Court Opinion

ID: 9859409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:29:26.956834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:49.789336
License: Public Domain

*382Haneman, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result attained by my colleagues. However, I conceive that N. J. S. A. 40:60-26(c) permits no changes in the advertised terms and conditions of sale prior to the reception of bids on the date set for the acceptance or rejection of the original offer and then permits a “modification” only in a limited sense.
N. J. S. A. 40:60-26(c) had its origin in 1939 as a part of an amendment to N. J. S. A. 40:60-26. The original bill (S-241) which eventually resulted in the enactment of subsection (c), contained a number of additional provisions concerning the sale of municipal lands. Attached thereto was a statement which reads in part:
“The present act is intended by subsection (c) to increase the power of the governing body of any municipality by authorizing sale of any land by private sale if approved by resolutions passed at two meetings of said governing body, the second meeting being after public notice thereof at which anyone interested may have an opportunity to bid a higher price * * *."
This bill was superseded by a committee substitute which when passed became L. 1939, c. 344. The differences between the original bill as introduced in the Senate and the bill as finally enacted concerned, (1) subsection (d), wherein the words “Commissioner of Local Government” were substituted for “Municipal Finance Commission,” and (3) the last two paragraphs of the act, wherein a municipality was authorized to accept a mortgage in any sale on credit where previously the municipality had been restricted in such sales to the security device of a municipal lien. It is thus seen that these changes neither directly nor indirectly affected subsection (c) nor its purpose. The conclusion is reasonable that the Legislature was fulfilling its originally stated purpose in enacting subsection (c), i. e.j to permit bids as to price alone.
N. J. S. A. 40:60-26 was subsequently amended by L. 1944, c. 160; L. 1946, c. 106; L. 1947. c. 417; L. 1948, *383c. 245; L. 1957, c. 86. Only L. 1947, c. 417 affected subsection (e). This statute added the clause “in which case the sale is to be made to the highest bidder” immediately following the provision “provided that no higher price or better terms shall then be bid for said property by any other person.” It is to be noted that the Legislature limited the award to the “highest bidder” and did not see fit to extend the provision so that the award could be made to a person offering a land use or improvement different from those specified in the advertisement.
The true meaning and intention of legislation must be derived from the whole act and not from any single component part. Denbo v. Moorestown Twp., 23 N. J. 476 (1957). The meaning of a statute and the intention of the Legislature in adopting it must be gained, not alone from the words used within the particular section involved, but from those words when read in connection with the entire enactment of which it is an integral part. Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 22 N. J. 548 (1956). The words, “said terms and conditions, or a modification thereof” must be read in conjunction with the proviso that “no higher price or better terms shall then be bid” and that the sale must be made to the “highest bidder.” This signifies, to me, that on the date set for confirmation or rejection of the initial offer, the bidding is restricted to the amount and manner of payment of the monetary consideration, subject to the initial restrictions concerning the land use and improvements set forth in the published notice.
The statement appended to the original bill confirms the conclusion that the “modification” of “terms and conditions” concerns itself solely with the cash consideration to be paid. To ascribe to the word “conditions” a connotation which would permit a bidder to submit an offer which contemplates a change in the restricted use and “conditions” of improvement from those advertised would destroy the standard upon which all interested parties must compete and would open wide the door to fraud. Also, if such *384change were permitted, the purpose of advising the public in advance of the intended restrictions and use so that they might appear and be heard thereon would be frustrated.
As above stated, I conceive that “modification” of the “terms and conditions” permits change only of the mode and method of payment, to the end that the sale is made “to the highest bidder.”
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintratjb, and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Haneman—7.
For reversal—Hone.