Court Opinion

ID: 9396437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 16:08:25.09799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.906400
License: Public Domain

May 22, 2023
                                                  Supreme Court

                                                 No. 2021-282-C.A.
                                                 (K2/18-249A)

               State                :

                v.                  :

       Michael DeCosta              :

         NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
         before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
         are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
         Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
         Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-3258 or Email
         opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov of any typographical or
         other formal errors in order that corrections may be made
         before the opinion is published.
                                                        Supreme Court

                                                        No. 2021-282-C.A.
                                                        (K2/18-249A)

                 State                    :

                   v.                     :

           Michael DeCosta.               :

      Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION

      Justice Lynch Prata, for the Court. On February 27, 2020, a Kent County

Superior Court jury found the defendant, Michael DeCosta (defendant or DeCosta),

guilty of felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of G.L. 1956

§ 11-5-2. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of twenty years at the Adult

Correctional Institutions.    Substance abuse evaluation and treatment, anger

management and counseling, and a no-contact order were also imposed. A judgment

of conviction entered on August 3, 2020, and defendant timely appealed.

      The defendant raises one issue on appeal before this Court. He contends that

the trial justice erred in admitting evidence that defendant struck an unrelated person

in an unrelated event earlier on the evening in question, in violation of Rules 404(b)

and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. For the reasons stated herein, we

affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
                                         -1-
                                   Facts and Travel

         The defendant was arrested and charged by way of criminal information with

one count of felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The charge stemmed

from an incident that occurred in the early morning hours of December 3, 2017,

wherein defendant attended a party at 115 Lincoln Avenue in Warwick, Rhode

Island. Prior to attending the party, on the evening of December 2, 2017, the

complaining witness, Joseph Napolillo (Napolillo), and two friends attended a vigil

at Rocky Point Park for a friend who had died by suicide. That same evening,

defendant, his then-girlfriend Amanda Paulino (Paulino), and her friend Dakota

Migliori (Migliori) had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana before the

party.1 Migliori drove defendant and Paulino to the party in her mother’s minivan

and parked in a lot across the street.2

         When defendant arrived at the party with Paulino and Migliori, they were

greeted by some of their friends including Napolillo. Shortly after they arrived,

defendant confronted an individual named Austin “Biz” Freelove after Paulino had

a disagreement with Freelove’s girlfriend.          After the confrontation, Paulino

1
  DeCosta and Paulino dated only for a few months; at the time of trial, she was
married to another person. For the purposes of this opinion, Paulino will be referred
to by her married name.
2
    Lincoln Avenue is a residential street that runs perpendicular to Post Road.

                                          -2-
described defendant’s demeanor as “[a]ggressive, kind of like fired up.” The only

interaction between defendant and Napolillo at the party involved a minor-mix up

regarding their respective bottles of Hennessy.3 Napolillo was smoking marijuana

and drinking alcohol. Napolillo’s friend, Errol Carrillo (Carrillo), lived down the

street from 115 Lincoln Avenue and was at the party. Carrillo was drinking alcohol,

was smoking marijuana, and was very intoxicated. Carrillo claimed that he heard

defendant yelling that he would fight someone.

        At some point during the night, defendant, Paulino, and Migliori left the party

and drove to Cumberland Farms, where they purchased soda to mix with their

alcohol. Upon leaving the Cumberland Farms, they returned to the same parking lot

across the street from the party. The defendant exited the van to talk to other

partygoers who were in the parking lot, including Napolillo. Paulino and Migliori

remained in the van listening to music, checking their cell phones, and chatting.

Meanwhile, at 2:05 a.m., Carrillo called Napolillo to tell him that he wanted to leave

the party, and Napolillo responded that he was in the parking lot with a few people

from the party. These individuals were on the phone with an individual whose last

name was Cloutier.

        The parking lot eventually cleared out, but defendant remained there talking

to a single individual. Paulino stated that defendant’s voice became louder and that

3
    Hennessy is a type of brandy that is made in the Cognac region of France.
                                          -3-
he and the other person were raising their hands. Moments later, Paulino heard a

bang and a thud. The defendant, in a panic, then got into the vehicle and said “[w]e

need to get the * * * out of here now.” Both women testified that defendant had

blood on his knuckles and that he said he had knocked someone out.4 Migliori stated

that defendant asked her not to mention the incident. They drove to a convenience

store farther away from the party, where defendant used water bottles to clean his

bloody knuckles and discard his sweatshirt, which had blood on it. Paulino and

Migliori have differing recollections of what occurred after they drove away from

the scene of the incident, but eventually defendant and Paulino were both dropped

off at Paulino’s house in Warwick.

        In the meantime, Carrillo stepped outside the party and noticed a car driving

away from the house. From a distance, he saw something on the ground in the

parking lot and believed it could be someone from the party laid out drunk. Other

partygoers exited the house, and, with Carrillo, they approached the person on the

ground to discover that it was Napolillo. When Carrillo found Napolillo, his mouth

and nose were full of blood and he was vomiting. The group of partygoers brought

Napolillo back into the house and called 911. Sergeant Stephen Major of the

Warwick Police Department responded to the call with fire personnel and sought to

check on the medical condition of an individual at the party. The people at the party

4
    Bloodstains from the back seat of the minivan matched defendant’s DNA.
                                          -4-
responded to his presence by stating, “Get the * * * out. He’s not going to rat. We’re

not going to rat.” Sergeant Major located Napolillo, who appeared intoxicated.

Napolillo stated that he was fine and told fire personnel that his injuries were the

result of falling.

       Napolillo was taken to Kent County Hospital (the hospital) at approximately

3:00 a.m., where his blood alcohol level registered at .092. At the hospital, Napolillo

stated for the first time that he was assaulted but did not name an assailant. Upon

learning this information from medical personnel, Sgt. Major sent an officer to the

hospital. When the officer arrived, Napolillo was no longer able to communicate.

Shalini Boodram, M.D., testified that Napolillo suffered a traumatic brain injury,

which resulted in two craniotomies or brain surgeries, a tracheostomy, and the

insertion of a feeding tube.5 He remained in the intensive-care unit for over a month

and was then placed in a rehabilitation center to receive occupational, speech, and

physical therapy. Napolillo was discharged in February 2018 but was still unable to

walk, work, drive, or write.

       Detective Ryan Santo of the Rhode Island State Police Fugitive Task Force

executed an arrest warrant for defendant on December 12, 2017. Members of the

5
  Doctor Boodram testified that traumatic brain injuries are graded on what is known
as the Glasgow Coma Scale, which ranges from 3 to 15; with 3 being unresponsive
and constituting the most severe brain injury, and 15 constituting the mildest brain
injury. Napolillo was graded as a 3 when he was assessed upon entering the hospital.

                                         -5-
Task Force covered the two entrances to defendant’s mother’s house and then

knocked and announced their presence. Detective Santo testified that when he

entered the home, he heard movement inside the house that sounded like someone

other than defendant’s mother or girlfriend, the only two people identified to be in

the apartment. Detective Santo set out to search for defendant, who he suspected

had been in the home and fled. Detective Santo started driving and spotted him

several hundred feet from the house getting into a truck registered to his mother.

The truck was stopped, defendant was arrested, and he informed Det. Santo that he

had escaped by climbing out of the kitchen window.

      On March 19, 2018, Napolillo met with Warwick Police Lieutenant Andrew

Sullivan and gave his statement to the police. 6 In the statement, Napolillo recalled

that earlier in the night defendant hit an individual named Cloutier in an unrelated

event. Napolillo stated that he remembered that defendant was talking to him outside

in the plaza. Napolillo explained that defendant punched him in the face, he became

unconscious, and woke up covered in blood. After arriving and later passing out at

the hospital, Napolillo does not recall anything that occurred until he woke up on

January 16, 2018.

6
 Because Napolillo could not write when he met with Lieutenant Sullivan on March
19, 2018, his mother transcribed his verbal statement.
                                        -6-
      At trial, Napolillo could not recall anything that occurred after arriving at the

party. He did not recall what prompted the assault, what happened in the parking

lot, or anything about defendant’s incident with Cloutier. When Napolillo read his

police statement into the record, defense counsel objected to certain parts of the

statement, including the sentence at issue: “Mike DeCosta had hit John Cloutier

previously that night.” At sidebar, defense counsel argued that the evidence was

inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.

The state contended that the statement related to defendant’s state of mind. The trial

justice allowed a redacted statement to be read into the record by Napolillo.

      Thereafter, the trial justice permitted the state to make the statement, including

the sentence regarding the Cloutier assault, as a full exhibit as evidence of

defendant’s common plan, scheme, or frame of mind toward Napolillo, pursuant to

Rule 404(b). Defense counsel objected. The trial justice gave an instruction to the

jury that they could use this information only for the limited purposes of defendant’s

intent, plan, or scheme toward Napolillo, and not as evidence of bad character or

criminal propensity, and went on to give the same instruction during the final charge.

The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty on the charge of felony assault

resulting in serious bodily injury. The defendant thereafter timely appealed.

                                         -7-
                                  Standard of Review

      “It is well settled that we review a trial justice’s decision admitting or

excluding evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Husband, 162

A.3d 646, 655 (R.I. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Pona, 66 A.3d 454,

465 (R.I. 2013)). The trial justice is vested with the discretion to determine whether

evidence is properly admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) and this Court will not

interfere with that decision barring an abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 59 A.3d

73, 85 (R.I. 2013). We will reverse a trial justice’s ruling on the admissibility of

evidence only where “it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Brown, 42

A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012); see also State v. Smith, 39 A.3d 669, 673 (R.I. 2012).

                                      Discussion

      On appeal, defendant contends that the trial justice erred in admitting evidence

that he hit Cloutier earlier in the night. Specifically, defendant argues that the

evidence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Further, defendant asserts that the

evidence was inadmissible because its probative value was substantially outweighed

by the prejudicial effect of its admittance. Finally, defendant suggests that admitting

evidence of the altercation with another individual earlier in the night was prejudicial

error and warrants a new trial.

      Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts * * * to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in

                                         -8-
conformity therewith.” However, “that rule does not ‘require exclusion of otherwise

legally probative evidence simply because such evidence might also suggest past

criminal activity.’” State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1051 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State

v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339, 1348 (R.I. 1986)). The mere fact that the evidence may

be prejudicial does not render it inadmissible. See State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155,

1164 (R.I. 2006). In State v. Ciresi, 45 A.3d 1201 (R.I. 2012), this Court held, in

accordance with 404(b), that prior acts of uncharged conduct are admissible

evidence for purposes other than propensity, such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, or knowledge. Ciresi, 45 A.3d at 1213.

      The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in admitting into evidence

what he calls “extraneous propensity evidence.” While discussing the admissibility

of the sentence at issue, “Mike DeCosta had hit John Cloutier previously that

night[,]” outside of the jury’s presence and on the record, the trial justice used the

terms disposition and predisposition. He explained that the term predisposition was

sometimes appropriate in sexual assault cases, but he would instruct the jury only on

three uses for the prior incident, “defendant’s plan, scheme, or intent towards Mr.

Napolillo.” The next morning before the jury was brought in the courtroom, the trial

justice explicitly emphasized that the instruction was not for propensity. “[W]hen

Rule 404(b) evidence is admitted ‘the trial justice must instruct the jury on the

limited purpose for which the evidence may be considered.’” State v. Clements, 83

                                        -9-
A.3d 553, 564 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v. Robinson, 989 A.2d 965, 980 (R.I.

2010)). The specific instruction given to the jury during the trial was as follows:

              “There was a situation yesterday towards the very end of
             Mr. Napolillo’s testimony where -- I think it was when
             they were addressing the content of State’s l, a full exhibit,
             where he made a statement to the police department. And
             within [Napolillo’s] statement there was testimony * * *,
             that he indicated prior to his alleged assault by the
             defendant that the defendant had hit another individual
             earlier that same evening, and that was contained in the
             statement. I want you to understand that that’s what is
             called evidence of prior acts or conduct, and we have a rule
             of evidence that when that type of evidence comes in, I
             want you to understand, and please bear in mind that this
             defendant, Mr. DeCosta, has not been charged with any
             criminal offense arising out of that alleged conduct that I
             just described to you, and you are not permitted to use that
             piece of testimony to find that the defendant was a person
             of bad character or that he might have a criminal
             propensity, and, therefore, he must have committed the
             criminal offense that he’s charged with in this case.
                    This evidence that I referred to, to the extent that
             you decide to consider, you still have to decide eventually
             the credibility of everything you hear in light of all the
             evidence you hear, but if you decide to consider that
             evidence, it is admitted for the limited purpose as it may
             in your minds relate to the defendant’s plan, scheme, or
             intent towards Mr. Napolillo on that particular evening.”
             (Emphasis added.)

      When evaluating whether a trial justice abused his or her discretion in

admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, this Court looks to the trial justice’s underlying

reasons for the decision. State v. Dubois, 36 A.3d 191, 200 (R.I. 2012). Here, while

the statement may indicate a general plan, scheme, or intent of defendant to hit or

                                         - 10 -
fight someone that evening, the Cloutier assault had no bearing on defendant’s intent

towards Napolillo and is not evidence of the assault of Napolillo.             We have

previously stated that this form of evidence is admissible to establish intent towards

the victims in circumstances where the prior bad act was against that same victim.

See Martinez, 59 A.3d at 87 (affirming ruling allowing evidence of prior assaults

against the victim to establish intent); State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 21 (R.I. 2012)

(holding that the trial justice did not err in allowing evidence of prior acts of violence

toward the decedent because they showed motive and intent). That is not the case

here. There is no evidence to suggest that defendant hitting Cloutier earlier in the

evening had any connection to defendant’s plan, intent, or scheme towards

Napolillo. Moreover, the state seems to concede this point by arguing that the

particular statement is relevant by conflating state of mind with common plan,

scheme, or intent. Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion

in admitting the statement.

      Accordingly, our task is to determine whether admission of that statement

would influence the average jury relative to defendant’s guilt or innocence or

whether it amounted to harmless error. “In order to meet the harmless-error test,

there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Mercurio, 89 A.3d 813, 822 (R.I. 2014)

(quoting State v. Smith, 446 A.2d 1035, 1036 (R.I. 1982)). This Court has used

                                          - 11 -
numerous factors to determine whether an error was harmless, “including the relative

degree of importance of the witness testimony to the prosecution’s case, the presence

or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness

on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the

overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. (deletions omitted) (quoting State v.

Bustamante, 756 A.2d 758, 766 (R.I. 2000)). “The admission of objectionable

evidence is harmless if we determine that it is not reasonably possible that such

evidence would influence an average jury on the ultimate issue of guilt or

innocence.” State v. Gomes, 764 A.2d 125, 136-37 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v.

Burns, 524 A.2d 564, 568 (R.I. 1987)).

      We are of the opinion that the overall strength of the prosecution’s case is

robust, such that the admission of this statement under the trial justice’s instruction

would not influence an average jury on the question of guilt. See State v. Momplaisir,

815 A.2d 65, 71 (R.I. 2003). The trial justice determined that the testimony of

Migliori, Paulino, and Napolillo was credible, in particular he noted “that when Mr.

DeCosta rushed into the vehicle, both Ms. Paulino and Ms. Migliori observed his

knuckles were bloody, and Ms. Migliori heard him say, ‘I knocked him out with one

punch.’” While there was no direct eyewitness of defendant assaulting Napolillo at

the scene, the trial justice, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial laid out the

state’s evidence, citing:

                                         - 12 -
             “[B]oth men were having a conversation with raised
             voices at times at the rear of Dakota Migliori’s minivan in
             the parking lot. And following that conversation Mr.
             DeCosta rushed into the vehicle after Amanda Fontes
             Paulino heard a bang or thud, and he stated, ‘[w]e need to
             get the * * * out of here now,’ and that shortly thereafter
             Mr. Napolillo was found in that parking lot lying on the
             ground, bloodied, vomiting, and requiring emergency
             medical attention * * * .”

      The trial justice found that a reasonable jury could have relied on this

substantial, credible evidence to find defendant guilty. The DNA evidence of

bloodstains from the back of the van matched defendant’s DNA. The defendant

attempted to flee from police officers when they arrived with a warrant for his arrest.

The evidence was so significant that at trial, defense counsel argued that the

statement was not reasonably necessary to be admitted because “[t]he State appears

to have ample evidence, most of which we haven’t heard yet, but ample evidence to

prove the charge of felony assault.” The state referenced the statement only in

passing in its closing argument. We are satisfied that the instruction by the trial

justice made clear to the jury the limited purpose for which they could consider the

statement. After reviewing all the evidence with the required degree of caution, we

are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Napolillo’s statement

did not contribute to the jury’s evaluation of the evidence and defendant’s conviction

and amounted to harmless error.

                                        - 13 -
      Furthermore, the trial justice did not explicitly refer to Rule 403 in his ruling;

however, his analysis demonstrates that he balanced the evidence and considered the

interests of each party. See State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 281 (R.I. 2017)

(noting that the trial justice should “balance the evidence to determine whether its

probative force is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice”)

(quoting State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 413 (R.I. 2008)); see also State v. Cook, 45

A.3d 1272, 1280 (R.I. 2012). Specifically, the trial justice determined that “it’s a

fair balancing of the interests of the State” and that he had “eliminated a substantial

part of that statement in an effort to be fair to the defendant.” At other points in the

trial, the trial justice was explicit in determining that evidence was unduly prejudicial

and excluded that evidence on grounds of Rules 403 and 404(b). That was not the

case here. The failure by the trial justice to specifically use the phrase “Rhode Island

Rule of Evidence 403” while conducting the relevant analysis, and as the parties

argued about that analysis, does not constitute error.

                                      Conclusion

      For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decision and judgment

of the Superior Court. The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.

                                         - 14 -
                                             STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case                            State v. Michael DeCosta.

                                         No. 2021-282-C.A.
Case Number                              (K2/18-249A)

Date Opinion Filed                       May 22, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
                                         Long, JJ.

Written By                               Associate Justice Erin Lynch Prata

Source of Appeal                         Kent County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini

                                         For State:

                                         Virginia McGinn
                                         Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                         For Defendant:

                                         Camille A. McKenna
                                         Rhode Island Public Defender

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)