Court Opinion

ID: 9959399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 17:02:33.974907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.933240
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                        STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                         v.

                          JUAN JIRON, JR., Appellant.

                              No. 1 CA-CR 23-0113
                               FILED 4-11-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County
                            No. CR201801061
                  The Honorable Ted Stuart Reed, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Rebecca Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Coconino Legal Defender’s Office, Flagstaff
By Joseph A. Carver
Counsel for Appellant
                              STATE v. JIRON
                            Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1           Juan Jiron, Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences for one
count of indecent exposure, three counts of sexual conduct with a minor,
and seven counts of child molestation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the jury’s verdict. State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2 (App. 1999).
In 2018, Jiron’s twelve-year-old step-granddaughter Penny1 told her school
counselor and her maternal grandmother that on multiple occasions Jiron
had touched her inappropriately, beginning when she was seven or eight
years old. Penny’s grandmother notified the Coconino County Sheriff’s
Office. Penny, who lived with Jiron and his wife from the age of six or
seven, related that Jiron often wore a fuzzy blue bathrobe with nothing
underneath it while she was alone with him. Penny disclosed that Jiron had
masturbated in her presence, asked her whether she wanted to touch his
penis or watch him masturbate, placed his finger in her vulva, licked her
vulva, and bit her clitoris. During a forensic interview, Penny disclosed that
Jiron had also victimized her cousin Jody.

¶3             After Penny’s disclosures, Jiron’s granddaughter Jody, who
was about three months older than Penny and spent time with her and Jiron
at Jiron’s house, told her mother and grandmother (Jiron’s wife) that Jiron
had also touched her inappropriately. Beginning when she was about six
years old, Jiron repeatedly put her hand on his penis and rubbed his erect
penis against her bottom. On one occasion, Jiron exposed his penis and
masturbated in front of her. On another occasion, when Jody was nine,
Jiron reached inside her underwear and touched her vulva.

1      We refer to the victims by the pseudonyms used in the parties’ briefs.
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(f).

                                      2
                              STATE v. JIRON
                            Decision of the Court

¶4              During the 2018 investigation, two of Jiron’s young adult
female relatives came forward and disclosed having been molested by
Jiron. Jiron’s great-niece and goddaughter Andrea, who had lived with
Jiron and his wife off and on as a child, disclosed that Jiron had touched her
clitoris in his bed when she was between the ages of eight and ten, and had
roughhoused and tickled her and exposed his penis while wearing nothing
but a blue bathrobe. Jiron’s great-niece Amy disclosed instances when Jiron
touched her private parts while she was in bed at night. Amy described an
incident when Jiron, wearing only a bathrobe, touched her vulva inside her
underwear, placed his penis on her leg, and put her hand on his penis.

¶5            A grand jury charged Jiron with one count of indecent
exposure, three counts of sexual conduct with a minor (dangerous crimes
against children), and eight counts of child molestation (dangerous crimes
against children). At Jiron’s first trial, the jury could not reach unanimous
verdicts. The superior court later dismissed count 6 (child molestation).

¶6             The State re-tried Jiron, and the second jury found him guilty
of one count of indecent exposure, three counts of sexual conduct with a
minor, and seven counts of child molestation. The superior court sentenced
Jiron to consecutive sentences ranging from one year in prison to multiple
life sentences. Jiron timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -
4033(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶7            Jiron argues the superior court violated his constitutional
right to present a complete defense when, under the rape shield law, A.R.S.
§ 13-1421, it denied his motion to compel Penny’s testimony at a pretrial
hearing. He further argues the superior court applied the wrong standard
of admissibility when it decided to exclude the section 13-1421 evidence.

¶8             During her forensic interview in 2018, Penny disclosed that
when she was seven or eight, her babysitter’s son, Craig, molested her.
Penny had disclosed Craig’s alleged behavior to a school counselor and
then to a police officer earlier that year. The police report taken in 2018 did
not result in criminal charges.

                                      3
                             STATE v. JIRON
                           Decision of the Court

¶9            Before trial, Jiron moved to admit evidence that Penny had
previously made a false allegation of sexual conduct against Craig.2 The
superior court set a pretrial hearing on the issue, and Jiron moved to compel
Penny’s testimony at the hearing. The court denied the motion to compel
Penny’s testimony. It ruled that Jiron could present other witnesses to
support his motion to admit specific instances of Penny’s prior sexual
conduct under A.R.S. § 13-1421, and the parties could rely on Penny’s
earlier recorded statements.

¶10           Craig and his mother testified at the pretrial hearing. After
the testimony, Jiron argued he had met the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard for admissibility under A.R.S. § 13-1421. The State agreed that the
superior court needed to find clear and convincing evidence of a false
allegation and argued that Jiron had not met the evidentiary standard. The
superior court denied Jiron’s motion to admit Penny’s prior false
allegations of sexual misconduct, stating:

       Subsection (B) [of A.R.S. § 13-1421] requires such evidence of
       false allegations of sexual misconduct made by the victim
       against others to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
       The State responds that the evidence before the Court is that
       the allegations were made by [Penny] and denied by Craig
       and his mother, but not that they were demonstrably false.
       The Court agrees. The fact that [Penny]’s allegations are
       disputed does not make them false.

       THE COURT FINDS that Defendant has not established by
       clear and convincing evidence that [Penny]’s allegations of
       sexual misconduct by Craig were false.

¶11           We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion but review de novo questions of statutory construction
or constitutional law. State v. Inzunza, 234 Ariz. 78, 83, ¶ 18 (App. 2014). A
defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated when evidence has been
properly excluded. State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 33 (App. 2003).

¶12           Section 13-1421 allows courts to admit “[e]vidence of specific
instances of the victim’s prior sexual conduct” when the evidence falls into
one of five categories. One category is “[e]vidence of false allegations of

2      Jiron also sought to admit evidence that Amy had made a prior false
allegation of sexual misconduct. The superior court excluded the evidence,
and Jiron raises no issue on appeal concerning Amy.

                                      4
                               STATE v. JIRON
                             Decision of the Court

sexual misconduct made by the victim against others.” A.R.S. § 13-
1421(A)(5). Evidence of a victim’s false allegations of sexual misconduct
against others “may be admitted only if a judge finds the evidence is
relevant and is material to a fact in issue in the case and that the
inflammatory or prejudicial nature of the evidence does not outweigh the
probative value of the evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-1421(A). “The standard for
admissibility of evidence under [A.R.S. § 13-1421(A)] is by clear and
convincing evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-1421(B).

¶13            Section 13-1421 does not require an evidentiary hearing. It
permits the superior court to admit section 13-1421 evidence only after “a
hearing on written motions . . . to determine the admissibility of the
evidence.” A.R.S. § 13-1421(B) (emphasis added). And the superior court
is not bound by the Arizona Rules of Evidence when deciding preliminary
admissibility questions. Ariz. R. Evid. 104(a). See also State v. James, 242
Ariz. 126, 133, ¶ 24 (App. 2017) (“Rule 104(a) support[s] the proposition that
an evidentiary hearing is not required simply because a defendant
demands one or because confrontation and cross-examination are the best
tools for developing facts, exposing inconsistencies, and determining
witness credibility.”). “It is well established . . . that confrontation rights do
not apply to the same extent at a pretrial suppression hearing as they do at
trial.” State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 43, ¶ 7 (App. 1999). Here, the superior
court determined it could adequately assess Penny’s credibility from her
prior recorded statements and did not need her in-person testimony to rule
on the admissibility of Jiron’s proffered section 13-1421(A)(5) evidence. We
find no abuse of discretion or violation of Jiron’s constitutional rights.

¶14          Jiron argues, for the first time on appeal, that the superior
court applied the wrong evidentiary standard in concluding he failed to
prove the alleged falsity of Penny’s prior allegation because the court
applied a “demonstrably false” standard rather than section 13-1421’s
“clear and convincing evidence” standard.

¶15            Because Jiron did not raise this issue in the superior court, he
must show that fundamental, prejudicial error occurred. See State v. Robles,
213 Ariz. 268, 272, ¶ 12 (App. 2006). A defendant establishes fundamental
error by first proving that trial error occurred. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz.
135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018). If he does so, the defendant must then show “that (1)
the error went to the foundation of the case, (2) the error took from the
defendant a right essential to his defense, or (3) the error was so egregious
that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Id. If a defendant
establishes fundamental error under prongs one or two, he must make a
separate showing of prejudice, but if he “establishes the third prong, he has

                                        5
                              STATE v. JIRON
                            Decision of the Court

shown both fundamental error and prejudice.” Id. “Prejudice is a fact-
intensive inquiry, the outcome of which will depend . . . upon the type of
error that occurred and the facts of a particular case.” State v. Dickinson, 233
Ariz. 527, 531, ¶ 13 (App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). A defendant “must affirmatively prove prejudice and may not
rely upon speculation to carry his burden.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

¶16          We find no error, fundamental or otherwise. Here, the
superior court correctly stated that A.R.S. § 13-1421(B) requires a defendant
to show “by clear and convincing evidence” that a prior allegation of sexual
misconduct by another is false. The court noted the conflicting evidence
and agreed that Penny’s allegations against Craig were not demonstrably
false. The court concluded that Jiron failed to demonstrate “by clear and
convincing evidence” that Penny’s prior allegations of sexual misconduct
by Craig were false. The fact that the superior court agreed Penny’s
allegations were not demonstrably false does not indicate the court applied
the wrong standard of admissibility for the section 13-1421(A)(5) evidence.

                               CONCLUSION

¶17           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jiron’s convictions and
sentences.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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