Court Opinion

ID: 9561133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:04:05.87565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:38.916132
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
dissenting.
As I cannot agree that the evidence concerning Roberts’ earlier drug conviction was admitted properly, I must respectfully dissent.
In Georgia, “[t]he general character of the parties and especially their conduct in other transactions are irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of such conduct.” OCGA § 24-2-2. The exception to the rule has come to mean that proof of independent and separate offenses is admissible when a logical connection exists between the separate offense and the offense for which the defendant is on trial, so that proof of the separate offense establishes the offense for which the defendant is on trial. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641 (409 SE2d 649) (1991). Most commonly, evidence of similar transactions has been allowed to show identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 761, 763-764, n. 3 (a) (363 SE2d 535) (1988). Unfortunately, however, as the majority opinion in this appeal illustrates, the exception has swallowed the rule. See Jones v. State, 257 Ga. 753, 757 (363 SE2d 529) (1988), tracing the rule’s development.
Although never a basis asserted for admissibility by the prosecution or found so by the trial court, the majority now finds that this evidence was admissible because Roberts denied that he committed the offense for which he was on trial, and therefore his past conviction “would be most helpful to the jury.” The difficulty with this analysis is that it is exactly the reason that similar transaction evidence is supposed to be inadmissible. See Williams v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 641.
*264This “he did it once, he must have done it again reasoning” in fact allows introduction of this evidence solely to show the defendant has a criminal character. That being the case, the evidence is inadmissible. Johnson v. State, 258 Ga. 506, 507 (3) (371 SE2d 396) (1988). Further, in Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 469 (405 SE2d 483) (1991), our Supreme Court reiterated that a similar transaction is not admissible just because it concerned “a crime of the same sort.”
Further, the majority’s theory of admissibility violates the principle that similar transaction evidence “may be admitted if it is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” (Punctuation omitted.) Hatcher v. State, 224 Ga. App. 747, 752 (3) (482 SE2d 443) (1997), quoting from Faison v. State, 199 Ga. App. 447, 448-449 (1) (405 SE2d 227) (1991).
We should not abandon the rule that the purpose for which similar transaction evidence is offered must logically connect to some issue in the case being tried, Stephens v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 469 (6), and the rule that proof of a similar transaction is not admissible unless it is relevant to an issue connected to the offense for which the defendant is on trial, so that proof of the separate offense proves the offense for which the accused is on trial. Williams v. State, supra, 261 Ga. at 641 (2) (a). The purpose for which similar transaction evidence is offered determines whether a logical connection exists, i.e., whether the similar transaction evidence is relevant to an issue in the case. Brockman v. State, 263 Ga. 637, 640 (3) (436 SE2d 316) (1993).
In this case, the similar transaction evidence is not admissible under the traditional rules. Although the State now asserts that the similar transaction evidence was admitted to show Roberts’ identity as the person who possessed the cocaine found by Officer Branham and his “course of conduct and scheme or plan to possess cocaine,” this explanation is not entirely consistent with the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the purposes for which the evidence could be considered.
The trial court’s limiting instruction, given before the similar transaction evidence was introduced, directed the jury that evidence of Roberts’ other offense “may be admissible and may be considered for the limited purpose of showing, if it does, the identity of the perpetrator, the state of mind, i.e., knowledge or intent of a defendant in the crimes charged in the case now on trial” (Emphasis supplied.) Later in the limiting instruction the trial court also instructed the jury that “you are strictly limited in your consideration of the evidence as to the identity, state of mind or other elements charged in this indictment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In its jury charge, however, the trial court instructed the jury *265the evidence might be considered to show the “defendant’s identity or state of mind on the subject involved, if you think it does so illustrate it, and for that purpose alone. You are not to consider it for any other purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading these instructions in combination, I must conclude that the only purposes for which the trial court found this evidence admissible were to prove Roberts’ identity and state of mind. Considered in that light, the similar transaction evidence should not have been admitted.
The only issue in this case was whether the jury would believe, based upon the police officer’s testimony, that Roberts dropped the plastic bag with the cocaine inside. The reasons found by the trial court for admitting the similar crimes evidence, i.e., identity or state of mind, do not connect logically to issues in this case. The officer’s direct testimony proved who allegedly dropped the ziplock bag. This was not a case in which the identity of the alleged perpetrator was unknown and similar transaction evidence was admitted to prove the perpetrator’s identity. In the same manner, Roberts’ state of mind was not an issue in the case.
Moreover, even if I were to find that identity and state of mind were issues in the case, I do not find the two transactions sufficiently similar to permit the first conviction to be admitted. According to the State, the similarities between the crimes were that Roberts possessed cocaine and approached vehicles in both cases. I acknowledge that admissibility of a similar transaction does not depend on the number of similarities between the prior act and the crime charged, but these two similarities must support the trial court’s decision to admit this evidence, because admissibility depends on whether the similarities tend to show that the former act is relevant to a proper issue in the case. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 252, 254 (1) (a) (511 SE2d 603) (1999).
The required degree of similarity depends upon the issue the former act is offered to prove. Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 293 (2) (380 SE2d 259) (1990). When, as in this case, the similar crime is offered to prove identity, a- long list of similarities between the offenses might be necessary to prove the defendant’s “criminal signature.” Id. When introduced to prove another permissible issue, such as motive, intent, or bent of mind, a lesser degree of similarity might suffice. Fields v. State, 223 Ga. App. 569, 571 (2) (479 SE2d 393) (1996).
I cannot agree that the circumstances surrounding Roberts’ prior drug conviction are sufficiently similar to prove any of the issues or purposes identified by the State. Nothing about the other offense showed that Roberts had such an unusual manner of possessing cocaine that he had a “criminal signature.” Indeed, the first offense *266showed a different manner of possessing a different form of cocaine. Likewise, the alleged “approach” similarity is insufficient to show identity or state of mind. Flagging a vehicle down is a far cry from merely walking in the general direction of a car that happens to be driving past.
Decided December 3, 1999.
Closson & Bass, J. Michael Bass, for appellant.
John W. Roberts, pro se.
J. David Miller, District Attorney, James B. Threlkeld, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In the same manner, nothing about the first offense shows Roberts’ state of mind regarding the offense for which he was being tried. Roberts’ defense was that he did not have and did not drop the cocaine; he did not contend that he did not have the requisite state of mind, i.e., that he was entrapped or unknowingly possessed the cocaine.
Therefore I am satisfied that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce the similar transaction evidence. Because I cannot conclude under the circumstances of this case that the introduction of this evidence was harmless, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a fair trial. Beasley v. State, 204 Ga. App. 214, 218 (3) (419 SE2d 92) (1992).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.