Court Opinion

ID: 9551105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:49.213582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:04.378333
License: Public Domain

*1391STERNBERG, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
With respect to Part I of the majority opinion, I agree with the holding that the appeal is cognizable under C.R.C.P. 54(b), but do not agree with the analysis of the majority opinion in that regard. I concur with Parts III and IV of the opinion but I disagree with, and respectfully dissent from, Part II thereof.
With respect to the 54(b) issue, I agree with the majority that a definition of what is a claim, for purposes of C.R.C.P. 54(b) is elusive; however, I do not understand either the need to manufacture a comprehensive rule in this case, or the rule propounded by the majority.
Although there are common questions of fact with otherwise distinct claims presented in this appeal, that in itself is insufficient to preclude 54(b) certification. Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo.1982). Also, the plaintiff has not merely alleged alternative legal theories as the basis for liability when the underlying facts permit only a single recovery. See Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, supra (n. 5); Messenger v. Main, 697 P.2d 420 (Colo.App.1985); Troxel v. Town of Basalt, 682 P.2d 501 (Colo.App.1984). Instead, the plaintiff has asserted claims which do stem from the same basic facts, but which are nonetheless independent claims for relief with remedies that are not mutually dependent or exclusive. And, the underlying purpose for C.R.C.P. 54(b) is not thwarted by allowing this review, because review of the certified claims would not be rendered moot by subsequent developments in the trial court.
Therefore, I would hold, as does the majority, that the trial court properly certified as final for the purpose of appellate review the claims appealed; however, I believe the rule propounded by the majority does not serve to dispel the confusion that exists in applying C.R.C.P. 54(b).
In Part II of the majority opinion it is held that the third claim for relief, that alleging wrongful termination of employment, was properly dismissed on defendant’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. I do not agree with this conclusion.
The plaintiff alleged not only a lack of fair dealing, but also wrongful termination of an employment contract. The trial court found no wrongful termination because there was no specific term of the contract that could be the basis of the claim. In my view, the trial court erred in requiring proof of a specific term of employment as a predicate to an action for breach thereof. The indefiniteness of a contract alone does not mean that there can be no liability for breach. Salimi v. Farmers Insurance Group, 684 P.2d 264 (Colo.App.1984).
For this reason I would reverse the trial court on its dismissal of plaintiffs third claim for relief and would remand that claim for trial.