Court Opinion

ID: 9960233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 20:00:45.812366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:18.981525
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 24a0085p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 HATTIE TANNER,
                                                            │
                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                             >        No. 22-1963
                                                            │
        v.                                                  │
                                                            │
 DAVID A. WALTERS,                                          │
                                Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                            ┘

                          Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
                      No. 1:19-cv-00849—Hala Y. Jarbou, District Judge.

                                    Argued: July 26, 2023

                              Decided and Filed: April 15, 2024

             Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DAVIS and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
                                  _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joel C. Bryant, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK, AND STONE, P.L.C., Ann
Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Wolfgang Mueller, MUELLER LAW FIRM, Novi, Michigan,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joel C. Bryant, MILLER, CANFIELD, PADDOCK, AND STONE,
P.L.C., Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Wolfgang Mueller, MUELLER LAW FIRM, Novi,
Michigan, for Appellee.
                                     _________________

                                            OPINION
                                     _________________

       DAVIS, Circuit Judge. After serving seventeen years in prison for murder, Plaintiff
Hattie Tanner gained her freedom when this court granted her habeas relief and set aside her
conviction, finding that it lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Once released from custody,
 No. 22-1963                                 Tanner v. Walters                             Page 2

Tanner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant David Walters, a since-retired
police detective who she says violated her constitutional rights by falsifying investigation reports
and testifying falsely to obtain her wrongful conviction. Walters moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, which the district court granted in part and denied in part.
Specifically, the district court found that Tanner’s claims for fabrication of evidence and
malicious prosecution should proceed to trial. Walters now appeals the district court’s partial
denial of his motion. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

                                                    I.

       The facts underlying Tanner’s murder conviction were well documented in this court’s
prior decision granting her habeas relief. See Tanner v. Yukins, 867 F.3d 661, 663 (6th Cir.
2017). Here, we limit our discussion to the facts pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal. In
the early morning hours of March 22, 1995, Sharon Watson was fatally stabbed at Barney’s Bar
and Grill in Calhoun County, Michigan. Id.; see also People v. Tanner, 660 N.W.2d 746, 751
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003). Watson was a bartender at Barney’s who was attacked during an
apparent robbery. Tanner, 867 F.3d at 663. Walters, who was then employed by the Battle
Creek Police Department (“BCPD”), was the lead detective assigned to Watson’s murder. He
investigated Tanner, Dion Paav, and Robert Cady as primary suspects for Watson’s death. Id. at
664. As part of his investigation, Walters interviewed Tanner twice within a couple of months of
the murder.

       First Tanner Interview.       Walters first questioned Tanner on May 24, 1995, in an
investigation room at the police department. Walters recorded the interview and later completed
a summary report about it. The transcript of the interview indicates that many of Tanner’s words
were inaudible. In addition to equipment issues the detective bureau was experiencing at the
time, there is some indication that Tanner spoke in a manner and speed that may have been
difficult to understand. Despite these hurdles, Walters understood Tanner well enough to engage
her in dialogue for at least half an hour.

       The following is a summary of the pertinent parts of the May 24 interview. Tanner stated
toward the beginning of the interview that she had not been to Barney’s in about three years.
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                                     Page 3

She relayed that Cady, her long-time friend, had visited her home in the hours leading up to the
murder. She and Cady decided to drive around in Cady’s car to search for drugs. After about 30
minutes of driving, their search paid off and they returned to Tanner’s home to get high. Tanner
relayed that Cady later left her home to go cash a check for money to buy more drugs. Walters
then repeatedly asked Tanner whether she rode in the car with Cady that night to cash the check.
Consistent with her later trial testimony on this point, Tanner maintained that she did not.

        During the interview, Walters also showed Tanner a picture of the murder weapon and
asked if she had seen it before. Tanner responded that she was not sure but thought it “look[ed]
like one of [her] knives.” (R. 93-6, PageID 783). Walters asked Tanner if it was her knife and
she indicated that it was not. He then asked if she “[c]ould . . . have ever had a knife like that,”
and Tanner responded that she “used to have something like that (INAUDIBLE) in [her] back
pocket.” (Id. at 784). A short time later, Walters asked Tanner whether she killed Watson.
Tanner denied doing so and stated that she did not “even know her” or “what [Watson] look[ed]
like.” (Id.).

        At the end of the interview, Walters also asked Tanner if he would find her fingerprints
on the knife he had shown her or in Barney’s and she responded, “No.” (Id. at 786). Tanner
explained that someone had called and told her about the murder the night it happened, but that
she was not aware that it had just happened or even where it occurred.

        Second Tanner Interview. Walters interviewed Tanner again about two weeks later, on
June 7, 1995. This time, Walters talked to Tanner while he and another BCPD detective, David
Adams, drove her to a scheduled polygraph examination. Walters did not tape this interview or
ask Tanner to provide a written statement afterwards. He did, however, summarize his account
of the interview in a report titled, “Investigation Notes.” According to Walters’s investigation
notes, Tanner told him and Adams that she remembered admitting, during the May 24 interview,
that she owned the murder weapon. His investigation notes also indicate that Tanner said the
officers would find both her fingerprints and Paav’s on the knife because they had used it about a
week before Watson’s murder to do drugs together. Walters also wrote that Tanner stated she
was certain the knife was hers based on the way it was filed and chipped because she would
sharpen her knives that way to clean her drug paraphernalia and do small home repairs. After
 No. 22-1963                            Tanner v. Walters                                 Page 4

speaking with Walters for over two hours, Tanner submitted to a polygraph examination the
results of which led the polygraph examiner to opine that Tanner was not being truthful.
Relevant here, none of Tanner’s answers to the five “test” questions central to the investigation
matched Walters’s recounting of her statements from the second interview. Rather, Tanner
answered each of the five central polygraph questions with responses consistent with her
recorded and transcribed interview responses from May 24, 1995.

        Former Prosecutor Declines to Charge Tanner. As the investigation progressed, in June
1995, Tanner’s former cellmate from the county jail, Constance Roberts, told police that Tanner
had admitted to her that she was at Barney’s the night leading to the murder. And a few months
later, in September 1995, the police crime lab reported that Tanner was “included in the
population of possible donors to the blood stain detected on the bar sink” near the crime scene.
(R. 93-7, PageID 798). Walters attached the lab report to an arrest warrant request he submitted
to the prosecutor’s office; the chief assistant prosecutor at the time declined the request due to
insufficient evidence. Walters’s investigation notes span from June to October of 1995. In 1997,
he was promoted to sergeant and was no longer assigned to the Watson murder investigation
team.

        New Prosecutor Charges Tanner. By 2000, a new prosecutor had taken office, and after
reviewing the Watson murder file, he authorized charges against Tanner. Michigan’s Tenth
District Court for the County of Calhoun held a preliminary examination hearing (“P.E.”) to
determine whether there was probable cause to order Tanner bound over for trial. Cady testified
at the P.E. that he drove to Barney’s that night, but Tanner stayed home. Walters testified about
his involvement in the investigation, including his two interviews with Tanner. His testimony
about the May 24 interview differed in important ways from the interview transcript. For
instance, Walters testified that Tanner admitted during the May 24 interview that she owned the
murder weapon and that she described why and how it was chipped. He also testified that
Tanner admitted during the June 7 interview that she had gone to the bar with Cady on the night
Watson was killed and that her fingerprints would likely be found on the murder weapon because
she had used it a week before the murder to do drugs.
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                                  Page 5

       The prosecution argued that it had established probable cause. The state district court
agreed, and summarized its reasoning as follows:

       [Tanner’s] false statements to [Walters] concerning her whereabouts in her initial
       statement, the fact that her blood matches within 4 percent of the population, the
       fact that it is her knife that was found in close proximity to the bloodstain that was
       left probably by the perpetrator that matches her, the fact that she was at Barney’s
       at 1:30 a.m. in the morning, all those facts combined together in the [c]ourt’s
       mind does establish probable cause.

(R. 100, PageID 1134).

       Tanner Is Convicted and Released. Tanner was tried in the Calhoun County Circuit
Court and convicted by a jury in November 2000. Tanner, 867 F.3d at 662, 670. After an
unsuccessful state court appeal, Tanner filed a federal habeas petition in the Eastern District of
Michigan which was denied. Tanner v. Yukins, No. 04-CV-71155-DT, 2005 WL 2994353 (E.D.
Mich. Nov. 7, 2005). This court reversed and remanded with directions to set aside Tanner’s
conviction, finding that her conviction lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Tanner, 867 F.3d at
674.

       Tanner filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Walters, alleging
violations of her constitutional rights premised on his fabrication of evidence, malicious
prosecution, and failure to produce exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). She also named the City of Battle Creek as a defendant, but subsequently
stipulated to the City’s dismissal. Walters moved for summary judgment as to each claim based
on qualified immunity. The district court granted Walters summary judgment on the Brady
claim but denied the motion as to Tanner’s claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious
prosecution. Walters timely appealed.

                                                II.

       We review de novo a district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds. See Adams v. Blount Cnty., 946 F.3d 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2020). Government officials
performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability “when
their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
 No. 22-1963                                Tanner v. Walters                                    Page 6

reasonable person would have known.’” King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 582 (6th Cir. 2017)
(quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2017)). To determine whether an officer is entitled
to qualified immunity, we employ a two-part inquiry which asks: “(1) whether the facts, when
taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right violated was clearly established such
‘that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”1 Mullins
v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202
(2001)). The court may consider the questions in whichever order it concludes makes the most
sense. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009). “When a defendant invokes qualified
immunity in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must offer sufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute of fact that the defendant violated a clearly established right.” Folks v.
Petit, 676 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing DiLuzio v. Vill. of Yorkville, 796 F.3d 604,
608–09 (6th Cir. 2015)).

        Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, appellate courts may review “appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.” A district court’s denial of qualified immunity is an appealable
final decision to the extent the appeal presents purely legal questions. As the Supreme Court
explained in Johnson v. Jones, qualified immunity rulings are reviewable on interlocutory appeal
to the degree they present “a legal issue that can be decided with reference only to undisputed
facts and in isolation from the remaining issues of the case.” 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (quoting
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 529 n.10 (1985)). In this vein, we “may overlook a factual
disagreement if a defendant, despite disputing a plaintiff’s version of the story, is ‘willing to
concede the most favorable view of the facts to the plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.’” Adams,
946 F.3d at 948 (quoting Barry v. O’Grady, 895 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2018)). We may also
review factual determinations that are “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe [them].” Id. (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).

        As set forth below, this interlocutory appeal presents both legal and factual disputes. We
limit our review to purely legal issues within our appellate jurisdiction.

        1
          Walters’s appeal only challenges the district court’s ruling as to the first prong. We therefore
limit our review to that inquiry.
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                                  Page 7

                                                III.

                                                 A.

       Fabrication of Evidence. For purposes of this appeal, Walters concedes the view of the
facts most favorable to Tanner. That is, he accepts Tanner’s assertions that he (1) included false
information in his reports describing his investigative interviews with her; and (2) testified
falsely about her statements to him at her preliminary examination hearing. Walters nevertheless
maintains that the district court wrongly denied him summary judgment on Tanner’s fabrication-
of-evidence claim. He argues that Tanner is required to do more than come forward with
evidence contradicting his testimony and written statements to establish fabrication of evidence;
she must first establish that he intentionally or recklessly misrepresented her statements pursuant
to Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (6th Cir. 2010). And to satisfy this first requirement,
according to Walters, Tanner must make a “substantial showing” of the requisite intent or
recklessness to prevail. He draws this “substantial showing” requirement from the court’s
jurisprudence relating to § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment where
the arrest is based on false statements by law enforcement officers. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 305. In
such cases, we have employed the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s decision in Franks
v. Delaware, which requires a hearing at the defendant’s request if the defendant can make a
substantial preliminary showing that an officer included a “deliberate falsity” or with “reckless
disregard for the truth” included a false statement in a search warrant affidavit that was necessary
to the finding of probable cause. 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978).

       Walters’ argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Walters overstates the showing
necessary for Tanner’s claim. Purposefulness is not an element of a standalone fabrication-of-
evidence claim. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “knowingly fabricated evidence
against [a plaintiff], and [that] there is a reasonable likelihood that the false evidence could have
affected the judgment of the jury.”      Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 484 (6th Cir. 2017)
(alterations in original) (quoting Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Such claims are rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so they are
understandably focused on the adjudicative process—in particular, the potential effect of
knowingly fabricated evidence on the trier of fact—not on the purpose of the publisher of such
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                                 Page 8

statements. See Anderson v. Knox Cnty., No. 22-5280, 2023 WL 4536078, at *8 (6th Cir. July
13, 2023) (distinguishing fabrication-of-evidence claims from malicious prosecution claims and
acknowledging that the former violates a defendant’s right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Second, we have not previously required a
“substantial showing” of intent for such claims. Instead, any mention of intentional conduct—
what we sometimes refer to as “deliberate falsehood”—or the “substantial showing” standard
appears in instances where false information is “material to the finding of probable cause.” See
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Because a stand-alone
fabrication-of-evidence claim can survive without regard to probable cause, it follows that such a
showing is unnecessary. See France v. Lucas, 836 F.3d 612, 629 (6th Cir. 2016) (“A plaintiff
does not need to show that the government lacked probable cause to prevail on a fabrication of
evidence claim.” (citing Stemler, 126 F.3d at 872)). Thus, Walters’s argument premised on the
requirement for such a showing for a fabrication of evidence claim lacks merit.

       Here, Tanner says Walters’s statements that she told him: (1) the knife belonged to her;
(2) her fingerprints would be found on the knife; (3) she knew it was her knife because of the
chip in it; (4) she was at Barney’s on the night in question; and (5) she “could do something” like
the murder if the victim “gave her a hard time” were fabrications. (ECF 21, Appellee’s Br. 11).
The transcript of the May 24 interview supports her claim of falsity as none of the challenged
statements appear in the transcript. Indeed, the transcript reflects that Tanner denied that the
knife was hers and that she denied traveling to Barney’s on the night of the murder. In view of
Walters’s concession that we may construe all facts and make all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to Tanner, we disregard Walters’s assertion that he possessed no
“information that contradicted” his version of events. (ECF 17, Appellant’s Br. 20). And when
we credit Tanner’s account that she never made any of the statements at issue, Walters’s
testimony and notes about his interview stating otherwise strongly suggest that he knowingly
fabricated the statements. Because a reasonable jury could reach the same conclusion, Walters is
not entitled to qualified immunity on Tanner’s fabrication-of-evidence claim.
 No. 22-1963                               Tanner v. Walters                                   Page 9

                                                  B.

        Malicious Prosecution. Tanner’s malicious prosecution claim is premised on the same
facts underlying her claim for fabrication of evidence—that Walters falsified his notes about
what she told him and testified falsely about her statements. Walters contends, however, that the
claim fails because Tanner cannot show that he “made, influenced, or participated in the decision
to prosecute.” (ECF 17, Appellant’s Br. 23 (quoting Mills, 869 F.3d at 480)).

        Claims stemming from a plaintiff’s seizure and continued detention based on purportedly
false or fabricated evidence presented by law enforcement fall under the broad umbrella of
malicious prosecution and are rooted in the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. See
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 747–50 (6th Cir. 2006). Such claims require a
plaintiff to prove that: “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to
prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause for the prosecution; (3) as a consequence
of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest;
and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” France, 836 F.3d at 625
(citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308–09). And while actual “malice” is not required to succeed on a
malicious prosecution claim, a defendant must have made “deliberate or reckless falsehoods”;
“mere negligence” will not create liability. See Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654–55 (6th
Cir. 2015). Here, neither party disputes Tanner’s satisfaction of the last two elements. But
Walters challenges part of the first prong—the decision to prosecute—and the second prong in
its entirety.

        1.      Decision to Prosecute

        The fact that an officer “did not make the decision to prosecute does not per se absolve
[the officer] from liability.” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 311 (emphasis omitted). Liability, for instance,
“extends to an officer who included falsehoods in [his] investigatory materials, knowing that
prosecutorial reliance is likely, where those materials actually influenced the prosecutor’s
ultimate decision to bring charges.” Jones v. City of Elyria, 947 F.3d 905, 918 (6th Cir. 2020)
(citing Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 820–21 (6th Cir. 2019)).
 No. 22-1963                              Tanner v. Walters                                 Page 10

       The district court in this case found that the assistant prosecutor reviewed the case file on
Watson’s murder and brought it to the attention of the lead prosecutor who authorized charges
against Tanner. The district court also found that the assistant prosecutor recalled that Tanner
had made some incriminating statements during her interview with Walters and that both he and
the lead prosecutor read and discussed Walters’s investigatory report before initiating charges
against Tanner. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Tanner, the district court
concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Walters’s investigation report influenced the
decision to charge Tanner.

       We agree. First, consider the prosecuting attorney’s affidavit. Walters notes that the
affidavit does not explicitly include Walters’s false statements as one of the reasons for moving
forward with the prosecution.        But this argument is unpersuasive.        Paragraph 5 of the
prosecutor’s affidavit reads in relevant part:

       My review of the Sharon Watson murder case file did not reveal any involvement
       by David Walters . . . regarding authorizing charges in this case other than the
       interviews he had conducted that were contained within the submitted
       information.

(R. 93-27, PageID 889) (emphasis added). The false statements at the center of this appeal
include the written statements Walters made about Tanner’s alleged incriminating admissions
during the interviews he conducted. It follows then, construing the affidavit in the light most
favorable to Tanner, that a reasonable jury could find that Walters’s false statements influenced
the prosecutor’s decision to bring charges. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 316. Likewise, a jury
reasonably could conclude that Walters’s false statements “were material to the state court’s
decision to bind the Plaintiff[] over for trial,” id. at 313, because the state trial court explicitly
stated that Walters’s statements were “credible” and were a “basis” for its probable cause
determination at the preliminary hearing. (R. 100, PageID 1129).

       2.      Probable Cause

       Walters next challenges the district court’s finding that there remains a triable issue on
whether Tanner established a lack of probable cause. First, he contends that the state court’s
probable cause determination precludes Tanner from relitigating probable cause. Second, he
 No. 22-1963                            Tanner v. Walters                               Page 11

maintains that probable cause existed even without Walters’s false statements. Third, he argues
that the district court applied the wrong standard in assessing probable cause. Each of these
arguments fails.

       For starters, Walters’s collateral estoppel argument does not align with Michigan law.
“The preclusive effect of a state court judgment is determined by state law.” Peterson v.
Heymes, 931 F.3d 546, 554 (6th Cir. 2019).          Under Michigan law, “crossover estoppel”
“precludes the relitigation of an issue from a criminal proceeding in a subsequent civil
proceeding, and vice versa.” Id. (citing Barrow v. Pritchard, 597 N.W.2d 853, 855–56 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1999)). But when a criminal judgment has been vacated, the trial court’s interlocutory
rulings merge with the final judgment and are vacated as well. Id.; see also Dodrill v. Ludt, 764
F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that a vacated judgment “technically leav[es] nothing to
which we may accord preclusive effect”).

       The district court found that Tanner presented sufficient evidence to show that the state
court relied on Walters’s false statements at the P.E. in making its probable cause determination.
Walters says Peterson is distinguishable in that the probable cause finding against Tanner was
not vacated when her criminal conviction was vacated because the probable cause adjudication
was the product of a separate, valid, final judgment. He says this is so because her P.E. was
conducted in a district court, while her trial occurred in one of the state’s circuit courts. But
Walters cites no binding authority to support this proposition, and we are not otherwise
persuaded that Tanner is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue. See Hinchman v.
Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 202–03 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A] finding of probable cause in a prior criminal
proceeding does not bar a plaintiff in a subsequent civil action from maintaining a claim for
malicious prosecution under Michigan law where the claim is based on a police officer’s
supplying false information to establish probable cause.”).      Indeed, Walters concedes that
“Tanner can avoid preclusion only if she can point to evidence that the claim of malicious
prosecution is based on a police officer’s supplying false information.” (ECF 17, Appellant’s Br.
25–26). As we have discussed, considering all facts in the light most favorable to Tanner, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the state court relied on Walters’s false statements for its
probable cause determination.
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                               Page 12

       Walters insists, however, that probable cause to prosecute Tanner still would have existed
even if he had not made any false statements and that the district court applied the wrong
standard. “Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a
prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.” Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98, 102 (1959). To be sure, without Walters’s false statements, the prosecutor could have
marshaled other evidence, such as Tanner’s failed polygraph examination, blood found at the
scene matching Tanner’s blood type, and a statement from a jailhouse informant that Tanner
allegedly admitted she went to Barneys on the night of Watson’s murder. Yet, none of this
evidence demands a finding of probable cause. A failed polygraph alone is insufficient to
support a probable cause determination.       See Tomasik v. Martin, No. 22-1081, 2023 WL
2137354, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 21, 2023). And as to the latter two items, “[m]illions of people
share Tanner’s blood type,” Tanner, 867 F.3d at 673, the crime scene was contaminated prior to
collection of the blood sample, and Tanner denied making the statement to the inmate. Taking
all facts and making all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Tanner, a reasonable
jury could find that these facts, without Walters’s statements, would not have provided probable
cause to prosecute Tanner.

       Substantial Showing. Like his argument relating to Tanner’s stand-alone fabrication-of-
evidence claim, Walters again insists that Tanner must make a “substantial showing” that he
stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth to maintain a § 1983
claim for malicious prosecution. See Johnson, 790 F.3d at 654–55. He contends that the district
court erred when it denied him qualified immunity because there is no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could conclude that he knowingly or recklessly fabricated evidence. Implicit in
his argument is an assumption that the district failed to find such a showing. But we do not agree
that it did. Even if Walters is correct that Tanner must make a “substantial showing” in this
context, the record here contains sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Tanner has satisfied
that standard. See Caskey v. Fenton, No. 22-3100, 2022 WL 16964963, at *8 (6th Cir. Nov. 16,
2022) (cautioning against “misconstru[ing] the height of [the substantial showing] requirement,”
which can be met by “an offer of proof” (quotation omitted)). In Butler v. City of Detroit, we
stated that “[a] plaintiff shows substantial evidence of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard
when, for example, he presents proof that at the time the officer swore out the affidavit, she knew
 No. 22-1963                             Tanner v. Walters                              Page 13

of or possessed information that contradicted the sworn assertions.” 936 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir.
2019). We reasoned that “such a showing gets the § 1983 plaintiff past the qualified-immunity
hurdle because it shows that no reasonable officer with access to the contradictory information
would have sworn out such an affidavit.” Id. (citing Vakilian, 335 F.3d 509). Here, looking at
the transcript and audio of the May 24 interview and making all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Tanner, Tanner has presented evidence that Walters possessed information that
contradicted his statements. Even though Walters did not have the transcript of his interview
when he testified at the probable cause hearing, he knew that the audio of the interview existed
because he recorded it himself. A reasonable jury could find by a substantial showing that
Walters made his statements in a deliberate falsehood or with reckless disregard for the truth.
His claim of qualified immunity, therefore, fails.

                                                IV.

       For the reasons discussed, we AFFIRM.