Court Opinion

ID: 9768711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:45:47.247731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:43.713194
License: Public Domain

KAPLAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
This mandamus proceeding presents important issues concerning the steps necessary to preserve a claim of privilege during discovery. I write separately to address these issues.
NECESSITY OF AN APPROPRIATE REQUEST
This discovery dispute centers on the interpretation of Request No. 17 to Plaintiff’s First Request for Production. As originally written, Corina McDonald asked Hyundai to produce:
Each document containing any compilation, report, summary, analysis, index or digest of warranty claims, problems, or complaints pertaining, directly or indirectly, to the seat belt system on the model of Hyundai vehicle made subject of this action, or to any accident or injury alleged to have been caused or contributed to by the type of seat, seat assembly and/or passive seat belt system installed in the vehicle made subject of this action.
Hyundai objected to this discovery request as follows:
Hyundai objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This request is overly broad in that it is unlimited as to accident configuration, nature of alleged injury particularities as to the manner or way in which “the front seat, seat assembly and/or passive seat belt system” is alleged to have caused the injury. If plaintiff is willing to properly narrow the scope of this request, Hyundai will attempt to make a further response. Hyundai further incorporates its objections contained in response to Document Requests Nos. 15 and 16.
Request Nos. 15 and 16 incorporated other objections based on attorney work product and trade secrets. Hyundai did not object to this original discovery request on the grounds of attorney-client privilege.
McDonald filed a motion to compel. The trial court conducted a hearing on February 11, 1991. Hyundai did not present any evidence to support its claim of privilege. The court ordered Hyundai to produce “all documents set forth in Plaintiff’s Request for Production numbers 15 and 17 to the extent that the corresponding interrogatories are limited.”1
Hyundai argues that the trial court impliedly ruled that Request No. 17 was overly broad and narrowed the scope of production. Thus, Hyundai asserts that the original discovery request was not “appropriate” under the rules. Hyundai contends that it was not required to plead or prove any specific privilege or exemption until McDonald propounded an “appropriate” discovery request. The majority assumes, but does not decide, that this argument is correct. I would expressly adopt it.
Rule 166b(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governs the presentation-of objections to discovery. The rule provides, in relevant part:
In objecting to an appropriate discovery request within the scope of paragraph 2, a party seeking to exclude any matter from discovery on the basis of an exemption or immunity from discovery, must specifically plead the particular exemption or immunity from discovery relied upon and at or prior to any hearing shall produce any evidence necessary to sup*483port such claim either in the form of affidavits served at least seven days before the hearing or by testimony.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(4) (emphasis added).
Rule 166b(4) allocates the burdens for pleading and proving a claim of privilege. First, the party seeking discovery must propound an “appropriate” discovery request. Second, upon receipt of an “appropriate” request, the responding party must plead any privilege or exemption. A specific objection preserves all claims of privilege until they are contested at a hearing. Third, the responding party must produce some evidence to support its claim of privilege at a hearing. If the responding party produces some evidence, he has made a prima fade claim of privilege. The court must then conduct an in camera inspection of the contested documents. See McKinney v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex.1989) (op. on reh’g); Weisel Enter., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986, orig. proceeding); Ryals v. Canales, 767 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, orig. proceeding).
Rule 166b(4) makes clear that the requirements of pleading privilege, producing evidence, and conducting an in camera inspection are not triggered except by an “appropriate” discovery request. A request for production that is overly broad is not “appropriate” within the meaning of the rule. See Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex.1989, orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J., dissenting)2; see also Gutierrez v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 729 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Tex.1987) (party answering discovery request must object to the form of the question so that it may be reurged in the proper form).
Even the trial court recognized the merits of Hyundai’s argument and the nearly impossible task of properly asserting a claim of privilege to an overly broad discovery request. The court found that “there cannot be an obligation on the respondent to a discovery request to assert burden-someness and also itemize and produce a log of all privileged documents which might be asserted ...” I agree. Request No. 17 was overly broad as originally drafted. I would hold that Hyundai was not required to specifically plead or prove any privilege or exemption to this discovery request until it was narrowed by the trial court.
PLEADING A SPECIFIC OBJECTION
The trial court ordered Hyundai to produce “all documents set forth in Plaintiff’s Request for Production numbers 15 and 17 to the extent that the corresponding interrogatories are limited.” This order was signed on March 5, 1991. Hyundai concedes that Request No. 17 became an “appropriate” discovery request once it was narrowed by the trial court’s order. Therefore, Hyundai was required to make any objections to this request within thirty days from the date of the order. See Tex. R.Civ.P. 167(2).
Hyundai made the following response to Request No. 17 as re-written:
As limited by the Court’s order, there are no documents responsive to the requests. Hyundai asserts and reasserts its specific objections to producing any document protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product and investigative exemptions in the event that any such protected document, otherwise responsive to the request, may be located or generated.
The majority concludes that Hyundai waived its right to assert the attorney-client privilege because it failed to specifically plead privilege. I agree that Hyundai waived any claim of. privilege to documents that had been located at the time the revised discovery request was propounded. *484However, I do not agree that this privilege is waived with regard to documents located or generated subsequent to the revised request.
Hyundai’s problem stems from its misinterpretation of the trial court’s order limiting the scope of Request No. 17. Hyundai argues that the revised discovery request was limited to documents pertaining to multiple claims, problems, or complaints. McDonald asserts that the scope of Request No. 17 includes documents pertaining to single claims, problems, or complaints. A special master later ruled that both single claims and multiple claims were covered by the trial court’s order.
This is not a case where Hyundai failed to make a specific objection to the revised discovery request. Rather, Hyundai misinterpreted the request and failed to make any objection to the production of documents it had located. The objections based on attorney-client, work product, and investigative privileges attach only to documents “located or generated” at a later date.
This situation is further complicated by the burdens imposed under the rules of civil procedure. A party is required to supplement a response to discovery if “the circumstances are such that the failure to amend is in substance misleading.” Tex. R.Crv.P. 166b(6). Several courts have held that the failure to supplement a response to a request for production will result in the automatic exclusion of documentary evidence at trial. See Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990), abated and remanded by agr., 35 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 725 (May 6, 1992); Wilson v. Snead Site Preparation, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied); Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 809 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); see also Tex.R.Civ.P. 215(5). While the duty to supplement is ongoing, the opportunity to assert objections is not. A party must plead any privilege or exemption to discovery within thirty days after the request is served. Otherwise, the privilege is waived. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166b(4); see also Indep. Insulating Glass/Southwest v. Street, 722 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex.App.—Port Worth 1987, orig. proceeding). Thus, the only effective way to preserve a claim of privilege for documents located or generated in the future is to object in the initial response.
The cases cited by the majority are inap-posite. In National Union Fire Insurance Co., this Court held that a conditional assertion of privilege does not satisfy the pleading requirements of rule 166b(4). We reaffirmed the general rule that not only must the particular privilege be identified, its application must be specifically pleaded. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 746 S.W.2d 305, 307 n. 3 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, orig. proceeding). Our holding was cited with approval in Kentucky Fried Chicken National Management Co. v. Tennant, 782 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding).
These cases do not address the requirements for asserting a privilege to documents that may be located or generated in the future. I do not agree that Hyundai’s claim of privilege “in the event that any such protected document ... may be located or generated” is a conditional assertion of privilege. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to plead privilege with any more specificity for documents that have not been located or do not yet exist. Similarly, it would be impossible to prove a claim of privilege until any such documents are actually located or generated.
I agree that Hyundai waived its claim of privilege to any documents actually located at the time Request No. 17 was re-written by the trial court. However, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that Hyundai waived the right to claim the attorney-client privilege as to documents located or generated in the future.
FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE
Hyundai misinterpreted the scope of Request No. 17 and thus waived its right to assert the attorney-client privilege to documents pertaining to single claims, problems, or complaints. The special master found that Hyundai acted in good faith with respect to Request No. 17. The trial *485court did not specifically adopt or reject this finding. The majority concludes that the trial court’s April 7, 1992 order, which does not address good faith, supersedes the finding contained in the master’s report.
The majority confuses good faith and good cause. Rule 166b(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
After the date on which answers are to be served, objections are waived unless an extension of time has been obtained by agreement or order of the court or good cause is shown for the failure to object within such period.
(Emphasis added).
Good faith is not tantamount to good cause. A finding of good faith may be relevant to a determination of good cause, but it is not dispositive of the issue. The record does not reveal that the court ever determined whether Hyundai had good cause for failing to assert the attorney-client privilege because it misinterpreted the scope of Request No. 17. Hyundai should not be precluded from raising the issue of good cause in the trial court. See Villarreal v. Dominguez, 745 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, orig. proceeding) (exceptions to the discovery rules based on good cause require proof of necessity and specific finding by the trial court).

. Hyundai and McDonald resolved some of their discovery disputes by letter agreement. The order directing Hyundai to produce documents "to the extent that the corresponding interrogatories are limited” apparently referred to limitations negotiated in the letter agreement.

. The majority in Loftin did not reject the dissent’s interpretation of Rule 166b(4). The majority and dissent disagreed with respect to the substance of the objections raised by the defendant. The majority interpreted the objection as simply asserting the investigative privilege. The dissent interpreted the objection to include a claim that the discovery request was overly broad. The majority opinion did not address the questions of law raised by the dissent. Thus, the interpretation of Rule 166b-4 advocated by the dissenting justices is both persuasive and consistent with existing authority.