Court Opinion

ID: 9416492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:47:30.65593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:28.566825
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question to be decided in this case is, whether the ' court has jurisdiction.
The case is brought before us by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. It appears by the record, that the decision turned upon the title of Andrew Miller to the lands in question, under the treaties of 1817 and 1819, with the Cherokee nation. Andrew Miller was the head of an Indian family when the first treaty was made, and it was insisted at the trial that the title to this land was in his heirs, by virtue of the reservations contained in these treaties. The decision was against the validity of this title, and the question is, whether the plaintiffs in error claimed under it. If they did not, this court has no power to revise the judgment of the State court.
It was an action of ejectment. The plaintiffs in error were permitted by the court to appear as defendants. They were not the tenants in possession when the suit was brought. The process was served on other persons named in the proceedings, and the record does not show in what character, or upon what ground, the plaintiffs in error were permitted to appear and defend the suit.
Andrew Miller died in 1818, and the land in dispute was held for his children until 1822, when the State took possession of it, claiming title. The widow of Miller removed to the Cherokee nation,' in their new settlement on the west of the Mississippi, soon after his death, and the children followed her when the State took possession' of the land ; and they have all remained there ever since. . The right to this property appears to have been continually in dispute since the treaties above mentioned, and after the removal of Miller’s children the possession changed hands several times before this suit was brought.
The bill of exceptions states, that Henderson, one of the plaintiffs in error, got possession for the hens of Andrew Miller in 1837 or 1838, under which title it was held down to the commencement-of this suit. But it is not stated that he or Calloway had any authority from the heirs of Andrew Miller. *323On the contrary, it is expressly, stated that they set up no title in themselves, but relied for their defence on an outstanding title in the heirs of Andrew Miller.
Now, in the language of ejectment law, an outstanding title means a title in a third person, under which the tenant in possession does not claim. And as no one has a right to enter upon the land and eject the tenant but the person holding the legal title, if the tenant can show that the title was in a third person it defeats the action, although the tenant sets up no title in himself. This was the defence in the case before the court. If they had been in possession undér the heirs of Miller, as tenants holding under their authority, then the title of the heirs would have been the title of the tenants, and they could have defended their possession, by showing title in themselves derived from the heirs. For although the landlord may appear and defend on account of his own interest, yet his appearance is not necessary for the protection of the tenant. The tenant may show the title of the landlord, and his own right derived from him. And if the plaintiffs in error had made this defence, they would evidently have claimed a right to the possession under a treaty of the United States; and as the decision was against the right, this court would have jurisdiction, and-might reverse the judgment if they deemed it erroneous. But they claimed no right to the possession under this title. They set it up as a title in a third person, not to show a right in themselves, but that the lessor of the plaintiff had none, and therefore had no right to enter upon them. They might have been mere trespassers or intruders, without any authority- from the legal owner, and yet this defence would have been a good one, if the outstanding title was superior to that produced by the lessor of the -plaintiff.
The .right to make this defence is not derived from the treaties, nor from any authority exercised under the general, government. It is given by the laws of the State, which provide that the defendant in ejectment may set up titlé in a stranger in bar of the action. It is true, the titlé set up in this case was claimed under a treaty. But to give jurisdiction to this court, the party must claim the right for himself, and not for a third person in whose title he has no interest. The case in 5 Cranch, 344, Owings v. Norwood’s Lessee, is in point. And the same doctrine was reaffirmed in Montgomery v. Hernandez, 12 Wheat. 129 ; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Peters, 149; and Udell v. Davidson, 7 Howard, 769.
The heirs of Miller- appear to have no interest in this suit, nor can their rights be-affected by the decision. The judgment in this case is no obstacle to the assertion of their title in an*324other suit, brought by themselves or any person claiming a legal title under them. And in such a suit this court would have jurisdiction upon a writ, of error, whether the judgment was in a Circuit Court of the United States or in a State court.
But this writ of error- must be dismissed for want of- jurisdiction.