Court Opinion

ID: 9556833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 20:01:02.106237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:13.803780
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10385   Document: 40-1     Date Filed: 08/18/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 22-10385
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        CHRISTINA NECOLE VAZQUEZ-KLECHA,
        as adult child of GEORGE HALE BICKERSTAFF, III, deceased,

                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Counter
                                                  Defendant-Appellant,
        versus
        ELIZABETH ANN BICKERSTAFF,
        Citizen of Georgia,
        MICHAEL NEELY,
        Citizen of Georgia,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10385

                                                       Defendants-Counter
                                                       Claimants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00227-CDL
                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This is a negligence case arising out of the death of George
        Hale “Bick” Bickerstaff, III, in July 2019. On July 12, Bick had a
        heated argument by phone with his sister, Elizabeth Bickerstaff
        (“Beth”), about how her cows had damaged a fence on property
        they jointly owned and on which Bick resided. Soon after, Beth
        and her long-term boyfriend, Michael Neely, who lived together
        on adjacent property, drove to Bick’s residence, where Bick was
        waiting outside with a rifle nearby. Upon their arrival, in circum-
        stances vigorously disputed by the parties, Bick shot at Beth’s truck
        with the rifle, and Neely shot Bick at close range with a 9mm hand-
        gun, ultimately killing him.
              The district court granted summary judgment to Beth on
        claims that she negligently caused Bick’s death or acted in concert
        with Neely to do so. But it denied summary judgment to Neely
        with respect to his individual negligence. That negligence claim
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        22-10385               Opinion of the Court                          3

        remains pending for trial and stayed until this appeal is resolved.
        The court then certified its decision as a partial final judgment un-
        der Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful
        review, though, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
        because the district court abused its discretion by certifying the par-
        tial judgment under Rule 54(b).
                                          I.
               In September 2020, Christina Necole Vazquez-Klecha
        (“Klecha”), as Bick’s surviving child, filed an action for wrongful
        death against Beth and Neely. One year later, after discovery
        closed, Beth and Neely each filed motions for summary judgment
        on all claims against them. Klecha moved for partial summary
        judgment.
               The district court entered an order granting Beth’s motion
        for summary judgment and denying the other motions. In the
        court’s view, no reasonable jury could “conclude that Elizabeth’s
        individual conduct amounted to negligence and that her alleged
        negligence was a proximate cause of Bick’s death,” or that she en-
        gaged in “concerted” conduct with Neely to negligently bring
        about his death. But the court denied summary judgment on the
        claim against Neely for his individual negligence.
               Klecha then requested entry of partial final judgment under
        Rule 54(b). She contended that the order was final in that it re-
        solved the claims against Beth and that there was no just reason for
        delay. In her view, permitting immediate review would prevent a
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10385

        “duplicative retrial of the same matter” if we reversed the grant of
        summary judgment as to Beth, thus conserving judicial resources.
                Without any clear opposition from the defendants, the dis-
        trict court granted Klecha’s motion to certify the partial judgment
        as final under Rule 54(b). Citing reasons of judicial economy, the
        district court found “no just reason for delay” of any appeal. The
        court stated that pretrial review of the summary-judgment order
        would “avoid the possibility of two trials” if we concluded on ap-
        peal that the court erred in granting summary judgment. And
        avoiding unnecessary trials was “particularly important in the on-
        going covid era,” in the court’s view. Plus, the court found that it
        was “unlikely that the Court of Appeals would have to decide the
        same issues again even if one or both Defendants appealed after a
        future trial.” The court stayed the action—that is, the remaining
        negligence claim against Neely—pending any appeal of its ruling.
        Klecha now appeals.
                                         II.
                Before reaching the merits, “[w]e must first satisfy ourselves
        that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.” Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns,
        Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 722 (11th Cir. 2021). Although no party on appeal
        questions the propriety of the district court’s entry of final judg-
        ment under Rule 54(b), “we do so sua sponte because such certifica-
        tions implicate the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.” Lloyd No-
        land Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
        Cir. 2007). We have asked for and received responses from the par-
        ties on this issue, which has been carried with the case.
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        22-10385               Opinion of the Court                          5

                Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction over a judgment that does
        not resolve all claims against all parties in a lawsuit unless the dis-
        trict court has certified its partial judgment as “final” under Rule
        54(b). Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Because the
        judgment here did not resolve the claim against Neely, Klecha
        could not have appealed without Rule 54(b) certification. See Lloyd
        Noland, 483 F.3d at 777. So “we must consider whether the district
        court’s determinations under Rule 54(b) fit within the scope of the
        rule.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
                A district court must follow a two-step analysis in certifying
        a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). Id. First, the court must
        enter a “final” judgment that “disposes entirely of a separable claim
        or dismisses a party entirely.” Id. at 777, 779. And second, the court
        must determine that there is “no just reason for delay.” Id. at 777.
        Only the second requirement is at issue here. We review the dis-
        trict court’s determination that no just reason for delay existed for
        an abuse of discretion. Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 722.
               “Not all final judgments on individual claims should be im-
        mediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from
        the remaining unresolved claims.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. 1,
        8 (1980). “When determining whether there is no just reason for
        delay, the district court should consider judicial administrative in-
        terests—including the historic federal policy against piecemeal ap-
        peals—and the equities involved.” Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 722.
               Because Rule 54 (b) certiﬁcations depart from the “historic
        federal policy against piecemeal appeals,” “we have explained that
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10385

        certifications must be reserved for the unusual case in which the
        costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of
        overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing
        needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some
        claims or parties.” Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 978 (11th Cir.
        2022) (quotation marks omitted). “These unusual circumstances
        will be encountered only rarely.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
                In this case, the district court certified the partial judgment
        under Rule 54(b) to promote judicial economy—that is, to “avoid
        the possibility of two trials” if we concluded on appeal that the
        court erred in granting summary judgment. While the court’s con-
        cerns are understandable, we rejected nearly identical reasoning in
        Ebrahimi as a basis for granting Rule 54(b) certification. See
        Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 168 (11th Cir.
        1997). We explained that, in certifying its judgment under Rule
        54(b), the court in that case “may have reasoned that early review
        by the appellate court would eliminate the necessity for a second
        trial in the event we reversed its rulings on the dismissed claims.”
        Id. But “[a]bsent special circumstances,” we stated, “the district
        court’s preference for pretrial appellate review of its dismissal deci-
        sions constitutes an improper basis for issuance of a partial final
        judgment.” Id.
               Accordingly, the parties’ and the district court’s “preference
        for pretrial appellate review” of the summary judgment order,
        standing alone, is not enough to justify granting Rule 54(b) certifi-
        cation. The critical question is whether there is anything special or
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        22-10385                Opinion of the Court                          7

        unique about this case that would warrant immediate review.
        Klecha maintains that this case is similar to Red Roof, where we
        found such special circumstances, but we disagree.
                In Red Roof, four plaintiffs, alleging that they were the vic-
        tims of sex trafficking, filed nearly identical complaints against nu-
        merous individual and businesses involved in the hotel industry.
        21 F.4th at 719–20. The district court granted three hotel franchi-
        sors’ motions to dismiss “in nearly identical orders” in each of the
        four cases, fully resolving all claims against the three defendants.
        Id. at 720. The court then certified its order under Rule 54(b) for
        reasons of judicial economy, including streamlining the litigation
        and avoiding duplicative discovery and trials. Id. at 721.
                On appeal, we concluded that the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in finding no just reason for delay, citing the
        “unique circumstances of these cases.” Id. at 722. We found that
        “[a]ddressing this consolidated appeal now significantly enhances
        the efficiency of the litigation,” explaining that “[t]he relatedness of
        these four cases, their early stage in litigation, the number of de-
        fendants involved, and the substantial discovery to be had are the
        kind of ‘special circumstances’ that warrant appellate review.” Id.
        at 723; see also Peden, 50 F.4th at 978 (stating that Red Roof “illus-
        trates the proper use of a Rule 54(b) certification”).
               None of the special circumstances identified in Red Roof are
        present here. This is a single case with two defendants based on a
        short series of events, not multiple related cases against numerous
        individuals and corporate defendants arising out of a large-scale
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10385

        venture. And this appeal does not come “early in litigation” with
        “substantial discovery [still] to be had.” Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 723.
        Rather, discovery is closed, the court has ruled on summary judg-
        ment, and the remaining claims are ready for trial. Accordingly,
        Red Roof does not support Klecha’s claim that an immediate appeal
        would “significantly enhance[] the efficiency of the litigation.” Id.
               Klecha also cites the district court’s finding that we likely
        would not have to “decide the same issues again” in the event of a
        future appeal. Even so, “we undoubtedly would be required to re-
        learn the same set of facts if and when the case returned to us on
        appeal.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167. The claims against Beth are
        based on the same set of facts as the pending claims against Neely.
        And “[i]n instances such as this, when the factual underpinnings of
        the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined, courts
        should be hesitant to employ Rule 54(b).” Id. As we observed in
        Ebrahimi, “judicial administration and efficiency will not normally
        be furthered by having piecemeal appeals that require two (or
        more) three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given
        case. Id. (cleaned up).
                Finally, “we consider whether equitable considerations jus-
        tify the district court’s decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification.”
        Id. at 168. In certifying its decision, the court did not suggest that
        this case “was an exceptional one or that there would be any unu-
        sual hardship in requiring either [Klecha] or any of the parties she
        sued to await the disposition of the entire case before obtaining ap-
        pellate review.” Id. (emphasis added); see id.at 166 (stating that
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        22-10385                Opinion of the Court                            9

        Rule 54(b) certification is limited to instances where “immediate
        appeal would alleviate some danger of hardship or in-justice asso-
        ciated with delay”).
                Nor does our review of the record disclose any equitable
        considerations that might support “depart[ing] from the federally
        preferred practice of postponing appeal until after a final judgment
        has been entered.” Id. at 168. Beth contends that a pretrial appeal
        could avoid a duplicative and expensive jury trial that would force
        the parties to “relive this tragic event twice.” Yet it is not unusual
        for some claims to be resolved at summary judgment, while other
        claims, arising from the same facts, proceed to trial. Inherent in
        that scenario is the possibility of two trials if the district court erred
        in its pretrial ruling. Or if the court did not err, there could be one
        trial and one appeal, thereby conserving judicial resources. Re-
        gardless, the “federally preferred practice” is to “postpon[e] appeal
        until after a final judgment has been entered,” id., notwithstanding
        that the court or the parties may wish to avoid the possibility of a
        “second trial in the event we reverse[],” id. at 167.
               In short, to the extent equitable considerations support the
        propriety of Rule 54(b) certification to some degree, they are not
        “sufficient to overcome the associated injury to the interest of judi-
        cial administration.” Id. at 168. Based on our review of the record,
        “there is no reason to suppose that an immediate appeal will suffi-
        ciently increase efficiency . . . that the Court should tolerate the
        costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of
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        overcrowding the appellate docket.” Peden, 50 F.4th at 979 (quota-
        tion marks omitted).
                For these reasons, the record lacks sufficient support for the
        district court’s determination of “no just reason for delay” to appeal
        the partial judgment in favor of Beth. Because granting Rule 54(b)
        certification was improper, we lack jurisdiction over the otherwise
        non-final summary-judgment order. See Lloyd Noland, 483 F.3d at
        777. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
        tion without reaching the merits.
              DISMISSED.