Court Opinion

ID: 9663275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:33:53.16433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:47.355268
License: Public Domain

LESLIE, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent and would remand the case for resentencing. Recognizing that “[bjecause of human involvement, no criminal proceeding disposed of by a trial is likely to be completely free of defects, irregularities or errors,” State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 75, 171 N.W.2d 695, 710 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1049, 90 S.Ct. 1381, 25 L.Ed.2d 662 (1970), the supreme court has stated “a defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.” Id., (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). Here, while I do notfe agree with a significant number of the trial court’s rulings, or with the majority’s official and public sanctioning of the same, I believe that appellant received a fair trial and that the evidence of appellant’s guilt is so overwhelming that I cannot help but conclude that his conviction was appropriate. I would, however, remand the case for resentencing.
Before specifically addressing the sentencing issue before the court, I am forced to observe, in general, the significant num*73ber of departures from the sentencing guidelines. “The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards * * *.” Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines I (emphasis added). As the comments to the guidelines observe,
[these purposes] cannot be achieved unless the presumptive sentences are applied with a high degree of regularity. Sentencing disparity cannot be reduced if judges depart from the guidelines frequently. Certainty in sentencing cannot be attained if departure rates are high.
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Comment II.D.03. With this in mind, I proceed to examine appellant’s sentence.
In this case, the trial court allowed an upward durational departure based entirely upon the state’s motion therefor. Without even verifying the validity of the state’s proffered reasons for the requested departure, the trial court simply stated “[t]he basis for the departure is by adoption and reference * * * the memorandum submitted to the court by the state.” This summary adoption procedure is, in my opinion, highly inappropriate.
By statute, when a nonguideline sentence is imposed
the district court shall make written findings of fact as to the reasons for departure from the sentencing guidelines in each case in which the court imposes or stays a sentence that deviates from the sentencing guidelines applicable to the case.
Minn.Stat. § 244.10, subd. 2 (1988) (emphasis added). “ ‘Shall’ is mandatory," Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (1988) (emphasis added); compare Minn.Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (1988) (“ ‘May’ is permissive”). See also Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.C. (‘‘any prison sentence duration pronounced by the sentencing judge which is outside the range of the presumptive duration is a departure from the guidelines, * * * and requires written reasons from the judge * * * ”) (emphasis added); II.D. (“When departing from the presumptive sentence, a judge must provide written reasons which specify the substantial and compelling nature of the circumstances, and which demonstrate why the sentence selected in the departure is more appropriate, reasonable, or equitable than the presumptive sentence”) (emphasis added). I believe that the legislature has made clear its intent that the absolute prerequisite of a nonguideline sentence is a set of written findings justifying that departure. Further, when the law’s application is without question, “the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1988). Because a trial court’s adoption of the state’s reasons for the departure does not constitute the statutorily required findings, I would remand for resentencing.
Even assuming that the adoption of an argument for a sentencing departure could be seen as the impartial judicial findings necessary to support that departure, that would not allow affirmance here. As noted by the majority, over half of the reasons the trial court allegedly used to “justify” its departure did not apply to this case. Further, to the extent that the trial court may have partially based its departure on the fact that the shooting took place at a community center, I note that factor is not on the guidelines’ admittedly “nonexclusive” list of aggravating factors, see Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.D.2.b. Like the majority, however, I am wholly unconvinced that the geographical locale of an intentional crime, which is arguably purely accidental, should be so used. Lastly, the majority’s reliance on State v. Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d 633, 634-35 (Minn.1982) is not persuasive to me. In that case, four separate aggravating factors were present. Further, although the supreme court “attach[ed] particular significance to the fact that permanent injury was inflicted” they “bas[ed] [their] conclusion on the totality of the circumstances.” Van Gorden, 326 N.W.2d at 635. Here, the presence of other aggravating circumstances is questionable and consideration of the “totality of the circumstances” would include recognition of the fact that Cotton, the victim, may have been involved in the substantial harassment of appellant and his family, including, as the majority points *74out, being watched, verbal threats, physical assaults, shootings at and into appellant’s residence and the stopping and breaking of windows of the car in which members of appellant’s family were traveling. As such, the victim could be seen as the aggressor in this incident and thus a mitigating factor would be present. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.D.2.a(l). I would remand for resentencing pursuant to the guidelines.