Court Opinion

ID: 9917021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 15:04:39.714637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:46.658398
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us

SJC-09265

                COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JASON ROBINSON.

       Suffolk.      February 6, 2023. – January 11, 2024.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Joint Enterprise. Robbery.
     Evidence, Joint enterprise, Statement of codefendant,
     Hearsay, Third-party culprit, Expert Opinion. Practice,
     Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Hearsay, Trial of
     defendants together, Instructions to jury, Argument by
     prosecutor, Sentence. Constitutional Law, Sentence.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on September 27, 2000.

     Following review by this court, 480 Mass. 146 (2018), a
motion for a new trial was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., and a
motion for reconsideration was also heard by him.

     Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Jillise McDonough also present)
for the defendant.
     Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, & Cailin M.
Campbell, Special Assistant District Attorney (John C. Verner,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Darina Shtrakham, of California, Matt K. Nguyen, of the
District of Columbia, & Adam Gershenson for Jeffrey Aaron &
others.
                                                                   2

     Jasmine Gonzales Rose, of Oregon, Duke K. McCall, III, &
Douglas A. Hastings, of the District of Columbia, Robert S.
Chang, of Washington, Caitlin Glass, Neda Khoshkoo, & Katharine
Naples-Mitchell, for Boston University Center for Antiracist
Research & others.
     Kenneth J. Parsigian, Avery E. Borreliz, Erin M. Haley, &
Martin W. Healy for Carol S. Ball & others.
     Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, &
John J. Barter for Committee for Public Counsel Services.

     BUDD, C.J.   Following a joint jury trial with his

codefendant, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of

murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory of felony-

murder, with armed robbery as the predicate offense, in

connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek (victim).1

The defendant appeals from his convictions and from the denial

of his motion for a new trial, claiming that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him as well as reversible error

on the part of the Commonwealth and the judge.   In the

alternative, he asks us to declare his life sentence without

parole to be unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old

at the time of the crime, based on Diatchenko v. District

     1 The defendant also was convicted of unlicensed possession
of a firearm as a coventurer, for which he received a sentence
of from four to five years to run concurrently with his life
sentence. However, as no evidence was presented that the
defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm, the
judgment as to this conviction must be reversed and the verdict
set aside, so that the defendant may be retried. See
Commonwealth v. Guardado, 493 Mass. 1, 7 (2023).
                                                                     3

Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (2013), and

sentence him to life with parole after fifteen years.

     We affirm the defendant's conviction of murder in the first

degree, as well as the order denying his motion for a new trial.

After full consideration of the record, we further conclude that

extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is not

warranted.   However, pursuant to our decision in Commonwealth v.

Mattis, 493 Mass.        (2023), the defendant's sentence of life

without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional where he

was nineteen years old at the time of the offense of murder in

the first degree.2    We therefore remand this matter to the

Superior Court for resentencing on the charge of murder in the

first degree in accordance with that decision.3

     Background.     We summarize the facts as the jury could have

found them, reserving certain details for later discussion.     On

March 27, 2000, the defendant was with codefendant Tanzerius

     2 This case was paired with the one underlying Mattis,
because, similarly to the defendant here, Mattis asked this
court to consider whether a sentence of life without parole is
constitutional when applied to those who committed their crime
while under twenty-one years of age.

     3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs on this issue submitted
by seventeen neuroscientists, psychologists, and criminal
justice scholars; Boston University Center for Antiracist
Research, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Center
on Race, Inequality, and the Law, and Criminal Justice Institute
at Harvard Law School; twenty-three retired Massachusetts
judges, Boston Bar Association, and Massachusetts Bar
Association; and Committee for Public Counsel Services.
                                                                      4

Anderson, Joleena Tate (Anderson's girlfriend), Heather Coady,

and Edward Gauthier at Gauthier's home.     While there, Tate asked

Anderson if he wanted to rob someone.     She told Anderson that

she knew someone named "Yaz," who always carried a large amount

of cash and was a "passive" person who would not "put up a fight

if ever approached."   After indicating that he was interested in

committing the robbery, Anderson called the defendant into the

room to ask him whether he was "down for a robbery."    The

defendant agreed.

    The trio planned that Tate would meet the victim and then

lead him to an apartment building in Brighton, where Anderson

and the defendant would ambush him.     After having dinner with

the victim at a restaurant in Watertown, Tate asked him to drive

her to the designated location and, using the victim's cell

phone, sent "1145" to the defendant's pager to signal when she

would be at the appointed meeting place.

    When Tate and the victim arrived, she led him into a

hallway of the building and then back out again, where they

encountered Anderson and the defendant.    Tate said to the

victim, "[W]e're being robbed," and walked away.     Anderson and

the defendant led the victim by his arms back into the building.

    Once inside, Anderson told the victim to keep his hands up

and not to turn around to look at them.    Anderson further told

the victim that he was going to be frisked for his belongings.
                                                                       5

At that point, the victim began to plead with them and to reach

for a doorknob.    Anderson told the victim to stop reaching.    The

victim continued to plead and said that he was not a police

officer.     Anderson then became "nervous" and shot the victim in

the back of the head.     Anderson and the defendant ran out of the

building, got into Anderson's car with Tate, and drove away.

The defendant, who was seated in the back, was holding a cell

phone and wallet and began to count the cash inside the wallet.

When Tate asked Anderson what happened, Anderson replied,

"[H]e's murked," which Tate understood to mean dead.     Anderson

also said, "I got my body for the summer."    Anderson then

removed a gun from his right vest pocket and passed it to the

defendant.    Anderson parked the car in a vacant lot, took the

gun from the defendant, hid it under a piece of construction

equipment, and drove away.    Anderson returned to the lot later

that evening with Tate and the defendant, retrieved the gun, and

passed it to the defendant again.     The Commonwealth did not

present evidence of a recovered gun to the jury.4

     Hours later, a resident of the apartment building found the

victim outside the building lying in a pool of blood.     The

medical examiner later determined that the cause of death was a

     4 The prosecutor represented to the court, outside the
presence of the jury, that no gun was ever recovered in this
case.
                                                                      6

single gunshot wound to the head, fired within one-half inch, or

closer, from the side of the victim's face.

    We stayed the defendant's direct appeal in order for a

Superior Court judge to hear his motion for a new trial.     After

the defendant's motion for a new trial was allowed, we reversed

that order on appeal and remanded for additional findings.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 155 (2018).    The motion

for a new trial ultimately was denied on all but one issue,

sufficiency of the evidence for the felony-murder conviction,

which was reserved for this court.

    Discussion.    1.   Sufficiency of the evidence.   In order for

a jury to convict a defendant of joint venture felony-murder

with armed robbery as the predicate offense, the Commonwealth

must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

participated in committing the armed robbery as a joint venturer

with the intent to commit that offense and that the victim was

killed in furtherance of that armed robbery.    Commonwealth v.

Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673 (2019).   To prove armed robbery, the

Commonwealth must prove that a defendant (1) was armed with a

dangerous weapon; (2) either applied actual force or violence to

the victim, or by words or gestures put the victim in fear; (3)

took the money or the property of the victim; and (4) did so

with the intent to steal it.   Commonwealth v. Chesko, 486 Mass.

314, 320 (2020).   Thus, to convict the defendant of armed
                                                                     7

robbery by joint venture, the Commonwealth was required to show

that the defendant knew that Anderson was armed and that the

defendant assisted Anderson in committing the armed robbery

while sharing the intent to steal the property of the victim.

See Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 11 (2010).

    The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove

that he committed joint venture armed robbery (and consequently

failed to prove joint venture felony-murder) because there was

insufficient evidence that he knew Anderson was armed.     For the

reasons discussed infra, we disagree.

    In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we assess the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found

each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).     In so

doing, we keep in mind that "[p]roof of the essential elements

of the crime may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from

the evidence, . . . and the inferences a jury may draw need only

be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or

inescapable."   Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791

(2022), quoting Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800 (2021).

    We conclude that, taken together, the evidence was

sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant knew that

Anderson would be armed when they committed the robbery.     See,
                                                                   8

e.g., Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 118, cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 607 (2018); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass.

22, 32-33 (2017).   First, prior to the robbery, Anderson, the

defendant, and Tate planned that it would take place in the

hallway of an apartment building.   The defendant's knowledge

that Anderson was armed therefore could be inferred, where a

weapon was likely to be of particular use to "persuade the

victim to surrender his property quickly and without resistance"

to avoid being seen by potential witnesses.5   Commonwealth v.

Colon, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 728 (2001).   See Commonwealth v.

Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220 (2010) (knowledge that

codefendant was armed inferred where robbery needed to be

effectuated quickly).   In addition, neither Anderson nor the

defendant had a mask, and they therefore would need a weapon to

discourage the victim from looking at them.

     Notably, the defendant and Anderson spent between one and

two hours together, after dropping Tate off to meet and spend

time with the victim before the robbery.    It is reasonable to

infer that, during that period of time, the defendant and

Anderson discussed their plan further and that Anderson made the

     5 The defendant contends that the evidence demonstrated that
he would not expect that a weapon would be necessary because
Tate told Anderson that the victim was "passive." However, the
defendant was not present to hear this exchange, thus it is not
probative as to whether the defendant knew that Anderson brought
a gun to the robbery.
                                                                   9

defendant aware of the gun.   See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462

Mass. 131, 139-140 (2012) (defendant "had an opportunity to see

the gun earlier that evening on the trip" to site of robbery);

Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 703 (2003), citing

Commonwealth v. Tracy, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 458 (1989).

     Even assuming that the defendant was unaware that Anderson

had a gun until Anderson pulled it out, the defendant did not

withdraw from participation in the joint venture at that time.

Instead, the defendant had possession of a wallet and cell

phone, which the jury could infer belonged to the victim, when

he returned to Anderson's car.   See Commonwealth v. Eagles, 491

Mass. 210, 219-220 (2023) (jury could infer that defendant had

requisite intent for armed robbery where, after learning of

coventurer's use of weapon, defendant continued to take victim's

valuables).   "Where a defendant continues to act in furtherance

of the joint venture even after learning of a coventurer's

weapon, we have allowed an inference that the coventurer had the

requisite intent for the joint venture."6   Phap Buth, 480 Mass.

     6 The defendant argues that Rosemond v. United States, 572
U.S. 65, 78 (2014), establishes a different standard, requiring
that proof of a "defendant's knowledge of a firearm must be
advance knowledge." Notwithstanding that the United States
Supreme Court was interpreting a particular Federal criminal
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), it went on to clarify, "Of course,
if a defendant continues to participate in a crime after a gun
was displayed or used by a confederate, the jury can permissibly
infer from his failure to object or withdraw that he had such
                                                                    10

at 117.   Compare Commonwealth v. Mazariego, 474 Mass. 42, 48-49

(2016) (defendant guilty of joint venture where he remained at

scene with coventurer after crime), with Commonwealth v.

Fickett, 403 Mass. 194, 200-201 (1988) (evidence presented that,

if believed, would have raised reasonable doubt whether

defendant had withdrawn from joint venture where he explicitly

informed coventurer of his withdrawal from robbery plot).

    The totality of the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the

jury's finding that the defendant intended to participate with

Anderson in an armed robbery of the victim.   Where the

circumstances of the robbery gave rise to a reasonable inference

that a weapon would be needed, and where the evidence suggested

that the defendant did not withdraw from the venture after

Anderson drew the gun, the jury were permitted to infer that the

defendant possessed the requisite knowledge and intent to be

convicted of the predicate offense of armed robbery.      There thus

was sufficient evidence to convict him of felony-murder.

    2.    Admission of codefendant's statements and acts.     The

defendant argues that the admission of certain evidence over his

knowledge." Id. at 78 n.9. This is compatible with our case
law. See, e.g., Phap Buth, 480 Mass. at 117.
                                                                  11

objection unduly prejudiced him.7   For the reasons discussed

infra, we are not persuaded.

     a.   Before the shooting.   The defendant suggests that

Tate's testimony regarding events involving only Tate and

Anderson had an adverse impact on the defendant.    First, Tate

testified that, prior to the robbery, she and Anderson had

discussed a scheme Anderson had to rob drug dealers.   She also

testified that, two days before the shooting, she and Anderson

had traveled to New Hampshire, broke into Tate's father's

condominium, and stole firearms and ammunition, including a .357

magnum revolver.

     On appeal, the defendant does not specify how this evidence

was prejudicial to him.   He was not implicated in either

Anderson's planned scheme to rob drug dealers or the theft of

the firearm.   Moreover, at the time of Tate's testimony, the

judge provided limiting instructions emphasizing to the jury

that they could not consider evidence concerning one defendant

against the other unless they determined that the acts or

     7 As the defendant objected to the admission of this
evidence at trial, we review any erroneous admission of hearsay
for prejudicial error and determine whether any error of a
constitutional dimension was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth, 482 Mass. 454, 465 (2019).
However, as discussed infra, we ultimately find no error in the
admission of this testimony.
                                                                     12

statements occurred during a joint venture.8     She reemphasized

this point in the final jury charge.      As we presume that the

jury followed the judge's instructions, see Commonwealth v.

Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 195 (2010), the defendant was not

prejudiced by the admission of this evidence.

     b.    After the shooting.   The defendant also challenges the

admission of various statements Anderson made after the

     8   The judge instructed the jury:

     "[B]efore you can consider any evidence of acts or
     statements allegedly made by one of the participants
     against the defendants here under a theory of joint
     venture, you first need to determine whether the
     Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence which is
     independent of those acts or statements to support a fair
     inference that there was a joint venture between the
     participants and the defendants. . . . If you find that
     there was sufficient evidence to support a fair inference
     that a joint venture existed, then you can consider
     evidence of the acts and statements of each of the
     participants against the defendants."

     The judge further instructed that only the "acts and
statements occurring while the joint venture exists or made when
the joint venturers were acting to conceal the crime, and that
are relevant to the joint venture," could be so admissible.
Although it would have been more accurate to instruct that only
the acts and statements made "in furtherance of," as opposed to
"relevant to," the joint venture were admissible, see
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 175 (2020), the
instructions nonetheless conveyed that only certain acts and
statements -- those that were a part of the joint venture --
could be admissible against the defendant. See Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 697 (2015) ("We do not require that judges
use particular words, but only that they convey the relevant
legal concepts properly").
                                                                   13

shooting.   As discussed infra, we conclude that these statements

were properly admitted.

     Tate testified that immediately after the shooting, when

she initially asked Anderson "what happened" to the victim, he

responded, "[H]e's murked," which she understood to mean that he

was dead.   She further testified that days later Anderson

provided more details about the shooting that implicated the

defendant in the crime.9

     Out-of-court statements, such as Anderson's, may be offered

to prove the truth of the matter asserted and are admissible

against a defendant if made by a coventurer "during the

cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal."   Mass. G.

Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E) (2023).   See Commonwealth v. Wardsworth,

482 Mass. 454, 459-460 (2019).   Before admitting such evidence,

however, a judge must make a preliminary determination, based on

a preponderance of the evidence, separate from the out-of-court

statement itself, that a joint venture existed between the

declarant and the defendant and that the statement was made

     9 Because neither defendant testified, the details of the
robbery and killing were presented at trial through Tate's
testimony, which was based on this conversation with Anderson.
                                                                   14

during and in furtherance of that venture.10   See Commonwealth v.

Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 142-144 (2023).

     Anderson's statements describing the crime to Tate were

made immediately after the shooting and a few days later.    There

was ample evidence from which to conclude that Tate was a joint

venturer, as she was a central party in the robbery's planning,

preparation, and execution.   See Rakes, 478 Mass. at 40, citing

Commonwealth v. Bright, 463 Mass. 421, 436 n.21 (2012).     Viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

these statements were made during and in furtherance of the

concealment of the joint venture, and thus were admissible

against the defendant.11   See Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass.

517, 523 (2016) ("appellate courts . . . have deemed admissible

statements made by joint venturers during the so-called

concealment phase of their criminal enterprise when such phase

is relatively close in time to the commission of the crime").

In making these statements, Anderson was sharing information

     10Additionally, the jury also must be instructed that they
may consider such statements as against a coventurer (here, the
defendant) "only if they find that a joint venture existed
independent of the statements, and that the statements were made
in furtherance of that venture" (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Winquist, 474 Mass. 517, 521 (2016).

     11There is no question that Anderson's second statement
describing the shooting occurred during the concealment phase of
the joint venture, as Tate testified that Anderson also said at
that time, "[A]s long as we stick to the story no one was going
to be in trouble." Cf. Rakes, 478 Mass. at 41.
                                                                 15

with a fellow joint venturer and revealed no details of the

crime to anyone outside the joint venture.   Contrast

Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 291-292 (2012).     The

judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting them.     See

Winquist, supra at 521 ("A judge's determination as to the

existence and scope of a joint venture is reviewed under the

abuse of discretion standard").12

     The defendant also argues that the statements Anderson made

to Tate, as well as a statement Anderson made to police

approximately one week after the robbery and killing, were

inadmissible in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.

123 (1968).   We disagree.

     Under Bruton, "the introduction at a joint trial of a

nontestifying codefendant's statement, which names and

incriminates the other defendant, violates that defendant's

     12The defendant references, in passing, statements that
Anderson made in the presence of Coady. But neither these, nor
statements Anderson made to Gauthier, were improperly admitted.
While Anderson told Tate the details of the robbery and killing,
Coady was sitting with the defendant about twenty feet away.
The defendant, however, does not allege, and there is no
evidence, that Coady heard Anderson's statements at that time.
Although Anderson and the defendant later talked to Gauthier,
the evidence clearly shows that the point of the discussion was,
as Gauthier testified that Anderson had told him, to get
Gauthier not to say anything more and "to stick to [his] story."
See Commonwealth v. Steadman, 489 Mass. 372, 380 (2022) (joint
venturer statements to third party admissible where statements
were "an attempt to enlist [his or] her aid in concealing the
crime").
                                                                    16

right to confront his accusers under . . . the Sixth Amendment

[to the United States Constitution]."     Commonwealth v. Rivera,

464 Mass. 56, 69, cert. denied, 570 U.S. 907 (2013), citing

Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137.     Such a statement that "expressly

implicate[s]" the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would be

"powerfully incriminating," is prohibited under Bruton (citation

omitted).   Rivera, supra.   A codefendant's statement that

becomes incriminating when linked with trial evidence is also

prohibited by Bruton, but only where the circumstances and

nature of the statement "so obviously implicate the defendant in

the crime itself as virtually to constitute direct

incrimination" (citation omitted).     Id. at 70.   Cf. Commonwealth

v. Blake, 428 Mass. 57, 60-61 (1998) (no Sixth Amendment issue

where statements referred to but did not inculpate defendant).

    As an initial matter, the defendant's argument that

Anderson's account of the robbery and killing to Tate violates

Bruton is unpersuasive, as it hinges on an assertion that Tate

was not a part of the joint venture.    See Commonwealth v.

Robertson, 489 Mass. 226, 232 (2022); Commonwealth v. DePina,

476 Mass. 614, 629 n.13 (2017).    For the reasons explained

supra, we disagree with that premise.

    The defendant also challenges the judge's admission of a

statement that Anderson made to police on April 4, one week

after the robbery and killing.    But to the extent the defendant
                                                                    17

argues that this evidence violated the prohibition on a

nontestifying codefendant's statement that implicates the

defendant in the crime, his argument mischaracterizes Anderson's

statement.    The statement Anderson gave did, as the defendant

points out, place the two together on the day of the crime.

However, Anderson also explicitly denied being with the

defendant at any time during which the crime in question

occurred.13

     Therefore, Anderson's "statements were not sufficiently

inculpatory to offend the defendant['s] Sixth Amendment rights."

Blake, 428 Mass. at 60.    Anderson told the police that during

the time the crime actually occurred, he was not with the

defendant and that he thought the defendant had gone home.

"Even if we take the statement of [Anderson] to suggest that the

defendant['s] whereabouts were unknown to him around the time of

the shooting[]," the statement did not inculpate the defendant

in any concrete way.    Id. at 62.   See Commonwealth v. Vasquez,

462 Mass. 827, 843-844 (2012).

     13Indeed, Anderson told the police that, on the night of
the murder, he had been with the defendant earlier in the
evening for a short time and gave the defendant a ride, but that
he (Anderson) had dropped off the defendant and did not see the
defendant again until the next day. Anderson further stated
that he spent that night drinking beers with another friend
approximately from 9 P.M. until 11 P.M., when he went to sleep.
                                                                     18

    Additionally, because Anderson's false statements to

police, made only a few days after the crime had occurred and

during the concealment phase of the joint venture, "were

designed to keep the police from discovering" that Anderson and

the defendant were involved in the victim's killing, these

statements were admissible as nonhearsay as well, as they were

made by a coventurer in furtherance of the joint venture's

concealment.   Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 Mass. 708, 721 (2021).

See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 863-864 (2000).

There was no error.

    3.   Severance.   The rules of criminal procedure allow for

defendants to be joined in the same indictment "if the charges

against them arise out of the same criminal conduct or episode

or out of a course of criminal conduct or series of criminal

episodes so connected as to constitute parts of a single scheme,

plan, conspiracy or joint enterprise."     Mass. R. Crim. P. 9 (b),

378 Mass. 859 (1979).     Severance is appropriate, however, where

a defendant demonstrates that "(1) the defenses are antagonistic

to the point of being mutually exclusive, . . . or (2) the

prejudice resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it

prevents a defendant from obtaining a fair trial" (quotations

and citations omitted).     Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460

Mass. 535, 542 (2011).    The defendant argues on appeal that the

judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to be tried
                                                                   19

separately from Anderson, claiming that, as was apparent prior

to trial, the overwhelming evidence of Anderson's guilt spilled

over to inculpate him.   We are not convinced.

    The defendant does not suggest that his theory of the case

was incompatible with Anderson's.    In fact, both defendants

focused on attacking Tate's credibility, pointing out the

inadequacy of the police's investigation, and suggesting the

existence of third-party culprits.     Nor has the defendant

demonstrated that being tried with Anderson resulted in

prejudice so acute as to deprive him of a fair trial.

    As discussed supra, evidence of Anderson's statements and

actions properly were admitted.     See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 418

Mass. 207, 218-219 (1994) (severance not required where

codefendant's statements were admissible).     We detect no

potential for "prejudicial spillover effect" where much of the

evidence admitted against Anderson was also admissible against

the defendant, and the jury were provided with appropriate

instructions as to how to view the evidence.     Commonwealth v.

Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 229-231 (1986).     Contrary to the

defendant's assertions, the evidence against him clearly

established that he willingly agreed to participate in the joint

venture, was involved in its planning, and was present for its

execution.   As a result, "a second proceeding" against the

defendant would have been "largely duplicative of the first."
                                                                     20

Id. at 231.    See Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 Mass. 245, 259-260

(2005).     The judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the

defendant's motion to sever.     See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487

Mass. 156, 168 (2021) (orders regarding severance are reviewed

for abuse of discretion).

     4.   Jury instructions.    The defendant also argues that the

judge failed to instruct the jury that they were to consider the

evidence against each defendant separately,14 resulting in a

substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.15    We

disagree.

     During her preliminary instructions to the jury, prior to

opening statements, the judge explained that the Commonwealth

was required to "prove the guilt of each defendant."     As

discussed supra, during the trial the judge gave limiting

instructions at appropriate points, admonishing the jury to

consider evidence relating to a particular defendant against

     14Specifically, the defendant contends that the judge
should have instructed the jury that (1) "they were to consider
each element against each defendant separately," (2) "the fact
that the defendants were on trial together is not evidence that
there is any connection between them and is not any evidence of
their guilt," and (3) they were "not to consider evidence of
Anderson's bad acts (i.e.[,] the Commonwealth's claim that he
had engaged in an uncharged robbery of a firearm) against [the
defendant]."

     15As the defendant neither requested these instructions nor
objected to the instructions provided, any error is reviewed for
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. See
Commonwealth v. Toolan, 490 Mass. 698, 705 (2022).
                                                                      21

that defendant only unless they find sufficient evidence to

support that a joint venture existed, in which case the acts and

statements of coventurers done in furtherance of the joint

venture could be attributed to the defendant.     See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 486 Mass. 159, 175 (2020).     Moreover,

during her final instructions, she repeatedly stated that the

jury were required to assess and carefully consider the evidence

as it related to each defendant individually.

     Judges are "not required to grant a particular instruction

so long as the charge, as a whole, adequately covers the

issue."16    Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 490 Mass. 733, 742 (2022),

quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 154 (2014).      This

is especially true where, as here, the defendant did not request

instructions on this issue.    As the judge's instructions were

entirely proper, there was no error and, thus, no substantial

likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.

     5.     Third-party culprit and Bowden evidence.   The defendant

contends that the judge erred in excluding evidence relating to

two persons that he sought to present as third-party culprits

and as suspects whom police failed to investigate.      See

     16The fact that the jury found Anderson guilty of murder in
the first degree on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and
felony-murder, but found the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree on a theory of felony-murder only, suggests that
they followed the judge's instructions to consider the evidence
against each defendant separately.
                                                                   22

Commonwealth v. Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 532 (2021).   We conclude

that no error occurred.

    "Third-party culprit evidence is 'a time-honored method of

defending against a criminal charge.'"    Commonwealth v. Silva-

Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v.

Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22 (1996).   A defendant generally is given

"wide latitude to the admission of relevant evidence that a

person other than the defendant may have committed the crime

charged."   Silva-Santiago, supra at 800-801.   However, the

evidence "must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the

defense raises[] and . . . cannot be too remote or speculative."

Id. at 801, quoting Rosa, supra.   Additionally, if the third-

party culprit evidence constitutes hearsay that does not fall

within a hearsay exception, it is admissible if "the evidence is

otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the

jury, and there are other 'substantial connecting links' to the

crime" (citation omitted).   Silva-Santiago, supra.   See

generally Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2023).

    At trial, the defendant proffered that one person was a

possible third-party culprit because allegedly he had been

Tate's boyfriend, lived in the same development where the crime

occurred, and was "known by the police" to have been in

possession of two "three fifty-seven magnums" approximately one
                                                                    23

month before the killing.17   The second person was alleged to

have lived in an apartment above Gauthier's, been present in

Gauthier's apartment on March 27, visited Tate at a boarding

school near the condominium from which the gun was taken, and

been friends with both Gauthier and Tate.   Based on the

information provided, the judge excluded the third-party culprit

evidence, concluding that it did not provide "substantial

connecting links" between either person and the crime "so as not

to confuse the jury."   This decision was not error, where the

proffered evidence had no rational tendency to prove that either

of the two was involved in the killing.   See Andrade, 488 Mass.

at 532 (to be admissible, third-party culprit evidence "must

have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises,

and [it] cannot be too remote or speculative" [citation

omitted]).

     In addition to presenting third-party culprit evidence,

defendants may "base their defense on the failure of police

adequately to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue

of reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt."    Commonwealth

v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165 (2006).    See Commonwealth v.

Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 485-486 (1980).    Whether evidence of

     17Aware of this, the police conducted fingerprint testing
to see if this individual's prints matched those found in Tate's
father's condominium. They did not.
                                                                    24

shoddy police work may be admitted, however, is left to the

discretion of the trial judge.    See Commonwealth v. Steadman,

489 Mass 372, 385 (2022); Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 800-801.

Here, the defendant's argument that he was prevented from

presenting Bowden evidence fails based on the trial record.       The

judge was clear in her ruling that she was only excluding third-

party culprit evidence and had not "excluded anything on

Bowden," so the defendant was "free to explore Bowden

[evidence]."

    6.   Commonwealth's opening statement and closing argument.

The defendant contends that errors made by the prosecutor in his

opening statement and closing argument warrant reversal.

Specifically, the defendant contends that the prosecutor

impermissibly appealed to the jurors' sympathy and improperly

vouched for Tate's credibility.    As the defendant objected to

the remarks at issue, we review them to determine whether any

error was prejudicial.   See Commonwealth v. Alemany, 488 Mass.

499, 511 (2021).

    a.   Appeals to sympathy.     The defendant argues that the

prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathy during

his opening statement in characterizing the victim's final

moments as spent "begging . . . for his life" and, as attributed

by defense counsel, describing the victim's face after the
                                                                  25

shooting as being "ripped off."18   The defendant also takes issue

with the prosecutor having raised that one of the victim's

brothers was planning to visit the victim, but the victim was

killed before he arrived.   Neither was error.

     The prosecutor's description of the gunshot wound to the

victim's face made during opening statement was accurate based

on the evidence presented at trial.19   See Commonwealth v.

Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 670 (2017) (closing not improper where

"the prosecutor's description of the victim's murder was based

on the evidence and was relevant to establish the nature of the

crime").   Where the Commonwealth was proceeding, in part, on a

theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty,20 the "[d]etails regarding

     18This word choice was an inaccurate characterization made
by defense counsel when he objected at sidebar. The prosecutor
never stated that the victim's face was "ripped off," but
variously described the victim's face as having been "peeled
off," "basically annihilated," and "blown off." We construe the
defendant's argument on appeal as pertaining to all of these
descriptions, as his objection at trial indicated.

     19One witness testified that the victim's "face was
distorted" and "wasn't attached," and another witness testified
that it "wasn't . . . a pretty sight." The medical examiner
described a laceration on the victim's face that was six inches
long and about two inches deep. A police officer testified
that, when he first observed the victim, he believed that the
injury to the victim's face had been caused by "a machete or a
hatchet" and not by a gun.

     20Although the defendant ultimately was convicted only of
felony-murder, the Commonwealth also proceeded against both the
defendant and Anderson on theories of extreme atrocity or
cruelty and deliberate premeditation.
                                                                     26

how the victim died were relevant to the jury's determination as

to the manner of killing necessary to justify a conviction of

murder in the first degree."   Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass.

95, 132 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745,

748 (1999).   Thus, the description of the extent of the victim's

injuries did not amount to error.     See Commonwealth v. Martinez,

476 Mass. 186, 199 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427

Mass. 336, 350-351 (1998).

    The same is true of the prosecutor's description of the

victim as begging for his life.     Where the evidence suggested

that the victim had pleaded with Anderson and the defendant

while a gun was pointed at him, the prosecutor's description, if

enthusiastic, was based on the evidence.     See Barbosa, 477 Mass.

at 670-671.

    Nor did the mention of the victim's brothers constitute an

improper appeal to the jury's sympathy.     A prosecutor may "tell

the jury something of the person whose life had been lost in

order to humanize the proceedings" (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Doughty, 491 Mass. 788, 797-798 (2023).     The

prosecutor's comments, while "certainly sympathetic, . . . were

not excessive, nor were they the focal point."     Commonwealth v.

Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 567 (2002), citing Commonwealth v.

Degro, 432 Mass. 319, 326-328 (2000).     Cf. Commonwealth v. Cheng

Sun, 490 Mass. 196, 210 (2022).   They did not constitute error.
                                                                     27

    b.    Vouching.   During his closing argument, the prosecutor

told the jury that they would be able to see Tate's plea

agreement, which demonstrated that she was obligated "to tell

the truth" or "be prosecuted."    The prosecutor also asked,

"[W]ith that obligation, what motivation is there for [Tate] to

lie?"    The prosecutor then stated that "[t]here is no motivation

for [Tate] to do anything but to tell the truth in this case"

and that Tate had "no motive to lie."    The defendant argues that

this constitutes vouching.    We disagree.

    Where a witness testifies pursuant to a plea agreement, a

prosecutor may not suggest that the government has special

knowledge of that witness's credibility.     See Commonwealth v.

Webb, 468 Mass. 26, 31-32 (2014).     However,

    "[a] prosecutor may generally bring out on direct
    examination the fact that a witness has entered into a plea
    agreement and understands his [or her] obligations under
    it, but any attempts to bolster the witness by questions
    concerning his [or her] obligation to tell the truth should
    await redirect examination, and are appropriate only after
    the defendant has attempted to impeach the witness's
    credibility by showing the witness struck a deal with the
    prosecution to obtain favorable treatment."

Commonwealth v. Washington, 459 Mass. 32, 44 n.21 (2011), citing

Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 264 (1989).

    This is exactly what happened here.      On cross-examination,

trial counsel for both defendants asked Tate extensive questions

about her plea agreement with the Commonwealth in order to

impeach her credibility.     Trial counsel for the defendant made
                                                                      28

Tate's plea deal a central part of his closing argument,

suggesting that she lacked credibility.    The prosecutor

responded to the attack on Tate's credibility by asking the jury

what motivation Tate had to lie, given that the government was

recommending a sentence for her of from eight to ten years.      Cf.

Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 39-40 (2012).       Although he

referenced Tate's plea agreement, the prosecutor stopped short

of suggesting that the government had "special knowledge by

which it can verify the witness's testimony."21    Webb, 468 Mass.

at 32, quoting Washington, 459 Mass. at 44 n.21.     See Cheng Sun,

490 Mass. at 219.     There was no improper vouching.

     7.    Ballistics expert evidence.   The defendant argues that

the opinion testimony provided by the Commonwealth's ballistics

expert, Sergeant Detective Mark Vickers, that the victim's

injuries were consistent with the use of a high velocity weapon

and that a .357 magnum firearm is a "perfect example" of a high

velocity weapon, was unreliable and prejudicial.     It was

neither.

     Expert testimony is admissible if reliable, relevant, and

helpful to the jury in understanding matters "outside their

common experience."     Commonwealth v. Hinds, 487 Mass. 212, 217-

     21Moreover, during her final charge, the judge thoroughly
instructed the jury to "examine . . . Tate's credibility . . .
with greater caution than you would that of other witnesses."
See Ciampa, 406 Mass. at 266.
                                                                    29

218 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 761

(2010).   See Mass. G. Evid. § 702 (2023).   "We review a judge's

determination to admit or exclude expert testimony . . . for an

abuse of discretion."   Hinds, supra at 218, quoting Commonwealth

v. DiCicco, 470 Mass. 720, 729 (2015).

    Here, the Commonwealth's expert, who was the head of the

Boston police department's ballistics unit at the time of his

testimony, based his opinion on his knowledge of firearms, his

observations of gunshot wounds to other individuals, the autopsy

report, and photographs of the victim's injuries.   As the bases

for his opinion, Vickers pointed to, among other things, the

bullet's path, the type of laceration, and the presence of

bullet fragments rather than an intact bullet.

    We note that, on cross-examination, Vickers testified that

he could not rule out that numerous other types of firearms,

including an automatic weapon, could have been used as the

murder weapon.   In response to a question, however, he did

conclude that, based on the victim's injuries, a rifle had not

been used.   In other words, Vickers did not express any view on

whether "a particular firearm" or type of firearm had been used;

rather, he "offer[ed] an opinion . . . that narrow[ed] the scope

of possible firearms" that could have been used as the murder

weapon.   Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848 (2011).

Given the expert's qualifications and experience, the judge did
                                                                   30

not abuse her discretion in admitting the opinion testimony that

the victim's injuries, as well as the recovered fragments, were

consistent with the use of a high velocity firearm.    See

Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 153 (2014) (no error in

admitting opinion "concerning the gun's membership in the class

of guns that could have" been murder weapon).

     The defendant also argues that the expert's testimony was

unduly prejudicial to him because it potentially connected the

firearm stolen by Anderson and Tate to the shooting.    We

disagree.   The fact that a .357 magnum revolver is a "perfect

example" of a high velocity weapon merely demonstrated why the

expert's testimony was particularly relevant.22   See Commonwealth

v. Kindell, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 187-188 (2013) ("the measure

of prejudice is not whether the evidence simply is adverse to

the party against whom it is offered").

     8.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   Finally, we have

reviewed the entire record and discern no basis upon which to

exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

     Conclusion.   For the foregoing reasons, the order denying

the motion for a new trial is affirmed.   The judgment as to the

     22We also note that the testimony was cumulative of other
evidence suggesting that the stolen .357 magnum was used to kill
the victim, including Tate's testimony that she saw Anderson
with that firearm immediately after the shooting. See
Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 469 (2000).
                                                                31

defendant's conviction of unlicensed possession of a firearm is

reversed, and that verdict is set aside.   The defendant's

conviction of murder in the first degree is affirmed, and the

matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with our decision

in Mattis, 493 Mass. at    .

                                   So ordered.