Court Opinion

ID: 9727711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:48:32.976684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:41.884528
License: Public Domain

OPINION BY
Senior Judge DOYLE.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which sustained the statutory appeal of Flora Sweeney challenging DOT’s imposition of a one-year suspension of her driving privilege pursuant to section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Code).2 We reverse.
*686DOT suspended Sweeney’s driving privilege as the result of a reported refusal to submit to chemical testing. Sweeney filed an appeal with Common Pleas, which held a de novo hearing.
At the hearing, DOT presented the testimony of Officers Matthew Cornwall and Howard McQuillan. Officer Cornwall testified that: (1) he stopped Sweeney’s vehicle on April 10, 1998, because the vehicle went through a red light; (2) he detected an odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the vehicle; (3) Sweeney explained that she had just dropped off friends who had been drinking; (4) he performed field sobriety tests; (4) Sweeney staggered while trying to walk heel-to-toe in a straight line; and (5) he transported Sweeney to the police station so that Officer McQuillan, a qualified test administrator, could administer a breath test. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 10a-15a, 17a-18a.)
Officer McQuillan testified that: (1) Sweeney readily agreed to submit to chemical testing before he even read her the warnings; (2) he instructed Sweeney to take a deep breath and blow into the mouthpiece of the Intoxilyzer 5000 until he told her to stop; (3) Sweeney placed the mouthpiece in her mouth and formed a tight seal around it with her lips; (4) Sweeney attempted many times to blow into the mouthpiece, but her breaths were not hard enough or long enough; (5) Sweeney appeared to be trying to provide a sufficient breath sample; and (6) Sweeney did not inform him that she suffered from a breathing disorder. (R.R. at 26a-28a, 31a-32a.)
Sweeney presented the testimony of Charles L. Winek, a professor of toxicology at Duquesne University and, previously, the chief toxicologist of Allegheny County for thirty-two years. (R.R. at 35a.) Winek testified that he “started the breath testing program in Allegheny County in 1966” and “taught it continuously until 1998.” (R.R. at 35a.) Winek further testified:
Q. Can you tell us whether the check that the machine runs through, when they start it up and the calibration of the machine, has any relationship to the function of the machine that deals with registering insufficient samples?
A. To my knowledge, it does not. The aspect of [a] deficient sample is a feedback mechanism when the cylinder is filled; and in order to fill the cylinder, you have to have enough pressure to overcome the resistance offered by that cylinder in the instrument.
And the resistance offered by that cylinder varies. It is generally set at the factory at six pounds per square inch. Some people cannot blow in at that level.
Q. Even completely sober and healthy?
A That is true. It depends [on the individual]....
So, we ... lowered [the machines] to about three pounds per square inch....
Q. And would ... a properly calibrated machine have anything to do with whether or not the function, about blowing hard enough, is working correctly?
*687A. It doesn’t tell you that, no.
Q. And when they run it through the initial test ampoules, does that have anything to do with insufficient samples working properly?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. And if it wasn’t working properly, that could affect whether a person, who was driving, registered a sample or is capable of blowing long enough; is that correct?
A. Yes.
(R.R. at 36a-38a.) Sweeney testified on her own behalf that she tried the best she could to follow the officer’s instructions and to provide a breath sample. (R.R. at 46a.)
After considering the evidence presented, Common Pleas accepted Sweeney’s testimony and sustained Sweeney’s appeal. Common Pleas explained that Sweeney “made the best effort possible at the time to provide the samples but was unable to do so for reasons beyond her control.” (Common Pleas Court op. at 1.)
On appeal to this Court,3 DOT argues that Common Pleas erred in sustaining Sweeney’s appeal, relying on numerous decisions of this Court. We agree.
Our statute makes it clear that refusal to take a chemical test of blood, breath or urine is a required finding in a driver’s license suspension, Section 1547(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1), and the law is now well established that failure to complete a breathalyzer test, whether or not a good faith effort was made to do so, constitutes a refusal per se to take the test. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Kilrain, 140 Pa.Cmwlth. 484, 593 A.2d 932 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 541 (1991).4 Our Supreme Court has also considered this issue and confirmed that “failure to supply a sufficient breath sample for any of the [breathalyzer] tests [is] a deemed refusal to submit to testing.” Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 547 Pa. 440, 448, 691 A.2d 450, 454 (1997). We have consistently held that failure to provide a deep lung breath sample required for testing by the Intoxñyzer machine constitutes a test refusal, unless the licensee can show' that the failure to produce a sample was due to a physical inability caused by a medical condition unrelated to ingestion of alcohol or drugs. See Pappas v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 669 A.2d 504, 508 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996) (stating that, where a licensee fails to “exert a total conscious effort, and thereby fails to supply a sufficient breath sample, such is tantamount to a refusal to take the test”)(quoting Appeal of Budd, 65 Pa.Cmwlth. 314, 442 A.2d 404 (1982)); *688Mueller v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 657 A.2d 90 (Pa.Cmwlth.), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 542 Pa. 637, 665 A.2d 471 (1995) (noting that we have attempted to steadfastly recognize that a licensee’s failure to provide a breath sample sufficient to complete a breathalyzer test constitutes a refusal); and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Beatty, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 272, 598 A.2d 1069 (1991) (indicating that a licensee’s failure to supply a sufficient breath sample is a per se refusal); Department of Transportation v. Gross, 146 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 605 A.2d 433 (1991) (same).
There is no allegation in this case that the testing equipment and the operator were improperly certified or that the testing procedures were not in accordance with requirements set forth by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. (Reproduced Record (R.R.), pp. 22a 24a.) Officer McQuillan testified that the machine was operating properly and that Sweeney attempted to blow into the machine many times, but that she wouldn’t blow hard enough or long enough to properly complete the test. Officer McQuillan testified:
Q. Approximately how many times did she attempt to blow into the machine?
A. I couldn’t count. It was a lot. And I kept telling her to blow into it properly. To blow longer, blow harder.
Q. Was she stopping before you told her to stop?
A. Yes.
(R.R., pp. 28a-30a.) And on redirect examination, Office McQuillan testified:
Q. Officer, isn’t it true that during multiple attempts that she made, she did not blow into the machine in the manner in which you had instructed her?
A. That’s correct.
(R.R., p. 34a.)
Sweeney’s expert indicated that generally Intoxilyzers needed to be set to a lower expiratory volumetric force of 3 pounds per liter. But Sweeney presented absolutely no evidence that this Intoxilyzer required an expiratory volumetric force of 6 pounds per liter rather than the 3 pounds per liter that her expert said was a better setting.
Succinctly, the testimony of Sweeney’s expert toxicologist consists entirely of conjecture and mere possibilities. A more complete examination of this expert’s testimony reveals the following:
Q. You have to blow with a certain amount of pressure ... for a certain period of time; and the period of time depends on the — what amount of pressure you are blowing with.
A. That is part of it; and the instrument constantly is monitoring the breath that is going into it; so if you have a mouth full of alcohol in there, it will register a higher number, if you watch the display, you can see this, if the display is on, you have a visual and audio communication with this instrument.
Q. Okay.
A. If somebody is blowing into the instrument, they don’t have to blow like they are blowing up a balloon, real hard. They should be able to blow into the instrument and fill the chamber. All right.
Now, depending on their own [vital capacity], if they are capable of doing that.
Q. Okay.
A. So, there are people with certain chronic obstructive pulmonary *689diseases such as asthma, things of that nature, they cannot take a breath test and really should be given a blood test.
Q. [I]sn’t it true that such — if she didn’t blow long enough or hard enough
A. If she didn’t blow long enough or hard enough, she could not deliver a sample to fill the cylinder, correct.
Q. And you are saying, though, that someone may not be able to blow with the — with a sufficient amount of pressure for the period of time that is required if they suffer from a certain type of respiratory disorder.
A. That’s correct.
Q. Now, in this case, Doctor, ... have you examined Ms. Sweeney with regard to any respiratory disorder?
A. I have not. I do not know about her respiratory system.
(R.R., pp. 40a-42a.) (Emphasis added.)
Our Supreme Court in Todd v. Department of Transportation, Burean of Driver Licensing, 555 Pa. 193, 723 A.2d 655 (1999), held that three failed attempts to produce a completed test was a refusal to submit to chemical testing, even if those three attempts were completed prior to the end of the machine cycle. In Todd, as in the instant matter, the licensee claimed that after the consequences of an incomplete test were emphasized, he “exhaled with as much force as he was able to generate on the second and third attempts,” but he still failed to complete a single test. Id. at 657. Todd was found to have refused the test. The Supreme Court also remarked that it had previously held that “failure to supply adequate breath samples during multiple attempts to administer a test was a deemed refusal to submit to testing.” Id. at 658 (citing Boucher).
We must dispel whatever misconception still remains that good faith attempts to complete a breath test are sufficient to avoid the consequences of Section 1547 of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1). Acceptance of conjecture and mere possibilities with regard to the operation of the Intoxi-lyzer 5000, without an offer of proof that the specific Intoxilyzer used in the case before the court functioned inadequately, would unravel years of established precedent and effectively destroy the viability of the Intoxilyzer 5000 as an effective tool in the unending battle against the drunken drivers on our roads. We note that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the effectiveness and reliability of the Intoxilyzer. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (commenting on the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer as having passed accuracy requirements established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as state certifications).
We conclude that the Commonwealth has clearly met the requirements of the statute in this matter, and the order of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas is reversed.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER dissents.
Senior Judge KELLEY dissents.

ORDER

NOW, July 3, 2002, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the above-captioned matter is hereby reversed.

. Section 1547(b)(1) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1) provides:
*686(b) Suspension for refusal.—
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person for a period of 12 months.

. In an appeal arising from a suspension of a driver's license, our review is limited to determining whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence, whether there has been an error of law, or whether the decision of the trial court indicates a manifest abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Kilrain, 140 Pa.Cmwlth. 484, 593 A.2d 932 (1991), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 529 Pa. 625, 600 A.2d 541 (1991).

. In Kilrain, we reversed the trial court’s determination that the licensee had made a good faith effort to complete the test and clearly stated:
The bedrock principal [sic] [...] is that failure to complete a breathalyzer test constitutes a refusal. A trial court’s finding that a licensee made a good faith attempt to complete the breathalyzer test is irrelevant to the question of whether the licensee refused the test. Anything less than a completed breathalyzer test which registers a blood alcohol reading on the breathalyzer constitutes a refusal.
Kilrain, 593 A.2d at 935 (emphasis added).