Court Opinion

ID: 9962581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:13:46.271116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:09.373085
License: Public Domain

J-A24015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CARL WHITE                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 161 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 6, 2023
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0001136-2015

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED APRIL 23, 2024

       Appellant, Carl White, appeals pro se from the January 6, 2023 order of

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (PCRA court), which denied

his second petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm the order denying relief.

       The underlying facts are not at issue in this instant appeal.1 The PCRA

court summarized the procedural history as follows:

       On February 16, 2016, [Appellant] pled guilty to one count each
       of third-degree murder, carrying a firearm on a public street in
       Philadelphia, carrying a firearm by a prohibited person
       (collectively, the “VUFA” charges), and possessing an instrument
       of crime (“PIC”). That day, [the trial court] imposed an aggregate

____________________________________________

1 For further detail, see our decision issued in connection with Appellant’s
previous appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v.
White, No. 3843 EDA 2017, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June
6, 2019).
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       sentence of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration. . . . [Appellant] did not
       file any post sentence [motions] or a direct appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/30/23, at 1 (citations omitted).

       Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on July 19, 2016, which the PCRA

court denied on October 20, 2017, after appointment of counsel. We affirmed

the PCRA court order on June 6, 2019. See Commonwealth v. White, No.

3843 EDA 2017, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 6, 2019).

       On February 10, 2020, Appellant, through counsel, filed the underlying

PCRA petition, his second.2 After amending/supplementing the petition twice,

the PCRA court denied relief on January 6, 2023, without holding a hearing.

The instant appeal followed.

       We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
       light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
       Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
       2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
       the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
       ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
       error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
       grounds if the record supports it. Id. We grant great deference
       to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
       findings unless they have no support in the record.
       Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011).
       However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.
       Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011);
       Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
       Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
       of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
       Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

____________________________________________

2 Appellant was counseled throughout the second PCRA proceedings.

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Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

         All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).3              “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,

522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (overruled on

other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)). As

timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of Appellant’s underlying

claims,     we   first   determine     whether   this   PCRA   petition     is   timely

filed.    Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008)

(consideration of Brady claim separate from consideration of its timeliness).

If it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the

petition. Id.

         On appeal, Appellant argues that the claims raised in his PCRA petition

are based on “newly discovered evidence” that was not disclosed to the

____________________________________________

3 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of
the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

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defense due to governmental interference and/or in violation of Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Appellant then

proceeds to discuss how his claims met the requirements of the after-

discovered evidence ground for PCRA relief, never discussing the timeliness of

the underlying petition, despite it being facially untimely.

       Appellant commits a fundamental error in not recognizing that the

jurisdictional timeliness requirements to assert an after-discovered evidence

claim under the PCRA are different from the criteria to succeed on such a

claim. Appellant erroneously argues that the underlying petition was timely

under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) because it met the requirements for after-

discovered evidence set forth in Section 9543(a)(2).4

       To reiterate, the newly-discovered facts exception to the time
       limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii),
       is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief
       delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). To qualify for an exception
       to the PCRA’s time limitations under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), a
       petitioner need only establish that the facts upon which the claim
____________________________________________

4 In the underlying PCRA petition, Appellant stated his claims as follows:

       The instant claims are brought pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
       §9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii). They are based on 'newly discovered
       evidence' and evidence not previously disclosed by the
       Commonwealth due to governmental interference. In order to
       obtain relief based upon newly discovered evidence, the Petitioner
       must prove that (1) the evidence could not have been obtained at
       or prior to when it was through reasonable diligence; (2) the
       evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to
       impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different
       verdict.

PCRA petition, 2/10/20, at 4 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).

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      is based were unknown to him and could not have been
      ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. However, where a
      petition is otherwise timely, to prevail on an after-discovered
      evidence claim for relief under subsection 9543(a)(2)(vi), a
      petitioner must prove that (1) the exculpatory evidence has been
      discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or prior
      to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not
      cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility;
      and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict.
      Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 856 A.2d 806, 823
      (2004); see [Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227–28
      (Pa. 2016) (“Once jurisdiction has been properly invoked (by
      establishing either that the petition was filed within one year of
      the date judgment became final or by establishing one of the three
      exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar), the relevant inquiry becomes
      whether the claim is cognizable under [Section 9543] of the
      PCRA.”).

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

      Thus, in light of the foregoing, before we can entertain whether

Appellant   meets   the   requirements     for   PCRA   relief   (here,   Section

9543(a)(2)(vi)), we must determine whether the underlying petition is timely.

      It is undisputed that the underlying petition is facially untimely. The

record shows that, on February 16, 2016, Appellant entered a negotiated

guilty plea to third-degree murder, two of the VUFA charges, and PIC, for an

aggregate term of thirty to sixty years of imprisonment. The trial court

accepted the plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Appellant did not

file a direct appeal. Appellant’s sentence, therefore, for purposes of the PCRA,

became final at the expiration of the time to file a direct appeal, i.e., March

17, 2016. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final at

conclusion of direct review or at expiration of time for seeking that review).

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Thus, a PCRA petition must have been filed by March 17, 2017, to be

considered timely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The underlying petition

was filed on February 10, 2020, almost 3 years after the expiration of the time

period for filing a timely PCRA petition.

      As noted above, a petitioner can overcome the one-year time bar if

he/she pleads and proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that one of

the three exceptions was met. Failure to plead and prove the applicability of

one of the exceptions precludes us from entertaining the merits of the petition,

and results in a denial of PCRA relief.

      While Appellant engaged in an extensive analysis of the merits of the

claim in his PCRA petition and appellate brief, he failed initially to allege and

prove that his facially untimely PCRA petition met one of the time-bar

exceptions. Specifically, Appellant failed to allege, nonetheless establish, that

the proffered after-discovered evidence was unknown to him and could not

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 177 (Pa. Super. 2015) (appellant’s

reliance on Section 9543 as a basis for asserting an after-discovered evidence

claim under the PCRA did not suspend appellant’s initial obligation to establish

jurisdiction by alleging and proving (a) the existence of facts that were

unknown to him and (b) his exercise of due diligence in discovering those

facts, under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)); see also Burton, 158 A.3d at

629 (and cases cited therein). In proceeding to a merits analysis, it appears

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both the Commonwealth5 and the PCRA court6 likewise erroneously assumed

or accepted that the petition met the jurisdictional timeliness requirements

under the PCRA.

       Consequently, as the present petition is facially untimely and Appellant

failed to plead and prove any exception to the timeliness requirements of the

PCRA, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the petition.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999). Because

neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits

of claims raised in this untimely PCRA petition, the petition must be dismissed.

____________________________________________

5 In its brief, the Commonwealth states that it agrees the affidavit by Dennis

Perkins satisfies the newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time
provisions. Commonwealth Brief at p. 2. This statement is made without any
discussion of when Appellant discovered this evidence and whether it was
discovered through due diligence. Like Appellant, the Commonwealth errs in
omitting timeliness first before a merits analysis of newly-discovered
evidence.

6 In a footnote to its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court stated: “While the

[underlying PCRA petition] was untimely filed, the parties agreed that the
newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar was applicable to all
of [Appellant]’s claims, and therefore, the [PCRA court] had jurisdiction to
address them.” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/30/23, at 3, n.1. To the contrary, “[i]n
the PCRA context, statutory jurisdiction cannot be conferred by silence,
agreement, or neglect.” Commonwealth v. Powell, 2021 WL 4787099,
unpublished memorandum, at *4 (Pa. Super October 14, 2021) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50, 54 (Pa. Super. 2000)). The
PCRA court first had to establish jurisdiction before proceeding to a merits
analysis of the proffered after-discovered evidence, despite an apparent
agreement between the parties.

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     Even if we were to address the merits of Appellant’s after-discovered

evidence claims, we would find them to be without merit.        Despite its

procedural flaw, the PCRA court, in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion,

properly found and concluded that Appellant’s second petition was without

merit. Accordingly, were we to proceed to a merits analysis we would affirm

on the basis of the PCRA’s opinion. We therefore direct that a copy of that

opinion be attached to this memorandum and to all future pleadings that

reference this memorandum.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 4/23/2024

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