Court Opinion

ID: 9852969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:40:12.155726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.624075
License: Public Domain

Justice Orr
concurring.
While I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusions, I find the opinion clouding even further the apparent distinction between *441“dependent spouse” and “dependency.” The majority’s reliance on Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982), concludes “that defendant’s status as the dependent spouse is not properly reconsidered upon a motion to modify ....” As such, the opinion seems to say that dependency in the context of the amount of alimony to be paid can be considered upon a motion to modify, but the dependent status cannot. Such a distinction does not appear to make any sense to me, nor do I find support for this distinction in Rowe.
In looking at the applicable statutes dealing with alimony as applied to this case, N.C.G.S. § 50-16.1 defines “dependent spouse” as “a spouse . . . who is actually substantially dependent upon the other spouse for his or her maintenance and support. . . .” N.C.G.S. § 50-16.1 (1987) (amended 1995).
Having determined first that one spouse is a dependent spouse and thus the other a supporting spouse, the inquiry pursuant to G.S. § 50-16.2 turns to whether the dependent spouse is entitled to alimony. Upon a finding of entitlement, the final inquiry would be under G.S. § 50-16.5 as to the amount of alimony.
Obviously, upon a showing of a change in circumstances, the entitlement issue could not be relitigated. Likewise, the relationship between the parties, specifically, which one is a supporting spouse and which one is a dependent spouse, could not be relitigated. However, it is unquestioned that the amount of alimony to be paid is subject to modification and I would contend that upon a proper showing, a “dependent spouse” could be shown to no longer be dependent under the statutory definition. Therefore, under the statutory scheme, at a modification hearing, if a party is not a “dependent spouse,” then regardless of entitlement, there can be no award of alimony.
The Court of Appeals opinion in Rowe v. Rowe, 52 N.C. App. 646, 280 S.E.2d 182 (1981), was directly on point, and as I read the Supreme Court’s decision in Rowe, was neither overruled nor contradicted by this Court. Judge Clark, writing for the majority, states:
Defendant’s argument that the court’s initial determination of dependency is not subject to reconsideration on a subsequent motion under G.S. 50-16.9 is untenable. As we have explained herein, G.S. 50-16.9 calls for a completely new examination of the factors which necessitated the initial award of alimony in order *442to determine whether any of these circumstances have changed. When the list of circumstances enumerated in G.S. 50-16.5 is properly employed, the conclusion is inescapable that defendant, although formerly dependent, is no longer so. Certainly one of the ultimate circumstances which might change under G.S. 50-16.9, would be the defendant’s condition of dependency. We hold that as a matter of law based on the undisputed fact that, as defendant herself has stated, her “separate income is well over what [she] spend[s] for living expenses,” the evidence established a change of circumstances requiring modification of the consent order to reflect a finding that defendant is not a dependent spouse and to vacate the award of alimony. We leave intact that portion of the consent order wherein the court found, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, that there were grounds for alimony under G.S. 50-16.2. Defendant may, therefore, still seek modification of the order under G.S. 50-16.9 should her circumstances change such that she once again is substantially in need of plaintiff’s support and maintenance. She may rely on the finding of entitlement in the consent order as res judicata and need only establish her dependency.
Rowe, 52 N.C. App. at 656, 280 S.E.2d at 188.
When Rowe reached this Court, the primary issues dealt with whether the consent order was modifiable and whether the consent order and the property settlement could be integrated. The next issue was whether there had been a change of circumstances. It is in this discussion, which affirmed the Court of Appeals on the issue, that language quoted in the majority opinion in the case sub judice is found. To the extent this Court held in Rowe that the status of a dependent spouse is permanently adjudicated, I would read it to mean that the original issue of the relationship between the parties in the case sub judice as to supporting and dependent spouse cannot be relitigated. As to the language in the majority opinion that “defendant can rely on the original finding of entitlement,” I agree to the extent that an entitlement determination cannot be relitigated.
Thus, I would hold that “dependency” — meaning whether the previously adjudicated “dependent spouse” is still dependent as defined by our statutes — is a perfectly appropriate issue to consider upon a motion to modify based on a change in circumstances.