Court Opinion

ID: 9379407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 16:06:49.500503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.391159
License: Public Domain

J-S06035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMES E. HARMON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1593 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 21, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-28-MD-0000375-1978

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: MARCH 15, 2023

        Appellant, James E. Harmon, appeals from the September 21, 2022,

Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County dismissing

Appellant’s self-styled petition for writ of habeas corpus as his eighth pro

se petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9545. Concluding that Appellant's petition amounts to an

untimely serial PCRA petition, we affirm.

        This Court previously has summarized the factual and procedural history

of Appellant's case, as follows:

        On February 7, 1979, after a [non-jury trial], Appellant was found
        guilty of murder in the second degree and robbery. On August
        29, 1979, the [c]ourt imposed the following sentences to be
        served consecutively: mandatory life imprisonment for the
        second[-] degree murder conviction and five (5) to twenty (20)

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      years of incarceration for the robbery conviction. Over the next
      thirty years, Appellant filed several [PCRA petitions]; none of the
      [petitions] filed has resulted in relief. [However, in 1986, a federal
      district court ruled Appellant's consecutive robbery sentence was
      null and void.]

Commonwealth v. Harmon, 1852 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed May 31, 2018)

(unpublished memorandum decision), quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 1/21/17,

at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

      Most recently, on      February 6, 2022, Appellant         filed   with   the

Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court a civil Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

challenging the legality of his second-degree murder sentence nunc pro tunc.

The Commonwealth Court transferred this matter to the trial court for want of

jurisdiction by order of February 23, 2022. On March 17, 2022, the trial court

construed Appellant’s filing as an untimely PCRA petition and denied him relief.

This appeal followed.

      Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “The

PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are

binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to

the PCRA court's legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d

1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

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      In Appellant’s pro se appellate brief, he maintains that the PCRA court

erred when it treated his habeas corpus petition as an untimely PCRA petition.

In the alternative, he argues that his legality of sentence claim is not waivable.

      Before we may address the merits of Appellant’s claim, however, we

must properly construe the nature of the petition in which he raised the claim.

We have noted that one may not circumvent PCRA time limits applicable to

issues cognizable under the PCRA simply by couching such issues in a self-

styled writ of habeas corpus:

      We recognize that, [i]t is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to
      be the sole means of achieving post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S.
      § 9542; Commonwealth v. Haun, ... 32 A.3d 697 ( [Pa.] 2011).
      Unless the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the
      PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus.
      [Commonwealth v.] Fahy, [737 A.2d 214,] 223–224 [(Pa.
      1999) ]; Commonwealth v. Chester, ... 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.]
      1999). Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised
      in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas
      corpus petition. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, ... 722 A.2d
      638 ( [Pa.] 1998); see also Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779
      A.2d 578 (Pa. Super. 2001) ([stating that] a collateral petition
      that raises an issue that the PCRA statute could remedy is to be
      considered a PCRA petition). Phrased differently, a defendant
      cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion
      as a writ of habeas corpus.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465–66 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Appellant’s claim arguably may be construed as stating either of two

alternate theories of relief. Under the first theory, Appellant’s claim challenges

the legality of his sentencing order because the order allegedly failed to cite

to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b), which explicitly authorizes a life sentence for second-

degree murder, and instead only cited to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b), which does

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not mention the applicable sentence. See Brief for Appellant, at pp. iv, iv-I,

and 11.1 Under the second theory, Appellant’s claim expresses a void-for-

vagueness2 challenge in which he argues that 18 Pa.C.S. 2502(b),3 defining

second-degree murder, and, by implication, Section 1102(b),4 providing the

sentence for second-degree murder, failed to authorize a life sentence for

second-degree murder.         Such a claim also implicates the legality of one’s
____________________________________________

1 Even if we were to address this claim on the merits, we would affirm that it
offers Appellant no relief, because the trial court possessed authority to
pronounce sentence in the instant matter. See Commonwealth v.
Stultz, 114 A.3d 865 (Pa. Super. 2015) (failure to cite a statute in a
sentencing order does not render a sentence illegal where court has statutory
authority to pronounce sentence).

2 “A statute will only be found unconstitutional if the statute is so vague that
persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.” Commonwealth v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440,
456 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

3   Section 2502, “Murder”, provides in relevant part:

        (b) Murder of the second degree.--A criminal homicide
        constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed
        while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in
        the perpetration of a felony.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

4   Section 1102, “Sentence for Murder”, provides in relevant part:

        (b) Second degree.--Except as provided under section 1102.1,
        a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree,
        of second degree murder of an unborn child or of second degree
        murder of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a term
        of life imprisonment.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b).

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sentence. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 562 (Pa. 2022)

(citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 997 (Pa. 2021)

(explaining that, because a sentencing court does not have authority to

sentence a defendant under a sentencing statute that is unconstitutionally

vague, a void-for-vagueness challenge “is exactly the type of claim” that we

held “implicated the legality of the sentence . . . and found cognizable under

the PCRA . . . .”)).

      Under either theory, therefore, Appellant’s self-styled habeas corpus

petition raised a legality of sentence claim that would be cognizable under the

PCRA and subject to the PCRA timeliness provisions. See Moore, supra at

993. Accordingly, as did the PCRA court below, we deem Appellant’s habeas

corpus petition a serial PCRA petition.

      The timeliness requirements of the PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and

cannot be ignored or set aside. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d

1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). The relevant statutory provision of the PCRA provide

as follows:

      (b) Time for filing petition.—

             (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
      or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date
      the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:
             (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

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            (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
      unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
      the exercise of due diligence; or
             (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
      recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
      Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
      this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
            (2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
      paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim
      could have been presented.
             (3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes
      final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
      review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
      Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for
      seeking the review.

42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b).

      Under this framework, an appellant must either file a petition within one

year of his judgment of sentence becoming final under Section 9545(b)(3), or

“plead” and “prove” that one of the enumerated exceptions apply. “[T]here

is no generalized equitable exception to the jurisdictional one-year time bar

pertaining to post-conviction petitions.”   Commonwealth v. Brown, 943

A.2d 264, 267 (Pa. 2008).

      For the purposes of the PCRA, Appellant's sentence became final ninety

days after our Supreme Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on June 4,

1981, when the time for him to seek a writ of certiorari to the United States

Supreme    Court   from   the   Pennsylvania    Supreme     Court's   denial   of

his allocatur petition expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct.

Rule 20.1 (effective Nov. 21, 1980 through Jan. 1, 1990 until replaced by U.S.

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Sup. Ct. Rule 13). Thus, Appellant's most recent petition was facially untimely

by over forty years when it was filed.

      Furthermore, Appellant has neither pled nor proven any of the

timeliness exceptions under Section 9545(b)(1).           Therefore, because

Appellant's petition for PCRA relief is untimely and not subject to any

exception, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Accordingly, we conclude the PCRA court correctly dismissed Appellant’s

eighth PCRA petition as untimely.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2023

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