Court Opinion

ID: 9581349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:04.189772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:53.050819
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of robbery by intimidation and criminal trespass.
1. Appellant was identified by the victim as one of two men to whom he gave a ride in his truck. There was testimony that appellant robbed the victim of his wallet and cut him with a sharp object. After struggling with his assailants, the victim escaped from the truck and saw appellant and his co-defendant smash the windows of the vehicle. The victim returned to the truck after his passengers departed.
In his contention concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, appellant centers on the sufficiency of the proof that venue was in Bar-tow County. The victim testified the attack on him and his truck took place in Bartow County, while appellant presented evidence that the incident occurred in Whitfield County. “When the evidence as to venue is conflicting, the State must prove venue as a jurisdictional fact beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cits.]” Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237 (2) (282 SE2d 305) (1981). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that venue was in Bar-tow County. See Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 862 (3) (302 SE2d 347) (1983); Miller v. State, 174 Ga. App. 42 (2) (329 SE2d 252) (1985).
2. Upon his arrest, appellant admitted being in the victim’s truck and smashing the windows, and also made reference to his status as a parolee. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the reference in appellant’s statement to his parolee status was inadmissible. Despite the trial court’s ruling, the investigating officer mentioned the portion of appellant’s in-custody statement ruled inadmissible. Appellant contends error was committed when his motion for mistrial was denied.
As soon as the testimony was spoken, the trial court, sua sponte, *506instructed the jury to “absolutely disregard” the offending testimony and questioned the jurors on their ability to disregard the testimony. No negative response was elicited from any juror. At that point, appellant moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion, and admonished the assistant district attorney. “ ‘Where a motion for mistrial is made on the ground of inadmissible evidence illegally placed before the jury, the corrective measure to be taken by the trial court is largely a matter of discretion, and where proper corrective measures are taken and there is no abuse of that discretion, the refusal to grant a mistrial is not error. [Cit.]’ ” Stansifer v. State, 166 Ga. App. 785 (2) (305 SE2d 481) (1983). See also Waddell v. State, 160 Ga. App. 743 (3) (288 SE2d 90) (1981). In light of the trial court’s prompt and thorough corrective action and in the absence of a remark “so flagrantly prejudicial as to violate appellant’s right to a fair trial,” (Waddell v. State, supra), we find no abuse of discretion and therefore, no error in the denial of the motion for mistrial.
3. During his struggle with appellant, the victim recovered a wallet he thought to be his from the truck’s floorboard. Upon examining it later, he ascertained the wallet belonged to appellant since he found appellant’s birth certificate and parole grid sheet in the wallet. Appellant sees error in the trial court’s admission of the grid sheet into evidence, contending it improperly injected appellant’s character into the trial.
The admission of the grid sheet connected appellant to the scene of the crime and identified him as one of the victim’s assailants. In a similar case, this court held that “ ‘[mjaterial evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely because it incidentally places a defendant’s character in issue. [Cits.]’ ” Bethea v. State, 172 Ga. App. 598 (324 SE2d 202) (1984). The dissent is mistaken in its statement that “the trial court had specifically held that the parolee status sought to be introduced was highly prejudicial.” In fact, the trial court ruled inadmissible only that portion of appellant’s in-custody statement in which he admitted that he was a parolee. The trial court clarified its ruling when faced with a challenge to the admission of testimony that the investigating officer met appellant at the probation office.
4. Appellant also takes issue with the trial court’s acquiescence in the jury’s request that they rehear the testimony of the investigating officer “specifically as to what, if anything, was said in the way of a statement by way of the defendants to the officer ...” “Whether or not to grant the jury’s request to rehear portions of the evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge. [Cits.]” Morris v. State, 254 Ga. 273 (2) (328 SE2d 547) (1985). On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show that “special circumstances which might work an injustice” were present, making the trial court’s decision to replay the testimony an abuse of discretion. Wilkerson v. State, 165 Ga. App. 14 *507(299 SE2d 67) (1983). In the case at bar, appellant contends the special circumstance present was the fact that the testimony requested to be replayed contained the inadmissible evidence discussed in Division 2, supra. The record reflects that the officer’s testimony was read back to the jury. If we assume that the stricken testimony was not read, appellant was not harmed by the replay. If we assume that the replay included the inadmissible reference to appellant’s statement that he was a parolee, we must also assume that the replay included the corrective action taken by the trial court. Thus, whether or not the replay included the inadmissible testimony, appellant was not done an injustice requiring reversal. Wilkerson v. State, supra. See also Akers v. State, 179 Ga. App. 529 (3) (346 SE2d 861) (1986).

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Parley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.