Court Opinion

ID: 9565448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:21:29.133906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:39.289858
License: Public Domain

Justice Mitchell
dissenting.
In my view the trial court correctly dismissed this action for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a justiciable controversy. The plaintiff city brought this action under our Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. N.C.G.S. §§.1-253 to 267 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1990). The existence of a justiciable or genuine controversy, existing at the time of the filing of the complaint, is a jurisdictional necessity for a claim brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, 317 N.C. 579, 347 S.E.2d 25 (1986). In order to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court in the present case, the plaintiff city was required to allege in its complaint all of the facts necessary to disclose the existence of an actual or real existing controversy between the parties to the action. State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker, 312 N.C. 326, 323 S.E.2d 294 (1984). The controversy must be more than mere difference of opinion or a threat or apprehension of litigation. Gaston Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 316 S.E.2d 59 (1984). In order to confer jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the plaintiff must establish that litigation appears unavoidable. Id. The term “unavoidable” needs little interpretation or explanation; it means “not avoidable: incapable of being shunned or prevented: INEVITABLE.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2483 (1976).
When the foregoing principles are applied to the present case, it is apparent that the trial court correctly concluded that the *562plaintiff city had failed to show that a justiciable controversy existed at the time of the filing of its complaint. The pleadings failed to show more than a mere difference of opinion as to the validity of an act of the General Assembly placing certain administrative and enforcement responsibilities with regard to building codes with Craven County. The plaintiff city failed to set forth any specific legal right belonging to it which was affected by the challenged act. In fact, it is obvious that the act merely relieves the city of a burden. Further, the city did not allege that it planned to conduct inspections in violation of the act. Instead, the city merely alleged its “belief” that the act was null and void and its “belief” that the defendants contend otherwise. Nothing in the complaint filed by the plaintiff city suggests that litigation is “unavoidable.” Therefore, the plaintiff city failed to establish a real existing controversy of the type required in order to vest jurisdiction in the trial court.
Writing for this Court more than forty years ago, Justice Ervin explained the limitations upon jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act as follows:
There is much misunderstanding as to the object and scope of this legislation. Despite some notions to the contrary, it does not undertake to convert judicial tribunals into counselors and impose upon them the duty of giving advisory opinions to any parties who may come into court and ask for either academic enlightenment or practical guidance concerning their legal affairs. (Citations omitted.) This observation may be stated in the vernacular in this wise: The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not license litigants to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice.
Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 117, 56 S.E.2d 404, 409 (1949). As the complaint filed by the plaintiff city in the present case does not meet the jurisdictional requirement of establishing the existence of an actual case or controversy, by showing that litigation appears unavoidable, the plaintiff city is merely seeking an impermissible advisory opinion. In reversing the trial court in this case, the majority requires the trial court to allow the plaintiff city “to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice” and to give the plaintiff that advice in the form of an advisory opinion. As I believe this flies *563in the face of long established and adhered to precedent, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Martin joins in this dissenting opinion.