Court Opinion

ID: 9841241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 18:04:30.872001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:43:05.862372
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/21/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

 ELAINE C. ESTRADA,                      B317848

         Plaintiff and Appellant,        (Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04059)
         v.

 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’
 RETIREMENT SYSTEM,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
     Elaine C. Estrada, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Matthew G. Jacobs, Elizabeth Yelland, Charles H.
Glauberman, Cristina Andrade and Seth Curtis for Defendant
and Respondent.
              _________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
      Government Code 1 section 7522.72 provides that if a public
employee is convicted of a felony for conduct arising out of or in
the performance of his or her official duties, the employee forfeits
certain accrued retirement benefits, which “shall remain forfeited
notwithstanding any reduction in sentence or expungement of the
conviction.” Appellant Elaine Estrada, a former employee of the
City of La Habra Heights (City), pled no contest to a felony that
arose out of the performance of her official duties. Under the
terms of Estrada’s plea agreement, the conviction was later
reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17 and then
dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. After respondent
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS)
determined that Estrada forfeited a portion of her retirement
benefits as a result of her felony conviction, she filed a petition
for writ of administrative mandate. We conclude the trial court
did not err in denying the petition because, consistent with the
language and purpose of section 7522.72, Estrada’s retirement
benefits were subject to forfeiture upon her no contest plea to a
job-related felony, notwithstanding the subsequent reduction to a
misdemeanor and dismissal of the charge. We accordingly affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Estrada worked for the City as an Accountant and Payroll
Administrator from November 7, 2005 to August 24, 2012.
Through her employment, she was eligible for retirement benefits
as a member of CalPERS.

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Government Code.

                                 2
I.     Criminal proceedings
       On April 28, 2016, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office filed a felony complaint against Estrada.
The complaint charged Estrada with one count of
misappropriation of public funds in violation of Penal Code
section 424, subdivision (a), (count 1), and one count of
embezzlement by a public officer in violation of Penal Code
section 504 (count 2). As to both counts, it was alleged that,
between April 1, 2007 and July 31, 2009, Estrada removed
payroll deductions, and as a result, did not pay the required
employee share for dependents covered on her plan. The City did
not discover the alleged conduct until an audit in 2012 because
Estrada was responsible for the payroll and timekeeping of all
City employees.
       On June 28, 2017, Estrada appeared for the preliminary
hearing. At that time, her counsel advised the trial court that
the parties had reached a plea agreement. As part of the plea,
the court granted the People’s motion to amend the complaint to
add a third felony count for unauthorized computer access in
violation of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(7), (count 3).
       The prosecutor set forth the terms of the plea agreement on
the record, stating: “Ms. Estrada will be pleading no contest
today to a felony count of Penal Code section 502(c)(7). That is
unauthorized access to a computer system or network. The plea
will be taken pursuant to a felony provision Penal Code
section 502(d)(3) little (c). [¶] But the sentencing will be set out
for six months, at which time the felony plea will [be] vacated and
a misdemeanor plea will be—of no contest will be entered in its
place. [¶] . . . [¶] Within two weeks of the plea of today’s date,
Ms. Estrada will pay to the City of La Habra Heights the amount

                                 3
of $5,780.20. At the end of the six-month period, when
Ms. Estrada is sentenced to a misdemeanor, the sentence will
then be one year of summary probation, starting on the day of the
sentencing of the misdemeanor. [¶] At the completion of
probation, counsel will move, as allowed under Penal Code
section 1203.4, to have the misdemeanor vacated and expunged.
[¶] . . . [¶] The D.A. would agree to the Penal Code section 1203.4
[motion] after the end of that one year of summary probation. . . .
[¶] The last condition . . . is regarding the six-month time period
from which the plea today is taken and the misdemeanor plea
and sentencing [that] takes place six months from now. If there’s
a failure to pay restitution or any violation of the law, either
misdemeanor or felony during that six-month period, the
sentencing will result in the sentencing on the felony itself and
that would involve a restitution order and formal probation.”
        Estrada answered affirmatively when asked if she
understood the terms and conditions of her plea, including that a
plea of no contest would be treated as a finding of guilt for all
purposes. After waiving her rights, Estrada pled no contest to
count 3, a violation of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(7).
The court found Estrada’s plea and waivers were knowingly and
intelligently made, and there was a factual basis for the plea.
The court accepted the plea and found Estrada guilty of the
charged offense. After obtaining a time waiver from Estrada’s
counsel, the court continued sentencing for a period of six
months.
        The court’s minute order for the June 28, 2017 hearing set
forth the terms of the plea as described by the prosecutor and
accepted by Estrada. The minute order included the following
disposition: “COUNT (03): DISPOSITION: CONVICTED.”

                                4
       On January 3, 2018, Estrada appeared for sentencing.
At that time, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Estrada
had paid restitution to the City. Because Estrada had complied
with the terms of her plea agreement, the prosecutor moved to
amend the complaint to reduce count 3 from a felony to a
misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b).
The court granted the People’s motion. The court then allowed
Estrada to withdraw her plea to count 3 as a felony, and to enter
a new plea of no contest to that count as a misdemeanor.
The court accepted the plea, and proceeded to sentence Estrada
to one year of summary probation on the condition that she obey
all laws and orders of the court. On the People’s motion, the
court dismissed counts 1 and 2 under Penal Code section 1385.
       On March 5, 2019, following her successful completion of
probation, Estrada moved to withdraw her plea of no contest and
to enter a plea of not guilty under Penal Code section 1203.4.
The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the criminal
case.
II.    Administrative proceedings
       On April 10, 2018, while Estrada was serving probation,
the City submitted a forfeiture of benefits form to CalPERS
regarding Estrada’s criminal conviction. The form indicated that
Estrada was convicted of a job-related felony on June 28, 2017,
and that the earliest date of commission of the felony was
September 1, 2007.
       On May 23, 2018, CalPERS notified Estrada that, as a
result of her felony conviction, a portion of her accrued retirement
benefits was subject to forfeiture under section 7522.72.
In addition, Estrada was no longer eligible to return to CalPERS-
covered employment or to accrue further CalPERS benefits.

                                 5
Estrada was informed that any member contributions that she
made to the retirement system during the forfeiture period would
be returned to her.
       On June 21, 2018, through her attorney, Estrada disputed
CalPERS’s forfeiture action. Estrada contended she was not
convicted of a felony because, on January 3, 2018, she withdrew
her plea to a felony and entered a new plea of no contest to a
misdemeanor. On September 7, 2018, Estrada appealed the
forfeiture action.
       On April 18, 2019, an administrative law judge (ALJ) held
an evidentiary hearing on Estrada’s appeal. The ALJ admitted
into evidence various documents offered by the parties, including
the minute orders and hearing transcripts from Estrada’s
criminal case. A CalPERS analyst responsible for reviewing
forfeiture-of-benefit cases testified that CalPERS based its
forfeiture decision on court records showing Estrada was
convicted of a felony, and that Estrada’s benefits remained
forfeited even if the conviction was later reduced to a
misdemeanor or dismissed. Estrada testified that she was not
convicted of a felony because, upon her completion of a six-month
probation, she was allowed to vacate her felony plea and enter a
new plea to a misdemeanor. She also testified that, after she
completed one year of probation, the criminal case was dismissed.
       On June 24, 2019, the ALJ issued a proposed decision
denying Estrada’s administrative appeal. The ALJ found
CalPERS was correct in its determination that Estrada was
convicted of a felony arising out of her official duties as an
employee of the City. As a result, the ALJ concluded that
Estrada forfeited her right to retirement benefits for the period
from September 1, 2007, the earliest date of the commission of

                                6
the felony, through June 28, 2017, the date of her felony
conviction.
       On August 21, 2019, the CalPERS Board of Administration
(Board) adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision.
III. Nunc pro tunc order
       On August 6, 2019, after the ALJ issued the proposed
decision but before the Board adopted it, Estrada returned to
criminal court. Following an off-the-record conference with
Estrada’s counsel and a deputy district attorney, the court stated
that it was granting a request to issue a nunc pro tunc order.
The court then found “nunc pro tunc that on June 28th, 2017,
the defendant pleaded to the felony but was not convicted.”
The court further found that “on January 3rd, 2018, the
defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to
a misdemeanor.” At the request of Estrada’s counsel, the court
added that “[t]he record will so reflect that the defendant did not
suffer a felony conviction in this case. She merely pleaded to the
felony on . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . June 28th, 2017, but was not
convicted. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he only criminal offense [for which] she
was convicted and sentenced was a misdemeanor on January 3rd,
2018.”
IV. Petition for writ of mandate
       On September 19, 2019, Estrada filed a petition for writ of
administrative mandate in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
She sought an order directing CalPERS to set aside its forfeiture
decision and to reinstate her retirement benefits. Estrada argued
that she was entitled to retain her retirement benefits because
she was convicted of a misdemeanor, not a felony, and the
criminal case against her was dismissed. CalPERS opposed the
petition, asserting that Estrada was convicted of a felony when

                                 7
she pled no contest to a felony charge on June 28, 2017, and that
the later reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor and
dismissal of the charge were irrelevant under section 7522.72.
       On December 15, 2021, the trial court denied Estrada’s
petition. In its written order, the court explained that, while the
term “conviction” as used in section 7522.72 was ambiguous,
the purpose of the statute was to ensure the integrity of the
public pension systems. The court found that “[a]llowing
[Estrada] to avoid the partial forfeiture of her pension benefits
where she admitted felonious conduct in connection with her
public employment would be to defeat the legislative purpose of
[s]ection 7522.72.” The court further found that, because the
Legislature expressly intended for postconviction proceedings to
have no effect on forfeiture unless the conviction was reversed,
the later reduction of the felony to a misdemeanor and dismissal
of the charge were “of no consequence; [Estrada’s] admission to
felonious conduct remains and her pension benefits are subject to
partial forfeiture.”
       Estrada appeals from the order denying her writ petition.
                           DISCUSSION
       In her appeal, Estrada does not dispute that she pled
no contest to a felony charge for violation of Penal Code
section 502, subdivision (c)(7), for conduct arising out of the
performance of her official duties for the City. She contends,
however, that her retirement benefits were not subject to
forfeiture under section 7522.72 because she withdrew her plea to
the felony and entered a new plea to a misdemeanor, and the
criminal case was later dismissed. We conclude Estrada’s claims
lack merit.

                                8
I.     Standard of review
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 governs judicial
review by administrative mandate of any final decision or order
rendered by an administrative agency. If the administrative
decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, such as
the right to employee retirement benefits, the trial court must
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. (Strumsky v.
San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d
28, 44–45.) Under this standard, the “trial court must afford a
strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative
findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision
bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative
findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v.
City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.) In cases where the
trial court exercised its independent judgment on the evidence,
the appellate court generally reviews the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 824.)
       The proper interpretation of a statute, however, presents a
question of law that is subject to de novo review. (Christensen v.
Lightbourne (2019) 7 Cal.5th 761, 771.) The rules governing
statutory interpretation are well-settled. “ ‘Our fundamental
task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the
statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.
We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context
of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its
scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the

                                9
statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ ”
(Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381.)
       “Where a question of law requires interpreting a statute
that governs CalPERS’s responsibilities, ‘ “ ‘the court accords
great weight to [CalPERS’s] interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (Byrd v. State
Personnel Bd. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 899, 907.) As the agency
charged with administering the state’s public pension statute,
CalPERS “ ‘has expertise and technical knowledge as well as
“ ‘ “an intimate knowledge of the problems dealt with in the
statute and the various administrative consequences arising from
particular interpretations.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
II.    Section 7522.72
       Section 7522.72 is part of the California Public Employees’
Pension Reform Act of 2013 (§ 7522 et seq.; PEPRA). It provides,
in relevant part, that “[i]f a public employee is convicted by a
state or federal trial court of any felony under state or federal law
for conduct arising out of or in the performance of his or her
official duties, . . . he or she shall forfeit all accrued rights and
benefits in any public retirement system in which he or she is a
member to the extent provided in subdivision (c) and shall not
accrue further benefits in that public retirement system, effective
on the date of the conviction.” (§ 7522.72, subd. (b)(1).)
       Section 7522.72, subdivision (c), sets forth the scope of the
forfeiture. It mandates that “[a] member shall forfeit all the
rights and benefits earned or accrued from the earliest date of the
commission of any felony described in subdivision (b) to the
forfeiture date.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) For purposes of this
subdivision, “forfeiture date” means the date of the conviction.

                                 10
(Id., subd. (c)(3).) Subdivision (c) further provides that “[t]he
rights and benefits shall remain forfeited notwithstanding any
reduction in sentence or expungement of the conviction following
the date of the member’s conviction.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
        Section 7522.72, subdivision (h), specifies the limited
circumstances under which a public employee may recover
benefits that were forfeited under the statute. It states that,
“[i]f a public employee’s conviction is reversed and that decision is
final, the employee shall be entitled to . . . [¶] [r]ecover the
forfeited rights and benefits,” as adjusted for any returned
member contributions. (§ 7522.72, subd. (h)(1).)
III. Estrada’s retirement benefits became subject to
        forfeiture upon her no contest plea to a felony
        Under the plain language of section 7522.72, a public
employee’s accrued retirement benefits are subject to forfeiture
upon his or her conviction of a job-related felony. While section
7522.72 does not define the terms “convicted” or “conviction,” the
general rule in California is that “ ‘[a] plea of guilty constitutes a
conviction.’ ” (People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 390–391;
accord, People v. Laino (2004) 32 Cal.4th 878, 895.) “A guilty plea
‘admits every element of the crime charged’ [citation] and ‘is the
“legal equivalent” of a “verdict” [citation] and is “tantamount” to
a “finding” [citations].’ ” (People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal.4th 738,
749.)
        The same principles apply to a plea of nolo contendere or
no contest. “The legal effect of such a plea, to a crime punishable
as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty for all
purposes.” (Pen. Code, § 1016, subd. 3.) Like a guilty plea,
a no contest plea to a felony admits every element of the charged
crime. (People v. Miller (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1058;

                                 11
People v. Voit (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1364.) Thus, a plea of
guilty or no contest “is a ‘conclusive admission of guilt’ [citation],
and constitutes a conviction ‘ “within the ordinary as well as the
technical meaning of the word.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1093–1094.) By pleading no contest to a
felony, “a defendant ‘acquire[s] the status . . . of a person
convicted of a felony.’ ” (Id. at p. 1094.)
      In this case, the record reflects that, on June 28, 2017,
Estrada pled no contest to a felony charge for violation of
Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(7). Subject to certain
enumerated exceptions, a person is guilty of a public offense
under that statute when he or she “[k]nowingly and without
permission accesses or causes to be accessed any computer,
computer system, or computer network.” (Pen. Code, § 502,
subd. (c)(7).) Where the loss to the victim exceeds $5,000, the
offense is punishable by either a fine, a term of imprisonment in
state prison or a county jail, or both. (Id., subd. (d)(3)(c).)
This type of offense, which is punishable as either a felony or a
misdemeanor, is commonly referred to as a “wobbler.” (People v.
Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789 (Park) [describing wobblers].)
      In setting forth the terms of Estrada’s negotiated plea
agreement, the prosecutor made clear that Estrada was “pleading
no contest today to a felony count of Penal Code section 502(c)(7),”
and that “[t]he plea will be taken pursuant to a felony provision
Penal Code section 502(d)(3)[(c)]” (italics added). Estrada
confirmed she understood the terms and conditions of the plea.
She also confirmed she understood that a plea of no contest would
be treated as a finding of guilt for all purposes. After Estrada
pled no contest to a felony violation of Penal Code section 502,
subdivision (c)(7), the trial court accepted the plea and found her

                                 12
guilty of the offense “at this time.” Because Estrada’s no contest
plea admitted every element of the charged felony and was the
legal equivalent of a guilty plea for all purposes, we conclude it
constituted a “conviction” for purposes of section 7522.72.
       This interpretation of section 7522.72 is also consistent
with the legislative purpose of statute. As discussed, section
7522.72 is part of PEPRA, which was enacted to close loopholes
and to curb abusive practices that existed in California’s public
pension system. (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v.
Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
1032, 1054, 1102.) The purpose of section 7522.72’s forfeiture
provision is “to protect the public employee pension system from
abusive practices . . . and to preserve public trust in government
by discouraging serious criminal activity abusive of the public
trust.” (Hipsher v. Los Angeles County Employees Retirement
Assn. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 671, 695 (Hipsher); accord, Wilmot
v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 631, 661–662 (Wilmot).) “By enacting section
7522.72, the Legislative moved to close an egregious loophole that
allowed public funds to reward criminality.” (Wilmot, at p. 662.)
       Consistent with this purpose, section 7522.72’s partial
forfeiture requirement “is triggered only by felonious conduct
committed in the scope of a pensioner’s public employment
(§ 7522.72, subd. (b)(1)) and limited to service time from the date
the criminal conduct began (§ 7522.72, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1)).”
(Hipsher, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 693.) Here, Estrada
admitted to felonious conduct committed in the scope of her
employment for the City when she pled no contest to a felony
violation of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(7). As the
trial court observed, “[a]llowing [Estrada] to avoid the partial

                                13
forfeiture of her pension benefits where she admitted felonious
conduct in connection with her public employment would be to
defeat the legislative purpose of [s]ection 7522.72.”
       In support of her argument that she was never convicted of
a felony, Estrada relies on the nunc pro tunc order issued by the
criminal court on August 6, 2019, more than two years after her
no contest plea. At that time, following an off-the-record
conference, the court stated it was finding “nunc pro tunc that on
June 28th, 2017, [Estrada] pleaded to the felony but was not
convicted.” It has long been recognized, however, “ ‘[t]he function
of a nunc pro tunc order is merely to correct the record of the
judgment and not to alter the judgment actually rendered.’ ”
(Estate of Eckstrom (1960) 54 Cal.2d 540, 544.) “A court can
always correct a clerical, as distinguished from a judicial error
which appears on the face of a decree by a nunc pro tunc order.
[Citations.] It cannot, however, change an order which has
become final even though made in error, if in fact the order made
was that intended to be made.” (Ibid.) “Any attempt by a court,
under the guise of correcting clerical error, to ‘revise its
deliberately exercised judicial discretion’ is not permitted.” (In re
Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.)
       On this record, the August 6, 2019 order was not a proper
exercise of the court’s authority to correct a clerical error with
respect to Estrada’s original no contest plea. That order was not
based on a finding that, at the June 28, 2017 plea hearing,
the court erroneously recorded that Estrada was convicted of
felony. Rather, it sought to retroactively modify the record to
find that, while Estrada may have pled no contest to a felony on
June 28, 2017, she was not actually convicted of a felony at that
time. The transcript of the plea hearing, however, contains no

                                 14
such finding by the court or stipulation by the parties, and the
court’s minute order from the hearing reflects that Estrada was
“CONVICTED” of a felony. “An amendment that substantially
modifies the original judgment . . . may not be made by the court
under its authority to correct clerical error . . . unless the record
clearly demonstrates that the error was not the result of the
exercise of judicial discretion.” (In re Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d
at p. 705.) Because the record does not clearly demonstrate that
the purported error sought to be corrected by the August 6, 2019
order was a clerical error rather than a judicial error, it did not
provide a valid basis for a nunc pro tunc order.
       For these reasons, we conclude that, as of June 28, 2017,
the date of Estrada’s no contest plea, she stood convicted of a job-
related felony within the meaning of section 7522.72. Therefore,
as of that date, Estrada’s retirement benefits were subject to
section 7522.72’s partial forfeiture requirement.
IV. Estrada’s retirement benefits remained forfeited
       notwithstanding the reduction of the felony to a
       misdemeanor and dismissal of the charge
       We next consider whether Estrada’s retirement benefits
remained forfeited under section 7522.72 following the
postconviction proceedings, in which her felony conviction was
reduced to a misdemeanor and then dismissed. The answer to
this question can be found in the express language of section
7522.72, subdivision (c)(1), which states that the employee’s
“rights and benefits shall remain forfeited notwithstanding any
reduction in sentence or expungement of the conviction following
the date of the member’s conviction.”
       On January 3, 2018, Estrada’s felony conviction was
reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17,

                                 15
subdivision (b). Where, as here, the defendant has pled guilty or
no contest to a wobbler offense, Penal Code section 17,
subdivision (b), specifies the circumstances under which the
offense may be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor. (Park,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 790.) As relevant here, a wobbler is
reduced to a misdemeanor when “the court grants probation to a
defendant and at the time of granting probation, or on
application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the
court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor,” or when “the
prosecuting attorney files . . . a complaint specifying that the
offense is a misdemeanor.” (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b)(3), (b)(4).)
When a wobbler is reduced to a misdemeanor under the
procedures set forth in Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b),
“the statute generally has been construed in accordance with its
plain language to mean that the offense is a misdemeanor ‘for all
purposes.’ ” (Park, at p. 793.)
       As our Supreme Court has recognized, the provisions
of Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), “are not necessarily
conclusive, however, and the Legislature sometimes has explicitly
made clear its intent to treat a wobbler as a felony for specified
purposes notwithstanding a court’s exercise of discretion to
reduce the offense to a misdemeanor.” (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 794.) For instance, under Business and Professions Code
section 6102, subdivision (b), an attorney who is convicted of a
felony is subject to immediate suspension from the practice of
law, “irrespective of whether in a particular case the crime may
be considered a misdemeanor as a result of postconviction
proceedings.” Similarly, for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law,
the determination whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike
is based “upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected

                                16
by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon
the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor.”
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).)
       In enacting section 7522.72, the Legislature explicitly
provided that it intended for a felony conviction that is later
reduced to a misdemeanor in a postconviction proceeding to be
treated as a felony for purposes of determining the forfeiture of a
convicted employee’s retirement benefits. Section 7522.72 thus
provides that a member convicted of a job-related felony “shall
forfeit all the rights and benefits earned or accrued” from the
earliest date of the commission of the felony through the date of
the conviction, and that “[t]he rights and benefits shall remain
forfeited notwithstanding any reduction in sentence . . . following
the date of the member’s conviction.” (§ 7522.72, subd. (c)(1).)
       While Estrada claims that her conviction was not reduced
to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, the record shows
otherwise. Both the transcript of Estrada’s January 3, 2018
sentencing hearing and the court’s minute order from the hearing
reflect that the prosecutor expressly moved to reduce count 3
from a felony to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17,
subdivision (b), because Estrada had complied with the terms of
her plea agreement by paying restitution to the City. After
granting that motion, the court allowed Estrada to withdraw her
plea to count 3 as a felony and to enter a plea of no contest to that
count as a misdemeanor. The court then sentenced Estrada on
the misdemeanor to one year of probation. However, as
mandated by section 7522.72, subdivision (c)(1), the reduction of
Estrada’s conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor had no legal
effect on the forfeiture of her retirement benefits.

                                 17
       Likewise, the March 5, 2019 dismissal of the criminal
charge against Estrada under Penal Code section 1203.4 did not
relieve her of the civil consequences of section 7522.72. Penal
Code section 1203.4, subdivision (a), allows for defendants who
have successfully completed probation to have their convictions
set aside and the accusations against them dismissed, and
subject to certain specified exceptions, releases such defendants
“from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of
which they have been convicted.” Although the relief provided by
the statute is sometimes referred to as expungement, Penal Code
section 1203.4 “ ‘does not, properly speaking, “expunge” the prior
conviction. The statute does not purport to render the conviction
a legal nullity.’ ” (People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225,
1230.) Moreover, the “ ‘penalties and disabilities’ ” from which a
defendant may be released under Penal Code section 1203.4 “do
not include nonpenal restrictions or qualifications imposed for
public protection.” (People v. Vasquez, at p. 1230.)
       Section 7522.72 defines that, like a felony conviction that is
later reduced to a misdemeanor, the Legislature intended for a
conviction that is dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4 to
be still treated as a conviction for purposes of forfeiture. Section
7522.72 provides that, once a member’s rights and benefits in the
retirement system are forfeited as a result of a felony conviction,
the “rights and benefits shall remain forfeited notwithstanding
any . . . expungement of the conviction following the date of the
member’s conviction.” (§ 7522.72, subd. (c)(1).) Additionally, the
statute precludes an employee who has been convicted of a job-
related felony from recovering any forfeited benefits unless the
“conviction is reversed and that decision is final.” (Id., subd. (h).)

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       “A reversal of a conviction places the parties in the trial
court in the same position as if the case had never been tried.”
(People v. Morrison (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 378, 382.) In contrast,
“dismissal under [Penal Code] section 1203.4 does not erase a
conviction; it ‘merely frees the convicted felon from certain
“penalties and disabilities” of a criminal or like nature.’ ” (People
v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 116.) Here, the charge
against Estrada was dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4
after she successfully completed probation. While the dismissal
relieved her of certain criminal “ ‘penalties and disabilities,’ ” it
did not reverse her conviction or render it a legal nullity. (People
v. Vasquez, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1230.) The relief that Estrada
obtained under Penal Code section 1203.4 therefore did not affect
the forfeiture of her retirement benefits under section 7522.72.
       Our conclusion in this case is further supported by Danser
v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
885 (Danser), in which the Court of Appeal considered section
75526, 2 a benefit forfeiture statute applicable to judges.
In Danser, a superior court judge was convicted of a felony count
of conspiring to obstruct justice. (Id. at p. 889.) The trial court
suspended imposition of the sentence and placed the judge on

2     Section 75526 provides that “[a] judge who pleads guilty or
no contest or is found guilty of a crime committed while holding
judicial office that is punishable as a felony under California or
federal law and which either involves moral turpitude under that
law or was committed in the course and scope of performing the
judge’s duties, and the conviction becomes final shall not receive
any benefits from the system, except that the amount of his or
her contributions to the system shall be paid to him or her by the
system.”

                                 19
probation. (Ibid.) After the conviction was affirmed on appeal,
the trial court terminated probation, reduced the conviction to a
misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), and
dismissed the charges under Penal Code section 1203.4. (Danser,
at pp. 889–890.) CalPERS nevertheless determined that, due to
the judge’s conviction, his retirement benefits remained forfeited
under section 75526. (Danser, at p. 890.) The judge challenged
the forfeiture decision in a petition for writ of administrative
mandate, and the trial court denied the petition. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at p. 895.)
       In concluding that the judge’s retirement benefits were
subject to forfeiture under section 75526, the Court of Appeal
rejected his argument that he was not convicted of a felony
because his conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor under
Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). (Danser, supra,
240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 893–894.) The Danser court explained:
“[S]ection 75526 is not concerned with the actual punishment a
judge has received or will receive. It is only concerned with
whether the judge was found guilty of an offense ‘punishable’ as a
felony, and whether that finding of guilt is final.” (Id. at p. 894.)
Because section 75526’s forfeiture requirement was triggered
when the judge’s felony conviction was affirmed on appeal, his
retirement benefits remained forfeited even after his conviction
was reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor. (Danser, at p. 894.)
       The Danser court likewise rejected the judge’s argument
that he was not convicted of a felony because the charges were
dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. (Danser, supra,
240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 894–895.) The court reasoned: “Section
75526 is designed to protect the public by requiring civil
consequences under circumstances such as those presented in

                                 20
this case. The dismissal of the case . . . did not erase the fact that
a jury found Danser guilty of a crime punishable as a felony, and
it did not alter the civil consequences flowing from the jury’s
verdict . . . .” (Id. at p. 895.) As the court observed, “Penal Code
section 1203.4 ‘was never intended to obliterate the fact that
defendant has been “finally adjudged guilty of a crime.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       The same reasoning applies in this case. Estrada was
convicted of a job-related felony on June 28, 2017, when she pled
no contest to the felony and was found guilty of that offense.
As of that date, section 7522.72’s partial forfeiture requirement
was triggered. Like the forfeiture statute at issue in Danser,
section 7522.72 is not concerned with the actual punishment that
a convicted employee has received or will receive. Rather, section
7522.72 provides that postconviction relief in the form of a
reduction in sentence or expungement of the conviction has no
legal effect on forfeiture. (§ 7522.72, subd. (c)(1).) Under these
circumstances, once Estrada stood convicted of a job-related
felony on June 28, 2017, her retirement benefits became subject
to forfeiture under section 7522.72, and they remained forfeited
notwithstanding the postconviction relief that she later obtained.
       Lastly, Estrada asserts that section 7522.72 is
unconstitutional, but she fails to present any cognizable
argument or legal authority to support her claim. As a general
rule, “ ‘[w]hen an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it
with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as waived.” ’ ” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.) In any event, two recent court of
appeal decisions considered the constitutionality of section
7522.72, and in a well-reasoned analysis, each held that the
statute does not unconstitutionally infringe on a public

                                 21
employee’s protected pension rights. (Wilmot, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 660–664; Hipsher, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 691–696.) Estrada’s constitutional claim accordingly fails.
                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition for writ of administrative
mandate is affirmed. CalPERS shall recover its costs on appeal.

                                    VIRAMONTES, J.

     WE CONCUR:

           GRIMES, Acting P. J.

           WILEY, J.

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