Court Opinion

ID: 9682265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:45.068709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.543333
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons:
1.Section 429 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the “apparent agency” legal theory upon which the majority relies in reversing this summary judgment:
a.was not pleaded or argued by either party in the trial court (either in a petition or answer or in a motion for summary judgment or response) and was not briefed or argued by either party in this court; rather, in the trial court and this court, the parties have argued whether Texas’ ostensible agency law — which they have consistently used interchangeably with “apparent authority” and “agency by estoppel” — mandates or precludes the summary judgment;
b. does not reflect Texas law, was not adopted by this court in Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Smith, 822 S.W.2d 67, 72-73 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied), and, as far as I have been able to determine, has not been adopted by any Texas court; and
c. is, in fact, completely inconsistent with Texas independent contractor law, which rests upon the right to control, as reflected in the leading case of Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.1985).
2. Even under the apparent agency theory adopted by the majority, “the hospital must ‘hold out’ the physician as its employee.” But Baptist has conclusively demonstrated that it did not hold out its emergency room physicians as its employees; to the contrary, short of shutting down its emergency room, it did all it could reasonably have done to notify patients that its emergency room physicians were not its employees. There simply is no evidence in this record raising a fact issue on this element of Sampson’s affirmative defense, and the majority cites none. Rather, the majority reverses the summary judgment because “Sampson’s affidavit raises a question of fact as to whether the signs were sufficient notice” to her and “whether [she] was in a position to understand the terms of the forms.” The majority’s reasons for reversing the summary judgment thus go only to Sampson’s belief — reasonable or otherwise — which is irrelevant and immaterial in the absence of some holding out by Baptist.
3. Under the controlling Texas law of ostensible agency, the record conclusively establishes that Baptist did not, by any act or omission, generate a belief in Sampson that its emergency room physicians were its employees or agents; rather, it did all it reasonably could have done (short of shutting down its emergency room) to ensure that she did not hold this belief. *139Under these circumstances, Baptist is entitled to summary judgment. Compare, e.g., Lopez v. Central Plains Regional Hosp., 859 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, no writ); Nicholson v. Memorial Hosp. Sys., 722 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff failed to raise fact issue as to some act or omission by hospital generated plaintiffs belief that physicians were hospital employees).
But as the majority’s expansive dicta — its encouragement of “the full leap” — makes clear, none of these procedural and substantive obstacles to reversal are even relevant to the members of the majority. The simple reason this summary judgment has been reversed is because they believe that the hospital should be liable for its emergency room physicians’ negligence as a matter of “public policy and fundamental fairness.” The first half of the opinion is, therefore, just an exercise in creating a fact issue to justify a reversal.
The members of the majority apparently believe it is this court’s role to unilaterally impose its views of good “public policy,” and what it perceives to be “fundamental fairness,” on Texas citizens. I, on the other hand, believe it is our role to apply the law enunciated by the higher courts and the legislatures to the best of our ability. Accordingly, I would leave this difficult policy decision — with its far-reaching social and economic ramifications — to the Texas Legislature. In short, I would hold that no material issues of fact are presented in this record under the controlling Texas law and affirm the summary judgment.