Court Opinion

ID: 9765603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:09:19.221216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:12.115387
License: Public Domain

DANA, J.,
with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins,
dissenting.
[¶ 24] For want of a writing, (“I as President assign the contract to myself’) the trial court and now this Court elevates form over substance and finds that the assignment never happened. I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 25] This discussion requires a more thorough examination of the facts. In 1986, Sturtevant, prior to incorporation as *271M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc., entered into a contract with the Town of Winthrop for snowplowing services. In 1991, after its formation, the Town renewed the contract with the corporation.
[¶ 26] In July 1992, Sturtevant dissolved M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc. He testified that he informed the Town of the corporate dissolution. Thereafter, Town correspondences, Town Council minutes, and other Town documents written after the corporate dissolution refer to Sturtevant in his individual capacity. For example, correspondences from the Town manager to Sturtevant written in February and July 1994 are addressed to M.E.S. Environmental Services, not the corporate entity. The Town Council minutes from May 16, 1994, refer to “Mark Sturtevant, Contract Snowplower.” In July 1994, the Town manager submitted “An Analysis of Snowplowing Alternatives” to the Town Council that states that “We have a contract with Marc [sic ] Sturtev-ant.” Town Council minutes from August 1, 1994, refer to “Mark E. Sturtevant” performing “his snowplow contract.”
[¶ 27] Similarly, all correspondences from Sturtevant or Sturtevant’s attorney to the Town after corporate dissolution refer to M.E.S. Environmental Services, without any reference to the corporate entity. In July 1994, Sturtevant wrote to the Town regarding a possible contractual arrangement with Buzzell and crossed out “Inc.” on his letterhead to reflect the corporate dissolution. The Town attorney who received the letter testified that the crossed-out “Inc.” indicated that M.E.S. was no longer a corporation.
[¶ 28] Around this same time, Sturtev-ant expressed his intent to assign the contract to Elwood Buzzell, another snow-plower, but the Town argued that such an assignment would violate the contract. The Town attorney’s letter in response reflects the Town’s understanding that a contract existed with Sturtevant individually and that the Town would attempt to enforce the contract. The attorney states that the Town Council discussed “your snowplowing contract with the Town,” contends that “assignment of your contractual interests and obligations to Elwood Buzzell further violates the contract,” and questions “whether you will continue to personally manage the snowplowing activities as you have done in the past.” Similarly, in August 1994, the Town attorney wrote Sturtevant’s attorney regarding the Town Council’s concern “over Mark’s current intentions regarding an assignment of the contract.” In all respects the Town treated Sturtevant — not the corporation — as the contracting party and attempted to enforce the contract to prohibit an assignment to Buzzell.
[¶ 29] While the Town continued to refer to Sturtevant in his individual capacity in Town minutes and communications, the Town also paid Sturtevant in his individual capacity for services rendered after corporate dissolution. Sturtevant testified that after dissolution he requested that the Town make payments to him individually, doing business as M.E.S. Environmental Services, instead of to the corporation. The only evidence offered by the Town that it was not aware of the assignment was provided by the Town’s outside counsel who testified that he personally was not aware that Sturtevant had notified the Town of the dissolution or that the Town was paying Sturtevant individually for his performance of the contract. There is no dispute, however, that Sturtevant performed the snowplowing contract and that the Town paid Sturtevant in his individual capacity for this work.
[¶ 30] When the Town terminated the contract in October 1994, Sturtevant, d/b/a M.E.S. Environmental Services, sued for breach of the contract. Although the Town in its answer denied the existence of a contract with Sturtevant individually, it failed to move for a summary judgment. At trial, the Town argued that Sturtevant violated the contract regarding the condition of his equipment and the quality of his snowplowing and that he therefore failed *272to perform satisfactorily the snowplowing .contract. At the close of Sturtevant’s case, the Town moved for a directed verdict on the ground that Sturtevant did not have standing because M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc., did not assign the contract to him individually. The Town renewed its motion at the close of evidence.
[¶ 31] The jury found that the Town had breached the contract and awarded Sturtevant damages of $156,000. The Town again renewed its motion after the jury verdict, and the court permitted the parties to submit evidence on the issue of the assignment. As evidence of the assignment, Sturtevant submitted an affidavit explaining that all of the corporation’s assets were distributed to himself and attached the articles of dissolution of M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc. Finding “no evidence of any written or verbal manifestation of intent to assign the contract” the court concluded there had been no assignment and Sturtevant, therefore, lacked standing to sue the Town. This appeal followed.
rn 32] “[T]he intent to vest in the as-signee a present right in the thing assigned must be manifested by some oral or written word or by some conduct signifying a relinquishment of control by the assignor and an appropriation to the as-signee.” Shiro v. Drew, 174 F.Supp. 495, 498 (D.Me.1959) (emphasis added) (quoting Lone Star Cement Corp. v. Swartwout, 93 F.2d 767, 769-70 (4th Cir.1938)). M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc., through its president and sole shareholder Sturtevant, manifested its intent to assign the contract when Sturtevant, in his corporate capacity, dissolved his corporation and when Stur-tevant, in his individual capacity, continued to perform the plowing contract after dissolution. See id.; Doughty v. Sullivan, 661 A.2d 1112, 1124 (Me.1995). Here, the assignor and the assignee are the same person acting in two capacities. To deny that Sturtevant’s conduct evidences an assignment frustrates the intent of both the corporation and Sturtevant individually. Moreover, 13-A M.R.S.A. § 1110 (1981) requires that a corporation shall only file articles of dissolution when “all debts, liabilities and obligations of the corporation have been paid and discharged, or adequate provision has been made therefor, and all remaining property and assets of the corporation have been distributed to its shareholders.” The filing of the articles, therefore, is further evidence that should be considered in determining whether the corporation had assigned the contract. I conclude that Sturtevant’s conduct, the filing of the articles of dissolution, and the absence of any evidence to the contrary is compelling evidence of an assignment.
[¶ 33] No evidence whatsoever was presented indicating that Sturtevant and the Town negotiated or entered into a new contract following the dissolution of the corporation. Yet both Sturtevant and the Town continued to reference “the contract” and to act under its terms. The inescapable conclusion is that the contract entered into between the Town and the corporation was assigned to Sturtevant personally and that Sturtevant, in fact, continued to fulfill the obligations under that contract.
[¶ 34] Notwithstanding this evidence of an assignment, the trial court concluded that Sturtevant had “failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any such assignment actually occurred.” Iu this regard, in my view, the court clearly erred. In doing so the court acknowledged that for an assignment to be effective it need not be in writing9 and that since the con*273tract was not a personal services contract, the Town’s consent to the assignment was also not required.10
[¶ 35] An assignee of a contract has the right to sue for a subsequent breach of the contract notwithstanding Maine’s survival statute. See 13-A M.R.S.A. § 1122 (1981). Section 1122(1) provides that “[t]he dissolution of a corporation ... shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders for any right or claim, existing ... prior to such dissolution, if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within 2 years after the date of such dissolution.” (emphasis added). Section 1122(1) does not apply to assignees who seek recovery in their individual capacities for a claim that arose after the assignment. See id.; Hunter v. Old Ben Coal Co., 844 F.2d 428, 435 (7th Cir.1988) (applying Illinois law) (“If a claim is held individually, even if it arises in conjunction with a corporate matter ..., the corporate survival statute does not bar a suit to enforce the claim even if it is brought after the time period specified in the corporate survival statute.”); Davis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 727 F.Supp. 549, 552 (D.S.D.1989) (distinguishing individual claims from derivative corporate claims for purpose of applying survival statute); Halliwell Assocs., Inc. v. C.E. Maguire Servs., Inc., 586 A.2d 530, 533 (R.I.1991) (same). An individual claim arises when there has been a violation of a duty owed directly to the individual. See Davis, 727 F.Supp. at 552. If, however, the claim arises from an injury to the corporation or is an action instituted to redress a wrong to the corporation, then the action is derivative in nature. See id.
[¶ 36] Here, Sturtevant is asserting an individual contractual right pursuant to an assigned contract — he is not asserting a corporate claim. See Hunter, 844 F.2d at 435. The breach occurred more than two years after corporate dissolution and is in no way derivative of an injury to M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc. The cases cited by the Court to suggest that section 1122 might bar Sturtevant from asserting his individual claim are inapposite because those cases address the assignment of corporate claims, not individual claims. See Nix v. W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn., 830 F.Supp. 601, 605 (S.D.Ala.1993); Davis, 727 F.Supp. at 553; Riley v. Fitzgerald, 178 Cal.App.3d 871, 223 Cal.Rptr. 889, 895 (1986). Consequently, Sturtevant, as an assignee asserting an individual claim, is not barred by section 1122 from bringing this action which arose more than two years after corporate dissolution.
[¶ 37] Because of a valid assignment of the contract, Sturtevant had standing to sue. I would restore the jury verdict in his favor.

. Although no contemporaneous writing or corporate record memorialized the assignment, no such writing is required. In the absence of an applicable statute, a manifestation of a present intent to assign a right need not be in writing. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981). Maine law does not require a writing for a corporation to assign a contract, therefore, M.E.S. Environmental Services, Inc.'s failure to generate a *273writing or corporate record to evidence the assignment is not controlling.

. The court concluded that a snowplowing contract is not a service that involves the type of personal service, trust, or confidence that would require the Town’s consent, particularly where the contract was purportedly assigned by the corporation to the sole shareholder who controlled its operations. See Salmon Lake Seed Co. v. Frontier Trust Co., 130 Me. 69, 74, 153 A. 671, 673 (1931).