Court Opinion

ID: 9663149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:29:27.52892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.293812
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion but I write specially to explain my rationale as to why the holding in Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.1984) [Hammond II], does not control this case and that partial summary judgment was proper.
Interestingly enough, in Hammond II, the defendant was the North Dakota State Personnel Board, not the State Laboratories Department nor its director by whom Hammond was employed. As the majority opinion notes, in Hammond II it was undisputed that the State Laboratories Department had promulgated the provisions of the North Dakota Personnel Policies Manual as its personnel policies and procedures. We concluded that the policies and procedures were a binding part of the employment relationship between the State Laboratories Department and Howard Hammond despite the fact those policies and procedures had not been adopted by the Personnel Board pursuant to Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C., the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, and therefore did not have the force and effect of law.
In this instance the defendants are Nicholas Spaeth, in his capacity as Attorney General and individually, and the State of North Dakota. The plaintiffs allege that the policies manual has been held out to be a part of the employment relationship between them and the Attorney General. They support their allegations with an affidavit from Robert Wefald, Spaeth’s predecessor in office, in which he states that during his term as Attorney General “I considered all employees of the office of Attorney General, except the Deputy Attorney General and the office manager, to be classified State employees and treated such employees, at all times, in accordance with the State Personnel Policies.”
Spaeth denies that the policies manual was a part of the employee relationship between the plaintiffs and the State and supports his allegations with copy of a memo from Wefald to his Assistant Attorneys General and Special Assistant Attorneys General indicating that their appointments will continue “until such time as it is specifically revoked by me or until such time as the particular matter you have been assigned to handle has been completed.” Because this dispute raised an issue of fact, the dispute ordinarily would be sufficient to prevent summary judgment for either party despite the allegations in their motion and cross-motion for summary judgment that no factual disputes exist. Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P.; Biby v. Union Nat. Bank of Minot, 162 N.W.2d 370 (N.D.1968).
In this instance, however, there is no allegation that Spaeth, as opposed to Wef-ald, operated under any policies manual. He held the office only one working day before dismissing the plaintiffs from their positions. The plaintiffs would extend the employment relationship they may have had with Wefald to Spaeth, but I do not believe that is a valid contention in view of the fact that the policies had not been adopted pursuant to Chapter 28-32, N.D. C.C., and therefore did not have the force and effect of law. Although the plaintiffs base this portion of their claim on contract, it is disingenuous to contend they had any form of contractual relationship with Spaeth, whatever their relationship might have been with his predecessor, Wefald.
Should it be contended that the State is also a defendant and that they have a contract with the State, regardless of who occupies the position of Attorney General, and that because such claim arises out of *708contract it is not barred by sovereign immunity [see Article I, Section 9, North Dakota Constitution; Section 32-12-02, N.D. C.C.; Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d 67 (N.D.1983)], I note that Hammond II does not stand for such a proposition. Under the facts in Hammond II, Hammond’s dismissal was sought by the very administration which it was conceded held out the policies to him as a part of the employment relationship.
Here, as noted above, there is no evidence or, for that matter, allegation that Spaeth held out the policies as part of the employment relationship or that the plaintiffs were to continue to be employed in his administration. Rather, the appointment by Wefald of the plaintiffs as Assistant Attorneys General specify they were to act in that capacity “until this appointment is revoked.” That appointment, coupled with the authority provided by Section 54-12-06, N.D.C.C., to the Attorney General to appoint Assistant Attorneys General, belies any contention that Wefald could, if it was in fact his intention to do so, extend the employee relationship beyond his term in office in view of the fact the policies had not been adopted as rules and regulations pursuant to Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C.
Although the termination of employment may thus be termed a failure to reappoint rather than a dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has stated that this is not a valid distinction for purposes of First Amendment analysis. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1291 n. 6, 63 L.Ed.2d 574, 580 n. 6 (1980); Kristensen v. Strinden, supra. However, the partial summary judgment does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ causes of action relating to dismissal for political reasons and exercise of their First Amendment right to free speech and I understand those causes of action are yet to be tried.
In summary, Hammond II does not stand for the proposition that one elected official may, in the absence of statutes or rules and regulations to the contrary, form a contract relationship between the current employees of his or her office and future officials elected to that office. Hammond II applies, as a matter of contract, only to the administration holding out the personnel policies as a part of the employment relationship between that administration and its employees.1
PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice, concurs.

. Apparently the policies and procedures now have the force and effect of law, having been approved by the Attorney General, and were effective December 1, 1985. See Chapter 59.5-03-02 and Chapter 59.5-03-03, N.D.A.C. We were informed that by definition assistant attorneys general were not classified employees and therefore were excluded from coverage.