Court Opinion

ID: 9751036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:00:24.010416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:33.304725
License: Public Domain

SONENSHINE, J., Dissenting.
Standard of Review
This case comes to us after the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers due to the plaintiffs’ failure to state a cause of action. We therefore accept the allegations of the pleadings as true. (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1223 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 197].)
Allegations Contained Within the Pleading
The plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleges: “The events giving rise to this cause of action occurred . . . when a Westwind Jet crashed while approaching for landing . . . . [f] . . . Plaintiffs . . . were at the time . . . employed by . . . a car dealership . . . . [H] . . . and . . . present [there when they] . . . ffl] . . . observed the . . . Jet begin to descend, falling out of the sky. The plaintiffs watched the Westwind Jet crash into the ground. Prior to the. . . crash[], the plaintiffs were fearful. . .the. . . Jet, or parts of it, would land on them and cause them serious injury. [^] . . . Plaintiffs watched the . . . Jet explode and, in fact, felt the force and heat of the explosion, the force of which caused them to be thrown forward as they ran from the scene of the crash. The plaintiffs also feared that they might be further harmed by the force and/or heat of the explosion as well as debris flying from the explosion site.” The complaint further alleges, “As a proximate result. . . , plaintiffs suffered serious, substantial and enduring mental anguish and emotional distress which injured their health, strength and *669activity, sustaining injury to their body and shock and injury to their psyche and person, all of which said injuries have caused and continue to cause plaintiffs great mental and physical pain and suffering. [^] . . . As a further proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of defendants, and each of them, plaintiff has incurred and will continue to incur, medical expense and costs of drugs and supplies. ... [Í] ... At the time of said injury, plaintiffs were employable and as a proximate result of said conduct of the defendant(s), and each of them, and by reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiffs, they were prevented from being employed, thereby losing earnings. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, that they will continue to be prevented from attending to their occupations for a period in the future, and will thereby lose future earnings.”
The Allegations State a Cause of Action
The majority concludes the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action because California does not recognize emotional distress damages for airplane crash spectators who suffer no physical harm.1 My colleagues fail to appreciate the controlling law.
Over 100 years ago, our Supreme Court recognized, “A shock to the nervous system may be caused either by some physical impact or by fright caused by exposure to imminent peril.” (BAJI No. 12.81 (7th ed. 1986 bound vol.), italics added; see Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co. (1896) 111 Cal. 668, 682-683 [44 P. 320].) Moreover, for several decades our highest court has permitted plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress resulting from fear of imminent peril. And this has been true even where there are no physical injuries. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently reiterated this very point. “ ‘[D]amages for negligently inflicted emotional distress may be recovered in the absence of physical injury or impact. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 986 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 863 P.2d 795].)
Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 182 [4 P.2d 532, 77 A.L.R. 675] is instructive. There, our Supreme Court held a plaintiff could recover emotional distress damages after witnessing a truck crash into the *670building in which she was standing. The court noted the truck did not hit the plaintiff but she nevertheless was injured because she reasonably feared for her own safety. (See also Cook v. Maier (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 581 [92 P.2d 434].)
The Supreme Court has not addressed the precise issue we consider—may an airplane crash witness recover for emotional distress damages relating solely to fear for personal safety? However, the Ninth Circuit in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal. (9th Cir. 1992) 973 F.2d 1490 went one step further. There, the plaintiffs alleged they “were inside the bedroom of their home when they heard two sounds like sonic booms . . . .” (Id. at p. 1494, italics added (dis. opn. of Rymer, J.).) They maintained they suffered severe and lasting emotional distress, fright and shock as a result of fear for their own safety. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding it failed to state a cause of action under California law. Relying on Webb and Cook, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding California law “quite clearly [suggests plaintiffs] . . . have stated a valid claim.” (Id. at p. 1491.)
Cerritos is noteworthy for two reasons. First, of course, the majority held the plaintiffs could recover emotional distress damages after merely hearing a crash. Second, even the dissent acknowledged California law would allow recovery if the plaintiffs had seen the crash. (In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., supra, 973 F.2d at pp. 1494-1495 (dis. opn. of Rymer, J.).) The dissenting judge parted company with her colleagues only because, as she explained, the cases upon which the majority relied do not extend to plaintiffs who “were unaware of the injury-causing event that threatened their safety. [H] . . . [H]. . . [Pjlaintiffs who may recover on account of fear for their own safety will have appreciated why they are in danger.” (Id. at p. 1496 (dis. opn. of Rymer, J.).)
The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court says a car crash spectator can recover emotional distress damages. The Ninth Circuit says plaintiffs can recover if they are emotionally distressed after hearing a plane crash.
Why do my colleagues conclude these plaintiffs cannot recover? The majority sees a difference between car crash and airplane disaster witnesses. They say those who operate a car must be more “aware of the surrounding area and nearby property” because “[t]he risk to bystanders is different . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 667.) Moreover, they say the standard is different because while results of airplane crashes are worse than car crashes, airplane operators should be held to a lower standard of care *671because pilot’s negligence is “at worst, negligence in light of a very high standard of required performance—rather than any kind of moral indifference to the possibility of injury.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 659.) I fail to appreciate their distinction.
Simply stated my brethren are unimpressed with California Supreme Court authority, suggesting the high court should rethink its position and recognize its rationale is “strained” because it “assume[s] that the trauma leading to the emotional distress caused some unspecified ‘nerve damage’ or ‘shock to the nerves’ which took the case out of the emotional and into the physical.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 663.) And, they find the Ninth Circuit just plain wrong. “With due respect to the Ninth Circuit, we must disagree . . . California tort case law [does not permit] emotional distress damages . . . whenever one reasonably fears for one’s own safety . . . .” (Id. at p. 661, original italics.)
When cleansed of its fictional and historical rhetoric, the majority opinion affirms the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrer because the justices reject what they label the “loosey-goosey” concept of emotional distress. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 658.) Actually, my brethren are just unimpressed with “weak” people. As they say, “[T]ort law cannot countenance [an] . . . ‘eggshell psyche.’ ”2 (Ibid.) If they had their way, we would all be certified war heroes. We certainly would not reward those who succumb to fear as a result of someone else’s negligence.
My colleagues miss the point. Their feelings about emotional distress damages are irrelevant. The Supreme Court sets the standard we are to follow. I would reverse the granting of the demurrer and permit the trier of fact to decide if the defendants were negligent and, if so, whether the plaintiffs were damaged as a result.

My brethren acknowledge the plaintiffs “may have felt some heat, wind and vibration in the few minutes before the crash,” but explain, “[I]t would be a gross distortion of their complaint to suggest that they are claiming anything in addition to their emotional distress for being exposed to the possibility of death or injury in an impending plane crash.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 657, fn. 5.) But we must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint. The plaintiffs claim their injuries resulted from fear the plane would crash on them and from the heat, wind and vibration. In any event, standing alone, the allegation of fear from imminent peril is sufficient to state a cause of action for emotional distress damages.

The majority has turned this doctrine on its ear. As every first year law student learns, tortfeasors take their victims as they find them. (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 43, p. 292 [defendant liable for death of plaintiff, even though normal victim would have suffered only a bump on the head]; see also Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., supra, 111 Cal. at p. 683 [“Whether the defendant. . . knew of (the plaintiffs) susceptibility to nervous disturbance was immaterial."].)