Court Opinion

ID: 9898589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:43.514681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.205594
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                             No. 84260-9-I

                           Respondent,            DIVISION ONE

                v.
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 DEMEKO BRAZILLE HOLLAND a/k/a
 DEMEKO BRAZILE HOLLAND,

                           Appellant.

       SMITH, C.J. — In 2008, a jury convicted Demeko Holland of second degree

murder with a firearm enhancement. Thirteen years later, in 2022, Holland filed a

motion for postconviction DNA testing of the murder weapon, claiming that new

techniques in rust removal warranted additional testing. The trial court denied

the motion. Because Holland does not explain how the rust removal process

would provide significantly more accurate DNA information than was obtained

prior to trial nor explain how a favorable DNA test result would prove his

innocence on a more probable than not basis, we affirm.

                                        FACTS

       On August 18, 2003, fourteen-year-old D.C. was riding his bike in West

Seattle when he was shot and killed. Witnesses reported to police that the

shooter was running through the residential area west of the shooting. Several

individuals testified they had witnessed a “dark skinned” individual fleeing with

varying physical descriptions. Seattle Police Officer Richard Heideman stopped

  Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 84260-9-I/2

Demeko Holland about 10 blocks northwest of the shooting. Heideman reported

that when stopped, Holland said, “Why did you stop me? I’m just out jogging.”

Officer Chris Hairston then arrived and asked Holland if he knew why he was

being stopped. Hairston reported that Holland responded, “Is this about the

shooting?” and then asked, “Is the kid all right?” One witness, Michael Anderson,

saw the final shots fired and pursued the shooter who began to flee the scene.

Officers brought Anderson to identify Holland, who was being detained and

handcuffed. Anderson identified Holland as the shooter with 70 percent

certainty.

       After Holland was detained, Seattle Police Department Detectives Donna

O’Neal and Rob Blanco questioned Holland, who admitted to being out late the

night before with friends and smoking 9 to 12 sticks of “sherm.”1 When asked

about the side effects of sherm, Holland explained that when his smoking was

excessive, he suffered blackouts. He described it as being in a state of

consciousness in which he was unable to account for any of his actions. When

asked about the gun, Holland told Detective Blanco that it was possible his friend

gave him a gun and that he did the shooting, but he could not remember.

Detective Blanco described Holland as being “very moody” during questioning

and recalled Holland telling him that he had “slipped up and that something

happened and he felt bad for it.” After Holland started crying during questioning,

Detective O’Neal asked if Holland wanted to write a letter to the victim’s family to

       1 “Sherm” is marijuana that has been dipped in either embalming fluid or

PCP and dried.
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No. 84260-9-I/3

express his remorse. Detective O’Neal said that Holland responded, “That’s a

good idea. Maybe I’ll do it later.”

       Evidence found and collected along Holland’s flight path included a jacket,

pen, T-shirt, and bandana. DNA testing implicated Holland as a possible

contributor to the DNA found on all four items. When asked about the jacket,

Holland told the detectives that his brother had a similar jacket and that he might

have taken it with him that morning. And when asked about the recovered T-

shirt, Holland gave the same response.

       Nearly two years after the shooting, a gun was discovered in a bush along

Holland’s flight path. The gun was severely rusted and corroded from having

been outside and exposed to the elements for 20 months. The gun, magazine,

and bullets were submitted to a fingerprint examiner, who did not find any

evidence of fingerprints. The items were then delivered to forensic scientist, Amy

Jagmin, who conducted a cursory visual examination and determined the gun

was not suitable for DNA testing. Jagmin testified that DNA testing the gun

would likely be unsuccessful due to environmental exposure, which “break[s]

down DNA and cause[s] the outer surface of . . . hard metal pieces to rust and

cause[s] inhibition to anything that may have been present.” For this reason, the

gun, magazine, and bullets were not examined further for DNA. The pieces were

then sent to a ballistics expert, who compared the gun with casings found at the

crime scene and determined the gun was the murder weapon.

       The case proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Holland of second degree

murder with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a

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No. 84260-9-I/4

firearm. Holland’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2022, thirteen

years after his conviction, Holland filed a motion requesting postconviction DNA

testing of the gun. The trial court denied the motion and Holland appeals.

                                    ANALYSIS

       Holland contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for

postconviction DNA testing of the gun. Because Holland fails to satisfy the

statutory requirements for postconviction DNA testing, we disagree.

       Under RCW 10.73.170, a person convicted of a felony currently serving a

prison sentence may file a motion requesting DNA testing. The person

requesting testing must then satisfy the statute’s procedural and substantive

requirements. RCW 10.73.170(2)-(3). The procedural requirement is “lenient.”

State v. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d 358, 367, 209 P.3d 467 (2009). The motion must (a)

“state the basis for the request,” (b) “explain the relevance of the DNA evidence

sought,” and (c) “comply with applicable court rules.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 364

(citing RCW 10.73.170(2)(a)-(c)). Postconviction DNA testing is allowed when:

“(i) the court previously denied admission of DNA testing; (ii) the DNA evidence

was unavailable due to inferior technology; and (iii) current technology will yield

more accurate results than those previously obtained or, . . . will provide

significant new information.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 366 (emphasis omitted) (citing

RCW 10.73.170(2)(a)(i)-(iii)). After stating the basis of the request, the statute

requires a defendant to explain “why DNA evidence is material to the identity of

the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime, or to sentence enhancement.”

RCW 10.73.170(2)(b).

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No. 84260-9-I/5

       Unlike the lenient procedural standard, the substantive standard is

“onerous.” Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367. The substantive standard requires a

defendant to show a “likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate

innocence on a more probable than not basis.” RCW 10.73.170(3). The court

evaluates the likelihood of innocence based on a presumption of favorable test

results. State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252, 262, 332 P.3d 448, 452 (2014). But

the defendant is not “entitled to additional inferences in [their] favor beyond the

assumption of favorable DNA test results.” State v. Braa, 2 Wn. App. 2d 510,

521, 410 P.3d 1176 (2018). Rather, the “ ‘court must look to whether, viewed in

light of all of the evidence presented at trial or newly discovered, favorable DNA

test results would raise the likelihood that the person is innocent on a more

probable than not basis.’ ” State v. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d 865, 872, 271 P.3d

204, (2012) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367 (citing RCW

10.73.170(3))). If the favorable results, in combination with other evidence, raise

a reasonable probability the defendant was not the perpetrator, the court must

grant the motion. Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 367-68.

       Finally, “[t]esting should be limited to situations where there is a credible

showing that it could benefit a possibly innocent individual, not only because that

is the goal of the statute but also to avoid overburdening labs or wasting state

resources.” Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d at 261 (internal citations omitted). We review

a trial court’s decision on a motion for postconviction DNA testing for abuse of

discretion. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d at 257 (citing Riofta, 166 Wn.2d at 370).

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No. 84260-9-I/6

       1. Procedural Standard

       As a preliminary matter, the State contends that Holland waived his

reliance on Section 1.29 of the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory

Division, Firearms/Tool Marks Technical Procedures Manual (Firearms Manual)

because he did not cite to it in his motion before the trial court. We disagree.

The statute does not require the defendant to state what the technology is, only

that technology exists that will produce more accurate DNA testing results.2

RCW 10.73.170.

       We now turn to whether Holland satisfied the procedural requirements of

the statute. Holland alleges “current technology will yield more accurate results”

because the Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory (WSPCL) has “amended

its procedure in DNA collection of rusty firearms.” Holland further asserts testing

the rusted gun is relevant “because there [was] no evidence adduced during trial

that linked him to the murder weapon.” We disagree and conclude that Holland

did not satisfy the statute’s procedural requirements because he did not explain

the materiality of the DNA evidence to his case.

       Holland’s motion easily clears the first procedural hurdle—he plainly

identifies the basis of his request as “technology [that] will yield more accurate

results then those previously obtained.” But his motion fails to meet the second

procedural requirement—explaining the relevance of additional DNA testing. To

       2 In his opening brief, Holland cites to “WSPCL 1, 28” and proceeds to talk

about rusted firearms. However, language about rusted firearms is found in
section 1.29 of the Firearms Manual, not section 1.28. This is a nonissue. The
State’s briefing demonstrates that the State understood Holland was trying to cite
to section 1.29 and Holland correctly refers to section 1.29 in his reply brief.
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No. 84260-9-I/7

meet the relevance prong, Holland must “[e]xplain why DNA evidence is material

to the identity of the perpetrator of . . . the crime.” State v. Gray, 151 Wn. App.

762, 768, 215 P.3d 961 (2009) (citing RCW 10.73.170(2)(b)).

        Gray is instructive here. In Gray, the court determined that the defendant

met the relevance requirement because they explained the relevance of the new

DNA testing in detail, noting that the new method made it possible to test “small

amounts of previously untestable biological material contained in rape kits.” 151

Wn. App. at 769. Unlike the defendant in Gray, Holland did not explain how the

updated Firearms Manual would be relevant to DNA analysis of the gun.

        Instead, Holland contends that because the procedural component of the

statute does not “require[] a petitioner to divulge ‘why and how’ a test is relevant

nor to ‘grapple’ with specific evidence,” he has satisfied the requirement by citing

to the Firearms Manual. We disagree. Though the procedural requirement is

lenient, the defendant still has the burden of showing materiality. RCW

10.73.170(2)(b). And here, the section of the Firearms Manual that Holland

relies on does not mention DNA at all; rather, it details the procedure for

removing rust from firearms in order to restore the firearm. The section provides

that the purpose of restoration is for test firing and recovering manufacturer

information such as serial numbers—not DNA recovery. Firearms Manual §

1.29.

        Moreover, the Manual instructs that the firearm should be thoroughly

sprayed with a water-displacing product like WD-40®, soaked in penetrating oil

and other de-rusting solvents, cleaned with a soda blaster, washed with gun

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No. 84260-9-I/8

cleaning solvent, and so forth. Firearms Manual § 1.29. It is difficult to

understand how any DNA would remain on the gun after following such a

rigorous cleaning procedure, let alone yield more accurate DNA results than

testing methods that were previously available. Without further explanation of

why rust removal will allow detection of new DNA evidence, Holland has not

demonstrated why these updated procedures are material to identifying the

perpetrator. We conclude that he fails to satisfy the relevance prong of the

statute.

       2. Substantive Standard

       Holland contends that exculpatory DNA results would exclude him as the

perpetrator, and, in light of weak evidence presented at trial, this would prove his

innocence on a more probable than not basis. We disagree. Even if there were

a possibility the firearm would yield DNA and produce favorable results, it would

not establish Holland’s innocence.

       Holland alleges that the cross-racial identification evidence of this case is

weak. We acknowledge that the problematic nature of eyewitness testimony can

lead to misidentification, and that misidentification increases substantially when

the identification is cross-racial. However, there is other independent evidence in

support of Holland’s conviction. In addition to the eyewitness testimony,

Holland’s conviction was based on flight path evidence, Holland’s proximity to the

shooting, DNA found on clothing items discarded along the flight path, and

inculpatory statements he made to police officers.

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No. 84260-9-I/9

        Officers found Holland at the end of that flight path,3 and when they asked

Holland if he knew why he was stopped, he asked if it was about the shooting

and if the kid was all right. When talking to the police, he began crying and said

he had slipped up and that something happened and he felt bad for it. According

to Detective O’Neal, after she asked if Holland would feel better if he wrote a

letter to the victim’s family, he replied, “That’s a good idea. Maybe I’ll do it later.”

       Holland later refused to tell officers where the gun was, stating, “I could

get charged with a weapon enhancement.” Moreover, Holland was a possible

contributor to DNA found on items discarded along the flight path—including a

jacket, T-shirt, bandana, and pen. When asked about the jacket, Holland said his

brother had a similar jacket and said that it was possible he took it with him that

morning. And when asked about the recovered T-shirt, Holland said the same

thing. Additionally, Detective Blanco said that during questioning Holland

admitted “it was possible he was the person that [] did the shooting, but he

couldn’t remember.” He also told the detectives that he was out late with friends

the night before using sherm and that he might have received a gun from his

friend but could not remember his actions while under the influence.

       Holland relies on Thompson and Gray—both of which are rape cases—to

contend that “[a]n exculpatory DNA test result [is] pertinent to show innocence on

       3 We recognize that a black person running from the police is not

incriminating evidence in and of itself. And there is a long history in American
society of attributing such behavior by black people as evidence of guilt due to
stereotyping members of the black community as criminals. Here, the evidence
is significant not because Holland was running, but because he was found at the
end of the flight path seen by several witnesses.
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No. 84260-9-I/10

a more probable than not basis when the identity of a lone perpetrator is in

question.” But these cases are not persuasive because both involved only one

possible source of DNA. Thompson, 173 Wn.2d at 870; Gray, 151 Wn. App.

at 775.

       The present case is more analogous to Riofta. 166 Wn.2d at 358. In

Riofta, the court held that exculpatory test results would not show innocence on a

more probable than not basis when the limited probative value of the evidence

sought was outweighed by other substantial evidence. 166 Wn.2d at 373. The

court determined that the hat had low probative value, because it could have

been worn by several individuals during and after the time of the incident. 166

Wn.2d at 370. Much like the hat in Riofta, here, the gun could have been

handled by anyone when it was left outside in a bush for 20 months.

       Indeed, the gun has likely been handled by several individuals before and

after its discovery in 2005. Holland told police it was possible he got the gun

from his friend; it was in the bushes for 20 months; it was handled by DNA

scientists and taken apart and reassembled at a ballistics lab; it was handled and

transported by the police; and it was also admitted at trial. And even if the gun

was not compromised by the DNA of others, the absence of Holland’s DNA and

the presence of someone else’s does not outweigh the substantial evidence

incriminating Holland. Because Holland failed to show the likelihood that the

DNA evidence would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis,

we conclude that he fails to satisfy the substantive requirement.

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No. 84260-9-I/11

      Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion

for postconviction DNA testing, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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