Court Opinion

ID: 9385668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 19:02:40.614636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.677713
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 P. v. Burrus CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084418
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                     (Tulare Super. Ct.
                    v.                                                               No. VCF290810B)

 CHRISTOPHER ALBERT BURRUS,
                                                                                          OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Antonio A.
Reyes, Judge.
         Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin, and Jeremy Cutcher for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, and Galen N.
Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respond ent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

         * Before     Smith, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
                                   INTRODUCTION
       In 2016, appellant and defendant Christopher Albert Burrus (appellant) pleaded no
contest to attempted murder with gang and firearm enhancements and was sentenced to
an indicated sentence of 22 years in prison.
       In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.61 and asserted he was entitled to relief because he was convicted based on a theory
of imputed malice. The trial court summarily denied the petition without appointing
counsel.
       On appeal, the parties agree the matter must be remanded because the trial court
should have issued an order to show cause (OSC) and conducted an evidentiary hearing.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
       “Reports of the Visalia Police Department indicate at approximately 6:53 p.m. on
January 27, 2012, officers responded to the Visalia Mall regarding a report of shots fired.
Officers arrived and found two victims lying on the floor of The Sweet Factory, a candy
store inside the mall. M.A. had a large amount of blood pooling around him and suffered
at least one gunshot wound to his neck. It was later determined he also sustained gunshot
wounds to his right elbow and inside portion of his left thigh. The second victim, S.H.[,]
suffered a gunshot wound to his right thigh. Both were transported to Kaweah Delta
Medical Center for treatment.

       1  All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Appellant filed his petition in 2022 under former section 1170.95, which was renumbered
as section 1172.6 without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (People v. Saibu (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 709, 714; Stats. 2022, ch. 58 (Assem. Bill. 200), § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.)
As such, we refer to the subject statute by its current number throughout this opinion.
        2 The following factual statement is taken from the probation report, also cited in
the parties’ appellate briefs, for the limited purpose of giving context to the parties’
appellate arguments. We do not on the hearsay summary to resolve the prima facie issue
in this appeal. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(4); People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015,
1026.)

                                               2.
      “Officers viewed mall surveillance and observed codefendants Anthony Hanson
and Adrian Esquer standing in front of the candy store and monitoring the victims’
movements prior to the shooting.
      “Victim S.A., a store employee, advised she observed the shooter, who was later
identified as Adrian Esquer and victim M.A. arguing in the store and told them both to
stop. Mr. Esquer then brandished a handgun and began shooting. S.A. ducked behind a
counter, heard more gunshots, and observed M.A. fall to the ground, bleeding heavily
from his neck. S.A. used a towel to apply direct pressure to M.A.’s wound until
paramedics arrived.
      “Victim S.H. informed investigators he was only in the store a few minutes when
he observed Mr. Esquer run up and start firing toward an employee, S.A., and M.A. S.H.
indicated the shooter shot at M.A. several times, turned and shot him and then fled on
foot. S.H. sustained a through-and-through gunshot wound to his right thigh.
      “M.A. indicated he and his brothers, F.A. and J.A., and their friend, J.S., were in
the Visalia Mall when some subjects began trying to start a fight with them. M.A. stated
the subjects were showing Northern Hispanic criminal street gang colors and he believed
they thought he was a rival gang member. He believed the shooter shot six times at him,
his brothers and their friend. M.A. identified the shooter as Adrian Esquer, who was
someone he and/or his brothers previously knew from school. Victims J.A. and F.A. also
identified Anthony Hanson, who has known, Northern Hispanic criminal street gang ties,
as the second person with Mr. Esquer during the shooting. Witnesses and victims
identified Mr. Esquer as the lone shooter and Mr. Hanson was not seen in possession of a
weapon. However, witnesses reported seeing Mr. Hanson approach the victims with
Mr. Esquer, proudly displaying a red bandana. Mr. Hanson stood by and watched the
entire incident unfold while apparently texting on his phone; continued to stand by while
shots were being fired; and, did not flee the scene until Mr. Esquer fled. Gang slurs were
also heard being shouted.

                                            3.
       “Following the shooting, witnesses reported seeing Mr. Hanson with Mr. Esquer
as he hid a .22 caliber, semi-automatic handgun within some bushes at a nearby business.
Officers subsequently responded to the location and recovered the firearm.
       “On January 28, 2012, officers located and arrested Mr. Hanson. He did not make
a formal statement to the authorities, but made a spontaneous statement at the time of his
arrest, saying, ‘I’m going away for a long time on this one.’
       “On January 29, 2012, officers responded to Mr. Esquer residence and took him
into custody. In a search of his residence, officers located gang indicia. During
questioning, Mr. Esquer admitted that four or five Southern Hispanic criminal street gang
members were ‘talking shit’ to him on the day of the crime. Mr. Esquer acknowledged
associating with Northern gang members and said he knew one of the four or five
subjects from school. He said his victims didn’t possess any weapons and claimed his
actions were not planned. Mr. Esquer admitted that he, not Mr. Hanson, was the shooter,
but acknowledged Mr. Hanson was his accomplice and knew he had a gun. Mr. Esquer
admitted hiding the gun after the shooting and said he felt badly for what he did at the
mall. The crime report noted Mr. Esquer had six, visible, gang-related tattoos.
       “Further observation of mall surveillance revealed known Northern gang members
Nathan Hiser and Andy Nanez were also present at the mall prior to the shooting. On
January 30, 2012, officers located and interviewed Nathan Hiser. During questioning,
Mr. Hiser advised [appellant] Christopher Burrus … informed him he was at the mall
with his family and had trouble with the victims prior to the shooting. [Appellant] further
informed Mr. Hiser, he then contacted Mr. Nanez who ultimately contacted Mr. Esquer
and Mr. Hanson for the job. Phone records later revealed communication between all the
defendants prior to and following the shooting.
       “On February 8, 2012, officers responded to [appellant’s] residence and contacted
him regarding the shooting. During questioning, [appellant] advised he was at the mall
prior to the shooting and observed a group of individuals who may have been

                                             4.
‘Southerners,’ and they were ‘mugging’ him. He further advised he was speaking with a
security guard when he noticed the group minutes before the shooting. He denied any
involvement, but admitted to associating with Northern gang members.
       “Further observation of the mall surveillance revealed [appellant] in the mall’s
food court speaking with a security guard prior to the shooting. Police also observed
Nathan Hiser shaking [appellant’s] hand on two occasions. Investigators later contacted
the security guard who confirmed he was speaking with [appellant] prior to the shooting.
       “On November 5, 2013, a complaint was filed and a bench warrant was issued for
[appellant] and Mr. Nanez.
       “On December 12, 2013, [appellant] was located at the Motel 99 and taken into
custody ….
       “On February 7, 2014, the officers responded to Mr. Nanez’[s] residence with a
warrant for his arrest. Officers arrived and detailed him without incident. During
questioning, he admitted to being at the mall at the time of the shooting, but denied any
involvement. He further denied communicating with [appellant], Mr. Hanson or
Mr. Esquer prior to, or after the shooting. He was taken into custody ….”
The Charges
       On February 11, 2014, an amended felony complaint was filed in the Superior
Court of Tulare County case No. VCF290810 A-B charging appellant Burrus and
codefendant Nanez with eight felony counts and special allegations.
       A preliminary hearing was conducted, and they were held to answer.
       On January 23, 2015, the information was filed in case No. VCF290810 A-B,
charging appellant and codefendant Nanez with eight felony counts and special
allegations. On December 2, 2016, a first amended information was filed.
       On December 5, 2016, a second amended information was filed that charged
appellant and codefendant Andy Jacob Nanez with counts 1 through 6, premeditated
attempted murder of, respectively, M.A., S.H., J.A., F.A., J.S., and S.A. (§§ 664,

                                            5.
subd. (a), 187, subd. (a)); count 7, conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1),
187); count 8, criminal street gang conspiracy (§ 182.5); and count 9, conspiracy to
commit assault with a firearm (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 245, subd. (a)(2)).
       As to appellant, it was further alleged for all charges except count 8, that a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, a handgun, causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and the offenses were committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
       It was also alleged that appellant had two prior strike convictions (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and two prior serious felony conviction
enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
The Plea Hearing
       On December 5, 2016, the day before their joint jury trial was scheduled to begin,
appellant and codefendant Nanez entered into plea agreements, for each to receive an
indicated sentence of 22 years in prison. The court stated both parties had been working
“very hard” to resolve the case.
       As to appellant, the court advised him of his constitutional rights, and the
consequences of his plea. Appellant stated he understood and waived his rights. In
response to the court’s questions, appellant said he had enough time to talk to his attorney
about his plea, and he was satisfied with his advice, and added: “Seems like it’s the best I
can get right now ….” Both parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript and
the police reports as the factual basis for the pleas.3
       Both appellant and codefendant Nanez pleaded no contest to count 1, attempted
nonpremeditated murder of M.A. and S.H. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), with gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)) and an amended section 12022.53,
subdivision (b) enhancement, that a principal intentionally discharged a firearm, and

       3   The preliminary hearing transcript is not part of the instant record.

                                               6.
counts 2 and 3, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury on, respectively,
J.A. and J.S., and F.A. and S.A. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) with gang enhancements.
       Appellant admitted one prior strike conviction and one prior serious felony
enhancement. Appellant also entered pleas and admissions in other cases. The court
granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. 4
Sentencing Hearing
       On January 17, 2017, the court held appellant’s sentencing hearing. As to count 1,
attempted murder, the court imposed the midterm of seven years, plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement and five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement,
for a total of 22 years consistent with the indicated sentence. The court stayed the term
for the gang enhancement, imposed concurrent sentences for counts 2 and 3 and stayed
the attached enhancements, and dismissed the prior strike conviction.
       The court also sentenced appellant on the pleas he entered in other cases, so that
his aggregate sentence in all cases was 25 years four months in prison.
       On February 26, 2019, an amended abstract of judgment was filed to correct the
terms imposed in appellant’s other cases, but the aggregate sentence in all cases was
again 25 years four months in prison.
                APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
       On March 22, 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing of his attempted
murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6 and requested appointment of counsel.
       Appellant filed a supporting declaration that consisted of a preprinted form where
he checked boxes that (1) he was eligible for resentencing because a complaint,
information, or indictment was filed that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or

       4 While the second amended information was filed on the same day as the plea
agreement, the pleas entered by appellant Burrus and codefendant Nanez were to charges
that were again amended at the plea hearing.

                                             7.
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; (2) he was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial, or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial in which he could
have been convicted of murder or manslaughter; and (3) he could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes made to sections 188 and
189, effective January 1, 2019.
The Court’s Summary Denial of the Petition
       On or about March 28, 2022, Judge Reyes signed an order that summarily denied
appellant’s petition because appellant “was active shooter in incident.” On April 4, 2022,
the order was sent to appellant, stating that his “request has been DENIED, due to being
the active shooter in the incident.”
       On May 25, 2022, appellant filed a notice of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Section 1172.6
       We begin with Senate Bill No. 1437’s (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437)
amendments of sections 188 and 189, the enactment of section 1172.6, and subsequent
statutory amendments.
       “Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e).
[Citation.] It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony
murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with
the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. [Citation.] The
Legislature also amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding
subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ [Citation.]” (People v.

                                               8.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50–51; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–
708 (Strong).)
        “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted
under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended ,” codified in
section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) The original version of the statute
permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she
could not have been convicted of murder as a result of the other legislative changes
implemented by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985,
992.)
        Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 and
“ ‘[c]larifie[d] that persons who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter
under a theory of felony murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are
permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same
theories.’ ” (People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v.
Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)
        Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) thus states:

               “(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
        natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
        malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
        a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
        doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
        the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
        manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
        counts when all of the following conditions apply:

                “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
        petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
        murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
        other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that

                                              9.
       person's participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
       probable consequences doctrine.

             “(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
       manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
       which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
       murder.

              “(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
       attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
       January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), italics added.)5
       The court shall appoint counsel if requested by petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
After service of the petition, the prosecutor shall file and serve a response. The petitioner
may file and serve a reply after the response is served. (Id., at subd. (c).)
       “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If
the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
court shall issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show
cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
       If an OSC is issued, “the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence….” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       “At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden
of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of

       5While not applicable herein, section 189 was amended to allow for felony-
murder liability where the victim is a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f).)

                                             10.
evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited
in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a
preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the
hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence
to meet their respective burdens….” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)6
       The prima facie determination is a question of law, and the trial court may deny a
petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 966 (Lewis).)
       Lewis announced a prejudicial error standard under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, that if the court failed to appoint counsel or violated the petitioner’s
statutory rights under former section 1170.95, the petitioner must “therefore ‘demonstrate
there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he [or she] … would have
obtained a more favorable result.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) To demonstrate
prejudice from the denial of a former section 1170.95 petition before the issuance of an
OSC, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable that, absent error, his or her
petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis,
at pp. 972–974; see People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)

       6 “If such evidence may not be considered at an evidentiary hearing to determine a
petitioner’s ultimate eligibility for resentencing, we fail to see how such evidence could
establish, as a matter of law, a petitioner's ineligibility for resentencing” in determining
whether he made a prima facie case for relief. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
974, 988.)

                                              11.
II.    The Court’s Summary Denial
       The court herein failed to comply with section 1172.6 when it denied appellant’s
petitions without granting his request for appointment of counsel, inviting further
briefing, or conducting a hearing as to whether he stated a prima facie case for relief and
an OSC should be issued.
       The court’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements of section 1172.6 is
not prejudicial unless the petitioner shows it is reasonably probable that, absent error, his
or her petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–974; see People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at
p. 836.) In determining whether a petitioner made a prima facie case for relief, the court
may review the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972 & fn. 6.)
The record of conviction allows the court “to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall purpose:
to ensure that … culpability is commensurate with a person’s actions, while also ensuring
that clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima
facie review process.” (Id. at p. 971.)
       While the court gave reasons for denying appellant’s petition, it violated
section 1172.6 by making factual findings that appellant was purportedly the “active
shooter” in the case. Effective on January 1, 2022, the substantive and procedural
process for petitions in section 1172.6 clarifies that “the Evidence Code shall apply at
such hearing. This may mean that, absent some exception, hearsay contained in
probation, presentence reports, appellate opinions/orders, and other documents, are not
now admissible” at an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1026.) The only factual statement in the record consists of the hearsay summary in the
probation report. As noted by appellant, that summary identifies someone else and not
appellant Burrus as the “actual shooter.” Instead, the probation report states that

                                             12.
appellant’s conduct leading to his convictions were “a representation of his leadership
role within his gang.”
       Both appellant and the People agree that the court’s summary denial of his petition
prior to appointing counsel was prejudicial because the instant record does not contain
any admissible nonhearsay evidence to find that appellant was ineligible for resentencing
on his attempted murder conviction as a matter of law. While a preliminary hearing was
held in this case, the transcript is not before this court. As conceded by the People,
appellant’s petition stated a prima facie case for relief, and the matter must be remanded
for an OSC and an evidentiary hearing.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The court’s order that summarily denied appellant’s petition for resentencing of
his attempted murder conviction is reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to
appoint counsel, issue an order to show cause, and conduct an evidentiary hearing
consistent with the provisions of section 1172.6.

                                             13.