Court Opinion

ID: 9584859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:21.041758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:22.421872
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
Three rebuttal witnesses for the State were examined outside the presence of the defendants (and the jury), with only counsel present. Counsel for each of the three co-defendants on trial objected on the ground the defendants had a constitutional right to be present at all proceedings in the trial. The three witnesses were from the company at which co-defendant Aaron Hunter had testified he worked on the day and at the time of the incident on trial. They testified that Aaron Hunter did not work for the company and that the time sheet he presented was a forgery, thus rebutting his alibi. Two of them testified again, to the same effect, in the presence of defendants and the jury.
Appellant Hunter rests his argument on “the legal right of a person accused of crime in this State to be present at all stages of his trial.” Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 74 (90 SE2d 557) (1955). It is derived from the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII, which provides that “No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.” He cites, however, Paragraph XIV, which contains the confrontation clause.
Appellant Perry rests his argument in support of the right to be present at every stage on what he terms the confrontation clauses of the Georgia and United States Constitutions, citing Paragraph XII of the Georgia Bill of Rights and the federal Sixth Amendment. Federal constitutional law need not be decided in this case because there is an adequate state constitutional remedy. It lies in Paragraph XII, but probably not in Paragraph XIV.
The three witnesses at issue were not witnesses against either appellant but rather against their co-defendant. Although defendants were not present when they were first examined out of the jury’s presence due to some professed fear, two of them were examined and cross-examined when the jury and defendants returned to the court*753room and the third was not called. Thus they fully confronted those witnesses who testified in front of the jury, which witnesses were not witnesses against either of them. Appellant Aaron Perry’s counsel did not even conduct any cross-examination. Carlton Hunter did not present an alibi. Aaron Hunter presented his alibi, that he was at work, through his own testimony. Aaron Perry presented his alibi, that he was at the dentist’s office, through the dentist.
Even though the witnesses’ testimony did not relate directly to either of these two appellants but only to the alibi presented by their co-defendant Aaron Hunter for himself alone, the involuntary absence of appellants during their preliminary testimony constituted a clear violation of their right to be present at all stages of their trial. It goes back at least to Georgia’s first constitution, that of 1777, Article LVIII.3 I cannot conclude that, because the witnesses did not testify against them, there was harmless error. It is impossible to discern whether the undermining of their co-defendant’s alibi infected their own defenses as well. More importantly, it has long been the law that no injury need be shown. Wade v. State, 12 Ga. 25, 28 (2) (1852).
For these reasons, I agree that a new trial is necessary.

 Walter McElreath, A Treatise of the Constitution of Georgia, p. 240, The Harrison Co., 1912.