Court Opinion

ID: 9724203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:48:26.6653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:57.400441
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Nearly all of the authorities cited by the majority, with the exception of People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 558 N.E.2d 656, deal with the suspension of one’s driving privileges, not with the admission into evidence of the refusal by a motorist to take the breath test. This is true also of People v. Wegielnik (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 418, 605 N.E.2d 487. A close reading of this latest pronouncement by our supreme court actually provides support for the trial court’s decision. For example, the court states: “For the reasons set forth below, we find that the implied-consent statute requires only that the summary suspension warnings be given in order for motorists suspected of drunken driving to have been properly warned. The statute does not require that a motorist understand the consequences of refusing to take a blood-alcohol test before the State may summarily suspend his or her driver’s license for failure to take the test.” (152 Ill. 2d at 424, 605 N.E.2d at 489-90.) The court further states: “The threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication. [Citation.] For this reason, it is in the State’s best interest for law enforcement officials to fully explain the consequences of refusal.” (Emphasis added.) (152 Ill. 2d at 425, 605 N.E.2d at 490.) Our supreme court then proceeded to explain that a motorist need not understand the consequences of refusal to take the test before the State may summarily suspend the driver’s license, and the court noted: “Although Illinois courts have not previously confronted this precise issue, they have, under somewhat similar circumstances, consistently held that a defendant need not understand the consequences of refusing to take a blood-alcohol test before the State may summarily suspend his or her driver’s license. (See, e.g., People v. Kirby (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 144, 146-47[ ,495 N.E.2d 656, 658]; People v. Carlyle (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 205, 211[, 474 N.E.2d 9, 12].) Refusals to take such tests are valid even where drivers are so intoxicated or disoriented because of injuries that they later have no memory of the statutory warnings. People v. Goodman (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561[, 527 N.E.2d 1055, 1057-58], People v. Solzak (1984) 126 Ill. App. 3d 119, 123[, 466 N.E.2d 1201, 1204].” (152 Ill. 2d at 426, 605 N.E.2dat490.) The focus of our supreme court’s opinion in Wegielnik, in considering the statute and due process, was the suspension of a motorist’s driving privileges resulting from a refusal to take the test. One authority supporting admissibility of that refusal is People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 558 N.E.2d 656, cited with approval by the majority. The Thomas court cited and refused to follow the earlier case of People v. Naseef (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 70, 468 N.E.2d 466, in which our colleagues in the third district affirmed an order refusing admission into evidence of a motorist’s refusal to take the breath test when that motorist later took the breath test. The Naseef court stated the General Assembly’s intent was to promote the use of the test, which intent was furthered by the trial court. Our colleagues in the second district in People v. Thomas did allow the admission into evidence of an initial refusal to take the breath test followed by a change of mind and taking of the test. In my view, the treatment of this question in Naseef is much better reasoned and should be followed by this court, rather than the opinion in Thomas-, neither Naseef nor Thomas directly deals with the question before this court, which is whether a refusal to take a breath test by a motorist may be admitted in evidence against that motorist consistent with the Illinois Constitution’s due process clause when the motorist was not warned of this consequence of his refusal to take the test — regardless of what, if anything, transpired concerning a suspension of that motorist’s driving privileges. The majority opinion also raises another question, but does not answer it. I agree with the majority that a driver’s license is a protectable property interest and that due process applies to the suspension of driving privileges. Given that those driving privileges are a protectable property interest, would not due process guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution support a bar to evidence of actions, such as refusal to take a breath test, that would impair that protectable property interest, if the motorist had not been warned that the refusal would be admissible and could be used to impair that protectable property interest in a court of law, not just an administrative procedure? For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the order of the circuit court of Marion County that granted defendant’s motion in limine.