Court Opinion

ID: 9901841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:03:33.705669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.712305
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 22 2023, 9:16 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael D. Dean                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Withered Burns, LLP                                       Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana                                        Ellen H. Meilaender
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Ambrose Doyle, Jr.,                               November 22, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-604
        v.                                                Appeal from the Tippecanoe
                                                          Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          79D01-2101-F2-4

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                             Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                           Page 1 of 21
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Michael Doyle (Doyle), appeals his convictions for

      dealing in methamphetamine (ten grams or more), a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code §

      35-48-4-1.1(a)(1); and dealing in methamphetamine (between five and ten

      grams), a Level 3 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1).

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   Doyle presents this court with three issues, which we restate as:

              (1) Whether the trial court properly admitted the statements of a
                  witness pursuant to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing;

              (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
                  evidence of uncharged conduct; and

              (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused
                  Doyle’s proffered instruction on circumstantial evidence.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On January 14, 2021, around 8:50 p.m., Deputy Ryan Holloway (Deputy

      Holloway) of the Newton County Sheriff’s Department brought his K-9 unit to

      the scene of a traffic stop in Goodland, Indiana, involving a vehicle in which

      Joshua Sweet (Sweet) was a passenger. After the K-9 officer alerted to the

      presence of narcotics in the vehicle, Deputy Holloway searched the vehicle and

      found what a field test and weighing at the scene indicated was approximately

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023        Page 2 of 21
      9.5 grams of methamphetamine, as well as paraphernalia and a digital scale.

      Deputy Holloway confronted Sweet about the methamphetamine. Sweet told

      Deputy Holloway that he had procured the methamphetamine from Doyle and

      that Doyle was dealing drugs at the Red Roof Inn in Lafayette, Indiana, Room

      102. Sweet allowed Deputy Holloway to access his cellphone and to read

      Facebook messages between himself and Doyle arranging for Sweet to come to

      the Red Roof Inn to meet with Doyle. Doyle told Sweet he was in Room 102,

      “All my cars outside,” and “I need money,” to which Sweet responded, “I got

      1000 can you do two for that[.]” (Exh. Vol. VI, pp. 165, 166). Doyle told

      Sweet, “Yes right now in Hand in My Pocket it’s no one else’s it’s so is that a

      yes come through or what” (Exh. Vol. VI, p. 166). Deputy Holloway had

      known Sweet for several years, and Sweet had provided the deputy with reliable

      information in the past. Deputy Holloway forwarded this information to the

      Lafayette Police Department (LPD).

[5]   In the early hours of January 15, 2021, officers with the LPD went to the Red

      Roof Inn in Lafayette with a K-9 unit, who alerted to the presence of narcotics

      in Room 102. Based on this alert, the officers procured a search warrant for the

      room which they executed that day. No one was in the room when the officers

      entered. The LPD officers found eleven baggies of what was later determined

      to be at least 49.48 grams 1 of methamphetamine in the top drawer of the room’s

      1
       Two of the eleven baggies were tested and confirmed to be methamphetamine. The remaining baggies were
      not tested but were determined to weigh 241.45 grams.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                      Page 3 of 21
      dresser/wall unit. In the same drawer officers found two baggies, one of which

      was later determined to contain .65 grams of cocaine, two glass pipes

      commonly used to smoke methamphetamine, and a digital scale which was

      later found to have Doyle’s DNA on it. In the room, the officers also found

      $2,228 in cash, a box of sandwich baggies, a used syringe, and clothing and

      other items which appeared to belong to a female. Further investigation

      revealed that Doyle’s red car was parked outside Room 102 when the officers

      made entry.

[6]   While officers were still on the scene at Room 102, a silver Nissan sedan pulled

      up just outside Room 102. Officers recognized Doyle as the passenger in the

      Nissan, took him into custody, and provided him with his Miranda

      advisements. Doyle told the officers that he had been in and out of Room 102

      over the previous day or two. The officers searched the Nissan and found what

      they suspected to be spice and partially consumed spice cigarettes. Doyle had

      $1,950 on his person. Subsequent investigation revealed that Room 102 had

      been rented to Riley Smith (Smith), a male friend of Doyle’s.

[7]   On January 15, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Doyle with Level

      2 felony dealing in methamphetamine (ten grams or more); Level 6 felony

      cocaine possession; Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe; Class A

      misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (spice or a synthetic drug);

      and Class C possession of paraphernalia. All these offenses were alleged to

      have occurred on or about January 15, 2021. In a separate Information the

      State alleged that Doyle was an habitual offender. On September 7, 2021, the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023    Page 4 of 21
      State filed a motion seeking to add two charges to the Information, namely

      Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine alleged to have occurred on

      January 5 and 6, 2021, and Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine alleged

      to have occurred on January 14, 2021. The Level 3 felony charge related to the

      dealing that Sweet had reported. On September 23, 2021, the trial court

      granted the State’s motion to add the new charges. On November 3, 2022,

      Doyle filed a motion to sever the new Level 2 felony dealing in

      methamphetamine charge. On November 10, 2022, the trial court granted

      Doyle’s motion to sever, and it granted a motion by the State to dismiss the

      Class A misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (spice or lookalike

      substance) charge.

[8]   On November 3, 2022, the State served Sweet with a trial subpoena. On

      November 14, 2022, the trial court convened Doyle’s four-day jury trial. Sweet

      did not appear for the first day of trial, and, with Doyle present in open court,

      the trial court issued a writ of body attachment for Sweet. Due to Sweet’s

      failure to appear, the State filed a motion to introduce evidence pursuant to

      Indiana Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), seeking the admission of Sweet’s January

      14, 2021, statements to Deputy Holloway and alleging that Sweet was

      unavailable for trial due to Doyle’s wrongdoing. On November 15, 2022, prior

      to the presentation of the evidence, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s

      motion. The State presented evidence of a telephone call Doyle had made from

      jail on January 29, 2021, wherein Doyle read from the probable cause affidavit

      filed in the instant matter that on January 14, 2021, Sweet had reported his drug

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023      Page 5 of 21
      dealing at the Red Roof Inn. Doyle instructed the woman on the other end of

      the call to contact his stepson, Hunter Snow (Snow). Doyle instructed the

      woman to tell Snow that Doyle loved him, that Snow should “take care of

      [Sweet,]” and that Snow should make sure to “do what [he] did to [his] dad to

      [Sweet].” (Exh. 7). Doyle explained in the call that Snow had previously

      beaten up his own father for Doyle. Doyle expressed his hope that Snow would

      “punch every fucking wall in the jail with that dude.” (Exh. 7). During the

      call, the woman to whom Doyle was speaking expressed her willingness to

      assist and confirmed that Sweet was in Rensselaer. Doyle noted that his

      stepson Snow was also in Rensselaer.

[9]   At the hearing on the State’s motion to admit Rule 804(b)(5) evidence, the State

      also had admitted into evidence a voice text from Sweet received by the State

      on November 9, 2022, in which Sweet stated that he would “not be much help

      for you guys,” “last time look what it did for me,” and “so take it how you

      want to, endangered my family’s lives.” (Exh. 2). Sweet had also texted the

      State on November 14, 2022, that he would not appear to testify at trial and

      that he would turn himself in after Doyle’s trial was over. In those texts, Sweet

      stated, “Last time I helped you it was published and my family was ran off the

      road several times and worse[.]” (Exh. Vol. VI, p. 23). In texts sent by Sweet

      later in the morning of the first day of Doyle’s trial, Sweet stated that he feared

      being prosecuted for his testimony. After being assured that he could only be

      prosecuted if he did not appear, Sweet texted that he was not sure what

      happened on the night of January 14, 2021, because he was high and drunk,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 6 of 21
       implied he would not testify because he was not being paid, and stated that he

       would assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Also admitted into

       evidence at the Rule 804(b)(5) hearing was a jailhouse telephone call made

       during the evening of November 14, 2022, from Doyle to a woman whom he

       instructed to call both the Newton County Jail and the Tippecanoe County Jail

       to attempt to locate Sweet and to find out when visitation hours at the jails

       were. Doyle instructed the woman to tell jail personnel that she was a friend or

       a relative if asked. At the close of the evidentiary hearing on the State’s motion

       for Rule 804(b)(5) evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

[10]   During opening argument, Doyle’s counsel told the jury that it would hear

       evidence that Doyle had admitted to law enforcement that he had been in

       Room 102 but that he was only there to visit prostitutes, not to deal

       methamphetamine. The jury also heard testimony that drug dealers commonly

       work out of hotels, they usually have a larger amount of drugs in their

       possession than a mere user would, they often deal in more than one kind of

       drug at a time, they use scales and sandwich baggies as packaging when dealing

       drugs, and that they commonly have large amounts of cash on their persons.

[11]   Regarding the Rule 804(b)(5) evidence, the trial court made an in-trial ruling

       that the State had met its burden, noting that Doyle had been present in open

       court when it had issued a body attachment warrant for Sweet on the first day

       of trial, that Doyle had then placed the call about finding out if Sweet had been

       taken into custody, and that the reason Doyle had placed that call “wasn’t to go

       ask him how he was.” (Transcript Vol. III, p. 6). Thereafter, Sweet’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023      Page 7 of 21
       statements from the January 14, 2021, traffic stop and the contents of the

       messages he had shown the deputy between himself and Doyle were admitted

       into evidence.

[12]   During trial, the trial court held a hearing on the admissibility of messages from

       Doyle’s Facebook account. In these messages, Doyle arranged drug deals with

       several individuals, including Sweet and Smith, between September 9, 2021,

       and September 15, 2021. In some messages, Doyle stated he was at the Red

       Roof Inn, and, in an image captured on January 14, 2021, Doyle was seen

       standing next to a door labeled Room 102. The messages Sweet had shown to

       Deputy Holloway on January 14, 2021, were included within this evidence.

       Doyle objected that the proffered evidence was inadmissible character evidence

       prohibited by Evidence Rule 404(b) and that the evidence was irrelevant, given

       that it was unrelated to the charges before the jury. The trial court admitted the

       evidence over Doyle’s objection pursuant to the “common scheme” exception

       to Rule 404(b) in that it showed Doyle’s drug dealing over a period of time.

       (Tr. Vol. III, p. 98). The trial court also ruled that Doyle’s use of Room 102

       was relevant. At Doyle’s request, the trial court issued the following limiting

       instruction to the jury pertaining to Doyle’s Facebook records:

               Members of the jury[,] . . . any evidence of the prior acts may
               not be considered as a basis for an inference that . . . the
               defendant acted in conformity with his prior conduct or with his
               indicated propensity.

       (Tr. Vol. III, p. 124).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 8 of 21
[13]   At the final instruction conference, Doyle proffered the following instruction on

       circumstantial evidence:

               [W]here proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only[,] [i]t
               must be so conclusive in character and point [s]o surely and
               unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude every
               reasonable theory of innocence.

       (Tr. Vol. III, p. 227). Doyle’s counsel argued that this was a pattern instruction,

       and was, thus, an accurate statement of the law. The trial court declined to give

       the instruction, ruling that the pattern instruction had changed and that the

       State had presented some direct evidence, rendering the instruction

       inapplicable.

[14]   During closing argument, Doyle’s counsel reminded the jury of this limiting

       instruction. At the close of the evidence the jury found Doyle guilty of the

       Level 2 and Level 3 felony dealing charges and not guilty of all the remaining

       charges. After the jury returned its verdicts, Doyle admitted to being an

       habitual offender. On January 20, 2023, the trial court held Doyle’s sentencing

       hearing and issued an aggregate twenty-eight-year sentence, with twenty-four

       years executed and four years suspended to probation.

[15]   Doyle now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023        Page 9 of 21
       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing

[16]   Doyle challenges the admission of Sweet’s January 14, 2021, statements to

       Deputy Holloway, which Doyle argues violated his Sixth Amendment 2 right to

       confrontation and the Indiana Rules of Evidence. We generally review the trial

       court’s admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Carr v.

       State, 106 N.E.3d 546, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. However, when a

       claim of error in the admission of evidence is based upon the violation of a

       constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo. Id.

[17]   The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

       accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

       him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In light of this guarantee, “a witness who

       makes testimonial statements admitted against a defendant will ordinarily be

       present at trial cross-examination, and . . . if the witness is unavailable, his prior

       testimony will be introduced only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to

       cross-examine him.” Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358, 128 S.Ct. 2678,

       2682, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68,

       124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.E.2d 177 (2004)). However, the Crawford court held that

       2
        The State cited Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(5) in its motion to admit Sweet’s statements to Deputy
       Holloway, and Doyle relied on his Sixth Amendment confrontation right in arguing the State’s motion. On
       appeal, Doyle argues that the challenged evidence violated Article 1, section 13 of our state constitution and
       Indiana Evidence Rule 403. However, Doyle did not mention either Article 1, section 13 or Rule 403 at trial,
       and, therefore, we conclude that he has waived those arguments for purposes of appeal. See State v. Allen, 187
       N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon
       constitutional claims, are waived for appeal.”), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                            Page 10 of 21
       this right to confrontation may be forfeited if the defendant procures the

       absence of a witness through his own wrongful conduct. Id. at 59, 1354; see also

       Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 467-68 (Ind. 2005) (recognizing the doctrine of

       forfeiture by wrongdoing). The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was

       developed to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings. Galloway v. State, 188

       N.E.3d 493, 498 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. The doctrine is only

       applicable where, in undertaking the actions that rendered the witness

       unavailable, the defendant had in mind the particular purpose of making that

       witness unavailable. Giles, 554 U.S. at 367, 128 S.Ct. at 2678; see also White v.

       State, 978 N.E.2d 475, 479-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing United States v.

       Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653-54 (2nd Cir. 2001), with approval for the proposition

       that the State need only prove that the defendant was at least partially

       motivated by the intent to silence the witness), trans. denied.

[18]   In addition, hearsay, which is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the

       truth of the matters it contains, is generally inadmissible under the Indiana

       Rules of Evidence. Ind. Evidence Rules 801(c); 802. The Evidence Rules

       provide an exception to the general prohibition on hearsay where a witness is

       unavailable and the statement is

               offered against a party that has engaged in or encouraged
               wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
               unavailability of the declarant as a witness for the purpose of
               preventing the declarant from attending or testifying.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 11 of 21
       Evid. R. 804(b)(5). The State was required to establish forfeiture by

       wrongdoing by the preponderance of the evidence, whether as forming an

       exemption to the Confrontation Clause or as an exception to the hearsay rules.

       Scott v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1148, 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (Sixth Amendment),

       trans. denied; White, 978 N.E.2d at 480 (Rule 804(b)(5)).

[19]   The evidence before us establishes that initially at the scene of the January 14,

       2021, traffic stop, Sweet identified Doyle as the source of the

       methamphetamine found in Sweet’s vehicle, and Sweet reported that Doyle

       was dealing drugs out of the Red Roof Inn in Lafayette. On January 15, 2021,

       Doyle was taken into custody and charged with several drug-related offenses.

       That same day, Doyle’s initial hearing was conducted at which Doyle filed a

       pro se request for a speedy trial, and his jury trial was initially set for May 4,

       2021. On January 29, 2021, after having read copies of the probable cause

       affidavit which contained Sweet’s January 14, 2021, statements, Doyle called a

       third party and instructed her to tell Doyle’s stepson to batter Sweet, and that

       third party expressed her willingness to assist. After a series of continuances,

       Doyle’s trial was eventually reset for November 14, 2021. Days before trial, on

       November 9, 2021, and after being served with a trial subpoena, Sweet

       indicated reluctance to assist the State, stated that his past cooperation had

       placed his family in peril, and expressed fear for the safety of his family. On the

       first day of Doyle’s trial, Sweet communicated to the State that he would not

       appear, again expressing his fear his family’s safety. Doyle was present when

       the trial court issued a body attachment warrant for Sweet when Sweet did not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 12 of 21
       appear for trial, and that night Doyle telephoned a third party and directed her

       to find out whether Sweet was being held in jail and when visiting hours were.

       Sweet did not appear on the second day of Doyle’s trial, but he sent several text

       messages to the State providing shifting explanations for why he was not going

       to appear to testify against Doyle.

[20]   The trial court ruled that, with this evidence, the State had met its burden of

       proof to establish Doyle’s forfeiture by wrongdoing. We agree. We may infer a

       defendant’s intent to silence a witness “from a defendant’s conduct and the

       natural consequences thereof.” See Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1287 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2021) (finding adequate evidence of Smoot’s intent, even though his

       recorded jailhouse conversation did not contain any explicit statements of his

       intent that others should threaten or dissuade the witness from testifying). The

       timing of a defendant’s actions is probative of his or her intent on this issue. See

       White, 978 N.E.2d at 481-82 (considering the temporal proximity of White’s

       shooting of his wife to a hearing on a child custody dispute as probative of his

       intent to keep his wife from testifying at that hearing).

[21]   Here, Doyle placed the January 29, 2021, call to arrange to have his stepson

       batter Sweet after Doyle had been charged with four criminal offenses and after

       he had learned that Sweet had incriminated him. Within the context and

       circumstances of this case, the natural consequence of Doyle’s communication

       was to intimidate Sweet into not cooperating with the State. Although Doyle

       argues that this call was too remote in time to his November 2022 trial date to

       be probative of his intent, we observe that the January 29, 2021, call was placed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023     Page 13 of 21
       shortly after Doyle had filed a speedy trial motion and was made only

       approximately three months prior to his first scheduled trial date. Doyle placed

       the second of the relevant calls during his trial after he was present in open

       court when a body attachment warrant had been issued for Sweet. After Doyle

       made these calls, Sweet again expressed concern for his family’s safety and did

       not, in fact, appear for trial. The timing of Doyle’s calls close to a previously

       scheduled trial date and within Doyle’s actual trial also permits a reasonable

       inference that his communications were intended to procure Sweet’s absence

       for trial. See id.

[22]   We further conclude that there was sufficient evidence to establish that it was

       Doyle’s communications that caused Sweet’s absence. See Scott, 139 N.E.3d at

       1155 (noting that the severity of the defendant’s conduct is not at issue, only

       whether the defendant intended to procure the witness’s absence and whether

       the defendant’s conduct was of such significance that it kept the witness from

       testifying). Doyle twice directed others to make contact with Sweet, and he

       arranged to have his stepson batter Sweet. Thereafter, Sweet expressed his

       unwillingness to cooperate, both on November 9, 2021, and on November 14,

       2021, the first day of Doyle’s trial. In addition, in his last texts with the State

       on the second day of Doyle’s trial, Sweet provided multiple, shifting answers

       about why he would not appear, from which it can reasonably be inferred that

       Sweet was being evasive about why he would not appear and that the real

       reason for his reticence was because of Doyle’s actions. Doyle does not provide

       us with any legal authority for his implication on appeal that the State must

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 14 of 21
       present direct evidence that the defendant’s conduct caused the witness’s

       absence, and we observe that we have sustained findings of forfeiture by

       wrongdoing based on circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Carr, 106 N.E.3d at 554

       (addressing Carr’s argument that he never explicitly urged the witness not to

       appear for trial by noting that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State

       supported a reasonable conclusion that the witness did not appear due to Carr’s

       efforts). Accordingly, we conclude that the admission of Sweet’s statements

       through Deputy Holloway’s testimony did not violate Doyle’s Sixth

       Amendment confrontation right and was not an abuse of the trial court’s

       discretion in light of Rule 804(b)(5). 3

[23]   However, even if the trial court had erred in admitting the challenged evidence,

       we would still affirm his convictions. “The improper admission [of evidence] is

       harmless error if the conviction is supported by substantial independent

       evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood

       the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Hoglund v. State, 962

       N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012). Here, the State presented the jury with

       Facebook messages between Sweet and a person named “Michael” in which

       the two arranged a drug transaction at Room 102 of the Red Roof Inn. In

       addition, Doyle admitted that he had been present in Room 102 close in time to

       3
         Given our conclusion, we do not address the State’s argument that Doyle failed to establish on appeal that
       Sweet’s statements were testimonial in nature so as to render the Confrontation Clause applicable. We note,
       however, that in arguing for the admissibility of Sweet’s statements in the trial court, the State did not dispute
       that Sweet’s statements were testimonial.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                                Page 15 of 21
       law enforcement’s discovery of drugs there, his car was parked right outside

       Room 102 when the search of the room occurred, Doyle showed up at Room

       102 while the investigation was ongoing, Doyle had a large amount of cash on

       his person, and his DNA was found on the digital scales found next to a large,

       dealer-sized quantity of methamphetamine. (Exh. Vol. p. 10; Tr. Vol. II, pp.

       128-30). As the State correctly points out, the jury was entitled to infer Doyle’s

       intent to deal the methamphetamine found in Room 102 based solely on the

       fact that 49.48 grams of methamphetamine were found there. See I.C. § 35-48-

       4-1.1(b)(2) (requiring an amount of twenty-eight grams or more of

       methamphetamine to independently sustain a finding of an intent to deal).

       Given this substantial additional evidence of Doyle’s guilt, we conclude that

       any error in the admission of the challenged statements was harmless.

       II. Facebook Records

[24]   Doyle next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed

       into evidence his Facebook messages arranging uncharged drug deals with

       multiple people. We review the trial court’s decision on the admission of

       evidence for an abuse of its discretion. Fansler v. State, 100 N.E.3d 250, 253

       (Ind. 2018). We will reverse only where the trial court’s decision is against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[25]   Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) generally prohibits “[e]vidence of a crime,

       wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

       particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character[,]” but it

       also provides that such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023     Page 16 of 21
       as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

       absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” In addition, any Rule 404(b) evidence

       must also pass Rule 403 muster, in that its probative value must not be

       substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the

       issues. Hall v. State, 137 N.E.3d 279, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[26]   Doyle contends that the challenged evidence was admitted in contravention to

       Rule 404(b) because it served only to show his propensity to deal drugs and that

       the evidence was not admissible for any other permitted purpose. Doyle also

       argues that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of his prior dealing greatly

       outweighed its probative value. The State counters that the challenged evidence

       was admissible to show Doyle’s knowledge of the drugs found in Room 102

       and that its admission was not barred by Rule 403.

[27]   We find the case of Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans.

       denied, to be instructive to the resolution of this issue. At Cannon’s trial on drug

       dealing and possession charges, over Cannon’s objection, the trial court allowed

       his girlfriend to testify that she had helped him in the past by driving him to

       drug deals and that Cannon sold heroin and cocaine to support himself. Id. at

       277. The trial court instructed the jury that the girlfriend’s testimony about

       Cannon’s prior dealing had been received solely on the issue of Cannon’s intent

       or knowledge and that it should only be considered for that limited purpose.

       On appeal, this court concluded that any error in the admission of this evidence

       was harmless, given the other substantial evidence of his guilt and that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023      Page 17 of 21
               [t]he jury was specifically instructed to use evidence of Cannon’s
               bad acts only for the purpose of evaluating his intent or
               knowledge, which is presumed to cure any error that might have
               occurred, unless Cannon can show otherwise, which he did not
               do. See Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584, 598 (Ind. Ct. App.
               2002) (“The trial court gave the jury an admonishment
               concerning the situation, and that is presumed to cure any
               error.”), trans. denied; see also Hackney v. State, 649 N.E.2d 690,
               694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“A proper admonishment to the jury is
               presumed to cure any alleged error, unless the contrary is
               shown.”), trans. denied.

       Id. at 280. In affirming the trial court, we observed that Cannon had failed to

       meet his burden to overcome the relevant presumption by pointing to anything

       in the record to indicate that the jury had failed to follow the trial court’s

       instruction. Id.

[28]   We reach the same result here. As we have already observed, there was

       substantial evidence of Doyle’s drug dealing apart from the challenged

       evidence. In addition, at Doyle’s request, the trial court issued an instruction

       that the evidence of Doyle’s prior dealing as contained in his Facebook

       messages could not be considered by the jury as showing that he had acted in

       conformity with that conduct for purposes of the instant charges. Doyle does

       not take issue with the substance of this instruction or contend that it was

       somehow inadequate. On appeal, Doyle does not address the trial court’s

       instruction to the jury at all, let alone provide us with any indication that the

       jury did not follow this instruction. As such, we conclude that Doyle has failed

       to overcome the presumption that the jury followed the trial court’s instruction

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023       Page 18 of 21
       which rendered any error in the admission of the Facebook evidence harmless.

       See id.; see also Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 480-81 (Ind. 2015) (declining to

       address the merits of Isom’s claim of error in the denial of his mistrial motion

       based on the admission of evidence, where the trial court had issued an

       admonishment, noting the strong presumption that juries follow the trial court’s

       instruction and that an admonishment cures any error).

       III. Final Instruction

[29]   Doyle contends that the trial court erred when it rejected his proffered

       instruction on circumstantial evidence. “The trial court has broad discretion as

       to how to instruct the jury, and we generally review that discretion only for

       abuse.” McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760, 763 (Ind. 2015). Upon reviewing a

       trial court’s decision to reject a proposed instruction, we consider (1) if the

       tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) if there was evidence to support

       giving the instruction; and (3) if the substance of the instruction was covered by

       other instructions that were given. Id. at 763-64.

[30]   Doyle contends that his proffered instruction was a correct statement of the law

       and that it was supported by the evidence. However, Doyle’s proposed

       instruction provided that “[W]here proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence

       only[,] [i]t must be so conclusive in character [and point] so surely and

       unerringly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude every reasonable theory of

       innocence.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 230) (emphasis added). Therefore, this

       instruction would only be supported by the evidence if the State’s case against

       Doyle was entirely circumstantial. It was not.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023        Page 19 of 21
[31]   As our supreme court explained in Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 489 (Ind.

       2014), direct evidence is “evidence that directly proves a fact, without an

       inference, and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact[,]” while

       circumstantial evidence is that which “proves a fact from which an inference of

       the existence of another fact may be drawn.” Here, Doyle was charged with

       Level 3 felony dealing methamphetamine to Sweet on January 14, 2021. 4 As

       we have already concluded, the trial court properly admitted Sweet’s January

       14, 2021, statements to Deputy Holloway that Doyle was the source of the

       methamphetamine found in Sweet’s car and that Doyle was dealing

       methamphetamine out of Room 102 at the Red Roof Inn. This was direct

       evidence that was probative of whether Doyle was dealing drugs on January 14,

       2021, as charged in the Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine

       Information. See id. Even if the State’s case on the other charges was purely

       circumstantial, Doyle did not proffer any alternate instruction limiting his

       instruction to other charged offenses apart from the Level 3 felony dealing

       charge. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to

       give Doyle’s proffered instruction. See Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1007 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2014) (finding no error in the trial court’s rejection of Griffin’s

       4
         Doyle argues that he “was not convicted of selling drugs to Sweet.” (Appellant’s Reply p. 9). However,
       Doyle was charged with and convicted of Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine for knowingly or
       intentionally delivering between five and ten grams of methamphetamine to Sweet on January 14, 2021.
       Although the Information did not specify that this charge related to Doyle’s dealing to Sweet, during closing
       argument, the deputy prosecutor specifically discussed the details of the methamphetamine found in Sweet’s
       car on January 14, 2021, and Sweet’s statements to Deputy Holloway in relation to this charge: “[Sweet]
       told Holloway he got meth from [] Doyle and that he got it at the Red Roof Inn.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 235).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                            Page 20 of 21
       proposed instruction on circumstantial evidence, where the State presented

       direct evidence to support its allegations).

[32]   Even if the trial court had erred in rejecting Doyle’s proposed instruction, we

       would still sustain Doyle’s convictions. We will only reverse a conviction

       based on instructional error if the defendant establishes that the error prejudiced

       his substantial rights. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). Doyle

       does not develop any argument regarding how he was prejudiced by the

       claimed instructional error. Therefore, he has failed to persuade us that reversal

       is merited. 5 See id.

       CONCLUSION
[33]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that Sweet’s statements were properly

       admitted, any error in the admission of Doyle’s Facebook messages was

       harmless, and that the trial court acted within its discretion when it rejected his

       proposed instruction.

[34]   Affirmed.

[35]   Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       5
        In light of our conclusion on this issue, we do not address Doyle’s contention that his proffered instruction,
       which was expressly disapproved of by our supreme court in Hampton, 961 N.E.2d at 483, 491, was “revived”
       by this court’s unpublished decision in Wooldridge v. State, 213 N.E.3d 1064, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. June 26,
       2023). (Appellant’s Reply p. 8).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-604 | November 22, 2023                             Page 21 of 21