Court Opinion

ID: 9852538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:32:29.821456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:29.324867
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority misinterprets Superwood. Superwood allows recovery of economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions “involving personal injury or damage to other property.” The majority reads this language to prevent recovery of those types of damages, even in cases involving “sudden and calamitous events.” Such a holding puts Minnesota very much in the minority. Super-wood never intended such a result.
Superwood should be interpreted to allow recovery for certain “accident-type” injuries. For example, in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Texas 1978), the Texas Supreme Court adopted and applied the following reasoning of Dean Page Keeton:
A distinction should be made between the type of “dangerous condition” that causes damage only to the product itself and the type that is dangerous to other property or persons. A hazardous product that has harmed something or someone can be labeled as part of the accident problem; tort law seeks to protect against this type of harm through allocation of risk. In contrast, a damaging event that harms only the product should be treated as irrelevant to policy considerations directing liability placement in tort. Consequently, if a defect causes damage limited solely to the property, recovery should be available, if at all, on a contract-warranty theory.
Id. at 312 (quoting Keeton, Annual Survey of Texas Law, Part I: Private Law: Torts, 32 Sw.L.J. 1, 5 (1978)). The reasoning of the Texas court indicates that its *436requirement that there be damage to other property or personal injury is simply a shorthand way of determining whether a defect is part of the “accident problem” against which tort law seeks to protect.
Most courts resolve the conflict between tort and contract law by distinguishing between “qualitative defects” and those defects which result from a “sudden and calamitous occurrence.” This distinction, essentially based upon the type of occurrence caused by the defect, was first recognized in Seely v. White Motor Company, 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), from which the Superwood rule was derived. For most courts adopting Seely, the line drawn between contract and tort damages for purposes of recovering for damage to the product itself typically falls between damage resulting merely from deterioration, internal breakage, depreciation, or failure to live up to the expectation and damage which is sudden and calamitous, resulting from a violent or hazardous accident.
Superwood was intended to be interpreted utilizing this theory. In fact, we recognized the merit of allowing recovery based primarily upon the type of accident in Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn.1984), by stating:
We need not determine here whether such damages, under certain circumstances not here existing, will ever be recoverable in tort. In passing, we note that other courts have focused not on whether damage has occurred to “other property,” but instead on the nature of the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred. * * * Where the damage results from deterioration, internal breakage, depreciation, or failure to live up to expectation, these courts would allow recovery only on a contract or warranty theory. Where the damage results from hazardous conditions or a sudden and calamitous occurrence, however, these courts would allow recovery under a tort theory. Their rationale for this distinction is that tort law imposes a duty on manufacturers to produce safe products, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property, or the product itself. * * * Contract or warranty law, on the other hand, has been traditionally concerned with redress of a purchaser’s disappointed expectations.
354 N.W.2d at 821 (citations omitted).
The question certified to us asks whether “economic losses” arising from the crash of the helicopter can be recovered under strict liability or negligence. I would answer the certified question in the affirmative. A reading of Superwood allowing Groves to recover for damage to the helicopter itself in this case is consistent with the clear majority view, as well as with our previous statement in Society of Fine Arts. Groves should also be allowed to recover for lost profits and loss of use damages resulting from the damage to the helicopter. Such losses resulted from a “sudden and catastrophic occurrence” — a tortious event— and thus should also be compensable in tort.