Court Opinion

ID: 9459171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:12:24.343026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.939809
License: Public Domain

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
Hypertechnical, I think we would be, to reverse the District Court. The Workmen’s Compensation law’s purpose was to assure indemnification to every employee injured (no matter how) in the course of his work. Despite the objectionable technicalities he now urges to bar his employer from recourse to the statute, the fact still is that employee Fair has without intermission enjoyed this assurance unconditionally and in full measure. Yet the majority penalizes the employer, Korhumel Steel & Aluminum Co., Inc., because of its omissions of certain statutory steps for employer-qualification under the law. Truth is none of these inattentions ever jeopardized even slightly Fair’s security. Each of them was reasonably explained and readily remediable. But in my view, absent loss to the employee, correction was for the Compensation Commissioner and not by foreclosure of employer’s defenses to the plaintiff’s action.
The majority’s decision, to me, overlooks the actuating concept of the compensation law. A primary and dominant aim was to give and to maintain for the employee prompt and unqualified indemnity for personal hurt and incidental expenses. If, as here, the overriding object has been continuously fulfilled — undiminished certainty of reimbursement —the employer’s failure to comply literally should not condemn the employer irretrievably. West Virginia’s courts have declared that this law is remedial in nature and must be given a liberal construction, Estes v. Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 150 W.Va. 492, 147 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1966); but this canon includes the employer as well.
The majority opinion precisely enumerates what is required of the employer for compliance with the statute. As a foreign corporation Korhumel was obliged to file with the compensation commission a certificate of its qualification to do business in West Virginia. It so qualified, but neglected the formality of filing a certificate thereof with the Commission. Korhumel also failed to make the requisite deposit, pay requisite periodic premiums into the compensation fund, and make requisite reports. For these delinquencies the majority refuse the corporation the benefits of the statute. But these derelictions in perspective are not as horrendous as they appear on bald recital.
Korhumel did not separately comply with these requisites of the statute solely because it thought itself covered as a “division” of National Steel Corporation by virtue of National’s qualification. Korhumel’s capital stock was wholly owned by National. National’s self-insurance was never doubted as also adequate to cover Korhumel’s predictable claim obligations. Korhumel operated on National’s property, under lease, at Weir-ton, West Virginia, where the plaintiff Fair was working. Indeed, his complaint alleges that it was National’s obligation to maintain the safety of his place of employment. The machine on which the plaintiff was injured was purchased by Korhumel from the Midwest Steel division of’ National and was installed by National on the premises it leased to Korhumel.
On May 27, 1965, two years before Fair’s accident and at the suggestion of National’s vice-president, it's representatives conferred with the Commissioner on the question of Korhumel’s compli-*708anee with the compensation law. The proposal was there advanced by the representatives that Korhumel be included under National’s coverage as a division, in the same manner as the Weirton Steel Company. It was then indicated to the Commissioner that Korhumel was a division of National Steel like Weirton. Thereafter Korhumel employees’ claims were reported under the National Steel employer’s account number.
The plaintiff admits that Weirton was a division of National. Plainly, in fact, Korhumel was as much a division of National as was Weirton. The latter had become a part of National by the merger of its separate corporate existence into National; Korhumel had become so by National’s acquisition of all of its capital stock. After the merger Weirton continued to operate with its own administrative staff, its president, vice-president and other officers, just as Korhumel was doing on the day of the accident.
Three days after Korhumel’s representatives met with the Commissioner the following, letter of confirmation was written by National’s Director of Compensation Department to the West Virginia compensation official:
“May 27, 1965
“F. L. Rippetoe, Chief
Accounting Division Workmen’s Compensation Fund
112 California Avenue Charleston, West Virginia 25305
“Dear Mr. Rippetoe:
“Confirming the result of our conference with Commissioner C. B. Hanley and yourself on the afternoon of May 24, 1965, we set forth here our understanding of procedure relative to coverage for employees of the Korhumel Steel and Aluminum Division of the National Steel Corporation.
“It was agreed that the National Steel Corporation operating in West Virginia under Risk No. 54-76, in completing the quarterly report of earnings, would continue to exhibit the Weirton Steel Company Division under Class E-l (Iron & Steel Manufacturing) at a base rate of .65 cents per $100 payroll. It was also agreed that the report will also display the payroll for the Korhumel Division listed under Class K-6 (Wholesale, Warehouse and Dairy) at a base rate of .55 cents per $100 payroll. Workmen’s Compensation coverage including catastrophe and second injury funds was to be in effect as of May 24, 1965, for the employees of the Korhumel Division and National Steel Corporation will begin reporting of payroll for this Division as of that date.
“We are most grateful to Mr. Han-ley and yourself for the kind reception afforded us and the promptness with which the coverage was initiated.
“Cordially,
“James H. Cramer, Director Compensation Department”
Certainly the facts heretofore stated refute the assertion of employee Fair that in the conference and in the letter Korhumel was misrepresented as a “division”. Concededly, there was no concealment of the relationship between National and Korhumel. The periodic reports to the Commissioner required of National over the two years elapsing between the interview and Fair’s accident referred to Korhumel as a division of National.
Surely National could never be heard to say that Fair was not covered by its insurance. Its amplitude has never been doubted. National’s letter to the Compensation Commissioner, supra, vouches Fair as an employee when it confirms that Korhumel’s payroll is embodied in National’s report of earnings. Obviously, Korhumel’s payroll was thus made National’s and consisted of the names of those who National considered as the equivalent of its employees. Furthermore, in his application for compensation, Fair said he was “employed by National Steel Corporation (Korhumel Steel & Aluminum Company)” and it appears *709similarly in the report of his injury to the Commissioner. The parenthesizing emphasizes that Korhumel was not primarily the employer. These facts make conclusive Fair’s National employee status unless we reject the actual identification of Fair with National in favor of a legalistic construction.
Finally and foremost, if Korhumel -was not a division of National, or if it was a division but the West Virginia statutes nevertheless required Korhumel to qualify separately, correction and cure lay in the province of the Commissioner. In either event, the Commissioner could have, and still can, effectuate such measures as are appropriate, for example: divorcement of Korhumel from National’s coverage, payment to the Commissioner of any deposit or premiums accrued but unpaid, as well as any other corrective acts. Noncompliance, if any, in the circumstances of this case surely does not warrant forfeiture of employer’s defenses in favor of Fair.
To the majority’s judgment of forfeit, I must dissent.