Court Opinion

ID: 9610210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:38:05.580073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:59.756931
License: Public Domain

*933Justice LOHR
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority overturns the holding of the Colorado Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in declining to provide a clarifying instruction in response to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations. I believe that the court of appeals correctly resolved this issue, which affects only the felony murder conviction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion holding that the defendant’s felony murder conviction should be reinstated.1
The evidence established that the weapon used to kill Ronald Yon Dollen was a .32 caliber handgun taken from the residence of Dr. Kathryn Simon during a robbery committed by defendant Michael Dwain Alexis and Louis Joe Reaves. The weapon was in Alexis’ possession when he was arrested more than a week after the homicide. He testified, however, that he had obtained the weapon from Reaves several days after the killing in exchange for a cassette deck. Reaves claimed his privilege against self-incrimination and did not testify. During the course of the trial Reaves told prosecutor LaCabe that he had participated in the Simon robbery, had taken three described handguns not including a .32 caliber weapon, and that Alexis had taken the other handguns. The prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated that Reaves told the prosecutor these things and agreed that the stipulation should be presented to the jury. The jury therefore had conflicting circumstantial evidence before it concerning who possessed the murder weapon at the time Von Dollen was shot.
The court orally instructed the jury that it could consider the stipulation as evidence and give it such weight and credence as the jury should determine that it deserved. The court also orally instructed the jury that the stipulation was that “this is what Mr. Louis Joe Reaves told Mr. LaCabe and you should treat it as what Mr. Louis Joe Reaves told Mr. LaCabe.” See maj. op. at 931, setting forth the stipulation and oral instruction in full. After the evidence had been presented, the court read the instructions to the jury, including an instruction on the effect of a stipulation. This instruction was instruction no. 19 and was taken with the jurors to the jury room. The instruction stated:
The prosecution and the defendant have stipulated to certain facts in this case, and you were so instructed about these stipulations during the trial. A stipulation renders unnecessary the presentation of any evidence to prove those facts, and the jury must regard those facts as conclusively proved. The effect of a stipulation is to make the stipulated facts true for purposes of the trial.
The jury deliberated for almost a day before sending the following question to the court: “On the stipulation, did the defendant knowingly agree to the stipulation as indicated in instruction # 19?”. About forty-five minutes later the jury inquired of the bailiff whether the judge had an answer to their question. In the meantime counsel and the court were considering the proper response. Defense counsel argued that the question likely reflected confusion concerning whether instruction no. 19 should be construed to require that the jurors accept as fact only that Reaves made certain statements to the prosecutor or whether the jurors must also regard the contents of those statements as conclusively proven. Defense counsel vigorously argued that the court should dispel any such confusion by answering the question to say that the parties stipulated that Reaves told the prosecutor the things stated in the stipulation but that the parties did not stipulate to the truth of that information. The court rejected this proposal and advised the jury in writing that “[bjoth the stipulation and Instruction No. 19 mean what they say and no more. Please refer to them again.” The jury returned its verdicts of guilty to *934the crimes charged within five to fifteen minutes after receiving this instruction.
The court of appeals held that “the trial court erred by its refusal to clarify the meaning of the stipulation after the jury expressed confusion during its deliberations.” People v. Alexis, 794 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Colo.App.1990). I agree.
In Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Colo.1986), we held that ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 15-4.3(a) (2d ed. 1980), “should serve as a guide for determining when the trial judge should give additional instructions in response to an inquiry from the jury.” Id. That standard provides that additional instructions on a point of law shall be given unless:
(i) the jury may be adequately informed by directing their attention to some portion of the original instructions;
(ii) the request concerns matters not in evidence or questions which do not pertain to the law of the case; or
(iii) the request would call upon the judge to express an opinion upon factual matters that the jury should determine.
The majority acknov/ledges the applicability of standard 15-4.3(a) but concludes that by referring the jury back to instruction no. 19 and the stipulation, the judge properly observed that standard because “the question of the jury did not relate to the law of the case, but to the extent and meaning of the evidence set forth in the stipulation.” Maj. op. at 932. I cannot agree with this characterization. The question strongly suggested that the jurors misunderstood the law as expressed in instruction no. 19 concerning the effect to be given to the stipulation.
I believe the court of appeals accurately expressed the importance of the issue as to which the jury’s confusion existed, the basis in the court’s instructions that gave rise to that confusion, and the duty of the court to instruct the jury clearly to dispel that confusion. I can do no better than to quote Judge Pierce’s words, writing for a unanimous panel of that court:
Here, the contents of the stipulation became critical because the circumstantial evidence linking the defendant to the homicide depended upon who possessed the murder weapon which had been taken in the burglary two days prior to the homicide. The defendant testified at trial, in contrast to the stipulated statement, that Reaves presumably possessed the murder weapon at the time of the homicide.
On its face, the stipulation indicates merely that Reaves stated that the defendant took handguns including the murder weapon. However, during the trial, defense counsel voiced a concern that the jury might not understand that the defense was stipulating only that Reaves made the statements, but not that those statements were true. When the jury sent out the question during deliberations, defense counsel again questioned whether the jury understood this distinction. The language in Instruction No. 19 indicating that the jury must regard stipulated facts “as conclusively proved” and “true for purposes of the trial” certainly could lead to such confusion. The trial court’s response to the jury failed to clarify this probable source of misunderstanding.
If a jury affirmatively indicates that it has a fundamental misunderstanding of an instruction, the basis for the presumption that the jury understands the instruction disappears. When the jury indicates to the court that it does not understand some matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court has an obligation to clarify that matter for the jury in a concrete and unambiguous manner. Leonardo v. People, supra.
[T]he jury’s inquiry regarding Instruction No. 19 adequately indicated its misunderstanding about a matter of law which required a more detailed response than a statement referring the jurors again to the instructions. A jury should be referred back to the instructions only when it is apparent that the jury has overlooked some portion of the instructions or when the instructions clearly answer the jury’s inquiry. Leonardo v. *935Such is not the case People, supra. here.
People v. Alexis, 794 P.2d at 1031.
I agree with the court of appeals that Michael Dwain Alexis’ judgment of conviction for the crime of felony murder should be reversed, but I agree with Justice Erickson’s opinion for the majority of this court that the defendant’s convictions for second degree burglary, aggravated robbery and theft should be reinstated. Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion in part and dissent in part.
QUINN and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.

. The majority also concludes that any error in admission of the stereo receiver into evidence was harmless, with the result that the defendant's convictions for second degree burglary, aggravated robbery and theft should be reinstated. I agree, and therefore join part III of the majority opinion.