Court Opinion

ID: 9551087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:34.300633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:02.775409
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s analysis in part I of the opinion. I respectfully dissent, however, to the majority’s holding in Part II of its opinion that the advisement Wilson received concerning the possible places of incarceration satisfied the requirements of the Colorado Sex Offenders Act of 1968 (the “Act”) and of Crim.P. 11(c). At the time Wilson entered his plea, the Act provided in pertinent part:
Before the district court may accept a plea of guilty from any person charged with a sex offense, the court shall, in addition to any other requirement of law, advise the defendant that he may be committed to the custody of the department, including any penal institution under the jurisdiction of the department, as provided in section 39-13-203.
Ch. 44, sec. 1, § 39-13-204, 1972 Colo.Sess. Laws 190, 256.
The relevant part of Crim.P. 11(c) provided:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere without first determining that the defendant is advised of all the rights set forth in (b) of this Rule and also determining:

(4) That he understands the possible penalty or penalties and the possible places of incarceration....
The judge who accepted Wilson’s plea did not advise Wilson that incarceration in a penal institution was a possible consequence of his guilty plea. To the contrary, the judge suggested the opposite when he decided later to sentence Wilson under the Act and stated, “The [psychiatrists’] reports indicate that you should have some treatment, and the penitentiary is not the place to get it.... So, this is really for your benefit.” Furthermore, the judge had advised Wilson, before accepting the plea, that a sentence imposed under the rape statute would carry a prison term of five to forty years whereas a sentence imposed under the Act could lead to commitment “to the Director of Institutions” for a term of one day to life.
Although we decided in People v. Adrian, 701 P.2d 45, 48 (1985), that Crim.P. 11(c) and the present version of the Act do not require a formalistic advisement that exactly tracks the Act’s words, the facts that rendered the advisement in Adrian satisfactory are not present in this case. In Adrian, the court told the defendant *800that he could be placed in any institution under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and we noted that “since it is common knowledge that the Department of Corrections manages the state prison system, the defendant was advised in substance, although not in form, that he might be confined to a state prison under the [Act].” Adrian, 701 P.2d at 48. The same cannot be said in the present case. Wilson was advised that he could be committed to the “Director of Institutions.” It is difficult to say that common knowledge included an understanding that the Director of Institutions managed both mental institutions and prisons.
Furthermore, the lawyer who represented the defendant in Adrian informed the court that he had told the defendant of possible consequences of sentencing under the Act on numerous occasions. 701 P.2d at 48. In contrast, Wilson’s attorney testified that he advised Wilson that if he pleaded guilty under the Act and if his plea were accepted, he would be sent to the state hospital for treatment until released by officials there. Wilson’s attorney testified that at the time he was advising Wilson, the attorney was either unaware of or paid no attention to the Act’s provision allowing a sex offender to be incarcerated in the penitentiary or other penal institution.
Finally, whereas in Adrian we could conclude, based on the record, that the defendant did understand the possible consequences of his guilty plea, 701 P.2d at 48, the record in this case does not support such a conclusion. Wilson’s attorney testified that Wilson showed interest in the plea agreement largely because he believed it meant he would not go to the penitentiary. The attorney was “sure” that Wilson thought the only place in which he would be incarcerated pursuant to the Act was the state hospital. Furthermore, one of the psychiatrists’ reports, prepared before Wilson received his sentence, quoted Wilson as stating that he had “pled guilty to rape here in Denver to get to Pueblo and avoid being buried in Canon City.”
Because this case is clearly distinguishable from Adrian in several essential aspects, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Adrian is dispositive of Wilson’s contention that he was not properly advised of the consequences of his guilty plea. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s denial of "Wilson’s motion to vacate his guilty plea.
I am authorized to say that Justice NEIGHBORS joins in this dissent.