Court Opinion

ID: 9716704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:48:35.713472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.052745
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 69. {concurring). In 2006 Christopher Baron was charged with violating several statutes, including Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(c) (2007-08).1 After argument, the circuit court dismissed the § 943.201 charge on grounds that the statute was unconstitutional as applied. This decision was subsequently reversed by the court of appeals. See State v. Baron, 2008 WI App 90, 312 Wis. 2d 789, 754 N.W.2d 175.1 concur in this court's decision to affirm the court of appeals but write separately to offer a different perspective on the legal issues.
¶ 70. Wisconsin created a comprehensive criminal code in the 1953 session of the legislature. Ch. 623, Laws of 1953. As Professor Gordon Baldwin later recalled, one of the first topics of the Legislative Council's criminal code project "was the law relating to crimes against property." Gordon L. Baldwin, Criminal Misappropriation in Wisconsin-Part I, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 253, 253 (1960-61). "Crimes involving acts directed against prop*93erty were divided into three types, crimes involving damage to property, trespass upon property and misappropriation of property." Id. "MISAPPROPRIATION" is now one of the four subchapter headings in Chapter 943, "Crimes Against Property."
¶ 71. Wisconsin Stat. § 943.201 has been located under this heading. The word "misappropriation" is not defined in the statutes and it does not appear in § 943.201, hut misappropriation is embedded in the subchapter and is the very heart of the statute in question.
¶ 72. Black's Law Dictionary defines "misappropriation" as "The application of another's property or money dishonestly to one's own use." Black's Law Dictionary 1013 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). Wisconsin's theft statute, § 943.20, also is included in the subchapter on misappropriation. Misappropriation may include theft, but it does not have to include theft.
¶ 73. Subsection (1) of § 943.201 contains two terms: (a) "personal identification document" and (b) "personal identifying information." "Personal identifying information" includes basic information such as "[a]n individual's name," "[a]n individual's address," "[a]n individual's telephone number," "[a]n individual's employer or place of employment," and "[t]he maiden name of an individual's mother." Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(b)l., 2., 3., 6., 8. Most of this information is not especially confidential and its release is not especially damaging. There are, of course, exceptions, and those exceptions can have profound consequences to the individuals involved.2
*94¶ 74. Other "personal identifying information," such as "[a]n individual's social security number," "[a]n individual's taxpayer identification number," and "[a]n individual's code or account number," Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(b)5., 10., 12.a., frequently present more ominous problems because of their potential "misappropriation" by people attempting to obtain "credit, money, goods, services, employment, or any other thing of value or benefit" without authorization or consent. Wis. Stat. § 943.201(2)(a). This kind of information is closely linked to theft or fraud.
¶ 75. Still another type of "personal identifying information," "[a]n individual's deoxyribonucleic acid profile," Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(b)ll., is at the core of an individual's personal privacy.
¶ 76. In subsection (l)(a), "Personal identification document" includes "[a] document containing personal identifying information." Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(a)l. This description is very broad. It may include an individual's resume, his telephone records, his tax returns, his medical records, and his e-mails. See Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(a) & (b). Also included in "personal identification documents" are "cards" and "plates," such as credit and debit cards. Wis. Stat. § 943.201(l)(a)2.
¶ 77. In an information age, the legislature is concerned about the unauthorized use, especially the misappropriation, of an individual's personal identifying information. Yet there are limits on the state's authority and ability to control such information. Statutes on this subject must be drafted carefully.
¶ 78. In this case, Baron allegedly accessed Mark Fisher's e-mail account by using Fisher's personal password. Even if he acquired the password lawfully, Baron surely was not authorized to rummage through Fisher's e-mail account, if he did so. Baron then allegedly *95collected embarrassing e-mails, "the personal identification documents," in Fisher's account and combined them into a new "personal identification document." He then allegedly transmitted the new "personal identification document," without authorization or consent, to people in the community. He allegedly did this from Fisher's own e-mail account using Fisher's name. He allegedly did this with the intent of harming the reputation of Fisher. If Baron did these things, he misappropriated Fisher's password, he misappropriated Fisher's personal identifying documents, he misappropriated Fisher's e-mail account to send out the documents, and he misappropriated Fisher's name, with the intent to harm Fisher's reputation.
¶ 79. Mark Fisher was a government employee. As such, he was inevitably subject to attacks on his reputation, especially if the attacks were true. But a lawful end did not justify these alleged unlawful means, especially the misappropriation of Fisher's name, i.e., the false representation of Fisher as the sender of the widely distributed e-mail.
¶ 80. If a person were to send documents from his own computer under his own name, he would have a defense, on these facts, under this statute. A person who misappropriates another person's name as he attempts to injure the other person does not have such a defense. If a person distributed information anonymously, he also would have a defense under this statute. A person so consumed with malice that he uses another person's name, without authority, to discredit that person, forgoes his defense under the statute.
¶ 81. The First Amendment does not protect a defendant accused of violating the statute in the manner alleged here, because the statute requires the state to prove that the defendant intentionally misrepre*96sented his role as the sender of the message. The statute punishes intentional misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation is not a First Amendment freedom.
¶ 82. "A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches." Proverbs 22:1. "A good name is better than precious ointment." Ecclesiastes 7:1. This is the wisdom of the ages. Misappropriating a person's name is taking that person's most valuable possession. The legislature understood that this conduct is a grave offense and should be punished accordingly.
¶ 83. For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.

 Cf, e.g., Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810 (1999).