Court Opinion

ID: 9376676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 16:00:52.413812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.240480
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5061     Document: 010110820982       Date Filed: 03/03/2023       Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 3, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-5061
                                                   (D.C. No. 4:98-CR-00086-TCK-1)
  JASON RYAN EATON,                                           (N.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Jason Ryan Eaton is incarcerated and moved for a reduction in his sentence

 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), which permits a modification of a sentence in

 certain circumstances if a district court finds extraordinary and compelling reasons

 warrant it. The district court denied his motion, and Mr. Eaton appeals. He argues

 the district court erred by relying on a legally inapplicable sentencing guideline

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-5061    Document: 010110820982         Date Filed: 03/03/2023    Page: 2

 policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2), when it found Mr. Eaton is a danger to the

 community.

        Mr. Eaton is correct that § 1B1.13(2) is not applicable to a defendant’s motion

 for a sentence reduction. See United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir.

 2021). But the district court’s error is harmless because the court’s dangerousness

 finding was not the exclusive basis for its decision; it also denied relief because the

 sentencing factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not favor early release. We affirm

 the district court.

                                       I. Background

        Mr. Eaton robbed two gas stations. He attempted to rob a third and shot a

 clerk. He pled guilty to two counts of using and carrying a firearm during Hobbs Act

 robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and one count of attempted Hobbs Act

 robbery. The district court sentenced him to 39 years imprisonment. Because of

 subsequent legislative changes to § 924(c), Mr. Eaton received a sentence fifteen

 years longer than he would receive today.

        Mr. Eaton thus sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He exhausted his administrative remedies with the Bureau of

 Prisons (BOP). The district court later denied his motion even though it found

 extraordinary and compelling reasons justified a sentence reduction.

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Appellate Case: 22-5061    Document: 010110820982        Date Filed: 03/03/2023      Page: 3

                                        II. Analysis

       We review a denial of a sentence reduction request under 18 U.S.C.

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15

 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). “A district court abuses its discretion when it

 relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”

 United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013). We review issues of

 statutory interpretation, such as the scope of the sentence reduction statute, de novo.

 McGee, 992 F.3d at 1041.

       Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a district court may grant a motion for a

 reduced sentence if the court concludes (1) extraordinary and compelling reasons

 warrant early release, (2) early release is consistent with applicable policy statements

 issued by the Sentencing Commission, and (3) the sentencing factors from 18 U.S.C.

 § 3553(a) favor release. Id. at 1042–43. District courts may deny sentence reduction

 motions based on any of these three requirements without addressing the others. Id.;

 see also United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2021).

       Here, Mr. Eaton argues that the district court relied on a legally inapplicable

 policy statement when it found he was a danger to the community. See U.S.S.G.

 § 1B1.13(2). That policy statement requires a court to consider whether a defendant

 is “a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community” when the Director

 of the BOP moves for a reduction. Id. But we have held that § 1B1.13(2) does not

 apply to a defendant’s sentence reduction motion. See McGee, 992 F.3d at 1050

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Appellate Case: 22-5061    Document: 010110820982         Date Filed: 03/03/2023     Page: 4

 (concluding that “the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement is

 applicable only to motions for sentence reductions filed by the Director of the BOP,

 and not to motions filed directly by defendants”). Notably, consideration of “danger

 to the community” comes from the policy statement, not the statute. Compare

 § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), with § 1B1.13(2).

       The record does not clarify whether the district court erroneously considered

 itself bound by the policy statement to deny relief based on dangerousness or if it

 merely allowed the dangerousness factor to guide its decision. Compare McGee, 992

 F.3d at 1048 (finding “the district court erred in considering itself bound by th[e]

 policy statement”), with Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 n.4 (noting that “it would hardly be an

 abuse of discretion for a district court to look to the present policy statement for

 guidance”). On the one hand, the district court explicitly acknowledged that the

 policy statement was not binding on defendant-filed motions, such as Mr. Eaton’s.

 R., Vol. I at 102. On the other hand, the district court stated that “[u]nder the

 applicable policy statement, this Court must deny a sentence reduction unless it

 determines the defendant ‘is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the

 community.’” R., Vol. I at 105 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2)).

       For the purposes of this appeal, we assume the district court considered itself

 bound by the policy statement to deny relief based on Mr. Eaton’s dangerousness and

 thus erred under our holding in McGee, 992 F.3d at 1050. See United States v.

 Wilson, No. 20-1324, 2021 WL 4859690, at *2 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished)

 (assuming district court erred by finding policy statement binding); United States v.

                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-5061     Document: 010110820982        Date Filed: 03/03/2023     Page: 5

 Carralero-Escobar, No. 20-2093, 2021 WL 2623160, at *2 (10th Cir. 2021)

 (unpublished) (finding plain error when district court denied relief based on

 dangerousness even though it “did not expressly cite the policy statement”); United

 States v. Dean, No. 21-2082, 2022 WL 484241, at *2 (10th Cir. 2022) (unpublished)

 (finding error when district court concluded it was constrained by policy statement).

       But nonetheless an error that does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights is

 harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance

 that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). In the sentencing

 context, “[h]armless error is that which did not affect the district court’s selection of

 the sentence imposed.” United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1270 (10th Cir.

 2008). Because the government benefited from the error, it must establish the error

 was harmless. Id. Here, we conclude it met its burden.

       In Mr. Eaton’s case, the district court denied his motion based on the § 3553(a)

 factors and his dangerousness. For example, the district court considered “the nature

 and circumstances of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); R., Vol. I at 106. It

 observed that “[Mr.] Eaton’s offense conduct escalated, becoming significantly more

 violent”—during the first two robberies he used his gun to demand money but during

 the third “he told the victim, ‘No, I’m just going to kill you right here,’ and asked

 him if he wanted to turn around or kneel down.” R., Vol. I at 106 (quoting R., Vol. I

 at 113).

        The court then considered Mr. Eaton’s “history and characteristics,” including

 Mr. Eaton’s serious juvenile offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); R., Vol. I at 105–06.

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 The court also considered Mr. Eaton’s conduct while incarcerated and disciplinary

 history as it informs “the need for the sentence imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2);

 Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011); R., Vol. I at 106–07. It noted he

 had not taken advantage of treatments and activities while incarcerated that would

 reduce his risk of recidivism and that he had obtained “many infractions, including

 two for assault and three for fighting with another person.” R., Vol. I at 106–07.

       Importantly, the district court did not deny the motion solely based on

 § 1B1.13(2). The district court’s legal error in its consideration of § 1B1.13(2) did

 not affect its decision regarding Mr. Eaton’s sentence length and did not affect Mr.

 Eaton’s substantial rights. Therefore, we conclude the district court’s error was

 harmless. See Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1270.

                                     III. Conclusion

       We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Eaton’s motion for a sentence

 reduction.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                            Circuit Judge

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