Court Opinion

ID: 9636908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:49:19.307906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:51.296265
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY.
I must respectfully dissent as I disagree with the majority that this court should exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.
“The United States Supreme Court has stated that the ‘collateral order doctrine’ must be narrowly applied lest it be allowed to swallow the general rule and has characterized the requirements for an appealable collateral order as ‘stringent.’ ” Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209, 1214 (1999) (citations omitted). In other words, invoking this court’s jurisdiction for review of a collateral order is not to be undertaken lightly, and interpretation of the collateral order doctrine should be narrow in order to prevent erosion of the collateral order rule. See generally id.; see also Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (2003).
In this case, the prong of the collateral order doctrine at issue is whether the “right involved is too important to be denied review.” Majority opinion at 107, 859 A.2d at 1278. The majority submits that the alleged “important” question presented for review is the “substance of the ‘good cause’ requirement for discovery as it relates to a claim brought pursuant to Batson and its progeny.” Id. at 108, 859 A.2d at 1278.1
*113As noted by the majority opinion, Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547 (1999) makes clear that in order to grant review of the issue presented by the collateral order, the issue must impact more than just the parties at hand. We explained that
[f]or purposes of defining an order as a collateral order under Rule 313 it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.
Id. at 552 (citations omitted); Geniviva, 725 A.2d at 1213-14; Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47. Furthermore, “the overarching principle governing ‘importance’ is that ... an issue is important if the interests that would potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final judgment rule.” Ben supra.
Based upon this understanding of the “importance” requirement, I am not persuaded that the issue in this case is sufficiently “important” to invoke our jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The majority intimates that this issue is sufficiently important since it “would provide our court with an opportunity to explain the substance of the ‘good cause’ requirement for discovery....” See Majority opinion at 108, 859 A.2d at 1278. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999), we examined the “good cause” requirement and indicated that a discovery request, at the collateral stage, must be supported by specific grounds and a claim of necessity in order to meet the good cause requirement. Id. at 1175. Thus, there is guidance of the definition of “good cause” as set forth in Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). In addition, I do not agree that the issue raised in this case involve rights “deeply rooted in public policy” which would impact more than just the parties in this case. See Geniviva, *114725 A.2d at 1213-14. This is no more than a review of an ordinary discovery order.
Furthermore, I find it unusual that after concluding that this issue is sufficiently “important” to invoke our jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the majority then concludes that this “important” issue is previously litigated.2 Thus, the majority invokes the collateral order doctrine to speak to the substance of the good cause requirement, but never analyzes this “important” issue because it is previously litigated. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
Justices NIGRO and SAYLOR join this dissenting opinion.

. The majority opinion is less than clear about what is the "important" issue for review, since on the prior page it speaks about the Common*113wealth's interest in protecting its own work product. See Majority opinion at 107, 859 A.2d at 1278. I, however, tend to agree with the issue as phrased on page 108, 859 A.2d page 1278 of the majority opinion, since ultimately, the question must relate to the PCRA court's discovery order in this case.

. This author expresses no opinion as to whether the issue is previously litigated or not; I am merely pointing out the paradoxical analysis set forth by the majority opinion.