Court Opinion

ID: 9420196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:53:19.502525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:23.193410
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting.
This is an equity suit for violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Law brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The same defendants were indicted in the same court for the same transactions under the criminal provisions of the Sherman Law. That court transferred the criminal proceedings from the Southern District of California to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois because it was “in the interest of justice” to order the transfer. In doing so, the court below was obedient to Rule 21 (b)1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, formulated by this Court and having the force of law. 327 U. S. 823 et seq. With convincing particularity the District *600Court set forth its reasons for making this transfer.2 After the transfer of the criminal case, the court granted the motion now before us, dismissing the equity suit “in the interest of justice, just as the same facts in the companion criminal prosecution required its transfer to another district.” 7 F. R. D. 456,465.
Is it not incongruous that that which “the interest of justice” demanded in the criminal prosecution is beyond the power of a court in a civil suit against the same defendants on the same transactions? 3
Of course Congress may leave no choice to a court to entertain a suit even though it is vexatious and oppressive for the plaintiff to choose the particular district in which he pursues his claim. But such limitation upon the power of courts to administer justice ought not to be lightly drawn from language merely conferring jurisdiction. The manner in which jurisdictional provisions are appropriately to be read is illustrated by our decision in Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, where this Court recognized “considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice” even when a State invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction in what was concededly a justiciable controversy. 308 U. S. at 19. I do not find in the *601scheme of the anti-trust acts and of their relevant legislative history the duty to exercise jurisdiction so imperative as to preclude judicial discretion in refusing to entertain a suit where “the interest of justice” commands it.
Defendants in an anti-trust suit may no doubt attempt to resort to delaying tactics by motions claiming unfairness of a particular forum. Neither must we be indifferent to the potentialities of unfairness in giving the Government a wholly free hand in selecting its forum so long as technical requirements of venue are met. See, e. g., The Railway Shopmen’s Strike Case (United States v. Railway Employees), 283 F. 479. All parties to a litigation tend to become partisans, and confidence in the fair administration of justice had better be rested on exacting standards in the quality of the federal judiciary. Federal judges ought to be of a calibre to be able to thwart obstructive tactics by defendants and not be denied all power to check attempted unfairness by a too zealous Government.
I find nothing in the anti-trust acts comparable to the considerations which led this Court to conclude that the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act were designed to give railroad employees a privileged position in bringing suits under that Act. See, especially, concurring opinion in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 315 U. S. 698, 705.
I am of opinion that the District Court had power to entertain the motion on the basis of which it entered the judgment.
Mr. Justice Burton joins this dissent.

 “The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him to another district or division, if it appears from the indictment or information or from a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred to another district or division in which the commission of the offense is charged.”

 “I do not question the motive of the Government in instituting the prosecution in this district.
“But I am satisfied that a trial here would impose unnecessary hardships on the defendants and entail unjustifiable expense which it is the object of the new rules of criminal procedure, and especially of the rule under discussion, to avoid. Altogether the facts spell out the vexatiousness and oppressiveness which the Supreme Court has warned us to eschew in matters of this character.” 7 F. R. D. 393, 402-403.

 Cf. L. Hand, J., in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429: “In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788, a later statute in pari materia was considered to throw a cross light upon the Anti-trust Acts, illuminating enough even to override an earlier ruling of the court.”