Court Opinion

ID: 9392333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:04:04.566963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.611955
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/4/23 P. v. Ortega CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D080017

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. RIF1902524)

 JOE ORTEGA,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Bernard J. Schwartz, Judge. Sentence vacated and remanded for
resentencing.
          Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier, Warren J. Williams and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      A jury found Joe Ortega guilty of one count of stalking while a

restraining order was in effect (Pen. Code, § 646.9),1 one count of making a
criminal threat (§ 422), four counts of misdemeanor violation of a protective
order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)), and one count of misdemeanor making of annoying
and threatening phone calls (§ 653m, subd. (a)). The trial court imposed an
upper term sentence of four years.
      Ortega contends that his sentence should be vacated and this matter
should be remanded for the trial court to apply the amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b) and section 654 that went into effect after his
sentencing. Ortega also contends that remand is required so that the trial
court can correct an error in calculating his presentence custody credits.
      We conclude that Ortega’s arguments have merit. We accordingly
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
                                       I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Ortega’s Past Domestic Violence Toward Jane Doe
      Over the course of several years, Ortega and Jane Doe were in an on-
again, off-again intimate relationship, including living together. According to
Jane Doe’s trial testimony, Ortega was violent to her on multiple occasions.
At trial, Jane Doe described three specific incidents of violence occurring
prior to the events for which Ortega was prosecuted in this action. Ortega
was prosecuted and convicted for those three incidents.
      First, in September 2012, Ortega threw an iPad at Jane Doe, hitting
her in the mouth. Second, in June 2014, while subject to a protective order
against any negative contact with Jane Doe, Ortega punched Jane Doe in the

1    Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
                                       2
face and head and threatened to kill her. Finally, in July 2017, Ortega
choked Jane Doe and then threatened to kill her. After that incident, Jane
Doe obtained a protective order valid until December 2020 that required
Ortega to stay away from her and have no contact with her.
B.    The Events Giving Rise to This Prosecution
      The incidents that gave rise to the instant criminal prosecution began
in December 2018. During a period when Jane Doe had recently broken off a
renewed relationship with Ortega, he came to Jane Doe’s third-floor
apartment and knocked on the door. When Jane Doe did not open the door,
Ortega climbed onto Jane Doe’s balcony patio, which is something he had
done multiple times before. Jane Doe called 911, but Ortega left while Jane
Doe was on the 911 call. When Ortega returned a short time later, Jane Doe
again called 911 because Ortega was continually knocking and pushing
hypodermic needles underneath her door.
      As of late January 2019, Jane Doe had broken off another short-lived
attempt to try to reestablish a relationship with Ortega. In January and
February 2019, Ortega called Jane Doe many times a day, during which he
would speak to her in a hostile and insulting manner. On one call, Ortega
threatened to “beat the fuck” out of Jane Doe, which made her fearful.
During that time period, Ortega would also come to Jane Doe’s apartment
and climb onto her balcony.
      In June 2019, Ortega knocked on Jane Doe’s door late at night, and the
next morning she found him on her balcony. Ortega was yelling, angry, and
refused to leave. According to Jane Doe, Ortega threatened “he was gonna
beat me up and he was gonna come in.”

                                      3
C.    Ortega’s Trial, Conviction, and Sentence
      In September 2021, Ortega was tried on one count of stalking while a
restraining order was in effect (§ 646.9), two counts of making a criminal
threat (§ 422), four counts of misdemeanor violation of a protective order
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1)), and one count of misdemeanor making of annoying and
threatening phone calls (§ 653m, subd. (a)).
      Ortega testified at trial. He admitted three prior convictions based on
violent conduct against Jane Doe. First, Ortega admitted he pled guilty to
willful infliction of corporal injury (§ 273.5) in 2013 for the 2012 incident
where he was accused of throwing an iPad at Jane Doe. However, he denied
actually having thrown an iPad. Second, Ortega admitted that in 2015 he
again pled guilty to willfully inflicting corporal injury (§ 273.5) based on the
2014 incident during which he punched Jane Doe. Although Ortega admitted
he did strike Jane Doe on that occasion, he claimed that she hit him first.
Third, Ortega admitted that in 2017 he pled guilty to assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) after being
accused of choking Jane Doe. However, he denied that he actually choked
Jane Doe, and he claimed there was no physical altercation between them
that day. Ortega also admitted to criminal convictions before he met Jane
Doe: a felony domestic violence conviction around 2005 or 2006, and a
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in 2011.
      During his testimony, Ortega disputed Jane Doe’s description of the
incidents that gave rise to this prosecution. Among other things, Ortega
contended that he was living with Jane Doe at the time of the December 2018
incident, and that he was on the balcony because he went out to smoke and
got locked out. Ortega also testified that he continually telephoned Jane Doe
in early 2019 because he was trying to retrieve his personal items from her,

                                        4
such as his identification and his debit card, but Jane Doe was unreasonably
withholding them. Finally, Ortega testified that although he slept on Jane
Doe’s balcony in June 2019, he did so because he was stuck without a way to
get home, and he did not threaten Jane Doe during that incident.
      The jury found Ortega guilty on all of the counts except for one of the
counts alleging that he made a criminal threat (§ 422). As to that count, the
jury was unable to reach a verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial and
dismissed it.
      On September 30, 2021, the trial court sentenced Ortega to an upper
term sentence of four years, using the stalking conviction (§ 646.9) as the
principal count. Pursuant to section 654, the trial court stayed the 180-day
jail sentences on each of the remaining counts. The trial court determined
that Ortega was entitled to 1684 days of presentence custody credit, which it
noted would result in Ortega’s release from custody as those credits exceeded
the four-year term it had imposed.
      Ortega appeals from the judgment.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Remand Is Warranted For the Trial Court to Apply the Newly Enacted
      Amendments to Section 1170 and Section 654
      We first consider Ortega’s contention that remand is warranted so that
the trial court may apply two amended sentencing provisions that went into
effect after Ortega was sentenced in September 2021.
      1.    The Newly Enacted Amendments Are Retroactively Applicable to
            Nonfinal Cases
      Effective January 1, 2022, two amended sentencing provisions that are
relevant in this case went into effect. First, effective January 1, 2022,
section 1170 was amended. (See Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.);

                                        5
Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; Assem. Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats.
2021, ch. 695, § 5.) As relevant here, under the amended statute, a trial court
must “order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term,” except
under limited circumstances. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) An upper term may be
imposed “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that
justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term,
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Nevertheless, “the
court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The amended statute is
relevant here because, as we have explained, the trial court selected the
upper term for the principal count.
      Second, when Ortega was sentenced, former section 654 provided that
an “act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the
longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or
omission be punished under more than one provision.” (Former § 654,
subd. (a).) Effective January 1, 2022, section 654 was amended to provide
that where an act or omission is punishable by different provisions, the
defendant “may be punished under either of such provisions.” (§ 654,
subd. (a); Assem. Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 441,
§ 1.) Thus, where section 654 applies, a trial court now has discretion to
determine which counts will be stayed, regardless of which count provides for
the longest term of imprisonment. Here, the statutory amendment is
relevant because, as required by the former version of section 654,

                                        6
subdivision (a), the trial court punished Ortega by requiring him to serve the
longest term of punishment, which was for the stalking conviction. (§ 646.9.)
      The parties correctly agree that the amended sentencing provisions in
sections 1170, subdivision (b), and 654, subdivision (a), apply retroactively to
Ortega because his case is not yet final on appeal. (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 (Lopez) [retroactivity of amendments to § 1170,
subd. (b)]; People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [retroactivity of
amendments to § 654].) However, the People contend that we need not
remand for the trial court to apply the amended sentencing provisions
because the trial court’s application of the former sentencing provisions was
not prejudicial.
      2.    The Amended Version of Section 1170, Subdivision (b)
      We first examine whether, as the People contend, the trial court’s
imposition of an upper term sentence under the prior version of section 1170,
subdivision (b) was harmless.
      The trial court explained its selection of the upper term sentence as
follows: “That term is chosen for a number of reasons: One, the defendant’s
criminal history; two, the continuous violations of court orders in this case
and what could be described as constant terrorizing of the victim in this case;
and, three, the nature and circumstances of the underlying charge are serious
in nature.” None of the aggravating factors upon which the trial court relied
were found by the trier of fact, set forth in a stipulation, or reflected in a
certified record of conviction. Thus they would no longer be permissible
aggravating factors under the current version of section 1170, subdivision (b).
Specifically, the jury did not find, and Ortega did not stipulate, that Ortega
engaged in a “continuous” violation of court orders that “terroriz[ed]” Jane
Doe, or that the underlying charges were “serious” in nature. Further,
although Ortega admitted during his testimony to several criminal
                                         7
convictions, those admissions were made during testimony (with Ortega
denying the underlying conduct), not in a stipulation, and there is no
indication that Ortega’s criminal history was presented to the trial court in
certified records of conviction.
      In Lopez, this court set forth a two-step inquiry that applies when
evaluating whether it was prejudicial error to sentence a defendant under the
prior version of section 1170, subdivision (b). (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th

at pp. 465-468.)2
      “[T]he initial relevant question for purposes of determining whether
prejudice resulted from failure to apply the new version of the sentencing law
is whether the reviewing court can conclude beyond reasonable doubt that a
jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all of the aggravating
factors on which the trial court relied in exercising its discretion to select the
upper term. If the answer to this question is ‘yes,’ then the defendant has not
suffered prejudice from the court’s reliance on factors not found true by a jury
in selecting the upper term.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.)
As we will explain, we are unable to conclude that the jury would have found
true all of the aggravating factors upon which the trial court relied.
      As an initial matter, with respect to the trial court’s reliance on
Ortega’s criminal history as an aggravating factor, because Ortega did admit

2      We note that “[t]here currently is a split of authority concerning the
applicable harmlessness standard.” (People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
953, 956.) The Supreme Court has granted review to decide the issue.
(See People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.) Because both the People’s and Ortega’s briefing
applies the harmless error analysis that this court set forth in Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pages 465-468, and neither party argues for the application
of a different standard, we need not, and do not, address the current
disagreement regarding the applicable standard.
                                         8
to his previous convictions during his testimony, we can conclude, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have made the same true finding about
Ortega’s criminal history. However, as to the remainder of the aggravating
factors, we cannot determine whether a jury would agree with the trial court
that (1) Ortega’s violation of the court orders was “continuous” in that he
“constant[ly] terroriz[ed]” Jane Doe, and (2) the underlying charges were
“serious.” Those findings are subjective in nature and would necessarily
depend on how individual jurors chose to view and characterize Ortega’s
conduct. (See People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840 [“to the extent a
potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a
somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing
court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the
jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the
trial court”].) Especially in light of Ortega’s testimony at trial, in which he
disputed much of Jane Doe’s account of the relevant incidents, and in light of
the complicated history of the relationship between Jane Doe and Ortega, we
are unable to determine whether a jury would have made the same findings
as the trial court regarding the aggravating factors. Thus, we cannot
conclude, in the first step of the Lopez inquiry, that it was harmless for the
trial court to have applied the prior version of section 1170, subdivision (b) in
sentencing Ortega.
      In the second step of the Lopez inquiry, when we have been unable to
find harmless error in the first step, we look to “whether a reviewing court
can be certain, to the degree required by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836, that the trial court would nevertheless have exercised its discretion
to select the upper term if it had recognized that it could permissibly rely on
only a single one of the aggravating factors, a few of the aggravating factors,

                                        9
or none of the aggravating factors, rather than all of the factors on which it
previously relied.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn 11.) The
question is “whether it is reasonably probable that a more favorable sentence
would have otherwise been imposed absent the trial court’s improper reliance
on” impermissible factors. (Id. at p. 467.) If we “cannot conclude that the
trial court would have selected an upper term sentence based on . . . some
constellation of permissible aggravating factors,” we must “conclude that
remand is required to allow the trial court the opportunity to exercise its
discretion to make its sentencing choice in light of the recent amendments to
section 1170.” (Lopez, at p. 468.)
      Here, the only permissible aggravating factor upon which the trial
court relied was Ortega’s criminal history. As we have explained, we have
determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have made a true
finding regarding that criminal history because Ortega admitted his prior
convictions during his testimony. However, based on the record before us, we
cannot conclude it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have
departed from the now-presumptive middle term, and would have selected an
upper term sentence, if the only aggravating factor it considered was Ortega’s
criminal history. This is especially the case because the other two
aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court concerned the nature of
Ortega’s instant offenses, not his prior offenses. (Cf. Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468 [given the “long list of aggravating factors” relied
upon by the trial court, the record did not indicate that the trial court would
have imposed an upper term based solely on aggravating factors relating to
the defendant’s prior convictions].) The record simply does not contain the
information necessary for us to determine how the trial court would have
exercised its discretion had it considered only Ortega’s criminal history.

                                       10
      The People’s argument to the contrary is not persuasive. The People’s
main contention is that the trial court’s actions “demonstrate that it believed
[Ortega] deserved an aggravated sentence” because it “found that the
underlying offense was serious and that [Ortega] had terrorized Jane Doe
over a continuous period of time.” This argument fails because it depends on
the impermissible aggravating factors that were not found by a jury or
contained in a stipulation. The People also contend it is significant that
“[t]he trial court . . . imposed the upper term sentence even knowing that
[Ortega] had excess presentence custody credits that would result in his
release with credit for time served.” We are not persuaded that fact has any
bearing on whether the trial court would impose an upper term sentence
were it only able to rely on Ortega’s criminal history, and the People do not
explain why such a conclusion is warranted.
      In sum, we reject the People’s contention that it was harmless for the
trial court to have sentenced Ortega under the prior version of section 1170.
Accordingly, we vacate Ortega’s sentence, and we remand for the trial court

to apply the current version of section 1170, subdivision (b).3
      3.    The Amended Version of Section 654
      We next turn to Ortega’s contention that remand is also required to
allow the trial court to apply the amended version of section 654, which no

3     As we explained in Lopez, “[o]n remand, the People may elect to
proceed under the requirements of the newly-amended version of
section 1170, subdivision (b), which would permit the People to prove the
existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, unless
the defendant waives the right to a jury and agrees to have the factors
decided by the court beyond a reasonable doubt; alternatively, the People
may accept resentencing on the record as it stands.” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.)
                                       11
longer requires that punishment be imposed on the count that provides for
the longest term of imprisonment. (§ 654, subd. (a).)
      The People contend that it was not prejudicial for the trial court to
sentence Ortega under the former version of section 654. According to the
People, we can conclude, based on the record, that the trial court would not
have exercised its discretion to impose a different sentence. However, it is
unnecessary for us to address the People’s argument, because we are already
vacating Ortega’s sentence and remanding the matter. During resentencing,
Ortega may present the trial court with any sentencing arguments he may
have, including his section 654 arguments. (See People v. Valenzuela (2019)
7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all
prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”].)
B.    On Remand, the Trial Court Should Address Ortega’s Presentence
      Custody Credits
       Ortega points out in his opening appellate brief that the trial court
appears to have made an error in calculating his presentence custody credits
because it did not take into account a period of custody in February and
March 2019. The People agree that there is a discrepancy in the record that
needs to be clarified by the trial court.
      On remand for resentencing, the trial court should address the issue of
Ortega’s presentence custody credits to determine whether it previously
failed to award credit to which Ortega was entitled.

                                        12
                                DISPOSITION
      The sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for resentencing
under the current versions of section 1170, subdivision (b) and section 654.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                                     IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

                                       13