Court Opinion

ID: 9927088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 06:05:02.315433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:47.444848
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 362758
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
DENEKO ALFRED CHILDS,                                               LC No. 21-002571-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and MURRAY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        On February 21, 2021, defendant, Deneko Alfred Childs, shot and killed Brian Chapman
outside a liquor store in Highland Park. The incident was captured on surveillance video. At trial,
defendant took the witness stand and testified that he shot Chapman in self-defense, but the jury
chose to reject that claim and convict defendant of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, felon in
possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second
offense, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 35 to 50 years’ imprisonment
for second-degree murder, 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for both felon-in-possession and carrying
a concealed weapon, and consecutive terms of five years’ imprisonment for each felony-firearm,
second offense, conviction. On appeal, defendant challenges his convictions, but not his sentences,
on three grounds. We affirm.

                                I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        On February 21, 2021, defendant walked into a liquor store in Highland Park where Brian
Chapman, the victim, was socializing. Chapman, who had known defendant for many years, had
a friendly interaction with defendant while inside the store and then followed defendant outside.
Chapman continued talking to defendant while defendant was sitting inside his vehicle, and as they
talked, the conversation became much more intense. Chapman pulled up his shirt and announced
to defendant that he had a gun. Then Chapman walked over to a nearby sidewalk and performed
a dance. While Chapman was dancing, defendant grabbed his gun and got out of his vehicle. That

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prompted Chapman to walk toward defendant, and defendant shot Chapman to death. At no point
did Chapman appear to grab or reach for his gun.

        During opening statement, the prosecutor played the surveillance video of the shooting and
described for the jurors what was depicted in the video. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor
playing the video because it had not yet been admitted into evidence, but the trial court ruled that
the prosecutor could play the video because it was likely to be admitted during the trial and defense
counsel had no objection to admitting the video into evidence.

        During the prosecution’s case-in-chief and in reliance upon a pretrial stipulation, Detective
Mitchell Heaney, a police detective for the city of Ecorse, testified that he knew defendant because
Highland Park was a small town and he had had several prior interactions with defendant. For that
reason, Detective Heaney told the jury that he was able to identify defendant as the shooter in the
surveillance video.

        After the prosecution completed its case-in-chief, defendant chose to testify in his defense.
He explained to the jury that he shot Chapman in self-defense because he feared for his life when
Chapman threatened him with a gun. The trial court gave the jury instructions on self-defense, but
the jury rejected defendant’s claim of self-defense and convicted him of second-degree murder for
the shooting of Chapman. After the trial court imposed sentences on the five counts of conviction,
including second-degree murder and four firearms offenses, defendant filed this appeal of right.

                                      II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

        Defendant contests his convictions, but not his sentences, on three grounds. First, he argues
that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in opening statement by playing the surveillance video
of the shooting and offering a narrative describing the events leading to the shooting. Second, he
contends that Detective Heaney improperly referred to numerous contacts he had with defendant
before the night of the shooting. Third, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the claim
of self-defense. We shall address these three issues in turn.

                      A. THE PROSECUTOR’S OPENING STATEMENT

        Defendant criticizes the prosecutor for playing the surveillance video for the jurors during
opening statement and describing what the video depicted. The prosecutor first played the video
without any comment or interruption, and then the prosecutor offered comments about the events
depicted in the video. As the prosecutor was making comments about the video, defense counsel
objected to the playing of the video, stating “[i]t’s not in evidence.” The trial court overruled that
objection, noting that “I don’t think there’s any dispute as to the video coming in[.]” And, indeed,
the entire video later was admitted into evidence without any objection. Defense counsel presented
no objection to the prosecutor’s comments about the contents of the video. Thus, the objection to
the playing of the surveillance video during opening statement preserved that issue for review, but
the absence of any objection to the prosecutor’s statements about the video dictates that that issue
is not preserved for review. People v Isrow, 339 Mich App 522, 529; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (“To
preserve an issue of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must contemporaneously object and
request a curative instruction.”) (citation omitted).

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        “We review de novo [preserved] claims of prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether
[a] defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 450-451;
709 NW2d 152 (2005). “In reviewing prosecutorial misconduct challenges, this Court views the
alleged prosecutorial misconduct in context.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 201; 891
NW2d 255 (2016). “Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights.” People v Clark, 330 Mich App 392, 433; 948 NW2d 604 (2019). To
establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Reversal is justified only if “plain error resulted in the conviction of
an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003).

         The prosecutor’s opening statement began with the playing of the surveillance video, which
was ultimately admitted during the prosecution’s case-in-chief without objection. In addressing a
complaint that “the prosecutor committed misconduct by playing the audio exhibit of defendant’s
recorded telephone conversation during the prosecutor’s opening statement[,]” we concluded that
prosecutorial misconduct did not occur because “the trial court later admitted that recording during
trial” and the prosecutor was simply providing “the facts that [would] be proved at trial[.]” People
v Alexander, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 6, 2014
(Docket No. 311437), p 7. Although we are not bound by an unpublished decision of this Court,
Cox v Hartman, 322 Mich App 292, 307; 911 NW2d 219 (2017), we find that the approach taken
in Alexander is persuasive, so we choose to apply it here. Hence, because the surveillance video
was admitted at trial, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by playing the video as part of the
prosecution’s opening statement.

        With respect to the prosecutor’s comments in opening statement about the contents of the
surveillance video, our review is limited to a search for plain error. “During opening statements, a
prosecutor may state the facts that will be proved at trial” and “summarize what he or she thinks
the evidence will show.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 63; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Summaries of what the evidence will show are permissible during
opening statement so long as the prosecutor does not volunteer an opinion as to the defendant’s
guilt. Id. In this case, the prosecutor’s comments were permissible because they summarized the
surveillance video and stated what the prosecutor believed the video showed without offering any
opinion as to defendant’s guilt. See id. at 65. The prosecutor told the jury:

       You will see that after [the victim] walks away from the van[,] . . . as he’s backing
       away he lifts up his jacket where he’s got that gun tucked in a holster and he says,
       “[b]ig 40 you know what it is.” It’s a 40 caliber pistol . . . that was ultimately
       recovered that was his.

               After he does that, he puts his jacket back down and he walks back over to
       the sidewalk away from the van and with only a cell phone in his hand he starts to
       kind of dance on the sidewalk joking around again. You’ll see that at that point,
       [defendant] gets out of the van with a pistol and that he points it at [the victim], and
       that when he does that [the victim] walks toward him again with only a cell phone
       in his hand and then at that point [defendant] fires three shots, closeup, including
       one as [the victim] is turning and you will see that [the victim] continued to turn

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       and walked away from the van back toward the front door of the store and you will
       see that [defendant] fires three more shots . . . .

                                               * * *

       You will not see any video footage that shows that [the victim] ever took that gun
       out and held it in his hands in [defendant’s] presence that night.

The prosecutor presented a theory of the case by describing what was depicted in the surveillance
video. This was permissible because prosecutors are allowed to use opening statement to state the
facts that will be proven at trial. Id. Thus, the trial record reveals no error at all, much less plain
error that affected defendant’s substantial rights, in the prosecutor’s opening statement.

                           B. DETECTIVE HEANEY’S TESTIMONY

        Defendant argues that Detective Heaney’s testimony that he knew defendant because they
had had previous interactions unfairly prejudiced defendant and deprived him of a fair trial because
the statement portrayed defendant as a criminal who was well-known to the police. That issue was
not preserved because defense counsel did not object to Detective Heaney’s testimony at trial. See
People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). An unpreserved issue is reviewed
for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id.

         At a pretrial hearing on July 21, 2021, the parties stipulated that Detective Heaney could
testify that he recognized defendant based on Highland Park being a small community where a lot
of people know each other, but Detective Heaney could not refer to defendant’s previous criminal
conduct. At trial, Detective Heaney testified as follows:

               Q. And the individual depicted in exhibits ten and 11, do you recognize
       him?

               A. Yes, I do.

              Q. When you were on the scene actually back on February 21st of 2021,
       did you recognize him at that point?

               A. I did.

               Q. And who is that individual?

               A. I recognized him as Deneko Childs.

               Q. And how did you recognize him?

              A. Well, Highland Park is a very small city. It’s less than three square
       miles. It’s probably 9,000 people in the city. Working there over the years you get
       to know everybody in the city and I’ve had multiple interactions specifically with
       [defendant].

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        In conformity with the pretrial stipulation, Detective Heaney did not testify that he knew
defendant based on defendant’s prior criminal history. But Detective Heaney went beyond merely
basing his recognition of defendant on the fact that Highland Park is a small community. Detective
Heaney added that he had “multiple interactions specifically with [defendant].” We conclude that
Detective Heaney’s testimony conformed to the pretrial stipulation because Detective Heaney did
not say that his prior interactions with defendant involved defendant’s criminal conduct. Further,
Detective Heaney’s statement that he had had multiple interactions with defendant was reasonable
to establish Detective Heaney’s ability to identify defendant. Simply working in a community of
9,000 people, without more, is insufficient to persuasively establish someone’s ability to positively
identify a person. Thus, Detective Heaney provided appropriate context to reveal the significance
of his statement that “Highland Park is a very small city.”

            C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REFUTING SELF-DEFENSE

         Finally, defendant argues the prosecution failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant did not act in self-defense when he shot Chapman. Challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence are reviewed de novo. See People v Wang, 505 Mich 239, 251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “view the evidence—whether direct or
circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier
of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394, 402-403; 956 NW2d 562 (2020). This Court must “draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Oros,
502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        “In a criminal proceeding, the defendant has a constitutional right to have the prosecution
prove his or her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Likine, 492 Mich 367, 407; 823 NW2d
50 (2012). Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, but he was convicted by the jury of
second-degree murder. “The elements of second-degree murder are (1) a death, (2) caused by an
act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.” People v Wafer,
509 Mich 31, 40; 983 NW2d 315 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Defendant claims there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree murder
because he was acting in self-defense. “With the enactment of the Self–Defense Act (SDA), MCL
780.971 et seq., the Legislature codified the circumstances in which a person may use deadly force
in self-defense . . . without having the duty to retreat.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 708; 788
NW2d 399 (2010).

               An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime
       at the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another
       individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if

               (a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly
       force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm
       to himself or herself or to another individual. [People v Stevens, 306 Mich App
       620, 630; 858 NW2d 98 (2014), quoting MCL 780.971(1).]

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“[O]nce a defendant satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury
could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exist,”
the prosecution must bear “the burden of disproving the affirmative defense of self-defense beyond
a reasonable doubt.” People v Rajput, 505 Mich 7, 11; 949 NW2d 32 (2020) (citation omitted).

        Here, defendant testified that he was afraid for his life when he shot Chapman because he
had seen Chapman act violently and Chapman was threatening him by showing defendant his gun.
This satisfied defendant’s burden to produce some evidence from which a jury could conclude that
defendant acted in self-defense. Id.

         The next inquiry is whether the jury properly found the prosecution disproved defendant’s
self-defense theory beyond a reasonable doubt. Dupree, 486 Mich at 710. Self-defense justifies
the killing of another person when the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is
in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm and it is necessary to use deadly
force to prevent such harm to himself. Stevens, 306 Mich App at 630. “The prosecution need not
negate every reasonable theory of innocence; it need only prove the elements of the crime in the
face of whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant.” Kenny, 332 Mich App
at 403. In order to claim the defense of self-defense, the defendant’s actions taken to defend
himself or herself must be reasonable. Dupree, 486 Mich at 707.

        The circumstances in this case that led up to the shooting were such that a rational trier of
fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not justified in shooting Chapman.
When defendant came into the liquor store, Chapman gave defendant a hug and wanted his picture
taken with defendant. Chapman seemed intoxicated, but his interactions with defendant inside the
store were peaceful and not aggressive. Robert Merdau, the owner of the liquor store where the
shooting occurred, testified that defendant and Chapman were talking normally to each other inside
the store, and Merdau opined that there was no hostility. Defendant stated Chapman was annoying
him inside the store, but Chapman did not threaten defendant then. When defendant left the store,
Chapman followed him.

        After they left the store, defendant and Chapman kept talking. The conversation appeared
normal, and neither person exhibited any violent behavior. At one point, Chapman raised his shirt
and announced that he had a gun. But Chapman did not appear to remove the gun from its holster.
When defendant stepped out of his vehicle with a gun in his hand, Chapman was on the sidewalk
doing a dance and not threatening defendant. After defendant emerged from his vehicle, Chapman
walked toward defendant with his hands empty. Defendant shot Chapman at that point. Defendant
fired several shots at Chapman, paused, and then fired again while Chapman was retreating to the
sidewalk. Chapman seemed to be turning to look back at defendant when defendant fired the final
shots at Chapman.

        The surveillance video reveals that defendant was the aggressor while Chapman displayed
no aggressive behavior. Thus, a rational trier of fact could have found Chapman’s actions outside
the store were not sufficient to create in defendant an honest and reasonable belief that the use of
deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. This is especially true
because defendant admitted he had the ability to drive away from Chapman, making defendant’s
use of deadly force unreasonable. Dupree, 486 Mich at 707 (holding that the steps the defendant
takes to defend himself must be reasonable in order to claim the defense of self-defense). Instead

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of driving away, defendant grabbed his gun and stepped out of his vehicle, prompting Chapman to
walk toward him, and then defendant coolly shot the victim. Defendant was not cowering behind
his van door or trying to avoid Chapman. Rather, defendant assumed a wide stance in front of his
van door, waited for Chapman to get within a few feet of him, and methodically raised his gun and
shot Chapman several times in the chest even though Chapman’s hands were open and empty as
he walked toward defendant. Significantly, the surveillance video offers no suggestion whatsoever
that Chapman had his gun in his hand at any point during his encounter with defendant.

        After the shooting, defendant fled the scene. In Michigan, evidence of flight is admissible
to support an inference of defendant’s consciousness of guilt. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210,
226; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). Thus, the jury was allowed to infer defendant was aware of his guilt.
In addition, despite defendant’s testimony to the contrary, Marlita Chapman-Sims, the sister of the
victim, testified Chapman was not a bully or a violent person and she was not aware of him being
involved in any specific act of violence. Defendant asserted that he was afraid of Chapman in part
because Chapman was in a gang called the Demons. But Chapman-Sims had not heard of a gang
called the Demons, and she was not aware of Chapman being involved in a gang. Detective Paul
Thomas, a Highland Park police detective, also had not heard of a gang called the Demons despite
his 30 years of local law enforcement experience. Based on all that, a reasonable juror could have
concluded that Chapman was not aggressive or violent and he was not affiliated with a gang called
the Demons, making it less likely defendant had a reasonable and honest fear of imminent death
or great bodily injury. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
did not act in self-defense when he shot Chapman.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                            /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                            /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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