Court Opinion

ID: 4322398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-10-18 18:09:19.197772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:12:48.719228
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                         No. 1D17-2156
                 _____________________________

MONTRE D. RICHARDSON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Russell L. Healey, Judge.

                        October 18, 2018

PER CURIAM.

     We are constrained to reverse on procedural grounds the
trial court’s order denying Appellant’s postconviction motion
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In a previous
appeal, Appellant successfully argued that the trial court must
attach to its order record excerpts conclusively refuting
Appellant’s claims. See Richardson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1287 (Fla.
1st DCA 2017). Our opinion issued on April 28, 2017. Very
promptly, on May 3, 2017, the trial court complied with our
decision and re-entered the order denying Appellant’s rule 3.850
motion, this time properly attaching records to support the
denial. However, our mandate in the previous postconviction
appeal did not issue until May 24, 2017.
     An appellate court’s mandate is the procedural vehicle by
which jurisdiction transfers back to the trial court. Mathis v.
State, 963 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Until issuance of our
mandate, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order
complying with our directions. Accordingly, while we applaud the
trial court’s efficient compliance with our decision, and are loathe
to “punish efficiency,” we must reverse the order because it was
entered when the trial court did not have jurisdiction. See
Leatherwood v. State, 168 So. 3d 328, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
(noting the court’s reluctance to punish efficiency); Scott v. State,
156 So. 3d 9, 10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). Under these circumstances,
we reverse and remand for re-entry of the order with record
attachments—after our mandate has issued. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.340(a) (defining “mandate” and setting forth procedures).

    REVERSED and REMANDED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and KELSEY and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Montre D. Richardson, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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