Court Opinion

ID: 9524927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:34.116538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:20.744300
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting). The court today rules, ante at 88, that a search warrant, which a judge inadvertently failed to sign, is valid because the absence of the judge’s signature “should be deemed a ministerial defect which does not invalidate the warrant.”* 1 I dissent.
*92A search warrant unsigned by a judge is a nullity, void on its face, and void ab initio. Kelley v. State, 55 Ala. App. 402, 403 (1975). State v. Vuin, 185 N.E.2d 506, 510 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1962). See State v. Spaw, 18 Ohio App. 3d 77, 79 (1984). Such a warrant is invalid because “it shows on its face that it lacks the signature of any [judge or] magistrate, such being the only authorized officer to put life in the paper.” Kelley v. State, supra at 404.
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights states that “no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws” (emphasis added). Similarly, G. L. c. 276, § 1, commands an authorized court or justice to “issue a warrant” if satisfied that there is probable cause to do so (emphasis added). G. L. c. 276, § 1 (1986 ed.). A judge or magistrate “issues” a warrant only when he or she signs the appropriate document and entrusts it to the proper person. People v. Hentkowski, 154 Mich. App. 171, 177 (1986). Although the parties here have stipulated that the judge intended to sign the warrant but failed to do so by inadvertence, I conclude that the judge could not “issue” the search warrant until he signed the document. “[A] lawful signature on the search warrant by the person authorized to issue it [is] essential to its issuance.” State v. Surowiecki, 184 Conn. 95, 97 (1981) (citing various authorities for the proposition). See People v. Hentkowski, supra at 177 (judge inadvertently failed to sign warrant).
It has been stated that “[c]ourts never regard lightly the extraordinary and unusual procedure authorized by search warrants and are ever mindful of the constitutional guarantee to citizens to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” State *93v. Cochrane, 84 S.D. 527, 530 (1970), quoting Byrd v. Commonwealth, 261 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Ky. 1953). “[Statutes authorizing and regulating searches and seizures and the issuance of search warrants are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the individual.” State v. Cochrane, supra at 531.
The signature requirement is supported by policy considerations concerning three sets of actors —judges, police officers, and the public. A judge’s signature on a search warrant serves as an “identifiable objective manifestation” of the judge’s subjective intent to issue a search warrant. State v. Surowiecki, supra at 97. The signature requirement impresses upon a judge the seriousness and importance of issuing a search warrant. People v. Hentkowski, supra at 178.
Furthermore, the potential for abuse and police misconduct in allowing unsigned warrants is clear. Id. Because officers who execute a search warrant must limit their search to the dictates of a warrant, they must first review the document. Id. Police officers cannot reasonably rely upon an unsigned document as authority to conduct a search. Id. at 178-179. State v. Spaw, 18 Ohio App. 3d 77, 79 (1984). The signature requirement is not overly burdensome to police officers who can take corrective measures and thereafter conduct the search. People v. Hentkowski, supra at 178.
Lastly, the signature requirement protects and assures persons in control of property which is to be searched. When such persons are presented with a document which purports to be a search warrant, they must be able to review the document and determine whether to allow the search. “The custodian should not have to guess as to whether a magistrate intended ... to sign the document which is presented to the custodian.” Id. at 179. See People v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 76, 80 (1977) (stating that secondary purpose of search warrant is to apprise householder that search has been authorized by magistrate).
There is no allegation in this case of wrongdoing either on the part of the police officer or the judge; this was simply a case of inadvertence. There was, however, a confrontation *94between the defendant and the officer executing the search warrant that illustrates one of the deficiencies of an unsigned search warrant. The defendant called to the officer’s attention the fact that the search warrant was not signed and was therefore not valid to search the garage. The officer told the defendant that he knew the warrant was good and that he just came from the judge who had told him that he had a good warrant.2 The defendant advised the officer that the police could not enter the premises with an unsigned warrant and that if they did, the defendant would sue. Nevertheless, the officers proceeded to search the premises. The court glosses over this confrontation and simply states that “no substantial rights of the defendant have been affected by the lack of signature on the warrant at the time of the search” because the officer told the defendant the name of the judge who authorized the search. Ante at 89 n.3.1 disagree. A property owner has the right, under art. 14, to obtain the protection of a warrant signed by a judge.
I would invalidate the defective search warrant and would suppress the evidence.

 The court cites six cases to support the proposition that an otherwise valid search warrant is not invalidated by the lack of a judge’s signature. Ante at 88-89. The court fails to point out that two of those cases involve telephonic search warrant statutes which explicitly allow telephonic judicial approval and provide other safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977); People v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. App. 3d 323, 329 (1982). In another case, Yuma County Attorney v. McGuire, 109 Ariz. 471 (1973), the court assesses the validity of an unsigned search warrant in light of the fact that the State legislature has authorized the use of telephonic search warrants.
In People v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 76, 80 (1977), another case cited by the court, the affiant testified that the judge signed numerous duplicate copies of the search warrant, but not the original. No such allega*92tion is made here. Furthermore, that court specifically ruled that the unsigned warrant was not invalid because no confrontation occurred between the householder and the police officer executing the warrant.
Also cited by the court is State v. Spaulding, 239 Kan. 439 (1986). Kansas has a statute stating that evidence shall not be suppressed because of technical irregularities in a search warrant. Neither the Massachusetts statutory scheme nor art. 14 of our Declaration of Rights has a similar provision. See G. L. c. 276, §§ 1 et seq. (1986 ed.).
In my view, none of these cases supports the court’s ruling.

 I am not comforted by the fact that the judge told the police officer in this case that he had a good warrant. This court has not yet ruled on the relevance of an officer’s subjective “good faith” intent. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 394 Mass. 381, 391-393 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-907 (1984). In Leon, the good faith exception was applied where the warrant was facially valid. This is not so here. I note also that two courts have held the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule cannot apply to an unsigned search warrant because the defect is readily apparent on the face of the instrument. State v. Spaw, 18 Ohio App. 3d 77, 78-79 (1984) (officers executing unsigned warrant could not be acting in good faith). See Miller v. State, 703 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. App. 1985).