Court Opinion

ID: 9383774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 06:00:12.251989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.879754
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LYNN RAY BAKER,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         CH-0731-17-0181-I-1

             v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: March 30, 2023
  MANAGEMENT,
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Andre Paul Gaston, Esquire, Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois, for the appellant.

      Darlene M. Carr, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member
                           Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
  Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                         2

                                      FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the suitability determination and associated action of the Office of
     Personnel Management (OPM). Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
     only in the following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affe cted the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective November 2, 2014, the appellant was appointed to the position of
     Police Officer, GS-05, with the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 414. In a letter dated August 2, 2016, OPM notified
     the appellant that information discovered during the course of a background
     investigation requested pursuant to his appointment raised a serious question as to
     his suitability for Federal employment, and that he was being charged with
     “Material, intention false statement, or deception or fraud in examinatio n or
     appointment.” IAF, Tab 5, 106-07. In addition, OPM proposed the following
     actions:   cancelation of eligibility; cancelation of any reinstatement eligibility
                                                                                       3

     resulting from the appellant’s present appointment; and debarment for a period of
     up to 3 years. Id. at 106.
¶3         In the summary of charges, OPM explained by way of background that the
     appellant was fired from his position with the Chicago Police Department (CPD)
     on December 6, 2013, because he did not provide accurate information on an
     employment questionnaire concerning his prior employment with the Berwyn
     Police Department, and because he had violated CPD rules and regulations by
     failing to notify his employer that he was subject to a criminal investigation, by
     failing to cooperate in a criminal investigation, and by being arrested. Id. at 109.
     In light of the appellant’s termination from CPD, OPM determined that the
     appellant made material and false statements regarding his employment history on
     five separate occasions. Id. at 110-12. We will discuss those incidents below.
¶4         First, when the appellant initially applied for the DVA Police Officer
     position on September 8, 2014, he answered “no” to Question 12 in the Optional
     Form 306 (OF-306), Declaration for Federal Employment which asked the
     following:
           During the last 5 years, have you been fired from any job for any
           reason, did you quit after being told that you would be fired, did you
           leave any job by mutual agreement because of specific problems, or
           were you debarred from Federal employment by [OPM] or any other
           agency? If “YES” use item 16 to provide the date and explanation of
           the problem, reason for leaving, and the employer’s name and
           address.
     IAF, Tab 9 at 446.     The appellant signed the OF-306 on September 8, 2014,
     certifying that “to the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the information on
     and attached to this Declaration for Federal Employment . . . is true, correct,
     complete, and made in good faith.” Id. at 447.
¶5         Second, on October 10, 2014, the appellant completed a Standard Form 85P
     (SF-85P), Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions, through the Electronic
     Questionnaires for Investigative Process (e-QUIP). Id. at 421-44. Section 12 of
     the SF-85P similarly asked the applicant if, in the last 7 years, any of the
                                                                                         4

     following happened to him: “(1) Fired from a job; (2) Quit after being told you’d
     be fired; (3) Left a job by mutual agreement following allegations of
     unsatisfactory performance; (5) Left a job for other reasons under unfavorable
     circumstances.” Id. at 433. The appellant responded “No.” Id. By signing the
     SF-85P, the appellant certified under penalty of perjury, “My statements on this
     form, and any attachments to it, are true, complete, and correct to the best of my
     knowledge and belief and are made in good faith.” Id. at 442.
¶6         Third, on November 3, 2014, upon his appointment to the Police Officer
     position, the appellant again signed the previously submitted OF-306, thus
     recertifying his previous answers, including his response to Question 12.          Id.
     at 448-49.
¶7         Fourth, when the appellant participated in a personal interview with an
     OPM investigator on December 1, 2015, the appellant stated that he had never
     been fired from a job, left a job after being told he would be fired, or left a job by
     mutual agreement after allegations of unsatisfactory performance or other
     unfavorable circumstances.      Id. at 383.    However, when confronted by the
     investigator about his termination from the CPD, the appellant responded that he
     was not terminated; instead, he left voluntarily and was eligible for rehire, and he
     did not have any issues while employed at the CPD. Id.
¶8         Fifth, the appellant completed a third OF-306 on January 23, 2016, when he
     applied for a Deportation Officer position with the Department of Homeland
     Security. Id. at 273-74. In completing this OF-306, he again answered “No” to
     question 12. Id.
¶9         OPM considered the appellant’s response to its proposal in which he
     asserted two main arguments:       (1) that he resigned from CPD when he was
     notified of his arrest and prior to being terminated; and (2) that he relied on an
     attorney’s legal advice both in completing his subsequent Federal employment
     application and in believing that, because he was acquitted of all charges, he
     would not have to provide any information regarding the arrest.          IAF, Tab 5
                                                                                     5

      at 53-85. The appellant claimed that, because his termination was incidental to
      the arrest, the expungement meant that “any collateral consequences should not
      have been provided in a job application.” Id. at 59.
¶10        On January 18, 2017, OPM issued a decision finding the appellant
      unsuitable for Federal employment based on the charge of material, intentional
      false statement, or deception or fraud in examination or appointment. IAF, Tab 5
      at 18-21. OPM directed DVA to separate the appellant within 5 business days of
      receiving OPM’s decision. Id. OPM also canceled any eligibilities the appellant
      may have had for appointment or reinstatement to any position in competitive
      service, excepted service that noncompetitively converts to the competitive
      service, or career appointment to positions in the Senior Executive Service, and
      debarred him from competition for, or appointment to, any covered position until
      January 18, 2020. Id.
¶11        The appellant filed a Board appeal regarding OPM’s decision and requested
      a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. On appeal, the appellant reasserted the arguments he
      raised before OPM. IAF, Tabs 1, 12. After holding a hearing, the administrative
      judge issued an initial decision affirming OPM’s decision. IAF, Tab 17, Initial
      Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that OPM proved by preponderant
      evidence that the appellant provided incorrect information , as alleged, that he
      knowingly provided incorrect information with the intention of de frauding the
      agency, and that any belief by the appellant that he could answer “no” to the
      questions regarding his prior employment was unreasonable . ID at 15-17. The
      administrative judge further found that the appellant’s “failure to disclose his
      prior termination was blatantly misleading and more consistent with a conscious
      purpose to avoid learning the truth than a willingness to disclose truthfu l
      information.”   ID at 16.   Accordingly, the administrative judge sustained the
      charge. ID at 16. After finding that OPM proved a nexus between the appellant’s
      falsification and the integrity and efficiency of the service, the administrative
      judge affirmed the suitability determination. ID at 16 -18.
                                                                                          6

¶12         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
      File, Tab 1. Although OPM was granted an extension of time to file a response to
      the appellant’s petition, it did not do so. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The administrative judge correctly sustained OPM’s charge of Material,
      Intentional False Statement, or Deception or Fraud in Examination or
      Appointment.
¶13         To prevail in a negative suitability determination appeal, OPM must
      demonstrate by preponderant evidence that the appellant’s conduct or character
      may have an impact on the integrity or efficiency of the service, based on one or
      more of the specific factors listed in 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b). Hawes v. Office of
      Personnel   Management,      122   M.S.P.R.   341,   ¶5    (2015);   see   5   C.F.R.
      §§ 731.101(a), 732.202(a), 731.501(b). The Board has jurisdiction to review all
      aspects of a suitability determination, including whether the charged conduct
      renders an individual unsuitable for the position in question.                 Hawes,
      122 M.S.P.R. 341, ¶ 5.       To establish unsuitability based on a charge of
      falsification, OPM must prove by preponderant evidence that the information was
      incorrect and that the appellant knowingly provided incorrect information with
      the intent of defrauding. Id., ¶ 21.
¶14         As the administrative judge found, the record evidence clearly shows that
      the appellant was terminated from his Police Officer position with the CPD. IAF,
      Tab 15, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (Testimony of CPD Chief Captain); Tab 5
      at 133. The appellant’s termination was based on his violation of agency rules
      and regulations, including a failure to notify the department that he was the
      subject of a criminal investigation, a failure to cooperate in a criminal
      investigation by Berwyn Police Department, his arrest by the Berwyn Police
      Department, and his provision of five false answers to questions on his CPD
      Personnel History Questionnaire, including false statements ab out his termination
      from his position with the Berwyn Police Department. IAF, Tab 9 at 198-202.
                                                                                      7

      Thus, because the record evidence shows that the CPD terminated the appellant
      based on multiple violations of rules and regulations, we agree with the
      administrative judge that his termination from the CPD was not a “legal
      consequence associated with his arrest.” IAF, Tab 5 at 197-99.
¶15        The appellant reasserts that he was advised by his legal counsel that he did
      not have to disclose his termination because his arrest record was expunged, and
      he argues that the administrative judge misinterpreted the Board’s decision in
      Doerr v. Office of Personnel Management, 104 M.S.P.R. 196 (2006). PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 10. The appellant contends that Doerr establishes that there is no intent
      to deceive when one has received legal advice and relies on it. Id. at 11. We are
      not persuaded by the appellant’s argument.
¶16        In Doerr, the appellant was charged with possession with intent to
      distribute a controlled substance and use of possession of drug paraphernalia.
      104 M.S.P.R. 196, ¶ 2.    The appellant subsequently entered into an abeyance
      agreement that did not include a conviction.      Id.   There, OPM charged the
      appellant with falsely completing her application because she indicated that she
      had not been convicted of a crime, imprisoned, or on probation or parole. Id.,
      ¶ 3. The Board found that she reasonably relied on her attorney’s advice that,
      under Utah law, she could answer “no” to questions regarding convictions for
      crimes or being on probation because the pretrial diversion program she
      participated in was quite different than probation. Id., ¶ 6. The appellant also
      provided evidence that she specifically sought advice from her criminal lawyer
      before completing the application.     Id.   Further, her attorney’s advice was
      consistent with Utah law. Id.
¶17        Here, however, the relevant Illinois law does not specifically indicate that,
      when an arrest has been expunged, an applicant for a position can state they were
      never terminated from a position.      IAF, Tab 13 at 7-67.      In addition, the
      appellant’s termination from the CPD was not solely based on the arrest in
      question, but instead was based on multiple violations of the police department’s
                                                                                           8

      rules and regulations. IAF, Tab 9 at 198-202. Moreover, unlike in Doerr, the
      administrative judge in this case found the appellant’s testimony that he
      specifically asked his attorney how to respond to questions regarding his
      employment to be not credible. ID at 13.
¶18            The appellant challenges the administrative judge ’s determination that he
      was not credible, and he asserts that he answered truthfully, though hesitantly, as
      he remembered the details. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. The appellant appears to
      assert that his delayed responses were the result of his diagnosis of post-traumatic
      stress disorder stemming from his military service.             Id.    However, the
      administrative judge thoroughly reviewed the hearing testimony, provided a
      detailed discussion of the evidence and testimony as required under Hillen v.
      Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), 3 and found the appellant’s
      testimony that his misrepresentations were not intentional to be not credible, ID
      at 13.     We discern no basis to overturn the administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations, which were based in part on her observations of witness
      demeanor. See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373
      (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility determinations regardless of whether demeanor is
      explicitly discussed).
¶19            Therefore, we find that the record evidence shows that the appellant knew
      he was terminated from the CPD for various reasons, including an arrest, and that
      his negative responses to whether he had been fired were incorrect. While the
      3
        To resolve credibility issues, an administrative judge must identify the factual
      questions in dispute, summarize the evidence on each disputed question, state which
      versions he believes, and explain in detail why she found the chosen version more
      credible, considering such factors as: (1) the witness’s opportunity and capacity to
      observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s character; (3) any prior
      inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or lack of bias; (5) the
      contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency
      with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s version of events;
      and (7) the witness’s demeanor. Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R. at 458.
                                                                                      9

appellant continues to argue that he did not intend to provide inaccurate
information, it is clear from the record that he knew that he did not leave his
employment with the CPD under favorable circumstances and that he failed to
indicate this at any time during his employment process for the DVA Police
Officer position. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant has shown no basis
upon which to disturb the initial decision.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.

4
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       10

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
                                                                                11

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     12

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no chal lenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review e ither with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             13

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.