Court Opinion

ID: 9966068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-04 01:00:40.667807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.568628
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40281           Document: 88-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/03/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                              FILED
                                                                         May 3, 2024
                                   No. 23-40281
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                              Clerk

Jane Roe,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Leighton Paige Patterson; Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-179
                  ______________________________

Before King, Ho, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Jane Roe, a former student at Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, alleges that she was sexually assaulted by a fellow student in 2015.
See, e.g., ROA.1482–85; 7057; 9731–35. She sued the Seminary and its
president, Leighton Paige Patterson, for failing to protect her from the
assaults and for allegedly defaming her after. She appeals the district court’s

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40281        Document: 88-1          Page: 2   Date Filed: 05/03/2024

                                 No. 23-40281

grant of summary judgment for Patterson and the Seminary on all claims. We
now affirm in part and certify in part.
       The district court, applying Texas law, produced two comprehensive
and well-reasoned opinions. ROA.2410–26; 2489–93. We primarily agree
with the district court’s analysis and do not feel the need to address most of
Roe’s challenges, many of which are not responsive to the district court’s
decisions.
       We only discuss two statements Roe alleges to be defamatory. The
first statement comes from a press release by Patterson’s lawyer. The press
release stated that Roe “had given . . . many contradictory statements.”
ROA.9441. We agree with the district court that this statement could be
defamatory by suggesting that Roe was untruthful. See Innovative Block of S.
Tex., Ltd. v. Valley Builders Supply, Inc., 603 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Tex. 2020)
(“A defamatory statement is one that tends to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him.”) (cleaned up)).
       But Roe fails to prove damages resulting from this statement. See D
Mag. Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex. 2017) (noting
damages as an essential element of a defamation claim). She recounts how
reading various statements, including the press release, caused her mental
pain and made her think about friendships she had lost due to the incidents.
See Appellant’s Br. 68–69. This evidence does not “directly demonstrate the
nature, duration, and severity of the mental anguish, which caused a
substantial disruption in the claimant’s daily routine.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Hines, 252 S.W.3d 496, 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.
denied) (citing EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Jones, 252 S.W.3d 857, 871 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, no pet.)). And allegations that Roe lost friendships generally do
not show that she lost friendships from the particular statement at issue.

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                                 No. 23-40281

Because Roe failed to prove the elements of her claim surrounding the press
release, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment for
Patterson and the Seminary.
       The second statement comes from a letter submitted by Seminary
donors to the Seminary’s Board of Trustees. The letter discussed several
claims concerning Patterson’s reputation and tenure at the Seminary,
including his handling of Roe’s allegations in 2015. It states that Roe’s
“allegations of rape were false,” that she “had engaged in consensual sexual
activities on more than one occasion . . . in public buildings at the Seminary,”
“that campus security were shown the nude pictures that she texted to the
male student [who allegedly raped her],” and that Patterson “desire[d] to
meet with her . . . and attempt to help her recant her false allegations of rape
before she continued with such false statements to the police.” ROA.8145.
Roe alleges that these statements are defamatory.
       For the reasons explained below, Patterson’s potential liability for this
statement depends on two questions: First, whether a person can be held
liable for supplying defamatory material to a publisher. Second, if the answer
to the first question is yes, whether Roe properly alleged such a claim. We
lack clear authority on these two questions, and so we certify them to the
Supreme Court of Texas.
    Certification from the United States Court of
 Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to the Supreme Court
    of Texas, Pursuant to Art. V, § 3-C of the Texas
     Constitution and Rule 58 of the Texas Rules of
                       Appellate Procedure.
To the Supreme Court of Texas and the Honorable
Justices Thereof:

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                                   No. 23-40281

                           I.     Style of the Case
       The style of the case in which this certification is made is Roe v.
Patterson, No. 23-40281, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. The case is on appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship. Texas law applies to the substantive issues.
                            II.     Background
       For a detailed account of the facts, we respectfully refer to the district
court’s two opinions granting summary judgment. See Roe v. Patterson, No.
4:19-CV-179, 2023 WL 2632803 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2023); Roe v. Patterson,
668 F.Supp.3d 582 (E.D. Tex. 2023).
                           III.     Legal Issues
       Roe contends that Patterson is responsible for the allegedly
defamatory statements in the donor letter described above. Even though
Patterson did not sign the letter, Roe argues that he is vicariously responsible
for its contents because his Chief of Staff, Scott Colter, was allegedly
involved in its dissemination and preparation.
       The summary judgment record contained evidence of Colter’s
involvement. See, e.g., ROA.8226–27; 8255; 8264; 8274–82; 9525–32; 9533–
34; 9540–48. Colter was well aware of the donors’ intent to submit a letter
to the Board. He provided contact information for additional donors who
might agree to sign the letter and weighed in on the timing and method of
distribution. He was copied on email threads discussing letter drafts. And,
according to a letter drafter, he provided “additional information about the
2015 event.” ROA.9540–48.
       The summary judgment record also contained evidence that Colter
undertook this involvement as an agent of Patterson. He helped route the

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                                 No. 23-40281

letter to Patterson’s lawyer for approval prior to its distribution, ROA.8255;
8274–82, and communicated Patterson’s appreciation of the letter after.
ROA.8306. Patterson and his wife also directly expressed these sentiments
to the letter drafters themselves. ROA.8158; 9487.
       We are persuaded that the summary judgment evidence creates a
genuine issue over whether Colter was indeed acting as Patterson’s agent and
“for the accomplishment of the objective of the agency,” In re Lipsky, 411
S.W. 530, 547 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. denied) (citing Minyard
Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 576, 578–79 (Tex. 2002) and
Louis v. Mobil Chem. Co., 254 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008,
pet. denied)), during his involvement with the letter. We would therefore
decline to affirm the district court’s judgment on those grounds.
       It’s less clear whether, assuming agency, Patterson can be liable for
the allegedly defamatory statements in the letter.
       First, assuming Patterson, though Colter, either directly drafted the
language for the statements about Roe’s allegations or gave those statements
to the letter drafters for inclusion, is he liable for them? There is not direct
authority from the Texas Supreme Court on whether a person who supplies
defamatory information to a third party is liable for any resulting publication.
Texas appeals courts have suggested that this theory may be legitimate. See
Wheeler v. Methodist Hosp., 95 S.W.3d 628, 639–40 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002) (“Although a party is generally not liable for a republication
of a defamatory statement by another, ‘[i]f a reasonable person would
recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter
will be communicated to a third party, the conduct becomes a negligent
communication, which amounts to a publication just as effectively as an
intentional communication.’” (quoting Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v.
Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993)).

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                                  No. 23-40281

       Second, even if such liability is possible, did Roe properly allege it? In
Roe’s briefing on appeal, she argues that Patterson, through Colter, is
responsible for the defamatory statements in the letter. But she does not
argue that Colter actually made those statements, either by writing them
directly in the letter or by giving them to the drafters. The Texas appeals
courts seem agreed that “[t]o recover on [a defamation] claim, the plaintiff
must identify the alleged defamatory statement and the speaker.” Ameen v.
Merck & Co., 226 F. App’x 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Abbott v. Pollock,
946 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, pet. denied)). See also Davis
v. Prosperity Bank, 383 S.W.3d 795, 804 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, no pet.) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant
where plaintiffs failed to identify “any specific statements they claim[ed] to
be defamatory”) (citing Bell v. Bennett, No. 02-10-00481-CV, 2012 WL
858603, at *9, 11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2012, no pet.)); Rogers v.
Soleil Chartered Bank, No. 02-19-00124-CV, 2019 WL 4686303, at *8–9
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 26, 2019, no pet.) (“When a party predicates
a defamation claim on a writing, traditional Texas pleading rules require the
party to be specific about what statement was false.”) (citing Kahn v. Beicker
Eng’g, Inc., No. 04-94-00823-CV, 1995 WL 612402, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Oct. 18, 1995, pet. denied)).
       Here, Roe identifies an allegedly defamatory statement—the letter’s
references to her rape allegations—and also identifies an alleged speaker—
Patterson, through Colter—but she does not identify the speaker as having
made the statement. Nor does her evidence identify any statements made by
Colter or show that he provided language for the letter, even if it does suggest
involvement with the letter generally and the provision of background
information about the operative events. Instead, what she seems to argue is
that, because Colter helped with the letter, he is responsible for defamatory
statements contained therein.

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                                  No. 23-40281

       We are uncertain whether this is enough to assert and maintain a
defamation claim under Texas law. We therefore conclude that certification
is warranted.
                        IV.    Questions Certified
       We hereby certify the following questions of law to the Supreme Court
of Texas:
            1. Can a person who supplies defamatory material to another for
                publication be liable for defamation?
            2. If so, can a defamation plaintiff survive summary judgment by
                presenting evidence that a defendant was involved in preparing
                a defamatory publication, without identifying any specific
                statements made by the defendant?
       We disclaim any intent that the Texas Supreme Court confine its reply
to the precise form or scope of the legal questions we certify. We transfer to
the Texas Supreme Court the record and appellate briefs in this case with our
certification. We retain this appeal pending the Texas Supreme Court’s
response.
       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court
in part and certify the questions stated above to the Supreme Court of Texas.

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