Court Opinion

ID: 9748270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:58:35.189731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:33.881657
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority in this case correctly finds that there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction on one charge of arson and three counts of second degree murder. However, they have seized on a brief exchange which occurred during the trial, branded it prosecutorial misconduct, and vacated the judgment of sentence. With this latter decision I cannot agree.
*101As set out in the majority opinion, the exchange occurred between the assistant district attorney and a police detective, and went as follows:
Q. Now, Detective DiPaolo, on October the 2nd, 1979, while you were present in this conversation with the defendant and in the presence of Assistant District Attorney Shad Connelly, did the defendant direct a question to Mr. Connelly in your presence?
A. Yes, sir, he did.
Q. What was the question?
A. The defendant asked him at this time, what did he think about this case.
Q. And in your presence and hearing did the Assistant District Attorney Connelly respond?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was his response?
A. He said, ‘Yes, I think you did it.’
However, in quoting the above language the majority failed to include the next two lines, which read:
Q. What did the defendant respond to Assistant District Attorney Connelly?
A. He told him he was a f_____g toad just like us.
The prosecutor, contrary to the majority’s statement in footnote 2, did indeed assert a rationale for admitting the statement: to show that the appellant’s cooperative stance with the police was really a facade to hide his involvement in the crime, and that, when confronted with the fact that the police and district attorney were not accepting his position, his real attitude surfaced.
There is no question that it is improper for a prosecutor to interject his own personal view as to a defendant’s guilt. Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 380, 387, 416 A.2d 986, 989 (1980). But the inquiry does not end there. Such a statement does not inalterably lead to a new trial. “[E]ven when the language is intemperate, uncalled for and improper, a new trial is not necessarily required.” Common*102wealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 61, 337 A.2d 873, 882 (1975); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 496 Pa. 546, 554, 437 A.2d 1175, 1178 (1981); Commonwealth v. Beavers, 492 Pa. 522, 527, 424 A.2d 1313, 1316 (1981); Commonwealth v. Burton, 491 Pa. 13, 22, 417 A.2d 611, 615 (1980); Commonwealth v. Crittenton, 326 Pa. 25, 31, 191 A. 358 (1937).
The standard for ordering a new trial in a case where a prosecutor’s statement is improper was recently set out in Commonwealth v. Upsher, 497 Pa. 621, 444 A.2d 90 (1982). There, we said that, while a prosecutor’s statement might be improper, a new trial is not called for unless it is inevitable that the prosecutor’s conduct prejudices the defendant to such a degree that it disables the jury from weighing the evidence and rendering a true verdict. 497 Pa. at 627, 444 A.2d at 93. Furthermore, “The prejudicial effect of the district attorney’s remarks must be evaluated in the context in which they occurred.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 380, 388, 416 A.2d 986, 989 (1980); see also, Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 485 Pa. 542, 555, 403 A.2d 521, 528 (1979); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 134, 373 A.2d 1076, 1085 (1977).
Looking at this brief exchange in the context of the trial as a whole we note that: the statement came in during a four-day trial in which nineteen witnesses testified; the prosecutor did not persist in the challenged line of questioning; and he did not argue the content of the answer in his summation. Such a minor exchange can hardly be said to have robbed the jurors of their role in determining guilt or innocence.
The majority also suggests that the effect of the statement had a greater likelihood of prejudice since it came in as evidence, rather than in oral argument, where this issue typically arises. This reasoning simply ignores the reality of trial procedure and the way this exchange entered this case. Closing argument, along with the jury charge, are the last matters presented to jurors and thus statements contained in a closing argument are more likely to be fresh in the jurors’ minds as they walk into the jury room. The *103possibility that this brief exchange had a prejudicial effect on the jury is slight. In the context of the entire trial, it is absurd to find that the statement constituted reversible error.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of sentence against the appellant.