Court Opinion

ID: 9793954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:45.113362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:08:51.309635
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached in this case because I believe that the police conduct amounted to a legitimate “stop and frisk.” Even though there was no probable cause to make an arrest at the time the initial stop took place,1 the police properly stopped an obviously suspicious individual *236to determine his identity and to investigate his possible criminal behavior. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 206 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), Goss v. State, 90 P.2d 220 (Alaska 1963), Maze v. State, 425 P.2d 235, 238 (Alaska 1967).
In Adams, the Supreme Court of the United States described the stop and frisk doctrine in the following language:
“[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” 392 U.S., at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman' who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. See id., at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881 [1868.] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Adams v. United States, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d .612 (1972) 2 In the case at bar, the police received two phone calls describing a burglary in process and the burglar’s subsequent departure in an unlighted van. The officers then observed the van driving without lights as described in the phone call. In a small Community like Ketchikan, under our holdings in Goss and Maze, supra, a prudent policeman could then legitimately detain the driver to investigate further. After stopping the van, it was proper for the officers to look inside for accomplices and to pat down appellant for weapons to protect themselves while they sought a reasonable explanation of the suspect’s conduct.
When the temporary detention of appellant resulted in confirmation that a burglary had been committed and that the women’s undergarments seen in the van and the tampax found in the appellant’s pocket were probable fruits of the burglary, the officers had probable cause to arrest appellant and seize those items. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Under these peculiar circumstances, I agree that the absence of a suppression hearing was harmless error because even under appellant’s version of the facts, the police conduct was proper.

. See dissenting opinion of Rabinowitz, J., infra.

. In Adams, three dissenting justices protested strongly that the majority opinion was an unwarranted extension of Terry and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), which seriously eroded the protection afforded persons by the fourth amendment.
The dissenters argued that in contrast to Terry, where the officer’s reasonable suspicion was based on his own personal observation of the suspects, the officer in Adams acted on the uncorroborated tip of an unnamed informant that the defendant possessed narcotic and a weapon.
In addition, the dissenters were persuaded by Judge Friendly’s argument that if Terry were extended to possessory offenses, “[tjhere is too much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true.” Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2nd Cir. 1970). In the case at bar, the crime being investigated was burglary, not possession of contraband. Moreover, the informant’s tip was corroborated when the officers observed the white van with its lights extinguished. The stop and frisk is therefore sustainable under Terry, and it is unnecessary for me to reach the question whether, as a matter of Alaska law, stop and frisk doctrine is properly extendable to Adams-type situations.