Court Opinion

ID: 9375913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 15:01:18.759077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.779755
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LORI Y. CLINE,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  SF-0845-15-0690-I-2

                  v.

     OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: February 28, 2023
       MANAGEMENT,
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lori Y. Cline, Huntington Beach, California, pro se.

           Jane Bancroft, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the June 30, 2015 reconsideration decision of the Office of Personnel
     Management (OPM) terminating her Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)
     disability annuity because she was restored to earning capacity and finding her

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     ineligible for a waiver of a resulting overpayment of her disability benefits or a
     repayment schedule adjustment. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
     only in the following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We VACATE in part and
     AFFIRM in part the initial decision, as MODIFIED, to more fully address the
     appellant’s claimed entitlement to a waiver.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant retired on disability from her PS-05 Clerk position with the
     U.S. Postal Service in 2007.        Cline v. Office of Personnel Management,
     SF-0845-15-0690-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 87. On June 3, 2013,
     OPM notified her that it had determined that her private-sector income for 2011
     exceeded the amount she could earn and remain eligible for a disability retirement
     annuity. Id. at 68. On July 17, 2013, OPM advised her that it terminated her
     annuity effective June 30, 2012, because, based on this income, she had been
     restored to earning capacity in 2011. Id. at 50; see 5 U.S.C. § 8337(d) (providing,
     in pertinent part, that a CSRS disability retirement an nuity terminates 180 days
     after the end of a calendar year in which an annuitant under 60 years old is
     restored to earning capacity).      OPM further notified her that because her
                                                                                          3

     payments should have terminated effective June 30, 2012, she received an
     overpayment, totaling $20,128.16. IAF, Tab 8 at 50. On June 30, 2015, OPM
     issued a reconsideration decision affirming its earlier findings. 2 Id. at 6-8. OPM
     denied her request for a waiver because she was not entirely without fault for the
     overpayment and recovery would not be against equity and good conscience. Id.
     at 7-8. OPM offered to allow her to repay the overpayment in full or to pay $100
     in 201 monthly installments with one final installment of $28.16 through its
     voluntary repayment program. Id. at 8.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging OPM’s reconsideration
     decision.   IAF, Tab 1.    She admitted to exceeding the restoration to earning
     capacity (REC) threshold for her Postal position and to receiving an overpayment.
     Cline v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. SF-0845-15-0690-I-
     2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 9 at 5; see 5 C.F.R. § 831.1209(a) (defining
     the REC threshold as income that is 80 percent or more of the current rate of
     basic pay for the position from which an annuitant retired).           However, she
     claimed that in considering her request for a waiver, OPM should have used a
     different Postal position with a higher pay rate. RAF, Tab 9 at 5. According to
     the appellant, if the higher pay rate were used, she would have exceeded her REC
     threshold by approximately $200, rather than by $1,000. Id. She also alleged
     that she only exceeded the threshold because OPM failed to respond to her
     questions about her Postal pay rate and her non-Federal employer unexpectedly
     forced her to work overtime. Id. at 6-9. She further argued that repayment would
     cause her financial hardship because her claimed expenses significantly exceeded
     her average monthly income; that she detrimentally relied on her disability
     annuity in incurring substantial student loan debt; and that it would be unjust to

     2
       OPM’s reconsideration decision apparently erroneously identified the appellant as a
     Federal Employee Retirement System (FERS) disability annuitant. However, the
     appellant’s application for retirement, OPM’s letter granting her retirement, and OPM’s
     initial decision all indicate that the appellant was receiving CSRS disability annuity
     benefits. IAF, Tab 8 at 6, 50, 73-89.
                                                                                    4

     require her to repay a debt vastly disproportionate to the $200 by which she went
     over the threshold, given her personal, health, and financial conditions.     Id.
     at 10-17. OPM challenged the appellant’s claimed expenses for her storage unit,
     transportation, student loans, and adult children. IAF, Tab 8 at 5.
¶4         After the appellant withdrew her request for a hearing, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision affirming OPM’s reconsideration decision based
     on the written record. RAF, Tab 7 at 4, Tab 13, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 15.
     He found that OPM established by preponderant evidence an overpayment of
     $20,128.16. ID at 5. He further found that the appellant was not without fault as
     to the overpayment because she did not disclose her non-Federal earnings when
     she contacted OPM between January and March 2011 to inquire about her REC
     threshold or pursue her inquiry after March 2011, despite not receiving an answer
     from OPM. ID at 6-9. He further found that her age, her physical and mental
     condition, and the nature of her contacts with OPM did not mitigate her
     culpability.   Id.   As such, he did not address the appellant’s arguments that
     recovery would be against equity and good conscience. Finally, he found that the
     appellant was not entitled to a schedule adjustment because, after adjusting and
     disallowing some of her claimed expenses, she had sufficient monthly income to
     meet the repayment schedule. ID at 9-15.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, to which the agency has
     submitted a pro forma response.      Cline v. Office of Personnel Management,
     MSPB Docket No. SF-0845-15-0690-I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1,
     4.
                                                                                              5

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge correctly found that OPM met its burden of proving that
     the appellant received an overpayment. 3
¶6         On    review,   the   appellant    advances     no   arguments     contesting    the
     administrative judge’s determination that her 2011 income was more than 80% of
     the current rate of pay for her most recent Postal position or that she continued to
     receive disability annuity payments after the June 30, 2012 effective termination
     date until July 17, 2013. PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 5. She therefore has shown no
     error, and we discern none, in the administrative judge’s finding that OPM met its
     burden of proving by preponderant evidence an overpayment of $20,128.16. ID
     at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 8337(d) (stating that a CSRS disability annuity terminates
     180 days after the end of the calendar year in which the annuitant’s income equals
     at least 80% of the current rate of pay of the position occupied immediately
     before retirement); 5 C.F.R. § 831.1209(a) (same).

     Although the administrative judge erred in finding the appellant at fault in
     causing the overpayment, she still is not entitled to a waiver.
¶7         The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding her at
     fault in causing the overpayment because she did not and should not have been
     expected to know that she exceeded her 2011 REC threshold before OPM
     contacted her about the issue in June 2013. 4 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-8. Recovery of

     3
       We find that the administrative judge’s reliance on FERS statutes and regulations, as
     opposed to CSRS, in analyzing the appellant’s disability retirement appeal does not
     affect the outcome of the appeal, as the statutes, regulations, and case law generally are
     parallel.    Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 8337(d), 8346(b) (containing relevant CSRS
     provisions), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 8455(a)(2), 8470(b) (containing relevant FERS
     provisions); see James v. Office of Personnel Management, 72 M.S.P.R. 211, 216 n.3
     (1996) (observing that the Board may rely on case law developed under the CSRS in
     deciding FERS overpayment appeals because the relevant regulations generally are
     parallel); Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding
     that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides
     no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
     4
      The appellant also argues that finding her at fault for the overpayment because she did
     not continue to inquire with OPM about her 2011 REC threshold contradicts the
                                                                                          6

     an overpayment from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund may be
     waived if the annuitant is without fault and recovery would be against equity and
     good conscience. 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b); 5 C.F.R. § 831.1401. The appellant bears
     the burden of establishing her entitlement to a waiver by substantial evidence . 5
     5 C.F.R. § 831.1407(b).
¶8         Under 5 C.F.R. § 831.1402(a), pertinent considerations in finding fault are
     whether the payment resulted from the annuitant’s incorrect but not necessarily
     fraudulent statement, which she should have known to be incorrect; whether
     payment resulted from the individual’s failure to disclose material facts in her
     possession which she should have known to be material; or whether she accepted
     a payment which she knew or should have known to be erroneous.
¶9         As here, in Fearon v. Office of Personnel Management, 107 M.S.P.R. 122,
     ¶¶ 3, 6 (2007), the Board considered whether an appellant, who had been restored
     to earning capacity after exceeding her REC threshold, was at fault for an
     overpayment that accrued after her benefits should have been terminated.            In
     Fearon, the appellant signed a sworn statement averring that she correctly
     reported her earned income, whereas OPM failed to submit a copy of the
     appellant’s earned income report for the relevant year or provide any evidence
     indicating that she underreported her income. Id., ¶ 9. As a result, the Board
     found that the appellant had not made any incorrect statement of omissions of
     material fact that delayed the termination of her disability benefits.              Id.

     Supreme Court’s holding in Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S.
     414 (1990), which she claims stands for the proposition that OPM must disclose
     accurate information in response to inquiries and that inquirers may reasonably rely on
     this information. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. We disagree. In Richmond, the Supreme Court
     held that OPM could not be equitably estopped from denying benefits not otherwise
     permitted by law, even if the claimant was denied monetary benefits because of his
     reliance on the mistaken advice of a Government official. 496 U.S. at 430-32.
     5
       Substantial evidence is defined as the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a
     conclusion, even though other reasonable persons might disagree. This is a lower
     standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).
                                                                                         7

      Similarly, here, OPM did not provide the appellant’s 2011 earning statement or
      claim that she failed to provide this information, and she stated that she submitted
      all of the relevant information to OPM. 6 IAF, Tab 8 at 69-70; RAF, Tab 9 at 8,
      Tabs 10, 12.
¶10         Furthermore, even if the appellant was on notice of the 80% income
      limitations, it does not necessarily mean that she knew or should have known that
      her earnings exceeded the limit.    Zelenka v. Office of Personnel Management,
      107 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶ 8 (2007).      While she could have visited OPM’s website,
      located the relevant Postal Service salary table on the internet, and made the
      requisite calculations, it was not her responsibility to do so. Id. Rather, it was
      OPM’s responsibility to determine her continued entitlement to payments based
      on her earned income report. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 831.1209(i). The appellant alleged
      that because OPM did not respond to her inquiries and she submitted what she
      believed to be the relevant information, she presumed that her continued receipt
      of benefits was appropriate. RAF, Tab 9 at 8-9. Once an appellant fulfills her
      obligations by submitting an earnings report to OPM, she has reason to expect
      that OPM will make the correct determination on her eligibility and, if the
      payments continue, to presume that she is entitled to them, unless OPM notifies
      her otherwise. Zelenka, 107 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶ 8.
¶11         Hence, the record does not establish that the appellant made any incorrect
      statements or omissions of material fact that delayed the termination of her
      disability annuity, or that she knew or should have known that the payments
      received after June 30, 2012, constituted an overpayment, at least until OPM’s
      June and July 2013 notices. Id. We find that the appellant met her burden to
      prove that she was without fault in causing the overpayment and modify the
      initial decision accordingly.

      6
        Although OPM’s June 2013 letter generally references a potential discrepancy in the
      earnings that the appellant reported to OPM and to SSA, OPM did not further explain
      the apparent error. IAF, Tab 8 at 68-69.
                                                                                        8

¶12        Nonetheless, the appellant is not entitled to a waiver of the overpayment
      because she has not shown that recovery would be against equity and good
      conscience. Generally, recovery is against equity and good conscience if it would
      cause financial hardship, the annuitant can show that she relinquished a valuable
      right or changed positions for the worse because of the ove rpayment, or recovery
      would be unconscionable under the circumstances. 5 C.F.R. § 831.1403(a). The
      appellant alleges that the administrative judge improperly reduced her claimed
      monthly expenses and failed to consider her additional arguments supporting her
      claims that recovery would be against equity and good conscience . PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 8-9. We find that these allegations provide no basis for reversing the
      administrative judge’s denial of the appellant’s request for a waiver of the
      overpayment.
¶13        Financial hardship warrants waiver of an overpayment of disability
      retirement benefits if the appellant needs substantially all of her current income
      and liquid assets to meet current ordinary and necessary living expenses and
      liabilities. 5 C.F.R. § 831.1404. Although the administrative judge did not reach
      the appellant’s arguments that recovery would be against equity and good
      conscience, his adjudication of her entitlement to an adjustment of the recovery
      schedule is instructive in determining her entitlement to a waiver based on
      financial hardship. ID at 9-15; see Derrico v. Office of Personnel Management,
      42 M.S.P.R. 491, 499, nn.8-9 (1989) (finding that an appellant who has not
      established entitlement to waiver based on financial hardship may stil l be entitled
      to an adjustment of her recovery schedule based on a less demanding showing of
      financial hardship); 5 C.F.R. § 831.1401 (explaining that an individual ineligible
      for a waiver may be entitled to a repayment schedule adjustment based on
      financial hardship). Although we are free to reweigh the evidence and substitute
      our own judgment on credibility issues involving these claims because the
      administrative judge’s findings are not based on observations of witnesses’
                                                                                       9

      demeanor, we generally agree with his analysis.      See Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶14         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s disallowance of her
      children’s education and transportation expenses , and contends that he
      significantly undervalued two of her monthly student loan obligations because he
      relied on outdated monthly payment schedules for these loans. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 8-9. Car and student loan payments may be ordinary and necessary expenses if
      incurred before the appellant became aware of the overpayment and the appellant
      is legally responsible for the loans. Wagner v. Office of Personnel Management,
      83 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 11 (1999).
¶15         The administrative judge allowed the actual education expenses for the
      appellant’s son; therefore, we discern no error in this finding.        ID at 11.
      Additionally, the appellant apparently is not legally responsible for the car loan,
      insurance, or other payments related to the vehicles titled in the names of her
      adult children, whom she does not claim on her taxes as dependents. ID at 11-13.
      We therefore find no error in the administrative judge’s disallowance of those
      claims, and we note that he allowed reasonable expenses related to the appellant’s
      vehicle.   ID at 13-14; see Wagner, 83 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 11 (observing that
      repayment of car loans may be a necessary and ordinary expens e and instructing
      the administrative judge on remand to consider whether the appellant could
      discharge the loan by selling his car).
¶16         Despite the appellant’s arguments otherwise, the information provided does
      not indicate that her designated monthly obligation for student loans 1153 and
      1161 have increased.     IAF, Tab 25 at 58-60, Tab 26 at 4-19; PFR File, Tab 1
      at 5-6. Rather, the higher figures apparently reflect a past due amount.      IAF,
      Tab 25 at 59. The appellant has not indicated any change in the remaining active
      loans, which total $92.77 per month.        IAF, Tab 26 at 20-27.      Her future
      obligations throughout the overpayment collection period for the student loans
      without current monthly installments are too indeterminate to be factored into her
                                                                                          10

      present ordinary and necessary expenses. IAF, Tab 25 at 52-57; RAF, Tab 9 at 6;
      see Malone v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 104, ¶ 11 (2010)
      (holding that speculative estimates of potential future expenditures should not be
      included in the appellant’s ordinary and necessary expenses). We agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant has identified an actual monthly student
      loan obligation of $458.74, as opposed to the $1,045.18 that she claimed. ID
      at 14-15. As such, the appellant’s average monthly expenses, including $50 for
      emergencies, total $1,904.39, leaving her with an excess income of $385.78 per
      month. 7 We therefore find that she is not entitled to a waiver based on financial
      hardship. 8
¶17         The appellant also reasserts that she detrimentally relied on her disability
      payments in incurring her student loan debt.       RAF, Tab 9 at 11-13; PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 10. We disagree. To qualify for a waiver on this basis, the appellant
      must meet all of the following criteria: (1) she must have relinquished a valuable
      right or changed positions for the worse as a direct result of the overpayment or
      the notice that such payment would be made; (2) the loss or change must have
      been detrimental to her; (3) the loss or change must be material; and (4) the loss

      7
        The monthly expense total calculated by the administrative judge does not include the
      $50 for emergency expenses, despite his contention otherwise. ID at 14-15; see
      Maseuli v. Office of Personnel Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 439, ¶ 12 (2009) (explaining
      that OPM allows $50 in emergency expenses per month in calculating repayment
      schedules). We therefore add the $50 to the appellant’s average monthly expenses of
      $1,854.39, for a total of $1,904.39. We have not made any further adjustments to the
      administrative judge’s calculations of the appellant’s expenses.
      8
         Although the appellant generally disagrees with the administrative judge’s
      adjustments, she does not directly challenge, and we discern no error in, his remaining
      adjustments to her claimed expenses for her utilities, storage unit, personal vehicle,
      beauty/gym/other health, or therapy dog. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. The administrative
      judge allocated the actual amount for the appellant’s storage unit. ID at 13. The
      appellant did not provide sufficient explanation for the claimed amount for her car in
      response to OPM’s inquiry, despite having an opportunity to do so. IAF, Tab 24
      at 13-17, 25-26, Tab 29; RAF, Tabs 3, 8. The remaining expenses were facially
      unreasonable based on the amount claimed, especially given that the appellant
      apparently shares household expenses with her parents. ID at 11-14.
                                                                                     11

      or change must be irrevocable.      Maples v. Office of Personnel Management,
      48 M.S.P.R. 572, 577 (1991). Here, the appellant has made no such showing.
      Her student loans originated in 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009, at least 3 years
      before the overpayment occurred. IAF, Tab 26 at 4, 10, 15, 20, 24-25. Thus, her
      student loan debt was a preexisting obligation. See Maples, 48 M.S.P.R. at 578
      (finding that, although the appellant used the overpayment to repay her home
      mortgage loan, she did not detrimentally rely on the overpayment because the
      loan predated the overpayment).      We therefore find that the appellant did not
      relinquish a valuable right as a direct result of the overpayment.
¶18          Next, the appellant alleges that recovery would be unconscionable given her
      recent personal circumstances, inability to pursue gainful employment due to her
      disabling conditions, compounding student loan debt, and OPM’s failure to timely
      notify her of her 2011 earning capacity. RAF, Tab 9 at 13-17; PFR File, Tab 1
      at 8, 10-11. She may be entitled to a waiver if she can show that recovery would
      be unconscionable. 5 C.F.R. § 831.1403(a)(3). The Board considers all relevant
      factors using a totality of the circumstances approach to determine if recovery of
      an annuity overpayment is unconscionable in a given case. Maples, 48 M.S.P.R.
      at 578. Such circumstances include, but are not limited to, when there has been
      an exceptionally lengthy delay by OPM in adjusting an annuity, or when OPM is
      otherwise grossly negligent in handling the case. Spinella v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 109 M.S.P.R. 185, ¶ 7 (2008). The Board also considers general
      principles of equity and fairness, such as the appellant’s personal circumstances,
      including her lack of education, disability, or some other factor that makes
      collection manifestly unfair.    Maples, 48 M.S.P.R. at 578-79.      However, the
      unconscionability standard is a high one, and a waiver based on this standard will
      be granted only under exceptional circumstances. Spinella, 109 M.S.P.R. 185,
      ¶ 7.
¶19          While we do not excuse OPM for not conducting a timelier audit, we find
      that its 1-year delay between the June 30, 2012 effective termination date and the
                                                                                        12

      June 2013 audit and the June and July 2013 overpayment notices does not
      constitute an exceptionally lengthy delay.       See id., ¶¶ 8, 10 (finding that a
      79-month    delay   alone   was   insufficient   to   establish   unconscionability).
      Furthermore, although OPM did not respond to the appellant’s inq uiries about her
      2011 REC threshold, she has not shown that OPM handled her case in a grossly
      negligent manner. The appellant does not claim that OPM provided her with the
      information based on which she miscalculated her REC threshold .           PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 5 n.2. As the appellant is highly educated, currently 53 years old, and
      according to OPM, no longer suffering from a disabling condition qualifying her
      for CSRS disability retirement benefits, we cannot find that collection against her
      would be manifestly unfair. IAF, Tab 8 at 27; RAF, Tab 5 at 5, Tab 9 at 13; see
      Maples, 48 M.S.P.R. at 578-79 (discussing the factors relevant to a finding that
      collection is manifestly unfair). As a result, we find that the appellant has not
      met her burden of showing by substantial evidence her entitlement to a waiver
      based on unconscionability.
¶20        Except as modified, we agree with the administrative judge’s affirmance of
      OPM’s denial of the appellant’s request for a waiver.

      The Board lacks authority to adjust the appellant’s repayment schedule.
¶21        The administrative judge analyzed and made findings concerning the
      appellant’s entitlement to a schedule adjustment. ID at 9-15. Yet, the scope of
      this appeal is limited to determinations of actions or orders b y OPM that affect
      the appellant’s “rights or interests” under the CSRS.        5 U.S.C. § 8347(d)(1);
      Zelenka, 107 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶ 13. If she were receiving a CSRS annuity or some
      other administrative benefit from which her overpayment may be administratively
      offset, then a reduction in that benefit to recover an overpayment would affect her
      rights and interests under the CSRS and fall within the Board’s jurisdiction.
      Alexander v. Office of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶¶ 11-12
      (2010); Zelenka, 107 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶¶ 11-13. However, she is not receiving such
      an annuity, and OPM’s attempts to recover the overpayment by other means,
                                                                                             13

      whether by persuading her to enter into a repayment agreement, or by referring
      the matter to the Department of the Treasury or the Department of Justice, do not
      affect her rights or interest under the CSRS.          IAF, Tab 24 at 4-8; Zelenka,
      107 M.S.P.R. 522, ¶ 13.        We therefore lack the authority to adjudicate the
      appellant’s entitlement to an adjustment of the recovery schedule, and we vacate
      the initial decision regarding these findings. Id.
¶22         Accordingly, we deny the petition for review, and we vacate in part and
      affirm in part, as modified, the initial decision affirming OPM’s June 30, 2015
      reconsideration decision. 9

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

      9
        OPM has advised the Board that it may seek recovery of any debt remaining upon an
      appellant’s death from the appellant’s estate or other responsible party. A party
      responsible for any debt remaining upon the appellant’s death may include an heir
      (spouse, child, or other) who is deriving a benefit from the appellant’s Federal benefits,
      an heir or other person acting as the representative of the estate if, for example, the
      representative fails to pay the United States before paying the claims of other creditors
      in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b), or transferees or distributers of the appellant’s
      estate. Pierotti v. Office of Personnel Management, 124 M.S.P.R. 103, ¶ 13 (2016).
      10
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      14

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                   15

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review    of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).             If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, se x, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     16

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 11   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                17

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.