Court Opinion

ID: 9454089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:35:49.395878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:57.948264
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse appellant Vaughn’s conviction for the reasons stated below.
We are here concerned, not with whether there was a basis-in-fact for Vaughn’s original December, 1964, I-A classification nor with whether the rejection of his conscientious objector claim by the Selective Service Appeal Board is supportable on a factual basis, but solely with whether the conviction can stand without showing on the record that Vaughn’s local Selective Service-*594board ever considered his claim for a conscientious objector status.
The record, including Vaughn’s Selective Service file, discloses that the members of the local board did not consider appellant’s request for a change in classification. True, draft board clerks saw Vaughn's letter of February, 1964, and his late-filed SSS form 150, but' the board neither saw nor acted on these documents.
I agree with the majority that we draw our focus on the February letter. If this letter makes a sufficient preliminary showing, taking all there written as true, that Vaughn could qualify as a conscientious objector pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j), as then applicable, he would thus be entitled to a reopening of his I-A classification, including a right of personal hearing before the local board.1
However, to the contrary, if Vaughn had not made a sufficient preliminary showing, a prima facie case for conscientious objector status, the failure of the board to reopen his classification deprived Vaughn of no substantial right and his conviction should stand.
I focus on this narrow issue with emphasis on the sixth paragraph of Vaughn’s letter reading:
“Gentlemen, I am as interested as anyone in preserving freedom and human rights and in defending our country. But I favor a different type of defense. One of the freedoms I am interested in preserving is the freedom of conscience. Therefore I ask you to allow me my freedom to follow my ethical principles. Incidentally, my principles seem to be the same as Christian principles, for Christ himself said, ‘He who takes up the sword shall perish by the sword,’ and ‘turn thou the other cheek.’ When will these principles become meaningful to all?”
The then applicable section of the law relating to conscientious objectors is 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (prior to 1967 amendment), which states in part:
“Nothing contained in this title * * shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”
The precise question may be presented thusly: Does Vaughn’s February letter demonstrate, pursuant to the essentials of the statute, that he was (1) conscientiously opposed to war in any form, and (2) this objection arises by reason of his religious training and belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation ?
In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 85 S.Ct. 850, 854, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), the test of belief in relation to a Supreme Being
“is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”
Based on these statutory principles and accepting for present purposes the sincerity of Vaughn’s statements in the letter, I feel that Vaughn states a commitment of conscience opposed to war in any form. Further, the letter evidences, at least in part, a moral commitment superior to those arising from any human relationship.2 His belief, which *595he equates with Christian principles and Christ’s message, parallels the orthodox belief in God of one who could qualify for the exemption.
In my judgment, the portions of Vaughn’s letter stating personal political and philosophical views are not inconsistent with nor do they detract from those religious-ethical principles asserted in the text of the letter. Thus, in my opinion, his letter makes a prima facie case requiring the local Selective Service board to reopen Vaughns classification. Vaughn ought to have been given the benefit of any doubt and allowed to present his case on the merits to the board. See, for example, United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968),in which a deep moral conviction against takmg life of another entitled the regístrant to reopening of his classification and Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078, (9th Cir., No. 21,442, September 23, 1968),in which a local board considered beliefs similar to Vaughns on the merits and classified the registrant as a conscientious objector available for non-combatant duty, but the appeal board refused to concur.
The consideration of Vaughn’s claim . , on Selective Service appeal, a de novo , . , , T, . .. , hearing, does not cure the failure to reopen his classification and thus to grant him a hearing and a right of personal appearance on the local board level. A registrant who fails to have a fair chance of obtaining proper classification by way of an appearance before the local board has been denied a fundamental right which cannot be cured on appeal. Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1952); Franks v. United States, 216 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1968).
The doctrine of Clay United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968)) DeRemer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1965) and similar cases holding that the de novo consideration on a Selective Service appeal cures irregularities on a local board level has no application to the instant situation where the issue was not heard at all by the local board.
,, . ,, , T, , My view that Vaughn was entitled to a consideration of his daimed conscien_ tioug ^ gtatug Qn ^ meritg before ^ local board ig fortified b events , . . , , . ,, ... „ transpiring subsequent to the writing of ,, , ,, „ . „ , , the letter. Following his first refusal to ...... 10CK report for induction on May 24, 1965, T7. , , „ , ,. 0 . ... . , , Vaughns Selective Service file, mcludhig Febru letter and conscientious or form gs wag forwarded J UV u> Clcl Jtv. v/X lUvd.1 Uvul vA tU l/Ilc IN v braska State Selective Service headqUarters for a review and determination, The Nebraska Se]ective Service deputy director suggested to the local board that Vaughn be permitted to appeal his classification. Notwithstanding Vaughn’s “conclusion of law” that he was not a conscientious objector under existing law, as noted by the majority, Vaughn . ’ , ... n ° „ later submitted a second SSS form 150 -n connection with the Selective gervice appeal indicating his opinion that his be. bef fe]j within the confines of Seeger. Tbe fact that tbe Nebraska deputy director proffered an appeal and thus a consideration of the merits of Vaughn’s case suggests that Vaughn’s claim was given serious consideration and was not deemed frivolous.3 While in every case for a conscientious objector status, a registrant’s sincerity is at issue, such matter concerns the merits and not the prelimi*596nary determination whether the registrant has made out a prima facie case. Miller v. United States, 388, F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d 808 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884, 81 S.Ct. 167, 5 L.Ed.2d 105 (1960); United States v. Ransom, 223 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Walsh, 279 F.Supp. 115 (D.Mass. 1968). See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428 (1955).
On the basis of the information submitted to the Nebraska Selective Service headquarters, I believe that headquarters should have advised that Vaughn was entitled to a reopening and reconsideration of his classification by the local board. Such classification is for the local board in the first instance. When Vaughn was not granted a right of reconsideration by the local board, he was deprived of basic procedural protection granted him by the law and the regulations. United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968); Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959, 88 S.Ct. 335, 19 L.Ed.2d 368 (1967); Stain v. United States, 235 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Vincelli, 215 F.2d 210 (2nd Cir. 1954); Knox v. United States, 200 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1952). See United States v. Griffin, 378 F.2d 899 (2nd Cir. 1967); Franks v. United States, 216 F.2d 266 (9th Cir. 1954). He was thus not permitted the basic right of a personal hearing before the local board. See United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 8, 73 S.Ct. 991, 97 L.Ed. 1417 (1953). This right to personal appearance affords the registrant the only opportunity under Selective Service procedures of personally appearing before a decision-making body to afford that body the opportunity to judge and test his sincerity on a man-to-man basis. This right should not be lightly denied.4
I believe the conviction here should be reversed. Nothing I have said bars the local board’s reconsideration of Vaughn’s claimed conscientious objector status in accordance with proper procedures if the conviction were set aside.

. 32 C.F.R. 1625.13.

. The trial record in fact disclosed that Vaughn had had extensive religious and parochial school training through grade, high school and college levels. It is clear, however, under Seeger, that adherence *595to an established church or formal religious doctrine is not a necessary requirement for conscientious objector status. For an excellent review of this area, Reisner, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 686 (1968).

. An appeal by a registrant can follow from a reopening of a classification, 32 C.F.R. 1625.13, or from an original classification, 32 C.F.R. 1625.2. This appeal by Vaughn was outside the regulations because there had been no reopening of the classification and the normal time to appeal the I-A classification of December 18, 1964, had expired.

. For a conscientious objector, the consequences of not prevailing at the administrative level can mean imprisonment. Judicial review is extremely limited. Thus, due process requirements here are not comparable to those in administrative proceedings relating to denial of admission to the bar discussed in Willner, fn. 8, majority opinion.