Court Opinion

ID: 9681399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:49:30.600077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.738378
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice, concurring in part; and dissenting in part. The Majority Opinion decides two issues. The first issue relates to the judgment of $150,000.00 to the landowners; and I agree with the Majority that this judgment should be reversed. This will be further mentioned in Topic I, infra. The second issue decided by the Majority relates to the refusal of the Trial Court to allow the Highway Commission to make exploratory drilling tests on lands owned by the Stanleys adjacent to the lands taken. The Majority holds that the Circuit Court was in error in refusing the Highway Commission’s request; and I dissent on this second issue because I am of the opinion that the Circuit Court ruling should not be disturbed on this point. This will be discussed in Topic II, infra. I. Admission Of Incompetent Evidence As To Value Of Land. I agree with the Majority that the judgment in this case must be reversed because of the admission of incompetent evidence as to the value of the land. The landowners undertook to show: (a) the number of cubic yards and the net dollar value of the white gravel on the land taken; (b) the number of cubic yards and the net dollar value of the concrete aggregate on the tract; and (c) the value of the tract of 18.03 acres as ordinary land. These three items were then totaled to show the landowners’ claims for damages. In 156 American Law Reports 1416, there is an annotation entitled: “Determination in eminent domain proceedings of market value of land as affected by mineral deposits or similar conditions ’ ’; and the holdings1 all over the country as to the basic rule are summarized: “With remarkable unanimity the courts hold that in determining the compensation in eminent domain proceedings for the land to be condemned, the existence of valuable mineral deposits in the land taken constitutes an element which may be taken into consideration if and insofar as it influences the market value of the land. The reason for this rule is that the measure of compensation in eminent domain proceedings is the market value of the land to be condemned as a whole with due consideration of all the components that make for its value. This rule has been expressed in a great number of decisions and has also been recognized by all the leading textwriters on this subject. It has been applied indiscriminately to all forms of mineral deposits, such as limestone, ore, gold, fire clay, coal, sand and gravel, and stone. Occasionally the rule has been expressed by the negative statement that the award may not be reached by separately evaluating the land and the deposits, since the latter, being only one element among many in determining the market value of the land, cannot be considered as an independent factor the value of which is to be simply added to the value of the land.” (Emphasis supplied.) The landowners could have shown the various mineral deposits as circumstances to be considered if and insofar as they influenced the market value of the land, but could not — as was done in this case — separately evaluate the deposits and then total the separate valuations to determine the value of the land. The question was the market value of land having such deposits, and the independent factors of minerals do not, in themselves, determine market value. So the landowners’ entire approach to the determination of value was erroneous. II. Drilling Holes On Property Not Involved In This Action. It is from the Majority holding on this point that I dissent. The Highway Commission condemned a tract of 18.03 acres. The landowners (appellees) waived all severance damages, and only sought recovery for the lands actually taken. The question was thus narrowed to the value of the 18.03 acres. Lazenby v. Ark. Hwy. Comm., 231 Ark. 601, 331 S. W. 2d 705. The landowners (appellees) claimed that the land taken contained valuable clay and gravel deposits; and the Highway Commission (appellant) sought a court order to be allowed to drill holes on other lands of the landowners, being lands adjacent to the lands taken. The Trial Court conducted a hearing on the motion, at which hearing the Highway Commission offered the witness Robert B. McElwaine, who testified: “As far as what I would want to do, it is my opinion that it would be impossible on mineral deposits of this type to evaluate the property being taken without knowing about the rest of the mineral deposit involved, not only on that tract, but in the remainder of the tract. I would propose to go onto the remaining properties, make a topographical survey, map and lay out, drill holes from which samples would be taken and tests performed and from that arrive at the amount of minerals on the whole tract in order to arrive at the amount of valuation of the minerals being taken.” And, on cross-examination of the same witness, the following occurred: ‘ ‘ Q. Did I understand you to say that you could not determine the value of that mineral unless you knew what deposits were in the community, the land laying around it? A. That is right. Q. Does that include the land of other land owners? A. In so far as it is possible to evaluate it, yes. Q. Doesn’t include the other land owners in that area ? A. It would include the right of way up and down the highway there, and if I had all the information I would like to have, yes. Q. In order to take your testimony outside of the speculative realm you would have to have the knowledge of a considerable portion of the land in that community? A. This is the focal point right here. I would like to examine the other land, but I would not go into so much work and drill on it as I would the focal point. Q. I understand the Stanleys own sixty-eight acres and this right of way runs across the whole business; if it was necessary to drill their land to ascertain what the value of the property was in the right of way proper, I can’t understand why you would have to have the information from the other lands. A. The more we observe from the focal point we may want to go on the other lands to obtain some more detailed information. Q. How would you do that? A. I would endeavor to get the permission of the land owners.” The foregoing excerpts constitute a reasonable summary of the testimony of this witness — the only witness offered by the Highway Commission in support of its motion — and from this testimony the Trial Court'concluded that it would not make an order allowing the Highway Commission to go on the landowners’ private property and drill holes. The Majority Opinion says that the Trial Court committed reversible error, and cites § 28-356 Ark. Stats., which is a copy of Federal Rule No. 34. I desire to defend the ruling of the Trial Court under three headings: (a) “Good Cause.” Our statute says, “Upon motion of any party showing good cause . . .” Good cause necessarily implies reasonable diligence on the part of the movant, and inability to obtain the desired evidence in any other method. The cases cited by the Majority so state.2 In the case at bar, the Highway Commission’s witness said that it might be necessary to drill on the lands of other landowners, and yet no effort had been made to accomplish that drilling. If similar clay and gravel deposits existed elsewhere than on the lands of these appellees, then the abundance of such deposits could easily have been shown without damaging the lands of these appellees. Furthermore, until the landowners alleged and proved that there were no other similar deposits except under the right-of-way taken, the landowners had made no case of scarcity. It is interesting to note that the landowners did not allege or undertake to show any such case of scarcity as regards the clay and gravel deposits. So when we look at the entire record, we see that there was no need for the Highway Commission to show abundance until the landowners had alleged and undertaken to show scarcity. This the landowners never claimed nor sought to show. So the Highway Commission’s “good cause”3 for trespassing on the lands of appellees and drilling exploratory holes was never shown. (b) Abuse Of Discretion. After hearing the Highway Commission’s proffered testimony (i. e., the witness McElwaine) the Trial Court concluded that the drilling of holes on the appellees’ adjacent lands was not essential to the Highway Commission’s case. The Majority, in reversing the Trial Court, is necessarily saying that the Trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the Highway Commission’s motion. I can see no abuse of discretion; and I use the words of Chief Judge Crie L. Phillips in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. Continental Oil Co., supra: “It is my opinion that in determining whether good cause has been shown, the district court is necessarily vested with a wide discretion, and that its determination of such question should not be disturbed, in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” (c) The Constitutional Issue. The Constitution of Arkansas says in Article II, Section 22: “The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated, or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.” The concluding sentence of the Majority Opinion in the present case reads: “We are therefore of the opinion that the Highway Commission is entitled, at a reasonable time in advance of a retrial, to an order permitting it to enter upon the land for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of mineral deposits therein.” There is no safeguard to protect rights of the landowners. Drilling holes on the land will certainly be damaging. In the cases cited by the Majority, there were safeguards made by the Court to protect the landowner against damage. For instance, in Williams v. Continental Oil Co., supra, it was affirmatively shown that the making of the survey would not damage the well and that the plaintiff would file a reasonable bond to protect the defendant against any damage which might be done in connection with the survey. But, even then, there was to be no drilling, but merely the ascertainment of the direction of a well already drilled. I find no case anywhere — and the Majority Opinion cites none — wherein the drilling of holes has been permitted under the discovery statute. Yet, the Majority is allowing such trespass and damage to be done in this case in the teeth of our constitutional provision which says that private property shall not be damaged for public use without just compensation. Our discovery statute says nothing about drilling holes on lands. The statute merely says that entry may be made on the land “. . . for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing . . .”, and those words are far less than drilling a hole on the land. The Majority says that the discovery statute should be liberally construed, but I insist that liberality should not be carried to the extreme of unconstitutionality. I regard the Majority Opinion on this discovery statute as an invasion and damage to the rights of private property. To overcome this point, the Majority Opinion says: “Of course, the Commission may be required to give a bond if the landowners undertake to show, as they have not. yet done, that the drilling may damage the land.” This quoted sentence I regard as further reason why this Court should not disturb the discretion exercised by the Trial Court in denying the motion of the Highway Commission to drill holes on private property. The burden was not on the landowners to show that the drilling would damage the land: the burden was on the Highway Commission to show that the drilling would not damage the land. And I find nothing in the record that shows that the Highway Commission met such burden. How does the landowner know what kind of holes the Highway Department intends to drill? It was incumbent on the Highway Department to show that these holes for core drilling would not be traps into which an animal or person could step and receive a broken leg. The Majority is reversing the Trial Court on a point wherein the Highway Department failed to meet its burden of proof. For each of the reasons hereinbefore stated, I respectfully dissent on this second issue. Johnson, J., dissents.   See in general 18 Am. Jur. 878, “Eminent Domain” § 242; and compare also 2 Lewis, “Eminent Domain”, 3d ed. p. 1267, § 724; 1 Nichols, “Eminent Domain” 2d ed. p. 692, § 226; Orgel, “Valuation under the Law of Eminent Domain,” 1936 ed. p. 541, § 164; Sehmutz, “Condemnation Appraisers Handbook,” 1938 ed. 65. There is a more recent — i.e., second-edition of Orgel on “Valuation Under Eminent Domain”; and the citation in that edition is Vol. 1, p. 672, § 165. Also, there is an annotation in Vol. 100 Law Edition of U. S. Sup. Ct. Reports, p. 256, entitled, “Measure of damages payable on condemnation of real property by federal government — Supreme Court Cases.”    For instance, in Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 215 F. (2d) 4, the Court said: “The making of the survey and the use of the report thereof as evidence was not only a convenient means of proving or disproving the crucial fact essential to the right of plaintiff’s to recover, it was the only way to prove or disprove such fact with sufficient certainty to remove it from the field of inference and probabilities. This was not an instance in which plaintiffs by means of other evidence could have established with the required measure of certainty the fact that the well was bottomed underneath their land. Neither was it an instance of the desired survey being cumulative of other available procedure to establish such fact. Without the making of such a survey, plaintiffs can never secure an adjudication of the critical issue in the case, based upon a foundation which is certain and sure.”    In 8 Ark. Law Review 125, there is a case note entitled: “Trial Practice — Federal rule 34 — Showing ‘Good Cause’ for Discovery.”