Court Opinion

ID: 9630281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:07:17.565173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:35.648131
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion that we should reverse the Commission’s dismissal of Cawley’s application for a hearing. However, in my view the case should be remanded to the Commission for a determination of when Cawley was first incapacitated, rather than whether he is disabled and, if so, when the disability occurred.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority that “incapacity” as used in I.C. § 72-448(2) means total incapacity and therefore is synonymous with “disablement.” As I see it, when the statute refers to “incapacity, disablement, or death,” the legislature intended to give a different meaning to “incapacity” than it did to “disablement.” Although there is no statutory definition of incapacity, the use of the term “total incapacity” in I.C. § 72-102(18)(c) defining “disablement” is clear evidence that the legislature understood that there are different degrees of incapacity. . I would define “incapacity” as the existence of a physical condition that is not so great as to preclude employment in the occupation in which the employee was injuriously exposed, but that is sufficient to decrease the employee’s ability to perform the employee’s work.