Court Opinion

ID: 9736070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:42:29.192407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.093469
License: Public Domain

Larson, J.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s participation in or encouragement of the larceny committed by another to generate a jury *593question as to his guilt, and the trial court committed no error in submitting that issue to the jury. Section 688.1 of the 1962 Code, which provides that all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act, or aid or abet its commission, are subject to criminal liability as principals, long recognized by us as applicable to lookout eases, should not be disturbed by unreasonable evidentiary requirements. State v. Berger, 121 Iowa 581, 585, 96 N.W. 1094. The question involved in such matters is whether from all the evidence and from all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, the acts done by the defendant and the conduct of the defendant constituted aiding, assisting or abetting in the commission of the crime charged. His guilt or innocence must be determined upon the facts and permissible inference which may be drawn therefrom tending to show his part therein. State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 3 N.W.2d 611, and citations.
It is well established in most jurisdictions that a common purpose among two or more persons to commit a crime need not be shown by positive evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act and from defendant’s conduct before, at the time of, and after the commitment of the act. State v. Kneedy, supra; State v. Brown, 130 Iowa 57, 62-64, 106 N.W. 379; State v. Miller, 259 Iowa 188, 199, 142 N.W.2d 394, 401.
Our sole inquiry, then, in this controversy is whether the evidence of defendant’s acts and conduct was sufficient to raise an inference that he, along with another, acted as aids or lookouts for Klepke, who actually committed the larceny involved, and whether an inference of participation and encouragement was raised by his association, presence and acts at that time. In connection with this review we are reminded the evidence must be construed in a light most favorable to the State. Rule 344(f)2, Rules of Civil Procedure; State v. Miller, supra.
The evidence clearly showed the defendant, Wells and Klepke often associated at night and were observed at this time in and about the bus depot where the larceny was committed. They were seen together in the waiting room during the nights of both the 7th and 8th of March.
*594About 9:50 p.m. on the 7th of March a police officer observed Mr. Klepke walk behind the counter in the bus depot after he had come into the room with the defendant and Mr. Wells. He said, while Klepke obtained a pamphlet under the counter and read from it, Wells and defendant wandered around the room but did not sit down. A short time later all three left, going out the hotel entrance from which they had arrived. About 10:50 p.m. all three came back. This time “Wells and Daves sat in the waiting chairs for the customers and Klepke made a trip behind the counter and picked up another pamphlet. Mr. Daves was sitting in the second chair and Mr. Wells was sitting in the third chair * * *. Mr. Daves was sitting kind of turned in his chair with his face turned towards the north, or towards the entrance of the hotel, and Mr. Wells was sitting-facing to the south.” They stayed that way for approximately ten minutes, and Klepke occupied himself behind the counter and apparently read pamphlets. Daves and Wells conversed, but the witness could not hear what was said. After they left, other persons were also observed coming in and out of the waiting room, but only one bus driver went behind the counter and no one was near the cash drawers. At one o’clock in the morning Daves, Wells and Klepke returned. The latter had a newspaper which he spread on the end of the counter and appeared to read. The others wandered around “just a few minutes and left by the north entrance.” Klepke produced a screwdriver, iron fingers and two small pieces of wire. He walked around behind the counter and “with the screwdriver pried on the top drawer * * * and it was visible that he was prying on the drawer and using the iron fingers.” As though he had some warning, “Every time somebody walked by, he would put the stuff in his pocket * * * appearing to be reading the paper.” For twenty minutes “He would do this before people walking-through came into my view and he was always over there reading the newspaper or had the screwdriver out of sight when the customers walked through.” Klepke was behind' the counter about an hour and left about two a.m. “At about 20 to two #• * # Daves and Wells came into sight again. At this time, Mr. Klepke was standing behind the counter and had the screwdriver *595in his hand. He took the screwdriver and stuck it in the drawer and pushed up against the counter and gave them both a cigarette”. The witness said the screwdriver was visible over the top of the counter and that Klepke also gave defendant and Wells a small piece of paper which he could not identify. He said they talked a few minutes and Daves and Wells appeared to leave by the north entrance. Wells returned shortly and he and Klepke went to the rest room, remained there a minute or so, and then left by the north entrance. None of the three returned that night. Later it was determined money was missing from the cash drawers and a search for them was instituted. Substantially, these are the material circumstances revealed surrounding the actual commitment of the criminal offense charged.
Next let us examine the testimony as to defendant’s movements and relationships with Klepke and Wells prior to this occasion.
By defendant’s own admission and the testimony of Wells we learn that they were roommates, living in a hotel less than a block from the bus depot, that they were friends of Klepke and were often with him at night, that he bought them coffee and some meals when they were short of money. Wells testified, “On the night of March 6th and the morning of March 7th, I’d say that I was in the bus depot. I might have been in the bus depot on the night of the 5th and 6th. Mr. Klepke was there and if I was there, Daves was. Wherever I was, Daves was generally at.”
Officer Snider, of the Iowa City police force, testified he set up a watch on Friday evening, March 5th, extending into Saturday morning, that his observer called him at 3 a.m. Saturday and reported a possible suspect, and that he hurried to the scene. After he arrived at the depot he observed defendant and Wells walking through the waiting room and they went to the rest room, followed shortly by Mr. Klepke. They remained there a short time and Daves and Wells came out, and a few steps behind was Klepke. All left the area and were not seen again that night.
The next night, March 6, surveillance was commenced at 9 p.m. At about 11:30 p.m. Daves, Wells and Klepke entered the depot area together. He said Wells and Daves sat down in *596the chairs in the back row while Klepke was around behind the counter in the area where the cash was kept. During this period Daves and Wells were seated in chairs facing south toward the outside door, but Daves was looking back toward the hotel area entrance. Although it did not appear that these men were conversing at the time, Klepke was always out from behind the counter when a person coming into the area from the north appeared.
At about 1:30 on Sunday morning, March 7, all three again came into the depot. Daves took a position at the north side of the east end of the counter and Wells the south side. Klepke went around the counter to where the cash drawers were located. The officer testified, “At this time these two fellows were carrying on a conversation, one turning and listening and looking one way and the other looking the other way, and they both turned over and looked at Klepke in behind the counter at the cash drawers. Klepke was manipulating the drawers from where I could see him. They remained like this for a good ten to fifteen minutes.”
At about 3:30 a.m. Wells and Klepke again came in and Klepke spent considerable time working on the drawers. The officer started to enter the depot to apprehend Klepke, but changed his mind when he saw Wells “standing in the southeast corner of the large room” which had a bay window to the south. Anyone approaching the south entrance could be observed long before he entered the room itself. While defendant at that timq was not seen by the officer, from Wells’ admissions of their association above referred to, it seems clear the jury could find he was stationed at the north entrance protecting from a surprise visitor from that entrance. The nest morning a check of the cash revealed missing marked money from the cash drawers, and another surveillance was prepared for Sunday night.
The testimony further revealed that about 1:30 a.m. on Sunday Klepke was seen getting in his car in the 100 block of South Capitol Street near the bus depot and that “Mr. Wells and Mr. Daves were with Mr. Klepke in the early morning of March 8 when they left the scene together.” It further appears defendant and Wells then accompanied Klepke to Muscatine, *597Iowa, to look at a wrecked car he considered buying. When they returned to Iowa City, all were apprehended in Klepke’s ear, and a search of the car under a previously-obtained search warrant revealed implements on the floor of the back seat of the car like those used by Klepke in the larceny at the bus depot. It is hard to believe defendant’s contention that he did not know of the presence and their use by Klepke in the larceny.
At any rate it seems to me this evidence of acts, circumstances and associations before, at the time of, the crime, and thereafter, was more than sufficient to generate a jury question as to the participation of defendant in the crime charged. It created much more than mere suspicion, surmise or conjecture. If this does not support an inference of participation, the only hope for a conviction of a lookout participant is by confession or testimony of an accomplice, which under recent decisions seems to furnish little aid to the authorities in an effort to detect and convict those who aid and abet the commission of a crime.
These circumstances disclose much more than mere presence at the scene of a crime. Defendant was not an innocent bystander or one possessed of mere knowledge that another was committing a crime, which of course would be insufficient. State v. Mabbitt, 257 Iowa 1063, 1067, 135 N.W.2d 525, 528; State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630, 635, 118 N.W.2d 548, 551. In Fonza there was no evidence of any plan, confederacy or intent. Although here there is little direct evidence of these elements, there is ample circumstantial evidence thereof in this record. Knowledge or intent is seldom capable of direct proof, but we have often held it may be inferred from the proven surrounding circumstances. State v. Kneedy, supra, 232 Iowa 21, 28, 3 N.W.2d 611; State v. Van, 232 Iowa 34, 2 N.W.2d 748, 749, and citations; State v. Miller, supra. Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed. State v. Myers, 253 Iowa 271, 275, 111 N.W.2d 660; State v. Miller, supra; 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, sections 87 and 88; 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 91, page 830; Wharton’s Criminal Law, Volume 1, Twelfth Ed., sections 246, 256, 258.
A common purpose among two or more persons to commit *598a crime need not be shown by positive evidence, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act and from defendant’s conduct prior and subsequent thereto. Callies v. State, 157 Neb. 640, 61 N.W.2d 370, which cites and refers to State v. Kneedy, supra, with approval.
It is generally held, if one be outside of an enclosure watching to prevent surprise or for the purpose of keeping guard while his confederate is inside committing the felony, such constructive presence is sufficient to make him a principal. If all are engaged in a common plan for the execution of a crime, and all take part in the furtherance of a common design, all are liable as principals. In 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 88 (2) d, it is stated that while merely witnessing a crime, without intervention, does not make a person a party to its commission, unless his interference was a duty, or unless his noninterference was designed by him and operated as an encouragement to or protection for the perpetrator, when something is shown which indicates a design to encourage, incite, or in some manner afford aid or consent to the particular act by the bystander which will reasonably be regarded as an encouragement and protection, then a jury question as to his participation is produced. State v. Storms, 233 Iowa 655, 657, 10 N.W.2d 53.
It was not necessary, therefore, to prove that defendant actually participated in the acts constituting the offense if he watched for his companion in order to prevent surprise, the knowledge of which was calculated to give additional confidence to the actual perpetrator, Klepke. State v. Mickle, 199 Iowa 704, 202 N.W. 549. It was not necessary, as the majority seem to hold, that the State show an express agreement or understanding between these parties, nor is it necessary that a common purpose be shown by positive evidence. Its existence may and should be inferred from all the circumstances accompanying the doing of the act; in other words, preconcert or a community of purpose may be and was shown here by the circumstances.
Defendant’s activities at the bus depot, and close associations shown with Klepke before, at the time of, and after, the offense, were in my view inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis. See State v. Miller, supra, and State v. Sigman, 220 *599Iowa 146, 149, 261 N.W. 538. Under the facts and circumstances revealed by this evidence, an inference of participation as a lookout was not only permissible but required jury submission. Every link in the chain necessary to raise an inference of participation was established. Some substantive proof of guilt appears, but, above all, facts were proven which tend to establish the substantive facts of active participation. In State v. Myers, supra, 253 Iowa 271, 274, 111 N.W.2d 660, we said: “But any evidence, circumstantial or direct, must be sufficient to raise a fair inference of guilt.” Of course, evidence which generates nothing more than suspicion, speculation or conjecture is not sufficient, but the trial court and the jury, under unchallenged instructions, thought the evidence did meet that challenge. Although each ease of this kind must be decided upon its own record, I feel that to reverse this conviction would be a repudiation of the position we carefully considered and adopted in State v. Kneedy, supra, and followed in the recent case of State v. Miller, supra.
It is only where there is a total failure of proof in a criminal case to support a material allegation in the information, or the testimony adduced is of so weak or doubtful a character that conviction thereon cannot be sustained, that a court should direct a verdict of not guilty.
Therefore, I would hold the trial court did not err in submitting the issue of participation to the jury and would affirm the conviction.
Garfield, O. J., and Becker, J., join in this dissent.