Court Opinion

ID: 991060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:31:00.81071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:52.703381
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                        No. 96-4019

RODNEY KEITH INGRAM,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-95-171)

Submitted: October 29, 1996

Decided: December 17, 1996

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Carlton M. Mansfield, CHAVIS & RANSOM, Lumberton, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney,
Richard S. Glaser, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rodney Keith Ingram pled guilty to one count of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. He appeals the denial of his motion
to suppress the cocaine recovered from his automobile. We affirm.

All warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967) (footnote omitted). One such exception is a search incident to
a lawful arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court held
that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of
that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id.
at 460 (footnotes omitted).

Ingram contends that he was no longer an occupant of the vehicle
at the time of his arrest, and therefore Deputy Webster had no author-
ity under Belton to search the passenger compartment of his parked
and locked vehicle. This argument lacks merit, however, because we
have held that a police officer may search the passenger area of a
vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of its occupant, even when the
occupant has already been removed from the car and is under the con-
trol of the police. United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995)
(No. 95-5231); see, e.g., United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971-
72 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989).

Here, Deputy Webster followed Ingram for a mile with his blue
police lights flashing. Webster was right behind Ingram as Ingram
turned into his driveway and parked his Mazda. Ingram sat momen-
tarily in his car as the deputy stepped out of his vehicle. Ingram then

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hastily stepped out of his car and locked the door before ordered to
do so by the deputy. The two met at the rear bumper of the Mazda,
where Webster arrested Ingram for driving without a license. The
deputy then secured Ingram in his police vehicle before searching the
Mazda and recovering cocaine from its console.

Webster thus initiated contact with Ingram while he was an occu-
pant of the vehicle and so was justified in searching the passenger
compartment under Belton. Ingram's voluntary separation from the
vehicle after that contact was initiated does not alter the analysis. See
United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1992).

Finally, the cases Ingram cites do not support his position. In those
cases, vehicle searches incident to arrest were found unjustified when
the police did not initiate contact with the suspects while they occu-
pied the vehicle in question. See United States v. Adams, 26 F.3d 702,
704 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Strahan , 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir.),
certified question dismissed, 489 U.S. 1002, aff'd, 881 F.2d 1088
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989). Such was not the case
here. Although in Fafowora DEA agents pursued the suspects in the
automobile that the agents ultimately searched, the opinion is not
clear whether this pursuit immediately preceded the arrest. However,
the opinion does state that at the time the police"came upon the
arrestees" they were outside the vehicle. Id. In contrast, Deputy Web-
ster came upon Ingram while he was still an occupant of the vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Ingram's
motion to suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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