Court Opinion

ID: 9403242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:09:29.695504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.717015
License: Public Domain

J-S13015-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GRANT A. BARBOUR                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1385 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 29, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0000350-2015

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 20, 2023

        Grant A. Barbour (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing the

petition he filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 For the

following reasons, we affirm.

        The trial court previously explained:

        On the evening of October 26, 2014[, A]ppellant’s wife, Shneek
        Walker (the Victim)], was at her mother’s home at 143 West
        Wyneva in […] Philadelphia. Appellant arrived to pick up [the
        Victim] at or about 9:30 pm. [The Victim,] who had previously
        taken Oxycodone, drove while [A]ppellant sat in the passenger
        seat. [The Victim] drove toward I-76 Eastbound when the two
        began arguing. After reaching the highway, and while arguing,
        [A]ppellant got out of the car.       After about ten minutes[,
        Appellant] returned to the car and [the Victim] drove again.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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     Once [the Victim] reached a driving speed of approximately fifty-
     five miles per hour, [A]ppellant stated that he would kill himself
     and then said, “we’re both going to die tonight.”           Quickly
     thereafter, [A]ppellant reached over and grabbed the steering
     wheel “and yank[ed] it toward the left.” The car struck the center-
     dividing wall and flipped over twice. EMS removed [the Victim]
     from the car and transported her and [A]ppellant to the hospital.

     Appellant repeatedly apologized and told [the Victim] to “just tell
     everybody that [she] lost control of the car.”

     State Trooper Michelle Naab, … responded to the scene of the
     accident at or about 10:00 pm. Appellant was out of the car and
     walking. Appellant told Trooper Naab he had been asleep at the
     time of the crash. After the vehicle was towed, Trooper Naab …
     went to HUP (University of Pennsylvania Hospital) to conduct
     interviews. Trooper Naab spoke with [A]ppellant first, as [the
     Victim] was not in stable condition until several hours later.
     Trooper Naab took statements from [the Victim] at 3:00 [a.m.]
     immediately following the accident on October 27, 2014, and
     again on October 29, 201[4].

     [The Victim] was hospitalized from October 26, 2014 until
     November 14, 2014. [The Victim’s] injuries included a broken
     fibula, punctured spleen, crushed ribs, fracture of her thoracic
     spine, and four plates and sixteen screws in her ankle. [The
     Victim] was transferred from trauma to the ICU where she
     underwent two surgeries. [The Victim] was discharged to rehab
     and required another surgery to remove the screws and plates
     from her ankle.

     Upon his release from the hospital on October 27, 2014, the
     morning following the accident, [A]ppellant was placed under
     arrest. [The Commonwealth charged Appellant with attempted
     murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, terroristic threats,
     recklessly endangering another person, and possession of an
     instrument of crime. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1),
     2701(a), 2706(a), 2705, and 907(a).]

     While he was in custody awaiting trial, [A]ppellant made repeated
     phone calls to [the Victim] while she was in the hospital and
     continued once she was discharged. Eight of the call recordings
     were played [at Appellant’s non-jury] trial, following proper
     authentication, without objection.

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Trial Court Opinion, 10/10/19, at 1-3 (record citations and footnotes omitted).

      At trial, the Victim recanted her statements to police; she instead

claimed she lost control of the car and accidentally caused the crash. N.T.,

5/20/16, at 12-16.    The Commonwealth impeached the Victim’s testimony

using her prior inconsistent statements to police and her testimony at the

preliminary hearing. Id. at 17-35. The Commonwealth also played recorded

telephone calls in which Appellant tried to convince the Victim to either recant

or not appear at trial, while the Victim reiterated that Appellant had tried to

kill her. Id. at 35-48.

      This Court explained:

      [T]he trial court convicted [A]ppellant of the [ ] crimes. On July
      18, 2016, the trial court imposed [a] sentence [of 18½ - 40 years
      in prison]. Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence,
      which the trial court denied on July 26, 2016.

             Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On August 2, 2018,
      this [C]ourt dismissed [A]ppellant’s appeal for failure to file a
      brief. Commonwealth v. Barbour, No. 2785 EDA 2016, per
      curiam order (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 2, 2018). On September 7,
      2018, [A]ppellant filed a [PCRA] petition … seeking reinstatement
      of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court reinstated
      [A]ppellant’s direct appellate rights nunc pro tunc on October 23,
      2018. This [C]ourt quashed [A]ppellant’s appeal sua sponte on
      July 12, 2019 for failing to file a timely notice of appeal.
      Commonwealth v. Barbour, No. 3586 EDA 2018, per curiam
      order (Pa. Super. filed July 12, 2019).

             Appellant filed a PCRA petition on August 30, 2019, in which
      he sought reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc.
      The trial court granted [A]ppellant’s petition … and [A]ppellant
      filed a notice of appeal that same day.

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Commonwealth v. Barbour, 239 A.3d 88 (Pa. Super. July 22, 2020)

(unpublished memorandum at 1-2) (footnote omitted, some parentheticals

added).

      This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. See Barbour,

239 A.3d 88 (unpublished memorandum at 1). Appellant did not seek leave

to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.        Appellant pro se filed the

instant PCRA petition on September 1, 2020. The PCRA court appointed Jules

Szanto, Esquire (PCRA Counsel), to represent Appellant. PCRA Counsel filed

an amended PCRA petition on September 30, 2021, contending, among other

claims, that Attorney Carl Reginald Johnson (Trial Counsel), was ineffective.

Amended PCRA Petition, 9/30/21, at 7-8. Thereafter, the PCRA court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA petition. Despite being

represented, Appellant filed a pro se response. On April 29, 2022, the PCRA

court dismissed the petition. On May 17, 2022, Attorney James Lloyd, III

(Attorney Lloyd), entered his appearance and filed the instant appeal on

Appellant’s behalf.

      Appellant raises the following issues:

      [1] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied [A]ppellant’s PCRA
      petition where [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to:

            a. Review prior to trial, and utilize at trial, recorded
               telephone calls in which the [Victim] admitted
               [A]ppellant is not guilty of the crimes at issue;

            b. Call a witness who was a party to the recorded
               phone calls to testify that [the Victim] admitted
               [A]ppellant is not guilty of the crimes at issue; or,

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            b. Cross-examine [the Victim] regarding her motive
               to fabricate the allegations against [A]ppellant in
               order to avoid a mandatory prison sentence
               including, inter alia, her drug use prior to the
               vehicle crash at issue, her prior no contest plea to
               DUI, and her knowledge that a DUI conviction for
               this   incident   would    result   in   mandatory
               incarceration?

      [2] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied [A]ppellant’s PCRA
      petition where [A]ppellant’s conviction is the result of the
      unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has
      subsequently become available and would have changed the
      outcome of the trial if it had been introduced, namely, testimony
      from [the Victim] and three other individuals which indicates that
      [the Victim] admitted after trial that she was under the influence
      of [Phencyclidine (PCP)] at the time of the accident, lied in order
      to avoid being arrested for a second DUI offense, and falsely
      blamed [A]ppellant for causing the accident because she was
      angry at him?

      [3] Did the PCRA [c]ourt err when it denied [A]ppellant’s PCRA
      petition where [T]rial [C]ounsel and/or PCRA [C]ounsel was
      ineffective for failing to:

            a. Obtain [the Victim’s] toxicology report from the
               hospital following the alleged crimes; or,

            b. Obtain recorded telephone calls occurring after
               sentencing in which [the Victim] admitted
               [A]ppellant is not guilty of the crimes at issue?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

      We review the PCRA court’s denial of relief by “examining whether the

PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of

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the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

     [T]he PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without
     a hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine
     issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
     to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
     would be served by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
     909(B)(2). “[T]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
     dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
     he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
     would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
     abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” Commonwealth v.
     D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).

     Appellant argues Trial Counsel and PCRA Counsel were ineffective. As

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

     [C]ounsel is presumed to have been effective and the petitioner
     bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.
     Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (Pa. 2007). To
     overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1)
     the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel
     did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or omission; and
     (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
     deficient performance, “that is, a reasonable probability that but
     for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would
     have been different.” Id. A PCRA petitioner must address each
     of these prongs on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Natividad,
     938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that “appellants
     continue to bear the burden of pleading and proving each of the
     Pierce elements on appeal to this Court”). A petitioner’s failure
     to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the claim. Cooper, 941
     A.2d at 664.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations

modified).   “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a

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baseless or meritless claim.”   Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035,

1042 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      In his first issue, Appellant contends Trial Counsel was ineffective for

failing “to utilize recorded telephone calls in which [the Victim] admitted that

Appellant is not guilty of the crimes charged.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. He

further argues Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness who

overhead the Victim admit Appellant was innocent, and for failing to cross-

examine the Victim about her motive to falsely implicate him. Id. at 33, 39.

      The Commonwealth counters that playing the phone calls would not

have changed the trial’s outcome. The Commonwealth states that because

the calls occurred after the phone calls the Commonwealth played at trial, the

trial court “properly gave more credence to the statements the Victim made

within the first few days of the crash[.]” Commonwealth Brief at 9; see also

id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth disputes Appellant’s contention that Trial

Counsel should have called a witness who allegedly overheard the Victim

recant, alleging the testimony “would fall into the same category as other later

statements made after [Appellant] had convinced [the Victim] to change her

story.” Id. at 12; see id. at 11-12. Further, the Commonwealth claims Trial

Counsel had a reasonable strategy for not cross-examining the Victim about

her motives to lie about the incident. Id. at 13.

      In rejecting Appellant’s argument, the PCRA court explained:

      Trial counsel’s strategy of not calling these witnesses [was] not
      ineffective, because the evidence was merely cumulative.

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      Moreover, the trial court established that [Appellant] constantly
      harassed the [V]ictim, attempted to bribe her, and instructed her
      to hide from the police to avoid appearing at court.         N.T.
      45:10,95:24-25,96:6-18; 97:1-8 (May 20, 2016). This shows
      that he attempted to influence her testimony or have her recant.
      N.T. 92:16-17 (May 20, 2016).

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 7 (unnumbered).

      The record supports the PCRA court’s rationale. The trial court, sitting

as factfinder: (a) discounted evidence of the Victim’s recantation; (b) credited

the Victim’s statements and testimony about Appellant’s culpability; and (c)

credited evidence that Appellant pressured the Victim to recant. Appellant

has not demonstrated that playing the telephone calls would have changed

the result. See Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144.

      Appellant’s claim that Trial Counsel should have called the witness who

had overhead the Victim recant also fails.        Again, this testimony was

cumulative. “[T]rial counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to call a

witness whose testimony would be cumulative.” Commonwealth v. Gibson,

951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (Pa. 2008).         The trial court rejected the Victim’s

recantation, and Appellant has not demonstrated that the witness’s testimony

would have changed the result. See Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144.

      Appellant further claims Trial Counsel was ineffective for not cross-

examining the Victim about her motive to lie due to her fear of being

prosecuted for DUI. Appellant’s Brief at 39. The Victim testified that she lied

to police and at the preliminary hearing because she was angry at Appellant.

N.T., 5/20/16, at 14-16. She also testified she was driving under the influence

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at the time of the incident. Id. at 15, 56-67. Under these circumstances, we

agree that it was reasonable for trial counsel to not question the Victim further,

because she was testifying favorably to Appellant. See Commonwealth v.

Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 451 (Pa. 2011) (holding trial counsel was not

ineffective for failing to impeach a prosecution witness about his prior criminal

record, where witness recanted his earlier statements to police and testified

favorably to defendant).

      In his second issue, Appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial based

on after-discovered evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 44-52. Appellant contends

he obtained signed statements from the Victim in 2017 and 2021 in she which

recanted her statements to police and her preliminary hearing testimony. Id.

at 44-45.   Appellant also claims to have obtained signed statements from

Tyreese Barber, Gloria King, and Danita Bates claiming the Victim told them

she had lied to police; that Appellant did not try to kill her; and she was under

the influence of PCP during the incident. Id. at 46-47.

      The law is well-settled:

      The four-prong test for awarding a new trial because of after-
      discovered evidence is well settled. The evidence: (1) could not
      have been obtained prior to trial by exercising reasonable
      diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will
      not be used solely to impeach a witness’s credibility; and (4)
      would likely result in a different verdict. See Commonwealth v.
      Pagan, [ ] 950 A.2d 270, 292 ([Pa.] 2008) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 821 n.7 (Pa. 2014). In determining

“whether the alleged after-discovered evidence is of such nature and character

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that it would likely compel a different verdict if a new trial is granted ... a court

should consider the integrity of the alleged after-discovered evidence, the

motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall strength of the evidence

supporting the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365

(Pa. Super. 2010). Also, “the proposed new evidence must be producible and

admissible.” Castro, 93 A.3d at 825. It is the petitioner’s burden to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that he met each of the factors necessary

for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      Here, the PCRA court rejected Appellant’s after-discovered evidence

claim because the “evidence and that testimony was known during the trial

and initial appeal … and cannot be admitted as newly discovered evidence.”

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 9. We agree.

      The Victim testified that her original statements to police and

preliminary hearing testimony were not true, and she was intoxicated at the

time of the incident.    N.T., 5/20/16, at 12-16, 56-57.        Thus, the Victim’s

affidavit affirming her trial testimony does not constitute after-discovered

evidence. Castro, supra. Further, affidavits from third parties avowing that

the Victim repeated this information are cumulative and do not constitute

after-discovered evidence. Id.

      In his third issue, Appellant claims PCRA Counsel was ineffective for

“failing to obtain then utilize, recorded prison calls in which [the Victim]

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admitted [A]ppellant was not guilty of the crimes[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 52.

Appellant further argues PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to “obtain

and utilize [the Victim’s] toxicology report.” Id. at 63.

      In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme

Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and

after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel's

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at

401. Because this is Appellant’s first PCRA petition, and he presents this claim

at the first opportunity following PCRA Counsel’s withdrawal and Attorney

Lloyd’s entry of appearance, Bradley applies.

      “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is

required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the

three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of representation.”

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022).

      In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical
      inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts
      was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of
      counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel
      cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying
      issue.

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      While Appellant asserts a “layered claim of ineffectiveness,” see

Appellant’s Brief at 5, 52, he argues PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing

to utilize “the statement made by [the Victim] in the recorded phone calls …

to support the claims that new evidence became available which, if presented

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at the trial, would more likely than not have resulted in a different outcome.”

Id. at 54.   Appellant makes this same claim with respect to the Victim’s

toxicology report, i.e., PCRA Counsel should have obtained it “to support a

claim that new evidence was available[.]” Id. at 63.

      As discussed above, PCRA Counsel claimed Trial Counsel was ineffective

for not utilizing prison phone calls in which the Victim recanted her statements

to police. Since those phone calls were known at the time of trial, they cannot

constitute after-discovered evidence and PCRA Counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective. Castro, 93 A.3d at 821 n.7. To the extent Appellant refers to

phone calls which occurred after trial, they would not have bolstered his claim

of after-discovered evidence, because, like the aforementioned affidavits, they

were cumulative. See id.

      Appellant also maintains PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to

obtain the Victim’s toxicology report. Appellant’s Brief at 63. Appellant has

not identified the report or shown that it exists. Appellant claims the Victim

told him her “medical records reflect the presence of PCP in her system[.]”

Id.   However, Appellant’s amended PCRA petition states, “all medical

records were passed to Trial Counsel through mandatory discovery and were

made part of the trial record through a stipulation by Trial Counsel and the

Assistant District Attorney[.]”    Amended PCRA Petition, 9/30/21, at 10

(emphasis added). Even if there is a report indicating the Victim was under

the influence of PCP, Appellant has not demonstrated how it would support his

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after-discovered evidence claim. It is undisputed that the Victim had ingested

drugs.2 N.T., 5/20/16, at 15, 56-67. Thus, the report would not qualify as

after-discovered evidence. Castro, supra.

        In sum, Appellant’s claims do not merit relief. Accordingly, we affirm

the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

        Order affirmed.

        P.J.E. Stevens joins the memorandum.

        Judge Nichols did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/20/2023

____________________________________________

2 Appellant does not explain the relevance of whether the Victim was under
the influence of Oxycodone or PCP. See Appellant’s Brief at 39. At trial,
Appellant sought to prove the Victim lied to police because she was afraid of
being charged with a DUI and going to prison; the substance the Victim
ingested was not at issue.

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