Court Opinion

ID: 9914764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 22:02:37.876404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:26.267671
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U
                                         No. 2-23-0389
                                   Order filed January 2, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Kane County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 23-CF-2182
                                       )
DAVID CONTRERAS,                       ) Honorable
                                       ) Salvatore LoPiccolo,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: Trial court did not err in entering an order denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2     Defendant, David Contreras, appeals the October 12, 2023, order of the circuit court of

Kane County granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to article 110, section

6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022)) 1 and

ordering him detained. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

       1
           Section 110-6.1 of the Code was amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1,
2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On October 12, 2023, defendant was charged with the following offenses in Kane County:

(1) aggravated battery to a pregnant or handicapped person (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(2) (West

2022)), a class 3 felony; (2) domestic battery (making physical contact), enhanced based on prior

convictions (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2022)), a class 4 felony; (3) domestic battery (causing

bodily harm), enhanced based on prior convictions, (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1) (West 2022)), a class

4 felony; and (4) interfering with the reporting of domestic violence (720 ILCS 5/12-3.5(a) (West

2022)), a class A misdemeanor.

¶5     The same day, the State filed a petition to deny defendant pretrial release pursuant to

section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)) and the circuit court held a hearing

on that petition. At the hearing, the State proffered a police synopsis from the instant case. The

State indicated that Officer Peter Bangs of the Aurora Police Department responded to a domestic

battery. Upon arrival, Bangs made contact with defendant’s girlfriend, Katie Arellano, who

advised him that she and defendant had gotten into a verbal argument. Defendant had been drinking

earlier in the evening and “was out of control.” The argument turned physical, and defendant

grabbed Arellano’s phone out of her hand, preventing her from calling emergency services.

Arellano stated that a struggle ensued over the phone, resulting in numerous calls and hangups.

Bangs verified this by checking the 911 call log. Further, Arellano advised that defendant told her

that he was “going to give [her] a reason to call the cops” before striking her in the mouth with his

hand. Bangs observed Arellano to have visible bleeding and swelling to the inside of her lower lip.

2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) or Safety, Accountability, Fairness and

Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

Arellano was five months pregnant on the date of the incident; post-Miranda, defendant stated that

he was aware Arellano was pregnant. Defendant denied that any physical altercation had occurred.

¶6     The State also proffered by way of synopsis two other reports where defendant was charged

with domestic battery. People’s exhibit 2 contained a synopsis from the Aurora Police Department

associated with Kane County Case No. 20-CM-2887. In that matter, Officer Andrew Petry

interviewed Selina Cantu-Luyando, with whom defendant has a child in common. On the date of

the offense, Cantu-Luyando went to defendant’s residence to pick up diapers. When she arrived,

defendant was extremely intoxicated. He entered Cantu-Luyando’s vehicle and began to argue

with her before he grabbed her by the hair, punched her multiple times with closed fists, and pushed

her head into the windshield. Cantu-Luyando reported losing consciousness twice when defendant

pushed her head into the windshield and stated that when defendant pushed her head, it cracked

the windshield. Petry observed Cantu-Luyando to have multiple contusions on her face and stated

that her lips were extremely swollen, making it difficult for Cantu-Luyando to speak. People’s

exhibit 3 was a synopsis from Kane County Case No. 21-CF-1502. There, officers responded to a

call after defendant grabbed the hair of his sister, Alexa Contreras, with one hand, and hit her on

the top of her head two to three times with his other. Alexa stated that defendant ripped out some

of her hair in the process, which officers observed at the scene. Alexa also indicated that defendant

was intoxicated when the offense occurred. Alexa further stated that she was 26 weeks pregnant

when the battery occurred and defendant was aware she was pregnant because the two were living

together at the time and had spoken about the pregnancy.

¶7     The State presented an additional synopsis from Kane County Case No. 23-CF-1761, for

which defendant was currently on pretrial release after having posted cash bond. According to that

report, officers from the Aurora Police Department self-initiated a warrant call for service based

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

on defendant’s failure to appear in court for case No. 21-CF-1502. Defendant was searched, and

officers found on his person a loaded firearm and a clear plastic bag containing a white powdery

substance that field tested positive for cocaine. Defendant did not have a FOID card at the time of

his arrest, as he was barred from owning or possessing firearms based on his prior domestic

violence convictions. Defendant was charged with armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West

2022)), unlawful use of a weapon (no FOID card) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2022)), and unlawful

possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2022)). Additionally, the State

proffered a non-compliance of conditions of bond report for case No. 23-CF-1761. The report,

dated October 6, 2023, stated that defendant had been released from Kane County custody on

September 19, 2023, on pretrial supervision level 4, but had failed to contact pretrial services since

his release. The report indicated that pretrial services had called and left a voicemail for defendant

instructing him to contact pretrial services.

¶8     After considering the State’s exhibits and the arguments of counsel, the trial court entered

a written order of pretrial detention. In reaching its decision, the court carefully considered the

factors for determining dangerousness set forth in the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West

2022). The court noted that defendant had two prior domestic batteries, which it deemed a history

of violence or abusive behavior by defendant. The court also observed that at the time of the instant

offense, defendant was on pretrial release or conditions of bond in case No. 23-CF-1761. Further,

it found that defendant posed a real and present threat to Arellano and that the police synopsis

provided clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident that the offense was committed

by defendant. The court found it relevant that the observations by officers corroborated Arellano’s

account of the incident. The injuries observed were “more than just her word.” Finally, the court

found that the State met its burden in proving that no condition or combination of conditions would

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant if he were to be granted pretrial release.

The court based that in part on the fact that defendant had been given conditions of pretrial release

in case No. 23-CF-1761 with which he had not complied, noting the “20-plus days” in which

defendant had not even contacted pretrial services as ordered. The court also found that defendant

demonstrated an inability to follow court rules based on his charges in case No. 23-CF-1761, as

defendant had a firearm, which he was not legally allowed to possess. Finally, the court found that

the only potential pretrial condition it could order would be electronic home monitoring, but

rejected it “based on his history of noncompliance.” Defendant timely appeals.

¶9                                          II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10      In his Notice of Appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that he

committed the offenses charged, that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, that

the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of

conditions would mitigate this threat, and that he was denied an opportunity for a fair hearing. We

affirm.

¶ 11      Under the Act, a trial court may deny a defendant pretrial release if the State proves by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1)the proof is evident or the presumption great that a

defendant has committed a qualifying offense; (2) the defendant constitutes a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community (or, not pertinent here, a flight risk); and (3) no

less restrictive conditions would mitigate that risk. 720 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Decisions

on such matters “must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used exclusively

to order detention.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022). We review the trial court’s factual

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

findings—including whether the defendant poses a threat and whether any conditions would

mitigate that threat—using the manifest-weight standard of review. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL

App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. A finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if an

opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. In re Marriage of Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853,

¶ 65. The ultimate question of whether a defendant should be detained is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion; thus, we will reverse only if no reasonable person could agree with the trial court.

Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Moreover, it is well established that we review the result

at which the trial court arrived rather than its reasoning and may affirm on any basis apparent in

the record. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003); People v. Munz, 2021 IL App (2d)

180873, ¶ 27.

¶ 12   Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the offenses charged. In support,

defendant contends that the State failed to meet its burden because it indicated that victim was

contacted by police regarding the hearing rather than the State’s Attorney’s office. However, this

has no merit. Section 110-6.1(m)(1) provides that “crime victims shall be given notice by the

State’s Attorney’s office of [the detention] hearing as required in paragraph (1) of subsection (b)

of Section 4.5 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act [725 ILCS 120/4.5(b) (West

2022)].” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(m)(1) (West 2022). However, this clause “was adopted with only

one focus, victims.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 41. “Nothing in [the Rights of Crime

Victims and Witnesses] Act shall create a basis *** or a ground for relief requested by the

defendant in any criminal case.” 725 ILCS 120/9 (West 2022). Therefore, defendant’s arguments

that he was deprived of a fair hearing and that the State failed to meet its burden of proof on the

grounds that it may not have contacted Arellano prior to the hearing are unavailing.

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

¶ 13   Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he committed the offenses charged because the State presented synopses from the instant case

and defendant’s other cases rather than presenting live testimony. He posits the same argument for

his belief that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a real and

present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. These arguments are also

without merit. The Act plainly states that the State “may present evidence at the hearing by way

of proffer based on reliable information.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022). See also People

v. Robinson, 2023 IL App (2d) 230345-U (providing that the State was not required to present any

testimony to support its petition); People v. Mendoza-Camargo, 2023 IL App (2d) 230330-U, ¶ 18

(“we decline to require the State to present any more evidence than required by the Act”). We note

that the synopsis from the instant matter contained the reporting officer’s corroboration of physical

injury to Arellano. Two of the other three synopses were for cases in which defendant had pleaded

guilty for domestic battery. Accordingly, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence

for the trial court to find that the proof was evident or the presumption great that defendant

committed the offenses charged and that defendant posed a real and present threat to Arellano

based on the synopses presented by the State.

¶ 14   Finally, defendant argues that the court erred in finding that the State proved by clear and

convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the real and

present threat posed by his pretrial release. He suggests that electronic monitoring and a condition

that he refrain from the use or possession of alcohol and intoxicating substances would mitigate

any threat posed. But, as the trial court observed, defendant was already on pretrial release with

bond conditions when the instant offense occurred and had not been compliant. And the trial court

had concerns regarding defendant’s history of violence and demonstrated inability to cooperate

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2024 IL App (2d) 230389-U

with conditions of probation and the law. Based on this record, the decision that nothing would

mitigate the threat is hardly against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.

¶ 15                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 17   Affirmed.

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