Court Opinion

ID: 9571570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:49.757449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:39.022129
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Because I do not believe the trial judge manifestly abused his discretion in not excusing for cause juror Konkol, I respectfully dissent.
In response to the first statutory qualification question asked by the court pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-164 (a), i.e., had the jurors “formed and expressed any opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused,” Konkol responded that “I may be prejudiced because I am a victim of an armed robbery.” That she had not formed or expressed any opinion in regard to Ivey’s guilt or innocence, the. crux of the inquiry, was affirmed when Konkol responded negatively when asked if she had formed and expressed any opinion as to Ivey’s guilt or innocence of “this particular offense.” Konkol responded, “I don’t believe so,” to the court’s asking if she could base her opinion on evidence presented in the courtroom, not on something that took place outside it. Konkol answered affirmatively when asked if, based on the fact that she was a victim, she would be “pre-committed.” Asked again by the court if she could limit herself to the evidence presented in the courtroom, Konkol said no.
The court completed questioning the jurors as a group and then allowed the parties to question Konkol. The State asked if her robbery would affect her ability to decide Ivey’s guilt or innocence. She replied, “[i]t could. After I hear evidence, I mean, it could.” Konkol then acknowledged that she did not know anything about Ivey’s case and would want to listen to all the evidence. She then said she would try to wait until she heard all the evidence to decide if he were guilty or not and that she would give Ivey the presumption of innocence.
The court then asked Konkol to explain what appeared to be conflicting answers regarding her ability to fairly consider Ivey’s case. In response, Konkol stated, “[w]hen you asked me if I could give an impartial, I said I would try. He [the prosecutor] asked it differently and said could I, after hearing the evidence. To be fair, yes, I can make a decision. Whether or not it would make a difference, I don’t know. But at this point, because of the trauma that I went through, it still affects me.” The court then asked her if she were picked as a member of the panel,
would you be able to make a decision based solely on the evidence you hear in this courtroom and any documents or exhibits admitted into evidence by the Court as to determining what the facts are in this case and apply the law that the *596Court. . . give[s] you in [the] charge, to the facts as you find them to be based on the evidence you heard in this courtroom? And if you find the State does not prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, can you acquit? But if you find that they do prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, can you convict? That is the question. And what is your answer?
Konkol answered “Yes” and said she could make the decision based solely on the evidence.
The trial judge “is the only person in a courtroom whose primary concern, indeed primary duty, is to ensure the selection of a fair and impartial jury.” Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259, 260 (549 SE2d 797) (2001). To fulfill this duty, the trial court is given broad discretion to evaluate and rule upon a potential juror’s impartiality, based upon “the ordinary general rules of human experience.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. Bi-Lo, 178 Ga. App. 849, 850 (1) (344 SE2d 707) (1986). A trial court’s decision on this issue may only be reversed upon a finding of “manifest abuse” of this discretion. Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 691 (7) (512 SE2d 896) (1999).
Relying on Parisie v. State, 178 Ga. App. 857, 858 (2) (344 SE2d 727) (1986), Ivéy contends that the trial court manifestly abused his discretion in failing to excuse Konkol for cause. In Parisie, supra, the juror stated that he was not impartial between the State and the accused; could not judge the case fairly; and would be influenced by previous events, otherwise unspecified, in his life. There is no indication that this juror equivocated about his impartiality, as Konkol did. Further, the concerns expressed by Konkol did not relate specifically to Ivey, but to the crime of robbery, of which she had been a victim. As concluded in Brown v. State, 243 Ga. App. 632-633 (1) (534 SE2d 98) (2000),
Unless the juror holds an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant that is so fixed and definite that the juror will be unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based on the evidence and court instructions, a court need not excuse the juror for cause. A potential juror’s doubts as to his or her own impartiality or reservations about his or her ability to set aside personal experiences do not require the court to strike the juror, as the judge is uniquely positioned to observe the juror’s demeanor and thereby to evaluate his or her capacity to render an impartial verdict. A juror who expresses a willingness to “try” to be objective and whose bias arises from feelings about the particular crime as *597opposed to feelings about the accused may be eligible for service.
(Footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. See also Harris v. State, 178 Ga. App. 735, 736 (1) (344 SE2d 528) (1986).
Juror Konkol’s situation is similar to that in Torres v. State, 253 Ga. App. 318, 320 (2) (558 SE2d 850) (2002), where, in a trafficking in cocaine case, a juror equivocated concerning his ability to set aside the fact that his niece had been murdered by her boyfriend, a drug dealer, but then said he could sit fairly and impartially. There, this Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove the juror.
Several recent cases authored by and concurred in by the judges who voted in the majority in Walls v. Kim,37 supra, support this conclusion, as does a consideration of the factual context of Walls. In that civil, medical malpractice case, a nurse who knew and worked with the defendant Dr. Kim was in the jury pool and acknowledged this relationship. The trial court, nonetheless, refused the plaintiff’s challenge for cause. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in affirming this Court’s judgment finding this inappropriate,
when a prospective juror has a relationship with a party to the case that is either close or subordinate, or one that suggests bias, the trial court must do more than “rehabilitate” the juror through the use of any talismanic question. The court is statutorily bound to conduct voir dire adequate to the situation, whether by questions of its own or through those asked by counsel. . . . Though we do not see this interest [(professional relationship)] as necessarily or categorically requiring her exclusion from the jury, we do see this interest as requiring the trial court to conduct voir dire of sufficient scope and depth to ascertain any partiality.
(Emphasis supplied.) Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 178-179 (563 SE2d 847) (2002). See also Powell v. Amin, 256 Ga. App. 757 (569 SE2d 582) (2002) (pharmacist who filled defendant doctor’s prescriptions and was asked only the “talismanic question” was member of jury pool and this Court concluded there had been insufficient voir dire regarding the relationship).
The Supreme Court further noted that “[o]ur holding today in no way modifies our adherence to the fundamental principle that ‘(t)he *598law presumes that potential jurors are impartial.’ Cohen [v. Baxter, 267 Ga. 422, 424 (2) (479 SE2d 746) (1997)].” Kim v. Walls, supra at 179. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that “to the extent that Walls, supra, can be read to advocate such a per se rule [exclusion of an entire class of jurors who have an employment relationship with a party to the lawsuit], it is expressly disapproved.” Id.
In Wardlaw v. State,38 257 Ga. App. 611 (571 SE2d 578) (2002), this Court addressed equivocation by two potential jurors regarding family members’ prior experience with violent crime. Wardlaw was charged with hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Juror Eggleston’s mother had been mugged four years earlier and badly injured, and two years prior to that, her sister had been mugged in an attempt to hijack her car. Both incidents occurred in Miami, and neither resulted in arrest or conviction. Asked by the State whether these incidents would affect her judgment in Wardlaw’s case, she responded, “I have no idea. I’d have to see how the trial played out.” In response to defense counsel’s questions, Juror Eggleston stated that she did not know if it would affect her ability to serve until she knew the specifics and that everyone deserved a fair trial and she would try to be impartial. The next morning, after speaking with her sister, she said she felt “probably more” that she could not be fair and impartial, although she would try. In explaining her answers, she stated that “I find myself relating to my mother’s incidents more than I would on any other kind of case. And só knowing that, I would say that I would really be very consciously trying not to make that an issue. And that’s — I mean, you know, I can’t say, yes, I’m going to say these boys are guilty when I don’t know any of the circumstances.”
The trial court then asked Eggleston if she understood that the incidents involving her family were separate from the issue at hand and asked if she could listen to the evidence and the charge fairly and impartially, to which she responded affirmatively.
Juror Hall’s son had been attacked with a knife and left with a nasty scar. She said she still got very emotional about the incident and it might “give her pause” if she were chosen. Nevertheless, she said she could be fair and impartial.
This Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to excuse these two jurors for cause, noting that
[a] prospective juror’s doubt as to his or her own impartiality does not demand as a matter of law that he or she be excused for cause. Nor is excusal required when a potential *599juror expresses reservations about his or her ability to put aside personal experiences. A conclusion on an issue of bias is based on findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly in the trial court’s province, and those findings are to be given deference. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Upshaw v. State, 249 Ga. App. 741, 743 (1) (549 SE2d 526) (2001).
Wardlaw v. State, supra at 614.
In Thomas v. State,39 257 Ga. App. 350 (571 SE2d 178) (2002), Thomas was charged with aggravated assault, kidnapping, and armed robbery.40 He sought to excuse for cause two jurors because both jurors stated that prior “personal experiences with violence led them to doubt their ability to be impartial as to the offense — if the facts as alleged were proved by the State. Neither juror had formed an opinion as to Thomas’ guilt or innocence, nor had they pre-judged the evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 351 (2).
Noting that trial courts are not obligated to strike for cause every juror who expresses doubts about his or her impartiality or reservations about their ability to set aside personal experiences, this Court found that
[t]here is a legal difference between (a) a potential juror who, because of life experiences, expresses doubt that he or she can be impartial if evidence triggers those experiences, and (b) a juror who, because of life experiences, cannot listen to the evidence before forming a judgment. While the former category may or may not merit a peremptory strike, the latter category does merit a strike for cause. Juror Beck’s and Juror Henderson’s concerns about their impartiality fall into the former category. “Although both expressed some reservations about their ability to put aside their experiences, neither suggested that he or she had already formed an opinion as to (Thomas’) guilt or innocence.” In that regard, (f)or a juror to be excused for cause, it must be shown that he or she holds an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant that is so fixed and definite that the juror will be unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the. evidence or the court’s charge upon the evidence. ... A conclusion on an issue of juror bias is based on findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly in *600the trial court’s province, and those findings are to be given deference. Nothing in the juror(s’) responses compels a finding that (they) had- formed an opinion of (Thomas') guilt or innocence that was so fixed and definite that (they) would be unable to set the opinion aside, or that (they) would be unable to decide the case based upon the court’s charge and upon the evidence. It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to excuse the juror(s).
(Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Thomas v. State, supra at 351-352.
In Klaub v. State,41 255 Ga. App. 40, 47 (3) (564 SE2d 471). (2002), a juror in a vehicular homicide case was asked if she knew any reason she could not be fair and impartial and stated, “I don’t know. It’s hard to say, to be honest with .you. Fair and impartial? I suppose I could be fair. I have to listen to the evidence; not a hundred percent sure, though; gut feelings.” Pressed further by defense counsel, the juror referred to her sister’s experience “that she had and having a hard time physically and with the court system and the insurance company and things of that nature, I don’t want to say that will happen, but that’s in the back of my mind. Gut feelings.” Id.
Pressed by the trial court about her reference to the court system, the juror said, “more so with the insurance company.” Klaub v. State, supra at 48. She then indicated she would not hold this experience against defendant, but said it “might affect my decision somehow. I mean, I don’t know. I mean, I think I could be — I couldn’t be totally fair and impartial. Let’s put it that way.” Id.
As noted by this Court, the juror’s equivocation did not go to a clear partiality for one party or the other, but other events in her life, and the “issue here is not whether we would have granted the motion to strike, but whether the trial court’s failure to do so was a manifest abuse of discretion.” Klaub v. State, supra at 49.
Similarly, in Ivey’s case, the only expression of doubt by Juror Konkol was based, not on her prejudging anything in Ivey’s case, but on her life experience as the victim of a crime.
As indicated by these cases, a juror’s honesty and forthrightness about prior life experiences does not, and in my opinion, should not, without more, preclude that juror from service. If allowed to do so, the pool of available jurors will be greatly diminished. Nor do I believe that this Court, on a cold record, should routinely overturn the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of the *601juror. To do so leaves trial judges hamstrung by hindsight. What is mandated by Kim v. Walls, supra, is voir dire of “sufficient scope and depth to ascertain any partiality.” Id. at 179. In this case, however, solely on the cold record, the majority has determined that the trial court went too far in attempting to make this determination. What is the limit to which the trial court may appropriately go? I fear the majority, particularly in light of the similar factual situations in Wardlaw, supra; Thomas, supra; and Klaub, supra, makes more difficult for the trial courts the already onerous task of evaluating jurors’ responses.
Decided November 26, 2002.
Patrick C. Kaufman, for appellant.
Stephen D. Kelley, District Attorney, Charles K. Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Mikell joins in this dissent.

 The opinion was authored by Presiding Judge Johnson, concurred in by Presiding Judge Pope, Presiding Judge Smith, Judge Barnes, Judge Ellington, and Judge Phipps and dissented to by Judge Ruffin.

 Authored by Senior Appellate Judge Pope, concurred in by Presiding Judge Ruffin, and concurred specially in by Judge Barnes.

 Authored by Judge Eldridge and concurred in by Presiding Judge Smith and Judge Ellington.

 He was acquitted of the latter two offenses and convicted of aggravated assault.

 Authored by Presiding Judge Pope and, as to Division 3, concurred in fully by Judge Eldridge, Judge Miller, Judge Ellington, and Judge Mikell and concurred in specially by Chief Judge Blackburn and Presiding Judge Andrews.