Court Opinion

ID: 9756173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:12:03.918598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:15.147267
License: Public Domain

*597HANDLER, J.,
dissenting in part.
The Court in this case has reached a result that is as puzzling as the tangle of legal issues it purports to solve. The Court allows patrolman 1 to recover only from the operators of cars 4 and 5 and patrolman 2 to recover only from the operator of car 5. Despite the negligence of all five car operators, and the provable proximate cause of their respective negligence, liability here may be limited (in the case of operator 4) or completely avoided (in the case of operators 1, 2, and 3) based solely upon the sequence of the misconduct creating the peril.
In my opinion this case can be used as a classic illustration of the fundamentally unfair and irrational results that will be generated by the “firemen’s rule.” In my dissenting opinion in Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co. Inc., 102 N.J. 564, 587 (1986), I noted with wry approval Justice Clifford’s disapproval of the Court’s new interpretation of the fireman’s rule. Justice Clifford aptly observed that the majority’s interpretation of the fireman’s rule in that case would lead to a situation in which two police officers or two firefighters sustaining identical injuries may receive unequal treatment and recovery due to the difference in the nature of the conduct causing the hazard which injured them. In this case, without the benefit of the refinement or exception created by the majority in Mahoney, negligent car operators are given refuge under the immunity of the “fireman’s rule” merely because their negligence occurred before plaintiffs arrived on the scene. We have in effect treated unequally two police officers sustaining virtually identical injuries in the same series of events. This case unfortunately exemplifies the peculiarities of our “fireman’s rule.”
For these reasons, and those set forth in my separate opinions in Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 91 (1983) and Mahoney v. Carus Chemical Co. Inc., supra, I dissent in part from the judgment of the Court.
*598For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN— 6.
Dissenting in part — Justice HANDLER — 1.