Court Opinion

ID: 9695514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:25.665985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.657410
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, PAUL H, Justice
(dissenting).
DISSENT
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer. I write separately to express my concern about another facet of the majority opinion.
In State v. Shriner, 751 N.W.2d 538, 549 (Minn.2008), we held that the rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates a single-factor exigent circumstance that allows law enforcement to force the drawing of blood from a defendant when probable cause exists that the defendant has committed criminal vehicular homicide or operation under Minn.Stat. § 609.21 (2006). I joined Justice Meyer’s dissent in Shriner because I agreed that the majority had created a new rule of law that eroded the rights of Minnesota citizens to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. See Shriner, 751 N.W.2d at 550 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Today I again dissent because I conclude that the majority has further eroded these rights by extending the single-factor exigency rule beyond criminal vehicular homicide and applying it to driving while intoxicated offenses. State v. Netland, 762 N.W.2d at 212-14. For the same reasons set forth in the Shriner dissent, 751 N.W.2d at 550-57, I believe it is unwise to say that law enforcement is per se justified in taking blood-evidence evidence without a warrant in DWI cases. Rather, we should maintain our jurisprudence that requires the State, under a totality-of-the-*215circumstances analysis, to explain why law enforcement could have reasonably believed the blood-alcohol evidence would disappear before a warrant could be obtained.