Court Opinion

ID: 9545140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:07:05.229117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:09.728079
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The defendant challenged the trial court’s findings of fact Nos. 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 which read as follows: 4. That Plaintiff slipped and fell on wax remover upon stepping into the hall from the area of the dining room and kitchen on the premises of Defendant, which wax remover was extremely slippery when applied to the tile floor on Defendant’s premises. 6. That the wax remover so placed by the employee of defendant corporation was invisible at the time Plaintiff slipped. 7. That no signs or barriers had been .placed by such employee near the doorway leading into the hall where plaintiff slipped to warn persons of the dangerous condition of the floor. 8. That the wax remover upon which plaintiff slipped and fell had been placed in front of the door leading from the dining room and kitchen area into the hallway by an employee of defendant corporation. 9. That it was not normal procedure for employees to conduct wax removal operations in the hallways of defendant corporation during dinner hours thereat, especially as wax removal operations are dangerous and hazardous to passersby. [Emphasis added.] I have carefully reviewed the record. The evidence most favorable to plaintiff shows the following: On March 30, 1969, plaintiff was employed by one Eunice Green, a patient at defendant’s Care Center. She had been employed 15 months prior thereto and this was the first time wax stripping was done on the floor. At about 5:15 p. m., plaintiff walked down a hallway to a doorway which led into the dining room, then through the dining room into the kitchen to obtain a tray of food for Mrs. Green. She wore crepe rubber sole nurse’s shoes. She noticed there was either wax or something being applied to two-thirds of the hallway which was glossy and one-third of the hallway was left out and was not glossy. To enter the dining room, she walked down the one-third part of the hallway that was not glossy. About 30 to 40 feet beyond the entrance to the dining room, she saw a wax remover machine with a man standing where the machine was located. No work was being done as she walked to the kitchen. She remained in the kitchen between ten and fifteen minutes, obtained a tray of food which she carried in front of her body even with her waist, and began to walk to Mrs. Green’s room. She could not'see down at her feet, but she could see out. The first step she took out of the dining room into the hallway, she slipped and fell. After she fell, she noticed a “preparation” or “liquid of some sort” or “some' substance right up to the door.” She did not see “where else the preparation • was in the hall at the time (she) fell,” or!.at any other time. She did not know what the substance was. She did not see the machine. The man who had -been with the machine asked if she got cut and she said “no,” and that was all of the conversation. After she fell, the “preparation” was on her uniform. She took off the- uniform and put towels under it and washed all she could get off of her uniform. She - later told her doctor she “slipped on waxed .floor and fell against the wall, slid down a wall and went to a sitting position.” But she testified that as she stepped out'-on. the floor, she didn’t see the wax. Fifteen minutes after her fall, the Care Center’s maintenance supervisor arrived. On cross-examination by plaintiff, it was disclosed that, on the supervisor’s arrival, Mr. Vargas, an employee, - -was ■ in the process of stripping the floor of wax. Just one side of the hallway had wax on it. The other side was dry. Expert testimony established that when emulsion is used on a tile floor for wax removal, the floor is slippery and dangerous. The trial court found the defendant put an invisible, slippery wax remover on its tile floor near the doorway leading into the hall where plaintiff slipped and fell. There is no evidence, nor any inferences therefrom, to support these findings. There is no evidence that the floor was tile and the “preparation” invisible, or that the “preparation,” the “liquid” or the '“substance” at the door was an emulsion or wax remover which created a dangerous condition, or that the defendant was processing the floor at or near the door during ten or fifteen minutes plaintiff was in the kitchen, or that defendant knew of the “preparation” being on the floor in front of the doorway prior to plaintiff’s slip and fall. There is a total absence of any evidence to show how or by whom the “preparation” was placed just outside the door. There is no proof of any act of negligence in maintaining the floor over a period of time, or any notice of the presence of the foreign substance on the floor in front of the door, or the existence of a messy condition or pattern of conduct. Plaintiff’s brief has been carefully reviewed. There is no reference to any evidence or inferences therefrom contrary to what has been heretofore mentioned. Findings of fact without some substantial evidence to support them cannot be sustained on appeal. DeBaca v. Kahn, 49 N.M. 225, 161 P.2d 630 (1945). Plaintiff has' failed to cite any authority on “slip and fall” to sustain the judgment under the evidence in this case. She relies solely on Mozert v. Noeding, 76 N.M. 396, 415 P.2d 364 (1966), which is not a ■ “slip and fall” case. The majority opinion does not rely on any New Mexico “slip and fall” case. I have reviewed every slip and fall case in New Mexico to determine whether any one of . them supports plaintiff’s position. I found none. See DeBaca v. Kahn, supra; Barrans v. Hogan, 62 N.M. 79, 304 P.2d 880 (1956); Kitts v. Shop Rite Foods, 64 N.M. 24, 323 P.2d 282 (1958); Williamson v. Piggly Wiggly Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 80 N.M. 591, 458 P.2d 843 (Ct.App.1969); Jimenez v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 72 N.M. 184, 382 P.2d 181 (1963); Lewis v. Barber’s Super Markets, Inc., 72 N.M. 402, 384 P.2d 470 (1963); Barakos v. Sponduris, 64 N.M. 125, 325 P.2d 712 (1958); Sanchez v. Shop Rite Foods, 82 N.M. 369, 482 P.2d 72 (Ct.App.1971); Garcia v. Barber’s Super Markets, Inc., 81 N.M. 92, 463 P.2d 516 (Ct.App.1969); Mahoney v. J. C. Penney Company, 71 N.M. 244, 377 P.2d 663 (1962); Edwards v. Ross, 72 N.M. 38, 380 P.2d 188 (1963). Edwards v. Ross, supra, appears to be a “wax” case. The plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of defendant’s business. After falling she noticed the floor. was discolored, yellowish and slick and felt damp to her touch. Plaintiff’s verdict was allowed to stand because she introduced evidence tending to prove that defendant had improperly maintained the floor over a considerable period of time. This fact does not appear in the present case. In Garcia, supra the court said: The mere presence of a slick or slippery spot on a floor does not in and of itself establish negligence for this condition may arise temporarily in any place of business. [Cases cited]. Nor does proof of a slippery floor without more give rise to an inference that the proprietor had knowledge of the condition. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat again the various rules which determine “slip and fall” liability on floors in public premises. Plaintiff’s evidence does not come within any rule. This case was tried on two separate hearings: One on May 7, 1970, and the other on November 24, 1970, over six months apart. Perhaps the evidence was not fresh in the trial court’s mind after the second hearing. This may have led the trial court to adopt plaintiff’s requested findings of fact. Until the Supreme Court changes the rule in “slip and fall” cases, we should follow the established policy.