Court Opinion

ID: 9687765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:47:30.473451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:31.635751
License: Public Domain

LUNDSTEN, J.
¶ 29. (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I join that part of the majority decision affirming the trial court's decision to deny Agnello's motion to suppress his confession. I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority decision remanding with directions that Agnello be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. It may be that Agnello deserves plea withdrawal, but the appropriate vehicle for determining that issue is a motion for plea withdrawal.
¶ 30. The majority first addresses the language used by the supreme court in 1999 when it vacated Agnello's original conviction. That language is as follows:
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals, vacate Agnello's conviction, and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new Goodchild hearing.
State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 182, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999).
¶ 31. Agnello argues that by vacating his conviction the supreme court was directing that, regardless whether the decision to deny suppression of his confession is reaffirmed on remand, Agnello's plea is deemed withdrawn and he is returned to the position he was in before he entered his guilty plea. That is, Agnello contends the supreme court was saying: Even if a new suppression hearing yields the same suppression result *280as the first flawed hearing, we return Agnello to his pre-plea hearing status. Agnello contends that this is a necessary interpretation of the language used above. He also contends that such an interpretation makes sense under the particular facts in this case.
¶ 32. I first address, as does the majority, whether the language used by the supreme court, when viewed in isolation, dictates that Agnello be restored to his pre-plea hearing status. Agnello interprets the language as meaning he is entitled to a new trial, regardless of the result of the new suppression hearing. The State interprets the language as meaning that, if Agnello's confession is found to be inadmissible on remand, he must be permitted to withdraw his plea, but if his confession is found to be admissible, the trial court may reinstate his conviction. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that case law assists in choosing between these two interpretations. Rather, the proper resolution lies in applying simple common sense.
¶ 33. First, I observe that the majority implicitly and correctly assumes that the phrase "vacate Agnello's conviction" is not the equivalent of "vacate Agnello's conviction and vacate his plea." If that were the case, the State's interpretation would not be reasonable.
¶ 34. Second, none of the cases identified by the parties or by the majority resolve the issue. In each of these cases, unlike the supreme court in Agnello, the court specified what should happen on remand if a suppression ruling was affirmed. See State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶ 49, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798 ("Jiles is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and to be granted a new and sufficient Miranda-Goodchild hearing. After this hearing, he is entitled to a trial if he so desires."); Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 564, 219 N.W.2d 363 (1974) (if, on remand, the trial court determines "the *281statement was made voluntarily by Upchurch, then the conviction should be reinstated. If the statement is found to be involuntary, then a new trial should be granted."); Renner v. State, 39 Wis. 2d 631, 639-40, 159 N.W.2d 618 (1968) (defendant's conviction was not vacated; trial court was directed to grant a new trial if the court determined that defendant's confession was involuntary); Bosket v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 586, 599-600, 143 N.W.2d 553 (1966) (same).
¶ 35. The majority focuses its attention on Jiles and finds it significant that Jiles, like this case, involves a conviction pursuant to a plea rather than a trial. The majority explains that Agnello and Jiles were similarly situated, and the majority "can discern no reason why the supreme court would treat such similarly situated parties differently." Majority at ¶ 27. Likewise, I can discern no reason why, in 1989, in the very same context (a faulty suppression proceeding and a plea), the supreme court treated a defendant differently than Jiles. The mandate in State v. Stevens, 217 Wis. 2d 369, 369-70, 577 N.W.2d 335 (1998), reads:
[T]he cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to conduct a new suppression hearing to determine ... whether the police officers executing the search warrant had a reasonable suspicion based upon the particular facts of this case that exigent circumstances existed to justify dispensing with the rule of announcement; if the evidence at the new suppression [hearing] satisfies the circuit court that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the no-knock entry accomplished in this case, the circuit court should reinstate the defendant's judgment of conviction.
Although neither Stevens, nor the court of appeals' decision in that same case, State v. Stevens, 213 Wis. 2d 324, 570 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1997), explains that *282Stevens pled guilty, we know that to be the situation because of the briefs before the supreme court in Stevens. See Letter Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 3, State v. Stevens, 213 Wis. 2d 324, 570 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1997) (No. 97-0758-CR) (available in Appendices and Briefs, 213 Wis. 2d 308-363, at tab 3).
¶ 36. Accordingly, the question in my mind is this: Why should the defendant in Jiles be entitled to a trial on remand, regardless of the outcome of a new suppression hearing, when the defendants in cases such as Stevens, Upchurch, Renner, and Bosket were not granted that remedy? I cannot answer that question. I certainly cannot conclude that, when Agnello was decided in 1999, the supreme court wanted to discard a well-established pattern and instead follow an approach in a case that would be decided four years later.
¶ 37. Finding no answer in supreme court decisions, I resort to an analysis of the context in which such dispositions are ordered by appellate courts. In the typical appellate case dealing with a challenge to an order denying a defendant's motion to suppress evidence, a decision by an appellate court affirming the circuit court's suppression ruling would, if remanded, put the defendant back in the same place he was in prior to entering his plea (or the same place for purposes of the trial held). For this reason, when appellate courts reverse and remand for a new suppression hearing, they frequently do not vacate the conviction, but instead direct that, if evidence is suppressed on remand, then the defendant must be afforded an opportunity for a new trial. E.g., Renner; Bosket. In other cases, appellate courts use an alternative approach that achieves the same result: they vacate the conviction, but direct reinstatement of the conviction if the suppression ruling is reaffirmed. E.g., Upchurch. Of course, *283both of these approaches make perfect sense because, absent some unusual circumstance, a decision on remand affirming an earlier suppression ruling validates the propriety of the proceedings in the circuit court, whether those proceedings resulted in either a plea or a conviction after a trial.
¶ 38. It follows that, absent some additional factor or express remand language to the contrary, when the supreme court or this court vacates a conviction and remands for a new suppression hearing, neither court intends that the defendant's plea be vacated if the original suppression ruling is reached a second time. To repeat, in the typical case, a circuit court decision on remand affirming an earlier suppression ruling validates the propriety of the original conviction.
¶ 39. Agnello argues that this is not the typical case. He contends there is an additional factor here that should persuade us that the supreme court intended that his plea be vacated, regardless the result of the new suppression hearing. Agnello writes:
When Mr. Agnello entered his guilty plea, he did so believing that if he exercised his right to a trial, the answers he gave at the first Goodchild hearing, in response to the improper questioning by the prosecutor about the underlying crime, would be admissible against him at trial. Now, as a result of this Court's decision that he should never have been ordered to answer such questions, they cannot be used against him at a trial because they were involuntarily compelled by the trial court's order.
I agree with part of Agnello's assertion. When combined with other case law, the supreme court's Agnello holding, that Agnello's suppression hearing testimony was involuntary, made clear something that was not clear before the decision: that there is a strong argument *284that Agnello's compelled suppression hearing testimony cannot be used against him at a trial. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (" 'any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law'" (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978))). The question remains, however, whether the supreme court had this changed circumstance in mind when it wrote its disposition language in Agnello. I agree with the trial court on this point. The trial court stated: "There is nothing in either the majority or the dissent [in Agnello] which makes me think that any thought was given to that issue at all. ..." A review of the briefs submitted to the supreme court supports this conclusion. Nothing in the briefs suggests that Agnello advised the supreme court that a ruling in his favor regarding his suppression hearing testimony was cause for plea withdrawal, regardless of the result of a new suppression hearing. That argument was first made when Agnello returned to the circuit court.
¶ 40. Agnello now argues that he entered his plea in part because of a mistaken assumption about the admissibility of his suppression hearing testimony. However, as the State points out, this is precisely the type of issue that plea withdrawal procedures are designed to address. Agnello could have, and perhaps still should, seek plea withdrawal.1 Acting on a plea withdrawal motion, the circuit court would have an opportunity to determine whether there is validity to *285Agnello's asserted misunderstanding and that he entered his plea because of the misunderstanding.
¶ 41. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the remand portion of the majority opinion. I would affirm the circuit court's order reinstating Agnello's conviction. If Agnello believes there are grounds for plea withdrawal, he should explore the possibility of bringing a plea withdrawal motion. I concur with the remainder of the opinion.

 Agnello denies in his reply brief that he is now arguing that "his plea was not knowing and voluntary." But, of course, that is exactly what he is arguing. Agnello contends he entered his plea acting under a mistaken understanding of the evidence that might be used against him at trial.