Court Opinion

ID: 9646671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:07:16.567023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.561002
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
The reversal of this conviction is predicated solely upon Bill of Exception No. 2, which relates to remarks of one of the attorneys for the state. My brethren conclude that the remarks constitute a reference to appellant’s failure to testify and thus offend against Art. 710 V.A.C.C.P.

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If the language used, looked to from the standpoint of the jury, necessarily had reference to the defendant’s failure to testify, a violation of Art. 710 C.C.P. is shown, and the defendant should be granted a new trial. But it is not sufficient that the language used by the attorney for the state may be construed as an implied or indirect allusion to the defendant’s *492failure to testify. Lewis v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 514, 236 S. W. 2d 812.
Every casual reference or bare allusion to the defendant’s failure to testify does not require the granting of a new trial. Lewis v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 544, 237 S. W. 2d 293; Bell v. State, 144 Tex. Cr. R. 106, 161 S. W. 2d 109.
The trial judge considered the complaint addressed to the remarks quoted in the majority opinion and overruled appellant’s motion for new trial. The bill of exception was then prepared and presented to the trial judge for his approval, in order that his ruling might be reviewed by this court.
Pursuant to the provisions of Art. 667 V.A.C.C.P. (as amended in 1953) the trial judge qualified the bill of exception so as to require it to reflect what he found to be a “reason whereby the argument complained of would not be error.” The qualification reads:
“1. I do not certify as a fact that the assistant district attorney made any comment or allusion whatever to the failure of the defendant to testify, as claimed in the bill, but do certify such is defendant’s contention.
“2. The assistant district attorney was commenting on the defendant’s failure to make any claim the killing of her husband was an accident, when the matter was investigated by the officers some time — a few weeks — before defendant was charged with the offense or arrested for it. At the time the silence occurred to which the prosecutor was alluding, the defendant was at liberty, not under arrest nor in custody. She was the only person present when her husband was shot to death, and did not claim accident to the investigating officers when they interviewed her. These facts were before the jury by admissible evidence, and the court thought then and thinks now it was legitimate for the prosecutor to comment on these facts.
“3. I do not certify as to what was the argument of state’s counsel other than as set out in this bill, and I do not certify to there being any denunciation of defendant’s counsel, nor as what the jury knew, nor that the remarks complained of in this bill were in any way prejudicial, damaging or hurtful to defendant. The remarks complained of in the bill as prosecutor’s argument did not constitute either a second, or a first reference, either direct or indirect, to defendant’s failure to testify, but *493such is defendant’s contention. The argument of state’s counsel was based on the evidence which had been admitted, and in my opinion was legitimate argument based thereon. I cannot certify as to how much of the remarks and objections and exceptions set out in the bill was heard by the jury.”
In Fowler v. State, 161 Tex. Cr. Rep. 30, 274 S. W. 2d 705, 708, this court speaking of the effect of the 1953 amendment of Art. 667 V.A.C.C.P., said:
“It (the legislature) went further and expressly provided that if facts exist which rendered the argument not objectionable, or subject to the complaint leveled thereat, the trial court was expressly authorized to require that the bill of exception reflect such facts.”
In the light of the trial court’s qualifications certifying to the contrary, which were accepted by appellant, the writer is unable to agree that the argument necessarily referred to appellant’s failure to testify.
Opinion approved by the court.