Court Opinion

ID: 9575152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:03.908209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:04.128656
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent in part. I agree only with the majority opinion that the white powder in plain view on the headboard should be admitted into evidence. I cannot agree that the remainder of the contraband in question was lawfully seized. The majority relies primarily upon two cases: McDowell v. State, 172 Ga. App. 643 (1) (324 SE2d 211) (1984), and Hatten v. State, 253 Ga. 24 (315 SE2d 893) (1984). Neither of these cases applies to the facts of the instant case. McDowell was an automobile search case. The rule in McDowell derived from State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141 (293 SE2d 529) (1982), which, in turn, relied upon New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (101 SC 2860, 69 LE2d 768) (1981). “ ‘While the Chimel case [395 U. S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685) (1969)] established that a search incident to an arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of “the area within the immediate control of the arrestee” when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant... In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, ... we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. [Cit.]’ ” State v. Hopkins, supra at 143. The quoted language clearly shows that the rule relied upon by the majority applies only to automobile searches due to the inherent exigencies arising from the mobility of the automobile. Such exigencies do not exist in regard to one’s residence. I cannot agree that Hatten v. State, supra, stands for the proposition that the rule in *598automobile cases such as McDowell may be extended to one’s residence. In Hatten the Georgia Supreme Court applied the rule set out in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (98 SC 2408, 57 LE2d 290) (1978): “ ‘(W)hen the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. . . . And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.’ [Cit.]” Hatten v. State, supra at 25. Thus, Hatten, relying on Mincey, recognizes that certain exigencies exist when dealing with homicide, and gives police the latitude necessary to deal with those exigencies; that is, to search for other possible victims or killers, and while so doing, police are permitted to seize evidence discovered in plain view. However, the central purpose of the permissible search is not the discovery of evidence, but rather to ensure the safety of officers and citizens present. Similarly, the central purpose in allowing the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile is not the discovery of evidence, but rather to ensure the safety of those present and to prevent possible destruction of evidence. An automobile is infinitely easier to get into to remove something than is a house.
My point is that the law has long recognized that exigencies exist which dictate that police make prompt warrantless searches, and that such searches are not unreasonable and thus offensive under the Fourth Amendment. However, such searches have always been limited. The majority opinion leaves no limits. Exigency would exist whenever a valid warrantless arrest occurred, and a thorough search of the premises allowed. This far exceeds the recognized exceptions which permit warrantless searches.
“In exigent circumstances . . . , police officers are authorized, pursuant to a lawful arrest, to enter upon . . . premises and conduct a reasonable search of the suspects’ persons and immediate presence.” Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 717 (305 SE2d 443) (1983). “Once lawfully within the house, the officers were authorized to make a search of the entire house for the limited purpose of securing it, i.e., discovering the presence of all occupants and eliminating the possibility of harm to the officers and the destruction of evidence.” Lentile v. State, 136 Ga. App. 611, 613 (222 SE2d 86) (1975).
Both Detective Starrett and Officer Wynn testified that they were not searching for weapons when they searched the bedroom. At the time he searched the purse, Officer Wynn testified that Poole and Camp had already been moved to the living room. Likewise, when the cache of marijuana was discovered inside the closed headboard, the suspects had already been safely secured in the living room. At that point Detective Starrett and Officer Wynn “were not authorized to open up closed containers or otherwise discover contraband which *599was not in plain view, and this is true whether they were conducting the warrantless search incident to the lawful arrest of the occupants or under the exigencies of the situation . . . The ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. The first of those is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle . . . that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances’ . . . The second limitation is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. After it was determined that all of the occupants of the house . . . were in custody, no exigency existed which would justify a general search of the entire house. At that point, the officers could, and should, have procured a search warrant to discover whatever contraband or other evidence may have been on the premises, not in plain view.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lentile v. State, supra at 614-15. In my opinion, the trial court did not err in excluding the contraband discovered in the closed headboard or under the cushion.
Decided July 15, 1985
Rehearing denied July 31, 1985
Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, Richard S. Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Wallace C. Clayton, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Benham join in this dissent.