Court Opinion

ID: 9843685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:41:50.893943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:52.135601
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 24] I agree the district court properly decided there was insufficient service of process upon the City of Minot itself. Still, I deplore the special technical treatment created by our rules of procedure for service of process upon a governmental entity, as differentiated from a business entity. Compare service of process on a business entity (delivery “to an officer, director, superintendent or managing or general agent,” under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2)(D)(i)) with service on a governmental entity (delivery “to any member of its governing board,” under Rule 4(d)(2)(E)). While it may be desirable to provide specifically for service on govern- mental entities for some reasons, there seems to be no reason that the rules do not authorize service on the chief executive officer of a governmental entity. More than any quasi-legislative delegate of a governmental unit, the chief executive officer would be the *96most responsible figure for acting to defend against a claim.
[¶ 25] “The city manager shall be the chief administrative officer of the city-” N.D.C.C. § 40-10-03. Elsewhere, generally, the chief administrative officer or chief executive of a governmental unit qualifies for service of process on the entity. Notable is F.R.Civ.P. 4(j)(2): “Service upon a state, municipal corporation, or other governmental organization subject to suit shall be effected by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer. ...” It is not just ironic, but unjust, that the service on the City in this case would have been perfectly valid if this case had been brought in federal court. We of this Court, who are responsible for making the procedural rules, should be more contemplative of the potential for injustices in their content. I hope our Joint Procedure Committee will recommend a revision to remedy this differential treatment that can lead to injustices for other litigants, and that this Court will adopt it.
[¶ 26] I concur in reversing the summary judgment dismissing this claim against the Water Resource District. There are numerous issues of fact concerning both its direct and vicarious liability.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the Water Resource District cannot be “a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest” with the City of Minot.2 In my opinion, most of the issues of fact concerning the District’s vicarious liability are equally issues of fact for its unity of interest with the City of Minot. The majority’s interesting speculations about different defenses possible for the City and the District mirror undecided factual questions for joint liability.
[¶ 28] A city and a water resource district can jointly exercise their powers. Part of N.D.C.C. § 54-40-01(1) declares: “Two or more governmental units or municipal corporations having in common any portion of their territory or boundary, by agreement entered into through action of their governing bodies, may jointly or cooperatively exercise their respective separate powers, or any power common to the contracting parties or any similar powers_” (My emphasis). The powers of a municipality include: “Flood control projects. To acquire, construct, maintain, operate, finance, and control flood control projects, both within and adjacent to such municipality, and for such purpose to acquire the necessary real property and easements therefor by purchase and eminent domain, and to adopt such ordinances as may reasonably be required to regulate the same.” N.D.C.C. § 40-05-01(68). See also N.D.C.C. § 40-05-01(59) empowering a city “[t]o accept aid from, cooperate and contract with, and to comply with and meet the requirements of any federal or state agency for the establishment, construction, and maintenance of public works, including dams and reservoirs ... for flood control ... ”, et cet-era. (My emphasis). “Cities shall also have the power to enter into an agreement with any such government, agency, or municipality ... to hold such government, agency, or municipality harmless from any and all liability or claim of liability arising from the establishment, construction, and maintenance of such works, and to indemnify such government, agency, or municipality for any such liability sustained by it ... ”, et cetera. Id. A water resource district is specifically empowered under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-09(3), (my emphasis), to “contract with the state or federal government, or any department or agency thereof, or any municipality within the district, in furnishing assurances and meeting local cooperation requirements of any project involving control ... of water.”
[¶29] The City and the District jointly agreed on a flood control structure. That should make it a joint project. Partners, joint venturers,3 and agency relationships of*97ten have agreements between themselves on how to share their joint responsibilities. For examples, compare N.D.C.C. eh. 45-16 (“Relations Of Partners To Each Other And To Partnership”), with N.D.C.C. ch. 45-15 (“Relations Of Partners To Persons Dealing With Partnership”), particularly N.D.C.C. § 45-15-05 (“Partnership hable for partner’s actionable conduct”). Similarly, compare N.D.C.C. ch. 3-02 (“Relation Between Principal And Agent”), with N.D.C.C. ch. 3-08 (“Relation Between Principal And Third Person”), and N.D.C.C. ch. 3-04 (“Relation Between Agent And Third Person”). Contracts between joint venturers do not defeat the unity of interest their conduct jointly manifests to others.
[¶ 30] In my opinion, despite the majority’s speculations about different defenses by each, there are many factual questions on the unity of interest between the City and the District on this common flood control structure. Findings on those factual elements could implement ■ N.D.C.C. § 28-01-38 to make the valid service of process on the District binding on the City as “a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest” with the District.
[¶31] To me, this project sounds like a joint one, it looks like a joint one, and these entities acted like it was a joint project. I believe Gessners should have the opportunity to prove at a trial it was a joint project.
[¶ 32] For these reasons, I would also reverse the summary judgment dismissing the City of Minot, and I would remand for a complete determination of the factual disputes about their unity of interest. Those factual disputes are inextricably intertwined with the unresolved factual disputes on vicarious liability of the District that are otherwise remanded. The dismissal as to the City should be provisional on findings that it was not a “joint contractor or otherwise united in interest.” Therefore, I dissent from affirming the summary judgment completely dismissing this claim against the City of Minot.
[¶ 33] Herbert L. Meschke

. See 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures § 73 (1994)(footnotes omitted): "Service upon a joint venture may be made by personally serving process on any one of the joint venturers. Service on any joint venturer is deemed service on all the others on the theory that each joint venturer is the principal and the agent of the others.”

. See 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Ventures § 3 (1994)(footnotes omitted): "Joint ventures are, in general, governed by the same rules as partnerships.” And, § 24: "Each member of a joint venture may be regarded as both an agent for his coventurers and a principal for himself....” See *97also 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, And Other Political Subdivisions § 217 (1971)(footnote omitted): "[Tjhere seems to be no reason in law which prevents two or more municipal corporations from engaging in a joint enterprise or project, except as they may be limited by constitutional or statutory provisions of the particular jurisdiction in which they are located.”