Court Opinion

ID: 9552798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:17:06.248314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:00.262698
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I dissent. It has heretofore been well established law, consistently followed, that the judgment of a court, not its opinion stating reasons for its judgment, should be given effect. The majority here give controlling effect to the opinion of the District Court of .Appeal rather than to its judgment.
On the first “hearing” of the motion the trial court refused to hear the petitioner’s testimony—which apparently would have constituted the most substantial part of the evidence in support of the motion—and denied the motion. In refusing to hear the petitioner’s testimony the trial judge remarked, “There is nothing I can do ... I have no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter.” Upon petitioner-defendant’s appeal (People v. Odlum (1949), 91 Cal.App.2d 761 [205 P.2d 1106]) *568the District Court of Appeal properly concluded that the trial court had erred in refusing to hear and decide on its merits the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment and sentence. The District Court of Appeal also very properly stated that (p. 772 of 91 Cal.App.2d) “It is for the superior court, after a hearing on the merits, to determine whether the judgment and plea of guilty should be vacated. If the plea of guilty is in fact and in law void it should be vacated, and both the People and the appellant should be restored to their original position in all four counts of the information as they stood immediately before entering of such plea.” But the judgment of the District Court of Appeal is in two words “Order reversed”; there was no remand for retrial of the motion.
The .trial court did not comply with the actual judgment of the District Court of Appeal. Instead, it purported to hear the motion and, relying on various papers including the probation officer’s report made before Odium was sentenced, but, as before, without hearing Odium’s testimony, again purported to deny such motion. Odium’s attorney attempted to appeal but his notice of appeal was filed three days late and the purported appeal was dismissed on motion of the People. Odium then instituted the present proceeding in propria persona. He contends that, under the unqualified and now final judgment of reversal of the trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate, that court “had no jurisdiction again [on June 22] to hear and deny the motion to vacate” and that, regardless of the merits of the motion, it must vacate the judgment. This contention is supported by law.
The decision of the appellate court was its unqualified order of reversal; its opinion was merely the statement of its reasons for that decision. (Houston v. Williams (1859), 13 Cal. 24, 27 [73 Am.Dec. 565].) Although the opinion may be a guide where the meaning of a judgment or order is unclear, “We do not look to an opinion to override an order.” (People ex rel. McCanliss v. McCanliss (1931), 255 N.Y. 456 [175 N.E. 129, 82 A.L.R. 1141, 1145]; see Rogers v. Hill (1933), 289 U.S. 582, 587 [53 S.Ct. 731, 77 L.Ed. 1385, 88 A.L.R. 744]; Strudthoff v. Yates (1946), 28 Cal.2d 602, 615 [170 P.2d 873].) The meaning of a reversal without directions of an order denying a motion in a criminal case has heretofore not been unclear; it has consistently been held that such a judgment of unqualified reversal requires that the motion be granted. Thus, the unqualified reversal of an order denying a new *569trial is in effect the ordering of a new trial (People v. Hardisson (1882), 61 Cal. 378, 380; People v. Lee Look (1904), 143 Cal. 216, 220 [76 P. 1028]; People v. Hudson (1928), 92 Cal.App. 593 [268 P. 687]). The like reversal of an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment, made on the ground of insufficiency of the information, as a matter of law required that the trial court dismiss the information, “accompanied by such order or direction as to the filing of a new information as the superior court may have deemed proper” (People v. Coronado (1904), 144 Cal. 207 [79 P. 418]). Similarly, after reversal of an order granting a motion in arrest of judgment, no proceeding to arrest judgment remains for disposition; the situation is as if the motion had been denied and there is before the trial court for disposition only a verdict or finding of guilty (People v. Lauman (1922), 59 Cal.App. 144, 146 [210 P. 421]; People v. Commons (1944), 64 Cal.App.2d Supp. 925, 937 [148 P.2d 724]). It appears, then, as petitioner contends, that under established law the unqualified reversal of an order denying a motion to vacate the judgment requires that the trial court vacate the judgment.
For the reasons stated it appears that at the time of the purported second hearing and denial of the motion to vacate, respondent court was and it now is without discretion to proceed in any other manner than to obey the actual judgment (rather than statements in the opinion) of the District Court of Appeal. Since respondent court has the clear duty to act in this, the only manner in which it can act, such action can be compelled by mandate. (Dixon v. Risley (1896), 114 Cal. 204, 206 [46 P. 5] [mandate to compel trial court to comply with appellate court order of reversal with direction]; Newlands v. Superior Court (1916), 171 Cal. 741, 744 [154 P. 829]; Hilmer v. Superior Court (1934), 220 Cal. 71, 73 [29 P.2d 175].)
It does not follow, however, that petitioner is entitled to be released from custody; rather, he should be returned to the custody of the sheriff of Los Angeles County and allowed to enter a new plea (People v. Butterfield (1940), 37 Cal.App.2d 140, 147 [99 P.2d 310]; People v. Gilbert (1944), 25 Cal.2d 422, 440 [154 P.2d 657]) and proceedings appropriate to such new plea should follow.
Carter, J., concurred.