Court Opinion

ID: 9743294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:30:05.123603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.383783
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court. Unlike my colleagues, I believe that the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the statements he made while in police custody. The totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession is to be considered in the determination of whether a juvenile confessed to a crime following a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Fare v. Michael G, 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 212, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2571-72 (1979). Factors to consider include the juvenile’s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of the questioning. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 54 (2000). Other factors also include the legality and duration of the detention, the duration of the questioning, and any physical or mental abuse by police such as threats or promises. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54. This court has held that the test for voluntariness is whether the juvenile “ ‘made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the [juvenile’s] will was overcome at the time he or she confessed.’ ” In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, quoting People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). Critically, . this court has been mindful of the fact that “the taking of a juvenile’s confession is ‘a sensitive concern.’ ” In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, quoting People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). We have noted that the “ ‘greatest care’ ” must be used in order to assure that the confession was not coerced or suggested and that “ ‘it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.’ ” People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967). As we explained in In re G.O., this specialized concern has led this court to include another factor in the inquiry, i.e., whether the juvenile, either before or during the interrogation, had an opportunity to consult with an adult interested in his welfare. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54-55. This factor also includes whether the police prevented the juvenile from conferring with a concerned adult and whether the police frustrated the parents’ attempt to confer with the juvenile. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 55. The court today lists the factors that lead it to conclude that the circuit court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress. First among these are the defendant’s age, experience, and emotional characteristics. 197 Ill. 2d at 437. The court finds significant the fact that defendant was of average intelligence, with normal reading, writing, and verbal skills. 197 Ill. 2d at 437. In my view, however, the record contains evidence which does not support the court’s conclusion. Defendant was 14 years of age at the time of his arrest. He had no prior experience with the legal system or with police interrogation. The record reveals that defendant’s only brush with the law came when he and another youth were caught trespassing on private property by a police officer. Defendant was not arrested but, instead, was warned by the officer and told to go home. Such an interaction can hardly be deemed as “experience” that would prepare a juvenile for the complexities of a double murder investigation interrogation! As for defendant’s emotional characteristics, the court’s opinion is devoid of any details with respect to this factor. I find this lack of detail troubling in light of the evidence contained in the record pertaining to defendant’s emotional health. According to the testimony, defendant was treated for psychiatric problems at the time he entered kindergarten. Defendant’s problems, discovered when he was five years old, eventually required hospitalization at the Psychiatric Institute of Richmond. Defendant was treated with antidepressants and was later discharged when he was no longer considered a danger to himself or others. Defendant was readmitted to the same psychiatric institute later when the problems continued. The reason for the readmission was aggression, academic deterioration, and suicidal tendencies. Defendant was ultimately diagnosed with major depression and attention deficit disorder. These conditions were treated successfully with medication. The record reveals, however, that when defendant’s mother sent defendant to live with the victims, the course of defendant’s psychiatric treatment changed, and the medicine, which had controlled defendant’s condition, was discontinued. Defendant was enrolled at Park Meadows Baptist Church and Academy. According to the principal of the academy, when defendant was disciplined, he would acknowledge his wrongdoing and accept his punishment. Defendant appeared to accept the discipline without any signs of outward rebellion. Dr. Chapman, who interviewed defendant to determine his fitness to stand trial, testified that defendant lacked the ability to appreciate the gravity of the situation when he waived his Miranda rights. Dr. Chapman stated that defendant’s behavior with the authorities the night of his arrest was consistent with his past behavior of trying to please authority figures. In light of these facts, I cannot agree that the evidence supports the conclusion that defendant’s age, experience, and emotional characteristics weigh in favor of the finding of a voluntary and knowing confession. Contrary to the court’s view, these factors should weigh in favor of suppressing the confession. The court next notes that although defendant was handcuffed when he was first taken to the police station from the crime scene, in violation of Lincoln police policy, this fact is not relevant because Detective Herberts testified that, at the time, he believed defendant to be 18 or 19 years old. Although the court does not consider this fact “significant enough” to render defendant’s statements coerced or involuntary (197 Ill. 2d at 439), I disagree. The record contains several photographs that depict defendant at the time of his arrest. The photographs, in my view, tend to show a young boy of high school age. Given the fact that the victims in this case were known by police to have been defendant’s grandparents, I cannot conceive of a police officer not ascertaining whether the alleged perpetrator in his custody was a juvenile. This fact, in conjunction with the officer’s failure to contact defendant’s parents or a juvenile officer prior to questioning, raises a serious question as to whether the police that night were as mindful of the fact that “the taking of a juvenile’s confession” is as “ ‘sensitive [a] concern’ ” as this court has deemed it to be. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 54, quoting People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). In this case, when Harberts discovered that defendant was only 14 years old, he called the Logan County State’s Attorney for advice. The State’s Attorney’s merely advised Harberts to make sure that defendant received his Miranda rights and to find out if the victims were his guardians. Harberts began his interrogation shortly after 9 p.m. At that time, Harberts did not tell defendant that he could consult with his parents, nor did he advise defendant that he could be tried as an adult. Harberts waited until 1 to IV2 hours later to attempt to call defendant’s mother. When he finally did telephone defendant’s mother, he received only an answering machine, on which he left a short message stating only his name and that defendant was with him and there was an emergency. When defendant’s mother returned the call, she advised Harberts that defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder and that she wanted defendant to be provided with a lawyer. This request was not complied with. Moreover, Harberts did not advise defendant that he could call the city of Lincoln’s juvenile officer.1 The behavior of Harberts certainly suggests that the “ ‘greatest care’ ” might not have been used to assure that the confession was not coerced or suggested and that “ ‘it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.’ ” People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967). This is yet another factor that should weigh in favor of suppressing the confession. The foregoing facts, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, compel me to conclude that defendant’s statement should have been suppressed. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized: “[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 328, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212 (1962). In this case, defendant’s age, experience, and the lack of a concerned adult’s presence, not to mention the evidence of record concerning defendant’s mental characteristics, raise a genuine doubt whether the confession which ensued was the product of free will. For this reason, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Given my position on the issue of the admissibility of defendant’s confession, I could end this dissent here. However, I wish to also point out my disagreement with the court’s conclusion that the circuit court’s error in instructing the jury on felony murder does not constitute reversible error with regard to defendant’s conviction for the first degree murder of Lila. See 197 Ill. 2d at 448. The court bases this conclusion on the fact that the jury’s return of the general verdict raises a presumption that the jury found defendant guilty of the most serious crime charged, which, in this case, would be intentional murder. See 197 Ill. 2d at 448. I assume that when the court states that the error does not constitute reversible error (197 Ill. 2d at 448), the court means that any error which occurred in this case was harmless. However, the court’s harmless error analysis fails to consider that the prosecutor in this case argued repeatedly to the jury that it should first consider the felony murder theory because, if the jury found the underlying felony proved, then it need not deal with the considerable amount of evidence relating to defendant’s mental state. Given the State’s argument, I believe that the court’s reliance on the presumption is inappropriate. The State’s argument demonstrates that the erroneous instruction may have played a part in the jury’s decision to convict defendant of first, as opposed to second, degree murder. In this respect, I agree with the conclusions reached by the appellate court with respect to this issue: “The State *** presented general verdict forms, which obscure the basis for the jury’s verdict, and repeatedly encouraged the jury to deal only with the felony murder counts and to disregard evidence of [defendant’s] mental state. *** *** In this case, the prosecutor succeeded in diluting the intent requirement for knowing or intentional murder by charging felony murder and, as a result, [defendant] was denied a fair trial.” People v. Morgan, 307 Ill. App. 3d 707, 717 (1999). For this reason, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that the error in this case was not “reversible error.” JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.  The record reveals that a member of the Lincoln police department eventually telephoned the youth officer, Sergeant Sisk, at 10:30 p.m. Sisk, who was at home sleeping, was asked if he knew the defendant. He stated that he did not know “this kid” and went back to bed. Sisk was not told by the officer that the “kid” in question had been arrested in the shooting deaths of two people and was currently in custody. This evidence hardly establishes confidence in the way in which law enforcement officials attempted to protect this juvenile’s rights.