Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:08:07.418304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:40.583998
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-1863

                                  THOMAS R. LUSSIER,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                   MARVIN RUNYON, UNITED STATES POSTMASTER GENERAL,
                                 Defendant, Appellee.
                                                       
                              _________________________

          No. 94-1946

                                  THOMAS R. LUSSIER,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                   MARVIN RUNYON, UNITED STATES POSTMASTER GENERAL,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                                       
                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of  the  Court issued  on  March 29,  1995,  is
          corrected as follows:

               On page 3, line  8   change "504(a)" to "501"

               On page 3, line  9   change "794(a)" to "791"

               On page 4, line 14   change "794(a)" to "791"

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                              _________________________

          No. 94-1863

                                  THOMAS R. LUSSIER,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                   MARVIN RUNYON, UNITED STATES POSTMASTER GENERAL,
                                 Defendant, Appellee.
                              _________________________

          No. 94-1946

                                  THOMAS R. LUSSIER,
                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                   MARVIN RUNYON, UNITED STATES POSTMASTER GENERAL,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               John F. Lambert, Jr., with whom Thomas V. Laprade and Black,
               ____________________            _________________     ______
          Lambert, Coffin & Rudman were on brief, for plaintiff.
          ________________________
               Jeffrey  A.  Clair, with  whom  Frank  W. Hunger,  Assistant
               __________________              ________________
          Attorney  General,  Jay  P. McCloskey,  United  States  Attorney,
                              _________________
          Robert S.  Greenspan and Sandra Wien  Simon, Attorneys, Appellate
          ____________________     __________________
          Staff,  Civil Division,  Dep't  of Justice,  were  on brief,  for
          defendant.

                              _________________________

                                    March 29, 1995
                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.   After  determining  that  the
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          United States Postal Service  (the Service) wrongfully discharged

          Thomas Lussier because of his post-traumatic stress disorder, the

          district  court  made  an  award that  included  future  damages,

          sometimes called "front pay." Both parties consider  the award to

          be  a dead  letter.    Their  cross-appeals  pose  two  kinds  of

          questions.   The  principal  inquiry  implicates  the  collateral

          source  rule and requires us  to decide whether  a district court

          may  tailor a  front  pay  award,  stemming  from  a  finding  of

          disability discrimination under  the Rehabilitation Act of  1973,

          Pub.  L.  No. 93-112,  87 Stat.  355 (codified  as amended  at 29

          U.S.C.     701-796i),  to  account for  an  increase in  Veterans

          Administration (VA) benefits occasioned by the adverse employment

          action.   The  second inquiry  also touches  upon the  collateral

          source rule, but turns on a determination of when, and under what

          circumstances, a  district court, after the  parties have rested,

          may  solicit and consider factual information germane to an issue

          in the case without formally reopening the record.

                    On the first issue, we hold that it is within the trial

          court's discretion to tailor a front pay award to take account of

          collateral benefits in a discrimination case, and that  the court

          acted within the realm of this discretion in the case at bar.  On

          the  second issue,  we hold  that  once the  record is  closed, a

          district  court, absent  waiver  or consent,  ordinarily may  not

          receive additional factual information  of a kind not susceptible

          to judicial  notice  unless  it  fully  reopens  the  record  and

                                          3

          animates  the   panoply  of  evidentiary  rules   and  procedural

          safeguards customarily  available to  litigants.  Finding,  as we

          do, that the district court transgressed this rule, we cancel the

          award and stamp the matter "returned to sender."

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Lussier  sued his  quondam employer in  Maine's federal

          district court alleging, inter alia, that  his discharge from the
                                   _____ ____

          Service on  March 4, 1992, amounted  to disability discrimination

          in violation of section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

          U.S.C.   791.1  A bench trial ensued.  Since  these appeals focus

          exclusively on the front pay award and  do not concern either the

          antecedent  question  of  liability  or the  propriety  of  other

          remedies, we discuss only  the evidence relating to the  form and

          amount of front pay.

                    The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Allan McCausland, testified

          that,  had Lussier not been fired, his future earnings and fringe

          benefits  over a  projected  25-year work  expectancy would  have

          aggregated  between  $790,805  and  $1,067,193  when  reduced  to

          present  value.   The Service did  not directly  contradict these

          estimates,  but introduced  evidence that  Lussier's cloud  had a

          small  silver lining;  he had  been receiving  VA benefits  for a

          military-service-related   disability,   and  the   circumstances

          surrounding  his ouster  from  the post  office exacerbated  this

          disability and triggered an increase in those benefits.  Moreover
                              
          ____________________

               1The named defendant is the Postmaster General, but, for all
          intents  and purposes, the Service is the real party in interest,
          and we treat it as such.

                                          4

            it  is said, after all,  that the postman always  rings twice  

          Patricia Asdourian, a Postal  Service human resources specialist,

          testified  that  Lussier  would  also   be  receiving  disability

          benefits through the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) as an

          incident of his discharge.  Lussier had applied for CSRS benefits

          only a few weeks before trial and the precise  benefit level was,

          therefore,   unknown.    Nonetheless,  Asdourian  predicted  that

          Lussier's CSRS benefits would be in the neighborhood of $1185 per

          month.  The  Service argued that  the present value  of both  the

          increase  in VA benefits (calculated to be $358,401) and the CSRS

          disability payments should be deducted from any front pay.

                    On  November  9,  1993,  the  parties  rested  and  the

          district court took the case under advisement.  In due course, it

          found  that  the Service  had  discriminated  against Lussier  on

          account of his  disability in violation of 29 U.S.C.    791.  See
                                                                        ___

          Lussier v. Runyon, No. 92-397-P-H, 1994  WL 129776, at *1 (D. Me.
          _______    ______

          Mar.  1,  1994) (Lussier  I).   The court  made  an award  to the
                           __________

          plaintiff, see  id. at *11,  but declined to  order reinstatement
                     ___  ___

          because,  given  the sequelae  of  the firing,  Lussier  could no

          longer  perform his accustomed duties.  As to future damages, the

          court  found that Lussier would probably be capable at some point

          of  returning to  lighter, lower-paying  work, and  estimated the

          present  value of Lussier's  net future lost  earnings and fringe

          benefits to be  $790,805.  See id. at *9.   The court also found,
                                     ___ ___

          however, that Lussier was slated to receive increased VA benefits

          worth $358,401 on a present-value basis.  It  determined that, to

                                          5

          prevent  a possible  windfall, these  benefits should  offset the

          recovery Lussier otherwise might obtain as front pay.  See id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          *9-*11.

                    The court  adopted  essentially the  same reasoning  in

          respect to  CSRS benefits,  concluding that these  benefits, like

          the VA  benefits, should  be factored  into  Lussier's front  pay

          award to  prevent overcompensation.   See  id. at *11  n.7.   But
                                                ___  ___

          there was a rub:  declaring itself "unable to determine Lussier's

          net  economic  loss  without  knowing the  outcome  of  his  CSRS

          application,"  id.  at *11,  the  court deferred  entry  of final
                         ___

          judgment and ordered the  parties to file reports within  30 days

          concerning  the outcome  or status  of Lussier's  application for

          CSRS benefits.

                    Though  objecting  to  the  court's   request,  Lussier

          complied under  protest.  He  submitted status reports  (the last

          dated  May 2,  1994) disclosing  that he  was receiving  $390 per

          month in CSRS benefits on an interim basis "pending determination

          of his  final entitlement."   Lussier v. Runyon,  No. 92-397-P-H,
                                        _______    ______

          1994 WL  247873, at *1 (D.  Me. May 24, 1994) (Lussier  II).  The
                                                         ___________

          Service,  by contrast,  gave  the court  no concrete  information

          within the 30-day  period.   It then compounded  its omission  by

          ignoring the  court's instruction, issued on  April 21, directing

          it to respond  within ten days.  Judge  Hornby, unwilling to wait

          any longer, entered final judgment on May 24, 1994.  Based mainly

          on  the lack of  any submission by the  Service, the judge seized

          upon  the figure of $390 per month, computed the present value of

                                          6

          these monthly payments over Lussier's work expectancy ($112,723),

          and offset  this amount  against the  potential front  pay award.

          The  court  thereupon  entered  a final  judgment  that  included

          $320,000  in  front pay  (representing  $790,805  in future  lost

          earnings, minus $358,401 in increased VA benefits, minus $112,723

          in CSRS benefits).

                    Three days later, the  Service moved to alter  or amend

          the judgment,  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), "to reflect the fact that a

          final calculation of the plaintiff's [CSRS] disability retirement

          annuity  has  now  been  made,  resulting  in  a  monthly payment

          effective March 1, 1994, in the amount  of $1,111."  The district

          court denied the motion, writing that:

                    The defendant has already had more generosity
                    than it deserves from my initial reopening of
                    the trial record  and extensions  thereafter.
                    Although the plaintiff  may realize  somewhat
                    of  a "windfall"  as a  result, awarding  the
                    defendant relief would make a mockery of  all
                    judicial deadlines and the closing of a trial
                    record.

          Both parties appeal.

          II.  COLLATERAL BENEFITS
          II.  COLLATERAL BENEFITS

                    These  appeals pose  an  important question:   In  what

          manner,  if any,  does the  collateral source  rule    which bars

          resort to collateral benefits  in connection with the calculation

          of pecuniary damage awards, see 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies  
                                      ___                 _______________

          3.8(1), at 372-73 (2d ed. 1993) (describing the collateral source

          rule as providing "that benefits received by the plaintiff from a

          source collateral to the defendant may not be used to reduce that

          defendant's liability for  damages")   apply  to awards of  front

                                          7

          pay?    We respond  by  holding  that  insofar as  front  pay  is

          concerned,  the  effect to  be  given  to collateral  benefits   

          whatever their source   is within the equitable discretion of the

          district  court.2  Applying this  general principle, we rule that

          the  court below acted within the proper sphere of its discretion

          in  tailoring the  plaintiff's  front pay  award  to account  for

          collateral  benefits received  by  the plaintiff  as a  traceable

          consequence of the defendant's statutory violation.

                              A.  The Letter of the Law.
                              A.  The Letter of the Law.
                                  _____________________

                    The  Rehabilitation Act  makes available  in disability

          discrimination cases the remedies authorized  by Title VII of the

          Civil Rights Act  of 1964, see 29 U.S.C.    794a(a)(1), and Title
                                     ___

          VII, in turn, provides that a court may order "affirmative action

          . .  . which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or

          hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other

          equitable relief as  the court  deems appropriate,"  42 U.S.C.   

          2000e-5(g).   Under this generous language,  courts commonly have

          recognized front pay as  a condign remedy.  See,  e.g., Saulpaugh
                                                      ___   ____  _________

          v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d  134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
             ______________________                                   _____

          denied, 114 S. Ct.  1189 (1994); Shore v. Federal  Express Corp.,
          ______                           _____    ______________________

          777 F.2d 1155, 1158-60  (6th Cir. 1985); Thompson v.  Sawyer, 678
                                                   ________     ______

          F.2d  257,  292 (D.C.  Cir.  1982) (collecting  cases);  see also
                                                                   ___ ____

          United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1873 n.9 (1992)  (noting
          _____________    _____

                              
          ____________________

               2We limit this  holding to  situations where,  as here,  (1)
          front pay is a  discretionary equitable remedy, and (2)  there is
          no statutory impediment to factoring collateral benefits into the
          mix.

                                          8

          approvingly, in  dictum, that  "[s]ome courts have  allowed Title

          VII  plaintiffs  who  were  wrongfully discharged  and  for  whom

          reinstatement  was not feasible to recover  `front pay' or future

          lost  earnings"); Sinai v. New Eng. Tel.  & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471,
                            _____    _________________________

          476 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing, in dictum, that front pay is an

          acceptable form of redress under Title VII), cert. denied, 115 S.
                                                       _____ ______

          Ct. 597 (1994); cf. Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605,
                          ___ _______    ___________________

          614-16  (1st Cir. 1985)  (explicitly recognizing front  pay as an

          equitable remedy under the analogous  relief provision of the Age

          Discrimination  in  Employment Act  (ADEA),  29  U.S.C.    626(b)

          (1988)).

                    These  precedents illuminate  our  path.   In light  of

          them, we hold  that front  pay is an  available equitable  remedy

          under  Title  VII  and,  hence,  under  the  Rehabilitation  Act.

          Nevertheless, confirming the propriety of the remedy merely takes

          us  to  a  way  station,  not to  our  destination.    A  further

          expedition must  be mounted if  we are to plot  the terrain where

          the  collateral  source  rule  and the  tenets  that  inform  the

          computation of front pay intersect.

                    We start  along this route by  acknowledging that front

          pay, within  the employment discrimination universe, is generally

          equitable  in nature.  See, e.g., Shore v. Federal Express Corp.,
                                 ___  ____  _____    _____________________

          42 F.3d  373, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1994).  It follows a fortiori from
                                                            _ ________

          the equitable nature of  the remedy that the decision to award or

          withhold  front  pay  is, at  the  outset,  within the  equitable
                                    _______________

          discretion of the trial court.  See, e.g., id.; Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d
                                          ___  ____  ___  _________

                                          9

          at 145;  2 Dobbs,  supra,    6.10(4),  at 214.    This court  has
                             _____

          consistently reached the same conclusion with regard to front pay

          in the ADEA  context, see,  e.g., Powers v.  Grinnell Corp.,  915
                                ___   ____  ______     ______________

          F.2d 34, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1990); Wildman, 771 F.2d at  616, and we
                                          _______

          perceive  no  reason  why   front  pay  should  be  characterized

          differently in respect to  its dispensation under Title VII  and,

          correspondingly,  under   the  Rehabilitation  Act.3    We  rule,

          therefore, that statutes such as Title VII and the Rehabilitation

          Act  afford trial courts wide latitude to award or withhold front

          pay  according  to  established  principles  of  equity  and  the

          idiocratic circumstances of each case.

                    We  think  it  follows   from  this  premise  that  the

          logically derivative question  of whether a  front pay award,  if

          granted, may be tailored to take collateral benefits into account

          is also within the court's equitable discretion.  This conclusion

          is supported  not only by  the brute  force of logic,  see United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States  v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d  292, 296 (1st  Cir. 1993) (explaining
          ______     ______

          that "the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the grant

          of  a lesser power, unless  the authority to  exercise the lesser

          power is expressly reserved"), but also by reference to precedent

          and  to an  understanding  of the  fundamental  nature of  equity

          itself.  We canvass these sources.

                    1.  Precedent.   The weight of authority unquestionably
                    1.  Precedent.
                        _________

          favors the  view that  decisions about  whether  to consider  the
                              
          ____________________

               3This is particularly true in view of the close relationship
          between the ADEA and Title VII.  See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville
                                           ___  ____  ________    _________
          Banner Publ. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995).
          ________________

                                          10

          plaintiff's  receipt  of  collateral   benefits  in  gauging  the

          appropriateness  and amount  of  front pay,  and  if so,  how  to

          calibrate the scales, lie within the equitable discretion  of the

          trial  court.   See,  e.g.,  Hukkanen v.  International  Union of
                          ___   ____   ________     _______________________

          Operating  Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding under
          _________________

          Title VII that "calculation  of front pay  . . .  is a matter  of

          equitable relief  within the district court's sound discretion");

          Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch.  Dist., 853 F.2d 375, 382 (5th
          _______    ______________________________

          Cir.  1988) (similar); see also Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31
                                 ___ ____ _______    __________________

          F.3d  1354,  1360 (6th  Cir. 1994)  (applying abuse-of-discretion

          test to  evaluate district court's deduction  of pension benefits

          from  an ADEA front pay award); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
                                          ___________    _________________

          870  F.2d  1198,  1210  (7th Cir.  1989)  (similar;  specifically

          stating that whether to deduct  such collateral benefits "from  a

          front  pay award is a  matter committed to  the discretion of the

          trial  court").   While  the case  law does  not  form a  perfect

          string, see, e.g., Doyne v. Union Elec. Co., 953 F.2d 447, 451-52
                  ___  ____  _____    _______________

          (8th  Cir. 1992)  (holding that  pension benefits  should not  be

          considered in fashioning an  ADEA front pay award), we  deem this

          virtually  seamless  array of  precedents  to  be worthy  of  our

          allegiance.

                    Our  conviction that  the majority  rule is  the better

          rule is  not weakened by the debate that has rent the circuits in

          regard to  whether collateral benefits should  be subtracted from

                                          11

          back pay  awards in employment discrimination  cases.4  According

          to our rough count, courts  of appeals have divided four-to-three

          on this issue.  Compare EEOC v. Wyoming Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d
                          _______ ____    _______________________

          1425,  1431  (10th  Cir.  1985)  (holding  under  the  ADEA  that

          "[d]eduction of  collateral  sources of  income from  a back  pay

          award is a matter within the trial court's discretion") and Orzel
                                                                  ___ _____

          v.  City of  Wauwatosa Fire Dep't,  697 F.2d 743,  756 (7th Cir.)
              _____________________________

          (similar),  cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) and Merriweather v.
                      _____ ______                      ___ ____________

          Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d  1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980)  (similar in
          ______________

          regard to Title VII back pay awards) and EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n
                                               ___ ____    ________________

          Steamfitters Local No. 638,  542 F.2d 579, 591-92 (2d  Cir. 1976)
          __________________________

          (allowing  district court  to  offset public  assistance payments

          against  a Title VII back pay award),  cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911
                                                 _____ ______

          (1977)  with Craig v. Y & Y  Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 81-85 (3d
                  ____ _____    ___________________

          Cir. 1983) (holding that  unemployment compensation should not be

          deducted  from a  Title VII  back pay  award) and  Brown v.  A.J.
                                                        ___  _____     ____

          Gerrard Mfg. Co.,  715 F.2d  1549, 1550-51 (11th  Cir. 1983)  (en
          ________________

          banc)  (similar) and  EEOC v. Ford  Motor Co., 688  F.2d 951, 952
                           ___  ____    _______________

          (4th Cir. 1982) (similar).  Three other circuits have shown signs

                              
          ____________________

               4NLRB v.  Gullett Gin Co.,  340 U.S. 361  (1951), frequently
                ____     _______________
          cited in connection with  the interplay between back pay  and the
          collateral  source  rule, is  simply  not  determinative on  this
          issue.    In  Gullett  Gin,  the  Court  held  that  unemployment
                        ____________
          compensation need not be deducted from a back pay award under the
          National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 364.  But the  Court did not
                                        ___
          furnish  clear  guidance  as to  whether  the  use  of collateral
          benefits was categorically disallowed  or merely entrusted to the
          trier's  discretion.  See 2  Dobbs, supra,    6.10(4), at 223-24;
                                ___           _____
          Thomas  W. Lee,  Comment, Deducting  Employment Compensation  and
                                    _______________________________________
          Ending Employment Discrimination:  Continuing Conflict, 43  Emory
          ______________________________________________________
          L.J. 325, 326 (1994).

                                          12

          of an internal division.  Compare Hawley v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
                                    _______ ______    ____________________

          958 F.2d 720,  726 (6th  Cir. 1992) (approving  the deduction  of

          pension benefits from  an ADEA  back pay award)  with Rasimas  v.
                                                           ____ _______

          Michigan  Dep't of  Mental Health,  714 F.2d  614, 627  (6th Cir.
          _________________________________

          1983)  (holding that "[u]nemployment benefits . . . should not be

          deducted from backpay awards" under Title VII), cert. denied, 466
                                                          _____ ______

          U.S. 950 (1984); and  compare Glover v. McDonnell  Douglas Corp.,
                           ___  _______ ______    ________________________

          12  F.3d 845,  848 (8th  Cir.) (holding  that the  district court

          erred in refusing  to offset  pension payments from  an award  of

          back pay), cert. denied, 114 S.  Ct. 1647 (1994) with Doyne,  953
                     _____ ______                          ____ _____

          F.2d at 451-52 (contra);5 and compare Naton  v. Bank of Cal., 649
                          ______    ___ _______ _____     ____________

          F.2d  691, 700  (9th  Cir. 1981)  (holding  that district  courts

          possess discretion  to deduct  collateral benefits from  back pay

          awards in ADEA cases)  with Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp.,  695 F.2d
                                 ____ ________    ______________

          343,  347 (9th  Cir.  1982) (holding  in  a Title  VII  case that

          "unemployment benefits  received by a successful  plaintiff in an

          employment  discrimination  action  are  not  offsets  against  a

          backpay award").

                    While we tend to agree with those courts that have held

          the  interplay between collateral benefits  and back pay  to be a

          matter  within  the district  court's  discretion,6  we need  not
                              
          ____________________

               5The Eighth Circuit recently noted this "possible conflict."
          Gaworski v. ITT  Commercial Fin.  Corp., 17 F.3d  1104, 1112  n.7
          ________    ___________________________
          (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 355 (1994).
                      _____ ______

               6In addition  to the cases catalogued  above, several trial-
          level cases in this circuit  take the same position.  See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____
          Townsend v. Grey Line Bus Co.,  597 F. Supp. 1287, 1293 (D. Mass.
          ________    _________________
          1984) ("The better  view . . .  is that the recovery  of back pay
          under Title VII is an equitable remedy intended primarily to make

                                          13

          decide that precise question today.  Even if we assume, arguendo,
                                                                  ________

          that granting discretion to  district courts to deduct collateral

          benefits from back pay awards is problematic, front  pay presents

          an easier  call.  After all,  the dispensation of front  pay   if

          only because  of its relatively speculative  nature, see Wildman,
                                                               ___ _______

          771  F.2d at 616   is  necessarily less mechanical than back pay,

          and  the amount of front pay    if only because of its predictive

          aspect   is necessarily less certain than back pay, see Hukkanen,
                                                              ___ ________

          3 F.3d at 286.  For these reasons, front pay is much more heavily

          dependent than back pay upon the district court's exercise of its

          informed  discretion.7    Consequently,  whether  or  not  courts

          possess  the  authority  to  tailor  back  pay  awards   to  take

          collateral  benefits into account   a question that we leave open

          for the  time  being    we are  confident that  they possess  the

          authority to tailor awards of front pay in that manner.

                    2.  The  Nature of  Equity.  Beyond  the relevant  case
                    2.  The  Nature of  Equity.
                        ______________________

                              
          ____________________

          the victim  of discrimination whole."),  aff'd, 767 F.2d  11 (1st
                                                   _____
          Cir. 1985); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's Inc., 521 F. Supp. 238, 242-
                      _______    __________________
          43  (D. Mass.  1981) (exercising  equitable discretion  to deduct
          unemployment  benefits  from  the plaintiff's  back  pay  award),
          aff'd, 717  F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1983),  cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904
          _____                                  _____ ______
          (1984); see also Crosby v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 624 F. Supp.
                  ___ ____ ______    ________________________
          487, 491  (D. Mass.  1985) (predicting in  an ADEA case  that the
          First  Circuit  will likely  allow  district  courts to  exercise
          discretion in tailoring back pay awards to account for collateral
          benefits).

               7To illustrate this point, we remind the reader that,  while
          front pay is fully  within the district court's discretion,  back
          pay is a presumptive entitlement  of a plaintiff who successfully
          prosecutes an  employment  discrimination case.   Compare,  e.g.,
                                                            _______   ____
          Wildman, 771 F.2d at 615 with Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1, 6 (1st
          _______                  ____ _____    ______
          Cir. 1982),  cert.  dismissed, 461  U.S.  920 (1983),  and  cert.
                       _____  _________                          ___  _____
          denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
          ______

                                          14

          law, our decision is informed by the nature of equity itself.  In

          particular,  the abstract  imposition  of  a black-or-white  rule

          regarding the relevance of collateral benefits, even if otherwise

          desirable, would simply not  comport with the essential character

          and function of equitable discretion.   And, though modern  civil

          practice for  the most  part merges  equity  with law,  equitable

          discretion remains a salient part of our legal system.  See Ralph
                                                                  ___

          A. Newman, Equity and Law:  A Comparative Study 50-53 (1961); see
                     ____________________________________               ___

          also  Roscoe   Pound,  Introduction  to  Newman,   supra,  at  10
          ____                   ____________                _____

          (suggesting  heightened importance  of  principles  of  equitable

          discretion "in applying legal precepts and remedies").

                    Historically, equity powers emerged in response to  the

          rigidity of the common  law, especially the impersonal generality

          of  the remedies it  afforded.  See, e.g.,  Harold J. Berman, Law
                                          ___  ____                     ___

          and  Revolution:   The Formation  of the Western  Legal Tradition
          _________________________________________________________________

          518-19 (1983); Peter C. Hoffer, The  Law's Conscience:  Equitable
                                          _________________________________

          Constitutionalism  in America 8-16 (1990).  As Lord Ellesmere put
          _____________________________

          it:  "The Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions

          are so  divers and infinite,  That it  is impossible to  make any

          general Law which may  aptly meet with every particular  Act, and

          not fail in  some Circumstances."  Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng.
                                             _____________________

          Rep. 485, 486 (1615).  Hence, "[t]he  Office of the Chancellor is

          . .  . to soften and  mollify the Extremity of  the Law .  . . ."

          Id.  Because the  hallmarks of equity have long  been flexibility
          ___

          and  particularity, the imposition of  a rigid rule,  pro or con,

          concerning the interrelationship between collateral  benefits and

                                          15

          front  pay (an  equitable remedy) would  be incongruent  with the

          historic and essential conception of equity.  In contrast, a rule

          that  confers latitude  upon  the district  court  to handle  the

          interface  between collateral benefits  and front pay differently

          in  different  cases  is   fully  consistent  with  this  storied

          heritage.

                    For these reasons, we conclude that  the decision as to

          whether  to tailor  a  front  pay  award  to  take  into  account

          collateral  benefits  is,  and  must  be,  within  the  equitable

          discretion of the nisi prius court.
                            ____ _____

                    On much the  same basis,  we do not  believe that  this

          discretion  is  rigidly  circumscribed   by  the  source  of  the
                                                            ______

          collateral benefits.8   We  consider the  source of a  collateral

          benefit to be informative, but not dispositive.   That is to say,

          because the  district court's decision about whether it should or

          should  not tailor  a front  pay award  to dovetail  with certain

          collateral benefits  is discretionary,  we think it  follows that

                              
          ____________________

               8The parties attach great significance to the source of  the
          benefits.   The Service argues that the collateral source rule is
          peculiarly inappropriate here because both  the front pay and the
          collateral benefits emanate  from the same  source   the  federal
          government.   Lussier  sees  no such  special  relationship.   He
          advocates  that we  judge the  parcel not  by its  wrapping, but,
          rather,  by its contents, and asseverates that the post office is
          an independent entity distinct  from other federal agencies, such
          as the  Veterans  Administration.   In his  view, therefore,  the
          front pay and the collateral benefits do not derive from the same
          source, and there is  all the more reason to apply the collateral
          source   rule  simpliciter.      Since   the   district   court's
                         ___________
          discretionary decision in this case is sustainable without regard
          to the source  of the benefits,  we need not  decide the  precise
          relationship between  the  post office  and  other parts  of  the
          federal apparatus.

                                          16

          the defendant's status as  the source (or not) of  the collateral

          benefit comprises, at  the most,  one factor of  many within  the

          mailbag of  discretionary considerations.  Here,  too, the nature

          and function of equity jurisprudence guide our reasoning.

                    To  be  sure, equity  is not  blind  to the  reality of

          events.  The fact that the  payer of damages and the dispenser of

          a  collateral benefit  are one  and the  same,  or that  they are

          linked in some  economically meaningful sense, tends to  make the

          deployment of  the collateral source  rule less attractive.   See
                                                                        ___

          Smith v. OPM,  778 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
          _____    ___

          the collateral  source rule may  lack force "when  the collateral

          source is  the defendant"), cert.  denied, 476 U.S.  1105 (1986);
                                      _____  ______

          Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542  F.2d at 591 (similar); Olivas
          _____________________________                              ______

          v.  United  States,  506  F.2d  1158,  1163-64  (9th  Cir.  1974)
              ______________

          (similar); see  also 2  Dobbs, supra,    8.6(2), at  491.   It is
                     ___  ____           _____

          nonetheless easy to  imagine scenarios in  which the totality  of

          equitable  considerations  favors  the  rule's  strict invocation

          regardless  of any  affinity  between payer  and  dispenser.   To

          recognize a  mechanical same-source  exception to the  rule would

          deny  district  courts  the   discretion  to  weigh  these  other

          considerations  and,  thus, would  offend  the  logic of  equity.

          Accordingly,  we decline  the  parties' invitations  to view  the

          source of a collateral benefit, without more, as determinative of

          whether  the benefit should be taken into account in fashioning a

          front pay award.

                             B.  Application of the Law.
                             B.  Application of the Law.
                                 ______________________

                                          17

                    Having surveyed the legal landscape, we now turn to the

          decision  below.   Though we  review a  district court's  factual

          findings in a bench trial only for clear error, see, e.g., Reilly
                                                          ___  ____  ______

          v.  United States,  863  F.2d  149,  163  (1st  Cir.  1988);  RCI
              _____________                                             ___

          Northeast  Servs. Div. v. Boston Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 201-02
          ______________________    _________________

          (1st Cir. 1987),  we review  its ultimate decision  to impose  or

          withhold equitable remedies for abuse of  discretion.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Shore, 42 F.3d at  377-78; Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889
          _____                      ______________    _______________

          F.2d  314, 323  (1st Cir. 1989)  (en banc)  (listing cases).   In

          general,  the abuse  of  discretion framework  is not  appellant-

          friendly.   See  Dopp v.  Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239,  1253 (1st Cir.
                      ___  ____     ________

          1994) (predicting that most appeals from discretionary  decisions

          of the district courts  will come to naught).  If  we are to find

          an abuse of discretion, the appellant ordinarily must persuade us

          that  the   lower  court   "committed  `a  meaningful   error  in

          judgment.'"  Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 323 (quoting Anderson v.
                       ______________                           ________

          Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)).9
          _____________
                              
          ____________________

               9At a more refined level,  we have focused appellate  review
          on the following considerations:

                    In making discretionary judgments, a district
                    court abuses its  discretion when a  relevant
                    factor  deserving  of  significant weight  is
                    overlooked, or  when  an improper  factor  is
                    accorded  significant  weight,  or  when  the
                    court  considers  the   appropriate  mix   of
                    factors,  but  commits  a  palpable  error of
                    judgment   in   calibrating  the   decisional
                    scales.

          United  States v.  Roberts,  978 F.2d  17,  21 (1st  Cir.  1992).
          ______________     _______
          Whether the  district court's decision is  viewed macroscopically
          or microscopically, however, the appellate focus is fundamentally
          the same.

                                          18

                    In  employment  discrimination  cases,   the  abuse-of-

          discretion  standard is  necessarily  informed  by the  statutory

          purposes at stake.  See, e.g., Albemarle Paper  Co. v. Moody, 422
                              ___  ____  ____________________    _____

          U.S. 405, 417  (1975); Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d at
                                 _____________________________

          583  n.2.   In mulling  Title VII,  the Court  has distilled  two

          primary  purposes from  the  statute:   the  need to  create  and

          maintain a level, discrimination-free  playing field and the need

          to make  victims  of  discrimination  whole.    See  McKennon  v.
                                                          ___  ________

          Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995); Albemarle
          __________________________                              _________

          Paper,  422 U.S.  at 417-18.    Thus, front  pay  awards must  be
          _____

          gauged, at least in  part, against the twin goals  of eradicating

          discrimination and ameliorating the harm that it has caused.  See
                                                                        ___

          Shore, 42 F.3d at 378; Thompson, 678 F.2d at 292.  On this basis,
          _____                  ________

          then, investigating  the  soundness of  any remedial  award in  a

          Title  VII case  entails two  inquiries:   (1) Does  the district

          court's  decision  serve  "to   achieve  equality  of  employment

          opportunity and remove barriers that have operated in the past to

          favor an identifiable group of .  . . employees"?  Griggs v. Duke
                                                             ______    ____

          Power Co.,  401 U.S. 424, 429-30  (1971).  (2) Does  the district
          _________

          court's  decision  serve  "to  make persons  whole  for  injuries

          suffered  on  account  of  unlawful  employment  discrimination"?

          Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418.
          _______________

                    When addressed to the district court's front pay award,

          these  queries yield no sign  of discretion misused.   Taking the

          inquiries in reverse order, the fit  between the district court's

          action and the second of the two statutory objects   compensation

                                          19

            cannot be gainsaid.  The root purpose of the challenged  offset

          is to  prevent overcompensation  and, thus, the  district court's

          decision  faithfully  serves the  goal  of  making the  plaintiff

          whole.  No more is exigible in this respect.   See, e.g., Wyoming
                                                         ___  ____  _______

          Retirement Sys., 771 F.2d at 1431; Orzel, 697 F.2d at 756.
          _______________                    _____

                    The district court's  decision is also  sufficiently in

          service to the  first of the  two statutory objects:  deterrence.

          While  any consideration that holds down the amount of a monetary

          judgment  can  be said  to lessen  the  deterrent effect  of that

          judgment,  we believe that the relevant inquiry is broader in its

          scope.  Deterrence  is a function of  degree, and nothing in  the

          Rehabilitation  Act  or  in the  case  law  commands  that it  be

          maximized at  all costs.   This  practical wisdom has  particular

          force where, as here,  maximizing deterrence might well interfere

          with the measured achievement  of other statutory goals.10   Even

          short  of  maximization,  the  statutory  purpose  can  be  fully

          satisfied  so long as  deterrence is meaningfully  achieved.  Cf.
                                                                        ___

          Navarro-Ayala  v. Nunez,  968  F.2d 1421,  1427  (1st Cir.  1992)
          _____________     _____

          (holding,  in the context of Fed. R.  Civ. P. 11, that a monetary
                              
          ____________________

               10We  add  that,  as   between  the  two  primary  statutory
          purposes, the goal of compensation, and not deterrence, is likely
          the more  important in regard to front pay.  After all, the basic
          function  of  a   front  pay   award  is  to   make  victims   of
          discrimination whole.   See Wildman,  771 F.2d at  615; see  also
                                  ___ _______                     ___  ____
          EEOC v. Prudential Fed.  Sav. & Loan  Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166,  1173
          ____    ___________________________________
          (10th  Cir.)  (explaining  that  front pay  "assur[es]  that  the
          aggrieved party is returned as nearly as possible to the economic
          situation he would  have enjoyed but for  the defendant's illegal
          conduct"), cert. denied, 474  U.S. 946 (1985).  For  that reason,
                     _____ ______
          an abuse of  discretion ordinarily  will not lie  when the  trial
          court, in the process of making the plaintiff whole   no more, no
          less   happens to produce a marginal diminution of deterrence.

                                          20

          sanction aimed at deterrence is most appropriate "when the amount

          of  the  sanction  falls  within  the  minimum  range  reasonably

          required   [effectively]  to   deter   the  abusive   behavior");

          Graefenhain, 870 F.2d at 1213 & n.9 (noting, in calculating front
          ___________

          pay, that a court's "own vision of `optimal deterrence'" is not a

          sufficient basis  "to engraft additional remedies  on a statutory

          scheme  which is  predominantly compensatory");  Enterprise Ass'n
                                                           ________________

          Steamfitters, 542 F.2d  at 592 (finding "no compelling  reason of
          ____________

          deterrence" that would justify  "providing the injured party with

          double  recovery   for  his  lost  employment").     Here,  every

          indication  is that  the  district court's  award  of front  pay,

          handsome eventhough diminished,packs an adequatedeterrent effect.

                    We add a  postscript:    viewing a  front pay award  in

          isolation for  the purpose  of measuring its  contribution toward

          the  goals of an antidiscrimination statute is risky business.  A

          front  pay award   like any other  single strand in a tapestry of

          relief   must be assessed as a part of the entire remedial fabric

          that the  trial court has fashioned  in a particular  case.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1990)
          ____  _______    ______________

          (holding that the  district court acted within  its discretion in

          denying front  pay entirely because other  relief, including back

          pay, prejudgment interest, and  attorneys' fees, sufficed to make

          the plaintiff whole).  This holistic principle takes into account

          the  fact that the finding  of liability, in  addition to setting

          the  stage  for  relief  and  thereby  furthering  the  goals  of

          compensation   and   deterrence,   itself   sends    a   valuable

                                          21

          informational signal.   See, e.g.,  McKennon, 115 S.  Ct. at  885
                                  ___  ____   ________

          (explaining  that  the  goals  of  an  employment  discrimination

          statute  are  advanced by  a  finding  of discrimination  because

          "disclosure  through litigation of  incidents or  practices which

          violate national  policies  respecting nondiscrimination  in  the

          work force is itself important").

                    We sum up by  remarking the obvious:   decisions within

          the world of equity  by their nature reflect judicial  efforts to

          balance competing  centrifugal and  centripetal forces.   In this

          instance,  the  district  court  struck  an  entirely  reasonable

          balance  between  the goals  of  fair  compensation and  adequate

          deterrence.   Mindful  of  the breadth  of  the district  court's

          discretion in such matters, we affirm its decision to award front

          pay to  the  plaintiff, but  to  tailor the  award to  take  into

          account the collateral VA  benefits that he received as  a result

          of his unlawful discharge.11

          III.  LATE-ARRIVING EVIDENCE
          III.  LATE-ARRIVING EVIDENCE

                    In  general, the  view  that we  take  of the  flexible

          interplay  between  front  pay  and the  collateral  source  rule

                              
          ____________________

               11The  Service  complains  that  the lower  court  erred  in
          figuring the amount of VA benefits used to reduce Lussier's front
          pay award.  Because  the factfinder's choice between two  or more
          permissible  views  of  the  evidence cannot  be  deemed  clearly
          erroneous, see Cumpiano  v. Banco Santander  P.R., 902 F.2d  148,
                     ___ ________     _____________________
          152  (1st Cir.  1990), we  reject this  complaint (which,  in any
          event, is anchored in an overly optimistic reading of the record)
          out of hand.

                                          22

          extends  to  CSRS  benefits.12    Withal,  the  district  court's

          handling of these benefits gives us pause.

                    During  the  trial,  reference  was made  to  Lussier's

          eligibility  for  a  CSRS  disability retirement  annuity.    The

          government advanced a rough estimate of the  monthly stipend that

          Lussier  would  likely  receive.   Dissatisfied  with  the  trial

          evidence on this subject, the district court ordered "the parties

          to file  within  30 days  a  status report  concerning  Lussier's

          application for  CSRS disability benefits."   Lussier I,  1994 WL
                                                        _________

          129776, at  *11.   Lussier,  though objecting  vigorously to  the

          directive, submitted  some  information anent  interim  payments.

          The Service offered no assistance.  Eventually, the court reduced

          its  planned front pay award based on  the new information.  Both

          parties appeal.

                    Lussier  contends   that  the  entire   enterprise  was

          procedurally infirm; that the Service failed  to prove the amount

          of any purported offset,  thus rendering the issue moot;  and, in

          all events, that the collateral  source rule should have operated

          to disqualify the CSRS  benefits from consideration in connection

          with the front pay award.  For its part, the  Service asseverates

          that the court erred in not  using the estimate of CSRS  benefits

          introduced at trial,  or, alternatively, in not granting its Rule

          59(e)  motion and using  the more precise  figure limned therein.
                              
          ____________________

               12Lussier argues that CSRS benefits arise, at least in part,
          out  of employee  contributions,  and, therefore,  should not  be
          treated  in the  same manner  as other  collateral benefits.   We
          express no opinion on this aspect of the matter.  Lussier can, of
          course, renew the argument before the district court on remand.

                                          23

          Since  we   give  our  stamp  of  approval   to  Lussier's  first

          contention, we need not address the parties' other points.

                    Typically, a district  court's decision  to reopen  the

          record for the purpose of receiving additional evidence engenders

          an  exercise of the  court's discretion, reviewable  for abuse of

          that discretion.  See  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine  Research,
                            ___  __________________    ____________________

          Inc.,  401  U.S. 321,  331-32  (1971); Briscoe  v.  Fred's Dollar
          ____                                   _______      _____________

          Store,  Inc.,  24  F.3d  1026,  1028  (8th  Cir.  1994);  Natural
          ____________                                              _______

          Resources Defense Council, Inc.  v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg.,  Inc., 2
          _______________________________     __________________________

          F.3d 493, 504 (3d Cir. 1993);  Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.  v.
                                         ______________________________

          Gulf Ins.  Co., 837 F.2d  767, 773  (7th Cir. 1988).   This  rule
          ______________

          pertains even when the  district court opts to reopen  the record

          on its own initiative.  See, e.g., Calage v. University of Tenn.,
                                  ___  ____  ______    ___________________

          544 F.2d 297, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1976)  (upholding district court's

          sua   sponte  solicitation   and   consideration  of   post-trial
          ___   ______

          evidentiary submissions in  employment discrimination suit);  see
                                                                        ___

          also Briscoe, 24 F.3d at 1028.  Here, however, the district court
          ____ _______

            despite what it said    did not reopen the record; instead, the

          court, over  the plaintiff's  objection, engaged in  a unilateral

          pursuit of additional evidence  without affording the parties the

          standard prophylaxis  that generally  obtains at trial.13   While

          we  do  not doubt  the court's  good intentions    the  judge was

          clearly motivated by concerns of judicial economy and a desire to

                              
          ____________________

               13These  protections include,  but are  not limited  to, the
          right  to object to evidence,  the right to  question its source,
          relevance,  and  reliability,  the  right  to  cross-examine  its
          proponent, and the right to impeach or contradict it.

                                          24

          be fair to all  parties   it  chose a mode of  evidence-gathering

          that  offends accepted  practice  and  contradicts existing  law.

          Therefore, we  must sustain Lussier's preserved  objection to it.

          And, moreover,  because the  error affected substantial  rights  

          the  court  used  the  extra-record  information  anent   interim

          payments  to reduce  the  amount of  the  front pay  award    the

          judgment must be vacated.  We explain briefly.

                    It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that

          a factfinder  may not  consider extra-record  evidence concerning

          disputed adjudicative facts.  A good illustration of this precept

          in operation can be found in the realm of judicial notice.  Under

          Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), a judge may take notice of an  adjudicative

          fact only if it is "not subject to reasonable dispute  in that it

          is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction

          of  the  trial  court  or  (2)  capable  of  accurate  and  ready

          determination  by   resort  to  sources  whose   accuracy  cannot

          reasonably  be questioned."   Courts  have  tended to  apply Rule

          201(b) stringently   and well  they might, for accepting disputed

          evidence not tested in the crucible of trial is a sharp departure

          from  standard  practice.   Hence,  in  Cooperativa de  Ahorro  y
                                                  _________________________

          Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody &  Co., 993 F.2d 269 (1st  Cir.
          ______________    ______________________

          1993), petition for  cert. filed  (U.S. Oct. 12,  1993) (No.  93-
                 _________________________

          564), we held that the district court exceeded the bounds of Rule

          201(b)   by  gleaning   information   supposedly  known   "within

          institutional investment circles" from financial periodicals that

          were not offered into evidence.  See id. at 272-73; see also Barr
                                           ___ ___            ___ ____ ____

                                          25

          Rubber Prods. Co.  v. Sun Rubber Co., 425  F.2d 1114, 1125-26 (2d
          _________________     ______________

          Cir.) (stating similar legal tenets),  cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878
                                                 _____ ______

          (1970).

                    In  this case, the  court's acquisition of extra-record

          information  by special  delivery is  similarly beyond  the pale.

          Its  actions cannot be justified under the first furculum of Rule

          201(b).  Facts that  are "generally known within  the territorial

          jurisdiction  of the  trial court"  are those  that exist  in the

          unrefreshed, unaided recollection of the  populace at large.  See
                                                                        ___

          21 Charles A. Wright  & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,  Federal Practice
                                                           ________________

          and Procedure    5105, at 489 (1977).  Though a court, under this
          _____________

          rubric,  may take judicial notice  of such varied  matters as the

          "traditional features of  a snowman," Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall
                                                _______________    ________

          Field &  Co.,  675 F.2d  498,  500 n.1  (2d  Cir. 1982),  or  the
          ____________

          popularity of certain reusable containers, Price Food Co. v. Good
                                                     ______________    ____

          Foods,   Inc.,  400  F.2d  662,  665  (6th  Cir.  1968),  or  the
          _____________

          impossibility of driving from one place to another in a specified

          period of  time, United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 332
                           _____________    ________

          (D.R.I. 1981),  it is  pellucid  that the  facts surrounding  the

          interim CSRS payments    the amount received, how the  amount was

          derived,  its significance  in  relation to  the  likely size  of

          Lussier's disability  retirement annuity,  and the  relevance (if

          any) of the interim  benefits to front  pay   never achieved  the

          requisite level of popular familiarity.

                    By like token, the  evidence also fails to  satisfy the

                                          26

          second  branch of  Rule  201(b).    Court records  aside,14  some

          government documents are subject to judicial notice (albeit under

          certain  limited  conditions)  on  the  ground  that  information

          contained therein is "capable of accurate and ready determination

          by  resort  to  sources   whose  accuracy  cannot  reasonably  be

          questioned."  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322,
                        ___  ____  _____________    ________

          323 n.2 (1977)  (per curiam) (taking  judicial notice of  fishery

          licenses as  reflected  in  the  records  of  the  Coast  Guard's

          Merchant Vessel Documentation Division).  The information here at

          issue  does not reach this safe harbor.   In the first place, the

          information  is not contained  in generally  available government

          records.  Second,  the court did not acquire  it by direct resort

          to any  public record,  but, rather, through  untested unilateral
             ___

          submissions.   Third, a  monetary figure affecting  a plaintiff's

          ultimate award, even though  eventually quantifiable, seems to us

          to  be the  sort  of disputed  adjudicative  fact for  which  the

          adversarial truth-finding process is  well suited.  And, finally,

          the  court gave  the parties  no real  opportunity to  address or

          counter the gleaned evidence.15
                              
          ____________________

               14Because  courts  may take  judicial  notice  of their  own
          records and the records  of sister tribunals under a  special set
          of rules,  see generally 21  Wright &  Graham, supra,    5106, at
                     ___ _________                       _____
          256-57  (Supp.  1994),  we   exempt  court  documents  from  this
          discourse.

               15Westcott forms  an  interesting  contrast  to  this  case.
                 ________
          There,  in  addition  to   the  qualitative  differences  in  the
          information  sought and in the  data source upon  which the court
          relied, "[t]he parties  were given an  opportunity to comment  on
          the  propriety of [the Court's] taking notice of the license, and
          both  sides agreed that [the  Court] could properly  do so."  433
          U.S. at 323 n.2.  Neither of these conditions obtains here.

                                          27

                    Ours is a system  that seeks the discovery of  truth by

          means of a managed  adversarial relationship between the parties.

          If we  were to allow  judges to bypass  this system, even  in the

          interest of furthering efficiency or promoting  judicial economy,

          we  would subvert this ultimate purpose.  As Rule 201(b) teaches,

          judges  may not  defenestrate established  evidentiary processes,

          thereby rendering  inoperative the  standard mechanisms of  proof

          and scrutiny, if the evidence in question is at all vulnerable to

          reasonable dispute.

                    Here,  the  district  court  failed to  steer  by  this

          beacon.   There is  no indication,  despite the  court's contrary

          characterization,16  that the  record  was actually  reopened  or

          that   the  parties  were  afforded  anything  approximating  the

          evidentiary  and  procedural  guarantees   to  which  they   were

          entitled.   Similarly,  there is  no basis  for finding  that the

          parties  waived  this  deprivation,   consented  to  the  court's

          shortcut, or  otherwise invited  judicial reliance on  the extra-

          record "proof."  To the  extent that the judgment is  premised on

          this late-arriving evidence, it cannot stand.

                              
          ____________________

               16The  district court paid  lip service to  the principle we
          have discussed, writing that  it had "reopened the record."   But
          the parties  agree that no actual reopening occurred, and calling
          what  the  court did  a "reopening"  does not  make  it so.   Cf.
                                                                        ___
          Siegfriedt v. Fair, 982 F.2d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1992) ("With Juliet
          __________    ____
          we ask `What's in a name?' and with her we conclude `[t]hat which
          we call  a  rose  by any  other  name would  smell  as  sweet.'")
          (quoting William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2).
                                        ________________

                                          28

                    Accordingly, we  vacate the judgment and  remand.17  We

          neither dictate how  the district court should  proceed on remand

          nor  restrict  its  range  of  options.    For instance,  without

          limiting  the generality of the  foregoing, the court  may in its

          discretion choose to reopen  the record fully for the  purpose of

          obtaining more information about Lussier's CSRS benefits, and, if

          the court follows that path, it can then decide what, if any, use

          to make of the new evidence.  Alternatively, the court may, if it

          so elects, hold the parties to their proof at trial and determine

          the front pay award on the existing record.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    We have  reached the point  at which neither  snow, nor

          rain,  nor heat, nor gloom of night, nor any lingering unresolved

          issue impedes  the delivery of our judgment.  Thus, we need go no

          further.

                    We  hold that the adjustment of a front pay award under

          the Rehabilitation Act  of 1973 to take collateral  benefits into

          account is within the equitable discretion of the district court;

          and that,  in this case,  the court,  by choosing to  account for

          collateral benefits  in fashioning such  an award, did  not abuse
                              
          ____________________

               17We neither  overlook  nor condone  the Service's  cavalier
          disregard  of the  district judge's  request for  status reports.
          Had  the judge  scrapped the  proposed offset  as a  sanction for
          uncooperative behavior, a different issue would confront us.  Cf.
                                                                        ___
          R.W.  Int'l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc.,  937 F.2d 11, 19-20 & n.9
          _________________    _________________
          (1st Cir. 1991).   Here,  however, the judge  did not purpose  to
          sanction the Service  but instead decided a  hotly disputed issue
          in the case based partly on extra-record information.  As we have
          indicated  on other  occasions, even  when a  party is  guilty of
          "lollygagging  that a district court should not have to tolerate,
          two wrongs seldom make a right."  Id. at 20.
                                            ___

                                          29

          its  discretion.    But  because  the  court,  in  calculating  a

          particular  offset,  relied on  evidence  dehors  the record,  we
                                                    ______

          vacate the  judgment and remand for  further proceedings relating

          to that offset.

                    Affirmed in  part, vacated in part, and remanded.  Each
                    Affirmed in  part, vacated in part, and remanded.  Each
                    ________________________________________________   ____

          party shall  bear his  own counsel  fees and costs  in regard  to
          party shall  bear his  own counsel  fees and costs  in regard  to
          _________________________________________________________________

          these appeals.
          these appeals.
          _____________

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