Court Opinion

ID: 9858935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 17:37:07.22358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:21.116540
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot agree with Division II and the result reached by virtue thereof.
Division II properly says that the issue was in no way properly raised in the trial court. It is then said: “We have frequently and consistently ruled errors not presented in the trial court, including constitutional questions, may not ordinarily be made the basis for reversal on appeal.” Recent authorities for this statement are cited. With this statement I agree.
This statement then appears: “But other circumstances present here require us to consider whether this appeal demands a departure from that general rule.” With this statement I do not agree.
There is an old statement that hard cases make bad law. It might also be said with some persuasiveness that when there is a substantial question as to the fairness of the trial or in any way an accused has been mistreated or any doubt exists as to the guilt of the accused, courts will consider and point to allegations of error that would ordinarily be treated as so harmless as to have no possible effect on the jury.
Such is not the case here. There is neither claim nor the faintest suggestion of innocence. The statement of facts from which the majority proceeds is that the defendant committed an armed robbery aggravated by a threat to kill.
This is not such a case as to justify the overruling or even departure from our well established rules.
As noted, supra, there was no objection in the trial court to the instruction now found to be error.
State v. Galloway cited and quoted by the majority does not support the conclusion now reached. In Galloway objection *889to the instruction was made in the trial court and so the error was properly preserved.
In Galloway we said a change in law would be given effect while a case is on direct review citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601. Neither Linkletter nor Galloway placed the rule on a basis that would require retroactive application in a case where the error had not been previously preserved.
By the majority opinion an exception to the general rule appears to have eliminated it in all cases where the new matter asserted on appeal involves a federal constitutional right newly created since the case became final. Thus there are now two general rules: one stating that nonconstitutional questions must be raised below, even though unknown at the time of trial; the other, that constitutional questions need not be so raised, unless known.
I fail to see what difference it makes wherein the right claimed on appeal is founded.
The authorities called upon by the majority to support its new rule are not convincing.
O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 87 S.Ct. 252, 17 L.Ed.2d 189, says: “We hold that in these circumstances the failure to object in the state courts cannot bar the petitioner from asserting this federal right.” (loc. cit. 253 of 87 S.Ct.) In O’Connor, Ohio had sought to negate the applicability of Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, on the ground that petitioner had failed to properly object. The supreme court noted that Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453, in rendering Griffin prospective only, had specifically added that Griffin was to apply to all cases which had not become final at the time Griffin was announced. Therefore, the court concluded that Ohio could not bypass Griffin because of defendant’s failure to object, since defendant’s case fell within the specific limit created by Tehan.
O’Connor properly applies, therefore, only to similar cases where a new rule has been made specifically applicable to cases which have not become final at the time the new rule was announced. Those circumstances are not present here.
Yet it appears that by use of the constitution, all of these cases are said to require reversal here. On two levels, the constitution can have nothing to do with this case.
On the first level, it is apparently thought by the majority that this court is constitutionally bound to follow the language in Linkletter which we approved pro tanto in Galloway. We are not so bound. Link-letter itself says that the constitution neither requires nor forbids retrospective application of the law. Be it argued that we are not here dealing with “retrospectivity”, yet it cannot be gainsaid that every case decided is given the benefit of some retro-spectivity. But I think the obvious lesson from Linkletter, too often forgotten in the rush of constitutional lawmaking, is that there is no constitutional cut-off point with respect to the applicability of judicial decisions.
The second level on which it is sought to constitutionally ground this case has already been mentioned. It can make no sensible difference with respect to the general rule requiring proper objections whether the claimed error is based on the constitution or the common law. To say that such a difference exists in effect overrules countless cases which have never before drawn such a distinction.
I would affirm.
GARFIELD, C. J., and LARSON and MOORE, JJ., join in this dissent.