Court Opinion

ID: 9965498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 17:01:04.7744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:08.189084
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1133     Document: 010111042103      Date Filed: 05/02/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          May 2, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  MICHAEL S. FREEMAN, II,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1133
                                                (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-01161-CNS-NRN)
  RAYTHEON TECHNOLOGIES                                       (D. Colo.)
  CORPORATION; U.S. DEPARTMENT
  OF DEFENSE; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
  OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; U.S.
  DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
  HUMAN SERVICES; LLOYD J.
  AUSTIN, III; XAVIER BECERRA,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Plaintiff Michael S. Freeman, II, proceeding pro se, appeals from a district

 court order dismissing his Third Amended Complaint against Raytheon Technologies

 Corporation (“Raytheon”), the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) and its

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1133    Document: 010111042103        Date Filed: 05/02/2024    Page: 2

 Secretary Lloyd J. Austin, III, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

 (“EEOC”), and the United States Department of Health and Human Services

 (“HHS”) and its Secretary Xavier Becerra. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we affirm.1

                                   BACKGROUND2

                                            I.

       In February 2021, almost a year into the COVID-19 pandemic, Collins

 Aerospace hired Mr. Freeman as a schedule analyst manager. Collins Aerospace is a

 subsidiary of defendant Raytheon, a frequent DOD contractor. Later that year, the

 President issued an executive order instructing all federal agencies to insert a clause

 into new government contracts requiring the contracting company to comply with

 COVID-19 guidance issued by the federal government. Around that time, Collins

 Aerospace implemented a policy promulgated by Raytheon requiring all employees

 to be vaccinated against COVID-19 or apply for an exemption (“Covid Policy”).

       1
         Appellant’s Petition for Initial En Banc Review was transmitted to all
 non-recused judges of the court who are in regular active service. No judge
 requested that the court be polled on the Appellant’s request for initial en banc
 review. As a result, Appellant’s petition is denied. The Honorable Timothy M.
 Tymkovich did not participate in the court’s consideration of Appellant’s petition.
       2
          The following facts are taken from the well-pleaded allegations in
 Mr. Freeman’s complaint. See Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc.,
 861 F.3d 1081, 1105 (10th Cir. 2017) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to
 state a claim, all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations,
 must be taken as true, and the court must liberally construe the pleadings and make
 all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” (Internal quotation
 marks and brackets omitted)).

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 Under the Covid Policy, exempt employees did not have to be vaccinated but were

 subject to other requirements. Unvaccinated employees had to work primarily from

 home, test weekly for the virus, provide a negative test within 72 hours of working

 onsite, and wear a mask while working onsite. Vaccinated employees were not

 subject to these requirements.

       In December 2021, pursuant to a preliminary injunction issued by a federal

 court, DOD instructed its contracting officers not to enforce any COVID-19 clauses

 that had been inserted into government contracts. Collins Aerospace, however,

 retained the Covid Policy.

       Mr. Freeman has Beta Thalassemia, a genetic blood disorder that causes

 anemia like symptoms and increases his risk profile with respect to the COVID-19

 vaccine. Because of this condition, he opted against the vaccine and requested and

 received an exemption. He refused to comply with the Covid Policy requirements for

 unvaccinated employees, however, because he believed the policy was ineffectual

 and discriminatory towards unvaccinated employees. Mr. Freeman made this

 complaint to the Collins Aerospace Human Resources department to no avail. And in

 January 2022, Collins Aerospace fired him for his refusal to comply with the Covid

 Policy. Mr. Freeman subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC complaining of

 discrimination but withdrew the complaint before the EEOC completed its

 investigation.

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                                           II.

                                           A.

       In May 2022 Mr. Freeman filed this action against Raytheon, DOD, HHS, and

 the EEOC as well as the secretaries of both DOD and HHS in their official capacities.

 He did not name Collins Aerospace as a defendant. Shortly after the complaint was

 filed, the district court ordered Mr. Freeman to amend his complaint to comply with

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Mr. Freeman proceeded to amend his complaint

 several times.

       Before this court is the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Freeman’s Third

 Amended Complaint with prejudice.3 The complaint asserted thirteen claims for

 relief stemming from Mr. Freeman’s termination from Collins Aerospace. Several

 claims were abandoned in the district court and are not at issue on appeal. The

 claims that Mr. Freeman argues were erroneously dismissed can be categorized into

 three groups: (1) employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII and

 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (claims 1 and 2); (2) constitutional claims for violations of the

 First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments (claims 5-7); and (3) claims under the

 Nuremberg Code and various federal regulations (claims 9, 11, and 13).4

       3
        Throughout this order, we refer to the Third Amended Complaint as simply
 the complaint.
       4
         It is not clear which claims are asserted against which defendants. But given
 the more fundamental deficiencies in Mr. Freeman’s complaint, this lack of
 specificity does not affect our analysis.

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       All defendants filed motions to dismiss. Raytheon, in addition to seeking

 dismissal under Rule 8, argued the employment discrimination claims failed under

 Rule 12(b)(6) because Raytheon was never Mr. Freeman’s employer and could not be

 held liable for the actions of its subsidiary, Collins Aerospace. The federal

 defendants sought dismissal of all claims under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing lack of

 jurisdiction under the theory of sovereign immunity and further argued the

 constitutional claims failed for lack of governmental action.

       On March 23, 2023, the district court, adopting the recommendation of a

 magistrate judge, dismissed Mr. Freeman’s complaint. Although Mr. Freeman had

 brought his employment claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which do not

 cover disability and genetic information discrimination, the court treated

 Mr. Freeman’s employment discrimination claims as if they had been asserted under

 the appropriate federal statutes.5 The court concluded, however, that Mr. Freeman

 failed to state a claim against Raytheon because his employer was Collins Aerospace,

 and Mr. Freeman had failed to allege facts that would justify piercing the corporate

 veil. The court held the employment discrimination claims against DOD were barred

 by sovereign immunity for the same reason—because DOD was not Mr. Freeman’s

 employer.

       5
         In the “Claims For Relief” section of the complaint, Mr. Freeman alleges
 violations of Title VII and § 1981. Scattered throughout the complaint, however, are
 references to the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information
 Nondiscrimination Act. The complaint did not reference the Rehabilitation Act.
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       The claims against the EEOC were based on the agency’s retroactive

 ratification of COVID-19 policies that Mr. Freeman views as ineffectual and

 discriminatory. And the claims against HHS were based on that agency’s issuance of

 allegedly flawed guidance that led to the promulgation of the discriminatory policies

 responsible for Mr. Freeman’s termination. The district court dismissed

 Mr. Freeman’s claims against those agencies for lack of jurisdiction, holding

 Mr. Freeman had failed to cite any caselaw that would support a waiver of sovereign

 immunity under the theories of liability set forth in the complaint.

       The district court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s First, Fourth, and Fifth

 Amendment claims for failure to allege government action under Gallagher v. Neil

 Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995), explaining that the federal

 government cannot be held liable for the conduct of a private actor. The court

 reiterated that Mr. Freeman was not a government employee and noted that, by his

 own admission, the COVID-19 contractual provision that had been inserted into

 government contracts was not operable at the time of his termination. Finally, the

 court dismissed Mr. Freeman’s claims under the Nuremberg Code and various federal

 regulations on the grounds the provisions did not provide for a private right of action.

 The district court entered final judgment on March 24, 2023.

                                            B.

       On April 5, 2023, Mr. Freeman filed a motion to set aside or vacate the

 judgment under Rule 60(a) and (b), which the court construed as also seeking

 reconsideration under Rule 59(e). In that motion, Mr. Freeman requested leave to

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 file a fourth amended complaint and sought recusal of the magistrate judge and

 district court judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455.

       On April 21, Mr. Freeman filed a notice of appeal challenging the district

 court’s March 23 order dismissing his complaint and entering final judgment.

       On June 28, the district court issued an order denying Mr. Freeman’s

 post-judgment motion in its entirety. Mr. Freeman did not amend his notice of

 appeal or file a separate notice of appeal as to the June 28 order.

                                     DISCUSSION

                                            I.

 A. Standard of Review

       The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over much of Mr. Freeman’s

 complaint based on sovereign immunity because the federal defendants were not his

 employer and because many of his claims cite provisions that do not provide a

 private right of action. We review those conclusions de novo. See Radil v. Sanborn

 Western Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We review the district

 court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”). Mr. Freeman

 “bears the burden of establishing [subject matter] jurisdiction as a threshold matter.”

 Id. To the extent the defendants attack the factual basis for subject matter

 jurisdiction, including whether they were Mr. Freeman’s employer, “the court does

 not presume the truthfulness of factual allegations in the complaint.” Id.

       We also review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under

 Rule 12(b)(6). Brokers’ Choice, 861 F.3d at 1104. To survive a motion to dismiss

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 under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact, taken as

 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air

 Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A

 claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to

 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

 alleged.” Jordan-Arapahoe, LLP v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 633 F.3d 1022, 1025

 (10th Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a

 dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept the well-pleaded facts alleged as true and

 view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life

 Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264, 1275 (10th Cir. 2023). But we need not accept “threadbare

 recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported by mere conclusory

 statements.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “An allegation is

 conclusory where it states an inference without stating the underlying facts or is

 devoid of any factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        As a pro se litigant, Mr. Freeman is entitled to a liberal construction of his

 pleadings. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840

 (10th Cir. 2005). But he must still comply with the same rules as other litigants, and

 we do not act as his “attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.”

 Id.

 B. Dismissal of Discrimination Claims Against Raytheon

        To survive Raytheon’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Freeman needed to allege

 sufficient facts to allow an inference that Raytheon was his employer or otherwise

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 responsible for the actions of Collins Aerospace. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,

 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a prima facie case under Title

 VII requires an employee/employer relationship); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d

 1357, 1361 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Whether Defendant was Plaintiffs’ employer depends

 upon whether Defendant is liable for the acts of its subsidiary.”). We agree with the

 district court’s conclusion that the complaint fails in this regard. We expand on its

 reasoning, however, to address Mr. Freeman’s arguments under the single-employer

 theory.

        The district court dismissed the claims against Raytheon because it concluded

 the complaint failed to allege facts that would justify piercing the corporate veil.

 See R. vol. 3 at 194 (holding the complaint “fail[ed] to show that Defendant

 Raytheon used Collins Aerospace to perpetuate a fraud or wrong that would permit

 Plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil”). We agree with the district court’s analysis as

 far as it went. Piercing the corporate veil requires facts from which to infer Collins

 Aerospace “was used to defeat public convenience, or to justify or protect wrong,

 fraud or crime.” Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1995)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). The complaint does not allege such facts. Nor

 does it allege facts relevant to whether Collins Aerospace was Raytheon’s alter ego

 or indeed facts relevant to any theory that would justify piercing the corporate veil.

 See Boughton, 65 F.3d at 836 (listing factors relevant to piercing-the-corporate-veil

 analysis). The district court was therefore correct in rejecting the veil-piercing

 theory of liability.

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        But Mr. Freeman’s theory against Raytheon is slightly different. His argument

  focuses on the single-employer theory of liability, which does not depend on a

  showing of fraud. The single-employer theory allows a “plaintiff who is the

  employee of one entity to hold another entity liable by arguing that the two entities

  effectively constitute a single employer.” Knitter v. Corvias Mil. Living, LLC, 758

  F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

        In general, ”[t]he doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that

  a parent company is not the employer of its subsidiary’s employees, and the courts

  have found otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances.” Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362.

  One of those circumstances is where the plaintiff’s immediate employer and its

  parent corporation are integrated to an extent they should be considered a single

  employer for purposes of federal discrimination law. See Lockard, 162 F.3d at

  1069-70 (explaining the single-employer test). To succeed under this theory,

  Mr. Freeman would have to show “sufficient indicia of an interrelationship” between

  Collins Aerospace and Raytheon to justify his belief that Raytheon was jointly

  responsible for the acts of his immediate employer. Id. at 1070. Put another way,

  Raytheon must have exercised a degree of control over Collins Aerospace

  “exceed[ing] that normally exercised by a parent corporation.” Id. at 1071 n.2. In

  considering this question, courts look to the following factors: “interrelation of

  operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management, and common

  ownership or financial control.” Id. at 1069.

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        The complaint does not allege facts to indicate interrelated operations or

  common management between Raytheon and Collins Aerospace. See Frank, 3 F.3d

  at 1362-63 (providing the following examples of facts suggesting interrelated

  operations: the parent keeping its subsidiary’s books, issuing its paychecks, paying

  its bills, and sharing its employees, headquarters, and office space). The complaint

  does include allegations of common ownership, but that, “standing alone, can never

  be sufficient to establish parent liability.” Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1071 (internal

  quotation marks omitted).

        Most importantly, the complaint is devoid of facts relevant to the most critical

  factor—centralized control of labor relations. See Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,

  312 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (observing that courts generally consider

  control of labor relations “to be the most important” factor); see also Lockard,

  162 F.3d at 1070 (“The key factor of this four-part test is . . . whether the putative

  employer has centralized control of labor relations.”). Centralized control of labor

  relations means the “parent must control the day-to-day employment decisions of the

  subsidiary.” Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1070 (internal quotation marks omitted). Several

  factors inform whether a parent controls a subsidiary’s labor relations, including

  whether the “parent kept [the] subsidiary’s books, issued its paychecks, and paid its

  bills;” whether the “parent and subsidiary had common employees, shared services,

  equipment, employees and office space;” and whether the “parent controlled [the]

  subsidiary’s payroll and benefit program.” Id. (citing Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363).

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        The complaint does not allege facts showing that Raytheon exercised

  day-to-day control over Collins Aerospace. Instead, the allegations focus exclusively

  on a single policy related to the COVID-19 pandemic. We accept as true that

  Raytheon promulgated the Covid Policy. But that is not enough to infer it exercised

  day-to-day control over Collins Aerospace. We have specifically cautioned that “[a]

  parent’s broad general policy statements regarding employment matters are not

  enough to” show centralized control of labor relations. Frank, 3 F.3d at 1363. “The

  critical question is, what entity made the final decisions regarding employment

  matters related to the person claiming discrimination?” Id. (internal quotation marks

  and brackets omitted) (emphasis added).

        In this case, that entity was Collins Aerospace. As Mr. Freeman alleges in his

  complaint, he was hired by Collins Aerospace. When he determined that the Covid

  Policy was discriminatory against unvaccinated employees, he took his complaints to

  the human resources department at Collins Aerospace. And when he refused to

  comply with the Covid Policy, his employment was terminated by Collins Aerospace.

  Raytheon may have promulgated the policy and provided the digital platform for

  employees to record their vaccination status, but there is no allegation from which to

  infer it had any right to fire Mr. Freeman or any other employee of Collins

  Aerospace. See Bristol, 312 F.3d at 1219 (explaining that “[m]ost important to

  control over the terms and conditions of an employment relationship is the right to

  terminate it”). To the contrary, what can be inferred from the complaint is that

  Raytheon was no longer obligated to enforce any vaccine mandate that may have

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  been added to its defense contracts. Because Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts

  leading to the plausible inference that Raytheon and Collins Aerospace constituted a

  single employer, his employment discrimination claims against Raytheon fail.

  C. Dismissal of Claims Against the Federal Government

        Mr. Freeman’s claims against DOD are brought under the joint-employer

  theory of liability. He argues DOD and Raytheon were joint employers because

  Raytheon operated as a defense contractor. The district court dismissed this claim

  outright, and it was right to do so. Sovereign immunity does not bar employment

  discrimination claims against the federal government where the federal government is

  the employer. See Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007)

  (citing Title VII waiver of sovereign immunity set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d)).

  But here the federal government did not employ Mr. Freeman, and this would be so

  even if Raytheon and Collins Aerospace could be considered a single employer, a

  theory we just rejected.

        Under the joint-employer theory, two separate entities may be considered joint

  employers “if they share or co-determine those matters governing the essential terms

  and conditions of employment.” Knitter, 758 F.3d at 1226 (internal quotation marks

  omitted); see id. at 1226-27 (explaining differences between the single-employer and

  joint-employer tests). DOD might be considered a joint employer under this test if it

  exercised “significant control over [Mr. Freeman].” Id. at 1226. In determining

  whether an entity exercised significant control, courts consider many factors,

  including “the ability to promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions

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  of employment, including compensation, benefits and hours; day-to-day supervision

  of employees, including employee discipline; and control of employee records,

  including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

  ellipsis omitted). Most importantly, however, as with the single-employer test, we

  ask whether DOD had the right to terminate the employment relationship. See id.

  at 1228 (emphasizing preeminence of the right to terminate). There is nothing in the

  complaint to indicate DOD had the right to fire Mr. Freeman or anyone else working

  at Raytheon or Collins Aerospace. Moreover, aside from the allegations about the

  unenforced contractual provision inserted into some defense contracts, the complaint

  includes no facts relevant to the significant-control analysis. In short there is nothing

  from which to draw a reasonable inference that DOD was Mr. Freeman’s employer.

  The employment discrimination claims against the federal government were properly

  dismissed.

  D. Dismissal of the Constitutional Claims

        Mr. Freeman claims that being forced to abide by the discriminatory Covid

  Policy under threat of termination violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and

  Fifth Amendments. These claims fail because Mr. Freeman has not alleged facts

  from which to infer Collins Aerospace was a government actor. See Gallaher,

  49 F.3d at 1446-47 (explaining the “essential dichotomy” between governmental

  action, which is subject to constitutional scrutiny, and “private conduct, which

  however discriminatory or wrongful,” is not). Several principles underlie the

  constitutional distinction between government action and private conduct, including

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  the desire to avoid holding the government responsible for conduct beyond its

  control. See id. at 1447. That is precisely what Mr. Freeman seeks to do here in

  claiming the Covid Policy was implemented and enforced at the behest of the federal

  government. Not so. Even if the government initially required that contracting

  employees be vaccinated, it did not promulgate the specific policy at issue, and in

  any event, it had expressly withdrawn its own vaccination mandate by the time

  Mr. Freeman was fired. Collins Aerospace opted to retain its Covid Policy, but

  Mr. Freeman cannot hold the government liable for the decision of a private

  employer to enforce its own employment policies.

        As the federal defendants correctly argue, “the fact that a private entity

  contracts with the government or receives governmental funds or other kinds of

  governmental assistance does not automatically transform the conduct of that entity

  into state action.” Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1448. Mr. Freeman claims Raytheon, and

  by extension Collins Aerospace, had a financial incentive to comply with the

  government’s COVID-19 policies. That is not enough to transform those entities into

  government actors. See Gilmore v. Salt Lake Cmty. Action Program, 710 F.2d 632,

  636 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that “governmental funding and regulation of an

  ostensibly private organization, in the absence of other factors, is insufficient to

  establish governmental action.”); see also Hurst v. McDonough, No. 21-2068, 2022

  WL 1090913, at *4 (10th Cir. Apr. 12, 2022) (holding the Department of Veterans

  Affairs was not a joint employer of federal contractor employee for purposes of

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  Title VII) (unpublished) (cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1;

  10th Cir. R. 32.1(A))

        Finally, even if Collins Aerospace could be considered a government actor,

  that does not automatically convert its termination of Mr. Freeman into government

  action. See Gilmore, 710 F.2d at 638 (recognizing “that not all actions by state actors

  are state action”). Government action requires, at a minimum, “a showing that the

  deprivation was in some sense attributable to a governmental decision.” Id. Here the

  government affirmatively stated it would not enforce its vaccination mandate against

  government contractors. And there are no allegations indicating a government agent

  participated in any way in the decision to fire Mr. Freeman. Because the complaint

  fails to allege that Collins Aerospace was a government actor and that its termination

  of Mr. Freeman constituted governmental action, the district court was correct in

  dismissing the constitutional claims.

  E. Dismissal of Claims Under the Ninth Amendment, the Nuremberg Code, and
     16 C.F.R. 1028.116

        Mr. Freeman argues the defendants’ conduct violated rights stemming from a

  combination of the Ninth Amendment and the Nuremberg Code and federal

  regulations governing informed consent. But he has cited no authority supporting

  this novel theory of liability. To the contrary, courts have held the Ninth Amendment

  does not create a private right of action. See, e.g., Strandberg v. City of Helena,

  791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding “the ninth amendment has never been

  recognized as independently securing any constitutional right”). And Mr. Freeman

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  has not identified any statute creating a private right of action for violations of the

  Nuremberg Code or 16 C.F.R. § 1028.116, which sets forth regulations governing

  informed consent in human research. See generally McKenzie v. U.S. Citizenship &

  Immigr. Servs., 761 F.3d 1149, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the Supreme Court

  “will rarely recognize an implied private cause of action arising from a mere

  regulation”). The district court did not err in dismissing these claims.6

  F. Challenges to the District Court’s June 28, 2023, Order

         We lack jurisdiction to address Mr. Freeman’s arguments concerning the

  district court’s order denying his post-judgment motion because he did not file a

  separate, or amend his existing, notice of appeal to challenge that order.

  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., 80 F.4th 1136,

  1159-60 (10th Cir. 2023).

                                      CONCLUSION

         The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Bobby R. Baldock
                                               Circuit Judge

         6
          For the same reason, the district court was correct in dismissing
  Mr. Freeman’s Thirteenth Claim for Relief, which cites various federal regulations
  implementing the Ethics in Government Act. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101, et seq. These
  regulations do not create a private right of action. Id., § 2635.106(c).
                                              17