Court Opinion

ID: 9882933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:22:06.200264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:20.495629
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hawkins, 2023-Ohio-2915.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                           TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                              BUTLER COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

        Appellee,                                     :        CASE NO. CA2023-02-013

                                                      :               OPINION
     - vs -                                                            8/21/2023
                                                      :

 BETHANIE J. HAWKINS,                                 :

        Appellant.                                    :

       CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                          Case No. CR2022-07-0968

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.

        M. POWELL, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Bethanie Hawkins, appeals her conviction and sentence in the

Butler County Court of Common Pleas following her guilty plea to grand theft of a motor

vehicle.

        {¶ 2} Appellant was indicted in August 2022 on one count of grand theft of a motor

vehicle, a fourth-degree felony.              Following the trial court's denial of her motion for
                                                                       Butler CA2023-02-013

intervention in lieu of conviction, appellant agreed to plead guilty as charged. During the

plea hearing, the trial court's Crim.R. 11 colloquy included an admonition that "[w]hen you

come in and plead guilty though you are talking about the allegations, you're admitting your

guilt." Upon appellant's acknowledgment and waiver of her rights, the trial court accepted

her guilty plea. The trial court sentenced appellant to 18 months in prison. At the sentencing

hearing, the trial court awarded appellant 90 days of jail-time credit; however, the

sentencing entry only awarded her 76 days of jail-time credit.

       {¶ 3} Appellant now appeals, raising two assignments of error.

       {¶ 4} Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶ 5} THE     GUILTY     PLEA     WAS     NOT    KNOWING,       INTELLIGENT,      AND

VOLUNTARY.

       {¶ 6} Appellant argues that she did not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily enter

her guilty plea because the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) when it did

not inform her that her guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt during the plea colloquy.

Appellant asserts that the trial court's failure is a complete failure to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(b); therefore, she is not required to show prejudice as a predicate to vacation of

her guilty plea.

       {¶ 7} "When a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.     Failure on any of those points renders

enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the

Ohio Constitution." State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179. Crim.R.

11(C)(2) governs the process a trial court must follow to ensure that a guilty plea to a felony

charge is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.      State v. Luttrell, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2021-07-062, 2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 8} As pertinent here, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) provides that a trial court shall not

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                                                                        Butler CA2023-02-013

accept a guilty plea "without first addressing the defendant personally and * * * [i]nforming

the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of

guilty * * * , and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment

and sentence." In turn, Crim.R. 11(B)(1) sets forth the effect of a guilty plea and provides

that a "plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt."

       {¶ 9} The supreme court has addressed a trial court's compliance with Crim.R.

11(C) and how an appellate court should review a trial court's plea colloquy. State v.

Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11. In general, "a defendant is not entitled

to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial

court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)." Id. at ¶ 16. However, there are two

exceptions to this rule: (1) when the trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights set

forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, and

(2) "a trial court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)." Id. at ¶ 15.

Under either exception, the defendant is not required to show prejudice. Id. at ¶ 14-16.

"The right to be informed that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt is

nonconstitutional." State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 12.

       {¶ 10} Upon reviewing the plea colloquy, we find that the trial court did not completely

fail to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). Although the trial court did not use the exact phrase

of Crim.R. 11(B)(1) or inform appellant that her guilty plea was a complete admission of

guilt, the trial court did inform appellant that "[w]hen you come in and plead guilty though

you are talking about the allegations, you're admitting your guilt." See State v. Henson,

12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2021-12-029, 2022-Ohio-2828; State v. Kauffman, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109579, 2021-Ohio-1584. We have held that a complete failure to comply

"involves a trial court's complete omission in advising about a distinct component of [Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a) or (b)].   By contrast, a trial court's mention of a component of [Crim.R.

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                                                                       Butler CA2023-02-013

11(C)(2)(a) or (b)] during a plea colloquy, albeit incomplete or perhaps inaccurate, does not

constitute a complete failure to comply with [the rule]." See State v. Fabian, 12th Dist.

Warren No. CA2019-10-119, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently

held, "[the] focus in enforcing Crim.R. 11 has not been on whether the trial judge has

'[incanted] the precise verbiage' of the rule, but on whether the dialogue between the court

and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his

plea." (Citation omitted.) State v. Tancak, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2578, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 11} Therefore, because the trial court did not completely fail to comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), appellant must establish she was prejudiced by the trial court's

incomplete or inaccurate advisement in order to have her guilty plea vacated.

       {¶ 12} The test for prejudice is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.

Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 at ¶ 12. Prejudice must be established on the face of the record

and not solely by virtue of challenging a plea on appeal. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765 at ¶ 24.

Appellant does not argue prejudice in her brief and did not assert actual innocence during

the plea hearing. "[A] defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting actual

innocence is presumed to understand that he has completely admitted his guilt." Griggs at

¶ 19. "In such circumstances, a court's failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his

guilty pleas as required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed not to be prejudicial." Id.

       {¶ 13} Consequently, because the trial court did not completely fail to comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), appellant has not established prejudice, and there is nothing in the

record to support a conclusion that appellant would not have entered her guilty plea had the

trial court informed her that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt, appellant is not

entitled to have her guilty plea vacated. See State v. Jones, 116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-

Ohio-6093.

       {¶ 14} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

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                                                                         Butler CA2023-02-013

       {¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING LESS JAILTIME CREDIT IN

THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT THAN IT DID AT SENTENCING IN THE DEFENDANT'S

PRESENCE.

       {¶ 17} Appellant argues that the trial court erred by awarding her 76 days of jail-time

credit in the sentencing entry when it had awarded her 90 days of jail-time credit at the

sentencing hearing. The state concedes that the amount of jail-time credit in the sentencing

entry is likely a clerical error that can be corrected by a nunc pro tunc entry on remand.

       {¶ 18} Crim.R. 36 provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other

parts of the record, and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission, may be

corrected by the court at any time." A clerical error or mistake is "a mistake or omission,

mechanical in nature and apparent on the record, which does not involve a legal decision

or judgment." State v. Miller, 127 Ohio St.3d 407, 2010-Ohio-5705, ¶ 15. A trial court may

issue a nunc pro tunc entry "to correct clerical mistakes so that the sentencing entry

accurately reflects what the court actually decided." State v. Goodwin, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2016-05-099, 2017-Ohio-2712, ¶ 45.

       {¶ 19} Appellant's second assignment of error is sustained and this matter is

remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc sentencing

entry that properly reflects that appellant is entitled to 90 days of jail-time credit rather than

76 days of jail-time credit. State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-07-085, 2022-Ohio-

564, ¶ 20; State v. Kinley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190270, 2020-Ohio-542, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 20} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.

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