Court Opinion

ID: 9884409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:55:42.727824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:38.288017
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 1. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the judgment of conviction of Obea S. Hayes, the defendant, in the Circuit Court for Rock County, *5David G. Deininger, Judge.2 The defendant was convicted of second-degree sexual assault pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a) (2001-02).3
¶ 2. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the defendant did not have to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during trial to preserve the challenge for appeal as a matter of right and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of second-degree sexual assault.
¶ 3. Two issues are raised on review. The first issue is whether the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must have been raised during trial to preserve the challenge for appeal as a matter of right. Second, if the court reaches the issue, was the evidence sufficient in the present case to support the jury's verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of second-degree sexual assault.
¶ 4. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and N. Patrick Crooks join the author of this opinion in concluding that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence did not have to be raised during trial to preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right and that the evidence was sufficient in the present case to support the jury's verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of second-degree sexual assault. Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., in a concurring opinion, adopts the interpretation of the statute set out in State v. Gomez, 179 *6Wis. 2d 400, 402, 507 N.W2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993) 4 Thus, four members of the court reach the same result on the statute. Justices Diane S. Sykes and Jon E Wilcox, in a concurring opinion, conclude that the waiver rule applies to sufficiency of the evidence challenges and that "sufficiency of evidence challenges [cannot] be made for the first time on appeal as a matter of right."5 Justice Patience D. Roggensack, in a concurring opinion, concludes that an accused's right to challenge the sufficiency of evidence is "bottomed in the requirement that the State must prove an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that to relieve the State of that burden at any point in the process undermines the fundamental constitutional principle that a defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him or her guilty by that requisite degree of proof."6
HH
¶ 5. The defendant did not move the circuit court for a directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence or the close of all the evidence and made no motions after judgment. The defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal. He continues to raise this issue before this court on review.
¶ 6. The State argued in the court of appeals and argues here that the defendant waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because he failed to raise the issue in a timely manner during trial.
¶ 7. Whether a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised during trial to preserve the issue on appeal as a matter of right is a question of law *7requiring statutory interpretation. This court decides this issue independently of the court of appeals, but benefiting from its analysis.7
¶ 8. The principal statute at issue is Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2), which provides as follows:
974.02 Appeals and posteonviction relief in criminal cases.
(2) An appellant is not required to file a posteonviction motion in the trial court prior to an appeal if the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised.
¶ 9. The State and the defendant disagree on the meaning of this statute. The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) exempts criminal appellants from filing a posteonviction motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a prerequisite to appellate review. The State's position is that Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) is directed only toward posteonviction motions, not toward challenging the sufficiency of the evidence during trial to preserve the issue on appeal as a matter of right.
¶ 10. According to the State, an accused must challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion during trial to preserve the right to appellate review of that claim. Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2), argues the State, eliminates only the redundancy of requiring an accused to bring issues, including the sufficiency of the evidence, to the circuit court both during trial and by posteonviction motion. The State argues that an ac*8cused must raise all issues about which he seeks appeal during trial as a prerequisite for appellate review as a matter of right.
¶ 11. The defendant argues that the State's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) is erroneous. The State's interpretation, according to the defendant, renders the words "sufficiency of the evidence" surplusage and meaningless. The defendant contends that if a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence has to be raised during trial, the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is equated with every other claimed error and would fall within the statutory phrase "issues previously raised." The defendant urges that because § 974.02(2) uses both "sufficiency of the evidence" and "issues previously raised," the two phrases must have different meanings.
¶ 12. The phrases have different meanings if § 974.02(2) is interpreted as signifying that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not be previously raised during trial. The defendant's position can be summarized by saying that there would be no reason for the legislature to have included the language "sufficiency of the evidence" along with "issues previously raised" if failure to raise the issue during trial would preclude an accused from raising the sufficiency issues on appeal as a matter of right.
¶ 13. The defendant bolsters his argument by pointing to the court of appeals' decision in State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993). Gomez was convicted of child enticement and various other sex crimes. Gomez appealed his conviction on the child enticement offense, arguing insufficiency of the evidence. The State argued in Gomez that the defendant had waived the challenge because he had not raised the issue in the circuit court before, during, or after trial. Without analysis of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) or the waiver *9issue, the court of appeals simply concluded that "Gomez correctly asserts that his argument is based upon the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, which under sec. 974.02(2), Stats., does not require a prior postconviction motion."8
¶ 14. The court of appeals concluded in the present case, without analysis, that it was bound to follow the Gomez decision. We recognize, as does the State, that the Gomez decision, although precedential, has limited precedential and persuasive value for the following reasons.9 The Gomez decision does not analyze Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2). Nor does it consider the competing arguments about whether an accused who does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during trial should be held to have waived the right to argue the issue on appeal.
¶ 15. The text of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) referring only to postconviction motions supports the State's interpretation. The text of § 974.02(2) referring to "sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised" supports the defendant's interpretation.
*10¶ 16. The text of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) is thus not determinative of the meaning of the statute and is not the only source of the intended effect of the text. Additional sources of legislative intent such as the context, history, scope, and objective of the statute, including the consequences of alternative interpretations, illuminate the intent of the legislature.
¶ 17. We now consider those alternative sources, including: (A) the context of the statute; (B) the history of the statute; and (C) the purposes and consequences of the parties' competing interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2).
A
¶ 18. Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2) must be viewed in the context of chapter 974 as a whole. This chapter governs criminal procedure in appeals, new trials, and writs of error. Nothing in chapter 974 explicitly addresses the issue of whether a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised in the circuit court during trial to preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right.
¶ 19. Wisconsin Stat. § 974.02(2) must also be viewed in the context of chapter 972, which governs criminal trials. Wisconsin Stat. § 972.10(4) governs motions during trial. Section 972.10(4) provides that at the conclusion of the entire case, an accused may move on the record for a dismissal. One ground for dismissal is the insufficiency of the evidence. Motions for a directed verdict and motions to dismiss at the close of the State's case or at the close of all evidence are accepted practice. The court has held that if an accused moves to dismiss on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, *11the circuit court may exercise its discretion to allow the State to introduce additional testimony after the State has rested.10
¶ 20. The State asks the court to examine Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in the context of Wis. Stat. § 805.14(6), a rule governing civil actions. Rules of practice in civil actions apply in all criminal proceedings "unless the context of a rule manifestly requires a different construction."11 Section 805.14(6) provides that "[i]n any motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the grounds of the motion shall be stated with particularity.... If the court grants a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the court shall state on the record or in writing with particularity the evidentiary defect underlying the order." The State acknowledges that a court cannot direct a verdict of guilt against an accused but argues that § 805.14(6) applies to both civil and criminal cases and compels that a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence be made during trial or be waived on appeal.
¶ 21. The State also argues that we must consider Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in the context of the general rule of appellate practice "that issues not raised in the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal."12 This waiver rule serves several important objectives in sound judicial administration. Failure to *12raise an issue in the circuit court deprives both the adversary and the circuit court of the opportunity to address the issue and perhaps remedy the defect without the necessity of an appeal. The waiver rule encourages attorneys to prepare for and conduct trials more diligently and prevents attorneys from sandbagging adversary counsel and the circuit court.13
¶ 22. The State argues that nothing in the statutory provisions governing criminal trials suggests that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence might be different from other kinds of claims and therefore not subject to the general rule that arguments not raised at trial are deemed waived.
¶ 23. Examining Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in the context of other statutes and the general rules of appellate practice does not definitively answer the critical question of whether the legislature sought to eliminate in Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) a requirement that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence be made during the trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right.
B
¶ 24. We next consider the statutory and legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) to gain insight into what the legislature intended. Section 974.02(2) was first enacted in 1977, as part of a complete overhaul of appellate practice in Wisconsin with the creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
¶ 25. When enacted in 1977, Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) was worded differently than it is now. The statute seemingly provided that a challenge to the *13sufficiency of the evidence was not necessary to raise the claim on appeal as a matter of right. Section 974.02(2) stated:
A motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is not necessary to raise on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence.14
¶ 26. The Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1977 Senate Bill 148, created by the Judicial Council and printed with and displayed on the bill introduced in the legislature, seems to limit the motion to a motion for a new trial. Although the word "motion" in the bill seems to refer to any motion, the reference in the 1977 version of § 974.02(2) may have been intended merely to eliminate the need to make a motion for a new trial to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for appeal. In other words, according to the Analysis, the word "motion" apparently meant "postconviction motion." The Analysis reads as follows:
Subsection (2) is intended to eliminate the need for a motion for new trial to set aside the judgment because of insufficiency of the evidence as a condition to raise the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. It does not change the quantum of evidence needed for the court to accept a guilty plea.
¶ 27. Neither the statute nor the Analysis suggests, however, whether the removal of the need to file a motion for a new trial also eliminated the need to file a motion during trial in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal as of right.
¶ 28. This court considered the 1977 version of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in a per curiam decision in State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982). The *14offender in that case argued, on a motion for reconsideration, that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(1)(f) entirely eliminated the need for postconviction motions because the language of Rule 809.30(l)(f) provided that the "defendant shall file a notice of appeal or motion seeking postconviction relief within 30 days of the service of the transcript."15
¶ 29. In Monje, the court held that Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(l)(f) did not alter the rule that postcon-viction motions were necessary to preserve challenges for appeal as a matter of right. The Monje court further concluded that the word "or" in Rule 809.30(l)(f) referred to the exception under § 974.02(2) for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The Monje court concluded that "for issues on appeal to be considered as a matter of right, postconviction motions must be made except in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence."16 The Monje court did not specify whether the elimination of the need to file a postconviction motion with respect to a challenge on the sufficiency of the evidence also eliminated the need to raise the issue during trial.
¶ 30. In the wake of the Monje decision, Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) was amended, apparently in response to a position paper prepared by Charles Bennett Vetzner, Chief of the Appellate Division of the State Public Defender's Office. In that position paper, Attorney Vetzner raised concerns that appellate counsel had, prior to Monje, viewed postconviction motions as not required when the issue had previously been raised in the trial court. The rationale was that the same issue need not be presented twice to the circuit court. Attor*15ney Vetzner urged that § 974.02(2) be amended to reflect the practice of avoiding this double presentation of the issues to the circuit court.
¶ 31. Attorney Vetzner was thus not primarily concerned with challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. He was concerned about issues previously raised in the circuit court. He did, however, briefly comment on challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and on his interpretation of this court's decision in Monje as follows: "[T]he [Monje] court concluded that it is still necessary to raise all issues twice in the trial court, except for sufficiency of the evidence. A claim of insufficient evidence need never be presented in the trial court and can be raised initially in an appeal in the Court of Appeals."17
¶ 32. Nevertheless, Vetzner explained that his proposed statute "would not in any way affect traditional concepts of waiver which preclude pursuing an issue after conviction if an objection or motion was not properly tendered beforehand. The change would only make it unnecessary to bring an additional trial court proceeding to again raise those issues previously decided adversely to the convicted offender."18 Vetzner, as the apparent drafter of the language, seemed to believe that a sufficiency of the evidence claim could be raised on appeal without having been raised at trial.
¶ 33. To remedy the effect of the Monje decision, Vetzner proposed to recreate § 974.02(2) as follows:
*16It is not necessary to file a post-conviction motion in the trial court prior to an appeal when the grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised.19
¶ 34. Vetzner's proposed amendment to § 974.02(2) was discussed by the Judicial Council and unanimously adopted by the Council in its January 21, 1983 meeting.20 A request was made to the Legislative Reference Bureau to draft the proposal for introduction in the 1983 legislature. A copy of Vetzner's letter was placed in the drafting file as background.21
¶ 35. The legislature amended the language of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) in 1983 to its current form, adopting language that is substantially the same as Vetzner's proposed amendment. The Legislative Reference Bureau's Analysis of 1983 Senate Bill 233, which was printed with and displayed on the bill when it was introduced in the legislature, reads as follows:
NOTE: Subsection (2) is amended to eliminate the necessity of presenting an issue twice to the trial court in order to preserve it for appeal. In State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153 (1982), sub. (2) was construed to require a postconviction motion to preserve the right to appeal any issue other than sufficiency of the evidence. This bill does not modify the waiver doctrine, requiring timely objection or motion to preserve alleged error. It merely eliminates the need for additional postconviction proceedings raising those same issues again in the trial court.
*17¶ 36. The State argues that Vetzner's letter is an anomaly and an incorrect view of the holding in Monje. It argues that even if Vetzner's view had been conveyed to the Judicial Council, his position was not conveyed to the legislature that enacted the law. Instead, the State takes the position that the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis communicated to the legislature suggests that the waiver doctrine and the requirement of timely motions or objections during trial to preserve alleged error were not modified by the 1983 amendment to § 974.02(2).
¶ 37. In contrast, the defendant takes the position that Vetzner's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) and his draft of the amendment are strong indicia of the reasons for adopting the statute as enacted and are evidence of legislative intent supporting his position.
¶ 38. The statutory and legislative history lend support to each party's respective views of the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2). The 1983 amendment was seemingly designed to codify Vetzner's interpretation that no need exists to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during trial. Neither the text of the 1983 amendment nor the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of the bill conclusively support Vetzner's or the defendant's interpretation. In short, the history of § 974.02(2), like the text and context of the statute, supports both the State's and the defendant's interpretations of the statute.
C
¶ 39. We therefore turn to an analysis of the purposes and consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute to determine the interpretation that gives the statute its intended effect.
*18¶ 40. The State argues that there are strong policy reasons an accused must raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence during trial to preserve the issue for appeal as a matter of right. According to the State, such a rule forces attorneys to prepare. diligently for trial. The State asserts that requiring an accused to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the circuit court before verdict allows the error to be corrected and might eliminate the need for an appeal. Applying the waiver rule to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, according to the State, "prevents attorneys from 'sandbagging' errors,"22 when an accused fails to make the challenge for strategic reasons and later claims that the error is grounds for reversal23 Requiring an accused to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during trial and giving the State an opportunity to correct the error, contends the State, is of particular concern because the consequences of an appellate court's declaring the evidence insufficient are so serious; if an appellate court determines the evidence to be insufficient, constitutional double jeopardy protections would prohibit retrial24
*19¶ 41. The State argues that the application of the waiver rule will not prevent an appellate court from considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in exceptional cases even when an accused has not preserved the issue during trial. This court may exercise its discretion to hear a claim and grant relief even when the issue has been waived.25 The State urges that the defendant did not ask the court of appeals or this court to grant relief in the interest of justice.
¶ 42. Finally, the State asserts that the appropriate way to analyze a failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence during trial is within the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel. The State argues that the defendant has never claimed that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and no postconviction factual record exists on this issue.
¶ 43. The defendant asserts that it is manifestly unjust for an appellate court to apply the waiver rule to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. He relies on State v. Harrington, 181 Wis. 2d 985, 512 N.W.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1994), in which the court of appeals held that the circuit court's failure to find a factual basis to support the accused's guilty plea constituted a manifest injustice warranting appellate relief even though the accused's plea was the result of a plea negotiation. The State minimizes the significance of Harrington by noting that no Wisconsin authority holds it is manifestly unjust for an appellate court to apply the waiver rule to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
¶ 44. Although the State makes a number of good policy, purpose, and consequence arguments, ultimately we are not persuaded by them.
*20¶ 45. First, when an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, he or she is arguing that the State has not carried its burden of proving the commission of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a claim presents a very serious issue in the administration of justice. If the claim can be proved but is deemed waived, a person whom the State has not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would remain incarcerated.
¶ 46. Several courts, but not all of them, have agreed with the public policy argument the defendant makes. These courts conclude that the potential miscarriage of justice resulting from a conviction based on insufficient evidence is so great as to justify review even when the issue was not raised in the trial court.26 Other courts conclude that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not waived even if not raised during trial because by merely entering the plea of not guilty, the defendant has asked for a judgment of acquittal and has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by implicitly *21asserting that the State does not have enough evidence to meet its burden of proof.27
¶ 47. Federal courts have reviewed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence when the challenge was not made during trial or was not renewed during trial under various standards, including "to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice," to avoid "plain error,"28 and *22to prevent a "clearly and grossly unjust" conviction.29
¶ 48. Although the language employed by these courts varies somewhat from case to case, the general sense from the cases is that because a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence goes to the heart of a determination of guilt in a criminal trial, courts will find a way to address the challenge on its merits. The need to protect the integrity of a finding of guilt is such that courts hesitate to treat the issue as waived. The waiver doctrine is muted because it limits the right of an accused to have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and because the waiver doctrine is imported from civil actions without fully considering the accusatorial system of criminal justice.
¶ 49. These courts conclude that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is of sufficient import that an accused should be entitled to raise it on appeal as of right even when the challenge was not raised during trial. We could interpret Wis. Stat. § 974.02 as *23requiring a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be made in the circuit court or be waived as a matter of right and then undercut the statute by deciding the sufficiency of the evidence by some mechanism, such as plain error.30 We conclude that it is more in keeping with the intended effect of § 974.02 to interpret the statute to allow an accused to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal as a matter of right.
¶ 50. Second, although the State is correct that it is preferable to give the State an opportunity to correct an insufficiency of evidence during trial to avoid appeals, the possibility of "sandbagging" is minimal. After an accused has been found guilty and convicted, he or she has the burden to prove that no reasonable jury could have come to the conclusion that it did. This burden is heavy, and appellate courts give great deference to jury verdicts. It is therefore unlikely that an accused or defense counsel will try to sandbag the State and the circuit court rather than make the proper objections and motions during trial.
¶ 51. Furthermore, as the defendant points out, persons facing incarceration have little reason to delay in making a motion to dismiss because they will be waiting in prison while an appeal is being litigated. These factors will limit "sandbagging."
¶ 52. Third, because the State concedes that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which would require proof of essentially the same issues, could be *24brought in cases like these, prosecutorial and court resources will not be subject to greater taxation as a result of our decision.
¶ 53. The criminal justice system is designed, insofar as it is possible, to punish only those who have committed crimes. If a conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, it is incumbent upon the legal system to make certain that the conviction is overturned. The guilty should be punished, but those whose guilt has not been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt should not be punished.
¶ 54. On the basis of an analysis of the policies, purposes, and consequences of alternative interpretations proposed by the parties in the case at bar, we conclude that the following interpretation best gives Wis. Stat. § 974.02(2) its intended legislative effect: A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is different from other types of challenge not previously reused during trial. This difference justifies allowing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to be raised on appeal as a matter of right despite the fact that the challenge was not raised in the circuit court. This interpretation comports with the text, context, histoxy, and purposes of the statute, including the consequences of alternative interpretations.
¶ 55. Having concluded that the defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as of right even though he did not raise the challenge during trial, we turn to the merits of his claim.
¶ 56. The standard of review in determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a con*25viction is that "an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."31
¶ 57. Our review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim is therefore very narrow. We give great deference to the determination of the trier of fact.32 We must examine the record to find facts that support upholding the jury's decision to convict.
¶ 58. The defendant concedes in this court that the evidence showed that he had sexual contact with the victim, M.M., and that the sexual contact occurred without M.M.'s consent. The defendant thus concedes that the first two elements of § 940.225(2) (a) are satisfied.
¶ 59. The defendant's sole claim is that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the nonconsensual sexual contact was achieved by force or threat of force. The "use or threat of force or violence" element of second-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2) (a) is satisfied if the use or threat of force or violence is directed to compelling the victim's submission.33 The element is satisfied whether the force is used or threatened as part of the sexual contact or whether it is used or threatened as part of the sexual *26contact to compel the victim's submission.34 The defendant's argument is that M.M.'s testimony at trial did not connect the use or threat of force or violence with the nonconsensual sexual contact, and therefore the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury's verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 60. We disagree with the defendant. According to the record, the defendant and M.M. (who is 4T1" and weighs 95 pounds) were involved in an intimate relationship. The two lived together for four months. In October 1999, M.M. apparently terminated her relationship with the defendant. That October, the defendant and M.M. had an argument in which the defendant kicked down M.M.'s door and threatened to kill her. M.M. called the police, and the defendant was jailed. Upon his release, the defendant signed a 72-hour no-contact order, which he immediately violated by returning to M.M.'s house.
¶ 61. M.M. testified that on March 24, 2000, the defendant appeared at her dwelling. He forced his way into her home, and a scuffle ensued. He accused her of "messin1 around" and stated that he wanted to have sex with her. He choked her, shoved her into a wall, and touched her breasts and vagina repeatedly while she struggled to get free. He tore her t-shirt and bra. He broke her finger. He told her he wanted to throw her down on the floor and have sex with her.
¶ 62. In contrast, the defendant testified that he had never grabbed M.M.'s breasts or buttocks, or attempted to fondle her vaginal area, or tried to physically harm her.
¶ 63. We reprint, verbatim, the pertinent direct and cross-examination of M.M.:
*27Q: Let's go back to the evening of March 24. You said Mr. Hayes knocked on the door, you opened it.
A: Right.
Q: Did you invite Mr. Hayes inside?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Did Mr. Hayes come inside?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: How did that happen?
A: He put his foot in, so — between the door.
Q: Then what happened?
A: He walked right on in.
Q: What did Mr. Hayes say to you at that time, if anything?
A: Where have you been? Apparently, you must have been out there, messin' around.
Q: What did you say?
A: I told him, no. I told him that was none of his business.
Q: What happened after that?
A: He ended up putting his hand on me and touched me in places where he wasn't supposed to be. My breasts, plus my vagina.
Q: How many times did Mr. Hayes touch you on the breasts?
A: About two or three times.
*28Q: What were the other areas you mentioned?
A: My sitting part.
Q: Are you referring to your vaginal area?
A: Right.
Q: And how many times did he touch you there?
A: Two or three times.
Q: Did he touch you on the buttocks?
A: Yes.
Q: How many times?
A: Two.
Q: Did he say anything to you during that period of time?
A: He grabbed ahold to my clothes and then tored [sic] my T-shirt, along with the bra.
Q: Okay. Did he indicate — make any statements to you about wanting to have sex with you at some point?
A: Yes, he did.
Q: When did that occur?
A: The same night.
Q: Did that occur during—
A: During.
Q: —the time he was taking your clothes off?
A: Right.
*29.... [M.M. testified that her shirt and bra were ripped.]
Q: How long did the struggle go on?
A: It went on for a little while. I really can't pinpoint to know exactly about what time. When you are scuffling and fighting, you are not looking at no watch to find out, you know?
Q: What particular injuries did the defendant inflict on you?
A: He ended up choking me with the left hand, and he ended up shoving me against my bathroom corner wall.
Q: Okay.
A: And then he end [sic] up putting a scar on my chest. Then he grabbing ahold to my hand and trying to break my fingers, but he broke the one finger.
Q: Going back to when Mr. Hayes was in your apartment on March 24th of 2000, what specifically do you recall him saying about him wanting to have sex with you?
A: Because I hadn't had sex with him since heaven knows when.
Q: I beg your pardon?
A: I hadn't had sex with him at all.
Q: What specifically did he say?
A: He said I had been out with someone else. The way he puts it, he was gonna have sex with me because he called that, his thing.
Q: Did he — did you tell the police officer that he told you that he wanted to throw you down on the floor and have sex with you?
*30A: Right.
Q: Is that what you recall happening, today?
A: Right.
On cross-examination, M.M. further explained:
Q: As soon as he got inside the apartment, what was the first thing that happened?
A: He done end up accusing me of messin' around.
Q: So it was before he tried to touch you that he accused you — that he accused you of fooling around?
A: Right. Right.
Q: Okay. At the time, what did you say?
A: I told him I wasn't, and I told him that it was my business. I told him to go find him someone else.
Q: He then touched your breast?
A: Right.
Q: Was he standing in front of you at the time?
A: Right.
Q: Did he put his hand up your shirt?
A: Right.
Q: Did he put his hand inside of your bra?
A: Right.
Q: How long did that go on?
A: Well, it went on for quite awhile, because I kept on wrassling with him, and all of that kind of stuff, to try to get him away from me.
*31Q: All right. But this was — he was doing this underneath your clothing; is that correct?
A: Right.
Q: At the time — well, how was it he stopped touching your breast? Did you push him away, or did he just stop?
A: I pushed him away.
Q: When he — you testified that he fondled your vaginal area.
A: Right.
Q: Was that also underneath your clothing?
A: That's right. I had pants on.
Q: And he reached down inside your pants?
A: Right.
Q: Same with when he touch [sic] your buttocks?
A: Right.
¶ 64. We agree with the court of appeals that M.M.'s testimony did not follow a chronological order. A reasonable factfinder could, however, draw the inference that the defendant verbally threatened to have retaliatory sex with M.M. and that the sexual contact occurred while he was wrestling and struggling with her to overcome her resistance. Wrestling, struggling, verbally threatening unwanted sex, tearing the victim's clothes, and breaking her finger are a sufficient use or threat of force or violence to support a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2)(a).
¶ 65. M.M.'s testimony was sufficient to support a jury verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt, that force or the threat of force or violence was used prior to or *32during the sexual contact to compel the victim's submission. We cannot conclude that the evidence in support of the defendant's conviction is so lacking in probative value and force that it can be said, as a matter of law, that no reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the inference that force or the threat of force or violence was used prior to or during the sexual contact to compel the victim's submission. Accordingly, we do not disturb the jury's verdict, and we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

 State v. Hayes, 2003 WI App 99, 264 Wis.2d 377, 663 N.W2d 351.

 Court of Appeals Judge David G. Deininger was sitting by special assignment to the circuit court pursuant to the Judicial Exchange Program.

 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.

 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 70.

 Justice Sykes' concurrence, ¶ 116.

 Justice Roggensack's concurrence, ¶ 118.

 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶ 12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.

 State v. Gomez, 179 Wis. 2d 400, 404, 507 N.W.2d 378 (Ct. App. 1993).

 Published opinions of the court of appeals are precedential for lawyers, trial courts, the court of appeals, and this court. See State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, ¶ 42, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1; Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 560 N.W2d 246 (1997); Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990); State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 Wis. 2d 87, 108, 394 N.W.2d 732 (1986) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). A decision of the court of appeals is not precedential in this court when this court has accepted review of the case. On review of a decision of the court of appeals, this court may affirm, modify, or reverse the court of appeals. Even if this court is not reviewing a decision of the court of appeals, it may withdraw or disavow language in a decision of the court of appeals.

 Grover v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 282, 283, 212 N.W2d 117 (1973).

 Wis. Stat. § 972.11.

 Apex Elecs. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). See also State v. Huebner, 2000 WT 59, ¶¶ 10-12, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727; Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980).

 Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶¶ 11-12.

 § 127, ch. 187, Laws of 1977 (emphasis added).

 State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).

 State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 153a, 327 N.W.2d 641 (denying motion for reconsideration and clarifying court's holding).

 Charles Bennett Vetzner, Position Paper on Proposed Change in Sec. 974.02 at 2 (on file in the Records of the Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, Wis.).

 Id. at 3.

 Jd.

 Letter from James L. Fullin to Charles B. Vetzner, February 14,1983 (on file in the Records of the Judicial Council, Wisconsin State Law Library, Madison, Wis.).

 Id.

 Huebner, 235 Wis. 2d 486, ¶ 12.

 The State argues that at trial the defendant did not assert that the jury should find the evidence insufficient on the element of use or threat of force or violence; that the defendant did not ask for an instruction on the lesser crime of sexual contact without consent but without use or threat of force or violence; and that the defendant agreed with the State that the issue was his credibility and that of the victim. The State claims that the defendant did not give it fair notice that he was contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on the force element of the crime based on the sequence of events described by the victim. Had the defendant alerted the State during trial, the State argues, the record could have been clarified at that time.

 State v. Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 608, 350 N.W2d 622 (1984).

 See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 406-07, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988).

 Commonwealth v. McGovern, 494 N.E.2d 1298, 1300-01 (Mass. 1986) ("[T]he defendant did not move for required findings of not guilty. However, findings based on legally insufficient evidence are inherently serious enough to create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice."); Commonwealth v. Dion, 575 N.E.2d 759, 764 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) (same, quoting McGovern);, Commonwealth v. Sims, 565 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) (sufficiency of evidence issue not treated as waived because of substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 509 N.E.2d 4, (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
See also State v. Miller, 2004 WL 115374; *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (despite waiver, court addressed sufficiency of evidence issue in "interest of justice"); State v. Otto, 717 A.2d 775, 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (addressing the sufficiency of the evidence claim although waived because it was "of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right... and the record is adequate to permit review").

 See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(4) (in actions tried to the court without a jury, sufficiency of the evidence may be raised on appeal regardless whether the party objected in the trial court or moved for a new trial); United States v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 627 (7th Cir. 1994) (in a bench trial, plea of not guilty is the same as a formal motion for acquittal); United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1993) (same, following 5th, 6th, 7th, and D.C. Circuits); Hall v. United States, 286 F.2d 676, 677 (5th Cir. 1960) (same); State v. Himmerick, 499 N.W.2d 568, 571 (N.D. 1993) (holding that in a bench trial, merely pleading "not guilty" is sufficient to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence challenge for appellate review); State v. Osier, 569 N.W.2d 441, 443 (N.D. 1997) (same, citing Himmerick); 2A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 469 at 322-23 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that entering plea of not guilty should preserve issue for appeal in jury trials as well as bench trials).

 United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (claim not presented after all the evidence was in is ordinarily waived, but court of appeals reviews claim "to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, or for plain error."); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 398 (6th Cir. 2001) (failure to raise challenge to sufficiency of evidence at end of government's case or at end of all evidence is reviewed only for a manifest miscarriage of justice); United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2001) (failure to renew challenge to sufficiency of evidence at end of all evidence puts burden on accused to persuade court of plain error or manifest injustice); United States v. Cole, 262 F.3d 704, 708 (8th Cir. 2001) (defense counsel's failure to renew claim for insufficient evidence following all of the evidence would normally constitute waiver, but defendant's "assertion that the government failed to prove one *22of the elements of his crime would prejudice his substantial rights, if proven to be correct, and we thus review his sufficiency of the evidence claim."); United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez, 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (manifest miscarriage of justice); United States v. Caudill, 915 F.2d 294, 296 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).
Federal Rule 29 of Criminal Procedure provides that an accused may move for an acquittal when the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction either after the close of the government's evidence, after the close of all evidence, after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury. Federal Rule 29(c)(3) provides that "[a] defendant is not required to move for a judgment of acquittal before the court submits the case to the jury as a prerequisite for making such a motion after jury discharge."

 United States v. Richard, 943 F.2d 115, 117 (1st Cir. 1991) (despite failure to make proper motion, court would review sufficiency of the evidence claim for gross injustice).

 See State v. Gustafson, 119 Wis. 2d 676, 687, 350 N.W.2d 653 (1984) ("[P]lain error is 'error so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the action was not objected to at the time.'") (quoting State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 177, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984) (quoting Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 191, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978))).

 State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).

 Id.

 See State v. Bonds, 165 Wis. 2d 27, 32, 477 N.W.2d 265 (1991).

 Id

 As recently as two months ago, the majority set forth a relatively lengthy discussion of the now defunct bright line rule of statutory interpretation. The majority stated in part:
If the statute is unambiguous, we must give effect to the words within the statute according to their common meanings. DNR v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 403, 407, 321 N.W.2d 286 (1982). As a general rule, we do not review extrinsic sources unless there is ambiguity. If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, we then may use the scope, history, context, and subject matter of the statute in order to ascertain legislative intent. State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶ 14, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.
Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, ¶ 17, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755.