Court Opinion

ID: 9753025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:51:28.380237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:24.763194
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB,
Associate Judge, dissenting:
With due respect to my colleagues, I do not think that this case presents the appropriate occasion to address profound constitutional issues regarding the precise character of a criminal defendant’s right to testify or the desirability or lack thereof of the colloquy procedure. In my opinion, these questions are simply not before us, and fundamental canons of judicial restraint should caution us to defer their resolution to another day.
I
It is important at the outset to identify with precision the nature of this appeal. The critical fact in this regard, relegated by the majority to a footnote, is that Ms. Boyd filed an appeal from her conviction but did not appeal from the trial judge’s denial, without a hearing, of her post-trial motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989). Accordingly, as my colleagues recognize, maj. op. at 672 n. 4, our review is limited to the trial record. We cannot go beyond it and, significantly, we have not been asked to do so.
On appeal, Ms. Boyd argues that the trial record demonstrates that she was denied her constitutional right to testify.1 She apparently bases this contention on her post-verdict complaint, renewed at the time of sentencing, that she had wanted to testify but that her attorney had not permitted her to do so. Her counsel, however, told the judge that he had advised Ms. Boyd not to testify, and not that he had prevented her from taking the stand. Ms. Boyd’s obscenity-riddled outburst was not under oath and was not evidence. See, e.g., District of Columbia Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 2.04 (3d ed.1978). The trial record therefore contains no evidence that Ms. Boyd was denied the right to testify, and it seems to me that her appeal must therefore fail.
In spite of the fact that the outburst was not evidence, I am inclined to agree with the majority that, upon hearing it, the trial judge might have done well to conduct a more comprehensive inquiry as to what had occurred between lawyer and client. The principals were present then, and recollections were presumably fresh. I am satisfied, in any event, that a hearing ought to have been held after Ms. Boyd had filed her § 23-110 motion. I cannot agree with the trial judge that the issue was resolved by trial counsel’s indication that tactical considerations had led him to advise his client not to testify. The final decision was for Ms. Boyd to make, not for her attorney.
Ms. Boyd’s problem in this court, however, is that she never appealed from the trial judge’s denial of the § 23-110 motion without a hearing, nor did she contend in her appeal from the underlying conviction that the judge erred by not holding a hearing when she brought her dissatisfaction to the judge’s attention.2 Rather, she has *681predicated her appeal entirely on the notion that no additional evidence is required, because the trial record demonstrates that she has been denied her rights. In fact, the record proves nothing of the kind. If Ms. Boyd’s appellate counsel thought that the judge’s error consisted of failure to hold a hearing following her courtroom outburst, he should have so argued. Since he did not, and since he filed no appeal on her behalf from the denial without a hearing of the § 23-110 motion, there is simply no claim before us that Judge Moore should have held a hearing or conducted any inquiry beyond the one he made. Under these circumstances, I do not think that we may or should recast Ms. Boyd’s appeal for her.
One might well conclude that Ms. Boyd had a far more promising appeal from the denial of her § 23-110 motion than from her original conviction.3 At least from my vantage point, it could not have been less promising. If she had indicated in any reasonable way a disposition to appeal from the judge’s failure to hold a hearing, either at trial or thereafter, then it would be appropriate to remand the case with directions to hold that hearing now. Since she has never complained about the lack of a hearing or the insufficiency of the trial record, however, I think my colleagues are deciding an issue which has not been presented to us.4
Assuming, arguendo, that it was “plain error” for the judge not to hold a hearing, or a more extensive one, at the time of Ms. Boyd’s outburst, we cannot correct even “plain error” if there is no appeal from it. It seems to me that the majority is treating the case as though Ms. Boyd had appealed from the denial of her § 23-110 motion, or had based her appeal from her conviction on the judge’s failure to hold a sufficient hearing. Since she has done neither, I *682cannot agree with the majority’s disposition of this appeal.
II
Even if the question whether the trial judge should be required to hold a further hearing were properly before us — and I do not think it is — then I suggest that this is hardly the case for broad-ranging advice to trial judges and lawyers about the desirability of a colloquy between the judge and the defendant regarding the latter’s right to testify.
Neither in her brief, nor in the oral argument which the court ordered sua sponte after the case had been submitted, did Ms. Boyd suggest that any requirement of such a colloquy be generally adopted. In fact, defense counsel stated that no such colloquy was constitutionally required in the routine case. The government did discuss the colloquy procedure in its brief, but was not placed on notice that we were considering the adoption of a mandatory rule that a colloquy of the kind described by the majority be conducted in all cases.5 The initiative for this substantial departure from current practice in the Superior Court comes entirely from the majority. I do not think it wise for a division of this court to be effecting procedural reforms in this manner, especially without any pragmatic demonstration of need and without any input from the judges of the Superior Court, who would surely have an “on the scene” sense of the practicality and desirability (or lack thereof) of the new proposed procedure.
Assuming, arguendo, that a remand is proper, all that this court needs to do is to explain that the ultimate decision whether to testify is the client’s (not the attorney’s, as the trial judge apparently thought) and to remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Ms. Boyd was in fact denied her right to testify. Nothing more is required to dispose of this case.
My colleagues, however, have chosen to “advise the trial court and the Bar” that it “behooves” the trial court to follow the colloquy procedure. Maj. op. at 678. “It is well settled that judicial tribunals do not have authority to issue advisory opinions unless that authority has been granted under a specific constitutional or legislative provision.” Smith v. Smith, 310 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C.1973) (citation omitted). A question which depends on contingencies which may not come about is not ripe for judicial resolution. Id. An issue is justiciable only “when the parties' rights may be immediately affected by ... a judicial decision [resolving it].” Id. Whether we do or do not adopt or encourage the use of the colloquy rule will make no difference to the parties to this controversy.
“The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 133, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895) (emphasis added); accord, Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367-68, 80 S.Ct. 391, 394, 4 L.Ed.2d 373 (1960) (“[t]o express an opinion upon the merits of the appellants’ contentions would be to ignore this basic limitation [articulated in Mills ] upon the duty and function of the Court, and to disregard principles of judicial administration long established and repeatedly followed”); Smith, supra, 310 A.2d 231. As the court concisely put in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal.App.3d 138, 153, 106 Cal.Rptr. 225, 235 (1973), “courts should not decide more than the occasion demands.” See also Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 922, 929-930, 557 P.2d 1299, 1305 (1976) (en banc):
As a general rule, this court will decide only such questions as are necessary for a determination of the case presented for *683consideration, and will not render decisions in advance of such necessity, particularly when the question is a constitutional one,[6] or involves the construction of a statute. See generally, 21 C.J.S. Courts § 182 (1940).
My colleagues rely on this court’s “supervisory power” to justify their detour into the dread domain of dictum and the provision of “advice” to the trial court and the Bar. Maj. op. at 678. I cannot agree that this is an appropriate exercise of our supervisory authority. The Supreme Court has warned that the supervisory power must be applied with caution. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 785, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2446, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980). If restraint is not exercised, then a power not dependent on any provision in the Constitution or in applicable statutes can become an open-ended vehicle for converting the views of individual judges into the law of the jurisdiction.
“Guided by considerations of justice, ... and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the. Congress.” United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1978, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (emphasis added). They have authority to do so to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights, to preserve judicial integrity, and to provide a remedy for illegal conduct. Id. None of these considerations is implicated here. The supervisory power does not provide courts with a “roving commission” to right wrongs, United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir.1976); see also United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 300 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 1794, 60 L.Ed.2d 244 (1979), or, in my judgment, to dispense with “principles of judicial administration long established and repeatedly followed.” Local No. 8-6, supra, 361 U.S. at 367-68, 80 S.Ct. at 394.
My colleagues cite a number of cases, maj.op. at 678-679 n. 14, in which this court has exercised its supervisory authority. In the earliest of them, In re D.M.R., 373 A.2d 235, 238 (D.C.1977), we simply directed the trial court to comply with its own rules; the invocation of the supervisory power was, in my view, more or less superfluous. In Oliver v. United States, 384 A.2d 642, 645 (D.C.1978) and Reed v. United States, 485 A.2d 613, 619 (D.C.1984), both dealing with procedural issues regarding the use of impeachable convictions, the court went further and, after holding that the matter had been handled in the wrong way, explained what it thought a correct procedure would be. Although these and other decisions do not discuss any limiting prudential principle regarding the circumstances under which exercise of the supervisory power is deemed appropriate, the rules adopted in them are at least more closely related to the issue presented by the appellants than is true in the present case.7
Here, as we have seen, the defendant has not complained about the procedure which the judge employed. Rather, she claims that she is entitled to reversal on the record as it exists under the procedure which the judge did utilize. Finally, my colleagues say, maj.op. at 678-679, that they are not holding that the trial court has a sua sponte obligation to utilize the colloquy procedure, and I simply cannot believe that the supervisory power exists to allow us to give advice to trial judges and lawyers by way of dictum.
*684Given the authorities counselling restraint and my adherence to a limited view of the judicial function, I cannot agree that this case presents an appropriate vehicle for an evaluation of the pros and cons of the colloquy rule or for the selection of the pros as more persuasive than the eons. If we were to hold, on a record in which the question was properly raised and reached, that the colloquy procedure is constitutionally required, that would of course be a different matter. In my opinion, however, this is not the situation here, and we should confine ourselves to the issues which we must resolve.
I would affirm the judgment.8

. She also contends, on the basis of the trial record alone, that she did not receive the effective assistance of counsel.

. It is true, as the majority indicates, maj.op. at 677 n. 12, that Ms. Boyd’s appellate brief contains the following statement at page 5: "the trial court did not make an inquiry into whether the Appellant wished to testify." Nowhere in her brief or in her notice of appeal, however, does she allege that the failure to make such an inquiry was error, as she was required to do under our Rules. See D.C.App.R. 28(a)(3), (5) & (6). The pertinent argument heading in her brief is as follows:
*681The defendant had a right to testify in her own behalf and her trial counsel’s decision to ignore his client’s request is a violation of her constitutional rights.
Appellant’s brief at (i). The brief goes on to claim that "[t]he record is clear from the two transcript portions cited above and the Affidavit of the Appellant that the Appellant wished to testify and was denied that right.” Id. at 4. (Emphasis added). Finally, Ms. Boyd's prayer for relief is that ”[t]he judgment of the lower court should be reversed because the Appellant was not permitted to testify on her own behalf ...” Id. at 8. Ms. Boyd simply did not allege the error which my colleagues have found or request the relief which they have awarded her.
The majority also views Ms. Boyd’s failure to appeal from the denial of her § 23-110 motion as irrelevant. I suggest, on the contrary, that this failure casts a revealing light on the proper construction of her arguments in her appeal from her conviction. If she were contending that an additional hearing was necessary, this could be simply accomplished by asking this court to set aside the denial, without a hearing, of her post-trial motion. Ms. Boyd’s failure to appeal from the order denying her § 23-110 motion confirms what is evident from her brief-namely, that she never intended to present to us for review the judge’s failure to hold a hearing.
In light of these considerations, I cannot agree with the majority’s perception that Ms. Boyd’s brief "must fairly be read to include a claim that the trial judge did not make an appropriate inquiry after [she] brought her concerns to the judge’s attention." See In re Texas Mortgage Services Corp., 761 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (5th Cir.1985) (failure specifically to raise or argue issue whether trial court should have conducted de novo review of bankruptcy court’s finding of fact waived the point; contrary holding would be "patently unfair” since adversary was not apprised that issue was being contested); Christoffel v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 10, 190 F.2d 585, 594 (1950) (per curiam) ("dispensatory discretion" to consider contentions where counsel failed to comply with appellate court's procedural requirements should be exercised sparingly). The government likewise did not understand Ms. Boyd to be making the supposed contentions on which the majority decision is based, and did not respond to them in its brief or, to any appreciable extent if at all, at argument. It is unfair, in my opinion, to rule against a party on a rationale to which that party never had any occasion or reason to respond.

. That motion was accompanied by an affidavit from Ms. Boyd to the effect that the trial court had prevented her from testifying. This affidavit would have been properly before us if Ms. Boyd had appealed from the denial of her post-trial motion, but is not properly before us now.

. I do not think that a remand with directions to conduct a further hearing is a "lesser included” remedy implicitly contained within Ms. Boyd’s demand for outright reversal. I so conclude because her appeal is based on a trial record devoid of competent evidence supporting her claim. The relief ordered by the majority requires an expansion of the record, which seems to me to be a horse of an entirely different color.

. Although my colleagues have not formally adopted such a requirement, most trial judges can be expected to take to heart an appellate declaration that it 'behooves” them to follow the colloquy procedure, maj.op. at 678, and that this procedure "would best serve all of the interests of all parties in the administration of justice.” Id. at 679.

. For a discussion of this court’s extreme reluctance to address constitutional questions until we have to, see Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 81 (D.C.1988). See also Allen-Bradley Local, etc. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 746, 62 S.Ct. 820, 824, 86 L.Ed. 1154 (1942) ("Constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly.... They will not be anticipated but will be dealt with only as they are appropriately raised upon a record before us.”)

. These distinctions are concededly shadowy, and the federal precedents are persuasive authority but no more than that. It may behoove this court to articulate, preferably en banc, on an appropriate record presented by parties who have contested the question, the proper prudential limits to the exercise of its supervisory authority. Compare In re F.G., 576 A.2d 724, 725 n. 1 (D.C.1990) (en banc) with the dissenting opinion, id. at 730.

. Ms. Boyd also contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel. She failed, however, to appeal from the order denying her § 23-110 motion, and the trial record is palpably insufficient to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 576 A.2d 1336, 1338-39 (D.C. 1990); Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 785 (D.C.1990).