Court Opinion

ID: 9759161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:07:50.430596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.934436
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.
This litigation results from the publication in the Rahway News-Record of two articles on the topic of a petition drive in the City of Rahway. Plaintiffs seek damages based on the alleged defamatory nature of both articles. Defendants, the newspaper’s publisher, editor and a reporter, assert the defense of truth and the qualified First Amendment privilege protecting newspapers from liability for defamatory statements concerning public figures. The trial court ruled that plaintiff Lawrence was a public figure as set forth in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), and dismissed Lawrence’s claim because of insufficient evidence of defendants’ actual *455malice. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Simpson. Lawrence’s post-trial motion for a new trial was granted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in favor of Simpson and the order granting Lawrence a new trial. 176 N.J.Super. 378 (1981).
We agree with so much of the determination below as holds both articles to be defamatory as a matter of law. However, we find both plaintiffs to be public figures for the purposes of this controversy. Therefore, since there is no evidence of actual malice, we vacate the order awarding plaintiff Lawrence a new trial and reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiff Simpson.
I
In 1974 the Rahway Taxpayers Association led by plaintiffs Alonzo Lawrence, the group’s president, and James Simpson, its secretary-treasurer, conducted a campaign in opposition to a municipal appropriation for the construction of a new firehouse. The Association, a citizens group made up of Rahway taxpayers, circulated petitions among Rahway’s registered voters in an attempt to force a public referendum on the appropriation issue. Petitions containing over 5,000 signatures were submitted by plaintiffs to the Rahway City Clerk in late December 1974.
On or about January 7, 1975 the Rahway News Record received a telephone call from City Business Administrator Joseph Hartnett, a sometime source of news concerning City affairs. Hartnett spoke first to the editor, defendant Kurt Bauer, and then to reporter Patsy Bontempo, who had been assigned to cover the controversy surrounding the firehouse appropriation. Although the substance of Hartnett’s conversations with Bauer and Bontempo is disputed, the three parties to the conversations agree that Hartnett said at least this: that there were “irregularities” in some of the signatures on the petitions filed by the Association; that the City Prosecutor, Theodore Romankow, was conducting an investigation of the petitions to determine whether there were incidents of forgery or false swearing in connec*456tion with the signatures; and that included in the petitions being investigated were those containing signatures witnessed personally by Lawrence and Simpson.
As part of its ongoing coverage of the firehouse controversy and as a result of the conversations referred to above, the Rahway News-Record published the first of two articles that plaintiffs allege are defamatory. On January 9,1975 the following headline spanned the entire eight columns of the Rahway News-Record’s front page: “City Attorney rules association petitions improper; forgery charges may loom for Lawrence, Simpson.” The accompanying article stated in pertinent part:
In separate actions city attorney Alan Karcher ruled the petitions filed by the officials of the Rahway Taxpayers Association are improper and attorney Theodore J. Romankow was asked to take action by city officials against association leaders because of “irregularities” in the petitions.
The Rahway News-Record learned Mr. Romankow was empowered to handle a case against Alonzo W. Lawrence, president of the Association, and James Simpson, the group’s secretary-treasurer.
The case would be based on charges that forgery was involved in the gathering of approximately 5,000 signatures which the two men filed with city clerk Robert W. Schrof on December 27, the News-Record was told.
In connection with this the men would also be charged with false swearing of oaths and affidavits, it was asserted.
In response to plaintiffs’ request that the News-Record retract the allegations contained in the above-quoted article, the following headline appeared on the front page of the April 17, 1975 edition of the newspaper: “News-Record asked to retract article on firehouse battle.” As acknowledged at trial by defendants, the accompanying article was not a retraction of the earlier article. Rather, it defended the earlier story as an accurate account of the facts as made known to the News-Record by “a source in the [City] administration.” The April 17th article emphasized that the first article contained no accusations of guilt but merely the assertion that “city officials were turning the petitions over to the local prosecutor, which in fact they did, to investigate allegations of forgery and false swearing of oaths.” The article described the Association's sponsorship of the petition drive, and reported that following an investigation by the municipal prosecutor, the petitions were referred to the *457Union County prosecutor’s office “for further investigations of the charges.”
In conclusion the newspaper stated:
The News-Record did not and does not seek to harm Messrs. Lawrence and Simpson or to in any way injure their good names. The pair of their own choosing publicly associated themselves and their organization with the petitions.
The gentlemen, thus, are in fact associated with the petitions and the petitions are in fact the subject of an investigation for allegations of forgery and false swearing of oaths.
This did not and does not mean, nor was it ever said to mean, the gentlemen are guilty of anything.
Following the publication of the second article plaintiffs instituted this libel action against the Bauer Publishing and Printing Company, owner of the Rahway News-Record; Kurt Bauer, the paper’s editor; Jeffrey Bauer, the corporation’s president; and Patsy Bontempo, reporter and author of the January Ninth article.1
At the outset of the trial plaintiffs moved for a ruling that the two articles in question were libelous as a matter of law and that the defense of truth should be stricken from the case. The court granted both motions inasmuch as the defendants were unprepared to prove that plaintiffs were guilty of the offenses attributed to them by the articles, namely, forgery and false swearing.
At the close of the case the court ruled that plaintiff Lawrence was a public figure for the purposes of the firehouse dispute. It granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Lawrence’s claim on the ground that he had failed to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice on the part of defendants. Observing that plaintiff Simpson did not have the same degree *458of access to the media as did Lawrence, the court ruled that Simpson was a private figure. Thus, the jury was charged only with respect to Simpson’s claim against defendants. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simpson against all defendants except the reporter, Patsy Bontempo, and awarded damages in the amount of $22,500.2
Following the verdict plaintiff Lawrence requested the court to reconsider its earlier dismissal of his case. Persuaded that the record contained sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to whether defendants had acted with actual malice, the trial court reversed itself and granted Lawrence’s motion for a new trial.
Defendants appealed, asserting as reversible error the trial court’s rulings striking the defense of truth and holding the articles libelous as a matter of law. Defendants also challenge the ruling that Simpson was not a public figure and the granting of Lawrence’s motion for a new trial. Finally, defendants question the language of the jury charge on damages, an issue we do not reach because of our conclusion that both plaintiffs are public figures as set forth in Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974).
The Appellate Division upheld the rulings of the trial court and affirmed the judgment in Simpson’s favor and the award of a new trial to Lawrence. Lawrence v. Bauer Publishing & Printing Ltd., 176 N.J.Super. 378 (1980). We granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, 87 N.J. 331 (1981).
II
We consider first the defendants’ contention that the trial court erred in ruling the two articles defamatory as a matter of *459law. The effect of that ruling was to remove from the jury the question of whether the articles could reasonably be interpreted as possessing a nondefamatory meaning. The court based its ruling on the tendency of the articles to subject the plaintiffs to public contempt or ridicule. See Garven v. Finch, 97 N.J.L. 329 (E.& A.1922). Defendants argue that the existence of a defamatory meaning was a question of fact for the jury because the articles did not accuse plaintiffs of any criminal conduct. That approach reveals defendants’ confusion as to the meaning of the lower court’s use of the term “libel per se.”
The terms “libel per se” and “libel per quod ” have long been used to differentiate between writings defamatory on their face and those defamatory solely in the light of extrinsic facts. Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J.Super. 420, 443 (App.Div.1958). A determination of whether certain language is defamatory on its face rests within the power of the trial court. Leers v. Green, 24 N.J. 239, 255 (1957). Only when the court finds the words to be capable of both a defamatory and a nondefamatory meaning does a question of fact arise for the jury to decide. Herrmann, supra, 48 N.J.Super. at 430. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling that the two articles were libelous per se meant the court found as a matter of law that the statements were not reasonably susceptible of a nondefamatory interpretation.
To establish the defamatory nature of the articles it was not necessary for plaintiffs to prove that defendants had accused them of the commission of a crime. Words that clearly “sound to the disreputation” of an individual are defamatory on their face. Shaw v. Bender, 90 N.J.L. 147 (E.& A.1917). The unambiguous import of the two articles is to cast doubt on the reputations of plaintiffs, Lawrence and Simpson. The statement that plaintiffs “may be” charged with criminal conduct diminishes their standing in the community and is little different from an assertion that plaintiffs have actually been charged with certain crimes. Hence the court correctly ruled that the *460articles were libelous per se, i.e., not susceptible of a nondefamatory interpretation.
Ill
Defendants assert that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion to strike truth as a defense. Under the common law, truth, if established, exonerates the publisher of a defamatory statement of fact. See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A (1977). For the defense to apply, however, the truth must be as broad as the defamatory imputation or “sting” of the statement. See Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, Inc., 152 N.J.Super. 133, 146-47 (Law Div.1977), modified, 164 N.J.Super. 465 (App.Div.1979); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 116 (4th ed. 1971). See also Medico, supra, 643 F.2d at 137; Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 401 (1949).
After hearing argument on plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defense of truth, the trial court determined that defendants’ publication of the statements that plaintiffs were suspected of and being investigated for committing the crimes of forgery and false swearing imputed to plaintiffs the very commission of those crimes. Therefore, the court ruled that defendants cpuld not assert the justification of truth unless they were prepared to prove not only that the reported investigation was conducted or that “forgery charges loomed,” but also that plaintiffs did in fact commit forgery and false swearing. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A, comment c, at 236 (1977). When defense counsel conceded that he was unprepared to prove that plaintiffs had in fact committed the criminal offenses imputed to plaintiffs, the trial court ordered the defense of truth stricken from the case.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination:
We are, therefore, entirely satisfied that a publisher of a statement which is defamatory by suggestion or insinuation, must, in order to present an adequate defense, prove more than that the article was literally true. That the informa*461tion was received from another source is not enough. To sufficiently develop the defense of truth under the facts of this case, defendants must show that plaintiffs had in fact committed the offenses or that they had been formally charged with criminal conduct or that police or county prosecuting authorities had announced an official investigation of plaintiffs for the offenses described in the articles. [176 N.J.Super, at 389-90 (footnote and citation omitted).] 3
There is considerable authority for the proposition that the fact that defendants accurately reported information obtained from another source will not relieve them of liability. Under that analysis the defense of truth does not refer to the truthful republication of a defamatory statement but to the truth of the statement’s contents. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578, comment b, at 235-36 (1977). Thus, if defendant published that a third person stated that plaintiff has committed a crime, it is no justification that the third party did in fact make that statement. Rogers, supra, 2 N.J. at 401-02. Defendant must prove that in fact plaintiff committed the crime. See L. Eldridge, Law of Defamation § 67 at 331 (1978). Similarly, a statement that criminal charges were imminent would be truthful only if such charges were demonstrably impending.
The trial court viewed the statement in this case as imputing to plaintiffs the crimes of forgery and false swearing and therefore imposed on defendants the burden of proving that plaintiffs had actually committed those crimes. A more literal reading of the headline indicates that the correct interpretation may have been that charges of forgery and false swearing were forthcoming. Whether the “truth” defense should be framed in terms of proof that defendants committed the crimes referred to in the article or simply that charges concerning those charges might “loom” is a provocative question we need not decide today, given our holding that plaintiffs were public figures who *462have not demonstrated the requisite malicious libel by defendants necessary to sustain a libel judgment.
IV
Ultimately, the successful invocation of a constitutional privilege in this case is controlled by whether defendants fall into the category of public or private figures. It is well settled that in defamation actions the existence vel non of privilege is basically a question of law for the court’s determination. See, e.g., Barbetta Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Publishing Co., 135 N.J.Super. 214, 218 (App.Div.1975); Sokolay v. Edlin, 65 N.J.Super. 112, 124 (App.Div.1961). In the case before us, because the news media’s right to speak freely and to disseminate newsworthy information about public figures is intricately related to First Amendment guarantees, the public figure question is one involving a limited constitutional privilege and is therefore a matter of law for the trial court to decide. See Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1981); Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir. 1980); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1978); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1977). In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and press give rise to a limited constitutional privilege in the case of certain publications. Under New York Times a newspaper is protected from liability for publishing a defamatory report about the official conduct of a public official unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the newspaper published with “ ‘actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706. A demonstration of actual malice is also necessary in cases where the plaintiff is not a public official but can be identified as a public figure, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), either for all purposes or for *463the purposes of only the events upon which the defamatory publication was based. Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3012, 41 L.Ed.2d at 812. Thus, the existence of the privilege is controlled by the status of the person defamed.
Gertz refrains from establishing specific criteria against which a plaintiff’s status can be measured to determine whether or not he is a public figure. Rather in instances where the plaintiff is not a public figure for all purposes, Gertz calls for a case-by-case examination “looking to the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation,” 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d at 812. Important factors that led the Court to conclude that the Gertz plaintiff was not a public figure included plaintiff’s lack of any calculated relationship with the press and the fact that he neither “thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor [engaged] the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.” Id.
With Gertz as a framework for our analysis we turn to a consideration of whether plaintiffs are public or private figures. Plainly, these plaintiffs are not public figures for all purposes; neither possesses the requisite “pervasive fame or notoriety.” Id. Therefore, we confine our examination to whether either was a public figure with regard only to the firehouse appropriation controversy and the petition drive they spearheaded to force a public referendum on the matter.

Lawrence

The undisputed facts concerning Lawrence’s participation in the firehouse controversy justify the conclusion that he voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront of that dispute. Lawrence, the founder and president of the Association, regularly attended city council meetings and spoke out against what his organization believed was an excessive appropriation for the proposed city firehouse. At one such meeting he was one of only five people permitted by the city council to speak on this issue on behalf of the public. He also attended an open public *464meeting concerning the appropriation ordinance and there again spoke out against the appropriation.
When his cause appeared to be defeated by the mayor and city council, Lawrence initiated the petition drive through the Taxpayer’s Association, with the goal of obtaining a sufficient number of signatures to force a public referendum. Lawrence was one of five Association officers and members whose names appeared on every petition sheet circulated. In circulating the petitions Lawrence personally canvassed Rahway neighborhoods house to house, explaining to residents the purpose of the petition drive and obtaining their signatures on the petition sheets. He visited at least fifty homes and collected at least two hundred signatures. Consequently, there is substantial credible evidence to support the lower courts’ determination that Lawrence voluntarily injected himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the firehouse appropriation issue, which gave rise to the defamation for which he seeks to recover. Moreover, Lawrence’s obvious purpose in thrusting himself into a major role in the public controversy was to influence the resolution of the issue involved. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 168, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 61 L.Ed.2d 450, 460-61 (1979); Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 341, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d at 812.
In addition, Lawrence received extensive exposure in the local press. On several occasions prior to the January Ninth article he provided press releases to the Rahway newspaper. Moreover, the trial court determined that in the few weeks prior to the publication of the January Ninth article, Lawrence’s name had been mentioned and his most recent activities discussed in approximately twenty published articles (some in headlines) reporting on the firehouse dispute. Lawrence therefore “enjoy [ed] significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence [had] a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals enjoy.” Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808. This access to the media, taken together with Lawrence’s active *465and significant participation in the public controversy giving rise to the defamation, leads us to agree with the determination of the lower courts that as a matter of law, Lawrence is a public figure for the limited purposes involved here.

Simpson

The record discloses that as secretary-treasurer of the Rahway Taxpayers Association, Simpson actively participated in the petition drive. He was one of the five-member committee of petitioners whose names appeared on every petition sheet circulated by the Association. Simpson personally collected approximately 250 petition signatures as a result of his door-to-door efforts, and on at least one occasion he wrote a letter to the editor on the issue of the firehouse appropriation. The day the petitions were filed, Simpson notified the Rahway News-Record and requested the presence of a photographer at the delivery. The resulting photograph portraying Simpson, among others, turning over the petitions, was published in the December 31, 1974 issue of the News-Record.
Although the factors delineating Simpson’s status are less compelling than those relating to Lawrence, we hold that Simpson is also a public figure for the limited purposes of the firehouse appropriation and petition controversies. This conclusion is derived from our close scrutiny of Simpson’s activities during the course of the firehouse controversy and the subsequent submission of the petitions. Both lower courts, perhaps because of the much more extensive activity of Lawrence, failed to perceive that Simpson was similarly in the forefront of the controversy. The proper determination of public figure status involves a measuring of the degree of plaintiff’s participation in a particular activity, not a relative comparison of the involvement of two separate participants. The analysis focuses on Simpson’s relationship to the controversy as a whole. Although his participation was not as extensive as Lawrence’s, it far exceeded the role of a private figure.
*466V
After the jury returned the verdict for plaintiff Simpson, the trial court granted plaintiff Lawrence’s motion for a new trial. In so doing the court reversed its own prior dismissal of Lawrence’s cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed without comment the order for a new trial. 176 N.J.Super. at 396.
As stated previously, in order to meet the “actual malice” test of New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, a public figure must prove with convincing clarity that the defamatory statements were published by the defendant with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26,11 L.Ed.2d at 706. “Reckless disregard” in this context refers to the publishing of defamatory statements with a “high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 133 (1964). In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), the Court emphasized the stringent evidentiary standard necessary to prove recklessness, stating:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. [390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d at 267.] 4
Put differently, the recklessness in publishing material of obviously doubtful veracity must approach the level of publishing a “knowing, calculated falsehood.” Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733 (4th Cir. 1980).
*467In light of this stringent standard we have carefully examined the record below to determine whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to present a jury question as to actual malice. That examination reveals that there was insufficient evidence of actual malice toward either plaintiff. For that reason the order granting Lawrence a new trial cannot stand.
Although a belief in the truth of the matter published is insufficient to sustain the defense of truth, it is relevant in determining whether the defendant showed actual malice in regard to the truth or falsity of the publication. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A, comment h, at 237 (1977). Here, defendants honestly believed that the concededly misleading statements published in the two articles were true. Their misconceptions arose primarily from their conversation with Hartnett in which he told them that the petitions were under investigation for possible evidence of false swearing and forgery. Having been informed by Hartnett that petitions witnessed by both Lawrence and Simpson were among those being examined, defendants thought it was a reasonably certain implication that any such investigation would center around the activities of Lawrence and Simpson, who were known by the newspaper to be the key figures in circulating and filing the petitions.
Lawrence’s post-trial argument that persuaded the trial court to reverse its earlier dismissal of his case was essentially nothing more than this: based upon the information the defendants received from Hartnett and City Prosecutor Romankow prior to the publication of the two articles, they should have known that the articles were false, or they at least should have doubted their accuracy. But the liability question is not one of reasonableness when public figures and media defendants are involved. Rather, the focus of the “actual malice” inquiry is on a defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of the publication, Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Co., Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980); on his subjective awareness of its probable *468falsity, Rosanova v. Playboy, supra, 580 F.2d at 862; and his actual doubts as to its accuracy, Ryan v. Brooks, supra, 634 F.2d at 732. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-200, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1660-1661, 60 L.Ed.2d 115, 148-49 (Stewart, J., dis.senting) (1979) (“actual malice” in the New York Times v. Sullivan sense has nothing to do with hostility or ill will; rather it concerns publisher’s “state of knowledge of the falsity of what he published, not at all upon his motivation in publishing it * * *.”).
Neither “errors of interpretation of judgment” nor “misconceptions” are sufficient to create a jury issue of actual malice under the New York Times standard. See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290, 91 S.Ct. 633, 639, 28 L.Ed.2d 45, 53 (1971); Ryan v. Brooks, supra, 634 F.2d at 733. The Supreme Court has held that “if ‘the freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they “need * * * to survive,” ’ misstatements of this kind must have the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra, 401 U.S. at 292, 91 S.Ct. at 640, 28 L.Ed.2d at 54 (quoting New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 84 S.Ct. at 721, 11 L.Ed.2d at 701). “[T]o insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.” St. Amant, supra, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d at 267.
There is not “clear and convincing” evidence that defendants knew that the defamatory publications were false, or that they actually doubted their accuracy. See Ryan v. Brooks, supra, 634 F.2d at 732. Rather, as originally concluded by the trial court, defendants published a careless and perhaps irresponsible account of the information received concerning the scope of the City Attorney’s investigation. But the evidence in the record is “constitutionally insufficient” to present a jury question of actual malice. See New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 288, 84 S.Ct. at 730, 11 L.Ed.2d at 711; Ryan v. Brooks, supra, 634 F.2d at 735.
*469VI
The articles published by defendants are defamatory as a matter of law. It is unnecessary for us to decide the issue of truth as a defense. The Court having determined that both parties are public figures for the limited purposes of the firehouse appropriation and the petition controversy, defendants are protected by a qualified First Amendment privilege unless there is clear and convincing evidence that they acted with actual malice toward plaintiffs. Whatever the evidence of malice, it is insufficient to present a jury question on the issue.
Accordingly, we vacate the order granting plaintiff Lawrence a new trial and reinstate the judgment in favor of defendants. We reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiff Simpson, and enter judgment for defendants.

Slightly more than one year later plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming Joseph Hartnett as an additional defendant. The trial court granted Hartnett’s motion for summary judgment based upon the one year statutory limitations period for libel actions, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3. 143 N.J.Super. 387 (Law Div.1976). The Appellate Division reversed and remanded. 154 N.J.Super. 271 (1977). We reinstated the trial court’s order of dismissal. 78 N.J. 371 (1979).

The original jury verdict awarded $18,000 in money damages and instructed defendants to publish a full apology and retraction in the News-Record. Following an explanation by the court on the scope of remedies available, the jury redeliberated and returned with the $22,500 figure. The court’s action in permitting the further deliberation is not challenged here.

The final portion of the quoted statement refers to the privilege of “fair report,” a qualified privilege that permits the republication of official statements issued by police department heads and county prosecutors in investigations in progress or completed by them. See N.J.S.A. 2A:43-1. This privilege was not seriously asserted by defendants since the source of their information was not one covered in the statute.

In St. Amant, supra, Justice White reflected on examples of reckless conduct that might be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including publication of a completely fabricated story, a publication based entirely on an unverified anonymous telephone call, or publication where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the information reported. 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, 20 L.Ed 2d at 268.