Court Opinion

ID: 9858292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:19:46.886032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:51.043324
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice (dissenting). For the • many reasons hereafter set out, I am unable to' agree with the majority opinion. A quick glance at the wide divergency of estimates made by different parties in this litigation emphasizes the need for strict compliance with established rules in condemnation cases wherein the taxpayers pay the bills. Appellees, Slagle, asked for $10,000 damage. for the right-of-way taken by the state; their own expert witness valued the property at only $12,840 before the taking; the state’s appraisers estimated their damage at $850; and the jury gave them $3,163. There is a well established rule in this state applicable to a case of this kind. In my.opinion this rule was not followed in this case. The Rule. Where there is a partial taking of a landowner’s real property (as here) the following rule applies : (a) Determines the market value of the property before the taking; (b) determine the market value of the property after the taking, and (c) the difference is the amount of damages to which the owner is entitled. Authority for the Rule. In the early case of St. Louis, Arkansas and Texas Railroad v. Anderson, (1882), 39 Ark. 167, the rule was clearly stated to be: “The true measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the whole tract before the taking and the market value of what remains to him after such taking ...” To my knowledge this case has never been overruled or modified but it has been cited with approval in at least eleven of this Court’s decisions, and the rule has been restated in many other decisions of this Court. Not only has said rule been recognized and adhered to by this Court during all these years but it is recognized by all texts examined by me. Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain, (1st ed. 1936), sets out three formulas —each adopted by different courts. At page 158 he defines the third formula: “Difference between the Pair Market Value of the Property before and after the Taking”. The same formula is reiterated in Orgel’s 2d ed. at page 236. The same rule is also recognized by Nichols, Eminent Domain, (3rd ed. 1962) Vol. 4 at page 509, and Jahr, Eminent Domain, ,(1957) at page 136. All these authorities recognize and point out that some states adopt a second method which is described as “Value of the Part Taken Plus Damages to the Remainder ’ ’. Our Court, of course has not heretofore seen fit to adopt this second formula. Is there a difference between the two methods described above? It hardly seems necessary to answer this question. If there is no difference then it would appear that the above mentioned authorities and also this Court have been wasting their time. There are, of course, several differences, but it will suffice to point out only one. States that do not allow a reduction of special benefits accruing to the landowner from his damages suffered could well afford, perhaps, to adopt the second formula— value of land taken plus damages to the rest of the land. Arkansas, however, is not such a state. See: Ark. State Highway Comm. v. Snowden, 233 Ark. 565, 345 S. W. 2d 917, and cases cited therein. An example of two from the case under consideration will illustrate the point in issue: The expert witness gave as one element of damages that appellant would have to rebuild a fence which was torn down. It is possible that the fence was not an asset and that its absence did not detract from the market value of the farm. The same thing could also be said about the trees, or most any other item. Did the Court apply the Rule? I take it that the majority admit the before and after rule was the applicable rule in this case, and we must assume they agree there is a difference between the rule and the second rule mentioned above. The only question then is, was the rule, in effect, applied in regard to the expert testimony given by Roderick. I agree that, in form, the rule was followed in the testimony given by Roderick on direct examination. He stated that, in his opinion, the property was worth $12,840 before the taking and $9,640 after the taking. From there on it was just a matter of arithmetic to determine that Slagles should receive $3,200 as damages. However, on cross-examination, Roderick, in my opinion, showed that he followed (to the letter) the second rule and not the before and after rule. The reason there can be no doubt in my mind is that the several items of damages (proper in the second rule) amounted exactly to $3,200. After detailing the several items, he said: “I have it all figured out as to costs which does total $3,200.” One reason for writing this dissent is the hope that it might in some way help prevent confusing the rule which we have sanctioned so many times with a rule which we have never sanctioned. I think the trial attorney and judges are entitled to that for future guidance. The Proper Objection. I cannot at all agree with the majority in holding appellant’s objection bad because part of Roderick’s testimony was true. If the method used by Roderick in arriving at $3,200 damages is incorrect, then all the testimony goes out. When the wrong figure is subtracted from a given figure the result cannot be right. I am not impressed with the idea that Roderick could not arrive at the fair market value of the land after the taking ($9,640) without considering all the elements of damages. He didn’t have any such aids when he arrived at the figure of $12,840—the value before the taking.