Court Opinion

ID: 9554366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 19:01:16.828766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:43.410738
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13905    Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 08/08/2023   Page: 1 of 16

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13905
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MICHAEL VENETEZ MCRAE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00125-JRH-BKE-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-13905

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Appellant Michael Venetez McRae appeals his convictions
        for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and possession
        of a controlled substance, and he appeals the district court’s impo-
        sition of his 235-month total sentence. McRae asserts several errors
        on appeal: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case
        because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited him from being
        federally prosecuted for the same offense conduct as that charged
        in a state indictment, and because his speedy trial rights were vio-
        lated; (2) the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
        as to a firearm and his statements related thereto, based on the pub-
        lic safety exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine, and implied
        consent; (3) the district court erred in permitting him to waive his
        right to counsel because his waiver was not knowing and volun-
        tary; and (4) the district court erred in sentencing him under the
        Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). After reading the parties
        briefs and reviewing the record, we affirm McRae’s convictions and
        sentence.
                                         I.
                                (A) Double Jeopardy
                The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
        tects a defendant against successive prosecutions for the same crim-
        inal oﬀense, providing that no person may “be twice put in jeop-
        ardy of life or limb” for the same oﬀense. U.S. Const. amend. V;
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        21-13905                Opinion of the Court                            3

        United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1360 (11th Cir.
        1994). Nevertheless, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, a defend-
        ant may be subject to successive prosecutions by two sovereigns for
        the violation of each of their laws if his conduct gives rise to two
        separate oﬀenses. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 66-67, 136
        S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016). Thus, because the state and federal gov-
        ernment are separate sovereigns, a prior state conviction does not
        preclude the federal government from prosecuting the defendant
        for the same conduct. See id.
                Reviewing de novo McRae’s double jeopardy challenge, we
        ﬁnd no error. United States v. McIntosh, 580 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th
        Cir. 2009). Because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit
        McRae from being federally prosecuted for the same oﬀense con-
        duct as that charged in a state indictment, we conclude that the dis-
        trict court did not lack jurisdiction over the case.
                                 (B) Speedy Trial Rights
               The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., prescribes
        deadlines and identiﬁes causes of delay that excuse strict compli-
        ance with those deadlines. “The primary purpose of the Speedy
        Trial Act is to accelerate criminal trials.” United States v. Varella, 692
        F.2d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982). Thus, the Speedy Trial Act man-
        dates that federal authorities must indict an incarcerated individual,
        or ﬁle an information, within 70 days of his arrest in connection
        with the oﬀenses speciﬁed in the indictment, or from the date the
        defendant ﬁrst appears before the court in which such charge is
        pending, whichever date is the latest. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13905

               The Speedy Trial Act, however, excludes periods of delay
        arising from other proceedings involving the defendant, including
        delay resulting from “any pretrial motion, from the ﬁling of the
        motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
        disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). It further
        excludes any delay arising from the district court’s grant of a con-
        tinuance on the ground that the ends of justice are served, provided
        that the district court articulates its speciﬁc ﬁndings. Id. §
        3161(h)(7)(A). Further, the Act provides a non-exclusive list of fac-
        tors which a judge should consider in determining whether to
        grant such a continuance. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B). One factor is
        whether “in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the
        ﬁling of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time
        such that it is unreasonable to expect return and ﬁling of the indict-
        ment within the period speciﬁed . . . .” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iii).
                We will consider whether a defendant’s right to a speedy
        trial has been violated as a mixed question of law and fact, review-
        ing questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the clearly
        erroneous standard. United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th
        Cir. 1996). Issues not raised in a party’s initial brief on appeal are
        considered abandoned. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 865
        (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
               The record shows that, even if properly preserved, McRae’s
        speedy trial argument nevertheless fails because there was no vio-
        lation of his speedy trial rights between September 2019 and May
        2021. All the relevant time was excluded by the need to: (i) address
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        21-13905               Opinion of the Court                          5

        pending motions, including McRae’s motion to suppress; (ii) con-
        tinue the proceedings, due to the ongoing COVID-19 health emer-
        gency; (docs. 49, 53, 54, 55, 60, 67); (iii) address McRae’s eﬀorts to
        obtain replacement counsel or proceed pro se; and (iv) respond to
        McRae’s motion to dismiss the indictment due to Double Jeopardy
        and speedy trial concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 3161(h)(7)(A); (h)(1)(D).
        Further, as the district court explicitly noted, those continuances
        were properly granted in the interest of justice. Thus, we aﬃrm
        the district court’s order dismissing McRae’s pretrial motions to dis-
        miss based on alleged Double Jeopardy and speedy trial challenges.
                                          II.
                McRae contends that the district court erred by denying his
        motion to suppress as to the ﬁrearm and his statements related
        thereto, based on the public safety exception, the inevitable discov-
        ery doctrine, and implied consent from the homeowner, Labrisha
        Keller. The Supreme Court has established a narrow exception to
        Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), where there
        is a threat to public safety or to law enforcement oﬃcers. United
        States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing New
        York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632 (1984)).
        “The public safety exception allows oﬃcers to question a suspect
        without ﬁrst Mirandizing him when necessary to protect either
        themselves or the general public.” Id.
               The inevitable discovery doctrine allows the government to
        introduce evidence obtained from an illegal search or other viola-
        tion if there is a “reasonable probability that the evidence in
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13905

        question would have been discovered by lawful means.” United
        States v. Johnson, 777 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted). The government must demonstrate that
        “the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were being ac-
        tively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct.” Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the govern-
        ment must show “that the police would have discovered the evi-
        dence by virtue of ordinary investigations of evidence or leads al-
        ready in their possession.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
                “An overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy
        in a residence suﬃcient to establish standing.” United States v. Maxi,
        886 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2018). The warrant requirement does
        not apply where the homeowner voluntarily consented to the
        search. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797
        (1990). Consent may be nonverbal, but this consent may not be
        voluntary if the oﬃcers exhibited a suﬃcient show of force or au-
        thority that coerced the occupant to agree to the search. United
        States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 751-52 (11th Cir. 2002).
                “We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
        evidence for clear error as to factual ﬁndings and de novo as to its
        application of the law.” United States v. Watkins, 760 F.3d 1271, 1282
        (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). We consider the evidence in the
        light most favorable to the district court’s judgment. Id. In review-
        ing the denial of a motion to suppress, we may review the entire
        record, including trial testimony. Newsome, 475 F.3d at 1224. Simi-
        larly, “[w]hether a person was in custody and entitled to Miranda
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        21-13905               Opinion of the Court                        7

        warnings is a mixed question of law and fact; we review the district
        court’s factual ﬁndings on the matter for clear error and its legal
        conclusions de novo.” United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1361
        (11th Cir. 2001).
                The record demonstrates that the oﬃcers’ questions regard-
        ing the gun did not violate Miranda because the questions ﬁt into
        the public safety exception. Newsome, 475 F.3d at 1224. The mag-
        istrate judge conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress and
        found that the oﬃcer clearly expressed concern about Keller’s chil-
        dren having access to the gun because he reasoned that if McRae
        had a gun clip in his pocket, which he admitted he did, the gun was
        nearby. In addition, the magistrate judge properly found that the
        magazine should not be suppressed because the oﬃcers would
        have inevitably discovered it. Johnson, 777 F.3d at 1274. Further-
        more, even if McRae had a reasonable expectation of privacy as an
        overnight guest in Keller’s home, see Maxi¸886 F.3d at 1326, the rec-
        ord supports the magistrate judge’s ﬁnding that Keller impliedly
        consented to the search, so there was no Fourth Amendment vio-
        lation. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S. Ct. at 2797. Having ob-
        tained consent, we conclude the oﬃcers thus did not violate the
        Fourth Amendment, and we aﬃrm the denial of the motion to sup-
        press.
                                        III.
              McRae argues that the district court erred in ﬁnding that his
        waiver of his right to counsel was valid. A district court’s determi-
        nation on the validity of a defendant’s waiver of his Sixth
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13905

        Amendment right to counsel is generally a mixed question of law
        and fact that we review de novo. United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d
        726, 730 (11th Cir. 2002).
                Under the Sixth Amendment, all criminal defendants are en-
        titled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. It does
        not, however, guarantee defendants the unqualiﬁed right to coun-
        sel of their choice, and an indigent criminal defendant does not
        have a right to a particular lawyer or to demand a diﬀerent ap-
        pointed lawyer except for good cause. United States v. Garey, 540
        F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008). “Good cause . . . means a funda-
        mental problem, such as a conﬂict of interest, a complete break-
        down in communication or an irreconcilable conﬂict which leads
        to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks
        omitted). Defendants who lack the means to hire a private attorney
        must either accept the appointed counsel or represent themselves.
        Garey, 540 F.3d at 1263-1264.
               The right to self-representation is closely tied to the right to
        representation by counsel. See id. at 1262-63. In Faretta v. California,
        the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment provides
        a right to the accused to make a defense himself. 422 U.S. 806, 819,
        95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533 (1975). For a waiver of the Sixth Amendment
        to be valid, the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his
        right of self-representation. Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d 1057,
        1064 (11th Cir. 1986). To make a valid waiver, the district court
        should make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages
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        21-13905                Opinion of the Court                          9

        of self-representations so the record will establish that he knows
        what he is doing, and his choice is made with that understanding.
        A proper Faretta hearing ensures that the defendant is aware of the
        nature of the charges against him, possible punishments, basic trial
        procedure, and the hazards of self-representation. See Kimball, 291
        F.3d at 730. We have repeatedly determined that “a defendant must
        have an awareness of the penal consequences of conviction before
        his decision to represent himself can constitute a knowing waiver
        of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” See, e.g., United States v.
        Hakim, 30 F.4th 1310, 1323 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
        ___, 143 S. Ct. 776 (2023); United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088
        (11th Cir. 1995); Kimball, 291 F.3d at 732. In Hakim, the district court
        allowed the defendant to represent himself during post-trial pro-
        ceedings, ﬁnding that the defendant had knowingly waived his right
        to counsel after the court misinformed him of the maximum pos-
        sible sentence he faced. 30 F.4th at 1314-15.
                On appeal, we vacated and remanded the case, noting that
        the magistrate judge “not only failed to inform Hakim of the max-
        imum sentence, but he misled Hakim by incorrectly representing
        that the maximum term of imprisonment would be one year, when
        it was instead three years.” Id. at 1325, 1327. However, we also
        explained that providing “materially incorrect information about
        the defendant’s sentence does not render his waiver unknowing if
        the defendant understood correct countervailing information from
        another source.” Id. at 1324-25. We clariﬁed that “[t]he ultimate
        test is not the trial court’s express advice, but rather the defendant’s
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13905

        understanding,” and that giving correct advice to a defendant
        about possible punishments is “the ideal method” of ensuring that
        he has that understanding. Id.; Cash, 47 F.3d at 1088; Garey, 540 F.3d
        at 1266 (internal quotation marks omitted).
               The record demonstrates that there was no Sixth Amend-
        ment violation. The magistrate judge properly considered many
        elements of the Faretta hearing, confirming that McRae had not
        studied law or represented himself before and that he was unfamil-
        iar with the rules of the court. The magistrate judge advised
        McRae of the advantages of counsel, the disadvantages of repre-
        senting himself, and stated that court-appointed counsel was a
        well-trained attorney. The magistrate judge confirmed that McRae
        wanted to proceed pro se and appointed standby counsel. Although
        the magistrate judge misinformed McRae of the maximum poten-
        tial sentence he faced, McRae had countervailing information
        about his potential maximum sentence from another source. At
        McRae’s initial appearance, the government informed him that he
        could face a penalty of 15 years to life if convicted. Thus, McRae
        had knowledge of the penal consequences to his conviction and
        made a knowing waiver of his right to counsel. See Hakim, 30 F.4th
        at 1324-25. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court com-
        mitted no reversible error.
                                        IV.
               McRae challenges his ACCA sentence enhancement on ap-
        peal for the ﬁrst time. We generally review ACCA enhancement
        challenges de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Xavier Smith, 983 F.3d
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        21-13905                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        1213, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2020) (whether a prior conviction is a “se-
        rious drug oﬀense” under the ACCA). However, when a defendant
        does not state the grounds for an objection in the district court, we
        review for plain error. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087
        (11th Cir. 2003). Under this review, the defendant must show that
        there was an error, that was plain, that aﬀected his substantial
        rights, and that seriously aﬀected the fairness, integrity, or public
        reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Aguilar-Ib-
        arra, 740 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 2014).
                The ACCA requires that any person who violates 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years when
        the defendant has 3 prior convictions for violent felonies or serious
        drug oﬀenses committed on occasions diﬀerent from one another.
        18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA deﬁnes a “serious drug oﬀense,”
        in relevant part, as “an oﬀense under State law, involving manufac-
        turing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
        distribute, a controlled substance (as deﬁned in section 102 of the
        Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
        Federal law, however, governs the meaning of terms in the ACCA
        and state law governs the elements of state law crimes. United
        States v. Jackson (“Jackson II”), 55 F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022), cert.
        granted, 143 S.Ct. 2457 (U.S. May 15, 2023) (No. 22-6640).
               First, McRae contends that because his 2017 drug convic-
        tions involved ioﬂupane, they are ineligible for the ACCA enhance-
        ment because this speciﬁc drug was not listed under the federal
        drug schedule. Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                21-13905

        deﬁnes a “controlled substance” as any substance on the federal
        controlled substances schedules. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812. The
        current version of the federal drug schedules expressly excludes io-
        ﬂupane. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii). However, the federal drug
        schedules included ioﬂupane until 2015. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 851
        & n.4.
               Georgia law prohibits possession with intent to distribute
        any controlled substance. Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30(b). In its cur-
        rent controlled substances schedules, Georgia includes, in part:
              Cocaine, coca leaves, any salt, compound, derivative,
              stereoisomers of cocaine, or preparation of coca
              leaves, and any salt, compound, derivative, stereoiso-
              mers of cocaine, or preparation thereof which is
              chemically equivalent or identical with any of these
              substances, but not including decocainized coca
              leaves or extractions which do not contain cocaine or
              ecgonine.

        Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-26(1)(D). It does not speciﬁcally include or
        exclude ioﬂupane. Id. The versions of the deﬁnition of cocaine in
        eﬀect in 2007 and 2018 contained the same wording. See id.
        (amendments eﬀective from May 29, 2007, to May 5, 2008; and May
        8, 2017, to May 2, 2018).
              We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a
        defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug oﬀense under the
        ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 850. Under the categorical approach,
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        21-13905               Opinion of the Court                        13

        we consider the statutory deﬁnition of the state oﬀense rather than
        the facts of the crime itself. Id. A state conviction qualiﬁes only if
        the state statute under which the conviction occurred deﬁnes the
        oﬀense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the ACCA’s
        deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense. Id.
               McRae relies on our decision in Jackson I, to argue that his
        two 2017 cocaine oﬀenses do not qualify under the ACCA. In
        United States v. Jackson (“Jackson I”), 36 F.4th 1294, 1306 (11th Cir.
        2022) (vacated), we determined that the federal controlled sub-
        stances schedules that deﬁned a serious drug oﬀense under the
        ACCA were those in eﬀect when the defendant committed his fed-
        eral oﬀense and that those schedules did not cover ioﬂupane at the
        time he committed his federal oﬀense. Id. at 1299-1302. Since the
        relevant Florida statute covered ioﬂupane when he was convicted
        of his prior cocaine-related oﬀenses, the Florida statute’s con-
        trolled-substance element was broader than the relevant version of
        the federal controlled substances schedules, and his prior co-
        caine-related convictions thus did not qualify as serious drug of-
        fenses. Id. at 1303-04.
                After vacating this decision, we held in Jackson II, that the
        appellant’s Florida cocaine-related convictions qualiﬁed as serious
        drug oﬀenses. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861-62. We determined that
        the ACCA’s deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense incorporates the
        version of the federal controlled substances schedules in eﬀect
        when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug oﬀense.
        Id. at 854. We concluded that the appellant’s 1998 and 2004 Florida
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13905

        cocaine-related convictions qualiﬁed because Florida’s controlled
        substances schedules included ioﬂupane until 2017 and the federal
        controlled substance schedules also included ioﬂupane until 2015.
        Id. at 851 & n. 3-4. We determined that the Florida controlled sub-
        stances schedules included ioﬂupane because Florida later
        amended its schedules to exclude ioﬂupane. Id. at 851 n.3.
               Although the district court incorrectly found that McRae’s
        two 2017 cocaine distribution convictions qualiﬁed under the
        ACCA, McRae cannot demonstrate plain error. McRae fails to cite
        any precedent directly holding that in 2017, Georgia law included
        ioﬂupane as a controlled substance. In light of this, McRae cannot
        establish error. See Aguila-Iberra, 740 F.3d at 592.
               Second, relying on Wooden v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 142
        S. Ct. 1063 (2022), McRae asserts that the district court erred in
        ﬁnding that his two 2017 cocaine distribution oﬀenses occurred on
        diﬀerent occasions. The ACCA mandates a minimum term of im-
        prisonment of 15 years for “a person who violates section 922(g) .
        . . and has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a
        serious drug oﬀense, or both, committed on occasions diﬀerent from
        one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (emphasis added). In Wooden, the
        Supreme Court noted that several factors may be relevant to that
        determination: the amount of time between oﬀenses, the proxim-
        ity of the locations where the oﬀenses occurred, and whether the
        oﬀenses are part of the same scheme or achieve the same objective.
        Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1070-71. But “[i]n many cases, a single fac-
        tor—especially of time or place—can decisively diﬀerentiate
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        21-13905               Opinion of the Court                       15

        occasions.” Id. at 1071. “Oﬀenses committed close in time, in an
        uninterrupted course of conduct, will often count as part of one
        occasion; not so oﬀenses separated by substantial gaps in time or
        signiﬁcant intervening events.” Id.
               In Penn, we “determine[d] whether two oﬀenses occurred
        on the same occasion based on the ordinary meaning of the word.”
        United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305, 1318 (11th Cir. 2023). We ap-
        plied Wooden and concluded that “the answer [wa]s obvious:” the
        defendant’s oﬀenses “did not occur on the same occasion.” Id. We
        held that the district court lawfully sentenced the defendant under
        the ACCA. Id. at 1318-19. We also addressed whether the Fifth and
        Sixth Amendments require a jury to ﬁnd, or the defendant to ad-
        mit, that the oﬀenses occurred on diﬀerent occasions. Id. at 1318.
        We reviewed the challenge for plain error because the defendant
        raised it for the ﬁrst time on appeal. Id. We held that the defendant
        did not “establish plain error” because there was no precedent
        from the Supreme Court or us holding that a sentencing court can-
        not perform the diﬀerent occasions analysis. Id.
               Under our prior panel precedent rule, we must follow a prior
        binding precedent “unless and until it is overruled by this [C]ourt
        en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d
        1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). A subsequent panel
        cannot overrule a prior panel even if it is convinced the prior panel
        was wrong. United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir.
        1998) (en banc).
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                21-13905

                The record convinces us that the district court did not err,
        let alone plainly err, in determining that McRae had committed his
        cocaine oﬀenses on diﬀerent occasions. His convictions occurred
        on two separate occasions and the state charged him in two diﬀer-
        ent indictments. In addition, McRae’s arguments related to the dis-
        trict court’s application of the ACCA enhancement are unpersua-
        sive. As was the case in Penn, there is no precedent from the Su-
        preme Court or us holding that a sentencing court cannot perform
        the diﬀerent occasions analysis. Penn, 63 F.4th at 1318. Thus, we
        ﬁnd no error in the district court’s application of the ACCA in
        McRae’s case.
             Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
        ﬁrm McRae’s convictions and total sentence.
               AFFIRMED.