Court Opinion

ID: 9911671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 17:04:34.981895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:23.094847
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 23-1244
                               Filed December 20, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF C.R.,
Minor Child,

K.R., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Steven Guiter,

District Associate Judge.

      A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Terzo R. Steves, Des Moines, for appellant father.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Sarah Dewein, Urbandale, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
                                         2

AHLERS, Judge.

       The juvenile court terminated a father’s parental rights to his child, born in

2017. The father appeals. He challenges one of the two statutory grounds for

termination found by the juvenile court, claims the court failed to properly consider

whether termination is in the child’s best interests, contends the court did not

consider if any permissive exceptions to termination were applicable, and requests

additional time to work toward reunification.

       We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973

N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact,

especially regarding witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. Our

review follows a three-step process that involves determining if a statutory ground

for termination has been established, whether termination is in the child’s best

interests, and whether any permissive exceptions should be applied to preclude

termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). Then we address any

additional claims raised by the parent.         In re K.B., No. 22-1343, 2022 WL

17481399, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2022).

       As to the statutory grounds, the juvenile court terminated the father’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2023). The father

argues the State failed to establish grounds for termination under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h)—a ground not relied upon by the juvenile court. As the

grounds for termination under paragraph (f) and (h) are very similar—both require

the court to find the child could not be returned to the parent’s custody at the time

of the termination hearing and differ only with respect to age of the child at issue

and the length of time the child must be removed from the parent’s custody,
                                         3

compare Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), with id. § 232.116(1)(h)—we assume the

father’s reference to paragraph (h) instead of (f) is a typographical error and that

he is challenging the juvenile court’s finding under paragraph (f).

       Even with the assumption in the father’s favor, his challenge to the statutory

grounds for termination fails. Where the juvenile court finds multiple grounds for

termination of parental rights have been satisfied, as here, we may affirm on any

one of those grounds. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Because the

father does not challenge the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e),

he has waived any claim of error under this ground. See, e.g., In re A.W., No. 23-

1125, 2023 WL 6290680, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2023); In re J.P., No. 19-

1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020); In re N.S., No. 14-1375,

2014 WL 5253291, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014). Therefore, a statutory

ground for termination is satisfied under section 232.116(1)(e).1

       We next move to the question of whether termination of the father’s parental

rights is in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination,

we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical,

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d

33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).

1 Although we need not address termination under paragraph (f), following our de

novo review of the entire record, we note that all elements for termination under
paragraph (f) are met here, as the child is four years of age or older, the child was
adjudicated a child in need of assistance, the child has been removed from the
physical custody of the father for over twelve consecutive months, and the child
could not be returned to the custody of the father, who was in prison at the time of
the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f).
                                           4

       Before getting into the details of the best-interests analysis, we start with

some history. This family became involved with the Iowa Department of Health

and Human Services thirteen months before the termination hearing, when the

child was first removed from his mother’s custody. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile

court adjudicated the child to be a child in need of assistance. The mother died in

an accident a few months later. As for the father, at the time of the termination

hearing, he was in prison for the eighth time, and he had not seen the child in

person in nearly three years. This is in part because of the father’s incarceration

for drug possession and burglary during the eighteen-month period before the

termination hearing. His current discharge date is estimated to be ten months after

the termination hearing, but evidence presented at the termination hearing

establishes that he would not be able to take immediate custody of the child when

he is discharged.     He would first have to engage with all the services the

department has requested of him.

       With that background in mind, we turn to some of the finer details of the

father’s claim that terminating his parental rights is not in the child’s best interests.

Historically, the father has not taken necessary steps to spend time with the child.

For example, when the father and the mother divorced in 2020, the father’s

visitation with the child was conditioned on the father’s completion of a Children in

the Middle class.2 But there is no evidence he ever took the class. In addition, his

2 Iowa Code section 598.15(1) requires parties to a dissolution-of-marriage action

involving the issues of child custody or visitation to “participate in a court-approved
course to educate and sensitize the parties to the needs of any child or party during
and subsequent to the proceeding.” “Children in the Middle” is one such court-
approved course.
                                          5

current contact with the child is limited to monthly phone or video visits supervised

by his sister. Most concerning is that, by his own admission, the father struggles

with substance abuse—including methamphetamine, which he started using daily

in 2020. See J.P., 2020 WL 110425, at *2 (“A parent’s methamphetamine use, in

itself, creates a dangerous environment for children.”).

       From these facts, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of the

father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests. We recognize that the father

has had limited ability to engage with services or to demonstrate his ability to care

for the child while incarcerated, but the father’s incarceration and his behavior prior

to that does not show that the child’s interests would be best served by delaying

termination.    See A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (recognizing a parent’s past

performance may be indicative of the parent’s future performance). The father

cannot provide the child with his basic needs given the father’s substance-abuse

issues and unwillingness to take on the role of a parent. Conversely, the child is

doing well in the care of his maternal grandparents.                See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)(b) (listing “whether the child has become integrated into the foster

family” as a factor to consider in determining whether termination of parental rights

is in a child’s best interests). The child’s grandparents are also placement for his

half-sibling, and the grandparents are willing to adopt both children. See In re

M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (considering the child’s placement in a

home with a half-sibling as a factor favoring the finding that termination of parental

rights is in the child’s best interests); In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 131 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2012) (noting a caretaker’s willingness to adopt as a favorable consideration

in assessing whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests).
                                          6

Termination would allow the child to achieve permanency and stability. Based on

these facts, we conclude termination of the father’s parental rights is in the child’s

best interests.

       As to the father’s claim that the court failed to consider whether a permissive

exception applied, the court’s termination order shows otherwise. It states:

       The court has considered all possible exceptions regarding the
       termination of the parental rights of [the father] and has determined
       that clear and convincing evidence shows that termination of [his]
       parental rights is in the child’s best interests and that no exceptions
       exist, or that any applicable exceptions do not outweigh the best
       interests of the child which require termination of the parent’s
       parental rights so that permanency and stability can be provided to
       the child.

The father has also failed to identify what permissive exception he believes should

have been applied and explain why it should be applied. So, to the extent he

argues a permissive exception should have been applied, he has waived that

argument. See In re E.W., No. 22-0647, 2022 WL 2347196, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 29, 2022) (finding an issue waived when the parent failed to develop a

supporting argument). Further, even if the argument were not waived, it is the

father’s burden to prove a permissive exception applies. In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d

315, 322 (Iowa 2021). Because the father fails to even identify which permissive

exception he wants us to apply, he has not met his burden.

       Finally, we consider the father’s request for more time to work toward

reunification. The court may grant a parent six additional months to work toward

reunification in lieu of termination under certain circumstances. See Iowa Code

§ 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order pursuant to

section 232.104 if it does not terminate parental rights); see also id.
                                         7

§ 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving an additional six months

to work toward reunification). Before the court may grant a parent additional time

to work toward reunification, it must be able to “enumerate the specific factors,

conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the

determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no

longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” See id. § 232.104(2)(b).

       We understand the father seeks more time so that he has an opportunity to

“demonstrate his ability to parent his son.” But nothing in the record before us

suggests that the father would be able to demonstrate an ability to parent within

such a short period of time. As a preliminary matter, we note that the father’s

earliest expected discharge date from prison is ten months after the termination

hearing, so the barriers to reunification cannot possibly be removed in six months.

Additionally, even if we ignored the prison-release-date problem, the father does

not identify how he would address the barriers to reunification during a six-month

extension. Instead, he merely says he would be willing to follow the department’s

recommendations. Even if that is true, he would not be able to meaningfully

address his substance-abuse issues within such a short period of time. As such,

the juvenile court correctly denied the father’s request for additional time to work

toward reunification.

       AFFIRMED.