Court Opinion

ID: 9391189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 15:08:14.795537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.778130
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 27, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00094-CV
                            ———————————
           IN THE INTEREST OF I.M.S AND C.K.S., CHILDREN

                    On Appeal from the 257th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2020-49033

                             MAJORITY OPINION

      Appellee A.L. (“Mother”) and her husband A.L. (“Stepfather”) filed this

private suit to terminate the parental rights of appellant B.S. (“Father”) to his two

minor daughters. Mother and Stepfather also requested that Stepfather be allowed to

adopt the children. The trial court found that Father had violated two statutory

predicate grounds for termination and that termination of his parental rights was in
the best interests of the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (Q),

(b)(2).

       On appeal, Father, who is pro se and incarcerated, argues that (1) the trial

court’s failure to appoint counsel to him violated his due process rights, and (2) the

trial court erred by terminating his parental rights to the children. We reverse and

remand.

                                    Background

       Mother and Father were married and they had two children together: I.M.S.

(“Iris”), who was born in 2009, and C.K.S. (“Catherine”), who was born in 2011.1

Iris and Catherine were twelve and ten years old, respectively, at the time of trial in

this case.

       In May 2013, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce. The decree named

the parties joint managing conservators of the children, and Mother was given the

exclusive right to designate their primary residence. The decree limited this right to

designating the children’s primary residence within 300 miles of Father’s residence,

so long as he resided in Arlington, where he lived at the time of the divorce

proceedings. At the time, Mother lived in Huffman, Texas, and worked in Houston.

With respect to Father’s possessory rights, the decree gave Father a modified

1
       In this opinion, we use pseudonyms for the parties and their minor children to
       protect their privacy.
                                          2
standard possession order. The decree also ordered Father to pay Mother $450 per

month in child support.

      In the years following the divorce, Father regularly exercised his possessory

rights under the decree. However, it became obvious to Mother in 2016 that Father

had started using drugs, including marijuana and methamphetamine, and that he did

so during his times of possession. Mother testified that the children “were put in

dangerous situations more than once,” and that Father left them unsupervised at

home and in public places, including pools and restaurants. Mother stated, “They

were around drugs, all different kinds.” The last time Father saw the children in

person or talked to them was June 2016.

      As a result of Father’s drug use, Mother moved to modify the parent-child

relationship. The trial court signed a modification order in March 2017. The

modification order named Mother as sole managing conservator and Father as

possessory conservator. The court found that awarding Father access to the children

would not be in their best interest. The court therefore ordered that Father’s visitation

with the children was to be supervised through the Guardians of Hope program in

Houston. The order required Father to register with the program within ten days, and

it also required both Father and Mother to comply with the program’s rules and

regulations. The order specified that if Father did not register with Guardians of

Hope, Mother was not required to register. If this occurred, Father’s possession

                                           3
would be supervised by the Harris County Victims Assistance Center. The court

ordered Father to pay 100% of the cost of the supervised visitation program.

      According to Mother, Father made a payment to Guardians of Hope, but he

did not provide his driver’s license or proof of insurance, both of which the program

required, and therefore Father did not complete the registration process. Mother

registered with the program but was not required to pay anything until Father

completed the registration process, which he never did. Guardians of Hope contacted

Mother about Father’s visitation with the children to inform her that “it wasn’t going

to happen.”

      In August 2020, Mother filed the underlying petition to terminate Father’s

parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the children. As grounds for

termination, Mother alleged that Father:

      (a)     voluntarily left the children alone or in the possession of another
              without providing adequate support of the children and remained
              away for a period of at least six months;
      (b)     failed to support the children in accordance with his ability
              during a period of one year ending within six months of the date
              of the filing of this petition; and
      (c)     knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his
              conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and
              inability to care for the children for not less than two years from
              the date this petition is filed.

                                           4
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(C), (F), (Q). Mother also alleged that terminating Father’s

parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. The trial court appointed an

amicus attorney to represent the interests of the children.

      Father filed a pro se answer and an unsworn declaration of inability to pay

costs. In this filing, Father declared that he was presently incarcerated. Father also

alleged that due to his indigency, he was unable to hire an attorney to represent him.

He requested that the trial court appoint an attorney ad litem to represent his interests.

The trial court did not appoint an attorney to represent Father.2

      In December 2021, the trial court held a bench trial. Mother testified that

Father did not comply with his child support obligation. The trial court admitted a

printout from the Attorney General’s Child Support Division that was dated the

month before trial and reflected Father’s payment history. This document showed

that Father made sporadic payments throughout 2013, 2014, and 2015. According to

this report, Father made a $650 payment in January 2016, an $11,413.35 payment in

January 2018, and a $1,455.48 payment in August 2021. He made no other payments

after January 2016, and he had over $27,000 in arrearages. When shown this

document, Mother agreed that she received payments in January 2016 and August

2
      At trial, the trial court asked whether Father had requested representation. Mother’s
      attorney responded that Father had requested counsel, but “because this is a private
      termination and not being done through the State, he is not entitled to one.” The
      court ordered the trial proceedings to continue.
                                            5
2021, but she disagreed that she received an $11,000 payment in January 2018. She

testified that she never received a payment of that size, and Father did not pay any

child support in 2018.

      Mother also testified that, at the time of trial, Father was incarcerated after

being convicted of possession of marijuana, robbery, and kidnapping. When asked

what the “underlying event” was for these convictions, Mother stated, “He robbed

his grandparents at gunpoint and beat them up.” The trial court admitted copies of

five judgments of conviction. These judgments reflected that, in February 2020,

Father pleaded guilty to the third-degree felony offense of possession of between

five and fifty pounds of marijuana, two counts of the first-degree felony offense of

aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and two counts of the first-degree felony

offense of aggravated kidnapping. Father’s punishment for each offense was set at

nine years’ confinement, to run concurrently. At the time of judgment, Father had

credit for nearly two years of time already served.

      Mother married Stepfather in October 2016. Stepfather had known the

children for nearly their entire lives. Mother testified that Stepfather had a good

relationship with the children and that he was a “wonderful dad.” She stated:

“[Stepfather is] their dad in their eyes. He has been for many years. And he raises

them and takes good care of them and they love him very much.” Mother believed

that terminating Father’s parental rights—and allowing Stepfather to adopt the

                                          6
children—would be in the children’s best interest. She also agreed with the

children’s amicus attorney that there was no way to keep the children safe other than

to terminate Father’s parental rights.

      Upon questioning from Father, Mother testified that providing letters and

artwork to the children was not the same as providing child support payments, and

Father had not provided support and care while he was incarcerated. Mother agreed

that, around 2017, she blocked Father from communicating with the children by

phone, but she did not prohibit Father from speaking with the children through email.

She stated that if Father had sent her an email, “which [he] was not blocked from,

and asked to talk to the girls and remain not irate, [he] would have been able to talk

to the girls.” Mother testified that she prohibited Father from speaking with the

children by phone because, over the course of several months, Father made “repeated

phone calls, harassment, threats, derogatory speech, middle of the night calls, all day

calls, all-day text messages.” Because Father refused to stop this behavior, she

refused to allow Father to speak with the children by phone.

      Stepfather testified that he “provide[s] a place for the girls to live” and

“provide[s] everything that they have.” He tries “to be a father figure to them,” and

he views the children as if they were his own biological children. He testified that

he and Mother have two younger children together. Stepfather agreed that,

regardless of the outcome of the trial, he would continue acting as a father figure to

                                          7
the children. He also agreed that terminating Father’s parental rights was in the

children’s best interest.

      Father testified and acknowledged that he had pleaded guilty to five offenses,

that he was serving a nine-year sentence for the offenses, and the complainants in

the robbery and kidnapping charges were his grandparents. He admitted that a

firearm was involved in those offenses, but he stated that it was his grandparents’

gun that he took away from his grandfather. He also stated that these offenses

occurred in June 2018. Father did not know how much marijuana he had in his

possession at the time of that offense, but it was at least five pounds. He denied that

he intended to sell the marijuana, stating instead that he had purchased it “for

personal use.”

      When asked about his payment of child support, Father testified that he did

not have the means to pay child support from 2016 onwards. Father had been self-

employed and owned a business printing T-shirts. Some months, he would earn more

than the amount of his child support obligation, but he “was trying to take care of

[himself]” and did not use these earnings to pay child support. He stated that he had

not had the means to pay child support since his incarceration in June 2018.3 When

3
      Father informed the trial court that his house was foreclosed upon after he was
      arrested, and approximately $26,000 of excess proceeds will go to Mother to satisfy
      Father’s child support obligation. Mother’s counsel confirmed that he had submitted
      to the court an application for a writ of garnishment to access these funds, but the
      court had not yet ruled upon that request. Statements by both Father and Mother’s
                                           8
asked by the children’s amicus attorney who he expected to provide for the children

when he was not paying child support and when he was incarcerated, he stated,

“Their mother.”

       Father agreed that he had not seen the children since 2016, but he stated that

this was not due to lack of effort and that he had “tried very hard to see [his] kids.”

When asked about the March 2017 modification order’s requirement that he register

for supervised visitation with Guardians of Hope, Father testified that he completed

the registration, provided appropriate identification, and paid the required fees.4

According to Father, supervised visitations never occurred due to Mother’s failure

to register with the program. Father never filed anything with the court to enforce

his visitation rights.

       With respect to his incarceration, Father testified that he would be eligible for

parole in December 2022. If he is not granted parole at that time, he could continue

to seek parole each year after that. If he is never granted parole, he would be released

from confinement in 2027. In addition to the charges for which he was currently

confined, he also had “some misdemeanors,” but he did not remember what those

       counsel suggest that the foreclosure sale of Father’s house occurred in 2018, after
       Father’s arrest, but no one stated precisely when the sale occurred or when Father
       became entitled to any excess proceeds from the sale.
4
       Father stated that he had a receipt from Guardians of Hope demonstrating his
       registration with the program. Father did not offer a receipt as documentary
       evidence.
                                            9
charges were. He did not dispute Mother’s testimony that he was placed on

supervised visitation with the children in 2017 because he had tested positive for

marijuana and methamphetamine usage. He stated, however, that he had not “had a

problem with drugs.”

       The trial court signed an order terminating Father’s parental rights. The court

found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had (1) failed to support the

children in accordance with his ability during a one-year period ending within six

months of the date of filing of the petition; and (2) knowingly engaged in criminal

conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement and inability

to care for the children for not less than two years from the date the petition was

filed. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (Q). The court also found, by clear and convincing

evidence, that terminating Father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best

interest.

       This appeal followed.

                             Denial of Appointed Counsel

       In his first issue,5 Father, who has been pro se and incarcerated throughout the

pendency of this proceeding, argues that the trial court’s failure to appoint him

counsel violated his due process rights.

5
       Father filed his appellate brief before the court reporter filed the reporter’s record,
       and therefore Father’s brief does not contain any citations to the appellate record.
       See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and
                                             10
A.    Governing Law

      Suits to terminate a parent’s parental rights can be filed by multiple parties,

including a governmental entity—such as the Department of Family and Protective

Services—and the child’s other parent. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.003(a)(1), (5),

(6); In re H.D.D.B., No. 01-20-00723-CV, 2022 WL 2251655, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). In a termination suit initiated

by a governmental entity, an indigent parent has a statutory right to appointment of

an attorney ad litem to represent his interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.013(a)(1);

In re B.C., 592 S.W.3d 133, 134 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam); In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d

486, 489 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). However, in termination suits

initiated by a private party, such as the child’s other parent, an indigent parent is not

statutorily entitled to appointment of counsel. See In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 489.

Instead, in private termination cases, the trial court is authorized to appoint an

attorney ad litem to represent an indigent parent, but this authority is discretionary

with the trial court, not mandatory. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.021(a)(2); In re J.C.,

250 S.W.3d at 489; In re H.D.D.B., 2022 WL 2251655, at *8.

      concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities
      and to the record”). He also cites no authorities in support of his statement that the
      trial court’s failure to appoint counsel for him violated his due process rights. Given
      the importance of Father’s rights at stake in this parental-rights termination
      proceeding, we construe his brief liberally to reach the merits of his appellate issues
      where possible. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9; In re H.D.D.B., No. 01-20-00723-CV,
      2022 WL 2251655, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 23, 2022, no pet.)
      (mem. op.).
                                            11
      Although Texas statutory law does not require appointment of counsel in

private termination suits, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may

require it. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; In re H.D.D.B., 2022 WL 2251655, at *9;

In re L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2201905, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

May 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of

Durham County, North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court addressed

whether indigent parents have a due process right to appointed counsel in

termination proceedings. See 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The Court began with the

presumption that an indigent litigant has a due process right to appointed counsel

“only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Id. at 26–27.

The Court then balanced this presumption against three elements typically evaluated

when determining what procedures due process requires: the private interests at

stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to an

erroneous decision. Id. at 27 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).

      Because a parent’s desire and right to “the companionship, care, custody and

management of his or her children” is an important one, the parent’s interest in the

accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate parental rights is “commanding.”

Id. The parent has an additional interest if the termination petition contains

allegations of abuse or neglect upon which future criminal charges could be based.

Id. at 32. The State has a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the

                                          12
welfare of children, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982), and thus the

State shares the parent’s interest in an accurate and just decision. See Lassiter, 452

U.S. at 27–28; see also In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (stating that

State’s interest in “just decision is largely coextensive with the parents’ interests”);

In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (noting that

parens patriae interest “favors preservation, not severance, of natural familial

bonds”).

      Parents, children, and the State have an interest in resolving termination cases

as expeditiously as reasonably possible to reduce the amount of instability in the

children’s lives. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 274 (Tex. 2002); In re K.L., 91 S.W.3d

at 10 (noting that State has interest in ensuring termination proceedings are not

unreasonably delayed to avoid “prolonged uncertainty” for child). “The child’s best

interest is inherently threatened by undue uncertainty and delay in finally

determining where the child will live and who will raise her.” In re K.S.L., 538

S.W.3d at 115. The State also has an economic interest in avoiding the expense of

appointed counsel and the cost of lengthened proceedings that may ensue if the

parent is represented by counsel. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28. The State’s pecuniary

interest is “legitimate,” but it is not significant enough to overcome the parent’s

strong and important interest in maintaining parental rights. Id.

                                          13
      Courts must also consider the risk that the parent might be erroneously

deprived of his parental rights because he is not represented by counsel. 6 Id. A

relevant consideration with respect to this interest is whether expert medical or

psychiatric testimony, “which few parents are equipped to understand and fewer still

to confute,” is presented. Id. at 30. Courts should also consider whether the case

presents “troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive,” for which

counsel could make “a determinative difference” or whether the “absence of

counsel’s guidance” on a particular point “render[s] the proceedings fundamentally

unfair.” Id. at 32–33.

      The Lassiter Court summarized its discussion of the relevant factors and

reasoned:

      [T]he parent’s interest is an extremely important one (and may be
      supplemented by the dangers of criminal liability inherent in some
      termination proceedings); the State shares with the parent an interest in
      a correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and, in some

6
      In a case in which the Department of Family and Protective Services sought
      termination of parental rights, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the Texas
      Legislature has “enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme to ensure that
      termination trials result in a correct decision.” In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353
      (Tex. 2003). For example, a termination petition must provide notice to all parties
      by alleging the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the
      children’s best interest; the findings supporting termination must be made by clear
      and convincing evidence; and legal and factual sufficiency challenges are
      considered under a heightened standard of appellate review. Id. at 353–54. The court
      also noted an additional procedural safeguard to ensure termination proceedings
      result in the correct decision: “A trial court must appoint counsel for indigent parents
      opposing termination.” Id. at 353. As discussed above, however, the Legislature has
      not granted this right of counsel to indigent parents in private termination
      proceedings.
                                             14
      but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal procedures;
      and the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the
      uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to
      make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent’s rights
      insupportably high.
      If, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the
      State’s interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at
      their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not
      overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and
      that due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.

Id. at 31; see M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (“When deprivation of

parental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process that is

due.”). However, the Court refused to hold that due process “requires the

appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding.” Lassiter, 452

U.S. at 31. Instead, the question whether due process requires appointment of

counsel for an indigent parent in a termination proceeding is “to be answered in the

first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review.” Id. at 31–32;

see In re R.J.C., No. 04-09-00106-CV, 2010 WL 816188, at *3 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Whether due process calls for the

appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings is left to the

sound discretion of the trial court.”).

B.    Analysis

      The proceeding to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and

Stepfather, not the Department of Family and Protective Services or another

                                           15
governmental entity. As a result, because this is a private termination case, Father,

even though he is incarcerated and indigent, is not statutorily entitled to appointment

of counsel. See In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 489. Father requested appointment of

counsel, and the trial court had discretion to grant that request, but the court was not

statutorily mandated to grant the request and appoint counsel for Father. See TEX.

FAM. CODE § 107.021(a)(2); In re J.C., 250 S.W.3d at 489; In re H.D.D.B., 2022

WL 2251655, at *8. We therefore turn to whether the failure to appoint counsel for

Father violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

      As the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged, Father has an

“important” interest in maintaining the “companionship, care, custody and

management” of his children, and his interest in the accuracy of this proceeding,

which sought to terminate his parental rights forever, is “commanding.” See Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 27. This “fundamental” right, see In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex.

2021), is “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59;

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 273. As in Lassiter, however, the termination petition did

not contain any allegations that Father abused or neglected the children, such that,

in addition to the termination proceedings, he could also be subject to future criminal

prosecution. See 452 U.S. at 32 (noting that termination petition contained no

allegations of abuse or neglect that could form basis for criminal liability, and

therefore indigent mother could not argue that she needed assistance of counsel for

                                          16
that reason); In re L.F., 2020 WL 2201905, at *12 (concluding that due process did

not require appointment of counsel for indigent mother in part because termination

petition “contained no allegations against [m]other upon which criminal charges

could be based”). Thus, although Father has an “extremely important” interest at

stake, his interests are not “at their strongest.” See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.

      At trial, the only witnesses were Mother, Father, and Stepfather. This was

therefore not a situation in which Father was faced with cross-examining expert

witnesses without the assistance of counsel. Additionally, although Mother offered

several exhibits, these exhibits consisted of an account activity report prepared by

the Office of the Attorney General, the judgments for Father’s criminal convictions,

Mother and Father’s divorce decree, and the March 2017 order modifying the parent-

child relationship to require supervised visitation. No complicated medical or

psychiatric reports or other evidence was admitted. See id. at 32 (noting that while

state entity seeking termination was represented by counsel at trial, no expert

witnesses testified); see also In re L.F., 2020 WL 2201905, at *12 (noting, in

concluding that due process did not require appointment of counsel in private

termination suit, that no expert witnesses testified); In re J.E.D., No. 11-19-00166-

CV, 2019 WL 5617645, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (same); In re T.L.W., No. 12-10-00401-CV, 2012 WL 1142475, at *2 (Tex.

                                           17
App.—Tyler Mar. 30, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); In re R.J.C., 2010 WL

816188, at *4 (same).

      Some of Mother’s testimony—including her testimony concerning the

circumstances of Father’s criminal offenses—was not based on her own personal

knowledge, and was therefore objectionable, but Father did not object. Father

acknowledged in his testimony that the complainants of his aggravated robbery and

kidnapping offenses were his grandparents and that a firearm was involved, although

Father testified that the gun was not his, and instead he took his grandfather’s gun

away from him. There is no indication that the judgments reflecting Father’s

convictions and sentences, the testimony concerning Father’s failure to pay child

support, and Mother’s and Stepfather’s testimony concerning Stepfather’s

relationship with the children were inadmissible. See In re T.L.W., 2012 WL

1142475, at *2 (“[A]lthough some objectionable evidence may have been admitted,

there is no indication that the evidence of [father’s] convictions, his child support

records, or [mother’s] and her new husband’s testimony indicating that termination

was in the children’s best interest was inadmissible.”); In re R.J.C., 2010 WL

816188, at *4 (same).

      Additionally, Father demonstrated a desire to contest the proceedings and

retain his parental rights. In several filings with the trial court, he stated that he

wanted to maintain a relationship with the children and that he had tried to do so by

                                         18
sending the children letters and gifts while he was incarcerated, but Mother was

uncooperative. Father offered, and the trial court admitted, three letters that Mother

wrote to him during his incarceration and the pendency of the termination

proceeding. In these letters, Mother acknowledged that Father had sent the children

letters, artwork, and gifts, and she also acknowledged that Father wanted to remain

a part of the children’s lives. Although the parent’s desire to contest the proceedings

and parent their children is a factor that we consider, that circumstance alone does

not entitle a parent to appointment of counsel. See In re T.L.W., 2012 WL 1142475,

at *2; In re R.J.C., 2010 WL 816188, at *4.

      We must also consider whether the case presented any “specially troublesome

points of law, either procedural or substantive.” See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32; In re

T.L.W., 2012 WL 1142475, at *2 (considering whether case involved any

“troublesome points of law to address”); In re R.J.C., 2010 WL 816188, at *4

(same). Mother sought termination of Father’s parental rights based on three

statutory predicate grounds: Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(C), (F), and (Q).

The trial court ultimately terminated Father’s parental rights based on subsections

(F) and (Q).

      A trial court may terminate a parent’s rights under subsection (F) if it finds,

by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to support the child in

accordance with the parent’s ability during a period of one year ending within six

                                          19
months of the date of the filing of the petition. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(F).

“One year” means twelve consecutive months, and this period must begin no earlier

than eighteen months before the date of filing the termination petition. In re J.G.S.,

574 S.W.3d 101, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); In re

F.E.N., 542 S.W.3d 752, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)

(concluding that relevant time period under subsection (F) was “any twelve

consecutive months” between September 1, 2011, and March 1, 2013, which was

date termination petition was filed), pet. denied, 579 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2019) (per

curiam).

      The party seeking termination bears the burden to establish that the parent had

the ability to support the child during each month of the twelve-month period. In re

J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 117; In re E.M.E., 234 S.W.3d 71, 72 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2007, no pet.); In re T.B.D., 223 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no

pet.). A previous child-support order is not evidence of a parent’s ability to pay under

subsection (F). In re D.M.D., 363 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2012, no pet.); In re D.S.P., 210 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2006, no pet.) (concluding that child support order “should not be

afforded any relevance in a termination proceeding involving section

161.001[b](1)(F)”). The parent does not bear the burden to disprove ability to pay.

See in re D.M.D., 363 S.W.3d at 920. Without clear and convincing evidence of the

                                          20
parent’s ability to support their child during the statutory period, the trial court may

not order termination under subsection (F). In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 117.

        Mother filed suit to terminate Father’s parental rights on August 16, 2020.

Thus, the relevant time period for determining if Father supported the children in

accordance with his ability is February 16, 2019, to August 16, 2020. See id. (stating

that “one year” means twelve consecutive months and period must begin no earlier

than eighteen months before filing of termination petition). Mother bore the burden

to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had the ability to support

the children for each of twelve consecutive months during this time period, but

Father failed to do so.

        The divorce decree, entered in May 2013, imposed a $450 per month child

support obligation on Father. A financial activity record maintained by the Attorney

General’s office reflected that Father made some payments throughout 2013, 2014,

and 2015. Father then made a $650 payment in January 2016, an $11,413.35

payment in January 2018, and a $1,455.48 payment in August 2021.7 He made no

other payments, including no payments at all from February 2019 through August

2020.

7
        Mother confirmed that she received a child support payment in January 2016 and
        August 2021, but she disputed receiving a payment in January 2018. She agreed that
        she received no child support payments from Father in 2019 and 2020.
                                            21
      It is undisputed that Father was incarcerated throughout the pendency of the

termination proceedings. Father testified that he was arrested for the incident that

formed the basis for his convictions in June 2018, and he has been incarcerated since

then. Father was convicted in February 2020. When asked if he has voluntarily paid

child support since he has been incarcerated, Father responded, “I haven’t had the

means.” See id. at 118 (concluding that paternal grandmother did not establish

father’s ability to pay when father was incarcerated for entire statutory period under

subsection (F) and he had no access to military pay during this time); In re E.M.E.,

234 S.W.3d at 74 (concluding evidence was insufficient to support finding under

subsection (F) when evidence was undisputed father had no income while

incarcerated during relevant time period); In re T.B.D., 223 S.W.3d at 518

(concluding that termination under subsection (F) was not appropriate when father

was incarcerated during entire statutory time period, father testified he had no ability

to support his child while in prison, and no evidence was presented of father’s ability

to support child). Mother’s counsel did not ask Father any questions about his assets,

nor did counsel ask any questions about any funds Father may have received or had

access to from February 16, 2019, through August 16, 2020.

      At the close of the hearing, the trial court stated its intentions to find that

Father committed at least two statutory predicate acts and that termination of his

parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The court mentioned subsection

                                          22
(F) and stated, “but you have not provided support.” The trial court, Father, and

Mother’s counsel then had the following exchange:

      Father:           In July I made [Mother’s counsel] and [Mother] a
                        judgment for $26,000 for child support,
                        uncontested, and they’re now going after the
                        foreclosure of my house, the excess funds to pay
                        that $26,000. So my child support will be paid in
                        full once that—once that excess proceeds comes to
                        [Mother].
      The Court:        Is the house on the market?
      Father:           No. It was foreclosed in 2018 when I got
                        incarcerated.
      The Court:        Okay. So how did you know that there’s any excess
                        proceeds?
      Father:           Because [Mother’s counsel] has provided me with
                        the information.
      ....
      Mother’s Counsel: There is [an] application for a writ of judgment—or
                        writ of garnishment that is awaiting your signature
                        in the original SAPCR, it was the original SAPCR
                        case with an A on it. We’ve been awaiting your
                        signature on that, although I will add that per the
                        Code, he’s not supporting the child during—what
                        he’s talking about is that application garnishment—
                        garnishment and that was for—he had property that
                        was foreclosed on in 2018.
                        I would just add to the Court though, that the mere
                        evidence of the fact that he’s owned—that he owned
                        the property that he could have sold to pay the child
                        support establishes that he had the ability to pay
                        child support.
      The Court:        All right. And do you have any response to that, sir?

                                       23
      Father:             That’s not the case. Nobody—I couldn’t sell my
                          property if I was living there. I would have nowhere
                          to live.

      Although Father and Mother’s counsel agreed that Father’s house had been

foreclosed upon in 2018 and there were excess proceeds from the foreclosure sale,

the record is not clear when the sale happened, whether Father had access to the

excess proceeds, or whether he even knew about the excess proceeds during the time

period relevant to subsection (F). Mother bore the burden to establish that Father had

the ability to pay support during the statutory time period but failed to do so. See In

re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 117. Based on this record, we cannot say that, had counsel

represented Father, counsel could not have “made a determinative difference” at

trial. Cf. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33 (stating that while hearsay evidence was

admitted at trial and mother “no doubt left incomplete her defense,” weight of

evidence that mother had little interest in relationship with her child “was

sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for [mother] could not have made a

determinative difference”).

      The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights based on subsection

(Q). This subsection allows a court to terminate a parent’s rights if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that the parent knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that

has resulted in the parent’s (1) conviction of an offense, and (2) confinement or

imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the

                                          24
date of filing the petition for termination. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). If

the parent is convicted and sentenced to serve at least two years’ confinement and

will not be able to provide for the child during that time, a party may seek termination

of the parent’s rights under subsection (Q). In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tex.

2003); In re A.R., 497 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.).

      Establishing “inability to care for the child” is not met by merely showing

prolonged incarceration. In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 118. If that were sufficient, then

termination of parental rights “could become an additional punishment

automatically imposed along with imprisonment for almost any crime.” In re E.S.S.,

131 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Thus, evidence of

incarceration for at least two years “is only the first of a three-step analysis.” In re

J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 118.

      Once the party seeking termination has presented evidence of criminal

conduct by the parent resulting in confinement for at least two years, the burden of

production shifts to the parent to provide some evidence of how the parent will

provide care for the child during the period of confinement. Id. at 119; see In re

C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (concluding that

sufficient evidence supported termination under subsection (Q) when parent

introduced “no evidence” of efforts to arrange for child’s care “during his remaining

imprisonment”). The parent may meet this burden of production by presenting some

                                          25
evidence that the parent has arranged with another person for that person to provide

care for the child during the parent’s period of confinement. In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d

at 119; In re Caballero, 53 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet.

denied). The parent must prove the proposed caregiver’s agreement to provide care.

In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 119.

      The Texas Supreme Court has stated:

      Absent evidence that the non-incarcerated parent agreed to care for the
      child on behalf of the incarcerated parent, merely leaving a child with
      a non-incarcerated parent does not constitute the ability to provide care.
      If it did, then termination under subsection Q could not occur in any
      instance where one parent is not incarcerated and is willing and able to
      care for the child. [The mother] is [the child’s] sole managing
      conservator, and as such, she has both the obligations of a parent and
      specific statutory rights. It does not follow that the possessory
      conservator’s obligations are satisfied by allowing the sole managing
      conservator to be the exclusive caregiver.

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); In re J.G.S., 574

S.W.3d at 119 (stating that parent “must demonstrate that the care is being provided

on behalf of the parent, not out of an existing duty or inclination to care for the

child”). When determining whether the parent has an inability to care for the child,

we consider factors including the “availability of financial and emotional support

from the incarcerated parent.” In re B.M.R., 84 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

      If the parent meets this burden of production, the burden shifts back to the

party seeking termination, who has the burden of persuasion to show that the parent’s
                                         26
provision or arrangement will not adequately satisfy the parent’s duty to the child.

In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 119–20; In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

      Father does not deny that he has been sentenced to confinement for nine years

and Mother presented evidence of his sentences for five criminal offenses at trial.

Thus, the first step in the analysis under subsection (Q) is satisfied. See TEX. FAM.

CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(Q); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360. However, this is “only the

first of a three-step analysis.” In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 118. After Mother

presented evidence that Father knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that resulted

in his imprisonment for at least two years, the burden of production shifted to Father

to present some evidence of how he would provide care for the children during his

period of confinement. See id. at 119. Father could meet this burden by providing

evidence that he arranged with another person for that person to provide care for the

children. See id. Father, however, presented no such evidence.

      While Mother, as the party seeking termination, bore the ultimate burden of

persuasion to establish the statutory elements of subsection (Q) by clear and

convincing evidence, once she presented evidence that he had engaged in criminal

conduct resulting in imprisonment for at least two years, Father also bore a burden

of production. See In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d at 700; In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at

119. Thus, to avoid termination under this subsection, Father was not just required

                                          27
to defend himself against the allegation that he violated subsection (Q). Instead, he

had his own evidentiary burden. We conclude that this case presented “troublesome

points of law” and that counsel for Father could have “made a determinative

difference.” See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33.

      When we consider all the circumstances, particularly the importance of

Father’s interest at stake, his desire to contest the proceedings and maintain a

relationship with his daughters, and the challenges of defending against termination

under subsections (F) and (Q) in this case, we conclude that the trial court should

have appointed counsel to represent Father as a matter of due process. See id. at 31–

32. We hold that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel to represent Father

in this private termination proceeding.

                                     Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to Iris

and Catherine and remand the case for further proceedings.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

Justice Countiss, dissenting.

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