Court Opinion

ID: 9953674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:13:22.170278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:21.820853
License: Public Domain

J-S08016-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T.R., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: M.T.W.B., FATHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1718 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered November 16, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Orphans’ Court at
                              No(s): A-9489

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED: MARCH 22, 2024

       M.T.W.B. (Father) appeals the decree granting the petition to

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to L.R. (Child) (born in November

2015), which was filed by L.R. (Mother) and her husband, D.R. (Stepfather)

(collectively, Petitioners), and terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).            After careful review, we are

constrained to vacate the decree and remand for further proceedings.

       On March 30, 2023, Petitioners filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights to Child, as well as a petition for Stepfather’s adoption

of Child.   Petitioners also filed notice of a termination hearing for July 26,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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2023. The petition and notice included no certificates of service. Father filed

no response, and no attorney entered an appearance on Father’s behalf.

        On November 15, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on the

termination petition.1 As we discuss infra, Father did not participate in the

hearing. At the hearing, Mother and Stepfather testified. Additionally, Marsha

Ann Basco, Esquire, appeared as guardian ad litem and legal counsel for Child,

but offered no testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

granted the petition and involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to

Child. Id. at 33. The court entered its termination decree on November 16,

2023.

        On December 12, 2023, Father, pro se, filed a notice of appeal that did

not include a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) (requiring, in children’s fast track cases, that the

notice of appeal and concise statement must be simultaneously filed). Father

additionally filed a petition to proceed in forma pauperis. On December 19,

2023, the trial court granted in forma pauperis status to Father and appointed

Louis J. Mattioli, Esquire, as his counsel. Order, 12/19/23.

        On January 2, 2023, this Court entered an order directing Father to file

a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal no later than January

12, 2024. Father filed his counseled concise statement on January 4, 2024.

____________________________________________

1 At the request of Petitioners, the hearing was continued from its originally

scheduled date, July 26, 2023, to November 15, 2023..

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Father additionally “reserve[d] the right to amend the instant Statement

within a reasonable period of time after receipt and review of the requested

transcript.” Concise Statement, 1/4/24, ¶ 6. According to counsel, at the

time he filed Father’s initial concise statement, he

       [w]as … acting without the benefit of a transcript and without
       details pertaining to the matter. Accordingly, on February 6,
       2024, said counsel, having received and reviewed a transcript,
       filed an Amended Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on
       Appeal.

Father’s Brief at 6-7 n.3. The trial court filed an opinion on January 10, 2024.

Father filed an amended concise statement on February 6, 2024.2

       Father presents the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or committed
          an error of law in permitting the November 15, 2023[,] Hearing
          to proceed where Petitioners failed to demonstrate appropriate
          and/or actual service of Notice of said Hearing upon [Father].

       2. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or committed
          an error of law in determining the parental rights of [Father]
          to [Child] should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
          2511(a)(1) and (2).

____________________________________________

2 In children’s fast track cases, there is no per se rule requiring that a defective

notice of appeal be automatically quashed or dismissed. In In re K.T.E.L.,
983 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2009), a panel of this Court opined that the failure
to file a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement contemporaneously with the
notice of appeal constitutes “a defective notice of appeal,” and we dispose of
such matters on a case-by-case basis pursuant to Stout v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 421 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1980). In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d
at 747. In Stout, our Supreme Court held that “[t]he extreme action of
dismissal should be imposed by an appellate court sparingly, and clearly would
be inappropriate when there has been substantial compliance with the rules
and when the party [moving for quashal of the appeal] has suffered no
prejudice.” Stout, 421 A.2d at 1049. With this in mind, we decline to quash
Father’s appeal.

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       3. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion and/or committed
          an error of law in determining the tenets of 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§]
          2511(b) have been satisfied and the best interests of [Child]
          served by terminating the parental rights of [Father.]

Father’s Brief at 4 (issues reordered, numerical designations added).

       Although Father raises four issues for our review, we only address the

first issue because it compels our result. Father argues that the trial court

improperly permitted the termination hearing to proceed, where Petitioners

had failed to demonstrate Father received appropriate/actual service of the

termination proceedings. Father’s Brief at 8. Father argues,

       there was no evidence introduced to demonstrate [Father], an
       inmate incarcerated at [State Correctional Institution-Phoenix
       (SCI-Phoenix)] had notice of the proceeding or any meaningful
       opportunity whatsoever to participate and defend himself therein.

Id. (capitalization modified). Father contends the lack of notice implicates his

right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Id.

       Father acknowledges that notice, in termination of parental rights

proceedings, is governed by Section 2513 of the Adoption Act 3 and

Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 15.6.           Father’s Brief at 9.   As Father

observes, Section 2513 requires at least ten days’ notice “by personal service

or by registered mail to his … last known address or by such other means as

the court may require[.]” Id. at 9 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513). Similarly,

____________________________________________

3 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513.

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Father argues that Orphans’ Court Rule 15.6 requires notice by personal

service, service at his residence on an adult member of the household, or by

registered or certified mail to his last known address.     Id. at 9-10 (citing

Pa.O.C.R. 15.6).    Father points out there is no evidence the termination

petition was served upon Father by any means. Id. at 10.

      Father further directs our attention to a statement made by Petitioners’

counsel, Kurt Lynott, Esquire, at the termination hearing. According to Father,

Attorney Lynott acknowledged that efforts to provide Father with a video link

for the hearing “fell by the wayside and the prison became nonresponsive.”

Id. (quoting N.T., 11/15/23, at 3). Although Petitioners’ counsel stated that

he sent the hearing notice to a clearinghouse in St. Petersburg, Florida, Father

claims there is nothing of record confirming that the notice was forwarded to

Father.   Id. at 11.   Additionally, Father notes that the letter sent to St.

Petersburg does not indicate that a petition was enclosed. Id.

      Finally, Father argues there is no indication that Father received “actual”

notice of the underlying proceedings. Id. at 12. Father points out that the

certified mail receipt was signed by an unidentified third party. Id. According

to Father, it is unclear whether the return receipt was signed by the

“clearinghouse” in Florida or by a prison official at SCI-Phoenix. Id. Thus,

Father argues, Petitioners failed to establish Father received actual notice of

the proceedings. Id.

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      Petitioners counter that “counsel sent notice of the hearing to []

Appellant at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix via certified and

regular United States First Class mail along with a copy of the Petition for

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights on July 26, 2023.” Appellees’ Brief

at 3. Petitioners point out that this Court “has required a ‘good faith’ effort to

provide notice” in termination proceedings.       Id.   Petitioners argue, “The

correspondence containing the notice and petition was accepted and signed

for on August 21, 2023[,] at SCI[-]Phoenix.” Id. They explain, “[n]either the

certified mail nor regular mail were returned to [their] counsel.”            Id.

Petitioners provided this information to the trial court at the November 15,

2023, hearing, and the trial court found proper service was effected. Id.

      Petitioners further claim that “current notice was mailed to the address

as provided by the Department of Corrections along with [Father’s]inmate

number that is required by the Department of Corrections when mailing to

inmates.” Id. at 4. Petitioners point out that Father is still incarcerated with

the same prisoner number, and Father does not claim lack of notice of the

November 15, 2023, hearing. Id. at 4-5.

      We review a decree terminating parental rights under the following

standard:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse

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     of   discretion    only   upon    demonstration       of    manifest
     unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
     court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
     the record would support a different result. We have previously
     emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
     observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

     This Court has explained,

     issues involving proper service of notice in termination
     proceedings have a constitutional underpinning. The Fourteenth
     Amendment provides, in relevant part: “nor shall the State
     deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
     process of law….”          U.S. Const. Amend. 14 (emphasis
     added). Among the oldest of “fundamental liberty interests”
     recognized by the Constitution is a parent’s right to make
     decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
     children. In re D.C.D., … 105 A.3d 662, 667 (Pa. 2014); see
     also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147
     L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (citing, inter alia, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
     U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923) (“liberty”
     protected by Due Process Clause includes right of parents to
     “establish a home and bring up children” and to “control the
     education of their own”)).

     Naturally then, it is well-settled that any individual whose parental
     rights are to be terminated must be afforded due process — that
     is, certain procedural safeguards. See In re A.N.P., 155 A.3d
     55, 66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing In re Interest of K.B., 763 A.2d
     436, 439 (Pa. Super. 2000)); see also Santosky v. Kramer,
     455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (“The
     fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
     custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
     because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
     custody of their child to the State.”). “Due process requires
     nothing more than adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard,
     and the chance to defend oneself in an impartial tribunal having
     jurisdiction over the matter.” A.N.P., 155 A.3d at 66 (citation
     omitted). Although we have explained that due process “is flexible
     and calls for such procedural protections as the situation

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        demands,” we are unwilling to allow the termination of parental
        rights “without strict compliance with the procedures set forth by
        the Legislature....” Id. at 66, 68 (citing Appeal of J.T.M., 845
        A.2d 861, 865 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (further citation omitted)
        (emphasis added).

In re K.M.D., 261 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2021).

        Father claims a due process violation based on his lack of notice of the

termination proceeding. The Adoption Act governs the notice requirement in

termination proceedings:

        § 2513. Hearing

        ….

        (b) Notice.—At least ten days’ notice shall be given to the parent
        or parents, putative father, or parent of a minor parent whose
        rights are to be terminated, by personal service or by
        registered mail to his or their last known address or by such
        other means as the court may require. A copy of the notice shall
        be given in the same manner to the other parent, putative father
        or parent or guardian of a minor parent whose rights are to be
        terminated….

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513(b) (emphasis added).

        Our Orphans’ Court Rules provide the following guidance, in relevant

part:

        (a) Notice to every person to be notified shall be by personal
        service, service at his or her residence on an adult member of the
        household, or by registered or certified mail to his or her last
        known address. If such service is unobtainable and the
        registered mail is returned undelivered, then:

        ….

             (2)    in   [involuntarily  termination    and    adoption
             proceedings], further notice by publication or otherwise
             shall be given if required by general rule or special order

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            of the local Orphans’ Court. If, after reasonable
            investigation, the identity of a person to be notified is
            unknown, notice to him or her shall not be required.

Pa.R.O.C. 15.6(a)(2) (emphasis added). As in all civil cases, the petitioners

bear the burden of proving proper service by their affirmative acts. Leight v.

Lefkowitz, 615 A.2d 751, 753 (Pa. Super. 1992).

      “[N]either the Adoption Act nor the cases interpreting it require that a

parent must be present in order for a court to grant” a termination petition. In

the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa. Super. 2017). This Court also

has long held that

      a trial court is not required to transport an incarcerated parent to
      a termination hearing in order to satisfy the needs of due process.
      However, if the incarcerated parent desires to contest the
      termination       petition,   the    trial   court    must    afford
      the incarcerated parent the ability to participate meaningfully in
      the termination hearing through alternate means.

In re Adoption of J.N.F., 887 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).         However,    a   parent    must     receive   notice    of   a

termination hearing. In the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d at 965.

      Our review of the record discloses the following. Petitioners filed their

termination petition on March 30, 2023. The petition included no certificate

of service. See Petition, 3/30/23. Petitioners additionally filed notice for the

July 26, 2023 termination hearing.      The notice included no certificate of

service. Our review further discloses no return of service or other evidence

indicating personal service or service by registered mail. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2513(b).

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       Our review discloses an application for a continuance filed by Petitioners’

counsel, Attorney Lynott. The application sought continuance of the July 26,

2023, termination hearing to November 15, 2023. Application, 7/27/23. The

application includes no certificate of service, or any evidence of service of the

continuance application or hearing notice on Father. Our review of the record

discloses an undated letter purportedly notifying Father of the November 15,

2023, hearing.      However, the letter was filed of record on November 20,

2023,4 after entry of the termination decree.              As such, it was not

considered by the trial court at the termination hearing.

       At the November 15, 2023, termination hearing, Attorney Lynott

explained his attempts to effectuate service on Father and arrange his

participation in the termination proceedings:

       [ATTORNEY LYNOTT:] Originally, [the termination hearing] was
       set for July 26th of this year.

             I had, candidly, with the court, as a court-appointed criminal
       attorney, I have a number that I can utilize through said mail to
       state prison inmates, which is their process because [Father] was
       not my client, and I could not utilize that number to serve him.

              [The Luzerne County Adoptions Clerk] and I were in
       communication with counselors at the prison to effectuate service,
       and had a video link setup for a July 26th hearing. That kind of
       fell by the wayside and the prison became nonresponsive.
____________________________________________

4 The letter has a return receipt indicating it was sent by certified mail to
Father at SCI-Phoenix, via Smart Communications in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Although the return receipt indicates delivery on August 21, 2023, it does not
indicate whether the letter was delivered and signed for in Florida or at SCI-
Phoenix. Father’s signature is not on the return receipt. There is nothing of
record evidencing service of the letter on Father.

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            So I requested to propose to have this hearing set. So it
       was moved from July 26th to today’s date.

            Since then[,] I provided notice to [Father] via Certified Mail
       as well as regular mail.

             For purposes of the record, … [Father is] incarcerated at
       [SCI-] Phoenix. When sending, it goes to a clearinghouse in St.
       Petersburg, Florida.

             I sent that notice. It was signed for and accepted at the
       prison on August 21st of this year.

              And the notice and petition were sent to that facility which,
       if I can proffer an offer that was E.E.A.5 for service.

       THE COURT: … [S]o let’s follow up. According to paragraph 26,
       the initial petition filed March 30th of this year, there was a belief,
       at that point in time, [Father] was at SCI Smithfield.

              And then he was moved to SCI Phoenix?

       [ATTORNEY] LYNOTT: Yes …. [Father] started at Camp Hill, then
       moved to Smithfield. The last check with the Department of
       Corrections had him at [SCI] Phoenix.

       THE COURT: So I will acknowledge that services were made at
       SCI Phoenix back in August, August 21st of 2023. Today is
       November 15th.

N.T., 11/15/23, at 3-5 (emphasis and footnotes added).

       As indicated above, Father, in forma pauperis, was not appointed

counsel until after entry of the decree terminating parental rights. Our review

discloses nothing of record supporting Attorney Lynott’s claim that Father, an

incarcerated individual, was served with the termination petition, application

____________________________________________

5 This term was not defined by Attorney Lynott.

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for a continuance, or notice of the rescheduled hearing. Further, a statement

by Petitioners’ counsel that the “prison became nonresponsive” does not

evidence that Father received actual notice of the hearing (or even the

termination petition).

      Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court violated

Father’s due process rights by conducting a termination hearing without

appropriate notice to Father. In re K.M.D., 261 A.3d at 1059 (stating, “we

are unwilling to allow the termination of parental rights without strict

compliance with the procedures set forth by the Legislature[.]” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we vacate the termination decree

and remand for further proceedings, following appropriate notice to Father.

      Decree vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.     Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/22/2024

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