Court Opinion

ID: 4892106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-09-02 23:51:37.630948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:43.578810
License: Public Domain

McAdoo, J.
This cause seems to have been instituted by the appellant as a means of strengthening his title to the land, which was involved in the cause of Holloman v. F. Smith and Wife, (No. 214.)
It is a proceeding to compel John P. White to execute a deed of trust by sale which had been imposed by Smith and wife on the same property in 1858, White being the trustee named in the deed of trust. This deed was executed by Smith and wife to secure debts due to other parties. The appellee had, by purchase from Rust, become the owner of the debts thus secured, and the deed of trust had been transferred to him.
In this suit, on the day the case was called for trial, Smith and wife intervened, pleading the statute of limitations against the debts so secured, wrongful holding of the property in controversy, a plea of payment of the debts and of tender of payment, and that the appellant had been discharged in bankruptcy, and had therefore no right to maintain suit for said debts.
The appellant denied every allegation of the appellee except that of his bankruptcy, and to that allegation he pleads that the property in controversy had been set aside to him by A. M. Jackson, his assignee in bankruptcy, and together therewith the debts and deed of trust embraced in this suit, as entering into and affecting his title thereto, the appellee, French Smith, being notoriously insolvent at the time.
One of the notes secured by the deed of trust was not *58barred by limitation when this suit was instituted. The proof failed entirely to show that any of the debts had been paid; the proof failed to show a legal tender of the amounts due. The proof, we think, amply showed the purchase and payment for the mortgage debts by the appellant.
The deed of trust was a proper charge on the estate, being complete in its terms and in its execution. And we think the appellant would have been entitled to the relief sought but for the plea of his bankruptcy.
He admitted the fact of his bankruptcy. His plea that the deed of trust had been assigned to him, as he alleges in his answer, we think, would have availed him, if it had been followed up by the proof. But we have looked in vain in the statement of facts for proof on that subject. Without such proof it is clear he could maintain n'o suit upon the debts or mortgage, they having passed to his creditors on his being adjudged a bankrupt.
Inasmuch as the cause must be affirmed, because the proof shows no cause of action on the part of the appellant, it will be unnecessary to notice the several assignments of error relied on by the appellant for a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Opinion rendered October 14, 1873.
On Rehearing.