Court Opinion

ID: 9424471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:11:42.596572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:50.437091
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants, welfare recipients residing in the State of Connecticut, brought this action in the Federal District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, challenging, as applied to them, certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of process, that restrict their access to the courts in their effort to bring an action for divorce.
It appears from the briefs and oral argument that the average cost to a litigant for bringing an action for divorce is $60. Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes provides: “There shall be paid to the clerks of the supreme court or the superior court, for entering each civil cause, forty-five dollars An additional $15 is usually required for the service of process by the sheriff, although as much as $40 or $50 may be necessary where notice must be accomplished by publication.1
There is no dispute as to the inability of the named appellants in the present case to pay either the court fees required by statute or the cost incurred for the service of process. The affidavits .in the record establish that appellants’ welfare income in each instance barely suffices *373to meet the costs of the daily essentials of life and includes no allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to gain access to the courts in order to obtain a divorce. Also undisputed is appellants’ “good faith” in seeking a divorce.
Assuming, as we must on this motion to dismiss the complaint, the truth of the undisputed allegations made by the appellants, it appears that they were unsuccessful in their attempt to bring their divorce actions in the Connecticut courts, simply by reason of their indigency. The clerk of the Superior Court returned their papers “on the ground that he could not accept them until an entry fee had been paid.” App. 8-9. Subsequent efforts to obtain a judicial waiver of the fee requirement and to have the court effect service of process were to no avail. Id., at 9.
Appellants thereafter commenced this action in the Federal District Court seeking a judgment declaring that Connecticut’s statute and service of process provisions, “requiring payment of court fees and expenses as a condition precedent to obtaining court relief [are] unconstitutional [as] applied to these indigent [appellants] and all other members of the class which they represent.” As further relief, appellants requested the entry of an injunction ordering the appropriate officials to permit them “to proceed with their divorce actions without payment of fees and costs.” A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281, and on July 16, 1968, that court concluded that “a state [may] limit access to its civil courts and particularly in this instance, to its divorce courts, by the requirement of a filing fee or other fees which effectively bar persons on relief from commencing actions therein.” 286 F. Supp. 968, 972.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U. S. 974 (1969). The case was heard at the 1969 Term and thereafter was *374set for reargument at the present Term. 399 U. S. 922 (1970). We now reverse.2 Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.
I
At its core, the right to due process reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional system. Our understanding of that value is the basis upon which we have resolved this case.
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a “legal system,” social organization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized resolution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society. Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of nature.”
*375American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework, those who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State’s monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things. Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism must function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has through years of adjudication put flesh upon the due process principle.
Such litigation has, however, typically involved rights of defendants — not, as here, persons seeking access to the judicial process in the first instance. This is because our society has been so structured that resort to the courts is not usually the only available, legitimate means of resolving private disputes. Indeed, private structuring of individual relationships and repair of their breach is largely encouraged in American life, subject only to the caveat that the formal judicial process, if resorted to, is paramount. Thus, this Court has seldom been asked to view access to the courts as an element of due process. The legitimacy of the State’s monopoly over techniques of final dispute settlement, even where *376some are denied access to its use, stands unimpaired where recognized, effective alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain. But the successful invocation of this governmental power by plaintiffs has often created serious problems for defendants' rights. For at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.
Recognition of this theoretical framework illuminates the precise issue presented in this case. As this Court on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society. See, e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923). It is not surprising, then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and rescind commercial contracts, for example, but we are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state approval. Even where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we know of no instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the State’s judicial machinery.
Thus, although they assert here due process rights as would-be plaintiffs, we think appellants’ plight, because resort to the state courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to *377defend his interests in court. For both groups this process is not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only available one. In this posture we think that this appeal is properly to be resolved in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions that delimit rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.
II
These due process decisions, representing over a hundred years of effort by this Court to give concrete embodiment to this concept, provide, we think, complete vindication for appellants’ contentions. In particular, precedent has firmly embedded in our due process jurisprudence two important principles upon whose application we rest our decision in the case before us.
A
Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Early in our jurisprudence, this Court voiced the doctrine that “[wjherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend,” Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 277 (1876). See Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (1864); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409 (1897). The theme that “due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one’s defence,” Hovey v. Elliott, supra, at 417, has continually recurred in the years since Baldwin, Windsor, and Hovey.3 Although “[mjany controver*378sies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause,” as Mr. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), “there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id., at 313.
Due process does not, of course, require that the defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing on the merits. A State, can, for example, enter a default judgment against a defendant who, after adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance, see Windsor, supra, at 278, or who, without justifiable excuse, violates a procedural rule requiring the production of evidence necessary for orderly adjudication, Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 351 (1909). What the Constitution does require is “an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’’Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 552 (1965) (emphasis added), “for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case,” Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra, at 313. The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.4 That the hearing required by due process *379is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest,5 except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after-the event.6 In short, “within the limits of practicability,” id., at 318, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of the Due Process Clause.
B
Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question. Thus, in cases involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has often held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally applied in particular circumstances because it interfered with an individual’s exercise of those rights.7
No less than these rights, the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits of practicality, must be protected against denial by particular laws *380that operate to jeopardize it for particular individuals. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra; Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956).
In Mullane this Court held that the statutory provision for notice by publication in a local newspaper, although sufficient as to beneficiaries of a trust whose interests or addresses were unknown to the trustee, was not sufficient notice under the Due Process Clause for known beneficiaries. Similarly, Covey held that notice by publication in a foreclosure action, even though sufficient to provide a normal person with an opportunity for a hearing, was not sufficient where the defendant was a known incompetent. The Court expressly rejected an argument that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the State to take measures in giving notice to an incompetent beyond those deemed sufficient in the case of the ordinary taxpayer.” Id., at 146.
Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard. The State’s obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; rather, the State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due.
Ill
Drawing upon the principles established by the cases just canvassed, we conclude that the State’s refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages, and, in the absence of a sufficient counter*381vailing justification for the State’s action, a denial of due process.8
The arguments for this kind of fee and cost requirement are that the State’s interest in the prevention of frivolous litigation is substantial, its use of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce resources is rational, and its balance between the defendant’s right to notice and the plaintiff’s right to access is reasonable.
In our opinion, none of these considerations is sufficient to override the interest of these plaintiff-appellants in having access to the only avenue open for dissolving their allegedly untenable marriages. Not only is there no necessary connection between a litigant’s assets and the seriousness of his motives in bringing suit,9 but it is here beyond present dispute that appellants bring these actions in good faith. Moreover, other alternatives exist to fees and cost requirements as a means for conserving the time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous liti*382gation, such as penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, to mention only a few. In the same vein we think that reliable alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid sheriff if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of official service. This is perforce true of service by publication which is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential defendant’s attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra. We think in this case service at defendant’s last known address by mail and posted notice is equally effective as publication in a newspaper.
We are thus left to evaluate the State’s asserted interest in its fee and cost requirements as a mechanism of resource allocation or cost recoupment. Such a justification was offered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956). In Griffin it was the requirement of a transcript beyond the means of the indigent that blocked access to the judicial process. While in Griffin the transcript could be waived as a convenient but not necessary predicate to court access, here the State invariably imposes the costs as a measure of allocating its judicial resources. Surely, then, the rationale of Griffin covers this case.
IV
In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than necessary to dispose of the case before us, a case where the bona fides of both appellants’ indigency and desire for divorce are here beyond dispute. We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any in*383dividual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship. The requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter. Thus we hold only that a State may not, consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so.

Reversed.

 App. 9. The dollar figures are averages taken from the undisputed allegations of the complaint. The particular fee the sheriff receives from the plaintiff for service of process in any one case depends on the distance he must travel to effectuate service of process. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-261 (1968).

 Following colloquy at the oral reargument as to the possible availability of public or private funds to enable plaintiffs-appellants to defray the expense requirements at issue in this case, the parties submitted further papers on this score. Nothing in these materials would justify our declining to adjudicate the constitutional question squarely presented by this record,

 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 (1965); Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208, 212 (1962); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 338 *378(1963); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 246 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152-153 (1941); Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U. S. 457, 463 (1934); Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 423 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385-386 (1908); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 236 (1900).

 Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, with In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). See also Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 520-521 (1944).

 Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, supra, at 152-153; United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra, at 463; Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, supra.

 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham, supra; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944).

 E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 527 (1960); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963).

 At least one court has already recognized the special nature of the divorce action. Justice Sobel in a case like that before us took note of the State’s involvement in the marital relationship:
“Marriage is clearly, marked with the public interest. In this State, a marriage cannot be dissolved except by ‘due judicial proceedings. . . .’ We have erected by statute a money hurdle to such dissolution by requiring in many circumstances the service of a summons by publication .... This hurdle is an effective barrier to [plaintiff’s] access to the courts. The loss of access to the courts in an action for divorce is a right of substantial magnitude when only through the courts may redress or relief be obtained.” Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1056, 296 N. Y. S. 2d 74, 87 (1968).
See also Brown v. Chastain, 416 F. 2d 1012, 1014 (CA5 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting).

 We think Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), has no bearing on this case. Differences between divorce actions and derivative actions aside, unlike Cohen, where we considered merely a statute on its face, the application of this statute here operates to cut off entirely access to the courts.