Court Opinion

ID: 9645062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:11:45.891899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:22.599557
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
with whom KELLY, Associate Judge, joins, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The characterization of complainant’s statement as a hearsay exception does not dispose of appellant’s claim that his right of confrontation was denied. The Supreme Court has made clear that while the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and every hearsay rule stem from the same roots, nevertheless, it has steadfastly declined to equate the two. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). To the contrary, “[t]he historical evidence leaves little doubt . .. that the clause was intended to exclude some hearsay.” Ohio v. Roberts, supra 448 U.S. at 63, 100 S.Ct. at 2537 (citations omitted). In expanding upon this theme, the Supreme Court in both Roberts and Dutton reiterated the language it first elucidated in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933-34, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970):
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” As a corollary, the Supreme Court has noted that the right of cross-examination “is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the ‘accuracy of the truth-determining process.’ ” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (citations omitted). Accordingly, it has been held that what the clause envisions is:
a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives testimony whether he is worthy of belief. [Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed.2d 409 (1895).]
See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra 448 U.S. at 63-64, 100 S.Ct. at 2538. This preference for face-to-face confrontation serves to restrict the range of admissible hearsay by erecting a rule of necessity under which the prosecution must either produce the declar-*740ant or, with certain exceptions,1 demonstrate his unavailability. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972). Once the declarant’s unavailability is demonstrated, the clause works to exclude hearsay unless it is “marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, supra 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). Thus “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.2 In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Ohio v. Roberts, supra 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The emphasis is on the degree of trustworthiness and thus the accuracy of the statement. Therefore, to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement, the Supreme Court devised its “indicia of reliability” test for confrontation purposes. Under that standard, first enunciated in Dutton v. Evans, the Court considered whether (1) the statement contained no express assertion about past fact and so carried on its face a warning to the jury against giving it undue weight; (2) declar-ant’s knowledge for making the out-of-court statement was well-established; (3) declarant’s recollection of the crime was good; (4) declarant had any motive to misrepresent himself.
Measured by these standards, I have concern about the right of confrontation in this case. I note, initially, that the government produced hearsay testimony establishing the declarant’s unavailability and appellant raised no objection. With respect to the question whether the statement evidenced sufficient indicia of reliability for confrontation purposes, weighing in favor of admission would be the fact that the declarant was in a position to know the contents of the envelope, he had no apparent motive to lie, and the statement arguably contained no express assertion about past fact. However, unlike Dutton, evidence on the final consideration — whether the statement was founded on faulty recollection — was not convincing in the instant case. The evidence presented portrayed the elderly de-clarant as a confused and disoriented man at the time he made the statement in question. Certainly, given his condition, doubt is cast upon the accuracy of his statement that the envelope contained $6,000. Bearing in mind that the means of testing the declarant’s accuracy are so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial “calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact finding process,” Chambers v. Mississippi, supra 410 U.S. at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 1045, 1 would hold that under the totality of the circumstances, the hearsay statement in question did not possess sufficient indicia of reliability to allow sublimation of the protections of the Confrontation Clause.
The error committed was not harmless. In holding that the extrajudicial statement in Dutton passed constitutional muster, the Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact that the evidence contested was neither “crucial” to the government’s case nor “devastating” to defendant’s defense. While the statement in issue here was not devastating to appellant’s defense that he was home with his mother at the time of the burglary, it was crucial to the prosecution.3 The indictment charged that appellant took from the complainant property of *741value consisting of a “brown envelope containing money.” Although there was eyewitness testimony that appellant took the brown envelope from complainant, it was only through the out-of-court statement that its content of money was established.4 I have grave difficulty, at least where a declarant is living, in permitting a hearsay statement to be used to supply an essential element of the government’s case.
I would hold, therefore, that the admission of the out-of-court statement, under the circumstances of this case, has deprived appellant of the opportunity to confront a witness against him in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra at 65 n.7, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 n.7.

. In applying this standard, the Supreme Court has concluded that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually all evidence within them comports with the substance of constitutional protection. Such noted exceptions include dying declarations, cross-examined prior testimony, business records and public records. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra at 66 n.8, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 n.8.

.I do not agree with the government that the evidence in this case would have been sufficient to sustain the conviction in the absence of the out-of-court statement. The case of Riley v. United States, D.C.App., 291 A.2d 190 (1972) relied upon by the trial court is distinguishable. We found in that case that circumstantial evidence supplied by the testimony of officers *741witnessing a pickpocket operation was sufficient to show ownership and possession of, and lack of consent to take, a wallet belonging to a victim absent from a second trial for petty larceny and assault. The distinction between the cases is simply that the circumstantial evidence here was insufficient to show that something of value was taken.

. Even if it is assumed that a brown envelope per se was property of value to sustain a conviction of robbery, the variance between the proof and the charge would prove fatal in this case. See, e. g., the reasoning of Barker v. United States, D.C.App., 373 A.2d 1215 (1977).