Court Opinion

ID: 9595866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:43:48.920498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:45.028465
License: Public Domain

Goolsby, Judge
(concurring):
I concur fully in Parts I, III, and IV of the majority opinion. I do not agree with the decision reached in Part II thereof that contributions made by a spouse after the entry of a pendente lite order in a divorce action to a retirement account and the increase in the value of the account attributed to those contributions and property acquired by a spouse after entry of a pendente lite order in a divorce action constitute marital property where the divorce action in which the pendente lite order was obtained did not result in the family court’s equitably distributing the marital property. In other words, I do not agree with the majority’s holding in Part II that property acquired by a spouse while a pendente lite order is in force constitutes marital property even when the action in which the order was obtained did not lead to an equitable division of the marital property. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp. 1994) plainly and unambiguously states that
[t]he term “marital property” . . . means all real and personal property . . . acquired by the parties during the marriage and . . . owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation . . . except the following . . .:
(2) property acquired by either party before the marriage and property acquired after the happening of the earliest of (a) entry of a pendente lite order in a divorce or separate maintenance action; (b) formal signing of a written property or marital settlement agreement; or (c) entry of a permanent order of separate maintenance and support or of a permanent order approving a property or marital *106settlement agreement between the parties. (Emphasis ours.)
In brief, the General Assembly, judging from the clear and unambiguous language employed in section 20-7-473, intended that property acquired by a person in certain defined, similar instances is to be regarded as that person’s sole property. These instances involve the acquisition of property either wholly outside of marriage or during marriage but when the parties no longer function economically as marital partners. Cf. Walker v. Walker, 295 S.C. 286, 288, 368 S.E. (2d) 89, 90 (1988) (“Equitable distribution is based on a recognition that marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership.”); L. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property, § 5.12 p. 106 (1983) (“[Wjhen the parties cease to contribute to the joint enterprise, when the partnership no longer exists, the rationale for equitable distribution is no longer cogent.”).
As to property acquired after the entry of a pendente lite order, the General Assembly did not exempt from the definition of the term “marital property” only that property acquired by a party after entry of a pendente lite order in the divorce or separate maintenance action that “commenc[ed] [the] marital litigation,” i.e., the litigation that leads to a property division. See Shannon v. Shannon, 301 S.C. 107, 390 S.E. (2d) 380 S.E. (2d) 380 (Ct. App. 1990) (defining what constitutes “commencement of marital litigation”).1 Rather, it exempted *107property that a party acquired after entry of a pendente lite order, regardless of whether the action “eommenc[ed] [the] marital litigation,” as Shannon defines that term.
Mr. Hickum, however, did not present this precise argument to the trial court; consequently, I concur in the result reached by the majority. See Schofield v. Richland County Sch. Dist. 316 S.C. 178, 447 S.E. (2d) 189 (1994) (an issue must be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court, in order to be considered on appeal); White v. Livingston, 231 S.C. 301, 98 S.E. (2d) 534 (1957) (one cannot present and try his case on one theory and then thereafter advocate another theory on appeal).

 I do not agree with the majority’s a reliance on Shannon because that case did not address the exceptions contained in S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp. 1994). Rather, it only interprets the meaning of the phrase “commencement of marital litigation,” concluding that “the kind of marital litigation required to trigger the statute must be the same litigation which brings about the equitable division.” Id. at 112, 390 S.E. (2d) at 383.
One other thing I do not agree with. I believe the majority’s decision does not further this state’s public policy of preserving marriages and encouraging reconciliations. It hinders that policy. For example, a husband who acquired assets after the entry of a pendente lite order in a divorce action brought by his wife and who, after the action was stricken from the docket pursuant to FC ADMIN-5 (S.C. Sup. Ct filed June 5, 1992) for failure of the wife to prosecute, chose not to rescue his marriage and moved to restore the case to the family court docket would not suffer an automatic decrease in the amount of his separate property as he would if he attempted to reconcile with his wife, elected not to move for a restoration of the case to the family court docket, failed in the reconciliation attempt, and thereafter brought an action for a divorce against his wife. In the former case, the assets acquired pendente lite would not be considered “marital assets,” while in the latter case they would be so considered.