Court Opinion

ID: 9489939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:28:28.716626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:48.825523
License: Public Domain

MINER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Because I agree with the district court that Críales’ Title VII claims are barred by res judicata, I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority opinion as vacates the judgment dismissing the Title VII claims and pendent state claims. I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it dismisses the remaining federal claims.
The prior action brought by Críales was dismissed as to the Title VTI claims for untimely filing of his second employment discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The majority opinion acknowledges that the dismissal of the Title VII portion of the complaint in that action was grounded in Críales’ failure to state a Title VII claim, Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and that such a dismissal generally is considered a judgment on the merits. See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428 n. 3, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981).
My colleagues nevertheless see the dismissal of the prior action as being for lack of jurisdiction within the intendment of Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b) and therefore without prejudice to the bringing of a new action based upon the earlier timely filing with the EEOC. This analysis is predicated in the main upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). In that case, the Court held that dismissal for the government’s failure to file a statutorily required affidavit of good cause in a denaturalization action was for lack of jurisdiction under 41(b) and therefore without prejudice. There, the district court had not classified the dismissal as without prejudice or for lack of jurisdiction.
*99Aside from the fact that the district court in the opinion giving rise to this appeal makes it clear that the dismissal of the previous action was not intended to have a jurisdictional basis, precedent compels us to arrive at the same result. The Supreme Court could not have been more clear on this subject:
We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Whatever may have been the rule in Costello, it cannot be applied in a Title VII action involving untimely fifing with the EEOC. It is because the “statutory requirement is analogous to a statute of limitations,” Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir.1996), that dismissal for failure to comply with the requirement is a judgment on the merits. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 n. 2 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judica-ta).
Although the result envisioned by the foregoing is most unfortunate, it could have been avoided. Críales could have moved for a stay in the prior action in the district court pending receipt of the right-to-sue letter that resulted from the timely fifing of his first administrative complaint. See Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.1992). In the alternative, Críales could have requested the district court to dismiss the prior action without prejudice to renewal upon receipt of the timely right-to-sue letter. Although Críales has conducted the bulk of this litigation as a pro se litigant, he did appear by counsel at various stages of the first action. Whether the fault is that of counsel or Críales himself, the failure to have considered these alternatives leaves Críales in his present bind.
Because the district court properly dismissed Críales’ federal claims, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988). Críales may bring-his state claims in state court if he chooses to do so;