Court Opinion

ID: 9741501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:56:45.125248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.005037
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN, specially concurring: While I concur with the result reached by the majority, I cannot agree "with its reasoning in its entirety. The case must be reversed and remanded as the admission of defendant’s exhibit B, the “Reason for Separation-Explanation” form, which was filled out by the plaintiff himself, was a clear violation of section 1900 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 640). However, I find the opinion of the majority too sweeping, in its claim that section 1900 “embraces all evidence concerning whether an individual is or is not receiving unemployment benefits” (221 Ill. App. 3d at 626). This is untenable. Such a broad assertion flies in the face of the plain language of the statute and creates a dilemma where none need exist. The evidence found privileged in Smith and Ellis involved a statement and questionnaires provided by an employee and employer, respectively, to the Department of Labor (Department). These are clearly examples of “information obtained from any individual or employing unit” (emphasis added) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 640) and, as such, were properly found privileged under the statute. But Smith clearly states that “the prohibition of the statute is not directed to records of the Department of Labor, but rather *** the disclosure of ‘information obtained from any individual.’ ” (Smith v. Illinois Valley Ice Cream Co. (1959), 20 Ill. App. 2d 312, 320, 156 N.E.2d 361, 365.) These decisions are not factually inconsistent with McMahon or Colvett, both of which dealt with the use of Department records and final decisions, not information obtained from any claimant or employer. My disagreement is with the majority’s broad language. It may be that Department records and decisions are so intertwined with the “information obtained” that not even the final decision should be used, or it may be that the Department’s final decision could be reviewed independently of the information obtained. This question, however, was not addressed by the trial court. I would not hold, as does the majority, that all documents in the file are inadmissible. I would reverse so that the trial court could examine the documents to determine whether the “information obtained” is so intertwined with the final decision as to preclude the latter’s admissibility. As the trial court’s ruling on the issue I have addressed could eliminate the issue of res judicata, I will not address it further other than to note that I have serious misgivings about its application in cases of this type. To impose an administrative tribunal’s finding on either the employee or the employer in a future retaliatory discharge action may not be fair to either. The administrative hearing may be concerned with only a few hundred dollars while the retaliatory discharge suit may involve a claim of several hundred thousand dollars and may be accompanied by a punitive damages count. I point this out not to suggest that smaller claims do not merit the consideration that larger claims do, but to emphasize that either side might treat the smaller claim more lightly. This rationale is evidenced by the exclusion of prior traffic court convictions. (Smith v. Andrews (1965), 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 62, 203 N.E.2d 160, 166.) These convictions often result from expediency, convenience or compromise. Such rulings often lack the adequate assurances of reliability and constitutional safeguards to warrant admission, much less grant res judicata effect. (Hengels v. Gilski (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 894, 910, 469 N.E.2d 708, 721.) Likewise, the automatic imposition of res judicata effect under the instant circumstances may not be appropriate.