Court Opinion

ID: 9930662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 15:11:01.13431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:15.541915
License: Public Domain

02/07/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                                September 7, 2023 Session

             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER BOLDEN

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                Nos. 18-07054, C1810335 J. Robert Carter, Jr., Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. W2022-01127-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Christopher Bolden, of especially aggravated
robbery, for which he received a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal,
Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
indictment for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for
severance of his case from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred in “curtailing
[Defendant’s] questions in jury selection”; (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s
request to cross-examine the victim about “potential bias” related to cases that the State
dismissed against the victim while Defendant awaited trial; (5) the trial court erred in
admitting Defendant’s prior conviction for robbery “without engaging in the required
analysis”; (6) the trial court erred in allowing the State to ask questions about “an irrelevant
and prejudicial rap music video”; (7) the trial court erred by refusing to fully bifurcate a
charged count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm from all other counts; and (8)
the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following a thorough review, we
affirm Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. ROSS DYER
and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Phyllis Aluko, District Public Defender; and Glover Wright and Katherine Oberembt,
Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Christopher Bolden.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Matt McLeod, Brad
Reasonover, and Forrest Edwards, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.
                                              OPINION

                              Factual and Procedural Background

     On July 2, 2018, Sebastian Parker was shot and robbed at a recording studio he
owned in Memphis. Mr. Parker later identified Defendant and his co-defendant, Corey
Brown, as the assailants.

                                        Pretrial Proceedings

       Defendant was arrested for his involvement in the offense on September 6, 2018.1
The Shelby County Grand Jury issued an indictment on December 4, 2018, charging both
Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown with attempted first degree premeditated murder,
especially aggravated robbery, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous
felony, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant was arraigned in
Criminal Court on January 4, 2019, and the Shelby County District Public Defender’s
Office was appointed to represent Defendant. In June 2019, the first Assistant District
Public Defender assigned to Defendant’s case filed multiple pretrial motions on
Defendant’s behalf, including a Motion for List of State’s Witnesses; Motion to Suppress
Out-of-Court Identification; Motion to Bifurcate Count Four (Convicted Felon in
Possession of a Firearm); and a Motion for a Rule 609 Hearing.

       On August 8, 2019, Defendant appeared in court with a second Assistant District
Public Defender (“defense counsel”), who made the following announcement: “I have now
had an opportunity to meet [Defendant] and go over discovery, and after meeting with him,
he would like to set another trial date. I’ve spoken with the State, and I think we are both
free on October 7th.” When defense counsel requested a motion date, the trial court
commented, “It’s been set for trial before. I assume we heard all the motions we needed
to hear. In fact, we did hear some motions. But if you filed some and there’s a good cause
shown, I’ll give you a motion date[.]” On September 5, 2019, the State filed a Notice of
Impeachment Convictions and Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment.

       On September 10, 2019, Defendant filed pro se a Motion to Relieve Counsel of
Duties, along with several additional pro se motions. At a status hearing held September
12, 2019, Defendant asserted that he did not want to be represented by defense counsel and
that he wanted to represent himself. When the trial court attempted to question Defendant
about his decision, however, Defendant refused to answer the court’s questions. Defense

        1
         We glean the date of Defendant’s arrest from the dates of Defendant’s pretrial jail credits on his
judgment of conviction; the record on appeal contains no information about pretrial proceedings occurring
between the time of Defendant’s arrest and his indictment.
                                                   -2-
counsel requested a mental evaluation for Defendant, but the trial court denied the request,
stating: “At this point, no. I’m sorry. It would just be delay. They wouldn’t get it done.
You have not felt the need to have him mentally evaluated until this last tack. And I’m
going to call it a behavioral choice that [Defendant’s] making[.]” On September 17, 2019,
defense counsel filed an “omnibus motion” on Defendant’s behalf, containing thirteen new
or amended pretrial motions.

       On October 3, 2019, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Continuance, asserting, in
part, that he had requested for his attorney to hire a ballistics expert and a private
investigator to assist in his case but that his attorney had not done so. Defendant averred
that he filed a Motion to Relieve Counsel of Duties due to the ineffectiveness of his
attorney, and Defendant objected to “being forced to trial October 7, 2019[.]” During a
court appearance on October 7, 2019, Defendant requested that his trial be continued
because the parties did not yet have the results of a ballistics test conducted by the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI); the trial court granted Defendant’s request for a
continuance and reset his case for trial on December 9, 2019.

        On December 6, 2019, the State filed a Motion for Severance of Defendants for a
Fair Determination, in which it requested that Co-Defendant Brown’s case be severed from
that of Defendant’s due to Defendant’s behavior. The State asserted in its motion:

               1. [Defendant] has exhibited erratic behavior during the pendency of
       this case. Prior to being represented by [defense counsel], [Defendant] issued
       inappropriate written communication to a previously appointed attorney
       which resulted in the Court relieving that attorney from the case on May 6,
       2019.

              2. On September 27, 2019, [Defendant] informed the Court that he
       wished to represent himself due to dissatisfaction with his appointed
       attorney. As the Court attempted to advise [Defendant] of his rights and the
       dangers of proceeding pro se, [Defendant] became highly argumentative and
       repeatedly interrupted the Court. [Defendant] became so agitated that he
       refused to cooperate with the Court’s required inquiry as to his ability to
       represent himself.

       ....

              In light of [Defendant’s] repeated misbehavior and disrespect to the
       Court, it is likely that those incidents will occur again at a jury trial. Such
       disruptive actions have the significant potential to negatively impact jurors’
       views of . . . [Co-Defendant Brown]. Failure to sever [Defendant’s] and [Co-
                                            -3-
       Defendant] Brown’s cases would likely result in severe prejudice to the
       State’s and [Co-Defendant] Brown’s right to a fair determination of the guilt
       or innocence of [Co-Defendant] Brown.

       On the morning of December 9, 2019, the trial court heard several pretrial motions,
including Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate Count Four (Convicted Felon in Possession of
a Firearm); Motion for Rule 609 Hearing; and a Motion in Limine to Exclude Prejudicial
Music Video. Regarding the issue of the admissibility of Defendant’s prior convictions for
impeachment purposes under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609, the trial court ruled that
Defendant’s previous conviction for assault did not qualify as an impeaching offense. As
for Defendant’s prior conviction for robbery, the trial court stated:

       [N]ormally, it qualifies as a crime of dishonesty. It’s a felony. It would
       certainly qualify. I have to . . . weigh the situation. And I think I probably
       would hold off on that and see how the proof came in.

              The caselaw tells me that in some cases like a person’s credibility is
       much more a determiner in other cases and, you know, I look at it a little
       differently depending on how the proof would unfold. So I don’t want to just
       blanket say, yes, it comes in. I mean, it qualifies as an impeachable offense,
       but I would be watching to make sure that it wasn’t unduly . . . prejudicial[.]

       ....

       The robbery qualifies as an impeaching conviction, but I’m going to watch
       how the proof unfolds. It may be too close or too similar to this one to be
       allowed, or it may not. And under the circumstances, I will make that ruling
       as the proof unfolds.

       Prior to taking a recess to view the music video that was the subject of Defendant’s
motion in limine, the trial court noted that Co-Defendant Brown had requested a
continuance2 and that the court had granted the continuance because Co-Defendant
Brown’s mental evaluation had not yet been completed. The court noted that he had signed
an order for a recommended thirty-day mental evaluation of Co-Defendant Brown but that
it was unaware when Co-Defendant Brown would be “shipped” for the evaluation.

       2
         The record on appeal does not contain Co-Defendant Brown’s motion for continuance, and it is
unclear whether the trial court granted Co-Defendant Brown’s motion for continuance on the morning of
December 9, 2019, or sometime prior. We note, however, that defense counsel appeared unaware that a
motion for continuance had been filed by Co-Defendant Brown. Moreover, the trial court commented that
the motion had not “made its way into the [court’s] jacket” by the morning of December 9.
                                                -4-
       Regarding the issue of the State’s Motion for Severance of Defendants, the trial
court stated:

      I understood the State’s concerns in terms of severance, and I shared them,
      frankly, because I wasn’t really clear what to do with that.

             But -- and what we’re talking about, [Defendant], is if you were going
      to try to represent yourself, there -- people who represent themselves
      generally do such a bad job of it, that not only is it bad for them, but it’s bad
      for their co[-]defendant who didn’t choose that, you know, who is
      represented by an attorney. So I was content to separate your cases when
      you were going to try to represent yourself.

             If you’re going to work with your attorneys, then I’m kind of back to
      thinking that it might be more -- make more sense to try these all together on
      that matter.

       After the court’s recess, defense counsel stated that Defendant “would like to go
forward” because of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court stated, however, that it
intended to try Defendant and Co-Defendant together. The court explained, “[T]he law
tells me I have to try [co-defendants] together unless there’s a good reason. And right now
I haven’t seen a legal reason to sever you.” The following exchange then took place:

            [Defense counsel]: [J]ust for the record, as I told the Court --
      [Defendant’s] here. We do object to the Court’s continuing the case.
      [Defendant] is asserting his right to a speedy trial in this instance. He is
      prepared to go forward today as are we.

              [Trial court]: All right. And this case was reset the last two times at
      [Defendant’s] request and so I’m going to grant this. It’s really a -- the
      Court’s order to reset it because of the unavailability of the co[-]defendant.
      And for that reason, I’m going to deny it. Now [on the reset date], if the --
      [Co-Defendant] Brown’s off in the mental hospital or something, then I think
      speedy trial would kick in more and I’d be prepared to sever, because I’m
      not going to hold you forever to -- while [Co-Defendant] Brown gets
      straightened out. But I think that this one resetting is mandated by the proof
      as it’s unfolding here.

The trial court reset Defendant’s case to February 24, 2020, and stated that, if Co-
Defendant Brown was not available for trial that day, the court would “revisit the motion
to sever.”
                                            -5-
       On February 24, 2020, the following exchange occurred before the trial court:

              [Defense counsel]: Good morning, Your Honor. I just need to check
       in on a trial.

              [Trial court]: Well, I think we’ve at least figured out in no small part,
       due to your casual comment on Friday, why [Co-Defendant] Brown has not
       been -- we don’t have a report on him. He hasn’t been sent, and that’s
       because he wasn’t ordered. So I think that’s the situation we find ourselves
       in. I’m going to probably reset this one time to try to try these together. If
       [Co-Defendant] Brown is not able to be tried together, then I -- you know,
       we simply can’t keep putting that off on this.

        While the court addressed other docketed matters, Defendant filed a Motion for
Severance, in which he averred that he “wishe[d] to be tried forthwith” and asserted his
right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the Motion for Severance but stated, “[I]t’s
not a permanent and universal denial. I think what we’re going to do is set this for a trial.
And if on the next setting [Co-Defendant] Brown is unavailable or unable, I just wouldn’t
be able to refuse to grant that anymore.” The court stated that,

       under the circumstances as I have them, in reviewing the records on [Co-
       Defendant] Brown, I’m a believer in [thirty] days he’ll be ready for trial. So
       . . . my experience and the report that I got, and it should’ve been done. It --
       like I said, an order was not entered. The reason he’s not ready for trial today
       is he hasn’t been for his [thirty]-day evaluation, which should’ve been done.

The court stated that it intended to have Co-Defendant Brown transported for his mental
evaluation “quickly.” After consulting with counsel for Defendant and Co-Defendant
Brown regarding their schedules, the trial court reset the matter for trial on April 13, 2020.

        As acknowledged by Defendant, by April 13, 2020, the Tennessee Supreme Court
had suspended all in-person courtroom proceedings, which included jury trials. See In Re:
COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Mar. 13, 2020) (Order). Pursuant to
subsequent Supreme Court orders, jury trials remained suspended through July 3, 2020, so
the trial court reset the case for report dates on April 13, 2020, May 18, 2020, June 15,
2020, and July 2, 2020. See In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn.
Mar. 25, 2020) (Order); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Apr.
24, 2020) (Order); In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. May 26,
2020) (Order).

                                            -6-
        On the July 2, 2020 report date, Defendant requested a bond reduction. The trial
court granted the request, reducing Defendant’s bond to $200,000. In addressing the issue,
the trial court commented on the reasons for the delay in Defendant’s trial. The court
stated:

              [Defendant] was very erratic and -- and his behavior has given me
       great question over the period of time. I -- but I will recognize in the last
       several months I have not experienced that.

       ....

              This case has taken longer than I believe a criminal trial should take
       for reasons that are outside of all of our control.

              The . . . COVID-19 virus has not allowed us to safely, legally, and
       appropriately try his case. He’s got a co[-]defendant who’s got some possible
       mental issues that has also contributed to delaying [Defendant’s trial]. Those
       are not [Defendant’s] fault[.]

       ....

       [T[hough he requested early continuances, but that’s neither here nor there.
       He didn’t ask for it to be set this long.

              So having said that, that’s the one change in circumstance that I can
       see only. It’s still a very serious, serious matter. I’ve heard motions on it so
       I’m -- heard the allegations. Anyway, I’m not making a decision on whether
       they’re accurate or not, but the -- but there is substantial proof that if a jury
       accredits it that [Defendant] is facing a significant amount of time if . . . a
       jury accredits that proof.

       Defendant’s case was reset to July 29, 2020. On that date, Defendant again
requested a jury trial. The trial court observed that the COVID-19 global pandemic had
been difficult for everyone but that the court was “not standing out and deciding that . . .
[Defendant] doesn’t get a trial.” The court said that it was “hopeful” that a safe procedure
for conducting trials would have become “apparent” but that it had not. The court reset the
case for August 26, 2020.

       On August 26, 2020, the court asked if September 29, 2020, was a suitable date for
the parties, and Defendant agreed that it was. On September 29, 2020, the parties again
discussed setting a date for trial. Acknowledging that the pandemic made it difficult to
                                             -7-
schedule trials, the trial court stated that it did not “know what we’re going to do” but
suggested October 30, 2020, as a new court date, to which Defendant agreed. On October
30, 2020, Defendant agreed that December 9, 2020, was an acceptable court date.
However, Defendant reiterated that he was seeking a trial “as quickly as possible.” The
trial court observed that it was not Defendant’s fault that the court had not yet been able to
schedule a trial.

       On November 17, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order suspending all jury trials
through January 31, 2021, due to the “significant increase in the number of Covid-19 cases
in Tennessee[.]” See In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Nov. 17,
2020) (Order). Accordingly, on December 9, 2020, the trial court reset Defendant’s case
for January 27, 2021, and acknowledged Defendant’s request for a trial. The court noted
that Health Department and Supreme Court orders would dictate when it could schedule a
trial and observed that “a two co[-]defendant trial is not imaginable in these
circumstances.”

       On January 27, 2021, the trial court reset the case for March 31, 2021, noting that it
could not currently schedule jury trials under the Supreme Court’s orders. See id; In Re:
COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2021) (Order). During the
March 31, 2021 hearing, the trial court reset the case for April 28, 2021; the court later set
the case for May 7, 2021. On May 7, 2021, the court rescheduled the case for June 23,
2021. During the hearing, defense counsel asked if the trial court was giving trial dates
currently, and the court stated that it was not setting cases for trial that involved two co-
defendants who were in custody. The court advised, however, that “the Shelby County
Health Department is supposed to pronounce on something midweek next week.” The
court stated that Defendant had not been scheduled for trial due to COVID-19 and the
Supreme Court’s orders. The court stated that “as soon as we’re safely able to try [cases],
we will accommodate [Defendant’s] rights.”

       On May 14, 2021, the Supreme Court issued an order in which it noted that the
suspension of all jury trials was lifted on March 31, 2021, but that the Court “continued to
grant discretion to all judicial districts to conduct in-person court proceedings in
accordance with this Court’s prior orders and the approved comprehensive written plans
for each judicial district.” In re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. May
14, 2021) (Order). The order modified its previous requirement of six feet of distance
between persons in the courtroom to a requirement of three feet of distance between
persons in the courtroom. The order also lifted previous “courtroom capacity
requirements” but noted, “Judges retain the discretion to limit the number of people in a
courtroom as health and safety conditions or circumstances necessitate while ensuring the
courts remain open and accessible.”

                                            -8-
       On June 23, 2021, the trial court reset the case for June 24, 2021, because Co-
Defendant Brown’s counsel was not present. On June 24, 2021, the trial court reset the
case to November 18, 2021.3

        On November 10, 2021, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Release Defendant on His Own Recognizance for Lack of a Speedy Trial. The next
transcribed hearing date in the record is from January 10, 2022. At this hearing, defense
counsel noted that he had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, but he
acknowledged that he was “bound by the order saying there are no trials this month.” The
trial court stated that it would give Defendant the next available trial date. Defense counsel
stated that he had three “out-of-custody” trials scheduled for February 2022, and the court
noted that an additional trial was scheduled for the date of one of defense counsel’s trials.
The court suggested April 18, 2022, as a trial date, but defense counsel explained that he
had two trials previously scheduled for that date. After accommodating scheduling
conflicts for Defendant’s and Co-Defendant Brown’s counsel, the trial court set a trial date
for May 9, 2022. Defendant reiterated his motion to dismiss, and the trial court stated that
it was not going to dismiss the case because the court had “a COVID mandate that says
we’re not to have a trial.” The trial court stated that it wanted to get Defendant’s case tried
but that it was “not finding [the delay] to be the fault of the State or the defense.” The court
opined that “we’re all ready but for the fact that we have an Omicron variant that has” a
high infection rate. The court observed that “we have a courtroom that’s the size of a --
slightly larger than the back of a station wagon,” along with six attorneys and two clients
“sitting in a space, [fifty]-something potential jurors, in addition to the courtroom staff. I
just don’t see how we can get it done.”

       On February 16, 2022, the Supreme Court issued an order eliminating its prior
distancing requirements between persons in the courtroom. See In Re: COVID-19
Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2022) (Order).

        During the May 9, 2022 setting, the trial court explained that it was “having some
difficulties” with Co-Defendant Brown because Co-Defendant Brown did not want to
attend trial. The trial court raised the issue of severing the co-defendants for trial, but
defense counsel stated that he was anticipating Defendant’s being tried with Co-Defendant
Brown and that Defendant would want a short continuance if the co-defendants were not
tried together. The trial court then indicated it would use the Detention Response Team
(D.R.T.) to escort Co-Defendant Brown to court. Ultimately, the trial court, with
Defendant’s agreement, continued the case until the following day. The court also issued

       3
          On November 18, 2021, there was no recording of an announcement on Defendant’s case, other
than the docket call.
                                               -9-
an order for the D.R.T. to bring Co-Defendant Brown to court and “remain with him at all
times during his court appearances.”

       Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown were tried jointly before a jury on May 10-13,
2022. On the morning of trial, Defendant filed a Motion in Limine to Allow Cross-
Examination on Alleged Victim’s Prior Dismissed Cases. In the motion, Defendant alleged
that Mr. Parker had been charged with domestic assault on February 21, 2019, and that Mr.
Parker successfully completed judicial diversion, resulting in the dismissal of the charge
on October 15, 2021. Defendant further alleged that Mr. Parker had been charged with
misdemeanor failure to appear on February 21, 2019, but that the charge was later
dismissed on July 11, 2019. Finally, Defendant alleged that Mr. Parker was charged with
unlawful possession of a weapon on June 26, 2021, but that the State announced a nolle
prosequi on the charge on September 29, 2021.

       Prior to the start of trial, defense counsel announced:

       I had filed a motion this morning to allow the defense to cross-examine the
       alleged victim, Sebastian Parker on three cases that had been dismissed
       during the pendency of this case, and we had a discussion about that off the
       record, and it’s fair to say that Your Honor denied that motion.

The trial court responded, “Yes. But I . . . barring, something you can show me, you know,
dismissed cases would not be impeachment material.”

                                           Voir Dire

        During voir dire, defense counsel questioned potential jurors about “what it feels
like to be in fear and how it affects” them and asked if any of the potential jurors had
experienced a situation that caused them to fear for their lives. One potential juror, Mr.
Bullard, discussed an incident in which he had a gun pointed in his face. Defense counsel
asked questions that elicited multiple responses regarding the incident, including Mr.
Bullard’s own experience with the criminal justice system. After asking Mr. Bullard if
authorities apprehended his assailant, Mr. Bullard said that it was “an interesting story”
and began to recount it. While assuring Mr. Bullard that it believed that it was “an
interesting story,” the trial court stated that it was not sure that it was “an interesting story
for today.” After defense counsel stated that she could “move on,” the trial court explained
that “we all have these experiences, and we’re trying to compartmentalize them, but we
don’t need to share them with everyone.” In additional questions to Mr. Bullard, defense
counsel elicited several responses about how he was not involved in the prosecution of his
assailant and was not happy to be excluded from participation in the prosecution. At this
point, the trial court asked defense counsel to “move on” because it did not want to bring
                                             - 10 -
up other “criminal case experiences[,]” explaining to the jury that “we want to try this case
with the evidence that comes in from this witness stand and the law I give you and not how
some other case was handled or could have been, should have been, [or] might have been
handled.”

        In additional questioning of the potential jurors, defense counsel asked if they had
any issues or disagreed with the instruction that it could not hold it against Defendant if he
chose not to testify. Defense counsel asked if anyone “strongly agree[d] that an innocent
person charged with a crime should want to testify on his own behalf,” several jurors
indicated a belief that an innocent person would wish to testify in his or her defense and
that there was a presumption that a defendant who did not testify was guilty. At this point,
the trial court instructed potential jurors that, under the law, the “presumption is exactly
the opposite” and that Defendant was “under no obligation to prove a thing.” The trial
court further explained that jurors could not draw any inference from a defendant’s choice
not to testify. When defense counsel continued the line of inquiry, one potential juror, Ms.
Parks, indicated that it would be difficult for her to find Defendant not guilty if he did not
testify. After the trial court explained the role of the jury and asked if potential jurors could
follow the law “and be fair,” Ms. Parks responded affirmatively.

                                         State’s Proof

        Sebastian Parker testified that, in July 2018, he owned a recording studio on Dudley
Street in Memphis. Mr. Parker explained that the recording studio was housed in a two-
story building, with the ground floor containing a tow truck company and a bathroom and
the second floor his recording studio, which consisted of an engineering booth and a
recording booth and was accessed by a flight of stairs. Mr. Parker stated that the recording
studio was located less than a minute away from the Crump Station police precinct of the
Memphis Police Department (MPD).

        Mr. Parker testified that on July 2, 2018, he arrived at the recording studio around
noon and that he received a phone call from Co-Defendant Brown, whom Mr. Parker knew
as “Goon Carleon.” He said that Co-Defendant Brown wanted to schedule an appointment
for an hour of recording time that day. Mr. Parker said that Co-Defendant Brown had used
his recording studio three or four times previously. Co-Defendant Brown arrived around
12:40 p.m. along with a man that Mr. Parker did not know but later identified as Defendant.
Mr. Parker explained that he had a surveillance system set up to record the outside entry to
the building. Mr. Parker testified that, when Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown arrived,
he let them into the locked door at the front of the building. He said:

             Well, I let them in. We went up the steps to the recording studio, and
       when we got upstairs, [Defendant] . . . asked could he go to the bathroom and
                                             - 11 -
       where was it. I told him yes, and it was downstairs to the right. So
       [Defendant] went to the bathroom.

       ....

              So when [Defendant] c[a]me back up the steps, I had heard the steps.
       They wooden. So I turned around like to the doorway, and that’s when
       [Defendant] had the gun with the beam pointed at me. He said, n***a, you
       know what time it is. So I threw my hands up, and [Co-Defendant Brown]
       was right beside me. He hit me across the head with the gun, and I fell to my
       knees and he shot twice, pow, pow. It went through my leg. I fell on my
       face, and both of them came over me. They flipped me over, went in my
       pockets, got my money, my credit card, my bank card, and my keys and my
       phone, and that’s when [Defendant] . . . he ran downstairs. I guess he was
       trying to get out the door, and while he was down there trying to get out the
       door, [Co-Defendant Brown] was running around trying to find the
       surveillance box, the DVR, the digital recording box that the camera go to,
       he was trying to find the camera box[.]

       Mr. Parker testified that, after he was shot, he was “in a state of shock” and that he
“played dead.” He said that Defendant was unable to unlock the door and called for Co-
Defendant Brown to help him. Mr. Parker stated, “[T]hat’s when I raised up and I in[-]
boxed the other engineer who be up there with me, I told him I’d been shot. Come on, [Co-
Defendant Brown] shot me, in case I didn’t make it out of there alive they’ll know who did
it.” He continued:

               So I got back on the ground playing like I was dead. Both of them
       came back up the steps. They jumped over me. They started -- I had like the
       surveillance camera, there’s another TV on the wall, and the DVR recording
       box was on the wall, I just heard everything fall off the wall, and I seen [Co-
       Defendant Brown] with the TV. He -- both of them . . . jumped over me, and
       I seen [Co-Defendant Brown] with the TV and the other guy pulled the gun.
       That’s when he -- he shot me. It went through like up there and they ran out.
       So I waited a while, and I rosed (sic) up and there’s another room on the side
       of my studio. So I limped over there, and I seen the gray Porsche truck that
       they arrived in, it did a U-turn. They shot back up going towards the Crump
       precinct.

      Mr. Parker testified that Defendant and Co-Defendant took his cell phone and that
he was unable to call 9-1-1. He said that a man at a bakery next door called police for him.
Mr. Parker testified that Defendant first pulled a gun on him and that the gun was black
                                           - 12 -
with a “beam” on it. He said that Co-Defendant Brown was also armed with a gun. He
explained that he heard three gunshots and that he was struck by two of the shots. He said
that he still had one bullet “sitting on [his] spine” that was “too dangerous to take out.”

        Mr. Parker identified the surveillance video from his recording studio taken on the
day of the shooting. He also identified both Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown on the
video. He said that the two men were inside the building for between five and ten minutes
that day. He testified that the video showed Co-Defendant Brown taking a television from
the building and Defendant carrying out a rifle belonging to Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker
explained that he kept the rifle at the recording studio for protection and denied ever pulling
the rifle on Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown; he explained that the rifle “wasn’t in the
room with us.”

        Mr. Parker testified that, after the shooting, he was taken to the hospital where he
remained for three days. Regarding the gunshot wounds he suffered, Mr. Parker stated that
the gunshot wound to his leg “ripped the nerves out [of] . . . [his] leg so it’s hard for [him]
to stand up a long time[.]” He said that the second gunshot wound that left a bullet “sitting”
on his spine caused him severe pain every day. Mr. Parker recalled that he first spoke to
an investigator when he was at the hospital and later gave a written statement regarding the
shooting while at the police department. He was shown a photographic lineup of potential
suspects at the hospital and identified Co-Defendant Brown from the lineup; when
identifying Co-Defendant Brown, Mr. Parker wrote, “robbed and shot me three times.”
Mr. Parker told the detective at the hospital that there had been another individual involved
in the shooting along with Co-Defendant Brown but that he did not know the man’s name
and had never seen him before. Mr. Parker testified that, after he made his formal statement
at the police department, he viewed a second photographic lineup and identified Defendant
as the second assailant. He said that it took him only three seconds to identify Defendant
from the lineup. He circled Defendant’s photo and wrote on the document, “The other guy
that robbed and shot me.”

       Mr. Parker stated that, after the shooting, he had to use a wheelchair, walker, and
crutches at various times and that he had to learn how to walk again. He said that he never
returned to the recording studio after getting out of the hospital and that family members
packed up the studio because he was too shaken by the incident. Mr. Parker denied dealing
drugs out of the recording studio. He said that there were no scales or baggies at the studio,
although he acknowledged that he had a marijuana blunt there that he said was for his
personal use.

       On cross-examination, Mr. Parker denied that the shooting occurred after a “quarter
bag of weed came up short[.]” Mr. Parker testified he informed investigators that both
assailants had guns; he said that, when Defendant came back from the bathroom, Defendant
                                            - 13 -
had a “laser pointer gun” pointed at his face and that Co-Defendant Brown pulled out a gun
and hit him in the head with it. He said that Co-Defendant Brown’s gun looked like a .40
caliber Glock. Mr. Parker recalled that both men told him, “[Y]ou know what time it is[.]”
He said that, after Co-Defendant Brown hit him with the gun, he fell to his knees and then
Co-Defendant Brown fired two shots at him. Mr. Parker testified that one of the shots went
through his leg. He continued:

       I don’t know where the other one went, and . . . I fell face forward on the
       ground. That’s when both of them flipped me over, went and took my ID,
       credit card, bank card, keys, phone, everything, and rolled me back over.
       And [Defendant] went downstairs trying to unlock the door to get out.

When Mr. Parker was asked if it was his testimony that Defendant shot him, Mr. Parker
responded, “Both of them robbed and shot me.” He said that Co-Defendant Brown shot
him in the leg and that Defendant shot him in the shoulder.

        Mr. Parker agreed that he knew Co-Defendant Brown’s friend, King Peso, who was
another rapper in Memphis. He said he was aware that the gray Porsche truck used by Co-
Defendant Brown and Defendant that day belonged to King Peso. He said that he met Co-
Defendant Brown through King Peso. Mr. Parker admitted that he had been using
marijuana at the recording studio before Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown arrived. He
said that, other than this marijuana blunt, he had no other marijuana in the recording studio
at the time of the shooting.

       Mr. Parker said that he always kept the rifle under the pillows on a couch inside the
studio. He identified Defendant on the surveillance video as coming out of the building
with a shirt slung over his shoulder carrying what appeared to be a rifle. Mr. Parker denied
having an argument with Co-Defendant Brown about marijuana.

        MPD Officer Kyle Vlastos testified that, in July 2018, he was working at the Crump
Station precinct when he was dispatched to the scene of a shooting at a nearby building on
Dudley Street. When he arrived, Officer Vlastos found Mr. Parker sitting on a staircase
inside the building suffering from gunshot wounds. Officer Vlastos continued up the stairs
past Mr. Parker to check for anyone else inside the building. Upstairs in the recording
studio, Officer Vlastos saw blood on the floor and on a chair; he also observed some spent
bullet casings on the ground. After confirming that the assailants were no longer at the
scene, Officer Vlastos briefly spoke to Mr. Parker about what happened. Mr. Parker said
that he did not know who shot him but that he thought the man went by “Goon Carleon.”

       MPD Officer Newton Morgan testified that, on July 2, 2018, he responded to the
scene of the shooting at the recording studio on Dudley Street. Officer Morgan explained
                                           - 14 -
that he worked for the police department as a crime scene investigator and that, when he
first arrived, he documented the scene by taking photographs. Officer Morgan also
collected several pieces of evidence inside the recording studio, including three bullet
casings and a green leafy substance. He said that he collected a 9mm spent cartridge casing
from the computer room on the floor and two spent 9mm casings from the recording room.
Inside the recording room, Officer Morgan also collected a plastic baggie containing 4.3
grams of marijuana. He said that he did not recover any scales, drug paraphernalia, or
additional plastic baggies typically used in drug sales.

        Detective Jennifer Robinson of the MPD testified that she was the lead detective in
the investigation into the shooting that took place at Mr. Parker’s recording studio. While
at the scene, Detective Robinson reviewed surveillance footage of the time surrounding the
incident, which officers collected as evidence. Detective Robinson then responded to the
hospital where she spoke to Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker told Detective Robinson that two
assailants robbed him and that he was familiar with one of the suspects because the suspect
had recorded music in his studio in the past. Detective Robinson later returned to the
hospital with a photographic lineup for Mr. Parker to view. She testified that, when shown
the lineup, Mr. Parker positively identified Co-Defendant Brown as one of the assailants.
On the form, Mr. Parker wrote: “robbed and shot me three times[.]” Detective Robinson
testified that Mr. Parker came to the police department a few weeks after the shooting to
provide a formal written statement. She explained that, by this time, she had developed
Defendant as a second suspect and that she asked Mr. Parker to view another photographic
lineup. She said that, from this lineup, Mr. Parker positively identified Defendant as the
second assailant.

        On cross-examination, Detective Robinson said that the handguns used in the
shooting were never recovered so she had “no direct knowledge or evidence of what
specific handguns were used[.]” She explained that the suspects took an assault rifle from
the scene that belonged to Mr. Parker that was never recovered. Detective Robinson
recalled that Mr. Parker moved out of the recording studio immediately after this incident
“in fear of somebody coming back and hurting him again” and that he had family members
assist in his moving. Detective Robinson acknowledged that, in her initial conversations
with Mr. Parker, she was under the impression that Co-Defendant Brown shot him in both
the leg and shoulder. Detective Robinson recalled that Mr. Parker reported cash, a video
monitor, and an assault rifle as stolen from him; she said that Mr. Parker did not mention
his credit card or debit card being taken. Mr. Parker told Detective Robinson that the
assault rifle was taken from under a couch. Regarding the assault rifle, Detective Robinson
stated:

             Well, I watched the video, and I saw [Defendant] go in without an
      assault rifle. I saw him come out with his shirt off with his shirt wrapped
                                          - 15 -
       around something with a barrel poking out of it so that’s when I put . . . two
       together, and Mr. Parker said he didn’t have his assault rifle anymore.

        Special Agent Cervinia Braswell of the TBI testified that she worked as a forensic
scientist in the Firearms Identification Unit of the TBI crime laboratory. Agent Braswell
testified that, as part of the investigation into Mr. Parker’s shooting, she examined three
9mm cartridge cases submitted to the lab. She stated that, based upon her comparative
examination, she determined that all three cartridge cases were fired from the same
unidentified firearm.

         During a break in the trial, the court again addressed the issue of the admissibility
of Defendant’s prior robbery conviction for impeachment purposes. Defendant argued that
“robbery is similar to the crimes for which [he] is currently on trial” and that, “when an
impeaching conviction is substantially similar to the crime for which the defendant is being
tried, there is of course a danger that jurors will erroneously utilize the impeaching
conviction as propensity evidence[.]” The State responded that the “claim of unfair
prejudice -- prejudicial effect does not outweigh the probative value here. It is a felony. It
will go to [the] weight of his testimony as to the credibility of . . . his testimony[.]” The
trial court then stated, “All right. It is a . . . weighing process, and it’s very careful and . .
. it’s always easier when – when the felony has nothing to do with the one on trial[.]” The
court continued:

       But I think in this instance, the credibility of [Defendant] when he testifies is
       going to be paramount. The . . . way this case has been defended and . . .
       tried from the beginning is that Mr. Parker’s lying about the whole thing, and
       it’s just, you know, Mr. Parker’s made this whole thing up. And I don’t have
       any idea what [Defendant] would testify to, but his version of the events
       whether they’re believable or not is . . . going to be very critical . . . . So I’m
       going to allow the impeachment, and if -- if he testifies, I will reiterate to the
       jury, I have a very strong instruction to them that any evidence of other
       crimes are not . . . something they can consider for the purpose of . . .
       considering the guilt at hand.

                                     Defense Proof

        Co-Defendant Brown testified that he went by the nickname “Goon Carleon” and
that his primary relationship with Mr. Parker was through his use of Mr. Parker’s recording
studio to record music. Co-Defendant Brown said that, on the day of the shooting, he went
to the recording studio to purchase a quarter of an ounce, or seven grams, of marijuana
from Mr. Parker. Co-Defendant Brown said that he called Mr. Parker and asked if Mr.
Parker had any marijuana for sale. He said that, when he told Mr. Parker how much
                                              - 16 -
marijuana he wanted, Mr. Parker advised that “he had the weed.” According to Co-
Defendant Brown, Mr. Parker instructed him to call when he arrived at the recording studio.
Co-Defendant Brown testified that Defendant was giving him a ride to the recording studio
that day and that Defendant did not know why he was going to the studio. He said that
they were in a gray Porsche truck. Co-Defendant Brown said that he called Mr. Parker
when they arrived at the recording studio and that Mr. Parker came downstairs to let him
and Defendant inside the building. Co-Defendant Brown said that Mr. Parker had a
handgun hanging out of his pocket and leaned an assault rifle against the wall after he
opened the door. He stated that Mr. Parker turned back around, locked the door, and left
the keys in the door; Mr. Parker then picked up the assault rifle, and Co-Defendant Brown
and Defendant followed him upstairs.

        Co-Defendant Brown testified that Mr. Parker placed the assault rifle against a table
upstairs and then Defendant asked if he could use the bathroom. Co-Defendant Brown said
that he asked Mr. Parker about the marijuana and that he gave Mr. Parker seventy dollars
for it. Co-Defendant Brown testified that Mr. Parker handed him the marijuana but that he
believed it was not seven grams’ worth. He contended that he asked Mr. Parker for the
money back but that Mr. Parker told him he could take the amount of marijuana or leave
with nothing. According to Co-Defendant Brown, Mr. Parker then put his hand on the
handle of the handgun in his pocket. He said that, before Mr. Parker could “pull the gun,”
he “rushed” Mr. Parker, and the two “got to tussling over the gun.” Co-Defendant Brown
stated that, as he and Mr. Parker wrestled for control of the gun, the gun fired twice, and
Mr. Parker fell to the ground after being shot in the leg. He claimed that Mr. Parker reached
for the assault rifle. Co-Defendant Brown explained, “I . . . grabbed like the barrel of the
assault rifle and I was trying to tug it up out of his hand. But . . . we [were] tugging it back
and forth, then he cocked it.” Co-Defendant Brown said that, when Mr. Parker cocked the
assault rifle, he shot Mr. Parker in the arm with the handgun. He said that Mr. Parker
dropped the rifle and that Defendant, who had returned from the bathroom at this time,
picked up the rifle and ran to keep the rifle from Mr. Parker. Co-Defendant Brown testified
that he took a monitor on the wall that showed the outside of the building and fled the
building in a panic. Co-Defendant Brown denied that he went to the recording studio
intending to rob or kill Mr. Parker. According to Co-Defendant Brown, he and Defendant
took only the monitor, handgun, and assault rifle from the recording studio.

        On cross-examination, Co-Defendant Brown stated that he met Defendant through
a mutual friend, King Peso, and that King Peso had asked Defendant to drive him to the
recording studio that day. He said that Defendant did not know he was intending to
purchase marijuana at the recording studio and that Defendant only came into the building
because he needed to use the bathroom. He stated that, after Defendant grabbed the assault
rifle, Defendant ran downstairs and did not come back upstairs. Co-Defendant Brown
denied taking Mr. Parker’s money, keys, or phone and denied going looking under couch
                                             - 17 -
cushions for the assault rifle. He testified that Defendant did not shoot the victim. He
testified that he did not get his seventy dollars back from Mr. Parker before leaving the
studio and that he left the marijuana behind. Co-Defendant Brown said that he did not
remember what happened to the assault rifle after they left the recording studio.

        Co-Defendant Brown acknowledged that he pled guilty to aggravated robbery in
2013. He agreed that he was a prominent rapper in Memphis and that he used Mr. Parker’s
recording studio to record music approximately seven times prior to the shooting. When
Co-Defendant Brown was asked about a music video he made, the parties approached the
trial court for a bench conference. The State argued that its questions about the music video
were relevant because the same vehicle from the surveillance footage from the recording
studio appeared in the music video. The State also argued that the music video depicted
firearms that matched the description of the gun that Mr. Parker testified was used to shoot
him. The trial court ruled that the State could question Co-Defendant Brown about the
music video to corroborate the testimony of its witnesses.

       The State subsequently asked Co-Defendant Brown if any of his music videos
depicted the gray Porsche truck from the surveillance footage, whether Defendant appeared
in any of the music videos, and whether they showed Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown
with handguns with lasers. Co-Defendant Brown agreed that both the gray Porsche truck
and Defendant had appeared in one of his music videos. He acknowledged that he and
Defendant had guns in the music video but explained that they were “prop guns.” When
asked if the music video showed “[h]andguns with lasers[,]” Co-Defendant Brown
responded, “Prop guns, prop money, yeah, all that in the video.”

       Defendant testified that, in July 2018, he was unemployed and lived with his sister.
He explained that it had been difficult to find a job because he had pled guilty to robbery
in 2013. Defendant said that, on July 2, 2018, he borrowed King Peso’s car to run errands
for Defendant’s grandmother because he did not own a car. He testified that, when he
returned to King Peso’s residence, King Peso asked him to drive Co-Defendant Brown to
Mr. Parker’s recording studio. Defendant agreed, and he and Co-Defendant Brown took
King Peso’s gray Porsche truck to the studio. Defendant testified that, when they arrived,
he asked Co-Defendant Brown if he could come inside and use the bathroom. Defendant
said that Mr. Parker let them in the front door of the building; Mr. Parker then led them
upstairs after grabbing an assault rifle. Defendant recalled that he asked Mr. Parker if he
could use the bathroom. Defendant said that he was in the downstairs bathroom for eight
or nine minutes, explaining that he “had problems with constipation[.]” He said that he
always took his shirt off while using the bathroom and that he took his shirt off that day.

       Defendant said that, when he returned upstairs, he heard Co-Defendant Brown
saying, “[T]his ain’t what it supposed to be . . . get my money back[.]” He testified that
                                           - 18 -
Mr. Parker became angry, grabbed the assault rifle, and aggressively told him and Co-
Defendant Brown to “get the f*** out of here.” Defendant said that, when Mr. Parker
grabbed the rifle, he heard a gunshot. He testified that he looked up and saw a gun in Co-
Defendant Brown’s hand; he said that he did not know where Co-Defendant Brown got
this gun. Defendant stated that Mr. Parker dropped the rifle and was clutching his leg.
Defendant testified that he grabbed the rifle and ran downstairs on instinct. According to
Defendant, he heard screaming and another gunshot after he ran downstairs. He said that
he struggled with the lock and that Co-Defendant Brown later opened the door because Co-
Defendant Brown knew how to operate the lock. Defendant said that he carried the rifle
wrapped in his shirt under his arm. He denied having to search the studio for the assault
rifle. He claimed that, after he took the assault rifle from the building, he put it in the trunk
of the gray Porsche truck; he said that he then took the rifle out of the truck and left it on
the curb. He said that he covered the rifle with “something” he took from the truck.
Defendant denied bringing a weapon to the recording studio or pulling a gun on Mr. Parker.
He also denied taking any money, credit or debit cards, or a phone from Mr. Parker.
Defendant stated that he was “in fear and panic and confusion at the time” he grabbed the
assault rifle. According to Defendant, he did not call 911 after the shooting because he
was afraid. He contended that he did not intend to rob or kill Mr. Parker, and he denied
shooting Mr. Parker.

        During a charge conference, the trial court discussed how it would handle the charge
of convicted felon in possession of a firearm in Count Four. The court indicated that it was
“bifurcating the format by which we will handle this, and we are removing any references
to prior felonies or unlawful acts.” The court stated that there would be “a second stage”
to the trial, during which the State could present proof and the jury could consider whether
the possession of the firearm occurred while Defendant was a felon convicted of a crime
whose elements involved the use of violence. The jury instructions regarding Count Four
asked the jury to determine whether Defendant was in “possession of a firearm.”

        Following deliberations, the jury acquitted Defendant of attempted first degree
premeditated murder but found him guilty of especially aggravated robbery and employing
a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.4 As to Count Four—convicted
felon in possession of a firearm—the jury found that Defendant was in possession of a
firearm. After the jury announced its verdict, the trial court entered a nolle prosequi on the
charge of convicted felon in possession of a firearm in Count Four upon the State’s
request.5 The trial court later dismissed the charge of employing a firearm during the
commission of a dangerous felony.

       4
           Co-Defendant Brown was also found guilty of only especially aggravated robbery and employing
a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony.
         5
           Defendant did not object to the nolle prosequi, which was entered without costs to Defendant.
                                                - 19 -
       At a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range I standard
offender, to serve twenty years with a one hundred percent release eligibility. Defendant
filed a timely motion for new trial and an amended motion for new trial. Following a
hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying Defendant’s motion. This timely
appeal follows.

                                          Analysis

                                       I. Speedy Trial

       Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for
lack of a speedy trial. He asserts that three years, eight months, and four days elapsed
between his arrest on September 6, 2018, and the start of his trial on May 10, 2022.
Defendant cites, as the reason for the lengthy delay, the trial court’s denial of his motion
to sever his case from that of Co-Defendant Brown, “the trial court’s negligence[,]” and
courtroom restrictions imposed by the trial court “without basis in the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s COVID-19 orders—including the trial court’s refusal to try a case with multiple
defendants and attorneys without recording any reason why.” Defendant contends that he
made multiple written and oral requests for a speedy trial beginning in 2019, and he argues
that the excessive delay impaired his defense. The State responds that Defendant’s right
to a speedy trial was not violated.

        Both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants
the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. Art. I § 9. Tennessee also
has a statutory right to a speedy trial. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-101 (2018). However,
the right to a speedy trial does not arise until the defendant has been arrested or an
indictment has been issued. State v. Baker, 614 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tenn. 1981). If the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, the only remedy is to dismiss the charges
against him. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972); State v. Bishop, 493 S.W.2d 81,
83 (Tenn. 1973).

       In Barker v. Wingo, the United States Supreme Court established four factors to be
considered when determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been
violated: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s
assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S.
at 530. Additionally, the Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that the strength of the
State’s case as to guilt can be used to help judge the four Barker factors. Bishop, 439
S.W.2d at 85.

      A delay approaching one year will trigger a speedy trial analysis, and the
presumption that delay has prejudiced the defendant intensifies over time. Doggett v.
                                            - 20 -
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992); State v. Utley, 956 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1997).
However, courts take into account the complexity of the case in evaluating the
reasonableness of the length of delay. State v. Wood, 924 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tenn. 1996).
Further, there may be reasons that justify delay, with different reasons assigned different
weight in the balancing analysis. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Intentional delay to gain a
tactical advantage over the defense or delay designed to harass the defendant is weighed
heavily against the State. Id. Bureaucratic indifference or negligence is also weighed
against the State, although not as heavily as deliberate delay. Id. Finally, Barker listed
three areas in which a defendant could suffer prejudice due to a delay: (1) oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) impairment of the
defense. Id. at 532. Of the three, impairment of the defense is the most serious way in
which a defendant can be prejudiced. Id.

        The issue of whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been
violated involves “a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Moon, 644 S.W.3d 72, 78
(Tenn. 2022). Our standard of review on appeal is “de novo review with respect to whether
the court correctly interpreted and applied the law.” Id. We must “give deference to the
trial court’s findings of fact unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id.

                                    A. Length of Delay

       The record shows that Defendant was arrested on September 6, 2018, and that
Defendant’s trial did not begin until May 10, 2022. The length of the delay from arrest to
trial was approximately three years and eight months. Such a delay is sufficient to trigger
a speedy trial analysis. See Utley, 956 S.W.2d at 494.

                                  B. Reason for the Delay

        The record on appeal contains no information about pretrial proceedings occurring
between the time of Defendant’s arrest on September 6, 2018, and his indictment on
December 4, 2018. The record reflects, however, that following Defendant’s arraignment
in January 2019, Defendant’s case was set for trial but that Defendant requested a
continuance until October 7, 2019. Then, a few weeks before his trial, Defendant filed pro
se a Motion to Relieve Counsel of Duties, along with several additional pro se motions
including a Motion for Continuance. At a status hearing held September 12, 2019,
Defendant asserted that he did not want to be represented by defense counsel and that he
wanted to represent himself. When the trial court attempted to question Defendant about
his decision, however, Defendant refused to answer the court’s questions. On his trial date
of October 7, 2019, Defendant again requested a continuance to obtain the results of a
ballistics test, and the trial court reset the case for trial on December 9, 2019. Thus, this
portion of the delay is attributable to Defendant.
                                           - 21 -
        The trial court subsequently reset the case—from December 9, 2019 to April 13,
2020—to allow Co-Defendant Brown to receive a mental health evaluation. When
resetting the case, the trial court repeatedly emphasized the preference for trying co-
defendants together and found that a short delay to allow for the completion of Co-
Defendant Brown’s mental evaluation would not be unreasonable. The Advisory
Commission Comment to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 notes that “[p]ermissive
joinder of defendants . . . is aimed at achieving improved judicial economy and efficiency.”
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8, Advisory Comm. Cmt. Here, the proof would have been the same for
each co-defendant, and separate trials would have required duplicate proof and for
witnesses to provide the same testimony on multiple occasions. Therefore, separate trials
would have run counter to the objectives of improved judicial economy and efficiency
sought under Rule 8.

        Defendant contends that the trial court’s failure to sign an order for Co-Defendant
Brown’s mental health evaluation caused a reasonably avoidable delay. From the record,
it appears that the failure to order Co-Defendant Brown’s evaluation was an inadvertent
oversight; nothing in the record suggests that the trial court intentionally declined to enter
the order. Upon discovering the oversight, the trial court granted a short continuance to
April 13, 2020, while expressing confidence that Co-Defendant Brown would be ready for
trial in thirty days. When considering the goal of improving judicial economy and
efficiency under Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, we conclude that
the trial court’s short delay was reasonable and did not rise to the level of bureaucratic
indifference or negligence. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531

       As noted by the State, the primary reason for the delay in this case was the COVID-
19 global pandemic—a factor beyond the control of the State, the trial court, and
Defendant. As set out above, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued multiple orders
prohibiting jury trials through March 31, 2021, requiring six feet of distance between
persons in the courtroom, and creating “courtroom capacity requirements.” Although the
Supreme Court’s order from May 14, 2021, modified its previous requirement of six feet
of distance between persons in the courtroom to a requirement of three feet of distance
between persons in the courtroom and lifted previous “courtroom capacity requirements,”
the order noted that judges “retain[ed] the discretion to limit the number of people in a
courtroom as health and safety conditions or circumstances necessitate[.]” When resetting
Defendant’s trial after March 31, 2021, the trial court repeatedly cited the difficulties in
scheduling a trial during the pandemic. On January 10, 2022, when resetting the trial for
May 9, 2022, the trial court specifically found that the delay was not the fault of the State
or Defendant but was due to the pandemic. The trial court cited the rising infection rates
and the small size of its courtroom and explained that May 9 was “the first possible trial
date” to safely try Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown. It was not until February 16, 2022,

                                            - 22 -
that the Supreme Court issued an order rescinding the requirement of any certain distance
between persons in the courtroom.

        A panel of this court has previously observed that “the large majority of courts in
other jurisdictions that have addressed a defendant’s claim of a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial based, in part, on pandemic-related delays have
declined to attribute such delays to the State.” State v. Hodge, No. E2022-00303-CCA-
R3-CD, 2023 WL 5472212, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2023) (citing United States
v. Keith, 61 F.4th 839, 853 (10th Cir. 2023) (noting that “no circuit has yet published an
opinion classifying delays under the second Barker factor,” choosing to “treat COVID-19
as a truly neutral justification—not favoring either side,” and concluding that “[t]he
extenuating circumstances brought about by the pandemic prevented the government from
trying [the defendant] in a speedy fashion”); State v. Adams, 876 S.E.2d 719, 725 (Ga. App.
2022) (declining to weigh the delay caused by pandemic-related suspension of jury trials
against either party); State v. Paige, 977 N.W.2d 829, 838 (Minn. 2022) (concluding that
“trial delays due to the statewide orders issued in response to the COVID-19 global
pandemic do not weigh against the State”); Ward v. State, 346 So.3d 868, 871-72 (Miss.
2022) (noting that delays caused by the pandemic are “neutral” and that “unrelated delays
occurring during the pandemic may not be neutral and should be considered by the trial
court in its analysis”); Ali v. Commonwealth, 872 S.E.2d 662, 675 (Va. App. 2022) (holding
that pandemic-related delays fell within the third category of delay, “which encompasses
‘valid’ reasons for delay that are not directly attributable to the government”); Vlahos v.
State, 518 P.3d 1057, 1072 (Wy. 2022) (determining that delays due to the pandemic are
“neutral” because the pandemic was an “extraordinary circumstance” that was not
attributable to the State or the defendant); cf. State v. Labrecque, No. 22-AP-314, 2023 WL
4381913, at *5-6 (Vt. July 7, 2023) (concluding that “COVID delays are attributable to the
State” but that “we will accord those delays very little weight in this case”)). Like the
previous panel of this court and the majority of other courts that have addressed the issue,
we decline to attribute pandemic-related delays to the State or Defendant in light of “[t]he
extenuating circumstances brought about by the pandemic.” Keith, 61 F.4th at 853.
Because the delay in this case was attributable first to Defendant and then, with the
exception of four months’ delay for Co-Defendant Brown’s mental evaluation, attributable
to the pandemic, we will not weigh this factor in favor of Defendant nor against the State.

                                 C. Assertion of the Right

        The Tennessee and United States Supreme Courts have both recognized that “an
accused who is unaware that charges are pending against him or her, as is often the case
where an indictment has been sealed and not served, cannot be penalized for his or her
failure to assert the speedy trial right.” Wood, 924 S.W.2d at 347 n.13 (citing Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652-54 (1992)). In this case, both parties agree that Defendant
                                           - 23 -
asserted his right to a speedy trial. The record reflects, however, that Defendant was
arrested for the offense on September 6, 2018, and he did not assert his right to a speedy
trial until December 9, 2019, more than fifteen months after his arrest. During a hearing
on December 9, 2019, Defendant verbally asserted his right to a speedy trial, and on
February 24, 2020, he filed a written motion asserting his right to a speedy trial. Eighteen
days later, the Supreme Court issued its order on March 13, 2020, suspending all in-person
courtroom proceedings. See In Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, No. ADM2020-00428 (Tenn.
Mar. 13, 2020) (Order). Because Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial until
over fifteen months after his arrest and because the further delays in his trial were primarily
the result of the COVID-19 global pandemic, we conclude that this factor weighs only
slightly in favor of Defendant.

                                 D. Prejudice to Defendant

        We must now determine the extent of the prejudice suffered by Defendant as a result
of the delay. Of the four Barker factors, the most important factor is prejudice to the
defendant, and the critical inquiry concerning prejudice “is the impairment of the ability to
prepare a defense.” See State v. Vance, 888 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998).
However, because it is impossible to prove the usefulness of a witness who has disappeared
or is unknown to the defense due to the delay, courts “do not necessarily require a defendant
to affirmatively prove particularized prejudice.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. Furthermore,

       [I]mpairment of one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial
       prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and
       testimony “can rarely be shown.”

       ...

       [E]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in
       ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such
       presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim
       without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant
       facts, and its importance increases with the length of the delay.

Id. (citations omitted).

       In this case, we cannot say that the delay was so excessive that it presumptively
compromised the reliability of Defendant’s trial. There was a delay of approximately three
years and four months between Defendant’s arrest and his trial; however, this period of
delay is not necessarily excessive when compared to other cases. See, e.g., Wood, 924
                                            - 24 -
S.W.2d at 342 (thirteen-year delay did not result in speedy trial violation); State v. Vickers,
985 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (finding no speedy trial violation from delay of
three years and nine months); State v. Patton, No. M2018-01462-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL
1320718, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2020) (three-year delay did not result in
speedy trial violation), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 7, 2020). In our view, the delay in
this case was not egregious, given the fact that Defendant’s case involved serious charges
of attempted first degree premeditated murder, especially aggravated robbery, employing
a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and convicted felon in possession
of a firearm; Defendant’s case involved a co-defendant and multiple witnesses; Defendant
did not assert his right to a speedy trial for over fifteen months after his arrest; Defendant
requested continuances or otherwise caused much of the early delay in trying his case; and
the primary cause of the extended delay thereafter was a global pandemic.

        Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that the defense was impaired by the delay
of the start of Defendant’s trial. In his brief, Defendant contends that, at a minimum, the
delay impaired his defense because Mr. Parker had difficulty recalling certain details at
trial. A review of the examples cited by Defendant shows that Mr. Parker expressed
difficulty remembering conversations that took place in the moments immediately after the
shooting and in the hospital due to his injuries. It appears that any difficulties with Mr.
Parker’s memory stemmed from his recalling conversations that occurred shortly after he
was shot multiple times, rather than because of a delay in Defendant’s trial date. Moreover,
Mr. Parker’s testimony was consistent about the identity of the assailants, how he was shot,
and the items that were taken during the robbery. Defendant conducted a thorough cross-
examination of Mr. Parker at trial, and his suggestion that an earlier trial may have resulted
in more favorable testimony from Mr. Parker is wholly speculative. Consequently, we
cannot conclude that Defendant has established prejudice based on the delay of his trial.
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and he is not
entitled to relief.

                          II. Severance from Co-Defendant Brown

       Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Severance of
his case from that of Co-Defendant Brown. He contends that severance was necessary to
protect his right to a speedy trial and to promote a fair determination of his guilt or
innocence. Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of the Motion for Severance
resulted in a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, he contends that the trial
court’s order requiring the D.R.T. to accompany Co-Defendant Brown for the entire trial—
and the D.R.T. officers’ presence immediately behind Defendant throughout the trial—
“communicated to the jury that [Defendant] posed a threat and thereby infringed on his
presumption of innocence” and that the admission by Co-Defendant Brown that he had
been previously convicted of aggravated robbery “exacerbated the undue prejudice” caused
                                            - 25 -
by the admission of Defendant’s prior robbery conviction. The State responds that
Defendant is not entitled to relief because he has not shown that his right to a speedy trial
was violated or that he suffered undue prejudice from the joint trial.

        The United States Supreme Court has previously recognized that “[j]oint trials play
a vital role in the criminal justice system[.]” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209
(1987). Joint trials promote judicial efficiency and “serve the interests of justice by
avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.” Id. at 210. Tennessee Rule of
Criminal Procedure 8(c)(3) provides:

       (c) Joinder of Defendants. An indictment, presentment, or information may
       charge two or more defendants:

       ....

              (3) even if conspiracy is not charged and all of the defendants
              are not charged in each count, if the several offenses charged:

                     (A) were part of a common scheme or plan; or

                     (B) were so closely connected in time, place, and
                     occasion that it would be difficult to separate
                     proof of one charge from proof of the others.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(c)(3). As previously noted, the rule of joinder promotes judicial
economy and efficiency by encouraging a single trial for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8, Advisory Comm. Cmts.

       However, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides that a trial court shall
grant a severance of defendants before trial if “the court finds a severance necessary to
protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial or appropriate to promote a fair determination
of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 14(c)(2)(A). Our
supreme court has explained:

              There is no bright-line rule as to when a trial court should grant a
       defendant’s request for severance. Courts consider the following factors,
       none of which are dispositive, when deciding whether to grant a severance:
       the number of defendants named in the indictment, the number of counts
       charged in the indictment, the complexity of the indictment, the estimated
       length of the trial, the disparities in the evidence offered against the
       defendants, the disparities in the degrees of involvement by the defendants
                                           - 26 -
       in the charged offenses, possible conflicts between the defendants and their
       strategies, and prejudice from evidence admitted against a co-defendant(s)
       which is inadmissible or excluded as to another defendant.

              When two or more defendants are charged in the same indictment,
       evidence that is not necessarily applicable to another defendant may be
       admissible against one or more defendants. A defendant is not entitled to a
       separate trial merely because damaging proof is introduced against another
       defendant.

State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tenn. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Furthermore,

       [w]hile “mutually antagonistic” defenses may mandate severance in some
       circumstances, they are not prejudicial per se. Due to the difficulty in
       establishing prejudice, relatively few convictions have been reversed for
       failure to sever on these grounds. Mere attempts to cast the blame on the
       other will not, standing alone, justify a severance on the grounds that the
       respective defenses are antagonistic. The defendant must go further and
       establish that a joint trial will result in compelling prejudice, against which
       the trial court cannot protect, so that a fair trial cannot be had.

State v. Ensley, 956 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

        The decision to grant or deny a motion for severance of defendants rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court’s ruling absent
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Dotson, 254 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tenn. 2008). “Where
a motion for severance has been denied, the test to be applied by this court in determining
whether the trial court abused its discretion is whether the defendant was ‘clearly
prejudiced’ in his defense as a result of being tried with his codefendant[.]” State v. Price,
46 S.W.3d 785, 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The record must demonstrate that “the
granting of a severance became a judicial duty” before an accused is entitled to a reversal
of his conviction. State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (quoting
Hunter v. State, 440 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tenn. 1969), vacated on other grounds by Hunter v.
Tennessee, 403 U.S. 711, 712 (1971)).

       On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court’s denial of his Motion for Severance
resulted in a violation of his right to a speedy trial. As set out supra, we have concluded
that Defendant was not deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Therefore, Defendant cannot
establish based upon this ground that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Motion for Severance.
                                            - 27 -
        Defendant also claims that the denial of his Motion for Severance unfairly
prejudiced him and undermined a fair determination of his guilt or innocence. Specifically,
Defendant contends that the presence of two D.R.T. officers, who accompanied Co-
Defendant Brown throughout the trial, communicated to the jury that Defendant posed a
threat and, thereby, infringed on his presumption of innocence. Defendant cites an affidavit
attached to his Motion for New Trial, in which defense counsel asserted that two D.R.T.
officers “sat directly behind” Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown during trial and that the
trial court “never mentioned or attempted to explain the presence of” the D.R.T. officers to
the jury.

        Initially, we observe that Defendant did not object to the use of the D.R.T. officers
at trial; he did not renew his Motion for Severance when the trial court indicated that it
would use the D.R.T. officers, and he did not request that the trial court explain the presence
of the D.R.T. officers to the jury to lessen any perceived prejudice to Defendant. “The
failure to make a contemporaneous objection constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.”
State v. Gilley, 297 S.W.3d 739, 762 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Moreover, Rule 36(a) of
the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states that “[n]othing in this rule shall be
construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to
take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of
an error.” Despite Defendant’s failure to take actions reasonably available to him to
prevent or nullify the harmful effect of the trial court’s ruling, we note that the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that the presence of uniformed, armed state troopers
seated in the front row of the gallery directly behind the defendant was not inherently
prejudicial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986). As explained in Holbrook,
“jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by
choice or happenstance.” Id. at 567. The Holbrook Court opined that the use of the four
troopers did not tend “to brand respondent . . . with an unmistakable mark of guilt” and
concluded that “[f]our troopers [were] unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything
other than a normal official concern for the safety and order of the proceedings.” Id. at
571.

       Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Motion
for Severance because of the admission of Co-Defendant Brown’s prior aggravated robbery
conviction unfairly prejudiced him and undermined a fair determination of his guilt or
innocence. However, a review of the jury instructions shows that the trial court instructed
the jury that it was to “give separate consideration to each defendant” and that each
defendant was “entitled to have his case decided on the evidence and the law which is
applicable to that particular defendant.” Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that
“[a]ny evidence which was limited to a particular defendant should not be considered by
you as to any other defendant.” The trial court’s instructions made it clear that the jury
was not to consider Co-Defendant Brown’s prior conviction in determining the guilt or
                                            - 28 -
innocence of Defendant, and the jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the trial
court. See Harbison, 539 S.W.3d at 164.

       In this case, there were two co-defendants named in the indictment, and each co-
defendant was charged with the same four offenses. There were no disparities in the
evidence offered against the co-defendants, other than impeachment evidence of the co-
defendants’ prior conviction, and no apparent conflicts between the co-defendants’ trial
strategies. In fact, Co-Defendant Brown’s testimony was consistent with Defendant’s. Co-
Defendant Brown testified that Defendant did not know he was going to the recording
studio to purchase marijuana; that Defendant was in the bathroom when the shooting
started; that Defendant did not shoot Mr. Parker; that Defendant did not go through Mr.
Parker’s pockets after the shooting; and that he and Defendant did not go to the recording
studio intending to rob and kill Mr. Parker. Under these circumstances, Defendant has not
shown that he was clearly prejudiced in his defense as the result of his being tried with Co-
Defendant Brown. See Price, 46 S.W.3d at 803. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this
claim.

                  III. Curtailing Defendant’s Questions During Voir Dire

        Defendant contends that the trial court infringed on his right to an impartial jury
when, during voir dire, it curtailed defense counsel’s questions about a prospective juror’s
experience with the criminal justice system, the State’s burden of proof, and Defendant’s
right not to testify. He further contends that the trial court illogically and unreasonably
refused defense counsel’s request to approach to make a challenge for cause and, instead,
rehabilitated a prospective juror who had agreed it would be difficult to acquit Defendant
if he did not testify. Defendant argues that the trial court limited his questions “to the point
where he could neither discover bases for cause challenges nor intelligently exercise his
peremptory strikes.” The State responds that the trial court properly exercised its discretion
to limit certain lines of questioning during voir dire.

        The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of
the Tennessee Constitution both guarantee the accused the right to trial “by an impartial
jury.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The Tennessee Constitution has
been interpreted to guarantee a jury free from “disqualification on account of some bias or
partiality toward one side or the other of the litigation.” Carruthers v. State, 145 S.W.3d
85, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Akins, 867 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1993)). Bias is “a leaning of the mind; propensity or prepossession towards an object
or view, not leaving the mind indifferent; a bent; for inclination.” Id. “The ultimate goal
of voir dire is to see that jurors are competent, unbiased, and impartial, and the decision of
how to conduct voir dire of prospective jurors rests within the sound discretion of the trial

                                             - 29 -
court.” State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State v. Harris, 839
S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 508 (Tenn. 1982)).

       A trial court’s decisions regarding juror qualifications are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d 356, 378 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Mickens, 123
S.W.3d 355, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). The trial court’s decision will not be reversed
absent “manifest error.” Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 248. On appeal, this court must determine
“whether the jury that tried the case was fair and impartial.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d
156, 193 (Tenn. 2016).

        Peremptory challenges are intended to exclude jurors “suspected of bias or
prejudice,” while the challenge for cause should be used to exclude potential jurors “whose
bias or prejudice rendered them unfit.” State v. Pamplin, 138 S.W.3d 283, 285-86 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Manning v. State, 292 S.W. 451, 455 (Tenn. 1927)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides that the
trial court “may ask potential jurors appropriate questions regarding their qualifications to
serve as jurors in the case” and “shall permit the parties to ask questions for the purpose of
discovering bases for challenge for cause and intelligently exercising peremptory
challenges.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(1). Additionally, “[o]n motion of a party or its own
initiative, the court may direct that any portion of the questioning of a prospective juror be
conducted out of the presence of the tentatively selected jurors and other prospective
jurors.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(b)(2).

       The Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure also sets forth the following procedure
for challenges for cause:

               After examination of any juror, the judge shall excuse that juror from
       the trial of the case if the court is of the opinion that there are grounds for
       challenge for cause. After the court has tentatively determined that the jury
       meets the prescribed qualifications, counsel may conduct further
       examination and, alternately, may exercise challenges for cause.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). “Any party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if: . . .
[t]here exists any ground for challenge for cause provided by law” or “[t]he prospective
juror’s exposure to potentially prejudicial information makes the person unacceptable as a
juror.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(2)(A)-(B). In determining whether a prospective juror has
been exposed to potentially prejudicial information, the trial court “shall consider both the
degree of exposure and the prospective juror’s testimony as to his or her state of mind.”
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(2)(B). “A prospective juror who states that he or she will be unable
to overcome preconceptions is subject to challenge for cause no matter how slight the
exposure.” Id.
                                            - 30 -
       If the prospective juror has seen or heard and remembers information that
       will be developed in the course of trial, or that may be inadmissible but is not
       so prejudicial as to create a substantial risk that his or her judgment will be
       affected, the prospective juror’s acceptability depends on whether the court
       believes the testimony as to impartiality. A prospective juror who admits to
       having formed an opinion about the case is subject to challenge for cause
       unless the examination shows unequivocally that the prospective juror can
       be impartial.

Id. “Jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts of the case on which they sit [and]
[e]ven the formation of an opinion on the merits will not disqualify a juror if [he] can lay
aside [his] opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Howell,
868 S.W.2d at 249 (quoting State v. Sammons, 656 S.W.2d 862, 869 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1982)). “An individual examined during voir dire is not required to have a complete lack
of knowledge of the facts and issues to be selected as a juror.” State v. Davidson, 121
S.W.3d 600, 612 (Tenn. 2003). “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 723 (1961); see also State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 531 (Tenn. 1997).

       In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to control voir dire. First,
the record reflects that defense counsel’s questions to Mr. Bullard—about whether police
apprehended Mr. Bullard’s assailant and whether Mr. Bullard participated in the
prosecution—far exceeded counsel’s initial question of whether potential jurors had an
experience where they felt in fear for their lives. The trial court reasonably limited defense
counsel’s further questions of Mr. Bullard on the subject because the court did not want to
present the potential jurors with lengthy descriptions of experiences in other criminal cases.
We further conclude that, after Ms. Parks expressed apprehension about acquitting
Defendant if he did not testify, the trial court properly provided an instruction to Ms. Parks
and the other potential jurors about why the jury could not draw a negative inference if
Defendant did not testify. The court also properly explained that the State had the burden
of proving every element of the offenses, and it did not abuse its discretion by asking if
Ms. Parks could be fair and follow the applicable law. Moreover, we note that Defendant
exercised peremptory challenges against Mr. Bullard and Ms. Parks and that neither served
on the jury.

       Under these circumstances, Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion during voir dire, that the trial court’s actions prohibited him from intelligently
exercising his peremptory challenges, or that he was denied the right to a fair and impartial
jury. He is not entitled to relief.

                                              - 31 -
                 IV. Cross-Examining Mr. Parker Regarding Prior Cases

        Next, Defendant contends that the trial court unreasonably restricted his right to
cross-examine a witness against him when the court denied his request to cross-examine
Mr. Parker about Mr. Parker’s criminal charges that the State dismissed prior to
Defendant’s trial. Defendant asserts that his cross-examination of Mr. Parker on this
subject would have revealed “potential bias” critical to the jury’s determination of the
credibility of Mr. Parker’s testimony. The State responds that the trial court properly
limited Defendant’s requested cross-examination because Defendant failed to show that
the line of inquiry was relevant to establishing Mr. Parker’s alleged bias.

        A defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses includes the right to
conduct meaningful cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987);
State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 430-31 (Tenn. 2000). The denial of a defendant’s right to
effective cross-examination is “‘constitutional error of the first magnitude’” and may
violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial. State v. Hill, 598 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1980) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). A defendant’s right to
confront witnesses does not preclude a trial court from imposing limits upon the cross-
examination of witnesses, taking into account such factors as “harassment, prejudice, issue
confusion, witness safety, or merely repetitive or marginally relevant interrogation.” State
v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d 423, 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 611(a)
(stating that the trial court has authority to “exercise appropriate control over the
presentation of evidence and conduct of the trial when necessary to avoid abuse by
counsel”). However, proof suggesting that a witness received or had reason to expect
leniency from the State typically constitutes relevant evidence of bias. See State v. Smith,
893 S.W.2d 908, 924 (Tenn. 1994); see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)
(“Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of
credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the
accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”).

        “The propriety, scope, manner and control of the cross-examination of witnesses . .
. rests within the discretion of the trial court.” State v. Dishman, 915 S.W.2d 458, 463
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Coffee v. State, 216 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tenn. 1948); Davis
v. State, 212 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tenn. 1948)). Absent a clear abuse of discretion that results
in manifest prejudice to the defendant, this court will not interfere with the trial court’s
exercise of its discretion on matters pertaining to the examination of witnesses. State v.
Johnson, 670 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Monts v. State, 379 S.W.2d
34 (Tenn. 1964)).

      Here, the record reflects that the trial court heard Defendant’s Motion in Limine to
Allow Cross-Examination on Alleged Victim’s Prior Dismissed Cases on the morning of
                                            - 32 -
trial but that the hearing took place off the record. Consequently, it is unclear whether any
evidence, or an offer of proof, was presented to the trial court on this issue, and the record
does not reflect the basis for the trial court’s determination that the dismissed cases were
not “impeachment material.” As noted by the State, “[t]his [c]ourt has repeatedly
discouraged ‘off-the-record’ discussions concerning matters of significance in criminal
proceedings because such discussions may preclude appropriate appellate review.” State
v. Byrd, No. E2013-00365-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 545451, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb.
10, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2014). The defendant bears the burden of
preparing an adequate record for appeal, State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn.
1993), and in the absence of a complete record, this court must presume that the trial court’s
ruling was correct. State v. Richardson, 875 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
Because of the lack of an adequate record as to this issue, we must presume that the trial
court correctly denied Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Allow Cross-Examination on
Alleged Victim’s Prior Dismissed Cases.

       Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his
cross-examination of Mr. Parker or that the court’s ruling violated his right to confront and
cross-examine the witness. He is not entitled to relief on this claim.

                  V. Admission of Defendant’s Prior Robbery Conviction

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting his prior robbery conviction
under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 and that the error was not harmless. Defendant
contends that the trial court admitted the prior conviction without explaining how the
robbery conviction was relevant to his credibility or determining whether the “conviction’s
probative value on credibility outweighed its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive
issues.” Defendant avers that because the impeaching conviction was “nearly identical” to
the crime for which Defendant was on trial, the danger of unfair prejudice was great. The
State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Defendant’s
prior robbery conviction was admissible as impeachment evidence.

       Rule 609(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provides:

       For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
       witness has been convicted of a crime may be admitted if the following
       procedures and conditions are satisfied:

              (1) The witness must be asked about the conviction on cross-
              examination. If the witness denies having been convicted, the
              conviction may be established by public record. If the witness

                                            - 33 -
              denies being the person named in the public record, identity
              may be established by other evidence.

              (2) The crime must be punishable by death or imprisonment in
              excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
              convicted or, if not so punishable, the crime must have
              involved dishonesty or false statement.

              (3) If the witness to be impeached is the accused in a criminal
              prosecution, the State must give the accused reasonable written
              notice of the impeaching conviction before trial, and the court
              upon request must determine that the conviction’s probative
              value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on
              the substantive issues. The court may rule on the admissibility
              of such proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior
              to the testimony of the accused. If the court makes a final
              determination that such proof is admissible for impeachment
              purposes, the accused need not actually testify at the trial to
              later challenge the propriety of the determination.

Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a).

      “Robbery is a crime involving dishonesty and may be used for impeachment
purposes.” State v. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tenn. 1999); see also State v. Pyburn,
No. M2003-01090-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1857109, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 16,
2004) (concluding that the defendant’s “credibility was a key issue at trial” and that the
defendant’s previous conviction for aggravated robbery “was probative of his credibility”),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2004).

       “The mere fact a prior conviction of the accused is identical or similar in nature to
the offense for which the accused is being tried does not, as a matter of law, bar the use of
the conviction to impeach the accused as a witness.” State v. Baker, 956 S.W.2d 8, 15
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (citing State v. Miller, 737 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1987)). Two criteria are especially relevant in determining whether the probative value of
a conviction on the issue of credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect upon the
substantive issues: (1) the impeaching conviction’s relevance as to credibility; and (2) the
impeaching conviction’s similarity to the charged offense. State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d
661, 674 (Tenn. 1999). We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment purposes under an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Waller, 118 S.W.3d 368, (Tenn. 2003) (citing Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 675; State v. Blanton,
926 S.W.2d 953, 960 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)).
                                            - 34 -
        In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the use of
Defendant’s prior robbery conviction as impeachment evidence. The record reflects that
the State gave Defendant reasonable written notice of the impeaching conviction before
trial and that the trial court properly found that the conviction was a felony and a crime
involving dishonesty. Galmore, 994 S.W.2d at 122. The trial court further found that,
although a prior robbery conviction was similar to the offenses for which Defendant was
on trial, the conviction’s probative value on Defendant’s credibility outweighed its unfair
prejudicial effect, reasoning that the issue of Defendant’s credibility was “going to be
paramount” because the theory of defense was that Mr. Parker was “lying about the whole
thing.” Finally, as noted by the State, the trial court instructed the jury that it could only
consider Defendant’s prior conviction for the “purpose of its effect, if any, on [his]
credibility as a witness” and that it could not be considered as evidence of Defendant’s
guilt for the offenses for which he was on trial. The jury is presumed to have followed the
instructions of the trial court, and Defendant has not presented any evidence to the contrary.
See Harbison, 539 S.W.3d at 164. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

  VI. Allowing the State to Question Co-Defendant Brown Regarding the Music Video

       Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine
Co-Defendant Brown about the rap music video in which Defendant and Co-Defendant
Brown appeared. Defendant argues that the music video was not relevant because: “there
was no basis for believing that its contents were rooted in reality”; there was no “nexus
between specific details of the music video and the circumstances of the offense for which
[Defendant] was charged”; and Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown “readily admitted
they were present for the incident.” Defendant also asserts that, even if the music video
was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue
prejudice. Finally, Defendant argues that evidence of his appearance in Co-Defendant
Brown’s music video was prohibited by Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). The State
responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to cross-
examine Co-Defendant Brown about the music video.

       When a trial court makes an evidentiary ruling, the appropriate standard of review
on direct appeal is “whether the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court abused its
discretion” in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. State v. McCaleb, 582 S.W.3d
179, 186 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Regions Bank v. Thomas, 532 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Tenn. 2017);
State v. Davis, 466 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Tenn. 2015)). In McCaleb, our supreme court
explained:

              We emphasize that the abuse of discretion standard of review does not
       permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
       State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 159 (Tenn. 2018). Rather, “[b]ecause,
                                            - 35 -
       by their very nature, discretionary decisions involve a choice among
       acceptable alternatives, reviewing courts will not second-guess a trial court’s
       exercise of its discretion simply because the trial court chose an alternative
       that the appellate courts would not have chosen.” White v. Vanderbilt Univ.,
       21 S.W.3d 215, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, if the reviewing
       court determines that “reasonable minds can disagree with the propriety of
       the decision,” the decision should be affirmed. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d at 159.

Id.

       Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 provides that “‘[r]elevant evidence’ means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. Tenn. R. Evid. 402. However, it
may be excluded if its probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice[.]” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. The term “unfair prejudice” has been defined as “[a]n
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one.” State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978).

       Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that evidence of
Defendant’s appearance in Co-Defendant Brown’s music video was relevant and that its
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. As
found by the trial court, evidence that Co-Defendant Brown and Defendant had access to
the gray Porsche truck found in the surveillance footage and to a gun with a laser sight was
probative of the fact that Co-Defendant Brown and Defendant utilized those items in the
robbery. The evidence also corroborated Mr. Parker’s testimony that Defendant had a gun
with a laser sight. We note that the State’s questions regarding the music video were
limited and that the video was not played for the jury. Defendant has not shown that any
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of this evidence.

       “Evidence of a person’s character or trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Tenn. R.
Evid. 404(a). However, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be admissible
for “other purposes,” such as proving identity, criminal intent, or rebuttal of accident or
mistake. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 239-40 (Tenn. 2005).
Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), the evidence must be excluded “if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(4).

        As noted by the State, evidence that someone possessed a firearm is not evidence of
a prior bad act as contemplated by Rule 404(b). State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 289 (Tenn.
2014); State v. Robinson, No. M2016-02335-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 4693999, at *7
                                           - 36 -
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017) (concluding that a photograph of the defendant holding
two handguns did not implicate Rule 404(b)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018).
Therefore, Co-Defendant Brown’s testimony that Defendant appeared with him in the
music video holding a prop gun did not implicate Rule 404(b). Defendant is not entitled
to relief.

VII. Failure to Fully Bifurcate the Charge of Convicted Felon in Possession of a Firearm

       Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the charge
of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in Count Four from the remaining
charges. Defendant avers that, instead of properly bifurcating the charge, the trial court
employed a procedure that charged Defendant “with an offense that did not exist” and
deprived him of the ability to argue an available statutory defense. The State responds that
Defendant is not entitled to relief because the State entered a nolle prosequi on the charge.

        A nolle prosequi is a formal entry upon the record by “the prosecuting officer in a
criminal action, by which he declares that he will no further prosecute the case, either as to
some of the counts . . . or altogether.” State v. D’Anna, 506 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1973) (citing State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168 (Tenn. 1951)).
“When an unconditional order [n]olle prosequi is entered after indictment, it is a dismissal
of the indictment and no conviction can be had except by beginning a new case against the
accused.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 93 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn. 1936)); see also
State v. Neely, 1 S.W.3d 679, 682 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).6

        Because the charge of convicted felon in possession of a firearm was dismissed
when the State requested a nolle prosequi, there is no judgment of conviction from which
Defendant can appeal pursuant to Rule 3(b). See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b); Homolko v. State,
295 S.W. 66, 67 (Tenn. 1927) (“No appeal lies from a nolle prosequi.”); State v. Childress,
298 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that a defendant cannot appeal
from an order allowing the State to nolle prosequi the charges against him). Because of
the unavailability of a Rule 3 appeal from the entry of a nolle prosequi, we conclude that
this court is without jurisdiction to consider the propriety of the procedure employed by
the trial court as to the charge of convicted felon in possession of a firearm in Count Four.
Because Defendant does not stand convicted of the offense in Count Four, this court has
no jurisdiction to address Defendant’s claim.

       6
          We note that Defendant was put in jeopardy before the nolle prosequi was entered; thus, a
subsequent prosecution of Defendant for the offense charged in Count Four would be barred by double
jeopardy considerations. See State v. Moore, 713 S.W.2d 670, 674-75 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
                                              - 37 -
                              VIII. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. He
argues that Mr. Parker’s testimony was contradictory and not credible and that the State
did not prove that his use of violence or fear preceded or was contemporaneous with the
taking of Mr. Parker’s property. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain
Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery.

       Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R.
App. P. 13(e). Questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence
are resolved by the fact finder. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This
court will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Our standard of review “is the same whether the
conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d
370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

       A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a
presumption of guilt. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn. 1982). The defendant bears the burden of proving why the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at
914. On appeal, the “State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d
514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

       “Robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another
by violence or putting the person in fear.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a) (2018).
Especially aggravated robbery is robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon where the
victim suffers serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403(a) (2018). “Serious
bodily injury” is defined as bodily injury that involves: a substantial risk of death;
protracted unconsciousness; extreme physical pain; protracted or obvious disfigurement;
protracted loss or substantial impairment of function of a bodily member, organ or mental
faculty; or a broken bone of a child who is twelve (12) years of age or less. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(34) (2018). “‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or
disfigurement, and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a
bodily member, organ, or mental faculty[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (2018).
The subjective nature of pain is a fact to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. Dedmon,
No. M2005-00762-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 448653, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23,
2006), no perm. app. filed.
                                            - 38 -
       In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on criminal responsibility. A person
is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if “[a]cting
with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds
or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person
to commit the offense[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2) (2018).

        Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to support
Defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The evidence at trial established
that on July 2, 2018, Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown arrived at Mr. Parker’s studio
under the pretense of Co-Defendant Brown’s using the studio for an hour of recording time.
After Mr. Parker let them inside and took them upstairs, Defendant excused himself to the
bathroom. Minutes later, Defendant returned to the recording studio pointing a gun with a
laser sight at Mr. Parker. Defendant told Mr. Parker, “[N]***a, you know what time it is.”
At the same time, Co-Defendant Brown pulled a gun out and hit Mr. Parker across the head
with it. Co-Defendant Brown also told Mr. Parker, “[Y]ou know what time it is[.]” When
Mr. Parker fell to his knees, Co-Defendant Brown fired the gun at him twice, hitting Mr.
Parker in the leg. Then, Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown flipped Mr. Parker over, went
through his pockets, and took money, a credit card, a bank card, and Mr. Parker’s keys and
phone. Co-Defendant Brown then attempted to find the digital recording box for the
surveillance system set up outside the recording studio as Mr. Parker “played dead” and
Defendant fled down the stairs. Mr. Parker testified that Co-Defendant Brown pulled items
off the wall, including a television. He said that Defendant was unable to unlock the door
and called for Co-Defendant Brown to help him. He said that, when Defendant and Co-
Defendant returned upstairs, Defendant “pulled the gun” and shot him.

        Through Mr. Parker’s testimony, the State introduced a surveillance video that
showed Co-Defendant Brown’s taking a television from Mr. Parker’s recording studio and
Defendant’s taking the assault rifle, which Defendant wrapped up in his shirt. After the
shooting, Mr. Parker was taken to the hospital where he remained for three days. Regarding
his wounds, Mr. Parker stated that the gunshot wound to his leg “ripped the nerves out [of]
. . . [his] leg so it’s hard for [him] to stand up a long time[.]” He said that the second
gunshot wound that left a bullet “sitting” on his spine caused him severe pain every day.
Mr. Parker identified both Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown in photographic lineups,
on the surveillance video, and in court. When Mr. Parker was asked if it was his testimony
that Defendant shot him, Mr. Parker responded, “Both of them robbed and shot me.” He
said that Co-Defendant Brown shot him in the leg and that Defendant shot him in the
shoulder.

       Although Defendant argues that Mr. Parker’s testimony was contradictory and not
credible, he acknowledges that it was the role of the jury to resolve questions of witness
credibility. Based upon its verdict, the jury clearly accredited Mr. Parker’s testimony over
                                             - 39 -
the testimony from Defendant and Co-Defendant Brown, as it was entitled to do. As
previously stated, questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence are resolved by the fact finder, and this court will not reweigh the evidence.
Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; see also State v. Hooper, No. W2021-01069-CCA-R3-CD, 2022
WL 2718863, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 13, 2022) (stating that this court will “not
entertain questions concerning the credibility of a witness because those are matters
entrusted to the jury”), no perm. app. filed. Any alleged inconsistencies in Mr. Parker’s
testimony do not render the evidence insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction.

        Defendant also contends that the State failed to prove that the use of violence or fear
preceded or was contemporaneous with the taking of the items from Mr. Parker. However,
Mr. Parker testified that Defendant pointed a gun at him and told him he “knew what time
it [was]” and that Co-Defendant Brown hit him with a gun and then shot him. Mr. Parker
stated that both assailants then flipped him over and removed items from his pockets. The
evidence clearly showed that the use of violence or fear preceded the taking of the victim’s
property. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find
Defendant guilty of especially aggravated robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant
is not entitled to relief.

                                         Conclusion

       Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               ____________________________________
                                               ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

                                            - 40 -