Court Opinion

ID: 9954149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:12:49.074716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.021221
License: Public Domain

J-A06031-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  NICOLE R. SMITH                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER N. KOCHER                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 964 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
                         No(s): FD-17-003323-017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                            FILED: March 25, 2024

       Christopher N. Kocher (“Father”) appeals from the custody modification

order related to L.K. (“Child”), born in June 2014, which awarded Nicole R.

Smith (“Mother”) and Father shared legal custody and Mother primary physical

custody of Child during the school year and Father primary physical custody

of Child during the summer.1 Father raises various claims regarding the trial

court’s credibility determinations, argues that trial court should have

____________________________________________

1 Although this appeal involves a custody action, we will use the parties’ names

in the caption “as they appeared on the record of the trial court at the time
the appeal was taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 904(b)(1). “[U]pon application of a party
and for cause shown, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to use the
initials of the parties in the caption based upon the sensitive nature of the
facts included in the case record and the best interest of the child.” Pa.R.A.P.
904(b)(2); see also Pa.R.A.P. 907(a). Neither party applied for the use of
initials in the caption. We will, however, refer to the minor involved in this
custody dispute as “Child” to protect her identity.
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maintained the prior custody determination made by a different judge and

further limited Mother’s custodial time, and asserts that the trial court abused

its discretion in failing to allocate a portion of the cost of the psychological

evaluation to Mother. After review, we affirm.

      Mother and Father were in a relationship starting in March 2013 but

never married. The parties had Child in June 2014.           They ended their

relationship in December 2016 but lived together until February 2017.

Following their separation, the parties lived in the same city. In March 2017,

Mother filed a custody complaint seeking primary physical custody of Child.

Thereafter, the trial court entered a consent order wherein the parties agreed

to share physical and legal custody of Child.

      In January 2019, because Mother’s fiancé’s job was being transferred,

Mother filed a petition to relocate with Child to North Carolina. In April 2019,

the trial court entered an interim order permitting Mother to move with Child

to her mother’s residence in Connellsville, Pennsylvania. The trial court noted

that Mother had to arrange for housing in North Carolina pending the final

relocation hearing in the case. In May 2019, the trial court entered an order

permitting Mother to permanently relocate to Raleigh, North Carolina, and

granting Mother primary physical custody and Father partial physical custody.

      Subsequently, Father filed a motion to modify custody, seeking primary

physical custody of Child.    Father alleged that Mother had left her then-

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husband and moved with Child to Bridgeport, West Virginia,2 which was near

her new boyfriend, without notice.

       The case proceeded to a four-day custody trial before the Honorable

Jennifer Satler.     Judge Satler weighed the custody factors set forth at 23

Pa.C.S. § 5328(a),3 and found four of the custody factors (1, 4, 9, 13) favored

Father, while the remaining factors were neutral or inapplicable. Judge Satler

particularly noted that Father could provide more stability to Child, as he has

lived in his residence since 2013, while Mother had moved multiple times and

could not provide the same level of stability. Ultimately, on December 28,

2020, Judge Satler entered an order granting the parties shared legal custody,

Father primary physical custody during the school year, Mother partial

physical custody during the school year, and the parties alternating custody

week-by-week in the summer.

____________________________________________

2 Mother indicated that four days after she moved to North Carolina, she ended

the relationship with her new husband and moved back to Pennsylvania.
Shortly thereafter, she moved to Bridgeport.

3 The Custody Act provides a non-exhaustive list of the sixteen factors a court

is required to consider to determine the best interests of the child. 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 5328(a). “All of the best interest factors ... are required to be considered
by the trial court when entering a custody order.” D.Q. v. K.K., 241 A.3d
1112, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and brackets omitted). The trial court,
as the finder of fact, determines “which factors are most salient and critical in
each particular case.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Additionally, in any custody action, the trial court must “delineate the reasons
for its decision on the record in open court or in a written opinion or order.”
23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(d). As Father’s appeal does not relate specifically to the
trial court’s consideration of the custody factors, we do not list them here.

                                           -3-
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       In June 2021, Mother filed a petition to modify custody, seeking primary

physical custody and shared legal custody.       Mother argued that she could

provide Child a stable living environment and that Father fails to coparent or

consider Mother’s custodial rights regarding Child, including prohibiting her

involvement in Child’s life. Because Judge Satler had been reassigned to the

criminal division, the case was assigned to the Honorable Nicola Henry-Taylor.

After several failed conciliations, Father filed an answer and counter-petition

to Mother’s petition, seeking sole legal custody and shared physical custody

of Child, which would grant him more time with Child in the summer and less

weekend time for Mother. In support of his counter-petition, Father indicated

that Mother disparaged him in the presence of Child and instructed Child in

Wicca4 and how to put curses on people.5 Father also filed two motions for

special relief: (1) requesting psychological evaluations of both parties, Child,

____________________________________________

4 Wicca “is a neo-pagan, polytheistic, and pantheistic faith based on beliefs

that predate Christianity.” Knowles v. Pfister, 829 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir.
2016). The religion “affirms the existence of supernatural power (such as
magic) and of both male and female deities who inhere in nature and that
emphasizes    ritual    observance   of   seasonal    and    life  cycles.”
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Wicca (last visited Mar. 14,
2024).

5 Notably, in West Virginia, Mother owns and operates Indigo Moon, LLC, which

the trial court describes as a “‘new age/metaphysical shop’ selling crystals,
herbs, incense, and related merchandise as well as providing personal services
such as tarot reading and reiki. Certain items sold at Indigo Moon are …
connected with Wicca … and the business attracts a certain clientele who are
favorably disposed toward Wicca.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 3
(unnumbered).

                                           -4-
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and any other essential parties and (2) requesting an order forbidding Mother

from indoctrinating Child in Wicca without his consent.

      On October 28, 2022, the trial court entered an order prohibiting Mother

from exposing Child to Wicca beliefs, discussions, or events without Father’s

express consent or an order from the court. On the same date, the trial court

entered an order directing the performance of psychological evaluations with

the cost of the evaluation to be paid by Father, subject to reallocation.

      The trial court appointed psychologist Patricia Pepe, Ph.D., of Allegheny

Forensics as the psychological evaluator. In conducting her evaluation, Dr.

Pepe interviewed Mother, Father, and Child; observed family interactions; was

given other collateral information from the parties, including information about

Mother’s GoFundMe crowdfunding campaign to aid in the child custody dispute

and classes offered by Indigo Moon involving Wicca; and spoke with the

coparenting mediator, Karen Firestine (“Firestine”), and Child’s therapist,

Danielle Parrish (“Parrish”).   Thereafter, Dr. Pepe submitted a report and

recommendations, noting multiple concerns related to Mother engaging in

alienating behavior against Father, the amount of time Child spends at

Mother’s store, and Child’s knowledge of Mother’s GoFundMe page. Dr. Pepe

suggested restricting Mother’s custodial time with Child and awarding Father

primary legal custody and primary physical custody for longer periods.

      On March 15, 2023, the parties engaged in a pretrial conciliation with

the Judge Henry-Taylor. Because they were unable to resolve matters, Judge

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Henry-Taylor scheduled a custody trial. Prior to the scheduled trial, however,

Judge Henry-Taylor recused herself sua sponte and the Honorable Chelsa

Wagner was assigned to the case. Father requested an updated psychological

evaluation because Mother’s parental alienation had worsened since Dr. Pepe’s

original evaluation of Mother. Judge Wagner denied the request.

      The matter proceeded to trial at which, inter alia, Mother, Father,

Father’s fiancée, Lisa Citriniti, Firestine, and Dr. Pepe testified; Child did not

testify. Following trial, Judge Wagner discounted Dr. Pepe’s testimony and

recommendations, finding that she harbored bias against Mother and did not

approve of Mother’s lifestyle or beliefs related to Wicca, which contributed to

her final opinion. Judge Wagner noted that there was no evidence that Mother

practiced Wicca, or how any of that information impacted Child. Additionally,

Judge Wagner found Dr. Pepe’s opinion was based upon Father’s version of

the facts, which the judge found incredible. Judge Wagner found Mother’s

testimony to be credible.

      Judge Wagner weighed the custody factors set forth at section 5328(a),

and found five of the custody factors (1, 4, 9, 10, 13) favored Mother, factor

(2) favored Father, and the remaining factors were neutral or inapplicable.

Ultimately, Judge Wagner entered an order awarding the parties shared legal

custody, Mother primary physical custody and Father partial physical custody

of Child during the school year, and Father primary physical custody and

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Mother partial physical custody of Child during the summer. Father filed a

timely appeal and a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.

      Father raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Did the Trial Court erred [sic] and/or abuse its discretion in
         “discounting and disregarding” the testimony, Evaluation and
         Recommendations of its own witness, sua sponte, after Trial
         when no grounds for impeachment were raised during Trial[?]

      2. Did the [Trial] Court err and/or abuse its discretion in
         determining, sua sponte, that L.K could know about Court
         Proceedings and Father’s testimony on her own and that there
         was no parental alienation as indicated by the Court’s own
         expert witness, whenever the Court did not even interview
         L.K.[?]

      3. Did the [Trial] Court err and/or abuse its discretion in not only
         discounting     and    disregarding   the      Evaluation    and
         Recommendations of his own expert witness, but totally
         reversing the Honorable Jennifer Satler’s Order of Court and
         granting Mother primary physical Custody of L.K. when the
         Court’s Expert’s Recommendation was that Mother’s custodial
         time should be limited due to her parental alienation[?]

      4. Did the Trial Court err and/or abuse its discretion in not
         allocating a portion of the cost of the Psychological Evaluation
         to Mother[?]

Father’s Brief at 4-5.

      Our standard of review in this case is deferential:

      We review a trial court’s determination in a custody case for
      an abuse of discretion, and our scope of review is broad. Because
      we cannot make independent factual determinations, we must
      accept the findings of the trial court that are supported by the
      evidence. We defer to the trial judge regarding credibility and the
      weight of the evidence. The trial judge’s deductions or inferences
      from its factual findings, however, do not bind this Court. We may
      reject the trial court’s conclusions only if they involve an error of
      law or are unreasonable in light of its factual findings.

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C.A.J. v. D.S.M., 136 A.3d 504, 506 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

      “With any child custody case, the paramount concern is the best

interests of the child.”   M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 334 (citation omitted).      “This

standard requires a case-by-case assessment of all the factors that may

legitimately affect the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-being of

the child.”   Id. (citation omitted).

      In his first claim, Father contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in discounting and disregarding Dr. Pepe’s testimony. Father’s Brief

at 14. Father argues that the trial court’s finding that the psychologist was

biased against Mother and unduly focused on Mother’s connection to Wicca or

Satanism is not supported by the record. Id. at 15, 18, 20-21. Father states

that Dr. Pepe did not testify to any of these topics during direct examination

and were barely mentioned in her report. Id. at 15-16. According to Father,

it is the trial court, not the psychologist, who repeatedly mentioned Wicca and

Satanism in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See id. at 18. Father asserts that he

testified to Wicca events because Mother had disregarded a prior order

entered by Judge Henry-Taylor, which prevented Mother from exposing Child

to Wicca beliefs or discussion without Father’s consent or order of the court.

Id. at 17; see also id. (noting that Father and Mother had shared legal

custody and they had to discuss any religious decisions). Father also claims

that the trial court could not impeach its own expert witness because she

testified consistent with her report. Id. at 18-21. Likewise, Father argues the

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trial court could not have ascertained that its own witness was biased, as it

did not question or discredit her. Id. at 18, 20-21.

      We have previously discussed the interplay between the trial court and

a testifying expert in a child custody matter:

             The trial court [is] under no obligation to delegate its
      decision-making authority to [an expert witness]. It is an abuse
      of discretion, however, for a trial court to dismiss as unpersuasive,
      and to totally discount, uncontradicted expert testimony.
      Accordingly, while a trial court is not required to accept the
      conclusions of an expert witness in a child custody case, it must
      consider them, and if the trial court chooses not to follow the
      expert’s recommendations, its independent decision must be
      supported by competent evidence of record.

M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 20 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      Regarding Dr. Pepe’s references to Wicca and Satanism, we observe the

following from the expert report submitted into evidence:

            Events [at Indigo Moon] include “New Moon” events,
      seemingly occurring late at night. Included are classes related to
      Wicca. Included in the flyer [provided to the psychologist by
      Father] are images of pentagrams, which is often used to
      represent Satanism. I cannot imagine an eight-year-old exposed
      to such symbolism and how she makes sense of the image. While
      I am making every attempt to be open minded and objective, I
      just cannot help being concerned of the potential impact on a
      young child.

                                     ***

            I am not being biased toward the position of Wicca. It is
      defined as a modern syncretic, pagan religion. And certainly, we
      have a right to religious freedom. My concern is using pentagrams
      on the advertisements for [Mother’s] classes. A pentagram is
      drawing a circle around the five points used by Wiccans and in
      paganism. And while it may be innocuous, it is also the most

                                      -9-
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       notable and widespread symbol of Satanism. I simply cannot
       imagine what impact this symbolism has for an eight-year-old
       child.

Father’s Exhibit V (Dr. Pepe Report), at 17, 19.

       During her testimony, Dr. Pepe made a single reference to Wicca, which

occurred on cross-examination by Mother’s counsel6 in response to a question

about her conversations with the coparenting counselor:

       What I said to [the coparenting mediator], what we discussed is
       what I wrote in my summary. I did ask her, which I don’t have in
       my summary, … what her thoughts were about the implications of
       [W]icca and did she have concerns about that and were any of
       those issues topics in co-parenting.

Id. at 239. Dr. Pepe did not recall what the coparenting counselor stated but

noted that she wrote her summary with this information. Id.

       The record further reflects that the parties extensively introduced

evidence regarding Mother’s exposure of the Child to Wicca throughout trial,

including citing the order entered by Judge Nicola-Taylor prohibiting Mother

from talking about Wicca. See, e.g., N.T., 6/30/2023, at 31, 32, 39, 41, 68-

69, 70-71, 140, and N.T., 6/29/2023, at 210-11, 215 (various references to

Wicca during Father’s testimony); N.T., 6/29/2023, at 165-66, 174-75

(Firestine’s testimony about Father’s concerns about Wicca); N.T., 6/27/2023,

at 30-32, 39, 68, 167-71, 180-81, 189-90, 213-16, 229-30, 232 (Mother

responded to questions during direct and cross-examination regarding Wicca,

____________________________________________

6 Father called Dr. Pepe as a witness and Mother cross-examined Dr. Pepe.

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and Mother stated that she is not a Wiccan, paganist, or Satanist); see also

N.T., 6/30/2023, at 33 (wherein the trial court indicated the issue of Child’s

exposure to Wicca was before the court).

      Father sought to make Mother’s exposure of Child to Wicca and the

nature of Mother’s business/clientele an issue of concern in the case and a

basis for the trial court to reject Mother’s request for increased custodial time

with Child. The trial court, however, found that Father offered no credible

evidence that exposure to Wicca caused any detriment to Child. Trial Court

Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 15-16. Notably, the trial court determined that there

was no evidence that Mother follows or practices Wicca, finding Mother’s

testimony on this topic to be credible. See id. at 7; Memorandum and Order,

8/14/2023, at 21 (unnumbered); see also N.T., 6/27/2023, at 30, 216.

      The issue of Child’s exposure to Wicca was raised throughout the trial,

including through the psychologist’s report and testimony, and the trial court

was free to weigh this evidence and the credibility of those who presented it

in rendering its decision. Throughout his brief, Father essentially asks us to

reject the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations in favor of the

factual findings and credibility determinations that he proposes and to reweigh

the evidence in his favor. This we cannot do. See S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d

905, 913-14 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“[W]ith regard to issues of credibility and

weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed

and assessed the witnesses first-hand.”).         The trial court’s credibility

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determinations regarding Mother’s exposure of Child to Wicca are supported

by testimony presented at trial, and it is not the role of this Court to make

independent factual determinations.     See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 337 (noting

“[w]e must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent

evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual

determinations.”) (citation omitted).

      Turning to Father’s argument that the trial court could not impeach the

court-appointed expert, as noted above, the trial court was under no

obligation to accept the conclusions of the expert so long as the court’s

findings are supported by the competent evidence. See M.A.T., 989 A.2d at

20. The trial court found that the psychologist’s ultimate conclusions lacked

credibility, emphasizing that her opinions mirrored Father’s version of the

facts, which the court had found incredible.        See Trial Court Opinion,

10/23/2023,    at   5;   Memorandum     and   Order,   8/14/2023,    at   17-18

(unnumbered). Indeed, in addition to its credibility determinations regarding

the evidence related to Child’s exposure to Wicca, the trial court was troubled

by the fact that the expert did not communicate with Child’s therapist, Parrish,

until the day she completed the report, and her failure to request or review

records and notes from the parties’ coparenting sessions.      See Trial Court

Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 5, 30-31 (noting Dr. Pepe did not obtain Parrish’s

treatment records and did not contact Parrish until the day she authored the

evaluation); 31 (stating that Dr. Pepe’s recommendations were made in a

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factual vacuum without considering the records of Child); see also N.T.,

6/30/2023, at 222-23, 243-44. Further, the trial court highlighted that the

expert failed to account in her recommendation how the increased custodial

time with Father would have impacted Child’s relationship with Mother. See

Memorandum and Opinion, 8/14/2023, at 17-18, 19 (unnumbered).

      Moreover, the trial court found credible Mother’s testimony that she

would encourage Child’s contact with Father when she had custody; that she

had   difficulty   obtaining   information    about   Child   from   Father   and

communicating with Child while she is in Father’s care; that she does not

denigrate Father in Child’s presence; that she could help Child with her

homework and manage her dyslexia; and that she and Child had a strong

emotional bond. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 12, 13, 14, 24, 27;

Memorandum and Order, 8/14/2023, at 5, 6 (unnumbered); see also N.T.,

6/27/2023, at 44-46, 52-53 (difficulty in receiving information about Child),

54-55 (noting that Child rarely calls her when in Father’s care), 60-64, 140-

42, 146-47 (wherein Mother testified that she strives not to denigrate Father

in Child’s presence and wants Child to maintain a bond with Father), 127-28,

129, 132-33 (Mother testified that she aids Child with her homework as well

as manages Child’s dyslexia), 153 (Mother testifying about close bond with

Child). The trial court additionally found Firestine’s testimony confirmed its

credibility findings as to Mother, noting that Firestine did not find Mother to

be uncooperative or contentious any more than Father was, and that Mother

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appeared ready and willing to compromise with Father on contentious matters.

See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 3, 29.

      Given that the trial court found Mother credible, it was not manifestly

unreasonable for the trial court to have declined to follow Dr. Pepe’s

recommendation, as the recommendation would have provided Father

primary physical and legal custody of Child and less custodial time for Mother.

Considering the animosity between the parties, and Child’s love of both Mother

and Father, the trial court found that Mother exercising primary physical

custody during the school year and Father during the summer provides Child

the best opportunity to spend meaningful time with both parents.          See

Memorandum and Order, 8/14/2023, at 20 (unnumbered); see also Trial

Court Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 8-9 (noting that the new custody arrangement

allows Father to exercise time on the weekends when he is not working); 12

(finding that the custody order is in Child’s best interests, as she loves both

parents). To that end, the trial court considered the custody factors under

section 5328(a), and there is support in the record for its decision.     See

C.A.J., 136 A.3d at 506 (“We may reject the trial court’s conclusions only if

they involve an error of law or are unreasonable in light of its factual

findings.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, while the trial court considered Dr.

Pepe’s opinion, it found her recommendation to be unavailing in conjunction

with the other evidence presented. See M.A.T., 989 A.2d at 20. Accordingly,

we cannot grant Father relief on his first claim. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d

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451, 469 (Pa. Super. 2019) (noting that “it is not this Court's function to

determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must

consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given due deference to

the trial court's weight and credibility determinations,' the trial court erred or

abused its discretion in awarding custody to the prevailing party.”) (citation

omitted).

      In his second claim, Father contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in determining that there was no parental alienation and sua sponte

finding that Child had independent knowledge of the custody proceedings.

Father’s Brief at 21, 32. Father cites Dr. Pepe’s report, noting that both Dr.

Pepe and Child’s therapist, Parrish, indicated they were concerned about

Mother’s alienation of Father, which could damage Child’s relationship with

him. Id. at 22-25, 28, 29-32. To that end, Father takes issue with the trial

court’s finding that because the only evidence of alienation was related to the

court litigation (and not negative statements about Father, his fiancée, or his

family), that this somehow meant the behavior was not “parental alienation.”

Id. at 28, 32.   Father highlights that in her testimony, Firestine could not

opine whether Child was being alienated because she did not know whether

comments made by Child about the custody proceedings were based upon her

own perception of her parents’ relationship and what was occurring or if Child

was parroting statements Mother made. Id. at 31-32. Father claims that

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Firestine’s testimony meant that the trial court could not make a ruling on

alienation without hearing testimony from Child. Id. at 32.

      Additionally, Father notes that Dr. Pepe testified that Child knew too

much about the custody dispute, including that Father makes more money

than Mother, the anger between the parties, and the number of significant

others each party has had since they separated. Id. at 26-27, 30. Father

also emphasizes Dr. Pepe’s testimony that Child is physically aggressive with

Mother, which reflected a lack of empathy and unresolved anger. Id. at 28-

29.

      The trial court found that neither party “has intentionally or purposefully

acted in a manner that seeks to alienate [Child] or turn her against a party.”

Memorandum and Order, 8/14/2023, at 11 (unnumbered). The trial court

further stated the following:

             Father offered evidence and testimony seeking to show that
      Mother has engaged in behavior designed to alienate the child
      from him. Father’s contentions were supported by the custody
      evaluator, Dr. Pepe, who opined that the child “knew too much”
      about the litigation, the claims of the parties and the role of the
      judge. Testimony was offered about the child stating that “Daddy
      lied to the judge,” as the reason that Father obtained primary
      custody. Additionally, Father submitted evidence about a
      fundraiser held on behalf of Mother to raise money for her legal
      fees called “Bring our Girl Home.” Evidence suggests that [Child]
      knew about this fundraiser and its purpose, i.e., to allow Mother
      to regain custody. Father likewise attributes [Child’s] negative
      outbursts in the house to what she is being told about him while
      in Mother’s custody. For instance, [Child] has said, in a negative
      way, “You are not my mom” to [Citriniti], the fiancée.

           Mother testified to her efforts to consistently portray Father
      in a favorable light.    Mother denied providing [Child] with

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     information about the lawsuit, positing that [Child’s] knowledge of
     the legal process stems from the fact that [Child] understands that
     “something” happened in [c]ourt that caused her to move from
     West Virginia with Mother into Father’s custody in Pennsylvania –
     and that that “something” was not the decision of either parent.

            … [T]he [trial c]ourt did not ascertain any direct evidence
     showing Mother engaged in alienating behavior. To the contrary,
     from the evidence reviewed by the [trial c]ourt it appears that
     [Child] has positive feelings toward Father, loving both her
     parents very much and wishing they could “get back together.” If
     [Child] does, indeed, have more information about these legal
     proceedings than she should, the [trial c]ourt did not hear
     evidence showing that it has negatively impacted her relationship
     with Father. On this score, the [trial c]ourt believes that Father is
     once again seeking to attribute every negative occurrence or
     interaction to something done by Mother. The [trial c]ourt does
     not find the testimony of Father and his witnesses and the custody
     evaluator to be credible under this factor.

Id. at 17-18 (unnumbered).

     As discussed above, the trial court found the psychologist’s testimony

to be incredible.   See id. at 17-20 (unnumbered); see also Trial Court

Opinion, 10/23/23, at 4-5, 24. Further, the trial court found no evidence of

ongoing parental alienation, noting that although Father stated that Child

knew about the custody proceedings after visiting Mother, he refused to

provide any specific evidence or testimony of what Child would say about the

custody proceedings after her custodial visits with Mother. See Trial Court

Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 23-25; id. at 25 (finding Father’s testimony in this

regard to be incredible); see also N.T., 6/30/2023, at 153-58; N.T.,

6/29/2023, at 262-64. The trial court found credible Mother’s testimony that

she did not alienate Child against Father.         See Trial Court Opinion,

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10/23/2023, at 3-4, 12-13 (determining that Mother credibly testified that

Mother would continue to support Father’s role in Child’s life); 24 (crediting

Mother’s testimony that she did not alienate Child against Father); see also

N.T., 6/27/2023, at 58-65. The trial court also observed that Firestine did not

find Mother to be uncooperative or contentious to any greater degree than

Father, and that Mother was willing to compromise with Father on contentious

matters. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 3, 29. Although Father

blamed Mother’s attempts at alienation for the problems Child is experiencing,

the trial court found that Child’s trauma is based upon the parties’ conflict, not

any information about the custody dispute. See id. at 23; see also id. at 12

(citing testimony by Dr. Pepe stating that Child is suffering because her

parents cannot get along).

      We reiterate that we must defer to the factfinder for issues concerning

credibility and weight of the evidence. See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 337. Here,

Father again appears to be requesting that this Court make new factual

findings or to reweigh the evidence and testimony presented by Dr. Pepe and

Firestine. Once again, we decline to do so. See C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d

441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting this Court must “accept findings of the

trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role

does not include making independent factual determinations.”) (citation

omitted); see also A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“The

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parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on

evidence.”). Accordingly, we cannot grant Father relief on his second claim.

       In this third claim, Father contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by reversing Judge Satler’s original custody determination and

ignoring the expert’s recommendation that Mother’s custodial time be limited.

Father’s Brief at 33. Father argues that after Dr. Pepe released her report,

Mother’s alienation of Child became worse, but the trial court refused his

request for a new evaluation. Id. at 33-34. According to Father, in advocating

for less custodial time for Mother he was merely following Dr. Pepe’s

recommendations, which invited the trial court’s disdain of him and resulted

in him being guilty by association with the psychologist.         Id. at 34-35.

Additionally, Father argues the trial court evidenced bias against him by calling

the proposed order he submitted “Draconian’,” and comparing “Father’s

motives to salad being on the menu at Domino’s.” 7 Id. at 33. Father claims

that the trial court’s finding that the psychologist was biased was not

____________________________________________

7 More specifically, the trial court stated that “Mother’s custodial proposal
strikes a note of optimism and magnanimity; Father’s is punitive and
draconian.” Memorandum and Order, 8/14/2023, at 15. Further, as to the
Domino’s menu simile, the trial court stated: “In his Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal, Father posits that he only sought this order to
protect L.K. from ‘Parental Alienation.’ Father’s proposed order is no more
about the prevention of parental alienation than the Domino’s Pizza Menu is
about salad — it may be on the menu, but it is far from the point.” Trial Court
Opinion, 10/23/2023, at 32-33.

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supported by the competent evidence and he seeks the entry of a new order,

which follows Dr. Pepe’s recommendations. Id. at 36.

      Preliminarily, we observe that Father cites to no case law to support

this contention. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the appellant’s argument

must be supported by pertinent citation to authority). The failure to do so

waives the claim raised on appeal. See C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272,

1276 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“It is well-established that the failure to develop an

argument with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent authority results in waiver

of that issue on appeal.”).

      Even if not waived, we reject Father’s contention that Judge Wagner

could not enter a modified custody order that differed from the existing

custody order entered by Judge Satler. “Upon petition, a court may modify a

custody order to serve the best interest of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5338(a);

see also J.P. v. J.S., 214 A.3d 1284, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Petitions for

modification of custody orders may be entertained at any time without regard

to whether there have been any material changes which would warrant a

reevaluation.”) (citation omitted).   Judge Wagner was not bound by Judge

Satler’s determination because she found modification was in Child’s best

interest. See K.D. v. E.D., 267 A.3d 1215, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting

that the trial court was not bound by a prior judge’s order because the

modification served the best interest of the children).

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      At bottom, Father’s claim on appeal is that Judge Wagner was biased

against him based upon her ruling adverse to him. Although he claims bias,

he does not seek Judge Wagner’s recusal. Even if he had, it is well settled

that “[a]dverse rulings alone do not establish the requisite bias warranting

recusal, especially where the rulings are legally proper.” Arnold v. Arnold,

847 A.2d 674, 681 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Father also supports his argument with Dr. Pepe’s testimony and his

request to have such testimony reweighed in his favor. To this end, Father

seeks for this Court order that custody be modified in accord with the

evaluator’s recommendation. As repeatedly stated throughout this decision

in response to this request, we cannot reweigh Dr. Pepe’s evidence in Father’s

favor. See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 337. Although Father correctly cites to some

harsh language in the trial court’s opinion that, in our view, is wholly

unnecessary for the disposition of the case, Father has not presented sufficient

argument to establish bias stemming from the trial court’s credibility

determinations to allow for reversal on that basis. Accordingly, we cannot

grant relief on Father’s third claim.

      In his final claim, Father contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to allocate a portion of the costs of psychological evaluation

to Mother. Father’s Brief at 36-37. Father argues that the cost of the court-

appointed psychologist is shared by the parties, usually in proportion of their

income.   Id. at 37, 39. Father asserts that the trial court’s reasoning for

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failing to reallocate the costs—requiring Father to pay for the evaluation

because he, and not Mother, requested it, and Father was not granted the

outcome he sought—is erroneous, as the trial court appointed Dr. Pepe and

he had no idea what she would state in the report. Id. at 38-39. Father

claims that the allocation of fees has never depended on the party who gains

relief. Id. at 38. Father seeks remand for a hearing on the allocation of fees

with a new judge, as Judge Wagner made up her mind on the issue. Id. at

39-40.

      Our review of a trial court’s allocation of expert fees is for an abuse of

discretion. Pavex, Inc. v. York Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 716 A.2d 640, 647

(Pa. Super. 1998).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.8 provides, in relevant part:

      The court may order the child(ren) and/or any party to submit to
      and fully participate in an evaluation by an appropriate expert or
      experts. ... In entering an order directing an evaluation pursuant
      to this rule, the court shall consider all appropriate factors,
      including the following, if applicable:

      (1) the allocation of costs, including insurance coverage, if any,
      attendant to the undertaking of the evaluation and preparation of
      the resultant report and court testimony of any appointed
      expert[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8(1). The Rule was “intended to afford the trial court and the

parties a more flexible and case-sensitive means of determining the scope and

parameters of a physical and/or mental examination, including deadlines,

costs, underlying data, and access.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8, cmt.

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      Here, Father does not cite to any relevant statute or case law to support

his claim that the trial court’s determination that he pay the evaluator’s fees

was an abuse of discretion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Indeed, Father fails to

support his assertion that these fees are always divided between the parties

in a custody action in any respect. The record reflects that Father requested

the evaluation and Judge Nicola-Taylor indicated he would bear the costs of

the psychologist.   Under the circumstances, we do not find that the court

abused its discretion in its allocation of expert fees to Father.

      Based upon the foregoing, and the standard by which we must review

the issues raised, we find no abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the trial

court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

 3/25/2024

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