Court Opinion

ID: 9373039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:18.092172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.412848
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     REDALE BENTON-FLORES,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                            DC-1221-13-0522-B-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                            DATE: January 23, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Alexis Tsotakos, Esquire, and Christopher H. Bonk, Esquire, Silver Spring,
             Maryland, for the appellant.

           Maxwell Selz, APO, AE, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                            Vice Chairman Harris recused herself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision,
     which denied her request for corrective action in this individual right of action

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
¶2         The appellant filed this IRA appeal, alleging that the agency retaliated
     against her for protected whistleblowing.        Benton-Flores v. Department of
     Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-13-0522-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1.     The administrative judge dismissed the IRA appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision. On review, the Board reversed and
     remanded for adjudication on the merits.         Benton-Flores v. Department of
     Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 428 (2014).
¶3         In the Board’s Opinion and Order, we found that the appellant exhausted
     disclosures concerning the following bef ore the Office of Special Counsel (OSC):
     (1) a teacher’s aide was wrongly taken away from the appellant’s classroom for
     training; (2) a speech teacher was not providing services to her students as
     required by their individualized education program; (3) st aff mistreated students;
     (4) a staff member endangered students by bringing a razor into the classroom;
     (5) a staff member engaged in abusive and threatening behavior; (6) a staff
     member performed an illegal search of her students’ belongings; and (7) a st aff
                                                                                     3

     member spread rumors around the school about the appellant. Id., ¶ 7. Of those,
     the Board found that the appellant presented nonfrivolous allegations concerning
     Disclosures 3-5.   Id., ¶¶ 8-11.    The Board also found that the appellant
     nonfrivolously alleged that Disclosures 3-5 were a contributing factor in her
     June 2012 termination, a personnel action which also was properly exhausted
     with OSC. Id., ¶¶ 12-14.
¶4        On remand, the administrative judge developed the record and planned for a
     hearing. Benton-Flores v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-
     13-0522-B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 37. Because of scheduling conflicts with
     witnesses, the administrative judge dismissed the case without prejudice.    RF,
     Tab 38. After refiling the case, the appellant decided she did not want to pursue
     the hearing and, instead, requested a decision on the written record.
     Benton-Flores v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-13-0522-
     B-2, Refiled Remand File (B-2 RF), Tab 18 at 1. The administrative judge then
     issued a remand initial decision, denying the appellant’s request for corrective
     action. B-2 RF, Tab 27, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 2. She found that the
     appellant failed to meet her burden of proving that the disclosures identified by
     the Board for further adjudication were protected. RID at 6 -19. The appellant
     has filed a petition for review challenging the remand initial decision.
     Benton-Flores v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-13-0522-
     B-2, Remand Petition for Review (RPFR) File, Tab 3. The agency has filed a
     response and the appellant has replied. RPFR File, Tabs 5-6.
¶5        To establish a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal in this case, the
     appellant had the burden of proving, by preponderant evidence, that:      (1) she
     made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); and (2) the protected
     disclosure was a     contributing factor in an agency’s personnel action.
     Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 5. To establish that she made a protected
     disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), the appellant need not prove that the
     matter disclosed actually established one of the categories of wrongdoing listed
                                                                                         4

     under section 2302(b)(8)(A); rather, she must show that the matter disclosed was
     one which a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced any of the
     situations specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Webb v. Department of the Interior,
     122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015); Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 8. The proper
     test for determining whether an employee had a reasonable belief that her
     disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of
     the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could
     reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
     regulation, or one of the other conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
     Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 8.

     The appellant failed to prove that Disclosure 3 was protected.
¶6        On review, the appellant first argues that the administrative judge
     improperly dismissed portions of Disclosure 3 because they were conveyed
     orally, rather than in writing. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 10-11 (referencing RID at 9).
     We disagree.    As will become clear in our discussion below, the argument
     misrepresents the administrative judge’s findings; she did not find any disclosure
     unprotected because it was oral.     The appellant separately reasserts that she
     reasonably believed Disclosure 3, about staff mistreating students, was protected.
     RPFR File, Tab 3 at 11-13. She argues that the administrative judge mistakenly
     interpreted Board precedent in finding otherwise. Id. at 12-13 (referencing RID
     at 8-11; Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 6-7 (2016);
     El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 10 n.11 (2015)). Again, we
     disagree.
¶7        As discussed in both the Board’s Opinion and Order and the remand initial
     decision,   Disclosure   3   actually   involves    several      discrete   incidents.
     Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶¶ 7, 9; RID at 8-14; IAF, Tab 5 at 8, 14-15.
     The first, which we will call Disclosure 3(a), involved a teacher’s aide reportedly
     dragging a student to isolation. IAF, Tab 5 at 14. The second, Disclosure 3(b),
                                                                                      5

     involved a teacher’s aide reportedly pushing a student. Id. at 15. And the third,
     Disclosure 3(c), involved the restraint of a student. Id. at 8.
¶8         In the Board’s Opinion and Order, we observed that while the appellant had
     not cited a particular law, rule, or regulation implicated by her alleged
     disclosures, the agency’s regulations clearly mandate the safety and security of
     staff and students in agency-run schools. Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 10.
     We found that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that a disinteres ted observer
     with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the
     appellant could reasonably conclude that the actions described in Disclosures 3-5
     evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation. Id. In reaching that conclusion,
     we relied on the appellant’s OSC complaint and her disclosures described therein.
     Id., ¶ 8.

            Disclosure 3(a)
¶9         In her OSC complaint, the appellant described Disclosure 3(a), an oral
     disclosure to her Assistant Principal, as follows:
            That [an aide] did drag my then 3 year old [student] out of [the]
            center and placed him in “isolation” seated in front of a glass
            window in the back of the room, with the blinds closed, and the
            child’s back turned away from rest of the classroom. Isolatin g a
            child in this manner was outlawed in the [USA] in public schools
            back in the 1960’s. The child cried profusely, and I considered this
            treatment of physically dragging the child out of [the] reading center
            to be abusive. (This was witnessed by [another aide], who was
            reading a story to students at the time, while I prepared the snacks).
     IAF, Tab 5 at 14.        By contrast, during the remand proceedings, in lieu of
     testimony about Disclosure 3(a), the appellant submitted a sworn affidavit in
     which she provided the following:
            In or about October 2011, I verbally disclosed to [the] Assistant
            Principal at Aviano Elementary School, that I witnessed [an aide]
            physically drag a three-year old [particular student] out of the
            reading center and into isolation away from the other students. I
            informed [the Assistant Principal] that [the aide’s] actions were
            improper and dangerous.
                                                                                              6

      B-2 RF, Tab 22 at 108.
¶10         Aside from the two aforementioned statements, the appellant has not
      directed us to any evidence corroborating Disclos ure 3(a) or providing further
      details about it. 2 RPFR File, Tab 3 at 6. However, we did locate a deposition
      wherein the alleged recipient of this disclosure could not recall the appellant ever
      disclosing that the aide improperly isolated or pushed any st udent. B-2 RF, Tab 4
      at 398-99.
¶11         In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge explained that an
      appellant must identify the regulation or provision that she reasonably believe d
      was violated if it is not clearly implicated by the facts. RID at 9 (referencing
      Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 6-7; El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 10 n.11). She went on
      to find that “the appellant’s statement that she orally disclosed an action she
      believed to be ‘improper and dangerous’ fails to establish by preponderant
      evidence that a disinterested observer would believe she disclosed a violation of
      agency policy.”     RID at 9.     The administrative judge further supported this
      conclusion by discussing, inter alia, the agency’s process for reporting incidents
      of child abuse and neglect, and noting that the appellant did not follow that
      process. RID at 9-10.

      2
        In her remand initial decision, the administrative judge noted that the appellant
      submitted a report of investigation from a related equal employment opportunity
      discrimination complaint totaling over 3,000 pages. RID at 4 n.1. The administrative
      judge explained that, in the absence of specific citations to that evidence, she had not
      independently examined the report to determine whether anything contained within
      supported the appellant’s burden in this appeal. Id. For the same reasons, we have
      considered the evidence the appellant referenced in her petition for revie w, but we have
      not otherwise pored through the exhaustive record. See Keefer v. Department of
      Agriculture, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 18 n.2 (2002) (recognizing that an appellant is required
      to articulate claims with reasonable clarity and precision and that “it is not the Board’s
      obligation to pore through the record . . . or to construe and make sense of allegations
      that [are] set forth at various parts of an extremely voluminous case file”) ; 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.115(a)(2) (requiring that a petition for review “explain why the challenged
      factual determination is incorrect and identify specific evidence in the record that
      demonstrates the error”).
                                                                                        7

¶12        While a disclosure about child safety certainly could be protected even if an
      individual did not follow designated reporting procedures, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove, by
      preponderant evidence, that she made Disclosure 3(a) and it was protected. In
      our Opinion and Order, we found that the appellant presented nonfrivolous
      allegations of protected disclosures because her allegations implicated agency
      regulations pertaining to school safety, as well as some associated state statutes
      or regulations. Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶¶ 8-10. However, even if we
      fully credited the appellant’s affidavit, which appears to be the only additional
      evidence she provided to support Disclosure 3(a) on remand, it merely alleges
      that Disclosure 3(a) was one of “improper and dangerous” actions.         B-2 RF,
      Tab 22 at 108. The appellant has not identified any additional evidence to further
      explain, for example, what led to the aide’s actions, whether the child was harmed
      in any way, whether she feared that the child was harmed in any way, or precisely
      how she reasonably believed the “improper and dangerous” actions amounted to a
      violation of law, rule, or regulation. Nor has she identified any evidence that her
      disclosure included similar details. In other words, while the appellant may have
      reasonably believed that she was disclosing wrongdoing, she failed to prove that
      she reasonably believed that she was disclosing wrongdoing that rose to the level
      of a violation of law, rule, regulation, or other protected category.          See
      Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428, ¶ 8; see also Keefer v. Department of
      Agriculture, 82 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 11 (1999) (recognizing that, to be protected, a
      disclosure must be specific and detailed, not a vague allegation of wrongdoing
      regarding broad or imprecise matters).

            Disclosure 3(b)
¶13        In her OSC complaint, the appellant described Disclosure 3(b), an oral
      disclosure to her Assistant Principal, as revealing that an aide “did push and
      shove [], a student with autism, away, when he ran to her to be comforted.” IAF,
      Tab 5 at 15. According to this OSC complaint, the incident was witnessed by
                                                                                        8

      another aide, who “felt for” the child. Id. In her sworn affidavit submitted on
      remand, the appellant described the incident somewhat differently.        B -2 RF,
      Tab 22 at 108.     The appellant asserted that she disclosed seeing the aide
      “physically push and shove [a particular student in her classroom], who was
      diagnosed with autism.” Id. She further asserted that she informed the Assistant
      Principal that the action was “improper and dangerous.” Id.
¶14         The administrative judge found the earlier of the two descriptions more
      reliable. RID at 12. She then concluded that the appellant failed to meet her
      burden for Disclosure 3(b) for the same reasons she failed to meet her burden for
      Disclosure 3(a).   RID at 12-13.      Among other things, she observed that the
      appellant did not allege that she followed up about this incident or otherwise
      establish that she reasonably believed that she disclosed something that rose to
      the level of a violation of law, rule, or regulation. RID at 13. The administrative
      judge also noted that, despite her earlier indication that another aide witnessed
      the event, the appellant failed to provide a statement from that individual or
      anything else for corroboration. Id. We further note that the alleged recipient,
      the Assistant Principal, did not recall any such disclosure.      B -2 RF, Tab 4
      at 398-99.
¶15         Again, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      appellant failed to meet her burden for Disclosure 3(b). The appellant provided
      minimal information about both the underlying incident and her alleged
      disclosure about the same.      Without more information, we cannot determine
      whether the appellant was disclosing actions that were insensitive, but far shy of
      a child safety issue, or something much worse. Therefore, we find that she has
      not proven by preponderant evidence that she made Disclosure 3(b) and had a
      reasonable belief that it revealed wrongdoing that rose to the level of a violation
      of law, rule, regulation, or other protected category.
                                                                                         9

            Disclosure 3(c)
¶16        As with the other disclosures, the Board found that the appellant met her
      jurisdictional burden for Disclosure 3(c) based on the description she provided in
      her OSC complaint. There, the appellant described Disclosure 3(c) as in volving
      an autistic student being physically restrained by an untrained aide. IAF, Tab 5
      at 8. She further indicated that “[t]hese types of restraints have resulted in . . .
      the death of children.”      Id.   Unlike Disclosure 3(a)-(b), which were not
      documented, Disclosure 3(c) occurred via email, copies of which the appellant
      provided on remand. B-2 RF, Tab 8 at 100-01. The email chain begins with the
      appellant complaining about an aide’s use of her time. Id. After the Assistant
      Principal responded, the appellant replied. Id. Near the end of that reply, which
      was largely a complaint about scheduling and time management, the appellant
      stated the following:
            They obviously can’t handle [a particular student] when he is having
            a difficult day, or they wouldn’t have had to RESTRAIN the child
            over there. To the best of my knowledge, no one in that particular
            class has had any experience or TRAINING in RESTRAINING A
            CHILD, let alone one with AUTISM. This is very dangerous
            practice to be re[s]training a child without the proper training, and
            then email the world that this is what was done. Some children have
            actually died while being re[s]trained.
      Id. at 100 (grammar, punctuation, and spelling in original).
¶17        While finding that the appellant failed to prove that Disclosure 3(c) was
      protected, the administrative judge noted that the appellant failed to specify when
      the alleged restraint took place or the circumstances under which it occurred.
      RID at 14.     She further recognized that the appellant did not allege that
      restraining a student is per se impermissible—the appellant merely speculated
      about whether the employees were trained to do so.               Id.   Finally, the
      administrative judge observed that the appellant failed to identify any po licy
      concerning the appropriateness of restraining students. Id.
                                                                                              10

¶18         On review, the appellant reasserts that restraining a child can have fatal
      consequences. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 14. While that may be true, we agree with
      the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove, by
      preponderant evidence, that Disclosure 3(c) was protected. The appellant did not
      disclose, for example, that an employee had actually restrained a child in a way
      that harmed or risked harming the child. Nor did she disclose that an employee
      had restrained a child in a way that was contrary to law, rule, or regulation.
      Instead, the appellant simply suggested that someone restrained a child, at some
      time, and may have done so without training. B-2 RF, Tab 8 at 100. Absent more
      information, the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to
      prove that she made a protected disclosure.

      The appellant failed to prove that Disclosure 4 or 5 was protected.
¶19         As discussed in both the Board’s Opinion and Order and the remand initial
      decision, what the Board characterized as Disclosures 4 -5 involved three discrete
      incidents, each involving the same teacher’s aide. Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R.
      428, ¶¶ 7, 9; RID at 8-14; IAF, Tab 5 at 8, 12-13. The first, which we will call
      Disclosure 4(a), generally involved the aide bringing a razor into a classroom.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 8.       The second, Disclosure 4(b), generally involved the aide
      pushing a child on a swing. 3 Id. The last, Disclosure 5, generally involved the
      aide yelling, rummaging through drawers, and blocking the appellant. Id. at 8,
      12-13.

      3
        In our Opinion and Order, we characterized Disclosure 4 as involving a staff member
      endangering students by bringing a razor into the classroom and Disclosure 5 as
      involving threatening behavior toward the appellant. Benton-Flores, 121 M.S.P.R. 428,
      ¶ 7. Although the incident involving the aide pushing a child on a swing does not fit
      within either description, it is an alleged disclosure about endangering student s, more
      closely aligned with Disclosure 4. Accordingly, like the administrative judge, we have
      grouped it with the disclosure about the razor blade. RID at 17 -19. This grouping and
      labeling is only provided for clarity and consistency; it is of no subst antive consequence
      in this appeal.
                                                                                       11

            Disclosure 4(a)
¶20        According to her OSC complaint, in Disclosure 4(a), the appellant reported
      that her aide was doing things that were unsafe for the school children, including
      his bringing a razor into the classroom. IAF, Tab 5 at 8. To corroborate this, the
      appellant submitted an email from her to the aide, wherein she stated, “There is a
      very sharp razor laying on your desk. This is very dangerous to our kids. Please
      remove it or take it home.”      PFR File, Tab 10 at 17.       The appellant then
      forwarded that message to an agency official with a note indicating that sh e had
      taken a picture of the razor, in anticipation that the aide might lie about it. Id.
      The record also includes corroborating deposition testimony from another agency
      official, the Principal. B-2 RF, Tab 4 at 199-200. The Principal confirmed that
      the appellant raised the issue of the razor with her, the Principal discussed the
      matter with the aide, and he explained that he had been using it for a class project
      but had since removed it. Id.
¶21        The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that she
      reasonably believed Disclosure 4(a) was protected.      RID at 17.    She found it
      inherently improbable that the appellant reasonably believed that she was
      disclosing a threat to students, yet responded merely by taking a picture and
      emailing the aide, rather than removing the razor herself. Id. The administrative
      judge also noted that the appellant failed to cite any specific policy prohibiting
      the use of razors within school premises. Id.
¶22        On review, the appellant argues that razors are inherently dangerous in a
      school setting, regardless of whether there was a policy prohibiting them. RPFR
      File, Tab 3 at 15-16. While that may be true, it was the appellant’s burden to
      prove that she reasonably believed she was making a protected disclosure.
      Absent further explanation or context, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      determination that the appellant did not meet that burden.       Without a policy
      altogether prohibiting the razor, it was incumbent upon the appellant to prove that
      she reasonably believed that the disclosure concerning the razor on school
                                                                                      12

      premises nevertheless rose to the level of a violation of law, rule, regulation, or
      other protected category. She has not done so. The appellant’s suggestion that
      the razor posed an inherent and immediate threat to students appears inconsistent
      with an admission she referenced on review—the appellant photographed the
      razor, but left it sitting there for several hours until the aide retrieved it. See
      RPFR File, Tab 3 at 7 (citing B-2 RF, Tab 6 at 57).         In fact, the appellant
      previously presented an altogether different concern than the one she now asserts.
      In a prior statement about the matter, the appellant showed no concern for the
      students; rather she explained, “I was very concerned about what he might be
      thinking. I felt in danger. (I honestly thought someone could come into this
      room and find my bloody body under a desk).” B-2 RF, Tab 6 at 57.

               Disclosure 4(b)
¶23         Disclosure 4(b) consists of an email from the appellant to administrators in
      which she asserted that her aide “started pushing this little boy on the swin g—and
      something I felt was way too high. If the child accidently flew -off, he would
      have surely have gone through one of the classroom windows.” PFR File, Tab 10
      at 23.     According to her email, the appellant informed the aide that he was
      frightening her, but he ignored the appellant’s concerns and continued to swing
      the child high in the air. Id. The appellant suggested that another teacher had
      expressed similar concerns. Id.
¶24         Like the other alleged disclosures, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to meet her burden for Disclosure 4(b).        RID at 18.     She
      explained that while the appellant previously had presented nonfrivolous
      allegations, the appellant did not present further specificity on remand to prove
      that she reasonably believed this to be a protected disclosure.          Id.   The
      administrative judge also noted that the appellant failed to include any ev idence
      corroborating the assertion that another teacher had witnessed the aide’s swinging
      a child. Id.
                                                                                            13

¶25         On review, the appellant has referenced this disclosure, generally, but she
      has not presented any particularized argument about it. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 17.
      The appellant simply asserts that Disclosures 4(a)-(b) “focus on the potential or
      risk of serious bodily harm.” Id. However, like the other allegations, we are
      unable to discern the gravity of Disclosure 4(b) with the limited context provided;
      the record is unclear whether the appellant was discussing someone not meeting
      her expectations or, more seriously, discussing what she reasonably perceived to
      be a violation of law, rule, regulation, or other category of protected disclosure.

            Disclosure 5
¶26         In the final disclosure that we previously recognized as within our
      jurisdiction, Disclosure 5, the appellant sent an email to administrators,
      characterizing her aide as “abusive.” PFR File, Tab 10 at 14. The details within
      this email more specifically describe an incident in which the appellant asked him
      for copies of an individualized education plan and he responded with a tirade that
      invaded her privacy, embarrassed her, and left her feeling helpless. Id.
¶27         The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that she
      reasonably believed this to be a protected disclosure. RID at 15 -16. While the
      appellant argued that she reasonably believed that she was disclosing threatening
      and dangerous behavior, the administrative judge found the argument undermined
      by the fact that the appellant waited nearly a month to report the incident. Id.
      The administrative judge also found the appellant’s description of the aide’s
      conduct notably less serious than disclosures of threats that the Board has found
      protected in other cases. RID at 16 (citing Baldwin v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶¶ 16, 18 (2010)).
¶28         On review, the appellant emphasizes that the aide pushed past her, arguing
      that the administrative judge failed to properly consider that portion of her
      disclosure. RPFR File, Tab 3 at 15. The appellant’s email to administrators did
      include an allegation that the aide “bursted into [her] office, pushing pass [her].”
      PFR File, Tab 10 at 14 (spelling and grammar in original). It also includes an
                                                                                           14

      allegation that the appellant “tried to block [her] desk with [her] body, but [the
      aide] was reaching [past] [her] anyhow.” Id. However, while the appellant would
      have us find this comparable to a disclosure concerning threats of violence, we
      are not persuaded. It is evident that the appellant did not approve of her aide, for
      a number of reasons. But the appellant has not proven, by preponderant evidence,
      that her disclosures about him were protected.
¶29         In sum, we agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that , although
      the appellant satisfied her jurisdictional burden by presenting nonfrivolous
      allegations, she failed to then present additional arguments and evidence
      satisfying her higher burden of proof on the merits. Therefore, we conclude that
      the administrative judge properly denied the appellant’s request for corrective
      action. 4

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
             You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

      4
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        15

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                 16

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).           If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at th eir respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     17

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                18

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.