Court Opinion

ID: 9651656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:30:11.876717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:37.046758
License: Public Domain

ADKINS, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the result in this case and with virtually all the reasoning explaining that result. My only real quarrel with the majority is produced by its statement that a secretary may not sign the State’s Attorney’s name to a criminal information.
Of course, a secretary is not a person who is authorized by rule or by statute to sign his or her own name to a charging document. But if a facsimile signature of a person so authorized is sufficient, I do not see why it cannot be permissible for a secretary to sign the name of the authorized person as well.
Rule 4-202(b)’s requirement that an indictment or information “be signed by the State’s Attorney of a county or by *541any other person authorized by law to do so” is not imposed merely to assure that a proper signature is appended to a piece of paper. The ink marks that constitute the signature are not what is important. Those ink marks are intended to be symbolic of something more fundamental. They certify that an authorized person has reviewed the document and has found it to be correct in form and substantiated by facts, or at least that the person is willing to assume responsibility for so representing. This fundamental purpose is reflected in Rule l-311(b), which explains that a lawyer’s signature on a pleading verifies that “the attorney has read the pleading ...; that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for improper purpose or delay.” As the majority notes, a charging document is a pleading, Rule l-202(r), and thus is subject to Rule 1-311(b).
If a State’s Attorney, deputy State’s Attorney, or assistant State’s Attorney has read a charging document and concludes that the requirements of Rule l-311(b) have been met, the basic purposes of the rule — its screening and accountability functions — have been satisfied. Under these circumstances, I see no reason why the lawyer could not authorize his or her secretary to sign a charging document in the lawyer’s name after ascertaining that the document is in proper form and that the charges are appropriate, based on the evidence in the case. Of course, the same effect would be produced if the lawyer, having reviewed the document in light of Rule l-311(b), and having satisfied him or herself that its requirements were met, simply directed the secretary to affix the lawyer’s name via a rubber stamp facsimile of the signature. In a situation such as this, the State’s Attorney’s signature, written by the secretary, is the functional equivalent of the State’s Attorney’s facsimile signature and in no way offends the policy of either Rule *5421-311 or Rule 4-202(b).1
In In re Valita T., 75 Md.App. 156, 164, 540 A.2d 854, 858 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals held that a preprinted facsimile of the State’s Attorney’s signature did not violate the requirement of Rules 1-311 and 4-202(b) when the State’s Attorney “approved and adopted the pre-printed signature as his own legitimate signature.” There is no reason why that approval may not come before the signature is affixed, as the majority appears to recognize. See 80 C.J.S. Signatures § 6, at 1291 (1953) (“Generally, a signature may be made for a person by the hand of another, acting ... at his direction”) [footnotes omitted].
Of course, when a charging document has been signed in the manner I have suggested, a question may arise as to whether the secretary was in fact authorized to sign the State’s Attorney’s name. I suppose a similar question might arise if the secretary affixed a facsimile signature of the State’s Attorney. If that question should be raised, it would first be faced with the strong presumption, recognized by the majority, that public officers properly perform their duties. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 126, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965). Should that presumption be sufficiently rebutted, as it was in this case, the burden would then be upon the State to come forward with evidence to demonstrate the grant of authority to the secretary. Were the authority shown to the satisfaction of the court, the charging document would be sufficient; were it not shown, dismissal ordinarily would be required.2
It seems to me that this view of matters offends no policy of statute or of rule and produces a common sense and *543workable process that facilitates the proper handling of large numbers of documents that require authenticating signatures. I see no reason to restrict the signing requirement as narrowly as the majority has.

. The authority to sign the State’s Attorney’s name or to affix a facsimile signature could be express as to a specific document or could be pursuant to general office practice — e.g., a policy stating that all charging documents in the State’s Attorney's out basket have been reviewed by that official and that a secretary may affix the official’s signature (by facsimile or otherwise) to those documents.

. No evidence was presented in this case regarding the secretary’s authority to sign the name of the State’s Attorney.