Court Opinion

ID: 9616253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:44:44.969697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:56.447821
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Presiding Judge
(dissents, but concurs in results reached).
The provisions of § 742 have been part of the Oklahoma Statutes since statehood. Today for the first time this Court extends the requirement of that statute, that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated, to a preliminary examination. I dissent to that decision.
First, I believe the construction of § 742 in the majority opinion ignores the plain ■language of that statute which provides:
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely show the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.” (Emphasis added)
The word “conviction” means, as this Court has held, “the final judgment of the court based upon a plea of guilty or a verdict of guilty after trial.” Ex parte White, 75 Okl.Cr. 204, 130 P.2d 103 (1942). I believe the use of the word “conviction” restricts the provisions of the statute to testimony given at trial.
Other jurisdictions with similar statutes have squarely ruled that the corroboration requirement of those statutes does not apply to preliminary examinations. See State v. Jeffrey, 211 Minn. 55, 300 N.W. 7 (1941); People v. McRae, 31 Cal.2d 185, 187 P.2d 741 (1947); People v. Martinez, 80 Misc.2d 735, 364 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1975); State v. Forgan, 19 Ariz.App. 124, 505 P.2d 562 (1973).
In State v. Jeffrey, supra, Justice Peterson of the Minnesota Supreme Court criticizes the Alabama decision, State v. Smith, relied on by the majority decision. In that opinion it is stated:
. . There are reasons which must be apparent to everybody for distinguishing between the degree of proof required to establish probable cause to believe a prisoner guilty for the purpose of holding him to answer for a crime and that required to convict him. The better reasoned cases hold that a statute requiring corroboration of an accomplice to convict does not apply to showing probable cause upon a preliminary examination
In People v. McRae, supra, the opinion by Justice Traynor states:
“It was held In Re Schwitalla, 36 Cal.App. 511, 172 P. 617, that a magistrate can hold a defendant to answer upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. ‘While a defendant cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the testimony of an accomplice is admissible and is proper to *826be considered, and we think it sufficient to make it appear that there is a “probability” that a defendant has been guilty of the offense charged against him.’ 36 Cal.App. 511, 512, 172 P. 617, 618. This case was followed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Curreri v. Vice, 77 F.2d 130 . . . ”
This Court appears to have used similar reasoning in the case of Kern v. State, Okl.Cr., 522 P.2d 644 (1974), in reaching the conclusion that the testimony of an accomplice needs no corroboration in a certification hearing to determine if a child should stand trial on criminal charges. The opinion in that case states, “Any person so certified is still protected by the terms of 22 O.S. § 742 during the trial upon the merits.” I point out that this question was not reached in the case of Crum v. State, Okl.Cr., 383 P.2d 45 (1963). The issue there was disposed of in Judge Nix’s opinion with the sentence, “Although we are highly intrigued with the contention made by defendant, we are unable to consider the question on this appeal, because there was no attempt to comply with the Statute for such cases.”
It is true that extending the requirements of § 742 to the preliminary examination may spare an occasional criminal defendant the expense and anxiety of preparation for trial. Competing against this interest however, is the interest of the state in seeing that pre-trial procedures are no more cumbersome than justice requires.
If the better policy be to require corroboration of accomplice testimony at a preliminary examination, it is the legislature, I believe, who should make that decision, not this Court. The language of the statute cannot support the construction placed upon it by the majority opinion.
Therefore, I concur that the District Court order should be vacated, but I dissent to the construction placed upon 22 O. S.1971, § 742, by the majority opinion.