Court Opinion

ID: 9440255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 08:08:14.055112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:17.864970
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                      No. 07-22-00255-CR

                               TARA HUGHES, APPELLANT

                                                V.

                            THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                           On Appeal from the 110th District Court
                                     Floyd County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. 4813, Honorable William P. Smith, Presiding

                                         July 31, 2023
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Following a plea of not guilty, Appellant, Tara Hughes, was convicted by a jury of

serious bodily injury to a child by omission and sentenced to twenty-five years’

confinement.1 By a sole issue, she contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support

her conviction. We affirm.

      1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (e).
                                        BACKGROUND

          In July 2019, paramedics responded to a 911 call from Appellant on behalf of her

seventeen-month-old daughter for possible heat exhaustion. When they arrived at her

residence, Appellant told paramedics her daughter had not been eating or drinking that

day. The paramedics noted numerous bruises on the child and asked Appellant what

happened. She explained her son, who was two-and-a-half years, played rough with his

sister.     The paramedics, finding no pulse, performed emergency procedures on

Appellant’s daughter and transported her to the nearest emergency room.               Neither

paramedics nor emergency room staff were able to resuscitate her. Appellant’s daughter

was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy by a forensic pathologist revealed

multiple contusions on the head and torso, as well as severe internal hemorrhaging of her

internal organs.      The pathologist concluded the internal hemorrhaging resulted in

restriction of blood flow to the child’s brain, depriving it of oxygen, and ultimately causing

her death. While the pathologist noted a scabbed-over cut on her scalp, he did not find

any hemorrhaging in her brain, ruling out blunt force to the head as the cause of death.

The pathologist opined if the child had received emergency medical intervention shortly

after receiving her injuries she would have survived.

          Appellant claimed her son jumped on her daughter the night before the call to 911.

Her daughter complained, but did not cry enough to cause her to seek medical care until

the following day, when her daughter stopped eating and drinking. At trial, the forensic

pathologist testified children have poor pain management skills and Appellant’s daughter

would have continually cried in pain from the injuries she received. The emergency room

physician who attended to the child also testified the injuries described by the forensic
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pathologist would have caused pain. Video interviews were presented to the jury in which

Appellant presented inconsistent explanations of the bruising found on her daughter’s

body.

        The matter was presented to a jury, which found Appellant guilty of intentionally or

knowingly causing injury to a child by omission for failure to provide medical care. The

jury then sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                      APPLICABLE LAW

        The offense of injury to a child is defined by the Texas Penal Code as follows:

               INJURY TO A CHILD, ELDERLY INDIVIDUAL, OR DISABLED
               INDIVIDUAL. (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally,
               knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or
               intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child,
               elderly individual, or disabled individual:
                      (1) serious bodily injury;
                      (2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or
                      (3) bodily injury.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a).

        An omission that causes a condition described by section 22.04(a)(1), (2), or (3) is

conduct constituting an offense if:

        (1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act; or
        (2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a child, elderly
        individual, or disabled individual.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(b).

        The Texas Penal Code defines the relevant culpable mental states as:

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              DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person acts
              intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct
              or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or
              desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
              (b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the
              nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
              when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the
              circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
              with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
              conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a), (b).

       “Omission” means failure to act. § 1.07(a)(34). “Serious bodily injury” means

bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious

permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily

member or organ. § 1.07(a)(46). “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any

impairment of physical condition. § 1.07(a)(8).

       Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that relates not

to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d

742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The State must prove a defendant caused a child’s

serious bodily injury with the requisite criminal intent. Id. As such, the full statutory

definitions of intentional and knowing do not apply. Chaney v. State, 314 S.W.3d 561,

567 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d). Instead, the State must establish the accused

intended the result, i.e., serious bodily injury to a child, or that she was aware her conduct

was reasonably certain to cause the result. Id.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the

evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is required
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to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d

854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243–

44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences to be

drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

       We give deference to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts

in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Each

fact need not point directly and independently to the appellant’s guilt, as long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the

conviction. Id.

       We compare the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury

charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2020) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). In

our review, we must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both direct and

circumstantial and whether properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d

772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When the record supports conflicting inferences, we

presume the fact finder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that

determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.

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                                         ANALYSIS

       Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution

to show she, “by omission, intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to a

child by failing to seek prompt medical treatment” as required by the statute. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1). She argues the alleged omission of medical care did not result

in serious bodily injury because the serious bodily injury leading to her daughter’s death

had already occurred.

       We begin by addressing the causation issue raised by Appellant. Even if Appellant

did not cause the initial injury, if the State demonstrated the lack of prompt medical care

aggravated the injury, she has still committed the offense of injury to a child by omission.

See Fellers v. State, No. 13-08-00688-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4792, at *17–18 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi June 24, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);

Mejia v. State, No. 03-05-00838-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 3964, at *14 (Tex. App.—

Austin May 29, 2008, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Assuming,

arguendo, Appellant’s testimony regarding the initial incident is credible, by her own

admission she delayed at least twenty-four hours in calling for medical assistance.

       In this case, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on the child

testified the child would have lived if she had received emergency medical treatment soon

after her injury. Therefore, the jury could have inferred the lack of prompt medical care

aggravated the initial abdominal injury and caused further injury to the child.

       A review of the record also reveals sufficient evidence to establish Appellant

intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury by omission. The pathologist and

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the attending ER physician testified Appellant’s daughter suffered extreme pain from the

crushing of her pancreas against her spine, and she would have shown age-appropriate

signs of distress, including doubling over and moans and groans. Testimony established

prominent bruising all over the child’s body by the time paramedics arrived at Appellant’s

house.   The child vomited several times on the day of her death, which both the

pathologist and ER physician testified are symptoms of blunt force trauma. The jury could

have inferred, under these circumstances, Appellant was aware something was wrong

with her daughter and still deliberately delayed calling 911. Fellers, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS

4792, at *18 (defendant noted child “breathing real heavy through his nose” and bruising

put him on notice to seek medical care); Payton v. State, 106 S.W.3d 326, 329–30 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (grandfather, despite his training as a former

emergency medical technician, did not call 911 even though toddler grandson was crying,

not walking, and lethargic for an hour).

       The State presented sufficient evidence for a rationale fact finder to infer Appellant

intentionally and knowingly committed injury to a child by omission of medical care.

Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

                                       CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                         Alex Yarbrough
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.

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