Court Opinion

ID: 9605129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:30:35.523862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:59.009337
License: Public Domain

*819TERRY JENNINGS, Justice,
concurring.
Appellant, George Lewis (Lewis), an independent contractor employee, did not present legally sufficient evidence to establish that appellee, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), a premises owner, had a contractual right of control over his work, retained any control over his work, or did anything to ensure that he safely performed his work. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit Lewis’s proposed jury question regarding UPS’s right to control safety procedures at its package-sorting facility. Because the majority opinion errs in concluding that “UPS’s right to control is implicit and ... not an issue in this case” and that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a control issue to the jury because “it properly submitted the issue of general negligence only,” I concur only in the judgment of this Court.
Background
On October 11, 1999, Jerry Carpenter, a UPS local sort supervisor, contacted Lewis, a millwright1 employed by Turbex Inc. (Turbex), to repair a conveyer belt located at a UPS package-sorting facility in Houston. At that time, Lewis had over 30 years of experience as a millwright and had worked “almost 20 years, off and on,” for Turbex, an independent contractor hired by UPS to perform conveyor belt repairs.
When Lewis arrived at the UPS facility at approximately 6:45 p.m., Carpenter directed him to the “M1-G2” conveyor belt. Lewis performed a “lockout/tagout” safety procedure, which prevented the M1-G2 from unexpectedly starting up, and he then began his repairs. However, an adjacent primary feed belt, the “PF1-1” continued in operation. As the evening wore on, Lewis noticed a UPS employee shift change, and he saw that the PF1-1 was not in use. At approximately 10:30 p.m., as Lewis was clearing his work area, he stepped onto the PF1-1 to retrieve a tool, and, when he did so, he heard the sound of a buzzer signaling that the conveyor belt was about to start up. When the PF1-1 started up, Lewis’s right foot was severely injured after it was pulled into a gap in the PF1-1.
Lewis subsequently sued UPS for negligence, alleging that UPS was negligent, generally, for certain acts and omissions and that UPS, as a premises owner, failed “to enforce pre-startup and pre-sort policies and procedures.”
At trial, Carpenter testified that, if Lewis had performed the lockout/tagout safety procedure on the PF1-1 before stepping onto it, the belt would not have started up. Carpenter had seen Lewis perform this procedure on previous occasions, and Lewis was authorized to lockout the PF1-1 if he “needed that belt shut off.” Carpenter also explained that, in his opinion, Lewis could have retrieved the tool without stepping onto the PF1-1.
Paul Allen, a UPS security representative, testified that UPS prohibited its employees and independent contractors from standing on the conveyor belts at its facility except for certain “metro gathering belts.” He noted that, although he was not present at the facility on October 11, 1999, there should have been a five-second delay between the warning buzzer and the start up of the PF1-1. Allen explained that, when he tested the system the day after the incident, he observed that five *820seconds elapsed between the time that the warning buzzer sounded and the start of the PF1-1. Allen also explained that UPS prohibited its employees from altering the duration of the delay.
Larry Alvarez, the owner of Turbex, testified that, after the incident, Lewis admitted that he heard the warning buzzer and “just [did not] react to it.” Alvarez explained that, in his opinion, when Lewis heard the buzzer, he “should have gotten [himself] out of harm[’s] way very fast.”
Lewis testified that he knew that the lockout/tagout safety procedure was important and that he had been using it “for a very long time.” Lewis also admitted that he knew it was dangerous to step onto a conveyor belt that had not been locked out and that nothing had prevented him from locking out the PF1-1. Lewis noted, however, that Carpenter had previously informed him by radio when UPS employees were preparing to start a conveyor belt. Lewis explained that the delay between the sound of the warning buzzer and the start of the PF1-1 was “the quickest delay [he] ever saw,” and that, as a result, he did not have enough time to get off of the PF1-1. Lewis estimated that the delay was only one or two seconds long.
At the charge conference, UPS, citing Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.1985), objected to the “absence of a control issue incorporated into the case” on the grounds that Lewis had worked for an independent contractor and that “Texas law establishes certain rules that apply to that relationship, one being that there is no obligation to insure that a contractor’s employee perform the work in a safe manner unless there is a right of control.” The trial court, on the record, distinguished Redinger on the basis that the instant case “is not a general contractor case, which Redinger was.” The trial court also noted that Lewis was not “claiming ... UPS should have watched Lewis and should have made sure he did his job in a safe manner.” After UPS cited additional authority, the trial court overruled its objection.
Lewis then tendered the following written question to the trial court and requested that it be submitted to the jury:
Did United Parcel Service, Inc. (Ohio) have the right to control safety policies and procedures at the Mykawa facility?
The trial court denied Lewis’s request and marked the question “refused.”
In its charge to the jury, the trial court included standard definitions, in regard to both individuals and companies, of “negligence” and “ordinary care” and presented the following broad-form negligence question:
Did the negligence, if any, of those named below, proximately cause the injury in question?
Answer “YES” or “NO” for each of the following:
a. United Parcel Service, Inc. _
b. George Lewis ---
The jury answered “no” as to UPS and “yes” as to Lewis.
Jury Question on UPS’s Right of Control
In issue one, Lewis contends that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a jury question regarding UPS’s right to control safety procedures at its package-sorting facility. Referencing two of the numerous theories of liability asserted by Lewis in his amended petition, the majority opinion notes that Lewis alleged that “(1) UPS’s employee started the conveyor without any warning and (2) UPS’s buzzer did not work properly.” The majority opinion reasons that, because these two acts “are attributable to UPS, not an independent contractor, UPS’s right of control *821is implicit and, therefore, not an issue in this case” and “the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the issue of right to control to the jury; rather, it properly submitted the issue of general negligence only.” The majority opinion further concludes that “a general negligence charge was proper.”
However, neither party actually challenges the trial court’s use of the basic definitions of “negligence” and “ordinary care,” or its submission of a broad-form negligence question. Instead, the issue squarely presented to this Court is whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury Lewis’s theory of liability based on UPS’s alleged duty, as a premises owner, to ensure that Lewis, an independent contractor employee, safely performed his work — an issue which, as demonstrated by the facts as I have presented them above, was, if not properly pleaded, expressly tried by the consent of both parties. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 67 (“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.”). Under this theory of liability, the negligent activity in question is that of Lewis himself, i.e., stepping onto the PF1-1 without performing UPS’s lockout/tagout procedure on the PF1-1. The majority opinion’s conclusion that the “trial court did not err in submitting a general negligence charge” ignores the actual issue presented to this Court and answers an issue that neither party has raised.
Like the trial court below, the majority opinion misses Lewis’s point. Lewis’s point, clearly articulated to this Court, is that he “presented more than a scintilla of evidence showing UPS was liable for failing to exercise its control over the safety methods and procedures with reasonable care” because Carpenter “never asked Mr. Lewis to lockout the adjacent conveyor that caused Mr. Lewis’s injuries.” Lewis asserts that the “evidence is uncontrovert-ed that Mr. Lewis was required to follow the ‘UPS lockout procedures,’ and that UPS retained the right of control over compliance with its lockout procedures.” He argues, thus, that his “requested jury question on UPS’s right of control was material, properly worded, and dispositive on the issue of liability.”
Had Lewis presented more than a scintilla of evidence that UPS, as a premises owner, had a contractual right of control over Lewis’ work, retained any control over Lewis’ work, or did anything to ensure that Lewis safely preformed his work, he would have been entitled to a properly phrased issue and instruction on UPS’s “right to control” safety procedures. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (A trial court must submit to a jury “questions, instructions and definitions ... which are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence.”). As explained by the Texas Supreme Court:
Right to control may be shown by explicit contractual assignment or actual exercise of control. Generally, the former is a question of law for the court and the latter a question of fact for the jury.
Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 292 (Tex.2004) (footnotes omitted).2
*822Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that it is “fundamental to our system of justice that parties have the right to be judged by a jury properly instructed in the law.” Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 (Tex.2000). We have been admonished that “when a jury bases a finding of liability on a single broad-form question that commingles invalid theories of liability with valid theories, [an] appellate court is often unable to determine the effect of [such an] error.” Id. A jury must be able to base its verdict on legally valid questions and instructions. Id. Here, a right to control safety issue was critical to Lewis because the jury simply could not have understood, without proper guidance, that UPS, as a premises owner, could have been held liable to Lewis, an independent contractor employee, for Lewis’s own negligent activity. A finding on a right to control issue would have been equally important to UPS had the jury found that its • negligence proximately caused Lewis’s injury because UPS could have, theoretically, been “held liable without a judicial determination that a factfinder actually found that [it] should be held hable on proper, legal grounds.” Id. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the issue and with its analysis, and I turn to the merits of Lewis’s first issue and his arguments presented.
Lewis asserts that UPS “dictated the safety methods and procedures that [Lewis] was required to follow” and “retained the right of control over compliance with its lockout procedures.” In fact, Carpenter testified that UPS required its independent contractors to be “familiar with the UPS procedure for lockout/tagout” and that “they abide by it.” Lewis, thus, concludes that the trial court erred in denying his proposed question “on UPS’s right of control over the safety and lockout procedures [he] was required to follow on UPS’s premises.” In support of his argument, Lewis relies on Redinger and Dow Chemical Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602 (Tex.2002), Lee Lewis Construction, Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778 (Tex.2001), and Hoechst-Celanese Corporation v. Mendez, 967 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.1998).
As noted by the Texas Supreme Court, a premises owner or occupier generally does not have a duty to ensure that an independent contractor safely performs his work. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418. The Redinger court noted that an owner or occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care to keep the premises under his control in a safe condition and that a general contractor, who is in control of a premises, is charged with the same duty as an owner or occupier. 689 S.W.2d at 417. The court also noted that:
This duty to keep the premises in a safe condition may subject the general contractor [premises owner] to direct liability in two situations: (1) those arising from a premises defect, (2) those arising from an activity or instrumentality.
Id. The Court concluded that the case before it was “not a premises defect case,” but was instead a case involving “an injury caused by an activity conducted on the premises.” Id. The Court then went on to adopt the rule that
[o]ne who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care.
Id. at 418 (quoting Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 414 (1977)).
Accordingly, where a premises owner either contractually retains or actually exercises control over the independent con*823tractor’s work, the premises owner must exercise that control with reasonable care. Koch Ref. Co. v. Chapa, 11 S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex.1999). For example, “an employer [premises owner] who gives on-site orders or provides detailed instructions on the means or methods to carry out a work order owes the independent contractor employee a duty of reasonable care to protect him from work related hazards.” Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 357 (citing Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418). Safety requirements also “give rise to a narrow duty of care.” Mendez, 967 S.W.2d at 357. This “narrow” duty is “commensurate with the control [the premises owner] retains over the contractor’s work.” Id. However, “merely exercising or retaining a general right to recommend a safe manner for the independent contractor’s employees to perform their work is not enough to subject a premises owner to liability.” Bright, 89 S.W.3d at 607 (quoting Koch, 11 S.W.3d at 155).
In Mendez, the Texas Supreme Court held that a premises owner’s “insistence” that an independent contractor “observe and promote compliance with federal laws, general safety guidelines, and other standard safety precautions did not impose an unqualified duty of care on [the premises owner] to ensure that [the independent contractor’s] employees did nothing unsafe.” Id. at 357-58. Rather, the premises owner owed the independent contractor’s employees “a duty that any safety requirements and procedures it promulgated did not unreasonably increase, rather than decrease, the probability and severity of injury.” Id. at 358.
Here, as noted above, Carpenter testified that UPS required independent contractors to be “familiar with the UPS procedure for lockout/tagout” and that “they abide by it.” However, as noted in Mendez, this evidence does not establish that UPS owed Lewis an unqualified duty of care to ensure that Lewis did nothing unsafe. See id. at 357-58. Lewis, in fact, performed a loekout/tagout safety procedure on the M1-G2 belt that he repaired, and he directs us to no evidence that UPS’s policies and procedures required the lockout/tagout of adjacent conveyor belts not being serviced.
More importantly, there is no evidence in the record that UPS had a contractual right of control over Lewis’s work, retained any control over Lewis’s work, or did anything to ensure that employees of independent contractors actually followed UPS’s lockout/tagout policies and procedures. Although UPS may have insisted that independent contractors “abide by” its lockout/tagout procedures, there is no evidence that UPS monitored employees of independent contractors or in any way inspected their work to ensure that they complied with its procedures. Cf. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d at 784-85 (holding testimony that employee of general contractor had “the responsibility to routinely inspect ... to see to it that the subcontractors and their employees properly utilized fall protection equipment” constituted more than scintilla of evidence that general contractor retained right to control fall protection system on jobsite).
Conclusion
Because there is no evidence in the record that UPS had a contractual right of control over Lewis’s work, retained any control over Lewis’s work, or did anything to ensure that employees of independent contractors actually followed UPS’s lockout/tagout policies and procedures, I would hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit Lewis’s proposed jury question regarding UPS’s right to control safety procedures at its package-sorting facility. However, I disagree with *824the majority opinion’s characterization of the issue presented, its analysis, and its conclusions that “UPS’s right to control is implicit” and that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a control issue because “it properly submitted the issue of general negligence only.” Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of this Court.

. A millwright performs precision work with rotating equipment, including pumps, compressors, turbines, and conveyor belts.

. In cases brought against a property owner for the negligent activity of an independent contractor, the Texas Pattern Jury Charges, addressing the fact issue of whether a property owner actually retained a right of control, provide the following predicate to the appropriate liability question: "Did ... [the property owner] have a right to control [the injury-causing activity] ... on the premises?” 2 Comm, on Patern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges PJC 66.3 (2d ed.2002).