Court Opinion

ID: 9460730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:58:55.495278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:53.498311
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, .Chief Judge
(dissenting) :
Appellant’s main contentions on appeal are: (1) that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for pre-trial discovery of the identity of the government informant to whom he allegedly sold narcotics; and (2) that he was denied a speedy trial by the lapse of twenty-seven months between his indictment and trial which resulted in the loss of the government informant. The majority rejects these claims. I respectfully dissent from both holdings of the court.
I.
Appellant allegedly agreed to sell one ounce of heroin to a police informer in Maryland on May 19, 1969. After the transaction was completed, the informer, and a police officer with whom he was working, discovered that they had only received half of an ounce; accordingly, another meeting was set up with appellant on the following day, May 20, 1969, in the District of Columbia, so that the, other half ounce could be delivered.
On August 27, 1969, appellant was indicted in D.C. for the May 20 transaction; and on June 9, 1970, almost one year after the D.C. indictment, he was indicted in Maryland for the May 19 transaction. On November 19, 1970, his Maryland counsel moved to transfer the Maryland case to D.C. so that it could be consolidated with the D.C. case. On June 22, 1971, the Maryland district court granted the motion for transfer.
Before return of the Maryland indictment, appellant filed a motion in the D. C. case on April 23, 1970, requesting “the name, home and business address, and corresponding telephone number of the ‘certain person’ [i. e. the informant] noted in the indictment.” Fifteen months later, on July 22, 1971, the U. S. Attorney informed Judge Robinson at a status hearing that he did not plan to disclose the identity of the informant because “we do not feel that we have to, or his whereabouts.” The following colloquy ensued:
The Court: What is the government’s problem with the informant?
*1010U. S. Attorney: Problem with the informant, Your Honor?
The Court: I do not think it is sufficient for the government to say that they just do not want to reveal the name, because there are circumstances under which it will be revealed prior to trial.
U. S. Attorney: It will be revealed at trial. The government does not intend to identify him, unless Your Honor orders that we must. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court: I want to know why I should not.
U. S. Attorney: Because of his safety.
The Court: I think I have an obligation to establish a record upon which a judgment can be made, counsel. I do not think the government can come in here and just say, “Well, we do not want to.” (Emphasis supplied.)
After repeated assurances that “at the time of trial [the informant] will be identified. He will testify in this ease,” and that “if something were to happen to [the informant], it would certainly impair our ability to proceed to trial,” the court, concerned for the safety of the informant, agreed that his identity need not be revealed until trial.
The court next considered appellant’s motion for dismissal of his D.C. indictment for lack of a speedy trial. Appellant pointed out that “some twenty-seven months have elapsed since [the time of the offense.] ”1 He also stated that “the only way, real way, that we could be prejudiced is if, unfortunately, something happened inadvertently to either [the police officer] or the informer.” The court denied this motion noting that no prejudice had resulted from the delay, and that much of the delay was due to the transfer of the Maryland case to D.C.
At a subsequent hearing on November 1, 1971, before Judge Walsh, a different U. S. Attorney indicated that “the informer will not testify in this case. He is not available for testimony in this case.” Apparently the informer, who had testified in several other narcotics cases, had disappeared out of fear of reprisal. The prosecutor claimed that despite diligent efforts to locate him, they had “lost him, so to speak,” and that “[t]o my knowledge the government has been willing, certainly since the end of the Tantillo conspiracy case which was tried in the [sic], in 1970 to advise counsel if he so chose to find out, the name of the informant.” The U. S. Attorney who had appeared at the earlier hearing before Judge Robinson was also present at the November 1 hearing. He corrected his colleague, and informed the court that although the informer was identified in the Tantillo case, “the man’s safety was involved and we didn’t care to divulge [his identity at the July 22 hearing] and the court did not require us to.”
On November 10, 1971, the day of trial, the court denied appellant’s motion for a dismissal of his indictment on the ground that he was denied a speedy trial due to the lengthy delay attended by the loss of the informant. Appellant was then convicted by a jury on all three counts of each of the two indictments. He received a five year sentence on counts one and three of each indictment, and a two to six year sentence2 on count two of each indictment. The sentence on count one of the D.C. indictment was *1011imposed consecutive to that on count one of the Maryland indictment; all other sentences were imposed concurrently.
II.
Appellant claims that at the July 22, 1971, hearing the government prejudiced his rights under Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), by withholding important information, and making a critical representation without adequate investigation. I .believe: (A) the majority fails to address this claim because it attributes a different Roviaro claim to appellant; and (B) the claim appellant makes is meritorious.
A.
Although appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the government’s actions “because the informer was not identified before trial,” the majority opinion nevertheless asserts that “appellant argues” there was “reversible error” because the “informant was not available for the trial.” 3 (Emphasis supplied.) The majority’s justification for refusing to consider appellant’s claim for pre-trial disclosure, and the effect of the government’s actions thereon, is that:
revealing, the identity of the informant is only a step to enable the appellant either (1) to obtain the informant’s testimony at trial, incident to which counsel would seek to interview him prior to trial, or (2) to reconstruct in the appellant’s mind the appellant’s relationship and contacts with the informant, and perhaps offer the testimony of third parties as to appellant’s relationship with the informant.
Roviaro, itself, however, specifically identifies still a third reason for pretrial disclosure that the majority ignores :
The desirability of calling [the informant] as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the Government to decide. 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 629 (emphasis supplied).
The Supreme Court’s use of the disjunctive “or” indicates that the defendant *1012has the right to interview an informant irrespective of whether he intends to call him as a witness. Indeed, as this court recognized in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (C.A.D.C.1973), unless counsel interviews a witness he obviously is unable to make an informed decision as to whether to call him to testify.
The majority also justifies its refusal to consider appellant’s claim for pre-trial disclosure by resting on the speculation that if “the informant [had been revealed] earlier, . . . [he] still would not have been present at trial; [he] probably would have been eliminated [i. e. murdered] sooner.”4 This assertion is wholly unsupported in the record; so far as the present record reveals, earlier disclosure may well have assisted appellant to secure the informant’s presence at trial, if appellant so chose.
In short, the court was plainly required to consider whether appellant’s right to pre-trial disclosure was abridged because appellant’s opportunities to interview the informant in preparation for trial and to call him as a witness were prejudiced by the delay in disclosure.
B.
It is well settled that when an informant is “an active participant” in the criminal transaction — as he was in this case — his identity must be disclosed; 5 thus, the question here is simply when was disclosure required. In Roviaro, in a factual setting remarkably similar to the present. case, the Court held that “the [trial] court erred also in denying, prior to trial, petitioner’s motion for [the identity and address of the informant] . . . [s]ince ... it was evident from the face of the indictment that [the informant] was a participant in and a material witness to th[e] sale.” 353 U.S. at 65 n. 15, 77 S.Ct. at 630 (emphasis supplied). Despite this plain language, however, we need not decide whether Roviaro intended to set down an inflexible rule requiring pretrial disclosure when the informant is a participant. For even if Roviaro permits a delay of disclosure in order to protect the informant,6 such delay clearly may not prejudice the defendant’s opportunity to interview him, as it did in this case.
Although the trial court attempted to “establish a record” at the July 22 hear*1013ing on which to decide appellant’s motion for pre-trial disclosure, the government failed to reveal7 that the informant had testified at several other trials.8 This fact was critically relevant to the court’s determination of whether delay was required to protect the informant since he was already known to the narcotics underworld.9 It also bore on the likelihood that the informant might leave this jurisdiction and “relocate,” and for that reason, too, it was important to a determination regarding the timing of disclosure.
Moreover, at this same hearing, the U. S. Attorney repeatedly assured the court that the informant would be present at trial, thereby giving the impression that the government knew the informant’s whereabouts and had some means by which to secure his presence at trial. This representation was apparently made without contacting the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which has responsibility for monitoring the location of narcotics informants.10 If the Bureau had been contacted, the government might have discovered that the informant had been, or was about to be, relocated in another jurisdiction, or that the Bureau had lost track of him. In any of these situations, immediate disclosure would be required to insure maximum protection of appellant’s rights.
Thus, the government’s failure to reveal a material fact, and its making of an important representation without adequate inquiry, misled the trial court, and thereby prejudiced appellant’s right to interview, and, perhaps, call the informant. Accordingly, his conviction should be reversed, and if the informant cannot now be located, his indictment must be dismissed.
III.
Appellant also claims that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial because twenty-seven months elapsed between his indictment and trial.11 We have repeatedly held that “[t]ime is the most important factor; ‘the longer the delay between arrest and trial the heavier the burden on the Government.’ ” 12 We need not decide, however, whether the government adduced adequate explanations13 to justify *1014this unusual delay since an additional factor is present — the loss of the government informant occasioned by the delay — that clearly swings the balance in appellant’s favor.
The majority rejects this claim, holding that “it is not reasonable to conclude that the informant would . . . provide any significant aid to the defense.” Requiring appellant to make such a showing, however, rests on an erroneous application of the governing case law. In this jurisdiction, he need only establish “a reasonable possibility of prejudice,” 14 or “[e]ven a slight showing of possible prejudice.” 15 And the Supreme Court has stated that “[i]f witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious,” since a defendant is thereby hindered in “prepar[ing] his case.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Moreover, in Roviaro, supra, in a factual setting virtually identical to the instant case, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he circumstances of this ease demonstrate that [the informant’s] possible testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense.” 353 U.S. at 63-64, 77 S.Ct. at 629 (emphasis supplied). Thus, appellant was prejudiced as a matter of law,16 and the court was obliged to uphold his challenge.
In fact, appellant was precluded from making a further showing of prejudice resulting from the loss of the informant since the majority also sustained the government’s failure to disclose his identity until after he had disappeared. Nonetheless, even before appellant knew that the informant had disappeared he explicitly advised the court that he would be prejudiced by such an event because the informant might substantiate his claims that certain phone conversations used against him were illegally obtained and that he was entrapped by the government. Thus, appellant’s claim of prejudice was clearly not an- afterthought raised on appeal. In the face of a twenty-seven month delay, I fail to see *1015how my brethren can conclude that there was “no possibility of prejudice” to appellant in these circumstances. Accordingly, I would reverse his convictions with instructions to the trial court to dismiss his indictments.

. Appellant initially filed a motion to dismiss his indictment for lack of a speedy trial on April 23, 1979, claiming that the four month lapse between the D.C. offense and appellant’s D.C. indictment violated Ross v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 349 F.2d 210 (1965), and its progeny, which prohibit unnecessary delays between the offense and indictment. At the June 22, 1971, hearing, appellant’s counsel abandoned the Ross claim, and argued instead that appellant was denied a speedy trial by the delay between the offense and trial.

. At the March 23, 1972, sentencing hearing the court below imposed a sentence of two to ten years on count two of each indictment. The judgment entered pursuant to that hearing, however, indicates a sentence of two to six years.

. The court rejects the argument it mistakenly attributes to appellant on the ground that “the Roviaro case cannot be relied on for the immutable proposition that the absence at trial of an informant who was an active participant in the narcotics transaction necessarily requires the sanction of dismissal.” Subsequent to Roviaro, however, this court decided United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642 (1971), which held that the government was responsible for “losing” evidence “unless [it] can show that it has promulgated, enforced and attempted in good faith to follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve . . . evidence.” When the informant is a special employee of the government, whose identity the government seeks to protect until trial, the spirit, if not the holding, of Bryant requires the government to adopt adequate procedures which reasonably insure against his loss.
My brethren state that Bryant should not be applied to special government informants because “[i]t is one thing to safeguard such inanimate objects as recordings of conversations. It is quite another to require that government witnesses be secured for the purpose of a future trial. Witnesses, like defendants released on bond, do disappear.” The court appears to miss the point of Bryant. Inanimate evidence, too, disappears sometimes. The point is that when the government has sole access to important evidence or witnesses it should undertake diligent efforts to insure that the evidence or witness is not lost. While there is testimony in this record indicating that the government attempted to locate the informer once he disappeared, there is nothing to suggest that any efforts were made to prevent him from disappearing in the first place. In view of the government’s promise to produce the informant at trial, such efforts were especially necessary here.
The majority also states that “[i]n the more recent case of United States v. Perry, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 471 F.2d 1057 (1972), . . . we took a somewhat different position than in Bryant." On the contrary, both the court and Judge Wright in a special concurring opinion were careful to point out that nothing in Perry “affects our holding in Bryant" since the loss of evidence in Perry “occurred prior to Bryant." 471 F.2d at 1068 (concurring opinion), and note 35 (court’s opinion).

. Nothing in the record supports the majority’s repeated suggestion that the informant has been “eliminated,” let alone its completely gratuitous assertion that earlier disclosure in this case probably would have hastened his demise. On the contrary, both the U.S. Attorney and the supervising officer from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, indicated that they did not know whether the informant was “dead or alive.” Tr. Nov. 10, 1971, at 20; Tr. Nov. 11,1971 at 55.

. Skeens v. United States, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 211, 449 F.2d 1066, 1071 (1971). See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); United States v. Miramon, 443 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1971); Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969); United States v. Roberts, 388 F.2d 646 (2nd Cir. 1968).
Although Roviaro and its progeny clearly strike the balance in favor of disclosure whenever the informant is a participant in the criminal transaction, the majority continually refers to Roviaro’s “balancing” test “with respect to disclosure” as if the balance had not already been struck. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the court appears to attach some relevance to the fact that Miss Phillips “was present ... on the May 20, 1969 transaction.” If this fact is relevant to disclosure — and I maintain that it is not — the court was required to distinguish between the May 20 and May 19 transactions because Miss Phillips was not present at the latter. No such distinction is considered.

. The safety of narcotics informants presents a serious problem that may well justify some delay in pre-trial disclosure. In such cases, however, the government should be required to make reasonable efforts — such as invoking protective custody — to protect against the informant’s disappearance. See note 3 supra.

. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 158 (1966); Levin v. Clark, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 6, 408 F.2d 1209 (1967).

. See Trial Tr., Nov. 11, 1971, at 37.

. See Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S. at 60 & n. 8, 77 S.Ct. 623. The majority claims that the informant “should not be considered out of danger because he had concluded his testimony in [other cases].” This determination, regardless of its merit, is for the trial court, not the government. Indeed, in this case, one of the U.S. Attorneys informed the court that he believed the government was willing to disclose the informant “since the end of the Tantillo case,” which was more than nine months before the July 22, 1971, hearing.

. See Trial Tr., Nov. 11, 1971, at 56, 62.

. The majority only discusses appellant’s speedy trial claim on the D.C. case; its rejection of that claim, which was based on a twenty-seven month delay, results, a fortiori, in rejection of the Maryland claim, which involved a seventeen month delay between indictment and trial. The Maryland offense however, was committed the day before the D.C. offense, and thirteen months lapsed before return of the Maryland indictment. See Ross v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 349 F.2d 210 (1965). Compare United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 315 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). In these circumstances, I would also find appellant’s speedy trial claim on the Maryland indictment meritorious, although I will, for convenience, discuss only the D.C. indictment in text.

. United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 186, 448 F.2d 1108, 1109 (1971) (opinion of Leventhal, J.), quoting Hedgepeth v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 364 F.2d 684, 687 (1966). See also United States v. Rucker, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 464 F.2d 823, 825 (1972) (“When the delay approaches a year and a half, . . .' the Government must provide a justification which convincingly outweighs the prejudice [to the defendant] which can normally be assumed.”).

. The majority suggests that the first eight months of delay were due to appellant since he had two changes of counsel. It also at*1014tributes an additional seven months to the fact that appellant moved to transfer his Maryland indictment to the District of Columbia. The remaining twelve months it simply holds were not “arbitrary, purposeful, oppressive or vexatious.” This conclusion fails to understand the nature and purpose of the right to a speedy trial: “In our jurisdiction it is peculiarly appropriate to hold the Government to the obligation of arranging a speedy trial.” United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 448 F.2d 1108, 1111 (1971) (opinion of Leventhal, X). Thus, the government was under an affirmative obligation to move rapidly in those twelve months, particularly since seven of them followed an eight month delay due to changes in counsel, and five of them followed a twenty-two month delay. See Hedgepeth v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 364 F.2d 684, 688 (1966) (“The passing of such a considerable length of time, no matter who is ‘at fault,’ should act as a spur to the Government to seek prompt trial. If the Government is lax in this regard, it is appropriate to take the earlier period into account.”) .
Moreover, even the fifteen months attributed in whole or part to appellant by the majority were inaccurately apportioned. Appellant’s first counsel, who was retained, was disbarred shortly after being hired — a circumstance hardly attributable to appellant. A court-appointed attorney was then assigned to appellant; three and one half months later this court-appointed attorney was dismissed, and another counsel retained. The record does not indicate why an attorney was appointed and then dismissed. This delay, therefore, may not have been due to appellant. Finally, the Maryland court did not act on appellant’s transfer motion for seven months. This considerable delay cannot be attributed wholly to appellant simply because he made the motion to transfer. In sum, appellant was responsible for only a small portion of the twenty-seven month delay.

. United States v. Holt, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 448 F.2d 1108, 1110 (1971); Hedgepeth v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 291, 364 F.2d 684, 687 (1966); Hedgepeth v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 19, 365 F.2d 952, 954 (1966).

. Harling v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 401 F.2d 392, 395 (1968). See also Coleman v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 442 F.2d 150, 156 (1971).

. Harling v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D. 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970).