Court Opinion

ID: 9671300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:34:11.542347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.034855
License: Public Domain

Quinn, P. J.,
(dissenting). It appears to me that the majority has written properly to an issue that is not before us. In the process, they have denominated the controlling issue a fact question not properly resolved by summary judgment without demonstrating that there is any issue on that fact question. I dissent because I am unable to find any issue on that fact question.
I agree with the reasoning of the majority with respect to the “specific language” required to exclude warranty of title, MCLA §440.2312(2) (Stat Ann 1964 Rev § 19.2312 [2]). There was no such language here, and I do not believe that either party so contends.
Count 1 of plaintiff’s complaint, as to which summary judgment was granted, claimed breach of warranty of title arising under MCLA § 440.2312. In *312addition to providing exclusion of warranty by specific language, MCLA §440.2312(2) provides for exclusion by “circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have”.
Whether plaintiff had “reason to know” is a question of fact, as the majority states, if there is any question that plaintiff had “reason to know”. My inability to agree with the majority arises from the fact that I read the record to establish without dispute that plaintiff not only had “reason to know” but that he knew defendant did not have title and that defendant was selling only such title as he obtained from Vann.
The majority opinion states: “The seller informed buyer that he did not have title to the chattels, that they were owned by a man named Clarence Vann. Buyer requested that seller obtain title to the cars.” Later, the majority opinion recites the fact that buyer received a bill of sale from seller which provided that the seller sold and assigned to the buyer all of the seller’s “right, title, and interest” in the chattel, and to the “best of [his] knowledge there [was] no title in existence by way of registration with the State of Michigan or with any other state or with any nation”.
Plaintiff states in his brief:
“Raymond Jones, plaintiff and appellant, is engaged in the antique automobile restoring business. David A. Linebaugh, d/b/a D.A.L. Customs, defendant and appellee, is engaged in the automotive specialty trade.
“In March of 1964, Jones heard that Linebaugh had two Bugatti automobiles at his shop in Ypsi*313lanti. Jones contacted Linebaugb in tbe hope of acquiring tbe said Bugattis. Jones drove to Ypsilanti to see tbe said Bugattis. Linebaugb stated that tbe Bugattis were owned by one Clarence Vann. Jones orally offered to purchase tbe Bugattis from Linebaugb if be could get title from Vann.”
Later in bis brief, plaintiff recites receipt of tbe bill of sale, as noted earlier in this opinion.
Whether I take tbe facts from tbe majority opinion or tbe facts as recited by plaintiff in bis brief on appeal, I come to tbe same conclusion, namely: plaintiff knew defendant did not have title and that defendant did not claim title in himself and that defendant was purporting to sell only such right or title as be received from Vann. Thus, by the explicit language of tbe statute, any warranty was excluded, and tbe trial court properly found that plaintiff bad failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in count 1 of bis complaint.
I vote to affirm.