Court Opinion

ID: 9373098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:43.242556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.232369
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DERICK ESHELMAN,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-15-0222-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: January 18, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ryan Green, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Sandra Fortson, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

                                              BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                    Member Leavitt issues a separate concurring opinion.

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 14-day suspension. For the reasons set
     forth below, the agency’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed
     without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2            The following facts are further detailed in the initial decision.         The
     appellant held the Fire Chief position at Royal Air Force Croughton (RAFC).
     Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-
     I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1; Eshelman v. Department of the Air
     Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF),
     Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. 2     In 2013, the agency’s Office of Special
     Investigations (AFOSI) opened an investigation after receiving a n anonymous tip
     that the appellant was committing fraud. ID at 2. The AFOSI later concluded
     that the appellant had knowingly scheduled firefighters to an improper work
     pattern (embedded schedule) that allowed them to collect a higher rate of pay
     from 2010 through 2013, at a cost of approximately $263,000. Id.; IAF, Tab 8
     at 95.
¶3            In July 2014, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on a single
     charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee, with three corresponding
     specifications. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 9-11. The deciding official sustained the
     removal action, effective November 2014. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 1 at 12 -13. The
     appellant challenged his removal in the instant appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 1 -6.
¶4            After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge sustained the
     lone charge along with each of the underlying specifications and found nexus, ID
     at 3-13, but mitigated the removal to a 14-day suspension, ID at 14-19.            The
     agency has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrat ive judge erred
     in mitigating the penalty.      Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB
     Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The
     appellant has filed a response, and the agency has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3 -5.

     2
       The administrative judge dismissed the initial appeal without prejudice for automatic
     refiling at a later date, resulting in the two docket numbers associated with this one
     matter. IAF, Tab 34.
                                                                                           3

                                          ANALYSIS
¶5         A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date
     of the issuance of the initial decision, or if the party filing the petition shows that
     the initial decision was received more than 5 days after it was issued, within
     30 days after the party received the initial decision. Palermo v. Department of
     the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3 (2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Board will
     waive the time limit for filing a petition for review only upon a showing of good
     cause for the delay in filing. Palermo, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 4. The party who
     submits an untimely petition for review has the burden of establishing good cause
     for the untimely filing by showing that he exercised due diligence or ordinary
     prudence under the particular circumstances of the case.          Id.   To determine
     whether a party has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the
     delay, the reasonableness of his excuse and the party’s showing of due diligence,
     whether he is proceeding pro se, and whether he has presented evidence of the
     existence of circumstances beyond his control that affected his ability to comply
     with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly
     shows a causal relationship to his inability to timely file his petition. Id.
¶6         In this case, because the initial decision was issued on July 22, 2016, the
     petition for review was due by August 26, 2016.             ID at 22; see Palermo,
     120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e).         The agency filed its petition
     through the Board’s e-Appeal system on August 27, 2016, at approximately
     12:13 a.m., several minutes after the deadline for doing so. PFR File, Tab 1.
     Because the filing appeared untimely, the Board’s e-Appeal system automatically
     generated questions concerning timeliness, to which the agency’s representative
     responded as follows:

           The PFR was filed prior to the deadline, but did not file. Instead,
           when I went to the logged on [sic] to submit the attachments, it had
           not been filed. The second attempt to file it with the documents
           resulted in the same problem. It appeared that the documents were
           being filed, but again, they were not filed. The final attempt resulted
                                                                                              4

               in the documents being untimely. A check of [e-Appeal] will verify
               that the documents were timely filed.
     Id. at 4. 3
¶7          The Clerk of the Board issued an acknowledgment letter, instructing the
     agency that an untimely petition for review must be accompanied by a motion to
     either accept the filing as timely, and/or waive the time limit for good cause.
     PFR File, Tab 2 at 1 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g)). The letter further instructed
     the agency that if it wanted to file the aforementioned motion, the agency must
     include a statement signed under penalty of perjury or an affidavit showing that
     the petition was either timely or good cause existed for the untimeliness.              Id.
     at 1-2.       It also included a form for doing so, and provided a deadline of
     September 23, 2016. Id. at 7-8.
¶8          Despite the instructions contained in the acknowledgment letter, the agency
     did not submit a separate sworn statement, affidavit, or further explanation for the
     untimely filing by the September 23, 2016 deadline. Instead, in its October 1,
     2016 reply brief, the agency argued that it had presented good cause. PFR File,
     Tab 4 at 4-8. With that reply brief, the agency also submitted a complaint filed
     with the Board’s Technical Support Team, where the agency reported attempting
     to file the petition at least twice within the 20 minutes leadi ng up to the deadline
     for doing so, but having problems doing so. 4 Id. at 18-19.
¶9          A review of the Board’s e-Appeal logs shows that the agency did access the
     system to start the process of filing a pleading on August 26, 2016, at 11:38 p.m.
     However, they do not reflect any attempt to submit the pleading until August 27,
     2016, at 12:13 a.m. The logs reflect one error, but that error occurred after the

     3
      The agency’s representative answered “yes” to whether she declared, under penalty of
     perjury, the facts asserted regarding the timeliness of the petition. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
     4
       The agency described the problem to the Board’s Technical Support Team citing both
     August 22, 2016, and August 26, 2016, as the dates of attempted fi ling. PFR File,
     Tab 4 at 18. However, it appears that the reference to August 22, 2016, was a
     typographical error.
                                                                                       5

      filing deadline, and was caused by the agency attempting to submit the petition a
      second time within seconds of the 12:13 a.m. submission, while the initial
      submission was still processing.
¶10         In considering allegations that an untimely filing was caused by technical
      difficulties, the Board has reached differing conclusions based on the particular
      circumstances of each case.         Compare Boykin v. U.S. Postal Service,
      104 M.S.P.R. 460, ¶ 6 (2007) (excusing a 1-day delay in filing when an
      appellant’s representative reported making multiple attempts to timely file and
      the Board’s records reflected a high incidence of users reporting problems with
      the e-Appeal system during the date in question), Wiggins v. Department of the
      Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2010) (excusing a petition that was
      untimely by 4 minutes when the appellant was pro se and had attempted to create
      a new pleading four times in the days leading up to his untimely filing), and
      Social Security Administration v. Price, 94 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶ 7 (2003) (finding that
      the agency exercised due diligence and showed good cause for filing a petition
      for review 34 minutes late when its attorney submitted a sworn statement
      indicating that she began sending the petition prior to the filing deadline but had
      technical problems with a fax machine), aff’d, 398 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
      with Palermo, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶¶ 5-10 (declining to excuse a 7-day delay for
      claimed difficulties with e-Appeal when, inter alia, the appellant’s representative
      was familiar with e-Appeal and failed to submit a motion showing good cause),
      and Gaetos v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 6 (2014)
      (declining to excuse a petition that was untimely by 3½ hours when the petitioner
      failed to establish a good reason for the delay).           Under the particular
      circumstances of this case, we find that the agency has failed to establish good
      cause for its untimely petition.
¶11         Although the agency’s petition for review was untimely by mere minutes,
      we are not persuaded by the explanation provided. The agency’s representative is
      familiar with the e-Appeal system, having used it throughout this appeal. E.g.,
                                                                                              6

      IAF, Tab 3.      She is also familiar with the potential consequences of her
      untimeliness, having been sanctioned for her untimeliness below.                 Hearing
      Transcript 2 (HT2) at 5-11. 5 Nevertheless, the Board’s e-Appeal logs indicate
      that she did not log into the system to begin the process of filing the petition for
      review until 11:38 p.m. on the day it was due. See generally Baker v. Department
      of Justice, 41 M.S.P.R. 25, 27 (1989) (recognizing that if a party delays the filing
      of a petition until the eleventh hour, that party bears the risk that unforeseen
      circumstances could prevent the timely filing of that petition).          Moreover, as
      detailed above, although the agency asserts that there were two failed attempts at
      filing the petition before the deadline to do so, the Board’s e -Appeal logs reflect
      otherwise. PFR File, Tab 2 at 1-2, 7-8; supra ¶ 9.
¶12         Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review as untimely filed. T his is
      the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board regarding the timeliness
      of the petition for review. The initial decision remains the final decision of the
      Board regarding the agency’s removal action.

      5
        The agency’s lack of timeliness was a persistent issue below. Among other things, the
      agency’s representative failed to submit the agency file until more than 2 weeks after
      the deadline for doing so, indicating that it was an unintentional error stemming from a
      misplaced email. Compare IAF, Tab 2 at 7, with IAF Tab 5 at 1-2. She also waited
      until the afternoon before the original hearing date to reschedule, citing difficulties
      obtaining video-teleconference connectivity for certain witnesses, after the appellant
      had already travelled from Illinois to Washington, D.C. for the hearing. IAF,
      Tabs 25, 29. In another instance, the agency’s representative failed to respond to
      emails and motions from opposing counsel in a timel y manner, reporting that technical
      problems prevented her from accessing email for a full week. Compare RAF, Tab 1
      at 4, 7, Tab 2 at 4, 8, with RAF, Tab 4 at 1. Lastly, she was untimely for each of the
      rescheduled hearing days, citing car troubles, traffic, trouble finding parking, and rain,
      for which the administrative judge issued sanctions in the form of precluding the
      agency from cross examining certain witnesses. HT2 at 5-11.
                                                                                           7

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
       You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.                 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
       Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

       (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                  5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
       If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must    submit    your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    8

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                  9

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     10

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney no r warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with t he U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       11

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                   CONCURRING OPINION OF TRISTAN L. LEAVITT

                                                   in

                       Derick Eshelman v. Department of the Air Force

                             MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-2

¶1         I concur in the opinion of the Board that the agency’s petition for review
     should be dismissed as untimely filed without good cause shown. Although the
     initial decision is therefore the final decision of the Board, see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b), I write separately to express my disagreement with the
     administrative judge’s determination to mitigate the penalty of removal to a
     14-day suspension.
¶2         The agency removed the appellant from his GS-12 Fire Chief position at
     Royal Air Force (RAF) Croughton based on a charge of conduct unbecoming a
     Federal employee. See MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0222-I-1, Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 1 at 9. In essence, the agency determined that for nearly 3 years,
     the appellant worked, and allowed his subordinate empl oyees to work, an
     unauthorized schedule that resulted in salary overpayments, even after being told
     this schedule was unauthorized.     See id.        The administrative judge found the
     agency proved its charge, including all specifications, by preponderant evidenc e.
     Initial Decision (ID) at 3-13.    He also found a nexus between the sustained
     misconduct and the efficiency of the service.            ID at 13-14.   I agree with
     these findings.
¶3         In mitigating the penalty, the administrative judge relied on several factors.
     First, he considered that a Fire Chief at another RAF—RAF Alconbury—“utilized
     the embedded schedule for himself, and at least two others, until June 2012,” but
     was not disciplined. ID at 15-18. The deciding official testified there were no
     comparable cases under his command at RAF Croughton.               Hearing Transcript
     (June 22, 2016) (HT1) at 45; see also IAF, Tab 8 at 31 (the deciding official
                                                                                       2

     stating on his Douglas factors worksheet, “I have no other cases to compare with
     this one”). While the deciding official “had heard the rumor . . . that there were
     other potential violations of this nature” at other bases, he was “not the
     commander at those locations” and was “not familiar with what they would have
     or could have done” or “how they handled that discipline.” H T1 at 45; see also
     id. at 87 (“I have no understanding of who the other personnel were or who
     would’ve been using the schedule. I just heard that Alconbury in general was
     using the schedule.”). The relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and
     unjustifiably treated employees differently.       Singh v. U.S. Postal Service,
     2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14.       A person generally does not have a legally protected
     interest in the evenness of a misconduct penalty assessed on him as compared to
     others, and there is a possible exception to this rule only if employees are
     knowingly   treated    differently.   Facer v.   Department    of   the   Air Force,
     836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rogers v. Department of Defense Dependents
     Schools, 814 F.2d 1549, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[d]isparate
     treatment requires that employees knowingly be treated differently” and
     considering that even if other employees had performance deficiencies simil ar to
     the appellant’s, there was no evidence that the deciding official was aware of
     such deficiencies). Given the deciding official’s undisputed lack of knowledge
     regarding potential comparator employees outside his authority, 1 I do not believe
     it was appropriate for the administrative judge to consider this employee for
     mitigation purposes.
¶4        Second, the administrative judge found the agency “failed to show by
     preponderant evidence that the appellant deliberately disregarded the rules as he

     1
       The appellant asserts he was “in the same chain of command” as the RAF Alconbury
     comparator because “the 501 Wing and its ultimate commander had responsibilities
     over both Croughton and Alconbury.” Petition for Review File, Tab 3 at 14. However,
     the deciding official was not the wing commander. Rather, as the group commander, he
     was subordinate to the wing commander, and was only responsible for three
     installations (RAF Croughton, RAF Fairford, and RAF Welford). HT1 at 11-13, 149.
                                                                                        3

     understood them simply to enrich himself and his coworkers.” ID at 18. This
     conclusion relied in part on the administrative judge’s demeanor -based credibility
     finding concerning the appellant’s testimony on this point.      ID at 18-19. The
     Board will overturn such determinations only when it has sufficiently sound
     reasons to do so. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed.
     Cir. 2002).   I would overturn the administrative judge’s credibility finding
     because it is wholly inconsistent with the appellant’s own prior admissions. See
     Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987).                   The
     administrative judge also found the agency “failed to prove by preponderant
     evidence that the appellant’s use of the embedded schedule cost the agency more
     money than it would have cost had the appellant used an appropriate schedule.”
     ID at 19.     Again, this finding is inconsistent with the appellant’s own
     prior admissions.
¶5        Specifically, in a signed, sworn statement, the appellant averred:
           Although I felt I had good reasons to work the embedded schedule,
           the extra money earned from the additional time worked was a
           benefit that was part of the decision. The money aspect made it
           worth doing all the extra hours and is and was simply the wrong
           thing to do. I truely [sic] regret costing the Air Force the additional
           money . . . I should have listened to those around me and those
           trying to help get me on the right path. 2
     IAF, Tab 8 at 148.    He acknowledged that by fall 2012, he “understood [the
     embedded schedule] was not a schedule desired to be used for Air Force
     firefighters,” but “[t]he extra hours and money would be nice.” Id. at 150. In
     light of the foregoing admissions, I would find preponderant evidence supports
     the deciding official’s conclusion that “the unauthorized schedule was
     intentional . . . the decision to repeat the mistake was made over several years,

     2
       The deciding official testified this statement “definitely impacted” his decision
     because it “showed that [the appellant] acknowledged that there was a money impact to
     his personal benefit.” HT1 at 42-43.
                                                                                        4

     even when others (such as the Air Force Chief or other functional experts)
     continued to indicate that this was not right.” Id. at 29-30.
¶6         Third, the administrative judge noted that the appellant “had approximately
     20 years of positive service with the agency, having received performance awards
     and good performance reviews, and having no prior disciplinary record.”          ID
     at 19. The deciding official explicitly considered the appellant’s “good work for
     over 20 years” and the fact that he had “no documented disciplinary actions ,” but
     apparently found those factors insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the
     appellant’s misconduct. IAF, Tab 8 at 31. I discern no error with that approach.
     Indeed, the Board has frequently stated that the nature and seriousness of the
     offense, and its relation to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibility, is
     the most important factor in assessing the reasonableness of a penalty.      Singh,
     2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 18.      The deciding official noted: “The offense of working
     longer hours than authorized is a very serious one.”        IAF, Tab 8 at 29.    He
     considered the appellant’s supervisory role, finding “the level of trust required to
     be a manager and supervisor of other fire fighters has been tarnished
     significantly” and that the appellant “cannot continue to service in the leadership
     role because his trustworthiness is in question.”      Id. at 31-32; see HT1 at 26
     (deciding official testifying, “there is a high degree of seriousness because of how
     we manage our fire department, the number of people involved, and the
     perspective within the community”); see also Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service,
     116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010) (stating that agencies are entitled to hold
     supervisors to a higher standard because they occupy positions of trust and
     responsibility). I would defer to the deciding official’s determination concerning
     the seriousness of the sustained misconduct, in relation to the appellant’s
     supervisory role.
¶7         Fourth, the administrative judge concluded the appellant demonstrated
     rehabilitative potential because he was honest with investigators and expressed
     remorse for his actions.    ID at 19.   This is directly contrary to the deciding
                                                                                        5

     official’s determination that the appellant “ha[d] no chance of rehabilitation at
     RAF Croughton” because he held such a prominent position, and his offense was
     notorious “throughout all the US-led fire departments in the United Kingdom”
     and “promulgated a poor reputation for the Croughton fire department.” IAF,
     Tab 8 at 32. “[T]he rumor about this was fairly pervasive.” HT1 at 29 (testimony
     of the deciding official). The deciding official testified, “[S]ince w e are a small
     fire department area, there was zero potential for rehabilitation at this location.
     Since we are overseas, then basically the only thing to do was to dismiss him.”
     HT1 at 27. The deciding official also found problematic that the appellant did not
     apologize for his actions until he was under investigation. HT1 at 135-38; see
     Wynne v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 75 M.S.P.R. 127, 137 (1997) (the
     appellant’s “belated, lukewarm expression of remorse” was insufficient to show
     rehabilitative potential and did not constitute a significant mitigating factor) . He
     considered whether the appellant could be demoted to a nonsup ervisory position
     and concluded, “When a supervisor makes a mistake, to basically move them
     down to a worker bee level . . . that would not be conducive to good order of
     discipline and the morale of the fire department that I had here.” HT1 at 27-28,
     152, 168-73; see also IAF, Tab 8 at 33 (Douglas factors worksheet indicating the
     deciding official “considered potential reduced punishments,” but concluded
     these other options “would send an inappropriate signal of the expectation to
     maintain high standards”).
¶8         As I noted in my dissent in Chin v. Department of Defense, 2022 MSPB 34,
     it is clearly not the Board’s role to decide what penalty we would impose if we
     were the deciding officials.     “Mitigation of a penalty by the Board is only
     appropriate where the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors, or the agency’s
     judgment clearly exceeded the limits of reasonableness.” Lopez v. Department of
     the Navy, 108 M.S.P.R. 384, ¶ 22 (2008). The letter of decision, as supplemented
     by the deciding official’s hearing testimony, demonstrates that he properly
     considered the relevant factors, and that removal was within of the tolerable
                                                                            6

limits of reasonableness in this case. Under these circumstances, the agency’s
penalty determination is entitled to deference.    Accordingly, I believe the
agency-imposed penalty should not have been disturbed.

/s/
Tristan L. Leavitt
Member