Court Opinion

ID: 9685074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:22:35.709015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:02.140159
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I find that I must once again regrettably dissent from the majority. My basis for dissenting is not that I am unconcerned about the welfare of a child but, rather, that I am compelled to recognize the limited role a court can play in making the world a perfect place in which to live. There is no question, as noted by the majority, that the child in this case was not blessed with perfect parents. Quite to the contrary, it is apparent that the child is a product of parents who themselves will undoubtedly have difficulty making their way through life. But the unfortunate truth of the matter is that they are not unlike scores of parents whose parental rights are not terminated.
As I have on previous occasions, I do not suggest for a moment that the parents here be granted unsupervised custody or control of the child. Indeed, I believe that the child must remain under the custody of the State. It is simply with the final step of terminating parental rights with which I disagree.
While it is true that the child has been in foster *225care for several years, it is likewise true, as reflected by the court record, that at each hearing up until the hearing of January 30, 1981, the parents were praised for their sincere efforts in attempting to correct the situation. They were given extended rights of visitation and commended for their dedication and efforts. Yet, based upon the affidavits of the . guardian ad litem dated January 30, 1981, indicating that the child had been spanked on his bottom and was inclined to use words which, while usually not uttered in court, are now found regularly in most movies and in almost all books, the parental rights are thereafter terminated on March 24, 1981.
The action taken by the court with regard to the mother seems better supported by the record, although the evidence is scant as to whether the mother’s condition is not likely to improve in the future. But evidence regarding the father sufficient to terminate his rights is totally lacking. We are offered no evidence to support our terminating his rights.
The precipitating action' in this case was the fact that the father was contemplating obtaining a divorce. While, to be sure, that in and of itself causes further instability to the family relationship and may prolong the time when the child may return to one or both of the natural parents, it does not occur to me to be sufficient to terminate parental rights, particularly that of the father, in this case. We have repeatedly held that the evidence necessary to justify parental termination must be clear and convincing. State v. Souza-Spittler, 204 Neb. 503, 283 N.W.2d 48 (1979); State v. Hamilton, 204 Neb. 537, 2803 N.W.2d 66 (1979). Yet the record in this case is neither clear nor convincing. The record is simply that everyone is growing tired of the effort which must be exerted if success is ever to be realized. In my view, all of the alternatives have not yet been sufficiently exhausted and the parental rights of at *226least the father should not have been terminated. In view of that fact, which would make the child ineligible for adoption at this time, I likewise see no purpose in terminating the mother’s parental rights. I would have continued the foster care program at least until I could determine what the situation between the parents would be and what indeed would be in the best legal interests of the child.
White and Caporale, JJ., join in this dissent.