Court Opinion

ID: 9570433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:11.663967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:51.778594
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
RICHARDSON, C.J.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority would reverse the trial court’s de novo computation of appellant’s losses at $5250, and uphold the original valuation of $18,200, as determined by the First Commission. The majority bases its decision on two conclusions of law:
(1) In the absence of express statutory authority, the Second Commission was without authority to re-certify losses as determined by the First Commission; and
(2) The State is equitably estopped from contesting and overturning the findings of the First Commission. The Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to review the findings of the two commissions, and its findings are moot.
I disagree. As to the first conclusion, I believe that administrative tribunals possess the inherent power of reconsideration of their judicial acts. Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 106-07, 71 A.2d 624, 627-28 (1950). This court may look for guidance to the courts of New York, which have found that administrative *632agencies possess an implied power to reconsider their decision in some instances, but have denied the existence of such powers in other cases. On the one hand, the power was held to be lacking to rescind approval of transfer of a liquor license or to rescind an order permitting redemption of property sold for taxes where a cloud on title would pall the property if reconsideration were permitted. People ex rel. Cochrane v. Wells, 11 Misc. 239, 32 N.Y.S. 973 (Sup. Ct. 1896); People ex rel. Chase v. Wemple, 144 N.Y. 478, 39 N.E. 397 (1895).
On the other hand, New York courts have balanced such consideration against “the grave consequences that might follow if a decision once made were to be considered beyond recall” or “the public interest and the supervisory nature of the administrative agency’s powers” which warranted the finding of an implied power to reconsider People ex rel. New York Fire Ins. Exchange v. Phillips, 203 App. Div. 13, 16, 196 N.Y.S. 202, 204 (3d Dept. 1922), rev’d on other grounds, 237 N.Y. 167, 142 N.E. 574 (1923); People ex rel. West Seneca v. Public Service Comm’n, 130 App. Div. 335, 340-42, 114 N.Y.S. 636, 639-40 (3d Dept. 1909), appeal dismissed, 195 N.Y. 562, 88 N.E. 1128 (1909); see Weiss, Administrative Reconsideration: Some Recent Developments in New York, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1262, 1271 (1953). These courts have found an implied power to reconsider absent express statutory grant or denial of such power where the latter considerations prevail.
The factual circumstances of an earlier New York decision, People ex rel. West Seneca v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, are analogous to those presented in the instant case. That case involved an April 30, 1907 decision of the New York Board of Railroad Commissioners concerning the number and location of railroad street crossings in West Seneca, N.Y. On July 1, the effective date of the Public Service Commissions Law, the Board of Railroad Commissioners was abolished and its powers *633and duties transferred to the Public Service Commission. On June 29, 1908, the Commission announced that it would rehear and review the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the Commission derived an implied power to reconsider from the railroad law. This statute by implication conferred on the Board the power to change its decision in respect to all matters within its jurisdiction. “The policy of the state was to vest extensive powers in the board of railroad commissioners in reference to these matters, and, if such board was without power to reconsider a matter simply because it had once reached a conclusion in reference thereto, its usefulness must have been seriously hampered, and the policy of the law largely thwarted.” People ex rel. West Seneca v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, 130 App. Div. at 342, 114 N.Y.S. at 640.
The New York Court of Appeals, writing in two 1919 decisions, set standards for a finding of the existence of an implied power to reconsider an administrative decision. Judge Cardozo, writing for the court in Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Hamilton, 226 N.Y. 241, 246, 123 N.E. 380, 382 (1919), found that a Board of Supervisors had the inherent power to rescind the allowance of a claim on the basis of a finding of error, because the Board “ought to have some opportunity to undo and correct an error apparent to themselves.” In People ex rel. Finnegan v. McBride, 226 N.Y. 252, 257-58, 123 N.E. 374, 376 (1919), the court ruled that a civil service commission, which' exercised a quasi-judicial function, possessed the implied power to vacate its own order by setting aside an eligible list if such list were the result of illegality, irregularity in vital matters, or fraud. The Finnegan standard has generally been followed in New York, and I would apply it to decide the instant case.
I also disagree with the majority’s opinion that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against *634the government in this case. The doctrine of equitable estoppel should not be applied to impair the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers of a state. This court has so held in the enforcement of police powers. Godbold v. Manibog, 36 Haw. 206, 214, rehearing denied, 36 Haw. 230 (1942). This rule has been expanded in other jurisdictions to the doctrine that the government cannot be estopped from collecting taxes or determining tax liabilities because of the mistake or erroneous ruling of an administrative official. Burhans v. County of Kern, 170 Cal. App. 2d 218, 226, 338 P.2d 546, 551-52 (1959); State v. Erie R.R., 23 N.J. Misc. 203, 42 A.2d 759, 765 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Hence the defense of equitable estoppel should not be available to appellants.
The circuit court’s decision should be affirmed if the First Commission’s decision demonstrated illegality, irregularity in vital matters, or fraud.
The record on appeal by stipulation of the parties included the transcript of proceedings in Hawaiian Coffee Co. v. Natural Disaster Claims Comm’n (No. 1359, Haw. 3d Cir. Ct., Mar. 31, 1970), a case presenting similar questions of law and fact to the instant case. In both cases, Judge Dick Yin Wong found the First Commission's certification of the claimants’ losses not supported by evidence.
The Commission was charged with determining the claimants’ total loss in each case, based upon the difference between the market value of the property immediately prior to and immediately after the date of the natural disaster. HRS § 234-4. In the instant case, the claimants had purchased a thirty-seven year old house and garage two months before the tsunami for $17,000. The claimants filed a claim for loss of $23,000, based on replacement cost plus the loss of aa lava fill. The First Commission allowed a loss of $18,200, based on replacement cost less depreciation.
In the Hawaiian Coffee case, claimant filed a claim *635for $128,000, alleging total destruction of its crop. A neighboring farmer, exposed to the same volcanic fallout, filed a claim based on one-half destruction. Although his fields were devastated to the same extent as Hawaiian Coffee’s, he produced a crop in the following year. None of the First Commission members visited the fields of either farmer, but nevertheless certified the full amount of both claims.
The record below demonstrated that in Judge Wong’s opinion, the First Commission’s decisions were characterized by irregularity in vital matters, and therefore were subject to administrative reconsideration.
Having concluded that the Second Commission possessed an implied power to reconsider the First Commission’s certification of losses, I must next determine whether the Second Commission properly certified claimants’ losses. The parties stipulated that the Second Commission recertified claimants’ losses in the amount of $2400 without prior notice or opportunity to be heard. Although the claimants subsequently received a hearing before the Commission, the recertified amount of loss was affirmed. No evidence was adduced at trial to indicate how the Second Commission’s determination was made or on what evidence it was based.
The right to a hearing on notice before property is taken or substantial rights withdrawn, which have previously been awarded in a judicial or administrative proceeding, is of the essence of procedural due process. Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 107, 71 A.2d 624, 628 (1950); Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908).
The appellants’ claim was recertified by the Second Commission on January 5, 1966. The applicable statute in effect at that time, R.L.H. § 131E-6 (now HRS § 234-4) provided that the determination of the loss by the Commission shall be final. Because no right of appeal was *636available at the time the Second Commission’s action was taken, the recertification violated claimants’ right to due process of law. Therefore the Second Commission’s act is void and subject to collateral attack.
On May 4, 1966, the legislature amended R.L.H. chap. 131E. Section 4 of Act 48, S.L.H. 1966, granted victims of the tsunami of 1960 the right of appeal in circuit court from the certification or recertification of any claim prior to the effective date of the Act. In the absence of a statutory right of appeal, an administrative decision is not subject to judicial review “unless the decision is wholly unsupported by the evidence or is wholly dependent upon a question of law, or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious.” Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924). Under either theory, Judge Wong’s review of the actions of the First and Second Commissions and de novo determination of the amount of claimants’ losses were properly taken.
The majority implies that a finding of fraud by the trial court might have justified administrative and judicial reconsideration in this case. The inconsistency in this conclusion is that the Second Commission and Circuit Court, which must reconsider the claim to determine fraud, are barred from reconsidering the claim in the absence of fraud.
The actions of both the First and Second Commissions were irregular and the proper subject of judicial review.
I would affirm.