Court Opinion

ID: 9406213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 14:05:49.38524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.071862
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-0125-MR

TERRY JONES                                                         APPELLANT

                         APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                       HONORABLE KATHLEEN S. LAPE, JUDGE
                              ACTION NO. 19-CR-01593-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Terry Jones appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion

pursuant to RCr1 11.42 seeking a new trial. Having reviewed the record, the briefs

of the parties, and the law, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                            FACTS

               In 2019, Jones was indicted on several counts. In exchange for his

guilty pleas, the Commonwealth amended the charges to aggravated trafficking in

a controlled substance, 28 or more grams of fentanyl; trafficking in a controlled

substance in the first degree, heroin; and trafficking in a controlled substance in the

first degree, cocaine. Other counts were dismissed. His total sentence to serve was

twenty-five (25) years: twenty (20) years on the aggravated trafficking count to

run concurrently with ten (10) years on the trafficking in heroin count, both to run

consecutive to five (5) years on the trafficking in cocaine count. He was sentenced

in February of 2021.

               Jones filed a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel in June of 2021. He alleged that his attorney had failed to

advise him concerning the legal basis for the charges against him, had failed to

challenge the search and seizure of items from his residence and failed to file a

motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, failed to challenge an

“incorrect” sentence, failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and failed

to file a direct appeal.2

2
  Jones has apparently abandoned several of these claims as he does not raise them in his brief
filed in this Court.

                                               -2-
             The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing into Jones’ claims,

finding all could be refuted by the record, were insufficient to require his

conviction be vacated, and failed to demonstrate prejudice. His motion was denied

by the court in a written order denying relief.

             In the order, the trial court found that there was not a sufficient

allegation concerning failure to advise him concerning the legal basis for the

aggravating trafficking count. While he labored under the mistaken belief that he

was charged with a Class C felony, he was charged with a Class A felony, the

court found. Further, the court found that the trafficking count had been enhanced

due to the discovery of a firearm near the controlled substance, but that his attorney

had successfully negotiated a plea to a Class B felony. The other two trafficking

counts were amended from Class B felonies, as charged, to Class C felonies when

his counsel negotiated the removal of the handgun enhancements on those charges.

The court dispensed with his arguments concerning the propriety of the search

warrant and the trial court’s failure to challenge the warrant by pointing to his

guilty plea and noting that he was questioned about his plea and the factual basis

therefor, and that the court had found his plea to be intelligent and voluntary. The

court did not address the other issues raised in the motion.

                                          -3-
                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

                The denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse

of the trial court’s discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548

(Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion has been defined as occurring when the trial court

enters an order or makes a ruling which is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

                                      ANALYSIS

                       To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
                counsel, a movant must satisfy the two-prong test
                articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
                104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). “First, the
                defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
                deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the
                deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at
                687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

Wagner v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d 381, 383 (Ky. App. 2015). Also,

reviewing courts must presume that the assistance offered by counsel “falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Strickland, supra, at 689,

104 S. Ct. at 2065. With this in mind, we review Jones’ allegations.

           When the prosecution ended in a guilty plea, the movant must make a

showing of prejudice which establishes that had the ineffective assistance not been

rendered, the matter would not have ended in a guilty plea but would have ended in

a trial.

                                           -4-
             The second, or “prejudice,” requirement, on the other
             hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally
             ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea
             process. In other words, in order to satisfy the
             “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that
             there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
             errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
             insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).

             The trial court conducted a plea colloquy when Jones entered his plea.

At that time, Jones indicated that he was pleading guilty knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily. He had also participated in felony mediation prior to the entry of

his guilty plea. Therefore, he had plenty of opportunity to determine whether

questioning the sufficiency of search warrant affidavits and other allegations

concerning the sufficiency of evidence before determining that he would enter a

guilty plea, putting aside any concerns about sufficiency of the search warrant

affidavits or any other evidence against him. He told the judge at the time of

entering his plea that he was satisfied with counsel’s advice and had no complaints

about her services.

             Moreover, allegations of illegal searches and seizures are not, in and

of themselves, grounds for relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.

             The trial court correctly noted that an illegal search and
             seizure cannot provide a basis for granting post-
             conviction relief, as the admission of illegally obtained
             evidence is merely a trial error and does not render the
             proceedings void. Carter v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d

                                         -5-
             257 (Ky. 1970). See also Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396
             S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky. 1965) (“The appellant challenged
             the legality of the search and seizure at the trial and is not
             in a position to raise the same question in an RCr 11.42
             proceeding at this time.”).

Parrish v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 675, 677-78 (Ky. 2009). Jones failed to

provide any cognizable argument that counsel was ineffective when she did not

challenge the search warrant, or the affidavits proffered to obtain the warrant.

Further, he makes no argument that he requested that counsel challenge the search

warrant.

             Jones next complains that his attorney advised him to plead guilty to a

Class A felony. He was charged with a Class A felony: aggravated trafficking in a

controlled substance, fentanyl, with a firearm. He ultimately pleaded guilty to

aggravated trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, fentanyl, 28 or

more grams, which is a Class B felony. His attorney obtained this result after

negotiating on his behalf for the removal of the firearm specification. Thus, this

claim must fail as counsel was clearly not deficient as she negotiated a lesser

charge, a charge to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty.

                    The validity of a guilty plea must be determined
             not from specific key words uttered at the time the plea
             was taken, but from considering the totality of
             circumstances surrounding the plea. Kotas v.
             Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978); Lynch
             v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 610 S.W.2d 902 (1980);
             Sparks, supra. These circumstances include the
             accused’s demeanor, background and experience, and

                                          -6-
               whether the record reveals that the plea was voluntarily
               made. Sparks, supra, Littlefield v. Commonwealth, Ky.
               App., 554 S.W.2d 872 (1977). The trial court is in the
               best position to determine if there was any reluctance,
               misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to
               plead guilty. Littlefield, supra, at 874. See Kotas, supra,
               at 447. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong
               presumption of verity. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
               63, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 52 L. Ed.2d 136 (1977).

                      In the instant case, the record clearly shows that
               the Boykin requirements have been met. The trial court
               conducted a lengthy discussion with appellant to
               determine that appellant was intelligently, knowingly,
               and voluntarily entering his guilty plea. The court first
               ascertained that appellant was not suffering from mental
               disease and was not under the influence of alcohol or
               drugs at the time of entering his plea. The appellant also
               told the judge that he had a sufficient amount of time to
               privately confer with his attorney about changing his
               plea, and that he had no further questions to ask his
               attorney. The appellant further told the court that he had
               read the waiver and guilty plea form, and understood it
               and, accordingly, signed his rights.

Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990).

               Jones also questions the legality of the sentence he received. The total

to serve on all charges to which he was sentenced was twenty-five (25) years, and

he acknowledged that sentence at the entry of his plea.3 He alleges that he was

sentenced to multiple sentences for the same count, and his attorney should have

3
 The sentence for the aggravated trafficking count, twenty (20) years, and the trafficking of
heroin count, ten (10) years, were run concurrently to one another, but consecutive to the
sentence for the trafficking of cocaine (5 years). Parole eligibility for the first two counts was
50%, and 20% for the five-(5) year sentence.

                                                 -7-
ensured that did not happen. His allegation, though, is simply incorrect. He faced

three counts and received three sentences to the amended counts. He was not

subjected to double jeopardy.

             Jones allocuted to the charges at the entry of his plea and

acknowledged that he committed the acts which led to the charges, in detail. He

complains that he was not advised by his attorney that a jury would have to

determine whether he was guilty of “aggravated” trafficking but fails to understand

that a jury would have had to have found each element of the crimes against him

were established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. His decision to

accept the plea deal made it unnecessary to empanel a jury and present the matter

to the jury for determination.

                    It should first be noted that the effect of entering a
             voluntary guilty plea is to waive all defenses other than
             that the indictment charges no offense. Quarles v.
             Commonwealth, Ky., 456 S.W.2d 693 (1970);
             Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 450 S.W.2d 234
             (1970). A guilty plea constitutes a break in the chain of
             events, and the defendant therefore may not raise
             independent claims related to the deprivation of
             constitutional rights occurring before entry of the guilty
             plea. White v. Sowders, 644 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir.1980).

Id. at 55.

             The trial court did not hold a hearing into Jones’ allegations

concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, finding they were refuted by the

record. Jones does not allege on appeal that the failure to hold a hearing was error.

                                          -8-
             A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr
             11.42 motion “only when there is ‘a material issue of fact
             that cannot be determined on the face of the record.’”
             [Commonwealth v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Ky.
             2014)] (quoting RCr 11.42(5) (other citation omitted)).
             A court may “summarily” deny “motions asserting
             claims refuted or otherwise resolved by the record.”
             Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Ky.
             2012). Also, no hearing is required if “the allegations,
             even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate [the]
             convictions.” Searight, 423 S.W.3d at 228 (internal
             quotation marks and citation omitted).

Fowler v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Ky. App. 2021).

             Since Jones does not complain about the lack of a hearing, and the

order of the trial court denying the relief establishes that a hearing was not required

as all allegations made were readily refuted by the record, we find that a hearing

was not required, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. See

Hensley v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.3d 434 (Ky. App. 2010) (evidentiary hearing

was not required on defendant’s motion to vacate sentence based on allegedly

ineffective assistance of counsel; defendant “offered no factual support for his

claims” and during plea colloquy, he “specified that he had no complaints about

his attorneys’ performance”).

                                  CONCLUSION

             For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order denying relief

on the RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.

                                          -9-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Terry Jones, pro se       Daniel Cameron
Wheelwright, Kentucky     Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Mark D. Barry
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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