Court Opinion

ID: 9942798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 21:00:41.810178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:41.891857
License: Public Domain

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                                              PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-6285

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        CARLOS EMANUEL KINARD,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:93−cr−00215−GCM−6;
        3:21−cv−00161−GCM)

        Argued: October 25, 2023                                     Decided: February 20, 2024

        Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by published per curiam opinion. Senior Judge Keenan wrote a separate
        concurring opinion, in which Judge Heytens joined.

        ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony J. Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan
        DuBois, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE
        OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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        PER CURIAM:

              The issue in this appeal is whether assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C.

        § 1959(a)(3), in violation of the North Carolina statutory crime of assault with a deadly

        weapon, N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-33(c)(1), requires a mens rea sufficiently culpable to qualify

        as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Based on our recent decision in United

        States v. Thomas, 87 F.4th 267 (4th Cir. 2023), we hold that this offense is a “crime of

        violence” and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                    I.

               In 1994, a jury convicted Carlos Emanuel Kinard on twelve counts related to a drug

        and racketeering conspiracy. Count 33 charged Kinard with use of a firearm during and in

        relation to a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) (the § 924(c) conviction). The predicate

        offense for the § 924(c) conviction arose under the violent crimes in aid of racketeering

        statute (VICAR), for VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) (the

        predicate VICAR assault offense).      The predicate VICAR assault offense, in turn,

        incorporated the North Carolina statutory crime of assault with a deadly weapon (the North

        Carolina assault offense), N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-33(c)(1). 1 The district court imposed a 20-

              1
                 At the time Kinard was prosecuted for this offense, the relevant statutory
        subsection was N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(b)(1). See N.C. Laws 1991, ch. 525, § 1 (effective
        Oct. 1, 1991). For simplicity, we refer in this opinion to the materially identical current
        version of this provision. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1).

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        year consecutive sentence for the § 924(c) conviction, 2 and we affirmed Kinard’s judgment

        of conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Padgett, 78 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 1996)

        (Table).

               In 2016, Kinard moved to vacate his sentence under § 2255, contending that the

        § 924(c) conviction was invalid because the predicate VICAR assault offense was not a

        “crime of violence” after Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding that

        “the residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is

        unconstitutionally vague). The district court rejected Kinard’s motion as untimely and, in

        the alternative, as meritless, concluding that the predicate VICAR assault offense qualified

        as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s “force clause” because that offense had as an

        element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or

        property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).

               In 2019, Kinard moved this Court for authorization to file a successive habeas

        petition based on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319

        (2019) (holding that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague). After we

        granted Kinard authorization to file the successive petition, he asked the district court to

        vacate his § 924(c) conviction based on the new rule of constitutional law set forth in Davis.

               2
                 On the remaining eleven counts of conviction, the court imposed seven concurrent
        life sentences, two concurrent 20-year sentences, one consecutive 10-year sentence, and
        one additional consecutive 20-year sentence. The district court later reduced Kinard’s
        sentences for three offenses not at issue here under section 404 of the First Step Act of
        2018. See Pub L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).

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               In the district court, Kinard argued that the predicate VICAR assault offense is not

        categorically a “crime of violence” for two reasons. First, Kinard argued that under the

        decision in Davis, the predicate VICAR offense could be committed without the use,

        attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. Second, Kinard

        contended that the predicate VICAR assault offense could be committed negligently or

        recklessly and, thus, did not qualify as a “crime of violence” based on the Supreme Court’s

        decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021) (plurality opinion) (holding that

        a crime with a mens rea of recklessness did not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed

        Career Criminal Act, 18 § U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). The district court denied Kinard’s

        motion, holding that VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon is categorically a “crime of

        violence” because the common law definition of “assault” satisfies the § 924(c) force

        clause. Kinard timely appealed.

                                                      II.

               On appeal, Kinard contends that the predicate VICAR assault crime, which

        incorporated the North Carolina assault offense, does not qualify as a § 924(c) “crime of

        violence” because it can be committed with a mens rea of “culpable negligence.” We

        review de novo the legal question whether an offense qualifies as a § 924(c) “crime of

        violence.” United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 263 (4th Cir. 2019).

               Under § 924(c), “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of

        violence . . . , uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses

        a firearm . . . shall be punished.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, “an essential

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        element of [Kinard’s § 924(c)] conviction was that his conduct was ‘in relation to [a] crime

        of violence.’” United States v. McDaniel, 85 F.4th 176, 184 (4th Cir. 2023). A “crime of

        violence,” in turn, is “an offense that is a felony” and “has as an element the use, attempted

        use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18

        U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (the force clause).

               To assess whether an offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the force

        clause, courts generally apply the categorical approach. McDaniel, 85 F.4th at 184. Under

        that approach, the court does not consider the facts of a defendant’s conduct, and instead

        evaluates whether the elements of the predicate offense “necessarily involve[] the

        defendant’s ‘use, attempted use, or threatened use’” of force. See Borden, 593 U.S. at 424

        (citation omitted). An offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3) only

        when this force is employed with a mens rea greater than recklessness. Id. at 432; Thomas,

        87 F.4th at 270.

               In limited circumstances, the applicable statute may create multiple offenses, only

        some of which qualify as “crime[s] of violence.” McDaniel, 85 F.4th at 184. For such

        “divisible” statutes, such as the VICAR statute in this case, we apply the modified

        categorical approach. Id.; Thomas, 87 F.4th at 272. This “tool” adds an additional,

        foundational step to the categorical approach, during which the court may review certain

        underlying documents, such as the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and

        colloquy, to identify “which of the statute’s alternative elements formed the basis of the

        defendant’s prior conviction.”     Thomas, 87 F.4th at 272 (citation omitted).          After

        completing this step, the court returns to the traditional categorical approach to evaluate

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        whether that offense qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). United States v.

        Simmons, 11 F.4th 239, 254 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

               We recently applied these principles in evaluating whether a different VICAR

        offense, VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of Virginia Code §§ 18.2-

        53.1 and 18.2-282, qualifies as a “crime of violence.” Thomas, 87 F.4th at 269, 274. In

        Thomas, we explained that one of the elements of a VICAR assault offense is that the

        assault “be committed ‘as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise

        or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from’ a racketeering enterprise or ‘for

        the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position’ in the racketeering

        enterprise” (the purpose element). Id. at 273 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)). We held that

        this element of a VICAR assault offense, which requires “a deliberate choice . . . to carry

        out the assault,” “satisfies” the requirement in Borden that a “crime of violence” “involve

        purposeful or knowing conduct.” Id. (omission added).

               Our holding in Thomas, that VICAR’s purpose element satisfies the mens rea

        requirement for a § 924(c) “crime of violence,” resolves the present appeal. 3 The predicate

        VICAR assault offense, which incorporated the North Carolina assault offense, had as an

        element that Kinard acted with one or more of the purposes set forth in § 1959(a).

        Therefore, under Thomas, the predicate VICAR assault offense in this case met Borden’s

        requirement that a “crime of violence” “involve purposeful or knowing conduct.” Thomas,

               3
                 Because our holding in Thomas regarding the purpose element resolves Kinard’s
        appeal, we do not reach the government’s alternative argument that the “enumerated
        federal offense” of assault with a dangerous weapon requires a sufficiently culpable mens
        rea for a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). See Thomas, 87 F.4th at 273.
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        87 F.4th at 274. Accordingly, we hold that the predicate VICAR assault offense was a

        “crime of violence” under the force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), and we affirm the

        district court’s judgment.

                                                                                    AFFIRMED

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        BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge, with whom JUDGE HEYTENS

        joins, concurring:

               I join in the present judgment because I agree that our decision in United States v.

        Thomas, 87 F.4th 267 (4th Cir. 2023), which issued after briefing and argument in this

        case, controls the outcome of Kinard’s appeal. Nevertheless, I write separately to relay my

        concerns with the resulting analysis.

                                                      I.

               I begin by outlining our usual approach to determining whether a VICAR offense

        categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). To sustain a conviction for

        VICAR assault, the government must show:

               (1) that there [is] an “enterprise,” as defined in § 1959(b)(2); (2) that the
               enterprise [is] engaged in “racketeering activity,” as defined in 18 U.S.C.
               § 1961; (3) that the defendant [] committed an assault “with a dangerous
               weapon” or “resulting in serious bodily injury”; (4) that the assault have
               violated state or federal law; and (5) that the assault [was] committed for a
               designated pecuniary purpose or “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or
               maintaining or increasing position in [the] enterprise” [(the purpose
               element)].

        United States v. Manley, 52 F.4th 143, 147 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)).

        Before Thomas, this Court’s “crime of violence” analysis of predicate VICAR offenses

        started and ended with an evaluation of the fourth requirement, namely, whether the

        incorporated state or federal offense satisfied the requirements of the § 924(c) force clause.

        See, e.g., id. at 148 (“To properly charge a VICAR assault, . . . the government must

        identify a specific state or federal law that the defendant violated by engaging in the

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        conduct underpinning the VICAR offense.”); United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 264

        (4th Cir. 2019). Had we followed that approach in this case, we would have concluded

        that the incorporated offense of assault with a deadly weapon under North Carolina law,

        N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1), which can be committed with “culpable negligence,” does

        not satisfy the mens rea requirement for a “crime of violence” under the § 924(c) force

        clause. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding

        that a similar North Carolina assault offense, like “any of the different forms of North

        Carolina assault,” can be proved with a mens rea of culpable negligence); Borden v. United

        States, 593 U.S. 420, 444 (2021) (plurality opinion).

               In Thomas, however, we became the first of our sister circuits to rely on the final

        element of a substantive VICAR assault offense, namely, the purpose element, to establish

        the mens rea necessary for a predicate VICAR assault offense to qualify as a “crime of

        violence” under § 924(c). 87 F.4th at 273–74. We also held, citing United States v. Keene,

        955 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2020), that for every charge of VICAR assault with a dangerous

        weapon the government must prove as an element the enumerated federal offense of

        “assault with a dangerous weapon.” 87 F.4th at 274. I set forth below my concerns with

        both of these points.

                                                    A.

               Initially, I disagree that the purpose element of the VICAR statute necessarily

        satisfies the mens rea requirement under Borden. In my view, this reading contradicts the

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        textual requirements of the force clause and, as a result, improperly categorizes as “crimes

        of violence” offenses that otherwise would not qualify as such under Borden.

               To provide context for the mens rea required for a § 924(c) crime of violence under

        the force clause, I first outline the Supreme Court’s holding in Borden. There, the Court

        held that under the materially identical § 924(e) force clause, an offense does not qualify

        as a “violent felony” if the offense can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. 1 593

        U.S. at 429. Like the § 924(c) force clause, a violent felony under § 924(e) must have “as

        an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

        another.” Id. at 424 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).

               Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the parties in Borden agreed that the term

        “use” in the § 924(e) force clause requires the “‘volitional’ or ‘active’ employment of

        force.” Id. at 430 (quoting Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 692–94 (2016)). But

        the parties disputed the meaning of the phrase “against the person of another” (the “against”

        clause). Id. at 430, 443. The defendant argued that the “against” clause requires that the

        volitional force be directed at an intended target, while the government argued that the

        clause refers merely to the recipient of the force. Id. at 430.

               1
                 The primary difference between the force clause in § 924(c) and the § 924(e) force
        clause is that the § 924(c) force clause also applies to crimes against property. Compare
        18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (defining a “crime of violence” as a felony having “as an element
        the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
        of another” (emphasis added)), with id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(1) (defining a violent felony as an
        offense having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
        against the person of another”). Since the Supreme Court issued Borden, we have applied
        the Court’s holding to the § 924(c) force clause. See, e.g., Manley, 52 F.4th at 147.
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               The Court adopted the defendant’s interpretation, reasoning that the term “against”

        refers to the “conduct’s conscious object” and, thus, that the “against” clause incorporates

        a required mens rea greater than recklessness. Id. at 430–31. In support of its conclusion,

        the Court in Borden provided helpful scenarios comparing the conduct of three individuals

        who, with varying degrees of mental state, strike a pedestrian while driving a car.

               In the Court’s description, the first driver purposefully aims the car at the pedestrian,

        desiring to hit him. Id. at 432. The second driver sees the pedestrian in his path but speeds

        ahead anyway, knowing that the car will hit the pedestrian. Id. And the third driver, late

        to work, recklessly runs a red light and hits a pedestrian whom he did not see. Id.

               The Court explained that the first two drivers “consciously deployed the full force

        of an automobile at another person” and thus “used physical force against the person of

        another” within the meaning of the force clause. Id. According to the Court, the third

        driver caused the same harm, namely, “making contact with another person,” and

        endangered others by consciously disregarding the real risk of that harm. Id. However,

        the Court explained that the third driver had not used force “against” another person within

        the meaning of the force clause, because his conduct was “not opposed to or directed at

        another.” Id. (emphasis added).

               Borden thus establishes that a predicate “crime of violence” under the materially

        identical § 924(c) force clause must involve force that not only is volitional but, also, is

        consciously directed at a target. Id. at 430–32; Thomas, 87 F.4th at 270 (explaining that

        Borden applies to a “crime of violence” analysis under § 924(c)); see Somers v. United

        States, 15 F.4th 1049, 1053 (11th Cir. 2021) (certification order) (explaining that pursuant

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        to Borden, a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) requires “both the general intent to

        volitionally take the action of using, attempting to use, or threat[en]ing to use force and

        something more: that the defendant direct the action at a target, namely another person”

        (emphasis added)). In other words, the predicate offense must require both that the

        individual actively employ the force that resulted in the harm, and that the individual direct

        that action at an intended target with a mens rea greater than recklessness. See Borden,

        593 U.S. at 430–32.

               Turning to the mens rea required under the purpose element of the VICAR statute,

        to satisfy this element the government must show that the defendant committed the assault

        for “a designated pecuniary purpose” or “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or

        maintaining or increasing position in [the] enterprise.” Manley, 52 F.4th at 147 (quoting

        18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)). We have explained that the government need not prove a “nexus”

        between the offense and the racketeering activity to satisfy this “general purpose”

        requirement, and that the government can prove this element by showing that the defendant

        committed the incorporated state or federal offense “because he knew it was expected of

        him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of

        that membership.” United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 927 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation

        omitted).

               In my view, the mens rea required under the force clause thus differs from the mens

        rea required under the purpose element in that the latter does not require a showing that the

        defendant knowingly directed force at a target. To illustrate this distinction, consider a

        defendant riding in a car late at night who sees a rival gang member’s empty car parked on

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        a deserted street in the defendant’s gang’s territory. The defendant fires a “warning shot”

        out his car’s window. As he passes the empty car, the defendant sees that the bullet has hit

        and injured a rival gang member, whom the defendant had not seen standing nearby. When

        the defendant returns to his gang’s headquarters, he brags to his superiors that he shot the

        rival gang member.

               In that scenario, the defendant purposefully fired the gun, but he did not

        purposefully hit the individual he had not seen. Instead, in firing the gun and injuring a

        person, the defendant “pa[id] insufficient attention to the potential application of force”

        and “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk.” Borden, 593 U.S. at

        427, 432. In other words, the defendant in this example recklessly applied force to an

        individual, rather than directing force at a target.

               Nevertheless, under our precedent, the defendant likely committed the assault “for

        the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in [the] enterprise,”

        as required to satisfy the purpose element of a substantive VICAR offense. Manley, 52

        F.4th at 147 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)); United States v. Umaña, 750 F.3d 320, 335

        (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that facts supporting the purpose element may include activity

        that occurs after commission of the crime, such as a defendant who “return[s] to . . .

        headquarters to boast about his exploits with a mind toward advancement”). In my view,

        as illustrated by the above scenario, proof of a “gang-related motive” under the purpose

        element does not, of itself, establish that the defendant consciously directed any force

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        “against” a target, as required to qualify that offense as a § 924(c) “crime of violence.”

        Borden, 593 U.S. at 430–31. 2

                                                     B.

               Although this Court’s conclusion in Thomas regarding the purpose element resolves

        the merits of Kinard’s appeal, I briefly address the additional conclusion in Thomas that

        for every charge of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon the government must prove

        as an element the enumerated federal offense of assault with a dangerous weapon. 87 F.4th

        at 274. The government also made this argument in the present case and, in my view, both

        the government’s argument here and our holding in Thomas undermine the plain text of

        the VICAR statute.

               18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) provides:

               Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise
               or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged
               in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or
               maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering

               2
                I acknowledge that the enumerated federal offenses reflect the types of crimes that
        society generally considers to be “violent.” And in many cases, conduct that can be
        prosecuted under VICAR will also constitute a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Indeed,
        when Congress enacted the VICAR statute, Congress may have intended that VICAR
        crimes generally would qualify as “crime[s] of violence” under the broader reach of the
        § 924(c) residual clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (including as a “crime of violence”
        any felony that, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
        person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense”). But
        the Supreme Court since has invalidated that provision, leaving the force clause as the only
        means for a predicate offense to qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Davis,
        139 S. Ct. at 2324. And in my view, it is not this Court’s prerogative to artificially expand
        the scope of the force clause to cover offenses that no longer qualify as “crime[s] of
        violence” after Davis. See United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2023 (2022) (rejecting
        a broad reading of the force clause because “it would only wind up effectively replicating
        the work formerly performed by the residual clause, collapsing the distinction between
        them, and perhaps inviting similar constitutional questions along the way”).
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               activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon,
               commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to
               commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of
               any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be
               punished.

        18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) (emphasis added). Under a natural reading of this provision, the

        modifier “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States” qualifies each

        enumerated federal offense. See Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (2021)

        (explaining that the series-qualifier canon of statutory construction “generally reflects the

        most natural reading of a sentence”); Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 352 (2016)

        (suggesting that this canon would apply to a “simple and parallel” list of items that are

        “often cited together”). Thus, the phrase “assaults with a dangerous weapon” simply

        identifies the relevant generic federal offense and does not add an element of proof to the

        VICAR crime charged in the indictment. See Manley, 52 F.4th at 148 (“[T]he government

        must identify a specific state or federal law that the defendant violated by engaging in the

        conduct underpinning the VICAR offense.”).

               Consistent with this plain meaning of the statute, in our prior cases addressing

        VICAR offenses we generally have not identified the enumerated federal offense as a

        separate element. See United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1003 (4th Cir. 1994); see also

        Zelaya, 908 F.3d at 926–27; United States v. Simmons, 11 F.4th 239, 271 (4th Cir. 2021).

        In Thomas, however, this Court, citing Keene, stated that “one element of a VICAR

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        conviction is that the defendant committed the enumerated federal offense.” 3 See 87 F.4th

        at 274 (citing Keene, 955 F.3d at 393); id. at 272–73 (outlining the elements of a VICAR

        assault offense).

               In my view, our decision in Keene does not bear on whether there is a separate

        generic offense element. In that case, we considered an interlocutory appeal after the

        district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss three substantive VICAR charges.

        955 F.3d at 392. On appeal, we were asked to decide whether the elements of the

        incorporated state offense for the VICAR assault charges must “categorically match” the

        elements of the “enumerated federal offense” of assault with a dangerous weapon. Id. We

        rejected the elements-to-elements comparison of the categorical approach in that context,

        and instead held that a defendant may be convicted of VICAR assault “when, by his

        conduct, he ‘assaults’ another person with a dangerous weapon ‘in violation of’ the state

        law charged in the indictment.” Id. at 398 (emphasis added).

               Addressing the effect of the enumerated federal offenses, we explained that the

        defendant’s “presently charged conduct” must “constitute an assault under federal law,

               3
                  We also stated in Manley that the third “element” of a substantive VICAR assault
        offense is “that the defendant have committed an assault ‘with a dangerous weapon.’”
        Manley, 52 F.4th at 147. But in accordance with this Court’s understanding of VICAR,
        for the fourth element we stated that “the assault [must] have violated state or federal law.”
        Id. Nowhere in that decision did we suggest that the state or federal assault also must
        violate a common-law version of that offense. Id. Indeed, we explicitly declined the
        defendant’s invitation to consider the mens rea required for “VICAR assault” in lieu of the
        elements of the incorporated state assault offense. Id. at 148; see also id. at 152 (Niemeyer,
        J., writing separately) (explaining that the defendant had pleaded guilty to “the commission
        of VICAR assault . . . , the elements of which included violations of” the incorporated state
        offense).
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        while simultaneously also violating a state law.” Id. at 397. In other words, even though

        the government did not need to prove as an element generic assault, the defendant’s actual

        conduct had to fall within the definition of that enumerated federal offense. We did not

        consider whether the enumerated federal offense of “assault” created a separate element of

        a substantive VICAR conviction, nor did we consider whether the VICAR statute requires

        a “‘look through’ approach” for a § 924(c) “crime of violence” analysis. See 955 F.3d at

        393; Thomas, 87 F.4th at 271 (citing Keene, 955 F.3d at 393).

               Our holding in Keene, when understood in its proper context, is limited to permitting

        a defendant to challenge a substantive VICAR charge by arguing that the conduct alleged

        in the indictment falls outside the generic definition of the enumerated federal offense in

        the VICAR statute. 4 Neither Thomas nor the present case involved any such challenge to

        a substantive VICAR charge. Rather, in both cases we were asked to address the validity

        of a § 924(c) conviction. When presented with such a question, we ignore the actual

        conduct underpinning the predicate VICAR assault offense and examine only the elements

               4
                 The Supreme Court enunciated a similar principle when it analyzed an earlier
        federal racketeering statute that also listed certain enumerated offenses “by reference to
        state law.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (the Travel Act); Johnson v. United States, 64 F.4th 715, 723
        (6th Cir. 2023). In United States v. Nardello, the Court considered whether the Travel
        Act’s prohibition on travel in interstate commerce with intent to further “extortion . . . in
        violation of the laws of the State in which the [crime is] committed,” applied to extortionate
        conduct classified as “blackmail” under the applicable state law. 393 U.S. 286, 287 (1969).
        In holding that the Act applied to such extortionate conduct, the Supreme Court explained
        that the proper inquiry was “not the manner in which States classify their criminal
        prohibitions,” but “whether the particular State involved prohibits the extortionate activity
        charged.” Id. at 295. Turning to the Travel Act charges in that case, the Supreme Court
        concluded that the defendants’ conduct fell within the generic term of “extortion,” as used
        in the Travel Act, because “the indictment encompasse[d] a type of activity generally
        known as extortionate.” Id. at 295–96.
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        of that offense to determine whether it categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence.”

        Accordingly, our conclusion in Keene does not bear on the distinct categorical analysis

        required in this case or in Thomas.

                                                      II.

               When Congress decided not to incorporate the phrase “crime of violence” in every

        enumerated federal offense in the VICAR statute, Congress established a statutory scheme

        that allows for potentially meaningful differences between substantive VICAR crimes and

        “crime[s] of violence” under § 924(c). We have long recognized that it is Congress’s

        prerogative to determine under what conditions an individual will be subject to a

        consecutive mandatory minimum sentence under § 924(c), and I am troubled by our

        elimination in Thomas of any distinction that Congress intended to create between certain

        substantive VICAR offenses and § 924(c) “crime[s] of violence.” Accordingly, although

        we are bound by Thomas in the present case, I otherwise would have reversed the district

        court’s judgment on the basis that no element of assault with a dangerous weapon under

        18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3), in violation of the North Carolina statutory crime of assault with a

        deadly weapon, N.C. Gen Stat. § 14-33(c)(1), requires a sufficiently culpable mens rea to

        meet the requirements of the § 924(c) force clause.

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