Court Opinion

ID: 9428799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:24:49.449173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:15.359916
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom Justice O’Connor joins, concurring.
As the Court notes, this case “does not fit comfortably in *30[the] mold” of our implied right of action cases. Ante, at 20. Congress here provided for the making of contracts that it must have intended to be enforced. The Court thus identifies the question correctly as whether Congress intended those contracts to be enforced in federal court. Ante, at 21. This of course is precisely the question on which implied rights of action cases properly are decided. See, e. g., Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13 (1981); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 639 (1981).
There are other parallels between this case and those in the more familiar implied right of action “mold.” Most significantly to me, both kinds of cases involve the same fundamental issues of congressional and judicial power. By enforcing contract rights not within the jurisdictional grant conferred by Congress, as much as by improperly “inferring” a right of action, “a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve. . . . This runs contrary to the established principle that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . ,’ American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951), and conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. Ill to set the limits of federal jurisdiction.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 746-747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Because a federal court should exercise extreme caution before assuming jurisdiction not clearly conferred by Congress, we should not condone the implication of federal jurisdiction over contract claims in the absence of an unambiguous expression of congressional intent. As I do not view this position as inconsistent with the reasoning of the Court, I join its opinion.