Court Opinion

ID: 9717525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:05:07.885088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.697144
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: I dissent. The majority holds that a written waiver alone does not waive a defendant’s right to a jury trial. 186 Ill. 2d at 284. I certainly agree with that statement as a general legal principle; the proposition is quite established. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. App. 3d 972, 978 (1996); People v. Steiger, 208 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982 (1991); People v. Lewis, 89 Ill. App. 3d 840, 844 (1980). However, it cannot be the holding in this case because it does not fit the facts herein presented. The State expressly contends: “The People do not suggest that it is the written waiver alone that creates the knowing and understanding waiver of the right to a jury. It is the written waiver in conjunction with the Defendant’s silent acquiescence in court when his attorney agreed to the bench trial.” (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion overlooks the totality of the circumstances in this case. A defendant waives the right to a jury trial only if made understanding^ in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103 — 6 (West 1992). “That determination cannot rest on any precise formula and necessarily turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 332 (1984) (and cases cited therein). In this case, defendant: (1) signed a clear and detailed written jury waiver (293 Ill. App. 3d at 243-44), and (2) was in court and failed to object when his defense counsel indicated that he was prepared to proceed with a bench trial. “Recognizing that the accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, we have given effect to jury waivers made by defense counsel in defendant’s presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection to the court hearing the case.” Frey, 103 Ill. 2d at 332 (collecting cases); accord People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985). Courts have held that a defense counsel’s single affirmative statement either that defendant waives a jury (e.g., People v. Murrell, 60 Ill. 2d 287, 290 (1975); People v. Sailor, 43 Ill. 2d 256, 260 (1969)) or requests a bench trial (e.g., People v. Pozdoll, 230 Ill. App. 3d 887, 892 (1992); People v. Tucker, 183 Ill. App. 3d 333, 334-35 (1989); People v. Burton, 121 Ill. App. 3d 182, 183-84 (1984)) constituted a valid jury waiver since defendant was in the courtroom and failed to object. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d at 332. Also, the record shows that defendant is not unsophisticated or uneducated. Defendant was 53 years old at the time of his arrest. He had completed two years of high school and had taken GED classes. He had police training and for two years was a deputy for the emergency services and disaster agency in Wayne County. Further, defendant had two previous DUI convictions. This fact indicates that he has some knowledge of the justice system generally and of this type of case particularly. Thus, based on the facts and circumstances of this case, I believe that defendant’s jury waiver was knowingly and understanding^ made. Whether a defendant understanding^ waived a jury trial is best determined based on all of the unique circumstances of that particular case. Courts have long required a totality-of-the-circumstances test (e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278, 87 L. Ed. 268, 274, 63 S. Ct. 236, 241 (1942)), which was codified in section 103 — 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 725 ILCS Ann. 5/103 — 6, Committee Comments — 1963, at 197 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (“This paragraph codifies *** the case decisions”). Justice Bilandic’s special concurrence correctly describes the majority opinion as. adopting a new interpretation of section 103 — 6, which replaces the totality-of-the-circumstances test. In this case, I would hold that defendant understandingly waived a jury trial, and I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Accordingly, I dissent.