Court Opinion

ID: 9673579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:48.64115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.902120
License: Public Domain

O’BRIEN, Judge,
dissenting.
If any credence is to be given to the Legislative Acts pertaining to suspension of sentences by trial judges and to the pertinent case law then the action of the trial judge in this case in denying probation is out of harmony with the tone and tenor of our probation laws to such an extent that his action is completely arbitrary, capri*405cious, and a palpable abuse of his discretion. See Stiller v. State, 516 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn.1974).
The only testimony presented at the hearing on the petition for probation came through the interrogation of petitioner by the court. He was asked whether or not he had paid his court costs or his fine. Petitioner did not recall that he had been fined at his conviction trial and an exchange relative to that incident took place between him and the trial judge. The court then inquired if he was current in payments of child support.1 He informed the court he was one week behind at the date of the hearing. Inquiry was then made relative to his employment which is recorded here verbatim:
THE COURT: Where is it you work when you work inside as Mr. Wallace said that you worked from 9:00 to 5:00 or whatnot in the wintertime. Where ‘is it you work?
MR. POE: I get a job sometimes the same job, sometimes not. It’s just whether they need help or not, but I always get a public job in the winter.
THE COURT: And you don’t have one at this time?
MR. POE: No sir.
MR. WALLACE: Where did you work last winter for example?
MR. POE: I worked at Paty Lumber Company.
Defense counsel argued in essence that defendant had no prior record of any convictions other than minor traffic infractions; there were no negative aspects to his social history; that his working habits were a common practice among the people in the community where he resided;2 his offense was a crime of passion not likely to be repeated; and fundamentally it would be to the best interest of everyone that probation be favorably considered.
The State, on the otherhand, argued he had been tried for a serious shooting offense and he was very fortunate that the jury chose to impose the sentence it did. The State was opposed to probation because, “I don’t think the citizens of Sullivan County can just take up arms and go shoot somebody when they upset them and that’s the main reason the State is opposed to probation because of the lack of sentence I feel he was given by the jury to begin with.”
The trial judge, who was specially designated to hear the case, inquired about the custom in Sullivan County relative to the payment of court costs and fines. He was advised by a court officer that the regularly elected judge for that circuit had just initiated the requirement that they had to be paid before he would consider probation. This was confirmed by defense counsel.
In his concluding remarks the trial judge stated his reasons for denying probation to be:
(1) Deterrence to crime in that area.
(2) Because of the nature of the particular crime.
(3) His disbelief that defendant was employed.
Upon inquiry by defense counsel if that was all, he responded, “That’s all the reasons I can think — I can think of a few others, but I think that’s enough.”
He did make reference to the probation report which also set forth in substance the relevant factors to be considered by him, viz, the circumstances of the offense; the defendant’s criminal record, his social history, his present condition; and his physical and mental condition. See State v. Welch, 565 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn.1978).
He also implied that payment of court costs and fines, if any, was a condition precedent to consideration for probation. The record indicates that the regular trial judge for the Twenty-Sixth Judicial Circuit imposed this condition prior to consideration of probation. T.C.A. § 40-2901, as amended by Public Acts of 1978, (Adj.S.), Chapter *406876, Section 1, effective April 14,1978, specifically excludes from the authority of the trial judge the discretion to require a defendant to either secure or pay costs accrued before a hearing on a petition for probation, or as a condition to granting such a petition. This statute repeals those provisions of T.C.A. § 40-3201 by implication where it is in conflict.
The order denying probation sets out only that probation is denied for deterrent reasons. The court’s comments at the conclusion of the probation hearing indicate he also considered the nature of the particular crime and expressed his doubt about defendant’s employment. Each of these reasons are considered in turn:
(1) On April 29, 1978, the date on which the offense was committed for which defendant was brought to trial deterrence was neither a statutory nor case law criterion for denial of probation. By enactment of chapter 911 of the 1978 Public Acts, which amended T.C.A. § 40-2904 effective May 5, 1978, the standards were changed to include deterrence as a factor. Our Supreme Court has held that to apply this new standard as grounds for denial of probation for an offense committed prior to the Act would amount to prohibited ex post facto legislation. See Boykins v. State, 584 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn.1979).
(2) Exercising the widest latitude possible in considering the court’s statement, “nature of this particular crime”, to be synonymous with the “circumstances of the offense”, still the judgment of the trial judge cannot withstand scrutiny. Obviously, the trial judge and the Assistant District Attorney were considering the indictment offense of assault with intent to commit murder. However, the jury resolved that issue in favor of the defendant by finding him guilty of a simple assault and battery. For the trial judge to consider the nature of the crime in the light of the charge in the indictment rather than the verdict of the jury would be a usurpation of the jury’s prerogative and certainly a capricious, arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of discretion. See Stiller v. State, supra.
(3)The trial judge commented that he did not believe defendant was employed. The report of the probation counselor indicated that all aspects of his investigation were favorable except defendant’s past and present employment status. In spite of his peculiar employment habits, which seem to be rather customary in the small, rural Virginia, mountain community where he resides, the record indicates that he provides for himself, pays his bills, and manages to pay, with fair regularity, $25 a week as child support to his divorced wife. He also assists in caring for his elderly ihother. There was no evidence whatsoever that he was untruthful.
All the factors in the record militate in favor of approval of defendant’s application. There is nothing in the record, giving due consideration to the statutory criteria and court decisions, to demonstrate that defendant is not a proper candidate for probation. If the trial judge found defendant’s work style to be a stumbling block to an affirmative ruling, he could certainly make a requirement of obtaining and maintaining full-time employment as a condition for probation. The case should be reversed and remanded for the entry of an order of probation to include such conditions as the trial judge deems fit and proper. See Boykins v. State, supra; Moten v. State, 559 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.1977).

. The probation report referred to defendant’s payment of $25 per week child support.

. The Probation Report indicates petitioner was a resident of Mendota, Virginia. The crime occurred in Bristol, Tennessee.