Court Opinion

ID: 9724756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:11:53.749808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:05.604066
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The jury recommended that Tapia not receive the penalty of death for his crime, and the trial judge concluded as well that death was not appropriate. In such circumstances, the duty is imposed upon the judge to sentence to a term of years pursuant to I.C. 35-50-2-8, applying the criteria mandated by the Legislature in 1.0. 85-88-1-7,* and setting forth in writing the reasons for the sentence selected in accordance with I.C. 85-88-1-8, in three groups as follows:
A sentencing statement must contain three elements. First, the statement *659must identify all the significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Second, it must state the specific reason why each circumstance is considered to be mitigating or aggravating. Third, it must balance the mitigating and aggravating factors.
Dumbsky v. State (1987), 508 N.E.2d 1274, 1278. Here, the sentencing statement sets forth four aggravating cireumstances, all of which have support in the record, but refers not at all to evidence of mitigating factors. The State impliedly concedes in its brief that appellant's age and lack of a prior record are mitigating factors in this case, but argues that they are "not mitigating enough to offset the serious aggravating circumstances of this case...."
Effective October 1, 1977, the Legislature abolished jury sentencing upon the premise that sentencing by a judge using sentencing criteria and requiring written reasoning is more rational and more just. Debose v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 675, 389 N.E.2d 272. At the heart of this premise stand the statutory steps required of the sentencing judge, and the requirement that the sentencing judge follow the statutory steps and memorialize each one is not and does not become, by reason of the existence in the particular case of many weighty aggravating circumstances, a futile or pointless judicial obligation. The requirement stands as a guard against arbitrary and capricious sentencing and provides a rational basis for appellate review. Dumbsky, 508 N.E.2d at 1278. The sentencing statement in the present case does not satisfy this dual purpose. This Court knows and appreciates that the sentencing function is a difficult and arduous one, yet this Court cannot shut its eyes when a judge, no matter how experienced, takes a short cut in sentencing. I would therefore set aside the order and remand with instructions to comply with the felony sentencing statute as construed by this Court.
DICKSON, J., concurs.

 Now codified at LC. 35-38-1-7.1.