Court Opinion

ID: 9915937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 01:02:00.09865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:04.237225
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24 (opinion on transfer from Supreme Court)
                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                        A163074
    v.
    MENIQUE LASHON,                                     (Contra Costa County
                                                        Super. Ct. No. 51814102)
         Defendant and Appellant.

         On September 1, 2023, we issued our original opinion affirming the
judgment against defendant Menique Lashon based on her conviction for one
count of second-degree murder and one count of first-degree murder, together
with true findings of special circumstance allegations. In that opinion, we
found Lashon had forfeited her ability to bring a California Racial Justice Act
(CRJA; Pen. Code, § 745 1) claim on direct appeal by failing to file a motion in
the trial court before judgment was entered and we affirmed the judgment.
         On November 15, 2023, having granted Lashon’s petition for review,
our Supreme Court remanded the case to us with directions to vacate our
opinion 2 and reconsider the cause in light of Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–

1        All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2     Our Supreme Court ordered the depublication of our original opinion.
Depublication does not bear on the merits of the case before us. (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425, fn. 4; see California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1125(d) [“[a] Supreme Court order to depublish is not an expression of
the court’s opinion of the correctness of the result of the decision or of any law
stated in the opinion”].)

                                                1
2024 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1118), which modified the CRJA to allow for additional
avenues of relief for claims made on direct appeal. Having now considered
AB 1118’s amendments to the CRJA, we find the long-standing procedural
appellate rules governing forfeiture of issues continue to apply and again
affirm.
      Lashon has also filed a separate motion requesting we stay the appeal
and remand the matter to the superior court to allow her to file a CRJA
motion. Under the circumstances presented here, we do not find good cause
to grant this request.
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    GOVERNING LAW – SECTION 745 AS AMENDED BY AB 1118
      In enacting section 745, the Legislature laudably declared its intention
“to eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system because
racism in any form or amount, at any stage of a criminal trial, is intolerable,
inimical to a fair criminal justice system, is a miscarriage of justice under
Article VI of the California Constitution, and violates the laws and
Constitution of the State of California. Implicit bias, although often
unintentional and unconscious, may inject racism and unfairness into
proceedings similar to intentional bias. The intent of the Legislature is not to
punish this type of bias, but rather to remedy the harm to the defendant’s
case and to the integrity of the judicial system. It is the intent of the
Legislature to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining
convictions or in sentencing. It is the intent of the Legislature to reject the
conclusion that racial disparities within our criminal justice are inevitable,
and to actively work to eradicate them.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2, subd. (i).)
      To further the goal of eliminating racial bias in criminal proceedings,
subdivision (a) of section 745, provides that “[t]he state shall not seek or

                                        2
obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis
of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” Pertinent to our discussion, a violation
of section 745 “is established if the defendant proves, by a preponderance of
the evidence,” that “[d]uring the defendant’s trial, in court and during the
proceedings,” a trial judge “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not
purposeful.” (Id., subd. (a)(2)).
      Subdivision (b) of section 745 informs defendants how to seek relief
during various stages of a criminal proceeding. As originally enacted,
effective January 1, 2021, defendants could seek relief by filing a motion in
the trial court or, if judgment had been imposed, by filing a “petition for writ
of habeas corpus or a motion under section 1473.7, in a court of competent
jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).” (§ 745, subd. (b).) When
enacted, section 745 applied only prospectively to cases in which judgment
had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2020, ch. 317.)
Therefore, in all eligible cases – including Lashon’s case – the defendant had
the opportunity to raise a CRJA claim in the trial court.
      Section 745 was later amended effective January 1, 2023 to provide for
retroactive application to judgments that were not final and created a
timeline for judgments entered before January 1, 2021. (Stats. 2022, ch. 739,
§ 2.) After retroactive application became possible, section 745 was modified
by AB 1118 (Stats. 2023, ch. 464), effective January 1, 2024. The statute now
provides that post-judgment CRJA claims based on the trial record may be
raised on direct appeal from the conviction or sentence (including to cases
with judgments entered before January 1, 2021). (Ibid.) The statute does not
state that a defendant may raise a section 745 claim on direct appeal for the
first time and does not refer to the general appellate rules governing the

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preservation or forfeiture of claims presented on direct appeal. In addition, a
defendant may move to stay the appeal and request remand to file a
section 745 motion in the trial court. (Ibid.)
II.   SECTION 745 CLAIMS REMAIN SUBJECT TO GENERAL APPELLATE
      RULES OF FORFEITURE
      In our original decision, we held Lashon’s section 745 claim was not
properly before us as she forfeited appellate review by failing to make a
motion before entry of judgment. Our decision was based on well-settled
general appellate rules of forfeiture. (See, e.g., People v. Elliot (2012) 53
Cal.4th 535, 572 [defendant forfeited claim that trial court exhibited racial
bias during jury selection process by failing to raise the issue at trial].) As we
now explain, we hold AB 1118’s amendments to section 745 do not change our
analysis or conclusion.
      The interpretation of section 745 as amended by AB 1118 is subject to
de novo review. (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382.) We first
look at the statutory language based upon the customary meaning of that
language; “ ‘ “[t]he words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping
in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to
the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to
the extent possible.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is susceptible of
more than one reasonable interpretation, we must look to additional canons
of statutory construction to determine the Legislature’s purpose. [Citation.]
“Both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical
circumstances of its enactment may be considered in ascertaining the
legislative intent.” ’ ” (Carmack v. Reynolds (2017) 2 Cal.5th 844, 849–850.)

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      A.    The Language of Section 745 Does Not Obviate the
            General Forfeiture Rules
      As noted, section 745 was enacted effective January 1, 2021 and
originally provided that the only methods for seeking relief for racial bias
after entry of judgment were by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus 3 or
a motion under section 1473.7 4, in a court of competent jurisdiction. (§ 745,
subd. (b); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5.) While the Legislature provided a
defendant could raise a violation of section 745 for the first time in a habeas
petition (see fn. 4, ante), there was no provision in section 745 “for raising a
violation of the statute for the first time on direct appeal.” (People v.
Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323, 336 (Simmons).) Of course, this was

3      Section 1473 was amended and currently provides, in pertinent part,
that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, a writ of habeas corpus may also be
prosecuted after judgment has been entered based on evidence that a
criminal conviction or sentence was sought, obtained, or imposed in violation
of subdivision (a) of Section 745;” that “[a] petition raising a claim of this
nature for the first time, or on the basis of new discovery provided by the
state or other new evidence that could not have been previously known by the
petitioner with due diligence, shall not be deemed a successive or abusive
petition;” and “[i]f the petitioner has a habeas corpus petition pending in
state court, but it has not yet been decided, the petitioner may amend the
existing petition with a claim that the petitioner’s conviction or sentence was
sought, obtained, or imposed in violation of subdivision (a) of section 745.”
(§ 1473, subd. (e); see Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 982, § 1.5;
Stats. 2023, ch. 381, § 1.)
4      Section 1473.7 was amended and currently provides, in pertinent part,
that a person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate
a conviction or sentence on the basis that a conviction or sentence was
sought, obtained, or imposed on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin
in violation of subdivision (a) of section 745; and the motion “shall be filed
without undue delay from the date the moving party discovered, or could
have discovered with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence that provides
a basis for relief under this section or Section 745.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(3),(c);
Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 5; Stats. 2021, ch. 420, § 1.)

                                         5
during the time that the CRJA was only applicable to cases in which
judgment had not been entered prior to January 1, 2021 (§ 745, former
subd. (j); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2); in other words, those defendants –
including Lashon – whose trial court proceedings had not been completed by
January 1, 2021 had the opportunity to raise a CRJA violation in the trial
court prior to entry of judgment.
      In the amendments to the statute effective January 1, 2023
(Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2), the Legislature made section 745 relief available in
all cases in which judgment was not final, and created a timeline for
retroactive relief that was sought in a petition for habeas corpus or a section
1473.3 motion in (1) capital cases and cases with certain immigration
consequences (commencing January 1, 2023), (2) cases in which the
defendant remained incarcerated (commencing January 1, 2024), (3) felony
juvenile cases adjudicated on or after January 1, 2015 (commencing January
1, 2025), and (4) all other felony juvenile cases (commencing
January 1, 2026). (§ 745, subd. (j); Stats 2022, ch. 739, § 2)
      Subsequent to the 2023 amendments, the Legislature was asked to
consider whether a defendant could pursue a post-judgment section 745 claim
by avenues other than a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a section 1473.7
motion. (See Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118
(2023–2024 Reg. Sess., as amended Mar. 15, 2023, at p. 6.) The Legislature
responded with AB 1118 (Stats. 2023, ch. 464), effective January 1, 2024,
which now allows a defendant to seek review of a section 745 claim on direct
appeal if the violation was based on the trial record. (§ 745, subd. (b).) As an
alternate method, a defendant may request a stay of the direct appeal and
remand to allow the filing of a motion in the trial court. (Ibid.)

                                        6
      By the AB 1118 amendment, the Legislature did not include any
language indicating a section 745 claim could be presented on direct appeal
for the first time. In the absence of such language, we conclude our review of
a section 745 claim, like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general
appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been
but were not made in the trial court. (See also Finley v. Superior Court
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 12, 21 [in habeas corpus proceedings, court is to
determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief “and also whether the stated
claims are for any reason procedurally barred;” italics added].) As an
appellate court, we may not add language to a statute or rewrite it to conform
to an asserted intent that does not appear in the plain language. (People v.
Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) “[O]ur task is ‘ “simply to ascertain
and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert
what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. . . .” [Citation.]
We cannot add . . . language . . . when the Legislature did not.’ ” (Hayes v.
Temecula Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 735, 748.)
       Our interpretation is supported by an examination of other provisions
in the statute addressing how to raise CJRA claims in the trial court.
In 2022, the Legislature amended the statute to provide that a section 745
motion shall be made in the trial court “as soon as practicable upon the
defendant learning of an alleged violation,” and “[a] motion that is not timely
may be deemed waived, in the discretion of the court.” (§ 745, subd. (c);
added by Stats. 2022, ch. 739, § 2.) When the Legislature again amended
section 745 by AB 1118, it retained the waiver provision in subdivision (c) of
section 745, which is consistent with the basic rationale of the forfeiture
doctrine — i.e., “ ‘ “ ‘to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention
of the trial court, so they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had.’ ” ’ ”

                                         7
(People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103.) The Legislature recognized
that, for tactical reasons, some defendants might choose not to pursue a claim
of racial bias in the trial court “ ‘in the hopes of an acquittal, with the thought
that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an
otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be
difficult.’ ” (Id. at p. 1104 & fn. 15 [defendant’s challenge to venue may be
forfeited if not raised by timely motion in trial court as failure to make
motion “often will reflect a strategic decision on part of the defense, and . . .
improper venue is a defect that easily can be remedied if timely raised”].)
      It makes little sense for the Legislature to prescribe a comprehensive
procedure for making and adjudicating a section 745 motion at the trial level
(including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow
defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby
preserving their claim for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue a
section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal.
      B.    Legislative History
      To the extent it may be argued section 745 is ambiguous as to whether
a defendant may raise a section 745 claim on direct appeal for the first time,
we conclude the legislative history indicates the Legislature did not intend to
allow a defendant to pursue such a claim for the first time on direct appeal
where it could have been but was not raised in the trial court.
      At the time the Legislature enacted AB 1118, it was made aware of
general appellate rules of preservation and forfeiture of issues on direct
appeal, and exceptions to those rules as judicially applied in analogous
contexts. In explaining AB 1118’s technical changes being recommended to
ensure racial bias claims were “processed more efficiently” and that “the
intent of the law” was followed, the bill’s author explained as follows:

                                         8
      [A] CRJA claim based on the trial record may be raised on direct
      appeal from the conviction or sentence, not just in a habeas
      petition. (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 636 [‘Appellate
      jurisdiction is limited to the four corners of the record on appeal
      . . . .’].) . . . [and] would also clarify that the defendant/appellant
      may move to stay the appeal and request remand to the superior
      court to file a CRJA motion. This may be necessary to permit the
      trial court to rule on the claim in the first instance, and to allow
      the parties to fully litigate the issue. (See Gray1 CPB, LLC v.
      SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 897 [‘[I]t is
      fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider
      claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been
      but were not presented in the trial court. Thus, we ignore
      arguments, authority and facts not presented and litigated in the
      trial court’] (citation and quotations omitted); see also People v.
      Welch (1993) 5 Cal.5th 228, 237 [‘Reviewing courts have
      traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial
      where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported
      by substantive law then in existence’].) [¶] Generally, a trial court
      loses jurisdiction once an appeal is filed. But in other post-
      conviction relief contexts, stays and remands have been
      permitted by the courts – for example to file a petition to vacate a
      felony murder conviction and be resentenced under SB 1437
      (Skinner), Chapter 1015, Statutes 2018. (See People v. Martinez
      (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 729 [‘A Court of Appeal presented
      with such a stay request and convinced it is supported by good
      cause can order the pending appeal stayed with a limited remand
      to the trial court for the sole purpose of permitting the trial court
      to rule on a petition under section 1170.95.’].)

(Assem. Com. Public Saf., com. on Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Mar. 15, 2023, pp. 5–6.)
      Given the above discussion, we find it significant that the Legislature
did not include any language to the effect that a section 745 claim may be
raised on direct appeal “for the first time,” which it could have easily done
just as it did when amending the habeas proceedings. (See fn. 3, ante.) The
omission of such language strongly suggests the Legislature intended to leave

                                        9
the issues of preservation and forfeiture of claims on direct appeal to be
resolved by the courts based on long-standing procedural canons. “ ‘We are
compelled to add language only in extreme cases where, as a matter of law,
we are convinced that the Legislature, through inadvertence, failed to utilize
the word or words which give purpose to its pronouncements.’ ” (Settle v.
State of California (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 215, 220 (Settle).) Here, we see no
compelling reason to add words to the statute as the legislative history does
not evince an intent by the Legislature to strip the courts of their
discretionary authority to determine whether a section 745 claim is
reviewable on direct appeal where the claim could have been but was not
presented in the trial court. 5
      Lashon argues forfeiture should not apply because the legislative intent
as expressed in the statute and subsequent amendments is that “all who can
make a prima facie case for a RJA violation in their cases should have their
claims heard,” and “[a]pplication of the forfeiture doctrine here cannot be
viewed as a remedy to eliminate discriminatory practices, but only continue
to cover up implicit biases which may not always be readily identifiable.”
While we agree the Legislature meant to provide remedies for racial bias,
“statutory statement of purpose does not override the express limits the
Legislature has placed in the statutory text . . . and in the manner the

5      Our original opinion was published approximately one month prior to
the Governor’s signing of AB 1118. In that opinion, we explained why
general appellate rules of forfeiture barred review of Lashon’s section 745
claim on direct appeal and that no exceptions to forfeiture applied in this
case. While the Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing judicial
interpretations of a statute when it chooses to amend a statute (In re Joseph
T., Jr. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 795–796), given the timing of our opinion
and the status of AB 1118 in the legislative process, we do not rely on this
presumption in reaching our decision.

                                       10
statutory text has specified” for a defendant to pursue a remedy for racial
bias. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876,
897.)
        Accordingly, taking into account the purpose of section 745 – to swiftly
and effectively address racial bias as soon as practical upon a defendant
learning of an alleged violation — and “the substantial state interest in
protecting the integrity of the process from improper ‘sandbagging’ by a
defendant” (Simon, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1104) along with the language of
the statute and its legislative history, we conclude a defendant may be found
to have forfeited a section 745 claim of racial bias made for the first time on
direct appeal in the absence of a showing that an exception to the forfeiture
doctrine applies. If we are incorrect and the Legislature meant to allow a
defendant to raise a section 745 claim for the first time on direct appeal, and
to dispense with the rules of preservation and forfeiture for a claim that could
have been but was not raised in the trial court, the Legislature is at liberty to
amend the statute. (See Settle, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.)
III.    LASHON’S SECTION 745 CLAIM ON DIRECT APPEAL IS FORFEITED
        Lashon asserts the general forfeiture rule should not apply in this case
because her section 745 claim involves a “substantial right” or “an important
issue of constitutional law.” Her reliance on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 875 for this assertion is misplaced. In that case, our Supreme Court
held a juvenile could present for the first time a constitutional challenge to a
probation condition on direct appeal as it presented “a pure question of law,
easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition.” (Id. at p. 888.)
However, the court did not conclude “that ‘all constitutional defects in
conditions of probation may be raised for the first time on appeal, since there
may be circumstances that do not present “pure questions of law that can be

                                        11
resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in
the trial court.” [Citation.] In those circumstances, “[t]raditional objection
and waiver principles encourage development of the record and a proper
exercise of discretion in the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 889.) Simply put,
Lashon’s claim of relief does not fall under the In re Sheena K. exception
because it does not present a pure question of law that can be resolved
without consideration as to what occurred during the trial and sentencing
proceedings.
      Lashon also argues the general forfeiture rule should not apply because
she did not have a meaningful opportunity to raise a section 745 claim in the
trial court and an objection would have been futile. According to Lashon,
there were no obvious signs of racial bias by the trial judge “[u]ntil the
African American defense attorney corrected the judge on her misassumption
that the attorney had not followed the correct procedure on a subpoena duces
tecum for medical records of a victim.” “However, once this judge felt
challenged by this attorney of color, both she and her client became targets of
increasing hostility. This behavior seems most likely explained by the
implicit bias held by the judge which was unleashed only after she felt her
authority questioned. When the trial attorney did object to the trial court’s
behaviors, she was met with denials and greater hostility.”
      We find this argument unavailing as Lashon has not demonstrated she
could not object or an objection would have been futile. Even if her counsel
did not want to antagonize the trial judge during the trial, a section 745
motion could have been filed immediately after the trial judge gave her
reasons for choosing the sentence she was about to impose. (See, e.g., People
v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 295–298 (Garcia) [trial court abused its

                                        12
discretion in denying request for continuance of sentencing to allow
defendant time to prepare a motion for substantive relief under § 745].) 6
IV.   LASHON’S MOTION TO STAY APPEAL AND REMAND TO FILE SECTION
      745 MOTION IS DENIED
      Lashon requests we stay the appeal and remand to allow her to file a
section 745 motion in the superior court. While there may be circumstances
in which a court of appeal chooses to exercise its discretion to stay a CRJA
appeal and remand, we find no basis for doing so in this case.
      We have reviewed the evolution of the CRJA ante. In brief, CRJA relief
was originally limited to cases in which judgment had not been entered prior
to January 1, 2021 (such as Lashon’s case). The Legislature enacted
amendments making section 745 relief available in all cases in which
judgment was not final and created a timeline for retroactive relief spanning
2023 to 2026. The following year, the Legislature enacted AB 1118, which
now allows a defendant to seek review of a section 745 claim on direct appeal
if the violation was based on the trial record or, in the alternative, request a
stay of the direct appeal and remand to allow the filing of a motion in the
trial court. This stay and remand procedure was designed “to permit the trial

6      To the extent Lashon asserts “[t]he behavior of the trial judge cannot be
sanctioned even without reference to the Racial Justice Act,” citing to People
v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404 (Nieves), that issue has been forfeited because
it was not presented in compliance with the rules governing briefs filed in
this court. It was not presented under a separate point heading and was not
supported by a cogent argument as to why we should follow Nieves in this
case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each brief must “[s]tate
each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point,
and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation to
authority”]; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [“citing
cases without any discussion” as to why the cases should be followed “results
in forfeiture” of the appellate claim].)

                                       13
court to rule on the claim in the first instance, and to allow the parties to
fully litigate the issue.” (Sen. Com. on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 18, 2023, at p. 7; Assem. Com.
on Pub. Saf., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Mar. 15, 2023, at p. 6.) Therefore, it appears the Legislature
intended the stay and remand procedure to be available in cases that need
further factual development.
      Lashon’s direct appeal is based solely on her claim of a violation of
section 745. She does not identify what factual development is needed
regarding that claim and simply maintains that the record is sufficient to
require a hearing to determine if the trial judge exhibited implicit bias. As
Lashon both had the opportunity to raise a CRJA violation and develop the
record in the trial court and fails to identify what factual development (if any)
is now needed in the trial court, we decline to stay and remand the matter.
      This does not leave Lashon without an adequate remedy. Indeed, as
she has informed us, her claim of a violation of section 745 has been made in
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed and currently pending in the
Supreme Court, a court of competent jurisdiction in which to file the petition
as required under section 745, subdivision (b). (In re Menique Lashon, petn.
pending, ptn. filed Oct. 16, 2023, S282242.) 7
                                  DISPOSITION
      Our September 1, 2023 opinion is vacated. The judgment is affirmed.

7      While Lashon has not filed the requisite separate request for judicial
notice and instead has made the request in her motion to stay, we grant her
request to take judicial notice of certain declarations that she has attached to
her motion to stay and has included in her petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed in the Supreme Court. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

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                                 _________________________
                                 Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A163074/People v. Lashon

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Trial Court:   Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge:   Hon. Terri. Mockler

Counsel:       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
               Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
               Assistant Attorney General, Katie Stowe, Deputy Attoeny
               General, and Linda Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, for
               Plaintiff and Respondent.

               First District Appellate Project, Marylou Hillberg, for
               Defendant and Appellant.

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