Court Opinion

ID: 9811256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:14:29.116365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:00.915133
License: Public Domain

BauNhill, J.,
concurring: There are certain undisputed facts which control decision in this case. Claimant on 15 June, 1944, while engaged *454in the discharge of his duties as an employee of defendant, received injury to his eye. Defendant filed a report Of the accident with the Commission as required by G. S. 97-92, on form furnished by the Commission. The report, dated 15 June, 1944, received by the Commission 22 June, 1944, has printed on it by the Commission the following : “This report filed only in compliance with section G. S. 97-92, and not employee’s claim for compensation.” At the suggestion of defendant’s agent claimant was examined by Dr. Lassiter 15 June, 1944. On June 20 he filed report and bjll for services as required by statute G. S. 97-90. On 19 June claimant was examined by Dr. Speas, an eye specialist, who likewise filed with the Commission for approval his statement for services. Both doctors reported that claimant was able to return to his work from the date of the accident, and claimant lost no time on account of the accident from the date of the accident to the time defendant’s plant closed in December 1945. The suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding, the claimant neither made nor filed with his employer any claim for compensation as required by G. S. 97-22 and 23.
Nothing further was done until claimant, through counsel, on 24 June, 1946, notified the Commission he desired to press his claim for compensation.
So, then, the only thing the employer did during the twelve months’ period after the accident was to file a report of the accident, and the employee filed no claim with his employer as required by G. S. 97-22-23, and he filed no claim with the Commission as required by G. S. 97-24 until more than two years after the accident.
It, therefore, seems clear to me that the majority conclusion that the judgment denying an award should be affirmed is correct and in accord with the pertinent statutory provisions.
The Industrial Commission is primarily an administrative agency of the State, charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the North Carolina "Workmen’s Compensation Act. As such it furnishes forms for use by employers, employees and others having business with the Commission ;• receives and tabulates information contained in reports of accidents, G. S. 97-81; approves voluntary settlements made by employers and employees when in accord with the Act, G. S. 97-82; approves for payment bills for services rendered by doctors and others, G. S. 97-90; supervises and enforces regulations for insurance and performs various other functions looking to the proper observance of the Act by employers, employees and insurance carriers. In re Hayes, 200 N. C., 133; Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N. C., 312.
At the same time it is a special or limited judicial agency, invested with certain judicial powers. As such it possesses the authority and incidents necessary to determine the rights and liabilities of .employees *455and employers. Hanks v. Utilities Co., supra. Its judicial authority is invoked by the filing of a claim for compensation and demand for a bearing. G. S. 97-24; G. S. 97-83; In re Hayes, supra.
But nothing in the Act prevents an employer or insurance carrier from invoking its jurisdiction to settle a controversy respecting a claim for compensation. Hardison v. Hampton, 203 N. C., 187; Hanks v. Utilities Co., supra. It is only necessary that the attention of the Commission be called to the fact, formally or informally, that the claimant is demanding-compensation and the necessity for the Commission to settle the question.
While an accident may result in injury which gives rise to a claim for compensation, an accident and a claim, in fact and as contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, are quite different. The employer is required to report the accident, G. S. 97-92, and the report becomes a part of the private records of the Commission, not open to the public, and the Commission, for statistical purposes, must compile the information contained in the report. G. S. 97-81.
The claim is the right of the employee, at his election, to demand compensation for such injuries as resulted from the accident. If he wishes to claim compensation he must notify his employer within thirty days after the accident, G. S. 97-22-23, and if they cannot agree on compensation, he or someone in his behalf must file a claim with the Commission within twelve months, in default of which his claim is barred. G. S. 97-24.
This requirement that he file a claim is a condition precedent to the right of recovery. Lineberry v. Town of Mebane, 218 N. C., 737; Winslow v. Carolina Conference Asso., 211 N. C., 571; Lilly v. Belk Bros., 210 N. C., 735; Wilson v. Clement, 207 N. C., 541; Wray v. Woolen Mills, 205 N. C., 782.
It is contended, however, that the report of the injury constitutes a claim and invokes the jurisdiction of the court. The form on which the report was made expressly states the contrary. This form 19 may not meet the approval of some. Even so, the authority to prescribe its contents is vested in the Commission. G. S. 97-81. It has performed that duty intelligently and in accord with the intent and purpose of the statute under which it acts.
But it is suggested that Hardison v. Hampton, supra, “is on all fours,” and that, therefore, the question here presented has been decided. The records in the two cases do not sustain this position. Instead the facts are quite different and are easily distinguishable.
In the Hardison case, after notice of the accident which occurred 27 March, 1930, was filed, there were negotiations between the employee, the employer and the insurance carrier as contemplated by G. S. 97-17. The negotiations were somewhat drawn out, and the carrier became dis*456satisfied with tbe delay, which seems to have been due to the refusal of the employee to undergo a necessary operation. On 12 November, 1930, its agent wrote the Commission detailing the facts and the dispute, and stated: “The employer seems to feel that the injured is entitled to compensation for 350 weeks ... In view of the injured's attitude and in view of the information which I have, I see nothing to do but have a hearing in the matter, in order that the Commission may decide what compensation benefits the injured is entitled to.” Copy of the letter was sent to the employee and his counsel applied for a hearing 27 March, 1931.
The Commission properly found and concluded that this letter in effect admitted liability, presented the claim for decision and requested a hearing. It was upon this conclusion, and not on the report of the injury, it assumed jurisdiction, over the protest of employer, and made an award. It was the award founded on these facts which was affirmed by this Court, Connor, J., closing his opinion with the statement:
“In the instant case, the claim of the injured employee was filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, and for that reason the employee was not barred of his right to compensation.”
There is no evidence in the instant case that the employee “at the time of his injury gave notice to his employer, advising him, however, that he did not consider his injury serious, but was advised that it might become so, or that the employer notified the carrier, or that the carrier informed the Commission that no settlement had been agreed upon.” The employee did nothing until more than two years after the accident.
It would seem that it might be well for those who are interested to read the record in this case as well as the one in the Hardison case.
Hanks v. Utilities Co., supra, factually, is as clearly distinguishable as the Hardison case.
The argument is likewise advanced that the Commission, by approving the doctors’ bills, “made an award covering the doctors’ fees which could only have been incidental to a consideration of the injury.”
The doctors examining an employee after an accident are required to file a report and statement of fees for services, without which they cannot collect their remuneration. G-. S. 97-90. The payment of their fees constitutes no part of the compensation. G-. S. 97-2 (k). But let us take the contrary view, as it is contended that we should, and see where ■ it leads us. The doctors reported there was no injury, and that the employee was capable of returning to work “immediately” from the day of the accident for “day or night” service. These reports were approved by the Commission. If that was an award it concluded the matter.
I can discover no formality, rigidity or uncertainty on this question, though admittedly there may be some prolixity, even in this case. Nor *457do I concede to others more liberality of view in the sane interpretation and application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. But the rule of liberal construction does not require us to render decision, even in a hard case such as this, which would put at naught the established procedural practice of the Commission, contravene the plain language of the statute, and overrule former well considered decisions of this Court. The procedure is not now uncertain. It could hardly be made more simple and speedy. Certainty and security are there. The trouble is the claimant unfortunately slept on his rights, and thereby lost his remedy.
I vote to affirm.