Court Opinion

ID: 9926622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:09:03.16288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:48.616164
License: Public Domain

01/24/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                                   July 25, 2023 Session

          STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSHUA STEVEN SULLIVAN

                   Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County
                        No. 117338 Steven W. Sword, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. E2022-00962-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Steven Sullivan, of two counts of
rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual
battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-two years. The
Defendant argues that the trial court committed several evidentiary errors, including by
admitting evidence that (1) the victim made statements to her sister and best friend as
excited utterances; (2) he told officers they needed a warrant to enter the house and that he
was on his way to his attorney’s office; (3) he had prior convictions for purposes of
impeachment; and (4) he removed his GPS monitoring bracelet and left the jurisdiction
while on pretrial release. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury regarding flight and that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a new
trial. Finally, he asserts that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon
review, we conclude that harmless errors exist in the admission of the Defendant’s
statements related to his purported exercise of constitutional rights. Otherwise, we
respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                         Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;
                       Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. CAMPBELL,
SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Jonathan Harwell (on appeal) and Keith Lowe (at trial), Assistant District Public
Defenders, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joshua Steven Sullivan.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Ashley McDermott and
Jordan Murray, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
                                         OPINION

                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       In 2019, the victim was eleven years old, and she lived with her mother and siblings
in Powell, Tennessee. Her mother was dating the Defendant at the time, and the Defendant
and his son also lived at the residence.

       During the early morning hours of September 2, 2019, the victim was sleeping in
her bedroom when she was awakened by the Defendant coming into her room. The
Defendant got into bed with the victim and repeatedly tried to pull down her shorts.
Eventually, the Defendant removed her clothes and penetrated the victim’s vagina with his
penis.

       The Defendant then “scooted down” on the bed and placed his mouth on the victim’s
vagina while he held her legs down and touched her breast with his hand. Next, the
Defendant penetrated her anus with his penis, and it hurt. The Defendant then told the
victim not to tell anyone, or he would hurt her mother. The threat frightened the victim.

       That night, the victim spoke with her best friend through a video chat application
on her cell phone. The victim was crying, distraught, and “breaking down really bad.” She
told her friend that the Defendant had raped her. Her friend told the victim she needed to
tell someone, and the victim told her older sister that the Defendant had raped her.

        The victim then told her mother that the Defendant had raped her. The mother then
called the victim’s grandmother to get her and her daughters. On her way to pick them up,
the grandmother called the police. During this time, the Defendant left the house in the
mother’s van.

       The grandmother took the victim and her mother to a convenience store to meet with
law enforcement officers. While at the convenience store, the mother saw the Defendant
drive by in her van, and she noted this for the officers. Officers then pursued the Defendant,
but were unable to find him.

       The victim and her mother were then taken to the hospital so the victim could be
“swabbed and tested.” A detective asked the mother about possible evidence, such as
sheets, underwear, or shorts. The mother responded that the victim’s underwear had been
washed but that she was wearing the shorts she had on at the time of the rape. Additionally,
she said the victim’s sheets were still on her bed.

                                            -2-
       While the victim and her mother were at the hospital, other officers were dispatched
to the victim’s house to contact the Defendant and collect evidence. They arrived at her
house at about 11:00 p.m. and encountered the Defendant’s son speaking with the
Defendant on his cell phone. Through the phone, the Defendant told the officers, “You
need a warrant.” When one of the officers asked the Defendant where he was, the
Defendant replied, “I’m headed to my lawyer’s office. What’s going on?”

       The officers nevertheless entered the residence, discovered the victim’s comforter
and sheets were being washed, and notified the crime scene technicians. The Defendant’s
son said that the Defendant had instructed him to clean the victim’s bedding “because there
was, like, drug residue all over them.” In fact, the Defendant’s son said that the Defendant
“made me show him me washing them.”

       Kim Lowe, a special agent forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (TBI), detected male DNA on a swab from the victim’s vaginal cavity. She
obtained a “Y-STR profile” from the male DNA. The Defendant could not be excluded as
the source of the profile. His son also could not be excluded because, as father and son,
“they have the exact same DNA profile on the Y chromosome.”

        As is relevant to this case, a Knox County grand jury charged the Defendant with
rape of a child by anal sex on count one; rape of a child by vaginal sex on count two; rape
of a child by oral sex on count three; and aggravated sexual battery by touching the victim’s
breasts on count four.1 The case was tried before a jury in November 2021.

        During defense proof, the Defendant testified that he went downstairs to check on
the victim on the night of the offense. He said he opened her door and discovered his son
in bed with her. The Defendant did not tell the victim’s mother because he did not want to
get his son in trouble.

       The Defendant denied having vaginal, anal, or oral sex with the victim or touching
her breasts. He said that the victim was “making that up” and “lying about [him].”

        1
                Although the grand jury also charged the Defendant with rape under other theories and
with kidnapping, the State dismissed these counts before trial, and they are not at issue in this appeal.
Following the dismissal, and with the parties’ agreement, the trial court renumbered the counts of the
presentment before submitting them to the jury. This was a permissible procedure to ensure that the jury
was unaware of other criminal offenses with which the Defendant was charged initially. See State v.
Bullock, No. E2021-00661-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 3012460 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2022), no perm.
app. filed. The jury returned its verdicts referencing the renumbered counts, and for clarity, we use these
renumbered counts in our analysis as well.

                                                   -3-
        The Defendant testified that on the night the victim told her mother about the
offense, he took the victim’s mother’s van so he could buy cigarettes and “drop[] some
weed off[.]” The Defendant admitted that he passed by the convenience store where the
victim and her mother were speaking to police. Shortly afterward, he called his son. He
said that his son was “freaking out” because everyone had left the house, and he heard
someone say, “[H]e touched [the victim.]” The Defendant, who thought his son was
referring to himself, told his son to wash the victim’s bedding if he “did anything” to the
victim.

        Instead of returning to the victim’s house, the Defendant left the mother’s van on a
side road and stayed with a friend at her house. Later that evening, the Defendant said that
his son contacted him by video chat and told him that officers were at the victim’s house.
When officers asked the Defendant where he was, he responded that he was “on [his] way
to see [his] lawyer.” At trial, the Defendant explained that he was actually waiting to talk
to his attorney and agreed that “waiting” was different from going to see his lawyer. The
Defendant admitted, “I wasn’t . . . directly on my way to see him. It was at nighttime, and
I had to wait to get ahold of him.”

       While staying with his friend, the Defendant asked his son to bring him clothes. The
Defendant said that he did not return to the mother’s house because he was told not to be
there and because he did not want the police to “come get [him].”

        Finally, the Defendant admitted that he exchanged apologetic Snapchat messages
with the victim’s mother about ten days after the rapes. In these messages, the Defendant
said, “I know you don’t deserve any of this[.] . . . I can’t change it.” He said that he wanted
“to be done,” that he did not “want to be here,” and that he “want[ed] to die[.]” The
Defendant continued to apologize and sent the mother a photograph of him holding a
remote control to his head. The Defendant said that he “was in a bad place. I just lost my
house, my family, everything.” The Defendant then sent her a message saying, “All I got
to do is pull the trigger. You got the kids, though, right?” In a separate Snapchat to the
mother, the Defendant explained, “I deserve to die.”

        The jury found the Defendant guilty of attempted rape of a child on count one, guilty
of rape of a child on counts two and three, and guilty of aggravated sexual battery on count
four. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve
concurrent sentences of twelve years on counts 1 and 4 and to serve concurrent sentences
of thirty years on counts 2 and 3. The trial court ordered the twelve-year sentences to be
served consecutively to the thirty-year sentences for a total effective sentence of forty-two
years.

                                             -4-
        The judgments of conviction were filed on February 7, 2022, and the Defendant
filed a timely motion for a new trial. The trial court denied this motion on July 14, 2022,
and the Defendant filed a timely notice to appeal four days later.

                                        ANALYSIS

        On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court committed several evidentiary
errors, including by admitting evidence that (1) the victim made statements to her sister
and best friend as excited utterances; (2) he told officers they needed a warrant to enter the
house and that he was on his way to his attorney’s office; (3) he had prior convictions for
purposes of impeachment; and (4) he removed his GPS monitoring bracelet and left the
jurisdiction while on pretrial release. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred
in instructing the jury regarding flight and that the cumulative effect of the trial errors
entitles him to a new trial. Finally, he asserts that the trial court erred in imposing
consecutive sentences.

       We address each of these issues in turn.

     A.       VICTIM’S STATEMENTS

        As his first issue, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the
State to introduce the victim’s statements to her friend and her sister that the Defendant
raped her under the excited utterance exception to the prohibition against hearsay. He
asserts that the victim could not have been operating under the stress of the startling event
when she made the statements because too much time had elapsed. The State maintains
that the trial court correctly admitted the statements as excited utterances. We agree with
the State.

              1.     Standard of Appellate Review

       Our supreme court has recognized that “the first question for a reviewing court on
any issue is ‘what is the appropriate standard of review?’” State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692,
698 (Tenn. 2022). The principal issue here is whether the trial court properly admitted
hearsay evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(2), also known as the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.

       Typically, we review questions involving the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 287 (Tenn. 2014) (“We generally review
evidentiary rulings under an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard.”). However, our review of a
hearsay issue is governed by different standards. In that context, “[t]rial courts must

                                            -5-
conduct layered inquiries when determining the admissibility of evidence objected to on
the grounds of hearsay,” State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 128 (Tenn. 2019), and the
standard of appellate review varies accordingly. As our supreme court has recognized,

       Initially, the trial court must determine whether the statement is hearsay. If
       the statement is hearsay, then the trial court must then determine whether the
       hearsay statement fits within one of the exceptions. To answer these
       questions, the trial court may need to receive evidence and hear testimony.
       When the trial court makes factual findings and credibility determinations in
       the course of ruling on an evidentiary motion, these factual and credibility
       findings are binding on a reviewing court unless the evidence in the record
       preponderates against them. Once the trial court has made its factual
       findings, the next questions—whether the facts prove that the statement (1)
       was hearsay and (2) fits under one [of] the exceptions to the hearsay rule—
       are questions of law subject to de novo review.

Kendrick v. State, 454 S.W.3d 450, 479 (Tenn. 2015) (citations omitted).

              2.      Background

      To give context to this issue, we note that after the victim testified at trial, the State
announced that it would call the victim’s friend as a witness. The State asserted that it
sought admission of the victim’s statement to her friend as an excited utterance.

       During a jury-out hearing, the friend testified that she spoke with the victim through
a video chat application on the night of September 2, 2019. During the conversation, the
victim was “breaking down,” scared, and crying. The friend asked what was wrong, but
the victim was initially too afraid to tell her. After a minute, she told her friend that her
“stepdad” had raped her. The friend was shocked and told the victim to tell her sister.

       The State argued that the victim was still under the stress of the rape when the
statement was made and that the statement related to the rape. The trial court agreed,
finding that the disclosure did not need to be immediate. The court also made specific
factual findings that the victim was under the stress of the startling event and that the
statement was about the startling event.

        The Defendant also objected to the sister’s testimony, again arguing that the victim’s
statement to her did not constitute an excited utterance. In a separate jury-out hearing, the
sister testified that on the night of September 2, 2019, she walked past the victim’s bedroom
and heard the victim crying. Because the door was open, the sister also heard the friend’s
voice on the phone saying, “[Y]ou have to tell somebody.” The sister went into the victim’s

                                             -6-
room and asked what happened. The victim said that the Defendant had raped her. The
victim cried and hugged her sister throughout their conversation. After this testimony, the
trial court held that it would “rule consistently” with the statement made to the victim’s
friend, and it found that the victim’s statement to her sister was also admissible as an
excited utterance.

              3.     Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule

       As defined by our Rules of Evidence, a hearsay statement is “a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). No party disputes that the
victim’s statements to her friend and sister were each subject to the hearsay rules. The
victim’s statements about the Defendant’s actions were made out-of-court, and the State
offered them for their truth. Indeed, the victim’s statements about the Defendant had
relevance only to the extent that they were true. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c); State v. Padgett,
No. E2018-00447-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2233890, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23,
2019), no perm. app. filed. As such, on our de novo review of whether the statements were
hearsay, we conclude that the statements were properly subject to a hearsay objection.

       While hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial, see Tenn. R. Evid. 802, the Rules
of Evidence contain several exceptions to this general principle. “The effect of these
exceptions is to admit some types of hearsay evidence even though the out-of-court
statements were not made under oath and are not subject to cross-examination at trial.”
State v. McGill, No. M2022-00501-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2033804, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 16, 2023) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1973)), no
perm. app. filed. In other words, despite the general prohibition on receiving hearsay
evidence at trial, some hearsay statements are nevertheless admissible if “they fall within
one of the evidentiary exceptions or some other law renders them admissible.” State v.
Perry, No. M2020-01407-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 1195311, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr.
22, 2022), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2022).

        As one exception to the hearsay rule, our Rules of Evidence allow the admission of
“[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Tenn. R. Evid. 802(2). This
exception is often referred to as the “excited utterance” exception, and the theory behind
this hearsay exception is that “circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which
temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious
fabrication.” State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 823 (Tenn. 2010).

      To that end, three requirements must be satisfied before hearsay evidence may be
admitted under this exception. First, there must be “a startling event or condition that

                                            -7-
suspend[s] the normal, reflective thought processes of the declarant.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “While any event deemed startling may be sufficient to
meet this requirement, the event must be sufficiently startling to suspend the normal,
reflective thought process of the declarant.” Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 478 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “a subsequent startling event or condition which
is related to the prior event can also produce an excited utterance.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

       Second, the statement “must relate to the startling event or condition.” Franklin,
308 S.W.3d at 823 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This broad
requirement offers considerable leeway such that the statement may describe all or part of
the event or condition, or deal with the effect or impact of that event or condition.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Finally, the statement must be made while the declarant is “under the stress or
excitement from the event or condition.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). This third element looks at factors that suggest “spontaneity” in the statement
and have a “logical relation” to the event. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 478. Thus, a court
may reflect upon the following considerations in assessing the applicability of this third
element, including the following:

             the interval or time elapsed between the startling event and the statement;

             the nature and seriousness of the startling event or condition;

             the appearance, behavior, outlook, and circumstances of the declarant,
              including such characteristics as age and physical or mental condition; and

             the contents and substance of the statement, which may indicate the presence
              or absence of stress.

See State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 117 (Tenn. 2008); Franklin, 308 S.W.3d at 823 n.27.

       a.     Victim’s Statement to Her Friend

        First addressing the victim’s statement to her friend, no dispute exists that the first
two requirements for admission of this statement are met. This Court has previously held
that rape is a “startling event or condition” for purposes of the excited utterance exception.
State v. Person, 781 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989) (“Rape is an occurrence or
an event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes

                                             -8-
of an observer.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Samuel, 243
S.W.3d 592, 600-01 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (“[T]he defendant coming into the victim’s
room, pulling her pants down, and vaginally penetrating her would certainly be a startling
event.”). In addition, the trial court found that the victim’s statement related to this startling
event, and the record fully supports this factual finding.

        The Defendant’s challenge is to the third requirement, i.e., that the victim made the
statement while still under the stress or excitement of the event or condition. The
Defendant argues that “the State failed to meet its burden, as the proponent of the evidence,
of establishing that the circumstances were such that [the victim] was still under the initial
excitement of that event and thus to eliminate the possibility of deliberation and
fabrication.” He also asserts that “if there is an intervening time period of calm, rather than
continuous stress, then that provides an opportunity for deliberation or fabrication.” The
State responds that the victim was still visibly upset when she made her disclosure to her
friend.

        Important to our standard of review, the question of whether the victim made a
statement while still under the stress or excitement of the startling event or condition is a
question of fact. See State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 760 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008)
(recognizing that “[t]he application of some [hearsay] exceptions may initially depend
upon factual determinations,” and identifying the factual determinations in Rule 803(2) to
include “whether the statement ‘relat[ed] to a startling event’ or was ‘made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event’”). In this case, the trial
court made a specific factual finding that the victim “was, in fact, under the stress and
excitement of the event that had occurred the previous evening” when she uttered the
statement to her friend. As such, we are bound by this factual finding unless the evidence
in the record preponderates otherwise.

        In our review of the record, however, the evidence supports the trial court’s factual
finding. As noted above, this third element looks to factors that suggest “spontaneity” in
the statement and have a “logical relation” to the event. Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 478. The
nature and seriousness of the rape as a startling event was significant, and its physical and
emotional impact on the eleven-year-old victim would have been substantial. Cf. State v.
Ramos, 331 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010) (admitting statements, in part, when
the victim “would still have been under emotional and even physical stress from the rape.”).
In addition, the Defendant had threatened physical harm to the victim’s mother if the victim
revealed what had happened.

       As to the victim’s appearance, behavior, outlook, and circumstances, the friend
could see the victim over the video chat, and she noted that the victim was in tears and
crying throughout the conversation, which was unusual for the victim. The friend testified
that she could see that the victim was “breaking down really bad” and was “scared” to tell

                                              -9-
her friend what was wrong. Indeed, the contents of the victim’s statement indicated stress,
as the victim said that she was terrified to tell someone about the rape.

        The heart of the Defendant’s complaint is that admitting the victim’s statement to
her friend violates the “temporal limits” of the excited utterance exception. While the time
elapsed between the statement and the startling event is important, it is not dispositive.
Indeed, “[t]he time interval is material only as a circumstance bearing on the issue of
continuing stress.” Banks, 271 S.W.3d 117 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
To that end, our supreme court has recognized that a spontaneous response can occur as
much as twelve hours after an event, particularly when the declarant is still in a state of
shock. See State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 700 (Tenn. 2001); see also State v. F.R., 34
N.E.3d 498, 507 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) (admitting an excited utterance from a minor made
24 hours after a rape and noting that “[t]he focus is not on a specific time frame but upon
whether the excitement of the assault is still dominant over the child declarant’s thought
processes and whether the child’s statements were unreflective expressions of her belief.”
(citation omitted)).

       The record is not clear as to the time interval other than to establish that the rape
occurred in the early morning and the disclosure occurred later that evening on the same
day. However, given the nature and seriousness of the event, as well as the appearance and
condition of the victim, the time interval does not preclude the possibility that the victim
was still under the continuing stress of the rape. In other words, although the time elapsed
is important to this analysis, it is not by itself so significant to overcome all other evidence
supporting this third factor.

       We acknowledge that the temporal factor makes this question closer than it may be
in other cases. However, in the hearsay context, our standard of review binds us to the trial
court’s factual findings when they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Kendrick, 454 S.W.3d at 479. Here, the trial court made a specific factual finding that the
victim’s statement was made while “under the stress and excitement of the event that had
occurred the previous evening.” In making this finding, the court carefully considered the
relevant factors, including the time between the startling event and the making of the
statement, in ruling on this close issue. From our examination of the record, the trial court’s
finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Deferring to this factual finding,
therefore, we conclude on our de novo review that the victim’s statement to her friend fell
within the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and was admissible at trial.

       b.     Victim’s Statement to Her Sister

      The admissibility of the victim’s statement to her sister is also a close question. As
we noted earlier, the rape was a startling event, and the statement related to the startling

                                             - 10 -
event. Approximately twelve hours following the startling event, the victim contacted her
friend by video chat and told her about the rape. During that conversation, the victim was
upset, breaking down, crying, and scared. The sister overheard the victim crying and asked
the victim what was wrong. The victim responded that the Defendant had raped her.

        “[S]tatements made in response to questions may still be admissible if the declarant
is under the excitement or stress of the event.” State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820-21
(Tenn. 1997); Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 8.07[3][d] (6th ed. 2011)
(“The fact that a question prompted the excited answer is a circumstance relevant to stress,
but it does not automatically bar the statement’s admission under Rule 803(2).”). In this
case, the trial court stated that it would “rule consistently” with its previous holding and
admit the evidence under the excited utterance exception. The previous holding included
a factual finding that the victim was still acting under the stress of the rape when she made
the statements, and, in the context of the victim’s statement to the sister, this finding is
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Again deferring to this factual finding, as
we must, we conclude on our de novo review that the victim’s statement to her sister fell
within the excited utterance exception and was admissible at trial. The Defendant is not
entitled to relief on this ground.

     B.       DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS

       The Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to
introduce statements he made in asserting various constitutional rights. More specifically,
the Defendant objected to evidence that he told law enforcement officers at the victim’s
house that they needed a warrant, ostensibly to enter the residence. He also objected to
evidence that he told these officers he was “headed to [his] lawyer’s office” when they
asked where he was. We agree that both statements should not have been admitted, though
any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

              1.     Background

       As background for these issues, officers were dispatched to the victim’s house while
the victim and her mother were still at the hospital. The officers were sent to collect
possible evidence and contact the Defendant. When the officers arrived about 11:00 p.m.
that night, they encountered the Defendant’s son. The Defendant and his son were on a
video chat, and through this medium, the Defendant told the police, “You have to have a
warrant” to enter the house. The officers also interrupted the conversation between the
Defendant and his son to ask about the Defendant’s location. The Defendant responded,
“I’m headed to my lawyer’s office. What’s going on?” An officer’s body camera captured
both statements.

                                           - 11 -
        The Defendant objected to this evidence, arguing “that it is generally irrelevant that
somebody has asserted a Constitutional Right if – if for the reason the State’s offering it is
for the jury to draw an inference of guilt.” Defense counsel acknowledged that if the State
sought to introduce such proof for another reason, “we would have to meet that when it
[comes] up[.]” Although the State responded that the Defendant’s statements were relevant
to the destruction of evidence and his flight, the Defendant disagreed. He argued that the
jury would infer that he was guilty because he wanted to speak to a lawyer. Defense
counsel also asserted that the Defendant’s demand for a warrant was irrelevant to the flight
issue.

       After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the State to
introduce the unredacted body camera footage with both statements by the Defendant. The
court acknowledged the difficulty of the questions but believed that the statement, “You
have to have a warrant,” was not necessarily “an invocation of any constitutional rights.”
The court also believed that, when viewed in the context in which it was made, the
Defendant’s statement about going to see his lawyer was evidence of his evasion of police
and relevant to flight.

              2.     Defendant’s Refusal to Consent to Search

        The Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statement that
the officers needed a warrant to enter the house. He asserts that the introduction of his
statement was a comment upon him exercising a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The
State, essentially conceding the error, responds that any error committed by the trial court
was harmless. We agree that the admission of this statement was harmless error.

       Our courts in Tennessee have not directly addressed this issue. The supreme court
has recognized that “[t]here is authority that the refusal of an accused to consent to a search
without a warrant may not be used against him to imply guilt.” State v. Johnson, 743
S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tenn. 1987). However, although the Johnson Court did not discuss the
principle in detail, it allowed this type of evidence when offered for other “relevant and
admissible” purposes, such as refuting the notion that the defendant “was cooperating
voluntarily with investigating authorities.” Id.

       Nevertheless, other courts have held that a defendant’s “exercise of a constitutional
right, whether to refuse to consent to a search, to refuse to waive Miranda rights or to
decline to testify at trial, is not evidence of guilt.” United States v. Clariot, 655 F.3d 550,
555 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 206 (3d
Cir. 1988) (“We also see little, if any, valid distinction between the privilege against self-
incrimination and the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures which is
relevant to the propriety of the prosecutor’s argument.”). In fact, “asking a jury to draw

                                            - 12 -
adverse inferences from [a refusal to consent to search] may be impermissible if the
testimony is not admitted as a fair response to a claim by the defendant or for some other
proper purpose.” United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Just as a criminal suspect may validly
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in an effort to shield himself from criminal liability,
so one may withhold consent to a warrantless search, even though one’s purpose be to
conceal evidence of wrongdoing.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Moreover, while
refusing to consent to a warrantless search “is equally available to the innocent and the
guilty,” a prosecutor’s introduction of the refusal “can have but one objective[:] to induce
the jury to infer guilt.” Prescott, 581 F.2d at 1352.

       On appeal, the State does not argue that it asked the trial court to admit the
Defendant’s insistence upon a search warrant for any purpose other than to establish his
guilt. From our review of the record, the evidence was not relevant to a flight issue, and
we can discern no “relevant and admissible” purpose for admitting the Defendant’s
insistence upon a search warrant other than to imply his guilt. Johnson, 743 S.W.2d at 159.
Even under the deferential standard of review, we respectfully conclude that this evidence
should not have been admitted.

       That said, admission of this type of evidence does not result in automatic reversal
of the conviction. Our supreme court has stated that “non-structural constitutional errors
do not require automatic reversal and are, therefore, subject to a harmless error analysis.”
State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008). To avoid reversal, the State bears
the burden of “demonstrat[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” Id.
“The test used to determine whether a non-structural constitutional error is harmless is
whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

        In this case, although the State referred to the Defendant’s insistence upon a search
warrant on three occasions, it did not try to convince the jury to attribute any particular
significance to the statement. More importantly, the State’s proof of the Defendant’s guilt
was overwhelming. The victim gave detailed testimony about the rapes, and she
definitively identified the Defendant as her rapist. DNA consistent with the Defendant’s
genetic profile was found inside and outside the victim’s vagina.

        After seeing the police speaking with the victim at a local convenience store, the
Defendant called his son and instructed him to wash the victim’s bedding, which destroyed
potential evidence of the rapes. Even though the Defendant claims his son was responsible,
multiple witnesses, including the victim, her mother, her sister, and the Defendant’s son,
all testified that the Defendant’s son was not in the house at the time of the offenses. The
Defendant fled from the scene, did not tell anyone where he was, and did not return. The
Defendant later sent the victim’s mother messages of remorse and said that she did not

                                           - 13 -
“deserve any of this,” that he could not “change it,” and that he deserved to die. In our
view, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence did not contribute to the
verdict. As such, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

               3.     Defendant’s Consultation with a Lawyer

       The Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
State to admit the statement that he was on his way to his attorney’s office. The State
responds that the Defendant’s statement, “I’m headed to my lawyer’s office,” was not an
invocation of his right to counsel. It asserts that the statement was not credible because it
was made at 11:00 p.m. when most lawyers’ offices were closed. It also argues that the
statement was circumstantial evidence of the Defendant’s flight when combined with his
leaving the house after the victim disclosed the rape, abandoning the victim’s mother’s car
in an unfamiliar neighborhood, and staying with a friend. We agree with the Defendant
but conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                      a.      Danger of Improper Inference of Guilt

        Although the issue has not been directly addressed in Tennessee, other courts have
held that a prosecutor may not refer to a defendant’s decision to meet with counsel, at least
to imply that the defendant is guilty. See, e.g., Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667, 671
(6th Cir. 1990) (“A prosecutor may not imply that an accused’s decision to meet with
counsel, even shortly after the incident giving rise to a criminal indictment, implies guilt.”).
When a defendant seeks a meeting with legal counsel before the initiation of formal charges
or custodial interrogation, courts have recognized that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State’s discussion of this fact at trial. See
Commonwealth v. Nolin, 859 N.E.2d 843, 856 (Mass. 2007); State v. Dixon, 112 P.3d 883,
904 (Kan. 2005), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Wright, 224 P.3d 1159 (Kan.
2010). The reason for this prohibition is simple: this evidence “is likely to give rise to the
improper inference that a defendant in a criminal case is, or at least believes himself to be,
guilty” because “he had done something for which he needed a lawyer to defend him.”
State v. Angel T., 973 A.2d 1207, 1221 (Conn. 2009); Martin v. State, 775 A.2d 385, 394
(Md. 2001) (“Evidence of a criminal defendant’s consultation with an attorney is highly
prejudicial, as it is likely to give rise to the improper inference that a defendant in a criminal
case is, or at least believes himself to be, guilty.”).

       For these reasons, the State must tread carefully before seeking admission of any
evidence that the accused sought legal advice or tried to meet with a lawyer before charges
are brought. However, the prohibition is not absolute. Where evidence of a legal
consultation is relevant to a material issue at trial, and where the jury is properly instructed
on how to consider the evidence, rare cases may exist where the evidence is admissible.

                                              - 14 -
See United States v. Frazier, 944 F.2d 820, 826 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Prosecutors may not use
the simple fact of representation by counsel to imply a defendant is guilty; but when the
defendant’s particular choice of counsel is relevant to an issue (such as, means or motive)
in dispute, defense counsel is not exempt from being talked about at trial.”); Sulie v.
Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 130 (7th Cir. 1982) (allowing statements against a Fifth
Amendment challenge as bearing on the issue of sanity).

       But this is not one of those rare cases. “In order for evidence to be admissible, it
must be relevant.” State v. Tolliver, No. W2021-01386-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2673152,
at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 29, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 8, 2023). The
Rules of Evidence provide that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401.

       The State argues here that the Defendant’s statement that he could not meet with
law enforcement officers because he was “headed to [his] lawyer’s office” was relevant to
the issue of flight. The State asserts that it was highly unlikely that the Defendant was
going to see his lawyer at 11:00 at night, particularly because he had abandoned the
mother’s vehicle around the same time. According to the State, he lied to the police to
avoid disclosing his location, and this evasion, when coupled with his leaving the crime
scene, arguably constituted flight.

        In the context of this line of questioning, the operative and relevant fact to the flight
issue was the Defendant’s refusal to disclose his location when asked by the officers. It
was his evasion and subsequent hiding out at his friend’s house that were important to the
flight argument. The fact that he mentioned seeing a lawyer as a basis for his refusal to
disclose his location possessed no probative value at all. The statement filled no material
gaps in the story, and it did not make any fact of consequence more probable than it would
have been without the evidence. The Defendant’s statement was simply irrelevant. Tenn.
R. Evid. 401, 402; see also Martin, 775 A.2d at 393 (“[T]he fact to be inferred—the
consciousness of guilt—is not made more probable (or less probable) from the mere
seeking of legal advice or representation, and so evidence of the predicate fact is simply
irrelevant. On pure evidentiary grounds, it is inadmissible.”).

        Even if the relevant inference were that the Defendant lied to the police officers
about why he could not meet with them, the State’s argument would fare no better. The
false information that he was meeting with someone else could have been elicited without
ever mentioning the Defendant’s stated desire to meet with a lawyer. In other words, that
the Defendant falsely represented that he was on his way to meet someone was the
operative fact, not that he was meeting specifically with a lawyer. Again, the Defendant’s
statement about meeting a lawyer specifically was simply irrelevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401,
402.

                                             - 15 -
       Indeed, the record itself clearly demonstrates the irrelevance of the Defendant’s
statement about seeing a lawyer. Despite arguing emphatically to the trial court that the
information was relevant to the Defendant’s flight, the State did no such thing with the
jury. The State never argued to the jury that the Defendant’s statement about seeing a
lawyer was offered as evidence of flight.2 It did not ask its witnesses if they confirmed the
Defendant’s supposed meeting, and it did not seek or propose a jury instruction to guide
the jury’s consideration of the evidence. In essence, the jury was left without any proper
guidance about how to consider and evaluate the evidence.

        This is a significant concern. We remain

        mindful that [m]ost jurors . . . are not schooled in the law and that from such
        evidence and arguments, a juror might easily draw the inference . . . that it
        was [the defendant’s] idea to seek counsel because he had done something
        for which he needed a lawyer to defend him. Accordingly, we view
        [e]vidence of a criminal defendant’s consultation with an attorney [as] highly
        prejudicial, as it is likely to give rise to the improper inference that a
        defendant in a criminal case is, or at least believes himself to be, guilty.

Angel T., 973 A.2d at 1221; see also Sizemore, 921 F.2d at 672 (“This repeated failure to
caution the jury and counsel not only failed to cure the errors made, but was bound to imply
that the right to counsel was of little or no consequence and that exercise of that right was
somehow indicative of guilt.”); Lane v. State, 327 So. 3d 691, 753 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020)
(“[T]he question is whether the State relied on the simple fact of representation by counsel
to imply [the] defendant is guilty, i.e., whether that is the unavoidable inference from such
references, or whether the specific facts and circumstances of the case indicate that such
references served a legitimate purpose tied to relevant issues in the case.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the State
should not have played the portion of the video on which the Defendant stated he was on
his way to his attorney’s office.

                        b.      Effect of the Error

       Virtually all courts addressing the erroneous admission of a defendant’s
consultation with a lawyer have held that the error is subject to some heightened harmless
error analysis. In other words, while the error is not one where automatic reversal is

        2
                 The trial court was naturally concerned that the State not exceed the leeway given, and it
warned the State about putting “a whole lot of argument” on the statement. The State apparently took heed
of the caution and opted to place no emphasis on the Defendant’s comment.

                                                  - 16 -
required,3 courts routinely hold that, given the nature of the constitutional right at issue, the
error requires proof of harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613, 616 (3d Cir. 1973); Angel T., 973 A.2d at 1223;
State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 149 (N.J. 1991) (surveying cases). We agree with these
courts that the erroneous admission of a defendant’s consultation with a lawyer is a non-
structural constitutional error. As such, the presence of this error requires a new trial unless
the State demonstrates “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

        We conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, as noted
above, the State’s case was strong, and evidence of the Defendant’s guilt was
overwhelming. Moreover, the Defendant’s statement was isolated and not highlighted by
the State later in the trial or during argument. The State did not mention the comment
during its case-in-chief other than playing the statement once through the officer’s body
camera video, nor did it discuss the Defendant’s statement during closing arguments. Thus,
while the jury was left with an inference of guilt, the State did not compound the error by
making an argument supporting this theory. This slight reliance on the evidence by the
State significantly minimizes the effect of the error. See United States v. Daoud, 741 F.2d
478, 482 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when “the
prosecutor never made a point of asking the jury to draw a negative inference from the
defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right” and when “[t]he matter was not pursued in
argument”). Accordingly, given the strength of the State’s case and the isolated reference
by the State, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      C.        IMPEACHMENT WITH PRIOR CONVICTIONS

       The Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach
him with two federal convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possess
methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking because the
convictions were over ten years old and “did not speak directly to honesty.” In response,
the State maintains that the trial court acted within its discretion when it admitted the prior
convictions. Alternatively, the State asserts that the Defendant “cannot show that

        3
                 The Defendant cites United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1980) to argue that
the State’s error is a structural constitutional error requiring automatic reversal. We do not believe that
McDonald compels this conclusion. Indeed, only two years later, the Fifth Circuit distinguished McDonald
on its facts and held that an instruction from the trial court could help cure an erroneous reference to a
defendant’s retention of counsel. United States v. Milstead, 671 F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1982); see also
Marshall, 586 A.2d at 148-49 (“Although the Fifth Circuit in McDonald considered the error to be harmful
per se, the same Court of Appeals applied a harmless-error analysis in Milstead.”).

                                                  - 17 -
admission of his prior convictions more likely than not affected the verdict.” We again
agree with the State.

                1.      Background

        As background for this issue, we note that after the State’s proof, the Defendant
made a motion for judgments of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The State then said
that it had given notice that it would impeach the Defendant with three prior convictions
should the Defendant testify. Two of these convictions were federal felony convictions
occurring on May 23, 2005, consisting of conspiracy to distribute and possess more than
50 grams of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm in relation to drug trafficking.4

        The trial court ruled that the State could use the state marijuana conviction for
impeachment purposes. Addressing the 2005 federal convictions, the court treated them
as if they were outside the ten-year time limitation without making a specific finding.
However, the trial court also found that the probative value of the convictions substantially
outweighed their prejudicial effect. In so doing, the trial court acknowledged that the
federal convictions did not have “an element of specific dishonesty.” However, it also
reasoned that witness credibility was an important issue, and it observed that the
seriousness of the convictions “could help the jury in determining credibility.” The trial
court also concluded that “the fact that he’s got prior felony convictions and it’s not just
one of selling marijuana, that it’s something more serious, I think, could help the jury in
determining credibility.” Accordingly, the trial court allowed the State to impeach the
Defendant with his prior federal convictions as well.

                2.      Standard of Appellate Review

      “We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes under an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Waller, 118 S.W.3d
368, 371 (Tenn. 2003). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect

        4
                 The third conviction was a state felony conviction for possession of marijuana occurring
on April 8, 2016. Because the Defendant does not challenge the admissibility of this conviction for
impeachment purposes, we do not address it further. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) (“Review generally will
extend only to those issues presented for review.”).

                                                 - 18 -
legal standard or reaches a decision that is against logic or reasoning that causes an injustice
to the party complaining.” State v. Russell, 382 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tenn. 2012).

              3.      Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609

        Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) provides that a witness’s credibility may be
impeached by evidence of a conviction of crimes “punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted or, if not so
punishable, the crime must have involved dishonesty or false statement.” To explain the
distinction between the two categories, this Court has previously stated that “[t]o be eligible
as an impeaching conviction, a prior felony conviction need not involve dishonesty.” State
v. Osborne, 251 S.W.3d 1, 22 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted, emphasis in original). In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that
each of the Defendant’s prior federal convictions were felonies as defined in Rule
609(a)(2).

       The admission of prior felonies for impeachment purposes, however, is governed
by different standards depending on when the felonies were committed in relation to the
current charges. For example, while a defendant’s prior conviction is not typically
admissible unless the trial court finds that “the conviction’s probative value on credibility
outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues,” Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3),
a different standard applies to older convictions. Thus, when more than ten years have
elapsed since the date the defendant was released from confinement, or if the defendant
was not confined, the date of conviction, a heightened standard applies. In that
circumstance, the prior conviction is admissible only when, among other things, “the court
determines in the interests of justice that the probative value of the conviction, supported
by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Tenn.
R. Evid. 609(b) (emphasis added).

       “The underlying theory [behind the ten-year rule] is that a person’s criminal deeds
long ago may have little bearing on the person’s credibility today. The individual may
have matured considerably and learned from the experiences engendered by the
conviction.” State v. Chism, No. W2002-01887-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 23100335, at *6
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), perm.
app. dismissed (Tenn. Mar. 18, 2004). “Thus, as a practical matter, the balancing test
required by Tenn. R. Evid. 609(b) ordinarily results in the exclusion of the evidence of the
stale conviction.” Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see
State v. Smith, No. 910, 1990 WL 157419, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 1990) (“Rule
609(b) creates, in effect, a rebuttable presumption that convictions over ten years old are
more prejudicial than helpful and should be excluded.”).

                                             - 19 -
        In this case, it is unclear from the record whether ten years had elapsed between the
Defendant’s release from federal custody and the commencement of the present charges.
At trial, the parties were equivocal on this point, and as such, the trial court appears to have
applied the more rigorous standard of admissibility under Rule 609(b) from a sense of
fairness to the Defendant. As such, we also review the trial court’s decision to admit the
prior federal convictions for impeachment purposes under that standard as well.

        In analyzing the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment, a trial court is
“required to determine and explain the relevance of the convictions to the issue of
credibility and to assess the similarity between the present offenses and the impeaching
convictions.” State v. Williamson, No. W2019-00437-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1274770,
at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 16, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 17, 2020).
Importantly, while a felony crime “need not involve dishonesty” to be admissible for
impeachment, our supreme court has “rejected a per se rule that permits impeachment by
any and all felony convictions.” Waller, 118 S.W.3d at 371. Instead, “[a] prior felony
conviction still must be analyzed to determine whether it is sufficiently probative of
credibility to outweigh any unfair prejudicial effect it may have on the substantive issues
of the case.” Id. “To determine how probative a felony conviction is to the issue of
credibility, the trial court must assess whether the felony offense involves dishonesty or
false statement.” Id. The court “must focus particular attention on: (1) the relevance of
the impeaching conviction to the issue of credibility; and (2) the similarity between the
charged offense and the impeaching conviction.” State v. Herron, 461 S.W.3d 890, 906
(Tenn. 2015).

        With respect to other types of possession offenses, our supreme court has recognized
that these offenses “do not involve dishonesty or false statement.” Waller, 118 S.W.3d at
372 (in the context of drug possession offenses). But the supreme court has stopped short
of holding that convictions for possession offenses are never admissible for impeachment,
and it has recognized that they can be “slightly probative of [a defendant’s] credibility.”
Id. at 373. Moreover, the court has expressly recognized the possibility that a greater
number of impeaching convictions “are more probative of credibility than a lesser number
would be[.]” Id.; see also State v. Walker, 29 S.W.3d 885, 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)
(stating that “five previous felony convictions are more probative on the issue of the
defendant’s credibility than would be a fewer amount”).5 Indeed, we have also recognized
that the probative value of an impeaching conviction increases when the credibility of the
accused is “the sole or primary issue.” State v. Bowen, No. W2015-01316-CCA-R3-CD,

        5
                  Of course, where the impeaching offenses are of the same type as the currently charged offense, a
greater number of impeaching offenses “increases the risk that the jury would improperly consider the impeaching
convictions as evidence of his propensity to commit the present offense.” Waller, 118 S.W.3d 373. Such is not the
case here.

                                                      - 20 -
2016 WL 6776348, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
Mar. 9, 2017).

        Although the Defendant argues strongly that the federal convictions were
inadmissible for impeachment, the standard of appellate review is important to our
analysis. When reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, we must have
“awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several acceptable
alternatives.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). To that end,
we may not “second-guess a trial court’s exercise of its discretion simply because the trial
court chose an alternative that [we] would not have chosen.” State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d
179, 186 (Tenn. 2019). We also may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court
simply because we believe that another choice would have been the “best decision.” State
v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 729 (Tenn. 2016).

        Instead, under this deferential standard of review, we look first to see whether the
trial court identified and applied the correct legal standard. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d at 198.
Next, we consider whether the trial court made a decision that took into account the
applicable law and the relevant facts. Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 524. We then examine
whether the trial court’s decision “was within the range of acceptable alternative
dispositions.” Id. Importantly, while “[a]ppellate courts have the task of articulating the
boundaries of the permissible range of the trial court’s options,” the choice among
alternatives within that range is left to the trial court. Harmon v. Hickman Cmty.
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 306 (Tenn. 2020).

        In this case, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of the
Defendant’s federal convictions for impeachment purposes. For example, the court first
identified the correct standards of law that applied to the analysis of older convictions under
Rule 609(b). Next, it examined the totality of the facts and circumstances in making its
decision. While the convictions were not crimes involving dishonesty, the court found that
they still possessed some probative value on the issue of credibility. The trial court
considered that multiple convictions were more probative of credibility than a single
conviction, and it found that the Defendant’s own credibility was an important issue given
that the DNA evidence was consistent with two individuals. Finally, the trial court
determined that the prior federal convictions and the instant charges were dissimilar, which
minimized the risk of the jury inferring that the Defendant had a propensity to commit the
instant crime. See State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

        Based on these findings, the trial court expressly held that the probative value of the
federal convictions on the issue of credibility substantially outweighed the danger of unfair
prejudice and that admission of the convictions for impeachment was in the interests of
justice supported by specific facts and circumstances. Although it is possible that others
could reach a different conclusion, the trial court’s decision here was not illogical, nor was

                                            - 21 -
it unreasonable. To the contrary, the court identified and applied the correct standard of
law, made findings that have support in the record, and made a reasoned choice between
acceptable alternatives. As such, because “reasonable minds can disagree with the
propriety of the decision,” we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion to
admit the Defendant’s prior federal convictions for impeachment purposes. McCaleb, 582
S.W.3d at 186. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

     D.      REMOVAL OF GPS MONITORING BRACELET

       The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce
evidence that while he was on pretrial release, the Defendant cut off his GPS monitoring
bracelet and left the jurisdiction but returned before trial. The State responds that the
Defendant waived this issue because he objected on a different basis at trial. We agree
with the State.

             1.     Background

       To provide context for this issue, we note that before cross-examining the
Defendant, the State told the trial court that it wanted to ask about the Defendant’s
removing his GPS monitoring bracelet while he was on pretrial release. The State said the
question related to flight, especially because the Defendant did it after being charged.
Defense counsel argued that no flight occurred because the Defendant told the authorities
in advance and voluntarily returned to the jurisdiction. The court disagreed and allowed
the evidence for “consciousness of guilt on flight.”

       On cross-examination, the Defendant acknowledged that after his arrest, he was
released on bond and was equipped with a GPS monitoring bracelet. After that, he cut off
the bracelet and left the jurisdiction. On redirect examination, the Defendant said that
before he cut off his GPS bracelet, he contacted the monitoring agency to tell them that he
was leaving but would return. After celebrating his fortieth birthday in Las Vegas, the
Defendant returned to Tennessee.

             2.     Admission of Evidence

       The Defendant asserts that cutting off his GPS monitoring bracelet was “a violation
of the terms of his release on bond that should have been analyzed under Rule 404(b).”
The Defendant contends that the “trial court was thus required, before admitting the
evidence, not only to identify the relevant issue but also to make a finding under a clear

                                          - 22 -
and convincing evidence standard and to balance the unfair prejudice against the probative
value.”

        However, as the State notes, the Defendant did not raise a 404(b) objection during
the trial. State v. Jones, 151 S.W.3d 494, 498 n.3 (Tenn. 2004) (“[The defendant] did not
request a 404(b) hearing at trial or in her motions before the trial court. Accordingly, we
do not consider whether the evidence should have been excluded under Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 404(b).”). At trial, the Defendant asserted only that cutting off his GPS
monitoring bracelet was not evidence of flight because he voluntarily returned to the
jurisdiction. In his amended motion for a new trial, the Defendant summarily stated the
admission of the proof “was contrary to Rule 404(b) and Rule 403.” The Defendant made
no further argument on the issue at the hearing on the motion for a new trial.

        Ordinarily, before a party can challenge the admission of evidence on appeal, the
party must have preserved the issue in the trial court. To preserve an issue, the party should
first assert a timely objection identifying a specific ground. The party then must later raise
that issue in a motion for a new trial. Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 51(b);
Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). Otherwise, “the party waives the issue on appeal and cannot seek
plenary review.” State v. Thompson, No. W2022-01535-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 4552193,
at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2023) (citations omitted), no perm. app. filed.

        It is well-established that “[w]hen a party abandons the ground asserted when the
objection was made and asserts completely different grounds in the motion for a new trial
and in [the appellate] court, the party waives the issue.” State v. Howard, No. M2020-
01053-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 5918320, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2021), no perm.
app. filed. As an appellate court, our authority to decide cases generally extends only to
those issues that have been “formulated and passed upon in some inferior tribunal.” State
v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tenn. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Because the Defendant did not argue that the statements were inadmissible
under Rule 404(b) or Rule 403 . . . , we have no ruling from the trial court regarding these
rules to review, and we must conclude that these arguments are waived.” State v. DeMeza,
No. W2016-02086-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 1040145, at *20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 21,
2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 8, 2018).

        Because the Defendant has waived plenary review of any Rule 404(b) objection in
this Court, he may obtain relief, if at all, under the standards governing plain error review.
Importantly, though, our authority to review unpreserved issues for plain error is
discretionary, and our supreme court has emphasized that this authority is to be “sparingly
exercised.” See State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tenn. 2007). Indeed, only “rarely
will plain error review extend to an evidentiary issue.” State v. Scoville, No. M2006-
01684-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2600540, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2007), no perm.
app. filed.

                                            - 23 -
       In this case, the State argued that the Defendant waived this issue by failing to raise
the objection he now advances. However, while the Defendant filed a reply brief, he did
not request plain error review therein or argue the factors that could justify such relief. “To
be clear, a party seeking plain error relief must generally raise and argue the issue in the
party’s briefing, just as the party would do with all other issues in the ordinary course of
an appeal.” State v. Funk, No. E2022-01367-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 7130289, at *3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2023), no perm. app. filed. As such, “where a defendant fails
to respond to a waiver argument, only particularly compelling or egregious circumstances
could typically justify our sua sponte consideration of plain error relief.” Thompson, 2023
WL 4552193, at *5. We find no such circumstances here. Accordingly, we respectfully
decline to exercise our discretion to review the Defendant’s issue under plain error review.
The Defendant is not entitled to relief.

      E.      FLIGHT INSTRUCTION

       On appeal, the Defendant maintains that the trial court erred by giving the jury an
instruction on flight, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction.
The State responds that the trial court correctly instructed the jury. We agree with the
State.

       A criminal defendant has a “right to a correct and complete charge of the law.” State
v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 280 (Tenn. 2009). As such, “the trial court has the duty to
give a comprehensive instruction of the law as applicable to the facts in each case[.]” Id.
“Challenges to jury instructions present mixed questions of law and fact; therefore, we
review challenged instructions de novo without a presumption of correctness.” State v.
Smith, 492 S.W.3d 224, 245 (Tenn. 2016).

       This Court has observed that “[f]light or attempted flight may bear on the
defendant’s intent, purpose, or consciousness of guilt and may connect the accused with
the commission of the offense.” State v. Collins, No. W2020-01566-CCA-R3-CD, 2022
WL 1183803, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2022) (citing Rogers v. State, 455 S.W.2d
182, 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)), no perm. app. filed. To that end, a trial court may
instruct the jury that it may consider a defendant’s flight if there “is proof of both a leaving
the scene of the difficulty and a subsequent hiding out, evasion, or concealment in the
community, or a leaving of the community for parts unknown.” State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d
276, 289-90 (Tenn. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted).

       “The law makes no nice or refined distinction as to the manner or method of a flight;
it may be open, or it may be a hurried or concealed departure, or it may be a concealment
within the jurisdiction.” Rogers, 455 S.W.2d at 187 (internal quotation marks and citation

                                             - 24 -
omitted). As such, “[e]ven a brief evasion of authorities can support the giving of the flight
instruction,” and no particular distance must be shown. State v. Martin, No. W2017-
01610-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4677575, at *19 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2018), no
perm. app. filed.

        Of course, a defendant’s flight may be explained by reasons other than a guilty
conscience. We have recognized that “[e]vidence of flight to avoid arrest may be rebutted
by a credible explanation of some motive other than guilt, but the conclusion to be drawn
from such evidence is for the jury upon proper instructions from the trial court.” Hall v.
State, 584 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). Nevertheless, “[a]ny contradictory
evidence that serves to rebut the [S]tate’s proof merely raises a question for the jury to
resolve.” State v. Brazelton, No. E2019-00992-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 5878997, at *11
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2021), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2022).

       In our review of the record, the evidence fairly raised the issue of flight. After the
victim disclosed the rape, she met with the police at a convenience store. Instead of
accompanying the victim and her mother, the Defendant left the house in the mother’s van,
and he later left the van in front of a vacant house in an unfamiliar location. Upon learning
the police were at the victim’s house, he did not return home and instead had his son bring
him clothes. The Defendant then stayed with a friend until his eventual arrest. In fact, the
Defendant’s testimony confirmed that he did not go home and instead went to his friend’s
house to avoid the police. Because these facts could support a finding that the Defendant
was hiding out to evade or avoid a prosecution, sufficient evidence existed to support the
instruction. State v. Berry, 141 S.W.3d 549, 588 (Tenn. 2004) (appendix).

        In addition, the flight instruction appears to have been taken from the Tennessee
Pattern Jury Instructions, and it properly left to the jury the issue of whether the Defendant
took flight. Berry, 141 S.W.3d at 588 (“This pattern jury instruction [on flight] is a correct
statement of the applicable law and has been previously cited with approval by our court.”).
The instruction noted that “the fact of flight alone does not allow you to find that the
defendant is guilty of the crime alleged,” and it equally observed that “an entirely innocent
person may take flight and such flight may be explained by proof offered, or by the facts
and circumstances of the case.” All things considered, the instruction given by the trial
court was relatively benign. State v. Wilks, No. W1999-00279-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL
1097832, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 1999) (noting that a nearly identical instruction
was “relatively benign” and rendered any error harmless), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May
9, 2000). We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in instructing the jury
on the issue of flight.

                                            - 25 -
      F.      CUMULATIVE TRIAL ERRORS

       The Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the errors in this case prevented
him from receiving a fair trial. The cumulative error doctrine applies when there have been
“multiple errors committed in trial proceedings, each of which in isolation constitutes mere
harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on the proceedings
so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State
v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76 (Tenn. 2010). To that end, more than one actual error must
exist before the cumulative error doctrine can apply. Id. at 77.

       In the instant case, we have concluded that the Defendant’s statements that the
police needed a warrant to enter the house and that he was on his way to his attorney’s
office should not have been admitted. Therefore, multiple errors exist in this case.
However, our supreme court has explained that

       [a] reviewing tribunal must consider each such claim against the background
       of the case as a whole, paying particular weight to factors such as the nature
       and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and
       combined effect; how the [trial] court dealt with the errors as they arose
       (including the efficacy—or lack of efficacy—of any remedial efforts); and
       the strength of the [State’s] case. The run of the trial may also be important[.]

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). Ultimately,
“[b]ecause a defendant is not guaranteed a perfect trial, the circumstances warranting the
reversal of a conviction under the cumulative error doctrine are rare.” State v. Reynolds,
635 S.W.3d 893, 933 (Tenn. 2021).

        We conclude that the errors committed “do not lend themselves to being aggregated
to show that” the Defendant did not receive a fair trial. Id. The nature of the errors, the
lack of any interrelation, and the other proof in the case do not show that this case is one
of the rare cases where multiple errors should result in reversal. The Defendant is not
entitled to relief due to cumulative error.

                                             - 26 -
     G.       SENTENCING

       Finally, the Defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. He does
not take issue with the length of the sentences for his individual crimes. However, he
argues that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. The State
responds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it imposed partial
consecutive sentences. We agree with the State.

       The process of imposing discretionary consecutive sentences pursuant to Tennessee
Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) involves two steps. First, the trial court must find
by a preponderance of the evidence that “the defendant qualifies for consecutive sentencing
under one of the classifications set forth in section 40-35-115(b).” State v. Perry, 656
S.W.3d 116, 127 (Tenn. 2022) (footnote omitted). Second, the trial court must “then
choose whether, and to what degree, to impose consecutive sentencing based on the facts
and circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the purposes and principles of sentencing.”
Id. “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences,
thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed
reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” State v. Pollard, 432
S.W.3d 851, 862 (Tenn. 2013) (citations omitted).

      The trial court found that the Defendant was qualified for consecutive sentencing
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(5). This statute permits
consecutive sentences to be considered when

       [t]he defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses involving
       sexual abuse of a minor with consideration of the aggravating circumstances
       arising from the relationship between the defendant and victim or victims,
       the time span of defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope
       of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage
       to the victim or victims[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(5).

       On appeal, the Defendant argues that his consecutive sentence was “excessively
punitive” and that “there was nothing about [the offenses] that makes this case especially
aggravated when compared to other child rape cases, such that consecutive sentences were
necessary.” The Defendant maintains that the offenses occurred on one night and caused
no lasting physical injuries. In other words, the Defendant contends that because two
aggravating circumstances listed in section 40-35-115(b)(5) were absent, the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. We respectfully disagree.

                                            - 27 -
       This Court has previously held that “not all of the aggravating circumstances listed
in section 40-35-115(b)(5) must be present to support the imposition of consecutive
sentencing.” State v. Doane, 393 S.W.3d 721, 738 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, “consecutive sentences may still be appropriate
under section 40-35-115(b)(5) even when one factor militates against them if the other
aggravating circumstances have been established and carry sufficient weight.” Id.

       In this case, the trial court carefully considered the aggravating circumstances
required by section 40-35-115(b)(5): (1) the relationship between the Defendant and the
victim; (2) the time span of the Defendant’s undetected sexual activity; (3) the nature and
scope of the sexual acts; and (4) the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to
the victim. Consistent with the Defendant’s argument, the trial court found that the time
span of the undetected sexual activity did not weigh in favor of consecutive sentences.

       However, the trial court found that the remaining aggravating circumstances had
been established in this case. Specifically, the trial court found that the Defendant
exploited his relationship as the victim’s putative stepfather to gain access to her and to
accomplish the offenses, giving significant weight to aggravating circumstance (1). E.g.,
State v. Brady, No. E2019-00947-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1847480, at *12 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Apr. 13, 2020) (affirming imposition of consecutive sentences, in part, and giving
weight to the “relationship between Defendant and the victim because Defendant was the
victim’s father figure”), no perm. app. filed. As to aggravating circumstance (3), the trial
court found that because the Defendant “penetrated or attempted to penetrate the victim in
every possible way,” the nature and scope of the acts weighed in favor of consecutive
sentencing. Specifically, the trial court said that “this was about as bad of a one-time
incident as you can possibly imagine.” E.g., State v. Mason, No. E2019-00174-CCA-R3-
CD, 2020 WL 5015903, at *35 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2020) (affirming imposition of
consecutive sentences, in part, when “the abuse involved multiple types of sexual
penetration”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 14, 2021).

        Finally, the trial court credited the victim’s testimony to find that she was still
suffering from the psychological pain of the offenses, thereby establishing aggravating
circumstance (4). See State v. Pruitt, No. E2021-01118-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 4005810,
at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 2, 2022) (affirming imposition of consecutive sentences, in
part, stating that “the record supports the trial court’s determination that the victim suffered
from residual and mental damage as a result of the abuse sufficient to support this
aggravating circumstance and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard”),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 11, 2023).

       Even after finding these factors, the trial court determined that partial consecutive
sentences best served the purposes and principles of sentencing. We conclude that the trial
court acted within its discretion in imposing the sentence in this case.

                                             - 28 -
                                     CONCLUSION

       In summary, we hold that harmless errors exist in the admission of the Defendant’s
statements related to his purported exercise of constitutional rights. We discern no error in
the remaining issues. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                          ____________________________________
                                                TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

                                           - 29 -