Court Opinion

ID: 9371203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 18:03:07.741183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.054696
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/23 Dutcher v. Wallace CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 JANDA DUTCHER,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                      A163135
 v.                                                                      (Contra Costa County
 JAMES WALLACE et al.,                                                   Super. Ct. No. CIVMSC1802179)

           Defendants and Respondents.

         Plaintiff Janda Dutcher sued, among others, defendants Tami and
Steven Weber after being bitten by a dog present at their property; she
appeals an order granting them summary judgment of her general negligence
and premises liability claims. We conclude there is no evidence the
Webers — landlords who neither lived at the property nor owned the dog —
had actual knowledge a dog with dangerous propensities was on the
premises. They consequently had no duty to prevent the harm alleged, and
Dutcher cannot establish the elements necessary for a general negligence or
premises liability cause of action. We affirm.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         The Webers own a home in Contra Costa County. They rent it to their
son, defendant Timothy Adams, who lives there with his wife, Desiree

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Adams, their three young children, and a dog.1 The Webers occasionally visit
to see their grandchildren. The Adamses pay the Webers a reduced monthly
rent in exchange for maintaining and landscaping the property, and the
Adamses reimburse the Webers for paying water and garbage bills. Although
Steven did not produce a written rental agreement or more than one copy of
a rent check, he testified the Adamses never missed a monthly payment.
      Defendant James Wallace temporarily lived with the Adamses in 2017.
During a three-month period, Wallace stayed approximately four to five
nights in total. Wallace owned the dog at issue here — Rambo — who also
occasionally stayed at the house. Whenever Wallace left, he either took
Rambo with him or left the dog at home in a cage. Desiree and Timothy both
stated Rambo did not act aggressively with them, their dog, or children. But
a neighbor recounted a conversation with Desiree in which she acknowledged
Rambo had once escaped the house and fought with another dog. The Webers
declared they did not know Wallace and Rambo were staying at the house;
Steven only knew that a person familiar with Timothy was going to stay for
a few weeks.
      On March 16, 2017, Dutcher was walking her two dogs across the
street from the Adamses’ home. Suddenly, the Adamses’ dog and Rambo ran
from the front yard towards Dutcher, and Rambo tried to attack one of
Dutcher’s dogs. While Dutcher was trying to protect her dog, Rambo bit her
several times on her left arm, resulting in injuries that required medical
treatment. Wallace surrendered Rambo to be euthanized and thereafter did
not return to the house.

     For clarity, we use first names when referring to the Webers and
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Adamses individually. We intend no disrespect.
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      It is unclear how the dogs escaped from the premises. A neighbor
observed the Adamses’ dog loose in front of the house on several occasions.
And Dutcher at some point noticed the Adamses had a broken fence, but it is
unclear whether it was broken before or during the incident. The Webers
stated they were not aware of any property defects at the time of the incident,
such as problems with backyard fencing, gates, or latches. Sometime before
March 16, Timothy notified Steven the fence had suffered windstorm
damage. Timothy, a carpenter, screwed down loose fence boards and
reinforced the fence to keep it from falling down. According to Timothy,
Steven did not see the damage; he only saw the completed repairs and found
them acceptable.
      Dutcher sued the Adamses; the Webers, as individuals and as trustees
of a family trust; and Wallace. As relevant here, Dutcher alleged all
defendants were negligent for allowing a dog to escape the premises and bite
her. In addition, in the premises liability cause of action, she alleged
defendants knew or should have known the dangerous propensities of the dog
and negligently allowed it to escape.
      The Webers moved for summary judgment, contending they had no
actual knowledge there was a dog with dangerous propensities on the
premises. They also argued they did not have a duty to inspect the property
and there was no showing there was a property defect that could have
contributed to the incident. The trial court granted the motion and entered
judgment in the Webers’ favor.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates
there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v.

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Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) A defendant seeking
summary judgment must demonstrate the cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish one or more necessary elements or
there is a complete defense. (Morgan v. Regents of University of California
(2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67.) Upon making that showing, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate there is a triable issue of fact for that cause of
action. (Ibid.) A genuine issue of material fact exists only if “the evidence
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of
the party opposing the motion.” (Aguilar, at p. 845.) Courts must draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. (Id. at p. 843.) We review de novo the decision to grant
summary judgment. (Morgan, at p. 67.)
      Prevailing on a cause of action for general negligence and premises
liability requires demonstrating the existence of a legal duty of care, breach
of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. (Castellon v. U.S.
Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998; Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property
Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369 (Chee).) A landlord owes an
attenuated duty of care “when the premises are let because the landlord is
not in possession, and usually lacks the right to control the tenant and the
tenant’s use of the property.” (Ibid.) Subject to various exceptions, landlords
generally are not liable for injuries to their tenants or tenants’ invitees from
dangerous conditions on the property that arise after the tenant takes
possession. (Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 510.)
A landlord does have a duty, however, to protect third parties from harm
caused by a tenant’s vicious dog if “the landlord has ‘actual knowledge’ of the
dog’s vicious nature” and its presence on the premises — “ ‘not mere

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constructive knowledge’ ” — and the landlord can control or prevent the
harm. (Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 152, 163 (Yuzon).)
      Dutcher contends the Webers breached their nondelegable duty to
maintain the property in a reasonably safe condition in order to prevent a dog
from escaping onto a public street and causing harm. This argument ignores
a threshold issue. Whether the Webers, as landlords,2 owed a duty to third
parties to prevent a dog attack first requires determining whether they
had actual knowledge of the presence of a dog with dangerous propensities.
(Donchin v. Guerrero (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1832, 1838 [analyzing
a landlord’s duty to third parties regarding dangerous dogs is a two-step
process].) Only after answering that question in the affirmative does the
court consider a “landlord’s ability to prevent foreseeable harm” — that is,
whether a landlord had the opportunity to remedy an existing problem with
the property, such as a broken fence, but failed to do so. (Id. at pp. 1838–
1839.) Here, there is no triable issue of fact regarding the Webers’ ignorance
of Rambo’s presence on the premises or the dog’s vicious tendencies (ibid.);
resolving whether the Webers failed to adequately maintain their property is
thus unnecessary.
      Nothing in the record indicates the Webers met Wallace or Rambo or
were informed about the dog. The Webers declared they did not know either
were staying at the property. While “ ‘denial of such knowledge will not, per
se, prevent liability,’ ” there is no circumstantial evidence the Webers “must
have known” about Rambo’s presence at the property. (Yuzon, supra,

      2 On appeal, Dutcher does not seriously dispute the Webers and
Adamses had a landlord-tenant relationship — uncontested evidence
established that the Adamses verbally agreed to rent the house, they
performed home maintenance in exchange for a reduced rent, and they
never missed a monthly rent payment.
                                       5
116 Cal.App.4th at p. 163.) The frequency of the Webers’ visits to the
home — somewhere between once every few months to as much as five times
each month — was not such that they must have known about Rambo,
especially since Wallace and his dog only stayed at the house four or five
nights in the span of three months.
      Moreover, even if the Webers crossed paths with Wallace and Rambo at
the property, there is no evidence the Webers learned of the dog’s
dangerousness. And the Webers had no duty to inspect the premises to learn
of the existence of a dangerous dog. (Yuzon, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at
p. 163.) Timothy testified he had never seen Rambo act aggressively; Desiree
similarly testified Rambo exhibited no aggressiveness toward her children or
her dog. (Cf. Yuzon, at p. 164 [landlord could not have known of dog’s vicious
propensities since there were no prior incidents involving the dog].) Dutcher
cites a neighbor’s declaration that Desiree told her Rambo had previously
escaped through the property’s fence and fought with another dog. Even
viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Dutcher, there was no
evidence this incident was observed by or reported to the Webers. (Yuzon, at
p. 164.) Indeed, nothing in the record indicates the Webers received any
reports or complaints about Rambo’s aggressiveness. (Chee, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1370 [landlord had no knowledge of dangerous dog
where he had never seen the dog or received any complaints].) Speculation or
conjecture about the Webers’ knowledge of Rambo’s vicious nature is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment. (Yuzon, at p. 166 [“ ‘An issue of
fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by
“speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.” ’ ”].)
      Disputing this conclusion, Dutcher contends (a) the Adamses were the
Webers’ agents because they maintained the property; (b) the Adamses knew

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of Rambo’s dangerous disposition; and (c) therefore, the Adamses’ knowledge
must be imputed to the Webers. (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1099 [“principal is charged only with the knowledge of
an agent acquired while the agent was acting in that role and within the
scope of his or her authority as an agent”].) We reject this creative argument.
      An agency relationship arises when a principal manifests assent to an
agent acting on the principal’s behalf, the principal controls the agent, and
the agent assents or otherwise consents to this arrangement. (Huong Que,
Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 410–411.) But “ ‘[n]ot all
relationships in which one person provides services to another satisfy the
definition of agency.’ ” (RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1100.) That the Adamses’ maintained and landscaped the property in
exchange for reduced rent does not give rise to an inference the Webers had
the requisite control over how the Adamses did the work let alone that the
Adamses represented the Webers in dealings with third persons. (Sonora
Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 541[“Control is
the key characteristic of the agent/principal relationship”].) The Webers did
not, for example, specify the type of work that was necessary nor the areas
that needed repair. Rather, the record shows Timothy made decisions
regarding fence repairs using his own judgment and notified Steven after
repairs were completed. Thus, the Adamses were not the Webers’ agents,
they were mere tenants. (Chee, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1374–1375;
Friedman et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter
Group 2022) ¶ 6:79:8 [“a tenancy does not itself make tenants their
landlords’ . . . agents”].) Dutcher’s suggestion the Webers are vicariously
liable here is “contrary to established law” that alleged negligence of a tenant
“ ‘cannot be imputed to the landlord.’ ” (Chee, at p. 1375.)

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      Finally, Dutcher contends the Webers were negligent per se for
violating Contra Costa County’s leash ordinance. (Contra Costa County
Code, § 416-4.402 [“[n]o person owning, possessing, harboring, or controlling
an animal may allow the animal to be at large”].) Not so. The ordinance does
not apply to the Webers as the undisputed facts demonstrate they did not
own, possess, harbor, or control Rambo.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondents.

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                                _________________________
                                Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

A163135

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