Court Opinion

ID: 9852378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:27.416105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:26.820273
License: Public Domain

McGregor, J.,
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the treatment of the sentencing issue, I dissent on the grounds that the trial court erred in accepting the defendant’s plea to a non-existent offense.
The practice of accepting guilty pleas to so-called non-existent or paradoxical offenses has been recently approved in People v Hooper, 58 Mich App 132; 227 NW2d 250 (1975). Although prosecutors have been cautioned against such *203practices, I fear that the number of pleas to offenses which have not been specifically defined by statute is growing. While the defendants in such cases, as in the case at bar, have been treated fairly and are receiving the benefit of such pleas, the practice is not in compliance with GCR 1963, 785.
GCR 1963, 785.7(1) (a) states that the trial court is required to advise the defendant of the general nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. It is impossible for the court personally to address the defendant and inform him of and determine that he understands the general nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, when no such offense exists. People v Banks, 51 Mich App 785; 216 NW2d 461 (1974).
While I believe that a defendant is not prejudiced by such a practice, the Supreme Court made patently and painfully clear that strict adherence to the requirements of the rule is mandatory and that neither substantial compliance nor the absence of prejudicial error will be deemed sufficient. People v Shekoski, 393 Mich 134; 224 NW2d 656 (1974).
Prosecutors who engage in the practice of allowing defendants to plead to non-existent offenses risk not only reversal of the plea but the discharge of the defendant on remand, where there are no lesser included offenses of the charged offense upon which to prosecute the defendant. People v McMiller, 389 Mich 425; 208 NW2d 451 (1973), cert den 414 US 1080; 94 S Ct 599; 38 L Ed 2d 486 (1973).
It is my hope that the Supreme Court will grant leave in this or another case which raises the issue of the propriety of accepting a plea to a non-existent or paradoxical offense.
I respectfully dissent.