Court Opinion

ID: 9716877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:53:10.007221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.634180
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court long ago determined that the protections of the Constitution were non-suspendable.
“The Constitution of the United States is a law for ruler and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances.”
Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866).
The majority of this court apparently disagrees. It realistically includes an addendum to these provisions reading “except in the war on drugs”. It seems this “war” is no longer of the same class as other wars. Rather, the war on drugs knows no constitutional limitations. It now is able to transcend constitutional boundaries guaranteeing the security of the home and justifies warrantless entry into the living room of the American family. Why this particular “war” is able to conquer fundamental rights and privileges is unexplained. In the zest to eradicate the drug culture in our society this war has apparently been elevated to a level above that held by the Constitution.
At about 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, April 28, 1985, J.M., a drug dealer, drug user, prostitute, exotic dancer, and one time former police informant, told police that appellant, her boyfriend, and a man named Orth, had abducted her at gun point at 1:00 p.m. the day before from a nightclub parking lot and held her in a motel room until she had been able to make her escape. She claimed that she had been raped and sodomized and forced to inject cocaine, and that the two men had also used drugs.
At about 10:30 a.m., armed with this information, the police placed the motel room, occupied by the two men, under surveillance. The police were not acquainted with the two men. Shortly thereafter appellant emerged from the room, got in his car and quickly drove out of the parking lot. Police followed him and, driving directly behind him, turned on their flashing red lights. Appellant accelerated quickly but police were able to surround his vehicle and force him off the road. After being so stopped appellant stepped out of his car without prompting, and the police noticed a gun in his right rear pocket. They removed the gun from his pocket, arrested him, and transported him back to the motel.
A uniformed officer and two others approached the door of the room with weapons drawn and knocked on it. They had no *494warrant and had not attempted to get one. Orth then pulled the curtain back and looked out. He opened the door after vigorous and repeated requests were made, and they simply forced their way in after the door was opened. The trial prosecutor stipulated that Orth did not open the door by consent. Once inside the officers saw white powder and some scales on a table. Orth was arrested. Upon searching the room, the police found narcotics “cutting” agents, a grinder, a sifter, plastic sandwich bags, small bottles, and other drug paraphernalia. A forensic chemist determined that the seized items were seven tablets of Diazepam and over ten grams of cocaine.
Official action intruding into a residence and searching it is restricted by the Fourth Amendment which provides a constitutional means for the police to gather information to be used in criminal prosecutions. Evidence obtained by means which are not constitutional is not admissible.
“... the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ The exceptions are ‘jealously and carefully drawn’, and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption * * * that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ ‘[T]he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need 403 it.’ 443,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, L.Ed.2d U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
The majority opinion designates the following as exigent circumstances:
(1) the police had probable cause to believe that an offense had been or was being committed;
(2) it would be impractical for the police to delay the search until a warrant was issued;
(3) A postponed search could have resulted in the disappearance of appellant and the evidence with no means of tracing his whereabouts.
Probable cause is not an exception to the warrant requirement and no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless entry and search of a residence. In addition to probable cause, exigent circumstances must be present. Robles v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 660. Exigent circumstances include:
(1) risk of bodily harm or death;
(2) to aid a person in need of assistance;
(3) to protect private property;
(4) actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant may be obtained.
Sayre v. State (1984), Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 708.
As noted above, probable cause is not the equivalent of exigent circumstances, so the fact police may have had probable cause to believe an offense had been or was being committed did not justify a warrantless entry and search. Impracticality has yet to be recognized as worthy of overriding a constitutional requirement. Judges are not as easily accessible on Sunday but they are accessible. The assertion that delay might result in the disappearance of appellant and the evidence is the only proposition which even comes close to a recognized exigent circumstance. However, that assertion is false. Appellant was already in custody at the time of the decision to enter and search the motel room. His opportunities to disappear with the evidence were therefore limited. Further, were the potential flight of Orth, the occupant of the motel room, offered as an exigent circumstance, it would not suffice. Orth was unaware that appellant had been arrested and had indicated no intention to flee or destroy the drugs. He had informed the motel desk that he intended to spend another night. It is pure speculation that Orth would destroy over ten grams of cocaine on a whim or through consumption. The motel room was surrounded and the victim was readily available at the scene to supply an affidavit of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. The warrantless entry and search were violative of the Fourth Amendment and all evidence seized pursuant thereto should have been suppressed.
*495The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent by finding exigent circumstances in mere probable cause contrary to the warrant requirement. The rationale expressed by the opinion leads to the conclusion that probable cause to believe drugs are located in a private home justifies entry and search of that home without a warrant. This is contrary to all existing precedent and constitutionally unsupportable.