Court Opinion

ID: 9861685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:19:24.151146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:49.408758
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hunter, J.
After careful review of the majority opinion in this matter I find I must respectfully dissent. I see no need to reach the question of hearsay evidence in the disposition of this case and would affirm the conviction.
Testimony was admitted at trial from Godfrey Harrison, the owner of the car which was stolen. One element of that testimony was the serial number of the vehicle. The police officer whose remarks at trial are made the focal point of the majority opinion recounted his personal inspection of the transmission unit and related a series of numbers stamped thereon. Obviously there is a great similarity between the number the officer gave and that given by Harrison. In fact, the series of digits given by the officer matched exactly the last six digits of the vehicle identification number given by the owner.
It seems to me not unreasonable that a fair and logical inference could be drawn from the similarity of these numbers that the transmission unit did indeed come from the vehicle in question thereby linking appellant to the stolen automobile. Clearly such an inference was made by the trier of fact. Further, even assuming the testimony of the police officer which the majority denominates hearsay is in fact *533hearsay, there exists a presumption that the court, as trier of fact, considered only that evidence properly before it, Swift v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 337, 264 N. E. 2d 317, and that it therefore did not enter into the decision. I find nothing to rebut that presumption.
For the foregoing reasons I must respectfully dissent.
Arterburn, C.J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 270 N. E. 2d 756.