Court Opinion

ID: 9770271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:57:00.102358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:19.713370
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s overruling of point of error one. I join the majority in the remainder of its opinion.
I would sustain point of error one and hold that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction in count one for aggravated robbery because the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that complainant’s bodily injury occurred “by knocking her to the floor,” as alleged in the indictment and contained in the jury charge. Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery and acquit.
Count one of the indictment alleged that on or about August 2, 1991, appellant did,
while in the course of committing theft of property owned by ANNIE MERRI-WEATHER and with intent to obtain and maintain control of the property, intentionally and knowingly cause bodily injury to ANNIE MERRIWEATHER, a person at least sixty-five years of age, by knocking her to the jloor.
(Emphasis added.) The trial court’s charge to the jury provided:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 2nd day of August, 1991, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Richard Lee Turk, did then and there unlawfully while in the course of committing theft of property owned by Annie Merriweather, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, intentionally or knowingly cause bodily injury to Annie Merriweather, a person at least sixty-five years of age, by knocking her to the jloor, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, as charged in count one of the indictment.
(Emphasis added.) Appellant complains that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused bodily injury to complainant by knocking her to the floor. I agree.
The majority accurately sets forth the proper standard to decide whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction.
[W]e must determine if the State proved the allegations in the indictment as set forth in the jury eharge. An appellate court must “look to the charge to determine whether the part at issue is one which authorizes a conviction.” If the part at issue is one which authorizes a conviction, then the portion of the charge at issue is not surplusage, and the State must prove the unnecessary allegations.
(Op. at 886) (citations omitted).
Further, the majority accurately points out that “[i]t was not necessary for the State to *889describe how appellant caused bodily injury.” Pursuant to the TexPenal Code ANN. § 29.03 (Vernon Supp.1993), “knocking her to the floor,” was unnecessary. Toliver, 828 S.W.2d at 288. Consistent with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and with this Court, once these words became part of the jury charge authorizing the conviction, the State assumed the burden of proving that appellant caused bodily injury by knocking her to the floor. Arceneaux, 803 S.W.2d at 271; Toliver, 828 S.W.2d at 288.
The majority then concludes that:
The fact finder could infer from the evidence that the complainant’s bodily injury resulted in part from appellant’s act of knocking her to the floor. The complainant did not state that she sustained injury only as a result of appellant twisting her arm when he got on top of her after he knocked her down. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have concluded that the complainant’s “bruising or injury” was caused both by being knocked to the floor and by having her arm twisted as she lay there.
Op. at 886 (emphasis in original).
The majority, however, then fails to apply the evidence to the properly stated standard. The majority uses what the complainant did not state to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that an injury was caused by appellant knocking her to the floor. Such inferences cannot be made from the absence of evidence. I agree that such an inference can represent some evidence. Some evidence, however, is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.
Complainant did not testify that she was injured by the fall, but instead her testimony suggested her injury occurred because appellant twisted her arm. The record is silent about complainant’s injuries resulting from the fall. The most detailed testimony concerning complainant’s injuries was between the prosecutor and the complainant.
Q: Now, Mrs. Merriweather, when you fell and Richard Lee got on top of you, did he do anything to you?
A: He tried to break my arm.
Q: How did he do that?
A: Caught it down here, twisted up like that (indicating).
Q: Did that hurt?
A: Yes, it hint. I told him, I said, “Richard Lee, you hurting my arm.”
Q: Did you suffer any type of bruising or injury?
A: Yeah, I had a bad bruise on it.
The State assumed the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant caused bodily injury by knocking her to the floor. Arceneaux, 803 S.W.2d at 271; Toliver, 828 S.W.2d at 288. Even by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that complainant’s injury was caused by appellant knocking her to the floor. Complainant’s response about her injuries was predicated upon inquiries about appellant twisting and hurting her arm. This occurred after appellant knocked her on the floor. Complainant was never asked whether she was injured by falling on the floor. We cannot infer from the stated testimony, or from the lack thereof, that the State met the burden it assumed by choosing to include the words, “by knocking her to the floor” in the indictment.