Court Opinion

ID: 9716269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:32:49.999391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.302495
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with that portion of the opinion which approves the supplemental charge to the jury. While it is true that supplemental charges given in immediate response to a request from the jury are less formal and lack the exactness of the formally prepared original charge, they are not excepted from the rule that a charge must be correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury.
In Silvester v. Kerelejza, 158 Conn. 433, 262 A.2d 157, the jury returned after two hours of deliberation with the following question: “If both are negligent, but he is considered the primary cause, can she [the plaintiff] recover?” Without repeating any portion of its charge on contributory negli*255gence, the court restated the general rules of proximate cause. We held that because the question was clearly susceptible to an interpretation which indicated confusion in the minds of the jury concerning the issue of contributory negligence, it was harmful error for the court to fail to restate the doctrine. Id., 433. In Bottaro v. Schoenborn, 157 Conn. 194, 197, 251 A.2d 79, where the jury had expressed confusion as to the doctrine of supervening negligence, we held it was error for the trial court not to repeat its instructions on that crucial issue. The jury in the present ease obviously had misunderstood the requirement of proximate cause. The fact that the original charge was adequate is irrelevant. Silvester v. Kerelejza, supra, 437.
It is apparent, from the question propounded in the present ease, that the jury were in doubt as to the legal effect of a finding of negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant. They were confused. In this dilemma, notwithstanding what the court had already said to the jury, it was plainly incumbent on the court to give full and adequate instructions to meet all phases of the situation which the question presented. The jury may have found that the plaintiff’s conduct was negligent up to the moment she was injured and that this negligence materially and essentially contributed to the injuries, together with the negligence of the defendant; or the jury may have found that any negligence of the plaintiff was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries. Either situation was consistent with the question asked of the court. It was, therefore, incumbent on the court to give the jury a rule for their guidance in either aspect of their possible finding. This was not done, though the plaintiff’s counsel called to the attention of the court in his excep*256tion to the supplemental charge its failure to instruct the jury on proximate cause. The effect of the court’s failure to give proper instructions was to withdraw the element of proximate cause from the jury’s consideration. Annes v. Connecticut Co., 107 Conn. 126, 131, 139 A. 511.
The majority opinion predicates our holding in the Silvester ease on the time lag between the charge and the “controversial supplemental charge.” What we said (p. 438) is as follows: “It would be improper for us to conclude that the doctrine of contributory negligence could not be confusing to laymen for the same reasons as those supporting our holdings that an inadequate supplemental charge is not saved merely because the jury fails to ask additional questions of the court. Further, the five-day hiatus between the original charge and the jury’s question, while not essential to our holding, lends further strength to the defendant’s contention that the jury were confused.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The present situation is not distinguishable from Silvester no matter how accurate the original charge may be. When the jury asks a question indicating that they are confused it becomes the duty of the trial court to give to the jury adequate instructions. The court’s answer to the question was an unequivocal response to a specific inquiry with the outcome of the case hanging in the balance. To tell a jury that if both the plaintiff and the defendant are negligent they must find for the defendant is an erroneous statement of the law because it completely ignores the requirement of proximate cause. This was tantamount to directing a verdict for the defendant.
The case should be remanded for a new trial.