Court Opinion

ID: 9692989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:17.33317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.666005
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). A confession is admissible if the court determines that the confession was voluntary under'the totality of the circumstances. The state has the burden to prove the voluntariness of a defendant’s statement beyond a reasonable doubt. I agree with the courts below. The state did not carry its' burden.
The word voluntariness is a convenient shorthand for describing a complex of values which underlie a decision to bar or admit a confession. State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 741 n.1, 345 N.W.2d 457 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (1984), writ of habeas corpus, granted, 605 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Wis. 1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1986). Professors LaFave and Israel conclude that three values underlie the Supreme Court's decisions:
*248Confessions will be barred if (1) the practices used to obtain them make their reliability doubtful; (2) the police use offensive practices to obtain them, even if reliability is not in question; and (3) circumstances significantly impair the defendant's free choice, even if the police do not resort to offensive practices. 1 LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, sec. 6.2 (b), pp. 441-444 (1984).
While the majority seems to say that a confession is per se voluntary if police tactics are not inherently coercive, the majority does not tell us how to determine whether the police conduct is inherently coercive. Courts have not had an easy time specifying what police conduct is inherently coercive.* That is the value of the totality of the circumstances test — it recognizes that police conduct may be coercive under some circumstances, but not under others. Police conduct cannot be dismissed as noncoercive without looking at all surrounding circumstances.
The circuit courts conducted an evidentiary hearing, heard the witnesses and reviewed the medical records. The court of appeals reviewed the records and affirmed the circuit courts. Both the circuit courts and *249the court of appeals concluded that the state had not carried its burden of proof and that the statements should be suppressed because they were not voluntarily given under the circumstances of these cases. As Judge Beilfuss, writing for the court of appeals, stated: "The mere presence of police, their appearance of authority, and perilous surrounding circumstances which threaten the life of a helpless individual — all of these in conjunction may pressure the individual and force a statement. The police may not apply the pressure; but in appearance they may still control the means of its release." Majority opinion at page 232.
I would affirm the decisions of the circuit courts and court of appeals. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins in this dissent.

 The majority cites Colorado v. Connelly, — U.S. — (1986), as directly supporting its holding. The facts of Connelly, however, are very different from those in this case. In Connelly, the defendant walked up to a police officer and confessed to a murder. The police officers apparently were wary of the defendant and his confession. Police questioning came after the initial volunteered confession and after Miranda rights were given. The defendant insisted that he understood his rights and spoke willingly to the police on several occasions. In this case the police officers approached the defendants and questioned them, without Miranda warnings, when they were in pain and disoriented.