Court Opinion

ID: 9737206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:18:57.098926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.214890
License: Public Domain

SHOEMAKER., P. J.
I dissent from that part of the judgment reversing the conviction as to statutory rape.
The opinion refers to CALJIC No. 507, and holds that, on this record, it was error for the trial court to refuse the request of defendant that it be given. In doing so, the court relies upon People v. Hernandez, supra (61 Cal.2d 529 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092]). I do not believe that Hernandez requires, under the facts here present, that this instruction be given. We must remember that in Hernandez, the defendant made an offer to prove his reasonable and good faith belief as to the age of the victim and that the court observed “the offer demonstrated a sufficient basis upon which, when fully developed, the trier of fact might have found in defendant’s favor. ” (P. 536.)
An examination of the record in Hernandez discloses that the belief, relied upon by Hernandez and the subject of his offer of proof, was allegedly based upon a statement made by the victim to a police officer, who stopped her and defendant on a curfew check and Hernandez overheard her tell the officer that she was over 18 (a defense that could only be raised by defendant taking the stand).
The victim herein testified that after defendant and she had lived together for several days, during which acts of sexual intercourse had taken place between them, she told defendant she was not 21 years of age. that she was 16 years old and that she had run away from Los Angeles; that defendant had *710sexual relations with her following her telling him that she was only 16 and that defendant never told her to leave but did say to her, after knowing her age and continuing his sexual relations with her, “Whew, every time I go to sleep I think about if I get in trouble behind you.” (This quotation from the victim’s testimony was adduced on cross-examination and is not set forth in the quotation in the opinion which was taken from her direct examination.)
The victim’s account of her relations with defendant Thomas stood up under cross-examination and while it presents a sordid picture, has a ring of truth.
The defendant did not take the stand to refute the testimony of the victim. He was the only person who could do so. He chooses to rely on the testimony of his probation officer on cross-examination that he met the victim once in defendant’s room and that to him she appeared to be at least 21 years of age (what else can be expected of a probation officer who accepted defendant’s statement that the victim was his girlfriend—a good girl—who as we know at the time was engaging in various sexual acts and defendant was her pimp); and the observation that the trier of fact could make at the time of trial as to the victim’s age.
In my opinion, such a showing, if such it may be called, is not sufficient. The defense we are dealing with is an affirmative defense as to which the defendant has the burden of proof (see comment to CALJIC No. 507, 1967 Cumulative Pocket Part).
The inquiry is as to the state of mind of the defendant, which can only be established by the expression of the party whose good faith is in issue—in this ease, the defendant.
It is not an unusual requirement. As is pointed out in Wit-kin, California Evidence (2d ed. 1966) at page 188, in many situations, for reasons of policy or convenience, the burden of proof is placed on the defendant: double jeopardy; entrapment; defendant under eighteen and not subject to death penalty; good faith marriage in "bigamy prosecution; valid doctor’s prescription in prosecution for narcotics possession or sale.
In addition to the foregoing, there are many statutes which impose the burden of producing evidence on certain defenses (Witkin, supra, at page 187).
Insofar as the Hernandez case is relied upon as placing the burden of proof on the People to prove that defendant did not have reasonable cause to believe that the victim was over 18 *711years of age, my colleagues have failed to appreciate that the court is talking of the overall burden on the People to establish the guilt of defendant and not the requirement as contended by the writer that the burden of proof is upon the defendant to establish the defense of good faith and reasonable belief with evidence of probative value, as opposed to evidence that is purely conjectural as to defendant’s state of mind.
In People v Moseley, supra (240 Cal.App.2d 859 [50 Cal.Rptr. 67]), the defendant took the stand and denied everything that the pleadings and testimony charged him with doing.
In People v. Winters, supra (242 Cal.App.2d 711 [51 Cal.Rptr. 735]), the defendant took the stand and testified as to his good faith and reasonable belief that the victim was over 18 years of age.
Hence in each case a conflict in the testimony was created and the duty fell on the trier of fact to determine the conflict.
There should be added to the references made in the majority opinion to the case of People v. Dolly, supra (239 Cal.App.2d 143 [48 Cal.Rptr. 478]), the following; “Finally, defendant argues that the prosecution had the burden of proving that he had knowledge of the victim’s lack of capacity to give consent, and that it failed to carry this burden. Defendant relies on People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529 [39 Cal.Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092], which holds that a statutory rape charge is defensible, upon defendant’s showing of his lack of criminal intent because of his honest and reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was old enough to consent. Presumably, the same rule applies to a case involving lack of mental capacity. Here, however, defendant elected not to testify and presented no defense. Furthermore, there was evidence to support a finding that defendant was aware of the lack of mental capacity of the prosecutrix. It is inferable from this record, including the letter from defendant to the prosecutrix above quoted, that defendant had been acquainted with the prosecutrix for some time prior to the alleged offense, and thus had had an opportunity to know about her condition.” (P. 146; italics supplied.) This quotation speaks for itself.
The majority opinion cites no case and it is apparent none can be found to support the statement that11 To impose such a requirement would be violative of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” The “requirement” re*712ferred to is that the Hernandez defense be raised by the defendant taking the stand. As has been noted, there are many cases in which the defendant must take the stand if his defense is to be established and it has never been held to violate any of his constitutional rights.
If the showing made in this ease justifies the giving of the instruction requested, then the administration of justice is but an exercise of futility.
I would affirm the judgment convicting defendant of statutory rape.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 19,1969.