Court Opinion

ID: 9399407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 21:00:31.221057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.794794
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029      Doc: 44         Filed: 06/01/2023     Pg: 1 of 11

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4029

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff − Appellee,

                      v.

        WALTER MELGAR GOMEZ,

                             Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:20−cr−00318−KDB−DSC−1)

        Submitted: February 28, 2023                                       Decided: June 1, 2023

        Before KING, DIAZ, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and
        Judge Quattlebaum joined.

        ON BRIEF: Brandon R. Roseman, BRANDON ROSEMAN, PLLC, Charlotte, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. William T. Stetzer, Acting United States Attorney, Anthony J.
        Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44         Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 2 of 11

        DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

               Walter Melgar Gomez appeals his conviction for illegally reentering the United

        States following his removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On appeal, Gomez

        contends that the district court abused its discretion by not inquiring into ethnic bias during

        voir dire and plainly erred by admitting the testimony and report of an expert fingerprint

        witness. We affirm.

                                                      I.

                                                      A.

               Gomez, a native of Honduras, first entered the United States in 2015 and was

        removed soon after. He returned, came to the attention of law enforcement in 2020, and

        was arrested and charged with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He pleaded

        not guilty and went to trial.

               The trial took place the day before the November 2020 election, when Gomez argues

        “the issue of Hispanic immigration was at the forefront of national debate.” Appellant’s

        Br. at 6. Gomez asked the district court to question jurors about their views on “Hispanic

        people coming to the United States.” J.A. 10. The court declined, but asked whether jurors

        had strong opinions about the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and

        Customs Enforcement, or legal or illegal immigration.           It also asked about jurors’

        experiences with recent immigrants, the immigration system, and the naturalization

        process. And it confirmed they could “decide this case based on the facts and the law . . .

        and not based on any notions of bias, prejudice, or sympathy for either side.” J.A. 181.

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44         Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 3 of 11

                                                   B.

               The trial focused on whether Gomez was the individual removed in 2015. The

        government presented documents from 2015 listing the removed person’s name as Walter

        Melgar-Gomez and his birthdate as August 25, 1997. The documents included a photo of

        the removed person and his signature. One document contained a right index fingerprint

        while another had a full fingerprint card with all ten fingers.

               Officers who arrested Gomez in 2020 found a Honduran identification card in his

        wallet. The jury saw the card, which includes the name Walter Melgar Gomez (no hyphen),

        has a photograph of Gomez, and gives his birthdate as August 28, 1997 (three days later

        than the date on the 2015 documents). The government also presented a full fingerprint

        card made during Gomez’s 2020 arrest.

               The government then offered the testimony and report of Laura Karel, a fingerprint-

        analysis expert. Karel testified that she had multiple criminal-justice degrees and fifteen

        years of experience in “tenprint” examination. She noted that she is one of around one

        hundred certified tenprint examiners in the world and detailed the certification process,

        which involves eighty hours of board-approved work, letters of endorsement, and a six-

        hour test.

               Karel explained that she uses the ACE-V method, which stands for analysis,

        comparison, evaluation, and verification. The examiner first analyzes whether the print

        has enough information for use in comparison. She then does a side-by-side comparison

        of two prints and evaluates whether the prints were made by the same or different

                                                        3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44         Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 4 of 11

        individuals, or if it can’t be determined. A second examiner completes the same process

        to verify the first examiner’s conclusion.

               Gomez didn’t object to Karel testifying as an expert, and the court accepted her.

               Karel testified that she compared the right index print and tenprint card from 2015

        with the tenprint card from 2020 and concluded all three right index prints were “made by

        the same individual.” J.A. 94–95. Her signed report (admitted without objection) likewise

        concluded that “the fingerprints were made by the same individual.” J.A. 136. And another

        examiner verified her report—the report contains the verifier’s initials.

               Gomez’s attorney probed deeper on the ACE-V method during cross-examination.

        First, counsel asked about the comparison step. Karel explained that she looks for

        “different minutia,” such as “a ridge that ends or a . . . ridge that goes straight and then []

        breaks off into two.” J.A. 98. She then marks those distinguishing points and confirms

        that what she sees on one print “is exactly” what she sees on the other. Id. Karel couldn’t

        remember “exactly how many” points she identified in Gomez’s case. But she testified

        that no set number of points is required and explained that she “usually do[es] more than

        eight.” Id.

               Second, Gomez’s attorney asked about the verification step, pressing Karel for the

        verifier’s report. Karel explained that the verifier doesn’t prepare a separate report, but

        “looks at everything that [Karel] did,” completes the “ACE portion of the ACE-V”

        themselves, comes to their own conclusion, and signs off on the original report if they agree

        with Karel. J.A. 100. Karel confirmed on redirect that the reviewer is also a certified

        member of fingerprint expert organizations.

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44         Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 5 of 11

               The jury returned a guilty verdict and the court sentenced Gomez to time served

        plus four days, followed by a year of supervised release. He was also charged a $100

        special assessment.

               This appeal followed.

                                                      II.

               Gomez argues the district court abused its discretion in not asking his proposed voir

        dire question about Hispanic immigration. And he claims the district court plainly erred in

        admitting Karel’s expert testimony and report. We consider each in turn.

                                                      A.

               Gomez first argues the district court’s voir dire questions failed to mitigate the risk

        that prejudice against Hispanic immigrants would infect his trial—a risk he says was

        heightened because of the 2020 election.

               We review the district court’s “refusal to ask requested voir dire questions for abuse

        of discretion.” United States v. Barber, 80 F.3d 964, 967 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). “A

        district court abuses its discretion . . . if the voir dire does not provide a reasonable

        assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present.” United States v. Lancaster, 96

        F.3d 734, 740 (1996) (en banc) (cleaned up).

               When issues of race or ethnicity are “inextricably bound up with the conduct of the

        trial,” the court can’t “refuse a request for voir dire directed to” a related bias. Barber, 80

        F.3d at 968. But when race or ethnicity isn’t an element of the offense, related to a defense,

        or otherwise “connected with the resolution of relevant facts,” the court abuses its

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44           Filed: 06/01/2023    Pg: 6 of 11

        discretion only if “there is a reasonable possibility that prejudice might influence the jury.”

        Id. (cleaned up).

               The district court acted within its broad discretion during voir dire. Hispanic

        ethnicity wasn’t “inextricably bound up” with Gomez’s case. Id. Gomez doesn’t, for

        example, argue that he was targeted for prosecution because of his ethnicity. Cf. Ristaino

        v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1976) (discussing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524

        (1973), and explaining that a question on racial bias was required there because the

        defendant argued officers framed him in retaliation for his civil-rights activities). And

        there’s no suggestion that ethnicity was otherwise connected to the facts of the case, the

        elements of the illegal-reentry offense, or Gomez’s defense. Gomez’s argument is simply

        that jurors might be more likely to convict him of illegal reentry because he is Hispanic.

               The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Rosales-Lopez v. United States,

        which involved a defendant of Mexican descent who was accused of smuggling other

        individuals from Mexico into the United States. 451 U.S. 182, 184 (1981). Defense

        counsel proposed the voir dire question: “Would you consider the race or Mexican descent

        of [the defendant] in your evaluation of this case?” Id. at 185. The trial court declined to

        ask the question, or any other question “directed specifically to possible racial or ethnic

        prejudice,” but it did ask whether the jurors had “any particular feelings one way or the

        other about aliens.” Id. at 185–86.

               The Supreme Court found no reversible error, determining that the issues in the case

        weren’t bound up with race or ethnicity. Id. at 193. And it held that the trial court’s

        questions about general prejudice towards noncitizens “eliminated . . . any reasonable

                                                       6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44          Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 7 of 11

        possibility” that the jurors would be influenced by “undisclosed racial prejudice toward

        Mexicans” specifically. Id. The Court found “no doubt that the jurors would have

        understood a question about aliens to at least include Mexican aliens.” Id.

               Gomez argues the danger of bias against Hispanic immigrants is heightened in a

        prosecution for illegal reentry because “the vast majority of enforcement involves Hispanic

        peoples,” and he faults the district court for failing to explicitly ask about this issue.

        Appellant’s Br. at 8. But under the logic of Rosales-Lopez, jurors steeped in the political

        environment Gomez describes would have understood the court’s general questions about

        illegal immigration to include Hispanic immigrants.

               The questions the district court asked eliminated “any reasonable possibility” of

        undisclosed prejudice toward Hispanic immigrants, so the court didn’t abuse its discretion

        in not asking Gomez’s additional question. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 193.

                                                      B.

               Gomez next argues the district court erred in admitting Karel’s expert testimony.

        Because Gomez didn’t object to Karel’s expert testimony, we review the court’s ruling for

        plain error. United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2010). Gomez must

        first establish (1) that an error occurred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error

        affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 272 (2013). Even

        then, we will exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it “seriously affects the

        fairness, integrity or public reputation” of the judicial process. Rosales-Mireles v. United

        States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1905 (2018).

                                                       7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029       Doc: 44          Filed: 06/01/2023     Pg: 8 of 11

                Gomez argues Karel’s testimony was unreliable (and thus should have been

        excluded) because she couldn’t remember exactly how many points she matched in his

        case. But we find no error in the admission of Karel’s testimony, much less a plain one.

                To provide expert testimony, a witness must be “qualified . . . by knowledge, skill,

        experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The court must conclude that the

        expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to

        understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Id. The expert’s opinion must be

        “based on sufficient facts or data,” and it must be “the product of reliable principles and

        methods,” “reliably applied” to the facts of the case. United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825,

        835 (4th Cir. 2019).

                Karel met these requirements. She testified to her training, certification, and fifteen

        years of experience in fingerprint examination. The method she applied, ACE-V, has been

        recognized by several circuits as sufficiently reliable. See United States v. Hood, 846 F.

        App’x 825, 829 (11th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Crisp, 324

        F.3d 261, 266–70 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining to exclude fingerprint evidence, but not

        specifically discussing the ACE-V method).

                As Karel explained, the International Association for Identification, the “oldest and

        largest forensic organization in the world,” previously determined that “there was no need

        to have an exact number of points in order for [an ACE-V] comparison to be concluded.”

        J.A. 88, 98. Karel also described in detail how she applied the ACE-V method in Gomez’s

        case.

                                                       8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029      Doc: 44          Filed: 06/01/2023     Pg: 9 of 11

               The jury was free to consider that Karel couldn’t remember exactly how many

        points she matched in Gomez’s case when weighing her testimony. Gomez had an

        opportunity for “[v]igorous cross-examination,” one of the “traditional and appropriate

        means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

        Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). And the district court instructed the jury that they weren’t

        required to accept Karel’s opinion. It directed them to assess her credibility based on her

        training, experience, and whether her “opinions were based on adequate information and

        sound reasoning and good judgment.” J.A. 92.

               We find no error (plain or otherwise) in the district court’s decision to admit Karel’s

        testimony. But even if there were an error, Gomez can’t demonstrate an impact on his

        substantial rights. Gomez would need to show “a reasonable probability that, but for the

        error,” he would have been acquitted. Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021).

               Excluding the fingerprint evidence, the jury still had an ample basis to conclude

        Gomez was the same person removed in 2015. The government presented a Honduran ID

        recovered from Gomez in 2020 and immigration forms from the individual removed in

        2015. Those exhibits reveal a similar photo and a near-perfect match on both name and

        birthdate.

                                                     C.

               Gomez’s final argument is that the district court erred in admitting Karel’s

        fingerprint-analysis report, in violation of the rules against hearsay and the Confrontation

        Clause. Gomez didn’t object to the admission of Karel’s report at trial, so we again review

                                                      9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029      Doc: 44          Filed: 06/01/2023      Pg: 10 of 11

        for plain error. Baptiste, 596 F.3d at 223–24 (evidentiary rulings); United States v. Keita,

        742 F.3d 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2014) (Confrontation Clause).

               Karel’s report was initialed by the individual who completed the verification step.

        But the verifier didn’t testify, and Gomez asserts that the initials allowed Karel “to bolster

        her credibility to the jury” by implying a second expert had confirmed her findings.

        Appellant’s Br. at 16.

               The government says the initials were offered for their effect on Karel (informing

        her that the required verification step had been completed), rather than for their truth (that

        the reviewer had confirmed Karel’s findings). And it points out that much of Karel’s

        testimony on verification took place during cross-examination; the government limited its

        own questions to confirming that Karel complied with the ACE-V method.

               The government is correct that neither the Confrontation Clause nor the rules against

        hearsay bar the use of statements “for purposes other than establishing the truth of the

        matter asserted.” United States v. Jordan, 952 F.3d 160, 167–68 (4th Cir. 2020). And a

        defendant in a criminal case “cannot complain of error which he himself has invited.”

        United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 904 (4th Cir. 1996).

               Had Gomez preserved this challenge, we would face an issue about which there is

        some disagreement among the state courts. Several state courts have found evidence of

        fingerprint verification to be inadmissible hearsay under their evidentiary rules. See, e.g.,

        People v. Yancy, 858 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ill. App. 2005) (testimony that “quality assurance

        department agreed with [expert witness’s] identification” was improper hearsay because it

        was “offered to prove the truth of the matter that it asserted: that the quality assurance

                                                     10
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4029      Doc: 44          Filed: 06/01/2023     Pg: 11 of 11

        department also found that the . . . prints were defendant’s”); State v. Wicker, 832 P.2d 127,

        128–29 (Wash. App. 1992) (testimony that identification was verified by another senior

        technician, as “demonstrated by the presence of her initials on the fingerprint card,”

        amounted to a statement that “the two sets of prints match” and was “classic hearsay”).

        But see State v. Quick, 405 S.E.2d 179, 196 (N.C. 1991) (finding a nonhearsay purpose

        where expert testified that second examiner’s verification was part of standard procedure

        and informed his opinion that the prints matched).

               But we needn’t resolve the issue because Gomez can’t show an impact on his

        substantial rights. Aside from his challenge based on Karel’s inability to remember the

        number of points matched—which we have rejected—Gomez doesn’t challenge Karel’s

        testimony that all three prints “were made by the same individual.” J.A. 136. And again,

        the government presented significant documentary evidence establishing that Gomez was

        the individual removed in 2015. So Gomez hasn’t shown a “reasonable probability” that

        the report “affected the outcome” of his trial. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262

        (2010).

                                                     III.

               We affirm the district court’s judgment. And we dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        Court and argument would not aid in our decision.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

                                                     11