Court Opinion

ID: 9700310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:19:32.348365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:06.965444
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). Because I do not believe that the majority’s conclusion is faithful to the language *633and purpose of the highway exception to the governmental immunity statute, I respectfully dissent. Consistent with this Court’s ruling in Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), I would hold that the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), does not expose the state or a county to liability for alleged defects that arise outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the Gratiot County Road Commission failed to place adequate signs warning motorists of the special danger presented by both (1) the unmarked intersection and (2) a nearby apple orchard that allegedly obscured a traveler’s view of the intersection. There was no allegation that there was a defect in the surface of the traveled roadbed itself, i.e., the improved portion of the highway, and, consequently, there was no claim that the road commission failed to repair or maintain the improved portion of the highway. Hence, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision upholding the grant of summary disposition in favor of the road commission as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
ANALYSIS
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A
Under MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), all governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while performing a governmental function, unless the activity falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. Mason v Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs, 447 Mich 130, 134; 523 NW2d 791 (1994); Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 618; 363 NW2d 641 *634(1984). One of the narrow exceptions, MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1), enables a person to recover against a governmental agency for an injury arising from the use of public highways:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. The liability, procedure and remedy as to county roads under the jurisdiction of a county road commission shall be provided in [MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121], The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
The resolution of the controversy in this case depends on the proper interpretation of this statute.1
B
Citing the reasoning of Salvati v State Hwy Dep’t, 415 Mich 708; 405 NW2d 856 (1982), the majority *635concludes that under the highway exception a governmental agency has a “duty to provide adequate warning signs or traffic control devices at known points of hazard . . . Ante at 619. I agree that the exception creates a duty to erect signs or proper control devices at points of hazard, but only when these hazards arise from the failure of the state or county to “maintain the [improved portion of the] highway [designed for vehicular travel] in reasonable repair . . . .” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). The hazard must result from the governmental agency’s failure to fulfill its statutory duty.
In contrast, the majority expands the meaning of this duty beyond that created by the Legislature by defining a “point of hazard” as “any condition that directly affects vehicular travel on the improved portion of the roadway so that such travel is not reasonably safe.” Ante at 623 (emphasis added). In so defining this phrase, the majority has interpreted the statute as establishing a governmental duty to ensure that the improved portion of a highway is “reasonably safe and fit for travel,” which is a more burdensome duty than to merely “maintain the [improved portion of the] highway [designed for vehicular travel] in reasonable repair . . . .” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). This is not consistent with a narrowly drawn interpretation of the statute. See Mason, supra at 134.
The majority rightly notes that the first sentence of MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) establishes the governmental agency’s duty. The Legislature only required that the government “maintain the highway in reasonable repair . . . .” This is the statement of the duty. The Legislature creatéd this duty to achieve *636a particular end “so that [the highway] is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” Id. This is the value that the Legislature hoped to realize by creating the duty. However, the statutory duty is not violated whenever the statute’s end is not achieved. In other words, there is not a violation of this duty by the lone fact that a highway is not “reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.” Id. The Legislature did not require that the governmental agency ensure that all highways were reasonably safe. Only when the governmental agency fails to “maintain the highway in reasonable repair” is there a violation of the statute.
In support of its reasoning, the majority refers to Justice Levin’s dissent in Chaney v Transportation Dep’t, 447 Mich 145, 193-194; 523 NW2d 762 (1994), in which he argued that the first two sentences of the statute establish that there is a duty “ ‘to repair and maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel . . . Ante at 622. In Chaney, supra at 196-198, Justice Levin relied on the statute’s second sentence in concluding that a governmental agency has a duty to provide this end (a reasonably safe road), not the mere duty to keep the highway in “reasonable repair.” The second sentence of the statute provides that “[a]ny person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) (emphasis added).
*637This interpretation of the second sentence suffers from the same deficiency as the majority’s treatment of the first sentence. Examined in context, the second sentence does not expand the government’s obligation established by the first.
The first sentence establishes the governmental agency’s duty. The second sentence then identifies an injured person’s right to recovery for a breach of that duty. The second sentence accomplishes this goal by providing for recovery when the governmental agency fails to keep the highway in “reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe . . . .” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). The comma placed after “reasonable repair” divides the government’s duty (“maintain” in “reasonable repair”) from the end this duty is intended to secure (a “reasonably safe” road). The point of identifying the statute’s desired end with the duty it created in this sentence is to indicate that a person will recover only when the government’s failure to perform its duty creates an unsafe condition. Thus, even if there is a breach of the duty (failure to maintain in reasonable repair), an injured person will not recover unless the breach of the duty created an unsafe condition. The interpretation that the majority posits when it adopts Justice Levin’s analysis ignores the significance of this comma and the preceding text.2
*638The strict interpretation is confirmed by subsequent text in the highway exception’s fourth sentence, which provides: “[t]he duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability thereof, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel . . . MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). The duty is reiterated. Using the ordinary meaning of these terms, the state and county road commissions, as governmental agencies, only have the duty “to repair and maintain” the highways, not the duty to keep the roads reasonably safe. See Scheurman, supra at 631 (Riley, C.J.)3 (“The purpose of the highway exception is not to place upon the state or the counties an unrealistic duty to ensure that travel upon the highways will always be safe”).4
With this understanding of the statutory duty, the statute in the fourth sentence states that the duty to repair and maintain “shall hot include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicu*639lar travel,” thus limiting this duty to "only” the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). I believe, as a plurality of this Court stated in Scheurman, supra at 631:
[T]he phrase “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.
[T]he true intent of the Legislature is to impose a duty to keep the physical portion of the traveled roadbed in reasonable repair. [Citation omitted.]
This conclusion is based on the nature of the duty the Legislature created. The state and county road commissions can only repair and maintain what already exists, what has already been constructed. Consequently, in specifying the improved portion of the highway, the Legislature must have contemplated the maintenance of the integrity of the roadbed’s surface, keeping it travel worthy.5
*640C
Consequently, I believe the majority has improperly enlarged the duty from one of repair and maintenance to a duty to keep the traveled portion of the road reasonably safe. I recognize that the majority has attempted to impose a limitation on the application of this expansive interpretation, but I believe this analysis only further confuses the matter. The majority states:
To be a point of hazard for purposes of the highway exception, the condition must be one that uniquely affects vehicular travel on the improved portion of the roadway, as opposed to a condition that generally affects the roadway and its surrounding environment. We reemphasize, however, that such conditions need not be physically part of the roadbed itself. [Ante at 623 (emphasis added).]
The majority fails to explain clearly what kind of condition “uniquely” affects the roadway and what condition only “generally” affects it. The majority attempts to clarify this distinction by applying it to the facts in Scheurman in which this Court ruled that there is no statutory duty for the state to erect a streetlight. The majority explains that “darkness is not a condition unique to the three-dimensional space in which vehicular traffic on a roadway occurs” in describing why the lack of street lighting would not expose travelers *641to a special hazard. Ante at 624. I worry that our trial courts will have a difficult time applying this distinction.6
This very effort to distinguish between unique and general hazards that arise outside the physical roadbed may provide insight to the Legislature’s desire to limit the duty of the state and county only to the obligation to “repair and maintain” the improved portion of the highway. The duty to repair would generally limit the government’s liability to cases in which there are defects in the roadbed’s surface. In contrast, the Legislature may have feared that it could not anticipate the circumstances in which the state or county would be exposed to liability if the Legislature imposed on it the duty to ensure that travel is reasonably safe on governmental highways.
*642n. CASE LAW
A. RECENT CASES
The narrow inteipretation required by the statute is consistent with this Court’s recent rulings. In a similar case, a plurality of this Court recognized the limitation that the statute’s fourth sentence placed on the duty created by the highway exception. See Scheurman, supra at 630-631. In Scheurman, supra at 623, this Court examined whether the highway exception statute imposed a duty on governmental agencies either to (1) install street lighting to ensure safe travel on the roadway or (2) remove vegetation on private property that allegedly obstructed the view of motorists approaching an intersection. In applying a narrow construction of the statute, the plurality (Riley, C.J., joined by Cavanagh and Griffin, JJ.) concluded that there was no duty to install street lighting “because the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel.” Id. at 633. Thus, any alleged hazard did not arise from a defect in the roadbed’s surface. Likewise, because the hedge that allegedly obstructed a motorist’s view had “no connection” with the roadbed, the Wayne County Road Commission did not have a duty under the statute to ensure that the hedges were trimmed to allow for unobstructed vision while driving. Id. at 635.7
*643After Scheurman, in 1994, this Court analyzed the highway exception statute in Mason, supra at 132-133, where a pedestrian alleged that a county failed to install proper signs and traffic devices at a school crossing for pedestrians, and in Chaney, supra at 151, where a driver alleged that the state failed to properly design and construct a concrete bridge abutment and adjoining guardrail adjacent to, but beyond, the shoulder of the road.
In Mason, supra at 135-137, this Court concluded that the county was not liable under the highway exception statute because a school crossing is not a danger to vehicles and passengers. This Court explained that the statute definitively excludes from the exception “specific installations whose only rational purposes narrowly service the unique neéds of pedestrians.” Id. at 136 (emphasis added).8 In Cha*644ney, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision by ruling that the Department of Transportation was protected by governmental immunity where the plaintiffs injuries arose from an allegedly defective guardrail even though the plaintiff claimed that the department failed to provide adequate warnings about this danger. See Chaney, supra at 152-153. However, there were four opinions among the five justices who concurred in this result.
This Court’s ruling in Mason (signs for school crossing) and Chaney (guardrail) is consistent with a narrow interpretation of the statute, as is this Court’s ruling in Scheurman (streetlights) and its companion case, Prokop v Wayne Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs (hedges on private property that allegedly obscured the view of an intersection). In each of these cases, the alleged defect did not arise from the physical roadbed itself, and this Court concluded that the statute protected the state or county from liability.
*645Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with this Court’s rulings in Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t, 435 Mich 307, 313-317; 458 NW2d 619 (1990), and Roy v Transportation Dep’t, 428 Mich 330, 331; 408 NW2d 783 (1987). In Gregg, this Court concluded that the statute did not protect the state from liability for a bicycle path that was a part of the improved portion, while in Roy this Court concluded that the statute did protect the state from liability for a bicycle path that was detached from the highway because the path did not comprise part of the traveled portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
B. OTHER CASES
In Scheurman, the plurality noted at 637, n 29, that it reserved the decision about the continuing vitality of two previous decisions, Tuttle v State Hwy Dep’t, 397 Mich 44, 45-46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976), and Salvati, supra, for another case. In each of these cases, this Court or a plurality of this Court apparently concluded that the highway exception included a duty to erect signs, regardless of whether the hazard arose from the roadbed surface. The present case involves the allegation that the road was unsafe because of the road commission’s failure to provide a warning sign or a traffic device, e.g., a stop sign, at the unmarked intersection that was allegedly obscured by a nearby apple orchard. Thus, this is the case that allows this Court to revisit Tattle and Salvati.
In Tattle, supra at 45-46, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries when he collided with another vehicle at an intersection he claimed was riot reasonably safe because of “inadequate signalization.” Sprinkle Road *646was a five-lane road with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour that intersected with a two-lane state trunk line with a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. There was a thirty-six-inch reflectorized “stop ahead” sign and a thirty-six-inch reflectorized stop sign on Sprinkle Road at each approach to the intersection. Immediately after opening the intersection, the traffic and safety engineer for the Department of State Highways received reports that people were not stopping, and he determined that the signs were not noticeable. Consequently, he ordered the installation of large black and white cross-hatch backboards to attach to each stop ahead sign and the installation of red and yellow battery-operated flashers for each stop sign and “stop ahead” sign. The department did not carry out these work orders before the accident. The department’s supervising electrical service unit had also approved the installation of a traffic signal at the intersection. On the basis of these facts, this Court unanimously decided that the department was negligent for failing to carry out its own orders when it had already determined that the existing stop controls were not sufficiently noticeable. Id. at 52.
Yet, the Court in Tuttle never examined the highway exception itself to determine whether the department’s failure was a breach of its duty to repair and maintain the highway. Instead, it merely assumed that there was a duty to keep the road reasonably safe and fit for travel. See Tuttle, supra at 52, n 5. Therefore, the Court did not address the question whether the alleged hazard arose from the surface of the highway because of the department’s failure to repair and maintain it. I do not believe this ruling can govern this Court’s understanding of the scope of liability *647created by the Legislature in the highway exception and would overrule it to the extent that it holds that the state or a county can be liable for inadequate signage at an intersection, when that signage does not identify a hazard related to the state’s failure to repair and maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
In Salvati, the plaintiff alleged that the department failed to post adequate signs alerting motorists of the danger of ice on a bridge road. Each plurality opinion in Salvati concluded that the duty of maintenance encompassed a duty to provide warning signs for a “point of hazard,” but, as I stated above, I would limit this principle to the circumstance in which the hazard resulted from the state’s or county’s failure to repair and maintain the roadbed’s surface designed for vehicular travel.
Before our ruling in Scheurman, this Court also concluded that the duty created by the highway exception includes the obligation to cure any design or construction defect in order to ensure that the road is reasonably safe. See Killeen v Transportation Dep’t, 432 Mich 1, 4; 438 NW2d 233 (1989); Peters v State Hwys Dep’t, 400 Mich 50, 53, n 1; 252 NW2d 799 (1977). I do not believe that this statement of the duty under the highway exception is consistent with the language of the statute, nor with the Legislature’s intent in limiting liability. See Killeen, supra at 19-21 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).9 Under a strict reading of the highway exception, the state or a county would only be bound to fix a design or construction defect when *648that defect left the physical surface of the road in disrepair (or not maintained), and thereby unsafe. For example, the state or a county would be responsible for remedying a construction or design defect that allowed a substantial depression to develop in the roadbed’s surface because of the agency’s failure to ensure that support for the roadbed was girded. Thus, I agree with the result in Peters, supra at 52-53, in which the state’s failure to repair a defect in the road’s drainage system allowed a body of water, up to ten to twelve inches deep, to collect on the road surface. This defect enabled a substantial obstruction to block free travel on the surface of the roadbed, leaving the surface of the roadbed legally in disrepair. However, I would overrule Killeen in which the alleged defect was a “superelevation” of the road because the defect did not arise from the physical surface of the roadbed. Id. at 5. In the present case, the allegation in plaintiffs’ complaint about a design defect was also unrelated to the roadbed’s surface.10
*649m. legislative history
A. PREDECESSOR STATUTES
Finally, I wish to briefly examine this Court’s treatment of the highway exception’s predecessor statutes to dispel any misapprehension about the significance I believe these cases have for the statute at issue. See Chaney, supra at 178-216 (Levin, J., dissenting). The present highway exception was enacted under 1964 PA 170. Before 1964, this Court interpreted the predecessor statutes, 1879 PA 244,11 1885 PA 214,12 and *6501887 PA 264,13 to provide that a municipality (“township, village, city or corporation”) was obliged to ensure that the road was in a “reasonably safe” condition.14
*651In McEvoy v Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich 172, 176; 98 NW 1006 (1904), this Court recognized that there was a conflict in the cases because the 1879 act was open to two incompatible constructions:
[O]ne, that it imposed upon municipalities an obligation to use diligence to keep their highways and streets in a condition reasonably safe and fit for public travel; and the other, that it imposed upon municipalities only the obligation to use due diligence to keep their highways and streets in good repair.
This Court decided to embrace the first interpretation, as it had held in Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458; 42 NW 50 (1889), and decided to disregard the analysis, although not necessarily the results, of the conflicting cases, as represented by McArthur v Saginaw, 58 Mich 357; 25 NW 313 (1885), among others.15 I do not quarrel with this holding or with the conclusion that the previous statutes required that a municipality ensure that a road was in a reasonably safe condition. However, the Legislature repealed this statute and, in enacting a new one, substantially changed the duty that it created.
B. 1964 PA 170
In response to this Court’s decision to abrogate common-law governmental immunity for municipalities in Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961), the Legislature enacted the governmental immunity act under 1964 PA 170 in order to restore governmental immunity to municipalities and to provide uniform treatment for state and local agencies. *652Ross, supra at 604-605. The Legislature created exceptions to governmental immunity, including a highway exception under MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). For the first two sentences of this statute, the Legislature borrowed provisions from 1887 PA 264: the first sentence of the new statute was basically taken from the first sentence of § 3 of 1887 PA 264, and the second from 1887 PA 264’s first sentence of § l.16 In reestablishing the highway exception, however, the Legislature specifically reduced the scope of liability for the state or a county road commission in the statute’s fourth sentence from what it created in the first sentence by eliminating liability for the state *653and counties for “sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway.” MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1). Instead, in this fourth sentence, the Legislature explained that the duty only extended to the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.”
Moreover, in limiting this liability, the Legislature described the nature of the duty as requiring the state or county only to “repair and maintain” the improved portion of the highway. I believe, in construing this statute narrowly, that this sentence not only limits the scope of liability, but also limits the nature of the duty the Legislature intended to create for these agencies. See part i(b).
IV. APPLICATION
In applying this properly strict interpretation of the highway exception statute to the facts of this case, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision to grant summary disposition in favor of the Gratiot County Road Commission.17 Plaintiffs argue that the commission failed to keep this intersection reasonably safe in two different regards: (1) it did not place adequate signs to warn motorists of the danger of the improperly designed intersection where there were no traffic controls, and (2) it failed to warn motorists of the obstructed vision (a “point of hazard”) caused by the apple orchard growing on private property near the intersection.
There is no dispute that the alleged hazard from the lack of traffic controls in this intersection did not *654arise from the disrepair of the roadbed (or from a failure to maintain the roadbed), and that the alleged design defect did not compromise the integrity of the roadbed surface. The duties imposed on the state and counties under the highway exception statute do not include the installation and maintenance of signs for dangers that do not arise from a defect in the roadbed. Consequently, the road commission is not subject to liability for the alleged lack of adequate signage at the intersection.
Moreover, the alleged danger due to the apple orchard did not arise from the roadbed. In fact, this Court ruled on almost the identical issue in Prokop, the companion case to Scheurman. The plaintiff in Prokop, supra at 633, argued that the road commission was liable under the statute because it failed to remove a six-foot hedge, located on private property, that obstructed the view of travelers. This Court concluded that there was no liability:
[T]he indisputable fact is that the hedge in question was on private property and had no connection with the roadbed or public travel thereon. While the hedge may have interfered with compass-range vision within the intersection, it cannot be categorized as a defective condition upon the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel . . . .” [Id. at 635 (Riley, C.J.).]
Similarly, in this case, I would conclude that there was no liability.
The duty identified by the majority cannot reasonably be reconciled with the result in Prokop.18 Accord*655ing to the reasoning of the majority, the plaintiff in Prokop failed to come under the highway exception as a matter of law merely because she neglected to argue that the hedge created a “point of hazard,” like the apple orchard allegedly did in the present case, requiring the road commission to erect a sign to alert drivers of this hazard. Hence, substantially nothing from Prokop survives this opinion. I also question whether this Court will need to revisit the result we reached in Chaney as a consequence of the majority’s decision today.19
CONCLUSION
I believe that the Court of Appeals properly relied on Scheurman, supra, in affirming the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition in favor of defendant Gratiot County Road Commission. The statute is unambiguous in creating a governmental duty to repair and maintain only the improved portion of *656the highway designed for vehicular travel. This conclusion is faithful to the plain meaning of the provision defining the scope of the duty of the state and counties. Consequently, the state or a county road commission would only be liable when its failure to repair or maintain the improved portion of the highway, i.e., the physical structure of the roadbed surface, causes an injury. There is no obligation to warn motorists about dangers that do not arise from the condition of the roadbed itself. Hence, the Gratiot County Road Commission is protected from liability as a matter of law because plaintiffs’ claims about the alleged dangers (an upcoming intersection and an apple orchard obstructing the motorists’ view) were unrelated to the highway roadbed itself. I would affirm.
Weaver, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 H a statute is unambiguous, this Court may not engage in judicial construction, but must apply the statute as written. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995); Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993). This Court accords statutory language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning. Turner, supra at 27; Mull v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 444 Mich 508, 514, n 7; 510 NW2d 184 (1994). However, where the meaning of the statute is unclear, judicial construction is necessary. Turner, supra at 27.

 If the majority were right, the second sentence should read:
Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.
*638Instead, the Legislature sets this clause off by commas, suggesting this understanding:
Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and [in breaching this duty thereby fails to keep the road] in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.

 Joined by Cavanagh and Griffin, JJ.

 See also Chaney, supra at 166 (Riley, J., joined by Griffin, J.) (“[T]he clear and unambiguous language of the statute imposes liability only when the physical highway is unreasonably unsafe because of physical disrepair of the improved portion of the road designed for vehicular travel’’ [emphasis added]). Chief Justice Cavanagh, writing separately, stated that he also “reluctantly” joined this opinion. Chaney, supra at 177.

 Thus, I do not agree with the majority that this duty “implicates factors not physically within the improved portion of the roadway itself . . . .” Ante at 622-623.
I dispute the claim in Justice Boyle’s concurrence that I have “collapse [d]” the duty recognized by the fourth sentence of the statute with the one created by the first. See ante at 627. The duty articulated by the statute’s first sentence (“maintain the highway in reasonable repair”) and fourth sentence (“repair and maintain highways”) are essentially the same. In Justice Boyle’s concurrence, she concludes that “an actionable breach of duty might occur where a governmental unit fails to warn of a dangerous condition of the roadway surface” and that this statutory duty to repair and maintain the highway is discharged by “repairing the highway or warning motorists using the highway of a dangerous condition of the roadway itself." Ante at 626, 628 (emphasis added). She later concludes that there was no point of hazard in this case, except from the design *640defect, because the alleged dangers did “not constitute a hazardous condition of the roadway surface as a result of improper maintenance of the roadway surface itself." Ante at 632 (emphasis added). This analysis appears to recognize the same standard I have identified, although Justice Boyle applies it differently for the design defect claim. Justice Boyle does not explain why the allegation that the road commission failed to properly design the intersection indicates that there is a defect in the roadbed surface.

 In fact, Chief Justice Cavanagh himself appeared to recognize this point in his concurring opinion in Chaney, supra at 178. In that case, Justice Brickley wrote the lead opinion and offered a very similar interpretation of the highway exception as Justice Cavanagh does in the present case. Justice Brickley concluded that MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) “encompasses (1) installations physically located within that traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, or (2) some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.” Chaney, supra at 158 (emphasis added). Cf. Justice Cavanagh’s definition of “point of hazard,” ante at 623. In response to Justice Brickley’s interpretation, Justice Cavanagh concluded:
Justice Brickley’s interpretation does not provide a standard with which to guide both the bench and bar. The test is vulnerable to endless interpretation, encouraging recurrent appellate litigation. [Chaney, supra at 178.]

 In a concurring opinion in Scheurman, supra at 637, Justice Boyle “join[ed] in both the rationale and result” of this opinion with the understanding that
it does not preclude the application of [the statute] in cases alleging a failure to “repair and maintain” installations that are integral to, if not part of, the “improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” such as traffic lights and signs. [Emphasis added.]
*643There is no dispute in the present case that the Gratiot County Road Commission had not placed any signs at this intersection. Thus, there were no existing signs to “repair and maintain.” See also Chaney, supra at 152-153, 176-177 (Boyle, J., concurring) (“The plaintiffs claim is barred by governmental immunity because he does not allege a failure to repair and maintain the paved surface of the roadway or a traffic sign or signal,” even though the plaintiff alleged that the transportation department “failed to provide adequate warnings of dangers on the entrance ramp”).

 As the majority notes, this Court did state in Mason, supra at 135 that “[t]he highway exception abrogates governmental immunity except [sic] at ‘points of special danger to motorists. . . Grof v Michigan, 126 Mich App 427, 434; 337 NW2d 345 (1983); Comerica Bank of Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Transportation, 168 Mich App 84, 86; 424 NW2d 2 (1987).” However, this statement from Mason does not, by itself, indicate that the Court departed from the plain meaning of the highway exception statute. Rather, the Court employed the phrase “points of special danger to motorists” in order to emphasize that the highway exception statute was intended to protect motorists and not pedestrians, the pivotal point of that case. This Court did not hold that there was a duty to post signs for dangers that do not arise from the physical roadbed itself.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals cases cited in Mason did state that the statute created a duty to post signs even where the state and road commission had kept the road surface in reasonable repair. See Comerica, *644supra at 86-87 (inadequate signage at intersection); Grof, supra at 434-435 (inadequate signage at intersection). This conclusion conflicts with the limitations placed in the statute by the Legislature. Consequently, I would overrule these cases insofar as they hold that the statute creates a more burdensome duty.
In other cases, the Court of Appeals has previously reached the conclusion, I believe erroneously, that the public highway exception created a duty to ensure that the road was reasonably safe even if there was no disrepair in the roadbed. See, e.g., Hutchinson v Allegan Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs (On Remand), 192 Mich App 472, 479-480; 481 NW2d 807 (1992) (failure to place guardrail to protect drivers from adjacent ditch); Hall v State Hwys Dep’t, 109 Mich App 592, 602-603; 311 NW2d 813 (1981) (failure to properly design a median guardrail); Bennett v City of Lansing, 52 Mich App 289, 294-295; 217 NW2d 54 (1974) (failure to repair malfunctioning traffic control light); Lynes v St Joseph Co Rd Comm, 29 Mich App 51, 54-58; 185 NW2d 111 (1970) (inadequate signage). But see Alpert v Ann Arbor, 172 Mich App 223, 230; 431 NW2d 467 (1988); Zyskowski v Habelmann (On Remand), 169 Mich App 98, 103; 425 NW2d 711 (1988) (“The first sentence . . . suggests that only the physical structure of the road itself was contemplated”).

 “The statute does not impose a duty to repair defects in design or construction.” Id. at 20.

 Furthermore, before Scheurman, this Court recognized that the highway exception rendered a governmental agency liable for a design or construction defect of a guardrail. See Endykiewicz v State Hwy Comm, 414 Mich 377, 380; 324 NW2d 755 (1982); Arnold v State Hwys Dep’t, 406 Mich 235, 236; 277 NW2d 627 (1979). I do not believe that this conclusion from these cases remains good law after this Court’s recent ruling in Chaney, supra. Although we issued four opinions among the five justices in the majority, these opinions agreed that the highway exception did not create a duty for the state to properly design and construct the concrete bridge abutment and adjoining guardrail. Rather, we affirmed the Court of Appeals decision upholding the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of the Department of Transportation where the plaintiff’s injuries arose from an allegedly defective guardrail. See Chaney, supra at 161-162 (Brickley, J.), 167-168 (Riley, J., joined by Griffin, J.), 171 (Boyle, J.), 177 (Cavanagh, C.J., joining the opinion of Riley, J.). Thus, Endykiewicz and Arnold were effectively overruled on this point.

 Act 244 provided in pertinent part:
[Section 1.] That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, crosswalks and culverts on the same in good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, by the township, village, city, or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, crosswalk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in good repair, such township, village, city, or corporation shall be liable to, and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before any court of competent jurisdiction.
[Section 4.] It is hereby made the duty of townships, villages, cities, or corporations to keep in good repair, so that they shall be safe and convenient for public travel at all times, all public highways, streets, bridges, crosswalks, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control, and which are open to public travel. [Emphasis added.]

 Act 214 amended §§ 1 and 4 of 1879 PA 244 by adding “sidewalks” to the list of public areas that the authorities are responsible for protecting, replaced “good repair” with “reasonable repair,” and added the term “reasonably” before “safe and convenient” in § 4. See n 13. This amendment was held to be unconstitutional because certain revisions were not described in the title of the act. Church v Detroit, 64 Mich 571, 574-575; 31 NW 447 (1887).

 Act 264 superseded the previous act, but reenacted the identical language of §§ 1 and 4 of 1885 PA 214 as §§ 1 and 3. Thus, this act provided in pertinent part:
[Section 1.] That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this State, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross-walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, cross-walk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction.
[Section 3.] It is hereby made the duty of townships, villages, cities, or corporations to Iceep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, cross-walks and culverts that are within their jurisdiction, and under their care and control, and which are open to public travel .... [Emphasis added.]

 See, e.g., O’Hare v Detroit, 362 Mich 19, 22; 106 NW2d 538 (1960) (failure to replace a knocked-down stop sign), and cases cited therein at 24; Malloy v Walker Twp, 77 Mich 448, 460-464; 43 NW 1012 (1889) (failure to provide a barrier or railings along an embankment); Joslyn v Detroit, 74 Mich 458, 460; 42 NW 50 (1889) (the failure to place a sign to alert travelers of an obstruction in the road). See also Mullins v Wayne Co, 16 Mich App 365, 373-374; 168 NW2d 246 (1969), and Michigan Supreme Court cases cited therein at 376. But see McArthur v Saginaw, 58 Mich 357, 361; 25 NW 313 (1885) (“the statutory liability [from 1879 PA 244] was confined to such defects in streets as arose from their being out of repair, and did not cover objects forming no part of the streets”). See also McKellar v Detroit, 57 Mich 158, 160; 23 NW 621 (1885) (“The natural meaning of the act, both in the title and in the body, is to create liability only for having ways out of repair and defective on that account”); Agnew v Corunna, 55 Mich 428, 430; 21 NW 873 (1885) (“The statute [1879 PA 244] does not seem to be aimed at indirect and remote mischiefs, but to those which follow from a direct injury caused by the want of repair”).

 See McEvoy, supra at 178-183. See also Kowalczyk v Bailey, 379 Mich 568, 571-572; 153 NW2d 660 (1967).

 In the first sentence of 1964 PA 170, the language of 1887 PA 264 in § 3 (“It is hereby made the duty of townships, villages, cities, or corporations to keep in reasonable repair . . . .”) is transformed into “[e]ach governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair . . . ." (Emphasis added.) In the second sentence, the Legislature changed the first sentence of § 1 (“[A]ny person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this State, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross-walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair . . . .”) to provide that “[a]ny person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair . . . .”
The third sentence states that “liability, procedure and remedy” for county roads would be taken from MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121, which was established under 1909 PA 283. This statute provides in part:
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel.
In interpreting this provision, the Court of Appeals in Mullins, n 14 supra at 373-374, relied on Joslyn, supra, and concluded that this statute imposes a duty to keep county roads reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The majority notes that this provision is not at issue in the case before us. See ante at 611, n 3.

 203 Mich App 138, 141; 511 NW2d 694 (1993).

 I also note that, contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante at 623, the plurality’s reasoning in Scheurman that the highway exception did not require the state to install street lighting was not based on MCL 247.651b; *655MSA 9.1097(lb) (placing the cost of highway maintenance on the state transportation department, but specifically excluding the maintenance of streetlights). See Scheurman, supra at 632 (“we do not believe [§ lb] to be dispositive of the question[;] [n]or do we believe that it is the issue here”).

 In rejecting the plurality’s reasoning from Scheurman, the minority may require the Court of Appeals to revisit questions that it resolved in favor of the state or a county on the basis of Scheurman and Chaney. See, e.g., Zwolinski v Transportation Dep’t (After Remand), 210 Mich App 496, 498-499; 534 NW2d 163 (1995) (failure to install a guardrail along a steep slope of an acyoining embankment); Fortunate v Transportation Dep’t, 208 Mich App 467, 468; 528 NW2d 743 (1995) (failure to design a pedestrian bridge to prevent people from throwing concrete blocks at cars); Colovos v Transportation Dep’t, 205 Mich App 524, 525; 517 NW2d 803 (1994) (failure to provide adequate warning signs for danger presented by ice on a bridge); Fogarty v Transportation Dep’t, 200 Mich App 572, 573; 504 NW2d 710 (1993) (grassy median); Coluccelli v Wayne Co, 196 Mich App 387, 389-390; 493 NW2d 439 (1992) (guardrail on grassy median); Soule v Macomb Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 196 Mich App 235, 237-238; 492 NW2d 783 (1992) (failure to construct a shoulder).