Court Opinion

ID: 9473323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:26:28.777077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:27.492156
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the United States is the rightful owner of the shipwreck. In my view, however, such a conclusion is compelled not by the “embedded in the soil” and “constructive possession” exceptions to the common law of finds, which are of dubious relevance in the context of a sunken ship,1 but rather by the Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 433. The Antiquities Act provides:
Any person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situate on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States, without the permission of the Secretary of the Department of the Government having jurisdiction over the lands on which said antiquities are situated, shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum of not more than $500 or be imprisoned for a period of not more than ninety days, or shall suffer both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Id. In the instant case, the shipwreck was found on submerged lands belonging in fee simple to the United States, and the vessel undoubtedly is an “antiquity.”2 Therefore, the Antiquities Act’s prohibition of *1516“appropriation]” and “excavation]” supersedes the principles of maritime law on which plaintiff relies, and defeats plaintiff’s claim of ownership of the vessel.
At the same time, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that plaintiff is not entitled to a salvage award. The majority accepts the government’s argument that the vessel “was not lost or suffering any marine peril.” Yet it is undisputed that the government’s 1975 survey of shipwrecks located in the Biscayne National Park misidentified the vessel in question and listed only its “approximate” location. In fact, the government was unable precisely to locate the vessel until July 4, 1980, some two years after plaintiff discovered it and a full nine months after plaintiff’s discovery came to the government’s attention.3
As to the existence of a “marine peril,” in my view the majority opinion conflicts with Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir.1978), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, on other grounds, sub nom. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982), in which this court’s predecessor explained:
The government’s argument that no marine peril existed ignores the reality of the situation. Marine peril includes more than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation____ There is no dispute that the [shipwreck] was lost. Even after discovery of the vessel’s location it is still in peril of being lost through the actions of the elements.
Id. at 337 (emphasis added; footnotes and citations omitted). The Treasure Salvors rule applies even when the sunken vessel is “impervious to weather conditions above the surface of the sea,” with “sand preventpng] deterioration underwater.” See Platoro Limited, Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051,1055 & n. 8 (5th Cir.1980); see also Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540, 557 (S.D.Fla.1982) (“It is established in this Circuit that a marine peril exists in an ancient, abandoned shipwreck for purposes of meeting the requirements of a valid salvage action.”).4
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff is not entitled to a salvage award because plaintiff’s salvage efforts were “unsuccessful.” Plaintiff performed a highly valuable service simply by locating the shipwreck, and should be compensated accordingly. The fact that plaintiff failed to employ proper archeological techniques in removing artifacts from the shipwreck may reduce the amount of any salvage award, but should not altogether deprive plaintiff of such an award. I therefore would remand this case to the district court for the purpose of calculating a salvage award based on the value of plaintiff’s services in locating the vessel, reduced by any damage caused by plaintiff’s unauthorized removal of artifacts from the vessel.

. In fact, both in its brief and at oral argument, the government eschewed reliance on these land-based exceptions to the common law of finds. The government argued instead that the district court’s conclusion, that the shipwreck belongs to the United States, should be affirmed on the basis of various federal statutes.

. The vessel is believed to be more than 240 years old. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir.1974), in which the Ninth Circuit found the penal provisions of the Antiquities Act unconstitutionally vague, is thus distinguishable. In Diaz, the “antiquities" in question were only three or four years old. The instant case is much more similar to United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 84, 62 L.Ed.2d 55 (1979), in which the Tenth Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to the Antiquities Act as applied to objects between 800 and 900 years old.

. The record shows that, in early 1980, the government even went to court in an attempt to force plaintiff to divulge the exact location of the shipwreck. I find it hard to believe that the vessel was not "lost,” when the government obviously had such difficulty finding it.

. The Fifth Circuit recently has interpreted Treasure Salvors as holding that "marine peril existed as a matter of law where the ship’s location was unknown.” Platoro Limited, Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 695 F.2d 893, 901 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 77, 78 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). The Fifth Circuit also rejected the government’s argument that, for a salvage award to be justified, a vessel must still be in peril after its location is discovered. See id. at 901 n. 9. While this Fifth Circuit decision is not binding on our court, I find it persuasive, especially since it, like the instant case, involves the interpretation of former Fifth Circuit precedent.