Court Opinion

ID: 9908307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:44.345468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.402182
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13217

                 COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JOSHUA HART.

     Franklin.      September 15, 2023. - December 8, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

Homicide. Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions,
     Voluntariness of statement, Fair trial, Confrontation of
     witnesses, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment. Fair
     Trial. Evidence, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness
     of statement, Hearsay, Testimonial statement. Practice,
     Criminal, Capital case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and
     confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Venue, Fair trial,
     Hearsay, Confrontation of witnesses, Sentence.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on December 19, 2016, and March 31, 2017.

     A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by John A.
Agostini, J., and the cases were tried before him.

     Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant.
     Cynthia M. Von Flatern, Assistant District Attorney, for
the Commonwealth.

    LOWY, J.   The defendant and his girlfriend entered an

elderly couple's home through an unlocked door, stabbed and

suffocated the two occupants of the house, and stole their
                                                                    2

valuables.   They then fled the Commonwealth in the victims' car.

One of the victims died immediately, and the other died

approximately one month later.   Following a jury trial, the

defendant was convicted of two charges of murder in the first

degree.1

     In this appeal, the defendant argues that his convictions

should be reversed on three bases:    (1) the defendant's

confession to law enforcement was involuntary and should have

been suppressed; (2) the trial should have been transferred to

another venue due to pretrial publicity; and (3) a victim's out-

of-court statement should have been excluded from evidence

because it was inadmissible hearsay and the victim did not

testify at trial.   The defendant further contends that,

considering his age at the time of the crimes, his sentences of

life without the possibility of parole constitute cruel or

unusual punishment.   Lastly, the defendant asks us to exercise

our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or

remand the case for resentencing.    We find no reversible error

in any issue raised by the defendant and, after plenary review,

no cause to exercise our powers under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     We

therefore affirm the defendant's convictions.

     1 The defendant was also convicted of attempted murder, two
counts of armed robbery, larceny of a motor vehicle, and
fraudulent use of a credit card.
                                                                      3

    1.   Background.    We recite the facts the jury could have

reasonably found, reserving certain details for our analysis of

the issues.

    a.   The attack on Thomas Harty and Joanna Fisher.     On

October 5, 2016, the defendant and his girlfriend, Brittany

Smith, decided that they would leave town in light of pending

criminal charges and that they would break into a house to steal

a car and money to effectuate their escape.    At around 7:30

P.M., they chose a specific house in Orange because the garage

contained an older car, which they believed would be less likely

to have a tracking system.   The defendant and Smith knew that

there were two individuals inside the house, and they intended

to intimidate the occupants of the house into providing money

and the keys to the car.

    The defendant and Smith both entered the garage of the

house through an unlocked door, collected a socket wrench from

the garage, and proceeded into the house.     As they walked

through the kitchen towards the living room, each also picked up

a knife from the kitchen counter.

    Thomas Harty, the ninety-five year old homeowner, stood up

from an armchair in the living room to confront the two

intruders.    The defendant entered the living room, where he

stabbed Harty in the neck and multiple times in the chest.      The
                                                                      4

defendant then put a pillow over Harty's face until Harty ceased

breathing.

       Next, the defendant turned to Joanna Fisher, Harty's

seventy-seven year old wife, who was nonambulatory and a full-

time wheelchair user.     Smith had already assaulted Fisher, and

Fisher was lying on the ground.     The defendant stabbed Fisher

numerous times, stood on her stomach in an attempt to take the

air out of her body, and put a pillow over her face to suffocate

her.

       The defendant and Smith proceeded to steal credit and debit

cards, approximately $200, a cell phone, and a car.     They then

disabled the house telephones and fled.

       b.   Fisher's statements.   At approximately 9:10 A.M. the

following day, October 6, 2016, Cindy Sumner-Moryl arrived at

the house.    Sumner-Moryl was Fisher's nurse and had a scheduled

appointment to assist Fisher with physical therapy exercises and

other personal care needs.     She and another care worker found

the house in disarray, Harty motionless in the armchair in the

living room, and Fisher on the floor in her bedroom.     Fisher had

a blanket over her legs, she was lying in a pool of blood, and

there was blood on the side of her face.      Sumner-Moryl testified

as follows at trial:

       "I heard her moaning, so I went over to her right away.
       And she said, [']Cindy, is that you?['] And I said
       [']yes['] and she said [']invasion, ambulance.['] And I
                                                                     5

    reassured her that we had help coming and that she was
    safe. . . . I directed [the other care worker] to call
    911. . . . And I stayed with Ms. Fisher to comfort her.
    . . . She wanted to know if she had a black eye and I said
    yes, she did. And she told me that they tried to kill her,
    that they kept putting a pillow over her face and tried to
    smother her[;] she said, [']But, I'm tough.['] Then she
    told me that she dragged herself out onto the porch and
    tried to call for help, but no one heard her."

    Fisher was brought to the hospital for medical attention

for stab wounds, loss of blood, rib fractures, and other

abrasions and lacerations.   Harty was declared deceased; Fisher

died weeks later from complications arising from the attack.

    c.   The police investigation.    Shortly after Sumner-Moryl

found Fisher, police arrived at Harty and Fisher's home.     There

was evidence of an attack throughout the house.    Harty lay

lifeless in the armchair in the living room, and there were

bloodstains across the living room –- on the floor, on multiple

pillows, and on the chair in which Harty was found dead –- as

well as in the rest of the house.    The police found a socket

wrench and a disabled cordless telephone on the dining room

table, and a disabled cordless telephone in the living room.

    Within hours of the attack, the police were notified that

someone attempted to use Harty's credit card at a store in

Worcester.   The police then obtained photographs showing the

defendant and Smith attempting to use Harty's credit card and

successfully using Fisher's debit card there.     A photograph and

a video recording also showed the defendant and Smith in the
                                                                    6

store's parking lot with Harty and Fisher's car.     The police

were first able to identify the defendant and Smith based on

these photographs.

    The police proceeded to speak with witnesses who stated

that they saw the defendant and Smith together immediately

before the attack.   Surveillance footage from a small market

further placed the couple together near the victims' house

around the time of the attack, and the local police's bloodhound

tracked Smith from the market to the victims' home based on the

scent of a shirt Smith had been wearing shortly before the

attack.

    Forensic and physical evidence also tied the defendant and

Smith to the crime scene.   Rosary beads, matching a description

from a rosary worn by the defendant on the night of the attack,

were discovered on the living room floor and in the chair in

which Harty was found.   The defendant's fingerprint was found on

a window shade behind Harty's body, and Smith's fingerprints

were found on various windows around the house.    A footwear

impression consistent with the heel print of a Nike Air Jordan,

the type of sneaker the defendant wore on the night of the

attack, was found on the floor of the living room.

    Massachusetts law enforcement tracked the defendant and

Smith over the following days as the two assailants fled down

the east coast.   On October 8, 2016, Rockbridge County,
                                                                   7

Virginia, deputy sheriffs (Virginia officers) arrested the

defendant and Smith.   The victims' car was found in a nearby U-

Haul parking lot.   The police later learned that the defendant

and Smith had rented a U-Haul motor vehicle after the car had

broken down.   The defendant's and Smith's fingerprints were

found in the car, along with Smith's pocketbook, a wallet with

the defendant's MassHealth card, receipts showing purchases with

Fisher's debit card, and an identification card for Harty.

    d.   The defendant's interrogations with law enforcement.

Once in custody, the defendant immediately indicated that he

wanted to speak with the Virginia officers.    The Virginia

officers, after consultation with Massachusetts law enforcement

officers, agreed to meet with the defendant and brought him from

his cell to an interview room.   During an approximately one-hour

long audio-recorded conversation, the defendant confessed to the

attack on Harty and Fisher.   The defendant also provided a

sketch of the victims' house and a written confession.

    The next day, two Massachusetts State police troopers

(Massachusetts officers) met with the defendant in the

Rockbridge County, Virginia, sheriff's office.    This

conversation was also audio recorded and lasted approximately

two hours and ten minutes.    The defendant again made numerous

admissions detailing the crimes that he and Smith committed.
                                                                         8

     e.   The defendant's convictions and sentencing.       On April

13, 2018, following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

murder in the first degree for Harty's death based on the theory

of felony-murder; murder in the first degree for Fisher's death

based on the theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme

atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder; and other charges.2        The

defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole for each conviction of murder in the first degree, to be

served consecutively.

     The defendant's codefendant, Brittany Smith, was

subsequently and separately tried for and convicted of two

charges of murder in the first degree for killing Harty and

Fisher, among other charges.    See Commonwealth v. Smith, 492

Mass. 604, 604-605 (2023).

     2.   Discussion.   a.   Voluntariness of confession.    The

defendant argues that his rights under art. 12 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution were violated because the trial

judge improperly denied the defendant's motion to suppress his

     2 As stated, the defendant was also convicted of attempted
murder, two counts of armed robbery, larceny of a motor vehicle,
and fraudulent use of a credit card.
                                                                          9

allegedly involuntary confession to the Virginia officers.3          When

reviewing a trial judge's denial of a motion to suppress, we

"conduct an independent review of [the trial judge's] ultimate

findings and conclusions of law."       Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480

Mass. 645, 652 (2018).       We review subsidiary findings of fact

with differing deference based on the type of evidence from

which the findings are drawn.       See id. at 655.   "[F]indings

drawn partly or wholly from testimonial evidence are accorded

deference and are not set aside unless clearly erroneous."          Id.

That is, such findings are set aside only if, although evidence

supports such findings, we are nonetheless "left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"

after review of all the evidence (citation omitted).        Id. at 655

n.7.       On the other hand, we review de novo any findings based

entirely on documentary evidence.       Id. at 655.   Where we are

solely reviewing an audio recording of an interrogation, for

example, "we are in the same position as the motion judge to

determine what occurred during the interview."        Commonwealth v.

Hammond, 477 Mass. 499, 502 (2017).       We conclude, based upon the

judge's findings of fact from the evidentiary hearing, and our

       It is uncontested that the defendant was in custody and
       3

that the conversation between the defendant and the Virginia
officers constituted interrogation.
                                                                   10

independent review of the recording here, that the trial judge

properly determined the defendant's statements to be voluntary.

     A statement is presumed voluntary until a defendant

produces any evidence showing otherwise.4    Commonwealth v.

Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 206 (2011).   Once a defendant presents

such evidence through a motion, affidavit, or proffer, the

burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the statement was made voluntarily.     Id.   A voluntary

statement is "the product of a 'rational intellect' and a 'free

will,' and not induced by physical or psychological coercion"

(citation omitted).   Hammond, 477 Mass. at 502.    More

specifically, "[t]he test for voluntariness . . . is 'whether,

in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

making of the statement, the will of the defendant was overborne

to the extent that the statement was not the result of a free

and voluntary act'" (citation omitted).     Id.   "Under this

'totality of the circumstances' test, we consider all of the

relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the

individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant"

     4 The rights to due process and against self-incrimination
afforded to defendants under the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights are at least as protective as, if not even more expansive
than, those afforded under the United States Constitution.
Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 60 (2022). Commonwealth
v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 858-859 (2000).
                                                                       11

(citation omitted).     Id.    The nonexhaustive list of relevant

factors includes

    "promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant,
    the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional
    stability, experience with and in the criminal justice
    system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the
    discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or
    the police), and the details of the interrogation[,
    including the recitation of Miranda warnings]" (citation
    omitted).

Id. at 502 n.3.

    The totality of the circumstances here demonstrates that

the will of the defendant was not overborne when he confessed to

the Virginia officers.        The interrogation lasted only

approximately one hour, and the tone during the entirety of the

interview was conversational rather than adversarial:         no one

raised his or her voice, the Virginia officers never harassed

the defendant, and the defendant never appeared agitated or

intimidated by the Virginia officers.        Additionally, the

defendant did not appear particularly vulnerable to coercion.

He was an adult with a postsecondary education; he appeared

physically healthy and mentally coherent; and he had had

significant experience with the criminal justice system.         The

defendant was able to recite the Miranda warnings himself --

saying that "[he knew] them very well" -- prior to the Virginia

officers formally providing those warnings and obtaining a

voluntary waiver.     The defendant initiated the conversation with
                                                                     12

the Virginia officers and displayed an obvious desire to speak

and confess to them.    Indeed, the defendant specifically

mentioned to the Massachusetts officers that he had "volunteered

to talk" to the Virginia officers.

    The defendant nonetheless contends that his statements were

involuntary because the police (i) used a "now or never"

interrogation tactic; (ii) used language minimizing the crimes;

(iii) appealed to the defendant's religious beliefs; and

(iv) made a promise to facilitate leniency for the defendant's

girlfriend.   We disagree.

    i.     "Now or never."   A "now or never" interrogation tactic

is one that "lead[s] a defendant to believe that the

conversation with police will be his or her sole opportunity to

tell his or her story."      Commonwealth v. Miller, 486 Mass. 78,

92 (2020).    The "now or never" tactic "casts substantial doubt

on the voluntariness of a subsequent confession and on the

integrity of the interrogation process leading up to it," and

"[t]his doubt would be extremely difficult for the Commonwealth

to overcome in any case."     Id. at 93, quoting Commonwealth v.

Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 269 (2004).     This tactic was not used here,

however.   The Virginia officers encouraged the defendant to

"take advantage of this opportunity to talk with [them]," but at

no time insinuated that this was the defendant's "sole

opportunity" to tell his story.     Further, our prior cases have
                                                                    13

found the "now or never" tactic problematic particularly in

circumstances that have an impact on a defendant's right to

counsel or right to testify before a jury.    See Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 541-542 (statement that "[t]his is your

only opportunity to tell your story to us so that we can help

you" would be improper "where a suspect has invoked her right to

counsel"); Novo, supra at 268-269 (statement that if defendant

did not speak to officers as to reason for his conduct, "a jury[

were] never going to hear a reason" was improper

"misrepresentation of the defendant's right to defend himself at

trial").    Here, the Virginia officers did not suggest in any way

that not speaking now would have an impact on his right to

counsel, his right to testify on his own behalf, or his right to

represent himself.

    ii.    Minimization.   We have explained that "the standard

interrogation tactic of minimization is problematic" because

describing a crime repeatedly "as understandable, justifiable,

and not particularly serious" could imply a promise of leniency

(citation omitted).    Commonwealth v. Harris, 468 Mass. 429, 436

(2014).    "Use of the tactic by itself, however, does not

compel[] the conclusion that a confession is involuntary"

(quotation and citation omitted).    Id.   See Hammond, 477 Mass.

at 503-504 ("Minimization, combined with other factors, may

render a confession involuntary . . .").     When analyzing the
                                                                  14

impact of minimization on voluntariness, we look not only to

whether law enforcement utilized minimization tactics, but also

to whether the tactics caused the defendant to be "misled as to

the severity of his situation."   Commonwealth v. Newson, 471

Mass. 222, 231 (2015).

    Here, the defendant's statements demonstrate that he was

not misled into somehow believing the situation was not serious.

The Virginia officers interrogating the defendant twice used

minimizing language, categorizing the defendant's crimes as "a

mistake" and "a lapse in judgment."   But the defendant

immediately disagreed with the Virginia officers:   when one

Virginia officer characterized the crimes as "a mistake," the

defendant replied, "Well this is bigger than a little mistake."

The Virginia officers also later stated to the defendant that

"this is a pretty severe, heinous incident," to which the

defendant agreed.   Any minimization tactic employed here did not

coerce the defendant to confess because "the defendant's actions

reveal that he was able to decide what to tell the officers and

could further identify the officers' tactics for what they

were."   Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 596-598 (2010),

S.C., 475 Mass. 657 (2016), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 896 (2017).

Indeed, even had the defendant been misled, the Virginia

officers' use of minimization, without more, would not affect

the outcome of our analysis here in the face of significant and
                                                                    15

considerable evidence that the defendant sought to speak to law

enforcement and then voluntarily did so consistent with his

desire.     See Commonwealth v. Cartright, 478 Mass. 273, 289

(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423,

438-439 (2004) (explaining we "expressly disclaimed the

suggestion that an officer's use of the standard interrogation

tactic of minimization, by itself, compels the conclusion that a

confession is involuntary" [quotations omitted]).

     iii.    Appeal to religion.   In Cartright, we adopted the

approach of some jurisdictions that "condemn 'the tactic of

exploiting a suspect's [specific] religious anxieties,' but [do]

not order suppression where the commentary on religion is

limited and not 'calculated to exploit a particular

psychological vulnerability of the defendant.'"    Cartright, 478

Mass. at 289-291, quoting People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 953

(1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842 (1991).    Here, the reference

to religion was extremely limited, if present at all.     The

Virginia officers referenced Smith's "soul" only once.5

     5 The Virginia officer testified at the hearing on the
motion to suppress that he was not seeking to invoke religion
when he mentioned Smith's "soul," but instead was only
attempting to reference Smith's "being." Cf. Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/soul [https://perma.cc/ZZY8-RUG7] (defining soul as "the
immaterial essence, animating principle, or actuating cause of
an individual life"). Further, the defendant stated that he was
not very religious at the time of the interrogation, and it is
                                                                   16

Moreover, there was no evidence that the Virginia officers were

attempting to exploit the defendant's religious sensibilities or

that the defendant's religious sensibilities were affected.     The

trial judge, in denying the defendant's motion to suppress,

found that "the police were unaware of any religious affiliation

of the defendant or of any personal religious sensibilities,

particularly those that would be a means to break his will," and

we have no reason to disagree with this finding.    Accordingly,

the singular reference to Smith's "soul" is insufficient to

upend our conclusion that the defendant's statement was freely

and voluntarily made.

    iv.   Promise of leniency.   The defendant's remaining

contention is that the Virginia officers promised leniency for

his girlfriend in exchange for his confession.     Officers may not

make a threat concerning a person's loved one, such as

threatening arrest and charging a loved one without any basis to

do so or "expressly bargain[ing] with the defendant over the

release of other individuals."   Commonwealth v. Raymond, 424

Mass. 382, 396 (1997), S.C., 450 Mass. 729 (2008).    See

Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 389 (2019).    However, this

is not a case where the Virginia officers threatened the

defendant as to his relationship with a loved one, contrast

therefore less likely that he would have interpreted the word
"soul" in the spiritual sense.
                                                                    17

Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 469 (2015) (threats to

defendant's ability to maintain contact with daughter

characterized as coercion); or a case where the Virginia

officers threatened to charge the defendant's girlfriend without

any basis to do so, contrast Commonwealth v. Hunt, 12 Mass. App.

Ct. 841, 842-843 (1981) (confession found to be involuntary

where officers promised leniency for defendant's wife in

exchange for defendant's confession even though officers never

had probable cause to hold wife); or a case where the Virginia

officers expressly assured the defendant that his girlfriend

would be released if he confessed.

    Instead, the Virginia officers simply provided a truthful

response to the defendant's inquiry.    Both the defendant and

Smith were taken into custody by the Virginia officers under

warrants based on probable cause.    The defendant then requested

to speak with the Virginia officers and, with urgency, raised

the issue of his girlfriend's innocence and stated multiple

times at the beginning of the interrogation that Smith was not

responsible for what had occurred.    Only after raising the issue

of his girlfriend's lack of responsibility did the defendant, in

reference to his girlfriend's then-alleged innocence, ask, "[D]o

you think after we talk there's a way we could try to contact

the police department down there and arrange something?"    The
                                                                  18

Virginia officer responded, If you're honest with me and you're

telling me everything that's going on."

    In this context, the Virginia officer's response was a

truthful explanation of what he believed would be the benefit of

the defendant's confession:   if the defendant was being honest

when he stated that Smith was not involved in the killings, then

leniency for Smith would likely result.   Explaining the

truthful, natural result of a suspect's statement is

permissible.   See Commonwealth v. Berg, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 200,

205-206 (1994); United States v. Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19, 24

(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 884 (2015) ("Without more, an

officer's truthful description of the family member's

predicament is permissible since it merely constitutes an

attempt to both accurately depict the situation to the suspect

and to elicit more information about the family member's

culpability"); United States v. McWhorter, 515 Fed. Appx. 511,

518 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 912 (2013) (confession

was voluntary where officer stated to suspect "that if he was

responsible for all the criminal activity, the state would not

be interested in prosecuting his wife"); United States v. Jones,

32 F.3d 1512, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994) (where agents truthfully

told defendant that "unless [he] explained the participation of

his girlfriend, she would continue to be considered a suspect,"

confession was found to be voluntary); Bruno v. State, 574 So.
                                                                  19

2d 76, 79-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991) ("Even

taking into account that [the detective] later testified at the

trial that he had told [the defendant] that if he gave a sworn

statement exculpating his son, his son would not be charged, the

record supports the conclusion that the confession was freely

and voluntarily made[;] [t]he police legitimately believed that

[the defendant's] son was involved but recognized that if [the

defendant] gave a sworn statement exculpating his son there

would be no basis upon which his son could be charged"); Bailey

v. State, 473 N.E.2d 609, 610 (Ind. 1985) (confession was

voluntary where defendant "was merely advised that [friend's

release] would not be forthcoming without some basis for

believing that, although the two were caught in the car with the

goods, the friend had no knowledge of the burglary").

    Indeed, the defendant's motivation for speaking with law

enforcement, at its core, can be reduced to one driving force:

his desire to protect his girlfriend.   This desire, absent any

illegitimate police tactics, does not render a confession

involuntary.   See Commonwealth v. Scott, 430 Mass. 351, 355

(1999) ("The defendant's concern for his sister is not enough to

tip the balance where all other factors indicate that the

defendant made his statement voluntarily"); Raymond, 424 Mass.

at 396 ("a motive to protect his mother is not sufficient to

find [the defendant's] confession involuntary" [citation
                                                                    20

omitted]).    We thus conclude that the response of the Virginia

officers to the defendant's inquiry concerning his potential

cooperation did not detract from the voluntariness of his

confession.

     Under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's

statements to the Virginia officers were made freely and

voluntarily.6

     b.   Fair and impartial jury.   The defendant argues that his

right to a fair and impartial jury as violated when the trial

judge declined to change the venue of the trial despite local

pretrial publicity of the crimes.    A trial judge "should

exercise [the] power to change the venue of a trial with great

caution" and only after the defendant has met his or her burden

"to establish the 'solid foundation of fact' necessary to

support a grant of the motion" (citation omitted).     Commonwealth

v. Bateman, 492 Mass. 404, 430 (2023).     "The mere existence of

pretrial publicity, even if it is extensive, does not constitute

a foundation of fact sufficient to require a change in venue"

(citation omitted).    Id.   Rather, the defendant must establish

that the pretrial publicity created presumptive prejudice or

     6 As the defendant makes no independent claim of coercion
during his interview with the Massachusetts officers, and as we
find that no coercion occurred upon our own review of the
interrogation, the defendant's statements to the Massachusetts
officers were likewise voluntary.
                                                                    21

actual prejudice.   Id.   The trial judge has "substantial

discretion" to decide the motion, and we review the trial

judge's decision for abuse of discretion (citation omitted).

Id. at 431.   Indeed, "[i]n evaluating the risk of prejudice

posed by pretrial publicity, we give careful attention to the

evaluation of the trial judge, especially one who, as here,

presides in the county where the crime occurred and is familiar

with the nature and pervasiveness of the pretrial publicity."

Id.   We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his

discretion because the pretrial publicity caused neither

presumptive nor actual prejudice.

      Presumptive prejudice "exists only in truly extraordinary

circumstances" and where the trial atmosphere had become

"'utterly corrupted' by media coverage."    Bateman, 492 Mass. at

431, quoting Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 463 (2011),

S.C., 490 Mass. 698 (2022), and Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463

Mass. 205, 221 (2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1129 (2013).

There are two factors that are central to this analysis:

(1) whether the nature of the pretrial publicity was "both

extensive and sensational;" and (2) "whether the judge was in

fact able to empanel jurors who appear impartial" (citation

omitted).   Bateman, supra.   First, the defendant referenced only

eleven news reports in his motion to change venue, almost all of

which were in the immediate aftermath of the crimes themselves
                                                                    22

(i.e., almost one and one-half years prior to the trial) and

only contained factual descriptions of the relevant events.

This publicity was insufficiently "all-consuming and constant"

to be even close to extensive.    Id. at 432.   See Commonwealth v.

Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 406-407 (2014) (sixteen articles "did not

constitute pervasive publicity because they appeared in a small

number of local news sources and the intensity of the reporting

decreased over time with no articles appearing between January,

2010, and the time of the judge's ruling in April, 2010").      Nor

was the publicity sufficiently sensational.     See Bateman, supra,

quoting Hoose, supra at 407 ("Publicity is sensational when it

contains emotionally charged material that is gratuitous or

inflammatory, rather than a factual recounting of the case").

       Second, less than twenty percent of potential jurors were

excused during voir dire due to pretrial publicity exposure.       We

have required a "high percentage of the venire" to be prejudiced

as a result of pretrial publicity to show that the judge could

not have empanelled an impartial jury.    Hoose, 467 Mass. at 407-

408.   Twenty percent of the venire does not meet this

requirement for presumptive prejudice.    See Commonwealth v.

Morales, 440 Mass. 536, 541-542 (2003) (claim of presumptive

prejudice rejected where approximately twenty-five percent of

venire was disqualified for exposure to media coverage);

Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 515 (1993) (claim of
                                                                    23

presumptive prejudice rejected where forty-two percent of venire

was excused).   We thus find no presumptive prejudice.

       "To demonstrate actual prejudice, a defendant must show

that, in the totality of the circumstances, pretrial publicity

deprived . . . him of his right to a fair and impartial jury."

Hoose, 467 Mass. at 408.    "[T]he voir dire procedures utilized

by the judge are particularly important" in this analysis.       Id.

Here, the trial judge was cognizant of the issue and took

careful, deliberate, and extensive steps to protect the

defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.    The judge

conducted a thorough and individual voir dire of each potential

juror, allowed both counsel and the prosecutor to ask questions

during the individual voir dire, on a daily basis reminded

seated jurors not to discuss the case with anyone and not to

come into contact with any media accounts of the case, inquired

when the jurors returned to the court whether anyone had come

into contact with any information related to the case, and noted

on each trial day their lack of affirmative responses for the

record.   These guardrails were sufficient.   See Hoose, supra at

409.   See also Smith, 492 Mass. at 610-611 (no actual prejudice

from pretrial publicity in codefendant's trial).    We therefore

find no actual prejudice.
                                                                  24

     Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion

in denying the defendant's motion to change venue, and the

defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated.

     c.   Fisher's statements.   The defendant contends that

Sumner-Moryl's testimony, communicating Fisher's statements on

the morning after the attack, contained inadmissible hearsay and

was violative of his right to confront witnesses against him.

     i.   Spontaneous utterance.7   The defendant specifically

argues that the trial judge erred by allowing Fisher's out-of-

court statements in evidence as a spontaneous utterance.     Where

a hearsay issue was properly preserved, as it was here,8 we

review the issue for prejudicial error.    Commonwealth v.

Cheremond, 461 Mass. 397, 411 (2012).     An error is not

prejudicial if it "did not influence the jury, or had but very

slight effect" (citation omitted).    Commonwealth v. Cruz, 445

Mass. 589, 591 (2005).

     Here, we need not decide whether the trial judge erred in

admitting Fisher's statements because, even assuming error,

     7 Courts and litigants alike have used various terms to
describe this hearsay exception, including "spontaneous
exclamation," "spontaneous utterance," "excited utterance," and
others. We reiterate that we will use the term "spontaneous
utterance." Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 4 n.1
(2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).

     8 The defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude this
testimony, which is sufficient to preserve the issue.
Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016).
                                                                    25

there was no resulting prejudice.    Fisher's statements contained

only three inculpatory facts:   there was an invasion into her

home, she had a black eye, and multiple individuals attempted to

suffocate her.   The Commonwealth presented other compelling

admissible evidence of all these facts in various forms:

forensic and physical evidence showed that the defendant invaded

the victims' home, a police officer and a doctor each testified

as to Fisher's injuries, and the defendant himself confessed to

all these facts in detail.   Fisher's statements were thus

duplicative and, at most, had "but very slight effect" on the

jury (citation omitted).   See Cheremond, 461 Mass. at 411 (no

prejudice where, even though it was error to admit victim's

statements to prove motive and nature of parties' relationship,

abundance of admissible evidence was presented to prove these

two facts).   The Commonwealth presented a strong case, and the

defendant therefore suffered no prejudice even if Fisher's

statements were admitted in error.     Accordingly, we find no

reversible error.

    ii.   Confrontation clause.     The defendant also asserts that

admitting Fisher's statements violated his right to

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of

Rights.   See Commonwealth v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 550 n.11

(2010), S.C., 483 Mass. 227 (2019).     In contrast to our review
                                                                   26

of hearsay evidence, if we do find error, "we evaluate the

admission of constitutionally proscribed evidence to determine

whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" (citation

omitted).   Commonwealth v. Rand, 487 Mass. 811, 814-815 (2021).

    We have interpreted the confrontation clause to "bar[] the

admission of testimonial hearsay by a declarant who does not

appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify

as a matter of law and the defendant had an earlier opportunity

to cross-examine him or her."     Commonwealth v. McGann, 484 Mass.

312, 316 (2020).   Nontestimonial hearsay, however, does not

violate the United States Constitution or the Declaration of

Rights.   Rand, 487 Mass. at 815.   We conclude that Fisher's

statements were nontestimonial and that, therefore, there was no

constitutional violation despite Fisher being unable to appear

at trial.

    "Testimonial statements are those made with the primary

purpose of 'creating an out-of-court substitute for trial

testimony'" (citation omitted).     Commonwealth v. Brum, 492 Mass.

581, 596 (2023).   "The inquiry is objective, asking not what

that particular declarant intended, but rather 'the primary

purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the

statement, taking into account all of the surrounding

circumstances'" (citation omitted).     Id.   Although "[a]n ongoing

emergency is not necessary for a statement to be nontestimonial,
                                                                    27

. . . when one is present it takes a central place in our

analysis."   Rand, 487 Mass. at 817.    "The reason for this is

straightforward:    when preoccupied by an ongoing emergency, a

victim is unlikely to have the presence of mind to create a

substitute for trial testimony."    Id.   "Factors bearing on the

existence of an ongoing emergency include (1) whether an armed

assailant poses a continued threat to the victim or the public

at large, (2) the type of weapon that has been employed, and (3)

the severity of the victim's injuries or medical condition"

(citation omitted).    Id.   A victim's medical condition, in

particular, "sheds light on the ability of the victim to have

any purpose at all in responding to police questions and on the

likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a

testimonial one."     Id. at 824, quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562

U.S. 344, 365 (2011).

       Fisher unquestionably had extreme and near-fatal injuries

when she made her statements:    she was stabbed with multiple

knives, suffocated, brutally beaten, and left on the ground to

die.   After repeatedly crying out for help without any response

for over twelve hours, Fisher finally had an opportunity to

speak to someone who could assist her.     We find that Fisher's

statements were made in the throes of an ongoing emergency in

light of these circumstances.
                                                                    28

    The defendant contends that, even if the conversation

between Fisher and Sumner-Moryl had begun during an ongoing

emergency, Fisher's statements turned testimonial once she was

told that "help was on the way."    The emergency did not end in

the middle of the conversation, however:     "[j]ust because an

ambulance has been called does not mean that any potential

medical emergency has dissolved."    Rand, 487 Mass. at 825.   In

particular, "it was prudent for [Sumner-Moryl] to continue

collecting medical information from the victim in case [she]

needed to relay it to paramedics upon their arrival."     Id. at

825-826.

    While the ongoing emergency here, in and of itself, was

enough for Fisher's statements to constitute nontestimonial

hearsay, we mention two additional factors present here:

"(1) the formality [or informality] of the statements, and

(2) the nature of 'the statements and actions of both the

declarant and interrogators'" (citation omitted).    Id. at 817.

These factors only further support a finding that Fisher's

statements were nontestimonial.     The exchange between Fisher and

Sumner-Moryl "was informal and very brief, which was consistent

with an interview whose purpose was to respond to an emergency

rather than to develop a case for prosecution."    Commonwealth v.

Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 263 (2011).     Indeed, far from being a

formal account of what transpired, Fisher's statements were
                                                                  29

devoid of any identification of the assailants -- information

that a reasonable person who intended to provide a substitute

for trial testimony might have provided.   See Commonwealth v.

Mulgrave, 472 Mass. 170, 180 (2015) ("Further, she did not name

the defendant, a fact likely to be communicated by a declarant

attempting to establish her perpetrator's identity");

Commonwealth v. Middlemiss, 465 Mass. 627, 636 (2013)

(statements "were concerned primarily with assessing the

victim's medical condition and collecting as much information as

possible to prepare first responders for what they would soon

encounter" and were, therefore, not testimonial).

    Lastly, that Fisher was speaking with a health care

professional rather than law enforcement weighs heavily in favor

of her statements being nontestimonial.    Although the United

States Supreme Court has declined to adopt a categorical rule

excluding statements to individuals other than law enforcement

from the reach of the confrontation clause, "such statements are

much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law

enforcement officers."   Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 246 (2015).

    In sum, for twelve hours, Fisher was lying on the ground on

the verge of death near her husband, who had been viciously

murdered in front of her.   She was without any ability to

contact the outside world despite crawling outside and

attempting to attract help.   When she was finally given a chance
                                                                    30

to speak to a health care professional through her pain and

anguish, she provided only the most basic of details.     The

ability for a reasonable person in Fisher's position to think

about anything other than obtaining medical assistance or the

horror of what she continued to endure, such as creating trial

testimony, is remote in the extreme.     We conclude that Fisher's

statements were nontestimonial and that, accordingly, there was

no confrontation clause violation.

    d.   Sentencing.    The defendant contends that his two

sentences of life without the possibility of parole are cruel or

unusual punishment under art. 26 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights because he was less than twenty-five years

old at the time of the offenses.     In Diatchenko v. District

Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 671 (2013), S.C.,

471 Mass. 12 (2015), we declared that the Legislature's

authorization of life sentences without the possibility of

parole for juveniles (i.e., those under eighteen years of age)

was unconstitutional.   The defendant, however, "has provided no

evidence of any circumstance that plausibly could suggest that

the known research on adolescent brain development, and its

impact on adolescent behavior, ought to extend to individuals

who are [under the age of twenty-five]."     Commonwealth v. Yat

Fung Ng, 491 Mass. 247, 271-272 (2023).     We thus find no error

in the defendant's sentencing.
                                                                    31

     e.   Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   Having reviewed the

entire record in accordance with our duty under G. L. c. 278,

§ 33E, we discern no reason to reduce the degree of guilt or to

order a new trial.9

                                   Judgments affirmed.

     9 Pursuant to our review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we note
that there may be an issue whether the convictions of attempted
murder and murder in the first degree resulting from the
defendant's attack of Fisher constitute inconsistent verdicts
and, if so, whether reversal of the conviction of murder in the
first degree for the killing of Fisher is required.
Inconsistent verdicts generally do not raise issues of concern.
See Commonwealth v. Resende, 476 Mass. 141, 147 (2017). Here,
however, there may be an issue of concern due to an error in the
trial judge's instruction on attempted murder. In particular,
the trial judge instructed the jury that they must find that
"the defendant's act did not result in the completed crime" in
order to find the defendant guilty of attempted murder. But
"nonachievement of murder is not an element of attempted murder"
(emphasis added). Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 765
(2016). The jury then found the defendant guilty of attempted
murder and murder in the first degree for the killing of Fisher.
Accordingly, due to the instruction error, the jury found that
the defendant's attack "did not result in [murder]." Yet the
jury also found the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree and, therefore, found that the defendant's attack
resulted in Fisher's death. If these are legally inconsistent
verdicts, "[both verdicts] must be set aside." See Resende,
supra. Should the defendant choose to raise this issue, he may
do so directly in the Supreme Judicial Court due to potential
constraints involving gatekeeper petitions.