Court Opinion

ID: 9758325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:22:00.472771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:49.475845
License: Public Domain

*275
Murphy, C. J,,

dissenting:

The Court holds that convictions for murder committed in the perpetration of a felony, and the underlying felony, where both charges arise from the same act ór transaction, violate the constitutional prohibition against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, While I agree with the majority that the “required evidence test” is controlling, I think the better reasoned cases, representing the clear weight of authority in the country, support the conclusion that the felony murder and the underlying felony do not constitute the same offense for federal double jeopardy purposes.1 1 therefore respectfully dissent.
Under the required evidence test, if each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the offenses are not the same; but if only one offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the offenses are deemed the same. In applying this rule, the majority has in effect held that because proof of murder requires only one fact, i.e. death, in addition to that necessary to prove the underlying felony, that felony is an “essential ingredient” of the murder conviction and thus the murder and the felony constitute the same offense when applying double jeopardy principles. In so concluding, the majority has ignored the requirement that the evidence distinguishing the two offenses must be that demanded by the definition of the offense “and not merely evidence adduced at trial.” Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 257, 264, 353 A. 2d 240, 245 (1976).
Murder is, of course, a common law crime traditionally *276defined as the unlawful killing of one person by another, done with malice aforethought; robbery, also a common law crime in Maryland, is larceny from the person accompanied by violence or putting in fear. Faulcon v. State, 211 Md. 249, 126 A. 2d 858 (1956); State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A. 2d 378 (1973). Murder in the perpetration of robbery is a species of murder in the first degree; it is not, as the majority acknowledges, a new crime, Wood v. State, 191 Md. 658, 62 A. 2d 576 (1948).
The necessary elements of murder and robbery are manifestly different and distinct; each crime can be proved independently of the other. That the facts supporting each offense may overlap, or that both offenses may arise from the same activity, does not implicate double jeopardy principles, since identity of offenses requires that they be the same both in law and in fact. See Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481, 97 A. 2d 285 (1953).
The majority has focused on the actual evidence adduced at trial to establish the murder, rather than on the elements generally required to establish that crime. This approach amounts to the application of an “actual evidence” test, rejected by the Supreme Court in Harris v. United States, 359 U. S. 19, 79 S. Ct. 560, 3 L.Ed.2d 597 (1959). There the defendant was convicted of (1) purchase of heroin in an unstamped package and (2) receiving and concealing it, knowing it to have been unlawfully imported. The statutory provision making the first act unlawful provided that possession of heroin in an unstamped package was prima facie evidence of purchase. The statutory provision making the second act unlawful provided that possession of the narcotic drug was sufficient evidence to show receiving and concealing. The defendant, claiming that the sole evidence in the case was the act of possession, challenged the multiple convictions. Although the same evidence, aided by the statutory presumptions, supported both offenses, each had different elements. Thus, “the violation, as distinguished from the direct evidence offered to prove that violation, was distinctly different under each of the respective statutes.” 359 U. S. at 23, 79 S. Ct. at 564, 3 L.Ed.2d at 600.
*277Similarly, the attempted robbery and the murder dommitted by Newton in this case are distinct and separate offenses, although the actual evidence offered to prove one also, plays a part in proving the other. It is implicit from the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 410, which provides that murder committed in the perpetration of attempted robbery is first degree murder, that robbery is prima facie evidence of malice. Malice is an element which can, of course, be established by other forms of direct evidence. The actual evidence produced in the case does not determine the evidence required to establish the elements of each offense. It is that evidence, however, upon which the majority has relied to support its conclusion that the offenses are identical for double jeopardy purposes.
Prior Maryland cases recognize that it is only when the required evidence of the two offenses, not the actual evidence, is the same that the lesser offense is merged into the greater or that double jeopardy applies. In State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 180 A. 266 (1935), the defendant, a bank officer, was acquitted of charges of accepting a deposit when he knew the banking institution to be insolvent. Subsequently, he was indicted for fraudulently signing a statement misrepresenting the bank’s financial status. He contended that res judicata prevented the State from relitigating the issue of the bank’s financial status. Our predecessors disagreed, holding that insolvency was an element of the first case only and that insolvency did not need to be proven in the second case, “even though that may be the effect of the evidence.” 169 Md. at 168, 180 A. at 270. The Court thus looked to the evidence required to establish the elements of each offense, not to the evidence actually adduced at trial.
In Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 109 A. 2d 89 (1954), the defendant challenged consecutive sentences imposed for breaking and entering a warehouse with intent to steal and for larceny. He claimed that the lesser crime merged into the greater and only a single punishment was appropriate. The Court implicitly recognized that both offenses arose out of the same transaction and that, under the facts of the *278particular case, they were interrelated. Nonetheless, because the elements of each crime were different and because each one could be completed without the other, the Court found consecutive sentences to be proper. Here again, the Court relied upon the required evidence, not the actual evidence.
More recently, in Thomas v. State, supra, we held that a conviction for driving a motor vehicle without the consent of its owner [Code (1957, 1970 Repl. Vol.), Art. 66V2, § 4-102] precluded a subsequent prosecution for unauthorized úse of a vehicle [Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 349] under certain circumstances. The elements required to establish a § 4-102 offense include (1) driving another’s vehicle, (2) without consent of the owner, and (3) with intent temporarily to deprive the owner of possession. Elements of a § 349 offense include either (1) entry upon another’s property, (2) taking vehicle away, (3) without owner’s consent, and (4) with intent temporarily to deprive the owner of possession or (1) taking a vehicle from wherever it may be located, (2) without owner’s consent, and (3) with intent temporarily to deprive the owner of possession. If both § 4-102 and the former aspect of § 349 are charged, we held that double jeopardy would not apply because each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not: § 4-102 requires driving and § 349 requires entry. If, however, both § 4-102 and the latter aspect of § 349 are charged, “the same evidence necessary to convict on the § 4-102 offense would always be sufficient to establish a § 349 offense ....” (Emphasis supplied.) 277 Md. 257, 270, 353 A. 2d 240, 248. The bar of double jeopardy would operate because the evidence required to establish one offense is also the same evidence required to establish another.
We have recently considered whether a felony conviction merges into the felony murder conviction. Although the appropriate test for merger is worded differently than the required evidence test, the principles are the same. In Price v. State, 261 Md. 573, 277 A. 2d 256 (1971), the defendant was convicted of arson and felony murder. He claimed that “ ‘the facts necessary to prove arson are essential ingredients in establishing felony murder.’ ” 261 Md. at 578, 277 A. 2d at *279259. We said that “where the offenses in question consist of separate and distinct acts (e.g., robbing and shooting), even though part of a single ‘transaction’ or criminal adventure, conviction on both counts is proper.” 261 Md. at 579-80, 277 A. 2d at 259. We cited with approval the following Court of Special Appeals analysis in Parker v. State, 7 Md. App. 167, 254 A. 2d 381 (1969), cert. denied, 256 Md. 747 (1970); cert. denied, 402 U. S. 984, 91 S. Ct. 1670,29 L.Ed.2d 150 (1971), of merger issues in a robbery murder case:
“ ‘... As “murder in the first degree” is not a crime as such but merely a classification of murder, that the status of a first degree classification may be attained by proof that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a robbery, does not make robbery an essential element of murder and it follows that murder does not necessarily involve robbery.’ 7 Md. App. 199.” 261 Md. at 577, 277 A. 2d at 258.
We found it unnecessary, however, to apply the Parker rationale in Price. Instead, we noted that since the single act of throwing a bucket of gasoline into a building was the operative act underlying both offenses, one offense was directed at property and the other at the person and hence the offenses were sufficiently separate so as not to merge.
As heretofore indicated, robbing and shooting are separate and distinct offenses. Neither necessarily involves the other. Whereas, in Price, both offenses arose from a single act but did not merge, here since there are two acts, the offenses surely cannot merge. Double jeopardy is simply inapplicable.
Numerous other states representing the great weight of authority (footnote 1, supra) recognize that convictions for both felony murder and the underlying felony do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy on the ground that murder and the underlying felony are different offenses.
New York, for example, has repeatedly held that, in a felony murder case, an underlying felony such as burglary *280or robbery is a “substantively and generically entirely separate and disconnected” offense. People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883, 884 (1921). See also People v. Lytton, 257 N. Y. 310, 178 N. E. 290 (1931), where Cardozo, C. J., speaking for the Court, explained that the independent felony merely characterizes the degree of culpability rather than changing the identity of the crime. The New York courts have reasoned that
“[p]roof of these [underlying] crimes, at most, was only evidence of the inferred criminal intent and not the element of criminal intention itself .... Proof of the commission of an underlying felony in a felony murder case is a condition of the murder charge conviction but is not an element of that crime. If it were an element of the felony murder, the elements of such a crime would be as various as the underlying felonies might be.” People v. Tutuska, 192 N.Y.S.2d 350, at 357, 19 Misc. 2d 308 (1959), affirmed, 205 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 11 App. Div. 2d 906 (1960).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized that the elements of the felony murder and the underlying felony are dissimilar. In discussing the relationship between the offenses, it said:
“With respect to the murders, the underlying felony serves only to prove the intent or state of mind necessary to the murders; and proof of the underlying felony proves both it and the intent necessary to the murder charges. Proof of different elements is necessary to each offense, even though the same evidence may go to both offenses.” State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1975).
Thus, the reasoning and authority of our sister states and Maryland law convincingly demonstrate that, according to the better reasoned view, felony murder and the underlying felony are separate and distinct offenses, the elements of *281which do not overlap. The underlying felony is only evidence of malice and is not actually an element of the murder. Convictions for both murder in the perpetration of a robbery and attempted robbery therefore do not violate the prohibition against placing a defendant twice in jeopardy. I would, therefore, affirm both judgments. Judge Smith has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed in this dissent.

. Cases applying the required evidence test which hold that the underlying felony is not an element of felony murder include State v. Clayton, 109 Ariz. 587, 514 P. 2d 720 (1973); Turner v. State, 248 Ark, 367, 452 S.W.2d 317 (1970), rev’d on other grounds, 407 U. S. 366, 92 S. Ct. 2096, 32 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); People v. Salas, Colo., 538 P. 2d 437 (1975); State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P. 2d 602 (1963); State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1058, 96 S. Ct. 794, 46 L.Ed.2d 649 (1976); Carmody v. Seventh Judicial District Court, 81 Nev. 83, 398 P. 2d 706 (1965); People v. Nichols, 230 N. Y. 221, 129 N. E. 883 (1921); Harris v. State, 555 P. 2d 76 (Okla. Crim. 1976); Commonwealth v. Smith, 452 Pa. 1, 304 A. 2d 456, cert. denied, 414 U, S, 1076, 94 S. Ct. 593, 38 L.Ed.2d 483 (1973); State v. Briggs, 533 S.W.2d 290 (Tenn, 1976); State v. Barton, 5 Wash, 2d 234, 105 P. 2d 63 (1940).