Court Opinion

ID: 9379834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 16:07:11.58848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.427668
License: Public Domain

J-S28037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    ROBERT L. ROHRBACH                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1696 MDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 15, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004178-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                        FILED: MARCH 16, 2023

        Appellant, Robert L. Rohrbach, appeals from the order entered in the

Berks County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition brought

under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

        This Court has previously set forth the facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

          On the evening of December 18, 2015, [Appellant] was at
          home with his girlfriend and victim, Deni[e]se McAvoy. At
          some point that evening, they went upstairs to the bedroom
          and an argument ensued, which was heard by the next door
          neighbor. Ms. McAvoy lay down in the spare bedroom while
          [Appellant] went to bed in the master bedroom.

          In the afternoon of December 19, 2015, [Appellant]
          contacted his estranged mother and asked her to come over
          to his house because something horrible had happened. The
          mother came and he eventually told her that his girlfriend,
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       Ms. McAvoy, was dead. His mother called the police and
       told them that [Appellant] told her he had killed Ms. McAvoy.
       When the first police officer arrived and encountered
       [Appellant] for the first time, [Appellant] said, “I did it. I
       have mental problems. I killed her.” More officers arrived
       and they found Ms. McAvoy’s body in bed in the spare
       bedroom. The officers also found two handwritten notes
       from [Appellant].      One said: “Call Police.        Suicide.
       Downstairs bathroom. Upstairs middle bedroom.” The
       other had a short explanation of [Appellant] and Ms.
       McAvoy’s tumultuous relationship and a short will. At the
       end it stated, “God forgive me.” The officers also found a
       makeshift noose in the downstairs bathroom.

       An autopsy of Ms. McAvoy’s body was performed by Dr.
       Supriya Kur[u]villa. She determined after her examination
       that the manner of death should be classified as a homicide.

       There was no dispute that [Appellant] was the only other
       person present when Ms. McAvoy died….

       Supriya Kuruvilla, M.D., performed the autopsy and opined
       that the manner of death was homicide. Dr. Kuruvilla
       testified that Ms. McAvoy died from “complications arising
       from blunt force injury to the abdomen.” The initial blow or
       blows were “to the abdominal wall which resulted in
       laceration of the pancreas,” which in turn caused a
       hemorrhage. Those injuries led to the colon leaking fecal
       matter into the abdominal area, causing a fatal infection.
       Dr. Kuruvilla stated that the injury would not result in
       immediate death and estimated that the inflammation and
       complications occurred over a period ranging from “several
       hours to a couple of days.” As to the initial damage to the
       pancreas, she explained that “less than .2 percent of
       injuries” in blunt force trauma cases are to the pancreas, as
       the organ is well-protected since it sits towards the back of
       the body. The doctor testified that the force required to
       cause injury to that organ is substantial and “usually
       requires a very focused and hard force in the middle of the
       abdomen which would then crush the pancreas against the
       spine and then produce injury.” Dr. Kuruvilla stated that a
       fall down the stairs or other type of fall would not cause
       pancreatic lacerations “unless there’s a fall onto an object
       that would explain that kind of impact.” Additionally, Ms.

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       McAvoy exhibited several injuries to her face that were in
       various states of healing.

       Samuel Land, M.D., a forensic pathologist, who the
       Commonwealth had retained to review Dr. Kuruvilla’s
       findings, testified on behalf of [Appellant]. While he agreed
       that blunt force trauma caused injury to the pancreas and
       ruptured the colon, Dr. Land declined to rule the manner of
       death as a homicide or accidental. Instead, he concluded it
       was undetermined. Dr. Land stated that a fall down the
       stairs would be an atypical cause of such injuries, “but had
       there been something on the steps, something heavy, let’s
       take a barbell and this woman had fallen onto the barbell,
       that would be a possibility.” Dr. Land testified that he
       reviewed all the police reports, including the notes written
       by [Appellant], which did not change his opinion.

       … Ms. McAvoy had been engaged to a man who developed
       cancer and died on May 15, 2014. Tara Shinn, Ms. McAvoy’s
       work manager, testified that Ms. McAvoy and [Appellant]
       began dating about two weeks later. Shortly thereafter, Ms.
       McAvoy began coming to work smelling of alcohol and
       occasionally with bruises on her face. The two spoke in
       private and Ms. McAvoy indicated that [Appellant] was
       responsible for the injuries. Ms. McAvoy stopped coming to
       work as of July 11, 2014, and was officially terminated on
       August 12, 2014.

       Mrs. Shinn shared her concerns with Pamela Rodriguez, a
       fellow co-worker. Mrs. Rodriguez was friends with Ms.
       McAvoy and noticed that the abuse had escalated after Ms.
       McAvoy and [Appellant] moved in together, which she said
       happened sometime in the fall. On at least three occasions,
       Ms. McAvoy showed Mrs. Rodriguez injuries and asked her
       to take photographs as proof. Mrs. Rodriguez took photos
       on November 7, November 20 and December 4, 2014. Ms.
       McAvoy told Mrs. Rodriguez to keep the evidence in case
       something happened to her.

       On December 9, 2014, Ms. McAvoy called Mrs. Rodriguez
       crying and requesting Percocet that Mr. Rodriguez had due
       to a back injury. Mrs. Rodriguez left work and went to Ms.
       McAvoy’s home and observed severe injuries. “The whole
       left side of her face and her shoulder were black, like not

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        black and blue, but black. Like her face was so swollen she
        was unrecognizable.” Knowing that Ms. McAvoy had an
        outstanding warrant for unspecified alcohol charges, Mrs.
        Rodriguez reported her to the police to force Ms. McAvoy’s
        removal from the home.

        After Ms. McAvoy was released from jail, their socialization
        significantly decreased. However, on May 10, 2015, Ms.
        McAvoy showed up at the Rodriguez home nearly naked,
        bleeding and bruised. Mr. Rodriguez testified that he called
        his wife, who left work to come home. The two decided to
        call the police. The officer took no action as Ms. McAvoy did
        not want to pursue charges.

                                 *    *    *

        Wilson Serrano-Aponte lived next door to Ms. McAvoy and
        [Appellant]. Their homes shared a wall and on December
        18, 2015, the day before Ms. McAvoy died, he heard
        “screaming between a man and a lady ... [the] lady
        screaming like stop, stop, please stop.” The screams
        started at approximately 10:30 p.m. and went on for five to
        fifteen minutes.

        Another neighbor, Wendy Bobst, lived close to [Appellant]’s
        house and would see Ms. McAvoy walking around the
        neighborhood. They would chat a couple times per week.
        Ms. Bobst noticed bruising and cuts on multiple occasions;
        on one of these, Ms. McAvoy’s eyes were almost swollen
        shut and her face was bruised. Eventually, Ms. McAvoy
        asked Ms. Bobst to write down a list of names and numbers.
        Ms. Bobst did so and Ms. McAvoy instructed her to contact
        those persons if anything ever happened to her. Those
        names included Pamela Rodriguez and Tara Shinn.

        Finally, Erinn Fortson, an employee of Laurel House, a
        domestic violence agency that provided shelter and
        counseling, testified that on November 23, 2015, Ms.
        McAvoy called to inquire about shelter. The two spoke and
        Ms. McAvoy stated she would call back but never did.

Commonwealth v. Rohrbach, 1500 MDA 2018, unpublished memorandum,

at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 27, 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 417, 218 A.3d

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389 (2019) (internal citations omitted).

       On April 12, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder

and aggravated assault. The court sentenced Appellant on May 8, 2018, to

an aggregate term of 16 to 40 years’ incarceration. On March 27, 2019, this

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal on October 1, 2019. See id.

       On October 2, 2020, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition, and

the court subsequently appointed PCRA counsel. On August 2, 2021, PCRA

counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter and a motion to withdraw as

counsel.2 On September 23, 2021, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent

to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.Crim.P. 907, and granted

counsel’s petition to withdraw.         Appellant did not respond, and the court

denied PCRA relief on November 15, 2021. Appellant timely filed a pro se

notice of appeal on December 14, 2021, per the prisoner mailbox rule. 3 On

December 28, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied

on January 19, 2022.

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 Appellant’s PCRA petition was postmarked December 14, 2021. See
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied,
616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (explaining prisoner mailbox rule provides
that pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on date he delivers it to prison
authorities for mailing).

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       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

          Appointed PCRA counsel … was ineffective for failing to
          investigate Pamela and Miguel Rodriguez, and discover
          evidence of their criminal activities, arrests, and or
          convictions to support Appellant’s PCRA claim that they had
          “motivation to lie.”

          Appointed PCRA counsel … provided ineffective assistance
          of counsel, when he failed to search the entire record for
          meritorious PCRA issues not recognized or raised by
          Appellant in his pro se PCRA petition, and document the act
          of searching the record for meritorious issues in his
          Turner/Finley letter, and finding none.

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).4

       “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

____________________________________________

4 We note that Appellant’s argument section in his brief raises many issues
that are not included in the “statements of questions involved” or preserved
in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Specifically, Appellant raises the following
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: 1) trial counsel’s failure to
comprehensively cross-examine Ms. Rodriguez about various details in her
testimony to undermine her credibility; 2) trial counsel’s inaccurate claim in
the opening statement that the medical experts would state that they could
not rule out the possibility that Ms. McAvoy’s cause of death was a fall, when
neither the Commonwealth nor the defense expert testified as such during the
trial; and 3) direct appeal counsel’s failure to develop the issues that counsel
raised on appeal. As these particular claims were not preserved in Appellant’s
Rule 1925(b) statement, they are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth
v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32
A.3d 1275 (2011) (explaining general rule that issues not raised in concise
statement will be deemed waived for review; concise statement must properly
specify error to be addressed on appeal).

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Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

      In his first issue on appeal, Appellant argues that PCRA counsel failed to

properly investigate and evaluate Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to discover evidence of Pamela and Miguel Rodriguez’s

criminal activities. Appellant claims that his ineffective assistance claim had

merit because Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez sold drugs to Ms. McAvoy. Appellant

asserts that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to discover

evidence of their criminal activities and use it during cross-examination to

demonstrate their “motivation to lie.”       Appellant asserts that he was

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure because Mrs. Rodriquez was the only

witness to testify that Ms. McAvoy stated that Appellant caused her injuries.

Appellant concludes that PCRA counsel’s failure to properly investigate this

claim and discover evidence of Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez’s criminal activity

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and this Court must grant relief.

We disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed   to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

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        [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
        defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
        ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
        of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
        process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
        could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
        prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
        claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
        reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
        and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
        a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
        proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).   The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

     “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

     “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

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client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).          “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      Instantly, PCRA counsel addressed Appellant’s claim that trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez in his “no

merit” letter. PCRA counsel concluded that Appellant’s claim lacked arguable

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merit because any evidence of Mr. or Mrs. Rodriguez’s alleged illegal drug

activity would have been irrelevant and inadmissible at trial. We agree with

PCRA counsel’s assessment.     Any evidence demonstrating that Mr. or Mrs.

Rodriguez sold drugs to Ms. McAvoy was not relevant to how Ms. McAvoy died

under the facts of this case. See Pa.R.E. 401 (stating: “Evidence is relevant

if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would

be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining

the action”). Likewise, evidence of Mr. or Mrs. Rodriguez’s alleged illegal drug

activity would have been inadmissible for impeachment purposes on cross-

examination. See Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1) (stating: “[T]he character of a witness

for truthfulness may not be attacked or supported by cross-examination or

extrinsic evidence concerning specific instances of the witness’ conduct”).

Further, we fail to see how such evidence demonstrates that Mr. and Mrs.

Rodriguez had a “motivation to lie” during their testimony, as Appellant

suggests.

      Additionally, we agree with PCRA counsel’s conclusion that Appellant

could not demonstrate prejudice in light of the photographs of Ms. McAvoy’s

injuries, and testimony of Ms. Shinn, Mr. Serrano-Aponte, Ms. Bobst, and Ms.

Fortson, all which corroborated the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez. See

Spotz, supra. Thus, PCRA counsel properly assessed Appellant’s claim and

correctly determined that it was without merit. As counsel cannot be found

ineffective for failing to advance a meritless claim, Appellant’s first issue on

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appeal fails. See Poplawski, supra.

      In his second issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that PCRA counsel failed

to properly examine the record to determine whether there were additional

instances of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.   Appellant argues that the “no

merit” letter was deficient because PCRA counsel “did not include any

additional errors that Appellant expected him to develop and add in an

amended petition with the assistance of counsel.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9-10).

Appellant further avers that PCRA counsel failed to speak with Appellant on

the phone or in person despite multiple requests to do so. Appellant contends

that “it defies logic to think that a pro se litigant, ignorant of the law, could

possibly identify claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, or assist [PCRA]

counsel with this task, when [PCRA] counsel was in the exclusive possession

of both the trial transcript and the discovery file.” (Id. at 25). Appellant

concludes that PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by

failing to consult with Appellant and review the record to identify all

meritorious issues. We disagree.

      Before counsel can be permitted to withdraw from representing a

petitioner under the PCRA, Pennsylvania law requires counsel to file a “no-

merit” brief or letter pursuant to Turner and Finley. Commonwealth v.

Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940 (Pa.Super. 2003).

      The independent review necessary to secure a withdrawal request by

counsel requires proof that:

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         1. PCRA counsel, in a “no-merit” letter, has detailed the
         nature and the extent of his review;

         2. PCRA counsel, in the “no-merit” letter, lists each issue the
         petitioner wishes to have reviewed;

         3. PCRA counsel must explain, in the “no-merit” letter, why
         petitioner's issues are meritless;

         4. The PCRA court must conduct its own independent review
         of the record; and

         5. The PCRA court must agree with counsel that the petition
         is meritless.

Commonwealth v. Merritt, 827 A.2d 485, 487 (Pa.Super. 2003).

         If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are without
         merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and deny
         relief. By contrast, if the claims appear to have merit, the
         court will deny counsel’s request and grant relief, or at least
         instruct counsel to file an advocate’s brief.

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal

citations omitted).

      Instantly, PCRA counsel affirmed in the “no merit” letter that he

reviewed the entire record in this case, including “the notes of testimony of

the trial and the sentencing, the appellate briefs, and the Superior Court

memorandum opinion.” (Tuner/Finley “No Merit” Letter, filed 8/2/21, at 3-

4).   PCRA counsel further stated that he corresponded extensively with

Appellant by way of letters to fully understand and evaluate the issues that

Appellant wished to pursue. PCRA counsel’s averments are supported by the

contents of the “no merit” letter, which contains a careful and nuanced

evaluation of each issue that Appellant wished to review and explains why

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those issues lack merit. Further, the PCRA court conducted an independent

review of the record and agreed with PCRA counsel’s assessment that

Appellant’s PCRA petition was without merit.

       Appellant fails to provide any support for his assertion that PCRA counsel

was required to speak with Appellant on the phone or in person to evaluate

possible PCRA claims.         We decline Appellant’s invitation to expand the

requirements set forth in Turner and Finley. PCRA counsel communicated

with Appellant via written correspondence, asking detailed questions to

understand Appellant’s issues and inquiring into details that could not be

gleaned from the record. There is no indication that PCRA counsel’s chosen

form of communication hampered his ability to assess and evaluate

Appellant’s claims. The record demonstrates that PCRA counsel satisfied the

mandates of Turner and Finley. See Merritt, supra. As such, there is no

merit to Appellant’s claim that PCRA counsel’s review of this case was

insufficient.5 See Sandusky, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

____________________________________________

5 As discussed above, Appellant’s brief raises additional claims of trial and
direct appeal counsel’s ineffectiveness not preserved in Appellant’s Rule
1925(b) statement. To the extent that Appellant is arguing that PCRA counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise these newly identified claims, we note that
Appellant’s brief fails to properly develop or support this argument.
Specifically, Appellant fails to properly address the reasonable basis and
prejudice prongs as applied to PCRA counsel, trial counsel, or direct appeal
counsel. The failure to develop a meaningful argument for all three parts of
the test is fatal to Appellant’s claim that PCRA counsel provided ineffective
assistance. See Sandusky, supra at 1044 (stating boilerplate allegations
and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot
satisfy petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was ineffective).

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/16/2023

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