Court Opinion

ID: 9656089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:34:46.064553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:28.083658
License: Public Domain

Larson, J.
(dissenting) — The real issue before us here is whether or not the trial court did abuse its discretion by sustaining defendant’s motion for a new trial. It must be conceded that there is ordinarily broad discretion vested in the trial court in such matters, and that we will not interfere with that discretion unless it appears from the entire record that there is no sound basis for such ruling. The majority, I believe, do not contend that the discretion is absolute.
It must be remembered that this case involves eminent domain wherein much of the evidence is tendered by experts who, under certain restrictions, give their opinion on the value of the property affected by the condemnation proceedings. It is not a question of observation, memory or veracity of a witness. The opinions as well as the credibility of the witnesses appear in the record and we can review them as well as the trial court. There would seem to be no presumption or inference that the trial court observed something we are unable to observe that should uphold its order for a new trial. Admittedly, the reason need not be one that would amount to reversible error, but I feel that it should be based upon something reasonable and tangible.
Quite clearly the basis of the trial court’s ruling here was *471upon its opinion that the jury’s verdict was too large. In its ruling the court stated: “It has appeared to the court that the allowance in favor of the plaintiff is so grossly excessive as to indicate passion and prejudice.” It is equally clear that because of the amount of the award the court concluded that the jury must have misunderstood ’ the facts and the instructions of the court, or did not follow them. This is mere surmise and I can find no substantial facts or circumstances in the record which support that conclusion. We certainly should review them carefully, for if there are none the trial court would abuse its discretion in granting such a new trial. In the quest to see that justice is done, we as well as the trial court need legal justification for the exercise of such a discretion.
We have said many times the fixing of the award is for the jury, and here they have done so. Has the trial court or have we the right now to say that because we think it too generous it should be set aside, especially if there is ample competent evidence in the record to sustain the award ? Should the trial court or should we say, in effect, that the witnesses of the plaintiff are not to be believed and that the jury cannot accept these opinions or valuations ? The award here was substantially under the values testified to by all of plaintiff’s witnesses. To superimpose our opinion over this testimony and the allowance of the jury on the basis of the amount of the award alone seems to me to make light of the jury’s function and is not at all sound. I feel that the trial court unjustifiably let its feelings on the amount of the award give rise to implications that are not there, and on those implications the majority would sustain the decision.
It is my feeling that this is the trial court’s error, and as I can find nothing substantial except the size of the award upon which the court could base the decision, I believe it abused its discretion in granting a new trial. I would not again subject plaintiff to the expense and inconvenience of defending her property rights.
I would reverse.
Mulroney, J., joins in this dissent.