Court Opinion

ID: 9598006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:23.930522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:40.321879
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
This Court is bound by the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions which were enacted for the purposes of establishing its jurisdiction and limiting its power. Thus, it should not be consid*581ered a novel proposition that “[t]he provisions of the law respecting the procedure to be followed in perfecting appeals to this [C]ourt are jurisdictional, and unless this [C]ourt has jurisdiction of a case, it is without power, or authority to render a judgment upon review.” Spivey v. Nalley, 212 Ga. 810 (96 SE2d 260) (1957). Because the exercise of jurisdiction over this case is contrary to that controlling principle and is based upon nothing other than the majority’s own subjective determination that it is somehow appropriate for it to rule on the merits, I dissent.
At issue in this currently pending habeas corpus proceeding is a discovery order. In this connection, we must bear in mind that “habeas corpus is not a criminal proceeding, but is considered to be civil in nature. [Cits.]” Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 857 (1) (513 SE2d 186) (1999). The only jurisdictional question which the parties were asked to address is whether that non-final ruling is directly appealable as a. collateral order. The Court correctly answers that question in the negative. However, the majority then proceeds to hold that the Court nevertheless has jurisdiction over this case because it will deem it to be a valid “interlocutory” appeal, even though there was absolutely no compliance with the requirement of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) that the trial court certify its discovery order for immediate review.
The majority does not cite either controlling or persuasive authority for its unprecedented holding. I submit that there is no such authority because in this case, the absence of jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 is undisputed. Compare In re Board of Twiggs County Commissioners, 249 Ga. 642 (1) (292 SE2d 673) (1982). Heretofore, certification by the trial court has always been considered a necessary and indispensable prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction over a civil case involving an interlocutory discovery order. See Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, 226 Ga. App. 77 (485 SE2d 525) (1997). Compare Isaacs v. State, 257 Ga. 798 (364 SE2d 567) (1988) (denial of plea in abatement and motion for acquittal in a criminal case addressed under the collateral order exception). In Scruggs v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 589 (1) (408 SE2d 103) (1991), we unambiguously held that
the certificate of immediate review is not “surplusage.” [Cit.] The certificate is an essential component of a trial court’s power to control litigation. Therefore, a party seeking appellate review from an interlocutory order must follow the interlocutory-application subsection, OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), seek a certificate of immediate review from the trial court, and comply with the time limitations therein.
*582The majority does not even attempt to distinguish Scruggs. Instead, it summarily discounts the established procedure as a “defect in the interlocutory review process” and posits that the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is consistent with certain American Bar Association Standards. In my opinion, a duly enacted statute of our General Assembly does not constitute and cannot be considered to be a “defect” which this Court or any court is at liberty to ignore because it prefers the pronouncements from a source which it perceives to be more enlightened. Instead, I strongly believe that the judiciary must comply with those legislative enactments, rather than embrace the recommendations made by some non-binding extraneous entity. Our General Assembly, not the American Bar Association, determines the manner in which an order entered in a Georgia trial court is appealable. “[T]he right of appeal is not absolute, but is one based upon the conditions imposed by the General Assembly for bringing cases to the appellate courts.” Fife v. Johnston, 225 Ga. 447 (169 SE2d 167) (1969). The legislative branch of government in any jurisdiction may or may not consider and adopt the American Bar Association Standards cited by the majority. However, unless and until the Georgia General Assembly enacts those recommendations as the law of this state, they are completely irrelevant to a determination of this Court’s authority to hear a particular case.
The majority predicates its exercise of jurisdiction upon the concept of inherent power. However, “ ‘[t]he very conception of inherent power carries with it the implication that its use is for occasions not provided for by established methods ....’” McCorkle v. Judges of Superior Court of Chatham County, 260 Ga. 315, 317, fn. 1 (392 SE2d 707) (1990) (Hunt, J., concurring). Certainly then this is not an appropriate case for the exercise of inherent power, because there is an “established method” for appealing the interlocutory discovery order, and there has been no compliance with the prescribed procedure. No court is at liberty “to ignore jurisdictional and procedural statutes and rules, and to change its role from disinterested decision-maker to appellate advocate reviewing a trial record for error.” Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 874 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). However, that is exactly what has been done in this case. According to the concept of inherent judicial power adopted today, either this Court or the Court of Appeals is now authorized to ignore clear statutory limits on its jurisdiction in any case simply because a majority of its members has a subjective disagreement with the propriety of those limitations as applied to that case. In my opinion, this constitutes blatant judicial usurpation of the legislative function, and cannot be considered to be the legitimate exercise of inherent judicial authority. “The Legislature, being the sovereign power in the State, while acting within the pale of its constitutional competency, it is the province of the *583Courts to interpret its mandates, and their duty to obey them, however absurd and unreasonable they may appear.” Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194 (2) (1848).
Decided June 12, 2000
Reconsideration denied July 7, 2000.
Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Lawrence J. Fox, David J. Kessler, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Patricia B. Burton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Timothy P. Terrell, Jack L. Sammons, Jr., L. Ray Patterson, Roy M. Sobelson, amici curiae.
Although the General Assembly has determined that the trial courts of this state are to play an important, integral and indispensable function in the appeal of any interlocutory order, it is now apparent that a majority of this Court, by employing the pretext of exercising its inherent power, will ignore the legislative mandate and henceforth will dispense with the lower court’s input in any and every case which, in its unbridled discretion, it wishes to review. I dissent because I have consistently subscribed to the principle that the judiciary should lead by example and, thus, that this Court must faithfully adhere to the constitutional and statutory provisions which apply to it to the same extent that it ensures the just enforcement of such of those provisions that are applicable to others. Because we have no jurisdiction over this case, this Court cannot, the majority should not and I will not reach the merits.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.