Court Opinion

ID: 9542423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:13.422646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:53.476956
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KARMEIER, dissenting: Contrary to the majority, I would hold that the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiffs medical malpractice action with prejudice based on her failure to comply with the provisions of section 2 — 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622 (West 2004)). As the majority’s opinion explains, plaintiff had previously taken a voluntary dismissal of her complaint. When she refiled the action in February of 2004, she failed to attach to her complaint the affidavit required by section 2 — 622(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(1) (West 2004)) declaring that she had consulted with a health professional who believed that she had reasonable and meritorious cause for filing the action. Section 2 — 622(g) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(g) (West 2004)) expressly provides that the failure to include such a certificate “shall be grounds for dismissal under Section 2 — 619” of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 2004)). When defendants moved to dismiss under section 2 — 619 based on the absence of the requisite certification, the court therefore had no discretion regarding how to proceed. Dismissal was mandatory. See Hull v. Southern Illinois Hospital Services, 356 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305 (2005). Plaintiff believed that she could avoid this result by including an affidavit from her lawyer indicating that he had been unable to obtain a consultation with a health professional before expiration of the statute of limitations and indicating that the required certificate and report would be filed within 90 days. That approach was untenable. Although section 2 — 622(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(2) (West 2004)) authorizes the use of such an affidavit to defer compliance with the certification requirement of section 2 — 622(a)(1), the statute expressly limits use of the affidavit option to situations where the plaintiff had not previously taken a voluntary dismissal of an action based on the same or substantially the same acts, omissions or occurrences underlying the current action. Because plaintiff had previously taken such a voluntary dismissal, this option was not available to her. Faced with this predicament, plaintiff argued that the “no previous dismissal” limitation set forth in section 2 — 622(a)(2) should be read out of the statute. In her view, the legislature never intended to adopt that portion of the law and it should not be given any legal effect. Instead, she urged reliance of the version of the statute as it existed prior to the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995) invalidated by this court’s decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). Under that earlier version, the affidavit option to defer compliance with the certification requirement was not limited to situations where there had been no prior voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff’s complaint would therefore not have been subject to dismissal on that basis. Arguments similar to plaintiffs have been considered and rejected by the appellate court. See Cargill v. Czelatdko, 353 Ill. App. 3d 654 (2004); accord Crull v. Sriratana, 376 Ill. App. 3d 803 (2007) (applying different provision of 2 — 622 but specifically endorsing Cargill’s result and analysis); see also Beauchamp v. Zimmerman, 359 Ill. App. 3d 143, 148 n.l (2005) (following Cargill); Giegoldt v. Condell Medical Center, 328 Ill. App. 3d 907, 912 (2002) (assuming, without deciding, that the version of the statute at issue in this case, rather than the version in effect before the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, applied to render plaintiffs complaint insufficient as a matter of law). The decision by the appellate court in this case was the first to reach a contrary conclusion.4 While the majority agrees with that result, I do not believe it can be squared with fundamental principles of statutory construction. It is axiomatic that in interpreting a statute, the primary rule of construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. In re Application for Judgment & Sale of Delinquent Properties for the Tax Year 1989, 167 Ill. 2d 161, 168 (1995). The best evidence of that intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself. U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2005). When the language is unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written without resorting to other aids of construction. People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477, 481 (2006). In this case the legislation enacted by the General Assembly clearly and unambiguously limited the use of the affidavit option in 2 — 622(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(2) (West 2004)) to situations where the plaintiff “ha[d] not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based upon the same or substantially the same acts, omissions, or occurrences.” This provision could not be more straightforward. We have no authority to depart from the law’s plain meaning (see Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994)), nor may we alter the statute’s language in “a way that constitutes a change in the plain meaning of the words actually adopted by the legislature” (U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d at 346). The majority’s opinion stands in direct conflict with these principles. It likewise violates the rule that, whenever possible, a court should construe a statute to give effect to each paragraph, sentence, clause, and word. See People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 350 (2001). Under this rule, a court is required to construe a statute, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. See Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill. 2d 169, 187 (2007). Rather than give meaning to the full text of the statute at issue in this case, however, the majority holds that critical portions of it have no effect whatever. The “no previous dismissal” limitation which is set forth in section 2 — 622(a)(2) and which was the predicate for the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiffs complaint was neither novel nor controversial. As the majority recounts, it was originally enacted five years before the events giving rise to this litigation as part of Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995). Although the provision was temporarily rendered void by this court’s decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), that action was unrelated to the merits of section 2 — 622(a)(2) itself. It was, instead, a byproduct of the court’s determination that invalidation of the core provisions of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995) rendered the remainder of that statute invalid as well. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 467. Nothing in Best precluded the General Assembly from reenacting the noncore provisions of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995). To the contrary, we held there that because the remaining provisions of the statute were not challenged and were deemed invalid based solely on severability principles, the General Assembly was “free to reenact whatever provisions it deem[ed] desirable or appropriate.” Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 471. With respect to section 2 — 622(a)(2), that is precisely what the General Assembly did. Less than two months after Best was decided, the legislature passed Public Act 90 — 579. That legislation restored section 2 — 622(a)(2) to precisely the same state it had been in before the Best decision, including its “no previous dismissal” limitation. The “no previous dismissal limitation” was therefore in full force and effect at the time Carla Thompson had the tonsillectomy which led to her death and Marjorie O’Casek brought this action as special administrator of Thompson’s estate. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that inclusion of the “no previous dismissal” limitation in Public Act 90 — 579 can be dismissed as mere “legislative oversight.” The “legislative oversight” theory presumes that the General Assembly somehow failed to realize that Best affected the prior version of the law. Under Illinois law, however, we must presume the opposite, namely, that in amending the statute, the General Assembly was fully aware of judicial decisions interpreting the statute and that it acted with this knowledge. Morris v. William, L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1999). In the case of Best, this presumption is no mere legal fiction. Many of our decisions are little known by anyone besides the litigants and their lawyers. Such was not the case with Best. At the time it was decided, Best was highly publicized and vigorously debated. It was perhaps one of the most well-known decisions issued by this court in the 1990s. The reality is that no conscientious legislator in Illinois could possibly have been unfamiliar with it or its effects on the General Assembly’s tort reform initiatives, of which the “no previous dismissal” limitation was a part. The remarks of Senator Madigan and Representative Burke scarcely suffice to overcome this presumption. Although their statements regarding Public Act 90 — 579 deal with the addition of naprapaths to the list of healthcare professionals covered by section 2 — 622(a)(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(1) (West 2004)), that may be because the addition of naprapaths was the only genuinely new aspect of the legislation. The “no previous dismissal” limitation was simply a reenactment of a provision which had previously been debated and adopted. Given that the time allotted for floor debate is limited and considering that the Best decision did not call into question the substantive merits of that provision, Madigan and Burke may simply have believed that elaboration on that aspect of the legislation was unnecessary. I note, moreover, that Senator Madigan and Representative Burke are but 2 of the 177 members of the General Assembly. We have no basis for assuming that they were the only legislators familiar with the contents of Public Act 90 — 579, nor can we impute their personal views to the legislature as a whole. Here, as in most instances of this kind, no claim can be made that their assessment of the law was shared by the majority of their colleagues or even any of their colleagues. That is why floor debates are such an unreliable and unhelpful guide to ascertaining legislative intent and cannot, by themselves, affirmatively establish the intent of the legislature. See People v. R.L., 158 Ill. 2d 432, 442 (1994). In any case, whatever Senator Madigan and Representative Burke may have had in mind when they stood on the floor of their respective chambers and addressed their colleagues about Public Act 90 — 579, their views cannot supercede or undo the statute that was ultimately adopted by the General Assembly. Hadley v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 224 Ill. 2d 365, 382 (2007). Indeed, because the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we should not even be referring to the floor debates or any other extrinsic aids of construction. Our obligation is to apply the law as written. Alvarez v. Pappas, 229 Ill. 2d 217, 228 (2008). Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that precedent governing implicit repeal of statutes by the General Assembly is relevant to the issue before us in this case. The challenge presented by those cases is how to reconcile legislative action taken by the General Assembly which appears to be inconsistent. That dilemma is not before us here. To the contrary, the changes to section 2 — 622(a)(2) of the Code which would result from applying the plain language of Public Act 90 — 579 are entirely consistent with the prior amendments to the statute included in the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 (Pub. Act 89 — 7, eff. March 9, 1995). Rather than implicit repeal, this case involves explicit reenactment of a law under circumstances we specifically sanctioned. The fact that the “no previous dismissal” limitation was not underscored or italicized in Public Act 90 — 579 is of no consequence. Section 5 of the Statute on Statutes does state that “[i]n construing an amendatory Act printed in any volume of the session laws published after January 1,1969, matter printed in italics shall be construed as new matter added by the amendatory Act, and matter shown crossed with a line shall be construed as matter deleted from the law by the amendatory Act.” 5 ILCS 70/5 (West 2004). As the appellate court correctly noted in Cargill v. Czelatdko, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 660-61, however, nothing in this provision makes the use of italics a prerequisite to the validity of new matter added by an amendment. The statute simply means that when items are italicized, such items shall be construed as adding new matter to the law. The Illinois House and Senate have enacted rules which go beyond this statutory requirement by specifying that in any bill amending a statute, “[a]ll new matter shall be underscored” and “[a] 11 matter that is to be omitted or superseded shall be shown crossed with a line.” 95th Ill. Gen. Assem. House R. 37(e); Senate R. 5 — 1(e); 90th Ill. Gen. Assem. House R. 37(3); Senate R. 5 — 1(e). Compliance with these rules is, in the first instance, a matter for the General Assembly to judge. There is no evidence that the General Assembly found the bill which culminated in Public Act 90 — 579 (S.B. 120) to be problematic, and we can infer none. The Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate certified that the procedural requirements for passage of the bill had been satisfied. Under the enrolled-bill doctrine, the bill is therefore conclusively presumed to have met all procedural requirements for passage. Friends of the Parks v. Chicago Park District, 203 Ill. 2d 312, 329 (2003). Nor can we find any deficiency in Public Act 90 — 579 under this state’s constitution. Article IY section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV §8(d)) requires only that “[a] bill expressly amending a law shall set forth completely the sections amended.” That requirement was met here. There is no dispute that the complete text of the law, as amended, was printed in the bill considered and adopted by the legislature. One may speculate as to what the General Assembly was thinking when it proceeded as it did with Public Act 90 — 579. It is well established, however, that we cannot ignore the plain language of a statute based on conjecture. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 447 (2002). Under the clear terms of the statute as ultimately enacted here, plaintiffs refiled cause of action was fatally defective. The circuit court therefore acted properly when it granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. I do not see how we can countenance any other conclusion. Section 2 — 622(a)(2) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 — 622(a)(2) (West 2004)), as amended by Public Act 90 — 579, was considered by 118 members of the House and 59 members of the Senate and approved by the Governor. The majority’s opinion ultimately stands on the proposition that these branches of government and their constituent officers did not realize what they were doing when they enacted Public 90 — 579. Pundits may assume that the other branches of government are inattentive to their duties, but we, as the highest court of this state, may not. When we refuse to give effect to the plain language of a statute on the conjecture that its passage must have been accidental or inadvertent, we invite courts to disregard legislative enactments whose purposes they do not understand or whose wisdom they question. This is not only presumptuous, it puts courts in the position of super legislators, undermining basic principles of separation of powers. I close by observing that the events culminating in the death of plaintiffs decedent took place in August of 2000. When plaintiff filed her complaint two years later, she failed to obtain the certificate of merit required by section 2 — 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When plaintiff attempted to refile her complaint two years after that, she still failed to obtain the requisite certificate. The reason for plaintiff’s ongoing difficulties in complying with the law is unknown. The delay may be justified. It may, on the other hand, simply be a function of some underlying problem with the merits of plaintiffs cause of action. In any event, without further explanation, no claim can be made that application of the law, as written, would be in any way unfair under the particular facts of this case. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE CARMAN join in this dissent.  The majority is correct that stare decisis did not bar the appellate court from departing from past precedent. In reaching that conclusion, however, they fail to distinguish between vertical and horizontal stare decisis. The doctrine of vertical stare decisis requires inferior tribunals to follow the decisions of superior ones. The doctrine of horizontal stare decisis pertains to a court’s responsibility to follow its own precedent or the precedent of coequal courts. A. Solomon, A Simple Prescription for Texas’s Ailing Court System: Stronger Stare Decisis, 37 St. Mary’s L.J. 417, 424-25 (2006). It is this latter form of stare decisis which is at issue here. Unlike vertical stare decisis, which has been viewed, historically, as an obligation, horizontal stare decisis has been regarded as a matter of sound policy. See W. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 53, 58. This approach is reflected in those decisions of our court which have held that stare decisis is not an inexorable command. It is, instead, a recognition of the principle that our system of justice works best when the law does not change erratically, but rather develops in a principled, intelligible fashion. See, e.g., People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 145-46 (2007); Iseberg v. Gross, 227 Ill. 2d 78, 94-95 (2007). There is no question under Illinois law that courts may depart from their own precedent or the precedent established by a coequal court when they believe they have good cause or a compelling reason for doing so, e.g., where they believe the existing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 520 (2005).