Court Opinion

ID: 9624391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:01:49.295168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:45.931511
License: Public Domain

STANFORD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I claim that W. C. Pryor had no authority to deal with appellants, the Christensens, in the manner in which he did deal with them. When Pryor approached the Christensens after the Christensens had listed their property with Saylor and Irvine, he said he was an agent of Saylor and Irvine and that he had a buyer named W. C. Clin*269ton, and that Clinton would pay $40,000 for the property in question. The Christen-sens sold to Clinton, not knowing that he was a fictitious person.
The court found the following in the findings of facts, in connection with the action of Gregg R. Irvine:
“38. That the action of Gregg R. Irvine as a Notary Public on January 31, 1947, in connection with the acknowledgment of an agreement for the sale of real property, and his action as a Notary Public on February 3, 1947, in connection with the acknowledgment upon a quit claim deed, all relating to the sale of Lot 3 Woolf Tract, were not relied upon by the plaintiffs in entering into said sale of Lot 3 Woolf Tract.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In this regard, while it is the law that all notary publics should make a record of each and all such real estate acknowledgments, and require identification of the person who signs the instrument, yet in this case that was not done but it is taken care of by the above finding of fact of the trial court.
In 1916 this court rendered an opinion in the case of Brutinel v. Nygren, 17 Ariz. 491, 154 P. 1042, 1044, L.R.A.1918F, 713, it being a case where Mrs. Brutinel was the •owner of a drugstore in Clifton, Arizona, and C. P. Dunn, her son-in-law and by profession a druggist, induced her to purchase the drugstore, that forming the basis of how she came to own it, Dunn promising here that he would manage the business for her. Some time thereafter Dunn decided to leave Clifton. He asked Mrs. Brutinel for the right to find a purchaser for the business. She consented, with the understanding that the purchaser would purchase on terms satisfactory to her. A Mr. Nygren, who was also engaged in the drugstore business, claimed that Mrs. Brutinel was indebted to him on account of the transaction and brought his action for services. The basis of the action which Nygren brought was a letter from Dunn, the son-in-law. Dunn’s letter closed by stating, “Will make terms on half, if desired, and if party is reliable”. Mrs. Brutinel never saw the letter written by Dunn. Nygren sold the store through Dunn’s solicitation and Nygren brought an action.
This court, in disposing of the case, cited the case of Gore v. Canada Life Assur. Co., 119 Mich. 136, 77 N.W. 650, and said:
“The mere fact that one is dealing with an agent, whether the agency be general or special, should be a danger signal, and like a railroad crossing suggests the duty to ‘stop, look, and listen,’ and if he would bind the principal is bound to ascertain, not only the fact of agency, but the nature and extent of the authority, and in case either is controverted the burden of proof is *270upon him to establish it. In fine, he must exercise due care and caution in the premises.”
From Mechem on Agency, Vol. 2, 2d Ed., Sec. 1988, we quote:
“No liability for representations if any representation is outside authority. —But if, on the other hand, the making of any representation concerning the subject matter could not be deemed to be within the scope of the authority, then obviously the making of false or fraudulent ones cannot be; and (unless the principal, by some act can be deemed to have ratified or adopted them, under the circumstances considered in a following paragraph), responsibility for them will not attach to him.”
In this court’s case of Litchfield v. Green, 43 Ariz. 509, 33 F.2d 290, this court again recognized the case of Brutinel v. Nygren, supra, and quoted generously from that case.
In our case of Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic v. Davis, 49 Ariz. 277, 66 P.2d 238, 241, this court again stated the- general rule as follqws:
“ * * * As a corollary to these principles, it is generally accepted that when one deals with a known agent, he must exercise due caution in ascertaining whether the agent is acting within the scope of his authority, if he wishes to bind the principal. * * * ”
As a definite indication of the class or kind of man Pryor was, the record here shows that he remained in the city of Phoenix for nearly a year after this transaction; that he individually took over the property on North Central Avenue which was sold by these appellants, in behalf of the purchasers, Dr. Balsinger and his. wife. The records, by his letter to them, shows-that he collected the rents for them, and everything indicates that he was a man who-was looking forward to advancing 'himself and not the brokerage company of Saylor and Irvine. Nothing is shown in the record that Saylor and Irvine got a cent out of this transaction. It was wholly a concoction by Pryor. It was done by fraud and connivance, never, indeed, authorized by this brokerage firm. Had this firm received any benefits from the $11,000 which Pryor made from his dealings with the Christensens, as the Christensens claim,, certainly it could 'have been found and some proof of it could be placed in the testimony, and the trial court recognized that by its-findings of facts and judgment. Therefore, Saylor and Irvine knew nothing of this, transaction. Pryor entered into this action of fraud and deceit without any knowledge, on their part.
In the findings of facts made by the trial court are the following:
*271“34. That any and all representations made by the defendant W. C. Pryor, relating to the sale of plaintiffs’ interest in Lot 3 Woolf Tract, were not made with the knowledge, assistance nr consent of either C. A. Saylor or Gregg R. Irvine.”
“35. That the plaintiffs received the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) from W. C. Pryor in consideration for an option from the said plaintiffs to the said W. C. Pryor for the lease of said Lot 3 Woolf Tract; that neither C. A. Saylor or Gregg R. Irvine furnished said one hundred dollars ($100.-■00) or any part thereof; that neither said C. A. Saylor or Gregg R. Irvine had any knowledge of said option transaction between the plaintiffs and W. C. Pryor.”
In final, on the subject of Pryor exceeding his authority, I quote again from Bru.tinel v. Nygren, supra:
“The fundamental idea, therefore, or seed- grain, so to speak, of agency, has its conception in something lawful. that a person may do, and a delegation by such person to another of the power lawfully to do that thing.”
Note: Justice WINDES being disqualified, having tried the case in the lower ■court, the four remaining Justices have made a determination in this case.