Court Opinion

ID: 9797978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:33:36.16229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:58.782011
License: Public Domain

Justice W. JONES,
dissenting.
The majority determined that Sandoval did’ not reside in Idaho “for temporary purposes.” Because I believe that Sandoval’s purposes for residing here were in fact temporary, I respectfully dissent.
The case law cited by the majority established that Idaho Code § 31-3502(12) requires proof of two elements in order to prove residency status: (1) presence in Idaho for at least 30 days and, (2) a present, subjective intent to reside in Idaho “at least longer than temporarily.” The second of these elements was not satisfied.4
This dissent is based on two points. First, I believe there is substantial, competent evidence to support the Board’s factual finding that Mr. Sandoval was not a resident of Ada County and second, I disagree with the majority’s opinion that a person’s illegal status in the United States is irrelevant.
At the hearing before the Ada County Board of Commissioners, Mr. Sandoval testified that he came to Idaho in April, 2005 to find work, but was working “just a small amount of time.” -He further testified that “my desire is to return to Mexico____” He further stated that when he came to Idaho “I was thinking of maybe returning to Mexico later on this year, the present year, but then I got sick____” He added that “I wanted to return [to Mexico], I was thinking of returning, I wanted to return, yes.” (Agency Tr., Sept.6, 2006 Hearing, p. 10. L. 4-p. 11) There is also documentary evidence introduced that Sandoval had returned to Mexico after December 30, 2005, and then returned again to Idaho sometime before February 6, 2006. Sandoval’s testimony supports the Board’s finding that Sandoval was in Idaho only for temporary purposes. It is not the province of this Court to reweigh that evidence or upset the Board’s findings when they are supported by such evidence. In Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007), in reviewing the decision of the Valley County Board of Commissioners, this Court stated: “The Court defers to the agency’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and the agency’s factual determinations are. binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record.” See also, Whitted v. Canyon County *56Bd. of Com’rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002) (“the Board is treated as an administrative agency for purposes of judicial review.”); see also, I.C. 67-5279(1), which states that “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.”
As to the second point of this dissent, the majority has in effect held that a person can be a resident of a place in which he has no legal right to be. That holding seems anomalous to me. If a person has no legal right to be in Ada County and would presumably be removed as soon as the Immigration Service catches up with him, his tenure here can be nothing more than temporary. Even assuming a person’s so-called “subjective intent” to remain here is the proper test, I believe such subjective intent must at least be reasonable or rational. It is undisputed in this case that Mr. Sandoval was illegally in the United States. To me, his status here was analogous to a fugitive from justice on the run from the law. I think even the majority would believe that such a person’s physical presence here would be nothing more than a temporary convenience, subject to immediate relocation as the law closes in.
It is clear from I.C. § 31-3502(12) that the legislature intended to exclude from residency any person who comes into the state for “temporary purposes” and it is equally clear that the examples listed in the statute such as “education, vacation, or seasonal labor” are not exhaustive exclusions for temporary purposes since the statute clearly says that temporary purposes include but are not limited to the examples given. It would seem strange that the legislature would consider students coming into the state for “education” to be temporary regardless of how long they remain here or whether they clearly subjectively intend to remain in Idaho following their education, yet exclude from temporary purposes an illegal alien who comes into the state for employment. Mr. Sandoval’s tenure in Idaho could last only as long as he successfully evades the authorities.
In a footnote, the majority noted that the legislature has now required proof that the individual was here legally in order to receive public benefits. According to the majority, this subsequent legislative decision “shows that the requirements they contain were not part of I.C. § 31-3502(12) at the time the Board was considering Sandoval’s application.” This use of subsequent legislative history is entirely unhelpful, as it is pure conjecture and easily lends itself to manipulation. For example, this subsequent legislative history may just as easily support the opposite conclusion, since it can be argued equally as reasonably that this legislative change occurred because the legislature was making explicit exactly what it implicitly stated before, i.e., that legal status was required in order to receive benefits. This predictable back-and-forth is likely the reason that the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that “subsequent legislative history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier” legislature. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 2678, 110 L.Ed.2d 579, 597 (1990); see also, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 80 S.Ct. 326, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960) (“the views of a subsequent [legislature] form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”).
Since I believe this Court should not overturn the factual findings of the Ada County Board of Commissioners that Mr. Sandoval did not have the requisite intent to remain here more than temporarily and because I do not believe that a person physically present in Idaho can form a reasonable or rational intent to remain here more than temporarily when he is illegally within the jurisdiction of Idaho, I believe the decision of the Ada County Board of Commissioners denying eligibility for indigent medical benefits should be affirmed.

. Moreover, it likely is the case that this element’s presence in Idaho's jurisprudence is the result of an erroneous reading of Idaho Code § 31-3502(12). The question is not whether the purported resident possesses a present subjective intent to reside in Idaho but, rather, according to the statute, whether he “[came] into the state for temporary purposes.” In other words, the relevant intent is the intent that existed at the time the potential resident- attempted to reside here.