Court Opinion

ID: 9736478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:57:55.266499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.897598
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent. The majority here categorizes the evidence the State misplaced or destroyed as "materially exculpatory," and reverses the trial court's denial of Roberson's motion to dismiss: based on its reading of Arizona v. Young-blood. I do not agree that the evidence was, in fact, "materially exculpatory," and posit that it was, at best, "potentially useful" to Roberson. As the majority correctly states, to be "materially exculpatory," there must be some indication in the record that the evidence possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed. Albrecht, 737 N.E.2d at 724. I see no such indication in the record. As such, it was incumbent upon Roberson to show bad faith on the part of the State in its mishandling of the evidence. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333. I find no such evidence.
Although the slip-shod handling of this evidence was certainly not a perfect example of law enforcement procedure, there is a photograph of the alleged weapon that could be viewed by a fact finder. I would remand this case and allow the State to offer the testimony of the three officers as to the description of the device. I would prohibit them from answering the ultimate question, i.e., was the device "dangerous," by invoking Indiana Evidence Rule 403 and concluding the prejudicial impact of such testimony would outweigh its probative value under the cireumstances of this case. In that way, a fact finder would decide the question and the State would not "gain an advantage" from its mishandling of the evidence, a concern the majority correctly points out.