Court Opinion

ID: 9483332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:17:44.633475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:34.119077
License: Public Domain

CONWAY, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s analysis regarding the validity of the initial stop and non-consensual nature of the search of the bag carried by the defendant. However, I would affirm the lower court’s denial of the motion to suppress for lack of standing given the circumstances of this case. Specifically, I am troubled by the notion that society would deem objectively reasonable a bailee’s subjective expectation of privacy in a bag containing contraband which he claims to have received from a virtual stranger and with no personal knowledge of its contents.
We have said that “[t]o decide whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, we consider concepts of real or personal property law, bearing in mind that ‘arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control.’ ” U.S. v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1318, 113 L.Ed.2d 251 (1991) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). In my view the majority relies exclusively on the “bailment” law peculiarities to stretch the reasonableness of privacy expectations of a bailee to “unknown” limits.
I agree that luggage is “a common repository for one’s personal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (emphasis added). In the absence of knowledgeable connection with the contents of the container, however, any proposed association with privacy seems remote and abstract. When one has placed none of his own “personal effects” within the luggage and its contents include unlawfully possessed controlled substances, an expectation of privacy appears neither inevitable nor warranted.
The majority states that “a Fourth Amendment violation does not automatical*830ly result from the illegal seizure of property from a person ... who has legal possession.” Majority Op. at 827. Yet, it is precisely a bailee’s right to exclude others which apparently triggers a reasonable expectation of privacy in the majority's view. In essence the majority holds that “lawful possession carries with it the legitimate expectation of privacy.” Majority Opinion at 828. Such an “automatic” result renders as surplusage the Supreme Court’s hedging statement that “one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.” See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430-31 n. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court advises that “in determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, [cite omitted], property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court’s inquiry.” See U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). I believe that for the majority, property rights were both the beginning and end of its analysis. In the rush to align ourselves with results reached by other courts, we should not blind ourselves to the heart of the privacy interests our Constitution preserves. The application of the exclusionary rule to this case trivializes genuine privacy expectations worthy of society’s protection against unjustifiable governmental intrusion. This case presents a situation where neither ownership nor lawful possession should be determinative or dispositive of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
I would affirm the trial court and uphold the conviction.