Court Opinion

ID: 9775772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:41.732453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.932934
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion except that portion of the opinion which overrules our decision in Cotton v. Commonwealth. The rule announced in Cotton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 698 (1970), was reached after a careful weighing of the value of admitting testimony of prior felony convictions as an impeachment of the veracity of a defendant against the admitted prejudice which must result to a defendant from evidence that he has committed other felonies.
Formerly, our rules of procedure permitted impeachment by showing the number and the nature of prior convictions of felony. In Cowan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 407 S.W.2d 695 (1966), this court recognized the prejudicial effect of proof of conviction of prior felonies and limited such impeachment to the proof of one prior conviction without reference to the nature of the offense.
In Cotton v. Commonwealth, supra, we held that, except for felonies involving dishonesty, fraud, false swearing or theft, the prejudice occasioned by proof of prior felonies outweighed the impeachment value of such proof. Proof of conviction of prior felonies was limited, therefore, to those felonies which would tend to show the un-trustworthiness of the witness. The type of the offense was permitted to be shown, and the number of prior offenses was not limited, as in Cowan.
I believe the Cotton rule is preferable to the Cowan rule. The reasoning behind Cotton was well stated as follows:
“[4] As pointed out in Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936 [1967], common human experience demonstrates that acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing are increasingly regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on the actor’s credibility. Felony convictions that rest on dishonest conduct directly relate to the issue of credibility.
“[5-7] We are, therefore, persuaded that the rule in Cowan should be modified to the extent of allowing impeachment of a witness, including a defendant in a criminal ease, by proof of conviction of felonies that rest on dishonesty, steal*519ing, and false swearing, subject, however, to vested discretion, although limited in scope, in the trial judge to limit such evidence. The exercise of discretion by the trial judge in this area should primarily consist of weighing the interest of society in the prosecution of criminal defendants to provide the trial jury with relevant evidence of the witness’ untrust-worthiness to be believed against the possible prejudice to the witness, particularly in the ease of a criminal defendant, in being convicted not of the crime for which he is charged but of some crime for which he has been convicted and punished on some prior occasion. The nearness or remoteness of the prior conviction is a relevant factor to consider in the exercise of this discretion. The probability of prejudice is greater where the crime for which the defendant is presently being tried is one of dishonesty or false statement, especially in those instances where he has been convicted several times previously of the same type of crime. The age and circumstances of the defendant are also proper factors.
“[8,9] In the instance involved where the prosecution desires to impeach the defendant who testifies by proof of prior felonies, those felonies must be relevant to the issue of credibility. A hearing should be had outside the presence of the jury. Therein it may be ascertained if the defendant has been convicted of a felony and, if so, its nature and circumstances. The trial judge may then determine the admissibility of the impeaching evidence. Where the prior convictions are of felonies not relevant to the issue of credibility, the cross-examiner may not inquire concerning them or any of them either generally or specifically. CR 43.-07, though applicable to criminal cases, must be interpreted to permit impeachment by proof of prior felonies relevant to the issue of credibility and not to allow the device condemned in Cowan.
“[10] By crimes involving dishonesty, stealing, and false swearing, we mean such felonies as perjury, subornation of perjury, obtaining money or property under false pretenses, forgery, embezzlement, counterfeiting, fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of funds, false personation, passing checks without sufficient funds or on nonexistent banks, fraudulent destruction of papers or wills, fraudulent concealment, making false entries, and all felonies involving theft or stealing. This list is not all-encompassing and we are confident that trial judges are capable of determining whether the particular prior felony involves a crime of dishonesty, stealing, or false swearing.”
Cotton v. Commonwealth, supra, at 701-702.
I would affirm the Judgment of the trial court but would not overrule our previous holding in Cotton v. Commonwealth, supra.
AKER, J., joins in this dissent.