Court Opinion

ID: 9574201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:03:17.199488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:13.155764
License: Public Domain

Cooper, Judge, dissenting.
The majority concludes that the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the defendant could not have reasonably concluded that he was free to terminate the interrogation. Because I find that the record amply supports the trial court’s decision to suppress the confession, I must dissent from the majority opinion.
As noted by the majority, “ ‘(u)nless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to the admissibility of a confession will be upheld on appeal.’ [Cit.]” Harper v. State, 193 Ga. App. 551 (388 SE2d 379) (1989). The majority correctly points out that standing alone, neither the fact that the interrogation occurred at the police station nor the fact that the police initiated the contact with defendant is a basis for requiring that defendant be given the Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694 (1966)) warnings. However, the flaw in the majority’s reasoning is the failure to recognize that the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in arriving at its conclusion. While factors such as the place of the interrogation and the party who initiated the interrogation were considered by the trial court, the record contains other facts which, in addition to those mentioned above, constitute the totality of the circumstances. First, defendant was never advised that he was free to leave, that he could terminate the interrogation at any time or that he was not under arrest. Secondly, at the time the police initiated the questioning, defendant had been positively identified by the victim as the perpetrator of a specific crime. Consequently, defendant was more than a mere “suspect” in the case. The police may have chosen to wait two months before arresting defendant, but considering the victim’s positive identification, the police could have chosen to arrest defendant immediately. Also, it is hard to imagine in light of the victim’s identification, that the subsequent interrogation was anything less than an attempt to obtain information establishing defendant’s guilt. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that defendant, when faced with questioning initiated by the police, at the police station, after he had been positively identified by the victim of the crime, did not feel that he was free to terminate the interrogation. I believe that the trial court recognized a flagrant attempt by the police to circumvent the *4protection afforded under Miranda. Because I cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings were “clearly erroneous,” I must respectfully dissent.
Decided April 10, 1992.
W. Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, Kevin R. Gough, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Lane, Tucker & Crowe, Grayson P. Lane, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this dissent.