Court Opinion

ID: 9363910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 21:00:44.641266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.860098
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 11 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANGELICA C. LIMCACO, an individual,             No.    21-56285

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-11372-RSWL-MAA
 v.

STEVE WYNN, an individual; et al.,              MEMORANDUM*

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                   Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted December 6, 2022
                              Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, BADE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Appellant Angelica Limcaco appeals the dismissal of her civil claim brought

under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      Limcaco asserts that she was wrongfully terminated from Wynn Las Vegas

(WLV) resorts in 2005, after reporting the alleged rape and impregnation of a former

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
coworker by Appellee Steve Wynn (Wynn). She alleges that she was threatened into

silence and therefore did not come forward with her claims until September 2018

when she sued in federal district court in Nevada (the Nevada Matter) under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed the claim as time barred,

and we affirmed. Limcaco v. Wynn, 809 F. App’x 465, 467 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.

denied sub nom. Limcaco v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 1688 (2021).

      Limcaco then sued in federal district court in California under RICO. The

core of Limcaco’s claim is that Appellees illegally influenced the appointment of

WLV’s counsel, Elayna Youchah, as a magistrate judge in the District of Nevada

where the Nevada Matter was pending.1 She contends that Appellees were part of a

RICO conspiracy to protect Wynn casino gaming licenses and that losing the Nevada

Matter would threaten those licenses. The district court again dismissed. We again

affirm.

      1. The district court properly determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction

over Buckley. “[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to

the forum.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). “The proper question is

not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the

defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. Limcaco

1
 The additional details surrounding the alleged conspiracy are numerous, attenuated
at best, and irrelevant to the disposition of this case.

                                         2
fails to allege that Buckley directed any conduct at California or that her claims arise

out of that purposeful direction. See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647

F.3d 1218, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2011).

      The district court also properly determined that nationwide service of process

under 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) was inappropriate. Nationwide service under § 1965(b)

requires a court to have personal jurisdiction over at least one of the participants, no

other district to be able to assert personal jurisdiction over all the alleged co-

conspirators, and facts showing the existence of a multidistrict conspiracy

encompassing defendants. See Butcher’s Union Loc. No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788

F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). Limcaco’s allegations—that ML Strategies would

not be subject to jurisdiction in Nevada because it is a Delaware corporation licensed

in Massachusetts and engaged in illegal conduct there, and likewise that

Massachusetts lacks jurisdiction over Buckley because her actions occurred in

Nevada and were aimed at Limcaco in California—are merely conclusory.

Limcaco’s bare assertions that “there is no indication” that Nevada has jurisdiction

over ML Strategies, or that Massachusetts had jurisdiction over Buckley, do not

establish that § 1965(b) applies, particularly when the First Amended Complaint’s

(FAC) primary theory is that all the purported bad actors were engaged in a scheme

aimed at assisting a Nevada entity in securing gaming licenses in Massachusetts.

      2. Limcaco similarly fails to satisfy statutory standing under RICO because

                                           3
she fails to allege an injury to business or property through a RICO violation. See

Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2017). Limcaco asserts

injuries under theories of honest services fraud, loss of chance to pursue her claim

(the Nevada Matter), lost damages from the Nevada Matter, and legal fees.

      The district court did not err in concluding that “deprivation of honest services

alone does not constitute concrete financial loss for purposes of pleading RICO’s

statutory standing requirement.” Additionally, Limcaco’s assertion that she suffered

injury from the lost ability to pursue her claim is not concrete nor financial because

she litigated the Nevada Matter before the district court and this court on appeal.

Limcaco, 809 F. App’x at 467. Limcaco’s lost damages claim similarly fails because

it presupposes success on the merits, which were never addressed. Lastly, Limcaco

cites no case in which this court has ever recognized the incurment of legal fees as a

cognizable injury under RICO. Cf. Thomas v. Baca, 308 F. App’x 87, 88 (9th Cir.

2009) (“This court has not recognized the incurment of legal fees as an injury

cognizable under RICO, and we decline to do so here.”). Even if legal fees could be

a cognizable interest as “deprivation[s] of money,” Limcaco’s assertions still fail to

be sufficiently financial or concrete. Compare Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S.

330, 339 (1979) (“When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers

an injury in both its ‘business’ and its ‘property.’”) with Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon

Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting plaintiff’s burden to assert a

                                          4
cognizable injury).

      Next, Limcaco cannot establish any injury “by reason of” a RICO violation

because she cannot show that Appellees’ conduct was the but-for or proximate cause

of any injury. Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010). As the

district court noted, Limcaco’s complicated theory of causation turns on a

“cascading chain of events” spanning multiple years and involving several third

parties. Limcaco does not adequately allege that, but-for the Appellees’ unlawful

conduct in elevating Youchah, her injury would not have occurred because the

district court dismissed her claim as time barred, and we affirmed that dismissal on

appeal.   Limcaco, 809 F. App’x at 467; see also Richards v. County of San

Bernardino, 39 F.4th 562, 572 (9th Cir. 2022).           Similarly, Limcaco fails to

sufficiently allege proximate causation because her allegations are conditioned on

several independent events2 and do not show that “the alleged violation led directly

to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461

(2006).

2
  These events include conditional payments allegedly connected to the Nevada
Matter (but to which Appellees had committed in 2017, before the Nevada Matter
was filed), Buckley’s service in 2018 on the multi-member panel recommending
finalists for a magistrate judge position, the district court’s selection of Youchah for
that position, and the dismissal of the Nevada Matter on timeliness grounds, which
coincided with a previously-scheduled donation from Wynn resorts to a non-profit
affiliated with Buckley.

                                           5
      3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Limcaco’s requests

for judicial notice.3 See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998

(9th Cir. 2018). The district court found that Limcaco’s first, untimely requests were

filed after the close of briefing and that most of the documents at issue were

discoverable and could have been included in her oppositions to the motion to

dismiss. And the court’s conclusion that Limcaco’s request could be construed as

an improper sur-reply or an attempt to bolster her FAC was not an abuse of

discretion. See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)

(explaining that the “district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties'

motion practice and enforcing local rules”). The district court also did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion to take judicial notice of these documents, which it

did not rely upon, and which were not pertinent or necessary to its rulings on the

motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955,

976 (9th Cir. 2006).

      The court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to notice particular

3
  On appeal, Limcaco has filed three additional motions for judication notice of
documents that allegedly support RICO standing and show that “Appellees exert
improper influence over public officials in the ‘ongoing’ manner in which they ‘do
business.’” ECF Nos. 31, 58, and 71. We deny these motions because “a plaintiff
may not cure her failure to present the trial court with facts sufficient to establish the
validity of her claim by requesting that this court take judicial notice of such facts.”
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc)).

                                            6
facts within Limcaco’s second requests for judicial notice. One of those requests

contained 209 pages, and Limcaco did not identify any particular facts within these

documents.       Thus, the court could not identify any judicially noticeable facts.

Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (“A court must also consider—and identify—which fact or

facts it is noticing . . .”).

       4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant further

leave to amend the FAC because amendment would be futile. See Kendall v. Visa

U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008). Limcaco filed the FAC after

Appellees filed their motion to dismiss; thus, Limcaco had notice of Appellees’

arguments. Nonetheless, Limcaco’s allegations in the FAC, and her arguments in

opposition to dismissal and in her requests for judicial notice, failed to cure the

deficiencies in her assertions of jurisdiction and in her RICO claims. Cafasso v.

Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the

court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad where plaintiff has

previously amended the complaint.” (citation and quotations omitted)).

       AFFIRMED.

                                           7