Court Opinion

ID: 9783567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:49:22.798053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.945993
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I concur in the result, but decline to join the majority in its unnecessary, potentially confusing, and questionable discussion of certain issues.
Having concluded the claim of sentencing manipulation “lacks any factual basis” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1218) because “the conduct of the police here was not overreaching by any reasonable standard” (id. at p. 1221), the majority (id. at pp. 1221-1223) nonetheless goes out of its way to reject the test adopted by the Court of Appeal—viz., whether there was any legitimate law enforcement purpose or bona fide reason for the police conduct—even though that court’s opinion, by virtue of our grant of review, is no longer citable authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 976(d).)
The majority’s extended discussion of the Court of Appeal’s test is also unnecessary because, even under the rejected standard, this is not a case requiring a sentence reduction. The prosecution posited, and the defense failed to rebut, a plausible legitimate law enforcement purpose for the police decision to use 85 kilograms of cocaine in their sting operation: given the *1228high risk of violence involved in theft of the type contemplated, the officers could reasonably have believed a relatively large quantity was more likely to keep Smith and her crew committed to the enterprise.
Moreover, the majority’s criticism of the Court of Appeal’s sentencing manipulation standard appears to be unjustified. Contrary to the majority’s implication, not all courts “caution against the adoption of such a standard” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1222). (See United States v. Shephard (8th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 647, 649 [suggesting sentencing manipulation might be found where “the government engages in continuing undercover or sting transactions for the sole purpose of ratcheting up a sentence”]; United States v. Sivils (6th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 587, 598-599 [“If [the defendant] could demonstrate that the government manipulated the dollar amount of cocaine to increase his sentence, such manipulation would certainly provide a fundamental fairness defense against the higher sentence”]; State v. Steadman (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2002) 827 So.2d 1022, 1025 [sentence reduction warranted where police extend sting operation against the defendant “for no reason other than to enhance his or her sentence”].) Consequently, were this court actually presented with the issue in a proper case, it is at least possible it would similarly conclude that government conduct with no legitimate law enforcement purpose, designed solely to increase a defendant’s sentence, was so outrageous as to warrant a sentence reduction. In any event, to purport to decide the issue here, while at the same time declining to decide whether the doctrine of sentencing manipulation even applies in California, is to engage in gratuitous dictum.
The majority also addresses the question whether “the defense of outrageous law enforcement conduct [is] superfluous because our entrapment defense itself focuses on the conduct of law enforcement” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1223), though after considerable discussion it reaches no conclusion because the facts here show no outrageous conduct (id. at p. 1227). I agree with regard to the police conduct in this case, but in place of the majority’s unhelpful and inconclusive discussion I would explain the potentially important differences between the doctrines of entrapment and outrageous law enforcement conduct.
The due process “defense” of outrageous law enforcement conduct is actually a bar to prosecution rather than a defense to the charge; as such, it is properly raised by motion and decided by the court. (People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 1138 [274 Cal.Rptr. 326]; see also People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 695-697, fns. 2 & 4 [261 Cal.Rptr. 789].) In contrast, entrapment is a defense to the charge and is decided by jury trial. (People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 691, fn. 6 [153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]; People v. Thoi, supra, at p. 693.) The constitutional bar of *1229outrageous law enforcement conduct, moreover, may be invoked against police or prosecutorial conduct that does not involve inducement to crime and therefore cannot serve as the basis for an entrapment defense. (People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 1767 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547]; People v. Thoi, supra, at p. 696, fn. 3.)
The two doctrines are therefore distinct both substantively and procedurally. They do overlap substantively in a particular factual context, i.e., “[i]n cases where the thrust of the defense is that the government improperly instigated the crime.” (People v. Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696.) But that an area of overlap exists does not make either doctrine redundant and provides no reason to doubt that in a proper case of outrageous conduct, whether or not including government inducement to crime, the defendant may be able to obtain dismissal of the action on due process grounds.
George, C. J., and Kennard, J., concurred.