Court Opinion

ID: 9555993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:12:07.889808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:05.160084
License: Public Domain

J-S06019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KEYEEN DWONNE JEFFERSON                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1128 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-28-CR-0000546-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

       Appellant Keyeen Dwonne Jefferson appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his conviction for criminal attempt—indecent

assault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the information and

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:

       The event in question occurred on April 11, 2020 at 702 Lincoln
       Way East, Chambersburg. Aleysia Barnes ([the victim]) was
       playing board games with Tera Franklin, Desmond Divens, and
       [Appellant]. N.T. Trial, 11/15/21, [at] 34. Tera Franklin is the
       victim’s mother and, at the time, she was in a relationship with
       [Appellant]. Desmond Divens is [Appellant’s] daughter. The
       victim, Ms. Franklin, Ms. Divens, and [Appellant] were all drinking
       and the victim passed out around midnight. Id. at 146-147.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S06019-23

     [Appellant] picked the victim up and Ms. Franklin and Ms. Divens
     followed him while he carried the victim to her bedroom. Id. at
     51. They laid the victim with her head “on top by the pillow.” Id.
     at 56. Ms. Franklin testified that the victim was lying “straight”
     on the bed at this point in time. Id. Then Ms. Franklin went
     outside to smoke a cigarette. Id. at 51. [Appellant] came outside
     to tell her that he was going to go upstairs and smoke marijuana.
     Id. Ms. Franklin testified that she had “a bad feeling” so she went
     upstairs. Id.

     Ms. Franklin saw [Appellant] in her unconscious daughter’s
     bedroom. Id. She testified, “When I walked into that room . . . I
     could [see] my daughter’s bare butt. I could see that she was
     pulled closer to the edge of the bed.” Id. She testified that the
     victim “was in a v shape pulled close to the edge of the bed and
     her bottom was fully exposed, her butt was fully exposed. Her
     pants were pulled down right underneath probably her butt
     cheek.” Id. at 61. [Appellant] was “right up against the bed.”
     Id. Ms. Franklin could see that [Appellant] “had his penis in his
     right hand and he jumped back and when he jumped back he
     grabbed his pants with his left hand and he put his penis in his
     pants.” Id. at 52. [Appellant] left the victim’s bedroom and went
     into the bathroom. Id.

     Ms. Franklin testified that she “acted like nothing happened
     because [she] was so shocked and disgusted. . . .” Id. at 54. She
     went downstairs, saw that Ms. Divens was asleep on the coach,
     and went upstairs with [Appellant] and acted like she was asleep.
     Id. After a half an hour to an hour later, [Appellant] left their
     shared room. Id. at 54. She caught him trying to go back into
     the victim’s room. Id. at 55. The next morning, the victim woke
     up in her bed wearing the same clothes she had on the night
     before. Id. at 35. Ms. Franklin then took the victim to Altoona to
     visit with her grandmother. Id. at 36. Ms. Franklin told the victim
     what happened the night before and, after they visited [the
     v]ictim’s grandmother, they went to the Chambersburg Hospital
     for a rape kit. Id. at 36. The victim does not remember the
     incident but did not consent or discuss having sexual contact with
     [Appellant]. Id. at 37 and 43.

     Officer Orien Hippensteal with the Chambersburg police was then
     called to the Chambersburg Hospital to make contact with the
     victim. Id. at 99. The case was then assigned to Detective James
     Iversen.    Detective Iversen interviewed the victim and Ms.
     Franklin. He contacted [Appellant] over the phone and asked if

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       he could speak to him regarding the events that happened on April
       11 and 12. Id. at 113. [Appellant] told him that he could be
       interviewed on April 14th around 2:30. Id. at 116-117. The
       interview was audio and visually recorded and played for the jury
       during trial. While in the interview, [Appellant] told Detective
       Iversen that he needed to leave in about 10 to 15 minutes so he
       could go to work. Id. at 118. During the interview, [Appellant]
       kept repeating questions and asking why he was there.[1] Id. at
       119.

       Detective Iversen then got a search warrant for [Appellant’s] DNA.
       Id. at 124. [Appellant] was residing with his sister and law
       enforcement attempted to execute the warrant. Id. at 125-126.
       They knocked on the door 10 times and nobody answered. Id.
       Detective Iversen informed another patrol unit to remain in the
       area. Id. After 15 minutes, [Appellant] exited the residence. Id.
       Detective Iversen, in an unmarked vehicle, attempted to make
       contact with [Appellant] by calling out to him three different times,
       but [Appellant] kept walking. Id. Detective Iversen got out of his
____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s recorded police interview was also included in the certified
record. See Commonwealth’s Ex. #5. However, because a transcript of this
interview was not included in the certified record, we cite to the interview by
timecode. During the interview, Appellant stated that he was drinking and
playing games with the victim, Ms. Divens, and Ms. Franklin on the night of
April 11, 2020. Id. at 2:41:31 - 2:41:46. Appellant stated that after the
victim passed out, he carried her up to her bedroom. Id. at 2:43:56 -
2:44:40.

Appellant indicated that later that evening, while Ms. Divens and Ms. Franklin
were outside smoking a cigarette, he went upstairs to check on the victim.
See id. 2:52:14. However, Appellant stated that he ultimately left the victim’s
room without checking on her and walked towards the bathroom, at which
point Ms. Franklin confronted Appellant and asked what he was doing in the
victim’s room. Id. at 2:53:06, 2:57:48. Appellant reiterated that he had
been “checking on” the victim. Id.

When asked why the victim’s pants were pulled down, Appellant stated “her
pants weren’t down” and then explained he did not “think” that was the case.
Id. at 2:59:12 - 2:59:16. He also denied that his own pants were pulled down
and repeatedly stated that he did not “do anything sexual” to the victim. Id.
at 2:59:25 - 2:59:30; 3:01:14. Finally, Appellant confirmed that his DNA
would not appear in any lab results from the victim because he “didn’t do
nothing with this girl.” Id. at 3:02:13.

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       car, approached [Appellant] with the search warrant, and obtained
       a sample of [Appellant’s] DNA though a buccal swab. Id. at 125-
       126. [Appellant] said that his DNA “shouldn’t” come back. Id. at
       126. The victim’s rape kit indicated that there was no DNA
       present, so there was nothing to compare the sample to. Id. at
       133. Based on his investigation, Detective Iversen contacted the
       Franklin County District Attorney’s Office and filed charges against
       [Appellant]. Id. at 126.

       Ms. Divens and [Appellant] also testified at trial. Ms. Divens
       testified that she and Ms. Franklin smoked cigarettes outside. Id.
       at 148. [Appellant] came outside and said that he was going to
       use the bathroom and check on the victim. Id. at 148. Ms. Divens
       testified that she, [Appellant], and Ms. Franklin then played
       another board game. After [Appellant] and Ms. Franklin went
       upstairs, Ms. Divens checked on the victim. She testified that she
       was “hanging off the bed like she rolled over” but could only see
       the top half of the victim’s body because she was under a blanket.
       Id. at 150. Ms. Divens then testified that it was not uncommon
       for the victim to pass out drinking and take off her pants in her
       sleep. Id. at 151. [Appellant] testified that when Ms. Franklin
       and Ms. Divens smoked cigarettes outside, that he told them that
       he was going to go check on the victim because he wanted to go
       upstairs and smoke marijuana.          Id. at 163.      When the
       Commonwealth asked about the inconsistency between his
       testimony and his daughter’s testimony, he said that Ms. Divens
       was incorrect. Id. at 171. [Appellant] also indicated that he was
       having problems in his relationship with Ms. Franklin. However,
       in his interview with Detective Iversen, he told the Detective that
       the two got along well and were getting married. Id. at 179.

Trial Ct. Op., 10/6/22, at 4-8.

       Appellant was initially charged with one count of indecent assault.2 On

November 1, 2021, two weeks prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion

to amend charge from indecent assault to criminal attempt—indecent assault.3

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).

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The trial court conducted a hearing on November 10, 2021. At that time,

Appellant argued that he would be prejudiced by the amendment because it

would necessitate a change in defense strategy. See N.T. Hr’g, 11/10/21, at

4-5. Specifically, Appellant claimed that his entire defense strategy was based

on the lack of DNA evidence and his argument that no contact actually

occurred. Id. at 5. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s

motion and the matter proceeded to trial.

      On November 15, 2021, following a one-day trial, the jury found

Appellant guilty of criminal attempt—indecent assault. On March 30, 2022,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen to forty-eight months’

incarceration. Appellant subsequently filed a post-sentence motion, which the

trial court denied.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s
         motion to amend the information?

      2. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Appellant’s] post-
         sentence motion for judgment of acquittal?

Appellant’s Brief at 12.

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                        Amendment to Information

      In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting

the Commonwealth’s request to amend the information.            Id. at 16.    In

support, Appellant contends that he suffered prejudice because the

amendment changed the factual scenario underlying the charge and modified

the description of the charge to an entirely separate and distinct offense. Id.

at 18-19. Appellant also argues that the amendment necessitated a change

in defense strategy. Id. at 19. Specifically, Appellant argues that, prior to

the amendment, he “intended on presenting evidence that no contact

occurred, and there was a DNA test that showed that[,]” but following the

amendment, his “defense strategy then had to shift to an assault of credibility

on the complainant rather than a specific defense showing[] specific proof that

no contact occurred.” Id. at 20. Appellant also claims that the timing of the

amendment weighs in his favor because “[t]he amendment and hearing [on]

the motion to amend occurred shortly before trial” and “[t]here was

insufficient time” for him to prepare. Id. Although Appellant acknowledges

that he did not request a continuance, he claims that the Commonwealth’s

“negligence in failing to provide adequate notice should not force a defendant

into having to waive his right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 21.

      Appellant concludes that, although the amendment did not add new

facts, it “was late, changed defense strategy, and called for an entirely new

criminal charge, not merely a correction or alternative theory. Appellant was

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clearly prejudiced by the amendment, and the convictions must be vacated.”

Id.

       We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend

an information for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Small,

741 A.2d 666, 681 (Pa. 1999). As we have explained,

       [a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
       rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise
       of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
       prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
       If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies
       the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate
       court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 10 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted and some formatting altered).

       Rule 564 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as

follows:

       The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that
       the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from
       a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so
       materially different from the original charge that the defendant
       would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may
       grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in
       the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564.

       “[T]he purpose of Rule 564 is to ensure that a defendant is fully apprised

of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition

of    alleged   criminal   acts   of   which   the   defendant   is   uninformed.”

Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2006)

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(citation omitted).    “[O]ur courts apply the rule with an eye toward its

underlying purposes and with a commitment to do justice rather than be

bound   by   a   literal   or   narrow   reading   of   [the]   procedural   rules.”

Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1284, 1289 (Pa. 1992).

      When presented with a question concerning the propriety of an

amendment, we consider

      [w]hether the crimes specified in the original indictment or
      information involve the same basic elements and evolved out of
      the same factual situation as the crimes specified in the amended
      indictment or information. If so, then the defendant is deemed to
      have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct.
      If, however, the amended provision alleges a different set of
      events, or the elements or defenses to the amended crime are
      materially different from the elements or defenses to the crime
      originally charged, such that the defendant would be prejudiced
      by the change, then the amend[ment] is not permitted.

Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 18 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citations omitted).

      Since the purpose of the information is to apprise the defendant
      of the charges against him so that he may have a fair opportunity
      to prepare a defense, our Supreme Court has stated that following
      an amendment, relief is warranted only when the variance
      between the original and the new charges prejudices [a
      defendant] by, for example, rendering defenses which might have
      been raised against the original charges ineffective with respect
      to the substituted charges.

Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223 (citation omitted).

      In determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice, we consider the

following factors:

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       (1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
       supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new
       facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
       factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4)
       whether the description of the charges changed with the
       amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was
       necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of
       the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
       notice and preparation.

Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203 (citation omitted).

       With respect to indecent assault, Section 3126(a)(4) of the Crimes Code

provides:

       (a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if
       the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the
       complainant to have indecent contact with the person or
       intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
       seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
       desire in the person or the complainant and:

                                  *      *         *

          (4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that
          the complainant is unaware that the indecent contact is
          occurring;

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). “Indecent contact” is defined as “[a]ny touching of

the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing

or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.4

____________________________________________

4 We emphasize that, unlike rape and IDSI, penetration is not an element of

indecent assault. Compare 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a) (rape) and 18 Pa.C.S. §
3123(a) (IDSI) with 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a) (indecent assault).

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     Section 901 states that “[a] person commits an attempt when, with

intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a

substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).

     Here, the trial court addressed the amendment to the criminal

information as follows:

     The Commonwealth amended the charges from indecent assault
     of person unconscious to criminal attempt-indecent assault of
     person unconscious.         By amending the charge, the
     Commonwealth no longer needed to prove indecent contact with
     an unconscious complainant. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). Rather,
     the Commonwealth needed to show that [Appellant] committed
     any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
     commission of indecent assault. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). The court
     conducted a hearing regarding this issue. At the hearing, the
     Commonwealth established that the amendment occurred
     because of the facts that had already been established in
     discovery through the information originally reported. N.T. Hr’g,
     11/10/21, at 3. The defense asserted that their strategy “has
     been that this did not happen” but asserted that the amendment
     took away their defense. Id. at 4-5.

     The amendment is based on the same nexus of facts as the
     original charge. No additional witnesses or information that was
     not available in discovery was used to support the amendment.
     [Appellant] waived his preliminary hearing on April 27, 2020,
     therefore, the court cannot consider this factor. Of the six factors,
     the only ones that prejudice[s Appellant] are the fourth and fifth
     factors.

     In Brown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
     defendant was prejudiced when the Commonwealth, immediately
     prior to the commencement of trial, sought leave to amend the
     information to charge [the] appellant with rape and IDSI with an
     unconscious person instead of the previously charged rape and
     IDSI by forcible compulsion. [Commonwealth v. Brown, 727
     A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. 1999)]. The trial counsel received notice of
     the amendment only immediately prior to trial, and had no time
     to plot a strategy for establishing that the victim was conscious
     and capable of consent during the relevant time period. Id. at

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      544. [On appeal, the Supreme] Court determined that the
      defendant in that case suffered prejudice.

      However, in the present case, the Commonwealth provided ample
      notice for the amendment. The hearing to determine whether the
      court should grant the Commonwealth’s motion occurred on
      November 10, 2021. The trial was not scheduled until November
      15, 2021. The defense still had four days to adjust their strategy
      in light of the Commonwealth needing to prove a substantial step
      rather than contact. N.T., 11/10/2021, at 6. This does not
      account for the Commonwealth putting [Appellant] on notice by
      filing its motion to amend information on November 1, 2021.
      [Appellant] had ample notice and time for preparation. For these
      reasons, [Appellant’s] claim fails.

Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12 (some formatting altered, footnote omitted).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the

information. See Small, 741 A.2d at 681; see also Belknap, 105 A.3d at

10. As noted previously, Appellant was initially charged with indecent assault

of an unconscious person based on Ms. Franklin’s allegation that she saw

Appellant with his penis in his right hand in the victim’s room at which point

she observed the victim laying face-down on the bed with her buttocks

exposed and “pulled closer to the edge of the bed.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-8.

Although the Commonwealth amended the indecent assault charge from a

completed offense to an attempt, that did not change the factual scenario

underlying the charges or add any facts that were unknown to Appellant. See

Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203; Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223.

      We recognize that the description of the charges changed because the

Commonwealth was no longer required to prove indecent contact, which may

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have necessitated a change in defense strategy. However, since his initial

interview with police, Appellant has maintained that he briefly entered the

victim’s room to check on her, that he exited moments later, that he did not

have his pants pulled down, and that he did not have any sexual contact with

the victim.    See Commonwealth’s Ex. #5; see also N.T. Trial at 165-66.

Although Appellant claims that he intended focus his entire defense on the

fact that no male DNA was present in the victim’s vaginal and rectal areas,

that   would    not    preclude    a   conviction   for   indecent   assault.   See

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 255 A.3d 497, 511 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining

that a “defense that no penetration occurred and that there was a general lack

of physical evidence—if believed by the jury—would no longer permit

avoidance of all felony convictions, since lack of penetration was no defense”

to indecent assault), rev’d in part on other grounds, --- A.3d ---, 22 MAP 2022,

2023 WL 4095438 (Pa. filed June 21, 2023).5

       Finally, as noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth filed the motion

to amend the information two weeks before trial, and Appellant did not request

a continuance when the trial court granted the motion four days before trial

was scheduled to begin. See Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223. For these reasons,

we conclude that Appellant did not suffer prejudice as a result of the
____________________________________________

5 We note that in Rivera, our Supreme Court granted discretionary review for

the purpose of reiterating “that different harmless error standards apply when
evaluating testimonial references to a defendant’s post-arrest versus pre-
arrest silence.” Rivera, 2023 WL 4095438 at *1. The Supreme Court did not
address this Court’s conclusions regarding whether the appellant was
prejudiced by the amendment to the information. Id. at *4 n.3.

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amendment.      See id.; see also Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203.         Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                         Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his remaining issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the Commonwealth

failed to prove that he took a substantial step towards having indecent contact

with the victim. Appellant’s Brief at 23. In support, Appellant refers to Ms.

Franklin’s testimony that the victim’s “buttocks was exposed and she had

moved on the bed” and argues that it “is not circumstantial evidence of an

attempt by Appellant to have indecent contact with her.” Id. Further, he

argues that “while Appellant clearly exposed himself in [the victim’s] room,

that is not evidence tending to show that he was attempting to have contact

with [the victim]” and that, “[e]ven coupled with his position within the room,

it is unclear what he intended to do, and that evidence does not point to him

attempting to have contact.” Id. at 24. Therefore, Appellant concludes that

his conviction for attempted indecent assault should be vacated. Id. at 25.

      In reviewing Appellant’s claim, our standard of review is as follows:

      A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of
      the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is
      granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to
      carry its burden regarding that charge. Therefore, in usual
      circumstances, we apply the following standard of review to
      sufficiency claims which arise in the context of a motion for
      judgment of acquittal:

         A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a
         question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
         support the verdict when it establishes each material

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        element of the crime charged and the commission thereof
        by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the
        evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to
        the physical facts, in contravention to human experience
        and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as
        a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the
        court is required to view the evidence in the light most
        favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
        benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
        evidence.

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted and formatting altered). “In applying the above test, we may not

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.”

Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-51 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

     Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

     In the present case, the Commonwealth established that the
     victim passed out after drinking and [Appellant] carried her to her
     room. N.T. Trial, 11/15/21, [at] 50-51. [Appellant] positioned
     her on her bed with “her head at the top by the pillow” so she was
     lying straight on the bed. Id. at 56.

     Ms. Franklin testified that later in the evening, she walked into her
     daughter’s bedroom and saw [Appellant] against the victim’s bed.
     Id. at 61. At this point in time, the victim’s body “was in a v shape
     pulled close to the edge of the bed and her bottom was fully
     exposed, her butt was fully exposed. Her pants were pulled down
     right underneath probably her butt cheek.” Id. at 61. She
     testified that she saw that [Appellant] “had his penis in his right
     hand and he jumped back and when he jumped back he grabbed
     his pants with his left hand and he put his penis in his pants.” Id.
     at 52.

     [Appellant] asserted that there is nothing in the record to support
     that [Appellant] pulled the victim to the edge of the bed, and
     therefore cannot be considered a substantial step. N.T. Hr’g,
     6/3/22, at 5.     [Appellant] argued that the jury also heard
     testimony that sometimes when the victim passes out from

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      drinking she removes her pants in her sleep. Id.; see also N.T.
      Trial, 11/15/21, at 151. However, this does not preclude the
      Commonwealth from showing that [Appellant] took substantial
      steps toward the crime. The jury made a credibility determination
      based on the circumstantial evidence presented. The fact finder
      believed Ms. Franklin when she testified that she caught
      [Appellant] holding his penis while her unconscious daughter’s
      pants were pulled down. The Commonwealth provided sufficient
      evidence that [Appellant] took substantial steps toward the
      completion of indecent assault.

Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16.

      Following our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for criminal attempt—

indecent assault. See Stahl, 175 A.3d at 303-04; 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). As

noted by the trial court, the victim’s mother testified that she saw Appellant

in the victim’s bedroom holding his penis while the victim was lying face-down

on the bed in a “v shape” with her pants pulled below her buttocks. See N.T.

Trial at 61. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Appellant had

performed acts constituting a substantial step toward committing indecent

assault. For these reasons, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails. Accordingly,

we affirm.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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