Court Opinion

ID: 9796667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:02:07.436451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:53.879771
License: Public Domain

ROSENBLUM, J.,
dissenting.
I would find that defendant absconded from supervision, and I would dismiss this appeal.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, defendant was most certainly on supervised probation at the time of his return to the United States,1 having been placed on formal *29probation for 18 months, with all the general conditions of probation as well as several special conditions. There is no argument that his probation had expired, and there is no indication in the record that his probationary status was ever changed, suspended, or terminated; thus, defendant remained on formal — that is, supervised — probation throughout the relevant time period. Even defendant concedes that “he remained on probation subject to its terms and conditions after he was deported * * *.”*2 210 Or App at 26.
The majority states that I “improperly equate[ ] the concept of formal probation with the concept of supervised probation * * Id. at 26. Aside from labeling my understanding as “improper,” the majority is correct. In my view, to be on formal probation is to be under supervision.3
In arriving at its understanding of “supervision,” the majority notes that, in construing statutes and rules, we are to give a word its ordinary meaning when the word is not specifically defined. That much I can readily agree with. I do not, however, agree with the majority’s strict reliance on the dictionary definition of “supervision.” This court has noted that dictionaries do not always reflect the intended meaning *30of a given term. See Confederated Tribes (Siletz) v. Employment Dept., 165 Or App 65, 74, 995 P2d 580 (2000) (“We agree that we may not simply rely on the dictionary definition of a statutory term as conclusive proof of the legislature’s intent.”). Rather, the “ordinary meaning” must be viewed in the context in which the word is used. See id. (“We must construe the statute in its context, which includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes.”).
Although neither the rules of appellate procedure nor the Oregon Revised Statutes formally defines “supervision,” related statutes provide useful context for understanding that term. Specifically, ORS 137.540(1), which sets forth the general conditions of probation, illustrates what constitutes supervision. Among other things, that statute requires a probationer to obtain permission before leaving the state or changing employment or residence; to permit the supervising officer to visit the probationer’s work site and residence and to inspect the residence; to answer all reasonable inquiries of the probation office; and to report as required and abide by the direction of the supervising officer. ORS 137.540(1)(e), (g), (h), (k), (o).
In my view, “supervision” should be understood as encompassing all of those requirements. A person is under supervision not merely when the person is reporting to his or her probation officer or when the probation officer is visiting the person’s work site or residence or directing the person to take certain actions. A person is under supervision if he or she is restrained from leaving the state or changing employment or residence without prior permission: that restraint allows the probation officer to monitor the person’s whereabouts and activities. Such monitoring constitutes supervision.4
The majority’s understanding of “supervision” eviscerates the meaning of that term, reducing it merely to active interaction between the probationer and the supervising officer. The majority concludes that defendant was not under supervision based on its initial (and incorrect) conclusion *31that the trial court deleted the general condition requiring him to report to his probation officer after he was deported.5 Even if the majority’s premise were correct, it does not follow from the fact that defendant was not required to report that he was not under supervision. Given that supervision entails more than simply reporting, the deletion of the reporting requirement would not alter the supervisory aspect of defendant’s probation.
Because defendant was under supervision, the only remaining pertinent question is whether he absconded from supervision. When defendant returned to the United States and failed to let anyone at the probation office know that he was back, and — even more significant — how he could be reached, he “ ‘evade [d]’ ” the “ ‘direction, inspection and critical evaluation’ ” of the probation office. 210 Or App at 25 (quoting definitions of “abscond” and “supervision” in Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 6, 2296 (unabridged ed 2002)). In other words, he absconded from supervision. Furthermore, he did not surrender to the authorities — his only other chance of saving his appeal. A warrant had issued for his arrest, and he was arrested on the warrant.
In short, the facts of the case neatly fit the rule in ORAP 8.05(3). Cf. Pruett and Pruett, 185 Or App 669, 676, 60 P3d 1094, rev den, 335 Or 443 (2003) (dismissing the appeal under the court’s discretionary authority to dismiss *32appeals in cases to which ORAP 8.05(3) does not apply). I would dismiss this appeal pursuant to ORAP 8.05(3).

 Despite the fact that the trial court file indicates that, in January 2006, six months after defendant was deported, he was arraigned for, and admitted to, a probation violation, the majority reports only that “it was believed that [defendant] had returned to the United States.” 210 Or App at 24. The majority notes that the state has not asked us to take judicial notice of any part of the trial court record, id., and it evidently concludes that, because the state failed to do so, taking notice of the record is improper. See id. at 28 (declining to exercise the court’s inherent authority to dismiss defendant’s appeal because “ [a] 11 we know from the record presented to us by the state in support of its motion to dismiss is that defendant may have returned to the United States and a warrant was issued for his arrest”). I question whether examining the trial court file actually constitutes taking judicial notice, but even if it does, the majority’s refusal to do so is misguided. The majority relies on OEC 201(d), which requires a court to take judicial notice if requested to do so by a party and supplied with the necessary information, but it ignores OEC 201(c), which provides, “A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.” *29(Emphasis added.) I agree with the majority’s implicit admonition that, in a motion to dismiss an appeal, the state should make an effort to provide us with a better-developed record than we have in this case. Nevertheless, the majority should acknowledge, at the very least, that defendant did in fact return to the United States after being deported, not merely that he “may have returned.”

 Defendant’s probation officer certainly considered defendant to be on supervised probation. She filed an application for an arrest warrant alleging a violation of formal, supervised probation: failure to report. Based on her affidavit, the court issued an arrest warrant. Defendant appears to have understood the nature of his probation as well: Upon his arrest, he admitted to the violation. While it is not clear from the record exactly what defendant admitted to by way of a violation, it seems fair to assume that it was what was alleged: failure to report.

 Although more likely to occur in the context of “bench probation” — yet another form of supervised probation, see OAR 213-003-0001(1) (“ ‘Bench probation’ means a probationary sentence, which directs the probationer to remain under the supervision and control of the sentencing judge.”) — there might be instances when the defendant could be placed on formal probation and the sentencing court informs the defendant that he or she will not be held to any of the general conditions of probation beyond the requirement that the defendant obey all laws. See ORS 137.540(l)(j) (providing that a probationer shall “[o]bey all laws, municipal, county, state, and federal”). Even in such a case, the defendant is under supervision to the extent that the court monitors the defendant’s criminal record with an eye toward new offenses. In any event, this is not one of those instances.

 It may be that there are some forms of supervision from which a person simply cannot abscond — for example, if the person is merely required not to commit any new offenses. This is not such a case.

 I say that the majority’s initial conclusion is wrong because ORS 137.540(1) provides that the general conditions of probation listed in that statute apply “unless specifically deleted by the court.” (Emphasis added.) “Specifically” means “with exactness and precision : in a definite manner.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2187 (unabridged ed 2002). Thus, a court may delete a general condition of probation only by doing so unambiguously. The special condition of probation cited by the majority required defendant to report to his probation officer within 30 days if he legally reentered the United States, but it did not, as the majority asserts, delete the requirements of ORS 137.540(1)(o). The purpose of the special condition is not unambiguous: It could mean, by negative implication, that defendant was not required to report at all unless he returned legally to the United States, as the majority asserts. It could also mean that, even if defendant’s probation officer did not require him to report after returning, he had to do so anyway (within 30 days) because it was ordered directly by the judge. It could also mean that his probation officer could not require him to report within fewer than 30 days after returning. The point is, the trial court did not delete the reporting requirement with the “exactness and precision” that the statute requires. Consequently, because the trial court did not “specifically” delete the conditions provided in ORS 137.540(1)(o), they remained in effect.