Court Opinion

ID: 9839134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 20:05:49.971845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:21.247792
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                              THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        (Sacramento)
                                              ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                              C096437

                  Plaintiff and Respondent,                 (Super. Ct. No. 21FE004429)

          v.

 CURTIS ANTHONY SLATON,

                  Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County,
Maryanne G. Gilliard, Judge. Affirmed.

      Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally
Espinoza, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is certified
for publication with the exception of parts I and II of the Discussion.

                                               1
       A jury found defendant Curtis Anthony Slaton guilty of murder. The
prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he
affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a
rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to
advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things,
show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang,
and holding up a blue bandana.
       On appeal, defendant contends the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots
for three reasons. First, he argues this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential
motive for the charged murder. He appears to reason that the screenshots might have
been admissible to show motive if having gang ties were a crime, but because it is not,
the screenshots should have been excluded. Second, he asserts the screenshots should
have been excluded because they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal
relevance. And third, he contends a new statute governing the admission of music videos
and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here—
applies retroactively and requires reversal. We affirm, finding none of these arguments
persuasive.
                                    BACKGROUND
                                             I
                                   Factual Background
       On October 3, 2020, Jaylen Betschart called a friend and said a car was following
him in Sacramento. Surveillance video from that time shows a gray Dodge Avenger
passing Betschart’s car and then, a little later, driving behind Betschart. Two witnesses
heard gunshots shortly after around 3:30 p.m. One witness saw a car veer off the road
and hit a telephone pole. The driver, Betschart, was slumped against the steering wheel
and not moving. Another witness saw a white car drive through an intersection and then
a gray Dodge approach the same intersection. The driver of the Dodge retracted his arm

                                             2
while looking in the direction of the white car and then drove away. Betschart died from
a gunshot wound that entered his back, passed through his left lung and heart, and exited
through his chest. He had just turned 17.
       Officers investigating the shooting were led to defendant’s home, where the gray
Dodge shown in the surveillance video was registered. They found two cars at the
home—the Dodge and a Buick. After being asked about the Dodge, defendant told an
officer that he was the car’s primary driver and no one else drove it. But he denied any
involvement in the shooting and denied having any guns at his home. After obtaining a
search warrant, law enforcement searched the two cars, checked the Dodge for gunshot
residue, and analyzed two bullet cartridges collected from the scene of the shooting. In
the Buick, officers found a Glock 22 .40-caliber handgun under the rear passenger seat
and a utility bill in defendant’s name. In the Dodge, a gunshot residue expert found a
relatively high concentration of gunshot residue, with most on the driver’s side of the car.
And a ballistics expert concluded that the bullet cartridges from the shooting were fired
from the gun found in the Buick.
       Officers reviewed cell phone location data for defendant and one of his
stepchildren, D.C. At 3:29 and 3:30 p.m. on October 3, 2020, D.C.’s phone was near the
intersection where witnesses heard gunshots. Defendant’s phone was not communicating
with cell towers at this time (or at any time between 3:22 and 3:55 p.m.), as could happen
if his phone were off. But at 3:21 p.m. and again at 3:55 p.m., defendant’s and D.C.’s
phones were in the same general area.
       Officers also reviewed videos on D.C.’s social media and pictures on his phone.
A video taken at 3:21 p.m. on October 3, 2020, shows D.C. in the passenger seat of
defendant’s Dodge. D.C. appears to have a Glock pistol in his lap. A second video taken
nine minutes later films the road and shows the Dodge driving behind Betschart’s car. In
the video, D.C. says: “Sucka’s spooked nigga on Grego. Nigga. Sucka’s runnin’. All
behind him. Dead homie. . . .” According to a witness familiar with these terms,

                                             3
“Sucka” is a derogatory term for the opposing side or someone you do not respect and
“Grego” was a gang member who was shot and killed in September 2017. A picture
taken at 4:00 p.m. on October 3, 2020, shows D.C. wearing a yellow sweatshirt and
holding a pistol of the type used in Betschart’s murder. Another picture shows an
October 3, 2020 news story concerning a shooting at Mama Marks Park in Sacramento
that left three wounded and a nine-year-old girl dead.
       Surveillance video from around the time of Betschart’s murder shows defendant’s
Dodge with a driver and a passenger inside. The passenger is wearing a yellow top,
consistent with the yellow sweatshirt that D.C. wore the day of the murder. The driver
appears to be a Black male in a white shirt with a very heavy build. Defendant is a Black
male with a heavy build. Records from the Department of Motor Vehicles list him as
five foot seven and weighing 280 pounds.
       Officers reviewed defendant’s Facebook account and, starting in March 2021,
listened to his calls after obtaining a wiretap. About nine hours after Betschart’s murder,
a Facebook friend of defendant’s posted a photograph of the girl murdered at Mama
Marks Park. Defendant messaged the friend, saying, “I know. I’m be on a killing spree.”
A few days after officers obtained the wiretap, officers recorded a call defendant had with
his sister, Kasey Potter. Defendant and Potter talked a little over an hour after an officer
went to Potter’s house and asked about defendant. Potter told defendant the police were
looking for him and said she told them she did not know his whereabouts. Potter added
that “[t]hey can’t pin point who is in the car” and instructed defendant, “[K]eep your
mouth shut. Keep your mother fucking mouth shut . . . .” Defendant responded, “On
mammas” or “On mamas.” Potter further instructed defendant, “[I]f they speak to you,
you don’t know nothing . . . and if they ask you don’t know what they are talking about.”
Defendant said, “Yep.”
       Law enforcement eventually suspected gang ties in Betschart’s murder. The lead
investigator in the case was familiar with various gangs operating in South Sacramento,

                                              4
including G Parkway Mobb (or G-Mobb), Starz Up, Guttah Gass Team (or Guttah, which
might have begun as the Guttah Boys), Garden Blocc Crips, 29th Street Crips, 24th Street
Crips, and Oak Park Bloods. He understood that the names for the three local Crips
gangs “are very interchangeable”; that the making of a “C” with a hand can stand for the
Crips; that the main rival for G-Mobb, Starz Up, and the Crips is the Oak Park Bloods;
and that blue is associated with the Crips and red is associated with the Oak Park Bloods.
On the day of the shooting in this case, Betschart was wearing a red shirt.
       Officers found both defendant’s and D.C.’s social media accounts suggested a
connection to one of the South Sacramento gangs. D.C.’s Instagram account name
included the initials “GGT,” which is an abbreviation for Guttah Gass Team. His account
listed the nicknames of several gang members who had been killed in Sacramento—
including a 29th Street Crip and Grego, a Starz Up and Guttah gang member—and said,
“Rest up soldiers.” Defendant’s social media—in which he is referred to as “Garden
Boy”—included a picture showing him wearing a blue bandana and making a “C” with
his hand. It also included a tribute to a 29th Street Crip who had been killed. A month
before Betschart’s murder, defendant posted a rap video on his social media. One man in
the video has a tattoo that says “Crip” and another is a known member of the Garden
Blocc Crips. Several people in the video wear blue clothing or have blue bandanas. And
defendant has a blue bandana and, in one of the scenes, makes a “C” with both his hands.
       On October 23, 2020, while defendant and D.C. were both in detention facilities,
the two spoke over the phone. Defendant told D.C., “I gotta write a song about you.
How . . . me and you came up in this bitch. Me and you run South Sac Iraq.” After D.C.
laughed, defendant continued, “PB and his son don’t, Lav and his son don’t, me and you
do.” The lead investigator for Betschart’s murder understood “South Sac Iraq” to refer to
the shootings in South Sacramento; “PB and his son” to refer to a 29th Street Crip and his
son, a Guttah gang member; and “Lav and his son” to refer to a Starz Up gang member

                                             5
and his son, a Guttah Boy gang member. Per stipulations in this case, neither defendant
nor Betschart were gang members.
                                              II
                                  Procedural Background
       Defendant was charged with Betschart’s murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)
The charging document alleged a firearm enhancement because defendant intentionally
discharged a firearm causing Betschart’s death (id., § 12022.53, subd. (d)) and a special
circumstance for the murder because defendant intentionally committed the murder by
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle at a person outside the vehicle (id., § 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)). It also alleged that defendant had a prior strike. (Id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-
(i), 1170.12.)
       Before trial, the prosecution asked the trial court to allow expert testimony about
the gang rivalries in Sacramento and defendant’s and D.C.’s gang affiliations. It argued
this evidence was necessary for the jury to understand defendant’s motive and intent,
explaining that although Betschart was not affiliated with the Oak Park Bloods, he was
wearing red on the day he was murdered. During the arguments on motions in limine, the
prosecution further suggested that the Mama Marks Park shooting—which it described as
another gang shooting—drove defendant to seek retribution.
       Over defendant’s objection, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce
some gang evidence. It reasoned that this evidence would provide an explanation for
why Betschart was murdered: He was targeted because he wore a red shirt and
defendant, although not shown to be a gang member, had affiliated with a gang that wore
blue. The court added that the jurors were entitled to know the meaning of several
terms—including South Sac Iraq, Sucka, and Grego—that they would hear. The court
emphasized, however, that it intended “to severely limit gang information this jury is
going to hear.”

                                              6
       During trial, the prosecution offered a witness explaining these terms and
introduced 13 screenshots from defendant’s rap video. A witness explained the relevance
of these screenshots. One shows a man with a back tattoo that says “Crip.” Another
shows a sign for 29th Street, which is in the South Sacramento neighborhood associated
with the 29th Street Crips or Garden Blocc Crips. A third image shows the intersection
of 29th Street with another street. A fourth image shows a man who is making a “C”
with his hand and wearing blue clothes and a blue bandana, which suggests association
with the Crips. A fifth image shows defendant displaying a “C” with both his hands. A
sixth image shows defendant and others holding up blue bandanas, which are commonly
associated with the 29th Street Crips or Garden Blocc Crips. A seventh image shows
defendant in what appears to be a convenience store. In the video of the depicted scene,
according to the witness, defendant made a motion with his hand consistent with firing a
pistol. Three images show a known Garden Blocc Crip gang member, with D.C. and
defendant present in two of these images. Two other images show D.C. and others, with
one of D.C.’s siblings shown in one of the images. And a final image shows defendant
standing in front of the camera. Apart from discussing these images, the witness also
acknowledged a line in the rap video in which defendant refers to taking his “pole”—
meaning, his gun—whenever he leaves home. The jury never heard the rap video.
       The jury found defendant guilty as charged and found the special circumstance
and the firearm allegation true. The court later found the strike allegation true and
sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for murder, plus a 25-year-to-
life sentence for the firearm enhancement. Defendant timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                       Section 1101
       We start with defendant’s contention that the screenshots from the music video
were inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder.

                                             7
       Defendant’s argument concerns the admission of evidence under Evidence Code
section 1101. 1 Section 1101, subdivision (a) limits the admissibility of character
evidence offered to prove a person’s conduct on a particular occasion. It provides that, in
general, “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified
occasion.” (§ 1101, subd. (a).) Section 1101, subdivision (b), however, “clarifies the
scope of subdivision (a).” (People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 689.) It allows the
“admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive . . .) other than his or her disposition to
commit such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b).)
       In this case, as covered above, the trial court admitted the screenshots on the
ground that they were relevant to show defendant’s motive for shooting Betschart:
Betschart wore red—the color of the Oak Park Bloods—and defendant affiliated with a
rival gang that wore blue. But in defendant’s telling, that was improper because section
1101, subdivision (b) “only applies to a crime, civil wrong, or other bad acts and
affiliating with a gang in a rap video is not a crime.”
       Defendant misreads the statute. Section 1101, subdivision (b) is not limited to acts
that are a crime, as defendant suggests. Nor is it limited to evidence of “a crime, civil
wrong or a bad act,” as defendant elsewhere claims. It instead, again, covers “a crime,
civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive . . .) other than
[the person’s] disposition to commit such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b), italics added.)
Defendant’s acts depicted in the screenshots, including those evidencing his gang ties,
can be considered “other act[s]” under this statute, even if, as defendant argues,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

                                              8
“affiliating with a gang in a rap video is not a crime.” That follows not only from the
statute’s plain text, but also from decades-old precedent interpreting the statute. (People
v. James (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 399, 407 [“section 1101 of the Evidence Code is not
confined to evidence of crimes”].)
                                             II
                                        Section 352
       We turn next to defendant’s assertion that admission of the screenshots was
unduly prejudicial.
       Under section 352, a trial court “may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” Reviewing courts will not disturb a trial court’s
admission of evidence “ ‘over an Evidence Code section 352 objection . . . unless the trial
court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th
809, 859.)
       According to defendant, the trial court here should have excluded the video
screenshots because they were irrelevant and highly prejudicial. He argues the
screenshots were irrelevant “because this case was not a gang case, there was no gang
enhancement charged and there was no evidence that [Betschart] was shot on orders from
the Crips.” And he argues the screenshots were highly prejudicial because gang
evidence, as a general matter, is particularly inflammatory.
       We reject his argument. Gang evidence, it is true, “ ‘may have a highly
inflammatory impact on the jury.’ ” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 402
(Flores).) And “[t]he risk of injecting undue prejudice is particularly high in cases where
the prosecution has not charged a gang enhancement and the probative value of the gang
evidence is minimal.” (Ibid.) But here, the evidence showing defendant’s affiliation with
the Crips was highly relevant to his possible motive for the charged murder. The

                                             9
screenshots show defendant using his hands to make a sign (a “C”) that stands for the
Crips, show several people holding blue bandanas (with blue being the Crips’ favored
color), and show defendant affiliating with a known member of the Garden Blocc Crips.
The screenshots also show a street sign for 29th Street—which is associated with the 29th
Street Crips or Garden Blocc Crips—and a man with a back tattoo that says “Crip.” An
image on defendant’s social media account further showed him wearing a blue bandana
and again making a “C” with his hand. This evidence established (at the least)
defendant’s sympathies for the Crips. Other evidence then established that defendant
could perceive Betschart as a rival to his favored gang. A gang expert explained that the
local Crips’ main rival, the Oak Park Bloods, wore red, and Betschart wore red on the
day of his murder.
       Under these circumstances, we find the screenshots showing defendant’s
affiliation with the Crips highly relevant—and indeed, central—to the prosecution’s
theory that defendant shot Betschart because he believed Betschart associated with a rival
gang. We also find the trial court limited the risk of undue prejudice, allowing the
prosecution to show the video screenshots but not play the video itself. Nothing in the
screenshots, moreover, emphasized the violent nature of gang activity or suggested
defendant’s gang association predisposed him to violent crimes. This evidence, like any
evidence of gang affiliation, was still prejudicial to a degree. But we find any prejudice
resulting from this limited evidence was outweighed by its probative value. (See People
v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 [finding gang evidence properly admitted to
show a defendant’s motive and intent and stating that, “[i]n general, ‘[t]he People are
entitled to “introduce evidence of gang affiliation and activity where such evidence is
relevant to an issue of motive or intent” ’ ”]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153,
193-194 [finding a trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence
relevant to the prosecution’s theory that the defendant shot a victim because he dressed
like those in a rival gang].)

                                            10
       None of defendant’s arguments persuade us to find differently. He first objects
that this case was not a gang case. But at least tangentially, it was. Again, defendant’s
gang affiliation (even if not gang membership) was central to the prosecution’s theory of
the case. Defendant also argues that no evidence showed that Betschart was shot on
orders from the Crips. Although an order of that sort may have supported the
prosecution’s case, it was not necessary to demonstrate defendant’s potential motive and
antipathy toward a perceived rival to the Crips.
       Defendant further notes that no gang enhancement was charged. But even when
no gang enhancement is charged, trial courts still can admit gang evidence when its
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. That was true,
for instance, in Flores. The defendant there, like defendant, was charged with murder
without any alleged gang enhancement. (Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 377, 402.) Even
so, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting expert testimony on gangs, including testimony explaining “the significance of
disrespect,” “the concept of ‘good murders,’ ” and “that the ‘ultimate’ discipline for
‘rat[t]ing out another gang member’ is death.” (Id. at p. 402.) The court reasoned that
this testimony “was highly relevant to defendant’s possible motive for the charged
crimes” and “far outweighed” any prejudice resulting from the testimony. (Ibid.) We
find similarly here.
       Defendant also cites our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gomez (2018) 6
Cal.5th 243 as supportive authority for his position. It is not. The prosecution’s theory
there was that the defendant killed two others, who were allegedly not paying “taxes”
owed a gang, to remove his name from the gang’s list that marked him for assault or
murder. (Id. at pp. 259-261, 282-283.) An expert provided testimony to advance this
theory, but our Supreme Court found two parts of this testimony should have been
excluded. The first part concerned the expert’s efforts to establish that he had contacts
with gang members in a jail. (Id. at p. 295.) In his testimony, the expert noted that gang

                                            11
members committed every conceivable crime in the jail and that a small number caused
most of the problems. (Ibid.) But the court found “[t]his evidence went well beyond its
stated purpose of demonstrating that [the expert] had ‘contact with gang members in the
[county] jail,’ which had already been established by [other testimony].” (Ibid.) The
second part concerned the expert’s discussion about where, when, and how the gang
started and a certain movie that the expert said accurately depicted the gang’s earlier
years. (Ibid.) In finding this testimony improperly admitted, the court explained that it
found no “apparent connection between the testimony regarding the early history of the
[gang] and [the charged] murders several decades later.” (Ibid.) None of this discussion,
however, advances defendant’s claim here. Unlike the irrelevant testimony in Gomez, the
evidence here was clearly relevant to the prosecution’s theory of motive.
       Defendant further contends the decision in People v. Coneal (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 951 favors his position. But we find that case undermines his position more
than anything. The court there found the trial court abused its discretion in admitting five
Taliban rap videos in which, among other things, “[g]ang members rap[ped] about ‘real-
life events,’ including ‘real-life individuals who have been murdered’ ” and “casually
describe[d] graphic, widespread violence.” (Id. at pp. 961, 965, 970.) The court noted
that some gang evidence was admissible, as the People’s theory of motive was premised
on the defendant’s gang membership. (Id. at p. 963.) But it found the videos highly
prejudicial and cumulative of other evidence, including “more than a dozen screenshots
from the videos depicting [the defendant] associating with other Taliban members and
making Taliban hand signs.” (Id. at pp. 966, 968.) “In fact,” the court went on, “the only
new ‘information’ provided by the videos is the lyrics, and the lyrics are the problem.”
(Id. at p. 968.) The case before us, however, is not comparable. Defendant, to start,
never even claims the screenshots were cumulative of other evidence. And the trial court
here, if anything, followed the very approach the Coneal court appeared to favor—it
excluded the video itself and admitted the screenshots.

                                             12
       Lastly on the topic of undue prejudice, defendant argues Flores and similar cases
are distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were gang members. (See, e.g.,
Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 379; People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655.) In
contrast here, defendant points out, a stipulation stated that “[h]e is not an active member
of any criminal street gang.” We agree this stipulation is important. On the one hand, it
lessened the potential prejudicial effect of the screenshots, eliminating the risk that the
jury would speculate that defendant was a gang member. But on the other hand, it
arguably lessened the relevance of the gang evidence. Although gang evidence could
help explain why a gang member would act against a perceived gang rival, it generally
does less to explain the conduct of non-gang members. Still, we find the gang evidence
relevant here. While the stipulation established that defendant was not an active member
of the Crips (or any other gang), the evidence still tended to establish that defendant
supported the Crips. On this record, we find the video screenshots remained highly
relevant on the topic of motive, even if they would have been more relevant still had
defendant been a gang member. (See People v. Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 859
[finding gang evidence admissible in a murder trial even though the evidence suggested
the defendant was not yet a gang member at the time of the murder].)
                                              III
                                        Section 352.2
       Finally, we consider defendant’s contention that a recently enacted statute,
section 352.2, applies retroactively and requires reversal in this case.
       Section 352.2 became effective on January 1, 2023, several months after the trial
in this case. It provides: “In any criminal proceeding where a party seeks to admit as
evidence a form of creative expression, the court, while balancing the probative value of
that evidence against the substantial danger of undue prejudice under Section 352, shall
consider, in addition to the factors listed in Section 352, that: (1) the probative value of
such expression for its literal truth or as a truthful narrative is minimal unless that

                                              13
expression is created near in time to the charged crime or crimes, bears a sufficient level
of similarity to the charged crime or crimes, or includes factual detail not otherwise
publicly available; and (2) undue prejudice includes, but is not limited to, the possibility
that the trier of fact will, in violation of Section 1101, treat the expression as evidence of
the defendant’s propensity for violence or general criminal disposition as well as the
possibility that the evidence will explicitly or implicitly inject racial bias into the
proceedings.” (§ 352.2, subd. (a).) The statute adds that the court must consider
additional matters in certain circumstances and defines “creative expression” to mean
“the expression or application of creativity or imagination in the production or
arrangement of forms, sounds, words, movements, or symbols, including, but not limited
to, music, dance, performance art, visual art, poetry, literature, film, and other such
objects or media.” (Id., subds. (b)-(c).)
       The legislative findings in the bill enacting section 352.2 explain the basis for
these new requirements. The Legislature declared: “Existing precedent allows artists’
creative expression to be admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings without a
sufficiently robust inquiry into whether such evidence introduces bias or prejudice into
the proceedings. In particular, a substantial body of research shows a significant risk of
unfair prejudice when rap lyrics are introduced into evidence.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 973, § 1,
subd. (a).) With section 352.2, the Legislature intended “to provide a framework by
which courts can ensure that the use of an accused person’s creative expression will not
be used to introduce stereotypes or activate bias against the defendant, nor as character or
propensity evidence; and to recognize that the use of rap lyrics and other creative
expression as circumstantial evidence of motive or intent is not a sufficient justification
to overcome substantial evidence that the introduction of rap lyrics creates a substantial
risk of unfair prejudice.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 973, § 1, subd. (b).)
       Citing this new law, defendant argues reversal is required here because section
352.2 applies retroactively, and the trial court prejudicially failed to comply with it. He

                                               14
reasons that the statute applies retroactively under the reasoning of In re Estrada (1965)
63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) because it provides a possible ameliorative benefit to some
defendants. Two published Court of Appeal cases have already considered this very
issue, with different results. One court found the statute applies retroactively in nonfinal
cases (People v. Venable (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 445, 448, review granted May 17, 2023,
S279081 (Venable))—which it to say, it applies retroactively “until the time for
petitioning for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court has passed”
(People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 790, fn. 5). Another court found differently,
finding the statute does not apply retroactively. (People v. Ramos (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
578, 595, review granted July 12, 2023, S280073.) We agree with the latter court.
       Penal Code section 3 provides that “[n]o part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared.” But “[e]ven without an express declaration,” case
precedent holds that “a statute may apply retroactively if there is ‘ “a clear and
compelling implication” ’ that the Legislature intended such a result.” (People v. Alford
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754.) Estrada is one such precedent. A new statute there reduced
the punishment for an offense after the defendant committed the offense, and it included
no express statement on whether the reduced penalty should apply retroactively.
(Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742.) Although our Supreme Court had previously held
that defendants in these circumstances should be punished under the law in effect when
the offense was committed, the court overruled that approach in Estrada. (Ibid.) It
reasoned that the Legislature “must have intended that the new statute imposing the new
lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it
constitutionally could apply,” “because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the
Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance.” (Id. at p. 745.)
       Our Supreme Court has since explained that “ ‘[t]he Estrada rule rests on an
inference that, in the absence of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends
for ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as possible,

                                             15
distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are
not.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 (Lara).) On this
principle, the court has applied Estrada to statutes that it has found “ ‘analogous’ to the
Estrada situation” (id. at p. 312), including (1) statutes altering the punishment (and
certain legal consequences) for an offense (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961,
968-969 [statute reducing probation term, though “probation is not considered a
traditional form of punishment”]), (2) statutes that “by design and function” reduce the
possible punishment for an offense (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624 (Frahs);
see Lara, at p. 303 [statute authorizing trial courts to treat an offender as a juvenile rather
than adult, which “can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment”]), and
(3) statutes governing substantive offenses and penalty enhancements (Frahs, at p. 628;
People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 94-95 [statute adding an affirmative defense]).
       Section 352.2, however, is not “ ‘analogous’ to the Estrada situation.” (Lara,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 312.) It does not alter the punishment or other consequences for an
offense. It does not, by design or function, reduce the possible punishment for an
offense. It does not change the substantive offense or penalty enhancement for any
crime. And it is not a statute that, if applied prospectively only, could be said to reflect
the Legislature’s “desire for vengeance.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) It is
instead a new evidentiary rule intended to prevent trial courts from admitting a person’s
creative expression without first properly evaluating the negative consequences of doing
so. And it is a neutral rule at that, limiting a defendant’s ability to present a person’s
creative expression just as much as the prosecution’s ability to present this type of
evidence. To be sure, we expect the statute will tend to affect the prosecution’s ability to
present evidence more than a defendant’s ability. And in some cases, no doubt,
defendants will benefit from having adverse evidence excluded under section 352.2. But
in other cases, the prosecution will instead be the beneficiary, as could be true, for
instance, if a defendant attempted to falsely accuse another of a crime based on that

                                              16
person’s poetry, rap lyrics, or other creative expression. Neutral evidentiary rules of this
sort do not warrant Estrada treatment. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p.
595, review granted [finding § 352.2 different in kind from previous statutes found
retroactive under the Estrada rule]; People v. Cervantes (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 927, 937,
940-941 [rule requiring the recording of custodial interrogations of those suspected of
committing murder—which would at times benefit defendants and at other times benefit
prosecutors—did not apply retroactively].)
       Our Supreme Court’s precedents demonstrate as much. In People v. Hayes (1989)
49 Cal.3d 1260, for instance, the court considered the retroactive effect of a statute
governing the admissibility of certain hypnosis-induced testimony. The statute provided
that a witness’s testimony “is not inadmissible in a criminal proceeding by reason of the
fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of recalling
events which are the subject of the witness’ testimony, if [certain conditions] are met.”
(Id. at p. 1273, fn. 4.) Although retroactive application of the statute certainly could have
benefitted some defendants, including those whose trials involved adverse testimony that
would be excluded under the new statute, the court declined to find it applied
retroactively. It noted that “[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate
prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling
implication that the Legislature intended otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1273.) It then explained
that it could find nothing overcoming this presumption, noting the statute included no
retroactivity clause and that “[n]othing in the history, context, wording or purpose of the
legislation suggests that the Legislature intended the new provisions to apply
retroactively.” (Ibid.)
       The court’s decision in People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 is similar. The
court there considered which of two laws applied in a capital trial—a 1977 death penalty
law (which was in effect at the time of the offense) or a 1978 death penalty law (which
was in effect at the time of trial). The 1978 law favored the defendant in part because,

                                             17
under its terms, “the prosecution’s case for aggravation is limited to evidence relevant to
[certain] listed factors,” while under the 1977 law, the prosecution could present evidence
“ ‘relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence’ [citation], even if it did not relate to
any specific aggravating or mitigating factor.” (Id. at p. 51.) Considering these
differences, the trial court “expressed its intent to apply any provisions of the 1978 law it
deemed more favorable than the 1977 law—in effect, to give defendant the ‘best of both
worlds.’ ” (Ibid.) But our Supreme Court found this approach “gave defendant more
than he was entitled to” and found inapposite cases that had applied Estrada’s
presumption of retroactivity. It reasoned that “[t]he replacement of the 1977 death
penalty law with the 1978 law had no bearing on the criminality of defendant’s conduct
or the severity of punishment therefor; hence the statute in effect at the time of the
offenses governs.” (Ibid.)
       One last example from our Supreme Court is Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53
Cal.3d 282. The court there considered whether Proposition 115, the “Crime Victims
Justice Reform Act,” applied retroactively. Proposition 115, among other things, made
hearsay evidence admissible at preliminary hearings, required felony trials to take place
within 60 days of arraignment, and added an intent requirement for certain special
circumstances for murder. (Tapia, at pp. 299, 301.) Addressing the retroactive
application of the law, the court wrote: “It is well settled that a new statute is presumed
to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retrospectivity or a clear
indication that the electorate, or the Legislature, intended otherwise.” (Id. at p. 287.) It
then, after noting that “the text of Proposition 115 and the related ballot arguments are
entirely silent on the question of retrospectivity,” concluded that “as to most of
Proposition 115’s provisions we see no reason to depart from the ordinary rule of
construction that new statutes are intended to operate prospectively.” (Ibid.) The court
noted an exception only for the proposition provisions that “clearly benefit[ted] only
defendants”—which were the portions adding an intent requirement for certain special

                                              18
circumstances—even though other provisions—including those concerning hearsay
evidence in preliminary hearings and the time for bringing felony cases to trial—could
certainly benefit some defendants (along with some prosecutors). (Id. at pp. 300-301,
italics added; see id. at p. 287, fn. 3.)
       Adopting defendant’s favored construction of Estrada would be inconsistent with
this precedent. It would also make Estrada’s presumption of retroactivity the exception
that swallows the rule in Penal Code section 3, with all new rules presumptively
retroactive so long as they might benefit a defendant. We decline to endorse this
approach. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 51 [not all laws that are
potentially beneficial to a defendant apply retroactively]; see also People v. Brown (2012)
54 Cal.4th 314, 324 [emphasizing that Estrada plays a “limited role . . . in our
jurisprudence of prospective versus retrospective operation”]; Evangelatos v. Superior
Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1209 [“The language in Estrada . . . should not be
interpreted as modifying this well-established, legislatively mandated principle”
concerning retroactivity].) Finding no clear indication of the Legislature’s intent on the
topic of retroactivity—apart from its general instruction that “[n]o part of [the Penal
Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared” (Pen. Code, § 3)—we conclude that
section 352.2 does not apply retroactively.
       Although, as noted, the Court of Appeal in Venable reached a different conclusion,
we find its reasoning misplaced. The court there found section 352.2 applies
retroactively largely based on our Supreme Court’s decisions in Lara and Frahs.
(Venable, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 456-457, review granted.) These cases, it is true,
include some language arguably supportive of this finding. Lara, for example, explained
that the court had applied the Estrada rule “to a statute that merely made a reduced
punishment possible,” citing a case—People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66—involving a
law granting trial courts discretion to treat marijuana possession, formerly “a straight
felony,” as either a felony or a misdemeanor. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 307, 303.)

                                              19
Frahs afterward said the very same. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 629.) Both Lara and
Frahs, moreover, found Estrada applied to the laws considered in those cases, which the
court described as laws providing “a possible ameliorating benefit for a class of persons.”
(Frahs, at p. 624; see Lara, at p. 308.) Considered alone, these statements might be read
to suggest that section 352.2 should apply retroactively. After all, for some defendants,
the application of the statute could result in the exclusion of certain adverse evidence,
which could consequently limit the persuasive force of the prosecution’s argument and
thus “ma[k]e a reduced punishment possible.” (Lara, at p. 303.) So went the reasoning
in Venable. (Venable, at pp. 456-458.)
       But in our view, that is not the appropriate takeaway from Lara and Frahs.
Context for these cases is important. Frahs involved a law creating a diversion program
for certain defendants with mental health disorders and requiring trial courts to dismiss
charges for those who successfully participate in this program. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at pp. 624, 631.) In enacting this law, the Legislature expressly aimed to “ ‘[i]ncrease[]
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and
reentry into the criminal justice system.” (Id. at p. 631.) Lara, in turn, involved a law
prohibiting prosecutors from charging juveniles with crimes directly in adult (i.e.,
criminal) court, allowing them to move to adult court for certain crimes only if a juvenile
court first agreed that adult court was appropriate. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 305.)
The Lara court explained that the law—which was expressly intended “to ‘[s]top the
revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation, especially for juveniles’ ” (id. at
p. 309)—“can result in dramatically different and more lenient treatment” (id. at p. 303).
That is because of the different purposes of juvenile court where the emphasis is on
rehabilitation (ibid.) and adult court where the emphasis is in part on punishment (Pen.
Code, § 1170, subd. (a); see also Lara, at p. 308 [“ ‘the impact of the decision to
prosecute a minor in criminal court rather than juvenile court can spell the difference
between a 16-year-old minor . . . being sentenced to prison for 72 years to life, or a

                                             20
discharge from the [Division of Juvenile Justice’s] custody at a maximum of 23 years of
age’ ”]).
       Both Lara and Frahs, then, concerned laws that “by design and function” reduce
the possible punishment for a class of persons (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 624), with
one giving certain defendants an opportunity to participate in a program that could result
in the dismissal of all charges (Frahs) and the other giving certain juveniles a better shot
at remaining in juvenile court and avoiding the harsher penalties of adult court (Lara).
Both, moreover, concerned laws that provide only a possible benefit to a class of persons,
not laws that, depending on the facts, could either be beneficial or detrimental. Our
Supreme Court ultimately found these laws “ ‘analogous’ to the Estrada situation” (Lara,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 312) and “within the spirit of the Estrada rule” (Frahs, at p. 631).
But in doing so, neither Lara nor Frahs purported to expand Estrada’s scope to cover all
laws that might provide an ameliorative benefit to a defendant. Nor did either purport to
overrule the court’s prior decisions in Hayes, Robertson, and Tapia—all of which
demonstrate that a law is not retroactive simply because it might provide an ameliorative
benefit to a defendant and might even (broadly speaking) result in a reduced punishment.
       With this context in mind, we return to the relevant question: Is section 352.2
“ ‘analogous’ to the Estrada situation”? (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 312.) We conclude
that it is not. Nor do we find it comparable to the laws considered in Lara and Frahs.
Unlike the laws in those cases, section 352.2 is not a law that by design and function
reduces the possible punishment for an offense. Nor is it a law that is even targeted to
benefit defendants specifically. It is instead a neutral evidentiary rule providing its
benefits to all comers, potentially to the detriment of defendants. That, in our view, is not
the type of law that triggers the Estrada rule. 2

2 The Venable court also believed its conclusion consistent with a recent Court of Appeal
decision finding the Estrada rule applied for a new law that “allows the defense to

                                              21
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

request a bifurcated trial on gang enhancements.” (People v. Burgos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 550, 561, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743.) The retroactivity of that
law “is the subject of a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal.” (People v. Tran
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1208.) But we need not weigh in on this split here. It is enough
for our purposes that we find Burgos readily distinguishable, for it involves a new law
that benefits defendants only.

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