Court Opinion

ID: 9559040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:21:09.990165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:43.901828
License: Public Domain

McGHEE, Justice (dissenting). The rule proposed by the appellant appears in 175 A.L.R. 30 and reads as follows : “In the overwhelming majority of the cases the result reached by their interpretational efforts can be condensed into the simple rule that where the parties fail to refer expressly to negligence in their contract such failure evidences the parties’ intention not to provide for indemnity for the indemnitee’s negligent acts.” A footnote states that there are literally hundreds of cases supporting this proposition and cites the following as illustrating its universal application: Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Thornley, 10 Cir., 1942, 127 F.2d 128; Southern R. Co. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 4 Cir., 1944, 145 F.2d 304; United States v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., D.C.Conn.1940, 33 F.Supp. 859, reversed on other grounds 2 Cir., 1941, 117 F.2d 503; The Zeller No. 14, D.C.N.Y.1947, 74 F.Supp. 538; Brandenburg v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 1941, 45 Cal.App.2d 306, 114 P.2d 14; Marshall v. Maryland, D. & V. R. Co., 1921, 1 W.W.Harr. 170, 31 Del. 170, 112 A. 526; Fisk Tire Co. v. Hood Coach Lines, 1936, 54 Ga.App. 401, 188 S.E. 57; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Brownenburg, 1869, 32 Ind. 199; Mitchell v. Southern R. Co., 1903, 124 Ky. 146, 74 S.W. 216, 24 Ky.Law Rep. 2388; Buford v. Sewerage & Water Bd., La.App.1937, 175 So. 110; New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. T. Stuart & Son Co., 1927, 260 Mass. 242, 157 N.E. 540; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., 1939, 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226; Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. Hinton, 1939, 233 Mo.App. 1218, 130 S.W.2d 235; ThompsonStarrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 1936, 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35; Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. National Fire Proofing Co., 1931, 39 Ohio App. 1, 176 N.E. 591; Southern Pac. Co. v. Layman, 1944, 173 Or. 275, 145 P.2d 295; Griffiths v. Henry Broderick, Inc., 1947, 27 Wash.2d 901, 182 P.2d 18, 175 A.L.R. 1; Finkelstein v. Brant, 1929, 198 Wis. 527, 224 N.W. 743; Toronto v. Lambert, 1916, 54 Can SC 200, 33 DLR 476, Ann.Cas.1918D, 57. The appellees offer a rule adopted by the majority to the effect that negligence need not be expressly referred to if the language used by the parties indicates the intention that negligence of the indemnitee is included in the agreement. The majority Seeks to bolster the adoption of the minority rule by saying the cases they cite are the “better reasoned,” but I disagree with such statement. Since there are no New Mexico cases on this point, we are free to adopt either rule. I believe the “express negligence” rule is the better reasoned and fairer one, and is much less likely to result ■in dispute or litigation. There would be no interpretation problems if this rule were adopted. The question would simply be: Is the negligence of the indemnitee expressly referred to? The rationale of this rule was well stated by. the court in Perry v. Payne, 1907, 217 Pa. 252, 66 A. 553, 555, 11 L.R.A.,N.S., 1173. • “It is contrary to experience and against ■ reason that the contractors should agree to indemnify (the owner) against the negligence of himself or his. employees. It would make them insurers, and impose a liability upon .the contractors, the extent of which .'•would be uncertain and indefinite, and •'ientirely in the hands of (the owner). The results of such a liability might become most disastrous. * * * A single act of negligence on the part of the owner or his employees, over whom the contractors would have no restraint or control whatever, might create a liability which a lifetime of successful business could ‘not repay. An interpretation of the bond which might give rise to such results could hardly be .regarded as reasonable or as giving effect to the intention of the parties. * * * The liability of such indemnity is so hazardous, and the character of the indemnity so unusual and extraordinary, that there can be no presumption that the indemnitor intended to .assume the responsibility unless the contract puts it beyond doubt by express stipulation. No inference from words of general import can establish it. The manifest • purpose, in such cases, to indemnify against the injury which, under the circumstances, could reasonably .be apprehended only from the action of the indemnitor or his servant, is a weighty consideration in construing indemnity contracts. The circumstances surrounding the parties, the one, the owner for whom the building is to be erected, and the other, the contractor who is to construct the building and hence from whose acts injury to persons and property may be anticipated, would seem to -make the conclusion irresistible, that unless expressly stipulated in the contract, the owner is not to be indemnified against his own negligence.” - The action of the majority in putting the burden of Herkenhoff’s negligence on the Metropolitan by interpretation does not appeal to me and as above stated such is the minority rule,-and I dissent.