Court Opinion

ID: 9567589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:58.687309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:41.878636
License: Public Domain

Owsley, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur with the opinion of the majority that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence and that the case should be reversed and remanded on that ground. I disagree with the majority opinion in its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. A meticulous search of the record fails to reveal any knowledge on the part of defendant White as to what his passenger, Holloway, was going to do or had done. There was not only lack of knowledge on the part of defendant, but there was nothing in the record upon which suspicion could have been predicated that Holloway was going to do anything other than what he stated to the defendant.
An excellent expression of the law which I feel should be applied in this case is contained in People v. Hill, 77 Cal. App. 2d 287, 175 P. 2d 45 (1946):
“It is to be observed that there is not a word of testimony that appellant had previous knowledge of the felonious purpose entertained by his two guests. The only possible support for his conviction must therefore be found in reasonable inferences deducible from the testimony and the circumstances. The incriminating circumstance was appellant’s driving the men to the cafe and waiting in his automobile while they visited the place.
“By all the evidence favorable to the state’s contention nothing was established but a suspicion of appellant’s guilt. The testimony of the People’s witnesses is devoid of act or word that may be interpreted as competent proof of *867a crime. If the trial court had believed the two convicts and appellant, the latter’s conviction could not have resulted for they completely exculpated him. If it disbelieved them, as of course it was privileged to do, a conviction was out of the question, for the record discloses that the total of the state’s evidence is wanting in the essentials of proof of an established crime. To suspect an accused is the privilege of prosecutor, judge or layman when he has been found in the company of criminals. But to put the brand of infamy upon a person because he has been brought to the bar can find no justification in law or morals. To do so is to disregard legal principles, long cherished. Appellant entered the courtroom clothed with the presumption of innocence which shielded him until his guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Martinez, 57 Cal. App. 771, 774 [208 P. 170].) This could have been done only by substantial proof that he knowingly assisted the robbers to accomplish their purpose or to escape detection after he had gained knowledge of the crime.” (p.292.)
Although I find no similar expression in our Kansas cases, ample authority to the same effect is found in Isaac v. State, _ Ind. _, 274 N. E. 2d 231 (1971); People v. Caruso, 68 C. 2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336, 436 P. 2d 336 (1968); Goodwin v. United States, 347 F. 2d 793, (D. C. Cir. 1965); State v. Aycoth, 272 N. C. 48, 157 S. E. 2d 655 (1967); People v. Hudson, 29 Mich. App. 285, 185 N. W. 2d 134 (1970).
The effect of the court’s majority opinion is startling. It means the driver of an automobile may be held responsible for all criminal acts of his passengers without a showing that he had any knowledge of their illicit purposes and without a showing of any facts from which the driver could reasonably be expected to know of such purposes.
In criminal appeals the guilt or innocence of the defendant is seldom the issue on appellate review. Under the leadership of the Supreme Court of the United States, this court, as well as others, has assumed the role of a jealous guardian of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. In many instances defendants, admittedly guilty, seek and frequently obtain exoneration for their crimes, based on a violation of constitutional safeguards.
It appears from the decision of the majority of this court that insufficiency of evidence to convict does not enjoy the judicial popularity of constitutional technicalities. I would reverse the trial court and discharge the defendant.
*868Pbager, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.