Court Opinion

ID: 9587183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:56.801991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:22.656417
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J., Dissenting.
I agree that the instant case is a proper one for review by a writ of prohibition but I cannot agree with the reasoning followed by the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in arriving at that result.
It is fundamental that a court, whether it is a trial or appellate court, has the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. (In re Grove Street, 61 Cal. 438; Clary v. Hoagland, 6 Cal. 685; Cohen v. Barrett, 5 Cal. 195; In re Meisner, 30 Cal.App.2d 290 [86 P.2d 124]; In re Wyatt, 114 Cal.App. 557 [300 P. 132] ; Fitzpatrick v. Sonoma County, 97 Cal.App. 588 [276 P. 113] ; In re Tassey, 81 Cal.App. 287 [253 P. 948] ; Dillon v. Dillon, 45 Cal.App. 191 [187 P. 27]; 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 113.) The general rule is stated in 21 Corpus Juris Secundum, Courts, section 113. "Every court has judicial power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and *474to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction. ’ ’ And as a necessary corollary to that proposition it has jurisdiction to decide the jurisdictional question wrongly as well as rightly. (Portnoy v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 375 [125 P.2d 487]; In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 [122 P.2d 22]; Truck Owners etc., Inc. v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 146 [228 P. 19]; Morehouse v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.App. 38 [12 P.2d 133].) These things are conceded by the opinion of the chief justice but it goes on to say that once it has decided the question erroneously and is proceeding to exercise that jurisdiction it may be restrained by a higher court from exercising it; that at that stage jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction has been exercised, implying that thereafter the court does not have jurisdiction because it has decided erroneously, and hence one of the extraordinary writs for testing jurisdiction will lie. The fallacy in that reasoning lies in the assumption that at some stage in the proceeding the court suddenly steps from a possession of power to a lack of it when all of the time the basic question was present of whether or not it had jurisdiction.
A court may determine its jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. It is always an issue before it. (Williams v. Sherman, 36 Idaho 494 [212 P. 971].) It is probably due to the thought that if a court has jurisdiction to decide its own jurisdiction correctly or incorrectly, its determination cannot be questioned by a jurisdictional writ, that leads to the idle distinction between power to determine power and the exercise ' of the power once a favorable determination is made. The issue need not be complicated in that fashion. It is simple. Of course a court has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction, and it may be right or wrong. In either event the jurisdictional writs lie to review its decision to ascertain whether the conclusion was correct. We are assuming that the court in making its decision is passing upon a question of jurisdiction. The question still remains one of jurisdiction after the decision as well as before and hence the jurisdictional writs are available to review it. The higher court entertaining the writ may conclude that the lower court was correct in its result and deny relief or the opposite conclusion may be reached and relief granted.
Perhaps the reasoning in the majority opinion was adopted to escape the untenable position taken by the majority of this court in Portnoy v. Superior Court, supra. It was there *475stated, after declaring that a court had jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction (the constitutionality of a statute) erroneously: “In the present case both the justice’s court and the superior court on appeal have held that the ordinance is constitutional, and it cannot be said that in so holding they had exceeded their jurisdiction.” This statement is clearly contrary to the holding in the majority opinion in the case at bar. If, as conceded in the opinion of the chief justice, the issue of constitutionality goes to the jurisdiction of the court, then that issue is still present and the decision of the court on that issue was subject to review by certiorari. The issue thus boils down to the simple proposition that whenever a lower court decides a jurisdictional question its decision is subject to review by certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus or other appropriate writ. That must be so because the question involved goes to the jurisdiction of the court. This does not mean that the lower court will not be given the opportunity to first decide the jurisdictional question. That is a matter of procedure—a matter of whether and when the higher court deems it wise to intercede—all of which is involved in the problem of whether other remedies are adequate. It does not involve the controversy of whether a jurisdictional question is present.
This brings us to the question of whether such a question is involved in the instant case, remembering that we are not concerned with the accuracy of the lower court’s decision or its power to pass upon it. The constitutionality of a statute under which a court is acting goes to the jurisdiction of the court (Whitney v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. 114 [187 P. 12] ; Levy v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. 600 [38 P. 965, 29 L.R.A. 811]), and if it is unconstitutional, any order or judgment made or rendered pursuant thereto is void and subject to collateral attack. The situation is no different than if the crime charged had been committed outside the territorial limits of the area over which the court had jurisdiction or was a crime which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court. In either case the lower court would have no jurisdiction to proceed with a prosecution and a higher court could issue a prerogative writ to stay such prosecution at any point. (Antilla v. Justice’s Court, 209 Cal. 621 [290 P. 43].)
The ordinance involved is clearly unconstitutional. I have set forth in my dissenting opinion in Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2d 232, 250 [163 P.2d 704], the reasons for that conclusion and I here repeat those views.
*476There are additional factors applying to the particular provision of the ordinance involved in the instant ease, which render such provision invalid. The provision reads §44.09(a)): “No person shall solicit any contribution for any purpose by means of any box or receptacle, upon any public street, sidewalk or way, or in any public park or in any publicly owned or controlled place, except by express written permission of the Board.” (Emphasis added.) The language is broad and comprehensive. Giving effect to all of its language as must be done in interpreting an ordinance, it clearly reaches solicitation on public property whether the receptacle is carried by the solicitor, and there is no obstruction of traffic, or is placed in or on the public place and is under the supervision of an attendant, or is left unattended. All three of those aspects of the solicitation are necessarily included in the wording and cannot be separated. If the provision is invalid as to one of them it is invalid as to all. Leaving aside for the instant the authority of the officials to give permission to solicit thereunder, that is, treating the clause as an absolute prohibition against soliciting on public property by use of a receptacle, it is clearly a violation of Murdock’s right to freedom of religion. The solicitation of funds for the cause is a legitimate incident of the exercise of religious freedom. The exercise of that freedom even though receptacles are used cannot be wholly limited to places other than public property. In commenting on a statute stating that no child under certain ages shall sell any magazine or merchandise on any street or in any public place, the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 [64 S.Ct. 438, at page 443; 88 L.Ed. 645, 653]: “Concededly a statute or ordinance identical in terms with Section 69, except that it is applicable to adults or all persons generally, would be invalid. Kim-Young v. California, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Nichols v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 147,. 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313.” And later: “Street preaching, whether oral or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the highway, even for adults. While for them it cannot be wholly prohibited, it can be regulated within reasonable limits in accommodation to the primary and other incidental uses. ’ ’
*477The fact that solicitation may be made under section 44.09(a) by express permission of the public officials does not save it. Where a statute is void on its face, such as is true of subdivision (a), the mere fact that an official may give consent to the conduct does not cure it when, as far as appears, the discretion of the official is uncontrolled—is guided by no valid signposts and he may act arbitrarily. Nor need a permit be sought under such circumstances as a prerequisite to raising the constitutional question. (See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352] ; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155]; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 [59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423]; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 [58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949] ; Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 [51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264]; cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577-578 [61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1396].)
There are no standards whatsoever which the enforcing officials must follow in determining whether the permit shall be issued. The legislative body has made no determination that traffic dangers are to be avoided or fraud prevented. The refusal of the permit is not conditioned on any traffic hazard or obstruction or that the solicitor is engaged in a fraudulent scheme. In Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 [59 S,Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423], the issue was the validity of an ordinance which denied use of the streets without a permit giving no standards to the officials. The court said, at page 516: “It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.’ It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly ‘prevent’ such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right.’’ (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, we have freedom to exercise one’s religion—a right in the same class as freedom of speech. Here the ordinance does not make convenience or use of public streets a test for the standard of official action. The permit may be denied on the “mere opinion” of the official that fraud or traffic hazards may occur.
The note in 128 A.L.R. 1361 is illuminating: “While there *478is a conflict among the state court decisions as to the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution of statutes or ordinances regulating the solicitation of contribution for charitable, religious, or individual purposes by prohibiting such solicitation without a license and providing that the licensing officer or body shall issue such a license only where he deems tlie applicant a worthy person and his cause a worthy or bona fide cause, it is now settled by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that such a statute or ordinance is void, since it authorises a previous restraint upon the free exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by a licensing officer or body having no fixed standard for determining whether a license must be issued.” (Emphasis added.)
It is aptly said in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155] : “It bans unlicensed communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house, and who may distribute it. The applicant must submit to that officer’s judgment evidence as to his good character and as to the absence of fraud in the ‘project’ he proposes to promote or the literature he intends to distribute, and must undergo a burdensome and inquisitorial examination, including photographing and fingerprinting. In the end, his liberty to communicate with the residents of the town at their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer’s discretion.” (Emphasis added.) (See, also, Hoyt Bros. Inc. v. Grand Rapids, 260 Mich. 447 [245 N.W. 509].)
The only answer offered by the majority opinion to the lack of a standard for the issuance of permits is that as a test for the denial of permits there must be either fraud or an interference with the public safety or convenience. There is no mention whatsoever of those tests in section 44.09(a). The board is given unlimited power in passing upon an application for a permit. The majority opinion by judicial legislation places those standards in the ordinance. This attempt to unearth vague and uncertain standards cannot stand in the face of this court’s decision in In re Porterfield, ante, p. 91 [168 P.2d 706]. This court there struck down an ordinance requiring a license (permit) to solicit, and quoted with approval from American Law Reports as follows (page 110): “A statute or ordinance which vests arbitrary discretion with respect to an ordinarily lawful business ... in *479public officials, without prescribing a uniform rule of action, or, in other words, which authorizes the issuing or withholding of licenses . . . according as the designated officials arbitrarily choose, without reference to all of the class to which the statute or ordinance under consideration was intended to apply, and without being controlled or guided by any definite rule or specified conditions to which all similarly situated might knowingly conform,—is unconstitutional and void.” (Emphasis added.) The court then went on to say (the ordinance there was much more explicit in its standards than in the instant case) that (p. 111) “It is to be noted that section 4 of the ordinance requires that application for a license be made in writing ‘upon such forms as may be provided by said city council, a copy of which shall at all times be attached to said license. ’ The ordinance is utterly silent as to what the content of the forms shall be.” No form whatsoever is provided in the case at bar. Continuing in the Porterfield case: “Section 6 provides that at the hearing to be held by the council on each application for a license, evidence shall be received of the good moral character of the applicant and whether or not he is likely to resort to force, violence, threat, menace, coercion, intimidation or corrupt means in his proposed work of solicitation. ‘ If the city council is satisfied that said applicant is of good moral character and will not resort to force, violence, threat, menace, coercion, intimidation or corrupt means in his proposed work of solicitation, it shall direct the issuance of a license to said applicant for said purpose of solicitation upon payment of the license fee herein provided for.’ ” In the case at bar there is no mention of moral character or character of a kind likely to indulge in violence, as a standard for issuing a permit. No standard whatever is set forth. Commenting on the terms of the ordinance there involved it is said in the Porterfield case (page 111) : “We are of the opinion that on the face of the ordinance the indefinite standards which it enunciates provide a mechanism for the deprival of constitutional rights, not only on the basis of the guaranties applicable to free speech but also on the basis of those protecting the right to engage in lawful fashion in a lawful activity. It is pointed out by petitioner that the council members in the exercise of their power might very conceivably conclude that because of an applicant’s labor union affiliations or because of his attitude upon controversial labor issues he did not have the prescribed *480qualities. It is entirely possible that on occasion a majority of the council might be members of a rival labor union or they might be employers engaged in a controversy with the union represented by the applicant. Certainly the standard provided by section 6 of the Redding ordinance is entirely subjective. Bach council member is left to determine in his own mind what is ‘likely’ to be the future conduct of the applicant. The character or extent of showing necessary to satisfy the council that the applicant is of good moral character and will not resort to the activities mentioned is not set forth. Satisfaction may be circumscribed by individual whim, caprice, or personal prejudice.”
The ordinance in the case at bar cannot stand in the face of the tests applied in the Porterfield ease. The ordinance involved in that ease sought to place restrictions upon the constitutional right of freedom of speech. The ordinance in the case at bar seeks to restrict the constitutional right of freedom of religion. The ordinance in each case reposes in 6, board uncontrolled discretion to exercise arbitrary power in acting upon applications for permits to exercise such constitutional rights. The ordinance in the Porterfield case was held unconstitutional on that ground. It follows that the ordinance in the case at bar should likewise be held unconstitutional insofar as it trenches upon the constitutional right of petitioner herein.
In my opinion the writ should issue as prayed.