Court Opinion

ID: 9706813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:52:11.054532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.297083
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur in the opinion of Justice Brickley as it relates to Brown, I disagree with my colleague, Justice Brickley, regarding the result in Juillet. I do not find, even under the "objective” test as explained today by Justice Brickley, that Juillet has met the burden required for the defense of entrapment.
In addition, I write separately to reiterate my adherence to views I expressed in People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61, 98; 461 NW2d 884 (1990). As I see it, the "guidance” provided to the bench and bar by the variety of opinions issued today serves only to demonstrate why entrapment should not be recognized as a defense unless the circumstances rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation. As I said in Jamieson, 436 Mich 98:
*110Unless police conduct in a given situation is so reprehensible as to violate constitutional standards imposed by the Due Process Clause, I do not believe that one who is guilty of committing a criminal act should be exonerated by the judiciary simply because it disapproves of conduct on the part of another branch of government. While constitutional limitations must be strictly observed, it is my view that the defense of entrapment, which has no constitutional base whatever, should be eliminated. Short of that, we should at least move to the "subjective” standard for judging entrapment, a position already taken by courts in the federal system and in the overwhelming majority of our sister states.