Court Opinion

ID: 9868442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:35:16.467632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.427571
License: Public Domain

0'N 'PETITION TO REHEAR,.
Our decree dismissing complainants’ bill was not based upon a holding that the cause on its merits had been submitted to the Chancellor on bill and answer. The cause *660was before the Chancellor upon a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, and this motion was heard on bill and answer.
If the Chancellor had dissolved the injunction, it would have been his duty to dismiss the bill and grant complainants an appeal, under the rule stated in Mengle Box Co. v. Lauderdale Co., 144 Tenn., 267. On appeal by the defendants from the decree refusing to dissolve the injunction, it appeared to us that the record evidence stated in the answer was conclusive and that the Chancellor should have dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill. Therefore, upon the authority of the case cited, it seemed proper to us to enter the decree the Chancellor should have entered.
In a controversy between the County and the State, as contracting parties, much of the argument of learned counsel for complainants would have force. Bat in this litigation both the contracting parties are in agreement. The State, through the Department of Highways, is making no point that its offer of aid to Jéfferson County could not have been accepted in January, 1927, so as to bind the State, because' it had previously been rejected, and there is no averment of the bill that the County will not receive the full measure of State aid required by law, as consideration for its contribution of the disputed funds to the construction of the proposed 'road. To sustain complainants’ bill, it seems to us, would be an unwarranted interference by the courts of the business of the County and State agencies, on account of mere irregularities. The purpose of the statute is to secure the building of state highways with a definite division of the cost between the State and County, and the interference of a court of equity, through its injunctive process, is not *661justifiable, at the suit of taxpayers, when the legal representatives of both governmental agencies are asserting without contradiction that the required division of cost is complied with.
These considerations impelled us to the conclusion, stated in our opinion previously filed, that the appropriation by the County in 1927, herein sought to be enjoined, was a substantial .acceptance of the offer made by the State Highway Department in 1925. But we are not convinced of the merits of the bill, even if the proposal of the Highway Department had come for the first time after the appropriation had been ordered by the county court. It is clear that taxpayers may maintain a suit in equity to enjoin an expenditure of public money for an illegal purpose, but it is not at all clear that such a suit may be maintained to restrain an expenditure of public money for a purpose authorized by law, because of some irregularity in the mode, order or time of the appropriation.
We do not feel that we can add to what we have already said as to the proper construction of the statute. Acts 1919, chapter 175, sections 2 and 3. Under section 3, the quarterly county court, in January, 1.927, could have directed that the balance of the proceeds of the bonds already issued be held for their redemption, and that a new issue of bonds be made for the construction of the road as now proposed. We adhere to our conclusion that such course ivas unnecessary, and that the county court acted within its power in changing the application of the existing fund from the road as originally proposed to the road now approved by the Department of Highways.
The petition to rehear will be denied.