Court Opinion

ID: 9391367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 00:00:33.213592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.356851
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40381         Document: 00516733497             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/01/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                             May 1, 2023
                                        No. 22-40381                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   Dustin Reynolds,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Wood County, Texas; Angela Speakman; Bradley Cox;
   Chelsea Fuller; Mark Taylor; Logan Miller,

                                                                  Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 6:20-CV-271

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          This case involves alleged constitutional violations committed by
   officers when they placed a detainee in a restraint chair for approximately 14
   hours and allowed him to urinate on himself. We AFFIRM the district
   court’s grant of summary judgment as to the individual officer-defendants’
   qualified immunity and as to municipal liability against Wood County.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40381      Document: 00516733497           Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/01/2023

                                     No. 22-40381

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          On the evening of July 3, 2018, Wood County Deputy William Burge
   observed Plaintiff Dustin Reynolds consuming a beer and possessing a dog in
   the water of Lake Holbrook, which were both violations of the lake’s govern-
   ing rules. When Burge approached Reynolds and asked for his identification,
   Reynolds became angry and began to yell and use profanity. As Burge at-
   tempted to run Reynolds’s driver’s license number, Reynolds continued yell-
   ing profane language. Burge then activated his body camera.
          As Burge arrested Reynolds, Reynolds continued to yell obscenities
   and resist arrest. During transport to the Wood County Jail, Reynolds re-
   peatedly kicked and used his hands to hit the back seat of Burge’s patrol ve-
   hicle, yelling profanities at Burge. Reynolds hit his own head against the par-
   tition in the patrol vehicle several times.
          Upon arrival at the jail around 7:00 p.m., Reynolds exited the vehicle
   yelling and resisting escort into the jail. As he was escorted into the jail,
   Reynolds attempted to kick and spit at officers as he continued to shout pro-
   fanities, and he refused to answer intake questions.
          To protect Reynolds and the jail staff, the officers then strapped Reyn-
   olds into a restraint chair and placed a spit mask over his mouth. Officers
   tried to complete the booking process with Reynolds multiple times, but he
   remained combative and refused to answer all questions. Promptly after be-
   ing strapped into the restraint chair, a nurse tended to Reynolds’s superficial
   wounds, then checked on him again later.
          Reynolds remained in the restraint chair until his hearing before a
   magistrate judge the following morning on July 4. He stayed in the restraint
   chair for a total of 14 hours, during which time he was offered water and limb
   exercises. Throughout the night, officers checked on Reynolds every 15
   minutes.

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          On the morning of July 4, while in the restraint chair, Reynolds uri-
   nated on himself. About one hour later, officers released Reynolds from the
   restraint chair and provided him clean clothes. Following his hearing, he was
   permitted to shower.
          Reynolds later filed suit against Wood County, Texas, and jail officers
   Mark Taylor, Angela Speakman, Logan Miller, Chelsea Fuller, and Bradley
   Cox in their individual capacities. Reynolds alleged the following claims un-
   der 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) excessive force against Speakman, Taylor, Fuller,
   Miller, and Cox; (2) deliberate indifference against Speakman, Taylor,
   Fuller, Miller, and Cox; (3) deliberate indifference against Cox; (4) bystander
   liability against Speakman, Taylor, Fuller, Miller, and Cox; and (5) deliberate
   indifference against Wood County.
          The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judg-
   ment, finding that the individual officer-defendants were entitled to qualified
   immunity and that Reynolds could not establish liability against Wood
   County. Reynolds timely appealed.
                                  DISCUSSION
           This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
   the same standard the district court applied. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864
   F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the mo-
   vant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
   Factual disputes are material if they “might affect the outcome of the suit
   under the governing law,” and they are genuine “if the evidence is such that
   a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
   v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where, as here, an individual
   defendant asserts qualified immunity, plaintiffs “must rebut the defense by
   establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official’s allegedly

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   wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.”          Vann v. City of
   Southaven, 884 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
          On appeal, Reynolds challenges the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment on all claims. We consider the claims separately.
          I.     Qualified immunity for the individual officer-defendants
          Reynolds contends the district court erred in granting the individual
   officer-defendants qualified immunity as to his Section 1983 claims for
   excessive force, bystander liability, and deliberate indifference.
          “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct
   violates a clearly established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine,
   333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003). The test for qualified immunity involves
   two steps: “first we ask whether the officer’s alleged conduct has violated a
   federal right”; “second we ask whether the right in question was clearly
   established at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on
   notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th
   975, 981 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
          “To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently
   clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be settled law,
   which means it is dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of
   cases of persuasive authority.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
   589–90 (2018) (quotations marks and citations omitted). “It is not enough
   that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
   clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the
   particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. at 590. The Supreme Court
   has explained that its “‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the
   legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular
   circumstances before him.” Id. (emphasis added).

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          The Court has also stated, though, that cases involving
   “fundamentally similar” facts are not always necessary to provide the “fair
   warning” that officers require. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002).
   “[A] general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may
   apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question.” Taylor v.
   Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
                 a.      Excessive force
          Reynolds argues the district court improperly granted the individual
   officer-defendants qualified immunity on Reynolds’s excessive force claim.
   Reynolds concedes it was reasonable for the officers to place him in a restraint
   chair while he was initially combative, but he argues it was objectively unrea-
   sonable in light of clearly established law to keep him in the restraint chair for
   an additional 12 to 13 hours after he calmed down and was compliant.
          “A pretrial detainee receives the protection of the Due Process Clause
   of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455–
   56 (5th Cir. 1994). Force against a pretrial detainee is “excessive” and a vi-
   olation of the Fourteenth Amendment when the force is objectively unrea-
   sonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015). Courts weigh
   the following factors to determine reasonableness:
          the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
          amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any
          effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of
          force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat
          reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff
          was actively resisting.
   Id. at 397.
          “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged
   from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
   20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

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   “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that po-
   lice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circum-
   stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount
   of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97. “If an of-
   ficer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight
   back, for instance, the officer would be justified in using more force than in
   fact was needed.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
          We agree with the district court that genuine fact disputes exist as to
   whether the officers’ conduct violated Reynolds’s constitutional rights as a
   pretrial detainee. As the district court found, “the facts about whether Reyn-
   olds presented a continued threat — the justification for the restraint chair
   — are disputed.” We therefore focus our analysis on whether the alleged
   violated right was clearly established. The district court determined there
   was insufficient clarity to deny qualified immunity.
          Reynolds relies primarily on the 2002 Supreme Court decision Hope
   v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730. There, prison guards forced plaintiff Hope to stand
   with his arms over his shoulders and handcuffed to a hitching post, shirtless,
   in the sun for seven hours, while giving him water only once or twice and
   denying him access to the restroom. Id. at 734–35. The guards taunted Hope
   about his thirst by giving water to dogs and spilling water from a cooler on the
   ground in front of him. Id. at 735. Finding that the actions were punitive and
   served no penological purpose, the Supreme Court concluded the guards had
   violated Hope’s Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 737–38. Hope stands for
   the proposition that a violation can be so blatant or egregious that officers
   need no on-point precedent to know their conduct is illegal because of the
   “obvious cruelty inherent” in handcuffing a prisoner to a post for seven
   hours. Id. at 745.

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          The district court found that the facts in Hope are distinguishable from
   those in this case. The overarching constitutional violation was the act of
   handcuffing the inmate to a hitching post and taunting him. Id. at 745–46. In
   Hope, there was no underlying security reason for the inmate’s treatment; it
   was purely punitive and the guards purposely increased Hope’s pain and suf-
   fering. Id. at 737–38.
          In contrast, Reynolds was placed in a restraint chair in a climate-con-
   trolled facility, was checked on every 15 minutes, and was offered necessities
   such as water, limb exercises, and medical care. Additionally, detention in
   the restraint chair resulted from his unsafe behavior and, though temporarily
   uncomfortable, was not objectively severe enough to violate the Fourteenth
   Amendment. Further, as the district court correctly noted, “nothing in Hope
   indicates at what point a restraint would become unconstitutional once an
   inmate quiets down.” Thus, Hope provides no support for Reynolds’s con-
   tention that remaining in the restraint chair under these circumstances vio-
   lated his clearly established constitutional rights.
          Reynolds also relies on one of this court’s opinions that held, “an ex-
   ercise of force that is reasonable at one moment can become unreasonable in
   the next if the justification for the use of force has ceased.” See Lytle v. Bexar
   Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2009). In that case, following a brief police
   chase, the officer-defendant fired his sidearm twice in the rear of a vehicle,
   striking and killing a passenger. Id. at 407–08. Firing a deadly weapon at a
   fleeing vehicle containing passengers is not analogous to strapping a com-
   bative detainee in a restraint chair and monitoring him throughout the night.
          Reynolds’s burden was to identify caselaw that put the individual of-
   ficer-defendants on notice that their alleged conduct was unlawful. Reynolds
   has not met his burden. Reynolds therefore cannot demonstrate that all rea-
   sonable officers would have believed it was a violation of a detainee’s

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   constitutional rights to keep him in a restraint chair for 14 hours under these
   circumstances. Qualified immunity as to the excessive force claims was
   properly granted.
                 b.      Bystander liability
          As Reynolds acknowledges, “this Court’s resolution of the excessive
   force claim will also resolve the bystander liability claim.” “An officer is lia-
   ble for failure to intervene when that officer: (1) knew a fellow officer was
   violating an individual’s constitutional rights, (2) was present at the scene of
   the constitutional violation, (3) had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
   harm but nevertheless, (4) chose not to act.” Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v.
   Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020).
          Thus, the individual officer-defendants are not liable on Reynolds’s
   bystander liability claim because the underlying excessive force claim fails.
                 c.      Deliberate indifference
          Reynolds alleges all individual officer-defendants violated his Four-
   teenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a substantial risk of serious
   bodily harm and responding with deliberate indifference. Specifically, Reyn-
   olds opposes summary judgment on the ground that he was denied restroom
   access and forced to remain in his urine for over an hour in the restraint chair.
          The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right
   “not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on
   the part of the confining officials.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447,
   457 (5th Cir. 2001). Reynolds must demonstrate “(1) objectively, the de-
   fendants exposed him to a substantial risk of serious harm and denied him the
   minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities and (2) subjectively, the de-
   fendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk.” Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d
   211, 224 (5th Cir. 2019). “Deliberate indifference is an extremely high

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   standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756
   (5th Cir. 2001).
          Deliberate indifference may be established through inferences arising
   from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may infer the requisite
   knowledge from the fact that the risk of harm was “obvious.” See Farmer v.
   Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994); Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 385 (5th
   Cir. 2020). A custodial officer acts with deliberate indifference to a de-
   tainee’s serious medical needs if the officer “‘refuse[s] to treat him, ignore[s]
   his complaints, intentionally treat[s] him incorrectly, or engage[s] in any sim-
   ilar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious
   medical needs.’” Sims v. Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 951 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
   Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 2006)).
          The district court found that “denying Reynolds restroom access un-
   der the circumstances here did not create a substantial risk of serious harm.”
   While we have held that denying inmates “a minimally sanitary way to relieve
   themselves” may expose them to a substantial risk of serious harm, we cau-
   tioned that such cases are “extraordinary” and explicitly warned that
   “[n]othing in th[ese] opinion[s] requires prison officials to provide a prisoner
   with a squeaky-clean toilet nor to escort him to the restroom whenever he
   wishes.” Taylor, 946 F.3d at 225, 225 n.20 (citing Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d
   346, 352–53 (5th Cir. 1999)). We acknowledge the obvious — that Reynolds
   is not complaining that the toilet provided was not squeaky-clean. The com-
   plaint is that no access to a toilet, clean or not, was provided.
          In our Taylor decision, prison officials ordered the plaintiff “to urinate
   in the drain in his cell’s floor, even though it was already overflowing with
   sewage.” Id. at 223. After more than 24 hours, the plaintiff’s bladder pain
   was so great that he involuntarily urinated into the drain, which overflowed
   and spilled sewage onto the floor, on which he was forced to sleep naked. Id.

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   “Eventually, [the plaintiff] had to be treated for a distended bladder and was
   catheterized.” Id. We held that a reasonable jury could find that in these
   circumstances the plaintiff was exposed “to a substantial risk of serious harm
   and deprived . . . of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id.
   at 224.
             Similarly, Palmer v. Johnson dealt with a plaintiff and 48 other inmates
   who were forced to sleep outdoors overnight; were confined to a 20-by-30-
   foot area bounded by poles and lights for 17 hours; were denied shelter, jack-
   ets, blankets, or other means of keeping warm in temperatures below 59 de-
   grees; were exposed to noxious fumes; and were made to urinate and defecate
   in the ground beneath themselves, right next to their fellow inmates. 193 F.3d
   at 349–50.
             We agree with the district court that both Taylor and Palmer are dis-
   tinguishable from this case:
             Reynolds’s deprivation here was very different. Reynolds was
             not held in an unsanitary cell, was not exposed to sewage or the
             waste of others, and was not forced to urinate and defecate in a
             confined area shared with other detainees. Rather, Reynolds
             was kept in a clean, climate-controlled cell by himself with De-
             fendants checking on him regularly.
             Reynolds sat in his urine for just “over an hour” before the officers
   released him from the restraint chair, gave him a clean jail uniform, had the
   floor mopped, and permitted Reynolds to take a shower. Reynolds’s alleged
   injuries, at worst, amount to temporary sensations of discomfort, not serious
   harm. As the district court stated, “Reynolds was not subjected to inhumane
   conditions and was given an opportunity to clean himself after release.” Ac-
   cordingly, Reynolds cannot show a substantial risk of serious harm.
             Moreover, there is no evidence that the individual officer-defendants
   acted with deliberate indifference to such alleged risk. Reynolds’s only

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   allegation in support of his contention is that officers should have known he
   would urinate on himself if kept in the restraint chair overnight, and that De-
   fendant Cox allegedly told Reynolds he should urinate on himself. Neither
   the refusal to release Reynolds from the chair nor Defendant Cox’s alleged
   statement is evidence that any individual officer-defendant was actually
   aware of a substantial risk of serious harm or subjectively intended that harm
   occur.
            In sum, Reynolds cannot show the individual officer-defendants pos-
   sessed information that made them subjectively infer that a substantial risk of
   serious harm existed and that they intended harm to occur. Qualified im-
   munity for the individual officer-defendants was properly granted as to all of
   Reynolds’s constitutional claims.
            II.    Monell liability against Wood County
            Reynolds also asserts the district court erred in granting summary
   judgment as to his deliberate indifference claim against Wood County. Reyn-
   olds contends Wood County maintained a “custom and practice” of using
   the restraint chair longer than necessary and as a form of punishment.
            Local governments are liable for a policy or custom that causes a con-
   stitutional injury under Section 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
   658, 690–91 (1978). To succeed on a municipal liability claim, plaintiffs must
   show “(1) an official policy (or custom), (2) of which a policy maker can be
   charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional vio-
   lation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy (or custom).” Newbury v. City of
   Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 680 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotations marks and citations
   omitted).
            An official policy is “[a] policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
   decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s law-
   making officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated

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   policy-making authority.” Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th
   Cir. 1984). An official policy can also be
          [a] persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employ-
          ees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and
          promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to consti-
          tute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or
          constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to
          the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom
          that body had delegated policy-making authority.
   Id.
          Proving a custom or practice “requires sufficiently numerous prior in-
   cidents, as opposed to isolated instances.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588
   F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotations marks and citations omitted). Prior
   incidents must be similar and specific: “prior indications cannot simply be
   for any and all bad or unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific viola-
   tion in question.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Isolated inci-
   dents of official misconduct by a governmental entity’s non-policymaking
   employees are inadequate to prove knowledge and acquiescence by the en-
   tity’s policymakers. See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th
   Cir. 1992).
          The district court here held that Reynolds cannot establish municipal
   liability against Wood County because there was no evidence of a policy or
   custom, and Reynolds failed to show a policymaker had knowledge of the al-
   leged unconstitutional policy. Reynolds’s only evidence of an allegedly un-
   constitutional “custom and practice” are over 50 “15 Minute Check Sheets”
   showing the instances in which the restraint chair was used in the Wood

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   County Jail between February 19, 2018, and July 26, 2019.2 The district court
   found two problems with Reynolds’s summary judgment evidence. First,
           the logs fail to provide enough detail for the court or any rea-
           sonable juror to determine whether using the restraint chair in
           the prior instances was improper. Each of the fifty-three check
           sheets identifies only the detainee’s name, the date, and the
           times a jailer checked on the detainee in the chair.
    Reynolds admits, “the use of a restraint chair is not ipso facto unconstitu-
   tional.” Reynolds argues, though, the district court should have inferred —
   from the face of the Check Sheets only — that inmates without a “4” nota-
   tion for “combative” were not combative. The district court addressed why
   it could not make such an assumption:
           Reynolds offers no evidence corroborating his claim that every
           time an officer failed to mark “combative” on a log the de-
           tainee had ceased to pose a threat. The logs therefore show
           nothing more than Defendants using a restraint chair on other
           detainees.
           As the district court stated, using a restraint chair, even for extended
   periods, is not inherently unconstitutional. For example, a panel once held
   that restraining a pretrial detainee for up to 20 hours was not unconstitu-
   tional, because the restraint was necessary to prevent the detainee’s disrup-
   tive behavior. Blakeney v. Rusk Cnty. Sheriff, 89 F. App’x 897, 899 (5th Cir.
   2004). We agree that the length of time for the restraint will not generally be
   enough to show a constitutional violation. The Check Sheets merely show

           2
             Wood County objected to the admissibility of the “15 Minute Check Sheets.”
   The district court determined that it “need not decide the objection because even assuming
   the logs are admissible, the Court concludes that they are insufficient to raise a genuine
   issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.” We agree with the district court and
   therefore do not revisit Wood County’s renewed objection on appeal.

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   use of the restraint chair for various amounts of time, not whether the use
   was improper.
            Second, the district court cited some Fifth Circuit caselaw disfavoring
   finding an unconstitutional custom or practice based upon “historical rec-
   ords lacking contemporaneous allegations of misconduct.” See Davidson v.
   City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 396 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 31,
   2017); Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). Reynolds
   has produced no prior lawsuits or complaints involving use of the restraint
   chair in the Wood County Jail. In fact, insofar as this record shows, Reyn-
   olds’s complaint is the first.
            The Check Sheets, therefore, cannot establish a custom or practice of
   improperly using the restraint chair. “Mere ‘improbable inferences’ and
   ‘unsupported speculation’ are not proper summary judgment evidence.”
   Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 169 (5th Cir. 2010).
            The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Monell
   claim.
            AFFIRMED.

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