Court Opinion

ID: 9741314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:53:10.996832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.349894
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, specially concurring: While I am in agreement with the majority’s resolution of the two issues raised by the employer in the present appeal, I feel compelled to write separately. The language of section 8(d)(1) clearly demonstrates that awards thereunder are to be based on the number of hours constituting "full performance” of claimant’s occupation, and that an individual claimant’s work history is not determinative of what constitutes full performance on a case-by-case basis. With respect to the employer’s argument that claimant’s wages might increase each year, there is no proper evidence of this in the record. I also agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue raised by the claimant in his cross-appeal, but with great reluctance because, as the Illinois State Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (ISFL) points out in its brief amicus curiae, the law as presently drafted and interpreted could result in a monumental loss of earning potential for certain workers and in economic ruin for the worker and his family. Section 8(d)(1) of the Act provides: "If, after the accidental injury has been sustained, the employee as a result thereof becomes partially incapacitated from pursuing his usual and customary line of employment, he shall, except in cases compensated under the specific schedule set forth in paragraph (e) of this Section, receive compensation for the duration of his disability, subject to the limitations as to maximum amounts fixed in paragraph (b) of this Section, equal to 662/s% of the difference between the average amount which he would be able to earn in the full performance of his duties in the occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident.” (Emphasis added.) (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) (West 1992).) Under section 8(d)(1), an employee who becomes partially incapacitated may receive compensation equal to 662/s% of the difference between what he would have been able to earn had he not been injured, and what he is earning or could earn after the injury, subject to the limitations set forth in section 8(b). Unfortunately, section 8(b) contains more than one maximum limitation provision. Section 8(b)(4) provides in pertinent part: "All weekly compensation rates provided under subparagraphs 1, 2 and 2.1 of this paragraph (b) of this Section shall be subject to the following limitations: The maximum weekly compensation rate from July 1, 1975, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 100% of the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act, that being the wage that most closely approximates the State’s average weekly wage. The maximum weekly compensation rate, for the period July 1, 1984, through June 30, 1987, except as hereinafter provided, shall be $293.61. Effective July 1, 1987 and on July 1 of each year thereafter the maximum weekly compensation rate, except as hereinafter provided, shall be determined as follows: if during the preceding 12 month period there shall have been an increase in the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act, the weekly compensation rate shall be proportionately increased by the same percentage as the percentage of increase in the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act during such period. The maximum weekly compensation rate, for the period January 1,1981 through December 31,1983, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 100% of the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act in effect on January 1, 1981. Effective January 1, 1984 and on January 1, or each year thereafter the maximum weekly compensation rate, except as hereinafter provided, shall be determined as follows: if during the preceding 12 month period there shall have been an increase in the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act, the weekly compensation rate shall be proportionately increased by the same percentage as the percentage of increase in the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act during such period. From July 1, 1977 and thereafter such maximum weekly compensation rate in death cases under Section 7, and permanent total disability cases under paragraph (f) or subparagraph 18 of paragraph (3) of this Section, and for temporary total disability under paragraph (b) of this Section, and for amputation of a member or enucleation of an eye under paragraph (e) of this Section shall be increased to 1331/s % of the State’s average weekly wage in covered industries under the Unemployment Insurance Act.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8(b)(4) (West 1992). Previous decisions by this court have addressed this issue. In General Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 495 N.E.2d 68, the employer argued that section 8(d)(1) wage differential awards were subject to the limitation set forth in section 8(b)(2). The court held that General Electric waived this issue by failing to assert it in the circuit court, but nevertheless went on to express its disagreement with General Electric’s position. Citing United Airlines v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 387, 411 N.E.2d 1009, the court stated that while section 8(b)(2) fixes minimum levels of certain compensation in various alternative situations, it did not fix the maximum amount of earning loss benefits which may be awarded under section 8(d)(1). The court then concluded that the limitations as to maximum amounts of wage differential awards referred to in section 8(d)(1) are set forth in sections 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(5). In Bohannon v. Industrial Comm’n (1992), 237 Ill. App. 3d 989, 606 N.E.2d 527, we rejected claimant’s argument that the proper maximum rate applicable to wage differential awards was the TTD rate rather than the PPD rate, and held that "[t]he proper maximum rates in determining permanent disability benefits are found in section 8(b)(4) of the Act.” Bohannon, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 606 N.E.2d at 530. In Fernandes v. Industrial Comm’n (1993), 246 Ill. App. 3d 261, 615 N.E.2d 1191, this court reversed the Commission’s finding that while section 8(d)(1) referred to the limits found in section 8(b), the language of section 8(b) was ambiguous as to which limit therein was applicable, and that section 8(b) could not be read as limiting a claimant’s award to the maximum allowed for permanent partial disability. In so doing, we stated: "In looking at section 8(b), sections 8(b)(1) and (b)(2.1) are concerned with calculating and setting minimum rates for temporary total disability and compensation rates for awards under sections 8(c), (d)(2) and (e) of the Act. Section 8(b)(2) covers compensation in all cases other than those covered by sections 8(b)(1) and (b)(2.1); that is, sections 8(d)(1) and 8(f). Section 8(b)(4) establishes the maximum weekly compensation payable under awards referred to in sections 8(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(2.1). Therefore, as stated in General Electric, we find the maximum rate contained in section 8(b)(4) applies to section 8(d)(1) awards.” Fernandes, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 269, 615 N.E.2d at 1197. Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that while sections 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(2.1) establish minimum compensation amounts, section 8(b)(4) sets the maximum amount. Section 8(d)(1) incorporates the maximum limit set forth in section 8(b)(4), but section 8(b)(4) sets forth several maximum limits and section 8(d)(1) does not specify which limit is applicable. Sections 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(2.1) provide rates of compensation for temporary total disability awards; awards other than those under sections 8(b)(1), 8(c), 8(d)(2) (i.e., 8(d)(1) and 8(f)), and 8(e); and awards under section 8(c), 8(d)(2), and 8(e), respectively, and set minimum rates of compensation for each. Section 8(b)(4) sets the maximum rate of compensation available under sections 8(b)(1), 8(b)(2), and 8(b)(2.1). Therefore, under sections 8(b)(1) and 8(b)(2), a claimant is entitled to compensation equal to 662/s% of his average weekly wage, but not less than the amounts set forth in the schedule therein and not more than the following máximums: From July 1, 1975, through December 31, 1980 — 100% of the State’s average weekly wage. From January 1, 1981, through December 31, 1983 — 100% of the State’s average weekly wage in effect on January 1, 1983. From January 1, 1984, through June 30, 1984 — 100% of the State’s average weekly wage in effect on January 1, 1983, increased by a percentage equal to the percentage increase in the State’s average weekly wage for the preceding 12 months. From July 1, 1989, through June 30, 1987 — $293.61 From July 1, 1987, to the present — $293.61, increased by a percentage equal to the percentage increase in the State’s average weekly wage for the preceding 12 months. Likewise, under section 8(b)(2.1), a claimant is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wage, but not less than the schedule set forth in section 8(b)(2.1) and not more than the máximums set forth above. After June 30, 1977, a claimant receiving an award under section 8(b)(1), 8(f), or 8(e) is entitled to compensation at the rate of 662/3 % of his average weekly wage up to a maximum of 1331/s % of the State’s average weekly wage. It appears, therefore, that the rate of wage differential awards under section 8(d)(1) is equal to 662/s% of the difference between the employee’s average pre-injury earning potential in his occupation and his average postinjury earning potential, up to the limits set forth in section 8(b)(4). As the ISFL points out, however, there are a great many workers who, because of talent or industry, earn well in excess of the average weekly wage. These workers become accustomed to, and reliant upon, such wages and assume long-term economic commitments based thereon. When such a worker suffers a disabling accident, a compensation award limited to the State’s average weekly wage can still leave him unable to meet these obligations. This is exacerbated in cases such as the present, because the maximum amount of the award is even further limited by the provisions of section 8(b)(4). In the present case, the arbitrator awarded the claimant $380.53 per week, this being 662h% of the difference between $810.80, the amount he could earn as an ironworker, and $240, the amount he was able to earn as a "pole man.” At the time of his injury, the State’s average weekly wage was $425.23. The Commission was required to reduce the award to $313.51 because of the limitations set forth in section 8(b)(4). We are bound by the language of the statute, and so I must reluctantly agree with the majority in affirming the Commission’s decision to reduce claimant’s award to $313.51 per week, but I believe that the arbitrary limits imposed by section 8(b)(4) are not in keeping with the remedial nature of the Act. Clearly, limiting a worker’s recovery to a percentage of the State’s average weekly wage, be it the 100% figure advocated by the claimant, or the 1331h% figure urged by the ISFL in its amicus brief, will not fully compensate those workers who earn considerably more than the average weekly wage, but either would better serve the purpose of the Act. At present, a worker who is totally disabled can receive up to 1331/3% of the State’s average weekly wage, and if the disability is permanent, he can receive incremental supplements to those benefits through the "Rate Adjustment Fund” pursuant to section 8(g) (820 ILCS 305/8(g) (West 1992)). Together, these provisions provide additional economic relief for those whose weekly wage substantially exceeds the State’s average weekly wage. No such protection exists, however, for a worker who is injured but retains some residual abilities and associated minimal earning potential. Such a worker, seeking wage differential benefits under section 8(d)(1), has his award limited by the provisions of section 8(b)(4). As occurred in the present case, not only will he suffer an economic loss by virtue of the fact that his weekly wage exceeds the State’s average weekly wage, he suffers even further loss because of the arbitrary limits imposed by section 8(b)(4), limits which make the maximum award even less than the State’s average weekly wage. In my view, this can work a substantial hardship on a partially disabled worker seeking benefits under section 8(d)(1) where his residual earning potential is minimal. I also believe that this hardship is best ameliorated by setting the maximum at 1331h% of the State’s average weekly wage, as advocated by the ISFL. This would give the Commission the flexibility to more adequately compensate those workers whose average wage substantially exceeds the State’s average weekly wage and those whose residual earning potential does not adequately make up the difference, and better effectuate the purpose of the Act. Such a move, however, cannot be made by the courts, but must be made by the legislature.