Court Opinion

ID: 9718902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:37:21.205824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.366345
License: Public Domain

*945Opinion
COBEY, J.
Plaintiff, Allen Foster, appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants, County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County and its employee, John McFadden, in his action for damages for personal injuries. The judgment is based solely on the conclusion of law that plaintiff failed to comply with the Governmental Claims Act. (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)1 The decisive legal question presented is whether a letter from plaintiff’s attorney, erroneously addressed to “John McFallon” at the office of the district, with a copy to the district at the same office (both of which apparently were received within the 100-day period for filing claims (see § 911.2)), was sufficient to invoke application of Government Code sections 910.8 and 911. We believe that it was and we therefore reverse.
Apparently on December 30, 1967 defendant McFadden, while operating a bulldozer in the course and scope of his employment by defendant district, struck and injured plaintiff. By the aforementioned letter, dated December 29, 1968, plaintiff’s attorney wrote McFadden advising him of his client’s name, the date and place of the accident and asking McFadden, if insured, to forward the letter to his insurance carrier and, if not insured, to contact the attorney at once and inform the attorney what he wished to do about the matter. The letter closed with the expressed hope that direct dealing between the parties would avoid the necessity for “initiating formal proceedings.”2
*946As previously indicated, a copy of this letter was mailed to the district and the district, instead of McFadden, responded to it. By letter dated March 12, 1968, the secretary of the board of directors of the district informed plaintiff’s attorney of the name, address and telephone number of the district’s insurance carrier and suggested that any further correspondence in connection with the matter be directed to the carrier. Inconclusive dealings regarding the matter thereafter ensued between the carrier and the plaintiff’s attorney.
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment against him on three grounds: (1) substantial compliance with the claims act; (2) estoppel of the district to assert noncompliance; (3) waiver by the district of the insufficiency of his claim (the letter of February 29, 1968).
The letter does not in content substantially comply with the requirements of the claims act.3 Furthermore plaintiff was not misled by the dis*947trict as to the necessity for his filing a claim since prior to the district’s replying to his attorney’s letter of February 29, 1968, he filed an apparently sufficient claim with the wrong public entity, the City of Los Angeles. Consequently defendants are not estopped to assert their defense of plaintiff’s noncompliance with the claims act.
This leaves as the sole issue meriting discussion the legal question whether the letter of February 29, 1968 should be treated as a claim for the purpose of making applicable the fundamental requirement of section 910.8 and the legal consequences of section 911. We refer to the requirement of section 910.8 that if, in the opinion of a board or its designee, a claim, as presented, fails to comply substantially with the claims act, the board or its designee must give written particularized notice to the claimant within 20 days of the claim’s insufficiencies and that if this notice is not given, then under section 911 the public entity waives its defense of such insufficiencies.
It is true that the letter under discussion was not itself addressed to the district, is not labeled “claim” and does not even contain the word “claim.” But it clearly, if inferentially, suggests to its recipients, McFadden and the district, that plaintiff was injured by McFadden in the course and scope of McFadden’s employment by the district in a recent accident occurring at a specified time and place and that therefore the writer of the letter, as plaintiff’s attorney, desires either that McFadden refer the letter to his insurance carrier or, if McFadden be uninsured, that he inform the lawyer at once what he wishes to do about the accident. The district obviously construed the letter as being applicable to it because in reply to the letter it furnished plaintiff, through his attorney, with the information through which the attorney could then contact directly the district’s insurance carrier.
In short, the letter performed the function of a claim. It told the district of a recent accident at a specified time and place involving a specified employee of the district. It inferentially requested that the district forward the letter to its insurance carrier. The district, by its reply to the letter, identified the letter for what it was—an unlabeled and deficient claim by plaintiff against the district for unstated damages for undescribed injuries he allegedly suffered in an identified but undescribed recent accident involving a specified employee of the district.
The California Law Revision Commission originated both sections 910.8 and 911 and their fundamentally identical 1959 predecessors (former §§712 and 713). The commission’s consultant, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, explained inferentially in his report to the commission that the *948requirement of notice of insufficiency of presented claims was introduced to protect claimants whose claims did not substantially comply with the claims act, but which, nevertheless, were readily identifiable as claims. The professor also intimated that such protection was needed because claims are often prepared by nonlawyers. (See 2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) A-122—A-124.) The subsequently enacted claims act, however, did not and has never limited this additional protection of claimants solely to claims filed by nonlawyers.4
*949The letter under consideration accomplished the two principal purposes of a sufficient claim. It afforded the district the opportunity to make a prompt investigation of the accident occasioning the letter and it gave to the district the opportunity to settle without suit, if it so desired. (See id. at p. A-7; Myers v. County of Orange, 6 Cal.App.3d 626, 637 [86 Cal.Rptr. 198].) We therefore hold that for the purpose of invoking sections 910.8 and 911 of the claims act the letter should be treated as a claim.
The judgment is reversed.
Allport, J., concurred.

All section references hereafter are to the Government Code.

The letter, save for the attorney’s letterhead (including his address), reads:
“February 29, 1968
Mr. John Me Fallon
C/ O Sanitation Districts
2020 West Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, California
Re: Our Client: Allen Foster
Our File No. 3429
Accident Date: December 30, 1967
Place: Mission Canyon-Sepulveda Landfill
Dear Mr. Me Fallon:
Please be advised that this firm has been retained to represent the interests of the above-named client in connection with the above accident.
Please forward this letter to your insurance carrier and have them contact the undersigned immediately. If you carry no insurance, please call this office at once and advise what disposition you wish to make of this matter. *946Trusting we may hear from you shortly, and thus eliminate the necessity for initiating formal proceedings -and inconvenience to all parties.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Donald T. Sterling
Donald T. Sterling
Attorney at Law
DTS:kt
cc: Sanitation Districts
2020 West Beverly Boulevard
Los Angeles, California
Attention: Sherman Marks"

These requirements are set out in sections 910 and 910.2.
Section 910 reads: “A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a person acting on his behalf and shall show:
(a) The name and post office address of the claimant;
(b) The post office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent;
(c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted;
(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim;
(e) The name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known; and
(f) The amount claimed as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed.”
Section 910.2, in pertinent part, reads: “The claim shall be signed by the claimant or by some person on his behalf.”
We note that the letter lacks completely items (d) and (f) of section 910 and is also deficient in regard to items (a) and (c) of the section.

As submitted to the Legislature by the commission proposed sections 712 and 713 read:
712. “If in the opinion of the governing body of the local public entity a claim as presented fails to comply substantially with the requirements of Section 711 the governing body may, at any time within 60 days after the claim is presented, give the person presenting the claim written notice of its insufficiency, stating with particularity the defects or omissions therein. The governing body may not take final action on the claim for a period of ten days after such notice is given. A failure or refusal to amend the claim shall not constitute a defense to any action brought upon the cause of action for which the claim was presented if the court finds that the claim as presented complied substantially with Section 711.” (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) A-13.)
713. “When suit is brought against a local public entity on a cause of action for which this chapter requires a claim to be presented, the local public entity may assert as a defense either that no claim was presented or that a claim as presented did not comply substantially with the requirements of Section 711, unless such defense has been waived. Any defense based upon a defect or omission in a claim as presented is waived by failure of the governing body to give notice of insufficiency with respect to such defect or omission as provided in Section 712, except that no notice need be given and no waiver shall result when the claim as presented fails to give the residence or business address of the person presenting it.” (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) A-13—A-14.)
As enacted sections 712 and 713 read:
712. “If in the opinion of the governing body of the local public entity a claim as presented fails to comply substantially with the requirements of Section 711 the governing body may, at any time within fifty (50) days after the claim is presented, give written notice of its insufficiency, stating with particularity the defects or omissions therein.
“Such notice may be given by mailing it to the address, if any, stated in the claim as the address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. If no such address is stated in the claim, the notice may be mailed to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim.
“The governing body may not take action on the claim for a period of twenty (20) days after such notice is given. A failure or refusal to amend the claim shall not constitute a defense to any action brought upon the cause of action for which the claim was presented if the court finds that the claim as presented complied substantially with Section 711.” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4135.)
713. “Any defense based upon a defect or omission in a claim as presented is waived by failure of the governing body to mail notice of insufficiency with respect to such defect or omission as provided in Section 712, except that no notice need be mailed and no waiver shall result when the claim as presented fails to state either an address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to he sent or an address of the claimant.” (Stats. 1959, ch. 1724, § 1, p. 4136.)
Sections 910.8 and 911 read:
910.8 “(a) If in the opinion of the board or the person designated by it a claim *949as presented fails to comply substantially with the requirements of Sections 910 and 910.2, or with the requirements of a form provided under Section 910.4 if a claim presented pursuant thereto, the board or such person may, at any time within 20 days after the claim is presented, give written notice of its insufficiency, stating with the defects or omissions therein.
“(b) Such notice may be given personally to the person presenting the claim or by mailing it to the address, if any, stated in the claim as the address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent. If no such address is stated in the claim, the notice may be mailed to the address, if any, of the claimant as stated in the claim.
“(c) The board may not take action on the claim for a period of 15 days after such notice is given.”
911. “Any defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim as presented is waived by failure to give notice of insufficiency with respect to such defect or omission as provided in Section 910.8, except that no notice need be given and no waiver shall result when the claim as presented fails to state either an address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent or an address of the claimant.”