Court Opinion

ID: 9765724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:16:29.989026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:20.272402
License: Public Domain

CAYTON, Judge:
Here for review is a decision of the trial court holding the owner of an automobile liable for the negligent operation thereof by his co-owner.
Following are the essential facts presented below. Appellant Joyner and a man named Foreman were owners of an automobile. Foreman was operating the automobile, Joyner not being with him at the time, and was involved in a collision with Holland. Holland and his insurer sued the two owners, Joyner and Foreman. Foreman defaulted and judgment was entered against him. Joyner presented no evidence by way of defense but moved for judgment on the ground that there had been no proof of agency as between the two defendants. This contention was rejected by the trial court and judgment was entered against Joyner.
*542On this appeal the only question is whether plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. Code 1961, 40-424 provides:
“Whenever any motor vehicle, after the passage of this chapter, shall he operated upon the public highways of the District of Columbia by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed to he the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle, and the proof of the owership of said motor vehicle shall he prima facie evidence that such person operated said motor vehicle with the consent of the owner.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It has long been understood and accepted that the effect of this statute is to make proof of ownership prima facie evidence of consent and to place on the owner the burden of proving that his vehicle was not operated with his express or implied consent at the time of collision. See, e.g., Hiscox v. Jackson, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 127 F.2d 160; Lancaster v. Canuel, D.C. App., 193 A.2d 555; Conrad v. Porter, D.C. Mun.App., 79 A.2d 777; also various cases therein cited. Such indeed had been the general law in this jurisdiction long before the statute was enacted. Almost forty years ago it was held that “proof that the automobile was owned by the defendant at the time of the accident establishes a' prima facie case for the plaintiff.” Curry v. Stevenson, 58 App.D.C. 162, 163, 26 F.2d 534, 535.
The owner in this case presented no proof whatever. Instead, he relied on his status as “co-owner” as exempting him from liability. Such claim cannot be sustained. We cannot approve the reasoning by which co-owners would have a lesser responsibility than a single owner. There is no doubt that if a third party had been operating the automobile both owners would be presumptively liable under the statute. The fact that one of the owners was the driver does not entitle the other owner to say that he was automatically relieved of liability. If he relied on some special circumstances to establish immunity, it would have been a simple matter to present proof thereof; and such was his statutory obligation. But as we have seen, he elected to present no evidence.
The statute which governs here has a broad social purpose and is to be construed realistically. It would be highly unrealistic to construe it flatly as meaning that “a person other than the owner” does not include one of two co-owners, and that a plaintiff would have to prove affirmatively that one co-owner had the consent of the other to operate the vehicle. Such a construction would do violence to the letter and spirit of the statute. It is much more accurate to say that in a co-ownership of an automobile there is an implied mutual consent to the use and operation thereof by either owner.
On the basis of the record before us it must be held that the statute applied to both owners. See Krum v. Malloy, 22 Cal. 2d 132, 137 P.2d 18; Moore v. Noorthoek, 280 Mich. 431, 273 N.W. 758; Kangas v. Winquist, 207 Minn. 315, 291 N.W. 292. We agree with counsel for appellees that there is no valid basis in law or logic “to divide ‘the owner’ into personal segments though one personal segment of ‘the owner’ also be the operator.”
Affirmed.