Court Opinion

ID: 9908225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:01:52.787621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:00.744625
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 8, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0495
                                _________________________

                                        Jeremy Smith

                                                  v.

                     Devilin Cameron and Andrea Graham

                      Appeal from Talladega Circuit Court
                                (CV-19-900608)

MITCHELL, Justice.

       Jeremy Smith, who purchased property at a tax sale, appeals from

a judgment entered by the Talladega Circuit Court determining that
SC-2023-0495

Devilin Cameron and Andrea Graham may redeem the property. We

affirm.

                       Facts and Procedural History

      In May 2019, Smith paid $179.10 for a tax certificate to Cameron

and Graham's property in Talladega County after Cameron and Graham

failed to pay taxes on the property. Seven months later, Smith sued to

eject Cameron and Graham, arguing that he was entitled to immediate

possession of the property. Cameron and Graham responded by filing a

motion asking the trial court to ascertain the amount needed to redeem

the property under § 40-10-83, Ala. Code 1975. While the case was

pending, Smith executed a quitclaim deed purporting to sell his interest

in the property to Bryan Green.             In response to that transaction,

Cameron and Graham filed a motion for a restraining order, which

notified the trial court of the sale.

      The trial court heard evidence ore tenus from both sides on the

redemption issue. On November 22, 2022, the trial court entered a

judgment holding that the sale to Green was void and that Cameron and

Graham were entitled to redeem the property free of any encumbrances,

liens, or competing ownership interests if they paid Smith a total of

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$676.64. In the judgment, the trial court explained that it had arrived at

that amount by using the guidelines set forth in the redemption statute.

See § 40-10-83. The sum included the purchase price of the property at

the tax sale; the taxes that Smith had paid on the property for 2019, 2020,

and 2021; the interest that had accrued at the legal interest rate; and a

fee to the Talladega Probate Court, but it did not include any award of

mesne profits.1 Smith appealed.

                           Standard of Review

      Only questions of law are raised in this appeal. We review a trial

court's ruling on questions of law de novo. See Ex parte Jarrett, 89 So.

3d 730, 732 (Ala. 2011) (" '[W]here the facts are not in dispute and we are

presented with pure questions of law, this Court's standard of review is

de novo.' " (quoting State v. American Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417, 419

(Ala. 2000))).

                                 Analysis

      Smith makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the

      1Mesne profits are " 'compensation for [the] use and occupation' " of

land, which is " 'the fair rental value of the property during the period of
tortious holding.' " Profile Cotton Mills v. Calhoun Water Co., 204 Ala.
243, 245, 85 So. 284, 285 (1920) (citation omitted).

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trial court erred by not awarding him mesne profits on his ejectment

claim. Second, Smith challenges the portion of the trial court's judgment

invalidating the quitclaim deed. Neither argument has merit.

     A. Mesne Profits

     Smith argues that he is entitled to mesne profits from May 2019 --

when he purchased the property at the tax sale -- until November 2022

 -- when the trial court entered the judgment granting Cameron and

Graham the right to redeem the property.        He does not challenge the

trial court's grant of the right of redemption or its denial of his ejectment

claim. Rather, Smith contends that he is entitled to recover mesne profits

despite those rulings because the ejectment statute -- § 6-6-280, Ala. Code

1975 -- says that a "plaintiff may recover … mesne profits … as the

plaintiff's interests in the lands entitled him to recover." § 6-6-280(b).

     This Court has not previously addressed whether redemption of a

property precludes an ejectment plaintiff from recovering mesne profits

for the period in which the ejectment plaintiff had the right of possession.

See Ex parte Milne, 308 So. 3d 914, 914 (Ala. 2020) (Parker C.J.,

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concurring specially). 2

      But we need not decide that question today because even if the

ejectment statute did permit the recovery of mesne profits in such a

situation, Smith would not be entitled to them. Although he argues that

the fair rental value of the property is $200 per month, he did not offer

any credible evidence below to support that calculation. See, e.g., Smith

v. Smith, 358 So. 3d 402, 404 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (noting that a tax-sale

purchaser must "put on evidence regarding the claimed mesne profits" in

order to recover them). At the hearing before the trial court, Smith

acknowledged that he had never been to the property or even visited the

neighborhood. And he conceded that his $200 per month calculation was

based on "pure speculation" and that there was "no basis and fact for the

amount" that he requested "other than the value of real estate rentals"

in the area.

      2The Court of Civil Appeals has previously addressed this issue and

held that when statutory redemption terminates an ejectment plaintiff's
right of possession, the ejectment plaintiff may still seek mesne profits
resulting from the wrongful possession of property during the period in
which the ejectment plaintiff had the right of possession. See Prescott v.
Milne, 308 So. 3d 906 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). Because we decide this case
on other grounds, we express no opinion on this issue.

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     That guesswork falls far short of what Smith must establish to

carry his evidentiary burden. "One of the fundamental rules of damages

is that to be compensable they must be direct and reasonably certain, not

remote and speculative." Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Public Serv.

Comm'n, 267 Ala. 474, 478, 103 So. 2d 14, 17 (1958); see also Crommelin

v. Montgomery Indep. Telecasters, Inc., 280 Ala. 391, 394, 194 So. 2d 548,

551 (1967) ("[N]either the fact nor amount of damages, nor the cause of

the damages, can rest solely on speculation."). Smith's testimony does

not pass muster.

     Other evidence in the record further undermines Smith's rental

calculations. In 2014, the City of Talladega condemned the property as

a public nuisance because the mobile home on the property presented an

"unsafe, untenable, or dangerous condition." Moreover, Cameron and

Graham testified that they did not even live on the property but merely

used it to periodically cut children's hair and store "extra stuff" and their

vehicles.   By all accounts, the property was uninhabitable, thus

undercutting Smith's assertions that he could have obtained rent

payments from a tenant during the months in which he held a right to

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possess the property. 3

      As a last resort, Smith tries to excuse his shortcomings by shifting

the blame to the trial court for imposing what he says is too rigorous of

an evidentiary standard.       But requiring ejectment plaintiffs seeking

mesne profits to show their work does not impose an undue burden on

litigants, nor does it "gut[] the entire [ejectment] law." Smith's brief at

13. Such gross overstatements do nothing to advance the ball.

      B. The Quitclaim Deed

      Smith's final contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in

invalidating the quitclaim deed that Smith had executed to convey the

property to Green in August 2022. We need not reach the merits of this

argument, however, because Smith does not cite any authority to support

it. " ' " ' " [ W ] here an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument,

this Court may affirm the judgment as to those issues, for it is neither

this Court's duty nor its function to perform all the legal research for an

appellant . " ' " ' " Anderson v. Coleman, 368 So. 3d 383, 388 (Ala. 2022)

      3A tax certificate does not vest in the purchaser title to the land but,

rather, gives the purchaser a right to possession of the land, subject to
the owner's statutory right to redemption. Smith v. Jackson, 277 Ala.
257, 261, 169 So. 2d 21, 26 (1964).
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(citations omitted). Nor will we " ' " 'create legal arguments for a party

based on undelineated general propositions unsupported by authority or

argument. ' " ' " Id. (citations omitted).

                                 Conclusion

      Smith fails to offer any credible evidence demonstrating that he

was entitled to mesne profits, and he fails to cite any authority for the

argument that the quitclaim deed was valid. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

      AFFIRMED.

      Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

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