Court Opinion

ID: 9849531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:07.041639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.453374
License: Public Domain

DIMOND, Justice
(dissenting in part).
Appellant was tried for manslaughter in connection with the deaths of two persons, Reynaldo Evangelista and Eugene Hogan. The evidence showed that both persons died after appellant had caused the car in which they were riding to drive off a road into a river. A jury found appellant guilty of manslaughter as to Evangelista, but not guilty as to Hogan.
Both deaths resulted from one act of criminal negligence on appellant’s part. He was either responsible for both deaths or not responsible for either. He could not rationally be held accountable for only one death and not for the other. The two conflicting verdicts were obviously and totally inconsistent. It is because of the inconsistency that this court sets aside the conviction of appellant for the manslaughter of Evangelista.
Up to this point I agree with the court. But I am unable to see why the not guilty verdict as to the death of Hogan should not *382also be set aside. The reason for disregarding the guilty verdict — and the only reason — is because it is inconsistent with the not guilty verdict. ' The overall result is irrational. Both verdicts, and not just the guilty one, are affected by the inconsistency and irrationality, so there is no way of knowing what the jury actually decided.
The court feels that it is obliged to give effect to the not guilty verdict, when it gives none to the guilty verdict, because of the double jeopardy provision of the constitution. At this point I disagree with my colleagues.
The principle of double jeopardy prevents the government from prosecuting a person more than once for the same offense. It reflects a sound policy — to prevent the government, with all its resources and power, from harassing an accused by successive prosecutions so as to afford the government a more favorable opportunity to convict.1 The double jeopardy clause “stands as a constitutional barrier against possible tyranny by the overzealous prosecutor.” 2
In order to effectuate the policy of the double jeopardy clause, it is held that a verdict of acquittal is conclusive even though it may appear to be erroneous.3 We are not concerned here with error on the part of the jury. Our concern is with the inability to ascertain, because of inconsistent verdicts, what the jury decided as to the guilt or innocence of appellant. We simply do not know what their decision was, since appellant cannot be guilty of one manslaughter and not guilty of the other.
It is also held that one appealing from a conviction of one offense may not be required, as a condition of appealing, to surrender his defense of double jeopardy as to another offense for which he had been acquitted.4 No such condition would be imposed here by setting aside the not guilty verdict, as well as the guilty verdict, and requiring a new trial as to both counts of the indictment. The court says that it cannot express faith “in the merit of the acquittal as a resolution of the issues involved in the charge.” It states that “[i]t should be quite obvious that the inconsistency of the verdicts here reflects as much doubt upon the acquittal as it did upon the conviction.” I believe what the court is saying is that the not guilty verdict is as meaningless as the court holds the guilty verdict to be. This being so, there is nothing for double jeopardy to operate upon. Appellant would not be required to waive a defense of double jeopardy because it has no application. In fact, he is not even required to appeal the conviction in order to obtain a new trial. The trial court, when faced with the totally inconsistent verdicts, ought to have disregarded both verdicts, discharged the jury and ordered another trial as to both counts of the indictment.
Because of the inconsistency, I can reach no other logical conclusion than that the jury failed to perform its function as a jury. The result is no different than if the jury had been unable to reach any verdict at all. This situation is equivalent to a hung jury — a jury unable to agree on a verdict. In such a situation double jeopardy is not a bar to another trial. As the United States Supreme Court has said:
There may be unforeseeable circumstances that arise during a trial making its completion impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict. In such event the purpose of law to protect society from those guilty of crimes frequently would be frustrated by denying *383courts power to put the defendant to trial again. [Emphasis added.] 5
A jury unable to agree is a “classic example” where double jeopardy has no application.6
I believe there should be a new trial on both counts ^of the indictment. As a practical matter, it probably will make no difference whether appellant is tried on both counts or only one, for under the evidence a finding of guilt or innocence as to one would require the same finding as to the other. The point I wish to make is that if the court is going to require reason and consistency of a jury, as it does in this case, it should not set a different standard for itself and ignore reason and consistency in its own decisions. That is what it does here by holding that the guilty verdict is without effect because of inconsistency with the not guilty verdict, and then holding that the not guilty verdict is effective despite the same inconsistency.

. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100, 102-103 (1963). See also Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204 (1957).

. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 456, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1200, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 482 (No. 57, April 6, 1970) [Concurring opinion of Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall].

. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204 (1957).

. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-194, 78 S.Ot. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 207-208 (1957).

. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949).

. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100, 102 (1963).