Court Opinion

ID: 9514754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:31.881696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.579540
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
[¶29.] I agree with the majority in adopting the lost chance doctrine for reasons as expressed by the Kansas Supreme Court in Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984). In Roberson, the court concluded that by not allowing the plaintiffs case to go forward,
in essence, declares open season on critically ill or injured persons as care providers would be free of liability for even the grossest malpractice if the patient had only a fifty-fifty chance of surviving the disease or injury even with proper treatment. Under such rationale a segment of society often least able to exercise independent judgment would be at the mercy of those professionals on whom it must rely for life-saving health care.
Id. at 160.
[¶ 30.] The Kansas Supreme Court again addressed this doctrine in Delaney v. Cade, 255 Kan. 199, 873 P.2d 175 (1994) in deciding whether or not this doctrine should apply to lost chance of recovery. The court held that it did and stated:
Although a variety of approaches has emerged among jurisdictions which have examined the loss of chance theory, three general approaches are utilized by courts confronted with the theory and the standard of proof to be adopted: (1) the all or nothing approach; (2) the relaxed standard of proof approach; and (3) the any loss of chance approach.
The all or nothing approach, or traditional approach, is that approach followed by jurisdictions which refuse to recognize the “lost chance” as a distinct' and compensable injury. These jurisdictions, which are now probably the minority, strictly adhere to the principle that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the injury or death suffered by the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff must establish that there existed a better-than-even chance of avoiding the physical injury or resulting death. If the plaintiff meets this burden, compensation is awarded for the particular injury or wrongful death suffered, not the lost chance of a better recovery or survival. Thus, these jurisdictions refuse to relax the traditional view of proximate cause in medical malpractice actions. As pointed out in Roberson, this argument is best illustrated in Cooper v. Sisters of Charity, 27 Ohio St.2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971). As the all or nothing (traditional) approach is nothing more than a rejection of the loss of chance theory, which we have already determined is applicable in Kansas, further consideration of the traditional standard of proof would be irrelevant.
*374The relaxed standard of proof approach, commonly referred to as the “substantial chance” approach, requires plaintiff to present evidence that a substantial or significant chance of survival or better recovery was lost. If plaintiff meets this initial threshold, the causation issue is submitted to the jury, using the traditional proximate cause standard to ascertain whether, in fact, the alleged malpractice resulted in the loss of a substantial or significant chance. Thus, the jury must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of the lost chance, but the lost chance itself need only be a substantial or significant chance, for a better result, absent any malpractice, rather than a greater than 50 percent chance of a better result.
Id. at 183-84.
[¶ 31.] This Court should also adopt this substantial chance approach to determine whether a plaintiff should be compensated and the amount of any compensation based on what they lost by being deprived of the opportunity to receive early treatment and the chance of realizing gain in avoiding physical harm or loss of life. This approach only provides that an individual is responsible for their part of the resulting damages.9 A percentage valuation and an assessment of damages for a lost chance of survival does not over compensate an injured party, nor does it unfairly make the defendant responsible for fault unattributable to that specific defendant.10

. The loss of chance should limit exposure to fault attributable to the defendant. This apportionment of fault was discussed in Delaney. In Delaney, the court stated:
"Application of the lost chance principle in medical malpractice cases often involves circumstances where the plaintiff or patient was already suffering from some disease or disorder at the time the health care malpractice occurred. Consequently, the loss of chance doctrine selves to fairly compensate the plaintiff for the tortious deprivation of an opportunity to live longer and recover from a physical injwy or condition inflicted by the defendant's wrongful act or omission. In the medical malpractice context, lost chance endeavors to allow a plaintiff to recover for the diminished chances of surviving or recovering from a disease or malady which results from the health care defendant's malpractice.”
873 P.2d at 182 (quoting Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modem Proportional Approach to Damages in Texas, 44 Baylor L.Rev. 759, 760 (1992)) (emphasis in original).

. Attached to this writing are copies from the pattern instructions of Kansas 123.22 and 181.06 which deal with this doctrine. These attachments are provided only to assist the trial court in finalizing the jury instructions to be given at a later date.