Court Opinion

ID: 9630707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:18:04.444881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:41.925591
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, J.,
concurring specially. I agree with the court’s opinion but ■write separately to make two points.
First, whether the test articulated in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), which applies when an ordinance regulates only commercial speech, applies to this ordinance is debatable. The ordinance does not restrict only commercial speech, and instead applies equally to all “[s]igns which move or create an illusion of movement except those parts which solely indicate date, time, or temperature.” CONCORD, N.H. ZONING ORDINANCE art. 28-6-7 (2001). As such, both commercial and non-commercial signs are prohibited under the ordinance. See La Tour v. City of Fayetteville, Ark., 442 F.3d 1094, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 2006) (treating sign regulation with exception permitting messages displaying time and/or temperature as applicable to both commercial and non-commercial speech).
For this type of ordinance, which does not on its face distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech, a significant number of courts have found that the Central Hudson test does not apply. See Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1268-69 n.5 (11th *406Cir. 2005) (where city code regulated all signs, including appellant’s electronic message sign, without distinguishing between signs bearing commercial and noncommercial messages, “the Central Hudson test has no application”); Cleveland Area Bd. of Realtors v. City of Euclid, 88 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 1996) (where City argued that ordinance regulating placement and size of signs in residential neighborhoods should be analyzed under Central Hudson, court found issue moot, but concluded “that use of the commercial speech test would be inappropriate”); Moser v. F.C.C., 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1995) (where statute regulating automated telemarketing calls did not distinguish between commercial and non-commercial speech, Central Hudson test not applicable); XXL of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Broadview Heights, 341 F. Supp. 2d 765, 783 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (Central Hudson does not apply if ordinance restricts both commercial and non-commercial signs and, instead, “more stringent ‘time, place, and manner’ test ... is used”); cf. Naser Jewelers, Inc. v. City of Concord, N.H., 2007 WL 1847307, at *2, 4 (D.N.H. June 25, 2007) (applying time, place, and manner test to amended Concord ordinance prohibiting, inter alia, all “electronic message center type signs,” and finding ordinance is likely constitutional).
On appeal, neither party has briefed the applicability of a test other than Central Hudson. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that, for the purposes of this appeal, we should analyze the First Amendment issues using the Central Hudson framework.
Second, the superior court relied in part on the exception for time, date and temperature in holding that the ordinance is unconstitutional. On appeal, the parties in their briefs and at oral argument discussed the effect of this exception on the analysis.
The four-prong Central Hudson test requires courts to consider: (1) whether the advertising is neither unlawful nor misleading and is therefore entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) whether the ordinance seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest; (3) whether the ordinance directly advances that interest; and (4) whether the ordinance reaches no further than necessary to accomplish its stated goals. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. In my view, Central Hudson requires us to account for the exception for time, date and temperature. See Flying J Travel Plaza v. Com., 928 S.W.2d 344, 348-49 (Ky. 1996) (analyzing whether sign regulation’s exception for time, date and temperature directly advances governmental interest). This exception in the ordinance makes the analysis under Central Hudson a closer question, but I would nonetheless conclude that the time, date and temperature exception also directly and materially advances the City’s interests and reaches no further than necessary to accomplish its stated goals. Because a message *407displaying time, date and temperature is short and rudimentary, the City could have reasonably found that such a message is less distracting and thus poses less of a traffic hazard than other messages. See Fayetteville, 442 F.3d At 1097. Such determination by the City is not “manifestly unreasonable and should not be set aside.” Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).