Court Opinion

ID: 9698549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:53:06.683685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.820730
License: Public Domain

Billings, J.,
dissenting. This is an appeal from convictions for unlawful trespass under 13 V.S.A. § 3705. The sole issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence on the defense of necessity at trial on the offer of proof made by the defendants at the preliminary hearing and at the trial.
The defendants, appearing pro se, made an offer of proof detailing the elements of the defense of necessity. The trial judge did not rule on the sufficiency of the offer, but excluded the offered evidence, stating that “the Court does not view it as a justification or a defense as the act as alleged [sic] in Vermont at this time.”
The common law has recognized that an act done through the compulsion of an emergency situation where the peril of imminent danger exists is not a crime. Rhode Island Recreartion Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949); United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14,470); Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1979). Vermont has long recognized and accepted the necessity defense in civil trespass actions. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). That this Court should recognize the existence of this defense is equally, if not more, compelling in the case of criminal trespass than in a civil law action.
Here the trial court prevented the introduction of any evidence on the issue of necessity in spite of the offer of proof. The test is whether the offer of proof was sufficient in form and substance to show that the tendered evidence was relevant and admissible. State v. Merrill, 85 Vt. 35, 38, 80 A. 819, 821 (1911), and material, State v. Fernie, 129 Vt. 605, 606, 285 A.2d 726, 727 (1971). The offer must be only specific and concrete enough to make apparent to the trial court the existence of facts, which, if proved, would make the evidence rele*30vant to an issue in the case and otherwise admissible. Cushman v. Outwater, 121 Vt. 426, 432, 159 A.2d 89, 93 (1960); State v. Lucia, 104 Vt. 53, 58, 157 A. 61, 63 (1931).
The majority states that the danger of low-level radiation and nuclear waste, which the defendants offered to prove, are “not the types of imminent danger classified as an emergency sufficient to justify criminal activity.” Furthermore, the majority dismisses those portions of the proof dealing with the threat of a nuclear accident by characterizing them as mere “speculative and uncertain dangers.” In doing so the majority has decided to so read the evidence as to give credibility only to that evidence offered on the effects of low-level radiation. This approach is clearly inconsistent with the case of State v. Fernie, supra, 129 Vt. at 606, 285 A.2d at 727, in which then Justice Barney held that it is reversible prejudicial error for the trial court to exclude a whole line of material evidence tending to support a defense even though “[d]eficiencies in the admissibility of such evidence might . . . have later appeared.” It is not for this Court to weigh the credibility of the evidence in this manner where there is evidence offered on the elements of the defense. While this case might stand in a different posture if, at the close of the defendants’ evidence, they had failed to introduce evidence, as offered, on each and every element of the defense sufficient to make out a prima facie case, that situation is not before us. Furthermore, it is not for the trial judge to rule on the ultimate credibility and weight of the evidence. Where there is evidence offered which supports the elements of the defense, the questions of reasonableness and credibility are for the jury to decide. See State v. Wilson, 113 Vt. 524, 527, 37 A.2d 400, 401 (1944).
The defendants offered evidence on all the requisite elements of the defense of necessity. They stated as follows:
[They had] a feeling that there was a situation of an emergency or imminent danger that would have occurred with the start up of the reactor on October 8th the time of [their] alleged crime . . . the chance ... of the nuclear power plant having a serious accident which would cause . . . great untold damage to property and lives and health for many generations.
*31The defendants also stated that “there was reasonable belief that it would have been an emergency had they started that reactor up . . . there was a very good chance of an accident there for which there is no insurance coverage or very little.” Specifically, the defendants offered to show by expert testimony that there were defects in the cooling system and other aspects of the power plant which they believed could and would result in a meltdown within seven seconds of failure on the start up of the plant. In addition, the defendants went to great lengths to base their defense on the imminent danger that would result from the hazardous radiation emitted from the plant and its wastes when the plant resumed operations.
While the offer made by the defendants was laced with statements about the dangers they saw in nuclear power generally, it is clear that they offered to show that the Vermont Yankee facility at which they were arrested was an imminent danger to the community on the day of the arrests; that, if it commenced operation, there was a danger of meltdown and severe radiation damage to persons and property. In support of this contention, the defendants stated that they would call experts familiar with the Vermont Yankee facility and the dangerous manner of its construction, as well as other experts who would testify on the effects of meltdown and radiation leakage, on the results of governmental testing, and on the regulation of the Vermont Yankee facility. These witnesses were highly qualified to testify about the dangers at the Vermont Yankee facility based either on personal knowledge or on conditions the defendants offered to show existed at the time of the trespass.
Furthermore, the defendants offered to show that, in light of the imminent danger of an accident, they had exhausted all alternative means of preventing the start up of the plant and the immediate catastrophe it would bring. Under the circumstances of imminent danger arising from the start up of the plant, coupled with the resistance of Vermont Yankee and government officials, which the defendants offered to prove, nothing short of preventing the workers access to start up the plant would have averted the accident that the defendants expected.
*32Through this offer, it cannot be said, without prejudgment, that the defendants failed to set forth specific and concrete evidence, which, if proven, would establish the existence of an imminent danger of serious proportions through no fault of the defendants which could not be averted without the trespass. See United States v. Ashton, supra, 24 F. Cas. at 874. Whether the defendants’ expectations and opportunities were reasonable under the circumstances of this case is not for the trial court to decide without hearing the evidence. See Nelson v. State, supra, 597 P.2d at 979-80. From a review of the record, I am of the opinion that the offer here measured up to the standard required and that the trial court struck too soon in excluding the offered evidence.
I would also dissent from the concurring opinion in so far as it attempts to hide behind inferences that the legislature precluded the courts from hearing the defense of necessity in the instant case on the authority of State v. Dorsey, 118 N.H. 844, 895 A.2d 855 (1978). Even assuming that such inferences can be drawn from the regulatory schemes cited, they have no bearing on this case. We are asked to infer under the facts, which the defendants offered to prove (that they were acting to avert an imminent nuclear disaster), that the legislative branch of government would not permit the courts of this state to entertain the defense of necessity because it had legislatively determined nuclear power to be safe. Were the defense raised without any offer to show an imminent danger of serious accident, it might fail both because defendants did not offer evidence on imminent danger and on the basis of legislative preclusion. But, where, as here, the defendants offer to prove an emergency which the regulatory scheme failed to avert, the inference of preclusion is unwarranted. The defendants are entitled to show that although there is a comprehensive regulatory scheme it had failed to such an extent as to raise for them the choice between criminal trespass and the nuclear disaster which the regulatory scheme was created to prevent.
Moreover, statutory enactments in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. This Court has heretofore been of the opinion that with regard to the language of statutes, the “ [r] ules of common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication.” State v. Levine, 117 Vt. *33320, 322, 91 A.2d 678, 679 (1952). The concurring opinion fails to indicate any basis for its implication, and I can find none that meets this test. In fact, the statutes to which the concurring opinion directs our attention make it the duty of the Nuclear Advisory Panel “[t]o develop awareness in the state ... of the potential liabilities ... of a fixed nuclear facility in this state,” 18 V.S.A. § 1701(a)(5), and generally secure to the people, as individuals and through their local and state representatives, the right to evaluate the dangers of depositing, storing, or reprocessing high-level radioactive waste materials, 10 V.S.A. §§ 6501-6504. Moreover, the legislature has seen fit to recognize the right of individuals to sue for damages resulting from ionizing radiation. 12 V.S.A. § 518. It cannot be said categorically that “[ijmplicit within these statutory enactments is the policy choice that the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its dangers,” as the concurring opinion states.
I am of the opinion that the defendants are entitled to present evidence on the defense of necessity as it exists at common law. To deny them this opportunity is to deny them a fair trial merely because they express unpopular political views. I would hold that they are entitled to present evidence on this defense even though they may well fail to establish a sufficient case to send the issue to the jury for deliberation, because I find the offer of proof sufficient for this purpose under the law of Vermont.