Court Opinion

ID: 9477573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:26:26.431374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:56.631780
License: Public Domain

BREYER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
In my view, this case is moot. Mrs. Allende complains of having been denied a visa in 1983. But, subsequently, the government granted her a multiple entry visa, valid through the end of 1987. And, the government now says that it is
advised by the State Department that, if Mrs. Allende were to file a visa application during 1988, the application presumably would be approved, just as all of her numerous applications have been approved both prior and subsequent to her 1983 denial.
Moreover, the government must concede it will not, and legally cannot, deny a visa to any other person whom Mrs. Allende could reasonably claim to represent in this litigation. The law of the United States has changed since the district court wrote its opinion. The law now prohibits denying a visa to an applicant “because of any past, current or expected beliefs, statements or associations which ... would be protected under the Constitution.” Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub.L. No. 100-204, § 901 (1987). It is such a denial — the finding that Mrs. Allende’s entry was prejudicial because of her past associations or speeches — that constitutes the subject matter of the present controversy.
Of course, the law of the United States may change again. Congress could fail to renew § 901. The Executive branch in 1989 or thereafter may revert to earlier practices. But, I do not see how this court can find (constitutionally speaking) a genuine “controversy” premised on the fact that present law may change. We do not know what will happen a year or so from now. We cannot predict that the law will change, that the next administration will enforce a new law according to a previous policy, and we cannot issue a declaratory judgment now about what the meaning of the law *1122will be, if it should happen to change. The “challenged government activity” in respect to associational or speech-related visa denials is highly “contingent;” prior policy is not a “continuing and brooding presence.” Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122-25, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 1698-1700, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (emphasis added) (noting Supreme Court precedents that found cases moot when application of controversial statute required occurrence of series of events including act of Executive discretion); see § 901.
Even were this case not moot in terms of Article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement, it is “prudentially” moot. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1238 (1969 & Supp.1987). That is to say, the remedy sought, a declaratory judgment, is a discretionary remedy, and controlling Supreme Court precedent requires us to withhold that remedy here, “where it appears that a challenged ‘continuing practice’ is, at the moment adjudication is sought, undergoing significant modification so that its ultimate form cannot be confidently predicted.” A.L. Mechling Barge Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 331, 82 S.Ct. 337, 342, 7 L.Ed.2d 317 (1961). The District of Columbia Circuit, following Mechling, has specifically held that a declaratory judgment is not appropriately rendered when an “allegedly unlawful departmental practice ... is currently under review and may never recur.” Chamber of Commerce v. United States Department of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 292 (D.C.Cir.1980). The uncertainty surrounding the recurrence of the present challenged practice is greater, not smaller, than the uncertainty at issue in Mechling or Chamber of Commerce. Should the government renew its challenged practice, plaintiff, or others similarly situated, can obtain speedy court review at that time.
Although I do not believe it appropriate to issue a declaratory judgment in this case, the majority of the panel believes the contrary. I therefore add that I agree with the panel’s opinion in respect to the merits.