Court Opinion

ID: 9772506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:20:13.976533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:45.123384
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
*179The information contains two counts, one charging the driving of an automobile in Dallas County while intoxicated on or about the 16th day of May, 1956, and the other charging the driving of an automobile in Dallas County while intoxicated on or about the 8th day of December, 1956.
Both counts were submitted to the jury and the jury found appellant not guilty of the offense charged in the first count but found him guilty of the offense charged in the second count.
Appellant insists, and I agree, that when the jury acquitted him on the first count he was acquitted of the one offense charged in the two counts of the information.
The allegation in the information that the offense was committed “on or about” a certain day was not specific or limited to that particular date. To the contrary, such allegation authorized conviction for the alleged offense committed at any time within two years prior to the date the information was filed— which was on the 23rd day of July, 1957.
It is apparent, therefore, that the same facts relied upon to convict appellant under the first count — being the count under which he was acquitted — could have been used to convict under the second count. Or, stated conversely, the facts relied upon to convict under the second count could have been those upon which the appellant was acquitted.
If the constitutional guarantee which says that no person shall for the same offense be twice put in jeopardy and shall not again be put on trial for the same offense after a verdict of not guilty (Art. 1, Sec. 14, Const.) means anything and is in full force and effect, then appellant was acquitted of the offense and the only offense alleged in the information.
The views here expressed are in keeping with those set out in my dissenting opinion in the case of Reynolds v. State, 162 Texas Cr. Rep. 143, 276 S.W. 2d 279. There is, however, in this case one difference that was not present in the Reynolds case, that being that the offense of drunken driving is not a continuous offense as was the offense in the Reynolds case of keeping a bawdy house.
The majority opinion in the Reynolds case points out the fact that the offense there charged was continuous.
*180I respectfully submit that when the jury acquitted the appellant under the first count, it acquitted him of the one and only offense charged by the information.
I dissent.