Court Opinion

ID: 9368634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 15:00:35.999283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.871654
License: Public Domain

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                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13621
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        ROBERT RALPH DIPIETRO,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        JAMES F. BARRON,
        Dentist,
        DR. SILVER,
        Psychiatrist,
        DR. THOMPSON,
        Psychologist,
        WARDEN,
        DEPUTY WARDEN SHELTON, et al.,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                21-13621

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00179-CDL-MSH
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Robert DiPietro appeals the district court’s entry of sum-
        mary judgment in favor of the defendants in his lawsuit alleging
        that healthcare providers at two Georgia prisons were deliberately
        indifferent to his serious medical needs. After careful considera-
        tion, we affirm.
                                        I.
               DiPietro was convicted of child molestation in March 2016
        and sentenced to seven years in state prison. After two months in
        the county jail, DiPietro was transferred to Georgia Diagnostic and
        Classification Prison (GDCP) on May 5, 2016, and then to Augusta
        State Medical Prison on July 12, 2016. On August 16, 2016,
        DiPietro was transferred to Rutledge State Prison, where he re-
        mains.
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        21-13621                   Opinion of the Court                                3

                On August 19, 2018, 1 DiPietro filed a lawsuit against several
        prison officials and healthcare providers at GDCP and Rutledge,
        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant to this appeal, DiPietro
        alleged that an advanced practice psychiatric nurse at GDCP (Jer-
        rye Foreman) and two mental health providers at Rutledge (psy-
        chologist John Thompson and psychiatrist Donna Silver) deliber-
        ately ignored his need for psychiatric medications and counseling,
        leading to his attempted suicide. He also alleged that a dentist at
        GDCP (James Barron) deliberately failed to provide treatment for
        an infected tooth, resulting in months of pain and suffering and the
        loss of the tooth.
               The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
        defendants. It concluded that DiPietro had failed to exhaust his
        prison administrative remedies for his claims against Foreman and
        Barron, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA);
        that the statute of limitations barred his claim against Barron; and
        that DiPietro failed to show that any of the four healthcare provid-
        ers were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
        DiPietro now appeals, challenging the district court’s rulings in fa-
        vor of the four healthcare providers.

        1 Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed
        on the date that he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing, which we
        ordinarily presume to be the same day that he signed it. Daniels v. United
        States, 809 F.3d 588, 589 (11th Cir. 2015).
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13621

                                            II.
               We review the district court’s interpretation and application
        of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement de novo. Johnson v. Mead-
        ows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir.2005). We review the court’s
        factual findings related to the exhaustion of administrative reme-
        dies for clear error. Varner v. Shepard, 11 F.4th 1252, 1257 (11th
        Cir. 2021).
                We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de
        novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        nonmovant and drawing all reasonable factual inferences in his fa-
        vor. Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2022).
        Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is en-
        titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                            III.
               We consider the district court’s rulings on DiPietro’s claims
        against each defendant in turn. We affirm the district court’s dis-
        missal of his claim against Foreman based on his failure to exhaust
        his administrative remedies for that claim. And we affirm the
        court’s summary judgment in favor of the remaining healthcare
        providers because the claim against Barron was barred by the stat-
        ute of limitations,2 and DiPietro failed to present evidence that

        2The district court also concluded that DiPietro failed to exhaust available
        administrative remedies with respect to his claim against Barron. DiPietro
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        21-13621                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

        would support a jury verdict in his favor on his claims that Silver
        and Thompson were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical
        need.
                                               A.
               Under the PLRA, a prisoner is required to properly exhaust
        all available administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit
        regarding prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Jones v.
        Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202 (2007). The Georgia Department of Cor-
        rections provides a two-step grievance procedure: first, the pris-
        oner must submit a written grievance within ten days of any griev-
        able occurrence. Second, if the prisoner receives a negative re-
        sponse or if the responsible prison staff member does not respond
        within the time provided (40 days, with a 10-day extension availa-
        ble upon written notice), the prisoner must file an appeal to the
        “central office” within 7 days. “To exhaust administrative reme-
        dies in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must properly take
        each step within the administrative process. If their initial

        filed at least one grievance seeking compensation for Barron’s alleged lack of
        care, and Barron concedes that the district court erred in determining that that
        grievance was untimely. But the parties dispute whether DiPietro filed an ap-
        peal from the denial of that grievance, a question of fact that the district court
        did not directly address. We decline to resolve this factual issue ourselves be-
        cause we conclude that DiPietro’s claim against Barron was barred by the stat-
        ute of limitations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325
        (11th Cir. 2020) (“We may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”)
        (quotation omitted)).
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13621

        grievance is denied, prisoners must then file a timely appeal.” Bry-
        ant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omit-
        ted).
                When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
        administrative remedies under the PLRA, the district court must
        first evaluate whether the prisoner has exhausted his administra-
        tive remedies under his own version of the facts. Turner v. Burn-
        side, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008). If the facts as stated by
        the prisoner show a failure to exhaust, then the district court must
        dismiss the complaint. Id. “If the complaint is not subject to dis-
        missal at the first step, where the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed
        to be true, the court then proceeds to make specific findings in or-
        der to resolve the disputed factual issues related to exhaustion.” Id.
               DiPietro’s claims against Jerrye Foreman arise from treat-
        ment she provided at GDCP. At the time of his conviction,
        DiPietro reportedly had been taking Lexapro for depression and
        Xanax for anxiety (both prescribed by a psychiatrist) for several
        years. Providers at the county jail where DiPietro was incarcerated
        immediately after his conviction did not prescribe those medica-
        tions for him, however, and by the time he reached GDCP on May
        5, 2016, he had not taken any psychiatric medication for two
        months.
              DiPietro requested mental health services, including antide-
        pressant medications, during his mental health intake examination
        at GDCP. A psychologist referred him to Foreman, whose license
        as an advanced practice nurse authorizes her to prescribe
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        21-13621               Opinion of the Court                       7

        psychiatric medications, and she evaluated DiPietro on May 24,
        2016. Foreman determined that there was no indication for medi-
        cation, though she noted that DiPietro was very depressed and
        needed counseling. According to DiPietro, he reluctantly agreed
        to continue without medication upon Foreman’s assurance that
        she would see him again if he changed his mind. But when he did
        change his mind, Foreman ignored his sick call requests and did not
        prescribe medication for him.
                The parties dispute whether DiPietro exhausted his admin-
        istrative remedies for his claim against Foreman. DiPietro testified
        that he submitted a grievance against her at GDCP, but he was not
        given a receipt and his grievance was ignored. The grievance co-
        ordinator at GDCP testified that every inmate receives a receipt for
        each grievance he submits, and that each grievance submitted is
        logged into a central database at or near the time the inmate sub-
        mits it and then investigated by prison staff and responded to in
        writing by the warden or his designated representative. The griev-
        ance coordinator further testified that the central database showed
        that DiPietro did not file any grievances at GDCP, and that she was
        not aware of, and had no record of, any grievance submitted by
        DiPietro that was not entered into the database and processed ac-
        cording to the usual procedure.
               The district court found that DiPietro’s testimony was not
        credible and accepted the defendants’ evidence that he did not file
        a grievance about Foreman at GDCP. This finding was not clear
        error. As the magistrate judge pointed out, DiPietro’s testimony
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13621

        on several different topics was inconsistent, undermining his cred-
        ibility. With respect to the grievance process at GDCP, DiPietro’s
        testimony that prison staff failed to follow the standard operating
        procedure at every stage—by failing to orally explain the process
        to him at intake, failing to provide a grievance handbook, failing to
        give him a receipt for either of the grievances he says he submitted
        at GDCP, and failing to log in, process, or respond to either of those
        grievances—seems unlikely. “Where there are two permissible
        views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot
        be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
        564, 574 (1985).
                In any event, although DiPietro claimed that he submitted a
        grievance about Foreman’s care at GDCP, he never claimed to
        have exhausted the grievance process by filing an appeal when the
        warden failed to respond, and he does not argue in this Court that
        the grievance appeal process was unavailable to him. The district
        court did not err in dismissing DiPietro’s claim against Foreman on
        the ground that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies be-
        fore filing the claim. See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1378.
                                         B.
               Like Foreman, James Barron provided care to DiPietro at
        GDCP. Barron, who is a dentist, saw DiPietro for a toothache on
        May 16 and June 8, 2016. He examined DiPietro, took dental x-
        rays, and prescribed ibuprofen and an antibiotic. According to
        DiPietro, Barron said that he would clean DiPietro’s teeth and
        make a mouth guard for him, but he never followed through and
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        21-13621               Opinion of the Court                         9

        did not see him again. He alleged that if Barron had provided ad-
        ditional treatment, he could have avoided months of pain and the
        eventual removal of the affected tooth.
               The district court determined that DiPietro’s claim against
        Barron was barred by the statute of limitations, which in Georgia
        is two years. See Crowe v. Donald, 528 F.3d 1290, 1292 (11th Cir.
        2008). The statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff
        knows or should know that he has suffered the injury that is the
        basis of the complaint and knows or should know who inflicted it.
        Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). At that
        point, the “cause of action accrues even though the full extent of
        the injury is not then known or predictable.” Wallace v. Kato, 549
        U.S. 384, 391 (2007).
               On appeal, DiPietro argues that Barron’s alleged deliberate
        indifference was a “continuing violation,” so that the statute of lim-
        itations did not begin to run until his tooth was pulled on August
        31, 2016. “The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to
        sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations
        of the law occur within the statutory period.” Ctr. for Biological
        Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). Here,
        DiPietro argues that Barron’s refusal to provide treatment after
        June 8, 2016, constituted a continuing or recurring violation of his
        Eighth Amendment rights. But even if we assume for purposes of
        this analysis that the failure to provide additional treatment at
        GDCP constituted deliberate indifference, Barron could not have
        deliberately withheld treatment for DiPietro after he was
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13621

        transferred to Augusta on July 16, 2016. After that date, Barron
        could not have provided dental treatment to DiPietro in any event.
                Moreover, “we have limited the application of the continu-
        ing violation doctrine to situations in which a reasonably prudent
        plaintiff would have been unable to determine that a violation had
        occurred.” Id. at 1335. DiPietro testified that the medication pre-
        scribed by Barron stopped working within a few weeks, that he ex-
        perienced severe pain and swollen gums beginning in June 2016,
        and that he repeatedly complained to Barron that he needed addi-
        tional treatment between his last visit on June 8, 2016, and his trans-
        fer to Augusta on July 16. On these facts, the district court did not
        err in determining that the two-year statute of limitations began to
        run no later than July 16, 2016. DiPietro’s claim against Barron,
        which was filed on August 19, 2018, was untimely.
                                               C.
                We turn next to DiPietro’s claim against Donna Silver, the
        psychiatrist who treated him after his transfer to Rutledge Prison
        on August 16, 2016. DiPietro contends that Silver’s failure to eval-
        uate him and prescribe medication to treat his depression and anx-
        iety before September 13, 2016, constituted deliberate indifference
        to his risk for suicide. 3 A “delay of treatment for obviously serious

        3 In the district court, DiPietro also alleged that Silver and Thompson failed to
        appropriately treat his anxiety after his suicide attempt. But he does not press
        those arguments on appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739
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        21-13621                  Opinion of the Court                             11

        conditions” may constitute deliberate indifference “where it is ap-
        parent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical
        problem, the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical problem,
        and the delay is medically unjustified.” Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d
        1254, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). The deliberate-
        indifference standard requires that the plaintiff prove that the de-
        fendant “had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and
        disregarded that risk by conduct that constituted more than mere
        negligence.” Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 954 (11th Cir. 2008).
        To establish deliberate indifference to the risk of suicide, the plain-
        tiff must show the defendant deliberately disregarded “a strong
        likelihood rather than a mere possibility” that the prisoner would
        harm himself. Id. (quotation omitted).
               DiPietro cannot meet that standard here because the infor-
        mation available to Silver before September 13, 2016, did not indi-
        cate a “strong likelihood” that DiPietro would harm himself unless
        he received immediate psychiatric treatment. At the time of his
        transfer to Rutledge, DiPietro’s chart showed that he had consist-
        ently complained of depression and anxiety, and on May 11, 2016,
        he reported to a psychologist at GDCP that he had occasional
        thoughts of suicide lasting a few minutes but without a plan. That
        same day, however, and in other evaluations in May and June 2016,
        DiPietro reportedly denied any suicidal ideation or any history of

        F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (arguments not effectively raised on appeal are
        deemed abandoned).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13621

        attempting to harm himself. And of course, DiPietro’s chart con-
        tained Foreman’s May 24, 2016, report expressing her opinion that
        treatment with psychiatric medication was not indicated at that
        time.
               DiPietro’s chart also showed that he had been evaluated by
        a psychologist less than a week before his transfer to Rutledge. The
        psychologist described DiPietro as “markedly tearful” and noted
        his report of feeling helpless, hopeless, and sad, but also stated that
        DiPietro denied any suicidal ideation. The psychologist recom-
        mended that DiPietro be evaluated by a psychiatrist within 60 to
        90 days to determine whether he would benefit from psychiatric
        medication.
               A week after his arrival at Rutledge, on August 23, 2016,
        DiPietro met with a mental health counselor. DiPietro testified
        that he was a “basket case” during the interview. He testified that
        he could not stop crying, that he told the counselor he had been
        “denied” psychiatric medications since March, that he was having
        a “mental health emergency,” and that he was having suicidal
        thoughts. He also testified that he was careful to reassure the nurse
        that he had no current plan to commit suicide, because he did not
        want to be put in a suicide-watch cell. According to DiPietro, the
        counselor told him that he would be seen “in a day or so since it
        was urgent.”
               But regardless of what the counselor told DiPietro, there is
        no evidence that any urgent need for treatment was conveyed to
        Silver. To the contrary, the counselor’s contemporaneous note
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        21-13621                Opinion of the Court                        13

        indicated that DiPietro’s chief concern was the heat in his dormi-
        tory. The counselor’s only comment about his mental state was
        that his “[d]isposition of attitude” was “positive.” Silver testified
        that she did not recall receiving any information indicating that
        DiPietro needed to be seen urgently until after his suicide attempt
        on September 13, 2016. In the meantime, DiPietro was placed on
        Silver’s case list for routine assessment, which typically would be
        done “as soon as practical,” unless “an emergent or urgent change
        in circumstances” occurred.
               DiPietro alleged that he waited about a week after his Au-
        gust 23 intake interview with the mental health counselor and then
        “started writing sick calls” requesting to be seen by the psychiatrist.
        Two weeks later, he tried to hang himself in his cell. After his at-
        tempt failed, he informed the mental health counselor that he had
        tried to commit suicide. The counselor called the mental health
        director (Thompson), who referred DiPietro to Silver on an emer-
        gency basis, and Silver evaluated DiPietro the same day.
               This evidence would not support a jury verdict of deliberate
        indifference by Silver. Although it may have been apparent that
        DiPietro needed mental health services and might benefit from
        psychiatric medications, the evidence does not indicate that Silver
        was subjectively aware of an urgent need for treatment or that a
        delay in treatment would detrimentally exacerbate DiPietro’s men-
        tal condition. The district court did not err in granting summary
        judgment in Silver’s favor.
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                     21-13621

                                             D.
                Last, we consider DiPietro’s deliberate-indifference claim
        against psychologist John Thompson. DiPietro acknowledges
        Thompson’s testimony that he was designated for evaluation by
        the psychiatrist (Silver), not Thompson, and that he was never part
        of Thompson’s caseload. DiPietro argues that as the Mental
        Health Clinical Director at Rutledge, Thompson should nonethe-
        less have been aware of his mental health history and his need for
        psychiatric services. But DiPietro has presented no evidence that
        Thompson actually was aware of his need for treatment before his
        suicide attempt. 4 This lack of evidence of subjective awareness is
        fatal to DiPietro’s Eighth Amendment claim; to be held liable for
        deliberate indifference, a prison official “must both be aware of
        facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
        risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
        Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also id. at 838 (“an
        official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have
        perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot
        under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment”).

        4 DiPietro points to the allegation in his amended complaint that Thompson
        told him after his September 13 suicide attempt that he was “aware of
        [DiPietro’s] chart.” But to survive a properly supported motion for summary
        judgment, a plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in his pleading; he “must
        present affirmative evidence” from which a jury could return a verdict in his
        favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256–57 (1986).
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        21-13621               Opinion of the Court                       15

        The district court did not err in granting Thompson’s motion for
        summary judgment on DiPietro’s deliberate-indifference claim.
                                        IV.
              For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s judg-
        ment in favor of the defendants.
              AFFIRMED.