Court Opinion

ID: 9381814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 21:00:28.926393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.643515
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1796

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

       QUINTON SPINKS, a/k/a Travis, a/k/a Trav, a/k/a Q,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

       [Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Eamonn R. C. Hart, with whom BRANN & ISAACSON was on brief,
for appellant.
     Lindsay B. Feinberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.

                         March 23, 2023
            MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge.      Quinton Spinks ("Spinks")

appeals a 115-month sentence imposed by the district court upon

his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and heroin, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C). Spinks

asserts that he may challenge the procedural reasonableness of the

sentence, despite an appellate waiver in his plea agreement,

because the waiver does not apply.      After careful review, we find

the appellate waiver applies, barring Spinks's challenge to his

sentence.    Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal.

                            I. Background

            Because this sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea,

"we glean the [following] relevant facts from the plea agreement,

the undisputed sections of the presentence investigation report

[], and the transcripts of [the] change-of-plea and sentencing

hearings."   United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 280 n.2

(1st Cir. 2017).

            Between approximately November 2016 and September 2017,

Spinks was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and

heroin throughout central Maine.     The conspiracy involved Spinks

and his co-conspirators travelling to Rochester, New York, to pick

up drugs and transporting them to central Maine for distribution.

In January 2017, as this conspiracy was occurring, Spinks sold two

bags of crack cocaine to an undercover law enforcement officer in

                                - 2 -
Batavia, New York, and was subsequently arrested and convicted in

state court.      Then, in July 2018, Spinks was arrested on the

federal charges at issue in this case.         In July 2019, following an

indictment, Spinks pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and

heroin,   in    violation   of   21   U.S.C.    §§ 846,   841(a)(1),    and

841(b)(1)(C).     As part of Spinks's plea agreement, he agreed to

the following in a section titled "Appeal Waivers":

          Defendant is aware that Title 18, United
          States Code, Section 3742 affords a defendant
          the right to appeal the sentence imposed.
          Knowing that, Defendant waives the right to
          appeal the following:

                 A. Defendant's guilty plea and any other
                 aspect of Defendant's conviction in the
                 above-captioned case; and

                 B. A sentence of imprisonment that does
                 not exceed 125 months.

          Defendant's waiver of his right to appeal
          shall not apply to appeals based on a right
          that has been newly recognized by the Supreme
          Court and made retroactively applicable to
          cases on collateral review.

          At    the   change-of-plea    hearing,    the   district     court

explained the rights that Spinks was waiving by pleading guilty

and inquired into Spinks's understanding of the plea agreement and

the consequences of his plea:

          THE COURT: In light of all that I've just
          explained to you, all the rights that you have
          that you're waiving or giving up by pleading
          guilty, do you still choose to plead guilty to

                                  - 3 -
          the charge    contained   in   Count   1   of   the
          indictment?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                                . . .

          THE COURT: The [plea agreement] has your
          signature on it or what purports to be your
          signature on it. Do you see your signature on
          the paperwork?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

          THE COURT: Is that your signature?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

          THE COURT: Did you read the [plea agreement]
          before you signed it?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

          THE COURT: Did you have a chance to consult
          with [your counsel] about the significance of
          the [plea agreement] before you signed it?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

          THE COURT: Did you understand what you were
          signing?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                                . . .

          THE COURT: In signing the [plea agreement],
          did you intend to agree to all its terms and
          conditions?

          THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The district court then called attention to the waiver provisions,

asking:

                                - 4 -
THE COURT: Now, you may recall that a little
while ago, I told you your right to appeal
your conviction was going to be limited
because you were pleading guilty.     Do you
remember that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: However, under the terms of this
agreement, and, again, these agreements are
usually upheld as a matter of law, you are
waiving or giving up any right to challenge
the legality of your guilty plea and your
conviction in a higher court.       Do you
understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: This goes on to say that you waive
the right to appeal a sentence of imprisonment
that does not exceed 125 months.

Now, unlike your right to appeal your
conviction, you would have, but for the terms
of this agreement, a right to appeal any
sentence that I imposed. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: However, under the terms of this
agreement, and, again, these agreements are
usually upheld as a matter of law, if I impose
a sentence of 125 months or less, you will
have no right to appeal that sentence to a
higher court. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: That means, for all intents and
purposes, if I impose a sentence of 125 months
or less, I will be the only judge to review
the legality of that sentence.         Do you
understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                    - 5 -
          Ahead of sentencing, the Probation Office prepared the

presentence    investigation       report    ("PSR"),   which    stated     that

Spinks's base offense level was thirty and that Spinks was subject

to a two-level dangerous weapon enhancement, a two-level criminal

livelihood     enhancement,    a    four-level     "organizer    or   leader"

enhancement,    and   a   three-level       reduction   for    acceptance    of

responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of thirty-five.

The PSR treated Spinks's 2017 New York state court conviction not

as relevant conduct but as a discrete sale separate from the

conspiracy at issue in this case.           Consequently, Spinks's criminal

history score added up to eleven, resulting in a criminal history

category of five.         As a result, the PSR calculated Spinks's

guidelines sentencing range as 262 to 327 months, which was then

capped at the statutorily authorized maximum term of imprisonment

of 240 months.

          Spinks objected to the PSR's guidelines sentencing range

calculation, challenging the determinations on the applicable base

offense level and criminal history score.               At sentencing, the

district court addressed Spinks's objections.           The court concluded

that a base offense level of twenty-four applied.               The district

court also held that Spinks was subject to a two-level dangerous

weapon   enhancement,      a   three-level       "supervisor    or    manager"

enhancement,    and   a   three-level       reduction   for    acceptance    of

                                    - 6 -
responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of twenty-six,

which was nine levels lower than the PSR recommended.

            As    to    Spinks's       objection   to    the     criminal        history

category calculation, he argued that his 2017 conviction for the

sale of crack cocaine in Batavia, New York, should be considered

relevant    conduct      for    this    case    rather    than    as       a    separate

conviction.            Spinks    explained      that     a      relevant         conduct

determination would put him into a lower criminal history category

and thus lower his guidelines sentencing range. The district court

overruled   the    objection       and,    after     considering       a       government

concession, placed Spinks in criminal history category four, one

category level lower than the PSR recommended.

            Subsequently,        the      district      court     calculated         the

guidelines sentencing range as 92 to 115 months, as opposed to the

range of 78 to 97 months that Spinks argued for with his objection,

and imposed a sentence of 115-months imprisonment.                         Spinks then

timely filed this appeal.

                                 II. Discussion

            On appeal, Spinks contends that, as a threshold issue,

his appellate waiver does not apply because the plea agreement's

language does not bar a procedural reasonableness challenge.                          As

a result, Spinks maintains that he is permitted to bring this

appeal arguing that the district court erred in rejecting his

                                        - 7 -
objection characterizing the 2017 New York state court conviction

as relevant conduct.

           In the alternative, Spinks claims that even if the

appellate waiver's language does bar this appeal, he was not

informed of that fact and thus did not enter the appeal waiver

knowingly.         Spinks   contends       that   enforcing     an   inadequately

explained appellate waiver would be a miscarriage of justice.

           We begin with the initial question of whether Spinks's

appeal is barred by the language of the waiver contained in his

plea agreement.

                     A. The Plea Agreement's Language

           Spinks's primary argument is not that the appellate

waiver is invalid, but rather that its language is limited in scope

and does not cover this appeal.              We review the language of the

waiver and "rely on basic contract interpretation principles,

construing the agreement where possible to give effect to every

term and phrase, and construing any ambiguities in favor of

allowing     the     appeal     to   proceed[.]"           United       States   v.

Santiago-Burgos,      750     F.3d   19,    23    (1st   Cir.   2014)    (internal

citations omitted).         In doing so, we must carefully consider the

scope of the waiver because "[e]ven a knowing and voluntary appeal

waiver only precludes appeals that fall within its scope."                  United

States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2007).

                                       - 8 -
           The plea agreement states that "Defendant waives the

right to appeal . . . [a] sentence of imprisonment that does not

exceed 125 months."      Spinks focuses on the phrase "a sentence of

imprisonment" and argues that waiving an appeal to "a sentence"

does not bar a procedural reasonableness challenge.                    He claims

that the government would have included a waiver to "the manner in

which the sentence was determined" if the appellate waiver was

meant to bar an appeal challenging the guidelines sentencing range

calculation.     He points to the omission of this language as

evidence that this appeal does not fall within the appellate

waiver's limited scope.      Spinks maintains that while the language

used in the waiver here, referring to "a sentence," may prevent

him from bringing a substantive reasonableness challenge to the

sentence length itself, it does not prevent him from appealing the

district   court's     decisions   made    in   calculating     that    sentence

length.

           This argument is unavailing.              Appellate review of a

sentence    "involves    a   two-step     pavane."          United   States   v.

Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2019).               First, we examine

"any claims of procedural error. If the sentence passes procedural

muster,    we   then    examine    any    challenge    to     its    substantive

reasonableness."       Id. (internal citation omitted).                It should

therefore be clear that waiving appellate review of "a sentence"

must be read as waiving claims of both procedural and substantive

                                    - 9 -
error in sentencing.         Here, the text of the appellate waiver is

clear and unambiguous; if the sentence imposed is less than 125

months, any appellate review right is waived.                  Thus, despite

Spinks's argument to the contrary, because he was sentenced to

less than 125 months imprisonment, there is no space reserved in

the waiver for a procedural reasonableness challenge.

              Nor are we willing to dictate specific language that the

government must utilize in its plea agreements.               To further his

argument, Spinks points out that, in a Criminal Resource Manual,

the Department of Justice has provided sample appellate review

waiver language stating: "the defendant knowingly waives the right

to   appeal    any    sentence    within   the   maximum   provided   in   the

statute(s) of conviction (or the manner in which that sentence was

determined)."        See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626, ¶

2,   https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-626-plea-

agreements-and-sentencing-appeal-waivers-discussion-law      (last    updated

Jan. 22, 2020).        However, "[w]aivers of appeal vary considerably

in their language and the scope of the waiver is simply a matter

of what the parties agreed to in the particular case."             McCoy, 508

F.3d at 77.     The only condition contemplated by the waiver in this

case was whether the sentence was more or less than 125 months.

As such, there is no reason to read in any additional conditions

nor will we "conjure up an ambiguity in a plea agreement where

none legitimately exists."         United States v. Arroyo-Blas, 783 F.3d

                                     - 10 -
361, 365 (1st Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.

Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also United

States v. Edelen, 539 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that

where the only condition of an appellate waiver is the duration of

the sentence, defendant's knowledge of which "offense level or

corresponding [guidelines sentencing range is] applicable to his

case [is] not a condition of the waiver.").

            Nonetheless, to buttress his contention, Spinks argues

that the scope of the appellate waiver could not include the

district court's guidelines sentencing range calculation because

it   had   not   been   calculated    at   the   time   he   signed   the   plea

agreement.       Thus, Spinks argues that he could not have waived a

challenge to a calculation that had not yet been made.                However,

knowledge of which offense level or what resulting guidelines

sentencing range would apply to his case was not a condition of

the waiver.      Indeed, Spinks was specifically told by the district

court at the change-of-plea hearing that the guidelines sentencing

range had not been determined yet and was warned that even if the

court "impose[d] a sentence more severe than the one called for by

the guideline, you will still not be permitted to withdraw your

guilty plea."      After hearing this warning, Spinks confirmed that

he understood.

            We have previously stated that if a defendant wanted to

know how the Probation Office would treat his past convictions, he

                                     - 11 -
could have requested that information before he signed the plea

agreement.    See United States v. Donath, 616 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir.

2010).   Spinks, however, did not establish any such condition to

his plea agreement, and we have long held that "[w]hen enforcing

the appellate waiver, we stress that both sides are obligated to

live by the bargain they made."         Id. at 84; see Edelen, 539 F.3d

at 86-87 ("The fact that           [a defendant]    considers unjust the

application of the . . . enhancement does not invalidate the

waiver, nor would the fact that he did not know the enhancement

was applicable.").     Thus, even though Spinks had no opportunity to

review the applicable guidelines sentencing range before he signed

the   plea   agreement,   Spinks    remains   bound   by   the   unambiguous

language of the appellate waiver.

             In any event, Spinks's appeal argument is constructed to

reduce his sentence, which is a situation barred by the waiver.

While Spinks may be unsatisfied with the guidelines sentencing

range calculation,      "[i]f the mere fact that a defendant has

arguments he could potentially invoke on appeal were allowed to

invalidate     a   waiver,   then    appellate     waivers   would   become

meaningless."      Edelen, 539 F.3d at 87.

             Here, the district court imposed a sentence of 115

months, coming in under the limit set in the plea agreement and

thus barring any appeal by Spinks.

                                    - 12 -
                   B. The Plea Agreement's Validity

           In the alternative, Spinks argues that even if the waiver

is construed to bar an appeal, the waiver was not entered into

knowingly and thus enforcing it would constitute a miscarriage of

justice.   These contentions are governed by the Teeter framework,

see United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), which

finds appellate waivers presumptively valid "so long as (1) the

agreement clearly delineates the waiver's scope; (2) the district

court specifically inquired about the waiver at the plea hearing;

and (3) denial of the right to appeal would not constitute a

miscarriage of justice."     United States v. Goodman, 971 F.3d 16,

21 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Betancourt-Pérez, 833

F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2016)).

           Spinks argues that if the waiver's scope is clearly

delineated to bar a procedural reasonableness challenge, then the

second and third Teeter factors are not satisfied because the

district   court   failed   to   explain   the   waiver's   full   effect.

Specifically, Spinks maintains that the district court failed to

inform him that the waiver encompassed challenges to the guidelines

sentencing range calculation, which Spinks argues was required in

order for him to have knowingly assented to the waiver.            But we

have established no requirement that the district court must

"drill[] down to lay bare what kinds of claims would be barred by

[an appellate] waiver."     United States v. Staveley, 43 F.4th 9, 15

                                  - 13 -
(1st Cir. 2022).          In fact, the "district court [is] entitled to

rely on the defendant's representations that he was satisfied with

his counsel's handiwork, that he had reviewed the terms of the

plea agreement with his counsel, and that he understood all of

those terms."       Id.

            And,     as    the    record    reflects,     the   district      court

questioned Spinks thoroughly at the change-of-plea hearing to

ensure that he understood his plea agreement.               The district court

confirmed    that    Spinks       had   consulted   his    counsel    about    the

significance of the agreement, that he understood it, that he had

signed it voluntarily, and that he intended to agree to all its

terms and conditions.            Spinks responded affirmatively to each of

the district court's questions, denoting his full understanding of

the agreement.      Yet, the district court went further and explained

that Spinks was "waiving or giving up any right to challenge the

legality of [his] guilty plea and [his] conviction in a higher

court."     The court emphasized that Spinks's agreement meant that

"for all intents and purposes, if I impose a sentence of 125 months

or less, I will be the only judge to review the legality of that

sentence."     Spinks again confirmed his understanding.

            The     district      court    then   discussed     the   guidelines

sentencing range and the court's obligation to calculate the

sentence under the applicable guidelines sentencing range.                      The

court added:

                                        - 14 -
           I can't determine the advisory guideline
           sentence until after I've read a presentence
           report that the probation office will prepare
           and until I've given your lawyer and the
           prosecutor an opportunity to challenge the
           facts in the report.

           After I determine what advisory guideline
           applies to your case, I still have the
           authority to impose a sentence that is more
           severe, or it could be less severe, than the
           sentence called for by the advisory guideline.
           Do you understand?

Spinks replied, "Yes, sir."        Given the extensive questioning, it

is unlikely that Spinks came away from the change-of-plea hearing

believing that he had somehow reserved his right to challenge the

guidelines sentencing range calculation.            Indeed, Spinks's own

comments   at   the   end   of   his   sentencing   hearing   reflect   his

understanding that he had given up that right.        After the district

court explained the appellate waiver once more, Spinks stated that

he understood the appellate waiver but also lamented the fact that

"now I've waived my rights, all my rights."

           Having determined the threshold issue that the appellate

waiver bars Spinks's appeal, we need not consider the merits of

his procedural reasonableness challenge regarding whether his

prior conviction should have been considered relevant conduct to

this case.

                             III. Conclusion

           For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Spinks's appeal.

                                   - 15 -