Court Opinion

ID: 9367503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 22:02:42.952665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.882695
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CONTINENTAL AUTOMOTIVE                     )
SYSTEMS, INC., a Delaware corporation,     )
                                           )
                       Plaintiff,          )
                                           )
              v.                           ) C.A. No. 2021-0066-NAC
                                           )
NOKIA CORPORATION, a Finnish               )
corporation, NOKIA OF AMERICA              )
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation,       )
NOKIA SOLUTIONS AND NETWORKS               )
OY, a Finnish corporation, and NOKIA       )
TECHNOLOGIES OY, a Finnish                 )
corporation,                               )
                                           )
                       Defendants.         )

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

                      Date Submitted: October 31, 2022
                       Date Decided: January 31, 2023

Philip A. Rovner, Jonathan A. Choa, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Matthew W. Holder, Martin R. Bader, SHEPPARD,
MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON, LLP, San Diego, California; Counsel for
Plaintiff Continental Automotive Systems, Inc.

Kelly E. Farnan, Blake Rohrbacher, Sara M. Metzler, RICHARDS, LAYTON &
FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Matthew D. Richardson, Mark A. McCarty,
Andrew J. Tuck, ALSTON & BIRD LLP, Atlanta, Georgia; Counsel for Defendants
Nokia Corporation, Nokia of America Corporation, Nokia Solutions and Networks
Oy, and Nokia Technologies Oy.

COOK, Vice Chancellor
      This case is the latest iteration in a long-running dispute between the owner

of certain patents essential to cellular standards and a manufacturer whose products

incorporate the standards.

      Nokia1 is a multinational conglomerate primarily based in Finland that

operates in the areas of telecommunications, information technology, and consumer

electronics. Known widely for its phones, Nokia is also the owner of patents for the

2G, 3G, and 4G cellular networks that have become an essential part of modern life.

      Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. (“Continental”) is a leading supplier of

cutting-edge automotive connectivity products, including devices for automobiles

that provide wireless connectivity. Those products rely on cellular communication

networks.

      To ensure the interoperability of products that use cellular networks, industry

groups called standard-setting organizations, or “SSOs,” develop and maintain

cellular standards. When a patent is necessary to meet (or “practice”) a particular

standard, that patent is considered a standard essential patent, or “SEP.” Nokia

claims that certain of its patents are SEPs.

1
 For simplicity, this decision refers to defendants Nokia Corporation, Nokia Solutions and
Networks Oy, and Nokia Technologies Oy as the “Foreign Nokia Defendants.” The
Foreign Nokia Defendants and Nokia of America Corporation (“Nokia of America”) are
collectively referred to as “Nokia.”

                                            1
          At bottom, Continental wants a license to certain Nokia SEPs and contends

that Nokia has failed to provide Continental with a license on appropriate terms. In

this action, Continental asks the Court to require that Nokia offer Continental a

license to the Nokia SEPs on terms and conditions that are either fair, reasonable,

and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) or otherwise consistent with certain

commitments made by Nokia. Continental also seeks various forms of declaratory

relief.

          Continental has two grounds for claiming a right to a license.              First,

Continental argues that it is entitled to a license because it is a Qualcomm customer.

Nokia entered the Subscriber Equipment and Infrastructure Equipment License

Agreement (“SULA”) with Qualcomm under which Nokia agreed to license certain

SEPs to certain Qualcomm customers. Continental claims it is covered by the

SULA. Second, Continental argues that SSO policies mandate that Nokia license its

SEPs on FRAND terms and conditions.

          But while the ultimate dispute in this case is one of patent licensing, the issues

at this stage involve Nokia’s six jurisdictional arguments. First, Nokia argues that

the SULA expired on December 31, 2022, depriving this Court of subject matter

jurisdiction over Continental’s claims. Second, Nokia argues that Continental lacks

standing to bring its claims because Continental did not negotiate with Nokia for a

license and because Continental has not suffered an injury-in-fact by failing to obtain

                                               2
a license. Third, Nokia argues that Continental’s requests for declaratory relief are

an improper effort to obtain an advisory opinion. Fourth, Nokia argues that this

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Foreign Nokia Defendants. Fifth, Nokia

argues that Continental’s case should be dismissed on the basis of forum non

conveniens or improper claim splitting. And finally, Nokia argues that certain of the

claims within Continental’s complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

      The expiration of the SULA moots some of Continental’s claims, but not

claims for pre-expiration breaches. I therefore grant in part and deny in part Nokia’s

motion to dismiss the claims premised on the SULA.

      Continental has standing to bring its claims and they do not seek an improper

advisory opinion. Those bases for dismissal are unavailing.

      This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over all the Nokia defendants

for both Continental’s remaining claims premised on the SULA and for all its claims

not premised on the SULA. I therefore deny Nokia’s motion to dismiss the foreign

Nokia defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.

      Continental’s claims should not be dismissed for forum non conveniens or

improper claim splitting because the litigation in all other courts has been resolved.

      Finally, Continental has alleged facts making it reasonably conceivable that

Continental states a claim for Nokia’s alleged pre-expiration breaches of the SULA,

                                          3
and Nokia has not argued that Continental’s remaining counts, which are not

premised on the SULA, fail to state a claim.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

         The facts are drawn from the well-pled allegations in the Verified Complaint

(the “Complaint”) and documents properly incorporated by reference or integral to

that pleading.2 For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true

the Complaint’s well-pled factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in

Continental’s favor.3

     A. Parties

         Plaintiff Continental is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in Auburn Hills, Michigan.          Continental is an indirect subsidiary of

Continental AG, a German corporation. Continental AG is a leading supplier to

automotive original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”).

         Continental develops and commercializes telematics control units (“TCUs”),

network       access   devices    (“NADs”),      and    other     devices   that    merge

2
  Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Nokia Corp., C.A. No. 2021-0066-NAC, Docket (“Dkt.”) 1,
Verified Complaint (“Compl.”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312,
320 (Del. 2004) (noting that on a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents
that are “incorporated by reference” or “integral” to the complaint). To the extent
allegations and claims by Continental are set forth in this decision without citation, they
are drawn from the well-pled allegations of the Complaint.
3
    Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002).

                                            4
telecommunications, infotainment, and safety features.          In some instances,

Continental sells its TCUs directly to OEMs (i.e., Continental acts as a “tier 1

supplier”); in other instances, Continental sells its NADs to other tier 1 suppliers

who use the NADs to manufacture TCUs, which are then sold to OEMs (i.e.,

Continental acts as a “tier 2 supplier”). The Complaint states that Continental’s

“customers commonly require that Continental secure all necessary licenses and

supply products free of third-party [intellectual property] rights, and further that

Continental indemnify its customers for the cost of any patent infringement claims

related to Continental’s products, as well as the cost of any license fees paid by the

customer.”4

         Nokia is a multinational conglomerate primarily based in Finland. The

Foreign Nokia Defendants are Finnish companies with headquarters in Espoo,

Finland. Defendant Nokia of America is a Delaware company with headquarters

in Murray Hill, New Jersey.

     B. Nokia’s Agreements With Standard Setting Organizations

         Nokia owns patents that are essential to the cellular standards adopted by

various SSOs. As a member of SSOs, Nokia promised to license its patents in

accordance with the SSOs’ Intellectual Property Rights Policies (“IPR Policies”).

4
    Compl. ¶ 10.

                                          5
The IPR Policies require that members like Nokia license their SEPs to any user of

the standard that requests a license on FRAND terms and conditions.

          Continental contends that it is a third-party beneficiary of Nokia’s FRAND

commitments with SSOs because Continental is “a supplier of TCUs, NADs, and

other products implementing various cellular standards[.]”5                Contrary to its

obligations under the IPR Policies, Nokia has failed to provide Continental with a

license on FRAND terms.

      C. The SULA 6

          On August 9, 2006, Nokia Corporation and Nokia Inc. filed a lawsuit in this

Court against Qualcomm, Inc. 7 Nokia argued that Qualcomm agreed with an SSO,

the European Telecommunications Standardization Institute (“ETSI”), to license its

5
    Id. ¶ 7.
6
 Nokia also sued Apple in Delaware in a FRAND dispute regarding Nokia’s 2G, 3G, and
4G patents where Nokia sought a declaration that it complied with its FRAND obligation
pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy. Id. ¶ 23.
7
  Nokia Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., C.A. No. 2330-CS, Dkt. 1 (“Qualcomm Compl.”). This
Court may take judicial notice of “records of the court in which the action is pending and
of any other court of this State or federal court sitting in or for this State.” D.R.E.
202(d)(1)(C). “Specifically, this Court may take judicial notice of court filings ‘for certain
limited purposes, such as to understand the nature and grounds for rulings’ made by the
court in which the documents were filed.” Indem. Ins. Corp. v. Cohen, 2018 WL 487246,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 2018) (quoting In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 2013 WL
6634009, at *7–9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2013)). Rule 202 does not permit me to take judicial
notice of such filings for the truth of their contents. Id.

                                              6
SEPs on FRAND terms. 8 Nokia argued that it was entitled to a license.9 Nokia

sought various forms of relief, including (a) a declaration that Qualcomm was

contractually bound by its FRAND commitments; and (b) an order compelling

Qualcomm to negotiate in good faith over a license.10

           After several years of litigation and on the eve of trial, Nokia and Qualcomm

reached a settlement that included the SULA. 11 By its terms, the SULA “continues

in full force and effect until (and including) December 31, 2022[.]” 12 Much of the

dispute in this case concerns whether Continental can enforce certain third-party

beneficiary rights included in the SULA.

              The License Obligation

           Section 5.3 of the SULA provides that, “Nokia commits to offer a license for

sales during the Term under the Nokia Standards Patents to each of Qualcomm’s

customers who requests such a license from Nokia or whom Nokia approaches about

8
 Compl. ¶ 22; see also Qualcomm Compl., ¶¶ 1, 19–30. Nokia subsequently amended its
complaint after engaging in over a year of discovery. See Ex. 1 to Dkt. 50.
9
    Qualcomm Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, 31–33.
10
     Id.
11
  Nokia Corp., C.A. No. 2330-CS, Dkt. 656 (“Settlement Letter”); Nokia Corp., C.A. No.
2330-CS, Dkt. 658.
12
     Ex. 1 to Dkt. 1 (“SULA”), Preamble.

                                             7
taking such a license.”       13
                                   The SULA specifies royalty rates for “Subscriber

Terminals”        and    “Modem      Cards”    that   “incorporate   Qualcomm-Branded

Components.”14          Continental argues that it is entitled to a license under this

provision.

           Continental separately argues that the settlement agreement in Nokia’s

litigation with Qualcomm gave Qualcomm the right to practice Nokia’s patents,

which in turn would exhaust Nokia’s patent rights in Qualcomm products sold

downstream. Continental argues that Nokia has failed to provide and offer a license

that takes into account that its patents are exhausted.

              The Dispute Resolution Provisions

           The SULA contains a convoluted dispute resolution provision, which states:

           Qualcomm’s Components customers will be third-party beneficiaries of this
           Section 5.3 with the right to enforce its terms, provided however, subject to
           the following paragraph, a Qualcomm Components customer will be
           permitted to enforce its rights as a third party beneficiary of this Section 5.3
           solely as a defense or counterclaim in Litigation initiated by Nokia with such
           customer (or its distributors or customers for the accused product) in which
           Nokia Litigates based on any Nokia Standards Patent (“Nokia-Initiated
           Litigation”), unless the Qualcomm Components customer is unable (due to
           the nature and/or venue of the Nokia-Initiated Litigation) to enforce its rights
           as a third party beneficiary of this Section 5.3 as a defense or counterclaim in
           such Nokia-Initiated Litigation (in which case the Qualcomm Components
           customer may enforce its rights as a third-party beneficiary of this Section 5.3

13
     SULA § 5.3.
14
     Id.

                                               8
           in accordance with the terms of the first and second paragraphs of Section
           22).15

In layman’s terms, a Qualcomm customer may enforce its right to a license under

the SULA from Nokia only if Nokia sues the customer—the customer cannot first

sue Nokia. The only exception to this general prohibition is if the Qualcomm

customer is unable to enforce its right to a license due to the rules of the forum in

which Nokia sued the customer.

           The SULA contains a forum selection provision (the “Forum-Selection

Clause”) which states:

           This Agreement is made and entered into in the State of Delaware and will be
           governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of
           Delaware without regard to conflict of laws principles. The Parties agree that
           any dispute arising under or relating to this Agreement shall be litigated in the
           Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 346. The
           Parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery of the State
           of Delaware and waive trial by jury.

           Notwithstanding the foregoing, if there is a determination that any dispute
           arising under or relating to this Agreement is not subject to 10 Del. C. § 346,
           the Parties agree that (i) if the Delaware Chancery Court has subject matter
           jurisdiction over such dispute, then such dispute will be adjudicated only by,
           and will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of, the Delaware
           Chancery Court; or (ii) if the Delaware Chancery Court does not have subject
           matter jurisdiction over such dispute, then such dispute will be adjudicated
           only by, and will be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of, the
           Superior Court of Delaware, and each Party hereby irrevocably consents to,

15
     Id.

                                               9
          and waives any objection to, the jurisdiction or venue of the Delaware Courts
          with respect to such dispute.16

In short, lawsuits arising from or relating to the SULA are to be brought in the state

courts of Delaware.

          Further complicating matters, the SULA specifies conditions under which a

third-party beneficiary can waive its rights to enforce Nokia’s commitments:

          Notwithstanding the foregoing: (i) if (a) after Nokia has engaged in good faith
          negotiations with a particular Qualcomm Components customer for a license
          under the applicable Nokia Standards Patents for a period that is the longer of
          (1) twelve (12) months after the date on which Nokia first notified such
          customer of such customer having a need to take a license to the Nokia
          Standards Patents; or (2) six (6) months after the date on which Nokia notifies
          such customer (in accordance with this Section 5.3) of its rights under this
          Section 5.3, such Qualcomm customer has not entered into a license
          agreement with Nokia for a license to the applicable Nokia Standards Patents
          on terms compliant with this Section 5.3; or (b) a particular Qualcomm
          Components customer (1) first Litigates (through itself or any of its Affiliates)
          against Nokia, or (2) Litigates (through itself or any of its Affiliates) against
          Nokia based on a patent that would be covered by the definition of Nokia
          Standards Patents if such patent were owned by Nokia and if the word
          “Nokia” in the definition of “Nokia Standard Patents” were replaced by such
          Qualcomm customer’s name, then in each case such customer will no longer
          be entitled to benefit from Nokia’s commitments to license set forth in this
          Section 5.3[.]17

Under the SULA, “to Litigate” means “to commence or prosecute patent

infringement litigation (whether by claim, counterclaim, or otherwise).”18

16
     Id. § 22.
17
     Id. § 5.3.
18
  Id. § 1. In addition, “Litigation means any administrative, court, judicial, arbitral or other
similar procedure for the resolution of a controversy whether based on a claim, a
                                              10
      D. Nokia’s Litigation Against Daimler AG

         The SULA’s dispute resolution provisions come into play through a series of

patent infringement lawsuits brought by Nokia against Daimler AG in Germany.

Continental alleges that “Nokia has pursued Continental’s customers with

infringement allegations and/or lawsuits, and has obtained injunctions against at

least one Continental customer based on its use of Continental’s products.”19 In

2019, Nokia filed ten patent infringement lawsuits in Germany against Continental’s

customer Daimler AG (the “Daimler Litigation”).20 Two wholly owned subsidiaries

of Continental (the “Continental Affiliates”) intervened in each action as third-party

intervenors on behalf of Daimler.21 Neither of the Continental Affiliates are parties

counterclaim, defense or other like demand, including any proceeding before the United
States International Trade Commission (‘ITC’) and any similar proceeding brought in any
other jurisdiction throughout the world.” Id.
19
     Compl. ¶ 8.
20
   Dkt. 53 (“Hufnagel Decl.”) ¶¶ 4, 8, 11, 15, 19, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36; Dkt. 48 (“Pl.’s
Answering Br.”) at 27. While these facts are taken from materials outside the pleadings,
the facts set forth in this section are considered solely for subject matter and personal
jurisdiction considerations discussed in greater detail below. I may properly consider
materials outside of the pleadings, including affidavits, in deciding a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Acierno v. New Castle Cty.
Dep’t of Land Use, 2006 WL 1668370, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2006). In addition, “[i]n
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and any
discovery of record.” Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing
Cornerstone Techs., LLC v. Conrad, 2003 WL 1787959, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2003)).
21
     Hufnagel Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10, 13, 17, 21, 26, 29, 32, 35, 37.

                                               11
to this litigation. Nokia and Daimler ultimately settled the patent infringement

lawsuits in June 2021. 22

         Continental filed this action on January 25, 2021.

                                II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

         Nokia argues that the Complaint should be dismissed under Court of Chancery

Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). 23 Continental’s claims fall into two

classes: those that are premised on the SULA and those that are not.

         Continental’s first cause of action contends that Nokia breached its

commitments under certain SSO’s IPR Policies to license its SEPs on FRAND

terms. Continental contends that as a user of cellular standards covered by Nokia’s

SEPs, it is a third-party beneficiary to Nokia’s FRAND commitments. Continental

asserts that Nokia has failed to offer Continental a license on FRAND terms and

conditions. The claims in Count I are referred to as the “FRAND Claims.”

         Continental’s second cause of action alleges that Nokia has failed to offer

Continental a license to Nokia’s patents at rates consistent with the SULA, which

Continental says are still higher than “true FRAND” rates.           Continental also

contends that Nokia’s patents are exhausted by virtue of the SULA such that Nokia

22
     Hufnagel Decl. ¶ 3.
23
     Dkt. 18.

                                           12
cannot charge royalties for products that incorporate Qualcomm chipsets. The

claims that make up Count II are referred to as the “SULA Claims.”

         Continental’s third cause of action seeks declaratory relief corresponding to

the alleged breaches in Counts I and II. Continental also seeks a declaration

regarding what FRAND terms are and a declaration that FRAND terms must be

consistent with apportionment principles. To the extent Count III seeks declarations

premised on the SULA, those requests are “SULA Claims.” To the extent Count III

seeks declarations concerning Nokia’s alleged FRAND commitments, those

requests are “FRAND Claims.”

      A. Continental Has Standing To Bring Its Claims Against Nokia

         Nokia argues that Continental’s claims should be dismissed under Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of standing.24 “The term ‘standing’ refers to the right of a party to

invoke the jurisdiction of a court to enforce a claim or redress a grievance.”25

“Delaware’s standards for determining standing are generally the same as the

requirements for establishing Article III standing in federal court.” 26 “Unlike the

federal courts, however, . . . we apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-

restraint to avoid the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are

24
     Dkt. 37 (“Defs.’ OB”) at 23–31.
25
     Dover Hist. Soc’y v. Dover Plan. Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1110 (Del. 2003).
26
     Albence v. Higgin, --- A.3d ---, 2022 WL 17591864, at *17 (Del. Dec. 13, 2022).

                                             13
mere intermeddlers.” 27 “Where the issue of standing is related to the merits, a

motion to dismiss is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 12(b)(1).”28

But where, as here, “a party is arguing that the court lacks the authority to grant the

relief requested by the plaintiff, standing is a jurisdictional question” evaluated under

Rule 12(b)(1). 29

         The issue of standing is concerned “only with the question of who is entitled

to mount a legal challenge and not with the merits of the subject matter of the

controversy.”30       “The ‘plaintiff bears the burden of establishing this Court’s

jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations are challenged

through the introduction of material extrinsic to the pleadings, he must support those

allegations with competent proof.’”31 Because Nokia is challenging Continental’s

standing under Rule 12(b)(1), “this Court may consider materials outside of the

pleadings[.]”32

27
     Id. (quoting Dover Hist. Soc’y, 838 A.2d at 1111) (internal quotations omitted).
28
     Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. ev3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Del. 2007).
29
     Spiro v. Vions Tech. Inc., 2014 WL 1245032, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 2014).
30
   Stuart Kingston, Inc. v. Robinson, 596 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Del. 1991) (emphasis in
original).
31
  Spiro, 2014 WL 1245032, at *7 (quoting Yancey v. Nat’l Trust Co., Ltd., 1993 WL
155492, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 7, 1993)).
32
     Acierno, 2006 WL 1668370, at *3.

                                              14
          A plaintiff can establish standing by showing that: “(i) the plaintiff has

suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ i.e., a concrete and actual invasion of a legally protected

interest; (ii) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct

complained of; and (iii) it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable court

decision.’”33 To qualify as an injury-in-fact, the asserted harm must be “concrete

and particularized, and . . . actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”34

For an injury to be particularized, “it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and

individual way.”35 For an injury to be concrete, it “must be ‘de facto’; that is, it must

actually exist.”36 A “risk of real harm” may qualify as concrete. 37 These criteria

parallel the requirements for Article III standing. Because Delaware courts take a

more flexible approach to standing, a showing that satisfies the Article III

requirements will establish standing under Delaware law. Failing to satisfy the

requirements for Article III standing means that a court must determine whether

standing nevertheless exists under Delaware law. 38

33
  Albence, 2022 WL 17591864, at *17 (quoting Reeder v. Wagner, 974 A.2d 858 (Del.
June 2, 2009) (TABLE)).
34
     Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilm. Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 904 (Del. 1994).
35
     Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36
     Id. at 340.
37
     Id. at 341–42.
38
     Albence, 2022 WL 17591864, at *17.

                                              15
         Nokia argues that Continental has not sufficiently pleaded injury-in-fact for

three reasons: (1) Continental has suffered no injury because Nokia engaged in

licensing discussions with an affiliate of Continental rather than Continental itself;

(2) Continental has only alleged potential future injury; and (3) Continental’s

requests for declaratory judgment seek improper advisory opinions. 39 I reject each

of these arguments.

             Continental Negotiated With Nokia

         Nokia argues that Continental has not suffered an injury-in-fact because

Nokia discussed licensing with a different entity that is not a party to the case.40 The

plaintiff is Continental Automotive Systems, Inc., an indirect subsidiary of

Continental Automotive GmbH, which is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of

Continental AG. 41 Nokia contends that it only discussed licensing with Continental

Automotive GmbH.42 Nokia argues that “it is axiomatic that affiliates do not have

39
     Defs.’ OB at 23–31 (citing Ex. A to Defs.’ OB (“Holopainen Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–10).
40
     Id. at 24 (emphasis in original); Dkt. 63 (“Defs.’ Reply Br.”) at 18–20.
41
     Dkt. 52 (“Droessler Decl.”) ¶4.
42
     Defs.’ OB at 24–27.

                                               16
standing to sue on behalf of another company merely because the two companies are

in the same corporate family.”43

         Nokia’s own declaration undermines its argument. In that declaration, an

employee of Nokia averred that “certain employees and/or representatives . . . of

Continental Automotive Systems Inc. have participated in communications and/or

negotiations with employees and/or representatives of [Nokia] regarding a potential

FRAND license.”44 The declaration acknowledges that discussions took place with

Continental.

         Furthermore, Continental has submitted a declaration from one of its lawyers

involved in the license negotiations who avers that he spoke with Nokia about

Nokia’s SEPs.45 The declaration attaches a letter that supports his assertion. The

declaration further avers that both Nokia’s employees and Continental Group’s

representatives used the term “Continental” to encompass all Continental entities.46

         Continental has met its burden of establishing that it was one of the parties to

the negotiations with Nokia. Moreover, Nokia must have been aware of Continental

43
  Id. at 27; see also Defs. Reply Br. at 20 (“The corporate form is observed and respected
in Delaware, and Continental [ ] cannot create standing or a ripe dispute through vague
references to ‘Continental’ to disregard corporate formalities and identity[.]”).
44
     Holopainen Decl. ¶ 24; Pl.’s Answering Br. at 17–18.
45
     Dkt. 49 (“Djavaherian Decl.”) ¶ 2.
46
     Djavaherian Decl. ¶¶ 7–28; Pl.’s Answering Br. at 18.

                                             17
by May 2019 at the latest when Continental filed a lawsuit against Nokia in

California.47 To the extent Nokia’s failure to offer a license in connection with these

negotiations constituted an injury-in-fact, that injury was suffered by Continental.

            Continental’s Claims Are Ripe

          Nokia next argues that Continental’s claims are not ripe.48 Nokia points out

that it has never asserted an infringement action against Continental, nor has it ever

threatened to do so.49 Nokia argues that a risk of future harm cannot give rise to

standing. 50

         The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas already

addressed this very issue and concluded that Continental did have standing to bring

suit.51 The same reasoning applies here.

47
  Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, et al., C.A. No. 5:19-CV-02520, Dkt. 1, Complaint
for Breach of FRAND Commitments and Violations of Antitrust under Unfair Competition
Laws.
48
     Defs.’ OB at 28–29; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 21–22.
49
     Defs.’ OB at 29.
50
  Id. at 29–30 (first citing Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 743–44 (Del. Ch. 2006) for
the proposition that a dispute is not ripe where future factual developments could shape
future litigation; then citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210–11 (2021)
for the proposition that “the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as
concrete harm”).
51
     Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, 485 F.Supp.3d 712, 726–27 (N.D. Tex. 2020).

                                             18
          Nokia points out that the district court held that Continental’s alleged future

indemnification obligations did not give rise to standing. 52 That is beside the point.

What matters now is the district court’s finding that “since [Continental] alleges its

unsuccessful attempts to obtain FRAND licenses from . . . the Nokia Defendants,

[Continental] alleges an injury in fact with respect to its claims against those

Defendants.” 53 On this basis, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to

dismiss for lack of Article III standing and ripeness. 54

          Continental argues that collateral estoppel or res judicata apply to the district

court’s ruling. 55 Neither doctrine works because both require that the rendering

court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. 56 The district court

ultimately dismissed Continental’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 57 But while

not binding, the district court’s ruling is persuasive. Like the district court, I

52
     Defs.’ OB 29–30 (citing Avanci, 485 F.Supp.3d at 726).
53
     Avanci, 485 F.Supp.3d at 726–27.
54
     Id. at 727.
55
     Pl.’s Answering Br. at 17.
56
   Defs.’ Reply Br. at 16–18; see also RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Educ. Loan Tr. IV, 87
A.3d 632, 643–45 (Del. 2014) (“Ordinarily, a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or for lack of standing will not operate as a final decree that bars later claims.”);
Norman v. State, 976 A.2d 843, 868 (Del. 2009) (holding that one factor that must be
present to trigger collateral estoppel is that “the prior action has been finally adjudicated
on the merits”).
57
     Avanci, 485 F.Supp.3d at 735.

                                               19
conclude that Continental has alleged injury-in-fact. Continental has alleged that

“Nokia has declared that certain of its patents or patent applications may be or may

become essential to cellular standards under considerations by [certain] SSOs, and

committed to grant licenses to the disclosed patents on FRAND terms and

conditions.”58 Continental has further alleged that it “has not been able to obtain

such a license because Nokia has failed and refused to grant a license to Continental

on FRAND terms.”59 As alleged, Continental is unable to obtain a license on

FRAND terms to which Continental is entitled.

          Continental therefore has three options: “1) rely on the OEMs to which it sells

TCUs to obtain licenses which cover the TCUS; 2) violate the law by infringing on

the SEPs; or 3) abandon production of products using the standards, and forego

associated profits.”60 On these facts, Continental’s inability to obtain a FRAND

license is an injury-in-fact.        Continental’s allegations also identify a causal

connection between Nokia’s failure to offer a FRAND license and Continental’s

injury. A decision ordering Nokia to offer Continental a license would redress

Continental’s injury. Continental therefore has standing.

58
     Compl. ¶ 42.
59
     Id. ¶ 47.
60
     Avanci, 485 F.Supp.3d at 726.

                                             20
             Continental’s Requests For Declaratory Judgments Would Not
             Constitute Advisory Opinions

         Third, Nokia argues that Continental’s requests for declaratory judgments are

not ripe and so any ruling would constitute an advisory opinion. 61 As discussed

above, the disputes are ripe, so a ruling would not constitute an advisory opinion.62

         Alternatively, Nokia argues that Continental’s requested relief would

constitute an improper advisory opinion because Continental seeks an option for a

license.63 According to Nokia, an order requiring Nokia to offer Continental a

license would create an option because Continental would not be bound to accept

it.64 Therefore, the order would not resolve the parties dispute and would be

advisory.65

         Nokia’s argument misses the point. Continental’s requests for declaratory

relief would resolve disputes and prevent Nokia from demanding non-FRAND

terms. 66 Like Nokia, Continental would have to live with the Court’s ruling.

61
     Defs.’ OB at 41.
62
     Supra Section II.A.2.
63
     Defs.’ OB at 42–43; Defs. Reply Br. at 27–28.
64
     Defs. OB at 42–43.
65
  Id.; see also Defs. Reply Br. at 28 (“[Continental’s] request for ‘bargaining leverage’
during potential licensing discussions should be denied as a request for an advisory
opinion.”).
66
     Pl.’s Answering Br. at 48.

                                             21
          “Delaware Courts are authorized, in certain situations, to hear actions for a

declaratory judgment, but there must be an ‘actual controversy’ between the

parties.”67 “In evaluating the justiciability of a declaratory judgment claim, a court

must determine whether ‘the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that

there is a substantial controversy . . . of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant

the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”68 This determination implicates standing

as “state courts apply the concept of standing as a matter of self-restraint to avoid

the rendering of advisory opinions at the behest of parties who are ‘mere

intermeddlers.’” 69

         I am satisfied at this stage that Continental has pleaded sufficient facts

showing an actual controversy warranting the issuance of declaratory judgment. As

already noted, Continental’s claims are ripe. The declaratory judgment claims are

intimately related to its requests for injunctive relief and addressing the contract

issues will be necessary to resolve the controversy. Furthermore, Continental

pointed to alleged breaches of the IPR Policies and the SULA that have caused

Continental harm. Given this, the breaches of contract alleged by Continental are of

67
  Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A., 2015 WL 5278913, at *16 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 10, 2015) (citing 10 Del. C. § 6501).
68
  Energy P’rs Ltd. v. Stone Energy Corp., 2006 WL 2947483, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11,
2006) (quoting Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990)).
69
     Dover Hist. Soc’y, 838 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Stuart Kingston, Inc., 596 A.2d at 1382).

                                              22
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of declaratory judgment if

proven.

           To argue for the opposite result, Nokia cites to InterDigital Communications,

Inc. v. ZTE Corp.,70 a case from the United States District Court for the District of

Delaware. There, InterDigital had been in separate licensing negotiations with ZTE

and Nokia for InterDigital’s patent portfolio.71 The negotiations ultimately broke

down for various reasons, including claims that InterDigital’s licensing offer was

not on FRAND terms. 72 InterDigital sued both ZTE and Nokia in federal court.73

Both ZTE and Nokia asserted counterclaims seeking declaratory judgments that

InterDigital had not offered a FRAND rate and requesting the court to determine

what FRAND license terms would be. 74 Relevant to the present dispute, the court

found that ruling on ZTE’s and Nokia’ counterclaims would have little utility,

highlighting that neither ZTE nor Nokia had committed in a sworn declaration to

accept such a license. 75 The court also noted that “the determination of a FRAND

70
     2014 WL 2206218 (D. Del. May 28, 2014).
71
     Id. at *1–2.
72
     Id.
73
     Id. at *2.
74
     Id.
75
     Id. at *3.

                                             23
rate would not lead directly to a patent license,” as there would be many other

licensing issues that would need to be addressed.76

       Although this case bears some superficial resemblance to InterDigital, a

comparison of the two decisions supports a finding of justiciability here.                A

significant distinction between InterDigital and the present dispute is that

Continental has submitted a sworn declaration committing to accept the terms of any

license adjudicated by this Court.77 And while I acknowledge that there could be

complexity in determining the terms of a license to Nokia’s patents, the fact that the

relief sought is complex does not mean that Continental has not pleaded sufficient

facts showing it may be entitled to such relief.78

76
   Id. (noting that “license agreements often include agreements as to warranties,
indemnification, cross-licensing, trademarks and attribution, insurance, etc.”).
77
  See Compl. ¶ 79 (“Continental is entitled to a declaratory judgment with respect to . . . a
determination of what constitutes FRAND terms and conditions for a license to Nokia’s
2G, 3G, and 4G SEPs, with those terms and conditions being imposed on the parties[.]”)
(emphasis added); see also Droessler Decl. ¶ 26. Because an argument that requested relief
would constitute an improper advisory opinion goes to a question of this Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction, I may properly consider materials outside of the pleadings. See Carlyle
Invest. Mgmt L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A., 2015 WL 5278913, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10,
2015) (“A motion to dismiss for lack of a case or controversy goes to this Court’s
jurisdiction and is examined under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1).”).
78
   I also note that while Nokia contends that Continental’s claims here are nonjusticiable
or would otherwise constitute an advisory opinion, Nokia brought very similar claims in
this Court against Qualcomm in 2006. See Qualcomm Compl. ¶ 66 (“Accordingly, Nokia
seeks a declaratory judgment that Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments constitute binding
contractual obligations, and defining the principles by which a FRAND royalty must be
calculated.”); Qualcomm Compl. Prayer for Relief ¶ C (“Nokia respectfully requests that
this Court . . . [a]djudge and decree that Qualcomm’s commitment to license its essential
                                             24
      Therefore, in consideration of the above, I find that granting Continental’s

requests for either injunctive or declaratory relief would not constitute an improper

advisory opinion.

   B. Continental’s SULA Claims

      I now address Continental’s SULA Claims. This Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over Continental’s patent exhaustion claims included within Counts II

and III. The remaining portion of the SULA Claims seek (1) a declaration that

Continental is entitled to rates no greater than those included in the SULA and (2)

an order requiring Nokia to offer Continental a license at those rates. Continental

has shown that an adjudication as to item (1) would address past breaches of the

SULA by Nokia and would not be rendered moot by the SULA’s expiration. By

contrast, item (2) seeks purely forward-looking relief that is rendered moot by the

expiration of the SULA. Therefore, I grant in part and deny in part Nokia’s motion

to dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint.

         There Is No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The Patent Exhaustion
         Claims

      In its second and third causes of action, Continental requests that this Court

confirm that Nokia’s patent rights are exhausted when Continental uses a Qualcomm

GSM and UMTS patents on FRAND terms is a binding contractual obligation, enforceable
by Nokia[.]”).

                                         25
chip. Nokia argues that Continental’s request is improper because patent exhaustion

is solely a defense to patent infringement, and Nokia has not initiated or threatened

an infringement action against Continental. 79 Nokia further contends that the request

is improper because it would require resolution of an exclusively federal patent

question. 80

         I agree with Nokia that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over Continental’s patent exhaustion claims. “[P]atent exhaustion is a defense to

patent infringement, not a cause of action.” 81 Given that patent exhaustion would

only arise in a patent case, Continental’s argument would require me to consider a

patent-law question that falls within the exclusive purview of the federal courts. 82

         Continental’s claim seeking declaratory relief on the question of patent

exhaustion is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

79
     Defs.’ OB at 43–44; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 6.
80
     Defs.’ OB at 44; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 6.
81
     Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 2021 WL 5299243, at *3 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2021).
82
   See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or
copyrights.”); see also Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Norden Labs. Inc., 1992 WL 368604, at
*2, *4–5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 1992) (noting that while Delaware state courts may adjudicate
patent-related defense to asserted claims, affirmative claims for declaratory relief related
to the provisions and purposes of the patent laws are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts).

                                               26
             There Is Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Some SULA Claims

          The SULA expired on December 31, 2022.83        Nokia argues that upon

expiration of the SULA, any claim for equitable relief under that agreement became

moot and cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction.84 Nokia further argues that to the

extent Continental has any other claims related to the SULA, those claims seek only

legal declarations over which this Court lacks independent jurisdiction.85 As set

forth below, the expiration of the SULA moots Continental’s forward-looking

requests. However, the SULA’s expiration does not moot Continental’s request for

declaratory relief to the extent those requests concern Nokia’s past breaches.

Furthermore, as this Court has equitable jurisdiction over Continental’s FRAND

Claims and because these FRAND Claims survive this motion to dismiss in their

entirety, 86 exercising jurisdiction over the remaining SULA Claims is proper under

the clean-up doctrine.

83
     SULA § 1.
84
     Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 1.
85
     Id. at 5–7.
86
     See generally infra Section II.C.

                                         27
                 a. The Expiration Of The SULA Moots Some Of Continental’s
                    Claims

           “Under the ‘mootness doctrine,’ although there may have been a justiciable

controversy at the time the litigation was commenced, the action will be dismissed

if that controversy ceases to exist.”87 “A dispute is moot only if a grant of relief

cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” 88 Because determining

whether a dispute is moot “is a peculiarly fact-intensive exercise, a court should not

dismiss claims unless it is certain they could have no practical effect on the parties

if adjudicated.” 89 Nokia argues that “[t]his Court has held that equitable relief under

an agreement is moot or unavailable after the agreement expires—even where the

agreement expires after a complaint was initiated.”90 In support of this proposition,

87
  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 80 A.3d 628, 632 (Del. 2013). In Davis, our
Supreme Court stated that there are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “situations
that are capable of repetition but evade review or matters of public importance.” Id.
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cnty., 701 A.2d 819, 823 n.5 (Del. 1997)).
Continental does not allege that either of these exceptions are applicable here.
88
     PPL Corp. v. Riverstone Hldgs., 2020 WL 3422397, at *3 (Del. Ch. June 22, 2020).
89
     Id.
90
     Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 2.

                                            28
Nokia cites to two cases: Levinson v. Continental Insurance Services, Inc. 91 and All

Pro Maids, Inc. v. Layton.92

           In Levinson, this Court addressed whether an action brought by the Insurance

Commissioner of Delaware seeking to have a contract declared void was moot once

the contract expired by its own terms. 93 This Court held that “[t]he existence of

equitable jurisdiction is ordinarily to be ascertained as of the time of filing the

complaint. If, however, a contract expires by its own terms during the pendency of

an action and there can be no harm to plaintiff by the existence of the uncancelled

instrument, equity need not continue to assert jurisdiction.”94

           In All Pro Maids, this Court addressed whether a noncompetition clause was

still enforceable after the agreement which contained such clause expired by its own

terms. 95 The Court concluded that once the agreement expired, it could not be

“specifically enforced as written,” including the noncompetition clause within the

agreement.96

91
     1991 WL 50145 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1991).
92
  2004 WL 1878784 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2004), aff’d Layton v. All Pro Maids, Inc., 880 A.2d
1047 (Del. 2005) (TABLE).
93
     Levinson, 1991 WL 50145, at *1.
94
     Id. at *2.
95
     All Pro Maids, 2004 WL 1878784, at *12.
96
     Id.

                                              29
          Continental argues that the expiration of the SULA will not deprive the court

of subject matter jurisdiction because “the existence of jurisdiction is to be

ascertained as of the timing of the filing of the complaint.” 97 Because it filed its

Complaint in January 2021, nearly two years before the expiration of the SULA,

Continental argues that the SULA’s expiration will not change this Court’s

jurisdiction. 98 However, as highlighted in Levinson and All Pro Maids, even though

subject matter jurisdiction may have existed when the Complaint was filed, the

expiration of the SULA may moot Continental’s claims.

          Continental’s second cause of action requests that this Court order and declare

that Nokia must provide Continental a license at rates no greater than the agreed-

upon rates in the SULA. However, the SULA specifically provides that “[f]or

clarity, this Section 5.3 . . . will not apply to the royalties Nokia may charge for sales

made by Qualcomm Components customers before or after the Term.” 99 Therefore,

the provision Continental invokes expressly provides that it does not apply to

licensing arrangements after the expiration of the SULA.              And because the

remaining equitable remedy requested as part of Continental’s second cause of

97
  Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 1 (quoting Diebold Computer Leasing, Inc. v. Com.
Credit Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 588 (Del. 1970)).
98
     Id. at 1–2.
99
     SULA § 5.3 (emphasis added).

                                             30
action is forward looking and dependent on the continued enforceability of the

SULA, Continental’s request for an order granting a license under the SULA was

mooted once the SULA expired.

          Continental also seeks a declaration of its past rights and Nokia’s breaches.100

Those claims are not mooted by the expiration of the SULA. To ultimately succeed

on its requests for declaratory judgment as to past breaches, it is not necessary that

the contract in question (i.e., the SULA) still be in effect—Continental only needs

to show that the contract existed.101 Furthermore, Continental has alleged that

Nokia’s past alleged breaches of the SULA caused harm to Continental. Even if the

harm caused to Continental is nominal, an adjudication will have a practical effect

on the parties.102

          This result avoids the injustice that would otherwise befall Continental if I

were to agree with Nokia’s arguments about mootness. As the Supreme Court of

the United States has held, moot cases should be disposed of in the manner “‘most

100
      Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 4.
101
   See Weichert Co. of Pa. v. Young, 2007 WL 4372823, at *2 n.15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2007)
(“[T]he elements for a breach of contract claim are: the existence of a contract, the breach
of an obligation imposed by that contract, and resulting damages to the plaintiff.”) (citing
VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003)).
102
    See Penn Mart Supermarkets, Inc. v. New Castle Shopping LLC, 2005 WL 3502054, at
*15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 15, 2005) (“Even where actual damages cannot be demonstrated, the
breach of a contractual obligation often warrants an allowance of nominal damages.”)
(citation omitted).

                                               31
consonant to justice’ . . . in view of the nature and character of the conditions which

have caused the case to become moot.”103 “The principal condition to which we

have looked is whether the party seeking relief . . . caused the mootness by voluntary

action.”104 Both sides arguably bear some blame for the delay resulting in the

mootness of some of Continental’s SULA Claims. Much of the delay since the

commencement of this action, however, was not caused by Continental’s voluntary

action. 105 Disposing of the remaining SULA Claims would, in these circumstances,

not be the result “most consonant to justice.”

                 b. There Is Ancillary Jurisdiction Over The SULA Claims

            Nokia contends that even if Continental’s remaining SULA Claims are not

moot, they nonetheless cannot support jurisdiction because they seek solely legal

relief. 106 The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction which generally

103
   U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 391 (1994);
accord In re IBP, Inc., 793 A.2d 396, 404–407 (Del. Ch. 2002) (quoting the relevant
passage regarding mootness from the U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. case), aff’d Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Aetos Corp., 818 A.2d 145 (Del. 2003).
104
      Id.
105
   Some delay is attributable to Continental’s failure to seek expedition and its overlapping
claims in federal court. Dkt. 34. However, an eight-month delay resulted from Nokia’s
unsuccessful attempt to remove this case to the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware. Dkt. 13. The district court ultimately remanded the action back to this Court.
Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., 2021 WL 5299243. Additional delay was caused by the
reassignment of this case in January 2022. Dkt. 56.
106
      Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 5–7.

                                             32
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims where there is an adequate remedy at

law. 107 “It is well settled that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not independently

confer jurisdiction on this court.”108

         This Court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction under the clean-up doctrine

over a plaintiff’s legal claims and requests for relief. “Fundamentally, once a right

to relief in Chancery has been determined to exist, the powers of the Court are broad

and the means flexible to shape and adjust the precise relief to be granted so as to

enforce particular rights and liabilities legitimately connected with the subject matter

of the action.”109 The clean-up doctrine allows this Court “to resolve purely legal

causes of action that are before it as part of the same controversy over which the

Court originally had subject matter jurisdiction in order to avoid piecemeal

litigation.” 110

107
   Vama F.Z. Co. v. WS02, Inc., 2021 WL 1174690, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2021) (“The
Court of Chancery is a court of ‘limited jurisdiction’; it acquires subject matter jurisdiction
‘only where (1) the complaint states a claim for relief that is equitable in character, (2) the
complaint requests an equitable remedy when there is no adequate remedy at law or (3)
Chancery is vested with jurisdiction by statute.’”) (quoting Perlman v. Vox Media, Inc.,
2019 WL 2647520, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2019)).
108
      Reeder v. Wagner, 2007 WL 3301026, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007)

  Wilmont Homes, Inc. v. Weiler, 202 A.2d 576, 580 (Del. 1964) (citing 1 John N.
109

Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence §115 (5th ed. 1941)).
110
      Kraft v. WisdomTree Investments, Inc., 145 A.3d 969, 975 (Del. Ch. 2016).

                                              33
         In determining whether to exercise ancillary jurisdiction, this Court considers

“whether the retention of the claims will: 1) resolve a factual issue which must be

determined in the proceedings; 2) avoid a multiplicity of suits; 3) promote judicial

efficiency; 4) do full justice; 5) avoid great expense; 6) afford complete relief in one

action; or 7) overcome insufficient modes of procedure at law.”111

         This Court has jurisdiction over Continental’s FRAND Claims. 112             The

remaining factors weigh in favor of exercising ancillary jurisdiction. As this Court

has already given in-depth consideration to Continental’s SULA Claims, exercising

ancillary jurisdiction over Continental’s declaratory judgment claims avoids the

need for multiple lawsuits in different Delaware courts, promotes judicial efficiency,

and avoids the significant expense that would be associated with relitigating these

issues.113

                c. Continental May Pursue Factual Questions Regarding The
                   SULA In Discovery

         To salvage its forward-looking SULA Claims, Continental argues that those

claims “will not be mooted by the contract’s expiration if (1) Nokia has offered those

  Acierno, 2004 WL 1488673, at *5 (citing Clark v. Teeven Hldg. Co., 625 A.2d 869, 882
111

(Del. Ch. 1992)).
112
      See generally infra Section II.C.
113
   In addition, as highlighted above, this case has been pending in this Court for
approximately two years. Exercising ancillary jurisdiction under the clean-up doctrine will
ensure that further delay does not accrue as to Continental’s SULA Claims.

                                            34
same rates to others for a term beyond the expiration date, (2) Nokia might extend

the SULA, and/or (3) a future license might cover past sales.”114

         Concerning point one, it is not apparent why Nokia’s business dealings with

unrelated third parties would affect Continental’s rights, and Continental cites no

law in support of this point. Continental’s third point does not follow because it

would require a finding that Continental is entitled to a license under an expired

contract. As to Continental’s second point, it would be relevant if Nokia and

Qualcomm had mutually agreed to extend the term of the SULA. Continental can

pursue that issue in discovery and, if warranted, amend the Complaint.

             This Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over All Nokia Defendants

         Nokia has moved to dismiss Continental’s SULA Claims against the Foreign

Nokia Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.115 Continental argues that the

Foreign Nokia Defendants have consented to jurisdiction in this Court by virtue of

the Forum-Selection Clause.116

114
      Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 4 (emphases in original).
115
   Defs.’ OB at 13–16; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 5–12. This Court has general jurisdiction over
Nokia of America because it is a Delaware corporation. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134
S. Ct. 746 (2014) (“The paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a
corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of business.”). Nokia does not
argue that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over Nokia of America.
116
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 32–37.

                                                35
          Nokia argues that the Foreign Nokia Defendants have not consented to

jurisdiction through the Forum-Selection Clause for five reasons. First, Nokia

argues that the SULA does not give rise to Continental’s claims and, as such, the

Forum-Selection Clause does not apply. 117 Second, Nokia argues that Continental

is not a party to the SULA and therefore cannot invoke the Forum-Selection

Clause.118 Third, Nokia argues that the SULA grants only defensive rights to certain

third-party beneficiaries and that Continental should have raised its alleged rights in

connection with the Daimler Litigation in Germany. 119 Fourth, Nokia argues that

Continental waived its alleged rights by filing offensive litigation against Nokia.120

Fifth, Nokia argues that Continental waived its alleged rights by rejecting an offer

under the SULA. 121 None of these arguments are persuasive.

                   a. Continental Can Enforce Section 5.3

          Nokia argues that Continental cannot invoke the Forum-Selection Clause

because it provides that “[t]he Parties agree that any dispute arising under or relating

to this Agreement shall be litigated in the Court of Chancery of the State of

117
      Defs.’ OB at 13–14, 31–35.
118
      Id. at 14–16.
119
      Id. at 14, 36–38.
120
      Id. at 38.
121
      Id. at 38–40; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 11–12.

                                                 36
Delaware, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 346.”122 Nokia argues that because Continental

is not a “Party” to the SULA it cannot enforce the Forum-Selection Clause. 123

            Nokia’s argument ignores the third-party beneficiary provisions of the SULA.

Under Delaware law, “[a] third-party beneficiary’s rights are measured by the terms

of the contract.”124 The SULA clearly provides that third-party beneficiaries have

the right to enforce the Forum-Selection Clause when certain conditions are met.

            Continental has pleaded sufficient facts showing that it is reasonably

conceivable that Continental is a “Qualcomm Components customer.” 125 Under the

SULA, “Qualcomm’s Components customers will be third-party beneficiaries of

this Section 5.3 with the right to enforce its terms[.]” 126 This right is generally

defensive and arises where Nokia initiates a lawsuit, but if certain conditions are

met, the customer can enforce rights in accordance with the Forum-Selection

Clause.127 Sections 5.3 and 22, when read together, clearly establish that non-

122
      Defs.’ OB at 14–15 (citing SULA § 22 (emphasis added)).
123
      Id. at 14–15.
124
   NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related World Mkt. Center, LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 431 (Del. Ch.
2007).
125
      Infra Section II.B.4.
126
      SULA § 5.3.
127
      Id.

                                             37
signatories to the SULA have a right to enforce the Forum-Selection Clause under

certain conditions.

                    b. The Forum-Selection Clause Extends To The Foreign Nokia
                       Defendants

          Nokia takes the position that the Foreign Nokia Defendants are not parties to

the SULA. Only Nokia is a signatory, but “[o]ne does not have to be a signatory to

a contract” to be a party to the contract. 128 For example, in MicroStrategy Inc. v.

Acacia Research Corp., this Court held that a signatory’s wholly owned subsidiary

could be liable for breach of a contract that the subsidiary did not sign.129 The

contract at issue encompassed “Affiliates,” which was defined to include “any entity

which [the signatory], now or hereafter, directly or indirectly, owns or controls[.]”130

Based on this language, this Court held that the contract “unambiguously

contemplate[d]” that the subsidiary would be bound to the disputed provision. 131

          The same is true here. The Forum-Selection Clause was an agreement

between the “Parties,” which is defined in the SULA as Nokia and Qualcomm.132

“Nokia” is defined in the SULA as “Nokia Corporation and all present or future

128
      Am. Legacy Found. v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 831 A.2d 335, 343 (Del. 2003).
129
      MicroStrategy Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., 2010 WL 5550455, at *12.
130
      Id. at *2.
131
      Id. at *12.
132
      SULA §§ 1, 22.

                                            38
Subsidiaries of Nokia Corporation.” 133 “Subsidiary” is defined in relevant part in

the SULA as any entity “the majority . . . of whose shares or other securities . . . is

now or hereafter controlled by [Nokia] either directly or indirectly.” 134 Continental

has alleged that the Foreign Nokia Defendants are wholly owned subsidiaries of

Nokia Corp., and Nokia has not disputed this allegation. Therefore, the Forum-

Selection Clause extends to the Foreign Nokia Defendants.

                 c. Continental Can Assert Claims That Implicate The Forum-
                    Selection Clause

          Although Section 5.3 generally provides third-party beneficiaries only with

defensive rights, Continental argues that it can assert offensive litigation against

Nokia in this Court based on an exception in Section 5.3. 135 Continental has made

a prima facie showing that the exception applies.

          “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the court may consider the pleadings,

affidavits, and any discovery of record.”136 “If no evidentiary hearing has been held,

133
      Id. § 1.
134
    Id. The full definition of “Subsidiary” is as follows: “any corporation or other legal
entity: (i) the majority (more than fifty per cent) of whose shares or other securities entitled
to vote for election of directors (or other managing authority) is now or hereafter owned or
controlled by such Party either directly or indirectly; or (ii) that does not have outstanding
shares or securities but the majority (more than fifty per cent) of the equity interest in which
is now or hereafter owned or controlled by such Party either directly or indirectly, but only
for so long as such ownership or control exists in (i) or (ii) above.” Id.
135
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 26–29.
136
      Ryan, 935 A.2d at 265.

                                              39
plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing, in the allegations of the complaint,

of personal jurisdiction and the record is construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.”137 “If the court takes that approach, then the jurisdictional question

technically remains open until trial, when the plaintiff must prove the jurisdictional

facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”138

          As part of its opening brief in support of its motion to dismiss, Nokia

submitted an affidavit from Cordula Schumacher, a German attorney who

represented Nokia Technologies Oy and Nokia Solutions and Networks Oy in the

Daimler Litigation.139 In her affidavit, Ms. Schumacher states that the Continental

Affiliates “have been able to raise – and in fact, have expressly raised – certain

defenses in support of Daimler AG that are ultimately based on Continental’s

position and purported legal rights with respect to [the SULA].”140 Ms. Schumacher

states that “[i]n essence, [the Continental Affiliates] have argued that Nokia would

have breached FRAND commitments towards [the Continental Affiliates] by

137
      Sprint Nextel Corp. v. iPCS, Inc., 2008 WL 2737409, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2008).
138
   Harris v. Harris, 2023 WL 165967, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 2023) (citing Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 1986)).
139
      Ex. E to Defs.’ OB (“Schumacher Decl.”) ¶ 1.
140
      Id. ¶ 8.

                                              40
refusing to license to them on FRAND terms and condition” and focused on the

patent exhaustion argument in particular in the Daimler Litigation. 141

            In her affidavit, Ms. Schumacher does concede that “it is correct that [the

Continental Affiliates] cannot in their capacity as intervening third parties assert a

counterclaim against Nokia within the German Proceedings[.]” 142 Rather, to the

extent the Continental Affiliates sought to assert a counterclaim against Nokia, “the

Court could interpret such counterclaim as an admissible standalone action.” 143 In

fact, per Ms. Schumacher, another party to the Daimler Litigation, Huawei

Technologies Deutschland GmbH, brought a counterclaim against Nokia and the

German court “separated this counterclaim and treated it as a standalone action[.]”144

Nokia contends that because Continental could have asserted its rights against Nokia

as a standalone, separate proceeding, Continental is contractually barred under the

SULA from asserting its rights in this Court.

            In response, Continental submitted an affidavit from Dr. Frank-Erich

Hufnagel, a German attorney who represented the Continental Affiliates in

141
   Id. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶¶ 10–17 (setting forth the various arguments raised by the
Continental affiliates premised on the SULA in the Daimler Litigation).
142
      Id. ¶ 18.
143
      Id.
144
      Id.

                                             41
connection with the Daimler Litigation.145 Notably, Dr. Hufnagel’s statements

concerning German procedural law as it relates to third-party intervenors are

substantially consistent with Ms. Schumacher’s statements. Both Dr. Hufnagel and

Ms. Schumacher note that a third-party intervenor in German litigation is generally

limited to supporting the party which filed the third-party notice. 146 Furthermore,

both Dr. Hufnagel and Ms. Schumacher agree that, under German procedural law, a

counterclaim brought by a third-party intervenor would be separated and treated as

an independent standalone claim.147 Per Dr. Hufnagel,

145
      Hufnagel Decl. ¶ 2.
146
    Compare Hufnagel Decl. ¶ 43 (“Due to the intervenor only participating in foreign
proceedings, the intervenor is only entitled to assert means of challenge or defence based
in the rights of the party it accedes to in support of said party . . . . The intervenor cannot
assert its own means of challenge or defence that are based exclusively on its own rights .
. . . It pursues its own interests only by procedurally supporting the interest in legal
protection of the party it accedes to[.]”) with Schumacher Decl. ¶ 6 (“As intervening third
parties, [the Continental Affiliates] are entitled to assert means of challenge or defense and
to effectively take all actions in the proceedings such that they are valid, provided that its
declarations and actions are not in opposition to the declarations made and actions taken
by Daimler AG as the primary party. . . . Specifically, this means that [the Continental
Affiliates were] inter alia entitled to allege and dispute facts as well as provide evidence to
support the position of Daimler AG – as far as this is not in contradiction with Daimler
AG’s behavior.”).
147
   Compare Hufnagel Decl. ¶ 44 (“[A]n intervenor cannot either bring a counterclaim that
is based on its own rights . . . . Such counterclaim would be treated as an independent
stand-alone claim as any counterclaim by any third entity not involved in the legal
dispute.”) with Schumacher Decl. ¶ 18 (“While it is correct that [the Continental Affiliates]
cannot in their capacity as intervening third parties assert a counterclaim . . . against Nokia
within the German Proceedings, it is not excluded that if such counterclaim would have
been – inadmissibly – brought by [the Continental Affiliates], the Court could interpret
such counterclaim as an – admissible – standalone action.”).

                                              42
         Due to their position as the recipient of a third-party notice . . ., [the
         Continental Affiliates] were not able to assert defenses based on their own
         rights or bring counterclaims based on their own rights once they acceded to
         the German actions as intervenors on the side of Daimler AG. [The
         Continental Affiliates] therefore did not (and could not) assert any rights of
         Continental, such as claims for a FRAND-license against any Nokia-entity
         based on [the SULA] in the German actions. Rather, [the Continental
         Affiliates] referred to the [SULA] as a supporting document for Daimler AG’s
         defense that Nokia’s assertion of injunctive relief in the German actions was
         a violation of Nokia’s FRAND-promise and thus European antitrust law under
         Ar. 102 TFEU. 148

Per Continental, because any counterclaim based on the Continental Affiliates’ own

rights under the SULA would be treated as a new standalone action, such a claim

would need to be pursued in accordance with the provisions of the SULA.149

         Section 5.3 of the SULA provides that third-party beneficiaries to Nokia’s

commitments under the SULA have the right to enforce the terms of Section 5.3 but

“solely as a defense or counterclaim in Litigation initiated by Nokia with such

[Qualcomm Components customer or its customers].”150 There is an exception to

this general restriction: if a “Qualcomm Components customer is unable (due to the

nature and/or venue of the Nokia-Initiated Litigation) to enforce its rights as a third-

party beneficiary . . . as a defense or counterclaim in such Nokia-Initiated Litigation[,

then] the Qualcomm Components customer may enforce its rights as a third-party

148
      Hufnagel Decl. ¶ 47.
149
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 29.
150
      SULA § 5.3 (emphasis added).

                                           43
beneficiary . . . in accordance with the terms of the first and second paragraphs of

[the Forum-Selection Clause].” 151 The Forum-Selection Clause provides, in relevant

part, that disputes “arising under or relating to” the SULA are to be adjudicated by

this Court.152

            It is undisputed that certain of the Foreign Nokia Defendants sued Daimler

AG in Germany and that Daimler AG is a customer of Continental. Continental has

made a prima facie showing that when Nokia sued Daimler AG in Germany and the

Continental Affiliates intervened, this lawsuit triggered Continental’s right under the

SULA to enforce their rights as a third-party beneficiary as a defense or

counterclaim. Both Nokia and Continental have submitted affidavits from German

lawyers stating that any defense or counterclaim that the Continental Affiliates may

have brought against Nokia in the Daimler Litigation asserting such affiliates’ own

rights under the SULA would have been treated as a new standalone action. A new

standalone action would, by its very nature, not have been a defense or counterclaim

in the Daimler Litigation. Consistent with Section 5.3 of the SULA, Continental has

made a prima facie showing that any new standalone action must have been brought

in this Court.

151
      Id.
152
      Id. § 22.

                                            44
            Therefore, Continental has made a prima facie showing that it can assert

offensive litigation in this Court under the SULA. Furthermore, Continental has

made a prima facie showing that the Foreign Nokia Defendants have consented to

personal jurisdiction in this Court under the SULA’s Forum-Selection Clause. At

trial, Continental must prove the facts establishing such consent by a preponderance

of the evidence.

                  d. Continental Has Not Waived Its Third-Party Beneficiary Rights

            In the alternative, Nokia argues that Continental waived its ability to enforce

Section 5.3 of the SULA by pursuing offensive litigation against Nokia. 153 Nokia

points to language in Section 5.3 of the SULA providing in part that if “a particular

Qualcomm Components customer . . . first Litigates (through itself or any of its

Affiliates) against Nokia . . . then in each case such customer will no longer be

entitled to benefit from Nokia’s commitments to license set forth in this Section

5.3[.]”154 Nokia argues that Continental waived its ability to assert its alleged rights

under the SULA by filing offensive litigation in California federal court. 155

153
      Defs.’ OB at 38.
154
      Id. (citing SULA § 5.3(4)).
155
      Id.

                                               45
            This argument is easily dismissed. The SULA defines “to Litigate” to mean

“to commence or prosecute patent infringement Litigation[.]”156 Nokia has not

alleged that Continental has commenced or prosecuted patent infringement litigation

against Nokia. Therefore, the exclusion highlighted by Nokia is inapplicable.

                  e. Nokia’s Argument On Its Alleged License Offer Is A Factual
                     Dispute

            Nokia’s last argument in support of is Rule 12(b)(2) motion is that Continental

has rejected a license under the SULA and therefore cannot invoke the Forum-

Selection Clause. 157 Nokia cites to Continental’s claim in its Complaint that “a true

FRAND royalty rate is less than the rates set forth in the [SULA] agreement between

Nokia and Qualcomm.” 158 Nokia proffers correspondence between a representative

of Nokia and an alleged representative of an affiliate of Continental (Zonar Systems

Inc.) where Nokia contends it offered Zonar a license.159 Per Nokia, Zonar declined

the offer. 160 Nokia points to Section 5.3(4)(i) of the SULA, which provides that any

offer made by Nokia to Continental expired six months later and, after that,

156
    Pl.’s Answering Br. at 29–30 (citing SULA § 1). Indeed, Nokia seems to have
recognized the fundamental problem with this argument as it did not even address
Continental’s argument on this point in its reply brief.
157
      Defs.’ OB at 38–40; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 11–12.
158
      Defs.’ OB at 39; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 11.
159
      Defs.’ Reply Br. at 11–12 (citing Ex. 15 and Ex. 16 to Dkt. 51).
160
      Id.

                                                 46
Continental was no longer entitled to benefit from Nokia’s commitments under

Section 5.3.161

         This argument seeks summary judgment in the guise of a jurisdictional

motion. The Complaint does not allege that Continental rejected an offer from Nokia

under the SULA. Continental only alleges that it believes a true FRAND rate is

lower than the rates provided under the SULA.162 The emails proffered by Nokia

create disputes of fact. Continental submitted an affidavit from one of its attorneys

that highlights those disputes. 163

         Continental need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction

and the record is construed in the light most favorable to Continental.164 Any factual

disputes at this stage must be resolved in favor of Continental. Accordingly,

Continental has made a prima facie showing that Nokia did not offer a license to

161
    Id.; see also SULA § 5.3 (“[I]f . . . after Nokia has engaged in good faith negotiations
with a particular Qualcomm Components customer for a license under the applicable Nokia
Standards Patents for a period that is . . . six (6) months after the date on which Nokia
notifies such customer (in accordance with this Section 5.3) of its rights under this Section
5.3, such Qualcomm customer has not entered into a license agreement with Nokia for a
license to the applicable Nokia Standards Patents on terms compliant with this Section 5.3
. . . then in each case such customer will no longer be entitled to benefit from Nokia’s
commitments set forth in this Section 5.3[.]”).
162
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 30–31.
163
      See Djavaherian Decl. ¶ 5
164
      Ryan, 935 A.2d at 265.

                                             47
Continental consistent with the terms of the SULA and, as such, Continental has not

waived its rights under Section 5.3 of the SULA.

              It Is Reasonably Conceivable That Continental Is A Qualcomm
              Components Customer

          Finally, Nokia has sought to dismiss Continental’s SULA Claims under Rule

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Nokia committed in Section 5.3 of the SULA

“to offer a license for sales during the Term under the Nokia Standards Patents to

each of Qualcomm’s customers who requests such a license from Nokia or whom

Nokia approaches about taking such a license” for certain “Subscriber Terminals”165

and “Modem Cards” 166 at specified rates.167 The question is whether Continental

produces either “Subscriber Terminals” or “Modem Cards.”

165
   “Subscriber Terminal means a complete end-user terminal that can be utilized, without
any additional equipment or components (other than a SIM card, a battery or other like
item routinely connected to the device by end-users when taking the terminal into use)
being attached thereto, to initiate and/or receive wireless communications in accordance
with one or more of the CDMA Standards, GSM Standards, and/or OFDM Standards. For
clarity, if a device requires connection to a battery or other like item to initiate or receive
wireless communications, then such articles are part of the Subscriber Terminal.” SULA
§ 1.
166
   “Modem Card means a complete end user modem card that is capable of being used to
implement wireless communication capability in accordance with one or more GSM
Standards, CDMA Standards, and/or OFDM Standards when connected to another device
by an end user by means of a physical or wireless consumer interface (i.e., is not for use in
embedded applications).” Id.
167
      Id. § 5.3.

                                              48
      “In interpreting contract language, clear and unambiguous terms are

interpreted according to their ordinary and usual meaning.” 168 “To demonstrate that

a contract is ambiguous, a litigant must show that the language ‘in controversy [is]

reasonably or fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more

different meanings.’” 169 “If the plaintiff has offered a reasonable construction of the

contract, and that construction supports the claims asserted in the complaint, then

the Court must deny the motion to dismiss even if the defendant’s construction is

also reasonable.”170

      Continental has alleged that “as a supplier of TCUs, NADs, and other products

implementing various cellular standards” it is a producer of either Subscriber

Terminals or Modem Cards and therefore a third-party beneficiary to Nokia’s

commitments in Section 5.3 of the SULA. 171          Nokia contends that under the

unambiguous terms of the SULA, Continental’s TCU products do not qualify as

168
    Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 739 (Del. 2006)).
169
    Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 2011 WL 1348438, at *8
(Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2011) (quoting Pharmathene, Inc. v. Siga Techs., Inc., 2008 WL 151855,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 2008)).

  Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc., 2017 WL 3420751, at *5 (Del.
170

Ch. Aug. 9, 2017).
171
   Compl. ¶ 7; see also Compl. ¶ 73 (“Continental is a third-party beneficiary of the
[SULA] and sells products covered by the [SULA].”).

                                          49
either “Modem Cards” or “Subscriber Terminals.”172 In support of this argument,

Nokia highlights that the definition of both “Modem Cards” and “Subscriber

Terminals” contemplates devices sold as-is and fully operational to end users.173

         Nokia argues that the term “end user” is unambiguous and means drivers that

operate automobiles, not automotive OEMs that install Continental’s products into

their automobiles.174 In support of this argument, Nokia cites to two cases where

courts interpreted the meaning of the term “end user”: Motorola Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc.,

a case from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, and

Multimedia Patent Trust v. DirecTV, Inc., a case from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. 175 In Motorola, the district court stated

in a footnote that “[a]lthough not expressly stated in the form agreement, logically,

the so-called ‘End User distribution channel’ contemplates sale to retail

consumers[.]”176 In Multimedia Patent Trust, the district court held that “the plain

172
      Defs.’ OB at 32–35; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 23–26.
173
   Defs.’ OB at 34–35; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 23–26; see also SULA § 1 (“Subscriber
Terminal means a complete end-user terminal that can be utilized, without any additional
equipment or components[.]”) (emphasis added); id. (“Modem Card means a complete end
user modem card[.]”) (emphasis added).
174
      Defs.’ OB at 32–35; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 23–25.
175
      Defs.’ OB at 34; Defs.’ Reply Br. at 25.
176
      Motorola Inc. v. PC-Tel, Inc., 58 F.Supp.2d 349, 352 n.5 (D. Del. 1999).

                                                 50
meaning of ‘end user’ is a person who employs the product for its final specific use

of decoding MPEG-2 video.’”177

          For its part, Continental highlights that the term “end user” is not defined in

the SULA.178 Continental also contends that it sells after-market products directly

to consumers and such products meet the definition of “Subscriber Terminals” and

“Modem Cards.”179 Finally, Continental alleges on information and belief that

Nokia has taken the position in dealings with others that components like those sold

by Continental do fall within the definition of “Subscriber Terminals” and/or

“Modem Cards.”180

          In assessing the parties’ arguments, I look first to dictionaries to determine the

plain meaning of the term “end user,” if any. 181 Some dictionaries define “end user”

as the ultimate consumer or user of a product.182 Other dictionaries provide a more

177
   Multimedia Pat. Tr. v. DirecTV, Inc., 2011 WL 13100722, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2011).
178
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 25.
179
      Id. at 25–26.
180
      Id. at 26.
181
   See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 903 A.2d at 738 (“Under well-settled case law, Delaware
courts look to dictionaries for assistance in determining the plain meaning of terms which
are not defined in a contract.”)
182
          E.g.,      End      User,      Merriam-Webster,          https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/end%20user (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) (“[T]he ultimate consumer
of     a    finished    product.”);   End     User,      Am.     Heritage     Dictionary,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=end+user (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) (“The
                                              51
general definition of “end user” as a person or organization that uses something

rather than one that makes or sells it. 183 The first definition would tend to support

Nokia’s asserted meaning whereas the second definition would tend to align with

Continental’s asserted meaning. This analysis alone establishes that there are at least

two reasonable interpretations of the meaning of the term “end user.”

       Nokia’s cases are not sufficient, at this stage, to establish plain meaning. In

Motorola, the term “end user” was capitalized, indicating that it may have been a

defined term in the agreement at issue. The term is undefined in the SULA. In

Multimedia Patent Trust, the court found that “end user” meant the person

employing the product for its final specific use, but that does not rule out the

possibility that an automotive OEM is the person employing a TCU or NAD for its

final specific use, namely the final use of installing the TCU or NAD into the

automobile.

       At this stage, it is not possible to construe the terms “Subscriber Terminals”

and “Modem Cards” as a matter of law. Nokia’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion is denied.

ultimate consumer of a product, especially the one for whom the product has been
designed.”);         End            User,          Oxford          English        Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61863 (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) (“[T]he person who is
the ultimate recipient or user of a product; the typical or intended customer or consumer.”).
183
              E.g.,        End            User,          Cambridge               Dictionary,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/end-user (last visited Jan. 31, 2023)
(“[T]he person or organization that uses something rather than an organization that trades
in it[.]”).

                                             52
      C. Continental’s FRAND Claims

         In its FRAND Claims, Continental has alleged that Nokia breached

commitments made to SSOs to license its SEPs on FRAND terms. In connection

with the alleged breaches, Continental has sought injunctive relief and declaratory

relief. I reject Nokia’s arguments for dismissal of these claims.

             This Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The FRAND Claims

         Nokia states, in a fleeting reference, that the FRAND Claims do not seek

“viable” equitable relief.184 It is not clear what Nokia means by “viable” equitable

relief. To the extent that this is an argument against subject matter jurisdiction, it

fails.

         The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction that can exercise

subject matter jurisdiction over a case if it falls into one of three buckets. “First,

jurisdiction exists if a plaintiff asserts a claim sounding in equity.              Second,

jurisdiction exists if the plaintiff seeks equitable relief and there is no adequate

remedy at law. Third, jurisdiction exists by statute.” 185 “A request for injunctive

relief clearly constitutes equitable relief over which this Court has jurisdiction.”186

184
      Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 4.
185
      250 Exec., LLC v. Christina Sch. Dist., 2022 WL 588078, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2022).
186
      Alpha Builders, Inc. v. Sullivan, 2004 WL 2694917, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2004).

                                              53
         Continental’s FRAND Claims request, in part, that this Court order Nokia to

offer Continental a license on FRAND terms. That is a request for injunctive relief.

That request supports subject matter jurisdiction in this Court.

             There Is Ancillary Personal Jurisdiction Over Nokia

         Nokia has moved to dismiss the Complaint with respect to the Foreign Nokia

Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. 187 Continental argues that the Foreign

Nokia Defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction in this Court through the

Forum-Selection Clause for all of Continental’s claims, including its FRAND

Claims.188

         “[O]nce a valid claim has been brought and personal jurisdiction established

over a party defending a proper claim . . . Delaware courts are justified in asserting

personal jurisdiction over the defending party where the subject matter of the claim

is ‘sufficiently related to the plaintiff’s independent claims.’”189 “This policy is

  As discussed, this Court has general jurisdiction over Nokia of America because it is a
187

Delaware corporation. Supra note 115.
188
      Pl.’s Answering Br. at 34–35.
189
   Fitzgerald v. Chandler, 1999 WL 1022065, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 1999) (quoting
Technicorp Int’l II, Inc. v. H. Frederick Johnston, 1997 WL 538671, at *19 (Del. Ch. Aug.
22, 1997)).

                                           54
consistent with the desire of our courts to achieve judicial economy and avoid

duplicative efforts among courts in resolving disputes.”190

            Continental argues that once the Forum-Selection Clause applies, this court

can exercise jurisdiction over “closely related” claims.191

            In assessing Continental’s argument, this Court’s opinion in SPay Inc. v. Stack

Media Inc. is instructive. In SPay, this Court found that it had personal jurisdiction

based on a forum-selection clause within an asset purchase agreement. 192 This Court

further held that it could exercise ancillary personal jurisdiction over a defendant for

counts asserting breach of an employment agreement, breach of fiduciary duty,

unjust enrichment, and conversion. 193 Exercising ancillary jurisdiction in that case

was appropriate because “all of Plaintiff’s claims [were] sufficiently related for

personal jurisdiction purposes, as all of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the same subject

matter[.]”194

190
      Id.

  Pl.’s Answering Br. at 35 (citing Fitzgerald v. Chandler, 1999 WL 1022065, at *3 (Del.
191

Ch. Oct. 14, 1999).
192
      SPay, Inc. v. Stack Media Inc., 2021 WL 6053869, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2021).
193
      Id.
194
      Id. (citation omitted).

                                               55
       Here, Continental has made a prima facie showing that this Court has personal

jurisdiction over the Foreign Nokia Defendants for Continental’s SULA Claims.

Exercising ancillary personal jurisdiction over the Foreign Nokia Defendants for

Continental’s FRAND Claims is appropriate if those claims relate to the same

subject matter as the SULA Claims. At bottom, all of Continental’s claims seek a

license to Nokia’s SEPs. Continental has alleged two alternative bases for obtaining

such a license, one premised on the SULA and one premised on Nokia’s agreements

with certain SSOs. The subject matter is the same, and the claims arise out of a

common nucleus of fact based on Nokia’s alleged failure to provide a license. I am

satisfied at this stage in the litigation that Continental’s FRAND Claims are

sufficiently related to its SULA Claims to support the exercise of ancillary personal

jurisdiction. 195

       Exercising ancillary personal jurisdiction does not work undue prejudice on

the Foreign Nokia Defendants. 196 To begin with, the Foreign Nokia Defendants will

195
    As discussed, Continental has made a prima facie showing that the Foreign Nokia
Defendants consented to personal jurisdiction in this Court for Continental’s remaining
SULA Claims. See supra Section II.B.3. Continental must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence at trial the jurisdictional facts establishing personal jurisdiction over the
Foreign Nokia Defendants. Id. If Continental fails to do so, then such failure would impact
this Court’s ability to exercise ancillary personal jurisdiction over the Foreign Nokia
Defendants for Continental’s FRAND Claims.
196
    See Fitzgerald, 1999 WL 1022065, at *4 (noting that exercising ancillary personal
jurisdiction is appropriate “where the defendants suffer no unfair prejudice”).

                                            56
continue to be party to this litigation in connection with Continental’s SULA

Claims.197 Furthermore, Nokia agreed as part of the Forum-Selection Clause “that

any dispute arising under or relating to this Agreement shall be litigated in the Court

of Chancery of the State of Delaware[.]”198

         The ordinary meaning of “relating to” is broad.199 The SULA arose out of

Nokia’s own litigation against Qualcomm in this very court. In that case, Nokia

sought declaratory judgment that Nokia had a right to implement ETSI standards

under certain Qualcomm patents on FRAND terms.200 One of the bases for Nokia’s

lawsuit was the FRAND contract with ETSI.201             Here, one of the bases for

Continental’s lawsuit is the FRAND contract with ETSI. As such, Continental’s

FRAND Claims relate to Nokia’s prior litigation with Qualcomm, which gave rise

197
   See SPay, 2021 WL 6053869, at *5 (“Given that Palazzo indisputably is subject to the
Court’s jurisdiction for most of the claims asserted against him, the Court may properly
exercise personal jurisdiction over him for all of the remaining claims.”).
198
      SULA § 22 (emphasis added).
199
   See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1033 (2021)
(“ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘relate to’ is [] broad”).
200
      Qualcomm Compl. ¶¶ 116–167.
201
      Id. ¶¶ 56–73.

                                          57
to the SULA. Therefore, by agreeing to litigate any disputes “relating to” the SULA

in this Court, the Foreign Nokia Defendants consented to jurisdiction here. 202

             It Is Reasonably Conceivable That Continental Could Recover On Its
             FRAND Claims

         Continental has pleaded sufficient facts as to its FRAND Claims such that it

is reasonably conceivable that Continental could recover on those claims. Nokia did

not advance any contrary arguments, but merely asserted in its post-hearing

supplemental briefing on mootness that Continental’s claims based on Nokia’s

FRAND commitments were not “viable.”203 That is insufficient, and any defense

on this ground is waived. 204

         Nokia has argued at various points that the relief Continental seeks as part of

its FRAND Claims is something no federal or state court has ever granted.205

However, the basic premise of this argument—namely that Continental seeks

202
   Because I find that personal jurisdiction is appropriate under ancillary jurisdiction, I
need not address Continental’s remaining arguments as to personal jurisdiction.
203
      See Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 3.
204
    See Mack v. Rev Worldwide, Inc., 2020 WL 7774604, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2020)
(citing Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999)) (“It is well settled that
arguments that were not raised in an opening brief and are beyond the scope of matter
asserted in a responsive brief are deemed waived.”).
205
    E.g., Dkt. 78 at 10:2–6 (“Continental is asking this Court to do something that no United
States court, no U.S. Federal court, no U.S. state court, has ever done without the consent
of all the parties, namely set a global FRAND rate.”); Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 4 (“Courts have
recognized they should not attempt to impose global license terms absent mutual consent
in the context of FRAND disputes.”).

                                             58
extraordinary relief—is contradicted by Nokia’s prior litigation against Qualcomm,

where Nokia sought comparable relief.206 Given Nokia’s own conduct, its argument

is not compelling.

      D. Nokia’s Forum Non Conveniens And Claim Splitting Arguments Are
         Rejected

         Finally, Nokia asserts Continental’s “claims should either be dismissed or, in

the alternative, stayed pending resolution of the Fifth Circuit appeal involving nearly

identical claims asserted in federal court.”207 The appeal challenged the decision by

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in Continental

Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, Case (the “Federal Action”).208 On June

21, 2022, the Fifth Circuit issued an order affirming “the judgment of the district

court that Continental failed to state claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman

Act.” 209 The deadline for Continental to seek certiorari has passed. 210 Therefore,

the judgment in the Federal Action is final, and that litigation provides no basis for

dismissal.

206
      Qualcomm Compl. ¶¶ 7–8, 31–33; see supra Section I.C.
207
      Defs.’ OB at 46; see also Defs.’ Reply Br. at 29–33.
208
      Defs. OB at 45–46.
209
   Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, 2022 WL 2205469, at *1 (5th Cir. June 21, 2022);
see also Dkt. 70 (“The purpose of this letter is to inform the Court that the appeal in the
Federal Action has now concluded.”).
210
      Dkt. 70 at 2.

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            The Cryo-Maid Factors Do Not Favor Application Of Forum Non
            Conveniens

         Nokia seeks dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens. “In order to

dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for forum non conveniens, the court must conclude,

after a consideration of the relevant Cryo-Maid factors, that the procession of the

litigation in the plaintiffs’ chosen forum would subject the defendants to

‘overwhelming hardship and inconvenience.’” 211 Nokia has failed to meet that

burden.

         In assessing whether Delaware is the appropriate venue for litigation, the

Court considers the following factors (generally referred to as the Cryo-Maid

factors): “(1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of a compulsory

process for witnesses; (3) the possibility to view the premises, if appropriate; (4) all

other practical problems that would make the trial easy, expeditious, and

inexpensive; (5) whether the controversy is dependent upon Delaware law, which

the courts of this State should decide rather than those of another jurisdiction; and

(6) the pendency or non-pendency of a similar action in another jurisdiction.” 212

211
    Lisa, S.A. v. Mayorga, 2009 WL 1846308, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 22, 2009) (citing IM2
Merch. And Mfg., Inc. v. Tirex Corp., 2000 WL 1664168, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2000)),
aff’d Lisa, S.A. v. Mayorga, 993 A.2d 1042 (Del. 2010).
212
      GXP Capital, LLC v. Argonaut Mfg. Serv., 253 A.3d 93, 101 (Del. 2021).

                                            60
         Nokia primarily relied on the ongoing appeal of the Federal Action as the basis

for its claim of forum non conveniens. 213 Nokia argued that the fourth and sixth

Cryo-Maid factors strongly favored dismissal214 and that the first, second, and third

Cryo-Maid factors were neutral.215 With the conclusion of the appeal, none of those

factors are pertinent.

         The only Cryo-Maid factor for which Nokia’s argument was not heavily

premised on the appeal of the Federal Action was the fifth factor, where Nokia

argues that Continental’s FRAND Claims are largely “claims . . . for breach of

contract under French law[.]”216 Assuming that to be the case, a Delaware court

“must not let its own lack of facility in a foreign language or foreign law tilt the

choice-of-law calculus [because] to do so is unfair to the parties[.]” 217 Furthermore,

“Delaware courts often decide legal issues—even unsettled ones—under the law of

213
      Defs.’ OB at 45–54.
214
    See id. at 50 (noting that the fourth Cryo-Maid factor “strongly supports dismissal for
forum non conveniens” because the parties were “still awaiting the outcome of the Fifth
Circuit appeal”); id. at 48 (noting that the sixth Cryo-Maid factor heavily favored dismissal
because “there is a nearly identical case pending before the Fifth Circuit, where the parties
and the Northern District of Texas have already invested substantial effort and resources
in litigating issues that are closely related to the ones presented to this Court”).
215
      Id. at 51–52.
216
      Id. at 49 (emphasis in original).
217
      Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Arteaga, 113 A.3d 1045, 1060 (Del. 2015).

                                              61
other jurisdictions,”218 and “the mere application of foreign law is insufficient reason

to utilize the forum non conveniens doctrine.”219 Here, the sole Cryo-Maid factor

that weighs in Nokia’s favor is the potential application of French law. This is an

insufficient reason to dismiss based on forum non conveniens.

             There Is No Improper Claim-Splitting

         Nokia also argues for dismissal on the theory that Continental is improperly

splitting its claims between the Federal Action and this case.220 Because the Federal

Action has been fully resolved, Nokia’s argument is no longer relevant.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss Count I is DENIED; the

motion to dismiss Count II is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; the motion

to dismiss Count III is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The parties are

directed to submit a form of implementing order within ten days.

218
      Berger v. Intelident Solutions, Inc., 906 A.2d 134, 137 (Del. 2006).
219
      Aveta, Inc. v. Colon, 942 A.2d 603, 610 (Del. Ch. 2008).
220
      See Defs. OB at 52–53; Defs. Reply Br. at 29–33.

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