Court Opinion

ID: 9962354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 16:00:40.130849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.340321
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT                          No. 23-3754
CITIZEN TASK
                                                    D.C. No.
FORCE; WILDEARTH
                                                 9:23-cv-00101-
GUARDIANS,
                                                     DWM
               Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    v.                                              OPINION

STATE OF MONTANA; LESLEY
ROBINSON; GREG GIANFORTE,

               Defendants - Appellants.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the District of Montana
         Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted January 12, 2024
                    Pasadena, California

                      Filed April 23, 2024

    Before: Richard C. Tallman and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit
         Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge. *

*
 The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
2          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

                Opinion by Judge Bennett;
 Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Tallman

                          SUMMARY **

      Environmental Law / Preliminary Injunction

    In an action brought under the Endangered Species Act,
the panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district
court’s preliminary injunction limiting wolf trapping and
snaring in certain parts of Montana to January 1, 2024,
through February 15, 2024, and remanded.
    Plaintiffs alleged that Montana’s laws authorizing
recreational wolf and coyote trapping and snaring, including
regulations approved by the Montana Fish and Wildlife
Commission, allowed the unlawful “take” of grizzly bears, a
threatened species, in violation of § 9 of the Endangered
Species Act. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
a preliminary injunction as to wolf trapping and snaring
only.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by considering new arguments and new materials,
submitted with plaintiffs’ reply brief in support of their
motion for a preliminary injunction, because the record
showed that defendants had an opportunity to respond to
plaintiffs’ submissions.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT            3

    The panel held that the district court applied the proper
preliminary injunction standard by requiring plaintiffs to
show only a serious question going to the merits instead of a
likelihood of success on the merits. Because plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction under the Endangered
Species Act, the last two factors of the “serious questions”
test—balance of hardships and the public interest—tipped
sharply in favor of the protected species. Plaintiffs were
required to demonstrate that they presented serious questions
as to the merits of their claim and that absent an injunction,
irreparable harm was likely.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that there were serious questions going
to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim that Montana’s 2023
recreational wolf trapping and snaring regulations would
cause the unlawful take of grizzly bears in violation of § 9 of
the Endangered Species Act. Fairly read, the record reflects
a genuine scientific and factual debate over this question.
    Reviewing deferentially, the panel also affirmed the
district court’s finding of a reasonably certain threat of
imminent harm to grizzly bears had Montana’s wolf trapping
and snaring season proceeded as planned.
    Addressing the scope of the preliminary injunction, the
panel affirmed the temporal scope of the injunction, but held
that the injunction was geographically overbroad, and
remanded for the district court to expeditiously reconsider
the geographic scope. The panel also held that the injunction
was overbroad because it prevents the State of Montana from
trapping and snaring wolves for research, vacated that part
of the injunction, and remanded for the district court to make
proper modifications to the scope of its order.
4         FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Tallman
would vacate the district court’s preliminary injunction in
toto. He concurred in the majority’s decision to remand the
district court’s preliminary injunction as geographically
overbroad and not sufficiently clear in preventing any
takings so as to accommodate the State of Montana’s
necessary scientific research activities. He dissented from
the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs established a
reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to the increasing
grizzly bear population through scientifically driven wolf
trapping regulations sufficient to warrant a preliminary
injunction.

                       COUNSEL

Timothy M. Bechtold (argued), Bechtold Law Firm PLLC,
Missoula, Montana, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Sarah M. Clerget (argued), Assistant Attorney General;
Alexander R. Scolavino, III, Attorney; Kevin Rechkoff,
Agency Counsel; Montana Department of Fish and Wildlife
Parks, Helena, Montana; for Defendants-Appellants.
Matthew G. Monforton, Monforton Law Offices PLLC,
Bozeman, Montana; Gary R. Leistico, Leistico & Esch
PLLC, Clear Lake, Minnesota; for Amicus Curiae Montana
Trappers Association, National Trappers Association, and
Fur Takers of America, Inc..
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                    5

                             OPINION

BENNETT, Circuit Judge:

    In this case, we review the district court’s order granting
a preliminary injunction. The order limited wolf trapping
and snaring 1 in certain parts of Montana to January 1, 2024
through February 15, 2024—when, as the district court
found, it is reasonably certain that almost all grizzly bears
will be in dens. Thus, under the injunction, Montana cannot
authorize any wolf trapping and snaring (in the specified
areas) anytime outside that period.
    The Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force, a
nonprofit public interest organization, together with
WildEarth Guardians (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued the
State of Montana (“State”); the Chair of the Montana Fish
and Wildlife Commission (“Commission”) 2 , Lesley
Robinson; and Governor Greg Gianforte (collectively,
“Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege that Montana’s laws
authorizing recreational wolf and coyote trapping and
snaring, including the regulations approved by the
Commission, allow the unlawful taking of grizzly bears in
violation of § 9 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16
U.S.C. § 1538.

1
 Snares are cable devices that are designed to noose around an animal’s
neck or foot.
2
  The Commission establishes the hunting, fishing, and trapping rules for
Montana’s Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (“MFWP”). Mont.
Code Ann. § 87-1-301(b). The MFWP’s stated mission is to “[s]teward
the fish, wildlife, parks, and recreational resources for the public, now
and into the future.” Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, About FWP,
https://fwp.mt.gov/aboutfwp/at-a-glance.
6           FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

    The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction as to wolf trapping and snaring only.3
Defendants filed an expedited interlocutory appeal. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Under our
limited and deferential standard of review, we affirm the
district court’s grant of injunctive relief. But the injunction
is overbroad in two respects. It is geographically overbroad,
and thus we remand for the district court to expeditiously
reconsider the geographic scope. But to prevent harm to
Plaintiffs, the current geographic scope remains in place
until the district court reconsiders the geographic scope. The
injunction is also overbroad as to wolf trapping and snaring
related to the State’s research activities. We therefore vacate
that part of the injunction and remand for the district court to
make proper modifications to the scope of its order
consistent with this opinion.
                                   I.
                                   A.
    In 1973, Congress passed the ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544. “[T]he ESA sets forth a comprehensive program to
limit harm to endangered species within the United States.”
Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Allen, 476 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir.
2007). “Section 9 of the ESA establishes a blanket
prohibition on the taking of any member of a listed
endangered species,” id. (footnote omitted) (citing 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a)(1)(B)), unless the “take” is authorized by the
relevant federal agency, 16 U.S.C. § 1539. A “take” means

3
  Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin Montana’s recreational coyote trapping
and snaring laws. But the district court declined to enjoin such laws
because Plaintiffs did not “identif[y] a remedy appropriately tailored to
the specific harm caused by coyote trapping and snaring in Montana.”
Because Plaintiffs do not challenge that denial, we do not address it.
             FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                        7

to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such
conduct.”     Id. § 1532(19).     Species listed as either
“endangered” or “threatened” are protected under the ESA. 4
See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a); Crow Indian Tribe v. United
States, 965 F.3d 662, 671 (9th Cir. 2020). The ESA allows
private parties to sue to enjoin ESA violations. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g).
    In 1975, the grizzly bear was listed as “threatened” under
the ESA, and it is still listed as “threatened.” See
Amendment Listing the Grizzly Bear of the 48
Conterminous States as a Threatened Species, 40 Fed. Reg.
31734 (July 28, 1975); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Grizzly
Bear,       https://www.fws.gov/species/grizzly-bear-ursus-
arctos-horribilis (last visited Jan. 14, 2024). In 1975, about
700 to 800 grizzlies were in the 48 contiguous states, living
primarily in areas of Wyoming, Washington, Montana, and
Idaho—the same areas where they are found today. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., Grizzly Bear, supra. Most lived in
Montana or Yellowstone National Park in areas now called
the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem and the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, respectively. These areas are still
home to most of the grizzlies in the 48 contiguous states. Id.
About 2,000 grizzlies currently live in these two areas and in
the Cabinet Yaak Ecosystem, an area of northwestern
Montana and northern Idaho. Id.

4
 “The term ‘endangered species’ means any species which is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . . .” 16
U.S.C. § 1532(6). “The term ‘threatened species’ means any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” Id.
§ 1532(20).
8          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

     Montana has allowed recreational wolf trapping since
2012. In 2020, the wolf trapping season opened on
December 15 and closed on February 28, statewide. In 2021,
the Montana Legislature required the Commission to also
authorize snaring of wolves and extended the length of the
wolf trapping and snaring season (“trapping season”) to the
first Monday after Thanksgiving through March 15. Mont.
Code Ann. § 87-1-304(8) (2021); id. § 87-1-901(1) (2021).
But since 2021, in the “estimated occupied grizzly bear
range” (“occupied grizzly range”), 5 also called the
“occupied grizzly bear habitat,” the default start date
“floats,” meaning that instead of a fixed date, the start date
can be any time from the Monday after Thanksgiving until
December 31. See Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2023
Furbearer Trapping and Hunting Regulations 15,
https://fwp.mt.gov/binaries/content/assets/fwp/hunt/regulati
ons/2023/2023-wolf-and-furbearer-final-for-web.pdf
(“2023 Regulations”); Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks,
2022 Furbearer Trapping and Hunting Regulations 15,
https://fwp.mt.gov/binaries/content/assets/fwp/hunt/regulati
ons/2022/wolf-and-furbearer-final-for-web.pdf          (“2022
Regulations”); Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2021
Montana FWP Wolf Hunting and Trapping Regulations 6,
https://fwp.mt.gov/binaries/content/assets/fwp/hunt/regulati
ons/2021/2021-wolf-final-for-web.pdf. The floating start
date is determined by the Commission based on its

5
  Collaborating biologists, including from the MFWP, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey Interagency Grizzly
Bear Study Team, have defined this area as “an estimate of the roughly
contiguous, minimum area within which grizzly bears have established
residency or have demonstrated habitat use. It does not include
occasional forays outside the estimated range or low-density peripheral
areas and therefore does not represent the total known extent of
occurrences.”
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                   9

assessment of real-time, on the ground observations of
grizzly bear activities. 2023 Regulations, supra, at 15. So
essentially, in those areas where it is estimated that grizzlies
reside or show habitat use, the default start date is December
31 unless the Commission announces an earlier start date.
The Commission is also permitted under the regulations to
adjust the trapping season end date if there is a “non-target
capture” 6 of a grizzly bear. Id. at 2, 15.
    For the 2021 and 2022 trapping seasons, Montana opted
to use easily identifiable landmarks, such as roads or creeks
to delineate the boundaries of the occupied grizzly range.
This adjustment resulted in a larger area than the actual
occupied grizzly range, and so during the 2021 and 2022
seasons, Montana applied floating start dates to areas outside
the actual occupied grizzly range. The floating start dates
for 2021 varied between December 15 and 27, and for 2022,
between December 12 and 24.
    In August 2023, the Commission adopted the 2023
Regulations. As in past years, it set the wolf trapping season
from the first Monday after Thanksgiving through March 15,
2024, but with floating start dates for the occupied grizzly
range. However, due to criticism that its prior use of
landmarks to delineate the boundaries of the occupied
grizzly range included areas with no grizzlies, Montana’s
map of the occupied grizzly range for the 2023 trapping
season used the actual occupied grizzly range boundaries. 7
For the 2023 season, Montana also used a new mapping

6
 Montana’s regulations define this term as “[c]apture of any animal that
cannot be lawfully trapped, including domestic animals.” 2023
Regulations, supra, at 2.
7
 According to Defendants, this was made possible due to the availability
and proliferation of specific GPS technologies.
10        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

method, which purportedly resulted in a more precise map
of the occupied grizzly range. These changes resulted in a
smaller occupied grizzly range than in prior years, and
consequently, the early default start date—the first Monday
after Thanksgiving—would apply to more areas than before.
                              B.
    On September 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed this suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Montana. The
operative amended complaint alleges that Montana’s
recreational wolf and coyote trapping and snaring laws are
causing and will cause the unlawful “take” of grizzly bears
in violation of § 9 of the ESA. Plaintiffs seek a declaration
that Montana’s laws violate the ESA and an injunction
barring Defendants from violating the ESA.
    On September 22, 2023, Plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction, asking the district court to “enjoin
the State of Montana from authorizing wolf trapping and
snaring in occupied grizzly bear habitat in Montana to avoid
irreparable harm until a ruling on the merits in this matter.”
Plaintiffs’ brief in support of its motion referenced a bulletin
issued by the MFWP, which stated that “Grizzly bears have
the potential to be found anywhere in the western two-thirds
of Montana (west of Billings).” Montana Fish, Wildlife &
Parks, Hunters Must Expect to See Bears (Aug. 30, 2023,
8:41                                                      AM),
https://fwp.mt.gov/homepage/news/2023/aug/0830---
hunters-must-expect-to-see-bears. The bulletin warns the
public about the presence of grizzlies and provides a list of
precautions for hunters. Id.
    Defendants requested and received an extension to
respond to the motion and eventually responded on October
23, 2023. On November 3, 2023, Plaintiffs submitted their
           FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT              11

reply brief, in which they more specifically asked the district
court to “enjoin the 2023 regulations and to require Montana
to establish regulations that are reasonably certain not to lead
to the take of grizzly bears” and “to limit wolf . . . trapping
and snaring in all areas ‘west of Billings’ to the time period
when it is reasonably certain that almost all grizzly bears will
be in dens: January 1 to February 15.” Plaintiffs submitted
six new declarations and four exhibits with their reply. They
also submitted two additional declarations before the hearing
on the motion. Defendants never objected to this additional
evidence.
    At the November 20, 2023 hearing, all parties had the
opportunity to offer testimony and arguments. Plaintiffs
reiterated that, based on their evidence, grizzlies would most
likely be in their dens from January 1 to February 15 and so
the court should limit the trapping season to that period.
During Plaintiffs’ opening argument, the court also asked
about the evidence that grizzlies may be found anywhere
west of Billings, signaling that it was considering whether
the “west of Billings” geographical scope would be proper. 8
Defendants did not address this evidence. Nor did they
address Plaintiffs’ argument that the grizzlies would most
likely be in their dens from January 1 to February 15.
    On November 21, 2023, the district court granted the
motion for a preliminary injunction as to the wolf trapping
and snaring regulations. It found that Plaintiffs had raised
serious questions going to the merits and had shown a
reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to grizzly bears

8
  The court asked Plaintiffs’ counsel: “What do you make of the
announcement by the powers that be to hunters that anybody west of
Billings has got a—there is a likelihood—not likelihood. There is a
potential of encountering a grizzly bear?”
12        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

should the 2023 wolf trapping season proceed as planned.
The district court’s order limited the wolf trapping season
“in all areas included in wolf regions one through five, plus
Hill, Blaine, and Phillips counties” to January 1 through
February 15, “the time period when it is reasonably certain
that almost all grizzly bears will be in dens.” Although
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin only Montana’s recreational wolf
trapping and snaring regulations, the district court’s order
appears to apply more broadly because it enjoins all
“authoriz[ed] wolf trapping and snaring” in the identified
areas, including the State’s trapping and snaring for research
purposes.
    Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal the same day
the district court issued its order. They argue that the district
court erred in granting the preliminary injunction because:
(1) it improperly considered new arguments and new
materials submitted with Plaintiffs’ reply brief; (2) it applied
the wrong preliminary injunction standard; and (3) there is
no reasonable certainty of irreparable harm. For the reasons
discussed below, we reject these arguments and affirm the
issuance of injunctive relief. But Defendants also argue that
the injunction is temporally and geographically overbroad,
and that it is also overbroad with respect to wolf trapping and
snaring related to the State’s research activities. While we
affirm the injunction’s temporal scope, we agree that it is
overbroad geographically and with respect to the State’s
research activities.
                              II.
    Our review of a grant of a preliminary injunction is
“limited and deferential.” Sw. Voter Registration Educ.
Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc). “Appellate review of a decision to grant . . . a
           FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT             13

preliminary injunction is restricted to determining whether
the district court abused its discretion or based its decision
on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings
of fact.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R. Inc., 23
F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994). A district court’s finding
of a likelihood of future harm is subject to clear error review.
Id. at 1512; see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 795 (9th Cir. 2005). A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous “if it is implausible in light of the
record, viewed in its entirety, or if the record contains no
evidence to support it.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 422 F.3d at
794 (citation omitted). “Mere disagreement with the district
court’s conclusions is not sufficient reason for us to reverse
the district court’s decision regarding a preliminary
injunction.” Id. at 793.
    We “review the scope of an injunction for abuse of
discretion.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries
Serv., 886 F.3d 803, 823 (9th Cir. 2018). It is an abuse of
discretion to issue an overly broad injunction. Id.
    We review for abuse of discretion whether it was proper
for the district court to consider new arguments and new
materials submitted with Plaintiffs’ reply brief. See Getz v.
Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011) (reviewing
for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to consider
evidence submitted for the first time in a reply brief); El
Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1040–41 (9th
Cir. 2003) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the district
court’s consideration of an argument raised for the first time
in a reply brief).
14        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

                             III.
                              A.
   We first address Defendants’ argument that the district
court abused its discretion by considering new arguments
and new materials submitted with Plaintiffs’ reply brief.
Because the record shows that Defendants had an
opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs’ submissions, we find no
abuse of discretion.
    As mentioned above, for the first time in their reply brief,
Plaintiffs asked the district court “to limit wolf . . . trapping
and snaring in all areas ‘west of Billings’ to the time period
when it is reasonably certain that almost all grizzly bears will
be in dens: January 1 to February 15.” They also submitted
six new declarations and four exhibits with their reply brief
and submitted two additional declarations after they filed
their reply brief. All were submitted at least five days before
the hearing on the motion.
     A district court does not abuse its discretion in
considering new arguments or evidence if the opposing party
had an opportunity to respond. See El Pollo Loco, 316 F.3d
at 1040–41 (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in considering an argument raised for the first time
in a reply brief because the adverse party had an opportunity
to rebut the argument at the hearing and “the district court
listened to, considered, and rejected” the rebuttal argument);
id. at 1041 (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483
(9th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that “a district court may
consider new evidence presented in a reply brief if the
district court gives the adverse party an opportunity to
respond”).
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                    15

    All of Plaintiffs’ documents were submitted at least five
days before the hearing, and nothing in the record suggests
that Defendants were prevented from responding to the
documents. 9 And Defendants had an opportunity to respond
at the hearing, as the district court gave both parties the
chance to offer testimony and arguments. Further, based on
Plaintiffs’ opening argument and the court’s questions to
Plaintiffs’ counsel, Defendants were on notice that the court
was considering whether Plaintiffs’ requested remedy raised
for the first time in its reply brief was proper. During the
hearing, the court also referenced some of Plaintiffs’ new
evidence, signaling that it was considering such evidence.10
Despite being put on notice that the court was considering
Plaintiffs’ new arguments and evidence and having the
opportunity to respond, Defendants failed to do so. Under
these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in considering Plaintiffs’ new arguments and new
materials. 11

9
  Defendants also do not suggest that they were barred from responding
to Plaintiffs’ new arguments or evidence before the hearing.
10
   For example, Plaintiffs submitted as an exhibit to their reply brief a
letter from the Director of the United States Department of the Interior
to the Director of the MFWP. During the hearing, the court questioned
Defendants’ counsel about the letter, and counsel raised no objection to
its submission.
11
   Defendants never objected to the submission of Plaintiffs’ new
arguments or evidence. Although Plaintiffs do not argue waiver, we note
that “[i]f a party does not object to or challenge the improper submission
of new evidence before the district court, the party who fails to object
has ‘waived any challenge on the admissibility of [the] evidence.’”
Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.
2018) (quoting Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 868 (9th Cir. 2011)).
16        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

    Defendants also argue that it was improper for the
district court to consider a news article that “came out the
day of oral argument” and “was never corroborated by any
witness.” The article stated that an adult grizzly bear had
been photographed on a ranch in October 2023 “along the
Missouri and Judith rivers, the farthest east a bear has been
seen in Montana in more than 100 years.” Brett French,
Grizzly Bear Photographed in Upper Missouri River Breaks,
Missoulian (Nov. 20, 2023), https://perma.cc/F2D7-LHGC.
But it appears that during the hearing, Plaintiffs’ counsel
referenced the very same facts, stating that recently “a
grizzly was seen on a ranch at the junction of the Missouri
and . . . Judith,” and that “[i]t’s been a long time since a bear
has been out on the Judith.” Defendants made no
contemporaneous objection to counsel’s statements.
    Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly
apply in the preliminary injunction context. Given that the
“purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve
the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits
can be held,” and “given the haste that is often necessary if
those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction
is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less
formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on
the merits.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395
(1981). Indeed, “[t]he trial court may give even inadmissible
evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of
preventing irreparable harm before trial.” Flynt Distrib. Co.
v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). Under these
principles and based on the record, we see no error in the
district court’s consideration of the news article.
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                      17

                                   B.
    Defendants next argue that the district court applied the
wrong preliminary injunction standard. They claim that the
district court erred by requiring Plaintiffs to show only a
serious question going to the merits instead of a likelihood
of success on the merits. Our case law does not support
Defendants’ position, as we have affirmed the viability of
the “serious questions” test. See All. for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test for
preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Winter [v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)].”). 12
    Under the Winter test, a party is entitled to a preliminary
injunction if it demonstrates (1) “that [it] is likely to succeed

12
   Our circuit along with the Second and Seventh Circuits have
confirmed the viability of a sliding scale test post-Winter. See Cottrell,
632 F.3d at 1134 (“[W]e join the Seventh and the Second Circuits in
concluding that the ‘serious questions’ version of the sliding scale test
for preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Winter.”). We note, however, that since our decision in
Cottrell, the Tenth Circuit has joined the Fourth Circuit in rejecting such
test as invalid under Winter. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Because of its
differences with the Winter test, [our] balance-of-hardship test may no
longer be applied in granting or denying preliminary injunctions in the
Fourth Circuit, as the standard articulated in Winter governs the issuance
of preliminary injunctions not only in the Fourth Circuit but in all federal
courts.”), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), and
reinstated in relevant part sub nom. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc.
v. F.E.C., 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010); Diné Citizens Against Ruining
Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Under
Winter’s rationale, any modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for
preliminary relief and thus deviates from the standard test is
impermissible.”).
18        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

on the merits,” (2) “that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the
balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and (4) “that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Cottrell, 632 F.3d at
1131 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). But our court has
adopted the “serious questions” test—a “sliding scale”
variant of the Winter test—under which a party is entitled to
a preliminary injunction if it demonstrates (1) “serious
questions going to the merits,” (2) “a likelihood of
irreparable injury,” (3) “a balance of hardships that tips
sharply towards the plaintiff,” and (4) “the injunction is in
the public interest.” Id. at 1135. As to the first factor, the
serious questions standard is “a lesser showing than
likelihood of success on the merits.” All. for the Wild
Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017).
    “In cases involving the ESA, Congress removed from the
courts their traditional equitable discretion in injunction
proceedings of balancing the parties’ competing interests.”
Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1511. So when applying the
“serious questions” test to ESA claims, the last two factors—
balance of hardships and the public interest—always “tip[]
heavily in favor of protected species.” Id. In practice, then,
only the first two factors—serious questions on the merits
and likelihood of irreparable injury—are at issue when
analyzing ESA claims under the “serious questions” test.
See Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1135.
    The district court applied the proper preliminary
injunction standard. It correctly determined that our circuit
employs the “serious questions” test; that because Plaintiffs
sought an injunction under the ESA, the last two factors of
the “serious questions” test tip sharply in Plaintiffs’ favor;
and that, therefore, in order to issue an injunction, “Plaintiffs
in this case must demonstrate they have presented serious
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT          19

questions as to the merits of their ESA claim and that absent
an injunction, irreparable harm is not only possible, but
likely.”
    Defendants also argue that the district court should have
used “the higher standard for issuance of [a] mandatory
injunction.” See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 997–
98 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that our circuit continues to
apply a heightened standard to mandatory injunctions). “A
mandatory injunction ‘orders a responsible party to take
action.’” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma
GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.
479, 484 (1996)). “A prohibitory injunction prohibits a party
from taking action and ‘preserves the status quo pending a
determination of the action on the merits.’” Id. at 878
(brackets omitted) (quoting Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d
701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988)). Defendants also argue that, even
if the injunction is prohibitory rather than mandatory, the
status quo would be a return to the 2022 Regulations, “not a
complete cessation of all wolf trapping.”            We are
unpersuaded.
    The injunction prevents the State from authorizing any
wolf trapping and snaring in certain areas outside January 1,
2024 to February 15, 2024. That is a prohibitory injunction
because it prevents the State from enforcing its regulations
that authorize wolf trapping. See, e.g., Bay Area Addiction
Rsch. & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725,
727–28, 732 n.13 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that an injunction
preventing enforcement of a local ordinance was prohibitory
rather than mandatory); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 998 (holding
that an injunction that prohibits the government from
engaging in likely unconstitutional conduct is a “classic form
of prohibitory injunction”).
20        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

    The injunction also maintains the status quo. The “status
quo ante litem” for preliminary injunction purposes “refers
not simply to any situation before the filing of a lawsuit, but
instead to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the
pending controversy.’” GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)).
Plaintiffs filed suit in September 2023. Thus, the last
uncontested status preceding the lawsuit was no authorized
recreational wolf trapping or snaring, as the 2022 wolf
trapping season had ended on March 15, 2023, and wolf
trapping was not scheduled to start again until November 27,
2023. See 2022 Regulations, supra, at 15; 2023 Regulations,
supra, at 15.
    For these reasons, the district court applied the proper
preliminary injunction standard, and its injunction, which
was prohibitory, preserved the status quo. We next address
whether the district court abused its discretion in analyzing
the two preliminary injunction factors at issue: serious
questions on the merits and likelihood of irreparable injury.
                             C.
                              1.
    Defendants do not appear to meaningfully challenge the
district court’s conclusion that there are serious questions
going to the merits of the ESA claim. Instead, their
challenge seems to hinge entirely on their claim (that we
rejected above) that the district court had to find that
Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits before it could
issue a preliminary injunction. But generously construing
Defendants’ argument as one challenging the district court’s
serious questions determination, we reject it.
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                    21

    “Serious questions” are ones “that ‘cannot be resolved
one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction’ because
they require ‘more deliberative investigation.’” Manrique v.
Kolc, 65 F.4th 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Republic
of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir.
1988) (en banc)). They “need not promise a certainty of
success, nor even present a probability of success, but must
involve a ‘fair chance of success on the merits.’” Marcos,
862 F.2d at 1362 (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Coston,
773 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1985)).
    The question is whether Montana’s 2023 recreational
wolf trapping and snaring regulations will cause the
unlawful “take” of grizzly bears in violation of § 9 of the
ESA. Plaintiffs provided the district court with many
declarations from qualified experts 13 as well as research
materials 14 , which show that the regulations permit wolf
trapping and snaring when a substantial number of grizzlies
are active outside their dens, and that the grizzlies will be
attracted to and get caught in wolf traps, resulting in

13
   For example, Plaintiffs’ experts included a scientist and retired
wildlife management professional with over forty years of experience in
grizzly bear research and conservation. This expert has a B.S. in Forest
Resource Management, an M.S. in Plant Ecology, and a Ph.D. in
Wildlife Resource Management, has been consulted by grizzly bear
researchers from around the world, and has authored more than 130
scientific articles and reports, many of which address the ecology and
behavior of grizzly bears. Another retired wildlife biologist, with a B.A.
in Environmental Sciences and an M.S. in Fish and Wildlife
Management, has been involved in grizzly and black bear research since
the 1970s and has authored or co-authored dozens of journal articles,
scientific reports, and book chapters on grizzly bears.
14
  Plaintiffs’ research materials included articles concluding that
multiple grizzly bears in southeast British Columbia suffered toe
amputations from wolf traps.
22        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

unlawful “take” under the ESA. Defendants also presented
evidence from qualified experts as well as research materials
relied on by those experts. Defendants’ evidence supports
that the State’s mitigation measures—including the floating
start date based on a comprehensive assessment of grizzly
bear activity, use of trap devices that would allow grizzly
bears to escape unharmed, and trapper education courses—
ensure that the recreational wolf trapping regulations will not
cause the unlawful “take” of grizzlies. Defendants’ position
is also supported by the absence of any verified reports of a
grizzly bear being caught in a public wolf trap during the
wolf trapping season following implementation of the
floating start date. Both sides presented evidence that
unlawful grizzly bear killings are underreported.
    Fairly read, the record reflects a genuine scientific and
factual debate over whether Montana’s 2023 recreational
wolf trapping and snaring regulations will cause the
unlawful “take” of grizzly bears. The issue therefore
“cannot be resolved one way or the other” and requires
“more deliberative investigation.” Manrique, 65 F.4th at
1041 (quoting Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1362). Given Plaintiffs’
substantial proffered evidence, which could be credited by a
fact finder even in light of Defendants’ evidence, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Plaintiffs have at least a “fair chance of success on the
merits,” Coston, 773 F.2d at 1517, and thus raise a serious
question on the merits.
                             2.
    Defendants challenge the district court’s finding of a
reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to grizzly bears
had Montana’s wolf trapping and snaring season proceeded
as planned. As described above, our review of this finding
           FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT             23

is limited and “very deferential.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 422
F.3d at 794; see also Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project,
344 F.3d at 918. We may only reverse if the finding is
clearly erroneous, meaning it must be “implausible in light
of the record, viewed in its entirety,” or nothing in the record
supports it. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 422 F.3d at 794. There
was no reversible error under this deferential standard.
      “A reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to a
protected species is sufficient for issuance of an injunction
under section 9 of the ESA.” Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt,
83 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of
reh’g (June 26, 1996). “[W]e do not require that future harm
be shown with certainty before an injunction may issue, [but]
we do require that a future injury be sufficiently likely.”
Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1512. This means “we require
. . . a definitive threat of future harm to protected species, not
mere speculation.” Id. at 1512 n.8.
    Plaintiffs’ evidence showed that grizzly bears have wide
home ranges, are not limited to geographical borders, are
active in areas frequented by wolves, are highly attracted to
scented and baited wolf traps, and often get caught in those
traps. For example, one of Plaintiffs’ experts stated in his
declaration that the current “spatial and temporal overlap of
trapping for . . . wolves in Montana with places and times
that grizzly bears are also active results in widespread
exposure of bears to risks posed by non-target injuries from
snares and body-hold traps set to capture other species.”
(emphasis added). Another expert stated in her declaration
that “[s]cented and baited traps set for wol[ves] . . . are likely
to attract grizzly bears from long distances,” and that “[i]n
those situations, grizzly bears can be highly vulnerable to
being caught in traps and suffer injuries to extremities or
even be killed.” As the district court pointed out,
24          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

Defendants’ own evidence showed that, in Montana, grizzly
bears have been caught in traps targeted at other animals—
the MFWP has recorded twenty-one reports of such
instances since 1988. 15 Plaintiffs also presented evidence
that grizzlies have been seen in Montana with injuries—
missing claws and toes and missing lower leg—likely caused
by traps.
    Plaintiffs also showed that a large percentage of grizzly
bears would be active outside their dens during Montana’s
proposed wolf trapping season. One of their experts stated
in his declaration that “[d]epending on the ecosystem, nearly
40% of grizzly bears in Montana have historically been
active outside their dens either after November 27th or
before March 15th.” 16 He added that this trend is likely to
continue and increase due to increasing climate
temperatures: “Grizzly bears in the Northern Rockies will
almost certainly enter dens later and exit dens earlier as

15
   Defendants argue that not all twenty-one reports are relevant for
various reasons, including because some involved non-recreational
traps. But the evidence is relevant, as it tends to show that grizzly bears
are attracted to and get caught in traps generally, which supports the
conclusion that they will get caught in recreational wolf traps. And this
conclusion was laid out by Plaintiffs’ experts in their declarations.
16
   Defendants criticize this evidence, arguing that it is based on data that
is not entirely Montana-specific, that is outdated, and that does not
account for the floating start date. But these criticisms go toward the
weight of the evidence, which is left to the trial court’s discretion. See
11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2949 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update) (“Once received, the
question of how much weight an affidavit will be given is left to the trial
court’s discretion and the quality of the affidavit will have a significant
effect on this determination.”).
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                    25

annual temperatures continue to warm and vegetal foods
become available earlier and later in the year.”
    As a whole, Plaintiffs’ evidence supported that a large
percentage—nearly 40%—of grizzly bears in Montana
would be active during the proposed wolf trapping season in
the same areas as wolves and would be highly attracted to
the wolf traps, which would likely result in grizzlies being
caught in those traps. Given all the evidence, it was plausible
for the district court to find a reasonably certain threat of
imminent harm to grizzly bears should Montana’s wolf
trapping and snaring season proceed as planned. In other
words, the district court’s finding was not implausible given
Plaintiffs’ evidence and the evidence as a whole. 17
    Defendants mainly challenge the district court’s finding
by identifying evidence that conflicts with or could
undermine Plaintiffs’ evidence. For example, Defendants
point to evidence that grizzly bears would not be active
during the wolf trapping season, and that Montana’s

17
  Respectfully, we disagree with our dissenting colleague. In arguing
that Plaintiffs’ evidence of harm is too speculative, the dissent fails to
take into consideration and give appropriate weight to the evidence that
supports the district court’s determination. Instead, the dissent focuses
on and gives more weight to the evidence that could undermine the
district court’s determination. Dissent 34–37. Such an analysis conflicts
with our standard of review.
  We also disagree with the dissent’s nexus analysis. Plaintiffs’ expert
declared that “nearly 40% of grizzly bears in Montana have historically
been active outside their dens either after November 27th or before
March 15th.” Because Montana’s laws permit wolf trapping during the
same time period when a large percentage of grizzlies will be active
outside their dens, it was reasonable for the district court to find a
sufficient nexus. We believe that the dissent concludes otherwise based
on conflicting evidence. Dissent 42–43, 42 n.4. But again, the standard
of review does not permit us to reweigh the evidence.
26          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

regulatory structure, including its mandatory trapper
education program, significantly reduces the chance that a
grizzly bear would be recreationally trapped during the wolf
trapping season. But “[c]lear error is not demonstrated by
pointing to conflicting evidence in the record.” United
States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991).
    Defendants also make much of the evidence reflecting
the lack of any verified reports of grizzly bears being caught
in recreational wolf traps in Montana since 2013. But the
district court considered that evidence, and the court was not
required to give it controlling weight because other evidence
undercut its persuasiveness. As the district court pointed
out, one of Plaintiffs’ experts declared that “only 12% of
unpermitted grizzly bear killings are actually reported,” and
that the “data shows that trappers who find grizzly bears in
their traps are highly unlikely to call a government agent.” 18
Even Defendants’ evidence showed that more than 25% of
grizzly bear killings go unreported. Given this evidence, the
district court could appropriately infer that the verified
reports significantly underrepresented the number of

18
  Defendants argue that these statements are based on a study of “non-
hunting human-caused mortalities” in “Flathead Valley, British
Columbia” and thus these statements cannot support the underreporting
of grizzlies caught by traps in Montana. See Bruce N. McLellan et al.,
Estimating Unrecorded Human-Caused Mortalities of Grizzly Bears in
the Flathead Valley, British Columbia, Canada, PeerJ (2018),
https://peerj.com/articles/5781/. We disagree. While the study did not
purport to cover the exact geographical regions at issue here, it was
reasonable for the district court to infer that it nevertheless supported
significant underreporting generally, particularly in light of Defendants’
own evidence showing underreporting of grizzly bear killings in
Montana.
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                     27

grizzlies caught in recreational wolf traps and thus the actual
number was likely more.
    The outcome here is controlled by the standard of
review. While we might have reached a different conclusion
than the district court, that is not the test. “Mere
disagreement with the district court’s conclusions is not
sufficient reason for us to reverse the district court’s decision
regarding a preliminary injunction.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
422 F.3d at 793. “[O]ur review in the preliminary injunction
context is very deferential.” Id. at 794 (emphasis added).
Because the district court’s finding of a reasonably certain
threat of imminent harm was not implausible on the record,
we must affirm that finding. 19
                                   D.
   Finally, we address the scope of the injunction.
Defendants appear to challenge the geographical and

19
   We reject Defendants’ argument that this case is controlled by
Burlington Northern Railroad in which we upheld the district court’s
denial of a preliminary injunction. There, the district court found that
there was no reasonable likelihood of future harm to grizzlies, and we
held that such finding was supported by the evidence in that case.
Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d at 1511–12. We did not, as Defendants
suggest, hold as a matter of law that evidence of “no incidental takes of
grizzly bears for three years br[eaks] the chain of likelihood” of harm.
   We also reject Defendants’ contention that the district court should
have followed Center for Biological Diversity v. Little, 622 F. Supp. 3d
997 (D. Idaho 2022). The district court was not bound by Little. See
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a
federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different
judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge
in a different case.” (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice
§ 134.02[1][d] (3d ed. 2011))). And regardless, we hold that the district
court’s finding of a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm was not
clearly erroneous based on the record here.
28        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

temporal scope of the injunction. Although “[a] district
court has considerable discretion in fashioning suitable relief
and defining the terms of an injunction,” injunctive relief
“must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.”
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970,
974 (9th Cir. 1991). “The scope of the [injunction] must be
no broader and no narrower than necessary to redress the
injury shown by the plaintiff[s].” California v. Azar, 911
F.3d 558, 584 (9th Cir. 2018).
    As to the injunction’s temporal scope, Defendants have
failed to persuade us that the district court abused its
discretion.     Defendants attack the injunction’s time
limitations based on the premise that the district court erred
by considering the new arguments and new materials
submitted with and after Plaintiffs’ reply brief. But we
rejected that premise above.
    Further, evidence in the record supports that the time
limitations were “no broader . . . than necessary to redress
the injury shown by the plaintiff[s].” Id. After presenting
information related to grizzlies’ denning habits, one of
Plaintiffs’ experts declared that “[w]hile it is important to
delay the start of the trapping and snaring season until at least
January 1 to avoid catching grizzly bears, it is equally
important to end the season by early February in low
elevations and mid-February in higher elevations.” In
support of his conclusion, this expert explained that
“[g]rizzly bears in the Northern Rockies will almost
certainly enter dens later and exit dens earlier as annual
temperatures continue to warm and vegetal foods become
available earlier and later in the year.” Defendants’ own
default start date of December 31 in the occupied grizzly
range also supports that it was reasonable for the district
court to conclude that most grizzlies would be denned by
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                   29

January 1. Defendants do not explain how all this evidence,
if considered, could lead to the conclusion that the district
court abused its discretion as to the injunction’s temporal
scope. Thus, we affirm the temporal scope of the injunction,
which limited wolf trapping and snaring to January 1, 2024
through February 15, 2024.
    We agree, however, with Defendants that the injunction
is geographically overbroad. The district court enjoined
wolf trapping and snaring “in all areas included in wolf
regions one through five, plus Hill, Blaine, and Phillips
counties.” 20 That comprises what appears to be more than
half of the entire state of Montana and includes expansive
areas outside the occupied grizzly range and even some areas
east of Billings—areas that Plaintiffs did not even ask to be
covered by the injunction. See 2023 Regulations, supra, at
14. On the current record, there is insufficient evidence to
reasonably conclude that this expansive geographical scope
is necessary to prevent the unlawful “take” of grizzly bears.
    The district court did not give an explanation supporting
the geographic scope. But Plaintiffs identify what appear to
be the strongest pieces of evidence in the record supporting
the injunction’s geographic scope. First, the MFWP’s
bulletin, which states (without any supporting information)
that “[g]rizzly bears have the potential to be found anywhere
in the western two-thirds of Montana (west of Billings), and
their distribution is denser and more widespread than in
previous years.” Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks, Hunters
Must Expect to See Bears, supra. Second, the news article
that reported a single grizzly bear had been photographed
“along the Missouri and Judith rivers, the farthest east a bear

20
  For simplicity, we refer to this geographic scope as “all areas west of
Billings” even though it also includes areas east of Billings.
30        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

has been seen in Montana in more than 100 years.” French,
supra.
    The news article shows that one bear was seen in one
area west of Billings, and that the occurrence was extremely
rare—it hadn’t happened in the last 100 years. Thus, rather
than support that grizzlies are likely to be found in all areas
west of Billings, the article shows the opposite: grizzly bear
presence is very rare in some areas west of Billings. The
bulletin fares no better. It states that grizzlies could
“potential[ly]” be found anywhere west of Billings. But
“potential” means “existing in possibility” or only “capable
of development into actuality.”          Potential, Merriam-
Webster,                                https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/potential (last visited Feb. 1, 2024).
The bulletin’s statement is thus couched in speculation and
is too hypothetical to support the conclusion that grizzlies
will likely be present in all areas west of Billings such that
the injunction’s geographic scope is necessary to protect the
grizzlies.
    On the current record, the injunction is geographically
overbroad. But because Defendants have not presented an
alternative geographic scope, we remand for the district
court to reconsider the geographic scope and instruct that it
do so expeditiously. See Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036,
1047–48 (9th Cir. 2023) (instructing the district court to
expeditiously decide the preliminary injunction motion on
remand). To prevent harm to Plaintiffs, the injunction’s
current geographic scope remains in place until the district
court reconsiders the geographic scope. See Nat’l Org. for
Reform of Marijuana L. (NORML) v. Mullen, 796 F.2d 276,
276 (9th Cir. 1986) (ordering that an injunction remain in
place while the district court considers whether the
injunction should be modified).
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT         31

    We also agree with Defendants that the injunction is
overbroad for another reason: it prevents the State from
trapping and snaring wolves for research, which usually
occurs during the summer. Oral Arg. at 7:43–8:24.
Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that, even if we affirmed the
injunction, Plaintiffs would have no objection to clarifying
that the injunction does not apply to government research
activities. Id. at 12:26–12:51. Given that concession, and
because Plaintiffs’ suit does not challenge trapping or
snaring related to government research, we agree that the
injunction is also overbroad as to wolf trapping and snaring
related to government research. We therefore vacate the
injunction to the extent that it prevents the State from
trapping and snaring wolves for research purposes and
remand for the district court to modify the scope of the
injunction. See Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 838 (9th Cir.
2022) (vacating an overbroad provision of an injunction and
remanding for proper modification).
                           IV.
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the district
court’s issuance of injunctive relief. But because the
injunction is geographically overbroad, we REMAND for
the district court to reconsider the geographic scope and
instruct that it do so expeditiously. The current geographic
scope, however, remains in effect until the district court
reconsiders the geographic scope. The injunction is also
overbroad as to wolf trapping and snaring related to the
State’s research activities. We therefore VACATE that part
of the injunction and REMAND for the district court to
make proper modifications to the scope of its order
consistent with this opinion. The district court may conduct
any further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
32            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

  AFFIRMED IN PART;                              VACATED   AND
REMANDED IN PART. 21

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.

    I concur in the majority’s decision to remand the district
court’s injunction as geographically overbroad and not
sufficiently clear in preventing any takings so as to
accommodate the State of Montana’s necessary scientific
research activities. However, I respectfully dissent from the
majority’s conclusion that Plaintiffs established a reasonably
certain threat of imminent harm to the increasing grizzly
bear population through scientifically driven wolf trapping
regulations sufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction.
The district court erred in granting equitable relief for that
reason as well.
     The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the
status quo and prevent the “irreparable loss of rights” before
a final judgment on the merits. See Sierra On-Line, Inc. v.
Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984);
Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130–31
(9th Cir. 2006). The remedy is considered extraordinary and
should not be awarded as a matter of right but only “upon a
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008).
In Winter we were reversed for not adhering to these black
letter principles. For that reason, we need to tread cautiously

21
     Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT           33

before blocking a state’s entire regulatory scheme for
wildlife conservation.
    To justify a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs had to not
only establish a likelihood of success on the merits, but also
that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible. Winter, 555
U.S. at 22. The evidence falls woefully short of meeting that
standard. While I agree with the majority that Plaintiffs
established a serious question on the merits, the evidence of
record establishes that Plaintiffs failed to show a reasonably
certain threat of imminent harm to grizzly bears should
Montana’s wolf regulations remain in force. See Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 886 F.3d 803,
819 (9th Cir. 2018). The reason for this is twofold: first, the
evidence of harm presented is too speculative to warrant a
preliminary injunction under Winter; second, the evidence
presented is not sufficiently tied to the challenged revised
Montana regulations.
                               I
    Plaintiffs who seek to enjoin a violation of the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) must show a “definitive
threat of future harm to protected species.” Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 886 F.3d at 818–19 (internal quotation marks
omitted). My colleagues correctly recite that this harm
cannot be based on “mere speculation.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1512 n.8 (9th Cir.
1994); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-
258-BLW, 2018 WL 539329, at *3 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2018).
    To merit the extraordinary award of a preliminary
injunction, the supporting materials presented to the court
“must be based on evidence not speculation.” Otter, 2018
WL 539329, at *3 (“There is always the danger that lynx
captures are going unreported.       But injunctions and
34        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

declaratory relief must be based on evidence not
speculation.”). A “showing of a mere possibility of
irreparable harm is not sufficient under Winter.” Earth
Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 468 (9th Cir. 2010);
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 886 F.3d at 819 (“A ‘possibility’ of
irreparable harm cannot support an injunction.”).
    The record viewed in totality does not support a finding
that irreparable harm is likely, other than just possible. Of
the four exhibits, ten declarations, and nine affidavits
submitted by the Plaintiffs, the bulk of the information
provided is speculative in nature, offering theories about
what could happen in the face of climate change or food
scarcity, instead of offering any actual evidence that the
harm is likely to occur.
    For example, Plaintiffs in the district court challenged
the new regulations primarily on the grounds that the
floating start date and increase of permitted wolf trapping
will result in greater unreported grizzly bear bycatch.
However, while the State of Montana offers actual data that
no recreational wolf trapper has had accidental grizzly bear
bycatch since 2013, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he absence of
evidence is not the evidence of absence;” “even if there’s no
verified reports of grizzly bears stepping in [wolf] traps, it
doesn’t lessen the likelihood that future captures are [going
to] harm affected bears;” and that “conversations with
various members of the trapper community” lead them to
believe that “trappers will not report incidental capture.” D.
Mont. Case No. 9:23-cv-00101-DWM, ECF No. 6-3, at 17
(hereinafter “D. Mont.”). This is speculation, not sufficient
to overcome the data presented by the State that no bycatch
is known to have occurred in more than a decade.
            FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT                    35

    Moreover, Plaintiffs in the district court challenged the
new regulations reducing the grizzly bear “occupied range,”
stating it could result in more takes as grizzly bears “may be
present” outside of the calculated and monitored territory.
But, while the State of Montana offers a specific map based
on enhanced technology showing where grizzly bears are
known to be from GPS tracking data and scientific
monitoring, 1 Plaintiffs advance only varying, inconsistent,
and speculative theories of where grizzlies may be. They
include a purported territory map noting all possible bear
sightings from the previous decade, and multiple
declarations which state that with current weather patterns
grizzly bears could be “anywhere west of Billings.” D.
Mont. ECF No. 6-2, at 3; ECF No. 6-5, at 3. Neither of these
theories are persuasive. In fact, my colleagues agree that the
declaration that grizzly bears could be anywhere west of
Billings is nothing but unsupported speculation, clarifying in
the opinion that “[o]n the current record, there is insufficient
evidence to reasonably conclude that this expansive
geographical scope is necessary.”
    Plaintiffs also assert that the permitted 9-inch foothold
wolf traps specifically harm grizzly bears as they are “large
enough to capture grizzly bears and all furbearers” and “can
cause toe fractures and toe amputations in grizzly bears,”
speculating that “[s]maller bears may not be able to break a
neck snare set for wolves.” But Defendants directly refute
Plaintiffs’ contention that the changes will result in more
takes. Defendants explain that actual data reflects no

1
   Notably, every declaration and affidavit which challenges the
effectiveness of the floating start date uses the same one-paragraph text,
arguing that the sample size of GPS tagged and tracked bears is not big
enough. D. Mont. ECF No. 21, at 2; ECF No. 22, at 2; ECF No. 24, at
3.
36          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

increase in bear mortality from July 1, 2021, to December
31, 2021, after the floating start date rule changes went into
effect. Moreover, “[n]o known grizzly bears have been
caught in a public, legally set wolf trap of any kind
(including snare or foot traps) since 2013, and none since
implementing the floating start date in the ‘estimated
occupied range of grizzly bears’ in 2021.”
    Instead of providing actual data or concrete examples of
harm, Plaintiffs submit declarations with “anecdotal
eyewitness reports of grizzly bears with traps on their feet,”
D. Mont. ECF No. 6-7, at 3, and an instance where the
declarant “doe[sn’t] know with certainty what caused the
injury to her leg, but it . . . could have been caught in a trap.”
D. Mont. ECF No. 6-6, at 2. Even more surprising, Plaintiffs
offered two exhibits to the district court that directly support
the State’s current floating start date regulation as the cure
to avoid trapping bycatch, stating that the solution is
“[r]educing the overlap between the bear active season and
trapping season,” and waiting until “bears were denning in
the fall.” 2 D. Mont. ECF No. 27-3, at 8; ECF 27-4, at 8.
Viewing the record in its entirety, the evidence presented
strongly supports the State’s contention that there has not
been any recorded grizzly bear bycatch during the recently
implemented seasons under the revised regulations.

2
  This peer reviewed article submitted by Plaintiffs as an exhibit “found
that the median den entry date . . . was November 06, and the 95th quartile
of den entry was November 22.” This supports the State’s floating start
date which can only begin, at the earliest, on the Monday after
Thanksgiving (November 27, 2023). This same article concludes that
researchers “found no overlap between den emergence and the end of the
trapping season.” D. Mont. ECF No. 27-3, at 8; ECF 27-4, at 8. See also
D. Mont. ECF No. 6-3, at 22 (declaring that “[t]raps and snares should
only be allowed during the non-denning season for grizzly bears”).
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT             37

Plaintiffs’ speculative arguments, anecdotal statements, and
inconsistent criticism of the wildlife regulations without
tangible evidence falls well short of the bar to warrant a
preliminary injunction preventing its implementation.
    Speculative harm is simply not enough to show a
possibility that grizzly bears will be taken as a consequence
of compliance with Montana’s revised laws and new
regulations pertaining to the lawful trapping and snaring of
wolves. See Friends of the Clearwater v. Higgins, 472 F.
Supp. 3d 859, 876 (D. Idaho 2020), aff’d, Friends of
Clearwater, 847 F. App’x at 394 (2021) (finding the
plaintiffs’ claims of harm speculative when no bears or lynx
were identified in the project area). It is true that courts have
found a preliminary injunction appropriate based on pure
scientific evidence when that evidence is “uncontroverted”
in its showing of future harm. See Loggerhead Turtle v.
Cnty. Council of Volusia Cnty., Fla., 896 F. Supp. 1170,
1180 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding the evidence uncontroverted
that driving a vehicle over sea turtle hatching grounds would
result in the take of endangered species eggs). Such
evidence of a direct threat to the species is not the case here.
Instead, Plaintiffs supporting documents look, taste, and
smell of the “mere speculation” directly prohibited by
Winter. Plaintiffs’ statements of harm are generalized
allegations tied to their theory that snares and traps are
inherently harmful to grizzly bears, who may or may not
wander outside of their previous known territory, and who
may or may not get stuck in traps specifically baited and
regulated to avoid their take.
   My colleagues justify the lack of definitive evidence by
declaring they are simply relying on our standard of review,
invoking the general rule that we may only overturn the
granting of a preliminary injunction if the district court
38        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

abused its discretion and committed clear error in weighing
the evidence of future harm.           But as the opinion
acknowledges, a “finding of fact is clearly erroneous ‘if it is
implausible in light of the record, viewed in its entirety, or if
the record contains no evidence to support it.’” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782,
794 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Serv. Employees Int’l Union v.
Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.7
(9th Cir. 1992)); see also Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Marsh, 52
F.3d 1485, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995). With the greatest respect
for the district judge here, the trial court’s finding is
implausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.
While the State provides concrete proof of no past harm by
recreational wolf trappers—as well as a plan to negate any
future harm—Plaintiffs instead offer the court 19
declarations and affidavits that speculate and theorize that
harm could occur. This does not meet their burden of proof.
Based on this record, a “reasonably certain” threat of future
harm is simply implausible.
    Federal judges are not wildlife biologists. And while our
review may be “limited and deferential” to the district court,
Earth Island Inst., 626 F.3d at 468, both appellate and
district courts must “grant considerable discretion to
agencies on matters ‘requir[ing] a high level of technical
expertise.’” Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 658–
59 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council,
490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)); see also Selkirk Conservation
Alliance v. Forsgren, 336 F.3d 944, 954 (9th Cir. 2003). We
are to be “most deferential” when the agency is “making
predictions, within its special expertise, at the frontiers of
science.” Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d
1089, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003). As we emphasized in the
landmark environmental case of Lands Council v. McNair—
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT          39

en banc with all judges concurring—it is not our job to
instruct the agency on “how to validate its hypotheses
regarding wildlife viability” or order “the agency to explain
every possible scientific uncertainty.” 537 F.3d 981, 988
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, courts “are not free to
‘impose on the agency [our] own notion of which procedures
are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, undefined
public good.’” Churchill Cnty. v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060,
1072 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549
(1978)). Instead, “[t]o determine whether deference is
warranted, we look to the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 995.
    It is legal error to grant a preliminary injunction
invalidating Montana’s updated wolf trapping regulations
based on largely speculative evidence that is contradicted by
the evidence in the administrative record compiled by the
wildlife agency. That runs counter to the goals of Winter,
and casts a blind eye to “the deference we owe to agencies
and their methodological choices.” See Lands Council, 537
F.3d at 991. Simply put, courts can not, and should not, grant
the extraordinary award of a preliminary injunction to
plaintiffs who are crying wolf.
                              II
    Second, the evidence presented here was not sufficiently
related to the challenged regulation to warrant the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. To support a preliminary
injunction, the moving party must show that future ESA
violations are likely if Montana’s existing laws and new
regulations remain in place. See, e.g., Winter, 207 U.S. at
564 (finding the scientific theory that sonar could hurt sea
mammals insufficient for an injunction); see Otter, 2018 WL
40           FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

539329 at *3 (holding that a single violation of the ESA did
not sufficiently “show that future ESA violations are likely
in Idaho if the existing regulations remain in place”); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Burlington N. R.R., 23 F.3d 1508, 1511
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding past ESA violations instructive but
not an indicator of future violations as the risks had been
“substantially minimized” by changed policy).
      As the District of Idaho emphasized in a remarkably
similar case, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Little, 622 F.
Supp. 3d 997, 1009 (D. Idaho 2022), there must be a causal
link between the evidence presented and the actual
challenged regulation. In Little, the court found that
evidence of two instances of wolf trapping accidentally
resulting in grizzly bear bycatch was insufficient for an
injunction, as they both happened outside of the scope of
Idaho’s permitted hunting regulations—“Plaintiffs have no
evidence that either bear was snared by a lawful wolf snare
or trap set in compliance with Idaho’s regulatory scheme.”
Id. 3
    Proof of harm to bears elsewhere does not automatically
guarantee protection for bears in Montana, as Canada and
other states have different regulatory and monitoring

3
  Here, the district court attempts to distinguish Little by stating it is
“non-precedential,” and contained less record evidence than this case.
Opinion 27. Not so. Plaintiffs in Little offered concrete evidence of two
recreational wolf trappers taking grizzly bears at an unpermitted time,
both outside the scope of the regulation. Plaintiffs here, as discussed
above, offer evidence of only one accidental recreational bycatch,
occurring over a decade ago under less protective regulations. Excluding
speculative evidence of future harm, a direct comparison of the cases
shows Little to be more persuasive than the record relied upon by the
district court to support the relief it ordered here. See Little, 622 F. Supp.
3d at 1008–10.
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT           41

schemes in place. Theoretical or general fear of harm to
grizzly bears is insufficient to impose an injunction on the
State’s wolf trapping regulations when there is little to no
proof that the State’s activities are causing that harm. Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n, 23 F.3d at 1511. The evidence here simply
does not show Montana’s current wolf trapping regulations
will result in grizzly bear take—just that grizzly bear takes
have generally happened under different regulatory
schemes. Plaintiffs argue, for example, that there have been
twenty-one documented grizzly bear takes since 1988, and
both the district court and my colleagues heavily rely on
these past takes to show future harm. On superficial review
past grizzly bear takings may “plausibly show that it is likely
that additional takings may occur unless further regulations
are implemented.”        Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Strommen, No. 20-CV-2554 (ECT/JFD), 2023 WL
2136650, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2023).
    However, the evidence presented here of the twenty-one
bear injuries is categorically not related to the current
Montana regulations. Out of the twenty-one listed grizzly
bears from 1988 to present, two were unverified, and sixteen
were trapped outside of wolf trapping season under old
regulations. The majority of these documented catches were
caught by researchers, not recreational trappers. Only a
single bear on the provided list was caught by a recreational
wolf trapper in 2013 during what is now wolf hunting
season—a capture that predated Montana’s introduction of
the “floating start date,” designed specifically to guarantee
that incidental bycatch such as this take does not occur. The
district court and my colleagues have applied this evidence
to “show that grizzly bears are attracted to and get caught in
traps generally.” Yet, if we look below the surface at this
evidence through the required lens comparing Montana’s
42          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

past and current regulations, instead of taking a generalist
approach, it specifically shows that the regulations are
working to avoid accidental bycatch by recreational wolf
trappers during wolf trapping season. Not a single known
catch has occurred by recreational trappers after the floating
start date took effect in 2021.
    This same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s assertion, relied
on by the Majority, that “[n]early 40% of grizzly bears in
Montana have historically been active outside their dens
either after November 27th or before March 15th and this
trend is likely to increase.” 4 As discussed above, the State’s
regulation is designed to avoid bycatch by monitoring
grizzly bear activity outside of their dens during the hunting
and trapping dates. If—as Plaintiffs ask us to speculate—
40% of grizzly bears did not den during this season, the
regulation as designed would not allow trapping to occur in
occupied grizzly bear range; the floating start date would be
adjusted to accommodate such facts. This assertion does not
actually challenge the regulation in place, as the regulation
is designed to accommodate this exact hypothetical.
    This absence of a nexus between the evidence and the
challenged Montana regulation is consistent throughout
Plaintiffs’ materials. One declaration before the district
court, for example, discusses how “baited traps set for wolf,
coyote, and furbearers are likely to attract grizzly bears.” D.
Mont. ECF No. 6-2, at 3. But this is directly redressed by

4
  As discussed above, Plaintiff’s own researchers “found no overlap
between den emergence and the end of the trapping season.” D. Mont.
ECF No. 27-3, at 8. I point this out not to “reweigh the evidence,” as my
colleagues suggest, but show that the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs
here is inherently speculative in nature and therefore inconsistent, failing
to both meet their burden of proof and establish a clear nexus between
their evidence and Montana’s regulations.
          FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT           43

the current challenged regulations, which require traps to be
baited at least 10 feet away and breakable by a grizzly-size
pull.
    The Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated that to succeed on
a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiff must
establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint. See
generally, Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med.
Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 637–38 (9th Cir. 2015). As discussed in
Winter, we need to “have before us at least some estimate of
the harm likely avoided by [the preliminary injunction].
Without such evidence, it is difficult to assess the relevant
harm—that is, the environmental harm likely caused by the
. . . measures[] in place.” 555 U.S. at 34 (J. Breyer,
concurring in part).
    While my colleagues recite that “[c]lear error is not
demonstrated by pointing to conflicting evidence in the
record,” the error here is not one of conflicting evidence; it
is the improper reliance on insufficient, speculative, and
non-causational evidence in the first place. While Plaintiffs
offer some direct challenges to the new regulations,
including a challenge to the slight reduction in size of the
known grizzly bear zone through improved data collection,
the evidence presented is simply too generalized. A
preliminary injunction cannot, at its core, cure harm that is
not causally connected to the challenged regulations.
Enjoining Montana’s regulatory scheme is not only
inherently speculative, but it violates long held principles of
redressability.    Plaintiffs have not established that
irreparable harm is likely to occur prior to a decision on the
merits. Thus, the granting of this preliminary injunction
relying on generalized harm and speculation not tied to
Montana’s conduct was error.
44        FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT V. STATE OF MT

                             III
    Accordingly, I would hold that the district court erred by
not viewing the evidence in its totality, focusing instead on
insufficient evidence that in context amounts to mere
speculation and conjecture. Nor did Plaintiffs establish that
the lawful placement of wolf traps and snares under
Montana’s prior and current laws and regulations is
reasonably likely to result in future take of grizzly bears.
Because Plaintiffs did not establish a likelihood of future
harm, the preliminary injunction should be vacated in toto.
I also agree that the district court’s unilateral line drawing
covering virtually the entire State geographic area west of
Billings, Montana, was overly broad and too generalized to
stand.