Court Opinion

ID: 9863225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:15:12.609863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:38:53.520803
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Twice this cause has been remanded to this Court by the United States Supreme Court. First the Supreme Court remanded the cause with instructions to reconsider it in light of its holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). That done, the cause was again tak*943en to the Supreme Court on petition for certiorari. Now the cause is before us again, remanded for reconsideration in light of Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). In Johnson the Supreme Court put the finishing touches on a stunning piece of revisionism, recasting Penny to mean something it clearly does not. See Elliott v. State, 858 S.W.2d 478, at 492-98 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Clinton, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Court has recently observed that so long as evidence proffered in mitigation of punishment can be given any mitigating application at all under the special issues contained in former Article 37.071(b), V.A.C.C.P., the Eighth Amendment does not require an additional jury instruction on mitigating evidence, as was required in Penny. Ex parte Davis, 866 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). The majority today is correct, then, to inquire whether appellant’s proffered evidence may be considered mitigating within the confines of the special issues, for that is surely the reconsideration in light of Johnson that the Supreme Court contemplated.
The majority concludes that appellant’s evidence of “voluntary service and kindness to others,” of his “artistic and poetic talent,” and of his “religious devotion” could all be given some mitigating effect under the second special issue. Indeed, the majority had already concluded as much in its opinion following the first remand, at least as to appellant’s evidence of service and kindness to others, and of religious devotion. It is puzzling, though, that the majority so readily concludes that the evidence of appellant’s artistic and poetic talent is covered by the second special issue, considering that on the first remand the Court expressly eschewed such a rationale in rejecting that portion of appellant’s contention. In any event, it is not apparent to me that artistic and poetic talent has any relevance whatsoever, aggravating or mitigating, to the issue of future dangerousness. The majority’s conclusion that it does bears some explanation. None is forthcoming.
The majority also concludes that appellant is not entitled to a Penny instruction on account of evidence of childhood abuse and disadvantaged background. I continue to believe, as I did at the time of the first remand, that appellant has presented no evidence of an abused childhood. It does seem to me, however, that he presented at least marginally colorable evidence of a disadvantaged background. That evidence has no mitigating significance within the scope of the statutory special issues. Thus, the holding in Johnson is not implicated. The majority today therefore disposes of this claim, not according to Johnson, but by rote invocation of its own “homemade ‘nexus’ requirement[.]” EUiott v. State, supra, at 492. That approach is not supported by either Johnson or Penny. Therefore, as in Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, at 138 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (On appellant’s motion for rehearing) (Clinton, J., dissenting), Goss v. State, 826 S.W.2d 162, at 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Clinton, J., dissenting), and Ex parte Bower, 823 S.W.2d 284, at 291 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting), I respectfully dissent.