Court Opinion

ID: 9753813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:30:57.514414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.926054
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice O’Beien :
I disagree with both aspects of the majority opinion. There was no memorandum sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, which requirement must be met because the alleged contract included real property. Not only do almost all the other jurisdictions which-have passed on the question require the superseded will to refer to the alleged contract in order' to coh-; *423stitute a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute, 'as the majority points out, but the latest Pennsylvania case to deal squarely with the problem, Anderson Estate, 348 Pa. 294, 35 A. 2d 301 (1944), has required reference in the will to the underlying contract. Although Wladyslaw’s case is a most sympathetic one, I can see no reason to retreat from the view expressed in Anderson. It is a bootstrapping argument, if ever there were one, to state, as the majority does, that where the parol evidence is clear that the will was intended to embody the terms of the contract, there is a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute. The statute is meant to prevent just that sort of bootstrapping, because the possibility of fraud is inherent in the introduction of oral testimony as to the essential terms of the contract, or for that matter, its very existence.
Moreover, even if there were a provable contract, I believe that the majority has chosen the wrong alternative in not requiring proof of the value of the services rendered. I agree with the majority that it makes no sense to distinguish between the situation where the contract establishes a promise to give a specific amount (where the value of the services rendered need not be proven), and the situation where the contract establishes a promise to give an amount vague or undetermined, such as the whole or part of his estate (where the value of the services must be proven).
However, rather than dispense with proving the value of the services in all eases, I think a much more salutary rule would be to require the value to be shown in all cases. Since the creditor does stand ahead of the widow, courts should take pains to prevent the diminishing of the widow’s share through the simple expedient of a contract to leave either a specific amount or a portion of the estate in the husband’s will.
*424I would reverse the decree of the court below and award the residue, in accordance with the 1964 will, to the widow.