Court Opinion

ID: 9396821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:28.279275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.127178
License: Public Domain

J-S05024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    MICHAEL CIPOLLONE                :            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                     :                 PENNSYLVANIA
                  Appellant          :
                                     :
                                     :
             v.                      :
                                     :
                                     :
    TARA MUELLER AND JOHN DOE A.K.A. :            No. 847 WDA 2022
    TATTOOPROTECTION_NY              :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered June 23, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                            No(s): GD-22-006209

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED: May 23, 2023

        Michael Cipollone appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of        Allegheny County, denying his motion for a preliminary

injunction1 against Tara Mueller (Mueller) and John Doe (Doe), a/k/a

TattooProtection_NY (collectively, Appellees).2 After our review, we affirm.

        On April 24, 2022, at the Roc City Tattoo Expo in Rochester, New York,

Cipollone, a professional tattoo artist, was approached by Mueller and her

friend to provide them with tattoos. Cipollone’s cell phone was not working

properly to create a stencil, and so he used Mueller’s cell phone to create the

stencil. Cipollone took Mueller’s phone to a back room to print the stencil but
____________________________________________

1 See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4) (“An appeal may be taken as of right . . . from . . .
[a]n order that grants or denies, modifies or refuses to modify, continues or
refuses to continue, or dissolves or refuses to dissolve an injunction[.]”).

2   Appellees have not filed briefs in this matter.
J-S05024-23

he was unable to print it. Ultimately, Cipollone did a freehand-sketched tattoo

on Mueller. Later that day, Cipollone emailed Mueller a picture he had taken

of the completed tattoo, and Mueller responded to the email, thanking him.

      The next day, Mueller emailed Cipollone, accusing him of going into her

iCloud account through her cell phone, taking private, sexually explicit videos

from her phone, and sending them to his own phone. She informed him that

his cell phone number was the number that appeared on her MacBook,

indicating that photos or videos had been sent from her phone to that phone

number.    See Mueller Affidavit, 6/10/22. Mueller also contacted Doe, who

operates the Instagram account, @tattooprotection-ny, about this incident,

and, on May 17, 2022, Doe posted Mueller’s story to the @tattooprotection-

ny Instagram account.

      Cipollone avers that as a result of the post, he was fired from his place

of employment (In the Blood Tattoo, located in the City of Pittsburgh), where

he had worked for seventeen years. He also avers that multiple re-posts have

occurred, naming Cipollone as a sexual predator.

      On May 31, 2022, Cipollone filed a complaint sounding in defamation

and an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order

requiring that Doe remove certain posts on the Instagram page and restricting

both Doe and Mueller from publishing defamatory speech about Cipollone. In

his motion, Cipollone claimed he has suffered irreparable harm to both his

personal and professional reputation. Mueller filed an answer, new matter,

and a counterclaim for conversion.

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      On June 13, 2022, the court held a hearing on Cipollone’s motion. The

court heard testimony from Cipollone and reviewed both parties’ exhibits,

including Mueller’s affidavit.   See N.T. Preliminary Injunction Hearing,

6/13/22, at 14-48. On June 23, 2022, the court entered an order denying the

motion. Cipollone filed this timely appeal and raises the following issues for

our review:

      I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
      [Cipollone’s] motion for preliminary injunctive relief?

         A. Did [Cipollone] experience immediate and irreparable
            harm that damages cannot adequately compensate?

         B. Did [Cipollone] show that greater injury would result
            from refusing an injunction than from granting it?

         C. Did [Cipollone] prove that a preliminary injunction would
            properly restore the parties to their status as it existed
            immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct?

         D. Did [Cipollone] show that he is likely to prevail on the
            merits of his case?

         E. Did [Cipollone] show that the injunction he sought is
            reasonably suited to abate the offending activity?

         F. Did [Cipollone] present evidence that a preliminary
            injunction would not adversely affect the public interest?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

      When reviewing an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction,

our review is “highly deferential” and limited to whether there was an abuse

of discretion. Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount,

Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003). “[W]e do not inquire into the merits of

the controversy, but only examine the record to determine if there were any

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apparently reasonable grounds for the action of the [trial] court.” Id. (citation

omitted). A trial court has “apparently reasonable grounds” when it has found

that one of the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction has not been met.

Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46 (Pa. 2004).

      To be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a party must show the
      following: First, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must
      show that an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and
      irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
      damages. Second, the party must show that greater injury would
      result from refusing an injunction than from granting it and,
      concomitantly, that issuance of an injunction will not substantially
      harm other interested parties in the proceedings. Third, the party
      must show that a preliminary injunction will properly restore the
      parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged
      wrongful conduct. Fourth, the party seeking the injunction must
      show that the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its
      right to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other
      words, must show that it is likely to prevail on the merits. Fifth,
      the party must show that the injunction it seeks is reasonably
      suited to abate the offending activity. Sixth and finally, the party
      seeking an injunction must show that a preliminary injunction will
      not adversely affect the public interest.

Kuhstoss v. Steele, 234 A.3d 789, 792–93 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted) (emphasis added). See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,

544 A.2d 1305, 1307-08 (Pa. 1988) (for preliminary injunction to issue, every

prerequisite must be established; proponent of preliminary injunction faces

heavy burden of persuasion).

      The purposes of a preliminary injunction are to preserve the status
      quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm which might
      occur before the merits of the case can be heard and determined.
      It is considered an extraordinary remedy and may only be granted
      if the plaintiff has established a clear right to the relief sought.

                                      -4-
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Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen's Club, 522 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Pa. Super.

1987) (citations omitted).

      After our review of the record, and in light of our highly deferential

standard of review, we conclude there are “apparently reasonable grounds”

for the trial court’s action. Summit Towne Centre, supra.      The trial court

made express findings related to the six prerequisites for a preliminary

injunction. The court found Cipollone failed to establish that a preliminary

injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm. In his

motion, Cipollone alleges that Mueller made defamatory statements that led

to his loss of employment and damage to his reputation. See Emergency

Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, 5/31/22, at ¶¶ 4, 17-18. However,

as the court observed, the damage has already been done. Cipollone has lost

his job, and, thus, has failed to prove that an injunction is necessary to

prevent immediate and irreparable harm that damages cannot adequately

compensate.   See Constantakis v. Bryan Advisory Services, LLC, 275

A.3d 998, 1016, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2022) (purposes of preliminary injunction

are to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and irreparable harm

that might occur before merits of case can be heard and determined).

Moreover, at the hearing, Cipollone failed to present evidence or testimony to

support the argument that he had become unemployable, such that injunctive

relief was necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm.       Finally,

damage to reputation is compensable at law with money damages.           See

Joseph v. Scranton Times, L.P., 129 A.3d 404, 426 (Pa. 2015).

                                    -5-
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      Furthermore, although Cipollone was not required to prove his

underlying claim, he had to show his “right to relief is clear” and that he was

“likely to prevail on the merits[.]” Warehime, 850 A.2d at 47. Here, the

court found that Cipollone failed to establish that he was likely to succeed on

the merits. Mueller’s affidavit and attached exhibits showed that at the time

Cipollone had access to Mueller’s phone, private videos were sent from

Mueller’s phone to Cipollone’s phone.          See N.T., Preliminary Injunction

Hearing, supra at 29, 36, 41, 50-51. The court found that evidence credible.

Cipollone testified that he did not send anything from Mueller’s phone to his

phone, but, as the court noted, no evidence was submitted that refuted

Mueller’s evidence.       We agree with the trial court that this falls short of

demonstrating Cipollone’s clear right to relief.

      Our review of the record reveals “apparently reasonable grounds” for

the   trial   court’s   ruling.   See   SEIU    Healthcare    Pennsylvania     v.

Commonwealth, 104 A.3d 495, 501 (Pa. 2014). Accordingly, we find that

the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Cipollone’s application

for a preliminary injunction. Kuhstoss, supra.

      Order affirmed.

                                        -6-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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