Court Opinion

ID: 9368329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 19:00:46.572064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.015437
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT RIGSBY; SCOTT RIGSBY                 No. 21-16182
FOUNDATION, INC.,
                                          D.C. No. 2:19-cv-
             Plaintiffs-Appellants,         05710-MTL

 v.
                                             OPINION
GODADDY INC.; GODADDY.COM,
LLC; GODADDY OPERATING
COMPANY LLC; DESERT NEWCO
LLC,

             Defendants-Appellees.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Arizona
      Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted August 9, 2022
                 Anchorage, Alaska

                 Filed February 3, 2023

 Before: Sidney R. Thomas, M. Margaret McKeown, and
            Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge McKeown
2                     RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

                          SUMMARY *

                           Lanham Act
    The panel (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an
action brought under the Lanham Act by Scott Rigsby and
the Scott Rigsby Foundation against GoDaddy Inc. et al.,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief including return of
the domain name “scottrigsbyfoundation.org;” and (2)
dismissed Rigsby’s and the Foundation’s appeal of an order
transferring venue.
    When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay
GoDaddy, a domain name registrar, the renewal fee for
scottrigsbyfoundation.org, a third party registered the then-
available domain name and used it for a gambling
information site.
    The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia’s order
transferring the case to the District of Arizona because
transfer orders are reviewable only in the circuit of the
transferor district court.
    The panel held that Rigsby could not satisfy the “use in
commerce” requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis
GoDaddy because the “use” in question was being carried
out by a third-party gambling site, not GoDaddy, and Rigsby
therefore did not state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). As
to the Lanham Act claim, the panel further held that Rigsby
could not overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                      3

Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which limits
the secondary liability of domain name registrars and
registries for the act of registering a domain name. The
panel concluded that Rigsby did not plausibly allege that
GoDaddy registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name
with a bad faith intent to profit, nor did he plausibly allege
that GoDaddy’s alleged wrongful conduct surpassed mere
registration activity.
    The panel held that § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which immunizes providers of interactive
computer services against liability arising from content
created by third parties, shielded GoDaddy from liability for
Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy, publicity,
trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s Consumer
Fraud Act. The panel held that immunity under § 230
applies when the provider is an interactive computer
services, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or
speaker, and the information is provided by another
information content provider. Agreeing with other circuits,
the panel held that domain name registrars and website
hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the definition of
an interactive computer service. In addition, GoDaddy was
not a publisher of scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and it was not
acting as an information content provider.
    Finally, the panel held that Rigsby did not state a claim
for injunctive relief or declaratory relief.
4                  RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

                       COUNSEL

Charles M. Dalziel Jr. (argued), Dalziel Law Firm, Marietta,
Georgia, for Plaintiff-Appellants.
Harper S. Seldin (argued) and Jeffrey M. Monhait, Cozen
O’Connor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Paula L. Zecchini,
GoDaddy.com LLC, Kirkland, Washington; for Defendants-
Appellees.

                        OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

    Scott Rigsby is a physically challenged athlete and
motivational speaker who started the Scott Rigsby
Foundation      and    registered    the    domain    name
“scottrigsbyfoundation.org” with GoDaddy.com in 2007.
When Rigsby and the Foundation failed to pay the annual
renewal fee in 2018, allegedly a result of a glitch in
GoDaddy.com’s billing, a third party registered the then-
available domain name. To Rigsby’s dismay and his
customers’ confusion, scottrigsbyfoundation.org became a
gambling information site. Rigsby sued GoDaddy.com,
LLC and its corporate relatives (collectively, “GoDaddy”),
in the Northern District of Georgia for violations of the
Lanham Act and various state laws and sought declaratory
and injunctive relief including return of the domain name.
The Northern District of Georgia transferred the case to the
District of Arizona, which dismissed all claims.
    Although Rigsby’s claims are sympathetic, relief is not
available against GoDaddy, which is a domain name
registrar. Rigsby cannot satisfy the “use in commerce”
                   RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                   5

requirement of the Lanham Act vis-à-vis GoDaddy nor can
he overcome GoDaddy’s immunity under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) or
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Rigsby’s
problem lies with the entity that acquired the domain name;
his efforts to tag GoDaddy with liability miss the mark.
   We affirm dismissal of the complaint against GoDaddy.
I. BACKGROUND
    The Scott Rigsby Foundation, a nonprofit for wounded
veterans and other individuals with disabilities, and the
Foundation’s namesake, Scott Rigsby, a motivational
speaker and the first double-leg amputee to complete an Iron
Man Triathlon (collectively, “Rigsby”), promote an active
lifestyle for all physically challenged individuals. Rigsby
registered the domain name scottrigsbyfoundation.org with
GoDaddy.com in 2007, but in 2018 Rigsby failed to make a
payment to renew the registration due to GoDaddy’s billing
“glitch.” A third party, whom Rigsby refers to as a
“hijacker,” swooped in and registered the domain with
GoDaddy. The website scottrigsbyfoundation.org became
“a portal into an online gambling education site.” Neither
the website nor its new owner is a party to the underlying
suit or this appeal.
    Rigsby sued GoDaddy in the Northern District of
Georgia to reclaim the domain scottrigsbyfoundation.org.
The district court transferred the case to the District of
Arizona on GoDaddy’s motion pursuant to the forum
selection clause in GoDaddy.com, LLC’s terms of service.
Rigsby’s Third Amended Complaint includes claims under
the Lanham Act and state-law claims for invasion of
privacy/publicity, trade libel, and libel. Rigsby also seeks a
declaratory judgment regarding ownership of the domain
6                   RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

name. Finally, Rigsby seeks an injunction under Arizona’s
Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522, requiring
GoDaddy to reinstate Rigsby as the owner of
scottrigsbyfoundation.org.
    The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice.
On appeal, Rigsby challenges the dismissal of his claims and
the transfer of venue.
II. ANALYSIS
    A. VENUE CHALLENGE
    We do not have jurisdiction to review the Northern
District of Georgia’s transfer order, as transfer orders “are
reviewable only in the circuit of the transferor district court.”
Posnanski v. Gibney, 421 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also, e.g., In re U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 25 F.4th 692, 698 (9th
Cir. 2022) (“Our case law is clear that we do not have
jurisdiction to review the procedural or substantive propriety
of the Florida court’s transfer order.”). Rigsby’s remedy, if
any, lies in the Eleventh Circuit. See Posnanski, 421 F.3d at
980–81.
    B. LANHAM ACT CLAIM
    Moving to the claims over which we have jurisdiction,
Rigsby first invokes § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a), to claim that GoDaddy is “knowingly providing
the use of the domain name” in a deceptive way. This
approach is unsuccessful because the “use” in question is
being carried out by a third-party gambling site, not
GoDaddy. A claim aimed at the third party cannot be
repackaged to assert use by GoDaddy. Rigsby’s claim fails
for two reasons: Rigsby does not adequately plead that
GoDaddy used Rigsby’s mark “in commerce,” see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a); and GoDaddy’s registrar activity is shielded from
                   RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                  7

liability under the ACPA because Rigsby has not plausibly
alleged that GoDaddy was more than a registrar or that it
exhibited “bad faith or reckless disregard,” see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii); 1114(2)(D)(iii).
       1. GoDaddy did not use Rigsby’s mark in
       commerce.
    We first consider Rigsby’s assertion that he did not have
to plead “use” of any “mark” in his Lanham Act claim.
Rigsby focuses on the lack of any trademark in his claim,
emphasizing that § 1125(a) allows suit completely apart
from “marks.” Rigsby is keying in on the wrong term.
Though Rigsby need not have a registered trademark to
bring claims under § 1125(a), the “use in commerce”
requirement still holds. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W.
Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Such use requirement is firmly established in the case law
and, moreover, is embodied in the Lanham Act itself.”
(citation omitted)). To state a claim under § 1125(a), Rigsby
must plausibly allege that GoDaddy “use[d]” Rigsby’s
domain name “in commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
    His efforts fall short. When Rigsby stopped paying for
the scottrigsbyfoundation.org domain, a third party
purchased it. Rigsby contends that GoDaddy “active[ly]
push[ed] out” gambling content through the domain name,
but he does not plausibly allege that GoDaddy played a role
beyond registration. In “grant[ing] a particular domain name
to a registrant,” GoDaddy “simply grant[ed] it an address.”
Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002). “The
fact that the [third party] can then use its domain name to
infringe on the rights of a registered trademark owner does
not subject the registrar to liability for trademark
infringement or unfair competition.” Id.
8                  RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

    In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., we
dismissed claims of contributory infringement against the
domain name registrar Network Solutions, Inc. (“NSI”)
because registration of Lockheed Martin’s mark was not
“use in commerce” under § 1125(a). See 194 F.3d 980, 984–
85 (9th Cir. 1999). Although registrants had to pay NSI a
fee to use its routing service, we explained that “NSI does
not supply the domain-name combination any more than the
Postal Service supplies a street address by performing the
routine service of routing mail.” Id. We recognized that
“[w]here domain names are used to infringe, the
infringement does not result from [a registrar’s registration
activities], but from the registrant’s use of the name on a web
site . . . in connection with goods or services.” Id. at 985
(quoting Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 985
F. Supp. 949, 958 (C.D. Cal 1997)). The registrar’s
“involvement with the use of domain names d[id] not extend
beyond registration.” Id. The same logic applies here.
While Lockheed Martin considered a claim for contributory
infringement, Rigsby’s suit under § 1125(a) is essentially a
repackaging of secondary liability claims, targeting the
domain registrar directly for the acts of the registrant.
Lockheed Martin’s reasoning still holds: “infringement does
not result from [the registrar’s services], but from the
registrant’s use” of the mark. See id. Rigsby has not
adequately alleged that GoDaddy “used” his mark, let alone
“in commerce,” sufficient to state a claim under § 1125(a).
       2. Rigsby does not plausibly allege that GoDaddy
       went beyond registration.
    In 1999, Congress passed the ACPA, which amended the
                      RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                        9

Lanham Act to protect against cybersquatting.1
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
106–113, § 3001, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A–545 (1999). Under
the ACPA, a person may be civilly liable “if . . . that person
. . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark” and
“registers, traffics in, or uses a [protected] domain name.”
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). “Extending liability to registrars
or other third parties who are not cybersquatters, but whose
actions may have the effect of aiding such cybersquatting,
would expand the range of conduct prohibited by the
statute.” Petroliam Nasional Berhad, 737 F.3d at 550.
Prohibited conduct would expand “from a bad faith intent to
cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a
domain name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent
to profit.” Id. at 550–51.
    As a domain name registrar, GoDaddy is shielded from
liability under the ACPA, assuming that its activities do not
extend beyond registration. See id. at 548 (“GoDaddy.com,
Inc. (GoDaddy) is the world’s largest domain name registrar,
maintaining over 50 million domain names registered by
customers around the world.”). Congress explained that the
ACPA “codif[ies]” existing case law by “limiting the
secondary liability of domain name registrars and registries
for the act of registration of a domain name.” S. Rep. No.
106–140, at 11 (1999) (citing, inter alia, Lockheed Martin,
985 F. Supp. 949, aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999)); see

1
  Cybersquatting entails “registering a domain name associated with a
protected trademark either to ransom the domain name to the mark
holder or to divert business from the mark holder.” Petroliam Nasional
Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013)
(citing Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.
2005)).
10                  RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

also Hawes v. Network Sols., Inc., 337 F.3d 377, 384 (4th
Cir. 2003) (“In creating these causes of action, Congress
intended expressly to limit the liability of domain name
registrars under the [Lanham] Act as long as the domain
name registrars comply with the conditions stated in [the
ACPA].”).
    Rigsby has not plausibly alleged that GoDaddy
registered, used, or trafficked in his domain name with a bad
faith intent to profit, nor has he plausibly alleged that
GoDaddy’s allegedly wrongful conduct surpassed mere
registration activity. See § 1125(d)(1)(A); Rigsby is clearly
frustrated that GoDaddy “let some other person or entity
register the domain name,” but letting a third party purchase
an available domain name is standard practice for a domain
name registrar. See InvenTel Prods., LLC v. Li, 406 F. Supp.
3d 396, 402 (D.N.J. 2019) (“[W]ithout a warning that the
specific URL being registered would be used for an illicit
purpose, GoDaddy did not have a ‘bad faith intent to profit’
from         the        automatic         registration     of
‘www.hdmirrorcambuy.com.’”); Verizon Cal. Inc. v.
OnlineNIC, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (noting that the ACPA “exempts a domain name
registrar from liability resulting from its registration of
domain names for others where the registrar is acting in a
purely passive capacity”).
    Rigsby equates GoDaddy’s lack of intervention with
active promotion, but GoDaddy “simply could not function
as a registrar, or as keeper of the registry, if it had to become
entangled in, and bear the expense of, disputes regarding the
right of a registrant to use a particular domain name.”
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 141 F. Supp.
2d 648, 655 (N.D. Tex. 2001). Rigsby has not alleged that
GoDaddy went beyond the registrar role by adding its own
                    RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                    11

content or advertising to the site or “using” the domain name
for its own purposes. Instead, by merely allowing another
entity to register the domain name without bad faith intent to
profit from the registration, GoDaddy is shielded from
liability under the ACPA.
    C. STATE-LAW CLAIMS
    Rigsby’s state-law claims for invasion of privacy,
publicity, trade libel, libel, and violations of Arizona’s
Consumer Fraud Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1522, fare no
better, as the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230, shields GoDaddy from liability. “Section 230 of the
CDA immunizes providers of interactive computer services
against liability arising from content created by third
parties.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)
(en banc) (footnotes omitted).         In designing § 230,
“Congress ‘made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful
online speech through the separate route of imposing tort
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
parties’ potentially injurious messages.’” Gonzalez v.
Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2021) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted).
    Section 230’s operative provision states “[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” § 230(c)(1). “No
cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.” § 230(e)(3). Immunity applies when three
criteria are met: the provider is an interactive computer
service, the plaintiff is treating the entity as the publisher or
speaker, and the information is provided by another
12                 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

information content provider. Dyroff v. Ultimate Software
Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019). GoDaddy
satisfies all three.
       1. GoDaddy is a provider of an interactive
       computer service.
     Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as
“any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
“Courts typically have held that internet service providers,
website exchange systems, online message boards, and
search engines fall within this definition.” Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d
Cir. 2016). Information content providers, in contrast, are
defined as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.” § 230(f)(3). “Under the statutory
scheme, an ‘interactive computer service’ qualifies for
immunity so long as it does not also function as an
‘information content provider’ for the portion of the
statement or publication at issue.”             Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003);
see also Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,
591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Congress thus
established a general rule that providers of interactive
computer services are liable only for speech that is properly
attributable to them.”).
    We have yet to consider whether domain name registrars
and website hosting companies like GoDaddy fall under the
“relatively expansive definition” of an “interactive computer
service.” See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. It is a novel
                   RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                 13

question for us, but one addressed by other courts. In Ricci
v. Teamsters Union Local 456, the Second Circuit
recognized that the term “has been construed broadly to
effectuate the statute’s speech-protective purpose” and
easily concluded that § 230 “shields GoDaddy from
publisher liability (with respect to web content provided by
others) in its capacity as a provider of an interactive
computer service.” 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing,
inter alia, Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., No. CV
08–0054–PHX–SMM, 2008 WL 2705377, at *3 (D. Ariz.
July 9, 2008) (“GoDaddy, as a web host, qualifies as an
interactive computer service provider under the CDA.”));
see also Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398, 406 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (including “broadband
providers, hosting companies, and website operators” within
the term interactive computer service); Kathleen Ann Ruane,
Cong. Rsch. Serv. Legal Sidebar, LSB10082, How Broad a
Shield? A Brief Overview of Section 230 of the
Communications          Decency       Act      2     (2018),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/LSB10082.pdf (last visited
January 26, 2023) (listing GoDaddy as an internet hosting
company shielded by Section 230 immunity).
    We agree with this approach. Though Rigsby argues that
discovery is necessary to figure out which corporate relative
was the domain name registrar, he acknowledges that one of
the entities must be the registrar, claiming that GoDaddy
Operating Company, LLC “operates as a website hosting
provider” and “offers domain search, auctions, managed
hosting, site protection, website security, and other domain
registration services.” We can set aside which corporate
relative may be the actual registrar—Rigsby complains of
conduct related to the domain name registration, and we
accept a plausible claim against any of the named
14                 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

defendants. As a domain name registrar and website hosting
provider, GoDaddy “provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server” and provides an
“interactive computer service” under § 230(f)(2).
       2. GoDaddy is not a publisher.
    We are not persuaded by Rigsby’s efforts to treat
GoDaddy as the “publisher” of scottrigsbyfoundation.org.
Rigsby’s state-law claims assert that he was harmed by the
gambling content on scottrigsbyfoundation.org, and he
alleges that “[s]ince the hijack of the site, daily, Defendants
have published false and defamatory statements concerning
the Foundation’s activities in the gambling world.” Rigsby
is mixing up GoDaddy’s registration of the domain name
with the creation and dissemination of a particular message.
The third-party registrant—arguably an information content
provider—is the one posting the content, not GoDaddy.
Section 230 shields GoDaddy from publisher liability when
another party is doing the speaking. See Ricci, 781 F.3d at
28 (holding that GoDaddy was shielded from publisher
liability where the complaint alleged only that it refused to
remove an allegedly defamatory newsletter).
       3. GoDaddy was not acting as an information
       content provider.
   GoDaddy enjoys § 230 immunity because, contrary to
Rigsby’s assertion that GoDaddy made “the affirmative
decision to publish” the harmful gambling content,
GoDaddy was not an information content provider.
Websites may lose immunity if they make “a material
contribution” to a site’s content, see Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 892
(quoting Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir.
2016)), but Rigsby’s complaint is devoid of allegations that
GoDaddy contributed to the content of the gambling site.
                   RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                  15

GoDaddy is offering only a domain name and a platform: a
“website does not create or develop content when it merely
provides a neutral means by which third parties can post
information of their own independent choosing online.”
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1270 (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg,
753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
    We are similarly unpersuaded by Rigsby’s analogy to
our decision in Roommates.com. In Roommates.com, the
website created a series of questions and required
subscribers to answer them in order to register with the site.
See 521 F.3d at 1164. The site then displayed those answers
on the subscriber’s profile page. Id. at 1165. We held that
“Roommate’s own acts—posting the questionnaire and
requiring answers to it—are entirely its doing and thus
section 230 of the CDA does not apply to them.” Id. Rigsby
does not allege that GoDaddy required or otherwise induced
the third-party registrant to post the objected-to gambling
content on scottrigsbyfoundation.org. GoDaddy’s “act” was
limited to providing the third party a domain name, and
nothing in Rigsby’s complaint makes a plausible case for
GoDaddy acting as an information content provider on
scottrigsbyfoundation.org. Under these circumstances,
GoDaddy is entitled to § 230 immunity, and his state-law
claims are statutorily barred.
   D. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
    While Rigsby’s claim for injunctive relief is difficult to
decipher—as evidenced by the district court characterizing
it as a claim without a cause of action—his reference to
Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act leads us to construe his
claim as seeking relief under that statute. This generous
reading does not change the result; the claim is barred by
§ 230 of the CDA and it is inadequately pled.
16                 RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

    The Arizona Consumer Fraud Act prohibits deceptive or
unfair practices “in connection with the sale or
advertisement of any merchandise.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-
1522(A). Rigsby seeks an injunction forbidding GoDaddy
from, among other things, “passing off the merchandise and
the services of The Scott Rigsby Foundation as being the
merchandise and services of gambling interests.” Again,
Rigsby picks the wrong culprit. GoDaddy is not the one
“passing off the merchandise”—the third-party registrant is
the one allegedly promoting gambling services. Rigsby
seeks to hold GoDaddy liable as a “publisher or speaker” of
the third party’s message. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Because
GoDaddy is being sued in its capacity as a provider of an
interactive computer service, it is immune from consumer
fraud liability under § 230. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at
886.
    To the extent that Rigsby is alleging that GoDaddy’s sale
of the domain name violated the Arizona Consumer Fraud
Act, Rigsby has still not adequately pleaded a claim. To
succeed, Rigsby must establish that GoDaddy (1) made a
misrepresentation in connection with the sale or
advertisement of merchandise, and (2) that conduct
proximately caused Rigsby to suffer damages.              See
Cheatham v. ADT Corp., 161 F. Supp. 3d 815, 825 (D. Ariz.
2016); Dunlap v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 666 P.2d 83,
87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). “The clear intent of this provision
is to protect unwary buyers from unscrupulous sellers.”
Sutter Home Winery, Inc. v. Vintage Selections, Ltd., 971
F.2d 401, 407 (9th Cir. 1992). Because GoDaddy made no
representations regarding the domain or any advertising or
merchandise, this claim is a nonstarter.
                    RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.                   17

   E. DECLARATORY RELIEF
    Finally, we consider Rigsby’s requests for declaratory
relief. Under the Declaratory Judgement Act, “any court of
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a). “Declaratory relief should be denied when it will
neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the
legal relations in issue nor terminate the proceedings and
afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by
the parties.” United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353,
1357 (9th Cir. 1985). We review the district court’s denial
of declaratory relief for abuse of discretion. See Arizona v.
City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2014).
   Rigsby seeks the following declarations:
   1.      GoDaddy’s UTSA is unenforceable against
           Rigsby “given the failure to comply with the
           electronic signature requirements of 15 U.S.C.
           § 7001 and A.R.S. 55-7001 et seq.”;
   2.      GoDaddy “cannot allow the hijacker to use the
           domain name scottrigsbyfoundation.org”; and
   3.      “The Scott Rigsby Foundation Inc. is the proper
           owner       of       the       domain      name
           scottrigsbyfoundation.org, so that Defendants
           must allow Plaintiffs to use that domain name.”
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to afford Rigsby a declaratory judgment that the UTSA is
unenforceable against him. Rigsby takes issue with the
forum selection clause of the UTSA, pursuant to which the
Northern District of Georgia transferred this case to the
District of Arizona. Because we lack jurisdiction to review
18                    RIGSBY V. GODADDY INC.

the Northern District of Georgia’s transfer order, Rigsby’s
effort to circumvent the jurisdictional barrier by reframing it
as a declaratory judgment request can’t fly. See Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2011)
(instructing courts to consider whether granting such relief
would “encourage the filing of declaratory actions as a
means of forum shopping”).
    Moving to the second and third requested declarations,
Rigsby has pleaded no viable claims that would allow us to
provide the relief he seeks, namely blocking the third-party
registrant and reinstating Rigsby as the rightful registrant of
the domain name. See United States v. Washington, 759
F.2d at 1356 (recognizing that a court may “refuse to grant
declaratory relief because the state of the record is
inadequate to support the extent of relief sought”). But
Rigsby is not necessarily without potential recourse, though
we offer no view on his potential success. For example, the
ACPA provides for an action against a registrant directly,
requiring allegations that the registrant has a bad faith intent
to profit from the mark and “registers, traffics in, or uses
[the] domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
    Although Rigsby presents a sympathetic ordeal, his ire,
and his claims, are misdirected. 2 We affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Rigsby’s claims, and we lack
jurisdiction to review the motion to transfer.
     AFFIRMED in part, DISMISSED in part.

2
  Given that Rigsby has had multiple opportunities to correct the
deficiencies in his complaint and has been unable to do so, the district
court acted within its discretion in denying him a fourth opportunity to
amend.