Court Opinion

ID: 9491886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:26:31.020244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:59.676165
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I am compelled by our court’s precedent to concur in the decision that the AEDPA bars consideration of Gerlaugh’s Lackey claim, although I would have held otherwise were I free to do so. I say this without indicating any view on the merits of the Lackey claim, other than to note that it is also barred on the merits in this court. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc). I write separately in part to express my continued belief that Gerlaugh’s execution is unconstitutional because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1045-52 (9th Cir.1997) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part) (Gerlaugh I). Gerlaugh’s attorney failed to make any argument as to why the death penalty should not be imposed, failed, in fact, to make any closing argument at all during the sentencing phase of his trial. Under these circumstances, I believe that reversal of Gerlaugh’s death sentence is mandated by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir.1998). This issue, however, is foreclosed by the majority decision in Gerlaugh I, and for this reason also I am compelled to concur in the part of the order that would reject Gerlaugh’s claim even if we granted a certificate of appealability.
Although Gerlaugh’s claim is foreclosed under this court’s precedent, I disagree with the majority’s decision to deny him a certificate of appealability. Gerlaugh has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right for (1) reasonable jurists differ concerning whether execution after extended tenure on death row violates the Eighth Amendment, see Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421 (Stevens, J., re denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 366, 142 L.Ed.2d 303 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari), and (2) the Supreme Court has also not decided whether a Lackey claim becomes ripe before an execution is imminent.
For the same reasons, I would hold that Gerlaugh is entitled to a stay under the “substantial grounds” standard of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983).