Court Opinion

ID: 9895474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 15:08:09.868428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:51.678030
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13481

             HAMID REZA ARDANEH   vs.   COMMONWEALTH.

                        November 7, 2023.

   Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.

     The petitioner, Hamid Reza Ardaneh, is awaiting trial on
indictments for rape, strangulation or suffocation, and other
offenses. See Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 492 Mass. 1019, 1019
(2023)(Ardaneh [No. 3]). Acting on his own behalf, he filed
papers in the county court citing G. L. c. 211, § 3 (general
superintendence); G. L. c. 249, § 5 (relief in the nature of
certiorari); G. L. c. 278, § 28E (certain interlocutory
appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (interlocutory appeals in Federal
court); and Mass. R. Crim. P. 15, as amended, 476 Mass. 1501
(2017) (certain interlocutory appeals), seeking review of the
denial of various pretrial motions and correction of other
alleged errors.1 A single justice of this court considered the
papers and denied all requests for relief, and Ardaneh appeals.
We affirm.

     After his appeal was entered in this court, Ardaneh filed a
brief, as well as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C.
Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). That rule applies
when a single justice "denies relief from an interlocutory
ruling in the trial court," and requires the appellant to "set
forth the reasons why review of the trial court decision cannot
adequately be obtained on appeal from any final adverse judgment
in the trial court or by other available means." Id. This
obligation coincides with the burden borne by a petitioner

     1 Among the papers were a motion to discharge counsel and a
motion to recuse the Superior Court judge. We consider both
motions pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.
                                                                   2

seeking extraordinary relief to demonstrate the absence or
inadequacy of alternative remedies. See, e.g., Ardaneh (No. 3),
492 Mass. at 1020; Chawla v. Appeals Court, 482 Mass. 1001, 1002
(2019). Regardless of whether rule 2:21 applies to all of
Ardaneh's claims, a review of his submissions and the record
before the single justice leads us to conclude that the single
justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying
relief.

     This is the fourth time that Ardaneh has sought some form
of extraordinary relief from this court arising out of the same
underlying criminal proceedings. In each of the three prior
appeals, the court affirmed the judgments denying relief. See
Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1019; Ardaneh v. Commonwealth, 487
Mass. 1030, 1031 (2021) (Ardaneh [No. 2]); Ardaneh v.
Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2020) (Ardaneh [No. 1]).
Each time, we concluded that Ardaneh failed to demonstrate that
review of his claims could not adequately be obtained in the
trial court or on appeal from any conviction. See Ardaneh (No.
3), 492 Mass. at 1021; Ardaneh (No. 2), 487 Mass. at 1030,
quoting Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006 ("to the extent that
Ardaneh seeks relief 'from what he perceive[s] to be general
injustices done to or imposed on him' in the trial court, '[h]is
claims [do] not present a situation warranting extraordinary
superintendence relief directly from this court'"). We reach
the same conclusion here.

     As he has previously, "Ardaneh claims very generally and
among other things that he has been falsely accused of the
criminal conduct for which he was indicted; that he has
exculpatory evidence to prove his innocence; that the evidence
does not support the indictments; that his constitutional
rights, including the right to effective assistance of counsel,
have been violated; and that he has been improperly detained."
Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1019. See Ardaneh (No. 2), 487
Mass. at 1030; Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1005-1006. Without
overly retreading the same ground, to the extent that Ardaneh
seeks review of issues related to motions to suppress, although
he could seek leave from the single justice to "appeal an order
determining a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial," Mass.
R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), there is "no right to appeal (as
[Ardaneh] has done here) from a single justice's denial of leave
to appeal."2 Azubuko v. Commonwealth, 464 Mass. 1002, 1002 n.1

    2 Ardaneh also cites 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), which applies to
interlocutory appeals in Federal court. It does not apply to
Ardanah's request for an interlocutory appeal in State court.
                                                                   3

(2012). He "'can still raise his challenge to the suppression
ruling [and related issues] in a direct appeal if he is
convicted after trial.'" Torres v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass.
1010, 1011 (2021), quoting Goguen v. Commonwealth, 457 Mass.
1006, 1006 (2010).

     To the extent Ardaneh challenges the denial of a motion to
dismiss, "'[t]he denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal
case is not appealable until after trial, and we have indicated
many times that G. L. c. 211, § 3, may not be used to circumvent
that rule.'" Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1020, quoting
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2002). The same
is true when such a motion is predicated on speedy trial claims.
See Flood v. Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 1015, 1017 (2013) (no right
to interlocutory review of motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds). Likewise, the denial of Ardaneh's motion to recuse
the Superior Court judge may be addressed in a direct appeal.
See Torres, 487 Mass. at 1011. The same is also true of
Ardaneh's motion to discharge counsel. See Glawson v.
Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 1021, 1021 (2005). To the extent
Ardaneh challenges the denial of other motions seeking
additional forms of relief, or raises other claims of error, he
similarly failed to demonstrate that review of those matters
cannot adequately be obtained on direct appeal following any
conviction. See, e.g., Tavares v. Commonwealth, 481 Mass. 1044,
1044 (2019). The single justice neither erred nor abused his
discretion in denying relief.3 See Commonwealth v. Fontanez, 482
Mass. 22, 25 (2019).

Cf. Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367
Mass. 464, 468 (1975).

     3 Two other points bear mention. First, with respect to
Ardaneh's allegation that the single justice failed to "[r]eview
the motions to [s]uppress, motions to [d]ismiss, and motions to
[g]rant [a]ppropriate [r]elief," there is nothing to support that
claim. Moreover, as stated, we have reviewed the record and
agree with the single justice that relief was not warranted.

     Second, to the extent that Ardaneh complains that the trial
court record was not assembled and transferred to the county
court, there was no error. To the extent the argument concerns
Ardaneh's requests for extraordinary relief, it was his "burden
to create a record -- not merely to allege but to demonstrate,
i.e., to provide copies of the lower court docket entries and
any relevant pleadings, motions, orders . . . or other parts of
the lower court record necessary to substantial [his]
                                                                  4

    As noted supra, this is Ardaneh's fourth attempt to seek
extraordinary relief from this court -- arising from the same
underlying criminal proceedings -- to correct alleged errors
that may be reviewed on the ordinary course of trial and appeal.
See Ardaneh (No. 3), 492 Mass. at 1021; Ardaneh (No. 2), 487
Mass. at 1030; Ardaneh (No. 1), 486 Mass. at 1006. In Ardaneh
(No. 3), supra, we cautioned Ardaneh that "further attempts to
obtain [extraordinary] relief in similar circumstances may
result in the imposition of sanctions." This case was pending
in the county court at the time Ardaneh (No.3) was decided.
Although we do not impose sanctions now, we emphasize that
Ardaneh is on notice that "further attempts to obtain
[extraordinary relief] in similar circumstances may result in
the imposition of sanctions." Id.

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by
a memorandum of law.
     Hamid Reza Ardaneh, pro se.

allegations" that relief is warranted. Gorod v. Tabachnick, 428
Mass. 1001, 1001, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1003 (1998). To the
extent the argument concerns Ardaneh's application for
interlocutory review, the single justice did not authorize an
interlocutory appeal, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 15 (a) (2), and no
assembly was required pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 8, as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019). See Ramos v. Commonwealth, 485 Mass.
1004, 1004 (2020).