Court Opinion

ID: 9671273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:51.033979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.149877
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that a person confined in a drug treatment facility as a condition of community supervision is not statutorily entitled to credit for that period of confinement if his community supervision is later revoked. I also agree applicant is not entitled to the credit pursuant to any double jeopardy protection. However, I dissent because the majority fails to determine whether, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicant is entitled *346to credit for Ms confinement in a drug treatment facility.
Although the Equal Protection Clause issue was not expressly raised by applicant, it may nevertheless be considered. A post-conviction habeas corpus applicant is not constitutionally entitled to appointment of counsel, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1993-94, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), although counsel may be appointed whenever “the interests of justice require representation.” Tex.Code Crim. Proe. Ann. art. 26.04(a). Consequently, pro se pleadings should be construed more liberally than those filed by counsel. See, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (civil rights complaint). Because of the unique nature of the remedy, habeas corpus relief is -underscored by elements of fairness and equity, Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), and should not be a procedural game played by the parties. As such, a pro se applicant should be required only to allege facts wMch, if true, would entitle him to relief. When such facts are alleged and shown to be true, the presumptively unlearned pro se applicant should not be restricted to the legal theories expressly raised in the application because to do so would transform what should be an equitable procedure into a procedural game. TMs Court is constitutionally established as the final arbiter of criminal law, and, therefore, is authorized to address any legal theory raised by facts established in a post-conviction habeas corpus application. The need for this principle is reflected by the Legislature’s determination that a post-conviction applicant is entitled to only one application challenging the conviction. See, Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App.1997); Tex.Code Crim. Proe. Ann. art. 11.07.
In Ex parte Chamberlain, 586 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Caraway v. State, 550 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), this Court addressed situations in wMch inmates had not been given credit for time spent in jail before sentencing and had been assessed sentences requiring them to serve the maximum period permitted by statute before becoming eligible for parole. We held that in these situations the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the inmates receive credit for their pre-sentence confinement if they had been unable to post pre-trial bond because of their indigence, even though the relevant statute provided that whether to award such credit was discretionary with the trial court. These cases present a similar situation but do not involve a showing of indigence.
Applicant received the maximum sentence authorized by law in both of these cases, so denying him credit for the time he was confined in the treatment facility has the effect of making him serve more time in confinement than the maximum sentence authorized by law, thereby treating him differently than persons convicted of the same offense but who did not receive probated sentences. Cf., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2022, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (An indigent may not be put in jail for failure to pay a fine or court costs if such confinement would exceed the maximum imprisonment for that offense.).
If a statute neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, it will be upheld under an equal protection analysis so long as it bears a rational relationsMp to some legitimate end. In the ordinary case, the statute will be upheld if it advances a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).
The class of persons convicted of a felony but whose punishment is probated is not a suspect class. Therefore, there need only be a rational basis between the application of the statute and its differing effect on persons assessed prison terms after community supervision is revoked and those whose initial sentence was not suspended. See, Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324, 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1995).
I can discern no rational basis for requiring persons originally placed on community supervision to serve more time in confinement than the maximum period authorized by law. Accordingly, I would hold that an *347inmate who is statutorily precluded from receiving credit for a period of actual confinement in a cause is nevertheless constitutionally entitled under the Equal Protection Clause to credit for that period of confinement.
Therefore, I dissent both to the Court’s failure to determine whether, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicant is entitled to credit for his confinement in a drug treatment facility and to the failure to hold that applicant should receive credit for the period he was confined in such a facility.
OVERSTREET and PRICE, JJ., join this opinion.