Court Opinion

ID: 9608601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:15:05.511021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:12.318932
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment, but write separately to elaborate on the underlying basis for applying the defense of justification as defined by OCGA § 16-3-20 (6).
The affirmative defense of justification is codified at OCGA § 16-3-20 and provides: “The fact that a person’s conduct is justified is a defense to prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. The defense of justification can be claimed: (1) When the person’s conduct is justified under Code Section 16-3-21 [Use of force in defense of self or others], 16-3-23 [Use of force in defense of habitation], 16-3-24 [Use of force in defense of property other than a habitation], 16-3-25 [Entrapment], or 16-3-26 [Coercion] of this article; (2) When the person’s conduct is in reasonable fulfillment of his duties as a government officer or employee; (3) When the person’s conduct is the reasonable discipline of a minor by his parent or a person in loco parentis; (4) When the person’s conduct is reasonable and is performed in the course of making a lawful arrest; (5) When the person’s conduct is justified for any other reason under the laws of this state; or (6) In all *107other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this article.”
Subsection (6) applies when the otherwise criminal conduct at issue cannot be justified under the criteria set out in the other enumerated subsections of OCGA § 16-3-20, but a rational basis exists to assert that such conduct is justified because it stands “upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this article.” Whether conduct is justified by fitting within the criteria of subsections (1) through (5), or whether it stands upon the same footing as these defenses is necessarily dictated by the facts of each case.
Here, there is evidence to support the defendant’s contention that he falsely held himself out as a police officer in an attempt to avoid an immediate and reasonably perceived threat of serious bodily injury to himself. Though this conduct is analogous to conduct justified under OCGA §§ 16-3-21 (Use of force in defense of self or others) and 16-3-26 (Coercion), it does not fit within the parameters of either. Self defense does not apply because the defendant used verbal deception rather than force to defend himself. Coercion does not apply because those threatening the defendant were not attempting to coerce or compel him to impersonate a police officer, rather he chose that conduct as a defense to the threat.
The defendant was entitled to a charge on justification under subsection (6) because the facts support a rational connection between his conduct and the defenses of self defense and coercion which places his conduct on the same footing of reason and justice as these defenses. Both the self defense and coercion defenses may be understood as justifying otherwise criminal conduct “on a common theme of ‘lesser of two evils.’ ” Kurtz, Criminal Offenses & Defenses in Ga. (2d ed.), pp. 250-252. The use of force in self defense, or undertaking criminal conduct in submission to coercion, may be justified as an acceptable alternative to suffering death or great bodily injury, if the force used or criminal conduct undertaken is a reasonably proportioned response to an immediate threat. Under the circumstances confronting the defendant, his single false statement that he was a police officer, made in an attempt to dissuade an immediate attack and escape serious bodily injury, stands on the same “lesser of two evils” footing. The conduct was arguably a reasoned and proportional response to the perceived threat, therefore the defendant was entitled to invoke the defense of justification under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6).
In coming to this conclusion, I am not unmindful of the difficulty created for trial judges in identifying and framing a charge on the defense of justification under OCGA § 16-3-20 (6). However, the alternative under the facts of this case is to hold that the section has no meaning, and I am unwilling to do that.
*108Decided June 20, 1991.
Christine A. Van Dross, for appellant.
Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, James C. Bernard, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.