Court Opinion

ID: 9491262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:08:44.558298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:37.330505
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join all but footnote six of the majority opinion, which holds that we need not address the Keatings’ sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument because jeopardy has not yet terminated. We review sufficiency claims all the time on direct appeal, even though jeopardy has not terminated. See, e.g., United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Tubiolo, 134 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Tucker, 133 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1998). If the majority were right, sufficiency claims could only be raised on collateral review; that has never been the law.
The majority errs by equating double jeopardy claims with sufficiency claims. Double jeopardy claims are sometimes based on a determination that the government presented insufficient evidence in a prior trial, see Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), but the two claims are certainly not identical. Insufficiency can’t be raised on interlocutory appeal; double jeopardy can. United States v. Gutierrez-Zamarano, 23 F.3d 235, 238 (9th Cir.1994), a double jeopardy case, therefore does *905not apply here. Our case is governed by United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1984), which held that we must reach a sufficiency claim on direct appeal even if there are other grounds for reversal.
The only way this case differs from Bibbe-ro is that this is not a direct appeal; it is an interlocutory appeal brought by the government. But this can’t be held against the Keatings, who challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in their direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. We chose to postpone their claim and remand the case for factual exploration of the jury misconduct issue. By so doing we did not-could not under Bibbero-cut off defendants’ right to have their sufficiency claim ruled upon. Indeed, our order makes it clear that we were merely postponing (not rejecting or bypassing) defendants’ other claims, including sufficiency: “In the event of a further appeal, we will reinstate defendants’ remaining contentions in this appeal and dispose of them at that time.” That time is here. We are bound to do as we promised, as our caselaw requires us to.
I therefore reach the Keatings’ sufficiency claim. While the government’s proof was not overwhelming, a rational jury could have convicted based on the evidence-if only just barely. Thus, I agree that we must remand for retrial.