Court Opinion

ID: 9520303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:35:41.862555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:58.725564
License: Public Domain

*533Fairchild, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the majority.
The crucial question is whether members of a union are the sole arbiters of those with whom they desire to associate and can exclude applicants against whom the members have no grievance except that the applicants belong to a different race or creed.
The majority of the court consider the únion as a voluntary association with no more restriction upon its power to admit or reject applicants than would be imposed on a group of people associated for purely social or fraternal purposes.
I am of the opinion that a difference should be recognized in this respect between unions and other voluntary associations and that the courts should give substance to a principle that members of unions do not have the right to exclude people from the enjoyment of the benefits of membership solely on grounds of race or religion. 0
We are engaged in a struggle to make equality and freedom realities for all Americans. In addition to political equality, the full availability to everyone of education and full opportunity for employment to the extent of his capacity are generally considered the basic essentials in order to erase from America anything which could be termed “second class” citizenship.
The disadvantage to an otherwise qualified applicant who is excluded from membership in a union is clearly substantial. In the eyes of many people in the community, a stigma attaches to him because he is nonunion. Unions properly strive for and often attain for their members advantages in gaining or retaining employment. Persons indifferent to the principles of organized labor nevertheless often prefer to employ union labor because of the attitude of others toward employers who do not. Of course there are a multitude of reasons why a union might validly exclude an applicant. *534There may be applicants whose conduct or views demonstrate that they would not be good members. Some applicants will fail to meet proper objective standards germane to the purposes of the union. In the nature of things, union members and officers should enjoy wide discretion and presumptions that they act in good faith. Such latitude should not only be tolerated but should be protected because it may be generally assumed that the members of a union act in good faith to achieve their legitimate purposes. Exclusion of persons from membership solely because of their race cannot, however, possibly contribute to the advancement of the legitimate causes of the union. Where an applicant meets every reasonable standard and is excluded solely because he is a Negro or belongs to some other racial or religious group, the injustice done him is obvious and it is great.
To be the butt of social discrimination is unpleasant in high degree, but to be denied the economic opportunity to work out one’s destiny as best he can, solely because of a racial or religious difference, impairs the very substance of citizenship itself. Perhaps the degree of the impairment is so great and the character of the rights impaired so fundamental that the wrong must be recognized and remedied by the judicial branch even in the absence of action by the legislature.
But there is another reason, in any event, for denying members of a union the right to exclude people of a different race or creed. Plaintiffs have an unquestioned constitutional right to equal protection of the laws of this state. Fourteenth amendment, United States constitution. If it be proved that defendant union is excluding plaintiffs because of their race, then the union is denying them the equal protection of the laws of the state concerning the right of organization and collective bargaining in employment relations. This is a wrong which a court of equity ought to prevent.
*535Ch. Ill, subch. I of our statutes, the Employment Peace Act,” creates duties and obligations as well as an administrative agency for the purpose of protecting the rights of employees in the matter of employment relations. It expressly recognizes the interest of the employee in regular and adequate income and that this right, among others, is largely dependent upon the maintenance of fair, friendly, and mutually satisfactory employment relations and the availability of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of whatever controversies may arise. The act expressly recognizes the importance of voluntary agreement between employer and employees as to terms and conditions of work and recognizes the right of an employee to associate with others in organizing and bargaining collectively through representatives of his own choosing.
The act further makes available to those employees who do desire to organize, a state agency which has the duty of protecting them in their activities both in the matter of organization and collective bargaining. It is implicit that the protection which is thus made available to employees is considered by the legislature to be valuable both to the employees and to the general public. The act provides that certain activities on the part of employers are unfair and gives resort to the employment relations board in order to prevent the continuance of those practices. Granted that restrictions are also imposed upon employees; that some or all of these restrictions might not legally exist except for the act; and that there are vigorous differences of opinion as to whether a law which imposed fewer of such restrictions might be more just, nevertheless, it is clear that the right of individual employees to organize is a substantial and valuable one and that the laws regulating employment relations have given greater substance and value to these rights.
Does any voluntary organization of employees enjoying these rights and the protection of the Employment Peace Act *536have the right to exclude from the enjoyment of such protection persons of a different race solely for that reason? My answer is “No.”
Under the Fourteenth amendment the state must not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Obviously the state could not include in its regulatory laws any provision making Negroes ineligible for membership in labor unions.
It has now been made clear by the supreme court of the United States that a state court must not enforce a private contract to exclude persons from the ownership or enjoyment of property because of their race. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441; Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586. It seems clearly to follow that if a union had a constitution which restricted its membership on the grounds of race the courts could not enforce that restriction.
It may also follow that when a state court denies relief to persons excluded from the equal protection of the law by a labor union, such denial is itself a violation of the Fourteenth amendment. In any event, however, the granting óf relief to plaintiffs by a court would protect their rights under the Fourteenth amendment and that fact alone is a sufficient basis for such action by the court.
It may be said that the plaintiffs could form a new union and that they would then gain for themselves the same legal rights of the members of defendant union, but the plain facts of economic life demonstrate that the possibility of so small a minority forming an effective organization when the defendant is already established in the field is illusory.
As the case now stands it has not been heard upon the merits. Except for the apparent fact that the industrial commission was satisfied that the rejection of plaintiffs was solely by reason of their race, it has not yet been established with finality that the charges made by the plaintiffs are true. *537In my opinion the order sustaining the demurrer should be reversed, and the case sent back for hearing upon the merits. If it be proved, as charged, that the rejection of plaintiffs was solely because of their race, defendants should be ordered to accept plaintiffs into membership. In doing otherwise the court is permitting (if the charges are true) the present members of defendant union to exclude other people, merely because of their race, from the full protection afforded by our employment statutes and the agency which administers them.