Court Opinion

ID: 9379000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 14:05:11.90752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.118387
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                        STATE V. WOCHNER

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                                 STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,
                                                 V.

                               WILLIAM H. WOCHNER, APPELLANT.

                              Filed March 14, 2023.    No. A-22-435.

       Appeal from the District Court for Clay County: MORGAN R. FARQUHAR, Judge. Affirmed.
       T. Charles James, of Langvardt, Valle & James, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
       Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Teryn Blessin for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and WELCH, Judges.
       MOORE, Judge.
                                        INTRODUCTION
        William H. Wochner filed a motion for absolute discharge in the district court for Clay
County, alleging a violation of his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial. The court
denied Wochner’s motion. On appeal, Wochner challenges only the court’s denial of his motion
on statutory speedy trial grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.
                                    STATEMENT OF FACTS
        On July 7, 2020, Wochner was charged by information with first degree sexual assault in
violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(c) (Reissue 2016), a Class II felony.
        On September 8, 2020, Wochner filed a motion for leave to take deposition, a motion for
discovery, and a notice for request for Brady material. At a pretrial hearing held the following day,
the district court sustained all three of Wochner’s motions.

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        The State filed a discovery response on October 2, 2020. The response listed documents
which had been emailed to Wochner’s counsel, including a statement Wochner made to the Sutton
Police Department and a signed Miranda waiver.
        On November 24, 2020, Wochner filed a motion to suppress and request for a Jackson v.
Denno hearing, a motion to inspect the alleged victim’s cell phone, and a motion for in-camera
inspection of the alleged victim’s counseling records.
        A hearing on Wochner’s motion to suppress was held on December 16, 2020. At the
hearing, Wochner moved for a continuance as the State had recently notified Wochner that
additional discovery existed and Wochner needed to review this new discovery which “may come
into play at the suppression.” Wochner also offered an affidavit in support of his motion for an
in-camera inspection of relevant counseling records. The district court continued the suppression
hearing, entered Wochner’s affidavit into evidence, and set a hearing regarding the in-camera
inspection for January 6. The district court ordered that the alleged victim’s cell phone be produced
on January 4, 2021, for Wochner’s expert to conduct a forensic evaluation. Wochner’s attorney
made an oral motion to take depositions of Sutton Police Department officers, and the court granted
the motion.
        On January 6, 2021, a hearing was held on Wochner’s motion for in-camera inspection of
the alleged victim’s counseling records. The district court took the matter under advisement. On
January 22, the court filed a journal entry which ordered the State to determine whether the alleged
victim would waive physician-patient privilege and consent to disclose the records. If consent was
given, the court would then conduct an in-camera review to determine what, if any, information
was material or relevant.
        On May 11, 2021, the Clay County Attorney filed a motion to appoint special deputy
county attorneys, requesting that the district court appoint the Nebraska Attorney General and his
designated assistant attorneys to the case. The court granted the motion the following day and an
assistant attorney general filed her substitution as lead counsel of record on May 20.
        In a journal entry filed on August 31, 2021, the district court stated that the alleged victim
authorized the release of her counseling records on June 7. After reviewing the records, the court
found them to be irrelevant or immaterial to the defense and overruled Wochner’s motion for
inspection of the counseling records.
        At a scheduling hearing on September 8, 2021, a discussion on the status of the case
occurred. In a journal entry filed on September 10, the district court noted that discovery had been
completed and that Wochner’s September 24, 2020, motion to suppress was the only motion still
pending before the court.
        A hearing on Wochner’s suppression motion was held on September 22, 2021. The Sutton
Police Chief testified that during the initial investigation, Wochner filled out two separate Miranda
waivers and was interviewed twice on the same day. Wochner’s counsel stated that he had received
only one of the two interview recordings and one Miranda waiver. Wochner made an oral motion
to dismiss the case on the basis that the State did not timely provide discovery. Alternatively,
Wochner’s counsel indicated that if the court did not grant the motion to dismiss, and he was forced
to move for a continuance, he would also ask that the time after this hearing not be counted against
Wochner for purposes of the speedy trial clock.

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         The State responded that the Attorney General’s Office was appointed after the addendum
to its discovery response was filed on November 12, 2020, and the State had believed that both of
the interviews were disclosed at that time. The State noted that it would immediately provide
Wochner with copies of the missing items. The district court continued the suppression hearing to
October 20, 2021, and reserved rulings on Wochner’s motions to dismiss and to exclude the time
between this hearing and the next hearing for purposes of absolute discharge.
         Before the hearing concluded, the State informed the district court that the alleged victim
had been hospitalized 2 weeks prior for mental health concerns. The State stipulated to an
in-camera inspection of mental health records related to the hospitalization, which could be
immediately provided to the court as a records release had already been executed. Wochner argued
that the new records were included in his previous motion to inspect and should have been
immediately provided to the court for an in-camera inspection. The State disagreed, arguing that
Wochner’s motion for in-camera inspection specifically referred to mental health records and a
mental health counselor, while this stipulation was only for medical records related to the recent
hospitalization. The court noted the State’s stipulation.
         On September 22, 2021, immediately following the suppression hearing, the State filed a
certificate of discovery, stating that it provided electronic files containing all police interviews
with Wochner, two Miranda waivers, Wochner’s voluntary statement form, and the Police Chief’s
interview notes to Wochner’s counsel.
         The following day, the district court filed a journal entry continuing the hearing on
Wochner’s motion to suppress and motion to dismiss to October 20, 2021. The journal entry also
noted the State’s stipulation to an in-camera inspection of medical records related to the alleged
victim’s hospitalization and granted the motion for in-camera inspection of the records.
         At the hearing on October 20, 2021, the district court stated that while it had received the
medical records from the alleged victim’s recent hospitalization, it had not yet reviewed them.
Both parties provided argument regarding Wochner’s motion to dismiss and the issue of late
discovery. The court took under advisement Wochner’s motion to dismiss, the motion to exclude
days for absolute discharge, and the motion for inspection of additional mental health records of
the alleged victim, pending its review of the records. The court continued the suppression hearing
to November 15 in the event the motion to dismiss was overruled.
         On November 8, 2021, the district court entered an order overruling Wochner’s motion to
dismiss and denying Wochner’s motion to exclude days for absolute discharge during the
pendency of his motions including the motion to suppress. The court also noted that it had
completed the in-camera review of the additional mental health records of the alleged victim and
found the records to be neither relevant nor material to the defense, thus overruling Wochner’s
motion for inspection of additional records.
         The continued suppression hearing was held on November 15, 2021. The police chief
completed his testimony regarding the two interviews he conducted of Wochner. The State entered
into evidence the Miranda waivers signed by Wochner as well as a copy of his voluntary statement
made to police. Wochner entered into evidence the Sutton Police Department’s body camera policy
and an affidavit for detention on warrantless arrest from the Police Chief. Wochner indicated that
he would later be submitting an affidavit from the former county attorney and the district court
took the matter under advisement.

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         On November 24, 2021, the district court entered an order sustaining Wochner’s motion to
suppress. After reviewing the video footage of Wochner’s police interviews, it concluded that
Wochner’s confession was involuntarily made and should be suppressed.
         On November 30, 2021, the State filed a motion to set the case for trial. On December 15,
Wochner filed a motion for absolute discharge alleging that his constitutional and statutory right
to speedy trial were violated.
         A hearing on Wochner’s motion for absolute discharge was held on January 19, 2022. The
State entered into evidence multiple exhibits of filings throughout the case. The district court also
took judicial notice of the case transcript at the State’s request. Wochner requested leave to submit
a bill of exceptions from the September 8, 2021, September 22, and November 15 hearings. The
court granted leave and noted that the hearing would be continued until Wochner had received the
bill of exceptions. The district court filed a journal entry on January 26 summarizing the exhibits
it had received during the hearing and directing Wochner to notify the State and the court once the
bill of exceptions was completed.
         The continued hearing on Wochner’s motion for absolute discharge was held on March 30,
2022. Wochner entered into evidence the bill of exceptions for the three requested hearings. The
State offered two affidavits dated March 8, one from the former county attorney who had filed the
case, exhibit 31, and one from the assistant attorney general who was then prosecuting the case,
exhibit 32. Wochner objected to specific paragraphs of both affidavits because of references to
documents or notes not received into evidence, and on the bases of hearsay and relevancy. The
district court noted the objections to exhibits 31 and 32 and took the matter under advisement.
         On June 9, 2022, the district court entered an order denying Wochner’s motion for absolute
discharge. The court overruled Wochner’s objections to exhibit 31, but sustained Wochner’s
objections to exhibit 32. The court observed that the initial speedy trial clock would have run on
January 7, 2021. The court performed a calculation of excludable time, attributing 1 day to
Wochner’s motion for deposition (September 8 to 9, 2020); 302 days to Wochner’s motions to
inspect, review counseling records in-camera, and suppress (November 24, 2020 to September 22,
2021); and 47 days to Wochner’s motion to dismiss, stipulation on in-camera review of
hospitalization records, and motion to exclude days for absolute discharge (September 22 to
November 8, 2021). The court excluded a total of 350 days under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a)
(Reissue 2016) and found that the State had until December 23 to try Wochner on the charges. The
court noted that it was “adopting a more conservative approach” to Wochner’s speedy trial
calculations, as the court “arguably” could have attributed 365 to Wochner’s motion to suppress,
including the entire period of November 24, 2020, (when Wochner filed 3 pretrial motions),
through November 24, 2021, (when the last motion was disposed of).
         The district court also found that Wochner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial had not
been violated. The court noted that Wochner had filed several pretrial motions which took time to
litigate and that delays were not caused by the State deliberately trying to hamper Wochner’s
defense.
         Wochner appeals.

                                                -4-
                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
        Wochner asserts, restated, that the district court erred in failing to find that his statutory
right to a speedy trial was violated.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
       Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on
speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Webb, 311 Neb. 694, 974 N.W.2d 317 (2022).
                                            ANALYSIS
         The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in § 29-1207 and § 29-1208. Under
§ 29-1207(1), “[e]very person indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial
within six months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section.” Section
29-1207(2) generally provides that the 6-month period “shall commence to run from the date the
indictment is returned or the information filed.” Section 29-1207(4) provides for the exclusion of
certain periods of delay from the speedy trial calculation. As relevant to the district court’s
calculations in this case, § 29-1207(4)(a) excludes all time between the time of the filing of a
defendant’s pretrial motions and their final disposition.
         To calculate the deadline for trial under the speedy trial statutes, a court must exclude the
day the State filed the information, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time
excluded under § 29-1207(4). State v. Blocher, 307 Neb. 874, 951 N.W.2d 499 (2020). Here, the
State filed the information against Wochner in district court on July 7, 2020. Excluding the day
the information was filed, counting forward 6 months, and backing up 1 day, the statutory speedy
trial clock would have run initially on January 7, 2021, as the district court calculated.
Wochner’s Motion to Suppress.
         The plain terms of § 29-1207(4)(a) dictates the exclusion of all time between the time of
the filing of a defendant’s pretrial motion and the final disposition of such motion, regardless of
the promptness or reasonableness of the delay. State v. Nelson, 313 Neb. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620
(2023).
         Wochner agrees with the district court’s determination that 1 day was excludable from the
speedy trial clock related to his motion to depose, which was filed on September 8, 2020, and
granted on September 9. Wochner also agrees with the district court’s calculation of 302
excludable days between the filing of his November 24, 2020, suppression motion and the
September 22, 2021, suppression hearing. Wochner further attributes 8 days to the period between
the November 15, 2021, continued suppression hearing and when the district court granted his
motion to suppress on November 23. Wochner has conceded a total of 311 excludable days.
However, Wochner challenges the district court’s exclusion of time under its “conservative”
approach and also argues that exclusion of the entire period between his motion to suppress and
the ruling thereon is error. He argues that the State’s failure to produce all discovery and the
resulting delay should not be attributable to him.
         Here, the district court used a conservative approach and did not exclude the entire period
that Wochner’s motion to suppress was pending; instead recognizing that some delay was caused

                                                -5-
by the State’s failure to provide certain discovery. However, in State v. Nelson, the Nebraska
Supreme Court made it clear that there is no exception to the mandate of Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1207(4)(a) for delays in hearing a defendant’s pretrial motions due to continuances granted
to the State. In Nelson, the State moved to continue the hearing on the defendant’s motion to
suppress, as it had not yet received a transcript which was necessary to its preparation for witness
testimony. The district court granted the State’s continuance and the defendant later moved for
absolute discharge. The district court found the period of time attributed to the State’s continuance
to be excluded from the speedy trial calculations under § 29-1207(4)(c)(i), § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii), and
§ 29-1207(4)(f), finding the State had exercised due diligence to obtain the transcript but could not
due to circumstances beyond its control, and as such was an exceptional circumstance.
         On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the period of the State’s
continuance of the hearing on Nelson’s motion to suppress was excluded because, as a matter of
law, § 29-1207(4)(a) dictates the exclusion of all time between the filing of a defendant’s pretrial
motion and the final disposition of such motion, regardless of the reason for the delay of its
disposition. The Supreme Court made it clear that there is no exception to this mandatory exclusion
for any period of delay in ruling on a pretrial motion caused by the State. The Supreme Court noted
its reasoning in State v. Lafler, that if the Legislature had intended to limit the scope of Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016), it would have inserted limiting phrases such as “reasonable
period of delay” in § 29-1207(4)(e) and “good cause” in § 29-1207(4)(f). See State v. Nelson,
supra, citing State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362, 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987), abrogated on other grounds,
State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990).
         While the State did not make a motion to continue in the case at issue, Wochner’s
suppression hearing was delayed due to the State’s failure to timely produce all discovery;
including a second police interview and second Miranda waiver. However, as a matter of law,
§ 29-1207(4)(a) dictates the exclusion of all time between the filing of Wochner’s motion to
suppress on November 24, 2020, and the district court’s order granting the motion on November
24, 2021, regardless of the reason for the delay. As such, we find that the speedy trial clock was
tolled for 365 days due to Wochner’s motion to suppress. In its order, the district court did indicate
that it could have found this entire period excludable from the speedy trial clock. The ruling in
State v. Nelson, supra, makes it clear that this is the correct result. Thus, we agree with the district
court that the speedy trial clock had not run at the time Wochner filed his motion for absolute
discharge.
         Because we have determined that the entire time between Wochner’s motion to suppress
and the order disposing of the motion was excluded from the speedy trial clock, we need not
address Wochner’s remaining assignments of error regarding other time periods excluded falling
within this same time frame and the admission of exhibit 31. An appellate court is not obligated to
engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. State
v. Brown, 310 Neb. 318, 965 N.W.2d 388 (2021).
         Considering the one excludable day related to Wochner’s motion to depose, and the
additional 365 days attributable to Wochner’s motion to suppress, the total excludable time
amounts to 366 days. Wochner’s speedy trial clock was tolled from January 7, 2021, to January
10, 2022 (addition of 366 days brought the clock to Saturday, January 8, 2022; time extended to
Monday, January 10). See State v. Jones, 208 Neb. 641, 305 N.W.2d 355 (1981) (applying in

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speedy trial computation, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2221, statute concerning effect of weekends and
holidays on periods of time in which acts are to be done).
Speedy Trial Waiver.
        Wochner’s December 15, 2021, motion for absolute discharge was filed prior to the
expiration of the 6-month speedy trial period. Wochner’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not
violated, the district court correctly overruled his motion for absolute discharge, and Wochner has
waived his statutory right to a speedy trial. A defendant waives his or her statutory right to a speedy
trial when the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the defendant
or his or her counsel extends the trial date beyond the statutory 6–month period. State v. Mortensen,
287 Neb. 158, 841 N.W.2d 393 (2014) (motion to discharge is considered request for continuance
and results in waiver).
                                          CONCLUSION
        We conclude that Wochner’s statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. Accordingly,
the district court did not err when it denied Wochner’s motion on that basis.
                                                                                        AFFIRMED.

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