Court Opinion

ID: 9631132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:29:51.863735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:16.673933
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with Part II.A but not with Parts II.B and C of the majority opinion. Consequently, I concur in Part II.A and dissent as to Parts II.B and C.
Part II.B acknowledges (properly, in my view) the need for an ADA plaintiff to show “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury” for purposes of standing. Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Then it declines (improperly, in my view) to accept the district court’s finding that D’Lil failed to provide evidence of her intent to return to the Best Western Encina as of the time her complaint was filed. In this, as I see it, the analysis is flawed.
First, it dismisses Lujan’s distinction between “ ‘some da/ intentions” and “concrete plans,” 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130, by stating 10372 that ADA plaintiffs are “not required ... to engage in the ‘futile gesture’ of actually returning to an inaccessible place of public accommodation in order to satisfy the injury in fact requirement.” Maj. Op. at 1037 (citing Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.2002)). However, this conflates injury in fact with the additional requirement for' injunctive relief— actual or imminent injury — which is met only if the plaintiff is likely to return such *1042that it can be said her injury is “certainly impending.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 & n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Second, instead of deferring to the district judge’s assessment, the majority decides for itself what “the obvious and most reasonable inference to be drawn from [D’Lil’s] testimony” is. Maj. Op. at 1038. That is not, however, our role when reviewing a district court’s factual determinations after an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1222 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that we apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s finding about the real reason a nonapplicant failed to apply for a position). Further, the opinion supports its own “findings” by allegations in the complaint and declarations in opposition to summary judgment, Maj. Op. at 1039, but these fall by the wayside once an eviden-tiary hearing is held. The evidence at that point is no longer viewed in the light most favorable to D’Lil; rather, controverted facts “must be supported by the evidence adduced” at the hearing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Having heard testimony from D’Lil, the district court found that D’Lil had adduced no evidence as to her intent to return to Santa Barbara or to the Best Western (if accessible) as of December 2002, when the action was brought.1 D’Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 415 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1054, 1055 (C.D.Cal.2006). The record discloses no such evidence which, as the district court noted, would have been but one question away. No one disputes that the date of filing is the critical time; the existence of federal jurisdiction depends on the facts as they were when the action was commenced. See Wilbur v. Locke, 423 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir.2005). Accordingly, I am not firmly convinced that the district court got it wrong.
Even though the majority holds that the court did get it wrong, Part II.C nevertheless discusses credibility. It recognizes that the district court only expressed concerns about credibility. Still, to the extent the court’s concerns might be taken as an adverse credibility finding, the majority rejects the “legal reasoning” on which any such finding is based. Maj. Op. at 1039. Evidently this is because, in the majority’s view, the district court “focused on D’Lil’s history of ADA litigation as a basis for questioning the sincerity of her intent to return to the Best Western Encina.” Id. at 1040. That is not, however, what the district court did. Rather, the court reasoned that statements D’Lil made in connection with other lawsuits are relevant to credibility. 415 F.Supp.2d at 1058 n. 14. This is surely correct, for to the extent that D’Lil represented in prior lawsuits *1043that she intended to return to the place of accommodation at issue in those cases in the reasonably near future, yet never has,2 the sincerity of a similar expression of intent in this law suit — to return to the Best Western Encina in the reasonably near future — is called into question.
When, as here, standing turns on the likelihood of being wronged again, see Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1081, there is nothing remarkable about measuring prior representations against the reality that the plaintiff has not yet done what she said she intended to do. Among other things, this may mean that she has made so many commitments to return to so many places of public accommodation in so many different locales that returning to the place at issue in this case — the Best Western Enci-na-is infeasible or, at least, implausible. In this way, evidence of prior statements may have probative value by shedding light on the present likelihood of repeated injury. If a district court were to so find, after an evidentiary hearing, I see no need for us to be “particularly cautious about affirming credibility determinations that rely on a plaintiffs past ADA litigation.” Maj. Op. at 1040.
In sum, I would affirm because D’Lil failed to show any concrete plan or intent to return to the Best Western Encina as of the time she filed her complaint. Accordingly, she falls short of the standard for standing to seek injunctive relief. To the extent questioned by the majority, I would not fault the district court for credibility concerns based on prior representations of an intent to return to numerous places of public accommodation coupled with the reality that those commitments remain outstanding.

. As the court explained:
It is obvious that Plaintiff could easily have testified to her intention — as of December 13, 2002 — to return to Santa Barbara, her plans for returning to Santa Barbara, and her intention to stay at the Encina Lodge if it were made Accessible. Her testimony, if credited, and if factually sufficient to meet the Lujan requirements, were all that was necessary to meet her burden. Yet Plaintiff was asked no questions that would elicit such testimony. Instead, Plaintiff was asked about her present intentions — in other words, she was asked about her intentions approximately two years and nine months after the relevant time frame. Even then, Plaintiff said only that (1) she had "a case coming up for Mr. Singleton,” (2) she had a trial in Santa Barbara (apparently the suit she filed against Ramada), and (3) she had “been talking about taking a vacation down to Santa Barbara.” Plaintiff later testified that the case for Mr. Singleton was in Carpenteria, not Santa Barbara, and that she has no other work in Santa Barbara. Because questions relating back to 2002 were so obviously relevant and could so easily have been addressed, the Court can only assume the answers would not have established standing.
415 F.Supp.2d at 1054-55 (internal citations to the record omitted).

. There was evidence to this effect with respect to at least six prior suits arising out of a trip that D’Lil took to Redding. Although the record contains no evidence of whether these places had been made accessible such that D’Lil could have safely returned, Maj. Op. at 1040, the more relevant point is that D’Lil never tried to find out. Likewise, the majority posits that whether or not D’Lil revisited the hotels in Redding says little about her intent to visit the Best Western Encina. Id. However true this may be given differences between Redding and Santa Barbara, as well as how far apart they are, the salient inference about the likelihood of her returning to the Best Western Encina is that D’Lil said she would return to the Redding hotels but has not yet done so.