Court Opinion

ID: 9401917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 17:03:42.421112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.997768
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/14/23 In re Ishani S. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re ISHANI S.,                                            B323573
 a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.                                         (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06798C)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 GILBERTO G.

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Juvenile Court Referee.
Conditionally affirmed with directions.
      Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Senior
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                        INTRODUCTION

      Gilberto G., the incarcerated father of eight-year-old
Ishani S., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders, challenging the court’s findings under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)
and (d),1 that Gilberto’s sexual abuse of an 11-year-old girl and
his resulting criminal convictions put Ishani at substantial risk of
serious physical harm or sexual abuse. Gilberto argues that the
judgment in a prior dependency case bars this proceeding under
the doctrine of issue preclusion and that substantial evidence did
not support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings based on his
criminal convictions. Gilberto also argues the juvenile court
erred in denying him family reunification services under section
361.5.
      We conclude that, because the juvenile court declared
Ishani a dependent child of the court based on both her mother’s
conduct and on Gilberto’s convictions, and because Gilberto has
not challenged the jurisdiction findings based on the mother’s
conduct or shown the additional findings based on his convictions
prejudice him, his appeal from the jurisdiction findings is
nonjusticiable. We also conclude the court did not err in denying
Gilberto reunification services.
      Finally, Gilberto contends the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services did not comply with
the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to this code.

                                 2
§ 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. The
Department concedes, and we agree, Gilberto is correct.
Therefore, we conditionally affirm the juvenile court’s findings
and orders and direct the court to ensure the Department
complies with ICWA and related California law.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Juvenile Court Sustains a Prior Petition and
             Terminates Jurisdiction with a Custody and
             Visitation Order
       In 2016 the juvenile court sustained a petition by the
Department under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging there was
a substantial risk Ishani would suffer serious physical harm
because her mother, Alma, had been arrested for domestic
violence in connection with her relationship with Edwin G., her
boyfriend at the time. The juvenile court initially placed Ishani
with Gilberto, but eventually ordered Ishani to return to, and
reside primarily with, Alma.
       The Department later filed a supplemental petition under
section 342 alleging Gilberto had sexually abused an 11-year-old
girl and was arrested for lewd and lascivious acts with a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The juvenile
court sustained the supplemental petition. The court ultimately
terminated its jurisdiction and entered a custody and visitation
order granting Alma sole legal and physical custody of Ishani.
When the court terminated its jurisdiction, Gilberto was
incarcerated and awaiting trial on the criminal charges. The
custody order granted Gilberto monthly monitored visits with
Ishani and semiweekly phone calls.

                                 3
      B.     The Juvenile Court Sustains a New Petition and
             Makes Disposition Orders
       In 2020 the Department filed a new petition under
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). The Department
alleged there was a substantial risk Ishani would suffer serious
physical harm because Alma and her new boyfriend, Dandre, had
a history of violent altercations in Ishani’s presence, Alma “failed
to enforce” a criminal protective order she had obtained after
Dandre was convicted of inflicting corporal injury on her, and
Alma allowed Dandre to live with her and Ishani. The
Department also alleged under section 355.1, subdivision (d), that
there was a rebuttable presumption Ishani was a dependent child
of the court because Gilberto had (by then) been convicted of
committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of
14 and committing an act of sexual penetration by force upon a
child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (a), 289,
subd. (a)(1)(B)), and because Gilberto was a registered sex
offender.
       Gilberto filed a motion to dismiss the Department’s
allegations against him. He argued issue preclusion barred the
Department’s new petition because the allegations against him
were “identical to those which were already litigated” in the
Department’s prior petition and there were no new facts or
evidence supporting the allegations in the new petition.
       At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the
juvenile court denied Gilberto’s motion, ruling issue preclusion
did not bar the Department’s petition because the allegations in
the two petitions were not identical—in particular, Gilberto had
been convicted of two sex crimes and was a registered sex
offender. The court also ruled Gilberto’s prior sexual abuse of a
minor continued to place Ishani at risk. The juvenile court
sustained the allegations against Alma and Gilberto, declared

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Ishani a dependent child of the court, removed her from Alma,
and placed her with the Department. The court further ruled
Gilberto was not entitled to reunification services under section
361.5, subdivision (e)(1), because he had been sentenced to prison
for 20 years (12 years for sexual penetration of a minor, and eight
years for lewd and lascivious acts with a minor) and was not
eligible for parole until 2031—well past the reunification period
authorized under section 361.5—and because the juvenile court
had not ordered reunification services for Gilberto in the prior
dependency proceeding. Gilberto timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.     The Appeal from the Jurisdiction Findings Is
             Nonjusticiable
       Gilberto contends the juvenile court erred in sustaining the
Department’s petition under section 300 based on his sexual
abuse of a minor and resulting criminal convictions. The
Department contends Gilberto’s challenge to the court’s
jurisdiction findings is nonjusticiable because he does not contest
the jurisdiction findings based on Alma’s conduct.
       When a petition under section 300 alleges multiple grounds
for jurisdiction, “a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is
supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Madison S. (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 308, 328-329; see In re Travis C. (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1224; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
438, 451.) A child is a dependent child of the court “‘if the actions
of either parent bring [the minor] within one of the statutory
definitions of a dependent . . . .’” (In re Briana V. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308; see In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th

                                  5
195, 212; In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484,
1492.) Therefore, “‘an appellate court may decline to address the
evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings
once a single finding has been found to be supported by the
evidence’ or is unchallenged,” if the ruling on the remaining
findings would have no “practical, tangible impact on the parties’
conduct or legal status.” (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 227,
237; see Briana V., at p. 308; I.A., at p. 1492.)
       Here, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over Ishani
after sustaining the Department’s allegations regarding the
history of domestic violence between Alma and Dandre and
Gilberto’s criminal convictions. Because Gilberto does not
challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings based on
Alma’s conduct, reversing the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
findings against Gilberto would have no impact on the court’s
jurisdiction over Ishani. (See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at
p. 212 [because “substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s decision to find the [children] dependents based on
mother’s conduct,” the reviewing court “need not review the
evidentiary basis for the sustained allegations against father”];
In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th. at pp. 1492-1493 [court would
not review jurisdiction findings based on the father’s conduct
because the juvenile court would “still be entitled to assert
jurisdiction over the minor on the basis of the unchallenged
allegations” regarding the mother’s conduct]; In re J.C. (2014)
233 Cal.App.4th 1, 3 [court would not review jurisdiction findings
based on the father’s conduct where the father did not contest the
jurisdiction findings based on the mother’s conduct and did not
explain “any legal or practical consequences that might flow”
from the finding against him].) Therefore, his appeal is
nonjusticiable.

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       Gilberto contends we should review the court’s jurisdiction
findings against him because the juvenile court’s decision to deny
him reunification services “flowed directly” from those findings.
As the Supreme Court recently explained in In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, a court may review a jurisdiction finding where
the finding “affects parental custody rights [citation], curtails a
parent’s contact with his or her child [citation], or ‘has resulted in
[disposition] orders which continue to adversely affect’ a parent.”
(Id. at p. 278; see In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774
[courts may “reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional
finding when, . . . the finding serves as the basis for a
dispositional order also challenged on appeal”].)
       Gilberto’s contention is based on a misunderstanding of the
court’s order denying him reunification services. The court did
not base its order on the jurisdiction findings against Gilberto. In
sustaining the petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)
and (d), the juvenile court found that there was a substantial risk
Ishani would suffer serious physical harm as a result of Gilberto’s
sexual misconduct, resulting criminal convictions, and status as a
sex offender (§ 300, subd. (b)) and that there was a substantial
risk she would be sexually abused (§ 300, subd. (d)). In contrast,
the juvenile court denied Gilberto reunification services under
section 361.5 because Gilberto could not possibly reunify with
Ishani within the reunification period—the criminal court had
sentenced Gilberto to prison for 20 years, and Gilberto was not
eligible for parole for nine years—and because the juvenile court
in the prior dependency proceeding had denied Gilberto
reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (e) [“if the parent or
guardian is incarcerated, . . . the court shall order reasonable
services unless the court determines, by clear and convincing
evidence, those services would be detrimental to the child” based

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on, among other factors, “the length of the sentence” and “the
likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration . . . within
the reunification time limitations”].) Indeed, to deny Gilberto
reunification services, the court did not need to find there was a
substantial risk Ishani would suffer physical harm or sexual
abuse because of Gilberto’s conduct, and the court did not deny
reunification services for that reason. (See In re S.F. (2023) ___
Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [2023 WL 3489025, p. 17] [“there need not
be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom
the court imposes a dispositional order”]; In re Briana V., supra,
236 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [same]; In re I.A., supra,
201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 [“[a] jurisdictional finding involving
the conduct of a particular parent is not necessary for the court to
enter orders binding on that parent, once dependency jurisdiction
has been established”].)
       Nor has Gilberto shown the jurisdiction findings would
prejudice him in future dependency proceedings or have
consequences beyond jurisdiction. (See In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 285; In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634, 639.)
The juvenile court in the prior case sustained a petition and
declared Ishani a dependent child of the court because of
Gilberto’s sexual abuse of a minor and has awarded Alma sole
legal and physical custody of Ishani. Gilberto does not dispute
that he sexually abused a child under the age of 14 or that he was
convicted of two sex crimes; he argues only that the Department
may not file a new dependency petition based on his prior
conduct and convictions. Given that a juvenile court and a
criminal court have already determined Gilberto committed acts
of sexual abuse, it is unclear how another jurisdiction finding
under section 300 could cause Gilberto any (further) prejudice.

                                 8
         In re Madison S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th 308 is instructive.
There, the mother challenged one of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings—that her child was at risk of harm because
the mother disciplined the child with a spoon and belt—but not
the other bases for jurisdiction. The mother, however, did not
claim the allegations about her use of a spoon and belt
allegations were “untrue” or “unsupported by the evidence.” (Id.
at p. 329.) In declining to review the mother’s challenge to the
jurisdiction finding, the court explained “[t]he substance of the
. . . allegation[s] would almost certainly be available in any future
dependency . . . proceeding, regardless of any determination on
our part as to whether it formed an independent basis for
juvenile court jurisdiction”; thus, the court held, it was “purely an
academic question whether such an allegation, standing alone, is
sufficient to support dependency jurisdiction . . . .” (Id. at p. 330.)
Similarly, because there is no dispute Gilberto was convicted on
two counts of sexually abusing a minor, the substance of the
Department’s allegations will be available for the juvenile court
to consider when issuing any order in this or future dependency
proceedings.

      B.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s
             Order Denying Gilberto Reunification Services
      “Reunification services for incarcerated parents are
specifically governed by section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), which
provides, ‘the court shall order reasonable services unless the
court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, those
services would be detrimental to the child.’” (Fabian L. v.
Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1028; see In re
Christopher L. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1190.) The

                                  9
statutorily enumerated factors for determining detriment include
the “‘age of the child, the degree of parent-child bonding, the
length of the sentence, . . . the nature of the crime . . . , the degree
of detriment to the child if services are not offered . . . , the
likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration . . . within
the reunification time limitations,’ and ‘any other appropriate
factors.’” (Christopher L., at p. 1190; see § 361.5, subd. (e)(1).)
         We review an order denying reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (e), for substantial evidence.
(Fabian L. v. Superior Court, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028;
In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484.) “In making this
determination, we review the record in the light most favorable to
the court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences
from the evidence to support the findings and orders. [Citation.]
‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court.’” (Fabian L., at p. 1028; see
James C., at p. 484.) In addition, because section 361.5 requires
the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that
reunification services would be detrimental, we take into account
the elevated standard of proof and consider “whether the record
as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was
true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)
         Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding
that providing Gilberto reunification services would be
detrimental to Ishani. “The purpose of providing reunification
services is to ‘eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody
. . . to further[ ] the goal of preservation of family,’” but “‘the
statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the

                                  10
delay attributable to the provision of reunification services would
be more detrimental to the minor than discounting the competing
goal of family preservation . . . .’” (In re I.A. (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 19, 23; see Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1120.)
        Reunification services would not have facilitated a reunion
between Ishani and Gilberto. Gilberto was serving a 20-year
prison sentence, and the juvenile court found Gilberto would not
be eligible for parole until 2031, a finding Gilberto does not
challenge. That was well past the 12-month reunification period
(and the 24-month extended reunification period) authorized by
section 361.5. (See § 365.1, subd. (a)(1)(A), (4)(A).) That Gilberto
had no chance of reunifying with Ishani for nearly a decade was
sufficient for the court to find that providing reunification
services would be detrimental to Ishani and would only interfere
with and delay her opportunity for stability in a permanent
home. (See Fabian L. v. Superior Court, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1030-1031 [“there are many cases in which the provision of
. . . services has little or no likelihood of success and thus only
serves to delay stability for the child,” and this “is especially true
when the parent will be incarcerated longer than the maximum
time periods for reunification efforts”]; see, e.g., In re Christopher
L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1191 [providing reunification
services would be detrimental to the child “beyond a reasonable
doubt” because the father would not be eligible for parole until
three years after the child was detained, and “any services the
court might order could not have successfully reunified [the
father] with [the child] within the statutory timeframe”]; In re
James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 485-486 [substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s order denying

                                 11
reunification services where the father’s release date was two
years after the child protective agency detained the children]; see
also Edgar O. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 13, 18
[section 361.5, subdivision (e), “does not require that each listed
factor exist in any particular case”].)
       In addition, as discussed, the juvenile court may consider
the degree of parent-child bonding, the nature of the crime, and
the degree of detriment to the child if the court did not provide
reunification services. (See § 361.5, subd. (e)(1); In re
Christopher L., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1190.) Gilberto
acknowledges his crime was serious. He sexually abused an
11-year-old girl in his home on at least six occasions, including
while Ishani was home and under his care. There was no
evidence that Gilberto and Ishani had a close bond or that it
would be detrimental to Ishani if the court were to deny Gilberto
reunification services. According to Alma, Ishani and Gilberto
spoke a few times on the phone when Gilberto was first
incarcerated, but they eventually stopped talking to each other,
Ishani no longer wanted to speak with Gilberto, and Ishani said
she did not feel safe with him. Dandre also confirmed that, when
Gilberto called, “Ishani was not really interested in talking to
[him].” When interviewed by a Department social worker, Ishani
referred to Dandre, not Gilberto, as her father, and said she
wanted to live with him and Alma. (See Christopher L., at
p. 1191 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s order
denying an incarcerated father reunification services where the
father had “no relationship” with the child and had a “violent
felony conviction” that kept him from seeing the child]; In re
James C., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 485 [substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s order denying an incarcerated

                                12
father reunification services where there was no evidence the
children “had any kind of relationship with him”].)
         Gilberto points to other evidence in the record, including
that he was not present during the domestic violence incidents
between Alma and Dandre that caused the Department to
initiate the current dependency proceedings, that he “made plans
. . . for his ex-partner to have rights” to Ishani, and that he
“continued to ask for phone calls.” None of this evidence is
particularly relevant to the factors enumerated in section 361.5,
subdivision (e)(1), which governs whether providing the parent
reunification services would be detrimental to the child.
Moreover, the only “evidence” Gilberto made plans for someone to
care for Ishani was his attorney’s argument at the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing. (See In re Anthony T. (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1032, fn. 7 [“[u]nsworn statements of
counsel are not evidence”]. ) Similarly, while counsel for Gilberto
requested that Gilberto continue to have monitored calls with
Ishani, Alma stated that Gilberto had not made much of an effort
to call Ishani during the past few years while he was
incarcerated. (See Fabian L. v. Superior Court, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028 [in reviewing an order denying
reunification services, we “draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence to support the [juvenile court’s] findings and
orders”].) Regardless of whether Gilberto was responsible for the
most recent exercise of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction or wanted
to have a relationship with Ishani, substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s findings under section 361.5,
subdivision (e)(1). (See In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218,
1227 [“‘“‘“the power of the appellate courts begins and ends with
a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,

                                13
contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion
reached by the [juvenile court]”’”’”].)

      C.      Remand Is Required for the Department and the
              Juvenile Court To Comply with ICWA
       “ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq.) set minimal procedural protections for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316), including “‘ask[ing] each participant “at
the commencement” of a child custody proceeding “whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child”’” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500;
see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77).
California law “‘more broadly imposes on social services agencies
and juvenile courts (but not parents) an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in the dependency
proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”’” (J.C., at p. 77;
see § 224.2, subd. (a); In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 237.)
       “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child
protective agency to ask ‘the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and
where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’”
(In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.Ap.5th at p. 77; see In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
Although this duty is “commonly referred to as the ‘initial duty of
inquiry,’ it ‘begins with the initial contact’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and
continues throughout the dependency proceedings.” (J.C., at

                                  14
p. 77; see In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) “‘[T]he
juvenile court [also] “has a responsibility to ascertain that [the
child protective agency] has conducted an adequate
investigation”’ [citation], and must determine whether ICWA
applies to the child’s proceedings [citation].” (In re G.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 15, 31; see § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); J.C., at
p. 78; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3).) The court may not
“find that ICWA does not apply when the absence of evidence
that a child is an Indian child results from a [child protective
agency] inquiry that is not proper, adequate, or demonstrative of
due diligence.” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408;
see In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.)
       Alma filed a Judicial Council ICWA-020 Parental
Notification of Indian Status form before the detention hearing.
The form included a list of various statements that may indicate
a child has Indian ancestry. Alma checked the box next to the
statement, “None of the above apply.” Gilberto subsequently filed
a substantially similar Judicial Council ICWA-020 form, checking
the same none-of-the-above-apply box. At the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the court entered an order finding that
ICWA did not apply.
       Gilberto contends, the Department concedes, and we agree
the Department did not comply with its duty of inquiry because it
did not ask any known extended family members whether Ishani
may be an Indian child. (See In re Rylei S., supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319 [“Regardless of a parent’s response
concerning his or her possible Indian ancestry on the ICWA-020
Parental Notification of Indian Status form, . . . section 224.2,
subdivision (b), requires the agency to ask the child, the parents,
extended family members and others who have an interest in the

                                15
child whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”].) Those
family members include Alma’s father, Alma’s sisters, Gilberto’s
parents, and Gilberto’s brothers. The juvenile court also erred in
finding ICWA did not apply and in failing to ensure the
Department conducted an adequate inquiry. (See Rylei S., at p.
320.) Therefore, we direct the juvenile court to ensure the
Department conducts a proper inquiry. (See id. at p. 326; In re
J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 507; In re J.C., supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 74.)

                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s orders are conditionally affirmed. The
juvenile court is directed to ensure the Department fully complies
with the inquiry and, if necessary, notice provisions of ICWA and
related California law, including inquiring about possible Indian
ancestry from any extended family members.

                                             SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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