Court Opinion

ID: 9464484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:34:41.752589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:39.569837
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The district court’s findings are supported by only the barest thread of evidence. The record reflects that the trial court used an erroneous standard of proof, based its conclusion on uncorroborated hearsay, and built inference upon inference; surely, our mandate requires a reversal.
I strenuously object to a finding made by the trial court that the plaintiff was discharged because he acted in an “offensive *456manner.” Not one shred of testimony or evidence in this record justifies such a conclusion. This egregious conclusion is not offered by the plaintiff’s employer as the reason for his discharge; rather, it is invented by unwarranted judicial inference. St. Louis Die Casting allegedly based Mop-kins’ discharge upon his “personality” and “attitude.” The term offensive finds its origin in the trial court’s opinion based on its admitted assumption that this is what the employer had in mind. The majority here erroneously enlarges the trial court’s assumption into a factual finding which says this plaintiff was “disturbing” to others. No credible evidence supports these statements.
The evaluation of Mopkins upon which his dismissal was based consisted of a supervisor’s interpretation of two isolated episodes involving two co-workers. In one instance one of the white female employees commented to the supervisor that plaintiff had called her “honey” or “babe” while on another occasion another female employee mentioned that Mopkins at one time had swept under her feet and had reached over her shoulder to pick up an ash tray. Since neither employee testified, the statements as related by Mopkins’ supervisor were obvious hearsay. Contrary to the district court’s holding, the supervisor conceded that the women had not complained that Mopkins’ conduct was either “improper” or “suggestive.” In addition, the supervisor did not ask the women whether their comments were in any way related to the fact that plaintiff was a black employee. Crediting such hearsay as a factual premise for the inference that plaintiff acted in an offensive manner without further investigation and inquiry is patently unwarranted.
On appeal the employer attempts to assert additional grounds including insubordination and failure to follow normal grievance procedure to support plaintiff’s dismissal. None of these reasons were raised in response to the EEOC investigation and, in addition, are not factually supported in the record. The employer’s change of position substantiates the conclusion that the reasons given for the discharge were pre-textual only. This conclusion is strongly supported by the defendant’s concession that the plaintiff was a satisfactory employee with respect to quality of work, quantity of work, personal appearance, attendance and dependability.
Plaintiff met his burden of establishing a prima facie case. Mopkins belongs to a racial minority and he performed his assigned tasks adequately. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The burden then shifted to the employer to show a business necessity to justify plaintiff’s discharge. It is well settled that when subjective reasons are urged as justifying a discharge courts should strictly scrutinize their validity to ensure they are not merely a pretext for discrimination. It is obvious the district court failed to do so. If a reviewing court does not carefully review such cases, then racially motivated discharges may be masked under the weakest of reasons such as personality, speech, environment, or appearance. Cf. Smith v. Board of Education, 365 F.2d 770, 782 (8th Cir. 1966).1 When such reasons are used as the basis of a discharge of a minority employee the record should demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that the criterion is related to a real business need and is not pretextual.
Where, as here, uncorroborated hearsay is credited and minor deficiencies in job performance are urged without a good faith attempt on the employer’s part to apprise the employee of the alleged deficiencies the law requires more to justify a discharge. *457See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 432 n. 30, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340,1345-46 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, 96 S.Ct. 19, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp., 538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1976), modified, 544 F.2d 1258, cert. denied, - U.S.-, 98 S.Ct. 65, 54 L.Ed.2d 78 (1977).
I would reverse.

. Judge Blackmun (now Mr. Justice Blackmun) then wrote:
However, in this day race per se is an impermissible criterion for judging either an applicant’s qualifications or the district’s needs. And this applies equally to considerations described as environment or ability to communicate or speech patterns or capacity to establish rapport with pupils when these descriptions amount only to euphemistic references to actual or assumed racial distinctions.
Smith v. Board of Education, 365 F.2d 770, 782 (8th Cir. 1966).