Court Opinion

ID: 9953694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 17:02:32.796904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:41.303670
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Elie CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081898

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE245883)

 CHAD THOMAS ELIE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Selena D. Epley, Judge. Affirmed.
         David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Lynne G. McGinnis
and Susan Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      Chad Thomas Elie appeals an order denying his petition for

resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6)1
based on changes to the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine (Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff.
Jan. 1, 2019)). He contends the superior court erred by denying his petition
at the prima facie stage “because, based on the [jury] instructions given, the
jury could have convicted [him] based on the acts of a co-participant and
imputed the co-participant’s malice to him.” We affirm the court’s order.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A. Facts
      The statement of facts is taken from this court’s nonpublished opinion,
People v. Elie (Nov. 18, 2008, D049404).
      On the night of July 31, 2004, Michael Major was in the driveway of a
residence. A group of four or five males arrived in a vehicle. One of the
males yelled “MK,” which stands for the “Murder Krew” criminal street gang,
and the group then began shooting. Major, who was standing in the
driveway about six feet from the assailants, was shot in the leg as he fled up
the driveway. Major was in substantial pain and for about one month walked
with a severe limp. At the time of trial his activities continued to be
restricted because of the injury.
      At trial, Major identified Elie as one of the shooters, testifying that he
recognized Elie’s voice saying, “MK.” Major also recognized Elie’s face among
the men, who all had guns and shot at him.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section 1172.6,
with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to
the statute throughout as section 1172.6.

                                        2
        Elie presented an alibi defense. His father and his brother’s girlfriend
testified Elie was at his residence celebrating his brother’s birthday the night
of July 31, 2004.
        The jury convicted Elie of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and
assault with a firearm, (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), with true findings on personal
firearm discharge causing great bodily injury (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.5,
subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)) and gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
The court sentenced him to a 34-years-to-life term: nine years for attempted
murder, and 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd.
(d)).
B. Senate Bill No. 1437
        After Elie’s judgment became final, the Legislature approved Senate
Bill No. 1437, which went into effect January 1, 2019. Senate Bill No. 1437
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule and eliminated
liability for murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
through two key provisions. First, Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189
so that “[d]efendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major
participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life[.]’ ” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Second, it
amended section 188 to provide that when the felony-murder rule does not
apply, a principal in the crime of murder can only be convicted if he or she
acted “with malice aforethought,” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
        Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a resentencing procedure, which is
now set forth in section 1172.6. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Under section

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1172.6, “A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner
to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       A petitioner initiates the process by filing a declaration averring that:
(1) a charging document was filed against the petitioner allowing the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, natural and probable
consequences murder, murder under another theory by which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2)
the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial, or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3)
the petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the changes to the murder laws that were implemented by
Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)(1)-(3), (b)(1).) If the petitioner
states a prima facie case for relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause and schedule an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction, recall the
sentence, and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (Id., subds.
(c), (d)(1).)
       At the hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder

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under the amended laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “If the prosecution fails to
sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner
shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)
C. The Resentencing Proceeding
      In 2022, Elie filed a petition to have his attempted murder conviction
vacated and to be resentenced under section 1172.6.
      The district attorney opposed the resentencing petition and argued it
should be summarily denied because it failed to state a prima facie case for
relief. The district attorney argued Elie was ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law because he was not convicted as an aider or abettor under the
natural and probable causes doctrine, but rather as an actual perpetrator
who acted with the intent to commit the crimes.
      Elie, through his appointed legal counsel, filed a reply in which he
generally asserted that he stated a prima facie case for relief. At the prima
facie review hearing, Elie’s counsel argued that although Elie “was the only
defendant at the trial, that based on the [jury] instructions that were given,
malice may have been imputed to him because there were, according to the

alleged facts, at least two perpetrators during this shooting.”2

2      Defense counsel specifically referred to the court’s instruction with
CALJIC No. 2.11.5, which provides: “There has been evidence in this case
indicating that a person other than a defendant was or may have been
involved in the crime for which that defendant is on trial. [¶] There may be
many reasons why that person is not here on trial. Therefore, do not
speculate or guess as to why the other person is not being prosecuted in this
trial or whether [he] has been or will be prosecuted. Your [sole] duty is to
decide whether the People have proved the guilt of [each] defendant on trial.”
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      The court summarily denied the resentencing petition without issuing
an order to show cause: “Mr. Elie has not shown that his conviction was
based on him being an aider and abetter under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The jury was not instructed to decide the attempted
murder was the result of a target offense. [¶] The verdict forms clearly show
that the jury found that the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was guilty of attempted murder and that he had—that he
personally—intentionally personally discharged a firearm: To wit, a
handgun, and proximately caused great bodily injury and death to a
person other than an accomplice within the meaning of . . . section
12022.53[, subdivision] (d). [¶] The court record establishes the jury was
instructed only as to the attempted murder being based on express malice

aforethought. Based on the guilty verdict and the CALJIC [No.] 8.66[3] jury

      The court also instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.00 as follows:
“You must decide separately whether each of the defendants is guilty or not
guilty. If you cannot agree upon a verdict as to [both] [all] the defendants,
but do agree upon a verdict as to any one [or more] of them, you must render
a verdict as to the one [or more] as to whom you agree.”

3      The court instructed with CALJIC No. 8.66 as follows: “Defendant
Chad Elie is accused in Counts 1 and 4 . . . of having committed the crime of
attempted murder, in violation of sections 664 and 187 of the Penal Code. [¶]
Every person who attempts to murder another human being is guilty of a
violation of Penal Code sections 664 and 187. [¶] Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought. [¶] In order to prove
attempted murder, each of the following elements must be proved:
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instruction, the jury clearly found that Mr. Elie harbored a specific intent to
kill and was the person who personally used a firearm pursuant to CALJIC

[No.] 17.19.[4]”
      Elie appeals the summary denial order.
                                 DISCUSSION
      When a court determines whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie
case for relief under section 1172.6, its review is “limited.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in

1. A direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing
another human being; and [¶] 2. The person committing the act harbored
express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully
another human being. [¶] In deciding whether or not such an act was done,
it is necessary to distinguish between mere preparation, on the one hand, and
the actual commencement of the doing of the criminal deed, on the other.
Mere preparation, which may consist of planning the killing or of devising,
obtaining or arranging the means for its commission, is not sufficient to
constitute an attempt. However, acts of a person who intends to kill another
person will constitute an attempt where those acts clearly indicate a certain,
unambiguous intent to kill. The acts must be an immediate step in the
present execution of the killing, the progress of which would be completed
unless interrupted by some circumstances not intended in the original
design.”

4       The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.19 as follows: “It is
alleged in Counts one, two, three, four and five that the defendant Chad Elie
personally used a firearm during the commission of the crimes charged. [¶]
If you find the defendant guilty of one or more of the crimes charged or an
attempt to commit the crimes charged, you must determine whether the
defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of those felonies.
. . . [¶] The term ‘personally used a firearm,’ as used in this instruction,
means that the defendant must have intentionally displayed a firearm in a
menacing manner, intentionally fired it, or intentionally struck or hit a
human being with it. [¶] The People have the burden of proving the truth of
this allegation. If you have a reasonable doubt that it is true, you must find
it to be not true.”
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habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations
as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A]
court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Ibid.) Further,
it must refrain from “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.) However, “the court may deny the
petition at the prima facie stage if the record of conviction discloses that the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” (People v. Berry-
Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 931.)
       “We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
      Section 1172.6 applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a) [“A
person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition”].) The court here did not
instruct the jury on this doctrine. Rather, it instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 8.66 that to convict Elie of attempted murder it was required to find the
“person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a
specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” It also instructed the
jury with CALJIC No. 17.19 that the “defendant must have intentionally
displayed a firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally fired it, or
intentionally struck or hit a human being with it.” The court instructed the
jury regarding aiding and abetting with CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01. But
“[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of attempted murder.”

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(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548; People v. Sanchez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 191, 196-197.) Elie failed to make a prima facie showing that he
was entitled to relief because the record of conviction demonstrates that he
was convicted of attempted murder either as an actual perpetrator or a direct
aider and abettor. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204.)
      Elie relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi) for his
claim the record of conviction does not “conclusively establish that [he]
harbored express or implied malice for attempted murder. Under the
instructions given, the jury might have convicted [him] of attempted murder
and found the firearm enhancement true as an aider and abettor.” In Langi,
the defendant was part of a group who accosted the victim with the purpose
of robbing him. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) The confrontation
ended in a fist fight, and the victim was killed by a blow to the head suffered
after he was punched by one member of the group. (Ibid.) The defendant
argued the jury could have found him guilty of aiding and abetting an
implied malice murder “if it found that (1) the killing resulted from the actual
killer’s intentional act; (2) [defendant] aided and abetted that intentional act;
and (3) the killer ‘deliberately performed [the act] with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life’—whether or not
[defendant] knew of or consciously disregarded the danger to human life.”
(Id. at p. 981; see also People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 714-715.)
The defendant argued “[t]he instructions thus permitted the jury to impute
malice to [him] based solely on his participation in a crime, without having to
find that he personally acted with malice.” (Langi, at p. 981.) The Court of
Appeal agreed and remanded to the trial court for a hearing on whether the
defendant could be convicted under the amended definition of murder. (Id. at
p. 984.)

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      “Assuming that aiding and abetting an implied malice murder can
involve the imputation of malice based on participation in a crime even when
no instructions have been given on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, Langi[, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972] does not apply because that case
involves implied malice.” (People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.)
Here, by contrast, as stated, under the instructions given, Elie was convicted
under an express malice theory. The court therefore did not err in denying
his resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.

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                               DISPOSITION
     The order denying Elie’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

                                                     O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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