Court Opinion

ID: 9353666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 16:00:16.004898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:18.088595
License: Public Domain

20-2780
     Terera v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                    Christensen, IJ
                                                                    A209 760 199
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 12th day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 9            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   YUNUSA TERERA,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                       v.                                  20-2780
18                                                           NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Patrick Crowley, Esq., New York,
25                                       NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                       Attorney General, Civil Division;
 1                                  Bernard A. Joseph, Senior
 2                                  Litigation Counsel, Office of
 3                                  Immigration Litigation; Katherine
 4                                  S. Fischer, Trial Attorney, U.S.
 5                                  Department of Justice, Civil
 6                                  Division, Office of Immigration
 7                                  Litigation, Washington, DC.

 8       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12       Petitioner Yunusa Terera, a native and citizen of The

13   Gambia, seeks review of an August 6, 2020 decision of the BIA

14   affirming a May 23, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

15   (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum, withholding

16   of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

17   (“CAT”).     See In re Yunusa Terera, No. A 209 760 199 (B.I.A.

18   Aug. 6, 2020), aff’g No. A 209 760 199 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City

19   May 23, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

20   underlying facts and procedural history.

21       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

22   the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

23   Cir. 2005).       The applicable standards of review are well

24   established.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“administrative

25   findings     of   fact   are   conclusive   unless   any   reasonable
                                         2
 1   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”);

 2   Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)

 3   (reviewing adverse credibility determination for substantial

 4   evidence).

 5          An    IJ   may,   “[c]onsidering    the   totality   of   the

 6   circumstances”       base   a     credibility    determination   on

 7   inconsistencies in an applicant’s statements or between his

 8   statements and other evidence, “without regard to whether an

9    inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

10   the applicant’s claim.”      8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      “We

11   defer [] to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

12   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

13   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

14   ruling.”     Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

15   2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.         In the instant

16   matter, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

17   determination.

18          Terera testified that his family and village elders tried

19   to force him to marry and then assaulted and threatened him

20   when    he    refused.      The   agency   reasonably   relied    on

21   inconsistencies between his testimony and letters from his

                                        3
 1   brother and stepfather.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

 2   Terera’s brother and stepfather stated that the family was

 3   compelling Terera to marry his uncle’s 10-year-old daughter,

 4   but Terera testified that he was being forced to marry someone

 5   older than him.   The agency was not required to accept his

 6   explanation that there were two different individuals because

 7   he mentioned that otherwise uncorroborated fact only when

 8   confronted with the discrepancy.   See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430

 9   F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than

10   offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements

11   to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

12   finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal

13   quotation marks omitted)).   In addition, the record reflects

14   inconsistencies regarding how serious his family was about

15   the marriage, whether his father died in 2010 or was alive

16   and arranged for the marriage in 2014, and when Terera left

17   The Gambia.

18       These inconsistencies constitute substantial evidence

19   for the adverse credibility determination.       See 8 U.S.C.

20   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (“[E]ven

21   where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae that, if taken

                                   4
 1   separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the

 2   claim,    the    cumulative    effect       may    nevertheless       be   deemed

 3   consequential by the fact-finder.”); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968

 4   F.3d     137,    145    n.8   (2d    Cir.    2020)        (“[E]ven    a    single

 5   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

 6   was compelled to find him credible.                Multiple inconsistencies

 7   would so preclude even more forcefully.” (citation omitted)).

 8   Contrary    to    Terera’s     position,          the    adverse     credibility

 9   determination      is    dispositive        of    asylum,      withholding     of

10   removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are

11   based on the same factual predicate.                    See Paul v. Gonzales,

12   444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

13          Finally, we find no merit to Terera’s remaining argument.

14   He did not ask to present expert testimony at his hearing,

15   and     expert     testimony        would    not        have    resolved      the

16   inconsistencies in his claim.           See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey,

17   531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Parties claiming denial of

18   due process in immigration cases must, in order to prevail,

19   allege some cognizable prejudice fairly attributable to the

20   challenged process.” (quotation marks omitted)).

21

                                            5
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  6