Court Opinion

ID: 9516313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:40:20.863656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:37.901095
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The inherent authority of the judiciary to hire, supervise and discharge court personnel creates an employer-employe relationship between judges and their appointees. The judges of the courts of common pleas are “public employers” as the term is defined by the Public Employe Relations Act (PERA), Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301. Commonwealth ex rel. Bradley v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 479 Pa. 440, 388 A.2d 736 (1978). The issue of whether judicial secretaries are “public employes” under PERA, however, requires an analysis of the statutory exclusion of “confidential employes.”
Under PERA, the term “confidential employe” is not coterminous with, and should not be confused with, traditional notions of an entrusted employe. There is no doubt that the latter relationship may arise between a judge and secretary. “Confidential employe” is defined by the statute to include “... any employe who works: (i) in the personnel offices of a public employer and has access to information subject to use by the public employer in collective bargaining; or (ii) in a close continuing relationship with public officers or representatives associated with collective bar*281gaining on behalf of the employer.” 43 P.S. § 1101.-301(13). [Emphasis added].
The intended purpose of the exclusion for confidential employes is to strike a balance between the employe’s right to representation and the employer’s right to develop labor policies with the aid of employes who are not represented by the union with whom the employer bargains. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Altoona Area School District, 480 Pa. 148, 389 A.2d 553 (1978). As the majority opinion states, this policy underlying the exclusion makes it peculiarly appropriate to interpret the statutory definition narrowly. Under the majority’s analysis, the balance has not been properly struck in this case.
In Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Altoona Area School District, (Altoona) the Altoona Area School Service Personnel Association (Association) had been certified as the exclusive representative of a unit comprised of the School District’s secretarial, supportive, maintenance and cafeteria employes. The Association subsequently requested the Board to clarify its description of the unit with regard to, inter alia, secretaries to the high school and junior high school principals. This Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the secretaries were confidential employes for purposes of PERA. Recognizing that PERA was enacted to accord public employes the right to bargain with their employers, we stated, “[s]ince § 1101.-301(13) denies to certain employes this fundamental right, the Board could properly determine that ‘associated with’ was best read so as to exclude only those employes whose inclusion in the bargaining unit would seriously impair the public employer’s ability to bargain on a fair and equal footing with the union.” 480 Pa. at 155, 389 A.2d at 557.
In holding that the Board had not erred in determining that the secretaries were not confidential employes, we noted the Board’s findings that the principals for whom the secretaries worked were not part of the bargaining team; that the principals were consulted on occasion regarding the effect of contract provisions; and that a secretary to a *282junior high school principal had typed memoranda relative to collective bargaining on two occasions during her ten-year employment. We concluded that “to deny these secretaries the salutary effects of public employe status based on such a minimal connection with collective bargaining would distort the legislative intent to accord employes in the public sector the right to organize and have the benefit of union representation.” 480 Pa. at 157, 389 A.2d at 558.
In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board similarly concluded that the judicial secretaries have not been involved in collective bargaining. The Commonwealth Court properly observed the standard of review of “abuse of discretion” in reviewing the PLRB’s findings of fact. Acknowledging that the county commissioners are the exclusive managerial representatives for collective bargaining purposes, Ellenbogen v. County of Allegheny, 479 Pa. 429, 388 A.2d 730 (1978), the court affirmed the PLRB’S conclusion that the judicial secretaries are not confidential employes under PERA. In doing so, the court noted that the record was barren of evidence that the judicial secretaries worked closely and continually with managerial employes who formulate the employer’s labor policy.
This Court is bound by the same standard of review. Review of the reproduced record in this case discloses minimal testimony relating to the involvement of the judicial secretaries and judges of the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas in the collective bargaining process. The testimony of President Judge Martin J. Coyne demonstrates that the judges’, and concomitantly their secretaries’, “involvement” in the formulation or effectuation of labor policy is non-existent:
Q. Each judge has a secretary, Your Honor, a personal secretary?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If, and this is a big if, but if the court were to engage in collective bargaining or if they were in some way to get involved in collective bargaining, *283which of the judges would be involved in that process?
A. I presume I would be for one.
Q. Would the other judges?
A. Now, understand that each judge in this jurisdiction has been assigned an administrative function. That’s by administrative order. For example, I have already alluded to the fact that Judge Davison is an administrative judge for the probation. Judge Mellenberg has been given Domestic Relations, and Judge Backenstoe has been given the administrative duties with respect to the criminal and civil division. Now, in our scheme of things, I have the overall responsibility for everything that goes on, but I certainly look to these judges for first line administration in the areas to which they have been assigned. To the degree that they are involved in those areas, their secretaries are privy, I guess, to everything that goes on.
Q. So would the secretaries have access to confidential information which would be related to, first of all, I guess, grievances?
A. I am certain of that.1
Q. Would they have access to confidential information, which would be related to the collective bargaining process, whether or not certain things were agreed to with a bargaining representative?
A. I am not quite certain about the answer to that. It depends, I guess, who was doing the bargaining, what mechanics were set up there. There’s a pretty good chance that that might happen, but I couldn’t say without—
*284Q. For example, if there was a proposal with respect to the Probation Office, the Probation Office be open certain hours and not open other hours, would you go to Judge Davison and discuss that matter?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And would his secretary have access to the court’s position with respect to such a proposal?
A. No question about that, she would.
[R. 72a, 73a] [Emphasis added]
It is apparent from this testimony that the judges have not been involved directly or indirectly in the collective bargaining process. The line of questioning was entirely hypothetical and demonstrates that involvement of the judges is illusory. To the extent that the majority opinion has made inferences to the contrary, such inferences are unfounded and belied by the record itself.
The judges are not part of the bargaining team and there was no testimony that the judicial secretaries have had access to collective bargaining materials. The record is devoid of evidence of even occasional communications relating to the effects of proposed contract provisions, comparable to those between the managerial representative and school principals presented and found insufficient in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Altoona Area School District, supra.
The majority’s holding signals an abandonment of our limited scope of review of these matters. The Court’s holding denies union representation to judicial secretaries not on the basis of an actual, even though attenuated, connection with collective bargaining, but on an imagined one. Based upon the record in this case, I would hold that the judicial secretaries are not confidential employes as defined by PERA.
The majority opinion concludes that the subjects of collective bargaining which may be incorporated into an agreement by the county commissioners are not limited by the judiciary’s inherent authority to hire, supervise and dis*285charge court personnel. While I do not believe that the majority’s discussion on this point is necessary to resolve the narrow issue with which this Court is confronted, I wish to make it clear that I depart from the majority’s analysis that the county commissioners are not limited in the scope of the subjects properly included in the collective bargaining process.
Although the majority readily concedes that judges retain a vital interest in items such as hours, vacations and other paid leave, the majority would permit such items to be included in the collective bargaining process, characterizing the same as “primarily financial.” Rather than restricting the matters involving court personnel which may be submitted to collective bargaining to their financial components —i.e. the compensation to be paid for vacations and other paid leave — the majority would permit such matters to be bargained for, reasoning that “[i]f it is determined that there would be no adverse impact there is no reason why the proposal should not be embodied in the collective bargaining agreement.” [Majority opinion at 279]
I reject such an analysis. I would hold that if the collective bargaining agreement includes terms which affect, adversely or not, the judiciary’s authority to hire, discharge or supervise court personnel, those terms are void because the matters are vested solely in the judiciary. The commissioners lack the authority to bargain such terms.
The effect of the majority’s approach would be to create uncertainty in the collective bargaining process — what may properly be subject to collective bargaining would turn on what is acceptable to the judiciary, rather than what is bargainable. Such a subjective standard is in fact no standard at all. The proper starting point of our analysis should be to determine what is properly subject to bargaining, not what is acceptable.
The majority dismisses this concern by stating that, “[i]n any event, contractual terms which actually impair the independence [of the judiciary] must be declared void____” [Majority opinion at 279] [Emphasis added]. The majori*286ty’s benefit/detriment treatment is inappropriate. This Court has never held that actual, or even potential, impairment of the judiciary’s independence is necessary — we have always held that it is the interference or infringement on the judiciary’s independence which is critical.
Beckert v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 56 Pa.Cmwlth. 572, 425 A.2d 859 (1981), per curiam aff’d., 501 Pa. 70, 459 A.2d 756 (1983), serves to illustrate the problems which may arise if the collective bargaining agreement incorporates those matters which affect the judiciary’s inherent authority to control the court employes, despite the common pleas judges acquiescence in the agreement.2 Although the subject of the lawsuit was a collective bargaining term originally agreed to by the common pleas judges, it subsequently proved to be unworkable and undesirable prior to the expiration of the term of the agreement. The Common Pleas judge’s attempt to control the discharge of one of his employes was affected by the agreement, resulting in a charge of unfair labor practice.
The Honorable Paul R. Beckert filed an equity action against the union which had acted as the bargaining representative for the non-professional court employes of the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. The union had entered into an agreement with the commissioners of Bucks County and the Common Pleas judges which included a multi-step procedure for the resolution of grievances between the parties concerning the agreement.
*287The agreement provided that no employe could be demoted, suspended, discharged or disciplined without just cause. A district justice’s clerk, who had been discharged from her employment, appealed her discharge through the grievance procedure. The clerk was reinstated at one level of the grievance procedure when an agreement was reached between the court administrator and the union, but the discharge was upheld when the district justice appealed the matter to the president judge. The agreement had provided for an appeal to the president judge only when the grievance had not yet been resolved. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practice charges with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board) against the commissioners and the Court of Common Pleas.
The equity action filed in the Commonwealth Court sought to permanently enjoin the Board from exercising jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice charges on the theory that the discharge of a court employe is a matter within the exclusive province of the judiciary. The Commonwealth Court entered the permanent injunction, holding that the agreement could not validly give a court employe a right to have his discharge reviewed by a non-judicial branch of government. The court concluded that a common pleas court could provide for a grievance procedure in discharge cases in the exercise of its constitutional power. The court emphasized that discharge decisions would have to remain finally with the court; otherwise, power to review such decisions would encroach upon the judiciary’s inherent authority to control the hiring and discharging of court personnel.
The difficulties inherent in the majority’s reasoning are numerous. Inasmuch as the instant action does not provide this Court with the proper vehicle to resolve the complicated issues which the majority opinion discusses, I would reserve such analysis until the issues have been properly presented to this Court. I maintain, however, that the scope of the subjects which may be properly included in a collective bargaining agreement is absolutely limited by the judi*288ciary’s authority to hire, supervise and discharge court personnel.

. In Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Altoona Area School District, supra, we held that the handling of grievances is not part of the formulation or effectuation of an employer’s labor policy. We specifically rejected an argument by the school district that the principals were “associated with" collective bargaining within the meaning of § 1101.301(13) because they were involved in handling grievances at the first level.

. The majority opinion emphasizes the relationship between the county commissioners and the judges of the common pleas court in analyzing the scope of collective bargaining agreements, suggesting that agreement by the judges of that court will suffice to preserve the judiciary’s authority over court personnel. The judiciary’s inherent authority over court personnel is a concept which relates to the judiciary’s freedom from the interference of other branches of the government. Although the authority is generally perceived to be exercised by the courts at the local level, it rests ultimately with this Court. Clearly what is acceptable to the judges of the common pleas court may not be acceptable to this Court. The majority opinion does not respond, however, to this larger issue.