Court Opinion

ID: 9679018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:38:35.202898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:09.654332
License: Public Domain

ROBBINS, J., dissenting. While I agree with the points made by Judge Hart in her dissent, I write separately to suggest that the trial court’s decision, and our court’s affirmance, evinces an unacceptable gender bias. Consider the following scenario: Dr. John Doe and his wife Jane Doe reside and are married in Bulgaria. Soon after their marriage, they relocate to Little Rock, Arkansas, where Dr. Doe is employed as a professor at UALR. Although Mrs. Doe struggles to learn to speak English and does not have a job outside their home, she works at maintaining their $300,000 residence in west Little Rock. Four years after settling in Little Rock the parties separate and Dr. Doe sues for divorce. Dr. Doe remains in the home and Mrs. Doe lives either in her car or with a friend. The decree of divorce awards the marital home, subject to the mortgage debt, and all furnishings to Dr. Doe. The rest of the marital assets are divided fairly evenly. Mrs. Doe’s request for alimony is denied, notwithstanding that Dr. Doe’s income approximates $110,000 per annum, while Mrs. Doe’s two part-time jobs provide her with an income of approximately $400 to $500 biweekly at best. Mrs. Doe appeals. Upon these facts, would our court hesitate to find that the trial court abused its discretion 11sby not at least ordering rehabilitative alimony in some amount? I submit that we would not. However, with a reversal of gender to comport the scenario to the facts of the appeal before us, we not only hesitated, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of alimony. This is wrong. The statutory authority for an award of alimony was rendered gender-neutral by Acts 1979, No. 705.5 We should be evenhanded in our treatment of divorce litigants who navigate the justice system. I would reverse. HART, J., joins in this dissent.  . See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-312 (Repl.2008).