Court Opinion

ID: 9828100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:06:02.537022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:16.491263
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/1/23 In re Daisy G. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re DAISY G. et al., Persons                               B324988
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00767)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 D.P.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
      William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, David Michael Miller, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                _______________________________
                                                                 1
       In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.),
D.P. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
parental rights to three of her daughters, then ages four, three,
and two. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) had detained each of these children from
Mother within a few months of birth, and they remained out of
her custody for the duration of these proceedings.
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred in not continuing
the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for preparation
of a bonding study, which the court had ordered three months
prior at Mother’s request, but Mother had not obtained. She does
not challenge the substance of the court’s order terminating
parental rights based on the evidence before it.
       As explained more fully below, there was no error. Mother
did not request that the juvenile court continue the section
366.26 hearing for preparation of the bonding study. Mother
consented to proceeding with the hearing without the bonding
study. Even if Mother had requested a continuance of the section
366.26 hearing and had preserved her contention for appellate
review, she did not show the requisite good cause for a
continuance of a hearing in a dependency matter under section
352, subdivision (a).

      1
        Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
                         BACKGROUND
      The present dependency proceedings involve Mother’s
daughters Daisy, Dakota, and Daphne, and not their older half
siblings, who were removed from Mother’s custody and placed
with their father in 2015. In those prior dependency proceedings,
the juvenile court sustained allegations against Mother due to
domestic violence by and against the half siblings’ father,
Mother’s mental and emotional problems, Mother’s substance
abuse, and Mother’s emotional abuse of one of the half siblings.
In 2016, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in the prior
dependency proceedings, with a custody order granting joint legal
custody, sole physical custody to the half siblings’ father, and
monitored visitation for Mother.
I.    Commencement of Present Dependency Proceedings
      as to Daisy
      In November 2018, DCFS sought and obtained an order
removing two-and-a-half-month-old Daisy from Mother and D.G.
(Father) due to domestic violence between Mother and Father for
                            2
which Father was arrested. Upon removal, DCFS placed Daisy
in a foster home. On November 16, 2018, DCFS filed a
dependency petition alleging, among other things, that Mother
and Father’s history of violent altercations placed Daisy at risk of
serious physical harm, within the meaning of section 300,
subdivision (a).

      2
        Father is not a party to this appeal. He is the father of
the three children involved in the present dependency
proceedings, Daisy, Dakota, and Daphne; he is not the father of
their older half siblings mentioned above.

                                 3
      On February 7, 2019, at the adjudication and disposition
hearing, Mother and Father pleaded no contest to the domestic
violence allegations under section 300, subdivision (a), and the
court sustained the dependency petition as amended. The court
declared Daisy a dependent of the court, removed her from
Mother and Father, and ordered her suitably placed under
DCFS’s supervision. The court granted Mother and Father
reunification services and twice-weekly monitored visitation, to
occur separately. Daisy remained in foster care, and the court
ordered DCFS to assess the paternal grandmother as a potential
placement for Daisy.
II.   Commencement of Present Dependency Proceedings
      as to Dakota and Continuation of Proceedings as to
      Daisy
      Mother gave birth to Dakota, her second child with Father.
In July 2019, DCFS sought and obtained an order removing
three-week-old Dakota from Mother and Father based on the
history of domestic violence between Mother and Father, and
information DCFS had received indicating Mother and Father
were still interacting with one another in violation of a criminal
protective order disallowing Father to contact Mother. DCFS
placed Dakota with the paternal grandparents. Older sister
Daisy remained placed in foster care.
      On July 30, 2019, DCFS filed a dependency petition under
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), alleging, among other
things, Mother and Father’s history of violent altercations placed
Dakota at risk of serious physical harm. At the July 31, 2019
detention hearing for Dakota, the juvenile court ordered twice-
weekly monitored visitation for Mother and Father, to occur
separately.

                                4
       As to Daisy, who was then nearly 11 months old, DCFS
reported that she appeared to have “a close bond” with her foster
parents as well as Mother and Father. At the end of July 2019,
DCFS placed Daisy on an extended visit with the paternal
grandparents (where newborn sister Dakota had already been
placed); and in August 2019, DCFS officially placed Daisy there.
       Mother visited Daisy and Dakota at the paternal
grandparents’ home around four days per week (and Father
visited on the other days). In September 2019, DCFS required
Mother to have her visits at a DCFS office due to Mother’s
conflict with the paternal grandmother. Mother’s twice-weekly
monitored visits at the DCFS office were reportedly appropriate.
       At the December 10, 2019 adjudication and disposition
hearing for Dakota, the juvenile court sustained allegations in a
first amended petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j),
regarding Mother and Father’s history of domestic violence (and
Father’s marijuana abuse). The court declared Dakota a
dependent of the court, removed her from Mother and Father,
and ordered reunification services and monitored visitation for
Mother and Father, to occur separately. Dakota remained placed
with the paternal grandparents, along with Daisy. Later that
same month, during a Christmas visit at the paternal
grandparents’ home, a violent altercation occurred between
Mother and Father and between Mother and the paternal uncle’s
girlfriend, and Mother was arrested.
       In an August 2020 Status Review Report, DCFS stated that
Daisy and Dakota had “a strong bond and connection” with the
paternal grandparents. DCFS also reported that prior to the
start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mother continued to have
twice-weekly monitored visits with the girls, which occurred at a

                                5
DCFS office or a park. During a January 2020 visit, when Daisy
was around 16 months old and Dakota was around six months
old, the monitor noted Mother “had strong parent child
interaction and strong bonding with both children.” In person
visits were temporarily suspended due to the pandemic. In June
2020, Mother’s monitored visits resumed once a week at a park.
       At a September 21, 2020 review hearing regarding Daisy
and Dakota, the court terminated Mother’s and Father’s
reunification services and set a section 366.26 permanency
planning hearing on January 19, 2021. The court ordered the
children to remain placed with the paternal grandparents and
ordered monitored visitation for Mother (and Father) to occur
three times per week. The same day, the court sustained
allegations in a section 342 subsequent petition regarding
Mother’s and Father’s ongoing violent altercations with each
other (and other individuals) in the paternal grandparents’ home.
III. Commencement of Dependency Proceedings as to
       Daphne
       Meanwhile, in late August 2020, Mother had given birth to
Daphne, her third child with Father. In October 2020, after an
investigation, DCFS obtained an order removing one-and-a-half-
month-old Daphne from Mother and Father based on, among
other things, the history of domestic violence between Mother
and Father and their continued interaction with one another in
violation of the criminal protective order, which was still in effect.
DCFS placed Daphne in foster care.
       On October 19, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition
alleging, among other things, that Mother’s and Father’s neglect
of Daphne’s siblings (including the half siblings) within the
meaning of section 300, subdivision (j), placed Daphne at risk of

                                  6
harm. The petition included allegations regarding Mother and
Father’s history of violent altercations (count j-1), Father’s
marijuana abuse (count j-2), Mother’s history of substance abuse
(count j-3), and Mother’s history of mental and emotional
problems (count j-4).
       At the October 23, 2020 detention hearing, the juvenile
ordered DCFS to assess the paternal grandparents as a potential
placement for Daphne. The child remained in foster care. The
court ordered monitored visitation for Mother (and Father) to
occur as frequently as the monitor was available.
       At the December 16, 2020, adjudication hearing for
Daphne, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in the
petition against Mother and Father under section 300,
subdivision (j) (counts j-1—j-4 listed above involving sibling abuse
or neglect). At the disposition hearing for Daphne, held on
January 19 and 21, 2021, the court declared Daphne a dependent
of the court, removed her from Mother and Father, and granted
Mother and Father reunification services (notwithstanding the
prior termination of reunification services as to Daisy and
Dakota) and monitored visitation. The court ordered DCFS to
assess the paternal grandparents as a potential placement for
Daphne and gave DCFS discretion to place Daphne there.
Daphne remained in foster care.
       At the July 20, 2021 six-month review hearing (§ 366.21,
subd. (e)) for Daphne, the juvenile court continued Father’s
reunification services and terminated Mother’s reunification

                                 7
                                                               3
services, finding she was not in compliance with her case plan.
On August 13, 2021, DCFS placed Daphne with the paternal
grandparents.
IV. Mother’s Visitation With the Children
       For more than a year, between May 20, 2021 and August
11, 2022, Mother’s in person visits were suspended by the
juvenile court due to Mother’s inappropriate behavior. Leading
up to the suspension, DCFS informed the juvenile court that
members of its staff had reported “grave safety concerns as to
[Mother]’s ability to parent and keep the children safe” during
monitored visits. On one occasion, Mother reportedly “became
aggressive and violent while holding the infant Daphne” during
an argument with a monitor. On several occasions, Mother
allowed her two toddlers to wander around a park (and once a
parking lot) without supervision and relied on the monitor to
redirect them. Mother became upset if the toddlers showed any
attachment to the monitor and, during one visit, she reprimanded
then-two-and-a-half-year-old Dakota for doing so and ended the
visit early. After a monitor spoke with Mother about the safety
concerns, Mother instructed the toddlers not to speak to the
monitor, which “create[d] confusion and anxiety for the children.”
       When the juvenile court suspended Mother’s in person
visits in May 2021, it allowed her to have monitored virtual
visits. For around the next six months, Mother was inconsistent

      3
       Later, in February 2022, the juvenile court terminated
Father’s reunification services and set Daphne’s case for a section
366.26 hearing with her siblings on June 21, 2022. The section
366.26 hearing for Daisy and Dakota had been continued
multiple times since January 19, 2021.

                                 8
in attending virtual visits with the children. Beginning around
December 2021, Mother consistently attended 20-to-40-minute
weekly virtual visits that went well, according to DCFS staff who
monitored the visits. In May 2022, DCFS informed the juvenile
court that the paternal grandparents and the children’s day care
provider reported the children had “an increase in behaviors
following virtual contact [with Mother] and fe[lt] this would only
be exacerbated by in person visitation.”
      Also in May 2022, a year after the suspension of her in
person visits, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking
reinstatement of reunification services. She attached
documentation indicating she had been seeing a therapist since
January 2022 and had been taking medication for her mental
health conditions. At an August 11, 2022 hearing, the juvenile
court denied Mother’s section 388 petition, but allowed in person
                                             4
monitored visits with the children to resume.
V.      Order for a Bonding Study and Mother’s Ineffectual
        Efforts to Obtain a Bonding Study Over A Three-
        Month Period
        At the August 11, 2022 hearing referenced above, Mother’s
counsel requested that the juvenile court order a bonding study
for Mother and the children. The court expressed the opinion
that bonding studies “serve little value” where the children are
very young (then, ranging in age from two to nearly four). The
court commented that “small children relate to and connect with
those adults who feed them, clean them, and play with them,”
i.e., the caregiver. The court cautioned Mother’s counsel that a

      4
       Mother filed numerous section 388 petitions in this case.
All were denied.

                                9
“bonding snapshot[],”—a brief observation at a monitored visit—
“may just cut the other way,” against Mother’s position.
Nonetheless, over objection from counsel for DCFS and the
children, the court ordered a bonding study pursuant to Evidence
Code section 730 and signed an order for the appointment of an
evaluator. The court set September 15, 2022 as the date for
receipt of the bonding study, in advance of the section 366.26
hearing scheduled for September 21, 2022.
       Before the September 21, 2022 section 366.26 hearing,
DCFS submitted a Last Minute Information for the Court
recommending the juvenile court terminate parental rights.
DCFS noted that the parental grandparents’ home study was
complete, and they were committed to adopting the children.
Mother had had six in person, monitored visits since the August
11, 2022 hearing when the court allowed her in person visits to
resume. The DCFS monitor reported that during the first visit,
“the children were hesitant to engage with [M]other but within
the first half of the visit warmed up to [M]other by seeking her
attention and appearing comfortable in her presence.” Mother’s
visits were appropriate. She engaged the children in activities
with materials she brought, and she was responsive to their
needs, remaining calm when the children misbehaved and
redirecting them with positive reinforcement.
       On September 21, 2022, Father filed a section 388 petition
requesting custody of the children or liberalized visitation and/or
reinstatement of family reunification services. At the section
366.26 hearing held the same day, the juvenile court set Father’s
section 388 petition for a hearing on October 28, 2022, and
continued the section 366.26 hearing to the same date.

                                10
      During the September 21, 2022 hearing, Mother’s counsel
informed the court that his office had tried multiple times to
schedule a bonding study evaluation with the appointed
evaluator and had received no response from her office. Counsel
asked the court if he could “try to contact Dr. Kaser-Boyd.” The
court responded that Dr. Kaser-Boyd was “very busy,” and it was
“highly unlikely” she would be able to complete a bonding study
report by the October 28, 2022 section 366.26 hearing. The court
asked Mother’s counsel to contact Dr. Kaser-Boyd the following
day, September 22, 2022, to see if she could complete a bonding
study report by October 28, 2022. Counsel agreed. The court
admonished Mother’s counsel, “That bonding study – you got to
get some action on that.”
      In advance of the October 28, 2022 section 366.26 hearing,
DCFS filed a Last Minute Information for the Court. Therein,
DCFS stated, in pertinent part: “On 08/11/2022, the Court
ordered a bonding study as to minor[s] and Mother pursuant to
Evidence Code section 730. As of the writing of this report
[October 26, 2022], DCFS has not been informed as to any
bonding studies taking place. DCFS is dismayed as to the length
of time it is taking to initiate this process.” DCFS also reported,
among other things, that Mother’s in person, monitored visits
with the children were consistent and appropriate.
      On October 28, 2022, the hearing on Father’s section 388
                                                     5
petition and the section 366.26 hearing commenced. Without
objection, the court admitted into evidence exhibits offered by
DCFS on both matters and an exhibit offered by Father in

      5
       The juvenile court had continued the section 366.26 twice
since June 21, 2022.

                                11
support of his section 388 petition. After hearing argument from
the parties on Father’s section 388 petition, the court took the
matter under submission and continued the hearing on both
matters to November 17, 2022. Mother’s counsel stated he had
believed the section 366.26 hearing was going to proceed that day
on October 28, 2022, and he had a witness present who was ready
to testify. He asked the court to order the witness to reappear at
the continued section 366.26 hearing in November, and the court
so ordered. Mother’s counsel did not mention the bonding study;
nor did anyone else.
       At the hearing on November 17, 2022, the juvenile court
denied Father’s section 388 petition and turned to the section
366.26 matter. Without prompting from the parties, the court
inquired about the status of the bonding study, and the following
exchange occurred between counsel and the court:
       “[Mother’s counsel]: “At this time a bonding study has not
been done. The 730 evaluator isn’t available to do the bonding
study. And as of yet we have not found another person to do the
assessment for Mother. [¶] My understanding is that one of the
assessors in Lancaster -- she recently went through a car accident
and is unable, as well, to do any bonding studies at this time.
       “The court: Well, are you requesting that another
evaluator be appointed?
       “[Mother’s counsel]: That would be Mother’s request[]. But
I don’t know who would be available at this time to do such a
bonding study.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “[The court:] And so, [Mother’s counsel], what do you want
to do?

                               12
       “[Mother’s counsel]: I know that we have sought to do the
bonding study. We have not been able to get anybody to do it. If
the court continues the hearing for that purpose, I will try to find
another evaluator to do the bonding study with Mother.
       “The court: Well, as to the .26, is the Department prepared
to proceed today?
       “[DCFS’s counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. [¶] The
Department’s Exhibits 1 through 10 were admitted October 28th.
       “The court: And Father’s counsel, as to the .26?
       “[Father’s counsel]: I am prepared to proceed on the .26 for
Father.
       “The court: All right. And, mom, mom’s counsel, Mother’s
counsel?
       “[Mother’s counsel]: I am prepared to proceed on the .26.
We subpoenaed the H.S.A. [Human Services Aide] worker,
Magdalena Castro, today to testify.
       “The court: She was ordered back.
       “[DCFS’s counsel]: She is on call, Your Honor. She called
in this morning.
       “The court: Do you want to call her now or after 1:30?
       “[Mother’s counsel]: Whenever the court would like to call
the case, Your Honor.
       “The court: Well, we can start. We can start with her.
       “[Mother’s counsel]: Then I am ready.”
       There was no further discussion about the bonding study,
and the section 366.26 hearing proceeded to completion, as
discussed below.

                                 13
VI.    Section 366.26 Hearing and Order Terminating
       Parental Rights
       Immediately after the above discussion regarding the
bonding study, Mother called Magdalena Castro, a DCFS Human
Services Aide, as a witness. She testified that she monitored half
of Mother’s visits (in person visits, and before those resumed,
telephonic visits), and a caseworker monitored the other half.
Castro described the visits as follows: “In general the visits are
very positive. The Mother has been constant with the visits, and
she is appropriate with the children. She communicates well.
She shows lots of love to the children. And I have no concerns
whatsoever with the visits.” According to Castro, the children
were happy to see Mother; they were receptive to her affection;
and they brought things to show her (e.g., toys and four-year-old
Daisy’s school work). They called her “ ‘mommy.’ ” The children
did art projects and sang and danced with Mother during visits.
Mother successfully redirected them when they misbehaved.
Based on her observations, Castro believed that “all three
children seem to be very bonded with Mother. They seek her
affection. When they trip, for example, and fall, they cry and
come to her for comfort. Mommy comforts them. And the
children are fine after that. So they have a very good – they are
very receptive to each other.” When visits ended, the children
were usually calm and happy, except on one occasion when then-
three-year-old Dakota appeared sad, and Daisy told Castro, “ ‘It
is because she misses mommy. She wants to live with mommy.’ ”
During an exchange with DCFS’s counsel after Castro’s
testimony, the juvenile court stated it was “treating her
testimony [regarding the bond between Mother and the children]
as observations only,” and “[n]ot an expert opinion.”

                                14
       Mother was present via Webex, but she did not testify at
the section 366.26 hearing. Her counsel argued the parental-
benefit exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied to her relationship with the children.
Father’s counsel requested the juvenile court order a permanent
plan of legal guardianship instead of adoption for the children.
Counsel for DCFS and the children urged the juvenile court to
terminate parental rights. The court took the matter under
submission.
       At a continued section 366.26 hearing on November 23,
2022, the juvenile court presented its ruling. Mother was present
via Webex. There was no discussion at this hearing about a
bonding study. The court found that no exception to termination
of parental rights applied. Regarding the parental-benefit
exception, the court found Mother maintained regular visitation
with the children, but concluded termination of parental rights
would not be detrimental to the children because maintaining the
relationship did not outweigh the security and stability the
children would receive through adoption. The court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the children were adoptable,
selected adoption as the permanent plan in the children’s best
interests, and designated the paternal grandparents as the
prospective adoptive parents.
                            DISCUSSION
       Mother describes the issue on appeal as follows:
“Continuances are granted upon a showing of good cause. Here,
information before the court indicated the children might suffer
detriment if [Mother]’s parental rights were terminated. The
court erred by failing to grant [Mother]’s request to continue the
selection and implementation hearing so she could obtain a

                               15
previously ordered bonding study that would have answered the
detriment question.”
       We disagree with Mother’s characterization of the
proceedings—that her counsel requested the juvenile court
continue the section 366.26 hearing for preparation of a bonding
study, and the court denied counsel’s request. As set forth above,
when the section 366.26 hearing commenced on October 28, 2022,
Mother’s counsel did not mention the bonding study or request a
continuance of the hearing for preparation of a bonding study.
Rather, counsel indicated Mother was prepared to proceed with
the section 366.26 hearing that day and to call her witness to
testify. The court ordered Mother’s witness to re-appear at a
continued section 366.26 hearing on November 17, 2022. There
was no mention of the bonding study by anyone at the section
366.26 hearing on October 28, 2022.
       At the continued section 366.26 hearing on November 17,
2022, the court, without prompting by any party, inquired about
the bonding study the court had ordered on August 11, 2022, at
Mother’s request. Mother’s counsel explained that over a period
of three months he had not found an evaluator to prepare a
bonding study and, although Mother would like to have the court
appoint another evaluator, he was unaware of anyone who could
conduct an evaluation and prepare a bonding study. The court
asked Mother’s counsel, “what do you want to do,” and he
responded: “I know that we have sought to do the bonding study.
We have not been able to get anybody to do it. If the court
continues the hearing for that purpose, I will try to find another
evaluator to do the bonding study with Mother.” The court asked
Mother’s counsel if he was prepared to proceed with the section
366.26 hearing. He answered affirmatively and stated he was

                               16
“ready” to call Mother’s witness to testify. He did not mention
the bonding study again.
       As DCFS pointed out in its respondent’s brief, a “party on
appeal cannot successfully complain because the trial court failed
to do something which it was not asked to do . . . .” (In re Cheryl
E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 603.) “As a general rule, a party is
precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial
court. Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose
with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by
without making an objection of which he is aware. . . . He who
consents to an act is not wronged by it.” (In re Richard K. (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590.)
       As the foregoing summary of the proceedings shows,
Mother’s counsel did not ask the juvenile court to continue the
section 366.26 hearing. Rather, counsel indicated that if the
court decided to continue the hearing for preparation of a bonding
study (as it was the court that raised the issue of the bonding
study at the section 366.26 hearing in the first place), then
counsel would try to find an evaluator to conduct the study, but
he was not confident he would succeed in doing so. Counsel never
asserted that a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing for
preparation of a bonding study was necessary for Mother to make
her case on the parental-benefit exception to termination of
parental rights. Rather, Mother’s counsel made clear that
Mother was prepared to proceed with the section 366.26 hearing
without a bonding study and Mother raised no objection to doing
so. “[I]t would be unfair to allow counsel to lull the trial court
and opposing counsel into believing” Mother consented to
proceeding with the section 366.26 hearing without a bonding
study, “and thereafter to take advantage of an error on appeal

                                17
although it could have been corrected at trial” if Mother had
made clear that she objected to proceeding with the hearing. (See
In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138.)
       Even assuming Mother had actually requested a
continuance of the section 366.26 hearing and had preserved her
contention for appellate review, she could not demonstrate the
juvenile court erred in deciding not to further delay the section
366.26 permanency planning hearing for preparation of a
bonding study. “We review the juvenile court’s decision to deny a
continuance for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘Discretion is
abused when a decision is arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (In re
D.Y. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1056.)
       “Although as a general matter continuances are
discouraged in dependency cases, they may be granted upon a
showing of good cause.” (In re D.Y., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p.
1056; § 352, subd. (a).) Here, Mother presented no good cause to
further delay the section 366.26 hearing when all parties
(including Mother) stated they were ready to proceed. As already
discussed, Mother had had three months to obtain the bonding
study. At the continued November 17, 2022 section 366.26
hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the juvenile court he had no
prospects for obtaining a bonding study, let alone obtaining one
in short order. He did not ask the court or DCFS for assistance in
finding an evaluator. Further, although counsel informed the
court that Mother wanted a bonding study, he never explained to
the court how a bonding study would be helpful in this particular
case, such that the court should further delay permanence for the
children so that Mother could try to obtain a bonding study.
Under these circumstances, Mother did not show good cause for a

                               18
continuance, and the court’s decision to proceed with the hearing
without a bonding study was not arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd.
      Mother argues the court’s August 11, 2022 order granting
Mother’s request for a bonding study constituted “an implied
finding that the bonding study was required for the section
366.26 hearing,” and therefore, proceeding without it was error.
In support of this argument, Mother relies on In re S.R. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 864 (S.R.). She acknowledges the case is “not
directly on point,” but argues it is “instructive.” The case is
readily distinguishable, both procedurally and substantively.
      There, three children, “all six years of age or younger,”
                                                6
were removed from the custody of their parents. After the
parents failed to reunify, they asked the court to order a bonding
study. (S.R., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) The children’s
“counsel took no position on the issue. Counsel for DHHS [the
agency] stated a bonding assessment would provide useful
information and did not object to the request. The court agreed
and ordered the assessment.” (Ibid.) Around two months later,
the agency filed a section 388 petition to modify the order for a
bonding study, explaining it had not found a qualified Spanish-
speaking evaluator in the area to conduct an evaluation for the
Spanish-speaking parents. The parents opposed the petition,
arguing the agency did not establish the requisite elements for
modification of an order under section 388: changed
circumstances and that the modification would be in the
children’s best interest. The court granted the petition, allowed

      6
       The ages of the two younger children were not specified in
the S.R. opinion.

                                19
the section 366.26 hearing to proceed without a bonding study,
and terminated parental rights. (S.R., at pp. 867-869.)
       The Court of Appeal reversed the orders granting the
petition for modification and terminating parental rights. The
appellate court concluded the agency did not show changed
circumstances to modify the order based on the “hollow evidence”
of the agency’s “meager efforts” to find a qualified Spanish-
speaking evaluator. (S.R., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 870-
871.) Moreover, the Court of Appeal concluded the agency did not
show modification of the order for a bonding study promoted the
interests of the children. (Id. at p. 871.) The appellate court
emphasized that the parents’ request for a bonding study “was
not opposed because [the agency] also thought it might be useful.
The court agreed and ordered the study.” (Id. at pp. 869-870.)
The Court of Appeal added: “While a bonding study is not
statutorily mandated in a dependency proceeding, once ordered,
the court has necessarily found it is required by the court or a
party. In such a circumstance, the court is without discretion to
modify or, more correctly, vacate the order, without substantial
evidence on the record that the bonding study is no longer
necessary or appropriate for legitimate reasons other than
apparent difficulty by [the agency] in complying with the order.
The only evidence adduced in this case establishes that
inadequate effort by [the agency] led to the failure to complete
the court-ordered bonding study. Thus, there is no basis for the
court to conclude that the minors’ interests are served by
vacating the court’s order.” (Id. at p. 871.)
        S.R. is not instructive here. First, we are not reviewing
an order granting a section 388 petition and evaluating the
elements of such a petition. Second, S.R. is not factually similar

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to this case. There, three children were removed from parental
custody when the oldest was six years old. A year and a half
later, when the parents requested a bonding study, the agency
and the court agreed with the parents that a bonding study
would be useful under the circumstances of the case. Here, all
three children were detained from Mother within a few months of
birth, and they did not live with Mother thereafter. Mother
requested a bonding study when the children ranged in age from
nearly two to nearly four years old. DCFS and the children’s
counsel opposed Mother’s request for a bonding study. The
juvenile court expressly stated it did not believe a bonding study
would be helpful to the court given the very young ages of the
          7
children. The court nonetheless granted Mother’s request for a
bonding study. Three months later, Mother had not obtained the
bonding study she requested, and her counsel indicated he was
unsure whether Mother could obtain a bonding study at that
time. Mother’s counsel consented to proceeding with the section
366.26 hearing without a bonding study, did not object to doing
so, and never argued to the juvenile court that a bonding study
was necessary for her to make her case on the parental-benefit
exception to termination of parental rights. On appeal, Mother
does not argue her counsel’s efforts to obtain a bonding study
were lacking (in fact, she describes his effort as “significant”) or

      7
        Mother does not cite a case indicating a bonding study is
warranted under circumstances similar to those in the matter
before us—where children were detained from a parent shortly
after birth, and parental rights were terminated when the
children were four years of age and younger, after a period of
monitored visitation.

                                 21
represent that she could have obtained a bonding study in a
timely manner if the juvenile court had continued the hearing.
      For all the foregoing reasons, the juvenile court did not err
in proceeding with the section 366.26 hearing without the
bonding study.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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