Court Opinion

ID: 9634780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:23:38.25817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:58.706948
License: Public Domain

LaVECCHIA, J.,
dissenting.
This case requires the Court to consider whether respondent, James A. Breslin, Jr., having been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have engaged in conduct warranting his removal from the bench, should continue nonetheless to be a member of the bar. Because I find the majority’s view of the facts of this case to place too much of a strain upon credibility, and because I believe that *294the majority’s disposition will jeopardize the public’s trust in the integrity of the members of the legal profession, I respectfully dissent. I would disbar respondent.
I.
The Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) brought this attorney-disciplinary matter before the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB), on a motion for reciprocal discipline. R. 1:20 — 14(b)(3). The DRB determined that respondent, a former judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court, was guilty of unethical conduct and should be publicly disciplined. There was no majority vote by the DRB on the form of discipline. Four members of the DRB voted to disbar respondent, three members voted to suspend him- for three years, and one member voted for a public reprimand. The ninth member of the DRB abstained.
The disciplinary proceeding arose from conduct that formed the basis for a complaint issued by the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC). The complaint alleged that respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by his participation in the attempted bribery of a public official. Following a hearing pursuant to Rule 2:15-14, the ACJC filed a Presentment with the Court recommending the institution of removal proceedings.
An order to show cause and a complaint issued for respondent’s removal. The complaint charged respondent with violating Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. After respondent filed an answer, the matter was referred to a three judge panel. The panel conducted two days of hearings, and thereafter filed a report containing findings of fact and a recommendation that the Court remove respondent from judicial office.
In January 2000, the Court accepted the findings of the panel, accepted with prejudice respondent’s resignation from the bench, and barred him from holding any future judicial office in this State. In re Breslin, 162 N.J. 190, 191, 742 A.2d 970 (2000). The DRB correctly noted in this matter that, pursuant to Rule 1:20-14(b)(3), the Court’s final determination of judicial misconduct *295conclusively established the facts on which this attorney discipline matter is based. In re Yaccarino, 117 N.J. 175, 183, 564 A.2d 1184 (1989). It is those facts found by the three judge panel beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:2A-9, then, that must be considered in assessing the appropriateness of discipline and the severity of the sanction to be imposed. In re Goldberg, 109 N.J. 163, 167, 536 A.2d 224 (1988); In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168, 170, 526 A.2d 658 (1987).
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the State of New Jersey in 1968. He was appointed a Judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court in 1978 and served until January 2000.
On October 17, 1996, respondent was approached in his law office by Joseph Ciardella, a former client. Ciardella had previously resided in Lyndhurst, but had relocated to Toms River. Ciardella came to respondent’s Lyndhurst law office to elicit respondent’s help in Ciardella’s plan to bribe Paul Haggerty, the elected Director of Public Safety for Lyndhurst. Haggerty had the power to appoint the municipal judge as well as police department employees. Ciardella did not seek any legal assistance from respondent, but rather wanted his assistance to get Haggerty to appoint Ciardella’s son to the Lyndhurst Police Department. Based on those facts the panel determined that “while Ciardella relied on the former lawyer-client relationship with respondent to gain access, he went to respondent because he was Lyndhurst’s Municipal Judge.”
At the meeting, Ciardella handed respondent an unaddressed, unsealed nine-by-twelve inch manila envelope containing his son’s job application, which was only twenty-two pages in length. Also in the envelope were two bank cash envelopes, each bundle containing fifty $100 bills for a total of $10,000 in cash. As the panel described it, “[t]he contents of the envelope made it bulky and reasonably heavy.”
The panel found that at that meeting Ciardella discussed with respondent, at least generally, the bribe and its goal. As stated by the panel:
*296Ciardella and Respondent, on that Thursday, conversed generally regarding the contents of the manila envelope and Ciardella’s purpose in presenting the envelope to Respondent. We find Ciardella would not have accumulated such a large amount of money and traveled all the way from Toms River without (1) explaining to Respondent at least generally the contents of the envelope; (2) explaining his intent and purpose in making the delivery to Respondent; and (3) receiving assurances from Respondent that he would pass the manila envelope and its contents to Haggerty. In sum, Ciardella chose Respondent to be the intermediary and delivered the money and application with some explanation — an explanation that made Respondent at least generally aware, at that time, of the bribery and its goal.
In making these findings, we find implausible Respondent’s testimony that the conversation lasted no more than one and one-half minutes and entailed only, “Here’s an application for the police department. Give it to the Commissioner.” At the same time, we elect not to rely substantively on the statements of Ciardella regarding his conversations with Respondent that are contained in either the electronically recorded January 5, 1997, conversation between Ciardella and Haggerty (C-3B, 3C) or in the statement Ciardella gave to the police (C — 6). We make this election for three reasons: (1) Ciardella’s apparent inability to testify before the Panel due to a mental impairment caused by a recent stroke; (2) the consequent inability of Respondent to cross-examine Ciardella; and (3) our consequent lack of opportunity to assess Ciardella’s credibility.
Either that day or within the next two days, Respondent reviewed the contents of the manila envelope. He saw the $10,000 divided into two separate smaller envelopes. He then knew the exact extent of his former client’s effort to bribe Haggerty.
Rather than report the bribery plan, respondent allowed several days to pass. He met Haggerty a few days later in a restaurant where frequently they socialized after work. He posed to Haggerty “a hypothetical question ... to get Haggerty’s reaction to what he would do if a client of [respondent] offered Haggerty money to do a favor.” Haggerty reacted angrily and ended conversation on the topic. Sometime during the next three weeks, Haggerty raised the issue again with respondent because the prior conversation continued to upset him. Haggerty inquired of respondent about the details of the plan, which respondent revealed. Respondent also identified his client when pressed to do so by Haggerty. When Haggerty asked him what was to be done with the manila envelope and its contents, respondent answered that he was waiting for a call from Ciardella. On November 26, 1999, Haggerty reported the plan to Lyndhurst’s Acting Chief of Police, James Tobin. Haggerty did so at his own insistence, but with *297respondent’s knowledge. At no prior time had respondent attempted to report the plan.
Respondent explained his own failure to report the bribery plan to Acting Police Chief Tobin as “essentially due to the fact that he did not know, at the time, who was in charge of the Lyndhurst Police Department.” The panel found that explanation to be “implausible.” Tobin had been appointed Acting Chief in July 1996 and served in that capacity at all relevant times. The panel explained:
The need for the Bergen County Prosecutor to appoint Tobin, then a Captain in the Prosecutor’s Office, as Acting Chief arose after a well-publicized and highly controversial dispute over the successor to the retired Chief, John Scalese. Before retiring, the Chief had designated the Deputy Chief Robert Giangeruso as the person in charge of the Police Department. Haggerty, exercising his authority as Commissioner, named Lyndhurst Police Captain James A. O’Connor as Acting Chief. An ensuing impasse over department control and supervision led to intervention by the Attorney General and Tobin’s appointment as Acting Chief. During the time between Ciardella’s delivery of the manila envelope and his ultimate arrest on bribery charges, certain events occurred respecting Tobin’s role as Acting Chief and Respondent’s knowledge of Tobin’s continuing presence in Lyndhurst. Tobin had constant contact with Haggerty. Respondent had constant social contact with Haggerty. Respondent met Tobin, who was introduced to Respondent as the Acting Chief, during Tobin’s tenure in that capacity. Tobin from time to time appeared in the Municipal Court to observe while court was in session. Tobin had an office, which he constantly used, in the Municipal Building in close proximity to the Municipal Court. Respondent’s son was a member of the Lyndhurst Police Department. We find, beyond a reasonable doubt, these facts demonstrate Respondent knew Tobin was Acting Chief of Police during the relevant time and was an available law enforcement official to whom he could report the bribe plan.
Ultimately, the panel found several reasons demonstrating Respondent’s unfitness to serve as a judge.
Three facets of Respondent’s conduct must be addressed: (1) his acceptance of the manfla envelope and knowledge of the bribe plan without promptly and independently notifying law enforcement officials; (2) his propounding of a hypothetical question to Haggerty; and (3) his abdication to Haggerty of the responsibility to report the bribe plan to Acting Chief Tobin.
The first facet requires findings regarding Respondent’s obligation as a municipal judge to report the bribe plan to law enforcement officials. We find that as a municipal judge, Respondent, upon delivery of the manila envelope and a general knowledge of the purpose of its delivery and especially upon becoming aware of the entirety of Ciardella’s bribe plan, had a duty under the Code of Judicial Conduct *298to promptly report the matter to law enforcement officials. The failure to report the matter either to the Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, a failure for which Respondent proffered no reasonable explanation, or to Acting Chief Tobin, a failure for which Respondent also proffered no plausible explanation, we find beyond a reasonable doubt contravened Canon 1 and 2A and brought the Lyndhurst municipal judgeship into disrepute.
The conduct of propounding the hypothetical question to Haggerty similarly transgressed the applicable Canons and Rule, particularly that aspect of Canon M that a judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Respondent initially addressed the matter with Haggerty in the context of a hypothetical question to get Haggerty’s reaction to what Respondent knew, and Haggerty did not know, was Ciardella’s bribe plan. We find this conduct created a circumstance whereby a reasonably objective member of the public could conclude Respondent was testing the waters to determine whether Ciardella’s plan could come to fruition, a testing that either implicated a hope of being able to share in one of the two small envelopes of money or, at the very least, a unllingness to act as intermediary in the transmission of the bribe money to Haggerty. We find, under either scenario, a reasonably objective member of the public could conclude that Respondent became an accomplice in Ciardella’s plan. Consequently, as to this facet, we find there can be no reasonable doubt Respondent’s conduct violated both the Canons and the Rule. Lastly, we find the fact Respondent elected to leave it to Haggerty to report the matter to Tobin was an equally serious transgression of the relevant standards governing judicial conduct. We find the standards make no allowance for Respondent, as a Municipal Judge, to turn over his responsibility to report the Ciardella criminal plan to a lay person, who was an elected official not versed in the law, particularly when the report to the law enforcement official, by Haggerty and not by the Respondent, occurred more than a month after Respondent’s total awareness of the bribe plans.
In sum, we find beyond a reasonable doubt, a plethora of conduct that demonstrates Respondent’s unfitness to serve as the Judge of the Lyndhurst Municipal Court-an unfitness that warrants his removal from that office.
(emphasis added).
Both the hearing panel in the judicial removal action and the DRB in this attorney disciplinary proceeding duly noted that respondent provided a voluntary sworn statement to the Bergen County prosecutor’s investigator and that respondent was not charged with any criminal conduct. Ciardella was charged with the second-degree offense of bribery of a public official, and ultimately pled guilty to violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-6b (third degree offense of a gift to a public official). He was fined $10,000.
The DRB held that respondent violated R.P.C. 8.4(c) (engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) *299and (d) (engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). In so concluding, the DRB rejected respondent’s argument that the facts were “susceptible of different interpretations.” Respondent argued before the DRB that the record did not demonstrate that 1) his conduct was “knowingly and intentionally wrongful;” 2) that he “had improper motives;” 3) that he “entertained hopes of sharing the money in the envelopes he had been given;” or 4) that he acted as an intermediary for Ciardella. The DRB relied, however, on the panel’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent’s “intelligence and ability countervails any finding that his conduct ... can be characterized as simply unintelligent or dilatory in nature.” In rejecting respondent’s more innocent explanations for his behavior, the DRB found unbelievable his contention that negligence or bad judgment led to his misconduct.
On the subject of discipline, four members of the DRB stated that attorneys who commit serious misconduct while serving in public office are subject to “stringent discipline, normally disbar-men t[,]” citing In re Boylan, 162 N.J. 289, 293, 744 A.2d 158 (2000) and In re Coruzzi, 98 N.J. 77, 81, 484 A.2d 667 (1984). Irrespective of whether respondent’s conduct involved his judicial position, those four members of the DRB determined that respondent’s actions warranted disbarment, citing In re Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192, 210, 526 A.2d 670 (1987) (disbarring attorney despite his acquittal on all criminal bribery charges arising from attempt to bribe state police officer to file false police report). Furthermore, respondent was perceived as exacerbating his misconduct by having lied to the panel. As noted, three other members voted to suspend respondent, and one member dissented by separate opinion.
II.
A judge’s authority reaches every corner of society, and because of the impact of that authority,
judges must be competent and ethical, and their actions must foster respect for their decisions as well as for the judiciary as a whole. Given that they hold *300positions of considerable authority and are entrusted with a great deal of power and discretion, judges are expected to conduct themselves according to the high standards of professional conduct. Indeed, it is often said that judges are subject to the highest standards of professional behavior.
[Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Ethics, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 (1988).]
Lawyers who serve in the judiciary have a very visible dual professional responsibility that subjects them to the strictest adherence to both the disciplinary rules as attorneys, and the Code of Judicial Conduct as judges. See In re Magid, 139 N.J. 449, 455, 655 A.2d 916 (1995) (“Attorneys who hold public office are invested with a public trust and are thereby more visible to the public. Such attorneys are held to the highest of standards.”).
In my view, an attorney must be disciplined for conduct while a judge “if the conduct itself corrupts the judicial process or evidences a lack of the character and integrity that are necessary in an attorney.” In re Boylan, supra, 162 N.J. at 293, 744 A.2d 158. The conduct itself must be viewed from the perspective of an informed and concerned private citizen to determine “whether the reputation of the Bar would be lowered if the conduct were permitted.” In re Opinion No. 415, 81 N.J. 318, 325, 407 A.2d 1197 (1979). That concern for the image of the bar is integral to public respect for the integrity of the administration of justice:
There are certain acts by attorneys that so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate remedy. In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32, 37, 446 A.2d 1208 (1982); In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 453, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979). These include, for example, any attempt to corrupt the judicial process by an attorney suborning perjury or tampering with witnesses to fix a case, In re Conway, supra, 107 N.J. at 170, 526 A.2d 658, or assisting others in such efforts, In re Rigolosi 107 N.J. 192, 208, 526 A.2d 670 (1987), or bribing a police officer, In re Hyett, 61 N.J. 518, 537, 296 A.2d 306 (1972), or bribing a public official, In re Tuso, 104 N.J. 59, 64-65, 514 A.2d 1311 (1986), or bribing an I.R.S. agent, In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 36, 446 A.2d 1208, or by a judge accepting a bribe and not sentencing defendant according to the law, see In re Coruzzi 98 N.J. 77, 80, 484 A.2d 667 (1984). “Misconduct of this stripe conclusively renders the wrongdoer unworthy of the profession.” In re Conway, supra, 107 N.J. at 182, 526 A.2d 658.
[In re Boylan, supra, 162 N.J. at 293, 744 A.2d 158.]
Bribery is one of the more serious offenses an attorney can commit. In re Callahan, 70 N.J. 178, 184, 358 A.2d 469 (1976). A *301judge’s participation in any aspect of a bribery scheme is inexcusable.
We hold that a judge who accepts a bribe must be removed from office. There can be no exceptions whatsoever. One might argue that there might conceivably be some bribery case somewhere with mitigating circumstances sufficient to justify discipline other than removal. That case will have to be argued elsewhere. In New Jersey nothing other than removal will do, no matter what the circumstances.
[In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 566, 472 A.2d 546 (1984).]
Even if the attorney offender does not “act for personal greed or financial gain, and the mitigating factors [are] substantial, [the Court has] found that the only appropriate discipline for bribery of a public official [is] disbarment.” In re Jones, 131 N.J. 505, 513, 621 A.2d 469 (1993); In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 36-37, 446 A.2d 1208 (1982) (stating that although “it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the misconduct, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means to restore public confidence in it. Bribery ... is surely one of those cases____No sanction short of disbarment will suffice____”).
In the past, the Court has disbarred attorneys for even collateral involvement in the bribery of public officials. See, e.g., In re Rigolosi, supra, 107 N.J. at 208, 526 A.2d 670 (disbarring attorney for attorney’s involvement in bribery scheme notwithstanding attorney’s acquittal of bribery); In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168, 182, 526 A.2d 658 (1987) (disbarring attorney convicted of participating in conspiracy to secure dismissal of criminal prosecution by bribing witness); In re Coruzzi, supra, 95 N.J. at 581-82, 472 A.2d 546 (disbarring judge on conviction of four counts of bribery when judge either received the money or solicited the bribe but did not receive the money); In re Hughes, supra, 90 N.J. at 39, 446 A.2d 1208 (disbarring attorney convicted of bribing IRS agent to remain silent concerning possible criminal violations and to alter certificates of release of federal tax liens); In re Sabatino, 65 N.J. 548, 554, 324 A.2d 20 (1974) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy to bribe public official); In re Colsey, 63 N.J. 210, 215, 306 A.2d 72 (1973) (disbarring attorney for aiding participants in payment of suspect political contributions); In re Goode, 58 N.J. *302420, 421, 278 A.2d 206 (1971) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy to bribe police officer). In Rigolosi, after conducting an independent review of the record, the Court disbarred an attorney acquitted of bribery. 107 N.J. at 208, 526 A.2d 670. Although the Court found that the attorney did not know of, assist, or encourage the bribery scheme in advance, the Court determined that the attorney’s conduct extending over a period of months, placed him “if not in the center, alongside those in the web of deceit.” Id. at 197, 526 A.2d 670. The Court held that the attorney’s conduct required his expulsion from the ranks of the legal profession:
This is not a case of a novice who had not yet had opportunity to develop a sense of ethics. Respondent was an attorney steeped in the ways of law, government, and politics. No amount of good works can save someone who, with all the knowledge and experience that he accumulated, “poisons the well of justice.”
[Id. at 210, 526 A.2d 670.]
III.
Both the OAE and respondent invoke comparison of this case to In re Rigolosi, supra. Respondent contends that disbarment was imposed in In re Rigolosi because the Court had clear evidence in the record that the attorney played a sinister part in the attempt to bribe a state trooper; he was “not just an. innocent bystander or dupe.” Id. at 208, 526 A.2d 670. Here, respondent asserts that the record fails to establish clear and convincing evidence of similar involvement by him in Ciardella’s effort to bribe Haggerty. Rather, he contends that the record permits varying inferences, and therefore lacks the clear and convincing proof necessary to place him in the status of “participant” in Ciardella’s scheme.
On the other hand, the OAE contends that the decision in In re Rigolosi compels disbarment here. As in Rigolosi, respondent may not have contrived the plan, but his involvement was significant because he demonstrated a “willingness to act as an intermediary” by posing the hypothetical question to Haggerty. The OAE also contends that, like Rigolosi, respondent’s involvement was not limited to a single instance, but spanned a period exceed*303ing a month during which he had the opportunity to prevent the bribe from taking place'but did not do so. During that month he received the bribe money, posed his hypothetical question to the target of the bribe and did not report Ciardella’s actions in furtherance of a bribe to any member of law enforcement. It was Haggerty who reported the matter, at his insistence, not respondent’s, to Tobin on November 26, 1999. The OAE asserts that respondent’s conduct is reasonably regarded as actions in furtherance of the bribe effort.
The task here is to determine whether based on the record developed in the judicial removal action brought against respondent, the evidence is clear and convincing that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, R.P.C. 8.4(c), and that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, R.P.C. 8.4(d). Like the DRB, I reject respondent’s contention that the facts are subject to competing interpretations and that respondent’s conduct could ever be characterized as innocent. Rather, my review of the record leads me to the conclusion that respondent has engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and that the conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Applying the principles of Rigolosi, disbarment is appropriate.
The record before the hearing panel on judicial removal is compelling. Employing the high beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof, the panel rendered several important findings. First, respondent had a general knowledge on October 17, 1996 of the purpose of Ciardella’s delivery to him of the manila envelope containing a job application and $10,000 to be provided to Haggerty. The panel also determined that either on October 17, 1996 or within a day or two thereafter, respondent had actual knowledge of the entirety of Ciardella’s bribe plan that involved him as intermediary in the delivery of the cash and job application to Haggerty. The panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that that knowledge imposed a duty on respondent to report the matter to law enforcement. He failed to do so, and upon viewing respon*304dent’s demeanor and overall credibility when he testified, the panel pronounced his various explanations as not reasonable and not plausible. The panel held that respondent’s failure to report the bribery scheme violated Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct beyond a reasonable doubt and, in a very public way, brought the Lyndhurst municipal judgeship into disrepute.
Second, the panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent failed to act in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary when he hypothetically asked Haggerty, the very target of the bribe scheme, how he would react if a client of respondent’s asked him to do him a favor. That type of action by a member of the bar, and a judicial officer, is corrosive to the public’s confidence in the administration of justice. The panel correctly perceived the devastating effect of respondent’s behavior. Fairly regarded, respondent’s conduct and words can only be reasonably viewed as a testing of the waters to see how Haggerty would respond. Respondent evidenced his willingness to act as an intermediary in furtherance of the bribery effort. The panel found, under the rigorous beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, that respondent’s conduct reasonably was viewed as rendering him an accomplice to the bribery plan. That finding amply supports, indeed compels, a clear and convincing finding that respondent engaged in conduct implicating him in a bribery scheme. Thus, the misconduct implicated deceit and it was prejudicial to the administration of justice, violations of R.P.C. 8.4(c) and (d).
The majority quotes verbatim some forty-eight pages of the record in an effort to establish that there is a plausible, innocent explanation for respondent’s posing that hypothetical question to Haggerty. The majority posits that respondent may have been looking to Haggerty for advice on “how to deal with an awkward and compromising situation.” Ante at 289, 793 A.2d 645. I must respectfully disagree.
There is no plausible, innocent explanation for respondent’s conduct. He plainly was testing the waters to ascertain Hagger*305ty’s receptivity to an offer of a bribe. To me, there is not another credible explanation. If respondent truly believed that Haggerty could not be bought, why pose the question to admit that possibility? If respondent truly was trying to report the incident to Haggerty as his supervisor, why did he not report the details of the scheme to him in that conversation? Why did he not report the scheme to law enforcement? Why did he not tell Haggerty the details until much later, and then only at Haggerty’s insistence? In that initial conversation with Haggerty, respondent was not asking Haggerty “what should I do,” he asked Haggerty “what would you do?” There was nothing innocent about respondent’s hypothetical inquiry of Haggerty; it was designed to test Haggerty. By so doing, respondent implicated himself in the bribery scheme in violation of R.P.C. 8.4(c) and (d).
This is not only one of many possible reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts. The essential facts here are not in dispute. Respondent does not contest that Ciardella came to his office and gave him a manila envelope containing a police application for his son and two thick bundles of cash to be delivered to Haggerty. He does not dispute that, within a day or so thereafter at the latest, he knew exactly what was in that envelope and understood what Ciardella wanted him to do with it. It is also undisputed that a few days later he met Haggerty and posed a hypothetical question to him, asking Haggerty what he would do if a client of respondent’s offered Haggerty a bribe. He did not go into the details of the bribery plan with Haggerty at that meeting, either before or after the posing of that hypothetical question. He did not report the bribery scheme to law enforcement. It was reported, later, by Haggerty. Those facts are uncontested. Respondent, through his testimony “explaining” those facts, asks us to accept different inferences. The three judge panel found those inferences to be implausible. They called his explanation for his conduct “incredible.” I agree.
Respondent’s proffered inferences do not have to be accepted merely because he testified to them. The inferences he asks us to *306accept have to be reasonable to be accepted. Unfortunately, there is only one reasonable inference that flows from these facts and that is that respondent implicated himself in a bribery scheme. Respondent’s proffered explanation, in contrast, is simply implausible. We accept the natural, plausible inferences that flow from incontestable fact; we need not accept implausible fiction as competing inferences, Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 139-40, 141 A.2d 761 (1958) (“The determinative inquiry is whether the evidence demonstrates the offered hypothesis as a rational inference, that is to say, a presumption grounded in a preponderance of the probabilities according to the common experience of mankind.”). Nor must we have competing testimony to reject the patently incredible inference that respondent wants us to accept. See Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J.Super. 139, 162, 83 A.2d 246 (Ch.Div.1951), aff’d o.b., 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (“What a person’s intentions were need not be proved from what he said, but they may be inferred from all that he did and said, and from all the surrounding circumstances of the situation under investigation.”).
The three judge panel looked at the same facts as we have before us and concluded that respondent was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice that required his removal from the bench. They viewed respondent on the stand, heard his same arguments for the same inferences to explain his conduct, and rejected those explanations as incredible. Indeed, his testimony was reported as not believable for multiple reasons. In addition to rejecting the substance of the explanation respondent was proffering, respondent himself was characterized as a less than candid witness. His changing versions of what transpired between Haggerty and him also rendered his testimony disingenuous. There is no credible basis from which to dispute the soundness of the panel’s findings. An explanation that is offered for conduct that is conceded may be so disingenuous that it may permit an inference that bad motive was intended. Respondent’s explanation sinks to such depths.
*307Moreover, the three judge panel found beyond a reasonable doubt that the public, on hearing all of the facts, would believe that respondent had participated in a bribe. Another way of characterizing that finding, made beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the commonly accepted inference that flows from the conduct conceded here is that respondent participated in the bribery scheme by testing the waters with the police commissioner. So when respondent says that there is another plausible inference to draw from these facts, that assertion runs directly contrary to the finding of the three judge panel in the prior judicial removal proceeding.
Finally, it is no response to argue that respondent was not charged with a criminal offense. We do not know, and will never know, why the prosecutor exercised his discretion as he did in this matter. But we do know that when judicial removal charges were prosecuted against respondent, a three judge panel, employing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, determined that respondent acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice, and that that conduct brought his judicial office into disrepute.
Respondent’s misconduct strikes at the heart of our attorney disciplinary system’s goal: to promote public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. That a longtime member of the bench and bar knew a criminal scheme was afoot and that he was asked to play an integral part in its fruition, and yet did not report it to law enforcement, is poison in the well of justice. Respondent’s actions, objectively regarded as being in furtherance of the criminal endeavor, reveal a corruption, or indifference to corruption, that are a violation of the professional fealty that respondent owed to the administration of justice. Disbarment is necessary and appropriate. The public should be reassured that an attorney who engages in such conduct will never again be trusted with the responsibilities of being a lawyer. In my view, respondent’s conduct violates R.P.C. 8.4(c) and (d) and renders him unfit to practice law. I respectfully dissent.
*308Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice COLEMAN join in this dissent.
For censuring — Justices STEIN, LONG and VERNIERO, and Appellate Division Judge KING (temporarily assigned) — 4.
For disbarring — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, and LaVECCHIA — 3.
ORDER
It is ordered that JAMES A. BRESLIN, JR., of LYNDHURST, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1968, is hereby censured; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.