Court Opinion

ID: 9370495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 21:00:31.673682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.737453
License: Public Domain

BLD-079                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                       No. 22-3209
                                       ___________

                             IN RE: FREDERICK FOSTER,
                                                 Petitioner

                      On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
           United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                (Related to Civ. Nos. 2:11-cv-07303 and 2:22-cv-03349)

                     Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
                                   January 26, 2023

               Before: AMBRO*, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: February 13, 2023)
                                        _________

                                        OPINION*
                                        _________

PER CURIAM

       In November 2011, Petitioner Frederick Foster brought a civil action against the

United States Postal Service (USPS), Pitney-Bowes, and others, alleging, inter alia,

violations of 39 U.S.C. § 404a(a)(3) of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act

*
 Judge Ambro assumed Senior Status on February 6, 2023.
**
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
(PAEA). The District Court dismissed the claims, and the Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit affirmed. See Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp., 549 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir.

2013).

         In August 2022, Petitioner filed a new civil action asserting that fraud rendered all

the judgments in the 2011 proceedings void, and otherwise sought to relitigate the claims

made in his earlier lawsuit. See Foster v. Slomsky, 2:22-cv-03349, ECF No. 8.

Petitioner moved to disqualify the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) from

representing the government defendants, arguing that such representation was precluded

by 39 U.S.C. § 409(g)(1). See Id., ECF No. 20. The District Court denied the motion,

noting that the representation issue was already litigated and found to lack merit in the

earlier proceedings. See Id., ECF No. 25 at 1; see also Foster, 549 F. App’x at 988

(“Although 39 U.S.C. § 409(g)(1) does prohibit the DOJ from representing USPS in

certain limited situations, none of these situations apply here.”). After the District Court

denied his motion for reconsideration on the issue, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to

this Court. See C.A. 22-3105. That appeal was ultimately withdrawn, after Petitioner

was notified it was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, as the orders being

appealed were not final orders.

         After that jurisdictional notification, and before he withdrew his appeal, Petitioner

filed the instant Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, seeking to have this Court “order the

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to act in accordance with

Congress’s intent, statutory and common law, this Third Circuit’s binding precedents,

inter alia.” 3d Cir. ECF No. 2 at 2 (emphasis in original). Petitioner asserts that “the

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District Court failed and refused to act in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1) – to

entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment and 60(d)(3) – to ‘set

aside’ a judgment for fraud on the Court.” Id. at 3. Petitioner also takes issue with the

District Court “allowing the DOJ to furnish legal representation to the USPS for

violations of Federal laws prohibiting the conduct of business in a fraudulent manner.”

Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Among other relief, Petitioner seeks to have this Court

“vacat[e] the VOID Orders made in 2:11-cv-07303 for failure [to] act in accordance with

due process [of] law and being produced by fraud,” and “overturn[] the VOID judgments

made in Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp., 549 F. App’x 982, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2013).” Id. at

28 (emphasis in original).

       A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy that is available only in extraordinary

circumstances. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).

To obtain the writ, a petitioner must show that “(1) no other adequate means [exist] to

attain the relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and

indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Hollingsworth v.

Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

       Petitioner has not made that showing here. His mandamus petition appears to

raise issues that either were the subject of his past appeal in connection with the 2011

litigation, or were the subject of the appeal in C.A. No. 22-3105, which Petitioner

voluntarily withdrew. Because mandamus is not a substitute for an appeal, and “a writ of

mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can obtain relief by appeal,” Madden v. Myers,

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102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996); see In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 219 (3d

Cir. 2003) (“If, in effect, an appeal will lie, mandamus will not.”), we will deny

Petitioner’s mandamus petition. His motion to stay the proceedings in 2:22-cv-03349,

motion to strike the entry of appearance and response on behalf of Respondents, and

emergency motion to expedite and for injunctive and other relief are denied.

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