Court Opinion

ID: 9611645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:58:51.771667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:15.759118
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully with the majority opinion, and I write separately only to highlight the special concurrence’s mischaracterization of what actually occurred in the trial court. Contrary to what the special concurrence asserts, this is not a case where the availability of injunctive relief turned on “the trial court’s exercise of its sound discretion in balancing the procedural benefit and detriment to the respective parties.”3 Rather, the record shows that the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief turned on the resolution of legal issues — whether the actions complained of constituted a statutorily-defined nuisance, and whether those same actions violated the restrictive covenants as a matter of law. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court engaged in a traditional “balancing of the equities” before denying the injunction sought. Furthermore, the only issues raised and resolved on appeal are legal; appellant asserts no equitable issues.4 Consequently, this Court has no jurisdiction over this appeal.5

 Special concurrence at 619.

 See Beauchamp v. Knight, 261 Ga. 608, 609 (409 SE2d 208) (1991) (“[Wlhether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not. . . upon the kinds of relief which may have been sought by the complaint.”).

 See Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Prof. Assn., 263 Ga. 66 (428 SE2d 328) (1993).