Court Opinion

ID: 9664070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:02:08.173289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:01.894201
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
I agree with the majority that the directed verdict in favor of the superintendent was proper, that the evidence supports the findings of fact that Lundquist was negligent, and that Lundquist’s liability was not precluded by the doctrine of discretionary immunity. However, because the record indicates to me that Peterson’s alleged negligence arose out of acts requiring judgment and discretion, I would hold that Peterson is protected from liability by the doctrine of discretionary immunity.1
Except for budgetary and financial matters, Peterson was primarily responsible for the running of the school. This job required him to make policy decisions of many types, decisions which required him to use skilled judgment and discretion. Peterson’s recommendations to the school district to hire Lundquist, a certified and apparently satisfactory physical education instructor, was a matter of judgment. No less so was his decision to let Lundquist and the former instructor, Embretson, plan the program and the lessons. Curriculum Bulletin No. 11, which Peterson provided to the physical education department, expressly indicated it was the teacher’s job to work out the details in accordance with its guidance. That delegation was also a discretionary act.
In Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 247 N.W.2d 907 (1976), this court held that the duties of the commissioner of corrections and the warden of the State prison in supervising the prison industries program called for the exercise of judgment and discretion, and therefore the commissioner and the warden were immune from personal liability to an inmate injured by a machine in the prison factory. Peterson’s duties supervising Lundquist involved no less discretion than those of the defendants in Susla.
It is the majority view that Peterson’s negligence was “not rooted in any policy judgment he made about teaching or developing the physical education curriculum,” because Peterson had made no decision at *124all relevant to developing the curriculum. However, Peterson testified that he chose not to provide more specific direction to Lundquist or Embretson because the instructors were professionals with expertise in physical education, which he lacked.
This court in Silver v. City of Minneapolis, 284 Minn. 266, 170 N.W.2d 206 (1969), demonstrated that choosing to take no action can require as much an exercise of discretion as choosing one action over another. In Silver, citizens claimed that the city was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested. The court held that the proper deployment of police and fire protection in the face of impending riots, responding to certain requests but not to others, involved the exercise of the municipality’s discretion.
Similarly, Peterson’s decision not to request more detailed curriculum plans or to supervise Lundquist more closely was a discretionary decision made on the “planning level of conduct.” Therefore, Peterson was immune from liability, and I would reverse on this issue.
Because I would hold Peterson immune from liability, I would not decide whether the jury’s verdict of negligence against him should be upheld, whether his liability should be limited to the insurance coverage prescribed by Minn.St.1971, § 466.04, or whether he is entitled to indemnity from the school district.

. The trial court did not hold Peterson entitled to discretionary immunity only because it believed this court had foreclosed that option in its earlier decision.