Court Opinion

ID: 9584816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:58.573186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:11.521237
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the result reached by the majority and in Divisions 2 and 4. I write specially for two reasons.
1. Although I agree that the evidence was sufficient to support Jackson’s conviction, I cannot agree with all that is said by the majority in Division 1. In describing both Reid v. State, 212 Ga. App. 787 (442 SE2d 852) (1994) and Whipple v. State, 207 Ga. App. 131 (427 SE2d 101) (1993), the majority states that both decisions “involve lack of evidence of the contraband’s close spatial proximity or easy accessibility to the defendants.” That may have been true in Whipple. In Reid, however, as in this case, there was evidence that the contraband was found in close spatial proximity to the accused and he had easy access to it. Reid was a passenger in the car where the contraband was found “on the floorboard on the passenger side of the car between the place where the bench seat was bolted to the car’s frame and the passenger door, approximately six inches from the door.” 212 Ga. App. at 788.
In my view, all three cases involve circumstantial evidence, constructive possession, and the spatial proximity of the contraband to the accused; Reid and this case also involve evidence of similar transactions. A finding of constructive possession, however, must be based upon “some connection [with] the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Llaguno v. State, 197 Ga. App. 789, 790-791 (1) (399 SE2d 564) (1990). If the State’s case had consisted solely of evidence that Jackson was driving, the drugs were found under the driver’s seat, and *847Jackson had previously been convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, then, in my view, a directed verdict of acquittal may have been demanded.
The reason it was not, and the difference between this case and Reid, is that here the State introduced additional evidence linking Jackson with the contraband. That evidence, although itself circumstantial, was sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury. See Allen v. State, 200 Ga. App. 326, 328 (2) (408 SE2d 127) (1991). The arresting officer testified that Jackson appeared to be inebriated. The State introduced evidence that Jackson had been driving, that an empty beer can was found under the driver’s seat, and that the vial containing 19 rocks of cocaine was found right next to the empty beer can. From this evidence, the jury was authorized to believe that Jackson had been drinking beer from the can found under his seat and that he placed the empty can under the seat. They therefore were also authorized to infer that he at least must have known of the vial immediately adjacent to the can.
2. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 3 that evidence of Jackson’s prior conviction was properly admitted as a similar transaction, I believe that Jackson is entitled to an explanation distinguishing his case from Morris v. State, 212 Ga. App. 779 (442 SE2d 792) (1994), upon which he relies heavily. In Morris, we reversed a conviction for possession of diazepam and held that similar transaction evidence was improperly admitted.1
Jackson argues that Morris stands for the proposition that a prior crime is necessarily dissimilar when it involves a different type of possession. In Morris, the prior offense involved constructive possession while in the charged offense the accused was found in actual possession of the contraband. Jackson reasons that the holding in Morris must have been based on that distinction because the other dissimilarity noted in the majority opinion there — the fact that the offenses involved different drugs — was held by the Supreme Court not to affect the admissibility of prior crimes. State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (272 SE2d 321) (1980) (reversing Johnson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 793 (270 SE2d 214) (1980)).
I find this argument to be fallacious. Johnson was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991), which changed the law regarding the admission of similar transaction evidence. Moreover, this court has found evidence of prior crimes admissible despite differences in the type of possession. See, e.g., Riden v. State, 213 Ga. App. 17, 18 (2) (443 SE2d 865) *848(1994) (prior offense admissible as similar even though it involved actual possession, when offense charged involved constructive possession). The distinction drawn by Jackson belies common sense as well, since possession may be changed from actual to constructive at will by the accused at the time of his arrest, merely by throwing down any contraband. That maneuver, however, does not change the underlying nature of the offense or the ways it may be similar to prior or subsequent offenses in the manner contemplated by Williams, supra.
Decided February 27, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 24, 1995
Lenzer & Lenzer, Robert W. Lenzer, Thomas P. Lenzer, for appellant.
Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, George F. Hutchinson III, Brian K. Wilcox, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Here, the prior offense was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be admissible, in that the drug was identical, the number of “rocks” of crack cocaine found was more than that ordinarily found for personal use, and Jackson possessed the contraband while traveling in an automobile.

 Morris has no precedential value, because only two judges concurred in the majority opinion.