Court Opinion

ID: 9381761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 18:00:33.627761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.466780
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10443        Document: 00516686498             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                March 23, 2023
                                       No. 22-10443                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk

   B. S., B/N/F Justin S.; Meghan S.,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Waxahachie Independent School District; Derrick
   Young, Individually and in his Official Capacity; Mike
   Lewis, Individually and in his Official Capacity; City
   of Waxahachie,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:18-CV-2724

   Before Davis, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiffs-Appellants, B.S., by his next friends and parents, Justin S.
   and Meghan S., brought a state administrative complaint against the
   Waxahachie School District (“the School District”), alleging that the School
   District failed to provide B.S. with a free and appropriate public education

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10443     Document: 00516686498           Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                    No. 22-10443

   “FAPE,” as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
   (“IDEA”).
          Following a state administrative hearing, a Special Education Hearing
   Officer concluded that the School District had provided B.S. with a FAPE
   during his third-grade year. B.S. subsequently challenged the ruling in
   federal district court. He also brought an intentional discrimination claim
   against the City of Waxahachie and its officers, Derrick Young and Mike
   Lewis (collectively “the City”), under the Americans with Disabilities Act
   (“ADA”). The district court affirmed the hearing officer’s decision on cross
   motions for summary judgment and dismissed B.S.’s remaining claims. For
   the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
                            I.     BACKGROUND
          B.S. enrolled in the School District as a kindergartener in the Fall of
   2013. In October of that year, the School District administered a Full and
   Individual Evaluation (“FIE”) to determine whether B.S. had a disability as
   defined by the IDEA, and if so, whether he required special education
   services. Based on this evaluation, the School District certified that B.S.
   qualified for special education as a student with autism and a speech
   impairment. Throughout the following years, B.S. struggled with behavioral
   issues—particularly physical and verbal aggression—during the school day.
          This appeal arises from the 2016-2017 school year when B.S. was eight
   years old and in the third grade. Pursuant to B.S.’s 2015 Individual Education
   Plan (“IEP”), he began the year in a special education classroom with teacher
   Tracy Gooch for English, language arts, reading, science, social studies, and
   social skills. B.S. attended his math and “specials” classes (i.e., art, PE,
   music) in a general-education setting.
          B.S.’s mother testified at the due process hearing that B.S.’s “first
   month [of third grade] was good” in terms of his behavior, but that in

                                            2
Case: 22-10443         Document: 00516686498               Page: 3       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   September he began having behavioral incidents.                     These incidents are
   detailed in B.S.’s behavioral “choice sheets,” which were filled out by his
   special education teacher, Ms. Gooch, each day. B.S.’s choice sheets show
   that from August 22, 2016, through October 11, 2016, he engaged in nine
   documented behavioral incidents. 1 Two of those incidents rose to the level
   of requiring a disciplinary incident report. Because Ms. Gooch had to
   restrain B.S. during one of those incidents, the School District filled out a
   “Written Summary of Restraint Use” that was placed in his special
   education eligibility folder.
           On October 7, 2016, the School District completed its three-year
   reevaluation of B.S.’s FIE. The results from B.S.’s reevaluation show that
   he has a below-average IQ of seventy-seven and that his present levels of
   academic achievement were “below average.” A licensed specialist in school
   psychology noted in B.S.’s FIE that he continued “to demonstrate a profile
   of behavior consistent with a diagnosis of autism,” but “has made marked
   strides in behavior since the time of his initial autism evaluation.”
           On October 11, 2016, the School District held a meeting with a team
   of qualified professionals, known in Texas as an Admission, Review, and
   Dismissal Committee (“ARD Committee”), to review B.S.’s progress and
   update his IEP 2 for the 2016-2017 school year. Although B.S.’s parents are

           1
              Some of those behavioral incidents included: (1) spitting on another student;
   (2) failing to follow directions; (3) disrespecting students and staff and hitting a staff
   member; (4) running in the hallways and using “unkind” words; (5) trying to stab another
   student with a pencil, using foul language, slapping a student with a ruler, failing to follow
   directions, and hitting a teacher; (6) hitting students, and climbing fences; (6) using a loud
   voice to seek attention and running out of class.
           2
            An IEP is a “‘written statement’ that outlines how special education and related
   services will be delivered to . . . [a particular] child,” and is reviewed at least annually by
   the ARD Committee. Lisa M. v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).

                                                 3
Case: 22-10443         Document: 00516686498               Page: 4       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   members of the ARD Committee, 3 they were unable to attend the meeting
   and gave permission for the Committee to proceed without them.
           At the meeting, the ARD Committee enumerated ten annual goals for
   B.S. in English, language arts, reading, math, social studies, science, adaptive
   behavior, and speech therapy. In terms of B.S.’s academics, the ARD
   Committee decided to remove B.S. from general education math and instead
   place him in a “modified math” in a special education classroom with
   younger students. The ARD Committee also discussed concerns about
   B.S.’s behavior, noting that he had “some behavior challenges at times due
   to academic frustration.” Due to these concerns, the Committee included a
   behavior management accommodation in B.S.’s IEP with strategies to
   manage his behavior, including: taking frequent breaks and giving him the
   opportunity to walk/run outside with staff.                     However, because the
   Committee decided that B.S.’s behavior did not impede his own learning or
   that of others, it declined to implement a behavior intervention plan (“BIP”).
           After the ARD Committee meeting, B.S. began attending Lora
   Lockamy’s special education classroom with younger students each day for
   thirty minutes of reading and thirty minutes of math. Although B.S. had one
   disciplinary incident on November 3, 2016, he did not have any further
   disciplinary incident reports until February of 2017. 4

           3
            See Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F. (“Michael F.”),
   118 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an IEP is prepared “at a meeting attended
   by a qualified representative of the school district, a teacher, the child’s parents or
   guardians, and, when appropriate, the child himself”).
           4
             At oral argument, B.S.’s counsel cast doubt on the assertion that B.S. did not have
   any serious behavioral incidents between November and February by alleging that the
   School District failed to turn over B.S.’s behavioral choice sheets from November through
   December of 2016. However, the record on appeal contains B.S.’s choice sheets during
   this time period and they do not document any further behavioral incidents.

                                                 4
Case: 22-10443       Document: 00516686498         Page: 5   Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                    No. 22-10443

          The parties agree that B.S.’s behavior suddenly deteriorated in
   February of 2017. In February alone B.S. had five disciplinary incident
   reports.     For context, during this time period, B.S.’s medication was
   changed, his family, which now included a new baby, moved homes, and a
   new student joined Ms. Gooch’s classroom. Because of B.S.’s rise in
   behavioral incidents, on February 13, he began attending Ms. Lockamy’s
   kindergarten through second grade classroom for more of the day. On
   February 28, 2017, Lucy Walter, the School District’s diagnostician, initiated
   a “Behavioral Specialist Request” recommending that the School District
   conduct a Functional Behavioral Assessment (“FBA”) and implement a BIP
   for B.S.
          On March 3, 2017, B.S. had a meltdown. He became agitated and
   began throwing objects, pushing over desks, and hitting his teachers,
   resulting in the evacuation of his classroom. His special education teacher,
   Ms. Gooch, testified that given B.S.’s escalating behavior, she called 911
   because she believed it was “in the best interest of the staff members and
   students on campus.” The Waxahachie Police Department responded by
   dispatching officer Derrick Young to the school.
          When Officer Young entered the classroom, B.S. began running
   towards him and threw a chair at him. After catching the chair, Officer
   Young restrained B.S. by grabbing his arms and placing him on his stomach
   while Ms. Kazda, B.S.’s principal, held his head up to keep him from banging
   it on the ground. At the due process hearing, Officer Young testified that as
   soon as he walked into the classroom, he knew it was a “very unsafe”
   situation.

                                         5
Case: 22-10443        Document: 00516686498             Page: 6      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                         No. 22-10443

           Because Ms. Kazda and Officer Young were unable to deescalate
   B.S.’s behavior, 5 Officer Young called for a backup officer. When Officer
   Mike Lewis arrived, he informed B.S. that if he did not calm down, he would
   have to place B.S. in handcuffs for his own safety. After B.S. was still unable
   to calm down, Officer Lewis placed B.S. in handcuffs. Once he was in
   handcuffs, the officers were able to walk B.S. to the front office where his
   mother came to pick him up. B.S., his mother, Ms. Kazda, and the officers
   then debriefed on what happened and the conversation ended with B.S.
   shaking hands with one of the officers and hugging Ms. Kazda. B.S.’s mother
   additionally asked Ms. Kazda to schedule an ARD Committee meeting to
   address the incident.
           On March 6, 2017, the School District provided B.S.’s parents with a
   “Notice of Proposal to Evaluate” which included a request for additional
   behavioral accommodations (an FBA and a BIP) and a parent training
   evaluation, all of which required parental consent. B.S.’s parents never
   provided consent for these evaluations. On March 8, the School District sent
   B.S.’s parents a notice that an ARD Committee was scheduled for March 20.
           The following day, B.S.’s parents filed a request for an IDEA due
   process hearing, alleging that the School District failed to provide B.S. with
   a FAPE. For relief, B.S.’s complaint requested: (1) the School District
   provide     B.S.    an    Independent        Educational      Evaluation      (“IEE”);
   (2) reimbursement for services privately obtained by B.S.’s parents,
   including the costs of a hospitalization and counseling; (3) reimbursements
   for the costs of a summer program; (4) compensatory education services by

           5
            Officer Young attempted to deescalate the situation by asking B.S. what was going
   on, why he was angry, and what his mother’s name was. He also told B.S. to calm down
   and to use his words. In response, B.S. yelled that it was “none of [Officer Young’s]
   business” what his mother’s name was, and that Officer Young should “shut up.”

                                               6
Case: 22-10443      Document: 00516686498          Page: 7    Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                    No. 22-10443

   private tutoring; (5) counseling for B.S.; and (6) damages of an “uncertain
   nature.” The School District scheduled a meeting with B.S.’s parents to
   resolve their due process complaint, but his parents failed to attend. B.S.’s
   mother left the rescheduled resolution meeting because Ms. Gooch was
   unable to attend.
          On March 18, B.S.’s parents’ advocate cancelled the ARD Committee
   meeting scheduled for March 20. After the meeting was cancelled, Diane
   Chapell, the School District’s director of special education, instructed her
   team to develop a proposed amendment to B.S.’s IEP that would provide him
   with additional behavioral accommodations without waiting for a formal
   ARD Committee meeting. However, B.S.’s parents declined to sign the
   proposed IEP amendment.
          After the March 3 incident, B.S.’s mother kept him out of school for
   several weeks, partially due to B.S.’s eight-day stay at a behavioral hospital.
   When he returned to school, the School District moved B.S. into Ms.
   Lockamy’s room full time. On April 19, 2017, B.S. threw a telephone at
   Melissa McGuire, a behavioral specialist for the School District, and
   emergency services were called to treat her injuries. In light of this incident,
   the ARD Committee conducted a Manifestation Determination Review on
   May 1. The School District provided B.S.’s parents with notice of meeting
   via email and mail. The night before the meeting, B.S.’s parents’ advocate
   informed the School District that the parents would be unable to attend.
   After offering B.S.’s parents the option of participating by telephone or
   rescheduling, the School District proceeded with the Manifestation
   Determination Review meeting in “light of the serious nature of [B.S.’s]
   behavior.”
          At the meeting, the ARD Committee concluded that because a direct
   relationship between B.S.’s disability and his behavioral outbursts could not

                                          7
Case: 22-10443        Document: 00516686498             Page: 8      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                         No. 22-10443

   be “ruled out,” they would consider his behavior to be a manifestation of his
   disability. Accordingly, the Committee decided to implement additional
   behavioral supports in B.S.’s IEP, including the development of a BIP. The
   Committee sent the minutes from the meeting to B.S.’s parents and noted
   that if his parents did not consent to these changes, B.S.’s amended IEP could
   not be implemented until May 9.
           On May 2, 2017, B.S.’s teachers physically restrained him after he hit
   one teacher and threw a chair at another. At the time of this incident, B.S.’s
   revised IEP had not yet been implemented because the School District had
   not received consent from B.S.’s parents. After B.S.’s May 2 escalation, he
   did not have any further significant behavioral issues for the rest of the year.
   B.S.’s parents enrolled him in a new school district for the 2017-2018 school
   year.
           The hearing officer held the requested due process hearing on May 9-
   10, 2018. 6 The hearing officer found in favor of the School District and
   concluded that it had provided B.S. with a FAPE. On October 15, 2018, B.S.
   appealed the hearing officer’s decision in federal district court. He also sued
   the School District and Principal Kazda under the ADA, § 504 of the
   Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. B.S. also included claims under §
   1983 and the ADA against the City.
           On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court affirmed
   the hearing officer’s decision that the School District provided B.S. with a
   FAPE. The district court also granted motions to dismiss B.S.’s remaining
   claims. B.S. timely appealed the district court’s order granting summary

           6
             20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(A) (“Whenever a complaint has been received, . . . the
   parents or the local education agency involved in such complaint shall have an opportunity
   for an impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational
   agency or by the local education agency . . . .”).

                                               8
Case: 22-10443           Document: 00516686498              Page: 9       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                            No. 22-10443

   judgment to the School District on his IDEA claim and its dismissal of his
   ADA claim against the City.
                            II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
           As it pertains to B.S.’s IDEA claim, we review a district court’s
   determination as to whether a school district has provided a FAPE as a mixed
   question of law and fact. 7 The district court’s legal conclusions are reviewed
   de novo, while its findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. 8 We review de
   novo mixed questions of law and fact, such as the “district court’s decision
   that a local school district’s IEP was or was not appropriate.” 9 However, the
   district court’s finding that a student obtained an educational benefit from
   the school’s special education services is a finding of underlying fact
   reviewed for clear error. 10 Because the IDEA “‘creates a presumption in
   favor of a school system’s education plan,’ the burden of proof rests on the
   party challenging the plan.” 11
           Under the IDEA, the district court’s review of the state hearing
   officer’s decision is “virtually de novo.” 12 Although the district court must
   give “due weight” to the hearing officer’s findings, the court must ultimately

           7
            Klein v. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hovem, 690 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Teague
   Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993)).
           8
            R.S. ex rel. Ruth B. v. Highland Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir.
   2020) (per curiam).
           9
              E.R. ex rel. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 766 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           10
                R.S., 951 F.3d at 328 (quoting Klein, 690 F.3d at 395).
           11
            H.W. ex rel. Jennie W. v. Comal Indep. Sch. Dist., 32 F.4th 454, 462 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (quoting White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 377 (5th Cir. 2003)).
           12
             Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 328 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir.
   2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                   9
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498                  Page: 10    Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                                No. 22-10443

   “arrive at its own independent decision based on the preponderance of the
   evidence.” 13 However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should
   not “substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the
   school authorities which they review.” 14 Finally, under this standard, the
   district court should award “greater deference” to the hearing officer’s
   credibility determinations based on live testimony. 15
           As it pertains to B.S.’s ADA claim, we review the grant of a motion to
   dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. 16 “To
   survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
   matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
   face.” 17
                                         III.    DISCUSSION
           A.         The IDEA Claim
           We begin with a brief background on the IDEA. The IDEA “offers
   States federal funds to assist in educating children with disabilities” in
   exchange for the State’s compliance “with a number of statutory
   conditions,” including the requirement to provide a FAPE to qualifying
   children with disabilities. 18 “The primary vehicle” 19 for ensuring that a

           13
                R.S., 951 F.3d at 328.
           14
              Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 404
   (2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           15
                Lisa M., 924 F.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           16
                Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Off., 530 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2008).
           17
                Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).
           18
                Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 390 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)).
           19
                Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).

                                                    10
Case: 22-10443             Document: 00516686498              Page: 11   Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                               No. 22-10443

   disabled student receives a FAPE is the creation and implementation of an
   IEP, which ensures that students receive special education and related
   services that are “tailored to the[ir] unique needs.” 20
           The IDEA includes both procedural and substantive requirements.
   As relevant here, a school district may violate the IDEA by implementing an
   IEP that is not “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
   educational benefits.” 21 To evaluate whether a student’s IEP is substantively
   adequate, this Court employs a four-factor test set forth in Michael F. These
   factors include whether “(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the
   student’s assessment and performance; (2) the program is administered in
   the least restrictive environment; (3) the services are provided in a
   coordinated and collaborative manner by the key ‘stakeholders;’ and
   (4) positive academic and non-academic benefits are demonstrated.” 22
           On appeal, B.S. argues that the district court erred in concluding that
   the School District complied with the substantive requirements of the IDEA.
   The thrust of B.S.’s argument is that his 2016 IEP was not reasonably
   calculated to provide him with educational benefits because it did not
   adequately address his behavioral issues. We review B.S.’s arguments in the
   course of evaluating whether his IEP satisfies the four Michael F. factors.
                      1.      Individualization
           B.S. contends that his 2016 IEP was not properly individualized
   because the ARD Committee did not fully consider the severity of his
   behavioral issues in the Fall of 2016. As a result, B.S. argues that the

           20
             Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391 (quoting Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch.
   Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181 (1982)).
           21
                Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201.
           22
                Michael F., 118 F.3d at 253.

                                                    11
Case: 22-10443       Document: 00516686498             Page: 12      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                        No. 22-10443

   Committee failed to perform an FBA or implement a BIP early enough to
   address his behavioral issues.
           As it pertains to B.S.’s argument that the ARD Committee was
   unaware of the full extent of his behavioral issues, B.S. points to Ms. Kazda’s
   testimony that she knew of one behavioral incident at the time of the ARD
   Committee meeting 23 and Ms. Gooch’s testimony that she did not reference
   B.S.’s restraint forms in developing his present levels of academic
   achievement and functional performance (“PLAAFP”). 24 However, B.S.’s
   IEP, as well as other record evidence, support the district court’s finding that
   the ARD Committee considered the full extent of B.S.’s behavior in
   developing his 2016 IEP.
           Ms. Kazda’s testimony that she was only aware of one behavioral
   incident in the Fall of 2016 does not mean that the full ARD Committee
   lacked awareness of the extent of B.S.’s behavioral issues. B.S.’s special
   education teacher, Ms. Gooch, also attended the ARD Committee meeting
   and was unquestionably aware of B.S.’s behavior, including his restraint
   referrals. 25 In fact, Ms. Gooch was able to use her first-hand observations of
   B.S.’s behavior in recommending the new behavioral goals adopted in the
   2016 IEP. Additionally, Ms. Chapell, the School District’s director of special
   education, testified that after reviewing B.S.’s 2016 PLAAFP statements and
   goals, she believed that the ARD Committee was fully aware of B.S.’s

           23
             Ms. Kazda testified that B.S. only had “one incident in September where he had
   a hard day.” However, on cross-examination, Ms. Kazda acknowledged that B.S. had more
   than one behavioral incident in September.
           24
             Ms. Gooch testified that in listing the data sources that were reviewed in
   developing B.S.’s PLAAFP, his September 28 restraint form was not listed.
           25
              Ms. Gooch testified that she included her “observations from the disciplinary
   incidents on September 28th and September 29th” in B.S.’s PLAAFP.

                                             12
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498             Page: 13      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   behavior. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the
   record supported the conclusion that the ARD Committee was aware of
   B.S.’s behavior in the Fall of 2016.
           Second, B.S. contends that his IEP was not individualized because it
   contained “virtually no behavioral support” and was created without the aid
   of an FBA or the implementation of a BIP. The IDEA requires a school
   district to “consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and
   supports, and other strategies” when a child’s behavior impedes the child’s
   own learning or that of others. 26 Courts have held that a school district
   satisfies this requirement, even in the absence of an FBA, in cases where a
   student’s IEP “adequately identifies a student’s behavioral impediments and
   implements strategies to address that behavior.” 27
           Here, B.S.’s 2016 IEP contained adequate accommodations to
   address his behavioral problems.              Specifically, his IEP set forth two
   behavioral goals that required him to work towards: (1) walking in the hallway
   with his hands not touching the walls and (2) not displaying negative behavior
   such as “kicking, hitting, running, throwing objects, or refusing to work to
   seek peer attention instead, [and] when prompted, talk with a staff member,
   take a break, or use a cool down place.” Further, as noted above, B.S.’s IEP
   included strategies to manage his behavior, and B.S.’s teachers testified that

           26
                20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
           27
              M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2013); see
   also Ruffin v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 459 F. App’x 358, 361 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that her daughter’s IEP was not individualized
   because the school failed to conduct an FBA given that the student’s IEP “contained
   accommodations to address . . . [the student’s] behavioral problems,” including “a
   behavioral support plan and educational goals tailored to meet” her needs). Although
   Ruffin and other unpublished opinions cited herein are “not controlling precedent” except
   in limited circumstances, they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d
   391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).

                                                13
Case: 22-10443        Document: 00516686498                Page: 14        Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   those strategies were helping him. 28 Accordingly, the district court did not
   error in concluding that the School District’s accommodations and
   behavioral goals set forth in B.S.’s IEP constituted a sufficiently good faith
   effort to help him achieve his educational goals in light of his behavioral
   issues. 29
           With respect to his argument about the need for an FBA and a BIP,
   B.S. relies on the testimony of Dr. Adiaha Spinks-Franklin and his mother,
   as well as the fact that his behavior escalated in February of 2017. Plaintiffs’
   expert, Dr. Spinks-Franklin, testified that she would have recommended an
   FBA and a BIP in the Fall of 2016. Dr. Spinks-Franklin based her testimony
   on B.S.’s records from the School District and her conversation with B.S.’s
   mother, but she never met with B.S. or any of his teachers. B.S.’s mother
   testified that she did not believe B.S.’s 2016 IEP sufficiently addressed his
   behavioral issues. However, aside from testifying generally that additional
   “behavior support” and “interventions” were necessary, B.S.’s mother
   offered no specifics about what the School District should have done
   differently.
           The hearing officer heard testimony that contradicts B.S.’s assertion
   that he needed an FBA and a BIP in the Fall of 2016. B.S.’s special education
   teachers, Ms. Lockamy and Ms. Gooch, both testified that B.S. did not need

           28
               For example, Ms. Gooch testified that in the Fall of 2016, B.S. got to the point
   where “he could actually verbalize the calming strategy that he needed,” such as asking
   staff to go for a walk or get a drink, and that he was unable to do that at the beginning of the
   year. Similarly, Ms. Chapell testified that the behavioral supports in place in B.S.’s 2016
   IEP were “fairly effective.” Although she conceded that the program “wasn’t perfect be-
   cause he continued to have some difficulties,” she noted that is “pretty normal.” .
           29
             H.W., 32 F.4th at 470 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the school district
   “should have exercised other options to dispel any behavioral issues” on the grounds that
   “our review of an IEP must be limited to whether the IEP is reasonable, not ideal”).

                                                 14
Case: 22-10443        Document: 00516686498                Page: 15        Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   an FBA or a BIP prior to February of 2017. 30 Ms. Edmondson, the School
   District’s behavior specialist and B.S.’s first-grade teacher, testified to the
   same. 31 In light of the above testimony, the district court found that the
   hearing officer was entitled to credit the testimony of B.S.’s teachers over the
   testimony of his mother and Dr. Spinks-Franklin.
           In reviewing the record, we find that the district court sensibly
   followed the hearing officer’s reliance on the testimony from B.S.’s teachers,
   who interacted with him on a daily basis, in concluding that B.S.’s behavior
   was being adequately managed without an FBA and a BIP until February of
   2017. 32 In light of the deference we afford to hearing officers’ credibility
   determinations based on live testimony, 33 we agree with the district court’s

           30
             Ms. Gooch testified that she agreed with the ARD Committee’s determination
   in October of 2016 that B.S. did not need a BIP. Ms. Lockamy testified that prior to
   February 27 she did not see a need to refer B.S. for an FBA or a BIP and that she “hadn’t
   seen any major aggressive behaviors from B.S.” in the Fall.
           31
             Ms. Edmondson, who has a master’s degree in autism, testified that during the
   Fall semester she did not see a need for any changes to B.S.’s IEP, and that in her opinion
   an FBA or a BIP was not necessary for B.S. prior to the incidents occurring in February.
           32
              See Michael F., 118 F.3d at 255 (finding that “the testimony . . . [of] individuals
   who had direct and frequent contact with Michael . . . provides substantial support for the
   district court’s determination that the October 4, 1993 IEP was reasonably calculated to,
   and in fact did, produce meaningful educational benefits”).
           33
              Lisa M., 924 F.3d at 218 (noting that the district court should award “greater
   deference” to the hearing officers’ credibility determinations based on live testimony);
   Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 889 (9th Cir. 2001)
   (noting that in light of “[t]raditional notions of the deference owed to a fact finder,” a state
   hearing officer “who receives live testimony is in the best position to determine issues of
   credibility”); P.P. v. Nw. Indep. Sch. Dist., 839 F. App’x 848, 858 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (“The hearing officer’s reliance on testimony from P.P.’s teachers,
   as opposed to testimony from P.P., reflects an implicit credibility determination that is
   owed deference.” (citing Lisa M., 924 F.3d at 218)).

                                                 15
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498               Page: 16        Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                             No. 22-10443

   conclusion that an FBA and a BIP were not necessary in the Fall of 2016 to
   ensure that B.S.’s IEP was sufficiently individualized.
           Finally, the fact that B.S.’s behavior escalated in February of 2017 by
   itself is not conclusive evidence that his 2016 IEP was not sufficiently
   individualized. An IEP need not be “perfect” nor “insulate a child from
   experiencing hardships” in order to comply with the IDEA. 34 Instead, the
   IDEA only guarantees a child a “basic floor” of opportunity that meets a
   child’s “unique needs” with “services that will permit him to benefit from
   the instruction.” 35 Here, that is exactly what B.S.’s 2016 IEP provided.
           B.S.’s teachers testified that they were generally able to manage his
   behavior under the 2016 IEP 36 and when that changed in February of 2017
   the School District responded by: (1) requesting consent for an FBA and a
   BIP, (2) scheduling an ARD Committee meeting, and (3) altering B.S.’s
   educational setting. This type of responsiveness to changes in a student’s
   behavior is what the IDEA requires to ensure that an IEP is sufficiently
   individualized. 37 Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the
   first Michael F. factor weighs in favor of the School District.

           34
                A.A. v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 678, 691 (5th Cir. 2020).
           35
             R.H. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 607 F.3d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
           36
              M.M. v. Dist. 0001 Lancaster Cnty. Sch., 702 F.3d 479, 487 (8th Cir. 2012) (“It is
   ‘largely irrelevant’ if the school district could have employed ‘more positive behavioral
   interventions’ as long as it made a ‘good faith effort’ to help the student achieve the
   educational goals outlined in his IEP.” (quoting CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d
   630, 639 (8th Cir. 2003)).
           37
               See H.W., 32 F.4th at 465 (finding the student’s IEP was “undoubtedly
   individualized” because the ARD Committee “showed that it was vigilant in its evaluation,
   observation, and assessment of H.W. and that it routinely updated H.W.’s IEP to reflect
   its individualized findings”); R.S., 951 F.3d at 332 (noting that each time the student fell
   the school district “implemented new measures that were intended to prevent the fall from

                                                   16
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498               Page: 17       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                            No. 22-10443

                      2.      Least Restrictive Environment
           Under the IDEA, a school must offer special education classes in the
   “least restrictive environment” appropriate for a child’s needs. “Although
   the IDEA contains a preference for mainstreaming children, that preference
   is not absolute.” 38 A school district does not run afoul of the IDEA’s
   preference for mainstreaming in cases where a student cannot be educated
   “satisfactorily in the regular education classroom.” 39
           B.S. contends that his 2016 IEP violated the least restrictive
   environment requirement by removing him from general education math and
   placing him in a classroom with younger students. The district court rejected
   this assertion, finding that there were valid reasons supporting the School
   District’s decision to move B.S. out of general education math. We agree.
           There is substantial support in the record, including testimony from
   B.S.’s teachers, 40 to support the district court’s finding. Notably, B.S.’s
   2016 IEP states that his “present level of educational performance” is
   significantly below his grade placement, and that his IEP could not be
   implemented in the general education setting “without eliminating essential
   components of the general curriculum.” In situations like this, we have
   refused to require general education teachers to “modify the[ir] curriculum

   reoccurring” and that although “these measures were not 100% successful does not
   establish that . . . [the student’s] IEP was not reasonably calculated to allow him to learn”).
           38
              E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 771 (5th Cir.
   2018) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)).
           39
                Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir. 1989).
           40
               B.S.’s special education teacher, Ms. Gooch, testified that general education
   math was causing B.S. frustration. Ms. Lockamy, B.S.’s other special education teacher,
   also testified that B.S. did better with the younger group of students because he “felt like a
   leader and a role model.” .

                                                  17
Case: 22-10443           Document: 00516686498           Page: 18       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                         No. 22-10443

   beyond recognition . . . in the name of mainstreaming.” 41 Such a requirement
   would be “unfair to the rest of the class” because although “regular
   education instructors must devote extra attention to their [disabled]
   students, we will not require them to do so at the expense of their entire
   class.” 42
           Additionally, the School District took steps to ensure that B.S. had as
   much access as possible to his general education peers. B.S. continued to
   attend “specials” in a general education setting and his placement in Ms.
   Lockamy’s classroom with younger students allowed him to work on his own
   goals while being in a class with other students. We therefore find that the
   district court correctly held that the second Michael F. factor weighed in favor
   of the School District.
                      3.       Collaboration
           B.S. asserts that there was no coordinated response by the School
   District to address his behavioral issues. As evidence of this alleged lack of
   coordination, B.S. contends that his IEP goals were not shared with Ms.
   Lockamy and that Ms. Gooch kept the severity of his behavior to herself. The
   district court rejected these assertions and found that there were “many
   examples in the record of key stakeholders for [the School District] in this
   case coordinating and collaborating.”
           B.S.’s assertions about a lack of coordination are not supported by the
   record.       First, Ms. Lockamy’s testimony at the due process hearing

           41
              See Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050 (finding that the school district’s decision to
   remove a student from the general education classroom did not violate the IDEA because
   the student’s disability “slowed his development so that he is not yet ready to learn the
   developmental skills offered in Pre-kindergarten” and therefore his teacher “would have
   to alter 90 to 100 percent of the curriculum to tailor it to” the student’s needs).
           42
                Id. at 1051.

                                               18
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498              Page: 19         Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                            No. 22-10443

   contradicts B.S.’s assertion that she did not have access to his IEP. 43 Ms.
   Lockamy testified that she had access to B.S.’s goals “on the system” and
   that she had “long conversations” about his goals with Ms. Gooch. Second,
   Ms. Gooch testified that although she did not specifically relay her concerns
   over B.S.’s behavior to other school personnel in February of 2017, she did
   ensure to document his behavior and that these documents were available to
   others. The district court did not clearly err in finding that B.S.’s IEP was
   created and implemented in a coordinated manner by key stakeholders.
   Accordingly, the third Michael F. factor also weighs in favor of the School
   District.
                      4.      Demonstrated Benefits
           The last Michael F. factor asks whether B.S. demonstrated positive
   academic and non-academic benefits under his IEP.                         This Court has
   emphasized that “evidence of an academic benefit militates in favor of a
   finding that an IEP is appropriate.” 44
           The district court agreed with the hearing officer that B.S. was making
   appropriate progress under the circumstances, and that the benefits he
   received from his IEP were meaningful. The court noted that B.S.’s teachers
   testified in detail about B.S.’s “steady progress, albeit slow progress.” 45

           43
              At the hearing, Ms. Lockamy testified that when B.S. came to her in October for
   reading and math, she only had B.S.’s IEP goals that related to those subjects, but that when
   he began coming to her classroom more in February of 2017, she received a hard copy of all
   of his IEP goals.
           44
                Klein, 690 F.3d at 399 (citing Adam J., 328 F.3d at 810).
           45
             For example, Ms. Lockamy testified that during the year B.S. “moved from very,
   very beginning kindergarten reading level to almost an end-of-the-year kindergarten
   reading level.” She also testified that B.S. improved in the following areas: reading
   comprehension, spelling, social skills instruction, and math skills. This conclusion is

                                                  19
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498              Page: 20        Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                           No. 22-10443

   Further, Ms. Lockamy described in depth B.S.’s academic improvement by
   comparing his test scores from the beginning and the end of his third-grade
   year.
           B.S. discounts the district court’s findings of progress as de minimus
   because his progress was below what is expected of his grade level. However,
   “[w]hether advancement is so trivial or minor as to qualify as de minimis must
   be evaluated in light of the child’s circumstances, and a court may determine
   that aiming for small amounts of progress is appropriately ambitious given a
   child’s unique needs.” 46 The district court therefore correctly relied on
   B.S.’s teachers’ testimony, as well as the results of B.S.’s testing, to conclude
   that he was making sufficient progress in light of his circumstances. 47
           As far as non-academic benefits, the district court also found that B.S.
   made progress on his behavioral goals to walk in the hallway without touching
   the wall and being able to verbalize calming strategies. While it is undisputed
   that B.S. continued to struggle with behavioral issues in the Spring of 2017,
   we again reiterate that an IEP must simply “aim to enable the child to make
   progress,” and that the “standard is not perfection.” 48 In short, the IDEA

   further supported by Ms. Carroll’s testimony that B.S.’s achievement scores in third grade
   were “consistent” with his cognitive ability.”
           46
                R.S., 951 F.3d at 337.
           47
              See id. at 336-37 (finding that plaintiff’s IEP provided sufficient academic benefits
   after thoroughly reviewing his academic record and finding that although he “did not
   display significant progress” in some areas, he displayed progress in other areas, as shown
   by comparisons between his FIE scores administered three years apart).
           48
              E.R. ex rel. E.R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d 754, 769 (5th Cir.
   2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                 20
Case: 22-10443       Document: 00516686498             Page: 21      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                        No. 22-10443

   does not entitle B.S. to an IEP that remediates his behavioral problems in
   every instance. 49
           Furthermore, despite B.S.’s behavioral problems, there is support for
   the district court’s finding that B.S. received at least some non-academic
   benefit from his IEP. In addition to making progress on his behavioral goals,
   B.S. had no significant behavioral issues from November through February, 50
   and after his IEP was amended in May, he was able to finish the school year
   without any further problems. Also, in B.S.’s 2016 FIE, the LSSP noted that
   he had “made marked strides in behavior since the time of his initial autism
   evaluation.” Therefore, we find that the district court did not clearly error
   in finding that B.S. achieved at least some academic and nonacademic
   benefits as a result of his IEP.
           In sum, this case is very fact specific given that the issues raised by
   B.S. on appeal mostly require our review of credibility determinations made
   by the hearing officer. After careful review of the record, we conclude that
   those findings, credited by the district court, generally control the outcome
   of this case. Accordingly, because all four Michael F. factors weigh in favor
   of the School District we affirm the district court’s order dismissing B.S.’s
   IDEA claim.
           B.      The ADA Claim
           Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a
   disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in

           49
              See Klein, 690 F.3d at 397-88 (explaining that the IDEA’s “ultimate statutory
   goal” is “educational benefit, not solely disability remediation”).
           50
              Ms. Edmondson testified that B.S.’s Fall semester was “fairly smooth” despite
   his “few behavior incidences” at the end of September. She also testified that after B.S.
   returned after Christmas “he was doing really great” and that his teachers had “smooth
   sailing until February.”

                                              21
Case: 22-10443           Document: 00516686498                Page: 22       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                             No. 22-10443

   or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
   entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 51 In addition to
   prohibiting disability-based discrimination, the ADA also “impose[s] upon
   public entities an affirmative obligation to make reasonable accommodations
   for disabled individuals.” 52
           To recover compensatory damages for a violation of Title II, B.S. must
   show “that the discrimination was intentional.” 53 Although this Court has
   not “delineate[d] the precise contours” 54 of the intentionality standard, we
   have required “something more than ‘deliberate indifference.’” 55                          In
   determining what conduct rises to this level, we have emphasized that a
   “critical component of a Title II claim for failure to accommodate . . . is proof
   that ‘the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the
   [entity providing public services.]’” 56 In short, “intentional discrimination
   requires at least actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” 57
           The burden falls on the plaintiff “to specifically identify the disability
   and resulting limitations,” and to request the necessary accommodation. 58

           51
                42 U.S.C. § 12132.
           52
             Bennett-Nelson v. La Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Jin
   Choi v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at San Antonio, 633 F. App’x 214, 215 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (per curiam) (unpublished); Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015).
           53
              Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir.
   2018) (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           54
                Id. at 575.
           55
                Id. (quoting Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 575).
           56
            Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jin Choi,
   633 F. App’x at 215).
           57
             Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Cadena v. El Paso
   Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020)).
           58
                Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).

                                                   22
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498              Page: 23    Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                          No. 22-10443

   However, if a plaintiff fails to request an accommodation, “he can prevail
   only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary
   reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the
   entity’s relevant agents.” 59 We have described this latter method as a
   “narrow exception.” 60
          B.S. alleges that the police officers who responded to Ms. Gooch’s 911
   call intentionally discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his
   disabilities of autism and a speech impairment. It is undisputed that B.S.
   never asked the officers for an accommodation. Thus, in order to survive a
   motion to dismiss, B.S. must plausibly allege that his disabilities and resulting
   limitations, as well as the reasonable accommodations, were open and
   obvious to the officers. The district court found that even assuming B.S.’s
   disabilities were open and obvious, B.S. did not allege that the limitations
   resulting from his disabilities and the required reasonable accommodations
   were open, obvious, and apparent.
          Assuming arguendo that B.S.’s disabilities were open and obvious, we
   agree with the district court that B.S. failed to plausibly allege that the
   limitations       from    his    disabilities     and    the   necessary   reasonable
   accommodations were open, obvious, and apparent to the officers.
   Regardless of whether Officer Young knew B.S. had a disability after asking
   Ms. Kazda if B.S. “was diagnosed,” 61 “knowledge of a disability is different

          59
               Windham, 875 F.3d at 237 (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164).
          60
               Id. at 239.
          61
             B.S. alleges that Officer Young knew he had a disability because he asked Ms.
   Kazda “if he [was] diagnosed?” Ms. Kazda did not respond.

                                                23
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498              Page: 24     Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                            No. 22-10443

   from knowledge of the resulting limitation” and “it certainly is different from
   knowledge of the necessary accommodation.” 62
           B.S.’s complaint is completely devoid of any allegation that the
   officers understood what they needed to do to accommodate B.S. and instead
   relies on conclusory assertions that the officers failed to take “reasonable
   actions.” What exactly these “reasonable action[s]” would have included is
   never spelled out, 63 which further undermines B.S.’s contention that the
   appropriate accommodations that would keep both himself and others safe
   were open and obvious to the officers in the moment.
           The facts alleged in B.S.’s complaint, confirmed by the officers’ body
   camera footage, 64 strongly support the district court’s finding. Unlike in
   Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, 65 relied on by B.S., his conduct did not make it
   obvious that he had autism or that he was unable to comprehend the
   situation. 66 To the contrary, B.S. provided coherent, albeit uncooperative,

           62
                Windham, 875 F.3d at 238.
           63
              At oral argument, counsel for B.S. was unable to definitively explain what
   additional actions the officers could have reasonably taken.
           64
               In considering a motion to dismiss, the court “must consider the complaint in its
   entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
   motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by
   reference,” Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), and
   is central to the party’s claims, New Orleans City v. Ambac Assur. Corp., 815 F.3d 196, 200
   (5th Cir. 2016). Here, B.S. refers to the body camera footage in his complaint, and the
   footage is central to his ADA claim. We therefore find it appropriate to consider the body
   camera footage in reviewing B.S.’s claim. See Phillips, 2021 WL 3376524, at *1 n.1
   (considering video footage that depicted the encounter between the student and the deputy
   because the plaintiff referenced the video in her complaint and it was central to her ADA
   claims).
           65
                No. 20-30110, 2021 WL 3376524 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2021) (unpublished).
           66
             Id. at *1 (finding that it was plausible the deputy knew an accommodation was
   necessary because he watched J.H. stand motionless in the hallway with his head down and

                                                24
Case: 22-10443          Document: 00516686498              Page: 25       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                            No. 22-10443

   answers to the officers’ questions. And unlike the deputy in Phillips who
   watched J.H.’s behavior for several minutes, neither officer here had a
   chance to observe B.S.’s behavior before having to engage with him. Finally,
   the officers’ efforts to interact with B.S. were far less extreme than the
   response by the deputy in Phillips. 67 Far from tasing a student, the officers’
   actions here indicate that they were doing their best to deescalate the
   situation by calmly asking B.S. questions and gently handcuffing him to
   provide safety to him and those in the room. Given these factual differences,
   we find B.S.’s reliance on Phillips to be unpersuasive.
           Accordingly, the district court correctly held that B.S. alleged
   insufficient facts to show that the officers understood the limits imposed by
   his disabilities and failed to accommodate them.
                                    IV.     CONCLUSION
           For the above reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment against B.S. on his IDEA claim and its dismissal of B.S.’s
   ADA claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

   his fingers in his ears which constituted “clear signals that J.H. did not comprehend what
   was happening”).
           67
                Id. (noting that when J.H. kicked a school administrator, the deputy tased him).

                                                 25