Court Opinion

ID: 9762023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:07:50.320214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.187899
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Jones :
I am compelled to dissent.
The error appealed from in this case is not the product of any event which occurred before, during or after trial which was prejudicial to the rights of the appellant. The error in this case has its genesis in the trial court’s misapplication of the somewhat confusing language of Section 712 of The Penal Code.1 Unfortunately, the decision of the majority converts what was otherwise an absolutely non-prejudicial trial court error into grounds for an arrest of judgment.
Two facts emerged from the evidence produced at trial: first, the appellant lunged at Officer Uziel in an apparent attempt to stab him; second, the intended victim was able to avoid the thrust and was never actually stabbed. Unquestionably the appellant’s conduct was sufficient for the jury to find him guilty of some crime; the sole question on this appeal is whether the jury found the appellant guilty of the proper crime.
The record reveals that the verdict slip which was sent out with the jury listed the charges against Darrell Dzvonick as:
*109“1st Count—Attempts with, intent to Kill
“2nd Count—Assault with intent to Maim.”
The verdict returned by the jury was:
“1st Count not guilty.
“2nd Count Guilty.”
Thus, on the face of the verdict slip it appears that the appellant stands convicted of the completed offense of assault with intent to maim. It is correctly pointed out by the majority and agreed to by all that the appellant cannot be convicted of the completed offense because under the language of the statute, the offense of “assault with intent to maim” requires that there be an actual stabbing, cutting or wounding of another person. Here, where there was admittedly no cutting, conviction for the completed offense was unwarranted.
However, examination of the entire record reveals that the indictment returned against the appellant actually charged him with attempted assault with intent to maim. Furthermore, the evidence presented at the trial, the judge’s initial charge to the jury, and a supplemental charge given during the course of the jury’s deliberation all show that the appellant was tried for the crime of attempted assault with intent to maim. In short, with the exception of the verdict slip, every reference to the crime committed by the appellant refers to an attempt rather than a completed offense.
As a result of the attempted stabbing, a two-count indictment was returned agaist the appellant by the grand jury. The first count, which is not in dispute, charged that the appellant “did attempt to cut, stab and wound with intent... to murder.” The second count of the indictment charged that the appellant “did make and assault, and . . . did attempt to stab, cut and wound, with intent . . . then and there to maim, disfigure and disable. . . .” The words “attempt to” are emphasized not only because they clearly show that the indictment charged the appellant with attempted as*110sault with intent to maim, but also because they are a typewritten addition to an otherwise standard printed form used to charge other defendants with the completed crime. The only reason for the addition of the words “attempt to” was to show that the defendant was only indicted for attempted assault with intent to maim and not the completed offense.2
The testimony presented at the trial by both the prosecution and the defense is further proof that at the time of trial there was no ambiguity on either side concerning the subject of the trial. It is clear that neither side considered an actual cutting necessary for conviction of an attempted assault with intent to maim.
Any doubt that the appellant was tried for attempted assault with intent to maim is dispelled by the trial judge’s charge to the jury delivered at the close of testimony. Even the majority opinion recognizes that the judge “specifically limited the jury’s consideration to the offense of ‘assault by attempting to stab, wound or cut with the intent to maim’,” in which case the judge instructed the jury to find the appellant “guilty of the second count.”
During the course of this deliberation, the jury sent a note to the judge asking for a definition of “maim.” In the presence of counsel the trial judge explained the term and went on to explain that: “The crux of the second count of the indictment is that an assault or putting in fear by force or threat of force *111with the intent at the time the attempt is made to [sic], there’s an attempt to stab or wound or injure the person.” Although this supplemental instruction is not as precise as might otherwise be desirable, its unmistakable impact is to instruct the jury to find the defendant guilty of the second count if they believe he is guilty of attempting an assault with intent to maim.
Thus the only logical inference which can be drawn from the jury’s verdict of “2nd Count—Guilty” is that they had determined that the evidence established an attempt to maim, notwithstanding that on the verdict slip the second count had been listed as “Assault with intent to maim”, the completed offense. The majority is correct in maintaining that: “A jury is without authority to find a defendant guilty of a more serious offense than that submitted to it by the court.” However, in this case the jury did no such thing. Where the indictment, the evidence produced at trial and the charge of the trial judge all maintain that the “second count” is the offense of attempted assault with intent to maim, and the jury returns a verdict of guilty of the second count, there is no basis for a holding that the jury found the defendant guilty of the completed offense.
The only remaining issue to be decided was not reached by the majority, i.e., whether there is such an offense as “attempted assault with intent to maim.” The appellant argues that there can be no such crime as “attempted assault” since an assault is by definition an attempt to commit a battery. However, as noted before, the crime of “assault with intent to maim” requires a touching, i.e., a cutting, stabbing or wounding and is thus more akin to a battery. Disregarding the section heading,3 it is clear from the elements of the *112offense recited in the body of the statute that, at least as far as the statute proscribes a cutting with a knife, it describes a battery. Therefore, since there can be an attempted battery, it is also possible for there to be an attempted “assault with intent to maim.”
Although The Penal Code does not contain a specific section proscribing “attempted assault with intent to maim,” the crime is clearly punishable under the general section which punishes attempts to commit crime. Section 1107, Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P.S. §5107, provides: “If, on the trial of any person charged with felony or misdemeanor, it shall appear to the jury upon the evidence, that the defendant did not complete the offense charged, but was guilty only of an attempt to commit the crime, he shall not by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted, but the jury may return, as their verdict, that the defendant is not guilty of the felony or misdemeanor charged but is guilty of an attempt to commit the same.” The section also provides that the punishment for conviction of an attempt to commit a crime shall be exactly the same as if the conviction had been for the completed offense. As a result of his conviction in the instant case, the appellant was sentenced to from nine months to three years’ imprisonment, which is within the limits allowed by Section 712 of The Penal Code, “Assault with intent to maim.”
It is impossible to find any prejudice to the appellant in this case. The indictment charged him with “attempting to assault with intent to maim”; the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove an attempt; the *113judge charged the j ary that if they believed the appellant had attempted to assault the officer they could find the appellant guilty of the second count; and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the second count. Since the penalty for the attempt is the same as the penalty for the completed offense, the appellant was not prejudiced by the inadvertent error which listed the second count on the verdict slip as the completed offense, “Assault with intent to maim.”
I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Mr. Justice Pomeroy joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Act of June 24, 1939, P. D. 872, §712, 18 P.S. §4712.

 The use of the printed form indictment, while convenient in most cases, is probably one reason for the mixup in this case. Although the language in the body of the indictment was changed to reflect “attempted assault with intent to maim” as the second count, the heading of the indictment was not changed and read:
“1st Count—Attempts with intent to kill
“2nd Count—Assault with intent to maim.”
Coincidentally, that is precisely the language which appeared on the verdict slip which went out with the jury.

 It is interesting to note Uiat the section heading “Assault with intent to maim” was added to the offense when it was re*112enacted in the 1939 Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §712. The substance of the offense, from which the present language was taken, first appeared in The Penal Code of 1860, where the offense was more correctly entitled, “Cutting and maiming with intent to disfigure.” Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, §83.