Court Opinion

ID: 9741010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:47:30.126334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:21.593435
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority and would affirm the • trial court. The city in its motion for summary judgment alleges that the decedent’s activities just prior to his death amounted to participation in an ultrahazardous activity and that the plaintiff was barred from recovery on the basis of such participation. First, it should be pointed out that in the present posture this case does not reach the question of whether the cutting of the tree was, in itself, an ultrahazardous activity. The city of Lexington has waived this issue by failing to file a notice of cross-appeal from the order denying its motion to dismiss in conformity with Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(3) (103 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(3)). The question presented by this appeal is whether the same duty of persons who authorize ultrahazardous activity which previous decisions have held extends to spectators and owners of nearby property also extends to one who, though not an employee, is present at the site of the activity for his or her own pecuniary benefit. As indicated in the majority opinion, no authority was cited in support of the motion. Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil, No. 115.01 (2d ed. 1971) ("Ultrahazardous Activities — Absolute Liability”), as applicable to this case, states: “When a person carries on an ultrahazardous activity such as _'_, he is liable for any injury proxi-(e.g. blasting) mately caused by that activity regardless of the amount of care used except to one who knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care should know of the dangers involved and voluntarily participates in the activity.” One who authorizes the performance of an ultrahazardous activity by an independent contractor is responsible for injuries received by spectators to the activity as a result of the performance of the activity. Clark v. City of Chicago (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763-64, 410 N.E.2d 1025, 1028-29. The record shows that the decedent did voluntarily participate in the activity and in fact received a pecuniary benefit therefrom. The pecuniary benefit was the receipt of firewood. It is clear that the decedent was helping the contractor for his (the decedent’s) own benefit in order to get the firewood and in fact used his truck in part of the tree felling operation. The granting of summary judgment was correct.