Court Opinion

ID: 9479631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:23:53.988567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:10.061864
License: Public Domain

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Through the exercise of our diversity jurisdiction, federal courts have interpreted Mississippi strict products liability law in a manner that is not justified either by Mississippi state court precedents or generally accepted strict products liability doctrine. These federal decisions lead the majority to uphold the district court’s conclusion that the danger presented by the combine auger in which Garland Melton’s arm was injured was open and obvious and that this finding warranted entry of a directed verdict. I disagree with the circuit precedents on which the majority relies and with the outcome in this case. I would remand for a new trial.
I.
A. When is a product design defective in Mississippi?
In State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912, 87 S.Ct. 860, 17 L.Ed.2d 784 (1967), the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the appropriate standard for evaluating manufacturer liability in a products liability action. Section 402A provides that “[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964). The primary issue in a Section 402A design defect case is whether the product that caused the injury is unreasonably dangerous. The Mississippi Supreme Court explained in State Stove.
Ordinarily the phrase “defective condition” means that the article has something wrong with it, that it did not function as expected. However, where the article was made as intended, and yet proves to be not reasonably safe, the phrase “defective condition” has no independent meaning. The issue is whether the product is “unreasonably dangerous” or not reasonably safe.
State Stove Mfg. Co., 189 So.2d at 121 (citations omitted). The Mississippi Supreme Court has reaffirmed this approach in subsequent design defect cases. See, e.g., Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213, 217-18 (Miss.1985); Dunson v. S.A. Allen, Inc., 355 So.2d 77, 78 (Miss.1978).
The court below interpreted Mississippi precedents as directing application of a “consumer expectation” analysis in determining whether a product design is unreasonably dangerous. Under that analysis, the only relevant evidence is the subjective expectations of ordinary consumers of a product as to its functions. The court explained when it initially rejected the testimony of a mechanical engineer.
Unreasonably dangerous means that the product did not meet the reasonable expectations of the consumer as to safety. A defective product means a product that does not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer as to the safety of the product.
Now who is better qualified to say what the ordinary expectation, the reasonable expectations of a consumer as to safety of a product is than the consumer, these farmers, and their opinions, they are the consumers themselves....
The majority appears to have adopted the same analysis, as have other federal courts. See, e.g., Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 869, 871 (5th Cir.1985); Hedgepeth v. Fruehauf Corp., 634 F.Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.Miss.1986).
It is true that Mississippi has adopted Section 402A, which is often described as encompassing a “consumer expectation” or *1247“consumer contemplation” analysis.1 A review of recent Mississippi design defect cases, however, indicates that if Mississippi ever did apply a consumer expectation approach as set forth in the court below, it has now moved beyond that analysis. These recent cases demonstrate that in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the primary focus should be the adequacy of the product’s design.2 A plaintiff will prevail in an action by demonstrating that the design of the product fell below the standard of design to which the manufacturer is expected to adhere. In Toliver v. General Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 213, 214 (Miss.1985), the plaintiff claimed that the Chevrolet Vega was defective because the gas tank “was inadequately designed to withstand punctures in rear-end collisions.” The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could proceed under a strict liability theory and explained the proof required.
Comment g. to Section 402A defines defective condition as “a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.” In the context of fuel tank design, obviously the plaintiff contemplated that the automobile which he purchased had a fuel tank affixed to it, which could become dangerous under some circumstances. Therefore, in order to make out his prima facie case, he must show that the placement of the tank on the car that injured him was defective: that it fell below the standard of automotive design contemplated by the user, and, thus, became unreasonably dangerous to him.
Id. at 218; see also Brown v. Williams, 504 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Miss.1987) (quoting Toliver); cf. Hall v. Mississippi Chem. Express, Inc., 528 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss.1988) (“The proper focus in a strict product liability case is upon the utility and safety of the product in view of its intended func-tion_”). Although the Toliver court uses the phrase “contemplated by the user,” it does not use the phrase in the sense suggested by the court below — that is, as limiting the evidence to uninformed consumers’ subjective expectations. Rather, the court’s focus is on whether a reasonable person informed of a product’s design characteristics and performance would consider it unreasonably dangerous. Thus, the court noted that in proving that a particular design is defective, a “plaintiff may introduce evidence of industry standards, to show deviation therefrom, or an alter*1248nate design, to show the feasibility thereof." Toliver, 482 So.2d at 218. Other Mississippi cases confirm the relevance of this evidence. See Hall, 528 So.2d at 799; Rose v. Mercury Marine, 483 So.2d 1351, 1352 (Miss.1986) (quoting Toliver); Ford Motor Co. v. Broadway, 374 So.2d 207, 210 (Miss.1979).
Cases such as Toliver demonstrate the Mississippi courts’ focus on a number of factors in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous and thus defective. This approach is consistent with the development of strict products liability law in the vast majority of jurisdictions and the corresponding rejection of the limited consumer expectations focus advocated by the majority and the court below.3 Although no Mississippi decision lists all the relevant factors a jury may consider, it is clear that alternative designs and industry standards are relevant. It is reasonable to assume that Mississippi courts would also consider engineering standards and a product’s compliance therewith, the number and type of injuries resulting from a particular design, and the cost of eliminating a hazard as relevant to a determination of whether the design is unreasonably dangerous. Certainly no Mississippi case has rejected the relevance of such evidence.
The majority misreads the case law when it concludes that “consumer expectations are still the basis of Mississippi’s test.” The Mississippi decisions discussed above establish that the ultimate fact question for the jury is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff may present evidence of the design’s danger, industry and engineering standards concerning the design, and alternative designs and their costs. Considering all of this evidence, the jury then decides the design’s reasonableness.
B. What is the role of the open and obvious rule?
In Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866, 869-70 (5th Cir.1985), a panel of this court held that the open and obvious or patent danger rule serves as an absolute bar to recovery in Mississippi strict products liability actions. See also Hedgepeth, 634 F.Supp. at 97-98 (holding that Mississippi strict products liability law bars recovery for injuries caused by product hazards that are open and obvious). The court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the absence of any direct authority in Mississippi case law supporting application of the rule. The key to the Manitowoc decision was the court’s determination that consumer expectations should be the primary focus in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. See Manitowoc, 771 F.2d at 869. Under this analysis, a product design incorporating an open and obvious hazard could never be unreasonably dangerous, because it would never be more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect.
When the focus of the inquiry is shifted from consumer expectations to product design, however, it becomes clear that the open and obvious rule is not appropriately applied as an automatic bar to plaintiff recovery. The ultimate fact issue for the jury is the reasonableness of a product’s design. A design with an open and obvious hazard may or may not be unreasonable. Only after a complete assessment of the full extent of the danger, in light of engineering standards, alternative designs, including their costs, and other relevant factors can a jury make a determination about reasonableness. Certainly, one would not conclude that because the potential harm of getting a hand caught in uncovered gears or in an unguarded press is open and obvious, the danger is therefore not unreasonable, even though the danger could be eliminated at a minimal cost by attaching safety devices.
Generally accepted strict products liability law recognizes that obvious risks may be unreasonable and that a manufacturer ought not to be able to escape liability by *1249merely contending the danger was obvious to the consumer. “Liability may attach even though the danger was obvious where an unreasonable danger could have been eliminated without excessive cost or loss of product efficiency.” 2 American Law of Products Liability 3d § 28.70, at 82 (1987); see S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. Gans, 5 The American Law of Torts § 18.80, at 896 (1988).
This does not necessarily mean that whether a hazard in a product design is obvious is irrelevant to the outcome of a case. The obviousness of a hazard may be available as a defense to bar a particular consumer from complaining. Indeed, there is some Mississippi case law suggesting that the assumption of risk defense might be available in a strict products liability action. See Alley v. Praschak Mach. Co., 366 So.2d 661, 664-65 (Miss.1979); Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., 477 So.2d 261, 263-64 (Miss.1985). If the defense is available, the obviousness of a hazard would be relevant in determining the appropriateness of recovery. A conclusion, however, that a plaintiff in a particular case should not recover because, for example, he assumed the risk of harm does not mean the product design is reasonable.
II.
The district court in the present case directed a verdict for Deere & Company at the close of plaintiffs case because “there [was] not proof in [the] record of a latent hazard.” The court based its holding on the two federal court decisions in Manitowoc and Hedgepeth. For the reasons discussed above, I believe these decisions misinterpret Mississippi law and thus improperly apply the open and obvious rule. That rule is inconsistent with an analysis that evaluates a number of factors concerning a product’s design to determine whether it is unreasonably dangerous. No Mississippi decision has approved the holdings in Man-itowoc or Hedgepeth or reached a similar result, and I do not feel bound in this diversity action to the errors of Manitowoc and Hedgepeth.
III.
Even under the majority’s approach, I believe the evidence is sufficient to create a jury question as to whether the hazard was open and obvious. As the majority notes, a nonmoving auger is not in itself obviously dangerous. The majority responds, however, that “the risk that the auger may be engaged whenever the engine is running is a matter of common sense with which a reasonable user of the combine must be charged.” This approach is excessively rigid. As the Seventh Circuit has noted,
Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on what people can see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about what they see. In particular, if people generally believe that there is a danger associated with the use of a product, but that there is a safe way to use it, any danger there may be in using the product in the way generally believed to be safe is not open and obvious.
Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir.1984) (applying Indiana law). In Banks v. Iron Hustler Corp., 59 Md.App. 408, 475 A.2d 1243 (1984), a Maryland appellate court made a related point.
Whether a particular danger is obvious or patent can depend on a number of things — the complexity of the machine, the knowledge, age, background, experience, intelligence, and training of the person injured, the extent to which his required contact with the device is routine and repetitive, whether he is subject to distractions, for example. It necessarily is a question of fact, then, and, if there is any dispute about it, the question is for the jury to decide.
Id. 475 A.2d at 1251; see also FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 725 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (“Even though a person may be aware of a general danger, defects in the product may create an additional danger which is not open and obvious.”).
At trial, plaintiff put on five witnesses, beside Melton, who had varying degrees of farming experience and exposure to the type of combine that injured Melton. Three of the witnesses had been involved in *1250accidents similar to Melton’s. The other two witnesses had been present when Melton’s arm was injured. Although the testimony of these witnesses varied in details, the substance was in large part consistent. They believed that to properly clean out the combine it was necessary to have the engine running and to occasionally engage the auger. They also testified that in cleaning out the combine it was necessary to use their hand to scrape excess grain out of the sump in which the auger is housed and that in undertaking this procedure it was necessary to stand in a position not within clear view of the combine cab and the mechanism by which the auger is engaged. Several of the witnesses testified that they had participated in the clean-out procedure a number of times.4 They testified that they were not aware of previous accidents involving John Deere Titan series combines, that they did not expect the auger to be activated while they had their hands in the sump, and that the combine was more dangerous than they expected it to be before the accidents. On cross-examination, the witnesses testified that they knew in general that augers are dangerous, that they knew they would be injured if their hand was in the auger when it was engaged, and that they would not have put their hand in the sump if they had known the auger was going to be engaged.
This evidence suggests that the witnesses believed there was a safe way to clean out the combine, and indeed, several of the witnesses indicated they had cleaned the combines using the process described numerous times without injury. A reasonable jury might well conclude that the combine’s danger which injured Garland Melton was not open and obvious.5 The district court should not have directed a verdict.

. These labels presumably arise out of the language contained in comments g and i to Section 402A. Comment g provides in part that “[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g. Comment i provides in part that "[t]he rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” Id. comment i.

. The focus on design makes a Mississippi strict products liability action very similar to a negligence case. This is not inconsistent with Mississippi precedent. In State Stove, for example, the court explained that the strict liability “action is different from negligence mainly in the element of scienter: Plaintiff will not need to prove either that defendant negligently created the unsafe condition of the product or that he was aware of it.” State Stove Mfg. Co., 189 So.2d at 121. Eight years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court quoted this definition of defective: ‘"The prevailing interpretation of "defective" is that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety. It has been said that this amounts to saying that if the seller knew of the condition he would be negligent in marketing the product.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So.2d 169, 172 (Miss.1974) (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 99, at 659-60 (4th ed. 1971)). In strict liability, then, as in negligence, the performance and design of the product will be important. Strict liability merely relieves the plaintiff of the burden of proving the defendant's mental state at the time of production. Thus, the effect of proceeding solely on a strict liability theory should be to make it easier for the plaintiff to prove his case; it should not make it more difficult to prove the dangerous character of a particular product design. Cf. Toliver, 482 So.2d at 215 (noting that one purpose of a strict liability action is "to assist the plaintiff in establishing what would otherwise be a near-impossible burden of proof).

. Commentators have noted that focusing on consumer expectations in design defect cases is unhelpful, because in most cases consumers do not know what to expect because they do not know how safe a product can be made. See, e.g., Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex.L.Rev. 777, 796-97 (1983).

. Danny Campbell testified that people working at Melton Planting Company, where Garland Melton was injured, had participated in the clean-out of the combine approximately 150 times prior to Melton’s accident. Richard Melton testified that he had cleaned out the combine 30 or 40 times prior to Garland Melton’s accident. Garland Melton testified that he could not remember how many times he had participated in the clean-out procedure, though he did testify he had worked with combines similar to the one on which he was injured for part of three years and had cleaned out the combines during that time.

. Cf. Corbin, 748 F.2d at 417 (holding that because plaintiff believed there was a safe way to dive into a shallow pool, danger of spinal injury from such dive was not open and obvious); Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind.1983) (holding that although injury-producing mechanism of sheet metal punch press was open and obvious, jury should decide issue because it was not obvious that uninitiated descent of press could or would occur); FMC Corp., 526 N.E.2d at 725-26 (holding that although plaintiff was aware of danger from crane coming in contact with power line, suit was not barred as a matter of law because plaintiff was not aware how close crane was to the power line); Banks, 475 A.2d at 1251 (holding that although plaintiff acknowledged he would not deliberately place his hand in pinch point between roller and conveyer belt, danger was not open and obvious as a matter of law because “ 'whether or not a workman would appreciate the significance of that pinch point when he was engaged in doing some other part of his work ... is very speculative’ ”).