Court Opinion

ID: 9860259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:16:25.665269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:44.455694
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GEOMETER, specially concurring: I agree with the result to which the majority comes, and I fully endorse its discussion of section 115 — 7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 — 7.3 (West 2004)) as well as its treatment of the hearsay issue. I do not, however, agree with its analysis of the joinder statute (725 ILCS 5/111 — 4 (West 2004)). The majority’s discussion of the factors courts use to determine whether two charges may be tried together reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of joinder. Accordingly, I write separately to address that issue. The heart of my disagreement with the majority concerns what it is we are trying to assess when we ask whether it would be appropriate to try two charges jointly. The majority believes that joinder is appropriate only if there is some actual relationship between two crimes. That is, what the majority does looks more like metaphysics in that it seems to ask whether there is some factual connection between the two events in question. Conversely, I believe that what we are trying to determine is simply whether two crimes form an acceptable package for a single trial. To this end, there are two overarching concerns: judicial efficiency and prejudice to the defendant. See People v. Wilier, 281 Ill. App. 3d 939, 952 (1996); People v. Karraker, 261 Ill. App. 3d 942, 951 (1994). The factors that have developed over the years in the myriad cases where courts have analyzed the propriety of joinder make much more sense if understood as tools for assessing these concerns than the majority ascribes to them. These factors, though not always set forth identically, are: “the proximity in time and location of the offenses, the identity of evidence needed to demonstrate a link between the offenses, whether there was a common method in the offenses, and whether the same or similar evidence would establish the elements of the offenses.” People v. Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942 (1996). Before proceeding further, I must address the majority’s contention that the language of section 111 — 4 prohibits a court from considering policy matters in interpreting the statute. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 602. It is generally true that a court may not depart from the plain language of an unambiguous statute. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (2000). The majority assumes, without explanation, that section 111 — 4 is clear and unambiguous. I, however, see nothing clear regarding the phrase “same comprehensive transaction.” 725 ILCS 5/111 — 4 (West 2004). How does a “same comprehensive transaction” differ from an ordinary “same transaction?” Is it a broader or narrower concept? What does the word “comprehensive” add? I believe that the inclusion of this word renders the phrase “same comprehensive transaction” unclear. Therefore, “it [is] necessary to look beyond express words and to consider the prospective and remedial objectives or purpose to be served by the statute.” Mack v. Seaman, 113 Ill. App. 3d 151, 154 (1983). Moreover, the very first sentence in the committee comments to section 111 — 4 states, “This paragraph is based on Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” 725 ILCS Ann. 5/111 — 4, Committee Comments — 1963, at 653 (Smith-Hurd 2006). Rule 8 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged— whether felonies or misdemeanors or both — are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Grim. E 8(a). Rule 8 simply states “same act or transaction.” Our legislature must have meant something when it added “comprehensive.” Perhaps it intended “comprehensive” to broaden the meaning of “same transaction” and replace the “same or similar character” language of Rule 8. The majority sets up a straw man here, asserting that I am arguing that “comprehensive” means “same or similar character.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 608 n.l. My point is that it is difficult to ascertain what it is the legislature meant. The legislature’s intent is certainly not clear to me. Additionally, the committee comments state, “[This] section is substantially a restatement and codification of former Illinois law.” 725 ILCS Ann. 5/111 — 4, Committee Comments — 1963, at 653 (SmithHurd 2006). Former Illinois law included Herman v. People, 131 Ill. 594, 601 (1889), a case in which our supreme court rejected the common-law rule against joining felonies and misdemeanors because it would “embarrass, delay, and prevent the administration of justice.” Over 100 years ago, the notion that joinder served judicial efficiency had already been recognized in this state, and it was thus part of the law that the legislature codified when it enacted section 111 — 4. The majority nevertheless contends that “comprehensive” does not cloud the meaning of “same comprehensive transaction.” Despite its many protestations, the majority never explains what “comprehensive” adds. Apparently, the majority believes the word does not add anything to the meaning of the phrase. This, of course, violates a cardinal principle of statutory construction. Compton v. Ubilluz, 351 Ill. App. 3d 223, 231 (2004) (a statute should not be construed so as to render any portion of it meaningless). The majority charges that “same comprehensive transaction” is not “remotely equivalent” to “convenient package for trial.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 607. I agree; however, as I have explained, I am not relying on the plain language of the statute to support my construction of it, for that language is ambiguous. Accordingly, I will take a policy-based approach as I examine the factors courts are to consider in assessing the propriety of joining multiple charges. This makes sense even disregarding what I have set forth above. Joinder is a procedural device available to courts to help manage their crowded dockets. They should be able to use it to the extent that it does not unfairly prejudice a defendant. Judicial efficiency and prejudice to the defendant are paramount concerns. With this in mind, I will now turn to the particular factors that have been articulated by the courts. I will start with what the majority deems the “most obviously inappropriate factor,” judicial efficiency. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 601. I would agree with the majority’s assessment if we were concerned with the relationship between two events in an ontological sense. That two charges can be efficiently tried together has no bearing on whether they are related as a matter of fact. However, it is of obvious relevance to the question of whether the two charges form an appropriate package for trial. There is little reason to try two charges together if it is not efficient to do so. As the majority (386 Ill. App. 3d at 601) and the court in People v. Patterson, 245 Ill. App. 3d 586, 589 (1993), note, trying multiple charges together typically will be efficient. Thus, more often than not, it should be treated as a constant and given little weight. It is conceivable that, in certain circumstances, joinder would not be efficient. Perhaps multiple crimes, though otherwise linked, are so removed geographically that marshaling witnesses and evidence would be cumbersome if the trial were held in one location. In such a case, efficiency would militate against joinder. Cf. Walker v. American River Transportation, 277 Ill. App. 3d 87, 92 (1996) (“None of the potential venues is free from practical problems affecting the ease and expense of the litigation. The geographical dispersion of the crew, the treating physicians, and the forensic experts presents [sic] a logistical problem in marshalling the evidence no matter where this case is tried”). Admittedly, this hypothetical would represent a rare case, but I do not view this as a reason to write judicial efficiency out of the test. Indeed, People v. Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 106, 116 (2005), expressly recognizes that efficiency may weigh in favor of severance, articulating this factor as “whether the severance will promote judicial efficiency.” In my view, the rest of the factors primarily concern prejudice to the defendant, although judicial efficiency is a factor underlying some of them as well. That is, they largely act as a sort of shorthand guiding the inquiry regarding the potential prejudicial effect of joinder. Take what the majority terms the “two supplemental factors identified in Patterson.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 602. These factors are whether there is any similarity between the victims and whether the defendant stood in a similar position of authority with respect to the victims. Patterson, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 588. Again, I agree with the majority that these factors have no bearing on the real relationship between multiple events. However, they are extremely useful for assessing potential prejudice to a defendant if a joint trial is held. If the victims are dissimilar, a potential for prejudice exists. For example, one victim may be particularly sympathetic. If a defendant is tried for two thefts, one from a 35-year-old man and another from a senior citizen, the jury may very well be outraged by the act targeting an elderly person. That ire could affect its judgment regarding the other theft. Similarly, any moral outrage arising from an abuse of a position of authority against one victim could be prejudicial to a defendant with regard to crimes targeting other victims over whom the defendant did not hold the same position of authority. These two “supplemental factors” have a place in the analysis. The majority states that it is improper to even consider prejudice to the defendant in determining whether joinder is appropriate, for “the Code incorporates prejudice to a defendant into the joinder analysis via a completely different section from the section that articulates the ‘same comprehensive transaction’ test we now discuss.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 603. The majority then goes on to resolve this portion of the appeal by finding that defendant was not prejudiced. The majority points out that prejudice appears in section 114 — 8 of the Code, which governs motions for severance, but not section 111 — 4. See 725 ILCS 5/114 — 8, 111 — 4 (West 2004). I agree that the text of section 111 — 4 does not expressly mention prejudice; however, the committee comments to that section do. 725 ILCS Ann. 5/111 — 4, Committee Comments — 1963, at 653 (Smith-Hurd 2006) (“The court may order a separate indictment for each offense if for any reason the defendant would be prejudiced or the jury confused”). Moreover, it would be needlessly awkward to require a trial court to make a determination regarding the propriety of joinder without considering prejudice, only to have to revisit the issue if a party makes a motion for severance. I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that temporal and spatial proximity (the first factor (Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942)) is the factor that is “probably the most helpful by far.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 603. It is certainly an important factor. If events are linked in space and time, it is likely that evidence will overlap. If evidence overlaps, presenting it in one trial is certainly more efficient. Moreover, if much of the same evidence would be presented in separate trials, any prejudice to a defendant would be reduced, as the jury would be hearing the overlapping evidence regardless of whether one or multiple trials were held. Nevertheless, I see no reason to give this factor elevated status, for proximity may also be coincidental. Cf. State v. Wills, 69 Ohio St. 3d 690, 691, 635 N.E.2d 370, 371 (1994) (the defendant “should serve no less time because of the coincidental proximity of his two victims”). The majority discusses a number of noncontroversial cases that apply this factor (386 Ill. App. 3d at 603-05), and I have no quarrel with these cases. I would point out, however, that courts have found joinder appropriate in circumstances much less proximate. In People v. Lewis, 269 Ill. App. 3d 523, 529 (1995), for example, the court found that a series of assaults against four victims occurring over a 22-month period were properly joined. I largely agree with the majority’s discussion of the second factor, “the identity of evidence needed to demonstrate a link between the offenses.” Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942. I further agree with the majority that this factor has often been conflated with other factors. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 605. If evidence is, in fact, identical, it would weigh in favor of joinder, but this fact would be more properly considered under the fourth factor, “whether the same or similar evidence would establish the elements of the offenses.” Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942. The majority improperly narrows the third factor, “whether there was a common method in the offenses” (Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942), replacing it with “whether the offenses were part of a ‘common scheme’ ” (386 Ill. App. 3d at 606-07). Keeping in mind that the object of this inquiry is to determine whether two offenses form an acceptable package for trial, it is clear that the majority’s articulation of this factor is too restrictive. If there is a common method, then it is likely that it would be efficient to conduct a joint trial to avoid the need to present redundant evidence concerning that method. More importantly, the potential for prejudice would be diminished by the likelihood that crimes committed using a common method are probably of similar moral turpitude. For the same reasons, I believe that the majority’s reading of the fourth factor — “whether the same or similar evidence would establish the elements of the offenses” (Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942) — is too narrow. It should not be limited to “determining whether multiple offenses are part of a single comprehensive transaction” (386 Ill. App. 3d at 607), at least if by “single comprehensive transaction” the majority means related as a matter of fact. Instead, trial courts should be allowed to use this factor to determine whether multiple charges may be addressed in one trial efficiently without prejudicing the defendant. Turning to more general considerations, even if I were to grant the majority its point about the allegedly plain language of the legislature foreclosing policy considerations, and the corollary that “same comprehensive transaction” should be read as “same transaction,” I still would not agree with its analysis. A venerable principle of statutory construction is that, “where a plain or literal reading of a statute produces absurd results, the literal reading should yield.” People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (2003). The majority’s construction of section 111 — 4 is absurd in light of its construction of section 115 — 7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115 — 7.3 (West 2004)). The majority begins its discussion of section 115 — 7.3 by noting that, though (in the majority’s opinion) it was error to join the charges, any error was harmless because “the joinder error did not prejudice defendant.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 609. Thus, the majority holds that it was improper, albeit harmless, to join the charges in this case even though no prejudice accrued to defendant. Parenthetically, this seems contrary to the committee comments to section 111 — 4: “The court may order a separate indictment for each offense if for any reason the defendant would be prejudiced or the jury confused.” 725 ILCS Ann. 5/111 — 4, Committee Comments — 1963, at 653 (Smith-Hurd 2006). Conversely, the majority finds misjoinder even though it concludes that defendant was not prejudiced. Moreover, this result is absurd, in that the majority expressly sanctions the admission of all of the evidence under section 115 — 7.3 that was admitted under section 111 — 4 in this case. Thus, the trial court properly allowed the jury to hear all of this evidence; however, it erred because it allowed the jury to consider an additional count based on this evidence. Put differently, a mini-trial of the related offense had in the course of a trial on the primary offense is fine, but it is improper to hold a joint trial. I cannot conceive of what value such a rule serves. A value it clearly does not serve is stare decisis. Accepting the majority’s assertion that People v. McLemore, 203 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1057-58 (1990), “originated the efficiency factor” (386 Ill. App. 3d at 601-02), the majority is overruling 18 years of law. Since McLemore, several cases have relied upon this factor when assessing the propriety of joinder. See Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 116; Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 952; Patterson, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 588. Stare decisis counsels that a court should “ ‘stand by precedents and not disturb settled points.’ ” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519-20 (2005), quoting Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936). This is particularly true in the realm of statutory construction, as a departure from precedent amounts to an amendment to the statute. People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924 (1997). The legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial constructions of statutes, and inaction by the legislature suggests agreement. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 925. Hence, it is for the legislature to alter the manner in which we interpret section 111 — 4, if it is to be altered at all. Indeed, the majority’s rewriting of the test for joinder implicates many other past decisions as well. See, e.g., People v. Trail, 197 Ill. App. 3d 742, 746 (1990) (listing “common method” and “common type of victim” as factors); People v. Terry, 177 Ill. App. 3d 185, 194 (1988) (listing “common method” as a factor). I am not willing to disturb these decisions. Finally, I note the case of People v. Harris, 147 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1986). Harris bears notable similarities to this case: “In this cause the offenses occurred within approximately two blocks and within about 31 hours. In each instance the offender followed elderly women to their apartments, grabbed them around the neck from behind, and forced them into their apartments. Both women were beaten and robbed of money. Both were asked about jewels. One victim was raped and had all her clothes removed except her stockings. The other was told she was too old to be raped, but when she regained consciousness she was wearing only a slip. Statements made by defendant to the police included admissions relating to both attacks. Of these factors, the physical proximity, the common method of operation, and the common type of victim all support the trial court’s determination to grant the State’s motion.” Harris, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 894-95. The key link in Harris appears to be the similarity between the two crimes. The Harris court concluded that “the facts in this cause clearly established that the two series of offenses were part of a comprehensive transaction so as to permit their joinder for trial.” Harris, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 895. The trial court in this case properly made a similar determination. Ultimately, if the majority is correct, it is because “same comprehensive transaction” means “related in reality.” Essentially, this makes “same comprehensive transaction” mean the same thing as “same transaction.” I cannot ignore that troublesome word “comprehensive,” which clouds the meaning of the phrase. Moreover, we are engaged in criminal procedure here and not metaphysics. “Related as a matter of fact” is a far less useful concept than “forms an acceptable package for trial.” Because I do not believe that the legislature’s words “same comprehensive transaction” foreclose judicial inquiry into policy, I cannot join the majority’s discussion of this issue.