Court Opinion

ID: 9489668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:21:09.246898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:39.288628
License: Public Domain

WEIS, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

The majority carefully explains that the dispute between the parties is limited to whether the phrase in the health benefits portion of the collective bargaining agreement “as described 12/22/92” imposes increases in deductible and co-payment provisions. The union asserts that the increases are not “as described 12/22/92,” and the employer says they are. The disagreement then is straightforward and focuses on the meaning to be given the cryptic statement, “as described 12/22/92.” The union contends that the dispute is an appropriate subject for a grievance, defined by the collective bargaining agreement as “an allegation that the employer has violated a specific provision of the collective bargaining agreement.” According to the union, the employer’s insistence that employees pay an increased deductible and co-payment for hospital and surgical expenses violates the health benefits provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
Although it disagrees with the union’s version of what was “described 12/22/92,” the employer sidesteps that issue and, instead, maintains that the peer review panel, as the final step of the grievance procedure, lacks the authority to resolve the issue. The employer points out that the collective bargaining agreement states: “The peer review panel can not change contract provisions, company policy, work rules, wage scales or benefits,” and argues that the union seeks to “change” the benefits provisions.
In its brief, the employer makes it clear that, in its view, “change” refers to the benefits that have “indisputably ... been in effect *104for six and one [half] months before the subject grievance was filed.” Appellee Brief at 21. That statement is based on the facts that the collective bargaining agreement was signed on January 9, 1993, and, on February 1, 1993, the employer began to impose the deductible and co-payment provisions. Despite grumbling by employees beginning at that time, the union did not file a formal grievance until August 16,1993.
When it attacks the peer review panel’s authority to “change” benefits, the employer focuses on those benefits in existence at the time the grievance was filed — not necessarily those due under the collective bargaining agreement. The employer’s contention is that its action in putting lesser benefits into effect sets the standard, which the peer review panel may not “change.”
Assuming arguendo that the union’s position on the understanding of 12/22/92 is correct and that the increases in deductibles and co-payments were not included, it follows that using management’s approach would result in denying the peer review panel the authority to remedy the employer’s violation of the collective bargaining agreement. Adopting such an interpretation of the panel’s authority makes the description of benefits in the collective bargaining agreement irrelevant when the employer unilaterally imposes a different health insurance program before the grievance occurs.
Indeed, had the collective bargaining agreement explicitly provided that no deductibles or co-payments would be applicable, under the employer’s interpretation, the peer review panel would still lack power to alter the benefits program implemented on February 1, 1993, even though the employer acted unilaterally. In sum, according to its view, the employer may circumvent peer review simply by adopting a new benefit, wage scale or work rule despite collective bargaining provisions to the contrary.
It seems to me that the district court misapprehended the parties’ positions when it stated that “the remedy sought by the Union is to change benefits provided by the Company under the terms of the CBA that went into effect on December 1, 1992.” Actually, the union seeks to reinstate, not change, the benefits it says were provided by the collective bargaining agreement.
Of course, the parties to a collective bargaining agreement are fi*ee to adopt a wide range of methods for resolving disputes over contract interpretation, including a veto power. In this ease, however, the employer did not retain the nullification right it now claims.
The peer review procedure adopted by the parties provides that “peer panels may review management’s actions to ensure that the application of the contract was followed correctly and fairly. If they find otherwise, they have the authority to rectify the situation consistent with contract provisions, company practices and/or policies.” That section clearly sets out the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement as the basis for determining if management’s action’s are correct and fair.
In deciding whether a ruling of a peer review panel is a “change,” therefore, the point of reference is the collective bargaining agreement — not a practice instituted by the employer after the agreement was adopted. The employer’s insistence that the peer review panel cannot act in the circumstances here is simply inconsistent with the provisions of the peer review agreement.
Even if there were a conflict or ambiguity between various provisions of the peer review agreement, the Court is required to adopt an interpretation favoring the means of dispute resolution provided in the collective bargaining agreement. “An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.” United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).7 See also *1055 Theodore Kheel, Labor Law § 23.07[2] (1995) (presumption of arbitrability compels arbitration even when parties do not clearly evidence a contractual intention to do so.)
The employer’s proposed construction of the peer review panel’s authority not only guts the dispute resolution procedure set up by the collective bargaining agreement, but is in conflict with basic tenets of labor law. When there are gaps in a contract, it is generally within the purview of the arbitrator to resolve them. Price v. International Broth. of Teamsters, 457 F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir.1972). See also United Steelworkers of America v. Lukens Steel Co., 969 F.2d 1468 (3d Cir.1992) (where collective bargaining agreement does not state who decides if grievance is valid, it is left to the arbitrator.).
I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to direct the parties to submit the dispute for resolution by a peer review panel.

. I agree with the majority that the peer review panel’s decisionmaking authority is entitled to the same deference that we accord arbitration panels. See Teamsters Local Union No. 30 v. Helms Express, Inc., 591 F.2d 211, 216 (3d Cir.1979).