Court Opinion

ID: 9948221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:01:36.925141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:20.070643
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAR 6 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CIRINO IBANEZ-ROSAS,                            No. 21-1294
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A205-720-475
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 4, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: CLIFTON, H.A. THOMAS, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Cirino Ibanez-Rosas, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions this

Court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying

his motion to reopen and terminate proceedings due to a fundamental change in

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
law. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

      This Court reviews the BIA’s denial of motions to terminate and reopen for

abuse of discretion. Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). Further,

this Court reviews BIA “decisions denying sua sponte reopening for the limited

purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional

error.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

      Ibanez-Rosas contends that the BIA’s finding that Niz-Chavez v. Garland

did not represent a fundamental change in law constituted a legal error. 593 U.S.

155 (2021). Because we have jurisdiction over BIA decisions denying sua sponte

reopening when legal or constitutional error is alleged, see Bonilla, 840 F.3d at

588, we have jurisdiction over Ibanez-Rosas’s case.

      First, Ibanez-Rosas challenges the immigration court’s subject matter

jurisdiction in his removal proceedings. Our decision in United States v. Bastide-

Hernandez, which held that a deficient Notice to Appear (“NTA”) does not deprive

the immigration court of jurisdiction, forecloses Ibanez-Rosas’s challenge. 39

F.4th 1187, 1191-92 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.14(a), provides only a claim-processing rule that has no bearing over the

immigration court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 1191. A defective NTA therefore does not

dispossess the court of its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1193.

                                          2                                 21-1294
      In the alternative, Ibanez-Rosas asks this Court to remand his case to the

BIA to consider his allegation that the deficiencies in his NTA constituted a claim

processing violation. Remand is not appropriate here. See Umana-Escobar v.

Garland, 69 F.4th, 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Ibanez-Rosas failed to exhaust his

claim-processing challenge. Exhaustion is statutorily required. Id. See also 8

U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 424 (2023)

(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) as requiring a noncitizen to “‘exhaus[t] all

administrative remedies available to the alien as of right’”).

      Ibanez-Rosas failed to raise any challenge to his defective NTA at any time

during his hearing before the immigration judge (“IJ”). And Ibanez-Rosas’s

briefing before the BIA—both on direct appeal and on his motion to reopen—

focused on challenges to the jurisdiction of the IJ and not on any claim-processing

error. “Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on appeal

to have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below, and to have been

sufficient to put the BIA on notice of what was being challenged.” Umana-

Escobar, 69 F.4th at 550 (quoting Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020)

(internal citation omitted)). Because Ibanez-Rosas did not raise his claim-

processing challenge before the BIA, he has failed to exhaust it.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         3                                    21-1294