Court Opinion

ID: 9387672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:07:40.225562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.955383
License: Public Domain

J-S40023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 EMMANUEL RENTERIA                       :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 131 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
            Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003746-2015

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 EMMANUEL RENTERIA                       :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 132 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
            Criminal Division at No: CP-15-CR-0003898-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED APRIL 18, 2023

     Appellant, Emmanuel Renteria, appeals from the December 21, 2021

orders dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

     The record reveals that, on May 12, 2016 at docket number CP-15-CR-

0003898 of 2015, (“No. 3898”), a jury found Appellant guilty of ten counts of
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robbery and related offenses. On April 1, 2016, at docket number CP-15-CR-

0003746 of 2015 (“No. 3746”), Appellant pled guilty to three counts of robbery

and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. On July 15, 2016, the trial

court imposed sentence at both dockets—an aggregate total of 28½ to 57

years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgments of sentence in a

consolidated appeal on August 2, 2017. This Court concluded, among other

things, that Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence

at No. 3898 was waived because he failed to preserve the issue pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).1

       Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition at both dockets on May 7,

2018. That petition was resolved by an agreement of the parties, pursuant to

which Appellant was resentenced to a lower sentence at No. 3746 in exchange

for dismissal of all remaining claims, including those pending as to No. 3898.

The parties also agreed that, in the event of a successful challenge to the

newly agreed upon sentence, the prior sentence would be reimposed. The

trial court accepted the agreement and imposed the modified judgment of

sentence on November 15, 2018.

       On September 4, 2019, Appellant, proceeding pro se, filed the instant

PCRA petition. The PCRA court treated it as a timely first petition challenging

____________________________________________

1   Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) requires that the basis for any challenge to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence be preserved in a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

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the November 15, 2018 sentence and appointed counsel. Counsel filed an

amended petition on April 21, 2020.

      The PCRA court conducted a hearing on December 3, 2020. A year later,

after a premature appeal was quashed by this Court, the PCRA court entered

the order that is the subject of this timely appeal. Appellant presents two

questions:

      1. Did the PCRA court err when it failed to find PCRA counsel [C.
         Curtis] Norcini ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal
         when [Appellant] requested him to do so, when Norcini
         brokered an agreement where [Appellant] bargained away his
         right to appeal in exchange for a reduced sentence?

      2. Was PCRA counsel Norcini ineffective for failing to allege in his
         amended PCRA petition that [Appellant’s] appellate counsel
         neglected to include the statement required by Pa.R.A.P.
         2119(f) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718(b) in [Appellant’s] brief
         challenging the discretionary aspects of sentencing?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      We conduct our review as follows:

             In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the
      findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the
      PCRA court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the
      prevailing party. Because most PCRA appeals involve questions
      of fact and law, we employ a mixed standard of review. We defer
      to the PCRA court’s factual findings and credibility determinations
      supported by the record. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s
      legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super.

2015), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2015).

      Counsel is presumed effective.      To overcome this presumption, the

petitioner must plead and prove that (1) the underlying issue is of arguable

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merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis in support of the disputed

action or inaction, and (3) that counsel’s errors prejudiced the petitioner.

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013).                    To

establish that plea counsel’s errors were prejudicial, the petitioner must show

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. A

reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136,

141 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

      In his first assertion of error, Appellant claims the ineffective assistance

of prior PCRA counsel, C. Curtis Norcini. Appellant claims Norcini failed to file

a requested direct appeal. As outlined above, in a prior PCRA proceeding,

Norcini negotiated a reduced sentence at No. 3746 in exchange for the

dismissal of remaining collateral claims at that docket and at No. 3989. The

result was a new judgment of sentence with a reduced term of incarceration,

entered on November 15, 2018. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, all other

pending PCRA claims were dismissed, and a successful challenge to the new

judgment of sentence would result in the reinstatement of the old one. The

record reflects that Appellant understood the nature of the bargain:

      [PROSECUTOR]: We have a proposed order and agreement for
           Your Honor’s consideration that would be to grant the
           petition [at No. 3746] in part and dismiss it in part.

            On [No. 3898], that the PCRA petition be dismissed with
            respect to that case number.

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          On [No. 3746], that [Appellant] be resentenced on Count 3,
          which is a first-degree robbery. Original sentence was four
          to eight years. The new sentence would be one and a half
          to three years. This is consecutive to Count 2.

                                    […]

          This is a full resolution of all of the PCRA issues. Any other
          issue is dismissed.

          And [Appellant] will agree that if this is successfully
          challenged, that this agreement would be void, we
          would be back to the original sentence that was
          imposed[.]

     MR. NORCINI: Your Honor, that is my understanding of the
          agreement in total.

          I had the opportunity to speak to [Appellant], and he
          understands what is being proposed for Your Honor’s
          consideration and hopes that Your Honor will accept
          that.

                                    […]

     THE COURT: And, [Appellant], you heard what [the prosecutor]
          put on the record?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes, I heard.

     THE COURT: So you had filed a PCRA petition.

          So relative to the case where there was a trial, that petition,
          the portion of that petition relating to that case is dismissed.

          Do you understand?

     [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.

     THE COURT: And then on the case where you pled guilty, that
          sentence is being reduced.

     DEFENDANT: I understand.

     THE COURT: All right. And do you understand that should
          you challenge this particular order at another point in

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            time, the sentence          reverts    back    as   originally
            imposed[?]

      [APPELLANT]: Yeah, I understand.

      THE COURT: Do you understand?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.

      THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything?

      [APPELLANT]: No, ma’am.

      THE COURT: So this is acceptable to you in resolving this PCRA?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes, ma’am.

      THE COURT: All right. I’ll accept the agreement. I’ve signed the
           order. And I’ll sign an amended sentencing sheet as well.

N.T. Hearing, 11/15/18, at 2-5 (emphasis added).          In essence, therefore,

Appellant affirmed his understanding of the agreement. And, pursuant to that

agreement, he had nothing to gain by appealing.

      Furthermore, Norcini testified at the hearing on the instant petition that

Appellant never requested an appeal of the November 15, 2018 sentence.

N.T. Hearing, 12/3/20, at 32. The PCRA court found his testimony credible

and Appellant’s testimony to the contrary not credible. We defer to the PCRA

court’s credibility determinations. Commonwealth v. Becker, 192 A.3d 106,

112 (Pa. Super. 2018). The record fails to support Appellant’s contention that

Norcini failed to file a requested appeal from the November 15, 2018 judgment

of sentence.

      Next, Appellant claims Norcini was ineffective for failing to raise trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to preserve a challenge to the trial court’s

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sentencing discretion at No. 3898. Appellant previously raised this claim in

the PCRA petition that led to his November 15, 2018 resentencing. As noted

above, Appellant agreed to the dismissal of his collateral claims at No. 3989—

including his challenge to the trial court’s sentencing discretion—in exchange

for the reduced sentence at No. 3746. The PCRA precludes relief for claims

that previously have been waived.      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).      Because

Appellant previously agreed to the dismissal of the present claim in exchange

for relief on another, we conclude the present claim is waived.

      Furthermore, we observe that Appellant has not attempted to plead,

prove, or argue that there is any merit to the underlying challenge to the trial

court’s sentencing discretion at No. 3898. Failure to preserve a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not among the errors for which a

PCRA petitioner need not prove prejudice. Commonwealth v. Liston, 977

A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 445-47

(Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 201 A.3d 154 (Pa. 2019).             Because

Appellant failed to develop an argument that trial counsel’s waiver, on direct

appeal, of his challenge to the trial court’s sentencing discretion was

prejudicial to him, Appellant cannot obtain relief on this argument. Presley,

193 A.3d at 447.

      Orders affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2023

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