Court Opinion

ID: 9595607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:42:06.214705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:29.155488
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the prevailing opinion, but find myself in sharp disagreement with much of the reasoning by which the court arrives at that result. I particularly do not concur in the analysis of the decisions of our Supreme Court which is proffered in support of the conclusion that our previous decision in Tatum v. Clackamas County, 19 Or App 770, 529 P2d 393 (1974), was in error and must be overturned.
I
First of all, the court’s interpretation of Art IV, § 1(5), Oregon Constitution,1 is directly contra to what has been (with one possible exception) the settled law in this state since the landmark decision in Rose v. Port of Portland, 82 Or 541, 162 P 498 (1917).
Simply stated, the rule announced in Rose is this: The legal voters of districts such as port districts, school districts and similar districts, including counties, have no authority to exercise initiative and referendum powers without some additional grant of authority from the legislature.
*590I believe that an analysis of the Rose case and the decisions of our Supreme Court which followed Rose will show that this rule has (with one possible exception) been consistently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court. Barber v. Johnson, 86 Or 390, 167 P 800, 1183 (1917); Carriker v. Lake County, 89 Or 240, 171 P 407, 173 P 573 (1918); Hansell v. Douglass, 234 Or 315, 380 P2d 977 (1963), appeal dismissed 375 US 396 (1964). These cases, which formed the basis of this court’s decision in Tatum v. Clackamas County, supra, will now be discussed.
It is true that Art IV, § 1(5), Oregon Constitution, says that the referendum and initiative powers are reserved to the people; however, our Supreme Court in Rose and in a series of cases which followed has held that this constitutional provision is not self-executing, except as to "cities and towns.”2
I begin my analysis with Rose v. Port of Portland, supra. The facts were that the Port of Portland adopted an ordinance giving itself initiative and referendum powers. The Port asserted that its action was fully authorized by what is now Art IV, § 1(5).
Our Supreme Court in denying that the Port possessed such powers said:
"* * * The Constitution enables the legal voters of cities and towns to enact or amend their charter, but does not permit the legal voters of any other municipality or district to enact or amend their charter or act of incorporation without outside legislative aid.” 82 Or at 558. (Emphasis supplied.)
Even before Rose, our Supreme Court held in State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or 1, 154 P 399 (1916), that any measure enacted by the people under Art IV, § la, Oregon Constitution, must be done so pursuant to *591some grant of legislative power, either by virtue of a charter or by statute. The court said:
"* * * [Mlunicipal legislation, within the meaning of Section la of Article IV, when applied to municipalities, other than cities and towns, refers to legislation which is permitted and made necessary for carrying into effect a lawful power previously granted. * * * If it does not rise to the dignity of a city or town, a municipality cannot take unto itself and exercise any power whatever, unless the right is first granted by a law passed by the people of the whole state or by a general statute enacted by the legislature. * * *” 79 Or at 23. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Barber v. Johnson, supra at 395, where the court was considering the power of the legal voters of a county to initiate a measure locating a county seat, the court said:
«* * * [H]e who would uphold the action of the people of a county under the initiative must point to some grant of power to act on the subject in question * * *.”
In Carriker v. Lake County, supra at 246, our Supreme Court was required to determine whether an initiative measure providing for a tax levy for bounties for jack rabbits passed by the people of the county at an election was valid. The court, in holding that the measure was not valid and referring to Art IV, § 1a, said:
"* * * A county cannot enact a law unless the power to enact that law is referable to a grant of power made by the people of the whole state or by their representatives, the legislature. Nor does it necessarily follow that a county can initiate and enact a local, special and municipal law without a charter merely because it can exercise the referendum without a charter granting it the power of exercising the referendum. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
I mentioned earlier that there was one decision in which our Supreme Court may have departed from the rule announced in Rose. That decision is Kosydar v. Collins, County Clerk, 201 Or 271, 270 P2d 132 (1954).
In Kosydar the Supreme Court seemingly departed from the reasoning of Rose, Barber and Carriker. *592Kosydar involved an election to remove a county seat. The election was held valid, even though the statutory authority for a popular vote on the question had been repealed.
The prevailing opinion in the case at bar seems to imply that Kosydar is authority for the proposition that implementing legislation is not required. I do not think, however, that the Kosydar court intended such a far-reaching result involving the overruling of Rose, Barber and Carriker, sub silentio. Furthermore, the Kosydar court in construing the ancestor statute3 of ORS 254.3104 said that the subject statute only provides the mechanics for exercising initiative and referendum powers granted elsewhere. The court said:
"It is evident that no powers were granted to the people by this statute [ORS 254.310] — the constitution had already reserved such powers to them — but the act did provide for the manner of exercising them. * * *” 201 Or at 279.
At any rate any doubt created by Kosydar was removed in 1963 when the court reaffirmed its adherence to the Rose rule in Hansell v. Douglass, supra.
In Hansell our Supreme Court was faced with the contention that school districts are "districts” under *593Art IV, § 1a, Oregon Constitution, and have the power to initiate legislation. The court had this to say:
"Prior to the decision in the Rose case this court had given conflicting decisions construing the meaning of Article IV, § 1a and its companion amendment of 1906, Article XI, § 2. The latter was the Home Rule Amendment. See Burton v. Gibbons, 1934, 148 Or 370, 36 P2d 786.
"The opinion in the Rose case decided that the two amendments must be construed together and then exhaustively analyzed the two amendments with unusual clarity and reason. The conclusion was reached that the two amendments extended the initiative power only to those municipalities and districts that had the power to legislate; basically cities and towns. The opinion said * * * 'no other corporate body can, without an enabling act, legislate power unto itself to legislate.’ 82 Or at 573. The case held that the Port of Portland did not have the initiative power. A year later, in Carriker v. Lake County, 1918, 89 Or 240, 171 P 407, 173 P 573, Justice Harris, in even more emphatic language, applied the same rule to a county:
''***'*** A county cannot enact a law unless the power to enact that law is referable to a grant of power made by the people of the whole state or by their representatives, the legislature. * * * As pointed out in Rose v. Port of Portland, 82 Or 541, 553-558, 570 (162 Pac. 498), the words found in the two sections of the Constitution, when read together, define the extent of the power of the referendum and define and limit the power of the initiative.’ 89 Or 245, 246, opinion on petition for rehearing.
"The same rule would apply equally, if not more so, to a school district. 'Although the municipality in Rose v. Port of Portland was a port and the municipality in the instant case is a county, nevertheless the legal principle involved is identical in both cases.’ Carriker v. Lake County, supra, 244.” 234 Or at 317-18. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prevailing opinion in the present case relegates Hansell to a footnote, and does not refer to the explanation of the Rose rule which I have just quoted. Along *594this same line, it is interesting to note here that a similar question involving the power of county voters to initiate legislation arose in Deschutes County (also a non-Home Rule county) in 1966. The voters of the county purported to adopt an antizoning "initiative measure” containing among others the following provision:
" ' "* * * All zoning ordinances or amendments to zoning ordinances will originate by petition from, and vote thereon by, the persons affected by such proposed ordinance or amendment as provided by law and not otherwise. * * * ” ’ ” 33 Op Att’y Gen 481 (Or 1966-68).
When the validity of the above measure was questioned, the district attorney presented the issue to the Attorney General’s office for decision. After an exhaustive examination of the Oregon authorities, including all of the decisions which have previously been referred to in this opinion, the Attorney General said:
"It is our opinion that under the doctrine of Rose v. Port of Portland, Barber v. Johnson and Carriker v. Lake County, supra, as reaffirmed in Hansell v. Douglass, supra, the people of Deschutes County had no authority to enact an initiative measure which would prohibit the county court from adopting zoning or subdivision ordinances, inasmuch as authority has not been granted by law for the enactment of such an initiative measure. * * *” 33 Op Att’y Gen at 485.
It is significant, I think, that the Rose rule has been followed by the Attorneys General of Oregon in the following published opinions:
27 Op Att’y Gen 66 (Or 1954-56) (The power of initiative and referendum held not available to a state representative district without implementing legislation authorizing the same).
31 Op Att’y Gen 240 (Or 1962-64) (Legislative district may not be subdistricted by the exercise of initiative power within the district).
33 Op Att’y Gen 481 (Or 1966-68) (Voters of a non-Home Rule county have no authority to enact an "anti-*595zoning” initiative measure without state legislation authorizing the same).
33 Op Att’y Gen 644 (Or 1966-68) (An area described in a county zoning ordinance is not a "district” so as to render available to the voters thereof the power of initiative).
36 Op Att’y Gen 1044 (Or 1974) (A comprehensive plan adopted by the governing body of a county under ORS 215.050 is not subject to referral by the voters).
II
I now turn to the remaining issues.
Plaintiff Allison’s argument in support of his claimed right of referendum is as follows: the amendment to the comprehensive plan was adopted pursuant to authority granted the county by ORS 215.050, which provides:
"The county governing body shall adopt and may from time to time revise a comprehensive plan and zoning, subdivision and other ordinances for the use of some or all of the land in the county. The plan and related ordinances may be adopted and revised part by part.”
Plaintiff next points to ORS 215.130, which provides:
"(1) Any ordinance adopted under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 * * * shall be a local law within the meaning of, and subject to, ORS 254.310 [section implementing referendums].
"* * * *- *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the amendment to the comprehensive plan was adopted pursuant to authority granted all counties by ORS 215.050, one of the statutes referred to in ORS 215.130, plaintiff concludes that the plan is a local law within the meaning of ORS 254.310 and subject to referendum.
I cannot agree with plaintiff’s conclusion. Plaintiff is correct that ORS 215.130 provides that ordinances so adopted are local laws and subject to referendum. But he incorrectly assumes that comprehensive plans and the amendments thereto are ordinances. While it *596is true that comprehensive plans may be enacted and amended by ordinance, the amendment in question here was adopted by resolution.
But the formal manner by which the amendment was enacted, however, is not the basis for my conclusion. I would hold that even if the amendment in question had been adopted by ordinance, it would not be a proper subject for a referendum. I say this because in the context of ORS 215.130 comprehensive plans and the amendments thereto are not ordinances. I recognize that comprehensive plans are legislative enactments, Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 271 Or 500, 533 P2d 772 (1975), and therefore arguably ordinances for most purposes.
My conclusion that comprehensive plans and the amendments thereto are not ordinances in this context is based on the proposition that there are fundamental conceptual differences between comprehensive plans and the related ordinances. The comprehensive plan which each county adopts is part of a broad policy-oriented program for orderly land development throughout the state, Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973), and has been likened to a constitution. Baker v. City of Milwaukie, supra.
The related ordinances on the other hand represent the manner by which the goals embodied in the comprehensive plan are carried out in each county. Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., supra. They are subject to referendum. ORS 215.130.
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized this essential difference between comprehensive plans and related ordinances in Fasano, 264 Or at 582.
Since there is such a vital difference between the manner of adopting comprehensive plans and the manner of enacting the related ordinances, and further because I find statutory authority authorizing only ordinances to be referred to the people, I conclude *597that the amendment to the Washington County comprehensive plan is not a proper referendum issue. I note that the Attorney General reached essentially the same conclusion in an opinion on the identical question rendered to the District Attorney of Washington County in 1974. See, 36 Op Att’y Gen 1044 (Or 1974).
Ill
There are two other aspects of the case before us on which I also differ with the approach taken in the prevailing opinion.
First, I am unable to agree with the rule announced in the prevailing opinion that henceforth the status of county land-use decisions made pursuant to ORS ch 215 — i.e., whether such decisions are to be classed as of local concern or of statewide concern — is to be determined on a case-by-case basis following the rules laid down in State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie et al, 231 Or 473, 373 P2d 680 (1962).
Contrary to the above proposal, it is my view that because of the broad language of Senate Bill 100,5 such county land-use decisions have now all become matters of paramount statewide concern.6 Accord: Fischer v. Miller, 228 Or 54, 363 P2d 1109 (1961).
The rule announced in the prevailing opinion is not only inconsistent with the provisions of SB 100, it introduces a new and unnecessary complication into the process of governmental regulation of land use. This rule will inevitably lead to more uncertainty and more litigation. This whole process is already strangling from the effects of far too much of this type of governmentally imposed sanctions and red tape.
*598I would agree with the defendant county’s argument that a comprehensive plan and amendments thereto are, by virtue of SB 100, a matter of statewide concern, and are not subject to a local referendum, except for one thing: ORS 215.130(1). Because of the provisions of this section, I cannot accept the argument that ordinances implementing the comprehensive plan are immune from referenda. In my view this statute is controlling on this issue.
ORS 215.130(1) provides:
"Any ordinance adopted under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 and 215.402 to 215.422 shall be a local law within the meaning of, and subject to, ORS 254.310.”
An examination of the legislative history of this provision will show that the above language was part of the original county planning and zoning law enacted in 1947, Oregon Laws 1947, ch 537, § 5, p 948. Although the county zoning law has been amended many times, the above provision has remained unchanged down to the present time. This provision shows an unmistakable legislative intention to authorize the referendum as to all ordinances enacted under ORS ch 215.
The only manner in which I can conceive that SB 100 could be construed as showing a contrary legislative intention by repealing the plain terms of ORS 215.130(1) would be under a theory of repeal of this section by implication. Repeals by implication are not favored by the law. Wampler v. Dept. of State Police, 224 Or 439, 355 P2d 238 (1960). I do not believe that such a construction is authorized here. See, Rorick v. Dalles City, 140 Or 342, 12 P2d 762 (1932).
IV
Lastly, I agree with the prevailing opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to have his proposed referendum submitted only to the voters of Washington County residing outside incorporated cities. I believe there is another reason which should be stated.
*599As I have already pointed out, the voters of a county do not have the authority to invoke a referendum as to a comprehensive plan or an amendment thereof. However, even if plaintiff had been entitled to have his proposed referendum submitted, he would not have been able to limit the same to the voters residing outside incorporated areas. It is my conclusion that under ORS ch 215, only the governing body of the county has authority to submit a referendum to a portion of the county. I base this conclusion on ORS 215.110(4), which provides:
"The governing body may refer to the legal voters of the county for their approval or rejection an ordinance or amendments thereto for which subsection (3) of this section provides. If only a part of the county is affected, the ordinance or amendment may be referred to that part only.”
Inasmuch as there is no similar authorization for a referendum vote by only part of a county contained in ORS 215.130 or elsewhere in ORS ch 215, I conclude that only the county governing body may so limit the scope of a referendum.

 Oregon Constitution, Art IV, § 1(5) provides:
"The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by subsections (2) and (3) of this section are further reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their municipality or district. The manner of exercising those powers shall be provided by general laws, but cities may provide the manner of exercising those powers as to their municipal legislation. * * *”

 It should be pointed out that the distinction drawn by the court between “cities and towns” on the one hand, and other municipalities and districts results from the provision in Art XI, § 2, Oregon Constitution, granting to the voters of "every city and town” power to adopt a charter.

 General Laws of Oregon 1919, ch 251, § 1, p 374, provides:
"The people of every county are hereby authorized to enact, amend or repeal all local laws for their county by initiative and referendum process. The method of procedure in the use by the people of any county of these powers is provided by sections 3470 to 3485 of Lord’s Oregon laws, and amendments thereof, making effective the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by sections 1 and 1-a of article IV of the constitution.”

 ORS 254.310 provides:
"The people of every county are authorized to enact, amend or repeal all local laws for their county by the initiative and referendum process. The procedure to be followed is provided by ORS 254.030, 254.042, 254.060, 254.070, 254.090 to 254.170, 254.320, 254.330 and 255.410 to 255.452, making effective the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by sections 1 and la, Article IV, Oregon Constitution * *

 Senate Bill 100, which was passed by the 1973 legislature and is now ORS ch 197, established the state Land Conservation and Development Commission and provided for statewide land-use planning.

 Whether or not the legislature has properly pre-empted the field by its determination in Senate Bill 100 that planning and zoning are matters of paramount state concern is, of course, ultimately a decision for the courts. State ex rel Heinig v. Milwaukie et al, 231 Or 473, 373 P2d 680 (1962).