Court Opinion

ID: 9850257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:54:10.115636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.947904
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority opinion departs from the standards established in Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980), Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah, Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1984), and Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, Utah, 680 P.2d 753 (1984), for the termination of an unwed father’s paternal rights to his child. I submit that the trial court properly applied those cases and that the majority opinion, which purports to distinguish those cases, in fact overrules sub silentio Sanchez, and in effect requires that actual notice be given unwed fathers before their paternal rights can be terminated and a valid adoption accomplished, even though U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-4(3) imposes no such requirement. The decision, I submit, will have the most unfortunate effects in the lives of numerous children who are born out of wedlock and placed for adoption.
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-30-4(3) provides that an unwed father may legally establish his paternal right to a child he has fathered out of wedlock by filing a notice of claim *692prior to the initiation of adoption proceedings. If he does so, no adoption may take place without either his consent or a determination that he has abandoned or neglected his child. However, a father who fails to file a notice is deemed to have abandoned his child and “waive[s] and surrender[s] ... any right to notice of or to a hearing in any judicial proceeding for the adoption of said child _” § 78-30-4(3)(c). The policy of the act is not to punish the father, but to provide, if the mother consents and the father fails to act, a certain and efficient procedure for placing a child as quickly as possible with adoptive parents who can raise and nurture the child in an environment free of fear that the adoption process will be abrogated and the psychological security of the child damaged, perhaps permanently. In Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah, supra, 681 P.2d at 206-07, the Court stated:
[T]he state has a compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children. Speedy identification is important to immediate and continued physical care and it is essential to early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being torn from parents with whom they have begun the process of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the process in making themselves available for adoptions, such determinations must also be final and irrevocable.
I.
The majority holds that due process does not permit termination of a father’s rights to a newborn child born out of wedlock “where a father does not know of the need to protect his rights, [and] there is no ‘reasonable opportunity’ to assert or protect parental rights.” In fact, the father in this case had a reasonable opportunity to assert his rights, and the Court's ruling is squarely at odds with the trial court’s findings and with this Court’s rulings in Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez. In Wells, we explicitly stated, “Due process does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before his parental right can be terminated.” Wells, supra, 681 P.2d at 207.
The first case this Court decided under section 78-30-4 was Ellis v. Social Services Department of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980). In Ellis, the unwed parents of a child were residents of the state of California. Shortly before the birth, and without notifying the father, the mother moved to Utah for the purpose of delivering her child. Acting with all possible speed, the father finally located the mother, came to Utah, and immediately filed a notice under the statute. Recognizing that a “situation may arise when it is impossible for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his own,” id. at 1256, we held that the father was entitled to an opportunity to show that “as a factual matter ...he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be bom in Utah.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing on that issue. In Ellis, the Court was not concerned with whether the father in fact had actual notice of his statutory rights under section 78-30-4(3), although he appeared to be aware of those rights.
Wells v. Children’s Aid Society of Utah, Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (1984), was the next case decided under section 78-30-4. The Court unanimously affirmed the proposition established in Ellis that the critical test was whether it was “impossible” for the father to make a filing of the statutory notice. Id. at 207. The Court ruled that the father in that case had failed to meet either one of the “two essential elements of the Ellis exception: it was [not] (1) ‘impossible’ for the father to make a timely filing of the required notice (2) ‘through no fault of his own.’ ” 681 P.2d at 208. The Court stated:
Otherwise, the need to prove in each adoption case that the unwed father— whoever he may be — had a “reasonable *693opportunity” to file the required notice of paternity would frustrate the statute’s purpose to facilitate secure adoptions by early clarification of status.
Id. We specifically addressed and unanimously rejected the very proposition that the majority now holds is the law:
Due process does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before his parental right can be terminated. In the common cases of unwed fathers without desires to assume the responsibilities and to claim the rights of parenthood, such a requirement would frustrate the compelling state interest in the speedy determination described above. It would also threaten the privacy interests of unwed mothers and frustrate the other interests the United States Supreme Court cited in Lehr v. Robertson ....
Id. at 207.
In Wells, we also noted that the United States Supreme Court had also rejected a similar constitutional argument that an unwed father should receive personal notice of an adoption proceeding. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). See Wells, supra, 681 P.2d at 205-06.
In Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, Utah, 680 P.2d 753 (1984), the father had no knowledge of the necessity to file a notice of paternity until after the baby had been placed with an adoption agency exactly as in the instant case. Sanchez squarely held, over the lone dissent of Justice Durham, that it was not pertinent whether the father had actual knowledge of the statutory requirement that he file a notice to preserve his paternal right, and that strict compliance with the statute is required. Id. at 755 & n. 2. The legislative policy embodied in section 78-30-4(3) requires as much:
In Wells we expressly held that a father who tried to register in a timely fashion, but did not do so, was not entitled to notice. Wells controls the issue here. It is of no constitutional importance that Sanchez came close to complying with the statute. Because of the nature of [the] subject matter dealt with by the statute, a firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential.
In referring to the dissent, we wrote:
The consequence of the position asserted by the dissent would be to promote litigation in a number of adoption cases, thereby holding the rights of putative adoptive parents, and the rights of the natural mother, whatever they may be, in limbo while the courts undertake to make a decision based on criteria nowhere articulated by the dissent, but which would, no doubt, involve the degree of the father’s diligence and sincerity in trying to establish his parental rights, factors which are foreign to the statutory provisions. The damage done by the actual and potential disruption of the adoption system by protracted litigation of such cases would be especially incalculable as to the children involved. The harm caused to infants, who need stable relationships with adults for the psychological bonding necessary for their well-being and character development, could be incurable.
The dissent concedes the facial constitutionality of § 78-30-4, but contends that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case. .>.. Sanchez lived in this state throughout the pregnancy, knew of the time and place of the birth of the child, and was presumed to know the law.
Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 755 (paragraphs reversed.)
In both Wells and Sanchez, the fathers knew that their children would be born in this state long prior to their actual births, and in the instant case the father must have realized that there was a reasonable likelihood that that would be the case. It cannot be said, therefore, that it was “impossible” for the appellant to protect his paternal rights.
That an unwed father may need legal advice to protect his rights may often be true, but legal advice is frequently necessary to protect one’s legal rights. Further*694more, none of the three prior cases decided by this Court held that an unwed father has, at the time of birth, a constitutionally protected parental right to the newborn child, and no United States Supreme Court opinion has taken that position either. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260-62, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2992-94, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). Yet, the majority in this case, without any authority and with no analysis whatsoever, simply declares as an ipse dix-it that the father in this case has a constitutional right to the child he has fathered, and that he must be given notice before his right can be terminated. I submit that the majority has ruled that section 78-30-4 is unconstitutional on its face, even though this Court in Ellis and Wells expressly declared that it is constitutional on its face, and the Court does so again in this case.
II.
The majority opinion declares section 78-30-4 facially constitutional, but holds that it may not be constitutionally applied to terminate the appellant’s claim to the child he fathered. The majority not only repudiates the rules established by Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez, but also overrides the trial court’s findings of fact.
The district court found:
1. The natural mother of Baby Boy Doe knowingly and intelligently consented to Baby Boy Doe’s adoption and waived her rights as his natural mother on August 27, 1984.
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3. Petitioners Bum filed the petition to adopt Baby Boy Doe in good faith on August 27, 1984.
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8. Mr. Aguilar filed his Notice of Claim of paternity with the Utah Department of Social Services on August 29, 1984, at 2:00 p.m.
9. Mr. Aguilar’s Notice of Claim was filed two days after petitioners Burn filed the pétition for adoption and took custody of Baby Boy Doe.
10. Mr. Aguilar knew that the natural mother was residing in Utah during the last three months of her pregnancy.
11. Mr. Aguilar visited the natural mother in Utah immediately prior to the birth of Baby Boy Doe.
12. When Mr. Aguilar visited the natural mother in Utah, there was some discussion about placing Baby Boy Doe for adoption.
13. Mr. Aguilar knew or had reason to know that the natural mother intended to place Baby Boy Doe for adoption.
14. Mr. Aguilar knew that the natural mother was susceptible to influence from the relatives with whom she was residing in Utah in that they wanted her to place Baby Boy Doe for adoption.
15. It was not impossible for Mr. Aguilar to have filed his Notice of Claim prior to the filing of the adoption petition by petitioners Bum.
16. Mr. Aguilar had a reasonable opportunity to file the Notice of Claim before the petition to adopt was filed.
(Emphasis added.)
Based on these findings and the law established in Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez, the trial court properly reached the legal conclusion that the appellant had a reasonable opportunity to file a “Notice before the petition to adopt was filed by petitioners Burn.” The majority purports to distinguish Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez, and holds the trial court’s conclusion erroneous on the ground that since the appellant “was not a Utah resident and during the relevant period had spent less than a week in this state, most of which time was spent on a camping trip,” he did not have a reasonable opportunity to file. What “the relevant period” referred to by the majority is meant to be is not explained. It is, however, clear from the trial court’s findings that the appellant had three months to file his notice and did not. The majority fails to explain why that is not a reasonable and sufficient time. It is of no significance whatsoever that the child’s mother indicated to the appellant prior to the birth of *695the baby that she would move with him to Arizona. Nor is it significant that the baby was born early, or that the father misjudged or was misled as to when the baby would be born. Due process limits state action, not the actions of private parties. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, Utah, 680 P.2d 753, 755 n. 2 (1984).
The appellant knew where the mother was long before the birth occurred and had ample time to take the necessary legal action, quite unlike the father in Ellis v. Social Services Department, Utah, 615 P.2d 1250 (1980). It is irrelevant that the appellant was not in Utah at the time of the actual birth of the child.
III.
Notwithstanding the rulings in Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez, the majority now adopts the position of the only dissent filed in our line of cases. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, Utah, 680 P.2d 753 (1984) (Durham, J., dissenting), and rejects the law established in Ellis, Wells, and Sanchez, where we sought to impart finality to adoption proceedings for the benefit of the thousands of children who each year are born out of wedlock. Today’s ruling, making the validity of many adoption proceedings turn on the majority’s notion of “fairness” and adequacy of notice to the father, will call in question the validity of one adoption proceeding after another, and each will have to be resolved on the basis of the subjective notions of “fairness” of any given majority of justices. The effect of today’s decision, I submit, will be to substitute a state of disorder and unpredictability for a state of order and predictability in a critical area of the law where predictability is essential to the welfare of adopted children. Children born out of wedlock whom their mothers wish to give up for adoption, as well as putative adoptive parents of such children, will be held hostage to fathers who fail to file timely notices of paternity and later come into court asserting that they did not know their “rights” and did not have a fair chance to file. The bonding of adopted children, and the psychological security of adoptive parents, will be subject to being torn asunder on the basis of a subjective, standardless judgment by a majority of this Court.
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.