Court Opinion

ID: 9895876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:14:08.77856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.110982
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                  September 2023 Term                          FILED
                                _____________________                 November 8, 2023
                                                                           released at 3:00 p.m.

                                      No. 22-698                       EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                       SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                _____________________                       OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                      IN RE: B.P.

        ___________________________________________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hampshire County
                         Honorable C. Carter Williams, Judge
                             Civil Action No. 21-JA-106

                                AFFIRMED
         _________________________________________________________

                               Submitted: October 18, 2023
                                Filed: November 8, 2023

Grant M. Sherman, Esq.                              Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Sherman Law Firm                                    Attorney General
Romney, West Virginia                               Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for Petitioner G.F.                        Lee Niezgoda, Esq.
                                                    Assistant Attorney General
Julie A. Frazer, Esq.                               Fairmont, West Virginia
Keaton, Frazer, Milleson, and Dante, PLLC                  Attorneys for WV DHHR
Romney, West Virginia
Guardian ad Litem

JUSTICE HUTCHISON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE WOOTON dissents and reserves the right to file a dissenting opinion.
                             SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to

de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts

without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and

shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or

neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the

finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not

overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must

affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223,

470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

              2.     “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a

question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of

review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

              3.     A parent’s absence from a child’s life because of incarceration that

results in the inability of the parent to provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical

                                             i
care, education, or supervision is a form of neglect under the definition of “neglected child”

set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018).

              4.     “A natural parent of an infant child does not forfeit his or her parental

right to the custody of the child merely by reason of having been convicted of one or more

charges of criminal offenses.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Action v. Flowers, 154 W. Va. 209,

174 S.E.2d 742 (1970).

              5.     “When no factors and circumstances other than incarceration are

raised at a disposition hearing in a child abuse and neglect proceeding with regard to a

parent’s ability to remedy the condition of abuse and neglect in the near future, the circuit

court shall evaluate whether the best interests of a child are served by terminating the rights

of the biological parent in light of the evidence before it. This would necessarily include

but not be limited to consideration of the nature of the offense for which the parent is

incarcerated, the terms of the confinement, and the length of the incarceration in light of

the abused or neglected child’s best interests and paramount need for permanency, security,

stability and continuity.” Syl. Pt. 3, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).

              6.     “‘“‘Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W.Va. Code, 49-6-5

[1977] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when

it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(b) [1977] that

                                              ii
conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.’ Syllabus Point 2, In re

R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).” Syllabus point 4, In re Jonathan P., 182

W.Va. 302, 387 S.E.2d 537 (1989).’ Syl. Pt. 1, In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435

S.E.2d 162 (1993).” Syl. Pt. 6, In re Isaiah A., 228 W. Va. 176, 718 S.E.2d 775 (2010).

              7.     “‘[C]ourts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of

parental improvement . . . where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously

threatened, and this is particularly applicable to children under the age of three years who

are more susceptible to illness, need consistent close interaction with fully committed

adults, and are likely to have their emotional and physical development retarded by

numerous placements.’ Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114

(1980).” Syl. Pt. 4, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011).

                                            iii
HUTCHISON, Justice:

              The petitioner, G.F., 1 appeals the July 13, 2022, order of the Circuit Court of

Hampshire County terminating his parental rights to his daughter, B.P. In this appeal, the

petitioner contends that the circuit court erred by adjudicating him as an abusive and/or

neglectful parent based on drug use because he was incarcerated at the time the respondent,

the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), filed the abuse

and neglect petition against him. Upon review of the parties’ briefs and oral arguments,

the submitted appendix record, and the pertinent authorities, we find that the circuit court

did not base its adjudication of the petitioner on drug use, but instead, properly adjudicated

the petitioner as a neglectful parent because of his failure to provide for B.P.’s basic needs

due to his absence from her life as a result of his incarceration. Accordingly, we affirm the

circuit court’s order.

                         I. Facts and Procedural Background

              On November 18, 2021, three days after B.P. was born, the DHHR filed a

petition alleging that her mother, T.P., had abused and/or neglected B.P. because both

tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of the child’s birth. When the petition

was filed, paternity had not yet been established. The man initially identified by T.P. as

       1
        In abuse and neglect cases, we use initials to identify the parties. See W. Va. R.
App. Proc. 40(e); see also In re L.W., 245 W. Va. 703, 706 n.1, 865 S.E.2d 105, 108 n.1
(2021).

                                              1
B.P.’s potential father was excluded by a paternity test. The petitioner was not determined

to be the father of B.P. until January 27, 2022. At that time, the petitioner was incarcerated

in the Potomac Highlands Regional Jail having been convicted of two counts of possession

with the intent to deliver a controlled substance, specifically methamphetamine, in

violation of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(a)(i) (2020). The petitioner had pled guilty

to these two felonies and was serving two terms of one to fifteen years in prison

concurrently. 2 The petitioner had been incarcerated since September 2, 2021.

              On March 1, 2022, the DHHR filed an amended petition alleging that the

petitioner had abused and/or neglected B.P. The record reflects that the DHHR used the

same petition it had filed against T.P., which included an allegation of abandonment with

respect to the unknown father. The following allegations concerning the petitioner were

added:

              On January 27, 2022, [G.F.] was determined to be the
              biological father of [B.P.]

              That [G.F.] was convicted of two counts of Possession with
              intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance: Methamphetamine
              December 1, 2021; and that [G.F.] was denied probation and
              sentenced to the penitentiary.

              Since the infant child’s birth, [G.F.] has had no contact nor has
              he provided any financial support for the infant child.

        The petitioner also pled guilty to two misdemeanors, no proof of insurance and
         2

driving while license suspended, for which he received fines.
                                              2
              The petitioner’s adjudicatory hearing was held on May 16, 2022. 3 At that

hearing, the petitioner testified that he and T.P. “just knew the same people” and were

never in a relationship. He further testified that he did not know that T.P. was a drug addict

and was unaware that she had possibly given birth to his child until he was ordered to

undergo paternity testing.    On June 29, 2022, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory

order in which it took judicial notice of the fact that the petitioner had been identified as

the boyfriend of T.P in the prior abuse and neglect proceeding that concerned her five older

children. The circuit court then found “that [G.F.’s] incarceration is due to his involvement

in drugs” and “that [G.F.] has failed to emotionally and financially support his child.”

Thus, the circuit court adjudicated the petitioner as an abusive and/or neglectful parent.

              The circuit court held the petitioner’s disposition hearing on June 28, 2022.

The DHHR presented evidence that the petitioner had declined to participate in services

offered to him in prison. The petitioner testified that he refused the recommended services

because it would require him to participate in a six-month program that could possibly

delay his release. He testified that he hoped to be paroled in a couple of months, but

acknowledged that if he was released, he had no home. He said he intended to seek

admission into a halfway house program for twelve months. He further testified that he

       3
         The petition filed against B.P.’s mother alleged “aggravated circumstances”
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-605(a)(3) (2018) because her parental rights to her
five older children had been terminated in a prior abuse and neglect proceeding.
Consequently, by the time of the petitioner’s adjudication, T.P.’s parental rights to B.P.
had already been involuntarily terminated.
                                              3
would need to obtain employment but admitted that transportation might be an issue

because his driver’s license had been suspended. The DHHR also presented testimony that

indicated that B.P. was thriving in her foster home and had a close bond with her foster

parents and her half-siblings who were residing with her.

              The circuit court entered its dispositional order terminating the petitioner’s

parental rights on July 13, 2022. In that order, the circuit court found:

                      [A]s we sit here today, [G.F.] remains incarcerated;
              however, [G.F.] testified that he plans to seek parole in
              September of 2022. This Court has no way of knowing
              whether or not [G.F.] will be granted parole in September 2022
              or whether he will be required to serve the remainder of his
              sentence of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15)
              years in the penitentiary of this state, and to delay permanency
              for the minor child, [B.P.], would be detrimental to her health,
              safety, and welfare.

The court further found that the petitioner had no plans in place to take care of or provide

for B.P. in the event he was released from prison, and thus, there was no reasonable

likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be substantially corrected in the

near future. The circuit court determined that there were no less restrictive alternatives and

that it was in B.P.’s best interests to terminate the petitioner’s parental rights. Upon entry

of the circuit court’s order, the petitioner filed his appeal with this Court.

                                               4
                                  II. Standard of Review

              Our standard of review for abuse and neglect cases is well established:

                      Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court
              are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse
              and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the
              circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
              evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
              law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These
              findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
              clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
              although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing
              court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
              conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a
              reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
              would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
              finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible
              in light of the record viewed in its entirety.

Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). We

have further explained that “a circuit court’s substantive determinations in abuse and

neglect cases on adjudicative and dispositional matters—such as whether neglect or abuse

is proven, or whether termination is necessary—[are] entitled to substantial deference in

the appellate context.” In re Rebecca K.C., 213 W. Va. 230, 235, 579 S.E.2d 718, 723

(2003). However, “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a

question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of

review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995).

                                      III. Discussion

              In this appeal, the petitioner challenges the termination of his parental rights

based on what he contends was an improper adjudication by the circuit court for drug use.

                                              5
The petitioner’s argument is quite simple: he maintains there was no evidence to support

the circuit court’s adjudication because he could not have been using drugs at the time the

abuse and neglect petition was filed against him as he had been incarcerated since

September 2, 2021, which was more than two months before B.P. was born. In support of

his argument, the petitioner relies upon syllabus point eight of In re C.S. and B.S., 247 W.

Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022), which provides:

                     For a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an
              abuse and neglect case, the child must be an “abused child” or
              a “neglected child” as those terms are defined in West Virginia
              Code § 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-
              4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court’s finding that a child is an
              “abused child” or a “neglected child” must be based upon the
              conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and
              neglect petition.

              Upon review, we agree with the petitioner that our law clearly provides that

an adjudication for abuse and/or neglect of a child must be premised upon conditions

existing at the time the abuse and neglect petition is filed. Id.; see also W. Va. Code § 49-

4-601(i) (2019). Nonetheless, we find no merit to the petitioner’s argument that he was

improperly adjudicated based upon alleged drug use. Rather, as set forth above, the circuit

court’s June 29, 2022, order indicates that the petitioner was adjudicated as a neglectful

parent because he “ha[d] failed to emotionally and financially support his child.” While

the circuit court also made a finding in the order that the petitioner was incarcerated due to

his involvement with drugs, it is clear he was adjudicated for neglecting B.P. because of

his failure to provide for her most basic needs. While we have not directly addressed

whether a parent’s inability to provide for a child’s basic needs due to incarceration can

                                              6
support a finding that the parent has been neglectful, we indicated as much in In re A.P.-1,

A.P.-2, A.P.-3, 241 W. Va. 688, 827 S.E.2d 830 (2019).

              In In re A.P.-1, the petitioner father argued that the circuit court had erred in

terminating his parental rights to his three children without first adjudicating him as an

abusive and/or neglectful parent. The abuse and neglect petition filed by the DHHR in that

case alleged that the petitioner had abused, neglected, and abandoned his children because

he was imprisoned and serving a life with mercy sentence for first-degree murder with no

parole eligibility until 2029. Id. at 690-91, 827 S.E.2d at 832-33. At the adjudicatory stage

of the proceeding, the circuit court refused to find that the petitioner had abandoned his

children because evidence at the adjudicatory hearing showed that the petitioner “remained

involved in the children’s lives through telephone conversations and cards, post-

incarceration” and that he was providing for the children financially to the best of his ability

despite being imprisoned. Id. at 691, 827 S.E.2d at 833. Even though the circuit court

refused to make a finding of abuse and/or neglect, it proceeded to terminate the petitioner’s

parental rights at a subsequent hearing after determining that the children’s best interests

“control at disposition.” Id. at 692, 827 S.E.2d at 834.

              We reversed the circuit court’s termination of the petitioner father’s parental

rights in In re A.P.-1 because a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to proceed to the disposition

phase in an abuse and neglect case absent a finding at the adjudicatory stage that the

child(ren) have been abused and/or neglected. Id. at 693, 827 S.E.2d at 835; see also Syl.

                                               7
Pt. 1, State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983) (“In a child abuse and neglect

hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W.Va.

Code, 49-6-5, it must hold a hearing under W.Va. Code, 49-6-2, and determine ‘whether

such child is abused or neglected.’ Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation

of the case.”). We also noted in In re A.P. that an abuse and neglect petition that included

appropriate allegations could support “a finding at the adjudicatory stage that a parent’s

absence due to incarceration that harms or threatens the physical or mental health of the

child is neglect.” Id. at 695 n.29, 827 S.E.2d at 837 n.29. And, indeed we find that to be

the case here.

                 West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018) sets forth the definitions of words and

terms related to abuse and neglect. Under that statute, “neglected child” is defined as a

child:

                        (A) Whose physical or mental health is harmed or
                 threatened by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child’s
                 parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with
                 necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or
                 education, when that refusal, failure, or inability is not due
                 primarily to a lack of financial means on the part of the parent,
                 guardian, or custodian;

                        (B) Who is presently without necessary food, clothing,
                 shelter, medical care, education, or supervision because of the
                 disappearance or absence of the child’s parent or custodian[.]

                                                  8
W.Va. Code § 49-1-201. We find the definition of “neglected child” in subsection (B) to

be particularly applicable when parents are absent from their children’s lives as a result of

incarceration. As Justice Workman elaborated in her separate opinion in In re A.P.,

                      The[] statutory definitions of abandonment and neglect
              are part of a body of legislation that was enacted to protect the
              welfare of children. To that end, it is essential to remember that
              “effect must be given to each part of the statute and to the
              statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of
              the legislation.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Smith v. State Workmen’s
              Comp. Comm’r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975).

                      In giving each of these statutory definitions effect so as
              to accomplish the critically important legislative purpose of
              protecting the welfare of children, one is led to the inescapable
              conclusion that an incarcerated parent can be adjudicated as
              having abandoned his or her child[ren] through evidence of
              the parent’s inability to meet even the most minimal parental
              duties and responsibilities to the child[ren]. Moreover, it is
              clear that the statutory definition of neglect encompasses not
              only abandonment, as defined by statute, 4 but also
              incarceration, so long as the factors surrounding that
              incarceration demonstrate that the parent is unable to provide
              the basic needs of his child[ren] as described in the neglect
              definition.

241 W. Va. at 696-97, 827 S.E.2d at 838-39 (Workman, J., concurring, in part, dissenting,

in part) (emphasis and footnote added). Accordingly, we now hold that a parent’s absence

from a child’s life because of incarceration that results in the inability of the parent to

provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision is a form

       4
         “‘Abandonment’ means any conduct that demonstrates the settled purpose to
forego the duties and parental responsibility to the child[.]” W. Va. Code § 49-1-201.
                                              9
of neglect under the definition of “neglected child” set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-

1-201.

              While we have concluded that parents may be adjudicated as neglectful as a

result of incarceration that prevents them from providing for their children’s basic needs,

we remain mindful that “[a] natural parent of an infant child does not forfeit his or her

parental right to the custody of the child merely by reason of having been convicted of one

or more charges of criminal offenses.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Action v. Flowers, 154 W.

Va. 209, 174 S.E.2d 742 (1970). In recognition of a parent’s natural right to custody of his

or her child(ren), we have held:

                     When no factors and circumstances other than
              incarceration are raised at a disposition hearing in a child abuse
              and neglect proceeding with regard to a parent’s ability to
              remedy the condition of abuse and neglect in the near future,
              the circuit court shall evaluate whether the best interests of a
              child are served by terminating the rights of the biological
              parent in light of the evidence before it. This would necessarily
              include but not be limited to consideration of the nature of the
              offense for which the parent is incarcerated, the terms of the
              confinement, and the length of the incarceration in light of the
              abused or neglected child’s best interests and paramount need
              for permanency, security, stability and continuity.

Syl. Pt. 3, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). In so holding, we

explained:

                     Because incarceration does not automatically result in
              termination of a person’s parental rights does not mean it may
              not affect the decision regarding permanent placement of a
              child. The reasons underlying the incarceration as well as the
              terms and conditions of incarceration can vary greatly. In some
              cases, a parent who is incarcerated may under the

                                             10
              circumstances still be able to correct conditions of abuse and
              neglect “in the near future” through participation in an
              improvement period or otherwise. In other cases, incarceration
              may unreasonably delay the permanent placement of the child
              deemed abused or neglected, and the best interests of the child
              would be served by terminating the incarcerated person’s
              parental rights. Thus while the mere fact that someone is
              incarcerated will not result in automatic termination of parental
              rights, the parental rights of an incarcerated person may be
              terminated.

Id. at 97, 717 S.E.2d at 881.

              In In re Cecil T., the father of the subject child was incarcerated after he “was

arrested in his home for selling firearms to undercover agents in violation of federal law

barring possession of firearms by a convicted felon.” Id. at 93, 717 S.E.2d at 877. He was

adjudicated as neglectful because his child was in the home at the time of his arrest and

“[his] choices placed the child in a very risky situation.” Id., (additional quotations

omitted). Accordingly, the father’s incarceration in In re Cecil T. became an issue at

disposition. Although Cecil T. was decided in the context of disposition, we find our

holding in syllabus three of that case to be applicable in the context of adjudication as well.

In that regard, there may be instances where an incarcerated parent is still able to provide

for his or her child’s minimum basic needs even though he or she is not physically present

in the child’s life. In such circumstances, a finding of neglect based on the parent’s absence

due to incarceration would not be warranted. Accordingly, “the Cecil T. factors, along

with the statutory definitions for ‘abandonment’ and ‘neglect’ in West Virginia Code § 49-

1-201, are all unquestioningly relevant to determining whether the Department has

                                              11
established that the parent is abusing or neglecting, as required by West Virginia Code §

49-4-601[.]” In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. at 697, 827 S.E.2d at 839 (Workman, J., concurring,

in part, dissenting, in part). In other words, a circuit court should consider the factors set

forth in syllabus point of three Cecil T. along with the definition of “neglected child” in

West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 in determining whether an incarcerated parent has been

neglectful of his or her child(ren).

              In this case, we find that circuit court appropriately considered all the factors

surrounding the petitioner’s incarceration in adjudicating the petitioner as a neglectful

parent. At the time the petitioner was adjudicated, he was serving two concurrent sentences

with a maximum term of fifteen years imprisonment for selling an illegal drug, notably the

same drug for which his child tested positive at birth. During the adjudicatory hearing, the

petitioner testified that he had no permanent home and that before he was incarcerated, he

“just bounced around.” He also indicated that he had no family in the area. Critically, the

petitioner had made no attempt have any contact with his child or provide for her

financially. The DHHR’s child protective services worker testified that the petitioner had

never reached out to see how B.P. “was getting along” or “to check on her welfare.”

Accordingly, we find that there was no clear error in the circuit court’s adjudication of the

                                             12
petitioner as neglectful because of his failure to support his child emotionally and

financially. 5

                 We further find that the circuit court did not clearly err in terminating the

petitioner’s parental rights. “As with all abuse and neglect proceedings, ‘the best interests

of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be made which affect children.’

Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W.Va. 399, 405, 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1989) (citation

omitted).” In re N.A., 227 W. Va. 458, 469, 711 S.E.2d 280, 291 (2011).            When the

petitioner’s disposition hearing was held, he remained incarcerated serving a sentence with

a maximum term of fifteen years. Although the petitioner testified that he thought he might

be released in a couple of months, he had no plans in place to take care of B.P. as he

intended to reside in a halfway house for twelve months. The petitioner’s inability to

provide for B.P.’s basic needs remained, and he had no prospects for correcting that

situation in the event his release from prison was, in fact, imminent. Thus, the circuit

court’s finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and

neglect could be corrected in the near future was not error. We have held:

                       “‘“Termination of parental rights, the most drastic
                 remedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition
                 of neglected children, W.Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1977] may be

       5
         While we have determined that the circuit court made the necessary findings to
support its adjudication of the petitioner as neglectful, we feel compelled to address another
finding the circuit court made in the adjudicatory order. The circuit court found that “the
ultimate form of neglect is not even knowing that your child exists.” Such a finding is not
supported by the definition of “neglected child” set forth in West Virginia Code § 49-1-
201 and it is also patently false.
                                               13
              employed without the use of intervening less restrictive
              alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable
              likelihood under W.Va. Code, 49-6-5(b) [1977] that conditions
              of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus
              Point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).’
              Syllabus point 4, In re Jonathan P., 182 W.Va. 302, 387 S.E.2d
              537 (1989).” Syl. Pt. 1, In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435
              S.E.2d 162 (1993).

Syl. Pt. 6, In re Isaiah A., 228 W. Va. 176, 718 S.E.2d 775 (2010). In addition,

                     “courts are not required to exhaust every speculative
              possibility of parental improvement . . . where it appears that
              the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened, and this is
              particularly applicable to children under the age of three years
              who are more susceptible to illness, need consistent close
              interaction with fully committed adults, and are likely to have
              their emotional and physical development retarded by
              numerous placements.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, In re R.J.M., 164
              W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, syl. pt. 4. B.P. was less than a year old and

needed permanency, security, stability, and continuity. She was thriving in her current

placement with her half-siblings. Thus, it was clearly in her best interests to terminate the

petitioner’s parental rights.

                                      IV. Conclusion

              Accordingly, the July 13, 2022, order of the Circuit Court of Hampshire

County terminating the petitioner’s parental rights is affirmed.

                                                                                   Affirmed.

                                             14