Court Opinion

ID: 9587638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:38.208373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:57.005730
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to stress two points.
First, the trial court found that the officer continued to detain the defendant during the questioning and during the request for consent to search his person. The court stated, “Rather than ticket Stinemetz or release him, the officer decided to conduct a drug investigation.” It is this continued detention that makes the questioning and request to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity impermissible. State v. Sims, 248 Ga. App. 277 (546 SE2d 47) (2001).
Second, an officer who has completed a traffic stop may question the driver on another topic and request consent to search so long as *865the driver is not still being detained, i.e., the encounter is consensual.
As stated in Sims,
The Fourth Amendment protects a person’s right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The “ ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’ Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248, 250 (111 SC 1801, 114 LE2d 297) (1991).” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39 (117 SC 417, 136 LE2d 347) (1996). “Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. And, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected bright-line rules in applying this test. Id. In deciding whether the question about drugs and weapons, standing alone, was unreasonable, we note that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (111 SC 2382, 115 LE2d 389) (1991). The Supreme Court has made clear that “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.; Simmons v. State, 223 Ga. App. 781, 783 (2) (479 SE2d 123) (1996) (if the police questioning was consensual, then questions on an unrelated topic after the conclusion of a valid traffic stop are allowed). Second, with regard to the consent to search, “one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” (Citations omitted.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 219 (93 SC 2041, 36 LE2d 854) (1973). See also Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80 (2) (a) (295 SE2d 306) (1982). In deciding whether consent to search is valid, the Supreme Court has made clear that the sole test is whether the consent was voluntary. Robinette, 519 U. S. at 40. And, if the consent is voluntary, an officer may obtain consent to search a car following the conclusion of a valid traffic stop, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. Finally, “ ‘voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’ ” (Citation omitted.) Id. In Robinette, the defendant was stopped for speeding, and after the stop was completed and his license returned, the officer asked him whether he had any drugs or weapons. Robinette, 519 U. S. at 36. Robinette answered no, after which the officer asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled that the evidence subsequently discovered in the car should be suppressed because the *866search resulted from an unlawful detention because Robinette had not been told that he was free to go. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment did not require such a bright-line test. Robinette, 519 U. S. at 39. Rather the test to be employed is whether under the totality of the circumstances the consent was voluntary. And the officer’s subjective intent is immaterial to the question. Id. at 38 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (116 SC 1769,135 LE2d 89) (1996)). However, as is shown in Migliore [v. State, 240 Ga. App. 783 (525 SE2d 166) (1999),] and Smith v. State, 216 Ga. App. 453, 454-455 (454 SE2d 635) (1995), if the officer continues to detain the subject after the conclusion of the traffic stop and interrogates him or seeks consent to search without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer has exceeded the scope of a permissible investigation of the initial traffic stop. This is so because “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.” (Citations omitted.) Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 18 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1967). And, “(t)he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 19. As stated in State v. Blair, 239 Ga. App. 340, 341 (521 SE2d 380) (1999), “An officer who questions and detains a suspect for other reasons exceeds the scope of permissible investigation unless he has ‘reasonable suspicion’ of other criminal activity.”
(Footnote and emphasis omitted.) Sims, 248 Ga. App. at 278-280.
To reiterate, “So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. at 434. Here, like in Sims, the trial court found that the defendant was detained without justification when the officer began to question the defendant about drugs and request consent to search. Therefore, the continued encounter was not consensual. Without reasonable suspicion to justify the continued detention, the subsequent consent to search was the product of this impermissible seizure. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in suppressing the evidence obtained in the search.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Johnson and Judge Ellington join in this special concurrence.