Court Opinion

ID: 9393366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 22:05:10.28589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.704295
License: Public Domain

05/09/2023

                                          DA 21-0255
                                                                                         Case Number: DA 21-0255

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 80N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

CARL SANGREY,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC 19-389
                       Honorable Elizabeth A. Best, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Gregory Hood, Assistant Appellate
                       Defender, Helena, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bree Gee, Assistant Attorney
                       General, Helena, Montana

                       Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: March 15, 2023

                                                              Decided: May 9, 2023

Filed:

                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Carl Sangrey Jr. (Sangrey) appeals the imposition of six contested sentencing

conditions by the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Cascade County. We affirm.

¶3     Sangrey raises one issue on appeal: whether the District Court abused its discretion

when it imposed contested sentencing Conditions 7, 11, 28, 29, 42, and 43.

¶4     In June 2019, the State charged Sangrey with two counts of felony Sexual Assault

after 12-year-old Jane Doe I and 16-year-old Jane Doe II disclosed that Sangrey sexually

abused them. Jane Doe I reported that the sexual abuse began when she was five years old

and ended a few weeks before her forensic interview. Jane Doe I reported that in the most

recent incident, Sangrey held her down, squeezed and rubbed her breasts, and rubbed her

“front part” and “butt part.” After the incident, Jane Doe I told Jane Doe II about the

assault, and Jane Doe II disclosed that she had also been touched by Sangrey. In her

forensic interview, Jane Doe II reported that while she was at the fair with Sangrey and her

family, Sangrey purposefully touched her vagina.

¶5     The State and Sangrey entered into a plea agreement which provided the State would

amend the two counts of felony Sexual Assault to two counts of felony Criminal

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Endangerment. In February 2021, Sangrey agreed to enter an Alford plea. The plea

agreement provided that Sangrey “agrees to have the Court impose and to abide by all the

standard conditions of probation as contained in the Administrative Rules of Montana

applicable at the time [Sangrey] is sentenced.”

¶6     The court ordered Sangrey to undergo a psychosexual evaluation (PSE) which was

performed by Christopher E. Quigley, LCSW (Quigley). Quigley reported that Sangrey’s

score was consistent with individuals who are “considered to be overly falsifying on the

test.” Quigley found that Sangrey was not forthright about his sexual history. In the

evaluation, Sangrey told Quigley that if he had touched one of his nieces, it was because

he lost his balance and his hand touched their stomach when he caught his fall. Quigley

made recommendations for conditions of probation after the evaluation. Quigley’s

recommendations included that Sangrey should complete Phases I and II of the sex

offender program with a licensed therapist certified by the Montana Sex Offender

Treatment Association (MSOTA); Sangrey should relinquish and not possess

pornography; Sangrey should have no unsupervised contact with children under the age of

16 and should not participate in activities that require him to supervise children; Sangrey

should not use alcohol or drugs unless medically indicated; and Sangrey should submit to

periodic polygraph examinations as part of his ongoing sex offender treatment. Finally,

Quigley determined that if convicted of a felony sexual offense, Sangrey should be required

to register as a Tier I sex offender.

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¶7    The District Court relied on the PSE and the presentence investigation report (PSI)

at sentencing. The District Court sentenced Sangrey to the Department of Corrections for

ten years, with nine years suspended, and ran the sentences concurrently. The District

Court also ordered Sangrey to complete Phases I and II of sexual offender treatment with

an MSOTA licensed provider.

¶8    During the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed six conditions over

Sangrey’s objection: Conditions 7, 11, 28, 29, 42, and 43. Those conditions provided:

      Condition 7: The Defendant must obtain permission from his/her supervising
      officer before engaging in a business, purchasing real property, purchasing
      an automobile, or incurring a debt.

      Condition 11: The Defendant is prohibited from gambling.

      Condition 28: The Defendant shall not have any contact with any individual
      under the age of 18 unless accompanied by an appropriately trained,
      responsible adult who is aware of the Defendant’s sexual conviction and is
      approved by the Probation & Parole Officer and sexual offender treatment
      provider. The Defendant shall sign a “No Contact” contract and abide by all
      conditions of the contract.

      Condition 29: The Defendant shall not frequent places where children
      congregate unless accompanied by an appropriately trained, responsible
      adult who is aware of the Defendant’s sexual conviction and is approved by
      the Probation & Parole Officer and sexual offender treatment provider. This
      includes, but is not limited to, schools, parks, playgrounds, malls, movies,
      fairs, parades, swimming pools, carnivals, arcades, parties, family functions,
      holiday festivities, or any other place or function where children are present
      or reasonably expected to be present. The Defendant shall obtain permission
      from the Officer prior to going to any of the above places.

      Condition 42: The Defendant shall submit to annual polygraph testing. (For
      Treatment Purposes)

      Condition 43: The Defendant shall not date, live with, or otherwise be
      aligned with any person with children under the age of 18 without the express
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       prior approval of the therapist and Probation and Parole Officer. If this
       approval is granted, they shall both be involved with the Defendant’s
       treatment to the extent recommended by the treatment provider.

¶9     Sangrey objected to Condition 7 because there was no nexus between financial

oversight and his crimes.     The District Court overruled this objection because “the

supervising officer needs discretion” and it was a standard condition of probation. Sangrey

objected to Condition 11 because a prohibition against gambling was not related to his

crimes and he enjoyed going to the horse races. The District Court overruled this objection

as it is a standard condition. Sangrey objected to Conditions 28 and 29 because he was not

convicted of sexual offenses and the PSE did not find that his sexual interests included

minors. The District Court overruled these objections due to the information in the PSE

and because of the “factual basis of this charge.” Next, Sangrey objected to Condition 42,

arguing polygraph testing is unreliable and violates his due process rights. The court

overruled this objection because the polygraph testing was for sex offender treatment

purposes and the court wanted to defer to Sangrey’s treatment professionals. Finally,

Sangrey objected to Condition 43, arguing there was no nexus to himself or the offense.

As with Conditions 28 and 29, the court concluded the PSE and the underlying facts

established a basis for imposing this condition.

¶10    On appeal, Sangrey argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it

imposed Conditions 7, 11, 28, 29, 42, and 43. He further argues that the imposed conditions

have no nexus to the underlying offenses and are overly broad. We review for an abuse of

discretion a district court’s sentencing conditions if the conditions are objected to at

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sentencing. State v. Ashby, 2008 MT 83, ¶¶ 9, 22, 342 Mont. 187, 179 P.3d 1164. A

district court abuses its discretion when it “acts arbitrarily, without employment of

conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.”

In re R.M.T., 2011 MT 164, ¶ 26, 361 Mont. 159, 256 P.3d 935.

¶11    The State maintains that the District Court did not abuse its discretion as Sangrey

agreed to follow standard conditions of probation as part of his plea agreement with the

State. Because Conditions 7 and 11 are standard conditions of probation, the nexus

requirement is inapplicable. Regarding Conditions 28, 29, 42, and 43, the State maintains

these conditions meet the nexus requirement as they reflect the recommendations contained

in Sangrey’s PSE.

¶12    When suspending a sentence, district courts have discretion to impose conditional

restrictions on a defendant’s liberty during the suspended portion. Section 46-18-201(4),

MCA. An imposed condition has a nexus to the offense or offender if the condition is

reasonable or “necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the victim or society.”

Ashby, ¶¶ 13-15. We will reverse an imposed condition if it “is ‘overly broad or unduly

punitive,’ or if the required nexus is ‘absent or exceedingly tenuous.’” State v. Melton,

2012 MT 84, ¶ 18, 364 Mont. 482, 276 P.3d 900.

¶13    Sangrey argues that requiring an annual polygraph test (Condition 42) violates his

right to due process and lacks a nexus to the offense. We have held that although polygraph

tests are inadmissible in Montana court proceedings, this does not apply to polygraph tests

as a condition of probation. State v. Heddings, 2008 MT 402, ¶ 20, 347 Mont. 169,

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198 P.3d 242. Here, the District Court relied on the PSI and Quigley’s recommendation

that Sangrey undergo polygraph testing to assist with his sex offender treatment and

rehabilitation. The District Court properly exercised its discretion to impose Condition 42

as it was recommended by the psychosexual evaluator and therefore is reasonably related

to Sangrey’s treatment needs as well as the underlying facts constituting the charges.

¶14    Sangrey argues that the conditions restricting his ability to contact or be in the

presence of children without supervision (Conditions 28, 29, and 43) do not have a nexus

to him or his offenses. He argues that no nexus was established because the PSE did not

indicate he had a sexual interest in minors and because he pleaded guilty to criminal

endangerment, which is not a sexual offense. However, as discussed above, district courts

have discretion to impose conditional restrictions on a defendant’s liberty during the

suspended portion of a sentence. Section 46-18-201(4), MCA. Here, Conditions 28, 29,

and 43 are based on Quigley’s recommendation contained in the PSE and therefore are

reasonably related to Sangrey and the underlying facts constituting the offenses.

¶15    Sangrey’s argument that the District Court erred in relying on the underlying facts

of the initial charges is incorrect. A sentencing court can rely on any evidence relevant to

a defendant’s sentence, which may include the defendant’s background history, mental and

physical condition, and any other evidence the court considers to have probative value.

State v. Rennaker, 2007 MT 10, ¶ 49, 335 Mont. 274, 150 P.3d 960. The District Court

described Sangrey’s offense as having the potential to “impact victims for

generations and . . . cause a cycling of offenses.” The information relied on by the District

                                             7
Court when imposing these conditions was relevant and reasonably related to Sangrey and

his conduct.

¶16    The Montana Department of Corrections is authorized by rule to adopt standard

conditions of probation, although it “may not make any rule conflicting with . . . conditions

of probation imposed by a court.” Section 46-23-1002, MCA. Sangrey appeals the

financial oversight condition (Condition 7) and the no gambling condition (Condition 11),

arguing they have no nexus to his offense. Under § 46-18-201(4)(c), MCA, sentencing

courts have authority to impose standard conditions whenever suspending a sentence.

While Conditions 7 and 11 are standard conditions recognized by the Department of

Corrections, Admin. R. M. 20.7.1101 (2023), and § 46-23-1002(3), we conclude that the

dispositive question is whether Sangrey agreed to the imposition of standard conditions of

probation in his plea agreement. Sangrey did. Accordingly, Conditions 7 and 11 were

properly imposed by the District Court because Sangrey agreed to their imposition.

¶17    Review of the record shows that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by

imposing Conditions 7, 11, 28, 29, 42, and 43. Although Conditions 28, 29, 42, and 43 are

not standard conditions of probation, the District Court had discretion to impose these

conditions after reasonably relying on the recommendation of Sangrey’s PSE and

considering the underlying facts. Sangrey agreed to imposition of Conditions 7 and 11

when he entered his plea. He, therefore, has failed to preserve any challenge on appeal to

these conditions.

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¶18    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶19    Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ LAURIE McKINNON

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

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