Court Opinion

ID: 9640689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:12:09.944961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.020124
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although I wholly agree with the majority’s conclusion that venue is not jurisdictional, I disagree that the case must nevertheless be transferred to St. Louis County. More particularly, I disagree that venue is determined “as the case stands when brought.” The import of the holding is to preclude plaintiffs from curing defects in venue.
The key to this case is to ascertain the date from which challenges to venue are to be determined. The statute on which the majority relies, § 508.010, does not address that issue, but provides only that suits shall be brought in certain designated venues. The statute contains no provision, express or implied, that supports the majority’s conclusion that challenges to venue must be determined as of the date the suit is originally filed.
In the absence of a controlling statute, the better rule, in my view, is that the propriety of venue and the “ministerial duty to transfer the case” should be determined according to the presence and status of the parties at the time the court rules on the merits of the challenge. This rule affords plaintiffs the opportunity to dismiss the party defendant whose presence in the suit gives rise to improper venue and allows the case to proceed expeditiously. It avoids the awkward procedure that ultimately allows plaintiff to bring the suit in the City of St. Louis, but only if it is first dismissed and then refiled without joinder of the party 'defendant in question.
For at least two other reasons, the majority approach is inappropriate. First, the curative dismissal of a party defendant is not without significant cost to plaintiff because plaintiff loses its expectation of recovery from that defendant. This alone is sufficient penalty for bringing the case in an improper venue. Second, the dismissal causes no harm to the remaining defendants who would be subject to the same venue had plaintiff originally filed the suit without joining the party who defeated venue. In my opinion, dismissal of parties that cause improper venue should be encouraged, not penalized.
Because plaintiffs dismissal of Dr. Hazen occurred prior to the trial judge’s ruling on the motion challenging venue, the defect to venue was cured. I would quash the writ.