion that, at first blush, it might appear that the guardian ad litem sought termination solely on the basis that Suzette refused to acknowledge that sexual contact had occurred. The guardian ad litem alleged that Suzette had “substantially and continuously neglected” the children and had “refused to give the necessary parental care and protection.” Subsection (2) in support thereof alleges that *777after a finding by the juvenile court that the children had been subjected to sexual contact by Suzette and her live-in boyfriend, Suzette had refused to acknowledge that the sexual contact had occurred and that she had refused to “acknowledge any parental responsibility that she has toward said children]’s care and protection to that end.”
Section 43-292(2) and (7) does not, however, contain the psychological conclusions which the evidence shows, namely, that without admitting to the sexual contact, Suzette’s therapy cannot be successful, and that without successful therapy, Suzette cannot be given custody of the children. Given the fact that in this day and age, judges, prosecutors, guardians ad litem, attorneys, and the public generally know that sexual abusers do not change without therapy, and that admission of the past harmful conduct is a necessary prerequisite to successful therapy, I would hold the petition to be adequate under § 43-292(2). In fact, the allegation that she substantially and continuously neglected them and refused to give them the necessary parental care is in itself sufficient. At least, I am satisfied that Suzette and her attorney knew and understood the basis of the guardian ad litem’s allegation.

Law and Evidence Under § 43-292(7).

Section 43-292(7) focuses on a parent’s failure to remedy the circumstances for which the child was removed from the parent’s custody. Suzette is essentially challenging the legality of the underlying orders, which (1) found that she had sexually abused her children and (2) required that she participate in Parents United. In Nebraska, both adjudication and dispositional orders are final, appealable orders. See, In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 (1997); In re Interest of Andrew H. et al., 5 Neb. App. 716, 564 N.W.2d 611 (1997). The majority overlooks the well-settled proposition of juvenile law that collateral attacks on previous proceedings are impermissible unless the attack is grounded upon the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., supra; In re Interest of J.H., 242 Neb. 906, 497 N.W.2d 346 (1993); In re Interest of C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105 (1992). In In re Interest of *778Joshua M. et al., supra, the mother attempted to collaterally attack, on an appeal from a termination of her parental rights, a rehabilitation plan which had been part of a previous dispositional order. The court concluded that she could not collaterally attack the rehabilitation plan adopted in that order because it was a final, appealable order and that she had failed to appeal it. As stated by the court,
A parent’s unwillingness to comply with a rehabilitation program directed at reuniting the parent with his or her child and designed to secure the continued long-term health and well-being of the child compels the conclusion that termination of that parent’s rights is in the best interests of the child.
251 Neb. at 637, 558 N.W.2d at 564.
The foregoing authority convinces me that the orders Suzette is attempting to challenge cannot be collaterally attacked. Suzette had her opportunity to appeal the orders but chose not to do so. As a result, Suzette’s present appeal cannot question the validity of the dispositional order requiring her to participate in therapy and, more specifically, Parents United. There can be no question but that the therapy was a reasonable effort and service to Suzette ordered by the juvenile court. It may be that the rehabilitation order requiring Suzette to admit her sexual contact was in error, but it was not appealed from. Therefore, that order was final and effective.
The majority adopts the reasoning of the Minnesota and Vermont courts. I note, however, that none of the three cases cited was an appeal from a termination of parental rights.
In Matter of Welfare of J.W, 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1987), the parents appealed from the trial court’s rehabilitation treatment plan, which followed a finding that they were responsible for the death of their 2-year-old nephew. The plan required the parents to obtain psychological evaluations and to explain the death of the 2-year-old consistent with the medical findings.
In finding that the order requiring the parents to incriminate themselves was violative of the Fifth Amendment, the Matter of Welfare of J.W. court stated:
While the state may not compel therapy treatment that would require appellants to incriminate themselves, it may *779require the parents to otherwise undergo treatment. Therapy, however, which does not include incriminating disclosures, may be ineffective; and ineffective therapy may hurt the parents’ chances of regaining their children. These consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 883.
Moreover, in a discussion of future decisions regarding the placement of the children, the court stated:
All we can say is that it remains to be seen whether a less than candid therapy will suffice to make appellants good parents. Admittedly, the parents are confronted with a dilemma, but it is not a dilemma that triggers the Fifth Amendment to the extent the parents would wish. In the lexicon of the Fifth Amendment, the risk of losing the children for failure to undergo meaningful therapy is neither a “threat” nor a “penalty” imposed by the state. It is simply a consequence of the reality that it is unsafe for children to be with parents who are abusive and violent.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 884.
In my opinion, if Suzette had appealed from the rehabilitation plan, Matter of Welfare of J.W. might have been used as authority for finding that the plan violated her privilege against self-incrimination because it required her to admit to criminal conduct. However, Suzette did not appeal from that dispositional order. She is still not required to admit to the conduct; she is simply suffering the consequences in the termination proceedings.
In Matter of Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1989), the juvenile court required a father to admit, as a prerequisite to obtaining even closely supervised visitation with his children, that he had sexually abused the children. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that such was violative of the father’s privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed on the same grounds but wrote separately because it believed that “the second part of our holding in [Matter of Welfare of] J.W., that the privilege does not protect the parent from the consequences of any failure to succeed in a court-ordered treatment plan merits equal empha*780sis.” Id. at 886. In the first part of its holding in Matter of Welfare of J.W., the court held that it is a violation of a parent’s Fifth Amendment privilege for a court to directly require the parent to admit guilt as a part of a court-ordered treatment plan.
In Mullin v. Phelps, 647 A.2d 714 (Vt. 1994), the family court ordered that custody of the parties’ two minor children be transferred from the father to the mother and that all contact be cut off between the father and the children unless the father acknowledged abusing the children. The Supreme Court of Vermont, citing the Minnesota court, stated:
While a court may require abusive parents to submit to therapy, and parental rights may be terminated without violating the fifth amendment based on the fact that the parents’ denial of their problem prevented effective therapy, the court’s specific condition requiring the father to acknowledge conduct for which he could be prosecuted must be stricken.
Id. at 724-25.
Read together, these cases stand for the proposition that a court cannot order a parent in a juvenile proceeding to admit to criminal conduct for which he or she could be later prosecuted. Such would be contrary to the privilege against self-incrimination. However, a parent’s rights may be terminated as a result of failing to undergo meaningful therapy — even if that includes admitting past conduct which may be criminal.
I find controlling a decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, even though it was announced prior to Matter of Welfare of J.W., supra. In Matter of Welfare of S.A.V., 392 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. App. 1986), the juvenile court found, in essence, that the parents had caused serious injury to their children. In a dispositional order, the court continued legal custody of the children in foster care and found that “ ‘the parents need to acknowledge the causes of the children’s injuries before any meaningful change will occur in the care and treatment they provide to the children.’ ” Id. at 262. The court of appeals framed the issue as whether the dispositional order requiring the parents to cooperate in the evaluation process violated the father’s constitutional right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. In holding that the dispositional order did not *781violate the father’s privilege against self-incrimination, the court stated:
Termination of appellant’s parental rights is a very real possibility if he does not cooperate with counseling because the state will be unable to work with him toward resumption of his parental responsibilities. The trial court’s finding that the parents need to recognize the cause of the children’s injuries before any meaningful change can occur recognizes that a parent who acknowledges the need for professional help is more amenable to treatment than one who denies the need for help. . . . Termination in such a situation is not, however, a sanction for exercise of a constitutional right, but simply the necessary result of failure to rectify parental deficiencies. Although the state cannot require appellant to waive his constitutional right, that does not mean it must relinquish its right and obligation to protect these children.
Id. at 264.
Such reasoning was followed in In Interest of H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46 (Iowa App. 1988), where the juvenile court terminated parental rights because the parents had failed to complete a sexual abuse treatment program which required that they admit to the sexual abuse of their children. Citing the above quote from Matter of Welfare of S.A.V., supra, the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that the parents’ due process argument was without merit. And in Matter of Tammy B., 185 A.D.2d 881, 587 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1992), the court terminated a father’s parental rights, based on permanent neglect. In upholding the judgment, the court found:
[T]he father was found to have sexually abused her. The Family Court directed him to seek sexual offender therapy if he wanted to reunite himself with his daughter.
The record reflects that although the father attended therapy sessions, due to his lack of acknowledgment of guilt, the cause of abuse was never explored and he was unable to gain any insight to his behavior. Since the father failed to make any therapeutic progress, we find that he cannot make an adequate plan for Tammy’s future. Thus, Tammy is a permanently neglected child ....
185 A.D.2d at 883, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
*782These authorities further support my position that courts may terminate parental rights based on the parents’ refusal to undergo therapy, which requires that they stop denying and admit their past harmful conduct, without impinging upon the parents’ privilege against self-incrimination. The termination of parental rights is not a sanction for the exercise of a constitutional right, but, rather, the necessary result of the failure of the parents to rectify their parental deficiencies. In view of the judicial determination that Suzette did sexually abuse the children, her protestations that she is innocent must be ignored in any proceeding, except a criminal one where the burden of proof would be greater.
The record reveals that the repercussions of a parent’s failure to admit to past harmful conduct are great. At trial, Dr. Joseph Stankus, a clinical psychologist, testified that it is “hard” to rehabilitate a sexual abuser unless there is an admission that he or she was involved in the abuse. He further testified that since Suzette refuses to admit the sexual abuse, it is impossible to start individual or family therapy working toward the goal of reintegrating Suzette with the children. According to Stankus, family therapy could only begin when two “variables” were met: (1) when Suzette had “worked through enough of her apparent abuse of the children” and (2) when the children felt less fearful of their mother. When asked about the effect that a parent’s refusal to acknowledge past sexual abuse had on the children, Stankus opined with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it destroys the children’s trust even more, it makes the children feel like their parent is not protecting them, and it retraumatizes them.
Stankus’ testimony was echoed by Kay McMahon, a child and family therapist. McMahon testified that it is “almost impossible” to resolve the children’s issues either without Suzette acknowledging and working through the issues or without visitation being suspended. McMahon further testified that the children recognize Suzette as a perpetrator and that her denial of the abuse blocks
any progress. It creates confusion ... of their own real[i]ty. . . . [A]ny trust that might be there between the children and their mother would totally be destroyed. They *783have distinct memories, especially Clifford, and to have mother say I didn’t do it, [her live-in boyfriend] did, would then have — it puts Clifford in a position of either having to choose whether he’s crazy or his mother’s a liar and neither one of those positions is a healthy position for a child.
It seems clear to me that no responsible public official is going to return the children to Suzette until experts determine that she is no longer a danger to her children. The chances of reunification are slim to none if she does not fully participate in her own treatment and therapy. The evidence in the record is clear that there is no chance of reconciliation without Suzette participating in therapy and that one of the initial steps of such therapy is her admission that she sexually abused her children. A child cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care, nor be made to await uncertain parental maturity. In re Interest of C.N.S. and A.I.S., 234 Neb. 406, 451 N.W.2d 275 (1990).
While a psychotherapist did testify that it is possible for Suzette to begin therapy prior to admitting involvement in the abuse, he admittedly was not an expert in sexual assault issues dealing with children. Moreover, his testimony contradicts the great weight of the evidence. I think that there is no evidence to establish any hope that Suzette will be able to have custody of her children without successful therapy. She has had more than 18 months to change and has failed to do so. I therefore think the juvenile court was justified in accepting the testimony of Stankus and McMahon, and upon a de novo review, I would so accept. Suzette’s participation in therapy may result in her making admissions that could result in her being convicted of a crime, but there is no evidence that the purpose of the termination proceeding is to force an admission or to sanction her for failing to admit the sexual abuse. Here, it is undisputed that Suzette did not participate in the Parents United program. Thus, I would conclude that Suzette’s parental rights should be terminated under § 43-292(7).

Evidence Under § 43-292(2).

I additionally believe that there are grounds to terminate Suzette’s parental rights under § 43-292(2) for “substantially *784and continuously or repeatedly neglecting] the [children] and refusing] to give the [children] necessary parental care and protection.” A parent’s failure to take proper measures to protect children from abuse by another furnishes sufficient cause to terminate parental rights under subsection (2). In re Interest of C.P., 235 Neb. 276, 455 N.W.2d 138 (1990). The evidence of Suzette’s refusal to acknowledge the sexual abuse is also relevant here. According to the experts, Suzette’s failure to acknowledge the past sexual abuse would confuse the children, destroy their trust, and retraumatize them. Clearly, Suzette, by maintaining her innocence in the face of a previous order which found to the contrary, has not taken proper measures to protect her children from further abuse. As such, she would not be able to give the children the necessary parental care and protection that they need and deserve. Suzette’s parental rights should also be terminated under subsection (2).
The evidence in the record establishes that Suzette cannot undergo successful therapy unless she admits she abused her children. In my opinion, by the very nature of the situation, the conditions cannot change unless Suzette admits her conduct and undergoes successful therapy. However, it is entirely possible that even if Suzette admits her conduct and engages in prolonged therapy, the State may still be able to prove that successful therapy is not possible in spite of her admissions. If I were the juvenile court judge and this case were returned to me with the direction stated in the majority opinion, in view of the evidence in the record, I would have no idea how to proceed, except to keep the children in foster care until Suzette agrees to admit her misconduct to a therapist or until the children reach the age of majority. For all of these reasons, I would affirm.