Court Opinion

ID: 9953218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 17:00:41.38977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:46.803881
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                 ___________

                     No. 18-1868
                     ___________

            TROY LAMONT MOORE, SR.,
                                Appellant
                      v.

               C.O. SAAJIDA WALTON
              _______________________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
             (D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-03873)
     District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                    ______________

               Argued: November 8, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

                (Filed: March 21, 2024)

Jonathan Dame
Regina Wang [ARGUED]
Yiyang Wang
Brian S. Wolfman
Georgetown University Law Center
Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic
600 New Jersey Avenue NW
Suite 312
Washington, DC 20001
   Counsel for Appellant

Elise M. Bruhl
Meghan Byrnes [ARGUED]
City of Philadelphia
Law Department
1515 Arch Street
17th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
   Counsel for Appellee

                     _________________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
                    _________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

       This case involves the relation back doctrine and
whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)’s
reference to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any
“good cause” extensions granted under that rule.

      After the toilet in plaintiff Troy Moore, Sr.’s prison cell
exploded, covering him and the entire cell in human sewage,
defendant Correctional Officer Saajida Walton refused to let

                               2
Moore out of his cell to clean up for over eight hours. Initially
proceeding pro se, Moore sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
arguing Walton violated his Eighth Amendment rights.
However, through no fault of his own, Moore’s original
complaint misspelled Walton’s name as “Walden,” and despite
the District Court finding “good cause for the delay in service
in this case,” J.A. 265, Moore was unable to correct the error
until well after the statute of limitations on his claim expired.

        On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,
the District Court denied Moore’s motion and granted
Walton’s motion on statute of limitations grounds, reasoning
“[t]here is no evidence in the record that Walton knew or
should have known of this action before the statute of
limitations had run,” Add. 10, and so Moore’s amended
complaint did not relate back to his original complaint under
Rule 15(c)(1)(C). In doing so, however, we believe the District
Court misapplied the relation back analysis by failing to look
to the period for service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(m) in assessing notice, as required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Consequently, the District Court did not have occasion to
consider whether that notice period incorporates the service
extension it previously granted to Moore for good cause under
Rule 4(m). Because we hold that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference
to “the period provided by Rule 4(m)” includes any extensions
for service granted under that rule for good cause, we will
vacate the District Court’s order.

                               3
                              I.

        The following facts are undisputed. See, e.g., Dkt.1 39
at 6-7; Appellee Br. 45 (conceding “Walton did not specifically
contest the facts set forth in [Moore’s] summary judgment
motion”).

                              A.

       At approximately 11:15 p.m. on September 16, 2013,
while incarcerated in the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional
Center (“PICC”), Moore was sitting in his prison cell when
“the water in the toilet absolutely exploded covering [him] in
raw sewage.” J.A. 172. “[T]he burst out of the toilet was so
violent there was defecation four feet high [up] the walls,” as
well as contaminant in Moore’s eyes and mouth. Id. at 172-73.
He immediately vomited and experienced shortness of breath
and chest pain.

       Five minutes later, Walton—the correctional officer on
duty that night—walked by Moore’s cell. Moore avers that
despite calling out to her for help, Walton “looked at me,
acknowledged me, turned her head and proceeded with her
rounds.” Id. at 242. When, for the next hour, Moore stood in
the flood of sewage banging on his cell door and pleading for
Walton’s assistance, Walton “act[ed] like she couldn’t hear”
him. Id. at 176-77; accord id. at 247, 249. Instead, Walton let
a neighboring inmate out of his cell to mop the floor outside of
Moore’s door and then released additional inmates in

       1
        “Dkt.” citations refer to the docket before the District
Court, Troy Lamont Moore, Sr. v. C.O. Saajida Walton, No. 14
Civ. 3873 (ER) (E.D. Pa.).

                               4
neighboring cells—but not Moore—to bathe and clean their
unit. Eventually, Moore stopped his cries for help because he
was in such “distress” and “had to . . . lay down.” Id. at 177.
He remained trapped in his cell until approximately 7:30 a.m.
the next morning and was released only after Walton ended her
shift.

                              B.

       The next day, Moore filed an Inmate Grievance Form
with the Philadelphia Prison System. The Grievance referred
only to “[t]he c/o” without specifying Walton by name. Id. at
24.

        Prior to initiating this action, Moore attempted to
ascertain Walton’s identity from prison authorities. PICC
eventually provided Walton’s name orally, and based on how
it sounded, Moore believed it was spelled “Walden.” When
Moore filed his initial complaint on June 23, 2014, he named
“Walden, Correctional Officer” as one of the defendants. Id.
at 15; see Dkt. 3 (the “Original Complaint”). Suing under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, Moore alleged he was subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. On June 26, 2014,
the District Court approved Moore’s application to proceed in
forma pauperis and directed the U.S. Marshals Service to serve
the defendants. The summons issued to “Walden” was
returned unexecuted on October 22, 2014.

      The District Court held a status conference on
December 14, 2014, at which an attorney for the City of
Philadelphia (the “City”) appeared. The City represented that
it had been unable to identify anyone named “Walden”
working at PICC. When asked to provide any information that
“may be helpful,” Moore explained that “CO Walden” was “an

                              5
older female” who “works the graveyard shift” “on G2 of PICC
Prison in Philadelphia” and was “on duty when the incident
happened.” Dkt. 44 at 9. In response, the District Court asked
whether the City was “tak[ing] into account those [employees]
who may have retired,” to which the City replied that “the
process is looking through who was working at the time of the
incident.” Id. at 10.

       In addition, the District Court granted in part Moore’s
motion to compel video footage and various repair and medical
reports concerning the incident and ordered the evidence be
preserved. The District Court subsequently ordered the City to
produce those records to Moore on April 6, 2015. One of the
records provided was a log of events from the night of the
incident with numerous entries by “WALTON_S.” J.A. 51.
As for the video evidence, however, the City submitted a
declaration from PICC’s warden claiming that despite
“conduct[ing] an exhaustive search,” “any video of Plaintiff’s
cell and the area surrounding it has been destroyed.” Dkt. 31
¶¶ 3, 6.

       When, by December 17, 2015, the City had still failed
to identify “Walden,” the District Court dismissed Moore’s
claim against her without prejudice given his failure to serve a
summons and the Original Complaint. Moore filed an
amended complaint shortly thereafter.2          See Dkt. 46

       2
        The Amended Complaint was dated December 31,
2015, the “Certificate of Service” attached to it states that
Moore “caused [the Amended Complaint] to be served” on
December 30, 2015, J.A. 121, the envelope in which Moore
mailed the Amended Complaint to the District Court is

                               6
(“Amended Complaint”). The Amended Complaint contained
the same factual and legal allegations as the Original
Complaint but renamed the defendant as “Corrections Officer
S. Walton.” Id.

        Despite correcting this spelling error, challenges to
serving Walton persisted. The summons issued to “C.O. S.
Walton” on February 10, 2016 was never returned (executed
or otherwise). J.A. 7. On June 17, 2016, the District Court
extended Moore’s deadline to serve for an additional sixty
days. A second summons was finally returned unexecuted on
October 24, 2016, with the City claiming only that it “need[ed]
more info” in order to accept service on Walton’s behalf. Dkt.
48. On November 2, 2016, the District Court ordered Moore
to provide “S. Walton’s” first name, and informed Moore for
the first time that “[t]he City of Philadelphia has indicated that
[the] only individual with a similar name is Saajida Walton
who was employed as a correctional officer from July 7, 2008
to April 5, 2014.” Dkt. 49.3 Moore responded less than two
weeks later—on November 15, 2016—confirming that
“Saajida Walton” was the person he intended to serve. The
District Court again extended Moore’s service deadline, and
Walton was finally served on May 2, 2017.

       That same month, Walton moved to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. She argued the statute of limitations had
run on Moore’s claim before he filed the Amended Complaint,

stamped January 15, 2016, and the Amended Complaint was
docketed on February 10, 2016.
       3
        The record does not indicate how or when the District
Court learned Walton’s full name.

                                7
and the Amended Complaint did not relate back to the Original
Complaint because Moore “did not in any way notify [her] of
this lawsuit within the timeframe provided by Rule 4(m) – 90
days.” Dkt. 59 at 6. At a hearing to resolve Walton’s motion,
Moore, still pro se, maintained he had “pursued all avenues to
serve the defendant in a timely manner,” including seeking
information from the “prison,” the “human resources
department,” and the “right-to-know office.” J.A. 256. He also
claimed he only learned the correct spelling of Walton’s full
name in November 2016, after the City provided him with the
preserved discovery, even though the City and the prison
“knew exactly who [Moore] was referring to” throughout. Id.
at 262-63.

       The District Court denied Walton’s motion to dismiss,
concluding Moore “has shown good cause for the delay in
service in this case.” Id. at 265. The District Court reasoned

      it is credible that the plaintiff made a number of
      attempts, through court administrators, to
      straighten out the name. This is a matter that
      went through the grievance process and the
      authorities. And it is likely that the correctional
      officer knew of the nature of this grievance. And
      what we had here is simply a spelling error; an
      error that the defendants provided no assistance
      in correcting, until the time had run out.

             So I find that the plaintiff made good faith
      efforts to learn the proper spelling of the
      defendant’s name; and that, for no fault of his
      own, he was unable to do so within the time
      provided for in the rule. That justifies the
      Court’s finding of good cause in this case for

                              8
       service to have occurred outside of the 90 days.

Id. at 266.

        At the District Court’s direction, the parties
subsequently cross-moved for summary judgment. Moore
argued he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his
Eighth Amendment claim, the facts of which were undisputed.
Walton again argued inter alia that Moore’s claim was barred
by the statute of limitations and that the Amended Complaint
did not relate back to the Original Complaint. The District
Court granted Walton’s motion and denied Moore’s motion on
statute of limitations grounds. Without acknowledging its
earlier relation back holding, the District Court found Moore
was not entitled to rely on the relation back doctrine because
“[t]here is no evidence in the record that Walton knew or
should have known of this action before the statute of
limitations had run,” Add. 10, and Moore “failed to show that
Walton had either actual notice or constructive notice within
the required 120 day period under Rule 15(c),” id. at 12.

       Moore timely appealed.

                            II.4

      Our review of the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment is plenary, and we apply the same standard as the
lower court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d

       4
        The District Court had original jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.

                              9
Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

       We review the District Court’s interpretation of the
relation back doctrine de novo, Hodge v. United States, 554
F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2009), and its embedded good cause
determination for abuse of discretion, see Ayres v. Jacobs &
Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1996).

                             III.

        A civil rights action under section 1983 is subject to the
personal injury statute of limitations of the state in which the
cause of action accrued. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440
F.3d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 2006). In Pennsylvania, where Moore’s
cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations for personal
injury actions is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). No
one disputes Moore filed the Original Complaint within the
applicable statute of limitations; Moore’s claim accrued on
September 16, 2013—the date of the incident, and he filed the
Original Complaint on June 26, 2014—less than two years
later. Nor do the parties dispute Moore filed and served Walton
with the Amended Complaint, where he correctly named
Walton as a defendant for the first time, after the statute of
limitations elapsed. Accordingly, Moore’s claim appears to be
time-barred.

       That said, “the relation-back doctrine under Rule 15(c)

                               10
allows a court to treat a later-filed amended pleading as if it
had been filed at the time of the initial pleading.” Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth. v. Orrstown Fin. Servs. Inc., 12 F.4th 337, 344
(3d Cir. 2021). It thus “ameliorate[s] the running of the statute
of limitations.” Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186,
193 (3d Cir. 2001). In particular, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) permits
relation back when an amendment to a pleading “changes the
party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is
asserted.” To do so, three requirements must be satisfied: first,
the claim against the newly added defendant must arise “out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out . . . in the
original pleading,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B); accord Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (requiring satisfaction of Rule 15(c)(1)(B));
second, the newly named party must have “received such
notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending
on the merits,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i); and third, the
newly named party must have or should have known that “but
for a mistake” made by the plaintiff concerning the newly
named party’s identity, “the action would have been brought
against” the newly named party in the first place, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). See also Singletary, 266 F.3d at 193-94.
Critically, the second and third requirements must be satisfied
“within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the
summons and complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also
Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 458 &
n.10 (3d Cir. 1996).

        Walton does not dispute the first and third conditions
are satisfied. That leaves the second condition, which itself has
two components each of which must be satisfied: notice and

                               11
the absence of prejudice.5 See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458.

                               A.

        In assessing whether Walton “received such notice of
the action,” Rule 15(c)(1)(C) directs us to “the period provided
by Rule 4(m).” Rule 4(m), in turn, states

       [i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after
       the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or
       on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must
       dismiss the action without prejudice against that
       defendant or order that service be made within a
       specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good
       cause for the failure, the court must extend the
       time for service for an appropriate period.

Because Rule 4(m) sets a default period for service of 90 days,6
we would ordinarily ask whether Walton received notice of
Moore’s action within 90 days of the filing of the Original
Complaint. See Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 458. But here, Moore does
not contend Walton received such notice of the action within
the default Rule 4(m) service period. Rather, he argues the
notice requirement was satisfied when Walton was served with
the Amended Complaint—on May 2, 2017. While this is well-

       5
         Because we conclude the District Court erred in its
application of the notice requirement and remand for further
consideration of that issue, we need not address the parties’
arguments on prejudice.
       6
         At the time this action was being litigated before the
District Court, the default period for service was 120 days.

                               12
outside the default period under Rule 4(m)—by 924 days—
Moore argues the District Court extended his deadline to serve
Walton under Rule 4(m)’s “good cause” extension provision
until that date, and such an extension is included in the notice
period set by Rule 15(c)(1)(C).

       The appropriate place to begin is with the text of the
rule. As previously noted, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires, in
relevant part, that a newly added defendant receive “notice of
the action” “within the period provided by Rule 4(m).” Rule
4(m) sets this period as 90 days unless “the plaintiff shows
good cause for the failure” to serve. In such a case, Rule 4(m)’s
service period is enlarged because the district court “must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(m) (emphasis added). By referencing only “the
period provided by Rule 4(m),” and not “the initial” or “default
period provided by Rule 4(m),” the plain text of Rule
15(c)(1)(C) means to include the entire Rule 4(m) service
period, which includes any mandatory extensions granted for
good cause. Indeed, Rule 4(m) is written as one provision,
without a subdivision for the good cause extension mandate.
Consequently, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to “the period
provided by Rule 4(m)” is not limited to just the default 90
days since Rule 4(m) also encompasses the mandatory good
cause extension provision.

       The Advisory Committee’s note to Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
confirms this reading. The Committee explained that “[i]n
allowing a name-correcting amendment within the time
allowed by Rule 4(m), [Rule 15(c)(1)(C)] allows not only the
[90] days specified in that rule, but also any additional time
resulting from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to
that rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 advisory committee’s note to the
1991 amendment (emphasis added). While not binding, “the

                               13
Advisory Committee’s notes on the federal rules are ‘of
weight’ in interpreting the meaning of the rules.” In re Nat’l
Football League Players Concussion Inj. Litig., 775 F.3d 570,
577 n.6 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger
Co., 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988)); see also Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550-51, 554 n.5 (2010)
(considering the Advisory Committee’s notes in interpreting
Rule 15(c)(1)(C)). In this case, the note indicates Rule
15(c)(1)(C) was specifically drafted to incorporate extensions
to service deadlines for good cause, such as the extension
granted to Moore.

       We also do not write on a blank slate. Our sister circuits
that have addressed this issue have all concluded that Rule
15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to Rule 4(m) incorporates Rule 4(m)’s
“good cause” extension provision. See McGraw v. Gore, 31
F.4th 844, 849 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Relation back is allowed, in
other words, so long as the added defendant had notice within
the 90 days – or any ‘good cause’ extension – allowed under
Rule 4(m).” (quoting Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 608
(4th Cir. 2010))); Rodriguez v. McCloughen, 49 F.4th 1120,
1122-23 (7th Cir. 2022) (faulting the district court’s relation
back analysis for failing to consider whether the delay in
service fits within the “good cause” exception under Rule
4(m)); Lee v. Airgas Mid-S., Inc., 793 F.3d 894, 897 & n.3 (8th
Cir. 2015) (noting Rule 15(c)’s requirement that defendant
“receiv[e] notice of [the] lawsuit within [90] days after the
complaint was filed” “also can be extended by any service-of-
process extensions the district court might grant for ‘good
cause’” (internal brackets omitted)); Jackson v. Herrington,
393 F. App’x 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e see no reason
for incorporating Rule 4(m)’s [90]-day baseline into Rule 15
without also incorporating Rule 4(m)’s good-cause baseline

                               14
exception.”); McGuire v. Turnbo, 137 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding “a complaint will relate back under Rule 15(c)
when the district court has enlarged Rule 4(m)’s notice
period”); see also 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1498.1
n.10 (3d ed. 2023) (collecting cases).

       And while we have yet to explicitly address this issue,
we have previously recognized another circumstance where the
notice period set by Rule 15(c)(1)(C) may be enlarged beyond
the baseline set by Rule 4(m). In Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Department, we held the deadline for satisfying the
requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) for plaintiffs proceeding in
forma pauperis is suspended pending the district court’s
mandatory screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 91 F.3d at 453-
54. And in Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., we noted, in
dicta, that because plaintiffs asserted they satisfied the
requirements for Rule 15(c) relation back within the default
period set by Rule 4(m), “[t]his case . . . does not involve the
issue of the circumstances under which the period for applying
the [notice] requirements [of Rule 15(c)] may be longer than
[90] days” such as when the district court extends the period to
serve under Rule 4(m). 34 F.3d 1173, 1181 & n.12 (3d Cir.
1994) (citing the advisory committee note discussed supra).

       Walton fails to point to any authority—district court or
circuit—endorsing a contrary reading of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
Instead, she urges us to “reserve the benefit of an expanded
notice period only for plaintiffs who can demonstrate a delay
beyond their control.” Appellee Br. 34. In addition, Walton
would limit our holding in Urrutia and the holdings in the cases
from our sister circuits to situations where the delay in service
was caused by mandatory screening, such as under section
1915 or the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

                               15
§ 1997e(a). But such limitations would be contrary to the plain
text of the rule. See Krupski, 560 U.S. at 553 (Rule 15(c)(1)(C)
“plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation
back, and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.”
(emphasis added)). Again, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) refers to only the
“period provided by Rule 4(m),” and Rule 4(m) provides that
its default 90-day period must be extended whenever the
district court finds “good cause”—not “delay beyond
plaintiff’s control,” or “delay caused by mandatory district
court screening.”

        Finally, Walton warns that Rule 4(m)’s good cause
standard is not a “sufficient limiting principle” for relation
back because it is too “lenient.” Appellee Br. 41. Even if that
were true, the Advisory Committee note explicitly indicates
that the drafters of the rule believed differently; Rule
15(c)(1)(C) was drafted to include in its notice period “any
additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the
court pursuant to” Rule 4(m). Advisory Committee Note,
supra (emphasis added). But more to the point, we feel that
Walton’s concerns are overstated. District courts retain plenty
of tools to account for unreasonable delay, and we still review
a district court’s good cause determination for abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts,
Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995) (district court abused
its discretion in finding good cause to excuse late service where
the record was devoid of any explanation for plaintiff’s lack of
diligence and failure to move to enlarge the time to serve); see
also Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997)
(district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no good
cause to extend plaintiff’s time to serve when “[n]othing in the
record . . . justified Boley’s ineffective attempts at service and
his failure to make a timely motion for an extension of time”);

                               16
Green v. Humphrey Elevator and Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 884
(3d Cir. 1987) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause when
he “waited until the eve of the service deadline” to mail a
summons, failed to serve the defendants before the cutoff, and
did not “present facts that would justify” the belated service
attempt).

       Accordingly, we hold that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s notice
period incorporates mandatory extensions granted for “good
cause” under Rule 4(m).

                               B.

        Having concluded Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s reference to Rule
4(m) incorporates any good cause extensions granted under
that rule, we now evaluate the District Court’s analysis. In
resolving the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,
the District Court found the Amended Complaint did not relate
back to the Original Complaint because “[t]here is no evidence
in the record that Walton knew or should have known of this
action before the statute of limitations had run.” Add. 10. This
reasoning is erroneous because “the limitation period for
purposes of analyzing whether [a] newly added defendant
received notice and should have had knowledge of the action
as required for relation back under Rule 15(c) is not the statute
of limitations for the underlying claim, but instead the [Rule]
4(m) service period.” McGraw, 31 F.4th at 849 (first alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Garvin
v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003). The District
Court therefore erred to the extent it looked to the statute of
limitations rather than the period for service under Rule 4(m)
to assess notice.

       But even to the extent the District Court properly looked

                               17
to the Rule 4(m) service period to assess notice,7 it failed to
account for the good cause extension it previously granted
Moore in denying Walton’s motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint. As noted above, the District Court previously
concluded that Moore “has shown good cause for the delay in
service in this case.” J.A. 265. Moore argues this ruling
“extended the Rule 4(m) period for service up to the day
[Walton] was served” with the Amended Complaint, and so
“[i]t necessarily follows that she received notice within the
Rule 4(m) period.” Appellant Br. 20 (citing Urrutia, 91 F.3d
at 460-61); accord id. at 17. Based on our analysis above, we
agree the District Court’s good cause service extension
enlarged the relation back notice period beyond the initial 120
days. The problem with Moore’s argument, however, is that it
conflates the Rule 4(m) service period for the Original
Complaint with the Rule 4(m) service period for the Amended
Complaint.

        It is blackletter law that “[f]iling an amended complaint
does not toll the Rule 4(m) service period” for an original
complaint. 4B Wright & Miller, supra, § 1137; see also
Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he . . . period provided by Rule 4(m) is not restarted by
the filing of an amended complaint . . . .”). “[A]t best, adding

       7
          Although the District Court initially referred to the
statute of limitations as the relevant notice period for relation
back, it later referred to the default period under Rule 4(m)—
then 120 days. See Add. 12 (“Because Plaintiff has failed to
show that Walton had either actual notice or constructive
notice within the required 120 day period under Rule 15(c),
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not relate back to the date
of the [I]nitial Complaint.”).

                               18
a new party through an amended complaint initiates a
new . . . timetable for service upon the added defendant.” Lee,
793 F.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted). Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s notice requirement “looks to the
Rule 4(m) period for serving the original complaint” not an
amended complaint. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Garvin,
354 F.3d at 220 (noting the newly added defendants “must
have received notice of the institution of the action within 120
days following the filing of the action” (emphasis added));
Urrutia, 91 F.3d at 459 n.14 (In “a situation where the court
orders service of an original complaint . . . and sometime later
orders service of an amended complaint[,] . . . . the 120 day
period specified by Rule 15(c)[(1)(C)] begins to run on the date
service of the original complaint was ordered.”). Accordingly,
any good cause extension to the service period for the
Amended Complaint would not be included in Rule
15(c)(1)(C)’s notice period.

       While not entirely clear, we interpret the District
Court’s ruling that there was “good cause for the delay in
service in this case,” J.A. 265 (emphasis added), as applying to
the Rule 4(m) service period for both the Amended and the
Original Complaints. In support of its good cause finding, the
District Court pointed to the “number of attempts, through
court administrators, to straighten out [Walton’s] name.” Id. at
266. As recounted above, those “attempts” primarily occurred
between 2014 and 2015—prior to the filing of the Amended
Complaint, see supra II.B—and so they naturally justify good
cause for delayed service of the Original Complaint, not the
Amended Complaint. However, despite being extended past
the initial 120 days for good cause, the Rule 4(m) service
period for the Original Complaint necessarily ended when the
Original Complaint was dismissed—on December 17, 2015.

                              19
Accordingly, the notice period for Rule 15(c)(1)(C) ended on
that date as well.

        Apart from unsworn statements from the City in its
briefing in support of Walton’s motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint and motion for summary judgment that Moore “did
not in any way notify Saajida Walton of this lawsuit within the
timeframe provided by Rule 4(m),” Dkt. 59 at 6; accord Dkt.
65 at 8, the parties and the District Court have not addressed,
and the current record contains no evidence concerning
whether Walton received notice of the action before December
17, 2015. However, as the District Court recognized, “[t]his is
a matter that went through [PICC’s internal] grievance
process” and “it is likely that [Walton] knew of the nature of
this grievance.” J.A. 266.8 We will therefore vacate and
remand to the District Court to determine, in the first instance,
whether Walton received actual or constructive notice of the

       8
         We note, however, that notice of the administrative
grievance proceeding alone would not be sufficient to
demonstrate notice for the purposes of relation back. Rule
15(c)(1)(C) refers to “notice of the action,” but the
administrative grievance proceeding occurred almost nine
months prior to the initiation of the action, or the “filing of the
original complaint.” Garvin, 354 F.3d at 220; see also
Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195 (“[T]he notice received must be
more than notice of the event that gave rise to the cause of
action; it must be notice that the plaintiff has instituted the
action.”).

                                20
action by December 17, 2015.9

                              C.

       Walton tries to avoid this outcome by arguing that the
District Court abused its discretion when it determined good
cause existed to extend Moore’s service deadline.10 We
disagree. To demonstrate good cause, a plaintiff must
demonstrate “good faith” and “some reasonable basis for
noncompliance within the time specified in the rules.” MCI,
71 F.3d at 1097 (internal quotation marks omitted). Good
cause is thus akin to “excusable neglect.” Id.

       In this case, the District Court found good cause because
Moore “made a number of attempts, through court
administrators, to straighten out [Walton’s] name” and his
failure to timely serve essentially boiled down to “a spelling
error; an error that the defendants provided no assistance in
correcting, until the time had run out.” J.A. 266; see also id.

       9
          In doing so, the District Court may exercise its
discretion as to whether to permit additional discovery on the
issue of notice and/or whether to hold an evidentiary hearing,
as well as whether to appoint Moore pro bono counsel.
       10
          Walton also contends the District Court abused its
discretion in permitting Moore to file the Amended Complaint
in the first place. But Walton failed to raise this argument
before that Court. Rather than opposing the amendment under
Rule 15(a), Walton moved to dismiss under 12(b), raising the
same statute of limitations arguments addressed above. The
argument is therefore waived on appeal. See In re Ins.
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 2009).

                              21
(“I find that the plaintiff made good faith efforts to learn the
proper spelling of the defendant’s name; and that, for no fault
of his own, he was unable to do so within the time provided for
in the rule.”). This ruling was reasonable, and certainly not an
abuse of discretion. While Moore may have known the correct
spelling of Walton’s name for over five months prior to filing
the Amended Complaint, we find this did not constitute “undue
delay,” particularly in light of Moore’s then-pro se status, the
many attempts he made to ascertain Walton’s identity, and the
City’s willful failure to provide assistance until after the statute
of limitations elapsed.

                              IV.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District
Court’s order granting Walton’s motion for summary judgment
and denying Moore’s motion for summary judgment and will
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In
particular, the District Court should address (1) whether
Walton received notice of the action by December 17, 2015,
and if so (2) whether Moore can demonstrate the absence of
prejudice—the final element necessary to satisfy the relation
back inquiry, and if so (3) the merits of Moore’s Eighth
Amendment claim.

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