Court Opinion

ID: 9706566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:46:33.464408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.653933
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
In Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57, 65, 364 A.2d 902, 904 (1976) we held:
... the right to a public trial is not absolute; rather, it must be considered in relationship to other important interests. In considering such other interests, a court must assess all of the circumstances to determine if they present a situation in which an exclusion order is necessary. If the court determines a necessity exists, it may then issue an exclusion order; but the exclusion order must be fashioned to effectuate protection of the important interest without unduly infringing upon the accused’s right to a public trial either through its scope or duration,1 (emphasis added)
On appeal, we may reverse only if the trial court has abused its discretion in balancing the competing interests. Knight, supra.
Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme Court aptly sets forth the importance of the openness of our trial system in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 823, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984).
This openness has what is sometimes described as a “community therapeutic value”. Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even out*141rage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done. Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrelevant. When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that the offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly selected, (citations omitted)
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Press-Enterprise Co., that sufficient evidence must be demonstrated to warrant the extreme sanction of closure of the public trial rather than other alternatives.2
The present record is conspicuously devoid of any evidence to support closure or any attempt to structure reasonable alternatives to that extreme sanction. On the first day of voir dire, the court, without notice, cleared the courtroom because of insufficient room to seat all the jurors and all the members of the news media. (N.T. 2/23/81, p. 98). On the second day of voir dire, the trial court chose to change the procedure and question only four prospective jurors at a time. (N.T. 2/24/81, p. 118). Yet, upon request for an open proceeding, the court ruled that it did not want the jurors, “to come in contact with any extraneous influences while being brought back and forth from the other courtroom.” (N.T. 2/24/81, p. 123). Although the court indicated fire considerations were involved, it expanded the seating capacity for the news media. The court then expressed concern that spectators from the general public would “start eating and opening up Lifesavers and things like that.” (N.T. 2/24/81, p. 124). Finally, on the fourth day of jury selection, upon the defendants’ request for an open voir dire, the *142trial court refused indicating that the news media would protect the openness of the proceedings. The court also indicated that interruptions and distractions mandated a closed proceeding. (N.T. 2/26/81, p. 700).
While all of these concerns may have required additional security measures to protect the fairness of the jury selection process, and the orderly administration of justice, none of these reasons either singularly or as a group required the extreme sanction of expulsion of the general public. Never should it be mistaken, misunderstood or misinterpreted, that the news media, electronic, newsprint or otherwise, will ever supplement the sanctity of the general public’s right to access. Furthermore, it is clear from this record that the circumstances did not warrant closure of the jury selection process. In fact, in the appellant’s brief we are not directed to any portions of the record which substantiate any necessity of barring the general public for the voir dire. If sufficient room existed to increase space for the news media, surely sufficient room existed to permit an orderly rotation of a few members of the general public to view the jury proceedings. The fact that the trial itself was open lends support to the proposition that the trial court acted improperly in closing the voir dire.
Since the trial court set forth no compelling reasons to deny to the defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, I would hold, that on this record, the trial court abused its discretion and would affirm the order of the Superior Court granting the defendants a new trial.
ORDER
PER CURIAM.
AND NOW, this 24th day of February, 1986, upon consideration of Appellees’ Application for Reargument or, in the Alternative, for Remand to the Superior Court, the Order of this Court dated November 22, 1985, is vacated to the extent it reinstates Appellees’ judgments of sentence. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for disposition of *143all issues raised in that court, but not yet considered. In all other respects, the Application is denied.

. Citations and footnotes omitted.

. As Justice Stevens correctly stated in his concurring opinion, the Press-Enterprise Co. case involved First Amendment rather than the Sixth Amendment protection. However, I believe the majority’s analysis is in accord with our decision in Knight, supra.