Court Opinion

ID: 9399500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 10:08:31.280082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.325852
License: Public Domain

In the
                   Court of Appeals
           Second Appellate District of Texas
                    at Fort Worth
                  ___________________________

                       No. 02-21-00106-CR
                  ___________________________

                 BINH HUNG NGUYEN, Appellant

                                   V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS

               On Appeal from the 396th District Court
                      Tarrant County, Texas
                    Trial Court No. 1643148D

Before Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.; and Lee Gabriel (Senior Justice, Retired,
                       Sitting by Assignment)
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Binh Hung Nguyen appeals his conviction and sentence for his third

driving while intoxicated offense.     Nguyen pleaded guilty with no plea bargain

agreement. He elected to go to the trial court for punishment. The trial court

sentenced Nguyen to imprisonment for five years in the Institutional Division of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Nguyen appeals his conviction and sentence

claiming, in three issues, that he does not understand or speak English and that the

trial court erred by failing to sua sponte appoint an interpreter. We affirm.

                                 I. BACKGROUND1

      Nguyen was arrested for driving while intoxicated on May 14, 2020.           He

appeared before a magistrate on the same day and it was determined that he was

indigent. Nguyen was appointed an attorney to represent him. His bond was set at

$3,500 with bond conditions.       Nguyen signed the form acknowledging that he

understood his rights and that he had received his bond conditions. He was indicted

on June 25, 2020, for the offense of driving while intoxicated. The indictment

contained a felony repetition enhancement alleging two prior convictions for driving

while intoxicated and a repeat offender notice alleging a prior conviction for

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. A bond was posted on August 31, 2020.

      1
        Because this opinion deals only with Nguyen’s claim that the trial court should
have appointed an interpreter, we will dispense with a discussion of the factual
allegations that led to the charges.

                                           2
While on bond, Nguyen was supervised by Brandon Velasco, who at the time was a

pre-trial officer for the Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections

Department. A violation report alleged Nguyen failed to abide by the terms of his

bond conditions and his bond was held insufficient, which resulted in Nguyen’s going

back to jail.

       The record reflects that while in jail awaiting trial, Nguyen spoke to the trial

court on three occasions. Since this was in the midst of the COVID-19 restrictions, it

appears that the first appearance before the trial court was by Zoom.          Nguyen

appeared in person before the trial court on June 14, 2021. At that time, Nguyen’s

counsel explained to him the three remaining options he had to resolve his case—

accept the State’s offer of four years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

plead guilty and go open to the judge, or go to a jury trial. Nguyen expressed that he

wanted a three-year sentence instead. The trial judge then entered the conversation

and asked Nguyen if he remembered that they had previously discussed his case: “Do

you remember that, when we were on the TV?” Nguyen replied that he did. The trial

court explained to Nguyen: “The last time we were on the TV they offered you a

three-year deal and you turned it down. You didn’t - - you said you didn’t want it. So

when they – now it’s not three. It’s four.” The trial court went on to discuss the

other available options—a jury trial or an open plea—at which time Nguyen asked

again if three years was available. When told by the court that “[i]t’s not available

from the State,” Nguyen appeared to ask the prosecutor if he could still offer three

                                           3
years. The trial court redirected the conversation indicating that the prosecutor “can’t

talk to [him] while [he has] a lawyer.” Soon thereafter Nguyen’s counsel asked him if

he wanted to talk to counsel privately and Nguyen said he did.

      When Nguyen and his counsel returned to court that same day, Nguyen was

asked whether he wanted to plead guilty and have the trial judge assess punishment.

Nguyen replied affirmatively.     The trial court then went through certain plea

admonishments in open court and asked if he was a citizen of the United States. That

question was also answered affirmatively. Counsel was asked if Nguyen was mentally

competent, and counsel responded that Nguyen was competent to stand trial. At no

time before his actual plea of guilty did Nguyen or his counsel ever state or even

allude that Nguyen could not understand or speak the English language. When asked

how he pleaded to the driving while intoxicated offense as alleged, Nguyen pleaded

“[g]uilty.” When asked if he was previously convicted in 2013, he answered “[y]es.”

The court accepted Nguyen’s pleas and reset the case for a punishment hearing.

Before recessing, however, the trial judge asked Nguyen if he had any questions.

Nguyen responded, “I don’t have no questions. I want two year or three year if you

can do.”

      Nguyen appeared before the trial court for the third time for his sentencing

hearing on June 29, 2021. The State’s only witness was Velasco, the community

supervision officer who had supervised Nguyen while he was out on bond. Velasco

testified that, due to COVID-19 restrictions, he only spoke to Nguyen by phone at

                                           4
first.   He said he had difficulty getting Nguyen to cooperate to schedule his

appointment with Smart Start to get his “breathalyzer.” Velasco further explained

that once the appointment occurred, he was advised that Nguyen was “rude and

uncooperative” with the personnel at Smart Start and that they had to ask him to

leave without obtaining the device. Velasco stated that Nguyen had been rude and

uncooperative with him as well, but he never testified to having any difficulty

speaking with Nguyen or understanding his English.

         The defense called Nguyen’s brother—Long Nguyen (Long)—as the first

witness. Long testified that he and his brother had immigrated to the United States

from Vietnam in 1989. He explained that Nguyen was 17 or 18 years old at the time

and that he was 49 or 50 at the time of the hearing. He further explained that one of

the first things that the brothers did upon arriving in the United States was to attend

English language classes.   During his testimony, Long described Nguyen’s work

history, the composition of his family, and his struggles with drug abuse. Long never

testified or even alluded to any difficulty Nguyen had with speaking or understanding

the English language.

         Defense counsel then called Nguyen as a witness. Neither Nguyen nor his

attorney requested an interpreter for Nguyen, and he never stated he could not

understand any question asked. Nguyen testified that he attended Carter-Riverside

High School after coming to Fort Worth and that upon graduation, he furthered his

education at the south campus of Tarrant County Junior College (TCJC). He also

                                          5
described taking English language classes at TCJC. Nguyen never responded to a

question asked by his counsel or the prosecutor with any type of response indicating

he was having difficulty understanding or answering the question.

      Upon completion of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial judge

found Nguyen guilty of the offense of driving while intoxicated, as alleged in the

indictment, and found that Nguyen had been previously convicted of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon, as alleged in the indictment. The trial judge assessed

Nguyen’s sentence at five years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice and appellate counsel was appointed.2

      In three issues, Nguyen argues that the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte

appoint a foreign-language interpreter 1) was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion;

2) deprived him of fundamental due process; and 3) violated his constitutional right to

confront witnesses.

                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Undoubtedly, language is the primary means of communication in a legal

proceeding, and the participants’ ability to understand and communicate that language

is critical to the proceeding’s fairness. Appellate courts must apply an abuse of

discretion standard in reviewing whether the trial judge was told or had actual

      2
       This court abated this appeal when a brief was not timely filed by appellate
counsel for Nguyen and ordered a hearing in the trial court. New appellate counsel
was appointed for Nguyen and the appeal was reinstated.

                                          6
knowledge of the defendant’s inability to understand the proceedings to be able to

assist in his own defense and thus had a duty to sua sponte appoint an interpreter.

Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Panchol v. State, No. 02-

12-00228-CR, 2013 WL 3874763, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2013, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because the proper handling of the

issue of the need for translation “hinges on a variety of factors, including the

defendant’s knowledge of English and the complexity of the proceedings and

testimony, the trial judge, who is in direct contact with the defendant, must be given

wide discretion.” Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 502–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(quoting Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1989)). We will not

second guess the trial court if its decision lies within the zone of reasonable

disagreement.   See Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(admission of hearsay evidence); Garcia v. State, 210 S.W.2d 574, 600 (Tex. Crim. App.

1948) (determination of whether interpreter was necessary); Abdygapparova v. State,

243 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d) (same).

                      III. TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETION

      Under Article 38.30 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, an interpreter

must be provided if the trial court is “aware of the defendant’s language barrier.”

Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 38.30. If the trial court is aware the defendant does not understand English,

there is “an independent duty to ensure that the proceedings are interpreted for the

                                           7
defendant, absent the defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver.”                  Garcia,

149 S.W.3d at 144. The trial court may become aware that the defendant does not

understand “either by being informed of it by one or both parties or by noticing the

problem sua sponte.” Franqui v. State, No. 03-08-00028-CR, 2009 WL 280981, at *1

(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 6, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      Nguyen acknowledges in his brief that neither he nor his counsel “ever told the

trial court about [his] language barrier, directly or indirectly, or that [Nguyen] could

not participate in the proceedings due to an inability [to] understand.” Thus, he

argues the trial court had a sua sponte duty to appoint an interpreter because the

“evidence clearly rises to the level of giving fair notice to the trial court that [Nguyen]

was so impaired as to require assistance in understanding or participating.” Nguyen

further acknowledges that he signed plea admonishments and waivers that stated that

he could understand English. Despite that concession, Nguyen argues that because

he did not understand what the plea admonishments and waivers said, he could not

have understood that he was forfeiting such a valuable right.

                                A. PLEA HEARING

      Nguyen argues that certain exchanges at the plea hearing were sufficient to put

the court on notice that an interpreter should be appointed for him. When Nguyen

appeared on June 14, 2021, for the first in-person hearing before the trial court, he

had been residing in the United States for over 30 years and was 49 years old. The

trial court reminded Nguyen that they had talked before on Zoom, and Nguyen stated

                                            8
he recalled that occurring. The trial court was aware that the indictment alleged that

Nguyen had been a defendant in three previous court proceedings. On appeal,

Nguyen claims that the following exchange between Nguyen, his counsel, and the trial

court was the “first” indication that an interpreter was needed:

      THE COURT: Okay. The purpose of this hearing is to tell me what the
      status is of plea negotiations. So Mr. Russo.

      MR. RUSSO: Sir, I have a few options for you today. The State’s offer
      to resolve your case is four years in the Texas Department of
      Corrections, or you can plead guilty and go open punishment to the
      judge, or we have a trial setting for July 12. That’s open to you as well if
      you’d like a trial. Those are the three options that are in front of you
      today, sir.

      THE COURT: You’ve communicated that to him?

      THE DEFENDANT: Can I sign three?

      Nguyen argues that the response “Can I sign three?” makes no sense in this

context. Nguyen fails to mention or consider the colloquy between the trial court and

Nguyen that immediately followed this alleged nonsensical question by Nguyen, as

well as what occurred in the previous proceeding:

      THE COURT: Let me explain this. We have been talking to you
      previously about your case. Do you remember that when we were on
      the TV?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

      THE COURT: Okay. The last time we were on the TV they offered
      you a three-year deal and you turned it down. You didn’t - - you said
      you didn’t want it. So when they - - now it’s not three. It’s four. Or
      you could plead guilty and ask me to assess punishment or you can have
      a trial.

                                           9
            If you ask me to assess punishment, I can go anywhere within the
      range of punishment. I can give you a two-year sentence. . . .

      Contrary to Nguyen’s argument, his question concerning the three-year offer

makes complete sense. Nguyen was referring to the previous offer by the State.

Throughout the proceeding on June 14, 2021, Nguyen was trying to negotiate a lower

offer than the four years the State was offering on that date:

      THE COURT: So that’s where we stand. You had three, you turned it
      down. Now they are offering you four. You want three. That’s not
      available.

      THE DEFENDANT: No more available?

      THE COURT: It’s not available from the State.

      THE DEFENDANT: Can you do - -

      THE COURT: He can’t talk to you while you have a lawyer.

From this exchange, it is clear that Nguyen was remorseful that he did not take the

three years when it was available and was trying to get the offer restored by addressing

the prosecutor himself.     The trial court personally conversed with Nguyen and

observed him processing the situation and trying to take the situation in his own

hands. After this conversation, Nguyen said he wanted to talk to his attorney about

the remaining options.

      When the proceeding resumed on the record, Nguyen had made the decision to

plead guilty and ask the court to assess punishment. During the private discussion

                                           10
with his attorney, Nguyen and his counsel signed plea paperwork that stated the

following:

       WRITTEN WAIVERS OF DEFENDANT—JOINED BY
       ATTORNEY
       Comes now BINH HUNG NGUYEN, in open, court, joined by my
       attorney and states:
       (A)I am able to read the English language. I fully understand each of the
           above written plea admonishments given by the Court and I have no
           questions. If I am unable to read the English language, then my
           attorney or an interpreter for my attorney has read this entire
           document to me in my own language and I fully understand the
           entire document, as well as each of the above written plead
           admonishments given by the Court and I have no questions.

Nguyen initialed the appropriate portion of the form acknowledging he was a United

States citizen and signed the waiver form. Immediately thereafter his counsel signed

the following certification:

       I have fully reviewed and explained the above and foregoing court
       admonishments, rights, and waivers, as well as the following judicial
       confession to the Defendant. I am satisfied that the Defendant is legally
       competent and has intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his
       rights and will enter a guilty plea understanding the consequences
       thereof. . . .

       The State argues that, under Marin v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals

categorized the right to an interpreter as a category-two right which must be waived

“plainly, freely, and intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record.”

851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Garcia 149 S.W.3d at 144. Although the

State concedes Nguyen never expressly waived his right to an interpreter, it argues

that by signing a form stating he was able to read English and based on his answers to

                                          11
the trial court’s questions during the actual plea, Nguyen did expressly waive the right

to an interpreter.    During Nguyen’s plea, which followed Nguyen’s requested

opportunity to talk to his lawyer, the trial court and Nguyen had the following

discussion:

      THE COURT: I have written plea admonishments, some papers right
      here - -

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: -- that I want to ask you about.

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      THE COURT: It’s my understanding that you want to plead guilty and
      have me assess punishment; is that right?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: And that’s what these papers, these plea admonishments
      tell me.

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: And so everything in these plea admonishments is true;
      is that right?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      THE COURT: Okay. Are you a United States citizen?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

      THE COURT: And he’s mentally competent?

      MR. JOHNSON: He is, Your Honor.

                                          12
       THE COURT: Okay. It’s my understanding that you’re going to plead
       guilty and tell me that it’s true that you have this prior conviction for
       aggravated assault back in 2013?

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

       THE COURT: And then that way we will come back and have a
       sentencing hearing to where I would decide what punishment you get
       for this DWI?

       THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

       Nguyen contends that he did not expressly waive his right to an interpreter and

that this exchange should have again put the court on notice of his language barrier

because his answers were only “yes” or “no” answers. The questions themselves did

not require or call for an answer of any greater length, and each answer was

appropriate to the inquiry. While the exchanges between Nguyen and the trial court

do not show an express waiver of his right to an interpreter, to this point, they also do

not show that the trial court was aware that Nguyen had any difficulty understanding

English or communicating his answers. See Goukasian v. State, Nos. 02-13-00018-CR,

02-13-00019-CR, 2014 WL 4656655, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 18, 2014,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Abdygapparova, 243 S.W.3d at

201.

       Finally, Nguyen asserts that after the trial court accepted his pleas, he made a

statement showing he did not understand that a punishment hearing would be held at

another time.

                                           13
      THE COURT: All right. Then I’ll accept your pleas. And then we will
      schedule a date that’s good for everybody --

      ....

      THE COURT: -- to where we can do the sentencing. . . .

             All right. Do you have any questions at this point?

      THE DEFENDANT: I don’t have no questions. I want two year or
      three year if you can do.

      THE COURT: I don’t know. We’ll talk about it . . . at that time. . . .

Contrary to Nguyen’s assertion on appeal, his comment to the trial court specifying

the sentence he wanted showed Nguyen clearly understood the procedure that was

taking place. When he learned he could not receive the sentence he wanted from the

prosecutor, he instead directed his request to the person who was going to be making

the decision at the sentencing hearing.

      The evidence in the plea hearing does not support Nguyen’s contention that

the trial court should have appointed an interpreter sua sponte. The trial court was in

the best position to observe Nguyen and his ability to communicate in English.

Indeed, the trial court conversed with Nguyen and observed his knowing pursuit of

the sentence he desired. Evidence that a person is capable of communicating in

English is sufficient to support a trial court’s denial of an interpreter. Abdygapparova,

243 S.W.3d at 201; see Aguilar Lamberto v. State, No. 02-07-070-CR, 2008 WL 2168122

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 24, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not designated for

publication). The evidence in the plea hearing does not show that the trial court was

                                           14
or should have been aware that Nguyen was unable to understand the English

language.

                         B. SENTENCING HEARING

      Nguyen argues that there was “[a] second opportunity for the court to sua

sponte appoint a translator . . . at the punishment hearing.” He references his

brother’s testimony in support of his position that the court should have been aware

of Nguyen’s language barrier. At the sentencing hearing, Long testified that he and

his brother came to the United States in 1989. Long also explained that “the first

thing” they did was take English as a second language classes.

      Nguyen also testified at the sentencing hearing concerning his arrival in the

United States.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] And you came to the United States when you were
      about 17 years old approximately; is that correct?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] Yes, sir.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] And what – did you attend school when you came
      to the United States?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] High school it was River -- Carter-Riverside.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] Carter-Riverside High School here in Fort Worth?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] Yes.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] Did you have any further education after that?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] Yes.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] What was that?

                                          15
      [THE DEFENDANT:] TCJC -- TCJC south campus.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] What did you study there, do you remember?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] I typically do noncredit and credit for math
      and ESL.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] Have you had some problems with your mental
      health through the years?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] Yeah, I got a mental health right now. I’m --
      I take a pill right now.

      [MR. JOHNSON:]         Do you -- have you received Social Security
      disability?

      [THE DFENDANT:] Yes, I do.

      [MR. JOHNSON:] For your mental condition?

      [THE DEFENDANT:] Yes, I do.

      Nguyen argues that the evidence showing he came from Vietnam and took

ESL classes should have “clearly indicate[d] to the trial court that there may have been

a language barrier.” While he does not argue that he was incompetent, he does argue

that “[t]he mental health issues suggest why it might have been more difficult for

[Nguyen] to learn or comprehend English.”

      What the evidence indicates is that Nguyen recognized that he had a language

barrier at the age of 17 when he arrived in the United States and took action to

correct that. It does not prove he had a language barrier 30 years later nor should it

have put the trial court on notice that such a problem existed. Counsel for Nguyen

                                          16
unequivocally expressed his opinion to the trial court that Nguyen was competent to

stand trial, and he does not raise that issue on appeal. Yet Nguyen argues that “[t]he

mental health issues suggest why it might have been more difficult for [Nguyen] to

learn or comprehend English.” Nguyen did not complain to the trial court that he did

not understand what was being said, nor did he indicate that he had any issue

understanding what he was being taught when taking classes in high school or at

TCJC. There was no request for an interpreter, by either Nguyen or his counsel.

Considering the record, there is ample evidence that Nguyen understood and

communicated in the English language sufficiently well, and the record reveals no

abuse of discretion by the trial court for failing to sua sponte appoint an interpreter.

See Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Vargas v. State,

627 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, no pet.). We overrule Nguyen’s

first issue.

                         IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

       In his second issue, Nguyen contends that the trial court’s failure to appoint an

interpreter deprived him of his right to due process. “It is well settled that if a

defendant . . . does not speak English well enough to understand the trial proceedings

or communicate with counsel, fundamental fairness and due process of law require

that an interpreter be provided to translate between English and the accused’s own

language.” Linton 275 S.W.3d at 500. We have held that the record reflects that

Nguyen understood the English language sufficiently to communicate with both his

                                          17
counsel and the trial court and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

failing to sua sponte appoint an interpreter. Thus, we also hold that the record does

not reflect that the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or a violation of Nguyen’s

due-process rights. See id. at 509. We overrule Nguyen’s second issue.

         In his third issue, Nguyen argues that the trial court’s failure to appoint an

interpreter deprived him of the fundamental right to confront his accusers. An

accused’s constitutional right to confront witnesses encompasses the right to have

trial proceedings interpreted to the accused in a language he can understand. Baltierra,

586 S.W.2d at 558; Cantu v. State, 993 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

1999, pet. ref’d). Again, we have held that the record from both the guilty plea

hearing and the sentencing hearing reveals nothing that would have put the trial court

on notice that Nguyen needed an interpreter. We further hold that Nguyen’s right to

confront witnesses against him was not violated. We overrule Nguyen’s third issue.

                                  V. CONCLUSION

         Having overruled Nguyen’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                      /s/ Lee Gabriel

                                                      Lee Gabriel
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 1, 2023

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