Court Opinion

ID: 9380186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 16:08:49.475158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.245336
License: Public Domain

J-S01020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S.K.G.               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: M.L.G., FATHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1132 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2022,
                in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County,
                    Orphans' Court at No(s): No. AD-11 2022.

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED: March 17, 2023

        M.L.G. (“Father”) appeals the orphans’ court decision to terminate his

parental rights to his daughter, K.S.K.G., (“the Child”), born March 2021,

pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).1 After

careful review, we affirm.

        The facts and procedural history are as follows: Shortly after the Child

was born, Bedford County Children and Youth Services (“the Agency”), filed

an application for emergency protective custody after receiving a report that

the Child tested positive for various drugs in her system. Thereafter, a shelter

care hearing was conducted.           The court granted the Agency’s request for
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   On August 25, 2022, K.L.B. (“Mother”) filed her consent to adoption.
J-S01020-23

shelter care and the court directed the Child to be placed in the physical

custody of her maternal grandmother upon release from the hospital.

      The Child was adjudicated dependent on March 25, 2021. Pursuant to

a subsequent emergency protective custody order, however, the court

directed that upon the Child’s release from the hospital she would be placed

in foster care. This change was necessitated by the fact that the maternal

grandmother tested positive for illegal drugs.

      A permanency plan was instituted for Father.       From the date of the

Child’s dependency adjudication to the time of the first permanency review on

August 17, 2021, Father’s compliance and progress were moderate toward

alleviating the circumstances which led to Child’s original placement. As of

that date, Father was consistent with his visitation, cooperated with the

Agency and service providers, and was addressing his mental health.

However, he was still experiencing difficulty managing basic life skills and was

still not ready for an unsupervised visitation with the Child. Father was still

not passing his drug tests but was in the process of applying for a medical

marijuana card.

      By the time of the next permanency review on February 1, 2022, Father

was found to have had only minimal compliance and progress toward

alleviating the circumstances which led to the Child’s original placement. By

this time, Father’s visits were inconsistent, he continued to fail drug screens,

was not receiving treatment for his mental health issues, and lacked

appropriate housing.

                                     -2-
J-S01020-23

      By the time of the third permanency review on July 19, 2022, Father

was incarcerated after his May 2022 arrest for criminal mischief and related

charges. He was found to have made minimal compliance and progress with

his permanency plan because he failed all his drug screens, lacked appropriate

housing, and was not receiving treatment for his mental health issues.

      On July 20, 2022, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Father’s

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

The orphans’ court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 29, 2022. The

Agency presented the testimony of Valerie Kinsey, the Agency’s caseworker

assigned to the case from its beginning, and Amanda Kendall, the Agency’s

caseworker who provided family preservation services to Father.          Father

testified on his own behalf.   After hearing argument from the parties, the

orphans’ court provided its reasons for terminating Father’s parental rights on

the record. By order entered that same day, the court terminated Father’s

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and (b).      Father appealed.

Both Father and the orphans’ court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Father raises the following issue:

         Did the [orphans’] court commit an abuse of discretion or
         an error of law in determining that [the Agency] presented
         sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of proof (clear and
         convincing evidence) in the bifurcated analysis to warrant
         the involuntary termination of [Father’s] parental rights?

Father’s Brief at 6.

      We begin our well-settled standard of review:

                                     -3-
J-S01020-23

         The standard of review in termination of parental rights
         cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
         and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
         supported by the record. If the factual findings are
         supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
         court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
         decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
         upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
         partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
         decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
         the record would support a different result. We have
         previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
         often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
         multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). We add that we

                                      -4-
J-S01020-23

may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for the result

reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. Importantly, we need only agree with

the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc).

     We first address Father’s claim that the Agency failed to present clear

and convincing evidence to support the termination of his parental rights

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), which provides:

        (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
        child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
        following grounds:

                                    […]

           (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
           parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
           an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
           date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
           to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
           and termination of parental rights would best serve the
           needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

     To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner

must prove: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months

or more from the date of the removal; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Termination

                                    -5-
J-S01020-23

under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s

current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused the

placement, or the availability or efficacy of the services provided by the local

children and youth agency. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).

      At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the orphans’ court first

noted the three elements that the Agency had the burden to prove under

Section 2511(a)(8). See N.T., 8/29/22, at 98; K.Z.S., supra. The court then

provide its rationale as to each element. As to the first element, the orphans’

court reasoned:

            So, [the first element] subsection 8 [is] essentially that the
      child has been removed from parental care for twelve months or
      more from the date of the removal. [The Child] was born, I
      believe, [in March 2021]. Upon discharge - -[the Child] was never
      discharged home to the parents. I believe we, there was an []
      shelter care order prior to discharge, but essentially upon
      discharge from the hospital [the Child] has always been placed in
      the foster home of [the Foster Parents]. I would note that today’s
      date is August 29, 2022. So, certainly that twelve months has
      passed.

N.T., 8/29/2, at 98-99.

      The court then noted that the second element is that the conditions

which led to the placement of the Child continue to exist. The orphans’ court

found that the Agency met its burden as to this element, and explained as

follows:

             So, my analysis will initially focus on whether the condition
      that led to [the Child’s] placement continue to exist despite
      reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a
      realistic period of time. And as I’ve stated, this case - - [the Child]
      has been in placement now for, well, close to a year and a half.

                                       -6-
J-S01020-23

            In the case at hand, I heard testimony from the caseworker,
     Ms. Kinsey, as well as the testimony of the Family Preservation
     caseworker, [Ms.] Kendall. It seems clear to me that the initial
     reasons as it relates to [Father], the reasons for placement, there
     were concerns as it relates to instability in the areas of drug use,
     mental health and unstable housing. So, three were essentially
     as it relates to [Father], the three big issues where his goals were
     focused around.

            [The orphans’ court] has noted that out of all of the drug
     tests, I believe it was approximately ten that were given to
     [Father], he unfortunately failed them all. What is of greater
     concern to the [court] is the trend beginning in December of 2021
     until, well, the most recent attempt at a test in May . . . he tested
     positive, among other things, to methamphetamine, I would note
     that initially when the case was open and he began being tested,
     he was testing positive for things like marijuana and suboxone,
     which while concerning - - I will be very frank - - the trend toward
     the heavier drugs concerns the [court] much, much more. So, it
     would seem to [the orphans’ court] as though that issue has not
     been resolved.

           The next issue raised or concern that was raised had to do
     with mental health. Well, it would seem to me that unless or until
     [Father] is able to get his drug use under control, it will be difficult
     to address the mental health issues, which I think has been
     indicated by the various caseworkers over the last months. That
     has been indicated and explained to [Father]. Various options, I
     believe, were discussed with him, and at least until his most recent
     incarceration about three months ago, that he has not effectively
     been able to get a handle on his drug use.

            Another one of the concerns was, as I said, the instability
     as it relates to housing. It seems to me at times [Father] has
     attempted to rely on his father to assist him with a residence but
     it seems to me that relationship at times has been quite volatile.
     So, the court is very concerned about that, and I don’t know, nor
     did I hear evidence today that if [Father] would be released from
     incarceration sometime in the future, that he would have the
     ability to go back to his father’s residence. I don’t know that’s the
     case. But, over the course of this case it seems as though the
     housing situation certainly has not improved.

           Additionally, again, I do want to touch upon a little bit
     further [on Father’s] mental health issues. [A]s I said, it would

                                      -7-
J-S01020-23

     seem to me that drug use must be resolved but the court is
     concerned he had in 2021, just after this case was opened, he had
     a mental health placement and I found his testimony credible
     when he said when he got out of the hospital from Pittsburgh back
     in June or July of 2021, that was probably the best he was doing.
     And I find that credible because our Permanency Review order
     reflected that. He wasn’t fully making, fully in compliance, but he
     was making progress at least. And so, I take him at his word that
     throughout the history of this case, that’s the best he had been.
     But, unfortunately, as I said over time instead of continuing to
     progress in the right direction [in] terms of both drug use and
     mental health treatment it just has not happened. And in the
     court’s estimation, it has, has in fact gotten worse.

           The court further notes that most recently here in May of
     2022, there was testimony that [Father] had a 302 commitment
     at the Somerset Hospital. [Father] was well aware that upon his
     discharge they recommended additional follow-up, mental health
     treatment, but he did not do that. He did not ask for assistance
     to do that and in fact, refused, and said he didn’t need treatment.

           So, in those regards, it would seem to me that as it relates
     to [Father] and the concerns of the Agency and the goals that he
     had, despite reasonable good faith efforts of the Agency, he has
     not improved upon those. He has not made progress.

N.T., 8/29/22, at 99-103 (excess capitalization omitted).

     Finally, the orphans’ court stated why it found that the Agency met the

element for termination under Section 2511(a)(8), that termination would

best serve the needs and welfare of the Child:

           It appears to me that the evidence has shown that through
     testimony of the case worker, as well as the report of the guardian
     ad litem, [the Child] currently is doing well in her current
     placement. She’s happy. She’s formed bonds within that family.
     And when I look at the bond that she has with [Father], I agree
     with the attorney for the Agency. I think there is a bond, but I
     just don’t think it’s outweighed by the stability that the child has
     currently.

N.T., 8/29/22, at 104.

                                    -8-
J-S01020-23

      Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusions. In

arguing to the contrary, Father first acknowledges that he “conceded during

the [termination] hearing that he was not in a position to provide the care and

nurturing environment that [the Child] would require.” Father’s Brief at 10-

11. He contends, however, that his three months of incarceration, “served to

afford [him] the space to clear his head and to commit to services he

requires/needs in order to provide [the Child] with a safe, stable and nurturing

environment.” Id. at 11. Thus, Father asserts that “[all] he requested of the

court was to be afforded an additional 3-6 months following his release to

meet his goals for him and [the Child] to be reunited.” Id.

      The orphan’s court was aware of Father’s testimony regarding his

incarceration status and his hope to meet his reunification goals upon his

release. As the court explained:

             The court will also look at what’s the likelihood that [Father]
      would make progress if we just simply give him more time. Well,
      unfortunately, things for [Father] seem to this court to continue
      to be a little up in the air. He’s currently incarcerated on new
      charges. There is no indication of what the resolution might [be],
      or what the plan might be when he may be released. I know he
      testified that he was hoping maybe to touch base with his father.
      Move back in with his father, but this court is not satisfied that
      that even is an option at this point.

N.T., 8/29/22, at 103 (excess capitalization omitted).          In essence, the

orphans’ court determined that the uncertainty regarding Father’s release

date, and ability to meet his reunification goals thereafter, supported the

termination of his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8).

                                      -9-
J-S01020-23

      The orphans’ court’s conclusion is consistent with pertinent case law. As

noted by the guardian ad litem’s brief supporting termination, Father asked

the orphans’ court to place the Child in a “holding pattern” until he gets

released from jail and can work on his reunification goals. Brief for Guardian

Ad Litem, at 16. As our Supreme Court has previously stated, “[i]n weighing

the difficult factors [relevant in a parental rights termination proceeding,]

courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are

young for a scant number of years, and courts have an obligation to see to

their healthy development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. Moreover, it is

now well settled that “[a] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent

attempts     to   attain   the   maturity   necessary   to   assume    parenting

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope

for the future.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 914 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted).

      Based on the foregoing, we conclude: the orphans’ court did not commit

an error of law or abuse its discretion when it terminated Father’s rights under

Section 2511(a)(8). Thus, we next consider whether the record supports the

orphans’ court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and convincing

evidence pursuant to Section 2511(b).

      Section 2511(b) provides:

           (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
           rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
           developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

                                      - 10 -
J-S01020-23

        of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
        solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
        inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
        medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
        With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
        (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
        the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
        are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
        filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

     This Court has explained that:

        [S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
        parental rights would best serve the developmental,
        physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
        In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
        this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
        security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
        needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
        that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
        of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
        on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id.
        However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond
        between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no
        bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.
        2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
        necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
        case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

     Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship. See   C.M.K.,   203   A.2d     at   264   (citation   omitted); see

also K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving

where the child had been in foster care for most of the child's life, which

                                    - 11 -
J-S01020-23

caused the resulting bond to be too attenuated). We add, the court is not

required to use expert testimony to resolve the bond analysis but may rely on

the testimony of social workers and caseworkers. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.

Finally, we emphasize that “[w]hile a parent's emotional bond with her and/or

her child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

     Here, at the close of testimony the orphans’ court explained its rationale

for concluding that the Agency met its burden of establishing termination was

warranted pursuant to Section 2511(b). The court stated:

           And, as I’ve mentioned, it seems to me [the Child] has a
     particularly strong parental bond, not just a bond, but a parental
     bond with the foster parents. The court notes, I also heard
     testimony that [the Child] has what I would refer to as a sibling
     bond with the other children in that household.

            The testimony that the court particularly relies on as it
     relates to this subsection is the testimony of the Family
     Preservation caseworker, [Ms.] Kendall. She forthrightly and
     credibly testified as to the things that [Father] was able to do. He
     clearly loves [the Child]. During visits he was able to take proper
     care of [the Child] in terms of feeding and holding, changing [her]
     diaper. So, the court did recognize that, and I did consider that,
     but I also considered the nature of the bond that was displayed
     between [the Child] and [Father].

           So, certainly I think there is a bond but I don’t know that I
     would characterize it, unfortunately as a parental bond. I think
     [the Child] has that bond with the foster parents. And I think the
     evidence has supported that. And I would note that parental
     rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
     convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
     others provide [the Child] with her physical, emotional needs.

                                    - 12 -
J-S01020-23

              So, what it really comes down to, [Father], unfortunately, is
        I have no doubt that you love [the Child]. You want what’s best
        for [the Child,] but I can’t put her life on hold while you []
        continually try to resolve the issues that you have and I don’t
        mean any disrespect in saying that, but I have to look at the
        fact[s], sir as they are today.

              So, based on that, I do find that the Agency has met its
        burden of proof and the court will grant the Agency’s petition as
        far as termination of parental rights.

N.T. 8/29/22, at 105-06 (excess capitalization omitted).

        Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusions. As

noted    above,    we   may   not   disturb    the   orphans’   courts   credibility

determinations when they are supported by the record. T.S.M., supra. The

court found Ms. Kendall’s testimony comparing the nature of the bond the

Child had with Father vis-à-vis her bond with the foster parents. Ms. Kendall

testified that, although she saw a bond between the Child and Father, the

Child displayed the same bond toward her.            See N.T., 8/29/22, at 38.

Contrarily, Ms. Kendall testified that the Child displayed a true parental bond

with both foster parents. Id. at 37.

        Thus, Ms. Kendall’s testimony establishes that the Agency met its

burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that termination of

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) was in the Child’s best

interests. See In re T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that a

parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, does not prevent

termination of parental rights); In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(explaining that whether a child’s primary emotional attachment is with a

                                      - 13 -
J-S01020-23

foster parent rather than a birth parent is a significant factor in evaluating the

child’s developmental and emotional needs and welfare in a termination of

parental rights proceeding).

      In sum, because the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion

that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Section

2511(a)(8) and (b), we affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2023

                                     - 14 -
J-S01020-23

              - 15 -