Court Opinion

ID: 9740682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:40:17.605895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.720888
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
In effect, the majority opinion imposes strict liability on a farmer for hiring a minor, with his parents’ consent, to do farm work. In so holding, the majority opinion states:
The plaintiff need only show a violation to the statute, which must be resolved by the jury in the first instance, and injury to the child. Legal or proximate causation is not in issue because the legislature has determined causation exists. In short, once a violation is established, these cases have construed child labor statutes to impose strict or absolute liability.
We hold ... that a wrongful death action based on an alleged violation of SDCL 60-12-3 is not subject to the defense of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased. In doing so, we recognize the legislature’s goal in passing the child labor statute to protect children from employment in dangerous occupations where, because of their immaturity, they are likely inappreciative of risks and prone to carelessness.
The majority opinion blindly follows the “majority” position in its conclusion that SDCL 60-12-3 was intended to place all liability upon the employer/farmer for any injury to a minor employee under the age of sixteen without regard to the cause. For the following reasons, the majority opinion incorrectly applies Restatement (Second) of Torts § 483,1 in that the “ef-*793feet” of SDCL 60-12-3 does not place “the entire responsibility” and the burden of strict liability upon this employer/farmer.
The majority opinion correctly concludes that the F.L.S.A. does not pre-empt SDCL 60-12-3. However, unlike the F.L.S.A., SDCL 60-12-3 does not define what constitutes an “occupation dangerous to life, health, or morals.” Therefore, the determination that operating a tractor of over 20 PTO horsepower is not “oppressive child labor” (a dangerous occupation) once the minor completes a training program is not pre-emptive of South Dakota law. Such a determination does, however, indicate that a properly certified minor, such as Tyler, is removed from the class of persons designed to be protected by SDCL 60-12-3.
The majority’s holding is also contrary to the legislative intent of SDCL 32-12-12.2 This statute not only recognizes the necessity of the operation of farm tractors and machinery by South Dakota minors (14-16 years of age), but authorizes such use and operation. This clearly implies that the South Dakota Legislature never intended “to place the entire responsibility ... upon the [farmer] defendant.”3
Finally, the trial court and the majority read and apply SDCL 60-12-3 in such a strained manner as to repeal by implication SDCL 32-12-12. The language of both statutes is clear and unambiguous, and therefore:
[I]t is the function of the court to give them effect and not to amend the statute to avoid or produce a particular result. ... The Court’s only function then is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.
Parsons v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Serv., 314 N.W.2d 863, 865 (S.D.1982) (quoting Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799, 802 (S.D. 1980)).
[RJepeals by implication are not favored and should be found only where there is a manifest and total repugnancy between the statutes and where both acts cannot be reconciled through a reasonable construction.
Parsons, 314 N.W.2d at 865; see also, Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d at 802; State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Cronin, 250 N.W.2d 690, 694 (S.D.1977). There is no “repugnancy between the statutes.” Both statutes clearly express legislative intent to regulate and protect certain classes of people. However, SDCL 60-12-3 does not define operation of a tractor as a dangerous occupation and to do so as a matter of law, improperly precludes contributory negligence as a defense and impliedly repeals the express provisions of SDCL 32-12-12.
Although the trial court permitted the jury to determine whether Tyler’s employment was a proximate cause of his death, it prevented the jury from receiving evidence concerning the real cause of the death by excluding evidence on contributory negligence. This ruling foreclosed all such evidence, including negligent, reckless or intentional conduct. SDCL 60-12-3 was never intended to have that effect or to tie the hands of the jury. The jury could have properly decided this case if they had been instructed in accordance with the South *794Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction 10-05, which provides:
As applied to a minor, ordinary care or skill means that degree of care or skill which would fairly be anticipated in like circumstances from a reasonably prudent minor of the same age, maturity, experience, and capacity.
This instruction, along with standard companion instructions, would permit the jury to decide whether the real cause of injury was employment or conduct. The majority appears to have no faith in the jury system. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the two examples used by the majority involve cleaning augers and disconnecting machinery without shutting off the power — substantially different than the situation here — driving a tractor on a highway.
In this case, Tyler was trained in safely operating farm equipment at the request of his employer and with the consent of his parents. He was familiar with the model 1066 tractor — his own father taught him how to operate one. Tyler was sufficiently competent to comprehend the risks involved. Under the specific facts of this case, Tyler was trained and competent to operate a tractor on the highway and was not within the class of persons designed to be protected by SDCL 60-12-3. Clearly, a jury question is presented. Therefore, the majority has incorrectly applied § 483 because the effect of the statute was not to “place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.” (emphasis added). Contributory negligence should have been allowed as a defense.
Evidence indicated the accident was not caused by mechanical problems: the tractor gradually drifted off the roadway; there were no zigzags in the tire tracks; Tyler informed the mechanic on the morning of the accident, that there were no problems with the tractor. The jury should have been instructed regarding the defense of contributory negligence on the part of Tyler, taking into consideration his age, maturity, experience and capacity. Therefore, we should hold, under these facts, that contributory negligence is a defense where the minor has by training removed himself from the class of people intended to be protected by SDCL 60-12-3, is authorized by law to operate farm machinery, and understands the dangers incident to his employment. We cannot determine from this evidence whether this death was caused by negligence, recklessness or even intentional actions. Therefore, the question should be decided by the jury on proper instructions.
I also dissent on Issue III for the reason that the contributory negligence or consent of the parents to Tyler’s employment may constitute a defense to a cause of action under SDCL 60-12-3.
Under wrongful death statutes, the majority rule is that recovery is barred if the survivor himself was guilty of contributory negligence which contributed to the death of the decedent. Annot., Contributory Negligence of Beneficiary as Affecting Action under Death or Survival Statute, 2 A.L.R.2d 785, 788 (1948); see also, Nichols v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 13 Wis.2d 491, 109 N.W.2d 131 (1961); Hondl v. Chicago Great Western Railway Company, 249 Minn. 306, 82 N.W.2d 245 (1957); Burkstrand v. Rasmussen, 77 N.D. 716, 45 N.W.2d 485 (1950). Further, courts have held where a parent consents to a child’s employment in violation of child labor statute, that parent may be barred from recovering for the wrongful death of the child, even though the wrongful death proximately results from the employment and disobedience of the statute. See, Totten v. Parker, 428 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Ky. 1968); Wieck v. Blessin, 165 Neb. 282, 85 N.W.2d 628 (1957); Lucas E. Moore Stave Co. of Georgia v. Overbee’s Adm’r., 262 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Ky.1953); Reber v. Hanson, 260 Wis. 632, 51 N.W.2d 505 (1952); Besonen, 220 N.W. at 303; Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 78 W.Va. 517, 89 S.E. 284, 285 (1916); 22A Am.Jur. 2d, Death § 209 (1988); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 785. See also, Wheat’s Adm’r. v. Gray, 309 Ky. 593, 218 S.W.2d 400 (1949); 7 A.L.R.2d 1336 (1949).
Here, both Tyler’s parents were aware of Tyler’s employment. They were aware *795that Tyler obtained a certificate permitting him to operate powerful tractors without violating F.L.S.A., and that his duties would include operating Christians International Model 1066 tractor. Even if the steering on Christians’ tractor was loose, Mr. Strain testified that he was aware of that fact. No evidence was presented that the Strains ever objected to Tyler’s employment under these conditions. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed that the consent of Tyler’s parents could constitute contributory negligence and could bar their recovery under South Dakota’s wrongful death statute. SDCL 60-12-3; SDCL 21-5-1; see also, Tufty v. Sioux Transit Co., 70 S.D. 352, 17 N.W.2d 700 (1945).
I believe these issues of contributory negligence are for the fact finder or the jury, based on proper instructions. The denial of proper jury instructions on contributory negligence is tantamount to denial of a jury trial to Christians on the real issues in the case contrary to the South Dakota Constitution. S.D.Const. art. VI, § 6.
The effect of the majority holding is contrary to Restatement of Torts § 483, where plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery “unless” the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility upon the employer. Our South Dakota statutes do not attempt to place the entire responsibility upon the farmer or employer. The majority opinion places the entire responsibility on the farmer simply because a minor is employed. I would reverse and remand for a fair trial on Issues II and III.

. § 483. Defense to Violation of Statute.
The plaintiffs contributory negligence bars his *793recovery for the negligence of the defendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant.
(emphasis added).

. SDCL 32-12-12 provides in part:
A restricted minor’s permit may be issued, upon application and payment of the proper fee as provided for in § 32-12-16, and passage of all driver’s license examination tests, to any minor between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years.... The restrictions as to time of operation and operation under the direction of a parent or legal guardian do not apply to the holder of a valid restricted minor’s permit operating a self-propelled agricultural machine which is not subject to registration under chapter 32-5.

. The concerns raised by Chief Justice Miller’s writing would be resolved by the appropriate pattern jury instruction on the negligence of a minor because the primary focus is on the "age, . maturity, experience, and capacity” of a reasonably prudent minor in like circumstances. See, S.D.Civil Pattern Jury Instruction, 10-05. Therefore, his use of the example of a 5-year-old merits no reply.