Court Opinion

ID: 9747218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:03:42.215484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:21.307457
License: Public Domain

*360NEWMAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the evidence seized from R.A. was seized illegally and must be suppressed, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence seized from Appellant Stevenson is likewise subject to suppression.
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) and adopted the “plain feel” doctrine. Earlier this year this Court applied Dickerson in Commonwealth v. E.M. 558 Pa. 16, 735 A.2d 654 (1999), reiterating that, in order for the plain feel doctrine to apply, the criminal nature of the object must be “immediately apparent” to the officer conducting the frisk. In a footnote, the majority elaborated on this requirement stating that: “In order to remain within the boundaries delineated by Dickerson, an officer must be able to substantiate what it was about the tactile impression of the object that made it immediately apparent to him that he was feeling contraband.” Id., 735 A.2d at 664 n. 8. In my opinion, that is precisely what occurred in Appellant Stevenson’s case. Accordingly, I agree with Justice Castille that the evidence seized was admissible under the plain feel doctrine.