Court Opinion

ID: 9384731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 20:02:42.041371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.059655
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/4/23 P. v. Shelton CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B320731

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BA339715)
           v.

 MARQUETTE SHELTON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
      Roberta Simon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
       Nelson McVay (McVay)1 —whom a jury convicted of the
attempted murder of Isaac Coulibaly in 2008—asks us to reverse
the trial court’s order denying his petition filed pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95).2 That section
permits a defendant convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” to petition for
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       McVay’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief
identifying no issues on appeal and requesting that we follow
the procedures outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). McVay filed a supplemental brief in which
his primary contention is that the trial court erred by summarily
denying his petition without first appointing counsel for him, as
section 1172.6 mandates. We conclude, however, that any errors
by the trial court were harmless because the record establishes
that the jury did not convict McVay pursuant to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. To the contrary, the jury found
that McVay personally aimed and fired a gun at Coulibaly with
the intent to kill. McVay therefore is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. We affirm.

      1During the pendency of this appeal, McVay changed his
name from “Marquette Shelton” to “Nelson McVay.”
      2 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are
to the Penal Code.
      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10),
without changing the statute’s content. We hereafter cite to
section 1172.6 for ease of reference.

                                    2
  FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3
       In June 2008, the district attorney charged McVay with
five counts arising out of an altercation in front of an after-hours
Hollywood nightclub: (1) attempted murder, (2) second degree
robbery, (3) possession of a firearm by a felon; (4) carrying a
concealed firearm on his person, and (5) assault with a firearm.
At trial, the prosecution argued that McVay—the only defendant
charged—and at least two other men engaged in a fist fight
with Coulibaly. During the fight, McVay or one of the other
men ripped a necklace from Coulibaly’s neck. Although injured,
Coulibaly walked away at the conclusion of the fight. McVay
followed Coulibaly and then aimed and fired a gun directly at his
body. The gun malfunctioned, however, and Coulibaly survived
the incident. The prosecution asserted that McVay’s conduct
in pursuing and then firing at Coulibaly constituted attempted
murder.
       On October 2, 2008, the jury acquitted McVay on the
robbery charge, but convicted him on all remaining counts.
With respect to the attempted murder charge, the jury found
further that (1) McVay had acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation, and (2) he had “personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm” in the course of the attempt. The trial
court sentenced McVay to prison for 50 years to life, and, on
April 26, 2010, this court affirmed McVay’s conviction. (See
People v. Shelton (April 26, 2010, B216443) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On April 14, 2022, McVay, representing himself, filed a
petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Checking boxes
on the printed form petition, McVay declared under penalty of

      3We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

                                    3
perjury that he met the statutory requirements for resentencing
and requested that the trial court appoint counsel to represent
him during the resentencing process. The trial court did not
appoint counsel. Instead, on April 25, 2022, it summarily denied
McVay’s petition, explaining: “The petition presents claims
raised and rejected in a prior habeas petition and petitioner has
not alleged facts establishing an exception to the rule barring
reconsideration of claims previously rejected. (See order of denial
filed 4-14-21.) Such successive claims constitute an abuse of the
writ of habeas corpus. . . . Reconsideration is also denied.”4
       McVay timely appealed the court’s denial of his petition,
and we appointed appellate counsel to represent him. On
January 23, 2023, McVay’s appointed counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and requesting that we follow the procedures
set forth in Delgadillo, including that we permit McVay “to file
a supplemental brief raising any issues he wishes the court to
consider.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) McVay filed a
supplemental brief on February 14, 2023.

                          DISCUSSION
      A.    Law Governing Delgadillo Appeals
       In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established the procedure
for cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an
order denying postconviction relief lacks merit. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.) In such cases, “(1) counsel should file
a brief informing the court of that determination, including
a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the

      4 Our appellate record does not contain any “order of
denial” dated April 14, 2021, nor does it contain any prior habeas
petition filed by McVay.

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petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of counsel’s
brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the
right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or
brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.”
(Id. at pp. 231–232.) If the defendant files a supplemental brief
or letter, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Id. at
p. 232.) But “[t]he filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not
compel an independent review of the entire record to identify
unraised issues.” (Ibid.)

      B.     Law Governing Section 1172.6 Petitions
        “Murder has long been defined as ‘the unlawful killing of
a human being . . . with malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595 (Offley), quoting § 187, subd. (a).)
“ ‘Malice aforethought may be express or implied. [Citation.]
“Express malice is an intent to kill. . . . Malice is implied
when a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger
to life that the act poses.” ’ [Citation.]” (Offley, supra, at p. 595.)
        “Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, however,
a defendant who aided and abetted a crime that ended in a
victim’s death could be convicted of murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine even if the defendant
personally did not act with malice aforethought. The natural
and probable consequences doctrine provides that ‘ “[a] person
who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not
only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other
crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that

                                      5
is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.” ’
[Citation.]” (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.)
       “Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted to abolish this doctrine
in cases of murder.[5 ] It amended section 188 to require that,
when the felony murder rule does not apply, a principal in the
crime of murder ‘shall act with malice aforethought,’ and that
‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his
or her participation in a crime.’ [Citations.] As a result, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine can no longer
support a murder conviction.” (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th
at p. 595, fn. added and omitted.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which
provides a procedure whereby “convicted murderers who could
not be convicted under the law as amended” may petition to have
the conviction vacated and be resentenced on any remaining
counts. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); see
§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which, among other
changes, extended the application of section 1172.6 to defendants
convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).)
       If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including “[a] declaration by the petitioner that

      5The bill “also amended section 189 by adding a
requirement to the felony-murder rule that a defendant who
was not the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor must
have been a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Offley, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, fn. 4, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
This aspect of the law is not relevant to McVay’s appeal.

                                     6
the petitioner is eligible for relief,” the trial court must appoint
counsel, if requested (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(3)); the
prosecutor must “file and serve a response” to the petition, to
which the petitioner may reply (id., subd. (c)); and “[a]fter the
parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court
shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.) A trial court’s failure
to comply with these statutory requirements is harmless if the
record of conviction establishes that a defendant is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Hurtado
(Mar. 27, 2023, B319381) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 WL 2643086
at p. *3] (Hurtado).)

      C.    McVay Is Ineligible for Section 1172.6 Relief
            as a Matter of Law
      McVay is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law because the record of conviction establishes that the
jury did not convict him pursuant to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.6
      At trial, the prosecution argued that McVay—acting
alone—committed attempted murder when he aimed and fired
a gun at Coulibaly, the only alleged victim. The trial court
instructed the jury that, to find McVay guilty of attempted
murder, it must conclude that he “intended to kill.” The

      6 The record submitted in connection with this appeal
does not contain a transcript of the parties’ opening and closing
arguments at McVay’s trial or the instructions provided to the
jury. These materials, however, are available to us as part of the
record submitted in support of McVay’s appeal of his conviction,
case No. B216443. We exercise our authority to take judicial
notice of the materials. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459,
subd. (a).)

                                     7
court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.7 In addition, the jury determined
that McVay committed the attempted murder willfully, and
with deliberation and premeditation—findings that the court
instructed the jurors they could make only if they concluded
that McVay “intended to kill when he acted,” and that he
“decided to kill before acting” after “carefully weigh[ing] the
considerations for and against his choice.” Finally, the jury
concluded that McVay “personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm” in the commission of the crime.
       Thus, in convicting McVay of attempted murder, the jury
necessarily concluded that he personally shot at Coulibaly with
the intent to kill. (See People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
198, 205 [the appellate court “presume[d] a jury underst[ood]
and follow[ed] the court’s instructions”].) These determinations
by the jury distinguish McVay’s case from the various authorities
on which he relies in arguing that neither his status as the
actual shooter nor his conviction on the firearm enhancement
categorically bars his resentencing request. Accordingly, we
conclude that McVay is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. (See Hurtado, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023
WL 2643086 at p. *3] [“[a]s the attempted murderer, [petitioner]
is ‘ineligible for relief ’ as ‘a matter of law’ ”].)

     7  “Section [1172.6] applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) But because
McVay nonetheless references the felony-murder rule in his
petition, we note that the trial court did not instruct the jury
on felony murder or on any other theory of imputed malice with
respect to the attempted murder charge.

                                   8
       None of the remaining arguments in McVay’s supplemental
brief persuades us otherwise. First, McVay urges that the
trial court’s failure to appoint counsel and its summary denial
of his facially valid petition constitute structural error that
mandates reversal. “But a trial court’s statutory omissions
at the first step of the section 1172.6 process are not state or
federal constitutional violations,” and such omissions therefore
are subject to harmless error review. (Hurtado, supra,
___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 WL 2643086 at p. *3], citing Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 973.) And assuming for purposes of
argument that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel
and conduct a hearing on McVay’s petition, any such errors
were harmless because McVay is categorically ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief. 8 (Hurtado, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___
[2023 WL 2643086 at p. *3].)
       Next, McVay urges that the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and that the trial evidence does not support that he
acted with the intent to kill. These arguments fail because
section 1172.6 “does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity
to raise claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the

      8 In light of this conclusion, we need not address the
propriety of the trial court’s determination that McVay’s petition
impermissibly “present[ed] claims raised and rejected in a prior
habeas petition,” nor need we resolve whether that determination
relieved the court of its duties under section 1172.6 to appoint
counsel for McVay and conduct a hearing. (See Cortes, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 204 [“declin[ing] to address the trial court’s
reasons for denying the petition” because the appellate court
“may affirm a ruling that is correct in law on any ground”].)

                                    9
evidence supporting the jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
       Finally, we note that we did not rely on the statement
of facts contained in appointed counsel’s Delgadillo brief in
resolving this appeal. We therefore need not decide whether,
as McVay contends, his counsel erred in relying on McVay’s
probation report in drafting the brief ’s statement of facts.

                         DISPOSITION
      We affirm the April 25, 2022 order denying McVay’s
section 1172.6 petition.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  BENDIX, J.

                  CHANEY, J.

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