Court Opinion

ID: 9553152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:23:46.333458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:57.893997
License: Public Domain

MARKS, J., Concurring.
I consider it necessary to briefly explain my concurrence in view of the recent case of Swartzbaugh v. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 451 [54 Pac. (2d) 73], where this court said: “An estate in joint tenancy can be severed by destroying one or more of the necessary unities, either by operation of law, by death, by voluntary or certain involuntary acts of the joint tenants, or by certain acts or omissions of one joint tenant without the consent of the other. ’ ’ I believe this correctly states the rule applied at common law and prevailing in the great majority of the states which follow that law. It is evident that if the rule be strictly applied the conclusion follows that where personal propery is purchased with joint tenancy funds and title is placed in the name of one of the cotenants the joint tenancy estate is terminated by the destruction of one of its necessary unities (Siberell v. Siberell, 214 Cal. 767 [7 Pac. (2d) 1003], namely, unity of title.
In California there has been recognized and established an exception to the application of this rule which to me seems to have become a rule of property that now must be followed. The exception found its definite origin in Estate of Harris, 169 Cal. 725 [147 Pac. 967]. There a husband and wife had *370agreed that all property held and acquired by them should be held together in joint ownership as joint tenants. They opened a bank account as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. With money withdrawn from this account they purchased corporate stock and some of the certificates were issued in the name of the husband. The Supreme Court held that this stock retained the character of the joint tenancy and formed no part of the husband’s estate.
A similar situation was presented in the case of In re Kessler, 217 Cal. 32 [17 Pac. (2d) 117], in respect to a deposit of $600 in the individual bank account of a cotenant. It was there said: ‘ ‘ The balance, $600, represented interest paid by the maker on one of the notes held in joint tenancy, and the court was justified in finding, as with the above-mentioned notes, that the proceeds took on the character of the property with which they were acquired, and were consequently held in joint tenancy.” (See, also, Young v. Young, 126 Cal. App. 306 [14 Pac. (2d) 580]; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 2 Cal. App. (2d) 684 [38 Pac. (2d) 790]; Estate of McCoin, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 480 [50 Pac. (2d) 114], and cases there cited.)
From the foregoing cases, and others that might be cited, it would seem to me to follow that in California where property is purchased with funds of the joint tenancy and title is placed in the name of one of the joint tenants it will retain its character as joint tenancy property unless there be facts from which the reasonable inference may be drawn that the cotenants agreed that the joint tenancy in the newly acquired property be terminated and it be held in a different estate. In the instant case there were such facts which justified the trial judge in drawing such an inference. (See Estate of Putnam, 219 Cal. 608 [28 Pac. (2d) 27].)
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 19, 1936..