Court Opinion

ID: 9894710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:10:42.077464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:24.042320
License: Public Domain

J-A22032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: SHIRLEY WEINBERG                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  REVOCABLE TRUST DATED JANUARY                :         PENNSYLVANIA
  27, 2011                                     :
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: LISA A. ANTIN,                    :
  BENJAMIN ANTIN, AND JASON                    :
  ANTIN                                        :       No. 940 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): 02-19-5237

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED: November 2, 2023

       Appellants, Lisa A. Antin, Benjamin Antin, and Jason Antin, appeal from

the order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’

Court, which denied their motion to disqualify Daniel A. Seibel, Esquire, from

representing Jeffrey Weinberg and his sons Jeremy, Jonathan, Justin, and

Joshua Weinberg. We quash the appeal.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

The parties are involved in a lengthy dispute concerning the validity of a

revocable trust established by their late mother/grandmother, Shirley

Weinberg, who died in February 2019.1 On May 26, 2022, Appellants filed a

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1 Appellant Lisa Antin, Mrs. Weinberg’s daughter, together with her two sons,

Appellants Benjamin and Jason, are attempting to establish the validity of the
trust. Mrs. Weinberg’s son Jeffrey Weinberg (“Son”) and his four sons,
Jeremy, Jonathan, Justin, and Joshua Weinberg (“Grandsons”) are challenging
the validity of the trust.
J-A22032-23

motion to disqualify Attorney Seibel from representing both Son and

Grandsons, alleging that Attorney Seibel’s representation of Son creates a

conflict where he was already representing Grandsons.2 Although not raised

in their motion to disqualify, or reply to Son’s and Grandsons’ response to

their motion to disqualify, Appellants subsequently alleged that Attorney

Seibel’s representation of all four Grandsons also posed a conflict of interest.

Appellants raised this claim based on the opinion of their professional liability

expert, who submitted a report to the court concerning the alleged conflicts

of interest. Thus, at a hearing held on July 25, 2022, Appellants alleged a

conflict of interest by Attorney Seibel representing Son and Grandsons; and

by representing all four Grandsons. Appellants renewed these claims at oral

argument on August 3, 2022.3

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2 Son and Grandsons waived any conflict of interest.

3 The transcripts from the July 25, 2022 hearing and August 3, 2022 oral
argument are not in the certified record; though they are included in the
reproduced record. (See N.T. Hearing, 7/25/22; R.R. at 349a-365a); (N.T.
Oral Argument, 8/3/22; R.R. at 367a-390a). It is well-settled that “an
appellate court cannot consider anything which is not part of the record in this
case[; a]ny document which is not part of the official certified record is
considered to be nonexistent, which deficiency may not be remedied by
inclusion in the reproduced record.” Brandon v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
34 A.3d 104, 106 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2011). “Where a review of an appellant’s
claim may not be made because of such a defect in the record, we may find
the issue waived.” Id. Nevertheless, our rules of appellate procedure state
that “if anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error
or accident, this Court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct
that the omission be corrected and a supplemental certified record be
transmitted if necessary.” Id. (citing Pa.R.A.P. 1926). Based on our
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The Orphans’ Court denied Appellants’ motion on August 4, 2022. The

next day, Attorney Seibel withdrew his appearance for Son.4 Appellants filed

a notice of appeal on August 17, 2022, and both the court and Appellants

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

          1. Did the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt…err as a matter of law in
             denying Appellants’ motion to disqualify Daniel A. Seibel,
             Esquire as shared counsel for [Son and Grandsons]
             without a hearing or any other due process proceeding,
             despite the existence of non-waivable conflicts among
             them?

          2. Did the Orphans’ Court abuse its discretion and err as a
             matter of law in holding that [Son] was not a party to the
             proceedings in its August 4, 2022 order?

(Appellants’ Brief at 5).5

       As a preliminary matter, we must address whether this appeal is

properly before us.       “The appealability of an order directly implicates the

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disposition that the appeal is not properly before us, we need not find
Appellants’ issue of a conflict of interest concerning Attorney Seibel’s
representation of all four Grandsons waived on this basis, or direct Appellants
to correct the record at this juncture, as we cannot reach the merits of their
claim on jurisdictional grounds.

4 Appellants concede that “the issue of Attorney Seibel’s disqualification as
counsel for [Son] has been rendered moot[.]” (Appellants’ Brief at 11 n.6).
Thus, Appellants now argue only that Attorney Seibel’s representation of all
four Grandsons creates a conflict of interest. (See id.)

5 Appellants note in their brief that the second issue presented is the subject

of consolidated appeals docketed at Nos. 88 WDA 2023 and 89 WDA 2023,
and it would be more appropriate to consider this issue in the consolidated
appeals. (See Appellants’ Brief at 31).

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jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.”         In re Estate of

Considine v. Wachovia Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Generally, an appeal may be taken from a final order, an interlocutory order

as of right or by permission, or a collateral order.6 In re Estate of Cella, 12

A.3d 374 (Pa.Super. 2010). An issue concerning this Court’s jurisdiction is a

question of law for which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of

review is plenary. Ford-Bey v. Pro. Anesthesia Servs., ___ A.3d ___, 2023

PA Super 163, 2023 WL 5920181 (filed Sept. 12, 2023).

       Here, Appellants attempt to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under the

collateral order doctrine at Pa.R.A.P. 313.7

          [Rule 313] permits an immediate appeal as of right from an
          otherwise interlocutory order where the appellant
          demonstrates that the order appealed from meets the
          following elements: (1) it is separable from and collateral to
          the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too
          important to be denied review; and (3) the question
          presented is such that if review is postponed until final
          judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.

Ford-Bey, supra at *3 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 313(b)).         “[T]he collateral order

doctrine is to be construed narrowly, and we require every one of its three

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6 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 342 also sets forth specific
Orphans’ Court orders which are appealable as of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 342(a).
The order on appeal denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not one of the
orders enumerated in Rule 342, so that rule is inapplicable here. See id.

7 Appellants make no claim that their appeal is properly before us as from a

final order (see Pa.R.A.P. 341), or an interlocutory order by right or
permission (see Pa.R.A.P. 311, 312). Thus, we confine our review to whether
the appeal is properly from a collateral order.

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prongs be clearly present before collateral appellate review is allowed.” Rae

v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass’n, 602 Pa. 65, 73, 977 A.2d 1121,

1126 (2009).

       “With regard to the first prong of the collateral order doctrine, an order

is separable from the main cause of action if it is entirely distinct from the

underlying issue in the case and if it can be resolved without an analysis of

the merits of the underlying dispute.” K.C. v. L.A., 633 Pa. 722, 729, 128

A.3d 774, 779 (2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Regarding the second prong, “a right is important if the interests that would

go unprotected without immediate appeal are significant relative to the

efficiency interests served by the final order rule.” Id. at 730, 128 A.3d at

779.   “[I]t is not sufficient that the issue under review is important to a

particular party; it ‘must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going

beyond the particular litigation at hand.’” Stahl v. Redcay, 897 A.2d 478,

485 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 704, 918 A.2d 747 (2007)

(internal citation omitted).   Concerning the third prong, whether a party’s

claims will be “irreparably lost” if review is postponed turns on the particular

facts and circumstances of each case. See K.C., supra.

       Instantly, we agree with Appellants that the issue of whether Attorney

Siebel has a conflict of interest to represent all four Grandsons is separable

from the underlying matter concerning the validity of the trust. See Ford-

Bey, supra. Nevertheless, Appellants have not established that any right

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involved is too important to be denied review, or that the question presented

is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim

will be irreparably lost.

       In their motion to disqualify, Appellants alleged that “Attorney Seibel’s

appearance as [Son’s] counsel, at the same time he is acting as counsel for

[Grandsons], creates a conflict that requires his disqualification or that his

appearance be stricken as [Son’s] counsel.” (Motion to Disqualify, 5/26/22,

at 2; R.R. at 216a). Appellants maintained that “Attorney Seibel is potentially

placed in the untenable position of asserting one client’s rights against others.”

(Id. at 4; R.R. at 218a). Appellants insisted that this conflict “places not just

[the Weinbergs] but [Appellants] in an untenable and unfair position.” (Id.

at 5; R.R. at 219a). Appellants have now conceded that the issue regarding

Attorney Seibel’s representation of Son and Grandsons is moot; but they claim

the issue of Attorney Seibel’s representation of all four Grandsons remains.

(See Appellants’ Brief at 11 n.6). Appellants did not raise this claim in their

motion to disqualify, in reply to the Weinbergs’ response to their motion to

disqualify, or in an amended motion to disqualify.        Nevertheless, we will

assume arguendo that they preserved this claim orally at the July 25, 2022

hearing and at the August 3, 2022 oral argument. 8 In those proceedings,

Appellants relied on a report submitted by their proffered expert in

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8 See footnote 3, supra.

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professional liability and conflicts of interest and argued that Jonathan

Weinberg has claims distinct from those of his siblings, such that Attorney

Seibel’s representation of all four Grandsons creates a “non-waivable” conflict

of interest.

      In response to a Rule to Show Cause issued by this Court, Appellants

cite the relevant three-pronged test of the collateral order doctrine and baldly

state that the right involved is too important to be denied review, and that if

review is postponed the claim will be lost. (See Response to Rule to Show

Cause, 10/27/22, at 2).     Although Appellants parrot the language of Rule

313(b), they do not explain why the right is too important to be denied review

or why their claim will be lost if review is postponed. (See id.)

      Likewise, on appeal, Appellants state: “The question presented by the

denial of a motion to disqualify counsel is such that if review is postponed until

final judgment, the claim will be irretrievably lost.    Accordingly, this Court

properly may exercise its appellate jurisdiction over the August 4, 2022 Order

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.” (Appellants’ Brief at 19). Although Appellants

maintain that “Attorney Seibel has a non-waivable conflict of interest in

representing Jonathan Weinberg and his three brothers,” (see id. at 20), they

do not explain why any right asserted is too important to be denied review or

how their claim will be irreparably lost if review is postponed.

      Instead, Appellants cite Dougherty v. Philadelphia Newspaper, 85

A.3d 1082 (Pa.Super. 2014), and cases which cite to Dougherty.                 In

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Dougherty, this Court considered an order denying a motion to disqualify

counsel as an appealable collateral order.       In that case, the appellant had

sought disqualification of a firm that had represented him in past because the

appellant believed there was a substantial risk that the firm would use

confidential information obtained from the prior representation for adverse

parties in the new matter. Noting that the appellant averred facts establishing

a colorable claim of potential disclosure of attorney work product and breach

of attorney/client privilege, which could result in irreparable harm, this Court

concluded that under those circumstances, the order denying disqualification

was appealable as a collateral order. See id. at 1085-86. In a footnote, this

Court distinguished cases that had reached an opposite result and “did not

involve the potential disclosure of attorney work product or privileged

material.” Id. at 1086 n.3.

       Unlike in Dougherty, Appellants do not allege that Attorney Seibel’s

representation of all four Grandsons would yield disclosure of any confidential

or privileged information of Appellants.9 Further, if any conflict of interest did

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9 Following Dougherty, this Court has permitted review of cases in similar
circumstances where the appellant sought disqualification of counsel based on
counsel’s prior representation of the appellant or where there was a similar
concern for the potential disclosure of confidential or privileged material. See,
e.g., Mertis v. Oh, 289 A.3d 532 (Pa.Super. 2022), appeal granted, ___ Pa.
___, 294 A.3d 1204 (2023) (order denying appellant’s motion to disqualify
counsel was appealable collateral order where counsel representing defendant
anesthesiologist in medical malpractice claim was also representing plaintiff’s
treating orthopedic surgeon, who was not named defendant in action; issue
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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exist, following adjudication of the merits of the underlying case, Appellants

could appeal, and if they were successful, this Court could grant a new trial

requiring separate counsel to represent the Grandsons to remedy the conflict.

See Vaccone v. Syken, 587 Pa. 380, 899 A.2d 1103 (2006), superseded by

statute on other grounds by Pa.R.A.P. 1114(b)(7) (holding that order

disqualifying counsel was not appealable as collateral order; if on appeal,

Superior Court determines that motion to disqualify was improperly granted,

Superior Court will order new trial and appellants can proceed with disqualified

counsel as their attorney).10 (See also Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/11/23, at

39) (stating that Appellants’ claim of conflict of interest will not be lost forever

if review is postponed; Appellants will still be able to complain about court’s

ruling if, and when, case ends). In light of the narrow construction of the

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on appeal concerned whether law firm representing defendant could have ex
parte communications with non-party treating physician); Rudalavage v.
PPL Elec. Utilities Corp., 268 A.3d 470 (Pa.Super. 2022) (order denying
appellant’s motion to disqualify law firm was appealable collateral order based
on conflict of interest of one of firm’s attorneys arising from his prior
representation of appellant); Darrow v. PPL Elec. Utilities Corp., 266 A.3d
1105 (Pa.Super. 2021) (order denying appellant’s motion to disqualify law
firm was appealable collateral order based on conflict of interest of one of
firm’s attorneys arising from his prior representation of appellant and intimate
knowledge of inner workings of appellant’s operations). Although this Court
did not conduct an in-depth analysis of the collateral order doctrine in these
cases, they share a concern for the dissemination of potentially privileged
information. Appellants make no argument that such a concern is present in
the case before us.

10 Although Vaccone involved an order disqualifying counsel instead of an
order denying a motion to disqualify, the rationale regarding the third prong
of the collateral order doctrine applies similarly to the circumstances here.

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collateral order doctrine, Appellants have failed to establish that each prong

of the requisite test is “clearly present” to warrant immediate review.11 See

Rae, supra; Ford-Bey, supra. Accordingly, we quash the appeal.

       Appeal quashed.

       Judge Olson joins this memorandum.

       Judge Bowes files a concurring memorandum.

  11/2/2023

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11 In the conclusion section of his appellee’s brief, Son requests attorneys’ fees

under Pa.R.A.P. 2744, alleging that Appellants brought this appeal for frivolous
reasons and only to cause delay. See Pa.R.A.P. 2744 (stating that appellate
court may award reasonable counsel fees and damages if it determines that
appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that conduct of participant
against whom costs are to be imposed is dilatory, obdurate or vexatious). Son
claims that this Court should award fees and damages to compensate him for
having to prepare a brief and to argue this appeal. (See Son’s Brief at 27-
28). Nevertheless, Appellants conceded that the issue as to Son was moot.
See footnote 4, supra. Under these circumstances, we deny Son’s request
for relief.

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