Court Opinion

ID: 9600863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:32:18.100799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.130447
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion which: (1) affirms the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff Angelí Copper, Desmond Johnson, Eric Warren, Joshua Thorpe, and Jazmyn Jenkins’ proce*287dural due process claims; (2) affirms the trial court’s dismissal of all of plaintiffs’ equal protection claims; and (3) reverses the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief. I disagree with that portion of the majority’s opinion which reverses Todd Douglas’ (“Douglas”) procedural due process claims against Ann T. Denlinger (“Denlinger”), in her individual capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Durham Public School Board of Education (“School Board”) pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution. I respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the standard of review is whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory. The complaint must be liberally construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts to support his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Hunter v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 162 N.C. App. 477, 480, 593 S.E.2d 595, 598 (internal citations and quotation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 49 (2004). This Court is not required “ ‘to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.’ ” Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 174 N.C. App. 266, 274, 620 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2005) (quoting Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002)). “This Court must conduct a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency and to determine whether the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss was correct.” Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 157 N.C. App. 396, 400, 580 S.E.2d 1, 4, aff’d, 357 N.C. 567, 597 S.E.2d 673 (2003).
II. Douglas’ 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 claim
The majority’s opinion holds the trial court erred by dismissing Douglas’ long-term suspension claim brought against Denlinger, in her individual capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 disagree.
A. Federal Procedural Due Process
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be *288subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis supplied). Our Supreme Court has stated, “[t]o state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show actual deprivation of a federal right under color of law. Federal rights are those secured by the United States Constitution and federal statutes.” Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 432, 471 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1996) (internal citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis supplied), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1112, 136 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1997).
“The United States Supreme Court has stated that a student facing suspension has a property interest that qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Roberts, 150 N.C. App. 86, 91-92, 563 S.E.2d 37, 41 (2002) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 735-36 (1975)), disc. rev. improvidently allowed and appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 660, 576 S.E.2d 327, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 820, 157 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2003). “At the very minimum . . . students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 579, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 737. However, “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.” Id. at 584, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 740.
In In re Roberts, this Court stated, with respect to long-term suspensions, “[t]he protections of due process require that petitioner be apprised of the evidence received and given an opportunity to explain or rebut it.” 150 N.C. App. at 92-93, 563 S.E.2d at 42 (citing Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972)). Based upon the particular facts of In re Roberts, i.e., where the respondent sought to impose a long-term suspension and the Board Policy specifically provided for a factual hearing before the Hearing Board, this Court held the petitioner was entitled to “have the opportunity to have counsel present, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.” 150 N.C. App. at 93, 563 S.E.2d at 42. Although the holding in In re Roberts was limited to those particular facts, this Court subsequently stated:
*289when a school board seeks to impose a long-term suspension, a student not only has the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, the student also has the right to a full hearing, an opportunity to have counsel present at the hearing, to examine evidence and to present evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, and to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.
In re Alexander v. Cumberland Cty Bd. of Educ., 171 N.C. App. 649, 657, 615 S.E.2d 408, 415 (2005) (citing In re Roberts, 150 N.C. App. at 92-93, 563 S.E.2d at 42).
B. Failure to State a Claim
We must now examine whether the allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint are sufficient to state a federal procedural due process claim against Denlinger, in her individual capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The majority’s opinion holds the trial court erred by dismissing Douglas’ long-term suspension claim against Denlinger based upon the following allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint: (1) “Denlinger purposely postdated her letter October 8 [DAY 9] to cut off [Douglas’] right to appeal” and (2) Denlinger’s October 8 letter was a “lie.” I disagree with the majority’s analysis. Any alleged interference with Douglas’ “right to appeal” is insufficient to establish a violation of federal procedural due process under “the United States Constitution” or “federal statutes.” Edward Valves, Inc., 343 N.C. at 432, 471 S.E.2d at 346. Our Supreme Court has stated “the question [of] whether the right of appeal is essential to due process of law . . . has frequently been considered by the courts and answered in the negative.” Gunter v. Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 457-58, 120 S.E. 41, 44 (1923). “Due process of law ... is not necessarily judicial process, and to due process the right of appeal is not essential.” Id. at 458, 120 S.E. at 44.
The procedures to be used in appealing a long-term suspension are statutorily outlined in the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-391 (2003). Douglas’ “right to appeal” is provided by state statutory law, not federal constitutional law. The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint are insufficient to state a federal procedural due process claim against Denlinger pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and were properly dismissed.
Alternatively, I would hold that the preceding allegations are nothing more than “unreasonable inferences” based upon the other *290allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint. Good Hope Hosp., Inc., 174 N.C. App. at 274, 620 S.E.2d at 880. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged Douglas’ mother, Mrs. Smith, met with school administrators on multiple occasions after being notified that Douglas was being suspended from school based upon his gang affiliation. On 8 October 2003, a school counselor delivered a letter to Douglas, which was signed by Denlinger and stated “after ‘careful review’ of [Douglas’] school records,” Denlinger believed Douglas presented a danger to the school. The 8 October letter further stated that Denlinger had approved the principal’s request for Douglas to transfer from Southern High School to Lakeview High School “effective immediately.” Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that Denlinger’s 8 October letter addressed Douglas’ suspension or his right to appeal. Further, plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain any other allegation sufficient to support the inference that Denlinger informed Mrs. Smith that Douglas did not have the right to appeal a short-term suspension, by letter or any other means of communication. The record shows after Mrs. Smith had retained counsel, met with various administrators, and received the 8 October letter, no further appeal was sought on any basis, nor was there any legal action taken until nearly three years later with the commencement of this lawsuit.
Nothing in the record supports the allegations that Denglinger’s 8 October letter was designed to “cut off’ Douglas’ right to appeal or that it was a “lie.” These allegations are nothing more than “unreasonable inferences” that should be disregarded by this Court. Good Hope Hosp., Inc., 174 N.C. App. at 274, 620 S.E.2d at 880. The trial court correctly found that plaintiffs, including Douglas, failed to state a federal procedural due process claim against Denlinger, in her individual capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The trial court’s ruling on this issue should be affirmed. Based upon this analysis, it is unnecessary to address whether Denlinger was entitled to qualified immunity or whether Douglas’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim survived his death. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1 (2003).
III. Douglas’ State Constitutional Claim
The majority’s opinion further holds that the trial court erred by dismissing Douglas’ long-term suspension claim against the School Board pursuant to the North Carolina Constitution. I disagree.
Here, the trial court’s order stated the following in regards to plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims:
*2915. State law provides a remedy for challenging final administrative decisions that allegedly violate federal or state statutory or constitutional law or board policy and for challenging long-term suspension or expulsion decisions. North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 115C-45(c) grants students the right to appeal final administrative decisions to the board of education. North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 115C-391(e) grants the right to appeal a long-term suspension or expulsion to the board of education. Under both statutes, the board’s decision is subject to judicial review in accordance with Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes. .Plaintiffs cannot bring direct claims under the North Carolina Constitution when there is an adequate state remedy available. Adequate state remedies were available to plaintiffs for their state constitutional claims; therefore, plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims for violations of their procedural due process and equal educational opportunity rights are DISMISSED.
In a separate section of its order, the trial court also dismissed plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims and equal educational opportunity rights based upon plaintiffs’ failure to allege that they had exhausted their administrative remedies or that these remedies were inadequate. The trial court’s order can be read as dismissing plaintiffs’ procedural due process claims under the North Carolina Constitution on two alternative and equally valid bases. Plaintiffs have failed to overcome the presumption of correctness in the trial court’s order or to show reversible error on this issue.
The majority’s opinion acknowledges in two separate instances that plaintiffs failed to assign error to or argue the issue of whether the trial court erred in holding adequate alternative state remedies existed to preclude plaintiffs’ state constitutional procedural due process claims. When addressing plaintiffs’ short-term suspensions under the North Carolina Constitution, the majority’s opinion states:
Although plaintiffs addressed the trial court’s separate conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, plaintiffs’ brief does not contain any specific argument regarding the trial court’s determination that adequate alternative remedies exist. Even if plaintiffs’ assignments of error could be construed as assigning error to this particular conclusion of law, Rule 28(b)(6) provides that “[assignments of error... in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.”
*292(Emphasis supplied). When addressing plaintiffs’ long-term suspensions under the North Carolina Constitution, the majority’s opinion also states: “The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ state constitutional claims based on long-term suspensions on the grounds that (1) an adequate alternative state remedy existed and (2) plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Plaintiffs only assigned error to the exhaustion basis for the trial court’s dismissal.”
Because plaintiffs’ failed to challenge the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ state constitutional procedural due process claims on the basis that an adequate alternative state remedy existed, this issue is not properly before this Court and the trial court’s ruling remains undisturbed. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2007) (“Assignments of error not set out in the appellant’s brief . . . will be taken as abandoned.”). It is well-established that “[a] claim under our state constitution is available only ‘in the absence of an adequate state remedy.’ ” Craig v. New Hanover Cty Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 651, 655, 648 S.E.2d 923, 926 (2007) (quoting Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 782, 413 S.E.2d 276, 289 (1992)), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 234, 659 S.E.2d 439 (2008). The trial court properly dismissed Douglas’ state constitutional claim. Plaintiffs have brought forth no argument on appeal to reverse this ruling. The majority’s opinion erroneously reverses the dismissal of Douglas’ state constitutional due process claim against the School Board.
IV. Conclusion
Any alleged interference with Douglas’ state statutory “right to appeal” is insufficient to establish a violation of federal procedural due process under the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Gunter, 186 N.C. at 458, 120 S.E. at 44. Alternatively, the allegations that Denlinger’s 8 October letter “cut off’ Douglas’ right to appeal and was a “lie” were, at most, “unreasonable inferences” based upon the other allegations contained in plaintiffs’ complaint and should be disregarded by this Court. Good Hope Hosp., Inc., 174 N.C. App. at 274, 620 S.E.2d at 880. The trial court properly dismissed Douglas’ federal procedural due process claim against Denlinger, in her individual capacity, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiffs’ failed to challenge the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ state constitutional procedural due process claims on the basis that an adequate alternative state remedy existed. This issue is not properly before this Court and the trial court’s ruling remains undisturbed. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Plaintiffs have brought *293forth no argument on appeal to reverse this ruling. The majority’s opinion erroneously reverses the dismissal of Douglas’ state constitutional procedural due process claim against the School Board. I respectfully dissent.