Court Opinion

ID: 9654626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:44:55.234571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:11.903918
License: Public Domain

CANTU, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not agree that the divorce decree is unambiguous. Clearly the various provisions cause the decree to be susceptible of conflicting interpretations. Surely the position advanced by the appellant is as equally supported by the language of the decree as is appellee’s contention.
Because the decree is in the nature of an agreed judgment, it must be interpreted as if it were a contract between the parties and the interpretation thereof is governed *156by the laws relating to contracts. Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962).
The intention expressed on the face of the decree is doubtful and in my opinion will support either position. Because the contract must be construed so as to give effect to the intention of the parties, resort should have been had to parol evidence of the situation and the surroundings of the parties to resolve the doubt. Gardner v. Watson, 76 Tex. 25, 13 S.W. 39, 40 (1890); La Brie v. McKim, 56 Tex.Civ.App. 322, 120 S.W. 1083 (1909, no writ).
While the construction placed upon the decree by the trial court is certainly capable of being a correct one, I would hold that the trial court was not justified in construing the decree as an unambiguous instrument and that it erred in failing to permit parol evidence offered by appellant in support of his interpretation and as evidence of the intent of the parties. I would reverse and remand.