Court Opinion

ID: 9889787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:01:30.90526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:58.761550
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14246    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 10/11/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14246
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DONTRAY LEWIS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00197-RSB-CLR-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14246           Document: 31-1          Date Filed: 10/11/2023            Page: 2 of 6

       2                            Opinion of the Court                          22-14246

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges
       PER CURIAM:
               Dontray Lewis appeals his conviction for possessing a fire-
       arm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He
       raises two claims. First, he contends that the district court erred in
       denying his motion to suppress physical evidence found during a
       traffic stop of his car, arguing that the officers did not have reason-
       able grounds under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to stop his
       vehicle. Second, Lewis asserts that his rights under the Equal Pro-
       tection Clause were violated when officers identified his vehicle
       based on a “Be On the Lookout” that allegedly targeted him based
       on his race, location, and car.1 After careful consideration of the
       parties’ arguments, we affirm.
                                                 I
             The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
       searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the

       1 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a mixed

       standard, reviewing the court’s fact-finding for clear error and its application of the
       law to those facts de novo. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir.
       2012). We grant substantial deference to the factfinder’s credibility determinations,
       construing all facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. Id. at
       1303. We must accept the version of events adopted by the district court “unless it is
       contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no
       reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744,
       749 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted).
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       3                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14246

       exclusionary rule, evidence that was obtained or derived from an
       encounter with police that violated the Fourth Amendment cannot
       be used against a defendant in an ensuing criminal trial. United
       States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). A traﬃc stop is
       a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v.
       United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).
              Under the Fourth Amendment, oﬃcers need only have rea-
       sonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate a traﬃc stop.
       United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 880 n.15 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
       banc). In determining whether a search or seizure is reasonable,
       we examine the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Lewis,
       674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012). Reasonable suspicion is deter-
       mined using an objective standard and without regard to the sub-
       jective intent or beliefs of the oﬃcers. United States v. Smith, 799
       F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Sub-
       jective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
       Amendment analysis.”).
              To satisfy reasonable suspicion, an oﬃcer must have “a par-
       ticularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
       stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393,
       396 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). “Even minor traﬃc viola-
       tions qualify as criminal activity.” Campbell, 26 F.4th at 880. The
       particularized basis for the stop can be based on “inferences from
       and deductions about the cumulative information available” to the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14246

       oﬃcer at the time they conduct the traﬃc stop. United States v.
       Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).
              Lewis’s infractions are the kinds of “minor traﬃc violations”
       that meet this threshold: Georgia law provides that, when making
       a right turn, a car must make the approach and turn “as close as
       practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.”
       O.C.G.A. § 40-6-120(1). Georgia law also criminalizes speeding,
       reckless driving, and failing to observe traﬃc signals. See id. §§ 40-
       6-181(b); 40-6-390(a), (b); 40-6-20(a).
              The district court’s credibility determinations are given
       great deference, and it did not err in crediting Oﬃcer Hinds’s testi-
       mony. Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1303. The magistrate judge found that
       Oﬃcer Hinds’s testimony about the traﬃc violation was “credible
       and unequivocal.” Lewis presented no evidence at the hearing to
       dispute that oﬃcers saw him make the improper right turn. See
       United States v. Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 2004). Alt-
       hough Oﬃcer Blair was not available at the suppression hearing,
       he—along with Oﬃcers Hines and Keel—testiﬁed at Lewis’s trial
       and corroborated the circumstances surrounding the stop.
              Here, the district court did not err in denying Lewis’s sup-
       pression motion on Fourth Amendment grounds, because the tes-
       timony at the suppression hearing, which was credible, established
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       5                         Opinion of the Court                       22-14246

       that the oﬃcers had reasonable suspicion that Lewis had commit-
       ted traﬃc violations.2
                                             II
              When a district court’s judgment is based on multiple, inde-
       pendent grounds, the appellant must properly address each
       ground. If he fails to address one of several independent grounds,
       he will be deemed to have abandoned any challenge on that
       ground, and the judgment will be aﬃrmed. United States v. King,
       751 F.3d 1268, 1277 (11th Cir. 2014).
               “[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the
       law based on considerations such as race.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
       The proper remedy for selective-enforcement is a claim under the
       Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment. See
       id. The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created to deter con-
       stitutional violations, not a “personal constitutional right.” United
       States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
               The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the “equal protec-
       tion of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To make out a se-
       lective-enforcement claim, a claimant bears the burden to demon-
       strate that oﬃcials acting under the color of law had discriminatory

       2 Lewis also brought Fifth Amendment claims, but we needn’t reach them

       here. The alleged violation of Lewis’s Fifth Amendment rights following his
       arrest was a separate issue irrelevant to the court’s credibility determinations
       and to this appeal. In fact, the district court granted Lewis’s suppression mo-
       tion on Fifth Amendment grounds.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14246

       motivations and that similarly situated individuals of a diﬀerent
       race who committed substantially the same violation were not sub-
       ject to the same enforcement. See United States v. Armstrong, 517
       U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
               Here, Lewis abandoned his Fourteenth Amendment chal-
       lenge because he neglected to address the district court’s refusal to
       consider the argument on the basis that it was not properly raised
       before the magistrate judge. See King, 751 F.3d at 1277. Even as-
       suming that Lewis preserved his claim, the district court did not
       err, because he has not demonstrated selective enforcement oc-
       curred. Lewis failed to provide any evidence in his objections to
       the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation or in his appel-
       late brief that the police failed to stop similarly situated individuals
       who committed substantially similar traﬃc violations. See Arm-
       strong, 517 U.S. at 465.
              In sum, Lewis forfeited his Fourteenth Amendment chal-
       lenge and, even assuming arguendo that he hadn’t, he failed to pro-
       vide any evidence that police failed to stop similarly situated indi-
       viduals who committed substantially similar traﬃc violations.
              AFFIRMED.