Court Opinion

ID: 9838703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:09:15.722238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:42.729995
License: Public Domain

J-S29035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MALAKIA ANTON JACKSON                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1630 MDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-31-CR-0000055-2017

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                          FILED SEPTEMBER 07, 2023

       Appellant, Malakia Anton Jackson, appeals from the order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County that denied his timely second petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 After careful review, we

affirm.

       Appellant was charged with burglary, robbery, possession of a firearm

by a prohibited person, reckless endangerment, three counts of simple

assault,2 and other offenses for committing an armed home invasion on

January 29, 2017, in which he and another robber pointed guns at occupants

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546.
2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(1)(ii), 3701(a)(1)(ii), 6105(a)(1), 2705, and
2701(a)(3), respectively.
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of the house. Criminal Information; Criminal Complaint, Affidavit of Probable

Cause. On June 27, 2017, Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one count of

robbery and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person pursuant to a plea

agreement that provided that he would be sentenced to 10 to 20 years’

incarceration. N.T., 6/27/17, at 1-4. At the same hearing, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 10 to 20 years’ incarceration in

accordance with the plea agreement. Id. at 7-8. Appellant did not file any

timely post-sentence motion or direct appeal from his judgment of sentence.

      On October 12, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se letter seeking to file a post

sentence motion nunc pro tunc. The court treated the letter as a PCRA petition

and appointed PCRA counsel (first PCRA counsel), who filed an amended PCRA

petition seeking reinstatement of Appellant’s post-sentence motion and direct

appeal rights.   Following a hearing, the trial court denied this first PCRA

petition on May 14, 2018. PCRA Court Order, 5/14/18. Appellant filed no

appeal from the denial of that first PCRA petition.

      On June 29, 2018, less than one year after Appellant’s judgment of

sentence became final, Appellant filed the instant timely pro se PCRA petition.

The court re-appointed first PCRA counsel to represent Appellant on this PCRA

petition and first PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on January 10,

2019 that asserted, inter alia, that Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective in

advising Appellant to enter his negotiated nolo contendere plea because the

Commonwealth had failed to produce mandatory discovery, including video

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evidence, photographs, and witness statements.       1/10/19 Amended PCRA

Petition ¶¶21(a), 22-23.

      Before any hearing was held or ruling was made on the amended PCRA

petition, two changes of PCRA counsel occurred. On April 4, 2019, first PCRA

counsel moved to withdraw on the ground that he had a conflict of interest,

and the court granted this motion and appointed new PCRA counsel for

Appellant (second PCRA counsel) on April 5, 2019. PCRA Court Order, 4/5/19.

Second PCRA counsel subsequently moved to withdraw based on breakdown

in the attorney-client relationship, and the PCRA court granted the motion and

appointed a third attorney (third PCRA counsel) to represent Appellant. PCRA

Court Order, 9/4/20.    On February 17, 2021, third PCRA counsel filed a

supplemental amended PCRA petition asserting the same claims as the

amended PCRA petition and adding, inter alia, a claim that the Commonwealth

had improperly asserted in plea negotiations that it would seek a deadly

weapons enhancement if Appellant was convicted after a trial and a claim that

the plea colloquy was deficient. Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition ¶¶1,

10-20, 35-37.

      The PCRA court held three hearings on the PCRA petition. At the first

hearing, on October 18, 2021, trial counsel and Appellant testified. N.T. PCRA,

10/18/21, at 4-73. At the second, December 14, 2021 hearing, Appellant

confirmed that he had viewed the video evidence that the Commonwealth had

not produced prior to the plea, N.T. PCRA, 12/14/21, at 2, but no testimony

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was taken. Following the second hearing, third PCRA counsel withdrew and

new counsel (fourth PCRA counsel) entered an appearance as counsel for

Appellant. On February 24, 2022, the PCRA court held the third and final

hearing, at which the state trooper who had possession of the video evidence

testified and Appellant was represented by fourth PCRA counsel. N.T. PCRA,

2/24/22, at 7-23.   On October 25, 2022, following further submissions by

Appellant and the Commonwealth, the PCRA court entered an order denying

the instant PCRA petition. PCRA Court Order, 10/25/22. This timely appeal

followed.

     Appellant raises the following four issues in this appeal:

     I. Whether the [PCRA court] erred in failing to find that [trial
     counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in counseling
     [Appellant] to tender a no lo contendere [sic] plea that was not
     voluntarily, knowingly, understandably, and/or intelligently
     entered since full and complete Pre-Trial discovery had not been
     obtained including materials that were required to be produced
     per Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194,10 L.Ed.2d
     215 (1963) before said pleas were entered, which constituted a
     manifest injustice?

     II. Whether the [PCRA court] erred in failing to find that [trial
     counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in advising
     [Appellant] to tender a no lo contendere [sic] plea that was not
     voluntarily, knowingly, understandably, and/or intelligently
     entered pursuant to a plea offer to try and avoid his potentially
     being sentenced pursuant to the Deadly Weapons Enhancement
     when the purported firearm was only in the possession of an
     accomplice, which fact would wholly nullify the potential
     application of the Deadly Weapons Enhancement per
     Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Greene, 702 A.2d 547,
     552 (Pa. Super. 1997), which constituted a manifest injustice?

     III. Whether the [PCRA court] erred in failing to find that [trial
     counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in permitting

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      [Appellant] to tender a no lo contendere [sic] plea that was not
      voluntarily, knowingly, understandably, and/or intelligently
      entered in light of the hybrid written guilty plea/no lo contendere
      [sic] Colloquy plea that was utilized in contravention of the
      dictates of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Gunter, 771
      A.2d 767 (Pa. 2001), which constituted a manifest injustice?

      IV. Whether the [PCRA court] erred in failing to find that [trial
      counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in permitting
      [Appellant] to tender a no lo contendere [sic] plea that was not
      voluntarily, knowingly, understandably, and/or intelligently
      entered in that the Trial Court failed to conduct a sufficient oral
      inquiry of [Appellant] into the six fundamental questions as
      specified in the Comment to Rule 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules
      of Criminal Procedure as well as to follow up in regard to his
      questionable answers that were contained within the written
      hybrid Colloquy, which constituted a manifest injustice?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (suggested answers omitted).

      Our review of an order denying a PCRA petition is limited to determining

whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its decision

is free of legal error.   Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa.

2015); Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa. Super.

2019); Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274, 1280 (Pa. Super.

2017). We must view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of

record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Mason, 130 A.3d at

617; Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d 949, 953 (Pa. Super. 2020);

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, if supported by the record, are

binding on this Court. Mason, 130 A.3d at 617; Mojica, 242 A.3d at 956;

Orlando, 156 A.3d at 1280.

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      All of Appellant’s issues assert that trial counsel was ineffective with

respect to Appellant’s nolo contendere plea. To be entitled to relief under the

PCRA on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must

prove: (1) that the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) that

counsel’s action or inaction had no reasonable basis; and (3) that he suffered

prejudice as a result of counsel’s action or inaction. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618;

Velazquez, 216 A.3d at 1149; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153,

1158 (Pa. Super. 2018). The defendant must satisfy all three prongs of this

test to obtain relief under the PCRA. Mason, 130 A.3d at 618; Mojica, 242

A.3d at 955; Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1158.

      Ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere can be a basis for PCRA relief only if the ineffectiveness caused

the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Commonwealth

v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 478 & n.3 (Pa. Super. 2018); Orlando, 156 A.3d at

1281; Commonwealth v. Burkholder, 719 A.2d 346, 349 & n.4 (Pa. Super.

1998).   The test for prejudice where counsel’s ineffective representation

involves a plea is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s error, the defendant would not have entered the plea and would

have gone to trial. Velazquez, 216 A.3d at 1150; Pier, 182 A.3d at 479;

Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1159.

      Appellant’s first claim, that trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was

involuntary and unknowing because discovery material had not been produced

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by the Commonwealth fails because Appellant was fully aware that the

material in question had not been produced at the time that he chose to plead

nolo contendere and Appellant has not shown that this material would have

altered his decision to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer. The items that

the Commonwealth failed to produce prior to Appellant’s plea were three video

recordings, four written statements by the victims, and four photographs.

PCRA Court Opinion at 13-14; Defendant’s Submission on Undisclosed Brady

Matter at 1-3; N.T. PCRA, 2/24/22, at 8-13.       The PCRA court found that

Appellant knew at the time of his plea that these items existed and had not

been produced. PCRA Court Opinion at 14. That finding is supported by the

record. The fact that the Commonwealth had not produced this material was

discussed in Appellant’s presence at a plea hearing five days before Appellant

entered his nolo contendere plea and Appellant admitted at the first PCRA

hearing that he knew that this material existed and had not been produced

when he entered his plea. N.T., 6/22/17, at 12; N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at 62-

63.

      Moreover, Appellant failed to satisfy the requirement that he show

prejudice from trial counsel’s advice to plead nolo contendere before receiving

this evidence because he did not show that anything in the withheld items

would have caused him to not plead nolo contendere and to go to trial.

Appellant does not contend that any of the witness statements or photographs

in any way weakened the Commonwealth’s case against him or that he would

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not have pleaded nolo contendere if he had received them before his plea.

Indeed, the victims’ statements confirmed that Appellant was one of the

robbers who broke into their house and that Appellant pointed a gun at them.

Defendant’s Submission on Undisclosed Brady Matter, Exs. C-E. Although

Appellant asserts in his brief in this Court that the videos would have affected

his decision to accept the Commonwealth’s plea deal, Appellant’s Brief at 20,

27, 29, there is nothing in the record that supports this claim. At the PCRA

hearings, Appellant only stated that he had watched the videos after they were

produced, N.T. PCRA, 12/14/21, at 2, and never testified or contended that

they would have had any effect on his plea decision.        Defendant’s PCRA

Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2-6.

      Nor was there anything in the videos that had any significant effect on

the strength of the Commonwealth’s case from which any effect on Appellant’s

plea decision could be inferred.   As the PCRA court found, the videos did not

show the home invasion and robbery or even the location where it occurred.

PCRA Court Opinion at 15. Rather, the videos were from three stores in the

general vicinity, not from the home that Appellant broke into. N.T. PCRA,

2/24/22, at 9-13; N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at 20, 42.        The Commonwealth’s

evidence against Appellant consisted primarily of testimony from the victims

and the other robber.     N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at 12, 20, 71; N.T. PCRA,

2/24/22, at 14.   Appellant points to nothing in the videos that negated these

witnesses’ identification of Appellant as one of the two people who committed

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the home invasion burglary and robbery or their testimony that Appellant had

a gun and pointed it at the victims.

      Appellant argues in his second issue that he was induced to plead by

the Commonwealth’s assertion that it would seek a deadly weapons

enhancement that would increase the standard range sentence if he was

convicted at trial, that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that

he was not subject to the deadly weapons enhancement, and that his lack of

accurate information concerning deadly weapons enhancement invalidates his

plea. This argument fails because its premise, that Appellant was not subject

to the deadly weapons enhancement, is incorrect.

      The deadly weapons enhancement applies where the defendant had a

deadly weapon on his person or in his immediate physical control during the

commission of the crime or used a deadly weapon to threaten or injure a

person. 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(1), (a)(2) (in effect September 25, 2015

to December 31, 2017).           Appellant argues that the deadly weapons

enhancement could not apply to any of the crimes with which he was charged

because the only person who had a gun was the other robber who was with

him and that under Greene, 702 A.2d at 552-53, possession by an accomplice

is insufficient to permit deadly weapons enhancement. The Commonwealth’s

case, however, was not based on solely on Appellant’s accomplice’s possession

of a gun.    To the contrary, the Commonwealth’s evidence showed that

Appellant had a gun and pointed it at the victims during the home invasion

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and robbery. Criminal Complaint, Affidavit of Probable Cause; Defendant’s

Submission on Undisclosed Brady Matter, Exs. C-E. Although Appellant would

not admit that he had a gun, N.T., 6/22/17, at 19, he admitted that the

Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that he had firearm

in his possession during the robbery. N.T., 6/27/17, at 3. The requirements

for application of the deadly weapons enhancement were therefore satisfied.

     Appellant is correct that the deadly weapons enhancement was not

applicable to the possession of a firearm by a prohibited person charge. 204

Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(3)(viii) (in effect September 25, 2015 to December 31,

2017). That, however, does not make the Commonwealth’s assertion that it

would invoke the deadly weapons enhancement inaccurate or make

Appellant’s plea involuntary or unknowing. Appellant was not charged with

only the two crimes to which he pleaded; he was also charged with numerous

other crimes, including burglary, reckless endangerment, and three counts of

simple assault. Criminal Information; N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at 70-71.    Both

the robbery charge and all of the burglary, reckless endangerment, and simple

assault charges were subject to the deadly weapons enhancement and if he

were convicted of those charges, the deadly weapons enhancement would

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apply to each of those convictions. 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(4) (in effect

September 25, 2015 to December 31, 2017).3

       Moreover, minor mistakes concerning sentencing exposure that do not

materially misstate the defendant’s actual risk do not make a plea involuntary

or unknowing.      Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267, 1272 (Pa.

Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81, 83 (Pa. Super.

2003). Here, any error or misunderstanding that Appellant had concerning

his possible sentence from applying the deadly risk enhancement to the

firearms offense was minor and immaterial. Appellant’s sentencing exposure

from the other offenses of which Appellant could have been convicted if he

went to trial was far greater than the effect of a deadly weapons enhancement

on the firearms charge to which it was inapplicable. For burglary alone, the

maximum sentence that Appellant faced was 20 years’ incarceration.         18

Pa.C.S. § 3502(c); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1). In contrast, Appellant states that

the only effect of application of the deadly weapons enhancement to a

possession of a firearm by a prohibited person conviction would be a nine-

month increase in the standard range minimum sentence for that offense.

Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant admitted that he was motivated to plead

____________________________________________

3 While simple assault under Section 2701(a)(2) of the Crimes Code is
excluded from the deadly weapons enhancement, 204 Pa. Code §
303.10(a)(3)(v) (in effect September 25, 2015 to December 31, 2017), the
simple assault charges against Appellant were under Section 2701(a)(3), not
Section 2701(a)(2).

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not merely by the deadly weapons enhancement, but by the danger of

receiving a longer sentence as a result of being convicted of the other

offenses. N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at 70-71.

       Appellant’s remaining claims of error assert that Appellant’s plea

colloquy was inadequate because the written colloquy that Appellant signed

was for a guilty plea rather than a nolo contendere plea and because the trial

court’s oral plea colloquy was allegedly deficient. Neither of these issues is

meritorious.

       To establish that a guilty plea or nolo contendere plea is voluntary and

knowing, the trial court must conduct a colloquy that shows the factual basis

for the plea and that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to

which he is pleading guilty or nolo contendere, his right to a jury trial, the

presumption of innocence, the permissible sentencing range for the charges,

and the court’s power to reject terms of a plea agreement. Commonwealth

v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa. Super. 2018); Commonwealth v. Hart,

174 A.3d 660, 667 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878

A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc); Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.

These matters may also be shown by a written plea colloquy read and signed

by the defendant that is made part of the record and supplemented by an oral,

on-the-record examination.     Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782

(Pa. Super. 2015); Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108-09; Comment to Pa.R.Crim.P.

590.

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      Those requirements were fully satisfied here. Before Appellant pleaded

nolo contendere and his plea was accepted, the trial court conducted two oral

plea colloquies and Appellant signed a written plea colloquy. At the first plea

hearing, the trial court explained the elements of the robbery and possession

of a firearm by a prohibited person charges and Appellant confirmed that he

understood what the Commonwealth would have to prove for these charges.

N.T., 6/22/17, at 14-15. At that hearing, the trial court also explained and

Appellant confirmed his understanding of the sentencing range for those

charges. Id. In both this oral plea colloquy and the written plea colloquy that

Appellant confirmed that he went over with his counsel and signed, Appellant

was advised of and confirmed his understanding of his right to a jury trial and

the presumption of innocence. Id. at 12-17; Written Plea Colloquy at 2-3. In

his written plea colloquy, Appellant was advised of and confirmed his

understanding of the trial court’s power to reject terms of his plea agreement.

Written Plea Colloquy at 3.    In addition, the Commonwealth set forth the

factual basis for the plea at both plea hearings. N.T., 6/22/17, at 18; N.T.,

6/27/17, at 2. Although Appellant was unwilling to fully admit those acts and

the trial court therefore rejected his guilty plea at the first hearing, N.T.,

6/22/17, at 18-20, Appellant admitted at the second plea hearing that the

Commonwealth had sufficient evidence to prove these facts, including the fact

that he carried a firearm during the robbery, and confirmed that he wished to

plead nolo contendere to the same charges. N.T., 6/27/17, at 1-4.

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      Notwithstanding this clear record, Appellant argues that his nolo

contendere plea was not voluntary and knowing because the first oral colloquy

and the written colloquy were for a guilty plea, not for a plea of nolo

contendere. We do not agree. The charges to which Appellant was pleading

nolo contendere were the identical charges that were fully explained to him at

the first plea hearing and the negotiated sentence that he would receive was

the same. N.T., 6/22/17, at 2-3; N.T., 6/27/17, at 1, 4. Before Appellant

entered his nolo contendere plea, the trial court explained the difference

between a nolo contendere plea and a guilty plea, explained that the

consequences for Appellant and the rights that Appellant gave up were the

same, and made clear that the prior oral and written plea colloquies were part

of the proceedings.    N.T., 6/27/17, at 1-3.     Appellant confirmed that he

understood that the effect of his nolo contendere plea was same as a guilty

plea, except that he did not admit guilt. Id. at 2. Appellant also confirmed

that he still understood that he had the rights that were discussed at the first

plea hearing and in his written plea colloquy and that he was giving up those

rights by pleading nolo contendere. Id. at 2-3.

      Gunter, on which Appellant relies, does not support his contention that

his plea was involuntary or unknowing. Neither of the factors on which our

Supreme Court based its conclusion that the plea was not voluntary and

knowing in that case are present here. In Gunter, not only was a written

guilty plea colloquy used for the defendant’s nolo contendere plea, but no oral

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plea colloquy was conducted and nothing appeared in the record from which

it could be concluded that the ramifications of the nolo contendere plea were

explained to the defendant. 771 A.2d at 768, 771-73. Here, as discussed

above, the trial court conducted an oral colloquy specific to Appellant’s nolo

contendere plea and explained the effect of the plea and in what respects it

was the same as and differed from a guilty plea. N.T., 6/27/17, at 2-3. In

addition, the PCRA record in Gunter showed that the defendant’s counsel told

him that she was unsure whether she could continue to represent him and try

the case if the defendant did not accept the plea bargain. 771 A.2d at 769-

72. In contrast, Appellant’s trial counsel in this case made clear at the first

plea hearing that he was willing to continue to represent Appellant and try the

case if Appellant did not choose to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer and

trial counsel testified at the first PCRA hearing that he did not pressure

Appellant take the plea deal. N.T., 6/22/17, at 10; N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at

31-32.

      Appellant also argues that the plea colloquy was inadequate because

Appellant had answered “no” on the written plea colloquy to the question “Are

you satisfied with your representation by your attorney?”           Written Plea

Colloquy at 5. That argument likewise fails. Trial counsel explained at the

first plea hearing that Appellant was not unhappy with counsel’s preparation

for trial or ability to try the case, but that the reason for that answer was that

Appellant had “a bad taste in his mouth about the outcome of the case” and

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was upset about one of counsel’s actions in the plea negotiations that had no

effect on the plea offer or what would occur if the case were tried.      N.T.,

6/22/17, at 10-12.     Although the trial court did not specifically question

Appellant about that answer, Appellant was present when trial court made

those statements and did not dispute them when he was later colloquied

concerning the voluntariness of his plea. Rather, Appellant confirmed to the

trial court without reservation that he was not forced to take the plea and

understood that he could go to trial. Id. at 17.

      Moreover, no evidence was introduced at any of the PCRA hearings that

suggested that Appellant was unhappy with counsel’s preparation for trial or

ability to try the case or that Appellant felt compelled to agree to the plea

because of a problem with counsel. Trial counsel testified at the first PCRA

hearing that the dissatisfaction that Appellant had with him was that Appellant

would have liked a more favorable plea deal and that he did not pressure

Appellant to plead guilty or plead nolo contendere. N.T. PCRA, 10/18/21, at

31-32, 43. At the PCRA hearing, Appellant’s primary complaint on the issue

of his dissatisfaction with trial counsel was that at the plea hearing, trial

counsel, rather than Appellant, stated the reason that Appellant was unhappy

with him, not that trial counsel’s statement was inaccurate. Id. at 64. Indeed,

in testifying on one of his PCRA claims that the PCRA court rejected and that

he has not pursued in this appeal, Appellant in fact confirmed the accuracy of

a significant portion of trial counsel’s explanation at the plea hearing. Id. at

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64-65. To the extent that Appellant stated any reasons for his dissatisfaction

with trial counsel at the PCRA hearing that were not explored at his plea

hearings or that he contends affected his plea, those are other claims of

ineffectiveness of counsel that the PCRA court found meritless, id. at 64-68;

PCRA Court Opinion at 11-13, and Appellant has not challenged the PCRA

court’s rulings on those claims in this appeal.

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of Appellant’s claims

that trial counsel was ineffective with respect to his nolo contendere plea has

merit. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/07/2023

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