Court Opinion

ID: 9393000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 21:00:34.138084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.348933
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11341    Document: 46-1      Date Filed: 05/08/2023   Page: 1 of 25

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11341
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ROBERT DAYON DUMAS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00326-TPB-TGW-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-11341

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Following his conviction on five counts of Hobbs Act rob-
        bery, Robert Dayon Dumas appeals the district court’s denial of his
        motion to suppress the items obtained during a warrantless search
        of his vehicle and the statements he made to the police following
        his arrest. The district court concluded that suppression of the ev-
        idence was not warranted because the police officer had probable
        cause to search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle for marijuana, the robbery
        items unrelated to the search for marijuana were in plain view dur-
        ing a lawful search of the vehicle, and Mr. Dumas knowingly and
        voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
        436, 439 (1966).
               After review of the parties’ briefs and the record, and with
        the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court did
        not err in denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress. We therefore
        affirm.
                                          I
                                         A
              During the five-day time period from February 8, 2018, until
        February 13, 2018, an unidentified man committed a series of five
        armed robberies in Wesley Chapel, Florida.
              Specifically, on February 8, 2018, an unknown “white or His-
        panic male,” approximately five feet, nine inches, to six feet in
        height and wearing “all black”—including a “ski mask” and a dark
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                        3

        hat with a white emblem in the front—entered a Citgo gas station
        brandishing a “black semi auto with a stainless upper slide hand-
        gun.” The suspect pointed the firearm at a store employee, cham-
        bered a round, and demanded money from the register. The em-
        ployee complied, and the suspect fled on foot with $800.
               Approximately 90 minutes later that same day, a suspect
        matching the description of the Citgo gas station assailant robbed
        a Best Western hotel. The suspect, armed with a black frame sem-
        iautomatic handgun with a silver upper slide, demanded that the
        clerk “open the safe.” As the clerk attempted to open the lock to
        the safe, “the suspect fired one shot into the wall above the clerk.”
        The suspect told the employee, “the next one goes in your head!”
        The suspect took approximately $500 from the register and the safe
        and fled. A witness reported a “dark color[ed] sedan leaving the
        hotel entrance.”
               Two days later, a suspect described as a “white male” and
        “wearing all black,” including a “ski mask,” robbed a Metro PCS
        store. The suspect wore black Nike sneakers with white soles. The
        suspect had a “black semi auto handgun,” demanded money from
        the register, and “fired one shot into the wall.” The suspect took
        approximately $820 from the register and fled.” The police sus-
        pected that a “light colored 2015-2017 Nissan Altima” was involved
        based on surveillance from a neighboring business.
               Three days after the Metro PCS robbery, a suspect described
        as a “white male” in his “late 20’s to early 30’s” and wearing “black
        clothing,” a “ski mask,” and “wire rim glasses,” robbed a B Creative
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11341

        painting studio. Once again, the suspect demanded money and ob-
        tained approximately $60. When the employee told the suspect
        that there was no more money, the suspect “cocked” the firearm,
        which was believed to be a “9mm.”
                About 30 minutes after that robbery, a similar suspect wear-
        ing all black clothing, including a black ski mask and gloves, robbed
        a Subway restaurant. The suspect demanded money from the cash
        register and the safe. The suspect fled the location in a vehicle after
        he received money in a “grey bank bag.”
               This armed-robbery spree was investigated by the Pasco
        County Sheriff’s Office Strategic Target Area Response (“STAR”)
        team, which conducts “investigations related to property crime,
        burglaries, robberies, and grand theft autos.” Corporal Andrew
        Denbo, a seven-year veteran of the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office,
        was a member of the STAR team involved in investigating this
        string of robberies in the “new and upcoming” Wesley Chapel area.
        Corporal Denbo was one of the first officers at the scene of the
        Metro PCS store robbery. Given that there was not a lot of crime
        in the Wesley Chapel area, the investigation into these robberies
        was the highest priority.
                                          B
               On March 11, 2018, Corporal Denbo conducted a traffic stop
        after he observed, and confirmed on the radar of his patrol car, a
        “black Audi sedan” traveling at 75 miles per hour in a 55-miles-per-
        hour zone. Mr. Dumas was the driver and sole occupant of the car.
        Corporal Denbo approached the vehicle, and asked Mr. Dumas for
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                         5

        his license and registration. Corporal Denbo also asked Mr. Dumas
        where he was headed and if he had received any citations before.
        Mr. Dumas provided his license and registration and responded
        that he had previously received one citation.
               After Corporal Denbo returned to his patrol car, he ran the
        driver license and registration to check the status of the vehicle and
        Mr. Dumas’ driving history. Corporal Denbo learned that, alt-
        hough the car registration was valid, Mr. Dumas had received a
        couple of warnings from the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office as well
        as several citations in other jurisdictions. Corporal Denbo returned
        to Mr. Dumas’ vehicle to speak with him.
               When Corporal Denbo approached the vehicle the second
        time, Mr. Dumas appeared “nervous,” seemed “uncomfortable,”
        “kept looking around the car,” and was “slow” to respond to Cor-
        poral Denbo’s questions. According to Corporal Denbo, Mr. Du-
        mas was looking at the “front passenger seat of the vehicle,” but
        Corporal Denbo could not see what he was looking at. Corporal
        Denbo then repositioned himself and leaned forward and down, so
        that he could look around Mr. Dumas’ body and into the passenger
        seat. At that point, Corporal Denbo was “[l]ess than a foot” away
        from the rolled-down window of Mr. Dumas’ car. Corporal Denbo
        then observed a partially unzipped bag in the passenger seat, de-
        tected the odor of marijuana coming from within the vehicle, and
        noticed “shake,” or small pieces of green leafy substances, all
        throughout the vehicle’s passenger seat.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11341

               After making these observations, Corporal Denbo asked Mr.
        Dumas to step out of the vehicle. Corporal Denbo also asked Mr.
        Dumas if he had any weapons, and he responded that he had a gun,
        a Glock 17, that was in the bag on the passenger seat. Corporal
        Denbo handcuffed Mr. Dumas, placed him on the curb, removed
        the bag from the vehicle, and took the gun out of the bag and se-
        cured it. Corporal Denbo then called and waited for backup to ar-
        rive before searching the vehicle.
               When Corporal Denbo searched Mr. Dumas’ vehicle he
        found a “piece of marijuana,” “smaller pieces throughout,” and “a
        green leafy substance” on the floorboard that he believed to be
        “marijuana.” According to Corporal Denbo, there was also a “ma-
        rijuana cigarette in the center console ashtray of the vehicle.” Cor-
        poral Denbo further found a “scale” that was “seated next to the
        driver in the center console, which had small flakes of marijuana
        on it and smelled of marijuana.” Corporal Denbo field-tested the
        substance he found, and the result was positive for marijuana.
                In the backseat of the vehicle, Corporal Denbo found a
        “mask” that was “shoved” into the bottom of the pocket directly
        behind the passenger seat. The backseat of the vehicle contained
        several items of clothing, shoes, and personal effects, including a
        “pair of black Nike shoes with a white bottom” and a “New York
        Yankees [baseball] hat.” Corporal Denbo also found “black base-
        ball gloves in the backseat,” along with a “black t-shirt,” and a “dark
        grey bank bag.” He also found suitcases in the trunk which con-
        tained black clothing.
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        21-11341              Opinion of the Court                        7

                                         C
                Following the search, Corporal Denbo placed Mr. Dumas in
        the back of a patrol car and read him his Miranda rights from an
        agency-issued card. After reading the Miranda rights to Mr. Du-
        mas, Corporal Denbo asked him about the marijuana and the mask
        in his car. Mr. Dumas responded that “he just used marijuana, and
        when he played baseball [ ] they didn’t drug test him so it wasn’t a
        problem.” Mr. Dumas claimed he did not know anything about
        the mask. Corporal Denbo arrested Dumas for possession of ma-
        rijuana and transported him to the Sheriff’s district office.
               While Corporal Denbo was waiting for detectives to arrive
        at the district office, he gave Mr. Dumas a copy of a multipurpose
        release/waiver form, which Mr. Dumas signed in his presence.
        Specifically, Mr. Dumas signed the section titled “Statement of Mi-
        randa Rights,” which explained the Miranda rights, but he did not
        sign any of the remaining sections, including the section titled
        “Waiver of Rights.”
                Mr. Dumas was then interviewed by Detective Toner and
        Agent Lanier at the Sheriff’s district office. When Mr. Dumas was
        first questioned about his involvement in the armed robberies, he
        denied any participation. But, when Corporal Denbo was later
        transporting Mr. Dumas to the Pasco County jail, Mr. Dumas be-
        gan to admit his involvement in the robberies. Corporal Denbo
        then returned Mr. Dumas to the Sheriff’s district office, where he
        provided a full video-taped confession. Nearly eight hours had
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                21-11341

        elapsed from the time Corporal Denbo searched Mr. Dumas’ car
        to the time he confessed.
                                         D
                A grand jury indicted Mr. Dumas on five counts of Hobbs
        Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts of
        discharging a firearm during two of the robberies, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). After his indictment, Mr. Dumas filed
        a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the warrantless
        search of his vehicle because, in his view, there was no probable
        cause. Mr. Dumas also moved to suppress his incriminating state-
        ments because he asserted that he was not properly advised of his
        Miranda rights. Mr. Dumas, however, did not challenge the valid-
        ity of the traffic stop in his motion to suppress.
               At the suppression hearing, Corporal Denbo was the only
        witness. Corporal Denbo testified in part that when he searched
        Mr. Dumas’ vehicle and saw the mask, the black gloves, the Yan-
        kees hat, the Nike shoes, the black clothing, and the bag, he “be-
        lieved [Mr. Dumas] was a suspect of [the] robberies at that time.”
        D.E. 72 at 53. During both direct and cross-examination, Corporal
        Denbo admitted that under the rules and policies of the Pasco
        County Sheriff’s Office, his camera should have been turned on
        sooner than it had been.
              Following the hearing, the district court entered an order
        denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress. The district court found
        Corporal Denbo credible and ruled that he had probable cause to
        search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle based on the odor of marijuana
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                         9

        emanating from the vehicle. The district court also ruled that Cor-
        poral Denbo’s detection of the odor of marijuana, his observation
        of marijuana in the vehicle, and Mr. Dumas’ admission of using
        marijuana established sufficient probable cause to support Mr. Du-
        mas’ arrest for possession of marijuana. Additionally, the district
        court concluded that there was no basis to suppress the items re-
        lated to the robberies because they were found in plain view during
        a lawful search of the vehicle. Finally, the district court ruled that
        incriminating statements made by Mr. Dumas were admissible be-
        cause he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
               In light of the district court’s ruling and Mr. Dumas’ desire
        to expedite the appeal of the district court’s order, the parties
        agreed to a streamlined bench trial. After a short trial, the district
        court found Mr. Dumas guilty of all charges and sentenced him to
        25 years in prison.
               This appeal followed.
                                          II
               On appeal, Mr. Dumas argues that the district court erred in
        denying his motion to suppress for three reasons. First, the district
        court erred in finding that Corporal Denbo had probable cause to
        search and arrest him for possession of marijuana because Corporal
        Denbo was “anything but a credible witness[.]” Appellant’s Br. at
        22. Second, the district court erred in finding that Corporal Denbo
        properly seized numerous items unrelated to marijuana possession
        because there was no probable cause to seize those items. See id.
        at 23. Finally, the district court erred in finding that he waived his
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11341

        Miranda rights because Corporal Denbo failed to “secure a valid
        waiver.” Id. at 39.
                We are unpersuaded by Mr. Dumas’ arguments that the dis-
        trict court committed any error. We therefore affirm the district
        court’s denial of Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress.
                                          A
                We begin by addressing Mr. Dumas’ challenges to the dis-
        trict court’s probable cause rulings.
               Probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact subject to
        plenary review. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97
        (1996). We review factual findings for clear error and the applica-
        tion of the law to those facts de novo in an appeal from the denial of
        a motion to suppress. See United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214,
        1222 (11th Cir. 2010). We construe all facts in the light most favor-
        able to the party prevailing below—the government in this in-
        stance. See United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir.
        2000).
                The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
        people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects,
        against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
        U.S. Const. amend. IV. In most circumstances, unless there is con-
        sent, police oﬃcers must obtain a warrant supported by probable
        cause to justify a search under the Fourth Amendment. See United
        States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). One excep-
        tion to the warrant requirement is the so-called automobile excep-
        tion, which allows police to conduct a search of a vehicle if (1) the
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        21-11341                Opinion of the Court                         11

        vehicle is readily mobile, and (2) the police have probable cause for
        the search. See United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.
        2007). No separate exigent circumstances need to be shown. See
        Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999). The validity of the
        search turns on whether there was probable cause to believe the
        vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. See id.
                                           1
                Probable cause exists when, “under the totality of the cir-
        cumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
        of a crime will be found in the vehicle.” Lindsey, 482 F.3d at 1293
        (quotation marks omitted). Specifically, when an officer detects
        the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, there is probable
        cause to support a warrantless search of the vehicle. See United
        States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (“After the officers came
        closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana [sic], they had
        probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contra-
        band.”); Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 560 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015)
        (noting that “the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehi-
        cle is sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle”). See also United
        States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
        (“There is no doubt that the agent’s suspicions rose to the level of
        probable cause when, as the door stood open, he detected what he
        knew from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of mari-
        juana.”); United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)
        (“[T]he recognizable smell of marijuana gives rise to probable
        cause supporting a . . . search.”).
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                21-11341

               Here, Corporal Denbo—whose testimony the district court
        credited—smelled marijuana when he returned to speak to Mr.
        Dumas while conducting a valid traffic stop. After Corporal Denbo
        witnessed Mr. Dumas nervously looking at the bag in the passen-
        ger seat, he shifted his position to lean forward and down to have
        a better view of the passenger seat. At that point, Corporal
        Denbo—who was standing “[l]ess than a foot” away from the
        rolled down window of Mr. Dumas’ car—detected the odor of ma-
        rijuana coming from within the vehicle, and noticed “shake” (or
        small pieces of green leafy substances) all throughout the vehicle’s
        passenger seat. Corporal Denbo, who had extensive training and
        experience with marijuana in his law enforcement career, thus had
        probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Mr. Dumas’ car
        for evidence of marijuana. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 482; Tobin, 923
        F.2d at 1512.
              Mr. Dumas challenges the district court’s conclusion that
        there was probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor
        of marijuana emanating from the vehicle because Corporal Denbo
        was not “a credible witness.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. According to
        Mr. Dumas, Corporal Denbo “inexplicably” failed to record all of
        the “most crucial moments” that allegedly gave him probable
        cause to search the vehicle, which included the interactions with
        Mr. Dumas at the driver-side window. Id. at 26.
              Mr. Dumas’ argument fails because even if Corporal
        Denbo’s camera had been turned on, it could not have captured
        the smell of marijuana. At the suppression hearing Mr. Dumas “did
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                         13

        not present any testimony or evidence to contradict Corporal
        Denbo’s testimony” as to the smell of marijuana, see D.E. 80 at 4,
        and he does not do so on appeal. As the district court observed,
        moreover, Corporal Denbo’s testimony was “consistent with what
        was eventually found in the vehicle.” Id. at 3–4. There was also
        the near contemporaneous video of Corporal Denbo searching Mr.
        Dumas’ vehicle, which revealed evidence of a leafy substance and
        marijuana paraphernalia, as well the questioning of Mr. Dumas in
        the back of the patrol car. This corroborated Corporal Denbo’s
        testimony that he smelled and observed marijuana in Mr. Dumas’
        vehicle.
                In sum, we cannot say that the district court, which had the
        benefit of observing Corporal Denbo, erred in crediting his testi-
        mony. See United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255–56 (11th Cir.
        2015) (“We accept the factfinder’s choice of whom to believe unless
        it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improb-
        able on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it . . .
        Thus, we defer to the district court’s factual determinations unless
        the district court’s understanding of the facts is unbelievable.”) (in-
        ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Corporal Denbo had
        probable cause to search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle.
                                          2
              Additionally, the district court did not err in ruling that Cor-
        poral Denbo had probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for misde-
        meanor possession of marijuana. As the district court noted, Mr.
        Dumas’ arrest for possession of marijuana was based on “Corporal
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11341

        Denbo’s detection of the odor of marijuana, observation of mariju-
        ana in the vehicle, and [Mr. Dumas’] statement admitting that he
        had used marijuana.” D.E. 80 at 5–6. Given these facts, Corporal
        Denbo had probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for possession of
        marijuana. See United States v. Tate, 855 F. App’x 509, 512 (11th Cir.
        2021) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest defendant
        for possession of marijuana because the police officers found him
        passed out in the driver’s seat of his vehicle at an intersection, he
        was described as drowsy and loopy, and the police officers claimed
        to see an item that looked like a blunt in the center console).
                Mr. Dumas’ challenge to the probable cause determination
        of his arrest for possession of marijuana focuses, once again, on at-
        tacking the credibility of Corporal Denbo due to his failure to rec-
        ord the entirety of the encounter. See Appellant’s Br. at 26–31. Mr.
        Dumas’ arguments as to the constant deactivation of the camera,
        which Corporal Denbo admitted was in violation of the rules and
        policies of the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office, and the fact that the
        marijuana cigarette was not among the items inventoried from the
        car, are well taken but they do not alter our conclusion.
                First, Corporal Denbo recorded key critical moments of his
        encounter with Mr. Dumas that support the conclusion that he had
        probable cause to arrest him for possession of marijuana. Corporal
        Denbo, for example, recorded the search of Mr. Dumas’ car, which
        showed evidence of marijuana particles as well as drug parapher-
        nalia (i.e., the scale) in the car. Corporal Denbo also recorded the
        field test that he conducted of a clump of marijuana found in the
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                         15

        vehicle, which yielded a positive result. And Corporal Denbo rec-
        orded his interview of Mr. Dumas in the back of his patrol vehicle,
        in which he admitted that he used marijuana. Thus, Mr. Dumas’
        argument that there was no evidence to support the district court’s
        probable cause determination is incorrect. Probable cause “does
        not require convincing proof.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878
        (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
                Second, the district court explicitly acknowledged the credi-
        bility concerns that Mr. Dumas now raises. Indeed, the district
        court went out of its way to explain that “[w]ith the advent of mod-
        ern technology . . . it is increasingly difficult to understand why law
        enforcement officers are either unwilling or unable to consistently
        record encounters with the public.” D.E. 80 at 7. According to the
        district court, “had Corporal Denbo recorded his entire encounter
        with [Mr. Dumas] on his body camera in this instance, it is highly
        unlikely the instant motion would have been filed in the first
        place.” Id. at 8. Nevertheless, the district court found Corporal
        Denbo’s testimony to be credible because “[a]lthough it is certainly
        the better practice for law enforcement officers to record encoun-
        ters with the public, there is no legal requirement that they do so.”
        Id. Given the consideration the district court gave to the issue of
        Corporal Denbo’s body camera after listening to the testimony and
        reviewing the evidence, which included more than three hours of
        cross-examination by Mr. Dumas’ counsel, this is not one of those
        rare instances where the credibility determination and finding of
        probable cause cannot stand.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11341

                                          3
               We next address the district court’s ruling that the items un-
        related to the possession of marijuana did not have to be sup-
        pressed. The district court explained that Corporal Denbo’s belief
        that the items were linked to the recent armed robberies that he
        had “personally investigated” was not “mere speculation,” and that
        the items were found in “plain view” during a lawful search of Mr.
        Dumas’ vehicle. See D.E. 80 at 5. We agree.
                The plain-view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of
        an object where an officer is lawfully located in a place from which
        the object can be plainly viewed, the officer has a lawful right to
        access the object, and the incriminating character of the object is
        “immediately apparent.” United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290
        (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37
        (1990)). The plain-view doctrine applies, for example, when, dur-
        ing the course of a lawful search for certain objects, the police come
        across other items of incriminating character. See Smith, 459 F.3d
        at 1290. For an item’s incriminating character to be “immediately
        apparent,” the police must have probable cause to believe the ob-
        ject in plain view is contraband or evidence of a crime. See Minne-
        sota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
               Corporal Denbo was lawfully located and had a lawful right
        to access Mr. Dumas’ vehicle when he was searching for marijuana.
        Indeed, as previously discussed, Corporal Denbo had probable
        cause to search the car for evidence of marijuana. Therefore, the
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                        17

        first two elements of the plain view inquiry are satisfied. See United
        States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 720 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Once probable
        cause exists to search the vehicle, the police may search all parts of
        the vehicle, and any containers therein, where the object of the
        search might be found.”) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
        301 (1999)).
                As to the third element—whether the incriminating charac-
        ter of the object is immediately apparent—it is satisfied as well. At
        the suppression hearing, Corporal Denbo testified that “[he] per-
        sonally believed [Mr. Dumas] was responsible” for the robbery
        spree in the Wesley Chapel area. See D.E. 72 at 55–56. Corporal
        Denbo’s belief is not, of course, dispositive because “probable
        cause is an objective standard[.]” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
        S. Ct. 577, 584 n.2 (2018). But that belief was based on his discovery
        of items that resembled items from the recent armed robberies, in-
        cluding (1) a dark grey bank bag, (2) black Nike shoes with white
        soles, (3) a black mask, (4) black gloves, and (5) black clothing. See
        D.E. 72 at 22, 44, 48–49. Corporal Denbo also testified that Mr.
        Dumas resembled the robbery suspect because he was of the same
        “race” as the suspect, and had a similar “height” and “body type.”
        See id. at 46. In particular, Corporal Denbo noticed that Mr. Dumas
        had “thicker eyebrows” and “blue eyes,” which matched the de-
        scription of the robbery suspect. See id. at 47. Corporal Denbo tes-
        tified that Mr. Dumas’ vehicle, a black Audi sedan, and the vehicle
        that Mr. Dumas’ mother drove to the scene of his arrest, a white
        sedan, matched the description of the cars in the “be on the look-
        out” (BOLO) notices. See id. Finally, Corporal Denbo testified that
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-11341

        the black handgun Mr. Dumas had in his car, including its Luger
        ammunition, resembled the black handgun the robber had bran-
        dished in two of the robberies and the Luger shell casings that were
        recovered at one of the robbery scenes. See id. at 48.
               In light of this testimony, a reasonable oﬃcer with Corporal
        Denbo’s prior knowledge about the recent armed-robbery spree
        could conclude that the items in the vehicle were evidence of the
        recent armed robberies. The district court, therefore, did not err
        in denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress on this ground. See
        United States v. Reeves, 604 F. App’x 823, 828–829 (11th Cir. 2015)
        (holding that the district court did not err in denying a motion to
        suppress evidence that a police officer found in plain view during a
        lawful search of the defendant’s backpack that was located in his
        vehicle and contained items—a laptop computer, approximately
        thirty credit cards, and a notebook with names, dates of birth, and
        social security numbers—whose incriminating character was im-
        mediately apparent to the police officer as evidence of fraud). Cf.
        Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 720 (holding that the district court did not err
        in denying a motion to suppress because “mail from the IRS not
        addressed to [the defendant] or the other passenger in the vehicle,
        debit cards not in their names, and currency within plain view”
        were suﬃcient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle for
        evidence of identity theft and tax fraud).
              Mr. Dumas challenges the district court’s ruling because
        “none of the seized items unrelated to the marijuana possession
        were incriminatory on their face.” Appellant’s Br. at 36–37.
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                       19

        According to Mr. Dumas, “[t]here is nothing immediately criminal
        about clothing, shoes, baseball equipment, or even a securely en-
        cased firearm.” Id. at 37. Mr. Dumas’ argument, however, fails.
        As the district court observed, “Corporal Denbo had personally in-
        vestigated some of those robberies so he had particularized famili-
        arity with the circumstances of those crimes.” D.E. 80 at 5.
               We find instructive and persuasive our decision in United
        States v. Rivera, 824 F. App’x 930, 934 (11th Cir. 2020). In Rivera,
        five convenience stores in the Tampa area were robbed in a ten-
        day period by an unknown Hispanic male brandishing a short-bar-
        reled shotgun. See id. at 932. In four of the robberies, the suspect
        appeared to be wearing “the same white athletic shoes with black
        edging.” Id. During the course of the police investigation, the po-
        lice witnessed a domestic violence incident at a motel involving
        one of the robbery suspects. See id. After the police entered a motel
        room to check on the safety of the victim, and in the process of
        conducting a protective sweep of the motel room, the police offic-
        ers “saw a white athletic sneaker with a black trim on the floor of
        the motel room.” Id. In affirming the district court’s denial of a
        motion to suppress, the panel held that “the plain-view doctrine
        applie[d] to the discovery of the sneaker because it was in plain
        view and its incriminating character would have been immediately
        apparent to the officers” because “[t]he masked robber was wear-
        ing sneakers with the same distinctive pattern, [the suspect]
        matched the description of a man wearing similar sneakers just be-
        fore the robbery, and [a car] linked to at least one of the robberies
        was parked at the motel.” Id. at 934. The panel explained that
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        20                    Opinion of the Court                21-11341

        although “mere possession of a similar sneaker alone might not be
        enough . . . the combined circumstances made the incriminating
        character of the sneaker in the motel room where [the suspect] was
        present immediately apparent.” Id.
                As in Rivera, the record here reveals that the incriminating
        character of the Nike sneakers and other items that were found in
        Mr. Dumas’ vehicle was immediately apparent to Corporal Denbo,
        who was intimately involved in the investigation of the recent
        armed-robbery spree in the Wesley Chapel area. Corporal Denbo
        testified that he was among the first officers on the scene at the
        Metro PCS robbery, so he remembered that Mr. Dumas’ descrip-
        tion matched the “description that the victim had provided in that
        particular case.” D.E. 72 at 47. Furthermore, according to Cor-
        poral Denbo, who had personally reviewed the security footage
        many times, the suspect of the Metro PCS robbery wore black
        “Nike shoes with [ ] white sole[s],” a black ski “mask,” “black
        gloves,” and was armed with a “9 millimeter handgun.” Id. at 48–
        50. Although we recognize, as did the panel did in Rivera, that mere
        possession of a common pair of black Nike shoes alone might not
        be enough, we conclude that under the totality of the circum-
        stances, the incriminating character of the items in Mr. Dumas’ ve-
        hicle was immediately apparent to Corporal Denbo. See Rivera, 824
        F. App’x at 934.
               Contrary to Mr. Dumas’ contention, Corporal Denbo’s be-
        lief was not “mere speculation.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. Although
        Mr. Dumas highlights some factual differences from the BOLOs,
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                        21

        such as the gun with a silver or stainless-steel upper slide and the
        height differences of the suspect, those discrepancies ignore the re-
        maining similarities previously discussed that led Corporal Denbo
        to believe that Mr. Dumas was involved in the armed robberies.
        Probable cause turns on the “assessment of probability in particular
        factual contexts[.]” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citation and internal
        quotation marks omitted). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
        160, 175 (1949) (“In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
        very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not tech-
        nical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
        life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
        act.”).
                Finally, Mr. Dumas claims that Corporal Denbo “twice ad-
        mitted, on video, that there was not probable cause to charge Mr.
        Dumas with the robberies.” Appellant’s Br. at 35. Mr. Dumas rea-
        sons that because an assistant state attorney purportedly deter-
        mined that there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for
        the robberies, then “there was no probable cause to seize items
        speculated to be involved in the robbery.” Id. Mr. Dumas’ argu-
        ment, however, does not carry the day because the subjective be-
        liefs of Corporal Denbo or the assistant state attorney are irrelevant
        to probable cause’s objective analysis. See Craig v. Singletary, 127
        F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]the subjective beliefs of De-
        tective Singer are irrelevant to our probable cause analysis. Proba-
        ble cause issues are to be decided on an objective basis by courts
        without regard to the subjective beliefs of law enforcement offic-
        ers, whatever those beliefs may have been.”). See also Whren v.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11341

        United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play
        no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
                                          III
              We conclude by addressing the argument that the district
        court erred in finding that Mr. Dumas waived his Miranda rights.
        See Appellant’s Br. at 38–41.
                                           A
                Miranda effectuates the Fifth Amendment’s protection
        against self-incrimination and requires that defendants be informed
        of their rights. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986). A
        valid waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and
        intelligent. See United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir.
        2010). Finding a valid waiver requires a two-step inquiry. We ask
        whether the waiver was (1) a “free and deliberate” choice (2) made
        with a “full awareness” of the Fifth Amendment’s protections and
        the consequences of abandoning them. See id. (internal quotation
        marks omitted). We find voluntary waiver only “if the totality of
        the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an un-
        coerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.” United
        States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
               We conclude that Mr. Dumas freely and deliberately waived
        his Miranda rights when he spoke to law enforcement. When ana-
        lyzing if waiver was “free and deliberate,” we consider “the defend-
        ant’s intelligence, the length of his detention, the nature of the in-
        terrogation, the use of any physical force against him, or the use of
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                       23

        any promises or inducements by police.” Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d
        1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003). As the district court observed, when
        Mr. Dumas was detained he was “23 years old and had a high
        school education.” D.E. 80 at 5. And there is no argument, evi-
        dence, or allegation that Mr. Dumas was coerced when he spoke
        to Corporal Denbo in his patrol car or after he was taken to the
        Sheriff’s district office.
                We also conclude that Mr. Dumas had full awareness of the
        Fifth Amendment’s protections and the consequences of abandon-
        ing them. When analyzing these issues, we pay special attention
        to the defendant’s intelligence and mental capacity. See Coleman v.
        Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1426 (11th Cir. 1994). Nothing in the rec-
        ord shows that Mr. Dumas’ intelligence prevented him from appre-
        ciating the importance of his rights or the choice to waive them.
        After Corporal Denbo read Mr. Dumas his Miranda rights in the
        back of the patrol car aloud, Mr. Dumas affirmed that he under-
        stood his rights, as evidenced by the video. Likewise, Mr. Dumas
        was informed again of his Fifth Amendment rights at the Sheriff’s
        district office, where he signed the multi-purpose form. Because
        Mr. Dumas was an adult of at least average intelligence, who spoke
        English fluently, he had full awareness of his rights.
               Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court
        did not err when it found that Mr. Dumas knowingly and volun-
        tarily waived his Miranda rights. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
        370, 388–89 (2010) (“In sum, a suspect who has received and under-
        stood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11341

        rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced
        statement to the police.”).
                                          B
               Finally, Mr. Dumas contends that Corporal Denbo’s reading
        of his Miranda rights was too quick to secure a valid waiver. Cor-
        poral Denbo, he points out, read 100 words in 13 seconds. See Ap-
        pellant’s Br. at 39. Though a police oﬃcer should not speed-read
        Miranda rights, here the video depicting the moment Corporal
        Denbo read Mr. Dumas his Miranda rights in the back of the patrol
        car demonstrates that Corporal Denbo read the Miranda rights at a
        speed that adequately enabled Mr. Dumas to understand his rights.
        Although Corporal Denbo read the Miranda rights swiftly, it was
        not so fast that they were incomprehensible, particularly given that
        Corporal Denbo paused after reading each right, that he explicitly
        asked Mr. Dumas whether he understood the rights that he read to
        him, and that Mr. Dumas said he did. In sum, Mr. Dumas has failed
        to convince us that the manner in which Corporal Denbo read him
        his Miranda rights was not understandable or unclear as a matter
        of law.
               Mr. Dumas also contends that law enforcement’s failure to
        obtain his written waiver of Miranda rights at the Sheriﬀ’s district
        oﬃce means he did not waive his rights there. See Appellant’s Br.
        at 41. We ﬁnd this argument unconvincing as well. “A signed Mi-
        randa waiver is usually strong evidence that the defendant waived
        his rights, but it is not necessary.” Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319
        (emphasis added). See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
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        21-11341               Opinion of the Court                        25

        (1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right
        to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof
        of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary
        or suﬃcient to establish waiver.”). The fact that Mr. Dumas did not
        sign the “Waiver of Rights” portion of the Miranda form he signed
        at the Sheriﬀ’s district oﬃce does not mean he did not waive his
        Miranda rights. See Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319 (rejecting de-
        fendant’s argument that he did not freely and knowingly waive his
        Miranda rights because he did not sign the Miranda waiver form
        presented to him).
                                         IV
              We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Dumas’ motion
        to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle
        and the incriminating statements he made following his arrest.
              AFFIRMED.