Court Opinion

ID: 9848901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:29:41.762739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:52.579819
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, Chief Elder presented clear and convincing evidence of Sossamon’s actual malice in publishing the anonymous commentary in The Gaffney Ledger.
The constitutional standard for proving actual malice is well-established. In N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the United States Supreme Court held “[t]he constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false *120or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” “ ‘Reckless disregard,’ it is true, cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case adjudication, as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases ... ”. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
“... [RJeckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.” Id. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323; see also Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 324 S.C. 261, 266, 478 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1996) (“[t]o establish recklessness, there must be an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”). Nevertheless, “[t]he defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is ... based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call ...”. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (italic added).1 When reporting the allegations of a third party, “recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.” Id.
On appeal, this Court has “a constitutional duty to ‘exercise independent judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity’.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989), citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); see also Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 324 S.C. 261, 478 S.E.2d 282 (1996) (de novo review is conducted to determine if there is clear and convincing evidence on issue of actual malice). “Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which *121will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established ...; it does not mean clear and unequivocal.” Id. 324 S.C. at 265, 478 S.E.2d at 286, citing Middleton v. Johnston, 221 Va. 797, 273 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1981).
In my opinion, de novo review of the record demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Sossamon’s claim he believed the anonymous recording was true because Chief Elder had previously notified him a newspaper employee was “hanging out” with a drug dealer who was going to be arrested does not support the recording’s assertion Chief Elder was taking bribes from drug dealers. In fact, it suggests the contrary: that Chief Elder, was actively arresting drug dealers. In that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the danger inherent in relying on anonymous sources, St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, Sossamon’s failure to take any steps to corroborate the accuracy of the recording suggests a purposeful avoidance of the truth tantamount to reckless disregard for the truth. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 692, 109 S.Ct. 2678 (“[although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category.”) (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, Sossamon’s attitude towards Chief Elder’s wife prior to the publication of the recording indicates a degree of apparent hostility towards Chief Elder. Further, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, Sossamon’s own arrest and conviction for manufacturing marijuana are evidence of his motive for publishing the recording without regard to whether its assertions were true. Id. at 668, 109 S.Ct. 2678 (italic added) (“[ajlthough courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, and it cannot he said that evidence concerning motive or care never hears any relation to the actual malice inquiry”) (internal citations omitted).
The First Amendment prevents the threat of litigation from inhibiting the freedom of the press. Nonetheless, its protection is not without limit. Where, as here, a newspaper heedlessly and falsely accuses a public official of a crime solely *122on an unsubstantiated anonymous recording, constitutional protections cease. Accordingly, I would affirm, in result, the decision of the Court of Appeals.2

. Our Court previously recognized this St. Amant standard in Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 332 S.C. 502, 506 S.E.2d 497 (1998) (Toal, J., concurring).

. Statements of opinion are not automatically entitled to constitutional protection. Mitkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (the First Amendment does not shield an assertion simply because it is characterized as an opinion). The phrase "[n]ow I often wonder if the drug dealers are paying the Chief of Blacksburg” is clearly an assertion of an objective fact and is actionable.