Court Opinion

ID: 9393734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 00:00:36.488899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:55.092881
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60312      Document: 00516745356          Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/10/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                                                                  FILED
                                                                              May 10, 2023
                                    No. 21-60312                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                  Clerk

   Jackson Municipal Airport Authority; Board of
   Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority, each in his or her official capacity as a Commissioner on the
   Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority; Doctor
   Rosie L. T. Pridgen, in her official capacity as a Commissioner on the
   Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority;
   Reverend James L. Henley, Jr., in his official capacity as a
   Commissioner on the Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority; LaWanda D. Harris, in her official capacity as a
   Commissioner on the Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority; Vernon W. Hartley, Sr., in his official capacity as a
   Commissioner on the Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority; Evelyn O. Reed, in her official capacity as a Commissioner on
   the Board of Commissioners of the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority;
   Doctor Rosie L. T. Pridgen, individually as citizens of the City of
   Jackson, Mississippi, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated;
   LaWanda D. Harris, individually as citizens of the City of Jackson,
   Mississippi, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Vernon
   W. Hartley, Sr., individually as citizens of the City of Jackson,
   Mississippi, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated; Evelyn
   O. Reed, individually as citizens of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, on behalf
   of themselves and all others similarly situated; James L. Henley, Jr.,
   individually as citizens of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, on behalf of
   themselves and all others similarly situated,

                                                           Intervenors—Appellees,

                                        versus
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356             Page: 2      Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                        No. 21-60312

   Josh Harkins; Dean Kirby; Phillip Moran; Chris
   Caughman; Nickey Browning; John A. Polk; Mark Baker;
   Alex Monsour,

                                                              Respondents—Appellants.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Mississippi
                              USDC No. 3:16-CV-246

   Before Dennis, Elrod, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge: *
           A group of Mississippi legislators appeals a district court order
   instructing them to produce: (1) a privilege log; and (2) communications and
   documents that have been shared with third parties. We hold that the district
   court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the Legislators to produce a
   privilege log. But the district court erred in broadly holding that legislative
   privilege was automatically waived for any documents that have been shared
   with third parties. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,
   and REMAND for further proceedings.
                                               I
           The Jackson-Medgar Wiley Evers International Airport is a major
   airport located in Jackson, Mississippi. Since 1960, the airport has been
   operated by the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, whose five
   commissioners are selected by the city government. But in 2016, the
   Mississippi legislature passed, and the governor signed into law, SB 2162. Id.
   § 61-3-6. SB 2162 abolishes the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and

           *
              Judge Dennis joins Part IV and Section V.A of this opinion. Judge Duncan joins
   Part III and Section V.B of this opinion.

                                              2
Case: 21-60312      Document: 00516745356           Page: 3   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   replaces it with a regional authority composed of nine commissioners, only
   two of whom are selected by Jackson city government. Id.
          Shortly before the Governor signed SB 2162 into law, a Jackson citizen
   filed a suit seeking to enjoin the law. The mayor, the city council, the Jackson
   Municipal Airport Authority, its board of commissioners, and the
   commissioners in their individual capacities intervened in that lawsuit. The
   intervenors contend that SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection rights of the
   citizens of Jackson by eliminating the locally controlled Jackson Municipal
   Airport Authority for racially discriminatory reasons.
          During discovery, the intervenors served subpoenas on eight non-
   party state legislators who participated in SB 2162’s drafting and passage.
   The Legislators refused to comply with Request #3 in the subpoena, which
   sought documents and communications related to SB 2162, asserting that any
   responsive discovery would either be irrelevant or protected by legislative
   privilege. The magistrate judge, and later the district court, rejected this
   position. The order noted that because legislative privilege is qualified, the
   Legislators must produce a privilege log before any assertions can be
   assessed. It also held that the “privilege has been waived for documents that
   have been shared with third parties,” and that “the Legislators must produce
   the nonprivileged documents responsive to Request #3.” The Legislators
   appealed and a panel of this court vacated the district court’s order.
   Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224 (5th Cir. 2019). But the panel did not reach
   the merits because it held that the Commissioners lacked standing. Id. at
   229–32.
          On remand, the district court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
   complaint to cure the standing defect and add two newly appointed
   commissioners as plaintiffs. The Commissioners again served subpoenas on
   the Legislators seeking the exact same information as the prior subpoenas.

                                          3
Case: 21-60312      Document: 00516745356           Page: 4     Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   The Legislators again objected on the basis of legislative privilege; the district
   court again ordered the Legislators to comply with the subpoena; and the
   Legislators again declined and appealed.
          This appeal raises four issues: (1) whether this court has appellate
   jurisdiction; (2) whether the Commissioners have standing; (3) whether
   legislative privilege relieves the Legislators from having to submit a privilege
   log; and (4) whether the district court erred in holding that legislative
   privilege was waived for any documents that have been shared with third
   parties.
                                           II
          We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Houston
   Ref., L.P. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., 765 F.3d 396, 400
   (5th Cir. 2014). A subpoena enforcement order is generally reviewed for
   abuse of discretion. United States v. Zadeh, 820 F.3d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 2016).
   But we review a district court’s determination of controlling law de novo. In
   re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2003).
                                          III
          Generally, appellate jurisdiction is statutorily confined to review of
   “final decisions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. But “the Supreme Court ‘has long
   given’ § 1291a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’” Leonard v.
   Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
   Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).             Accordingly, section 1291
   encompasses not only the final decisions that terminate an action, “but also
   a small class of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation,
   are appropriately deemed final.”        Id.   (quoting Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
   Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                           4
Case: 21-60312       Document: 00516745356           Page: 5   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

             Under this court’s precedent, the Legislators have the right to
   immediately appeal the district court’s order. Our decisions in Cates and
   Branch are instructive. Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 622 (5th
   Cir. 1973); Branch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 638 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 1981).
   In Cates, we considered whether a subpoena upon a government
   representative can be used to obtain documents that are not in the custody of
   that representative.    Before addressing the merits, we first considered
   whether appellate jurisdiction existed.          We held that it did because
   “discovery orders may be appealable” when governmental privilege is
   involved and the government “is not a party to the lawsuit.” Cates, 480 F.2d
   at 622.
             While our decision in Cates only considered an instance where the
   subpoenaed entity was not in custody of the relevant documents, our
   subsequent opinion in Branch observed that “Cates clearly extends the right
   of immediate appeal to the government even when it is itself in custody of the
   subpoenaed material.” 638 F.2d at 879. Likewise, relying on this court’s
   holding in Cates and Branch, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “one who
   unsuccessfully asserts a governmental privilege may immediately appeal a
   discovery order where he is not a party to the lawsuit.” In re Hubbard, 803
   F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus, in accordance with our precedent
   and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hubbard, we hold that appellate
   jurisdiction exists in this case. Id.; Cates, 480 F.2d at 622; Branch, 638 F.2d
   at 879; see also Leonard, 38 F.4th at 487 (observing that the Fifth Circuit
   “allows immediate appeal of orders” that “implicate[] ‘some particular
   value of a high order’ or ‘substantial public interest’ that would be imperiled
   or destroyed if review were delayed until after entry of an archetypal final
   judgment.” (quoting Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107)).
             The Commissioners argue that we lack appellate jurisdiction here
   because “[n]othing about the district court’s order forces ‘disclosure’ of any

                                          5
Case: 21-60312       Document: 00516745356          Page: 6   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   documents.” The Commissioners assert that the order “merely requires the
   Legislators to provide a privilege log.” Citing our decision in Banca Pueyo,
   the Commissioners argue that we lack appellate jurisdiction here because the
   order is merely a preliminary step in the resolution of this discovery dispute.
   Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund IX (US), L.P., 978 F.3d 968 (5th Cir.
   2020).
            But the order here is not merely a preliminary step because it
   specifically ordered the Legislators to produce any documents that had been
   shared with third parties. Contrary to Judge Dennis’s partial dissent, the
   magistrate judge’s finding is not just a “summary of the state of the law
   regarding legislative privilege.” Post, at 15. The order stated:
            The Court finds that to the extent documents or information
            otherwise protected by the legislative privilege have been
            shared with third parties, the privilege has been waived.
            Accordingly, the Legislators must produce those documents.
   Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Enforce Subpoenas at
   13, Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Reeves, No. 16-CV-246 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 19,
   2017) (emphasis added).
            The magistrate judge held that documents or information that “have
   been shared with third parties” are non-privileged and that “the Legislators
   must produce the nonprivileged documents.” Because the Legislators were
   ordered to produce all non-privileged documents, it necessarily follows that
   the Legislators were ordered to produce documents that had been shared
   with third parties. That is unquestionably a final discovery order because the
   Legislators could no longer assert any privilege as to those documents.
            And so, Banca Pueyo is distinguishable. In Banca Pueyo, we held that
   there was no appellate jurisdiction because the appealed order did "not
   conclusively determine whether, and to what extent, discovery might be

                                          6
Case: 21-60312      Document: 00516745356          Page: 7   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                    No. 21-60312

   required.” 978 F.3d at 973. Here, the order did so. Accordingly, unlike the
   order in Banca Pueyo, the order here constitutes a final discovery order that
   is appealable under our precedent. See Branch, 638 F.2d at 879; Cates, 480
   F.2d at 622.
                                         IV
          Next, we consider standing. The Commissioners have standing in this
   case based on the amended complaint that was filed after remand. To have
   standing, the plaintiffs must have suffered an invasion of a legally protected
   interest that is: (1) “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent”; (2)
   “fairly traceable to the challenged action”; and (3) “redressable by a
   favorable ruling.” Stallworth, 936 F.3d at 229–30 (citation omitted). The
   Commissioners fulfill these conditions.
                                         A
                                         1
          The alleged injury is concrete because the Commissioners will be
   deprived of their benefits if they lose their position. As Commissioners, they
   are entitled to receive a per diem for their service and a travel reimbursement
   that allows them to obtain specialized training in airport administration. In
   addition to these tangible benefits, their positions also confer substantial
   status and authority because as commissioners, they exercise considerable
   power over the airport by overseeing finances and operations and defining
   the airport’s strategic goals. We hold that the potential loss of benefits that
   comes with the Commissioners’ position is sufficiently concrete to support
   the Commissioners’ standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340
   (2016) (“Concrete is not, however, necessarily synonymous with tangible.”
   (quotation marks omitted)); see also Stallworth, 936 F.3d at 232
   (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (noting that the Commissioner’s “position

                                          7
Case: 21-60312         Document: 00516745356               Page: 8      Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                          No. 21-60312

   of status and authority may be a sufficient injury for their standing”). 1 The
   Legislators did not meaningfully challenge the concreteness of the alleged
   injury.
                                                 2
             The alleged injury is also sufficiently particularized because the
   Commissioners would suffer a personal injury from losing their seats. They
   are the only people who would lose the position as commissioners and the
   benefits that come with the position if SB 2162 is allowed to become effective.
   Cf. Abbott v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding
   that an injury was not particularized where plaintiffs’ harm was same as harm
   to “millions of people”).
             The Legislators argue that because SB 2162 abolishes the entirety of
   Jackson Municipal Airport Authority (not just the Commissioners’ seats),
   the harm is not particularized to the Commissioners. Citing Raines v. Byrd,
   521 U.S. 811 (1997), the Legislators contend that the alleged injury is “the
   sort of institutional injury which the Supreme Court has held insufficient to
   establish standing for Members of Congress.” But Raines hardly supports
   the Legislators’ position here.
             In Raines, the Supreme Court considered whether Members of
   Congress have standing to seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of an
   act passed over their negative votes. The Court held that the Congressmen

             1
             A panel of this court in Stallworth held that the plaintiffs had no standing because
   “The complaint never suggests—as counsel did during oral argument—that the individual
   commissioners are volunteers reimbursed for some expenses, that Mississippi law
   recognizes volunteers as public employees in some contexts, and that the combination
   might give them standing to challenge SB 2162.” Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 232
   (5th Cir. 2019). The plaintiffs have since amended their complaint and cured that defect
   on remand.

                                                 8
Case: 21-60312      Document: 00516745356          Page: 9   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                    No. 21-60312

   did not have standing because their claim was “based on a loss of political
   power, not loss of something to which they are personally entitled.” Id. at
   821. The Court observed that the alleged harm there was not sufficiently
   particularized because “appellees do not claim that they have been deprived
   of something to which they personally are entitled—such as their seats as
   Members of Congress after their constituents had elected them.” Raines, 521
   U.S. at 821. Unlike the plaintiffs in Raines, the Commissioners are alleging
   deprivation of something to which they are personally entitled: their seats as
   Commissioners and the benefits that come with the position. Accordingly,
   we hold that the alleged injury is sufficiently particularized to support the
   Commissioners’ standing.
                                         3
          Further, the alleged injury is imminent because SB 2162 abolishes the
   Jackson Municipal Airport Authority and thus the Commissioners’
   positions. On this issue, the Legislators argue that the injury is not imminent
   because SB 2162 will not immediately abolish the Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority. They note that the Authority will continue to exist until the
   Federal Aviation Administration approves the new Jackson Metropolitan
   Area Airport Authority.
          In response, the Commissioners argue that “the time delay that [the
   Legislators] claim is fatal to the Commissioners’ standing is almost entirely
   caused by the fact that this lawsuit is pending: the only reason the FAA has
   not considered the transfer yet is because FAA declines to do so while there
   is active litigation concerning a contested transfer of airport control.” See
   FAA’s “Notice of Policy on Evaluating Disputed Changes of Sponsorship at
   Federally Obligated Airports,” 81 Fed. Reg. 36144, 36145 (Jun. 6, 2016). The
   Legislators never denied that assertion. Nor did they provide any reason to
   suggest that the FAA may decide not to approve the new authority. Rather,

                                         9
Case: 21-60312     Document: 00516745356            Page: 10   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   the Legislators merely assert that “[e]ven if the dismissal of the complaint
   will ultimately lead to approval by the FAA of the new Authority, the process
   may take a very long time.”
          But the fact that the approval process might take a very long time is
   insufficient to defeat the Commissioners’ standing because the alleged injury
   here is still likely to occur and is “certainly impending.” Friends of the Earth,
   Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000); see Susan
   B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014). Thus, we hold that the
   Commissioners satisfy the imminence requirement.
                                          B
          Finally, we address traceability and redressability. The alleged injury
   is traceable to SB 2162 because the law, by its very own terms, eliminates the
   Commissioners’ positions. As to redressability, the Commissioners here are
   seeking an injunction against SB 2162 and a declaration that SB 2162 is
   unconstitutional. The Legislators argue this will not redress any harm
   because the Commissioners could lose their positions for some other reason.
   But the redressability prong does not require a remedy that covers every
   conceivable injury, just one that redresses the harm caused by SB 2162.
   Enjoining the enforcement of SB 2162 would prevent the law from abolishing
   the Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, and thus the Commissioners’
   positions. Consequently, the alleged injury is redressable by the relief sought.
          Accordingly, based on the operative complaint, the Commissioners
   have standing in this case.
                                          V
          Having considered jurisdiction and standing, we now proceed to the
   merits. The district court ordered the Legislators to produce: (1) a privilege
   log; and (2) communications and documents that have been shared with third

                                          10
Case: 21-60312     Document: 00516745356            Page: 11    Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   parties. On appeal, the Legislators argue that this court should reverse both
   aspects of the order. We address each aspect in turn.
                                          A
          First, the Legislators contend that no privilege log should be required
   because the Commissioners seek only evidence of motive, and any evidence
   of motive is privileged. And because the Equal Protection claim is based
   entirely on motive, the Legislators assert that any non-motive evidence
   would be irrelevant. Put simply, the Legislators argue that all the requested
   communications would either be privileged or irrelevant.            Thus, they
   conclude that they need not produce a privilege log.
          But a privilege log would not be useless because evidence of legislative
   motive is not necessarily privileged.        As the Legislators themselves
   recognized, legislative privilege can be waived when certain conditions apply.
   For example, legislative privilege as to certain documents is waived when the
   Legislator publicly reveal those documents. Favors v. Cuomo, 285 F.R.D. 187
   (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] legislator waives his or her legislative privilege when
   the legislator publicly reveals documents related to internal deliberations.”).
   Likewise, statements that have no connection whatsoever with “legitimate
   legislative activity” are not protected by legislative privilege. Hubbard, 803
   F.3d at 1308 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)); see
   Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
   uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence
   but for the public good.”). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that
   a privilege log is necessary to determine which of the requested documents
   and communications are protected by legislative privilege.
                                          B
          Although the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the
   Legislators to produce a privilege log, the district court’s determination that

                                          11
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356                 Page: 12      Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                             No. 21-60312

   legislative privilege had been waived for any “documents or information
   [that] have been shared with third parties” is overbroad. Legislative privilege
   applies to communications where the legislator or his agent was acting within
   “the sphere of legislative activity.” Id. And the privilege is “not limited to
   the casting of a vote on a resolution or bill; it covers all aspects of the
   legislative process.” Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir.
   2007).
            As relevant here, communications with third parties outside the
   legislature might still be within the sphere of “legitimate legislative activity”
   if the communication bears on potential legislation. Hubbard, 803 F.3d at
   1308. Consequently, some communications with third parties, such as
   private communications with advocacy groups, are protected by legislative
   privilege when they are “a part and parcel of the modern legislative
   procedures through which legislators receive information possibly bearing on
   the legislation they are to consider.” Almonte, 478 F.3d at 107 (quoting Bruce
   v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 1980)). Thus, we disagree with the
   district court’s broad pronouncement that the Legislators waived their
   legislative privilege for any documents or information that had been shared
   with third parties. 2
                                         *        *         *
            Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and
   REMAND for further proceedings.

            2
             Finally, contrary to Judge Dennis’s partial dissent, our holding on this issue is not
   an “advisory opinion.” Post, at 14. The appellant squarely presented the issue before this
   court. And as explained in Part III, the magistrate judge made a final determination as to
   this issue, so we have appellate jurisdiction to consider it.

                                                 12
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356              Page: 13       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                          No. 21-60312

   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
           I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that the district court
   ordered anything more than the production of a privilege log in this
   interlocutory appeal. Neither party has ever argued that the district court
   ordered the Legislators to produce any withheld discovery, and the order
   itself—contrary to the majority’s selective quotation—is clear: if the
   Legislators choose to withhold any responsive discovery on the basis of
   legislative privilege, they must sustain their assertion of privilege with a
   privilege log which the Commissioners may then challenge. The court will
   resolve any dispute, only then ordering production if appropriate. This, of
   course, is how assertions of privilege work in discovery practice. See Fed.
   R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2). 1 The Legislators’ challenge to the first step of this
   process, before any assertion of privilege over specific discovery has been
   sustained, disputed, or adjudicated, is a challenge to an undetermined and
   inconclusive discovery dispute. It is unripe for appellate review.
           Because the district court only ordered the Legislators to produce
   “the customary privilege log”—nothing more—I disagree that there is
   appellate jurisdiction for their interlocutory appeal. However, as a majority
   of the court finds we have the power to entertain this appeal, I agree with
   Judge Elrod that the Commissioners have standing to assert their Equal
   Protection claim. Losing a job, and its social and material benefits, is not an

           1
             The district court ordered the Legislators to submit a privilege log pursuant to
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A). Rule 45(e)(2), formerly Rule 45(d), governs
   assertions of privilege over subpoenaed information, but the text of the two rules, as well
   as their obligations, are identical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to
   1991 amendment subsection d and notes to 2007 amendment; Mosely v. City of Chicago, 252
   F.R.D. 421, 426 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“Just as Rule 26(b)(5) requires parties lodging a claim of
   privilege against a discovery request to compile a privilege log, Rule 45(d)(2)(A)(ii)
   imposes the same obligation on nonparties responding to subpoenas.”).

                                               13
Case: 21-60312       Document: 00516745356                Page: 14    Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                           No. 21-60312

   “institutional injury” simply because one happens to work for a public
   institution. I also agree that the Legislators’ argument that legislative
   privilege is so absolute as to exempt them from all discovery process, even
   the basic responsibility of sustaining their assertion of privilege as the Federal
   Rules require, fails. 2 However, because I do not understand the district court
   to have ordered the production of any discovery, I view the majority’s
   attempt to reverse the magistrate judge’s statements of law as an advisory
   opinion which I cannot join.
           In sum, I respectfully dissent from Section III of Judge Elrod’s
   opinion above, concur with Section IV and Section V.A, and dissent from the
   advisory opinion of Section V.B.
                                       *        *         *
           As my disagreement with the majority turns entirely on the nature of
   the order appealed, a detailed recounting of both the magistrate judge’s order
   and the district court order overruling the Legislators’ objections to the
   magistrate judge’s order is necessary.
           According to the majority, the magistrate judge’s order held that
   legislative privilege had been waived for documents that “have been shared
   with third parties,” and that “the Legislators must produce the
   nonprivileged documents.” Maj. Op. at 7. Read in the context of the entire
   order, neither of these quotes means what the majority thinks they do.

           2
             The Legislators’ notion that they need merely invoke legislative privilege to be
   entitled to it is unknown to federal discovery practice and obviously unworkable. “The
   person claiming a privilege or protection cannot decide the limits of that party’s own
   entitlement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, advisory committee’s note to 1991 amendment
   subsection d.

                                               14
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356              Page: 15       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                          No. 21-60312

           Starting with the second one first, the magistrate judge’s directive to
   produce nonprivileged documents is, by its very terms, not an order to
   produce privileged documents for which the privilege has been waived.
   Rather, it is an order to produce nonprivileged documents. 3 At the time the
   Commissioners filed their motion to compel, the Legislators had not turned
   over any discovery in response to Request #3, including discovery over which
   they asserted no privilege. If the distinction between privileged and
   nonprivileged documents were not obvious from the plain meaning of the
   words, it is obvious from the remainder of the sentence in the order, which
   the majority omits. The omitted portion of the order states that the
   Legislators “must produce a privilege log identifying the responsive
   documents withheld from production under a claim of privilege.” The
   distinction is clear: Nonprivileged documents must be produced, and for
   privileged documents, a privilege log must be produced. Nothing orders the
   production of privileged documents for which privilege has been waived.
            The other supposed holding of the magistrate judge’s that the
   majority relies on for jurisdiction—that legislative privilege has been waived
   for documents shared with third parties—is also a misreading of the
   magistrate judge’s order. The complete sentence from which the majority
   selects its quote reads: “The Court finds that to the extent otherwise-
   privileged documents or information have been shared with third parties, the
   privilege with regard to those specific documents or information has been
   waived.” This “finding,” which the majority treats as a holding, is the

           3
             The majority tries to evade this distinction by mischaracterizing the record,
   saying that “[t]he magistrate judge held that documents or information that ‘have been
   shared with third parties’ are non-privileged,” Maj. Op. at 7, when in fact the order stated
   “to the extent documents or information otherwise protected by the legislative privilege
   have been shared with third parties, the privilege has been waived,” Maj. Op. at 6 (quoting
   the magistrate judge’s order) (emphasis added).

                                               15
Case: 21-60312     Document: 00516745356            Page: 16   Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   magistrate judge’s summary of the state of the law regarding legislative
   privilege, not an application of that law to the specific discovery withheld.
   Immediately prior to the sentence cited by the majority, the order states that
   the Legislators “urge the Court to find” that, under the applicable caselaw,
   legislative privilege applies broadly to all communications with third parties,
   thus obviating the need to produce a privilege log. But after reviewing the
   caselaw, the magistrate judge “found” the law to be different than the
   Legislators’ account of it, notably that legislative privilege could be waived
   with respect to documents shared with certain third parties. The language
   the majority quotes is the magistrate judge’s summary of the applicable law,
   not an application of that law to any specific discovery withheld. Read in
   context, the language excerpted by the majority is simply the magistrate
   judge’s response to the Legislators’ argument that all communications, even
   those with third parties, are shielded by legislative privilege. This was the
   basis upon which the magistrate judge rejected the Legislators’ position that
   they need not provide a privilege log. That the magistrate judge qualified his
   statement about the applicability of the law—noting that “to the extent
   otherwise-privileged documents or information have been shared with third
   parties,” privilege would be waived—only demonstrates further that he had
   not, in fact, made any determination as to what specific discovery must be
   produced.
          Perhaps that is why nothing in the order’s decree actually directs the
   Legislators to produce any documents they have withheld on the basis of
   legislative privilege. The decretal portion of the order reads only: “By
   February 28, 2018, the Legislators must produce the nonprivileged
   documents responsive to Request #3 and must produce a privilege log
   identifying the responsive documents withheld from production under a
   claim of privilege.” Notably absent from this is the directive that the majority

                                          16
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356              Page: 17       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                          No. 21-60312

   says is there: produce otherwise privileged documents that have been shared
   with third parties.
           If there were any ambiguity, the district court’s order overruling the
   Legislators’ objections to the magistrate judge’s order makes clear that the
   only thing the magistrate judge ordered the Legislators to produce was a
   privilege log. As the district court stated:
           The Magistrate Judge concluded that the state legislators subpoenaed
           in this action must create the customary privilege log. Once the
           privilege log is created and reviewed by all, the Magistrate Judge will
           adjudicate whether the plaintiffs can overcome the traditional
           privilege afforded to legislators’ communications with other
           legislators and legislative staff. He then indicated that the legislators
           will likely have to produce their communications with nonlegislative
           third parties, where the privilege was waived.
   I read the magistrate judge’s order as the district court did. It directs the
   Legislators to produce a privilege log, and only after that will the application
   of legislative privilege to any withheld discovery be adjudicated. 4 Implicit in

           4
            Indeed, the magistrate judge himself laid out these standard steps of asserting and
   adjudicating claims of privilege in his order, stating further that the parties and the court
   would follow them:
           Considering the claims in this case, the specific request, and the privilege
           at issue, the Court finds that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 and L.U.Civ.R. 26 require
           a privilege log. Accordingly, should the Legislators withhold any
           documents responsive to Request #3, they must also produce a privilege
           log identifying all such documents, in accordance with Fed R. Civ. P. 26
           and L.U.Civ.R. 26. Should Plaintiffs wish to challenge a privilege claim as
           to any documents on the Legislators’ privilege logs, Plaintiffs must file a
           motion identifying the specific documents to which they contest the claim
           of privilege and setting forth their arguments for production under the
           Rodriguez factors and otherwise. After briefing on any such motion has
           been completed, the Court will, if necessary, conduct an in camera review,
           in whole or part, and rule on the motion.

                                                17
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356               Page: 18       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                           No. 21-60312

   the statement that the magistrate judge “will adjudicate” any privilege
   dispute is the proposition that the magistrate judge has not yet done so. Any
   dispute over the application of legislative privilege to the withheld discovery
   has, as of this appeal, not yet been decided by the district court.
           Finally, it is worth noting that what the majority claims the magistrate
   judge ordered is simply not possible under the Federal Rules. Rule 45(e)(2)
   provides that any person withholding subpoenaed information under a claim
   of privilege “must: (1) expressly make the claim; and (2) describe the nature
   of the withheld documents . . . in a manner that . . . will enable the parties to
   assess the claim.” That latter requirement of Rule 45(e)(2) is, of course, that
   of a producing a privilege log. Without the information contained in a
   privilege log, the Commissioners cannot “asses the claim” and the district
   court cannot adjudicate any dispute they might have with the Legislators’
   assertion. Simply put, there cannot be an order to produce withheld
   discovery without a privilege log because the parties and the court lack the
   information needed to determine whether the privilege applies to the
   withheld discovery. See Marx v. Kelly, Hart & Hallman, P.C., 929 F.2d 8, 12
   (1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he assertion of privilege . . . must also be accompanied
   by sufficient information to allow the court to rule intelligently on the
   privilege claim.”); Peacock v. Merrill, No. 08-01-B-M2, 2008 WL 687195, at
   *3 (M.D. La. Mar. 10, 2008) (“Without . . . the privilege log, it is not possible
   for Peacock to legitimately contest the asserted privilege and for the Court to
   rule intelligently upon whether the claim of privilege should be sustained.”).
   That there can be no adjudication without a privilege log is why the failure to
   submit a privilege log may result in waiver, rather than an adverse
   determination on the merits that the privilege does not apply. See EEOC v.

   It is nonsensical to read the magistrate judge’s order as both ordering the production of
   discovery and also stating that it will do so only after a motion to compel and full briefing.

                                                18
Case: 21-60312       Document: 00516745356          Page: 19    Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                     No. 21-60312

   BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 697 (5th Cir. 2017); Fed R. Civ. P. 26,
   advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. In this particular case, no
   one—not the Commissioners, not the district court, not the majority—know
   whether the discovery the Legislators are withholding contains
   communications shared with third parties outside the sphere of legislative
   activity. Yet this is precisely the determination that the majority claims the
   magistrate judge erroneously made. How the majority knows that the
   withheld discovery was not shared with third parties for non-legislative
   purposes when it too lacks this information is beyond comprehension.
          Because it is both obvious from the face of the order itself and a
   necessary conclusion from the procedural rules governing assertions of
   privilege in discovery, it is clear that the order appealed only directs the
   Legislators to produce a privilege log. I disagree with the majority’s
   imagining that there is more. Accordingly, I view the majority’s opinion that
   the magistrate judge’s statements regarding the scope of legislative privilege
   were “overbroad” as an advisory opinion that Article III does not empower
   us to render. Maj. Op. at 11.
          I respectfully dissent from Section III of Judge Elrod’s opinion,
   finding appellate jurisdiction, concur in Section IV finding the
   Commissioners have standing, concur in Section IV.A finding that the
   Legislators must submit a privilege log to sustain their assertions of legislative
   privilege, and dissent from Section IV.B’s advisory opinion reversing the
   district court’s “broad pronouncement” about the scope of that privilege.
   Maj. Op. at 12.

                                          19
Case: 21-60312         Document: 00516745356                Page: 20       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                            No. 21-60312

   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
   in part:
           While I agree that we have appellate jurisdiction, see Elrod Op. at 4–6,
   I respectfully disagree that the individual Commissioners have standing, see
   id. at 6–10; see also Dennis Op. at 1–2. In the majority’s view, the
   Commissioners are personally injured because eliminating the JMAA will cut
   off their expense accounts. No precedent supports that theory of standing.
   Per diems are perks tethered to public office, not private rights whose loss
   personally injures the officeholder. So, instead of remanding for further
   proceedings in this now-seven-year-old intrastate political squabble, I would
   reverse and render judgment dismissing the Commissioners’ claims.
               The Commissioners claim SB 2162 violates the Equal Protection
   Clause by “abolish[ing] the JMAA and thereby terminat[ing] their
   employment as Commissioners on the basis of race.” Am. Compl. ¶ 140. The
   majority decides the Commissioners have standing to press these claims
   based on allegations that they are “entitled to receive a per diem for their
   service and a travel reimbursement that allows them to obtain specialized
   training in airport administration.” Elrod Op. at 7; see Am. Compl. ¶ 142. It
   also suggests the Commissioners are injured by the loss of “status and
   authority” caused by the elimination of the JMAA and, along with it, their
   positions. Elrod Op. at 7. The majority cites no precedent supporting its view
   that these asserted harms qualify as personal injuries to the individual
   Commissioners. 1

           1
             Judge Elrod’s opinion relies mostly on general standing precedents that do
   not address legislators’ standing. See Elrod Op. at 7 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.
   330, 340 (2016)); id. at 8 (citing Abbott v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir.
   2017)); id. at 9 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
   167, 170 (2000); Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). The only
   cited opinion addressing legislators’ standing is a concurrence in our court’s prior opinion

                                                  20
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356              Page: 21       Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                          No. 21-60312

           The only case the majority discusses, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
   (1997), undermines its view. See Elrod Op. at 8. Raines teaches that individual
   lawmakers can’t sue to vindicate “a loss of political power” but only a “loss
   of [a] private right.” 521 U.S. at 821. That principle defeats the
   Commissioners’ standing. Each loss they assert is political, not personal.
   They have no “private right” to the perquisites of office. Such benefits exist
   “solely because [the Commissioners] are Members of [the JMAA].” Ibid.
   The minute they leave office, the perks end. See ibid. (“If one of the Members
   were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would
   be possessed by his successor instead.”). Their loss “thus runs with the
   [Commissioner’s] seat, a seat which the [Commissioner] hold[s] as trustee
   for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power.” Ibid. (cleaned
   up). Translation: Commissioners enjoy these perks only because they are
   public servants, not because they have a private right to expense the City of
   Jackson for a New York Strip or a trip to Vegas.
           The majority seeks support in this statement from Raines: “appellees
   do not claim that they have been deprived of something to which they
   personally are entitled—such as their seats as Members of Congress after
   their constituents had elected them.” Elrod Op. at 8 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S.
   at 821). But the majority divorces this statement from its context. Raines was
   discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where a Congressman
   was allowed to “challenge . . . his exclusion from the House of
   Representatives (and his consequent loss of salary).” Raines, 521 U.S. at
   820–21 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 496, 512–14). As Raines explained, there

   in this case. See Elrod Op. at 7 (citing Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 232–33 (5th Cir.
   2019) (Higginbotham, J., concurring)). But that non-precedential opinion cites no authority
   for its view that a Commissioner’s loss of “status and authority” as a public official
   qualifies as a personal injury for Article III purposes.

                                                21
Case: 21-60312        Document: 00516745356               Page: 22        Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                           No. 21-60312

   was standing in Powell only because Congressman Powell had been “singled
   out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members.” Id. at
   821. The Court distinguished Powell’s personal harm from a claim of
   “institutional injury, which necessarily damages all Members of Congress
   and both Houses of Congress equally.” Ibid (cleaned up).
           The Commissioners’ asserted injuries differ critically from the injury
   in Powell. Congressman Powell was excluded from his seat by a House
   majority after a subcommittee found he had committed financial
   improprieties as a committee chairman. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 489–93. He
   could therefore sue to redress this personal injury to him (and to his
   constituents, who also sued). Id. at 493; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 820–21.
   By contrast, the Commissioners do not allege they have been singled out for
   “specially unfavorable treatment.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 821. Rather, their
   claimed injury is that the JMAA itself has been eliminated and, along with it,
   their positions. This is what Raines described as an “institutional
   injury . . . which necessarily damages all [Commissioners] equally.” Ibid.; see
   also Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 824 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[I]ndividual
   legislators may not support standing by alleging only an institutional injury.”)
   (citations omitted). The Commissioners can’t circumvent Raines by claiming
   that sunsetting the JMAA zeroes out their expense accounts. Those benefits
   “run with the seat” and so aren’t “something to which [the Commissioners]
   personally are entitled.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
           By allowing individual lawmakers standing to sue for an institutional
   injury, the majority puts our circuit out of step with at least three others. 2

           2
               See Yaw v. Del. River Basin Comm’n, 49 F.4th 302, 311 (3d Cir. 2022)
   (“[I]ndividual legislators lack standing to assert institutional injuries belonging to the
   legislature as a whole.”); Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (explaining
   that legislators do not have standing for harms that “befell the institution as a whole and all
   legislators collectively”); Kerr, 824 F.3d at 1216 (“An individual legislator certainly retains

                                                 22
Case: 21-60312         Document: 00516745356                Page: 23        Date Filed: 05/10/2023

                                            No. 21-60312

   And this standing misadventure is notably harmful because it lets a federal
   court continue to stick its nose into a political spat. Cf. id. at 819–20 (standing
   should be “especially rigorous” when the merits would require “decid[ing]
   whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
   Government was unconstitutional”); Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redist.
   Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 859 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the
   Framers “would be all the more averse to unprecedented judicial meddling by
   federal courts with the branches of their state governments”). Various
   government parties have been fighting over control of the Jackson airport,
   now going on seven years. See Stallworth v. Bryant, 936 F.3d 224, 226–29 (5th
   Cir. 2019). The case has already spawned two appeals, yet it remains mired
   in debates over legislative subpoenas. See id. at 228–29. And while Judge
   Elrod’s opinion correctly fixes one aspect of the district court’s overbroad
   privilege waiver, see Elrod Op. at 11–12 3, it sends the case back for more
   squabbling. Instead of doing that, I would hold the individual Commissioners
   are not injured in any judicially cognizable manner, which would go a long
   way toward ending federal involvement in this political dog fight.
           I respectfully dissent.

   the ability to bring a suit to redress a personal injury, as opposed to an institutional injury.”)
   (citing Raines, 521 U.S. at 824 n.7; Powell, 395 U.S. at 550).
           3
             I agree with this part of Judge Elrod’s opinion, even though, left to my own
   devices, I would find the legislators had no standing to begin with.

                                                  23