Court Opinion

ID: 9543739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:48.866945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:06.191662
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

concurring and dissenting:

I agree with the majority that individuals engaged in the educational process who intentionally injure a child entrusted to their educational care should be held liable. *492Accordingly, I agree with the majority’s holding that petitioners are entitled to maintain an action against the individual defendants for the intentional injuries alleged.
I do not agree with the majority, however, that individuals engaged in the educational process who, through professional malpractice, negligently injure a child entrusted to their educational care should not be held liable. In my view a cause of action against such individuals should exist for such negligent injuries. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the petitioners here are not entitled to maintain an action against the individual defendants for the negligent injuries alleged.
As long ago as 1889 in Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 331-32, 18 A. 698, 700-01 (1889), Chief Judge Alvey stated the following with respect to actions against lawyers for their negligent acts:
"Apart from any mere special or technical objections, the declaration would seem to contain all the averments essential to entitle the plaintiffs to maintain their action. This is best shown by a brief statement of the principles upon which the action is maintainable. It is now well settled by many decisions of courts of high authority, both of England and of this country, that every client employing an attorney has a right to the exercise, on the part of the attorney, of ordinary care and diligence in the execution of the business intrusted to him, and to a fair average degree of professional skill and knowledge; and if the attorney has not as much of these qualities as he ought to possess, and which, by holding himself out for employment he impliedly represents himself as possessing, or if, having them, he has neglected to employ them, the law makes him responsible for the loss or damage which has accrued to his client from their deficiency or failure of application. Or, as said by Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in delivering the opinion in Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & Fin. 193, 209, a client who has *493employed an attorney has a right to his diligence, his knowledge, and his skill; and whether he had not so much of these qualities as he was bound to have, or having them, neglected to employ them, the law properly makes him liable for the loss which has accrued to his employer. And in another part of the same opinion the learned Chancellor said: Professional men, possessed of a reasonable portion of information and skill, according to the duties they undertake to perform, and exercising what they so possess with reasonable care and diligence in the affairs of their employers, certainly ought not to be held liable for errors in judgment, whether in matters of law or discretion. Every case, therefore, ought to depend upon its own peculiar circumstances; and when an injury has been sustained which could not have arisen except from the want of such reasonable skill and diligence, or the absence of the employment of either on the part of the attorney, the law holds him liable. In undertaking the client’s business, he undertakes for the existence and for the due employment of these qualities, and receives the price of them. Such is the principle of the law of England, and that of Scotland does not vary from it. ...”
"... In the course of the trial several exceptions were taken by the defendant to rulings of the court. The first two of these were taken to the admissibility of the testimony of lawyers, examined by the plaintiffs, for the purpose of proving to the jury, that, in their opinion, the advice given by the defendant to Korns, under the facts and circumstances proved by other witnesses in the case, was not such as a prudent, careful lawyer, of ordinary capacity and intelligence, would have given, or ought to have given. As we understand it, this was not an *494attempt on the part of the plaintiffs to prove to the jury by the lawyers, that the abstract principle involved in the advice given by the defendant was not law, for that would have been an usurpation of the functions of the court; but simply that the advice, in view of all the circumstances and conditions under which it was given, was not such as a prudent, careful lawyer, of ordinary capacity, would have given. Such testimony, in this class of cases, is allowed, as furnishing aid to the jury, in considering the question of negligence or want of skill. There are many cases in which such testimony has been received, but it is not deemed necessary to refer to more than Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing. 460; Hunter v. Caldwell, 10 Q. B. 69; Swinfen v. Chelmsford, 5 Hurl. & N. 890, 897. There was therefore no error in the rulings on these exceptions.”
As recently as 1975 in Raitt v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 274 Md. 489, 498-99, 336 A.2d 90, 95 (1975), Judge Levine stated the following with respect to the nature of the duty of care and the standard of care applicable in actions against physicians for their negligent acts:
"... in Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 380-81, 35 A. 1094 (1896), our predecessors stated: '... The cases are generally agreed upon the proposition, that the amount of care, skill and diligence required is not the highest or greatest, but only such as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally. .. /(emphasis added). There had been a hint of this standard in State, use of Janney v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 172, 16 A. 382 (1889), where this Court held that '... the degree of care and skill required is that reasonable degree of care and skill which physicians and surgeons ordinarily exercise in the treatment of their patients. . . .’
"This rule, which makes no reference whatever to the defendant-physician’s community, was consis*495tently followed prior to 1962. See, e.g., Lane v. Calvert, 215 Md. 457, 462, 138 A.2d 902 (1958) (standard of care 'such as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally.’); McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 66, 148 A. 124 (1930). Indeed, it has been quoted occasionally even since 1962, Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 534, 276 A.2d 36 (1971) (standard of care 'such as is ordinarily exercised by others in the profession generally.’); Anderson v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 260 Md. 348, 350, 272 A.2d 372 (1971) ('... the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by surgeons in cases of this kind....’); Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Genda, 255 Md. 616, 620, 258 A.2d 595 (1969) ('.. . the standard of skill and care ordinarily exercised by surgeons in cases of this kind .. ..’).”
Thus, this Court has consistently recognized, notwithstanding the existence of a myriad of intangibles, a multiplicity of unknown quantities and a variety of other uncertainties attendant in any profession, that a professional owes a duty of care to a person receiving professional services; that a standard of care based upon customary conduct is appropriate; and that it is possible to maintain a viable tort action against a professional for professional malpractice. Finally, as recently as 1979, in Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490,408 A.2d 728 (1979), this Court has recognized that under certain circumstances there can be recovery for mental or emotional distress resulting from non-intentional negligent acts. The application of all of these principles to this case leads me to the conclusion that there should be a viable cause of action on the facts alleged here.
In my view, public educators are professionals. They have special training and state certification is a prerequisite to their employment. They hold themselves out as possessing certain skills and knowledge not shared by noneducators. As a result, people who utilize their services have a right to expect them to use that skill and knowledge with some minimum degree of competence. In addition, like other profes*496sionals, they must often make educated judgments in applying their knowledge to specific individual needs. As professionals, they owe a professional duty of care to children who receive their services and a standard of care based upon customary conduct is appropriate. There can be no question that negligent conduct on the part of a public educator may damage a child by inflicting psychological damage and emotional distress. Moreover, from the fact that public educators purport to teach it follows that some causal relationship may exist between the conduct of a teacher and the failure of a child to learn. Thus, it should be possible to maintain a viable tort action against such professionals for educational malpractice.
Here the declaration alleges, in pertinent part, that the individual defendants "owed a duty to the minor plaintiff to comport themselves within the standards of their profession, and to exercise that degree of care and skill ordinarily exercised by those similarly situated in the profession;...” The declaration further alleges that the defendants breached that duty by, among other things, placing the child in the second grade and requiring him to repeat first grade materials even though he had satisfactorily completed these materials in his first year in school, subsequently placing him in a grade ahead of the material he was actually studying, testing the child so incompletely and inadequately as to result in total failure of evaluation of the problems, and insulting and demeaning the child in private and public. Finally, the declaration alleges that the defendants’ acts in breach of their duties were the proximate cause of injuries to the child which included, among other things, substantial learning deficiencies, psychological damage and emotional stress. This declaration alleges that the defendants owed a professional duty to the child to act in conformity with an appropriate standard of care based upon customary conduct, that there was a breach of that duty, and that unforeseeable injuries were proximately caused by that breach. Manifestly, it states a cause of action that comports with traditional notions of tort law.
*497Unlike my colleagues, I believe that public policy does not prohibit such claims from being entertained. It is common knowledge, and indeed the majority recognizes, that the failure of schools to achieve educational objectives has reached massive proportions. It is widely recognized that, as a result, not only are many persons deprived of the learning that both materially and spiritually enhances life, but also that society as a whole is beset by social and moral problems. These changed circumstances mandate a change in the common law. New and effective remedies must be devised if the law is to remain vital and viable.
Moreover, I do not agree with my colleagues that adequate internal administrative procedures designed for the achievement of educational goals are available within the educational system. In my view none of the available procedures adequately deal with incompetent teaching or provide adequate relief to an injured student. A cause of action for educational malpractice meets these social and individual needs.
In addition, I do not agree with the majority that recognition of such a cause of action will result in a flood of litigation imposing an impossible burden on the public educational system and the courts. Similar arguments appearing in cases that recognized the constitutional rights of students have not been validated by subsequent empirical evidence. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 600 n.22 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Finally, I do not agree with the majority that the recognition of such a cause of action "would in effect position the courts of this State as overseers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies”, roles that have been "properly entrusted by the General Assembly to the State Department of Education and the local school boards.” That the Legislature has delegated authority to administer a particular area to certain administrative agencies should not preclude judicial responsiveness to individuals injured by unqualified administrative functioning. In recognizing a cause of action for educational malpractice, this Court would do nothing *498more than what courts have traditionally done from time immemorial — namely provide a remedy to a person harmed by the negligent act of another. Our children deserve nothing less.