Court Opinion

ID: 9689217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:24:52.426082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:46.114936
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I write separately to explain why I am persuaded that the majority correctly concludes that the Legislature did not intend to permit trial courts to sentence an individual in habitual offender status to a minimum term that effectively deprives corrections officials of discretion.
The public demand for reform of release policy expressed in Proposal B was an unequivocal directive to reallocate authority between trial courts and corrections officials as to Proposal b offenses. However, the Legislature did not similarly act to prohibit parole board jurisdiction upon the basis of the habitual offender status, as such. While it is arguable that the Legislature intended to give trial judges unlimited discretion in sentencing defendants convicted as habitual offenders, absent a clear Legislative directive that parole board jurisdiction can be circumvented on the basis of habitual offender status alone, I concur in today’s result.
i
Prior to 1978, a trial court could impose only a determinate sentence, that is, a sentence for a fixed term of years upon a defendant convicted as an habitual offender. MCL 769.10-769.12; MSA 28.1082-28.1084. Sections 10, 11, and 12 of the habitual offender act then provided that the trial judge, sentencing a defendant to a term of years imposed a maximum term, either the maximum *95allowed under the statute,1 or a lesser term at the judge’s discretion. No minimum term was set.
For offenders charged as first offenders, the only punishment authorized by the Legislature was an indeterminate sentence where the maximum was imposed by law and the minimum was to be determined by the sentencing courts. MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080. The Legislature had thus created two types of sentences, a flat determinate sentence for habitual offenders and an indeterminate sentence for first-time offenders.
Under the indeterminate sentence act, judicial discretion operated only to establish the minimum sentence.2 This type of structure, a legislatively set maximum, and a judicially set minimum, transferred the discretion from the sentencing court to the parole board in regard to the actual length of service of a defendant’s prison term. Thus, a function of the indeterminate sentence structure itself was to apportion the authority to determine a defendant’s actual period of confinement between the court and the parole board.
In People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), this Court addressed the issue whether an indeterminate sentence with too short an interval between the minimum and maximum term satisfied the policy underlying indeterminate sentencing. The Court concluded in Tanner that an *96indeterminate sentence with too short an interval between minimum and maximum frustrated the effect of the indeterminate sentencing act because it did not allow parole authorities any meaningful time within which to exercise their authority.3 Therefore the Court in Tanner held that a sentence which provided for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum was improper.4 Id., pp 689-690. The structure of the indeterminate sentencing act to which the holding of Tanner was addressed was a structure with legislatively set máximums and judicially set minimums, that emphasized the authority of the corrections authority to determine the length of a defendant’s actual term of imprisonment.
ii
In 1978, the Legislature made substantial changes throughout the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including the sentencing provisions of the habitual offender act. The 1978 amendments of the habitual criminal statute directed the trial court to set both the maximum and minimum terms of the sentence, fixed outer limits as the maximum term allowed under the statute,5 and provided that the sentence would be *97considered an indeterminate sentence. See subsection (2) of 769.10-769.12; MSA 28.1082-28.1084.
However, while providing that such a sentence was "indeterminate,” the amendments maintained the feature of prior habitual sentence acts that the judge was to determine the maximum sentence within any stated maximum. Thus, unlike a sentence under the indeterminate sentence section which provides that the maximum penalty provided by law "shall be the maximum sentence in all cases,”6 all three sections of the habitual criminal act authorize the sentencing judge to sentence a defendant for a minimum term and for the maximum term authorized under the statute or "for a lesser term.”7 Unless the words "or for a lesser term” are surplusage,8 the obvious intent of the Legislature was to give the trial court discretion to set the maximum term of the defendant’s sentence. Given the fact that the judge was thus authorized to set the maximum term within the outer limit proscribed, and that the Legislature did not restrict the trial judge in regard to the minimum term, it appears that this "indeterminate” scheme is not the type of structure to which the Tanner two-thirds/one-third rule applied. Tanner emphasized the need for parole board discretion to determine a defendant’s actual term of imprisonment in the context of a legislatively proscribed maximum sentence. By contrast, legislative authorization of judicial control over the *98maximum and minimum sentences suggests a possible reallocation of authority between the courts and corrections.
The contention that the Legislature did not intend that the habitual criminal acts incorporate the Tanner formulation finds its strongest support in the context of indeterminate sentences imposed on persons convicted as first offenders under the controlled substance act. Unlike the sentence structure at issue in Tanner where the judge was authorized only to set the minimum within the maximum term provided by law, these provisions follow the format of the habitual criminal sections and direct the court to set both a minimum and a maximum term.9
*99This Court held in People v Perez, 417 Mich 1100.21 (1983), that the statutory minimum and maximum sentences for major controlled substances were not mandatory, except in so far as they established the outer limits within which the sentence must be fixed. Thus, for example, given the fact that the judge is authorized to set the maximum term within the mandatory outer limit, application of Tanner to a sentence for a violation of the controlled substance act with a maximum term of twenty-five years would have the anomalous effect of repealing the mandatory minimum of twenty years required by the very same Legislature, a dubious construction at best. The use of the same language in §§ 10, 11, and 12 of the habitual criminal act supports the contention that the Legislature did not intend to circumscribe trial judge discretion with the two-third minimum Tanner rule.10
However, despite the differences between the indeterminate sentence to which Tanner applies and the indeterminate sentences authorized under the habitual criminal act,11 we are unable to conclude that the Legislature intended to permit *100judges to eliminate parole board authority solely on the basis of habitual offender status.
Prior to the passage of Proposal b in 1978, parole authorities treated habitual offenders and first offenders in the same manner in regard to the computation of credits to reduce a defendant’s minimum term of imprisonment. In 1977, the Court of Appeals recognized a distinction in the point at which the prisoner came under the exclusive direction and jurisdiction of the parole board. While a first offender was subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board when the minimum term of the sentence minus allowances was served, and the eventual release was considered discretionary and unreviewable, if in compliance with the law, an habitual offender was not subject to exclusive jurisdiction of the parole board and could not be released prior to the expiration of the minimum term fixed by the sentencing judge without written approval of the judge or a successor.12
In 1978, Proposal b was enacted into law and the statutes governing parole board authority were amended. These statutes created two basic types of offenders: Proposal b offenders and non-Proposal b offenders. Distinctions between prisoners in regard to parole eligibility were thereafter based on whether the underlying offense for which a person was convicted was a “Proposal b” offense13 rather *101than whether the person was an habitual offender.
There is no indication of an intention by the Legislature to alter the prior practice of treating offenders in an habitual status differently than persons convicted as first offenders.14 Indeed both are treated the same once they have served the calendar minimum and the parole board has jurisdiction in each instance. Stated otherwise, while the purpose of the habitual criminal provisions is to augment the punishment for subsequent offenses, and the climate surrounding Proposal b *102clearly indicated public opposition to early release, the Legislature did not modify the treatment of non-Proposal b offenders other than as indicated. Thus, non-Proposal B habitual offenders are eligible for special parole prior to expiration of the calendar minimum with the court’s approval, and Proposal b offenders are not eligible for special parole even with the court’s consent, MCL 791.233(l)(b); MSA 28.2303(l)(b). Parole authorities apply rules appropriate for each prisoner on the basis of the underlying offense for which the offender has been convicted.15
Parole board release policies are of course not binding on this Court. However, I find it both instructive and persuasive that the Legislature has differentiated the authority of the corrections officials only by precluding special parole for Proposal B offenders. Since the Legislature has not indicated an intent to restrict the jurisdiction of the parole board after service of the calendar minimum,16 I conclude that it has not permitted courts to constrict parole board authority by failing to provide a meaningful interval between the minimum and maximum term.

 Under the habitual offender act the court would first determine the punishment authorized on the principal charge and then sentence the defendant to a term not greater than one and one-half times, or whatever the statute proscribed, the maximum term authorized for a first conviction of the offense. MCL 769.10(l)(a), 769.11(l)(a), 769.12(l)(a); MSA 28.1082(l)(a), 28.1083(l)(a), 28.1084(l)(a).

 A variety of indeterminate sentencing structures could exist: (1) a sentence could be wholly indeterminate between a legislatively set minimum and maximum; (2) a sentence could have a legislatively set maximum and a judicially set minimum, or vice versa; or (3) a sentence could have a judicially set minimum and a maximum established within legislatively proscribed levels. 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 18-4.1, Commentary, p 18-240.

 While the majority in Tanner did not specifically identify the manner in which the defendant’s sentence frustrated the intended effect of indeterminate sentencing, the rationale appears to be that there must be a sufficient interval of time to guarantee that the corrections authorities have some time within which to exercise their judgment in determining a prisoner’s release date in order to serve the rehabilitative goal of the indeterminate sentence structure. People v Tanner, 387 Mich 683, 690; 199 NW2d 202 (1978).

 The only restriction the majority of the Court imposed on the application of the holding in Tanner was that it would not apply to sentencing under statutes for which the only punishment prescribed was imprisonment for life, or those offenses providing for a mandatory minimum. Id., p 690.

 While the statute provided that the court must "fix the length of *97both the minimum and maximum sentence within any specified limits,” the only limit specified in the statute was the maximum term authorized for the underlying offense, increased accordingly. See, for example, MCL 769.10(2); MSA 28.1082(2) and MCL 769.10(l)(a); MSA 28.1082(l)(a).

 MCL 769.8; MSA 28.1080.

 See subsections (l)(a) and (b) of MCL 769.10-769.12; MSA 28.1082-28.1084.

 Metropolitan Council No 23, AFSCME v Oakland Co Prosecutor, 409 Mich 299; 294 NW2d 578 (1980).

 Effective May 12, 1978, former MCL 335.341(l)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(l)(a) was amended to provide for sentences within specified minimum and maximum terms for delivery of certain specified controlled substances in the following amounts:
(i) ... an amount of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for life.
(ii) ... an amount of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 20 years nor more than 30 years.
(iii) ... an amount of 50 grams or more, but less than 225 grams, of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be either imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years or placed on probation for life. [MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(i)-(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(i)-(iii).]
In addition, the following change was made in the indeterminate sentencing act:
Subsection 3 of § 9 was added to that statute by 1978 PA 77:
In cases involving a major controlled substance offense for which the court is directed by law to impose a sentence which cannot be less than a specified term of years nor more than a specified term of years, the court in imposing sentence shall fix the length of both the minimum and maximum sentence within those specified limits, in terms of years or fraction thereof, and the sentence so imposed shall be considered an indeterminate sentence. [MCL 769.9(3); MSA 28,1081(3).]

 In addition to the discretion given to the sentencing court in regard to the minimum and maximum terms of the defendant’s sentence, the habitual offender sections give the judge what seems to be complete authority to determine a defendant’s actual release date. The statute specifically provides:
Offenders sentenced under this section or section 10 or 11 for offenses other than a major controlled substance offense shall not be eligible for parole before the expiration of the minimum term fixed by the sentencing judge at the time of sentence without the written approval of the sentencing judge or a successor. [MCL 769.12(3); MSA 28.1084(3).]

 Under Michigan law the defendant must be given advance notice that the trial will be followed by an habitual criminal proceeding although this is not required as a matter of due process. Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 452; 82 S Ct 501; 7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962).

 See n 9, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, and Oakland Prosecutor v Parole Bd, 78 Mich App 111, 117; 259 NW2d 385 (1977).

 Amended in 1978, the statute provided:
(b) A parole shall not be granted to a prisoner until the prisoner has served the minimum term imposed by the court less allowances for good time or special good time to which the prisoner may be entitled to by statute, except that prisoners shall be eligible for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms of imprisonment whenever the sentencing judge or the judge’s successor in office gives written approval of the parole of the prisoner prior to the expiration of the minimum terms of imprisonment.
*101(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b), a parole shall not be granted to a prisoner sentenced for the commission of a crime described in section 33b until the prisoner has served the minimum term imposed by the court, which minimum term shall not be diminished by allowances for good time, special good time, or special parole. [MCL 791.233; MSA 28.2303.]
House Bill 6166, ultimately enacted as 1982 PA 458 was introduced in response to the effects of "Proposal b,” i.e., prison overcrowding and the fact that "Proposal b” seemed to have been ineffective as a deterrent to crime. House Bill Analysis 6165-6166, December 7, 1982. The new provision provided that
(b) A parole shall not be granted to a prisoner until the prisoner has served the minimum term imposed by the court less allowances for good time or special good time to which the prisoner may be entitled to by statute, except that prisoners shall be eligible for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms of imprisonment whenever the sentencing judge, or the judge’s successor in office, gives written approval of the parole of the prisoner prior to the expiration of the minimum terms of imprisonment.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b), a parole shall not be granted to a prisoner sentenced for the commission of a crime described in section 33b(a) to (cc) until the prisoner has served the minimum term imposed by the court less an allowance for disciplinary credits as provided in section 33(5) of Act No. 118 of the Public Acts of 1893, being section 800.33 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. A prisoner described in this subdivision is not eligible for special parole.

 The only exceptions to this are the treatment of Proposal b offenders and the fact that an habitual offender needs the judge’s authorization for release prior to the expiration of the calendar minimum.

 Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive 45.14, Habitual Offenders (August 1,1988).

 The Legislature has, of course, restricted the parole board’s authority by the imposition of mandatory mínimums and the requirement of judicial approval prior to precalendar release.