Court Opinion

ID: 9710927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:20:54.487778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.168366
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I find the reasoning of Justice Levin’s dissent in People v Patterson, 39 Mich App 467, 472; 198 NW2d 175, 178 (1972), more persuasive. In Patterson, supra, the breach of the canons was indirect, namely, failing to prevent the police from questioning a defendant in the absence of his *360attorney. Here, the prosecutor was a direct participant in the preparation for and the conducting of the counselless interview. The effect of the prosecutor’s presence and his influence upon the defendant is inestimable. Of equal uncertainty is whether any statements at all would have been produced had counsel been present prior to the commencement of any interrogation.
If Disciplinary Rule 7-104 is to have any meaningful effect, a prosecutor must be absolutely prohibited from interviewing a defendant, or authorizing the police to do so, without first obtaining the consent of defense counsel or the affirmation of defense counsel that he has advised the defendant of his rights and, following this advice, the defendant still wishes to be interviewed without him. Failure to do so should result in the suppression of any resulting evidence.
Accordingly, I would hold that the conduct of the prosecutor in this case necessitates reversal.