Court Opinion

ID: 9948153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 16:06:32.398923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:15.375830
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellant,

                                      v.

                              KEVIN TYSON,
                                Appellee.

                             No. 4D2023-1104

                              [March 6, 2024]

   Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Deborah Carpenter-Toye, Judge; L.T. Case No. 21-
016150MU10A.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Gordon Weekes, Public Defender, and Bernadette Guerra, Assistant
Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

   The state appeals an order granting defendant Kevin Tyson’s motion to
suppress in a misdemeanor DUI case. We reverse, holding that the
unrebutted testimony of the arresting officer, which the trial court found
to be credible, was sufficient to establish that the officer had reasonable
suspicion to detain the defendant to conduct a DUI investigation.

    Shortly before midnight, the arresting officer observed Tyson driving 73
miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone. After the officer activated his
lights and siren, he noticed Tyson’s car driving in the left lane, hitting the
right-side lane marker once, and then drifting “at least a couple of inches”
into the right lane.

   When the officer first encountered Tyson after the stop, he detected the
odor of an alcoholic beverage on his breath and noticed that his eyes were
red and glassy and his face was flushed. Tyson said he had drunk one or
two beers about four hours earlier.
   The officer believed Tyson was impaired based on the way he was
driving, the smell of alcohol on his breath, and his physical appearance
(red, watery eyes and a flushed face). The officer asked Tyson to step out
of his car and initiated a DUI investigation. Following the investigation,
the officer arrested Tyson for DUI and issued a citation for speeding.

    The trial court found the officer’s testimony to be credible but granted
Tyson’s motion to suppress, agreeing that the DUI investigation was
unlawful because the evidence did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion
of impairment.

   To detain a driver for a DUI investigation, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion that the driver’s normal faculties are impaired, not
only that he has consumed alcohol. See State v. Velasco, 368 So. 3d 997,
999–1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (citing § 316.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2022)).
Reasonable suspicion must be based on “a factual foundation in the
circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are
interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge and experience.” Id. at
1000 (quoting State v. Castaneda, 79 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)).
Whether a reasonable suspicion exists based on a given set of facts is a
question of law subject to de novo review. Allenbrand v. State, 283 So. 3d
969, 970 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019); Hill v. State, 51 So. 3d 649, 650 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2011).

   We have often held that an officer’s observations that a driver has been
speeding, has the smell of alcohol on his breath, and has bloodshot, watery
eyes are sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion to detain the driver
to conduct a DUI investigation. Velasco, 368 So. 3d at 1000; Castaneda,
79 So. 3d at 42; Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69, 71–72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005);
accord State v. Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d 339, 341–42 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Also,
we have recognized that the time of day can be a relevant factor in the
reasonable suspicion equation. See Baden v. State, 174 So. 3d 494, 497
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015); see also Velasco, 368 So. 3d at 998 (where driver was
pulled over around 1:00 a.m.); Castaneda, 79 So. 3d at 41 (same);
Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d at 340 (where driver was stopped around 4:00 a.m.).

   Tyson relies on Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), to
argue that speeding alone is not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of impairment. However, this case is distinguishable because it
involves a speeding violation absent from Hurd.

   In Hurd, an officer conducted a traffic stop after observing the driver
looking at the officer several times through his rearview mirror, repeatedly
speeding up and slowing down, and changing lanes without using his turn

                                      2
signal. Id. at 601–02, 603–04. A later search of the driver revealed drugs.
Id. at 602. The driver moved to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was
illegal because the officer lacked probable cause to believe a traffic
violation had occurred. See id. at 601–02. The trial court denied the
motion and the driver ultimately entered a plea to drug charges, reserving
the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Id. at 601.

    On direct appeal, we reversed the convictions and remanded with
instructions to grant the motion to suppress. Id. at 604. We held the
officer did not have probable cause to believe a traffic violation had
occurred because the driver’s changing lanes without using a turn signal
was done safely without endangering other vehicles. Id. at 603–04. We
recognized that the stop could have been justified absent probable cause
to believe a traffic violation had occurred if the officer had a reasonable
suspicion that the driver was impaired, but the evidence was insufficient
to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment. Id. at 604. The officer
saw the driver speeding up and slowing down, but the driver never
exceeded the speed limit, and the officer did not believe he was impaired.
Id.

   Tyson relies on the statement in Hurd that the driver’s speeding up and
slowing down did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment,
but that reliance is misplaced. The driver in Hurd never exceeded the
speed limit, while Tyson was driving 73 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-
hour zone. Although Tyson’s speeding alone might not have given rise to
a reasonable suspicion of impairment, the initial stop of his car was
justified because the officer had probable cause to believe that he had
committed a traffic violation. See Hurd, 958 So. 2d at 602. The officer’s
subsequent observations that Tyson smelled of alcohol and had red,
watery eyes and a flushed face—when combined with his speeding and the
fact that it was shortly before midnight—created a reasonable suspicion
that he was impaired. The officer had a legal basis for detaining him to
conduct a DUI investigation. See Velasco, 368 So. 3d at 1000; Baden, 174
So. 3d at 497; Castaneda, 79 So. 3d at 42; Origi, 912 So. 2d at 71–72.

   We reverse the order granting the motion to suppress and remand to
the county court for further proceedings.

   Reversed and remanded.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

                                     3
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                               4