Court Opinion

ID: 9409120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 05:06:44.984496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.973204
License: Public Domain

Michigan Supreme Court
                                                                                           Lansing, Michigan

Syllabus
                                                             Chief Justice:              Justices:
                                                              Elizabeth T. Clement       Brian K. Zahra
                                                                                         David F. Viviano
                                                                                         Richard H. Bernstein
                                                                                         Megan K. Cavanagh
                                                                                         Elizabeth M. Welch
                                                                                         Kyra H. Bolden

This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been               Reporter of Decisions:
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.                 Kathryn L. Loomis

                                            OTTGEN v KATRANJI

              Docket No. 163216. Argued October 12, 2022. Decided July 14, 2023.

              Candi Ottgen and her husband, Patrick Ottgen, brought a medical malpractice action in the
      Ingham Circuit Court against Abdalmaijid Katranji, M.D., and others, alleging that Katranji had
      negligently performed two thumb surgeries on Candi Ottgen on May 1, 2017, and July 23, 2017.
      Plaintiffs filed the action on April 11, 2019, focusing their complaint on the first surgery, but they
      did not attach an affidavit of merit (AOM) to the complaint as required by MCL 600.2912d(1).
      On May 9, 2019, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) pursuant to
      Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547 (2000), which held that filing a medical malpractice complaint
      without an AOM was ineffective to commence the action and thereby toll the two-year statutory
      limitations period. Plaintiffs responded by filing an amended complaint with an AOM that had
      purportedly been executed on January 30, 2019, but was not attached to the original complaint
      because of a clerical error. Plaintiffs also separately requested permission to make the late filing
      and contended that it related back to the original complaint. The trial court, Clinton Canady III,
      J., held that Scarsella was inapplicable because the AOM was completed when the original
      complaint was filed and its omission from the filing was inadvertent. The trial court also permitted
      plaintiffs to file their late AOM and allowed it to relate back to the April 2019 complaint. The
      Court of Appeals, CAMERON, P.J., and BORRELLO and REDFORD, JJ., affirmed in part and reversed
      in part in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued May 20, 2021 (Docket No. 350767), holding
      that Scarsella applied and, accordingly, that plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely with regard to the
      first surgery, rendering the April 2019 complaint ineffective and leaving nothing for the
      subsequently filed May 13, 2019 amended complaint to relate back to. Because the dismissal was
      on statute-of-limitations grounds, the Court of Appeals held that it was with prejudice. The
      Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal, asking the parties to address
      whether Scarsella was correctly decided and whether the plaintiffs’ complaint should have been
      dismissed without prejudice. 508 Mich 1002 (2021).

              In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, the Supreme Court held:

              Scarsella was erroneously decided and failed to survive a stare decisis analysis, and it was
      therefore overruled. Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a
      medical malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal tolling
      rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing of a timely served
complaint. A failure to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case;
however, the dismissal cannot be based on statute-of-limitations grounds. Because the courts
below have not considered the nature of dismissals for violations of MCL 600.2912d(1), the case
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

         1. The starting point for an action is the filing of a complaint with a court, as clearly stated
by MCL 600.1901 and MCR 2.101(B). Plaintiffs must file the action within the applicable
statutory limitations period, MCL 600.5805(1), which for medical malpractice actions generally is
two years, MCL 600.5805(8). MCL 600.5856(a) reflects this framework by providing that the
period of limitations is generally tolled once the complaint is filed. None of these provisions
suggests that the tolling of the medical malpractice period of limitations requires something more
than the filing and timely service of a complaint, nor does any other statute or court rule provide
such a requirement, and MCL 600.5838(2) expressly provides that the general tolling rules apply
to medical malpractice actions. Michigan caselaw previously rejected the straightforward
conclusion that a medical malpractice action commences when the complaint is filed on the basis
of MCL 600.2912d(1), the statutory provision requiring an AOM to be filed with a medical
malpractice complaint. But that provision says nothing about the statute of limitations or tolling
and, in fact, indicates that the AOM and the complaint are two separate documents. Scarsella, in
particular, erred by concluding that because the AOM is mandatory, a case cannot commence
without it and the statutory limitations period therefore could not be tolled. Because the AOM
requirement remains mandatory and has effect even if tolling occurs, there was no need to resort
to the interpretive principle that, where two statutes conflict, the specific statutory provisions trump
more general provisions. The fact that the Legislature expressly provided that filing the required
notice of intent to sue would toll the statutory limitations period, but enacted no similar provision
respecting AOMs, suggests an AOM was not needed for tolling to occur. The Michigan Supreme
Court adopted the essence of this reasoning when addressing a similar question in Progress Mich
v Attorney General, 506 Mich 74, 103 (2020), which supports the conclusion that Scarsella was
wrongly decided. Contrary to defendants’ argument, the exceptions to the AOM requirement in
MCL 600.2912d(2) and (3) do not bolster their position but rather show that a case indeed
commences even when the AOM is not filed, because if there were no case, a party could not move
for or obtain an extension. These exceptions remain legally operative regardless of whether the
statutory limitations period has been tolled. Further, overruling Scarsella would not allow a
plaintiff to repeatedly file without an AOM and thereby indefinitely extend the period in which to
obtain an AOM, because courts are not prohibited from dismissing such cases with prejudice or
imposing a lesser sanction where appropriate. In short, the plain text, read in light of the statutory
context, compelled the conclusion that an AOM is not required to commence a medical malpractice
action or toll the period of limitations. Therefore, Scarsella was wrongly decided.

        2. Before overruling a decision, the Michigan Supreme Court considers whether the
decision defies practical workability, whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship,
and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision. The first factor,
“practical workability,” involves the reception of the decision by courts and parties and the ease
of its application. Considerations that are relevant to this analysis include whether the decision
has been met with criticism, whether its application has been contested or difficult, and, in the
context of statutory interpretation, whether a reader of the underlying statute would be unable to
rely on its plain meaning in light of the decision’s departure from that meaning. Scarsella did little
more than adopt the Court of Appeals’ opinion in that case and was not joined by the full Court.
Over the years since, numerous members of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have
continued to question Scarsella, and parties have continued to challenge it. These sustained attacks
were reasonable given that Scarsella’s interpretive gloss substantially deviated from the plain
meaning of the statutes, making it impossible for a reader to rely on the text of the statutes without
also combing through past judicial decisions. Moreover, the decision gave rise to a series of
workability problems involving the uncertain effects of Scarsella’s analysis on related questions.
The second factor requires consideration of “reliance interests,” which might be shared by certain
individuals, groups, courts, other governmental institutions, or the public at large. Scarsella
involves a procedural rule pertaining to civil litigation between private plaintiffs. Thus, there is
no apparent reliance by governmental institutions or the public at large. And while courts have
relied on it, their reliance has been marked by struggles with applying the case. With regard to
group and individual interests, defendants cannot rely on the rule from Scarsella given that it
springs into effect only once a malpractice complaint has been filed without an AOM, which is not
something that defendants can plan for, and no one has suggested that the practice of medicine has
been altered in reliance on Scarsella. For these reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how
potential medical malpractice defendants could have entered into contracts, provided medical
services, or engaged in ventures on the basis of Scarsella. Moreover, any disruption caused to
parties by overruling Scarsella would be minimal, given that lawsuits filed without an AOM will
still be subject to dismissal, simply on other grounds. Finally, there have been no changes in the
law or facts that weigh in favor of or against overruling Scarsella. Because Scarsella was wrongly
decided, proved difficult to apply and disruptive to the state’s jurisprudence, and did not benefit
from sufficient reliance interests, it was overruled.

       Court of Appeals judgment reversed; case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.

         Justice ZAHRA, concurring, agreed that that filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is
not required to commence a medical malpractice action and that the running of the statutory
limitations period is tolled upon the filing of a timely served complaint. He wrote separately to
note that his support for the Court’s opinion was consistent with his continuing support of the
Court’s decision in Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581 (2007), which held that the proper remedy for
a defective AOM is dismissal without prejudice, leaving the plaintiff with whatever time remains
in the limitations period within which to file a complaint accompanied by a conforming AOM. He
suggested that if, as in Scarsella, the AOM was not executed until after the statutory limitations
period had passed, the AOM should not be afforded the same presumption of validity, leaving to
the trial court’s discretion whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. While he agreed that
a stare decisis analysis supported the overruling of Scarsella, he believed that changes in the law
weighed in favor of overruling Scarsella. Specifically, in Kirkaldy, the Court relied on the
presumption that a filed AOM is presumed valid to distinguish between cases in which an AOM
had not been filed and those in which a defective, but presumably valid, AOM had been filed.
Then, in Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8 (2007), the Court held that where an AOM is filed with a
medical malpractice complaint, a defendant must timely answer or otherwise file some responsive
pleading to the complaint, or else be subject to a default. Saffian further held that a defendant’s
unilateral belief that an AOM does not conform to the requirements of MCL 600.2912d does not
constitute good cause for failing to respond timely to a medical malpractice complaint, and thus is
not a proper basis to challenge the entry of a default. Under these cases, a defendant must answer
a complaint, and if no AOM is attached to the complaint, a defendant must still answer the
complaint and presume that a plaintiff is seeking an extension to file an AOM. Thus, Justice
ZAHRA observed that Scarsella has now largely been eroded by caselaw and amendments to court
rules, namely MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118, which all were directed toward alleviating a disorderly
pleading process in medical malpractice cases. Because he believed that the majority’s opinion
was consistent with this line of cases and with maintaining a more orderly and efficient
administration of justice, he concurred with the Court’s opinion.

       Justice BOLDEN did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court
considered it before she assumed office.
                                                                              Michigan Supreme Court
                                                                                    Lansing, Michigan

OPINION
                                                     Chief Justice:                Justices:
                                                      Elizabeth T. Clement         Brian K. Zahra
                                                                                   David F. Viviano
                                                                                   Richard H. Bernstein
                                                                                   Megan K. Cavanagh
                                                                                   Elizabeth M. Welch
                                                                                   Kyra H. Bolden

                                                            FILED July 14, 2023

                              STATE OF MICHIGAN

                                     SUPREME COURT

  CANDI OTTGEN and PATRICK OTTGEN,

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

  v                                                                   No. 163216

  ABDALMAIJID KATRANJI, M.D.,
  KATRANJI RECONSTRUCTIVE
  SURGICAL INSTITUTE, KATRANJI
  RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
  INSTITUTE, PLLC, KATRANJI FAMILY
  FOUNDATION, KATRANJI HAND
  CENTER, and KATRANJI INSTITUTE,

                Defendants-Appellees.

 BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except BOLDEN, J.)

 VIVIANO, J.
        The question in this case is narrow and seemingly straightforward: when does a

 medical malpractice action begin? The answer is important because a medical malpractice

 plaintiff may not bring or maintain an action if the action is not commenced within the

 statutory limitations period. The running of the statutory limitations period usually is tolled
when a timely served complaint is filed. But this Court has held that because medical

malpractice plaintiffs must file an affidavit of merit (AOM) along with their complaint

under MCL 600.2912d(1), a medical malpractice action does not commence (and the

limitations period under MCL 600.5805 is not tolled) if the plaintiff fails to file an AOM

with the complaint. Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000). Today we

overrule this erroneous precedent. Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not

required to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period.

Instead, the normal tolling rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs

upon the filing of a timely served complaint. Nevertheless, failure to comply with MCL

600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case—just not on statute-of-limitations

grounds. Because the courts below have not considered the nature of dismissals for

violations of MCL 600.2912d(1), we remand the case to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                      I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Plaintiff Candi Ottgen underwent two thumb surgeries performed by defendant

Abdalmaijid Katranji, M.D. The first occurred on May 1, 2017, and the second on July 23,

2017. Plaintiff and her husband subsequently filed the present action on April 11, 2019,

focusing their complaint on the first surgery. An AOM was not attached to the complaint

as required by MCL 600.2912d(1). On May 9, 2019, defendants moved for summary

disposition pursuant to this Court’s decision in Scarsella, 461 Mich at 553, which held that

the filing of a medical malpractice complaint without an AOM was ineffective to

commence the action and thereby toll the statutory limitations period. Defendants here

                                             2
accordingly argued that because the AOM had not been filed with the complaint, the two-

year limitations period was never tolled and had expired. Plaintiffs responded by filing an

amended complaint with an AOM that had purportedly been executed on January 30, 2019;

they also separately requested permission to make the late filing and contended it related

back to the original complaint. They explained that the AOM had been prepared but was

not attached to the original complaint because of a clerical error.

       The trial court held that Scarsella was inapplicable because the AOM here was

completed when the original complaint was filed and had been inadvertently omitted from

the filing. The trial court also permitted plaintiffs to file their late AOM and allowed it to

relate back to the April 2019 complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished

per curiam opinion, holding that Scarsella applied and that plaintiffs’ complaint was

untimely with regard to the first surgery but was timely with regard to the July 23 surgery.

Under Scarsella, it said, the April 2019 complaint was ineffective. Therefore, “there was

nothing for the subsequently filed May 13, 2019 amended complaint to relate back to.”

Because the dismissal was on statute-of-limitations grounds, the Court held that it was with

prejudice.

       Plaintiffs subsequently sought leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave,

asking the parties to “address whether Scarsella . . . was correctly decided and whether the

plaintiffs’ complaint, which was filed without an affidavit of merit contrary to MCL

600.2912d(1), should have been dismissed without prejudice.” Ottgen v Katranji, 508

Mich 1002, 1002 (2021).

                                              3
                               II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.”

Meyers v Rieck, 509 Mich 460, 468; 983 NW2d 747 (2022).

                                      III. ANALYSIS

       We must determine when a medical malpractice action commences, such that the

running of the statutory limitations period is tolled. Specifically, does the requirement in

MCL 600.2912d(1) that a plaintiff must file an AOM with the complaint have any effect

on when an action is commenced or when the limitations period is tolled? And if the

answer is “no,” then we must consider whether to overrule Scarsella.

       A. COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION, TOLLING, AND THE AOM

       Our statutes clearly demarcate the starting point for an action in court: “A civil

action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” MCL 600.1901; see also MCR

2.101(B) (“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with a court.”). And

plaintiffs must file the action within the applicable statute-of-limitations period, MCL

600.5805(1), 1 which for medical malpractice actions generally is two years, MCL

600.5805(8). MCL 600.5856(a) reflects this framework by providing that the period of

limitations is tolled once the complaint is filed (if the complaint is also served on the

defendant pursuant to our court rules). In other words, once a timely served complaint is

filed, the limitations period generally is tolled.

1
  MCL 600.5805(1) reads, “A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover
damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the
plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within
the periods of time prescribed by this section.”

                                               4
         None of these provisions suggests that the tolling of the medical malpractice period

of limitations requires something more than the filing and timely service of a complaint.

Nor does any other statute or court rule provide such a requirement. In fact, the Legislature

has expressly indicated that the general tolling rules above apply to medical malpractice

actions:

                Except as otherwise provided in section 5838a or 5838b, an action
         involving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time
         within the applicable period prescribed in sections 5805 or 5851 to 5856, or
         within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the
         existence of the claim, whichever is later. [MCL 600.5838(2).]

As noted above, § 5805 establishes the general two-year limitations period, and § 5856(a)

provides for tolling when the complaint is filed and served. 2 The exceptions mentioned in

§ 5838(2) are similarly inapplicable. Section 5838b deals with legal malpractice. Section

5838a pertains to medical malpractice but is consistent with, and nearly identical to,

§ 5838(2); i.e., it provides that the general tolling provision applies to medical malpractice

actions. 3

2
  The remaining provisions in §§ 5851 through 5856 include accrual dates and specific
tolling provisions that are not relevant here.
3
    MCL 600.5838a(3) states in relevant part:

                An action involving a claim based on medical malpractice under
         circumstances described in subsection (2)(a) or (b) may be commenced at
         any time within the applicable period prescribed in section 5805 or sections
         5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have
         discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. . . . A medical
         malpractice action that is not commenced within the time prescribed by this
         subsection is barred.

                                                5
       “Sections 5838 and 5838a thus state that the normal rules in § 5805 and § 5856(1)

‘prescribe[]’ the commencement of medical malpractice cases. Further, neither § 5838 nor

§ 5838a includes [the AOM requirement, MCL 600.]2912d(1) in the list of statutes

‘prescrib[ing]’ when to commence an action.” Castro v Goulet, 501 Mich 884, 888 (2017)

(VIVIANO, J., concurring) (first and third alterations in original). Under these statutes, then,

“the usual tolling regime would apply to medical malpractice cases, i.e., under § 5856(1),

the running of the statutory limitations period would be tolled when the complaint is filed

and served.” Id.

       Unfortunately, our caselaw has rejected this straightforward conclusion based on a

statutory provision, MCL 600.2912d(1), that says nothing about the statute of limitations

or tolling. Indeed, that section indicates that the AOM and the complaint are two separate

documents. Section 2912d(1) states that “the plaintiff . . . shall file with the complaint an

affidavit of merit signed by a health professional . . . .” In Ligons v Crittenton Hosp, 490

Mich 61, 82-84; 803 NW2d 271 (2011), we correctly observed that the AOM was not part

of the complaint itself.

       But we had already gone astray in Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 552; 607

NW2d 711 (2000), when we addressed the effect of the failure to file an AOM with the

complaint. We relied heavily on the statute’s use of the word “shall,” which we took to

“indicate[] that an affidavit accompanying the complaint is mandatory and imperative.”

Id. at 549. From this, we inferred “that, for statute of limitations purposes in a medical

malpractice case, the mere tendering of a complaint without the required affidavit of merit

is insufficient to commence the lawsuit.” Id. Accordingly, we adopted the Court of

Appeals’ opinion holding that a medical malpractice action did not commence, and the

                                               6
period of limitations was not tolled, when the AOM was not filed with the complaint as

required by MCL 600.2912d(1). In subsequent cases, we have characterized § 2912d(1)

as the more specific provision on tolling in the medical malpractice context, giving it

precedence over the general rules in § 1901 and § 5856. See, e.g., Ligons, 490 Mich at

82-84.

         The problem with Scarsella’s reasoning is not its conclusion that the AOM

requirement is mandatory and must be followed. No one disputes this. Rather, Scarsella

erred by concluding that because the AOM is mandatory, a case cannot commence without

it and the statutory limitations period therefore cannot be tolled. Put differently, Scarsella

appears premised on the mistaken belief that to have any meaning or effect, § 2912d’s

AOM requirement must relate to tolling. But allowing the limitations period to be tolled

when the plaintiff omits the AOM “would not . . . vitiate the requirements of § 2912d(1):

plaintiffs would still have to file the AOM and their claims might be dismissed when they

failed to do so, just not on statute of limitations grounds.” Castro, 501 Mich at 886

(VIVIANO, J., concurring). The AOM requirement, in other words, remains mandatory and

has effect even if tolling occurs. For that same reason, there is no need to resort to the

interpretive principle that, where two statutes conflict, the specific statutory provisions

trump more general provisions. Id. Section 2912d(1) does not conflict with § 1901,

§ 5856, or any of the other general provisions mentioned above—indeed, as noted,

§ 2912d(1) is silent about the limitations period and tolling.

         The silence in § 2912d(1) is particularly meaningful here. That is because the

Legislature has shown it “knows how to tweak the limitations period in the medical

malpractice context,” but it did not do so for AOMs. Castro, 501 Mich at 887 (VIVIANO,

                                              7
J., concurring). “[I]n enacting Public Act 78 of 1993—the public act that created the

affidavit-of-merit requirement—the Legislature added another procedural prerequisite for

would-be medical malpractice plaintiffs, requiring them to provide a defendant with notice

of intent to sue ‘not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.’ ” Progress Mich

v Attorney General, 506 Mich 74, 103; 954 NW2d 475 (2020) (MCCORMACK, C.J.,

concurring). In that same public act, the Legislature specifically provided for tolling during

the notice period. MCL 600.5856(d), as amended by 1993 PA 78 (“The statutes of

limitations or repose are tolled . . . [i]f, during the applicable notice period under section

2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than

a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date

notice is given in compliance with section 2912b.”). “That the Legislature provided for

the [notice of intent’s] tolling effect, but not the AOM’s, suggests the AOM may not be

needed for tolling to occur.” Castro, 501 Mich at 887 (VIVIANO, J., concurring). This

analysis of the relevant statutory text inexorably leads to the conclusion that the filing of

an AOM is not necessary to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the statutory

limitations period.

       This Court has already adopted the essence of the reasoning above when addressing

a similar question in Progress Mich v Attorney General. In that case, the plaintiff sued in

the Court of Claims, where complaints must be signed and verified per MCL 600.6434(1).

Progress Mich, 506 Mich at 82. The Court of Appeals analogized the verification

requirement to the AOM requirement and applied Scarsella, holding that an unverified

complaint was insufficient to commence the case and toll the statutory limitations period.

Id. at 84-85. We reversed, noting at the outset that the statutory violation, i.e., the failure

                                              8
to verify the complaint, subjected the case to dismissal. Id. at 95. We then stated that

Scarsella involved a different statutory scheme and was, on its face, inapplicable. Id. at 96.

       Progress Mich went on to reject the extension of Scarsella’s logic, offering many

of the same reasons described above. We noted, for example, that nothing in MCL

600.6434 contradicted the general rules pertaining to commencement of actions, § 1901,

or the tolling of the statute of limitations, § 5856. Id. at 97-98. “It is not inconsistent to

require a plaintiff to comply with the verification requirement in MCL 600.6434 while at

the same time permitting the action to be commenced under MCL 600.1901 and the

limitations period tolled under MCL 600.5856(1).” Id. at 98. We again emphasized that

an unverified complaint was still subject to dismissal on grounds other than the violation

of the statute of limitations. Id. These same rationales apply with equal force in the present

context. Thus, Progress Mich supports the conclusion that Scarsella was wrongly decided.

       To avoid this conclusion, defendants attempt to rely on the statutory context

surrounding the AOM requirement, specifically the exceptions to that requirement. But

these exceptions bolster, rather than weaken, our conclusion. Under § 2912d(2), “[u]pon

motion of a party for good cause shown, the court . . . may grant the plaintiff or . . . the

plaintiff’s attorney an additional 28 days in which to file the affidavit . . . .” And per

§ 2912d(3), “[i]f the defendant in an action alleging medical malpractice fails to allow

access to medical records within the time period set forth in section 2912b(6), the affidavit

required under subsection (1) may be filed within 91 days after the filing of the complaint.”

These exceptions show that a case indeed commences even when the AOM is not filed: if

there were no case, then how would the party move for an extension under § 2912d(2) or

obtain an extension under § 2912d(3)? There would be no action in which to file a motion

                                              9
seeking that extension. The fact that the Legislature provided for extensions when the

AOM was not filed with the complaint indicates that the Legislature believed, in

accordance with the textual analysis above, that an action commences under § 1901 with

the filing of the complaint.

       Defendants contend that our conclusion today would render the exceptions

meaningless and, because we seek to avoid such interpretations, we must therefore uphold

Scarsella. See generally People v Pinkney, 501 Mich 259, 283; 912 NW2d 535 (2018)

(noting “that ‘[w]hen possible, we strive to avoid constructions that would render any part

of the Legislature’s work nugatory’ ”) (citation and emphasis omitted). Defendants are

mistaken. The exceptions in § 2912d provide a plaintiff two narrow avenues to obtain

additional time to procure an AOM without the malpractice action being subject to

dismissal for lack of an AOM. The exceptions are legally operative regardless of whether

the statutory limitations period has been tolled.

       Defendants next present a parade of horribles that is based on a misapprehension of

our caselaw. If we overrule Scarsella, defendants warn, then a plaintiff’s failure to file an

AOM would lead only to dismissal without prejudice (as opposed to, under Scarsella,

dismissal with prejudice for violation of the statute of limitations). A dismissal without

prejudice allows a plaintiff to refile the case, assuming the limitations period has not

otherwise expired. See Scarsella, 461 Mich at 551-552. Consequently, without Scarsella,

when a complaint is filed without the AOM and the case is subsequently dismissed without

prejudice, the limitations period would be tolled in the interim. As a result, a plaintiff who

fails to file an AOM will arguably always, or almost always, have some time remaining

after the dismissal without prejudice in which to refile his or her case. And, according to

                                             10
defendants, a plaintiff could again file without an AOM, as many times as he or she would

like, without any consequence to his or her ability to keep refiling. A plaintiff could thereby

indefinitely extend the period in which to obtain an AOM, far past the limited periods

allowed by § 2912d(2) and § 2912d(3).

       Defendants’ argument depends on the proposition that dismissal for failure to file

an AOM must be without prejudice and that a court is therefore powerless to prevent a

serial filer from stretching out his or her case indefinitely. While we need not decide

whether, and under what circumstances, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate, we take

this opportunity to note that the caselaw relied on by defendants nowhere requires

dismissals without prejudice or prohibits dismissals with prejudice. The key case, cited by

both parties here, is Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp Corp, 460 Mich 26; 594 NW2d

455 (1999). There, we observed that the Court of Appeals had, in a previous case, declined

to dismiss at all when the plaintiff filed the complaint without an AOM but served the

complaint with the AOM. Id. at 47, discussing VandenBerg v VandenBerg, 231 Mich App

497; 586 NW2d 570 (1998). We distinguished the facts in VandenBerg from the situation

in Dorris, where the AOM had never been filed. We then held that, “[u]nder these

circumstances, . . . dismissal without prejudice would be an appropriate sanction for

plaintiff’s failure to comply with § 2912d.” Id. at 48 (emphasis added).

       Dorris does not lay down a rule that dismissal without prejudice is always required

for violations of the AOM requirement in § 2912d. The result in Dorris was expressly tied

to the circumstances of that case. Moreover, Dorris did not mention or apply any of the

                                              11
general rules pertaining to dismissals, including MCR 2.504. 4 Dorris’s fact-bound and

circumscribed analysis approved one remedy for AOM violations under the facts of that

case, but it simply did not answer the question what rules and standards apply to determine

whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. 5 We need not answer that question

now, however, as the parties should have a full opportunity to litigate this question below.

       Moreover, even if dismissal without prejudice is often the appropriate remedy,

defendants’ forebodings about the risk of serial refilings are ill-founded. As noted above,

defendants warn that without the protection of Scarsella, plaintiffs will be able to file an

action without an AOM, proceed through the dispositive motion stage, have their case

dismissed without prejudice, and then refile again without an AOM, starting the whole

process over, ad infinitum. Plaintiffs would undertake all this simply to buy extra time to

acquire an AOM. Although we need not decide the question now, it is worth noting that

in such circumstances—an intentional violation of § 2912d to create additional time for

filing an AOM or otherwise improperly delay the proceedings—a trial court might opt to

dismiss the case with prejudice. By contrast, an inadvertent or quickly rectified failure to

attach an AOM might merit a lesser sanction. In any event, we cannot conclude that the

Legislature was concerned about the possibility of such gamesmanship, since it failed to

expressly link § 2912d’s AOM requirement to tolling.

4
  MCR 2.504 prescribes the rules pertaining to voluntary and involuntary dismissals,
including when those dismissals are presumed to be with or without prejudice.
5
 Subsequent cases have noted that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate under Dorris,
but they have not indicated that such dismissal is required, nor have they elaborated on
Dorris’s analysis. See, e.g., Scarsella, 461 Mich at 551-552 (“As we explained in Dorris,
a plaintiff who files a medical-malpractice complaint without the required affidavit is
subject to a dismissal without prejudice, and can refile properly at a later date.”).

                                            12
       In short, the plain text, read in light of the statutory context, compels the conclusion

that an AOM is not required to commence a medical malpractice action or toll the period

of limitations. We therefore conclude that Scarsella was wrongly decided.

                                   B. STARE DECISIS

       Determining that the decision in Scarsella was erroneous is only the first step in the

analysis. Before overruling it, we must also examine “whether the decision . . . defies

‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and

whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision.” Robinson

v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).               The first factor, “practical

workability,” involves the reception of the decision by courts and parties and the ease of

its application. Considerations that are relevant to this analysis include whether the

decision been met with criticism, whether its application been contested or difficult, and,

in the context of statutory interpretation, whether a reader of the underlying statute would

be unable to rely on its plain meaning in light of the decision’s departure from that

meaning. 6

       With regard to criticism, the opinion in Scarsella, which did little more than adopt

the Court of Appeals’ opinion in that case, was not joined by the full Court. Scarsella, 461

6
  See Robinson, 462 Mich at 466 (noting that the decision at issue had been repeatedly
questioned); see also Paige v Sterling Hts, 476 Mich 495, 510; 720 NW2d 219 (2006)
(“[The decision at issue] defies practical workability because a person reading the statute
surely would not know that he or she cannot rely on what the statute plainly says. That is,
a reader and follower of the statute would, because of [the decision’s] rewrite, not be
behaving in accord with the law. Such a regime is unworkable in a rational polity.”);
Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 584; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (finding that
a decision defied practical workability when it caused confusion in the lower courts and
required additional clarification from this Court).

                                              13
Mich at 554 (CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., dissenting) (declining to resolve the case in a per

curiam opinion and instead stating that they would either grant or deny leave to appeal).

Over the years since, numerous members of this Court and the Court of Appeals have

continued to question Scarsella, 7 and parties have continued to challenge it. 8 There has

been good reason for these sustained attacks. As explained above, Scarsella’s interpretive

gloss substantially deviates from the plain meaning of the statutes, making it impossible

for a reader to rely on the text of the statutes without also combing through past judicial

7
   See Progress Mich, 506 Mich at 100 (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring) (“I
would . . . overrule our decision in Scarsella[.]”); Castro, 501 Mich at 890 (VIVIANO, J.,
concurring) (calling for reconsideration of Scarsella in light of its “shaky legal foundation
and the continuing dislocations in our law it has caused”); Wade v McCadie, 503 Mich
1024, 1024 (2019) (VIVIANO, J., concurring) (“I continue to question whether Scarsella
was correctly decided.”); Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581, 586-587; 734 NW2d 201 (2007)
(CAVANAGH, J., concurring) (“I believe that Scarsella . . . was incorrectly decided . . . . I
would hold that under the plain language of MCL 600.5856(a), the period of limitations is
tolled when a complaint is filed, regardless of whether an affidavit of merit is filed with
the complaint.”); id. at 588 (KELLY, J., concurring) (“[M]eritorious arguments exist
indicating that the Court misread MCL 600.5856(a) seven years ago when it acted
peremptorily in Scarsella.”); Kirkaldy v Rim (On Remand), 266 Mich App 626, 631; 702
NW2d 686 (2005) (“We believe that the Supreme Court should reexamine the holding in
Scarsella when given the opportunity, if not to question whether the decision was
consistent with well-established principles of statutory construction, then to determine
whether it was proper for this Court to extend the holding to cases in which an affidavit of
merit, ultimately found to be nonconforming, was actually filed with the complaint.”),
rev’d 478 Mich 581; Young v Sellers, 254 Mich App 447, 453; 657 NW2d 555 (2002)
(requesting that this Court “revisit or distinguish Scarsella” to address situations in which
the failure to file the AOM was inadvertent).
8
  See Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 498 Mich 68, 93; 869 NW2d 213 (2015)
(noting the plaintiffs’ argument that Scarsella, among other cases, should be overruled as
inconsistent with the statutory text); Kirkaldy v Rim, Application for Leave to Appeal
(July 19, 2005) (Docket No. 129128), p 14 (“This Court should grant leave to appeal to
consider the question of whether the Scarsella Court’s interpretation of MCL 600.5856(a)
directly conflicts with the literal language of that statute and, for that reason, should be
overruled.”) (formatting altered).

                                             14
decisions. Moreover, the decision “has given rise to a series of workability problems”

involving the uncertain effects of Scarsella’s analysis on related questions. Castro, 501

Mich at 888 (VIVIANO, J., concurring). This comes as no surprise, for Scarsella created a

class of cases appropriately “describe[d] as ‘spectral’: cases assigned a docket number and

litigated in the courts, but somehow never begun because the cases were a ‘nullity.’ ”

Progress Mich, 506 Mich at 105 (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring). What are courts and

parties to do in cases that are not really cases at all?

       One obvious question that has arisen is whether, if no AOM is filed and no case

commenced, defendants have any obligation to raise this noncompliance with § 2912d as

an affirmative defense, as they are usually required to do with such defenses. See Tyra v

Organ Procurement Agency of Mich, 498 Mich 68, 87-88; 869 NW2d 213 (2015),

discussing Auslander v Chernick, 480 Mich 910 (2007).          Relying on Scarsella, we

answered in the negative. Auslander, 480 Mich at 910. The result, if followed, would

create chaos: it would invite defendants to ignore lawsuits filed without an AOM, even if

they were otherwise timely filed. If a default judgment is then entered against them,

defendants could still prevail by attacking the lack of an AOM, at which point the

limitations period might have expired and the plaintiffs would have no opportunity to cure

the defect. See Tyra, 498 Mich at 105 (VIVIANO, J., dissenting), citing Saffian v Simmons,

267 Mich App 297, 307; 704 NW2d 722 (2005). Yet, marking the unworkability of such

a system, it appears that defendants generally have disregarded Scarsella’s invitation and

instead “continue to follow the court rules and statutes by filing answers and affirmative

defenses.” Tyra, 498 Mich at 106.

                                               15
       Another class of workability problems, which we have dealt with on multiple

occasions, involved the question of whether a noncompliant AOM filed with the complaint

is sufficient to commence the case and toll the statutory limitations period. See Progress

Mich, 506 Mich at 104-105 (MCCORMACK, C.J., concurring) (collecting cases). Yet

another difficulty that arose from Scarsella was determining whether the AOM is part of

the complaint or a separate document. See Ligons, 490 Mich at 82-84. Thus, while the

rule articulated by Scarsella might be straightforward—if there is no AOM with the

complaint, then there is no action and thus no tolling—the application and effects of the

rule in related areas have been anything but clear.

       Next, we must consider reliance interests, which might be shared by certain

individuals, groups, courts, other governmental institutions, or the public at large. Kozel,

Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Washington & Lee L Rev 411, 452 (2010).

Scarsella involves a procedural rule pertaining to civil litigation between private plaintiffs.

Thus, there is no apparent reliance by governmental institutions or the public at large. And

while courts have relied on it, their reliance has been marked by struggles with applying

the case, as discussed above. 9

9
  Defendants contend that overruling Scarsella would destabilize the law by endangering
other precedents that relied on Scarsella. In particular, they believe that Scarsella
undergirds this Court’s decisions in Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp, 471 Mich 745; 691
NW2d 424 (2005); Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558; 751 NW2d 44 (2008); and
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). Burton held that
a medical malpractice action filed before expiration of the notice period in MCL 600.2912b
does not commence an action or toll the limitations period. Burton, 471 Mich at 747.
Boodt and Roberts stand for the proposition that a defective notice of intent is insufficient
to toll the limitations period even if the plaintiff files a complaint and an AOM. Boodt,
481 Mich at 561-562. We need not decide the effect, if any, of today’s decision on those
cases. It is worth noting, however, that the statutory provision at issue in them, § 2912b(1),

                                              16
       With regard to group and individual interests, the rule from Scarsella springs into

effect only once a malpractice complaint has been filed without an AOM. Plaintiffs in this

situation, of course, do not rely on the rule given that a plaintiff is unlikely to intentionally

put their malpractice claims at risk of dismissal. Even defendants who benefit from it could

have little ability to rely, ex ante, on the rule. The fact that an AOM is required to toll a

case is not something that defendants can plan for until an AOM-less complaint is filed.

No one has suggested that the practice of medicine has been altered in reliance on Scarsella.

For these reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how potential medical malpractice

defendants could have entered into contracts, provided medical services, or engaged in

ventures on the basis of Scarsella.        Moreover, any disruption caused to parties by

overruling Scarsella is minimal, as lawsuits filed without an AOM will still be subject to

dismissal, simply on other grounds.

       Finally, there have been no changes in the law or facts that weigh in favor of or

against overruling Scarsella.      Consequently, the stare decisis analysis leads to the

conclusion that Scarsella must be overruled. It was wrongly decided, has proved difficult

to apply and disruptive to our jurisprudence, and does not benefit from sufficient reliance

interests.

                                    IV. CONCLUSION

       The general rule that for purposes of the statute of limitations, a case commences

when a timely served complaint is filed applies to medical malpractice actions just as it

contains language different from § 2912d(1)—a difference that might justify the results
reached in those cases.

                                               17
does to other civil actions. The statutes make this clear. The AOM requirement in MCL

600.2912d does not explicitly or implicitly involve the tolling of the statutory limitations

period. Scarsella’s contrary conclusion has proved unworkable, and we now overrule it.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. But this does not mean

that the AOM requirement lacks teeth. As discussed above, nothing in our caselaw requires

a trial court to dismiss an action without prejudice when the AOM requirement has been

violated. Because the lower courts and the parties have had no occasion to consider the

standards relevant to this question, i.e., whether dismissal here should be with or without

prejudice, we remand the case to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this

opinion.

                                                        David F. Viviano
                                                        Elizabeth T. Clement
                                                        Brian K. Zahra
                                                        Richard H. Bernstein
                                                        Megan K. Cavanagh
                                                        Elizabeth M. Welch

                                            18
                              STATE OF MICHIGAN

                                     SUPREME COURT

    CANDI OTTGEN and PATRICK OTTGEN,

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

    v                                                          No. 163216

    ABDALMAIJID KATRANJI, M.D.,
    KATRANJI RECONSTRUCTIVE
    SURGICAL INSTITUTE, KATRANJI
    RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
    INSTITUTE, PLLC, KATRANJI FAMILY
    FOUNDATION, KATRANJI HAND
    CENTER, and KATRANJI INSTITUTE,

                 Defendants-Appellees.

ZAHRA, J. (concurring).
         I agree with the Court’s decision that “[f]iling an [affidavit of merit (AOM)] under

MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the

statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal tolling rules apply to medical malpractice

actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing of a timely served complaint.” The Court

properly resolves the problems that have developed since this Court’s decision in Scarsella

v Pollak, 1 which too broadly prohibited a medical malpractice action from commencing

without an AOM even though a party is entitled to move for an extension under MCL

600.2912d(2) or obtain an extension under MCL 600.2912d(3) to submit an AOM after a

complaint has been filed.

1
    Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547; 607 NW2d 711 (2000).
         I write separately to note that my support for the Court’s opinion is consistent with

my continuing support of this Court’s decision in Kirkaldy v Rim, 2 in which this Court held

that “the proper remedy” when a court finds an affidavit of merit to be defective “is

dismissal without prejudice,” leaving the plaintiff with “whatever time remains in the

period of limitations within which to file a complaint accompanied by a conforming

affidavit of merit.” In addition, the Court today offers reassurance that trial courts will

retain discretion to regulate the pleadings in a medical malpractice case. 3 Having acceded

that a trial court may take action to address “an intentional violation of [MCL 600.]2912d

to create additional time for filing an AOM or otherwise improperly delay the

proceedings,” the Court today ensures that amendments to AOMs under MCR 2.112 and

MCR 2.118 will now properly be viewed as “ ‘merely “permissive in nature” and . . . not

run afoul of Kirkaldy.’ ” 4

         And this is precisely how the trial court acted under the court rules by exercising its

discretion to permit plaintiffs to file their late AOM and allowing it to relate back to the

April 2019 complaint. Here, the AOM was executed before the original complaint was

filed and clearly had been inadvertently omitted when the complaint was filed. As trial

2
 Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581, 586; 734 NW2d 201 (2007). See, e.g., Ligons v Crittendon
Hosp, 490 Mich 61; 803 NW2d 271 (2011), and Legion-London v Surgical Institute of
Mich Ambulatory Surgery Center, LLC, 508 Mich 1006, 1006; 967 NW2d 381 (2021)
(ZAHRA, J., dissenting).
3
    See Legion-London, 508 Mich at 1009-1010 (ZAHRA, J., dissenting).
4
 Id., quoting MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118, 485 Mich cclxxv, cclxxix-cclxxx (KELLY, C.J.,
concurring).

                                                2
courts are no longer bound by Scarsella’s overly broad holding, they are now permitted to

rely on our court rules to regulate pleadings in medical malpractice cases.

       Although the Court overrules Scarsella, I would add that Scarsella reached the

correct result in that case by affirming the trial court’s decision denying the plaintiff’s

attempt to amend the AOM. Scarsella was concerned about gamesmanship following the

then-recent adoption of medical malpractice reforms. 5

5
  This Court has previously resolved concerns of gamesmanship under MCL 600.2912d
and MCL 600.2912e. For instance, in Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 13; 727 NW2d 132
(2007), the Court rejected the questionable practice of allowing a defendant

       to determine unilaterally whether the plaintiff’s affidavit of merit satisfies
       the requirements of MCL 600.2912d. As the Court of Appeals majority
       pointed out in ruling for plaintiff, when an affidavit is filed, it is presumed
       valid. It is only in subsequent judicial proceedings that the presumption can
       be rebutted. As is evident, no such presumption arises when no affidavit is
       filed.

      I was a member of the Court of Appeals panel in Saffian v Simmons, 267 Mich App
297; 704 NW2d 722 (2005), and I maintain my support for the panel’s decision on the
above point.

        I partially concurred in the majority’s opinion. I found unclear the factual basis on
which “the trial court concluded that defendant fabricated his claim that the failure to
transmit the summons and complaint to his insurer was the product of excusable clerical
error,” and I would have “vacate[d] the default and remand[ed] for further factual findings
on whether defendant had fabricated this claim.” Saffian, 267 Mich App at 310 (ZAHRA,
J., concurring in part).

       In regard to remedy, I posited:

       If the trial court concludes that defendant fabricated the facts supporting his
       motion to set aside the default, the default judgment should be reinstated and
       the trial court should impose monetary sanctions against defendant pursuant
       to MCR 2.114(E). If, however, the trial court concludes that defendant’s
       claim of excusable clerical error was not fabricated, the trial court abused its
       discretion by reinstating the default. The ensuing default judgment should

                                              3
       The Court today declines to “decide whether, and under what circumstances,

dismissal with prejudice is appropriate[.]” I would submit that Scarsella itself presents

facts that would justify the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. There,

the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against the defendant, approximately

two to three weeks before the plaintiff’s claim would be barred by the applicable two-year

limitation period. The plaintiff did not file an AOM with the complaint, nor did the plaintiff

move for a 28-day extension in which to file an AOM. The defendant filed a motion

seeking summary disposition for failure to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1). Some 213

days later—two days before the trial court heard the defendant’s motion—the plaintiff

finally filed an AOM.

       In my view, the date on which the AOM is executed is highly telling in regard to

the question whether a plaintiff has intentionally failed to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1).

While Scarsella did not mention the date on which the AOM was executed, it seems rather

obvious that it had not been executed until long after the complaint had been filed and after

the statutory limitations period had passed. Here, on the other hand, plaintiffs responded

in less than less four business days after learning that the AOM had been omitted. And

when plaintiff here did respond, plaintiff submitted an AOM that had been executed

months before the case was filed. In cases where the AOM was executed before the

       be set aside, and the trial court should rule on defendant’s motion for
       summary disposition. [Id.]

I also dissented in part from that opinion. I maintain, as in Saffian, that “where there are
allegations indicating that fraud has been committed on the court, it is generally an abuse
of discretion for the court to decide the motion without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing into the allegations.” Id. at 316 (ZAHRA, J., dissenting in part). As later discussed,
gamesmanship does not appear to be a factor in this case.

                                              4
complaint was filed, I would presume the AOM to be valid such that dismissal is either

unnecessary or dismissal without prejudice would be appropriate.

         The date of the AOM’s execution itself provides the most significant evidence in

deciding whether a plaintiff has intentionally violated MCL 600.2912d to create additional

time for filing an AOM or otherwise improperly delay the proceedings. If, as in Scarsella,

the AOM was not executed until after the statutory limitations period had passed, the AOM

should not be afforded the same presumption of validity, leaving to the trial court’s

discretion whether dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.

         Last, while I agree with the Court that a stare decisis analysis supports the overruling

of Scarsella, contrary to the Court, I believe that changes in the law weigh in favor of

overruling Scarsella. In Kirkaldy, the Court relied on the presumption that a filed AOM is

presumed valid to distinguish between cases in which an AOM had not been filed and those

in which a defective, but presumably valid, AOM had been filed. Then, in Saffian, this

Court held that

         where an affidavit of merit is filed with a medical malpractice complaint, a
         defendant must timely answer or otherwise file some responsive pleading to
         the complaint, or else be subject to a default. A defendant’s unilateral belief
         that the affidavit of merit does not conform to the requirements of MCL
         600.2912d does not constitute “good cause” for failing to respond timely to
         a medical malpractice complaint, and thus is not a proper basis to challenge
         the entry of a default.[6]

         In keeping with Saffian, a defendant must answer a complaint. And if no AOM is

attached to the complaint, a defendant must still answer the complaint and presume that a

plaintiff is seeking an extension to file an AOM. In a very real way, Scarsella has now

6
    Saffian, 477 Mich at 16.

                                                5
largely been eroded by caselaw and amendments to court rules, namely MCR 2.112 and

MCR 2.118, all directed toward alleviating a disorderly pleading process in medical

malpractice cases. In other words, the instant case is another mechanism to improve the

“orderly process of honoring the presumption of the validity of pleadings, requiring an

answer, and then allowing the defendant to challenge the affidavit,” which “reduces the

chaotic uncertainty that allowing the defendant to decline to answer would introduce.” 7 As

the Saffian Court observed:

          [T]his rule advances the efficient administration of justice because to allow
          defendants to nitpick plaintiffs’ affidavits and, upon discovering an
          imperfection, to decline to answer surely leads, as it did here, to challenged
          default judgments and the hearings those entail. On the other hand, no such
          hearings are necessitated if the procedure is to require an answer and then a
          motion by the defendant to challenge the affidavit. This approach will
          conserve judicial resources and is advisable for that reason.[8]

Since I believe that the majority’s opinion is consistent with the line of the above-

mentioned cases maintaining a more orderly and efficient administration of justice, I

concur with the Court’s opinion.

                                                           Brian K. Zahra

      BOLDEN, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case because the Court
considered it before she assumed office.

7
    Id. at 14.
8
    Id.

                                                6