Court Opinion

ID: 9458298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:48:18.449784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:42.710700
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge
(concurring specially):
My disagreement with the Court’s holding stems from its interpretation of Fein,1 as expressed in the opinion. In Fein the registrant had asserted that he was entitled to a conscientious objector classification, but that such status had been denied him by Selective Service procedures which allegedly violated due process of law. The Court held that § 10(b) (3) would preclude preinduction consideration of that claim because Fein’s ultimate entitlement to conscientious objector status was not “factually conceded and thus assured by the statute upon objective criteria.” 405 U.S. at 376, 92 S.Ct. at 1070, 31 L.Ed.2d at 307 (emphasis added). Fein’s conscientious objector claim “turned ‘on the weight and credibility of the testimony,’ * * * [a]nd it was ‘dependent upon an act of judgment by the board.’ ” Id. Accordingly, pre-induction review was barred, since § 10(b) (3) forecloses review in the situation where “the board, authoritatively, has used its discretion and judgment in determining facts and in arriving at a classification for the registrant.” Id. (Emphasis added).
By contrast, Crowley’s claim that he is entitled to assignment to the First Priority Selection Group instead of the Extended Priority Selection Group does not involve ’any determination of facts, exercise of discretion or act of judgment. It would be a purely ministerial duty on the Board, if Crowley’s interpretation of the regulations is correct. The facts are undisputed, as the Court concedes, and Crowley’s claim turns solely on the legal consequences of those facts, as the Board asserts them to be. Unlike Fein where the ultimate issue (Fein’s entitlement to conscientious objector status) required subjective, judgment-call considerations, the ultimate issue in Crowley’s case (his entitlement to First Priority Selection Group assignment rather than Extended Priority Selection Group placement) involves solely a completely objective analysis of what the regulations prescribe — a “distilled question of law.” Cf. Hunt v. Local Board No. 197, 3 Cir. (en banc), 1971, 438 F.2d 1128, 1138. Accordingly, Fein does not answer the problem of Crowley’s case.
More importantly, I do not believe that the Court’s interpretation of Fein, stressing as it does the term “conceded status,” can be reconciled with the holdings in Oestereich2 and Breen,3 cases which the Supreme Court specifically reaffirmed in Fein.4 In both Oestereich and Breen the Selective Service had strenuously urged that the registrants *618were entitled only to I-A status. Indeed, under the regulations as they then existed, that is the only legal status to which the were entitled. Of course, those regulations were declared invalid for their lack of statutory authorization, but the point is that far from “conceding” that Oestereich was entitled to IVD status under the regulations, or Breen, that of a II-S, the Government vigorously argued that they were properly entitled to I-A status only. And that argument could hot have been patently frivolous or absurd, since it was favorably received by the local boards, the appeals boards, the District Courts, the Courts of Appeals and several dissenting justices of the Supreme Court in each case. Oestereich and Breen were granted pre-induction review for reasons altogether removed from concessions of status (in the sense that term is employed by the Court here), for indeed the Selective Service did not concede their legal status at all. And that issue —legal status — is the only “unconceded” aspect of Crowley’s case.
But all that is not to say that pre-in-duction review is appropriate here. On the contrary, I agree that judicial consideration of the merits of Crowley’s claim is barred by § 10(b) (3). I, however, would reach this conclusion for the reason that Crowley’s claim is not grounded in the statute, not because there is some dispute over his legal status, or because the Government has refused to “concede.”
In the correct approach, I believe, it is first necessary to pierce the pleadings and preview the merits5 in order to comprehend precisely the nature of the claim being made, which in this case relies exclusively on the regulations and not the statute. Crowley’s contention is that the State Appeals Board classified him I-A on February 16, 1971. Under 32 C.F.R. §§ 1626.26(a) and 1625.116 and the cases interpreting those regulations,7 the Appeals Board’s classification “shall be and have the effect of a new and original classification even though the registrant is again placed in the class that he was in before *619* * * ” 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11. (Emphasis added). Thus, Crowley argues, the legal effect of the Appeals Board’s action in classifying him I-A was a new and independent classification, despite the fact that he was again placed in the same class (I-A) that he had been in before the appeal was decided.
The First Priority Selection Group is defined by 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(c) (2) (ii) and includes all “nonvolunteers who prior to January 1 [1971] have attained the age of 19 but not 26 years and who during 1971 are classified into Class I— A.” (Emphasis added.) During 1971 —on February 16, 1971, to be precise— Crowley was “classified into Class I-A” by the Appeals Board, in an action which had the force and effect under the regulations of an initial classification, despite the fact that Crowley was already “in” Class I-A by virtue of the local board’s December 16, 1970, classification of him.8
Thus, Crowley argues, under the regulations he is entitled to be assigned to the First Priority Selection Group, since he was classified into Class I-A during 1971.9
The Government’s answer to this theory — and ironically it is the same response evoked by the courts in allowing pre-induction review in limited situations despite the apparent absolute prohibition of § 10(b) (3)10 — is simply that the regulations quoted cannot and therefore do not mean what their literal words say they mean. Specifically, the Government argues that, despite the absence of express qualifying language, the definition of the First Priority Selection Group contained in 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(2) (ii) should be interpreted to mean to apply only to registrants who “during [1971] are classified into Class I-A” from another class. Support for this interpretation of the pertinent regulation is found in the transmittal letter *620from Selective Service Director Tarr to the White House accompanying the proposal which ultimately became § 1631.7. “The proposed language * * * (b) Extends all ‘reached’ I-A registrants without regard to the type of delay which prevented their 1970 induction.” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, § 1631.7(d) (5) specifically provides, in effect, that Extended Priority Selection Group liability is not to be extinguished by the simple expedient of taking an appeal. Thus, the Selective Service argues that under its interpretation of the regulations, the registrant was properly assigned to the Extended Priority Selection Group instead of the First Priority Selection Group.
Regardless of whose interpretation of the regulations should ultimately prevail, it is apparent at this point that pre-in-duction consideration of the merits of the case must cease. The controversy boils down to a dispute over interpretation of regulations. Cast in that form, I can find no justification in the cases or the rationale underlying them to poke another hole in § 10(b) (3)’s anti-litigious dyke.
The few Supreme Court cases which have forged the limited exception to § 10(b) (3)'s otherwise impervious and absolute proscription have all involved cases in which the claimed exemption or deferment had been specifically mandated by Congress. It was required by the statute. The Selective Service’s actions or regulations had, in those cases, worked to deprive the registrant of the classification to which Congress had specifically pronounced him statutorily entitled. Administrative action which subverts the policy of the agency’s underlying statutory mandate is “basically lawless”,11 and where the agency is the Selective Service System, pre-induction review of its determinations is required, despite § 10(b) (3), where the local board or the System has acted “outside the pale” 12 of the Selective Service Act, to the abrogation of rights or benefits bestowed by the statute.
But this is not such a case. Nothing in the Act even mentions, let alone defines entitlement to, First Priority Selection Groups or Extended Priority Selection Groups. Rather, these are classifications established by the regulations — not the statute — pursuant to the President’s statutory authority to promulgate rules respecting the induction of those registrants not deferred or exempted by statute.
Indeed, the statute demands, and therefore pre-induction review might well be available to vindicate, that the Boards act in accordance with the regulations. But that is not really the argument here. Rather, the conflict here involves the interpretation of administrative regulations. Both sides proffer facially reasonable interpretations of the relevant regulations. Particularly given the presumption of administrative regularity,13 the great deference accorded agency interpretations of the regulations which it has promulgated for itself14 and the unambiguous Congressional policy to minimize judicial interference with Selective Service processing at the pre-induction stage, courts should not create exceptions to § 10(b) (3) except where such are absolutely necessary to vindicate rights expressly created by the statute. This to me is the lesson of Fein, which speaks repeatedly in terms of “entitled by statute,” “assured by the statute” and “statutory exemption and *621statutory deferment.” (Emphasis added). No such rights are jeopardized here.
Since the Board’s interpretation of the lawfully promulgated regulations is not patently unreasonable, it cannot be said that assignment of this registrant to the First Priority Selection Group is demanded by the statute15 or that assigning him to the Extended Priority Selection Group goes “outside the pale of the Act.” Accordingly, § 10(b) (3) forecloses judicial consideration of the merits of the dispute.

. Fein v. Selective Service Local Board No. 7, 1972, 405 U.S. 365, 92 S.Ct. 1062, 31 L.Ed.2d 298.

. Oestereich v. Selective Service Board, 1968, 393 U.S. 233, 89 S.Ct. 414, 21 L.Ed.2d 402.

. Breen v. Selective Service Board, 1970, 396 U.S. 460, 90 S.Ct. 661, 24 L.Ed.2d 653.

. “We again conclude that the line drawn by the Court between Oestereich and Breen, on the one hand, and Gabriel and, inferentially, Boyd, on the other, is the appropriate place at which in the face of the bar of § 10(b) (3), to distinguish between availability and unavailability of pre-induction review. We therefore adhere to the principles established by those cases.” 405 U.S. at 376, 92 S.Ct. at 1070, 31 L.Ed.2d at 307.

. Cf. Gregory v. Tarr, 6 Cir., 1971, 436 F.2d 513, 515-516; Stella v. Selective Service Board, 2 Cir., 1970, 427 F.2d 887, 889.

. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.26(a) provides:
■ “The appeal board shall classify the registrant, giving consideration to the various classes in the same manner in which the local board gives consideration thereto when it classifies a registrant.”
The here pertinent “manner” of classifying a registrant is set forth in § 1625.11, which provides:
“When the local board reopens the registrant’s classification, it shall consider the new information which it has received and shall again classify the registrant in the same manner as if he had never before been classified. Such classification shall be and have the effect of a new and original classification even though the registrant is again placed in' the class that he was in before his classification was reopened.”

. See, e. g., United States v. Chodorski, 7 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 590, 591, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 950, 77 S.Ct. 861, 1 L.Ed.2d 858, (“The decision of the local board * * * has been set aside and held for naught * * *.”) ; United States v. Stepler, 3 Cir., 1958, 258 F.2d 310 (A classification by an Appeal Board is not, therefore, merely an affirmance of the action of an inferior agency but is the independent act of such board.) ; United States v. Longworth, S.D.Ohio, 1967, 269 F.Supp. 971, 976 (“[An Appeal Board] classification is one of first instance, not a mere affirmance or reversal of the Local Board.”). See also, De Remer v. United States, 8 Cir., 1965, 340 F.2d 712; Cramer v. France, 9 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d 801; Reed v. United States, 9 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 216; United States ex rel. Bodenstein v. Nichols, 3 Cir., 1945, 151 F.2d 155; Tyrrell v. United States, 9 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 8, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910, 73 S.Ct. 646, 97 L.Ed. 1346; Capehart v. United States, 4 Cir., 1956, 237 F.2d 388, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 971, 77 S.Ct. 363, 1 L.Ed.2d 324; Ayers v. United States, 9 Cir., 1956, 240 F.2d 802, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1016, 77 S.Ct. 563, 1 L.Ed.2d 548; United States v. Dunn, D.Mass., 1967, 264 F.Supp. 112, aff’d, 1 Cir., 383 F.2d 357; Storey v. United States, 9 Cir., 1966, 370 F.2d 255; United States v. Lynch, S.D.Cal., 1953, 115 F.Supp. 735.

. Although Crowley was initially reclassified into Class I-A by the local board on October 21, 1970, he was finally classified by the board on December 16, 1970, following his personal appearance before the board. The Government’s brief, particularly at page 6, continually refers to this date (December 16, 1970) as the trigger date for Extended Priority Selection Group liability. In other words, it seems to be the Government’s position that Crowley was “classified into I-A” when the local board finally classified him on December 16, 1970.

. 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(b) (2) defines the Extended Priority Selection Group to consist of “registrants who on December 31 were members of the First Priority Selection Group [i. e., generally, I-A’s] whose random sequence number had been reached but who had not been issued Orders to Report for Induction.” The consequences of sucli classification are set out in § 1631.7(d) (4) :
“Members of the First Priority Selection Group on December 31 in any calendar year whose random sequence number had been reached but who had not been issued Orders to Report for Induction during the calendar year shall be assigned to the Extended Priority Selection Group for the immediately succeeding calendar year.”
To the extent, if any, that Crowley might also be eligible for inclusion in the Extended Priority Selection Group by virtue of his having been classified “in” Class I-A on December 31, 1970, that fact may be of no consequence if Crowley is also entitled under the regulations to be assigned to the First Priority Selection Group. 32 C.F.R. § 1632.2 provides that' “the registrant shall be classified in the lowest class for which he is determined to be eligible.” Whether or not that regulation applies to “classification” into priority selection groups within classes need not — indeed cannot — be determined here, although it should be noted that in effect and Selective Service usage, if not definition, a determination of assignment to priority groups within classes is apparently deemed to be a “classification” itself. See, e. g., Local Board Memorandum No. 99: “It is important that local boards swiftly process all registrants who submit information which merits reclassification of the registrant into or out of the First Priority Selection Group.” (Emphasis added.)

. “No one, we believe, suggests that § 10(b) (3) can sustain a literal reading.” Oestereich, supra, 393 U.S. at 238, 89 S.Ct. at 417, 21 L.Ed.2d at 406; Fein, supra, 405 U.S. at 373, 92 S.Ct. at 1062, 31 L.Ed.2d at 306; Edwards v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11, 5 Cir., 1970, 432 F.2d 287, 292.

. See, Oestereich, supra, 393 U.S. at 237, 89 S.Ct. at 416, 21 L.Ed.2d at 406.

. See Edwards, supra, 432 F.2d at 292.

. See, e. g., Greer v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 378 F.2d 931; Lowe v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 51; Campbell v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 1; Pigue v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 389 F.2d 765.

. See, Udall v. Tallman, 1965, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616; Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 1945, 325 U.S. 410, 413-414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700, 1702; Allen M. Campbell Co. v. Lloyd Wood Construction Co., 5 Cir., 1971, 446 F.2d 261, 265.

. Crowley’s contention that his claim is grounded in the statutory provision authorizing the President to establish Appeals Boards can he easily dismissed. The provision evoked might well establish a registrants’ right to appeal, hut it falls short of mandating a statutory effect to be accorded the appeal when it results in a reaffirmation of the classification fixed by the local board, so long as the substantive right to appeal is not abrogated. Similarly, Crowley’s claim that he was not “in” Class I-A on December 31, 1970, since he had taken an appeal, finds nothing in the statute to compel that interpretation of the regulations. The statute simply does not speak of deferment or exemption from Extended Priority Selection Groups.