Court Opinion

ID: 9728762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:15:58.405173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:51.812521
License: Public Domain

Bashara, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). Plaintiffs appeal from a jury verdict of no cause for action. The suit arose from a claim, under the no-fault act,1 for damages sustained in an automobile collision. Plaintiff Leo Cassidy sustained complete breaks in both bones of his lower right leg, as well as other contusions and abrasions. Just prior to trial, defendants admitted *327fault, reserving for trial only the issues of threshold liability and damages. Plaintiffs raise several issues, which will be dealt with seriatim.
I
Plaintiffs claim the jury was misled and misinformed about the threshold tort requirement of the no-fault act. They argue that defendants’ argument and medical testimony showing that "serious impairment” requires permanency was erroneous. They also contend that the trial court’s instructions to the jury were not couched in statutory language but instead employed the objectionable phrase "serious impairment of a body function and/or permanent serious disfigurement”.
A review of the record reveals that when the jury returned for further instructions, the trial judge clarified any ambiguity as to whether serious impairment of body function requires permanency. He indicated that impairment need only be Serious, whereas disfigurement must be permanent and serious.
In Krisher v Duff, 331 Mich 699, 711; 50 NW2d 332 (1951), the Supreme Court stated:
" * * * it is not necessarily error to refuse to mention the existence of the statute provided the judge states the law as embodied in the statute.”
See also Lepley v Bryant, 336 Mich 224; 57 NW2d 507 (1953).
Plaintiffs failed to object to defense counsel’s allegedly improper argument, thereby precluding appellate review in the absence of a manifest injustice. In view of the trial court’s clarification of the issues for the jury, I find no manifest injustice.
*328Finally, I would also reject plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in refusing to include in its instructions the holding of McKendrick v Petrucci, 71 Mich App 200; 247 NW2d 349 (1976). The McKendrick Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff did not suffer serious impairment of body function by virtue of tendonitis in his right arm.
However, the "particular body function” language used in McKendrick does not appear to be the holding of the Court. The words were used only as an analogy relating to the existence of a material issue of fact relating to summary judgment. The Court clearly appeared to be distinguishing between impairment and serious impairment.
A trial court does not err in refusing to charge as to a particular party’s theory of another case. This is so especially where the theory may be ambiguous or inapplicable. Nowicki v Suddeth, 7 Mich App 503; 152 NW2d 33 (1967).
While the trial court’s initial instruction as to the threshold for serious impairment of body function may have been ambiguous, when the record is viewed as a whole, no reversible error was committed.
II
Plaintiffs contend the trial judge erred in refusing to advise the jury that defendants had limited immunity because they acquired and maintained proper security for payment. Further, that it was an abuse of discretion to instruct the jury to disregard any consideration of insurance.
*329MCL 500.3030; MSA 24.130302 does not appear to have been repealed by the no-fault act. That act provides that no reference be made to an insurer or to the question of carrying insurance during trial.
Even if the statute were considered to have been impliedly repealed by the no-fault act, mention of insurance coverage could be precluded based on the common law, Broitman v Kohn, 16 Mich App 400; 168 NW2d 311 (1969). See also Heuss v Rockwell Standard Corp, 495 F2d 1207 (CA 6, 1974).
In the case at bar, the existence of defendants’ liability insurance was totally irrelevant to the threshold damage issues. Consequently, the trial court’s refusal to allow any reference thereto was not erroneous.
Ill
1 likewise find no error in the trial court’s refusal to allow photographic evidence of the vehicles involved subsequent to the collision. The evidence had little relevance, since serious damage to an automobile does not always mean serious damage to its occupants. Considering the danger of undue prejudice, the evidence could properly be excluded, People v Surles, 29 Mich App 132; 185 NW2d 126 (1970), lv den, 385 Mich 764 (1971).
Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are matters within the trial court’s discretion. This Court will not reverse unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, People v Amison, 70 Mich App 70; *330245 NW2d 405 (1976), Carreras v Honeggers & Co, Inc, 68 Mich App 716; 244 NW2d 10 (1976).
IV
Plaintiffs argue that it was improper for the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard plaintiffs’ counsel’s first closing argument as to the legislative intent regarding the no-fault act; and that the court further erred in interpreting some of counsel’s arguments as a request to punish defendants. Plaintiffs failed to timely object or move for a mistrial. Secrist v Detroit, 299 Mich 393; 300 NW 137 (1941), Lucy v Dowd, 285 Mich 530; 281 NW 314 (1938).
Therefore, I would reverse on this ground only where there is such a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge that manifest injustice can be shown. Secrist, supra, and Lucy, supra.
A review of the record reveals that plaintiffs’ counsel attempted a rather extensive explanation of the no-fault statute. An attempt was made by counsel to interpret the words used in the statute in their "common meaning” for the benefit of the jurors. Not all of the argument was perhaps necessary or relevant. The trial judge is allowed great discretion in the manner and style of his charge to the jury. Pratt v Berry, 37 Mich App 234; 194 NW2d 465 (1971). Viewing the record as a whole, I cannot say that discretion was abused.
V
Plaintiffs finally argue that the injuries sustained by plaintiff Leo Cassidy qualify as a "serious impairment of body function” as a matter of law, and therefore, the trial judge erroneously denied a directed verdict as to the threshold requirement of the no-fault act.
*331The trial judge denied the motion, on the basis of McKendrick v Petrucci, supra. I cannot find reversible error on the part of the trial judge. However, I must respectfully observe that McKendrick did not conclude that every question of whether a particular impairment falls under the act must be submitted to the fact finder.
In Vitale v Danylak, 74 Mich App 615, 619; 254 NW2d 593 (1977), this Court interpreted McKendrick and the Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441; 208 NW2d 469 (1973) as follows:
"We do not read the language of the Supreme Court as a complete prohibition of the use of summary judgment whenever a 'serious impairment’ or 'permanent serious disfigurement’ is alleged in the pleadings. While we recognize that generally the trier of fact must make the qualitative decision of whether a particular injury is serious or permanent, it does not follow that the trial judge is in all cases precluded from consideration of those questions.”
It cannot be said with any confidence that, under the facts of the instant case, interpretation of the term, "serious impairment of body function” " * * * approaches or breaches permissible limits * * * ”. The question of whether plaintiffs met the threshold requirements of the no-fault act was properly submitted to the jury.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that no reversible error was committed in the conduct of the trial. I also note that the recent Supreme Court opinion of Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), does not appear to invalidate any of the holdings of this opinion.
I would affirm with costs to defendants.

 MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1) states:
“A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.”

 "Sec. 3030. In the original action brought by the injured person, or his or her personal representative in case death results from the accident, as mentioned in section 3006, the insurer shall not be made or joined as a party defendant, nor shall any reference whatever be made to such insurer or to the question of carrying of such insurance during the course of trial.”