Court Opinion

ID: 9595003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:50.217826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:25.714839
License: Public Domain

Finney, Judge:
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that any substantive direct appeal issues raised by the petitioner in this capital case are not barred from collateral review in postconviction relief (PCR) proceedings.
Under the majority’s decision, the procedural bar established in Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417, 215 S.E. (2d) 883 (1975), is revived by prohibiting consideration of this capital prisoner’s direct appeal issues on PCR review. Although the majority concedes that the Simmons rule has been abrogated by this Court in two instances1 when it considered direct appeal issues in conjunction with PCR proceedings, several of this Court’s recent decisions reveal that it has consistently addressed direct appeal issues during PCR review in both capital and noncapital cases.2
Additionally, what I view as the far more damaging precedential effect of imposing the Simmons rule on capital defendants is further erosion of the procedural protections formerly available in South Carolina. When a majority of this Court *14abolished the doctrine of in favor em vitae review of direct appeals in death penalty cases, one of the two grounds asserted to rationalize its actions was the availability of meaningful postconviction relief. See State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E. (2d) 315, 324 (1991).
In a relatively recent case, Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E. (2d) 392 (1991), this Court determined that a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel is not grounds for a successive PCR application. Apparently, the gravamen of petitioner’s assertions emanates from PCR counsel’s failure to couch direct appeal issues in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I am convinced that the majority’s decision in this death penalty case to deny petitioner the right to have crucial issues considered on collateral review effectively renders the already narrowed provision for PCR a superficial remedy and denies petitioner his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions.
Notwithstanding a series of underlying circumstances — the failure of petitioner’s trial counsel to object and thereby preserve the issues for direct appeal, the failure of petitioner’s PCR counsel to properly frame the issues, and the failure of this Court to recognize the issues as appropriate for consideration on direct appeal in favorem vitae and/or its disposition of such issues,3 — the majority affirms the judgment of the PCR court; thereby denying the petitioner’s claims without regard to their merits.
I would ameliorate the denigration of meaningful appellate review created by the decision in State v. Torrence, supra, and restore substance to the constitutional safeguards by affording, on collateral review, the right to have substantive issues adjudicated on the merits.

 See Yates v. Aiken, 290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E. (2d) 84 (1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 211, 108 S.Ct. 534, 98 L.Ed. (2d) 546 (1988); and Thompson v. Aiken, 281 S.C. 239, 315 S.E. (2d) 110 (1984).

 See, e.g., Plyler v. State, — S.C. —, 424 S.E. (2d) 477 (1992) (noncapital); Graves v. State, — S.C. —, 422 S.E. (2d) 125 (1992) (noncapital); Plath v. State, — S.C. —, 420 S.E. (2d) 834 (1992) (capital); Brown v. State, — S.C. —, 412 S.E. (2d) 399 (1991) (noncapital); and Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 405 S.E. (2d) 391 (1991) (noncapital).

 See State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E. (2d) 329 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1060, 98 L.Ed. (2d) 1021 (1988), overruled on other grounds, [see State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E. (2d) 315 (1991)].