Court Opinion

ID: 9903382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:35:36.063962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.018487
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

GLORIA F. BERK-FIALKOFF, AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE ESTATE OF ALAN FIALKOFF,

           Appellant,

v.                                       Case No. 5D22-628
                                         LT Case No. 2021-CA-001400

WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, IN ITS CAPACITY
AS TRUSTEE, AND H-BAY MINISTRIES,
INC., A TEXAS NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

           Appellees.

________________________________/

Opinion filed March 24, 2023

Nonfinal Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Lake County,
Larry Metz, Judge.

Rainey C. Booth, Jr., and Joanna Greber
Detloff, of Mendes, Reins & Wilander,
PLLC, Tampa, for Appellant.

Kimberly S. Mello, of Greenberg Traurig,
P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, Wilmington
Trust, N.A., In Its Capacity as Trustee.
Cleveland Burke, of Waller Lansden Dortch
& Davis, LLP, Austin, Texas, for Appellee,
H-Bay Ministries, Inc., a Texas Corporation.

PER CURIAM

       Gloria F. Berk-Fialkoff, as personal representative of the estate of Alan

Fialkoff (the “Fialkoff Estate”), appeals inter alia the trial court’s non-final

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Receiver’s Amended Motion to

Enforce Injunction and Stay Proceedings of Personal Injury Claimants (the

“Order”). The Order enjoined the Fialkoff Estate along with other claimants

from pursuing personal injury claims against H-Bay Ministries, Inc. (“H-Bay”)

and other affiliated entities and individuals for a period of one year, but

allowed the claimants to initiate pre-suit procedures and file claims for

purposes of the statute of limitations. The Fialkoff Estate raises several issues

on appeal, one of which we find meritorious, specifically that the challenged

Order does not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c) because

it does not specify the reasons for its entry, it does not contain factual findings,

and it does not contain any findings regarding the four criteria necessary for

entry of an injunction. We agree that the Order is legally insufficient and

reverse.

       In 2018, H-Bay financed the acquisition of five senior living facilities

(the “Facilities”) located on parcels of real property throughout Florida. Three

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years later, after H-Bay allegedly defaulted on the bond payments,

Wilmington Trust, National Association (the “Trustee”) initiated the underlying

lawsuit, seeking, among other relief, foreclosure on its liens and appointment

of a receiver to assume control of the Facilities. The Trustee also filed an

emergency action for appointment of receiver to ensure the well-being of the

elderly residents of the Facilities, provide upkeep of the properties, including

paying employees, collect rents from residents, provide security, preserve the

Trustee’s security interests, and otherwise maintain the status quo pending

resolution of the litigation.

       The court subsequently entered an order appointing a Receiver

(“Receivership Order”) and ordered that the Receiver take exclusive

possession and control of the “Receivership Estate.” 1 It authorized the

Receiver to “undertake all acts necessary in its sole discretion to operate the

Facilities’ business” and stayed all civil legal proceedings of any nature

related to any Receivership property.

       Approximately one year before the Receivership Order was entered,

Alan Fialkoff was admitted to one of the Facilities, where he remained until

his death on September 12, 2020. During his residency at the Facility, Fialkoff

       The Receivership Estate was defined as “[t]he real and personal
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property of [H-Bay] comprising and relating to [Facilities].”

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allegedly suffered from abuse, neglect, and exploitation at the hands of H-

Bay along with other entities and individuals. In March 2021, the Fialkoff

Estate initiated the pre-suit process against H-Bay asserting violations of

Fialkoff’s resident’s rights and deviations from the standard of care. Over the

next twelve months the court held several hearings related to motions to

enforce the original Receivership Order.

       Ultimately on March 4, 2022, the court entered its Order providing that

various personal injury claimants, including the Fialkoff Estate, would be

enjoined from continuing to pursue their claims arising from their residence

or treatment at the Facilities against the Receiver, the Receivership Estate,

H-Bay, and any past or present manager of the Facilities, and any individual

that provided services to H-Bay, the Facilities, or the management

companies. However, the Order authorized the personal injury claimants to

proceed with pre-suit activities, including investigation and informal discovery

as provided in section 429.293, Florida Statutes. Following the pre-suit

activities, the claimants could file suit in any court of competent jurisdiction or

initiate arbitration proceedings, provided that H-Bay would promptly file a

motion to stay the proceedings until February 10, 2023. This is the order the

Fialkoff Estate challenges in this appeal.

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      A trial court with jurisdiction over receivership property may enjoin a

proceeding against that property “if the injunction is necessary to protect

against misappropriation of, or waste relating directly to, the receivership

property.” § 714.14(2), Fla. Stat. (2021); see also Liberte Cap. Grp., LLC v.

Capwill, 462 F.3d 543, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2006); S.E.C. v. Wencke, 622 F.2d

1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding authority of district court to issue order

staying non-party from bringing litigation derived from “the inherent power of

a court of equity to fashion effective relief”). The order of injunction must

specify the reasons for its entry and describe in reasonable detail the acts

restrained without reference to a pleading or other document. § 714.14(3),

Fla. Stat. (2021). Here, in its Order, which essentially modified the injunction

contained in the original Receivership Order, the receivership court simply

explained that the relief sought in the Amended Motion to Enforce was in the

best interests of the Receivership Estate and enjoined the Fialkoff Estate and

other claimants from continuing to pursue claims arising from or related to

their residence, treatment, and/or care at the Facilities.

      Although receivership courts have broad equitable authority to enter

orders to protect a receivership, section 714.14(3) effectively mirrors the

language in rule 1.610(c), which governs the form and scope of temporary

injunctions. As a result, we find that the rules for injunctions also apply in

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receivership cases involving blanket stays, including this case. Typically,

reversal would be warranted when the party seeking the injunction fails to

plead the necessary four elements to obtain the injunction. In accordance with

rule 1.610, the party seeking the injunction must establish: (1) the likelihood

of irreparable harm; (2) the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (3) a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) considerations of the

public interest. See, e.g., Yardley v. Albu, 826 So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 5th DCA

2002). When a party against whom an injunction is entered does not file a

motion to dissolve the injunction pursuant to rule 1.610(d) prior to the direct

appeal, such as in this case, an appellate court does not inquire into the

factual matters presented, and instead limits its inquiry to the legal sufficiency

of the trial court’s order, the complaint, and any supporting documents. Id. at

469.

       Here, the original injunction was essentially sought in the motion for

appointment of receiver and in the foreclosure complaint, which were filed by

the Trustee. The Trustee alleged that a receivership would be in the best

interests of the Facilities’ residents and that unless emergency measures

were implemented, the residents and the Facilities would experience

irreparable harm. It did not, however, allege the likelihood of success or

inadequate remedy at law, and therefore, it did not comply with rule 1.610 for

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obtaining a temporary injunction. However, the Fialkoff Estate did not move

to dissolve the injunction once it received notice of it nor did the Fialkoff Estate

challenge the Receivership Order or the motions that led to entry of the

Receivership Order. Instead, the Fialkoff Estate involved itself in several

hearings, acknowledged that it was not arguing the Receivership Order was

“flawed in any way,” and acquiesced to the injunction being amended to

provide for a middle ground that, in part, provided the relief it requested. We

therefore conclude that the Fialkoff Estate has waived or failed to preserve its

argument as to the failure to plead the elements necessary for an injunction.

See Pendergraft v. C.H., 225 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“When an

appeal is taken from the entry of a temporary injunction, Appellants cannot

raise arguments that should have been, but were not, raised at the hearing in

the trial court.”).

       However, the injunction contained in the Receivership Order as well as

the Order on appeal did not contain findings of fact as to each of the four

elements and “[s]trict compliance with [rule 1.610(c)] . . . is required.” Eldon

v. Perrin, 78 So. 3d 737, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); see also Am. Learning

Sys., Inc. v. Gomes, 199 So. 3d 1076, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that

order granting injunction that does not make clear, definite, and unequivocally

sufficient factual findings “is facially insufficient”). “Where a temporary

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injunction does not include specific findings on each of the required elements

necessary for issuance of an injunction, reversal is required.” SPC Fortebello,

LLC v. Catuogno, 343 So. 3d 1276, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Because we

find that the requirements for temporary injunctions in accordance with rule

1.610(c) apply to this case, we are compelled to reverse and remand for the

court to make the appropriate findings as to the four elements necessary for

entry of an injunction. See Walton Cnty. v. Sandestin Invs., LLC, 148 So. 3d

172, 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (reversing and remanding for trial court to either

enter order that satisfies requirements for entry of temporary injunction, or, if

appropriate, an order denying injunction); see also Yardley, 826 So. 2d at 471

(reversing and remanding for entry of order that includes sufficient findings of

fact). If the trial court is unable to comply with that requirement, it shall enter

an order denying the motion for temporary injunction.

       REVERSED and REMANDED, with instructions.

WALLIS, EDWARDS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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