Court Opinion

ID: 9717693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:08:43.74209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.737715
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: Today’s opinion states that “[a] s an attorney, former State’s Attorney, and in his capacity of Special Assistant Attorney General, respondent was certainly aware of the fact that the proper course of conduct was to report the extortion demand to the appropriate authorities. For a lawyer of respondent’s demonstrated ability and standing at the bar to serve as the conduit through which funds were passed from the alleged victim to the extortionist was unprofessional and unseemly and served to bring the legal profession into disrepute.” (91 Ill. 2d at 427.) Despite this broad and warranted condemnation of respondent’s behavior, the majority concludes that suspension for one year is an appropriate sanction. Because I believe that the discipline imposed is inconsistent with this court’s holding in In re Rosenthal (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 46, cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 961, 59 L. Ed. 2d 775, 99 S. Ct. 1505, and does not adequately consider the severity of respondent’s misconduct, I must respectfully dissent. In In re Rosenthal, respondents, Camow and Rosenthal, negotiated and participated in a bribery scheme perpetrated against their client by a public official. Rosenthal’s corroborated testimony at the disciplinary hearing indicated that he initially advised his client to reject the attempted bribe or he would withdraw from the case. Ultimately, however, he did not withdraw and instead facilitated the bribery consisting of one $20,000 payment. Although Camow was, at first, untruthful to Federal agents investigating the transaction, he and Rosenthal subsequently obtained immunity from prosecution in exchange for their testimony against the public official. The latter was later convicted of extortion and income tax evasion. During the disciplinary hearing in that case, numerous witnesses appeared on respondents’ behalf and attested to their good reputation and service to the community. Also offered in mitigation was Rosenthal’s testimony that they did not withdraw from the case and disclose the crime because of fear of economic, political and physical reprisal against themselves or their client, and because of the attorney-client confidentiality requirement. Carnow additionally asserted that he was under emotional stress at the time of the transaction. This court duly considered the factors offered in mitigation but found them unpersuasive and insufficient to warrant a sanction less than disbarment. Now, in the instant case, which parallels Rosenthal in a number of particulars, the majority concludes that a one-year suspension is justified. It apparently so holds because “[m] any of the circumstances which aggravated the original offense in Rosenthal are not shown here.” 91 Ill. 2d at 428. While it is true that in Rosenthal respondents actually negotiated the bribery payment, they also initially advised against their client’s involvement in the transaction. In the instant case, the respondent counseled his client from the very beginning to meet the extortionist’s demands and, as in Rosenthal, delivered the payments himself. He contends that he so advised his client because he knew of Arambasich’s propensity for violence and feared for the safety of his client and son, as well as his own. However, the attorney’s fear of reprisal did not persuade this court to enter a sanction less than disbarment in Rosenthal. While there the threats did not occur until after the bribery payment, nevertheless, if fear of reprisal is not considered sufficient to conceal an illegal payment, it certainly should not be a sufficient justification for making the payment. Respondent’s fear for the safety of his son could have been avoided by the son’s obtaining other summer employment. Finally, in this regard, respondent eventually did disclose to the authorities the illegal transactions. As noted by the majority, “the evidence shows no change of circumstances which diminished the alleged danger.” 91 Ill. 2d at 427. Respondent points out that, in Rosenthal, the attorneys participated in the bribery scheme to protect a client’s business interests, whereas, in the instant case, the payment was allegedly made to protect the client’s safety. Inasmuch as bribery is reprehensible conduct which cannot be countenanced to protect a client, the particular “interest” involved is irrelevant. Regardless of what prompts a bribery attempt, an attorney’s proper response is to disclose that attempt to the appropriate authorities. D.R. 7 — 102(A)(3), (A)(7). In both cases, respondents submitted mitigating circumstances. While it is true that an additional aggravating circumstance in Rosenthal was respondent’s initial lack of candor in dealing with the authorities, this factor is more than offset in the instant case by respondent’s repeated transgressions. We are not dealing with an isolated instance of misconduct such as the single bribery payment at issue in Rosenthal, and in cases where suspension was deemed an appropriate sanction. (See In re Porcelli (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 473; In re Kien (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 355; In re Kayne (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 410.) Nor is a question of negligence or lack of care involved, which conduct “ *** would justify imposition of a sanction less than disbarment. ***’ ” (In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 324, quoting In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276.) Rather, respondent intentionally participated in an extortion scheme on 10 separate occasions over a period of five years. (Cf. In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7 (disbarment warranted in conversion cases where intentional improper acts extended over a period of time); In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 307 (same principle involving fraudulent activity).) It is anomalous that the administration of justice should be obstmcted for five years, while a perpetrator thereof is suspended for one. This is particularly unfortunate because, assuming Arambasich’s character is as reprehensible as we are led to believe, respondent’s failure to report his activities undoubtedly caused other members of the public to suffer the extortionist’s demands. The only fact more clear than respondent’s obligation in this case was his failure to live up to it. “Corruption within government could not, in most instances, thrive but for those few attorneys, who, like [respondent], are willing to tolerate such illegal activity if it will benefit their client. The practice of law is a privilege and demands a greater acceptance of responsibility and adherence to ethical standards than [respondent has] demonstrated.” In re Rosenthal (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 46, 56, cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 961, 59 L. Ed. 2d 775, 99 S. Ct. 1505. For these reasons, I believe that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.