Court Opinion

ID: 9390835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 18:00:58.335857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.501226
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                    FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   APR 28 2023
                                                                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARLVINE NKEMASONG                               No.   21-431
ASONGAKAP,
                                                 Agency No. A213-189-689
                  Petitioner,

     v.                                          MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                  Respondent.

                       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                           Board of Immigration Appeals

                         Argued and Submitted April 18, 2023
                              San Francisco, California

Before: VANDYKE and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL,** District
Judge.

          Petitioner Marlvine Nkemasong Asongakap seeks review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the decision of the Immigration

Judge (IJ) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
 The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the District of
**

Kansas, sitting by designation.

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Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252

and deny the petition.

      Where, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision but relies in part on the

immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted). We review

the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial

evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). To

overturn the agency’s factual findings, a petitioner must show that “any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (emphasis in

original) (quotation omitted)

      First, Asongakap argues that the agency ignored portions of the record.

Although it is true that the agency must consider the entire record, that “does not

mean that the [agency] must individually identify and discuss every piece of

evidence in the record.” Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 770 (9th Cir. 2022).

Instead, this court presumes that the agency reviewed the entire record and issued its

decisions accordingly. Id. at 771. That presumption can be overcome in some

circumstances, but Asongakap has not overcome it here. Sufficient indicia show that

the agency below considered the total record. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d

983, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the agency “adequately considered”

the record even though it “did not directly reference” certain evidence).

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      Second, the IJ denied asylum and withholding because it found that

Asongakap failed to establish a nexus between any past or feared harm and a

protected ground. The BIA affirmed on that same ground. For both claims, a

petitioner must prove a causal nexus between one of his statutorily protected

characteristics and either past harm or an objectively tenable fear of future harm.

See Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2021); Flores-Vega v. Barr,

932 F.3d 878, 887 (9th Cir. 2019). Asongakap does not show that agency lacked

substantial evidence for these determinations.

      The agency found that the Amba Boys harmed Asongakap for monetary

reasons and that the harm lacked a nexus to a protected ground. Asongakap argues

that the Amba Boys “could [have] seen” his violation of the “separatists’ lockdown

policy” as indicating a lack of support for their cause. But he does not provide

evidence compelling the conclusion that the Amba Boys had in fact imputed a

political opinion to him because of his violation, or that the Amba Boys harmed him

because of an imputed political opinion. Asongakap thus fails to show that the

agency’s finding lacked substantial evidence. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 482 (1992).

      The agency also found that the Cameroonian authorities detained and

interrogated Asongakap because they sought to investigate the Amba Boys.

Asongakap contends that this investigation was illegitimate and that, in addition to

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their investigative motivation, the authorities could have also been motivated by

Asongakap’s nationality and a political opinion they imputed to him. The only direct

evidence of the Cameroonian authorities’ motivation for detaining and questioning

Asongakap, however, supports the agency’s finding that the authorities were

motivated by their desire to investigate the kidnapping. And the remaining evidence,

regarding the conditions in Cameroon generally, does not compel any conclusion

about the particularized motivations of the officials involved in Asongakap’s

detention and interrogation. The record thus does not compel a different conclusion

than that reached by the agency: that the authorities’ motive was investigatory.

      Third, the agency found that Asongakap failed to show it was more likely than

not that he would suffer torture if he returned to Cameroon. Asongakap has not

shown that this finding lacked substantial evidence. “For CAT relief, the alien must

prove that it is ‘more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to

the proposed country.’” Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir.

2017) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). “All evidence relevant to the possibility of

future torture is to be considered, including,” inter alia, evidence of past torture and

evidence of human rights violations in the country of removal. Tzompantzi-Salazar,

32 F.4th at 704.

      Asongakap contends he suffered past torture when the Cameroonian

authorities harshly interrogated him. Although the Cameroonian authorities’ actions

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were reprehensible, the agency found that these acts did not amount to torture and

the evidence does not compel a different conclusion. See, e.g., Vitug v. Holder, 723

F.3d 1056, 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1188–89,

1201 (9th Cir. 2007). Nor does Asongakap’s other evidence compel the conclusion

that he will more likely than not suffer torture if returned to Cameroon. The country

conditions evidence indicates that the Cameroonian government oppresses

Anglophone citizens, but it does not show that Asongakap faces a particularized risk

of torture in Cameroon. See Tzompantzi-Salazar, 32 F.4th at 706–07 (concluding

“the evidence fails to show that Petitioner faces a particularized, ongoing risk of

future torture”); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). Nor

do the threats Asongakap’s relatives received against him from Cameroonian

authorities, the fact that the authorities know the address for one of his family’s

residences, or Asongakap’s contention that the Cameroonian authorities possess his

biometrics compel the conclusion that he will more likely than not suffer torture

upon his return to Cameroon.

      PETITION DENIED.

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