Court Opinion

ID: 9565705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:17.396271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.633723
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
The majority awards a new trial to the defendant because the trial judge failed to allow both of defendant’s counsel to participate in the closing arguments to the jury. I dissent for the failure of the majority to apply a harmless error analysis to the error to determine whether prejudice resulted.
This Court first addressed this issue in State v. Eury, 317 N.C. 511, 346 S.E. 2d 447 (1986), where the Court held that it was error to refuse to allow both of defendant’s counsel to participate in the closing argument. The Court then determined whether the ruling constituted prejudicial error, applying a harmless error analysis. Eury does not establish a per se prejudicial error rule.
Nevertheless, the majority of this Court in State v. Simpson, 320 N.C. 313, 357 S.E. 2d 332 (1987), relied upon Eury for the statement that the error “deprived the defendant of a substantial right and amounted to prejudicial error.” 320 N.C. at 327, 357 S.E. 2d at 340. The two dissenters in Simpson demonstrated the fallacy of this statement.
The majority here seeks to avoid the holding of Eury, stating that in Eury it was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the error was prejudicial per se. At no place in Eury do we find the words “per se”; the Court did not decline to determine the per se issue in Eury. Whether the error was per se prejudicial was simply not involved in Eury.
This is not the kind of error which automatically results in prejudice — it is to be remembered that this issue does not involve constitutional rights. Cf. State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E. 2d 521 (1975) (presence of alternate juror during deliberations violated state constitutional guarantees and was prejudicial per se). Rather, it is a matter of statutory construction of N.C.G.S. *661§ 84-14. The statute itself does not provide that violations of it are per se prejudicial error. The rule of this jurisdiction is that unless otherwise provided the defendant has the burden to show not only error but prejudice as well. State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 296 S.E. 2d 267 (1982); State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E. 2d 858 (1979). The test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that had the error not been committed a different result would have been reached at trial. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443 (a) (1983).
I find the majority erred in holding that the failure of the trial court to allow both counsel to make the closing arguments constitutes prejudicial error per se. Not one single case or authority from any jurisdiction is cited for this holding.
This case demonstrates exactly why this Court established a harmless error rule in Eury. Here the state’s evidence was overwhelming and compelling. Eyewitnesses testified to defendant’s participation in the robbery and murder of an innocent bystander. The defendant planned the armed robbery, recruited his accomplices, and approached the store with a bullet in the firing chamber of his pistol with the purpose that he “wouldn’t leave nobody talking.” The victim Hall was shot in the back.
Moreover, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances: the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in an armed robbery; the murder was a part of a course of conduct by defendant including additional crimes of violence against others; the murder was for pecuniary gain. As mitigating circumstances the jury found: the defendant loved, respected, and provided financial assistance to his mother, father, and siblings; defendant was one of seven children and his mother and father died before he was fourteen years old; defendant was raised in poverty and left home before he was eighteen years old; defendant was first sent to prison before he was nineteen years old. Upon weighing these findings the jury concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty.
Can it be said that had both counsel taken part in the final arguments and argued “until blue in the face,” there is a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached? I *662think not. As Justice Huskins said in his dissenting opinion in Hatcheries, Inc. v. Coble, “the law does not require judges to be more ignorant than other people.” 286 N.C. 518, 524, 212 S.E. 2d 150, 154 (1975).
Furthermore, the majority erred in finding that the failure of the trial court to allow both of defendant’s counsel to make the closing argument in the felony cases, resulted in prejudicial error per se. Different considerations apply to noncapital felony cases. N.C.G.S. § 84-14 does not establish a right for defendant to have two different lawyers argue on his behalf at any stage of the proceedings. The statute only guarantees the defendant the right to make two addresses to the jury, not to have two lawyers make the addresses. In capital cases defendant has a right to have as many as three lawyers to argue and the number of addresses is unlimited. State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 340 S.E. 2d 673, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 93 L.Ed. 2d 166 (1986).
Here, defendant was provided with his two statutory addresses to the jury in the trial of the felony charges. His counsel made the opening and closing arguments. The sentencing hearing was only for the capital charge, and the arguments of counsel at that time were completely irrelevant to the felony charges. The trial judge did not err with respect to the jury arguments in the trial of the felony cases. The determination of error in the felony cases and the capital charge must be made separately as different rules of law apply. The majority erred in sweeping the felony cases in with the capital charge.
There was no error with respect to the arguments in the felony charges and no prejudicial error in the capital case.
Justice MEYER joins in this dissenting opinion.