Court Opinion

ID: 9606443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:45.579409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.523928
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
It is important to consider what has happened in this case. Chandler was permitted to serve his sentence beyond the confines of prison. When he violated that privilege, his probation was modified by placing him in custody of a diversion center — still outside the confines of prison. Now, after Chandler has absconded and has been returned to custody only by reason of his re-arrest, the majority will limit the sanction for this second violation to a brief confinement during the unserved portion of his probated sentence.
That seems to be an undue restriction upon the ability of the trial judge to enforce sentences.
1. OCGA § 16-10-52 (a) (3) provides: “A person commits the offense of escape when he: Intentionally fails to return as instructed to lawful custody or lawful confinement after having been released on the condition that he will so return.” It is undisputed that Chandler was released on such a condition, and that he failed to return. Hence, the issue in this case is whether the status to which he was directed *777to return was that of “lawful confinement or lawful custody.” The answer to that inquiry must be in the affirmative. Chandler’s initial probationary status was modified by the sentencing judge so as to commit him “to the custody of a diversion center.” State v. Chandler, 184 Ga. App. 1, 2 (360 SE2d 727) (1987). It was from such custody that he was released, and to such custody that he failed to return. Hence, all the elements of the crime of escape are established.
Decided February 4, 1988.
Sara F. Miller, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, for appellee.
2. It is true that Chandler’s conduct might be the cause for the revocation of his probation. The question, however, is whether the mere existence of two sanctions demands a holding that they are of necessity inconsistent, thereby requiring the lesser punishment under the principles discussed in the majority opinion.
Logic would reject that proposition. Chandler’s conduct was both a violation of probation and the crime of escape. As such, it may serve both as a cause for probation revocation, and as basis for an independent felony prosecution. (Note Judge Carley’s apt observation that “probation revocation and criminal prosecutions are not mutually exclusive punishments.” Id.) Were it otherwise, a probationer might commit the most heinous crime, and face nothing more severe than a revocation of the unexpired term of his probation.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Hunt join in this dissent.