Court Opinion

ID: 9719202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:48.146604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.157226
License: Public Domain

Gilbert, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent from the ruling of the majority because, in my opinion, they have misconstrued the law of Maryland in regard to the Boulevard Rule and seek to carve out an exception under a factual situation where I think no exception exists. The Maryland law in effect at the time of the accident in the instant case provided:
“§ 233. Vehicle entering through highway or stop intersection.
(a) In general. — The driver of a vehicle shall come to a full stop as required by this article at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles approaching on said through highway.
(b) Stopping in obedience to stop sign. — The driver of a vehicle shall likewise come to a full stop in obedience to a stop sign and yield the right of way to a vehicle approaching on the intersecting highway as required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway. (Ann. Code, 1951, § 198; 1943, ch. 1007, § 178; 1945, ch. 506, § 178 (b).)”
That section required compliance with two dictates: (1) that the unfavored driver bring his vehicle to a complete stop, and (2) that the unfavored driver yield the right of way to all oncoming traffic. Oddis v. Greene, 11 Md. App. 153, 273 A. 2d 232 (1971).
While it is true that in Greenfeld v. Hook, 177 Md. 116, 8 A. 2d 888 (1939), the Court of Appeals stated that *609there are “many situations in which the driver of an automobile entering a favored from an unfavored highway may without negligence be endangered by traffic over and along the same,” they have, nevertheless, continued to apply the Rule almost without exception. See inter alia: Carlin v. Worthington, 172 Md. 505, 192 A. 356 (1937) ; Pegelow v. Johnson, 177 Md. 345, 9 A. 2d 645 (1939) ; Madge v. Fabrizio, 179 Md. 517, 20 A. 2d 172 (1941) ; Rinehart v. Risling, 180 Md. 668, 26 A. 2d 411 (1942) ; Brooks v. Childress, 198 Md. 1, 81 A. 2d 47 (1951) ; Fowler v. DeFontes, 211 Md. 568, 128 A. 2d 395 (1957) ; McDonald v. Wolfe, 226 Md. 198, 172 A. 2d 481 (1961) ; Dunnill v. Bloomberg, 228 Md. 230, 179 A. 2d 371 (1962) ; Brown v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 204 A. 2d 526 (1964) ; Savage v. Mills, Admr’x, 237 Md. 204, 205 A. 2d 239 (1964) ; Thompson v. Terry, 245 Md. 480, 226 A. 2d 540 (1967) ; Trionfo v. Hellman, 250 Md. 12, 241 A. 2d 554 (1960). Cf. Ness v. Males, 201 Md. 235, 93 A. 2d 541 (1953) ; Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 169 A. 2d 661 (1961) ; Nicholson v. Page, 255 Md. 659, 259 A. 2d 319 (1969).
This Court has followed the Court of Appeals in Oddis v. Greene, supra; Kowalewski v. Carter, 11 Md. App. 182, 273 A. 2d 212 (1971) ; Bayliss v. Federal Mutual Insurance Co., 13 Md. App. 166, 282 A. 2d 531 (1971) ; Quinn Freight Lines, Inc. v. Woods, 13 Md. App. 346, 283 A. 2d 624 (1971) ; Roberts v. Fairchild, 14 Md. App. 612; Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Carter, 14 Md. App. 395.
The majority seem to me to place strong reliance on the appellant’s inability to see an approaching vehicle and her continuous looking toward her left as she attempted to move her vehicle across the intersection. It has been held that the unfavored motorist’s inability to see oncoming traffic is all the more reason to be extra careful.
In Dunnill v. Bloomberg, supra, the Court of Appeals stated flatly:
“The fact that the defendant’s view was ob*610structed by parked cars does not excuse him; on the contrary, it required the exercise of particular caution. See Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 83, 188 A. 31. Nor does the fact that the favored driver was (as we must assume) exceeding the speed limit somewhat of itself constitute negligence or excuse the defendant’s negligence.”
In Blinder v. Monaghan, supra, the Court of Appeals held that where a cab driver’s vision was obstructed by a bus on the favored street that such obstruction did not remove the case from the Boulevard Law. I would apply the rationale of Dunnill and Blinder.
The ruling of the majority in this case erodes the Boulevard Rule and creates the defense that the unfavored driver could not see approaching traffic. Such a ruling requires the favored driver to know of obstacles at the intersection with an unfavored road and to take such precautions as may be requisite under the circumstances. Under the majority opinion, the favored driver no longer has the right to anticipate that an unfavored driver will not enter an intersection and deprive the favored driver of his right of way. The favored driver is now placed in the untenable position of having to be gifted with clairvoyance and extra-sensory perception in order to determine that the vision of the unfavored driver is not going to be hindered by hills, curves, walls, trees or other obstructions. In short, the majority render the Boulevard Law meaningless in its application to intersections where the unfavored driver’s vision is obscured.
I think that when a driver of a large vehicle, such as here present, pulls the same onto a favored highway when he is unable to ascertain that he may enter and clear the intersection safely and he is struck, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The legislature was certainly aware of the Boulevard Law when Article 66%, § 233 was repealed by Chapter 534 of the Acts of 1970 and recodified as Article 66%, § 11-403, and *611had they decided to change it they could have done so at that time.
It is to be noted that the Boulevard Law (§ 233) provided that the unfavored driver “shall come to a full stop” and “shall yield the right of way to other vehicles approaching on said through highway.” Nowhere does it say that the rule shall apply except to the operator of an empty school bus on the way to work; nowhere does it say that the rule shall apply except where visibility is limited; nowhere does it say that the rule shall apply except where the unfavored driver’s vehicle is ponderous; nowhere does it say that the rule shall apply except where the favored driver is speeding, and nowhere does it say that the rule shall apply unless the unfavored driver continues to look for other traffic. In Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Carter, supra, this Court said:
“As the Boulevard Rules was applicable * * * the unfavored driver had an absolute duty to stop and an absolute duty to yield the right of way.”
I think it impossible to reconcile the quoted language with the majority opinion.
If the Boulevard Rule is to be changed from the clear meaning set forth in the Statute, then it is, in my opinion, for the legislature to make the change and not this Court. I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
I am authorized to say that Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Orth concur in the opinions expressed herein.