Court Opinion

ID: 9953718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:02:49.05921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:06.629961
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 In re Z.R. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 In re Z.R., a Person Coming                                     B331435
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct.
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           No. 22CCJP01774A)

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 C.R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark A. Davis, Judge. Conditionally affirmed
and remanded with directions.
      Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
     C.R. (father) appeals from the August 31, 2023 order
terminating parental rights to his child (minor) under section
366.26.1 We conditionally affirm and remand.
      The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies
constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)
      Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court
and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) did not comply with their obligations
under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.).
According to father, the Department failed to comply with its
continuing duty to interview extended family members regarding
ICWA despite having contact with several maternal and paternal
family members. The Department contends that because mother,

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

                                 2
father, maternal grandparents, and paternal grandmother all
denied any Indian ancestry, there is substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s determination that ICWA does not
apply.
       State law imposes on the Department a first-step inquiry
duty to “interview, among others, extended family members and
others who had an interest in the child.” (In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; see § 224.2, subd. (b).) Federal
regulations explain that the term “[e]xtended family member is
defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s Tribe or, in the
absence of such law or custom, is a person who has reached
age 18 and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle,
brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew,
first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2017).)
The duty of initial inquiry includes making a meaningful effort to
interview available relatives. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
542, 552–553.)
       We agree with father that the Department failed to comply
with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California
law. (See In re H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; In re
Charles W. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.) Specifically, the
record indicates that the Department had contact with paternal
grandfather, maternal cousin J.R., who was minor’s caregiver,
and other maternal relatives. But there is no indication that
those reasonably available extended family members were asked
about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. It therefore appears
that the Department failed to fulfill its initial duty of inquiry
under ICWA. We will therefore conditionally affirm and remand
for further proceedings.

                                 3
                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s August 31, 2023 order terminating
parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26 is conditionally affirmed and remanded for proceedings
required by this opinion. The court shall order the Department
to make reasonable efforts to (1) interview all available extended
family members about the possibility of the child’s Indian
ancestry, including those extended family members that the
Department had previous contact with, namely, the paternal
grandfather and maternal cousin J.R., as well as other
reasonably available maternal relatives; and (2) report on the
results of those efforts. Nothing in this disposition precludes the
court from ordering the Department to make inquiry of the
additional family members identified in the record or others who
may have an interest in the child. Based on the information
reported, if the court determines that no additional inquiry or
notice to tribes is necessary, the order terminating parental
rights is to be reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is
warranted, the court shall make all necessary orders to ensure
compliance with ICWA and related California law.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     MOOR, J.

I concur:

                  KIM, J.

                                 4
In re Z.R.
B331435

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

       I would affirm because substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
does not apply. (In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 132 (dis.
opn. of Baker, J.); In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984; In
re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 439 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)
The majority does not even mention the controlling deferential
standard of review in its opinion, and understandably so: on this
record, where ICWA-related inquiry was made of the parents and
of extended family members on both the maternal and paternal
sides of the child’s family, there is no principled basis to conclude
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding.
(See, e.g., In re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, 323 [denials of
Indian ancestry by the parents and interviews of extended family
members on both sides of the family “‘reliably answered’” the
question of whether the children were Indian children].) By all
appearances then, what is really going on in this appeal is what I
feared would happen: a court unjustifiably “follow[ing] a new
unspoken rule[ that requires] interrogat[ing] every person
contacted in a child welfare investigation about ICWA issues.”
(H.V., supra, at 442 (dis. opn. of Baker, J.).)

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.