Court Opinion

ID: 9737031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:30.102139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.070165
License: Public Domain

COUGHLIN, J.
Defendant and a codefendant Marguerite Anderson were charged with possession of marijuana for sale, viz., a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11530.5; were convicted by verdict of a jury; moved for a new trial, which was denied; and defendant alone appeals, contending the judgment should be reversed because (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict; (2) statements by the district attorney constituted prejudicial misconduct; and (3) the court erred in refusing an instruction requested by him.
The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict is determinable on appeal under the well-settled rule stated in People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778], as follows: “The court on appeal ‘will not attempt to determine the weight of the evidence, but will decide only whether upon *1062the face of the evidence it can be held that sufficient facts could not have been found by the jury to warrant the inference of guilt. For it is the function of the jury in the first instance, and of the trial court after verdict, to determine what facts are established by the evidence, and before the verdict of the jury which has been approved by the trial court, can be set aside on appeal upon the ground’ of insufficiency of the evidence, 'it must be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below. . . .’If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury.” In this regard the court said in People v. Redrick, 55 Cal.2d 282, 290 [10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255], a narcotics possession case: “The existence of possible exculpatory explanations, whether they are simply suggestions not excluded by the evidence or even where they could be reasonably deduced from the evidence, could not justify this court’s rejecting the determination of the trier of fact that defendant is guilty unless on appeal it ‘be made clearly to appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the conclusion reached in the court below. ’ ’ ’
On May 22, 1966, at 8 p.m., narcotics agents and police officers, with a warrant authorizing the search of a residence identified as 4364 “G” Street., in San Diego, and of the person of defendant, took a reconnaissance position near the residence; remained there for approximately two and one-half hours; shortly after 10 p.m. saw Marguerite Anderson leave the residence and walk in a westerly direction toward Market Street; within 5 or 10 minutes saw an automobile come west on “G” Street and park in front of the residence; saw a male and a female person get out of the automobile, the female appearing to be the same person who previously had left the residence and the male being a person of the same general description as the defendant; saw both of them enter the residence from which, shortly thereafter, the male person left, went to the car in which a third person was acting as driver, leaned inside, turned and walked back to the residence, opened the door and hollered “Lock the door,” then returned to the car and left. At about 10 :30 p.m. the officers left the area; returned at 1:15 a.m. on the following morning, i.e., *1063May 23d; and proceeded to execute the search warrant. One of the officers knocked on the door of the residence and “hollered very loudly, ‘Police Officers. Open up. We have a search warrant. ’ ”; received no response; about 30 seconds later again “beat rather heavily on the side of the door,” announced the presence of the officers and their possession of a search warrant; then heard sounds inside of “rapid movement”; and thereupon, together with the other officers, forced his way into the house. Defendant and Marguerite Anderson were in a “TV room.” The former, standing by a chair, was clothed but did not have on shoes. The latter was lying on a couch, awake, and was wearing a robe and covered by a blanket. Also in the house were her five children.
Upon searching the house, the officers found in the ‘ ‘ TV room” a single marijuana seed on the floor near the place where defendant had been standing; a waxed sandwich bag containing marijuana, in the pocket of a woman’s sweater in a closet adjoining the bedroom; a purse containing 'marijuana debris; a pair of man’s shoes, and a man’s suit with a cleaning tag attached bearing the notation: “J. Haynes, 5/16/66, 4364 ‘G’ Street,” in the same closet; on top of a dresser in the bedroom an empty package of Zig-Zag papers; and in the kitchen, unused waxed sandwich bags similar to the one found in the woman’s sweater.
In searching under the house the officers found 37 waxed paper bags containing marijuana; two kilo bricks of marijuana worth approximately $1,100; brown paper bags, one of which contained a Safeway shopping receipt dated May 19, 1966; blue cellophane paper; and green wrapping paper upon which was a sticky substance. The waxed paper bags of marijuana were found near the crawl hole used as an entryway under the house. The bags were similar to the waxed sandwich bags found in the kitchen. Marijuana is packaged in this manner for sale. The kilo bricks were found at a place more distant from the entryway. Near them was the green wrapping paper containing a sticky substance. When marijuana is wrapped for sale, a substance, ordinarily of a sticky nature, is rubbed on the paper to “kill” the marijuana odor.
Defendant had $109 in his possession; was wearing a new pair of pants, which he had purchased about a week before for $19; and said he was unemployed. Traces of marijuana were found in the two pockets of his shirt; in the two front pockets of his pants; and also in the two rear pockets of his pants. A *1064package of Zig-Zag papers was found in the left rear pocket of his pants.
To establish possession of narcotics it must be shown the defendant exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and narcotic character. (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 285.) Substantial proof of these elements may be supplied by circumstantial evidence alone; does not require a showing of exclusive or physical possession; and may be established by an inferential showing of joint and constructive possession. (People v. White, 50 Cal. 2d 428, 431 [325 P.2d 985]; People v. Roberts, 228 Cal.App.2d 722, 726-727 [39 Cal.Rptr. 843].) Factors supporting an inference of joint and constructive possession are joint occupancy of premises where the narcotic is located (People v. Poe, 164 Cal.App.2d 514, 516 [330 P.2d 681]; People v. MacArthur, 126 Cal.App.2d 232, 236 [271 P.2d 914]; People v. Williams, 121 Cal.App.2d 679, 681 [263 P.2d 853]); recent association with the narcotic by use or otherwise, which may be inferred from the presence of narcotic debris in the clothing of the accused (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 287; People v. Rogers, 207 Cal.App.2d 261, 268 [24 Cal.Rptr. 341]; People v. Allen, 196 Cal.App.2d. 655, 660 [16 Cal.Rptr. 869]; People v. Anders, 167 Cal.App.2d 65. 67. 68 [333 P.2d 854]; People v. Robarge, 151 Cal.App.2d 660, 668 [312 P.2d 70]); knowledge of the presence of the narcotic on the premises, which likewise may be inferred from the presence of narcotic debris in the clothing of an accused who jointly occupied the premises where the narcotic was located (People v. Anders, supra, 167 Cal.App.2d 65. 67. 68; gen. see People v. Cahill, 163 Cal.App.2d 15, 18. 20-21 [328 P.2d 995]); circumstances indicating the accused may have been engaged in the sale of narcotics, such as the unexplained possession of a substantial amount of money by an unemployed person (People v. Magdaleno, 158 Cal.App.2d 48, 52 [322 P.2d 89]); and conduct evidencing a guilty conscience. (People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 287, 288; People v. Roberts, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d 722, 729; People v. Magdaleno, supra, 158 Cal. App.2d 48, 52; see also People v. Ortiz, 185 Cal.App.2d 622, 624 [8 Cal.Rptr. 494].)
The evidence in the case at bench supports reasonably dedueible inferences that the defendant, with his codefendant Marguerite Anderson, jointly occupied the premises where the marijuana was found; had knowledge of the presence of that *1065marijuana and its narcotic character; had access thereto; and had joint control thereof.
It may be inferred the name and address appearing on the cleaning slip attached to the suit in the closet was given the cleaning establishment by defendant; that this address identified the place where he resided; that he was present on the night in question as a joint occupant of the premises with his codefendant; and that he was not a mere visitor. Corroborating this conclusion is the fact, inferentially supported by the evidence that he had removed his shoes and placed them in the closet. Although the defense successfully blocked the introduction in evidence of statements made by the defendant t<s the officers respecting the ownership of the shoes and the suit in the closet, it may be inferred they belonged to him. The tag on the suit bore his name; there was no evidence of any other man’s shoes in the house; and and the defendant was not wearing shoes.
The fact Zig-Zag papers, which are used to make marijuana cigarettes, and marijuana debris were found in defendant’s pockets, supports the conclusion he was a marijuana user. It is significant the debris was found not just in one pocket but in all of the pockets of his shirt and pants. This fact, together with the fact he was unemployed but had in his possession $109 and recently had purchased a pair of pants costing $19, together with the fact inferentially supported by the evidence that on the night in question he was contacted by Marguerite Anderson, accompanied her to the residence and then left in an automobile driven by a third person, after which he returned to the residence, support the conclusion he was trafficking in marijuana; and was using the residence at 4364 “G” Street as a base of operations. Reasonably deducible from the evidence is the inference the marijuana debris in defendant’s pockets came from packages of marijuana he had delivered, or from the handling of bulk marijuana in the process of packaging.
The evidence also supports the inference defendant heard the announcement of the officers before entry; refused to open the door as requested; and engaged in some movement indicative of an effort to hide or destroy evidence. This incident supports an inference of a consciousness of guilt. (Cf. People v. Hood, 150 Cal.App.2d 197, 201 [309 P.2d 856].)
In People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 287, the court said: “As might be expected, no sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts which will and that which *1066. will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the presence of a narcotic in a place to which he had access, but not exclusive access, and over which he had some control, but not exclusive control. ’ ’
Cases involving a consideration of factors present in the ease at bench, although not parallel in all details, which furnish precedent for the conclusion the evidence under review supports the verdict, in addition to those heretofore cited, are People v. Hamilton, 223 Cal.App.2d 542, 544 [85 Cal.Rptr. 812]—where the accused claimed he was only a visitor at the premises where the narcotic was found, People v. Dominguez, 191 Cal.App.2d 704, 705-707 [12 Cal.Rptr. 910], People v. Hurst, 183 Cal.App.2d 379, 387 [6 Cal.Rptr. 483]—where the narcotics were found under a house occupied by defendant, and People v. Bretado, 178 Cal.App.2d 465, 468-469 [3 Cal.Rptr. 216], People v. Bassett, 68 Cal.App.2d 241, 247 [156 P.2d 457]—where the narcotics were found in an adjoining light well.
Defendant relies upon the rule that mere presence in or mere opportunity of access to the place where marijuana is found is not sufficient to prove possession. (See People v. Redrick, supra, 55 Cal.2d 282, 285; People v. Roberts, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d 722, 727-729.) However, the ease at bench is not one of “mere presence” or “mere opportunity of access”; additional factors exist.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we are required to do, it adequately supports the verdict.
In the course of an opening statement preliminary to the introduction of evidence, the district attorney said: “At some point during the course of the trial the testimony will show that Mr. Haynes and Miss Anderson have had several children together, just to show their relationship between the two defendants. ’ ’ The prosecution rested its case without any offer of proof respecting this matter. The defendants rested without introducing any evidence. Defendants did not object to the statement of the district attorney at the time it was made, but through their counsel did refer to it in their arguments to the jury, asserting. lack of any proof upon the subject showed the purpose of the district attorney in making the statement was to prejudice the jury against them. This was an effort to capitalize upon the failure of the prosecution to prove its assertion. No request was made for an instruction to the .jury to disregard the remark of the district attorney in *1067considering the case. The fact, if it were a fact, defendant and Anderson “had several children together” would have been relevant to the issue of the relationship between them, the occupancy of the premises, and defendant’s participation in the offense with which he was charged. Absent proof of bad faith, the failure to introduce evidence in support of a relevant fact asserted to be such by the district attorney in his opening statement is not misconduct. (People v. Cooley, 211 Cal.App.2d 173, 215-216 [27 Cal.Rptr. 543].) On their motion for new trial the defendant and codefendant asserted the action of the district attorney in the premises constituted prejudicial misconduct.. The trial court found there was no prejudice or bad faith, and denied the motions. These findings are supported by the record. It would appear to have been the hope of the district attorney to solicit “the testimony” to which he referred through cross-examination of the defendants. Any error in assuming they would testify was one of judgment and not bad faith.
When the defendants rested without offering any evidence, the district attorney indicated his surprise, and at his request a recess was taken to permit a discussion with the court regarding instructions. Upon resumption of the trial the district attorney proceeded with his opening argument in this manner: “Well, this is the time when the prosecution has the opportunity whether they are, shall we say, prepared for it or not, in summing up as to what we think the evidence in this case has shown. In this matter of preparation let me say that, of course, the case has been somewhat shorter than perhaps I anticipated because we had no testimonial evidence as far as the defendant is concerned. But remember, of course, the defendants do not have to take the stand in their own behalf. It is up to the prosecution to prove their case to you.” Thé defendant contends the aforesaid statement constituted a comment upon failure of the defendants to testify in their own behalf, violative of the rule stated in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229],  The reference of the district attorney to the fact the defendants did not testify must be considered in relation to his offered excuse for lack of preparation and readiness to proceed with the argument. No misconduct occurred.
Defendant requested, and the court refused to give, an instruction to the effect a conviction could not be based upon possession of marijuana debris alone, based on the principles stated in People v. Leal, 64 Cal.2d 504 [50 Cal.Rptr. *1068777, 413 P.2d 665], and People v. McCarthy, 64 Cal.2d 513 [50 Cal.Rptr. 783, 413 P.2d 671], The court adequately covered the subject in other instructions. No error occurred in the refusal.
The judgment is affirmed.
Brown (Gerald), P. J., concurred.