Court Opinion

ID: 9395822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 18:03:45.955156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.744567
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/18/23 Nielson v. Courtney CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

BRETT A. NIELSON,                                              2d Civil No. B324058
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 56-2020-
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                00547663-CU-OR-VTA)
                                                                 (Ventura County)
v.

SHANNON J. COURTNEY,

     Defendant and Respondent.

       Brett A. Nielson appeals from the judgment after the trial
court ordered the partition sale of a Newbury Park property he
co-owned with Shannon J. Courtney. The court also awarded
Nielson and Courtney attorney fees and costs, to be paid from the
proceeds of the property sale. Nielson contends the court erred
when it: (1) declined to apportion his fees entirely to Courtney,
and (2) granted Courtney’s fee request. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Nielson and Courtney were a couple for nearly 16 years.
They owned property and raised a child together. Eventually,
their relationship deteriorated to the point that Nielson
requested an order forcing the partition sale of the Newbury Park
home he and Courtney owned. He moved for summary judgment
on his request the following year. The trial court granted
Nielson’s motion, and entered an interlocutory judgment of
partition. It reserved ruling on any claims for the recovery and
apportionment of attorney fees and costs.
      Nielson and Courtney both moved for attorney fees awards.
In his motion, Nielson claimed he filed the partition action for the
“common benefit” because proceeds from the sale would be split
equally between him and Courtney. He asked the trial court to
apportion the $22,000 in fees he sought entirely to her, claiming
she “caused the[] costs to be incurred by . . . refus[ing] to
cooperate in the sale of the property.” He also urged the court to
deny any recovery sought by Courtney because, in his view, her
actions in the case only served to delay the property sale and
thus were not for the common benefit.
      Courtney had a different view. She claimed the actions she
took in the partition action were not dilatory but were instead
required because of the “deftly calculated . . . ambiguity” of
Nielson’s pleadings and his attorney’s refusal to engage with
hers. She requested that the trial court deny Nielson’s fee
request and instead order him to pay the entirety of the nearly
$35,000 in fees she claimed to have incurred.
      The trial court viewed Nielson and Courtney’s attorney fee
dispute a consequence of their “toxic relationship,” one akin to
“two scorpions in a bottle.” Both parties alleged they were
“content to conclude their relationship with [the] sale of the
[Newbury Park] property” and a “50/50 split of the proceeds,” but
at the same time claimed the other’s “unreasonable demands”
prevented early resolution of the case. It was also “impossible” to
determine which of the parties’ attorneys refused to engage with
the other. Ultimately, the court concluded that the presence of

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both attorneys was necessary—and thus for the common benefit
of the parties—since Nielson and Courtney “would never have
accomplished a partition sale by themselves.” It awarded Nielson
$16,750 and Courtney $19,800 in attorney fees and costs, with
each award to be paid from the sale of the Newbury Park
property before the distribution of any remaining proceeds.
                            DISCUSSION
       Nielson contends the trial court erred when it: (1) declined
his request to apportion his attorney fee and cost award to
Courtney, and (2) awarded Courtney fees. We disagree.
       “The costs of partition include . . . [¶] [r]easonable
attorney[] fees incurred or paid by a party for the common
benefit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010, subd. (a).) A trial court
shall apportion these costs “among the parties in proportion to
their interests[,] or make such other apportionment as may be
equitable.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.040.) We review a ruling
based on such equitable considerations for abuse of discretion.
(Lin v. Jeng (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1025.) We will not
disturb it unless the appellant shows that the court “exceeded the
bounds of reason, resulting in a miscarriage of justice” (ibid.), or
that “ ‘there is no substantial evidence to support the . . . court’s
findings’ ” (Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 966 (Orien)).
       Nielson made neither showing here. He first argues the
trial court should have apportioned his attorney fee award
entirely to Courtney, but he supports this argument with no legal
analysis. “Whether legal or factual, no error warrants reversal
unless the appellant can show injury from the error.” (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “[T]o
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis.” (Id. at
pp. 286-287.) “[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments that are

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not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions [they]
want[] us to adopt.” (Id. at p. 287.)
      Nielson’s apportionment argument is little more than a list
of conclusory assertions with no citations to legal authority. This
is unacceptable. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 993, 1011.) “One cannot simply say the [trial] court
erred and leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why.”
(Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) It is not our
duty to “ ‘act as counsel for [Nielson] . . . and furnish a legal
argument as to how the trial court’s rulings . . . constituted an
abuse of discretion’ [citation] or a mistake of law.” (Ibid.)
      Moreover, the trial court’s apportionment decision was
reasonable. The evidence showed that Nielson and Courtney had
a “toxic” relationship and made “unreasonable” demands of each
other throughout this litigation. Either one or both of their
attorneys refused to engage with the other. Both sides’ actions
dragged out the case longer than necessary. Such needless
actions support the trial court’s equitable decision not to
apportion Nielson’s attorney fee award entirely to Courtney.
There was no abuse of discretion. (See Orien, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th at p. 968 [detailing permissible ways a court may
apportion fees in a partition action].)
      There was also no abuse of discretion when the trial court
granted Courtney’s attorney fee request. As with his
apportionment argument, Nielson supports this contention with
no legal analysis. Instead, he simply asserts that Courtney
provided no common benefit in the case because she filed an
answer to his partition request in which she denied that Nielson
was entitled to relief. This assertion ignores the long-standing
principle in California law that “fees incurred by a defendant to a

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partition action [can] be for the common benefit, and therefore
allocable in part to the plaintiff, despite the fact that the
defendant had ‘resisted partition.’ ” (Orien, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th
at p. 967, italics added; see, e.g., Forrest v. Elam (1979) 88
Cal.App.3d 164, 174 [“counsel for defendants performed services
for the common benefit of the parties by resistance to the efforts
of [the plaintiff] to take . . . value to which he was not entitled”].)
“[T]hat [an] action was contested [is] no bar to the proportional
allocation of attorney fees.” (Orien, at p. 967.)
       Nielson also invites this court to reweigh evidence on which
party delayed the partition action and which attorney refused to
engage with the other to support his contention that the trial
court erroneously granted Courtney’s attorney fee request. We
decline this invitation. (Campbell v. Southern Pacific Co. (1978)
22 Cal.3d 51, 60.)
                              DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Courtney shall recover her costs
on appeal and the attorney fees incurred in conjunction with this
appeal (Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927),
in amounts to be determined by the trial court (Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 3.1702(c) & 8.278).
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.           CODY, J.

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                    Henry J. Walsh, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Douglas C. Michie for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Manfredi, Levine, Eccles, Miller & Lanson and Matthew R.
Eccles for Defendant and Respondent.