Court Opinion

ID: 9948578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:03:50.279719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:40.887457
License: Public Domain

IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                              DIVISION ONE

            PANAGIOTA M. COSTARAS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                    v.

              BASILIOS C. COSTARAS, Defendant/Appellee.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 23-0286
                            FILED 3-7-2024

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                         No. CV2021-002643
         The Honorable Mary Collins Cronin, Judge Pro Tempore

                     VACATED AND REMANDED

                                  COUNSEL

Windtberg Law, PLC, Phoenix
By Marc Windtberg
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Denton Peterson Dunn, PLLC, Mesa
By Samuel Dampt, Brad A. Denton
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
                         COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                           Opinion of the Court

                                   OPINION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s opinion, in which Presiding
Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1            The issue before us is to what extent the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. 4, § 1, and A.R.S.
§ 12-544(3) obligate Arizona courts to enforce a domesticated revived
judgment issued by a court in another state. We hold that if the laws of the
state of rendition treat a revived judgment as a new judgment, Arizona’s
foreign judgment limitation statute begins to run anew with the revived
judgment. Here, because Ohio law treats a revived judgment as a new
judgment, A.R.S. § 12-544(3) began to run anew with the issuance of the
revived judgment by the Ohio court. Accordingly, we vacate the superior
court’s order vacating the domestication of the Ohio revived judgment and
quashing the associated writ of garnishment, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            Panagiota Vasko (formerly Panagiota Costaras) and Basilios
Costaras divorced in 1999. In March 2016, Vasko obtained a judgment from
an Ohio court (“the Original Judgment”) ordering Costaras to pay her for
obligations he owed but had not paid: (1) $53,899.60 for spousal support
arrearages, (2) $111,760.34 for monies she paid to satisfy his separate legal
obligation, (3) $490.44 for unpaid court costs in the divorce, and (4)
$8,317.46 for attorney’s fees and costs.

¶3             After Costaras moved to Arizona, Vasko domesticated the
Original Judgment here under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act (“UEFJA”) in February 2021. Vasko then applied for and
obtained a writ of garnishment against Costaras. See A.R.S. §§ 12-1701 to
-1708 (adopting the UEFJA); A.R.S. § 12-1702 (“A copy of any foreign
judgment authenticated in accordance with . . . the statutes of this state may
be filed in the office of the clerk of any superior court of this state. The clerk
shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the
superior court of this state.”). Costaras objected and moved to vacate the
domestication of the Original Judgment, asserting the statute of limitations

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                         COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                           Opinion of the Court

governing foreign judgments precluded enforcement of the “non-support
portions of the [Original] Judgment.” See A.R.S. § 12-544(3) (generally
barring the enforcement of a foreign “judgment or decree” more than “four
years after the cause of action accrue[d]” but exempting a foreign
“judgment for support . . . [and] associated costs and attorney fees” from
the statutory deadline); see also A.R.S. § 12-1598.07(A) (authorizing a
garnishee to file a written objection).

¶4            The superior court denied Costaras’ motion, reasoning that
“dissect[ing]” the spousal support arrearage and non-support provisions of
the Original Judgment “would undermine the principle of full faith and
credit and the applicability of the UEFJA.” Considering the Original
Judgment as a whole, the court found it “properly domesticated” and
“enforceable.”

¶5             Costaras appealed. On review, this court held the Original
Judgment’s “award of $53,899.60 for ‘spousal support arrearages’
represented a ‘judgment for support’ . . . not subject to the general four-year
statute of limitations on foreign judgments.” Costaras v. Costaras, 253 Ariz.
221, 223, ¶ 10 (App. 2022). Concerning the Original Judgment’s other award
provisions, however, we vacated and remanded “for the court to determine
whether [Vasko] domesticated the foreign judgment’s non-support awards
within the four-year statute of limitations.” Id. at ¶ 11.

¶6            On remand, Costaras moved to quash the writ of garnishment
and petitioned the superior court to order disgorgement for all garnished
monies exceeding the Original Judgment’s award for spousal support
arrearages ($53,899.60). Meanwhile, Vasko petitioned the Ohio court to
revive the Original Judgment, which had since become dormant under
Ohio law. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.07(B)(1) (providing that a
judgment falls dormant after five years without execution). In October 2022,
the Ohio court entered a second judgment (“the Revived Judgment”),
which granted Vasko’s motion to revive but rejected her proposed “partial
satisfaction of judgment” because it improperly “calculate[d] interest
during the period of dormancy.” See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2325.18
(authorizing the revival of a judgment “within ten years from the time it
became dormant” but providing that “[f]or the purpose of calculating
interest due on a revived judgment,” no interest accrues during dormancy).

¶7            Less than three months later, Vasko domesticated the Revived
Judgment in the same Maricopa County Superior Court case and obtained
a writ of garnishment. Costaras then moved to (1) vacate the domestication
of the Revived Judgment and (2) quash the writ of garnishment, arguing

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                       COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                         Opinion of the Court

the Revived Judgment was not a separate foreign judgment resetting the
time from which the limitation period began to run, and therefore A.R.S.
§ 12-544(3) barred its enforcement.

¶8           Finding the “revival of a previously dormant judgment [is]
not a new judgment,” the superior court implicitly concluded that
Arizona’s statute of limitations began to run on the entry date of the
Original Judgment rather than the entry date of the Revived Judgment, thus
foreclosing enforcement of the Revived Judgment in Arizona. The court
then vacated the domestication of the Revived Judgment and quashed the
associated writ of garnishment.

¶9           Vasko timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and
-2101(A)(1).

                             DISCUSSION

¶10           Vasko challenges the superior court’s implicit determination
that A.R.S. § 12-544(3) bars enforcement of a revived foreign judgment
domesticated in Arizona more than four years after entry of the original
judgment. Noting that A.R.S. § 12-544(3) does not “distinguish between
‘new’ judgments and ‘revived’ judgments,” Vasko argues the four-year
period for timely enforcement of a foreign judgment begins when a revived
judgment is entered—supplanting the entry date of the original judgment
for calculation purposes—whether the rendering state deems the revived
judgment a new judgment or merely a continuation of the original
judgment. Specific to this case, Vasko further contends that Ohio “treats
revived judgments as new judgments,” and because “[t]he statute of
limitations runs from the entry of any ‘judgment or decree’ issued in
another state” and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution “mandates that Arizona give the Revived [] Judgment the
same validity and effect that it would have in Ohio,” no legal basis exists
for finding the Revived Judgment unenforceable on statute of limitations
grounds. 1

1     Asserting waiver, Costaras contends that Vasko failed to raise in the
superior court both her constitutional argument and her contention that a
revived judgment “is, itself, an enforceable foreign judgment”—even if not
deemed a “new judgment” in the rendering state. Although Vasko has
more fully developed her arguments and included additional citations to

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                         COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                           Opinion of the Court

¶11           The interpretation of a limitations statute presents a legal
question that we review de novo. Webster Bank NA v. Mutka, 250 Ariz. 498,
499, ¶ 6 (App. 2021). “Absent ambiguity or absurdity, our inquiry begins
and ends with the plain meaning of the legislature’s chosen words, read
within the overall statutory context.” Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 251 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (2021) (internal quotation omitted).
When statutes relate to the “same subject or general purpose,” we read
them together. Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017).

¶12           Section 12-544 provides in relevant part:

       There shall be commenced and prosecuted within four years
       after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, the
       following actions:

       ...

       3. Upon a judgment or decree of a court rendered without the
       state, or upon an instrument in writing executed without the
       state. This paragraph does not apply to a judgment for
       support . . . and to associated costs and attorney fees.

¶13             Thus, A.R.S. § 12-544 bars the enforcement of a foreign
judgment—other than awards for support and related attorney’s fees and
costs—more than four years after the cause of action’s accrual date. The
UEFJA defines a foreign judgment as “any judgment, decree, or order . . . of
any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” A.R.S.
§ 12-1701 (emphasis added). Read together, A.R.S. § 12-544 and the UEFJA
recognize as timely the domestication of any foreign judgment within four
years of the cause of action’s accrual date insofar as the judgment is entitled
to full faith and credit in Arizona.

¶14          Applying these statutes here, A.R.S. § 12-544(3) bars the
enforcement of the Original Judgment, other than the support provision,
because Vasko domesticated the Original Judgment in February 2021,
nearly five years after its March 2016 entry. While several jurisdictions
“have held that [a] forum state’s statute of limitations applicable to an action
on a foreign judgment is not applicable to the registration of a foreign

authority on appeal, the record reflects she adequately preserved these
contentions by arguing in the superior court that (1) the Original Judgment
is no longer enforceable, (2) she must instead execute upon the Revived
Judgment, and (3) the United States Constitution requires Arizona to give
revived judgments full faith and credit.

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                         COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                           Opinion of the Court

judgment under a uniform enforcement of foreign judgment act,” Potomac
Leasing Co. v. Dasco Technology Corp., 10 P.3d 972, 974, ¶ 8 (Utah 2000)
(emphasis added; collecting cases), Arizona has consistently applied its
own statute of limitations when assessing the timeliness of a foreign
judgment’s domestication under the UEFJA, concluding “that such
application does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
States Constitution,” Eschenhagen v. Zika, 144 Ariz. 213, 216 (App. 1985)
(recognizing “that courts which have been presented with the question of
whether the [UEFJA] requires the forum state to recognize any judgment
properly filed under the Act at a time the judgment was valid in the
rendering state have reached differing conclusions”); see also Citibank (S.D.),
N.A. v. Phifer, 181 Ariz. 5, 6 (App. 1994) (“Although filing a judgment under
the [UEFJA] domesticates it for purposes of enforcement, it still remains a
foreign judgment subject to the time limitations imposed by A.R.S.
§ 12-544(3).”).

¶15            Here, Vasko does not dispute the untimeliness of the Original
Judgment’s domestication with respect to the non-support provisions.
Instead, she asserts that the continuing garnishment proceeding is
predicated not on the Original Judgment but on the Revived Judgment
—which independently qualifies as a judgment entitled to full faith and
credit in Arizona—thus requiring a separate timeliness determination. To
support this contention, Vasko points to Ohio law requiring “a judgment
creditor . . . to execute upon [a] revived judgment” because a dormant
judgment “is [] without legal effect.” Auto Now Acceptance Co., LLC v.
Brickey, 154 N.E.3d 1033, 1035, ¶¶ 9–10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).

¶16             We review de novo whether a foreign judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit. McDaniel v. Banes, 249 Ariz. 497, 500, ¶ 10 (App. 2020).
“The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires
that a judgment validly rendered in one state’s court be accorded the same
validity and effect in every other court in the country as it had in the state
rendering it.” Id. at ¶ 9 (internal quotation omitted); see also U.S. Const. art.
4, § 1; see also Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 257, ¶ 6 (App. 2007) (“[A]
foreign judgment properly filed with the superior court of Arizona [under
the UEFJA] will be treated in the same manner as a domestic judgment.”)
(citing A.R.S. § 12-1702).

¶17           “The UEFJA provides the enacting state with a speedy and
economical method of doing that which is required by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.” Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 257,
¶ 6 (internal quotation omitted). When a judgment debtor challenges the
enforceability of a foreign judgment domesticated under the UEFJA, he

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                        COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                          Opinion of the Court

bears the burden of proving it should not be accorded full faith and credit.
McDaniel, 249 Ariz. at 500, ¶ 10.

¶18           For foreign judgments domesticated in Arizona, “the statute
of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which is the
date on which the foreign judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.”
Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 257, ¶ 7. To determine when a judgment became
enforceable for full faith and credit purposes—triggering the running of
time under A.R.S. § 12-544(3)—we look to the laws of the rendering state.
Id. at 258–59, ¶¶ 8, 14, 17 (“[A] foreign judgment becomes enforceable in
Arizona when it has become enforceable in the rendering state[.]”); see also
Costaras, 253 Ariz. at 222, ¶ 7.

¶19           While a forum state may lawfully refuse to enforce a foreign
judgment if the judgment creditor domesticated the judgment (or
commenced an enforcement action) after the expiration of the forum state’s
limitations period, supra ¶ 14, “[a] more complicated situation arises” when
a judgment is revived in the rendering state and the creditor then seeks to
enforce the revived judgment in the forum state before the forum state’s
limitations period has expired based on the date of revival. Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Restatement”) § 118, cmt. c (1971). No
Arizona case squarely addresses such a circumstance, but the United States
Supreme Court has directly considered this complexity.

¶20            In Union National Bank of Wichita, Kansas v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38,
39 (1949), a judgment creditor brought an action in Missouri to enforce a
revived judgment entered in Colorado. Because the Colorado court had
entered the original judgment 18 years earlier, the judgment debtor raised
a statute of limitations defense, arguing the revived judgment was “not a
new judgment.” Id. at 39, 42–43. To resolve the dispute, the Supreme Court
looked to Colorado law, which held “that a revived judgment has the effect
of a new one.” Id. Reasoning a forum state may not “defeat [a] foreign
judgment” merely because “the forum itself would not have recognized” a
revivor, the Supreme Court held that the Colorado revived judgment was
“entitled to full faith and credit in Missouri.” Id. at 43–45.

¶21           Similarly, in Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 188–89 (1966), a
judgment creditor appealed the dismissal of his action to enforce a Florida
judgment in Georgia on statute of limitations grounds, essentially arguing
“that Georgia ha[d] drawn an impermissible distinction between foreign
and domestic judgments.” Noting it “might [otherwise] agree that
[Georgia’s statute of limitations governing foreign judgments] violates the
Federal Constitution,” the Supreme Court found no violation of the Full

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                         COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                           Opinion of the Court

Faith and Credit Clause because Georgia’s statutory scheme allowed a
judgment creditor to “revive his judgment in the State where it was
originally obtained” and then “file suit free of the [statutory] limitations.”
Id. at 189–90. Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded “there is no denial of
equal protection in a scheme that relies upon the judgment State’s view of
the validity of [its] own judgments.” Id. at 191 n.4 (stating it “would be
. . . a different case” if the rendering state did not permit a “revival
proceeding”).

¶22            Guided by Lamb and Watkins, we adopt the analytic
framework prescribed in Restatement § 118, cmt c. See Cramer v. Starr, 240
Ariz. 4, 10, ¶ 21 (2016) (explaining that absent contrary law, Arizona courts
generally follow the Restatement); see also Garza v. Gama, 240 Ariz. 373, 378,
¶ 16 (App. 2016) (“Arizona courts generally look to the [Restatement] to
determine which state’s substantive law applies to a claim.”).

       If the intervening time between the revival of the judgment
       and the commencement of the suit in the sister State exceeds
       that State’s statutory period for the enforcement of
       judgments, the action will be dismissed. If, however, the
       intervening time between the revival and the commencement
       of suit does not exceed the sister State’s statutory period, but
       this period is exceeded by the time that has elapsed since the
       rendition of the original judgment, the nature of the revival
       becomes material. If under the local law of the State of rendition
       the effect of this revival is to create a new judgment, then suit on
       this judgment may not be held barred under full faith and credit in
       the sister State. The contrary will be true, however, if the effect
       of the revival in the State of rendition is not to create a new
       judgment but rather to prolong the effective life of the original
       judgment.

Restatement § 118, cmt c. (emphasis added); see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d
Judgments § 380 (“[I]t is well-established that where an action is brought in
another state upon a judgment of a sister state which is a revival of an earlier
judgment, and under the law of the state rendering the revival judgment is
a new judgment and not merely an extension of the statutory period in
which to enforce the original judgment, a judgment of revival, as a new
judgment, is entitled to full faith and credit and may not be refused
enforcement on the ground that under the law of the forum, the original
judgment could not have been revived at the time it was revived by the
judgment of the sister state.”).

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                        COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                          Opinion of the Court

¶23             With this framework in mind, we turn to Ohio law to
determine whether the Revived Judgment is subject to full faith and credit.
See McDaniel, 249 Ariz. at 500–01, ¶¶ 12, 15. In Thompson v. Slone, 589 N.E.2d
118, 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), the court addressed “whether the revival of
a dormant judgment has the effect of reviving liens earlier attached as a
result of the judgment or the revived judgment is in effect a new judgment”
and held that “reviving a judgment once dormant has the effect of creating
a new judgment for purposes of subsequent execution.” Twenty years later,
in Columbus Check Cashiers v. Cary, 962 N.E.2d 812, 816–17 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011), the court considered whether a court entering a revived judgment
must “make a finding as to the amount still due and unsatisfied on the
original judgment” and concluded that the state statutes governing reviver
do not require the “court to supplant the original judgment on record with
a new judgment.” Although pertaining to different aspects of a revivor, to
the extent Columbus Check Cashiers and Thompson are arguably in tension,
the Ohio Court of Appeals recently clarified “that a revived judgment is not
a continuation of a dormant judgment, but in essence a new judgment that
a judgment creditor may seek to enforce.” Auto Now Acceptance Co., LLC,
154 N.E.3d at 1035, ¶ 9. Applying these cases here, the Ohio court’s
proceeding resulting in the Revived Judgment effectively established a new
judgment—both executable from its entry date and entitled to full faith and
credit.

¶24            Having found that the Revived Judgment is a separately
enforceable judgment entitled to full faith and credit, we turn to whether
the four-year limitations period in A.R.S. § 12-544(3) bars its enforcement.
See McDaniel, 249 Ariz. at 501, ¶ 15 (“[T]he Arizona statute of limitations on
filing a foreign judgment is triggered when the foreign judgment becomes
enforceable.”). The Ohio court entered the Revived Judgment on October
21, 2022. Vasko domesticated the Revived Judgment in Arizona on January
9, 2023. While Arizona’s four-year limitation period for enforcing the
Original Judgment expired, the limitations period for enforcing the Revived
Judgment began to run in October 2022 and has not yet expired. See Shuee
v. Ferguson, 3 Ohio 136, 138 (1827) (construing Ohio statute governing
priority of creditors and noting that a judgment is executable once
rendered); Geier v. Ace Lakefront Properties, Inc., 2007-L-068, 2007 WL
4564422, at *4, ¶ 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (noting that a revived judgment is
executable from the date of revival). Therefore, Vasko timely domesticated
the Revived Judgment, and it is enforceable against Costaras in Arizona.

¶25          In sum, we hold that the entry of a revived foreign judgment,
if deemed a new judgment under the law of the rendering state, resets
Arizona’s limitations period for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

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                       COSTARAS v. COSTARAS
                         Opinion of the Court

Because a revived judgment is a new judgment under Ohio law, entry of
the Revived Judgment in this case reset the limitations period and Vasko’s
domestication of the Revived Judgment in Arizona, less than three months
after its entry, was timely under A.R.S. § 12-544(3).

                              CONCLUSION

¶26            For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the superior court’s
order vacating the domestication of the Revived Judgment and quashing
the associated writ of garnishment, and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Vasko requests an award of attorney’s fees incurred on
appeal under A.R.S. § 25-324, which authorizes an award of attorney’s fees
“for the costs and expenses of maintaining any proceeding” under Title 25,
Chapter 3. Because this matter does not arise under Title 25, Chapter 3
(governing the dissolution of marriage), A.R.S. § 25-324 does not authorize
an award of attorney’s fees and we deny Vasko’s request. However, we
award Vasko her taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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