Court Opinion

ID: 9942882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 23:01:47.181969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:51.655710
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
           C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40326
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                       Joel T. BICKFORD
         Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                     Decided 14 February 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Christopher S. James (pretrial motions and arraign-
ment); Dayle P. Percle.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 14 April 2022 by GCM convened at Joint
Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey. Sentence entered by mili-
tary judge on 24 May 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 18
months, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Samantha P. Golseth, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Major Olivia
B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, GRUEN, and KEARLEY, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge KEARLEY delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge ANNEXSTAD and Judge GRUEN joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
                    United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

KEARLEY, Judge:
    At a general court-martial, Appellant entered mixed pleas to two specifica-
tions. A military judge convicted Appellant, consistent with his pleas, of one
specification of possession of child pornography in violation of Article 134, Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934.1 Contrary to Appel-
lant’s pleas, a panel of officer and enlisted members found Appellant guilty of
one specification of soliciting the distribution of child pornography in violation
of Article 82, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 882. The members sentenced Appellant to a
dishonorable discharge, confinement for 18 months, and reduction to the grade
of E-1. The convening authority took no action on the findings or sentence.
    Appellant asserts three issues,2 which we have reworded and reordered
into four issues: (1) whether the military judge erred in allowing the Govern-
ment to present irrelevant “victim impact” evidence during findings; (2)
whether trial counsel committed prosecutorial misconduct by improperly argu-
ing “victim impact” evidence during findings and sentencing arguments; (3)
whether Appellant’s conviction for soliciting the distribution of child pornogra-
phy is legally and factually sufficient because the person Appellant solicited
was not subject to the UCMJ; and (4) whether Appellant was deprived of his
constitutional right to a unanimous guilty verdict.
    As to Appellant’s third issue, this court has previously addressed the legal
and factual sufficiency where the solicited person was not subject to the UCMJ.
Therefore, Appellant’s third issue does not warrant further discussion. See
United States v. Heppermann, 82 M.J. 794, 800 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2022)
(finding solicitation to distribute child pornography in violation of Article 82,
UCMJ, was legally and factually sufficient where the solicited person was not
subject to the UCMJ), rev. denied, 83 M.J. 103 (C.A.A.F. 2022); see also United
States v. Massey, No. ACM 40017, 2023 CCA LEXIS 46, at *18 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 30 Jan. 2023) (unpub. op.) (“[T]he question is whether the solicited offense
would be punishable under the UCMJ if committed by someone subject to the
UCMJ, and not whether the solicited person him- or herself is in fact subject
to the UCMJ.” (Citing Heppermann, 82 M.J. at 799)), rev. denied, 83 M.J. 317
(C.A.A.F. 2023).

1 Unless noted otherwise, all references to the UCMJ, the Military Rules of Evidence,

and the Rules for Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2019 ed.).
2 Appellant’s first assignment of error read: “whether trial counsel elicited inadmissible

‘victim impact’ evidence during findings and argued the same during findings and sen-
tencing arguments, materially prejudicing Appellant.” We reworded this phrase into
two separate assignments of error.

                                            2
                    United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

    We have carefully considered Appellant’s fourth issue and find it does not
require discussion or warrant relief. See United States v. Anderson, 83 M.J.
291, 302 (C.A.A.F. 2023) (“[a]ppellant did not have a right to a unanimous ver-
dict at his court-martial under the Sixth Amendment[3], Fifth Amendment[4]
due process and Fifth Amendment equal protection”).
   We find no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights
and affirm the findings and the sentence.

                                  I. BACKGROUND
    During Appellant’s court-martial, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Special Agent (SA) MV testified for the Government. SA MV explained how he
came to investigate Appellant. SA MV described how he was investigating a
civilian, PB, who was using Internet accounts, email, and a profile on a photo-
sharing website to advertise and trade child pornography. During an inter-
view, PB granted SA MV access to his email account. SA MV saw an email
from Appellant asking if the offer to trade was still available and referencing
a post on a photo-sharing website in a section titled “kids.” SA MV responded
as though he was PB and told Appellant to contact him via a specific account
name, on a separate messaging application, which SA MV controlled. On that
application, SA MV exchanged several messages with Appellant. In those mes-
sages Appellant said the following:5
        [Appellant:] Hey it’s [Appellant] I emailed you the other day
        ....
        [Appellant:] I’m the one who asked if your offer to trade was still
        up, and I’m looking more specifically for any videos in English
        and the girl is enjoying it
        ....
        [Appellant:] Thanks man your awesome [thumbs up emoji] also
        if you have anything of a girl named [N16] she is a little [color of
        hair] that would be appreciated
        ....

3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

4 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

5 Unless otherwise noted, content from these messages appears without correction.

6 Out of respect and in the interest of privacy, “N1” is a pseudonym for the victim.

                                           3
                    United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

       [Appellant:] . . . I got a lot of Asian vids but I haven’t gotten an-
       ything of her. I’m pretty new to this scene
       ....
       [Appellant:] It was just easier to find, that and Russian vids but
       The stuff I want is anything in English and for me any age range
       is fine
       ....
       [Appellant:] I’ll see if if I have any pics of her so we know we’re
       talking about the same person . . .
       ....
       [Appellant:] [Sends image of N17] This her
       [SA MV:] oral? or anal? or both [smiling sunglasses emoji]
       [Appellant:] Why not both.
    After this exchange, SA MV issued a subpoena to the messaging application
for records that included Internet Protocol (IP) address logs to identify sub-
scribers for those IP addresses. The subscriber for the IP address associated to
the above message exchange was linked to Appellant’s dorm room address on
Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.
    Next, trial counsel called a special agent with the Iowa Department of Pub-
lic Safety, Division of Criminal Investigation, SA JM. SA JM testified about
her role in assisting with search warrants and discovering the victim and her
perpetrator of the N18 series of child pornography. SA JM also described how
the child’s step-uncle was the perpetrator and that he made approximately
20,000 photos and videos of N1 while she was approximately 5 to 9 years old.
SA JM described the content in this series included oral and anal sexual abuse
of N1. SA JM indicated that after N1’s step-uncle was convicted, SA JM con-
tinued to be involved in matters associated with the N1 series because other
law enforcement entities requested information from her for assistance with
their own N1 investigations.

7 Appellant sent a non-explicit image of N1 to SA MV, “so [they knew they were] talking

about the same person.”
8 We also use “N1” as a pseudonym for the series of child pornography.

                                          4
                  United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

                               II. DISCUSSION
A. Irrelevant “Victim Impact” Evidence
    Appellant claims that trial counsel elicited irrelevant, inadmissible victim
impact evidence during direct examination of SA JM. We find the military
judge did not err in admitting, with no defense objection, testimony provided
by SA JM. The evidence elicited was res gestae evidence relevant to the speci-
fication at hand, permissible in findings, and as such we do not find error in
how that testimony was used in findings.
   1. Additional Background
   During opening statements, trial counsel displayed a photo and stated,
       This is [N1]. Or at least that is what she is referred to by those
       seeking to receive and watch videos of her being sexually abused.
       In this photo [N1] is between the age of five and nine years old,
       and [N1] was abused and molested for years, and photos and
       videos of her molestation were made and posted to the Internet
       while it occurred. The man that abused and molested [N1] would
       then distribute these photos across the Internet for those who
       wanted to look at child pornography. . . . The recordings of her
       molestation are among some of the [ ] most highly demanded ev-
       idence of child pornography across the Internet. And [Appellant]
       is one of those individuals who wanted and solicited images and
       videos of her molestation.
Trial defense counsel did not object to comments made in trial counsel’s open-
ing statement.
    During the Government’s case-in-chief SA JM testified that she was famil-
iar with the series of child pornography involving N1 because she was re-
quested by the FBI to assist in the investigation. SA JM ultimately discovered
the identities of the perpetrator and N1. She confirmed that the victim was
reported to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and was
considered a “known victim.”
    Additionally, the following exchange took place during circuit trial coun-
sel’s direct examination of SA JM:
       Q. As part of the questioning of [N1’s step-uncle], did he make
       any sort of admissions to producing child pornography featuring
       the victim in the [N1] series?
       A. Yes, sir.
       ....

                                       5
                   United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

       Q. Did this individual – the step-uncle – describe for you approx-
       imately how many videos he may have made – or to law enforce-
       ment – of her sexual exploitation?
       A. He said that he made approximately 20,000 photos and videos
       of the victim.
       Q. And how old was the victim during the time of the abuse?
       A. She was approximately between the ages of five and nine
       years old when the abuse happened.
       Q. I’m not asking you to describe anything specific in any of the
       videos, but generally speaking, what sort of sexual content was
       produced as part of this known series of child pornography?[9]
       A. There was oral sexual abuse and anal sexual abuse.
       ....
       Q. Now, during this 2-to-3-year time period when you became
       the primary point of contact for this particular series, could you
       just give us an approximation of how frequently you get requests
       for this particular series?
       A. I suppose it would be on average 2 to 3 emails a week, some-
       times more.
       [Civilian Defense Counsel (Civ DC)]: Objection, Your Honor. I
       think we’re getting a little – – relevance.
       [Military Judge (MJ)]: Sustained. Trial counsel, you can move
       on.
       [Circuit Trial Counsel (CTC)]: Your Honor, may I just be heard
       briefly?
       MJ: No. I sustained the objection.
       [CTC]. Based on your continuing involvement in this case, is it
       your understanding this is a widely trafficked series of child por-
       nography on the Internet?
       A. Yes, sir.
(Emphasis added).

9 Later, SA JM testified that “a known series of child pornography” includes a victim

that is known by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and law en-
forcement.

                                         6
                   United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

   SA JM confirmed that the photo Appellant provided to SA MV when re-
questing photos of N1 was indeed a photo of the victim in the N1 series of child
pornography. The above objection was the only objection to SA JM’s testimony.
   2. Law
    We review a military judge’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of dis-
cretion. United States v. Stephens, 67 M.J. 233, 235 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (citing
United States v. Manns, 54 M.J. 164, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
    A military judge abuses his or her discretion when: (1) the military judge
predicates a ruling on findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence
of record; (2) the military judge uses incorrect legal principles; (3) the military
judge applies correct legal principles to the facts in a way that is clearly unrea-
sonable; or (4) the military judge fails to consider important facts. United
States v. Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citations omitted).
    Whether an accused has waived or instead forfeited an issue is a question
of law this court reviews de novo. United States v. Ahern, 76 M.J. 194, 197
(C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). In the absence of waiver, a plain error stand-
ard of review applies to situations where a counsel fails to object or where an
objection failed to preserve discrete issues. “[W]e review forfeited issues for
plain error.” United States v. Davis, 79 M.J. 329, 331 (C.A.A.F. 2020).
   “Plain error occurs when (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain or obvious,
and (3) the error results in material prejudice to a substantial right of the ac-
cused.” United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citation
omitted).
    Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See Mil. R. Evid.
401.
   The military judge may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the members, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. See Mil. R. Evid. 403.
   3. Analysis
    Appellant claims SA JM’s testimony regarding the background of the N1
series constituted “inadmissible and irrelevant victim impact testimony.” Re-
garding admissibility, contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, the testimony he is
now objecting to was not victim impact testimony. It was witness testimony

                                        7
                    United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

offered during the Government’s case-in-chief and before findings, not during
pre-sentencing.10
    We also disagree that SA JM’s testimony was irrelevant. Appellant argues
the military judge erred in allowing circuit trial counsel to ask SA JM about
her “investigation, arrest and questioning of an individual who was suspected
of sexually abusing his niece and creating child pornography, when there was
never and has never been a connection between Appellant and the suspect that
SA JM interviewed.”
    Trial defense counsel did not object to any questions posed to SA JM during
direct examination as to the creation and contents of the N1 series. Appellant
suggests—and we agree—that because Appellant did not object to SA JM’s tes-
timony, we review for plain error.
    We do not find that SA JM’s testimony about the creation of the N1 series
was plainly irrelevant or improper. SA JM’s testimony was relevant in findings
to prove elements of the offense with which Appellant was charged. The testi-
mony tended to prove N1 is a real person who was a minor, approximately
between the ages of five and nine years old, at the time when the photos and
videos were created. The testimony tended to prove images involving N1 were
images of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. The testimony
tended to prove that Appellant’s request for images “of a girl named [N1]” who
“is a little [girl with a certain color of hair],” followed by her photo, was a re-
quest for images of the same child victim that SA JM discovered in her inves-
tigation of the N1 series. SA JM’s testimony proved Appellant was intention-
ally and wrongfully seeking images which were part of a child pornography
series with a known victim.
    Appellant further contends the military judge erred by not instructing the
panel to disregard SA JM’s testimony after sustaining the objection about how
many requests SA JM receives about the N1 series. At the beginning of the
trial, the military judge explained her duties to the members of the court, stat-
ing her duty was to ensure the trial is conducted in a fair, orderly, and impar-
tial matter according to law. The military judge instructed the members that
when she sustains an objection, they are to “disregard the question and the

10 We note that evidence, which in sentencing could be considered aggravating “victim

impact” evidence, is not necessarily inadmissible in findings. The sentencing authority
may consider “matters in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation, whether intro-
duced before or after findings . . . .” Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1005(e)(5) (em-
phasis added); see also R.C.M. 1001(g) (“In addition to matters introduced under
[R.C.M. 1001], the court-martial may consider . . . (2) Any evidence properly introduced
on the merits before findings, including: (A) Evidence of other offenses or acts of mis-
conduct even if introduced for a limited purpose . . . .”).

                                           8
                   United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

answer.” Given this instruction, there was no requirement on the part of the
military judge to sua sponte reinstruct the members after sustaining the objec-
tion.11 Furthermore, before deliberations, the military judge properly in-
structed the members on the elements of Appellant’s offense of solicitating the
distribution of child pornography. Finally, Appellant waived this issue by not
requesting a special instruction regarding SA JM’s answer to the question
about how many requests she received about the N1 series. See Davis, 79 M.J.
at 331.
    For the reasons cited above, we do not find the military judge plainly erred
in allowing SA JM’s testimony during the findings portion of the proceedings.
B. Circuit Trial Counsel’s Findings Argument
   Appellant claims the circuit trial counsel improperly “continu[ed] to intro-
duce the theme of abuse and trauma caused by another” in his findings argu-
ment. We first consider the portions of circuit trial counsel’s arguments Appel-
lant highlights.
   1. Additional Background
   During circuit trial counsel’s findings argument, the following exchange oc-
curred:
       CTC: . . . You heard from [SA MV]. She was the lady with the
       Iowa Department of Criminal Investigations. She told you about
       [N1]. She told you that her abuser was a family member who
       abused her for years.
       Now, members, anyone who has spent time with children knows
       that kids look to their adult for confirmation. They don’t always
       know or understand why they are being asked to do something,
       and when that happens, they look at their adult and they ask,
       “Am I doing it right?” The child has no idea why she is being
       posed like that, but the person who posed her did. So did he.
       CTC: Members, when you read his words in those [application]
       messages, and you look at his collection, that is proof beyond a
       reasonable doubt. He wanted her. He wanted to watch a grown
       man molest that child because it was sexually gratifying for him.

11 We further note that we presume the court members followed the military judge’s

prefatory instructions at the beginning of the trial to disregard testimony which was
the subject of a sustained objection. See United States v. Hornback, 73 M.J. 155, 161
(C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Thompkins, 58 M.J. 43, 47 (C.A.A.F. 2003))
(“Absent evidence to the contrary, court members are presumed to comply with the
military judge's instructions.”).

                                         9
                  United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

       Civ DC: Objection, Your Honor.
       MJ: Overruled.
       CTC: And he wanted others just like her to add to his collection.
       So from the comfort of his dorm room on this Air Force installa-
       tion, he went trolling for [N1] and little girls just like her. And
       beyond a reasonable doubt he is guilty.
   2. Law
   “We review prosecutorial misconduct and improper argument de novo and
where . . . no objection is made, we review for plain error.” United States v.
Voorhees, 79 M.J. 5, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J.
393, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).
    Under plain error review, the appellant bears the burden to demonstrate
error that is clear or obvious and results in material prejudice to his substan-
tial rights. United States v. Knapp, 73 M.J. 33, 36 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (citation
omitted).
   “Plain error occurs when (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain or obvious,
and (3) the error results in material prejudice to a substantial right of the ac-
cused.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179.
    “Improper argument is one facet of prosecutorial misconduct.” United
States v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). Prosecutorial
misconduct occurs when trial counsel “oversteps the bounds of that propriety
and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the
prosecution of a criminal offense.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 178 (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935)). Such conduct “can be generally defined
as action or inaction by a prosecutor in violation of some legal norm or stand-
ard, e.g., a constitutional provision, a statute, a Manual rule, or an applicable
professional ethics canon.” United States v. Hornback, 73 M.J. 155, 160
(C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
   “Trial counsel is entitled to argue the evidence of record, as well as all rea-
sonable inferences fairly derived from such evidence.” United States v. Frey, 73
M.J. 245, 248 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    While a trial counsel “may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179 (quoting Berger, 295 U.S. at 88).
   “[I]t is error for trial counsel to make arguments that ‘unduly . . . inflame
the passions or prejudices of the court members.’” United States v. Schroder,
65 M.J. 49, 58 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (omission in original) (quoting United States v.

                                       10
                   United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

Clifton, 15 M.J. 26, 30 (C.M.A. 1983)). Trial counsel are also prohibited from
injecting into argument irrelevant matters, such as facts not in evidence or
personal opinions about the truth or falsity of testimony or evidence. See id.;
Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179; Rule for Courts-Martial 919(b), Discussion. Courts
have struggled to draw the “exceedingly fine line which distinguishes permis-
sible advocacy from improper excess.” Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 183 (quoting United
States v. White, 486 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1973)).
    “[A]rgument by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context of the
entire court-martial. The focus of [the] inquiry should not be on words in isola-
tion, but on the argument as ‘viewed in context.’” United States v. Baer, 53 M.J.
235, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16
(1985)). In performing our review, “it is improper to ‘surgically carve’ out a
portion of the argument with no regard to its context.” Id.
   “A statement that might appear improper if viewed in isolation may not be
improper when viewed in context. And even if a statement is improper, it may
not be sufficiently prejudicial, in the context of the entire trial, to violate the
accused’s due process rights.” United States v. Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 333
(C.A.A.F. 2022) (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642–43, 645
(1974)).
   3. Analysis
   Appellant contends circuit trial counsel kept “the theme of abuse and
trauma caused by another” and impermissibly focused his argument on the
creator of the N1 series as opposed to Appellant’s actions.
    The military judge overruled an objection to circuit trial counsel’s argument
that Appellant “wanted to watch a grown man molest a child because it was
sexually gratifying to him.” (Emphasis added). In context, we read this argu-
ment to mean that Appellant wanted to view and possess those images because
he believed it would be sexually gratifying to Appellant. We conducted a de
novo review of the argument, and in context, we do not find this to be imper-
missible argument. The record confirmed Appellant wanted images in general
of children engaged in both oral or anal sexual abuse where “the girl is enjoying
it” and—in his own words—“any age range is fine.” Moreover, the record es-
tablishes Appellant was also seeking images of the same girl as the victim in
the N1 series. This evidence is relevant because it proves he knowingly sought
images of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct without any legal
justification.
   While circuit trial counsel referenced the origins of the N1 series of child
pornography, circuit trial counsel did not imply that the members should find
Appellant guilty of the crimes committed by others in creating the series. We

                                        11
                    United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

find no error, plain or otherwise, and therefore no prosecutorial misconduct
related to circuit trial counsel’s findings argument.
C. Circuit Trial Counsel’s Sentencing Argument
    Appellant claims the circuit trial counsel continued to focus on the details
related to N1’s abuse and the creation of child pornography, and not on the
details of Appellant’s actions.
   1. Additional Background
   During sentencing proceedings, circuit trial counsel argued:
       Now, the list goes on with these images. These are children
       whose bodies have not even remotely started to develop, but in
       those videos[12], they are assaulted in every orifice. And they are
       assaulted by men with grown penises. Think about that, a pre-
       pubescent child who has not gone through puberty is being as-
       saulted by a fully pubescent grown man and what that would’ve
       done. Every image he collected, every video he wanted is another
       child who is being exploited. Let’s be clear about one other thing:
       those children, they are the victims, not [Appellant]. It is unfor-
       tunate. It is truly unfortunate that the consequences of his ac-
       tions are going to be felt by his family members. That’s unfortu-
       nate that the confinement time is going to affect them because
       they didn’t do this, but he did. So keep that in mind when you’re
       determining what is an appropriate sentence; who is the victim
       here?
Trial defense counsel did not object to this argument.
   2. Law
    The issue of “[i]mproper argument is a question of law that we review de
novo.” United States v. Marsh, 70 M.J. 101, 104 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citation omit-
ted). However, if the defense does not object to a sentencing argument by trial
counsel, we review the issue for plain error. Id. (citing Erickson, 65 M.J. at
223). To establish plain error, an appellant “must prove the existence of error,
that the error was plain or obvious, and that the error resulted in material
prejudice to a substantial right.” Id. at 106 (citing Erickson, 65 M.J. at 223).
Because “all three prongs must be satisfied in order to find plain error, the
failure to establish any one of the prongs is fatal to a plain error claim.” United

12 The record showed that Appellant possessed still images from videos of child pornog-

raphy. There was no evidence that he possessed actual videos.

                                          12
                   United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

States v. Bungert, 62 M.J. 346, 348 (C.A.A.F. 2006). The burden of proof under
a plain error review is on the appellant. See id. (citation omitted).
    “The legal test for improper argument is whether the argument was erro-
neous and whether it materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the ac-
cused.” Frey, 73 M.J. at 248 (quoting Baer, 53 M.J. at 237). Three factors guide
our determination of the prejudicial effect of improper argument: “(1) the se-
verity of the misconduct, (2) the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and
(3) the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction[s].” Sewell, 76 M.J. at
18 (alteration in original) (quoting Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184). In some cases, “the
third factor may so clearly favor the [G]overnment that the appellant cannot
demonstrate prejudice.” Id. (citing United States v. Halpin, 71 M.J. 477, 480
(C.A.A.F. 2013)).
    In Halpin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)
extended the Fletcher plain error test to improper sentencing argument. 71
M.J. at 480. “In applying the Fletcher factors in the context of an allegedly
improper sentencing argument, we consider whether trial counsel’s comments,
taken as a whole, were so damaging that we cannot be confident that the ap-
pellant was sentenced on the basis of the evidence alone.” Id. (alteration, in-
ternal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
   The CAAF has identified five indicators of severity of improper argument:
       (1) the raw numbers—the instances of misconduct as compared
       to the overall length of the argument[;] (2) whether the miscon-
       duct was confined to the trial counsel’s rebuttal or spread
       throughout the findings argument or the case as a whole; (3) the
       length of the trial; (4) the length of the panel’s deliberations; and
       (5) whether the trial counsel abided by any rulings from the mil-
       itary judge.
Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 184 (citation omitted).
    In assessing prejudice, the lack of a defense objection is “‘some measure of
the minimal impact’ of a prosecutor’s improper comment.” United States v. Gil-
ley, 56 M.J. 113, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 51
M.J. 393, 397 (C.A.A.F. 1999)).
    “Trial counsel is entitled to argue the evidence of record, as well as all rea-
sonable inferences fairly derived from such evidence.” Frey, 73 M.J. at 248
(quotation marks and citation omitted). As with findings argument, “trial coun-
sel is at liberty to strike hard, but not foul, blows” during sentencing argument.
Halpin, 71 M.J. at 479 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he argu-
ment by a trial counsel must be viewed within the context of the entire court-
martial.” Baer, 53 M.J. at 238. “The focus of our inquiry should not be on words

                                        13
                     United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

in isolation, but on the argument as viewed in context.” Id. (quotation marks
and citations omitted).
   The impact of the creation of child pornography can be admissible in sen-
tencing for the offense of possession of child pornography. United States v.
Miles, 71 M.J. 671, 675–76 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
   Child pornography is “a permanent record of the depicted child’s abuse, and
the harm to the child is exacerbated by [its] circulation.” Paroline v. United
States, 572 U.S. 434, 440 (2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), quoted with approval in United States v. Barker,
77 M.J. 377, 381 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
    3. Analysis
    Because there was no objection during circuit trial counsel’s sentencing ar-
gument, we analyze this issue under a plain error standard of review. After
closely examining circuit trial counsel’s sentencing argument in its entirety,
we find Appellant has failed to establish any error, let alone plain or obvious
error.
    Appellant claims trial counsel’s argument was improper sentencing argu-
ment. Specifically, Appellant directs us to that part of trial counsel’s argument
which states, “Think about that, a prepubescent child who has not gone
through puberty is being assaulted by a fully pubescent grown man and what
that would’ve done.” To the extent Appellant argues the violence towards the
victim in the creation of the child pornography is not a permissible aggravating
factor in sentencing for possession and solicitation of child pornography, we
disagree. We agree with our sister court that “the violent nature of the pictures
the appellant possessed is proper aggravation” and the impact of the creation
of child pornography can be admissible in sentencing for child pornography
cases. Miles, 71 M.J. at 675–76. Furthermore, in Appellant’s case, the circuit
trial counsel reiterated what was presented as evidence, in the photographs
related to Appellant’s guilty plea to possession of child pornography.
    Considering circuit trial counsel’s entire sentencing argument, we find trial
counsel argued Appellant was exploiting the children in the images through
his possession and solicitation of images of this specific type of abuse.13 There-
fore, we do not find this to be improper argument.

13 See, e.g., Paroline, 572 U.S. at 436 (“The unlawful conduct of everyone who repro-

duces, distributes, or possesses the images of the [child] victim’s abuse . . . plays a part
in sustaining and aggravating this tragedy.”); Barker, 77 M.J. at 381 (finding those
who possess and distribute child pornography directly contribute to the child’s

                                            14
                     United States v. Bickford, No. ACM 40326

    We are confident that Appellant was sentenced based on the evidence
alone. See Halpin, 71 M.J. at 480. Accordingly, we find Appellant is not entitled
to relief on this issue.

                                   III. CONCLUSION
   The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Article
59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d).14 Accordingly, the findings
and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                        FOR THE COURT

                        CAROL K. JOYCE
                        Clerk of the Court

continuing victimization); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 259 (3d Cir. 2007) (rec-
ognizing that even those who “‘merely’ or ‘passively’ receive or possess child pornogra-
phy directly contribute to [the child’s] continuing victimization”).
14 In a footnote in his brief to this court, Appellant notes two items in the record of trial

appear to be missing: (1) the memorandum which detailed Judge Percle as military
judge for Appellant’s court-martial and (2) the receipt demonstrating delivery of the
record of trial to Appellant. However, Appellant states in his brief that “[he] does not
assert these omissions are substantial or cause the record to be incomplete.” We find
these omissions do not require corrective action.

                                             15