Court Opinion

ID: 9840116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 13:06:14.265799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:54.068791
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
09/15/2023 08:06 AM CDT

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                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        315 Nebraska Reports
                                                  STATE V. DOLINAR
                                                  Cite as 315 Neb. 257

                                      State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                    Jacob Edward Dolinar, appellant.
                                                    ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed September 15, 2023.   No. S-22-612.

                1. Pleadings. Issues regarding the grant or denial of a plea in bar are ques-
                   tions of law.
                2. Penalties and Forfeitures. Forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431
                   (Reissue 2016), as amended by 2016 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1106, is civil
                   in nature.
                3. Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy. One of the abuses the Double
                   Jeopardy Clause protects against is multiple criminal punishments in
                   separate proceedings for the same offense.
                4. Double Jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
                   imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance,
                   be described as punishment.
                5. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy. In the consti-
                   tutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated
                   with a criminal prosecution, including criminal punishment.
                6. Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy. The preliminary question in a double
                   jeopardy analysis is whether a sanction can be fairly regarded as crimi-
                   nal in the first instance.
                7. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy. What will
                   be considered criminal for purposes of double jeopardy is a constitu-
                   tional question.
                8. Statutes. Whether a particular sanction is criminal or civil is initially a
                   matter of statutory construction.
                9. Legislature: Statutes. A court must look to a statute on its face
                   and determine whether, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, the
                   Legislature either expressly or impliedly indicated a preference for one
                   label or the other.
               10. Legislature: Statutes: Intent: Controlled Substances: Proof. A court
                   will reject the Legislature’s manifest intent for a civil label only if
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              Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                       315 Nebraska Reports
                               STATE V. DOLINAR
                               Cite as 315 Neb. 257

       the party challenging the Uniform Controlled Substances Act provides
       the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either pur-
       pose or effect as to negate its intention.
11.    Penalties and Forfeitures. Forfeiture in rem is distinguished from
       potentially punitive penalties such as fines that are in personam.
12.    ____. Forfeiture in rem has a long tradition of being viewed as a
       civil sanction.
13.    ____. Under the plain language of the statutory scheme as amended
       by 2016 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1106, the State has the option of pursuing
       forfeiture either through a separate civil proceeding under Neb. Rev.
       Stat. § 28-431 (Reissue 2016) or through sentencing in the underlying
       criminal proceeding as provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(18) (Cum.
       Supp. 2022).
14.    Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy: Legislature: Intent. The Legislature
       has manifested its intent that proceedings under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-431
       (Reissue 2016) shall no longer be considered criminal for purposes of a
       double jeopardy analysis.
15.    Statutes: Intent. The nonexhaustive factors to be considered in deter-
       mining if the actual punitive effects of a statute negate the intended
       nature of the sanction are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirma-
       tive disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded
       as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
       scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
       punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to
       which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to
       which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether
       it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
16.    Double Jeopardy: Legislature: Intent: Penalties and Forfeiture.
       Because the procedural mechanisms of forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat.
       § 28-431 (Reissue 2016) manifest the Legislature’s intent that it be civil,
       and the forfeiture scheme under § 28-431 is not so punitive as to negate
       that intent, forfeiture under § 28-431 is not criminal punishment for
       purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
17.    Criminal Law: Double Jeopardy. No double jeopardy arises from a
       civil forfeiture proceeding and a criminal prosecution for the same act.
18.    Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
       analysis that is not needed to adjudicate the controversy before it.

 Appeal from the District Court for Buffalo County: John H.
Marsh, Judge. Affirmed.
      Renee L. Mathias, of Berry Law, for appellant.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. DOLINAR
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 257

   Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph
for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
                        INTRODUCTION
   The appellant filed an appeal from the denial of his plea in
bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (Act) 1 would subject
him to Double Jeopardy. The appellant claimed he was already
criminally punished for the same crime through a judgment in
a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to § 28-431. The
claim for forfeiture was brought against money seized from
a vehicle in which the appellant was a passenger. Although
served with a copy of the petition, the appellant did not appear
to contest the forfeiture. In denying the plea in bar, the district
court reasoned that the appellant had failed to demonstrate he
was punished by the forfeiture because he had failed to show
he had an ownership interest in the forfeited money. Because
forfeiture under § 28-431 as amended in 2016 is civil in
nature, we affirm the district court’s order denying the appel-
lant’s plea in bar.
                       BACKGROUND
                          Charges
  A criminal complaint was filed in county court against
Jacob Edward Dolinar on October 25, 2021, charging him
with distribution of a controlled substance and possession of
drug paraphernalia in violation of the Act. The information
against Dolinar was filed in district court on November 16,
charging him with two counts of distribution of a controlled
substance in violation of § 28-416(1)(a), a Class IIA felony.
1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-401 to 28-456.01 and 28-458 to 28-476 (Reissue
    2016 & Cum. Supp. 2022).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                         STATE V. DOLINAR
                         Cite as 315 Neb. 257

He was also charged with one count of possessing money used
or intended to be used to obtain possession of a controlled
substance or to facilitate the manufacture, distribution, deliv-
ery, or dispensing of a controlled substance in violation of
§ 28-416(17), a Class IV felony.
   The probable cause affidavit in support of Dolinar’s arrest
described that Dolinar was a passenger of a vehicle subject to
a traffic stop due to an expired registration. A search of the car
found numerous tetrahydrocannabinol products, six receipts
totaling $1,949.97 in marijuana purchased in dispensaries in
Colorado, and $12,865 of mixed U.S. currency packaged in
several rubberbands and located “under the passenger seat,
driver’s door, and in a backpack in the trunk.”
              Forfeiture Action Under § 28-431
   After the criminal complaint was filed in county court and
before the information was filed in district court, the State
filed in district court a separate petition for forfeiture under
§ 28-431, in case No. CI 21-673. The State alleged in the peti-
tion that “[b]ased on numerous indicators of criminal activ-
ity, criminal investigation, and other factors, Troopers believe
. . . the subject currency was used or intended to be used to
facilitate a violation of the . . . Act by potential claimants, [the
driver] and . . . Dolinar.” Dolinar was listed, along with the
driver, as a person “with interest in this subject currency” and
was served with the petition for forfeiture, a notice of hearing,
and a summons. Dolinar did not file an answer or demurrer
and did not otherwise participate in the forfeiture action. On
December 15, 2021, the district court ordered the cash forfeited
to the State.
                         Plea in Bar
   The charges from the November 16, 2021, information
were still pending when the forfeiture order was entered.
Dolinar filed a plea in bar against the information, arguing
jeopardy had attached in the forfeiture action. He requested
that the court dismiss the State’s information with prejudice
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. DOLINAR
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 257

pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 12, of the
Nebraska Constitution.
   At the hearing on the plea in bar, the State argued that
proceedings under § 28-431 are civil in nature, but, even
if criminal in nature, Dolinar was not subjected to double
jeopardy because he had failed to prove he had an owner-
ship interest in the forfeited money. The State argued that
Dolinar had only presented evidence he was a person entitled
to notice of the forfeiture action pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-21,302 (Reissue 2016) and that he was the “possessor”
of the money.
   The court overruled the plea in bar. It did not reach the
question of whether proceedings under § 28-431 are criminal
versus civil in nature. Instead, the court reasoned there was
nothing in the record establishing the money—subject of the
separate forfeiture proceedings under § 28-431—belonged to
Dolinar. The court explained that despite § 28-431(4)’s requir-
ing the State to list in the complaint the owner of the property
if known, the complaint filed in November listed no owner,
and Dolinar made no claim to the money.
                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
   Dolinar assigns that the trial court erred in overruling his
plea in bar.
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
  [1] Issues regarding the grant or denial of a plea in bar are
questions of law. 2
                          ANALYSIS
   [2] Dolinar asserts a trial on the charges in the November
16, 2021, information would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions because he was
already subjected to criminal punishment for the same offense
2
    State v. Muhannad, 290 Neb. 59, 858 N.W.2d 598 (2015).
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          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. DOLINAR
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 257

through the judgment in the forfeiture action brought under
§ 28-431. We have held that forfeiture proceedings under
§ 28-431 are criminal in nature, and thus, prosecution in a sep-
arate proceeding for the underlying violation of the Act would
subject the defendant to Double Jeopardy. 3 Subsequently to
such holdings, however, the Legislature amended § 28-431
to change the State’s burden of proof to show the property
was subject to forfeiture from “beyond a reasonable doubt”
to “clear and convincing evidence.” In State v. $18,000, 4 we
rejected the argument that under this amendment the State still
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was
subject to forfeiture. Because the question was not squarely
before us, we left for another day whether forfeiture proceed-
ings under § 28-431 remain criminal in nature. This appeal
is the proper time to finally address that question. For the
following reasons, we hold that forfeiture under § 28-431, as
amended by 2016 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1106, is civil in nature.
   [3] The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides
in relevant part that no person shall be “subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Similarly,
article I, § 12, of the Nebraska constitution provides, “No per-
son shall be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”
One of the abuses the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
is multiple criminal punishments in separate proceedings for
the same offense. 5
3
  See, State v. Spotts, 257 Neb. 44, 595 N.W.2d 259 (1999); State v. Franco,
  257 Neb. 15, 594 N.W.2d 633 (1999) (superseded by statute on other
  grounds as stated in State v. $18,000, 311 Neb. 621, 974 N.W.2d 290
  (2022)); State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, 247 Neb. 335, 526
  N.W.2d 657 (1995).
4
  State v. $18,000, supra note 3.
5
  See, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct. 488, 139 L. Ed. 2d
  450 (1997); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 135
  L. Ed. 2d 549 (1996); State v. Dragoo, 277 Neb. 858, 765 N.W.2d 666
  (2009); State v. Franco, supra note 3.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. DOLINAR
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 257

   [4-7] The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the
imposition of “all additional sanctions that could, in common
parlance, be described as punishment.” 6 Rather, in the consti-
tutional sense, “jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally
associated with a criminal prosecution,” 7 including criminal
punishment. 8 Thus, the preliminary question in a double jeop-
ardy analysis is whether a sanction can be fairly regarded as
criminal in the first instance. 9 What will be considered criminal
for purposes of double jeopardy is a constitutional question. 10
   [8-10] Whether a particular sanction is criminal or civil is
initially a matter of statutory construction. 11 A court must look
to a statute on its face 12 and determine whether, in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, the Legislature either expressly or
impliedly indicated a preference for one label or the other. 13
A court will reject the Legislature’s manifest intent for a civil
label only if the party challenging the Act provides the “clear-
est proof” that the statutory scheme is “so punitive in either
purpose or effect as to negate [its] intention.” 14
6
   Hudson v. United States, supra note 5, 522 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation
   marks omitted).
 7
   Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975)
   (internal quotation marks omitted).
 8
   See Hudson v. United States, supra note 5.
 9
   See, id.; Garrity v. State Bd. of Plumbing, 447 Md. 359, 383, 135 A.3d
   452, 467 (2016).
10
   6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.1(c) (4th ed. 2015).
11
   See, Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 121 S. Ct. 727, 148 L. Ed. 2d 734
   (2001); Hudson v. United States, supra note 5; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
   U.S. 346, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997). See, also, State v.
   Franco, supra note 3.
12
   See, Seling v. Young, supra note 11; Students for Sensible Drug Policy v.
   Spellings, 523 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2008).
13
   United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 65 L. Ed. 2d 742
   (1980).
14
   Seling v. Young, supra note 11, 531 U.S. at 261.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. DOLINAR
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 257

   In United States v. Ursery, 15 the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the sanction under two different forfeiture laws was
intended to be civil and was not so punitive in purpose or
effect to negate Congress’ intent. Ursery is particularly appo-
site to the case at bar.
   [11,12] The Court in Ursery found Congress’ intent that the
sanctions be civil was most clearly demonstrated by structur-
ing the laws to operate in rem. The Court explained that for-
feiture in rem seeks to disgorge the fruits of illegal conduct
by resorting to a legal fiction that the physical property held
is guilty and condemned. 16 Forfeiture in rem is distinguished
from potentially punitive penalties such as fines that are in
personam. 17 The laws at issue were structured to be in rem by
targeting the property itself rather than a person, 18 providing
that laws “relating to the seizure, summary and judicial for-
feiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the cus-
toms laws . . . shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred”
thereunder. 19 Forfeiture in rem, observed the Court, has a long
tradition of being viewed as civil. 20
   The Court found other procedural mechanisms of the for-
feiture laws further manifested Congress’ intent that they be
civil rather than criminal. 21 Under the two laws at issue, actual
notice of the impending forfeitures was unnecessary when
the government could not identify any party with an interest
in the seized articles. The property was subject to forfeiture
through a summary administrative procedure if no party filed
a claim. 22 If a claimant appeared, the burden of proof was
15
   United States v. Ursery, supra note 5.
16
   See id.
17
   See id.
18
   See id.
19
   Id., 518 U.S. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
   See United States v. Ursery, supra note 5.
21
   See id.
22
   See id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. DOLINAR
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 257

on the claimant to show an innocent ownership interest. The
government had the burden of showing probable cause that
the property was subject to forfeiture. 23 The Court reasoned
that all these “distinctly civil procedures” 24 clearly expressed
Congress’ intent that the laws imposed a civil, not a crimi-
nal, sanction.
   Section 28-431 has always shared many of the attributes the
Supreme Court in Ursery found manifested a legislative pref-
erence for a civil label. Section 28-431 is structured as a pro-
ceeding in rem. It targets the seized property itself rather than
the owner of the property, describing the seizure with or with-
out a warrant of items violative of the Act or used or intended
to be used to facilitate a violation of the Act. 25 Pursuant to
§ 28-431(4), actual notice of the impending forfeiture is unnec-
essary when the government cannot identify any party with
an interest in the seized article. The petition must only state
the name of the “owner if known.” 26 Under § 28-431(6), if a
claimant appears in the forfeiture action, the burden is on that
claimant to prove the claimant is an innocent owner by show-
ing the claimant
      (a) has not used or intended to use the property to facili-
      tate an offense in violation of the act, (b) has an interest
      in such property as owner or lienor or otherwise, acquired
      by him or her in good faith, and (c) at no time had any
      actual knowledge that such property was being or would
      be used in, or to facilitate, the violation of the act.
   Until amendments passed by L.B. 1106 in 2016, § 28-431
was dissimilar to the forfeiture laws addressed in Ursery
in one notable way. Instead of a burden on the government
to show probable cause that the property was subject to
23
   See id.
24
   Id., 518 U.S. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
25
   See, § 28-431(1); State v. $ 15,518, 239 Neb. 100, 474 N.W.2d 659 (1991).
26
   § 28-431(4).
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. DOLINAR
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 257

forfeiture, the prior version of § 28-431 required the State to
show “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the property was used
in violation of the Act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the
standard necessary for procuring a criminal conviction. 27 This
requirement does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. 28
In several cases, we held that forfeiture under the prior ver-
sion of § 28-431 was criminal punishment and that it subjects
a defendant to Double Jeopardy when the State pursues both
forfeiture under § 28-431 and a separate criminal prosecution
of the owner of the forfeited property. 29
   Pursuant to L.B. 1106, § 28-431(6) now provides in part
that “[i]f there are no claims, if all claims are denied, or if
the value of the property exceeds all claims granted and it is
shown by clear and convincing evidence that such property
was used in violation of the act,” the court shall grant the peti-
tion for forfeiture. The State now has a civil burden of proof
to show the property is subject to forfeiture.
   Our reasoning that § 28-431 was criminal was based pri-
marily on the fact that the Legislature set forth a criminal
burden of proof rather than a civil burden of proof respect-
ing the use of the property that subjected it to forfeiture.
Thus, in State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, 30 we
found forfeiture under § 28-431 was meaningfully different
from forfeiture of gambling devices under Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1111 (Reissue 2016). Section 28-1111, which is civil in
nature, 31 requires the State to prove by clear and convincing

27
   See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
   (1970).
28
   Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488
   (1993).
29
   See, State v. Spotts, supra note 3; State v. Franco, supra note 3; State v.
   One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, supra note 3.
30
   State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, supra note 3.
31
   See, id.; State v. $3,067.65 in U.S. Currency, 4 Neb. App. 443, 545
   N.W.2d 129 (1996).
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                             STATE V. DOLINAR
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 257

evidence that the seized devices were used for gambling.
We observed that § 28-431 required proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, while § 28-1111 requires something “less than
the State’s ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ burden of proof in
a criminal trial.” 32 Likewise, in State v. Franco 33 and State
v. Spotts, 34 both decided before the 2016 amendment, we
emphasized the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof
that was set forth in § 28-431.
   In Franco, we also reasoned that by failing to amend
§ 28-431 in response to case law holding forfeiture under
§ 28-431 to be criminal punishment for purposes of Double
Jeopardy, the Legislature had acquiesced to that determina-
tion. We said that in the absence of a legislative amendment
to § 28-431, we could not conclude the Legislature’s intent
had changed. 35
   Because of L.B. 1106, we can no longer rely on the doc-
trine of legislative acquiescence to hold that forfeiture under
§ 28-431 is criminal punishment. Still, Dolinar suggests an
amendment to § 28-416, which was also passed through
L.B. 1106, shows the Legislature intended to maintain the
criminal nature of § 28-431. Section 28-416 generally sets
forth the illegal acts pertaining to controlled substances and
their penalties. The Legislature amended § 28-416 to add sub-
section (18), allowing the sentencing court to order, in addition
to the other punishment authorized for violating the Act, forfei-
ture of items the sentencing court finds by clear and convinc-
ing evidence were derived from, used, or intended to be used
to facilitate a controlled substances violation. Dolinar points
32
   State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile, supra note 3, 247 Neb. at
   342, 526 N.W.2d at 663.
33
   State v. Franco, supra note 3. See, also, State v. Bishop, 263 Neb. 266, 639
   N.W.2d 409 (2022); State v. Spotts, supra note 3.
34
   State v. Spotts, supra note 3.
35
   State v. Franco, supra note 3.
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                  315 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. DOLINAR
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 257

out that we discussed in Spotts and Franco that it would not
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause to impose, in a single pro-
ceeding, both the punishments authorized under § 28-416 and
forfeiture under § 28-431, and the addition of subsection (18)
to § 28-416 codifies that arrangement. He argues it follows
that the Legislature intended forfeiture will only be pursued
in conjunction with a criminal conviction for violating the Act
when imposed under § 28-416(18) as part of the sentencing in
the single criminal proceeding.
   [13] While we agree the Legislature clearly expressed its
intent that forfeiture may be part of a defendant’s sentence for
violating the Act, we disagree with Dolinar’s argument that
this embodies an intention that sentencing under § 28-416(18)
is the exclusive means of pursuing both sanctions in relation
to the same underlying crime. Nothing in either § 28-416
or § 28-431, read individually or in pari materia, suggests
§ 28-416(18) is the exclusive avenue for pursuing both crimi-
nal punishment under the sentencing provisions of § 28-416
and the forfeiture of items derived from, used, or intended to
be used to facilitate the violation of the Act. Furthermore, we
note that § 28-427 provides, “Any penalty imposed for viola-
tion of the . . . Act shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of,
any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.” Under the plain language of the statutory scheme as
amended by L.B. 1106, the State has the option of pursuing
forfeiture either through a separate civil proceeding under
§ 28-431 or through sentencing in the underlying criminal
proceeding as provided in § 28-416(18). The availability
of forfeiture as part of a defendant’s sentence pursuant to
§ 28-416(18) has no bearing on the civil nature of forfeiture
under § 28-431.
   [14] Instead, we look to the language of § 28-431 to
determine if it is civil or criminal. We find that by amending
§ 28-431 to eliminate the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
in favor of clear and convincing evidence, the Legislature
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                    315 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. DOLINAR
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 257

brought § 28-431 in line with other civil in rem proceedings. 36
The Legislature thereby manifested its intent that proceedings
under § 28-431 shall no longer be considered criminal for pur-
poses of a double jeopardy analysis.
   [15] Looking to the factors set forth by the U.S. Supreme
Court, we find no constitutional reason to negate this manifest
intent. The nonexhaustive factors to be considered in deter-
mining if the actual punitive effects of a statute negate its
intended civil nature are: (1) “[w]hether the sanction involves
an affirm­ative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter”; (4) “whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—
retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alterna-
tive purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assign-
able for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned.” 37 “[T]hese factors must
be considered in relation to the statute on its face,” 38 and not
by reference to the effect the law has on a single individual.
No single factor is dispositive. 39
   We have already discussed that in rem forfeiture has not
historically been regarded as criminal punishment. Section
28-431 serves the same important nonpunitive goals as the
forfeiture laws addressed in Ursery, such as encouraging prop-
erty owners to take care in managing their property, ensuring
that individuals do not permit their property to be used for
illegal purposes, and ensuring that individuals do not profit
36
   See Charles Basler, Reforming Civil Asset Forfeiture: Ensuring Fairness
   and Due Process for Property Owners in Massachusetts, 49 New Eng. L.
   Rev. 665 (2015).
37
   Hudson v. United States, supra note 5, 522 U.S. at 99-100 (internal
   quotation marks omitted)(emphasis omitted).
38
   Id., 522 U.S. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39
   Hudson v. United States, supra note 5.
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                          STATE V. DOLINAR
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 257

from their illegal acts. Also, like the forfeiture statutes in
Ursery, § 28-431 does not require the State to prove scienter
to establish that the property is subject to forfeiture. 40 The
“innocent owner” exception does not require the government
to demonstrate scienter because a connection between the
property and a particular person is not a necessary element of
the State’s prima facie case. 41 Although the State must show
that the property was used in violation of the Act, “the fact
that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal
violation is far from the clearest proof necessary to show that
a proceeding is criminal.” 42 There are no other factors that
weigh in favor of negating the State’s manifest intent.
   [16] Because the procedural mechanisms of forfeiture
under § 28-431, as amended by L.B. 1106, manifest the
Legislature’s intent that it be civil, and the forfeiture scheme
under § 28-431 as amended is not so punitive as to negate that
intent, forfeiture under § 28-431 as amended by L.B. 1106 is
not criminal punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Our holding that forfeiture under the prior version
of § 28-431 is criminal punishment for purposes of Double
Jeopardy has been superseded by the amendment to § 28-431,
which changed the State’s burden of proof to clear and con-
vincing evidence.
   [17,18] It is well established that no double jeopardy
arises from a civil forfeiture proceeding and a criminal
prosecution for the same act. 43 As a result, even assuming
Dolinar was a party to the forfeiture action and had an own-
ership interest in the forfeited money, he was not subjected
to jeopardy through the forfeiture of that money in the civil
action brought under § 28-431. We affirm the district court’s
40
   See 28-431(6).
41
   See United States v. Ursery, supra note 5.
42
   Id., 518 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
   See, United States v. Ursery, supra note 5; 15A Cyclopedia of Federal
   Procedure § 88:18 (3d ed. July 2023 update).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. DOLINAR
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 257

order on the grounds that § 28-431 is civil for purposes of a
double jeopardy analysis. We do not address the correctness
of the district court’s reasoning that Dolinar failed to show
he was subjected to a prior punishment because he failed to
demonstrate an ownership interest in the cash, as we are not
obligated to engage in an analysis that is not needed to adju-
dicate the controversy before us. 44 Further, we do not address
the constitutionality of the portion of § 28-431 imposing a
burden of proof upon a property owner or claimant to avoid
forfeiture, as such issue was not raised in this appeal.
                          CONCLUSION
   Because the sanction imposed by a forfeiture under § 28-431
is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy
analysis, the district court did not err in denying Dolinar’s plea
in bar based on a prior forfeiture pursuant to § 28-431.
                                                     Affirmed.
44
     State v. Draper, 289 Neb. 777, 857 N.W.2d 334 (2015).