Court Opinion

ID: 9753184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:02:57.017769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:31.977361
License: Public Domain

Dissenting] Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones:
I do not believe that appellant has knowingly and understandingly waived her conflict of interest contention under Section four of the Post Conviction Hearing Act due to her failure to raise this issue in her direct appeal to this Court in 1968. Instead, I would directly address this meritorious argument.
Since my research indicates appellant’s contention to be one of first impression in these United States, *220the question becomes whether one can knowingly and understanding^ waive1 an issue that has not been theretofore advanced by anyone. Besides my logical inclination to answer this query in the negative, this Court’s case law suggests a similar response. Thus, it was stated in Com. v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 95, 239 A. 2d 793, 796 (1968), that, “[i]t would be manifestly unfair to hold appellant to a waiver when this waiver is alleged to have occurred at a time when neither the defendant nor his attorney had any way of knowing that there existed a right to be waived.” See, also, Com. v. Richardson, 433 Pa. 195, 249 A. 2d 307 (1969) ; Com. v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A. 2d 765 (1967). Although the Cheeks opinion can be distinguished along the lines adopted by a majority of my colleagues, I do not believe an extension of that principle, limited solely to cases of first impression, is either unwarranted or precedent-shattering.
While the facts and legal precedents necessary for appellant’s present argument were admittedly available to appellant’s previous counsel on appeal, no attorney in these United States had ever constructed this argument before. It is one thing to say that an appellant has waived a well-established legal principle; it is a quite different situation when a contention of first impression is advanced. I believe it is the height of injustice to hold this appellant to a Section four waiver, especially when her conviction was affirmed by an evenly-divided Court on direct appeal. I shall now address the merits of this appeal.
*221Despite her limited financial resources, appellant privately retained counsel to represent her. The record reveals both testimonial and documentary evidence that counsel received a cash down payment for his fees as well as an oral understanding that the balance of his fees would be paid out of the proceeds of Mr. Simon’s life insurance policy wherein appellant was named the beneficiary. Of course, under the Slayer’s Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P. L. 816, §§1-2, 20 P.S. §§3441-42,2 if the appellant were convicted of the murder of her husband, she would not be entitled to the proceeds of her husband’s life insurance policy, e.g., Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A. 2d 443 (1965), and she could not pay her counsel’s fee. In light of the Commonwealth’s certification that the case might rise to first degree murder, this fee arrangement insured vigorous advocacy of appellant’s innocence; however, appellant contends that it also diminished counsel’s willingness to obtain a conAdction for a lesser degree of homicide. Since the payment of counsel’s fee was contingent upon appellant’s complete acquittal, the specific issue presented by this appeal is Avhether this defense attorney was embroiled in a conflict of interest Avhieh severely dulled his desire to obtain a lesser conviction due to the contingent fee.
The normal conflict of interest allegation arises in the “dual representation” situation where one counsel represents codefendants with conflicting interests. See, generally, Com. v. Wheeler, 444 Pa. 164, 281 A. 2d 846 (1971). While other jurisdictions have encountered various types of conflict of interest allegations in crimi*222nal cases, 34 A.L.R. 3d 470 (1970), this Court has only-been confronted with “dual representation” cases. My research indicates that no court has considered whether contingent fee arrangements on analogous facts create a conflict of interest in criminal cases.3 I do note that disciplinary rule 2-106(c) of the American Bar Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by this Court on May 20, 1970, provides, “[a] lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.” 438 Pa. liv (1970). Moreover, this Court expressed its view in Peyton v. Margiotti, 398 Pa. 86, 156 A. 2d 865 (1959), that contingent fee agreements in criminal cases were highly suspect and often unenforceable as against public policy. Bearing these considerations in mind, an examination of the evidence must be made to determine whether a conflict of interest existed.
Appellant advances three major arguments in support of her position that a conflict of interest existed: (1) the trial prosecutor testified during the second P.C.H.A. hearing that he initiated plea discussions concerning the possibility of a plea to second degree murder which was rejected by the defense counsel; (2) counsel did not request any charge on murder in the second degree or voluntary manslaughter; and (3) counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s own charge on voluntary manslaughter, the pivotal issue in our previous affirmance of appellant’s conviction by an evenly-divided vote, indicates counsel was not concerned with *223a lesser conviction. On the other hand, the Commonwealth contends that no conflict arose since appellant relied entirely upon her claim of self-defense, which, if believed, would have resulted in an outright acquittal.
To my way of thinking, the defect in the Commonwealth’s position lies in its assumption that trial counsel “decided that appellant had a colorable claim of self-defense.” (Emphasis added) Assuming for the moment that appellant’s self-defense claim was colorable, an assumption that can be seriously questioned in light of the jury’s guilty verdict, defense counsel should have realistically assessed appellant’s claim in view of the available alternatives. One can only surmise whether trial counsel would have pursued the same strategy if this unique financial arrangement had never existed. I am of the opinion that an apparent conflict of interest did exist and that there is at least a possibility that this fee arrangement influenced counsel’s judgment.
I dissent.

 In view of the recent decision by the Third Circuit in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Cavell, F. 2d (3d Cir. 1971), and contrary to certain language in the majority opinion, the Commonwealth can no longer rest on a statutory presumption that the failure to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure. Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §4(e), 19 P.S. §1180-4(c) (Supp. 1971).

 Section 1 of the Slayer’s Act defines “slayer” as “any person who participates, either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the wilful and unlawful killing of any other person.” Section 2 then provides that “[n']o slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent . . . .”

 Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did examine contingent fee agreements in People v. Meyers, 46 Ill. 2d 149, 263 N.E. 2d 81 (1970), the potential conflict existed due to counsel’s simultaneous representation of the accused’s wife in a dramshop action whereby the amount of her recovery and counsel’s fee would vary depending upon the length of the accused’s sentence.