Court Opinion

ID: 9836914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:29.828734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.290441
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge, in which SULLIVAN, Judge,
joins (dissenting):
I agree with the majority that “[t]he undisclosed evidence might have added some credibility to appellant’s trial testimony and his first statement to NCIS by making his description of CM’s conflicting signals and sudden change of mood more believable in light of her mental condition.” I also agree with the majority’s view that the undisclosed evidence “might also have suggested that CM’s poor impulse control and confused self-image might have caused her to falsely accuse appellant of sexually assaulting her.” 52 MJ at 198.
In light of these observations, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that any error was harmless.
I
Prior to trial, defense counsel learned that CM may have made a prior accusation of sexual assault not involving appellant. The Government provided paperwork related to that allegation of sexual assault, as directed by the military judge. The defense requested a full range of medical and psychological records pertaining to CM’s reaction to that alleged sexual assault. The Government objected, and the military judge ordered all medical and psychological records on CM produced for an in camera inspection. Thereafter, the military judge ruled that only one of the 25 pages he had reviewed was relevant to the defense, but he failed to articulate any standard for his determination *199as to which material should be released. The judge ordered all nonreleased records sealed.
The sealed records indicate that CM had reported being raped by another person only 6 months before the incident at issue in the present case. The records also indicate that she was diagnosed at the Naval Hospital Camp LeJeune as suffering from post-trau-matie stress disorder (PTSD) as a result of the earlier rape. Additionally, the records include counseling documents containing a notation that CM had “trouble controlling her impulses.” Appellate exhibit L.
II
“‘Military law provides a much more direct and generally broader means of discovery by an accused than is normally available to him in civilian courts.’ ” United States v. Reece, 25 MJ 93, 94 (CMA 1987), quoting United States v. Mougenel, 6 MJ 589, 591 (AFCMR 1978), pet. denied, 6 MJ 194 (1979). When there is a defense discovery request under RCM 701(a)(2), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998), the Government is required to “permit the defense to inspect: (A) Any ... papers ... which are within the possession, custody, or control of military authorities and which are material to the preparation of the defense----” (Emphasis added). See also Reece, supra at 95 (“The only restrictions placed upon the liberal discovery of documentary evidence by the accused are that the evidence must be ‘relevant and necessary to the subject matter of the inquiry, and the request must be reasonable.”). In the present case, I would hold that the military judge erred by declining to release information material to the preparation of the defense.
According to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 424 (4th ed.1994), PTSD may include intense distress or physiological reactions when the sufferer is exposed to a triggering event that is akin to, or that symbolizes some aspect of, the traumatic event at the foundation of the disorder. The symptom of “persistent reexperiencjng of the traumatic event” can result from prior sexual assault, among other possible causes of stress. “The disorder may be especially severe or long lasting when the stressor is of human design (e.g., torture, rape).” As the majority acknowledges, the information about CM’s PTSD “might have added some credibility to appellant’s trial testimony and his first statement to NCIS____” Appellant’s version of the events in CM’s apartment reflects her abrupt, unexplained, and seemingly unexplainable mood change — from sensual and consensual to a sharp demand to stop. Without the PTSD evidence, the members were left to wonder why a supposedly close and intimate friend would suddenly reverse moods in the midst of purportedly consensual sexual activity. With that information — and with expert testimony explaining PTSD and applying it to the events in this case — the members would have had the opportunity to consider a plausible explanation, which they could choose to accept or reject, for CM’s conduct.
Similarly, the psychological evidence that CM had “trouble controlling her impulses” would have provided the court members with an opportunity to consider a plausible explanation in support of the evidence that CM, while dating another man, permitted herself to be in a compromising position with appellant. The morning after the incident with appellant, CM’s boyfriend inquired about marks on her neck, and she initially responded that she had been cheating on him, at which point he became enraged. This information would have set the stage for the members to consider whether CM fabricated the allegations of sexual assault to assuage the anger of her boyfriend.
The undisclosed evidence in issue here “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” See Strickler v. Greene, — U.S.-, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1952, — L.Ed.2d - (1999), quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The undisclosed evidence could have been used to raise the possibility that, with respect to CM, the combination of PTSD and CM’s “trouble controlling her impulses” placed her in a compromising position with appellant and could have *200caused her sudden shift of attitude. Under these circumstances, I conclude that there is “a reasonable probability” that the members would have been inclined to accept the defense theory that this was a consensual situation in which the alleged victim fabricated the allegations of assault. See — U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 1953, citing Kyles, supra at 434,115 S.Ct. 1555.
Ill
Because the sealed records contained information that was “material to the preparation of the defense,” the military judge abused his discretion to appellant’s prejudice when he precluded defense access to it. See Art. 46, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 846; ROM 701(a)(2)(A) and 703(a). I would set aside the findings and sentence and authorize a rehearing.