Court Opinion

ID: 9898126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:38.558036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:53.161188
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                        October 24, 2023
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                               No. 55855-6-II

                         Respondent,

           v.
                                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 JUSTIN WILLIAM HAMMONS,

                         Appellant.

          PRICE, J. — Justin W. Hammons appeals his sentence imposed following his guilty plea

to two counts of first degree rape of a child and one count of third degree assault of a child. We

affirm.

                                             FACTS

          On May 3, 2013, Hammons pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree rape of a child

(counts I and II) and one count of third degree assault of a child (count III). Hammons was 16

years old when he committed count II, and he was 18 years old when he committed counts I

and III. The charges were based on the repeated sexual abuse of Hammons’ three younger cousins

over the course of several years. One of the victims was between 6 and 8 years old during the

period Hammons vaginally and anally raped her repeatedly. Another victim was raped over 100

times when he was 6 to 9 years old. The third victim was raped by forced oral copulation with

Hammons repeatedly when she was 8 years old. As part of the plea agreement, the State intended
No. 55855-6-II

to argue for standard range sentences, but Hammons was free to argue for a Special Sex Offender

Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA).1

        At sentencing, Hammons argued for imposition of a SSOSA based on the fact that

Hammons was very young at the time of most of the offending behavior and he had an evaluation

determining that he was amenable to a SSOSA. Hammons argued, “I think it’s a critical factor

that the [c]ourt needs to take into account and that most or all of the offending took place between

the ages of 13 and 16 when he was a juvenile.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Aug. 23, 2023) at

13. Hammons argued this youthfulness made him more amenable to a SSOSA and less likely to

reoffend after completion of the SSOSA. Hammons further argued a SSOSA was supported by

the fact that Hammons was genuinely remorseful for his conduct and his offending was not

predatory but rather opportunistic and incestuous. Hammons also directly addressed the court:

        I very much appreciate the opportunity you’ve given me today to apologize to not
        only the community and to my family but especially to the victims.

        First and foremost, I truly regret what I did and the choices I’ve made in the past,
        not because I’m in here or because you think I should, but for the reason that now
        the victims and I have to live the rest of our lives with what I have done and that is
        punishment in itself. Again, I am truly very sorry for all my actions, and I take one
        hundred percent responsibility for everything that occurred.

        I know nothing excuses the poor choices I have made in the past, but since then I
        have learned my lesson and made many right choices in favor of the community to
        help the less fortunate. Some of the positive choices I have made include
        volunteering as a Puyallup police explorer as well as at the Eatonville food bank to
        help serve the needy and homeless. I also volunteered at a retirement home to help
        others clean and take care of his or her living quarters. I’ve done all this while
        working full-time jobs to support myself. Again, I know nothing at all excuses the
        awful choices I have made, but since then I have learned my lesson and made many
        positive choices not only to change lives and help others but also better the
        community.

1
    RCW 9.94A.670.

                                                  2
No. 55855-6-II

       Finally, I would like to ask you for the opportunity to be released on the SSOSA
       program with my promise to you that I will never again harm another individual at
       all and that I will successfully complete the necessary treatment and supervision
       requirements needed while knowing that if I fail to comply just once with your
       orders, I will be sentenced to ten or more years in prison. Your Honor, I give my
       word to you today, after serving over 13 months, and getting back into the loving
       care of my family and friends, that I would cherish the opportunity to reestablish
       myself back into the community. I will dedicate myself and do everything possible
       to prove to you that you made the correct decision by releasing me on the SSOSA
       program and letting me rejoin the community as a working, positive member of
       society.

VRP (Aug. 23, 2023) at 20-21.

       The State objected to the SSOSA, noting that Hammons had abused the victims for a longer

period of time than he had currently served in custody.

       The superior court denied Hammons request for a SSOSA. Hammons was sentenced on

count I, committed as an adult, to an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of 171 months

and a maximum term of life. Hammons was sentenced to determinate sentences of 171 months on

count II, committed as a juvenile, and 12 months on count III, committed as an adult, to run

concurrently with his sentence on count I. All of Hammons sentences were high-end standard

range sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW.

       In May 2021, roughly eight years later, Hammons filed a notice of appeal. On July 12,

2021, a commissioner of this court granted Hammons’ motion to file a late notice of appeal.2 Later,

Hammons’ appeal was stayed pending several Supreme Court decisions. The stay was lifted on

2
  The State suggests Hammons obtained permission to file his late appeal by misrepresenting the
record. However, the State did not file a motion to modify the commissioner’s ruling allowing
Hammons to file the late appeal within 30 days of the ruling. RAP 17.7(a). Accordingly, we do
not address the propriety of allowing Hammons’ late notice of appeal.

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No. 55855-6-II

January 13, 2023. After the stay was lifted, the State filed its response, and Hammons filed his

reply.

                                            ANALYSIS

         In Hammons’ opening brief, he made two arguments. First, he argued that the superior

court erred by supposedly imposing an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of life on count

II, the juvenile count, alleging that the superior court failed to appreciate its discretion to impose

a determinate sentence. And, second, he argued that same discretion to impose a determinate

sentence should be extended to his adult count I because, although he was not a juvenile for count

I, he was a late-adolescent, youthful offender.

         In his post-stay reply brief, Hammons conceded these two arguments fail both factually

and legally. As to count II, Hammons was factually incorrect; the superior court did actually

impose a determinate sentence of 171 months, under RCW 9.94A.507(2), not an indeterminate

sentence. Further, as for count I, developing case law foreclosed his argument. Our Supreme

Court held in In re Personal Restraint of Forcha-Williams, decided after Hammons’ opening brief,

that superior courts lack the discretion to convert an indeterminate sentence to a determinate one

or to reduce the statutory maximum of an indeterminate sentence, even when sentencing juveniles.

200 Wn.2d 581, 597-98, 520 P.3d 939 (2022). Because Hammons was a young adult, not even a

juvenile, for count I, the Forcha-Williams decision ends any legal basis for Hammons’ initial

argument. Accordingly, the two arguments raised in Hammons’ opening brief necessarily fail.

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No. 55855-6-II

         Despite the failure of his original arguments, Hammons contends, in his reply brief, that

his sentence on count II is still unconstitutional based on the sentencing court’s failure to comply

with State v. Houston-Sconiers.3

         Houston-Sconiers established both a substantive rule and a procedural rule. In re Pers.

Restraint of Hinton, 1 Wn.3d 317, 328-29, 525 P.3d 156 (2023). Under Houston-Sconiers’

substantive rule, “courts may not impose ‘certain adult sentences . . . on juveniles who possess

such diminished culpability that the adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements would be

disproportionate punishment.” Hinton, 1 Wn.3d at 328-29 (alteration in original) (quoting In re

Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 239, 474 P.3d 507 (2020)). Houston-Sconiers’ procedural

rule “ ‘established a mechanism necessary to effectuate that substantive rule: sentencing courts

must consider the mitigating qualities of youth and have discretion to impose sentences below

what the SRA mandates.’ ” Id. at 329 (quoting Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 237). Only Houston-Sconiers’

substantive rule applies retroactively. Id. at 330-31.

         Because Hammons’ sentencing occurred before Houston-Sconiers was decided, only the

retroactive aspect of the decision—the substantive rule—applies to his sentence on count II. Here,

Hammons received a standard range SRA sentence on count II. However, there is nothing

establishing that Hammons possessed such diminished culpability that his sentence was

disproportionate to his culpability. See State v. Barry, 183 Wn.2d 297, 317, 352 P.3d 161 (2015)

(“The party presenting an issue for review has the burden of providing an adequate record to

establish error.”). In fact, Hammons specifically requested a SSOSA based in part on his youth

3
    188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

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No. 55855-6-II

during most of the criminal behavior, and the superior court rejected this argument. Further, the

sentence resulted from his agreement to a plea deal that reduced multiple years of abuse against

three separate victims to merely three convictions, which undermines any argument that Hammons

sentence on count II is disproportionate to his culpability.

          Accordingly, Hammons cannot show that his sentence on count II violates Houston-

Sconiers’ substantive rule. Because Hammons cannot make this showing, there is no error. We

affirm.

          A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                      PRICE, J.
 We concur:

 VELJACIC, P.J.

 CHE, J.

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