Court Opinion

ID: 9590519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:55:43.945252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:31.500991
License: Public Domain

Finney, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority that State v. Blassingame, 271 S.C. 44, 244 S.E. (2d) 528 (1978), is needlessly overbroad and should be modified. Consistent with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed. (2d) 908 (1964), this Court has held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when the state seeks to introduce evidence which was allegedly obtained by conduct in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.
The majority contends that Blassingame affords defendants unconditional entitlement to a suppression hearing upon a bare allegation of unconstitutionality. Such a contention disregards the fact that trial courts are required to exercise sound discretion in considering motions for suppression hearings. The majority’s aversion to fettering trial courts appears to be inconsistent with its unduly burdensome requirement that the grounds for such hearings be “sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural.” Trial courts must now assume the added duty of determining whether motions for suppression hearings are in compliance with the new rule. Furthermore, “duplicative consumption” of the trial court’s time for a threshold suppression hearing would be minimal compared to the duplication of a series of hearings during a trial where, as in this case, issues concerning allegedly improperly obtained evidence arise repeatedly.
Additionally, the new rule declared here by the majority will now place a significant burden upon a defendant to convince the trial court that a suppression hearing is necessary, which is contrary to the law articulated in Blassingame, supra. In my view, neither the current state of our law nor the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration warrant the majority’s conclusion that the necessary constitutional safeguards promulgated by this Court less than two decades ago in Blassingame are needlessly overbroad and should now be modified.
I continue to support the bright line test as adopted in Blassingame, supra.