Court Opinion

ID: 9631130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:29:42.911027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:34.215662
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
MOON, J.,
IN WHICH HAYASHI, J., JOINS
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority in this case. I agree that under HRS § 704-416 it was error for the trial court to allow into evidence defendant’s statements to his mental examiners which constituted admissions of guilt of the offense charged. Nevertheless, I find that such error was in this instance harmless. There was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt excluding the confessions. We may presume, moreover, that the trial court disregarded any incompetent evidence.
As defendant admits, his primary defense at trial was mental irresponsibility. On appeal, he asserts that identification was a secondary defense. Defendant points out that he did not admit committing the burglary with which he was charged. He argues that before his mental examiners took the stand, there had been little solid evidence connecting him to the burglary. However, the latter contention is belied by the evidence. The state’s case in chief included testimony by the victim in which he explained how he positively identified defendant as the man he saw in his home at the time of the burglary. The victim related how he shone his *596flashlight on the intruder and clearly saw his, face. In addition, a police officer described the sequence of events leading to the victim’s identification of defendant. The officer testified that the victim gave a physical description of the burglar and of the van used by the burglar. Based upon the victim’s detailed description and the officer’s previous encounters with the defendant, the officer immediately suspected him. Defendant was apprehended a short time after the burglary and the victim then picked defendant from a lineup and recognized his vehicle as the van he had earlier described to the officer. This evidence alone clearly supports the trial court’s finding that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, because this case was tried by a judge and not a jury, “if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the judgment or finding below, there is a presumption that any incompetent evidence was disregarded and the issue determined from a consideration of competent evidence only.” State v. Gutierrez, 1 Haw. App. 268, 270, 618 P.2d 315, 317 (1980); see also State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 128, 612 P.2d 526, 532 (1980) (where overwhelming evidence tends to show defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, errors in admission or exclusion of evidence deemed harmless). Trial courts are regularly called upon to separate competent from incompetent evidence, and we must give due deference to their ability to make such a separation. The record in tills case does in fact reflect the trial court’s specific awareness that defendant’s confessions could not be admitted for the purpose of proving defendant’s commission of the burglary in question.1 I would find *597that the competent evidence was substantial and supported the trial court’s determination that defendant was guilty of the offense charged. Therefore, any error committed by the trial court in allowing testimony of defendant’s admissions was harmless.
I would uphold the conviction.

At one point in the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Knight, one of -defendant’s mental examiners and a defense witness, “[d]id you talk about how the burglary was committed with Mr. Wallace?” When she answered, ”[y]es,” defense counsel objected on the ground that the prosecutor was trying to “fish out admissions.” The court ruled “[a]s itrelate[s] to Dr. Knight's conclusion here [on *597the issue of defendant’s mental capacity], I will allow it, otherwise I will sustain the objection.” Tr. 6/19/89 at 86. Thus, although the trial court erroneously admitted defendant’s confessions as part of the bases for the experts’ opinions, clearly the court knew that such statements could not be considered when deciding the issue of defendant’s guilt.