Court Opinion

ID: 9892140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 17:11:11.428545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:56.862657
License: Public Domain

J-S12036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DEVIN MICHAEL MILLER                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1011 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-14-CR-0000726-2021

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 20, 2023

       Appellant, Devin Michael Miller, appeals from the judgments of sentence

imposed by the Centre County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him

guilty of driving under the influence (DUI) of a Schedule I controlled substance

(as a fourth offense) and false identification to a law enforcement officer, and

the lower court found him guilty of driving while operating privilege is

suspended or revoked - DUI related (as a third or subsequent violation),

driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked – DUI related with a

controlled substance in blood (as a third or subsequent violation), failing to

wear protective headgear while operating a motorcycle, careless driving, and

failing to use a traffic signal.1 He challenges the denial of his pre-trial motion
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 4914(a), 1543(b)(1)(iii), 1543(b)(1.1)(iii),
3525(b), 3714(a), and 3334(a), respectively.
J-S12036-23

to dismiss his case, alleging that the Commonwealth violated his right to a

speedy trial under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Upon

review, we affirm.

       The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions concern a motor vehicle

stop that occurred at 2:29 a.m. on August 2, 2020, near the intersection of

Pugh    Street   and   Beaver   Avenue   in   State   College,   Centre    County,

Pennsylvania. N.T. 4/29/22, 41-43, 45. Police Officer Kevin Orndorff saw

Appellant driving a motorcycle with a female passenger, later identified as

Shelly Payne, traveling on Beaver Avenue near Fraser Street. Id. at 42, 46.

Appellant had a helmet with a full-face shield sitting on top of his head. Id.

at 42, 100.      Officer Orndorff turned around to pursue Appellant with the

intention of conducting a traffic stop because Appellant was not properly

wearing the helmet with the shield covering his face.        Id. at 42-43.      As

Appellant came to the intersection of Pugh Street and Beaver Avenue, Officer

Orndorff saw him swerve from the right lane to the left lane of the one-way,

two-lane street without using a turn signal. Id. at 43, 45. After the officer

waited for the traffic light at that intersection to turn green, he initiated the

stop of Appellant’s motorcycle as Appellant was parking and alighting from the

motorcycle. Id. at 44-45.

       The relevant events of the traffic stop and the ensuing investigation

were recorded by a camera worn by Officer Orndorff and a dash camera in his

patrol car. N.T. 4/29/22, 48-49, 53; Commonwealth Exhibit 1 (Dash Cam

Video); Commonwealth Exhibit 2 (Body Worn Camera Video).                  Appellant

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admitted that his helmet had been “up,” remarking, “my fault.” N.T. 4/29/22,

55, 87. He was unable to produce a driver’s license after repeated requests.

Id.at 55-56. Appellant identified himself as “Tershar” to the officer, and said

that his identification card was in Ms. Payne’s bag.          Id. at 56-57.   Officer

Orndorff later found out that “Tershar Miller” was Appellant’s cousin. Id. at

57.   At Appellant’s request, the officer conducted a pat-down of Appellant

during which he smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from Appellant’s

body.    Id.   Appellant then produced an identification card for his cousin,

Tershar. Id. at 58-59. He said that he recently lost his wallet which contained

his driver’s license.       Id. at 58.         Officer Orndorff determined that the

identification card was associated with a suspended driver’s license. Id. at

60.

        Officer Orndorff confronted Appellant about the suspended license

associated with the identification card and the observed weaving of the

motorcycle and proceeded to subject Appellant to field sobriety testing from

the ARIDE curriculum.2 N.T. 4/29/22, 61, 63-69. The officer noted various

clues to identifying impairment that were evident in each of the separate tests

conducted that were consistent with marijuana impairment. Id. at 65, 67,
____________________________________________

2 “ARIDE” refers to advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement training

developed under the auspices and direction of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of Police to
prepare police officers and other qualified persons “to conduct various drug-
impairment detection tests at roadside for use in drugged-driving
investigations.” ARIDE Instructor Guide, 2023, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, at 4, available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/
nhtsa.gov/files/2023-04/15941-2023_ARIDE_Instructor%20Guide-tag.pdf.

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69-70. The officer also conducted a breathalyzer test that indicated “a pretty

low amount” of alcohol. Id. at 71. Appellant admitted to smoking marijuana

earlier in the morning. Id. Officer Orndorff told Appellant that he believed

that he was impaired and that he wanted to further the investigation into

whether he had been driving under the influence. Id. at 72. Appellant then

indicated that he had been involved in a minor crash and requested an

ambulance. Id. at 71-72. After an ambulance was requested, he withdrew

his request to be transported in it when he found out that Ms. Payne could not

ride in the ambulance with him. Id. at 72. Officer Orndorff subsequently

arrested Appellant after he declined to be evaluated by a drug recognition

expert unless Ms. Payne was by his side which the officers could not permit

due to on-going COVID-19 pandemic restrictions.       Id. at 72-73.    Officer

Orndorff transported Appellant to the Mount Nittany Medical Center for

chemical testing that was performed after Appellant signed a Pennsylvania

Department of Transportation DL-26 form, indicating his agreement to provide

a blood sample. Id. at 73-76.

      At trial, Officer Orndorff and Officer Dean Woodring, who was also

present for the field sobriety tests, opined that they believed that Appellant

was under the influence of marijuana to the point that he was incapable of

safely operating a motor vehicle.   N.T. 4/26/22, 74, 103.     Stipulations of

counsel indicated that, inter alia, the chemical testing determined that

Appellant’s blood contained: (1) “11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC, which is the active

metabolite of marijuana, at a concentration of 3.2 nanograms per milliliter;”

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(2) “Delta-9 Carboxy THC, the inactive metabolite of marijuana, at a

concentration of 26 nanograms per milliliter;” and (3) Delta-9 THC, the active

ingredient of marijuana, at a concentration of 4.3 nanograms per milliliter.”

Id. at 80. Appellant was positively identified as Devin Michael Miller after his

fingerprints were uploaded to the Automated Identification System (AFIS) at

the Centre County Correctional Facility. Id. at 81-82. Appellant admitted that

his name was Devin Miller after the arresting officers returned him to that

facility, following the fingerprint identification. Id. at 82.

      On March 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. He acknowledged that, as of filing of his motion, 434 days

had elapsed since the filing of the criminal complaint.          Rule 600 Motion,

3/28/22, ¶ 9. He alleged that, at all relevant times, he had been available to

defend himself in any proceedings on his charges and the Commonwealth had

been aware of his address, telephone numbers, and contact information. Id.

at ¶ 11.   He also alleged that the Commonwealth had not exercised due

diligence in locating and prosecuting him. Id. at ¶ 12. He asserted: “The

delay from the time of the filing of the Criminal Complaint was without

justification, and said delay was in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure Rule 600, the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution,

and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Id. at ¶

13. In a brief in opposition to Appellant’s Rule 600 motion, the Commonwealth

noted that Appellant’s counsel had informed it that Appellant was abandoning

his claim under Rule 600 and pursuing dismissal based on a violation of his

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constitutional right to a speedy trial. Commonwealth’s Response to Rule 600

Motion, 4/1/22, 1.

      At a hearing on the speedy trial motion, Appellant’s counsel presented

the speedy trial claim on federal constitutional grounds, addressing the four-

factor test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (endorsing a balancing

test to determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been

violated). N.T. 4/4/22, 3-4, 12. Counsel pointed out that almost two years

had passed since Appellant’s arrest and then characterized the entire period

from the arrest until March 4, 2022, as delay: (1) the five months between

the arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint (August 2, 2020 to January

19, 2021); (2) the two and one-half months between the filing of the criminal

complaint and the formal arraignment (January 19, 2021 to April 8, 2021);

(3) the two months between the arraignment and the preliminary hearing

(April 8, 2021 to June 24, 2021); and (4) the eight months between the

preliminary hearing and a scheduled trial date (June 24, 2021 to March 4,

2022).   Id. at 3-5, 7-9.   With respect to the last period of time, counsel

acknowledged that a prior trial date for January 28, 2021, was rescheduled

because of a Commonwealth witness’s “COVID-19 exposure.” Id. at 8. The

court added that it remembered that the reason for the delay in that instance

resulted from defense counsel’s concern about exposure. Id. at 9 (the trial

court: “I believe, and anyone can correct me if I’m wrong, that [Appellant’s]

then-serving counsel was leaving the office where she worked, leaving her

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employment in Centre County, and expressed her own concerns about

possibly being exposed to the affiant because of some activity she was going

to have with her father helping her move that weekend…”).           Appellant’s

counsel agreed that the delay from March 4, 2022, until the filing of the speedy

trial motion was caused by the defense. Id.

      Appellant claimed that two forms of prejudice supported his speedy trial

claim. First, he alleged that the “Commonwealth ha[d] caused great anxiety

for [him] by having th[e] criminal proceeding drag on.” N.T. 4/4/22, 10-11.

Second, he asserted that he suffered from the loss of evidence due to the

delay. Id. at 11. While his counsel acknowledged that the Commonwealth’s

evidence had included police body camera footage and a dashcam video that

began after Officer Orndorff initiated his emergency lights, counsel suggested

that a delay in the filing of the charges prevented him from acquiring

additional surveillance video evidence. Id. (“Had timely charges been filed, a

thorough investigation could have been conducted, resulting in additional

footage of the erratic driving from the surrounding businesses, which could

have assisted in [Appellant’s] defense. However, that footage would not have

survived the lengthy delay, and now we are reliant on witness memory of an

event almost two years later.”). After hearing arguments from both parties,

the court denied the speedy trial motion. Id. at 19.

      On April 29, 2022, Appellant failed to appear for trial and a jury found

him guilty in absentia of the DUI offense and false identification to a law

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enforcement officer.3 Jury Verdict Slip, 4/29/22, 1; N.T. 4/29/22, 8-12, 161-

62. Afterwards, the court found Appellant guilty of the remaining offenses

referenced above.        Non-jury Verdict, 4/29/22, 1; N.T. 4/29/22, 162-63.

Sentencing was deferred for the preparation of a presentence investigation

report. Order, 4/29/22, 1. On July 6, 2022, the court imposed an aggregate

term of two to seven years’ imprisonment consistent with the parties’

recommendation based on their agreement to pre-trial stipulations.4        N.T.

7/6/22, 2-6. After no post-sentence motions were filed, Appellant timely filed

a notice of appeal and a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).5 Notice of Appeal, 7/15/22, 1;
____________________________________________

3 We note that, prior to trial, the Commonwealth represented to the trial court

that an earlier trial listing on March 7, 2022, needed to be continued because
Appellant was impaired when he appeared in court. N.T. 4/29/22, 10.

4 The aggregate sentence included concurrent prison terms of two to seven

years for driving under the influence of a Schedule I controlled substance as
a fourth offense, six to twelve months for false identification to a law
enforcement officer, and two to four years for driving while operating privilege
is suspended or revoked – DUI related with a controlled substance in blood as
a third or subsequent violation. Sentencing Order (Count 1), 7/6/22, 1;
Sentencing Order (Count 6), 7/6/22, 1; Sentencing Order (Count 8), 7/6/22,
1. Driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked - DUI related as
a third or subsequent violation merged for sentencing purposes. Sentencing
Order (Count 8), 7/6/22, 2. Fines were imposed for the remaining summary
offenses. Sentencing Order (Count 10), 7/6/22, 1; Sentencing Order (Count
11), 7/6/22, 1; Sentencing Order (Count 12), 7/6/22, 1.

5  On August 2, 2022, the trial court reissued sentencing orders for the
summary offense counts changing the wording of the original orders to reflect
how the convictions for those offenses were obtained, without affecting the
fines imposed for those offenses. Amended Sentencing Order (Count 10),
8/2/22, 1; Amended Sentencing Order (Count 11), 8/2/22, 1; Amended
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Rule 1925 Order, 7/19/22, 1; Amended Rule 1925 Order, 7/22/22, 1; Rule

1925(b) Statement, 8/2/22, 1.

       Appellant presents the following question for our review:

       Did the trial court err by denying [Appellant’s m]otion to [d]ismiss
       based on a violation of his speedy trial rights under Article I,
       Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and [the] Sixth
       Amendment [to] the [United States] Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 9.

       Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss and rejecting his claim alleging a violation of his constitutional right

to a speedy trial.         Appellant’s Brief at 15-22.    He argues that the

Commonwealth unreasonably delayed its prosecution where a jury trial was

not conducted until 635 days after the date on which his offenses occurred.

Id. at 16-19. In particular, he points out that the criminal complaint was not

filed until 171 days after the offenses were alleged to have occurred, his

preliminary arraignment did not take place until 77 days after the filing of the

criminal complaint, his preliminary hearing did not take place until 72 days

____________________________________________

Sentencing Order (Count 12), 8/2/22, 1. Because we view the changes made
by the court to the summary offense judgments of sentence as correcting
patent typographical errors, the trial court’s inherent authority to correct the
orders was not limited by the fact that this appeal was pending from all of the
judgments of sentences. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65
(Pa. 2007) (holding 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505’s limits on jurisdiction do not impinge
upon a trial court’s inherent authority to correct patent errors despite an
absence of traditional jurisdiction); id. at 66 (holding that where an error in
sentencing was clear from the order itself and the docket sheet, the trial
court’s exercise of inherent power to correct a mistake was proper).

                                           -9-
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after it was originally scheduled to be held, his pre-trial conference was not

held until 64 days after it was first scheduled to be held, and an original trial

listing for January 28, 2022, was continued because the Commonwealth was

unable to produce a witness. Id.

      Appellant alleges three grounds for prejudice such that delay: (1)

caused him to “suffer significant anxiety and concern;” (2) prevented him from

developing his defense; and (3) prevented him from losing the opportunity to

receive a sentence that would be partially served concurrent with another

sentence that he was serving in another jurisdiction. Appellant’s Brief at 20-

21. As for the effect that any delay would have had on his ability to develop

a defense for trial, he notes that the deterioration of his relationship with Ms.

Payne while his case remained pending made her an unavailable defense

witness:

      During this fifteen-month delay [i.e., the period between the filing
      of the criminal complaint and the trial], a critical witness, Shelley
      Payne, had become unavailable to testify.

                                       …

      During the 171 days that had elapsed before the [c]riminal
      [c]omplaint was filed, [Appellant] no longer had a romantic
      relationship with the only other eyewitness. The deterioration of
      this relationship would have led to inevitable credibility issues had
      defense counsel been able to contact Ms. Payne.

      Being present at the traffic stop from which this case arose, Ms.
      Payne’s testimony was critical to refute allegations that
      [Appellant] had ingested marijuana while in physical control of the
      vehicle. Rather, Ms. Payne would have testified that [Appellant]
      had ingested marijuana after exiting and disabling the motorcycle.
      Had charges been filed closer to the date of the offense, defense

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      counsel may have been able to successfully procure Ms. Payne to
      provide testimony at [Appellant’s] preliminary hearing and
      subsequent trial.

Id. at 21-22.

      As a preliminary matter, we note that Appellant’s theory for prejudice

based on the availability of Ms. Payne as a defense witness is waived because

Appellant presented no prejudice arguments concerning Ms. Payne in his

speedy trial claim argued in the hearing before the trial court.             See

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 666 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citations omitted) (“[a] new and different theory of relief may not be

successfully advanced for the first time on appeal”); Commonwealth v.

Cain, 906 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2006) (speedy trial issue waived on

appeal when not properly presented to trial court); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal”).     Appellant likewise waived his claim that delay

prejudiced him by causing him to lose the opportunity to serve his sentence

concurrently with a term he was already serving in a separate jurisdiction.

That assertion was not included in the prejudice arguments made in the pre-

trial hearing. See N.T. 4/4/22, 10-12.

      In evaluating the preserved portions of Appellant’s constitutional speedy

trial rights issue, “our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its

discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s court findings

and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the

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prevailing party.” Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. 2020)

(citation omitted).

       The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by operation of

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and Article I, Section 9 of

the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a

speedy trial, and Article I, Section 9 of Pennsylvania Constitution co-

extensively protects that right with the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. See Commonwealth v. DeBlase, 665 A.2d 427, 432 & n.2

(Pa. 1995).     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has continued to apply the

Barker balancing test where an appellant presents an independent claim

premised on the constitutional guarantees to a speedy trial.6     Id. at 431.
____________________________________________

6 As Appellant abandoned any claim premised under the prompt trial rule
under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, we need not conduct a Rule 600 inquiry and may
proceed to evaluate Appellant’s discrete constitutional claim. We also note
that Rule 600 appears to have been suspended from March 16, 2020 to
December 10, 2021, during the judicial emergency declared in the 49th Judicial
District, which includes Centre County, in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic
that began in March of 2020. See Declaration of Judicial Emergency, In Re:
49th Judicial District – Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 3/16/20, P.J.
Ruest (declaring a judicial emergency from March 16, 2020 to April 14, 2020,
during which “[t]he operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 shall be
suspended”), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/
20210519/010521-file-8521.pdf; Amended Administrative Order, In Re: 49th
Judicial District – Actions Pursuant to Declaration of Judicial
Emergency, 4/6/20, P.J. Ruest (extending the judicial emergency through
May 1, 2020, while continuing the Rule 600 suspension), available at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010650-file-8932.
pdf; Second Amended Administrative Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District –
Actions Pursuant to Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 4/23/20, P.J.
Ruest (extending the judicial emergency through May 31, 2020, while
continuing the Rule 600 suspension), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010725-file-9094.pdf;             Third      Amended
Administrative Order, In Re: 49 Judicial District – Actions Pursuant to
                                   th

Declaration of Judicial Emergency, 5/29/20, P.J. Ruest (extending the
judicial emergency through July 3, 2020, while continuing the Rule 600
suspension     “subject    to    constitutional   limitations”),   available  at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010801-file-9394.
pdf; Fourth Amended Administrative Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District
Judicial Emergency Order, 6/25/20, P.J. Ruest (extending the judicial
emergency through September 7, 2020, while continuing the Rule 600
suspension     “subject    to    constitutional   limitations”),   available  at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010829-file-9556.
pdf; Fifth Amended Administrative Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District
Judicial Emergency Order, 9/3/20, P.J. Ruest (extending the judicial
emergency through December 31, 2020, while continuing the Rule 600
suspension     “subject    to    constitutional   limitations”),   available  at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010900-file-9986.
pdf; Sixth Amended Administrative Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District
Judicial Emergency Order, 12/29/20, P.J. Ruest (extending the judicial
emergency through April 30, 2021, while continuing the Rule 600 suspension
“subject to constitutional limitations”), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
Storage/media/pdfs/20210519/010957-file-10987.pdf; Seventh Amended
Administrative Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District Judicial Emergency
Order, 4/23/21, P.J. Ruest (extending the judicial emergency through June
30, 2021, while continuing the Rule 600 suspension “subject to constitutional
limitations”),    available     at    https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/
pdfs/20210519/011028-file-11454.pdf; Request for Emergency Judicial
Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District Judicial Emergency Order, 6/25/21,
P.J. Ruest (requesting authorization from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
extend the 49th Judicial District’s judicial emergency through August 31,
2021), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210827/
153417-june25centrecountyrequestforemergencyjudicialorder.pdf; Order, In
Re: 49th Judicial District Declaration of Judicial Emergency (Centre
County) (Pa., filed 4/29/21) (granting an extension of the judicial emergency
through August 31, 2021) (per curiam), available at https://www.pacourts.us/
Storage/media/pdfs/20210701/143630-39mm2020-centre-6-29-21order.
pdf; Request for Emergency Judicial Order, In Re: 49th Judicial District
Judicial Emergency Order, 9/13/21, P.J. Ruest (requesting authorization
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to extend the 49th Judicial District’s
judicial   emergency     through      December      10,   2021)     available at
https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210914/195322-sept.13-
centrecounty-requestforemergencyjudicialorder.pdf; In Re: 49th Judicial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Barker’s four-part constitutional analysis requires consideration of: (1) the

length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion

of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.        See

Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700-01 (Pa. 2012) (discussing

Barker).     “The particular interests the Sixth Amendment was designed to

protect are the following: to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; to

minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and to limit the possibility that

the defense will be impaired.” Commonwealth v. McCord, 644 A.2d 1206,

1212 (Pa. Super. 1994).

       As to the first two parts of the Barker test, Appellant argues that: (1)

the Commonwealth provided no justification for not filing criminal charges

against him until 171 days after the occurrence of his offenses; (2) his

continued incarceration in a separate matter in Blair County did not justify

delays including 77 days between the filing of the criminal charges and his

preliminary arraignment and a 72-day delay between when his preliminary

hearing was original scheduled for and then held; (3) there was a 64-day delay

between when his pre-trial conference was first scheduled for and then held;

and (4) the scheduling of his trial was delayed for a 36-day period because

____________________________________________

District Declaration of Judicial Emergency (Centre County) (Pa., filed
9/14/21) (granting an extension of the judicial emergency through December
10, 2021) (per curiam), available at https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/
media/pdfs/20210914/195322-sept.13-centrecounty-requestforemergency
judicialorder.pdf.

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the Commonwealth was unable to procure a witness. Appellant’s Brief at 16-

19.

      In its opinion, the trial court advises that the delays in this case were

“due to circumstances outside of the Commonwealth’s control, as well as the

actions taken and agreements made by Appellant.”            Trial Court Opinion,

8/17/23, 6. The court’s recitation of the pre-trial procedural history highlight

that the delays were caused by logistical issues caused by the on-going

COVID-19 pandemic, a continuance granted sua sponte by the court, a

continuance granted with the consent of both parties after a Commonwealth

witness contracted the COVID-19 virus, and an incident where trial was unable

to proceed because Appellant appeared for court in an impaired state. Id. at

2-3, 5-6.

      For the third part of the Barker test, Appellant argues that he asserted

his speedy trial rights by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 27,

2021 (189 days after the filing of the criminal complaint), and his dismissal

motion on March 28, 2022 (433 days after the filing of the criminal complaint).

Appellant’s Brief at 19. The trial court instead notes that “Appellant never

asserted his rights until after the delays agreed [to] or caused by Appellant.”

Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/23, 6. By doing so, the court is implicitly referring

either to the dismissal motion or the arguments made at the hearing on that

motion.     The court appears to make no reference to the pre-trial habeas

petition because there were no apparent speedy trial issues presented in that

motion. Instead, Appellant alleged therein that there was insufficient evidence

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for a prima facie case to support charges for forgery, identity theft, and theft

by receiving stolen property. Habeas Petition, 7/27/21, ¶¶ 5-16.

      With respect to the last part of the test, Appellant argues he sustained

three forms of prejudice resulting from delay. First, he asserts that delay and

the restraint on his liberty and lengthy pretrial incarceration resulting from

delay caused him to suffer significant anxiety and concern. Appellant’s Brief

at 20. Second, he argues that the same restraint and incarceration hindered

him from preparing a defense because, by the time of trial, he was no longer

in a romantic relationship with Ms. Payne and, assuming there was no delay,

Appellant suggests that Ms. Payne would have provided testimony for the

defense at a preliminary hearing and trial. Id. at 20-22. Lastly, he claims

that “the harm incurred by … prosecutorial delay manifested in the

irretrievable loss of opportunity to receive a sentence partially concurrent with

that which was being served in another jurisdiction.” Id. at 21.

      When addressing the possibility of prejudice, the trial court advises that

“Appellant failed to articulate any cognizable prejudice he suffered as a result

of the delay.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/23, 6-7. The court never addresses

the argument that delay hindered Appellant from securing testimony from Ms.

Payne because, as we observed in our waiver holding above, Appellant never

raised that argument to the trial court. The court also never addresses the

lost opportunity for concurrent sentences argument.        With respect to the

suggestion that prejudice prevented Appellant from developing a defense, the

trial court appears to address Appellant’s separate claim raised below that

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delay in the filing of his charges prevented him from timely securing

surveillance videos that he assumed would have existed and showed his

motorcycle driving prior to the beginning of the police camera footage that

was presented at trial. Id. at 7; see N.T. 4/4/22, 11 (Appellant’s argument

at the dismissal hearing: “Had timely charges been filed, a thorough

investigation could have been conducted, resulting in additional businesses,

which could have assisted in [Appellant’s] defense.”).

      “A finding in the defendant’s favor of any one of the four factors,

standing alone, does not constitute a speedy trial violation. Rather, each of

the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court’s

evaluation of a criminal defendant’s claim that his speedy trial rights were

violated.” DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 432 (citations omitted). Here, our careful

review of Appellant’s arguments, the trial court’s opinion, and the certified

record failed to show that any of the four factors of the Barker test should

have weighed in Appellant’s favor. Moreover, we discern that Appellant has

failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his constitutional speedy trial rights claim.

      Seeing that Appellant was tried in this case within twenty months of his

arrest and, for sixteen of those months, the trial court was navigating through

an ongoing judicial emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we can

hardly fault the trial court for declining to consider the delay in this case as

uncommonly long.     Even assuming arguendo that the length of delay was

unreasonable, the trial court did not determine that any of the continuances

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in this case were the result of intentional delay or negligence on the part of

the Commonwealth.          That conclusion was also not an apparent abuse of

discretion. Appellant presented no testimony at the hearing on his dismissal

motion and the arguments of counsel and the certified record supported the

trial court’s conclusion that the delays in this case were either outside the

control of the Commonwealth or were delays that Appellant assented to or

caused by himself: some of the delay appeared to have been attributed to

difficulties with transporting Appellant amid the ongoing pandemic, the trial

court sua sponte granted a continuance of the preliminary hearing, a joint

continuance occurred when a Commonwealth witness was unable to appear

for trial due to a COVID-19 infection, and a trial date needed to be continued

on an occasion when Appellant appeared in court in an impaired state. 7 N.T.

4/4/22, 13-16; 4/29/22, 10.

       The timing of Appellant’s assertion of his speedy trial rights was also an

unpersuasive factor for him which his counsel acknowledged below. See N.T.

4/4/22, 10 (“It is acknowledged that this is perhaps the defense’s weakest
____________________________________________

7 While the parties failed to point to any definitive reason for the delay between

Appellant’s arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint (from August 2, 2020
to January 19, 2021), it is not lost on this Court that that period of time
coincided with times when jails and prisons across Pennsylvania were being
overwhelmed by the spread of the COVID-19 virus. See Paula Reed Ward,
COVID Cases Continue to Ravage Pennsylvania Jails, Prisons,
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Dec. 11, 2020, available at https://triblive.com/
news/pennsylvania/covid-cases-continue-to-ravage-pennsylvania-jails-
prisons/; Gary Sinderson, Centre County Correctional Facility Limiting
Taking New Inmates, WJACTV, Jan. 11, 2021, available at
https://wjactv.com/news/local/centre-county-correctional-facility-limiting-
taking-new-inmates.

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J-S12036-23

argument, as this is his first time invoking his Sixth Amendment right.”).

Here, the constitutional speedy trial rights claim was not presented until the

hearing for Appellant’s motion in which he originally requested dismissal under

Rule 600 and after Appellant had caused a delay of trial.

      Lastly, Appellant fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion

by finding that he failed “to articulate any cognizable prejudice he suffered as

a result of the delay.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/17/23, 6-7. The only preserved

portion of the appellate prejudice argument is that he experienced anxiety

because of delay in this case. Appellant’s Brief at 20 (assertion that Appellant

was subjected to “extended restraint on his liberties with oppressive pretrial

incarceration” and noting that “lengthy pretrial incarceration [can] cause a

defendant to suffer significant anxiety and concern”), compare with N.T.

4/4/22, 11 (“Here, the Commonwealth has caused great anxiety for my client

by having this criminal process drag on. My client has had to live his life for

almost two years while the Commonwealth dragged their feet in bringing the

charges, bringing my client to his pretrial hearings, bringing my client to his

pretrial hearings, and finally bringing my client to trial.”).

      The appellate argument for prejudice such that delay in this case caused

Appellant anxiety because it subjected him to lengthy pretrial incarceration

has no support in the record. In a pretrial motion in limine filed by Appellee,

the Commonwealth pointed out that Appellant incurred additional criminal

charges in a separate case, after an incident in Blair County on October 30,

2020, which involved Ms. Payne as his victim of witness intimidation and

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harassment.     Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 1/20/22, ¶¶ 58-59 &

attached Exhibit B, Sentencing Order, Commonwealth v. Miller, CP-07-CR-

0000071-2021, 6/23/21.       The sentencing order in that Blair County case

indicates that Appellant received credit for time-served starting on October

30, 2022. Id. at attached Exhibit B, Sentencing Order, Commonwealth v.

Miller, CP-07-CR-0000071-2021, 6/23/21, 5. In comparison, the sentencing

notes of testimony in the instant case suggested that Appellant was only

entitled to a time-credit for two days of pre-trial incarceration. N.T. 7/6/22,

3. Accordingly, there was no basis for Appellant to now argue that delays in

the instant case caused him anxiety by way of lengthy pre-trial incarceration

– Appellant was already incarcerated from his offenses in another jurisdiction.

      Upon our review of the certified record, we do not find anything

objectionable about the trial court’s application of the four-factor Barker test.

Appellant fails to demonstrate that the trial court’s denial of his constitutional

speedy rights claim was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we decline to

find any basis to grant relief.

     Judgments of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/20/2023

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