Court Opinion

ID: 9460175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:43:58.974693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:30.987720
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
It is difficult to fathom from the majority opinion to what it is referring when it says,
Still, this is not an instance of “. . . deliberate suppression with purpose to obstruct the defense . [nor is it] a failure to disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have escaped the attention of the prosecution.”
If, as I believe, the majority is referring to the prosecutor’s omission to tell the defense about the arrest of the witness, Keller, and the pending prosecution of him in the state courts of New York, I of course agree as far as the opinion goes, but as indicated below think it does not reach the critical question. If, on the other hand, the majority opinion is referring to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose to the defense that Keller and the Assistant United States Attorney had had a discussion with reference to the pending state charges as a result of which the Assistant United States Attorney agreed to tell the local District Attorney that Keller was cooperating with the Federal Government in its prosecution, and that indeed the Assistant United States Attorney carried out his commitment to Keller in this regard, then I must disagree, for reasons also set out below.
If I am correct that the majority opinion in the language above quoted is not referring at all to the Assistant United States Attorney’s agreement with Keller and subsequent call, helpful to Keller, to the local District Attorney, then the majority does not anywhere consider the question whether or not this was an instance of deliberate suppression or a failure to disclose evidence the high value of which to the defense was obvious. It seems to me that the impeachment value of such information was obvious to the prosecution, and in light of the critical nature of Keller’s testimony to the case against Houle, there was “a significant chance that this added item [the prosecutor’s agreement with Keller and subsequent telephone call], developed by skilled counsel ., could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction.” United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969).
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the substantive count also as to appellant Houle.