Court Opinion

ID: 9714115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:31:11.180451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.599217
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: When a witness testifies in a civil or criminal case, the character of that witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness is placed in issue. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 608.1 (6th ed. 1994). The general rule in Illinois is that proof of such character may be made solely by testimony as to general reputation and that opinion testimony is not permitted. "The current Illinois rule apparently rests upon the notion that opinion testimony is not sufficiently probative in light of its capacity to confuse and consume time and that introduction of opinion testimony might result in many trials becoming swearing contests between character witnesses. Why this should be true with regard to opinion but not with reputation is unclear.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 405.2, at 226 (6th ed. 1994). Wigmore pointed out that the earlier practice permitted opinion and argued strongly for evidence based on personal knowledge and belief as contrasted with the " 'secondhand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term "reputation.” ’ ” Fed. R. Evid. 405, Advisory Committee’s Note (eff. July 1, 1973), 56 F.R.D. 183, 222, quoting 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1986, at 167 (3d ed. 1940). The Federal Rules of Evidence permit proof by opinion testimony in addition to reputation testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 405(a) (eff. July 1, 1975); 65 F.R.D. 131, 143; 28 U.S.C. opp. Fed. R. Evid. 405(a) (1994). Professor Graham notes that the Illinois practice of permitting a witness who testifies as to the reputation of another for truthfulness or untruthfulness to state whether he would believe such a witness under oath amounts to permitting the witness to give an opinion. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 405.2, at 227 (6th ed. 1994). Professor Graham states that the rule barring opinion testimony "is unduly restrictive,” and that permitting character testimony in the form of opinion "deserves serious consideration.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 405.2, at 227 (6th ed. 1994). The reputation requirement allows a prosecution witness who would not believe another prosecution witness under oath to refuse to say so, simply by stating that he is unfamiliar with the witness’ reputation. Cf. People v. Bascomb, 74 Ill. App. 3d 392, 395-96, 392 N.E.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1979) (not necessary for reputation witness to be able to testify that he heard reputation being discussed). The all-important question, in a case where a defendant is charged with sexual assault upon a six-year-old child, is whether the child is telling the truth. No independent witness is in a better position to observe the child’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness than the child’s teacher. The majority justifies the refusal to consider the testimony of the teacher in this case with the observation that that testimony was opinion testimony, not reputation testimony. The majority thereby elevates strict compliance with a questionable rule over the substantial rights of an accused. It is true that in West the supreme court reiterated that the proper procedure for impeaching a witness’ character for truthfulness is through the use of reputation evidence, not opinion evidence. In West, however, an objection was sustained to a single question, "has [the minor victim] ever exaggerated the truth to you before?” West, 158 Ill. 2d at 161, 632 N.E.2d at 1007. That question was asked of the defendant’s sister and was clearly improper. West (158 Ill. 2d at 162, 632 N.E.2d at 1007) cited People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 21, 563 N.E.2d 431, 440 (1990). Although the court in Williams suggested that opinion testimony from two teachers that the 11-year-old victim was an "inveterate liar” was properly excluded, it is important to note that no attempt was ever made to introduce that testimony. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d at 20-21, 563 N.E.2d at 440. The issue in Williams was not whether the evidence was properly excluded, but whether counsel was ineffective for not attempting to introduce it. Greenwood’s testimony would certainly have been admissible in an in camera hearing to determine whether the child was competent to testify. See 725 ILCS 5/115 — 14 (West 1996). Competency requires a minimum capacity to observe, record, recollect, and recount. Competency includes an understanding of the difference between the truth and a lie, and a willingness and ability to tell the truth. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 601.1, at 322 (6th ed. 1994). It is true that defense counsel did not request a competency hearing. However, when a case is tried to a judge, rather than a jury, a trial judge may determine a witness’ competency either by preliminary inquiry or by observing the witness’ demeanor and ability to testify during the trial. People v. Campos, 155 Ill. App. 3d 348, 357, 507 N.E.2d 1342, 1347 (1987). Defense counsel attempted to present the testimony of Greenwood to the trial court. Even if the trial court would not have allowed that testimony to go to a jury, the trial court should have considered the testimony in determining competency, a question that must be resolved by the court. Although in my view the trial court committed error when it refused to consider Greenwood’s testimony, I would nevertheless affirm. There was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, in the form of defendant’s own admissions.