Court Opinion

ID: 9949336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:11:26.119268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.072167
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 7, 2024

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00355-CR
                            ———————————
                           JOSE SANTOS, Appellant
                                        V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 506th District Court
                             Waller County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 18-05-16434

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant, Jose Santos, of the first-degree felony offense of

aggravated kidnapping.1 After finding the allegations in two enhancement

paragraphs true, the jury assessed Santos’s punishment at confinement for life.

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(a)(4).
      In four issues, Santos argues that (1) the trial court erred by failing to set an

evidentiary hearing on Santos’s motion for new trial before the motion was overruled

by operation of law; (2) the State did not present sufficient evidence that Santos had

the intent to secrete or hold the complainant in a place where she was unlikely to be

found; (3) the State did not provide sufficient notice of the allegations in an

enhancement paragraph; and (4) a material variance existed between the alleged

enhancement paragraph and the proof of the enhancement admitted at trial.

      We affirm.

                                    Background

      In February 2018, Santos and the complainant, A.S. (“Ashley”),2 had been

dating for several months. Ashley was approximately 15 weeks pregnant. Santos and

Ashley had a tumultuous relationship, and he had been violent and threatening with

her on several occasions prior to the incident that forms the basis for this appeal.

      Santos lived at a complex of three buildings that witnesses referred to as a

“banquet hall” or “jazz bar” in Prairie View, Texas. The banquet hall was not open

to the public. The middle building of the complex had a big open room and a smaller

enclosed room that Santos used as a bedroom. Ashley lived in an apartment in Prairie

View that had electricity but no running water, so she did not like to spend time

there. Ashley “mainly lived out of [her] car.” She estimated that she had been to the

2
      In this opinion we refer to the complainant by a pseudonym to protect her privacy.
                                           2
banquet hall to see Santos fifty to a hundred times. She “would go there frequently,”

but she did not keep any belongings, other than possibly some toiletries, at Santos’s

residence.

      On February 21, 2018, Ashley left her apartment and went to the banquet hall

to get some rest. Her friend Kyle McCafferty, who lived in the same apartment

complex as she did, was aware that she went to the banquet hall. Santos had a friend

over at the time Ashley arrived, but the friend left soon thereafter. Ashley did not

feel well and wanted to lay down, but the bed “was all messed up” and she “got a

little lippy” with Santos. After staying at the banquet hall for around an hour, she

decided to leave.

      Ashley walked out to her car, and Santos followed her. As she stood at her car

with the driver’s side door open, Santos suddenly punched her in the face. Ashley’s

head “bounced off the top of [her] car,” and Santos then pushed her into the front

passenger seat. Santos got into the driver’s seat. Ashley testified:

      He didn’t want me to sit up. He kept making sure I was laid down, in
      my mind, so nobody could see me because he kept, like, looking
      around. He kept punching me. He punched me numerous times in my
      stomach. I was pregnant at the time.

Ashley and Santos were in her car for around an hour. The record does not indicate

whether Santos drove anywhere or whether the car remained parked in the parking

lot of the banquet hall.

                                           3
      Santos then pulled Ashley out of her car and started “guiding” her, with his

hands on her, to the building where he resided. At the door to the building, Ashley

started fighting back, but she “gave up pretty quickly” and fell to the ground. Santos

was “pretty agitated” at that point, and Ashley tried to calm him down as he walked

her through the building to his bedroom. Once in his bedroom, Santos taped Ashley’s

wrists behind her back, taped her ankles together, and wrapped a comforter around

her. The comforter extended from Ashley’s chest to her knees, and Santos used tape

to secure it around her chest.

      Santos pushed Ashley to the bed, where she remained for most of the night.

He demanded that she give him the passcode for her tablet, which she did. As Santos

went through the contents of Ashley’s tablet, he started getting upset. He hit her in

the face at least one more time, and he choked her multiple times while she was still

wrapped in the comforter, causing her to pass out. Santos also threatened her with a

gun and told her that he was going to shoot her. Santos pulled the trigger, but the

gun “just clicked, no bullets came out.”

      At some point during the night, Santos removed the tape from Ashley’s arms,

but not her ankles. They then had sexual intercourse. Ashley did not want to have

sex with Santos, but she believed that if she said no, Santos would tape her arms

                                           4
back up or think about killing her.3 She testified that she “didn’t fight him,” she just

did “kind of whatever [she] had to do or say to make him feel like [she] wasn’t going

to tell or just make him calm down and let [her] go.”

      Santos fell asleep with Ashley’s head laying on his right arm. Ashley believed

this positioning was deliberate, so “he could feel [her] if [she] moved or something,

because at that point it was only [her] ankles taped up.” Ashley did not sleep but

instead lay still beside Santos, trying not to move so that he would not “think [she]

was trying to get away or trying to do something sneaky.” Eventually, after Santos

woke up, Ashley convinced him to let her go. He cut off the tape wrapping her

ankles, and Ashley walked out to her car and left the parking lot, moving and driving

slowly so Santos would not become worried that she would call the police.

      Ashley, who was bruised, crying, and frightened, arrived back at her

apartment and spoke with McCafferty.4 McCafferty encouraged Ashley to call the

police. After speaking with police officers, Ashley went to the hospital for a forensic

3
      In addition to aggravated kidnapping, the grand jury also charged Santos with the
      offense of aggravated sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i).
      The jury found Santos not guilty of this offense.
4
      McCafferty testified that he was on the phone with Santos when Ashley arrived back
      at her apartment. Santos told McCafferty that he had gone through Ashley’s phone
      and felt disrespected because he learned she was seeing other men. Santos admitted
      to McCafferty that he “beat her ass for it,” that he “taped her up because she tried
      to leave,” and that he “wrapped her up in a sheet so she would have all her attention
      on him, so she couldn’t get away.”
                                            5
exam. The trial court admitted a copy of the report from this exam. The report

contained a lightly redacted narrative about the assault.

      A grand jury indicted Santos for the offense of aggravated kidnapping. The

indictment alleged the following enhancement paragraphs:

      And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the charged
      offense (hereafter styled the primary offense), on January 25, 2007, in
      cause number 107259701010 in the 209th District Court Houston of
      Harris County, Texas, the defendant was finally convicted of the second
      degree felony offense of Burglary of a Habitation.
      And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the primary
      offense, on June 28, 2013, in cause number 133394301010 in the 209th
      District Court Houston of Harris County, Texas, the defendant was
      finally convicted of the third degree felony of Obstruction or
      Retaliation.

The jury found Santos guilty of the offense of aggravated kidnapping.

      Before the punishment phase began, the State sought to abandon a portion of

the first alleged enhancement paragraph. Specifically, the State requested that the

trial court strike the last five digits—“01010”—in the cause number for the offense

alleged in the first enhancement paragraph. Over defense counsel’s objection that he

did not have notice of the new cause number, the trial court agreed to grant the

State’s motion and ruled that “those last five digits will be stricken in the

indictment.” The court did not, however, physically alter the indictment.

      Santos pleaded “not true” to both enhancement paragraphs. During the

punishment phase, the trial court admitted a “pen packet” for a conviction for the

                                          6
second-degree felony offense of “Burglary of a Habitation, With Intent to Commit

Theft” from the 209th District Court of Harris County on January 25, 2007. The trial

court cause number on the judgment of conviction was 1072597.

      The jury found the allegations in both enhancement paragraphs true and

assessed Santos’s punishment at confinement for life. The trial court imposed

sentence in open court on May 3, 2022.

      Santos filed a notice of appeal on May 9, 2022. On May 31, Santos’s appellate

counsel filed a motion for new trial. Santos argued that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by denying him his right to testify. He also argued that

although he was not physically shackled during trial, the bailiff violated his

presumption of innocence by standing close to Santos throughout the trial,

“mirroring” all of Santos’s movements, and inspecting the pens Santos used to write

messages to his counsel. This motion was not supported by an affidavit. Santos

requested an evidentiary hearing and provided a fiat for the court to complete upon

scheduling the hearing.

      The next day, June 1, the trial court signed the fiat, setting the motion for a

hearing at 9:00 a.m. on July 20. It is undisputed that July 20 is 78 days after May 3,

the date the court imposed Santos’s sentence in open court.

      At the hearing, the State objected to proceeding because July 20 was more

than 75 days after the trial court imposed sentence in open court, and the trial court

                                          7
had lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial. The trial court acknowledged

that it erred in setting the hearing date, stating, “And that might be on me. I might

have messed up on that. . . . So I should have [seen] the date and got you in here

sooner.” The court allowed Santos to make a proffer of testimony relevant to the

grounds stated in the motion for new trial.

      This appeal followed.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his second issue, Santos argues that the State failed to present sufficient

evidence that he had the specific intent to hold or secrete Ashley in a place where

she was unlikely to be found. We address this issue first.

A.    Standard of Review

      In analyzing whether the evidence was sufficient to support a criminal

conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and

determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements

of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the

guilt of the defendant, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to

establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

                                          8
      Our review includes all the evidence in the appellate record. Stahmann v.

State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The factfinder is the sole judge

of “the credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses.” Dunham

v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d

166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When the record supports conflicting inferences

from the evidence, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the

verdict, and we defer to that determination. Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482; see Murray

v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (noting that Jackson standard

“tasks the factfinder with resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts”).

      “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the

appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is

sufficient to support the conviction.” Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170 (citing Hooper v.

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We may not use a “divide and

conquer” strategy for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence; instead, we must

“consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.” Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448.

      We measure sufficiency of the evidence “by the elements of the offense as

defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Byrd v. State, 336

S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quotations omitted). The hypothetically

correct jury charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

                                         9
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. (quotations omitted). The

law “as authorized by the indictment” is the statutory elements of the offense as

modified by the charging instrument. Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012).

B.    Intent to Hold or Secrete Complainant in a Place Where She Was Unlikely
      to be Found

      A defendant commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he intentionally

or knowingly abducts another person with the intent to inflict bodily injury on the

person. TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.04(a)(4). The Penal Code defines “abduct” as “to

restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by” either:

      (A)    secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be
             found; or
      (B)    using or threatening to use deadly force.

Id. § 20.01(2); see also id. § 20.01(1) (defining “restrain” as “to restrict a person’s

movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty,

by moving the person from one place to another or by confining the person”). An

abduction “is a continuous, ongoing event,” and there is “no time limit for an

abduction.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

                                          10
      “Abduct” has two elements. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 521 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009); Bertram v. State, 579 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2019, no pet.). “First, the defendant must have restrained another, which is the actus

reus requirement. Second, the defendant must have had the specific intent to prevent

liberation, which is the mens rea requirement.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521. Secreting

or holding another person in a place where she is unlikely to be found is part of the

mens rea element of a kidnapping offense. Id.; Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466,

475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

      The State is not required to prove that the defendant actually secreted or held

another in a place where the person was unlikely to be found. Laster, 275 S.W.3d at

521; Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 476 (“It is therefore not necessary, as appellant argues,

that the State prove a restraint accomplished by either secretion or deadly force.”).

Instead, the State must prove that the defendant restrained another person with the

specific intent to prevent liberation by secreting or holding the person. Laster, 275

S.W.3d at 521; Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 476. In other words, “[t]he offense of

kidnapping is legally completed when the defendant, at any time during the restraint,

forms the intent to prevent liberation by secreting or holding another in a place

unlikely to be found.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521; Bertram, 579 S.W.3d at 668.

      The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that a factfinder is not precluded

from inferring that the defendant intended to secrete or hold the complainant “in a

                                         11
place where she was unlikely to be found simply because he restrained her in public.”

See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522. The court further recognized that a rational factfinder

can infer the requisite intent “when a defendant isolates a person from anyone who

might be of assistance.” Id. (citing Fann v. State, 696 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1985)); see Megas v. State, 68 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d); see also Bertram, 579 S.W.3d at 669 (quoting Laster, 275

S.W.3d at 522).

      In Laster, the eight-year-old complainant and her ten-year-old brother were

walking home on a public sidewalk when they passed Laster walking toward them.

See 275 S.W.3d at 515. As Laster passed the children, he grabbed the complainant’s

arm, put his arm around her waist, “and tried to pull her away.” Id. at 515–16. The

complainant’s brother grabbed her hand “and a tug of war over [the complainant]

ensued.” Id. at 516. When a driver in the area honked a horn, Laster “abruptly let

go” of the complainant and “continued to walk down the sidewalk.” Id. In

determining that sufficient evidence supported Laster’s conviction for attempted

aggravated kidnapping, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the jury could

have reasonably inferred from the testimony of the complainant and her brother that

“by pulling [the complainant] away from her brother, the only person available to

help her, Laster intended to hold or secrete [the complainant] in a place where she

was unlikely to be found.” Id. at 522.

                                         12
      Our Court has held similarly. In Megas, the defendant drove the complainant

to a bar. See 68 S.W.3d at 237. They began to argue, and that argument grew more

heated throughout the evening. Id. While driving with the complainant later that

night, Megas pulled over onto the shoulder of the freeway. Id. A witness driving in

the opposite direction on the freeway saw Megas punch and kick the complainant to

prevent her from leaving the car. Id. A different witness saw the complainant

“running away from the car toward the barricade while [Megas] was holding onto

her with one hand and punching her with the other.” Id. This witness pulled over to

assist the complainant and honked her horn. Id. Megas stopped hitting the

complainant, “dragged her into the car, and drove off.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Megas

swerved into a barricade. Id. The car flipped several times, and the complainant “was

partially ejected from the car and killed when the car rolled on top of her.” Id. Megas

was convicted of felony murder, with kidnapping as the underlying felony. Id.

      On appeal, Megas argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction because the State did not prove that he had abducted the complainant by

secreting or holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found. Id. at 238,

240. This Court disagreed, holding that “secreting the victim, or holding her in a

place where she is not likely to be found, can be established when the defendant

forces a victim into a car and moves the victim from one place to another.” Id. at

240. We further reasoned that “a defendant can be operating a motor vehicle in

                                          13
public while still intending to secret[e] or keep the victim from being found” because

the offense of kidnapping is complete if the defendant intends to secrete or hold the

complainant in a place where she is not likely to be found. Id. Additionally, keeping

the complainant isolated from anyone who might be able to assist meets the secretion

element of the offense. Id.

      On these facts, we concluded that any reasonable jury could have found the

element of abduction beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence that Megas “forc[ed

the complainant] back into the car” after a witness attempted to render aid “supports

the finding that [Megas] intended to secret[e] or hold [the complainant] in a place

where she was not likely to be found” because Megas isolated the complainant “from

contacting anyone who might have been of assistance.” Id.

      Santos argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence that he

intended to secrete or hold Ashley in a place where she was unlikely to be found. He

argues that, instead, “the evidence established that [Santos] and [Ashley] were where

[Ashley] wanted to be (i.e. her car) or where her best friend knew she was and where

she went nearly every day (i.e. [Santos’s] home).” He points out that Ashley “mainly

lived out of [her] car,” and the State presented no evidence that Santos did anything

to disguise Ashley’s car. He also argues that, with respect to keeping Ashley in his

bedroom at the banquet hall, Ashley visited him there nearly every day, she was

pregnant with his child, she had at one point possibly kept toiletries at his home, and

                                          14
McCafferty knew that Ashley had gone to the banquet hall that night. He contends

that both the banquet hall and Ashley’s car were places where she was likely to be

found.

      We disagree that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Santos intended

to secrete or hold Ashley in a place where she was unlikely to be found. Both this

Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals have held that a reasonable jury is not

precluded from inferring that the defendant intended to secrete or hold the

complainant in a place where she was unlikely to be found “simply because he

restrained her in public.” See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522; Megas, 68 S.W.3d at 240

(“[A] defendant can be operating a motor vehicle in public while still intending to

secret[e] or keep the victim from being found.”). Both this Court and the Court of

Criminal Appeals have also held that a rational factfinder can infer the requisite

intent when evidence exists that the defendant “isolates a person from anyone who

might be of assistance.” Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522; Megas, 68 S.W.3d at 240; see

also Moreno v. State, 413 S.W.3d 119, 132–33 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no

pet.) (citing Megas and concluding that sufficient evidence existed to support

abduction element of kidnapping when defendant held complainant in room at house

where she had voluntarily gone on multiple occasions to buy drugs).

      Here, after punching Ashley in the face and pushing her into the passenger

seat of her car, Santos held her there for approximately one hour. Santos “didn’t

                                         15
want [Ashley] to sit up” in the passenger seat, and he “kept making sure [Ashley]

was laid down.” Ashley believed that Santos did this so that no passersby would be

able to see that she was in the car. Santos then forced Ashley into his bedroom at the

banquet hall, and he wrapped her wrists and ankles with tape to prevent her from

leaving. Santos kept Ashley wrapped up in his bedroom all night before finally

cutting the tape and allowing her to leave.

      A reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence presented at trial that

by ensuring Ashley remained out of sight in her vehicle, Santos isolated her from

anyone who might have been of assistance. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 522; Megas,

68 S.W.3d at 240. We therefore conclude that, when considering the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable factfinder could determine that

Santos intended to secrete or hold Ashley in a place where she was unlikely to be

found, satisfying the “abduction” element of aggravated kidnapping. See TEX.

PENAL CODE §§ 20.01(2)(A), 20.04(a)(4). We hold that sufficient evidence supports

the jury’s verdict.

      We overrule Santos’s second issue.

                        Hearing on Motion for New Trial

      In his first issue, Santos argues that the trial court erred by allowing his motion

for new trial to be overruled by operation of law without holding an evidentiary

                                          16
hearing. Santos requests that we abate this appeal and remand to the trial court for

the limited purpose of holding a hearing on his motion for new trial.

      The purposes of a hearing on a motion for new trial are (1) to determine

whether the case should be retried or (2) to complete the record for presenting issues

on appeal. Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Smith v.

State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Such a hearing is not an

absolute right. Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338. Nevertheless,

a trial court abuses its discretion in failing to hold a hearing if the motion for new

trial and accompanying affidavits (1) raise matters which are not determinable from

the record and (2) establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could

potentially be entitled to relief. Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at

338–39; see TEX. R. APP. P. 21.2 (“A motion for new trial is a prerequisite to

presenting a point of error on appeal only when necessary to adduce facts not in the

record.”).

      If a defendant chooses to file a motion for new trial following conviction, he

must do so no later than 30 days after the date the trial court imposes or suspends

sentence in open court. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.4(a). The defendant must then present the

motion to the trial court within 10 days of the filing. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6; Obella v.

State, 532 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (per curiam) (“presenting”

motion for new trial “means the defendant must give the trial court actual notice that

                                          17
he timely filed a motion for new trial and requests a hearing”). The trial court must

rule on a motion for new trial within 75 days after imposing or suspending sentence

in open court. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(a). If the court does not rule on the motion within

75 days, the motion is overruled by operation of law. See id. Once a motion for new

trial is overruled by operation of law, the trial court loses jurisdiction to rule upon it.

Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

       Here, the trial court imposed Santos’s sentence in open court on May 3, 2022.

Santos timely filed a motion for new trial on May 31, and he requested an evidentiary

hearing. The following day, June 1, the trial court signed the fiat attached to the

motion and set the matter for hearing on July 20. It is undisputed that July 20 is 78

days after May 3, or three days after the motion was overruled by operation of law

on the 75th day following imposition of sentence in open court. See TEX. R. APP. P.

21.8(a).

       The parties agree that the trial court scheduled the hearing for a date after the

date on which the motion was overruled by operation of law and the court lost

jurisdiction to rule upon the motion. The State argues that Santos has failed to

preserve his complaint about the trial court’s failure to timely hold a hearing because

he did not object to the untimely setting. The State also argues that Santos’s failure

to support his motion with an affidavit precludes any finding of error.

                                            18
      Assuming arguendo that Santos had no obligation to object to the trial court’s

untimely setting and therefore this issue is preserved for appellate review, we hold

that the trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing because Santos did not

establish that he was entitled to a hearing on the motion. When the grounds in a

motion for new trial are based on matters not already in the record, the Court of

Criminal Appeals requires that the motion “be supported by an affidavit, either of

the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the

claim.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339; Bahm v. State, 219 S.W.3d 391, 395 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). The affidavit need not establish a prima facie case or “reflect every

component legally required to establish relief” as long as a “fair reading” of the

affidavit “gives rise to reasonable grounds in support of the claim.” Smith, 286

S.W.3d at 339 (quotations omitted). “If the affidavit is conclusory, is unsupported

by facts, or fails to provide requisite notice of the basis for the relief claimed, no

hearing is required.” Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339.

      Santos argues that a hearing on his motion for new trial was necessary because

the grounds that he asserted raised matters not determinable from the trial record.

He also acknowledges on appeal that he did not support his motion for new trial with

any affidavits. He argues that his appellate counsel could not obtain an affidavit from

                                          19
him because he was incarcerated at the time,5 but he cites to no authority holding

that this is an exception to the Court of Criminal Appeals’ longstanding precedent

requiring motions for new trial raising grounds not determinable from the record to

be supported by an affidavit, which need not be executed by the defendant.6 See

Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 (“Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the

grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion

be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically

setting out the factual basis for the claim.”) (emphasis added); Reyes v. State, 849

5
      An incarcerated defendant can use an unsworn declaration that complies with Civil
      Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 in lieu of a verification or affidavit
      supporting a motion for new trial. Bahm v. State, 219 S.W.3d 391, 393–94 (Tex.
      Crim. App. 2007); Owens v. State, 763 S.W.2d 489, 490–91 (Tex. App.—Dallas
      1988, pet. ref’d); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 132.001(a) (providing that
      unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of affidavit), (c) (providing that unsworn
      declaration must be in writing and subscribed “as true under penalty of perjury”),
      (e) (providing jurat form for inmate declarations); Dominguez v. State, 441 S.W.3d
      652, 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“The inclusion of the
      phrase ‘under penalty of perjury’ is the key to allowing an unsworn declaration to
      replace an affidavit.”); see also Grant v. State, 172 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. App.—
      Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (noting that “[e]ven if it is difficult to obtain a verification
      of a statement for one confined,” other methods, such as unsworn declaration, can
      be used). Santos did not submit an unsworn declaration with his motion for new
      trial.
6
      In his request for an evidentiary hearing, Santos stated, “Mr. Santos will testify in
      this hearing and so will his mother who was present for much of the trial. There may
      be other witnesses who testify to the events.” Neither Santos’s mother nor any other
      potential witness provided an affidavit or unsworn declaration in support of the
      motion for new trial.
                                             20
S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (stating that affidavit requirement is “a

prerequisite to obtaining a hearing” and “a matter of pleading”) (quotations omitted).

      Without an affidavit setting out the factual basis for the claims, the trial court

was not required to hold a hearing on Santos’s motion for new trial. See Hobbs, 298

S.W.3d at 199; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339. We hold that Santos has not established

that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing on his motion for

new trial.

      We overrule Santos’s first issue.

                        Notice of Enhancement Paragraph

      In his third issue, Santos argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State

to proceed on the first alleged enhancement paragraph because the State did not

provide adequate notice that it intended to use this enhancement.

      A defendant is entitled to notice that a prior conviction will be used for

enhancement. Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Sears v.

State, 91 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (“The accused has

a right to be advised that a greater penalty is to be sought.”). It is not necessary for

the State to allege enhancements “with the same particularity as must be used in

charging the original offense.” Hollins v. State, 571 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1978). However, because the defendant “is entitled to proper notice of any

prior conviction alleged for enhancement of punishment,” the defendant “is entitled

                                           21
to a description of the judgment of former conviction that will enable him to find the

record and make preparation for a trial of the question whether he is the convict

named therein.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Generally, an enhancement

allegation “should include the court in which the conviction was obtained, the time

of the conviction and the nature of the offense.” Id. at 876.

      The State must therefore plead a prior conviction to be used as an

enhancement “in some form,” but it need not plead enhancements in the indictment,

“although it is permissible and perhaps preferable to do so.” Brooks, 957 S.W.2d at

34 (concluding that State’s motion for leave to amend indictment to add allegations

of enhancement paragraph and trial court’s order granting leave provided adequate

notice to defendant even though indictment itself was not physically amended). This

pleading requirement is “a right to notice rooted in due process.” Villescas v. State,

189 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      A defendant should receive sufficient notice of an enhancement such that he

has an opportunity to prepare a defense to the enhancement. Pelache v. State, 324

S.W.3d 568, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Villescas, 189 S.W.3d at 294 (“The

ultimate question is whether constitutionally adequate notice was given.”). The

Court of Criminal Appeals has not established that notice must be given within a

particular time frame, and the court has declined to hold that “the relevant time

period for determining proper notice is the period before trial.” See Villescas, 189

                                          22
S.W.3d at 294 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962), for proposition that due

process does not require that notice of enhancements be given before guilt-innocence

phase of trial begins). In Villescas, the court concluded that “when a defendant has

no defense to the enhancement allegation and has not suggested the need for a

continuance in order to prepare one, notice given at the beginning of the punishment

phase satisfies the federal constitution.” Id. We must look to the record to determine

whether the defendant’s defense was impaired by the timing of the State’s notice.

Pelache, 324 S.W.3d at 577.

      The grand jury indicted Santos for aggravated kidnapping on May 30, 2018.

The indictment alleged the following two enhancement paragraphs:

      And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the charged
      offense (hereafter styled the primary offense), on January 25, 2007, in
      cause number 107259701010 in the 209th District Court Houston of
      Harris County, Texas, the defendant was finally convicted of the second
      degree felony offense of Burglary of a Habitation.
      And it is further presented that, prior to the commission of the primary
      offense, on June 28, 2013, in cause number 133394301010 in the 209th
      District Court Houston of Harris County, Texas, the defendant was
      finally convicted of the third degree felony of Obstruction or
      Retaliation.

Before trial, the State provided Santos with several notices of extraneous offenses

that it intended to introduce at trial. Both prior offenses alleged as enhancements

were listed in these notices.

                                         23
      At the start of the punishment phase, the State moved to abandon the last five

digits of the cause number for the prior offense alleged in the first enhancement

paragraph. The prosecutor argued:

      In the first enhancement paragraph the cause number listed in the
      indictment was 107259701010. As the Judge is probably aware, Harris
      County in their older—even if you look at criminal histories with their
      older convictions, they’ve added their new style of cause number.
      So what’s reflected in the indictment is not necessarily what’s reflected
      in the actual judgment. That is surplusage. [Code of Criminal
      Procedure] Article 28.10 doesn’t apply, according to case law, and the
      State’s permitted to move to abandon that portion of the surplusage of
      the indictment prior to the commencement of punishment. So we would
      ask to strike the 01010 before the enhancement paragraph’s read to the
      jury.

      Defense counsel objected. Counsel argued that the judgment for the prior

conviction had been in the pretrial discovery document manager, so the State knew

the cause number for the prior case. There was “no reason that they couldn’t have

amended [the indictment] prior.” Defense counsel agreed that the State is not

required to plead enhancement paragraphs in the indictment, but the State still must

give adequate notice that it was seeking an enhanced punishment. Counsel argued,

“I didn’t have notice of the cause number for the judgment that they wanted to try to

prove today in the enhancement paragraphs.”

      Ultimately, the trial court granted the State’s motion, but it did not physically

alter the indictment to remove the “01010” from the cause number in the first

enhancement paragraph. Before the jury, the State read the enhancement paragraph

                                          24
without the “01010.” The trial court also admitted the “pen packet” that

corresponded with the first enhancement paragraph.7 The cause number at the top of

the judgment of conviction stated “1072597.” The judgment listed the court as the

209th District Court of Harris County, stated that the date of judgment was January

25, 2007, named the offense as “Burglary of a Habitation, With Intent to Commit

Theft,” and listed the degree of offense as a second-degree felony. The jury found

the allegations in this enhancement paragraph true.

      The first enhancement paragraph in the indictment alleged the nature of the

offense (burglary of a habitation), the degree of the offense (second-degree felony),

the date of conviction (January 25, 2007), the court (“209th District Court

Houston”), and the county (Harris County, Texas). All this information is correct.

See Hollins, 571 S.W.2d at 876 (“It has been frequently held that in alleging a prior

conviction for enhancement of punishment the allegations should include the court

in which the conviction was obtained, the time of the conviction and the nature of

the offense.”). The first seven digits of the cause number alleged in the first

enhancement paragraph match the cause number on the judgment for this offense

introduced into evidence, but the cause number alleged in the indictment contains

five additional digits—“01010”—at the end.

7
      Before trial, defense counsel signed an acknowledgment that the State had provided
      a list of items during discovery. The items included “PEN PAC Request -
      #107259701010 Burglary of a Habitation.”
                                          25
      We conclude that despite the discrepancy in the cause numbers, the first

enhancement paragraph as alleged in the indictment was sufficient to provide Santos

with “a description of the judgment of former conviction that will enable him to find

the record and make preparation for a trial of the question whether he is the convict

named therein.” See id. at 875 (quotation omitted). We hold that the trial court did

not err by determining that Santos had sufficient notice of the first alleged

enhancement paragraph.

      We overrule Santos’s third issue.

                                 Material Variance

      Finally, in his fourth issue, Santos argues that after the trial court allowed the

State to abandon five digits in the cause number of the prior conviction alleged in

the first enhancement paragraph, the indictment was not physically amended,

leading to a material variance between the cause number in the enhancement

paragraph as alleged in the indictment and the cause number that was proved at trial.

      A variance occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the

indictment and the proof offered at trial. Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 246; Gollihar v. State,

46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “In a variance situation, the State has

proven the defendant guilty of a crime, but has proven its commission in a manner

that varies from the allegations in the charging instrument.” Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at

246. Not all variances constitute reversible error; instead, only material variances

                                          26
are “fatal.” See id. at 249, 257. A variance that is not prejudicial to a defendant’s

substantial rights is immaterial and does not require reversal. Id. at 247–48, 257. In

determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights have been prejudiced, we

consider two questions: (1) whether the indictment, as written, informed the

defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate

defense at trial; and (2) whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment

would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.

Id. at 248 (quotation omitted).

      Both the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court have held that a variance

between the cause number alleged in an enhancement paragraph and the cause

number proved at trial is not necessarily a fatal variance. The Court of Criminal

Appeals has stated that “[t]he object of the doctrine of variance between allegations

of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be

such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380,

381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (citation omitted); see Freda v. State, 704 S.W.2d 41,

42–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing numerous Court of Criminal Appeals and

intermediate appellate court cases holding that discrepancies in style of prior offense,

cause number, type of charging instrument, name of court, and date prior conviction

became final did not constitute material variance). “It seems logical, therefore, that

alleging the wrong cause number but the right court, county, date, and offense

                                          27
produces no fatal variance.” Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App.

1981); Simmons v. State, 288 S.W.3d 72, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009,

pet. ref’d) (“[V]ariances between an indictment and the proof of cause numbers,

courts, and dates of conviction in enhancement paragraphs have been held not to be

material.”).

      As stated above, the first enhancement paragraph in the indictment listed the

cause number for Santos’s prior conviction for burglary of a habitation as

“107259701010.” After the State moved to abandon the last five digits of this cause

number, the trial court admitted a pen packet for a burglary of a habitation conviction

that listed the cause number as “1072597.” Both the indictment and the judgment of

conviction stated that the convicting court was the 209th District Court of Harris

County, the date of conviction was January 25, 2007, and the degree of the offense

was a second-degree felony. The indictment called the prior offense “Burglary of a

Habitation,” while the judgment of conviction was more specific and stated

“Burglary of a Habitation, With Intent to Commit Theft.”

      The State’s proof at trial of the nature of the prior offense, the degree of the

offense, the date of conviction, the convicting court, and the county matched the

allegations in the indictment. The discrepancy between the cause number alleged in

the indictment and the cause number in the judgment of conviction admitted at trial

would not have prevented Santos from finding the record of the prior conviction and

                                          28
presenting a defense. See Cole, 611 S.W.2d at 82; see also Chavis v. State, 177

S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (concluding that

variance in number of convicting court was not material because enhancement

paragraphs in indictment and jury charge stated same cause number, offense, and

date of judgment, so defendant would not have been prevented from locating record

of prior conviction). We therefore hold that the variance between the first

enhancement paragraph alleged in the indictment and the proof at trial was not a

material variance. See Cole, 611 S.W.2d at 82; Simmons, 288 S.W.3d at 80.

      We overrule Santos’s fourth issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           29