Court Opinion

ID: 9682769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:16:35.522971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:41.340460
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
As recognized in the principal opinion, plaintiff (in the front vehicle) testified that “he had no intention to turn,” and that he did not leave the right side of the highway. To the contrary, defendant (in the following vehicle) testified that plaintiff did drive to the left of the center line. Thus, it would appear that whether or not plaintiff turned *916left was the ultimate issue as to liability and was for the jury to decide.
MAI 17.06 was not applicable to the facts of this case because said instruction “assumes” that a turn was being made. It is appropriate only in those instances where the adequacy of the signal is the ultimate issue. The instruction should have been modified to hypothesize the fact of a turn and require the jury to so find. Thereafter, and for the first time, a signal or lack thereof would become an issue for resolution.
Admittedly, the contributory negligence instruction given (No. 4) assumed that a turn was made and guided the jury toward the presence or absence of a signal. The instruction thereby failed to require resolution of the real issue. Price v. Seidler, 408 S.W.2d 815, 824 (Mo.1966); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Thomas Grain Fumigant Co., 407 S.W.2d 622, 630 (Mo.App.1966); Thompson v. Gray, 415 S.W.2d 299 (Mo.App.1967).
Although defendant gave a different version as to what happened, plaintiff by the instruction given was denied any hope the jury would believe his version.
The judgment should be reversed.