Court Opinion

ID: 9689845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:48:41.137488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.497600
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 62. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that a remand is necessary in this case. However, I write separately because the majority opinion has, I believe, stated the primary issue of this case in a confusing manner. In addition, the majority opinion seems to suggest that a dam permit, with minimum and maximum water levels, could not form the basis for a regulatory takings claim.
¶ 63. With respect to the primary issue presented by this case, the majority opinion properly remands this case so that "the parties can develop the facts and legal analysis to enable the circuit court to address the legal issue presented." Majority op. at ¶ 7. There is a lack of evidence in the record with respect to the ordinary high water mark (OHWM) of Lake Kil-larney in 1988, at the time the Kelleys deposited the fill. In order to address properly the interrelationship between navigability-in-fact and the OHWM, both the parties and the court need information regarding the OHWM.
¶ 64. The preceding sentence leads me to the next point, that the majority opinion has not properly stated the primary issue of this case. Rather than stating the issue in terms of "whether a property owner is required to obtain a permit before depositing fill on land submerged below navigable water regardless of whether the land is above or below the ordinary high water mark," (majority op. at ¶ 7), the issue is better *800stated as follows: What is the interrelationship between navigability-in-fact and a body of water's OHWM as these terms pertain to liability under Wis. Stat. §§ 30.12(1)(a), 30.15(1)(a), and 30.15(1)(d)? This is a more fitting statement of the issue because the majority's statement of the issue seems to assume that there was water covering a portion of the road at the time the fill was deposited, even though the parties dispute whether this was the case. Roger Wojner Second Aff. at 1; Paul Kurth Aff. at 1.
¶ 65. Finally, the majority, in holding that the flooding of the Kelleys' roads and timberlands, due to alleged failure of the DNR to maintain the water levels of Lake Killarney as set forth in the dam permit, cannot support a takings claim seems to foreclose a properly proved regulatory takings claim. Majority op. at ¶ 47-48.1 Under well-established Wisconsin law, a taking of property can occur without physical occupation of land by the government. Eberle v. Dane Co. Bd. of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 621, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999) (citing Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 81, 87, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979)). Such a taking is referred to as a regulatory taking. Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d at 622. A regulatory taking occurs when a regulation or government action denies " 'the landowner all or substantially all practical uses of a property.'" Eberle, 227 Wis. 2d at 622 (quoting Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 374, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996)). Although I agree with the majority that the information presented in this case does not support a regulatory takings claim, I would not foreclose the *801possibility that, with proper proof, a party could maintain such a claim. It is possible that the failure to maintain proper water levels, according to a dam permit and order which requires minimum and maximum water levels, could deprive a landowner of all or substantially all practical uses of a piece of property. I write, therefore, to make it clear that we do not foreclose the possibility that the failure to maintain water levels pursuant to such a dam permit and order could form the basis of a valid regulatory takings claim.
¶ 66. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 67. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this concurrence.

It is noted, as set forth in the majority opinion (majority op. at ¶ 45), that the takings issue was first raised in ¶¶ 1 and 5 of the Kelleys' motion for dismissal that was filed after the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State.