Court Opinion

ID: 9654320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:15:11.906773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:08.052649
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
While I concur in the result reached here, I do so only because I feel constrained to do so by the case law of the appellate courts of this State which have set the precedent followed by the opinion herein. State v. Connor, 318 Mo. 592, 300 S.W. 685 (1927); State v. Virdure, 371 S.W.2d 196 (Mo.1963); State v. Worley, 375 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.1964); State v. Sledge, 471 S.W.2d 256 (Mo.1971); State v. Stavricos, 506 S.W.2d 51 (Mo.App.1974); and State v. Davis, 510 S.W.2d 790 (Mo.App.1974).
Article I, Sec. 18(a) of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, requires that “in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . ; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation.” Rule 24.01 provides that “the indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” See also State v. Brooks, 507 S.W.2d 375 (Mo.1974); State v. Todd, 477 S.W.2d 725, 728 (Mo.App.1972). From the earliest times in Missouri it has been held that a defendant’s right to know “the nature and cause of the accusa*538tion”, means that “. . . it is necessary to allege in an information or indictment all the elements of the crime intended to be charged, . . . (and) if such elements are missing they cannot be supplied by in-tendment or implication.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Cantrell, 403 S.W.2d 647 (Mo.1966); State v. Brooks, supra, 507 S.W.2d l. c. 376; State v. Osborn, 526 S.W.2d 37 (Mo.App.1975). To test the sufficiency of an information or indictment we must determine whether it alleges all of the elements or ingredients of the offense charged, clearly apprising both the defendant and the court of the facts constituting the offense and whether a conviction or acquittal of the charge would bar any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Bott, 518 S.W.2d 726 (Mo.App.1974). Where the statute defining the crime contains all of the elements of the offense, it is sufficient that the indictment or information allege the offense in the terms of the statute. State v. Kesterson, 403 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Mo.1966); State v. Cunningham, 380 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Mo.1964). Where, however, the statute requires a certain state of mind, e. g. intent or knowledge, it is essential that the indictment or information allege that state of mind, intent or knowledge necessary to constitute the crime therein defined. State v. Harris, 313 S.W.2d 664, 670[7] (Mo.1958); State v. Thomas, 343 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Mo.1961).1 This principle — that where the statute makes a particular intention essential to charge an offense — applies to cases where the statute contains no state of mind requirement but the particular intention is required by common law judicial decisions. State v. Harris, supra, l. c. 669.
These principles are, I believe, applicable to this case, because Section 195.020 makes the possession of a controlled substance a crime. Although the statute does not require a particular state of mind as an element of the offense, the courts of this State have held that in order to make a submissi-ble case under the statute it is necessary that the State prove that the defendant “did knowingly and intentionally have in his possession the prescribed controlled substance. It is not sufficient that it prove only actual or constructive possession, but the test is whether the defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance, and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it.” State v. Polk, 529 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Mo.App.1975) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Burns, 457 S.W.2d 721 (Mo.1970); State v. Roberts, 524 S.W.2d 174 (Mo.App.1975); State v. Berry, 488 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.App.1972); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 811, 821 (1963).
As our Supreme Court stated in State v. Burns, supra, l. c. 724: “Possession without knowledge of such possession is not possession in the legal sense of that word”.
By judicial decision knowledge of possession of a controlled substance is an essential ingredient of the offense; I, therefore, believe that under the authorities supra knowledge is an essential element of the offense which should be charged in the information or indictment alleging the offense; and since this information fails to include an allegation that Gary Gene Williams, the defendant here, possessed the proscribed controlled substance with knowledge of the presence and character thereof, I would, were I not bound by precedents, hold the information fatally deficient. It is my belief that to hold otherwise is to continue toleration of pleadings which neither comply with the constitutional mandate contained in Article I, Sec. 18(a) of the Constitution nor with the requirement of Rule 24.01.

. State v. Harris, supra, (feloniously and fraudulently held not sufficient to charge an intent to defraud in a buying or receiving stolen goods case); State v. Thomas, supra, (“knowingly and willingly” transporting liquor not satisfied by charging “unlawfully and feloniously.”)