Court Opinion

ID: 9569485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:16.916649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:00:38.015765
License: Public Domain

Hale, J.
(separate opinion concurring in the result) — I concur in the result reached by the majority but not the thesis on which it rests. Recognizing full well the clarity and strong intellectual force with which Judge Donworth has delineated the majority opinion, I must, nonetheless, take issue with its fundamental concept that the Supreme Court of Washington lost jurisdiction of this petition in habeas corpus when petitioner filed a similar petition with the District Court of the United States. I believe that so deeply rooted is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Washington in habeas corpus that it can be divested only by the Supreme Court of the United States in entertaining *727a similar petition concurrently or by staying our consideration of the petition on appeal or certiorari.
The Supreme Court of Washington derives its powers from the organic law as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Washington, and by inheritance from the common law. Under the federal constitution, this state entered the Union by means of the Enabling Act (25 Stat., chapter 180), with explicit power in habeas corpus written into its basic law through Article 4 of the Washington State Constitution—a judicial power which found broad confirmation in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Thus, this state became an integral part of the Nation under a constitution which fixes not only jurisdiction in but places a duty upon the Supreme Court of Washington to hear and determine proceedings in habeas corpus. Article 4, § 4 of the Washington State Constitution declares:
“The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus . . . ” (Italics mine.)
The same section confirms power in habeas corpus twice more in the following language:
“. . . The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. Each of the judges shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the state upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself, or before the supreme court, or before any superior court of the state or any judge thereof.” (Italics mine.)
I would conclude, therefore, that our jurisdiction to hear this proceeding in habeas corpus persists until finally determined.
But, in my disagreement with the majority’s view that the filing or pending of a petition for habeas corpus in a district court of the United States divests the Supreme Court of the state of jurisdiction, I do accept the majority’s ultimate conclusion that this court can grant no relief to petitioner in *728the premises. Considering the petitions for habeas corpus and for an order of reference on their merits and in conjunction with the proceedings that have gone before, I think it manifest that Don Anthony White has exhausted all of his remedies in this forum. A detailed recital of the steps taken by petitioner, or which being readily available to him could have been taken, shows, I think, that he has no further remedies to pursue before the Supreme Court of Washington.
Here is a record of proceedings:
Don Anthony White, now confined in the state penitentiary at Walla Walla under a judgment and sentence of death entered July 18, 1960 by the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus August 17, 1964. He informs us in his petition that, on May 6, 1964, he filed and now has pending in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Washington, Southern Division, a petition for habeas corpus directed against respondent here, challenging the validity of the same judgment and sentence.
Respondent filed his return and answer August 26, 1964, to the petition now before us. Before hearing could be had in this court on the issues thus joined, petitioner additionally filed with us a petition for an order of reference requesting this court to direct the Superior Court for King County to conduct a hearing and receive evidence concerning events said in the petition to have occurred in connection with the arrest and interrogation of the petitioner prior to his being formally charged with the crimes whereof he is now convicted and for which he is awaiting execution. Through counsel, he applied to us for a continuance of the hearing on the petition for order of reference, and it was granted. Both the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for order of reference come before us en banc pursuant to the continuance.
In my opinion, if the order of reference lies, the petition for habeas corpus may warrant further hearing. If, however, the petitioner has no further remedies available to him under the laws of this jurisdiction, then the petition for *729an order of reference ought to be denied and the petition for habeas corpus should thereupon be dismissed.
The only question raised by the two petitions is: Has the petitioner exhausted his remedies under the laws of this state, or, expressed otherwise, is there yet available to the petitioner any further proceedings which he may bring before the tribunals of the state of Washington under the constitution or laws of the United States, the constitution and laws of the state of Washington, or the common law by which he may now question the validity of the judgment and sentence under which the death penalty is to be inflicted upon him. The purpose here is to examine into the whole record of proceedings to ascertain what remedies, if any, remain to the petitioner.
By information filed January 7, 1960, the prosecuting attorney of King County charged petitioner in two counts with the murder in the first degree of Alice Jumper on December 24, 1959, and with the murder of Willie LeRoy Dixson as a separate crime committed on the same day. Capable and experienced counsel were appointed by the court to serve defendant at public expense.
On petitioner’s behalf, on January 22, 1960, counsel entered a special plea of mental irresponsibility asserting that he was mentally irresponsible at the time of the commission of the crimes charged and that such mental irresponsibility continued; petitioner also entered general pleas of not guilty to each of the two counts.
Issues raised by the information, the pleas of not guilty and the special plea of mental irresponsibility came on regularly for trial May 16, 1960, in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County before a jury—two deputy prosecuting attorneys appearing for the state and two attorneys appearing for the petitioner. The trial court submitted the case to the jury May 26, 1960, at 9:48 p.m. That the petitioner was granted ample time and opportunity to raise all questions, and to point out any errors occurring or claimed to have occurred before, at or during trial, and to assert all constitutional rights, privileges and immunities, may be seen from a reading of the statement of facts—a *730verbatim transcript and report of everything said or done by the court, jurors, witnesses and counsel—running to 1454 pages in length.
The jury received the case for its deliberations May 26, 1960, at 9:48 p.m., and the following day, May 27, 1960, at 3:40 p.m., returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree as charged in count 1 of the information, and guilty of murder in the second degree as charged in count 2 of the information, and a special verdict that the death penalty be inflicted. A poll of the jury taken in open court confirmed the several verdicts to be the individual verdicts of each juror and the unanimous verdict of the jury. I find nothing in the record nor was any claim made by petitioner that he was not allowed ample time and opportunity to prepare his defense; nor were any avenues closed to him by which he might raise any questions he deemed advisable under either the federal or state constitutions, or the statutory or common law; nor was he at any time during the trial foreclosed from or his opportunities abridged in noting objections to evidence or in presenting matters of law to the judge presiding and to receive a ruling thereon.
May 31, 1960, through his counsel, petitioner filed formal motion in arrest of judgment or in the alternative for a new trial, challenging, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence, urging error in the giving and refusal to give offered instructions, misconduct of the jury, newly discovered evidence, accident and surprise, errors of law occurring at the trial, that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, that substantial justice was not done, and that the jury received evidence not allowed by the court. Petitioner moved for and the court allowed an extension of time for the filing of briefs in support of his motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial to June 30, 1960. Whereupon, after considering written briefs and upon oral argument relating to the motions, the court denied the motions on July 18, 1960. Thereupon, in open court, in the presence of petitioner and his counsel, the judgment and sentence of death was pronounced by the court upon petitioner on the verdict and special verdict relating to count 1, and a judgment *731and sentence of life imprisonment on count 2, with the death sentence to have precedence over the life imprisonment.
Petitioner filed timely notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence, and in pursuance thereof there was prepared for petitioner, at public expense, a complete statement of facts showing everything said and done at the trial. Petitioner, through counsel filed a praecipe for a transcript on appeal, directing all minute entries, exhibits, pleadings, papers, and orders filed in connection with the case—with a few exceptions designated by petitioner—be sent to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington as a part of the record on appeal. The transcript on appeal runs to 304 pages. I find nothing to indicate that the petitioner was in any way limited or disparaged in his designation of the record on appeal or that the record on appeal is other than in accordance with his choice and designation.
Petitioner perfected his appeal, filing his brief urging 11 separate assignments of error, and it came on regularly to be heard by this court en banc upon written briefs and oral argument. On September 25, 1962, this court, being the highest court in the state, in a formal written opinion, affirmed the trial court and the judgment and sentence. State v. White, 60 Wn. (2d) 551, 374 P. (2d) 942. Thereafter, petitioner regularly petitioned this court for a rehearing of his appeal. The court, through its Chief Justice, directed the respondent state to file an answer thereto, and then, having considered the petition for rehearing and the arguments made in support and opposition thereto, denied the petition for rehearing on March 13, 1963.
Following denial of the petition for rehearing, petitioner, on May 17, 1963, filed with this court his praecipe requesting that we certify and send to the Supreme Court of the United States all essential records pertaining to his trial, the judgment and sentence, and appeal. We ordered compliance and sent forward all transcripts of the record and evidence so designated by petitioner to accompany his petition for review by that court by writ of certiorari of his conviction and sentence. October 21, 1963, the Supreme *732Court of the United States denied the petition for certiorari and sent a copy of its order so doing to this court. White v. Washington, 375 U.S. 883, 11 L. Ed. (2d) 113, 84 S. Ct. 154. Since Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 94 L. Ed. 761, 70 S. Ct. 587 (1949), I am not sure that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States to review the opinion and judgment of the highest tribunal of a state having jurisdiction in criminal cases is essential to the exhausting of state remedies. See: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 9 L. Ed. (2d) 837, 83 S. Ct. 822 (1963). But this point need not be considered in extenso for petitioner did petition for certiorari and the same was denied.
With the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States, no further remedies remained to petitioner by which he might directly challenge the judgment and sentence. Any new attacks on the validity of the judgment must perforce be collateral. Proceeding collaterally then, petitioner, on February 21, 1964, filed in this court his petition for a writ of habeas corpus which we heard en banc, and subsequently, on March 19, 1964, denied in a formal published opinion. In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn. (2d) 15, 390 P. (2d) 535.
There rests on the courts of the several states a duty to uphold the constitution of the United States and the acts of Congress made in pursuance thereto, a duty neither inferior nor secondary to the same obligation resting upon the federal judicial system. All courts, state and federal, bear with equal weight an obligation to provide remedies for violations of constitutional guarantees. Fay v. Noia, supra. That this is so comes not only from powers and duties necessarily implied or inherent, but rather from the express language of the constitution. In words designed to place the burden squarely and with equal weight on all courts, the constitution declares:
“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in *733the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. . . .” (Italics mine.) U.S. Const. Art. 6.
I see in the supreme law of the land clause a categorical imperative placing upon all the courts in the nation a duty to secure to every person held to answer a criminal charge all of the rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed in the constitution of the United States. I take this clause to mean that all courts, state or federal, trial or review, of special or limited jurisdiction, are equally bound in their obligation to observe, uphold and apply the constitution.
That this is an equal and universal responsibility resting with equal weight upon all of the judges in the Nation may further be seen in that provision of the constitution which requires every court to give full faith and credence to the courts of every other state.
“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. ...” U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 1.
Should there be any doubt as to the universality of this doctrine, I suggest that this section applies equally to the federal courts, for the courts of the United States are bound to give the judgments constitutionally entered by state courts the same faith and credit that the courts of one state are bound to give to the courts of the other states. Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555, 43 L. Ed. 808, 19 S. Ct. 506 (1899); Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 96 L. Ed. 448, 72 S. Ct. 398, rehearing denied 343 U.S. 921, 96 L. Ed. 1334, 72 S. Ct. 674 (1950). A failure to heed the admonitory concepts contained in this section must inevitably lead to a kind of judicial anarchy in the prosecution of crime, a condition where a criminal case will never end, a state of things where the sovereign people have lost their power to enjoin, punish or rehabilitate the criminal offender, for none of these can be done if the judgment upon him never becomes final. See: Fay v. Noia, supra, where 21 years after signing a coerced confession to murder, there being no appeal taken from the judgment of conviction and life sentence—possibly because a new trial may have resulted in the death penalty—the petitioner was set free on petition for habeas corpus.
*734Exhaustion of state remedies must mean remedies by which a judgment of conviction or errors in the trial may be challenged directly as distinguished from collateral attacks on the judgment of conviction, by habeas corpus or coram nobis or such other writs as may be discovered or invented. If, by exhaustion of state remedies something else is meant to include collateral attacks, the term becomes meaningless, for habeas corpus is said not to be subject to the doctrine of res judicata. Darr v. Burford, supra; Fay v. Noia, supra. And, before the ink is dry on an order denying one petition, another may be filed and be deemed pending. So it may go, one petition after another, ad infinitum.
What then are the remedies which ought to be available to one accused of crime in the state courts which are said to be exhausted in a case such as this? When one has been accorded a public trial by a constitutionally selected jury; represented by competent counsel at public expense; afforded the power of subpoena; free to testify or not as he chose; allowed freedom of cross-examination; given ample time and opportunity to prepare his defense; and at all times free to bring to the judge’s attention any claims of error in law or occurrences during or preceding the trial which tend to deprive him of either a fair trial or due process of law and to have these assertions of error or impairment of due process considered and ruled upon by the judge presiding, he has been afforded in large measure the remedies contemplated. Then, when to these are added the further remedies that, after verdict, one has been entitled, under the law of the forum, to consideration anew of all claims of error through motions in arrest of judgment or for a new trial, including reference to newly discovered evidence, and to have all matters going to the fairness of the trial and treatment preceding the trial heard and ruled upon by the trial judge, he has nearly exhausted his remedies. Finally, when to all of these remedies he has been granted the right of appeal to the highest court in the state having jurisdiction in criminal cases and has received from that court a review of all claims of error, it should be held that the opinion of the highest state court be considered the final *735remedy. If there be any doubt on the point that the judgment of the highest court of appeal constitutes the last remedy, then it follows that the right to petition for a rehearing to the highest court must be the last and final remedy. Accordingly, when in considered judgment of the highest court the rehearing be denied, the petitioner has exhausted his remedies under the state law. Petitioner here, having pursued all of these remedies on a direct challenge to the judgment, and further having attacked the judgment collaterally by habeas corpus here, has no further remedies available. He has used every means by which to directly attack the judgment in the courts of this state.
Accordingly, I would deny the petition for an order of reference; the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the cause now pending before us being dependent upon the issuance of an order of reference should likewise be denied and dismissed.
Rosellini, C.J., concurs with Hale, J.