Court Opinion

ID: 9647376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:34:28.205618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:48.560732
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
We have affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division that upheld the State Parole Board’s grant of parole to William Hawley. In explaining the result reached, we have expressly adopted the essential reasoning of the Appellate Division as set forth in the comprehensive and clear opinion of Judge Gaulkin reported at 192 N.J. Super. 85.
*118In that opinion the court below has determined that the decision of the State Parole Board “to grant parole release in this matter was neither arbitrary nor capricious,” and that there is “no reason to conclude that the decision of the Parole Board was anything other than a proper exercise of the discretion entrusted to it.” Id., 192 N.J.Super. at 94-95. By our affirmance we express parallel satisfaction that the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion or render a decision that was arbitrary or capricious. Further, our dispositon of the appeal necessarily reflects the view that in this case neither the parole function as exercised by the Parole Board at the administrative level nor the judicial review role undertaken on appeal by the Appellate Division and this Court was impaired by the Parole Board’s failure to issue reasons to justify the grant of parole release.
Our decision today must be understood to have settled two issues that were properly and fairly raised on appeal, issues that had not previously been definitively resolved by the Court. The first such holding is that a prosecutor, the Attorney General, or any other administrator of a criminal justice agency who has properly received notice of a parole hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4—123.45(b)(5) and who has participated in the hearing by performing an informational role for the benefit of the Parole Board, see In re Trantino, 89 N.J. 347, 375-76 (1982), “has standing to appeal * * * release decisions.” 192 N.J.Super. at 90. Further, such an appeal can encompass the question whether the parole decision was arbitrary or capricious. Id., 192 N.J.Super. at 91.
The second issue that has now been dispositively settled is that a prosecutor or other informational participant in a parole hearing is not entitled to, and the Parole Board is under no obligation to furnish, a “statement of reasons” in support of any decision to grant parole release. Id., 192 N.J.Super. at 92. The reasons marshalled by the Appellate Division in reaching this conclusion are cogent and persuasive.
*119The court below quite soundly rejects Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238 (1971), as analogous authority for finding a right in the prosecutor to obtain a statement of reasons from the Parole Board. Monks mandates that a statement of reasons be given to an inmate after a denial of parole release. The interests in Monks differ significantly from those at stake when a prosecutor or other informational participant in a parole hearing opposes the grant of parole release. As pointed out by the Appellate Division, fairness to an inmate whose liberty interest has been curtailed by the denial of parole and the need for that inmate to attempt to obtain his liberty by qualifying for parole — matters that are now of constitutional magnitude, see Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979) — exceeds the statutory interest of a prosecutor who provides relevant information to the Parole Board in a parole hearing. 192 N.J.Super. at 92.
While our decision embraces the sound reasoning of the court below, ante at 113-114, the majority nonetheless has delivered an opinion that may be misleading. The Court takes the position that the issuance of a statement of reasons by the Parole Board in support of a parole release decision is concordant with the public’s legitimate interest in a correct parole decision. See ante at 114. By the tenor, if not the literal sense of its expressions, the Court appears to require or strongly request that such a statement of reasons be forthcoming from the Parole Board. See ante at 114, 116-117. I do not believe that either of these propositions is expressed or implied by our affirmance of the judgment of the Appellate Division.
I find no warrant to reach the conclusion that a statement of reasons by the Parole Board to support a parole release decision should be required as suggested by the majority. The court below aptly points out that the Parole Act of 1979 does not impose any obligation on the Board to give a statement of reasons to an interceding prosecutor nor does the statute *120purport to give the prosecutor any right to demand reasons for parole release. 192 N.J.Super. at 92. The Legislature has carefully specified the parties or persons who shall be deemed to have an interest and a stake in parole proceedings. These are the prosecutor from the county in which the underlying crime committed by the inmate occurred, the sentencing court, the Attorney General, and any other law enforcement official representing an agency whose information may be relevant. N.J.S.A. 30:4—123.45(b)(5); In re Trantino, supra, 89 N.J. at 375-76. The Legislature has not expanded the proceedings or otherwise amplified the manner in which the public interest is to be served and protected in the administration of parole.1 Consequently, as a matter of effectuating legislative intent, it is unsound to suggest that a statement of reasons be given by the Parole Board to justify parole release in order to serve an interest, when clearly no such statement is required on behalf of any of the persons or entities who actually has a right to participate in the parole process.
In addition, the Court’s position that would require or strongly encourage the Parole Board to express such reasons when it has granted parole release derogates from the highly sensitive discretion that is inherent in the parole function. It cannot be overstressed that although parole standards under the Parole Act of 1979 have been considerably narrowed, this has served primarily to “reduce the discretion involved in parole decisions.” In re Trantino, supra, 89 N.J. at 368. The Legislature assuredly has not eliminated that discretion nor has it mechanized it to the point that the parole function is ministerial. As observed by Chief Justice Burger in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra, 442 U.S. at 9-10, 98 S.Ct. at 2538, 60 L.Ed. 2d at 677, quoted below, 192 N.J.Super. at 92-93, “[t]he parole release de-
*121cisión * * * is subtle and depends on an amalgam of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.”
Further, as pointed out by the court below, with respect to inmates, such as Hawley, convicted prior to the enactment of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, the decision as to whether the “punitive aspects of a sentence have been satisfied in terms of rehabilitative potential of the inmate” itself remains a highly subjective and deeply discretionary determination. 192 N.J.Super. at 93, quoting In re Trantino, supra, 89 N.J. at 373. A sound and reasoned determination as to parole ordinarily does not emanate from an adversarial or contested administrative hearing. The appropriate role of the prosecutor in that delicate process is not to act as a legal combatant, but rather “to inform the Board.” Id., quoting In re Trantino, supra, 89 N.J. at 376.
We expressed concern in Trantino that the Parole Board should not fall prey to public opinion or sentiment. 89 N.J. at 376. The Parole Board should in all cases be informed by the evidence and information that is placed before it. By gratuitously encouraging the Parole Board to issue a statement of reasons in support of certain decisions to grant parole, the Court should not allow the Parole Board to be victimized by public opinion. The requirement of a statement of reasons for the grant of parole release should not be permitted to become a sword that can be used against the Parole Board by undercutting from its ability properly to discharge the parole function.
As determined by the court below, a statement of reasons explaining a grant of parole release may reasonably be required in certain cases to effectuate judicial review, which assures that the Parole Board’s decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious. It suffices to allow the appellate court to determine whether *122such a statement is needed in a given case. I am completely satisfied that any statement of reasons to be given in such circumstances will fully respond to the public’s interest in the parole process in those cases on appeal.
Justice POLLOCK joins in this concurrence.
HANDLER and POLLOCK, JJ., concurring in the result.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 7.
For reversal — None.

 When the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 30:4—123.54(b)(2) to permit victim participation in Parole Board hearings, it granted victims an informational role similar to that of prosecutors. £.1983, c. 453.