Court Opinion

ID: 9676902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:37:20.706269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:52.271434
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the trial court committed harmless error in failing to include an instruction on accomplice witness testimony in the jury charge. However, I respectfully dissent with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict Stubblefield of possession of a controlled substance. The majority concludes that there were sufficient affirmative links to justify the jury in finding that Stubblefield possessed contraband and reminds us that proof of joint possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Although proof of joint possession would be sufficient to sustain a conviction, the State failed to meet its burden regarding one of the elements necessary to a finding of sole or joint possession — the element of control.
The “affirmative links” rule has been stated in different ways, which, taken out of context, can appear to relieve the state of its burden to prove the element of control. For example, “the evidence must affirmatively link the accused to the contraband in such a manner and to such an extent that a reasonable inference may arise that the accused knew of the contraband’s existence and of its whereabouts,” Waldon v. State, 579 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979), “[the evidence] must establish ... that the accused’s connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous,” Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), and finally, “evidence must affirmatively link the accused to the drug he is alleged to have possessed,” Payne v. State, 480 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
However, as the court clarified in Brown, “[the ‘affirmative links’ rule] is still, just as it always was, only a short*177hand expression of what must be proven to establish that a person possessed some kind of drug ‘knowingly or intentionally.’ ” Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d at 747. For a finding of possession, whether it be sole possession or joint possession, “the State must prove two elements: (1) that the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband, and (2) that the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband.” McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), citing Wilkes v. State, 572 S.W.2d 588, 540 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978); see also Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d at 747. Both of these elements may be proved circumstantially, and control may be shown by actual or constructive possession. McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d at 578. “ ‘Circumstantial evidence’ has been defined as direct proof of a secondary fact which, by logical inference, demonstrates the ultimate fact to be proven.” Watson v. State, 861 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1993, pet. ref'd). The state must introduce evidence of facts and circumstances which generates a reasonable inference that the accused knew of the contraband’s existence and exercised control over it. Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). This is the “affirmative link.”
Courts have produced a generic list of some of the facts and circumstances that have generated that reasonable inference in different combinations and in particular contexts. Many of these are listed in the majority opinion. While the majority recognizes that the number of factors present is not as important as the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense, the majority goes on to emphasize that at least nine of the fourteen factors, which the majority erroneously labels affirmative links, are present in this case which, if found by the jury, connect Stubblefield to the contraband, but does not discuss the logical force these nine factors have, in the context of this case, to establish that Stubblefield exercised care, custody, and control of the contraband.
In Earvin, the Dallas Court of Appeals recognized that although the evidence the drugs were both in close proximity and in plain view of the defendant was strong evidence the defendant knew of its presence, it did not necessarily show that the defendant had exercised control over it, since there was no evidence he had used or touched it. Earvin v. State, 632 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, pet. refd). The court found the evidence sufficient to convict Earvin, however, because there was also evidence that he exercised control over the money involved in the drug transaction. Id. He snatched the money out of his sister’s hand and gave it back to the undercover officer when he recognized the officer. Id. The court found that the act of snatching the money constituted constructively exercising control over the drugs. Id. The court in Earvin pointed out that it could not find any cases that were reversed for insufficient evidence in which there was evidence the drugs were both in close proximity and in plain view of the defendant. Id. However, no court has found sufficient evidence where there was not some circumstantial evidence generating the reasonable inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband. In the cases with the most similar facts where the evidence was found sufficient, there was at least circumstantial evidence the defendant exercised control over the contraband. See Curtis v. State, 519 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (where defendant found in living room with four others sitting in circle around marihuana, marihuana was also found in a coat pocket in the bedroom where letters addressed to the defendant were also found); Nolen v. State, 872 *178S.W.2d 807 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1994), pet. denied, 897 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (defendant’s fingerprints were found on contraband); Villegas v. State, 871 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. refd) (where two men were found in house with contraband in plain view, defendant was sole resident and contraband was also found in two closets); Castillo v. State, 867 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (contraband seen falling from defendant’s body); Warmowski v. State, 818 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991), aff'd, 853 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), overruled in part on other grounds, 12 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (defendant made furtive attempt to discard a razor with white substance on it when officers found him and two other men within reach of narcotics and drug paraphernalia, including a snorting mirror).
As in Earvin, there is evidence the drugs on the coffee table were in close proximity and in plain view of where Stub-blefield was lying. There was also evidence there were other narcotics and drug paraphernalia found on the first floor of the house, where the common areas were located. All of this is strong evidence that Stubblefield was aware the drugs were present, but does not necessarily show that Stubblefield exercised control over them. The evidence showing that there was a significant amount of contraband and that another resident of the house was cutting the cocaine preparing it for sale in small portions strongly supports the finding that the drugs were intended for sale and further supports the conclusion that Stubble-field had knowledge the drugs were present, but does not necessarily show that Stubblefield exercised control over them. Additionally, Crisp testified that Stubble-field had been staying in one of the bedrooms for two to three weeks. While this supports an inference that Stubblefield exercised some degree of control over the possessions in the bedroom he occupied, it does not support the inference that he had control over the contraband found in the common areas of the house. Even the testimony regarding the bag of cocaine found behind the couch where Stubblefield was lying is not sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Stubblefield had exercised control over that or any of the contraband in the house.
It is the State’s burden to present sufficient evidence to generate a reasonable inference that Stubblefield not only knew of the contraband’s existence, but exercised control over it. It is one thing for the fact-finder to leap to a conclusion and quite another for the evidence to logically support a fact-finder’s reasonable inference. Although there are at least nine of the “affirmative link” factors present in this case, even in the light most favorable to the prosecution, they do not alone or in combination generate the necessary reasonable inferences.