Court Opinion

ID: 9726703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:04:41.007907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.877629
License: Public Domain

Bashara, P. J.
We adopt the statement of facts from the dissenting opinion of Judge White. However, we cannot agree with the result reached by Judge White.
In Michigan a cause of action based on malpractice against a state licensed physician must be brought within two years of the time when the physician discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff, or within two years of the time when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the asserted malpractice, whichever is later. Dyke v Richard, 390 Mich 739, 747; 213 NW2d 185 (1973).
The complaint alleges negligence on the part of Dr. Flick in severing the appellant’s femoral nerve during an appendectomy in April of 1969. As a matter of law the appellant discovered the asserted malpractice when she was informed by Dr. Flick immediately following the operation that he severed the nerve and she experienced paralysis and numbness in her right leg. Dr. Flick continued to treat the appellant for approximately one more year.
The litigation in the case at bar commenced in November of 1973, approximately 4-1/2 years after discovery of the asserted malpractice and 3-1/2 years after discontinuance of treatment by Dr. Flick. The trial judge correctly granted accelerated *104judgment, GCR 1963, 116.1(5), on the ground the action was barred by the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5805(3); MSA 27A.5805(3), and MCLA 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838. Dyke v Richard, supra.
We believe that if the discovery rule is expanded to the extent suggested in the dissenting opinion, it would virtually be impossible to obtain accelerated judgment grounded on the statute of limitations. Most people do not recognize the fact that they have suffered an "invasion of a legal right” until they consult with an attorney. To forestall the running of the statute of limitations to that point would, for all practical purposes, abolish the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases.
Nor do we agree with appellant’s contention that Dr. Flick fraudulently concealed the malpractice tolling the statute of limitations. MCLA 600.5855; MSA 27A.5855. Fraudulent concealment requires actions of an affirmative character to purposely conceal the right of action from the plaintiff. De Haan v Winter, 258 Mich 293; 241 NW 923 (1932). Appellant’s complaint failed to allege that Dr. Flick intentionally concealed the cause of action.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
D. F. Walsh, J., concurred.