Court Opinion

ID: 9398170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 15:12:26.825082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.389814
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                       2023 WY 52
                                                                  April Term, A.D. 2023

                                                                       May 30, 2023

 IN THE MATTER OF THE
 TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
 RIGHTS TO: JJD, minor child,

 DOMINIQUE DESIREE SCIACCA,

 Appellant
 (Respondent),
                                                    S-23-0076
 v.

 STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel.
 DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
 SERVICES,

 Appellee
 (Petitioner).

                 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL

[¶1] This matter came before the Court upon a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, e-filed
herein May 11, 2023, by court-appointed counsel for Appellant. Appellant took this appeal
to challenge the Goshen County District Court’s October 18, 2022, Order Terminating
Parental Rights. That order was entered after a full hearing. The district court concluded
there was clear and convincing evidence to support two statutory grounds for termination
of Appellant’s parental rights: (1) the child was abused or neglected and efforts to
rehabilitate the family were unsuccessful; and (2) the child was in foster care for fifteen of
twenty-two months and Appellant is unfit. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii) & (v) (2021).

[¶2] Now, Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel requests that he be allowed to
withdraw as counsel, pursuant to procedures this Court has adopted based on Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Counsel is correct that, in
In re NRL, 2015 WY 27, 344 P.3d 759 (Wyo. 2015), this Court approved the Anders-type
procedure in appeals from orders terminating parental rights. However, this Court takes
this occasion to reconsider that decision. After careful review, this Court finds it should
overrule In re NRL and that it should no longer use the Anders brief procedure in appeals
from orders terminating parental rights.

[¶3] “Overruling prior case law is an act this Court approaches with caution.” Brown v.
City of Casper, 2011 WY 35, ¶ 43, 248 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Wyo. 2011). Nevertheless,
“[r]ecognizing that stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable command,’ but a ‘principle of policy,’
we have rejected it now and then over the years for specific articulated reasons.” Smith v.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Park Cnty., 2013 WY 3, ¶ 15, 291 P.3d 947, 952 (Wyo. 2013).
“There are occasions when departure from precedent is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Gueke v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs
for Teton Cnty., 728 P.2d 167, 171 (Wyo. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Dunnegan
v. Laramie Cnty. Comm’rs, 852 P.2d 1138 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶4] This Court finds In re NRL should be overruled for the following reasons. For one
thing, the order terminating parental rights there was entered after a default hearing. In re
NRL, 2015 WY 27, ¶ 1, 344 P.3d at 759. Such hearings are usually relatively brief. Thus,
In re NRL provided a poor vehicle to approve use of Anders briefs in all appeals from
orders terminating parental rights, where such orders are often entered after trials that take
several days. Such trial cases are generally not appropriate for Anders briefing, because it
places this Court in the position of reviewing a lengthy record, after which it must play the
roles of both advocate and tribunal to decide whether the appeal is frivolous.

              [I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
              conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court
              and request permission to withdraw. That request must,
              however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in
              the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of
              counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time
              allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court—not
              counsel—then proceeds, after a full examination of all the
              proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400.

[¶5] In addition, this Court has limited the availability of the Anders brief procedure in
other contexts, without any serious problems. This Court does not permit Anders brief in
all criminal cases.

              The rule on Anders briefs in criminal cases is this: this Court
              will not accept Anders briefs in cases that went to trial and
              resulted in felony conviction, in probation revocation cases
              where the probation violations were not admitted, and in cases

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              that arise from conditional pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
              (no contest).

Beckwith v. State, S-22-0227 (November 22, 2022, Order Denying Motion to File Anders
Brief). This Court does not allow exceptions to that rule. Id. That rule has worked well in
the criminal context for years, and this Court has not seen any need to increase the type of
cases in which it must act as both advocate and tribunal.

[¶6] Also, by confidential order, this Court has indicated it will not accept Anders
briefing in appeals from orders entered in proceedings brought pursuant to the Child
Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-401 et seq. This Court finds it incongruous to not
allow Anders briefs in Child Protection cases (where the deprivation of parental rights is
not permanent), while allowing Anders briefs in appeals from orders terminating parental
rights.

[¶7] Finally, this Court finds the procedure from In re NRL does not fully protect parental
rights or parents’ statutory right to counsel. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-318(a). In In re NRL,
this Court cited J.K. v. Lee Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 668 So. 2d 813, 816 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995) (“we extend the procedures set forth in Anders v. California to civil cases, but limit
its use to those civil cases in which an indigent client has a court-appointed attorney as
authorized by statute.”). However, that Alabama court recently overruled J.K., writing:

             It is the view of this court that, as a matter of prospective application,
       the Anders procedure as adopted in J.K. should no longer be permitted in
       appeals taken after the date of this decision from dependency and
       termination-of-parental-rights judgments:

              “An action involving a claim seeking to terminate parental
              rights affects both the fundamental rights of a parent and the
              well-being of the child at issue. The nature of a termination
              action involves allegations that a parent’s inability to parent his
              or her child, that parent’s failure to timely adjust his or her
              circumstances, and the lack of viable alternatives to
              termination, warrant the termination of the parent’s
              fundamental right to parent his or her child. It is the duty of
              counsel to proceed as best he or she can to advocate on behalf
              of his or her client, even given a generally less-than-ideal fact
              situation.”

       K.J. v. Pike Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 275 So. 3d 1135, 1143 (Ala. Civ. App.
       2018) (emphasis added). As the Colorado Supreme Court observed,
       affording a right to representation by counsel to a parent involved in
       termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, which Alabama does by statute

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      (see Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-305(b)), indicates a policy determination that
      “the parent must be able to seek meaningful review of the order, whatever
      the specific circumstances of his case,” such that “pursuit of such an appeal
      – with the guaranteed aid of court-appointed counsel – serves an important
      function and cannot be said to be ‘wholly frivolous’ for lack of merit
      alone.” A.L.L. v. People, 226 P.3d 1054, 1063 (Colo. 2010). Stated another
      way, “the prosecution by appointed counsel of an appeal serves the same
      important goals – shared by the State and the parent alike – of protecting the
      parent-child relationship and ensuring a fair and accurate decision that
      termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.” In re S.C., 195
      Vt. 415, 419, 88 A.3d 1220, 1223 (2014).

                                            ...

      We further agree with the Vermont Supreme Court that, under Rule 1.16(c)
      of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted in various states
      (including Alabama) – which rule permits an attorney’s continued
      representation of a client “when ordered to do so by a tribunal” – an
      appointed attorney acting in good faith on behalf of an appealing parent in a
      child-protection proceeding may resist a hypothetical or actual charge of
      unethical conduct on the basis that “even an arguably frivolous claim will not
      be deemed to violate Rule 3.1 where . . . a court categorically refuses to grant
      motions to withdraw in deference to overriding state interests.” In re S.C.,
      195 Vt. at 420-21, 88 A.3d at 1224. Indeed, as an Arizona appellate court has
      intimated, there is rarely a significant additional expenditure of effort in
      counsel’s filing a “substantive” brief as opposed to an Anders no-merit brief:

             “A proceeding to terminate a parent’s rights is one filled with
             facts and opinions, all relating to whether one of the statutory
             grounds for termination can be proved and whether termination
             will be in the child’s best interests. No matter how egregious
             the facts may appear to be in such a case, they are rarely wholly
             one-sided or entirely clear-cut. In addition, experts’ opinions
             are frequently based on a limited knowledge of the applicable
             facts and vary from timely to stale. . . . It seems to us counsel
             could have filed a substantive brief in this case by developing
             two of the four arguable issues she listed.”

      Denise H. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 257, 260, 972 P.2d 241,
      244 (Ct. App. 1998).

J.L. v. Alabama Dep’t of Hum. Res., 335 So. 3d 670, 674-76 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021)
(underline in original) (footnote omitted).

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              In Colorado, Anders briefs are inappropriate and unnecessary
              in the context of D & N [Dependency and Neglect] proceedings
              . . . . Appellate review of a parent’s best arguments—however
              weak—made with the assistance of counsel best protects the
              parent’s rights, supports the child’s interests in permanency
              and finality, and avoids the injection of unnecessary confusion
              and delay into the reviewing process.

A.L.L. v. People, 226 P.3d 1054, 1064 (Colo. 2010).

[¶8] This Court finds the reasoning in these cases persuasive. Not only does the approach
therein better protect both familial rights and the right to counsel, that approach also does
not increase the number of cases in which this Court must act as both advocate and tribunal.
Further, that approach does not add more confusion and delay to the appellate process.
Thus, this Court concludes it should no longer accept Anders brief in appeals from orders
terminating parental rights. It is the duty of counsel to proceed as best he or she can to
advocate on behalf of his or her client. It is, therefore,

[¶9] ORDERED that the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, e-filed herein May 11, 2023,
be, and hereby is, denied. Appellant’s brief is due for filing on or before June 26, 2023;
and it is further

[¶10] ORDERED that the Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Pro Se
Brief, which this Court entered May 15, 2023, is hereby rescinded and of no further effect.

[¶11] DATED this 30th day of May, 2023.
                                                  BY THE COURT: *

                                                  /s/

                                                  KATE M. FOX
                                                  Chief Justice

* Justice Kautz would grant the motion. He filed the following dissenting opinion.

[¶12] I respectfully dissent from the Court’s Order in this case requiring counsel to
prosecute an appeal when he or she certifies to this Court that he or she has thoroughly
investigated the case and finds no appealable issues. In those circumstances prosecution
of an appeal gives the false impression that important goals of the State and parent are
being served, when in fact it amounts to a waste of public funds for appointed counsel and
a waste of judicial resources. It requires an attorney to fabricate or invent arguments

                                             5
without any supporting argument in fact or law—something no attorney should do whether
prohibited by the Rules of Professional Conduct or not.

[¶13] I find it logically inconsistent to permit counsel to withdraw using the Anders
procedure in criminal cases, where there is a constitutional right to counsel, but to refuse
any withdrawal in a Termination of Parental Rights case, where there is no such right.

[¶14] Prosecution of frivolous appeals unnecessarily delays permanency and stability for
the children involved in a Termination of Parental Rights Case.

              Whatever the benefits in ensuring that appointed appellate
              counsel conduct themselves as active advocates [by complying
              with Anders]—they appear to be relatively small—the costs
              are greater. These obviously include time and money and delay
              in finality. It is true that the state’s interest in its financial
              resources is no stronger here than elsewhere. But its interest in
              expeditiousness is strong indeed. As stated, proceedings such
              as these “must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with
              fairness....” (Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, supra,
              452 U.S. at p. 32, 101 S.Ct. at p. 2162.) Its interest in finality
              is stronger still. In fact, it is “unusually strong.” (Lehman v.
              Lycoming County Children’s Services, supra, 458 U.S. at p.
              513, 102 S.Ct. at p. 3238.) The costs also involve the child—
              especially so. In fact, it is they that support the state’s particular
              interest in finality. (See id. at pp. 513–514, 102 S.Ct. at pp.
              3238–39.) They comprise the pointed and concrete harm that
              the child may suffer. Not in every case, of course, will he be
              forced to wait overlong for a “normal family home” (Santosky
              v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 759, 102 S.Ct. at p. 1398), or
              at least one that is “stable” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th
              at p. 306, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 851 P.2d 826). But in each he
              will face the threat. Unless necessary, he should not.

In re Sade C., 920 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1996) (footnotes omitted).

[¶15] While I agree that the Anders procedure in Termination of Parental Rights cases we
established in In re NRL, I conclude that the better approach when counsel determines that
there are no appealable issues is that taken by California: When counsel certifies that they
have fully investigated the case and can find no arguable issue to present on appeal, they
may withdraw as counsel. The client (parent) then may file a pro se brief. If they do so,
the court will determine the case based on the briefs. If they do not file a pro se brief, the
court may, it its discretion, determine that the appeal is abandoned. Id.
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