Court Opinion

ID: 9400827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 16:04:21.18777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.179258
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    TAMMY YOST,                      §
                                     § No. 171, 2023
        Defendant Below,             §
        Appellant,                   § Court Below: Superior Court of
                                     § of the State of Delaware
        v.                           §
                                     § C.A. No. K22J-00403
    CHRISTINE WEBER and MICHAEL §
    WEBER,                           §
                                     §
        Plaintiffs Below, Appellees. §

                              Submitted: June 2, 2023
                              Decided: June 7, 2023

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

                                         ORDER

       After consideration of the notice to show cause and the responses, it appears

to the Court that:

       (1)    The appellant, Tammy Yost, filed this appeal from a Superior Court

order dated May 1, 2023. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the appeal

must be dismissed as interlocutory.

       (2)    In February 2020, the Superior Court in New Castle County entered a

default judgment in a tort matter in favor of the appellees, Christine and Michael

Weber, and against Mary Brown, Gregory Scott, and another party.1 Following an

1
  Weber v. Yost, C.A. No. N19C-10-034, Docket Entry No. 9 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020). We
cite the docket of Civil Action No. N19C-10-034 as the “New Castle County Docket.”
inquisition hearing on damages at which Scott appeared but Brown did not, a

Commissioner in New Castle County entered judgment on March 11, 2022, in favor

of the Webers and against Brown and Scott for a total of more than $400,000.2

       (3)    The Webers then filed a writ of testatum fi fa to transfer the judgment

to the Superior Court in Kent County so that they could pursue a sheriff’s sale of

Brown’s real property located in Harrington, Delaware.3 Brown died on August 4,

2022. The sheriff’s sale was scheduled for November 22, 2022.4 On November 16,

2022, Scott filed a motion to stay the sheriff’s sale, asserting that he was never served

in the New Castle County action. The Superior Court in Kent County held a hearing

on the motion on November 18, 2022. At the hearing, the Webers’ counsel stated

that the sheriff’s sale had been stayed a few days before, at his request, because

counsel had determined that it would be proper to substitute Yost, the administratrix

of Brown’s estate, for Brown as a party before proceeding with the sale. The court

therefore denied Scott’s motion as moot.5 The court also stated that it was not

inclined to consider a collateral attack on the judgment entered by the Superior Court

2
  New Castle County Docket, No. 18 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2022).
3
  New Castle County Docket, No. 21 (filed Apr. 12, 2022); Weber v. Brown, C.A. No. K22J-00403
(Del. Super. Ct.), Docket Entry No. 1 (filed Apr. 26, 2022). We cite the docket of Civil Action
No. K22J-00403 as the “Kent County Docket.”
4
  Kent County Docket, No. 13 (filed Nov. 1, 2022).
5
  Kent County Docket, No. 16 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2022); see also id., No. 17, Transcript of
Nov. 18, 2022 hearing (filed Nov. 27, 2022) [hereinafter, November 2022 Transcript].
                                               2
in New Castle County and that if Scott wanted to reopen the judgment, he should

seek relief from the Superior Court in New Castle County.6

       (4)     Yost, as administratrix for Brown’s estate, and Scott then moved the

Superior Court in New Castle County to vacate the default judgment, asserting

insufficient service of process. At a hearing on the motion on February 3, 2023, a

Commissioner in New Castle County granted the motion and vacated the judgment

as to Scott. The Commissioner denied the motion as to Brown and her estate,

ordering that the Webers “may continue to execute on the default judgment against

Mary Brown and her estate.”7 The Webers moved the Superior Court in Kent

County to allow them to proceed with the execution against the Harrington property.

Yost opposed the motion, again asserting that Brown had not been properly served

in the New Castle County case.

       (5)     Following a hearing on March 2, 2023, a Commissioner in Kent County

entered an order holding that, upon the Webers’ filing of an appropriate writ, the

Kent County Sheriff would be permitted to sell the Harrington property. 8 Yost

sought reconsideration of the Commissioner’s order by a Superior Court judge.9 On

6
  November 2022 Transcript, supra note 5, at 8:3-8:15, 9:11-10:4, 10:20-11:17, 12:17-12:20.
7
  New Castle County Docket, No. 30 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2023).
8
  Kent County Docket, No. 32 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2023).
9
  See DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. PROC. 132(a)(3)(ii) (authorizing any party to seek “reconsideration”
of a Commissioner’s order by a Superior Court judge by serving and filing written objections
within ten days).
                                                3
May 1, 2023, the Superior Court denied the motion.10 The court held that the

doctrine of issue preclusion supported the Commissioner’s decision to allow the sale

of the property to proceed, because the Superior Court in New Castle County had

already rejected Yost’s challenges to the judgment against Brown.11 The court also

held that a court “has no power to invalidate the judgment of another jurisdiction or

venue upon transfer of that judgment” and that the court in Kent County had already

“exercise[d] its limited equitable authority to stay execution to permit an aggrieved

party to return to the issuing jurisdiction or venue to challenge” the judgment by

considering Scott’s motion to say the sale in November 2022 and effectively

allowing Yost and Scott to seek to reopen the judgment in New Castle County.12 The

court therefore ordered that the sale could proceed as scheduled.13

       (6)    Yost filed a notice of appeal from the Superior Court’s May 1, 2023

order. The Senior Court Clerk of this Court issued a notice to Yost to show cause

why the appeal should not be dismissed for Yost’s failure to comply with Supreme

Court Rule 42 when appealing an apparent interlocutory order. Scott, who is neither

a party to this appeal nor a Delaware lawyer, filed a response “for Tammy Yost,”14

10
   Weber v. Brown, 2023 WL 3186750 (Del. Super. Ct. May 1, 2023).
11
   Id. at *3.
12
   Id.
13
   Id.
14
   The time for responding to the notice to show cause has elapsed, and the Court has received no
other response from Yost. The Court could therefore dismiss this appeal under Supreme Court
Rule 29(b). Nevertheless, we have considered the contents of the response and determined that
the appeal must be dismissed for the reasons discussed in this order.
                                               4
in which he asks the Court to hear the case because (i) Brown was on life support

when Scott and Yost became aware of the original action in New Castle County, and

Scott and Yost did not know how to respond to the litigation; (ii) the court awarded

an “unethical” amount of damages; and (iii) Scott and Yost did not know that, in

order to pursue their challenges to the underlying judgment, they should have filed

an appeal from the February 3, 2023 order denying the motion to reopen the

judgment against Brown.

       (7)     After careful consideration, the Court has concluded that this appeal

must be dismissed as interlocutory. Absent compliance with Supreme Court Rule

42, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the review of final orders.15

An order is deemed final and appealable when the trial court has declared its

intention that the order be the court’s final act in disposing of all justiciable matters

within its jurisdiction.16 The Superior Court’s order denied Yost’s effort to stay or

prevent the Kent County sheriff’s sale in execution of the New Castle County

judgment. The Superior Court docket reflects that the sheriff’s sale was scheduled

for May 25, 2023, and that the Superior Court has not yet confirmed the sale.17

15
   Eid v. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n, 2021 WL 2577116, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 2021).
16
   J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., 303 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 1973).
17
   See DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. PROC. 69(d) (providing that return of sheriff’s sales of real estate
“shall be made on the third Monday of the month succeeding the date of the sale,” that
“applications to set aside such sales shall be made on or before the first Thursday succeeding said
return date,” and that “all such sales not objected to on or before the first Thursday, shall on the
first Friday, be confirmed as a matter of course”).
                                                 5
Consequently, the May 1, 2023 order that is the subject of this appeal is an

interlocutory order.18 Yost’s failure to comply with Rule 42 leaves the Court without

jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed.19

       NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is hereby

DISMISSED.

                                            BY THE COURT:

                                            /s/ Gary F. Traynor
                                                  Justice

18
   See Eid, 2021 WL 2577116, at *1 (dismissing as interlocutory an appeal from an order denying
a motion to stay a sheriff’s sale of real property because the sale had not yet occurred and the
Superior Court had not yet confirmed the sale).
19
   Id.

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