Court Opinion

ID: 9941172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 23:02:56.110666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:19.121376
License: Public Domain

IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 24S‐CR‐55                        FILED
                                                                 Feb 15 2024, 2:57 pm
                   Jennifer R. Teising,                              CLERK
                                                                 Indiana Supreme Court
                  Appellant (Defendant below),                      Court of Appeals
                                                                      and Tax Court

                               –v–

                     State of Indiana,
                    Appellee (Plaintiff below).

       Argued: June 23, 2023 | Decided: February 15, 2024

          Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court 5
                     No. 79D05‐2105‐F6‐368
             The Honorable Kristen E. McVey, Judge

    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                         No. 22A‐CR‐548

                   Opinion by Justice Molter
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
Molter, Justice.

   Article 6, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution requires that all
township officers “shall reside within their respective . . . townships,” and
they forfeit their position if they don’t. Defendant Jennifer Teising resided
within West Lafayette’s Wabash Township when she was elected
township trustee in November 2018. But after the COVID‐19 pandemic
spread to Indiana, she sold her home, bought a travel trailer, and left for a
nomadic life while continuing to work remotely. Sometimes she stayed in
Florida, sometimes she stayed with friends in Anderson, Indiana, and
sometimes she traveled. But she hardly ever stayed in Wabash Township.
And despite growing controversy over her residency, she refused to
resign.

   Usually, the State resolves residency disputes like this through a civil
quo warranto action to remove the official from office. But here it chose
stronger medicine. It convened a grand jury, which indicted Teising for
twenty‐one counts of theft on the theory that by spending most of her
time outside the township, she forfeited her office. And once she forfeited
her office, none of the twenty‐one paychecks she kept collecting belonged
to her even though she continued working as the trustee remotely. After
the parties agreed to a bench trial, the trial court convicted her on all
counts.

   A unanimous Court of Appeals panel vacated the convictions in a
published opinion. The panel concluded Teising never stopped complying
with the constitutional residency requirement because she never
established a legal domicile somewhere else, and she therefore didn’t
forfeit her office. We now grant transfer, and we too conclude Teising’s
convictions must be vacated, but for a different reason. We don’t need to
reach the constitutional residency question because, either way, the State
didn’t introduce evidence that Teising acted with the criminal intent
required for theft—evidence that she believed she wasn’t supposed to
continue collecting her salary for the work she kept performing remotely.
And without criminal intent, the only available remedies were civil, such
as a quo warranto action to remove Teising from office or a conversion
claim to recover allegedly misappropriated money.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024      Page 2 of 12
Facts and Procedural History
   Teising was elected trustee of Wabash Township in November 2018,
and she took office the following January for a four‐year term. Ind. Code §
36‐6‐4‐2(c). At that time, she owned a house in Wabash Township on
Princess Drive.

   About a year later, Teising briefly ran for county commissioner before
withdrawing from the race and saying she was “probably going to . . . sell
[her] house, resign [as trustee], and move to Florida.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 238. She
asked the Wabash Township Board President, Michelle Wietbrock,
whether Wietbrock would replace her after she resigned. But when
Wietbrock declined, Teising changed her mind and decided not to resign.

   Teising continued waffling after the COVID‐19 pandemic spread to
Indiana and the first lockdowns were put in place. She again said she
planned to sell her house, resign as trustee, and move away. This time, she
did sell her house, moving some of her things into her mother’s home in
Vincennes and the rest into her ex‐boyfriend’s home on Knox Drive in
Wabash Township. She also changed both her BMV and voter registration
address to that Knox Drive address. And she bought a truck and
recreational travel trailer.

   Even though Teising began to use the Knox Drive home as her personal
address, cell phone records reflect she rarely stayed there. From June 17,
2020 through March 19, 2021, Teising spent only twenty‐seven overnights
there and seven overnights at another address in Lafayette. She spent the
other 241 days traveling the country on trips to Minnesota, Colorado, and
Florida. She also visited other cities in Indiana. During her travels, Teising
often stayed with friends in Anderson, Indiana who considered Teising
part of their COVID‐19 “bubble.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 106.

   Throughout these travels, Teising continued working remotely as
trustee. Teising’s office manager, Tricia Fultz, kept the office open and
continued working there in person. Teising maintained access to her
trustee email account, and Fultz scanned and uploaded documents that
came into the office so Teising could view them remotely. Fultz would
also send Teising pictures of important emails and documents via

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024       Page 3 of 12
cellphone so Teising could review them immediately. The Indiana State
Police determined that from June 1, 2020 through January 11, 2021, Teising
contacted Fultz’s cellphone more often than any other phone number.

   Teising maintained she was complying with the requirements of her
office while working remotely. In November 2020, Wietbrock informed
Teising that township residents and elected officials had begun to express
concerns about her residency. In her email response, Teising said: “I have
complied with the requirements of the office.” Ex. Vol. 2 at 75. And on
December 22, 2020, the Lafayette Journal & Courier published a story about
Teising and her travels outside of Wabash Township. Teising responded
to the Journal & Courier’s request for comment and said that the Knox
Drive address was her residence. She also stated: “I have definitely abided
by the law. I’ve done all the requirements of my office, and I’m doing the
job of my office.” App. Vol. II at 136.

   Her responses did not quell the controversy, and a grand jury indicted
her on twenty‐one counts of theft. The indictment alleged that Teising no
longer resided within Wabash Township, so she forfeited her office and
the right to continue collecting her salary. Thus, the twenty‐one paychecks
she collected after she allegedly moved away constituted theft.

   Teising filed pre‐trial motions for a change of venue and the
appointment of a special prosecutor. But the trial court denied both
motions. After Teising waived her right to a jury trial, the court conducted
a bench trial on December 13 through December 15, 2021.

    The trial court then found Teising guilty of all twenty‐one theft counts.
It concluded that “upon the Defendant’s move out of Wabash Township
in June 2020 to live a nomadic RV lifestyle, she ceased to . . . make her
‘true, permanent and fixed’ home in Wabash Township, West Lafayette,
Indiana and forfeited the office of Township Trustee.” Id. at 26. And
“[u]pon forfeiture of the office of Wabash Township Trustee, the
Defendant’s continued collection of her salary constituted the crime of
Theft.” Id. The court then imposed an aggregate 1,095‐day sentence with
847 days suspended, leaving 124 days to be served in the Tippecanoe
County Jail and 124 days to be served in community corrections.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024      Page 4 of 12
   Teising appealed her convictions, and her sentence was stayed pending
appeal. See Teising v. State, 201 N.E.3d 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Applying
Indiana Code Chapter 3‐5‐5, which establishes statutory residency
requirements, a unanimous Court of Appeals panel agreed with Teising
and reversed her convictions. The panel reasoned that “Teising could not
lose her residency in Wabash Township until she established a new
residence elsewhere.” Id. at 219. And the trial court erred when it found
Teising guilty of theft because “the State failed to present sufficient
evidence that Teising intended to abandon her Wabash Township
domicile and establish a new residence” outside the township. Id. at 220.

   The State petitioned for transfer to this Court, which we now grant
through a separate order, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion
under Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
   The appellate standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence
challenges is well settled. “It is the fact‐finder’s role, not that of appellate
courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine
whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d
144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Therefore, the “reviewing court does not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses,” and it leaves those
determinations to the fact‐finder. McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126
(Ind. 2005). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling and will affirm a defendant’s conviction unless “no
reasonable fact‐finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000).

Discussion and Decision
   Teising argues we should vacate her convictions for many reasons
which all relate to two overarching points. First, she says she never
stopped residing within Wabash Township, so she never forfeited her
office. And second, even if she did forfeit her office, the State’s remedy

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024        Page 5 of 12
was to remove her from office through a civil quo warranto action, not to
convict her of theft.

   Her first point requires interpreting and applying Article 6, Section 6’s
residency requirement, but the “longstanding principle of constitutional
avoidance . . . weighs against deciding constitutional questions not
absolutely necessary to a merits disposition.” Ind. Land Tr. Co. v. XL Inv.
Props. LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182 (Ind. 2020) (quotations omitted). And
here, we don’t need to decide the constitutional residency question
because we agree with Teising’s second point.

   The State’s theory of the case is that Teising stopped residing in the
township, so she automatically forfeited her position under Indiana Code
Section 36‐6‐4‐2(b); and once she forfeited her position, the twenty‐one
paychecks she kept collecting did not rightfully belong to her. But Teising
argues the State skipped a step by charging her with a crime before
succeeding on a civil quo warranto action to remove her from office.
Because without first being ejected from office, she didn’t know the salary
she received while remotely performing her duties didn’t belong to her.

   For the most part, we agree with Teising, although we think the State
frames the issue better. While Teising views this as a constitutional
question about adequate notice and the limits of prosecutorial discretion,
we agree with the State that the question is much simpler: “Whether
sufficient evidence supports Defendant’s convictions for theft.” Appellee’s
Br. at 8.1 And because there was no evidence Teising believed the
paychecks she received did not belong to her, her theft convictions must
be vacated.

1See also Appellee’s Br. at 32 (arguing Teising’s claim that she lacked sufficient notice that
abandoning her residence could subject her to theft charges “should only be considered as
part of her sufficiency argument and not as a separate constitutional vagueness claim”); Resp.
to Trans. at 16 (“Nearly every crime contained in the Indiana Code requires a degree of intent
and is something the State regularly must prove in criminal cases. The State never makes clear
why proving intent for purposes of committing theft under these circumstances goes against
public policy.”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024                    Page 6 of 12
I. The State did not introduce evidence of criminal
   intent.
   The theft statute underlying Teising’s convictions provided: “A person
who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property
of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its
value or use, commits theft . . . .” I.C. § 35‐43‐4‐2 (2021). It has long been
settled that “[t]he taking of property of another under a good faith claim
of title or right to possession, or under circumstances consistent with
honest conduct, is not larceny [(i.e., theft)], although the party charged
with the crime might have been mistaken in [their] belief.” Roark v. State,
130 N.E.2d 326, 328 (Ind. 1955); see generally 1 Subst. Crim. L. § 5.6(d) (3d
ed.) (explaining “the crime of [theft] is not committed if the defendant,
because of a mistaken understanding[,] . . . believed that the property
taken belonged to him”).2 That is because “[t]he intent to steal property
and a [bona fide] claim of right to take it are incompatible.” Roark, 130
N.E.2d at 328. And that is so whether the defendant’s mistaken belief
about ownership is based on a factual misunderstanding or a
misunderstanding of the law as it relates to property ownership. Baugh v.
State, 165 N.E. 434, 435 (Ind. 1929); accord Model Penal Code § 2.04(1)(a)
(“Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if . . . the
ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the

2 See also generally 27 Ind. Law Encyc. Theft and Related Offenses § 2 (2023) (“A person who
takes the property of another under a good faith but mistaken claim of ownership of the
property does not commit theft by such action, since the required intent to exert unauthorized
control over another’s property is absent.”); 3 Subst. Crim. L. § 19.5(a) (3d ed.) (explaining that
“[o]ne may take the property of another honestly but mistakenly believing . . . that it is his
own property” and in that event “he lacks the intent to steal required for larceny, even though
his mistaken but honest belief was unreasonable” (footnote omitted)); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny
§ 31 (2024) (“Because larceny is a specific intent crime, the State must show that the defendant
acted with the subjective desire or knowledge that his actions constituted stealing. The intent
to steal or animus furandi, as an element of theft by larceny, is the intent, without a good faith
claim of right, to permanently deprive the owner of possession of personal property.”
(footnotes omitted)); 52B C.J.S. Larceny § 184 (2023) (“It is also for the jury to determine
whether the taking has been done with a felonious intent . . . or under a mistaken claim of
right made in good faith . . . .”).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024                         Page 7 of 12
offense . . . .”).

    So, for example, a car dealer cannot be convicted of theft if they do not
realize the car they are selling was stolen, or someone else has a superior
title for whatever reason. Pierce v. State, 315 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. Ct. App.
1974). To be sure, the State may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove
the dealer did in fact know the car belonged to someone else. Fortson v.
State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2010) (explaining “knowledge that
property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding
the possession”). But one way or another, the State must prove the
defendant knew the property wasn’t theirs to secure a theft conviction.

   Here, there is no evidence Teising believed she was no longer entitled
to continue collecting her salary for the work she kept performing
remotely. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law do not
conclude she believed the money she collected wasn’t hers. The State did
not point to any such evidence in its briefing or in response to our
questions at oral argument. And our own review of the trial transcript
didn’t reveal any such evidence either. In fact, the only evidence in the
record on this point suggests Teising believed she did have the right to
continue collecting her salary. In both her November 2020 email to
Wietbrock, and her December 2020 comments to the Journal & Courier,
Teising claimed she never stopped fulfilling the requirements of her office.

    Instead, the State rests its case entirely on the fact that Teising was
aware of both the requirement to reside within the township and her own
nomadic lifestyle. And, the State argues, that lifestyle produced a chain of
legal consequences: by leaving the township indefinitely, she stopped
residing in the township as a matter of law; then by not complying with
the constitutional requirement to reside within the township, she forfeited
her office; and then by forfeiting her office, her paychecks became ill‐
gotten gains. But even if we assume Teising stopped residing in the
township and therefore forfeited her office as a matter of law (questions
we do not decide), the State didn’t prove Teising knew she forfeited her
office, nor, more importantly, that she knew her paychecks had become
ill‐gotten gains. And without knowing she wasn’t supposed to be

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024       Page 8 of 12
receiving the paychecks, Teising could not have had the necessary
criminal intent.

II. Without criminal intent, this is a dispute for the
    civil law, not the criminal law.
   The State views this differently. It argues that vacating Teising’s theft
convictions because there is no evidence—direct or circumstantial—that
she knew she wasn’t supposed to continue receiving her salary would
allow her to prevail on an improper “mistake of law” defense. Oral
Argument at 4:47–8:10.

      A longstanding legal principle presumes that citizens know the
      law and must obey it—on pain of losing their lives, liberty, or
      property for noncompliance. Because we assume that man is
      free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
      that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
      opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
      accordingly. An ancient legal maxim, phrased in the obligatory
      Latin (ignorantia juris non excusat), admonishes that ignorance
      of the law is no excuse.

Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind.
2017) (cleaned up).

    But the State maintains the burden to prove Teising’s criminal intent,
including that when she possessed the allegedly stolen property, she
knew it wasn’t hers. So this limitation just means Teising can’t defend
based on her ignorance of the criminal law—she can’t defend on the basis
that she didn’t know it was a crime to take other people’s things without
their permission. But she can defend on the basis that she misunderstood
the civil law to mean the allegedly stolen property was rightfully hers,
because that misunderstanding negates her criminal intent. That a mistake
of law can be a proper defense to the criminal intent element of theft is
one reason why civil litigation usually doesn’t end with anyone going to
jail even when a defendant must return money or property that the judge

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024       Page 9 of 12
or jury concludes belonged to the plaintiff all along. J.G. v. State, 30 N.E.3d
777, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (explaining that “a party to a good faith
contract dispute should not be convicted of theft simply because he
eventually finds himself on the losing end of the dispute” since he “lack[s]
the requisite intent necessary to commit theft”).

   Our decision in Baugh v. State, is a good illustration of how the maxim
that “ignorance of the law is no excuse” does not relieve the State of its
burden to prove criminal intent, even when the defendant bases their
claimed lack of intent on a misunderstanding of the civil law. 165 N.E. at
435. William Baugh transferred one acre of land to the Cumberland
Presbyterian Church on the condition that the property would revert back
to him if the land was no longer used for a church or burial ground. Id. at
434. When more than a year passed without any church services on the
property, the building had become dilapidated, and there were no
remaining burial plots, he concluded the property had reverted back to
him, and he transferred it to his son, John. Id. To preclude any doubt,
William filed a suit to quiet title, but he died before that case was resolved,
and it was dismissed. Id.

   John concluded from all this that he owned not just the real estate, but
also the personal property on it, so he removed the church pews, chairs,
and pulpit, and he sold them. Id. But before he did that, he checked with
his lawyer, who said he couldn’t “conceive of anybody making a big row
about” John removing the property, and even “if it should turn out [that
John] didn’t have a right to sell it,” he would “simply have to hand the
money back.” Id. at 435 (quotations omitted).

   The lawyer guessed wrong. The church trustee filed a civil replevin
action, and then let that case languish after persuading the local
prosecutor to charge John with burglary for entering the church with the
intent to steal the personal property in it. Id. at 434, 435. John was
convicted and sentenced to between one and ten years in the Indiana State
Prison, but our Court vacated the conviction. Id. We declined to decide
who had the superior legal claim to own the property, explaining it didn’t
matter. “One who takes property under a fair color or claim of title and in
the honest belief of ownership and of a right to its possession is not guilty

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024      Page 10 of 12
of larceny, although his claim is based on a misconception of the law or his rights
under it . . . .” Id. at 435 (emphasis added). John’s belief, even if it were
based on a mistake of law, negated “any intent . . . in selling and removing
the property in question[ ] to commit larceny.” Id. At bottom, “this
controversy [was] properly one for determination by a civil action but not
one for criminal prosecution.” Id.

   The same is true here. Under the criminal law, it doesn’t make a
difference if Teising was mistaken in her belief that she had not forfeited
her office. What matters is that she believed she continued to meet the
constitutional requirements of her office while working remotely and that
she was allowed to continue collecting her salary. Or, more precisely, the
State failed to prove she didn’t believe that.

  So, like in Baugh, this is a controversy for the civil law, not the criminal
law, no matter how outrageous the State and its constituents may find
Teising’s conduct. If the State’s objective was to oust Teising from office
because she no longer resided within the township, its relief was through
a civil quo warranto action. Hovanec v. Diaz, 397 N.E.2d 1249, 1250 (Ind.
1979) (“Historically, quo warranto is the proper remedy to determine the
right to an office.”). Indeed, that is how the State routinely handles claims
that an officeholder has forfeited their position by abandoning their
residence. See, e.g., Relender v. State ex rel. Utz, 49 N.E. 30, 33 (Ind. 1898);
Mehringer v. State, 20 Ind. 103, 103 (1863); State ex rel. Cornwall v. Allen, 21
Ind. 516, 520 (1863). Or if the goal was to recover money the township
thought Teising was not entitled to keep, then the relief was through a
civil action for something like a conversion claim. Allen, 21 Ind. at 520
(explaining that the expeditious resolution of a quo warranto action was in
the defendant’s best interests “for if he is not rightly in office, he will be
liable to the legal officer for the fees of the office”). But the State could not
vindicate its interests through the criminal law unless Teising knew the
money she was receiving wasn’t hers.

   That is not to say a civil action is a prerequisite to criminal theft charges
based on an officeholder’s improper retention of pay, nor that the State
could never demonstrate criminal intent without prevailing on a civil
claim first. Suppose an officeholder retained funds they knew were paid

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024          Page 11 of 12
improperly after their term expired. Whatever other defenses they might
have to a theft charge, it would not seem that a lack of criminal intent
would be one of them even if there were no civil claim filed first.

   Since the State had no evidence Teising believed the money she
received wasn’t rightfully hers, the only available remedies were civil.

Conclusion
    For these reasons, we vacate Teising’s convictions and sentence.3

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Karen Celestino‐Horseman
Austin & Jones, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Andrew A. Kobe
Justin F. Roebel
Angela Sanchez
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

3Teising raised additional issues in her Brief of Appellant, including whether her convictions
violated double jeopardy protections, and whether the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to appoint a special prosecutor. Because we are vacating her conviction based on the
State’s failure to prove criminal intent, we need not reach those issues.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S‐CR‐55 | February 15, 2024                   Page 12 of 12