Court Opinion

ID: 9733522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:09:53.031015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.597346
License: Public Domain

TOM GRAY, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
The rules by which we are governed require “a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but ... addresses every issue ... necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” Tex.R ,App.P. 47.1 (emphasis added). Because the majority disposes of this cause on an issue which was not necessary for disposition of the appeal, and further because I disagree with the majority’s analysis of that issue, I respectfully dissent. I do, however, concur in the result reached on an issue raised that disposes of the entire appeal.
Castaldo’s second issue is:
The trial court erred in allowing the State to present as evidence in its casein-chief of alleged extraneous crimes, wrongs or acts on the part of the Appellant?
(Emphasis added). However, in its disposition of this issue, the majority spends a great deal of time discussing the application of Rule 404(b) to evidence admitted regarding the driver of the Jeep in which Castaldo was a passenger. Castaldo grouped his complaints about all the extraneous evidence admitted over his objections in one issue and counters the anticipated argument of the State that the evidence was necessary background contextual evidence. The majority ultimately holds that Rule 404(b) applies to acts of third parties.
I cannot agree that Rule 404(b) applies to the acts of third parties. Our sister court in Fort Worth has squarely addressed this issue. In McKnight v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that evidence of a witness’s murder conviction and two pending charges were erroneously admitted in violation of Rules 401, 403, and 404. The Fort Worth court held that the 404 objection to the evidence was properly overruled because that Rule only applied to the admission of extraneous offenses of the accused. McKnight v. State, 874 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1994, no pet.).
It appears that the Fifth Circuit is in agreement with this conclusion as well. It first touched on this topic in 1978. U.S. v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978). Beechum involved extrinsic offense evidence but not by a third party. In Beec-hum, the court set out the two-step test to determine whether extrinsic offense or bad act evidence would be admissible. First, the extrinsic evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character. Id. at 911. Second, the evidence must have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice and meet the other requirements of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The court went on to state that it was obvious that if the defendant did not commit the extrinsic act or offense, the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. Id. at 912-913. The government was required *429to offer proof demonstrating that the defendant committed the act. Id. at 913.
In 1979, while explaining the applicability of Rule 404(b), the Fifth Circuit stated that the rule was based on the fear that the jury will use evidence that the defendant has, at other times, committed bad acts to convict him of the charged offense. U.S. v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979). Again, this did not involve acts of a third party, and the court held that the act was not extrinsic because it was intertwined with the charged offense.
Then, in 1981, the court finally reviewed a case where the government had successfully entered into evidence the extrinsic act of a third party. U.S. v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir.1981). In Krezdom, the defendant was a U.S. Immigration Inspector who was charged with falsely making and forging the signature of another inspector on the application for border crossing cards of five nonresident aliens. The government admitted over the defendant’s objection evidence that the aliens whose applications were forged acquired their border crossing cards by illegally paying a third party who lived in a border town. The court acknowledged that the extraneous offense was committed by a person other than the defendant but stated, “[ajrguably, this is not the kind of evidence to which Rule 404(b) applies.” Id. at 1332. The court noted that “where the only purpose served by extrinsic offense evidence is to demonstrate the propensity of the defendant to act in a certain way, the evidence must be excluded.” Id. at 1333. But, the court further noted that when the “extrinsic offense was not committed by the defendant, the evidence will not tend to show that the defendant has a criminal disposition and that he can be expected to act in conformity therewith.” Id. For the purpose of the 404(b) argument, the court relied on Beechum and concluded, “[i]t would seem, therefore, that when extrinsic offense evidence is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant, in order to trigger the application of Rule 404(b) there must be an allegation that the extrinsic offense was committed by the defendant.” Id. The court, however, declined to decide whether 404(b) was applicable to their facts because the evidence was admissible whether or not 404(b) applied. Id.
There are other means of keeping out extrinsic acts or offenses of third parties. See Williams v. State, 27 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet. h.). Rule 404(b) does not and should not be applied to the extrinsic acts or offenses of a third party. Thus, I dissent from the majority’s determination of the issue based on Rule 404(b). Further, I dissent because the eleven pages of discussion by the majority of Rule 404(b) is not only wrong but is completely unnecessary to the disposition of the appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 47.1.
I concur with the majority opinion regarding the need for the limiting jury instruction upon which the result is properly founded.