Court Opinion

ID: 9489348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:13:25.349269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:28.844266
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
Following our seminal attorneys’ fees eases in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy I), 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973), and Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II), 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.1976) (in banc), this court carefully articulated the standard of review in attorneys’ fees eases:
[A]n award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is within the district court’s discretion. Thus our standard of review is a narrow one. We can find an abuse of discretion if no reasonable man would adopt the district court’s view. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. We may also find an abuse of discretion when the trial court uses improper standards or procedures in determining fees, or if it does not properly identify the criteria used for such determination.
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir.1982) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Deisler v. McCormack Aggregates Co., 54 F.3d 1074, 1087 (3d Cir.1995). What divides this panel is not the selection of this standard of review as the governing legal precept; here, there are no competing precepts. See Majority at 1034 (“We review the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted). In agreement on the controlling major premise, then, we differ only as to what it means. Such interpretation, however, implicates questions of both legal philosophy and jurisprudence.
At bottom, this case is about whether an appellate court appreciates the allocation of competence between trial courts and reviewing courts. To be sure, statements of deference by appellate courts to district judges appear in this court’s dispositions. See, e.g., Majority at 1034-35. But quoting a standard of review and respecting it are different matters. See, e.g., Majority at 1037-38, 1039^13. We must be vigilant of this court’s increasing proclivity to deny substituting its judgment for that of the district court, but then to proceed with the tack that it expressly renounces. In this regard I am reminded of Byron’s account of Julia: “And whispering T will ne’er consent’ — consented.” Byron, Don *1045Juan, Canto I, St. 117 (quoted in R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 717 (2d ed. 1996)).
I.
I first indicate those portions of the majority’s opinion of which I am in accord. I agree that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the hours claimed by Mr. Epstein were “excessive and unreasonable.” Majority at 1039. I also agree “that the district court was well within its broad discretion when it discounted the fees by fifty percent for partial lack of success.” Majority at 1044.
Further, I agree that in light of the district court’s reliance on the district court opinion, subsequently reversed by Griffiths v. Signa Corp., Nos. 94-2090 and 94-2091, 77 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. Nov. 30, 1995) (unpublished), we should remand for reconsideration of the attorneys’ reasonable hourly rate. Thus, I concur in the remand order.
Upon careful examination of the attorneys’ time sheets, see A91-A129,1 too have trouble with the district court’s conclusion that “[m]any of the hours set forth in the fee petition are not properly documented.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. Indeed, I agree with the majority’s reading of Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir.1990), which held that billing records such as those at issue here need not document “the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney.” Id. at 1190 (quotation and citation omitted); see Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 473 (3d Cir.1992); see also Majority at 1037-38. However, the statement of the district court giving rise to this discussion of specificity, reprinted in the margin,1 appears in a single paragraph of a much larger discussion under the heading “HOURS REASONABLY EXPENDED”. That section of the district court opinion contained an independent alternative justification for reducing the number of hours — “that many of the billable hours requested are redundant, unnecessary or excessive.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. The majority has no quarrel with this alternative basis. See Majority at 1039 (“[W]e only review the court’s finding that the hours claimed by Mr. Epstein are ‘excessive and unreasonable’ for clear error. While Mr. Epstein offers persuasive arguments to support the hours he and his colleagues spent on the various parts of the trial, we conclude that these arguments fall short of satisfying our exacting standard of review and therefore conclude that the district court’s conclusion is not clearly erroneous.”). Thus, although the majority remand based on the District Court’s criticism of the specificity of the documentation, in light of the alternative justification for reducing the number of hours, I dissent from the remand order based on specificity.
II.
I turn next to the majority’s contention that the district court “diminish[ed] counsel fees ... to maintain some ratio between the fees and damages awarded.” Majority at 1041^2. For the reasons that follow, I do not agree that the district court impermissi-bly considered the proportionality of the damages in diminishing the requested fee.
I turn first to the statement of the district court upon which the majority premise their reasoning. The district court stated that “requesting that this Court approve an expenditure of $175,000 in fees to obtain a $25,000 verdict is nonsensical.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.2
To be sure, this court has expressed serious concerns with the practice of limiting an award of attorneys’ fees to maintain proportionality between the fees and the amount of damages awarded. See, e.g., Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49, 53-54 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 107 *1046S.Ct. 2179, 95 L.Ed.2d 836 (1987); Northeast Women’s Center v. McMonagle, 889 F.2d 466, 474-75 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1068, 110 S.Ct. 1788, 108 L.Ed.2d 790 (1990). Although the district court’s statements, in and of themselves, have the potential of being interpreted as implying that the district court improperly reduced the fees to maintain proportionality, we must consider the context in which the district court made them.
The district court offered the “nonsensical” description after concluding that the fees submitted by Appellant “are not merely excessive, they border on the outrageous.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. The district court explained that:
If the[se figures] were actually sent to a client who was expected to pay for them, the bill would possibl[y] result in that client obviously going bankrupt or, at a minimum, finding a new attorney.
Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. Accordingly, taken in context, the district court’s statement also reflects a determination that Appellant failed to exercise “billing judgment.” See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (“The applicant should exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to the hours worked.”). Indeed, after making these statements, the district court added that “the petition tendered by plaintiffs counsel is woefully deficient of the billing judgment that should have animated its preparation.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 (citing Oliver v. Bell, No. CIV. A. 92-751, 1994 WL 315815 (E.D. Pa. June 30,1994) (Order Memorandum)).
The majority agree that alternate inferences can be drawn from the ambiguous statement of the district court. See Majority at 1040 (“The statement could, on the other hand, reflect the court’s opinion that Mr. Epstein failed to exercise ‘billing judgment.’ There is some support for this alternative reading ...”). Yet, given two reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statement, the majority reject one reasonable interpretation, in favor of another reasonable interpretation. This a reviewing court may not do. Indeed, “[i]f reasonable people could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.” Deisler, 54 F.3d at 1087 (quotation and citation omitted).
Moreover, even using the majority’s preferred reasonable interpretation of the district court’s statement, the majority do not identify how the district court deployed the forbidden ratio. And indeed, even after the reductions, the fee awarded by the district court still exceeded the damages by a ratio of 1.216 to 1 ($30,389.63 to $25,000.00). This hardly bespeaks a rigid mathematical calculation by the district court.
Furthermore, the majority construct an unworkable — if not implausible — schemata for determining attorneys’ fees. They condemn any relationship between fees and recovery, while making it clear that the relationship between fees and recovery remains extremely relevant in considering the plaintiffs success. See Majority at 1042-43; see also Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 168 (“In evaluating the quality of an attorney’s work in a case, the district court should consider ... the amount of recovery obtained.”). Although the majority purport to announce a new rule of law that forbids consideration of proportionality between the damage award and attorneys’ fees, the currency value of this initial public offering is seriously discounted by recognizing that at least three clear exceptions inhere in it: one, in measuring success, see Abrams v. Lightolier, 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir.1995); Majority at 1041-42; two, when considering billing judgment, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); and three, as recounted above, in evaluating the quality of an attorney’s work.
Thus, the majority’s new offspring is born with at least three bar sinisters on its escutcheon, and staggering through its uneasy fledgling steps, will no doubt cause confusion within district courts and, most assuredly, will generate litigation. Especially troubling here is that the majority fail even to disclose where or how the district court employed a proportionality ratio. To borrow from Lord Devlin, “I confess that I approach the investigation of this legal proposition with a prejudice in favour of the idea that there may be a flaw in the argument somewhere.” St. John *1047Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank, 1 Q.B. 267, 282 (1957). Accordingly, I dissent in all respects from the majority’s conclusion on proportionality.
III.
I do not come as a stranger to attorney fee jurisprudence in this court. Twenty years ago, I authored the in banc opinion in Lindy II, wherein I stated the views of our court at that time:
We find it necessary also to observe that we did not and do not intend that a district court, in setting an attorneys’ fee, become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detañed facet of the professional representation. It was not and is not our intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee assume massive proportions, perhaps even dwarfing the case in chief. Once the district court determines the reasonable hourly rates to be applied, for example, it need not conduct a minute evaluation of each phase or category of counsel’s work.
Lindy II, 540 F.2d at 116.
Whatever had been the intention of the full court in 1976, the history of the past decades demonstrates that our district judges today have “become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation,” as evidenced by the opinions in this case. So also this court has become enmeshed.3 Perhaps the time has *1048arrived for us to have the full court revisit basic concepts of our attorneys’ fees jurisprudence in order to furnish clearer guidance, and hopefully, minimize the atrocious fulmination of these cases, here and in the district court.
Drawing from my personal experience of almost 30 years on this court, and my current practice of sitting in three or four circuits each year, I beg indulgence to permit a personal expression of what troubles me in examining pertinent cases. Appellate courts seem to have lost respect for the narrow review encompassed in reviewing an exercise of discretion. Either because they have a hunger to get involved in the action, or because they disagree viscerally with fees set by the district courts, appellate judges introduce a devious device to broaden appellate review: new standards or criteria for district courts to follow meticulously.
What has emerged is what Holmes called “Delusive exactness [,] a source of fallacy throughout the law.”4 In this practice, newly created “standards and criteria” wag the tail of genuine exercise of discretion. And to argue against this, as I do, is to inveigh against Mom and Apple pie because everybody knows that “standards and criteria” are good for you. As indeed they are in most circumstances, but not if they destroy the exercise of discretion. These standards and criteria create an environment where an appeal is taken every time a district judge fails to kiss the book or to genuflect properly.
Most importantly, appeals challenging deviations from these standards and criteria arrive in the appellate court with a fundamental difference: the standard of review is not a limited review of exercise of discretion or the more restricted clear error, but plenary. See Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 472 (3d Cir.1992) (the question of what standards to apply in calculating an award of attorneys’ fees is a legal question subject to plenary review). Thus, instead of playing a limited role in the determination of attorneys’ fees in limited review of discretion, the appellate courts, like the proverbial camel, have not only stuck their noses under the district courts’ tent, but they are fully inside ranging around in turf that properly belongs to the district courts.
Almost 40 years ago a youthful Charles Alan Wright, America’s premier federal courts expert, now president of the American Law Institute, wrote a very perceptive law review article entitled The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts5 in which he decried the development in “which trial courts [are] losing most of their power [and] the appellate courts have drawn unto themselves practically all the power of the judicial system.”6 Professor Wright noted:
The principal consequences of broadening appellate review are two. Such a course impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the trial courts, and it multiplies the number of appeals .... Every time a trial judge is reversed, every time the belief is reiterated that appellate courts are better qualified than trial judges to decide what justice *1049requires, the confidence of litigants and the public in the trial courts will be further impaired. Under any feasible or conceivable system, our trial courts must always have the last word in the great bulk of cases. I doubt whether there will be much satisfaction with the' judgments of trial courts among a public which is educated to believe that only appellate judges are trustworthy ministers of justice.7
I associate fully with Professor Wright’s observations and find his commentary apropos and germane to current attorneys’ fees jurisprudence. I believe that we should return to the basic concepts of discretionary review we set forth in Lindy II: “If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion,” 540 F.2d at 115, and cease the manufacturing of “standards and procedures” in order to bring about an abuse of discretion as a matter of law because the district courts failed, directly or indirectly, to cross every “t” and dot every “i” to the satisfaction of an appellate judge. We should free the district courts in attorneys fees cases from the solemn high mass ritual as is now required in the reception of guilty plea under Criminal Rule 11, or the judiciary’s nit picking version of the USGA rules of golf — Sentencing Guidelines. As Professor Wright comments, “If trial judges are carefully selected, as in the federal system, it is hard to think of any reason why they are more likely to make errors of judgment than are appellate judges.”8
Indeed, there are several reasons why district judges are much more capable of exercising broad discretion. They are on the scene. They smell the smoke of battle. Indeed, Professor Maurice Rosenberg has identified four reasons that support vesting discretion in trial courts. The first three are lesser reasons:
• One is the plain urge to economize on judicial energies. Appeal courts would be swamped to the point of capsizing if every ruling by a trial judge could be presented for appellate review.
• A second reason is maintaining morale. A trial judge ... would have an oppressive sense that appellate Big Brothers [and Sisters] were ever watching, peering over the trial bench, waiting for the harried and hurried trial judge to lapse into mortal fallibility.
• The third reason is ... finality. The more reverse-proof the trial judge’s rulings, the less likely the losing party is to test them on appeal and the sooner the first adjudication becomes accepted and the dispute tranquilized.
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 660-61 (1971). Then follows what he calls the most pointed and helpful reason:
• [T]he superiority of his [or her] nether position. It is not that he [or she] knows more than his [or her] loftier [brothers and sisters]; rather [the trial judge] sees more and senses more. In the dialogue between the appellate judges and the trial judge, the former often seem to be saying: “You were there. We do not think we would have done what you did, but we were not present and we may be unaware of significant matters, for the record does not adequately convey to us all that went on at the trial. Therefore, we defer to you.”
Id. at 663. So long as the jurisprudence has conferred discretionary power in the district courts, we should respect it. We should not construct obstacles to its use in the form of artificial standards and criteria, the breach of which we deem an abuse of discretion as a matter of law, thereby creating a philosophical oxymoron by savaging traditional notions of discretionary powers.
It is for the foregoing reasons that I dissent from the majority approach, except in *1050those areas set forth above, in which I concur.

. "It would be fair to say that most of the entries are vague and identified only by non-descriptive statements such as ‘research’, 'review', ‘prepare1, ‘letter to’, and 'conference with.’ Descriptions such as this do not suffice in establishing the reasonableness of a fee petition." Dist. Ct. Opinion at 5.

. Similarly, in setting forth the history of the case, the district court stated that Epstein “now asks that attorney’s fees be approved in excess of seven times the amount of that award, $175,-987.50.” Id. at 3.

. Below follows a partial list of cases of this court discussing attorneys’ fees. These do not include a galaxy of unpublished Memorandum Opinions, such as Griffiths, and judgment orders:
In Re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.1995); Public Interest Group of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179 (3d Cir.1995); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir.1995); Gulfstream III Associates v. Gulfstream Aerospace, 995 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1993); Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (1992); Anthuis v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999 (3d Cir.1992); Kean v. Stone, 966 F.2d 119 (3d Cir.1992); Rode v. Dettarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir.1990); Northeast Women's Center v. McMona gle, 889 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.1989); Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 888 F.2d 975 (3d Cir.1989).(3d Cir.1989); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 864 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir.1989); Knecht, Inc. v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.1988); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080 (3d Cir.1988); Student Public Int. Res. Group v. AT & T Bell Lab., 842 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.1988); Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.1988); Coup v. Heckler, 834 F.2d 313 (3d Cir.1987); Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.1987); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.1987); Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1986). Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648 (3d Cir.1986); Ford v. Temple Hosp., 790 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.1986); Ranco Indus. Products Corp. v. Dunlap, 776 F.2d 1135 (1985); Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Com. of Pa., 762 F.2d 272 (1985); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec. of Pub. Wet, 758 F.2d 897 (1985); Sims v. Flanagan, 756 F.2d 4 (3d Cir.1985); Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 270 (3d Cir.1985) (Statement sur Denial of Petition for Rehearing: "|T]his case raises serious questions regarding a fee request that appears to be more than ten times the cost of a small piece of real estate that was destroyed.... The question of disproportionate attorney's fees is a matter sufficiently serious, I believe, to command the attention of the entire Court. Moreover, this proceeding might provide an opportune occasion for the Court to refine some important aspects of the Lindy rule.... Since its announcement in 1976 many questions have arisen regarding its applicability which should be resolved promptly in order for the bar and the trial courts to pursue a more realistic interpretation of its salutary goals.” (Adams, Hunter, Weis and Garth, JJ)); In Re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.1984); Williams v. Tri-County Growers, Inc., 747 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.1984); Hall v. Borough of Roselle, 747 F.2d 838 (3d Cir.1984); Citizens Council of Delaware County v. Brinegar, 741 F.2d 584 (3d Cir.1984); God win v. Schramm, 731 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.1984); Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.1983); Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 730 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1983); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (1983); Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., Inc., 719 F.2d 667 (1983); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir.1983); Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.1983); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 716 F.2d 177 (3d Cir.1983); Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.1983); Dougherty v. Lehman, 711 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1983); Goldhaber v. Foley, 698 F.2d 193 (3d Cir.1983); In Re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 697 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1982); Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.1982); Marshall v. United Steelworkers of America, Etc., 666 F.2d 845 (3d Cir.1981); Cunningham v. F.B.I., 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.1981); Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.1981): Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1, Inc., 622 F.2d 692 (3d Cir. 1980); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.1980); Vasquez v. Fleming, 617 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d 411 *1048(3d Cir.1979); Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs v. U.S. Steel Corp., 606 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.1979); Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co., Inc., 602 F.2d 1105 (3d Cir.1979); Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286 (3d Cir.1979). Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.1978) (Weis, J., dissenting) ("The trial judge did not err in application of the Lindy II rule" because the “determination of reasonable fees is an inexact science at best, and I fear our efforts to make it more precise by refining and qualifying the standards set out in our opinions in [Lindy I and Lindy II ] have not been particularly helpful to district judges. The guidelines we set out in those opinions are route markers that should be followed in groping for that elusive concept 'reasonable compensation.' "); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.1978); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.1978); Shlensky v. Dorsey, 574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir.1978); Wolf v. General Motors-United Auto Workers, Etc., 569 F.2d 1266 (3d Cir.1978); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir.1977); Kutska v. California State College, 564 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.1977); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.1977); Brennan v. United Steelworkers of America, Etc., 554 F.2d 586 (3d Cir.1977); Richerson v. Iones, 551 F.2d 918 (3d Cir.1977).

. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

. 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751 (1957).

. Id. at 751 (quoting Leon Green, Judge and Jury 380 (1930)).

. 41 Minn L. Rev at 779, 781.

. 41 Minn. L. Rev at 781.