Court Opinion

ID: 9764550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:27:03.123896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:58.144488
License: Public Domain

W. H.“Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice, dissenting. The claimant has failed to satisfy the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102(5)(A)(i), 11-9-102(5)(D), and 11-9-102(5)(E)(i) (Supp. 1997), which state in part: (5) (A) ‘Compensable injury’ means (i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury is ‘accidental’ only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. *** (D) A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence, supported by ‘objective findings’ as defined in § 11-9-1-2(16). (E) Burden of Proof. The burden of proof of a compensable injury shall be on the employee and shall be as follows: (i) For injuries falling within the definition of compensable injury under subdivision (5)(A)(i) of this section, the burden of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) The majority would award benefits based upon the claimant’s testimony that she struck her right chest against a proofer machine in the bakery and that this blow caused swelling, redness, and obvious bruising of her right breast. She claims that Dr. Gary Moffett noted the swelling and bruising on her November 25, 1994, visit. Dr. Moffett does not support this contention. In his report dated November 28, 1994, Dr. Moffett stated: Brenda is seen today for complaint of worse shoulder pain. She states that while she is [sic] at work she slipped on the floor and through [sic] her right arm up in the air as she did. She states that it caused worsening pain, particularly along the anterior portion of her chest. She had a friend with her today and states that she had a lot of bruising on her anterior chest. However, on visual inspection I found no bruising whatsoever. (Emphasis added.) As pointed out by the appellant, the first documented complaint regarding the right breast is the report of Dr. Moffett dated June 20, 1995. Dr. Moffett noted: She then started asking about her breast implant on the right side being higher than the one on the left side and she thinks that this is related to the injury as well. I told her I don’t see any relationship between it and the injury, [i.e., right shoulder injury] but I gave her the name of Dr. Alderson who is a plastic surgeon that she could see to have take care of this. Once again, I do not think it is a work related situation. (Emphasis added.) Dr. Moffett referred the claimant to Dr. Roger Alderson and he first saw the claimant on July 12, 1995. Dr. Alderson states: I told her that knowing the history of a 14 year old Silicone gel implant, there was a possibility of gel leakage. I could not determine cause and effect if she is demonstrated to have a leak, whether that was related to her injury at Wal-Mart or whether it could have been preexisting. (Emphasis added.) The Workers Compensation Commission accepts the claimant’s testimony that she sustained an injury to her silicone implant and that she had a lot of bruising on her chest. She claims that Dr. Gary Moffett noted the swelling and bruising on her November 25, 1994 visit. However, Dr. Moffett disagrees with this statement. In his November 28, 1994 report Dr. Moffett states: “However, on visual inspection I found no bruising whatsoever.” Dr. Alderson said that he could not determine if the possibility of a gel leakage was related to her injury at Wal-Mart. However, the majority relies upon the medical testimony to affirm the case. On appeal of a workers’ compensation case from the court of appeals to this court, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, Cleek v. Great Southern Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 981 S.W.2d 529 (1998). Substantial evidence exists f reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. The questionable testimony of the claimant and the testimony of the doctors certainly does not compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resort to speculation or conjecture. Reasonable minds could not have reached the decision that was reached by the Commission in this case. The majority is sending the wrong message in affirming this case. Based upon the majority opinion, the claimant can report her claim seven months after the alleged injury, simply state that she has suffered a compensable injury, and, even though her testimony is contradicted, the claim is compensable. No positive medical testimony is required, no physical evidence is required, and no witness is required; just a questionable statement by the claimant makes the claim compensable. The burden of proof would no longer be a preponderance of the evidence. For all of these reasons, I would reverse and dismiss.