Court Opinion

ID: 9662602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:14:00.930467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.011103
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Justice COOPER.
I. DENIAL OF RIGHT TO TESTIFY.
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994), held that, assuming mental competency to make such a decision, a defendant is “the master of his own defense and pilot of the ship.” Id. at *202418. Counsel may have had good reasons for believing that Appellant should not take the stand in his own defense. However, her duty was to give Appellant her reasoned advice. The decision whether to accept or reject that advice ultimately belonged to Appellant — assuming his proposed testimony would not have been per-jurious. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir.1984) (“[A] defendant’s personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in his own behalf may not be waived by counsel as a matter of trial strategy.... It is equally clear, however, that a defendant has no constitutional right to testify perjuriously in his own behalf.”). Once the trial judge was informed of Appellant’s desire to testify, it was error to fail to inquire as to the accuracy of that information and, if accurate, to permit Appellant to testify. Ortega v. O’Leary, 843 F.2d 258, 261-62 (7th Cir.1988). Although Ortega found the error to be harmless because Ortega’s proposed testimony would have been cumulative of that of other witnesses, id. at 262, we, of course, do not know what Appellant’s testimony would have been. (Ortega was an appeal from a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.) Regardless, my view is that the right of a defendant to testify in his own behalf is so important as to withstand any “cumulative evidence” analysis.
Apart from what appellant would have testified to, his presence on the stand would have afforded him the opportunity to have the jury observe his demeanor and judge his veracity firsthand. As one Circuit Judge has noted, “The facial expressions of a witness may convey much more to the trier of facts than do the spoken words.”
United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Irvin, 450 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir.1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting)).
Nor do I agree that this case should be remanded for a retrospective hearing on voluntary waiver. Appellant’s attorney has already told the trial judge that Appellant wished to testify but that she would not allow him to take the stand. I cannot imagine Appellant testifying to the contrary on remand.
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF BREWSTER.
I agree with the Hayes analysis in the majority opinion. Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d 879 (2001). However, because this case is being remanded for a new trial, I would further note that the trial judge’s ruling on the proposed cross-examination of Brewster was incorrect. Brewster’s testimony in response to the Commonwealth’s proposed rehabilitation of Searight’s credibility, as preserved by avowal, would have been as follows:
Q. Were you aware that Mr. Searight went to prison for twenty years because of Mr. Crawley’s statements?
A. No, ma’am.
Q. That would make you not like someone very much, wouldn’t it?
A. Yes, ma’am.
Thus, Brewster’s testimony would not have been that Searight had expressed animosity towards Appellant because Appellant’s statements to the police had caused Searight to receive a twenty-year prison sentence. (In fact, no foundation had been laid for such testimony. KRE 613(a).) Brewster would have testified only that he, himself, “would ... not like someone very much” whose statements to the police had caused him to receive a twenty-year sentence. Of course, Brewster’s hypothetical animosity was not in issue. Thus, it was irrelevant, and the attempted rehabilitation should have been suppressed for that reason alone.
*203Furthermore, this alleged rehabilitation was, in fact, only additional impeachment. Searight had other reasons in addition to jealousy for testifying against Appellant. Of course, the Commonwealth’s real reason for this proposed inquiry was to inform the jury that Searight had received a twenty-year sentence for his participation in these crimes, ergo, Appellant should receive the same sentence. Searight did not even know that Appellant had received a twenty-year sentence. Thus, even if relevant, the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. KRE 403.
Accordingly, I concur only in the result reached by the majority opinion in this case.
GRAVES J., joins this concurring opinion.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins this concurring opinion as to Part II (Issue III in the majority opinion) only.