Court Opinion

ID: 9725238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:36:25.065562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:12.787647
License: Public Domain

GARDNER, P. J.
I dissent.
Stripped to their essentials the facts show that the defendant rented a car from Mr. Smith for a period of five days. The car was equipped with its original tires which were in good condition. The defendant gave a false address, a false telephone number, and a false employer. Two months and six days later, the car was recovered in a garage in Lemoore, California. In the interim, it had been driven 4,509 miles and Mr. Smith had to replace some tires before returning the car to Orange County. At the time of her arrest, the defendant gave a false name.
During the time the car was missing, the only communications Mr. Smith had concerning the car were: (1) a call from a woman (Mr. Smith, however, did not know it was the defendant and assumed it was someone else; in her testimony, the defendant said she made the call) the day before the car was due back asking for an extension of time to return the car to which request Mr. Smith said that since he could not do anything about it that it would be all right to keep it for a couple of days; (2) Mrs. Welch received a letter from the defendant and thereafter called Mr. Smith and said the car was in a garage in Hanford.
*1064After the complaint was filed and the warrant issued, Mr. Smith did receive a call from the defendant in which she said she had given the car to George Lackey over a month before the call. After her arrest, she called Mr. Smith and asked him to drop the charges.
The defendant testified that she had no intent to wrongfully take the car; that she would have returned it except that it had bad tires; that at one time she left it in a street behind a used car lot in Hanford, then picked it up again, drove it some more, let others drive it, then put it in a garage in Lemoore where it was eventually found. During the time the car was missing, she returned to Orange County but made no effort to communicate with Mr. Smith.
To me, the evidence of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming. Her defense is pitiful. “It would be difficult to imagine conduct more dishonest and surreptitious than that of this appellant as disclosed by the instant record.” (Mr. Justice Herndon dissenting in People v. Turner, 267 Cal.App.2d 440, 447 [73 Cal.Rptr. 263], a case in which the facts are weaker than those in the one before us.) I do not consider the case to be a close one. On the contrary, the evidence of defendant’s guilt is strong and convincing. Assuming the majority to be correct in their holding that the giving of the two instructions was error, in my opinion the giving of those instructions and the manner in which they were given did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
The jury was thoroughly, fully, painstakingly and properly instructed as to all phases of the law necessary to their deliberation. Buried in all of these proper instructions were the two found to be erroneous by the majority. These two were followed by an instruction that presumptions were not evidence and were not to be considered as such. This instruction lessened the impact of the challenged instructions to the extent that they became virtually a nullity—at the worst, surplusage.
I have some reservations about the invalidity of these instructions on the grounds stated by the majority, but this is not an appropriate case to enter the “Never-Never Land” of appearing and disappearing presumptions. To expound my reservations concerning these instructions would unduly prolong this dissent and add nothing to the lore of the law in this area. However, even if the instructions were erroneous, no injustice was done.
I agree that the giving of the instruction on Penal Code section 484, subdivision (b), was error because, at least in part, it was not responsive to the evidence. The sending of a letter which was returned and stamped “Moved, left no address” can hardly be construed as a valid “written demand.” Nevertheless, I do not feel that any juror would feel that the *1065letter sent in this case would be a “demand” sufficient to put the presumption into effect. The jury was told: “Whether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of the facts. You will disregard any instruction which applies to a state of facts which you determine does not exist.” (CALJIC 17.31.)
Therefore with respect to the Penal Code section 484, subdivision (b) instruction, the language in the recent case of People v. Hairgrove, 18 Cal.App.3d 606 [96 Cal.Rptr. 142], is especially appropriate: “Because the erroneous instructions were so clearly inapplicable, we are convinced the jury disregarded them in reaching its verdict.” (People v. Hairgrove, supra, p. 609.)
I do not agree with the majority that the instructions complained of removed from the jury’s consideration the question of intent. The matter of intent was thoroughly covered in other instructions. Unlike People v. Graham, 71 Cal.2d 303 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153], where a failure to give an instruction was found to be reversible error, here the defendant was hot deprived of her constitutional right to have the jury determine every constitutional issue presented by the evidence. Thus, I take the error to be of Watson1 rather than Chapman2 proportions. From an examination of the entire case, it is my opinion that the error, or errors, complained of have not resulted in a miscarriage of justice and I find no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of these alleged errors. I refuse to join in a reversal of a conviction in which the defendant’s guilt is established by overwhelming evidence which reversal is bottomed on something as gossamer as instructions such as these which were buried in a mass of correct instructions. Although defendant’s trial was not perfect, it was fair and the jury reached a proper verdict.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 11, 1971.

People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243].

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].