Court Opinion

ID: 9951684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 19:02:25.696158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:01.048223
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Garcia CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B323974
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. TA155843)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 JUAN MANUEL GARCIA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Juan Manuel Garcia appeals from judgment following a
trial at which the jury found him guilty of possession of a
controlled substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1) and possession of a firearm with a
prior felony conviction (Pen. Code1, § 29900, subd. (a)(1)
(§ 29900(a)(1); count 2). Appellant contends: (1) this court must
reverse his section 29900(a)(1) conviction because New York State

         1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal

Code.
Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen),
renders that statute unconstitutional; (2) the trial court erred in
failing to stay the punishment for the section 29900(a)(1)
conviction under section 654; and (3) his case must be remanded
to the trial court for a determination of whether, under section
1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), his childhood trauma was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offenses such that
imposition of the low term is warranted.
       We agree appellant’s sentence violates section 654 and will
stay execution of the eight-month consecutive sentence imposed
on count 2. We will affirm the judgment as modified.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriffs Tobin Hood and
Jonathan Montes were on vehicle patrol when they saw a black
Volkswagen Beetle blocking an alley. The deputies observed
appellant, who was in the passenger seat, conversing with Waldo
Gonzalez in the driver seat. After initially driving onward,
within seconds the deputies returned and pulled up next to the
vehicle. The vehicle’s seats were reclined, and both appellant and
Gonzalez appeared to be sleeping.
       Deputy Hood approached appellant while Deputy Morales
approached Gonzalez. Appellant awoke shortly after Deputy
Hood knocked on the car window. Deputy Hood saw appellant
using his feet to drag a plastic bag from the front of the foot
compartment toward the area underneath the passenger seat. As
appellant moved the bag, Deputy Hood saw a firearm, later
identified as a loaded semiautomatic handgun. The firearm was
between appellant’s feet when Deputy Hood first saw it. The
deputies handcuffed and searched appellant. Deputy Hood found
a bindle with over ten grams of methamphetamine in appellant’s

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right front pant pocket. Deputy Montes recovered a
methamphetamine pipe from appellant’s waistband. The court
accepted the parties’ stipulation that appellant had been
previously convicted of a felony.
       The jury convicted appellant of possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (count 1) and possession of a firearm
with a prior felony conviction (count 2). At sentencing,
appellant’s trial counsel stated: “[J]ust to get a little context,
there’s a grown man before us, a man in middle age now. But he
was also once an eight-year-old child who indicated to me today
that he was molested by his uncle. He never told anyone. This is
a common story. It’s very painful for people to talk about. I can’t
corroborate that, and I’m no expert. However, we do know my
client has a criminal history. Despite the mitigating factor, I
think under the new Rules of Court and what has been
happening with the change in the law, those type of early
childhood traumas can lead to a recommendation of a low-term
sentence.”
       The court sentenced appellant to a total term of four years,
eight months: the upper term of four years for count 1, plus a
consecutive term of eight months (one-third the middle term) for
count 2. The court relied upon appellant’s prior prison term as a
circumstance in aggravation to impose the upper term on count 1.
                           DISCUSSION
                Section 29900(a)(1) Constitutionality
       Appellant contends Bruen requires reversing his conviction
under section 29900(a)(1), which prohibits individuals previously

                                3
convicted of certain violent offenses from possessing or owning
firearms.2 We disagree.
       “A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute
or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself, not its
application to the particular circumstances of an individual.”
(Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084.) “The
interpretation of a statute and the determination of its
constitutionality are questions of law. In such cases, appellate
courts apply a de novo standard of review.” (People v. Health
Laboratories of North America, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 442,
445.) A facial constitutional challenge may be raised for the first
time on appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887-889.)
       “‘To support a determination of facial unconstitutionality,
voiding the statute as a whole, petitioners cannot prevail by
suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation
constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular
application of the statute. . . .’” (Arcadia Unified School Dist. v.
State Dept. of Education (1992) 2 Cal.4th 251, 267.) Instead, a
facial challenger must demonstrate the statute is constitutionally
infirm in, at minimum, “‘the generality or great majority of
cases.’” (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 388.) Other
cases have adopted an even more stringent standard that
requires showing the statute’s “‘“provisions inevitably pose a
present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional
prohibitions.”’” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, supra, 9 Cal.4th at

      2 Section 29900(a)(1) provides:  “Notwithstanding
subdivision (a) of Section 29800, any person who has been
previously convicted of any of the offenses listed in Section 29905
and who owns or has in possession or under custody or control
any firearm is guilty of a felony.”

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p. 1084; see also T-Mobile West LLC v. City and County of San
Francisco (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1107, 1117, fn. 6 [noting divergent
formulations of standard].) Appellant’s claim fails under either
standard. Section 29900 does not violate the Second Amendment
in the generality or great majority of cases, much less inevitably
pose a present, total, and fatal conflict with that amendment.
       Although appellant relies on Bruen, we begin with a brief
review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent that informs Bruen.
In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the
Court struck down a District of Columbia law banning the
possession of operable handguns in the home. (Id. at pp. 573-574,
635.) The Court held the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation.” (Id. at p. 592.) However, “[l]ike most rights, the
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.” (Id.
at p. 626.) Accordingly, the Court added the following:
“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis
today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . .” (Id. at
p. 626.)
       In McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742
(McDonald), the Court held the Second Amendment right
recognized in Heller applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The McDonald plurality reiterated Heller’s
assurance that this Second Amendment jurisprudence did not
imperil longstanding regulatory measures like prohibitions on
felons possessing firearms. (Id. at p. 786 (plur. opn. of Alito, J.).)
       In Bruen, the Court invalidated New York’s public-carry
licensing regime, which required applicants to satisfy an

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amorphous “proper cause” standard. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at
pp. 11-12.) It rejected the use of “means-end scrutiny” to
evaluate Second Amendment claims. (Id. at pp. 19-20, 24.) The
Court articulated the proper framework as follows: “When the
Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct,
the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
‘unqualified command.’” (Id. at p. 24.)
       While the Bruen majority did not directly address the
question of felons possessing firearms, the majority consistently
referenced the Second Amendment rights of “law-abiding”
citizens. (Id. at pp. 9, 26, 29, 30, 31, 33, fn. 8, 38, fn. 9, 71.)
Indeed, the Bruen Court expressed its core holding as follows:
“New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth
Amendment in that it prevents law-abiding citizens with
ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep
and bear arms.” (Id. at p. 71, italics added.) Moreover, the Court
generally approved so-called “shall-issue” licensing schemes that
issue gun permits more routinely but nevertheless subject
individuals to background checks. (Id. at p. 38, fn. 9.)
       Nothing in Bruen signals any departure from the
continuing validity of laws prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms, as originally expressed in Heller and reiterated by the
McDonald plurality. Even assuming the endorsements of such
laws in Heller and McDonald are dicta, “they are sensible and
persuasive dicta.” (People v. Odell (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307,
317 (Odell).) Bruen reinforces these endorsements. Bruen’s

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consistent focus on the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding
citizens impliedly negates those rights for citizens who do not
abide by the law. Convicted felons, by definition, have failed to
abide by the law. The Bruen majority’s approval of background
checks in licensing regimes further validates laws prohibiting
felons from possessing firearms, given that one of the core
purposes of a background check is to ascertain criminal history.
       Section 29900(a)(1), the statute challenged here, is
equivalent to prohibitions against felons possessing firearms as
endorsed by the Court. Section 29900(a)(1) prohibits individuals
convicted of specified violent offenses from possessing or owning
firearms. (§§ 29900(a)(1), 29905.) A sizable majority of those
violent offenses are felonies (e.g., murder, rape, carjacking).
While in rarer circumstances the violent offense convictions could
be misdemeanors, we conclude section 29900(a)(1) is precisely the
type of longstanding firearm regulation the Court has approved.
       The presumption framework articulated in Bruen does not
alter this conclusion. If the presumption applies, the government
“must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is
consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 24.) As explained in
People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, because the
Second Amendment extends the right to bear arms only to law-
abiding citizens, convicted felons “are not among ‘the people’ who
have an individual right to possess firearms under the Second
Amendment.” (Id. at p. 479 [upholding sections 29800,
subdivision (a)(1) and 30305 subdivision (a)(1), which bar felons
and other prohibited persons from owning or possessing firearms
and ammunition, respectively]; see also People v. Ceja (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 1296, 1301 [upholding section 30305, subdivision

                                7
(a)(1)]; Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 317 [upholding section
29800, subdivision (a)(1)].) The same is true for individuals
convicted of section 29900(a)(1) violent offenses. Thus, appellant
cannot demonstrate that the Second Amendment covers the
conduct section 29900(a)(1) prohibits, and no presumption of
unconstitutionality applies. Accordingly, under the Bruen test,
we need not consider whether the People offered a sufficient
historical justification for section 29900(a)(1).
              Multiple Punishments Under Section 654
       Appellant asserts the trial court violated section 654 by not
staying the punishment imposed for count 2. The People appear
to agree but stop short of conceding the issue. We likewise agree.
       Section 654, subdivision (a), provides: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case
shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” In conducting a section 654 analysis, the court begins
by asking “if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single
physical act.’” (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.)
“Whether a defendant will be found to have committed a single
physical act for purposes of section 654 depends on whether some
action the defendant is charged with having taken separately
completes the actus reus for each of the relevant criminal
offenses.” (Id. at p. 313.) If only a single act exists, then the
defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. (Id.
at p. 311; see also People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358
(Jones).) The court examines the facts of each case to determine
whether the different convictions are rooted in a single physical
act. (Corpening, at p. 312.) When those facts are undisputed, the

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application of section 654 raises questions of law we review de
novo. (Ibid.)
       In Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 357, our Supreme Court
held “that a single possession or carrying of a single firearm on a
single occasion may be punished only once under section 654.”
The trial court had sentenced the defendant on three underlying
offenses, all stemming from a single incident in which the
defendant, a convicted felon, was found with a loaded,
unregistered firearm. (Ibid.) Jones held that section 654
prohibited punishment for more than one of those crimes because
the defendant had committed a single act. (Ibid.; see also People
v. Washington (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 776 [section 654 barred
multiple punishments for possessing a controlled substance while
armed (Health & Saf. Code, § 11307.1, subd. (a)) and possessing a
firearm as a felon (§ 29800(a)(1), subd. (a)(1)) based on a single
act of firearm possession].)
       Appellant’s punishment under both section 29900(a)(1) and
Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, subdivision (a)(1)
violates section 654 because the same physical act completed both
offenses. Like the Jones defendant, appellant possessed the
firearm on a single occasion while seated in the car. The trial
court erred in punishing appellant more than once for this single
act of firearm possession.
       Appellant requests remand so the trial court can consider
whether to impose punishment on count 1 or count 2. However,
such remand is unnecessary. The trial court designated the four-
year (upper) term in count 1 as principal and the eight-month
(one-third the middle) term in count 2 as subordinate. This
choice precludes a reasonable belief the trial court would, upon
remand, impose punishment only on count 2, which carries a

                                9
maximum sentence of three years. The trial court already
declined that option in sentencing appellant to the four-year
upper term for count 1. We are, therefore, persuaded beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant would not receive a more
favorable sentence upon remand. (Cf. People v. Berdoll (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 159, 165.) Pursuant to section 654, we will stay
execution of the eight-month consecutive sentence imposed on
count 2. (See People v. Alford (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1463,
1466.)
      Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)(A) Childhood Trauma
      Appellant contends the trial court lacked discretion to
impose the upper term on count 1 without finding appellant’s
childhood trauma was not a contributing factor under section
1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) (section 1170(b)(6)(A)). Appellant
asserts the trial court should have inquired further into his
childhood trauma and taken this experience into account during
sentencing. We conclude no error occurred.
      Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) vests the choice of a triad
term in the trial court’s “sound discretion,” subject to certain
limitations. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b)(6) limits this
discretion. It states: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and
unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court
shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A)
The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)

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       “‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial
court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’” (People v.
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) “To
meet this burden, the defendant must ‘affirmatively demonstrate
that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.’”
(People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.) “In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law.’” (People v. Thomas
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) However, “‘[d]efendants are entitled
to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the “informed
discretion” of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A court which is
unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that “informed discretion” than one whose sentence is or
may have been based on misinformation regarding a material
aspect of a defendant’s record.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
       We reject the People’s initial argument that appellant has
forfeited his claim under section 1170(b)(6)(A). While defense
counsel did not specifically invoke the statute, counsel
communicated the claim of childhood trauma and indicated such
trauma “can lead to a recommendation of a low-term sentence.”
This reference suffices to avert forfeiture. We decline to elevate
form over function.
       Nevertheless, appellant has not established sentencing
error. Section 1170(b)(6)(A) does not impose a general duty of
inquiry on the trial court. It establishes a low-term presumption

                                11
if childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the commission
of the offense. (§ 1170(b)(6)(A).) Defense counsel did not assert,
let alone establish, any causal connection between the childhood
trauma and the offenses. Nor does the record contain any other
evidence of childhood trauma that would trigger the
presumption. Given that dearth of evidence, section
1170(b)(6)(A)’s presumption did not operate, and the trial court
did not err by failing to inquire into the childhood trauma. (See
People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 992 [holding
that, in order to trigger the low-term presumption under section
1170, subdivision (b)(6), “there must be some initial showing” of a
statutory contributing factor, “and only then must the record
affirmatively show compliance with the statute”].)
       Nor has appellant shown the trial court erred in failing
either to address childhood trauma in imposing the sentence or to
expressly eliminate that trauma as a contributing factor. Section
1170, subdivision (b)(5) simply requires: “The court shall set
forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the
sentence imposed.” The trial court satisfied this requirement
when it cited appellant’s prior prison term as an aggravating
circumstance. Section 1170 does not task the trial court with
making explicit findings or statements regarding a purported,
but unsubstantiated, section 1170(b)(6)(A) contributing factor.
                            DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to stay execution of the eight-
month consecutive sentence imposed on count 2. (§ 1260.) The
trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract reflecting
the modification ordered by this court and to forward a certified
copy of the abstract to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

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     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                             CODY, J.

We concur:

     GILBERT, P. J.

     BALTODANO, J.

                        13
                  Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

      Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Bryne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and Susan S.
Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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