Court Opinion

ID: 9486250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:42:01.141164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:36.005684
License: Public Domain

JON 0. NEWMAN, Chief Judge,
concurring:
Under a sentencing regime that makes extensive use of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses and that correlates those sentences precisely to drug quantities, it is crucially important for courts to be analytically sound and factually correct in their determination of drug quantities attributable to each defendant facing such penalties. This appeal presents important issues concerning the determination of such quantities. The first issue is whether a defendant convicted of possession of drugs is subject to the mandatory minimum penalty specified for whatever quantity is actually possessed or only for such quantity as was reasonably foreseeable. If the defendant’s reasonable expectation limits the penalty, the second issue is whether a sentencing court’s determination of the quantity that was reasonably foreseeable is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. The majority finds it unnecessary to decide the first issue and rules that reasonable foreseeability in this context is a question of fact. I agree that this is an inappropriate ease to resolve the first issue, but I conclude that reasonable foreseeability in this context, as in all others, is a question of law. However, believing that the District Court’s ruling as to reasonable foreseeability was legally incorrect, though not necessarily clearly erroneous, I concur in the judgment remanding for resentencing.
1. Mens rea and drug possession offenses
In drug possession cases, we have ruled that mandatory minimum penalty provisions are applicable “even if a defendant does not know the specific nature and amount of the controlled substance.” United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 163 (2d Cir.) (citing United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1244, 99 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992). . No “trap for the unwary” is created because there must be “proof that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance.” See United States v. Pineda, 847 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir.1988).
Though the defendant need not actually know the quantity possessed to receive the penalty applicable to that quantity, it is not settled whether he may be punished for such a quantity if he could not reasonably foresee that such a- quantity would be placed in his possession.' Doubt has been engendered by our ruling in a conspiracy ease that a defendant may not be punished under a mandatory minimum provision for a quantity of drugs possessed by a co-conspirator unless possession of that quantity was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. See United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993). Since Martinez, we have ruled that a conspirator could be punished for the actual quantity in his possession where such quantity was reasonably foreseeable, United States v. Pico, 2 F.3d 472, 475-76 (2d Cir.1993), and have made a' similar ruling as to a defendant convicted-of a substantive importation. offense, United States v. Imariagbe, 999 F.2d 706, 707-08 (2d Cir.1993). What we have not decided is the converse of Imariagbe: may a defendant be punished for the quantity possessed if possession of such quantity was not reasonably foreseeable?
*372The pending case poses that issue in circumstances that are closer to a conspiracy case than to the typical substantive possession case. Caroline Ekwunoh was instructed to meet a courier arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport, give him $2,000, and drive him to New Jersey. The courier arrived carrying an attache case containing just over one kilogram of heroin. Ekwunoh accompanied him to her ear in the airport parking lot. At the ear, the courier handed her the attache case so that she could place it in the trunk of the car. At that point she was arrested. It is this momentary holding of the attache case that renders Ekwunoh liable for the substantive possession offense, though realistically what she is being punished for is her role in conspiring with the courier or perhaps in aiding and abetting his substantive offense. Her situation reveals a less significant possession than the activity of Pico, who swam to a boat, called for a package to be tossed to him and swam to shore with the package, see Pico, 2 F.3d at 473-74, or the activity of Imariagbe, who carried a suitcase from Nigeria to New York City, see Imariagbe, 999 F.2d at-707.
, Since Ekwunoh’s possession was so fleeting, I agree with the majority that we should assume, for purposes of this appeal, that reasonable foreseeability of the quantity possessed is a requirement in substantive possession cases.
2. Reasonable foreseeability as an issue of law
Many courts, including ours, have said or implied that reasonable foreseeability is an issue of fact, and that a district court’s determination is to be accepted on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307, 1314 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 356, 126 L.Ed.2d 320 (1993); United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d 1456, 1479 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d 218 (1993); United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1188-89 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1242 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1315, 122 L.Ed.2d 702 (1993); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d 682, 688 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992). Such statements, however, have not reflected any analysis of whether the issue is one of fact or of law,1 and, in my view, are incorrect.
The “reasonable foreseeability” standard is a legal standard that needs to be applied to the specific facts of a case. Any standard involving a determination of what is reasonable involves a legal standard. Application of a legal standard to facts is normally an issue of law. See 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2589 (1971) (“Many issues in a law suit involve elements of both law and fact. *373Whether these be referred to as mixed questions of law and fact, or ... the application of law to facts, there is substantial authority that they are not protected by the ‘clearly erroneous’ rule and are freely reviewable”).
The Supreme Court has suggested that what is reasonable for a police officer to have thought for purposes of qualified immunity is a question of law. See Hunter v. Bryant, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). We give such questions to a jury only because they usually also involve underlying disputed issues of fact, and, in such cases, the jury is both the decider of the fact issues and the applier of the relevant legal standard, as set forth in the jury instructions. See Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir.1991). However, when the underlying facts are found by a judge, as occurs at sentencing, the judge’s determination of the legal issue whether those underlying facts support a conclusion of reasonable foreseeability is not mixed with the underlying fact issues and is fully available for de novo review.
In this case, the District Judge is not determining what the defendant in fact foresaw. If Ekwunoh did in fact foresee the one kilogram quantity that was in the attache case, she would clearly be responsible for it, and there would be no need to go on to the issue of whether that quantity would have been foreseeable by a reasonable person' in her circumstances.
The factual circumstances on which the reasonable foreseeability determination is to be made are not seriously disputed, and, as to these facts, the findings of the District Judge are binding on us unless clearly erroneous. Ekwunoh had been involved in heroin dealings for two years, handling up to 250 grams twice a month. She was instructed to meet a narcotics courier arriving from Nigeria, give him $2,000, and drive him to New Jersey. Even if she actually believed, as the District Court found, that the courier had 400 grams, the same quantity previously brought in by her boyfriend in his alimentary canal, it was reasonably foreseeable that a courier for the organization she had been dealing with, arriving with an attache case, would be bringing in a one kilogram quantity. The District Court’s contrary ruling was an error of law. I therefore concur in the judgment remanding for resentencing.

. The First Circuit’s statement that the "finding as to the quantity embraced by the conspiracy and reasonably foreseen by the defendant is a factual one,” United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d at 1314, cites United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1287 (1st Cir.),. cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2393, 124 L.Ed.2d 294 (1993), which had involved only the actual quantity possessed and had nothing to do with foreseeabilily.
The Fifth Circuit’s statement that ”[t]he quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to [defendant] is a question of fact,” United States v. Pofahl, 990 F.2d at 1479, relies on prior decisions holding only that determinations of relevant conduct are "primarily factual,” United States v. Cockerham, 919 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir.1990), and that the actual quantity of drugs is a factual question. United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 445 (5th Cir.1990).
The Sixth Circuit's statement that “[t]he district court’s determination of the quantity of drugs for which a defendant will be held accountable is a factual finding,” United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d at 1242, relies on a similar statement in United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1300-01 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990, 111 S.Ct. 532, 112 L.Ed.2d 542 (1990), that in turn relied on a general statement in United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855, 867 (6th Cir.1989), that concerned the statutory requirement that findings of fact in sentencing are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d), a standard applied in Barrett to the entirely factual question of whether the defendant was an organizer or. manager.
The District of Columbia Circuit’s statement that the district court made "factual findings" as to what the defendant "knew or reasonably could have foreseen,” United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d at 688, extends the findings beyond what occurred, since the trial judge in that case made findings as to what the defendant actually knew, id. at 689-90, and had no occasion to consider what was reasonably foreseeable.