Court Opinion

ID: 9369604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 16:01:29.39359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.126051
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                              For the Eighth Circuit
                           ___________________________

                                 No. 22-2119
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                              Shawn George Hutson

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern
                                  ____________

                          Submitted: November 14, 2022
                             Filed: February 9, 2023
                                   [Published]
                                   ____________

Before BENTON, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                                   ____________

PER CURIAM.

       In 2019, Shawn Hutson was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and a
five-year term of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of failing to
register as a sex offender. His term of supervised release began on September 2,
2020. At a May 16, 2022, revocation hearing, Hutson admitted to several substance-
abuse-related violations of his supervised release. The district court1 revoked his
supervision and imposed a ten-month sentence of imprisonment to be followed by a
one-year term of supervised release. Hutson appeals, challenging one of the special
conditions of his post-revocation supervision.

      At his revocation hearing, Hutson objected to Special Condition 2, which
reads as follows:

      The defendant must not knowingly have contact with children under
      the age of 18 (including through letters, communication devices, audio
      or visual devices, visits, electronic mail, the Internet, or any contact
      through a third party) without the prior written consent of the United
      States Probation Office. The United States Probation Office may work
      with the defendant and the defendant’s family to set up supervised
      communications and visits with the defendant’s biological and legally
      adopted children.

(emphasis added). While his criminal case was pending, Hutson had married a
woman with three minor children from a previous relationship, and he asked the
district court to add “stepchildren” to “biological and legally adopted children” for
purposes of setting up supervised visits. The district court denied his request.

       On appeal, Hutson raises several challenges to Special Condition 2. We start
with his claim that the condition is an unconstitutional restriction on his ability to
associate with his family because it “directly prohibits” him from visiting his
stepchildren and, by extension, “prevents him from associating with his wife when
any of her children are present.” Hutson did not raise this argument to the district
court, so we review it for plain error. See United States v. Perrin, 926 F.3d 1044,
1045–47 (8th Cir. 2019).

      1
        The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.
                                       -2-
       Contrary to Hutson’s characterization, we do not interpret Special Condition 2
as an outright prohibition on visits with his stepchildren. As Hutson points out, the
condition does not include “stepchildren” in the category of minors with whom
supervised visits may be arranged with the help of the probation office. But, more
generally, the condition’s first sentence prohibits “contact” with minors “without the
prior written consent of the United States Probation Office.” A fair reading of this
restriction would permit Hutson to visit his stepchildren so long as he obtained the
requisite permission from the proper source. See United States v. Cramer, 962 F.3d
375, 383 (8th Cir. 2020) (“When a condition [of supervision] impacts basic liberty
interests, such as limits on contacting minors . . . , we have encouraged the use of
conditions requiring advance approval of the probation officer, . . . rather than
outright prohibitions.”). And this court has “repeatedly upheld conditions requiring
defendants to receive permission from a probation officer before contacting their
own children.” United States v. Puckett, 929 F.3d 1004, 1007 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting United States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 2013)). We see no
plain error in the district court’s crafting of Special Condition 2.

       Hutson next argues that the district court’s refusal to include “stepchildren”
in Special Condition 2 amounted to an abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Kempter, 29 F.4th 960, 968 (8th Cir. 2022) (“We review special conditions of
supervised release for abuse of discretion.”). He suggests that the condition’s
distinction between stepchildren and “biological and legally adopted children” is
arbitrary and ultimately prevents him from visiting his stepchildren in person.

      Again, we read Special Condition 2 as barring Hutson from visiting his
stepchildren only when the probation office does not give him permission to do so
beforehand. Furthermore, based on the record before it at the time of Hutson’s
revocation hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Special
Condition 2 without Hutson’s requested modification. Hutson told the district court
at the hearing that he lived in Iowa while his wife and stepchildren resided in
Wisconsin. When the district court asked him directly, “So as long as you’re on
supervision, you’re not living even in the same state as [your stepchildren]?” Hutson
                                         -3-
answered, “No.” Hutson failed to address the complications such living
arrangements might present if the probation office in Iowa were tasked with
arranging supervised visits between him and his stepchildren. Moreover, the district
court left the door open for the very type of supervised visits Hutson requested,
telling Hutson: “And when you come out, if the situation is different, if you’ve
adopted the[] kids or the situation has changed, you can always petition the Court
for a change.” (emphasis added). If Hutson’s living situation changes and he
presents a realistic plan for how supervised visits with his stepchildren could be
arranged, we see no reason why the district court would decline to consider a petition
to modify the terms of his supervised release accordingly. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2).

      Finally, Hutson contends that the district court failed to engage in an
individualized inquiry before imposing Special Condition 2. See United States v.
Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[A] court must make an individualized
inquiry into the facts and circumstances underlying a case and make sufficient
findings on the record so as to ensure that the special condition satisfies the statutory
requirements.” (citation omitted)). Hutson’s objection to Special Condition 2 was
narrow: He objected only to the omission of “stepchildren” from the condition’s
second sentence. As described above, the district court engaged in a colloquy with
Hutson about his living arrangements, explained its reasons for imposing Special
Condition 2 without modification, and left open the possibility for future
modifications if warranted by the circumstances. Given the limited nature of
Hutson’s objection, the district court’s analysis was sufficiently individualized.

      The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                     ______________________________

                                          -4-