Court Opinion

ID: 9672177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:16.586239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.734735
License: Public Domain

*533Adams, J.
(dissenting). This ease involves a claim of statutory exemption from real property, taxes, as set forth hy Justice Dethmers in his opinion.
St. Joseph’s Church v. City of Detroit, 189 Mich 408, 414, states:
“It is a cardinal rule that exemption statutes— unlike homestead statutes—should receive a strict construction. Cooley on Taxation (2d ed), p 205. # * *
“A grant of exemption is never presumed; on the contrary, in all cases of doubt as to the legislative intention, or as to the inclusion of particular property within the terms of the statute, the presumption is in favor of the taxing power, and the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to exemption. See 37 Cyc pp 891, 892, and cases cited, including East Saginaw Manfg. Co. v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich 259 (2 Am Rep 82); Attorney General v. Common Council of Detroit, 113 Mich 388 (71 NW 632).”
“It is axiomatic that all property, unless specially exempted, shall bear its fair share of taxation.. * * * Exemptions from taxation are not favored. As was said by the trial court:
“ ‘While, of course, it lies within the power pf the legislature to create an exemption from such special assessment, any such grant, must be thoroughly and definitely expressed. The general rule is that any exemption from any form of taxation will be strictly construed. In 37 Cyc p 892, it is said :■
“ ‘ “Such a privilege or immunity cannot be made out by inference or implication, but must be conferred in -terms too dear and plain to be mistaken, and in fact admitting of no reasonable doubt, but where it exists it should he carefully scrutinized and not permitted to extend either in scope or duration beyond what the terms of the concession "clearly require.”- ’ ” Doane v. Pere Marquette R. Co.; 247 Mich 542, 544, 545. " ' ".....
*534" Keeping in mind these long-established principles, I am unable to agree that the appellant is entitled to an exemption. The critical facts are that the hospital was employing a total of 24 resident physicians and interns and providing housing for all 24. Housing for six was provided on the hospital prem-' ises. These houses are located outside a fence which surrounds the hospital grounds. They are private, ranch-type houses on the edge of property which fronts on a public street in a residential neighborhood. Children, of families residing in these homes are attending, public schools in the city of Dearborn. They and their parents enjoy all community services and facilities.
The other 18 resident physicians and interns employed'by the hospital are furnished housing facilities-which have been rented for this purpose. The terms and conditions are the same as for the six houses in question. So far as appears upon this record, the doctors or interns occupying the 18 houses off’the hospital-premises have the same duties and responsibilities as those - who occupy the six that are on the premises. The dwellings are allocated on a first-come-first-served basis.
The houses, whether on the hospital premises or off, are not used and occupied by the appellant any more than it could be said that the appellant uses and occupies the private housing of its janitors, pharmacists, nurses, dietitians, or other employees. It is not within the purview of the corporate purposes of the hospital to be in the housing business.
This emphasis upon “occupancy,” “use,” and “purposes” has its origin in the statute within which the plaintiff seeks to establish an exemption. In relevant part, it reads:
. “The following, property shall be exempt from taxation: * * *
*535“Fourth, Such real estate as shall he owned and occupied hy library, benevolent, charitable, educational or scientific institutions * * * incorporated under the laws of this State with the buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which they were incorporated. * * * Also real estate, with the buildings and other property thereon, owned and occupied by any nonprofit trust and used for hospital or public health purposes.” CLS 1961, § 211.7, as amended by PA 1963, No 148 (Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 7.7).
As stated at the outset, it is essential that the plaintiff establish beyond a reasonable doubt the ability of the property here involved to come within the terms of the statute. There is, to say the least, substantial doubt as to the occupancy, use and purpose, to which these homes are being put. Prior case law does little to remove that doubt.
Webb Academy v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich 523, is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Webb there was an incidental use of the school building as a residence, enabling the occupants to carry out school purposes and activities.
“ ‘The school grounds and. school building, all of the recitation rooms are kept in order by Mr. and Mrs. Webb; they are there in the early morning to have the rooms heated and prepared for its students when the. school shall open; they do some of their instructing of pupils in the evening; they are there for that purpose; they are there during vacation times for the purpose of keeping and putting said building in condition for the opening of this academy at its next term.’ ” p 533. , ■
'Likewise, in Gull Lake Bible Conference Association v. Township of Ross, 351 Mich 269, 275: ,
“The purpose of the plaintiff [was] to conduct gatherings for the study of the Bible, et cetera, but *536it is also its purpose to promote such gatherings. Looking at the situation in the light of this latter purpose, it may be logically concluded that in order to obtain satisfactory attendance to its conference, plaintiff found it advisable and necessary to provide those attending with' living accommodations, recreational facilities and all of the other services offered by plaintiff and made possible through the use and occupancy of the land in question by plaintiff in the manner in which they do use and occupy such land.”
I agree with Justice Dethmers that whether the housing is physically' attached to the' hospital is unimportant; What is important is that the property is neither occupied by the hospital “solely for the purposes for which they [it] were [was] incorporated” nor is it used for “hospital or public health purposes.”
• No costs, question of statutory construction being involved..
Souris, J., did not sit,.