Court Opinion

ID: 9945216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 16:04:36.873144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.823574
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                       SAMUEL MCSMITH, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 23-0059
                               FILED 2-27-2024

         Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                       No. CR2018-153124-001
        The Honorable Tracy Renee Nadzieja, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Kevin M. Morrow
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Aaron J. Moskowitz
Counsel for Appellant
                          STATE v. MCSMITH
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1           Samuel McSmith appeals the trial court’s decision that he
violated probation and the subsequent order adding three more years to his
probation. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           In 2019, Samuel McSmith was charged with two counts of
aggravated driving under the influence. McSmith pled guilty to one charge
while the other was dismissed. McSmith was sentenced in accord with the
plea agreement, to eight months in prison, followed by three years of
probation. McSmith signed the “Uniform Conditions of Supervised
Probation” document, acknowledging he would, among other things,
“provide the [Adult Probation Department (“APD”)] safe, unrestricted
access to my residence and receive prior approval of the APD before
changing my residence” and would “reside in a residence approved by the
APD.” Both provisions were part of “Term 7” of the uniform conditions
document.

¶3             Once released from prison, McSmith moved into a shelter; he
left just two days later claiming it was unhealthy. McSmith returned to his
previous job located on 19th Avenue between Deer Valley and Pinnacle
Peak Road. To be close to work, he informed APD he would be residing at
the cross-streets of 19th Avenue and Deer Valley.

¶4           In June 2022, after many unsuccessful attempts to contact
McSmith where he claimed to be living, APD verbally disapproved of
McSmith living at the cross-streets of 19th Avenue and Deer Valley, giving
him a 30-day deadline to change his residence. Three weeks later, during a
meeting between McSmith and APD at its office, McSmith signed a
document acknowledging that he lived at the specified cross-streets of 19th

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                            STATE v. MCSMITH
                            Decision of the Court

Avenue and Deer Valley but directing him to contact and reside in a half-
way house or sober living home.

¶5           The following week, McSmith voluntarily telephoned APD,
informing his probation officer that he was at a hotel due to a medical
procedure. He invited the probation officer to visit him there.
Approximately two weeks later, APD petitioned to revoke probation, based
on a violation of Term 7, and requested a warrant for McSmith’s arrest.
McSmith turned himself in without incident.

¶6            After a witness violation hearing, the trial court found
McSmith violated Term 7 of the conditions of probation. McSmith was
subsequently reinstated on standard probation for an additional three
years. McSmith timely appealed. Under Article 2, Section 24, and Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-
4031, and 13-4033(A)(1), this Court has jurisdiction.

                               DISCUSSION

¶7            A trial court’s decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Sanchez, 19 Ariz. App. 253, 254 (1973). “This
court will uphold the superior court’s ‘finding that a probationer has
violated probation unless the finding is arbitrary or unsupported by any
theory of evidence.’” State v. Vaughn, 217 Ariz. 518, 521, ¶ 14 (App. 2008)
(quoting State v. Thomas, 196 Ariz. 312, 313, ¶ 3 (1999)).

¶8             Probation may be revoked when the defendant violates a
condition of his probation. A.R.S. § 13-901(C). The process for revocation of
probation is outlined in Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (collectively
“Rules”) 27 and requires that the probationer be provided a written copy of
the conditions and regulations. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.1(b). Proof of a
probation violation is established by a preponderance of the evidence. Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 27.8(b)(3). “To revoke a defendant’s probation, [i]t is enough for
the trial court to have a reason to believe that the individual is violating the
conditions of his probation or engaging in criminal practices[.]” State v.
Tatlow, 231 Ariz. 34, 39, ¶ 15 (App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶9            McSmith contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the trial court’s finding that he violated Term 7 of his probation.1 When

1 McSmith also contends he did not change his residence, maintaining that

he continued to reside at the cross-streets, clarifying his two-night stay at
the hotel was solely for a medical procedure. Since McSmith did not have

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                            STATE v. MCSMITH
                            Decision of the Court

evaluating challenges to probation revocations, this Court does not reweigh
evidence to determine its sufficiency but instead reviews only for the
presence of substantial evidence supporting the court’s determination. See
State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). Substantial evidence is “[m]ore
than a scintilla and is such proof as a reasonable mind would employ to
support the conclusion reached.” Id. (quoting State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546,
553 (1981)). Further, a term of probation is punishment for the commission
of a crime. State v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 584 (1977). “To remain at
liberty under a suspended sentence is not a matter of right but a matter of
[legislative] grace.” State v. Crowder, 103 Ariz. 264, 265 (1968) (quoting State
v. Maxwell, 97 Ariz. 162, 164 (1965)); accord State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 419
(1975). Compliance with probation terms is the responsibility of the
defendant. State v. Hulon, 16 Ariz. App. 429, 431 (1972).

¶10            The record establishes that, in accordance with the Rules,
McSmith was provided with “a written copy of the conditions and
regulations” in 2021. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.1(b). Term 7 of those conditions
required that McSmith’s residence be approved, and indeed, the location of
19th Avenue and Deer Valley had been approved as McSmith’s residence
until June 28, 2022. But APD orally revoked that approval and informed
McSmith he had 30-days to relocate to a half-way house or sober living
facility. This was his notice that he was in violation of Term 7.

¶11            Three weeks later, when McSmith met with APD, he was
provided resources for half-way houses and other sober living facilities, bus
passes and was again told that the location at which he had been staying
was no longer approved. He was provided written notice during this
meeting, curing any defect with the prior verbal notice. State v. Stotts, 144
Ariz. 72, 78 (1985) (establishing that providing probationer with written
conditions and probationer’s acknowledgement cured any unenforceability
of the conditions). McSmith’s probation officer testified that McSmith
contacted her to say he was staying in a motel—not a half-way house or
sober living facility as instructed. The probation officer further testified that
she understood that McSmith was residing at this motel and that it was not
an approved residence under the terms of his probation. For his part,
McSmith testified that he did not suggest, expressly or implicitly, that the
motel was his new residence. Nevertheless, the court found McSmith
violated Term 7 of his probation. Implicit in the court’s decision is its
resolution of the conflict between the evidence. Though McSmith

an approved residence, wherever he claims it was, as required by Term 7,
this Court need not address the issue of whether he changed his residence.

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                          STATE v. MCSMITH
                          Decision of the Court

adamantly contested it, his parole officer’s testimony presented sufficient
evidence to support a violation of Term 7. Guerra, 161 Ariz. at 293.

                             CONCLUSION

¶12         For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms the court’s order
that McSmith resume three years of probation.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: AA

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