Court Opinion

ID: 9752986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:49:08.472486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:27.211535
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
Today we have abandoned the twenty seven (27) year history of this Court’s restrictive use of the exclusionary rule to only those instances where its application would deter misconduct by law enforcement authorities. Now that we have ignored that history and have decided to employ it even in cases where police officers have fulfilled their every obligation to protect the individual constitutional rights of citizens, I dissent.
Until this day we have dutifully followed the canons of the Fourth Amendment prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States through hundreds of cases. We accepted, as we must, their rationale that police procedures had overstepped constitutional bounds and we imposed the sanction of suppression to dissuade illegal search. See Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). To teach the lesson, we were obliged to ignore a mountain of illegal contraband that otherwise was palpable indicia of guilt. There is no doubt that the social cost has been more than criminals freed to try again.1 It has generated a disbelief and a growing disrespect in the efficacy of law that stands mute in the presence of incontrovertible evi*414dence of fire and lets the house burn down because the fireman arrived before he was properly called.2 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) does not open the gates to unauthorized search, it does not dissolve the need for probable cause. It simply and properly shifts the responsibility for determining probable cause to a neutral magistrate and frees the police of his or her mistakes. The police cannot search on a whim. They must present their cause to a neutral magistrate. The facts they present must be true, the magistrate must act within his bounds, and, as the final test, the police must employ their experience in recognizing whether a warrant is illegal despite the authorization of the magistrate. Id. at 923,104 S.Ct. at 3421. All of these contentions remain alive and subject to scrutiny at a suppression hearing. The instant case is a classic illustration. The defect in the affidavit of probable cause was that the time of the offense was not specified. What was told the magistrate was that the contraband was “growing,” a clear indication of present tense. The informants told the police that they saw it growing and the magistrate was told that it was growing and he issued a search warrant on that premise. When the police arrived it was still growing. All concerned acted in good faith. To suppress the evidence because a date was not specified with exactitude under those circumstances dwindles into practiced absurdity.
The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that suppression of evidence seized without probable cause is not a constitutional right. Id. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at *4153411.3 This Court has made that clear as well. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 133-134, 518 A.2d 1187, 1195 (1986) (“[T]he exclusionary rule is a judicially created device designed to deter improper governmental action in the course of criminal investigations and prosecutions. It is not a personal right of the accused”).
The United States Supreme Court has made it equally clear that suppression of evidence seized without probable cause is mandated to contain police action. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417. Likewise, we have approved the suppression of evidence only where it will have the benefit of deterring similar police misconduct in the future. Commonwealth v. Corley, 507 Pa. 540, 491 A.2d 829 (1985); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979); Commonwealth v. Brown, 470 Pa. 274, 368 A.2d 626 (1976); Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 312 A.2d 29 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); and Commonwealth ex rel. Wilson v. Rundle, 412 Pa. 109, 194 A.2d 143 (1963).4
In interpreting our Constitution we are, as are our sister states, always free to give more than that allowed under Federal Constitutional interpretation. Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 63, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (1983). I would choose to accept the rationale of the Supreme Court and recognize the “good faith exception” of Leon to the exclusionary rule as have eighteen of our sister states.5 My *416opinion is not merely grounded in the absurdity of excluding this evidence, nor only upon the persuasiveness of Leon, but also because it is firmly grounded in Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
In Commonwealth ex rel Wilson v. Rundle, supra, the defendant, in a habeas corpus petition, contended that the admission into evidence at his trial of $100.00 bills in U.S. currency and their serial numbers, seized from his person and hotel room in Las Vegas without a search warrant, was improper and that he should be awarded a new trial. The defendant’s judgment of sentence had become final prior to the Mapp decision, and therefore the Court was obligated to address whether Mapp should be applied retrospectively.
In deciding the issue, the Court stated that “we must understand the basic purpose in the mandate of the court in Mapp.” The Court answered this question by citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960): “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Rundle, 412 Pa. at 118, 194 A.2d at 148. The Court continued that “This rule of exclusion is essentially a rule of evidence, even though of constitutional dimensions. In excluding illegally obtained evidence, the purpose is not to exclude such evidence because it is testimonially untrustworthy or lacking in reliability but to discourage police officials from conduct in violation of the Constitution.” Id., 412 Pa. at 120, 194 A.2d at 148. The Court concluded that to apply the exclusionary rule retrospectively to the case would not *417satisfy the purpose of the rule, and therefore, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.
In Commonwealth v. Corley, supra, this Court refused to employ the exclusionary rule to cases where a citizen makes an arrest and search because, “the exclusionary rule is designed to prevent, not to repair, and is aimed at official misconduct, it would be a wholly improper extension to apply it here, as a remedy for private conduct.” Id. 507 Pa. at 551, 491 A.2d at 834. In Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, we held that where evidence is the “fruit” of evidence obtained as a result of illegal police activity, but it “would have been discovered in the course of a lawfully conducted investigation, no purpose is served in applying the exclusionary rule,” because the initial taint did not effect the reliability of the evidence and excluding the evidence would not discourage unlawful police practices. Id. 470 Pa. at 284, 368 A.2d at 631.
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1989) we held that a pen register device could not be installed unless probable cause to do so was established. We concluded that evidence seized by the installation of pen registers without probable cause, even though the police reasonably relied upon the Federal standard,6 should nevertheless be suppressed. We explicitly did not disagree with the Leon decision. Instead, we determined that the evidence was appropriately suppressed because the judge who issued the order to install the pen registers7 never considered whether probable cause existed and thereby “wholly abandoned his judicial role,” a situation “envisioned” by Leon as worthy of suppression. Id., 521 Pa. at 420, 555 A.2d at 1262.
*418To now reject the holding of Leon for Pennsylvania is mere fiat, an exercise of personal illumination about a need for protection not only from the police but from the judiciary. Like the United States Supreme Court, I find no evidence that the judiciary has run beyond its responsibilities, or that if they do we cannot correct them. See Melilli, supra. The Supreme Court of the United States is a world landmark for the protection of constitutional rights. What they require we enforce; what they allow we ought not deter except upon clear evidence of positive need. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a positive need to allow, under the canons of Leon, a good faith exception. To do otherwise is to provide a sanctuary for the lawless elements seeking profit, particularly in the growing human misery of addiction. With all the consequent losses from the ability to plot, plan and accomplish what common sense, if not common decency, requires be brought to justice because the evidence is real, present, palpable and beyond contradiction.
I would affirm the Superior Court.

. One of those social costs has been the breakdown of the deterrent effect of the criminal law. “[0]ur preoccupation with restriction on police activity has become so great that an impression circulates that the chief end of the criminal law is to prevent invasions by police rather than invasions by criminals. Unquestionably, this preoccupation has lead to the release of patently guilty criminals and thereby weakened the deterrent effect of the criminal law.” Fleming, Of Crimes and Rights, 150, 151 (1978).

. One rationale, other than deterrence, that has been offered for the use of the exclusionary rule is "the imperative of judicial integrity." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1447, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). However, this rationale has been criticized because, "The layman finds the judicial integrity rationale difficult to grasp, and many lawyers think the highest integrity of the adjudicative aspect of the criminal process lies in the separation of the guilty from the innocent on the basis of all the relevant evidence available." Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 63, 403 A.2d 1283, 1298 (1979), (Larsen J. dissent) citing, McGowan, Rulemaking and the Police, 70 Mich.L.Rev. 659, 674 (1972).

. See also Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale LJ. 906, 918-922 (1986).

. See also Corley, 507 Pa. at 552, 491 A.2d at 835 (Larsen J., concurring) wherein he states: “Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have made it clear that the exclusionary rule will not be extended to areas where its application would not tend to achieve its primary purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct." Citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 490 A.2d 421 (1985), and Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 404 A.2d 378 (1979).

. Alabama-Crittenden v. State, 476 So.2d 632 (1985); Arizona-A.R.S. § 13-3925; Arkansas-Jackson v. State, 291 Ark. 98, 722 S.W.2d 831 (1987); California-In re Lance, 37 Cal.3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631 (1985) (by statute, California has mandated the use of all relevant evidence, even if unlawfully seized, to the extent the admission of that evidence is permitted by the U.S. Constitution); Colorado-(Statute) Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-3-308 (1986); Florida-Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (1988); Idaho-State v. Prestwick, 116 Idaho 959, 783 *416P.2d 298 (1984); Illinois-People v. Stewart, 104 Ill.2d 463, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (1984); Indiana-Blalock v. State, 483 N.E.2d 439 (1985); Louisiana-State v. Matthieu, 506 So.2d 1209 (1987); Maryland-Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 522 A.2d 1348 (1987); Missouri-State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (1986); Nevada-Barrett v. State, 775 P.2d 1276 (1989); Ohio-State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986); South Dakota-State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825 (1988); Texas-Curry v. State, 780 S.W.2d 825 (1989); Virginia-McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 321 S.E.2d 637 (1984); Wyoming-Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (1984), cert. denied sub nom. Spoon v. Wyoming, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 2048, 85 L.Ed.2d 311 (1985).

. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) which held that the use of pen registers did not constitute a search, and therefore, the use of pen registers did not require a prior showing of probable cause. At the time the pen registers were installed in the Melilli case, Pennsylvania had not spoken to the need to show probable cause prior to the installation of pen registers.

. The orders for pen registers were obtained because Bell Telephone Company refused installation without prior court authorization.