Court Opinion

ID: 9845713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:26:48.183736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:19.926437
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OPALA, Vice Chief Justice,
with whom SIMMS, J., joins, dissenting.
Today the court dismisses the entire complaint against the respondent-lawyer because the facts stipulated for the record are insufficient for imposition of any discipline. The charges were pressed for (a) writing a threatening letter to an unrepresented individual against whom respondent was prosecuting a damage claim (Count I) and (b) serving the same municipality as both municipal judge and city attorney (Count II). In my view, the proceeding should be remanded for a full-scale inquiry by the Professional Responsibility Panel into the misconduct alleged in the complaint.
This court’s review of disciplinary proceedings is conducted by de novo consideration of the prosecution that is brought before us.1 Our task is to be distinguished from two other concepts with which it is easily confused: de novo appellate review on the record and trial de novo. The latter denotes a retrial of an entire case before a different tribunal, with all litigable issues standing as though they had never been resolved.2 The former — a de novo appellate review on the record — means that, consideration of errors, though conducted upon and' confined to a record made at nisi prius, is effected without any deference to findings entered by the first-instance tribunal.3
This court’s power to discipline a lawyer is nondelegable; no other tribunal may *631take cognizance of disputes that fall under this rubric,4 Unlike in those eases where we exercise reviewing jurisdiction, in bar disciplinary proceedings our cognizance is both original and exclusive.5 The proof to be reviewed is never to be deemed settled beyond our ability to expand it. The record always remains within this court’s plenary power to order its supplementation. Insufficiency of proof can never rise to an insuperable postural obstacle where, as here, it is clear that additional evidence needed for review may be available.
As a constitutional tribunal of both first and last instance, in disciplinary prosecutions of lawyers this court claims for itself the very same quantum of control over the contents of the record to be examined as it does over the breadth of inquiry necessary for a panel’s minimal exploration of the issues tendered by the complaint. Every aspect of the Bar’s adjudicative process, from its beginning to the end, is an exercise of this court’s original and exclusive constitutional cognizance over lawyers. As this power cannot be shared with any other institution,6 the entire process must be supervised by our de novo consideration. It is the attribute of nondelegable jurisdiction that serves to distinguish the conduct of our bar disciplinary function from trial de novo — a retrial in a different court — or even from de novo appellate review on the record, which stands for an independent, non-deferential examination of another tribunal’s record.7
My assessment of the record reveals that some critical evidence was not included with the stipulated facts. Among other deficiencies, the offending letter — which serves as the very foundation for Count I — is not in the record. This case hence stands in the same procedural posture as did Lloyd8 when it made its initial appearance in this court. Lloyd was remanded for a hearing and so should this case.9
As for Count II, there is enough factual material in this record to warrant imposition of a much more severe disciplinary sanction than public reprimand. While serving as a city attorney, respondent admittedly also acted as a municipal judge. His conduct violates Rule 1.12(a), Okla*632homa Rules of Professional Conduct.10 More importantly, the dual service contravenes federal due process as it is presumptively destructive of a judge’s neutrality and detachment — a condition that is constitutionally mandated for all adjudicative functionaries, administrative and judicial.11 This count of charged misconduct seriously offends the Nation’s fundamental charter a lawyer is sworn to uphold and obey.12
As it was done in Lloyd I, I would today remand this cause for a full-scale inquiry into both counts charged in the complaint and for reconsideration of discipline to be visited upon the respondent.

. State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Lloyd, Okl., 787 P.2d 855, 858 [1990] [Lloyd II]; Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Stubblefield, Okl., 766 P.2d 979, 982 [1988]; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Cantrell, Okl., 734 P.2d 1292, 1293 [1987]; State ex rel., Okl. Bar Ass'n v. Raskin, Okl., 642 P.2d 262, 265-266 [1982].

. See Shelton v. Lambert, Okl., 399 P.2d 467, 470 (1965). See also Globe-Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co., 103 F.2d 722, 728 (7th Cir.1939); Burstein v. Millikin Trust Co., 350 Ill.App. 462, 113 N.E.2d 339, 341 (1953).

. Brown v. Burkett, Okl., 755 P.2d 650, 651 (1988); Globe-Union, Inc. v. Chicago Telephone Supply Co., supra note 2 at 728; Niehaus v. Madden, 348 Mo. 770, 155 S.W.2d 141, 145 (1941); see also Art. 9 § 20, Okl. Const., infra; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Be Ry. Co. v. State, Okl., 692 P.2d 554, 555-556 (1984).
The pertinent terms of Art. 9 § 20, Okl.Const., provide:
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“The Supreme Court’s review of appealable orders of the Corporation Commission shall be judicial only, and in all appeals involving in [sic] asserted violation of any right of the parties under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the Court shall exercise its own independent judgment as to both the law and the facts. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) *631In a de novo appellate review the court exercises its judgment independently and without deference to the findings or rulings below. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodgers, 756 F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1985), which holds that when the district court, based on the record before it, rejects a magistrate’s recommendations and draws its own findings with conclusions, it need not return the case to the magistrate either for additional findings or a new hearing.

. In re Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okl. 505, 95 P.2d 113 (1939) (the court's syllabus); State ex rel. Okl. Bar Ass’n v. Raskin, supra note 1 at 265-266.

. Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, Okl., 624 P.2d 1049, 1052 (1981).

. Delegata potestas non potest delegari — delegated power may not be redelegated. American Home Products Corporation v. Homsey, Okl., 361 P.2d 297, 301-302 (1961).

. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498-511, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1958-1965, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 [1984]; Peel v. Attorney Reg. & Disciplinary Com’n. — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 2291-2292, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 [1990].

. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. James R. Lloyd, SCBD No. 3455, received November 17, 1987 [Lloyd I].

.In Lloyd I, supra note 8, this court's June 21, 1988 order provides:
"ORDER DECLINING TO APPROVE PROPOSED STIPULATIONS AND AGREED RECOMMENDATION FOR DISCIPLINE
On consideration of the stipulations submitted on May 11, 1988, the court declines to impose the recommended sanction and notes that, by the terms of the parties’ agreement, the stipulated disposition of the complaint is to be treated as withdrawn if it is rejected by this court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT THE COMPLAINT IN THIS CAUSE STAND REMANDED TO THE PANEL OF THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TRIBUNAL WHENCE IT CAME FOR FURTHER ADVERSARY HEARINGS AND DISPOSITION BY A REPORT OF THE PANEL WITH ITS RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE.
DONE BY ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE THIS 20TH DAY OF JUNE, 1988.
/s/ Acting Chief Justice
Robert E. Lavender
LAVENDER, SIMMS, OPALA, WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur; DOOLIN, C.J., and HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and KAUGER, J., dissent."

. 5 O.S.Supp.1988, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.

. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 [1973].

.Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 [1927]; Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 82-83, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 [1972].