Court Opinion

ID: 9657042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:11:29.34339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.119877
License: Public Domain

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with Justice Levine in her statement that: “We cannot say, without expert advice, that the failure to follow the portion of the approved method governing the timely insertion of the test record could not affect the test results.”
I do not agree, however, that that conclusion necessitates or warrants the disposition that Justice Levine has directed on behalf of this court.
Very recently, in Price v. North Dakota Department of Transportation Director, 469 N.W.2d 560 (N.D.1991), I said in my dissent: “As the record is silent as to effect of the deviation, I think the public’s interest in safe highways necessitates and justifies a remand for the receipt of evidence on this issue before the Department of Transportation rather than a remand for the restoration of Mr. Price’s license.” Because the scenario in this case is quite similar to the scenario in Price, I would remand this case for the receipt of evidence on the effect of the deviation before the Department of Transportation, rather than remand this case for the restoration of Mr. Wagner’s license. I believe that the public’s interest in safe highways cries out for such a procedure in this case and in all similar cases.
The procedure I recommend is not only justified, but seems to be clearly contemplated as a possible solution in cases like this one by the last sentence of section 39-20-06, N.D.C.C., which reads:
“39-20-06. Judicial review. ... The court may direct that the matter be returned to the commissioner [now Director, Department of Transportation] or hearing officer for rehearing and the presentation of additional evidence.” See sections 24-02-01.3 and 24-02-01.4, N.D. C.C.
Possible solutions, to what seems to be a recurring problem resulting from slight deviations from the approved method of the State Toxicologist by an operator conducting tests of a person’s breath to determine the alcoholic content of a person’s blood, might be (1) more intense training sessions for the operators of the alcohol testing machine, and (2) an amendment of chapter 39-20, N.D.C.C., the Implied Consent Act, requiring a mandate of the case to the Department of Transportation for the receipt of further evidence when evidence is lacking on the effect of such deviations.
Until these solutions correct the problem, let us hope that none of these drivers, whose licenses have been restored in circumstances such as this, will be involved in accidents caused by their intoxication resulting in serious injuries or death to innocent people or to themselves.
MESCHKE, J., concurs.