Court Opinion

ID: 9688538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:55:49.119399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:32.397084
License: Public Domain

DIETZEN, Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case. But I disagree with its underlying analysis, particularly its *649conclusion that the applicable language of the statute is unambiguous.
The applicable language of Minn.Stat. § 641.12 is set forth in the first portion of subdivision 3(a), which provides:
A county board may require that an offender convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail, workhouse, or correctional or work farm pay the cost of the offender’s room, board, clothing, medical, dental, and other correctional services.
The majority concludes that subdivision 3(a) unambiguously provides that a county may not require persons to pay for the costs of confinement incurred before conviction. It reasons that the word “offender” means a person convicted of a crime, that Jones was a “nonoffender” until he was convicted, and therefore that the county may not require payment for preconviction confinement costs under subdivision 3(a). I agree with the majority that an “offender” is “[a] person who has committed a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1185 (9th ed. 2009). But the majority also concludes that “[t]he state deems a person to have committed a crime upon conviction” and that under Minnesota law, a “ ‘conviction’ occurs when the court accepts and records a guilty plea.” I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a person is not an “offender” until that person is convicted of a crime.
In my view, subdivision 3(a) is ambiguous in two ways. First, the word “offender” might mean a person convicted of a crime, or “offender” might mean a person who has been charged with a crime, but not yet convicted. The first sentence of subdivision 3(a) provides that the county may require an “offender convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail” to pay the cost of confinement. Under the majority’s interpretation, the word “offender” is redundant. Specifically, the majority reads “offender” as a person who is convicted of a crime. By doing so it renders the words “convicted of a crime” superfluous. It is presumed that all statutory language has a purpose. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.2006) (“We must presume that every statute has a purpose and that no statutory language should be deemed superfluous or insignificant.”); Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (“A statute should be interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all its provisions; no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
But it is also reasonable to conclude that “offender” means a person who is charged with a crime, but has not yet been convicted of that crime. Under this interpretation, the words “convicted of a crime” modify the word “offender,” and limit the meaning of “offender.” Thus, the words “convicted of a crime” are not rendered superfluous.
Second, subdivision 3(a) does not explicitly state whether the county may require payment for the costs of confinement beginning on the date of confinement or the date of conviction. The meaning of the phrase “offender convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail” is pivotal in answering the question. In my view, this phrase is susceptible of two different interpretations, and therefore is ambiguous. First, the words “offender convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail” could mean that the two conditions must exist before the offender’s obligation to pay is triggered, thus limiting the time period for which the county may require payment of confinement costs. The majority adopts this “time limitation” interpretation. But this interpretation renders the words “convicted of a crime” superfluous. *650Put differently, this interpretation does not answer the question of whether the county may require payment for the confinement costs of an “offender” charged with a crime, but not yet convicted of that crime.
Alternatively, we could read the phrase “offender convicted of a crime and confined in the county jail” as not placing any time limitation upon the county’s ability to require payment from the “offender” for the costs of confinement. Under this interpretation, a county may require the “offender” to pay for preconviction confinement costs. Other language of subdivision 3(a) supports this interpretation. Specifically, the third sentence states: “During the period of confinement, the costs may be deducted from any money possessed by the offender....” Minn.Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(a). This language covers the period of confinement without limitation and therefore includes preconviction confinement.
Based upon my analysis of the entire statute, however, I conclude that the “time limitation” interpretation is the most reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. Simply stated, the statute does not explicitly provide that the county may require payment for the preconviction time period; yet, it could have easily done so. Under principles of lenity, when we have competing interpretations of a statute, we apply the more narrow interpretation. State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (Minn.2003). Here, the more narrow interpretation is the “time limitation” interpretation. In applying this interpretation, the words “convicted of a crime” are rendered superfluous, but these words do not contradict the “time limitation” interpretation of the statute. Further, it is not reasonable to confer a right to the county to require persons to pay preconviction costs when the legislature has not explicitly provided for it.