Court Opinion

ID: 9526081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:11:49.937138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:21.313512
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: Because the plaintiff’s claim in this case is wholly independent of rights and obligations embodied in the defendant’s collective-bargaining agreement, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. sec. 151 et seq. (1982)) (RLA) preempts this action. Retaliatory discharge is a tort arising from State law, while the “wrongful” in wrongful discharge is an epithet denoting a discharge made in breach of a labor agreement. Retaliatory discharge is not the equivalent of wrongful discharge since the former is not an action premised on the employer’s breach of contract. (See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172, 187.) Regardless of terms contained in the collective-bargaining agreement, the elements of retaliatory discharge remain the same. Even if the collective-bargaining agreement in this case were written most favorably for the employer, it could at most grant the employer the right to discharge the plaintiff at will, and an action for retaliatory discharge would still be well founded. For this reason, Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (7th Cir. 1983), 717 F.2d 1045, is not an applicable precedent. That court equated retaliatory discharge with wrongful discharge in violation of a labor agreement, but the two terms are not synonymous. As Judge Posner noted in his separate opinion, retaliatory discharge is not a grievance within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction “because it would exist even if there were no collective bargaining agreement ***.” 717 F.2d 1045, 1059 (Posner, J., dissenting in part). The rationale for preemption in cases of wrongful discharge is that an allegedly wrongful discharge requires construction of the labor contract, and it is therefore a “minor dispute” within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board. (45 U.S.C. sec. 153 First (i) (1982); Carbone v. Meserve (1st Cir. 1981), 645 F.2d 96, 98 (“minor dispute” refers to disputes over the meaning of contractual terms).) Exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes is vested with the Board because it has administrative expertise in “the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements,” and because “uniform administrative interpretation [of those agreements] is of great importance.” (Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Day (1959), 360 U.S. 548, 551-52, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1422, 1426, 79 S. Ct. 1322, 1324.) It is apparent from the development of retaliatory discharge as a tort in this State that provisions of an employment contract are superfluous to a determination of whether a tortious discharge occurred. (See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 143, 149 (“to provide a complete remedy it is necessary that the victim of a retaliatory discharge be given an action in tort, independent of any contract remedy the employee may have based on the collective-bargaining agreement”).) In fact, this court recently held that an action for retaliatory discharge does not lie where the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged in retaliation for pursuing private rights conferred by his contract of employment (Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 65), so it cannot be said that the distribution of private rights in the defendant’s collective-bargaining agreement is relevant to the outcome of this case. In an action for retaliatory discharge, the only issues are why an employee was fired and whether that reason was in contravention of clearly mandated public policy (Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 124, 133-34). These determinations are squarely within the expertise of a court of law. Not only is the Adjustment Board without jurisdiction over noncontractual disputes (Southern Pac. Co. v. Joint Council of Dining Car Employees (9th Cir. 1947), 165 F.2d 26), but also the Board — which is neither a court nor a governmental body (Dahlberg v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co. (3d Cir. 1943), 138 F.2d 121)—is not particularly qualified to identify the public policy of this State or usurp the fact-finding function of a trial court. The majority’s reliance on Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (1972), 406 U.S. 320, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95, 92 S. Ct. 1562, is misplaced. Andrews holds only that contractual disputes must proceed through the RLA’s administrative procedure even if the parties have agreed otherwise. There is no basis for the contention in the majority opinion that Andrews extends the preemptive effect of the RLA beyond contractual disputes. In fact, Andrews held the action in that case to be preempted because it was a contractual dispute. (406 U.S. 320, 324, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95, 99, 92 S. Ct. 1562, 1564 (“petitioner’s claim, and respondent’s disallowance of it, stem from differing interpretations of the collective-bargaining agreement. *** [and h]is claim is therefore subject to the Act’s requirement that it be submitted to the Board for adjustment”).) Retaliatory discharge is a law of State rights and obligations existing “independently of private agreements”; since it cannot be “waived or altered by agreement,” it is error to preempt State jurisdiction and defer to an administrative agency whose sole function is the interpretation of negotiated agreements. Allis Chalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S._,_, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206, 216, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912. This action does not implicate contractual rights or Federal labor policy. I cannot, therefore, see any basis in law or logic for preemption of an uncontrived tort action in favor of Federal procedures for the resolution of labor contract disputes, and I dissent.