Court Opinion

ID: 9404998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 21:04:55.17879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:18.478864
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/26/23 Vieira v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

JODI VIEIRA,                                                       B317139

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                        19VECV01454

KAISER FOUNDATION
HOSPITALS et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Huey P. Cotton, Judge. Affirmed.

         Jodi Vieira, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Cozen O’Connor, Michele Ballard Miller, John R.
Carrigan, Jr., and H. Sarah Fan for Defendants and
Respondents.
                   _________________________
       Plaintiff Jodi Vieira appeals a summary judgment in favor
of defendants Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (KFH) and Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (KFHP). We conclude the trial
court reasonably exercised its discretion to deny plaintiff’s
request to continue the summary judgment hearing and there
is no merit to plaintiff’s contention that she did not receive
sufficient notice of the motion. Defendants’ evidence proved
KFH had lawful reasons for the adverse employment action
at the heart of plaintiff’s claims and plaintiff failed to produce
responsive evidence suggesting those reasons may be pretextual.
We affirm.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.     The Complaint
       Plaintiff sued defendants in a four-count complaint,
asserting causes of action for (1) disability discrimination,
harassment, and retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940); (2) violation
of the California Family Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 12945.2);
(3) whistleblower retaliation (Lab. Code, § 1102.5); and
(4) retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of
public policy.
       She alleged defendants had employed her for over
10 years in an unspecified capacity. In late-January 2018,
plaintiff requested and received medical leave from defendants
to recuperate from ongoing stress, anxiety, and panic attacks.
When she returned to work on May 2, 2018, defendants informed
plaintiff she “had no choice but to resign, or be terminated”
for an “incident” that occurred in January 2018 before she took
medical leave. Due to the “stress of this incident,” plaintiff’s
physician placed her back on medical leave the same day. While
she remained on leave, defendants advised plaintiff that she

                                2
would be placed on an “action plan, in lieu of termination” when
she returned to work. Defendants later “retract[ed] the action
plan, and suspend[ed] [p]laintiff to prevent her from working.”
Defendants then advised plaintiff she would have a “ ‘last
chance’ ” to avoid termination by signing “away any rights
to a lawsuit for unfair treatment.” When she refused to sign
the “ ‘Last Chance Agreement,’ ” defendants terminated
plaintiff’s employment.
       Before returning to work in May 2018, plaintiff allegedly
complained to defendants and the California Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) about practices
by defendants and other employees that “violated the law with
respect to hazardous materials” and led to “an incident in which
hazardous materials were improperly spilled, in January 2018.”
She alleged defendants “refused to undertake an investigation”
of her complaints and “proceeded to improperly terminate” her
employment after she “refused to sign a document waiving
any legal right to bring a claim” against defendants.
2.     The Summary Judgment Motion
       Defendants moved for summary judgment. Their
supporting evidence showed that, on January 16, 2018, plaintiff
had been working an evening shift in the Labor and Delivery
Unit of Kaiser Permanente’s Woodland Hills Medical Center
when an expectant mother was admitted to the unit in active
labor.1 Plaintiff was assigned to be the patient’s primary care
nurse, and was assisted by a “traveler orientee” nurse, a charge

1    According to the declaration of a KFHP human resources
consultant for the Kaiser Permanente Woodland Hills Medical
Center, plaintiff was an employee of KFH and has never been
employed by KFHP.

                                3
nurse, and a scrub technician. After the patient delivered twins,
a bucket containing a mixture of formaldehyde and water (known
as “formalin”) cracked and spilled onto the floor of the unit,
releasing toxic fumes that jeopardized the health of several
people, including the two newborn babies.
       Bella Berelovich, the manager of the Labor and Delivery
Unit, conducted an investigation of the incident to determine
what had caused the formalin spill and to assess what, if any,
discipline should follow. As part of her investigation, on
January 25, 2018, Berelovich held a meeting with plaintiff and
plaintiff’s union representatives, as well as the scrub technician
who had been present for the incident. Based on the evidence
she developed in her investigation, Berelovich and other KFH
management determined plaintiff and the scrub technician
bore responsibility for the formalin spill; however, plaintiff
bore greater responsibility because she had placed the bucket
of formalin at the bottom of a gurney used to transport the new
mother without informing the traveler nurse of the hazardous
substance. When the traveler nurse lowered the gurney,
it cracked the bucket, causing the formalin spill. Berelovich
and her management colleagues determined plaintiff’s conduct
was “reckless” and reflected “a lack of critical thinking.”
       After the January 25, 2018 meeting with Berelovich,
plaintiff’s union representative advised her that she would likely
receive a “Level 4 Corrective Action.” Under KFH’s policies, a
Level 4 Corrective Action is accompanied by a “ ‘Day of Decision’ ”
—a one-day paid leave during which an employee must decide
whether to “ ‘change [their] performance and/or behavior and
return to the organization, or to voluntarily resign [their]
employment’ ” with KFH. If the employee elects to return

                                4
to work, she is responsible for completing a “ ‘Draft Action Plan’ ”
form, which serves as the basis for a “ ‘Last Chance Agreement.’ ”
An employee’s failure to complete a Draft Action Plan form or
to sign the Last Chance Agreement gives rise to a “Level 5 . . .
Corrective Action,” which can result in involuntary termination.
After discussing the anticipated discipline with her union
representative, plaintiff went out on medical stress leave.
       When plaintiff returned from her leave on May 2, 2018,
KFH presented her with the Level 4 Corrective Action. The
next day, plaintiff again went out on medical leave and made
a complaint to Cal-OSHA, alleging health and safety violations
related to the handling of hazardous substances, including
formalin. Cal-OSHA conducted an investigation and found
no violations.
       On May 26, 2018, while still out on leave, plaintiff sent a
letter to Jennifer Astasio, the Director of Maternal/Child Health
for KFH, giving her account of the formalin spill. Astasio was
frustrated that plaintiff appeared to take no responsibility for
her conduct, policy violations, and “poor judgment.” Astasio was
also concerned that plaintiff claimed she had not been trained
regarding formalin spills when KFH’s records reflected she had
received training. In Astasio’s view, plaintiff’s complaints about
a lack of sufficient supplies and personal protective equipment
were unfounded and did not constitute a legitimate “complaint
of allegedly unsafe working conditions because, had [plaintiff]
followed her training, she would not have been the person
responsible for cleaning up the Formalin spill.”
       On May 30, 2018, plaintiff sent Astasio a Draft Action Plan
with three action items generally stipulating that plaintiff would
follow all KFH safety and environmental awareness protocols in

                                 5
the work area. However, on June 5, 2018, plaintiff sent Astasio
an “Addendum to Draft Action Plan Form,” stating, among other
things, “For the record, I followed all protocols and demonstrated
critical thinking throughout my 16 year career and for the said
incident, with the rules and protocols that were already set in
place.” Astasio determined plaintiff was, once again, refusing
to take responsibility for her part in the incident.
       After plaintiff returned from leave, KFH scheduled another
meeting to discuss the Level 4 Corrective Action. On June 6,
2018, Astasio sent an email to plaintiff’s union representative,
explaining that, in order to move forward with the meeting,
plaintiff would have to confirm her commitment to the original
Draft Action Plan, without incorporating the Addendum. Astasio
warned, “If [plaintiff] is not committed to take responsibility and
change her performance and/or behavior, then this means that
she is unable to meet the requirements [of the Level 4 Corrective
Action] and therefore should prepare to voluntarily resign, and
as the employer we can advance the corrective action process
to Level 5, [which] may result in the involuntary termination
of employment.” Plaintiff’s union representative confirmed
plaintiff had agreed to work with the Draft Action Plan and
wished to move forward with the meeting.
       On June 6, 2018, plaintiff and her union representatives
met with Astasio. Astasio reiterated that KFH could not accept
plaintiff’s proposed Addendum. Plaintiff refused to withdraw
the Addendum, even after several caucus sessions with her
union representatives. As a result, Astasio placed plaintiff
on a “paid investigatory suspension” to enable KFH to review
the circumstances precipitating the Level 4 Corrective Action

                                 6
and to determine whether further disciplinary action was
warranted.
       On June 19, 2018, plaintiff and her union representatives
met with Astasio and other KFH management to discuss the
Draft Action Plan and a Last Chance Agreement. Plaintiff again
refused to sign the documents, even after she was advised that
her unwillingness to reach an agreement would leave KFH with
no option but to terminate her employment.
       On June 22, 2018, plaintiff’s union representative notified
KFH management that plaintiff was willing to sign the Last
Chance Agreement, and another meeting was scheduled. Before
the meeting, however, plaintiff advised Astasio that she had
changed her mind and she remained unwilling to sign the
agreement. Astasio again advised plaintiff that her refusal to
reach an agreement could lead to termination of her employment.
Plaintiff responded, “Yes I understand. Do what you have to do.”
       Due to plaintiff’s continued refusal to fulfill the terms
of the Level 4 Corrective Action, Astasio and the other KFH
management decided to terminate plaintiff’s employment,
effective July 2, 2018. To Astasio’s knowledge, plaintiff is the
only KFH employee to have refused to submit a Draft Action Plan
after receiving a Level 4 Corrective Action.
       Based on the foregoing evidence, KFH argued it had a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for all adverse employment
actions taken against plaintiff and it provided plaintiff with every
legitimate accommodation she requested.2

2     KFHP argued it was not plaintiff’s employer and therefore
could not be held liable for her employment claims. Plaintiff
admitted she was only a KFH employee at her deposition and

                                 7
       Plaintiff opposed the summary judgment motion,
offering her own declaration in support. She declared KFH’s
investigation had revealed the scrub technician who received
only a Level 3 Corrective Action had violated the “usual and
customary practice” by bringing the bucket containing formalin
into the delivery unit. Plaintiff maintained she was “unaware
of the bucket full of the toxic formalin” because she had been
with “her patient at all times.” She also asserted her requests
for an investigation into the spill incident and clarification
of KFH’s disciplinary actions “went woefully unanswered.”
However, in her response to defendants’ separate statement
of undisputed facts, plaintiff conceded it was “[u]ndisputed”
that KFH’s disciplinary decisions were “not based” on whether
plaintiff “had engaged in any protected activity of any kind (such
as making any complaints about safety, or taking any medical
leave) or on whether . . . [plaintiff] did or did not suffer from
any disability.” She also conceded it was “[u]ndisputed” that
KFH terminated her employment “[b]ased on her continued
refusals to sign a Last Chance Agreement.”
3.     The Judgment
       The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, concluding KFH had presented evidence of a
nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for the adverse
employment action—namely, KFH’s good faith belief that
plaintiff was responsible for the formalin spill and her
unwillingness to take personal responsibility for the incident
—and plaintiff had failed to present evidence suggesting
the reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

the trial court granted KFHP summary judgment on that basis.
Plaintiff does not appear to challenge that ruling on appeal.

                                8
       Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal.
                             DISCUSSION
1.     Plaintiff Received Sufficient Notice of the Summary
       Judgment Motion
       Plaintiff contends she received inadequate notice of
defendants’ summary judgment motion. Without citation to
the record, she asserts defendants served notice of the motion
by mail less than 80 days before the hearing date. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(2)3 [75-day notice period for summary
judgment motion shall be increased by five days if notice is
served by mail to address in California].)
       Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the record establishes
defendants personally served plaintiff at her residence with
notice of the summary judgment motion and supporting
documents 76 calendar days before the appointed hearing date.
Plaintiff received sufficient notice of the motion.
2.     Plaintiff Failed to Submit an Adequate Affidavit
       or to Make a Timely Application for Continuance
       of the Summary Judgment Hearing
       Section 437c, subdivision (h) directs that a motion for
summary judgment shall be denied, or a continuance shall
be granted, “[i]f it appears from the affidavits submitted in
opposition . . . that facts essential to justify opposition may exist
but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented . . . .” A party
opposing summary judgment may also apply for a continuance
to obtain necessary discovery “at any time on or before the date
the opposition response to the motion is due.” (Ibid.)
       The party seeking a continuance under section 437c,
subdivision (h) must show “ ‘(1) the facts to be obtained are

3     Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                  9
essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe
such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time
is needed to obtain these facts.’ ” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95
Cal.App.4th 627, 633.) While “continuances are to be liberally
granted,” the decision whether to grant such a continuance is
ultimately within the discretion of the trial court. (Bahl v. Bank
of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395; FSR Brokerage, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 69, 72.)
       Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to continue the summary judgment hearing to allow
her to conduct further discovery. However, she does not identify
any part of the record where she made the showing required
under section 437c, subdivision (h), and our review of her
declaration in opposition to the summary judgment motion
confirms the affidavit was inadequate to satisfy her statutory
burden.
       The following two sentences in plaintiff’s declaration
are all we can find remotely addressing the issue: “Plaintiff is
continuing to conduct [d]iscovery in efforts to obtain statements
from parties who were known to be in the room at the time of the
incident. This includes, the patient, patients’ family and Kaiser
personnel.” This was insufficient. Section 437c, subdivision (h)
“requires more than a simple recital that ‘facts essential to justify
opposition may exist.’ The affidavit or declaration in support
of the continuance request must detail the specific facts that
would show the existence of controverting evidence.” (Lerma
v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 715; see also
Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
411, 420 [finding “insufficient” declaration that simply stated
“ ‘additional information and testimony is still required in order

                                 10
to adequately respond to Defendant’s Motion’ ”]; cf. Dee v. Vintage
Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 35 [declaration
explaining witness “made admissions that were ‘essential’ to
[plaintiff’s] case” regarding “hostile working environment” and
plaintiff’s counsel had “acted promptly” to obtain deposition
transcript held sufficient to mandate continuance under § 437c,
subd. (h)].)
       Plaintiff likewise failed to file a timely application
for a continuance under the statute. The record discloses it
was not until “commencement of the hearing” on defendant’s
summary judgment motion that plaintiff first made an
“ex-parte application for continuance.” The trial court denied
the application and proceeded to hear argument on the motion.
This was not an abuse of discretion. (See § 437c, subd. (h) [party
opposing summary judgment may apply for a continuance “at any
time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion
is due”]; Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th
1040, 1056 [to obtain a continuance the party opposing summary
judgment must “demonstrate, either in their opposition papers
or in a separate application filed no later than their opposition
papers, that the missing discovery was required”].)
3.     KFH Proved It Terminated Plaintiff’s Employment
       for a Lawful Reason; Plaintiff Failed to Respond with
       Evidence Suggesting Pretext
       On appeal from a summary judgment, “we review the
record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposition papers except that to which objections
have been made and sustained.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).) We make “an independent
assessment of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, applying

                                11
the same legal standard as the trial court in determining
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
218, 222.)
       A defendant is entitled to summary judgment upon
a showing that a plaintiff’s action has no merit. (§ 437c,
subd. (a)(1).) The defendant meets this burden with respect
to each cause of action by establishing undisputed facts that
negate one or more elements of the claim or state a complete
defense to the cause of action. (Id., subd. (p)(2); Romano v.
Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 487 (Romano).)
Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material
fact exists as to the cause of action or defense. (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.)
       In the employment discrimination context, case law
has refined this burden-shifting analysis to incorporate
the three-stage McDonnell Douglas test used to try federal
discrimination claims. (See Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354,
citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792;
Kelly v. Stamps.com Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097;
Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986,
1004–1005.) Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff
bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination; if the plaintiff is successful, the burden shifts
to the employer to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions; and, if the employer produces evidence of a
legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show
the employer’s reason was a pretext to mask an illegal motive.

                                12
(Guz, at pp. 354–356; Clark v. Claremont University Center
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639, 662; Morgan v. Regents of University
of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67–68.)
       Although an employee’s evidence in opposition to an
employer’s motion for summary judgment is construed liberally,
it “remains subject to careful scrutiny.” (King v. United Parcel
Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 433.) The employee’s
“subjective beliefs in an employment discrimination case do
not create a genuine issue of fact; nor do uncorroborated and
self-serving declarations.” (Ibid.) The employee’s evidence
must relate to the motivation of the decision makers and prove,
by nonspeculative evidence, “an actual causal link between
prohibited motivation and termination.” (Id. at pp. 433–434.)
       To show an employer’s reason for termination is pretextual,
an employee “ ‘cannot simply show that the employer’s decision
was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is
whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.’ ”
(Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
997, 1004–1005 (Hersant); Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358.) To
meet his or her burden, the employee “ ‘must demonstrate such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
“unworthy of credence,” . . . and hence infer “that the employer
did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.” ’ ”
(Hersant, at p. 1005.)
       Plaintiff argues defendants failed to meet their initial
burden in moving for summary judgment because some of the
facts set forth in their separate statement were not material.

                               13
(See § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) She does not, however, identify which
facts she contends were immaterial, nor does plaintiff attempt
to demonstrate that striking those facts compels reversal of
the summary judgment. (See Claudio v. Regents of University
of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230 [on review of a
summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing
reversible error, even if she did not bear the burden in the
trial court].) In any event, even if we agreed that defendants’
separate statement was overinclusive, our review of the record
and plaintiff’s objections confirms defendants set forth (and
proved) sufficient material facts to meet their initial burden.
(Cf. Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 106
(Reeves) [observing, if the trial court exercises its “inherent power
to strike proposed ‘undisputed facts’ that fail to comply with the
statutory requirements” and thus “leaves the required separate
statement insufficient to support the motion, the court is
justified in denying the motion on that basis,” but concluding
overinclusive separate statement did not alone warrant
reversal].)
       Consistent with a defendant’s summary judgment burden,
a fact is material if it negates one or more elements of a claim
or supports a complete defense to a cause of action. (§ 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 487; Reeves, supra,
121 Cal.App.4th at p. 106; see also Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 915, 926 [“to be ‘material’ a fact must relate to
some claim or defense in issue under the pleadings”].) In an
employment discrimination or retaliation case, because “ ‘the
factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus
motivated the employer,’ ” any fact relevant to the employer’s
motivation for an adverse employment action is necessarily

                                 14
material to the plaintiff’s claim and the employer’s defense.
(Hersant, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
       Here, although plaintiff objected to a number of facts
in defendants’ separate statement as immaterial, she conceded
it was “[u]ndisputed” that KFH’s disciplinary decisions were
“not based” on whether plaintiff “had engaged in any protected
activity of any kind . . . or on whether . . . [plaintiff] did or
did not suffer from any disability”; and that KFH terminated
her employment “[b]ased on her continued refusals to sign a
Last Chance Agreement.” Those undisputed facts, which were
supported by substantial evidence and directly related to KFH’s
reasons for terminating plaintiff’s employment, were sufficient
to meet defendants’ initial burden. (See, e.g., Hersant, supra,
57 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006 [employer’s issuance of “notice of
adverse action that resulted in [plaintiff’s] demotion,” accusing
plaintiff of “inefficiency, insubordination, neglect of duty,
dishonesty and misuse of state property,” sufficient to meet
employer’s initial burden to show nondiscriminatory reason
for adverse employment action].)
       Plaintiff also appears to argue the trial court failed to
construe her evidence liberally and to consider all reasonable
inferences deducible from that evidence. (See § 437c, subd. (c).)
However, here again, plaintiff does not identify what inferences
the trial court should have drawn or how those inferences would
have amounted to a triable issue of material fact. (See Lewis v.
County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 [“As with
an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s responsibility
to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out
the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation
to the record and any supporting authority.”].) In any event,

                                15
our review of plaintiff’s declaration—the only evidence she
offered in support of her summary judgment opposition—
confirms the trial court properly considered the evidence
in ruling on the motion.
       As the trial court explained, “Plaintiff[’s] declaration
dispute[d] in some respects the events that led up to the spill,”
but it offered no evidence to support an inference that KFH did
not genuinely believe “plaintiff was at fault” for the incident or
that KFH’s decision to terminate her employment was based on
anything other than plaintiff’s refusal to sign the Last Chance
Agreement. Even liberally construed, plaintiff’s declaration
at most suggested KFH management misjudged the level
of culpability of the various actors. While her declaration
emphasized the scrub technician had received “less harsh”
discipline despite bringing the bucket containing formalin into
the delivery unit, plaintiff did not dispute that her role in the
formalin spill was the inciting reason for KFH’s disciplinary
action against her. As discussed, to demonstrate an employer’s
reason for termination is pretextual, an employee “ ‘cannot
simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or
mistaken,’ ” because “ ‘the factual dispute at issue is whether
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether
the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.’ ” (Hersant,
supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1004–1005.) The trial court
correctly applied the applicable law and reasonably considered
plaintiff’s evidence in concluding that “[p]laintiff may disagree
with the conclusions drawn by defendants with regard to her role
in the incident, but that alone shows neither discrimination or
harassment based on her medical condition, nor pretext.” We
find no error in the court’s ruling.

                                16
                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. are entitled
to costs.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                   EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             HEIDEL, J.


      Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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