Court Opinion

ID: 9696847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:00:14.679239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.164024
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that all of the records at issue that have not been disclosed already are exempt from disclosure on the grounds of executive privilege, and particularly the deliberative process privilege, as enunciated by this Court in Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 414 A.2d 914 (1980), and incorporated into the Maryland Public Information Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 10-615(1) of the State Government Article.1
This Court recognized the doctrine of executive privilege as part of Maryland law in Hamilton, 287 Md. at 562, 414 A.2d at 924.2 The privilege has its foundations in the common law of evidence and the constitutional principle of separation of powers, including the express 'provision of Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See id. While the Court observed that executive privilege generally is not absolute, it found that the interest in protecting confidential government *594communications justified a presumptive privilege: “[Wjhen a formal claim of executive privilege is made for confidential communications of the chief executive ... or other government officials of an advisory or deliberative nature, there is a presumptive privilege, with the burden upon those seeking to compel disclosure.” Id. at 563, 414 A.2d at 925 (citations omitted). We went on to hold that this presumptive privilege extended even to “ ‘the limited intrusion represented by an in camera examination of the conversations by a court.’ ” Id. (quoting Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 730 (D.C.Cir.1974)).
The doctrine of executive privilege does not apply solely to opinion material. Even where the confidential communications or documents sought are factual in nature, a balancing process is used, wherein the government’s need for confidentiality is weighed against the litigant’s need for disclosure. See Hamilton, 287 Md. at 564, 414 A.2d at 925. Although compiled or severable factual material ordinarily is available for discovery, we reasoned, in Hamilton, that “material cannot always ‘easily be separated into fact finding and decision making categories,’ ”id. at 564, 414 A.2d at 925-26 (citations omitted), recognized that “some factual material is entitled to a degree of protection under the privilege,” including “facts obtained upon promises or understandings of confidentiality, investigative facts underlying and intertwined with opinions and advice, and facts the disclosure of which would impinge on the deliberative process,” id. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 926, and concluded that, in these situations, “the government’s asserted reasons for nondisclosure are weighed against the litigant’s need for discovery in light of the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. at 565, 414 A.2d at 926.
The Hamilton Court further explained that “in camera inspection by the trial judge does not automatically follow whenever a claim of executive privilege is made,” since “the in camera inspection itself is an intrusion upon the privilege.” Id. at 566, 414 A.2d at 926. We concluded:
Thus, when a formal claim of executive privilege is made, with an affidavit stating that the demanded materials are of *595a type that fall within the scope of the privilege, they are presumptively privileged even from in camera inspection. The burden is on the party seeking production to make a preliminary shewing that the communications or documents may not be privileged or, in those cases where a weighing approach is appropriate, that there is some necessity for production. ... Consequently, absent such a preliminary showing by the party demanding disclosure, the claim of executive privilege should be honored without requiring an in camera inspection.
Id. at 566-67, 414 A.2d at 926-27 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The Governor’s Office has asserted executive privilege with respect to the documents at issue in this case, i.e., the requested telephone records and appointment calendars. That assertion has been accompanied by affidavits by Governor Glenden-ing and members of his staff, explaining how the documents fall within that privilege. I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s dismissal of the validity of that claim. While the individual entries in the documents in question are generally “factual” in nature, in compilation they disclose the deliberative processes of the Governor’s Office.
In Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240 (1991), the California Supreme Court considered a closely analogous case in which a newspaper sought disclosure of the Governor of California’s appointment calendars and schedules under the California Public Records Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 6250 (West 1995). In that case, like this one, the Governor had conceded that his appointment calendars were public records within the meaning of the California Public Records Act, but asserted that they were exempted from disclosure. See Times Mirror, 283 Cal. Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d at 250 n. 12. The California Supreme Court, citing this Court’s decision in Hamilton, see id., 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d at 248 n. 10, held that disclosure of the documents was not in the public interest and based its reasoning, in part, on the deliberative process privilege. See id., 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d at 252. While the majority is correct *596in pointing out that the California statute contained a public interest exemption not present in the Maryland Public Information Act, the California court’s reasoning is equally applicable to the present case:
Disclosing the identity of persons with whom the Governor has met and consulted is the functional equivalent of revealing the substance or direction of the Governor’s judgment and mental processes; such information would indicate which interests or information he deemed to be of significance -with respect to critical issues of the moment. The intrusion into the deliberative process is patent.
Id., 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d at 251. The court concluded that “while the raw material in the Governor’s appointment calendars and schedules is factual, its essence is deliberative.” Id.3
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has followed similar analysis in the context of whether the President’s Task Force on National Health Care Reform was required to comply with the open meeting requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act: .
If public disclosure of the real information-gathering process is required, the confidentiality of the advice-giving function inevitably would be compromised. If you know what information people seek, you can usually determine why they seek it. A group directly reporting and advising the President must have confidentiality at each stage in the formulation of advice to him.
*597Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 910 (D.C.Cir.1993) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises, Inc., 242 Va. 219, 409 S.E.2d 136 (1991), the Virginia Supreme Court held that itemized long distance telephone bills for calls placed by the Governor’s office that were sought by a newspaper publisher were exempt from disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, Va.Code Ann. § 2.1-340 (Michie 1999). Like the Appellee in this case, the publisher in Worrell argued that disclosure of the phone bills would not encroach on the Governor’s decision-making process because the content of the calls would remain confidential. See id. at 138. However, the plurality opinion4 rejected that contention, explaining that “data which show the time and the originating and terminating location of a call is information concerning the activity of the Governor’s office,” since “[t]he data, standing alone, could provide a basis for public speculation” and “an information base for further investigation which could subject recipients of such calls to inquiries regarding the calls and their content.” Id. The plurality went on to express its concern about the potential chilling effect that release of the information could have on both the Governor and the individuals that he might want to consult via telephone, arguing that “[a] lack of candor or an unwillingness to participate in the decision making process is as likely to flow from the compelled disclosure of the fact of consultation as from the disclosure of the content of the consultation.” Id. at 139.
Concern with the potential chilling effect that disclosure of deliberative documents could have on the ability of executive officials to execute the duties of the Governor’s office underlies *598much of the jurisprudence on executive privilege. As the court in Times Mirror explained:
If the law required disclosure of a private meeting between the Governor and a politically unpopular or controversial group, that meeting might never occur. Compelled disclosure could thus devalue or eliminate altogether a particular viewpoint from the Governor’s consideration. Even routine meetings between the Governor and other lawmakers, lobbyists or citizens’ groups might be inhibited if the meetings were regularly revealed to the public and the participants routinely subjected to probing questions and scrutiny by the press.
Times Mirror, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d at 251. The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of the expectation of executive confidentiality:
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3107, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).
This potential for disruption of the essential communicative, investigative, and deliberative functions of the Governor’s office are equally in force in this case. In fact, these policy concerns are particularly compelling in the face of the sweeping scope of the Appellee’s demand for production of doeu-*599ments in this case and the lack of any specifically identified public interest by the Appellee in these particular materials. The majority stresses the age of the documents that are being sought in this case as undermining the potential chilling effect of their disclosure on the Governor’s ability to access a broad spectrum of viewpoints, see maj. op. at 563-65, but this is hardly a determinative factor. I see no reason to believe that a government official or community member might not be just as hesitant to engage in a confidential communication whether it was likely to be disclosed immediately or in four years.
Nonetheless, that is not to say that there is no situation under which the types of records sought here should be obtainable. Under the balancing test outlined in Hamilton, 287 Md. at 564-65, 414 A.2d at 925-26, it is conceivable that the doctrine of executive privilege might not shield telephone or appointment records that were subject to a more focused and limited request that would have substantially less of an impact on the deliberative process.5 That simply is not the situation here, where Appellee has requested all of the Governor’s schedules and telephone records for himself and several members of his staff, covering a six month period, without offering any evidence to dispute the Governor’s initial showing that the requested documents are protected by executive privilege.
Given the doctrine of executive privilege outlined by this Court in Hamilton, and given the policy concerns with the chilling of the important constitutional functions of the Governor and his staff, I would reverse the decision of the Circuit Court and hold that, as a matter of law, the Appellee has not *600made a sufficient showing of necessity to overcome the presumption of executive privilege for the requested documents. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Section 10-615 states, in relevant part, that ‘‘[a] custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if: (1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential.”

. The Court, in Hamilton, was ruling on a certified question of Maryland law from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Maryland Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.) §§ 12-601-12-609 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (current version at Maryland Code (1996, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum.Supp.) §§ 12-601-12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article). See Hamilton v. Verdow, 287 Md. 544, 546, 414 A.2d 914, 916 (1980). Hamilton dealt with an assertion of privilege in the context of discovery in a tort suit brought in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See id. at 547, 414 A.2d at 917.

. This exemption was extended to telephone records of a City Council member in Rogers v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 19 Cal.App.4th 469, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 (1993). But cf. DR Partners v. Board of County Comm’rs of Clark County, 6 P.3d 465 (Nev.2000) (holding that deliberative process privilege was not implicated by disclosure of county officials' cellular telephone records). While the Nevada Supreme Court disagreed with the premise of Times Miiror and Rogers, see id. at 470, it also distinguished those opinions on the facts of the cases, noting that, in DR Partners, the newspaper seeking disclosure of the records was specifically investigating possible government waste and the County had not properly accounted for payment for private use of governmental cellular phone service by government officials in the records in the trial court proceedings. See id. at 470-71.

. The three-judge plurality held that disclosure of the telephone records would be unconstitutional because the interference with the Governor’s decision-making process would violate the separation of powers doctrine. See Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises, Inc., 242 Va. 219, 409 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1991). The Chief Justice, who concurred in the result, argued that the separation of powers and executive privilege issues had not been properly raised for appellate review, but concluded that the phone bills were “memoranda” and were, therefore, statutorily exempt from disclosure. See id. at 140.

. Cf. Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.3d 1325, 283 Cal.Rptr. 893, 813 P.2d 240, 253 (1991):
There may be cases where the public interest in certain specific information contained in one or more of the Governor's calendars is more compelling, the specific request more focused, and the extent of the requested disclosure more limited; then, the court might properly conclude that the public interest in nondisclosure does not clearly outweigh the public interest in disclosure, whatever the incidental impact on the deliberative process.