Court Opinion

ID: 9745872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:38:04.665394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:05.520211
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Justice Wolfson’s majority decision is well written but its reasoning ignores existing case law. I agree with the majority that the case must be decided on the meaning and interpretation of the words in the statute “secretly confines another.” 720 ILCS 5/10 — 1(a)(1) (West 2006). In People v. Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d 282, 285 (1978), our Illinois Supreme Court found that the wife of a bank president, who informed her husband that she was being held hostage for ransom, was secretly confined when she was taped to a chair in her own home and when her husband did not know where she was being held. Our supreme court stated: “ ‘Secret’ has been variously defined as: ‘Concealed; hidden; not made public; particularly, in law, kept from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act, transaction, deed, or other thing spoken of.’ (Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (4th ed. 1951).) *** [Sjecret confinement contemplated by the statute may be shown by proof of the secrecy of both the confinement and place of confinement, or of either. The victim in this case was ‘secretly confined’ as effectively in her own home as if defendant had as-ported her to some remote isolated place of confinement. We hold that defendant secretly confined Mrs. Luttrell within the meaning of the statute.” Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d at 285. I find this case instructive because the definition of “secret” includes “kept from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act” and in the Mulcahey case, the husband did not know where his wife was being held. Defendant argues, and the majority agrees, that the defendant did not secretly confine the baby, because the baby was never removed from the view of the public. I agree that the defendant never removed the baby from public view, and the public could easily recognize that she carried a baby. However, defendant’s argument fails to address the second half of the accepted definition of secret confinement: that defendant kept the baby “ ‘from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act.’ ” Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d at 285, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1519 (4th ed. 1951). In other words, the taking of the baby without parental permission can be concealment. “Confinement of a child under the age of 13 years is against his will within the meaning of this Section if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian.” 720 ILCS 5/10 — 1(b) (West 2006). Although reviewing courts have historically defined “confinement” as being within an identifiable place such as a house or a car (see People v. Sykes, 161 Ill. App. 3d 623, 628 (1987)), more recently, this court has expanded the traditional definition of confinement (see People v. Turner, 282 Ill. App. 3d 770, 780 (1996) (secret confinement where victim was dragged to a viaduct late at night in an area with limited traffic); People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (2002) (secret confinement where victim, despite being in the public view at various points during confinement, was prevented from escaping because the defendant threatened him)). I find People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (2002), and People v. Goodwin, 381 Ill. App. 3d 927 (2008), instructive. In George, the defendant approached the 12-year-old victim and told him he was a police officer. The defendant, over a four-day period, coerced the victim into believing that defendant was a police officer and, later, his adopted father. Despite being present in public together at various points, the victim did not attempt to escape because the defendant had threatened and coerced him. The defendant argued that the State failed to prove defendant secretly confined the victim, in part because they had been seen in public on several occasions. This court, in affirming the defendant’s conviction, found that the defendant had kept the victim’s mother, a “person affected” by defendant’s act, unaware of the victim’s whereabouts the entire time. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. In the case at bar, the defendant kept the confinement secret by not letting anyone know she had the baby without the parents’ permission. Furthermore, when the defendant was approached by a curious security guard, she attempted to bribe the security guard and attempted to flee with the baby. Similarly, in Goodwin, the defendant, while attempting to elude police officers, stole a minivan with an 11-month-old child buckled in a child seat in the back of the van. The area where the child sat had tinted windows. The child’s father chased the defendant and yelled for him to stop. The defendant traveled at speeds nearing 100 miles an hour, and he temporarily escaped from the father and the police. Goodwin, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 930-31. Shortly thereafter, the father and the police caught up with the defendant and safely recovered the child. The reviewing court affirmed the conviction for aggravated kidnapping, finding that even if the child were visible through the window, her presence would not arouse suspicion because there was no indication to the public that she was in the van without her parent’s permission. Goodwin, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 936. Similarly, in the case at bar, the defendant walked along with the baby as if it were her own baby, which would not arouse suspicion, thereby keeping hidden from the public the fact that the baby was being confined, as defined by section 10 — 1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/10 — 1(b) (West 2006)). In the case at bar, the defendant admits that she took the baby from Joel. Without Joel’s knowledge, defendant wrapped her up in a pink and white towel that she had purchased that morning. Joel and Mirabel did not know where defendant had taken their baby. Although the public could easily view that the defendant carried a baby, similar to Goodwin, her presence on the street carrying a child wrapped in a towel “would not arouse suspicion” because there is no indication to the public that defendant carried the child without the parents’ permission. Goodwin, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 936. I believe that defendant kept Mirabel, a “person affected” by defendant’s act, unaware of her baby’s whereabouts. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1101. Accordingly, a rational jury could find that the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant secretly confined the baby. In support of her argument, defendant relies upon People v. Trotter, 371 Ill. App. 3d 869 (2007), overruled by People v. Harrison, 226 Ill. 2d 427 (2007), and People v. Lamkey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 435 (1992). I find both cases distinguishable. Initially, I must note that our supreme court overruled Trotter in Harrison on grounds related to the Trotter defendant’s insanity plea. To the extent that the appellate court’s decision in Trotter remains good law, it is distinguishable. The Trotter defendant took a 13-month-old baby from an auto, crossed the street, and boarded a train with the child. While on the train, she told several riders that the child did not belong to her. Later, the defendant walked into a restroom at a gas station; the store clerk and a police officer both knew that she was in the restroom with a child. This court reversed the trial court, in part, because the defendant never removed the victim from the public view; was in “constant contact with other people”; and made no effort to secretly confine the child, going so far as to tell strangers that the child was not hers. Trotter, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 877. We are not presented with such a situation here, where it was reasonable for the jury to infer, based on the evidence, that defendant sought to pass the baby off as her own child to the public. Although she spent the morning talking with Mirabel, once she took the baby, she left the waiting room and did not have contact with another person until Hopkins stopped her for questioning. She attempted to bribe him and also sought to escape in an elevator. It is clear from the facts in the case at bar that defendant intended to, and did, for a brief period of time, prevent Mirabel and Joel from knowing their baby’s whereabouts. In Lamkey, this court found that the State failed to prove secret confinement where the defendant restrained a sexual assault victim in a glass vestibule only feet away from a major avenue, and the victim could see people walking past. In this vestibule, the defendant assaulted the victim, but did not attempt to move her to a more secluded area. Again, we are presented with a different situation than the instant case. The Lamkey defendant was not attempting, in any way, to prevent others from seeing his actions. Lamkey, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 439. In the case at bar, the record demonstrates that a jury could find defendant sought to have the public believe that the baby was her own child. The facts are clear that the defendant, although she did not entirely remove the baby from the public view, did prevent the baby’s parents, Joel and Mirabel, from knowing her whereabouts and sought to pass the baby off as her own child to the public, thereby giving no indication to the public that the baby was not permitted to be with her. Accordingly, I believe that a rational jury could have found that the State proved secret confinement beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant next contends that the prosecutor prejudiced her during the rebuttal argument by referring to suppressed evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor, by stating that defendant placed the baby in her coat, referred to her suppressed postarrest statement. The concurring opinion agrees with the conclusion by Justice Wolf-son, but finds the prosecutor’s use of the suppressed statement borders on prosecutorial misconduct to the prejudice of the defendant. I too am displeased with the comment made, but I also do not find the comments enough to provide defendant with a new trial. A prosecutor is given wide latitude in closing arguments, although his or her comments must be based on the facts in evidence or upon reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 276 (1993). While a prosecutor’s remarks may sometimes exceed the bounds of proper comments, the verdict must not be disturbed unless it can be said that the remarks resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused, such that absent those remarks the verdict would have been different. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 295 (1995). A defendant bears a substantial burden to reverse a conviction based upon improper remarks during closing argument. People v. Williams, 332 Ill. App. 3d 254, 266 (2002). A prosecutor’s improper remarks must be considered in the context of the closing arguments as a whole and will not be reversible error unless they are a material factor in the conviction or cause substantial prejudice to the accused, i.e., a reasonable jury could have reached a different verdict if the improper comments had not been made. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123 (2007). I find that, after considering the disputed comment in the entirety of the closing argument, defendant has failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice. See People v. Meeks, 382 Ill. App. 3d 81, 86 (2008). The prosecutor made the comment a single time, the jury was properly instructed to disregard any remarks that were not based in evidence, and defendant identifies no evidence to suggest that the comment was deliberate. See People v. Siefke, 195 Ill. App. 3d 135, 145 (1990) (finding that an isolated prosecutorial indiscretion, when not deliberately repeated and cured by an instruction to the jury, did not constitute reversible error). The trial court, based on defendant’s objection, allowed the prosecutor the opportunity to clarify her argument. In her supplemental rebuttal, the prosecutor explained the State’s theory of secret confinement; she explained that defendant wrapped the baby in the pink and white towel but made no mention of the jacket. The trial court then instructed the jury to disregard any part of the argument that was not based in the evidence. The trial court’s instruction to the jury, combined with the prior admonishments and the curative efforts of the supplemental rebuttal, mitigated any of the potential prejudice from the prosecutor’s statement. See Meeks, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 86. In reaching my conclusion, I considered the conduct of the prosecutor in light of the cases defendant relies upon (People v. Edwards, 49 Ill. App. 3d 79 (1977); People v. Gilmer, 110 Ill. App. 2d 73 (1969)), to support her argument. I find both cases distinguishable. In both cases, the prosecutor referred to suppressed evidence. In Edwards, the prosecutor made a second reference to such evidence after the court sustained defendant’s objection to the first reference. This court determined the second reference was “deliberate” and the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s comments was highly prejudicial. Edwards, 49 Ill. App. 3d at 83. Similarly, in Gilmer, this court found the actions of the prosecutor deliberate and that there was a reasonable possibility that improperly introduced evidence contributed to the conviction. Gilmer, 110 Ill. App. 2d at 80. Here, we are not faced with the sort of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct that the Gilmer or Edwards court faced. I cannot say that the prosecutor’s one-time reference in the rebuttal argument to the suppressed evidence resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendant, such that absent that remark the verdict would have been different. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d at 295.