Court Opinion

ID: 9537412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:17:55.354674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:37.725418
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, C. J.,
concurring:
I fully concur with the views expressed in the opinion of my Brother Batjer. I write separately to emphasize my concern with the constitutional problems raised by suggestive identification procedures.
Under the applicable due process standards we are required to weigh the factors in favor of the reliability of an identification, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972), against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.” Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Factors indicating the reliability of the identification are present in this case, ante at 3. The procedure used, however, was suggestive. The witnesses were taken to appellant’s home at four in the morning, after police officers had indicated that appellant fit the description the witnesses had given; appellant was escorted before the headlights of a police car in the company of police officers; the *586witnesses were seated together in the back seat of the police car, where their initial reaction, whether correct or not, could be reinforced. This procedure was suggestive, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198; and since there was no emergency, see Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), or other exigent circumstances, this increased possibility of misidentification was gratuitous as well. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 109.
While the factors indicating the reliability of the identification in this case outweigh the possible corrupting effect of the suggestive procedure, I am disturbed by the testimony in the record which suggests that this sort of procedure is commonplace.
I believe that unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures may not be tolerated if this Court is to continue to deal with these cases on an ad hoc basis, assessing the totality of the circumstances of each case, rather than by enforcing rules when such procedures are employed. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 111-112. The economic and societal costs incident to these procedures are substantial: judicial time and resources are expended in processing these appeals, and otherwise valid convictions are called into question. We cannot ignore such procedures.
In short, I believe that the administration of criminal justice would be well served if procedures which are either unduly or unnecessarily suggestive are avoided.1 If followed, this appeal and many others similarly grounded would not therefore be taken.

While formal line-up procedures are not necessary in all situations, see ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 160.1 and 160.2 (1975); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. at 111; the identification procedures should be as free of suggestion as possible.