Court Opinion

ID: 9942662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 18:01:29.04244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:23.386254
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          FEB 21 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTA SILFIDA ROMERO-AMAYA,                     No. 21-1030

              Petitioner,                       Agency No. A212-953-218

                                     v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                             On Petition for Review of a
                              Final Order of Removal

                            Submitted February 16, 2024**
                                Pasadena, California

Before: TALLMAN, IKUTA, and OWENS, Circuit Judges

      Marta Silfida Romero-Amaya, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions

for review of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision upholding the determination

by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) that she does not have a

reasonable fear of future persecution or torture in El Salvador. As the parties are

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

       1. The IJ’s reasonable fear determination is supported by substantial

evidence. See Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). We will

not disturb a reasonable fear determination “unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Here, an asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear interview and concluded that

Romero-Amaya failed to establish that she suffered past persecution or torture

and to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution or torture. Upon

Romero-Amaya’s request, an IJ conducted an independent reasonable fear review

proceeding at which she was represented and assisted by an interpreter. The IJ

concluded that Romero-Amaya failed to offer evidence that there was a

reasonable possibility that she would be persecuted on the basis of a protected

ground or that she would be tortured.

      The IJ found that Romero-Amaya did not establish entitlement to relief

under the Refugee Act after she “testified she has not been harmed or threatened

or fears harm in the future on account of her race, nationality, religion or any

political opinion she has,” nor had she ever “been threatened or harmed by anyone

in the El Salvadoran government or any police official in El Salvador.” See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Specifically, the IJ concluded that although Romero-

Amaya “appear[ed] to be the unfortunate victim of a scam that was committed by

an unidentified criminal perpetrator,” the perpetrator “was clearly motivated by

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financial gain at the applicant’s expense.” Furthermore, aside from the number

of threatening phone calls, she “was never personally confronted by the

unidentified caller, nor was she ever physically harmed.” The IJ further found

that no evidence was presented that Romero-Amaya would be persecuted in the

future, and that Romero-Amaya in fact “unequivocally testified that following

2015 when she changed her phone number after the last threat she did not receive

anymore calls from the unidentified caller.” Lastly, the IJ found that Romero-

Amaya further failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that she would be

tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government if returned to El Salvador,

on the basis that she testified that she did not fear anyone other than the

unidentified caller, and that she has never had any problems with the police or

government officials in El Salvador.

      The IJ’s adverse reasonable fear determination relied on Romero-Amaya’s

own testimony, provided with the aid of representation and an interpreter. The IJ

found that: 1) Petitioner feared returning to El Salvador solely due to a number

of phone calls she received from an anonymous caller over five years ago; 2) she

was never personally confronted by the unidentified caller, nor was she ever

physically harmed; 3) when she changed her phone number she did not receive

any more calls from the unidentified caller; 4) she does not fear anyone other than

the unidentified caller; and 5) she never had any problems with police or any

government official in El Salvador. In light of this record, the IJ’s reasonable

fear determination is supported by substantial evidence.

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      Because Romero-Amaya fails to identify any error in the IJ’s determination

and because that determination is supported by substantial evidence, the Court

declines to entertain her new arguments raised for the first time in her brief to this

Court. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023)

(“Exhaustion requires a non-constitutional legal claim to the court on appeal to

have first been raised in the administrative proceedings below . . . .” (citation

omitted)).

      PETITION DENIED.

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