Court Opinion

ID: 9739005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:07:10.295656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.623760
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, P. J., dissenting: I am unable to agree with my colleagues that there is sufficient competent evidence to support a finding of guilty of the offense of pandering. An information was filed charging the defendant with pandering in that “for money he arranged a situation in which Toye Brown, a female, did practice prostitution, . ...” A bench trial resulted in a finding of guilty in the manner and form charged in the indictment and the defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of two to five years. Ill Rev Stats 1967, § 11-16 (a) of c 38, defines the offense of pandering in terms of one who “(1) Compels a female to become a prostitute; or (2) Arranges or offers to arrange a situation in which a female may practice prostitution.” There is no indication, nor is it urged, that the defendant compelled a female to become a prostitute. There is no essential dispute as to the evidence. Two police officers, not in uniform and in an unmarked car, drove to an address in Decatur, Illinois. The defendant was sitting on the porch and one of the officers went up to the defendant and asked him if there were any girls there. He replied in the affirmative, told the officer to go around to the back door and further advised him to tell his “buddy” to pull the car around to the back. This was done. The two officers went to the back door and were admitted to the premises by the defendant. The defendant then left for another part of the house without further conversation with the officers. Two women were in the room. One of the officers had a conversation with one of the women, agreed to a price of $10, and gave her a $10 bill which had previously been treated with a phosphorescent material. The officer went upstairs with the woman into a bedroom. She started to undress. He placed her under arrest and notified his partner who was still downstairs. At some point the girl to whom the officer had given the $10 had a conversation with the defendant and was seen handing him something not otherwise identified. The defendant and the two girls were taken to the police station. Ultraviolet-light examination indicated that the hands of the defendant had some of the phosphorescent material on them. The money itself was not recovered, and in fact the defendant stated that it would not be recovered. In the rewrite of the Criminal Code of 1961, criminal offenses dealing with prostitution were reclassified and section 11-16 is described in the Committee Comments as “the activity here labeled ‘pandering,’ which involves the recruiting of persons into the practice of prostitution and with keeping practicing prostitutes in that line of endeavor.” (SHA, c 38, sec 11-16, Committee Comments, p 668.) At another point in the Comments (p 669), it is stated: “. . . the emphasis of section 11-16 is shifted away from the technique by which the panderer accomplishes his objective, to the striving to accomplish the task, namely, putting a prostitute in business, or keeping her there. . . .” (Italicized in original.) The evidence here is not sufficient to establish that the defendant either compelled a female to become a prostitute or arranged or offered to arrange a situation in which a female may practice prostitution. This case is not one where the determination of guilt by the trier of fact, based upon conflicting evidence or the credibility of witnesses, is such that a reviewing court will not interfere with the finding. Where, as in this case, the evidence is insufficient to establish the offense charged, it is our duty to reverse the conviction. As stated in People v. Dougard, 16 Ill2d 603, 607-608 (158 NE2d 596, 598-599 (1959)): . . if there is not sufficient credible evidence, or if it is improbable or unsatisfactory, or not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt and create an abiding conviction that he is guilty, the conviction will be reversed. It is the duty of this court to resolve all facts and circumstances in evidence on the theory of innocence rather than guilt if that reasonably may be done, and where the entire record leaves us, as this one does, with grave and substantial doubt of the guilt of the defendant, we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment. People v. Sheppard, 402 Ill 347, 83 NE2d 587 (1949).” The brief of the appellee, in argument, describes the activity of the defendant in terms that would meet the statutory definition of the offense of pandering. For example: “Defendant should be commended for his astute management of these prostitutes. He . . . provided parking facilities . . . insured the availability of two ‘girls’ . . . supplied bedroom facilities . . . required the payment of money ... [in advance].” This language may well describe conduct sufficient to convict of pandering. A reading of the record, however, does not disclose any evidence that the defendant managed prostitutes, supplied bedroom facilities, required the payment of money in advance, or insured the availability of two girls, as is argued in the brief. I would reverse the conviction.