Court Opinion

ID: 9797035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:11:43.937724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:26.142478
License: Public Domain

Judge WEBB
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
With respect, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which remands for a determination of mother’s request for fees incurred on appeal under § 14-10-119, C.R.S.2003.
Generally, we do not entertain a claim for attorney fees where, as here, the claim is raised for the first time on appeal. Harwig v. Downey, 56 P.3d 1220 (Colo.App.2002)(interpreting § 13-17-101, C.R.S.2003). However, this rule cannot be applied if the grounds for recovering attorney fees are unique to the appellate process. See C.A.R. 38(d)(“Sanctions for Frivolous Appeal”).
Here, the grounds for mother’s claim to appellate fees under § 14-10-119 are her reference to “the unequal resources of the parties,” coupled with her assertion that she has “exhausted her resources including her share of the marital estate, and her retirement savings in order to provide a comfortable home for the parties [sic] son and pursue this matter while she is unemployed.”
Mother provides no record support for these assertions. See Mauldin v. Lowery, 127 Colo. 234, 255 P.2d 976 (1953)(refusing to consider statements in briefs unsupported by *533references to the record). Moreover, she does not explain the absence of record support on the basis that either the alleged inequality of the parties’ resources or the purported exhaustion of her resources could not have been presented to the trial court, because one or both of these circumstances arose only after she filed her notice of appeal. See Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar and Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718 (Colo.1992)(lim-iting review to issues raised in the trial court).
C.A.R. 39.5 is a procedural rule that does not establish substantive grounds for awarding attorney fees. Regardless, I believe that before exercising our discretion to remand attorney fees claims under C.A.R. 39.5, we should perform a gatekeeper function by subjecting attorney fees claims raised on appeal to at least threshold scrutiny. Cf. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999).
In my view, mother’s assertions do not survive this analysis. Indeed, if the assertions presented here warrant further proceedings on remand under § 14-10-119, then most appellants or appellees in cases subject to § 14-10-119 could further protract the proceedings, and perhaps obtain settlement leverage over the adverse party, merely by raising before us an unsubstantiated and previously unheard request for attorney fees.