Court Opinion

ID: 9588688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:55.228785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:13.001098
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
“While it is true that where venue is not contested slight proof will suffice (Loftin v. State, 230 Ga. 92 (195 SE2d 402) (1974)), it must nevertheless be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Parks v. State, 212 Ga. 433, 435 (93 SE2d 663) (1956).” Carter v. State, 146 Ga. App. 681 (247 SE2d 191). See also Trogdon v. State, 176 Ga. App. 246, 247 (1) (335 SE2d 481). Linder the facts and circumstances of the case sub judice, venue in Coweta County must have been established by some slight evidence that defendant’s home, where the stolen property was found by the Sheriff’s Department investigator, is located in Coweta County. Barfield v. State, 149 Ga. App. 166 (2) (253 *221SE2d 781). The record does not contain any evidence establishing this fact.
The State urges that “[t]he evidence at trial showed [defendant] to be in possession of items stolen in two separate burglaries, and it was specifically shown that: (1) the burglaries occurred in the City of Palmetto, Coweta County, Georgia . . . ; (2) [defendant] exercised control over the stolen items in his mobile home in Palmetto, Georgia . . . ; and that (3) [defendant’s] mobile home was located directly behind the Collinsworth Road Truck Stop, the site of one burglary, and not far from Weldon Road, the site of the second burglary. . . . This Court is authorized to take judicial notice that [defendant’s] mobile home is located within Coweta County, Georgia. The evidence established that the burglaries occurred in Palmetto in Coweta County . . . , that [defendant’s] mobile home was located in Palmetto, right behind the burglarized truck stop and near the Weldon Road burglary site.”
Of the three specific facts upon which the State’s argument rests, the first, that the burglaries occurred in the City of Palmetto is irrelevant. There is no evidence that defendant’s residence was located in Palmetto, therefore, the second fact asserted by the State is not supported by the record. The remaining factual predicate of the State’s position, that defendant’s residence is located “directly behind” one Coweta County burglary site and “not far” from the road on which the second Coweta County burglary site is located is not alone sufficient to establish venue in Coweta County since the terms used are too vague and indefinite to provide a meaningful indication of location. If judicial notice is taken of the location of the City of Palmetto as apparently urged by the State, this adds only that that city is located in both Fulton and Coweta Counties. Therefore, the State has failed to meet its burden of proof regarding venue.
The majority’s reliance upon Melton v. State, 252 Ga. 97 (311 SE2d 471), is misplaced and that case should be distinguished. In Melton the offense of child molestation occurred at the victim’s home in College Park, a city which is located partially in Fulton County and partially in Clayton County. The evidence that the victim attended the Fulton County school system authorized an inference that the victim’s home was located in the Fulton County portion of College Park. Thus, the decision in Melton was predicated upon a logical inference arising from direct evidence.
In the case at bar, on the other hand, the majority rpsts its decision upon a presumption which absolves the State of its burden to prove venue. Using the majority’s reasoning, venue will be proven sufficient by simply showing that the crime was investigated by an officer of the forum county.
I would hold that the State has failed to prove venue. Therefore, *222I respectfully dissent.
Decided April 3, 1989.
Sanders, Mottola, Haugen & Mann, Walter S. Haugen, for appellant.
William G. Hamrick, Jr., District Attorney, Agnes T. McCabe, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Carley, Judge Sognier and Judge Benham join in this dissent.