Court Opinion

ID: 9369863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 20:02:21.627471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.610680
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 P. v. Sambrano CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F082945
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. CF86346302)
                    v.

 ARTHUR M. SAMBRANO,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. F. Brian
Alvarez, Judge.
         Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and
Ward A. Campbell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Appellant Arthur M. Sambrano appeals after the trial court declined to recall his
felony murder conviction and resentence him under Penal Code1 former
section 1170.95.2 Appellant raises several issues with the evidentiary hearing held in this
matter, arguing the court committed procedural errors in accepting and relying upon
certain evidence and a substantive error in determining appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life in the commission of the underlying robbery. The parties also
dispute the proper standard of review when resentencing hearings are considered
exclusively on a paper record. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In 1986, appellant and a codefendant, David Avila, were charged with the murder
and robbery of Michael Bergman (Bergman or the victim). Avila eventually pleaded
guilty to first degree murder. After a jury trial, appellant was convicted of both murder
and robbery. Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life on the murder conviction and
three years, stayed, on the robbery conviction.
       In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under what is now
section 1172.6. In subsequent briefing, the People conceded appellant could state a prima
facie case for relief and was not the person that actually killed Bergman, but opposed
resentencing on the ground that appellant was a major participant in the robbery who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. They sought to prove this fact through
three pieces of evidence, a transcript of the preliminary hearing in appellant’s case, a
copy of this court’s opinion affirming appellant’s conviction on appeal, and a transcript

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2       Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered then effective section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the statute at
that time, although prior changes had been implemented effective January 1, 2022. There is no
dispute in this case that turns on any of these changes. For purposes of clarity, we refer to the
statute as section 1172.6.

                                                2.
of statements made by appellant in a recent parole board hearing. Each of these pieces of
evidence is summarized below before we recount the court’s ruling.
       The Preliminary Hearing Evidence
       The preliminary hearing transcript shows that appellant was bound over for trial
based primarily on the testimony of a witness to the crime, a man named Keith
Thompson. Thompson admitted to having memory problems and being unable to read,
write, and spell to the point of needing special education services. At the time of the
incident, Thompson worked at an upholstery shop next door to the liquor store where the
murder occurred and had spent the night at work with a coworker to protect the shop’s
merchandise. Thompson testified that he was outside at around 10:30 p.m. and witnessed
the attack on Bergman.
       According to Thompson, appellant and Avila were standing outside the liquor
store when Bergman arrived in his car. Thompson testified he heard someone say, “Let’s
go,” when the car arrived and assumed it was appellant that made the statement but did
not actually see who was speaking. Thompson claimed Bergman parked in the lot and
was going through his wallet while sitting in his car when appellant approached and
asked for change to buy cigarettes.3 When Bergman declined to give appellant money,
appellant grabbed Bergman by the shirt, told Bergman to give appellant the wallet, and
said something along the lines of either, “It’s your life or your death,” or “Give me your
wallet or your life.” Bergman continued resisting, at one point, kicking appellant away,
and the two struggled for a short period of time over Bergman’s wallet.

3       Notably, Thompson also stated he was aware Bergman went into the store and bought
groceries before the incident. He claimed to know this based on conversations with the store
clerk and information gleaned from a police report, which Thompson later stated he had not read
but had seen some pages. Thompson denied seeing Bergman enter the store and consistently
stated the robbery occurred after Bergman pulled into the parking lot and opened his car door.

                                              3.
       While this interaction was occurring, Avila remained back where he and appellant
had been previously been standing. After a few moments, Thompson saw Avila
approach the vehicle carrying what appeared to be a knife. Avila came up to where
Bergman and appellant were struggling and, in the course of a second or so, reached both
hands into the car. At this point, appellant obtained control of the wallet and both
appellant and Avila walked away. Thompson testified he heard someone say something
like, “I got it. Let’s go,” when they gained control of the wallet. In the course of Avila’s
actions, Thompson did not hear any conversations between appellant and Avila, did not
see appellant gesture to Avila, and never saw appellant with a weapon. The entire
robbery and stabbing was estimated to take somewhere between seven and nine seconds.4
       Thompson testified that while it did not immediately appear that Bergman was
hurt, Thompson saw Bergman drive away in an erratic fashion while holding his chest.
Bergman’s girlfriend testified that she found Bergman dead in her driveway, a short
distance from the store, around 10:00 p.m. The parties stipulated that Bergman died from
a single stab wound to the left side of his chest that pierced his heart.
       Thompson testified that he informed his coworker someone had been robbed and
that his coworker responded by chasing after appellant and Avila with a baseball bat.
While the two fled, Thompson stated he saw appellant search through Bergman’s wallet
and throw paper from it into a bush. Thompson conceded he had searched the area with
the police for whatever was thrown and did not find it.
       With respect to the overall scene, Thompson noted it was not a busy night at the
liquor store, that no one else arrived during the time of the robbery, and that traffic was
generally light. Thompson explained this was not typical, as most nights the area was

4      In later testimony, Thompson claimed Bergman’s car had been parked for close to
20 minutes and that Bergman had been sitting in the car for nearly 10 minutes while sorting
through something. Thompson later backtracked, suggesting it was more than three minutes and
anywhere from five to 20 minutes.

                                              4.
busy and people were around. Thomson also provided an opinion that appellant appeared
to be high on “dust” during the incident.
       Although Thompson provided the core testimony, the People also tried to
introduce evidence through appellant’s cousin and Avila’s girlfriend, Margaret Carlos.
Carlos was generally uncooperative, claiming to recall very little because she had been
under the influence of drugs. Carlos specifically denied making several statements to
police about the incident. Carlos did eventually admit that appellant and Avila had gone
to the liquor store to make a phone call and buy a soda the night of the robbery.
       The People then called a police officer to testify to the statements Carlos claimed
not to have made. In this testimony, the officer recounted that Carlos claimed appellant
had arrived at her apartment with a wallet, a bloody knife, and blood on his hands. At
that time, Carlos claimed appellant had admitted to stabbing someone. Carlos also
claimed, however, that it was Avila who had the knife and wallet, and that Avila had
admitted to stabbing someone after being kicked during a robbery.
       The officer also spoke to appellant. In that conversation, appellant denied
stabbing anyone and stated he did not see Avila stab anyone either. Appellant admitted
to being at the liquor store but claimed it was Avila that approached Bergman first.
Appellant stated he had gone over to Bergman’s car after Bergman kicked Avila to assist
in what he thought was a fight between the two.
       In its ruling, the trial court recognized that the evidence included two differing
factual scenarios but found probable cause existed to hold over both appellant and Avila
on murder and robbery charges. It then noted it did not need to resolve the factual
dispute with respect to an alleged enhancement for use of a knife because it “appear[ed]
that [the] Court [was] in a position to find sufficient probable cause based upon differing
versions of the evidence, that there [was] a basis for the People to charge that in Superior

                                             5.
Court in the alternative obviously based upon the facts both of them cannot be found to
have had personal use of a knife based upon the evidence adduced here.”
       The Conviction and Original Appeal
       Appellant was eventually tried and convicted of murder and robbery. He appealed
that conviction, and in a nonpublished opinion (People v. Sambrano (March 1, 1989,
F008032)), this court affirmed. In the course of this court’s opinion, we provided a case
and factual summary of the evidence adduced at trial. We repeat those summaries here.5
       In the statement of the case, this court wrote:
       “Appellant and David Avila were charged with murder with the use of a knife.
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 12022, subd. (b)) and with robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).
       “Avila pleaded guilty to first degree murder.
       “Appellant’s first trial ended in a mistrial following reports by potential jurors that
prosecution witness Keith Thompson was making statements concerning the case.
       “During the proceedings to impanel a new jury, appellant made a Wheeler motion
(People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258), which was denied.
       “The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder and robbery. He was
sentenced to 25 years to life for the murder and granted presentence custody credit for
243 days time served and 121 days good time/work time. A three-year sentence imposed
for the robbery was stayed.

5       Appellant challenges the use of this evidence in his resentencing proceedings. With
respect to the facts provided, we include these facts only for background concerning the nature of
appellant’s conviction and the proceedings below. (See People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292, quoting § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [“effective January 1, 2022, the
Legislature limited use of prior appellate opinions, allowing trial judges to ‘consider the
procedural history of the case recited’ ”]; see also People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393,
400, fn. 9 [“Senate Bill [No.] 775 [(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)] prevents a trial court from relying on
facts recited in an appellate opinion to rule on a petition under section [1172.6].”].) By doing so,
we take no position on the admissibility of these facts in light of the case law noted.

                                                6.
       “Appellant makes multiple contentions on appeal, none of which have merit with
the exception of the question of presentence custody credits. We order the Director of
Corrections to award appellant the correct number of days credit and affirm the
judgment.” (Italics added & underlining omitted.)
       For the statement of facts, we wrote:
       “Keith Thompson testified that on the night Michael Bergman was killed, he saw
two men standing near the ice machine in front of Jack’s Liquor Store. He stated that one
man was taller than the other and that the taller man was wearing a blue shirt. Thompson
was employed by an upholstery shop located next to the liquor store.
       “Thompson stated that after the victim’s car drove up to the liquor store, he saw
the taller man go over to the car, place the palm of his hand on the window and ask the
victim if he had any loose change. He next heard the taller man say, ‘[W]ell, give me
your wallet.’ The two men then struggled over the wallet.
       “During this struggle, the second man left the ice machine and approached the
driver’s door. The second or shorter man stuck his head inside the car. The shorter
man’s left hand went inside the car. The taller man then pulled the wallet out and said,
‘[W]e got it, let’s go.’
       “Thompson went into the upholstery shop and told his coworker, Martin Gamez,
that someone was being robbed. They ran outside and saw Bergman drive away at a high
rate of speed. Gamez saw the two suspects across the street. After Gamez shouted at the
two men, they started running. Gamez chased the suspects for several blocks before
losing them in an apartment complex.
       “Bergman’s body was found lying in front of his vehicle in his girlfriend’s
driveway. He died from a single stab wound to his chest. Appellant’s left palm print was
found on the driver’s door window of Bergman’s car.

                                               7.
       “Sophia Villarreal also observed the robbery take place. She testified she noticed
two men by the ice machine in front of the liquor store. The taller man was counting
money. After Bergman came out of the store, she saw the shorter man follow him to the
car and lean inside. After a few minutes, the taller man approached the car and just stood
there. Shortly thereafter, the two men took off running, and the car drove away quickly.
Villarreal identified appellant as the taller man.
       “Cruz Subia, appellant’s cousin, testified that he, appellant, appellant’s wife and
Maria Reyna were staying at his cousin Margaret Carlos’s apartment along with Carlos’s
boyfriend, Avila. Subia testified that Avila was the first to return to the apartment after
he and appellant left to go to the store. Avila looked scared and was breathing hard.
Avila went to the kitchen and began washing blood off a knife. A few minutes later,
appellant returned also looking scared. Appellant asked Avila what happened, and Avila
responded, ‘I stabbed some guy and took his wallet.’ Subia took the wallet from Avila
and burned it. Subia testified that appellant told him he had not known what was going
on. Appellant stated that when he told Avila he did not have enough money to buy beer,
Avila asked someone for money and then started fighting with this person. Appellant did
not say he was involved in the fight in any way.
       “Maria Reyna was also present at the apartment when Avila and appellant
returned. Avila was the first to return and began washing blood off a knife and out of his
shirt. She heard Avila say he stabbed someone and took his wallet. Reyna stated she
never saw appellant with the wallet.
       “Appellant testified that Avila followed him to the liquor store. After arriving at
the store, appellant stood in front and counted his change. Avila asked him to buy a 40-
ounce beer[,] but appellant did not have enough money. When the victim walked out of
the store, Avila approached him to ask for change. Avila and the victim started fighting.
Appellant walked over to the car and put his hand on the window. He intended to either

                                              8.
break up the fight or help Avila out. However, as soon as he arrived[,] both Avila and
Bergman left quickly. Appellant started running but then stopped, realizing there was no
reason to run, and walked back to the apartment.
       “Appellant stated that when he arrived at the apartment, Avila was washing blood
off of his knife and his hands. When appellant asked Avila what happened, Avila replied,
‘I stabbed and took that guy’s wallet.’ Avila pulled out the wallet and handed it to
Margaret Carlos. Appellant refused to have anything to do with the wallet and
disclaimed any involvement with it.”
       On appeal, appellant raised issues with jury selection, two evidentiary rulings by
the trial court, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the calculation of presentencing
credits. One of the evidentiary rulings concerned appellant’s desire to cross-examine
Thompson on the statements that led to the initial mistrial. Thompson believed these
statements showed Thompson as the type that would “exaggerate and misstate facts to
ingratiate himself to individuals whom he believes he can become important to.” This
court found no error because other testimony regarding this point had been introduced
through the prior juror’s themselves. With respect to the sufficiency argument, this court
explained that “[a]ppellant testified that he was at the liquor store when the murder and
robbery took place. Thus, the issue before the jury was whether appellant was involved
in the crime. Keith Thompson’s testimony supported the jury’s determination that
appellant was involved. Although Thompson’s testimony was contradicted by other
witnesses and there was testimony that his reputation for truth was poor, the jury decided
he was credible. The matters to which Thompson testified were neither physically
impossible nor demonstrably false without resort to inferences or deductions. [Citation.]
Therefore, the jury’s finding is binding on this court.” As, noted, this court ultimately
affirmed the conviction but modified appellant’s presentence custody credit.

                                             9.
       The Parole Hearing Evidence
       In 2018, appellant testified in a parole hearing.6 During that testimony, appellant
made several statements about the crime underlying his conviction.
       Initially, appellant indicated that he had gone to the store knowing he did not have
enough money but figuring he could take by force what he needed from anyone that
arrived. Appellant affirmed that he had gone to the store with Avila but stated he did not
know Avila had a knife and that he had not made any plans with Avila regarding a
robbery. Appellant acknowledged, “I robbed [Bergman], my crimie[, Avila,] stabbed
him,” and conceded his admission of the robbery was a recent change in his statements.
But appellant also explained, “[E]verything happened so quick it was just—it wasn’t
planned, it just came—it just happened like that. And to this day I—I’m just like I
could’ve done something else instead of that.” According to appellant’s various
statements, he did not go to the store with a direct plan to rob anyone and did not have
any previous discussion with Avila about doing so, but he did decide to get money from
Bergman in the moment and conceded he “wasn’t going to take no for an answer.”
Appellant conceded he would likely have assaulted Bergman even if Bergman did not
have any money.
       As the interview proceeded, appellant stated that Avila was the first to approach
Bergman and that appellant only intervened after he thought the two were fighting.
Appellant claimed he only learned of the stabbing once the two were back at Carlos’s
apartment and Avila told him what happened. He ultimately claimed he was guilty of
being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

6       Appellant also challenges the use of this evidence in his resentencing proceedings. Our
recitation of these facts is for background and context and does not indicate that they were
properly admitted.

                                              10.
       The Resentencing Evidentiary Hearing and Ruling
       After admitting the above evidence, the trial court heard argument from the parties
and denied appellant’s petition for resentencing. During argument, the court
acknowledged that Carlos “was all over the place and had to be impeached in order to
elicit any testimony,” and that appellant was not charged with “malice murder.” In
ruling, the court conceded it had read and relied upon the preliminary hearing transcript,
the Court of Appeal opinion, and the parole hearing transcript that had been introduced.
The court then identified several factors it can consider when determining whether a
defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life and whether a defendant is a
major participant in an underlying felony.
       Following its identification of these factors, the court provided a thorough
recitation of the facts of the case, as found in the multiple documents it considered.
Interspersed with its recitation of the facts were references back to several of the factors
the court can consider for both the major participant and reckless indifference to human
life considerations, along with commentary about how the court viewed certain witnesses
and their testimony.
       With respect to the major participant finding, the court found the evidence showed
appellant’s “role and planning was manifest and apparent.” However, the court noted
that “[t]here was no evidence that [appellant] supplied or used a lethal weapon” and “no
evidence about any dangers posed or past experience of conduct by the other participant,
Mr. Avila.” Looking at the evidence concerning how Bergman was ultimately stabbed,
the court determined appellant “was in a position to prevent the death” because while
appellant “could have simply just waived off Mr. Avila,” he instead continued with his
efforts to obtain the wallet when Avila approached. Similarly, the court focused on the
fact appellant left with Avila after the stabbing, accepting Thompson’s testimony on this
point despite the fact he was generally impeached based on memory issues. Overall, the

                                             11.
court focused on its findings that accosting Bergman in his car and preventing him from
exiting meant appellant’s “actions acted as a resisting influence” that “played a particular
role in Mr. Bergman’s death.”
       The court then turned to the reckless indifference to human life element. Stating
first this was the “closer issue for the Court,” the court began by noting “that there is no
evidence that [appellant] knew a lethal weapon would be present during the robbery” and
“no evidence that he knew that a lethal weapon was likely to be used.” The court then
recited preliminary hearing evidence from Carlos concerning events before and after the
attack, whom the court had found fully impeached, before reviewing conflicts between
appellant’s version of the events and Thompson’s testimony that appellant had been the
initial aggressor.
       Finding there was “a lot of overlap with regards to the major participant aspect of
this case,” the court specifically identified the fact appellant “was present at the scene,”
accepted Thompson’s preliminary hearing testimony and appellant’s concession at the
parole hearing that appellant was the initial aggressor, and recalled appellant’s statement
to Bergman of, “It’s your life or your death,” in the face of Bergman’s refusal to provide
his wallet. The court reasoned these facts demonstrated “a mental state above and
beyond merely a passive participant,” one “approaching reckless indifference to human
life.” Reviewing the general scope of Thompson’s preliminary hearing testimony, the
court determined appellant did not “try to minimize the possibility of violence” but rather
said, “ ‘Give me your wallet or your life.’ ” Likewise, the court found appellant “put Mr.
Bergman in a vulnerable position” when he “essentially trapped Mr. Bergman in the
driver’s seat of his vehicle during the robbery[,] ensuring that Mr. Bergman would not
escape as [appellant] stood by in the doorway of the car.” Summarizing the scope of its
findings, the court found appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life by
“noting that there was no evidence that [appellant] knew of this objective knowledge of a

                                             12.
knife being used, but also noting that he was present there during the time and he was in a
position [to] see and facilitate the underlying robbery.”
       This appeal timely followed.
                                        DISCUSSION
       Although several disputes over the procedural processes for reviewing a trial
court’s ruling following an evidentiary hearing exist between the parties, underlying
those issues is a fundamental question whether the evidence introduced by the
prosecution is adequate to demonstrate appellant could have been convicted of felony
murder under the standards currently employed. We note these underlying disputes at the
outset because, upon review of the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to
convict appellant of felony murder under any potential standard of review and regardless
of the scope of evidence that could be properly considered. We therefore focus primarily
on the preliminary hearing evidence offered to show appellant was a major participant
who acted with a reckless indifference to human life and do not reach those procedural
disputes raised by the parties which are not ultimately necessary to resolving this matter.
       Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that one convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime
may file a petition to have the conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when (1) an information was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder
after either a trial or accepting a plea offer in lieu of a trial, and (3) the petitioner could

                                               13.
not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
section 188 or 189.
       Relevant here, “section 189, as amended, now limits liability under a felony-
murder theory principally to ‘actual killer[s]’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e)(1)) and those
who, ‘with the intent to kill,’ aid or abet ‘the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree’ (id., subd. (e)(2)). Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted
with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participant[s]
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described
in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2’—that is, the statute defining the felony-
murder special circumstance.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
       Returning to the resentencing statute, if a petitioner makes a prima facie showing
for relief, the trial court “shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At
this point, the court must “hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder …
conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
       Several procedural rules are specifically provided for the show cause hearing. As
set out in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3): “At the hearing to determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder
under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the
Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any
prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay
evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of

                                             14.
Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the
petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. A
finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the
conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.”
       Under the existing rubric used in these matters, we “review the trial judge’s
factfinding for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We ‘ “examine the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would
support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding
the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298, second
bracketed insertion in original.)7

7       Appellant, relying on the analysis contained in People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510,
argues this standard rubric is improper where the underlying evidence is a paper record
recounting events from many year’s past. Although this court considers Clements as the
controlling law, we have also independently reviewed the evidence. As our opinion would not
change regardless of the standard of review, we take no position on the effect Vivar may have on
paper-record cases that require no in-person credibility determinations.

                                              15.
       Major Participant Finding
       As noted above, under the current statutory scheme, “[d]efendants who were
neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if
they were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code]
Section 190.2’—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.”
(People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, first bracketed insertion added.)
       To be a major participant in the underlying felony, “a defendant’s personal
involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor
to an ordinary felony murder.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 802.) “The
ultimate question pertaining to being a major participant is ‘whether the defendant’s
participation “in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation] was
sufficiently significant to be considered “major” [citations].” ’ ” (People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522, 611 (Clark).) The following factors may be relevant to a determination
of whether a defendant was a major participant in a felony murder: “What role did the
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What
role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did
the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used,
or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the
scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do
after lethal force was used?” (Banks, at p. 803, fn. omitted; accord, Clark, at p. 611.)
“No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.” (Banks, at p. 803.)
       Appellant raises a challenge to the trial court’s finding that he was a major
participant in the underlying robbery. Focusing on evidence appellant argues shows a

                                              16.
lack of connection between appellant and Avila and a lack of knowledge Avila was
armed or dangerous, appellant argues that “the court erred in concluding beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant was a major participant in the incident resulting in
Bergman’s murder.” We do not agree.
       We readily conclude that appellant was a major participant in the underlying
felony, a robbery. The evidence shows he initiated the robbery, actively engaged in
attempts to complete it, and participated in retrieving and leaving with Bergman’s wallet.
Appellant was therefore far removed from a standard aider and abettor. Rather, he was
the primary actor in the underlying felony up until the point the murder occurred and
continued to participate after the murder.
       While appellant’s argument infers that he must be a major participant in not only
the robbery but also the actual killing, this requirement is not in the statutory language
and we see no evidence such a specific finding is required by the case law. Rather, the
major participant analysis often overlaps with and is related to the reckless indifference to
human life analysis, which focuses on determining culpability for a killing that occurred
because of choices and conduct made in effectuating the underlying felony. (See Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 at p. 615 [although the requirements are stated separately, “ ‘they
often overlap’ ”].) We further develop the reckless indifference point, below. In doing
so, our conclusions strongly support not only finding that appellant was a major
participant in the robbery generally, but also that he knowingly engaged in a cooperative
robbery with Avila which raised the inherent risk of harm to human life. Accordingly,
we find no error in the trial court’s determination appellant was a major participant in the
underlying robbery.
       Reckless Indifference to Human Life Finding
       What it means to be a major participant who acts with a reckless indifference to
human life under section 189 is a heavily analyzed issue. Our Supreme Court provided

                                             17.
an excellent summary of the law as part of In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667. The
general framework for analyzing the issue is well settled, a point recognized by the trial
court, but turns on a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry” for the case. (Id. at p. 683.)
We therefor provide a general review of the analytical framework for this issue before
considering the facts of this case.
       The reckless indifference analysis considers the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the crime to determine whether the accused acted in a manner that created a
grave risk of death. As explained by our Supreme Court, in general, a reckless
indifference to human life “is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death.’ [Citation.] Examples include ‘the person who
tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots
someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob
may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s
property.’ [Citation.] Reckless indifference ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’ ” (In re Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at pp. 676–677.) However, “ ‘[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk
of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient’ to establish reckless indifference
to human life; ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the statutory
requirement. [Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a participant [or planner of] an armed robbery
could anticipate lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless
indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 677, first & third bracketed insertions added.)
       The test considers the facts from both objective and subjective perspectives,
considering both as relevant elements in the analysis. “As to the subjective element,
‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which
the particular offense is committed,’ and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the

                                             18.
significant risk of death his or her actions create.’ [Citations.] As to the objective
element, ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her],
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding
person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ ” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677, second bracketed insertion added.)
        When considering the evidence in its totality, from both objective and subjective
perspectives, our Supreme Court has identified several questions that explore relevant
factors in the analysis. No one of these questions is dispositive of the issue, nor is any
necessarily sufficient to prove a reckless indifference to human life existed. However,
given their usefulness, we begin by reviewing them in the context of the evidence of this
case.
        The questions are: “Did the defendant use or know that a [weapon] would be used
during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant
physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime
or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of
the felony and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her
confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts
did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)8 We therefore consider the facts of this case in

8       An additional potential factor, identified in In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 439,
is the defendant’s youth at the time of the offense. Appellant argues this factor weighs in favor
of finding no reckless indifference to human life. However, the defendant in In re Moore was
only 16 years old (id. at p. 454), while appellant in this case was 21 years old at the time of the
robbery and thus not an adolescent. In re Moore draws a clear line between “juvenile” offenders
and “adult” offenders that is not triggered by appellant’s age. (Ibid. [noting evidence sufficient
to find reckless indifference for an adult insufficient for less mature children].) Accordingly,
although In re Moore was not decided at the time of appellant’s evidentiary hearing, we conclude
a remand is not necessary for consideration of this potential factor. (Contra, People v. Jones
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093 [remanding in the interest of justice only].) Appellant’s

                                               19.
light of these guiding questions to determine whether the evidence supports a conclusion
that appellant acted with a reckless indifference to human life.
       As the trial court recognized, some of these factors counsel against a finding that
appellant acted with a reckless indifference to human life. For example, there is no direct
evidence that appellant was aware Avila had a knife9 or was likely to use a knife in the
course of the robbery, and no evidence appellant knew of any propensity for violence
from Avila.
       Other factors are generally neutral given the evidence submitted to the trial court.
For example, evidence regarding the duration of the robbery does not directly support
either side of the reckless indifference to human life analysis. While the evidence
indicates the entire interaction was relatively brief, the testimony does show that there
was an initial verbal indication from appellant that he was going to engage in a robbery, a
period of time in which appellant walked over to Bergman, spoke with him, and actively
tried to obtain Bergman’s wallet—a time period which included sufficient time for Avila
to potentially hear appellant’s “your wallet or your life” comment and travel from his
location to the robbery—and a brief period where both engaged in robbing Bergman.

citation to section 3051, which grants parole hearings to youthful offenders under the age of
26 years, does not convince us otherwise. Appellant cites no authority that persuades us we
should extend the assumption that a minor’s maturity and judgment is undeveloped to persons
beyond the age of 18 years. Rather, the age of 18 years is generally considered “ ‘the point
where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.’ ” (Graham
v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 74.) Accordingly, we assume the court properly considered
appellant’s age and maturity in the totality of the circumstances analysis typically required in this
case. (See In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [trial court is presumed to have been aware
of and followed the applicable law].)
9       The only indication that appellant knew of a knife came from Carlos’s internally
inconsistent testimony that it was appellant who returned with a bloody knife and bloody hands,
indicating he had been the attacker. No party argues this testimony was true, and it was
contradicted not only by Carlos but by all other evidence in the case. The trial court recognized
the problems in Carlos’s testimony and did not appear to consider it reliable. We, likewise,
would also discount Carlos’s testimony in an independent review.

                                                20.
Although the time involved was not prolonged, it was sufficient to provide a greater
opportunity for violence, as strongly evidenced by the fact Avila could observe the
interaction and then choose to intercede while it was still occurring. (See In re Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 680–681 [finding a three-to five-minute period is not a prolonged
period but noting the relevant question is whether the period of time provides a greater
window of opportunity for violence, possibly culminating in murder].)
       Based on these factors, the core question in this case is how to view the remaining
factors related to appellant’s presence and actions during the robbery with the generally
neutral or exculpatory factors discussed above. The trial court’s analysis concluded that
appellant’s presence and actions during the robbery were sufficient to show a reckless
indifference to human life. Upon review, when looking at appellant’s presence at the
robbery, his opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim, and his efforts to
minimize the risks of violence, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion.
       The trial court’s recognition that appellant was present at the scene of the stabbing
is well supported by the record, as there is no meaningful dispute appellant was engaged
with Bergman at the time Avila acted. This fact differentiates this case from many of
those finding no reckless indifference, which typically include facts suggesting that the
defendant was across the street or otherwise meaningfully removed from the conduct
when the killing occurred. (See In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 678–679 [noting
the defendant was across the street at time of shooting and contrasting that with cases
where the defendant was present during the entire sequence of events]; In re Ramirez
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 405 [the defendant was several feet away, with cars between
him and the shooting]; In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [the defendant sat in
car during shooting].) As our Supreme Court has recognized, the case law stresses “the
importance of presence to culpability” particularly because proximity to the murder and

                                             21.
events leading up to it can demonstrate the murder is a culmination or foreseeable result
of several intermediate steps. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.)
       The preliminary hearing evidence in this case contains meaningful evidence
supporting the conclusion that Bergman’s death was a foreseeable consequence of several
intermediate steps. The record shows appellant present at the scene with Avila before the
robbery. Upon the start of the robbery, a witness heard communication between
appellant and Avila, the comment, “Let’s go.” Appellant then proceeded to Bergman’s
car and attempted to take his wallet. When that initially failed, appellant stated, loud
enough to be heard, something similar to “Give me your wallet or your life.” After this
comment, appellant reengaged with Bergman and struggled to obtain his wallet. As this
struggle continued, Avila, who had remained behind during the “Let’s go” and “Give me
your wallet or your life” comments, left his position and came to appellant’s aid. In
doing so, Avila reached into the car where appellant had cornered Bergman and stabbed
him. Immediately after, the two communicated again through the comment, “I got it.
Let’s go,” before the two fled together, with appellant looking through Bergman’s wallet
as they left.
       The evidence permits the reasonable inferences that appellant and Avila were
engaged in a coordinated robbery, that appellant’s actions and comments throughout
increased the risk that Avila would engage as well as the risk of lethal action occurring,
and that Avila’s eventual participation was not only predictable but welcomed by
appellant. Such inferences are sufficient to demonstrate substantial evidence supports the
trial court. (People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330 [“ ‘Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.’ ”].) Coupled with the evidence discussed above, this court is also
independently convinced that appellant exhibited a reckless disregard for human life in
the course of the robbery. Appellant did not act as if Avila’s participation was

                                             22.
unexpected or unwelcome and, coupled with his express threat to Bergman’s life, did not
seek to limit the potential for violence by ceasing his conduct when it initially failed,
calling off Avila when he interceded, or breaking away from Avila after his interjection
allowed appellant to obtain Bergman’s wallet. His extensive, cooperative conduct
throughout the robbery showed a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of death
occurring in the robbery.
       In line with this analysis, the factor considering appellant’s efforts to minimize the
risks of violence also tends toward finding a reckless indifference to human life. Even
accepting that the evidence does not demonstrate appellant knew Avila was armed, the
overall evidence generally shows a plan to engage in a cooperative robbery in a public
space. The cooperative nature of the plan, appellant’s conduct in confronting the victim
in the enclosed and controllable space of his car while threatening his life, and the fact
the robbery occurred at night all work to increase the risk of violence over other possible
robbery plans. This is particularly so given the unpredictable nature of a cooperative
robbery in a public place, where discovery of the criminal act could immediately increase
the likelihood of being caught and thus the need to engage in reckless conduct to succeed.
       Regardless of how this court conducts its review of the record, the end result is
that the evidence submitted to the trial court demonstrates appellant acted with a reckless
indifference to human life. There is substantial evidence tying appellant to a cooperative
plan to commit an unarmed robbery and to specific steps in the course of the robbery that
increased the risk of death, such as the manner in which appellant confronted the victim
and the statements made just before and during the robbery. Ultimately, the analysis in
these cases consists of a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry.” (In re Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 683.) Here, appellant actively led the robbery, made threats to Bergman’s
life, was present for the stabbing, and fled with his partner. While some of the factors
weigh in appellant’s favor, the overall facts concerning the robbery planned and executed

                                             23.
in this case demonstrate the reckless indifference to human life required to affirm the trial
court’s order.
       Evidentiary Issues
       Having concluded that the evidence supports the trial court’s order, we briefly
consider and reject appellant’s argument the trial court erred by relying upon the
preliminary hearing transcript to support its conclusion. The cases cited by appellant
which reject reliance on the preliminary hearing transcript to reject a petition for
resentencing arise in the context of the prima facie eligibility determination, where the
trial court is generally not permitted to resolve factual disputes. (See People v.
Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 481–482 [although preliminary hearing transcript
is part of the record of conviction, the trial court engages in impermissible factfinding at
the prima facie stage if it resolves factual disputes by relying on unstipulated facts from
the hearing].) At the following evidentiary hearing the trial court is not precluded from
weighing evidence and making factual findings. In that context, the statutory scheme
specifically permits use of the preliminary hearing transcript with some restrictions and
this court is aware of no authority precluding the trial court from considering properly
admitted evidence. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [“The admission of evidence in the
hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current
law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.…
However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the
evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”]; People v.
Davenport, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 485 fn. 3 [“the prosecution may, at the
section [1172.6] hearing that will occur upon remand, rely on the preliminary hearing
transcript to sustain its burden of establishing that he is not entitled to relief”].)

                                               24.
       We also reject appellant’s claims of error in admitting this court’s prior
unpublished opinion and statements made in appellant’s parole hearing. We evaluate the
erroneous admission of evidence at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing under the
harmless error standard for state law error articulated in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 706 [considering
potential error in admitting parole hearing transcript].) “ ‘Under the Watson harmless
error standard, it is the burden of appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that
they would have received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred.’ ”
(Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 447.) Even if we assume the opinion and
transcript were improperly admitted, any error was harmless. The evidence submitted
from the preliminary hearing was sufficient, standing alone, to support the trial court’s
ruling on all relevant issues. In fact, to the extent these additional documents were
submitted, the facts contained within them tended to benefit appellant by minimizing his
connection to Avila or implying he never intended to commit anything other than an
unarmed robbery. It was thus not reasonably probable a different result would have
occurred had the additional evidence not been admitted.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying appellant’s petition is affirmed.

                                                                                    HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                             25.