Court Opinion

ID: 9372406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 16:00:53.914943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.146159
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 18-15229   Document: 103-1      Date Filed: 02/21/2023   Page: 1 of 22

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 18-15229
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        DANIEL NATHANIEL MCCALL,
        a.k.a. Papa,

                                                   Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cr-00120-GAP-KRS-1
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

                             ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Daniel McCall appeals his conviction for being a felon in pos-
        session of a firearm, arguing that his indictment was jurisdictionally
        defective and that the district court erred in accepting his guilty
        plea without informing him of each element of his offense. McCall
        also appeals his fifteen-year sentence, contending that the district
        court erred in enhancing his sentence under the Armed Career
        Criminal Act and in calculating his base offense level under the sen-
        tencing guidelines. We affirm.

          FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               A federal grand jury indicted McCall for knowingly pos-
        sessing a firearm and ammunition on November 7, 2017, after hav-
        ing been previously convicted of a crime punishable by longer than
        one year of imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections
        922(g)(1) and 924(e).
               At McCall’s change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge ex-
        plained that, to obtain a conviction, the government would need
        to prove that McCall “knowingly possessed a firearm or ammuni-
        tion in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” McCall said
        that he understood. The magistrate judge then told McCall that he
        faced a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence because he had
        been convicted at least three times of a “violent felony” or “serious
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        18-15229               Opinion of the Court                       3

        drug offense.” The magistrate judge asked McCall if, on Novem-
        ber 7, 2017, he had previously been convicted of a felony, which
        she explained was a crime for which he could have been incarcer-
        ated for a year or more. McCall said that he had and also denied
        having his rights to own a firearm restored.
               The government then set out the factual basis for the plea.
        The government explained that McCall was involved in a domestic
        dispute outside of his home. During that dispute, McCall went in-
        side his home and retrieved a firearm. When he got back out, he
        attempted to fire the gun—and eventually did fire it. Others at the
        scene wrestled the firearm away from him. When law enforce-
        ment arrived, McCall fled but was ultimately apprehended. After
        this proffer, McCall pleaded guilty.
               Prior to sentencing, a probation officer determined that
        McCall’s base offense level was twenty-four under guideline sec-
        tion 2K2.1(a)(2) because McCall possessed a firearm with “at least
        two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
        substance offense.” The probation officer recommended a four-
        level enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(6) because McCall had
        used the firearm in connection with two state felonies for aggra-
        vated assault with a firearm. This gave McCall an offense level of
        twenty-eight.
               The probation officer also enhanced McCall’s offense level
        under the Armed Career Criminal Act because he had at least three
        prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses com-
        mitted on different occasions. The probation officer listed four
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

        predicate felonies. First, a conviction for the “sale of cocaine” on
        May 13, 1991, in violation of Florida Statutes section
        891.13(1)(a)(1), for which McCall was sentenced to thirty months’
        incarceration. Second, a conviction for the “sale of cocaine” on
        May 15, 1991, in violation of Florida Statutes section
        891.13(1)(a)(1), for which McCall was sentenced to thirty months’
        incarceration. Third, a conviction for aggravated assault on No-
        vember 29, 1996, in violation of Florida Statutes section
        784.021(1)(a), for which McCall was sentenced to 120 months’ in-
        carceration. And fourth, a conviction for unlawful possession with
        intent to sell or deliver a controlled substance on February 15, 1998,
        in violation of Florida Statutes section 893.13(1)(a)(1), for which
        McCall was sentenced to 120 months’ incarceration.
               Having determined that McCall’s criminal history brought
        him within the scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act, the pro-
        bation officer then decided which specific enhancement applied.
        Because McCall had used or possessed a firearm in connection with
        a crime of violence, the probation officer used section
        4B1.4(a)(3)(A), increasing McCall’s offense level to thirty-four. The
        probation officer also recommended giving McCall a three-level re-
        duction because he pleaded guilty, bringing his final offense level
        to thirty-one.
               As to McCall’s criminal history, the probation officer deter-
        mined, under section 4B1.4(c)(2), that McCall had a criminal his-
        tory category of VI because he had used or possessed a firearm or
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        18-15229               Opinion of the Court                         5

        ammunition in connection with a crime of violence or a controlled
        substance.
               With a total offense level of thirty-one and a criminal history
        category of VI, McCall’s guideline range was 188 to 235 months.
        And, because McCall pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. sections
        922(g)(1) and 924(e), his mandatory minimum was fifteen years and
        his maximum sentence was life.
                McCall objected to the report. As relevant here, McCall ob-
        jected to the enhancement of his sentence under both section 2K2.1
        (for having at least two prior felony convictions for either a “crime
        of violence” or a “controlled substance offense”) and section
        4B1.4(b)(3)(A) (for having at least three prior convictions for a “vi-
        olent felony offense” or a “serious drug offense”). McCall argued
        that his two 1991 drug convictions did not qualify as “serious drug
        offenses” because section 893.13(1)(a)(1) was indivisible and so the
        district court should assume that McCall committed the crime by
        the least culpable means. In other words, McCall argued that, be-
        cause one could violate section 893.13(1)(a)(1) by purchasing drugs,
        and purchasing drugs is not a “serious drug offense,” his convic-
        tions could not be counted for purposes of the enhancement.
        McCall acknowledged that we had held that section 893.13 was di-
        visible in Spaho v. United States Attorney General, 837 F.3d 1172
        (11th Cir. 2016). But he argued that Spaho was not binding because
        it addressed a different version of the statute. And he argued that
        Spaho was wrongly decided.
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        6                            Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

                McCall also contended that none of his three drug convic-
        tions qualified as “serious drug offenses” because they could “be
        committed without the defendant receiving remuneration”—that
        is, without any compensation. He argued by analogy to the Con-
        trolled Substances Act, pointing out that, under that statute, “drug
        trafficking crimes” required compensation, and therefore “serious
        drug crimes” under the Armed Career Criminal Act should too.
               Finally, McCall argued that the government couldn’t show
        that his two 1991 drug offenses occurred on separate occasions
        such that they counted as two predicates. McCall argued that the
        government could use Shepard documents only to prove the ele-
        ments of an offense. 1 But the dates of the crimes were not elements
        of his offenses. As a result, McCall argued that the government
        could not establish that the crimes occurred on separate dates and
        thus on separate occasions.
               As to his conviction for aggravated assault, McCall argued
        that his conviction could not be either a crime of violence or a vio-
        lent felony. He argued that “[a]n offense cannot qualify as a ‘vio-
        lent felony’ or ‘crime of violence’ if it may be committed with a
        mens rea of recklessness.” In Florida, he argued, an aggravated as-
        sault could be committed with a mens rea of “culpable negli-
        gence”—akin to recklessness—thus preventing it from qualifying
        as a violent felony or crime of violence. McCall conceded that we

        1
            Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
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        18-15229               Opinion of the Court                       7

        had already decided otherwise in Turner v. Warden, Coleman FCI,
        709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d
        1256 (11th Cir. 2017), but contended those cases were wrongly de-
        cided.
                The government responded that McCall’s 1991 drug convic-
        tions qualified as serious drug crimes because section
        893.13(1)(a)(1) was divisible under Spaho. Because the statute was
        divisible, the government said, the district court could use Shepard
        documents to see that McCall was convicted of selling cocaine, not
        buying it. The government also argued that McCall’s compensa-
        tion argument was meritless because the cases he relied on ad-
        dressed a different statute, not the Armed Career Criminal Act,
        which had no compensation requirement. The government then
        pointed out that our case law allowed reliance on Shepard docu-
        ments to determine whether crimes were committed on different
        occasions. And, as to McCall’s aggravated assault conviction, the
        government relied on our cases holding that the conviction quali-
        fied as both a violent felony and a crime of violence.
              The district court overruled McCall’s objections and
        adopted the probation officer’s report. It then varied downwards
        and sentenced McCall to 180 months’ incarceration and 60 months’
        supervised release. McCall timely appealed.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review for plain error the validity of a guilty plea when
        it was not raised before the district court. United States v. James,
        210 F.3d 1342, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000).
               We review de novo the sufficiency of an indictment. United
        States v. Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1082–83 (11th Cir. 2003).
               We review de novo the district court’s determination that a
        prior crime qualifies as a violent felony or serious drug offense, and
        whether crimes occurred on different occasions from each other.
        United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014);
        United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2009);
        United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2017).

                                   DISCUSSION
               McCall makes five arguments on appeal. First, he argues
        that his indictment is jurisdictionally defective because it did not
        allege that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time he pos-
        sessed the firearm. Second, he contends that his guilty plea should
        be vacated because the district court violated both his due process
        rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by failing to en-
        sure he knew the true nature of the charges against him. Third,
        McCall asserts that his three drug convictions under section
        893.13(1)(a)(1) are not serious drug offenses or controlled sub-
        stance offenses because (1) the statute is indivisible and could be
        committed through mere purchase and (2) even if it is divisible, the
        Shepard documents do not prove that McCall received
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        18-15229                Opinion of the Court                         9

        compensation. Fourth, McCall maintains that the government
        failed to prove that his two 1991 drug convictions occurred on dif-
        ferent occasions. And fifth, McCall argues that his aggravated as-
        sault conviction is not a violent felony. We take each in turn.
                                 A. Lack of Jurisdiction
               McCall argues that his indictment is jurisdictionally defec-
        tive because it did not allege that he knew his status as a felon, also
        known as the “knowledge-of-status” element. Cf. Rehaif v. United
        States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019) (“To convict a defendant, the
        [g]overnment . . . must show that the defendant knew he possessed
        a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status [as a
        felon] when he possessed it.”).
                But, as McCall concedes, our precedent forecloses this argu-
        ment. In United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2020),
        the defendants advanced the same argument that McCall has raised
        here: that “because their indictments failed to allege their
        knowledge of their felon status, the indictment failed to allege a
        crime, depriving the district court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 1332. We
        rejected that argument, holding that “the omission of an element
        [in an indictment] does not affect jurisdiction.” Id. at 1333.
               Here, McCall’s indictment alleged that he knew that he had
        a firearm, that the firearm had affected interstate commerce, and
        that McCall had previously been convicted of a felony. It did not
        allege that McCall knew he was a felon and thus prohibited from
        possessing a firearm, but we held in Moore that the element’s ab-
        sence was not a jurisdictional defect. Id.; see also United States v.
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         10                      Opinion of the Court                   18-15229

         Morales, 987 F.3d 966, 969 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[The defendant] also
         claims that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
         the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition charge be-
         cause his indictment failed to allege that he knew he was a con-
         victed felon. But . . . [we’ve] held that such an omission is not a
         jurisdictional defect.”).
                The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the
         felon in possession charge.
                               B. Due Process and Rule 11
                McCall contends that the district court erred by accepting
         his guilty plea because doing so violated the due process clause and
         Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. As to due process, McCall
         says that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
         wasn’t aware that the government needed to prove that he knew
         he was a felon. As to rule 11, McCall similarly argues that, because
         he was unaware of this element, his plea colloquy failed to establish
         that he understood the nature of the charges against him.
                 A guilty plea satisfies due process only if it is “voluntary” and
         “intelligent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). To
         voluntarily and intelligently plea, the defendant must have “real
         notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and
         most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Id.
         (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941)). “Building
         upon these [due process] principles, [r]ule 11(b) sets out procedures
         that district courts must follow when accepting guilty pleas.”
         United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018).
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         18-15229                Opinion of the Court                         11

         In accepting a guilty plea, for instance, “the court must inform the
         defendant of . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant
         is pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). These procedures are meant
         to ensure that the defendant is entering into a “knowing and vol-
         untary guilty plea.” Presendieu, 880 F.3d at 1238.
                Because McCall did not make these arguments to the district
         court, we review them for plain error. Id. at 1237 (reviewing for
         plain error whether a defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary
         under the due process clause and rule 11). Plain error occurs
         where: (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects the
         defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fair-
         ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
                 McCall hasn’t satisfied the third prong because he hasn’t
         shown that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known the
         government had to prove that he knew he was a felon. To meet
         the substantial rights prong, a defendant must show that there’s “a
         reasonable probability that, but for the error [complained of], the
         outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Greer v.
         United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (quotation omitted). So,
         in a case like this, McCall “ha[d] the burden of showing that, if the
         [d]istrict [c]ourt had correctly advised him of the mens rea element
         of the [felon in possession] offense, there is a reasonable probability
         that he would not have pled guilty.” Id. (cleaned up). “[W]here
         the defendant was in fact a felon when he possessed firearms, the
         defendant faces an uphill climb in trying to satisfy the substantial-
         rights prong.” Id.
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         12                     Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

                Here, McCall admitted that he knew he was a felon and that
         he hadn’t had his rights to own a firearm restored. McCall had also
         been convicted of four previous felonies with sentences of five
         years or longer. He cannot show a reasonable possibility that he
         would have contested, had he been aware of the element, whether
         he knew that he was a felon. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has
         explained, “a jury will usually find that a defendant knew he was a
         felon based on the fact that he was a felon.” Id. And so it’s unlikely
         that McCall would have opted for a trial by arguing that, although
         he was a felon, he didn’t actually know he was a felon. “Felony
         status is simply not the kind of thing that one forgets.” Id. (quota-
         tion omitted).
                Against this, McCall, citing United States v. Dominguez Be-
         nitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), argues that a guilty plea accepted in vio-
         lation of due process is a structural error that requires automatic
         reversal of his guilty plea. But, in that case, the Supreme Court
         only commented that when “a criminal conviction obtained by
         guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights
         he was putatively waiving, the conviction must be reversed.” Id.
         at 84 n.10 (emphasis added). In saying so, the Supreme Court cited
         a case where there was no plea colloquy at all. See Boykin v. Ala-
         bama, 395 U.S. 238, 239 (1969) (noting that “the judge asked no
         questions of petitioner concerning his plea”). In this case, however,
         there was an extensive colloquy. And we’ve applied plain error re-
         view where a plea colloquy omitted the knowledge-of-status
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         18-15229                Opinion of the Court                          13

         element. United States v. McLellan, 958 F.3d 1110, 1120 (11th Cir.
         2020).
                Thus, the district court did not plainly err in accepting
         McCall’s guilty plea without advising him of the knowledge-of-sta-
         tus element.
                                 C. Serious Drug Offenses
                McCall argues that his three drug convictions under section
         893.13(1)(a) are not “serious drug offenses” under the Armed Ca-
         reer Criminal Act or “controlled substance offenses” under the sen-
         tencing guidelines. McCall is mistaken.
                The Armed Career Criminal Act defines a “serious drug of-
         fense” as an “offense under [s]tate law, involving manufacturing,
         distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute,
         a controlled substance . . . , for which a maximum term of impris-
         onment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. §
         924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The guidelines similarly define a “controlled sub-
         stance offense” as an “offense under federal or state law, punishable
         by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
         manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a con-
         trolled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . .
         with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dis-
         pense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
                 Florida law provides that “a person may not sell, manufac-
         ture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or de-
         liver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a). We have
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         14                     Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

         previously held that a violation of section 893.13(1)(a) is both a se-
         rious drug offense and a controlled substance offense. See United
         States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Section
         893.13(1) of the Florida Statutes is both a serious drug offense and
         a controlled substance offense.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, all
         three of McCall’s prior drug convictions—all under section
         893.13(1)(a)—are valid predicates.
                 Neither of McCall’s counterarguments are persuasive. First,
         McCall argues that section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is indivisible. But we’ve
         already concluded that the statute is divisible. Spaho v. U.S. Att’y
         Gen., 837 F.3d 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that section
         “893.13(1)(a)(1) was divisible”). McCall acknowledges this prece-
         dent but argues that Donawa v. U.S. Attorney General, 735 F.3d
         1275 (11th Cir. 2013) controls. But we rejected this precise argu-
         ment in Spaho, where we explained that Donawa “addressed a dif-
         ferent and narrower question.” Spaho, 837 F.3d at 1178. Accord-
         ingly, section 893.13(1)(a)(1) is divisible—and McCall doesn’t chal-
         lenge the district court’s findings following from this conclusion:
         that his Shepard documents reveal that his 1991 convictions were
         for selling cocaine (not buying it) and that selling cocaine qualifies
         as a serious drug offense.
                 Second, McCall argues that his drug convictions are not se-
         rious drug offenses or controlled substance offenses because the
         state laws he was convicted under did not require him to receive
         compensation to be convicted. But compensation isn’t part of the
         definition of a serious drug offense or controlled substance offense.
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         18-15229                Opinion of the Court                        15

         As we’ve said, a “serious drug offense” involves “manufacturing,
         distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute,
         a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). A “controlled
         substance offense” involves “the manufacture, import, export, dis-
         tribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the posses-
         sion of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, im-
         port, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). There’s
         nothing in these provisions about compensation.
                Guided by the plain language, we’ve found serious drug of-
         fenses and controlled substance offenses even where the state stat-
         ute doesn’t require compensation. See, e.g., Hollis v. United
         States, 958 F.3d 1120, 1123 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that a convic-
         tion for violating an Alabama statute prohibiting “giv[ing] away”
         controlled substances “categorically qualif[ied] as [a] predicate of-
         fense[] under both the [Armed Career Criminal Act] and the career-
         offender provision of the [g]uidelines”); United States v. Robinson,
         583 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a conviction for
         violating an Alabama statute prohibiting possession of a controlled
         substance for “other than personal use” constituted a serious drug
         offense). Compensation, in short, is irrelevant.
                Accordingly, all three of McCall’s drug convictions consti-
         tute serious drug offenses for purposes of the Armed Career Crim-
         inal Act and controlled substance offenses for purposes of the
         guidelines.
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         16                         Opinion of the Court                       18-15229

                                     D. Different Occasions
               McCall argues that the government did not meet its burden
         to prove that his May 13, 1991, and May 15, 1991, convictions oc-
         curred on “different occasions.” We disagree. 2
                Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, a defendant con-
         victed of a felon in possession charge is subject to a mandatory min-
         imum of fifteen years’ imprisonment if he “has three previous con-
         victions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
         committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. §
         924(e)(1). At issue here is the occasions clause.
                 An “occasion” is “an event, occurrence, happening, or epi-
         sode.” Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1069 (2022). The
         analysis we undertake to assess whether crimes occurred on differ-
         ent occasions is “multi-factored in nature.” Id. at 1070. The Su-
         preme Court has explained some of the factors courts might con-
         sider, including the time, place, and relationship of the crimes:
                 Timing of course matters[.] Offenses committed
                 close in time, in an uninterrupted course of conduct,
                 will often count as part of one occasion; not so [for]
                 offenses separated by substantial gaps in time or

         2
           The Supreme Court decided Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022)
         while this case was on appeal. McCall didn’t argue before the district court or
         in his initial appellate brief that the timing between the two 1991 drug offenses
         was insufficient to establish that the crimes took place on different occasions.
         Nonetheless, we gave the parties leave to file supplemental briefs in light of
         Wooden.
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         18-15229               Opinion of the Court                        17

               significant intervening events. Proximity of location
               is also important; the further away crimes take place,
               the less likely they are components of the same crim-
               inal event. And the character and relationship of the
               offenses may make a difference: The more similar or
               intertwined the conduct giving rise to the offenses—
               the more, for example, they share a common scheme
               or purpose—the more apt they are to compose one
               occasion.

         Id. at 1071. The Court explained that, “[i]n many cases, a single
         factor—especially of time or place—can decisively differentiate oc-
         casions.” Id. “Courts, for instance, have nearly always treated of-
         fenses as occurring on separate occasions if a person committed
         them a day or more apart, or at a ‘significant distance.’” Id.
                 In this case, the government met its “burden of proving by
         a preponderance of the evidence that the prior convictions more
         likely than not arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes.”
         United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (cleaned
         up). The government presented evidence that McCall sold cocaine
         to an undercover officer on May 13, 1991, and again on May 15,
         1991. These two crimes were charged in separate informations.
         They were discrete drug transactions that occurred on different
         days. This indicates that the offenses occurred on different occa-
         sions. And McCall didn’t present the district court with any evi-
         dence to the contrary. Thus, the district court didn’t err in finding,
         by a preponderance of the evidence, that the drug crimes—which
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         18                       Opinion of the Court                    18-15229

         involved two separate transactions that took place days apart—oc-
         curred on different occasions.
                In response, McCall advances five main arguments—all un-
         persuasive. First, McCall argues that “the district court’s singular
         focus on the dates of the offenses, when the governing standard
         now requires a multi-factor consideration, constitutes legal error.”
         But the Supreme Court observed that, “[i]n many cases, a single
         factor—especially of time or place—can decisively differentiate oc-
         casions.” Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1071. And it noted that “[c]ourts,
         for instance, have nearly always treated offenses as occurring on
         separate occasions if a person committed them a day or more
         apart.” Id. McCall has not identified any facts that may warrant a
         different evaluation here.
                 Second, McCall contends that his two drug offenses were
         committed on a single occasion because the offenses had “the same
         character (selling/delivering a controlled substance),” “involve[d]
         the same participants (the same undercover officer),” and “oc-
         curred in the same general location (at or near Daytona Beach).”
         But McCall’s offenses were separate drug transactions that took
         place days apart. It’s entirely consistent with ordinary language to
         say that on two occasions McCall sold controlled substances to the
         same undercover officer in Daytona Beach. Guided by ordinary
         language, the district court didn’t err in finding two occasions. Id.
         (“[I]n law as in life, it is usually not so difficult to identify an ‘occa-
         sion’: Given that the term in [the Act] has just its ordinary mean-
         ing, most cases should involve no extra-ordinary work.”).
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         18-15229                Opinion of the Court                         19

                Third, McCall argues that, because the charging documents
         said that the drug offenses took place “on or about” May 13, 1991,
         and May 15, 1991, they alleged only “approximate dates.” But
         charging documents routinely use the language “on or about” to
         refer to precise dates. In any event, the district court did not err in
         finding—based on the state having charged McCall in two separate
         informations for two separate drug transactions that were alleged
         to occur on dates two days apart—that McCall had committed
         those offenses on different occasions.
                 Fourth, McCall argues that the “occasions clause is uncon-
         stitutionally vague.” Not so. “To satisfy due process, a penal stat-
         ute must define the criminal offense (1) with sufficient definiteness
         that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited
         and (2) in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrim-
         inatory enforcement.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–
         03 (2010) (cleaned up). The occasions clause captures offenses
         “committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. §
         924(e)(1). This gives fair notice that qualifying offenses committed
         on different occasions will lead to a sentencing enhancement. In-
         deed, the term “occasion” (as used in the Act) “has just its ordinary
         meaning,” so “it is usually not so difficult to identify an ‘occasion.’”
         Wooden, 142 S. Ct. at 1071. And the occasions clause does not en-
         courage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement because courts
         must apply Wooden’s multi-factor test. Id. at 1070–71. The clause
         is not unconstitutionally vague.
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         20                     Opinion of the Court                 18-15229

                 And fifth, McCall argues that the district court violated his
         Sixth Amendment right to a jury by enhancing his sentence based
         on the dates of his drug offenses. He says that sentencing courts
         can rely on Shepard documents only to find the elements of prior
         offenses, not the facts of those prior offenses—like the offense date.
         We have rejected this argument many times. See, e.g., Dudley, 5
         F.4th at 1265 (“[D]istrict courts may rely on non-elemental facts
         contained in Shepard-approved documents when deciding
         whether a defendant’s predicate offenses were committed on occa-
         sions different from one another. . . . Any holding to the contrary
         would effectively render a sentencing judge incapable of making
         the . . . different-occasions determination as the elemental facts
         rarely ever involve the date, time, or location of crimes.”); Longo-
         ria, 874 F.3d at 1283 (“[The defendant] argues that the [d]istrict
         [c]ourt should not have looked at ‘non-elemental facts,’ the dates
         of his prior convictions, in Shepard-approved documents when de-
         ciding whether his predicate offenses were committed on different
         occasions. This argument is directly foreclosed by our prece-
         dent.”).
                The district court did not err in finding that McCall’s drug
         offenses occurred on different occasions.
                                 E. Aggravated Assault
                McCall’s final contention is that his aggravated assault con-
         viction is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal
         Act or a crime of violence under the guidelines. We’ve already
         concluded that McCall’s three drug crimes qualify as predicates
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         18-15229               Opinion of the Court                        21

         under the Act and under the guidelines. That (by itself) is enough
         to affirm. But we also agree with the district court’s conclusion
         that McCall’s aggravated assault conviction is a fourth predicate.
                 McCall concedes that we’ve held that aggravated assault un-
         der Florida law qualifies as a violent felony and a crime of violence.
         See Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328,
         1338 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that a “conviction for aggravated as-
         sault” under Florida law “qualifies as a violent felony for purposes
         of the [Armed Career Criminal Act]”); United States v. Golden, 854
         F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that “a Florida conviction for
         aggravated assault . . . constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under [sec-
         tion] 2K2.1(a)(2)”). And so McCall’s contention—that his aggra-
         vated assault conviction is not a violent felony or crime of vio-
         lence—is foreclosed by binding precedent.
                 Pushing back, McCall argues that Florida’s aggravated as-
         sault statute cannot qualify as a violent felony or crime of violence
         because an aggravated assault conviction “can be obtained where
         the defendant merely was reckless.” The Supreme Court has held
         that “[o]ffenses with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as
         violent felonies under” the Armed Career Criminal Act. Borden v.
         United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021) (plurality op.). In other
         words, the Act “sets out a mens rea requirement—of purposeful or
         knowing conduct.” Id. at 1828. Only prior convictions for pur-
         poseful or knowing conduct can qualify as predicates. Id. In
         McCall’s view, Florida’s aggravated assault statute punishes
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         22                      Opinion of the Court                   18-15229

         reckless conduct and thus falls short of this purpose or knowledge
         requirement.
                 But McCall is wrong. We recently certified this question to
         the Florida Supreme Court, asking whether Florida’s aggravated
         assault statute “require[s] specific intent.” See Somers v. United
         States, 15 F.4th 1049, 1056 (11th Cir. 2021). The Florida Supreme
         Court held that it does, explaining that aggravated assault “requires
         at least knowing conduct” and “cannot be accomplished via a reck-
         less act.” Somers v. United States, --- So. 3d ---, 2022 WL 16984702,
         at *3 (Fla. Nov. 17, 2022). Because a Florida aggravated assault con-
         viction requires purposeful or knowing conduct, McCall’s convic-
         tion satisfies Borden and qualifies as a predicate. 3
               In sum, the Armed Career Criminal Act requires three prior
         convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. See 18
         U.S.C. § 924(e). And guideline section 2K2.1 requires two prior
         convictions for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses.
         See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). McCall had four. As a result, we find
         no error in the district court’s sentencing enhancement.
                AFFIRMED.

         3
          McCall moved to stay this appeal pending Somers. Because the Florida Su-
         preme Court issued its opinion in Somers, his motion is DENIED.