Court Opinion

ID: 9679213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:44:40.674707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.474896
License: Public Domain

Levin, P. J.,

(dissenting).

A jury trial was timely demanded by the plaintiff. Within 20 days after defendant Donald E. Duffin1 filed his answer, the plaintiff moved to strike a part of the answer,2 and within 30 days after the motion to strike was denied the plaintiff filed its reply and jury demand.3
Moreover, plaintiff’s jury demand has been treated as timely; the pretrial statement provides: “A jury trial has been demanded by plaintiff which is granted”. And even if it is thought that a jury was not timely demanded, once it is granted a trial judge may not, as the trial is about to begin, without cause, retract the grant.
The judge’s action in taking this case from the jury before the witnesses were heard and hearing the testimony himself as if a jury had not been de*149manded or granted deprived the plaintiff of its right to a jury verdict on the disputed issue of fact.
In Drysdale v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (1968), 13 Mich App 13, we held that whether an inoperable automobile was in fact an automobile within the meaning of an automobile liability insurance policy could not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.4 Similarly here, the trial judge erred when he ruled, just before the impaneling of the jury, that whether Laming’s inoperable 1955 Oldsmobile was an automobile did not present a question of fact necessitating consideration by a jury, and that, although it was necessary to hear the testimony of witnesses, he foresaw that the question presented was purely one of law.
Although it developed at the trial that the testimony of the witnesses, relied on by the judge when he decided for the defendant, was not contradicted, issues of credibility are always to he decided by the trier of fact;5 and the trier of fact that the plaintiff was entitled to have decide the credibility issue was a jury. The testimony relied on by the judge was largely that of defendant William J. Laming, an interested witness.6 “A jury may disbelieve the most positive evidence, even when it stands uncon*150tradicted.” Woodin v. Durfee (1881), 46 Mich 424, 427.7

 Defendants William J. Laming and Louise E. Laming did not answer and their defaults were taken. Defendant Donald E. Duffin, Administrator of the Estate of Kathleen A. Duffin, deceased, was added as a party defendant after plaintiff’s motion to strike was filed.

 See GCR 1963, 108.

 See GCR 1963, 508.2.

 While the plaintiff had the burden of showing that William J. Laming was the owner of a private passenger automobile, once it established that the 1955 Oldsmobile was owned by Laming it became the defendant’s burden to show that the vehicle was not in fact an automobile within the meaning of the policy.

 See Republic Insurance Company v. State Farm Insurance Company (Tex App, 1967), 416 SW2d 557, reversing a summary judgment that an inoperable vehicle was not an automobile within the meaning of an insurance policy. The evidence was one-sided; the insurance company was unable to produce contradictory testimony. In reversing, the court declared that the issue of credibility was to be decided by the trier of fact. Similarly, see, American Parts Co., Inc. v. American Arbitration Association (1967), 8 Mich App 156, 170; Martino v. Kentros (1970), 22 Mich App 209, 212.

 See MOLA § 600.2158 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2158).

 Similarly, see, Crampton v. Crumpton (1919), 205 Mich 233, 241; Cuttle v. Concordia Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1940), 295 Mich 514, 519; Hughes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (1958), 351 Mich 302, 308; Baumgartner v. Ham (1965), 374 Mich 169, 174; Wolf gram v. Valko (1965), 375 Mich 421, 435 (per Black, J., in an opinion signed by three other justices).