Court Opinion

ID: 9909846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 15:06:14.614521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:59.043886
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2111-22

BOUAZZA QUAZIZ,

                   Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NOURA EL GHAZOINI,

          Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

                   Submitted November 9, 2023 — Decided December 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
                   Hudson County, Docket No. FM-09-0618-20.

                   Bouazza Quaziz, appellant pro se.

                   Dunne, Dunne & Cohen, LLC., attorneys for
                   respondent (Leonard B. Cohen, of counsel and on the
                   brief).

PER CURIAM
        By leave granted, plaintiff Bouazza Quaziz challenges the entry of a

March 17, 2023 Rosenblum1 order finding him a vexatious litigant and directing

that any future motions he seeks to file must be reviewed by the Assignment

Judge prior to filing. We granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal solely

from the Rosenblum order.

        Plaintiff's refusal to accept DNA confirmed test results establishing that

he is the biological father of the child born during his marriage to defendant,

Noura El Ghazoini, and plaintiff's filing of several motions challenging those

results led to the entry of the Rosenblum order.        We discern no abuse of

discretion by the judge and affirm.

        Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 14, 2019, and defendant

gave birth to a child on April 9, 2020. Approximately six months into the

marriage and prior to the birth of the child, plaintiff filed his initial pro-se

complaint for divorce. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that he was not the

child's father. Over the course of several months, plaintiff filed three amended

complaints both through counsel and as a self-represented litigant, including a

"first amended complaint for divorce," on September 20, 2020; a pro se "verified

amended complaint for annulment," dated November 16, 2020; an "amended

1
    Rosenblum v. Borough of Closter, 333 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 2000).

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complaint for annulment and alternatively divorce," filed January 27, 2021; and

a "verified second amended complaint for annulment," filed July 15, 2022.

Plaintiff's current amended complaint includes counts for adultery, extreme

cruelty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and a cause of action for annulment based upon fraud in

which he claims that the marriage was a sham and defendant married him to

secure a green card.

      The court ordered a paternity test as requested in plaintiff's second

amended complaint, which confirmed with 99.99 percent probability that

plaintiff is the child's father.   Upon receipt of these results, plaintiff filed

opposition to the entry of an order confirming paternity pursuant to Rule 5:14-

2, and the court ordered retesting.

      The second DNA test also yielded identical results again showing a 99.99

percent probability that plaintiff is the child's father, and the court entered an

order establishing plaintiff's paternity based on the results of the second test. A

few months later, the court entered a child support order for $214 per week and

setting arrears at $6,328. Plaintiff failed to pay child support in accordance with

the order and approximately two months later, the court entered an order finding

plaintiff in violation of litigant's rights and directing plaintiff to pay defendant's

counsel fees.

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      Unsatisfied with these results and the entry of a pendente lite order for

child support, plaintiff moved for recusal of the motion judge and to void all

prior orders. The judge denied plaintiff's motion in an order dated December

17, 2021. Defendant moved to enforce the child support orders and plaintiff

next moved for vacatur of all prior orders, including the orders establishing

paternity and for child support.

      In an order dated February 25, 2022, the court denied plaintiff's motion

and issued a warrant for plaintiff's arrest "for failing to pay child support in

accordance with the October 27, 2021 order as he was already in violation of

litigants rights . . . ." The judge reserved the issuance of the warrant until

plaintiff could be scheduled for an enforcement hearing.

      While the Family Part matrimonial proceeding was pending, plaintiff filed

a lawsuit in the United States District Court against the two Superior Court

judges who had made rulings in this matrimonial action, the Hudson County

Prosecutor, defendant, several of his prior counsel and Labcorp, the entity that

performed the paternity testing. Plaintiff's complaint, filed July 12, 2022, was

subsequently amended twice.

      In his second amended complaint, plaintiff's alleged various causes of

actions against the State defendants were dismissed with prejudice, sua sponte,

in an order dated December 2, 2022. Plaintiff's claims against the remaining

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defendants, including his prior counsel, were not found to be entirely time

barred, and were dismissed without prejudice. The court granted him thirty days

to file an amended complaint. 2

      With portions of his federal court complaint still pending, plaintiff moved

in the Family Part for the third time to vacate all its orders approximately one

year after the prior judge denied plaintiff's second motion to vacate all prior

orders. Plaintiff again argued that he is not the child's father and contested the

results of the second DNA test, asserting it was "based on fraud and inaccurate

taking" and "[he] never had sex with defendant when she [got] pregnant."

      Defendant cross-moved for a Rosenblum order. In her certification dated

February 2, 2023, defendant referred to the frivolous and harassing nature of

plaintiff's repeated filings against her, his failure to adhere to the court's prior

orders establishing child support, his child support arrears of $21,522, his

numerous complaints and amended complaints for divorce, his ex-parte order of

protection against her in Brooklyn, and his refiling of the same motion to void

all prior orders solely because a different judge had been assigned to the case.

2
   The court found that plaintiff's second amended complaint included claims
that accrued in 2016 to 2019. Reading plaintiff's complaint liberally, the court
concluded that those claims were time-barred under the one-year statute of
limitations in 42 U.S.C. § 1986, or the two-year statute of limitations in 42
U.S.C. § 1982 and N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2.
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      The court denied plaintiff's third motion to vacate and granted defendant's

cross-motion and entered the Rosenblum order.          The court considered the

volume and disposition of plaintiff's numerous filings, and explained in detail

the reasons for its conclusion, finding more traditional sanctions would not

protect against further frivolous litigation. This appeal followed.

      Though difficult to discern, a fair reading of plaintiff's vague and

voluminous brief suggests that he seeks vacation of the Rosenblum order, as

well as all prior orders establishing paternity and support. As to the entry of the

Rosenblum order, plaintiff contests the court's finding he is a vexatious litigant.

He further argues that vacation is necessary under two different theories. First,

he maintains defendant's boyfriend was "drugging [him] to have sex and drug[s]

with defendant," thereby resulting in the conception of the child. Alternatively,

plaintiff alleges that defendant "got pregnant from her boyfriend," the two

Labcorp results establishing his paternity of the child are a product of fraud, and

the Superior Court judge presiding over his case conspired with others, including

the police department in Jersey City, to deprive him of the relief sought,

constituting among other things, "[four] years of war zone crimes."

      Those theories are directed at the validity of the prior paternity orders and

the pendente lite support order, which is currently in arrears. Because we

granted plaintiff leave to appeal solely from the Rosenblum order, we limit our

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review of his arguments to their application to his challenge to the that order.

Stated differently, and as noted, the scope of our review pursuant to our order

granting plaintiff leave to appeal does not permit consideration of plaintiff's

arguments to the extent they are offered as a challenge to orders. We consider

the arguments only to the extent they are pertinent to his challenge to the

Rosenblum order.

                                        I.

      We review a court's order to enjoin a litigant from further filings for abuse

of discretion. See Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 51 (App. Div. 2010);

Rosenblum, 333 N.J. Super. at 392. "A court abuses its discretion when a

decision 'is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Terranova v. Gen.

Elec. Pension Tr., 457 N.J. Super. 404, 410 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting U.S. Bank

Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).

      The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause "imposes upon state

actors an obligation to refrain from preventing individuals from obtaining access

to the civil courts." Rosenblum, 333 N.J. Super. at 389-90 (quoting Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990)). "[T]he complete denial of the

filing of a claim without judicial review of its merits would violate the

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constitutional right to access of the courts."    Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48

(quoting Rosenblum, 333 N.J. Super. at 390).

      At the same time, "courts have the inherent authority, if not the obligation,

to control the filing of frivolous motions and to curtail 'harassing and vexatious

litigation.'" Ibid. (quoting Rosenblum, 333 N.J. Super. at 387, 391). The court's

power to deem pleadings frivolous under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1) and Rule

1:4-8(a)(1) is the source of this authority. Id. at 48-49. The "discretionary

exercise of the extreme remedy of enjoining or conditioning a litigant's ability

to present his or her claim to the court must be used sparingly; it is not a remedy

of first or even second resort." Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 54.

      When determining whether to issue an order under Rosenblum enjoining

a party from frivolous litigation, the court must evaluate "the volume and

disposition of the cases" filed by the litigant, "address the allegations in the

present complaints," "give reasons for her conclusion that the complaints may

not be filed," "be assured that more traditional sanctions will not protect against

frivolous litigation," and "must review the new complaint to be assured that a

meritorious claim is not suppressed." 333 N.J. Super. at 392-97; see also Parish,

412 N.J. Super. at 54.

      In Rosenblum, we rejected a finding made by an assignment judge that a

filer should be enjoined from future filings due to a history of frivolous filings

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because the court failed to "address the allegations in the present complaints and

conclude why, if frivolous, traditional sanctions [were] inadequate to protect the

interests of the courts and defendants" and that "[the court] must also give

reasons for her conclusion that the complaints may not be filed." 333 N.J. Super.

at 397. The court elaborated,

            [t]he volume and disposition of the cases must be
            evaluated before the plaintiff can be said to have filed
            only frivolous litigation. . . . [T]he [a]ssignment
            [j]udge must also address the allegations in the present
            complaints and conclude why, if frivolous, traditional
            sanctions are inadequate to protect the interests of the
            courts and defendants. She must also give reasons for
            her conclusion that the complaints may not be filed. In
            essence, while we appreciate the concerns relating to
            frivolous litigation, the record the [a]ssignment [j]udge
            must build in order to sustain her decision not to permit
            the filing may raise questions of practicality, at least
            where other sanctions for frivolous litigation can
            provide a deterrent and can be collected or enforced.

            [Ibid.]

      Dissatisfied with the entry of the orders establishing paternity and his

child support obligations, plaintiff sought to challenge, for the third time, the

DNA results establishing paternity and all the orders entered based on the

paternity determination. A different judge denied plaintiff's third motion to

vacate and granted defendant's cross-motion for the Rosenblum order, finding it

was warranted because plaintiff had filed a third motion challenging paternity—

the last of which was filed a year after the second challenge—and that coupled
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                                        9
with his history of non-compliance with prior court orders and lack of deterrence

by the prior imposition of monetary sanctions, necessitated the entry of the

order. The judge issued a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion addressing

the fundamental rights of litigants to have access to the court system and the

well-developed record that showed plaintiff's actions since the commencement

of the divorce proceedings.

      Specifically, the court stated that plaintiff had "requested a paternity test

with respect to the minor child [and] subsequently amended his [c]omplaint four

times, adding causes of action for annulment based on fraud and divorce based

on adultery and extreme cruelty," that the parties consented to the first paternity

test and following receipt of the test results—showing 99.99 percent probability

that plaintiff was the biological parent of the child—the court ordered that

plaintiff's paternity of the child had been established.       Shortly thereafter,

plaintiff objected to the test results and sought a second test, which "also showed

a probability of 99.99 percent paternity . . . ."

      The court further discussed the history of plaintiff's motions, including

"two motions challenging the [c]ourt's paternity decision," the motion for

recusal of the prior judge, the motion to vacate all prior orders under Rule 4:50-

1 and Rule 4:42-2, which were denied; and plaintiff's motion to vacate the

paternity decision that is the subject of this appeal. The court stated:

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            Plaintiff's January 28, 2023 [n]otice of [m]otion to
            vacate all [o]rders signed by the previous [j]udge
            assigned to this matter is [denied] in its
            entirety . . . [p]laintiff's motion papers do not present a
            sufficient basis for either reconsideration of an
            interlocutory order under . . . Rule 4:43-2(b) or relief
            from a final order under . . . Rule 4:50-1. In support of
            his motion, [p]laintiff relies upon vague, confusing, and
            conclusory arguments that paternity test results that
            show he is the father of the minor child were in some
            way fraudulent. Plaintiff fails to sufficiently explain
            how the test results were fraudulent or how this
            warrants reconsideration of all prior [o]rders entered in
            this matter.

            [emphasis added.]

Critically, the court also incorporated into its analysis the undisputed facts

showing that plaintiff had not only filed multiple complaints and motions against

defendant in Superior Court but that he had also filed an action in the United

States District Court of New Jersey against many individuals, including two

judges who had ruled on his case, defendant, and defendant's counsel. 3

      Upon reviewing the record, and the volume and disposition of plaintiff's

filings, the court next addressed the allegations made by plaintiff in the current

application, finding them to be without merit. Consistent with Rosenblum, the

3
  The claims against the State defendants were dismissed in their entirety on
December 2, 2022. Defendant avers plaintiff appealed from the dismissal. The
record indicates plaintiff has since filed a second sixty-four-page complaint in
the District Court against defendant and others, including the judge who entered
the Rosenblum order.
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                                        11
court also addressed whether other sanctions, such as the imposition of

attorneys' fees or penalties would be adequate to protect against other frivolous

filings, stating:

             [p]laintiff has a documented history of non-compliance
             with his court-ordered obligations. He owes substantial
             child support arrears and has previously been found in
             violation of litigants' rights regarding this. The [c]ourt
             has also awarded counsel fees to [d]efendant on prior
             occasions, including on December 27, 2021 and
             February 25, 2022.

      Lastly, in his statement of reasons, the judge acknowledged the gravity of

the remedy that he was about to impose—as the Rosenblum order would require

"all of [p]laintiff's future motions to be reviewed by the Assignment Judge

before being accepted"—referring to the imposition of such an order as an

"extraordinary remedy." He was nevertheless persuaded that "[p]laintiff's recent

filings in this matter have been frivolous and [d]efendant should not have to

continue to bear the burden of responding to them," and the court further found

"[p]rior monetary sanctions have not deterred plaintiff . . . [and] [t]here is no

merit whatsoever to the pending application . . . ."

      We find no abuse of discretion by the judge in reaching his determination

that a Rosenblum order is necessary based upon the undisputed facts in this

record. We find significant the judge's thorough examination of the record, and

thoughtful weighing of plaintiff's constitutional right to have access to the courts

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and the need to protect defendant from frivolous litigation based upon plaintiff's

refusal to accept the results of the very paternity test he sought for the child.

      Rosenblum requires consideration of all applicable factors and not merely

the number of filings made by a vexatious litigant. Here, the judge appropriately

considered and found significant that plaintiff's last motion was his third attempt

to relitigate the same issues involving paternity that he had unsuccessfully

brought before the court one year earlier. We agree with the judge that this third

motion was frivolous because plaintiff raised no new arguments for the court to

consider and instead continued to express his dissatisfaction with the paternity

results and child support orders. Plaintiff offered no new evidence or scientific

or expert testimony to support his contention the DNA results were unreliable,

incorrect, or compromised, and he supported his motion with only self-serving

and demeaning accusations against defendant. He remains undeterred even in

the face of scientific evidence showing a 99.99 percent probability he is the

biological parent of the child and, based on his prior conduct, plaintiff will likely

continue to challenge these results.

      Further, we also agree with the judge that the imposition of additional fees

and financial sanctions for frivolous litigation will likely prove ineffective—

given plaintiff's history of meritless filings and the absence of any evidence the

prior imposition of monetary sanctions in the form of attorney's fee awards have

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                                         13
dissuaded him from further frivolous motions. And, we concur that plaintiff's

repeated court filings only serve to compound the financial burden endured by

defendant as she must respond to each and every frivolous motion and court

filing brought by plaintiff.

          We therefore affirm the entry of the Rosenblum order requiring plaintiff

to submit all future motions to the Assignment Judge of the vicinage prior to

filing.

          Affirmed.

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