Court Opinion

ID: 9855284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:22:22.283967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:32.940102
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
Attention is invited to the increasing number of states which are adopting the view contrary to the majority opinion. It *484appears that the states are numerically divided almost equally on the question as to whether a defendant may be permitted to appeal from a judgment after payment of a fine.
In Illinois it was said:
“Examination of authorities, many of which are cited in the recent case of Village of Avon v. Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d 254, also discloses conflicting results in other jurisdictions, with the majority view being that the right to review is waived where a fine is voluntarily paid. It is our conclusion, however, that the contrary view is the more just and reasonable, such a conclusion being supported in principle by the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1053, wherein he said: ‘We should be slow to suppose that the legislature meant to take away the right to undo the disgrace and the legal discredit of a conviction * * * merely because a wrongly convicted person has paid his fine or served his term.’ ” People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 93 Ariz. 351, 380 P.2d 1009 (1963), considered the same question and rationalized:
“We now consider the other question raised by petitioner in the original proceedings. This is, whether a defendant who has been convicted in a municipal court and has satisified the sentence imposed upon him may thereafter appeal to the superior court and receive a trial de novo. Although there is authority to the contrary, we believe that the better reasoning would allow an appeal in such a case. Town of White Sulphur Springs v. Voise, 136 Mont. 1, 343 P.2d 855 (1959); Burns v. People, 9 Ill.2d 477, 138 N.E.2d 525 (1956); State ex rel. Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808, 74 A.L.R. 631 (1931); Jones v. State, 214 Md. 525, 136 A.2d 252 (1957).
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“Petitioner contends that satisfaction of sentence renders the question moot and constitutes a waiver of the right of appeal. However, the law recognizes and protects an individual’s interest in his reputation and it would be absurdly inconsistent to dismiss as moot a proceeding initiated to clear one’s name of the stigma and infamy of an allegedly erroneous conviction on a criminal charge. * * *”
The language in Jackson v. People, 151 Colo. 171, 376 P.2d 991 at page 995 (1962), is particularly pointed on the question:
“We no longer subscribe to the foregoing language'or language of similar *485import in other cases, and expressly disavow the same. We find nothing in 49 C.J.S. [Judgments § 577, p.] 1058, cited as authority for the foregoing conclusions, which deals in any manner with the question of appeals.
“We do not find the law ‘well settled’ that one who has paid a judgment has lost his right to appeal. On the contrary, we find the ‘better rule’ is stated in 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 214, page 638:
“ ‘According to other decisions, however, it is held to be the better rule that even a voluntary compliance with the judgment, order, or decree of the court by payment or performance, either before or after taking the appeal, is not necessarily a bar to an appeal or writ of error for its reversal, particularly where repayment or restitution may be enforced, or the effect of compliance may be otherwise undone, in case of a reversal, and where a statute permits an appeal without obtaining a stay. * * * It has further been held that it is immaterial whether or not the money paid can be recovered back, since the erroneous judgment is itself an injury from which the law will presume damages.’ ”
See also People v. Chamness, 109 Cal.App.Supp. 778, 288 P. 20 (1930).