Court Opinion

ID: 9380580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 17:00:37.27195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.297409
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                      No. 22-3451
                                      ___________

                                 SHAWN T. WALKER,
                                            Appellant

                                             v.

  GEORGE LITTLE, Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
   MR. J. HALL; KELLY LONG; MR. WILLIAMS, III; MR. B.A. GAY; MR. J.
FREEMAN; MR. D.K. SMITH; MR. N. MACCAIN; MR. S. SWARY; MR. J. BLUME;
 MR. C. FOREMAN; MR. M. SOMPEL; MR. W.L. JAMES; JOHN DOE; JANE ROE
                 ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-04460)
                      District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
                      ____________________________________

      Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
         Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                                  March 16, 2023
     Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 20, 2023)
                                       _________

                                        OPINION*
                                        _________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

         Shawn T. Walker appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint for

failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow, we will

summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

         Walker, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint alleging that prison

officials violated his rights in several instances when they gave him photocopies of his

legal mail and kept the originals. 1 He also alleged that on a few occasions prison officials

returned his legal mail to the sender when Walker refused to sign the legal mail log to

acknowledge that he had received his legal mail. Before service, the District Court

dismissed Walker’s claims that Appellees’ actions violated due process, the Eighth

Amendment, and his First Amendment right to access the courts. It also dismissed his

claims for declaratory relief. Only Walker’s claims that his First Amendment right to

free speech was violated remained. The Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing

that Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The District Court agreed

and dismissed Walker’s complaint. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal.

         We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A prisoner may not file a

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he has exhausted available administrative

remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In order to properly exhaust a claim, a prisoner

must comply with the prison’s deadlines and procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548

U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the [Prison Litigation

1
    The prison officials were acting pursuant to a policy that has since been discontinued.
                                               2
Reform Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

199, 218 (2007). Appellees argued, and the District Court agreed, that Walker did not

exhaust his claim for monetary relief because he did not request money damages in his

grievance as required by the prison’s grievance policy. We exercise de novo review over

the District Court’s determination that Walker failed to properly exhaust his

administrative remedies. Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153

(3d Cir. 2016).

       In Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), we concluded that an inmate

did not default his claim for money damages when he failed to request such damages in

his grievance. The prison’s grievance policy at the time did not require an inmate to

request specific relief in a grievance. See id. (examining prior exhaustion policy and

noting that “[n]othing in the Grievance System Policy would have put Spruill on notice

that he had to ask for money damages–or any particular form of relief at all.”). We noted

that prison officials could amend the grievance policy to require more of inmates in order

to exhaust a claim. Id. at 235. The prison officials in Pennsylvania did, in fact, amend

the grievance policy to require that if an inmate seeks compensation, the inmate must

request that relief in the grievance. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of

Corrections, Inmate Grievance System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804(1)(A)(11)(d) (“If the

inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the

inmate shall request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.”); cf. Spruill,

372 F.3d at 234 (contrasting language in prior policy with a potential amendment); Byrd

v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that prisoner failed to exhaust

                                               3
when he did not name defendant in his grievance as required by the prison grievance

procedure).

       In response to Appellees’ arguments in the District Court, Walker did not dispute

that he did not request monetary relief in any of his grievances. Rather, he argued that

the Inmate Handbook that he was given did not instruct inmates that they must request

compensation in their grievances or refer them to any additional instructions or

requirements. He is correct that the section of the handbook describing the grievance

process does not include the requirement that specific relief such as monetary damages be

requested. However, at the beginning of the handbook, the inmate is advised that any

changes to the prison’s policies will be effective regardless of whether they are in the

handbook. The inmate is informed that copies of the policies are available in his housing

unit. Thus, Walker had notice that the inmate handbook may not include all the details of

the grievance procedure. And as noted by the District Court, the inmate grievance form

refers the inmate to DC-ADM 804 for the relevant procedures. Moreover, the

instructions on the grievance form advise the inmate to “[s]tate all relief that you are

seeking.” The Chief Grievance Officer in her Final Appeal Decisions for several

grievances noted that Walker had sought no relief in his initial grievances. There was no

misrepresentation by prison staff that rendered the grievance process unavailable to

Walker. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (holding that there is an exception

to the exhaustion requirement if the process is made unavailable by prison officials

thwarting its use through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”); Hardy v.

Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that inmate must show, inter alia,

                                              4
that the “misrepresentation is one which a reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on

and sufficiently misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the grievance

process”).

       The District Court did not err in determining that Walker had failed to properly

exhaust his claim for money damages and dismissing his complaint. Summary action is

appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR

27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will

summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 2 Appellant’s

motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.

2
 We find no error in the District Court’s dismissal before service of Walker’s due
process, legal access, and Eighth Amendment claims as well as his request for
declaratory relief. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that in
order to allege a claim of the denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that he
was hindered in his efforts to litigate a nonfrivolous or arguable claim); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that post-deprivation remedies provide
sufficient due process for deprivations of property).
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