Court Opinion

ID: 9914864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 16:03:20.985364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:48.845173
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                           TESLA, INC. a/k/a
                         TESLA FLORIDA, INC.,
                              Petitioner,

                                     v.

       EDGAR MONSERRATT, as Personal Representative of the
          ESTATE OF EDGAR MONSERRATT MARTINEZ,
                        Respondent.

                             No. 4D2023-2075

                             [January 3, 2024]

  Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Mark Alan Speiser, Judge; L.T. Case No.
CACE-19-000422.

  Wendy F. Lumish and Alina Alonso Rodriguez of Bowman and Brooke
LLP, Miami, for petitioner.

    Bard D. Rockenbach and Adam Richardson of Burlington &
Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Scott P. Schlesinger, Jonathan
R. Gdanski, and David Silverman of Schlesinger Law Offices, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, and Philip Harnett Corboy of Corboy & Demetrio, Chicago,
Illinois, for respondent.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

   Defendant Tesla, Inc. a/k/a Tesla Florida, Inc. (“Tesla”) seeks certiorari
review of an order compelling the deposition of its CEO, Elon Musk. For
the reasons discussed below, we grant the petition and quash the order
compelling deposition.

   In 2018, eighteen-year-old Barrett Riley crashed his Tesla Model S
while driving 116 mph. Barrett and one passenger, Edgar Monserratt
Martinez, died as a result of the crash. Edgar’s father, as the personal
representative of his son’s estate (“Plaintiff”), thereafter sued Tesla for
negligence. The complaint alleged a Tesla service technician deactivated
the 85-mph top speed limiting software previously enabled on the vehicle
after Barrett complained he could not accelerate over 85 mph.
   Following the crash and the ensuing media coverage, Mr. Musk called
the driver’s father, James Riley, to extend his condolences. According to
Mr. Riley, during the approximately twenty-minute phone call, Mr. Musk
“said something to the effect of, perhaps we should not have removed the
limiter. We will have to review and revise our policies.” Mr. Musk and Mr.
Riley also exchanged a number of e-mails wherein Mr. Musk conveyed
information learned in Tesla’s initial investigation of the crash.

    In December 2021, Plaintiff sought to take Mr. Musk’s deposition
regarding the phone conversation. Tesla responded that Mr. Musk was
entitled to protection under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(c) and
(h). Tesla also filed Mr. Musk’s declaration in which he described his
executive role at Tesla and other companies and stated that it would place
a substantial burden and hardship on him if he were to be deposed.
Mr. Musk also stated under penalty of perjury that he had no independent
recollection of the phone call beyond what was in the e-mail
communications and his extension of condolences. Tesla also produced
all of the e-mail correspondence between Mr. Musk and Mr. Riley. The
original presiding judge ultimately granted Tesla’s motion for protective
order, finding the call was a sympathy call and that Mr. Musk did not
possess unique, personal knowledge.

   After the case was administratively transferred to a different judge,
Plaintiff again sought to depose Mr. Musk. In lieu of the deposition, Tesla
agreed to have Mr. Musk directly respond to requests for admissions and
interrogatories about the phone conversation. In his subsequent answers
to the requests for admissions and interrogatories, Mr. Musk reiterated
that, beyond extending his condolences to the family, he did not recall
discussing the matters claimed by Mr. Riley. After receiving the under-
oath answers, Plaintiff again sought to compel the deposition of Mr. Musk
regarding the phone conversation. The trial court granted the motion,
reasoning “apparently there allegedly is a dispute as to what was said by
Mr. Musk via-à-vis his conversation with Mr. Riley.”

    “A party seeking certiorari review of a non-final order must demonstrate
‘(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in
material injury for the remainder of the case[,] (3) that cannot be corrected
on postjudgment appeal.’” DecisionHR USA, Inc. v. Mills, 341 So. 3d 448,
452 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “The last
two elements are jurisdictional and must be analyzed before the first
element.” Id. (citation omitted).

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    We have jurisdiction to review the order compelling the deposition of
Tesla’s apex officer. See Karisma Hotels & Resorts Corp. v. Hoffmann, 346
So. 3d 59, 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (conducting plenary certiorari review of
an order compelling the deposition of a corporate officer); DecisionHR USA,
Inc., 341 So. 3d at 452–57 (finding that an order requiring the deposition
of a CEO or government official satisfies the jurisdictional requirements
for a petition for a writ of certiorari because an erroneously entered order
would result in material injury for the remainder of the trial that cannot
be corrected on postjudgment appeal). We therefore address the merits of
the petition—whether the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law when it granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel the
deposition of Mr. Musk.

   In 2021, the Florida Supreme Court amended Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.280(h) to expressly adopt the apex doctrine in the corporate
context. In re Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.280, 324 So. 3d 459, 461
(Fla. 2021). Rule 1.280(h) provides:

      A current or former high-level government or corporate officer
      may seek an order preventing the officer from being subject to
      a deposition. The motion, whether by a party or by the person
      of whom the deposition is sought, must be accompanied by
      an affidavit or declaration of the officer explaining that the
      officer lacks unique, personal knowledge of the issues being
      litigated. If the officer meets this burden of production, the
      court shall issue an order preventing the deposition, unless
      the party seeking the deposition demonstrates that it has
      exhausted other discovery, that such discovery is inadequate,
      and that the officer has unique, personal knowledge of
      discoverable information. The court may vacate or modify the
      order if, after additional discovery, the party seeking the
      deposition can meet its burden of persuasion under this rule.
      The burden to persuade the court that the officer is high-level
      for purposes of this rule lies with the person or party opposing
      the deposition.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(h). This rule became effective on August 26, 2021,
and “it applies in pending cases,” including the instant case. In re Amend.
to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 463; see also DecisionHR USA,
Inc., 341 So. 3d at 453–54 (concluding “that once the supreme court
codified the apex doctrine in rule 1.280(h), the doctrine became a clearly
established principle of law” for purposes of determining whether a court
has departed from the essential requirements of the law).

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    Accordingly, in determining whether the trial court departed from the
essential requirements of the law in granting the motion to compel
deposition, the first inquiry is whether Tesla met its two-fold burden of
(1) demonstrating that Mr. Musk met the high-level officer requirement,
and (2) producing an affidavit or declaration explaining Mr. Musk’s lack of
unique, personal knowledge of the issues being litigated. See In re Amend.
to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 463. There does not appear
to be any dispute in this case that Mr. Musk is a high-level corporate
officer, or that Tesla produced a sufficient declaration.

   Once Tesla established that Mr. Musk is a high-level officer and
produced the declaration, the trial court was required to issue a protective
order unless Plaintiff demonstrated that he had exhausted other discovery,
that such discovery was inadequate, and that Mr. Musk had unique,
personal knowledge of discoverable information. See Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.280(h); see also DecisionHR USA, Inc., 341 So. 3d at 457 (“This provision
of the rule is written in the conjunctive, so all three factors must be
demonstrated.”). As Tesla correctly argues, Plaintiff has not shown that
the existing discovery is inadequate or that Mr. Musk has unique, personal
knowledge of discoverable information.        The only arguably unique,
personal knowledge Mr. Musk may have is whether or not he remembers
the phone conversation. Mr. Musk, however, has already twice provided
sworn testimony attesting that he does not recall making any statements
during the phone call regarding the speed limiter.            Under these
circumstances, requiring Mr. Musk to sit for a deposition would serve no
purpose other than to harass and burden Tesla and disrupt Mr. Musk’s
ability to meet his obligations to consumers, stockholders, Tesla’s
employees, and other activities integral to his position as CEO. See In re
Amend. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.280, 324 So. 3d at 460 (“Preventing
harassment and unduly burdensome discovery has always been at the
heart of [the apex] doctrine in our state.”).

   Accordingly, we conclude the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law by compelling the deposition of Mr. Musk, grant
Tesla’s petition, and quash the order compelling deposition.

   Petition granted; order quashed.

LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.

                           *          *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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