Court Opinion

ID: 9673442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:11:58.11349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.242600
License: Public Domain

*357Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I concur with the reasoning and result of the lead opinion’s conclusion that personal jurisdiction does not exist over defendant Wilson. However, I dissent from the lead opinion’s creation of an exception to the “name and retain” provision of Michigan’s dramshop act. There is no justifiable reason for this Court to create an exception to the plain language of the “name and retain” provision where the allegedly intoxicated driver has been dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
i
The “name and retain” provision of the dramshop act states in pertinent part:
An action under this section against a retail licensee shall not be commenced unless the . . . alleged intoxicated person is a named defendant in the action and is retained in the action until the litigation is concluded by trial or settlement. [MCL 436.22(6); MSA 18.993(6).]
The language of this provision is clear and unambiguous. Spalo v A & G Enterprises (After Remand), 437 Mich 406, 409-411; 471 NW2d 546 (1991) (Griffin, J., plurality opinion). “ ‘[R]etained’ means being a real party in interest in the full sense of those words.” Riley v Richards, 428 Mich 198, 213; 404 NW2d 618 (1987). In Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181, 187; 324 NW2d 729 (1982), this Court acknowledged the “name and retain” provision amounted to a rule per se requiring the retention of the allegedly intoxicated defendant until the litigation is concluded by trial or settlement.
*358One purpose of the “name and retain” provision is to preclude collusion between allegedly intoxicated defendants and injured plaintiffs to the disadvantage of the retail licensee defendant.1 This Court has emphasized that
[o]ne of the ways the “name and retain” provision prevents fraud and collusion is by ensuring that the defendant will have a direct financial stake in personally testifying, examining witnesses, and arguing that he did not act in a negligent manner. [Putney, supra at 188.]
In order to have a direct financial stake, the allegedly intoxicated defendant must be more than a nominal party, but must actually be retained in the litigation. Id.
An allegedly intoxicated defendant excused for lack of personal jurisdiction has no direct financial stake in the litigation. Therefore, however remote, there exists a risk of collusion or fraud. Putney, supra. As this Court stated in Riley, supra, “[t]here can be no degrees of compliance with the ‘name and retain’ provision.” Riley, supra at 211. Thus, I would hold that creating an exception to the “name and retain” provision in this case is contrary to the provision’s purpose.
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In 1986, after the decision in Putney, the Legislature added MCL 436.22(7); MSA 18.993(7) to the *359dramshop act. This subsection affords the dramshop a “right to full indemnification from the alleged visibly intoxicated person for all damages awarded against the licensee.” This Court has yet to be presented with a case interpreting the scope of the indemnification provision. However, the lead opinion reasons that the indemnification provision insures against collusion because the allegedly intoxicated driver retains a financial stake in the litigation even if the allegedly intoxicated defendant cannot be retained.2 Therefore, the lead opinion concludes that an exception to the “name and retain” provision is appropriate in this case.
The effect of this reasoning is to render the “name and retain” provision meaningless whenever there is some possibility that the dramshop might be able to pursue the allegedly intoxicated person for indemnification, even if that pursuit involves litigation in a foreign jurisdiction as in the instant case. The conclusion of the lead opinion is inconsistent with the purposes of the “name and retain” provision. Further, the Legislature did not repeal or amend the clear and unambiguous language of the “name and retain” provision when it added the indemnification provision. Therefore, the plain language of the provision should be afforded full effect, and because the lead opinion fails to do this, I find its reasoning unpersuasive.
*360Further, I find the Court of Appeals holding that “strict enforcement of the name and retain provision would produce an absurd result” similarly unpersuasive. 211 Mich App 140, 145; 535 NW2d 233 (1995). Relying on Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 889 (1976), the Court reasoned that because the plaintiffs were not responsible for defendant Wilson’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, there was no danger of collusion between the plaintiffs and defendant Wilson.
In Salas at 109, this Court noted that “departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” Thus, this Court created an exception to the name and retain provision where the identity of the allegedly intoxicated individual was unknown because, in such a situation, there could be no collusion between the plaintiff and the alleged intoxicated individual.3 Id. Clearly, this reasoning does not apply in the present case where the identity of the allegedly intoxicated defendant is known. Nor is the plaintiff’s lack of control over a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction grounds for ignoring the Legislature’s clear *361mandate that the allegedly intoxicated defendant must be named and retained until the conclusion of the litigation.
In this case, the allegedly intoxicated defendant is known. Therefore, the danger of collusion and fraud against the retail licensee exists. While the danger of collusion might well be remote, it is entirely inappropriate for this Court to speculate regarding the likelihood of such collusion or fraud in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the “name and retain” provision.
For the reasons stated above, I would not create an exception to the “name and retain” provision in this case.
Brickley and Riley, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.

 In adopting the “name and retain” provision, the Legislature may have recognized the difficulty inherent for the court in determining whether there was a serious likelihood of fraud and the resulting drain on judicial resources, and instead decided to create a rule per se. Putney, supra at 187.

 While a separate suit for indemnification is expressly permitted for all cases filed after July 1, 1986, indemnification remains only a possible avenue of recourse for the dramshop. As this Court noted in Riley, supra, a case evidently filed before the effective date of the indemnification provision, “[a] separate suit for contribution ... in the case of an alleged intoxicated person with something less than a deep pocket, [is] an even more remote possibility.” Riley, supra at 212, n 4.

 The only other instance where this Court created an exception to the “name and retain” provision was in Shay v JohnKal, Inc, 437 Mich 394; 471 NW2d 551 (1991). In Shay, this Court held that the name and retain provision does not bar maintenance of a dramshop action where the allegedly intoxicated defendant was dismissed after a court-ordered mediation settlement. Shay is distinguishable from the present case because the dismissal of the defendant in Shay occurred after discovery, thus allowing the retail licensee remaining in the action a testimonial record for its defense. The danger of collusion may also have been diminished by the mediation process. Further, Shay was a plurality opinion, and the reasoning of the two opinions comprising the majority does not control.