Court Opinion

ID: 9411039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:26:11.012959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.406737
License: Public Domain

J-A13012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A                  :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.K., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :     No. 84 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-28-DP-0000049-2019

  IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D., A                  :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.K., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :     No. 85 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-28-DP-0000050-2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: JULY 25, 2023

       A.K. (“Mother”) appeals the December 9, 2022 order finding aggravating

circumstances pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.1) with respect to Mother’s

natural daughter, A.D., born in April 2014, and her natural son, D.D., born in

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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January 2016. In the same order, the trial court also directed no efforts be

made toward reunification with respect to Mother.1 We affirm.2

       We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record. Franklin County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the

agency”) have been involved with this family since June 2019, when CYS

assumed emergency custody of A.D. and D.D. following allegations of

inappropriate contact between A.D. and her paternal grandfather, with whom

Father was living at the time. Mother and Father are not married, resided

separately, and exercised equally shared custody of A.D. and D.D. in June

2019. Mother resided with her paramour, Jack Wetzel III. Although A.D. and

D.D. were declared dependent shortly after the agency’s involvement, they

were returned to Mother’s physical custody in April 2021 and the dependency

case was closed in August 2021. Shortly thereafter, Father was incarcerated

for driving under the influence. His anticipated release date is in March 2023.

       In May 2022,

       the agency sought and was granted emergency protective custody
       of the A.D. and D.D. based on allegations that they had

____________________________________________

1 The trial court did not find aggravating circumstances with respect to D.D.
(“Father”). In a separate order filed the same day, the trial court changed the
respective permanency goals from reunification to adoption. Father has
appealed the December 9, 2022 goal change order at 82 and 83 MDA 2023.
We address Father’s claims in a separate memorandum.

2  As discussed further infra, an order finding aggravated circumstances
pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.1) is a collateral order that is immediately
appealable of right. See Interest of A.D.-G., 263 A.3d 21, 26 n.4 (Pa.Super.
2021) (citing In re R.C., 945 A.2d 182, 184 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

                                           -2-
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     insufficiently explained marks and bruises and the school nurse
     was concerned that the children were not safe. A.D. and D.D.
     were placed in foster care. A dependency petition was filed
     alleging the children were without proper parental care or control.
     A shelter care hearing was held on May 12, 2022, after which they
     were placed in the legal and physical custody of the agency with
     placement continuing in foster care.

     [A]n adjudicatory hearing took place on June 10 and June 17,
     2022, after which . . . the trial court on July 7, 2022, found clear
     and convincing evidence to substantiate the allegations in the
     dependency petition. The order in A.D.’s case at CP-28-DP-
     0000049-2019 states,

           [A.D.] sustained multiple injuries and on multiple
           occasions while in the care of [Mother and Mr.
           Wetzel]. The injuries were suggestive of physical
           abuse and physical neglect. The explanation of the
           injuries provided by [Mother] was not credible.

           [D.D.] also sustained multiple injuries on multiple
           occasions while in the care of [Mother and Mr.
           Wetzel]. The injuries were suggestive of physical
           abuse and physical neglect. The explanation of the
           injuries provided by [Mother] was not credible.

           [A.D.] has a significant history of psychological
           impairment as does [D.D.] Parents did not arrange
           necessary counseling services for [A.D. or D.D.] while
           they were in the care of [Mother and Mr. Wetzel].

     Order, 7/5/22. A similar finding was made by order the same date
     in D.D.’s case at CP-XX-XXXXXXX-2019. In both cases, the
     permanency goal was set at reunification.

     The agency filed its motion for a finding of aggravated
     circumstances on July 22, 2022, solely as to Mother[.]

           ....

     A motion to admit out-of-court statements made by A.D. and D.D.
     pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1 was filed by the agency on
     September 19, 2022, seeking the admission of the children’s
     statements to . . . a forensic interviewer at Over the Rainbow

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       Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”). The trial court held a hearing
       on that motion on October 11, 2022. Thereafter, the trial court
       . . . permitted the children’s statements . . . to be admitted at the
       hearing . . ., under what is commonly referred to as the “tender
       years” exception to the rule against hearsay. In reaching this
       determination, the court found the children were “unavailable”
       pursuant to [Sections 5985.1(a)(1)(ii)(B) and (a.1) due to
       emotional distress.]

       On December 6 and 8, 2022, the trial court conducted a joint
       evidentiary hearing on the agency’s aggravated circumstances
       and goal change petitions.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/23, at 2-4 (cleaned up).

       On December 9, 2022, the trial court entered orders finding that the

agency had sufficiently established the requisite aggravating circumstances

pursuant to § 6341(c.1) and directing no efforts be made to reunify Mother

with A.D. or D.D.       The same day, the trial court entered separate orders

changing the respective permanency goals from reunification to adoption.

       On January 9, 2023, Mother filed timely notices of appeal from the

aggravated circumstances orders along with concise statements of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3 The

trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion.      Thereafter, this

Court granted leave for Mother to file amended concise statements after new

counsel was appointed to represent her on appeal and she timely complied.

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3  Mother’s thirty-day window to appeal technically expired on January 8,
2023. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Since that day fell on a Sunday, however, it
must be omitted from the time computation. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.
Accordingly, Mother’s January 9, 2023 notices of appeal were timely filed.

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Thereafter, the trial court submitted a supplemental Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii)

opinion. Finally, this Court consolidated the above-captioned cases sua sponte

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. Mother has raised the following issues in her brief:

       1) Did the court err by changing the permanency goal from
       reunification to adoption as same was not supported by clear and
       convincing evidence, a standard that requires “evidence that is so
       clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact
       to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
       the precise facts in issue?”

       2)     Did the court improvidently determine aggravated
       circumstances existed based on the conduct of another and not
       the parent?

       3) Did the court base its determination on inadmissible hearsay?

       4) Was Mother prevented from testifying at the hearing by her
       own counsel, and the court did not properly voir dire Mother as to
       the voluntary nature of her alleged decision not to testify?

Mother’s brief at 3.4 We will address each of these claims seriatim.

       Our pertinent standard of review requires that we “accept the findings

of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by

the record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s

inferences or conclusions of law.” In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831, 834 (Pa.Super.

2015) (cleaned up). Thus, we review the trial court’s finding of aggravated

circumstances for an abuse of discretion. See id.

____________________________________________

4 The guardian ad litem filed a letter with this Court stating its intent to rely

on the trial court opinion in lieu of a brief in these appeals.

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      As noted above, the basic legal foundation of aggravated circumstances

allegations is § 6341(c.1), which provides as follows:

      (c.1) Aggravated circumstances.—If the county agency or the
      child's attorney alleges the existence of aggravated circumstances
      and the court determines that the child is dependent, the court
      shall also determine if aggravated circumstances exist. If the
      court finds from clear and convincing evidence that aggravated
      circumstances exist, the court shall determine whether or not
      reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing
      the child from the home or to preserve and reunify the family shall
      be made or continue to be made and schedule a hearing as
      required in section 6351(e)(3) (relating to disposition of
      dependent child).

42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.1). “Clear and convincing evidence” is “evidence that is

so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come

to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in

issue.” Interest of R.C.-G., 292 A.3d 582, 588 (Pa.Super. 2023).

      The operative definitions of “aggravated circumstances” and other

related terms of art are set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, which provides, in

pertinent part, as follows:

      The following words and phrases when used in this chapter shall
      have, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings
      given to them in this section:

            ....

         “Aggravated circumstances.”           Any of the following
         circumstances:

            ....

            (2) The child or another child of the parent has been
            the victim of physical abuse resulting in serious bodily

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            injury, sexual violence or aggravated physical neglect
            by the parent.

            ....

          “Aggravated physical neglect.” Any omission in the care
          of a child which results in a life-threatening condition or
          seriously impairs the child’s function.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.     Our precedent provides that we “‘need not find the

existence of aggravated circumstances as to a particular party; rather, it

merely must determine whether they are present in the case.’” L.V., supra

at 838 (quoting In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2008)).

Furthermore, we remain mindful that “[t]he focus of dependency proceedings

is on the child. Safety, permanency, and the well-being of the child must take

precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of the parents.”

Interest of S.U., 204 A.3d 949, 965 (Pa.Super. 2019).

      With these precepts in mind, we turn to Mother’s first issue, which

implicates the trial court’s permanency goal change findings and orders. See

Mother’s brief at 6-8 (baldly reciting the legal standards attendant to

permanency goal change orders and discussing various testimonies adduced

at the underlying hearings). We emphasize that the above-captioned appeals

lie solely from the trial court’s December 9, 2022 aggravated circumstances

orders.   See Notice of Appeal at CP-28-DP-0000049-2019, 1/9/23, at 1;

Notice of Appeal at CP-28-DP-0000050-2019, 1/9/23, at 1. Critically, Mother

did not file separate notices of appeal with respect to the permanency goal

change orders entered on the same day. Mother does not acknowledge or

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address this concern, although the brief submitted by CYS does make note of

this irregularity. See CYS’s brief at 8 n.2.

      Our case law provides that an order finding aggravated circumstances

pursuant to § 6341(c.1) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-75, is a

collateral order that is immediately appealable of right pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313(b). See Interest of A.D.-G.,

263 A.3d 21, 26 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citing In re R.C., 945 A.2d 182, 184

(Pa.Super. 2008)). Under this doctrine, “only that portion of the order that is

collateral is subject to collateral review.” Rhodes v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 21

A.3d 1253, 1259 (Pa.Super. 2011) (emphasis added).             Furthermore, this

Court has “rejected a ‘whole order approach’ to the collateral order doctrine

permitting appellate review of all issues surrounding a collateral order[.]” Id.

(citing Rae v. Pa. Funeral Directors Assoc., 977 A.2d 1121, 1130 (Pa.

2009)). Accordingly, we must reject any attempt by Mother to obtain review

of matters beyond the scope of the trial court’s aggravated circumstances

orders. To the extent that Mother raises arguments implicating the findings

in the permanency goal change orders, such claims are not properly before

this Court since they exceed the scope of the aggravated circumstances

orders. Accord Rhodes, supra at 1259; R.C., supra at 184. Thus, as a

matter of justiciability, we cannot address Mother’s first claim for relief.

      Turning to Mother’s second issue, we discern that she intends to

challenge the trial court’s finding of aggravated circumstances pursuant to

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§ 6341(c.1).   Specifically, she asserts that “[t]he facts of this case do not

suggest that [Mother] knew of and failed to prevent any acts of abuse

perpetrated on her children.” Mother’s brief at 9. Mother’s argument on this

point focuses upon 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d), which provides that “[e]vidence that

a child has suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be

sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent . . .

of the child shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent[.]” Our

case law recognizes that this statute creates a rebuttable presumption of child

abuse.   See Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d 376, 381-82 (Pa.Super. 2022).

However, we are perplexed by Mother’s invocation of this statute, which is

neither cited nor relied upon by the trial court. Contrary to Mother’s specious

arguments, the trial court’s findings regarding aggravated circumstances are

not predicated upon any evidentiary presumption, but direct evidence.

      The testimony adduced at the hearing is revealing. Trisha Goshorn, the

nurse at A.D. and D.D.’s elementary school, explained that she first raised

concerns with CYS after observing increasingly serious injuries to A.D. and

D.D. during May 2022. Between May 3 and May 9, 2022, A.D. presented to

Ms. Goshorn on nine different occasions with troubling injuries, including

significant fresh and old bruising, scratches, swelling, and “hand marks to her

neck[.]” N.T., 12/6/22, at 8-17. A.D. disclosed that “sometimes [Mother]

moves her face or jaw whenever she wants her to look at her or to get her

attention.” Id. at 18. Separately, D.D. visited Ms. Goshorn on May 3, 2022,

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concerning an abrasion to his left elbow.     Id. at 22.   Six days later, D.D.

returned to Ms. Goshorn’s office with “purplish skin discoloration to his right

eye” and petechia under his right eye, which injuries were not present during

his earlier visit. Id. at 23-24.

      As noted by CYS intake caseworker Rushele Wingert, these injuries

provoked a number of agency referrals that resulted in a recommendation that

A.D. and D.D. both undergo forensic interviews. Id. at 120-25. A.D. and

D.D. underwent forensic examinations at CAC on May 11, 2022, which was

performed by nurse Brandi Castro. She noted “bruising, marks, or redness

on A.D.’s face, head shoulders, legs, back, buttocks, and pubic area, as well

as bruising, marks, or redness on D.D.’s face, genitals, legs, hips, legs, and

buttocks.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/23, at 11 (citing N.T., 12/6/22, at 86).

Dr. Kathryn Crowell, an expert in child abuse pediatrics, also testified that the

nature and extent of these injuries were indicative of physical abuse, rather

than accidental causes.    See N.T., 12/6/22, at 99-103.      Furthermore, she

found the injuries were very painful, would have created difficulties in

concentrating and sitting, and may have provoked behavioral changes in A.D.

and D.D. Id. at 109-12. Ms. Wingert also testified concerning the forensic

interviews of A.D. and D.D., wherein they independently disclosed that Mother

and Mr. Wetzel were causing their injuries. Id. at 129-30.

      After viewing recordings of these interviews, the trial court offered this

summary of the respective testimonies:

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       Both children disclosed that they were physically disciplined by
       [Mr.] Wetzel and [Mother]. D.D. described being hit in his genitals
       and other locations on his body. He described being punished by
       being made to stand in a corner for hours at a time – sometimes
       an entire day because he “did bad stuff.” [He] described being hit
       with a belt and with his clothes off. He said they did the same
       thing to A.D. D.D. described that [Mother] was in the room when
       [Mr. Wetzel] hit him.

       A.D. told the interviewer that she didn’t [want to] live with
       [Mother] and [Mr. Wetzel] because “they were abusing us.” A.D.
       described being hit and made to stand in timeout for hours. [A.D.
       and D.D.] were required to eat breakfast and lunch in timeout and
       could not get out of timeout unless they stood still, but their legs
       got so numb that they had to move, so they couldn’t get out of
       timeout. [A.D.] described being hit on the face with bare hands,
       on the “but” with a belt and bare hands, and on the arms and legs
       with bare hands. A.D. went to the nurse for ice because it hurt
       badly. A.D. described that [Mr. Wetzel] hurt D.D. [She averred
       that Mother] hit her on her face, nose, arms, and legs. A.D. told
       the interviewer that she was afraid to tell anyone because [Mother
       and Mr. Wetzel] said they would “beat their butts” if they told.
       A.D. told the interviewer that she got the bruise near her [pubic
       area] from [Mother] punching her with her clothes on.[5]

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/23, at 15-16.

       Finally, CYS caseworker Gayle Schreiber testified regarding, inter alia,

the mental health of the children.             D.D.’s first such evaluation in 2019

“‘resulted in a diagnosis of [an] adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance

____________________________________________

5 No transcript of these interviews appears in the certified record and Mother
did not request preparation of any such materials. See Trial Court Opinion,
2/2/23, at 30. Although the absence of these transcripts does not appear to
have adversely affected these proceedings, we note our case law is clear that
“the appellant bears the responsibility to ensure that a complete record is
produced for appeal.” Dressler Family, LP v. PennEnergy Resources,
LLC, 276 A.3d 729, 733 n.8 (Pa.Super. 2022). No party disputes the trial
court’s summary of the testimonies adduced from A.D. and D.D.

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of emotions and conduct and personal history of psychological trauma.’” N.T.,

12/8/22, at 31. A.D. was similarly diagnosed with an “‘adjustment disorder

with mixed anxiety and depressed mood’” and posttraumatic stress disorder.

Id. at 33. Thereafter, D.D.’s updated psychiatric evaluation in 2022 resulted

in “diagnoses of ‘unspecific trauma and stressor related disorder, attention

deficit hyperactivity disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, oppositional

defiant disorder,’” and suspected reactive attachment disorder. Id. at 36.

      Despite these troubling diagnoses, Ms. Schreiber noted A.D. had not

been properly enrolled in mental health treatment since being returned to

Mother’s custody. Id. at 33-35. Finally, Ms. Schreiber also reported that A.D.

and D.D. are mutually “scared to death” of Mother, such that the agency

opposed the notion of even conducting a bond assessment. Id. at 45.

      With this testimony in mind, the trial court articulated the rationale for

its finding of aggravated circumstances, as follows:

      [T]he uncontradicted testimony of each of the agency’s witnesses
      established that the children were subjected to repeated beatings
      at the hands of Mother and Mr. Wetzel. At times, the children
      were beaten by Mother; at times they were beaten by Mr. Wetzel
      while Mother was in the room and aware. There was absolutely
      no evidence presented that Mother was unaware of the beating by
      Mr. Wetzel or that she attempted to stop him from hurting her
      children.

      The trial court found credible the way in which this case came to
      light. Elementary school personnel observed marks and bruising
      on the children on multiple occasions and for which there were
      insufficient explanations. The court found [Ms. Goshorn], the
      school nurse, to be a credible witness. We also found Ms. Wingert,
      the intake caseworker, who performed the initial investigation on
      behalf of the agency, to be a credible witness.

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     The children described the painful beatings they sustained by
     Mother and Mr. Wetzel in individual forensic interviews on two
     different dates at the CAC. The children responded to open-
     ended, non-leading questions in their forensic interviews. Their
     statements were not equivocal, confused, or inconsistent;
     however, each told their story in their own way and did not lead
     the court to find that their statements were practiced, rehearsed,
     or coached. . . .

     We further found the children’s recorded interviews to be credible
     based on the children’s age-appropriate language and demeanor
     and accorded this evidence great weight.

     [Ms.] Castro’s testimony regarding her forensic examination of
     each child and her findings was also given substantial weight. The
     photographs of each child’s injuries, specifically, the significant
     marks and bruising in areas like the children’s faces and genitals
     – were particularly troubling and important to our determination
     that the children were subjected to, at a minimum, aggravated
     physical neglect by Mother.

     We also placed great weight on the expert testimony of [Dr.
     Crowell] who opined, in summary, that the children were
     subjected to non-accidental injury based on the location and
     pattern of the marks and bruises. . . .

     In addition to the physical abuse suffered by A.D. and D.D.,
     Mother’s termination of the children’s important and necessary
     mental health services seriously impaired their functioning. Each
     of the children was evaluated and diagnosed with significant
     mental health issues when they were in the agency’s legal and
     physical custody from June 2019 until they were returned to
     Mother’s physical custody in April 2021 and legal custody in
     August 2021. At that time, the children were actively participating
     with mental health professionals addressing their mental health
     needs. The agency believed Mother would continue those services
     when the children were returned to her legal custody. She failed
     to do so. There is no evidence to the contrary.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/2/23, at 27-29.

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      There is no indication that the trial court was forced to rely upon a legal

presumption pursuant to § 6381(d) in this matter.         To the contrary, the

evidence detailed above readily established that Mother, inter alia:         (1)

directly participated in the physical abuse of both A.D. and D.D.; (2) failed to

intercede when Mr. Wetzel assaulted A.D. and D.D.; and (3) neglected to

obtain appropriate medical attention for either child.    Furthermore, Mother

failed to enroll A.D. in recommended mental health services.

      We re-emphasize that a court “‘need not find the existence of

aggravated circumstances as to a particular party; rather, it merely must

determine whether they are present in the case.’” L.V., supra at 838 (quoting

R.P., supra at 1219). Overall, there was clear and convincing evidence of

Mother’s aggravated physical neglect with respect to both A.D. and D.D., i.e.,

an omission in their care that seriously impaired their function.       See 42

Pa.C.S. § 6302. In addition to the obvious physical pain and mental anguish

associated with the injuries inflicted upon A.D. and D.D. by Mother, Dr. Crowell

testified that the “emotional trauma” associated with these violent events

could result in the “serious impairment” of A.D. and D.D. N.T., 12/6/22, at

113. The troubling and voluminous mental health diagnoses ascribed to A.D.

and D.D. at the respective ages of eight and six years old are highly

corroborative of this concern. The testimony from Ms. Schreiber reflects that

D.D. deteriorated significantly after being returned to Mother’s custody, while

A.D. was denied appropriate therapy.       See N.T., 12/8/22, at 31-36.      We

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observe no abuse of discretion or error law in finding that A.D. and D.D. have

suffered “serious impairment” as a result of Mother’s aggravated physical

neglect. No relief is due with respect to Mother’s second claim.

       In Mother’s third issue, she alleges that the trial court’s holding was

predicated upon inadmissible hearsay adduced from Ms. Goshorn and Dr.

Crowell.6    See Mother’s brief at 10 (citing Pa.R.E. 802 (“The Rule Against

Hearsay”)). Specifically, Mother has noted several points in the transcripts

where this alleged hearsay was entered into the record. See N.T., 12/6/22,

at 12, 16, 24, 119, 123-24, 129-30. Assuming, arguendo, these statements

constitute hearsay, our review reveals that Mother failed to lodge any

contemporaneous objection in the trial court regarding these statements. Id.

       It is beyond cavil that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Indeed,

this Court has discussed the necessity of timely objections, as follows:

       In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must
       make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of
       the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely object to
       a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.
       On appeal the Superior Court will not consider a claim which was
       not called to the trial court's attention at a time when any error
       committed could have been corrected. In this jurisdiction one
       must object to errors, improprieties[,] or irregularities at the
       earliest possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford the
       jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and
       possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.

____________________________________________

6 Mother’s brief contains no mention of the trial court’s admission of A.D.’s
and D.D.’s forensic interview testimonies as an exception to hearsay.

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Interest of N.B., 260 A.3d 236, 243 (Pa.Super. 2021). Instantly, Mother’s

failure to assert timely objections to these alleged instances of hearsay results

in waiver of these claims on appeal. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

       In Mother’s fourth claim, she asserts two related-but-separate claims,

namely, that: (1) her prior counsel “prevented” her from testifying at the

hearing; and (2) this Court should mandate that trial courts must conduct

voluntariness colloquies in dependency proceedings.            Mother’s brief at 11

(“[T]here is a paucity of information in the record as to whether [Mother] was

aware or understood her right to testify.” (cleaned up)).

       As to the first aspect of this issue, Mother is essentially asserting that

prior counsel was ineffective.       Id. (“[T]he decision of whether to testify in

one’s own behalf is ultimately to be made by the accused after full consultation

with counsel. The record is replete [sic] of whether any such consultation with

counsel occurred.” (cleaned up)).              The transcripts confirm that Mother

declined to testify on the advice of counsel.7 See N.T., 12/8/22, at 76.

       Mother is statutorily entitled to representation by counsel in these

dependency proceedings pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6337, which “has also been

expressed as a right to effective assistance of counsel, such that the denial of

effective assistance is tantamount to having proceeded with no counsel at all.”

In re N.B., 817 A.2d 530, 535 (Pa.Super. 2003). Mother is also entitled “to

____________________________________________

7 Mother is facing multiple criminal charges in connection with these events
and faces possible incarceration if convicted. See N.T., 12/8/22, at 39-40.

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the opportunity to introduce evidence and otherwise be heard in [her] own

behalf[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6338(a). However, a party alleging ineffectiveness in

the context of dependency proceedings “must make a strong showing of

ineffectiveness of counsel” by coming forward “with evidence that indicates to

a high degree of likelihood that but for an unprofessional error on the part of

counsel,” the results of the proceeding would have been different. 8       In re

S.M., 614 A.2d 312, 315-16 (Pa.Super. 1992) (emphasis in original); see

also Interest of A.G., 273 A.3d 1013 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum at 8-9) (same). Finally, “the law presumes that counsel was

effective and the burden of proving that this presumption is false rests with

the petitioner.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 678 (Pa. 2009).

       Instantly, Mother’s bald allegations are insufficient to sustain her burden

to make a “strong showing” with respect to her claims of ineffectiveness. In

sum, she has offered no discussion whatsoever of the critical testimony she

would have offered if counsel had not advised her to remain silent, nor has

she offered any argument concerning how such information would have

altered the trial court’s holding. Beyond innuendo, Mother has proffered no

evidence or specific allegations in support of her ineffectiveness claims. Such

threadbare arguments lack merit. See S.M., supra at 315-16.

____________________________________________

8 But see In re K.D., 871 A.2d 823, 828 (Pa.Super. 2005) (acknowledging
the precedential value of In re S.M., 614 A.2d 312 (Pa.Super. 1992) while
questioning “under what authority our Court announced a new and heightened
standard of review” as to ineffectiveness in dependency proceedings.).

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J-A13012-23

      Mother’s second related argument suggests we adopt a new colloquy

rule with respect to dependency proceedings.       In support of her position,

Mother has cited largely inapposite federal and state criminal law holdings.

See Mother’s brief at 11. We emphasize that her arguments do not allege

that her decision to testify was unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary in any

particular fashion. Rather, she alleges only that the absence of a colloquy

creates an untenable ambiguity in the record. Id. at 11 (“Herein, there is a

paucity of information in the record as to whether [Mother] was aware of

and/or understood her right to testify.” (cleaned up)).

      Assuming, arguendo, that the specific legal principles concerning a

criminal defendant’s right to testify in their own defense are relevant to the

instant dependency proceedings, Mother’s preoccupation with the lack of a

colloquy in this matter is misplaced. As this Court has explained, “[a] trial

court is not required to conduct a colloquy to determine whether a defendant

has made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of [her] right to testify.”

Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(emphasis added).    The colloquy is merely a “useful procedural tool” that

“does not share the same status as the right itself.” Id. at 1264 n.2. In the

absence of a colloquy, a trial court may instead rely upon “the presumed

competent advice of counsel” to confirm a valid waiver of the right to testify.

Id. at 1264.    Thus, to the extent that Mother claims that a colloquy is

mandated pursuant to Pennsylvania law, she is mistaken.

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      Furthermore, we reject Mother’s insinuation that the record is

ambiguous as to whether she conferred with counsel concerning her decision

not to testify. As noted above, Mother’s counsel stated on the record that

Mother was declining to testify upon the advice of her counsel. See N.T.,

12/8/22, at 76 (“On the advice of counsel my client will not be testifying

today.”).   Mother was present at the time this statement was made and

offered no objection. Id. Even before this Court, Mother continues to remain

silent regarding this crucial fact. Counsel’s advice is presumed to be effective

under Pennsylvania law and Mother has offered no salient argument in

rebuttal. See Cox, supra at 678. Instead, she focuses exclusively upon the

trial court’s supposed failure to conduct an unnecessary procedure.

      Based upon the foregoing, we respectfully decline Mother’s invitation to

announce a new procedural requirement under our dependency law.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/25/2023

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