Court Opinion

ID: 9790385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:25.257108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.286267
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). Following appellee’s motion for rehearing, I submit the following modified special concurrence and dissenfa I concur with the majority that the order modifying joint custody should be reversed and remanded for adoption of amended findings of fact and conclusions of law, and for entry of an amended order addressing the cross-motions of the parents to modify the joint custody provisions of the original divorce decree. I write separately to clarify what I believe to be the proper rule relating to the burden of proof where a parent seeks to modify a joint custody decree so as to permit relocation of a child to a different city or state, thus substantially impacting the provisions of the prior decree of joint custody. The majority opinion states, under the circumstances of this case, that it “declinéis] to place the burden of proof on [the] mother to establish that the proposed relocation to New Hampshire is in the child’s best interests.” I disagree that this statement correctly spells out the proper rule. Although in this case both the mother and father indicated their desire to relocate, insofar as the proposed move of each of the parents may materially impact the provisions of the existing joint custody provision, each party carried the burden of establishing that any proposed modification of the prior joint custody order is in the child’s best interests. In Strosnider v. Strosnider, 101 N.M. 639, 646, 686 P.2d 981, 988 (Ct.App.1984), this court observed that an order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon the motion of one or both parties if the best interests of the minor require modification or termination of the order. Similarly, in Garcia v. Garcia, 81 N.M. 277, 466 P.2d 554 (1970), a case not involving joint child custody, our supreme court stated that the right of a custodial parent to relocate should not be interfered with except where the move would be clearly contrary to the child’s welfare. Similarly, the applicable rule in cases involving joint legal and physical child custody, where the decree is silent concerning the right of relocation, and where the parties are unable to agree upon modification, requires a parent seeking to move to a location substantially distant from the place of former residence, to prove that the relocation will be in the child’s best interest. In such case, NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-9.1(J)(4) (Repl.Pamp.1989), requires advance written notice of the proposed relocation. Section 40-4-9.-1(A) provides that “[t]here shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a child in an initial custody determination.” The statute also specifies that “the court shall not terminate joint custody unless there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, since entry of the joint custody order.” Id. The presumption created under Section 40-4-9(A), that joint custody is in the best interest of a child, does not disappear where one party seeks to move outside the state, and the burden remains on the parent seeking to relocate, if relocation will require modification of the joint custody decree, to show that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests. See Newhouse v. Chavez, 108 N.M. 319, 772 P.2d 353 (Ct.App.1988) (burden is on parent seeking modification of child custody to show change of circumstances and that change overcomes presumption in favor of reasonableness of original decree); Alfieri v. Alfieri, 105 N.M. 373, 733 P.2d 4 (Ct.App.1987) (burden of proof to establish change of child custody is upon party seeking modification); see also Seeley v. Jaramillo, 104 N.M. 783, 727 P.2d 91 (Ct.App.1986) (once custody has been decided by the court, a presumption exists in favor of the reasonableness of the original decree); Blake v. Blake, 207 Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988) (burden of proving that a modification of custody is in the best interests of child rests with the party seeking modification). The proximity of the homes of the parents is an important factor for consideration in evaluating joint custody. In the text, 2 J. McCahey, M. Kaufman, C. Kraut, D. Gaffner, M. Silverman & J. Zett, Child Custody & Visitation Law and Practice § 13.08[4][a] (1990), the authors note: When one parent desires to move to a new location considerably distant from the other parent, modification from joint to sole custody is frequently sought. The increasing tendency of courts is not to allow modification of an otherwise workable and successful joint legal custody arrangement for the sole reason that one parent wishes to change locale. As the court stated in Rusin v. Rusin, [103 Misc.2d 534, 426 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1980)] mere distance does not outweigh the benefits of joint (legal) custody, nor make joint custody unworkable. Another court [Bazant v. Bazant, 80 App.Div.2d 310, 439 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1981)], further reasoned that modern transportation and communication lessen many adverse effects of geographic separation. Although courts may grant modification of a joint custody award due to one parent’s geographic move, the modification is usually coupled with other demonstrable changes in circumstance which adversely affect the child. [Footnotes omitted.] In view of the fact that public policy favors an award of joint custody, except where such award is demonstrably contrary to the best interests of the child, the courts should attempt to accommodate a parent’s desire to relocate, and at the same time preserve the positive aspects of the joint custody provisions. The burden of proof, however, rests upon each party seeking to modify a prior joint custody decree to show that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interests. If the proposed relocation will necessitate modification of the joint custody order, the court should also require the party seeking the change to submit a proposed modified parenting plan for review by the court. See, e.g., § 40-4-9.1(F)(5).