Court Opinion

ID: 9443442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:20:09.005847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:29.122650
License: Public Domain

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.
I dissent for the reasons stated in the-former opinion of the court, reversing the Board, which was filed November 23, 1951. That opinion, now superseded, was as follows:
“Congress has provided that in the District of Columbia ‘The following personal property shall be exempt from taxation. First. The personal property of all library,, benevolent, charitable, and scientific institutions incorporated under the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia and not conducted for private gain.’ 37 Stat. 1006, D.C.Code 1940 § 47-1208. * * *
*180“The Press is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under 31. Stat. 1283, 1284, D.C.Code 1940 Title 29, Chap. 6. Its object as stated in its charter is ‘the preparation, publication and distribution of educational, literary, scientific, or religious matter.’ As the Board found, the Press ‘has published and sold various books on education, religion, history and logic, all from a Catholic point of view; also a series of spellers of some, but not much religious content, and phonograph records of Gregorian chants.’ It publishes the Catholic Educational Review, a monthly periodical whose purpose is -to give advice to school teachers and administrators and discuss problems of interest to educators. It also sells books on commission for one individual. It does no printing.
“The Press does not contend that it is either a library, a benevolent institution, or a charitable institution. It contends and the Board found that it is a scientific institution. We think the evidence does not support this finding. The fact that a publishing house specializes in educational, scientific and religious works does not make it what any one would ordinarily . call a scientific institution or, for that matter, an educational institution. The ‘assumption that the meaning of the term does not depend on usage but can be found by analysis’ is erroneous. Dissent in Mitchell v. Cohen, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 89, 160 F.2d. 915, 921, reversed, 333 U.S. 411 [68 S.Ct. 518, 92 L.Ed. 774]. No doubt Congress might have used the term ‘scientific institutions’ in some extraordinary sense, but nothing in the context or elsewhere suggests that it did so.
“The Press is associated with the Catholic University of America. It has the same officers as the University and its trustees are the Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the University. The Press has no bank account. The General Accounting Office of the University takes charge of its ’ receipts, makes its disbursements, and keeps its accounts. During the first year of its operation the Press had a deficit which was covered by advances from- the University. But the record shows that the Press and the University are distinct entities in substance as well as form. The University makes a charge to the Press for keeping its accounts. The Press has regarded advances from the University as loans and has repaid, them in' part from profits o.f a subsequent year. Except by way of ‘advances’, no funds other than those of the Press are shown to have been used in paying Press bills. And the Press. ‘is not * * * the publishing arm of the University. That is a corporation known as Catholic University of America Press.’
“The case is more or less like Stanford University Book Store v. Helvering, 65 App.D.C. 364, 83 F.2d 710, in which we held that the Book Store was not ‘ “operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes”.’ The Press is not even operated, as the Book Store was, for the almost exclusive use of persons connected with the University.
“Since the Press is not the University we think it irrelevant that schools have been called scientific institutions ás well as educational institutions. The legal separateness of two corporate entities, which insulates each from liability for the obligations of the other, cannot be disregarded in order to extend to either a right or privilege of the other. See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 441, [54 S.Ct. 788, 78 L.Ed. 1348]. Exemptions from taxation are construed strictly. Hale v. [Iowa] State Board of Assessment and Review, 302 U.S. 95 [58 S.Ct. 102, 82 L.Ed. 72]; Hebrew Home for the Aged v. District of Columbia, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 142 F.2d 573."