Court Opinion

ID: 9847665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:04:24.019199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:26.175774
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the majority opinion. It is contrary to our statutory law as heretofore clearly declared by this Court. When an instrument purporting to be the will of a soldier serving in a foreign country is presented for probate it is only natural that we make every effort to give effect to any instrument that appears to disclose his intentions and desires as to the disposition of his property. This is especially true where, as here, the soldier dies in the service of his country soon after making an effort to express his desires as to the disposition of his property.
However, it is not within the province of this Court to do other than interpret and apply the law as written by the Legislature. It is well established that the right to make a will is not a natural or inherent right but a right created by and dependent upon the will of the legislative branch of the government. The Legislature of Oklahoma has prescribed certain mandatory rules and requirements that must be followed.
The applicable portions of Section 55, 84 O.S.1951, after providing that “Every will, other than a nuncupative will, must be in writing; and every will, other than a holographic will and a nuncupative will, must be executed and attested” in a certain form, then provides in subdivision (1) as follows:
“It must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself, or some person, in his presence and by his direction, must subscribe his name thereto.”
The above quoted subdivision is the.only requirement in controversy here relative to the instrument involved. The other requirements as to the instrument being in writing, witnessed and declared to be the will of the testator are not here involved.
Since the pertinent parts of the will of Grady Coplin are copied in the majority opinion, I shall not copy the instrument here, but will refer to its form as shown ⅛ the majority opinion. After the dating clause it will be noted that there are two lines for signature below the dating clause *190and above the attesting clause. In the second line of the attesting clause appears the name of the testator as follows:
“The foregoing instrument was signed, published and declared by the said testator Grady Coplin, to be his last will and testament, in the presence of us and each of us, * *
The appearance of “Grady Coplin” in the first line of the instrument and in the second line of the attesting clause are in the handwriting of the testator and the majority opinion holds that because Grady Coplin filled in his name on the second line of the attesting clause in the blank left in that printed form, he thereby subscribed his will at “the end thereof.”
The body of the will gave the entire estate to the mother, and if she predeceased Grady Coplin, all was given to a sister. Oler Coplin, father of Grady Coplin, is the contestant. The mother was made executrix without bond. The only real issue is whether subdivision (1) of Section 55, supra, requiring that a valid will must be “subscribed at the end thereof” has been substantially complied with.
The majority opinion finds that when Grady Coplin wrote his name on the second line of the attesting clause, which follows the body of the will and is below the two lines patently intended for the signature of the testator and in the attesting clause, he complied substantially with the requirement of subscribing his will “at the end thereof.” He had written his name in the first line of the printed form which began “I, Grady Coplin, etc.” These printed forms had a blank space in the first line for the name of any testator who might desire to use such form. There was also a blank in the second line of the attesting clause to identify the party using such form.
One of the principal decisions relied upon by contestant is In re Abrams’ Will, 182 Okl. 215, 77 P.2d 101, in which the validity of a holographic will was involved. Section 54, 84 O.S.1951, defines a holographic will as one “entirely written, dated and signed by the hand of the testator.”
The Abrams’ Will met the above requirements except that it bore no date and this Court held it was not entitled to probate. The proponent there relied upon the decision of this Court in In re Estate of Hail, 1923, 106 Okl. 124, 235 P. 916, in which the instrument offered for probate was dated “November 1919”, only the day of the month being omitted. It was held admissible to probate but this decision was in effect overruled by later decisions of this Court.
In In re Abrams’ Will, supra [182 Okl. 215, 77 P.2d 103], the Court said in the body of the opinion:
“ * * * The right to make a will is not an inherent or natural right, but rests wholly upon the legislative will. Statutory requirements a»e mandatory and must be substantially complied with. * * * The courts cannot inquire into the wisdom or reason for legislative requirements as to the manner of making and executing wills. Their duty is to ascertain the legislative intent and to enforce it. When a will is offered for probate the court does not inquire into the intention of the testator, but its duty is to see if the legislative intent has been complied with in the execution of the will, and if it is found that it has not, its duty is to deny probate of the proffered will. * * *”
The Court then quoted from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana in In re Noyes’ Estate, 1909, 40 Mont. 190, 105 P. 1017, 1020, 26 L.R.A.,N.S., 1145, 20 Ann.Cas. 366, as follows:
“ ‘The question is not whether she intended this paper to be her will, but whether it is a will clothed with the form of law. An holographic will, like every other testament, is a solemn act. It matters not how clearly it conveys the last wishes of the decedent. If it is not clothed with the forms prescribed, it is null.’ ”
In the body of the opinion in the Abrams’ case above mentioned it is said:
“It is to be regretted that the intention of the testatrix is defeated by her failure to observe the statutory requirements, but to hold otherwise *191would in effect be to let down the bars to evils against which the statutory provisions are aimed.”
The Court further cites with approval the decision in In re Tyrrell’s Estate, 1915, 17 Ariz. 418, 153 P. 767, quoting from an English decision as follows:
“ ‘It may happen, even frequently, that genuine wills, namely, wills truly expressing the intentions of the testators, are made without observations of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated by the act of the Legislature, of which the general object is to give effect to the intention. The courts must consider that the Legislature, having regard to all probable circumstances, has thought it best, and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating the intentions sometimes, in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by the absence of forms. It is supposed, and that authoritatively, that the evil of defeating the intention in some cases, by requiring forms, is less than the evil probably to arise by giving validity to wills without any form in all cases.’ ”
In the Noyes’ Estate case, supra, a holographic will was involved and the question was raised that it was not wholly written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testator. It was all in his handwriting except the printed figures “190 — ”. If this printing were omitted from the date it would be “Feb. 23 -3”. It was ■held that the instrument was without a date in testator’s handwriting and invalid as a will.
In discussing the case, the Court quoted from Succession of Armant, 43 La.Ann. 310, 314, 9 So. 50, 52, 26 Am.St.Rep. 183, where it was said:
“ ‘ * * * The q'uestion is not whether she intended this paper to be her will, but whether it is a will clothed with the form of law. An holographic will, like every other testament, is a solemn act. It matters not how clearly it conveys the last wishes of the decedent. If it is not clothed with the forms prescribed, it is null.’ ”
The above cases construe Section 54, 84 O.S.1951, applicable to holographic wills, but that section is similar to the provisions of Section 55, above quoted, which is applicable to other classes of wills, and the rules announced as applicable to Section 54 are also applicable to Section 55.
Alexander in his Commentaries on Wills, Vol. 1, chapter XVI, section 419, page 567, had this to say:
“ * * * The statutory provision that a will must be ‘signed or subscribed at the end thereof,’ was adopted to remedy real or threatened evils; therefore, its force should not-be ‘frittered away by exceptions.’ Its provision should not be carried beyond the policy of the framers of it, yet that policy should not be defeated by judicial construction, or by lax interpretation. A very evident purpose of requiring the signature at the end of the will is not only that it may appear on the face of the instrument that the testamentary purpose which is expressed therein is completed and that the mind of the testator is fully made up to dispose of his property in the manner expressed, but also to prevent any opportunity for fraudulent or other interlineations.”
In In re Stover’s Will, 104 Okl. 251, 231 P. 212, 214, the Court quoted from Hill v. Davis, 64 Okl. 253, 167 P. 465, 468, L.R.A. 1918B, 687, as follows:
“ * * * The Legislature has the power, in granting the right, to determine and prescribe the form and manner in which it shall be exercised. ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ 7>
The contestant does not claim that the will of Grady Coplin is invalid because the signature is located three-fourths or an inch between the' bottom line of the will which is the date line and the signature of Grady Coplin appearing in the second line of the attesting clause, but contends that the will is not subscribed at the end thereof as the statute requires.
*192No one knows that when Grady Coplin inserted his name in the second line of the attesting clause he had any intention that such action should constitute a signing of his will. It is quite reasonable to assume that he intended to sign on one of the lines so clearly intended for his signature between the date line and the attesting clause. It may be that Grady Coplin decided to consider the instrument further before signing his name at the end thereof and overlooked, until too late, carrying out such intention, but be that as it may, under the rulings above considered, Grady Coplin failed to sign his name at the end of the instrument and thus failed to meet a clear, mandatory statutory requirement.
I think it is wholly incorrect to conclude that the signature of a testator inserted in the blank left in the attesting clause, leaving the two blank lines intended for his signature blank, that he signed the instrument at the end thereof as required by statute.
For the foregoing reasons, I therefore dissent.
I am authorized to state that WILLIAMS, V. C. J., concurs in these views.