Court Opinion

ID: 9850006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:54.576841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.295860
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — While I concur with the rest *770of the opinion of the majority, I dissent to part II dealing with the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony. My general views on this subject have been expressed in my concurrence and dissent to State v. Martin, 101 Wn.2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984) and will not be repeated here. If the kind of testimony in this case was of the same nature as that in Martin, I might join in the reversal and remand of the majority. It is not, and it is from these differences that this dissent springs.
When Terry Friel was put under hypnosis, January 9, 1980, the hypnosis session was conducted by a highly qualified psychologist who had particular training and experience in investigative hypnosis. Since the identities of the perpetrators of the crime were neither known nor presumed, the purpose of the hypnosis of Friel was to gain investigative leads.
An illuminating commentary is made by Martin T. Orne, M.D., Ph. D. Dr. Orne is cited as an authority by defendant, amici curiae, and the majority in their argument that the testimony of Friel be suppressed since she had been hypnotized during the investigation stage of the proceedings. In an article cited by amici curiae and the majority, Dr. Orne states:
There are many cases involving a victim or a witness to a crime who cannot recall potentially important details and where the enforcement authorities are equally in the dark. In cases of assault, for example, hypnosis has made it possible for the victim to recall the assailant's appearance, enabling police artists to draw a reasonable likeness. To the extent that the victim or witness, police, artist, and hypnotist alike share no preconceived bias about what might have occurred, the situation approaches the ideal case for hypnosis to be most appropriately employed: to develop investigative leads.
Hypnotic suggestions may directly or indirectly enhance memory by providing contextual cues, and the relaxed environment of a sensitively conducted session may help diminish the anxiety which otherwise interferes with attempts to recall. Several cases of this type are described by Kroger and Douce (1979). Many of the lim*771itations of the technique — even under such circumstances — have been emphasized earlier, while other pitfalls are described by Kroger and Douce. Given appropriate care, however, hypnosis has provided important new information to the authorities in many instances. If the sole purpose of the hypnotic session is to provide clues which ultimately lead to incriminating evidence, the fact that hypnosis was originally employed becomes irrelevant. However, if there is even the vaguest possibility that hypnotically enhanced recall is to be used in court, it is essential that the entire contact of the hypnotist with the subject be videotape-recorded in order to allow an independent assessment of the events preceding, during, and following the hypnotic session to determine whether or not the memories might have inadvertently been guided by cues in the situation.
Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 Int'l J. of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 311, 328 (1979). Under the facts in this case, the fact that Friel was hypnotized is, in the words of Dr. Orne, "irrelevant".
No indication is made there was any improper suggestion. Indeed, since there were no known suspects at the time of the hypnosis, there would be little, if any, risk of suggestiveness. The record indicates the expert hypnotist was from outside the law enforcement agency directly concerned with the investigation. Furthermore, an audio recording of the entire hypnosis was made. This was made available to the defendant who employed an expert on hypnosis to review the session, but no mention was made of this during the trial. At no time during the trial did defendant make any effort to challenge the procedures employed or to demonstrate any suggestiveness either by the hypnotist or the police. Under these circumstances, it seems to me defendant has waived any complaint he may have had about the Friel testimony. Investigative hypnosis under the facts of this case did not render Friel incompetent to testify. See Annot., Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
I would find no violation of defendant's rights to due process in the pretrial identification procedures. Terry Friel *772was competent to testify; the trial court properly refused to suppress her testimony.
Utter and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied August 21, 1984.