Court Opinion

ID: 9678910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:35:46.721319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.903081
License: Public Domain

MINTON, Chief Justice,
Concurring, in Part, and Dissenting, in Part:
Because it is a startling departure from precedent, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the urinalysis showing Burton had used marijuana and cocaine is inadmissible. I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the issue regarding Darrell Cook’s testimony was adequately preserved for appellate review.
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Admitting the Urinalysis.
I readily acknowledge that the urinalysis did not determine the concentration of marijuana or cocaine in Burton’s system, nor did it indicate when Burton had used those illegal drugs. But the indisputable fact that Burton had used marijuana and cocaine at some point in the recent past was a relevant and probative factor from which the jury could reasonably have inferred that Burton was impaired at the time of the tragic accident.
All relevant evidence is presumptively admissible under Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 402.10 Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” KRE 401. Because the presence of cocaine and marijuana in Burton’s urine could lead a fact-finder to a reasonable inference that it was more probable that Burton acted wantonly in causing the accident, the urinalysis results should be deemed admissible, unless excluded for another reason. Although it also mentions KRE 404(b), the majority apparently concludes that the urinalysis was inadmissible under KRE 403 because, in the majority’s view, the probative value of the urinalysis was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. I strongly disagree.
Similar to the present case is Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775 (Ky.2004), in which the appellant had a urinalysis performed at a hospital one hour after a motor vehicle accident. And, like the present ease, the urinalysis showed traces of cocaine and marijuana although it could not be determined when the drugs were ingested or the degree of impairment they caused. Id. at 780. We held in Parson that the urinalysis results were admissible because “evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of *146the degree of impairment caused by its presence.” Id. at 781.
I agree with the majority’s proposition that a large and readily identifiable quantity of alcohol was present in the defendant’s bloodstream in Parson. But I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Parson. The presence of alcohol in Parson was irrelevant to the conclusion that the urinalysis was admissible. We held that the jury was informed “in detail to the effects of a blood alcohol concentration of 0.238 grams per deciliter on the motor skills and judgment of a person with that amount of alcohol in his system....” Id. at 780. Yet, we still held that the urinalysis was admissible because “evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence.” Id. at 781 (emphasis added). Nowhere in our opinion in Parson did we base the admissibility of the urinalysis upon the presence of alcohol. In fact, we held that the urinalysis was admissible even though (1) the urinalysis did not inform the jury of the degree of impairment and (2) the jury had already been informed of the effect alcohol had on the defendant. So, far from being interrelated, the admissibility of the urinalysis was an entirely separate matter from the alcohol-related evidence. How is it possible to conclude from virtually identical facts that the urinalysis was admissible against Parson but is inadmissible against Burton?
The majority’s conclusion also distorts and conflicts with our holding in the recent case of Berryman v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 175 (Ky.2007). In Berryman, a defendant argued that he should have been granted a directed verdict on wanton murder and assault stemming from a tragic auto accident. Id. at 177. We disagreed with the defendant, at least in part, because a chemist testified that the defendant had traces of Xanax in his system-even though the chemist was not able to state conclusively whether the Xanax had impaired the defendant. Id. at 178 n. 6. Despite no evidence directly linking the Xanax with impairment, we nevertheless held that “the finder of fact would be permitted to draw a reasonable inference that the Xanax did, in fact, impair Berry-man’s ability to operate a motor vehicle in a safe, lawful manner.” Id. We even reiterated later that “[a] reasonable inference could be drawn that Berryman was impaired, at least somewhat, by the Xanax in his system.” Id. at 179. How was it permissible for a jury reasonably to infer that Berryman was at least somewhat impaired by the Xanax in his system, but it is unreasonable for a jury to be trusted to decide reasonably whether Burton was at least somewhat impaired by the marijuana and cocaine found in his system?
Contrary to the majority’s astonishing conclusion, we did not say in Berryman that other factors (such as the defendant’s driving at a high rate of speed) “were such as to compel a conclusion that the defendant was impaired.” Majority opinion, p. 136. Instead, as quoted above, we simply held that the presence of Xanax, along with other factors, was only sufficient to support a reasonable inference of impairment. Indeed, the crash arguably may have been a result of inattentive driving because there was also evidence that Ber-ryman was watching his passenger count pills and, thus, was driving in an inattentive manner before the crash.11 Id. at *147176-77. The majority mischaracterizes the evidence when it opines that the facts in Berryman compelled a conclusion that Berryman was impaired.
I also disagree with the majority’s unduly narrow interpretation of Estep v. Commonwealth, 957 S.W.2d 191 (Ky.1997), involving yet another wanton murder charge stemming from a tragic automobile accident. In Estep, the jury heard detailed testimony about the name and effects of five different prescription drugs found in the defendant’s blood, as well as whether those drugs were found to be within proper therapeutic levels. Id. at 192-93. Nevertheless, we held that the Commonwealth was entitled to introduce evidence regarding a urinalysis that showed the presence of marijuana in the defendant’s urine because we believed that urinalysis was probative of the issue of wantonness. Id. at 193-94.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, nowhere in Estep did we hold that “the urinalysis evidence assisted in identifying the substances used by the defendant....” Majority opinion, p. 134. To the contrary, the other five prescription drugs found in the defendant were already known by a blood test. Id. at 193 (“Blood tests revealed the existence of five different types of drugs in Estep’s body....”). And I am puzzled by the point the majority tries to make when it opines that we deemed admissible the urinalysis in Estep in order to “evidenc[e] temporal aspects of the conduct pertinent to the degree of the wanton conduct....” Majority opinion, p. 134. As I read it, all Estep stands for is the simple proposition that a urinalysis showing that drugs were present in a defendant’s sys-tern contemporaneously with the alleged commission of the underlying offense(s) is admissible, even if the urinalysis does not definitively show the amount of drugs or the drugs’ precise effects upon a defendant.
Finally, as I construe it, Bush v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 550 (Ky.1992), is distinguishable and does not affect the admissibility of Burton’s urinalysis. In that case, a blood test performed upon a person charged with wanton murder revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.13 percent. The blood test was negative for other drugs, but a urinalysis revealed the presence of marijuana and amphetamines. Id. at 555. Because the marijuana and amphetamines were not found in the defendant’s blood, a chemist was unable to testify that the marijuana and amphetamines caused impairment. We held that “if it was error to admit this testimony [regarding the urinalysis], it was harmless.” Id. So Bush is unlike the present case because a blood test was taken in that case that was negative for the presence of marijuana and amphetamines, meaning that it would have been illogical to infer impairment from the presence of those drugs in the defendant’s urine. In other words, impairment should not be inferred from a urinalysis if the drugs found in the urinalysis were not also found in a contemporaneous blood test. Obviously, the situation in Bush is far different from the present case because no contemporaneous blood test was performed on Burton.
Despite its attempt to argue to the contrary, the majority’s novel conclusion is directly and unmistakably contrary to our previously consistent precedent. Because *148I believe it is impossible to distinguish legitimately this case from the consistent troika of Parson, Berryman, and Estep, Kentucky’s bench and bar will have an impossible task in future cases in determining whether similar urinalysis results will be admissible. Indistinguishable cases should not yield different results.
The fact that Burton had illegal drugs or their metabolites in his urine obviously would make recent drug use before driving at least slightly more probable than a negative urine drug screen or lack of any urine drug screen. And recent drug use before driving would impact whether Burton had acted wantonly. So it is clear to me that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the urinalysis into evidence.
I recognize that the presence of drug metabolites in Burton’s urine might not be, by itself, sufficient to establish wantonness. But in determining whether evidence is admissible, a court must focus on the relevancy of the evidence, not its sufficiency. Robert G. Lawson, Kentuoky Evidence Law Handbook; § 2.05(3) (4th ed.2003). So the Commonwealth was not required to prove that the drugs were present in sufficient quantity to cause impairment, nor to show any additional proof that Burton was actually impaired in order for the urinalysis evidence to be relevant. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 781. Or, in other words, I believe the majority errs when it opines that evidence of this nature is admissible only if it “compels a conclusion” that the accident leading to the charges was attributable to impairment. Majority opinion, p. 138. The standard for admission of evidence is whether it makes a relevant issue more or less probable, not whether it compels a conclusion. So, in addition to being directly contrary to our precedent on this exact point, the majority’s opinion blurs what has been a clear line of demarcation between the standard for determining the admissibility of evidence and the standard for determining the sufficiency of evidence.12
Simply put, the admissibility of evidence does not, and should not, depend upon whether the evidence compels a certain conclusion. Rather, evidence is admissible only if it merely makes more probable or less probable “the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.... ” KRE 401. The fact that Burton had illegal drugs in his system contemporaneously with the accident should have been made known to the jury, and the jury could have made as much or as little of that evidence as it deemed proper. In other words, since the urinalysis was admissible, it should have been left to the jury, not this Court, to decide *149whether Burton’s drug usage was “disconnected from the criminal event or criminal mental state at issue....” Majority opinion, p. 133. I disagree with the majority’s insistence on hiding this potentially highly relevant fact from the jury under the cover ofKRE 403.
The trial court has discretion to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by any undue prejudice. Parson, 144 S.W.3d at 781. Unlike the majority, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion here, especially since the Commonwealth’s testimony regarding the urinalysis evidence was subjected to vigorous cross-examination and Burton presented his own expert who testified concerning what the urinalysis could (and could not) show. The majority sidesteps or minimizes much of the evidence as it substitutes its analysis of the evidence for that of the trial court. Taken in the proper evidentiary context in the present case, the urinalysis results are highly probative. More specifically, the probative value of the presence of the drugs in Burton’s urine is heightened by: (1) the paramedic’s testimony that he suspected Burton was impaired, (2) Burton’s asking Parnell not to call the police or an ambulance to the crash scene, (3) Burton’s initial refusal to give a urine sample until he was threatened with catheterization, and (4) Burton’s very erratic behavior at the crime scene.
In short, I would follow our established precedent, recognize the trial court’s inherent discretion regarding the admission of evidence, and affirm.
2. Issue of Whether Expert Testimony of Drug Recognition Instructor was Properly Admitted Waived by Failure to Request a Hearing on this Issue.
Burton argues that the testimony of Darrell Cook, a drug recognition instructor, does not satisfy the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). But because Burton failed to request a Daubert hearing in the trial court or demand a ruling from the trial court on Cook’s qualifications to present expert testimony, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the issue is properly preserved for our review. However, if the majority believes the issue was adequately preserved, I believe it should have provided guidance to the trial court about the admissibility of the evidence on remand instead of merely “cautioning] the trial court to test this witness and his conclusions per KRE 702 ....” (Majority opinion, p. 141). After all, since the case is being remanded on other grounds and since it is highly likely the Commonwealth will again seek to admit Cook’s damning testimony, why would the majority strain to find an issue preserved only to decline ultimately to resolve the issue?
Without belaboring the facts, suffice it to say that I agree with the majority that the trial court’s belief that the Commonwealth was entitled to an expert witness simply because the defense had one was improper. The facile old maxim, “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander,” is not a proper basis for determining the admissibility of expert testimony. But I would refrain from deciding whether the trial court’s ultimate decision was correct because I agree with the Commonwealth that this issue was not properly preserved. The majority also fails to decide explicitly whether the trial court’s decision to admit the testimony was proper. It is unclear to me why the majority believes it proper to castigate Cook’s testimony as being “unqualified testimony” that “improperly invited the jury to speculate that Burton could have been under the influence of ... illicit substances of which there was no *150evidence”13 while refusing to take the next logical step of holding that the admission of that so-called unqualified testimony was improper.
At best, Burton’s concerns about Cook’s qualification had been arguably raised to the trial court through Burton’s earlier written objection, stating that “the Commonwealth has not provided a curriculum vitae for Mr. Cook to allow the Court or the defense to determine whether Cook is or is not an expert in his field.” But Burton failed to request a Daubert hearing or otherwise demand a ruling from the trial court on Cook’s qualifications to testify as an expert witness, thereby waiving the issue. See Dillard v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Ky.1999) (“It is the duty of one who moves the trial court for relief to insist upon a ruling, and a failure to do so is regarded as a waiver.”).
Frankly, whether Cook was properly qualified to offer expert testimony about Burton’s possible drug use based upon others’ observations of Burton’s behavior and vital signs poses a troubling question. But since an insufficient record has been developed on this question before the trial court, we should refuse to speculate on what an unrequested Daubert hearing might have indicated. Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Ky.2000) (“We decline to speculate on the outcome of an unrequested Daubert hearing, or to hold that the failure to conduct such a hearing sua sponte constitutes palpable error”); Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 203, 212 (Ky.2005) (issue of qualification as expert unpreserved where objection was to testimony as lay witness, and no Daubert hearing was requested).14 What we should not do, however, is stretch our preservation rules past what had been recognized as the breaking point only to refuse to determine explicitly whether the contested evidence should have been excluded. Because the present case is being remanded on other grounds, why did the majority choose to address this issue at all if it did not want to resolve it on its merits?
I firmly believe the issue was inadequately preserved for our review and, thus, would summarily affirm because this issue does not lend itself to palpable error review. Tharp, 40 S.W.3d at 368. But, since the majority finds the question to be preserved, I am perplexed as to why it did not choose to resolve this important issue.
3. Conclusion.
I concur with the majority as to the issues regarding the testimony of James Boyd, the mistrial, and the sufficiency of the evidence. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s analysis and conclusions regarding the urinalysis. I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the issue of the admissibility of Cook’s testimony was properly preserved. I would affirm Burton’s convictions and sentence.
ABRAMSON, J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., join this opinion.

. KRE 402 provides: “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by Acts of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”

. "[T]wo witnesses observed that Berryman appeared to be preoccupied with something in the center or passenger area of the car shortly before the accident.” Id. at 176-77. *147Indeed, the majority's remarkable conclusion that the evidence compelled a finding that Berryman was impaired is belied by the fact that one of the main thrusts of Justice Schro-der's dissent in that case was his belief that a driver's inattentiveness while speeding was not sufficient to rise to the level of wanton conduct necessary to support a conviction for wanton murder. Id. at 180-82.

. See Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.05(3) at p. 80:
“In other words, to meet the test of relevancy, evidence need not be even moderately probative of a material fact; [r]elevance is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight.
Lack of appreciation of the leniency of this requirement and of die law's powerful tilt toward admission over exclusion can result from inadequate awareness of the difference between the concepts of relevancy and sufficiency. It needs always to be remembered that relevancy determinations resolve mere admissibility issues while sufficiency decisions determine if disputes are to end or continue. It needs to be remembered that relevancy determinations focus on individual items of evidence while sufficiency determinations focus on the totality of evidence. It is because the two concepts perform different functions and focus on evidence in different ways that each has its own standard of measurement. Evidence is relevant if it has any probative force; evidence is sufficient only if its probativeness is strong enough to induce belief in the minds of reasonable people. The difference is great rather than slight.” (Footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted.)

. Majority opinion, p. 141.

. The majority does not cite or discuss Dau-bert.