Court Opinion

ID: 9580746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:22.826653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:29.499062
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court in Wright v. Jett, 120 Ga. 995, 1001 (48 SE 345) (1904), has made clear that the payment of costs before renewing an action is in the nature of a penalty. A case dismissed may not be renewed “without first making payment of the costs. . . .” The exceptions to this general rule reflected in Whitsett v. Hester-Bowman Enterprises, 94 Ga. App. 78 (93 SE2d 788) (1956), and Daugherty v. Norville Indus., 174 Ga. App. 89 (329 SE2d 202) (1985), are both limited seemingly to a good faith personal inquiry and contacting of the clerk of the court, the latter cited case stating that “having been informed by a reliable source” was referring to the clerk of the court. Since the costs had not been paid at the time of filing the renewed action, we have no alternative but to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
There seems to be a greater burden on plaintiff regarding payment of costs or penalty in this type of situation than in any normal payment of costs. This is emphasized in Wright, at 1001: “The evident intent of our statute is to prevent the harassing renewal of a suit which the plaintiff has, after calling upon the defendant to appear in court and defend it, elected to dismiss for some reason, good or otherwise. And the condition imposed upon him as to the payment of costs, before renewing this action, is in the nature of a penalty for not being ready and willing to press his original suit to a hearing on its merits. The expense incurred in bringing the dismissed action is thus thrown upon the plaintiff, and the costs thereof can not be recovered by him from the defendant, even though the former may, upon a final determination of his second suit, prevail in the cause. In other words, a plaintiff may arbitrarily and over the protest of the defendant dismiss a suit, his reasons for dismissing it can not be inquired into by the court; but he must in any event pay for this privilege, and can not, without first making payment of the costs of that suit, exercise his conditional statutory right to renew it.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I must respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.
*813Decided January 28, 1986
Rehearings denied February 14, 1986
C. Edwin Rozier, Rudolph J. Chambless, for appellant.
Terry A. Dillard, J. Baker McGee III, W. Grady Pedrick, for appellees.