Court Opinion

ID: 9526518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:19:14.105021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:24.757461
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(dissenting). From the stipulation of the parties it appears that “from prior to service of the summons in this action [that resulting in the judgment here involved] and until 1946, the defendant, George Scherer, was a bona fide resident of the state of Texas,” he was out of this state.
Sec. 330.30, Stats., provides:
“If when the cause of action shall accrue against any person he shall be out of this state such action may be com*155menced within the terms herein [the chapter containing the statute of limitations] respectively limited after such person shall return or remove to this state. . . .”
The statute in express terms is made to apply to every cause of action which the chapter on limitations aims to limit, and applies to judgments as well as other causes of action. Its effect and purpose is to preserve to' Wisconsin residents their rights of action, including those based upon judgments, against nonresident debtors so long as they remain outside the state and beyond the reach of our courts.
The statute is not open to construction. Its purpose and effect are stated clearly and without ambiguity, and means that,—
“If a party in whose favor a cause of action accrues is a resident of the state at the time of the accrual of the cause of action and the debtor is a nonresident, the statute does not run in favor of the nonresident while he continues to reside out of the state. Nat. Bank v. Davis, 100 Wis. 240, 75 N. W. 1005.” Estate of Gilbert, 167 Wis. 291, 298, 167 N. W. 447.
And that,- — ■
“The statute of limitations runs only during the time that the debtor is present in the state so that service of process may be made upon him.” Rauch v. Bensman, 200 Wis. 36, 39, 227 N. W. 253.
I have no quarrel with the statement of the majority that it is the established rule in this state that our statutes of limitation operate to extinguish the legal right as well as to bar the remedy. Certainly, when judgment was taken by the plaintiff in 1928 the debt which was sought to be recovered was extinguished. But it is just as certain and clear that upon the entry of judgment a new right, a new cause of action was created. The majority does not dispute that. And the new right continued until extinguished by the statute of limitations, tolled as it was here by the fact that *156defendant was out of the state and by the application of the provisions of sec. 330.30, Stats.
Before its amendment in 1878 what is now sec. 272.04 (1), Stats., which limits the time within which an execution may issue, contained the provision:
“. . . Provided, that no execution shall issue, nor any action or proceedings be had upon any such judgment after twenty years from the time of the rendition or docketing thereof.” (Ch. cxxxiv, p. 1545, sec. 2, Stats. 1871.)
Significantly, by the revision of 1878 the words, “nor any action” were deleted. Following sec. 2968 (now sec. 272.04), Sanborn & Berryman’s Anno. Stats. 1889, appears a re-visor’s note to the effect that the words were deleted because the subject is covered by the chapter on limitation of actions. The deletion could have been made for no other reason. Present the words, there seems to have been a question as to whether the provisions of sec. 272.04 (1) did not conflict with those appearing in the chapter on limitations, particularly those of sec. 330.30. It is clear to me that the deletion must have been made so as to remove any doubt that the provisions of the latter section should control as to the time within which an action may be brought upon a judgment when the judgment debtor is out of the state.
I cannot agree that sec. 272.04, Stats., “applies to the life of the judgment.” Its provisions apply only to proceedings brought to enforce judgments and are not intended to make those of sec. 330.30 a nullity. There is no conflict between its provisions and those of sec. 330.30.
The petition for an order granting leave to sue upon the judgment should have been granted.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hughes joins in this dissent.