Court Opinion

ID: 9837598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:43:24.096012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:27.708474
License: Public Domain

GURICH, J.,
with whom REIF, C.J., and COLBERT, J. join dissenting:
¶ 1 I must respectfully dissent to the majority decision in the above-styled matter. The majority opinion concludes that the remainder interests of settlor’s grandchildren, Erin and David O’Donoghue, were contingent and unvested. Thus, according to the holding, their interests in the trust lapsed when both predeceased settlor’s surviving spouse, Carolyn Dooley. Yet, according to the unambiguous language of the trust instrument, Erin or David O’Donoghue’s remainder interests were not conditioned on survival; each interest vested immediately upon the settlor’s death. Both Oklahoma statutes and our jurisprudence unequivocally provide that remainder interests vest upon the death of a grantor unless a will or trust clearly state otherwise.
¶ 2 Further, the intent of the settlor in this case was to create a Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) trust which passed only an income interest to Carolyn Dooley. The existence of QTIP language in the trust instrument is clear evidence the settlor never intended Carolyn Dooley to possess any interest in the trust principal. The purpose of a QTIP trust is to afford a, grantor’s estate with a significant tax benefit, while still providing the surviving spouse with income for life and maintaining control of the estate’s ultimate disposition.

The interests of David O’Donoghue and Erin O’Donoghue became vested on the date of settlor’s death,

¶3 Future interests in property may be either contingent or vested. A remainder is vested when the interest is (1) given to an ascertained person (i.e., Erin and David Donoghue); and (2) is free from any condition precedent. Conville v. Bakke, 1964 OK 111, ¶ 33, 400 P.2d 179, 188-189; see also Jesse Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander, Michael H. Schill, Property, 225 (6th ed. 2006).1 The following narrative clearly demonstrates that Erin and David O’Donoghue’s interests in the David L. Dooley QTIP trust were fully vested on the death of settlor:
Whether, in any particular case, a remainder is contingent or vested depends on the construction of the language used, as creating a mere possibility of an estate, or as creating an estate. Thus, a transfer of property to A for life, to B for life, and remainder to C vests on the creation of the interest and goes to C, whether or not C is living when the property vests in his possession, as, in order to change such result, there must be a specific reference in the creating instrument indicating that the remainderman must survive the life tenants in order to take.
2 Tiffany Real ' Property § 323, Westlaw (database updated 2015) (emphasis added).
¶ 4 We have previously said when a will and trust are executed simultaneously, with each referencing the other, they reflect “one instrument and a scheme of testamentary disposition.” Miller v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 1981 OK 133, ¶ 9, 637 P.2d 75, 77 (emphasis added); see also, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining testamentary disposition as “[a] disposition to take effect upon the death of the person making it, who retains substantially entire control of the *778property until death.”) Both the will and trust were executed contemporaneously by David Dooley and are part of one intertwined testamentary scheme. In Oklahoma, testamentary transfers are presumed to vest upon the death of a grantor unless specific language in the will or trust makes the gift conditional. 84 O.S. 2001 § 175 (“[t]estamen-tary dispositions, including devises and bequests to a person on attaining majority, are presumed to vest at the testator’s death.”); Matter of Estate of Westfahl, 1983 OK 119, ¶ 4, 674 P.2d 21, 24. Once vested, a testamentary disposition cannot be “divested unless upon the occurrence of the precise contingency prescribed by the testator for that purpose.” 84 O.S. 2001 § 176.
¶ 5 In the present ease, paragraph 5.04 in the Dooley trust placed no preconditions on the gifts to the grantor’s grandchildren David and Erin. For more than one-hundred years this Court has adhered to the fundamental precept that testamentary gifts are presumed to vest immediately upon the death of the grantor. The Court of Civil Appeals correctly determined that both David and Erin O’Donoghue’s remainder interests vested upon the death of the grantor, David Dooley. In reaching their decision, COCA relied on our decision in Moore v. McAlester, 1967 OK 100, 428 P.2d 266. In Moore, 1967 OK 100, ¶¶ 31-32, 428 P.2d at 271, this Court found that two sons who died before their sister were not deprived of their interest in them father’s estate. This Court held that on the death of their father, both sons had vested interests which could not be “divested by their subsequent deaths before the death of [them sister].” Id; see also Riddle v. Jay, 1960 OK 223, ¶ 13, 356 P.2d 1074, 1077 (holding remainder interest which followed life estate was fully vested, authorizing remainderman to convey her interest by deed); Dannenburg v. Dannenburg, 1953 OK 201, ¶ 32, 271 P.2d 345, 352 (concluding son’s share of mother’s estate vested on her death and did not lapse despite dying before distribution); Porter v. Porter, 97 Okla. 231, 1923 OK 1184, ¶ 7, 222 P. 971, 973 (holding remainder interests of children vested immediately upon father’s death).
¶ 6 The majority looks to the phrase per stirpes to conclude the gifts to Erin and David O’Donoghue were not vested. However, the phrase per stirpes did not impose any limitation on the gifts; rather the phrase merely explained that should either or both die before receipt of their gift, the money or property would inure to the benefit of their hems by representation. Neither Erin' nor David were required by the grantor to have lineal descendants to receive the gifts. More importantly, according to our statutes, any references to heirs, issue, descendents, etc. are not deemed terms of condition or limitation:
A testamentary disposition to “heirs,” “relations,” “nearest relations,” “representatives,” “legal representatives,” or “personal representatives,” or “family,” “issue,” “descendants,” “nearest,” or “next of kin,” of any person, without other words of qualification, and when the terms are used as words of donation, and not of limitation, vests the property in those who would be entitled to succeed to the property of such person according to the provisions of the article on succession in this chapter.
84 O.S. 2001 § 168.

Settlor did not intend for Carolyn Dooley to have any interest in the residue of the QTIP trust

¶ 7 The trust instrument executed by set-tlor provided for the creation of two separate trusts upon his death. The first trust was funded with the amount of money which could be transferred free from estate and gift tax by utilizing the federal unified tax credit and state death tax credit. The second, a QTIP trust, is the one at issue in the present case.
¶ 8 Section 5.05(e) of the David L. Dooley Trust Agreement provided:
It is the intention of the Settlor that [the Carolyn Ann Dooley Trust] is to be qualified terminable interest property [QTIP], as defined in Section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) [sic] of the [IRC], and it shall be held, administered and distributed accordingly. Accordingly, the Trustee is hereby directed to make the election provided in Section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) of the *779[IRC], as amended, and to treat all assets of this Trust as qualified terminable interest property [QTIP] for the purpose of qualifying for the marital deduction allowable in determining the federal estate tax upon Settlor’s Estate, (emphasis added).2
A QTIP trust allows a grantor’s estate to benefit from the unlimited marital deduction, while still maintaining control of the estate’s ultimate disposition. The QTIP affords the surviving spouse with income for life but allows the decedent to control disposition of the residuary estate on the death' of the surviving spouse. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B).3 QTIP trusts are often utilized in second marriages; situations involving a ‘grantor who wishes to continue providing care for his or her surviving spouse, but desires to leave his or her estate to children from a prior marriage. Diane Hubbard Kennedy, 26 Ind. Prac., Anderson’s Wills, Trusts & Est. Plan. § 3:117 (2015-2016 ed.) (“The QTIP trust is a significant tool in many estate plans involving second or third marriage1 situations. This type of a bequest solves the problem where a spouse wishes to take care of his second surviving spouse, but wants to make sure that after the spouse passes away that the assets revert to the children of a prior' marriage.”).4 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Estate of Clayton v. C.I.R., 976 F.2d 1486, 1492 (5th Cir. 1992), by enacting the QTIP provisions, a testator could qualify for the marital deduction while furnishing “maximum financial benefits and security for the surviving spouse” and eliminate “the risk that the survivor might waste the property or appoint it to successors other than the children of the testator’s first marriage.” In the Estate of Shelfer v. C.I.R., 86 F.3d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1996) the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the purpose for establishing the QTIP:
Congress became increasingly concerned with the difficult choice facing those in second marriages, who could either provide for their spouse to the possible detriment of the children of a prior marriage or risk under-endowing their spouse to provide directly for the children. In the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Congress addressed this problem by creating the QTIP exception to the terminable property interest rule. According to the House of Representatives Report, the QTIP trust was designed to prevent a decedent from being forced to choose between surrendering control of the entire estate to avoid imposition of estate tax at his death or reducing his tax benefits at his death to insure inheritance by the children, (emphasis added, citations and quotations omitted).
*780¶ 9 As the majority notes, the paramount consideration when construing a trust instrument is the intent of the settlor. In re Will of Dimick, 1975 OK 10, ¶ 10, 531 P.2d 1027, 1030.5 Further, a trust document should be interpreted in favor of the intended beneficiaries. Trust Co. of Okla. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs., 1991 OK 133, ¶ 13, 825 P.2d 1295, 1303. The plain language of the trust in this case reflects the settlor’s clear intent to have the Carolyn Dooley Trust treated as a QTIP. Accordingly, the settlor intended the remainder interests of Erin and David O’Donoghue to vest immediately upon his death.

Conclusion

¶ 10 The primary goal of this Court is to interpret a will or trust in a manner which gives effect to the decedent’s intentions. David L. Dooley did not intend to leave the residue of his estate to Carolyn Dooley or her heirs. He could have easily done so by either (1) allowing Carolyn Dooley to withdraw principal from the QTIP trust; or (2) including language which vested the residue in Carolyn Dooley if Erin and David O’Dono-ghue both were predeceased. Paragraphs 5.04(a)-(c) included specific terms which caused gifts to Susan Haggard, Janet Haggard and David Haggard to lapse should they predecease the settlor. Had settlor intended the O’Donoghue bequests to lapse, such language would have been included .in the terms of the trust.
¶ 11 Accordingly, the COCA reached the correct conclusion in this case, and that decision should be 'affirmed.

. The following was taken from Property, Chapter 4, Future Interests:
A remainder may be indefeasibly vested, meaning that the remainder is certain of becoming possessory in the future and cannot be divested. Thus:
O conveys Blackacre ⅛ A for life, then to B and her heirs.’ B has an indefeasibly vested remainder certain to become possessory upon termination of the life estate. If B dies during A’s life, on B’s death B’s remainder . passes to B’s [estate, heirs, devisees, etc] ... (emphasis added).

. Rec. on Acc. App„ Doc. 2, Ex. A.

. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B) reads:
(B) Qualified terminable interest property defined.—For purposes of this paragraph—
(i) In general.—The term "qualified terminable interest property” means property—
(I) which passes from the'decedent,
.(II) in which the surviving spouse has a qualifying income interest for life, and
(III) to which an election under this paragraph applies.
To satisfy the "qualifying income interest for life test,” the following must be met: (1) all income must be paid to the surviving spouse at least annually; and (2) no person, other than the surviving spouse may possess a power of appointment over the property. IRC § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii). Paragraph 5.05(e) of the David L. Dooley Trust did not contain a power of appointment; however, this does not preclude the property from meeting the QTIP requirements, See Myron Kóvb, Amy Morris Hess, George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert, Bogert’s Trusts And Trustees § 275.10, n. 14(2015).

. See also Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Donald J. Malouf, Alex E. Nakos, Contributing Author Diann M. Addison, The Marital Fund-Choices As To The Marital Deduction Bequest—Qualified Terminable Interest Property ("Qtip”) Trust, 16A West’s Legal Forms, Estate Planning § 11.7, Westlaw (database updated 2015);
Because the QTIP form of marital bequest allows the testator spouse to control disposition of the remainder interest after the death of the surviving spouse, it is useful in a variety of situations in which testators previously were put to a difficult choice. A client in a second marriage is a good example of a situation in which the QTIP marital bequest is useful. The client might want to pay as little tax as possible at death in order to leave intact the family property for the purpose of supporting the surviving second spouse. At the same time, however, one or both of the spouses might have children by a prior marriage. A QTIP bequest could provide the surviving spouse with an income interest for life, with the remainder going to the children of the decedent’s prior marriage.

. Interestingly, the Dimick case revolved around a-sole issue, namely: whether the settlor's daughter possessed a vested interest in a trust, which was "not subject to being divested by her subsequent death prior to actual distribution.” Id-¶ 9, 531 P.2d at 1030. This Court concluded a deceased daughter's share of the trust was vested, despite language which provided for lapsing of the gift should a beneficiary die "prior to the full and complete distribution of all of the corpus of the trust estate herein created.” Id. ¶ 1, 531 P.2d at 1029.