Court Opinion

ID: 9684942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:19:02.977013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.221975
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
The appellee has filed a petition to rehear, based principally upon the proposition that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) confers continuing jurisdiction in the state that rendered the original decree so long as that state remains the residence of one of the contestants, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d). It should be noted, however, that section (d) contains two requirements for continuing jurisdiction:
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
Jurisdiction continues “as long as” the requirement of (c)(1) “continues to be met ...” Section (c)(1) provides:
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if—
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State.
Tennessee must continue to have jurisdiction under its own law, in order to maintain the status described in section (d) of the PKPA. We have concluded in the original opinion in this case, for reasons stated therein, that Tennessee has ceased to have *738jurisdiction under its own law. We adhere to that opinion.1
The appellee further insists that Tennessee should exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the emergency provisions of the PKPA. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(C). In order to invoke these provisions it is necessary to show that the child has been “subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” This Court reviews custody determinations de novo without the usual presumption of correctness, giving paramount consideration to the best interest of the child. Smith v. Smith, 188 Tenn. 430, 220 S.W.2d 627 (1949), Bevins v. Bevins, 53 Tenn.App. 403, 383 S.W.2d 780 (1964). We did not find that appellee made out a case for the application of emergency relief. The appellee has not directed any facts to our attention which were not considered in the original opinion.
The appellee also contends that the child has now resided in Tennessee for a sufficient period of time to confer jurisdiction even if this state had lost its original jurisdiction in the case. It is clear that the period during which a child has resided in this state pending resolution of a custody dispute may not be considered in reckoning the time necessary to establish “home state” jurisdiction.2
The effect of our ruling is that the original award of custody in the final decree of divorce is re-instated, and the petition for rehearing is respectfully denied. Costs of the petition to rehear are adjudged against the appellee.
NEARN, P.J., and CRAWFORD, J., concur.

. Appellee has cited Bohr v. Bahr, 442 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam.Ct.1981) and S. Frederick P. v. Barbara P., 115 Misc.2d 332, 454 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Fam.Ct.1982), which are apparently trial court rulings from the state of New York. That all trial courts do not agree with the rationale in these cases, however, see also Leslie L.F. v. Constance F„ 110 Misc.2d 86, 441 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Fam.Ct.1981) and Mebert v. Mebert, 111 Misc.2d 500, 444 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Fam.Ct.1981). In any event, these cases are not determinative of the question of continuing jurisdiction under Tennessee law.

. T.C.A. 36-1303 specifically sets the “commencement of the proceeding” as the controlling time for determining jurisdiction. Cf. Hegler v. Hegier, 383 So.2d 1134 (Fla.App.1980).