Court Opinion

ID: 9912147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 18:07:16.117937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:17.635666
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 5

                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                      IN THE MATTER OF THE                                   No. 84655
                      GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON
                      AND ESTATE OF KATHLEEN JUNE
                      JONES, PROTECTED PERSON.

                      KATHLEEN JUNE JONES,                                    FL
                      Appellant,
                      vs.
                      ROBYN FRIEDMAN; DONNA
                      SIMMONS; AND ELIZABETH
                      BRICKFIELD, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
                      FOR KATHLEEN JUNE JONES,
                      Respondents.

                                Appeal from district court order granting guardian ad litem
                     fees. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark CountY, Linda
                     Marquis, Judge.
                                Affirmed.

                     Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Scott Cardenas and
                     Elizabeth Mikesell, Las Vegas,
                     for Appellant.

                     Dawson & Lordahl, PLLC, and- Elizabeth Brickfield, Las Vegas,
                     for Respondent Elizabeth Brickfield.

                     Michaelson Law and John P. Michaelson, Ammon E. Francom, and Peter R.
                     Pratt, Henderson,
                     for Respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Simmons.

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                Julia S. Gold, Chairperson, Dara J. Goldsmith, Amicus Curiae Chairperson,
                Michael W. Keane, and Amanda Netuschil, Reno,
                for Amicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Probate and Trust Law Section.

                BEFORE  THE     SUPREME               COURT,    HERNDON,         LEE,      and
                PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

                                                   OPINION

                By the Court, HERNDON, J.:
                            Roughly     18   months    after   respondents    petitioned   for

                guardianship over their mother, triggering the contentious litigation that
                followed,1 the district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to aid it in
                determining the protected person's best interests. The GAL, an attorney,
                soon thereafter filed a notice of intent to seek the fees and costs to be
                incurred at her standard hourly rate. After submitting a report, the GAL
                sought fees at her stated rate. The court awarded her those fees over the
                protected person's objection. At issue in this appeal are three arguments
                against the fee award: (1) the GAL has no right to fees when the district
                court order appointing her did not specify the rate, as required by the
                Nevada Statewide Rules for Guardianship (NSRG); (2) the court improperly
                appointed an attorney as the GAL under NRS 159.0455 and NSRG Rule 8;
                and (3) the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that
                of a fiduciary, not an attorney.

                      'See Matter of Guardianship of Jones, 138 Nev. 51, 507 P.3d 598 (Ct.
                App. 2022), for background information on the guardianship proceedings.
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                            We conclude that the protected person waived any argument
                pertaining to the form of the district court's order by failing to raise the
                issue below. Even so, we note that, within days of the GAL's appointment,
                the protected person was notified that the GAL would seek fees at her
                requested rate of compensation, and the district court's failure to specify the
                rate in the order thus did not prejudice the protected person. We further
                conclude that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as
                requiring the court to •appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved
                volunteer program. However, this error was harmless because the district
                court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the
                complexity of this matter. Lastly, we conclude that the record contains
                substantial evidence supporting the GAL's fee request. The district court
                did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her
                requested fees.
                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            Upon petition, re8pondents Robyn Friedman and Donna
                Simmons became temporary guardians over their Mother, appellant
                Kathleen June Jones (June); their temporary guardianship was followed by
                their sister Kimberly's appointment as guardian. During Kimberly's term
                as guardian, there were over 400 documents filed in the Case; .25 hearings
                held, and at least 3 investigations conducted into the. circumstances
                Underlying the guardianship proceedings. -
                            A major issue between the parties concerned Robyn's and
                Donna's ability to obtain communication, visits, and vacation time with.
                june. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue. and
                aPpointed respondent Elizabeth BriCkfield, an attorney, as GAL for June.
                In particular, the court directed Brickfield to address the issue in the
                following manner:
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                           Schedule[ ] opportunities for Protected Person to
                           elect to speak with and/or visit in person with her,
                           adult daughters and [address] whether • the
                           Guardian has an obligation to facilitate, prompt,
                           encourage, plan, schedule, and/or create an
                           environment that prornotes an• opportunity for
                           continued communication between Protected •
                           Person and her adult daughters based upon the
                           current level of care and needs of the Protected
                           Person.
                The court later asked Brickfield to assist with another issue—that of
                relocating June to California. • It.noted that each of the issues for which it
                sought the GAL's help were interrelated and complex. As to COmpensation,
                the order stated, "Nile guardian ad litem may request fees from the
                guardianship estate or a third party" and any request must comply with
                NRS 159.344.
                            Five days after the order was filed, Brickfield filed a notice Of
                appearance and a notice of intent to•seek attorney fees and costs•froin the
                guardianship estate pursuant to NRS 159.344(3).           BriCkfield's nOtic,.e
                indicated that her hourly rate was •$400 and listed various support staff
                billing at rates ranging from $75 to $350 per hour. In response, June filed,
                a notice of objection, arguing that the GAL was not entitled to her Attorney
                rate of $400 per hour because the issues did not require legal, services or
                legal expertise. June prOposed that the GAL should charge within the
                national average range, which June represented •to be $22 to $45 per hour.
                Kimberly joined June's opposition. Brickfield filed a declaration in resPonse
                to the notice of objection, describing her extensive experience and•
                qualifications and asserting that the rate was comparable to that charged
                by other attorneys with similar qualifications in Clark•County for seryice8
                as counsel and as a GAL.

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                            About 6 weeks later, Brickfield filed her report to the court. The
                report outlined Brickfield's work on the case:
                            (i) reviewed the pleadings relevant to the issues of
                            visitation and Communication and the Physician's
                            Certificate and accompanying report; (ii) met with
                            Ms. Jones by telephone on 2/24/21 and in person on
                            3/25/21; Ms. Jones was accompanied by LACSN
                            counsel; (iii) met individually with Ms. Jones' five
                            children    by separate telephone or          Zoom
                            conferences; the children who are represented by
                            counsel were accompanied by counsel. Each
                            meeting with a child lasted approximately one
                            hour; the two meetings with Ms. Jones totaled one
                            hour; and (iv) separate telephone conversations
                            with the respective children's counsel.
                Brickfield also provided her conclusions and made recommendations in
                June's best interests.
                            Brickfield thereafter filed a petition seeking approval of her
                GAL fees and costs, requesting a total of $5713.50. Brickfield requested

                $5400 in fees for herself for 13.5 hours of work, $310 in fees for 2 hours of
                work by a paralegal, and $3.50 in costs for filing fees.      June objected,

                agreeing that Brickfield was entitled to compensation but arguing that a
                GAL should be paid at a lower GAL rate rather than an attorney rate. She
                added that Brickfield misrepresented how she benefited her and that, in
                fact, she gained no benefit from Brickfield's appointment. She added that
                she should not have to pay for a GAL to whom she objected. The district
                court entered a written order awarding Brickfield her• requested $5713.50
                in fees and costs. June appealed,2 and the Probate and Trust Section of the
                Nevada State Bar was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief.

                      2 Respondents assert that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because

                the order awarding guardian ad litem fees and costs was entered amidst
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                                                       DISCUSSION
                        Any error in the district court's order appointing the GAL is waived
                                    June argues the district court lacked authority to award the

                        GAL fees because it did not specify the GAL's rate in its appointment order.
                        NSRG 8(1) requires the district court to "state the hourly rate to be charged

                        by the guardian ad litem" in the appointment order. June contends that
                        Brickfield cannot receive payment because her rate was not specified in the
                        appointment order. She adds that the district court also did not •amend its
                        appointment order to comply with NSRG 8(I) after receiving Brickfield's
                        notice of intent to seek fees. • Resp-ondents assert that June waived her
                        argument that the order appointing the GAL•does not conform with NSRG
                        8(I) because June failed to raise it below.3 Respondents also argue that any
                        error in failing to state the GAL's exact rate was not prejudicial.
                                    Generally, "[a] point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes
                        to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not

                        ongoing guardianship proceedings and thus does not constitute a special
                        order after final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(8) •and because it
                        is not appealable under any other provision of that rule. We conclude that
                        the order is independently appealable under NRS 159.375(5) (allowing
                        appeals from orders in guardianship proceedings "authorizing the payment
                        of a debt, claim, devise, guardian's fees or attorney's fees"). Moreover,
                        despite respondents' request, we decline to issue sanctions for June's
                        counsel filing this appeal, as this appeal ostensibly was filed to protect her
                        interests and presents previously unanswered questions of law pertaining
                        to attorney GALs. NSRG 9.

                              3Respondents further suggest that the issue was waived when JUne
                        failed to appeal from the order appointing the GAL. However, that order
                        was not appealable. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343,
                        345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) ("[W]e may only consider appeals authorized
                        by statute or court rule."); NRAP 3A(b) (providing appellate jurisdiction
                        over final judgments and other specified orders).
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                  be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52,
                  623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). This general rule applies even to issues that are
                  subject to review de novo. Schuck v. Signature Flight Support of Nev., Inc.,
                  126 Nev. 434, 436, 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010).
                              The record below supports that June waived any argument that
                  the district court order did not satisfy the formalities under NSRG 8(I).
                  June did not raise any such issues with the district court's order in her
                  objection to Brickfield's notice for feeS, nor did she raise •any suCh issues in
                  her opposition to Brickfield's petition .for fees. Finally, June did not raise
                  any issues with the GAL's appointment order at the hearing on the motion
                  for fees. Thus, June waived any arguments to the form of the appointment
                  order.
                     •        Even if the issue had been prOperly raised, Jurie fails to
                  demonstrate any prejudice warranting reversal. See NRCP 61. (providing
                  that reversal is not warranted where the error• is harmless). The order
                  specifically required the GAL to comply with NRS 159.844, indicating tó the
                  parties the GAL was•allowed to seek fees, arid further expressly permitted
                  the GAL to "request fees froth the guardianship. estate or a third party."
                  Shortly after the order was entered and on the same day she filed her notice
                  of appearance, Brickfield filed her notice of intent to seek fees. See NSI1G
                  8(I). June noticed her objection, but the court did not 'alter the noticed
                  compensation rate. Thus, while June correctly notes that the district court
                  should have stated the GAL's permissible hourly rate in its order of
                  appointment, the error was harmless in this instance and did: not diVest the
                  court of authority to later award fees.

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                The district court erred in concluding that it must appoint an cOtorney •to
                serve as a GAL, but the error was harinless
                            In addressing June's objections to Brickfield's motion for fees,

                the district court concluded that it could appoint a nonattorney as GAL only
                if a court-approved volunteer advocate program was established under NRS
                159.0455. June argues that the court erred in so concluding. Respondents
                argue that, even if the court could have appointed a nonattorney outside of
                a volunteer advocate program, no other person who had the appropriate
                training and experience to serve as the GAL was suggested to the court,
                noting that Brickfield was uniquely qualified to address the išsues present
                in such a complex case.
                            The district court's interpretation and construction of a statute

                presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Zohar v, Zbiegien, 130
                Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). Likewise, the district Court's legal
                conclusions regarding court rules are reviewed de novo. Casey u.. Wells
                Fargo Bank, N.A., 128 Nev. 713, 715, 290 P.3d 265, 267 (2012). When
                interpreting a statute that is clear on its face, the language of a statute
                should be given its plain meaning. Zohar, 130 Nev. at 737, 334 P.3d at 405.
                            A GAL may be appointed by the court to represent a protected
                person if the court determines that the protected person will benefit from
                the appointment and the GAL's services will be beneficial in determining
                the protected person's best interests.    •NRS 159.0455(1).     Under NRS

                159.0455(3), "[i]f a court-approved • volunteer advoCate •program fcir
                guardians ad litem has been established in a judicial district, a court may
                appoint a person who is not an attorney to represent a protected person or
                proposed protected person as a guardian ad litem." On•the other hand,
                NSRG 8, which governs GALs appointed pursuant to NRS 159:0455,
                specifies in subsection H that "[a] guardian ad litein may be a trained
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                volunteer from a court-approved advocate program; an attorney, or any
                other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience."
                           June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8(H) contradict each
                other on the topic of who a court may appoint as GAL. But there is no
                conflict: NSRG 8(H) creates a complete list of people who could be eligible
                to serve as a GAL ("a trained volunteer from a court-approved advocate
                program, an attorney, or any other person that the court finds has
                appropriate training and experience"). Meanwhile, the statute clarifies that
                the court may appoint a nonattorney           a court-approved volunteer
                advocate program for guardians ad litern has been established in a judicial
                district." NRS 159.0455(3). But the statute does not create a necessary
                condition for the appointment of a nonattorney. So the district court erred
                in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the appointment of an
                attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program.
                           A third option under NSRG 8(H) exists and does not conflict
                with NRS 159.0455(3). NSRG 8(H) provides three types of•individuals that
                the district court can appoi.nt as a GAL: an attorney, a volunteer from a
                volunteer advocate program, and "any other person that the court finds has
                appropriate training and experience." While the district court analyzed the
                first two options, it did not address the third option, which included any
                person trained and experienced as a GAL. Thus, it erred to the extent it
                concluded that it had to appoint an attorney because no trained volunteer
                was available.
                           This error, however, was • harmless, as the district court
                alternatively stated that an attorney GAL was specifically appointed due-to
                the complex nature of the case, the visitation issues' impact on June, and
                the parties' continuing inability to communicate effectively. See NRCP 61;
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                Cook v. Sunrise Hosri. & Med. Ctr., LLC, 1.24 Nev. 907, 1007, 194 P.3d 1214,
                1220 (2008) (explainiAg that to be reei-Sible error, the moving party must
                demonstrate that a substantial right was prejudiced and "that, but for the
                error, a different result might have been reached"). There is no evidence in
                the record that the district court was aware of any nonattorney with the
                appropriate training and experience to be Considered for the appointment.
                Nor does the record reflect that any such persons were proposed to the
                district court for consideration.    So, while NSRG 8(H) providês• three

                options, the facts of the instant case indicate that the third option was not
                available to the district court.    The district court revieWed. Brickfield's

                extensive qualifications, including her experience, legal .abilities, and
                knowledge in the guardianship field. Because June cannot •demonstrate
                that the district court could have appointed a nonattorney to deal with the
                complex legal issues relating to June's guardianship and relocation, we
                conclude that the district court's error could not-have affected the outcome
                of the GAL proceedings. Its error was thus harmless.    •

                The district court did not abuse its di.scretion in awarding the GAL's fees
                            June contends that the district court should not have awarded
                Brickfield fees at her attorney rate because a GAL performs fiduciary
                services, as opposed to legal services.4 June argues that NRS 159.0455 and
                NSRG 8 make clear that a GAL, as "an officer of the court," is a fiduciary
                and is restricted from "offer[ing] legal advice to the protected person." NRS
                159.0455; NSRG 8(C) (noting that "[a] guardian ad litem is an officer of the
                court"); •NSRG 8(N) (distinguishing the role of an attorney from the role of

                      4June clòes not provide any arguments specific to the $3.50 in costs or
                the paralegal's $310 in fees. Thus, June appears to only .dispute the $5400
                in fees awarded to Brickfield.
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                the GAL); see also NRS 159.344 (concerning the payment of attorney fees
                and costs in a guardiariShiP). June alleke§ that the district court's finding
                that the customary fiduciary rate for a G.AL in Clark County is $400 per
                hour or more has no evidentiary basis and that, based on the market rate,
                a reasonable fee ranges between $22 to $48 per hour.
                            Respondents argue that the district court's fee order is

                supported by substantial evidence and that Brickfield's fees as a GAL were
                appropriately paid at an amount commensurate with her attorney rate.
                Respondents contend that there is no market rate requirement and that the
                dikrict court satisfied the requirements codified in NRS 159.344.
                            But the statute requires a court to determine the nature of the
                services performed in awarding compensation: it distinguishes between
                if services that require an attorney[,] which may be compensated at an

                attorney rate, and "fiduciary services," which may be compensated at a
                fiduciary rate. NRS 159.34.4(5)(g). We now determine that, while GALs in
                Nevada act in the same manner as a fiduciary and do not provide "attoi'ney"
                work, the record nonetheless contains substantial evidence supporting the
                district court's award of Brickfield's requested fees.
                      GALs are fiduciaries
                            A fiduciary relationship is one "between two persons When one
                of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of a.nother
                upon matters within the scope of the relation[ship]." Restatement (Second)
                of Torts § 874 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2008); see also Matter of Frei Irrevocable
                Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 58, 390 P:3d 646, 653 (2017) (sine)..
                            As noted, the district court may appoint a GAL to benefit the

                protected person and assist in determining the protected person's bek
                interests. NRS 159.0455(1)(a). A GAL "is an officer of the court and is not ;

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                a party to the case." NRS 159.0455(4); see also In re Christina B., 23 Cal.
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                Rptr. 2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a GAL is a party's
                representative whose pi.166se is to prótect, the person, creating a role that

                is "more than an attorney's but less than a party's"); Shainwald v.
                Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (collecting cases and
                explaining that "[a] guardian ad litem is a representative of the court"). The
                GAL's duties are limited to those set forth in the district court's order. NRS
                159.0455(2).   GALs are also prohibited from offering legal advice to the

                protected person. NRS 159.0455(4).
                            We conclude that the relationship between GALs and protected
                persons is fiduciary in nature. The scope of duties GALs are ordered to
                perform is directed by the court for the benefit of the protected person.
                NSRG 8. While amicus contends that GALs are only "officers of the court"
                pursuant to NRS 159.0455(4), nothing prevents an officer of the court from
                also being a fiduciary. GALs are required to "zealously advocate for the best
                interest of the protected person . . . in a manner that will enable the court
                to determine the action that will be the least restrictive and in the best
                interest of the protected person or proposed protected person." NSRG 8(B).
                This duty fits squarely with the definition of a fiduciary. Likewise, GALs
                are to "advocate for the best interest of the protected person . . . based on
                admissible evidence available" and "conduct independent in-vestigation and
                assessment of the facts to carry out the directives of the appointing order
                and may submit recommendations to the court that are based on admissible
                evidence." NSRG 8(G).
                            Here, every aspect of the GAL's relationship with June is to. act

                for her benefit and with her best interests in mind under the direction of
                the district court. Other states have recognized the same where the GAL is

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                court-appointed and acting a5 a btanch of the judiciary.5 This, however,
                does not mean that the 'AL catidot "pei..form services that revire an
                attorney. For exainple, advocacy befizire a court is the quintessential task 6f
                an attorney and a purpose of the GAL. See NRS 159.0455(4)(a) & (b)
                (requiring a GAL to advocate for the protected person's best interests in a
                manner that enables the court to act in those interests). We now take thiS
                opportunity to clarify how the GAL's actions in a guardianship proceeding
                bear on the type of fees they may seek.                 •

                 •         In Hull v. United States, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
                compensation for a GAL was taxable as costs or as attorney fees. 971 F.2d
                1499 (loth Cir. 1992). That coUrt held that the GAL's Tole determines
                whether its expenses are taxed as costs or attorney fees. Id. at 1510. It
                then remanded the case to district court to determine what portions of the
                guardian ad litem's work should be taxed as costs and what portiöns should
                be paid as attorney fees based on the nature of the GAL's work; specifically,

                      5 See, e.g., Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cit. 1989)
                (concluding that the GAL is a type of fiduciary); Golin v. Allenby, 118 Cal.
                Rptr. 3d 762, 787 (Ct. App. 2010) (obServing that a GAL's powers are
                "subject to both the fiduciary duties owed to the incompetent person
                and . . . the requirement that court approval be obtained for certain acts");
                People ex rel. MM., 726 P.2d 1108, 1119-20 (Colo. 1986) (noting the
                propriety of appointing a GAL as a fiduciary representative for the
                protected person); Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M.
                1991) (recognizing that GALs "occuP[y] a position of the highest trust
                suggest[ing] that he or she is a fiduciary''); Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d
                689, 706 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that "a guardian ad litem's cõurt-
                appointed role to act as the representative of a minor's interest is sufficient
                to establish a fiduciary relationship"); see also 1 •Pa. 'Cons. Stat. § 1-991
                (2008) (defining GAL as a fiduciary); cf. Fleming v. Asbill, 483.S.E.2d 751,
                75a-54 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the relationship between a GAL and the
                court is not an employer-employee relationship, creating no agency
                relationship between the court and the GAL).
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                based on Whether the GAL performed tasks "as an officer of the cotirt," or
                whether they perforined 1el services aS an attorney." Id. On appeal after
                remand, the court upheld the award of guardian ad litem fees as cošts,
                findin.g undisputed evidence that the GAL rendered services solely as an
                officer of the court while a separately retained attorney rendered attorney
                serviCes. Hull ex rel. Hull v. United States, 53 F.3d 11.25, 1128-29 (10th Cir.
                1995). We now adopt this distinguishing factor because it clarifies that the
                type of work PerfOrmed by the GAL dictates the propriety of the GAL's feeS.
                GALs are ha presumptively entitled to "attorney fees" because they do Isla
                act as attorneys on behalf of the protected person: However, if they perform
                the type of services also performed by .attorneys and have commensurate
                experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate
                for their work. This conclusion accords with NSRG 8(J);. which requites
                courts to analyze the work completed by the GAL and their particWar
                expertise and experience. We hold that courts, When determining feeS,for a
                GAL, should evaluate (1) the experience and qualifications of the GAL,
                (2) the nature and complexity of the 7vork asked Of the GAL, (3) the work
                actually performed, (4) the result of the GAL's work, and (5) any other
                factors the court finds to be relevant in a particular case.° .We adopt theSe
                factors, which are similar to the factors guiding inquiries into attorney feeš'
                in guardianship proceedings, because they bear on the propriety .of

                      °We also clarify that while a GAL seeking compensatibri must meet
                the requirernents pf NRS 159.44, as per NSRG 8(J); the factors listed •in
                NRS 159.344(5) apply only to attorney fees, not GAL fees. That is, GALs
                must meet the written notice and petition requirements laid • out in the
                statute, but courts evaluating their compensation should• consider the
                factors enumerated above, not the •factors enumerated in NRS 159.344(5).
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                GAL's rate, the success (or lack thereof) of the GAL, and the nature of the
                GAL's work.
                      The award of Brookfield's fees at a •rate of $400 per hour is reasonable
                            When a fee award depends on the interpretation of a statute or

                court rule, the district court's decision is reviewed de novo. Logan v. Abe,
                131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2015).        An award of costs is

                reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1.144.
                            This court has not determined the standard of review. for an

                award of fees to a GAL as a fiduciary.         We now determine that the

                appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Robbins v. Ginese,
                638 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the district court
                did not abuse its discretion by awarding the GAL its attorney rate). An
                abuse of discretion "occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or
                capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or• reason." Jackson v. State,
                117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).
                            The parties agree that the district court discussed each
                enumerated factor in NRS 159.344(5) when evaluating Brickfield's fee
                request. While we now clarify that NRS 159.344(5) is not appropriately
                applied to GAL fees but rather only to attorney fees, June's only argument
                is that the fiduciary rate is not equivalent to the attorney rate. However,
                based on the factors enumerated above, we conclude that the district court
                did not abuse its discretion in awarding Brickfield $400 per hour, as the
                court noted the importance of the GAL's report and its determination
                regarding the visitation petition. See Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat. Bank,
                85 Nev. 345, 350, 455 P.2d 31, 33-34 (1969) (stating that the trier of fact
                understands the value of the services the best). June's analysis fails to
                consider that Brickfield's experience as an attorney was important to this
                case, though she was acting as a fiduciary.      The distrid court was not
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                      required to rely on June's suggested $22 to $48 per hour range, as she
                      merely surveyed three N'rebSites without any indication as to delineating
                      factors like each GAL's experience, qualifications, or work performed. June
                      also ignores the difficulty of the visitation petition and the legal knowledge
                      required to serve her best interests. Meanwhile, the district court reviewed
                      Brickfield's experience, her qualifications, the services she provided for
                      June, the invoices submitted, and the benefits June received. The district
                      court also repeatedly noted the complexity of the visitation petition and the
                      need for someone with extensive guardianship experience. As it noted,
                      Brickfield operated in the sensitive area of determining how June's family
                      members could communicate with or visit her, a deterrnination that
                      required legal experience and skill. Brickfield also aided in the• court's
                      determination to remove Kimberly as Jun&s guardian and its appointment
                      of June's next guardian.
                                  Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding
                      that Brickfield's requested fees were appropriate compensation for her work
                      as a fiduciary in this case. While Brickfield's fees are more appropriately
                      termed as a fiduciary fee rather than an attorney fee, the district court did
                      not abuse its discretion in awarding the full amount requested.
                                                     CONCLUSION
                                  Although the district court erred by failing to include
                      Brookfield's rate in the order Of appointment, June waived this argument
                      by failing to raise it below. Likewise, the district court'S error in concluding
                      an attorney must be appointed where a volunteer is not available froin a
                      GAL program, without acknowledging the third option under NSRG 8(H),
                      was harmless. Finally, while Brookfield is a fiduciary entitled to fiduciary
                      fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding her fees in
                      an amount commensurate with her attorney rate because the award was
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                  supported by the GAL's experience, specialized knowledge, and ability to
                  understand the intricacies of this particular case's complex 'legal issues.
                  Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding the GAL fees.

                                                                                    J.
                                                    Herndon

                  We concur:

                  Lee

                  Parraguirre

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