Court Opinion

ID: 9527268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:29:02.815277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:40.815394
License: Public Domain

Alexander, J.
(dissenting).
The difficulties of this case cluster about the tendency to look through words rather than at them. It is striking and significant with what readiness both parties agree that in the deed from the Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees to appellant the words “reserving forever from *574this conveyance unto the grantors . . . one-half of all oil mineral or gases . . . ”, mean that the grantors reserved unto themselves one-half of the existing minerals. This is of course because that is what this grantor wrote in its deed and elemental knowledge detects no need of translation or construction. There is no need to scourge these forthright words to make them cry aloud in repudiation. Above all, the reason for complete accord here is that they have always meant that this grantor, and every grantor who employs them, reserves unto himself one-half of the possessed minerals.
Now this appellee, aware of the plain import of this language, adopts it, and at once all adversely affected forage about in the remote shadows of plain words for scraps of ambiguity so as to confront them with an accusing hypocrisy. In this search all the resourceful forces of doubt are conscripted to the end that the solid structure of simple terms may be made transparent, and that an assumed and contrary intent, theretofore successfully and traditionally eclipsed, may be examined.
If there is ambiguity in language, there is set the stage for construction, Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corporation, 193 Miss. 675, 9 So. (2d) 648, but if there is no ambiguity, courts look solely to the language used in the instrument. Sumter Lbr. Co., Inc. v. Skipper, 183 Miss. 595, 184 So. 296, 835.
As stated in Gaston v. Mitchell, 192 Miss. 452, 458, 4 So. (2d) 892, 893, 6 So. (2d) 318, “Ambiguity may not be created in order to make available rules of construction. Nor may courts seek out an intent in order to judge what was said, but rather must they judge what was meant by what was said. ’ ’
In Federal Land Bank v. Cooper, 190 Miss. 490, 200 So. 729, 732, the language “ One-half interest in all minerals is reserved to the Grantor” was held to mean just what it said. The grantor reserved and held back for itself one-half of all the minerals.
*575Iii all of the cases cited to support a contrary view, there was at least superficial ambiguity. In Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So. (2d) 352, 353, there was no expressed reservation, but a mere exception from the lands described of such minerals as ‘ ‘ the grantors hereto have promised to convey to . Cook”. This was not a reservation in word or intent, but the reason for exception and exclusion of the minerals was set out in the conveyance.
In Fatherree v. McCormick, 199 Miss. 248, 24 So. (2d) 724, 725, it was controlling that the grantor “excepted” from the calls of the conveyance a greater interest than he possessed. Yet, it was there stated: “To give the exception any other character it would have to be so amended or otherwise by simple and clear expression enlarged to indicate that there is a reservation of one-half of the minerals owned by the grantor.” In the case at bar, there was simple and clear expression that there was “reserved unto the grantor(s)” such interest as the appellant owned.
This distinction clearly appears in Richardson v. Moore, 198 Miss. 741, 22 So. (2d) 494, 495, where the grantor conveyed to Richardson certain lands “Subject, however, to any mineral or oil rights, if any such exist, belonging to any former owner of said land other than this grantor. ’ ’ In the chain of title was a precedent deed which stated that “The fee herein is subject to mineral and oil rights, if any, now of record and not owned by the grantors herein ...”
In Klein v. Humble Oil Co., Tex. Civ. App., 67 S. W. (2d) 911, affirmed 126 Tex. 450, 86 S. W. (2d) 1077, 1078, the language used was “There is however excepted from this conveyance % of all mineral rights . . . ”
While it is true that reservations and exceptions are often used interchangeably, the latter is the term exposed to ambiguity. One may except an interest which he does not own, but he can not reserve an interest which he does not have. Concededly a purported reservation may *576obviously be found to be a mere exclusion from a grant. But, as suggested in Fatherree v. McCormick, supra, an addition that the reservation is by and “unto the grantor” himself of an interest of which he is possessed, ought to remove the language from exposure to those procedures which divest plain words of their meaning and distort them into conformity with a supposed intent.
In Peavy-Moore Lbr. Company v. Duhig, Tex. Civ. App., 119 S. W. (2d) 688, affirmed in 135 Tex. 503, 144 S. W. (2d) 878, it was deemed important that the grantor had cast his conveyance in the form of a warranty. The court found the language by which he “retained an undivided onehalf % interest in and to all the mineral rights . . .on said land” was less important than the fact that by the warranty he had purported to convey all the land except that interest which had theretofore been reserved. So that the implications of a warranty were permitted to override clear expression. I am unable to find support in a theory by which a court seeks gratuitously to save a grantor against an anticipated suit 'for breach of warranty. A warranty does not effect the conveyance. Title is acquired by the conveyance and guaranteed by the warranty. Nor is a deed void which subjects the grantor to a possible suit to- enforce the warranty or for damages.
The inevitable result of the Court’s conclusion is that a grantor who owns all minerals may reserve unto himself one-half, but if he owns only one-half, he must convey it with his warranty.
Is it not possible that appellant intended to reserve unto itself the mineral interest which it owned? It had a right to do so. If such was its purpose, it is unjust to thrust upon it a construction which denies to it such right. It certainly used language adequate to this end. What else should it have done? Under what duty do we construe the words as an exception from the'warranty, rather than as a reservation unto the grantor?
As stated, we may not speculate uppn a hidden intent until we have robbed the words of their unambiguous *577import. In all the eases cited herein, ambiguity was present. In none of them was there an unequivocal reservation unto the grantor of an interest which he then owned.
It is important to keep uppermost in mind that this is not a suit for reformation, and there is no cross-bill by appellees. It could be true that the reservation was inadvertent and unintended. But here no mistake or fraud is alleged or shown. There was no testimony adduced. The record is documentary and intent is sought out by the detective processes of deduction. Yet, the ticket of admission to the arena of construction is ambiguity. To set out at once to create ambiguity is to reach a predetermined conclusion first and later to seek for reason and justification.
In this sort of action, we ought to say to the appellant: We know what you meant, because we know what you said. However, we are saying to it: Begardless of what you said, we think it best to take your reserved half mineral interest and give it to appellees because it is better for you to- surrender this interest than that you be exposed to embarrassment or litigation. It should be kept in mind that there is no such thing as a breach of warranty in vacuo. It must be declared upon and loss established.
All the circumstances which the Court assembled to support an intent at variance with the universal meaning of the words used would be relevant in a suit to reform the deed and rewrite it in language importing a mere exception. But in this form of action, they should be held at bay since the words are not to be construed but merely defined. By definition, “reservation” means a reservation and “unto the grantor” means unto the grantor.
Here again the answer to an inquiry as to what the grantor meant is what it said.
McGehee, O. J,( joins in the foregoing dissent.