Court Opinion

ID: 9749999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:11:35.895901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:01.297611
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority has been persuaded that judicial wisdom dictates that Chapter 21 of the Uniform Commercial Code— Sales, 13 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2725, be extended to leases of goods — a “wisdom” that has not yet befallen the Legislature, as the majority recognizes by its statement that the revisions proposed by Article 2A have not been enacted in Pennsylvania. While I do not expect my words to dissuade the majority from doing what the Legislature has not seen fit to do, I must state that I find it unwise to effect sweeping changes in lease transactions merely because the judiciary is impatient with the Legislature’s failure to do so. At the very least, individuals and businesses are entitled to know what legal consequences may arise from lease transactions. Legislation would provide this; judicial decisions affecting transactions made prior to their pronouncements would not.
Even if I felt compelled, as does the majority, to fill what is perceived as a void in the body of warranty law, I could not agree with the disposition of the statute of limitations issue in this case. The Superior Court’s resolution of this issue is consistent with its attempt to apply Article 2 provisions to the lease by analogy. The majority’s resolution, however, distorts the concept of warranty for future performance and expands liability retroactively under leases beyond the period contemplated by Article 2 for sales.
*536Under Article 2, the applicable statute of limitations is set forth at 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725 and provides as follows:
(a) General rule. — An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of actions has occurred____
(b) Accrual of cause of action, — A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action occurs when the breach is or should have been discovered.
At trial, Anthony Cucchi testified that Rollins’s salesman had stated that the system was “state of the art” and “almost unbeatable”. He indicated that the salesman represented that the system would do what he wanted it to, which was to provide safety. The majority interprets this testimony as express and implied warranties explicitly extending to the future performance of the burglar alarm system. From this interpretation, the majority reasons that the four year statute of limitations began to run on February 2, 1984 — the date on which the Cucchis’ home was burglarized — almost eleven years after the lease was entered into.
The majority states:
The express warranty found by the trial court and jury in this case was that the burglar alarm system would provide “safety,” which, considering the nature of the goods leased meant protection from unauthorized intrusion. While these warranties express and implied, do not in and of themselves “explicitly extend” to future performances, this explicit extension is manifest from all of the circumstances where these parties quite clearly bargained for a continually operational burglar alarm system for the duration of the lease.
*537Majority at 531. This analysis is a stark departure from the exception stated under Article 2’s limitation provision for breach of warranty actions, 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725. The majority looks to the circumstances surrounding the transaction to create a warranty “explicitly” extending to the future performance of the goods. Resorting to an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, the majority creates a warranty that explicitly extends to future performance by implying the existence of the warranty from the circumstances.
The majority admits that the testimony regarding safety did not in itself explicitly extend to future performance. Clearly, then, there was no warranty explicitly extending to future performance of the goods. “Explicit” is defined by Webster’s Dictionary as “fully and clearly expressed; leaving nothing merely implied; unequivocal.” It is now defined by the majority to include its antithesis — that is, what is “implicit”; what is garnered from the surrounding circumstances; what is not expressly stated.
The sounder and more consistent approach is that expressed by the Superior Court’s opinion in this case. The Superior Court stated,
Having determined that 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725 applies to breach of warranty actions in lease transactions, we must now apply the limitation provision to the case at bar. The alarm system was installed in the Cucchis’ residence in 1973. Delivery of the alarm system was, therefore, tendered in 1973. This date of delivery is not affected by the fact that the lease of the alarm system was continually renewed every time the Cucchis made another payment to Rollins or that Rollins periodically made repairs on the alarm system and replaced some of its parts. Only if Rollins had repossessed the alarm system and then reinstalled it or another system in the Cucchis’ home every time the Cucchis renewed their lease would the warranties begin anew with the Cucchis’ renewals of their lease. Any other method of reasoning would unfairly expose lessors to far greater liability than sellers. Moreover, *538any defect in the operation of the alarm system attributable to the parts in the alarm which were replaced or to the work. which was done when Rollins repaired the system is entirely irrelevant to the Cucchis’ cause of action for breach of warranty. Such a defect, instead, would pertain to a cause of action based on Rollins’ duty to repair the system.
Furthermore, Rollins’ express warranty, that the system would provide “safety,” did not explicitly relate to the future performance or condition of the alarm system. Rollins’ statement regarding the system, rather, related to the good at the time it was leased to the Cucchis or installed in their residence. Likewise, the implied warranty of merchantability pertained to the condition of the alarm system when it was first installed in the Cucchis’ home.
In Ranker v. Skyline Corporation, 342 Pa.Super. 510, 493 A.2d 706 (1985), the Appellant brought an action to rescind the sale of a travel trailer alleging a breach of express and implied warranties of the contract of sale. The complaint was dismissed on the basis that the four year statute of limitations of 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725 had expired. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint, the Superior Court rejected Appellant’s argument that the action was not untimely because the written warranty contained a promise to repair defects within a specified time.
The written warranty provided that manufacturing defects reported within one year after the delivery of the trailer would be corrected without charge and within a reasonable time. Appellant argued that this express agreement extended to future performance of the goods and that the period of limitation did not begin to run until after attempts to correct defects were proven to be unsuccessful.
The Superior Court rejected the argument, holding: [Appellee’s] written warranty provided for correction of manufacturing defects reported to it within one year after delivery. That language, however, did not explicitly extend the warranty to future performance. It did not *539pertain to performance of the trailer, but to the condition of the trailer at delivery. That the warranty defined the buyer’s remedy if a defect were discovered and reported within one year after delivery did not extend the warranty to future performance. An extension of the period of limitation under 13 Pa.C.S. § 2725(b) will not be permitted except in those instances in which there is a clear and unambiguous expression of an intent that the warranty shall pertain to future performance. See: Annot., 93 A.L.R.3rd 690 (1979).
342 Pa.Super. at 515, 493 A.2d at 709 (Emphasis added.)
In Patton v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 360 Pa.Super. 1, 519 A.2d 959 (1986), the Superior Court held that a warranty that goods met or exceeded federal Occupational Safety and Health Law regulations in effect or proposed as of the date of the order of the goods was not a warranty explicitly extended to future performance of the goods. The Appellant was injured when a truck purchased by his employer from Mack Trucks, Inc. spun out of control due to a defect in the steering mechanism.
The Superior Court stated:
Professors White and Summers have observed that “extension of the normal warranty period does not occur in the usual case, even though all warranties in a sense apply to future performance of goods.” J. White & R. Summer, Uniform Commercial Code § 11-9 (2d ed. 1980), Another expert has reasoned that Section 2725(b) “presumes that all warranties, expressed or implied, relate only to the condition of the goods at the time of sale.” Klinger, The Concept of Warranty Duration: A Tangled Web, 89 Dick.L.Rev. 935, 939 (1985). The drafters of the Commercial Code certainly understood that in most cases a warranty is tested only after the seller has put the goods to their intended use. Nonetheless, they established “tender of delivery” as the point at which the period of limitations begins to run. Actual discovery of the breach is irrelevant in the usual case. This strict rule ensures that the seller will not have to account for its *540product or wares beyond “the normal commercial record keeping period,” unless it explicitly agrees to do so. 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2725, Uniform Commercial Code Official Comment. Section 2725 serves the interests of commercial uniformity and practicality even though it might bar some otherwise meritorious breach of warranty actions.
We therefore must reject the argument that a warranty necessarily extends to future performance merely because it contains promises regarding the manner in which the goods will perform after tender of delivery. The same argument applies to nearly all warranties. If we held that the warranty in this case “explicitly extended” to future performance, we would allow the exception to swallow the rule. Commonplace warranties such as those which guarantee the number or quality of widgets a particular machine can produce or the number of pounds a particular truck can haul all would “explicitly extend” to future performance. The drafters of the Code would not have intended this result. As we noted in Ranker, supra [342 Pa.Super.] at 515, 493 A.2d at 709, parties must make a “clear and unambiguous expression” of their intent to extend warranties to cover future performance. This reading of Section 2725 does not render Mack’s warranty “meaningless.” Mack remained open to any suit for breach brought within four years of tender. The drafters of the Code selected the four-year period of exposure “as the most appropriate to modern business practice.” 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2725, Uniform Commercial Code Official Comments.
This analysis was found to be applicable to the instant case by the Superior Court. The Superior Court’s concern that commonplace warranties guaranteeing the number or quality of goods could be interpreted to “explicitly extend” to future performance has been far overshadowed by this Court’s extension of the concept of warranties explicitly extended to future performance to circumstances impliedly extending warranties to future performance.
' The Superior Court observed in footnote 10 of its opinion that courts generally have held that implied warranties, *541including those of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, cannot explicitly relate to future performance. An “implied warranty by nature cannot be explicit.” J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, § 11-9, n. 73 (2d ed. 1980) In footnote 9 of the Patton opinion, the Superior Court cited several cases from other jurisdictions to illustrate explicit prospective warranties:
For examples of explicitly prospective warranties, see Commissioners of Fire District No. 9 v. American La France, 176 N.J.Super. 566, 424 A.2d 441 (App.Div.1980) (fire truck “guaranteed for one year”); Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wash.2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979) (sewerage system would provide “no difficulty during the first 2 years of operation”); U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Mitchell, 148 Ga.App. 770, 252 S.E.2d 672 (1979) (poultry cages guaranteed for ten years); Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1973) (burial vault warranted to give “satisfactory service at all times”); Rempe v. General Electric Co., 28 Conn.Sup. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969) (“lifetime” warranty on garbage disposal).
360 Pa.Super. at 11, 519 A.2d at 965, fn. 9. See also, “What Constitutes Warranty Explicitly Extending To ‘Future Performance’ For Purposes of UCC § 2-725(2),” Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 690. The qualitative and explicit nature of these express warranties differs substantially from the reference to “safety” upon which the majority rests its holding today.
I would affirm the order of the Superior Court and hold that the action was untimely as it was not brought within four years of the tender of delivery.
McDERMOTT and CAPPY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.