Court Opinion

ID: 2963865
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:26.43325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:47.596827
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1291

                                    UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    ROBERT WIHBEY,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

        No. 95-1394

                                    UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   CLAUDE WHITMAN,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                 [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before
                                Cyr, Boudin, and Stahl,
                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Jack St.  Clair with  whom Barbara  J.  Sweeney was  on brief  for
            _______________            ____________________
        appellant Wihbey.
            Vincent A. Bongiorni for appellant Whitman.
            ____________________
            Dina Michael  Chaitowitz, Assistant United  States Attorney,  with
            ________________________
        whom  Donald  K.  Stern, United  States  Attorney,  was  on brief  for
              _________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   February 6, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Robert  Wihbey  and   Claude
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            Whitman were tried by  a jury and convicted of  conspiracy to

            distribute  marijuana.   The  jury also  convicted Wihbey  of

            possession  of marijuana  with  intent to  distribute.   Both

            Wihbey and Whitman challenge their convictions on the grounds

            that  the   prosecutor  made  improper  remarks   in  closing

            argument,   and   that   the   government   proved   multiple

            conspiracies,  not  the  single  conspiracy  charged  in  the

            indictment.   Wihbey argues that the warrantless entry of his

            home was not justified by exigent  circumstances and that the

            evidence  against him does not support the drug quantity used

            to calculate his sentence under the guidelines.  Whitman also

            challenges  his sentence,  asserting that he  did not  play a

            leadership role in the  conspiracy that justified an increase

            in   offense  level.    Finding  no   error,  we  affirm  the

            convictions and the resulting sentences.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                   FACTUAL OVERVIEW
                                   FACTUAL OVERVIEW
                                   ________________

                      The evidence, taken in  the light most favorable to

            the  verdict, permitted the jury to find the following facts.

            See  United States v. Twitty, No. 95-1056, slip op. at 2 (1st
            ___  _____________    ______

            Cir.  December 28,  1995).   In the  spring of  1991, Richard

            Britt  and  Thomas  Rohan  agreed to  work  together  dealing

            marijuana.   Initially, they intended their  source of supply

            to be appellant Claude Whitman and one Frank Camyre, but when

                                         -2-
                                          2

            Camyre and Whitman repeatedly  failed to produce as promised,

            Rohan cultivated another supplier, Robert Wihbey.  Meanwhile,

            an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"),

            David DeCastro, had convinced Britt and Rohan that he had the

            desire and ability  to buy  250 pounds or  more of  marijuana

            (about  $500,000 worth).  Britt and Rohan, eager to recoup an

            earlier loss in  a failed  marijuana deal, agreed  to act  as

            middlemen in a large  sale to informant DeCastro.   Britt and

            Rohan  informed both  of their  sources that  they had  a big

            buyer on  the hook.   On  or  about November  22, 1991,  both

            sources  independently obtained  shipments of marijuana.   On

            November  23,  1991,  DEA  agents arranged  for  DeCastro  to

            conduct  controlled  buys the  following  day  from both  the

            Wihbey source and the Whitman/Camyre source.  Britt and Rohan

            were arrested  during a buy from  Wihbey's associate, Michael

            Weiner, who  was also arrested; all  three immediately agreed

            to  cooperate.  Weiner led  the DEA agents  to Wihbey's home,

            where they  arrested Wihbey and searched the premises.  Later

            that day, Britt and Rohan cooperated with the DEA on a second

            controlled buy,  from the  Whitman/Camyre source,  leading to

            the  arrest of  Whitman, Camyre  and Whitman's  source, Roger

            Brandt.   Further factual details will be  provided as needed

            to analyze the several issues presented.

                                         -3-
                                          3

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                _____________________

                      In  March 1993,  a  federal grand  jury returned  a

            four-count indictment  that charged: in Count  One, that from

            May  1991 through  November 23,  1991, Britt,  Rohan, Wihbey,

            Weiner, Whitman, and Camyre  conspired to possess with intent

            to distribute,  and to distribute, marijuana  in violation of

            21  U.S.C.    846; in  Count Two,  that on  October  4, 1991,

            Camyre  possessed  marijuana  with  intent  to distribute  in

            violation of 21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1); in Count Three,  that on

            November 22, 1991, Wihbey  possessed marijuana with intent to

            distribute  in violation  of 21  U.S.C.    841(a)(1); and  in

            Count Four, that on  November 23, 1991, Wihbey used  a pistol

            during  and in  relation  to a  drug  trafficking offense  in

            violation of 21 U.S.C.   924(c).

                      Wihbey filed a motion to suppress physical evidence

            and  a statement  obtained  from him  during the  warrantless

            arrest  and search  at his  home, but  the motion  was denied

            after an evidentiary  hearing.   Prior to trial,  all of  the

            defendants  except  Wihbey  and Whitman  pleaded  guilty  and

            agreed to  cooperate with the  government.  After  a five-day

            trial in May 1994,  the jury found Wihbey and  Whitman guilty

            of the conspiracy  count and Wihbey guilty  of the possession

            with  intent  to  distribute   count.    The  jury,  however,

            acquitted Wihbey on  the firearm count.   Wihbey and  Whitman

                                         -4-
                                          4

            were sentenced in November 1994 and promptly filed notices of

            appeal.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

            A.  Warrantless Entry of Wihbey's Home
            A.  Warrantless Entry of Wihbey's Home
            ______________________________________

                      1.  Facts
                          _____

                      The magistrate  judge found the following  facts at

            the suppression hearing.  The  DEA investigation that led  to

            the arrests in this case  was focused on a controlled buy  of

            marijuana by the informant  DeCastro from Whitman and Camyre,

            with Britt  and Rohan acting as  middlemen.  It was  only one

            day before  the scheduled Whitman/Camyre buy  that DEA agents

            learned that  Rohan had another source, Robert  Wihbey.  Late

            in the afternoon of Friday, November 22, 1991, Rohan told the

            informant  DeCastro that he had an  unnamed source that could

            deliver 250 pounds of marijuana.  When DeCastro expressed his

            interest in  purchasing  from both  this new  source and  the

            Whitman/Camyre source, Britt and  Rohan drove DeCastro to the

            Beekman   Place   condominiums   in  Agawam,   Massachusetts.

            DeCastro wore a  transmitter, and was under audio  and visual

            surveillance by  DEA special  agent Sean McDonough  and other

            agents.   Rohan parked the car, got out, and returned shortly

            thereafter   with  a  sample   of  marijuana  for  DeCastro's

            approval.  The agents were unable to discern,  however, which

            condominium unit Rohan  had entered, nor  did they learn  the

                                         -5-
                                          5

            name of the new source.  DeCastro approved the  sample and he

            and Rohan scheduled a 250 pound deal to take place at Rohan's

            residence later that night.

                      Early   that  evening,  DeCastro  called  Britt  to

            confirm the arrangements, but  Britt stated that the delivery

            would  have to  be  postponed until  8:00 a.m.  the following

            morning,  Saturday, November  23, 1991.   The  following day,

            Britt  and  Rohan met  DeCastro and  brought  him to  a house

            (owned by Wihbey, but not used as his  residence) at 30 Arden

            Street   in  Springfield,  Massachusetts.    There,  DeCastro

            examined  ten pounds of  marijuana, and was  told by Wihbey's

            associate, Michael Weiner, that there were thirty more pounds

            in Weiner's  car.  Weiner advised the buyers that the rest of

            the marijuana would be produced  in increments after the cash

            for  the first  forty  pounds was  delivered  to the  source.

            DeCastro said he  had to get his "money man," but he returned

            instead with special agent McDonough, followed by a number of

            DEA agents.   Britt, Rohan,  and Weiner were  arrested inside

            the Arden Street house at about 11:00 a.m.; the DEA still had

            not learned the identity  of the source (Wihbey) or  his unit

            number at Beekman Place.

                      Britt,  Rohan,  and   Weiner  promptly  agreed   to

            cooperate with  the DEA agents,  and by 11:15 one  or more of

            them had disclosed  that Wihbey  was the source  and that  he

            lived  at  33 Beekman.    At  the  hearing,  agent  McDonough

                                         -6-
                                          6

            conceded that at this  point he had probable cause  to arrest

            Wihbey  and search  33 Beekman.   Nonetheless,  McDonough had

            doubts  about  the credibility  of  the  three arrestees  and

            decided to interview  them individually at  DEA headquarters;

            these  interviews  began  at   11:30  that  morning.    Agent

            McDonough  determined that  the  cooperating defendants  were

            credible, and based on information they provided, that Wihbey

            would grow suspicious if Weiner did not  return promptly with

            $68,000 or call to explain the delay.  At   about  the   same

            time, roughly noon, McDonough was also concerned with setting

            up the  controlled buy  from Whitman and  Camyre.   McDonough

            directed Britt to  contact Whitman or Camyre,  and the second

            deal  was set  up  for  3:00  that  same  afternoon.    Thus,

            McDonough was  involved to  some extent  with setting  up the

            Whitman/Camyre  buy at the same time that he was preparing to

            arrest Wihbey.

                      Because  it was  Saturday, McDonough  believed that

            application  for a warrant to arrest Wihbey in his home might

            take  as long  as several  hours, and  that quick  action was

            necessary  because Wihbey's growing  suspicion might motivate

            him  to flee  or destroy  evidence.   At approximately  12:45

            p.m., the DEA established surveillance of Wihbey's condo, and

            at 1:00  p.m. Weiner and  Rohan entered, followed  by special

            agent McDonough and other agents who "secured the apartment."

                                         -7-
                                          7

            Wihbey  was found lying on  the basement floor  behind a pool

            table, with a loaded pistol a few feet away.

                      Agent  McDonough  placed  Wihbey under  arrest  and

            advised him of his  rights.  McDonough then told  Wihbey that

            they had no search warrant, but  would get one if needed;  he

            asked  Wihbey to show the  agents where he  had marijuana and

            guns.    Wihbey agreed,  and  during the  ensuing  search the

            agents found 1200 grams of marijuana (about 2.7 pounds, which

            McDonough characterized as "personal use" marijuana) and some

            marijuana  paraphernalia.   Agent  McDonough  sought Wihbey's

            cooperation, asking him to name his source.  Wihbey said that

            he would  not give McDonough  the name of the  "guy above me"

            because he  was a personal friend, but he would give the name

            of the  "guy above him."   Agent McDonough  declined Wihbey's

            offer of partial cooperation.

                      2.  Analysis
                          ________

                      The  Constitution  requires  that  police  normally

            obtain a warrant before  entering a person's home to  make an

            arrest.   Payton v. New York, 445  U.S. 573, 590 (1980).  The
                      ______    ________

            government  says,   however,  that  in  this   case  "exigent

            circumstances" excused the warrantless entry.  In determining

            whether  an  exigency  justifies  a  warrantless  search  and

            seizure,  the test  is "whether  there is  such a  compelling

            necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of

            obtaining  a warrant."  United States v. Wilson, 36 F.3d 205,
                                    _____________    ______

                                         -8-
                                          8

            209 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d
                                         _____________    _____

            41,  44  (1st  Cir.  1980)).    Exigency  determinations  are

            generally fact-intensive and thus must  be made on a case-by-

            case basis.   See United States  v. Donlin, 982  F.2d 31,  34
                          ___ _____________     ______

            (1st Cir. 1992), in  our past holdings, exigent circumstances

            have commonly  included: (1) "hot  pursuit" of  a felon;  (2)

            threatened destruction of evidence; (3) risk that the suspect

            may  flee undetected;  and (4)  danger to  the safety  of the

            public or the police.   See United States v. Tibolt, No.  94-
                                    ___ _____________    ______

            2221, slip op. at 8 (1st Cir. Dec. 29, 1995).   Exigency must

            be  assessed in light  of the totality  of the circumstances.

            United  States v.  Veillette,  778 F.2d  899,  902 (1st  Cir.
            ______________     _________

            1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986).
                   _____ ______

                      We defer  to the  district court's findings  of the

            underlying  facts  unless clearly  erroneous,  but  we afford

            plenary  review to  the district  court's legal  analysis and

            ultimate conclusion.  Tibolt, slip op. at  8-9; United States
                                  ______                    _____________

            v. Curzi,  867 F.2d 36,  42 (1st Cir.  1989).  We  find clear
               _____

            error  only if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left

            with "the  definite and  firm conviction that  a mistake  had

            been committed."  United States v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55, 57 (1st
                              _____________    ____

            Cir. 1992).

                      The magistrate judge who conducted  the suppression

            hearing  characterized  this  as  a  "borderline  case,"  but

            nonetheless denied  the motion  to suppress.   The magistrate

                                         -9-
                                          9

            judge  found that  Wihbey had  consented to  a search  of his

            condominium  after he had  been arrested.   Thus the critical

            issue  was  whether the  entry  to  arrest was  justified  by

            exigent circumstances.

                      The magistrate judge determined  that circumstances

            were exigent based upon the following five "factors."  First,

            it was reasonable for the DEA agents to choose not to prepare

            part  or all of  a warrant on  the day before  the arrest, as

            they did not know whom they were to arrest or, with requisite

            particularity, where  the arrestee  lived.  Second,  it would

            have  taken "substantially more  than two hours"  to obtain a

            warrant  at  the relevant  time,  Saturday  morning or  early

            afternoon.   Third, it was reasonable for  agent McDonough to

            bring  Britt,  Rohan,  and  Weiner to  DEA  headquarters  for

            further debriefing  before seeking a warrant  or taking other

            action.  Fourth, it was reasonable for the agents to conclude

            that there  was a compelling necessity  for immediate action,

            based on  the likelihood that Wihbey would grow suspicious of

            the  delay  in Weiner's  return,  causing Wihbey  to  flee or

            conceal  or destroy evidence.   Fifth, the  DEA agents' plans

            for a  second controlled  buy from  Camyre and  Whitman later

            that  afternoon did  not precipitate  the decision  to arrest

            Wihbey without a warrant.   Wihbey objected to the magistrate

            judge's  report and  recommendation,  but the  district court

            adopted the report and denied the motion to suppress.

                                         -10-
                                          10

                      Before reviewing the  ruling below,  we narrow  the

            issues  because  Wihbey  has  forfeited some  of  his  Fourth

            Amendment  arguments  by  failing  to  press  his  objections

            below.1   Wihbey's  challenge  to the  suppression ruling  is

            therefore limited to those issues that he specifically raised

            in  his  objection  to  the  magistrate  judge's  report  and

            recommendation.   We  ignore Wihbey's  attempt to  "generally

            object" to  the  magistrate judge's  report, as  well as  his

            attempt to incorporate by reference the arguments made in his

            pre-hearing  memorandum.   Wihbey  made two  objections  with

            sufficient specificity:  (1) the  magistrate  judge erred  in

            determining that  it was reasonable  for the agents  to delay

            preparing for  a warrant  application until  Saturday morning

            when  they learned  Wihbey's name  and address,  and (2)  the

            magistrate  judge  erred  in  determining that  there  was  a

            compelling   necessity  for  immediate  action,  because  the

            exigency was  created by the  agents' investigative strategy.

            We note that  Wihbey did not object to  any of the magistrate

            judge's proposed  findings of the underlying  facts, but only

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Rule 3(b) of  the Rules for United States  Magistrates in
            the  United  States  District   Court  for  the  District  of
            Massachusetts requires  a party  who objects to  a magistrate
            judge's findings and recommendations to identify specifically
            the objectionable  portions  of  the  proposed  findings  and
            recommendations and  to state the  basis for objection.   The
            magistrate  judge's report  contained a  clear  warning about
            this  rule,  advising Wihbey  that  failure  to comply  would
            preclude appellate review, citing  United States v. Valencia-
                                               _____________    _________
            Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (approving such a local
            ______
            rule).  See also 28 U.S.C.   636(b)(1).
                    ___ ____

                                         -11-
                                          11

            to the reasonableness of the agents'  actions and whether the

            facts  constituted  exigent  circumstances.    In particular,

            Wihbey did not object to the finding that Wihbey consented to

            the search after he was arrested; thus the issue before us is

            whether  the warrantless  arrest  was  justified  by  exigent

            circumstances.  In any  event,  we find  no error,  let alone

            clear error,  in the  magistrate judge's  findings as to  the

            underlying facts.  As to the forfeited  arguments that Wihbey

            now raises, we find that none of the asserted errors rises to

            the level of plain  error which might justify reversal.   See
                                                                      ___

            United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-1779 (1993).
            _____________    _____

                           a.   Should the agents have  started a warrant
                                _________________________________________

                           application earlier?
                           ____________________

                      Contrary to his assertion on appeal, Wihbey's right

            to be  free from unreasonable  searches and seizures  did not

            impose a duty  on the investigating agents to begin preparing

            for  a  warrant  prior  to the  arrest  and  interrogation of

            Weiner, Britt, and Rohan on Saturday morning.  The DEA agents

            did  not  learn Wihbey's  name or  which condominium  unit he

            lived in until Saturday morning.  Moreover, prior to Weiner's

            arrest,  the agents could not be sure whether Wihbey would be

            at his condo or some other place, nor was there any assurance

            that the suspects to be  arrested would cooperate and provide

            that crucial information.  The DEA agents were  not obligated

            to prepare a warrant application in advance merely because it

                                         -12-
                                          12

            might have  been foreseeable that the  contemplated arrest of

            Britt and  Rohan would lead the  agents to the  source of the

            marijuana.   See United States  v. Cresta, 825  F.2d 538, 553
                         ___ _____________     ______

            (1st Cir.  1987) ("Although probable cause  existed some time

            prior  to the  arrests,  this does  not  negate the  rise  of

            exigent   factors.";   "Unforeseeability   has   never   been

            recognized  as  an  element   of  the  exigent  circumstances

            exception .  . . ."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).  We
                                  _____ ______

            therefore reject Wihbey's first basis for objection.

                           b.  Were the circumstances exigent?
                               ______________________________

                      The  magistrate  judge  credited agent  McDonough's

            statement that he had doubts  about the credibility of Britt,

            Rohan, and Weiner,  and that it  was reasonable to  interview

            them  in further  detail  before  proceeding against  Wihbey.

            Therefore, it was only sometime after 11:30 a.m., about three

            hours after the marijuana buy had begun, that McDonough faced

            the crucial decision whether he had time to obtain a warrant.

            The magistrate judge also  relied on McDonough's testimony in

            finding that (1) it would take  substantially longer than two

            hours to obtain  a warrant and (2) that  McDonough's decision

            to  forego a warrant was not motivated by his desire to press

            ahead with  the investigation of Whitman and  Camyre.  Wihbey

            did  not specifically object  to those  recommended findings,

            and  even if he had, those findings are not clearly erroneous

            in light of  all the circumstances.  Because of  the delay in

                                         -13-
                                          13

            Weiner's return to Wihbey, and Weiner's statement that Wihbey

            would  be growing  suspicious, we  agree with  the magistrate

            judge  and  the district  court  that  the agents  reasonably

            feared  that  Wihbey  would   flee,  or  conceal  or  destroy

            marijuana evidence before a warrant could be obtained.

                      It is well established  that government agents must

            act reasonably, based on  the objective facts available, when

            deciding that a warrantless  entry is justified: "Whether the

            basis for  such authority  exists is  the  sort of  recurring

            factual question  to which law enforcement  officials must be

            expected  to  apply  their   judgment;  and  all  the  Fourth

            Amendment  requires  is  that  they  answer  it  reasonably."

            Illinois  v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  177, 186 (1990).   We agree
            ________     _________

            with  the magistrate judge and the district court that it was

            reasonable  for  the  agents  in  this  case  to   judge  the

            circumstances exigent and to take action accordingly.

                      Although  he  did  not  raise  the  argument below,

            Wihbey now  argues that his suspicion could have been allayed

            -- and the exigency  averted -- by a  phone call from  Weiner

            assuring him that all was  well.  While that may be  true, it

            does  not alter  our  conclusion.   It  was well  within  the

            reasonable professional judgment of  the agents to choose not

            to jeopardize a continuing investigation by  taking measures,

            such as a phone call, that might (or might not) alleviate the

            exigency.   The telephone  call might  have had the  opposite

                                         -14-
                                          14

            effect, heightening Wihbey's  suspicion, and inducing him  to

            immediately flee, or destroy or conceal evidence.

                      We also reject Wihbey's argument that the  exigency

            was created  by the DEA agents' investigative  strategy.  The

            need for  quick action  arose upon the  agents' determination

            that arrestees Rohan, Britt, and Weiner had provided reliable

            information  about Wihbey  and  that he  would be  suspicious

            because of  any further  delay in  getting back  to him.   We

            accept the  magistrate judge's finding that the timing of the

            second controlled buy did  not drive the agents'  decision to

            forego a  warrant.  And, as  we have said, the  agents had no

            duty to  prepare a warrant  application before the  arrest of

            Rohan and  Weiner nor to attempt to  allay Wihbey's suspicion

            with a phone call.  Wihbey  argues that the agents could have

            established surveillance  of his condominium,  without entry,

            to prevent Wihbey's flight, but that would not have prevented

            the destruction of evidence within.  We see nothing about the

            agent's  investigative strategy  that  created the  exigency.

            This is not a situation where the agents deliberately created

            the exigent circumstances.   The agents had no choice  but to

            respond promptly  once they  learned that  Wihbey was  at his

            condominium, undoubtedly growing suspicious as he awaited the

            overdue  proceeds  of the  busted  transaction.   See  United
                                                              ___  ______

            States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d at 553.
            ______    ______

                                         -15-
                                          15

                      For the foregoing reasons,  we affirm the denial of

            Wihbey's motion to suppress.

                                         -16-
                                          16

            B.  Improper Arguments by the Prosecutor
            B.  Improper Arguments by the Prosecutor
            ________________________________________

                      Wihbey and  Whitman seek a new  trial because, they

            claim,  the prosecutor  in  closing argument  commented  upon

            their failure  to testify,  shifted  the burden  of proof  to

            them, and vouched for the government's witnesses.

                      1.   Comment on Failure  to Testify and  Attempt to
                           ______________________________________________

                      Shift the Burden of Proof
                      _________________________

                      Wihbey  and  Whitman  contend  that  the  following

            remark   (hereafter   "Comment   One"),   made   during   the

            government's  summation, was  an  improper comment  on  their

            failure to testify:

                           What I would like to do, however, is
                      talk to  you for a few  minutes about the
                      three specific charges that are contained
                      in the indictment . . . .  
                           The  first one, and  I would suggest
                      to you  the most  important  one, is  the
                      conspiracy  count   and  that  conspiracy
                      count  lists, as you  know, six different
                      persons -- four of them you heard from --
                      Mr.  Britt, Mr.  Rohan,  Mr. Weiner,  Mr.
                      Wihbey  and Mr.  Whitman and  Mr. Camyre.
                      You've  heard from all of those witnesses
                      _________________________________________
                      except for obviously  the two  Defendants
                      _________________________________________
                      who have now been charged.
                      __________________________

            (emphasis added).  

                      Wihbey asserts that a second remark ("Comment Two")

            was also an  improper comment  on his failure  to testify  as

            well as an attempt  to shift the burden of proof to him.  The

            prosecutor  recounted Wihbey's  post-arrest statement  to DEA

            special agent  McDonough that  Wihbey would not  turn in  his

                                         -17-
                                          17

            source because he was Wihbey's friend, but that he would give

            the name of the friend's source.  Then the prosecutor said:

                           Now,  if  Mr.  St.  Clair  [Wihbey's
                      lawyer] can  stand  up and  explain  away
                                            _
                      that conversation to you, then you should
                      let Bob  Wihbey walk  out of here  with a
                      verdict of  acquittal.   But he can't  do
                      that, ladies and gentlemen,  because that
                      is  not a  conversation that  an innocent
                      man,  who's  been falsely  accused, would
                      have under those circumstances.
                           There's  just  no other  explanation
                      except the one that's been  provided from
                      the  witness stand by the eight witnesses
                      called by the government.

            (emphasis added). 

                      At  the end  of the prosecutor's  summation, during

            which  the prosecutor  made  Comments One  and Two,  Wihbey's

            lawyer  asked  to approach  the  bench, but  the  trial judge

            ordered him instead  to "move on with it for  now."  Wihbey's

            lawyer  therefore   proceeded  with  his   closing  argument;

            Whitman's lawyer followed.  After the  prosecutor's rebuttal,

            Wihbey and Whitman both moved for a  mistrial, citing Comment

            One as an improper  comment on their failure to  testify, and

            citing  as improper a third comment.  We assume arguendo that
                                                            ________

            defense counsel's attempt to  approach, coupled with specific

            mention in the mistrial motion, was a sufficient objection to

            Comment  One to preserve the  issue for appeal.   We consider

            Wihbey's failure  to mention  Comment Two  in the  motion for

            mistrial, however, as a failure to object; therefore if there

            was an error  in Comment Two, the error was  forfeited and is

                                         -18-
                                          18

            reviewed for  plain error only.   See  Olano, 113  S. Ct.  at
                                              ___  _____

            1776-1779.

                      Comment by a prosecutor on a defendant's failure to

            testify  violates the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-

            incrimination.   Griffin  v.  California, 380  U.S. 609,  615
                             _______      __________

            (1965).  A court determines if a prosecutor's remarks violate

            Griffin  by  asking "whether,  in  the  circumstances of  the
            _______

            particular case, the language used was manifestly intended or

            was of such  a character  that the jury  would naturally  and

            necessarily take  it to be  a comment on  the failure of  the

            accused  to testify."   United  States  v. Akinola,  985 F.2d
                                    ______________     _______

            1105, 1111 (1st Cir. 1993)  (quoting United States v. Glantz,
                                                 _____________    ______

            810  F.2d 316,  322 (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied, 482  U.S. 929
                                             _____  ______

            (1987)).   If we find that a prosecutor has violated Griffin,
                                                                 _______

            we then review for harmless error.  United States v. Hasting,
                                                _____________    _______

            461 U.S.  499,  508-12 (1983)  (applying  the  constitutional

            harmless error analysis established in Chapman v. California,
                                                   _______    __________

            386  U.S.  18, 24  (1967)).   In  Chapman, the  Supreme Court
                                              _______

            stated that a  prosecutorial comment  on the  failure of  the

            accused  to testify would  not require reversal  if the State

            could  show  "beyond  a   reasonable  doubt  that  the  error

            complained of  did not  contribute to the  verdict obtained."

            386  U.S. at  24.   The Supreme  Court clarified  the Chapman
                                                                  _______

            constitutional  harmless   error  standard  in   Sullivan  v.
                                                             ________

            Louisiana, 113 S.  Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993), explaining that the
            _________

                                         -19-
                                          19

            inquiry is "not  whether, in  a trial  that occurred  without

            error,  a guilty verdict surely would have been rendered, but

            whether the  guilty verdict  actually rendered in  this trial
                                                               ____

            was   surely  unattributable  to  the  error."  (emphasis  in

            original).

                      A very  different standard is applied  when a party

            forfeits  an  error  by  failing to  make  a  contemporaneous

            objection, as Wihbey  did with  respect to Comment  Two.   In

            that  case, we have the discretion to reverse only for "plain

            error," i.e., error  that is "clear"  and "obvious" and  that

            was "prejudicial" to  the defendant in that it  "affected the

            outcome of the  District Court proceedings."2   Olano, 113 S.
                                                            _____

            Ct. at 1777-78.  And, we exercise that discretion only if the

            plain   forfeited  error  seriously   affects  the  fairness,

            integrity, or public  reputation of judicial proceedings;  an

            example of such an error is one that causes the conviction of

            an actually innocent defendant.  Id. at 1779.
                                             ___

                      As  to  Comment  One,  we  find,  first,  that  the

            prosecutor  did not  "manifestly  intend" to  comment on  the

            defendants' failure  to testify.   See Akinola,  985 F.2d  at
                                               ___ _______

                                
            ____________________

            2.  After stating  that a forfeited error  was prejudicial if
            it affected the outcome of the proceedings, the Supreme Court
            in  Olano  stated:  "There  may  be  a  special  category  of
                _____
            forfeited errors  that can  be corrected regardless  of their
            effect  on the  outcome . .  . ."   The  Court also adverted,
            without specificity,  to a class  of errors  "that should  be
            presumed prejudicial if the  defendant cannot make a specific
            showing of prejudice."  113 S. Ct. at 1778. 

                                         -20-
                                          20

            1111.    The  context  of  the  comment  indicates  that  the

            prosecutor  intended to list  the six persons  charged in the

            conspiracy count and to  remind the jury that they  had heard

            from four  of the six.  But,  apparently by mistake, he named

            Wihbey and Whitman among those who testified.  The challenged

            comment appears  to be an  unartful attempt  to correct  that

            mistake,  by   reminding  the  jury  that   "of  course"  the

            defendants did not testify.  Second, based on the context, we

            find that  the jury would not "naturally and necessarily take

            [the remark] to be a comment on the failure of the accused to

            testify."  See id.  We think it likely that the jury took the
                       ___ ___

            comment the same  way we do, as an attempt  to clarify a slip

            of the  tongue.  By saying "of course [the defendants did not

            testify]," the prosecutor just  as plausibly has reminded the

            jury  that the defendants' silence was  to be expected, i.e.,

            that  it is  natural for  a defendant  to exercise  his Fifth

            Amendment right.  The remark does not  necessarily imply that

            the jury  should draw any negative inference from the failure

            to  testify.    "A court  should  not  lightly  infer that  a

            prosecutor  intends  an ambiguous  remark  to  have its  most

            damaging  meaning or  that  a jury,  sitting through  lengthy

            exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less

            damaging interpretations."  United  States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d
                                        ______________    _____

            300, 307 (1st Cir.  1992) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
                                               ________    _____________

                                         -21-
                                          21

            416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).  Accordingly, we hold that Comment

            One was not a Griffin violation.
                          _______

                      In contrast to Comment One,  we find Comment Two to

            be effectively a comment on Wihbey's failure to testify,  and

            that  the  jury likely  understood it  that  way.   Also, the

            comment impermissibly  suggested that Wihbey bore  the burden

            of proof.  See United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43,  45-46
                       ___ _____________    ________

            (1st  Cir. 1985)  (holding that  a "how-does-counsel-explain"

            argument is a Griffin violation and an impermissible shift of
                          _______

            burden of proof).   Wihbey, however, forfeited this  error by

            failing to  object  or raise  it  as grounds  for  mistrial.3

            Although  it was improper, Comment  Two does not  rise to the

            level of  "plain error" under the Olano standard.  113 S. Ct.
                                              _____

            at 1776-79.

                      In  light  of  all  the circumstances,  we  do  not

            believe that  the comment affected the  outcome or "seriously

            affected  the fairness,  integrity,  or public  reputation of

            judicial  proceedings."4  Id. at 1779.  First, the judge gave
                                      ___

                                
            ____________________

            3.  We  recognize that,  after  the  prosecutor's  summation,
            Wihbey's lawyer  asked "Your honor, may  I approach sidebar?"
            We  must assume  he intended  to  object to  the prosecutor's
            remarks.  The judge told counsel to  move on with his closing
            argument.   Upon  being rebuffed,  counsel did  not state  an
            objection or press further  the request to approach.   In any
            event, counsel had  the opportunity to  raise Comment Two  as
            grounds for  mistrial, but  specified only Comments  One (and
            Comment Three, which we discuss further on).

            4.  This  improper remark  by  the prosecutor  is not  in the
            class of forfeited errors adverted to in Olano, 113 S. Ct. at
                                                     _____
            1778, which are  presumed to be prejudicial without regard to

                                         -22-
                                          22

            a strong instruction on the defendants'  right not to testify

            and the  government's burden  of proof.5   Second, there  was

                                
            ____________________

            their  affect on the outcome.  Indeed, if Wihbey had objected
            and preserved  the  error, it  would be  subject to  harmless
            error  review, which of course  focuses on the  effect of the
            error on the outcome.  See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S.
                                   ___ _____________    _______
            499, 508-12 (1983).

            5.  The relevant portions of the jury instruction follow:
                           The  law presumes a  defendant to be
                      innocent of a crime.  Thus, a  defendant,
                      although accused, begins the trial with a
                      clean  slate,  with  no evidence  against
                      him.
                           . . . .
                           The  presumption of  innocence alone
                      is sufficient to acquit a defendant . . .
                      .
                           . . . .
                           The  burden  is   always  upon   the
                      prosecution  to  prove  guilt   beyond  a
                      reasonable doubt.
                           Now  I told you  two or  three times
                      during  this  trial  that the  Defendants
                      have  a  constitutional   right  not   to
                      testify  or offer  any evidence  on their
                      behalf.   If  any  counsel stated  during
                      final argument that the Defendant did not
                      testify  in an  attempt to  impugn that's
                      wrong and  something might be  wrong with
                      them, I urge you now to completely ignore
                      it and disregard it.
                           The law  is clear a  defendant never
                      has the burden of proving  his innocence,
                      for   the  law   never  imposes   upon  a
                      defendant in  a criminal case  the burden
                      or  duty  of  calling  any  witnesses  or
                      producing any evidence.  The   Government
                      has the burden of proving to you beyond a
                      reasonable doubt that the  Defendants are
                      guilty  of  the  crimes  charged.    This
                      burden of proof rests upon the Government
                      and it never shifts to the Defendants.
                           . . . .
                           As  I told  you, the  Government has
                      the  burden  of  proving  guilt   of  the
                      Defendant  beyond   a  reasonable  doubt.

                                         -23-
                                          23

            significant  (but  admittedly not  overwhelming)  evidence of

            Wihbey's  guilt, enough  that we  find  it unlikely  that any

            negative inference  drawn from his failure  to testify tipped

            the  scale from  "not  guilty"  to  "guilty."   The  evidence

            against  Wihbey  included  co-conspirator  testimony,  police

            surveillance   of   pre-transaction  marijuana   sampling  at

            Wihbey's condo complex, Wihbey's ownership of the house where

            the   forty-pound  transaction  took   place,  marijuana  and

            paraphernalia  seized  from   Wihbey's  condo,  and  Wihbey's

            incriminating  post-arrest statement.    Given  the  curative

            instruction and the  evidence of guilt, we are  not convinced

            that the improper remark constituted plain error. 

                      2.  Witness Vouching
                          ________________

                      Wihbey and Whitman contend  that the prosecutor, in

            his rebuttal, improperly vouched for the accomplice witnesses

            who testified  under their  plea agreements.   The prosecutor

                                
            ____________________

                      That burden remains  with the  Government
                      throughout  the  entire  trial and  never
                      shifts to the Defendant.  
                           Accordingly,   if   either  of   the
                      Defendants  has  not  testified  in  this
                      case, and neither have testified  in this
                      case,   you   are  not   to   attach  any
                      significance  to this  fact, and  you may
                      not  in  any  way  consider  this against
                      eitheroftheDefendantsinyourdeliberations.
                           . . . .
                           And further, you should bear in mind
                      that  the  law   never  imposes  upon   a
                      defendant in  a criminal case  the burden
                      or  duty  of  calling  any  witnesses  or
                      producing any evidence.

                                         -24-
                                          24

            analogized the trial evidence  to a "mosaic" made up  of many

            "tiles"  that   were   individually  imperfect   if   closely

            scrutinized, but which nonetheless would give a clear picture

            if  viewed  as  a whole.    After  making  that analogy,  the

            prosecutor made the challenged comment ("Comment Three"):

                      None  of  these  witnesses  are  perfect.
                      None of them have perfect memories.  
                           But what they have done is testified
                               ________________________________
                      to you  truthfully about what  they knew,
                      _________________________________________
                      and despite the fact that  there are some
                      imperfections in their testimony,  if you
                      take  a step  back  from that  individual
                      tile, you  will see  that the  Britt tile
                      [government   witness]   and  the   Rohan
                      [government  witness]  tile  go  hand  in
                      hand.

            (emphasis added).  There was no immediate objection.  But two

            sentences later, the prosecutor ended his rebuttal, the judge

            excused  the jury for lunch,  and the defendants  moved for a

            mistrial,  arguing  that this  comment  was  improper witness

            vouching.  The  question is close whether the defendants have

            preserved  the issue for  appeal.   Compare United  States v.
                                                _______ ______________

            Sepulveda,  15  F.3d 1161,  1186-87  (1st  Cir. 1993)  (where
            _________

            defendant  did  not  object or  raise  improper prosecutorial

            argument  until  motion  for  mistrial  after  conclusion  of

            summations,  error forfeited  and  reviewed  for plain  error

            only),  cert.  denied 114  S.  Ct. 2714  (1994),  with United
                    _____  ______                             ____ ______

            States  v.  Mandelbaum,  803  F.2d 42,  43  (1st  Cir.  1986)
            ______      __________

            (objection made after closing  arguments was timely enough to

            preserve error for appeal, although it "should have been made

                                         -25-
                                          25

            earlier)  and United  States v.  Levy-Cordero, 67  F.3d 1002,
                      ___ ______________     ____________

            1008   n.6  (1st  Cir.   1995)  (objection   after  arguments

            sufficient  to preserve  issue for  appeal where  parties had

            agreed  not to  object during  arguments).   For the  sake of

            argument,  we will treat the issue as preserved for appeal as

            if a contemporaneous objection had been lodged.

                      An  improper argument  to  the jury  that does  not

            implicate a defendant's  constitutional rights,  such as  the

            witness vouching  that occurred here,  constitutes reversible

            error  only   where  the  prosecutor's   remarks  were   both

            inappropriate  and  harmful.   See  id.  at  1008.   Improper
                                           ___  ___

            statements during closing argument are considered harmful if,

            given the  totality of the circumstances, they  are likely to

            have  affected  the trial's  outcome.6    Id. (citing  United
                                                      ___          ______

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Prosecutorial arguments that  implicate a  constitutional
            right of  the accused  are reviewed under  a higher  standard
            than arguments that are  improper, but not  unconstitutional.
            See Steven A Childress and Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards
            ___                                         _________________
            of Review    11.23 (2d  ed. 1992).   We have repeatedly  held
            _________
            that  an "inappropriate"  comment is  not a  reversible error
            unless  it  is likely  to have  affected  the outcome  of the
            trial.  See,  e.g., United States  v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo,
                    ___   ____  _____________     ______________________
            70  F.3d 706,  713 (1st  Cir. 1995);  United States  v. Levy-
                                                  _____________     _____
            Cordero, 67 F.3d 1002, 1008 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
            _______                                      _____________
            Ovalle-M rquez,  36  F.3d 212,  220  (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert.
            ______________                                          _____
            denied, 115 S. Ct.  947 (1995); United States v.  Manning, 23
            ______                          _____________     _______
            F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994).
                      The Supreme Court, however, has held that a comment
            on  the failure of the accused to testify is a constitutional
            violation, without inquiry as  to its affect on the  outcome.
            Griffin v. California, 380  U.S. 609, 615 (1965).   Indeed, a
            _______    __________
            Griffin comment  is a reversible error  unless the government
            _______                                            __________
            can persuade the appellate court that it was  harmless, i.e.,
                                                          ________
            did  not affect the outcome.   See United  States v. Hasting,
                 ___                       ___ ______________    _______
            461 U.S. 499,  507-09 (1982); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
                                          _______    __________

                                         -26-
                                          26

            States v.  Manning, 23 F.3d  570, 574 (1st  Cir. 1994)).   In
            ______     _______

            making  that determination, we  focus on (1)  the severity of

            the  prosecutor's   misconduct,  including  whether   it  was

            deliberate  or  accidental;  (2)  the context  in  which  the

            misconduct  occurred;  (3)  whether the  judge  gave curative

            instructions and the likely  effect of such instructions; and

            (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendants.  Id.
                                                                      ___

                      Although the prosecutor's statement that "what they

            have  done  is  testify  truthfully"  was inappropriate,  our

            consideration of these factors  leads us to conclude  that it

            was not harmful.   First,  the witness vouching here was not,

            on  balance, severe.    The prosecutor  did  not express  his

            personal opinion  about the  witnesses' veracity,  see United
                                                               ___ ______

            States v.  Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d  268, 273 (1st  Cir. 1987);
            ______     ____________

                                
            ____________________

            18, 26 (1967).
                      It appears that this  court has on occasion treated
            Griffin  comments like  other  improper  comments,  affirming
            _______
            convictions  where  the  panel  found it  unlikely  that  the
            comments affected the outcome.   See, e.g., United States  v.
                                             ___  ____  _____________
            Glantz,  810 F.2d 316, 320 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
            ______                                 _____ ______
            929 (1987); United States v. Cox, 752 F.2d 741, 744 (1st Cir.
                        _____________    ___
            1985).  These  cases may overstate the  defendant's burden in
            demonstrating a Griffin violation.  
                            _______
                      It  is clear that a  comment on the  failure of the
            accused  to testify is a constitutional error, and the burden
            rests with the government to show the error harmless beyond a
            reasonable doubt, not with the  defendant to show the comment
            was  harmful.    See,  e.g.,  Hasting,  461 U.S.  at  507-09;
                             ___   ____   _______
            Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26.
            _______
                      On the  other hand, in cases  where defendants have
            challenged  non-constitutional  inappropriate  comments,  the
            burden  rests with the defendant to show that the comment was
            harmful, i.e., that "under  the totality of the circumstances
            they   affected   the   trial's   outcome."   See  Cartagena-
                                                          ___  __________
            Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d at 713; Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d at 1008.
            ____________                  ____________

                                         -27-
                                          27

            nor did the prosecutor suggest that  he had special knowledge

            about   the   witnesses'   credibility,   or   that   special

            circumstances such as an oath or a plea agreement ensured the

            witnesses'  honesty, see Manning, 23  F.3d at 572,  575.  The
                                 ___ _______

            purpose of the "mosaic" analogy  and the vouching comment was

            to concede the existence of imperfections and inconsistencies

            in  the  accomplices'  testimony,  and to  argue  that  those

            inconsistencies  did not indicate  dishonesty or fabrication.

            Although the witness vouching seems to have been intentional,

            in  that it  was part  of a clearly  planned oration,  it was

            fairly  mild and barely crossed the line of impropriety.  See
                                                                      ___

            United  States v.  Oreto, 37  F.3d 739,  746 (1st  Cir. 1994)
            ______________     _____

            (prosecutor's argument that "nobody lied" was "mild vouching,

            essentially harmless"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1161 (1995);
                                    _____ ______

            United States  v. Innamorati, 996  F.2d 456,  483 (1st  Cir.)
            _____________     __________

            (stating that the line between proper argument that a witness

            is  credible and  improper vouching  is "often  hazy"), cert.
                                                                    _____

            denied, 114 S. Ct. 409 (1993). The   context  in   which  the
            ______

            vouching occurred has aspects  that suggest harmfulness,  and

            aspects that cut the other  way.  On the one hand,  the final

            lines of  the prosecutor's  rebuttal are  thought to  leave a

            lasting impression on the jury.  See Manning, 23 F.3d at 575.
                                             ___ _______

            On the  other hand, the  vouching was to  some extent  a fair

            response  to  the  thrust  of the  defense  summation,  which

            emphasized that the accomplices were liars and that they were

                                         -28-
                                          28

            exaggerating,  coloring  their  testimony,  and  telling  the

            government what they  wanted to hear.  See  Mejia-Lozano, 829
                                                   ___  ____________

            F.2d  at 268,  274 (prosecutor  given "greater  leeway" where

            vouching was "in  response to defense  counsel's inflammatory

            statements").

                      The  judge  gave  a strong  and  specific  curative

            instruction.

                           Statements and  arguments of counsel
                      are not evidence in the case . . . .  
                           If  any  attorney  in  the  case  in
                      closing  arguments stated to  you that my
                      clients or my  witnesses told the  truth,
                      ignore it.  It's  what you determine from
                      the witnesses  and  the evidence  in  the
                      case, from the point of  view of deciding
                      facts, that will control  the credibility
                      of all witnesses; it  will be for you and
                      only for you to determine.

            Although  the curative  instruction was  not contemporaneous,

            the  defendants did not object to  the witness vouching until

            after  the prosecutor finished his  rebuttal and the jury was

            excused for lunch.  The earliest opportunity for the judge to

            give  a curative instruction was during the final charge.  We

            normally presume that  a jury will  follow an instruction  to

            disregard inadmissible evidence or an improper argument.  See
                                                                      ___

            Greer v.  Miller, 483 U.S. 756,  766 n.8 (1987).   We find it
            _____     ______

            likely that this forceful instruction effectively neutralized

            the vouching that occurred here.

                      Finally,  the evidence  against Wihbey  and Whitman

            was sufficiently strong for us to conclude, after considering

                                         -29-
                                          29

            the totality of circumstances, that the vouching was unlikely

            to affect  the outcome of the trial.  As noted in our earlier

            analysis  of Comment  Two,  the evidence  against Wihbey  was

            substantial.  The evidence against Whitman was even stronger;

            it included  the testimony  of his accomplices  Britt, Rohan,

            Camyre,  and Brandt,  pre-arrest tape  recorded conversations

            where  Whitman's  accomplices explicitly  discussed Whitman's

            role in  the marijuana  distribution plans, and  testimony by

            DEA  agents  about   Whitman's  post-arrest  cooperation  and

            statements  that  made  his   role  in  a  planned  marijuana

            transaction  rather clear.   We  therefore conclude  that the

            vouching in this case did not constitute reversible error.

                      3.  Motions for Mistrial and New Trial
                          __________________________________

                      We    recognize    that   several    incidents   of

            prosecutorial  misconduct,  none  of which  would  separately

            constitute grounds  for  mistrial, could  have  a  cumulative

            impact on the jury sufficient to affect  the trial's outcome.

            We review a trial judge's ruling on a motion for a  mistrial,

            or for a  new trial,  only for abuse  of discretion.   United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Barbioni, 62 F.3d 5, 7 (1st  Cir. 1995) (motion for
            ______    ________

            mistrial);  Glantz, 810  F.2d at  320 &  n.2 (motion  for new
                        ______

            trial because of improper  argument).  Although the Assistant

            United States Attorney in  this case exceeded the permissible

            limits  of proper argument, we cannot say that his action was

            deliberate and we  do not believe that the closing arguments,

                                         -30-
                                          30

            viewed collectively, affected the  outcome or the fairness of

            this trial.  For the  reasons set forth in our review  of the

            challenged comments,  we hold  that the  trial judge  did not

            abuse his discretion in denying the defendants' motions for a

            mistrial and for a new trial.

                                         -31-
                                          31

            C.  Single Conspiracy vs. Multiple Conspiracies
            C.  Single Conspiracy vs. Multiple Conspiracies
            _______________________________________________

                      The  jury convicted both  Wihbey and  Whitman under

            Count I of  the indictment, which charged  a single marijuana

            distribution conspiracy among six persons (the two defendants

            along with  Britt, Rohan,  Weiner, and  Camyre).   Wihbey and

            Whitman argue that the evidence was insufficient to allow the

            jury  to  find a  single  conspiracy, and  that  the evidence

            showed instead two separate conspiracies.

                      The framework for analyzing when a variance between

            the conspiracy charged and the conspiracy proven  constitutes

            reversible error was set forth in United States v. Glenn:
                                              _____________    _____

                      (1) Is the  evidence sufficient to permit
                      a jury  to  find the  (express or  tacit)
                      agreement  that  the indictment  charges?
                      (2) If not, is  it sufficient to permit a
                      jury, under a proper set of instructions,
                      to  convict the  defendant of  a related,
                      similar conspiracy?  (3) If so [i.e., the
                      answer to  (2) is yes], does the variance
                      affect the defendant's substantial rights
                      or  does  the   difference  between   the
                      charged  conspiracy  and  the  conspiracy
                      proved amount to "harmless error?"

            828  F.2d 855, 858 (1st  Cir. 1987).   Put differently, "[s]o

            long as  the statutory violation  remains the same,  the jury

            can convict  even if  the facts  are somewhat different  than

            charged  -- so long as  the difference does  not cause unfair

            prejudice."  United States  v. Twitty, No. 95-1056, slip  op.
                         _____________     ______

            at 3  (1st Cir.  Dec. 28, 1995)  (citing Glenn,  828 F.2d  at
                                                     _____

            858). 

                                         -32-
                                          32

                      This court  has recognized  at least three  ways in

            which such  a variance might "affect  the substantial rights"

            of the accused.   United States v. Sutherland, 929  F.2d 765,
                              _____________    __________

            772-73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 822 (1991).  First,
                               _____ ______

            a  defendant  may receive  inadequate  notice  of the  charge

            against him and  thus be  taken by  surprise at  trial.   Id.
                                                                      ___

            Second,  a defendant may be  twice subject to prosecution for

            the same offense.   Id.  Third, a defendant may be prejudiced
                                ___

            by "evidentiary spillover": the  "transference of guilt" to a

            defendant   involved  in   one   conspiracy   from   evidence

            incriminating defendants in  another conspiracy in  which the

            particular defendant was not involved.  Id.  
                                                    ___

                      The question  whether a  given body of  evidence is

            indicative of a single  conspiracy, multiple conspiracies, or

            no conspiracy at all is ordinarily a matter of fact; a jury's

            determination in that  regard is subject  to review only  for

            evidentiary sufficiency.   United  States v. David,  940 F.2d
                                       ______________    _____

            722,  732 (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 502 U.S.  989 (1991), et
                                  _____  ______                        __

            al..  In reviewing  the sufficiency of the evidence,  we take
            ___

            the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.  Id.
                                                                      ___

            at  730.  We review  de novo the  question whether a variance
                                 __ ____

            affected a defendant's substantial  rights.  United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1994).
            __________

                      Wihbey  and Whitman  assert  that the  evidence was

            insufficient  "to demonstrate  that  all of  the alleged  co-

                                         -33-
                                          33

            conspirators    directed    their    efforts   towards    the

            accomplishment of  a common  goal or overall  plan."   United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  Drougas, 748 F.2d 8,  17 (1st Cir. 1984).   But we
            ______     _______

            find  it unnecessary  to engage in  that factual  inquiry; we

            shall assume for the  sake of argument that the  evidence was

            insufficient  to  convict either  Wihbey  or  Whitman of  the

            charged single  conspiracy, satisfying the first  part of the

            tripartite Glenn framework.  See 828 F.2d at 858.  Wihbey and
                       _____             ___

            Whitman properly  concede,  however, that  the  evidence  was

            sufficient  to  prove that  each  participated  in a  related

            similar,  but smaller,  conspiracy, and their  arguments jump

            directly from the first prong to the third (prejudice) prong.

            Specifically, they  concede that the evidence  was sufficient

            for  a  rational  juror  to find  agreements  to  traffic  in

            marijuana  among  (1) Wihbey,  Weiner,  and  Rohan,7 and  (2)

            Whitman, Camyre, Britt, and Rohan.  Thus, the second prong of

            Glenn is satisfied.  See id.  Wihbey   and   Whitman   argue,
            _____                ___ ___

            however,  for a  new trial  because the variance  between the

            single  conspiracy  charged  and  the  multiple  conspiracies

            proven  was  prejudicial  to   them  because  of  evidentiary

            spillover.    We  therefore proceed  to Glenn's  third prong,
                                                    _____

            making two assumptions.   We assume  first that the  evidence

                                
            ____________________

            7.  Although Britt  was arrested along with  Weiner and Rohan
            during  the Wihbey-supplied  transaction  at  Wihbey's  Arden
            Street  house, Britt  is  not included  in  this first  group
            because we are assuming arguendo that there were two separate
                                    ________
            conspiracies.  

                                         -34-
                                          34

            was insufficient to prove  the single conspiracy charged, and

            second,  as  the defendants  concede  and  as ample  evidence

            supports,  that there  were  two separate  conspiracies:  (1)

            Wihbey  agreeing to  sell 250 pounds  of marijuana  to Rohan,

            with Weiner  acting as  Wihbey's agent,  and (2)  Whitman and

            Camyre agreeing  to sell Britt and  Rohan thirty-seven pounds

            of  marijuana  obtained from  Brandt.   Even  if  the assumed

            variance existed between the conspiracy charged and the proof

            at  trial, it did not prejudice either Wihbey or Whitman, and

            it was therefore  harmless under  the Glenn  framework.   See
                                                  _____               ___

            Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858.  We explain.
            _____

                      Wihbey  and  Whitman  argue that  the  variance was

            prejudicial  because there  was  "an  improper imputation  of

            guilt"  to each of them  from the other's  conspiracy.  After

            reviewing  the   trial  record,   we  reject  the   claim  of

            prejudicial  evidentiary spillover for the following reasons.

                      First,  the   defendants'  briefs  cite   only  two

            specific instances of evidentiary spillover.  One instance is

            Britt's testimony that Rohan said he had a friend (implicitly

            Wihbey)  who  could supply  250  pounds  of marijuana.    But

            Rohan's  statements  about  Wihbey  do not  spill  over  from

            another  conspiracy in which Wihbey did not take part; on the

            contrary, the  evidence clearly showed  that Wihbey conspired

            with Rohan.   Therefore, Britt's testimony as to Rohan's out-

                                         -35-
                                          35

            of-court  statement was  admissible against  Wihbey as  a co-

            conspirator   statement  under   Federal  Rule   of  Evidence

            801(d)(2)(E), thus there  was no "spillover" to  Wihbey.  And

            as  to  Whitman,  Rohan's   statement  is  probative  of  the

            agreement  between  Britt  and  Rohan and  thus  relevant  to

            proving  the conspiracy  between Britt,  Rohan, Whitman,  and

            Camyre.    The  testimony  was not  "spillover"  because  the

            evidence  clearly  showed that  Whitman  and  Rohan were  co-

            conspirators,  rendering  the  statement  admissible  against

            Whitman under Fed. R.  Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  Thus, as  to both

            Wihbey and Whitman, the cited statement by Rohan was relevant

            and independently  admissible without regard to the existence

            of the larger conspiracy (which we are assuming arguendo  was
                                                            ________

            not proven).  See United States  v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 26
                          ___ _____________     ________

            (1st Cir. 1993) (no spillover where evidence was relevant and

            independently admissible).

                       The other cited instance of  evidentiary spillover

            was Britt's testimony  that he and Rohan were  "going to do a

            separate  deal" together  (implicitly  with  Wihbey).    That

            statement might  be fairly  characterized as spillover  as to

            Wihbey,   given  our   assumption  that   the  evidence   was

            insufficient   to  tie   Britt  to   the  Wihbey-Rohan-Weiner

            conspiracy.   But, even if  Wihbey had been  given a separate

            trial, the jury would have properly heard testimony about the

            arrest of Britt  and Rohan while buying marijuana from Wiener

                                         -36-
                                          36

            in Wihbey's Arden Street house.  Thus, it is hard  to see how

            there  could  be  any  marginal probative  value  in  Britt's

            statement  that  he and  Rohan had  planned  to do  that deal

            together.   And, once again, this testimony  is not spillover

            as  to  Whitman,  against  whom  it  would  be  relevant  and

            independently  admissible, because  the evidence  showed that

            Britt, Rohan,  and Whitman  were co-conspirators.   Thus, the

            defendants  have  identified only  one  specific  instance of

            evidentiary spillover,  which we  find harmless, and  we will

            not hypothesize the existence of other instances.

                      Second, the  trial judge  gave  a jury  instruction

            that cautioned against using spillover evidence:8 

                      In  reaching your  verdict, keep  in mind
                      that   guilt   is   both   personal   and
                      individual.   Your verdict  must be based
                      solely upon the evidence  presented about
                      each  Defendant.   The case  against each
                      Defendant stands or falls upon  the proof
                      or lack of  proof against that  Defendant
                      alone.  Your verdict  as to one Defendant
                      should not influence your decision  as to
                      the other Defendant.

            The trial judge gave similar instructions again when charging

            the jury on the elements of conspiracy and what evidence they

                                
            ____________________

            8.  The judge also gave a multiple conspiracy instruction, to
            the  effect that the jury  must acquit both  defendants if it
            found that the single conspiracy charged did  not exist, even
            if it found other  conspiracies.  Thus, the jury  verdict can
            be seen  as an effective rejection of the multiple conspiracy
            theory.  See United  States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d  1161, 1191
                     ___ ______________    _________
            (1st  Cir.  1993),  cert. denied,  114  S.  Ct. 2714  (1994).
                                _____ ______
            However,  we have assumed for  the sake of  analysis that the
            evidence  was insufficient  to support  that verdict,  and we
            have momentarily embraced the multiple conspiracy theory.

                                         -37-
                                          37

            could consider as proof of a  conspiracy.  These instructions

            were aimed at preventing evidentiary spillover, and we do not

            readily  assume  that  a  jury  disregards  clear directions.

            Greer, 483  U.S. at 766 n.8.   The defendants did not request
            _____

            any other instruction as to spillover, nor did they object to

            this one.

                      Third,  Wihbey's  activities   (and  the   evidence

            thereof) were quite distinct from  Whitman's; each separately

            agreed to supply marijuana  to a middleman (Rohan, at  least,

            and perhaps Britt) for resale to the informant DeCastro.  The

            question  here  is  whether  evidence about  Wihbey  and  his

            conspiracy spilled over to  prejudice Whitman, or vice versa.

            Assuming,  as we  are,  two separate  conspiracies, with  the

            Wihbey sale  distinct from  the Whitman sale,  the defendants

            have not  explained how the  jury could  have found  evidence

            from one conspiracy to be particularly probative of the other

            conspiracy.   See United States  v. Dworken, 855  F.2d 12, 24
                          ___ _____________     _______

            n.24 (1st  Cir. 1988)  (evidence  from separate  conspiracies

            unlikely  to have spillover effect).  We see little about the

            fact that one of the defendants agreed to  sell to Rohan that

            makes  it more likely that the other defendant also agreed to

            sell to Rohan.  All we are left with is  the possibility that

            some  general, non-specific transference  of guilt  must have

            occurred.  The appellants have not pressed that argument, and

            in  any event we find  such any such  general transference of

                                         -38-
                                          38

            guilt  in this case to be  harmless under the totality of the

            circumstances.  

                      Wihbey   also  asserts   that   the  variance   was

            prejudicial  in that he was  sentenced for the  250 pounds of

            marijuana  he agreed  to  sell Rohan  rather  than the  forty

            pounds actually delivered.  We see no merit in that argument.

            Drug quantity is  not considered  by the jury  an element  of

            either the conspiracy or the possession count,  but is rather

            a matter  for the district  court to consider  at sentencing.

            See  United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 979-80 (1st Cir.
            ___  _____________    ________

            1995) (no specific quantity need be proven at trial; quantity

            typically  relevant  only  at sentencing  stage).   Moreover,

            evidence  of  the 250  pound  quantity was  derived  from the

            smaller conspiracy of which Wihbey was clearly part, thus his

            claim that his sentence was affected by the asserted variance

            and  some  associated evidentiary  spillover  is particularly

            difficult to fathom.

                      "To prevail on a  claim of prejudicial spillover, a

            defendant  `must   prove  prejudice   so  pervasive  that   a

            miscarriage  of  justice looms.'"    United  States v.  Levy-
                                                 ______________     _____

            Cordero, 67 F.3d  1002, 1008 (1st Cir.  1995) (quoting United
            _______                                                ______

            States v. Pierro,  32 F.3d  611, 615 (1st  Cir. 1994),  cert.
            ______    ______                                        _____

            denied, 115 S. Ct. 919  (1995)) (citations omitted).  Because
            ______

            Wihbey and Whitman have  fallen far short of such  a showing,

            we conclude  that any variance between  the single conspiracy

                                         -39-
                                          39

            charged and  the conspiracy  or conspiracies proven  at trial

            was  not prejudicial to the defendants and is not grounds for

            reversal.

            D.  Sentencing Issues
            D.  Sentencing Issues
            _____________________

                      Wihbey and Whitman both contend that the sentencing

            judge  made  erroneous  factual findings  material  to  their

            sentencing  under the  federal  sentencing  guidelines.   For

            sentencing  purposes,   the   government  must   prove   drug

            quantities by a preponderance of the evidence.  United States
                                                            _____________

            v.  Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1198 (1st Cir. 1993).  We review
                _________

            the sentencing  court's factfinding  for clear error,  id. at
                                                                   ___

            1196, reversing only if, after reviewing all of the evidence,

            we  are left  with the  definite and  firm conviction  that a

            mistake has been  made.  United States v. Rust,  976 F.2d 55,
                                     _____________    ____

            57 (1st Cir. 1992).

                      1.  Wihbey's Sentence:  Drug Quantity
                          _________________________________

                      Wihbey asserts that the sentencing  judge committed

            clear error  in determining  the drug quantity  for guideline

            sentencing  purposes.    The  commentary  to  the  applicable

            guideline provides:

                      In  an  offense involving  negotiation to
                      traffic  in  a controlled  substance, the
                      weight    under    negotiation   in    an
                      uncompleted distribution shall be used to
                      calculate    the    applicable    amount.
                      However, where the  court finds that  the
                      defendant did  not intend to  produce and
                      was not reasonably  capable of  producing
                      the  negotiated  amount, the  court shall
                      exclude  from  the guideline  calculation

                                         -40-
                                          40

                      the  amount that  it finds  the defendant
                      did  not intend  to produce  and  was not
                      reasonably capable of producing.

            United  States Sentencing  Commission,  Guidelines Manual,   
                                                    _________________

            2D1.1, comment. (n.12) (Nov.  1, 1994).  The judge  found the

            applicable quantity of marijuana to be 250 pounds, the amount

            Wihbey had agreed to sell to Rohan according to the testimony

            of  Wihbey's co-conspirators.   Wihbey  points out  that only

            forty  pounds changed hands  in the  controlled buy  and less

            than  three   more  pounds  were  found   later  in  Wihbey's

            condominium.  As the  guideline commentary suggests, we first

            examine the evidentiary basis for determining that 250 pounds

            was the negotiated  amount, which  as a general  rule is  the

            applicable  quantity,   and  then  we  examine   whether  the

            exception to the general rule should have been applied.

                      The sentencing judge  presided at  trial and  heard

            and observed  the testimony  of all  the witnesses, which  we

            find sufficient  to support  his drug quantity  finding under

            our  deferential standard  of review.   Rohan  testified that

            Wihbey agreed  to sell 250 pounds  in fifty-pound increments.

            Weiner also testified  that the deal was "for  something like

            250 pounds."   Rohan, Britt, and DeCastro  discussed the 250-

            pound purchase in  their tape-recorded  conversation.   Britt

            testified  that Rohan said his  source had 200  to 250 pounds

            available, and the deal would go forward in fifty-pound lots.

                                         -41-
                                          41

                      Wihbey   argues   that  the   testimony   of  these

            cooperating co-conspirators was unreliable.  Our observations

            in United States v. Zuleta-Alvarez are applicable here:
               _____________    ______________

                      In  this  case, there  existed sufficient
                      indicia of reliability to  avoid reversal
                      for clear  error.  First, the testimony .
                      .  . relied upon  by the sentencing judge
                      was all provided under oath . . . and was
                      corroborated  by  the many  witnesses who
                      testified  .   .  .  .     Moreover,  the
                      sentencing judge was  also the  presiding
                      judge during the prior proceedings.  Thus
                      the sentencing judge had  the opportunity
                      to  observe  the  testimony   and  cross-
                      examination of the various  witnesses and
                      could   thereby   make   an   independent
                      assessment of their credibility.

            922  F.2d 33, 36-37 (1st  Cir. 1990), cert.  denied, 500 U.S.
                                                  _____  ______

            927 (1991).   Based on  the testimony at  trial, the  judge's

            factual finding that the negotiated amount was 250 pounds was

            not clearly erroneous.

                      In addition to challenging the  evidentiary support

            for the  finding that the  negotiated amount was  250 pounds,

            Wihbey  argues that  there was  insufficient evidence  of his

            intention and  capability to deliver  that amount.   But that

            argument  misses  the  mark;  it  seems  to  be  based  on  a

            misreading  of the directive of commentary note 12 to   2D1.1

            of the guidelines.

                      We have interpreted  application note  12
                      as directing  that  the amount  of  drugs
                      under negotiation must  be considered  in
                      determining   the   applicability  of   a
                      minimum  mandatory   penalty  unless  the
                      sentencing  court supportably  finds both
                                                           ____
                      that  the  defendant  did not  intend  to

                                         -42-
                                          42

                      produce   the   additional  quantity   of
                      narcotics,   and   that  he   lacked  the
                                   ___
                      capacity to do so.

            United  States v.  Muniz,  49 F.3d  36,  42 (1st  Cir.  1995)
                               _____

            (emphasis  in  original).    In  other  words,  as  the plain

            language of  the guideline  comment dictates, the  negotiated

            amount applies  unless the  sentencing judge makes  a finding

            that the defendant  lacked the intent  and the capability  to

            deliver.

                      Wihbey  argued  at  the  disposition  hearing  that

            because only forty pounds  were delivered and because  he had

            no  prior record  of  drug-dealing, he  therefore lacked  the

            capability  and  intent  to  deliver 250  pounds.    But  the

            sentencing  judge rejected  Wihbey's argument,  and expressly

            found that  Wihbey was capable  of producing the  250 pounds;

            the  judge did not state the basis for that finding, however.

            In our  view, the co-conspirator testimony  noted above about

            the 250-pound  deal is somewhat probative  of Wihbey's intent

            and capability to produce that amount.  The fact that the DEA

            did not find the  remaining marijuana in Wihbey's condominium

            does  not prove that  Wihbey was unable or  did not intend to

            deliver; obviously,  he may have  arranged to have  the drugs

            kept elsewhere, to be  delivered to Arden Street as  the deal

            progressed.  Consistent with the clear language of note 12 to

            section 2D1.1 of the guidelines, the negotiated amount is the

            applicable quantity  unless Wihbey can show  both "no intent"

                                         -43-
                                          43

            and "no capacity"  to produce  that amount.   The  sentencing

            judge found that Wihbey failed to make that showing, and that

            finding was not clearly erroneous.

                      2.  Whitman's Sentence:  Leadership Role
                          ____________________________________

                      Whitman  urges that the  sentencing judge committed

            clear error in  finding that  he had a  leadership role  over

            Camyre justifying  an enhancement under U.S.S.G.    3B1.1(c).

            His  argument   is  twofold:  (1)  the   trial  evidence  was

            insufficient  to  support  the  leadership  finding, and  (2)

            Whitman's youth relative to Camyre and the other conspirators

            indicates  that  Whitman was  at  most  a  "co-equal," not  a

            leader.   The second  argument is easily  dismissed: although

            age often correlates with one's organizational status, common

            experience  provides enough counterexamples  to indicate that

            there is little probative  value in that correlation.   As to

            the  first  argument,  the  evidence in  this  case  strongly

            suggests  that  Whitman  did  play a  leadership  role.   The

            excerpts  of  Camyre's testimony  cited  in the  government's

            brief show  that Camyre  responded to Whitman's  orders, that

            Whitman set the  timing of the planned transaction,  and that

            Camyre expected a  smaller share of the  profit than Whitman.

            Whitman points to no  evidence that suggests a non-leadership

            role,  other than  his  age  relative  to  that  of  his  co-

            conspirators.  The  judge  who   presided  at  trial  and  at

            sentencing  is  in the  best  position to  make  this factual

                                         -44-
                                          44

            finding.  Our review of the  record finds significant support

            for  the judge's  finding, and  there  is certainly  no clear

            error.

                                         IV.
                                         IV.
                                         ___

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      For the  foregoing reasons,  the judgments  and the

            sentences are affirmed.
                          affirmed
                          ________

                                         -45-
                                          45