Court Opinion

ID: 9685761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:01:09.757027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:04.137315
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1765   Document: 47     Page: 1   Filed: 08/24/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

      VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC,
                  Appellant

                            v.

            BRUNSWICK CORPORATION,
                    Appellee

  KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
  COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
      PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                  Intervenor
            ______________________

                       2022-1765
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2020-
 01512.
                  ______________________

                Decided: August 24, 2023
                 ______________________

    JOHN C. ALEMANNI, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton
 LLP, Raleigh, NC, argued for appellant. Also represented
 by N. DEAN POWELL, Winston-Salem, NC; ANDREW N.
 SAUL, Atlanta, GA.

    WILLIAM R. PETERSON, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
Case: 22-1765     Document: 47     Page: 2    Filed: 08/24/2023

 2                        VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 Houston, TX, for appellee. Also represented by JULIE S.
 GOLDEMBERG, Philadelphia, PA; JASON C. WHITE, Chicago,
 IL.

     KEVIN RICHARDS, Office of the Solicitor, United States
 Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for
 intervenor. Also represented by PETER J. AYERS, THOMAS
 W. KRAUSE, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED, PETER JOHN
 SAWERT.
                 ______________________

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE and CUNNINGHAM,
                       Circuit Judges.
 LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
     Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC (“Volvo Penta”) ap-
 peals from a final written decision of the United States Pa-
 tent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Patent Trial and
 Appeal Board (“the Board”) holding all claims, claims 1–18,
 of U.S. Patent 9,630,692 unpatentable as obvious. Bruns-
 wick Corp. v. Volvo Penta of the Ams., LLC, IPR2020-
 01512, 2022 WL 1153453 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2022) (“Deci-
 sion”), J.A. 1–119 (public version), 1285–1309 (confidential
 excerpts). For the reasons articulated below, we vacate
 and remand.
                         BACKGROUND
     The ’692 patent, assigned to Volvo Penta, is directed to
 a tractor-type stern drive for a boat. Claim 1 of the ’692
 patent, reproduced below, is representative.
         1. A steerable tractor-type drive for a boat,
         comprising:
         a drive support mountable to a stern of the
         boat;
         a drive housing pivotally attached to the sup-
         port about a steering axis, the drive housing
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         having a vertical drive shaft connected to
         drive a propeller shaft, the propeller shaft ex-
         tending from a forward end of the drive hous-
         ing;
         at least one pulling propeller mounted to the
         propeller shaft,
         wherein the steering axis is offset forward of
         the vertical drive shaft.
 ’692 patent, col. 5 ll. 48–67.
     A stern drive is a type of engine mounted in the hull of
 a boat and connected to a drive unit mounted outside of the
 hull, typically on the stern. Id. col. 1 ll. 19–21. It may also
 be referred to as an “inboard/outboard drive.” Id. Alterna-
 tive drive arrangements include inboard drives, where the
 engine and transmission are mounted in the hull with a
 propeller shaft extending through the bottom of the hull,
 and outboard drives, where the engine and propeller drive
 are generally configured as a unit attached to and located
 outside the hull. Id. col. 1 ll. 13–19.
     A tractor-type drive generally relies on one or more for-
 ward, bow-facing propellers that produce a propulsive force
 to pull the boat through the water. Id. col. 1 ll. 26–28. It
 may also be referred to as a “pulling-type” or “forward-fac-
 ing drive.” Id. col. 1 ll. 28–29. A drive may alternatively
 be a pushing-type drive, where the propellers face rear-
 ward relative to the boat and generate a propulsive force
 that pushes the boat through the water. Id. col. 1 ll. 22–26.
    In 2015, Volvo Penta launched its commercial embodi-
 ment of the ’692 patent, the Forward Drive. 1 Patent Owner

     1   Like the Board, we refer to the Forward Drive as
 owned by Volvo Penta and the Bravo Four S as owned by
 Brunswick even though each may technically be an offering
 from a related corporate entity. See Decision at *26 n.18.
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 Resp. at 52. This product became extremely successful
 once available, particularly for wakesurfing and other wa-
 ter sports. See, e.g., Decision at *31. The forward-facing
 propellers increased the distance between the propeller
 and swimmers or surfers compared with prior, pulling-type
 stern drive boats. See J.A. 3712. In August 2020, Bruns-
 wick Corp. (“Brunswick”) launched its own drive that also
 embodies the ’692 patent, the Bravo Four S. Patent Owner
 Resp. at 52–53. Brunswick does not dispute that the For-
 ward Drive and Bravo Four S both embody the ’692 patent.
 See, e.g., J.A. 1211 (Oral Hearing Tr.) at 117:20–25.
      The same day that Brunswick launched the Bravo
 Four S, it petitioned for inter partes review of all claims of
 the ’692 patent. Brunswick asserted that the challenged
 claims would have been anticipated or obvious based on
 several references, two of which, Kiekhaefer 2 and Brandt, 3
 are relevant to this appeal. Kiekhaefer is a 1952 patent
 assigned to Brunswick and directed to an outboard motor
 that could have either rear-facing or forward-facing propel-
 lers. See, e.g., Kiekhaefer, Figs. 1 and 2. Brandt is a 1989
 patent assigned to Volvo Penta and directed to a stern
 drive with rear-facing propellers. 4 See, e.g., Brandt, Fig. 1,
 col. 2 ll. 59–60.
     Volvo Penta did not assert that the references in com-
 bination failed to disclose all the claim elements. Rather,
 Volvo Penta argued that a person of ordinary skill in the
 art would not have been motivated to combine the

     2   U.S. Patent 2,616,387 issued November 4, 1952 to
 Kiekhaefer (“Kiekhaefer”).
     3   U.S. Patent 4,840,136 issued June 10, 1989 to
 Brandt (“Brandt”).
     4   Similarly, we refer to Brandt as assigned to Volvo
 Penta and Kiekhaefer as assigned to Brunswick even
 though each may technically be assigned to a related cor-
 porate entity.
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 references with a reasonable expectation of success and
 that the objective indicia of nonobviousness overcame any
 prima facie case of obviousness. Volvo Penta offered evi-
 dence of six objective indicia: copying, industry praise, com-
 mercial success, skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt
 but unsolved need. It also argued that it was entitled to a
 presumption of nexus between the objective indicia and the
 claimed invention, and, even if there was no presumption,
 that there was still nexus.
     The Board first found that Kiekhaefer did not antici-
 pate any challenged claim of the ’692 patent because it
 “only discloses improvements involving outboard propul-
 sion systems” yet the “the independent claims [of the ’692
 patent] are limited to improvements involving stern drives,
 and do not encompass, for example, improvements involv-
 ing outboard propulsion systems.” Decision at *10. How-
 ever, the Board held that it would have been obvious to
 redesign the stern drive of Brandt in light of the outboard
 motor of Kiekhaefer to arrive at the challenged claims. In
 finding a motivation to combine, the Board relied largely
 on (1) a sentence in Kiekhaefer, and (2) testimony of a
 Volvo Penta employee, Mr. Andrew Sweet. Namely, the
 Board relied on an express teaching in Kiekhaefer that
 changing to a forward-facing propeller arrangement is one
 way to provide a system that is “more efficient and capable
 of higher speeds.” Id. at *17 (quoting Kiekhaefer, col. 1 ll.
 10–13). It also relied on Mr. Sweet’s testimony that he
 knew that “the teachings of Kiekhaefer as to outboard mo-
 tors—including the benefits of increased speed and effi-
 ciency—would have been understood to apply even to stern
 drives, as in Brandt,” in addition to testimony from Bruns-
 wick’s expert witness. Id. at *19.
     After finding a motivation to combine, the Board next
 considered Volvo Penta’s arguments on secondary consid-
 erations. The Board first found that Volvo Penta was not
 entitled to a presumption of nexus because, even though
 the Forward Drive and Bravo Four S indisputably
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                                   BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 embodied the claimed invention, Volvo Penta did not make
 sufficient arguments on coextensiveness. Decision at *26–
 27. It further held that record evidence showed that the
 Forward Drive is not coextensive with the claims, citing
 statements made by Volvo Penta in marketing materials
 “that the Forward Drive ‘includes several patented fea-
 tures that make the drive stand out,’ such as exhaust-re-
 lated features, which are not claimed in the ’692 patent.”
 Id. at *26 (quoting J.A. 1735). The Board then found that,
 regardless of the presumption, Volvo Penta did not other-
 wise show nexus because it failed to identify the “unique
 characteristics” or “merits” of the claimed invention. Id. at
 *28.
     Despite finding a lack of nexus, the Board went on to
 alternatively consider Volvo Penta’s evidence of objective
 indicia. It assigned copying, industry praise, and commer-
 cial success “some weight,” id. at *30–32, and assigned
 skepticism, failure of others, and long-felt but unsolved
 need “very little weight,” id. at *33–34. It found that “Pa-
 tent Owner’s objective evidence weighs somewhat in favor
 of nonobviousness.” Id. at *34.
     The Board ultimately found that, even if there was a
 nexus, Brunswick’s “strong evidence of obviousness out-
 weighs [Volvo Penta’s] objective evidence of nonobvious-
 ness.” Id. at *34. It therefore concluded that Brunswick
 had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
 claims 1–18 would have been obvious over Brandt and
 Kiekhaefer.
      Volvo Penta appealed to this court. Following the com-
 pletion of briefing on appeal, the petitioner, Brunswick,
 settled its dispute with patent owner Volvo Penta, in-
 formed us that it no longer opposed the appeal, and waived
 its oral argument time. ECF 33. The USPTO intervened.
 ECF 35. It participated in oral argument, defending the
 decision of the Board by largely adopting the arguments
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 raised by the original appellee, Brunswick, rather than
 submitting new briefs. Id.
     We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
                         DISCUSSION
      Volvo Penta raises three main arguments on appeal:
 (1) that the Board’s finding of motivation to combine was
 not supported by substantial evidence, (2) that the Board
 erred in its determination that there was no nexus, and (3)
 that the Board erred in its consideration of Volvo Penta’s
 objective evidence of secondary considerations of nonobvi-
 ousness. We address each of these in turn.
                  I. Motivation to Combine
     The ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a legal deter-
 mination based on underlying factual findings, including
 whether or not a relevant artisan would have had a moti-
 vation to combine references in the way required to achieve
 the claimed invention. Henny Penny Corp. v. Frymaster
 LLC, 938 F.3d 1324, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citing Wyers v.
 Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238–39 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
 We review the Board’s obviousness determination de novo,
 but its factual findings for substantial evidence. E.g.,
 Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343,
 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Substantial evidence exists when,
 reviewing the record as a whole, “a reasonable fact finder
 could have arrived at” the finding on review. In re Gart-
 side, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
      Volvo Penta first argues that the Board ignored a num-
 ber of assertions in its favor: (1) that Brunswick, despite
 having knowledge of Kiekhaefer for decades, never at-
 tempted the proposed modification itself; (2) that Bruns-
 wick’s proposed modification would have entailed a nearly
 total and exceedingly complex redesign of the drive system;
 (3) the complexity of and difficulty in shifting the vertical
 drive shaft of Kiekhaefer; and (4) that Brunswick itself
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 8                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                   BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 attempted to make its proposed modification yet failed to
 create a functional drive.
     We disagree on all points. The Board considered and
 evaluated each of these assertions in view of the record ev-
 idence. For example, the Board acknowledged the testi-
 mony of Volvo Penta’s expert that a “complete redesign of
 Brandt” would be necessary, including “over two dozen
 modifications,” Decision at *21, but ultimately found that
 not all of the identified changes would have been required
 to arrive at the claimed invention and/or they would have
 been “minor,” id. at *22. The Board likewise considered the
 prototype drive created by Brunswick and acknowledged
 evidence both in favor of and contrary to its alleged success.
 Id. at *24. That the Board ultimately did not rely on this
 “proof of concept” drive as support for its motivation to com-
 bine finding, id., does not mean that they did not consider
 it.
      Volvo Penta also argues that the Board’s reliance on
 Kiekhaefer for motivation to combine is misplaced.
 Kiekhaefer states that a “tractor-type propeller” is “more
 efficient and capable of higher speeds.” Kiekhaefer, col. 1
 ll. 10–13. The Board found that this statement would have
 motivated a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify
 Brandt’s pushing-type stern drive to be a pulling-type stern
 drive. Decision at *17. Volvo Penta argues that (1) there
 are other ways to provide higher speeds and greater effi-
 ciency, (2) speed is not the metric by which most recrea-
 tional boats are measured and wakesurfing boats, for
 instance, travel at low speeds, (3) greater speed and effi-
 ciency is too generic to be a motivation, (4) Kiekhaefer’s
 statement only related to outboard propulsion systems for
 racing boats, and (5) the Board erred in relying on the tes-
 timony of Mr. Sweet to determine the applicability of
 Kiekhaefer’s teachings.
    It is not decisive here whether or not there are other
 ways to improve speed and efficiency. Regardless whether
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 or not that is true, that does not mean improved speed and
 efficiency cannot provide a motivation for the method of us-
 ing a tractor-type drive. It is likewise not conclusive that
 speed may not be the primary or only metric by which rec-
 reational boats are measured. Substantial evidence sup-
 ports a finding that speed is at least a consideration. Nor
 was the Board’s found motivation too generic. As we have
 found, a broadly applicable motivation may be sufficient as
 long as it is supported by more than conclusory expert tes-
 timony. See Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784,
 797 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, the prospect of increased speed
 and efficiency has the support of an express statement in
 one of the asserted prior art references. Further, the Board
 did not rely on improved speed or improved efficiency alone
 as a motivation to combine, but rather improved speed and
 improved efficiency together. See Decision at *18. The rec-
 ord supports that increased speed and greater efficiency
 may have provided a motivation to modify a boat drive sys-
 tem. Finally, Volvo Penta forfeited the argument that
 Kiekhaefer’s statement only related to racing boats, and
 not recreational sport boats, by not making it before the
 Board. See Appellee Br. at 25–26.
     In determining that Kiekhaefer’s teachings would have
 been relevant to more than outboard propulsion systems as
 part of its obviousness analysis, the Board relied in part on
 the testimony of Andrew Sweet, a Volvo Penta employee.
 See id. at *18–19. Mr. Sweet testified that Volvo Penta
 knew from the products that they had on the market “that
 putting the propell[e]rs on the front of the stern drive cre-
 ated quite a bit of efficiency” because there would be “noth-
 ing to block the flow of water to the propell[e]rs.” J.A. 1813
 (Sweet Depo. Tr.), 43:3–9. But, as the Board found, Mr.
 Sweet was “not a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Deci-
 sion at *19. Rather, his testimony indicated the nonpublic,
 corporate knowledge of Volvo Penta. Id. at *19 (viewing
 “his statements—as to what ‘we’ knew with regard to cre-
 ating efficiency in stern drives—as indicating more than
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 10                      VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                   BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 merely his personal knowledge on the issue”). It was there-
 fore an error for the Board to rely on Mr. Sweet’s testimony
 for the knowledge of a skilled artisan. See Graham v. John
 Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) (stating that the obviousness
 inquiry is with respect to the knowledge of a person having
 ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention).
     Nonetheless, the Board’s reliance on Mr. Sweet’s testi-
 mony does not deprive the Board’s finding of motivation to
 combine as being supported by substantial evidence. Sub-
 stantial evidence exists when a reasonable fact finder could
 have reached the same conclusion when considering the
 record as a whole. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (“Substantial evidence is more
 than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as
 a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
 conclusion.”). The Board also relied on other evidence to
 demonstrate that a skilled artisan would have understood
 Kiekhaefer’s teachings to have broader applications, such
 as the testimony of Brunswick’s expert witness, Decision at
 *17–18, and Volvo Penta’s lack of dispute that Kiekhaefer
 was “reasonably pertinent” to the claimed invention, id. at
 *17 (citing Pet. at 47; Pet. Reply at 7). The Board’s finding
 of a motivation to combine is therefore supported by sub-
 stantial evidence.
                          II. Nexus
     For objective evidence of secondary considerations to be
 relevant, there must be a nexus between the merits of the
 claimed invention and the objective evidence. See In re
 GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A showing of
 nexus can be made in two ways: (1) via a presumption of
 nexus, or (2) via a showing that the evidence is a direct re-
 sult of the unique characteristics of the claimed invention.
     A patent owner is entitled to a presumption of nexus
 when it shows that the asserted objective evidence is tied
 to a specific product that “embodies the claimed features,
 and is coextensive with them.” Brown & Williamson
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 Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1130
 (Fed. Cir. 2000). When a nexus is presumed, “the burden
 shifts to the party asserting obviousness to present evi-
 dence to rebut the presumed nexus.” Id.; see also Yita LLC
 v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
 The inclusion of noncritical features does not defeat a find-
 ing of a presumption of nexus. See, e.g., PPC Broadband,
 Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC, 815 F.3d 734,
 747 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that a nexus may exist “even
 when the product has additional, unclaimed features”).
     However, even absent a presumption of nexus, “the pa-
 tent owner is still afforded an opportunity to prove nexus
 by showing that the evidence of secondary considerations
 is the ‘direct result of the unique characteristics of the
 claimed invention.’” Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944
 F.3d 1366, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Huang,
 100 F.3d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
     Volvo Penta challenges both the Board’s finding that it
 was not entitled to a presumption of nexus and that it did
 not otherwise independently show nexus. We address each
 below.
                              A
     A presumption of nexus requires both that the product
 embodies the invention and is coextensive with it. Brown
 & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130. Neither party disputes
 that both the Forward Drive and the Bravo Four S embody
 the claimed invention. See, e.g., J.A. 1211, 117:10–25. But
 coextensiveness is a separate requirement. Fox Factory,
 944 F.3d at 1374.
      Volvo Penta, as Brunswick and the Board note, did not
 provide sufficient argument on coextensiveness in its Pa-
 tent Owner Response. See Decision at *19. Its argument
 for the Forward Drive amounts to a single sentence with a
 citation to its expert’s declaration: “Volvo Penta’s Forward
 Drive is a commercial embodiment of the ’692 Patent and
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                                  BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 coextensive with the claims. Ex. 2027, ¶ 51.” Patent
 Owner Resp. at 52. The declaration paragraph cited does
 little more than confirm that the Forward Drive embodies
 the challenged claims. J.A. 4040. The Board correctly
 found the single, conclusory sentence and one-paragraph
 citation to be insufficient to show a presumption of nexus,
 and “[t]he patentee bears the burden of showing that a
 nexus exists.” Fox Factory, 944 F.3d at 1373 (quoting WMS
 Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359 (Fed.
 Cir. 1999)).
      Volvo Penta’s arguments regarding the alleged coex-
 tensiveness of the Bravo Four S were equally insufficient.
 As with the Forward Drive, Volvo Penta only included one
 sentence of argument in its Patent Owner Response: “The
 Bravo Four S also embodies the claimed features of the ’692
 Patent and is coextensive with them. Ex. 2027, ¶ 119–120.”
 Patent Owner Resp. 52–53. The two cited paragraphs of
 its expert declaration likewise only demonstrate that the
 Bravo Four S embodies the challenged claims and do not
 address coextensiveness. J.A. 5086–87. As the Board
 found, that is insufficient to show a presumption of nexus
 for the Bravo Four S. Decision at *27.
                             B
      Our inquiry does not end there, however. We may also
 consider whether the patent owner proved a nexus inde-
 pendently of a presumption. Volvo Penta’s arguments that
 its evidence of secondary considerations of nonobviousness
 is the direct result of the unique characteristics of the
 claimed invention is likewise brief, but carries more sub-
 stance. In its Patent Owner Response, Volvo Penta argued
 that “Brunswick recognized that the success of Volvo
 Penta’s Forward Drive was tied directly to the claimed fea-
 tures, namely a steerable tractor-type drive as recited in
 each of the challenged claims,” citing internal Brunswick
 documents in support. Patent Owner Resp. at 53 (citing
 J.A. 4521–23). As the Board found, these documents
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 “clearly reference[] the Forward Drive that Patent Owner
 argues—and Petitioner does not dispute—practices the
 claims of the ’692 patent” and “discuss[] the objective of de-
 livering a ‘comparable forward facing stern drive’ with ‘ca-
 pabilities that match the Volvo Penta Forward Drive.’”
 Decision at *28; Conf. J.A. 1292. However, the Board crit-
 icized Volvo Penta for “not actually identify[ing] the
 ‘unique characteristics’ of the claimed combination” or the
 “‘merits of the claimed invention’” that were tied to the ob-
 jective evidence. Decision at *28 (quoting In re Huang, 100
 F.3d at 140). For this reason, it found that Volvo Penta had
 not shown a nexus between its objective evidence of second-
 ary considerations and the claimed invention. Id.
      That finding was not supported by substantial evi-
 dence. It ignores the crux of Volvo Penta’s argument and
 its evidence cited in support. Volvo Penta expressly argued
 that the “steerable tractor-type drive as recited in each of
 the challenged claims” was shown to drive the success of
 the Forward Drive. Patent Owner Resp. at 53. The docu-
 ments cited in its Response further demonstrate the con-
 nection between these claim elements and the objective
 evidence of nonobviousness. For example, the cited Bruns-
 wick documents state the need for a “comparable forward
 facing sterndrive” with “capabilities that match the Volvo
 Penta Forward Drive,” going on to recite unique character-
 istics that made “a forward-facing drive [] valuable in
 wake-surfing.” Conf. J.A. 4521–22; ECF 46. To the extent
 that there was any confusion over the characteristics and
 capabilities Volvo Penta was pointing to, it clarified in its
 Sur-Reply, arguing that “[t]he inventive combination of
 propeller arrangement and steering axis location provided
 certain benefits praised in the industry and not achieved
 by drives in the prior art.” Patent Owner Sur-Reply at 23.
 Indeed, the undisputed evidence, as the Board found,
 shows that boat manufacturers strongly desired Volvo
 Penta’s Forward Drive and were urging Brunswick to bring
 a forward drive to market. Conf. J.A. 1300; ECF 46. The
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 Board went on to find that Brunswick’s development of the
 Bravo Four S was “akin to ‘copying,’” and that its “own in-
 ternal documents indicate that the Forward Drive product
 guided [Brunswick] to design the Bravo Four S in the first
 place.” Conf. J.A. 1297. There is therefore a nexus between
 the unique features of the claimed invention, a tractor-type
 stern drive, and the evidence of secondary considerations.
      At oral argument, counsel for the USPTO argued that
 to the extent Volvo Penta identified these claim elements
 as unique characteristics of the claimed invention, they al-
 ready existed in the prior art. Oral Arg. at 18:55–20:43
 (available at https://cafc.uscourts.gov/home/oral-argu-
 ment/listen-to-oral-arguments/). But the Board did not
 rely on this argument in reaching its decision. See gener-
 ally Decision at *26–28. We therefore cannot adopt it as a
 basis to affirm. “The Board’s judgment must be reviewed
 on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied,” and
 “[a]lternative grounds supporting the Board’s decision gen-
 erally are not considered.” In re Applied Materials, Inc.,
 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, as the Board
 found and we have previously articulated, a nexus analysis
 need not be limited to a discussion of only novel features.
 Decision at *27–28 (citing WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829
 F.3d 1317, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that “proof of
 nexus is not limited to only when objective evidence is tied
 to the supposedly ‘new’ feature(s)”)). It is instead im-
 portant to consider “the invention as a whole,” rather than
 on a “limitation-by-limitation” basis. Chemours Co. FC,
 LLC v. Daikin Indus., Ltd., 4 F.4th 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
 2021); see also Yita, 69 F.4th at 1364 (discussing WBIP).
     The Board’s finding of a lack of nexus is therefore not
 supported by substantial evidence. We hold that Volvo
 Penta demonstrated a nexus between the claims and its ev-
 idence of secondary considerations.
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                    III. Objective Indicia
     Objective evidence of nonobviousness includes: (1) com-
 mercial success, (2) copying, (3) industry praise, (4) skepti-
 cism, (5) long-felt but unsolved need, and (6) failure of
 others. See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling,
 Inc. v. Maersk Drilling U.S., Inc., 699 F.3d 1340, 1349–56
 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The weight to be given to evidence of sec-
 ondary considerations involves factual determinations,
 which we review only for substantial evidence. In re Cou-
 varas, 70 F.4th 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
      Volvo Penta argues that the Board failed to conduct a
 reasoned, collective weighing of its evidence of secondary
 considerations, assigning only vague weights (i.e., “some
 weight” and “very little weight”) to the various factors and
 failing to explain its overall summation. It argues that the
 Board, in its analysis, improperly shifted the burden to
 Volvo Penta, forcing it to show that the claims would not
 have been obvious, rather than considering the evidence of
 secondary considerations as part of the totality of the rec-
 ord. Even were the Board’s assignment of weight to vari-
 ous factors and its overall summation not overly vague,
 Volvo Penta further argues that they are not supported by
 substantial evidence.
     We agree with Volvo Penta that the Board’s analysis of
 objective indicia of nonobviousness, including its assign-
 ments of weight to different considerations, was overly
 vague and ambiguous. A closer look at the individual fac-
 tors highlights the problem.
      For example, when considering the evidence of copying,
 the Board concluded that “the record here shows some evi-
 dence supporting a finding of copying” and that Bruns-
 wick’s investigation into the Forward Drive for developing
 its own product “was more akin to ‘copying’ than to a mere
 assessment of a competitor’s product.” Decision at *29–30.
 It further found that Brunswick’s “own internal documents
 indicate that the Forward Drive Product guided Petitioner
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 16                      VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                   BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 to design the Bravo Four S in the first place.” Conf. J.A.
 1297. Although the Board found the Brunswick internal
 documents more persuasive than the similarities between
 the two products, it still found similarities “as supporting”
 and did not identify any evidence that detracted from its
 finding of copying. See Decision at *29–31. It is unclear
 why, despite finding copying, the Board only afforded this
 factor “some weight.” Id. at *30.
     Further, although copying is not alone dispositive of
 nonobviousness, we have usually considered a determina-
 tion of copying to be “strong evidence of nonobviousness.”
 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099
 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other
 grounds, 475 U.S. 809 (1986) (“That Dennison, a large cor-
 poration with many engineers on its staff, did not copy any
 prior art device, but found it necessary to copy the cable tie
 of the claims in suit, is equally strong evidence of nonobvi-
 ousness.”). Indeed, we have found that “[o]bjective consid-
 erations such as failure by others to solve the problem and
 copying may often be the most probative and cogent evi-
 dence of nonobviousness.” Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent
 State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (cleaned
 up); see also Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d
 995, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986)
 (reasoning that “copying the claimed invention, rather
 than one in the public domain, is indicative of non-obvious-
 ness”). In light of the Board’s own findings that copying
 occurred, its assignment of only “some weight” was not sup-
 ported by substantial evidence.
     Similarly to copying, the Board found no evidence de-
 tracting from its finding of commercial success. Bruns-
 wick’s only arguments against commercial success of the
 Forward Drive were related to nexus. Decision at *31. As
 the Board found, Brunswick either admitted or did not con-
 test that “the Forward Drive essentially created a new
 market for stern drives,” “sales of the ‘Forward Drive have
 increased significantly since its launch in 2015,’” and “more
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 BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 and more boat builders are offering the Volvo Penta For-
 ward Drive as original equipment, including boats specifi-
 cally designed to incorporate the Forward Drive.” Id. The
 Board further found that the record supported, and Bruns-
 wick did not contest, that boat manufacturers strongly de-
 sired Volvo Penta’s Forward Drive and were urging
 Brunswick to bring a forward drive to market. Conf. J.A.
 1300; ECF 46. Despite these findings and Brunswick’s lack
 of arguments to the contrary (at least for the Forward
 Drive), the Board only afforded this factor “some weight.”
 Decision at *31. This finding was not supported by sub-
 stantial evidence.
      Meanwhile, regarding industry praise, the Board found
 that although the exhibits “provide praise for the Forward
 Drive more generally, including mentioning its forward-
 facing propellers, as claimed in the ’692 patent,” it also
 found that “many of the statements of alleged praise spe-
 cifically discuss unclaimed features, such as adjustable
 trim and exhaust-related features.” Id. at *32. Yet the
 Board assigned industry praise, commercial success, and
 copying all “some weight.” Id. at *30–32. The Board did
 not explain why it gave these three factors the same
 weight, or even whether or not that constituted precisely
 the same weight. Although “some weight” may not always
 be ambiguous, it is in this context. The Board therefore
 failed to sufficiently explain and support its conclusions.
 See, e.g., Pers. Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987,
 993 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (remanding in view of the Board’s fail-
 ure to “sufficiently explain and support [its] conclusions”);
 In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
 (same).
     We also determine that the Board failed to properly
 evaluate long-felt but unresolved need. In evaluating the
 evidence presented by Volvo Penta, the Board dismissed it
 as merely describing the benefits of the product without in-
 dicating a long-felt problem that others had failed to solve.
 Decision at *33. This understanding of the cited evidence
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 18                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 was not supported by substantial evidence. Volvo Penta
 cites an article in a 2015 issue of Boating World magazine,
 J.A. 3711–13, which describes Volvo Penta’s Forward Drive
 as “radical,” “game-changing,” and as starting a “revolu-
 tion.” The Board, without explanation, gave those com-
 ments very little weight. But more concerningly, it ignores
 other portions of the article. In addition to those laudatory
 comments, the article also explains that “[e]ver since the
 first surfer discovered he could hang 10 behind a boat’s
 wake, back in the 1950s, people have been trying to figure
 out a way to do it better…and safer.” J.A. 3712. It further
 explains that although “inboard V-drive manufacturers—
 their props tucked safely under the hull—enjoyed serving
 [the wakesurfing] market[,] sterndrive manufacturers
 couldn’t.” Id. That indisputably identifies a long-felt need:
 safe wakesurfing on stern-drive boats. Although the article
 notes that another manufacturer attempted to make
 wakesurfing possible on sterndrive boats by creating a
 platform extension, it explains that it was Volvo Penta’s
 Forward Drive that revolutionized the industry with its
 “game-changing propulsion system.” Id. That article
 therefore identifies more than mere benefits of the Forward
 Drive.
      Volvo Penta additionally cited an article in a 2015 issue
 of Volvo Group Magazine, J.A. 1734–36. Although that ar-
 ticle is marketing material originating from Volvo Penta
 itself, it is still informative. That article, like the Boating
 Magazine article, does not simply tout benefits of the For-
 ward Drive; it also describes the decade-long need for a safe
 sterndrive boat as the popularity of watersports grew. It
 explains that Volvo Penta had not previously developed a
 forward-facing sterndrive ten years prior “due to the lack
 of a strong market case to build it.” Id. However, the arti-
 cle goes on to explain that “[f]or the past decade, growth in
 the US leisure motorboat market has been dominated by
 pricey inboard tow-boats and ski boats speciali[z]ed for wa-
 tersports,” but that the new “forward-facing sterndrive
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 BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 allows Volvo Penta to compete in the water sports market.”
 Id. That there was an earlier time when there was not a
 market demand for a forward-facing stern drive does not
 completely negate the decade when there was a demand for
 a forward-facing stern drive.
     The Board also inexplicably dismisses the relevance of
 the time since the issuance of the asserted prior art refer-
 ences, Brandt and Kiekhaefer. Although we agree with the
 Board that “the mere passage of time from dates of the
 prior art to the challenged patents” does not indicate non-
 obviousness, Decision at *34, their age can be relevant to
 long-felt unresolved need. See Leo Pharm. Prods., 726 F.3d
 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The length of the intervening
 time between the publication dates of the prior art and the
 claimed invention can also qualify as an objective indicator
 of nonobviousness.”); cf. Nike, Inc. v. Adidas AG, 812 F.3d
 1326, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on other grounds by
 Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
 As the Board noted, other factors, such as “lack of market
 demand” can explain why a product was not developed for
 years, even decades after the prior art. Decision at *34.
 But when, as here, evidence demonstrates that there was
 a market demand for at least the prior decade, the fact that
 Brunswick itself owned one of the asserted references for
 almost fifty years yet did not develop the claimed invention
 should not be overlooked. Even if the market demand only
 existed for ten of those fifty years, it is certainly relevant
 that the asserted patents were long in existence and not
 obscure, but rather owned by the parties in this case.
     Finally, we address the Board’s ultimate conclusion
 that “Patent Owner’s objective evidence weighs somewhat
 in favor of nonobviousness” but that Brunswick’s “strong
 evidence of obviousness outweighs Patent Owner’s objec-
 tive evidence of nonobviousness.” Decision at *34. The
 Board fails to provide any explanation for that conclusion.
 Even if its assignment of weight to each individual factor
 was supported by substantial evidence (“some weight” for
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 20                       VOLVO PENTA OF THE AMERICAS, LLC v.
                                    BRUNSWICK CORPORATION

 copying, industry praise, and commercial success; and
 “very little weight” for skepticism, failure of others, and
 long-felt but unsolved need), it stands to reason that these
 individual weights would sum to a greater weight. The
 Board does not discuss the summation of the factors at all
 other than to say, without explanation, that they collec-
 tively “weigh[] somewhat in favor of nonobviousness.” Id.
 That is not sufficient to sustain its determination. See, e.g.,
 Pers. Web, 848 F.3d at 993; In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d
 at 1385.
     For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the
 Board failed to properly consider the evidence of objective
 indicia of nonobviousness. We therefore vacate and re-
 mand for further consideration consistent with this opin-
 ion. The Board should make additional findings as needed,
 considering the totality of the evidence of obviousness, in-
 cluding the teachings of the combined references in rela-
 tion to secondary considerations. Brown & Williamson,
 229 F.3d at 1124 (“The ultimate determination of whether
 an invention would have been obvious is a legal conclusion
 based on the totality of the evidence.”).
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered both parties’ remaining arguments
 but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the
 decision of the Board is vacated and remanded.
                VACATED AND REMANDED
                             COSTS
 No costs.