Court Opinion

ID: 9592591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:15:32.268641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:45.972816
License: Public Domain

*635ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I find no infirmity in Rieco Maye’s convictions or sentence. I agree with the majority that the district court did not err in denying Maye a three-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. I also agree that the district court correctly determined Maye’s criminal history category. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that Maye’s guilty plea to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge was knowing and voluntary, and had a sufficient factual basis. Also, there is no indication of error in the record that would justify a remand for resentencing on the distribution count.

Maye’s Plea to the § 924(c) Charge Was Knowing and Voluntary

Maye pled guilty under the terms of a Rule 11 plea agreement. At Maye’s plea hearing on March 23, 2007, the district court explained the elements the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if Maye exercised his right to go to trial. As to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count, the court recited that the government would have to prove that: (1) Maye possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime; (2) that he did so knowingly and intentionally; and (3) that jurisdiction was proper.1 The Assistant United States Attorney then read a statement of facts into the record. Afterward, the court went through the statement, paragraph by paragraph, to see if Maye disputed any of the facts. This colloquy included the following exchange:
THE COURT: During the transaction, Maye possessed a chrome-plated revolver, which was displayed in close proximity to the drug transaction. Is that accurate?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Was a search warrant executed on that same residence where you and others were found inside?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And did they find 2.1 grams of crack cocaine, baggies, digital scales, cellular telephones, a money counter, and Smith & Wesson model 6D73738? Is that accurate?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
At no time during his plea hearing did Maye indicate that he did not understand the charges against him. He did ask the court to provide “more detail” about his right to trial, and indicated that he wanted to know what his exact sentence would be; the court answered his questions and attempted to make sure Maye understood the answers.
It was not until five months later at his third sentencing hearing, on August 23, 2007, that Maye indicated that he “was kind of confused on one of the charges.” He wanted to know “how [he] got charged with the 924(c)” and said that he wanted to “back away” from that plea. Maye explained: “I mean, I’m not denying the fact that I had the gun, but as far as what I learned from being in jail, like the 924(e) is committing a crime by having a gun.” The court instructed him:
The 924(c) charge charged you with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. You had it in your possession for use in a drug trafficking crime. You’re not being charged *636with brandishing it or otherwise using it. You had it, and that was sufficient. Specifically, the elements that you previously heard were that you, Ricco Maye, possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime....
After the district court explained the elements of the offense to which Maye had pled guilty, the following exchange occurred:
MAYE: Okay. Well, I think I was just under the impression that I was being charged for having a gun period, point blank.
COURT: I’m sorry. Come again with that.
MAYE: I said I was under the impression that I was just being charged with having the gun in my apartment. From what I learned from in jail or — I mean— COURT: Which is the best place to get legal advice, is the jail, right?
Okay. So why don’t you — why don’t you learn from your lawyer who is standing right next to you, the one that’s passed the bar, unlike your friends in the county jail.
All right. Why don’t you gentlemen have a seat and chat about this for a moment. Okay?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I have explained to Mr. Maye to the best I can the elements of the offense and why he’s guilty of them or why I believe he’s guilty of them, and I don’t know that I can do anymore — or that anybody can do anymore, and I’m still at this time not certain that Mr. Maye understands why the situation- — given the facts of the situation as were explained and applying the law to those facts why that makes him guilty of the offense. He has requested that the Court explain it to him, and that’s where we are.
COURT: Mr. Maye, are you guilty as charged [... ] with respect to Count 2, the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime [...]?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: He’d like to ask counsel a question, Your Honor.
COURT: Yes.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I think Mr. Maye is clear now.
COURT: And so he could answer my question?
MAYE: Yes.
COURT: You are guilty of Counts 1 and 2 as charged, correct?
MAYE: That’s correct.
COURT: And you understand why you’re guilty?
MAYE: Yes, I understand now.
COURT: Why don’t you tell me one more time. Why are you guilty?
MAYE: [...] and on Count 2, I was guilty because I had — I just hand the gun period, point blank. I was just under the impression that—
COURT: You had the gun with you, and you were selling crack cocaine?
MAYE: Are you saying with me, like, on me?
COURT: No. In your possession, in your constructive possession, in your apartment?
MAYE: Oh, yes, it was in my apartment.
COURT: Okay. And it was your gun?
MAYE: Yes.
COURT: And it was in your apartment?
MAYE: Yes.
COURT: And it was — nobody else lived there?
MAYE: No.
COURT: Okay. Very good.
MAYE: Oh.
*637COURT: Go ahead.
MAYE: Al right. But the thing — the main thing I was confused about is that the sale took place on the front porch and not in my apartment, so I was thinking that the 924 means that the crime would have to happen at the same place that the gun was at.
Maye never argued before the district court — at his plea hearing or at any of his three sentencing hearings — that his plea was uninformed or based on insufficient facts. Our review, therefore, is for plain error. We may vacate Maye’s conviction only if “(1) there was error that (2) was plain, (3) affected a substantial right, and (4) ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632, 640 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 656, 658 (6th Cir.2008)). This is an “exceedingly deferential” standard, United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 764 (6th Cir.2008); ‘“[t]he Supreme Court and numerous federal courts have repeatedly stated that the plain error doctrine is to be used sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, and solely to avoid a miscarriage of justice.’ ” United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir.1999). Put another way, the error must be “so plain that the trial judge ... [was] derelict in countenancing it.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 589 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2006)).
While acknowledging that our review is for plain error, the majority adopts the most uncharitable reading possible of the exchanges between Maye and the district court. The majority contends that “it was obvious” that the court was “confused as to what exactly was required to establish guilt of a section 924(c) possession-in-furtherance charge.” Maj. Op. at 627. Specifically, the majority states that the “various principals,” including the court, “did not believe that ‘a specific nexus between the gun and crime charged’ need be shown but, rather, that the government need show only that the defendant possessed a firearm and that the firearm was located somewhere near the illegal drug transaction.” Id. The majority even asserts that Maye’s “jailhouse acquaintances” understood the “the proper preconditions for a section 924(c) conviction, while the district court ... [led] Maye astray.” Maj. Op. at 630.
The record contradicts this gratuitous jab at the district court. Section 924(c) criminalizes not the mere possession of a firearm, but possession in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court correctly explained to Maye that a conviction under 924(c) requires more than mere possession but does not require a showing that the firearm was brandished or otherwise used.
Given our stringent standard of review, we cannot say that the district court committed any error — certainly not “plain” error — in accepting Maye’s guilty plea or in refusing to allow him to withdraw it. Although Maye continued to express confusion about how he could be convicted given that the gun was in the apartment while the transaction occurred on the porch, he did not dispute that he possessed the gun in furtherance of his crack-dealing business. To be sure, Maye wanted to withdraw his plea because he questioned the sufficiency of the nexus between the firearm and his drug trafficking. But the district court was not required to accept Maye’s post hoc assertion that he did not understand the charge to which he had pled guilty; and to the extent that Maye was arguing that he overestimated the strength of the government’s case, he did not provide the court with a basis for allowing him to withdraw the plea.
*638The majority quotes a lengthy excerpt from the sentencing hearing transcript “to demonstrate,” it claims, “the consistency with which the district court expressed a mistaken understanding that a section 924(c) conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime could be established simply by evidence that a gun was present on the premises where a drug sale occurred.” Maj. Op. at 630. Noticeably absent, however, is any serious attempt by the majority to identify any contextually supportable statements by the district court that demonstrate this alleged misunderstanding. In a footnote, the majority points out my acknowledgment that the court “stated plainly to Maye that ‘[y]ou had it, and that was sufficient’ and asserts that I fail to take ‘those unambiguous words at their face value.’ ” Maj. Op. at 630 n. 2. Rather than attempt to explain how one sentence extracted from a five-page colloquy demonstrates a consistent error, the majority simply declares that the sentence is “unambiguous” (but does not indicate what the unambiguous meaning is) and accuses me of “imputing some hidden explanatory meaning” and engaging in “judicial creationism” for daring to read the statement in context. Id.
What the district court meant when it told Maye that “[he] had it, and that was sufficient” is not hidden and needs no imputation. Again, the full paragraph reads:
The 924(c) charge charged you with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. You had it in your possession for use in a drug trafficking crime. You’re not being charged with brandishing it or otherwise using it. You had it, and that was sufficient. Specifically, the elements that you previously heard were that you, Ricco Maye, possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. And I would assume that it was based upon that fact that you were charged with it, that you did so knowingly and intentionally, and that you did this on or about the date that was alleged in the indictment in the Southern District of Ohio.
The context demonstrates that the court did not consider mere possession of a firearm, without any nexus to a drug trafficking crime, to constitute an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The court twice noted — both before and after saying “[y]ou had it, and that was sufficient” — that Maye was charged with possessing the firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court even defined “in furtherance” by explaining that Maye was charged with possessing the gun “for use in a drug trafficking crime”; at the same time, the court explained that Maye was not being charged with actually using or brandishing the weapon. In this way, the court’s comment that “[y]ou had it, and that was sufficient” was intended to distinguish a possession-in-furtherance charge under 924(c) from a charge of using or carrying a weapon under that same subsection. Under this interpretation of the colloquy (and it is not “plain” that it should be otherwise interpreted), the court did not err.

Mage’s Plea to the § 924(c) Charge Had a Sufficient Factual Basis

The majority incorrectly holds that “the prosecution never identified evidence that would meet that more stringent ‘in furtherance standard[,]’ ” Maj. Op. at 630, and even states that the government’s evidence “leads to the conclusion that the firearm was not possessed to advance or promote the drug trafficking offense[,]” Maj. Op. at 631 n. 3. In reaching this conclusion, the majority ignores our deferential standard of review and relevant caselaw.
In United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir.2001), we held that “the possession of a firearm on the same premises as a drug transaction would not, with*639out a showing of a connection between the two, sustain a § 924(c) conviction.” “In order for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime,” we explained, “the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use.” Id. Factors we consider in determining possession in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime include: “whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found.” Id. Although this “list of factors is not exclusive ... it helps to distinguish possession in furtherance of a crime from innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard.” Id.
Here, application of each of those factors supports a finding that Maye possessed the firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The firearm was loaded. It was a .38 caliber revolver, a handgun designed for quick access and easy maneuverability. Maye did not acquire the revolver legally but bought it “off the street.” The type of drug activity conducted was a hand-to-hand transaction, one where a dealer would want the protection of a firearm. The revolver was found the same day the drug transaction occurred, while Maye was still in the residence. From the table on which the gun was found, officers also recovered 2.1 grams of crack cocaine, plastic baggies, digital scales, several cellular telephones, a significant amount of cash, and a money counter.
The majority points out that Maye did not brandish the gun during his transaction with the confidential informant, did not point out the gun to the informant, and did not otherwise threaten the informant with the gun. These facts are true enough, but are completely irrelevant: Maye did not plead guilty to using or brandishing the gun; he pled guilty to possessing it in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. And the fact that Maye ultimately moved the transaction to another location because of nearby police activity does not mean that he did not possess the gun in furtherance of his drug trading. The facts were sufficient to show that the revolver — like the scales, baggies, and other paraphernalia discovered along with it — was another tool of Maye’s trade. The majority argues that my “[mjerely stating such a conclusion ... does not necessarily make the statement true.” Maj. Op. at 631 n. 3. But it is the majority opinion that fails to explain its conclusion — that is, the majority opinion does not explain how application of the Mackey factors leads to a conclusion that Maye did not possess the gun in furtherance of his drug trade.
Indeed, the facts here are strikingly similar to those in Mackey. In that case, police arranged for a confidential informant to purchase crack cocaine at a particular house. The next day, officers executed a search warrant at the house and found “an illegally possessed, loaded, short-barreled shotgun in the living room of the crack house, easily accessible to the defendant and located near the scales and razor blades. Defendant, stopped by police near the gun, possessed cocaine and a large sum of cash.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. We held that “[f]rom the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could infer that the purpose of the firearm was to provide defense or deterrence in furtherance of the drug trafficking for which defendant was arrested.” Id. at 462-63. Likewise, it was not plain error for the district court to find that the government’s proffered facts all tended to show that Maye possessed the firearm in furtherance of the drug transaction; without a doubt, the firearm here was not like a “wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard.” Id. at 462.

*640
A Remand for Resentencing on the Distribution Count is Unwarranted

The majority also decides that we should vacate Maye’s sentence on the distribution count and remand for resentencing so the district court can determine whether to depart from the crack guidelines based on policy considerations. In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 575, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court may use its discretion to depart from the crack guidelines, even in the mine-run case. This year, in Spears v. United States, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 840, 843-44, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009), the Court made it clear that a sentencing court may depart from the guidelines based solely on policy considerations. But neither Kimbrough nor Spears provided any basis for a presumption of error just because a sentencing court did not, sua sponte, expound on the scope of its discretion or explain why it had decided to stick with the guidelines’ recommendation. Rather, our decisions— even after Kimbrough and Spears — “make clear that there should be some indication of error in the record justifying remand.” United States v. Guest, 564 F.3d 777, 779 (6th Cir.2009). “[T]o justify a remand ... an appellant must identify a specific error in the proceedings below[,]” id., which Maye has failed to do.
In Guest, we rejected an argument similar to that made here by Maye, and declined to remand for resentencing because there was “no indication that the district court had a policy disagreement with any of the relevant Guidelines.... ” Id. Although the district court in Guest affirmatively indicated “that it understood its authority to deviate from the relevant guidelines calculation,” Maj. Op. at 633, we may not read the court’s silence here to mean that it misunderstood its discretion. “We do not require that a district court explicitly state that it is aware of its discretion” to impose a below-Guidelines sentence. United States v. Santillana, 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir.2005)). “Rather, we presume that the district court understood its discretion, absent clear evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citing United States v. Crouch, 288 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir.2002)). And it remains the rule in this Circuit that a defendant must point to some sentencing error to warrant a remand. Guest, 564 F.3d at 779.
The majority notes that “[wjhen the guidelines were amended ... the district judge ... simply reduced the relevant offense level ... and again imposed the lowest sentence within the range without further explanation” and concludes that this fact provides “reason to believe” that the court failed to recognize its authority to categorically reject the crack guidelines on policy grounds. Maj. Op. at 633. Although a judge who chooses a sentence outside the guideline range apparently is aware of his discretion to do so, it does not follow — nor have we ever held — that a judge who imposes a within-guidelines sentence presumably is unaware of his discretion to do otherwise. Indeed, the majority’s suggestion that the court’s repeated imposition of within-guidelines sentences is somehow indicative of ignorance runs counter to the rule that “sentences falling within the advisory Guidelines range may be considered presumptively reasonable ... [while] [sentences that deviate from the Guidelines ... are afforded no such presumption.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 582 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-51, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)).
Ultimately, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court here was inclined to disagree with the crack guidelines on policy grounds or that Maye
*641made any argument that the crack guidelines were unfair. “There is no appealable issue saved ... when a defendant wishes to appeal a discretionary factor and does not request the judge to exercise such discretion during the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir.2007). Maye did not ask the court to exercise discretion to depart downward, and it was not plain error for the court not to do so.
Accordingly, I would affirm Maye’s conviction and sentence on both counts.

. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) provides, in relevant part: ''[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtheranee of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime — (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years[.]”