Court Opinion

ID: 9491191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:06:14.685556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:34.026178
License: Public Domain

DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s conclusions that the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) are hot unconstitutionally vague and that 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6)’s six-year statute of limitations period applies to prosecutions brought pursuant to § 7212(a). I respectfully dissent, however, from this court’s determination that a defendant cannot be found guilty of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) without knowingly obstructing or impeding a pending or ongoing Internal Revenue Service investigation or proceeding.
In reaching its conclusion on the breadth of § 7212(a)’s proscriptions, the majority analogizes the language of that statutory provision to the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the general obstruction of justice statute. Because the language of the two provisions is somewhat similar, and because the federal courts have ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 1503’s prohibition on obstructions of the “due administration of justice” requires that a judicial proceeding be ongoing or pending, the majority holds that the Internal Revenue Service must also have proceedings ongoing in order to suffer obstruction of “the due administration of [Title 26].”
As noted by the majority, however, courts must presume that Congress knew of the prevailing law when it enacted a statute. International Union, United Auto. Workers, Local 737 v. Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d 1243, 1248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 63, 136 L.Ed.2d 24 (1996). Section 1503 was in effect long before § 7212(a) and the “due administration of justice” wording of § 1503 has consistently been construed to require affected judicial proceedings. It is only logical, therefore, to conclude that if Congress wished 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) to be interpreted in an identical fashion, identical language would have been inserted into that statute. In its wisdom, our nation’s legislative body chose, however, to distinguish the requirements of the statutes by use of broader language in § 7212(a). Pursuant to those provisions, it is not only the administration of “justice” that is protected from undue obstruction, but the very administration of the myriad duties performed under the Title.
The majority unnecessarily sounds the alarm that such a reading of the plain language of the statute will result in criminal prosecutions of individuals who may, for example, innocently dispose of old tax returns and records later requested by the Internal Revenue Service for audit purposes. In light of recent revelations of abuses perpetrated by employees of the Internal Revenue Service, such concern is understandable. The comforting fact remains, however, that the statute itself still requires that any obstruction of the due administration of Title 26 be accomplished by means of corruption, force, or threats of force. If the courts of our land remain vigilant and scrupulously require government prosecutors to toe the well-defined line drawn by Congress in this legislation, I am confident the majority’s fears will be allayed.
Although no federal court of appeals appears to have addressed directly the precise issue now before us, every sister circuit that has examined the reach of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) has accepted the principle that the provisions of that subsection do . not require the government to prove the existence of an ongoing or pending tax investigation or pro*961eeeding. See United States v. Winchell, 129 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696 (8th Cir.1981). I see no reason for us now to rush into the breach to create an analytical split on this question. I would REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Count 26 of the indictment and REMAND this matter for further proceedings as necessary.