Court Opinion

ID: 9364396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 16:01:22.011849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.963194
License: Public Domain

21-6172
     Subhani v. Garland
                                                                                BIA
                                                                          Loprest, IJ
                                                                        A209 870 496
                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 19th day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 9                 Chief Judge,
10            BETH ROBINSON,
11            MYRNA PÉREZ,
12                 Circuit Judges.
13   _____________________________________
14
15   JUNAID SUBHANI,
16            Petitioner,
17
18                        v.                                  21-6172
19                                                            NAC
20   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
21   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22            Respondent.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26   FOR PETITIONER:                      Judy Resnick, Esq., Far Rockaway,
27                                        NY.
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
 2                                  Attorney General; Anthony P.
 3                                  Nicastro, Assistant Director;
 4                                  Jenny C. Lee, Trial Attorney,
 5                                  Office of Immigration Litigation,
 6                                  United States Department of
 7                                  Justice, Washington, DC.

 8        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12        Petitioner     Junaid    Subhani,   a   native      and   citizen   of

13   Pakistan, seeks review of a March 1, 2021, decision of the

14   BIA affirming a November 13, 2018, decision of an Immigration

15   Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

16   of   removal,    and    protection   under   the    Convention    Against

17   Torture (“CAT”).         In re Junaid Subhani, No. A209 870 496

18   (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 2021), aff’g No. A209 870 496 (Immig. Ct.

19   N.Y. City Nov. 13, 2018).       We assume the parties’ familiarity

20   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21        In lieu of filing a brief, the Government moves for

22   summary denial of Subhani’s petition for review.                  Summary

23   denial is a “rare exception to the completion of the appeal

24   process”   and    “is    available   only    if    an   appeal   is   truly

25   frivolous.”      United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir.

                                          2
 1   2010) (quotation marks omitted).        A claim is frivolous if it

 2   is based on an “inarguable legal conclusion” or “fanciful

 3   factual allegation.”     Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir.

 4   1995) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).

 5   However,    “not   all   unsuccessful    claims    are    frivolous.”

 6   Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 329.        Subhani has filed his brief, so

 7   rather than determine whether the petition exceeds the low

 8   bar   for   non-frivolousness,    we   construe   the    Government’s

 9   motion as its brief and deny the petition on the merits.

10         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for

11   the sake of completeness.”       Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

12   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).           We review factual

13   findings under a substantial evidence standard and review

14   questions of law and the application of law to fact de novo.

15   Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

16   “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless

17   any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

18   the contrary.”     8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

19         An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal must

20   establish past persecution or a fear of future persecution

21   and that a protected ground “was or will be at least one

22   central reason for persecuting the applicant.”              8 U.S.C.

                                       3
 1   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R.

 2   §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b)(1), (2); Quituizaca v. Garland, No.

 3   19-3470, 52 F.4th 103 (2d Cir. Nov. 1, 2022).                  The applicant

 4   must     provide     direct      or    circumstantial      evidence   of   the

 5   persecutor’s motives.            INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,

 6   483 (1992) (requiring “some evidence” of motive, “direct or

 7   circumstantial”).

 8          We   conclude      that    substantial      evidence    supports    the

 9   agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal on nexus

10   grounds.      See Edimo-Doualla v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282–

11   83 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying substantial evidence standard to

12   nexus determination).             While the protected ground need not

13   be the sole reason for the harm, see Acharya v. Holder, 761

14   F.3d 289, 297–98 (2d Cir. 2014), it “cannot play a minor role

15   in the [noncitizen’s] past mistreatment or fears of future

16   mistreatment.        That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential,

17   superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm,” In

18   re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007).

19   “Whether the requisite nexus exists depends on the views and

20   motives of the persecutor.”                Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191,

21   196–97      (2d    Cir.   2014)       (quotation   marks    omitted).      For

22   example,      to    succeed      on    a   political   opinion   claim,    an

                                                4
 1   “applicant must . . . show, through direct or circumstantial

 2   evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises

 3   from the applicant’s political belief,” Yueqing Zhang v.

 4   Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Elias-

 5   Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482), or an opinion imputed to the

 6   applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not

 7   this imputation is accurate, see Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424

 8   F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).

 9       Subhani claimed that a relative killed his father for

10   the family’s land and because his father supported a rival

11   political party, and that the same relative, along with his

12   associates, targeted Subhani and other family members for

13   contesting the land seizure and seeking justice for his

14   father’s      murder.      Subhani’s      testimony       and     documentary

15   evidence   do    not    compel   a   finding   that       the    perpetrators

16   targeted   him    to    overcome     or   punish    him    for    an   imputed

17   political opinion or membership in a particular social group

18   or family.       See Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545; see also

19   Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where

20   there   are     two    permissible    views    of    the    evidence,      the

21   factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.

22   Rather, a reviewing court must defer to that choice so long

                                           5
 1   as   the    deductions      are    not       illogical      or   implausible.”

 2   (quotation marks and citation omitted)).                      Instead, the IJ

 3   could reasonably conclude that Subhani’s testimony indicated

 4   that the individuals who targeted him and his family either

 5   wanted their land, i.e., that they targeted Subhani’s family

 6   to increase their own wealth, or wanted to evade prosecution

 7   for killing his father.           See Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d

 8   70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting claim based on perceived

 9   wealth and political opinion where putative persecutors had

10   no “motive other than increasing their own wealth at the

11   expense of the petitioners.” (quotation marks omitted));

12   Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999)

13   (“general crime conditions are not a stated ground” for

14   asylum).      Subhani’s documentary evidence does not compel a

15   contrary result.      His medical records and his father’s death

16   certificate do not touch on any potential reasons for his

17   harm,   and   letters      from    his       mother   and    another    relative

18   indicate that Subhani was attacked because of his efforts to

19   hold his father’s killers accountable under the law.                     Without

20   more, the record does not compel a finding that a reason for

21   Subhani’s     harm   was    an    imputed       political     opinion    or   his

22   membership in a particular social group.                    See Yueqing Zhang,

                                              6
 1   426 F.3d at 545 (requiring evidence of motive); see also Jian

 2   Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008)

 3   (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure

 4   to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial

 5   evidence’    necessary   to   support      the   agency’s    challenged

 6   decision.”).

 7       The     nexus   finding   is       dispositive   of     asylum   and

8    withholding of removal.       See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),

9    1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 107.          Finally, Subhani

10   failed to exhaust his CAT claim before the BIA.                See Lin

11   Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir.

12   2007) (“usually . . . issues not raised to the BIA will not

13   be examined by the reviewing court”).

14       For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion for

15   summary denial is construed as its brief and the petition for

16   review is DENIED.    All other pending motions and applications

17   are DENIED and stays VACATED.

18                                  FOR THE COURT:
19                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20                                  Clerk of Court

                                        7