Court Opinion

ID: 9727241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:27:27.739376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:35.396664
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, J.,
dissenting.
¶ 1 I dissent. On July 13, 1998, the parties appeared before the Chancellor for trial. Prior to beginning the trial, the court ruled on cross motions for Summary Judgment. It granted summary judgment in favor of the Additional Defendant, and denied Appellant’s motion. Following a short recess, the trial began with Appellant calling one witness. After her testimony, the trial judge advised that he was incorporating the transcripts from the pri- or hearings unless there were objections. None were made. N.T., July 13, 1998, at 37-38.
*980¶ 2 On August 11, 1998, the trial judge filed a comprehensive Opinion and Order, determining the facts, discussing the applicable law, and resolving the matter. Unlike the Majority, I find that this Opinion meets the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 1517(a) which reads:
(a) The court shall make an adjudication and may do so before the testimony has been transcribed. The adjudication shall consist of (1) a statement of the issues; (2) a closely condensed chronological statement, in narrative form or in separate findings, of all the facts necessary to be known in order to determine the issues: (3) a discussion of the questions of law involved and the court’s conclusions of law and (4) a decree nisi.
Pa.R.C.P. 1517(a) (emphasis added). Other than failing to label the order a decree nisi, the Chancellor complied fully with Rule 1517.8
¶ 3 The Rules of Civil Procedure require the filing of post-trial motions following a decision. Specifically, Rule 227.1(c) provides:
Post-Trial motions shall be filed within ten days after
(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision or adjudication in the case of a trial without a jury or equity trial.
Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c) (emphasis added).
¶ 4 This rule does not make a specific reference to a decree nisi. Whether the action is filed at law or in equity, Rule 227.1 expressly requires the filing of post-trial motions. As noted by the Majority,' “Rule 227.1 was enacted to abolish the distinctions in post-trial practice between actions at law and equity and actions tried with or without a jury.” Majority Opinion at 975. The Majority’s decision erodes the import of Rule 227.1, and relieves counsel of the responsibility to apprise the trial court of any errors it may have made. Like any other error below, if not raised, it is waived on appeal. Christopher M’s Hand Poured Fudge, Inc. v. Hennon, 699 A.2d 1272 (Pa.Super.1997). “The rationale for this requirement of strict compliance is ‘to maximize our efficiency and enhance the quality of our dispute resolution process’ ”. Matthews v. Joines, 700 A.2d 1322 (Pa.Super.1997) (quoting Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 376, 426 A.2d 595, 597 (1981)). I find the Majority’s reasoning for overlooking the failure to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 227.1 is unsound as it elevates form over substance, a concept this Court has uniformly abhorred.
¶ 5 The Majority, despite its acknowl-edgement that Rule 227.1 rescinded equity post-trial practice rules with the purpose of abolishing any distinction between actions at law and equity, relies on cases which apply the rationale of decisions reached under the former equity rules. In rebanee on Donegal Mutual Ins. Co. v. State Farm, 377 Pa.Super. 171, 546 A.2d 1212 (1988) and Altomare v. Altomare, 355 Pa.Super. 391, 513 A.2d 486-(1986), the Majority concludes dismissal would be improper because the instant “order is neither entitled a decree nisi nor does it indicate that post-trial motions are required” and “‘did not suggest by its express language or by necessary implication that the order was not intended to be final.’ ” Majority Opinion, at 978, citing Donegal Mutual, 546 A.2d at 1214. Nothing in Rule 1517(a) requires the court’s adjudication to be in a particular form or indicate that post-trial motions are required. Rule 227.1 was specifically enacted to serve this function of notifying the parties and their counsel of thé procedure to be followed upon conclusion of trial. Ostensibly the Majority distinguishes our Supreme Court’s holding in Lane Enter*981prises9 on the basis that actions at law as opposed to equity “are more clearly defined, and final, [with] appealable matters generally aris[ing] at the conclusion of trial.” Majority Opinion at 977 fn.5. I find the procedural posture of this matter is indistinguishable from Lane Enterprises. Unlike the cases cited by the Majority, the trial court here took no definitive action that either precluded Appellant from filing a motion for post-trial relief or engendered confusion. In fact, Appellant does not even suggest that he was misled by the court or was not given an opportunity to file for post-trial relief.
¶ 6 Further, I note that Appellant, in his Brief on Reargument, concedes that post-trial motions were necessary. He does not seek to avoid waiver because the trial court created procedural confusion that placed him on the “horns of a dilemma” about whether an appeal or post-trial motions should be filed. Rather, he claims that the post-trial function was satisfied because he filed a 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal to which the trial court filed an opinion. He relies on this court’s decision in Jara v. Rexworks, 718 A.2d 788 (Pa.Super.1998). Appellant’s Brief on Reargument at 10-11. I agree with the Majority’s analysis on the inapplicability of Jara, as set forth in footnote 6 on page 978-79 of its opinion. Since Appellant failed to file post-trial motions, I would find the issues waived.10 Benson v. Penn Central, 463 Pa. 37, 342 A.2d 393 (1975).
¶ 7 JOHNSON, ORIE MELVIN, and LALLY-GREEN, JJ., join.

. Trial courts are reminded that when conducting equity trials, the initial adjudication should be labeled a decree nisi.

. Lane Enterprises v. L.B. Foster Co., 551 Pa. 306, 710 A.2d 54 (1998), and L.B. Foster Co. v. Lane Enterprises, Inc., 551 Pa. 307, 710 A.2d 55 (1998).

. Appellant, an attorney, represented himself at all stages of the matter before the trial court. Current counsel entered his appearance and filed this appeal long after the time expired for filing post-trial motions.