Court Opinion

ID: 9692846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:08:48.842638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:37.424729
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the joinder of Ms. Kratz as additional defendant was accomplished improperly, and would therefore affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court insofar as it remanded to effectuate proper service.
*334I agree with the majority’s holding that Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2251 through 2274, Joinder of Additional Defendants, do not define the procedure governing the joinder of Ms. Kratz. Rules 2251 et seq. apply only when a defendant seeks to join an additional defendant, not when a plaintiff seeks the joinder, as in this case. Rule 2232(c) empowers a court to join an additional party under circumstances such as were presented in this case, but the rules do not outline the specific steps which must be followed when a plaintiff is required to add another person as a party defendant.
Inasmuch as a detailed procedure is not specified for joinder under these circumstances, it seems appropriate to examine all the rules which govern service of process upon defendants. Although Rule 425 did not exist at the time of the trial court proceedings, the explanatory comment which precedes the rule explains clearly that Subpart C (Rules 420-425) consolidates rules governing service of process upon special parties rather than setting forth new criteria. Rule 425(a) states: “Original process shall be served upon an additional defendant who is not already a party to the action in the same manner as if he were an original defendant. Copies of all pleadings filed in the action shall be served with the complaint against the additional defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The obvious inference is that any person joined as a defendant is always entitled to a complaint which sets forth a cause of action against him.
The awesome power of a chancellor in equity justifies the detailed requirements set forth in the rules of civil procedure which precede and validate the exercise of jurisdiction over a party and his property. They insure that a person who is to be subjected to the court’s pervasive authority will first be presented with a complaint which alleges his wrongdoing and delineates his potential liability. He will not be ordered to tear down his house, bulldoze the foundation, and pay a penalty of $100 per day, without being served with a pleading which explains, in simple terms, why he should be subjected to such draconian measures. The ma*335jority upholds these sanctions against Ms. Kratz without according her the right to receive a complaint.
The majority purports to justify this result by quoting the United States Supreme Court as set forth in our opinion in Spica v. ILGWA, 388 Pa. 382, 394, 130 A.2d 468, 473-74 (1957): “A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method of notification is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard.” This statement is not controlling in this case. It is a declaration of the minimal requirements under the due process clause of the federal Constitution— not a statement of what is required under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the quotation was not followed in Spica itself, and cannot be taken literally in any event.
Were we to take the statement literally, the only necessity would be a method of notification reasonably calculated to inform a defendant of the proceeding and give him an opportunity to be heard; we might well dispense with all the procedural rules relating to service of process. If a petition and rule satisfies the requirement in the case of Ms. Kratz, perhaps a letter will be sufficient in the next instance. We might later conclude that only a telephone call is necessary. So long as we need only a method of notification reasonably calculated to inform a defendant of the proceeding and give him an opportunity to be heard, we would never need such a formality as a complaint.
My position does not exalt form over substance. The purpose of a complaint is explained in Standard Pennsylvania Practice:
§ 21:4. Function of complaint
The primary function of a complaint is to set forth the plaintiffs cause of action. It also should inform the defendant, with reasonable accuracy, of the nature and extent of the plaintiffs claim, and set forth concisely the material and issuable facts on which the plaintiff relies *336for his claim. Since the very purpose of the complaint is to set forth facts which show a claim “enforceable” by action, it necessarily fails of this purpose unless those facts are averred.
4 Standard Pa. Practice 2d § 21:4 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
These functions of a complaint were never fulfilled in this case insofar as Ms. Kratz is concerned. No cause of action was stated against her. There was no concise declaration of the material and issuable facts upon which the plaintiff relied against Ms. Kratz. Clearly, the plaintiff failed to establish an enforceable claim against this defendant by omitting to file a complaint against her.
Instead, Ms. Kratz was served with a petition alleging that she should be joined in a lawsuit pending against the Clemmers. She did not answer or oppose the petition, believing it was proper to add her as a party to that litigation. She assumed, however, that she was entitled to and would subsequently receive a complaint alleging a cause of action against her. Upon receipt of such a complaint, she would make her answer or interpose her defense, whereupon the issues would be joined and the matter would ripen for adjudication. In blatant disregard of the invariable pleading practice in Pennsylvania, a decision on the merits was prematurely issued against her without according her the mere right to answer a complaint.
It might appear, as a practical matter, that Ms. Kratz had sufficient extra-judicial opportunity to inform herself of all aspects of the lawsuit against the Clemmers, her parents, and to deduce the basis of her own potential liability. Nevertheless, I regard it as improper to abandon the salutary and hitherto invariable requirement that personal jurisdiction cannot be established over a defendant without affording him the opportunity to answer a complaint against him.
I believe the majority has abandoned the fundamental requirement of a complaint without sufficient justification, and I fear the precedent so established. I would affirm the *337order of the Commonwealth Court due to the improper joinder of Ms. Kratz.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.