Court Opinion

ID: 9402191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:56.391499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.210531
License: Public Domain

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                                                   RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2021-SC-0480-MR

ISHMAIL T. POWELL                                                    APPELLANT

                    ON APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE
                               NO. 19-CR-00692

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                     AFFIRMING

      A Boone County jury found Appellant Ishmail T. Powell (Powell) guilty of

murder, attempted murder, tampering with physical evidence, and being a

persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO I). In accordance with the

jury’s recommendation, as enhanced, the trial court sentenced Powell to a total

of fifty years in prison. Powell raises three issues on appeal. He claims the

trial court erred by (1) failing to dismiss the indictment pursuant to RCr1 8.18,

(2) allowing into evidence irrelevant testimony regarding the murder victim, and

(3) failing to grant a directed verdict on the charges. Upon review, we affirm

the Boone Circuit Court’s judgment.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In the early morning hours of Sunday, July 21, 2019, a melee, described

by participants as a “cluster” fight, broke out at a pizza restaurant/bar in

      1   Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
Boone County, Kentucky. Stephen Dodson (Dodson) was stabbed and died at

the scene. Malcolm Willoughby (Willoughby) was also stabbed; he survived his

life-threatening injuries. A Boone County grand jury returned an indictment

charging Powell with (1) murder, (2) attempted murder, (3) tampering with

physical evidence, and (4) becoming a persistent felony offender in the first

degree. Prior to trial, Powell moved the trial court to dismiss the indictment.

The trial court denied the motion.

      At trial, witnesses providing testimony about the fight included patrons

involved in the fight and restaurant staff and patrons who witnessed the fight.

Some witnesses testified that they did not see Powell in the restaurant that

night, some testified that they saw him in the restaurant but did not see him

fighting, and some testified that they did see him fighting. Josh King (King)

was the only witness who testified that he saw Powell with a knife at the

restaurant. King testified that Powell jokingly put the knife to his stomach and

threatened to gut him and that Powell was playing with the knife throughout

the night. None of the witnesses saw Powell stab the victims.

      A week after the fight, detectives received an anonymous tip that the

knife used in the stabbing had been thrown in a sewer drain. Detectives

obtained surveillance videos from area establishments. One video showed an

individual stopping and bending over the sewer drain on the night of the fight.

In that area, a knife was found just inside the pipe leading to the storm drain.

Forensic testing on the knife and clothing did not provide incriminating

evidence against Powell; in particular, the swabs of the knife handle and knife

blade had insufficient DNA for analysis.
                                       2
      King was the Commonwealth’s primary witness against Powell.

According to King, Powell confessed to him later on the day of the fight that he

stabbed the two victims; he stabbed one victim as he fought with their friend

Leon, and he stabbed the other victim as he fought with King. King further

testified that Powell also stated that after the stabbings, he ran out the door

and threw the knife in a sewer drain.

      King shared with his then girlfriend that Powell confessed to him that

Powell stabbed the victims.2 Although the girlfriend encouraged King to go to

the police, King did not inform the police about Powell’s confession right away.

According to King’s testimony, King did not look at Powell the same again after

Powell told him that he killed somebody, and he took Powell’s actions as a

threat. Consequently, during his first police interview, he did not mention

Powell’s confession or say anything about the knife. Afterward, he provided the

anonymous tip about the knife being thrown into the drain. King testified that

he was not forthcoming to police about Powell’s confession because Powell was

still on the street. About one month after the stabbings and within a week of

Powell’s arrest, King told Detective Dickhaus in a recorded interview about

Powell’s confession.

      At trial, Powell maintained his own theory of who stabbed the victims.

He suggested the true perpetrator was King.

      2 King also told another friend, Mike, that Powell confessed to stabbing the
victims. Both King and Mike were questioned by the defense as to whether King
actually told Mike that someone other than Powell had stabbed the victims.
                                           3
      The jury found Powell guilty of the crimes charged. The jury

recommended that Powell serve the following PFO I enhanced sentences

concurrently for a total sentence of fifty years in prison: fifty years for

committing murder, thirty years for committing attempted murder, and ten

years for tampering with physical evidence. The trial court sentenced Powell

accordingly.

      Powell brings three issues on appeal. Each issue is addressed in turn.

Additional facts are presented as necessary.

                                     ANALYSIS

I.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying Powell’s
      Motion to Dismiss the Indictment.

      Powell claims that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the

indictment pursuant to RCr 8.18 and alleges that his due process rights were

violated. He claims that the Commonwealth presented false statements to the

grand jury when Detective Dickhaus testified to statements King did not make.

      Detective Dickhaus recorded two interviews with King. During the

second interview, King told Detective Dickhaus about his visit with Powell

during which Powell admitted stabbing the victims. King did not provide

information in the interview about the number of times Powell stabbed the

victims.

      During the Commonwealth’s presentation to the grand jury, the

Commonwealth asked Detective Dickhaus if Powell admitted to King that he

stabbed Dobson and Willoughby five times each and Detective Dickhaus stated

that was correct. When asked by the Commonwealth whether the witness had

                                          4
seen any sort of autopsy report or anything that would give him the

information on how much each victim had been stabbed, Detective Dickhaus

stated no.

      Powell argues that the blatantly false statement from the Commonwealth

and Detective Dickhaus’s misstatement of a key piece of evidence were used by

the Commonwealth to indict Powell and therefore, the indictment must be

dismissed.

      RCr 8.18(1)(b) provides that except for good cause shown, a motion

alleging a defect in the indictment shall be raised before trial. Consistent with

RCr 9.24,3 the criminal trial harmless error rule, RCr 6.12 provides that an

indictment is not invalid because of a defect that constitutes harmless error.

RCr 6.12 states: “An indictment . . . shall not be deemed invalid, nor shall the

trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be stayed, arrested or in any

manner affected by reason of a defect or imperfection that does not tend to

prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.”

      3   RCr 9.24 states in full:

              No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and
      no error or defect in any ruling or order, or in anything done or omitted
      by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
      for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise
      disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the court that the
      denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. The
      court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
      in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the
      parties.

                                           5
      In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,4 the United States Supreme

Court considered the role of the federal harmless error rule, a rule comparable

to Kentucky’s, when the trial court is asked to dismiss an indictment for

prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court concluded that a federal court

may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless-error inquiry

prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a); that rule provides that

“[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial

rights shall be disregarded.”5 The Supreme Court held that, as a general

matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury

proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants.6 More specifically,

a district court exceeds its powers in dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial

misconduct not prejudicial to the defendant.7 The Supreme Court concluded

that when dismissal is sought for nonconstitutional error, the dismissal may be

properly granted “if it is established that the violation substantially influenced

the grand jury’s decision to indict,” or “if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the decision

to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations.”8,9

      4   487 U.S. 250 (1988).
      5   Id. at 254-55.
      6   Id. at 254.
      7   Id. at 255 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986)).
      8 Id. at 256 (quoting and adopting the standard articulated by Justice O’Connor
in her concurring opinion in Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78).
      9 The Supreme Court also explained that a class of cases exist in which
indictments may be dismissed without a particular assessment of the prejudicial
impact of the errors because the errors are deemed fundamental, cases in which the
structural protections of the grand jury have been compromised as to render the
proceedings fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice. Id. at 257.
                                             6
      In Commonwealth v. Baker,10 the Court of Appeals adopted the harmless

error standard pronounced in Bank of Nova Scotia11 and, in consideration of

other federal authority, explained that “[a] court may utilize its supervisory

power to dismiss an indictment where a prosecutor knowingly or intentionally

presents false, misleading or perjured testimony to the grand jury that results

in actual prejudice to the defendant.”12 Baker thus presents a two-part test: (1)

Was there prosecutorial misconduct? 2) If so, was the misconduct prejudicial to

the defendant? Considering Baker, the trial court denied Powell’s motion to

dismiss.

      On appeal, Powell argues that the trial court erred in finding that the

false testimony by Detective Dickhaus did not substantially influence the grand

jury’s decision to indict him. Powell asserts that the knowingly false testimony

to the grand jury could only bias the grand jury against him and that the grand

jury hearing that King knew how many times Powell stabbed each victim

without seeing the autopsy report added false credibility to King’s allegations in

this case.

      Under the trial court’s Baker analysis, the circumstances of this case

constituted harmless error. First, the trial court did not find that the

Commonwealth intended to use a false statement as evidence before the grand

jury, hence, there was no finding of prosecutorial misconduct. However, Powell

      10   11 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2000).
      11   Id. at 588.
      12 Id. at 588-89 (citing United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Soberon, 929 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1991); and United States v. Roth, 777
F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1985)).
                                            7
does not now challenge the trial court’s finding that there was no prosecutorial

misconduct. Instead, Powell complains that Detective Dickhaus fabricated the

false statement to bolster the credibility of the only witness that alleged that

Powell stabbed anyone at the restaurant.

      Without a challenge to the trial court’s finding of no prosecutorial

misconduct, Powell’s complaint on appeal that Detective Dickhaus’s false

testimony substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict him

comes down to a challenge of the competence of the evidence presented to the

grand jury, a challenge which is not sufficient to require a dismissal of the

indictment. As expressed in RCr 5.10, “The grand jurors shall find an

indictment where they have received what they believe to be sufficient evidence

to support it, but no indictment shall be quashed or judgment of conviction

reversed on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence before the grand

jury to support the indictment.” The premise that a grand jury’s indictments

are not open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or

incompetent evidence is also reflected in Costello v. United States,13 a case

discussing long-recognized authority that a court may not look behind the

indictment to determine if the evidence upon which it was based is sufficient.14

Costello explains that “[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and

      13   350 U.S. 359 (1956).
       14 See id. at 363 (citing United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727 (C.C.N.D. N.Y.

1852); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)).
                                            8
unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the

charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”15

      We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Powell’s motion to dismiss.16 Even if the trial court had concluded there was

prosecutorial misconduct, Powell was not entitled to the relief sought. While

Detective Dickhaus’s statement that Powell told King the number of times he

allegedly stabbed the victims may have been false, there were sufficient

grounds for the indictment based upon the other testimony the grand jury

heard. Like the trial court concluded, the grand jury was still able to

independently indict Powell as the jurors heard testimony that Powell admitted

to King that he stabbed the victims, irrespective of the number of times he

stabbed them.

II.   The Trial Court Did Not Commit Palpable Error by Admitting
      Testimony Which Provided Background Information about the
      Murder Victim.

      Powell’s second claim is that the trial court erred by allowing Dodson’s

mother, Mrs. Hern, to testify. He claims that her testimony was irrelevant, and

more prejudicial than probative. Powell seeks RCr 10.26 palpable error

review.17

      15   Id. (internal citation omitted).
      16 The test for abuse of discretion “is whether the trial judge’s decision was
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      17   RCr 10.26 states:
             A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
      may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
      appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved
                                              9
      Mrs. Hern was the Commonwealth’s first witness. She testified that

Dodson was her youngest son, that she called him “Bear,” that Dodson had

lived with her the last two years of his life, and that her daughters informed her

that Dodson had passed away. Powell did not object to this testimony based

upon its relevancy.18 On appeal, he complains that the testimony was

irrelevant because Mrs. Hern had no personal knowledge of the events at the

restaurant and was not present that night.

      “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the

Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by

Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by [the

Kentucky Rules of Evidence], or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court

of Kentucky.”19 Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make

the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”20

Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or

      for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
      that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
      18 Defense counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s question about how Mrs.

Hern heard of her son’s death; the objection was based on the testimony arousing the
emotions of the jury. The trial court sustained the objection. The Commonwealth
withdrew the question and asked Mrs. Hern who informed her of her son’s death.
      19   Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 402.
      20   KRE 401.
                                          10
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”21

      Citing Bussell v. Commonwealth,22 Powell recognizes that “a certain

amount of background evidence regarding the victim is relevant to

understanding the nature of the crime.” However, Powell views Mrs. Hern’s

testimony as going beyond providing background for who Dodson was and as

glorifying him as a youngest son named “Bear” who was living with his mother

the last two years. Citing Bennett v. Commonwealth, Powell argues that Mrs.

Hern’s testimony was “intended to arouse sympathy for the families of the

victims, which, although relevant to the issue of penalty, is largely irrelevant to

the issue of guilt or innocence.”23 In regard to Powell’s argument, this Court

has stated:

      A murder victim can be identified as more than a naked statistic,
      and statements identifying the victims as individual human beings
      with personalities and activities does not unduly prejudice the
      defendant or inflame the jury. Just as the jury visually observed
      the appellant in the courtroom, the jury may receive an adequate
      word description of the victim as long as the victim is not glorified
      or enlarged.24

      More recently, this Court has stated that “[t]he line between relevant-

background information and prejudicial-impact testimony is a narrow one; but

we essentially distinguish the two forms of testimony by inquiring whether the

      21   KRE 403.
      22   882 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Ky. 1994).
      23   978 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Ky. 1998).
      24Bennett, 978 S.W.2d at 325 (quoting Bowling v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d
293, 302–03 (Ky. 1997) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by
McQueen v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2011)).
                                             11
witness was overly emotional, condemnatory, or accusatory in nature.25. Like

the Court in Roe, after review of the testimony in this case and the

characteristics unique to victim-impact information, we conclude the trial court

did not commit palpable error by allowing Mrs. Hern’s testimony into evidence.

       The testimony Powell complains about provides background information,

tending to establish the type of relationship Dodson shared with his mother,

rather than any “physical, psychological, or financial” harm26 Dodson’s death

caused Mrs. Hern. Here, Mrs. Hern’s testimony was not emotional,

condemnatory, or accusatory in any way. She testified only briefly and during

that time remained composed as she spoke about her son. Any error was not

“easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable” and was not so grave

in nature that uncorrected, it seriously affected the fairness of the

proceedings.27

III.   The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying a Directed
       Verdict.

       Powell’s last claim is that the trial court erred by failing to grant a

directed verdict on each of the three charges.

       When reviewing a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict,

       the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from
       the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is
       sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
       reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed verdict
       should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the motion, the
       trial court must assume that the evidence for the Commonwealth

       25   Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 823-24 (Ky. 2015) (citation omitted).
       26   See Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 532.055(2)(a)(7).
       27   Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (citations omitted).
                                            12
      is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to the credibility and
      weight to be given to such testimony.28

      “As stated in Sawhill,[29] there must be evidence of substance, and the

trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the

prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence.”30 “In the end,

a trial court should only grant a directed verdict when ‘there is a complete

absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon

which reasonable minds could differ.’”31

      Powell argues that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of

producing more than a scintilla of evidence on the three charges and citing

Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth,32 argues that his Due Process rights were

violated when the trial court denied his directed verdict motions because there

was insufficient evidence to support a conviction. Powell argues that the

evidence against him was no more than a scintilla because there was only a

possibility that Powell confessed to the stabbings and disposing of a knife and

that in order to convict him of committing the crimes, the jury had to pile

inference on top of inference. He argues that under Francis v. Franklin’s33 and

Ulster County Court v. Allen’s34 guidance, cases which respectively address jury

      28   Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).
      29   Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1983).
      30   Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187-88.
      31Toler v. Sud-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 285 (Ky. 2014) (quoting Bierman v.
Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998)).
      32   95 S.W.3d 830, 836-37 (Ky. 2003).
      33   471 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1985).
      34   442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979).
                                           13
instruction and standing issues and discuss the role inferences play in our

adversary system of factfinding, the connection between the basic underlying

evidentiary fact (Powell confessed to King) and the ultimate facts to be

established under the three charges was not strong enough to support a

conviction. For example, Powell states that the jury had to rely on the

inference that King, who the jury heard has history of lying and history of

violence, was telling the truth about Powell confessing to him that he stabbed

the victims and tossed the knife in the sewer drain; that Powell is the figure

bending over the sewer drain in the poor-quality video provided at trial; and

that Powell stabbed the victims despite no eyewitnesses and no DNA evidence.

Powell asserts that when the Commonwealth argued that he confessed to

committing the crimes to King, the conclusion the Commonwealth wished the

jury to draw—that Powell murdered Dodson, attempted to kill Willoughby, and

tampered with the knife found in the sewer drain—was “not one that reason

and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.”35

      Upon review, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the

Commonwealth to overcome a motion for a directed verdict and consequently

disagree with Powell’s assertions. As described above, under the directed

verdict standard, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the

Commonwealth is true and must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from

the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. Under this standard, evidence of

Powell’s guilt came from King’s testimony and other circumstantial evidence.

      35   Citing Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15.
                                            14
Based upon King’s testimony, the trial court was required to view as true that

Powell confessed to King that he stabbed the victims and threw the knife down

a sewer drain. In support of that confession, the trial court was required to

consider other evidence that Powell was at the bar that night wearing a red hat

and seen leaving the bar quickly and that a person, inferred to be Powell based

on his statement to King, was seen bending over a nearby sewer drain where

the knife was eventually located. Furthermore, Powell was recorded on a jail

phone call attempting to get a friend to talk to King about changing his

testimony.

      “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction as

long as the evidence taken as a whole shows that it was not clearly

unreasonable for the jury to find guilt.”36 Our review indicates that the

Commonwealth produced evidence that was considerably more than a mere

scintilla, that the trial judge correctly determined that a reasonable juror could

fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the case was properly

presented to the jury for determination.

                                  CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the Boone Circuit Court’s judgment is

affirmed.

      All sitting. All concur.

       36 Bussell, 882 S.W.2d at 114 (citing Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530

(Ky. 1977); and Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1981).
                                        15
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jason Apollo Hart
Apollo Law PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kenneth W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General

                               16