Court Opinion

ID: 9939512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 01:00:35.892612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:21.327257
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60246        Document: 00517061698             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/09/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     February 9, 2024
                                      No. 23-60246
                                     ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk
   Quincy D. Taylor,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   University of Mississippi Medical Center,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 3:19-CV-331
                     ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff Quincy Taylor appeals the grant of summary judgment
   dismissing his employment-related claims against his former employer, the
   University of Mississippi Medical Center (“UMMC”). We AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60246         Document: 00517061698              Page: 2       Date Filed: 02/09/2024

                                          No. 23-60246

                                                I.
           Taylor, a black man, had worked in UMMC’s IT department since
   2012, specifically as a Field Support Specialist Associate since 2016. He was
   supervised by Stephen Parnell and Russell Donald.
           In 2018, Taylor applied for a promotion to Field Support Specialist
   Intermediate. A hiring panel interviewed each qualified candidate and
   recommended the most qualified to Donald, UMMC’s Director of Field
   Services. Marcella Fleming, a black woman, was promoted instead of Taylor.
   Fleming had worked at UMMC since 2015, specifically as an End User
   Computer Specialist Intermediate since 2016. She had a bachelor’s degree in
   Computer Networking and Information Technology, while Taylor only had
   an associate’s degree in Network Engineering. The panel and Donald based
   their decision on Fleming’s exemplary work performance at UMMC,
   favorable interview, educational background, and experience.
           After being passed over, Taylor resigned in protest. In his resignation
   email on April 4, 2018, Taylor said his last day would be April 27, 2018. About
   a week before his designated last day, Taylor emailed Parnell to ask what
   factors went into Fleming’s selection. Taylor also complained about his
   workload and how he had not advanced as quickly as others at UMMC. He
   aired similar grievances in person with Parnell on April 16, 2018. After this
   meeting, Taylor asked to rescind his resignation. But Donald and other IT
   department leadership decided to accept Taylor’s resignation because they
   viewed it as “impulsive and an attempt to negotiate [his] current position.”
           After exhausting his administrative remedies,1 Taylor sued UMMC.
   Relevant to this appeal, he brought claims under the Rehabilitation Act of

           _____________________
           1
            Even though Taylor technically failed to check the “retaliation” box in his EEOC
   charge, his retaliation claim could still “reasonably be expected to grow out of” his initial

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                                         No. 23-60246

   1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, for retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment,
   and failure to accommodate. He also brought claims under Title VII of the
   Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, for sex, race, and color
   discrimination based on failure to promote. The district court granted
   UMMC summary judgment on all claims. Taylor now appeals the dismissal
   of his claims for failure to accommodate, retaliation, and failure to promote.
                                              II.
            We review a summary judgment de novo. Patel v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 941
   F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2019). “The court shall grant summary judgment if
   the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
   the    movant      is   entitled    to    judgment      as    a   matter     of    law.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “This court may affirm the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment on any ground supported by the record and presented to
   the district court.” Salinas v. R.A. Rogers, Inc., 952 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir.
   2020).
                                             III.
                                              A.
            We first consider whether the district court erred in dismissing
   Taylor’s claim that UMMC failed to reasonably accommodate his disability
   under the Rehabilitation Act.
            To show failure-to-accommodate, Taylor had to prove (1) he was “a
   qualified individual with a disability,” (2) UMMC knew about “the
   disability and its consequential limitations,” and (3) UMMC “failed to make
   reasonable accommodations.” Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 304 (5th

            _____________________
   charge of discrimination and thus be up for consideration now. Sanchez v. Standard Brands,
   Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970).

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                                      No. 23-60246

   Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (citation omitted). The district court granted
   summary judgment because Taylor failed to meet the second element. At
   that step, an employer is obligated to “engage in an interactive process . . . to
   find the best means of accommodating [a] disability” if the employee first
   specifically   identifies   “the     disability   and   resulting   limitations,
   and . . . [suggests] reasonable accommodations.” E.E.O.C. v. Chevron
   Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 621 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
   marks and citations omitted). If the plaintiff is not direct and specific in his
   request, then “he can prevail only by showing that the disability, resulting
   limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation were open, obvious,
   and apparent to the [employer’s] relevant agents.” Sligh, 87 F.4th at 304
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Taylor argues he met the second element because his supervisors
   knew his workload exacerbated his depression, anxiety, and insomnia, yet
   they failed to engage with him to determine a reasonable accommodation to
   lighten his workload. Taylor first informed UMMC about his disability in his
   2012 employment application, in which he stated he was “being treated for
   depression.” In 2014, Taylor emailed Donald about suggestions to reduce his
   workload, complaining about how mentally and physically exhausting it was
   to provide “ongoing [IT] support” to “multiple departments.” After being
   passed over for the 2018 promotion, Taylor complained to HR about
   “mismanagement of personnel and unequal compensation [that] has led to
   burnout, physically and mentally.” In a similar vein, Taylor emailed Parnell
   in April 2018, saying, “Although no other technician has had this type of
   [increased] workload, I’ve done this willingly for the past two years in order
   to support the mission of [UMMC] while under much stress.” He later met
   with Parnell to “air[] out [his] grievances and told him the reason why [he]
   was resigning was [because of his] workload.” Taylor claims that in that
   meeting, he also told Parnell that he was receiving treatment for depression.

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           Even assuming UMMC knew about Taylor’s depression, however,
   he never tied this disability directly to suggested accommodations. See
   Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Mere
   knowledge of the disability is not enough; the service provider must also have
   understood the limitations the plaintiff experienced as a result of that
   disability.” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)). His 2012 application, for
   example, did not identify the “consequential limitations” of his depression.
   Sligh, 87 F.4th at 304. Likewise, Taylor’s workload grievances to Donald and
   Parnell did not tie his exhaustion to his depression, nor did Taylor “suggest
   [any] reasonable accommodation[]” based on that disability. Chevron Phillips
   Chem. Co., 570 F.3d at 621. Taylor instead met with Parnell in April 2018 to
   explain why he was resigning, not to request accommodations based on a
   disability. In fact, Taylor admitted he never expressly told any supervisor that
   he was disabled and needed a specific accommodation.
           Taylor’s piecemeal and vague complaints of exhaustion were not
   “direct and specific” requests sufficient to put UMMC on notice that he
   requested and suggested reasonable accommodations based on a disability.
   See Sligh, 87 F.4th at 304; Windham, 875 F.3d at 236–37. And because Taylor
   does not argue his disability and necessary accommodations were “open,
   obvious, and apparent,” he cannot prevail on his failure-to-accommodate
   claim. Sligh, 87 F.4th at 304–05.2
           Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on Taylor’s
   failure-to-accommodate claim.

           _____________________
           2
               Taylor also contends that he can prove disability discrimination for the same
   reasons he can prove failure to accommodate. We decline to consider this passing argument
   as it is inadequately briefed. Davis v. Davis, 826 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2016).

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                                              B.
           We next consider whether the district court erred in dismissing
   Taylor’s retaliation claim.
           Both Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act prohibit employers from
   discriminating “against any individual because such individual has opposed
   any act or practice made unlawful by th[e] Act[s].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)
   (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)
   (incorporating the ADA’s retaliation standard for Rehabilitation Act
   claims); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII).
           Because Taylor cannot point to any direct evidence of retaliation,3 he
   must satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test. January v. City of
   Huntsville, 74 F.4th 646, 653 (5th Cir. 2023) (analyzing Rehabilitation Act
   retaliation claim); Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990,
   999–1000 (5th Cir. 2022) (analyzing Title VII retaliation claim). To do so,
   he must first establish “a prima facie case by showing (1) engagement in
   protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal
   connection between the two.” January, 74 F.4th at 653. When claiming
   protected opposition, as Taylor does here, “an employee must at least have
   referred to conduct that could plausibly be considered discriminatory in
   intent or effect, thereby alerting the employer of its discriminatory
   practices.” Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1000 (citation omitted). Therefore, if Taylor
   never opposed purported unlawful conduct by UMMC, then he cannot
   maintain a retaliation claim. See ibid.

           _____________________
           3
              That is, Taylor points to no “evidence which, if believed, proves [retaliation]
   without inference or presumption.” Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861
   (5th Cir. 1993).

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                                         No. 23-60246

           Taylor offers three instances of protected activity: (1) his resignation
   for being discriminatorily passed over for a promotion; (2) his grievances to
   Parnell for being discriminatorily passed over; and (3) his requests for a
   reasonable accommodation. According to Taylor, summary judgment was
   improper because we must assume a jury could believe the “timing” of his
   resignation and grievances “demonstrates a protest against a discriminatory
   action,” and that his “attempt to negotiate his current position” was a
   request for a reasonable accommodation. We disagree. Taylor’s argument
   overlooks that a dispute of fact is genuine only “if the evidence is sufficient
   for a reasonable jury to return a verdict” in his favor. Ahders v. SEI Priv. Tr.
   Co., 982 F.3d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
   No reasonable jury could find in Taylor’s favor based on these conclusory
   arguments supported by no evidence.
           First, consider Taylor’s resignation and “airing his grievances” in
   protest for being passed over for the promotion.4 His resignation letter did
   not specify why he was resigning, let alone say that his resignation was based
   on perceived discrimination. His grievances to Parnell simply expressed
   displeasure for being passed over twice in favor of another candidate, but
   Taylor never alleged those decisions were discriminatory. He instead asked
   about “what skills [he] could sharpen to become a better candidate” and
   “what factors ultimately lead to [the other candidate’s] selection.” Rather
   than protesting discriminatory hiring, Taylor lamented his increased
   workload and that his “hard work and willingness to maintain support for

           _____________________
           4
             The district court found that “airing his grievances” was sufficient evidence that
   he engaged in a protected opposition activity, relying on Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851
   F.3d 422, 428 n.23 (5th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff in Alkhawaldeh, however, presented
   evidence that his grievances were complaints about discriminatory conduct—specifically,
   “racially insensitive remarks.” See id. at 428. By contrast, Taylor’s grievances to Parnell
   mentioned no alleged discrimination.

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                                      No. 23-60246

   [UMMC’s] customers has gone un[n]oticed and unappreciated.” Beyond
   Taylor’s conclusory allegation that Fleming received the promotion because
   she was a “bright skinned female,” nothing suggests Taylor complained
   about discrimination to UMMC. While Taylor later stated at his deposition
   that his “resignation was, in effect, a protest to the discrimination that [he]
   felt [he] was facing, to raise a flag to get some attention,” no evidence
   indicates he communicated this belief to UMMC.
          Next, consider Taylor’s purported request for an accommodation. He
   points to his April 2018 grievance email and meeting with Parnell as requests
   for an accommodation. As discussed above, however, these grievances
   cannot reasonably be perceived as specific requests for an accommodation.
   See supra Part III.A.
          Without evidence that Taylor either complained of discrimination or
   requested an accommodation, nothing suggests he engaged in a protected
   activity.   See   Saketkoo,   31   F.4th    at    1000   (noting   evidence   of
   “general . . . hostility is not enough”; “an employee must at least have
   referred to conduct that could plausibly be considered discriminatory in
   intent or effect, thereby alerting the employer of its discriminatory practices”
   (citation omitted)); see also Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 169 F.
   App’x 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding no protected activity
   where plaintiff’s complaints did not allege that she was treated unfairly based
   on a protected status).
          Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted on Taylor’s
   retaliation claim.
                                          C.
          Finally, we consider whether the district court erred in dismissing
   Taylor’s Title VII discrimination claim based on UMMC’s promotion of
   Fleming instead of him.

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          Taylor’s failure-to-promote claim must satisfy the McDonnell Douglas
   test. See Autry v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 346–47 (5th Cir.
   2013). At the prima facie stage, Taylor must show (1) he was a member of a
   protected class, (2) he sought and was qualified for an open position, (3) he
   “was rejected for the position,” and (4) UMMC either “hired a person
   outside of [his] protected class or continued to seek applicants with”
   Taylor’s qualifications. McMullin v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 782 F.3d 251,
   258 (5th Cir. 2015). If Taylor makes these showings, then the burden shifts
   to UMMC to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
   decision not to promote [Taylor].” Ibid. If it does, the burden shifts back to
   Taylor to present evidence that UMMC’s reasons for not promoting him
   were pretextual, ibid.—for instance, evidence that he was “clearly better
   qualified (as opposed to merely better or as qualified) than [Fleming].”
   Roberson-King v. La. Workforce Comm’n, Off. of Workforce Dev., 904 F.3d 377,
   381 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Taylor
   may also show that UMMC’s “proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy
   of credence.’” Ibid. (citation omitted).
          The district court ruled that Taylor’s discrimination claims failed at
   the   pretext   stage.   Specifically,       Taylor   identified   no   evidence
   “demonstrat[ing] that UMMC’s reasons for not selecting him for the Field
   Support Specialist-Intermediate position were pretextual.” We agree.
          Even assuming Taylor made a prima facie case, UMMC provided a
   legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for promoting Fleming over Taylor.
   Donald and the hiring panel thought Fleming was more qualified than Taylor
   based on her prior exemplary work performance at UMMC, her favorable
   interview, educational background, and extensive experience. These are
   legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the decision. See Reeves v.
   Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (explaining the

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                                     No. 23-60246

   burden to present a nondiscriminatory reason “is one of production, not
   persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment’” (citation omitted)).
          Taylor failed to present evidence that these proffered reasons were
   mere pretext for discrimination. Rather than attack the UMMC’s reasons,
   Taylor instead points to inconsistencies in Fleming’s employment
   application with respect to her years of work experience. He also questions
   whether Fleming’s prior experience was as relevant as his to the Field
   Support Specialist Intermediate position. These factors, however, do not
   suggest pretext.
          We have repeatedly held that “differences in qualifications between
   job candidates are generally not probative evidence of discrimination unless
   those differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute
   among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly
   better qualified for the position at issue.” Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
   Regul. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Roberson-King,
   904 F.3d at 381. So, Taylor must point to evidence suggesting he was clearly
   more qualified than Fleming or that UMMC’s proffered reasons for
   promoting her were clearly unworthy of belief. Deines, 164 F.3d at 279. He
   has not done so. Employers can generally “weigh the qualifications of
   prospective employees, so long as they are not motivated by
   [discrimination].” Roberson-King, 904 F.3d at 382 (citation omitted). Taylor
   has not presented any evidence that UMMC chose Fleming over Taylor
   based on sex, race, or color. Accordingly, summary judgment for UMMC
   was proper on this claim as well.
                                         IV.
          The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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