Court Opinion

ID: 9406285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 16:07:59.736584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.711341
License: Public Domain

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                                 2023 PA Super 117
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
               v.                           :
                                            :
                                            :
    VINCENT SMITH                           :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 1256 WDA 2021

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-02-CR-0008964-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE,
        J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:                              FILED: JUNE 30, 2023

        Vincent Smith (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his open

guilty pleas to two counts of voluntary manslaughter and four counts of arson

endangering persons.1 The four counts of arson endangering persons relate

to the presence of four police officers when Appellant started the fire. As an

issue of first impression, Appellant argues the trial court’s imposition of

multiple sentences for these counts was illegal, as the arson endangering

persons statute — Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code — provides

for a single sentence regardless of the number of victims. We hold: (1) the

unit of prosecution for this offense is not merely the starting of a fire, but the

intentional starting of a fire that recklessly places another in danger of death

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503(b), 3301(a)(1)(i).
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or bodily injury; (2) Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) was written with regard to an

individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury;2

and (3) a defendant may be convicted of and sentenced on separate counts

when there is one arson but more than one victim. We thus affirm.

                        I. Facts & Procedural History

        At the plea hearing, Appellant generally agreed with the facts set forth

in the affidavit of probable cause,3 which stated the following: On February

26, 2018, four police officers went to the rowhome at 103 Penfield Place,

Pittsburgh, attempting to locate a missing person, John Van Dyke.             See

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/28/18, at 3. The officers forcibly entered the

home and repeatedly announced their presence. Id. Once inside they heard

someone on the second floor say, “Steve’s not here[,]” and the officers again

announced their presence and purpose. Id. The officers then

        observed [Appellant] striking matches and tossing them on the
        floor. The matches started an instant fire[, which] began traveling
        down the stairs toward the officers. The officers immediately
        exited the residence and took positions . . . outside[. Appellant]
        was eventually rescued by firemen and . . . treated for smoke
        inhalation. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 4/6/22, at 2.

2   See Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. 1984).

3   See N.T. Plea H’rg, 4/5/21, at 16-17.

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        The bodies of John Van Dyke and Steven Pariser were recovered from

the residence. Both “had obvious trauma to the back of their heads and their

deaths were ruled as homicides.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Appellant told detectives:

        [H]e was attacked by the men and he fought back. He . . .
        admitted that he [threw] them down a flight of steps[.] He
        covered them with blankets and bags. He further told the
        detectives that he wanted to kill himself so he took some pills and
        spread lighter fluid all over the residence.[4]

Id.

        Appellant was charged with homicide, various counts of arson, and

related offenses. On April 5, 2021, he entered open guilty pleas, all graded

as felonies of the first degree, to: (1) two counts of voluntary manslaughter,

representing the two victims killed; and (2) four counts of arson endangering

persons, for the four police officers present when Appellant started the fire.

        On June 30, 2021, the trial court imposed the following sentences, all

to run consecutively: (1) for the two voluntary manslaughter counts, two

terms of five to 10 years’ imprisonment; and (2) for the four arson

endangering persons count, four terms of four to eight years. Therefore, the

aggregate sentence was 26 to 52 years’ imprisonment.5

        Appellant filed a timely counseled post-sentence motion, challenging the

discretionary aspects of his sentence and the voluntariness of his guilty plea.

4Appellant had killed the two victims approximately five days before the fire.
See N.T. Post-Sentence Mot. H’rg, 8/23/21, at 12.

5   At the time of sentencing, Appellant was 61 years old.

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The trial court conducted a hearing on August 23, 2021. Based on Appellant’s

arguments, the court considered an additional question, whether the

commission of arson endangering persons was “a one-act event,” regardless

of the number of potential victims — in other words, whether an individual

could be sentenced on multiple counts of this offense, based on a single act

of arson that placed more than one person at risk. See N.T., 8/23/21, at 26-

27. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this

issue, and they complied.

        The trial court then conducted a second post-sentence hearing on

September 20, 2021.      Both parties addressed: (1) the recent decision in

Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 255 A.3d 438 (Pa. 2021) (discussed infra),

which held the “unit of prosecution” of leaving the scene of an accident

involving death or personal injury6 was the defendant’s single act of leaving,

regardless of the number of victims, and thus only one conviction of this

offense and one sentence were proper; and (2) Commonwealth v. Frisbie,

485 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1984) (discussed infra), which permitted separate

sentences for recklessly endangering another person7 (REAP), where there

was one act by the defendant that endangered multiple victims. N.T. Post[-]

sentencing Mot., 9/20/21, at 4-10, 12-17. The trial court ruled it was proper

6   75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.

7   18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

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to impose separate sentences on Appellant’s arson endangering persons

convictions, and thus denied his request for relief. Id. at 24.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

             II. Question Presented, Standards of Review &

                    Arson Endangering Persons Statute

      Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

      Did the trial court err in imposing multiple sentences for
      [Appellant’s] convictions for arson pertaining to multiple
      endangered persons where the statute providing for the offense,
      properly construed according to the rules of statutory
      interpretation, provide for a single sentence regardless of the
      number of victims?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

      We note Appellant’s claim implicates the legality of his sentence, which

presents a pure question of law; thus our scope of review is plenary, and our

standard of review, de novo.     See Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 442 (citation

omitted).   Resolution of Appellant’s issue also involves interpretation of a

statute, namely 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i), which likewise “presents a pure

question of law; again, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of

review, de novo.” See id.

      At this juncture, we set forth the pertinent statutory definition of arson

endangering persons:

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      § 3301. Arson and related offenses.

          (a) Arson endangering persons.

               (1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he
          intentionally starts a fire . . . and if:

                   (i) he thereby recklessly places another person in
               danger of death or bodily injury, including but not limited
               to a firefighter, police officer or other person actively
               engaged in fighting the fire . . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (some emphasis added).

                          III. Parties’ Arguments

      Appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing multiple sentences for

his arson endangering persons convictions, as the unit of prosecution is one

arson, and not the endangerment to others.8 In support, he first contends

the arson endangering persons statute is ambiguous. Appellant’s Brief at 16-

17. He proposes two possible interpretations of the statute: (1) first, that the

statute primarily prosecutes arson, not endangerment of persons; and (2) on

the other hand, that it prosecutes “arsons as ersatz crimes against persons.”

Id.

      In support of his contention that the former interpretation should

control, Appellant presents the following arguments.9 First, where there are

8 We note Appellant does not challenge his multiple convictions of arson
endangering persons, and instead only the consecutive sentences.

9 Appellant does not present any discussion of his latter interpretation of the
statute.

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“two reasonable interpretations of a statute’s unit of prosecution[, the courts]

should adopt the more lenient one.”            Appellant’s Brief at 19, citing

Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198, 221 (Pa. 2007) (“[The United

States] Supreme Court has explained that ‘[w]hen Congress leaves to the

Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity

should be resolved in favor of lenity.’”) (citation omitted). Second, the titles

of both Section 3301 (“Arson and related offenses”) and Subsection 3301(a)

(“Arson endangering persons”) suggest their primary focus, or key element,

is arson — and not endangerment.         Appellant’s Brief at 17.    Meanwhile,

“[c]rimes primarily focused on injury or danger to persons are defined

elsewhere” in the Crimes Code. Id. at 18, citing “18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501 et seq.”

Finally, although the arson endangering persons statute contains an element

of endangerment to “another” person, in the singular, “our legislature has

provided that singular words . . . subsume their plural coordinate terms[.]”

Appellant’s Brief at 16-17, citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1902 (“The singular shall include

the plural, and the plural, the singular.”).

      Furthermore, Appellant asserts the trial court failed to conduct any

“textual or other statutory analysis[,] but instead rejected [his] claim . . . on

the ground” that the arson endangering persons statute is unlike the statute

addressed in Satterfield — leaving the scene of an accident involving death

or personal injury.    Appellant’s Brief at 19.    While Appellant agrees the

Satterfield statute is distinguishable, he maintains that “it does not follow

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that Section 3301’s unit of prosecution is [an] endangerment.” Id. at 20.

Appellant contends that in Satterfield, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

concluded that a vehicle “accident was [the] key element, and [it was]

immaterial that additional elements gave rise to [higher] penalties.” Id.

      Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court’s reasoning, that it would be

absurd for a person to be charged with only one arson causing murder, under

18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(2),10 if more than one person died from an act of arson.

Appellant’s Brief at 21, citing Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Appellant reasons that in that

scenario, a defendant could be charged with one count of arson endangering

persons and multiple counts of murder. Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant

concludes this Court should vacate three of his arson endangering persons

sentences.

      The Commonwealth responds that the present sentencing issue is

governed by Frisbie, 485 A.2d 1098, which Appellant does not address on

appeal. In Frisbie, the defendant drove his car through a crowd injuring nine

pedestrians.   Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.        On appeal, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court upheld the imposition of separate sentences for nine counts of

REAP, reasoning that the REAP statute’s inclusion of the phrase, “another

10See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(2) (“A person who commits arson endangering
persons is guilty of murder of the second degree if the fire . . . causes the
death of any person . . . .”).

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person,” indicated “a separate offense is committed for each individual person

placed in danger.” Id. at 11, citing Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100.

      The Commonwealth further contends that Appellant’s reliance on the

title of Section 3301 is misplaced, as our Supreme Court has held the

“headings prefixed to titles, . . . sections and other divisions of a statute shall

not be considered to control.”          Commonwealth’s Brief at 14, citing

Commonwealth v. Magwood, 469 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 1983). We agree

with the trial court’s analysis and the Commonwealth’s discussion and

therefore conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                           IV. Pertinent Authority

      To resolve Appellant’s issue, we must determine what our General

Assembly fixed as the unit of prosecution for a violation of Section

3301(a)(1)(i), arson endangering persons. In Satterfield, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court explained:

      The unit of prosecution is the actus reus that the General
      Assembly intended to punish.         Put otherwise, the unit of
      prosecution is the minimum conduct that must be proven to obtain
      a conviction for the statute in question. Only a single conviction
      and resulting punishment may be imposed for a single unit of
      prosecution. As this Court has indicated, “[t]o determine the
      correct unit of prosecution, the inquiry should focus on whether
      separate and distinct prohibited acts . . . have been committed.”

Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 445-46 (citation omitted).

      This review involves statutory interpretation.      The Satterfield Court

further stated:

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      The best expression of legislative intent appears in the plain
      language of a statute. Words of a statute “shall be construed
      according to rules of grammar and according to their common and
      approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). “[W]hen the words of a
      statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no need to look
      beyond the plain meaning of the statute under the pretext of
      pursuing its spirit.”

Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 446 (some citations omitted).

      We consider our Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Frisbie.        In that

case, the defendant, while fleeing from police officers, “drove his car through

a crowded intersection and seriously injured nine pedestrians.” Frisbie, 485

A.2d at 1099.    He was convicted of, inter alia, nine counts of REAP and

received nine consecutive sentences for each count. Id.

      On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether the

multiple sentences for REAP, arising from the defendant’s single act that

affected multiple victims, violated the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1099.

The Court reviewed the language of the REAP statute:

      A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he
      recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
      person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

Id. at 1100, quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (emphasis in Frisbie). The Frisbie

Court emphasized the phrase, “another person,” and concluded that under the

“fair import” of its terms, Section 2705 “was written with regard to an

individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury[.]”

Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court found, “a

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separate offense is committed for each individual person placed in such

danger.” Id.

      In further support, the Court considered:

            Where the legislature has intended to preclude multiple
      punishments for multiple injuries resulting from a single act, it has
      expressly done so. For example, in § 2707 of the Crimes Code,
      the legislature made it a crime to “throw . . . a rock, stone, brick,
      . . . or any deadly or dangerous missile . . . into a vehicle . . . that
      is occupied by one or more persons . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2707
      (emphasis added). Similarly, § 2710 of the Crimes Code makes
      it a crime to commit an offense under any other provision of Article
      B (offenses involving danger to the person) “with malicious
      intention toward the race, color, religion or national origin of
      another individual or group of individuals.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 2710 (emphasis added).

          Had the legislature intended to preclude multiple
      punishments under § 2705, that section would read: “a person
      commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly
      engages in conduct which places or may place another person
      or persons in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”

Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100 (some citations omitted & paragraph break added).

The Court thus upheld the imposition of multiple sentences upon the

defendant. Id. at 1101.

      Next, we review the 2021 decision in Satterfield. The defendant, under

the influence of alcohol, crashed his tractor-trailer into numerous vehicles,

which were stopped. Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 439. The defendant then fled

from his vehicle. Id. “As a result of the crash, three people died and many

others were injured.” Id. The defendant entered open guilty pleas to, inter

alia, three counts of Pennsylvania’s so-called “hit-and-run” statute, or leaving

the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury. Id. at 440. Each

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count related to one of the three victims killed. Id. at 440-41. The trial court

imposed three consecutive sentences on these counts. Id. at 441.

      On appeal, our Supreme Court considered the defendant’s claim that

the imposition of separate sentences was illegal because he committed only a

single violation of Section 3742. Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 445. That statute

states, in pertinent part:

           (a) General rule.—The driver of any vehicle involved in an
      accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall
      immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as
      close thereto as possible . . . and in every event shall remain at
      the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirement of
      section 3744 (relating to duty to give information and render aid).
      ...

Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 446, quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a).

      The Satterfield Court reasoned that “Section 3742(a) plainly instructs

that a driver involved in an accident must ‘. . . remain at the scene of the

accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of 3744 (relating to duty to

give information and render aid).’” Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 447 (citation

omitted). In other words, “[a] driver who leaves the scene of the accident

prematurely[   ]   violates the statute.[ ]”     Id. at 447-48.   “Based upon this

statutory language, it is solely involvement in an accident that triggers the

obligation to stop and remain at the scene.” Id. at 448. Accordingly, the

Court held “the unit of prosecution is the act of leaving the scene of an accident

without first rendering aid and providing the information required by Section

3744.[ ]” Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted).              In other words, the unit of

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prosecution “does not depend upon the results of the accident, including the

number of victims or the severity of their injuries.” Id. at 448.

      Because the unit of prosecution is the act of leaving the scene of an

accident without rendering aid and providing information, the Satterfield

Court concluded the defendant violated the statute only once — as “[t]here

was only one accident scene at which [he] had a legal duty to remain[.]”

Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 449-50.        The Court thus vacated two of the

defendant’s three leaving the scene of an accident sentences, on the ground

they were illegal. Id. at 451.

                                 V. Analysis

      In its opinion, the trial court applied the “guidance” set forth in

Satterfield in order to determine a criminal statute’s unit of prosecution. Trial

Ct. Op. at 5. The court reviewed the language of Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i),

which provides:

           (1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he
      intentionally starts a fire or causes an explosion, or if he aids,
      counsels, pays or agrees to pay another to cause a fire or
      explosion, whether on his own property or on that of another, and
      if:

                (i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger
          of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a
          firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in
          fighting the fire[.]

Id. at 6, quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

      The trial court concluded this statute “is specifically focused on the

individual risk of death or serious bodily injury caused to” another person.

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Trial Ct. Op. at 6. It found the unit of prosecution is not merely an arson, but

instead “the commission of an arson that specifically recklessly places

another person in danger of death or bodily injury.” Id. (emphasis added).

It reasoned “the statute specifically requires proof of both an arson and that

an enumerated person be placed in danger of death or bodily injury from the

arson.” Id. at 7 (some emphasis omitted & emphasis added). Thus, the court

concluded, the proper interpretation of this statute permits separate

sentences for each victim endangered by a defendant’s conduct. Id.

      We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and, contrary to Appellant’s

argument, we conclude Section 3301(a)(1)(i) is unambiguous. First, applying

our statutory interpretation principles and the discussion in Satterfield, we

likewise conclude the General Assembly intended the unit of prosecution to be

the defendant’s commission of an arson coupled with their “recklessly

plac[ing] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]”        See 18

Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i); Satterfield, 255 A.3d at 447. The plain meaning of

the word, “and,” at the end of Subsection (1) requires the Commonwealth to

prove not only that a defendant “intentionally start[ed] a fire,” but also that

they “recklessly place[d] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]”

See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 285 A.3d 599,

605 (Pa. 2022) (“[W]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules

of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]”) (citation

omitted).

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     As to whether the statute contemplates placing a single person in

danger, or more than one person, we find Frisbie instructive.11 The REAP

statute at issue in that case and the pertinent arson endangering persons

subsection bear similarities. A person commits REAP when they “recklessly

engage[ ] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 (emphasis added). The

Frisbie Court emphasized the phrase, “another person” and, as discussed

above, construed this language to mean “that § 2705 was written with regard

to an individual person being placed in danger of death of serious bodily

injury, and that a separate offense is committed for reach individual person

placed in such danger.” Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100. Similarly, the definition

of arson endangering persons is the intentional starting of a fire “and” the

“recklessly plac[ing] another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.]”

See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Applying the rationale of

Frisbie, we conclude the phrase, “another person,” “was written with regard

to an individual person being placed in danger of death of serious bodily

injury,” and thus separate offenses are committed for each person placed in

such danger. Thus, separate sentences may be imposed. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3301(a)(1)(i); Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100.

11Although Appellant addressed Frisbie in the trial court proceedings, he
wholly ignores it on appeal. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.

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      To this end, we also disagree with Appellant’s reliance on 1 Pa.C.S. §

1902, which states:

      § 1902. Number; gender; tense.

      The singular shall include the plural, and the plural, the singular.
      Words used in the masculine gender shall include the feminine and
      neuter. Words used in the past or present tense shall include the
      future.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1902. Appellant does not address the discussion in Frisbie, that

“[w]here the legislature has intended to preclude multiple punishments for

multiple injuries resulting from a single act, it has expressly done so.” See

Frisbie, 485 A.2d at 1100, citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2707 (it is a crime to throw

a rock or any deadly or dangerous missile into a vehicle “that is occupied by

one or more persons”), 2710 (a person commits ethnic intimidation if they

commit an offense “with malicious intention toward the race, color, religion or

national origin of another individual or group of individuals”).

                               VI. Conclusion

      In sum, we conclude that under the plain language and meaning of

Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i), within the arson endangering persons statute, the

unit of prosecution is the intentional starting of a fire which recklessly places

another person in danger of death or bodily injury.          See 18 Pa.C.S. §

3301(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, a defendant may be convicted of and sentenced

separately on multiple counts if one act of arson causes more than one person

to be in danger of death or bodily injury. Applying this holding to the case

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sub judice, we affirm the separate sentences imposed on each of Appellant’s

four arson endangering persons convictions, and hold they are not illegal.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

     President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge Olson,

Judge Stabile, Judge Dubow, Judge Nichols and Judge McLaughlin join this

opinion.

     Judge Lazarus files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/23

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