Court Opinion

ID: 9741834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:02:48.945176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:26.616644
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I cannot agree with the multiple convictions based on separate firemen being injured. There is no question but that multiple crimes may arise out of a single act where separate individuals are victims of the act. (People v. Mercado (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 461, 463, 456 N.E.2d 331, 333; People v. Williams (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 597, 475 N.E.2d 1082.) In Mercado, three reckless homicide convictions were based upon three people being killed as a result of reckless conduct. Mercado was driving under the influence of alcohol. Reckless homicide is not an enhancement of the crime of driving under the influence. The elements of the offenses are different, and no lesser included status exists. Driving under the influence convictions can rest solely on the defendant driving a motor vehicle while under the influence. Reckless homicide requires a reckless operation of the vehicle and a resulting death. In Williams, there was a single conviction for aggravated arson, but there were three homicide convictions because of the death of three people in the fire. There were separate offenses: (1) starting the fire, and (2) the killing of three people. Arson is included by reference in the aggravated arson provision. Section 20 — 1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 20 — 1.1(a)) provides, in part: “(a) A person commits aggravated arson when in the course of committing arson ***.” It, thus, appears that aggravated arson is intended to be an enhancement of the offense of arson. The enhancement can be based on one or more of three happenings: “(1) [A person] knows or reasonably should know that one or more persons are present therein or (2) any person suffers great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement as a result of the fire or explosion or (3) a fireman or policeman who is present at the scene acting in the line of duty, is injured as a result of the fire or explosion.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 20-l.l(a)(l), (a)(2), (a)(3).) Proof of any one of the three conditions can result in a Class X sentence. Under section 20 — 1.1(a)(1) of the Code, injury need not occur, and the wording is both singular and plural. Both subsections 20— 1.1(a)(2) and 20 — 1.1(a)(3) are stated in the singular. The basic crime of arson relates to the illegal use of fire or explosives. This is in contrast to the crime of homicide, reckless homicide, kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping, all of which are, by definition, crimes against individuals. Our supreme court in People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844, cert, denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 273, discussed multiple convictions but dealt with lesser included offenses carved out of the same act, allowing multiple convictions where there were separate acts, though by nature interrelated. We are concerned whether aggravated arson was intended to enhance arson penalties, or whether it was to create crimes against each person injured. I would find that the legislative intent was to enhance the penalty, not to create separate offenses. Our courts have held that there can be only one conviction for home invasion, regardless of the number of persons injured. (People v. Yarbrough (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 643, 646, 509 N.E.2d 747, 749; People v. Hawkins (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 520, 522-23, 466 N.E.2d 299, 301; People v. Ammons (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861, 458 N.E.2d 1031, 1036.) The home invasion statute uses the words “causes any injury to any person or persons” (singular and plural) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 — 11(a)(2)), while section 20 — 1.1(a)(3) of the Code refers to “fireman or policeman who is present” (seemingly a singular connotation) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 20— 1.1(a)(3)). However, section 20 — 1.1(a)(1) is plural and can result in the same sentence as an offense alleging the 20 — 1.1(a)(3) requirements. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed (3 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes & Statutory Construction §59.03 (Sands 4th ed. 1986)), and this legislation should be construed to provide for only one conviction of aggravated arson regardless of the number of firemen injured or the number of people present in the building ignited. I concur in all other aspects of the majority opinion.