Court Opinion

ID: 9519336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:14:23.147646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:18.164016
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: In People v. Jennings (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 125, this court held that total failure to publish increased tax assessments is a valid objection under the Revenue Act of 1939 to payment of the tax based thereon. I agree with Jennings, but Jennings, in my judgment, does not support the result reached by the court in this case. The Jennings opinion indicates that court would not have reached the same conclusion here, and that delay in publication, as contrasted to a complete failure to publish, is not fatal where there is no showing that the taxpayer is prejudiced. Publication dates are mandatory only where, by their disregard, the taxpayer’s “rights might be and generally would be injuriously affected” (3 Ill. 2d 125, 127). Obviously a taxpayer’s rights “generally would be injuriously affected” where an increase in his assessment is never published and he has no notice of it. But that situation bears no resemblance to what occurred here. Not only was there published notice as the statute requires — in addition, the authorities mailed each taxpayer a notice of the increase. True, the notice was not published until after July 10, but the board of review remained in session for the purpose of hearing complaints. No taxpayer denies receiving notice, and each had the same opportunity to appear before the board of review that he would have had if publication had been made on July 10 as the statute directs. No taxpayer has made any attempt to demonstrate in what manner he has been prejudiced by the delay, and I can envision none. I dislike taxes, inflation and governmental waste and inefficiency as much or more than most persons. But every member of this court is aware that few of the many ministerial acts required of county or State officials in the tax assessing and collecting process have been accomplished in recent years by the statutorily directed dates. If for that reason we are to now commence invalidating taxes without first requiring a showing of prejudice to the objecting taxpayer, the collection of taxes will be seriously impeded. If an additional reason to sustain the tax is thought necessary, it is to be found, I believe, in section 235 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 716), since the delay is one “not affecting the substantial justice of the tax itself.” Mr. Justice Simkins, in his dissenting opinion in the appellate court, accurately interpreted the saving provision: “Section 235 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 716) is specifically directed towards this kind of problem, that is, errors or informalities of procedure by the officials in the taxing process. Publication is not constitutionally required and could be eliminated altogether by the legislature. Infirmities in publication can even be retroactively eliminated by a curative act. (People v. Holmstrom (1956), 8 Ill. 2d 401, 134 N.E.2d 246.) There is a strong public policy behind section 235 that entire assessments should not be declared void due to a technicality when communties depend on these taxes to perform necessary functions of government. In view of that policy, the stipulated fact that plaintiffs received actual written notice, and the fact that plaintiffs did not show any prejudice from the belated publication, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court.” 43 Ill. App. 3d 438, 443. In my judgment the majority opinion unnecessarily and substantially interferes with the tax-collection process. I would reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts. MR. JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.