Court Opinion

ID: 9541845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:59.742678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:59.838572
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice, Retired,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all of the opinion of the majority except that part which in my view offers no useful guidance to counsel. It is agreeable with me and proper that plaintiffs recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the appellate work of their counsel, to be fixed by this court, for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. My objection goes to the vagueness of “upon proper documentation.”
There is no useful evidence in the record of what should be a reasonable attorney’s fee for the professional work of defending an appeal by defendants and the forcing an appeal by plaintiffs to collect reasonable attorney’s fees as provided by contract. Nor are there available empirical studies made of what attorney’s fees are normal for handling an appeal, the going rate, so to speak, based on the considerations necessary in fixing a fee for legal services rendered.
This court has previously and in this case set a rule applying to district courts as to how they shall fix attorney’s fees. The determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees is a factual question to be decided upon evidence and facts in each individual case. Greenough v. Prairie Dog Ranch, Inc., Wyo., 531 P.2d 499 (1975), and authority there cited. Greenough sets out various factors to be considered in the determination of reasonable attorney’s fees. These are ability and quality of the attorney; the kind and complexity of the matter; the work actually performed and the manner in which it was done; and the result. Greenough also referred to the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association. Those rules have been adopted by this court as part of the Amended Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming Providing for the Organization and Government of the Wyoming State Bar, ÓR2-106, which sets out the following guides:
“(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
“(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
“(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
“(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
“(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
“(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
“(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
“(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.”
This court ought to be bound in the matter of fixing attorney’s fees by the same rule it imposes on district courts. I would have referred the matter to the district *868court for the taking of evidence relevant to the fixing of a fee for work done on this appeal by plaintiffs’ counsel and referring such evidence back to this court so that it has some sound basis to fix a fee.
This is particularly appropriate here because the case is going back to the district court for the purpose of fixing fees for trial work. The district court can at that time take evidence appropriate to the fixing of appellate fees consistent with the standards set out in Greenough and Rule OR2-106, and without recommendation refer such evidence to this court for its use in establishing the appellate fee.
While this may appear clumsy, this court has in practice refrained from itself taking evidence in that it is not designed or equipped to do so. Rule 20, W.R.A.P., provides:
“Whenever a cause over which the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction is pending therein, the court may direct any district judge of the state to conduct a hearing thereon at any county seat in the state. The judge conducting said hearing shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall forward the entire proceedings and record properly certified to this court for final determination in the cause.”
Since this court has decided it should fix the fee, there is some resemblance to an original proceeding. It must be conceded that the rule probably refers to such original proceedings as habeas corpus and prerogative writs requiring evidence for disposition, not otherwise available, but Rule 20, W.R.A.P., does disclose a policy.
This court’s experience in the past with statements of time and charges by counsel has been less than satisfactory. If this court requires “documentation,” it ought to state with some particularity what the term means.
I would refer the matter to the district court as indicated above.