Court Opinion

ID: 9953721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:02:50.865634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:48.348186
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 Hanlin v. X-Pest CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 GAVIN G. HANLIN et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                                                        A165553
 v.
 X-PEST, INC. et al.,                                                   (San Francisco County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CGC-19-581323)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         This is the second of two actions alleging defective and uninhabitable
conditions (including a bedbug infestation) in a family’s residential dwelling
unit in San Francisco. In or around 2014, the mother of then-minors Gavin
G. Hanlin and Chayton M. Hanlin sued defendant X-Pest, Inc. (X-Pest) and
others, alleging that X-Pest’s negligent performance of pest control services in
the family’s unit caused the parents to sustain personal injuries and
emotional distress. The case went to trial in 2016, and the trial court entered
a directed verdict and judgment in favor of X-Pest. After the two minors
reached the age of majority, they brought the instant action in 2019 against
X-Pest for negligence and intentional torts arising out of the same
circumstances as the prior action. The trial court, however, sustained X-
Pest’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint on res judicata grounds and denied
their motion for leave to file an amended complaint and for reconsideration of
the demurrer ruling.

                                                               1
      In contending the trial court erred in applying a res judicata bar,
plaintiffs assert they were not parties in the earlier litigation or in privity
with their mother, and they never presented evidence of their damages in
that trial. We conclude, under a close examination of the circumstances in
this case, that sufficient privity exists to bar plaintiffs from relitigating the
dispositive issue of X-Pest’s tortious liability. Plaintiffs had an identity of
interest with and were adequately represented by their mother on the
liability issue, which was actually litigated and necessarily decided against
the mother on the merits in the prior suit. Accordingly, we will affirm the
judgment.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Allegations of the Operative Complaint
      We accept as true the following material allegations of the operative
first amended complaint. (Villarroel v. Recology, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
762, 768.)
      Plaintiffs were occupants of a residential dwelling unit at The Harcourt
in San Francisco. During their occupancy, plaintiffs experienced numerous
health and safety hazards in their unit, including a severe bedbug
infestation. X-Pest, a licensed pest control company, negligently performed
pest control services at The Harcourt, including in plaintiffs’ unit, and as
result, plaintiffs suffered injuries including bedbug bites and severe
emotional distress.
      Plaintiffs assert five causes of action against X-Pest for negligence per
se, negligence, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. At the time these causes of action
accrued, plaintiffs were under the age of majority, but they are now legal
adults.

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      B. X-Pest’s Demurrer
      X-Pest demurred to the first amended complaint on the ground that
plaintiffs failed to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action because
their claims were barred by res judicata. According to X-Pest, the instant
matter was the second of two lawsuits involving plaintiffs’ residence at The
Harcourt, and the prior suit, filed by plaintiffs’ parents, John Hanlin (Hanlin)
and Yoshabel Clements (Clements), ended in a directed verdict and judgment
in favor of X-Pest following a trial in 2016.
      In a brief order, the trial court, citing Garcia v. Rehrig Internat., Inc.
(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 869 (Garcia), sustained X-Pest’s demurrer to the first
amended complaint without leave to amend.
      C. Motion for Leave and Reconsideration
      Following the demurrer ruling, but prior to entry of judgment,
plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second amended complaint and for
reconsideration of the demurrer ruling (hereafter motion for
leave/reconsideration). The trial court denied the motion, finding the claims
against X-Pest in plaintiffs’ proposed second amended complaint were barred
under the Garcia decision.
      Plaintiffs timely appealed from the ensuing judgment.
                                   DISCUSSION
      “A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, i.e.,
whether it states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which
relief may be based.” (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142
Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469 (McKell).) “On demurrer a court considers the
allegations on the face of the complaint and any matter of which it must or
may take judicial notice. [Citation.] If judicially noticed records of prior
litigation show the complaint is barred by collateral estoppel, the demurrer

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may be sustained.” (Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 659, 667.)
“On appeal, we review the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer without
leave to amend de novo, exercising our independent judgment as to whether a
cause of action has been stated as a matter of law and applying the abuse of
discretion standard in reviewing the trial court’s denial of leave to amend.”
(McKell, at p. 1469.)
      A. Judicial Notice of Records in Prior Action
      In the proceedings below, the trial court granted the parties’ requests
for judicial notice of various court records filed in Clements v. Harcourt Group
(Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2012, No. CGC-12-526503) (Clements).
Although the parties have not filed corresponding requests regarding these
records in this court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252), we sua sponte take
judicial notice of the following records filed in Clements: the complaint filed
by Clements; the compulsory cross-complaints filed by Hanlin and Clements;
X-Pest’s motion for a directed verdict in Clements; X-Pest’s motions in limine
in Clements; and excerpts from the reporter’s transcript of the Clements trial.
(See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a); Aixtron, Inc. v. Veeco
Instruments Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 360, 382 [judicial notice of existence
of court records and “ ‘the truth of the results reached’ ”].)
      The judicially-noticed records demonstrate as follows. In November
2012, plaintiffs’ mother (Clements) filed a lawsuit against The Harcourt, its
property manager Sojourn Properties, Inc. (Sojourn), and several other
defendants for various claims alleging defective and uninhabitable conditions
in her residential dwelling unit, including a bedbug infestation. After
Sojourn filed a cross-complaint against Clements and plaintiffs’ father
(Hanlin) for breach of the rental agreement and unpaid rent, Clements and
Hanlin each filed a cross-complaint against various individuals and entities,

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including X-Pest. In their cross-complaints, Clements and Hanlin asserted
four claims against X-Pest arising out of its pest control services at The
Harcourt and their dwelling unit: negligence, negligence per se, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
      Trial proceedings in Clements commenced in January 2016. Before the
jury was empaneled, Hanlin voluntarily dismissed his cross-complaint.
During the Clements trial, the three children of Clements and Hanlin
(including the two plaintiffs in this case) were permitted to testify regarding
the bedbug infestation, the numerous bites that they and Clements had
sustained, and the effect of the infestation on Clements’s emotional and
physical state.
      In February of 2016, the trial court in Clements granted X-Pest’s
motion for a directed verdict on all four causes of action asserted against it in
Clements’s cross-complaint. The court found that X-Pest did not owe a duty
of care to Clements under any contract, statute, or perceived special
relationship. While acknowledging X-Pest had a general duty to use ordinary
care under the circumstances, the court determined that duty did not require
X-Pest to ensure there would never be bedbugs in Clements’s unit, but
rather, to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of its
professional community, and that Clements failed to present expert
testimony to counter X-Pest’s expert testimony that X-Pest did not breach its
duty and the applicable standard of care in the pest control industry. Finally,
the court found there was no evidence of outrageous conduct by X-Pest to
support Clements’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
      B. Collateral Estoppel
      Res judicata is “an umbrella term” that encompasses “two separate
‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine”: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

                                        5
(DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823–824.) Claim
preclusion bars claims that “were, or should have been, advanced in a
previous suit involving the same parties,” while issue preclusion (or collateral
estoppel) precludes parties and their privies from relitigating issues that
were actually decided on the merits in a prior suit. (Id. at p. 824.) The
elements of collateral estoppel are: “(1) after final adjudication (2) of an
identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit
and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity
with that party.” (Id. at p. 825.)1
      “Privity ‘ “refers ‘to a mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with
another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently,
to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party
in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application
of the doctrine of [res judicata]. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘ “This requirement
of identity of parties or privity is a requirement of due process of law.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Mooney v. Caspari (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 704, 718.) “ ‘ “Whether someone
is in privity with the actual parties requires close examination of the
circumstances of each case.” ’ ” (Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v.
Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1070 (Seadrift).) “ ‘ “The
circumstances must also have been such that the nonparty should reasonably
have expected to be bound by the prior adjudication.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      Garcia, relied upon by the trial court below, is instructive. In that case,
a three-year-old was injured after falling out of a shopping cart, and his

1     Although plaintiffs devote most of their briefing to the argument that
the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata does not apply, we, like the trial
court, focus our analysis on the dispositive issue of collateral estoppel.

                                         6
parents sued the shopping cart manufacturer on negligence and products
liability theories. (Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 873.) After the jury
found in favor of the defendant, the child brought his own lawsuit through a
guardian ad litem against the same defendant under negligence and products
liability theories. (Ibid.) The appellate court held that the suit was barred by
collateral estoppel because the liability issues to be determined in the child’s
case were identical to those actually litigated and resolved on the merits in
the defendant’s favor in the parents’ prior lawsuit, and that there was
sufficient privity between the parents and the child to preclude the child’s
relitigation of the liability issues in the second suit. (Id. at pp. 872, 878.)
      As Garcia explained, “ ‘[i]n the context of collateral estoppel, due
process requires that the party to be estopped must have had an identity or
community of interest with, and adequate representation by, the losing party
in the first action as well as that the circumstances must have been such that
the party to be estopped should reasonably have expected to be bound by the
prior adjudication.’ ” (Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) Garcia found
those requirements were met on the facts before it, as the parents adequately
represented their child’s interests in the previous lawsuit, shared an identity
of interest with him, and the young child had “no cognizable independent
interest in relitigating a liability claim that has been determined adversely to
his parents.” (Id. at p. 878.)
      In so concluding, Garcia joined several other courts in declining to
follow Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d
327, which held that a minor daughter was not collaterally estopped from
relitigating a hospital’s liability for the wrongful death of her mother even
though the jury had found the hospital not liable in an earlier malpractice
action by the mother based on the same facts. (Garcia, at pp. 877–878.) As

                                         7
Garcia explained, Kaiser “ ‘ “reflects outdated notions of privity under the
California law of collateral estoppel. The concept of privity ‘has been
expanded . . . to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the
unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to
justify the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’ ” ’ ” (Garcia, at
p. 878, citing Brown v. Rahman (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1462–1463
(Brown); Evans v. Celotex Corp. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 745–747; Aguilar
v. Los Angeles County. (9th Cir. 1985) 751 F.2d 1089, 1093.)
      With these authorities in mind, we turn to the present case. As
recounted above, plaintiffs’ parents previously filed cross-complaints for
negligence and intentional torts against X-Pest arising out of X-Pest’s pest
control services in their residential dwelling unit at The Harcourt. At issue
in both Clements and the instant case were the same liability questions as to
whether X-Pest owed and breached a duty of care to the occupants of the unit
in question and engaged in outrageous conduct that caused the occupants to
suffer emotional distress. Although Hanlin voluntarily dismissed his cross-
complaint, these liability issues were actually and finally litigated and
necessarily decided against Clements and in favor of X-Pest after the trial
court granted X-Pest’s motion for a directed verdict.
      Though plaintiffs were not parties in Clements, we conclude, under a
close examination of the circumstances of this case, that they were in privity
with Clements for purposes of precluding relitigation of X-Pest’s liability.
Clements shared an identity of interest with plaintiffs because they all
sought the same goal of recovering against X-Pest for its allegedly inadequate
pest control services in their unit at The Harcourt. Clements also adequately
represented the interests of plaintiffs on the issue of X-Pest’s liability, as she
had “ ‘the same interest as the party to be precluded’ ” and “ ‘a strong motive

                                         8
to assert that interest.’ ” (Seadrift, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.) On
this score, we note that both the Clements complaint and compulsory cross-
complaint specifically alleged that the bedbug infestation posed health and
safety risks to Clements and her children; that plaintiffs testified at the
Clements trial regarding not only the impact of the bedbug infestation on
their mother, but the bedbug bites they themselves had sustained; and that
Hanlin was attorney of record in both Clements and in the instant action.
(See Brown, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1463 [identity of interest and
adequate representation established where same attorney represented
decedent in pre-death personal injury action and heirs in subsequent
wrongful death suit].) As such, plaintiffs could reasonably expect that they
would be bound by an adverse finding against Clements relating to X-Pest’s
liability for its pest control services in their unit. Like the parent-child
relationship in Garcia, the relationship between Clements and plaintiffs was
“ ‘ “ ‘ “sufficiently close” so as to justify the application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.’ ” ’ ” (Garcia, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.)
        Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They contend
Garcia is distinguishable because there, the parents’ claims for emotional
distress were “wholly derivative” of the duty of care the defendant owed to
their child, whereas here, Clements’s personal injury and emotional distress
claims were based on a “separate and independent” duty that X-Pest owed
directly to her. We disagree. Garcia’s conclusion that the parents and child
were in privity did not rest on the “derivative” nature of the parents’ claims,
but on the child’s identity of interest with, and adequate representation by,
his parents on the liability question in the first action. (See Garcia, supra, 99
Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) As discussed, those elements are met in this case as
well.

                                           9
      Plaintiffs further contend the adequate representation requirement for
privity is lacking in this case because they were minors at the time of the
Clements action, and neither Clements nor Hanlin was ever appointed
plaintiffs’ guardian ad litem in the prior suit. We again are unpersuaded, as
plaintiffs’ cited authorities do not support a guardian ad litem requirement
for the application of collateral estoppel in all cases involving minors. They
are also materially distinguishable as involving the issue of paternity in
multiple actions for support and maintenance.
      For example, County of Shasta v. Caruthers (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1838
(Caruthers) involved a prior support action by a mother against an alleged
father that she dismissed with prejudice in exchange for payments by the
alleged father, while leaving the issue of paternity unresolved. (Id. at
pp. 1841–1842.) Subsequently, the county district attorney filed suit on
behalf of the mother’s minor child against the alleged father to establish
paternity and for child support. (Id. at p. 1842.) Caruthers held that
collateral estoppel did not bar the minor’s suit because the issue of paternity
had not been litigated or determined in the mother’s action; the minor’s right
to support and maintenance could not be limited or contracted away by the
parents; the mother and the district attorney were different parties and there
was no privity between them; the minor and her mother were not in privity
because they did not have identical interests2; and the minor’s “interests were

2      Plaintiffs rely on this portion of Caruthers to broadly argue that privity
is not created from the parent-child relationship. But Caruthers’ precise
point was that a “mother and child do not always have identical interests
when the issue of paternity is raised outside a dissolution action.”
(Caruthers, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1846.) That reasoning, and the
decisional authorities it is based on, have no application in this case. The
same can be said for Caruthers’ seemingly broad assertion that “ ‘[t]he
parent-child relationship . . . is traditionally excluded from privity notions for

                                        10
not fully protected and considered” in the earlier action. (Id. at pp. 1842–
1844; see also Everett v. Everett (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 65, 69 [minor’s claim for
support and maintenance could not be “ ‘limited or contracted away by his
parents’ ” without court approval].) Caruthers’ collateral estoppel holding
does not logically apply where, as here, a parent and her children share an
identity of interest on a common liability issue that was actually litigated and
necessarily decided against the parent on the merits in her earlier action.
      Also unavailing is plaintiffs’ contention that X-Pest should be judicially
estopped from arguing that plaintiffs’ interests were adequately represented
in Clements because of an inconsistent position X-Pest took in its motions in
limine. The elements of judicial estoppel are: “(1) the same party has taken
two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first
position . . . ; (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first
position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.” (Jackson
v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183.)
      Here, plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that the two actions involved totally
inconsistent positions taken by X-Pest. In Clements, X-Pest moved to
prohibit evidence or testimony before the jury relating to any injuries or
emotional distress suffered by the children, arguing that because the children
were nonparties, the admission of such evidence would unduly consume time,
mislead the jury, and create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. But

res judicata purposes.’ ” (Id., at p. 1843.) Notably, Caruthers was addressing
privity in the specific context of a minor’s subsequent paternity action, as
evident from the court’s citation to a non-California case finding no res
judicata bar to a daughter’s paternity action after the dismissal of her
mother’s prior paternity suit. (See Caruthers, at p. 1843, citing Johnson v.
Hunter (Minn. 1989) 447 N.W.2d 871, 874.)

                                         11
there was nothing inconsistent between that position regarding the children’s
injuries and X-Pest’s argument on demurrer that plaintiffs’ interests were
adequately represented in Clements on the liability question common to both
actions. As such, X-Pest is not judicially estopped from arguing there was
sufficient privity to bar relitigation of the liability issue.
      We quickly dispense with plaintiffs’ remaining contentions. The record
on appeal is not incomplete for lack of a judgment in favor of X-Pest; to the
contrary, the record contains a notice of entry of judgment attaching the
signed judgment in favor of X-Pest. Nor is the record insufficient to establish
that the same issues were actually litigated and necessarily determined in
the prior proceeding, as the judicially-noticed records from Clements
satisfactorily demonstrate the elements of collateral estoppel were met in this
case. Finally, it is of no consequence that Hanlin voluntarily dismissed his
cross-complaint in Clements, as the liability issues against X-Pest were still
actually and finally litigated and necessarily decided at trial on Clements’s
cross-complaint.
      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court properly
sustained the demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint as barred by
collateral estoppel.
      C. Leave to Amend
      When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.
[Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on
the plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) On the record
before us, we see no abuse of discretion.

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         Plaintiffs argue they should have been granted leave to amend because
the new and different factual allegations in their proposed second amended
complaint sufficiently demonstrated that the action is not barred by collateral
estoppel. Our review of the proposed second amended complaint, however,
reveals that plaintiffs’ new allegations primarily focus on their limited
participation in Clements and their lack of representation by a guardian ad
litem in that suit. Even with the inclusion of these allegations, plaintiffs’ suit
would still be barred by collateral estoppel for the reasons already discussed.
                                   DISPOSITION
         The judgment is affirmed. X-Pest is entitled to its costs on appeal.

                                       _________________________
                                       Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Hanlin v. X-Pest (A165553)

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