Court Opinion

ID: 9757335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:33:42.883047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.266670
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Hoffman, my opinion, the lower court erred in refusing, after timely request by defense counsel, to order disclosure of the informer’s identity.
The Commonwealth produced only two witnesses to the alleged narcotics sale. Both were police officers who had not previously known the seller. One of the officers observed the transaction only from a distance. They testified that it was the informer who was personally acquainted with the seller and who introduced him to one of the officers. They testified further that it was the informer who made the actual purchase of *252narcotics. Although the informer was an immediate participant and an eyewitness to the entire transaction, he was not produced at trial, nor was his name revealed.
Defendant denied any knowledge of the transaction or of the informer’s identity.
In these circumstances, with the testimony of the officers and the defendant squarely in conflict, elementary fairness required that the defendant be given access to the testimony of the informer, through revelation of his identity. “Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro v. U. S., 353 U. S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
It is true that the informer in Roviaro was the sole participant, other than the accused, in the crime charged. That circumstance, however, was not essential to the decision requiring that his identity be revealed. The Court’s central concern was clearly that the informer “. . . was the only witness in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.” “[The informer] had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment. He might have thrown doubt upon petitioner’s identity. . . . The desirability of calling [him] as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the Government to decide.” Id. at 64.
The thrust of Roviaro, as later cases have observed, is that an informer’s identity must be disclosed whenever his relationship to the events in question is such as to render him a material witness on the issue of defendant’s guilt. Thus, in People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 808, 330 P. 2d 33, 36 (1958), Justice Traynor noted;
*253“Disclosure is uot limited to the informer who participates in the crime alleged. The information elicited from an informer may he ‘relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused or essential to a fair determination of a cause’ even though the informer was not a participant. For example, the testimony of an eyewitness-nonparticipant informer that would vindicate the innocence of the accused or lessen the risk of false testimony would obviously be relevant and helpful. . . . Thus, when it appears from the evidence that the informer is a material witness on the issue of guilt and the accused seeks disclosure on cross-examination, the People must either disclose his identity or incur a dismissal.”
Again, in Gilmore v. U. S., 256 F. 2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1958), the Court required the disclosure of an informer’s identity, even though he did not see the actual transfer of narcotics and heard only part of a critical conversation between defendant and the police officer who made the purchase.
“As [the informer] was a principal actor before and during this performance, who he was and what he knew was certainly material and relevant. In this testimony there might have been the seeds of innocence, of substantial doubt, or overwhelming corroboration. As the inferences from it covered the full spectrum from innocence to guilt, the process of truth-finding, which should be the aim of every trial, compelled its disclosure.”
In State v. Oliver (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, No. A-879-64, decided August 23, 1966), a conviction of bookmaking rested largely on testimony by a state trooper that he sat at a bar, in the company of an unnamed informer, and observed a number of persons place bets with the defendant. The Court set aside the conviction on the ground that the prosecution could not, in fairness, refuse to reveal *254the identity of an informer who was an eyewitness to the transactions, even though he did not participate in them.
The relevance of these decisions is clear. The Commonwealth, in this case, deliberately withheld the identity of the one man who could resolve the disputed issue of the identity of the narcotics seller. As an eyewitness and a participant, the informer’s testimony would have borne directly on the guilt or innocence of the accused. His name should not, therefore, have been concealed. Cf. Portomene v. U. S., 221 F. 2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955); People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354, 340 P. 2d 594 (1959); 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) §2374, p. 768.
The suggestion in the majority opinion that the defendant knew the informer’s identity, and hence was not prejudiced by its nondisclosure, is disingenuous. It assumes the very fact in issue—that the defendant was indeed present when the sale was made, and, therefore, must have known the man with whom he dealt. The circuity of such reasoning is apparent. Cf. People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 806, 330 P. 2d 33, 35 (1958).
I agree with the majority that the public interest would be served by preserving the anonymity of an informant who simply points to the suspected illegal activities of another. When, however, the informant’s role embraces observation of, and actual participation in, the particular acts of which the defendant stands accused, he becomes a material witness on the issue of guilt. In that event, the policy favoring nondisclosure must give way to the necessity of according a fair trial to the defendant. State v. Oliver, supra.
I would reverse.
Jacobs, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.