Court Opinion

ID: 9572429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:36.603547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:55.900276
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). I would hold that Dixon did not have an expectation of privacy in Bond's truck that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. As a result, Dixon is not entitled to challenge the search of that truck on Fourth Amendment grounds.
In the trial court, the burden was on Dixon to prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in *475Bond's truck. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978); State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 520, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); State v. Rhodes, 149 Wis. 2d 722, 724, 439 N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1989). In an effort to satisfy this burden, he established the following facts.
Dixon had custody of Bond's truck only for the purpose of transporting it to his automotive business for a wash and a tire change. He was given only "one individual key," which he placed on his key ring for safekeeping. Dixon testified that he picked up cars "every other day or so" as part of his business, and he had picked up Bond's truck for servicing in the past. Dixon did not establish the number of times he had previously serviced Bond's truck.
Dixon also established that he and Bond were "dating" at the time of the search. While testifying, he referred to Bond as "a girlfriend" and "a friend of mine." However, the record does not indicate whether Bond and Dixon had a relationship akin to a marriage, or whether they were mere acquaintances in the initial stages of courtship. Indeed, Dixon's references to Bond — "a girlfriend," "friend of mine," and "dating" — suggest the latter.1 Regardless, Dixon failed to prove that he and Bond had a relationship which was intimate enough to suggest that Dixon had implicit permission to use the truck for purposes other than performing the services specified by Bond.
*476In brief, Dixon only established that he was a repairman driving a customer's vehicle for a limited period of time for the purpose of performing services on that vehicle which the customer requested. Therefore, the issue before us is a very narrow one. It does not involve a defendant who borrowed a vehicle from its owner for the defendant's own use; it does not involve a defendant who rented or leased a vehicle from its owner for the defendant's own use; and it does not involve a defendant who was commissioned by the owner of a vehicle to use that vehicle for a substantial period of time to perform some task for the owner.
Given this narrow fact situation, I conclude that Dixon did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Bond's truck. The bailment relationship between Dixon and Bond was simply too transitory and too limited in scope to create such an expectation.
The majority cites 15 cases to support its conclusion that Dixon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Bond's truck. Majority op. at 471-472. Only one of these cases, People v. Campbell, 451 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1982), is somewhat analogous to the case at bar. In Campbell, the owner of a truck hired the defendant to drive the truck from New York to Bellemore Long Island and back again for the purpose of picking up and transporting a cargo of garments. Upon his arrival in New York with the truck and cargo, the defendant was stopped by police. The police searched the truck and determined that the garments were stolen. The defendant was subsequently charged with conspiracy and possession of stolen property.
The defendant moved to suppress the stolen merchandise. He argued, in part, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck. To support this argument, he pointed to the fact that he kept personal *477property, including an overnight bag, in the truck. The New York Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had such an expectation. Id. at 989-90.
Campbell differs from the case at bar. The defendant in Campbell was specifically hired for the purpose of driving the truck and transporting its cargo. Here, the defendant drove Bond's truck only as a necessary incident to servicing the truck. From a common sense standpoint, the Campbell arrangement partakes of a greater expectation of privacy than the arrangement between Dixon and Bond. That the defendant in Campbell kept personal property in the truck illustrates this fact. Accordingly, I find Campbell unpersuasive.
In addition, I respectfully disagree with the New York Supreme Court's holding in Campbell. A person hired by the owner of a truck to drive said truck and cargo for a relatively short distance does not acquire a reasonable expectation of privacy in that truck. Like the case at bar, the bailment is simply too transitory and too limited in scope to create such an expectation.
The remaining cases cited by the majority address fact situations which are much different than the fact situation at bar; therefore, these cases do not support the majority's holding. Most of the cited cases involve defendants who had unqualified permission from the vehicle owner to use the vehicle for the defendants' own purposes. United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 547-48 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1987), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Griffin, 729 F.2d 475, 483 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 830 (1984); United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n.1 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Posey, 663 F.2d 37, 39-41 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 959 (1982); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d *4781313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043 (1981); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (2d. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979); United States v. McMichael, 541 F. Supp. 956, 958 n.5 (D. Md. 1982); State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464, 465, 468 n.4 (Fla. 1989), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Florida v. Wells, 491 U.S. 1 (1989); People v. Regnet, 443 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644 (1981). The scope of permission granted in these cases was much more broad than the scope of permission granted in the instant case. As explained above, Dixon merely had permission to drive Bond's truck in order to perform the service on the vehicle that Bond requested.
United States v. Blanco, 844 F.2d 344, 346-350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1046 (1988) and United States v. Tragash, 691 F. Supp. 1066, 1068-70 (S.D. Ohio 1988), also cited by the majority, involved defendants who rented vehicles for their own purposes, a fact situation which is also much different than the case at bar. In these cases, the defendants purchased a property interest in the vehicles at issue which gave them an unqualified right to use the vehicles for their own purposes for a specified period of time.
The majority also cites United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1415-18 (7th Cir. 1990). Garcia involved a defendant who received permission from the owner of a truck to drive the truck from Texas to Indiana. Again, the scope of permission to use the vehicle in Garcia was much broader than the scope of permission granted in this case. The Garcia defendant was to drive the owner's vehicle through several states, which would take a substantial period of time. On a trip of this length, one can expect the driver to deviate from the prescribed route for food, lodging, etc. Here, Dixon *479only had permission to drive Bond's truck for the time needed to wash it and change its tires.
The majority also cites United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1273-75 (10th Cir. 1990) to support its holding. Rivera held that the defendant in the case had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle he was driving merely because he had permission to use the vehicle from the vehicle's owner, regardless of the nature and scope of that permission. I simply disagree with this holding. Examination of the nature and scope of a bailment is necessary to determine whether the bailee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bailor's property. I am in accord with the majority on this point. See majority op. at 469.
Finally, the majority also cites Professor LaFave to support its holding. He states that "ordinary bailment relationships still deserve to be recognized as establishing a justified expectation of privacy upon which Fourth Amendment standing may be grounded." 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 11.3(e) at 334 (2d ed. 1987). However, the cases cited by LaFave in support of this proposition can be distinguished on the same grounds as the cases cited by the majority. Id. at 334 n.239 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993). Therefore, Professor LaFave's pronouncement does not apply to the fact situation here.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX joins this dissenting opinion.

 "When reviewing an order on a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court may take into account the evidence at the trial, as well as the evidence at the suppression hearing." State v. Griffin, 126 Wis. 2d 183, 198, 376 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).