Court Opinion

ID: 9621397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:57:13.523381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:49.022669
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Justice, concurring. I concur because I believe that this case must finally be brought to a close. However, I take this opportunity to again express my deeply held concerns about the precedent that we are setting. It is not within our authority to dictate what sort of educational system the legislature must provide. Rather, our duty is to declare whether a system implemented by the legislature is constitutional once a proper appeal from a circuit court decision on the issue is presented to us. Our jurisdiction on this issue is appellate, rather than original, and our authority does not extend beyond interpretation we have stated: Ever since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, was decided in 1803, the Supreme. Court has had the responsibility of interpreting the United States Constitution and the State courts that of interpreting the State Constitutions. But the judicial authority does not extend beyond interpretation. The courts do not have the power to hold a constitutional mandate in abeyance; they should not have that power. The constitutional way of doing things may be slow at times, but it is the right way. City of Hot Springs v. Creviston, 288 Ark. 286, 293C-D, 713 S.W.2d 230, 231 (1986). This court has made it clear over the years that its authority does not reach to supervising or overseeing the actions of the other branches of government. In Wells v. Riviere, 269 Ark. 156, S.W.2d 375 (1980), we clearly stated: We do not even imply that we have the authority to dictate to the General Assembly, the legislative branch of this state government, how it proceeds about its business. It can convene as it pleases. Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979). However, whether its acts are lawful is a matter for this court. That was decided by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion written by Chiefjustice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Wells, 269 Ark. at 169. I wrote separately in Lakeview III because of language in the majority opinion that I feared would create confusion about the role of the separate branches of government in providing a “general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools,” as required by art. 14, § 1 of our constitution. I am even more convinced that the path this court must take was succinctly and plainly set out in my concurrence to Lakeview III. I wrote a concurrence to the January 22, 2004, per curiam recalling our mandate in Lakeview III because of my concern that we were stepping on to a very slippery slope leading directly to a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. I agreed to the recall of the mandate because of an assertion that the decision of this court in Lakeview III was being ignored and violated. That is an issue wholly separate from the issue of whether the General Assembly passed acts in the last legislative session which when implemented would provide a constitutional system of free public schools in the future. Upon the recall of the mandate, we lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the acts passed by the General Assembly in the last legislative session passed constitutional muster. My greatest fear has been realized. After we took the unprecedented step of recalling the mandate in this case, we were asked at the very first opportunity to retain jurisdiction and oversee the work of the General Assembly. There is no precedent for overseeing the work of the General Assembly, and we have no authority to do so. There are sound reasons behind the decision of our forefathers to set up three co-equal branches of government, and the resulting system of checks and balances has served us well. We should be highly reluctant to injure the venerable doctrine that has served us so well. I share the majority’s concern regarding the state of the public schools, but in our zeal to see the wrong righted, we may not allow ourselves to fall to the temptation of attempting to do by judicial fiat what we believe the General Assembly has been unable to do on its own. The constitutional way is the slower way, but the better way. Creviston, supra. If we succumb to the temptation to oversee the work of the General Assembly, we will be deluged with request after request to retain jurisdiction, not only in this case, but in case after case in the future.