Court Opinion

ID: 9709553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:50:46.59474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.026108
License: Public Domain

CHEZEM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the jury. The question of whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Hacker and Holland was a question of fact. It was for the jury to decide questions of fact, and on appeal, we cannot reweigh evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. The majority has simply reweighed the evidence presented at trial. Picadilly v. Colvin (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 1217 (on appeal, a general judgment will be sustained upon any theory consistent with the evidence, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor rejudge the credibility of witnesses).
Even assuming the majority correctly found there was an attorney-client relationship between Holland and Hacker, I would not find error in the admission of the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness, Hoffman.
In Hacker’s case in chief, Hacker presented an attorney, Thopy, as “an independent expert.” That witness gave as his opinion, “[ajssuming that Mr. Holland was her attorney, ... he failed to protect [Hacker] with the contract”. The record then sets forth a series of questions and answers about Hacker’s remedies, including whether she could file suit against Evans.1 On cross-examination the expert was *960asked “ ... the first thing for a, a party to be able to collect under a legal malpractice suit is that she actually has a loss, is that —, do you feel that’s a true statement?” The expert replied, “Yes.”
It was not error for the trial court to allow Holland’s expert witness to testify. The witness testified,' “[i]n this particular case, where this obligation’s [sic] still outstanding, she would have to file suit and seek to enforce any Judgment she might obtain and determine as to whether or not that Judgment was enforceable and collectable against Mr. Evans.” The witness limited his opinion to the facts of this case. I do not believe the witness’ testimony was necessarily an incorrect conclusion of law as applied to the specific facts of this case. Therefore, the witness’ testimony was not prejudicial to the point that Hacker’s rights were substantially affected. Holland was entitled to have his expert witness testify to insure a fair trial.
The situation at hand is distinguishable from Walker v. Lawson (1988), Ind., 526 N.E.2d 968, 970 cited by the majority. In a summary judgment proceeding where the lawyers for each side had filed affidavits concerning legal issues and not factual issues our Supreme Court said, “It is inappropriate for a court to entertain evidence concerning a witness’s interpretation of the law. The presence of these affidavits does not create a genuine issue of material fact; thus, it does not preclude the issuance of summary judgment.”
Here, we have a matter before the jury who must decide whether an attorney-client relationship existed and, if so, whether Hacker was damaged by Holland’s acts. Then, if the jury finds those facts, it must resolve the question of the amount of damages. That question includes the consideration of mitigation of damages by Hacker. There were several remedies available to Hacker. This evidence had to be presented for the jury’s consideration. The legal options available to Hacker could only be presented to the jury via an expert witness. I do not think the expert testimony here should fall within the prohibition against interpreting the law.

. The plaintiffs evidence discloses that Evans owns several parcels of land in Dearborn Coun*960ty. The discussion of getting a judgment against him was relevant to the issue of damages.