Court Opinion

ID: 9387205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-16 15:00:20.017975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.083730
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10159     Document: 00516712265         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                ____________                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                  No. 22-10159                           April 14, 2023
                                ____________
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Victor Manuel Solorzano,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:16-CR-283-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          Victor Solorzano was sentenced to statutory mandatory-minimum
   sentences of 10 and 25 years as part of a total 567 months’ imprisonment. He
   appealed. While his appeal was pending, the First Step Act was signed into
   law. In relevant part, the new law (a) decreased the mandatory minimum of
   25 years in cases, like Solorzano’s, where the predicate convictions were part
   of the same criminal proceeding and (b) retroactively applied that decrease
   to all offenses for which “a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as
   of such date of enactment.” Pub. L. 115–391, § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5221. This
   Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence on plain error
Case: 22-10159      Document: 00516712265            Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/14/2023

                                      No. 22-10159

   review. See United States v. Solorzano, 832 F. App’x 276, 283 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (“Solorzano I”). On resentencing, the district court declined to retroactively
   apply the decrease and left in place Solorzano’s 25-year sentence for the
   relevant count. This appeal followed.
                                Factual Background
          Victor Solorzano was a target of a narcotics investigation in Dallas. As
   part of their investigation, law enforcement officers obtained permission to
   place a tracking device on Solorzano’s car. A covert officer placed the
   tracking device on Solorzano’s car and began to leave when Solorzano
   emerged from his residence with his rifle at the ready and shouted at the
   officer. After attempts to verbally engage seemed to fail, the officer ran
   towards his partner’s vehicle and Solorzano opened fire. Solorzano shot the
   officer in the left hand and left ankle, but the officer was able to climb into his
   partner’s vehicle and the two drove off despite gunshot damage to the
   vehicle. Solorzano was subsequently arrested.
                                 Procedural History
          In a six-count indictment, Solorzano was charged with: (Count 1)
   possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, (Count 2)
   possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (Count 3)
   assault on a federal officer (that is, the officer who planted the tracker),
   (Count 4) using carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm during and
   in relation to a crime of violence (namely, Count 3), (Count 5) assault on a
   federal officer (that is, the driver), and (Count 6) using carrying, brandishing,
   and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence
   (namely, Count 5). After a jury trial, Solorzano was found guilty as to Counts
   1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and not guilty as to Count 2.

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                                       No. 22-10159

          At sentencing, the district court sentenced Solorzano to 147 months’
   imprisonment for his convictions on Counts 1, 3, and 5. 1 As required by
   statute, Solorzano was sentenced to a consecutive ten years for his conviction
   on Count 4 and a further consecutive 25 years for his conviction on Count 6.
   Solorzano timely appealed.
          On appeal, this court affirmed Solorzano’s conviction, holding that he
   had neither demonstrated error on a Fourth Amendment issue nor
   successfully demonstrated that the evidence was insufficient for a finding of
   guilt. See Solorzano I, 832 F. App’x at 279-81. However, the panel held that,
   since Solorzano did not know that he was firing at federal officers, he “was
   not motivated by [their] official status,” and so the district court plainly erred
   in imposing a particular enhancement. Id. at 282. The court “thus vacate[d]
   Solorzano’s sentence on Counts 3 and 5 and remand[ed] so that he may be
   resentenced.” Id. at 283. Notably, the court rejected an argument that the
   then-newly-enacted First Step Act applied to nullify the mandatory 25-year
   sentence as to Count 6. Relying on precedent, the court noted that “‘A
   sentence is ‘imposed’ when the district court pronounces it, not when the
   defendant exhausts his appeals.’” Id. at 284 (quoting United States v. Gomez,
   960 F.3d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 2020)). The court therefore “affirm[ed] the
   district court’s sentence on Count 6.” Id. The opinion ended: “Based on the
   foregoing, Solorzano’s conviction is AFFIRMED. Because the district court
   plainly erred in applying the sentence enhancement under § 3A1.2(b) for
   Counts 3 and 5, Solorzano’s sentence is VACATED. We REMAND for
   resentencing consistent with this opinion.” Id.

          _____________________
          1
           The court initially sentenced Solorzano to 156 months on these counts but took
   nine months off that pronouncement in consideration of time spent in state custody.

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                                          No. 22-10159

           On remand, the district court stated that he “believes that the Fifth
   Circuit’s opinion was explicit as to what the Court had to do,” namely
   resentence as to Counts 3 and 5 and leave the rest untouched. So, over
   objections from Solorzano’s counsel, the court decided that it had no
   authority to revisit the 10-year sentence as to Count 4 and the 25-year
   sentence as to Count 6. However, having accounted for the length of time
   encompassed by those two sentences and the defendant’s post-conviction
   rehabilitation efforts, the court varied downwards from the guidelines and
   sentenced Solorzano to 60 months as to Counts 1, 3, and 5. 2 Solorzano again
   appealed.
                                         Discussion
           Solorzano challenges the re-imposition of the mandatory-minimum
   sentences on three grounds: first, that the district court misinterpreted the
   mandate of Solorzano I, second, that the district court erred in not applying
   the First Step Act, and third, that the district court erred in not considering
   the First Step Act under the 3553 sentencing factors. As we determine the
   case on the first of these challenges, we do not reach the latter two. 3
           “We review de novo whether the trial court faithfully and accurately
   applied our instructions on remand.” Sobley v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 302 F.3d 325,
   332 (5th Cir. 2002). Solorzano contends that the district court erred in
   believing that the mandate bound it to maintain the mandatory minimum
   sentences as to Counts 4 and 6. Unfortunately, Solorzano I is less than clear.

           _____________________
           2
             As the original sentence was bundled as to these three counts, all parties agreed
   that the court had to re-sentence as to all three despite the Fifth Circuit’s language of
   vacating as to Counts 3 and 5 only. See infra, n.4.
           3
             To the extent that the argument concerning the 3553(a) factors is independent of
   the other two issues, we find that Solorzano has not shown error, plain or otherwise, in the
   district court’s discussion of the issue.

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   In the section which discusses the error, the opinion reads: “[w]e thus vacate
   Solorzano’s sentence on Counts 3 and 5 and remand so that he may be
   resentenced under the appropriate Guidelines.” Solorzano I, 832 F. App’x at
   283 (emphasis added). In another section, it is stated: “we affirm the district
   court’s sentence on Count 6.” Id. at 284. But the conclusion is more
   sweeping: “Because the district court plainly erred in applying the sentence
   enhancement under § 3A1.2(b) for Counts 3 and 5, Solorzano’s sentence is
   VACATED. We REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.”
   Id. The interpretive challenge is as follows: the body of the opinion suggests
   that only part of the sentence was vacated, while the conclusion suggests that
   it all was.
           Solorzano attempts to sidestep the interpretive challenge by
   suggesting that “the intervening law exception” should apply. A district
   court may forgo faithful application of the mandate in one of three
   circumstances: “(1) Introduction of evidence at a subsequent trial that is
   substantially different; (2) an intervening change in controlling authority;
   and (3) a determination that the earlier decision was clearly erroneous and
   would work a manifest injustice.” United States v. Pineiro, 470 F.3d 200, 205-
   06 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Here, Solorzano claims that the
   enactment of the First Step Act is “an intervening change in controlling
   authority.” Id. at 205. Not so. The intervening change in law must occur
   “between the issuance of our remand mandate . . . and . . . resentencing on
   remand.” Id. at 207. The First Step Act was enacted well before the decision
   in Solorzano I, so it is not an “intervening” change in authority. And while
   Solorzano claims that “there has been a significant change in the overall
   attitude towards the [First Step] Act and its overall applicability to criminal
   defendants” since Solorzano I, his briefing identifies no controlling authority
   by which the district court was bound.

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                                         No. 22-10159

           “This court has adopted a restrictive rule for interpreting the scope of
   the mandate in the criminal resentencing context.” United States v. Matthews,
   312 F.3d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). This restrictive rule
   mandates that “only those discrete, particular issues identified by the appeals
   court for remand are properly before the resentencing court.” Matthews, 312
   F.3d at 658 (quoting United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir.
   1998)). Moreover: “The only issues on remand properly before the district
   court are those issues arising out of the correction of the sentence ordered by
   this court. In short, the resentencing court can consider whatever this court
   directs – no more, no less. All other issues … which could have been brought
   in the original appeal[] are not proper for reconsideration.” Marmolejo, 139
   F.3d at 531. Solorzano I explicitly identified one “discrete, particular issue[],”
   id. at 530, for the district court to correct: improper application of an
   enhancement to Counts 3 and 5. See Solorzano I, 832 F. App’x at 282-83.
   Despite the inexact language of the conclusion, the district court was thus
   correct in determining that the mandate of Solorzano I encompassed only
   Counts 3 and 5. 4 Therefore, the district court correctly declined to reach the
   question of whether or not the First Step Act’s retroactivity provision would
   change the mandatory minimums Solorzano faced.
                                        Conclusion
           Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

           _____________________
           4
             The district court was also correct to note that it needed to reconsider the
   sentence as to Count 1, even though it was untouched in Solorzano I. This is because
   Solorzano’s sentence was bundled as to Counts 1, 3, and 5. See United States v. Clark, 816
   F.3d 350, 360 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Counts 4 and 6, however, ran
   consecutively to any sentence imposed for Counts 1, 3, and 5, and were thus unbundled and
   not part of the mandate.

                                               6