Court Opinion

ID: 9763133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:37:18.832576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.603770
License: Public Domain

PALLADINO, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority applies the per se confusion rule which was set forth in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Fiester, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 342, 583 A.2d 31 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 528 Pa. 632, 598 A.2d 285 (1991) to hold that because Sorg was given both the implied consent warnings and the Miranda warnings, and because he asked for an attorney and was allowed by the police officers to attempt to contact his attorney, Sorg was per se *93confused about his right to speak to an attorney before submitting to a chemical test.
By applying the per se rule, the majority relieves Sorg of the requirement that he make a showing that he was unable to make a knowing and conscious refusal because he was confused about his right to an attorney. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 70, 606 A.2d 1264 (1992), I would hold that Sorg did not meet his burden of proving that his refusal to take a chemical test was not knowing and conscious; therefore, Sorg’s driving privileges should have been suspended pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.