Court Opinion

ID: 97203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:42:26+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:58.152723
License: Public Domain

216 U.S. 571 (1910)
OSBORN ET AL., TRUSTEES OF THE HASTINGS AND DAKOTA RAILWAY CO.
v.
FROYSETH.
No. 395.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted January 5, 1910.
Decided March 14, 1910.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
*574 Mr. Aldis B. Browne and Mr. Alexander Britton for plaintiff in error.
Mr. C.A. Fosnes for defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE LURTON, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts found show that on May 15, 1888, the defendant in error, being in every way qualified, entered upon the land in question with the intention of claiming it as a homestead, and has ever since continued in possession, residing thereon with his family, and that his improvements have at all times been such as to comply with the homestead laws and exceeded in value seven hundred dollars when this action of ejectment was started. On November 3, 1891, he offered at the proper land office a homestead entry, in due form, for said land. This was rejected. Upon appeal the decision was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior on September 11, 1894. But the facts found in the trial court, and upon which the Supreme Court of Minnesota made its decision, show that this entry was refused by the local land office "solely on the ground that said land was withdrawn from settlement by the executive withdrawal of April 22, 1868." A rejection upon the ground stated was not authorized, for the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to withdraw from settlement lands within the indemnity limits of the grant which had not been before selected and approved by *575 him. Sjoli v. Dreschel, 199 U.S. 564, and cases cited. It has been insisted that although the local land office rejected the application for the reason stated, the affirmance, upon his appeal, was because his homestead application, instead of alleging that he had settled upon the land at some date prior to the selection made by the railroad company on October 29, 1891, simply alleged, that "he resides on the described land." This contention as to the grounds of the affirmance is only made out by the introduction now for the first time of the decision of the Secretary of the Interior under date of January 25, 1896. But that simply affirms the decision of the Commissioner made September 11, 1894, affirming the rejection made by the local land office, and gives no reason for the affirmance. This decision is sought to be explained by what purports to be a copy of an official communication under date of September 11, 1894, from the Commissioner to the local land register and receiver, notifying him that his rejection of a number of homestead entries, including that of Froyseth, on the indemnity lands in question, had been affirmed. Among other matters in that communication, it is stated, "that none of the applicants allege that the lands were settled upon either by themselves or others at the date of the said selections in October, 1891, by the Hastings and Dakota Company, nor do the records show that the lands were otherwise than vacant and subject to such selection at said date." If this be competent for our consideration upon this writ of error, it being no part of the record, it does not appear that the applicant was ever advised of this supposed defect in his affidavit. The local office simply advised him that its decision had been affirmed. The matter was remediable, as the fact was that his settlement was made months prior to his application affidavit. But, assuming that the application in its then form was defective, it is of no legal consequence in determining the validity of the title of the plaintiff in error. This was a plain common-law action of ejectment. The plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the *576 legal title. That the defendant's application for a homestead has not yet ripened into a legal title is of no moment if the plaintiffs are unable to show a complete and superior legal title. The plain effect of the settlement made upon the land here in controversy before any valid selection of the same land by the railroad company, under its grant, was to initiate a homestead right. That settlement and possession continued from the time it was first made, and when, in October, 1891, the Hastings and Dakota Railroad, or its successors in title, attempted to select that land as indemnity land, the land in question was in the actual occupancy of Froyseth claiming it as a homestead. It had, by such settlement, been segregated from the lands subject to selection, and in a contest between such a homesteader and those claiming under selections subsequently made of lieu lands the claim of the former is the better claim. Under the act of May 14, 1880 (ch. 89, 21 Stat. 141, § 3), the right of one, settling in good faith for the purpose of claiming a homestead, `relates back to the date of settlement." Nelson v. Northern Pacific Railway, 188 U.S. 108; Sjoli v. Dreschel, 199 U.S. 564; St. Paul &c. R. Co. v. Donohue, 210 U.S. 21. But it is urged that the original selection made May 26, 1883, was valid, and operated to vest the title as of that date in the railroad company. There is nothing peculiar in the act of July 4, 1866, which protected indemnity lands against settlement upon the filing of a map showing definite location of the railroad. The grant was one of every alternate section of land, designated by odd numbers, to the amount of five alternate sections per mile on each side of the road. Then follows the indemnity provision, in these words (July 4, 1866, c. 168, 14 Stat. 87):
"But in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the lines or route of said roads are definitely located, sold any section, or part thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the right of preemption or homestead settlement has attached to the same, or that the same has been reserved by the United *577 States for any purpose whatever, then it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause to be selected, for the purpose aforesaid, from the public lands of the United States, nearest to the tiers of sections above specified, so much land in alternate sections or parts of sections designated by odd numbers, as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, reserved, or otherwise appropriated, or to which the right of homestead settlement or preemption has attached, as aforesaid, which lands, thus indicated by odd numbers and sections, by the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shall be held by," etc.
The rejection by the Secretary of the Interior of the selection made in 1883 is fatal to any claim now made to carry back the title of the plaintiff in error to that selection. The right to any land within the indemnity limits of the grant, as has been often decided, depended upon the inquiry whether deficiencies had been established within the place limits, and also whether the lands selected in place of such lost lands were at the time subject to such appropriation. Thus, if either preemption or homestead rights had been initiated before such selection, the parcels to which such right had attached were not subject to appropriation as indemnity lands. The function of the Secretary of the Interior was therefore judicial and not ministerial. Wisconsin Railroad Company v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 512. In the case cited above this court said:
"Until the selections were approved there were no selections in fact, only preliminary proceedings taken for that purpose; and the indemnity lands remained unaffected in their title. Until then, the lands which might be taken as indemnity were incapable of identification; the proposed selections remained the property of the United States. The Government was, indeed, under a promise to give the company indemnity lands in lieu of what might be lost by the causes mentioned. But such promise passed no title, and, until it was executed, created no legal interest which could be enforced in the courts. The doctrine, that until selection *578 made no title vests in any indemnity lands, has been recognized in several decisions of this court. Thus in Ryan v. Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 382, 386, in considering a grant of land by Congress, in aid of the construction of a railroad similar in its general features to the one in this case, the court said: `Under this statute, when the road was located and the maps were made, the right of the company to the odd sections first named became ipso facto fixed and absolute. With respect to the `lieu lands,' as they are called, the right was only a float, and attached to no specific tracts until the selection was actually made in the manner prescribed.' And again, speaking of a deficiency in the land granted, it said: `It was within the secondary or indemnity territory where that deficiency was to be supplied. The railroad company had not and could not have any claim to it until specially selected, as it was for that purpose.'"
In Sjoli v. Dreschel, 199 U.S. 564, 566, this court said:
"That up to the time such approval is given, lands within indemnity limits, although embraced by the company's list of selections, are subject to be disposed of by the United States or to be settled upon and occupied under the preemption and homestead laws of the United States."
But it is urged that the mere fact that there was no record evidence of the homestead claim when the selections of 1891 were made was enough to give efficacy to that selection and vest the legal title under the patents thereafter issued. But this is answered by what we have already said, namely, that if at that date this land was actually occupied by one qualified under the law, who had entered and settled thereon before that time, with the intent to claim it as a homestead, the land had ceased to be public land and as such subject to selection as lieu land.
We find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, and it is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not sit in this case.