Court Opinion

ID: 9658190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:50:27.189131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:52.655316
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 39. (dissenting). This case clearly demands the opposite result from that reached by the majority. The plaintiffs, Vicki Tatera and the Estate of Walter Tatera (collectively, Tatera), at a minimum, established their right to a trial on their claim for negligence based on an affirmative act of the defendant, FMC, in which it supplied Walter Tatera's *354employer with asbestos-containing friction disks for grinding without warning the employer of the disks' dangerous content. Accordingly, granting summary judgment for the defendant, FMC, is clearly inappropriate. The majority's decision to deny Tatera a trial under the circumstances presented here is not defensible.
¶ 40. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, primarily because it denies the nonmoving party a trial. Accordingly, it is the circuit court's and reviewing courts' duty to consider these motions carefully and prudently. In this case, the circuit court did not fulfill its duties in that regard, and the majority, by affirming that court's conclusion, fails to fulfill its duties as well.
¶ 41. Rather, like the court of appeals, I would conclude that summary judgment here is inappropriate for the following two reasons. First, there are genuine issues of material fact in this case as to whether Tatera's proofs support the elements of Restatement (Second) Torts § 388 (1965) (hereinafter described as "§ 388" or "section 388"). Second, I am satisfied that to the extent that it is proper under these circumstances to apply Wagner v. Continental Cas. Co., 143 Wis. 2d 379, 388, 421 N.W.2d 835 (1988) (holding that generally, contractors are not liable in tort for the injuries to employees of a subcontractor), it does not bar Tatera's claim because the affirmative act exception to its rule applies. Accordingly, it seems quite inappropriate to grant summary judgment for FMC in this situation, and Tatera should have an opportunity to move forward to a trial. Hence, I dissent.
¶ 42. To demonstrate how far afield the circuit court's decision — and the majority's affirmation of it— stray from the principles underlying summary judgment, it is important to discuss the methodology for assessing motions for summary judgment at the circuit *355court and appellate court levels. A court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (emphasis added). As we have observed, summary judgment is a "drastic remedy" that denies the nonmoving party a trial. Lecus v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 81 Wis. 2d 183, 189, 260 N.W.2d 241 (1977). Reviewing a motion for summary judgment should "not... be a trial on affidavits and depositions." Id. The moving party must "leave no room for controversy." Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980).
¶ 43. We explained the methodology for a circuit court to use when reviewing a motion for summary judgment in Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). First, the circuit court "examines the moving party's ... affidavits or other proof to determine whether the moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment under [Wis. Stat. § ]802.08(2)." Id. at 338. To successfully make a prima facie case for summary judgment, "a moving defendant must show a defense [that] would defeat the plaintiff." Id.
If the moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment, the court must examine the affidavits and other proof of the opposing party... to determine whether there exist disputed material facts, or undisputed material facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn, sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial.

Id.

¶ 44. Our methodology in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is identical to that of the circuit *356court, and our review of the decision of the court of appeals is to review the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment. See Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987). Accordingly, it is important to chronicle what happened at the circuit court hearing on the motion for summary judgment as it relates to Tatera's negligence claim.
¶ 45. As the majority observed, Vicki Tatera filed a claim for negligence against FMC1 in 2004 on behalf of herself and her deceased husband, Walter Tatera (Walter), who died in 2004 shortly after being diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. Walter was a full-time employee with B&M Machine Products (B&M) from 1968 to 1993. One of Walter's duties during his employment at B&M was to grind and cut friction disks used in industrial electric brake systems. The disks, which were made by several manufacturers and sold to FMC, were supplied by FMC to B&M to shape them to FMC's desired specifications and then return the finished disks to FMC to install in brake systems. That process of machining the disks caused a significant amount of dust to accumulate in the B&M shop. At least until 1986, the disks FMC supplied to B&M contained asbestos.
¶ 46. FMC moved for summary judgment on the basis that the rule in Wagner, protecting a principal employer from liability for torts committed against employees of its independent contractors, prevented Tatera's suit from moving forward.2 It asserted that *357neither of the exceptions to the Wagner rule applied, i.e., that FMC had not committed an affirmative act of negligence and that machining friction disks containing asbestos was not extrahazardous. In response, Tatera asserted that the circumstances here gave rise to a claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, which provides that "one who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use" is liable in tort if it can be shown that the supplier knew or had reason to know that the product is dangerous, the supplier had no reason to believe those using the product would recognize its dangerousness, and the supplier fails to warn those users of the dangerous condition. Tatera argued that because § 388 provided them a method of recovery in tort, they established that FMC committed an affirmative act and Wagner was inapplicable. However, Tatera also argued that, in the alternative, to the extent that Wagner did apply, it did not bar the claim because the extrahazardous activity exception to the Wagner rule applied.
¶ 47. To accompany their response to FMC's motion for summary judgment, Tatera provided appropriate evidence to support their claim. First, Tatera included excerpts of a deposition of Raymond Mazurek (Mazurek), an FMC employee, that indicated that *358(1) FMC purchased asbestos-containing friction disks in the 1970s and 1980s; (2) that FMC knew that some of the materials on those disks contained asbestos; (3) in 1974 and 1975, FMC tested some of those materials for asbestos content and that that testing produced documents that Mazurek had observed; (4) FMC likely started supplying material safety data sheets,' which would have contained information regarding materials that were in the disks, when OSHA required them to do so, which was in the late 1970s or early 1980s; (5) FMC supplied those data sheets to customers upon request, but Mazurek was unaware of whether FMC provided those data sheets to machine shops or specifically, B&M; and (6) FMC never put warnings in or on the boxes containing on its asbestos-containing products.
¶ 48. Tatera also provided an affidavit from Richard Hatfield (Hatfield), a scientist who was knowledgeable about asbestos-containing brake and clutch materials, and who had conducted studies measuring "how much asbestos is released from the abrasion of brakes, clutches[,] and friction wear dust." His studies indicated that asbestos-containing friction materials can release asbestos fibers from minimal abrasion to the material's surface. His studies indicated that, in fact, asbestos dust is present in boxes containing unused brakes or clutches. Accordingly, he explained that it is unnecessary "for asbestos-containing friction materials to undergo substantial changes before these materials will release asbestos fibers."
¶ 49. Finally, Tatera also produced an affidavit from Dr. Henry Anderson, a physician who specialized in occupational and environmental medicine, as well as diseases caused by asbestos exposure. Dr. Anderson stated that, in his opinion "the vast majority of malignant mesothelioma cases are caused by asbestos expo*359sure." He further indicated that "all" exposures to asbestos occurring more than ten years before the diagnosis of malignant mesothelioma contribute to the disease; that malignant mesothelioma, in general, "has a latency period of [20] to [40] years after exposure to asbestos"; and that there is no known level of "safe" exposure to asbestos, below which there would be no risk of developing malignant mesothelioma.
¶ 50. After a hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgment to FMC and dismissed Tatera's negligence claim, holding that § 388 did not apply to FMC because that section applied only to manufacturers, and FMC did not manufacture the disks. The circuit court further concluded that because Tatera was the employee of an independent contractor, the general rule in Wagner barring claims against a contractor by an injured employee of a subcontractor applied, and neither of the two exceptions to that rule applied. Because of that, the circuit court reasoned, FMC was not liable. It granted FMC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Tatera's negligence claim.
¶ 51. The court of appeals reversed, holding that (1) § 388 applies to suppliers such as FMC; (2) Wagner did not bar Tatera's claim because both the affirmative act and extrahazardous activity exceptions applied; and (3) Tatera had offered sufficient proofs that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the claim satisfied the elements of § 388.
¶ 52. To reiterate, this court's task, in reviewing the decision of the court of appeals, is to review the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment to FMC. Consistent with our summary-judgment methodology, then, this court is to look to Tatera's proofs, as the nonmoving party, in the light most favorable to it. Based on that examination, we will not reverse the *360circuit court's grant of summary judgment unless the record reveals that there are genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party — in this case, FMC — is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶ 28, 236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142.
¶ 53. To begin, there appear to be open questions presented by the parties that the majority does not acknowledge. Namely, for an employee in Walter Tatera's situation, must the rule in Wagner limiting the liability of a principal for torts involving the employee of an independent contractor apply?3 Or is the proper theory of liability the rule under § 388 imposing liabil*361ity on a supplier who fails to warn of a known, dangerous condition to unsuspecting users? Or do both rules apply? Moreover, if both Wagner and § 388 apply, how (and in what order) does a court apply those two rules, which are based on competing policies regarding liability? Rather than answer those difficult questions, the majority summarily concludes that because B&M is an independent contractor, Wagner must apply. Majority op., ¶ 21. It then holds that Tatera's claim does not fit under either of the two narrow exceptions that would allow liability to extend to FMC.
¶ 54. In my view, regardless of whether Wagner applies exclusively, § 388 applies exclusively, or both apply, FMC is not entitled to summary judgment in this case. Again, the methodology we have set forth for reviewing a grant of summary judgment requires us to determine (1) whether Tatera raised genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether FMC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that § 388 is applicable to this case; that Tatera set forth genuine issues of material fact and as to the elements of § 388; and that, to the extent that Wagner applies, it does not bar Tatera's claim. Accordingly, FMC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 55. First, a grant of summary judgment for FMC is improper because Tatera has, at a minimum, established a prima facie case under § 388. Section 388, which Wisconsin has adopted, see Strasser, 236 Wis. 2d 435, ¶ 58, provides:
§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to *362those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
¶ 56. I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that § 388 applies to FMC as a supplier. The text of the rule clearly designates that it applies to suppliers. The comments attached to the section support that conclusion. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. a (describing supplier as "one who lends" a chattel); id., cmt. c ("These rules, therefore, apply to sellers, lessors, donors, or lenders, irrespective of whether the chattel is made by them or by a third person."); id., cmt. d ("One supplying a chattel to be used or dealt with by others is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section ...."). Here, FMC is a supplier, given that it provided the friction disks to B&M for grinding. Accordingly, nothing clearly precludes § 388 from applying under these circumstances.
¶ 57. Looking at Tatera's proofs in the light most favorable to Tatera, I also agree with the court of appeals that Tatera established a prima facie case under § 388. I reach that conclusion on the basis of Tatera's proofs, including (1) Mazurek's deposition de*363scribing FMC's knowledge of the friction disks' asbestos content, the extent to which FMC used material data safety sheets, and that to Mazurek's knowledge, FMC never placed warnings on the products; (2) Dr. Hatfield's affidavit as to the causal relationship between asbestos exposure and diagnosis of malignant mesothelioma; and (3) Hatfield's studies indicating that asbestos-containing products such as friction disks will release asbestos fibers absent any "substantial changes" to the material.
¶ 58. In its briefs to this court, FMC does not put forth arguments as to whether it believes that Tatera failed to state facts supporting the elements of § 388. Rather, it endorses the circuit court's conclusion that § 388 is inapplicable and argues, alternatively, that even if Tatera had asserted a claim of liability against FMC pursuant to § 388, that claim is still barred by Wagner because the claim is not premised upon an "affirmative act" of negligence and because machining asbestos-containing friction disks is not extrahazardous. That is the approach that the majority appears to adopt although it does not state as much or explain its rationale.
¶ 59. Nevertheless, assuming that Wagner is applicable to this case, FMC is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because at least one of the exceptions to its rule shielding principals from liability — the affirmative act exception — applies here.
¶ 60. In Wagner, we stated the general rule that employees of a subcontractor cannot bring a claim for negligence against the principal contractor unless at least one of two exceptions applies. Wagner, 143 Wis. 2d at 388. First, a principal employer may be liable for injuries to the independent contractor's employee "caused by the principal employer's affirmative act of negligence." See id. Second, if the employee's injuries occur "while performing inherently dangerous activi*364ties," a principal employer may be held liable. See id. My focus is on the affirmative act of negligence exception.
¶ 61. This court has had only a few opportunities to explain what sort of behavior might constitute an affirmative act of negligence. In those cases, it is notable that we have yet to explain what an affirmative act is; rather, we have only explained what an affirmative act is not. For example, in Wagner, a contractor hired a subcontractor to do demolition work. Wagner, an employee of the subcontractor, was injured in the course of the demolition, and evidence indicated that the subcontractor did not have sufficient equipment or take proper safety precautions. Id. at 383. Wagner sued the principal contractor, alleging that it was liable for his injuries, because it had negligently hired the subcontractor when it failed to check if the subcontractor had proper equipment and followed necessary safety procedures. Id. at 382-84. The court held that the principal employer was not liable for Wagner's injuries because it had not committed an "affirmative act of negligence" when it neglected to check the credentials of the subcontractor who employed Wagner. Id. at 390.
¶ 62. Similarly, in Barth v. Downey, 71 Wis. 2d 775, 782-84, 239 N.W.2d 92 (1976), the first case in which we articulated the "affirmative act" standard, we held that the failure to provide a safe working environment was not an affirmative act. Likewise, other cases in which we or the court of appeals have considered this question have found similarly passive acts such as to a failure to investigate or failure to provide a safe working environment not to be affirmative acts. See Danks, 298 Wis. 2d 348, ¶ 26 (failure to check credentials of a subcontractor is not an affirmative act); Estate of Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d at 601 (failure to discover and act upon safety violations is not an affirmative act).
*365¶ 63. The majority seems to understand those cases to stand for the proposition that an allegation that includes any "failure" to do something is necessarily an omission and therefore not an affirmative act of negligence. See majority op., ¶ 3 (stating that the act here cannot be an affirmative act of negligence "because liability for such an act is necessarily premised in failing to warn, an omission"); ¶ 31 (stating that to permit liability to attach to a principal where an omission is present "would completely undermine our three decades of precedent that requires an affirmative act of negligence").
¶ 64. That conclusion appears to be indefensible. Negligence, by its very definition, includes some sort of failure or omission. See Wis. JI — Civil 1005 ("A person is negligent when (he) (she) fails to exercise ordinary care.") (emphasis added). It is impossible to have an "affirmative act of negligence" without some sort of failure to act occurring somewhere in the chain of causation. An affirmative act of negligence, at the very least, must include a combination of an affirmative act linked with an act of negligence that, when taken together, could have caused the harm alleged.
¶ 65. Here, the act is patently unlike the acts described in the above cases: FMC supplied B&M with asbestos-containing disks for B&M's employees to grind without warning them of the disks' content. Supplying the asbestos-containing disks is an affirmative act, failing to warn of the disks' dangerous content is the act of negligence, and the harm alleged is death by a disease known to be caused by exposure to asbestos. If this act is not an affirmative one, I fail to see what act could possibly fit within the affirmative act exception.
¶ 66. In some regard, it appears that the majority recognizes that point. To avoid reaching the same *366conclusion that I do, however, it breaks down the act in question by its individual components and disposes of each component on the basis that it is insufficient — on its own — to be an affirmative act of negligence. Its bases its description of FMC's alleged affirmative act from Tatera's complaint, word for word.4 See majority op., ¶¶ 2, 9. That complaint listed five allegations, four of which describe failures to warn, to investigate, and to instruct, and one of which that alleges that FMC "[m]anufactured, supplied, installed, or removed unsafe asbestos-containing products." Id. It then takes each allegation to be a literal description of the act. That methodology allows it to dispatch with the first four acts describing a "failure," because "[b]y definition, the failure to warn, the failure to investigate or test, and the failure to instruct are omissions, not affirmative acts." Majority op., ¶ 29. In other words, in the majority's view, FMC's "failures" may have been negligent, but those failures are not affirmative acts.
¶ 67. Yet, the majority then considers the fifth allegation — supplying asbestos-containing friction disks — and knocks it down with the opposite reasoning *367by which it dismissed the first four. It writes, "The act of supplying the asbestos-containing friction disks is no doubt 'affirmative,' but the mere fact that FMC supplied the disks to B&M is not enough to impose liability on FMC for committing an affirmative act of negligence." Majority op., ¶ 30 (majority's emphasis). By the majority's reasoning, it seems, FMC may have acted affirmatively in that fifth allegation but not negligently.
¶ 68. I believe that the majority's logic is twisted. If the first four allegations are not affirmative acts because they merely state allegations of negligence, how could the affirmative act, i.e., supplying the disks, not fill that gap? Essentially, Tatera loses the opportunity to move forward to trial, not so much based on an application of law to the circumstances presented in this case, but because Tatera's counsel formatted the allegations in the complaint in the manner that it did.
¶ 69. Because FMC committed an affirmative act when it provided asbestos-containing friction disks to B&M for its employees to grind and manipulate without warning of the dangerous content, Wagner — to the extent that case applies — does not operate to bar Tatera's claim.5 Accordingly, FMC is not entitled to summary judgment on that basis and Tatera's claim for negligence should go forward. Moreover, as explained herein, Tatera raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether the elements of § 388 are satisfied. Hence, FMC is not entitled to summary judgment on that basis.
*368¶ 70. Here, the majority commits a grievous and fundamental error by failing to abide by the standards and principles underlying summary judgment. In so doing, it robs Tatera of the opportunity and right to present this case to a jury.
¶ 71. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 72. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY A. ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.

 Tatera made other claims against FMC; however, only the negligence claim is pertinent to our review.

 As the majority noted, FMC first moved for summary judgment in May 2006, and the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Clare L. Fiorenza, presiding, denied the motion in *357September 2006. However, due to judicial rotation, Judge Timothy G. Dugan replaced Judge Fiorenza as the presiding judge in this case in August 2007. FMC renewed its motion for summary judgment, and Tatera objected, but Judge Dugan agreed to hear the motion.
It is Judge Dugan's November 2007 grant of summary judgment for FMC that is the focus of our review. However, I believe that it is significant that Judge Fiorenza denied FMC's first motion for summary judgment, which appeared to be roughly identical to the motion assessed by Judge Dugan.

 The court of appeals acknowledged that whether Wagner should be applied here is unclear. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2009 WI App 80, ¶ 49, 319 Wis. 2d 688, 768 N.W.2d 198 (stating that its application of Wagner was on the basis of "assuming (without deciding)" that it applied).
Additionally, I am unaware of any cases from this court or the court of appeals applying Wagner or the affirmative act analysis for purposes of determining liability of a principal in tort in a case involving chattel. The few published cases from Wisconsin appellate courts applying Wagner are construction and utility cases, not cases involving a chattel. See, e.g., Danks v. Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, 298 Wis. 2d 348, 727 N.W.2d 846 (involving an injury to an employee of a subcontractor hired to load a truss at construction site); Estate of Thompson v. Jump River Elec. Coop., 225 Wis. 2d 588, 593 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999) (involving an injury to an employee of a subcontractor hired to remove utility poles). Moreover, the pre-Wagner cases from our appellate courts in which the courts assessed whether a principal committed an affirmative act for purposes of establishing liability also were construction or utility — not chattel — cases. See, e.g., Barrons v. J.H. Findorff & Sons, Inc., 89 Wis. 2d 444, 278 N.W.2d 827 (1979) (construction case); Snider v. N. States Power Co., 81 Wis. 2d 224, 260 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (utility case).

 Well, almost word for word: the majority ignores an important conjunction. In the complaint, Tatera listed five allegations of negligence, linked by "and/or," which would suggest that any one of the allegations or a combination thereof would constitute a claim. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 109 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "and/or" as "[u]sed to indicate that either or both of the items connected by it are involved"). The majority ignores that distinction, and assesses each allegation on its own, essentially replacing the "and/or" in the allegation with "or." See majority op., ¶¶ 2, 29-30. To the extent that the majority is insisting that courts must base decisions on whether something is an affirmative act on text of the plaintiffs complaint, the majority should, at a minimum, accurately reflect that text.

 The court of appeals also determined that the extrahazardous exception applies. I do not address that exception here because it is unnecessary for me to do so. Because, in my view, the affirmative act exception applies, that exception is sufficient to lift the Wagner bar.