Court Opinion

ID: 9720985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:46:02.661102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:22.628778
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting, Issue IV.
For its fourth appellate contention, Barton-Malow raises the issue whether minor children should have an independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium when a parent is negligently injured by a third party. In Dearborn Fabricating & Eng. v. Wickham (1988), Ind.App., 532 N.E.2d 16, trans. pending, it was suggested that this Court need not defer to the legislature in recognizing a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. However, if the action is to be created, it is wiser to leave it to the legislative branch with its greater ability to study and circumscribe the cause.
The legislature is in a better position to weigh the benefits of the proposed cause of action against other societal concerns.
“The legislature has more widespread resources- to utilize in weighing the benefits of allowing children to have a right to recover damages for loss of parental consortium due to negligent injury and is *1127the appropriate entity to determine if [this state] will recognize a child’s cause of action for loss of parental consortium and under what circumstances. The legislature has the ability to enact legislation for wrongful injury patterned on the wrongful death statute. Concern about increased litigation and multiple claims could thereby be addressed by allowing only one action to be brought and only one recovery to be made which must be shared by some legislatively determined apportionment among a legislatively determined class of beneficiaries. The legislature is also the more appropriate branch of government to establish the suggested new cause of action because then, if it is determined that some recovery should be allowed but that the benefits of unlimited recovery is [sic] outweighed by the cost to society, the legislature can establish a rule of law allowing partial recovery under circumstances and upon conditions which the people’s representatives have established to be fairest and most beneficial to all.” Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co. (1986), 358 Pa.Super. 505, 521, 517 A.2d 1348, 1356, aff'd, (1988), 518 Pa. 57, 540 A.2d 266. See also Zorzos v. Rosen (1985), Fla., 467 So.2d 305;
Huter v. Ekman (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 733, 92 Ill.Dec. 369, 484 N.E.2d 1224.
Of significance is the fact that the legislature has recognized a child’s loss of parental consortium in a wrongful death action but has not created a companion action for such loss when the parent is injured. See IND.CODE § 34-1-1-2 (1988 Ed.) (allowing recovery for loss of parental consortium when a parent dies from negligently inflicted injuries). Although the omission may be an oversight, it suggests that the legislature has deliberately chosen not to create an independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium when a parent is negligently injured by a third party. See Zorzos v. Rosen, supra, at 307. Under such circumstances, judicial recognition of the action would be improper.
It is urged that the common law of today “[is] active and dynamic and thus changes with the times and growth of society to meet its needs.” Dearborn Fabricating & Eng. v. Wickham, supra, at 18. Yet the lack of sound precedent must be considered as a bar to the creation of an independent cause of action for loss of parental consortium. Koskela v. Martin (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 568, 571, 47 Ill.Dec. 32, 35, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151.
The overwhelming majority of courts which have addressed the issue have denied a minor’s cause of action for loss of parental consortium.
See Annot., 11 A.L.R.4th 549, 552 (1982);
Dearborn Fabricating & Eng. v. Wickham, supra, at 16;
Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., supra, 358 Pa.Super. at 516, 517 A.2d at 1354.
Since 1980 when the first state supreme court, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, permitted a child to recover for loss of parental consortium, only six other jurisdictions have recognized the cause of action.
See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc. (1987), Alaska, 734 P.2d 991;
Weitl v. Moes (1981), Iowa, 311 N.W.2d 259, overruled by Audubon-Exira v. III. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. (1983), Iowa, 335 N.W.2d 148;
Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc. (1980), 381 Mass. 507, 413 N.E.2d 690;
Berger v. Weber (1981), 411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424;
Hay v. Medical Center Hosp. (1985), 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939;
Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co. (1984), 103 Wash.2d 131, 691 P.2d 190;
Theama v. City of Kenosha (1984), 117 Wis.2d 508, 344 N.W.2d 513.
Other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have declined to follow Massachusetts’ lead in extending the common law to include such an action.

See, e.g., Steiner v. Bell Telephone Co., supra;

Kershner v. Beloit Corporation and Black Clawson Co., Inc. (D. Maine 1985), 611 F.Supp. 943;
*1128Lewis v. Rowland (1985), 287 Ark. 474, 701 S.W.2d 122;

Zorzos v. Rosen, supra;

Sanders v. Mt. Sinai Hospital (1985), 21 OhioApp.3d 249, 487 N.E.2d 588;
Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co. (1984), Tex.App., 670 S.W.2d 873;
W.J. Bremer Co., Inc. v. Graham (1983), 169 Ga.App. 115, 312 S.E.2d 806;
Block v. Pielet Bros. Scrap and Metal, Inc. (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 983, 75 Ill.Dec. 515, 457 N.E.2d 509;
Versland v. Caron Transport (1983), 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583;
Salin v. Kloempken (1982), Minn., 322 N.W.2d 736;
Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (1982), 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318;
DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Center (1981), 84 A.D.2d 17, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188, aff'd, (1983) 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626, 449 N.E.2d 406;
Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (D.Neb.1980), 484 F.Supp. 478;
Morgel v. Winger (1980), N.D., 290 N.W.2d 266.
Because there is no general or growing consensus that a cause of action for loss of parental consortium should be recognized, and because the recognition of such an action is a policy determination which can most thoroughly and representatively be resolved by the legislature, this Court should not create a cause of action for loss of parental consortium due to tortious interference by a third party. Barton-Malow is entitled to summary judgment on Count III of the Wilburns’ complaint.
SHIELDS, P.J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.