Court Opinion

ID: 9623307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:31:13.449982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:20.639264
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
The law of the case rule does not apply here because there has been an intervening change of law.1 If a majority of this Court no longer wishes to follow the rule adopted in Edge v. State2 just four years ago by a unanimous decision of this Court, they should explicitly overrule that decision.
Contrary to the majority opinion’s ruling, the habeas court properly considered the sequential charge issue. On direct appeal, this Court held that the issue was not preserved for appeal due to the absence of a contemporaneous objection.3 We did not address in Martin I whether a defendant could preserve the issue for appellate review by reserving the right to raise objections to the jury charge on appeal. Five months later, we decided this latter issue in Martin’s favor. In Taylor v. State,4 we held that a defendant does preserve the right to raise the sequential charge issue on appeal by reserving the right to raise objections to the jury charge on appeal and that the rule in Edge should apply to all cases that were not final when Edge was decided on February 4, 1992.
The majority opinion is also wrong in determining that Martin waived his right to challenge the sequential charge by requesting a similar charge at trial. Unlike the cases on which the state relies, Martin’s attorney did not induce the error.5 The trial court’s charge was a correct statement of the law when given and the trial court was obligated to give the charge, whether the state or defendant requested it. It is illogical, inconsistent, and unfair for this Court to first decide that the court-made rule in Edge should apply retroactively to cases tried before we adopted the rule, then refuse to apply that rule retroactively because the defendant failed to foresee that this Court would change the law.
In reviewing a trial court’s factual findings, this Court must apply *356the clearly erroneous standard of review.6 The habeas court found that the court at Martin’s trial gave the sequential charge that we disapproved in Edge, Martin preserved the issue for appellate review by reserving the right to object to the jury charge on appeal, and Martin’s direct appeal was not final when we issued our opinion in Edge. Based on these findings, the habeas court concluded that the original charge prevented the jury from considering Martin’s defense that he was guilty only of voluntary manslaughter and the recharge did not correct this defect in the original charge. Applying the Edge rule retroactively because Martin’s case was in the pipeline when Edge was decided, the court granted the writ of habeas corpus and vacated Martin’s felony murder conviction. Because the habeas court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and it correctly applied our decisions in Edge and Taylor, this Court should affirm.
Decided February 12, 1996 —
Reconsideration denied March 11, 1996.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, Womack & Rhyne, Ronald R. Womack, for appellant.
D. Garner Phillips, Michael M. Worth, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 See Stanley v. United States, 786 F2d 1490, 1498 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U. S. 1020 (107 SC 3262, 97 LE2d 761) (1987); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F2d 1157, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1115 (99 SC 1020, 59 LE2d 74) (1979).

 261 Ga. 865 (414 SE2d 463) (1992).

 Martin v. State, 262 Ga. 312 (418 SE2d 12) (1992).

 Taylor v. State, 262 Ga. 584, 586 (422 SE2d 430) (1992) (decided Nov. 5, 1992).

 See Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603, 604 (221 SE2d 28) (1975).

 Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 317 (431 SE2d 110) (1993), cert. denied,_U. S. _(114 SC 1577, 128 LE2d 220) (1994).