Court Opinion

ID: 9550895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:44:28.299164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:39.799309
License: Public Domain

LINDE, J.,
concurring.
Despite the doubts reflected in the first question to counsel quoted in the Court’s opinion, the legislative history convinces me that the definition of second degree robbery in ORS 164.405 does not preclude a conviction of first degree robbery upon an unaided inference that a pointed gun was in fact loaded. I only add these few sentences to draw attention to the resulting anomaly in the definitions of robbery.
The statutes define three degrees of robbery. Actual or attempted theft by the use or threat of physical force, standing alone, is third degree robbery, a Class C felony. ORS 164.395. It becomes a Class A felony when the robber "(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or (b) Uses or attempts to use a dangerous weapon; or (c) Causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury to any person.” ORS 164.415. However, between these extremes, robbery in the second degree is a Class B felony if the robber "[represents by word or conduct that he is armed with what purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon.” ORS 164.405.
On its face, this definition of second degree robbery seemed to cover a threat with a real but empty gun. Such a threat would appear to represent that the robber is armed with what purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon. If so, the legislature presumably would not have meant the identical threat also to suffice for an inference that the weapon was in fact *397loaded, raising the crime to first degree robbery, without additional support in the evidence.
The legislative history recounted in the Court’s opinion, however, supports the state’s position that ORS 164.405 was added specifically to deal with threats with a simulated or pretended weapon, not a real but unloaded one. The latter situation was to remain open to the inference by the factfinder, permitted under prior case law, that a pointed gun was loaded.
If it is established that the pointed gun in fact was empty, the state’s position is that ORS 164.405 does not apply and that the facts constitute a third degree robbery. 1 That was counsel’s explanation of the statutes at oral argument, and indeed, it is necessary to the state’s argument if the prior law on first degree robbery upon mere inference is to survive the enactment of ORS 164.405. As stated, above, the Court has accepted the argument, but it does seem anomalous. It means, in effect, that a robber is better advised to display a real weapon than a toy, or mere acting skills, provided he prepares some credible evidence, in case it should be needed, that the weapon could not be fired. Moreover, since in many prosecutions the weapon itself will not be in evidence and its character must be determined from the testimony of witnesses, a jury must first be asked to decide "beyond a reasonable doubt” whether what the witness thought he saw was an operable weapon or a simulated one. If the jury concludes that it was simulated, the crime will be *398second degree robbery; otherwise, it can be either third degree or first degree, but not second. The rationality of this result as a matter of policy is open to question. So is the effect of these combinations on the defendant’s choice whether or not to testify in his own defense, to say nothing of the plea-bargaining possibilities.
As for the inference that a pointed gun is in fact loaded, I cannot share the Court’s enthusiasm for the 50-year-old quotation from State v. Milo, 126 Or 238, 244, 269 P2d 225 (1928), set forth on page 394, supra. As an attentive reading will show, practically the entire quotation is devoted to the proposition that when a robber commands his victim at gun point to "stick 'em up” or the like, he "impliedly represents that the gun is loaded.” That much is, of course, obvious. But the final sentence of the quotation, that this implied representation "establishes prima facie that the gun so used was loaded,” far from being "well stated,” is a patent non sequitur. The fact that a thief plans to steal by threatening his victim with a gun does not say much about whether he means to be ready to commit a murder. At least that is not within my judicial notice, and I doubt that it is within the knowledge of most jurors without evidence.
Nevertheless, it has long been the law in this state that a jury may infer that a gun used to threaten a victim is in fact loaded, assuming, as the Court points out, that there is evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was a real gun. It does not follow that the prosecution is entitled to have the trial judge instruct the jury on making such an inference, or that the judge ought to do so. On other recent occasions we have said that the inferences which may or may not be drawn from evidence can normally be left to argument without any instruction, State v. Stilling, 285 Or 293, 590 P2d 1223 (1979); State v. McCormick, 280 Or 417, 571 P2d 499 (1977). However, no constitutional obstacle has been shown to *399forbid letting the jury draw the inference in the manner stated in the instruction in this case. I therefore concur in the Court’s decision.
Lent, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 An empty gun wielded as a club might also be a "dangerous weapon” within the definition of first degree robbery, ORS 164.415(1)03), but only if the robber "uses or attempts to use” it as such. The terms are defined in ORS 161.015 as follows:
(1) "Dangerous weapon” means any instrument, article or substance which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
(2) "Deadly weapon” means any instrument, article or substance specifically designed for and presently capable of causing death or serious physical injury.