Court Opinion

ID: 9488532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:48:10.021686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:56.768253
License: Public Domain

MOTZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
An employee of a West Virginia company, driving a truck, without passengers or cargo, that was titled in West Virginia and owned by his West Virginia employer, was fatally shot as he was leaving a West Virginia coal mine to return to his employer’s West Virginia shop. Principal responsibility for this tragedy was attributed to appellant Jerry Dale Lowe.1 But Lowe was not charged with murder, manslaughter, felonious wounding, assault, battery, or any other seemingly appropriate state law offense. Instead, he was charged with, and convicted of, violating a federal statute aimed at punishing those who damage commercial vehicles used in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 33. The majority concludes that the government proved, as it had to, that all vehicles involved in this case, including that driven by the victim, were (1) “used for commercial purposes ... in the transportation of passengers ... or property or cargo” and (2) “used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 31, 33. I do not believe that either of these elements was proved, and so I respectfully dissent.2
To come within the reach of § 33, damage must be done to a “motor vehicle,” which is defined as a:
carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargof]
18 U.S.C. § 31 (emphasis added).
The majority does not suggest that any of the vehicles involved in this case was used in the transportation of “property or cargo.” *1149The majority does assert, however, that “each of the vehicles was used ‘in the transportation of passengers.’ ” Maj. op. at 1143. I cannot find any evidence that any vehicle involved here was ever used for “commercial purposes” in the “transportation of passengers.” The Elite vehicles were used to escort Deskins vehicles to and from the mine; although the Elite vehicles contained several Elite employees, there was no evidence that they were ever used to provide commercial transportation for Deskins employees or anyone else. The legislative history of § 33 strongly suggests that it was not intended to apply to vehicles in which employees of the vehicle owner were the only passengers, ie., that this does not constitute the “transportation of passengers” for “commercial purposes.” See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 2287, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145, 3151 (statute “does not extend to motor vehicles, including commercial motor vehicles, used merely for the transportation of property, or for personal or private purposes ” (emphasis added)). Nor has any other court interpreted § 33 to apply to this or a similar situation; rather the statute has only been invoked in crimes involving vehicles engaged in true commercial, rather than private, purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 994 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir.1993) (Greyhound bus); United States v. Daniels, 948 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1279, 117 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992); United States v. Heightland, 865 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.) (truck transport ing coal in first phase of interstate shipment), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 826, 110 S.Ct. 90, 107 L.Ed.2d 55 (1989).
However, even if § 33 was intended to apply to vehicles in which the owner’s employees were the only passengers, it would not apply to the two Deskins vehicles. It was undisputed that the Deskins vehicles— including the one containing the victim who was fatally shot — contained only one person, the driver himself. At least with regard to the Deskins vehicles then, there cannot be any claim that any passengers were transported for any purpose, let alone for commercial purposes. By definition, drivers are not passengers. See also S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3500 (discussing the need for amending the definition of “motor vehicle” to include “property or cargo” because without this addition, the statute “does not reach the destruction of’ single-driver commercial trucks since they carry “only cargo, not passengers”). Absent evidence that the Deskins vehicles were ever used to transport “passengers,” “property,” or “cargo” as required by § 31, the convictions cannot stand.
Furthermore, to make out a violation of § 33, the “motor vehicles” that are damaged must also be “used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 33. The majority asserts that this requirement is satisfied because the vehicles were used to “further” the general business activities of Arch (“distribution of Arch’s coal”) and Elite (“Elite’s business furnishing security services in the interstate market”). Maj. op. at 1143. No court has ever endorsed such a broad reading of § 33 and for good reason. The plain language of the statute clearly provides to the contrary.
First, only if a person damages a “motor vehicle which is used, operated, or employed in interstate ... commerce” is his conduct forbidden by § 33. Thus, the vehicles themselves must have some connection to interstate commerce. That the owners of the vehicles, Arch and Elite, were engaged generally in interstate activities is wholly irrelevant. See United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir.) (statute broader than § 33, which punishes anyone who commits arson on “property used in ... or ... affecting interstate or foreign commerce,” held to require evidence “that the building [which was burned] was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce” rather than merely that the building owner was engaged in interstate commerce (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 888, 107 S.Ct. 286, 93 L.Ed.2d 261 (1986).
Furthermore, § 33 requires that motor vehicles must be “used in” interstate commerce, not just “affect” interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has recognized three categories of statutes enacted by Congress *1150pursuant to its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been kidnaped. Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or persons or things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting commerce.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1359, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, Congress is aware of the “distinction between legislation limited to activities ‘in commerce,’ and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.” United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 280, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 2156, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (emphasis added). Thus, the phrase “in commerce” is a more narrow and restrictive jurisdictional requirement than the phrase “affecting interstate commerce,” and denotes “only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce — the practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and their transport and distribution to the consumer.” Id. at 276, 95 S.Ct. at 2154 (emphasis added) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195, 95 S.Ct. 392, 398, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974)). Had Congress wanted to include in § 33 vehicles that are merely used to “further” or “affect” interstate commerce, it could easily have done so. It did not. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (applying to vehicles “used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce ” (emphasis added)).
The jurisdictional phrase “used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce” appears in only two other sections of the Code. Section 32 of Title 18, enacted along with § 33 in 1956, provides for federal prosecution of anyone who “sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks ... any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 32. Sections 32 and 33 in turn adopted the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1992, which authorizes prosecution of anyone who “willfully derails, disables, or wrecks any train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce by any railroad.” See H.R.Rep. No. 1979, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3145. In both § 32 and § 1992, Congress was concerned with protecting certain channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, e.g., trains and aircraft. Section 33 merely extended that protection to “motor vehicles ... used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce.” See, e.g., Lambert, 994 F.2d 1088 (Greyhound bus); Daniels, 948 F.2d 1033 (same); Heightland, 865 F.2d 94 (truck transporting coal in first phase of interstate shipment); see also 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3500 (“there is a definite Federal interest in keeping open the channels of interstate commerce in which trucks play a critical role”).
The vehicle that the decedent was driving was owned and operated by a West Virginia company in connection with an intrastate business transaction with another West Virginia company. There was no evidence that the vehicle had ever been used outside the state of West Virginia, in connection with interstate commerce or otherwise. The statute as interpreted by the majority would extend the reach of § 33 to every vehicle owned by a person or entity engaged in interstate commerce, no matter how confined the use of the vehicle, because conceivably every such vehicle somehow “furthers” the interstate market activities of its owner. I do not believe Congress intended to stretch the scope of § 33 in such a manner.
In light of the recent efforts towards “de-federalization,” it is surprising that the majority chooses to convert what would otherwise be a classic state-law offense, with strong local overtones, into a federal crime. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has warned against such statutory interpretation. *1151See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 836, 350, 92 S.Ct. 515, 524, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) (“[T]he broad construction urged by the Government renders traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal enforcement and would also involve a substantial extension of federal police resources. Absent proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each ease, [the statute] dramatically intrudes upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). Nor does the fact that this tragedy occurred during a vitriolic labor strike somehow provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has also cautioned against this:
[I]t would require statutory language much more explicit than that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the language of [the statute] nor its legislative history can justify the conclusion that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal jurisdiction of the States.
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 1015, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973).
For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Seven other miners were permitted to plead guilty to a petty state offense, destruction of property, and were sentenced to 120 days in prison and fined $500.

. I agree with the majority's well-reasoned conclusions as to the evidentiary and sentencing issues. I also agree that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a jury could conclude that Lowe fired the shot that killed the decedent.