Court Opinion

ID: 9668265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:07:39.738471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.189418
License: Public Domain

Concurring opinion, delivered by
MEYERS, J., joined by PRICE, J.
The majority holds appellant forfeited his limitations defense because he failed to raise it “at or before guilt/innocence stage of trial.” Majority opinion at 274. But appellant’s guilt was deferred; there has been no “guilt/innocence stage of trial” yet in this case. The majority is therefore wrong to conclude appellant waived his “limitations defense” 1 by failing to timely raise it. Appellant could still raise limitations in the event his guilt is adjudicated later.
That aside, I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering judgments of acquittal. But not because appellant waived his limitations defense. Majority opinion at 274. The Court of Appeals erred in ordering judgments of acquittal for two reasons: (1) appellant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence was not yet ripe, and (2) even if the claim was ripe, a finding of insufficient evidence under article 1.152 is trial error which results in a new trial not an acquittal.
As stated previously, since appellant’s guilt has not yet been adjudicated by the trial court, appellant’s claim on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment is premature. There is no judgment of guilt by the trial court since a finding of appellant’s guilt has been deferred. The Court of Appeals erred in addressing appellant’s insufficiency of the evidence claim.
Assuming arguendo the claim was ripe for review, appellant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal pursuant to an article 1.15 claim. Article 1.15 provides that when a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere in a noncapital felony case the State must “introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment.” This requirement is peculiar to state law and is not required by the federal constitution. Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Thus, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), does not apply to an *275insufficiency of the evidence claim where the conviction is based upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere under article 1.15:
It is to be observed that Jackson was convicted in a bench trial in a Virginia state court upon his plea of not guilty, thus placing upon the state prosecution the burden of proof as required by In re Winship, supra.
Jackson and Winship are only applicable where the federal constitution places the burden on the prosecution to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither case is applicable where a defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.... It is clear then there is no federal constitutional requirement that evidence of guilt must be offered to corroborate a guilty plea in a state criminal prosecution, and that the “rationality” test of Jackson has no application here.
Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 682 (emphasis in original)(holding insufficiency of evidence not cognizable in writ where conviction arose from guilty plea). Likewise, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978) do not bar retrial upon a finding of insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction arising from a guilty plea under article 1.15. Bender v. State, 758 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). In Bender, the Court observed that “Burks and Greene involved contested jury trial where the plea in each case was ‘not guilty* and where the burden was on the prosecution to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt [but][i]n the instant case the prior conviction involved a plea of nolo contendere before the court and a failure to comply with a state statute.” 758 S.W.2d at 280. Burks and Greene do not apply in a federal constitutional sense where the defendant has voluntarily pled guilty. Rather, evidentiary insufficiency to support a guilty plea under article 1.15 is trial error. Id.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be vacated, and this case remanded to that Court to address appellant’s remaining points of error, given that his insufficiency claim under article 1.15 is not yet ripe for review. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. Although limitations is referred to by the majority in Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), as a "defense,” it is not a true defense as described in the Penal Code since it is still a matter the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, once raised:
If there is some such evidence [that the prosecution is limitations-barred] and the defendant requests a jury instruction on the limitations defense, then the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution is not limitations-barred. Compare Tex. Penal Code § 2.03.
Id. at 844.

. TexCode Crim. Proc. art. 1.15.