Court Opinion

ID: 9626082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:01:33.507803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:20.791953
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Division 1, but I do not concur fully in Division 2.
For one thing, I do not agree that Preston will have an opportunity to pursue his claim of unconstitutionality of the High-voltage Safety Act on petition for certiorari. If the Supreme Court grants his petition, should he file one, its review will be limited to this Court’s rulings, as it will be this Court’s action and not that of the superior court which will be subject to review. As stated in Daniels v. State, 248 Ga. 591, n. 1, 592 (285 SE2d 516) (1981), when a petition for certiorari is granted and the case is before the Supreme Court, “in its discretion [that] court can consider any matter presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals.” Southeast Ceramics v. Klem, 246 Ga. 294 (271 SE2d 199) (1980) is an illustration. The Constitution provides that “The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance.” Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V. The scope of certiorari, then, is comprised of matters presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals.
This Court cannot decide the constitutionality vel non of a statute (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1)), and the matter was not and, for the jurisdictional reason, could not be presented to us. In fact, the issue was presented to the Supreme Court by appellant, but it transferred the case to the Court of Appeals. Even if, as a matter of jurisdictional jurisprudence, the Supreme Court could reach around the Court of Appeals decision and take up on certiorari an issue decided only by the superior court and outside the competency of the Court of Appeals, it is unrealistic to propose that it would do so. Had the Supreme Court viewed the constitutionality issue properly before it on the appeal taken directly to it by appellant, it would have been compelled by the constitution to accept the case because of its exclusive jurisdiction of such matters. Ga. Const; 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (1). Instead, it transferred the appeal to this Court. Preston’s claim in this regard has effectively been foreclosed. The trial court denied plaintiff Preston’s motion to strike Georgia Power Company’s defense founded on the Act, which motion was based in part on the charge that the Act was unconstitutional. Preston argued that it violated his rights to equal protection and due process. Although he referred to both the federal and the state constitutions, he did so generally and without any citation to specific provisions. The trial court did not expressly differentiate in its ruling either, although it ruled *457that Preston had no standing to complain of the lack of equal protection, and it ruled that federally protected due process was not contravened by the Act. The court granted a certificate of immediate review at plaintiff’s request, but the Supreme Court denied interlocutory appeal. It did not explain its denial.
The Supreme Court has now transferred to this Court Preston’s appeal from the order granting both Ashland’s and Georgia Power Company’s motions for summary judgment. In that order, the trial court noted: “Plaintiff also raises constitutional challenges to the High Voltage Safety Act on equal protection and due process grounds. This court has already ruled adversely to plaintiff on these constitutional issues in the order filed November 17, 1994.” Thus, the trial court reiterated and confirmed its ruling on constitutionality and made it part of the summary judgment order as well. That ruling was necessary to its ruling on the remaining grounds, which depended upon an application of the Act; had it been unconstitutional, Georgia Power Company would not have been entitled to summary judgment.
This Court could not have addressed the issue of constitutionality, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the transfer to this Court merely means that the Supreme Court has discerned some reason it need not exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the constitutionality issue. In the words used in Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657 (1) (469 SE2d 22) (1996), “[the] transfer merely represents [the Supreme Court’s] determination that [this] was not a case involving a constitutional issue over which [it] had exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. This does not mean that the constitutional issue does not have merit. Id. at 658.
The Supreme Court’s order states that the case is transferred to this Court “[b]ecause the issue on which the trial court granted summary judgment . . . does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court.” The constitutionality issue falls by the wayside.
On another subject, I must point out that I do concur in footnote 4. In 1992, the general liability of owners and operators of high-voltage lines was eliminated in the ten-foot circumstances described in OCGA § 46-3-39 (a). Because of the 1992 amendments to the High-voltage Safety Act, the liability for injury or damage caused by improperly located or improperly maintained lines which is discussed in Malvarez v. Ga. Power Co., 250 Ga. 568 (300 SE2d 145) (1983), applies only to instances outside the exception created in subsection (a). See OCGA § 46-3-39 (b). The date of the accident in Callaway v. Crown Crafts, 223 Ga. App. 297 (477 SE2d 435) (1996) was after the effective date of the 1992 amendments.