Court Opinion

ID: 9542207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:00.744637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:08.944111
License: Public Domain

Judge CASEBOLT
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert psychiatric evidence concerning heat of passion at the time of the shooting, I respectfully dissent as to part II. I concur with the majority’s disposition in part I. Further, I would not reach the issues contained in parts III and IV of the majority opinion.
I.
Expert testimony is admissible under CRE 702 if it will assist the jury either to understand other evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495 (Colo.1992). The pivotal question is whether “on this subject, can a jury from this person receive appreciable help?” People v. Williams, 790 P.2d 796, 798 (Colo.1990) (emphasis in original).
In determining admissibility, the trial court retains broad discretion and the exercise of that discretion will not be overturned in the absence of manifest error. Lanari v. People, supra.
To say that a trial court has discretion in resolving an issue means that it has the power to choose between two or more courses of action and that it is not bound in all eases to select one over the other. Colorado National Bank v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159 (Colo.1993).
To establish that a court has abused its discretion it must appear that the court’s choice of a particular course of action was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33 (Colo.1993). However, if the court misapplies the appropriate legal standard in exercising its discretion, that, too, constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Kuhn v. State, 817 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1991); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1982).
In exercising discretion under CRE 702 to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, the supreme court has ruled that the trial court must consider the elements of the particular offenses involved, the nature and extent of other evidence in the case, the expertise of the proposed expert witness, the sufficiency and extent of the foundational evidence upon which the expert witness’ ultimate opinion is to be based, and the scope and content of the opinion itself. Lanari v. People, supra.
There are two categories of topics that are potentially appropriate for expert psychiatric testimony in a case in which provoked passion manslaughter is an issue.
First, an expert may be permitted to describe the characteristics of heat of passion manslaughter in general terms and the reactions of people to highly provoking acts. Lanari v. People, supra. Such testimony should be grounded upon the expert’s specialized knowledge in the field of expertise in which the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and should not be merely an interpretation of what the law is. See People v. Williams, supra. Expert testimony concerning such conduct may be particularly helpful because it is “counterintuitive” or “contrary to common wisdom,” inasmuch as a jury may have difficulty understanding how a reasonable person can be overcome by heat of passion. See People v. Campbell, 847 P.2d 228 (Colo. App.1992).
*124Second, an expert may evaluate a particular defendant’s conduct at the time of the commission of the crime, and may render an opinion that the defendant’s conduct was consistent or inconsistent with the state of mind required to meet the statutory culpable mental state. This testimony would be based upon the expert’s familiarity with the characteristics of a particular defendant, his or her knowledge concerning the commission of the crime, and other foundational evidence. La-nan v. People, supra. At the same time, however, an expert must avoid testifying that a particular witness is being truthful, and must not simply tell the jury what result to reach. People v. Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081 (Colo.1989).
Here, the trial court found the offer of proof tendered by defendant to be deficient, ruling that the offer did not state sufficient factual detail to support the expert’s opinions; the scope of the opinions was so broad as to be irrelevant; and the content of the expert’s opinions was too vague to be of assistance to the jury. Were I simply to disagree with the trial court, yet recognize that there were grounds to support its ruling, no abuse of discretion could be found.
However, based on my review, this determination was predicated upon an incorrect analysis and application of the legal standard required by Lanari v. People, supra, and was also manifestly unreasonable and unfair, in part because the trial court excluded the whole of the proffered evidence and in part because of the sufficiency of the offer of proof.
II.
Defendant filed a seven-page offer of proof. The global opinion to be offered can be briefly summarized: the expert would testify to the degree of provocation necessary to produce an irresistible passion in a reasonable person and the psychological reactions of persons to highly provoking conduct, including examples to the jury of highly provoking conduct and how reasonable people might react to such provocation. The expert would farther offer the opinion that the defendant was acting under the heat of passion at the time of the offense, as a result of cumulative provocation.
The offer of proof then summarized the expertise of the proposed witness. The witness, a psychiatrist, was familiar with the psychological reactions of people in general to highly provoking acts, particularly in situations involving divorce. He was a diplómate of the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry and, for over thirty years, had been appointed by courts and hired by prosecuting and defense attorneys to evaluate criminal defendants concerning legal sanity, impaired mental condition, voluntariness of statements, witness competency, competency to proceed and to dismiss counsel, impairment of ability to form various mental states, and psychological suitability for probation. The expert had personally evaluated defendants for the presence of heat of passion and had qualified as an expert in that area at least five times previously. Further, he had worked extensively on civil cases, evaluated persons with traumatic neuroses, assessed allegations of emotional distress, and evaluated psychiatric eases for malpractice claims.
The expert was prepared to testify that defendant was suffering from a paranoid personality disorder consisting of a pervasive and unwanted tendency to interpret the actions of people as deliberately demeaning or threatening. This diagnosis was, according to the expert, severely aggravated by the disintegration of defendant’s marriage.
The offer then set forth the diagnostic criteria for that finding. It further indicated that the expert would explain the features of that disorder and its applicability to the defendant.
This was preceded and followed by a recitation of facts that supported the expert’s determination, which included the following:
1. the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage;
2. the defendant’s wife informing defendant of her romantic relationship with defendant’s best friend on the day of the shooting;
3. the arrangement of a meeting between defendant, his wife, and the best friend;
*1254. the fact that defendant’s best friend had been specifically asked by defendant to “look after” defendant’s wife by defendant while he was out-of-state;
5. previous infidelities by the defendant’s wife with good friends of the defendant;
6. during a conversation on the day of the shooting between defendant and his wife, defendant’s threats of suicide followed by assurances of love and concern from defendant’s wife;
7. the decision to take a gun to the meeting, professed by defendant to be for self-protection and as a response to his perception of threats.
The offer then described the occurrences at the meeting among the defendant, his wife, and the best friend. These included defendant’s observations of domestic intimacy between defendant’s wife and his best friend and an act of physically intimate touching between them.
The expert would opine, based upon these facts, that these events resulted in an irresistible passion that triggered defendant’s acts and that defendant was not necessarily planning murder.
The offer of proof then explained how the expert would assist the jury in understanding the way in which those provocations affected defendant, explaining the psychological process and the manner in which the actions provoked feelings of loss, rage, humiliation, panic, and fear.
The offer continued by setting forth the expert’s view that people do not generally understand the ability of one person to provoke an irresistible passion in another and that such ability is generally underestimated. The expert would opine that, in eighty percent of those cases that he had examined to determine the presence of heat of passion, he was unable to conclude that it existed, but in defendant’s ease, he believed that it did exist.
The expert further offered to assist the jury in determining whether a sufficient interval of time had passed between the provoking events for defendant to have heeded a voice of reason and offered to explain the factors involved in determining a sufficient cooling off period. He would opine that defendant did not have a sufficient interval of time to heed the voice of reason.
Finally, the expert would have advised the jury that heat of passion was different from being insane or suffering from an impaired mental condition, and proposed to tell the jury why.
As a basis for these opinions, the expert proffered that he had met with and evaluated defendant for seven to eight hours, that he had reviewed all the police reports, collected information about defendant’s responses to various stresses and situations, and discussed defendant’s fantasies and facts of his life with defendant.
The trial court, in analyzing this offer of proof, looked first at the nature and extent of other evidence. It determined that defendant’s testimony did not “clearly establish that he acted in the heat of passion,” noting, however, that defendant had testified that his conduct was impulsive, inexplicable, and unremembered. The court then described the evidence concerning the events of the day of the shooting and pointed out various inconsistencies between defendant’s trial testimony and his statements to the expert and differences between defendant’s testimony and that of other witnesses.
The record reflects, however, defendant’s testimony that he spent the day of the shooting in an emotional turmoil and that he was overcome by depression, shock, grief, and sadness. He further testified that the shooting was “an emotional thing” and that he “just kind of snapped” after seeing the physical contact between his wife and best friend. Indeed, as noted above, the court’s finding even acknowledges that defendant had testified that his conduct was impulsive and inexplicable.
This testimony provides at least some evidence concerning heat of passion. Furthermore, a heat of passion instruction was given at trial; hence, the trial court must have already concluded that there was sufficient evidence to justify the instruction and, correspondingly, sufficient evidence to prove that fact if the jury believed the proffered evidence.
*126Reliance upon “inconsistencies” in the evidence as a ground for excluding the expert’s testimony invades the province of the fact-finder. See McCune v. People, 179 Colo. 262, 499 P.2d 1184 (1972) (once expert is qualified, credibility and weight of the testimony is a jury question); People v. Jiminez, 187 Colo. 97, 528 P.2d 913 (1974) (it is the jury’s function to resolve conflicts in the evidence).
In my view, the trial court misunderstood and misapplied the element of “the nature and extent of the other evidence” set forth by the supreme court in Lanari v. People, supra. I read that opinion to indicate, inter alia, that, under that factor, the trial court should decide whether there is sufficient evidence to support the introduction of the opinions of the expert to determine a fact in issue without regard to countervailing evidence, and it should determine whether the opinions will assist the trier of fact in understanding the other evidence in the case. I do not read the opinion as directing the trial court to engage in a credibility analysis or to balance or weigh the facts presented for this purpose.
Nor was this misapplication, in my view, limited only to the discussion concerning the nature and extent of the other evidence in the case. Rather, the trial court continued to engage in such an analysis in determining whether the expert had a sufficient foundation upon which to base an opinion that defendant was acting under heat of passion.
For example, the court recited conflicting testimony of several witnesses and concluded that the expert did not state which version of the evidence he had relied upon in reaching his conclusions and did not state whether and to what extent his opinion would be altered if he were to assume the truth of certain statements. The trial court relied upon this conflict in determining that the offer did not state sufficient factual detail to support the expert’s opinions and that the scope of the opinions was so broad as to be irrelevant. In contrast, I do not perceive that the expert needs to set forth how his opinion would be altered by any conflict in the evidence. Rather, this area should be reserved for cross-examination after the opinion has been received.
Thus, while the trial court concluded that the offer of proof set forth few, if any, facts upon which the expert relied in forming his opinions, I believe that it reached that conclusion via a misanalysis and misapplication of the standard set forth by the supreme court in Lanari v. People, supra.
In summary, I believe that the trial court misapplied the relevant standards in exercising its discretion in this matter. Further, because of the sufficiency of the offer of proof and the importance of the proffered opinion to the defendant’s defense, see Miller v. District Court, 737 P.2d 834 (Colo.1987); People v. Campbell, supra, the trial court’s ruling was manifestly unreasonable. Thus, I would find an abuse of discretion and would, accordingly, reverse the order.
Because of these views, I would not reach defendant’s contention that the exclusion of this evidence violated his constitutional right to present a defense, nor his contentions concerning sentencing.