Court Opinion

ID: 9809625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:19:03.427813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:45.783081
License: Public Domain

OlaRK, O. I.,
concurring in result. The mayor and commissioners of the town of Cbncord, in November, 1902, entered into a contract with Scott & Burton for lighting the *593public buildings and streets of said town with electricity for the term of eighteen years from 1st June, 1903. The town has been lighted by electricity for the last thirteen years, the current contract not expiring till 1st June, 1903. This is an action brought by a citizen and tax payer to restrain the town authorities from paying out any money under said new contract, on the ground that the town had no power to make such contract without having first obtained the consent and approval of a majority of the qualified voters of said town, which had not been done. The Judge, being of opinion with the plaintiff, granted an injunction till the hearing, and the defendant appealed. A tax payer can bring such action. Flynn v. Electric Co., 14 Minn., 180; 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., sec. 914-922; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S., 601; Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass., 347; 32 L. R. A., 610.
Furnishing light and water for public purposes is in this day and time “a necessary purpose,” and has been so recognized. Gas Co. v. Raleigh, 75 N. C., 274; Smith v. Goldsboro, 121 N. C., 350; Croswell Electricity, sec. 190; Crawfordsville v. Bradan (Ind.), 30 Am. Rep., 214, and notes; Heilbron v. Cuthbert, 96 Gra., 312; Ellenwood v. Reidsburg, 91 Wis., 131; Opinion of Justices, 150 Mass., 592, 6 L. R. A., 842; Rushville v. Rushville (Ind.), 6 L. R. A., 315; 16 Am. Rep., 388; Mauldin v. Greenville, 33 S. C., 1, 8 L. R. A., 291; Lott v. Waycross, 84 Ga., 681; 1 Dillon Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 3a, and other cases cited in Mayo v. Comrs., 122 N. C., at p. 25. Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C., 5, 40 L. R. A., 163, is only a precedent that the erection by á city of an electric light plant is not a public necessity, but that point is not presented in this case, and it is not necessary that we should pass upon it. Egerton v. Water Co., 126 N. C., 93, 48 L. R. A., 44, is the only case in which it has been held (and there by a divided Cburt) that furnishing a town or city with a supply of water is not a necessary expense, *594and upon, fuller consideration we must overrule it. All tbe towns in tbe State, of sufficient size, have, notwithstanding that decision, continuously down to the present continued to furnish light and water for public purposes, and the validity of such contracts, even to the extent of conferring a right of action for breach thereof upon beneficiaries though not parties to the contract, was upheld in Gorrell v. Water Co., 124 N. C., 328, 10 Am. St. Rep., 598, 46 L. R. A., 513. In that case there was an act of the Legislature authorizing the contract, but it does not appear that the matter was submitted to a vote of the people, which would have been indispensable if furnishing water had not been “a necessary expense.” Const., Art. VII, seo. Y. Eurnishing light and water, for public purposes at least, being a necessary expense, the only question remaining is: for what period are the municipal authorities authorized to so contract? Can they contract for any period, however long ? Gan they contract for one hundred year’s, or eighteen years (as here), or for ten years, and thus tie the town down for long years to a system which in the rapid march of improvement may become antiquated, or be superseded by the invention of a far better or a far cheaper system, or which may become unfitted to the proportions which a growing town may soon attain? The Courts in the later cases, oppressed with the force of this objection, have laid down the principle that the length of time must be “reasonable.” This is objectionable unless there is a rule to determine what is reasonable; otherwise, it will leave the decision of reasonable time in each instance to the views of the particular Judge or Court which tries the case, the rule of “the Chancellor’s thumb.” Besides, if the town authorities have power to make the contract at all, they and not the Court are to judge of the extent of the exercise of power confided to them (Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 644) in the *595absence always, of course, of fraud, which is not charged here.
Yet there must be some restriction ex necessitate in the duration of such contracts. Certainly the most logical one is this: that inasmuch as the town authorities are elected for a specified fixed term to furnish, among their other duties, those things which are necessary expenses for the town, that the authority of the commissioners to contract for such necessities is restricted to the time for which they have been chosen by the people to discharge that duty, i. e., for their term of office, and they cannot make a valid contract for such purpose beyond the term, for which they have been authorized to act in supplying such necessary things. Certainly this is a safe rule, free from the fluctuations and arbitrariness incident to the doctrine of “reasonable duration” (unless the term of office is reasonable time), and this Court is as fully empowered to establish this rule by way of precedent as the Courts which have created the rule which subjects the length of every contract to be “validated” by a law-suit. Under that system no contract is certainly valid unless passed upon by litigation instituted for that purpose.
It is true it is argued in this case that no contractor will go to the expense of establishing a light plant for a short-term contract. This is merely the argument ab mcorwenienti and would make it a matter of 'consideration not between the town authorities (elected by the people thereof) and the contractor but between a court (not acquainted with the needs of the town and attendant circumstances) and the contractor, how short a term the latter can be induced to take. Furthermore, if the contractor is not willing to take a contract for two years (the term of office), with the opportunity to furnish private consumers, and trust to the reasonableness of his prices and the advantages of already having a plant to procure a renewal from the board successively elected each two *596years,'.then it is open to the town either to establish its own light and water plant, as most progressive towns are doing’, or the desired contract can be submitted to the qualified voters upon legislative authority, to make a contract for such period as the popular voice may ratify at the ballot box. It is always a sound policy to consult the will of the' taxpayers upon an expenditure of this importance, especially when the engagement is to extend some years into the future.
“It may now be taken as well settled by this Court that water and light are not in themselves such necessary expenses of the town as to' authorize an unusual levy of tax or the incurring of a debt without proper legislative authority and the approval of a popular vote.” Thrift v. Elizabeth City, 122 N. C., 31. That authority is exactly in point, and we have none to the contrary. In that case a contract to supply the town with water for thirty years was held invalid, the Court saying, through Douglas\ J., that “there is no difference between making a contract binding a municipality for a long period of years, requiring the payment of a large yearly sum, and the issuance of bonds of the municipality to run a like period.”
The view herein expressed, that furnishing water and light for public purposes is a necessary expense, but restricting the power of the town commissioners to contract to the term of their office (in the absence of special authorization by a vote of the people to contract for a longer period), reconciles and puts in perfect accord the proposition laid down in Thrift v. Elizabeth City, supra, with the ruling of the Court, stated by the same learned Judge, in Smith v. Goldsboro, 121 N. C., at p. 352, as follows: “The city provides for its citizens electric lights and water, as it is its duty to do; * * * the defendant has taken possession of said street in order that it may perform its duty to its citizens and furnish water and lights to the owners of said lots.” It is not the duty *597of the town commissioners to furnish water and lights longer than the period for which they have been elected to do that duty. And in the absence of a special authorization by popular vote they have no power to go beyond their term of office and, by a contract extending beyond their term, provide for future year’s and thus tie the hands of their successors, who may be able by their better judgment or by reason of the progress of invention to furnish the public with necessaries by a better or more economical method.
In this state of the law, those desiring profitable contracts will not be tempted (as in some cities) to spend money to elect a temporary board to make contracts, pillaging the tax payers for a long period of years. They can only get long contracts from the people at the ballot box with full discussion and publicity. Already, in these last few months, a well-known discovery promises with good reason to reduce electric lighting to one-eighth of its present cost. If it were a question, therefore, for the Courts to pass upon the “reasonableness” of time and prices of a contract by a nxunicipality, could this contract for eighteen years and $85 per year for 1,200-candle-power light be held reasonable ?
We come to the same conclusion as his Honor, though for a somewhat different reason, that the contract to furnish the town with electric lights for eighteen years is invalid. Section 5, chapter 85, Private Laws 1903, authorizing the town commissioners of Concord “to provide for lighting the streets and public buildings of the city and to contract and pay for the same” does not affect what is said above, for such power was already in them., but not to be exercised beyond their term of office unless submitted to a vote of the people, since it cannot be “a necessary expense” to bind the town now to the rates and terms of the proposed contract “for a long period of year’s.” Thrift v. Elizabeth City, supra. Indeed, the act of 1903 does not contain any words attempting to *598confer upon the commissioners such authority. It merely gives them the ordinary right to provide for lights, which, as we tíave seen, means the right to contract for lighting for such period as it is their duty to furnish lights; But whether this act may not authorize the establishment of a municipal plant, as a present “necessary expense” (and not a continuing expense), like the power to build a town jail or guard house, McLin, v. Newbern, 70 N. C., 12, or to erect a city hospital, Smith v. Newbern, 70 N. C., 14, 16 Am. Rep., 766, or like a county building a court-house, Vaughn v. Commrs., 117 N. C., 429, and as is held as to an electric light plant in Light Co. v. Jacksonville (Fla.), 51 Am. St. Rep., 24, 30 L. R. A., 540, and in Mitchell v. Negaunee (Mich.), 38 L. R. A., 157, 67 Am. St. Rep., 468, is, as already stated, a matter which is not before us.
The views above expressed will not invalidate any contract for necessary expenditures during the term of office of any board of commissioners who have made such contract, nor during the term of any board which has ratified or recognized and acted upon such contract, but at the end of the current term of such board the contract will not be binding on their successors unless ratified or recognized by them, except, of course, in those cases in which a contract for a longer term has been authorized by popular vote.
Where a contract for lighting, water and the like is to be be made, it is for the public protection that it shall not be binding for a longer time than the duration of powers of the temporary agents, the town commissioners. To be binding beyond that term, the people can and should be consulted at the ballot box, as in the recent struggle for good government in Chicago over the granting of franchises for street cars. The assumption of authority by the board of aldermen to contract, without a vote of the people, beyond their term has elsewhere led to untold corruption, and we *599should be warned against opening the door here by precedent, though there is no intimation of fraud in this ease. All the Courts now hold that the power of the town authorities to contract must be restricted to “a reasonable time.” Instead of a contest in the Courts in each case, as to what is a reasonable time, to the detriment of contractors as well as the town, a reasonable time is the term of office of the town authorities, since within that time if a longer contract is desirable the matter can be submitted to the people at the ballot box. They, and not the Courts, are the tribunal to determine what is such reasonable time for which they are to be bound.
When, however, a contract has already been made beyond such “reasonable time” the contract is not void but voidable. The Courts have held in such cases that for the time the contract has been executed the town must pay for what it has received thereunder. Carlyle Water Co. v. Carlyle, 31 Ill. App., 325; E. St. Louis v. Gas Light Co., 98 Ill., 415, 38 Am. Rep., 97. As to the executory part, the authorities then in office can ratify it for their term, but as to the part beyond their term, the people not having elected the commissioners to represent them beyond such term of office, such contract can only be made subject to approval a,t the ballot box. One Legislature cannot bind a succeeding one by a legislative contract enforcible at law; nor can one board of town representatives bind its successors. I Dill. Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 97. There were authorities, before the abuses of contracting by town authorities were so well known or had become so unpleasantly notorious, that they could make contracts extending beyond their terms of office — '“the evil that men do live after them.” The more recent authorities are that such contracts are only valid if of “reasonable duration,” though of course compensation even in such case is recoverable for the executed part of the contract.
*600The better reason, and the evident intent of constitutional provisions in several recent Constitutions, is that such “reasonable time” is the term of office of the officials acting on the contract, and if a longer time is desirable the matter should be referred to popular vote, as can be so readily done. Our towns and cities should have this protection, especially in view of the present and prospective growth of municipal indebtedness, which bids fair to outstrip even their growth in population. This view, conflicts with none of our precedents, will safeguard our towns and cities from improper debts, often fraudulently made according to experience elsewhere, and will in no wise hamper municipal administration, seeing that ordinary supplies and requirements need not be contracted for longer than two years, the term of office.
Of course the General Assembly can, by general statute applicable to all municipal corporations, or by special statutes applicable only to the town or towns named, authorize the boards of town commissioners to contract for a specified length of time, beyond their terms of office, and they will be then elected by their respective constituency with knowledge on the part of the electorate that such officials can bind the municipality for such length of time for necessaries to be-furnished even after they shall go out of office. But as the law now stands there is no such statute and the power of the municipal boards to bind the municipality by their contracts expires with their power of attorney, their term of office, leaving the town to be bound thereafter only by the ratification, express or implied, of such contract by the newly-elected board. If this were not so, it would follow that a town board could bind the town for contracts, far into the future, to furnish water, lights and other necessaries, at high figures, perhaps, while under Mayo v. Commissioners, 122 N. C., 5, they are disabled to contract for a water or light plant for which the municipality would receive at once prop*601erty in band in return for its cash or bonds. Such practical result would afford opportunity to prevent for a long time tbe acquisition of water and light plants by any town boards forestalling public opinion where it might be in favor of municipal ownership, and would offer opportunity for palpable abuses. I do not think such is now the law, but that in the absence of a statute giving them such power the town boards of commissioners cannot bind the municipalities beyond the terms for which they are elected and empowered to act as municipal agents.
In the present case the judgment should, in any view, be modified, so as to dissolve the injunction during the current term of the commissioners, but for the fact that the contract by its terms was not even to begin till (1st June, 1903) after their term of office ended and has never had any validity. Water and lights are necessary expenses during the term of the town commissioners or aldermen whose duty it is to furnish them, but they are not necessary expenses which such authorities must or can incur for their successors in office, unless authorized thereto by a vote of the people.