Court Opinion

ID: 9725812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:12:47.876505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:20.233468
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LONDRIGAN, dissenting: I would affirm the order of the trial court. Sexual liaisons are a factor to be considered with all the surrounding circumstances and not the factor. The trial court in its opinion set out at length its factual findings, distinguished this case from Jarrett v. Jarrett (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421, and correctly found Rippon v. Rippon (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70, to apply. Rippon stated: “Although the respondent admitted having sexual intercourse with Robbins before she married him and with her present boyfriend after divorcing Robbins, indulgence in moral indiscretions alone is not grounds for a change of custody where the children are leading a normal life. [Citation.] * * ° Only when an open adulterous relationship exists with no possibility of marriage, as when the paramour is and remains married to another woman, is there sufficient grounds to remove custody from the mother.” 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 468, 381 N.E.2d 70, 73. The trial court herein stated: “Section 610 of Chapter 40 indicates the public policy established by this section is against a change of custody unless there is a strong showing that a change is necessary for the best interest of the children. 6 * ” The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to prove [that] a modification of the custody provisions of the decree of divorce is warranted at this time. The Court further finds that a change of custody would not serve the best interests of the children. The harm resulting to the children by a change of custody would be far greater, considering their ages, than allowing them to remain with their present custodian.” The majority opinion herein held that the trial court’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence nor did it make any error of law.