Court Opinion

ID: 9699764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:50:36.707477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:56.904484
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY

Opinion by
Justice MINTON.
Today, a majority of our Court boldly embraces the initial permission rule, a new *66law that rewrites every Kentuckian’s compulsory auto liability insurance contract. I do not join the majority in this venture because, as I see it, broad public policy decisions like this belong to our General Assembly where the costs and the benefits of this new direction for all citizens of the Commonwealth can be fully debated in the public arena and subjected ultimately to a majority vote by those whom the people have elected for that purpose. My position on this larger issue of judge-made law on a grand scale compels me to write separately to disagree respectfully with the decision of the majority even though I do agree that the summary judgment must be reversed in light of facts affecting whether liability coverage for permissive use existed under the minor deviation rule.
I. WE SHOULD RESOLVE ONLY THE CASE BEFORE US.
I would reverse this case on issues that are properly before us, resolving it simply under our known precedent. Under our known precedent, a slight or non-material deviation by the driver from the purpose and use for which the owner granted permission to use the motor vehicle does not preclude coverage under the omnibus clause of the auto liability policy. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hassell, 426 S.W.2d 133, 137 (Ky.1967); see also Vezolles v. Home Indemnity Co., New York, 38 F.Supp. 455, 459 (W.D.Ky.1941). Summary judgment cannot be granted if there is a factual dispute surrounding the application of this rule.
From the evidence thus far produced in the case before us, it does not appear at all clear to me that Rita Taylor had “expressly forbidden the driver’s [Allan’s] use of the car.”1 The record contains deposition testimony that Rita forbade Allan from using the car at one point; but it is not clear that her flat prohibition was effective on the day of the accident, especially since Rita testified that Virginia had the authority to decide when Allan could use the car. The record is not clear that Rita had communicated directly to Virginia that Allan could not use the ear. It seems that Virginia may have witnessed or heard that Rita told Allan not to use the car after he exceeded the bounds of the permission Virginia gave Allan on one occasion. But there is a conflict between Virginia’s deposition testimony that she was very strict about Allan’s use — only allowing him to use the car for specific purposes, such as going to work, and not allowing him to take passengers along — and Allan’s friends’ affidavits stating that Virginia allowed him more liberal use of the car, including transporting passengers. So there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a jury.
II. KENTUCKY’S MVRA DID NOT CHANGE LAW TO REQUIRE INITIAL PERMISSION RULE.
The majority builds its case for the initial permission rule on the premise that we are constrained to do so “[bjecause of the spirit of the MVRA[,] and ... general policy reasons” impel it. But I do not agree that the MVRA, which became effective in Kentucky in 1975, really changed the law in any way that would mandate the initial permission rule. And we said that in Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 872 S.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Ky.1994).
Before the MVRA, Kentucky had motorists’ financial responsibility laws codified in former KRS 187.290, et. seq., which was *67enacted in 1946 and mostly repealed in 1975.2 A main purpose of these statutes was to ensure that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents received compensation. 1946 Acts, Chapter 118 was titled “AN ACT to promote safe driving and to remove the reckless and financially irresponsible drivers from the highways; ... providing for operator to offer proof of ability to respond in damages as condition precedent to future licensing or registra-tion_” See also Allen v. Canal Ins. Co., 433 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Ky.1968) (stating that fundamental purpose of Financial Responsibility Law was to provide compensation to people injured by “faulty” driving). So the goal of providing compensation to victims of motor vehicle accidents was not something new in the MVRA.
In fact, a careful reading of the stated goals of the MVRA does not support the view that the General Assembly meant for that statute always to call for the most liberal compensation of victims.
KRS 304.39-010 frames the policy and purpose behind Kentucky’s MVRA (KRS Chapter 304, Subtitle 39) as follows:
The toll of about 20,000,000 motor vehicle accidents nationally and comparable experience in Kentucky upon the interests of victims, the public, policyholders and others require that improvements in the reparations provided for herein be adopted to effect the following purposes:
(1)To require owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth to procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits and legal liability arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor vehicles;
(2) To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate the inequities which fault-determination has created;
(3) To encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation;
(4) To permit more liberal wage loss and medical benefits by allowing claims for intangible loss only when their determination is reasonable and appropriate;
(5) To reduce the need to resort to bargaining and litigation through a system which can pay victims of motor vehicle accidents without the delay, expense, aggravation, inconvenience, inequities and uncertainties of the liability system;
(6) To help guarantee the continued availability of motor vehicle insurance at reasonable prices by a more efficient, economical and equitable system of motor vehicle accident reparations;
(7) To create an insurance system which can more adequately be regulated; and
(8) To correct the inadequacies of the present reparation system, recognizing that it was devised and our present Constitution adopted prior to the development of the internal combustion motor vehicle.
In short, the plain language of these statutory goals — particularly subsection 4 — reflects a list of policy choices to provide prompt and liberal wage loss and medical *68benefits (no-fault benefits) without the victim’s being forced into litigation regarding fault. In exchange, the General Assembly placed some limitations on tort liability by allowing damages for non-economic losses only after a certain threshold has been met. I would note that in the instant case, no-fault benefits are not an issue. Rather, the issue before us concerns the broader tort liability coverage for an accident resulting in major injuries. I believe that the majority confuses the MVRA’s goal of providing broader compensation in terms of no-fault benefits with a different goal of providing broader liability coverage when, in fact, the MVRA traded broader no-fault coverage for limitations on liability coverage.
My interpretation of the spirit of the MVRA finds support in secondary authority published soon after the enactment of the MVRA. A Kentucky Law Journal note published just a year or two after the MVRA became effective interpreted these stated legislative goals to “reflect a desire for prompt and liberal recovery to accident victims without regard to fault. While this section does not emphasize the abolition of tort liability, it does express the desire to reduce litigation.” Robert P. Moore & David W. Rutledge, Note, Kentucky No-Fault: An Analysis and Interpretation, 65 Ky.L.J. 466, 473-74(1976-77).
I would note that the “prompt and liberal recovery” relates to no-fault benefits. In fact, tort liability is somewhat limited under the MVRA. And the sought-after reduction of litigation means fewer lawsuits over relatively minor accidents, not necessarily less litigation over whether coverage exists. Ironically, according to this law journal note, the MVRA, as originally enacted, was actually not as strong as the former financial responsibility laws in requiring insurance. Id. at 504.
In addition to the MVRA’s not generally providing broader tort liability coverage, it also did not specifically alter tort liability coverage where another driver operated the car with the owner’s permission. The former financial responsibility laws exempted owners from the requirement of providing security where the vehicle was operated by someone else without the owner’s permission. Former KRS 187.340(3). These laws required that motor vehicle liability insurance policies “[s]hall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, mainte-nanee[,] or use of the motor vehicle[.]” Former KRS 187.490(2)(b). In other words, omnibus clauses for others using the car with the owner/insured’s permission were required by the law years before the MVRA. The MVRA did not essentially change this by requiring that owners provide security such as insurance for basic reparations or tort liability arising out of others’ operating the vehicle with the owner/insured’s permission. KRS 304.39-080(5).
So I believe the majority builds on sand its foundational premise that attributes to the General Assembly the mandate to adopt the initial permission rule through its enactment of the MVRA, which does not generally broaden the availability of liability coverage nor specifically broaden tort liability coverage for accidents arising from the permissive use of a vehicle by one other than the named insured.
III. LACK OF PRESERVATION OF IMPLIED PERMISSION RULE APPLICABILITY.
Preservation of this issue is questionable at best since the appellants’ arguments to the trial court and their briefs to the Court *69of Appeals did not explicitly urge adoption or application of the initial permission rule. Actually, the trial court made no ruling concerning the applicability of the initial permission rule or the minor deviation rule. The trial court simply ruled that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that summary judgment was granted on the basis that Rita Taylor prohibited Allan from using the car.
I recognize that the trial court and Court of Appeals lacked thé authority to overrule binding precedent that applied the minor deviation rule; but, nonetheless, I hesitate to disturb precedent and adopt a sweeping new rule where the issue was not presented to the trial court or even to the Court of Appeals. It was the Court of Appeals, acting on its own initiative, that effectively invited consideration of the issue by suggesting in its opinion that the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment was correct under the minor deviation rule established in Kentucky precedent but would not be correct if the initial permission rule were applied. And I would note that Allstate has not objected to appellants arguing this issue before us. But I would decline to consider the initial permission rule issue as unpreserved.
IV. ALLURE OF THE INITIAL PERMISSION RULE.
I recognize the appeal of the initial permission rule as reducing litigation concerning coverage and ensuring that victims are compensated. I also think one could fairly say that Kentucky has a long history of enacting statutes aimed at providing motor vehicle accident victims with compensation going back to at least 1946 and probably earlier. Clearly, the initial permission rule would be more successful in meeting this goal; and I really do not understand why earlier precedent embraced the minor deviation rule instead, although I recognize that perhaps the minor deviation rule was viewed as a middle-of-the road approach that better reflected the parties’ intentions as to coverage under the contract.
As the majority demonstrates today, this Court has the authority to overrule existing precedent and embrace the initial permission rule as best achieving longstanding and laudable legislative goals compensating injured victims — goals that I view as pre-dating the MVRA. But I would decline to abandon settled law in this area, especially since the adopting the initial permission rule is pure policy-making, which I view as a legislative function.
V. CONCLUSION
I concur with the result reached by the majority, but I would reverse the lower courts’ decisions only because there exist genuine issues of material fact.
ABRAMSON, J., joins this opinion concurring in result only.

. The Court of Appeals opinion stated that the trial court had granted summary judgment because "[t]he trial court found that there was no issue of fact because the named insured had expressly forbidden the driver’s use of the vehicle.”

. Other laws (former KRS 187.010 to 187.280) relating to the financial responsibility of motorists were repealed by the 1946 Act. I would imagine that these former statutes also required in some form that motorists be prepared to provide compensation to innocent people injured by their irresponsible driving.