Court Opinion

ID: 9362925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:07.815318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.444846
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals

                                 NO. 2021-CA-0902-MR

JASON WOOD                                                                   APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM SIMPSON FAMILY COURT
v.               HONORABLE G. SIDNOR BRODERSON, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 19-CI-00115

MICHELLE ANN CRITZ AND BRIAN
STRAIN                                                                       APPELLEES

                                        OPINION
                                       AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND K. THOMPSON,
JUDGES. 1

THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: This case concerns the right of Brian Strain to

intervene post-judgment in a dissolution action between Jason Wood and Michelle

Ann Critz to establish himself as the biological father of S.J.W. and thereby seek

1
 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of
Appeals expired on December 31, 2022. Judge Denise G. Clayton concurred in this Opinion
prior to her retirement from the Court of Appeals. Release of this Opinion was delayed by
administrative handling.
custody and timesharing rights. Jason appeals from the February 24, 2021 order

sustaining Brian’s motion to intervene and the July 15, 2021 order sustaining

Brian’s motion to amend final judgment pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil

Procedure (CR) 60.02. We affirm because Brian’s motion to intervene was timely

under the circumstances, his motion for CR 60.02 relief was brought within a

reasonable amount of time given the fraud that occurred which prevented his

appearance to be heard regarding paternity in the dissolution matter, and the DNA

test warranted relief.

             Jason and Michelle married in 2011 and three children were born

during their marriage, H.W.W., K.A.W., and S.J.W. (collectively the children).

S.J.W., a boy, was the youngest.

             Michelle was having an affair with Brian in 2015 when she became

pregnant with S.J.W. Michelle informed Brian in March or April of 2015 that she

was pregnant and that he could be the father. Michelle offered to have prenatal

paternity testing done if Brian would pay for it. It is disputed whether Brian

agreed, but no testing was ultimately performed. S.J.W. was born in November

2015.

             According to Jason’s deposition testimony, based upon his marital

interactions with Michelle, he had no reason to doubt that S.J.W. was his child. It

was not until 2017 that he became suspicious that S.J.W. might not be his

                                         -2-
biological child based on Michelle’s behavior. In July 2017, Jason used an over-

the-counter DNA test to test himself and S.J.W. The online results he received

indicated that he was not S.J.W.’s father and when confronted, Michelle

acknowledged that S.J.W. was not Jason’s child but would not tell him who was.

             According to Michelle’s and Brian’s discovery admissions, Michelle

informed Brian of the result of Jason’s test. Later in July 2017, Brian then also

took an over-the-counter DNA test which indicated that he was S.J.W.’s father.

According to Brian, Michelle told him that they did not want him in S.J.W.’s life

and wanted him to sign over his rights, but when Brian said he wanted to be

involved, Michelle stopped communicating with him.

             On March 27, 2019, Jason filed a petition for dissolution and stated

that the three children were “born of this marriage” and requested joint custody

with Michelle to be the primary residential custodian and Jason to have parenting

time. Michelle’s response and the parties’ property settlement agreement were

filed simultaneously. Michelle admitted to the allegations in the petition. The

agreement specified “[t]he parties have three infant children” and “shall have joint

custody of their children[.]” Jason agreed to pay child support in the amount of

$200 per week. The tax benefit for the three children was divided between them.

             Jason and Michelle did not raise any issue as to S.J.W.’s paternity in

the dissolution action. Brian admitted learning at some point that Jason and

                                         -3-
Michelle were divorcing but disputes that Michelle informed him of this or

communicated anything about how the dissolution proceeding related to his

paternity rights.

              On September 16, 2019, the decree of dissolution of marriage was

entered, adopting Jason’s and Michelle’s property settlement agreement.2

Immediately thereafter, despite receiving child support from Jason for all three

children, Michelle sought child support from Brian through the Simpson County

Child Support Office. On October 8, 2019, in 19-J-00118, a paternity action was

filed on her behalf. Brian appeared with counsel and opposed paying child

support. Pursuant to a court order, a DNA test was performed and on October 24,

2019, the results revealed that Brian was the biological father of S.J.W.

              Jason filed a motion to intervene in the paternity action and a motion

to dismiss based on the decree. According to Brian, he first learned on December

10, 2019, during an evidentiary hearing that paternity of S.J.W. had already been

adjudicated pursuant to the decree of dissolution on September 16, 2019. On

December 18, 2019, Jason’s motion to intervene was granted and the paternity

2
  That same day, an amended property agreement was filed which modified the agreement as to
the children to be a split custody arrangement with alternating weeks of parenting time, with
Jason continuing to pay $200 a week of child support. While the original property agreement
was named in the pre-drafted findings of fact and conclusions of law and the decree of
dissolution that the court signed, it appears that the parties followed the split custody
arrangement.

                                             -4-
petition was dismissed without prejudice on the basis of the decree having

previously determined paternity.

             According to Brian and Michelle, after the paternity action was

initiated, Michelle allowed Brian to have visits with S.J.W. during the weeks she

had physical possession of the children, with Brian beginning with supervised

visits and culminating with him having overnight visits. He had about one visit per

week when Michelle had the children. Brian stated that he had fifteen to twenty

overnight visits with S.J.W. However, Jason disputed that this frequency of visits

took place based on what he had heard from the children. It is undisputed that

Brian never provided any monetary support for S.J.W. other than providing for

S.J.W. during visits.

             On October 13, 2020, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services

filed a dependency, neglect, and abuse petition against Michelle based upon her

driving the children in her vehicle when she was intoxicated and removed the

children from her care. Regarding S.J.W., this was in 19-J-0090-003. Following

the removal of the children from Michelle’s care, the children were placed with

Jason, who was granted temporary custody, and Michelle had supervised visits. At

this time, Brian ceased to have any visits with S.J.W.

             On October 20, 2020, Brian filed simultaneous motions to intervene

and amend the final judgment in the dissolution action pursuant to CR 60.02. He

                                         -5-
argued he was the biological father of S.J.W. and sought a finding to that effect so

that he could pursue custody and timesharing. Jason opposed Brian’s motions to

intervene and amend the final judgment; Michelle took no position on Brian’s

motions. Extensive discovery then took place regarding Brian’s knowledge of

S.J.W.’s parentage and the visitation he had engaged in with S.J.W.

              According to Jason’s deposition testimony, Brian showed up at

S.J.W.’s fifth birthday party which caused problems. Jason explained that

afterwards he was instructed by either the Cabinet or the family court in the

dependency, neglect, and abuse action, that Brian was not to have contact with

S.J.W.

              On December 17, 2020, Brian also filed a motion to intervene in the

dependency, neglect, and abuse case to establish temporary visitation. On January

15, 2021, Brian filed a separate paternity action in 21-CI-00019.

              On February 24, 2021, the family court summarily granted Brian’s

motion to intervene in the dissolution action and continued his motion to amend,

scheduling an evidentiary hearing. Jason filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate

this order.

              On April 5, 2021, Brian’s motion to intervene in the dependency,

neglect, and abuse action was denied because he had never been adjudicated to be

S.J.W.’s parent.

                                         -6-
             On July 15, 2021, two orders were entered in the dissolution

proceeding, an order denying Jason’s motion to alter, vacate, or amend the order

granting Brian’s motion to intervene, and an order sustaining Brian’s motion to

amend the final judgment pursuant to CR 60.02. As to the denial of the motion to

alter, amend, or vacate, the family court considered the factors enumerated in

Carter v. Smith, 170 S.W.3d 402, 408 (Ky. App. 2004), regarding whether

intervention was warranted post-decree. The family court considered the history as

to what had transpired in the dissolution and paternity cases. It found that the

purpose of intervention to adjudicate paternity rights was distinct from a property

rights case as it involved Brian’s fundamental constitutional rights. The family

court indicated “the best interests of [S.J.W.] must be considered, and [Brian’s]

rights as a biological parent are significant.” The family court found that, in

considering the length of time Brian knew or should have known of his interest in

the case, “one could certainly argue that [Brian] did not move very fast, but given

the circumstances, the Court can understand that [Brian] did not do more than he

did prior to the DNA test with the Simpson County Child Support Office.” As to

prejudice, the family court explained:

             The Court is sympathetic to [Jason] when considering
             this factor, as [Jason] has treated [S.J.W.] as a . . . [son],
             but at the same time, the Court does not think that the
             intervention poses any undue prejudice to [Jason].
             Ultimately, the Court will have to make a decision
             considering the best interest factors as to what

                                           -7-
             relationship, if any, [Brian] and [Jason] will have to
             [S.J.W.]

As to unusual factors, the family court found “the underlying acts in this action are

somewhat unusual but not unheard of, and it is certainly not the norm.” Finally,

the family court concluded that Brian’s special burden for post-judgment

intervention was met, explaining further:

             The Court finds that considering all facts and
             circumstances, [Brian] could have acted sooner. As
             indicated, [Brian] could have filed an action all on his
             own, as early as the birth of [S.J.W.], but he did not. It is
             understandable under the facts and circumstances, as
             [Brian] was not familiar with the law as a layman, and he
             was unsure what he could or could not do before he hired
             legal counsel. If this was neglect, it was excusable
             neglect, and the Court finds that the issue regarding
             timeliness has been overcome.

             The family court granted Brian’s motion to amend the final judgment

on the basis that he was a party to the action, the court had subject matter

jurisdiction, and relief was proper pursuant to CR 60.02(f). The family court

explained its reasoning as follows:

             The Court finds this is a case with an extraordinary
             nature, because it involves the constitutional rights of the
             minor child’s biological parents. The Court finds that
             such rights were not addressed in the divorce action by
             [Brian], as he was not a Party to such action, and one or
             both of the legal parents knew there was a high chance
             that [Brian] was [S.J.W.]’s biological father, yet gave
             [Brian] no notice of the divorce action.

                                          -8-
              Jason appeals from the February 24, 2021 order allowing Brian to

intervene, and the July 15, 2021 order granting Brian’s motion to amend the final

judgment, both of which were designated as final and appealable orders for which

there is no just cause for delay.3

              We first consider the timeliness of the motion to intervene. Jason

argues that the family court abused its discretion in allowing Brian to intervene in

the dissolution action because his motion to intervene was untimely under CR

24.01 and CR 24.02, given an appropriate application of the Carter factors. Jason

specifically argues that Brian was well aware that he could be S.J.W.’s father

during Michelle’s pregnancy, was aware he was the father prior to the divorce

based on the over-the-counter paternity test, waited too long to attempt to

intervene, and had no meaningful parental relationship with child.

              Brian in contrast argues that permitting his intervention was not an

abuse of discretion because he had a fundamental right to parent, custodial actions

are never final, and he only learned about the decree adjudicating paternity in

December 2019. Brian also argues that Jason and Michelle intentionally concealed

3
  After the appeal was filed, the family court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Jason’s,
Michelle’s, and Brian’s rights to custody and timesharing of S.J.W. It appears that the family
court ruled Jason was a de facto custodian of S.J.W. and ordered that Jason and Michelle have a
split custody timesharing arrangement regarding all the children, with Brian ultimately awarded
some limited timesharing with S.J.W.

                                              -9-
the dissolution proceedings from him and the material fact that Jason was being

adjudicated S.J.W.’s father, and Jason’s hands are subsequently unclean because

he perpetrated a fraud on the court by representing that S.J.W. was a child born of

the marriage. Brian emphasizes that it is the best interests of S.J.W. which are

paramount and that he had an established relationship with S.J.W.

             CR 24.01(1) provides in relevant part:

             Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
             intervene in an action . . . (b) when the applicant claims
             an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
             the subject of the action and is so situated that the
             disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
             or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest,
             unless that interest is adequately represented by existing
             parties.

             We review whether Brian’s motion to intervene was timely under the

abuse of discretion standard. Carter, 170 S.W.3d at 408. We apply the five-factor

test as set out in Carter to determine timeliness:

             (1) [T]he point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the
             purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length
             of time preceding the application during which the
             proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have
             known of his interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the
             original parties due to the proposed intervenor’s failure,
             after he or she knew or reasonably should have known of
             his or her interest in the case, to apply promptly
             for intervention; and (5) the existence of unusual
             circumstances militating against or in favor
             of intervention.

                                         -10-
Carter, 170 S.W.3d at 408 (quoting Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir.

1989)). We also recognize that “intervention may be allowed under certain

circumstances even after the judgment has been entered, although . . . the applicant

would have to overcome a special burden to justify the apparent lack of

timeliness.” Id.

             We are confident that the family court adequately addressed these

factors and acted appropriately within its discretion in determining that under the

specific facts of this case Brian’s intervention was timely. While we agree that the

evidence establishes that Brian was aware of the fact that he could be S.J.W.’s

biological father before S.J.W. was born, we do not think this precludes his

intervention being timely under the circumstances. These circumstances include

the importance of Brian’s interest having a constitutional dimension and his lack of

knowledge that paternity could be and was resolved in the dissolution action until

December 2019. It is significant that paternity was resolved in the dissolution

action without any notice to Brian or notice to the family court that the parties had

reason to believe that Jason was not the biological father of S.J.W. We believe that

had the family court received such information, it would not have simply entered

the agreed upon judgment but would have instead required notice to Brian for his

participation in such action; had that happened and Brian chosen not to participate,

Brian seeking to act now might well be untimely. However, that is not what

                                         -11-
occurred. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that Jason has established

that the family court abused its discretion in determining that Brian’s motion to

intervene was timely.

             As to whether substantively Brian should have been allowed to

intervene, we review the grant of intervention under the clearly erroneous standard.

Carter, 170 S.W.3d at 409. Having determined that the motion was timely filed,

we consider whether Brian “has an interest relating to the subject of the action, that

his ability to protect his interest may be impaired or impeded, and that none of the

existing parties could adequately represent his interests.” Id. at 409-10. There can

be no doubt that Brian’s claim to have a right to custody and timesharing as

S.J.W.’s father is an interest that he is entitled to protect through intervention. The

contrary finding in the dissolution action was impeding his ability to claim

paternity and the related custodial and timesharing rights available due to such a

status, and neither Jason nor Michelle could or did adequately represent his

interests. See Baker v. Webb, 127 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Ky. 2004) (explaining that

relatives who have priority of placement for a child placed for adoption are thereby

vested “with a sufficient, cognizable legal interest in the adoption proceeding of

this child”); A. H. v. W. R. L., 482 S.W.3d 372, 374 (Ky. 2016) (explaining that CR

24.01(1)(b) is applicable to allow intervention in an adoption action to someone

“claiming a cognizable legal interest – i.e. maintaining a relational connection with

                                         -12-
the child, either through custody or visitation”). Therefore, the family court

allowing Brian to intervene in the dissolution action was not clearly erroneous.

             As to whether CR 60.02 relief was warranted, Brian sought relief

pursuant to CR 60.02, generally asserting as grounds (b) and (f), and the family

court granted relief pursuant to CR 60.02(f). Jason argues that the family court

abused its discretion in granting Brian CR 60.02(f) relief as his grounds for relief

were really founded in CR 60.02(b), and more than a year had elapsed between

when Brian knew he was S.J.W.’s biological father and the filing. He asserts that

Brian had no justification for the delay of more than a year in acting even after

formal testing had revealed he was S.J.W.’s biological father. Jason argues

granting CR 60.02 relief was unwarranted given Brian’s prior knowledge of his

paternity and his failure to act constituted waiver of his rights. Finally, Jason

argues he established a parental relationship with S.J.W. and had become the

equitable father of S.J.W.

             Brian argues relief was appropriate pursuant to CR 60.02(f) based on

his constitutional rights as S.J.W.’s biological parent. He emphasizes that Jason

and Michelle failed to provide him any notice in the dissolution action. Brian

argues that Jason knew he was not the biological father of S.J.W. prior to his

initiation of the dissolution action, but Jason nevertheless indicated the children

were born of the marriage and sought joint custody of them, which “was an

                                         -13-
assertion of fraud upon the trial court.” While Brian recognizes that there is a

rebuttable legal presumption that a child born during a marriage is the child of the

husband and wife pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 406.011, he

argues here it was overcome by DNA testing in the paternity action and CR

60.02(f) relief is thus appropriate. Brian argues that his potential knowledge of his

paternity prior to the entry of the decree is not the same as him making a knowing

and voluntary waiver of his fundamental constitutional right to parent.

             “CR 60.02, is a safety valve, error correcting device for trial courts.”

Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454,

456 (Ky. 2002). “[CR 60.02] is designed to allow trial courts a measure of

flexibility to achieve just results and thereby ‘provides the trial court with

extensive power to correct a judgment.’” Id. (quoting Fortney v. Mahan, 302

S.W.2d 842, 843 (Ky. 1957)).

             CR 60.02 provides in relevant part as follows:

             On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
             relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
             judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
             grounds: . . . (b) newly discovered evidence which by
             due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
             move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or
             falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings,
             other than perjury or falsified evidence; . . . or (f) any
             other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
             The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
             on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after
             the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

                                          -14-
             As explained in Kurtsinger, “the broad discretion of the trial court” to

grant relief pursuant to CR 60.02 is “not [to be] disturbed unless the trial judge

abused his/her discretion.” Kurtsinger, 90 S.W.3d at 456. “Two of the factors to

be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion are whether the movant

had a fair opportunity to present his claim at the trial on the merits and whether the

granting of the relief sought would be inequitable to other parties.” Fortney, 302

S.W.2d at 843 (citations omitted).

             Importantly, “it is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a

lower court for any reason supported by the record.” McCloud v. Commonwealth,

286 S.W.3d 780, 786 n.19 (Ky. 2009). We interpret Brian’s motion for CR 60.02

relief as implicating CR 60.02 generally, although he suggested that (b) and (f)

were the grounds most likely to have merit. While the family court appropriately

granted relief pursuant to CR 60.02(f), we believe that the record supports relief

based on CR 60.02(d) better than CR 60.02(f) and focus our discussion on CR

60.02(d). While CR 60.02(b) and (c) could also be implicated, relief subject to

those subsections would be untimely.

             In Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d 816 (Ky. 2002), the Kentucky

Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the distinction between fraud under CR

60.02(c) as compared with (d). It also rejected the dichotomy of “intrinsic” versus

                                         -15-
“extrinsic” fraud in overruling Rasnick v. Rasnick, 982 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.App.

1998). The Court’s reasoning in Terwilliger is instructive:

                   The Court in Rasnick held that nondisclosure of
            assets in a divorce proceeding does not constitute “fraud
            affecting the proceedings” within the meaning of CR
            60.02(d). The Rasnick decision draws a distinction
            between fraud intrinsic to the proceedings, such as
            perjury or nondisclosure during pretrial discovery which
            causes injury to a single litigant, and “extrinsic” fraud,
            which, the Court held, constitutes “fraud affecting the
            proceedings.” In reexamining the Rasnick decision,
            which relies primarily upon decisions from other
            jurisdictions, this Court finds that the definition of “fraud
            affecting the proceeding” utilized by the Court in Rasnick
            is an overly restrictive conception of CR 60.02(d). It is
            the finding of this Court that fraud on a party is, in fact,
            “fraud affecting the proceedings.” As Appellant notes,
            by filing a settlement agreement with knowingly
            undervalued marital assets, Mr. Terwilliger used the
            proceedings as a tool to defraud his wife.

                   Whatever popularity the distinction between
            intrinsic and extrinsic fraud may have enjoyed in the
            past, the judicial tide is turning against the distinction in
            favor of equity. According to the leading authority on the
            Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure,

                   As a general proposition [fraud affecting the
                   proceedings] relates to what is denominated
                   ‘extrinsic’ fraud. This covers fraudulent conduct
                   outside of the trial which is practiced upon the
                   court, or upon the defeated party, in such a manner
                   that he is prevented from appearing or presenting
                   fully and fairly his side of the case.

                   The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
                   fraud has been widely criticized and has been
                   rejected by more recent [federal] decisions.

                                        -16-
            7 Kurt A. Philipps, Jr., Kentucky Practice, CR 60.02,
            cmt. 6 (5th Ed. 1995). Our rule, however, does
            distinguish between fraud affecting the proceedings as
            discussed herein, and the presentation of perjury or
            falsified evidence, which is clearly a fraud upon the
            court. This distinction is important because the latter can
            be raised only “not more than one year after the
            judgement,” CR 60.02, while the former must be “made
            within a reasonable time.” Thus, it appears that fraud
            perpetrated in the courtroom or through testimony under
            oath is subject to a one-year limitation while fraud
            occurring outside the courtroom that interferes with
            presentation of the losing party’s evidence to the extent
            that he or she is “prevented from appearing or
            presenting fully and fairly his side of the case” is not
            subject to that limitation. 7 Kurt A. Philipps, Jr.,
            Kentucky Practice, CR 60.02, cmt. 6 (5th Ed. 1995).
            Philipps goes on to say: “It may be said the language
            specifying [fraud upon the proceeding] is quite broad and
            allows for flexibility in the determination of what
            constitutes ‘fraud affecting the proceedings’ where the
            net effect would cause an unjust judgment to stand.” Id.
            While finality of judgment is a laudable goal, it cannot
            take precedence over the fair and equitable resolution of
            disputes.

Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d at 818-19 (emphasis added). The Court went on to discuss

applicable cases, including Burke v. Sexton, 814 S.W.2d 290 (Ky.App. 1991),

where the wife allowed an unconscionable settlement agreement to become final

because the husband misled the wife into believing he was no longer pursuing a

divorce. The circuit court allowed the wife to reopen under these circumstances

and the settlement agreement was overturned, and when the husband appealed, the

                                       -17-
Court of Appeals affirmed. The Terwilliger Court explained the reasoning in

Burke and why it was correct:

             the Court of Appeals found this sort of situation to fall
             under CR 60.02(d) as a “fraud affecting the
             proceedings.” . . . While in [Burke and Terwilliger] a
             fraud was perpetrated against a party to the dispute, the
             ultimate result was a fraud against the court. Both in the
             case at bar, and as noted by the court in Burke, [814
             S.W.2d at 292,] allowing the original decree to stand
             would be a miscarriage of justice.

Terwilliger, 64 S.W.3d at 819.

             Brian never had a fair opportunity to present his claim that he should

be determined to be S.J.W.’s father at the trial on the merits. Brian’s right to have

a paternal relationship with S.J.W. was far more important than a party receiving

an unfair share of assets due to deliberate undervaluing or a faked reconciliation,

but he was given no opportunity to assert his rights before Jason was declared to be

S.J.W.’s father.

             Based on the undisputed facts, fraud occurred against Brian as he was

never joined as a party or informed that he needed to intervene during the

dissolution proceeding or else Jason would become S.J.W.’s legal father. Brian

was thus prevented from appearing and asserting his rights. A fraud was also

perpetrated against the family court as it was prevented from knowing the facts

which would have made it require that Brian be joined as a party or delay entry of

the judgment pending a separate paternity action.

                                         -18-
             We do not believe Jason or Michelle were attempting to do anything

improper. Instead, they were trying to safeguard S.J.W. from being deprived of

having equal legitimate status with his siblings and maintenance of the established

relationship with the only father he had ever known. They likely believed they

were acting in S.J.W.’s best interest.

             Nevertheless, their actions resulted in a fraud to the proceedings, and

makes it appropriate to affirm the grant of CR 60.02 relief at this juncture. Their

longstanding knowledge that Brian was likely S.J.W.’s biological father and failure

to act to protect Brian’s rights militates against the granting of the relief sought by

Brian being inequitable to them. As there is no true dispute that Brian is S.J.W.’s

biological father as established by the DNA test in the paternity action, the

alteration of the judgment to acknowledge that fact was appropriate. This allows

Brian to receive consideration for custody and timesharing based on his status as

S.J.W.’s biological father.

             Accordingly, we affirm the Simpson Family Court’s orders allowing

Brian to intervene and granting his request for CR 60.02 relief.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -19-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BRIAN
                          STRAIN:
Samuel J. Crocker
Franklin, Kentucky        Christopher T. Davenport
                          Kaitlyn S. Embry
                          Bowling Green, Kentucky

                        -20-