Court Opinion

ID: 9476864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:07:25.539245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:33.074636
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the defendant is in fact guilty or innocent of the crime charged. In federal habeas corpus cases, a state conviction carries with it a presumption of legality. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3392, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983).
Defendant in this case confessed — not just once but twice — to his part in the brutal murder. These detailed confessions were introduced against him; there is no contention here that the confessions were unlawfully admitted. Moreover, there was considerable physical and scientific evidence 1 introduced at trial which was consistent with defendant’s confessions and, thus, corroborated them. Notwithstanding this extremely strong evidence and the presumption of legality, the court orders the State of Florida to set aside the conviction and grants defendant another trial. They say the presence of constitutional error demands this intrusion; but if there is constitutional error presented to us, it is harmless beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingfy, we are unjustified in interfering with Florida’s disposition of defendant’s case.
As a practical matter, the only issue tried was the voluntariness and validity of Brown’s confessions. This made the factual background leading to Brown’s confessions relevant. All of the errors enumerated by the majority spring from a short portion of one witness’s testimony. The prosecution’s main witness was Detective Wesley Dallas, who investigated the murder. Detective Dallas described the confrontation he arranged between defendant Brown and Brown's friend, Mack Simmons, who had previously confessed to the murder and implicated Brown. Detective Dallas testified that when he brought Simmons into the room where Brown was sitting, Dallas asked Simmons if Brown had been involved in the crime. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court allowed Dallas to testify that Simmons replied, “Yes.”
From this one-word response, Brown has fashioned a pyramid of purported errors that the court concludes requires a new trial. Although the majority opinions appear to describe a trial fraught with constitutional errors, all of them are minor outgrowths of Simmons’ accusation of Brown: (1) its admission into evidence; (2) the trial judge’s limitation on testimony regarding Simmons’ motives for making the accusation; (3) the trial judge’s response to defense counsel’s argument regarding the accusation; and (4) the prosecutor’s reference to the accusation in closing argument. All of these purported errors are, at most, harmless; they certainly do not transform a one-word response into a constitutional violation requiring a new trial.
My first point of disagreement concerns Simmons’ accusation of Brown. I agree that Simmons’ reply would be inadmissible as hearsay to prove the truth of Simmons’ statement; and, as a corollary, the reply would violate the confrontation clause if the reply’s only relevance was its truth. But this does not end the confrontation clause debate in this case.
Simmons’ answer, “Yes,” was admissible for other, non-hearsay purposes, such as, *1561to explain Brown’s decision to confess. This non-hearsay aspect of Simmons’ “Yes” —not to prove that Brown took part in the murder but to prove what happened when Brown confessed — raises no confrontation clause concerns. See generally United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1128 n. 11, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 410, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 2079, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985); United States v. Peaden, 727 F.2d 1493, 1500 n. 11 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S.Ct. 185, 83 L.Ed.2d 118 (1984); United States v. Norwood, 798 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (7th Cir.1986) (“[t]estimony about what [declarant] said to [defendant] was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish the statement’s effect upon [defendant’s] state of mind and, therefore, was not hearsay”). Because “Yes” was admissible as nonhearsay, I think there was no confrontation clause violation.
We must first place this evidence in context. Brown’s trial lasted four days. On the third day, Detective Dallas testified that he had arranged for Simmons to accuse Brown in person. During Dallas’ testimony, the following exchange occurred:
Prosecutor: After you read the [Miranda] rights to them [Simmons and Brown], what happened then?
Dallas: I asked Mack Simmons if Henry Brown was involved in the death of Abraham Goldstone.
Prosecutor: And what did Mr. Simmons do or say?
Defense: Your honor, I will object on the grounds that it is hearsay on the grounds that I have no right of confrontation with Mr. Simmons. I will object.
Court: Was Mr. Brown present at that time, the defendant?
Witness: Yes, sir. He was.
Court: Overruled.2
Prosecutor: Please tell us what Mr. Simmons did or said.
Witness: He hesitated for approximately a minute before making an answer and then he said, ‘Yes.’
This short exchange, which could not have lasted more than a few seconds, is asserted as the fundamental constitutional violation in Brown’s trial. While it might have been better had the jury been instructed that Simmons’ statement was not introduced for its truth, defense counsel requested no limiting instruction.3 See generally Walter v. State, 272 So.2d 180, 182 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1973); Johnson v. State, 249 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1971). Of course, there may have been good, tactical reasons for making no such *1562request. See, e.g., Sica v. United States, 325 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952, 84 S.Ct. 970, 11 L.Ed.2d 972 (1964). In instances such as this, because of these tactical considerations, it is the better practice not to give a limiting instruction if one is not requested.
Assuming arguendo4 that there was a violation of the confrontation clause, it was plainly harmless. Our mandate is not to demand flawless trials. Trials are human endeavors; all are flawed. Consequently, it is our duty to recognize that “the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence” and to focus “on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436-37, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).
In this case, Brown received a fair trial. The government introduced not only two detailed confessions5 given by Brown to the police, but also significant corroborating evidence. Brown was given ample opportunity to argue that the confessions were false or involuntary or both.
Both the prosecutor and defense counsel commented, without objection, in their opening statements to the jury that Mack Simmons — in the face to face confrontation with Brown shortly before Brown’s first confession — had accused Brown of being involved in this murder. Furthermore, on no fewer than three occasions in the trial before the colloquy quoted above, Detective Dallas testified, without objection, that Mack Simmons had implicated Brown in the murder. After the single, noncontinuing defense objection to the testimony quoted above, Detective Dallas testified at least five more times, all without objection, that Simmons had implicated Brown. The defense made no motions to strike any of this evidence.
Leaving aside the interesting question of whether defense counsel waived any objection by failing to object to eight of the nine instances of the testimony, it is clear to me that the introduction of the single answer to which the defense did object is at most harmless error. In light of multiple confessions and the corroborating evidence that the government introduced, the jury was not likely influenced to any degree by the one repetition of Mack Simmons’ accusation to which the defense objected. Because of the lack of objections, the fact that Mack Simmons said defendant was involved in the murder was already properly before the jury. See United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1977). Any error in the admission of the one bit of accusation testimony objected to was harmless.
Once Simmons’ accusation is placed in its proper context, the rest of Brown's arguments may be viewed as the trivialities that they are. I disagree with the majority’s view of the closing arguments in the trial. The district court concluded that the trial judge acted erroneously in instructing the jury to disregard Brown’s defense counsel’s argument that the prosecution should have called Mack Simmons to testify.6
Even had this trial been in federal court, the judge’s instruction would be at most “invited error”, responsive to defense counsel’s earlier argument that Mack Simmons’ absence indicated bad faith on the part of the government. Cf. United States v. *1563Ard, 731 F.2d 718, 727 (11th Cir.1984) (in view of the fact that defense attorneys specifically argued that one government agent was never called to testify, prosecutor’s argument that agent could have been called by the defense as well as the government was not reversible error); United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465, 1477 (11th Cir.1984). In reviewing this habeas petition dealing with a trial in state court, this court can hardly find a constitutional violation in conduct that could not be considered error in a direct appeal from a federal district court.
A similar analysis applies to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding Brown’s silence in response to Simmons’ statement. Contrary to the district court and majority’s assertion, the trial transcript does not reveal any testimony that Brown was silent after Simmons’ accusation.7 Also contrary to the district court and majority opinion, the first time that the jury heard that Brown never responded to Simmons was in defense counsel’s closing argument, which (because defendant had introduced no evidence) preceded the prosecutor’s argument.
It is critical that the prosecution’s argument came after defendant’s argument had already been heard. In his closing statement, Brown’s attorney argued that Brown confessed because the confrontation with Simmons was coercive, as evidenced by the fact that the police ostensibly ushered Simmons out of the room before Brown even had a chance to answer the accusation. The prosecutor then responded to that charge by arguing that Brown did in fact have a chance to answer Simmons but did not and that Brown’s silence was consistent not with innocence, as the defense claimed, but with guilt.
The prosecutor was perhaps overzealous in his response to defense counsel’s argument. That zeal, however, was provoked by defense counsel’s argument — an argument to which the prosecutor was entitled, indeed forced, to respond. Thus, the doctrine of “invited error” also applies here. As this circuit has previously held in similar circumstances, “the government’s comment [on the defendant’s failure to testify] in the case at bar was in response to defense counsel’s reference to his client’s silence. Accordingly, the admission of the arguably impermissible comment does not constitute reversible error.” United States v. Males, 715 F.2d 568, 571 (11th Cir.1983). The prosecutor’s comment about Brown’s silence, therefore, cannot be a basis for overturning his conviction.
The final error upon which the court relies in Brown’s trial is the trial judge’s purported limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Dallas regarding Simmons’ motives to implicate Brown. Needless to say, cross-examination can be important. The trial transcript, however, reveals no unconstitutional limitation. At one point, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony from Detective Dallas to the effect that the first time he *1564heard of Brown’s involvement in the murder was from Simmons’ defense attorney and in the context of working out a deal for Simmons. The trial judge ruled that such testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Seemingly, such a ruling was proper under Florida law. Neither Brown nor the district court nor the majority have cited any precedent for holding that exclusion of such hearsay testimony implicates any constitutional rights of a defendant, and I do not think defendant had a constitutional right to introduce hearsay.
Defense counsel was not barred from inquiry concerning a deal as a motivator for Simmons’ accusation of defendant Brown. In the face of the prosecutor’s hearsay objections, the state trial judge told defense counsel at least three times that defense counsel could ask about any deals that were made with Simmons, but not about what Simmons’ lawyer (who, of course, was not the witness being examined) had said or asked for on Simmons’ behalf.
For example, the trial judge specifically told Brown’s counsel,
What Mr. Emory [Simmons’ attorney] was trying to do has nothing to do with Mr. Dallas. If you can ask Mr. Dallas if a deal was worked out with him [Mack Simmons] to do that, fine, and if you can prove that he did not work out a deal, but what was requested by Mr. Emory has nothing to do with it. It would be absolutely improper.
The judge did point out, however, that if the defense counsel inquired into the Simmons’ plea negotiations or deal (if any), the prosecution was entitled to inquire into all of the circumstances surrounding those subjects. Defendant did not pursue the matter: apparently, Simmons’ and Brown’s plea negotiations had become entangled at some point. Again, no one has explained how such a notice to counsel could be fairly described as a true limitation on cross-examination or how this notice impinged on Brown’s constitutional rights.
Even if the state trial judge was in error in believing that further inquiry would properly “open the door” to much more evidence from the prosecution, defense counsel was certainly left free to make his further inquiry; and defense counsel could have objected to any subsequent prosecutorial evidentiary matters that defense counsel thought were inadmissible and uninvited. Such defense objections might have been sustained by the trial court on greater reflection. If not, the state appellate courts could correct state evidentiary error. Instead, defense counsel did not pursue the matter. I do not criticize defense counsel for making this choice, but he was not so compelled and limited as to involve federal constitutional rights. In this respect, this case is like none cited by my colleagues. Although it is at times proper, federal courts ought to be very slow in converting typical instances of state trial judges exercising discretion in respect to evidentiary matters into matters of federal constitutional import. The trial judge’s control of cross-examination in this case violated no constitutional principle. Trial lawyers commonly face difficult choices; the federal Constitution does not prohibit all hard choices.
In conclusion, all of the supposed errors raised on this appeal made Brown’s trial, at worst, less than perfect; but it was not less than fair. “The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to a fair and correct judgment____ ‘[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.’ ” Rose v. Clark, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107 [92 L.Ed.2d 460] (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 106 S.Ct. at 1436). Furthermore, when federal courts reverse where error almost certainly never affected the judgment, they “[encourage] litigants to abuse the judicial process and [bestir] the public to ridicule it.” Id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 3106 (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)).
The evidence against Brown was powerful. The record in this case establishes no constitutional reason to order the State of Florida to grant a new trial. Rather, the record reveals beyond a reasonable doubt that a seventy-year-old man who chose the *1565wrong day to cash his Social Security check was stuffed into the trunk of his car, beaten, shot, and drowned simply because Henry Brown and his friends wanted a car to rob a bank. Henry Brown has repeatedly admitted that he took part. This was a horrible crime which, of course, Florida has a right to punish. Federal courts have no right and no power to interfere with a state conviction absent harmful constitutional error. I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
Accordingly, I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court.

. For example, fingerprint evidence linked defendant to the victim's automobile.

. The district court interpreted this ruling as a comment "in the jury’s presence that the accusation was admissible because petitioner was present when it was made.” I do not agree that the jury would, or that reasonable jurors could, interpret this ruling as a comment that Simmons’ accusation was true simply because it was made in Brown's presence.

. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that the admission in a state trial of evidence relevant and admissible as nonhearsay (but inadmissible for its truth) violates the confrontation clause when the defendant does not request and the court does not give a limiting instruction. Florida’s Supreme Court said that Simmons’ reply was allowed into evidence “on the ground that it was made in Brown’s presence.” Brown v. State, 367 So.2d 616, 624 (Fla. 1979). The state trial judge did not actually say that, but I agree with the state supreme court's statement as a matter of fact.
Still, the state trial judge never declared the legal reason for overruling the hearsay and confrontation clause objection. Because the circumstances leading up to the confessions were important facts concerning the voluntariness and validity of the confessions and because the trial judge did not explain his decision to allow Simmons’ answer to be admitted, the purpose for which the evidence was allowed is an open issue. Cf. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 25, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). The state trial judge may have recognized the question as involving nonhearsay and, thus, allowable. The fact that the trial judge wanted to confirm that Simmons spoke in defendant’s presence is completely consistent with admitting the evidence to explain defendant's decision to confess and does not require a conclusion that the testimony was allowed for its truth. See Brown, 367 So.2d at 624. This is not some sort of after-the-event justification, but an analysis of what the trial record shows.
Incidentally, the record, as I read it, does not support a contention that the prosecution ever argued the objected-to Simmons statement for its truth.

. The attorneys for the State of Florida have not contested on appeal that a confrontation clause error occurred, but have relied on waiver and harmless error.

. One was an oral statement to Detective Dallas which he recounted at trial. The other was in writing, having been given in the presence of a court reporter and signed by defendant.

. The trial transcript reveals the following conversation during defense counsel's rebuttal argument to the jury:
Defense: "... Mr. McGuirk made a whole big thing about Mack Simmons. Was Mack Simmons here? Mr. McGuirk told you all it takes is a subpoena, and they have to come
Prosecution: "Judge, I object, and ask the Court to instruct the jury."
Court: "Disregard that. Mr. McGuirk can subpoena any witness as could Mr. Robbins could subpoena any witness. Both have had an opportunity to bring any witnesses they wish.”

. According to the trial transcript, during the prosecutor's direct examination of Detective Dallas, defense counsel conducted in front of the jury the following voir dire examination:
Defense: What did Mack Simmons finally say?
Dallas: Yes.
Defense: Did you give Henry Brown an opportunity to talk to Mack Simmons or question him?
Dallas: About two minutes went by before I had Simmons removed from the room.
There was no other mention of Brown’s silence until defense counsel cross-examined Detective Dallas:
Defense: Would it be fair to say Mack Simmons, after you heard the uttered word, yes, was removed from that room within a minute?
Dallas: No, sir.
Defense: Two minutes?
Dallas: Possibly.
Defense: Was anything said after the word "Yes” by Mack Simmons?
Dallas: Yes, sir.
Defense: Did you ask Detective Storer to take Mack Simmons back?
Dallas: Yes, sir.
On redirect examination, the prosecutor only asked one question about Brown’s reaction to Simmons’ accusation:
Prosecutor: Do you recall if the defendant said anything during that two minutes or so when Mack Simmons says he was involved, and then there was nothing but quiet?
Dallas: I don’t recall now, sir.