Court Opinion

ID: 9458240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:46:01.695173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:41.022723
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) :
I join in the first part of the majority’s opinion and I am in agreement that this case must be remanded to the District Court for re-trial since the jury was never apprised of the effect of the prescribed medication on Bennett. This omission could cause some confusion as to whether he was suffering from a mental illness or defect at the time of the alleged offense. A careful consideration of the second part of the majority’s opinion concerning the need and desirability of bifurcation, on the other hand, leads me to dissent from that part of their opinion.
Bifurcation is clearly not a matter of right but rather is a procedural consideration within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Contee v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 262, 410 F.2d 249, 250 (1969) citing Holmes v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 154, 363 F.2d 281, 284 (1966). As Judge Bazelon has so aptly stated the law: “[W]e have repeatedly held that the trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing bifurcation where the defendant does not present a substantial defense both on the merits and on the issue of responsibility.” 1 Clearly this is *883the ease before us. In fact, the majority obviously believes this to be the case as they specifically state that “[w]e emphasize, therefore, that the failure to order a bifurcated trial was not reversible error.” 2 They continue by saying that notwithstanding this fact there is no reason to deny bifurcation on remand. This line of reasoning appears to be not only fallacious but also appears to constitute nothing more than somewhat gratuitous dieta. The majority first contends that the trial judge did not initially abuse his discretion, that he did not commit reversible error; it is their view, however, that as the proceedings progressed the need for bifurcation became clear. This causes them to enunciate a preferred course of action on remand. I believe that this must remain a determination for the trial judge. To my way of thinking the trial judge either erred or he did not and if he did not then he must be allowed to exercise his sound discretion without supervision from this court. Finding no abuse I find it arbitrary and inconsistent to dictate a course of action to the trial judge albeit the absence of any justification. Such appellate direction is both uncalled for and unnecessary.
The situation in this case would admittedly not entitle the appellant to a bifurcated trial before two separate jury panels.3 The use of two separate panels in eases of this nature is certainly of questionable legal value and would exemplify an inexcusable lack of economy in the judiciary. I can conceive of no reason why the same panel could not make a determination of both the merits and the defense of lack of responsibility. The fact that this case involves a sexual attack does not lead me to believe that the jury would in any sense be incapable of distinguishing between the attack itself and the issue of appellant’s responsibility following instructions from the bench.
For these reasons I would remand the case to the District Court but would not require a bifurcated trial.

. See majority opinion at 878. “See, e. g., Harried v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 389 F.2d 281 (1967). But cf. United States v. Grimes, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 186-188, 421 F.2d 1119, 1121-1123 (1969).” (Footnote renumbered.)

. See the majority opinion at 881.

. For a discussion concerning impaneling two separate panels see Parman v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 190-191, 399 F.2d 559, 561-562, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858, 89 S.Ct. 109, 21 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); Holmes v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 152, 363 F.2d 281 (1966).