Court Opinion

ID: 9389813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 15:01:49.61224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.910678
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1585   Document: 25     Page: 1   Filed: 04/26/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  JOHN CRAWFORD,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-1585
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:18-cv-01956-PEC, Judge Patricia E. Campbell-
 Smith.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 26, 2023
                 ______________________

     CHRISTIAN CURRAN, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
 by STEPHEN JOHN MCBRADY, CHARLES BAEK; ROCHELLE
 BOBROFF, National Veterans Legal Services Program, Ar-
 lington, VA.

     WILLIAM PORTER RAYEL, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also
 represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY, DOUGLAS K. MICKLE.
                  ______________________
Case: 22-1585     Document: 25     Page: 2    Filed: 04/26/2023

 2                                             CRAWFORD   v. US

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, PROST and STARK, Circuit
                          Judges.
 MOORE, Chief Judge.
     John Crawford appeals a decision of the United States
 Court of Federal Claims holding Mr. Crawford is not enti-
 tled to attorneys’ fees and expenses under the Equal Access
 to Justice Act (EAJA). We reverse.
                        BACKGROUND
      Mr. Crawford served honorably in the United States
 Army and Florida Army National Guard for two decades
 before he was discharged in 2011 for failure to meet medi-
 cal retention standards due to his service-connected PTSD.
 Mr. Crawford’s PTSD began after his second tour of duty
 in Iraq, at which time he was referred to the Florida State
 Surgeons Medical Discharge Review Board (SSMDRB) for
 a medical assessment. J.A. 282. The SSMDRB found Mr.
 Crawford did not meet medical retention standards and
 that his PTSD was incurred in the line of duty. J.A. 1221–
 22. It accordingly recommended Mr. Crawford be coun-
 seled regarding his rights to request a fitness determina-
 tion by a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) of the Army’s
 Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES), a prerequi-
 site for medical retirement. See 10 U.S.C. § 1201.
     Despite the SSMDRB’s findings, Mr. Crawford was not
 referred to a PEB and was instead erroneously discharged
 as if his PTSD was not incurred in the line of duty. As a
 consequence, Mr. Crawford never received a fitness deter-
 mination or medical retirement. In 2015, Mr. Crawford
 sought correction of his records and retroactive benefits be-
 fore the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records
 (ABCMR). Although the ABCMR found Mr. Crawford’s
 PTSD may have been service connected and that he should
 have been referred to PDES, the ABCMR did not grant him
 that relief. J.A. 1176. Instead, it directed the Office of the
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 CRAWFORD   v. US                                           3

 Surgeon General to further review Mr. Crawford’s records
 to determine whether he met retention standards at the
 time of his discharge and whether he should have been re-
 ferred to PDES. See J.A. 1166; J.A. 1176. Pursuant to that
 directive, Dr. Kathryn O’Donnell reviewed Mr. Crawford’s
 records. Notwithstanding the SSMDRB’s findings and the
 uncontested fact that Mr. Crawford was discharged for fail-
 ure to meet medical retention standards, Dr. O’Donnell rec-
 ommended that Mr. Crawford not be referred for a fitness
 determination because, in her opinion, Mr. Crawford met
 retention standards at the time of his discharge. J.A.
 1002–03.
      Following Dr. O’Donnell’s report, Mr. Crawford filed a
 complaint with the United States Court of Federal Claims.
 The complaint directly challenged the ABCMR’s and Dr.
 O’Donnell’s decisions and findings, but also alleged an orig-
 inal error in the Army’s failure to refer him to a PEB for a
 fitness determination prior to his separation, as required
 by Army Regulation 40-501, ¶ 10-25. J.A. 14–37. Rather
 than answer Mr. Crawford’s complaint, the government
 filed a voluntary motion for remand to the ABCMR (Re-
 mand Motion). J.A. 41–46; J.A. 56–60. The Remand Mo-
 tion argued Mr. Crawford’s claims for medical retirement
 should not proceed until the ABCMR conducted the predi-
 cate fitness determination, which the government con-
 ceded did not occur at the time of Mr. Crawford’s
 separation. J.A. 43–45.
     The Court of Federal Claims concluded remand was
 warranted for two “principal reasons”: (1) remand for a fit-
 ness determination could obviate the need for further pro-
 ceedings in the event the ABCMR granted Mr. Crawford
 relief, and (2) if the ABCMR did not grant such relief, then
 the more extensive record developed on remand would be
 essential for further litigation. J.A. 82–84 (Remand Deci-
 sion). Accordingly, it granted the motion and remanded for
 the ABCMR to “determine and explain whether Mr. Craw-
 ford was unfit for duty at the time of his separation . . .
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 4                                            CRAWFORD   v. US

 based upon the existing ABCMR record and any other doc-
 umentation received by the ABCMR on remand.” J.A. 83–
 84.
     On remand, the ABCMR found Mr. Crawford was enti-
 tled to medical retirement based solely on the evidence
 available “at the time of [his] separation without additional
 processing through PDES” and accordingly granted him
 complete relief, including the correction of his records and
 medical retirement benefits retroactive to the date of his
 discharge. J.A. 132; see also J.A. 413. Mr. Crawford then
 moved for attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to
 § 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA, arguing the remand was pred-
 icated on agency error and that he was therefore a prevail-
 ing party under the statute. The Court of Federal Claims
 denied the motion, reasoning the remand was based on ju-
 dicial economy rather than a finding or admission of agency
 error, and that Mr. Crawford was therefore not a prevailing
 party. Crawford v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 741 (2022)
 (Fees Decision). Mr. Crawford appeals. We have jurisdic-
 tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                         DISCUSSION
     Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of Title 28 directs courts to award
 attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred in civil actions
 against the government if: (1) the litigant is a “prevailing
 party”; (2) the “position of the United States” was not “sub-
 stantially justified”; and (3) special circumstances do not
 make the award unjust. Because we conclude these condi-
 tions are satisfied, 1 we reverse.

     1    The government bears the burden to establish the
 existence of special circumstances making the award un-
 just, see, e.g., Brewer v. Am. Battle Monuments Comm’n,
 814 F.2d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987), but did not contend,
 either before the Court of Federal Claims or on appeal, that
 such circumstances exist here.
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 CRAWFORD   v. US                                            5

                               I
      To be a prevailing party under § 2412(d)(1)(A), a plain-
 tiff must receive “at least some relief on the merits of his
 claims.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
 Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603–04
 (2001). Typically, it is readily apparent whether a decision
 grants a party relief on the merits and thereby confers pre-
 vailing party status. The Supreme Court has made clear,
 for example, that remands to district courts do not consti-
 tute relief on the merits or otherwise confer prevailing
 party status. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762
 (1987). Where a decision remands a matter to an adminis-
 trative agency for further proceedings, however, whether
 the plaintiff is prevailing may be less clear because, in
 some cases, “[s]ecuring a remand to an agency can consti-
 tute the requisite success on the merits.” Kelly v. Nichol-
 son, 463 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
     Accordingly, “we have developed tests [to determine]
 when court-to-administrative agency remands confer pre-
 vailing party status.” Davis v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 1360,
 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Where, as here, the remanding court
 retains jurisdiction, a plaintiff is a prevailing party if the
 remand was “because of alleged error by the agency” and
 the plaintiff is successful in the remand proceedings. For-
 mer Emps. of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States,
 336 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Remands “based on
 our recognition of agency error from the record,” as well as
 judicial findings or agency concessions of error, confer pre-
 vailing party status. Davis, 475 F.3d at 1364–65 (citing
 Kelly, 463 F.3d at 1354 n.3). “[O]ur focus is on whether
 agency error was the reason,” whether explicit or implicit,
 for the remand. Id. at 1364. In the absence of a judicial
 finding or agency concession of error, “the default rule is
 that the remand is not based on administrative error” and
 the burden is on the EAJA applicant “to prove, based on
 the record, that the remand had to have been predicated on
 administrative error even though the remand order does
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 6                                             CRAWFORD   v. US

 not say so.” Id. at 1366. Whether a party is a prevailing
 party under § 2412(d)(1)(A) is a question of law we review
 de novo. 2
     We hold the Court of Federal Claims erred in conclud-
 ing Mr. Crawford was not a prevailing party under
 § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Remand Decision provided “two prin-
 cipal reasons” for remand:
     [1] The ABCMR has not yet considered the find-
     ings of Dr. Kathryn R. O’Donnell. . . . As [the gov-
     ernment] notes, it is possible once the ABCMR has
     considered this new evidence, some or all of plain-
     tiff’s requests for relief may be granted by that
     board. See ECF No. 7 at 4 (stating that “[i]f the
     ABCMR agrees with Mr. Crawford, it may obviate
     the need for further litigation”). [2] Further, once
     the ABCMR has created a more extensive record of
     the Army’s consideration of all of Mr. Crawford’s
     claims, that record would be essential to further lit-
     igation in this court, if the ABCMR again rejects
     Mr. Crawford’s relief. See ECF No. 9 at 1-2 (stating
     the government “is seeking to have the ABCMR de-
     cide, for the first time, whether Mr. Crawford was
     unfit for duty at the time of his separation, a

     2   The parties dispute, in part, the applicable stand-
 ard of review. While the government agrees with Mr.
 Crawford that the ultimate question of whether a litigant
 is a prevailing party is a question of law subject to de novo
 review, it contends the Court of Federal Claims’ determi-
 nation that the government did not concede error in its Re-
 mand Motion is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error.
 We need not resolve this dispute because we conclude the
 Court of Federal Claims’ determination that the govern-
 ment did not concede error must be reversed under either
 standard of review.
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 CRAWFORD   v. US                                            7

     determination that is necessary for Mr. Crawford
     to obtain the relief he seeks”).
 J.A. 83 (emphasis in original). The Court of Federal Claims
 reasoned Mr. Crawford was not a prevailing party because
 the remand for Mr. Crawford to receive the fitness deter-
 mination he was previously denied was “rooted in concerns
 for judicial efficiency” rather than agency error. Fees Deci-
 sion, 157 Fed. Cl. at 745. We do not agree.
      While the Remand Decision explicitly invoked concerns
 for judicial efficiency, that does not preclude the conclusion
 that the remand was nevertheless implicitly predicated on
 agency error. The judicial efficiency achieved in this case
 was to provide Mr. Crawford with the process he was due
 either at the time of his discharge or during the pre-re-
 mand ABCMR proceedings—an omission the government
 repeatedly acknowledged in its Remand Motion and which
 the ABCMR subsequently determined was error. See, e.g.,
 J.A. 43 (“[I]t is undisputed that neither a PEB nor the
 ABCMR determined whether Mr. Crawford was fit or unfit
 for duty at the time of his separation from the Army Na-
 tional Guard.”); J.A. 56 (“Because no competent board has
 made a fitness determination, a fact that is undisputed, we
 proposed a remand to the Army so that the ABCMR can
 make this necessary determination.”); J.A. 132 (finding the
 Army “should have referred [Mr. Crawford]” to PDES “but
 failed to do so without adequate explanation”). But for this
 error, there would be no judicial efficiency in remanding
 the case for Mr. Crawford to obtain a fitness determination.
 If proper procedures had been followed, Mr. Crawford
 would have already received that determination and been
 granted medical retirement. J.A. 132 (finding Mr. Craw-
 ford’s entitlement to medical retirement was apparent
 based on the “medical evidence available . . . at the time of
 [his] service separation without additional processing
 through PDES”).
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 8                                            CRAWFORD   v. US

     This case is therefore distinguishable from prior deci-
 sions in which we have held remands based “solely” on ju-
 dicial efficiency do not confer prevailing party status. See
 Gurley v. Peake, 528 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (hold-
 ing remand to avoid “piecemeal litigation” of “inextricably
 intertwined claims” did not confer prevailing party status
 where it was explicitly predicated on judicial economy and
 “nothing in the joint motion [for remand] [] suggest[ed] that
 the Board erred”); see also Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv., 672
 F.3d 1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing Gurley). Here,
 the remand was necessary to cure the agency error. To the
 extent the remand was based both on judicial efficiency and
 agency error, the government concedes this is sufficient to
 confer prevailing party status. Oral Arg. at 21:40–22:10.3
 The Court of Federal Claims erred in determining the re-
 mand was “rooted in concerns for judicial efficiency” to the
 exclusion of agency error. Fees Decision, 157 Fed. Cl. at
 745. Understood in context, the Court of Federal Claims’
 remand was implicitly predicated on agency error. Cf.
 Kelly, 463 F.3d at 1354–55 (rejecting the Veterans Court’s
 interpretation of its remand order as being premised on of-
 fering the veteran the option to further pursue a claim and
 concluding the remand was predicated on the VA’s errone-
 ous neglect of evidence); Davis, 475 F.3d at 1365 (distin-
 guishing Kelly as involving an “agency error [that],
 although not explicitly stated in the [] remand order, was
 nevertheless clear from the record”).
     To be sure, the Court of Federal Claims did not find in
 its Remand Decision that the failure to provide Mr. Craw-
 ford with a pre-discharge fitness determination was error.
 Nor did the government’s Remand Motion characterize
 that omission as erroneous. Indeed, the Remand Motion
 expressly disclaimed any error. J.A. 43; J.A. 59. But courts

     3   Available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.
 gov/default.aspx?fl=22-1585_03092023.mp3.
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 CRAWFORD   v. US                                            9

 are not bound by a party’s characterizations of its conduct
 in determining whether there has been a concession of er-
 ror. It is the substance of the government’s admissions
 that matter.
     Here, the substance of the government’s admissions
 amounts to an implicit concession of error in failing to refer
 Mr. Crawford to a PEB for a fitness determination. In re-
 questing remand, the government repeatedly admitted Mr.
 Crawford did not receive a fitness determination prior to
 his discharge or during the pre-remand ABCMR proceed-
 ings. See, e.g., J.A. 43; J.A. 56. Nor did the government
 dispute Mr. Crawford’s allegations that, pursuant to Army
 Regulation 40-501, ¶ 10-25, he was entitled to—but did not
 receive—notification that he could request a PEB fitness
 determination regardless of whether his PTSD was in-
 curred in the line of duty. See J.A. 22–23 at ¶¶ 39–42; J.A.
 27–28 at ¶¶ 65–70; see also J.A. 257 (Army Regulation 40-
 501, ¶ 10-25 (Aug. 23, 2010)). Rather, the government
 urged that its requested remand would “address that al-
 leged error,” J.A. 58, and provide “the relief Mr. Crawford
 would likely receive if he successfully moved for judgment
 on the administrative record.” J.A. 44; see also J.A. 57 (urg-
 ing remand in lieu of merits briefing since “the likely result
 of such briefing (if Mr. Crawford were successful) is the
 very relief we are proposing now”). On remand, the
 ABCMR expressly found that these omissions were errone-
 ous and that Mr. Crawford’s medical records at the time of
 his discharge established he “was unfit due to PTSD and
 should have been medically separated from service.” J.A.
 132. Thus, viewed in the context of the full evidentiary rec-
 ord, the government’s admissions that Mr. Crawford did
 not receive a fitness determination were, in fact, implicit
 admissions of error.
     In sum, we conclude the Court of Federal Claims’ Re-
 mand Order was predicated on agency error. There is no
 dispute Mr. Crawford was successful on remand while the
 Court of Federal Claims retained jurisdiction. Accordingly,
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 10                                            CRAWFORD   v. US

 the Court of Federal Claims erred in concluding Mr. Craw-
 ford was not a prevailing party for purposes of
 § 2412(d)(1)(A).
                               II
     The availability of attorneys’ fees and expenses under
 the EAJA also requires the “position of the United States”
 to have been not substantially justified.        28 U.S.C.
 § 2412(d)(1)(A). Although the Court of Federal Claims did
 not reach this question because it determined Mr. Craw-
 ford was not a prevailing party, the parties agree the issue
 has been adequately briefed and can be resolved on appeal.
 Oral Arg. at 2:40–2:54, 27:09–27:17.
     The government’s position is substantially justified
 when it is “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reason-
 able person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
 (1988). To meet this standard, the government bears the
 burden to “show it has not persisted in pressing a tenuous
 factual or legal position.” Gavette v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt.,
 808 F.2d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (internal
 quotation marks omitted). The “position” under review in-
 cludes not only litigation positions taken by the govern-
 ment, but also “the action or failure to act by the agency
 upon which the civil action is based.”             28 U.S.C.
 § 2412(d)(2)(D); see also Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d
 711, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen assessing whether to
 award attorney fees . . . the entirety of the conduct of the
 government is to be viewed, including the action or inaction
 by the agency prior to litigation.”).
     The government has not carried its burden to show its
 position was substantially justified in this case. It is now
 undisputed the Army erred by not referring Mr. Crawford
 to PDES and granting medical retirement in 2011 when
 Mr. Crawford was honorably discharged. Nevertheless,
 the government resisted the correction of Mr. Crawford’s
 records and the award of benefits through years of unrea-
 sonable litigation. The government has not identified any
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 CRAWFORD   v. US                                          11

 non-tenuous factual or legal support for that position. In-
 deed, the Army’s own findings following the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims’ remand belie any argument to the contrary.
 On remand, the ABCMR determined the Army should have
 referred Mr. Crawford to PDES “but failed to do so without
 adequate explanation,” a failure it characterized as an “in-
 justice” and “deprivation of due process.” J.A. 132. The
 ABCMR further determined “there was sufficient medical
 evidence available to render a decision regarding [Mr.
 Crawford’s] fitness at the time of separation without addi-
 tional processing through PDES.” J.A. 132 (emphasis
 added). In other words, the ABCMR determined not only
 that it was error to deprive Mr. Crawford of medical retire-
 ment in 2011, but also that the government’s repeated de-
 mands for additional assessments and evidence were
 unnecessary in view of the records the government had al-
 ready possessed for eight years.
     An advisory opinion solicited by the ABCMR on re-
 mand denounced the government’s failures in even
 stronger terms. That opinion, offered by the Army Review
 Boards Agency’s Medical Advisor, concluded “significant
 harm has been committed upon Mr. Crawford through
 multiple errors of competency and possible errors of integ-
 rity in adjudicating what should have been a rather
 straightforward PEB/MEB case.” J.A. 253. The Medical
 Advisor expressed that he could not “sufficiently empha-
 size [his] dismay at the treatment of a Solider who has
 served honorably at war” and noted he had not encountered
 such an egregious error in his “25 years in the Army.” J.A.
 253–54. As he aptly summarized: “This is absolutely not
 what right looks like in the Army.” J.A. 253 (internal quo-
 tation marks omitted).
     The government contends its position was nonetheless
 substantially justified because it has “reasonably worked
 to rectify potential errors in Mr. Crawford’s discharge,” in-
 cluding by requesting additional opinions regarding Mr.
 Crawford’s medical state during the initial ABCMR
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 12                                          CRAWFORD   v. US

 proceedings. Appellee’s Br. at 51. We are not persuaded.
 On remand, the ABCMR found sufficient medical evidence
 existed as early as 2011 to grant Mr. Crawford the relief he
 did not receive until 2019. The government’s solicitation of
 unnecessary additional evidence in the interim does not
 demonstrate the government’s position was substantially
 justified. The government also contends its position was
 justified because it permitted Mr. Crawford to move for a
 correction of his records after the three-year deadline pro-
 vided by 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b). Weighed against the totality
 of the government’s conduct, that small grace does not con-
 stitute substantial justification. Permitting Mr. Crawford
 to seek correction of an error that should never have oc-
 curred can hardly justify the government’s unwarranted
 opposition throughout the remainder of those proceedings.
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered the parties’ other arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the reasons given, we reverse
 the Court of Federal Claims’ decision that Mr. Crawford is
 not entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses under
 § 2412(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA. We therefore remand for the
 Court of Federal Claims to consider, in the first instance,
 the quantum of attorneys’ fees.
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                           COSTS
 Costs are awarded to Mr. Crawford.