Court Opinion

ID: 9741211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:51:39.100933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.885502
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur with Parts I and II of the majority opinion, and I vote to affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment on the claim of negligent hiring and retention. However, unlike the majority, I believe that Interim's motion for summary judgment produced evidence demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of a material fact on at least one issue of the negligent. hiring and retention claim-proximate cause. See maj. op., at 486 n. 6. Therefore, the Moyers were required to come forward with designated evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Because they came forward with such designated evidence, their claim rightly survived summary judgment.
While acknowledging Baral's two positive professional references and an absence of eriminal history, the majority concludes that Interim failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the claim for negligent hiring and retention. In reaching its conclusion the majority reasons, "[There is no indication that Interim contacted Tammie Logsdon, the supervisor listed for Baral's most recent employer." Maj. op., at 485. The majority also finds support in that "the record does not conclusively establish that Interim contacted Baral's supervisors from the three remaining previous employers listed on her application form." Id.
However, assuming that Interim had a duty to eall Baral's previous employers, the Barals were still required to come forward with evidence showing that these former employers would have revealed negative employment information. In my view, the logical extension of the majority's *437reasoning would allow claims for negligent hiring and retention to survive summary judgment whenever a defendant failed to show that it spoke to an employee's former employers. In other words, the claim would survive summary judgment even if the former employers ultimately would not have given information showing an employee's propensity to commit criminal acts or misconduct.
Here, Interim's Vice President of Operations stated that the company had contacted Baral's previous employers and reviewed her professional references. He also declared, "There was nothing in Baral's history to indicate a habit of misconduct or a propensity to commit an intentional criminal act." These statements necessarily demonstrate a lack of a genuine issue of material fact on proximate causation. Put differently, if there was nothing in Baral's history to put Interim on notice of her propensity for misconduct or committing criminal acts, then Interim could not have proximately caused the Moyers' injuries. Accordingly, the Moyers were required to come forward with contrary evidence about whether Interim's purported failure to call certain recent employers led to the Moyers' injuries. See Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ind.1997). The Moyers did so by including two affidavits from employees of Your Friends and Neighbors, Inc., Baral's most recent employer. These former co-workers recounted several unusual incidents, including two deaths, involving Baral's care of patients. For instance, one individual with autism, having no history of seizures, suffered a seizure under Baral's sole care and later stated to the Baral's co-worker, "Michele not hit me so hard."
Though the Moyers came forward with designated evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the negligent hiring and retention claim, the majority does not require this production of contrary designated evidence from the Moyers. Rather, the majority concludes that Interim failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the Moyers' claim of negligent hiring and retention-a conclusion I disagree with. In effect, the majority has found a duty and breach of that duty; but, without the Moyers' evidentiary designations, there is no contrary evidence that such breach proximately caused the Moyers' injuries. So without requiring contrary designated evidence from the Moyers, then under these cireumstances the majority has dispensed with the element of proximate cause in the tort of negligent hiring and retention. In the end, the Moyers' designated material was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on proximate cause.