Court Opinion

ID: 9741334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:53:48.922283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.131754
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: At issue in this case is whether the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the Department) has jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging racial discrimination in an academic program at a public university. We conclude that it does not. Plaintiffs, the Board of Trustees (the Board) of Southern Illinois University (SIU) and certain of SIU’s employees, David White, Jim Bramlet, Richard Moy and Terry Travis, were granted a writ of prohibition by the circuit court of Jackson County to prevent defendants, the Department, its director, Joyce E. Tucker, and two of its investigators, Freddie Gatewood and Stanley R. Moen, from pursuing certain charges against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had been charged with unlawful discrimination in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 1 — 101 et seq.). The circuit court determined that the Department did not have statutory jurisdiction to investigate the charges because the alleged discrimination occurred in the context of the SIU’s academic programs. A divided appellate court reversed (228 Ill. App. 3d 367), and we granted plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315). We now reverse the appellate court’s ruling. The facts which gave rise to this appeal began when two black SIU students, Kevin Mitchell and Marsha Stokes, filed charges with the Department alleging that plaintiffs had discriminated against them based on their race or sex in violation of the Act. Mitchell charged that Terry Travis, the director of psychiatry clerkship at SIU’s school of medicine, and Richard Moy, the dean of the medical school, unlawfully discriminated against him when he was dismissed from the medical school after his third year. He claimed he was treated differently than nonblack and female classmates in the way he was evaluated. Mitchell also alleged that he was denied the same opportunities to retake final examinations and for clerkships, and that Travis demonstrated a racial bias which harmed the evaluation of Mitchell’s clerkship at his dismissal hearing. Stokes alleged that she was the only black student in the commercial graphics program at SIU. She claimed that David White, Jim Bramlet, and the Board were guilty of unlawful racial discrimination by sanctioning the existence of a racially hostile classroom environment. Stokes alleged that the other, white students were allowed to harass and threaten her and to subject her to racial epithets. Further, she was suspended from class without advance notice, which was usually provided to other students. The Department served copies of the charges on the plaintiffs. SIU filed a response on behalf of all the plaintiffs, in which it opined that the Department lacked jurisdiction “to entertain allegations of racial discrimination in academic programs.” The Department informed SIU that it intended to assert jurisdiction over the charges. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to block the Department from proceeding further. The circuit court of Jackson County subsequently entered a default judgment for plaintiffs which permanently enjoined the Department from taking any additional action with regard to the charges. The appellate court reversed the default judgment and remanded the cause to the circuit court for consideration on the merits. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 644. On remand, plaintiffs filed an amended petition for writ of prohibition. Although similar to the initial petition, the amended petition added a request to block the Department from conducting any and all proceedings in the matter of an unlawful discrimination claim filed by another black SIU student, Michael Scruggs. Scruggs claimed that the Board unlawfully discriminated against him by grading and testing him differently than white students, resulting in the denial of his admission to a Ph.D. program. The amended petition was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment, as there were no disputed facts. The only question was the legal issue of whether the Department had jurisdiction to pursue the discrimination charges where the challenged conduct occurred in the context of SIU’s academic programs. The circuit court held that the Department had no such jurisdiction and granted the writ of prohibition. A split appellate court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the cause. (228 111. App. 3d 367.) The majority of the appellate court concluded that it did not matter whether SIU was considered a place of public accommodation within the context of its academic programs because section 5 — 102(C) of the Act, which prohibits discrimination by a public official, does not require that such discrimination occur within a place of public accommodation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 102(0. DISCUSSION "An administrative agency *** has no greater powers than those conferred upon it by the legislative enactment creating it.” (Village of Lombard v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 503, 506.) Thus, our inquiry is whether the General Assembly gave the Department jurisdiction to hear this case. There are but two sections of the Act which could arguably give rise to a claim of jurisdiction for the Department over the conduct alleged: section 5 — 102(A) or section 5 — 102(C) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, pars. 5 — 102(A), (C)). We address these sections in turn. Section 5 — 102(A) states: "It is a civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to: (A) *** Deny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and services of any public place of accommodation.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 102(A). At issue is whether an academic program in a public institution of higher learning is a "public place of accommodation” under the Act. Since the primary role of the court in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature (In re Marriage of Logston (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 266, 277), we look to the legislature’s definition of the term to resolve this issue. Section 5 — 101(A) defines a "Place of Public Accommodation” as follows: "(1) 'Place of public accommodation’ means a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public. (2) By way of example, but not of limitation, 'place of public accommodation’ includes facilities of the following types: inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors, taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores, shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, public golf courses, public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, busses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water, or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation and amusement.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 101(A). The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statute lists several classes of persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated persons or things will be interpreted as those "others such like” the named persons or things. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 389, 396; Farley v. Marion Power Shovel Co. (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436. We note that the terms "institution of higher education,” "education program” and "classroom” are not contained anywhere in the list provided in the Act. Further, the examples listed in the Act are fundamentally different from institutions of higher education, which administer educational programs. The cited establishments are examples of facilities for overnight accommodations, entertainment, recreation or transportation. The definition specifically requires that the "services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations [be] extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 101(A)(1). Thus, what was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, or a pub, or a bookstore. What was not anticipated is an academic program of a higher education institution. Thus, we hold that the conduct alleged by the Department does not fall within section 5 — 102(A), and consequently no jurisdiction is conferred by that section over this cause of action. The second arguable source of jurisdiction is section 5 — 102(C). That section makes it a civil rights violation to "[d]env or refuse to another, as a public official, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantage, facilities or privileges of the official’s office or services or any property under the official’s care because of unlawful discrimination.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 102(C). Plaintiffs concede that they are public officials for purposes of the Act, as the Act defines a public official as "any officer or employee of the state.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 101(C).) Thus, the issue becomes whether academic programs are "accommodations” of these public officials for purposes of section 5 — 102(C). Again, the primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. (In re Marriage of Logston (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 266, 277.) When the legislature spoke of the accommodations of a public official’s office, it was by definition referring to public accommodations. We therefore give the same reading to "the accommodations *** of the [public] official’s office or services” that we did to "public accommodations.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 5 — 102(C).) Consequently, we hold that the conduct alleged by the Department does not fall within section 5 — 102(C), and consequently no jurisdiction is conferred by that section to this cause of action. This conclusion is bolstered by the legislature’s 1983 enactment of article 5A of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, pars. 5A — 101, 5A — 102). That article specifically confers jurisdiction on the Department over claims of sexual harassment in higher education. Where the legislature has made a material change in a statute, such as by adding specific limited jurisdiction language, the presumption is that "the amendment was intended to change the law.” State of Illinois v. Mikusch (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 242, 252. Had higher education already been covered by the Act, a simple amendment adding sexual harassment to the Department’s jurisdiction would have been sufficient. The addition of an entire new article evinces the legislature’s understanding that, until that new article’s passage, no jurisdiction had yet been conferred to the Department over institutions of higher education. Since 1983, the Department has had jurisdiction over higher education, but only over a very distinct type of claim: sexual harassment. Since no such allegation was made in the present cause, the trial court appropriately granted the writ of prohibition, and the appellate court erroneously reversed. Thus, we reverse the appellate court and affirm the trial court. Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed. JUSTICE HARRISON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.