Court Opinion

ID: 9844380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:02:01.210099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:33.929121
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Judge (specially concurring). While I concur with the affirmance of defendant’s conviction, I do not concur with one of the court’s conclusions relating the sufficiency of the information; and I believe that the point relating to the voluntariness of the plea requires additional comment. (1) Sufficiency of the criminal information. I agree with the alternative holding of the court that the information was sufficient in that it: (1) contained the common name of the offense, “statutory rape”, (2) referred to the specific section number of the New Mexico statutes which defines the offense, and (3) contained some of the essential facts necessary to give the defendant notice of the crime charged, to-wit: “ * * * committed an act of sexual intercourse with a female under the age of sixteen (16) years, who was not his wife.” However, I do not agree with the court’s first holding on this issue that merely giving' the common name of the offense and the statutory citation is sufficient for a valid information in this instance. Prior to the adoption of the present rules of criminal procedure, § 40-23-1 et seq., N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972 Spec.Supp.), an information was sufficient if it indicated the offense charged in any one of three ways, one of which was by reference to the particular statutory provision alleged to have been violated. § 41— 6-7(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6) (repealed) ; State v. Romero, 69 N.M. 187, 365 P.2d 58 (1961); State v. Cummings, 63 N.M. 337, 319 P.2d 946 (1957). Under the new rules of criminal procedure, applicable to defendant’s prosecution, Rule 6(c), § 41-23-6(c), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972 Spec.Supp.), provides, in part: “An information is a written statement, signed by the district attorney, containing the essential facts, common name of the offense, and, if applicable, a specific section number of the New Mexico Statutes which defines the offense.” Section 41-23-8 (a), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, 1972 Spec.Supp.) provides: “It shall be unnecessary for a complaint, indictment or an information to contain the following allegations unless such allegations are necessary to give the defendant notice of the crime charged: (1) time of the commission of offense; (2) place of the commission of offense; (3) means by which the offense was committed; (4) value or price of any property; (5) ownership of property; (6) intent with which an act was done; (7) description of any place or thing; (8) the particular character, number, denomination, kind, species, or nature of money, checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other currency; (9) the specific degree of the offense charged; (10) any statutory exceptions to the offense charged; or (11) any other similar allegation.” I do not believe that the phrase “essential facts” in Rule 6 can be disregarded, since its inclusion is an obvious departure from the prior rule, § 41-6-7(c) supra, which permitted an information to be framed solely in terms of a statutory reference. Rule 8 helps in understanding what essential facts should be included since it enumerates what “allegations” need not be included unless they “are necessary to give the defendant notice of the crime charged.” I believe that “allegations” as used in Rule 8 must be read as being synonymous with the word “facts.” A reading of these two rules convinces me that “essential facts” in rule 6 must be read as “such essential facts as are necessary to give the defendant notice of the crime charged.” If an information charges a crime by a “common name” which might not be readily understood by a layman, 'then it must contain such other “essential facts” as are necessary to give the defendant notice of the crime charged. In this, case, the term “statutory rape”, in my opinion, is not within a layman’s common understanding. The term “rape” alone probably does connote the elements of that crime to a layman, including for example, the idea of force, lack of consent, etc. Since the crime of statutory rape makes consent and force immaterial, and since the age of the victim is crucial, further explanation in the information is necessary. I believe that the two elements of the crime, the act of intercourse and that the victim was under the age of sixteen must be included. Similarly, I believe that an information charging burglary must be accompanied by some further explanation of the crime. The average person associates the crime of burglary with the entry of a building with the intent to steal. But the statutory definition of burglary is much broader: “Burglary consists of the unauthorized entry of any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure . . . with the intent to commit any felony . . . therein.” [Emphasis mine] § 40A-16-3, N.M.S. A. 1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6). An information validly charging the crime of “burglary” should contain both an allegation of unauthorized entry plus an explanation of the actual felony alleged to have been committed, or intended to have been committed, in the building. Thus, the court’s conclusion that the common name of the offense plus the statutory citation “convey that which is necessary to validly charge the criminal offense” misses what I consider to be a central purpose of the change in Rule 6(c) supra, the inclusion of the “essential facts” requirement, and is tantamount to a return to the old rules. (2) Voluntariness of the guilty plea. I agree that the question of the voluntariness of defendant’s plea is not properly before this court because it has not been ruled on by the court below; but since the opinion discusses the procedures to be followed in receiving guilty pleas, I feel that the discussion should be amplified. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), placed a conscience-straining duty on all trial courts by pointing out: “What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” [Emphasis mine] After Boykin, reliance on Neller v. State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968), in my opinion, is misplaced. Neller required that a trial court “ascertain that a defendant knows the consequences of his plea and to advise him of those consequences if he is not otherwise advised.” [Emphasis mine] The court in Neller went on to point out that presence of counsel “is a factor to be considered in determining the question of the need for or sufficiency of any admonition given by the court.” Since Boykin the trial court has a duty to determine to its own satisfaction that the plea of guilty is being intelligently and understanding^ made and there must be an affirmative showing of waiver in the record, irrespective of the presence or advice of counsel, of three constitutional protections enjoyed by criminal defendants who proceed to trial on the merits. While I do not advocate a “laundry list” approach to a trial court’s inquiry on the subject of voluntariness certainly something more is required than what occurred in the instant case if the spirit of Boykin is to be observed. The colloquy between trial court and defendant in this case is as follows: “THE COURT: * * * Do you read, understand and write English? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir, Your Honor. “THE COURT: Do you know that you are entitled to a jury trial on the charges against you ? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Hon- or. “THE COURT: And the right to be confronted by witnesses against you? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes. “THE COURT: And the right to remain silent? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Hon- or. “THE COURT: You have consulted with your attorney, Mr. Prince, and have been advised in connection with this matter thoroughly? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. “THE COURT: Proceed.” As a threshold matter, the trial court should direct the inquiry to the defendant and not to defendant’s counsel. See Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In my judgment it is extremely important that a defendant who is voluntarily agreeing to a criminal conviction take an active and affirmative part in the proceeding. Voluntariness is a question of the state of mind of the defendant, not of defendant’s counsel, and any inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind should be determined by statements made by the defendant. One of the greatest concerns of the average criminal defendant who pleads guilty is the length and type of sentence he' will receive. Presently, there is no requirement that the trial court engage in a colloquy with the defendant on the matter of sentencing. I believe this is a serious defect. The trial court should explain both maximum and minimum sentences possible for the crime charged, and should, if relevant, explain the possibility of a separate “habitual criminal” information being filed after the guilty plea. In this respect I would urge the trial courts to adopt the suggestions made by Section 1.4, American Bar Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (Tentative Draft, 1967): “The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally and * * * (c) informing him: (i) of the maximum possible sentence, if any, on the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences; (ii) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge; and (iii) when the offense charged is one for which a different or additional punishment is authorized by reason of the fact that the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense, that this fact may be established after his plea in the present action if he has been previously convicted, thereby subjecting him to such different or additional punishment.” There is no indication in this record that the defendant was fully aware of the precise nature and consequences of the charge against him or that he was aware of the possible sentence he could receive. There is reason to infer that he thought that he would be given a suspended sentence. The sentence actually imposed was not less than two or more than ten years. The trial court should have discussed the sentencing possibilities with the defendant. The question “You have consulted with your attorney . . . and have been advised in connection with this matter thoroughly?” is not a satisfactory substitute for a discussion between the trial court and the defendant. The words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Boykin are particularly appropriate here: “When the judge discharges that function [of making full and proper inquiry before receiving the plea], he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought [citations omitted], and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.” In the last analysis, of course, we must depend on the integrity and alertness of the trial courts to insure that guilty pleas are the product of an intelligent and understanding decision on the part of the defendant. Any list of areas of inquiry cannot substitute for the alert “solicitude” exercised by a trial judge. These proceedings cannot be standardized by rigid lists of questions that ultimately will turn into rote exercises. “The responsibility of the judge varies depending upon such circumstances as the complexity and comprehensibility of the indictment and the defendant’s intelligence, education, age, and experience.” Commentary to ABA Standards, § 1.4, supra. Both the court and the defendant must play an active role in these proceedings and this active role must be affirmatively shown in the record.