Court Opinion

ID: 9853350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:47:00.986309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.101529
License: Public Domain

McInturff, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. This case falls squarely within State v. Murray, 8 Wn. App. 944, 509 P.2d 1003 (1973), aff'd, 84 Wn.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974) , and State v. Keefe, 13 Wn. App. 829, 537 P.2d 795 (1975) . Neither here nor in either of those cases were the officers aware at the time they "seized" the evidence that it was evidence of a crime. Here, as in Murray and Keefe, it was a subsequent investigation that disclosed the incriminating nature of the evidence seized by the officers.
Just as there was nothing incongruous about the presence of the television set from which the officers took the identification number in Murray, there is nothing incongruous about the Camaro in the garage here. Indeed, that is where *470a vehicle in a state of disrepair likely would be found. Furthermore, the officers' knowledge of other Camaros in the area does not furnish them with knowledge of the vehicle's incriminating nature. There was nothing to establish a nexus between the vehicle in the garage and any of the other vehicles or between the vehicles and the defendants. In fact, the information possessed by the officers when they searched for and seized the identification number would not provide probable cause upon which to issue a warrant.
Thus, under these circumstances, State v. Proctor, 12 Wn. App. 274, 276-77, 529 P.2d 472 (1974), relied upon by the majority, is distinguishable. As the more complete context of that portion of the opinion cited by the majority reads:
In other words, police who are rightfully upon a citizen's property for a limited purpose may not rummage about in the hope or expectation that incriminating evidence or contraband will turn up. But that is not this case. The information which the police had about Proctor, coupled with the incongruity of the items seen in the business office, gave the officer probable cause to believe that he was looking at stolen property. It was reasonable for him to note the serial numbers.
(Italics ours.)
If, as the majority strenuously argues, the officers entered the garage solely for the purpose of finding possible fight participants, injured victims or "people who might be hiding for one reason or another," they exceeded the scope of their exceptional and limited intrusion just as did the police officers in Murray. Their discovery of the Camaro could have been inadvertent, but the discovery of a metal identification tag on its dashboard was not. Finding and recording the identification number required an overt, searching act beyond the purpose for which the officers were lawfully present. This is a classic case of extending a justifiable but limited intrusion to ’’a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerge[d]." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971).
*471Since the discovery was neither inadvertent nor made with knowledge of its incriminating nature, the plain-view exception does not apply; nor do any of the cases cited by the majority in footnote 3 of their opinion. Each of those cases is distinguishable as involving a legitimate reason for identifying the vehicle in question. In United States v. Williams, 434 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1970) and United States v. Johnson, 413 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1969), there was knowledge of license-plate switching on the suspect vehicle; in Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1967), the investigating officer knew the identification number of the vehicle prior to its seizure; in Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967), recording the identification number of the vehicle was necessary because it was being impounded by the police; and in Pasterchik v. United States, 400 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1968), the officers had information that the suspect vehicle belonged to someone other than the defendant. Finally, United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1972) did not even involve an identification number. Instead, the officers there were searching for the vehicle registration number and uncovered incriminating evidence during the search.
Applying the plain-view doctrine here lets the exception swallow the rule. I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.
Reconsideration denied July 19, 1978.
Review denied by Supreme Court December 1, 1978.