Court Opinion

ID: 9959070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:11:36.018797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.484444
License: Public Domain

J-S37036-23

                                2024 PA Super 70

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 THOMAS W. NESTOR                         :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :     No. 460 EDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 13, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0002107-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                 FILED APRIL 10, 2024

      I respectfully dissent as I agree with Appellant that the Commonwealth

did not present sufficient evidence to establish that his impairment was caused

by a drug or combination of drugs.      Under these facts, where there is no

circumstantial evidence of drug usage, I conclude that expert testimony was

required and would discharge Appellant’s conviction for driving under the

influence (DUI).

      The conviction at issue requires proof that Appellant was “under the

influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the

individual’s ability to safely drive….”       75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).     The

Commonwealth relied on Trooper Nathan Zimmerman’s observations to meet

its burden. The trooper explained that, after pulling Appellant over for some

erratic driving, he asked Appellant to perform field sobriety tests due to

Appellant’s “mood swings, his agitation, [and being] extremely talkative the
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whole time…. He complained of a dry mouth on numerous occasions.” N.T.,

11/2/22, at 24.     During the field sobriety tests, the trooper noted that

Appellant’s pupils were dilated.       Trooper Zimmerman then conducted

Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) tests.           Trooper

Zimmerman was not qualified as an expert in this area, and he testified that

he merely received training on how to perform the ARIDE tests, which are

“about common drugs that are used and abused, [and] indicators that

different drugs can show.”    Id. at 35.    Trooper Zimmerman testified that

Appellant’s eyes showed no indicators of impairment.             Appellant also

performed the Modified Romberg Balance Test.         The trooper testified that

during this test, he looks “for tremors in their eyelids or their extremities and

… for swaying of the body.” Id. at 36-37. The Commonwealth then asked

Trooper Zimmerman what indicators of impairment he observed during that

test, and Appellant objected on the basis that this called for expert testimony.

Id. at 37. The trial court overruled the objection, and Trooper Zimmerman

then explained that Appellant’s eyelids “had severe tremors and that his arms

and his hands were twitching….”       Id. at 40.    The trooper believed that

Appellant was acting “the way that someone that’s impaired by some sort of

stimulant acts.” Id. at 42. Appellant again objected, arguing that such a

conclusion required expert testimony. The Commonwealth replied that the

witness was not offering an expert opinion and was merely testifying to “his

personal observation of interacting with people who he knows to be under the

influence of a stimulant.” Id. The trial court overruled the objection.

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      Expert testimony is not per se required to convict a driver of violating

Section 3802(d)(2). Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1233 (Pa.

2011). By the same token, the Commonwealth may, in some circumstances,

need to present expert testimony. Id. at 1238 (“We do not dispute that in

some cases, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, expert

testimony may be helpful, or perhaps even necessary, to prove causation

under subsection 3802(d)(2)….”). This is one of those cases.

      In this regard, Appellant’s issues effectively overlap.   The first issue

claims that the trial court improperly relied on Trooper Zimmerman’s lay

testimony, and the second and third issues assert that the evidence was

insufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of expert

testimony. I therefore discuss the issues collectively.

      In response to Appellant’s objection that expert testimony was needed

to discuss indicators of impairment, the Commonwealth stated that it did not

intend for Trooper Zimmerman to opine that Appellant was under the influence

of a specific controlled substance. See N.T., 11/2/22, at 38-39 (“I’m not going

to ask him to render an opinion on what, if anything, [Appellant] was under

the influence of.”). The Commonwealth told the court that it sought to merely

have the trooper testify as to his perceptions. The Commonwealth argues

that Trooper Zimmerman’s lay testimony was properly admitted for these

reasons, explaining:

      As the trooper testified, his job places him in a lot of different
      situations with impaired individuals. Particular to this case, the
      trooper testified to his observations of individuals he has

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       encountered that have been impaired due to controlled substance
       stimulant use and described those individuals to be talkative,
       agitated, complaining of dry mouth, dilated pupils, and to have
       mood swings. All the same observations that Trooper Zimmerman
       noted that [Appellant] displayed during his interactions with him.
       After laying this foundation, Trooper Zimmerman expressed his
       belief that [Appellant] was under the influence of a controlled
       substance stimulant and that this impaired his ability to drive
       safely.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 19.

       I agree that Trooper Zimmerman could offer an opinion that Appellant

was impaired.        However, the statute requires that the Commonwealth

establish that said impairment was caused by a drug or combination of drugs,

and I conclude that, in this case, expert testimony was required.

       The Majority concludes that “[t]he totality of Trooper Zimmerman’s

observations, taking into account his relevant training and experience,

permitted the admission of his lay opinion under Pa.R.E. 701.” Maj. Op. at

13.1 My learned colleagues conflate evidence of impairment with evidence of

causation. I agree that Trooper Zimmerman could testify to his lay opinion

____________________________________________

1 The Majority declares that our courts “have generally agreed with federal
courts that a witness with the requisite observations and experience may offer
a lay opinion to establish DUI – controlled substance impairment under section
3802(d)(2).” Maj. Op. at 9. Whether our law aligns with federal law on this
issue is beyond the scope of the issues as presented.             Additionally,
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 (“Testimony by Expert Witnesses”),
“differ[s] from F.R.E. 702 in that Pa.R.E. 702(a) and (b) impose the
requirement that the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is admissible only if it is beyond that possessed by the average
layperson.” Pa.R.E. 702. I do not see any need to opine that federal law is
identical to our law on this specific topic, as existing Pennsylvania law
adequately addresses the issue.

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that Appellant was impaired. What he could not do, as a lay witness, was

opine that the impairment was caused by a drug or combination of drugs. I

conclude that evidence of causation is lacking in this case, and I do not believe

that the additional circumstantial evidence cited by the Majority bridges the

gap.

       The inability to link impairment to a specific drug2 is not a novel problem

and typically arises when a driver, like Appellant here, refuses chemical

testing. However, I submit that cases in which this Court has held that expert

testimony was not needed to convict under Section 3802(d)(2) tend to involve

direct or circumstantial evidence of a particular drug. Typically, those are (1)

an admission; (2) blood or urine tests revealing the presence of those

substances; and/or (3) use paraphernalia or the actual drugs. Our decision

in Commonwealth v. DiPanfilo, 993 A.2d 1262 (Pa. Super. 2010), is

illustrative. The driver in that case admitted “that he had cocaine metabolites

and opiates in his urine, but argue[d] that this evidence [could not] be

scientifically linked to any impairment.” Id. at 1264 (footnote omitted). We

concluded that “the intoxicating effects of cocaine and opiates, like the

intoxicating effects of alcohol, are … widely and commonly understood….” Id.

at 1267. Thus, expert testimony was not needed due to the objective evidence

____________________________________________

2 The statutory reference to “drug” in Section 3802(d)(2) is not limited to
controlled substances. See Commonwealth v. Roser, 914 A.2d 447, 455–
56 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that “gasoline and bug and tar remover are
drugs under the circumstances of this case”). For ease of reference, I will
refer to “drugs” as a shorthand.

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that the driver had specific drugs in his system combined with the “widely and

commonly understood” effects of those drugs. See also Commonwealth v.

Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 310 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding that expert testimony

was not needed due to circumstantial evidence; the trooper “immediately

detected the odor of marijuana” and the driver admitted to smoking marijuana

hours before driving).

      Our Supreme Court’s decision in Griffith, which overruled this Court’s

holding that expert testimony is required when prescription medications are

at issue, similarly illustrates the importance of establishing that evidence of

impairment was caused by a specific drug. There, the Court explained:

      We recognize that the Superior Court appeared to limit its
      requirement for expert testimony in subsection 3802(d)(2) cases
      to those involving prescription medications as the alleged
      intoxicants. This limitation was based on the Superior Court’s
      determination that the average layperson does not know or
      recognize the effects of prescription medications. We do not
      believe that the Superior Court’s division of drugs into prescription
      versus non-prescription categories is warranted or helpful in the
      interpretation or application of subsection 3802(d)(2) or in the
      determination of whether an expert witness should be called.
      Pursuant to our general standard, a need for expert testimony
      arises when “the jury is confronted with factual issues whose
      resolution requires knowledge beyond the ken of the ordinary
      layman.” Kozak v. Struth, … 531 A.2d 420, 422 ([Pa.] 1987).
      The need for expert testimony in a subsection 3802(d)(2)
      prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking
      into account not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or
      otherwise, but also the nature and overall strength of the
      Commonwealth’s evidence, viewed pursuant to the general
      standard expressed in Kozak, supra.

Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1239 (emphasis in original).

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      The reference to “the specific drug at issue” demonstrates that the

Commonwealth cannot rely on conjecture, which is consistent with general

principles surrounding sufficiency review.    Commonwealth v. Boettcher,

459 A.2d 806, 807 (Pa. Super. 1983) (“It is settled law that while guilt may

be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, it may not rest upon mere

suspicion or conjecture.”).      This Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Gause, 164 A.3d 532 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc), which Appellant largely

relies upon, drives this point home. In that case, the Commonwealth charged

Gause with driving under the influence of alcohol as well as a controlled

substance. The arresting officer smelled alcohol on Gause’s breath but did not

detect any signs of marijuana usage. During field sobriety tests, Officer Eiker

performed, inter alia, the Romberg Test due to her suspicion that Gause was

under the influence of marijuana. She observed Gause’s eyelids tremoring

and opined that the tremors were associated with marijuana usage. Gause

refused blood testing.

      The Gause Court stated, “expert testimony is not necessary to establish

impairment    under      subsection   3802(d)(2)   where   there   exists   other

independent evidence of impairment.           In our opinion, the facts and

circumstances of the case before us clearly fall within the ‘expert testimony

necessary’ classification.” Id. at 538. We pointed out that the Commonwealth

“provided no evidence that Gause had recently ingested marijuana.” Id. We

elaborated:

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       On the contrary, Officer Eiker testified that Gause had stopped at
       a lighted intersection, with his headlights and turn signal properly
       activated, and that she stopped him after he had turned and she
       saw that his taillights were not illuminated. Officer Eiker testified
       that when she activated her lights, Gause properly signaled and
       pulled over immediately to the curb. Gause provided his license,
       registration and proof of insurance without fumbling. There was
       no evidence that an odor of marijuana emanated from his person
       or from his vehicle at the time he was stopped. There was no
       testimony that Gause’s eyes were bloodshot. Nor did Officer Eiker
       testify that she discovered any physical evidence of recent
       marijuana usage. Further, there was no admission from Gause
       that he had recently smoked marijuana, nor was there eyewitness
       testimony to establish recent ingestion of marijuana.

Id. at 538–39 (citations to transcript and footnote omitted).

       The Gause Court explained why the officer’s testimony linking eyelid

tremors to marijuana required expert testimony, as follows:

       It is clear to this Court that Officer Eiker’s observation of “eyelid
       tremors” is not the typical and obvious indicia of marijuana use,
       such as the distinct odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the
       person or the vehicle. Further, it is eminently clear that attributing
       body or eyelid tremors to marijuana use requires specialized
       knowledge…. Unlike staggering, stumbling, glassy or bloodshot
       eyes, and slurred speech, the “ordinary signs of intoxication
       discernable by a layperson,” eye tremors are not an ordinary sign
       of ingestion of a controlled substance, in particular, marijuana. As
       the trial court acknowledged, Officer Eiker’s testimony as to her
       observations did not obviate the necessity of an expert to
       explain whether “eye tremors,” or “body tremors,” would indicate
       that someone was under the influence of marijuana and that this
       impaired his ability to safely drive, in violation of section
       3802(d)(2).

Id. at 539 (footnote omitted; all emphasis in original).

       Officer Eiker was not qualified to link eyelid tremors to drug usage at

all.   Similarly, Trooper Zimmerman could not opine that Appellant’s

impairment was due to the presence of drugs in his system. The Majority

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argues that this is another basis to distinguish Gause, stating, “Critically,

unlike the officer in Gause, ‘Trooper Zimmerman did not voice an opinion as

to which controlled substance he suspected [Appellant] had ingested….’” Maj.

Op. at 15 (quoting trial court opinion; bracketing supplied by Majority).

Gause would be meaningless if the Commonwealth could avoid the need for

expert testimony by instructing police officers to testify that eyelid tremors

are indicative of drug usage. The problem in Gause was not that the officer

linked the behavior to a specific drug; the problem was that the officer was

not qualified to link the behavior to drug usage at all. The same is true here.

      Furthermore, the fact that Trooper Zimmerman identified Appellant as

being under the influence of a “controlled substance stimulant” further

highlights the need for expert testimony.      As the Gause Court remarked,

behaviors like eye tremors can be caused by a variety of innocent behaviors:

      According to the Mayo Clinic, eye tremors, or eye twitches, are
      also an indication of stress, bright light, caffeine excess, fatigue,
      irritation of the eye surface or inner eyelids, physical exertion,
      smoking, wind and alcohol use. Additionally, eye tremors can also
      be caused by various medical conditions, including dry eyes,
      glaucoma, blepharitis, corneal abrasion, and Tourette’s syndrome.

Gause, 164 A.3d at 539 n.8.

      The Gause Court’s analysis signals a belief that the General Assembly

presumably did not intend for, inter alia, caffeine, which is a stimulant, to

qualify as a drug for purposes of the DUI statute. The principle that emerges

from our caselaw is that connecting eyelid tremors and eye twitches to drug

use calls for expert testimony.     For the foregoing reasons, I agree with

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Appellant that expert testimony was needed to establish that the signs of

impairment observed by the troopers were attributable to drugs.

         Next, the Majority distinguishes Gause on the grounds that Gause

exhibited far more limited signs of impairment than Appellant. However, I do

not agree that the signs of impairment displayed by Appellant were so

circumstantially strong that expert testimony was not needed.           I do not

foreclose the possibility that a citizen’s behavior could be so bizarre or

irrational that the Commonwealth is entitled to a rational inference on

sufficiency-of-evidence      review    that the    person must   have   been “on

something.” I simply conclude that Appellant’s behavior does not rise to that

level.     Nor is there any other circumstantial evidence to suggest that

Appellant’s impairment was due to a drug. Significantly, the troopers did not

find any kind of drugs or use paraphernalia in Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant

did not admit to recently ingesting any kind of drug. And the Commonwealth

failed to have a drug recognition expert examine Appellant.3 While Appellant’s

refusal to submit to a blood draw is admissible as evidence, 75 Pa.C.S. §

1547(e), that is not dispositive, as “[n]o presumptions shall arise” from the

refusal, id., and the driver in Gause likewise refused a blood draw.

____________________________________________

3 Trooper Zimmerman testified that he requested a drug recognition expert,

but “[t]here was none available at the time.” N.T., 11/2/22, at 67.

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       Finally, the Commonwealth and the Majority rely on the dashcam video

showing Appellant’s driving,4 his mood swings, agitation, and talkative

manner.      These are not, in my view, particularly compelling pieces of

circumstantial evidence. Being pulled over is not a pleasant experience, and

mood swings and talkative behavior may simply reflect nervousness or

annoyance. The Majority does not suggest otherwise; instead, my learned

colleagues choose to defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Maj.

Op. at 22 (“The trial court found Trooper Zimmerman credible, and Appellant

not credible.”). As I have explained, Trooper Zimmerman was not qualified

to offer an opinion that Appellant’s impairment was caused by a drug.

Therefore, the trial court could not credit Trooper Zimmerman as an expert.

Relatedly, the fact that the trial court did not credit Appellant’s explanation for

his impaired driving does not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to

establish the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.               “[T]he

Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden of proof solely on the fact finder’s

disbelief of the defendant’s testimony.            The disbelief of a denial does not,

taken alone, afford affirmative proof that the denied fact existed so as to

satisfy a proponent’s burden of proving that fact.”              Commonwealth v.

Torres, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Appellant was not required to convince the court that his impairment was
____________________________________________

4 As the trial court opinion relates, Appellant’s vehicle veered over the fog and

center lines. After reviewing the video of Appellant’s driving and his field
sobriety tests, I do not conclude that Appellant’s behavior was so erratic that
the Commonwealth was entitled to a rational inference that he was on drugs.

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attributable to an innocent explanation. On the contrary, the Commonwealth

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his impairment was

caused by a drug. Because the Commonwealth failed to do so under these

circumstances, I would discharge Appellant’s DUI conviction.

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