Court Opinion

ID: 9958132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 12:01:53.611802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.525384
License: Public Domain

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                           James P. v. Commissioner of Correction

             JAMES P. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION*
                             (AC 46227)
                                Cradle, Seeley and Norcott, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes pursuant to a
            plea agreement reached in accordance with State v. Garvin (242 Conn.
            296), sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel
            rendered ineffective assistance. In accordance with the Garvin agree-
            ment, the trial court agreed to a specific sentence for the petitioner as
            long as the petitioner, inter alia, was not arrested for any offense for
            which a court made a finding of probable cause while awaiting sentenc-
            ing. If there was a violation of the agreement, the petitioner would no
            longer be entitled to the agreed upon sentence and would face a longer
            period of incarceration. Before the petitioner was sentenced, he was
            arrested on subsequent charges. The sentencing court found a Garvin
            violation as a result and sentenced him accordingly. Before the habeas
            court, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel performed deficiently
            by improperly advising him with respect to whether the sentencing court
            could deviate from the plea agreement, providing him with unrealistic
            expectations as to the sentence he would face, and that he was preju-
            diced by this advice because he would not have accepted the plea deal
            but for his counsel’s deficient performance. After a trial, the habeas
            court rendered judgment denying the petition, and the petitioner, on
            the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas
            court properly denied the operative petition as to the petitioner’s claim
            of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel: the petitioner failed to
            prove that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance of
            his trial counsel in advising him of the remote possibility that the trial
            court could deviate from the plea agreement at the time of sentencing,
            as the trial court’s swift response when this notion was raised by trial
            counsel made it clear that there was no real possibility of that outcome,
            and the petitioner’s bald assertion in his appellate brief that there was
            a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s improper advice, he
            would have rejected the plea agreement and proceeded to trial, without
            more, was insufficient to establish that the petitioner was prejudiced
            by his trial counsel’s performance; moreover, the plea canvass conducted

           * In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
         amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
         Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
         protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
         order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
         whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
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                        James P. v. Commisioner of Correction
          by the trial court established that the petitioner understood the sentenc-
          ing possibilities and made the strategic decision to plead guilty to ensure
          that he would receive a shorter period of incarceration and to avoid
          the risk of being exposed to the maximum possible sentence for the
          charges if he went to trial; furthermore, the petitioner failed to present
          any credible evidence at the habeas trial that he would have gone to
          trial but for trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in inducing
          him to plead guilty.
                 Argued January 16—officially released April 9, 2024

                                  Procedural History

         Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
       brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
       Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
       denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
       granting of certification, appealed to this court.
       Affirmed.
         Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
       lant (petitioner).
          Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with
       whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state’s
       attorney, and Christopher A. Alexy, senior assistant
       state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                                        Opinion

          SEELEY, J. Following the granting of his petition for
       certification to appeal, the petitioner, James P., appeals
       from the judgment of the habeas court denying his
       second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
       in which he alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of
       his criminal trial counsel, Douglas Ovian. On appeal, the
       petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes
       pursuant to a guilty plea, claims that (1) his trial counsel
       performed deficiently by informing him that it was pos-
       sible for the sentencing court to reject the plea agree-
       ment if the court determined that the agreed upon sen-
       tence was too high and (2) he was prejudiced by his
       trial counsel’s deficient performance. We disagree with
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                           James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

         the petitioner’s second claim and, accordingly, affirm
         the judgment of the habeas court.
            The following facts, as set forth in the record and by
         the habeas court in its memorandum of decision, and
         procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In June,
         2015, the petitioner was arrested for assaulting his
         elderly mother in the parking lot of a grocery store and
         charged with various crimes (2015 case).1 On March 10,
         2016, pursuant to a plea agreement reached in accor-
         dance with State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 300–302,
         699 A.2d 921 (1997),2 the petitioner appeared before the
         trial court and pleaded guilty in the 2015 case to charges
         of assault of an elderly person in the third degree and
         criminal violation of a protective order, and to a part
         B information charging him with being a persistent
         offender to crimes involving assault pursuant to General
         Statutes § 53a-40d. In accordance with the Garvin
         agreement, the court agreed to sentence the petitioner
         to a total effective sentence of seven years to serve,
         execution suspended after three years, of which one
             1
              The state initially charged the petitioner with breach of the peace in the
         second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181, assault of an elderly
         person in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61a (a),
         and criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes
         § 53a-223.
            2
              ‘‘A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement. . . . Typically,
         a defendant who enters into a Garvin agreement agrees to a particular
         sentence of incarceration, but wishes to be at liberty pending sentencing.
         Thus, the court will release the defendant on bond prior to sentencing and,
         in exchange, the defendant agrees to abide by certain conditions. Oftentimes,
         those conditions include a requirement that the defendant appear at the
         sentencing hearing and refrain from being arrested. If the defendant violates
         a condition of the Garvin agreement, the court may impose a longer sentence
         than that to which the defendant originally agreed.’’ (Citation omitted.) State
         v. Hudson, 182 Conn. App. 833, 835 n.4, 191 A.3d 1032 (2013). ‘‘A Garvin
         agreement . . . has two possible binding outcomes, one that results from
         the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the plea agreement and
         one that is triggered by his violation of a condition of the agreement.’’
         (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hurdle, 217 Conn. App. 453,
         456 n.3, 288 A.3d 675, cert. granted, 346 Conn. 923, 295 A.3d 420 (2023).
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                    James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

       year was mandatory, followed by five years of proba-
       tion, with the right to argue down to a sentence of seven
       years to serve, execution suspended after the one year
       mandatory minimum, followed by five years of proba-
       tion, so long as he (1) appeared in court and was sober
       for sentencing and (2) was not arrested while out on
       bond for any offense for which a court made a finding
       of probable cause between the dates of his guilty plea
       and his sentencing. The court advised the petitioner that
       if he violated any condition of the Garvin agreement,
       he would no longer be entitled to the agreed upon
       sentence and that, instead, he would ‘‘face . . . fifteen
       years and six months because the state’s not going to
       nolle the breach of peace [charge].’’ The petitioner
       stated that he understood the terms of the Garvin plea
       agreement.
         During the court’s thorough plea canvass, the follow-
       ing colloquy transpired:
         ‘‘The Court: All right. Any reason for the pleas not
       to be accepted?
         ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.
          ‘‘[Trial Counsel]: None, Your Honor. Except, I would
       just indicate that, although it’s maybe not common for
       it to happen, just as it’s possible for a court to decide
       not to abide by the agreement and allow a [withdrawal]
       of the plea because the court’s going to exceed the
       agreement, it’s also possible that the court can choose
       to allow the state to withdraw from the agreement
       because of a decision to undercut the agreement. So,
       I just wanted to make sure that the court was willing
       to include that concept in the canvass, as well.
         ‘‘The Court: The idea that, if the state reads the pre-
       sentence investigation [report], [it] might reach out to
       the defense and, say, let’s modify the agreement, based
       on what [it] read.
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                          James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

           ‘‘[Trial Counsel]: Or, that the court might encourage
         that in the same way that it could choose after reading
         and hearing everything to exceed it. So—
            ‘‘The Court: It’s possible. I’ve never done it. Frankly,
         I don’t think it’s quite fair to everybody . . . without
         notice to start changing offers.
            ‘‘[Trial Counsel]: I understand, Your Honor. I . . .
         will just say that typically when I describe . . . the
         plea agreement involving a [presentence investigation
         report], I made that reference that it’s not without—
         beyond the realm of possibility for it to go the other
         way, since I’ve seen it. But I’m glad the court has said
         it hasn’t seen it in its own work.
            ‘‘The Court: I have not—I have not done it. And I’m
         trying to search my memory for an incidence where it
         happened without the parties coming to the judge and
         suggesting it.
             ‘‘[Trial Counsel]: I see . . .
           ‘‘The Court: My point is, don’t count on it. You
         shouldn’t—you shouldn’t hang your hopes on that
         would be happening. And I see [the prosecutor] shaking
         her head in the negative at the possibility. Is that correct,
         counsel?
             ‘‘[The Prosecutor]: That’s correct.
           ‘‘The Court: Anything can happen, but you shouldn’t
         entertain any thoughts other than the one year floor is
         going to happen.
           ‘‘[The Petitioner]: Doug Flutie Hail Mary might be out
         of the question,3 I guess, then.
           3
             The habeas court provided context for the petitioner’s statement at the
         plea canvass in its memorandum of decision: ‘‘Any true college football
         fan from the 1980s remembers the November 23, 1984, Boston College v.
         [University of] Miami game. With six seconds remaining on the clock, Boston
         College quarterback Doug Flutie took the final snap of the game against
         the defending national champions, dropped back, scrambled away from
         pressure to his right, and heaved a ‘Hail Mary’ from his own thirty-seven
         yard line that was caught by teammate Gerard Phelan as he fell across the
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                         James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

          ‘‘The Court: Exactly right, sir.’’ (Footnote added.)
         The court found that the plea was made ‘‘voluntarily
       [and] understandingly . . . with the assistance of com-
       petent counsel,’’ and accepted the plea. The matter was
       continued to May 13, 2016, for sentencing.
          Thereafter, on April 4, 2016, before sentencing for
       the 2015 case, the petitioner was arrested after he
       accosted his elderly mother in a parking lot of a store
       (2016 case).4 On May 27, 2016, the petitioner appeared
       before the court, Oliver, J., for sentencing with respect
       to the 2015 case. The court heard argument from the
       prosecutor and the petitioner’s criminal trial counsel.
       The court found a Garvin violation as a result of the
       petitioner’s arrest in the 2016 case and sentenced him to
       a total effective sentence of ten years of incarceration,
       execution suspended after seven years, followed by five
       years of probation. The petitioner did not appeal from
       the judgment of conviction in the 2015 case.
          On May 25, 2018, the petitioner, in a self-represented
       capacity, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
       alleging ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. On
       August 4, 2022, with the assistance of habeas counsel,
       goal line. The catch resulted in a 47-45 Boston College victory . . . .’’ See
       also P. Attner, ‘‘Flutie’s Miracle Pass Still Amazing to Phelan After All These
       Years,’’ Los Angeles Times, December 31, 1995, available at https://www.lat-
       imes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-12-31-sp-19732-story.html (last visited April
       1, 2024); see also Commonwealth v. Camuti, 493 Mass. 500, 510 n.8, 226
       N.E.3d 868 (2024) (‘‘a ‘Hail Mary’ ’’ is long forward pass in football made in
       desperation into end zone with little time remaining in game and small
       chance of success, and Flutie’s pass in game between Boston College and
       University of Miami in 1984 arguably represents most famous example).
          4
            In connection with the 2016 case, the petitioner entered a guilty plea on
       March 9, 2018, to a charge of violation of a protective order pursuant to
       the Alford doctrine, under which ‘‘[a] defendant who pleads guilty . . .
       does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him
       is so strong that he is prepared to accept entry of a guilty plea. See generally
       North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162
       (1970).’’ Love v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 658, 663 n.3,
       308 A.3d 1040 (2024).
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                           James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

         the petitioner filed the operative second amended peti-
         tion for a writ of habeas corpus, which alleged two
         counts of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, one
         count of prosecutorial impropriety, and one count of a
         due process violation.5
           The ineffective assistance of counsel claim in count
         one pertained to trial counsel’s representation of the
         petitioner in the 2015 case. Specifically, in count one,
         the petitioner alleged, inter alia,6 that his trial counsel
             5
              The habeas court denied the habeas petition as to the petitioner’s claims
         of prosecutorial impropriety and a due process violation in counts three
         and four, and the petitioner does not challenge the court’s ruling concerning
         those counts. Moreover, the petitioner’s claim on appeal does not relate to
         the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in count two, which pertains to
         trial counsel’s representation of the petitioner concerning the 2016 case.
         Therefore, the only claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is at issue
         in this appeal relates to trial counsel’s representation in the 2015 case, as
         alleged in count one.
            6
              The petitioner also alleged in count one that his trial counsel was ineffec-
         tive by failing to adequately explain to the petitioner the offenses with which
         he was charged; allowing the petitioner to enter his plea despite the fact
         that the petitioner was noticeably under the influence of alcohol at the time,
         which thereby impaired his judgment regarding his decision to plead guilty;
         failing to object to the prosecutor’s threat to raise the maximum exposure
         she would seek to fifteen and one-half years if the petitioner did not enter
         a guilty plea that day; incorrectly assuring the petitioner that he would
         receive 120 days of jail credit for time he served while he was incarcerated
         on another charge in 2015; urging and pressuring the petitioner to plead
         guilty; and inadequately arguing, at the May 27, 2016 sentencing hearing, to
         put off sentencing for the 2015 case until an agreement could be reached
         to dispose of both the 2015 and 2016 cases together. The petitioner does
         not challenge the habeas court’s decision as to count one with respect to
         these other grounds; therefore, we deem any claim related thereto aban-
         doned. See New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc., 212 Conn.
         App. 30, 34 n.1, 274 A.3d 911 (declining to review claim that was not briefed
         and, therefore, was deemed abandoned), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 908, 283
         A.3d 506 (2022). We do note, however, that, as to the petitioner’s claim that
         he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the plea canvass, the
         habeas court concluded that nothing in the transcript revealed that the
         petitioner was unable to provide appropriate and responsive answers to
         every one of the court’s questions, and there was no ‘‘evidence in the trial
         court record that would lead any reasonable person to believe that the
         petitioner was not in full control of his mental faculties or that he did not
         ‘knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily’ enter his guilty [plea] . . . .’’ The
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                         James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

       performed deficiently by ‘‘providing improper advice
       with respect to whether the trial court could deviate
       from the plea agreement and sentence the petitioner
       to less time than agreed upon.’’ The petitioner argued
       further that, in doing so, trial counsel provided him
       with unrealistic expectations as to the sentence he
       would face, and that he was prejudiced thereby.
         A trial was held before the habeas court, Newson, J.,
       on November 17, 2022, during which the petitioner was
       represented by counsel. The petitioner’s trial counsel
       and the petitioner each testified at the habeas trial. In
       a memorandum of decision dated December 8, 2022, the
       habeas court rendered judgment denying the operative
       habeas petition. With respect to the claim of ineffective
       assistance of trial counsel in count one, the court con-
       cluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden
       of demonstrating that his trial counsel performed defi-
       ciently and that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleg-
       edly deficient performance. Thereafter, the court
       granted the petition for certification to appeal, and this
       appeal followed.
          On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the habeas court
       improperly rejected his claim that his trial counsel per-
       formed deficiently by inducing him to enter his guilty
       plea in the 2015 case with unrealistic expectations about
       the outcome of the sentencing. Specifically, the peti-
       tioner argues that trial counsel made ‘‘false representa-
       tions about his ability to argue for a sentence below
       the agreed upon parameters’’ and that he might also
       have an opportunity to argue for lesser charges. With
       respect to the issue of prejudice, the petitioner argues
       that the habeas court erroneously determined that he
       court also found credible trial counsel’s testimony that ‘‘he had no memory
       of the petitioner smelling of alcohol or appearing to be under the influence on
       the day of the plea’’ hearing or that, as the petitioner alleged, the prosecutor
       approached the petitioner and his trial counsel in the lobby and made a
       comment about the petitioner smelling like alcohol.
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                      James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

         failed to sustain his burden of proving that he would not
         have accepted the plea deal but for the constitutionally
         deficient performance of his trial counsel. We are not
         persuaded.
            We first set forth our standard of review and general
         principles governing claims of ineffective assistance of
         counsel resulting from guilty pleas. ‘‘Our standard of
         review of a habeas court’s judgment on ineffective assis-
         tance of counsel claims is well settled. In a habeas
         appeal, this court cannot disturb the underlying facts
         found by the habeas court unless they are clearly erro-
         neous, but our review of whether the facts as found by
         the habeas court constituted a violation of the petition-
         er’s constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
         sel is plenary . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
         ted.) Martinez v. Commissioner of Correction, 221
         Conn. App. 852, 863, 303 A.3d 1196 (2023), cert. denied,
         348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 273 (2024); see also Love v.
         Commissioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 658, 667,
         308 A.3d 1040 (2024). ‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffec-
         tive assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must
         satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland
         v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.
         Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. Strickland requires that a petitioner
         satisfy both a performance prong and prejudice prong.
         . . . It is well settled that [a] reviewing court can find
         against a petitioner on either ground, whichever is eas-
         ier.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grant v. Com-
         missioner of Correction, 342 Conn. 771, 780, 272 A.3d
         189 (2022). ‘‘[B]ecause a successful petitioner must sat-
         isfy both prongs of the Strickland test, failure to satisfy
         either prong is fatal to the habeas petition.’’ (Internal
         quotation marks omitted.) Foster v. Commissioner of
         Correction, 217 Conn. App. 658, 667, 289 A.3d 1206,
         cert. denied, 348 Conn. 917, 303 A.3d 1193 (2023).
            In the present case, the habeas court denied the peti-
         tioner’s habeas petition on the grounds that the peti-
         tioner failed to demonstrate both deficient performance
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                     James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

       and prejudice with respect to his claim of ineffective
       assistance of counsel in count one. We need not decide
       whether the petitioner’s trial counsel rendered deficient
       performance because, even if we assume that counsel’s
       performance was deficient, we conclude, for the follow-
       ing reasons, that the petitioner has failed to demon-
       strate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleg-
       edly deficient performance. See, e.g., Martinez v.
       Commissioner of Correction, supra, 221 Conn. App.
       864.
          ‘‘To establish prejudice in cases involving guilty pleas,
       the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that,
       but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
       guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’’ (Inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.) Love v. Commissioner
       of Correction, supra, 223 Conn. App. 667; see also Hill
       v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed.
       2d 203 (1985). Moreover, a petitioner ‘‘must make more
       than a bare allegation that he would have pleaded differ-
       ently and gone to trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction,
       144 Conn. App. 461, 473, 72 A.3d 426 (2013), appeal
       dismissed, 317 Conn. 594, 119 A.3d 1153 (2015). ‘‘Addi-
       tionally, a petitioner’s assertion after he has accepted
       a plea that he would have insisted on going to trial
       suffers from obvious credibility problems . . . and
       should be assessed in light of the likely risks that pursu-
       ing that course would have entailed.’’ (Citations omit-
       ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 475–76; see
       also Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 204 Conn.
       App. 44, 51–52, 250 A.3d 44, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 948,
       250 A.3d 695 (2021).
         In the present case, the habeas court, in addressing
       the petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel performed
       deficiently ‘‘by inducing him to enter his [guilty plea]
       with unrealistic expectations about the possible out-
       comes of the sentencing,’’ stated: ‘‘Under the particular
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                       James P. v. Commisioner of Correction

          circumstances of this case, where the petitioner was
          facing one charge that required the imposition of a
          minimum of one year in prison, there was no legal
          sentence that could be imposed by Judge Oliver that
          would have been less than the minimum sentence called
          for under the terms of the plea agreement. Therefore,
          even if Judge Oliver were to have taken this rarest of
          action [of deviating from the terms of a plea agreement],
          he had no power to reduce the petitioner’s minimum
          prison exposure below what was called for under the
          plea agreement without the consent of the prosecutor.
          . . . In the end, raising this miniscule possibility with
          the petitioner, if it had not been checked by the court,
          would likely have warranted a finding that [trial coun-
          sel’s] conduct was unreasonable. . . .
             ‘‘Luckily . . . [trial counsel’s] information did not go
          unchecked. [Trial counsel] raised the issue in court and
          Judge Oliver informed the petitioner in no uncertain
          terms, which the petitioner acknowledged, that such
          an outcome was not a real possibility. The petitioner
          also heard Judge Oliver confirm with the [prosecutor]
          that she would not agree to modify any charges.
          Because [trial counsel’s] reference to the possibility of
          the court deviating from the plea agreement at the time
          of sentencing in the petitioner’s favor was immediately
          addressed and corrected in court, this court does not
          find that the petitioner has established that [trial coun-
          sel’s] conduct was constitutionally unreasonable. . . .
          Further, given the fact that the petitioner acknowledged
          his understanding when Judge Oliver and the [prosecu-
          tor] immediately notified him that there was no real
          possibility of such an outcome, the petitioner has failed
          to prove that he was prejudiced, because there is no
          reasonable basis to believe that he was under any false
          pretenses about the charges or the real possible out-
          come he could expect at [the] time of sentencing.’’ (Cita-
          tions omitted; footnote omitted.)
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          After our careful review of the record, we agree with
       the habeas court that the petitioner was not prejudiced
       by any alleged deficient performance of his trial counsel
       in advising the petitioner of the remote possibility that
       the court could deviate from the plea agreement at the
       time of sentencing in the petitioner’s favor. We first
       note that the trial court’s swift response when this
       notion was raised by the petitioner’s trial counsel,
       which made it clear that there was no real possibility
       of that outcome, renders the petitioner’s claim that
       counsel’s advice caused him to have unrealistic expec-
       tations about the outcome of sentencing and thereby
       prejudiced him dubious.7 Nevertheless, we must deter-
       mine whether the petitioner has demonstrated ‘‘a rea-
       sonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
       would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
       on going to trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Love v. Commissioner of Correction, supra 223 Conn.
       App. 667. For the following reasons, we conclude that
       he has not done so.
          Although the petitioner devotes a portion of his appel-
       late brief to his argument that he was prejudiced by
       his trial counsel’s deficient performance, most of the
       arguments raised therein relate to the adequacy of coun-
       sel’s performance and advice to the petitioner about
       accepting the plea offer, not to whether the petitioner
       would have proceeded to trial but for counsel’s deficient
         7
           As the habeas court found, any misunderstanding about the possible
       outcomes at sentencing caused by trial counsel’s conversation with the
       petitioner was quickly resolved, as the trial court made it clear ‘‘[i]n no
       uncertain terms’’ that there was no chance of varying from the plea agree-
       ment at sentencing. This was also confirmed by the prosecutor and acknowl-
       edged by the petitioner. Additionally, at the plea hearing when the court
       specifically stated to the petitioner that the one year minimum portion of
       the sentence was ‘‘mandatory based on the conviction of assault [in the]
       third degree of an elderly victim,’’ the petitioner replied, ‘‘I do understand
       that.’’ Therefore, the sentencing court had no power to reduce the petitioner’s
       minimum sentence exposure below what was called for in the plea agree-
       ment.
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          performance. For example, the petitioner asserts that
          ‘‘[t]he habeas court failed to account for the impact of
          the petitioner learning that his assumptions regarding
          the plea agreement were inaccurate and the pressure
          this placed upon him to make a decision regarding the
          plea agreement without full faith in his counsel and,
          thus, without making a voluntary decision to accept
          the plea.’’ See Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. 56–57
          (when ‘‘a defendant is represented by counsel during
          the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice
          of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
          whether counsel’s advice ‘was within the range of com-
          petence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,’ ’’
          which relates to performance prong of Strickland test).
          He also asserts that ‘‘the improper advice of trial coun-
          sel with regard to the possibility that the trial court
          would deviate from the sentencing guidelines and offer
          a sentence lower than the floor established by the agree-
          ment prejudiced the petitioner by forcing him to make
          a decision to accept a plea agreement without proper
          advice or preparation . . . .’’ This argument, however,
          focuses on the ‘‘improper advice’’ given to the petitioner
          by his trial counsel and the impact it had on his decision
          to plead guilty, and does not in any way establish that
          the petitioner would have gone to trial if counsel had
          not given him ‘‘unrealistic’’ expectations about his sen-
          tencing possibilities with the plea agreement.
             In one sentence in his principal appellate brief, the
          petitioner asserts that ‘‘there remains a reasonable
          probability that but for the improper advice of counsel
          he would have decided to reject the plea agreement
          and proceed to trial.’’ This bald assertion, without more,
          is not sufficient to establish that the petitioner was
          prejudiced by his trial counsel’s performance.8 As we
             8
               We also note that the petitioner did not allege in his operative habeas
          petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his sentencing possi-
          bilities, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.
          Instead, in count one, the petitioner alleges that ‘‘there is reasonable probabil-
          ity that, but for counsel’s acts and omissions, the petitioner would have
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       have stated previously, ‘‘[w]ith respect to the prejudice
       prong, a petitioner ‘must make more than a bare allega-
       tion that he would have pleaded differently and gone
       to trial . . . .’ ’’ Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, 207 Conn. App. 449, 469, 262 A.3d 152, cert. denied,
       340 Conn. 903, 263 A.3d 388 (2021). ‘‘[C]ourts should
       not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions
       from a defendant about how he would have pleaded
       but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should
       instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substanti-
       ate a defendant’s expressed preferences. Lee v. United
       States, [582] U.S. [357], 137 S. Ct. 1958 . . . 198 L. Ed.
       2d 476 (2017).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Kondjoua v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn.
       App. 793, 801, 222 A.3d 974 (2019), cert. denied, 334
       Conn. 915, 221 A.3d 908 (2020).
          Our review of the relevant transcript from the peti-
       tioner’s plea canvass establishes that the petitioner
       understood the sentencing possibilities and wanted to
       plead guilty. On two separate occasions during the plea
       canvass, the trial court expressly advised the petitioner
       that the charges to which he was pleading guilty carried
       a mandatory minimum sentence of one year of incarcer-
       ation. See, e.g., Williams v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, 120 Conn. App. 412, 421–22, 991 A.2d 705 (because
       trial court fully informed petitioner of terms of plea
       agreement and petitioner acknowledged that he under-
       stood those terms, petitioner was unable to demon-
       strate prejudice despite counsel’s inaccurate advice),
       cert. denied, 297 Conn. 915, 996 A.2d 279 (2010); see
       also Flomo v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn.
       App. 266, 285, 149 A.3d 185 (2016) (‘‘[a] court is permit-
       ted to rely upon a defendant’s answer given in response
       to a plea canvass’’), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 906, 152
       A.3d 544 (2017). The petitioner’s statements during the
       received a more favorable outcome than he did receive with [trial counsel]
       as his attorney.’’
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          plea canvass demonstrate that he understood there was
          ‘‘no real possibility’’ that he would receive a sentence
          below the one agreed upon in the plea agreement. More-
          over, when the court asked the petitioner whether ‘‘any-
          one forced, threatened, or promised [him] anything to
          make’’ him enter his guilty plea, he responded: ‘‘Well,
          I really don’t want fifteen years. So, I’d rather just cut
          my losses . . . .’’ The court followed with the question
          of whether the petitioner ‘‘essentially [was making] a
          strategic decision based on the nature of the exposure
          and what [he] thought the state [could] prove,’’ to which
          the petitioner answered: ‘‘Yeah, I don’t want to be fifty-
          two years old and getting out of jail if I roll the dice
          on those [charges].’’ These statements demonstrate that
          the petitioner made the strategic decision to plead guilty
          to ensure that he would receive a shorter period of
          incarceration and that he did not want to risk being
          exposed to the maximum possible sentence for the
          charges if he went to trial.
             Additionally, there is nothing in the petitioner’s testi-
          mony at the habeas trial suggesting that the petitioner
          would have gone to trial but for trial counsel’s allegedly
          deficient performance in inducing him to enter his guilty
          plea with unrealistic expectations about the possible
          outcomes of the sentencing. Trial counsel testified at
          the habeas trial that, after the petitioner entered his
          guilty plea in the 2015 case, the petitioner informed
          trial counsel that he wanted to withdraw the plea. Trial
          counsel then advised the petitioner that, if he withdrew
          his plea, he would be facing ‘‘the same negative implica-
          tions that caused him to decide to [plead guilty] to
          begin with.’’ Ultimately, the petitioner did not seek to
          withdraw his plea, which lends further support to the
          petitioner’s statement that he did not want to ‘‘roll the
          dice’’ with a trial on the charges and the maximum
          possible sentence he would be subjected to if he did
          not plead guilty. We agree with the habeas court that
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       the petitioner ‘‘failed to present any credible evidence
       that . . . he would not have gone forward with the
       plea agreement and was prepared to proceed to trial’’
       but for trial counsel’s allegedly deficient advice and
       performance.
         Accordingly, the petitioner failed to prove that he
       was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient
       performance. We conclude, therefore, that the habeas
       court properly denied the habeas petition as to the
       petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
       in count one.
         The judgment is affirmed.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.