Court Opinion

ID: 9553274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:27:01.40893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:35.954116
License: Public Domain

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because it is clear that due process was met with respect to the elimination of EMC’s lien notwithstanding Mansaray-Ruffin’s violation of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to obtain that relief. I have reached this conclusion even though I agree with the majority that her Chapter 13 reorganization plan included a provision dealing with EMC’s mortgage adopted in violation of the Rules because she did not file an adversary proceeding to avoid EMC’s lien. The basis for my conclusion is that notwithstanding the Rules violation EMC had adequate notice of the impairment of its lien and an opportunity to object to that adverse treatment and, accordingly, that it received the constitutionally required due process to which it was entitled. Therefore, once the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan, the confirmation order bound EMC and precluded it from obtaining relief in the post-confirmation adversary proceeding that we now consider.
It is clear that Mansaray-Ruffin’s plan included a provision adopted in violation of the Bankruptcy Rules. Rule 7001(2) provides that “a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property” is an adversary proceeding. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7001(2). We have determined that under Rule 7001(2) a debtor must initiate an adversary proceeding to avoid a lien. See In re McKay, 732 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir.1984) (“[Wjhere a debt- or seeks to avoid a judicial hen pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the adversary proceedings rules adopted by the Bankruptcy Code apply....”). Mansaray-Ruffin did not initiate an adversary proceeding to avoid EMC’s lien but, instead, provided in her plan that EMC’s claim would be fixed as an unsecured $1,000 claim upon the plan’s confirmation. Because the proceedings leading to the approval of her plan did not comply with Rule 7001, if EMC had objected unsuccessfully to the confirmation of her plan during the confirmation hearing and then appealed from the confirmation order, I have no doubt but that I would have voted to reverse the order *244confirming the plan. Thus, the proceedings at the confirmation hearing could not substitute for an adversary proceeding at which Mansaray-Ruffin could challenge the validity of the lien and I do not suggest that they could do so.
EMC, of course, did not object to confirmation of the plan or appeal from the confirmation order. Instead of taking those opportunities to protect its lien, EMC, quite inexplicably, though on adequate notice that its lien was being eliminated, sat idle in the face of the adoption of the plan. Though I recognize that an attorney for EMC examining the plan might have believed that the plan lawfully could not adversely affect EMC’s hen, I cannot understand why the attorney then would not have taken the uncomplicated step of objecting to the plan inasmuch as 11 U.S.C. § 1827(a) provides that “the provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor.” After all, our experience teaches us that attorneys ordinarily are careful to protect their clients’ interests and an attorney could not be certain that in the light of section 1327(a) a plan would not be given preclusive effect even with respect to the elimination of EMC’s lien.9 But instead of objecting, almost nine months after confirmation EMC filed the adversary proceeding leading to this appeal seeking to collaterally attack the confirmed plan. Accordingly, a situation that should not have raised any significant procedural problems instead presents the divisive issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order binds EMC and precludes EMC from collaterally attacking the plan, even though the plan violated the Bankruptcy Rules.
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the binding effect of confirmed plans. Under the Code:
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1327.
In In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405 (3d Cir.1989), we determined that under section 1327 a confirmed plan binds creditors even when the plan violates the Bankruptcy Code and includes unauthorized provisions. In Szostek the debtors filed a plan that proposed payments to a secured creditor but did not propose to pay interest, i.e., present value, on the claim. Id. at 1406. The creditor in Szostek did not timely object to the plan and did not appeal from the confirmation order. Id. at 1407-08. Instead, four months after confirmation, the creditor mounted a post-confirmation challenge to the plan, arguing that the plan violated a provision of the Code by not paying the present value of his claim. Id. at 1408. Though the creditor was correct with respect to the Code violation the bankruptcy court nevertheless found that the plan was not revocable. Id. On appeal, the district court reversed that aspect of the bankruptcy court’s ruling and vacated the plan confirmation or*245der. Id. The debtors then appealed to this Court.
The issue before us was whether under section 1327 the confirmation order bound the creditor even though the debtors’ plan did not provide for the present value of the creditor’s claim as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Id. Significantly, in considering this issue we recognized that
the purpose of bankruptcy law and the provisions for reorganization could not be realized if the discharge of debtors were not complete and absolute; that if courts should relax provisions of the law and facilitate the assertion of old claims against discharged and reorganized debtors, the policy of the law would be defeated; that creditors would- not participate in reorganization if they could not feel that the plan was final, and that it would be unjust and unfair to those who had accepted and acted upon a reorganization plan if the court were thereafter to reopen the plan and change the conditions which constituted the basis of its earlier acceptance.
Id. at 1409 (quoting In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 771 F.2d 762, 767 (3d Cir.1985)). We further stated that “if a creditor ignores the bankruptcy proceedings, he does so at his peril.” Id. at 1410 (citing In re Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.1983)). We also noted the “general rule” that “the acceptance of the plan by a secured creditor can be inferred by the absence of an objection.” Id. at 1413. We concluded that “once the ... plan was confirmed, it became final under § 1327 and, absent a showing of fraud under § 1330(a), it could not be challenged ... for failure to pay [the creditor] the present value of its claim.” Id.
In an opinion citing Szostek another court set forth its meaning perfectly:
[The secured creditor] was not free blithely to forego its full and fair opportunity to object to the plan’s plain terms. Even if issues relating to. [the debtor’s] liability to [the creditor] could not be finally resolved through a plan confirmation contest, ... [the secured creditor] ignored the plan confirmation process, and its opportunity-to object to confirmation, at its peril.
In re Fili, 257 B.R. 370, 372 (1st Cir. BAP2001).
Thus, Szostek stands for the rule that “plans that would not be confirmable due to provisions that do not conform to applicable law will nonetheless be given effect if an objection is not raised prior to entry of the confirmation order.” In re Bryant, 323 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2005). This principle is tempered only by considerations of procedural due process which, of course, concern the notice given creditors of the confirmation proceedings and their opportunity to object to the terms of the plan. Under the Fifth Amendment “[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....” U.S. Const, amend. V. The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to respond. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir.1995). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. the Supreme Court stated that notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.... ” 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
A creditor with a secured claim has a property interest and thus is entitled to due process protection before the interest may be impaired. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795-800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2709-12, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983); see also Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209-10 (3d Cir.2000) (holding *246that a confirmation order does not discharge a claim when the claimant did not have notice of the proceedings). Accordingly, a debtor’s plan that proposes to adverséiy affect a creditor’s secured claim will bind the creditor only if it was given notice of the proposed adverse action and had an opportunity to be heard on the appropriateness of that action. See In re Linkous, 990 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir.1993).
In this case the conclusion is inescapable that the requirements of due process were met prior to the impairment of EMC’s lien notwithstanding Mansaray-Ruffin’s violation of the Bankruptcy Rules in achieving relief from the lien. She mailed notice to EMC of her plan, which stated that upon confirmation EMC’s claim would be fixed as an unsecured claim of $1,000. After receiving this notice, EMC had multiple opportunities to be heard on the appropriateness of Mansaray-Ruffin’s proposed action. For instance, after Mansaray-Ruffin filed a proof of claim on behalf of EMC that stated that EMC’s claim was for $1,000 and was unsecured, EMC could have objected to the proof of claim and presented its position to the Bankruptcy Court at a hearing. See 11 U.S.C. § 502. EMC also could have appeared at the plan confirmation hearing and objected to the plan’s treatment of its property interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1324(a). After confirmation, if its objections had been overruled, EMC could have appealed from the confirmation order to the District Court and then, if necessary, to this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158. Moreover, if EMC believed that the confirmation order had been procured by fraud, it could have sought revocation- of the order within 180 days after the date of the entry.10 See 11 U.S.C. § 1330.
I realize that sometimes a person will receive a notice buried in a very large and complex document and therefore understandably may overlook the notice. It might be that in such a case a court would hold that the notice, though delivered, was inadequate. But that was not the situation here as the amended plan of which EMC had notice was less than two complete pages in length and included the following paragraph:
4. The Debtor planned to file a further adversary proceeding to avoid in whole or in part the sécured claim allegedly arising from the first mortgage held against her residential realty by EMC Mortgage Corp. (“EMC”). However, EMC has not filed a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case. The Debtor will therefore file an unsecured proof of claim in the amount of $1000 on behalf of EMC, and will resort to an adversary proceeding against EMC only in the event that EMC successfully amends that claim and asserts a larger or a secured claim. The Debtor has been paying the regular mortgage payments to EMC outside of the plan in the event that her challenge of the claim of EMC would not be entirely successful. However, upon confirmation of this plan, in which the claim of EMC will be fixed- as an unsecured claim in the amount of $1000 unless it is able to object to this claim, the Debtor will cease making payments to EMC, and EMC will be obliged to satisfy its mortgage against the Debt- or’s home upon the discharge of its debt as filed or allowed.
*247App. at 34. I have quoted the plan in full as an appendix to this opinion.
But instead of availing itself of its various opportunities to be heard on the appropriateness of the plan’s proposed action with respect to its lien, EMC did not take any action until almost nine months after the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the plan when it brought the adversary complaint leading to this appeal. Significantly, EMC has not contended in these proceedings that it was not aware of the plan and the plan’s treatment of its lien nor has it given any explanation for its nine-month delay in challenging the plan. In these circumstances, EMC .clearly was afforded due process. Because EMC received due process before its lien was impaired, the confirmed plan binds EMC and precludes it from succeeding in this adversary proceeding even though the proceedings leading to the impairment of its lien did not comply with the Bankruptcy Rules. The critical issue is whether the procedural Rules for adoption of a plan were satisfied and they were.
I understand that my view of this case could encourage a debtor to place what the debtor believed was an unlawful lien-avoidance provision into his or her plan in the hope that an unwary creditor would be caught off-guard and not object to prevent the plan’s confirmation.' After all, a debtor might believe that the creditor would not pay proper attention to the unlawful provision of the plan. On the other hand is it really too much to expect a creditor receiving a plan filed on behalf of one of its debtors to examine the plan to see whether, if confirmed, it will adversely affect its lien?.
In any event the controlling consideration must be that Congress by providing for the finality of confirmation orders requires that unauthorized provisions in plans be enforced. Clearly, unless and until Congress amends section 1327 to provide that confirmed plans that include unlawful lien-avoidance provisions will not be accorded preclusive effect or, alternatively, expands the basis for post-confirmation objections beyond the narrow fraud grounds in section 1330, we must continue to enforce plans with such provisions as written and why should that not be so?11 A creditor always can protect itself from an unlawful deprivation of its lien because its property interest cannot be deprived without due process which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard and such protections are adequate to protect against the unconstitutional deprivation of property. EMC has only itself to blame for the loss of its lien.
I realize that the majority contends that EMC did not receive due process because Mansaray-Ruffin violated the Bankruptcy Rules by not initiating an adversary proceeding to avoid its lien. Thus, according to the majority, “EMC had the due process right to assume that, unless Mansa*248ray-Ruffin commenced the adversary proceeding required by the Rules and served it with a complaint and a summons, its lien could not be invalidated.”
While I certainly respect the majority’s view, I nevertheless dissent because I see no escape from a conclusion that the majority is equating the requirements of constitutional due process to the requirements of the Bankruptcy Rules; thus, it effectively is using the Rules as a proxy for due process.in this case. But this linking is unjustified as a nonconstitutionally prescribed proxy can be both over-and under-inclusive with respect to satisfying constitutional requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.2008) (stating that a police officer’s impoundment of .a car pursuant to standardized procedures will most likely, but not always, satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement, and that conversely, an impoundment that is contrary to a standardized procedure or in absence of a standardized procedure is not a per se Fourth Amendment violation). Therefore there may be situations, and this case certainly is one of them, where due process has been met notwithstanding a debtor’s violation of the Bankruptcy Rules.
Through the Bankruptcy Code and Rules Congress and the courts have imposed stricter procedural requirements on debtors who seek to invalidate liens than due process of law requires. By raising these standards above the floor set by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, Congress and the courts have recognized that the invalidation of a lien “is a matter of particularly great consequence.... ” Thus, under the Rules, a debtor must initiate an adversary proceeding, with all of its procedural trapping's, to invalidate a lien.
But these procedures are not proxies for the constitutional due process required to invalidate a lien. From a constitutional perspective, it makes no difference whether a debtor’s plan seeks to extinguish a creditor’s lien rights or simply reduce the value of the creditor’s secured claim. Just because Congress has decided to require more process than the Fifth Amendment requires to deprive a creditor of a lien does not mean that the Constitution requires that enhanced process. Instead, as I stated above, all that the Constitution requires to deprive a person of property is notice and an opportunity for a hearing. And in this case, those requirements clearly were met and the majority fairly cannot say that they were not met.
In reaching my result I have taken particular note of the majority’s reference, “[b]y way of analogy,” to a situation in which a plaintiff seeks to commence a civil action with a motion filed with the court and mailed to a defendant. The majority indicates that we would not permit a default judgment to be entered on the basis of that procedure. I completely agree not because due process of law precluded entry of the judgment but rather because its entry would violate procedural rules.
In any event, the majority’s hypothetical situation is not in any way analogous to that here. Mansaray-Ruffin seeks merely to uphold a confirmed plan and there is not the slightest suggestion in the record that the Code’s procedural notice requirements for the confirmation of her plan were not satisfied. Nothing could be clearer than the Code’s provision that the “confirmed plan bind[s] the debtor and each creditor.” Section 1327(a). A proper analogy to the majority’s hypothetical situation would be if Mansaray-Ruffin had been seeking to enforce an order from a procedurally defective adversary proceeding but she surely is doing no such thing as she never brought an adversary proceeding to avoid the lien. I reiterate she is seeking to *249enforce an order of confirmation. My point is not complex and is that we are not concerned with the due process aspect of the nonexistent adversary proceeding; rather we are concerned with the proceedings leading to confirmation of the plan.
Our case law compels a conclusion that due process was met in this case. In In re Fesq, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan that provided for a single lump sum payment of $7,050 in full satisfaction of a $69,166.59 judgment that was a lien on the debtor’s house. 153 F.3d 113, 114 (3d Cir.1998). The creditor did not file an objection to the plan and the bankruptcy court confirmed it. Id. The debtor then filed a motion to vacate the creditor’s lien, and the creditor filed a cross-motion to vacate the confirmation order. Id. The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s motion and denied the creditor’s motion. Id. at 115. The creditor appealed from the order denying its motion to vacate and the district court affirmed. Id. On appeal, in affirming we based our decision on the language of section 1330(a), which states that “[o]n request of a party in interest at any time within 180 days after the date of the entry of an order of confirmation ..., and after notice and a hearing, the court may revoke such order if such order was procured by fraud.” We noted Szostek’s recognition that finality is an important goal of bankruptcy law and stated that “[Revoking a confirmation order is a measure that upsets the legitimate expectations of both debtors and creditors. Interpreting Section 1330(a) as a limiting provision permits such disruption in only a very narrow category of egregious cases.” Fesq, 153 F.3d at 120 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we held that “fraud is the only ground for relief available for revocation of a Chapter 13 confirmation order.” Id. Because the creditor in Fesq did not assert that the confirmation order was procured by fraud, we affirmed the judgment that granted the debtor’s motion to vacate the lien and denied the creditor’s motion to revoke the confirmation order. Id.
The majority contends that this case is distinguishable from Fesq because “Fesq did not involve a determination as to the validity of the creditor’s lien or any other matter for which Rule 7001 requires an adversary proceeding” and thus “Fesq does not implicate the due process concerns that animate our decision in this case....” But the majority’s conclusion cannot be correct: in Fesq we affirmed a ruling which both denied the creditor’s motion to revoke the confirmation order and granted the debtor’s motion to invalidate the creditor’s lien. Fesq, 153 F.3d at 114-15. Thus, the result in that case is identical to the one that we should reach in this case. The same due process concerns were present in Fesq as here and yet we found there that the debtor’s plan bound the creditor.
Moreover, even if the majority is correct that Fesq did not involve the invalidation of a lien but instead involved only the modification of the amount of a secured claim, this distinction is immaterial in a due process inquiry. In either situation, a debtor’s plan adversely affects a creditor’s property interest, the distinction being only of degree. I ask what, under the majority’s proposed distinction, would be the proper result if Mansaray-Ruffin had stated in her plan that she valued EMC’s secured claim at $1? Apparently the majority would find that Mansaray-Ruffin’s confirmed plan bound EMC and that the hen would be satisfied upon payment of the $1. After all, in such a situation, Mansaray-Ruffin would not be providing in her plan that the lien would be avoided upon confirmation. And yet, the ultimate outcome in both the hypothetical scenario and this case would be the same: in both sitúa*250tions, EMC effectively would lose its lien in exchange for a fraction of its claim amount. I cannot understand how the majority can acknowledge that due process is satisfied in the hypothetical situation but not this case, when the procedures and outcome in both situations are identical.12
The majority also contends that Fesq is distinguishable because “quite simply, [the creditor] is not seeking the revocation of the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order. Rather, it is asking us to declare that the confirmed plan did not invalidate the lien that it now holds.” I disagree with the majority’s assessment of this case. Although styled as an adversary proceeding to determine the status of the lien, EMC’s case most certainly seeks to revoke the Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order to the extent that the order confirmed that Mansaray-Ruffin’s plan avoided the lien. The majority’s action, stepping in after the confirmation and finding that the lien survived the Bankruptcy Court’s order, clearly annuls the order with respect to the lien. Thus, this case is not distinguishable from Fesq on that basis.
Furthermore, the majority’s view will open the door to many post-confirmation challenges that attempt to undermine the provisions of confirmed plans without explicitly seeking “revocation” of those plans, a result that is not desirable because it will work against the important interest in finality that we recognized in Szostek. I ask what time constraints under the majority’s ruling will limit a creditor from bringing such a post-confirmation challenge? EMC waited almost nine months after confirmation before it got around to bringing the adversary complaint in this case. How long could EMC have delayed before the majority would have concluded that it was too late for it to bring this adversary proceeding? The majority provides no guidance on this aspect of its decision.13
*251The majority relies on In re McKay, 732 F.2d 44, for the proposition that Mansaray-Ruffin’s plan does not bind EMC because she did not initiate a separate adversary proceeding to challenge EMC’s lien. In this regard in In re McKay we reversed a bankruptcy court’s orders confirming the debtors’ plans that included provisions avoiding liens against them because the debtors had not initiated adversary proceedings to avoid the liens. Id. at 48.
But McKay is distinguishable from this case and is no support at all for the majority’s result and in no way is inconsistent with this dissent. In McKay, the creditor objected to the treatment of its liens and timely appealed the orders confirming the debtors’ plans, precisely what EMC did not do. Therefore, the preclusive effect afforded confirmed plans under 11 U.S.C. § 1327 did not apply and the interest in finality that we articulated in Szostek was absent. In this case, by contrast, EMC did not object or appeal from the confirmation order. Thus, section 1327 applies to bind EMC and the need for finality — i.e., the need to protect the integrity of a confirmed plan against post-confirmation challenges — outweighs any reason to permit EMC to raise a post-confirmation collateral attack on Mansaray-Ruffm’s plan.
In sum, I conclude that because due process requirements were met, Mansaray-Ruffin’s confirmed plan binds EMC even though the plan included a provision adopted in violation of the Bankruptcy Rules. My approach to the due process issue in this case gives proper effect to section 1327, promotes the important goal of finality of bankruptcy confirmation orders, and encourages creditors to be active participants in the bankruptcy process. Moreover, it is faithful to the reasoning in In re Szostek that we set forth almost 19 years ago that “although prior to confirmation the bankruptcy court and trustee do have a responsibility to verify that a Chapter 13 plan complies with the Bankruptcy Code provisions, after the plan is confirmed the policy favoring the finality of confirmation is stronger than the bankruptcy court’s and trustee’s obligations to verify a plan’s compliance with the Code.” 886 F.2d at 1406. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s decision finding that EMC’s lien survived the bankruptcy process.14
*252Appendix
AMENDED CHAPTER 13 PLAN OF THE DEBTOR
1. If the Debtor’s estate were liquidated under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured creditors would not receive any payments. Those creditors will not receive less under the terms of this plan.
2. The Debtor shall submit to the supervision and control of the Trustee payments in the amount of $10 monthly for the first 10 months of the plan, through July, 2003, and thereafter $50 monthly for the final 26 months of the plan.
3. The Debtor has prosecuted an adversary proceeding which avoided the totally undersecured claim of AFBA-IB Bankcard Center.
4. The Debtor planned to file a further adversary proceeding to avoid in whole or in part the secured claim allegedly arising from the first mortgage held against her residential realty by EMC Mortgage Corp. (“EMC”). However, EMC has not filed a proof of claim in this bankruptcy case. The Debtor will therefore file an unsecured proof of claim in the amount of $1000 on behalf of EMC, and will resort to an adversary proceeding against EMC only in the event that EMC successfully amends that claim and asserts a larger or a secured claim. The Debtor has been paying the regular mortgage payments to EMC outside of the plan in the event that her challenge of the claim of EMC would not be entirely successful. However, upon confirmation of this plan, in which the claim of EMC will be fixed as an unsecured claim in the amount of $1000 unless it is able to object to this claim, the Debtor will cease making payments to EMC, and EMC will be obliged to satisfy its mortgage against the Debtor’s home upon the discharge of its debt as filed or allowed.
5. The Debtor will avoid any judicial lien held against her residential realty by Sherran Gray.
6. The Debtor shall make arrangements to pay the various claims of the City of Philadelphia (“the City”) directly to the City outside the plan.
7. The claims of the Debtor’s creditors are classified in this Plan as follows:
A. Class One: Administrative claims. These claims include any unpaid attorney’s fees and the Trustee’s fees.
B. Class Two: The claim of EMC. This claim shall be dealt with as described in paragraph 4 of the plan and treated as an unsecured claim.
*253C. Class Three: The claim of AFRA. As noted in paragraph 3, this claim will be treated as an unsecured claim, because it is entirely undersecured and any security interest of this claimant has been avoided.
D. Class Four: The secured claim of Sherran Gray. As noted in paragraph 5, this claim will not be paid, because it either has been or can be avoided.
E. Class Five: The secured claims of the City & School District of Philadelphia (“the City”) for real estate taxes, water and sewer, and a statutory municipal lien. The Debtor shall make an agreement with the City outside of the plan to liquidate these claims.
(F). Class Six: All other unsecured claims against the Debtor, in addition to the Class Two and Class Three claims, which are timely filed or ultimately allowed.
[15] The payments received by the Trustee from the Debtor shall be distributed first to allowed Class One claimants until they are paid in full; secondly, to any arrearages allowed to the Class Two claimant, and thirdly to Class Six claimants pro rata.
8. Title of the property of the estate shall revest in the Debtor upon confirmation of the Plan, and the Debtor shall have the sole right to the use and possession of same.
9. Upon application, the Debtor may alter the amount and timing of payments under this plan.
10. The automatic stay shall remain in full force and effect until this case is closed.
11. Upon completion of this or any other duty confirmed plan, as amended, all claims of all creditors listed except the Class Five claims, including the Class Two, Three, and Four claims, shall be discharged, and any liens which those claimants have or had shall be void and shall be so marked on any court records.

. Actually, as I point out below, it is possible that EMC was acting perfectly rationally in not objecting to the plan even though the plan eliminated its lien. See infra n. 6.

. I see no basis at all for a suggestion, if it had been made that Mansaray-Ruffin or her attorney was guilty of fraud. Quite to the contrary their conduct was completely transparent. In fact, they practically begged EMC to object to the treatment of its lien by her plan.

. In Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir.2007), a case in which we applied the Federal Arbitration Act as Congress wrote it and upheld a contractual provision providing for arbitration even though other courts had found arbitration provisions in similar cases before them to be unconscionable, we indicated with respect to the other cases that "their reasoning if applied logically could result in a significant narrowing of the application of the FAA.’' We therefore were of the view that whether or not the narrowing "might be a desirable result" it wás "not our function to do so" and that "[i]f the reach of the FAA is to be confined then Congress and not the courts should be the body to do so." Inasmuch as there was not a due process notice violation in the proceedings resulting in the confirmation of the amended plan we should take the Gay approach here and hold that if there is to be a modification of section 1327 so that a confirmed plan does not always bind "each creditor” then Congress arid not the courts should made the modification.

. The majority does not dispute my understanding of its opinion and apparently would have permitted Mansaray-Ruffin to substantially dilute the lien by fixing its amount at one dollar in her plan. One need not be a prophet to foresee that hereafter in this Circuit debtors in bankruptcy proceedings seeking to invalidate liens in some cases effectively will eliminate them without filing adversary proceedings simply by reducing their value in their plans to a nominal amount in the hope that somnolent creditors such as EMC will not object to the reduction.

. The majority indicates that notwithstanding my concern regarding its "failure to provide guidance as to whether EMC delayed too long — nine months — after confirmation before filing its adversary proceeding,” Mansaray-Ruffin, though complaining of the delay, "has not briefed this issue or pointed to authority to support the proposition that nine months was too long and/or should have barred EMC’s claim.” I disagree with the majority because clearly Mansaray-Ruffin’s briefs recite:
EMC took no action of any kind in the case until the filing of a complaint in the Bankruptcy Court (Adversary Case No. 03-1297) on December 19, 2003. The Complaint did not seek to revoke the order confirming the Plan.... Indeed, it could not do so because (1) it was presently well past the 180-day time-period for seeking to revoke confirmation of a plan, even though EMC was informed of the presence and content of the confirmation order well within that time-period; and (2)[EMC] did not and could not allege the requisite fraud in procuring this order.
Appellant’s Br. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
From the time that she sent the letter of February 27, 2002, to EMC indicating that she rescinded the loan at issue until December 19, 2003, when the Proceeding at issue was filed, EMC failed to respond to any of the Debtor's statements that she considered the loan to be rescinded and the mortgage loan securing it invalid.... The Proceeding at issue, [was] filed almost nine months after confirmation and after the contents of the Plan had been reiterated twice in letters to EMC over six months before....
Id. at 13-14.
*251The Appellee ... cannot dispute that ... it did not object to the confirmed plan, which was sent to it and set forth very precisely the exact treatment of the underlying claim in the plan; and that it received correspondence thereafter again describing its plan treatment which it did not in any way contest until it filed the proceeding at issue almost nine months after confirmation.
Appellant’s Rep. Br. at 1.
Clearly Mansaray-Ruffin has briefed the delay argument and supported it with authority as her 180-day reference was to .11 U.S.C. § 1330 dealing with the period of revocation of a confirmation order for fraud. Obviously, the nine-month delay was very important for, as I point out above, EMC in effect was seeking to revoke the confirmation order to the extent that the order confirmed that Mansaray-Ruffin’s plan avoided the lien. Thus, at the time that EMC brought these adversary proceedings its complaint could not have been amended to be a de jure action to revoke confirmation of the amended plan and EMC was attempting to do indirectly what it could no longer do directly.

. I make one more point with respect to this particular adversary proceeding and Mansaray-Ruffin’s bankruptcy proceedings in general. As of now EMC’s lien remains valid but because it did not object to the provision of her amended plan providing for the satisfaction of its lien until it brought these proceedings Mansaray-Ruffin previously had no reason to seek to rescind or otherwise avoid the lien in whole or in part as she had indicated that she contemplated doing in her original plan. It is beyond the scope of this case before us to decide whether she might now be *252able to bring the adversary proceeding she originally anticipated bringing but if fairness means anything she should have the opportunity to do so as EMC by its conduct in not objecting to the amended plan led her to believe that it acquiesced in the elimination of its lien. Indeed, even though I think that it is likely that EMC merely was negligent in not challenging the amended plan it is conceivable that to avoid the challenge that Mansaray-Ruffin originally contemplated bringing to avoid its lien, when EMC saw in the amended plan that Mansaray-Ruffin would bring her adversary proceeding only if EMC amended the $1000 claim she would file on its behalf and did not assert a “larger or a secured claim” it brilliantly did not object to the treatment of its lien in the amended plan and instead bided its time in contemplation of bringing these proceedings. I point out in this regard this scenario is not farfetched as according to the amended plan Mansaray-Ruffin did prosecute an adversary proceeding against another creditor in which she successfully avoided the creditor’s claim. Thus, EMC could not laugh off Mansaray-Ruffin's threat to bring an adversary proceeding to avoid its lien on the basis of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 to 1667F, preferring instead to litigate the Truth in Lending Act issue, if necessary, in a state court foreclosure action.

15. In her plan Mansaray-Ruffin erroneously numbered two consecutive paragraphs “7.”