Court Opinion

ID: 9884593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:02:52.586038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:03.535332
License: Public Domain

WOZNIAK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Since 1898 our Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the rule that requires filing notice within six months of leaving one’s homestead. I believe the following rule of law has evolved:
If the removal is for a longer time than six months, filing of notice in accordance with the terms of the statute is the only way the homestead right can be preserved unless the removal is involuntary and without intent to abandon.
Homestead rights are valuable rights, and the protecting arm of the law should always be raised to guard them.
I.
The exception to section 510.07 for involuntary removal from the premises was established nearly 100 years ago:
Of course, the term “actual occupancy” must receive a reasonable construction, and is not to be understood as requiring constant personal presence, so as to make a man’s residence his prison, or that a temporary absence, enforced by some casualty, or for purposes of business or pleasure would constitute a removal, ceasing to occupy, or an abandonment. Quehl v. Peterson, 47 Minn. 13, 49 N.W. 390.
Clark v. Dewey, 71 Minn. 108,110, 73 N.W. 639, 640 (1898) (emphasis added).
Clark shows that the statute only operates in the context of a voluntary abandonment of occupancy. The notice requirement is inapplicable in the context of a casualty — an involuntary removal. Involuntary commitment for insanity and imprisonment also are recognized exceptions to the statute. Beigler v. Chamberlin, 145 Minn. 104, 176 N.W. 49 (1920); Millet v. Pearson, 143 Minn. 187, 173 N.W. 411 (1919).
The present case falls into the Clark casualty exception because destruction of the home forced an involuntary abandonment. Therefore notice was not necessary. The majority mistakenly overlooks the well-established voluntary-involuntary distinction. It relies on First National Bank of Mankato v. Wilson, 234 Minn. 160, 47 N.W.2d 764 (1951), and Muscala v. Wirtjes, 310 N.W.2d 696 (Minn.1981), both of which deal with voluntary abandonment.
Just as Clark noted 100 years ago that the statute must be construed liberally, even today homestead rights are considered vital to the owner and to society as a whole:
The law originated in the wise and humane policy of securing to the citizen, against all the misfortunes and uncer*367tainties of life, the benefits of a home, not only in his interest, or if a married man, in the interest of himself and his family alone, but also in the interest of the state, whose welfare and prosperity so largely depend upon the growth and cultivation among its citizens of feelings of personal independence, together with love of country and kindred; sentiments that find their deepest root and best nourishment where the home life is spent and enjoyed. Its main purpose is to exempt from forced sale a homestead; the place made such by choice, residence, use and occupancy of the owner as a home, including as its necessary incidents the dwelling house and its appurtenances, and the land belonging to it.
The policy of the law is to protect the homestead, to preserve the homestead for the family even at the sacrifice of just demands. In no manner does the statute yield to the demands of equity in favor of third parties. [Citations omitted.]
9A Dunnell Minn. Digest Homestead § 4193 (3d ed. rev. 1977) (emphasis added). The majority unnecessarily undermines the policy of Minnesota’s homestead statute.
II.
Joy was tied up in litigation for two years before he collected his insurance proceeds.
A homeowner cannot rebuild until he receives his insurance proceeds. To allow a creditor, under these circumstances, to lien the land is inequitable and unjust.
Certainly, at a minimum, when lack of occupancy is occasioned by a casualty loss, and, as here, the homestead beneficiary acts diligently to recover money damages from his insurance carrier for the casualty loss, he remains in “constructive occupancy” until the funds have been recovered.
My concerns run beyond Joy’s vulnerable situation. I am concerned for our aged and the protection of their rights — particularly when temporarily incapacitated. Imagine the plight of the elderly person who, after a nursing home stay exceeding six months, returns to his homestead, only to find it sold for a creditor’s lien. Such vulnerable members of society cannot be held to the notice requirement. A person in jail or in a mental institution (both involuntary) should not be given more rights than someone in failing health who is forced to seek nursing home or other care due to physical problems.

Conclusion

Joy did not voluntarily abandon his home. A fire destroyed his occupancy, and this obviated the necessity of notice.
He did not file another homestead claim. He was forced to litigate his rights to insurance proceeds.
A fire should not prevent a person from rebuilding his residence on the land. Because of the reasons outlined, the land should not be subject to a creditor’s lien because it is contra to the legislative and judicial philosophy of homestead exemption.