Court Opinion

ID: 9677180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:45:27.723375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:53.364227
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the request for instructions on the insanity defense and the request for an instruction on unlawful imprisonment were both properly refused.
The trial judge correctly refused the defendant’s request for an instruction on the defense of insanity. First I must observe that the argument by Cannon is not properly preserved for appellate review. He argues on appeal that the language “reasonable medical certainty” was the incorrect standard. However, defense counsel did not object to it at the time, nor did he raise the issue when he later made his motion for an insanity instruction. It was the defense counsel who first presented this standard to the court. The defense cannot now benefit when the trial judge merely repeated the standard presented by the defense. Cannon should have made some effort to correct the alleged error he now complains of. The trial judge did not have the opportunity to rule on the issue of the correctness of the language “reasonable medical certainty.” RCr 9.22; Kennedy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219 (1976). Cannon cannot now complain.
In any event the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow the instruction on insanity. The majority asserts that a “silver thread” runs through previ*598ous decisions of this Court that “any evidence of insanity” demands an instruction. I disagree because I believe that there must be sufficient competent evidence of insanity before the defendant is entitled to the instruction. Here the proof was lacking.
This Court has previously held that not only must a mental defect be shown, but also there must be evidence from which a jury might reasonably conclude that as a result the defendant was substantially unable to understand that he was violating the law. Henderson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 454 (1974) at 459. In this case, Cannon called a psychiatrist who testified that the defendant suffered from organic mental disorder associated with chronic heavy alcohol and amphetamine dependence. The expert stated that Cannon did not know right from wrong. The trial judge specifically questioned the doctor as to whether he could state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Cannon did not have substantial capacity to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct, or if he did have such capacity, he did not have capacity to conform his conduct to the law. The psychiatrist answered “No, I can’t.” All the doctor could say was that there was a 50/50 chance that the defendant did not have the required capacity. The psychiatrist repeated his testimony on redirect examination that the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong. The court asked the doctor if the defendant failed to meet the requirements on the two dates in question and again the physican answered that he could not say with medical certainty that Cannon met the standards for insanity. It is clear that the proof was insufficient to warrant an instruction on the defense of insanity.
The trial judge correctly refused the defendant’s request for a second-degree unlawful imprisonment instruction because the evidence did not support the giving of such an instruction. The kidnapping instruction was properly based on the evidence. An instruction on a lesser-included offense should be given only when it is justified by the evidence. Martin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 571 S.W.2d 613 (1978); Isaacs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 553 S.W.2d 843 (1977). The evidence must create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of the higher or lower degree in order to allow giving a lesser-included instruction. Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 640 S.W.2d 818 (1982). Here the evidence did not establish a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was guilty of kidnapping or unlawful restraint. The evidence clearly indicates that the defendant’s intent was to restrain one of the women to accomplish or advance the commission of attempted murder or to inflict bodily injury or to terrorize the woman. The. evidence does not support the giving of an instruction on unlawful restraint. If the evidence indicates that the accused is guilty of only one offense, it is not necessary or proper to give instructions on lesser-included offenses. Cox v. Commonwealth, 491 S.W.2d 834, cert. den. 414 U.S. 862, 94 S.Ct. 81, 38 L.Ed.2d 112 (1973).
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.