Court Opinion

ID: 9849827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:47:10.689008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.704086
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
Unless violation of a specific statute is charged, larceny is a common law crime in Virginia. Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 955, 408 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1991). Although the punishment for the larceny is prescribed by statute, see Code §§ 18.2-95 and 18.2-96, we must look to case decisions for the elements of the common law offense. Sylvestre v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 253, 256, 391 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1990). The case decisions universally define the elements of “[Ijarceny at common law [to be] the (1) trespassory (2) taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5) of another (6) with intent to steal it.” A. Scott & W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal Law § 85, at 622 (1972). Indeed, the majority “agree[s] that in every larceny there must be an actual taking, or severance of the goods from the possession of the owner.” The majority further states that “the crime of larceny is complete when a defendant with the requisite intent to permanently deprive: (1) takes possession of property without the consent of the owner; and, (2) moves that property from the exact location it occupied prior to the defendant’s conduct.” The evidence in this case, however, proved neither a “severance of the goods from the possession of the owner’ ’ nor ‘ ‘possession of property without the consent of the owner.” Thus, the evidence was insufficient to prove common law larceny.
“To prove common law larceny, the Commonwealth must show that the accused wrongfully acquired possession of personal goods belonging to another.” Payne v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 485, 488, 281 S.E.2d 873, 874 (1981). It is a fundamental principle that common law larceny requires proof “that the original taking was trespassory.” Maye v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 48, 49, 189 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1972). If no trespass occurs in the taking, the mere act of asportation does not constitute a larceny. Tanner v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 635 (1857).
*527Any analysis of this argument requires a consideration of the distinction, in the context of larceny, between possession and custody.
The owner of personal property may deliver it to another upon conditions, or in circumstances, which give the recipient bare custody of the property. Constructive possession remains in the owner. Examples are: a watch handed to a friend to time a race, the owner expecting its return at the end of the race; clothing handed to a customer in a clothing store, to try on for size, the owner expecting it to be returned if rejected, paid for if accepted; groceries loaded into a shopping cart in a supermarket, the owner expecting them to be paid for at a cash register before they are removed from the premises. Even though the property remains in the control of the custodian, asportation has not been completed until it is carried away in violation of the condition precedent upon which it was delivered. But if the property is carried away before the condition is performed, with the intent to steal it from the owner, the act becomes larceny. This act converts the recipient’s bare custody to possession.
“[Tjhere can be no trespass against mere custody; trespass can only invade possession and it can be perpetrated as easily by a custodian as by anyone else.” Thus, a custodian, holding the property of another upon condition of prompt payment in cash, has committed no larceny until he carries the goods away in violation of the condition, with requisite intent.
Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 559, 562, 303 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1983) (citations omitted). When a custodian receives merchandise without a trespass, “[t]o constitute larceny the object . . . must be removed from the premises of the owner, with intent to steal, before the larceny is complete.” State v. Richard, 216 Neb. 832, 834, 346 N.W.2d 399, 400 (1984). See also Ray v. United States, 229 A.2d 161, 162 (D.C. 1967).
The evidence proved that the store manager saw Tyronne Lynn Welch pushing a shopping cart containing two televisions inside the lawn and garden department of a Lowe’s Hardware Store. The televisions had been on open display in the store. The manager saw Welch enter the outdoor portion of the lawn and garden department and “saw him pushing a grocery cart with two televisions in it . . . out in the lawn and garden section toward the back of the store.” The manager *528went in the opposite direction through the front of the store, exited the store’s main entrance, and went to the side of the store where the fenced in outdoor portion of the lawn and garden department is located. The manager testified as follows:
I knew that the lawn and garden department only had one exit and it was at the front of the store, so I exited out the front and then through the gate into that fenced in area.
When the manager walked through the gate into the fenced enclosure of the lawn and garden department, he observed Welch again. Welch was still inside the lawn and garden department approximately thirty feet away from the gate and near other merchandise. The manager testified that he approached Welch and the following transpired:
When we saw each other he backed away from the cart as I walked towards him. ... I asked him if he had a receipt and if they were his, and he said no, that they weren’t his, and that he was looking for a place to go to pay for them. ... I asked him if he would come inside with me and he agreed. And as we were walking towards the, the front of the store, he took off running.
Welch had not left the premises of the Lowe’s Hardware Store with the televisions and he had not concealed the televisions in any manner.
“[I]n modern self-service stores . .. customers are impliedly invited to examine, try on, and carry about the merchandise on display. Thus in a sense, the owner has consented to the customer’s possession of the goods for a limited purpose.” People v. Olivo, 52 N.Y.2d 309, 317-18, 420 N.E.2d 40, 43 483 N.Y.S. 2d 242, 245 (1981).
While we are mindful that in some cases the slightest taking or moving may constitute asportation, such circumstances are not present here. Appellant, as any other customer in a self-service store, had the implied permission of the store management to pick up, move, and either replace or pay for any product offered for sale. In fact, the normal procedure in this type of market is for customers to circulate through the sales area, taking from the shelves any items they wish to buy but not paying for their selections until they pass through the check-out counter. Unless some conduct by appellant made his possession clearly adverse to that of the store, he held the merchandise only conditionally until such time as he took it to the check-out counter for payment.
*529Durphy v. United States, 235 A.2d 326, 327 (D.C. 1967) (citations omitted). “In a self-service store, the mere taking up of goods in the. sales area does not constitute asportation with felonious intent. There must be some conduct by the customer which makes [the customer’s] possession clearly adverse to the store.” Freeman v. Meijer, Inc., 95 Mich. App. 475, 479, 291 N.W.2d 87, 89 (1980). See also State v. Hauck, 190 Neb. 534, 537, 209 N.W.2d 580, 583 (1973).
[T]he alleged thief, at some moment, must have obtained complete, independent and absolute possession and control of the item, adverse to the rights of the owner. If the possession is imperfect in any degree, or if the alleged thief’s control is qualified by any circumstance, however slight, the severance is incomplete and the act is only an attempt.
Scott v. State, 409 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).
Because every customer in a self-service store has implied permission to move merchandise, placed on open display, unconcealed about the premises of the store, the trespassory taking and carrying away of the merchandise of another does not occur when the property is moved on the premises. Although a person need not leave the premises with goods in order to be guilty of larceny, if the person does not leave the premises, the proof must establish that the person in some way exercised trespassory possession of the goods inconsistent with the owner’s rights. Evidence must prove that the goods were concealed, the tags were altered, or other conduct of a similar type occurred. See, e.g., State v. Grant, 373 A.2d 847 (Vt. 1977); Groomes v. United States, 155 A.2d 73 (D.C. 1959).
This Court’s decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 295, 349 S.E.2d 414 (1986), is consistent with the classic common law decisions because the defendant in Jones was a trespasser. The majority relies upon the statement in Jones that “the slightest removal [of property], even if it is only a hair’s breadth, with intent to steal the same, is sufficient to constitute the asportation.” Id. at 302, 349 S.E.2d at 418. However, that statement was appropriate within the factual context of Jones because the evidence proved that the thieves had “secreted themselves in the storeroom [of a department store] where they remained until the store closed.” Id. When the thieves moved the merchandise from the display counters to the storeroom, they did not have *530the owner’s permission to be in the store and, thus, no implied permission to move merchandise. Id. In that circumstance, any taking or asportation, however slight, was trespassory. See also Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 35 S.E.2d 763 (1945). Accord State v. Carswell, 296 N.C. 101,104, 249 S.E.2d 427, 428-29 (1978) (air conditioner taken by persons trespassing at a motel under construction); Hutchinson v. State, 427 P.2d 112, 113 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (stranger entered the office of a store manager, pried open a locked drawer, and removed a cash box); State v. Houston, 688 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (store employee who concealed merchandise in a bag without implied permission and left it at a pick-up dock for a friend who had not paid for it committed a statutory “fraudulent appropriation” and, thus, a “trespass”). The facts of this case do not prove that Welch committed a trespassory taking or a severance of the owner’s possession.
The majority openly acknowledges that they do not want to “impose upon Virginia retailers a requirement that they must wait until a suspected thief flees their store with merchandise before they may attempt an apprehension.” They conclude, therefore, that “[wjhere there is evidence that an individual has acted, or is acting, in a manner that is wholly inconsistent with that of a prospective purchaser, and has exercised immediate dominion and control over the property, despite his continued presence within the owner’s store, such conduct establishes sufficient possession to satisfy that element of larceny.” However, Welch did not act in a manner inconsistent with that of a prospective purchaser, and he did not exercise immediate dominion over the property. Welch carted two televisions into the lawn and garden area as any prospective purchaser of televisions might do if they wanted to browse that area of the store. He did not conceal the televisions or alter their tags. His possession of the television sets equalled that of any prospective purchaser. Cf. State v. Richard, 346 N.W.2d 399, 400 (Neb. 1984) (“The fact that appellant placed the goods in a shopping bag provided no valid reason for the trial court to infer a criminal intent or a possession clearly adverse to the interest of the store”). Only after Welch was approached by the manager and began to walk to the manager’s office did he act in a manner inconsistent with that of a prospective purchaser.
Even if Welch’s conduct was culpable, it was not within the common law definition of larceny. Where conduct is not subject to the common law definition of an offense, the legislature may amend the *531criminal code specifically to make that conduct a crime. Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 692, 232 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1977). However, it is not the duty of Courts to create new offenses unknown to the common law. Id. It is precisely because of the limitations of common law larceny that Virginia, like other states, has adopted statutory shoplifting laws.
The evolution of theft law is particularly relevant to thefts occurring in modern self-service stores where customers are impliedly invited to examine, try on, and carry about the merchandise on display. In a self-service store, the owner has in a sense, consented to the customer’s possession of the goods for a limited purpose. Under common law principles of theft, a person could not have been convicted if apprehended while still in the store because the perpetrator would have rightful possession (albeit temporarily) and thus could not perform the element of trespassory taking until he left the store without paying (at which point it might be too late).
Lee v. State, 59 Md. App. 28, 35-36,474 A.2d 537, 541 (1984).
“Shoplifting statutes create a separate and distinct offense from that denounced by the general larceny or theft statutes.” Yearwood v. State, 2 Term. Crim. App. 552, 561, 455 S.W.2d 612, 616 (1970). See also State v. White, 118 Ariz. 279, 280, 576 P.2d 138, 139 (Ct. App. 1978) (announcing the rule that the “shoplifting statute creates a separate and distinct offense from that denounced by the general theft statute” but providing no facts concerning the circumstances under which the defendant was found guilty of larceny). Shoplifting statutes have been enacted to supplement the common law “for the obvious purpose of affording more adequate relief than had previously been available to merchants from the increasing depredations of thieves.” Tweedy v. J.C. Penney Co., 216 Va. 596, 598-99, 221 S.E.2d 152, 154-55 (1976). Indeed, in most states “the essential elements of larceny and shoplifting are by no means the same.” Yearwood, 2 Tenn. Crim. App. at 561, 455 S.W.2d at 617. “[Statutory definitions of [shoplifting] differ from those of larceny, most often'dispensing with one of the elements in larceny in order to increase the deterrent effect by making convictions easier.” State v. Harper, 498 A.2d 310, 314 (N.H. 1985). See also Lee, 59 Md. App. at 40, 474 A.2d at 543.
In Virginia, the legislature has omitted the requirement of proving that the original taking was trespassory for a specific class of statutory *532offenses that are deemed to be larceny. See Maye v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 48, 49, 189 S.E.2d 350, 351 (1972). These statutes now allow proof of larceny in those instances where (1) goods were concealed while on the premises of another, Code § 18.2-103(i), (2) identifying marks were altered or deleted, Code § 18.2-96.1(C), (3) goods were taken without authority, Code § 18.2-103(i), (4) shopping carts were removed beyond the extended premises of the owner, Code § 18.2-102.1(2), (5) price tags are altered, Code § 18.2-103(ii), and (6) goods were transferred from one container to another, Code § 18.2-103(ii). See Ketchum v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 258, 262, 403 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1991).
The Commonwealth failed to charge Welch’s conduct under the appropriate statute. Moreover, even if the evidence in this record may have warranted a conviction for attempted larceny, see Wormsley v. United States, 526 A.2d 1373 (D.C. 1987), the evidence does not suffice to prove larceny. Because the evidence failed to prove Welch took property ‘from the possession of [Lowe’s] without the owner’s consent,” Smith v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 646, 649, 283 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1981) (emphasis added), the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of common law larceny.
I dissent.