Court Opinion

ID: 9890543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 15:01:41.977144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:26.809967
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1048   Document: 45     Page: 1    Filed: 10/13/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

           FINJAN LLC, FKA FINJAN, INC.,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                  SONICWALL, INC.,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-1048
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in No. 5:17-cv-04467-BLF,
 Judge Beth Labson Freeman.
                 ______________________

                Decided: October 13, 2023
                 ______________________

     JUANITA ROSE BROOKS, Fish & Richardson, PC, San Di-
 ego, CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
 by JASON W. WOLFF; MICHAEL JOHN BALLANCO, Washing-
 ton, DC; ROBERT COURTNEY, Minneapolis, MN.

     MATTHEW CHRISTOPHER GAUDET, Duane Morris LLP,
 Atlanta, GA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by JOHN R. GIBSON; JARRAD GUNTHER, ROBERT M.
 PALUMBOS, JOSEPH POWERS, Philadelphia, PA; PIERRE J.
 HUBERT, Austin, TX.
                 ______________________
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 2                                FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 Before REYNA, BRYSON, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM.
 Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by
                 Circuit Judge BRYSON.
 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
     Finjan LLC sued SonicWall, Inc. for patent infringe-
 ment in the United States District Court for the Northern
 District of California. Because the district court based its
 judgment of invalidity on a collateral estoppel decision that
 we have since vacated, we vacate the district court’s judg-
 ment of invalidity and remand for further proceedings. We
 also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
 of noninfringement and the district court’s decision to ex-
 clude Finjan’s expert analysis.
                       I.   BACKGROUND
     Finjan asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,677,494, 6,154,844,
 6,804,780, and 7,613,926 (collectively, the “Downloadable
 Patents”), as well as U.S. Patent No. 8,225,408 (the “ARB
 Patent”) (collectively, the “Asserted Patents”), among oth-
 ers. J.A. 294–95 (Complaint ¶ 57); Amended Complaint
 ¶¶ 9, 15, 18, 27, 33, Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc., No.
 5:17-CV-04467-BLF (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2018) (“Amended
 Complaint”). Finjan alleged patent infringement as to Son-
 icWall’s (1) Gateways; (2) Email Security products (“ES
 products”); and (3) Capture Advanced Threat Protection
 (“Capture ATP”), among other products. J.A. 42 (Summary
 Judgment Order); see also J.A. 289–94 (Complaint);
 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 46–56.
     The Downloadable Patents relate to ways to protect
 network-connectable devices from undesirable down-
 loadable operations. See, e.g., ’494 patent col. 1 ll. 60–63;
 ’844 patent col. 1 ll. 23–27; ’780 patent col. 1 ll. 31–34; ’926
 patent col. 1 ll. 37–40. Each claim of the Downloadable Pa-
 tents requires interacting with a “Downloadable” or
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                             3

 “incoming Downloadable.” For example, claim 10 of the
 ’494 patent recites:
     10. A system for managing Downloadables, com-
     prising:
         a receiver for receiving an incoming Down-
         loadable;
         a Downloadable scanner coupled with said
         receiver, for deriving security profile data
         for the Downloadable, including a list of
         suspicious computer operations that may
         be attempted by the Downloadable; and
         a database manager coupled with said
         Downloadable scanner, for storing the
         Downloadable security profile data in a da-
         tabase.
 ’494 patent col. 22 ll. 7–16.
     The ARB Patent relates to adaptive, rule-based content
 scanners that scan mobile content for exploits to facilitate
 network security. ’408 patent col. 1 ll. 19–20, 65–66. Claim
 1 of the ARB Patent recites:
     1. A computer processor-based multi-lingual
     method for scanning incoming program code, com-
     prising:
         receiving, by a computer, an incoming
         stream of program code;
         determining, by the computer, any specific
         one of a plurality of programming lan-
         guages in which the incoming stream is
         written;
         instantiating, by the computer, a scanner
         for the specific programming language, in
         response to said determining, the scanner
         comprising parser rules and analyzer rules
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 4                                    FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

         for the specific programming language,
         wherein the parser rules define certain pat-
         terns in terms of tokens, tokens being lexi-
         cal constructs for the specific programming
         language, and wherein the analyzer rules
         identify certain combinations of tokens and
         patterns as being indicators of potential ex-
         ploits, exploits being portions of program
         code that are malicious;
         identifying, by the computer, individual to-
         kens within the incoming stream;
         dynamically building, by the computer
         while said receiving receives the incoming
         stream, a parse tree whose nodes represent
         tokens and patterns in accordance with the
         parser rules;
         dynamically detecting, by the computer
         while said dynamically building builds the
         parse tree, combinations of nodes in the
         parse tree which are indicators of potential
         exploits, based on the analyzer rules; and
         indicating, by the computer, the presence of
         potential exploits within the incoming
         stream, based on said dynamically detect-
         ing.
 Id. col. 19 l. 45 to col. 20 l. 7.
     SonicWall filed a motion seeking judgment of invalidity
 as to the asserted claims of the ’780, ’844, and ’494 patents
 due to collateral estoppel based on a decision in related pro-
 ceedings finding the claims of the ’780 and ’844 patents in-
 valid for indefiniteness. Finjan LLC v. SonicWall, Inc., No.
 17-CV-04467-BLF, 2021 WL 3111685, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July
 22, 2021) (“Collateral Estoppel Order”); see Finjan, Inc. v.
 ESET, LLC, No. 3:17-CV-0183-CAB-BGS, 2021 WL
 1241143, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021) (“ESET”). The
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                             5

 district court agreed with SonicWall and granted judgment
 of invalidity due to collateral estoppel and indefiniteness
 as to claims of the ’844, ’780, and ’494 patents. Collateral
 Estoppel Order at *5. Subsequently, in the ESET case
 which provided the underlying support for the Collateral
 Estoppel Order, Finjan appealed the district court’s grant
 of summary judgment of invalidity. Finjan LLC v. ESET,
 LLC, 51 F.4th 1377, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2022). On appeal
 in the related ESET case, we vacated the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment of invalidity due to indefinite-
 ness and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1384.
      During claim construction, the parties agreed that
 “Downloadable” means “an executable application pro-
 gram, which is downloaded from a source computer and
 run on the destination computer.” Finjan LLC v. Son-
 icWall, Inc., No. 17-CV-04467-BLF, 2019 WL 1369938, at
 *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (“Claim Construction Order”)
 (emphasis added). Based on this construction, SonicWall
 moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of cer-
 tain claims of the Downloadable Patents, arguing that its
 Gateway products could not infringe those claims because
 they never receive “Downloadables”—“executable applica-
 tion program[s]”—and instead, their Gateway products re-
 ceive and inspect packets without extracting the data or
 reassembling the file within. 1 J.A. 44, 55–56 (Summary
 Judgment Order) (emphasis added). As explained by the
 district court, the parties’ disagreement centered on
 “whether a device receives or obtains a Downloadable when
 it receives a sequence of packets of an executable file, but

     1   For this noninfringement theory, the claims in Son-
 icWall’s motion were claims 10 and 14 of the ’494 patent,
 claims 41 and 43 of the ’844 patent, and claim 9 of the ’780
 patent. J.A. 44. For ease of reference, we refer to these
 claims as the asserted claims of the Downloadable Patents
 or asserted claims throughout this opinion.
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 6                               FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 never re-assembles the packets into a final executable file
 format.” J.A. 57. The district court concluded that Finjan
 failed to present evidence that the accused Gateway prod-
 ucts “ever possess a reassembled file or executable applica-
 tion” or that “unassembled packets are an executable
 application program that can run on a destination com-
 puter.” J.A. 57–58. Thus, the district court granted sum-
 mary judgment of noninfringement of the asserted claims
 of the Downloadable Patents. 2 J.A. 58.
     SonicWall also moved for summary judgment of nonin-
 fringement of the asserted claims of the ARB Patent, argu-
 ing that the relevant limitations needed to be completed by
 the same computer. J.A. 58. The district court agreed with
 SonicWall’s interpretation of the claims and concluded that
 the recited claim limitations “must be performed by the
 same computer.” J.A. 64. Because the parties did not dis-
 pute that “(1) Capture ATP and Gateways and (2) Capture
 ATP and ES products involve separate, remote comput-
 ers,” 3 the district court granted summary judgment of non-
 infringement for the asserted claims of the ARB Patent. Id.

     2    While the district court’s order did not discuss
 claim 22 of the ’926 patent, the parties agreed that its anal-
 ysis on this issue applied equally to that claim and stipu-
 lated to judgment of noninfringement of that claim. J.A.
 15792 (Stipulation and Order); Appellant’s Br. 33 n.6.
      3   Finjan argued in a motion for reconsideration that
 there remained a factual dispute as to whether “(1) Cap-
 ture ATP and its Gateway and (2) Capture ATP and its ES
 [products] each work together to act as a unified computer
 system to form the steps as Finjan alleges.” J.A. 88 (Re-
 consideration Order). The district court found that Finjan
 failed to raise this argument in its opposition to summary
 judgment briefing, and that even considering the argu-
 ment’s merits, operating as a unified computer system
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                               7

     SonicWall also filed a motion in limine to exclude cer-
 tain opinions of Finjan’s experts, which the district court
 granted. J.A. 111 (Motions in Limine Order); see also J.A.
 92–116. SonicWall argued that Finjan’s expert failed to
 perform a proper apportionment analysis and examine
 whether the “top-level functions” identified in SonicWall’s
 documentation included substantial non-patented fea-
 tures. J.A. 108–09. The district court excluded the appor-
 tionment opinions of Finjan’s technical expert, along with
 the opinions of Finjan’s damages expert based on that ap-
 portionment analysis. J.A. 111.
    Finjan timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
     A district court’s grant of summary judgment is re-
 viewed according to the law of the regional circuit. Amgen
 Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 923 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
 “In the Ninth Circuit, summary judgment is reviewed de
 novo, and is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in fa-
 vor of the non-movant, there is no genuine dispute of ma-
 terial fact.” Id. (first citing Brunozzi v. Cable Commc’ns,
 Inc., 851 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2017); and then citing
 Zetwick v. Cty. of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2017)).
      “When reviewing damages in patent cases, we apply re-
 gional circuit law to procedural issues and Federal Circuit
 law to substantive and procedural issues pertaining to pa-
 tent law.” MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 10
 F.4th 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit re-
 views “a district court’s evidentiary rulings, such as its de-
 cisions to exclude expert testimony . . . for an abuse of
 discretion.” Id. (quoting Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High

 would not meet the district court’s requirement that a sin-
 gle computer perform each of the relevant limitations. J.A.
 88–89.
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 8                               FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 Sch. Dist., 768 F.3d 843, 859 (9th Cir. 2014)) (citation omit-
 ted).
                        III. DISCUSSION
     Finjan raises four arguments. First, Finjan challenges
 the district court’s grant of judgment of invalidity of the
 claims of the ’844, ’780, and ’494 patents based on collateral
 estoppel. Appellant’s Br. 63–65. Second, Finjan seeks to
 reverse the district court’s judgment of noninfringement as
 to the asserted claims of the Downloadable Patents, con-
 tending that receiving packets that contain a downloadable
 or portions thereof constitutes receiving a downloadable.
 Id. at 32–49. Third, Finjan challenges the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment of noninfringement as to the
 ARB Patent, alleging that multiple computers can collec-
 tively perform the “by a computer” or “by the computer”
 limitations. Id. at 49–59. Fourth, Finjan argues that the
 district court abused its discretion in striking Finjan’s ex-
 pert apportionment analysis, which purportedly mirrored
 an apportionment analysis we previously approved in Fin-
 jan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1312–
 13 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appellant’s Br. 15–32. We address
 each argument in turn.
                         A. Invalidity
     Finjan argues that the district court’s grant of judg-
 ment of invalidity based on collateral estoppel should be
 vacated because it was based on a district court’s grant of
 summary judgment of invalidity that was subsequently va-
 cated by this court. Id. at 63–65. We agree.
    A party seeking to invoke collateral estoppel must
 show:
     (1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first
     action; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the
     first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential
     to a final judgment in the first action; and (4) [the
     party against whom collateral estoppel is being
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     asserted] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
     the issue in the first action.
 Google LLC v. Hammond Dev. Int’l, Inc., 54 F.4th 1377,
 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting In re
 Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). For patent
 claims, collateral estoppel applies where the “issues of pa-
 tentability” are identical, i.e., where “the differences be-
 tween the unadjudicated patent claims and adjudicated
 patent claims do not materially alter the question of inva-
 lidity.” Id. at 1381 (quoting Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps
 S., LLC, 735 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). If a court
 reverses or vacates a judgment upon which a collateral es-
 toppel decision is based, then collateral estoppel can no
 longer apply based on that decision. Mills v. City of Covina,
 921 F.3d 1161, 1170 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Ornellas
 v. Oakley, 618 F.2d 1351, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980)) (“A reversed
 or dismissed judgment cannot serve as the basis for a dis-
 position on the ground of res judicata or collateral estop-
 pel.”); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch
 Trading Co., 719 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations
 omitted).
     These principles require us to vacate the district court’s
 judgment of invalidity based on collateral estoppel here.
 The district court held that the ESET court’s order meant
 that collateral estoppel required granting judgment of in-
 validity as to the claims of the ’844, ’780, and ’494 patents.
 Collateral Estoppel Order at *2, *5. We have since vacated
 the judgment upon which the district court based its appli-
 cation of collateral estoppel. See Finjan LLC v. ESET,
 LLC, 51 F.4th 1377, 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2022). We can-
 not uphold applying collateral estoppel based on a vacated
 judgment. 4 Mills, 921 F.3d at 1170. Accordingly, we

     4 When reviewing the application of collateral estop-
 pel, we are “generally guided by regional circuit
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 10                             FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 vacate the district court’s grant of judgment of invalidity
 based on indefiniteness as to the claims of the ’844, ’780,
 and ’494 patents and remand for further proceedings.
       B. Noninfringement: Downloadable Patents
     Finjan argues that the district court erred in determin-
 ing that SonicWall Gateway products do not infringe the
 asserted claims because they receive a sequence of packets
 and not the downloadables themselves. Appellant’s Br. 32–
 49; see J.A. 57–58 (Summary Judgment Order). According
 to Finjan, the district court took the parties’ agreed-upon
 construction of “Downloadable”—“an executable applica-
 tion program, which is downloaded from a source computer
 and run on the destination computer,” Claim Construction
 Order at *3—and added a requirement that the down-
 loadable also be “re-assembled by and executable at the re-
 ceiver.” Appellant’s Br. 32; see J.A. 57–58 (“Finjan offers
 no evidence that the accused Gateways ever possess a re-
 assembled file or executable application.”). Finjan further
 argues that differences among the asserted claims—requir-
 ing “a receiver for receiving an incoming Downloadable,”
 ’494 patent claim 10 (emphasis added); a “communications
 engine for obtaining a Downloadable,” ’780 patent claim 9
 (emphasis added); or “means for receiving a Downloadable,”
 ’844 patent claim 43 (emphasis added)—indicate that a
 downloadable does not need to be received “in an executa-
 ble format” to infringe. Appellant’s Br. 35–37, 39–40. In
 other words, to infringe, the downloadable need not be re-
 assembled and executable at the receiver. Id. Finjan also
 contends that the district court’s additional requirements
 are unsupported by the Downloadable Patents’ specifica-
 tions, which do not require reassembling packets or

 precedent”—here, the Ninth Circuit—“but we apply our
 own precedent to those aspects of such a determination
 that involve substantive issues of patent law.” Ohio Willow
 Wood, 735 F.3d at 1342.
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                                11

 executing downloadables at a receiver. Id. at 42–47. Fi-
 nally, Finjan argues that summary judgment of nonin-
 fringement was inappropriate even under the district
 court’s new construction because Gateway products that
 receive packets containing the entire downloadable file
 would still infringe. Id. at 47–49.
     SonicWall contends that the district court’s conclusion
 is derived directly from the parties’ agreed-upon construc-
 tion, which describes a downloadable as an “executable ap-
 plication program.”       Appellee’s Br. 19–21.       Finjan
 submitted testimony from its expert as to the meaning of
 “executable,” and SonicWall provided evidence showing
 that its products do not satisfy that definition because they
 analyze data streams on a packet-by-packet basis without
 reassembling those packets to obtain the executable appli-
 cation program. Id. at 19–20. SonicWall argues that “Fin-
 jan did not identify any evidence” to oppose summary
 judgment. Id. at 20.
     We agree with SonicWall that the district court’s judg-
 ment of noninfringement flows from the parties’ agreed-
 upon construction. The asserted claims use “Down-
 loadable” in different ways. See, e.g., ’494 patent claim 10
 (“a receiver for receiving an incoming Downloadable”),
 claim 14 (“The system of claim 10 wherein the Down-
 loadable includes program script.”); ’844 patent claim 41
 (“receiving a Downloadable”), claim 43 (“means for receiv-
 ing a Downloadable”); ’780 patent claim 9 (“a communica-
 tions engine for obtaining a Downloadable”). Yet the
 parties adopted a single construction of “Downloadable” for
 each of these claims: “an executable application program,
 which is downloaded from a source computer and run on
 the destination computer.” Claim Construction Order at *3
 (emphases added). The parties’ construction comes verba-
 tim from the definition of “Downloadable” in the ’844 and
 ’780 patents’ specifications. ’844 patent col. 1 ll. 44–47; ’780
 patent col. 1 ll. 50–53.
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 12                             FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

     We do not permit parties on appeal to raise claim con-
 struction arguments challenging a stipulated construction.
 See, e.g., Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d
 1310, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Traxcell Techs., LLC
 v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. LP, 15 F.4th 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir.
 2021) (“Now Traxcell insists in retrospect that this con-
 struction was wrong. But having stipulated to it, Traxcell
 cannot pull an about-face.”). Therefore, we focus our anal-
 ysis on whether the district court erred in analyzing in-
 fringement under the parties’ agreed-upon construction.
     We conclude that a device that merely receives and for-
 wards packets without reassembling their contents does
 not receive a downloadable, under the parties’ agreed-upon
 construction, because that device does not receive an exe-
 cutable application program. The district court credited
 Finjan’s expert, who defined an “executable application
 program” as “a piece of code that can actually execute, run,
 or perform a function on a system.” 5 J.A. 57 (Summary
 Judgment Order). SonicWall then submitted evidence that
 its Gateway products do not ever possess a downloadable
 because they operate by “inspect[ing] the payload of each
 packet on a packet-by-packet basis and then send[ing] each
 packet to its destination without extracting the data and
 reassembling a file” into an executable form. J.A. 56–57
 (alterations in original) (emphasis added). Finjan never
 identified evidence challenging how SonicWall’s products
 operate, arguing instead that SonicWall’s understanding
 must be incorrect because “every device on the Internet,”
 including SonicWall’s device, receives program files in the
 same way, i.e., “in a sequence of packets that contain the

      5  Because the district court’s interpretation of the
 word “executable” is based on Finjan’s own expert’s testi-
 mony, we disagree with the dissent’s characterization that
 the parties disputed the meaning of “executable.” See Dis-
 sent at 3–4.
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                               13

 file’s bits.” J.A. 55–56. Given SonicWall’s unrebutted evi-
 dence, we agree with the district court that SonicWall’s
 products do not infringe under the parties’ agreed-upon
 construction because they do not reassemble a received
 packet into an executable form, i.e., one that can be exe-
 cuted or run. See J.A. 57.
     We disagree that the district court impermissibly devi-
 ated from the parties’ agreed-upon construction. It is
 within the discretion of the district court to clarify or elab-
 orate on the claim construction, so long as it is only “elabo-
 rates on a meaning inherent in the previous construction.”
 Mformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Mot. Ltd., 764 F.3d
 1392, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Mformation, the patentee
 argued that the district court impermissibly added an or-
 der-of-steps requirement to the claim construction—i.e., a
 requirement that a connection must be completely estab-
 lished before the transmitting step begins. 764 F.3d at
 1397. We concluded that the district court did not err or
 alter the construction, but rather clarified what was inher-
 ent in the construction. Id. Similarly, here, it is inherent
 in the stipulated construction that the “receiver” receives
 an assembled downloadable. See, e.g., ’494 patent, claim 1.
 At least dependent claims 9 and 18 of the ’494 patent sup-
 port this reading. Claim 9 derives from claim 1 and con-
 templates “disassembling the incoming Downloadable.”
 See id. claim 9. Claim 18 derives from claim 10 and con-
 templates a “disassembler for disassembling the incoming
 Downloadable.” See id. claim 18. This suggests that the
 incoming downloadable is assembled before it is received
 such that, in some embodiments, it will be disassembled
 after being received. See Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP
 Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

     Finjan argues the district court’s understanding of the
 claims—that downloadables refer to the executable appli-
 cation program, not the packets themselves—would ex-
 clude “preferred embodiments” of monitoring “internet
 traffic” because it would preclude any device that transmits
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 14                              FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 information using packets from infringing. Appellant’s
 Br. 44–46; see, e.g., ’844 patent col. 3 ll. 32–44 (describing
 using the invention to scan Internet traffic); ’780 patent col.
 3 ll. 7–17 (same); ’494 patent col. 6 ll. 26–41 (same). A de-
 vice could still monitor internet traffic and infringe the as-
 serted claims by “receiving” or “obtaining” a downloadable
 whenever it reassembles the packet and gains possession
 of the downloadable itself. In other words, the “receiving”
 or “obtaining” step can include the reception and reassem-
 bly of the packets into an executable application program.
 The key point is that SonicWall’s Gateway products never
 reassemble packets to receive or obtain the contents
 within, i.e., the executable application program or down-
 loadable. See J.A. 55–58 (Summary Judgment Order).
     Finjan points to differences among the claims to argue
 that the district court’s understanding of the parties’ claim
 construction—that the claims only read on executable ap-
 plication programs, not packets—must be incorrect. As an
 example, Finjan points to the claims of the ’780 patent,
 which require “obtaining a Downloadable that includes one
 or more references to software components” to argue that a
 device could infringe even when there are other “software
 components” (i.e., remaining packets with pieces of the
 downloadable) remaining to be received. Appellant’s Br.
 39–40 (citing claims 1, 9, 17). We see no reason why refer-
 ences to other software components would refer to out-
 standing packets as opposed to other software relevant to
 the downloadable. See, e.g., ’780 patent col. 4 ll. 58–61
 (“For example, the ID generator 315 may prefetch all clas-
 ses embodied in or identified by the JavaTM applet bytecode
 to generate the Downloadable ID.”). This argument fails to
 grapple with the parties’ agreed-upon construction and the
 testimony from its own expert, which confirms that a down-
 loadable must be an executable application program that
 “can actually execute, run, or perform a function.” See J.A.
 56.
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                                15

     Similarly, Finjan argues that the claims of the ’494 pa-
 tent use “incoming Downloadable” to suggest that a packet
 can infringe the asserted claims because “receipt was in the
 process of coming in and [that process has] not completed.”
 Appellant’s Br. 39 (citing ’494 patent claim 10). Finjan also
 cites the ’494 patent’s discussion of inspecting a “potential-
 Downloadable to see if it more likely includes executable
 code, and if it does, designating it as a Downloadable.” Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 44 (cleaned up); ’494 patent col. 19 l. 64 to col.
 20 l. 11. We are not persuaded that the ’494 patent’s dis-
 cussion of a “potential-Downloadable” means the district
 court misinterpreted the parties’ agreed-upon construction
 as applied to “incoming Downloadables,” including because
 the parties agreed to apply a definition of downloadables
 found in the ’844 and ’780 patents and not the ’494 patent.
 See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805
 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (declining to incorpo-
 rate limitations from one patent into parties’ stipulated
 construction for a related patent, despite patents’ overlap-
 ping discussion of “tagging”). Moreover, the claims of the
 ’494 and ’926 patents repeatedly introduce an “incoming
 Downloadable” and subsequently use “the Downloadable”
 to refer to the same limitation, confirming the patentee
 used “incoming Downloadable” and “Downloadable” inter-
 changeably. See, e.g., ’494 patent claims 1, 10; ’926 patent
 claims 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, 30.
      Finjan argues that the district court’s understanding of
 the parties’ claim construction has no support in the speci-
 fications of the Downloadable Patents. Appellant’s Br. 32.
 For example, Finjan argues that the Downloadable Patents
 do not describe or require a downloadable to be “re-assem-
 bled by and executable at the receiver.” Appellant’s Br. 39,
 42–43. The parties’ agreed-upon construction is supported
 by the specifications—it is taken verbatim from the ’780
 and ’844 patents. ’780 patent col. 1 ll. 50–53 (providing def-
 inition adopted by parties); ’844 patent col. 1 ll. 44–47
 (same).
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 16                             FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

      Finjan also challenges the district court’s construction
 because certain packets may contain an entire down-
 loadable, such that a device receives a downloadable when
 it receives that packet containing the entire downloadable.
 Appellant’s Br. 48. Finjan’s arguments assume that the
 district court based its judgment of noninfringement solely
 on the fact that most IP packets contain only a portion of
 the larger downloadable they are transmitting. However,
 the district court based its judgment on the fact that an
 unassembled packet containing a downloadable is not exe-
 cutable. J.A. 58 (“While Finjan emphasizes that transmit-
 ted IP packets ‘contain[]’ Downloadables, it offers no
 evidence that unassembled packets are an executable ap-
 plication program that can run on a destination com-
 puter[.]” (citations omitted)). Finjan’s argument that a
 packet can contain the entire downloadable itself fails to
 address the crux of the district court’s reasoning.
     We see no evidence from Finjan demonstrating that
 SonicWall’s products operate differently than the district
 court described. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment of noninfringement as to
 claims 10 and 14 of the ’494 patent, claims 41 and 43 of the
 ’844 patent, and claim 9 of the ’780 patent.
             C. Noninfringement: ARB Patent
     Finjan argues that the district court erred in determin-
 ing that SonicWall’s Capture ATP technology in combina-
 tion with SonicWall’s Gateways and/or ES products cannot
 infringe the asserted claims of the ARB Patent and requir-
 ing each recited step be performed by “a single, standalone
 computer.” Appellant’s Br. 49, see also id. 50–62. Accord-
 ing to Finjan, the ARB Patent requires “a computer”—sub-
 sequently referred to as “the computer”—to perform
 certain steps, where the use of “a” indicates that “one or
 more” computers can perform the various steps of the
 claim. Id. at 54 (quoting Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v.
 Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Finjan
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                              17

 argues the district court’s decision cannot be squared with
 01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v. LogMeIn, Inc., where
 we concluded that “a location facility” could “be distributed
 among multiple locator server computers.” Id. at 56–57
 (citing 687 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
     SonicWall argues that Finjan never disputed that its
 Capture ATP and Gateway products are performed by dif-
 ferent computers, challenging only whether the claims re-
 quired the “same computer” to perform the claim
 limitations. Appellee’s Br. 31 (citing Finjan’s Opp. Summ.
 J. at J.A. 11146). SonicWall argues that even if the refer-
 ence to “a computer” may mean “one or more computers,”
 the subsequent references to “the computer” can only be
 satisfied by the same “one or more computers” that satis-
 fied the first limitation. Appellee’s Br. 33–35.
     We agree with SonicWall. For example, in Salazar v.
 AT&T Mobility LLC, we agreed with the district court that
 “while the claim term ‘a microprocessor’ does not require
 there be only one microprocessor, the subsequent limita-
 tions referring back to ‘said microprocessor’ require that at
 least one microprocessor be capable of performing each of
 the claimed functions.” 64 F.4th 1311, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
 2023). Similar to this court’s holding that “said” indicates
 part of a claim limitation refers to the corresponding part
 of a previously claimed limitation, see Summit 6, LLC v.
 Samsung Elecs. Co., 802 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
 the use of “the” also indicates the claimed term refers to an
 antecedent term. See, e.g., Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Com-
 put. Corp., 812 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“This ref-
 erence to ‘the processor,’ referring back to the ‘a processor’
 recited in preamble, supports a conclusion that the recited
 user interface is ‘operatively working with’ the same proces-
 sor to perform all of the recited steps.” (emphasis added)).
 The same logic from Salazar applies here.
     Furthermore, we previously examined a similar claim
 construction argument in Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Nokia
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 18                             FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 Sols. & Networks Oy, 15 F.4th 1136, 1143–44 (Fed. Cir.
 2021) (“Nokia”). In Nokia, we explained that “[a]s a matter
 of plain language, reciting ‘a computer’ (or a ‘first com-
 puter’) that performs a function, and then further reciting
 that ‘the computer’ (or ‘said first computer’) performs mul-
 tiple additional functions, suggests that such ‘computer’
 must be tied to all those functions.” Id. This same ra-
 tionale is relevant in analyzing the claims here.
     We see no inconsistency between the holdings in Sala-
 zar and Nokia and the principles outlined in Baldwin.
 “[T]he indefinite article a means one or more in open-ended
 claims containing the transitional phrase comprising.”
 Salazar, 64 F.4th at 1315 (cleaned up) (quoting Convolve,
 812 F.3d at 1321). But that is a separate issue from
 whether the claims require the same component to perform
 multiple functions or satisfy multiple limitations of a
 claim. See Salazar, 64 F.4th at 1318 (“[I]t does not suffice
 to have multiple microprocessors, each able to perform just
 one of the recited functions; the claim language requires at
 least one microprocessor capable of performing each of the
 recited functions.”); see also Baldwin, 512 F.3d at 1342 (not
 addressing whether the use of a definite article to refer to
 the initial antecedent phrase requires the same component
 to perform the later limitation).
      Finjan relies heavily on our decision in 01 Commu-
 nique. See Appellant’s Br. 56–59. In that case, the claim
 required, among other limitations, “a locator server com-
 puter linked to the Internet[;] its location on the Internet
 being defined by a static IP address[;] and including a loca-
 tion facility for locating the personal computer;” where the
 location facility is “operable” to create a communication
 channel between a remote computer and a personal com-
 puter. 687 F.3d at 1294–95 (first and third emphases
 added). The parties disputed whether the “location facil-
 ity” software “must be contained entirely on a single locator
 server computer . . . or whether it may be distributed
 among multiple locator server computers.” Id. at 1296. We
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                                  19

 explained that the use of “a,” “its,” and “the” in the claims
 did not require the locator server computer to be a single
 computer, especially where the patent disclosed that “the
 locator server computer may comprise multiple comput-
 ers.” Id. at 1297. But 01 Communique does not consider
 whether the same computer must perform each of several
 subsequent claim limitations referring to that computer,
 and we see nothing in that decision contradicting the prin-
 ciples outlined in Salazar and Nokia.
     With this understanding of our precedent in mind, we
 agree with the district court’s grant of summary judgment
 of noninfringement as to asserted claims of the ARB Pa-
 tent. Claim 1 of the ARB Patent requires that the same
 computer perform each of the claimed steps “receiv-
 ing . . . ,” “determining . . . ,” “instantiating . . . ,” “deter-
 mining . . . ,”        “identifying . . . ,”      “dynamically
 building . . . ,” “dynamically detecting . . . ,” and “indicat-
 ing . . . .” ’408 patent claim 1. Claim 22 is even more ex-
 plicit, requiring “a computer to perform” the claimed steps.
 Id. claim 22 (emphasis added). Even if an infringing sys-
 tem can use “one or more computers,” the plain language
 of the claims requires at least one of those computers to
 perform all the functions listed in the claims of the ARB
 Patent.
      Finally, Finjan argues that even if the ARB Patent re-
 quires a single “computer” to perform each step of claims 1
 and 22, granting summary judgment was still improper be-
 cause a “computer” can be “comprised of a combination of
 computers working together.” Appellant’s Br. 59–61 (citing
 Symantec v. Comp. Assocs. Int’l, 522 F.3d 1279, 1291 (Fed.
 Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the ordinary meaning of the
 terms ‘computer’ and ‘computer system’” are “not limited to
 a single, stand-alone computer or workstation”)). The dis-
 trict court, in denying Finjan’s motion for reconsideration,
 concluded that (1) even if Finjan argued SonicWall’s prod-
 ucts operated “as unified computer systems,” it did not
 show that a “single computer satisfies the relevant
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 20                              FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 limitations,” and (2) under the standards for granting a
 motion for reconsideration, Finjan failed to show the dis-
 trict court’s “manifest failure” to consider Finjan’s legal ar-
 guments. J.A. 88–89 (Reconsideration Order). Besides its
 argument that the claims do not require a single computer
 to perform each limitation, Finjan does not challenge the
 district court’s reasoning for denying Finjan’s reconsidera-
 tion motion. Appellant’s Br. 60–61. We agree with the dis-
 trict court that the analysis above is dispositive. We are
 not persuaded Symantec requires a different outcome for
 the claims we consider here, which require the same com-
 puter to perform each of several subsequent claim limita-
 tions. See ’408 patent claims 1, 22; Symantec, 522 F.3d at
 1291.
    We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg-
 ment of noninfringement as to the asserted claims of the
 ARB Patent. J.A. 64.
                     D. Expert Analysis
     Lastly, Finjan challenges the district court’s grant of
 SonicWall’s motion to exclude the apportionment analysis
 of one Finjan expert and the opinion of another Finjan ex-
 pert relying on the apportionment analysis. Appellant’s
 Br. 21–32. In that order, the district court found that Fin-
 jan’s expert providing the apportionment analysis “slapped
 top-level function labels onto the accused products without
 particularizing how apt the labels were” and then failed to
 analyze how “sub-features” within those top-level functions
 related, if at all, to the Asserted Patents. J.A. 110 (Motions
 in Limine Order). As an example, Finjan argued that Son-
 icWall SuperMassive’s RFDPI Engine benefitted from the
 technology in the ARB patent “at least by how incoming . . .
 program code (’408 [patent]) is received.” Id. But Finjan’s
 expert never then analyzed the five sub-features listed un-
 derneath the RFDPI engine, meaning his analysis never
 established “the extent to which these sub-features involve
 receiving incoming . . . program code.” Id. The district
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                                21

 court struck Finjan’s expert apportionment analysis be-
 cause he offered “no analysis of whether SonicWall custom-
 ers derived value solely from the patented features of the
 top-level function or whether the top-level functions in-
 cluded non-accused or non-patented functions at all.” Id.
 Accordingly, the district court also struck the related dam-
 ages opinions relying on the apportionment analysis. J.A.
 111.
      Finjan argues that the district court’s decision cannot
 stand in light of our decision in Blue Coat. Appellant’s
 Br. 21–26 (citing 879 F.3d at 1312–13). In that case, a dif-
 ferent Finjan expert based her apportionment analysis on
 a diagram prepared by the accused infringer that orga-
 nized the accused products’ functionality into twenty-four
 boxes; she “assumed that each box represented one top
 level function and that each function was equally valua-
 ble.” 879 F.3d at 1312–13. Finjan argues that we “con-
 firmed that the methodology in [Blue Coat] satisfied the
 apportionment requirement,” such that the district court
 should have permitted its expert to offer similar analysis
 of top-level features in this case. Appellant’s Br. 21–24. In
 Finjan’s view, an expert need only distinguish between “pa-
 tented and unpatented features,” not sub-features. Id. at
 21 (citing Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201,
 1226–27 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
     SonicWall responds that Blue Coat is inapposite be-
 cause it arises in the context of a jury verdict, not a district
 court exercising its discretion to exclude unreliable expert
 testimony. Appellee’s Br. 44–45. Because the district court
 identified the correct law and its decision on this issue is
 otherwise logical and supported, SonicWall argues that the
 district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Fin-
 jan’s expert apportionment analysis. Appellee’s Br. 50–51.
     We agree that the district court did not abuse its dis-
 cretion in excluding Finjan’s expert apportionment anal-
 yses. “[T]he patentee . . . must in every case give evidence
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 22                             FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 tending to separate or apportion . . . the patentee’s dam-
 ages between the patented feature and the unpatented fea-
 tures[.]” LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694
 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Garretson v. Clark,
 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)); see also Pavo Sols. LLC v. King-
 ston Tech. Co., Inc., 35 F.4th 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
 (same). “[W]here multi-component products are involved,
 the governing rule is that the ultimate combination of roy-
 alty base and royalty rate must reflect the value attributa-
 ble to the infringing features of the product, and no more.”
 Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1226 (citing VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco
 Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
     The SonicWall documents relied upon by Finjan’s ex-
 pert to identify the purported “top-level functions” divide
 those functions into additional sub-features.             See
 J.A. 14145 (listing “feature summary” for SonicWall prod-
 ucts); J.A. 14142–44 (describing additional features of each
 “top-level” feature). Because Finjan’s expert admitted that
 he presented no analysis to assess the value of the sub-fea-
 tures, J.A. 13958, the district court did not abuse its dis-
 cretion by concluding that Finjan’s expert failed to
 carefully tie his analysis to allegedly infringing features
 and to exclude value attributable to unpatented features.
 See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Rsch. Organisation v.
 Cisco Sys., Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]o
 be admissible, all expert damages opinions must separate
 the value of the allegedly infringing features from the value
 of all other features.” (citation omitted)).
     Nor are we persuaded by Finjan’s reliance on Blue
 Coat. In Blue Coat, we held—as we do here—that Finjan’s
 expert failed to apportion the value of unpatented elements
 from patented elements. 879 F.3d at 1311–12. The other
 portion of Blue Coat on which Finjan’s appeal focuses is in-
 apposite, because it concerns whether a jury’s damages
 award was supported by substantial evidence, id. at 1312,
 whereas this appeal concerns the district court’s discretion
 to strike Finjan’s expert apportionment analyses before it
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                              23

 went to a jury. Blue Coat is also distinguishable because
 the jury’s damages award was based on an expert who re-
 lied on a document that identified twenty-four relevant fea-
 tures but identified no sub-features of those relevant
 features, whereas here the documents Finjan’s expert re-
 lied on identify nearly 100 sub-features. Compare 879 F.3d
 at 1312–13, with J.A. 14142–45.
     Because the district court did not abuse its discretion,
 we affirm the district court’s decision to strike the appor-
 tionment analysis of Finjan’s expert and the related dam-
 ages opinions. J.A. 110–11 (Motions in Limine Order).
                       IV. CONCLUSION
     We have considered Finjan’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For these reasons, we vacate the
 district court’s judgment of invalidity based on collateral
 estoppel as to the claims of the ’844, ’780, and ’494 patents;
 we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
 of noninfringement as to the asserted claims of the Down-
 loadable Patents and the ARB Patent; and we affirm the
 district court’s decision to exclude Finjan’s expert appor-
 tionment analysis and the related damages opinions. We
 remand to the district court for further proceedings con-
 sistent with this opinion.
  AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND RE-
                  MANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.
Case: 22-1048    Document: 45      Page: 24   Filed: 10/13/2023

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

           FINJAN LLC, FKA FINJAN, INC.,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant

                              v.

                    SONICWALL, INC.,
                     Defendant-Appellee
                   ______________________

                         2022-1048
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in No. 5:17-cv-04467-BLF,
 Judge Beth Labson Freeman.
                    ______________________

 BRYSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
 in part.
     I join the majority opinion with respect to its treatment
 of the ’408 patent, the expert opinion of Dr. Striegel, and
 the district court’s judgment of invalidity based on collat-
 eral estoppel. However, I believe that the district court
 erred in its disposition of the Downloadable patents, and I
 would not affirm the judgment as to those patents.
     In the district court the parties stipulated that the
 term “Downloadable” should be construed to mean “an ex-
 ecutable application program, which is downloaded from a
 source computer and run on a destination computer.” J.A.
 5. In granting summary judgment of non-infringement of
 the Downloadable patents, the district court accepted
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 2                              FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 SonicWall’s assertion that the Gateway device does not in-
 fringe because the Gateway does not receive an executable
 program, but only a series of packets that must be recon-
 structed before actually being executed. J.A. 55–58. By
 resolving the issue in that manner, the court effectively
 further construed the term Downloadable to require the
 Downloadable to be capable of being executed in the form
 and at the time of its receipt by the intermediate computer,
 rather than being reconstructed by the destination com-
 puter before execution. I disagree with that construction,
 for two reasons.
      First, to construe the term Downloadable in that man-
 ner would read the preferred Internet embodiments out of
 the claims of at least two of the Downloadable patents. As
 the district court noted, it was undisputed that network de-
 vices transmit files in a sequence of packets. J.A. 57. As a
 result, any computer that receives a Downloadable over a
 network will receive it in the form of packets that must be
 reconstructed before the Downloadable may be executed.
 The district court’s ruling that the Downloadable patents
 require that the Downloadable be executable upon receipt
 by the receiver therefore means that the Downloadable pa-
 tents would not read on any network that uses packetized
 files. That anomalous result strongly suggests that the
 term “executable” should be understood to refer to a file
 that is capable of being executed once it is reconstructed
 from the packetized form in which the file was transmitted
 and received. 1

     1   The majority contends that the district court’s con-
 struction would not render the Downloadable claims nuga-
 tory because receiver systems other than SonicWall’s
 reconstruct the packets after receiving them in order to
 scan them for malware in their reconstructed form. In that
 respect, the majority suggests, those systems can be said to
 “receive” or “obtain” Downloadables. While that may be
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 FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.                               3

     SonicWall argues that Finjan agreed to the construc-
 tion of the term Downloadable and is stuck with the conse-
 quences, even if the consequences are that the patent reads

 true for the ’780 patent, which claims methods or systems
 for “obtaining a Downloadable,” it is not true for the other
 three Downloadable patents, which claim methods and sys-
 tems for “receiving a Downloadable” (’844 patent), or meth-
 ods and systems for “receiving an incoming Downloadable”
 (’926 patent and ’494 patent). And even if, despite the awk-
 wardness of the construction, a receiver that reconstructs
 a file can be said, under the district court’s understanding,
 to be “receiving a Downloadable” from itself, it cannot rea-
 sonably be said to be “receiving an incoming Down-
 loadable.” Thus, the district court’s construction would, at
 minimum, leave the claims of the ’926 patent and the ’494
 patent with no scope as to the Internet embodiments.
      The majority also finds support for its interpretation of
 the term “Downloadable” in claims 9 and 18 of the ’494 pa-
 tent, which recite that deriving Downloadable security
 data “comprises disassembling the incoming Down-
 loadable” (claim 9) and that the Downloadable scanner
 “comprises a disassembler for disassembling the incoming
 Downloadable” (claim 18). But “disassembly” in this con-
 text refers to extracting data from packets. See Dennis
 Longley & Michael Shain, Dictionary of Information Tech-
 nology 94 (2d ed. 1986) (defining “disassembler” as “a de-
 vice that extracts the message content from packets”).
 Assembly means the opposite. See Microsoft Computer Dic-
 tionary 386 (5th ed. 2002) (referring to “assembling/disas-
 sembling packets”). As the majority notes, claims 9 and 18
 imply that the incoming Downloadable is assembled before
 it is received. “Assembled,” however, means assembled
 into packets—not into a reconstructed file. Because claims
 9 and 18 indicate that Downloadables are received in
 packet form, they support Finjan’s interpretation of the
 term, not SonicWall’s.
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 4                               FINJAN LLC v. SONICWALL, INC.

 on no embodiments. In fact, however, the record reflects
 that although the parties stipulated to the construction of
 the term Downloadable, they did not share the same un-
 derstanding of the term “executable,” as used in that con-
 struction, a point that became clear during the summary
 judgment argument. By agreeing to the construction of the
 term Downloadable, Finjan did not acquiesce in the inter-
 pretation of the court’s construction of “executable,” which
 was that an “executable” file must be executable without
 any further processing, rather than being capable of execu-
 tion after, for example, being reconstructed following its
 transmission in packetized form.
     Second, the specifications of the Downloadable patents
 suggest that it is not necessary for the claimed receiver to
 reconstruct the packets in order for the file to be considered
 an executable file. For example, the specification of the
 ’494 patent discloses a mechanism for determining
 whether a “potential-Downloadable” is actually a Down-
 loadable by examining whether it “more likely [than not]
 includes executable code.” ’494 patent, col. 19, line 64
 through col. 20, line 12. The fact there is no actual deter-
 mination of whether the file contains executable code, but
 instead merely a determination of whether the file “likely”
 contains such code, indicates that the analysis described in
 that passage could take place before the reconstruction of
 the packets into a file that can be executed. The specifica-
 tion of the ’844 patent also notes that “programs and data
 may be received by and stored in the system in alternative
 ways.” ’844 patent, col. 7, ll. 31–33. That language further
 suggests that a system may transmit the Downloadable in
 packets if desired, and that the Downloadable would be
 “executable” even when it is transmitted in packetized
 form.
     For those reasons, I would vacate the district court’s
 grant of summary judgment of non-infringement with re-
 spect to the Downloadable patents and remand for further
 proceedings on that issue.