Court Opinion

ID: 9891449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:10:31.886478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.779605
License: Public Domain

J-S37042-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
               v.                        :
                                         :
                                         :
 MICHAEL MCDOWELL                        :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 28 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 14, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0004138-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023

     Appellant, Michael McDowell, appeals from the order entered on

December 14, 2021, which dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546.       We vacate and

remand.

     A prior panel of this court summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s

convictions:

        On January 19, 2016, in the mid-afternoon, a truck owned by
        Appellant's friend, Sean Fishgold, rear-ended a vehicle driven
        by Augustine Swaray, on the 7300 block of Torresdale
        Avenue in . . . Philadelphia. The truck hit Swaray's car with
        such force [that Swaray’s vehicle] struck a tree and another
        parked vehicle.

        Swaray was unable to identify the truck's driver either before
        or during trial, although he did narrow down a double blind
        photo array to two photographs, one of which was
        Appellant's. Approximately one week after the accident,
        Swaray gave a description of the driver to the police.
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       At trial, Swaray was unable to recall the description. During
       cross-examination, defense counsel read this description to
       Swaray which included the information Appellant was
       wearing[] a “short-sleeved shirt” which was “white.” Mr.
       Swaray affirmed the shirt color and the shirt was a t-shirt but
       never confirmed the sleeve-length. Defense counsel did not
       question Swaray as to whether the driver had any tattoos on
       his arms. Swaray was not injured as a result of the accident,
       although his car suffered $800.00 worth of damage.

       After hitting Swaray's car, the truck attempted to leave the
       scene, drove directly into the opposing lane of traffic and
       struck a vehicle driven and owned by Michelle Hunter
       head-on, totaling it.     The [truck’s] driver attempted to
       extricate his vehicle from hers but was unsuccessful, and he
       fled the scene on foot.

       Michelle Hunter was the only witness to identify Appellant.
       She gave a description of Appellant to the police, selected his
       photo from a double blind array, and identified him both at
       the preliminary hearing and at trial. [Ms.] Hunter described
       Appellant as wearing a white t-shirt but never mentioned and
       was never questioned about the length of the sleeves.
       Defense counsel did not question her about any tattoos she
       might have observed on Appellant's arms.

       While searching [the truck], the police found the operating
       keys on a ring with multiple gym passes; all of the passes
       belonged to Appellant. The police were able to determine
       Fishgold was at the gym at the time of the accident.
       [Fishgold] admitted to the police Appellant was a friend and
       fellow roofer who had borrowed the truck on at least one
       previous occasion.

       As a result of the car accident, [Ms.] Hunter . . . said she had
       to attend cognitive brain therapy, was unable to walk or
       “function correctly” for two weeks, was unable to work for
       four to five months, could not care for her children for three
       weeks, and was unable to drive a car for six months. [At
       trial,] defense counsel stipulated to the admission of Hunter's
       medical records and [further stipulated] that

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              . . . the medical records indicate that Michelle Hunter was
              admitted to Aria Torresdale Hospital 3:11 p.m. on January
              [19], 2016. She received among other things a CT scan
              of her head where the doctors found trauma, soft tissue
              damage and swelling in her frontal brain area.

              [Ms.] Hunter was diagnosed with a closed head wound, a
              contusion to her forehead and trauma to her brain. She
              was discharged from the hospital later that night.

         At trial, Appellant did not present any evidence regarding
         either the length of his shirt sleeves or whether he had
         tattoos on his arms at the time of the accident, two years
         earlier. Immediately prior to closing, Appellant sua sponte
         began to disrobe because he wanted the jury to see his
         tattooed arms. However, when the trial court asked defense
         counsel if he wanted to put on rebuttal evidence regarding
         the tattoos, counsel declined. The trial court did permit the
         jury to view Appellant in short sleeves with no testimony.

         Appellant called two witnesses on his behalf, a co-worker,
         Shawn Rooney, who testified he believed Appellant was at
         work with him at the time of the accident. Appellant also
         called Fishgold, who testified Appellant had not borrowed the
         truck from him that day and thought Appellant had left his
         gym passes in the truck earlier.

         On June 13, 2018, the jury convicted Appellant of aggravated
         assault, [accidents involving death or personal injury,
         accidents involving damage to attended vehicle or property,
         and aggravated assault by vehicle].[1]

Commonwealth v. McDowell, 239 A.3d 43, **1-2 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(non-precedential decision).

       On August 31, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an

aggregate term of eight to 16 years in prison, followed by five years of

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3742(a), 3743(a), and
3732.1(a), respectively.

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probation, for his convictions. N.T. Sentencing, 8/31/18, at 20-21. On July

2, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence and, on

November 24, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s

petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. McDowell, 239 A.3d 43

(Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 242 A.3d 309

(Pa. 2020).

      On February 10, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, counseled PCRA petition.

In the petition, Appellant claimed that his convictions and sentences for

aggravated assault and aggravated assault by vehicle should be vacated as

those convictions were obtained in violation of his due process rights. With

respect to this issue, Appellant claimed that his convictions were based upon

“false evidence, i.e., an erroneous stipulation to [Ms. Hunter’s] injuries.” To

support this claim, Appellant attached Ms. Hunter’s medical records from Aria

Health Torresdale Hospital as well as a report prepared by Brian D. Greenwald,

M.D., the Medical Director of Center for Brain Injuries and the Associate

Medical Director of JFK-Johnson Rehabilitation Institute.

      At the outset, during trial, Appellant and the Commonwealth stipulated

to the following:

        the medical records indicate that Michelle Hunter was
        admitted to Aria Torresdale Hospital [at] 3:11 p.m. on
        January [19, 2016]. She received among other things a CT
        scan of her head where the doctors found trauma, soft tissue
        damage and swelling in her front brain area.

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            Ms. Hunter was diagnosed with a closed head wound, a
            contusion to her forehead and trauma to her brain. She was
            discharged from the hospital that night.

N.T. Trial, 6/12/18, at 191-192.

      Notwithstanding the stipulation agreed to by counsel for the parties,

Appellant claimed that Ms. Hunter’s medical records did not indicate that she

suffered “swelling in her front brain area” or “trauma to her brain.” See id.

To support this claim, Appellant attached Ms. Hunter’s medical records to his

petition.     These medical records declared that, following the collision, Ms.

Hunter was diagnosed with the following: closed head injury, contusion of

head, laceration, MVC (motor vehicle collision), and elevated creatine kinase.

Ms. Hunter’s Discharge Instructions, 1/19/16, at 1.             Further, Appellant

attached the summary of a CT scan of Ms. Hunter’s head.              The summary

declared that Ms. Hunter suffered “midline frontal soft tissue swelling” and a

“[s]oft tissue injury.” Ms. Hunter’s CT Summary, 1/19/16, at 1.

      Appellant also attached Dr. Greenwald’s report to his PCRA petition.

Within the report, Dr. Greenwald declared that he reviewed the trial court

record, including the trial transcript and Ms. Hunter’s medical records. Dr.

Greenwald Report, 12/27/20, at 1. Dr. Greenwald opined:

            1. The stipulation regarding Ms. Hunter’s medical records that
            was read by the prosecutor and agreed to by [Appellant’s
            counsel] was an incorrect summary of the medical records
            admitted into evidence at trial. Specifically, the CT scan of
            the head showed soft tissue damage (swelling of the
            forehead), but no evidence of swelling in the frontal brain
            area. Additionally, the records did not reflect that Ms. Hunter
            was diagnosed with trauma to the brain.

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        2. Based on the emergency room records admitted into
        evidence at trial, it cannot be said within a reasonable degree
        of medical certainty that Ms. Hunter suffered a concussion,
        traumatic brain injury, brain swelling and/or trauma to her
        brain.

        3. Taken together, the medical records admitted into
        evidence at trial and Ms. Hunter’s testimony, it cannot be said
        within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Ms.
        Hunter suffered a concussion, traumatic brain injury, brain
        swelling and/or trauma to her brain.

Dr. Greenwald Report, 12/27/20, at 2-3.

      Dr. Greenwald declared that his opinions were “given to a reasonable

degree of medical certainty” and that, if he “had been retained as an expert

witness at the time of [Appellant’s] trial, [he] would have been willing and

able to testify consistently with the conclusions set forth above.” Id. at 3.

      Within Appellant’s PCRA petition, Appellant also claimed that his trial

counsel (hereinafter “Trial Counsel”) was ineffective for:     “stipulat[ing] to

injuries that were not supported by the medical evidence or testimony;”

“fail[ing] to secure and/or present the testimony of an expert witness” who

“would have explained to the jury that neither the medical records nor the

victim’s testimony would support a finding that Ms. Hunter suffered a

concussion, traumatic brain injury, brain swelling and/or trauma to her brain;”

and, “fail[ing] to object to inadmissible evidence [regarding Appellant’s gym

tags] that undercut [Appellant’s] identification defense.”      PCRA Petition,

2/10/21, at 4.

      On March 17, 2021, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, where

he claimed that he recently received a recorded telephone conversation

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between Joseph Hunter, who was Ms. Hunter’s husband (hereinafter “Ms.

Hunter’s Husband”), and an agent for Liberty Mutual Insurance.             The

conversation occurred one day after the accident and, during the telephone

call, the following exchange occurred:

        [Liberty Mutual]: Okay.      Did we get the other person’s
        insurance information?

        [Ms. Hunter’s Husband]: No. My wife got rushed to the
        emergency room. He ran. I have police reports though.
        They knew, they knew, I don’t know if they locked him up
        yet, but they knew who did it. I know who did it. It’s in
        (unintelligible) the police report. He better hope the cops get
        him before I do, though, that’s all I can say for real.

Amended PCRA Petition, 3/17/21, at 2 (footnote omitted).

      Appellant declared that the police report identified him as a suspect and

he claimed that the above, after-discovered evidence “tend[s] to prove that

investigators, whether wittingly or unwittingly, provided Ms. Hunter and/or

her husband with the name of their prime suspect as early as one day after

the accident.”   Id. at 3.   Appellant surmised that Ms. Hunter could have

searched for his name on social media and viewed photographs of him on the

internet. Thus, according to Appellant, “[t]here can [] be no confidence that

Ms. Hunter identified the person she saw crash into her rather than

[Appellant], the suspect she learned about from the police crash report.” Id.

Appellant requested that the PCRA court grant him a new trial. Id. at 5.

      Appellant filed a second amended PCRA petition on March 25, 2021.

Within this petition, Appellant alleged he recently uncovered evidence that Ms.

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Hunter made a claim to Shawn Fishgold’s car insurance carrier, State Farm

Insurance, for the bodily injury policy limits.   Appellant claimed that the

demand letter sent to State Farm on Ms. Hunter’s behalf declared “that Ms.

Hunter sustained a traumatic brain injury and relie[d] upon the discharge

paperwork from [the emergency room] as proof of this diagnosis.” Second

Amended PCRA Petition, 3/25/21, at 1-2. Appellant further claimed that State

Farm tendered the $50,000.00 policy limit to Ms. Hunter. Id. According to

Appellant, the above evidence tends to show that Ms. Hunter had a monetary

“reason[] to offer false testimony to embellish the nature of her injuries,

implicate [Appellant,] and otherwise refrain from being completely honest

during trial.” Id. at 3. Appellant thus requested that the PCRA court grant

him a new trial. Id.

      On November 2, 2021, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice

that it intended to dismiss his petition in 20 days, without holding a hearing,

as the issues raised in the petition were meritless.      PCRA Court Notice,

11/2/21, at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).          The PCRA court finally

dismissed Appellant’s petition on December 14, 2021 and Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal. Appellant numbers four claims on appeal:

        1. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s]
        petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
        hearing where [Appellant] produced credible, uncontroverted
        medical evidence tending to show that the prosecutor and
        defense counsel stipulated to injuries that the complaining
        witness did not in fact sustain, all of which violated
        [Appellant’s] Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his
        Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process?

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         2. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s]
         petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
         hearing where [Appellant] established his right to relief under
         Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and
         Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987) by
         pleading and proving that defense counsel was ineffective
         insofar as he failed to retain a neurologist to ensure that he
         understood the medical evidence and that the medical
         evidence was accurately presented to the jury?

         3. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s]
         petition for post-conviction relief as trial counsel was
         ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible testimony
         regarding the gym tags found in the vehicle driven by the
         suspect insofar as the testimony concerned a crucial issue in
         the case and violated the best evidence rule and the rule
         against hearsay?

         4. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s]
         petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary
         hearing where [Appellant] uncovered and presented new
         evidence from insurance claims files which, if presented to
         the jury, would have both supported [Appellant’s] defense of
         misidentification and called into question the veracity,
         sincerity and accuracy of the complaining witness’ trial
         testimony, thereby warranting the grant of a new trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.2

       “We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is

supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of

a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar,

154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted).

       A PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing

on his petition. A PCRA petition may be dismissed without a hearing if the
____________________________________________

2 For ease of discussion, we have renumbered Appellant’s claims on appeal.

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PCRA court “is satisfied from [its review of the petition] that there are no

genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the [petitioner] is not

entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose would be served

by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). However, when the PCRA

petition raises material issues of fact, the PCRA court “shall order a hearing.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2). Thus, “[t]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court's decision

to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised

a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him

to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a

hearing.”   Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Within Appellant’s first issue on appeal, Appellant contends he is entitled

to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that “the prosecutor and defense

counsel stipulated to injuries that the complaining witness did not in fact

sustain,” thus violating both Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Appellant’s Brief at 9. We

will address Appellant’s two subclaims separately.

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily

enumerated circumstances is a “violation of the Constitution of this

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the

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circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i). Further, the petitioner must also plead

and prove “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been . . . waived.”        42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). Under the PCRA, “an issue is waived if the petitioner

could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary

review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9544(b).

      “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state ‘shall . . . deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’”

Commonwealth v. Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1193 (Pa. 2021), quoting U.S.

Const. XIV, Sec. 1. In opinions spanning from Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103 (1935) to Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the United States

Supreme Court “made clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by

the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary

demands of justice. . . . [T]he same result obtains when the State, although

not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.”

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quotation marks and

citations omitted). “Thereafter, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. [83 (1963),]

held that suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153.

      Although it is now well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids

the presentation of false evidence and the concealment of exculpatory

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evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that claims grounded in

Brady and Napue are subject to waiver under the PCRA. Commonwealth

v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 301-302 (Pa. 2017) (holding: “Brady claims . . .

may be subject to waiver” under the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 162

A.3d 394, 403-404 (Pa. 2017) (holding: under the PCRA, the petitioner waived

his claims that the Commonwealth presented “false and misleading testimony”

where the underlying information “was known (or, at the very least, should

have been known) to [trial] counsel” and where trial counsel “could have

presented at trial precisely the same challenges as [were] reflected” at the

PCRA stage).

      Here, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth violated his due process

rights when, through a stipulation, the Commonwealth presented false

evidence that Ms. Hunter’s medical records indicated she suffered from

“swelling in her front brain area” and “trauma to her brain.” See Appellant’s

Brief at 22. Appellant’s due process claim is waived under the PCRA, as he

“could have raised [the claim] but failed to do so” at trial and on direct appeal.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544.     To be sure, Appellant’s due process claim is based

entirely upon a reevaluation of Ms. Hunter’s medical records. Specifically, the

Commonwealth presented to the jury a stipulation which said that Ms.

Hunter’s medical records indicated she suffered from “swelling in her front

brain area” and “trauma to her brain.” In fact, Ms. Hunter’s medical records

do not declare that she sustained those injuries. Instead, the medical records

declared that Ms. Hunter suffered a “[s]oft tissue injury” to her head and was

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diagnosed with:       closed head injury, contusion of head, laceration, MVC

(motor vehicle collision), and elevated creatine kinase.          Ms. Hunter’s

Discharge Instructions, 1/19/16, at 1.

       Ms. Hunter’s medical records were available to Appellant during the

entirety of the trial and on direct appeal.        Therefore, to paraphrase the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we conclude that since the underlying

“information was known (or, at the very least, should have been known) to

[Trial C]ounsel, [Trial Counsel] apparently could have presented at trial

precisely the same challenges as are reflected in the present briefing. As such,

we find the instant claim to be unpreserved in its entirety.” Pruitt, 162 A.3d

at 404.

       Appellant’s second subclaim contends that Trial Counsel was ineffective

when he stipulated to a factually incorrect summary of Ms. Hunter’s medical

records.3 Appellant’s Brief at 31.

       The PCRA provides an avenue for relief where the petitioner is able to

plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence the “[i]neffective

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so

____________________________________________

3 Although we conclude that Appellant’s due process claim was waived under

the PCRA, Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is proper in this
context, as “an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a separate legal issue
distinct from the underlying substantive claim for which counsel allegedly had
provided ineffective assistance.” Commonwealth v. Derk, 913 A.2d 875,
883 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

     Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d

1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead

and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

        (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
        particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have
        some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests;
        and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a
        reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
        proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court has

explained:

        A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
        accurate, could establish cause for relief.                 See
        Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005)
        (“if a petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted as
        true, do not establish the underlying claim . . . , he or she
        will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong related
        to the claim”). Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable
        merit is a legal determination.

        The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis
        for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel
        would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative,
        not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of
        success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if
        they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a
        hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with
        other efforts he may have taken.

        Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability
        that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
        would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

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        probability   sufficient   to   undermine   confidence   in   the
        outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

      According to Appellant, Trial Counsel was ineffective when he stipulated

to a factually incorrect summary of Ms. Hunter’s medical records.           See

Appellant’s Brief at 22 and 31. Further, Appellant contends that the PCRA

court erred when it dismissed his petition without granting him a hearing on

this claim. Id. at 32. The Commonwealth agrees that the PCRA court erred

when it refused to grant Appellant an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective

assistance claim. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. We agree with Appellant and

the Commonwealth and conclude that the PCRA court erred when it failed to

grant Appellant an evidentiary hearing on his claim that Trial Counsel was

ineffective when counsel stipulated to a factually incorrect summary of Ms.

Hunter’s medical records. Therefore, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and

remand for an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim.

      As explained above, at trial, Appellant and the Commonwealth

stipulated to the following:

        the medical records indicate that Michelle Hunter was
        admitted to Aria Torresdale Hospital [at] 3:11 p.m. on
        January [19, 2016]. She received among other things a CT
        scan of her head where the doctors found trauma, soft tissue
        damage and swelling in her front brain area.

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        Ms. Hunter was diagnosed with a closed head wound, a
        contusion to her forehead and trauma to her brain. She was
        discharged from the hospital that night.

N.T. Trial, 6/12/18, at 191-192.

      However, and contrary to the above stipulation, Ms. Hunter’s medical

records do not declare that “a CT scan of [Ms. Hunter’s] head” found “swelling

in her front brain area” or that she was diagnosed with “trauma to her brain.”

See id. Rather, the CT scan revealed that Ms. Hunter suffered “[s]oft tissue

injury” and “midline frontal soft tissue swelling” to her head. Ms. Hunter’s CT

Summary, 1/19/16, at 1. Further, Ms. Hunter was diagnosed with: closed

head injury, contusion of head, laceration, MVC (motor vehicle collision), and

elevated creatine kinase. Ms. Hunter’s Discharge Instructions, 1/19/16, at 1.

Moreover, as Dr. Greenwald opined:

        The stipulation regarding Ms. Hunter’s medical records that
        was read by the prosecutor and agreed to by [Appellant’s
        counsel] was an incorrect summary of the medical records
        admitted into evidence at trial. Specifically, the CT scan of
        the head showed soft tissue damage (swelling of the
        forehead), but no evidence of swelling in the frontal brain
        area. Additionally, the records did not reflect that Ms. Hunter
        was diagnosed with trauma to the brain.

Dr. Greenwald Report, 12/27/20, at 2.

      Appellant’s petition thus creates a genuine issue of material fact that his

underlying claim – that Trial Counsel stipulated to a factually incorrect

summary of Ms. Hunter’s medical records – has arguable merit.

      The second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim asks

whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his action. With respect to this

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prong, Appellant pleaded facts tending to show that, as a result of the

stipulation, the jury was led to believe that Ms. Hunter’s injuries were more

severe than they actually were. Thus, Appellant’s petition creates a genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Trial Counsel had a reasonable basis for

entering into the stipulation.

       Finally, Appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Trial

Counsel’s alleged errors.        As to this element, we note that Appellant was

convicted of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) and

aggravated assault by vehicle under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a).                 See

Commonwealth’s Information, 5/3/16, at 1-3; see also N.T. Trial, 6/13/18,

at 86-95.      Both convictions required the Commonwealth to prove that

Appellant caused Ms. Hunter “serious bodily injury.”4, 5 “Serious bodily injury”

____________________________________________

4 Aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) is statutorily defined as

follows: “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). Nevertheless, at trial, the
trial court instructed the jury:

       So let’s start at the top. Aggravated assault, victim Michelle
       Hunter, causing serious bodily injury. [Appellant] is charged with
       this count of aggravated assault. In order to find [Appellant]
       guilty of this offense, you must find each of the following elements
       proven beyond a reasonable doubt:               Number one, that
       [Appellant] caused serious bodily injury.

N.T. Trial, 6/13/18, at 86 (emphasis added).

5 Aggravated assault by vehicle is defined in the following manner:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which

causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of

the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

       As this Court has held, a bodily injury that impairs the function of the

brain, such as a concussion, “is sufficient evidence of ‘serious bodily injury’

under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 294 A.3d 482,

486 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding: “concussing someone during an assault is

sufficient evidence of ‘serious bodily injury’ under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301, as a

matter of law”).      However, we have held that a “bump on the head” is

insufficient to qualify as a “serious bodily injury.”       Commonwealth v.

Benaglio, 385 A.2d 544, 546 (Pa. Super. 1978) (holding: where the victim

was punched once in the forehead during a robbery, resulting in a “bump on

the head,” the injury was insufficient to constitute “serious bodily injury” and,

thus, the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant committed

aggravated assault).

____________________________________________

       Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes serious
       bodily injury to another person while engaged in the violation of
       any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to
       the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic,
       except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol
       or controlled substance), is guilty of aggravated assault by
       vehicle, a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause
       of the injury.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a).

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         Here, Appellant’s petition creates a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether he was prejudiced by Trial Counsel’s alleged errors. As stated above,

aggravated assault requires proof that, inter alia, Appellant either caused or

attempted to cause serious bodily injury and aggravated assault by vehicle

also requires proof that, inter alia, Appellant caused serious bodily injury. In

his petition, Appellant pleaded facts tending to show that the stipulation

essentially foreclosed any potential argument that Ms. Hunter did not actually

suffer “serious bodily injury” in the form of the “impairment of the function of”

her brain, as Trial Counsel stipulated that Ms. Hunter suffered “swelling in her

front brain area” and “trauma to her brain.”              Certainly, during the

Commonwealth’s closing argument, the Commonwealth emphasized this

point:

           [The Commonwealth]: So what we agree about is pretty
           much everything. We agree there was an accident that day.
           We agree the accident was caused by someone driving Mr.
           Fishgold’s truck.    We agree about the injuries and we
           stipulated. I’m surprised to hear [Appellant’s] counsel now
           going back and trying to say no, it really wasn’t that bad. We
           stipulated that she had a [] traumatic brain injury. She had
           swelling to the front of her brain. It was weeks before she
           went back to work, before she could take care of her kids,
           months before she could drive again. But I’ll get to that.

           But another way of saying what we agree on is this: Whoever
           it was that day who drove the truck, did the two hit and runs
           and hit [Ms.] Hunter, whoever that was is guilty of
           aggravated assault, aggravated assault by vehicle and the
           two hit and runs. So we do agree on that.

                                        ...

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        So I’ll end with, I got to talk to you about the law. . . . [To
        prove aggravated assault by vehicle, the Commonwealth has
        to prove] four elements. . . . Third element, that Michelle
        Hunter suffered serious bodily injury.             Apparently,
        [Appellant’s] counsel doesn’t agree on this, which surprises
        me. I’ll talk about that a little bit more. Suffice it to say,
        traumatic brain injury is a serious bodily injury.

        Here's the definition of serious bodily injury, just while we’re
        on it. Serious bodily injury means any bodily injury that
        creates a substantial risk of death or causes serious,
        permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of
        the function of any bodily member or organ.

        Like, say you had brain damage. You had swollen. You
        weren’t able to take care of your kids or drive or go to work
        for a while. The brain, you know, traumatic brain injury is
        serious bodily injury.

        So that’s third. Check.

N.T. Trial, 6/13/18, at 45-46 and 60-61.

     Therefore, we conclude that Appellant petition creates a genuine issue

of material fact that Trial Counsel was ineffective when he stipulated to a

factually incorrect summary of Ms. Hunter’s medical records. We thus vacate

the PCRA court’s order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

     Appellant’s remaining claims, however, do not entitle him to relief.

     Within Appellant’s second numbered claim on appeal, Appellant

contends that Trial Counsel was “ineffective insofar as he failed to retain a

neurologist to ensure that he understood the medical evidence and that the

medical evidence was accurately presented to the jury.” Appellant’s Brief at

9. We have already concluded that the PCRA court erred when it refused to

grant Appellant an evidentiary hearing on his claim that Trial Counsel was

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ineffective by stipulating to a factually incorrect summary of Ms. Hunter’s

medical records. Essentially, Appellant's first claim embraces Trial Counsel’s

comprehension of Ms. Hunter’s medical records and the accuracy with which

those records were presented to the jury. In light of these determinations,

Appellant’s second numbered claim on appeal is moot.

      Third, Appellant claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the testimony regarding the gym tags found in the truck. According

to Appellant, the testimony concerning the gym tags “violated the best

evidence rule and the rule against hearsay.” Appellant’s Brief at 45. As the

PCRA court explained, Appellant’s claim is meritless:

        [Hearsay is defined as a statement that “the declarant does
        not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing” and
        “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
        asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c).] Pa.R.E. 801(a)
        defines a statement as “a person’s oral assertion, written
        assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as
        an assertion.” Notably, our Courts have held that computer
        generated information, free from interference by any person,
        does not constitute a “statement,” and therefore, cannot
        qualify as hearsay. Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d
        1261, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2021) (GPS data from defendant’s
        tracking bracelet was not hearsay). Pa.R.E. 801(b) further
        defines a declarant as “the person who made the
        statement.” (emphasis added).

        In this case, Officer Patrick Owens testified that the key tags
        were scanned at each [fitness] establishment in front of him
        and the screen displayed Appellant’s name. As such, there
        was no declarant involved, and precedent would further
        suggest that computer generated information of this type
        would not constitute a statement. As such, [Trial Counsel]
        cannot be ineffective for failing to object to evidence that was
        not hearsay.

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       Moreover, Officer [Owens’] testimony did not violate the best
       evidence rule.     The best evidence rule is codified by
       Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 1002, which provides as
       follows:

          [An original writing, recording, or photograph is required
          in order to prove its content unless these rules, other
          rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or a statute
          provides otherwise.]

       Pa.R.E. 1002. “Rule 1002 requires that an original writing,
       recording, or photograph be introduced at trial only if the
       proponent must prove the contents of the writing, recording,
       or photograph to prove the elements of its case.
       Commonwealth v. Ribot, 169 A.3d 64, 67 (Pa. Super.
       2017). . . . “The best evidence rule is triggered, however,
       only when the contents of a writing are essential, not merely
       relevant, in proving a claim or defense.” Commonwealth
       v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 62 (Pa. Super. 2020). “If the
       Commonwealth does not need to prove the content of the
       writing or recording to prove the elements of the offense
       charged, then the Commonwealth is not required to introduce
       the original writing or recording.” Commonwealth v. Dent,
       837 A.2d 571, 590 (Pa. Super. 2003).

       Regarding the key tags, Officer Owens testified that when he
       arrived at the location, he spoke to the first driver that had
       been struck (Augustine Swaray) and then he ran the tag of
       the pick-up truck (the striking vehicle) which was
       unattended. He got the owner’s information and sent a police
       car to the address associated with the tag: . . .

          [Officer Owens]: From there I run the tag to the pickup
          truck, which is unattended, and I was advised by the
          driver of the . . . [car], all he could tell me that a white
          male twenties to thirties, white shirt, fled southbound on
          Torresdale. I ran the tag to the vehicle. I got the owner’s
          information, sent a police car out to that location.

          [The Commonwealth]: To the owner’s house?

          [Officer Owens]: To the owner’s location of the pickup
          truck where the person had fled. He was not on location.
          His mother was. She had advised the police that he was

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          at the Mayfair Fitness working out, which is on Frankford
          [Avenue], approximately Frankford and Vista area. A
          marked patrol car went over there to see if the owner was
          there. His name was Shawn Fishgold. He was. We
          brought him out to the location to see if he was possibly
          the driver of the vehicle. He was not the driver.

          [The Commonwealth]: How do you know that?

          [Officer Owens]: We were able to find out he was at the
          gym the entire time when the accident happened. We
          asked him if it was his vehicle. He told us yes, that it is
          his truck and that the last time he had seen it, it was at,
          I believe, sixteen hundred Stanwood and it was parked
          there a few days prior and that a female by the name of
          Amanda had the key, the only other key to the vehicle.

          [The Commonwealth]: Okay. All right. So he IDs his
          truck. Does he ID anything else that's on the scene?

          [Officer Owens]: There was an ignition key to the vehicle,
          which he identified as his, and on that key ring there was
          a green climbing hook, I believe three Aquatic Fitness
          Center key tags, a Mayfair Fitness key tag and a Modell's
          key tag.

                                     ...

          [The Commonwealth]: So those keys, so you go back to
          Mr. Fishgold. You said that he identified the ignition key
          for the Ford, but what about the rest of the items?

          [Officer Owens]: They said they were not his. That's what
          he said.

                                     ...

          [The Commonwealth]: At that point what do you do with
          those items? Well, what do you do in general?

          [Officer Owens]: Well, tow comes on location, removes
          the vehicle, which Mr. Fishgold gave permission to due to
          the heavy damage to the vehicle. He actually signed a tow
          slip for that. The scene was cleared. Due to the fact that

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          the gentlemen was just at Mayfair Fitness, I took him
          back to Mayfair Fitness. There was a key tag for Mayfair
          Fitness so I had the gym scan that tag. That came back
          to a Mr. Michael McDowell.

          [The Commonwealth]: And so when you got there, how
          is it that you find that information out?

          [Officer Owens]: I gave it to the clerk. I let them know
          could you check to see whose key tag this is. It was found
          in a vehicle of someone who fled the scene. They scanned
          it in front of me and I looked at the screen and saw
          Michael McDowell on there.

          [The Commonwealth]: What do you do next?

          [Officer Owens]: I then have to go up to Aria Torresdale
          to check on the female that was taken to the hospital
          before my arrival. I checked on her condition. She was
          stable at the time. The Aquatic Fitness Center is actually
          maybe five minutes away from that hospital so I took, I
          went over there to have them scan the three Aquatic
          Center keys and all three of those keys came up to a Mr.
          Michael McDowell.

          [The Commonwealth]: Same procedure in terms of
          scanning and seeing it on the screen?

          [Officer Owens]: Yes. When you walked up to it, it was a
          round desk and you could see the computer screen. They
          scanned all three and all three came to Michael McDowell.

                                    ...

       [N.T. Trial, 6/12/18, at 39-45].

       Despite Appellant’s argument to the contrary, the best
       evidence rule is not applicable to this case. Testimony
       concerning the gym tags was presented to demonstrate that
       Appellant had access to the pickup truck, not to conclusively
       establish any element of the Commonwealth’s case. See
       Commonwealth v. Townsend, 747 A.2d 376, 380 (Pa.
       Super. 2000) (no violation of best evidence rule occurred
       where trial court allowed detective to testify regarding

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        content of defendant’s written confession, even though
        written confession was not admitted into evidence; content
        of confession made persuasive evidence for Commonwealth’s
        case but was not necessary to establish elements of crimes
        of burglary and assault, which had no elements requiring
        proof of content of confession or any other writing).
        Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective [for failing] to
        make an objection based on the best evidence rule.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/12/22, at 21-25.

      We agree with the PCRA court’s thorough analysis and conclusion.

Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s third numbered claim on appeal fails.

      Finally, Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief based upon

after-discovered evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 49.

      First, according to Appellant, after he filed his initial PCRA petition, he

received a recorded telephone conversation between Ms. Hunter’s Husband

and an agent for Liberty Mutual Insurance. The conversation occurred one

day after the accident and, during the telephone call, the following exchange

occurred:

        [Liberty Mutual]: Okay.       Did we get the other person’s
        insurance information?

        [Ms. Hunter’s Husband]: No. My wife got rushed to the
        emergency room. He ran. I have police reports though.
        They knew, they knew, I don’t know if they locked him up
        yet, but they knew who did it. I know who did it. It’s in
        (unintelligible) the police report. He better hope the cops get
        him before I do, though, that’s all I can say for real.

Amended PCRA Petition, 3/17/21, at 2 (footnote omitted); Appellant’s Brief at

50.

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      According to Appellant, this after-discovered evidence entitles him to a

new trial because:

        The files received from Liberty Mutual Insurance tend to
        prove that investigators, whether wittingly or unwittingly,
        provided Ms. Hunter and/or her husband with the name of
        their prime suspect as early as one day after the accident. .
        ..

        [W]ith the advent of social media and the internet, locating a
        picture or pictures of [Appellant] prior to the January 27 th
        lineup would have been easy for Ms. Hunter. There can
        simply be no confidence that Ms. Hunter identified the person
        she saw crash into her rather than [Appellant], the suspect
        she learned about from the police crash report.

Appellant’s Brief at 51.

      Further, Appellant claims, after he filed his PCRA petition, he learned

that Ms. Hunter received the bodily injury policy limits from Mr. Fishgold’s

insurance carrier. Appellant claims that this after-discovered evidence entitles

him to a new trial because it demonstrates that Ms. Hunter had a monetary

“reason[] to offer false testimony and embellish the nature of her injuries.”

Id. at 56.

      Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claims fails.

      As our Supreme Court has explained:

        in order to be granted a new trial based on after-discovered
        evidence, appellant must show the evidence: 1) has been
        discovered after trial and could not have been obtained at or
        prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable
        diligence; 2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; 3)
        will not be used solely to impeach a witness's credibility; and
        4) is of such a nature and character that a different verdict
        will likely result if a new trial is granted.

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Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 311 (Pa. 2017).

         Appellant’s claims on appeal immediately fail, as Appellant admits that

he would only use the above evidence to impeach Ms. Hunter’s credibility

regarding her identification of Appellant and the extent of her injuries. See

Appellant’s Brief at 52 (surmising that Ms. Hunter might have falsely identified

Appellant as her assailant because she located Appellant’s photograph on the

internet); 53 (declaring that the evidence entitles Appellant to a new trial

because “[t]he jury was unable to properly evaluate whether Ms. Hunter

should or should not be believed”); 54 (declaring that “this new evidence . . .

calls into serious question whether Ms. Hunter gave truthful, accurate

testimony); 55 (declaring that the evidence entitles Appellant to a new trial

“so that he can fully . . . probe Ms. Hunter’s motive and/or bias as a witness”);

56 (declaring: “[a]s a result of this newly discovered evidence, we now know

that Ms. Hunter had [a monetary] reason[] to offer false testimony to

embellish the nature of her injuries”). Appellant’s final claim on appeal thus

fails.

         In conclusion, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for an

evidentiary hearing on whether Trial Counsel was ineffective when he

stipulated to a factually incorrect summary of Ms. Hunter’s medical records.

Appellant’s remaining claims fail.

         Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: October 18, 2023

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