Court Opinion

ID: 9688300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:42:54.154422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.282128
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice
(dissenting).
Article. Ill, Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
Every statute enacted by the Legisla_ ture, shall embrace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of its ob,,'ject. •
The Legislature may, however, by ' means of a single statute, enact dr re- " vise a system of laws of a general or public nature, such as the general' statute, or' a codification of laws on the same general subject.
The primary purpose of the title-body clause contained in paragraph one is to prevent the joining of incongruous and unrelated matter in one act, State v. Hertzog, 243 La.647, 146 So.2d 149 (1962); to give legislators fair notice of- the scope of. proposed legislation and to defeat deceitful, mysterious and misleading practices of entrapping the legislature into passage of provisions unrelated to and not inti■’■máted -by the title of the •■bill, A. & M. Best Control Service, Inc. v. LaBurre, 247 La.315, 170 So.2d 855 (1965).
., By decisions' of this court it has' 'been repeatedly, affirmed that this title-body clause, requiring the title of an. act- to indicate the subject matter, of dtár.body, must be broadly construed with a-' view to effectuating, not frustating, the legislative purpose. Bethlehem Supply , Company v. Pan-Southern Petroleum Corp., 207 La. 149, 20 So.2d 737 (1945); Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, 200 La. 341, 8 So.2d 49 (1939); Jackson v. Hart, 192 La. 1068, 190 So. 220 (1939). In its •consideration of the issue this court has held that the title of a law is not1-to-be strictly or technically interpreted, and, if it states the object according to the understanding of reasonable men, it is sufficient. Bethlehem Supply Co. v. Pan-Southern (Petroleum Corp., supra; State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1936) ; Lacoste v. Department, of Conservation of State of Louisiana, 151 La. 909, 92 So. 381 (1922); Municipality No. Three v. Michoud, 6 La.Ann. 605 (1851).
Nor does the constitution .requi.re that every change which an act may-effect in other laws be expressed in detail in the title of the new act, the requirement' is merely that the title shall be appropriate to the subject dealt with in the act itself and ' that the title not be misleading as to any purpose intended to be accomplished by the act. Louisiana Board of Pharmacy v. Smith, 226 La. 537, 76 So.2d 722 (1955). In., .resolving this 'issue, the presumption *835exists that the act is constitutional. State ex rel. Board of Com’rs, etc. v. Bergeron, 235 La. 879, 106 So.2d 295 (1958); Ramey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 200 So. 333 (La.App.1941).
To determine whether an act is violative of the title-body clause, courts must first examine the body of the act to ascertain its purpose. Ricks v. Department of State Civil Service, supra; Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So.2d 508 (1942).
The title of the act declared unconstitutional is set out in these words:
An Act
To amend and reenact Sub-Part A of Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, designated as the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, providing definition of narcotic drugs; providing regulation of the manufacture, transportation, sale, possession or use thereof ; providing penalties for violation; and providing generally with respect thereto including the administration thereof.
Prior to the amendment of 1970, Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Revised Statutes was entitled “Narcotics” and contained Sub-Part A., titled “Uniform Narcotic Drug Law”; Sub-Part B, titled “Miscellaneous” ; Sub-Part C., titled “Benzedrine” and Sub-Part D., titled “Barbiturate and Central Nervous System Law”. Part X of Chapter 4 contains all Louisiana law dealing with narcotics.
The body of Act 457 of 1970 is likewise comprehensive in its treatment, and, as its title indicates, it defines all narcotic drugs subject to control, regulates their manufacture, transportation, sale, possession or use. The body of the act further provides penalties for violations and provides generally with respect to narcotic drugs and the administration of the law on the subject.
In substance, therefore, Act 457 of 1970 treats of every phase of narcotic law covered by Part X of Chapter 4. All laws in conflict with its provisions are repealed. Indeed, it covers the entire subject of narcotic drugs, for there is no reservation or exception indicated to the general, all-embracing terminology employed in its title or body.
The principle contention of the attack upon the act is that its title refers only to Sub-Part A of Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Revised Statutes when Sub-Parts B, C and D are also contained in Part X; Sub-Part D being the law under which the prosecution would have fallen in the absence of Act 457- of 1970 under which the prosecution was in fact brought.
In my view the inadvertent failure of the drafters of Act 457 to refer to the other Sub-Parts of Part X of Chapter 4 *837of Title 40 of the Revised Statute is unimportant so long as the substance of the title of the act clearly demonstrates that it purports to cover the entire subject matter of Part X of Chapter 4 of Title 40 of the Revised Statutes.
By referring in its title to controlled dangerous substances, to which classification such drugs as amphetamines and barbiturates belong, Act 457 of 1970 sufficiently apprises legislators of the scope of the body of the act. And I cannot believe that the constitutional purpose of protecting legislators from deceitful practices has been frustrated. The senate amended the bill ten times and the house proposed and acted upon 156 amendments. 2 Official Journal of the Senate 1866 (1970). Surely such careful attention to this act precludes any inference that the legislature was deceived by the title.
Another important constitutional guide to interpretation is the language which makes it evident that it is no longer required, as it was formerly in preceding constitutions, that the object of the law be expressed in its title. It is sufficient now under the clear meaning of Section 16 of Article III that the title of the statute be indicative of its object. “The criterion would seem to be that the title of a statute is sufficient if it places those who are to be affected by the act upon inquiry info, its contents.” State ex rel. Board of Com’rs, etc. v. Bergeron, 235 La. 879, 106 So.2d 295 (1958).
This case is no different than out ruling in State v. O’Dell, 253 La. 418, 218 So.2d 318 (1969), where we held ineffective an attack upon a narcotics act because both the title and body incorrectly signified that it amended certain sections of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes (Criminal Code) when actually the sections reenacted were contained in Title 40 of the Revised Statutes.
I am moreover of the firm opinion that the comprehensiveness of Act 457 of 1970; its attempt to cover the entire subject matter of narcotic drugs in Louisiana law; its length (29 pages) and its format make it fall within the contemplation of a “system of laws of a general or public nature” or “a codification of laws on the same subject” contained in paragraph 2 of Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution. It is as much a code as the Louisiana Trust Code, the Corporation Code, or the Insurance Code. Under paragraph 2 of Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution, which permits the enactment of a system of laws or a code, the statute need only refer in its title to the general purpose and scope of the enactment. This it does.
By a super technical requirement that all Sub-Parts of Part X amended by Act 457 of 1970 be specifically referred to *839in the title of the act, even .though the unequivocal meaning, of the language used in the title is that the entire subject matter of all Sub-Parts of Part X are amended and superseded, this court strikes down this important legislation seeking to control the menace of drug abuse in this State.