Court Opinion

ID: 9585496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:05.844269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:48:57.518175
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As the majority recognizes, quoting from State v. Corley, 201 Ga. App. 320 (411 SE2d 324) (1991), we take the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. None of the trial court’s findings are rejected by the majority, and I find no reason to differ in this regard.
In its order, the trial court stated its findings as follows: “The police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to support the original traffic stop. Thereafter, the subsequent pat down of the Defendant’s sock was reasonable to protect the safety of the officers. Conflicts in testimony were resolved adverse to the Defendant, who testified he thought the suspected contraband in his sock was ‘cornbread.’ ” What is inferred by the inclusion of the latter reference is made clear by what the court stated at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing. The court revealed that defendant’s testimony that he thought the vial contained cornbread helped the court resolve the conflict in the evidence, thus indicating the court’s rejection of defendant’s explanation as unworthy of belief. Defendant had testified that the friend who had bought the merchandise in the Goody’s bag and inadvertently left it on the passenger’s seat, had dropped the vial when leaving Goody’s; that defendant picked it up and was going to return it to him and, when he saw officer Carter signaling him to stop, put the vial in his sock.
The court used the term “pat-down” in a broad sense, as there was no actual preliminary laying on of hands to determine if defendant carried an object which could be a weapon. Such physical investigatory touching of all of the suspect’s clothing to determine if he was armed, a greater intrusion than what transpired, was not necessary in this case, because the officers could see that a hard object was still concealed in defendant’s sock after he removed a roll of four or five bills. The object was three to four inches long and one-half to one inch in diameter, about the size of a Life Saver holder.
1. The question is whether a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 27 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). The officer was “able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 64 (88 SC 1889, 20 LE2d 917) (1968). The evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the information the officer had when he touched and searched the sock warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the sock contained a weapon. As repeated in Roberts v. State, 193 Ga. App. 96, 98-99 (386 SE2d 921) (1989), the particular facts and circum*751stances of each case must be weighed.
Defendant acknowledged to the court below that frisking or patting down that area of defendant’s sock-covered anatomy could have led the officer to believe that it was a pocketknife; his argument was that the officer did not first feel it. However, touching the sock in the area of the object, in order to retrieve it, instantly confirmed to the officer that it was a long hard object, just as he had visually observed, before he removed it. A pat-down or tactile inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether defendant possessed what an officer would reasonably believe was a weapon on defendant’s person was not necessary when touching confirmed what the officer already knew, from sight, was an object which appeared to be a knife. “Terry v. Ohio, [supra,] is not authority for the proposition that an officer who has effectuated an investigatory stop of a potentially armed individual is necessarily limited, under all circumstances, to conducting a pat-down. To the contrary, Terry merely held that it was not unreasonable for an officer to have conducted a pat-down of a potentially armed suspect who had actually submitted to that procedure.” Hayes v. State, 202 Ga. App. 204, 206 (414 SE2d 321) (1991).
When the car was stopped which fit the description and had the license number of one involved in the suspected shoplifting and the officer saw the bag from the reported victim store, the intent was formed for Officer Carter to take defendant back to the store in furtherance of the investigation. He did not know if defendant was armed, and when Officer Dawson saw that a bulge remained after defendant removed his money, he feared he had a weapon. It would have been foolhardy at best for Carter to transport defendant back to Goody’s without the assurance that the pocketknife-size bulge in defendant’s sock was not that. Not OCGA § 17-5-30, not Paragraph 13 of the Georgia Bill of Rights, not the Fourth Amendment, require such peril. The Supreme Court has “recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1047 (III) (103 SC 3469, 77 LE2d 1201) (1983). The officer’s action was reasonable, and that is the touchstone. Michigan v. Long, supra at 1051.
Then when he saw, not a knife, but the plastic tube with what appeared to be crack cocaine in plain view, he was authorized to seize it.
2. Defendant also claims that this evidence was obtained in a manner which violated his right against self-incrimination under Paragraph 16 of the Georgia Bill of Rights. Non-resistance or passive resistance to the search would not constitute a violation of the prohibition against compelling a person “to give testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating.” This fundamental right is not im*752plicated in these circumstances. He was not compelled to do an act which produced the evidence; he did not yield the vial but rather refused or at least declined to do so. Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511 (2) (192 SE2d 350) (1972); State v. Armstead, 152 Ga. App. 56 (1) (262 SE2d 233) (1979). See Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 634 (7) (323 SE2d 801) (1984).
Decided March 18, 1994
Reconsideration denied April 1, 1994
Russell C. Gabriel, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, J. Mark Hatfield, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.