Court Opinion

ID: 9901843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:03:35.231213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.703010
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           Nov 22 2023, 8:59 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Leeman                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Leeman Law Office                                         Attorney General
Logansport, Indiana                                       Tyler Banks
                                                          Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                          General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Curtis Baker,                                             November 22, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-1340
        v.                                                Appeal from the
                                                          Cass Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        James Muehlhausen, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          09D01-2209-F6-274

                                Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                            Judges Bradford and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023                       Page 1 of 10
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   In a criminal jury trial where the State presents evidence of “a greater number

      of separate criminal offenses” than charged and doesn’t designate the specific

      act or acts on which it relies for conviction, a general unanimity instruction

      doesn’t suffice. The jury should be instructed that they must either unanimously

      agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts or that the defendant

      committed all the acts alleged. However, where multiple similar acts are part of

      one continuous episode, this special unanimity instruction isn’t required.

[2]   Here, a jury found Curtis Baker guilty of domestic battery and strangulation

      after the State presented evidence that he punched a woman, threw her to the

      ground, pinned her to the ground, and choked her twice. Baker now appeals,

      arguing that the jury should have been given the special unanimity instruction.

      Because the alleged acts were all part of a single continuous attack, we disagree

      and affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   The evidence most favorable to the convictions is as follows. Baker met Ann

      Humphrey in 2019, and they had a “[f]riends with benefits type of

      relationship.” Tr. p. 78. The sexual relationship continued even after Baker

      married another woman. During the summer of 2022, Humphrey informed

      Baker that she had tested positive for a sexually transmitted disease.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023    Page 2 of 10
[4]   On August 27, Baker hosted a bonfire at his house for Humphrey’s birthday. At

      some point that night, Humphrey and Baker took Humphrey’s car to a nearby

      business and parked. They exited the car and started kissing. Before long,

      though, “It was like a light switch went off and [Baker] just changed.” Id. at 86.

      “He looked mean. He had an evil look in his eyes. His forehead was, like, like

      he was squinting so his forehead was, like, wrinkled.” Id. According to

      Humphrey, Baker pushed her against the back of the car, punched her in the

      face twice, and then started choking her. He said his STD test came back

      positive and asked Humphrey why she “did this to him.” Id. at 87, 90.

[5]   After about ten seconds, Humphrey broke free and ran toward the road. Baker

      chased after her, grabbed the hood of her sweatshirt, and threw her to the

      ground. Baker got on top of Humphrey and started choking her again.

      Humphrey’s eyes “were starting to roll into the back of [her] head” and she

      could see “nothing but black.” Id. at 94. Baker eventually relented, and after

      some additional arguing, Humphrey managed to get to her car and leave. She

      had marks on various parts of her body, including scratches on her neck and

      bruises on her arms.

[6]   When Humphrey left, Baker called his wife, Rachel, and told her to come pick

      him up. Rachel drove to where Baker was, and Baker said he was going to

      drive. Rachel could see that Baker was “angry,” “breathing heavy,” and

      “sweating” and “kept balling up his fists[.]” Id. at 133. Baker said he and

      Humphrey “got into it” and that “he was going to go burn down her house.” Id.

      at 130, 133, 136. He began driving “[v]ery fast . . . probably over a hundred

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023     Page 3 of 10
       miles an hour.” Id. at 134. Baker drove to Humphrey’s house and confronted

       her as she exited her car. He told Humphrey, “[T]ell your kids I’m sorry B. I’m

       setting your house on fire.” Id. at 99. Baker then drove away.

[7]    The State charged Baker with Level 6 felony domestic battery (elevated from a

       Class A misdemeanor based on a prior conviction for the same offense) and

       Level 6 felony strangulation. The State also alleged that Baker is a habitual

       offender. A jury trial was held in May 2023. Humphrey and Rachel testified as

       described above. Baker testified that Humphrey assaulted him, not the other

       way around.

[8]    After the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury, in part, “Do not

       sign any Verdict form for which there is not unanimous agreement.” Id. at 172.

       Baker did not object to this instruction or offer a different unanimity

       instruction.

[9]    The jury found Baker guilty of both domestic battery and strangulation, and

       Baker admitted his prior domestic-battery conviction and his habitual-offender

       status. The trial court sentenced him to seven years in the Department of

       Correction.

[10]   Baker now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[11]   Baker contends that the lack of a more specific unanimity instruction amounted

       to fundamental error and that as a result his convictions must be reversed and
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023      Page 4 of 10
       the case remanded for a new trial. In the alternative, he argues that the two

       convictions constitute double jeopardy under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227

       (Ind. 2020), and that one of the convictions must be vacated.

       I. Baker has not shown fundamental error in the jury
       instructions
[12]   In arguing that the jury should have been given a more detailed unanimity

       instruction, Baker relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. State, 948

       N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. 2011), reh’g denied. There, the Court held that where

       “evidence is presented of a greater number of separate criminal offenses than

       the defendant is charged with,” and the State doesn’t “designate a specific act

       (or acts) on which it relies,” the jury “should be instructed that in order to

       convict the defendant they must either unanimously agree that the defendant

       committed the same act or acts or that the defendant committed all of the acts

       described by the victim and included within the time period charged.” Id. at

       1175-77. Baker argues that without such an instruction in this case, some jurors

       might have found him guilty of domestic battery believing he choked

       Humphrey, some might have believed he punched her, and some might have

       believed both. Likewise, he contends that some jurors might have found him

       guilty of strangulation believing he choked Humphrey against the car, some

       might have believed he choked her on the ground, and some might have

       believed both.

[13]   Baker acknowledges he didn’t ask the trial court to give the more detailed

       instruction and therefore waived this argument, but he contends that the lack of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023      Page 5 of 10
       such an instruction was fundamental error. “An error is fundamental, and thus

       reviewable despite failure to object, if it made a fair trial impossible or

       constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due

       process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Young v.

       State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 726 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted).

[14]   Baker has not shown fundamental error. When our Supreme Court, in its Baker

       decision, used the phrase “a greater number of separate criminal offenses than

       the defendant is charged with,” it was referring to situations where evidence is

       presented of entirely separate criminal incidents, each of which could be used to

       support a conviction. The defendant in that case was charged with three counts

       of child molesting—one count each for three girls—and the State presented

       evidence that he molested each girl multiple times on separate occasions over a

       period of three years. This Court addressed a similar situation in Castillo v. State,

       734 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, summarily aff’d, 741 N.E.2d

       1196 (Ind. 2001). There, we held that a specific unanimity instruction should

       have been given because the State charged the defendant with one count of

       dealing cocaine but presented evidence of two deals at different times and

       locations.

[15]   Here, on the other hand, the State presented evidence of a single continuous

       attack, albeit an attack that included multiple acts of violence—Baker punching

       Humphrey, throwing her to the ground, pinning her to the ground, and choking

       her twice. Under the continuous-crime doctrine, “actions that are sufficient in

       themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023         Page 6 of 10
       terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to

       constitute a single transaction.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 735 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2010), reh’g denied. Citing this doctrine, we have held that where multiple

       acts that could each support a guilty verdict are all part of a continuous episode,

       a Baker unanimity instruction isn’t required. See Benson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 198

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (one count of attempted murder based on evidence that

       defendant shot at police officer twice during a continuous ninety-second

       pursuit), trans. denied; see also Vest v. State, 930 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (holding that a specific unanimity instruction wasn’t required where the State

       charged the defendant with one count of resisting law enforcement and

       presented evidence that the defendant fled from three officers during a

       continuous two-minute pursuit), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[16]   In this case, the State charged Baker with two offenses—domestic battery and

       strangulation—and it presented evidence of a single continuous attack that

       included both offenses. Therefore, the lack of a specific unanimity instruction

       wasn’t error, let alone fundamental error.

       II. Baker’s convictions are not double jeopardy under Wadle v.
       State
[17]   Alternatively, Baker argues that “one of his convictions should be vacated on

       substantive double jeopardy grounds” under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227

       (Ind. 2020), because the jury “may have” convicted him of both strangulation

       and domestic battery based on the “same act” of choking. Appellant’s Br. p. 18.

       As an initial matter, we think it is highly unlikely the jury found Baker guilty on
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023       Page 7 of 10
       both counts based on the same act of choking. In its closing argument, the

       State’s discussion of the strangulation charge focused on the evidence of

       choking, while its discussion of the domestic-battery charge focused on the

       evidence that Baker punched Humphrey, threw her to the ground, and pinned

       her to the ground. See Tr. pp. 173-77.

[18]   But even assuming the jury based both guilty verdicts on the same act of

       choking, there would be no double-jeopardy violation. In Wadle, our Supreme

       Court established a three-step test for determining whether convictions under

       multiple statutes constitute double jeopardy:

               1. We first look to the statutes themselves. If either statute
                  clearly permits multiple punishment, whether expressly or by
                  unmistakable implication, the court’s inquiry comes to an end
                  and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.

               2. But if the statutory language is not clear, then a court must
                  apply our included-offense statutes to determine whether the
                  charged offenses are the same. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168.
                  If neither offense is included in the other (either inherently or
                  as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy.

               3. But if one offense is included in the other (either inherently or
                  as charged), then the court must examine the facts underlying
                  those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as
                  adduced at trial. If, based on these facts, the defendant’s
                  actions were so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness
                  of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single
                  transaction, then the prosecutor may charge the offenses as
                  alternative sanctions only. But if the defendant’s actions prove
                  otherwise, a court may convict on each charged offense.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023          Page 8 of 10
       151 N.E.3d at 253 (cleaned up).

[19]   Baker’s argument that the jury “may have” convicted him of both strangulation

       and domestic battery based on the same act of choking concerns the third step

       of the test. But we don’t reach the third step unless the second step is satisfied—

       that is, if one offense is included in the other, “either inherently or as charged.”

       Here, the second step isn’t satisfied.

[20]   To determine whether an offense is “inherently included” in another offense,

       we look at the statutory elements of each offense and ask whether (1) one

       offense may be established by proof of the same material elements or less than

       all the material elements of the other offense or (2) the only feature

       distinguishing the two offenses is that a lesser culpability is required to establish

       the commission of the lesser offense. Id. at 251 n.30. Neither is true here. The

       strangulation statute includes an element that the domestic-battery statute does

       not: the defendant must apply pressure to the throat, neck, or upper torso of

       another person, or obstruct the nose or mouth of another person, “in a manner

       that impedes the normal breathing or the blood circulation of the other person.”

       I.C. § 35-42-2-9(c). And the domestic-battery statute includes an element that

       the strangulation statute does not: the victim must be a “family or household

       member.” I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a). Therefore, neither offense is inherently included

       in the other.

[21]   To determine whether an offense is included “as charged” (or “factually

       included”) in another offense, we look at the charging information and ask

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023       Page 9 of 10
       whether it alleges that the means used to commit one offense include all the

       elements of the other offense. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30. Here, the

       strangulation charge specifically alleged that Baker applied pressure to

       Humphrey’s throat or neck, but the domestic-battery charge tracked the

       language of the domestic-battery statute, without alleging any specific act of

       battery. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 17. Therefore, neither offense is included

       “as charged” in the other.

[22]   Because neither offense is included in the other, either inherently or as charged,

       we don’t reach the third step of the Wadle test.1

[23]   Affirmed.

       Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       1
         We noted in Mills v. State, 211 N.E.3d 22, 34 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), that this reading of Wadle means the
       State can in some cases avoid what would otherwise be a clear double-jeopardy violation simply by omitting
       detailed factual allegations from a charging information. The defendant in that case has filed a petition to
       transfer. See No. 22A-CR-1392.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1340 | November 22, 2023                            Page 10 of 10