Court Opinion

ID: 9775755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:30.083033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.827928
License: Public Domain

Judge LICHTENSTEIN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. My point of disagreement lies in the majority's conclusion that defendant's postconviction claim does *318not raise the issue whether the restitution order was "authorized by law." I perceive defendant's claim to raise this issue, and as such the claim is not time barred.
Defendant's postconviction motion in the trial court raised two types of legal challenges to the restitution order; it asserted that "the restitution order was not authorized by law and was imposed in violation" of the law. Defendant's motion indeed challenged the manner in which the restitution hearing had been conducted, 1 but relevant here, defendant's motior also asserted that the restitution order requiring payment for various other thefts in addition to her charged criminal conduct was illegal because defendant "can be ordered to pay restitution only for the amount of a 'pecuniary loss' sustained as a result of her criminal conduct" and "[a] defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for losses that did not result from the conduct that formed the basis of the defendant's criminal conviction."
Maintaining this latter argument, defendant asserts on appeal that "restitution is authorized only for the actual loss caused as the direct result of a defendant's conduct." Defendant cites section 18-1.3-6028)(a), C.R.S8.2009, which provides in pertinent part, " 'Restitution' means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim and includes ... other losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct ...." Defendant further cites to People v. Borquez, 814 P.2d 382, 384 (Colo.1991), and Cumhuriyet v. People, 200 Colo. 466, 615 P.2d 724 (1980), which respectively addressed whether the statutory scheme, then in effect, authorized restitution for thefts to which the defendant did not specifically plead guilty, or authorized restitution for thefts unrelated to the charges. Both cases acknowledged that restitution is statutorily authorized only for the actual loss caused as the direct result of a defendant's conduct.
Defendant contends that based on the above authority and absent proof (by the requisite preponderance of the evidence standard) that the restitution amount was related to defendant's conduct, the court's restitution order "constituted an illegal sentence." In my view, the claim before us raises the issue that that the court's restitution order was "not authorized by law."
I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that "because the court was required to order defendant to pay restitution, the court's restitution order here was authorized by law." An illegal sentence is one that is contrary to the legislative sentencing scheme. See People v. Wenzinger, 155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo.App.2006). A sentence that does not fully comply with the sentencing statutes is illegal in its entirety. Delgado v. People, 105 P.3d 634, 635 (Colo.2005). Accordingly, several courts have recognized that a challenge to the court's statutory authority to impose restitution for a particular loss, or its authority to impose a certain amount of restitution, are cognizable as a Crim. P. 85(a) challenge that the restitution order was not authorized by law. See People v. Suttmiller, 240 P.3d 504, 507 (Colo.App.2010) (defendant raised a cognizable Crim. P. 85(a) claim, by asserting that the restitution statute, which authorizes restitution only for "pecuniary losses" suffered by victims, did not authorize restitution for the rental value of an item which the victim never rented); People v. Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo.App.2010) (defendant raised a cognizable Crim. P. 85(a) challenge to the legality of a sentence by asserting the district court lacked statutory authority to include a juvenile restitution obligation in an adult sentence, because the restitution statute authorizes restitution only to the victims of the offender's criminal conduct); see also Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005, 1006-07 (Colo.2006) (defendant presented an issue as to the legality of the sentence, by asserting whether the court could, as part of its restitution order, award prejudgment interest based on amount of restitution determined).
It follows, therefore, that a restitution order that imposes payment for losses beyond those "losses or injuries proximately caused by an offender's conduct," see § 18-1.3-602(8)(a), is a sentence "not authorized by law." Because I perceive defendant's claim to raise this issue, I consider it to be a *319cognizable Crim. P. 85(a) challenge that can be raised at any time. See Crim. P. 85(a) ("[the court may correct a sentence that was not authorized by law or that was imposed without jurisdiction at any time"). Accordingly, I would proceed to the merits of defendant's appeal.
Here, defendant was charged by information with one count of theft and two counts of false information to a pawnbroker for con-duet occurring between May 3 and 11, 2005. As a result of a guilty plea to one count of false information to a pawnbroker, and an added count of attempted theft, defendant admitted to stealing two vacuum cleaners and a camera from the victim between May 3 and 11, 2005 and admitted that she pawned these items on May 11, 2005.
At the sentencing hearing held three months after the guilty plea, the court awarded $14,759.48 restitution based on the above criminal conduct and on uncharged allegations newly revealed by the victim that:
® Defendant and her boyfriend moved into the victim's house at the end of May 2005;
@The victim arranged for defendant to watch her house while she was in California (June 4 to 28, 2005);
® According to the victim's neighbors, defendant and her boyfriend had garage sales and sold several items (valued by the insurance company in the vicinity of $14,000) while the victim was away.
These allegations of subsequent misconduct pertained to losses that did not result from the conduct that formed the basis of defendant's criminal conviction. Consequently, the court was not authorized to impose restitution to compensate for these losses. See People v. Steinbeck, 186 P.3d 54, 60 (Colo.App.2007) (although the restitution statute does not require that a defendant be charged with a specific act to be ordered to pay restitution, a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution unless the conduct underlying the basis of the defendant's criminal conviction proximately caused the victim's losses); People v. Brigner, 978 P.2d 163, 164 (Colo.App.1999) (a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for losses that did not result from the conduct that was the basis of the defendant's criminal convietion); see also People v. Wright, 18 P.3d 816, 818 (Colo.App.2000) (although restitution may be authorized for losses incurred by a victim after a crime is committed, it is proper only as long as those losses were the result of the defendant's eriminal act; it is improper for losses unrelated to the criminal act); cf. Borquez, 814 P.2d at 384 (restitution for uncharged thefts was authorized by statute where plea agreement was based upon a series of thefts for which the prosecution agreed not to file charges, and defendant expressly acknowledged this criminal conduct).
I am not persuaded by the People's contention on appeal that the restitution order was nonetheless authorized because there was sufficient evidence to establish defendant engaged in the subsequent misconduct, and such misconduct "proximately caused" the victim's losses. In evaluating restitution, the court must consider whether proximate cause exists between the conduct that was the basis of the conviction and the loss. People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo.App.2010); see, e.g., People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029, 1086 (Colo.App.2005) (holding that defendant's conduct underlying his plea was the proximate cause of burial expenses and travel expenses for victim's parents to attend memorial service). Here, the losses resulted from the alleged subsequent misconduct and therefore were not proximately caused by conduct forming the basis of defendant's conviction. Consequently, in my view, the restitution order cannot stand.
I would therefore remand the case to the trial court with directions to modify its restitution order to reflect restitution for only those losses based on defendant's conduct forming the basis for the August 2006 guilty plea.

. The trial court ruled that defendant waived her procedural challenge to the manner in which the hearing was conducted, but that portion of the order has not been appealed.