Court Opinion

ID: 9658286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:54:22.86847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.363402
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
{dissenting). The first difficulty I have with the majority opinion is in finding any negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Granted, the plaintiff had a duty to exercise reasonable care for his own safety. Although the plaintiff’s left arm was disabled there is no evidence in the record to show that it was useless. Under the circumstances I find no duty on the part of the plaintiff (1) to refrain from participating in the unloading operation with his partially disabled *347left arm, or (2) to notify the other two men of this disability before the first crate was unloaded. The majority finds a further duty requiring the plaintiff to tell the two men before the second crate was unloaded of the strain to his right arm that he experienced during the unloading of the first crate. No authority is cited impressing any such duty on the plaintiff. I find none. To require a person in the situation in which the plaintiff found himself to complain to his fellow workers of each ache or pain as it arose during the process of a continuous unloading operation would impose an impractical, unrealistic, and unreasonable burden. I find no such duty here.
Even assuming that the plaintiff may have had a duty, either to refrain from participating in the unloading operation or to tell the other men of his handicap or of the strain occurring during the unloading of the first crate, in my review of the record I find no evidence to support a determination that the plaintiff’s injuries were really caused by any alleged failure to meet any of these duties. Any jury finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff and any finding of causal connection with plaintiff’s injury to his right arm, must have been based on conjecture and speculation. Many cases have held that a verdict so founded must fail.1
The second difficulty I have with the majority opinion is in its affirmance of the trial court’s decision affirming the jury verdict assessing plaintiff with 60 percent of the causal negligence while assessing the other workers with only 40 percent. It is true that this court generally regards the apportionment of negligence as a jury matter,2 but there are *348exceptions 3 and I believe that this is such a case. In my view the defendants would have to be at least as negligent as the plaintiff.
I would reverse, find no negligence on plaintiff, and enter judgment for plaintiff; or at least I would reverse and exercise our discretion under sec. 251.09, Stats., and order a new trial.
I have, been authorized to state that Mr. Justice Gordon joins in this dissent.

 Arledge v. Scherer Freight Lines, Inc. (1955), 269 Wis. 142, 68 N. W. (2d) 821; Chaimson v. American R. Express Co. (1922), 178 Wis. 286, 189 N. W. 529, and cases cited therein.

 Zenner v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. (1935), 219 Wis. 124, 262 N. W. 581.

 Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1956), 274 Wis. 210, 79 N. W. (2d) 834; Zenner v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., supra, footnote 2, and cases cited therein.