Court Opinion

ID: 9927191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:06:08.46894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.324009
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                   22-P-991

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                  PETER AKARA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a jury-waived trial in Superior Court, the

 defendant was convicted of trafficking a class B substance in an

 amount over thirty-six grams.         The conviction was based on

 cocaine, a scale, and over $59,000 in cash discovered at the

 defendant's Roslindale residence during the execution of a

 search warrant.      On appeal, the defendant raises multiple claims

 of error, most of which relate to assertions that the police

 might have obtained the search warrant based on an affidavit

 that contained fabrications.         We affirm.

       Background.     The search warrant affidavit was signed by

 Boston police officer Robert England, a member of the "Drug

 Control Unit" (DCU).       It relies in pertinent part on information

 provided by a confidential informant referred to as "Randall,"
and on three controlled buys of cocaine that Randall made from

the defendant.   According to the affidavit, Randall had provided

England "and other members of the DCU with reliable information

in the past which has resulted in the purchase of illegal

narcotics by undercover police officers in several of these

investigations."     Randall told police that that a Black male was

operating a narcotics delivery service in and around West

Roxbury and Roslindale.    He reported that he would reach the

person by calling him using a specified phone number and that

the person would deliver the drugs using a Blue Toyota Avalon

that had a Massachusetts license plate 555SS1.     The police knew

that the car was registered to the defendant's mother at 133

Cornell Street in Roslindale.    They showed a photograph of the

defendant to Randall, who identified the person shown in the

photograph as the one who would sell him drugs.

    Based on this information, the police used Randall to set

up three controlled buys using customary protocols.     Each

controlled buy followed the same pattern:    after Randall

contacted the defendant by calling the referenced phone number,

the defendant would leave 133 Cornell Street and drive in the

Toyota Avalon to an agreed-upon location where he sold Randall

cocaine in exchange for money.    Although the descriptions of the

controlled buys were very specific in some respects, they were

general in others.    Thus, for example, the affidavit did not set

                                  2
forth the specific locations of the controlled buys, and it

described their respective dates as follows:      "[w]ithin the last

several weeks [of September 20, 2018, the date the affidavit was

signed], "[w]ithin the last week or so," and "[w]ithin the last

seventy-two hours."   The affidavit explained that any vagueness

as to such points was designed to protect Randall's identity.

    A clerk-magistrate determined that England's affidavit

supplied probable cause to search the defendant's person, the

Toyota Avalon, and the residence at 133 Cornell Street, and

issued three search warrants (one for each).       The police

executed the warrants the following day (September 21, 2018).

On the defendant's person, the police discovered a cell phone

and a set of keys that included keys to the Avalon, his bedroom,

and two safes.   As noted, inside the residence, the police found

cocaine, a scale, and over $59,000 in cash.       They also found a

second cell phone -- this one with a broken screen -- on a couch

in the living room.

    The defendant was indicted for trafficking a class B

substance based on the evidence found inside his residence.       He

was not charged with possessing or distributing the cocaine sold

during the controlled buys.   Neither Randall nor England were

called to testify at his trial.       The defendant represented

himself at trial, and during his cross-examination of one of the

officers who executed the search warrant, he asked "[d]id you or

                                  3
any of the officers plant the drugs?"     The officer answered

"no."

    Both before and after trial, the defendant pursued a series

of motions that related to whether Randall or England might have

fabricated information included in the search warrant affidavit

regarding the controlled buys.    Indeed, the defendant maintained

that Randall may not even have existed.    Each of these motions

was denied, in pertinent part, and at trial, the defendant was

not allowed to pursue cross-examination regarding the search

warrant affidavit.    The details regarding the defendant's

efforts and claims of error are discussed below.

    Discussion.      The evidence of trafficking cocaine found

inside the defendant's residence was extremely strong.

Unsurprisingly, he focused his efforts on seeking to suppress

that evidence.   However, because the search was done pursuant to

a warrant, the defendant bore the burden of demonstrating the

invalidity of the warrant.    See Commonwealth v. Bond, 375 Mass.

201, 210 (1978).     To the extent that the defendant argued that

the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause

that evidence of a crime would be found inside his residence,

our review is confined to the information contained within the

four corners of the affidavit submitted in support of the

application.   See Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297

(2003).   Here, Officer England's affidavit "contain[ed] facts

                                  4
sufficient to demonstrate that there is probable cause to

believe that drugs, or related evidence, will be found at the

location to be searched."   Commonwealth v. Lewis, 103 Mass. App.

Ct. 61, 63 (2023), quoting Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438,

440 (2009).   There also was "specific information in the

affidavit, and reasonable inferences a magistrate may draw, to

provide 'a sufficient nexus between the defendant's drug-selling

activity and his residence.'"   Lewis, supra, quoting Pina, supra

at 440-441.   Nothing more was required.   Accordingly, the

defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search was

properly denied.

    The defendant's other motions all relate to his efforts to

claim that key averments in England's affidavit may have been

fabricated.   As one such effort, the defendant requested a

hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and

Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511 (1990).   To obtain a

Franks/Amral hearing, a defendant must make "a substantial

preliminary showing" that the affiant either intentionally or

recklessly made materially false statements in the affidavit.

Franks, 438 U.S. at 170.    See also Amral, 407 Mass. at 522 (in

camera hearing required only "where the defendant by affidavit

asserts facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of

material representations made by the affiant concerning a

confidential informant").   Other than his own general denial

                                 5
that he had sold cocaine in the Boston area during the relevant

time period, the defendant provided no support for his claim

that Officer England had included a misstatement in his

affidavit, much less a material falsehood.    This being the case,

the judge who denied the defendant's motion for a Franks/Amral

hearing did not abuse his discretion in doing so.

     For similar reasons, the defendant's other related efforts

also fail.   In an effort to obtain information that might

support his request for a Franks/Amral hearing, the defendant

filed a pretrial "Motion Seeking Discovery Pertaining to Alleged

'Controlled Buys.'"   This was a motion seeking discretionary

discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (2), as appearing

in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004).1   Citing to Commonwealth v. John, 36

Mass. App. Ct. 702, 705 (1994), the judge denied that motion

after concluding that the defendant had not established by

affidavit "facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity

of material representations made by the affiant concerning a

confidential informant" (citation omitted).   We recognize that

1 We pause to note that the Commonwealth has an affirmative
obligation to disclose exculpatory information in its possession
as part of its mandatory automatic discovery obligations. See
Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518
(2004). Thus, for example, if counsel had reason to doubt that
the controlled buys had taken place, he or she would have a duty
to volunteer such information to the defense and potentially be
subject to discipline for not doing so.

                                 6
the defendant submitted an affidavit that included his general

denial that he had sold drugs in Boston during the period in

question.   However, "[t]he judge was not required to credit the

affidavit, even if undisputed."       Commonwealth v. Dubois, 451

Mass. 20, 29 (2008).   We conclude that the judge did not abuse

her discretion in denying the defendant's discovery motion.2

     The defendant seeks to make much of the fact that during

the hearing on his discovery motion, the judge who ultimately

denied that motion commented that defense counsel had "given

[her] some basis for being skeptical about the veracity of th[e]

search warrant."   It bears noting that the judge made that

comment in the midst of her trying to broker an agreement in

which the Commonwealth would turn over something to the

defendant to demonstrate that the controlled buys occurred.         In

any event, the judge's passing comment that there was a reason

for skepticism is not supported by the arguments that the

2 To be clear, we agree with the defendant that the Commonwealth
could have provided some discovery responsive to the defendant's
motion without impinging on the informant's privilege. However,
given that the search warrant enjoyed a presumption of validity,
the mere possibility that the requested discovery might be
helpful to support a Franks/Amral hearing is not enough to
entitle the defendant to pursue it. See Commonwealth v.
Whitfield, 492 Mass. 61, 73 (2023), citing John, 36 Mass. App.
Ct. at 706. Cf. Commonwealth v. Cuffee, 492 Mass. 25, 29-31
(2023) (even though defendant need not prove selective
enforcement in order to obtain discovery to try to support such
claim, there still must be "an initial showing of selective
enforcement sufficient to order discretionary discovery").

                                  7
defendant had presented to her, as the judge herself apparently

came to conclude by the time she denied the motion.    We turn to

reviewing the defendant's claims on this in some detail.

     In asserting that there was reason to doubt England's

veracity, the defendant focused primarily on an omission in his

affidavit.   It is undisputed that during the relevant period,

police were aware that the defendant was subject to global

positioning system (GPS) monitoring.     As a result, as the

defendant pointed out, England theoretically could have

strengthened his affidavit by cross-referencing the defendant's

GPS data against the locations of the controlled buys during the

precise times.   The defendant suggests that the affidavit's

silence on this issue is telling.    We are unpersuaded.   For one

thing, such cross-referencing would have added significant value

only to the extent that the specific locations and timing of the

controlled buys were revealed, and the Commonwealth had good

reason to want to withhold that information given that it could

have revealed the identity of Randall.     For another, England's

affidavit was readily sufficient without any reliance on GPS

data.   See Lewis, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 65 (rejecting similar

argument because "question is ultimately not whether the

affidavit might have been made stronger [had it included certain

                                 8
information], but whether it was sufficient to establish

probable cause to search [defendant's residence]").3

     As noted, England declined to identify Randall in his

affidavit, asserting the long-recognized informant privilege.

See Commonwealth v. Whitfield, 492 Mass. 61, 68-69 (2023).     The

defendant moved for disclosure of Randall's identity, but failed

to make a preliminary showing of how this would be relevant and

material to his defense (in circumstances where the defendant

was not being charged for possession or distribution of the

cocaine involved in the controlled buys).   See id. at 71,

quoting Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. 463, 469 (2008)

("defendant must make 'some offering' so that the judge 'may

assess the materiality and relevancy of the disclosure to the

defense'").   The mere possibility that disclosure of the

identity of the informant might lead to information that could

3 The other argument that the defendant made at the hearing on
his discovery motion was even weaker. He pointed to a
photograph of one of the two cell phones found during the
search -- the one with the broken screen -- that indicated that
that phone was associated with a phone number different than the
one that Randall identified as the one that he used to contact
the defendant. That fact alone provides no reason to believe
that anything in the affidavit was fabricated; indeed, the fact
that the defendant had more than one cell phone was, if
anything, inculpatory. In his appellate brief, the defendant
claims that neither of the two phones found upon the execution
of the search warrants matched the phone number that Randall
reportedly used to contact him. That assertion is simply not
supported by the defendant's record citations or anything else
appearing in the record before us.

                                 9
be helpful in crafting a motion to suppress is not sufficient.

Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413 Mass. 521, 532 (1992).      The judge

who denied the defendant's Motion for Disclosure of Informant

did not abuse his discretion in doing so.

    Nor has the defendant demonstrated error in the partial

denial of the defendant's motion seeking the disclosure of any

"promises, rewards, and inducements" made to Randall.      The judge

allowed that motion if the Commonwealth intended to call Randall

as a witness but denied it otherwise.       Especially where the

affidavit turned on controlled buys that the police

independently oversaw, the defendant has not shown how any

benefits that Randall might have received would be relevant to

the defendant's defenses at the trial at which Randall did not

testify.

    In a post-conviction motion, the defendant sought discovery

to try to substantiate his unsubstantiated claim that the

controlled buys never occurred.    Unlike his pretrial motion for

discovery, the post-conviction motion was carefully targeted so

as not to impinge on police efforts to protect Randall's

identity.   Thus, for example, the motion sought such information

as records of the field tests that had been used on the drugs

sold during the controlled buys.       To prevail on a post-

conviction motion for discovery, a defendant needs to "make a

sufficient showing that the discovery is reasonably likely to

                                  10
uncover evidence that might warrant granting a new trial."

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 407 (2005).   The judge

who denied this motion concluded that the defendant had not met

this standard, characterizing the motion instead as "a long-shot

hope of finding something that might help him on appeal, without

any meaningful showing that exculpatory evidence exists and

without making any creditable showing that he has a meritorious

claim."   This was not an abuse of discretion.

     Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the allowance

of the Commonwealth's Motion in Limine to Exclude Defendant From

Referencing Information in Search Warrant Affidavit during the

trial, or in the trial judge's preventing the defendant from

cross-examining a police witness about such issues at trial.4

Where the defendant was not being charged with the possession or

distribution of the drugs that were the subject of the

controlled buys, the defendant has not demonstrated how issues

related to the controlled buys were relevant to the issues at

trial.5

4 We note that the Commonwealth did not call England to testify
at trial, nor did the defendant.

5 We recognize a police witness made a passing reference to the
search warrant, which served to set the context of how the
police came to discover the drugs for which the defendant was
charged. But this did not sweep into the trial the issues the
defendant sought to explore regarding alleged problems in the
search warrant affidavit. This is particularly true given that
this was a bench trial.

                                11
       For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment and

the order denying the defendant's motion for post-conviction

discovery.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                        Milkey & D'Angelo, JJ.6),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    January 26, 2024.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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