Court Opinion

ID: 9571116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:10.203139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:15.694296
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully with Divisions 1(a), 1(b), and 1(d) of the majority opinion. With regard to the remainder, however, I must respectfully dissent.
1. With regard to the appellants’ claim for libel and slander, the record does not support either of the majority opinion’s conclusions as a matter of law that no publication occurred and that Jansen was acting as a public officer in discharge of her official duties at the time she telephoned the appellants’ supervisor and wrote the supervisor in confirmation of that telephone conversation.
Concerning the publication of the alleged libel, there was no real dispute at trial that Jansen’s letter was received and read by the appellants’ supervisor. Jansen herself testified about her phone call to the appellants’ supervisor, and that she mailed the letter to that supervisor at his request. The contents of the telephone conversation and the letter were the same. One of the appellants testified that the supervisor advised him that the matter would have to be referred to the captain in view of the receipt of Jansen’s letter. The fact that the supervisor felt compelled to refer the matter to the captain would support a finding that he understood the letter to cast aspersions upon the conduct of the appellants.
The majority opinion disregards this evidence by erroneously categorizing it as hearsay. As emphasized by the majority opinion, in order to effect the publication of a libel, “there must be an understanding of its meaning by the person reading it. . .” Sigmon v. Womack, *592158 Ga. App. 47, 50 (279 SE2d 254) (1981). In the instant case, the supervisor’s act of referring the matter to the captain most certainly reflected his personal understanding of the letter; in other words, the supervisor’s conduct, so indicative of his understanding or state of mind, was necessarily a matter concerning which the truth must be found. Under this circumstance, the appellant’s testimony recounting his conversation with the supervisor, which explained the supervisor’s conduct, was admissible not as hearsay but as original evidence. OCGA _§ 24-3-2; Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534 (314 SE2d 910) (1984).
Neither Jansen nor Maier & Berkele really questioned the supervisor’s receipt and reading of Jansen’s letter; in moving for directed verdict on the slander and libel claim, Maier & Berkele merely contended that any communication by Jansen had been unauthorized, and Jansen asserted solely that the letter was not defamatory. There is evidence of the publication of the alleged slander and libel, and no real dispute over that fact, and the majority opinion mistakenly concludes otherwise.
In the letter, Jansen complained to the supervisor that the appellants had been uncooperative and belligerent, and that they had flashed badges during their encounter. She concluded the letter by expressing her disapproval of such conduct which she considered to be unbecoming of employees of the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary. Statements which tend to injure one in his trade or occupation may be libelous. Walker v. Sheehan, 80 Ga. App. 606 (2) (56 SE2d 628) (1949). In writing the letter in the instant case, Jansen served no general duty to enforce the law, and specifically did not further any inherent duty of a law enforcement officer to report improper acts, to the extent that a directed verdict was proper, because the evidence of the alleged improper act, i.e., flashing of the badges, was conflicting. In short, the evidence and circumstances in this case would authorize a finding that Jansen’s communication with the appellants’ supervisor served no law enforcement purpose, but rather was intended to cause the appellants some degree of trouble.
2. I can accept the holding of the majority opinion, and the persuasive authority relied upon by it, that the appellants’ § 1983 claim against Maier & Berkele must fail because Section 1983 will not support a respondeat superior theory of liability. However, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s finding that Jansen’s detention of the appellants was undertaken solely in her capacity as a police officer, and that Maier & Berkele was thus entitled to directed verdict on the claim for false imprisonment.
In Welton v. Ga. Power Co., 189 Ga. App. 17, 20 (1) (375 SE2d 108) (1988), relied upon by the majority opinion, the police officer moon-lighting as a security guard was hired, not to investigate offenses against the company or assist in apprehending suspected *593criminals, “but rather to afford security to company employees, primarily going to and from parking areas to the company offices . . .” In the instant case, by comparison, Jansen was hired as a deterrent to criminal activity within the store. As she testified at trial, Jansen’s job was “of being seen, of hopefully being a deterrent to anyone that might have other than straight motives when they came in.” The evidence would authorize a finding that Jansen detained the appellants ostensibly, in the process of doing exactly what Maier & Berkele employed her to do, and the trial court erred in directing verdict for Maier & Berkele on the false imprisonment claim.
Decided July 14, 1989
Rehearings denied July 31, 1989
Robert M. Goldberg, Michael E. Bergin, for appellants.
Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, David W. Davenport, Norton, Pennington & Goetz, Charles M. Goetz, Jr., for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope and Judge Benham join in this opinion.