Court Opinion

ID: 9396248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:04:31.93353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.397658
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE               )
OF GEORGE WROTEN CORDRAY                  )
and ROBERT L. LANE,                       )    C.A. No. 2022-0614-SG
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE              )
OF GEORGE WROTEN CORDRAY                  )

                                     OPINION

                         Date Submitted: May 8, 2023
                         Date Decided: May 19, 2023

Gerald I. Street of STREET & ELLIS, P.A., Dover, Delaware, Attorneys for
Petitioner, the Estate of George Wroten Cordray and Robert L. Lane, Estate
Administrator.

Deirdre A. McCartney of SERGOVIC CARMEAN WEIDMAN MCCARTNEY &
OWENS, PA, Georgetown, Delaware, Attorneys for James Roy Wroten.

Cynthia L. Maxwell Masters, Pro Se.

Diane Elaine Maxwell Tori, Pro Se.

Beverly Anne Maxwell Miller, Pro Se.

GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
       Almost seventy years ago, on August 4, 1955, a tragedy occurred. Norris

Cordray killed his wife, Emma,1 then himself. A child of that marriage, George, a

resident of New Castle County, passed away in 1988, intestate. An estate was

opened in 1988; for reasons not pertinent here, the estate remains open. Last July,

the administrator of George’s estate, Robert Lane (the “Administrator”) brought the

Petition for Instructions at issue here.2 The Petition seeks instructions as to George’s

heirs, a matter to be determined under the Delaware statutes concerning intestate

succession, set out at Chapter 5 of Title 12.3 George died without a wife, and without

issue. He had a lone sibling, a brother, Norris Jr., living at the time of his death, who

is now himself dead—Norris Jr. ostensibly renounced his interest in George’s estate

and then died without issue.4 George had no other siblings. Accordingly, Section

503(4) is applicable: “If there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, then

to the next of kin of the decedent, and to the issue of a deceased next of kin, per

stirpes.”5 “Next of kin” means “nearest blood relations [as] determined by tracing

1
  I use first names for those surnamed “Cordray.” Clarity is the object, and no familiarity or
disrespect is intended.
2
  Pet. Instructions, Dkt. No. 1.
3
  See 12 Del. C. §§ 501 et seq.
4
  This Court adjudicated George’s only sibling, Norris, Jr., to be deceased in a related action. In
re Cordray, 2022 WL 293012 (Del.Ch.); Pet. Instructions Ex. F. George died before Norris, Jr.,
who was at the time his next of kin—I need not address the issue of Norris, Jr.’s estate for three
reasons: first, the matter is not addressed in the Petition for Instructions; next, Norris, Jr.
purportedly renounced any interest in George’s estate; and third, Norris, Jr. died, presumably,
intestate, unmarried and without issue; his next of kin taking his estate would be identical with
those I find to be George’s next of kin here, so it is immaterial to the questions posed in the Petition
for Instructions whether George’s estate flows through that of Norris, Jr.
5
  12 Del. C. § 503(4).

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the decedent’s family back to the closest forbear[er or forebearers] who ha[ve] living

descendants and then tracing forward to those descendants.”6 In other words, a

decedent’s next of kin are determined by counting up to the nearest common ancestor

or ancestors of living relatives; the living issue of that progenitor or those progenitors

take, per stirpes.7 This rule of intestate succession is meant to supply the presumed

intent of the decedent, where the decedent has failed to provide otherwise by

testament.

       Here, a genealogical search was conducted, and discloses that George’s next

of kin are descendants of his grandparents Roy Wroten and Viola Shull through

Emma’s (mother’s) lineage, and grandparents George and Mary Cordray through

Norris’s (father’s) lineage.8 Obviously, these progenitors are at the same level of

consanguinity to George. Under the statute, accordingly, the living descendants of

George’s grandparents are the heirs of George and take the estate per stirpes.9

6
  In re Estate of Wright, 1997 WL 124149, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 10, 1997) (citing In re White’s
Estate, 37 A.2d 167 (Del. Orph. 1944).
7
  Matter of Estate of Smith, 467 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1983) (interpreting 1 Del. C. § 302(9)).
8
  Pet. Instructions Ex. G.
9
  I base this determination on an exhibit to an affidavit filed by the genealogical surveyor. See
Pet. Instructions Ex. G. at Ex. A–B. The final order in this matter should provide the list of heirs
and their relative shares of the estate. “[I]n cases of intestacy the persons entitled must be
ascertained as of the time of the testator’s death.” Bedyk v. Bank of Del., 176 A.2d 196, 198
(Del. 1961). The heirs’ rights vested as of the time of George’s death, and this rule should
inform the form of order I ask the Administrator to submit, infra.

                                                 2
        The twist in this matter involves the so-called “Slayer Statute,”10 a

codification of a common-law precept; that one must not profit from his own

wrong.11 The problem addressed by the Slayer Statute is that a slayer, as a survivor

of the victim, might inherit, under a will or by intestacy; or might otherwise benefit

from the killing.12 This inequity is elegantly solved under the Slayer Statute, by a

statutory fiction. “The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased” the victim for

purposes of inheritance.13 As stated above, George’s father Norris killed his mother

Emma, then himself. Emma predeceased in fact, but for inheritance purposes Norris

is deemed to have died first. The Slayer Statute also serves the rationale of the

statutes of intestate succession, since it is unlikely that a decedent would want her

slayer to receive the bounty of her estate.

        On its face, the Slayer Statute has no application to the legal question before

me. The next of kin are determined by consanguinity, by counting generations; the

question of which ancestor died first does not enter into this calculation, the results

of which in the case of George’s estate are laid out above. The Administrator raises

a novel approach to the Slayer Statute and the interests that underlie it, as supplied

10
   12 Del. C. § 2322.
11
   See Welch v. Welch, 252 A. 2d 131 (Del. Ch. 1969).
12
   In addition to its application to rights otherwise inuring to a slayer from a victim’s estate, testate
or intestate, or from a trust, the Slayer Statute addresses property held jointly or by the entireties,
vested and contingent remainder interests, and “proceeds passing by designation” (such as
insurance benefits). 12 Del. C. § 2322.
13
   12 Del C. § 2322(b) (intestate rights), (c) (wills and trusts).

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by the common law, however. He asserts that, on account of slaying Emma, Norris

not only is prohibited from benefiting from Emma’s estate; the heirs of his lineage

(and, pertinently, the lineage of Norris’s parents) are likewise precluded from

inheriting from Emma’s issue.14 This, I take it, is a matter of first impression in

Delaware.

       The statute itself cannot support this analysis. Here, Norris is deemed to have

predeceased Emma, but this does not defeat the inheritance by George’s next of kin

who happen to share a common lineage with Norris. Nor do I find the caselaw

preceding the enactment of the statute in 1993 to support the position of the

Administrator. In Colton v. Wade, the Chancellor found that where a wife had

murdered her husband, the resulting vesting, in her, of the estate formerly held by

husband and wife by the entireties was subject to a trust in favor of husband’s heirs.15

Welch v. Welch extended that rationale to the estate of a slayer.16 As here, in Welch

a husband slew his wife, then committed suicide.17 The former entireties estate

vested in husband, then his estate (or the beneficiaries under his will), but the equities

of the slayer doctrine dictated that the property be subject to a trust in favor of wife’s

alternative beneficiaries under her will.18

14
   Pet. Instructions ¶ 9; Letter to the Ct. from Pet’r’s Counsel 2, May 3, 2023, Dkt. No. 15.
15
   80 A.2d 923 (Del. Ch. 1951).
16
   252 A. 2d 131 (Del. Ch. 1969).
17
   Id. at 132.
18
   Id. at 133. The slaying husband in Welch was the primary beneficiary under the will of wife, so
the alternative beneficiaries under the will were the beneficiaries of the trust. Colton and Welch

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       The Superior Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to insurance

proceeds, in Maneval v. Lutheran Brotherhood.19 In that case, wife was primary

beneficiary of husband’s life insurance when she shot him to death; pursuant to the

slayer doctrine, she was deemed to have predeceased husband, and his contingent

beneficiaries received the proceeds.20 In In re Estate of Cohen, the Chancellor

affirmed a Master’s Report concerning property held by a husband and wife killed

by their son.21 The parents both died intestate; the slayer was their only heir.22 The

son was charged with his parents’ murder, and pled “guilty, but mentally ill.”23 In

such a case “[t]he [slayer] must be deemed to have predeceased [the victims],” and

the property passed to parents’ heirs (excluding the son, who was considered to have

predeceased) on that basis.24

       In other words, under the (thankfully sparse) case law, the slayer doctrine

applies to property that would otherwise go to the slayer himself, or his estate. 25

employed the trust remedy, presumably, because of the peculiar nature of entireties property, held
per tout et non per my. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Parker, 188 A. 67, 70 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936)
(“Joint tenants hold by moieties . . . . A husband and wife have no moieties—they are seized “per
tout” but not “per my”; each has an entirety in the subject of the estate . . . .”). In other words,
strictly speaking, the slain spouses held no individual interests in the property prior to their
murders.
19
   281 A.2d 502 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
20
   Id. at 504.
21
   1993 WL 1502698 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 1993).
22
   Id. at *1.
23
   Id.
24
   Id. at *2.
25
   See also Matter of Estate of Cohen, 1995 WL 106314, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1995) (noting
that Slayer Statute codified the slayer doctrine, under which insurance proceeds could not flow to
slayer/beneficiary); Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 2009 WL 159184, at *1 (D. Del. Jan.

                                                 5
Here, the estate in question is that of George, who is not a slayer; and not the estate

of his father Norris. No Delaware case supports employing the slayer doctrine to

disinherit next of kin, with the exception of the slayer himself, or those who would

take through the slayer’s estate.

       Nonetheless, the Administrator points out that the Slayer Statute provides that

“[t]his section . . . shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State

that a person shall not be permitted to profit by that person’s own wrong.” 26 The

Administrator argues that allowing George’s next of kin to take through the lineage

of Norris would do just this. Moreover, any different decision here would “tempt”

would-be slayers to murder for the benefit of their heirs.27

       But this concern is not cogent here. The next of kin taking through the lineage

of George’s father are in no way profiting from Norris’s evil act.                   Such an

unconscionable benefit to a murderer, or his estate, is the wrong addressed by the

slayer doctrine, at common law and by statute. The kin of Norris do not so benefit

here, because it is immaterial under the intestacy statute whether Norris survived or

predeceased Emma. Because the slaying has no effect in the current situation, there

is no reason to construe Section 2322 to do anything other than what it explicitly

21, 2009) at *1 (slayer/beneficiary of insurance policy treated as predeceasing victim under the
Slayer Statute).
26
   12 Del. C. § 2322(k).
27
   Letter to the Ct. from Pet’r’s Counsel 2.

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calls for—to deem Norris as the predecessor of Emma—which, again, has no effect

on the issue before me.

       Likewise, the Administrator points to language in Welch addressing

application of the common-law slayer doctrine, stating that “not only is the

wrongdoer to be treated as though he had predeceased his spouse but the rights and

interests of other persons, whether as heirs [or] next of kin . . . are to be determined

upon that premise.”28 The Administrator points out that Welch was not overruled by

the enactment of the Slayer Statute, and argues that the quoted language is exactly

what the General Assembly had in mind when providing that Section 2332 should

be construed broadly. I do not disagree.29 For instance, if husband kills wife, he

cannot inherit from wife.30 If husband then kills himself, his estate, and via his estate

his beneficiaries or next of kin, also cannot inherit from wife. That is because the

rights of husband’s estate must be “determined upon the premise” that husband

predeceased.31 The husband’s estate, and its beneficiaries, are thereby disabled from

28
   252 A.2d at 132–33 (emphasis added).
29
   The legislative history does not disclose the reason for specifying that the Slayer Statute should
be broadly construed. However, I note that the statute was codifying a flexible common-law
doctrine designed to ensure that wrongdoers not profit thereby; presumably, the “broad
construction” language was an attempt to preserve flexibility to achieve that desired result.
30
   Thus, Norris was precluded from inheriting from Emma.
31
   See Welch, 252 A.2d at 132–33. I note that this application of the doctrine does not exclude
husband’s next-of-kin inheriting from Wife’s estate—rather than through the estate of the slayer—
if husband’s next of kin happen to be so entitled. For example, if husband/slayer is deemed to
predecease wife/victim, her beneficiaries are determined on that basis; thus in this example
children of the couple could inherit directly from mother’s estate, but not through father.

                                                 7
benefiting due to the husband’s evil act. But that is not the situation here. The kin

of Norris who happen to be next of kin of George are not inheriting from Norris’s

estate,32 and are not benefiting from Norris’ actions.

       The next of kin of George in Norris’s lineage are inheriting from George

because under the statute of intestacy they are entitled to, and would be regardless

of the slaying. Emma and Norris were born in 1905 and 1904, respectively.33 Had

they lived out their biblical span of three score and ten, then passed away

peacefully in the mid-1970s, the heirs of George would be exactly the same as

determined here. Allowing those heirs to inherit therefore gives no incentive to

murder, the Administrator’s argument notwithstanding.

       The Slayer Statute is expressly non-penal in nature.34 Since George’s next-

of-kin are innocent of wrongdoing in the murder of Emma, and because they do not

stand to benefit from her murder, disinheriting them as the Administrator suggests

would be punitive. Such would be inconsistent with the text of the Statute and its

animating spirit.35

32
   An estate presumably closed more than 65 years ago.
33
   Pet. Instructions Ex. G. at Ex. A–B.
34
   12 Del. C. § 2322(k). The underlying doctrine is also nonpunitive. See Karen J. Sneddon, Should
Cain’s Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the Extended Slayer Rule Quagmire, 76
UMKC L. Rev. 101, 102 n.10 (2007) (“Compensation and punishment are not policy goals of the
slayer rule.”)
35
   Because of my decision here, I need not address whether the rule advocated by the Administrator
would run afoul of the United States Constitution, or the Delaware Constitution. See Sneddon,
supra at 104–06 (discussing the slayer doctrine in terms of prohibited attainder under US Const.

                                                8
       Accordingly, the Slayer Statute, and its common-law analog, find no

application here. The Administrator should present a form of order for distribution

of George’s estate consistent with this Opinion.

art. III, § 3); Del Const. art I, § 15 (prohibiting an attainder from “work[ing] corruption of blood
or . . . forfeiture of estate”).

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