Court Opinion

ID: 9575546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:41.334005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:20.422352
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
The majority today explains its previous order that the Arizona League of Women Voters was guilty of laches in its attempt to keep Proposition 110 off the ballot, so that its request for an injunction should have been denied by the trial court. I dissented from the previous order, and I dissent from the present opinion explaining that order.
As the majority acknowledges, the affirmative defense of laches exists only when the. evidence shows that the delay is “ ‘unreasonable under the circumstances ... and ... the delay has resulted in prejudice to the other party sufficient to justify denial of relief.’ ”4 Neither of these predicates for the doctrine of laches is supported by the record in this case.
UNREASONABLE DELAY
The plain facts show that there was delay in bringing the injunction suit. But was that delay unreasonable? In rejecting laches as a defense, the trial judge implicitly found that the delay was not unreasonable. Neither the Secretary of State nor Arizonans for Common Sense made any attempt to establish facts showing that the delay was unreasonable. It was their burden to establish the defense of laches. See Lakin Cattle Co. v. Engelthaler, 101 Ariz. 282, 284, 419 P.2d 66, 68 (1966); Rule 8(c), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. Despite this, the majority summarily concludes that the delay was unreasonable because plaintiffs could have brought the suit earlier.
The court should not presume that a citizens’ organization dealing with issues so divisive and emotional as abortion rights and funding acted unreasonably simply by failing to bring the action earlier than five weeks after the signatures were certified. Although plaintiffs may have known of their potential legal challenge in advance, they hardly could have brought the action before certification. There was no way to tell whether the large number of necessary signatures would even be obtained — let alone certified.
We do know that pro bono counsel who was working on the case withdrew, making it necessary to find new pro bono counsel. We do not know why prior counsel withdrew, but we do know that the new counsel acted more than expeditiously. In sum, we know that there was delay, we know that the case was filed late — as has been almost every other election contest that this court has heard, but we do not know the cause of the delay. It follows, therefore, that we cannot know that the delay was unreasonable. Because it is the defendant’s burden to show the delay was unreasonable, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in rejecting the defense of laches.
PREJUDICE
Even if the delay had been unreasonable, laches should not be applied because the defendants have failed to show prejudice. *462The trial judge explicitly refused to rely on plaintiffs’ expert evidence, disregarding it altogether in reaching her decision. Instead, the ruling was based solely on the judge’s reading of the proposed constitutional amendment and her conclusion that, as a matter of law, Proposition 110 facially violated the single subject requirement of article 21, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution.
The trial judge did not abuse her discretion in disregarding expert evidence when applying the single subject rule to the proposed constitutional amendment. After all, no Arizona court applying article 21, § 1 has ever indicated that it considered, needed, or wanted expert evidence to help decide whether a proposed amendment or statute dealt with more than one subject. Although such evidence might be useful, we have, to date, decided every case brought under this constitutional provision without the benefit of expert testimony. See Slayton v. Shumway, 166 Ariz. 87, 800 P.2d 590 (1990); Tilson v. Mofford, 153 Ariz. 468, 737 P.2d 1367 (1987); State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 90, 449 P.2d 18 (1968), vacated, 104 Ariz. 193, 450 P.2d 383, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 5, 90 S.Ct. 24, 24 L.Ed.2d 4 (1969); State ex rel. Jones v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 390, 265 P.2d 447 (1953); Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549 (1934). Nor did the defense in this case suggest that such testimony was necessary from its standpoint. The real prejudice that the majority relies on, therefore, is, first, the hardship defendants’ lawyers may have experienced in preparing for the hearing, and, second, the perceived unfairness to the process when this court must hear and decide the matter so quickly.
A. Hardship to Counsel
While I share much of the court’s concern regarding the difficulties encountered and the dangers presented when the court and the lawyers must act so quickly, I believe the majority makes too much of the difficulty defendants’ lawyers may have had in addressing the issues in this case on short notice. According to the majority, defendants were prejudiced because on short notice their lawyers were forced to “marshal their witnesses, facts and legal arguments; analyze the challenge, research and brief the issues; and prepare for a trial on the merits to defend against undisclosed evidentiary materials.”5 I am not persuaded. There are many lawyers who have done as much in preparing to meet requests for stays, temporary restraining orders, and preliminary injunctions, as well as petitions for writs of mandamus, prohibition, and all other matters now encompassed under the rubric of special actions. See Rule 1, Ariz.R.P.Spec.Act, 17B A.R.S.
Such inconvenience, unfortunately, is the emotional and physical cost of time-dependent equitable relief. To date, so far as I know, all of our lawyers have survived such hardships. The experienced, able defense lawyers in this case have no doubt suffered this type of pressure many times before and will do so again. For trial lawyers, such hardships are a way of life, not legal prejudice. Inconvenience to counsel is not grounds for denying equitable relief in so important a case.
Thus, the court is overly concerned about defense counsel’s difficulties in preparing cross-examination.6 The court impressively describes the defense attorneys’ “resource[ful] struggle] to piece together an adequate cross-examination of the expert.” 7 As all trial lawyers know, resourceful struggle is not extraordinary in cross-examination. Every day, lawyers appearing on even shorter notice at hearings on stays, temporary restraining orders, and the like effectively cross-examine witnesses on issues far more demanding than whether the words of the proposed amendment covered one issue or two. Moreover, even if, as the majority concludes, defendants were prejudiced by their struggle during cross-examination, it was of no consequence because the trial judge ultimately disregarded plaintiffs’ expert evidence. Defendants would not have been helped by having a full five weeks to prepare for cross-examination of an expert witness *463whose testimony the trial judge ultimately refused to consider.
The issues in this case were not complex. No expert evidence was required. Realistically, the most important preparation required in this case was reading the six Arizona cases on the subject — the five listed above and one from the court of appeals. They are all cited in the Arizona Revised Statutes annotation under article 21, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution. One supposes that is just how defense counsel found them. They were all decided as matters of law and may be read, digested, and understood in a few hours. I have every confidence that defense counsel were able to read the cases, marshal their legal arguments, and present them to the judge within the time frame available. I have seen less experienced counsel do as much in less time. Admittedly, working so hard with so little notice is a hardship on the lawyers. Without much more, it is not the same as legal prejudice.
B. Judicial Inconvenience
Finally, the court indicates that the inconvenience to this court in having to schedule, hear, and decide a matter such as this on short notice somehow constitutes prejudice.8 I disagree. As to the “public litigation”9 rationale adopted by the majority, concerned and interested private parties and citizens’ groups on all sides of various questions frequently seek resolution of thorny legal matters on short notice. When these matters involve significant issues of public concern, such as compliance with the constitutionally mandated single subject rule, this court should not avoid the merits by raising a shield called laches. Rather, as trial courts do, we should make every effort to hear the merits of the case. I have every confidence that this court could have properly resolved the issues presented without compromising the integrity of the process or its result. Simply put, judicial inconvenience is not the same as laches. Absent a showing of prejudice attributable to short notice, this court should not refuse to hear the merits. The majority’s rationale falls under its own weight. If, due to the shortness of time, the court could not adequately assess the merits of the single legal issue raised by plaintiffs’ challenge, how could it adequately assess the merits of a laches defense in the same time period? I agree that the “quality of judicial decision making” should not be “seriously compromised.” 10 This argument, however, should apply equally to the equitable doctrine of laches as to the constitutionally mandated single subject provision. See Ariz. Const. art. 21, § 1.
In sum, I find no grounds in this case on which to conclude that the trial judge erred in rejecting the defense of laches. The trial judge made no finding that the delay was unreasonable, the defendants produced no evidence indicating that it was, and there is simply no showing of real, relevant prejudice. I believe, therefore, that this court could have and should have decided the substantive issue under article 21, § 1. In these days of public relations campaigning, the importance of adhering to the constitution’s single subject requirement transcends the inconvenience to court and counsel of grappling with difficult issues on short notice. I therefore dissent.

. Majority at 459, 851 P.2d at 84 (quoting Flynn v. Rogers, 172 Ariz. 62, 66, 834 P.2d 148, 152 (1992) (emphasis added)).

. Majority at 459, 851 P.2d at 84.

. Majority at 460, 851 P.2d at 85.

. Majority at 460, 851 P.2d at 85.

. Majority at 460-61, 851 P.2d at 85-86.

. Majority at 460, 851 P.2d at 85.

. Majority at 460, 851 P.2d at 85.