Court Opinion

ID: 9559707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:34:02.741636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:33.742466
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent to the majority opinion filed herein.
I think the material contentions or questions are (a) that the action, being a statutory action against a surety on the bond of a public improvement contractor, it must be commenced within six months from date improvement is completed, Title 61 O. S. A. §2; Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Dolese Bros. Co., 163 Okla. 36, *22920 P. 2d 569, and that the original petition did not state a cause of action because it was not alleged therein the date the improvement was completed; (b) that an action is only “rightfully brought” so as to authorize issuance of summons to defendants in another county when a petition is filed stating a joint transitory cause of action against resident and nonresident defendants. Maggi v. Johnson, 200 Okla. 361, 194 P. 2d 854.
In the Dolese Bros. Co. case, supra, it was held that one suing public contractor’s surety has burden of showing that the action authorized by §2, Title 61 O. S. A. was commenced within the statutory time.
I think that every ultimate fact required to be proved to sustain a cause of action must be alleged. In re Eskridge’s Estate, 51 Cal. App. 634, 125 P. 2d 527, or, as stated in Bernstein v. Peters, 68 Ga. App. 218, 22 S. E. 2d 614:
“A petition must allege every material fact which plaintiff must prove in order to recover.”
The contention that the original petition did not state a cause of action against the resident defendant is well taken. Also, the further contention that the issuance of summons and service thereof on the nonresident defendants was invalid must be sustained; and, unless it can be said that by filing separate general demurrers on March 3, 1948, wherein each of the nonresident defendants and the resident defendant alleged and stated therein that the petition wholly failed to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, constituted a voluntary general appearance for all purposes; and that the amendment following the court’s order of March 12, 1948, invokes the doctrine of “relation back”, the judgment of the trial court must be sustained.
The action authorized by 61 O. S. A. §1 et seq. can only be maintained against a surety company on its bond when it is commenced within six months from the date the public improvement is completed. Dolese Bros. Co. case, supra, and cases cited therein.
The rule governing statutory actions similar to the statute cited above was applied in Matheny v. Porter, 158 Fed. 2d 478, wherein it was said:
“In a case of this kind brought under the provisions of a statute creating the right of action where none previously existed and qualifies the right of action by requiring that the suit to enforce it be brought within a limited time, it must affirmatively appear from the face of the complaint that the action was commenced within the prescribed time. (Citing authorities) In so far as it related to the recovery of damages, the complaint was fatally defective in its failure to show that the suit was commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued, and therefore the denial of the motion to that extent constituted error.”
In the Maggi Case, supra, it was held that a petition failing to state a cause of action against the resident defendant does not state a joint cause of action as against resident and nonresident defendants, and, in such case, process served upon nonresident defendants in another county is a nullity; and, that such an action is commenced under the provision of 12 O.S.A. §§151, 154 only when a petition is filed stating a joint transitory cause of action against resident and nonresident defendants.
In Fisher v. Fiske, 96 Okla. 36, 219 P. 683, cited in the Maggi case, supra, it was said in the first paragraph of the syllabus:
“ . . . the averments of the petition . . . must show that the plaintiff has a valid joint cause of action against the resident defendants, on whom valid service is had, as well as against the non-resident defendants.”
I am of the opinion that the original service of summons being a nullity, and the demurrers being filed March 3, 1948, after the expiration of six *230months from the date of the alleged completion of the improvement as shown by the amendment to the original petition made on March 12, 1948, which, for the first time, stated a cause of action against the resident defendant (surety bond), was too late to comply with Title 61 O. S. A. §2, supra, which provided . . that no action shall be brought on said bond after six months from the completion of . . . public improvements . .
In Murray v. McGehee, 121 Okla. 248, 249 P. 700, it was said:
“Where the original petition wholly fails to state a cause of action, it will not arrest the running of limitations, and an amendment made after the bar of the statute is complete will be regarded as the beginning of the action in reckoning the statutory period of limitation.”
I think the action of the trial court should be affirmed.