Court Opinion

ID: 9540610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:08.498232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:04.324994
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. For a number of reasons, I agree with the Disciplinary Commission that respondent should be disbarred.
The majority considered each of respondent’s ethical violations in isolation and relied heavily on the fact that, under the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, each type of ethical violation committed by respondent warrants suspension rather than disbarment. I think that this approach is misguided.
By considering each type of ethical violation in isolation, the majority overlooks the severity of respondent’s ethical violations, which becomes distinctly apparent when his misconduct is viewed as a whole. Over a 7-year period, respondent engaged in a continuous pattern of misconduct that affected 10 different clients and resulted in the violation of no fewer than 6 separate ethical rules, a number of which respondent violated on more than one occasion.
The Standards set forth a specific framework for considering respondent’s misconduct as a whole. The majority is correct in noting that the Standards provide that each type of ethical violation, standing alone, calls only for suspension. Each recommended sanction, however, is qualified by the phrase “[ajbsent aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” And, one of the aggravating circumstances provided for in the Standards is “multiple offenses.” See Standard 9.22(d). Not only does the majority fail to consider respondent’s multiple offenses, but also it gives inadequate weight to the other numerous aggravating circumstances present in this case — namely, respondent’s two prior informal reprimands, pattern of misconduct, and bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary process. See Standards 9.22(a), (c) and (e). Indeed, failure to cooperate with disciplinary authorities in itself is a “significant aggravating factor.” In re Pappas, 159 Ariz. 516, 527, 768 P.2d 1161, 1172 (1988) (emphasis added). In light of respondent’s numerous and varied ethical violations, I cannot agree with the majority that “none of [the aggravating circumstances] rise to the level of tipping the balance in favor of disbarment rather than suspension.”
Moreover, according to the Standards, when disciplinary cases involve multiple charges of misconduct, the ultimate sanction imposed “generally should be greater than the sanction for the most serious misconduct.” Standards, Theoretical Framework, at 6 (emphasis added). The majority presumably contemplated this guideline when it acknowledged that, at a minimum, suspension is warranted in this case. Nonetheless, upon concluding that respondent’s misconduct calls for suspension rather than disbarment, the majority finds that “it is often appropriate to move from reprimand to suspension, not from reprimand to disbarment, depending, of course, on the severity of the subsequent conduct.” Although I agree that this statement correct*340ly reflects a principle that generally applies in disciplinary cases, I find that this case is one in which gradual and graded sanctions are both ineffective and inappropriate.
This court has reiterated in many prior disciplinary cases that the objectives of the disciplinary rules are to protect the public from further acts by respondent, to deter others from similar misconduct, and to provide the public with a basis for continued confidence in the Bar and the judicial system. See, e.g., In re Hoover, 155 Ariz. 192, 197, 745 P.2d 939, 944 (1987). Requiring gradual and graded sanctions effectively allows respondent to benefit from his wholesale disregard for the disciplinary process. Such an approach cannot promote the goal of deterring others from engaging in similar misconduct. Granted, the failure of the disciplinary process to put a prompt end to respondent’s misconduct is an unfortunate fact in this case. And, although the majority reasonably could treat this delay as a mitigating circumstance, I do not think that prior case law compels the lock-step approach to imposing sanctions that is adopted in this case. See, e.g., In re Mul-hall, 170 Ariz. 152, 822 P.2d 947 (1992); In re Engan, 170 Ariz. 409, 825 P.2d 468 (1992); In re Gaynes, 168 Ariz. 574, 816 P.2d 231 (1991).
For too many years, respondent has been an irresponsible, unguided missile. As a result, he has injured at least 10 different clients, all of whom are members of the public. Considering the number and variety of ethical violations committed by respondent, along with the Disciplinary Commission’s determination that his “level of carelessness is so great as to make him a hazard to the profession,” I find that the only appropriate sanction in this case is disbarment. By affording respondent the opportunity to practice law in the future, this court does a disservice both to the public and to the legal profession.
FELDMAN, C.J., and ZLAKET, J., re-cused themselves and did not participate in the determination of this matter.