Court Opinion

ID: 9666626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:22:59.378572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:31.040464
License: Public Domain

BRIGHAM, Justice,
concurring.
The majority has reached a correct decision in its opinion, with which I wholeheartedly agree. I write separately only to offer an additional reason for this court to conclude that jury argument regarding the parole instruction is proper jury argument.
A brief history of the parole instruction outlined in article 37.07, section 4(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is appropriate. In 1985, the Legislature added the instruction to article 37.07. Tex.Code CRIM. PROcAnn. art. 37.07 § 4(a)1. Two years later, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the parole instruction violated the separation of powers and due course of law provisions of the Texas Constitution. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 537 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). In reaching its holding, the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the risk that punishment could be unfairly based on extraneous considerations. Id. The Rose holding rendered the parole instruction of article 37.07 unconstitutional.
Two years later, Texas voters altered the fundamental law of this state so as to approve the parole instruction. On November 7, 1989, article IV, section 11(a) of the Texas Constitution was amended to expressly authorize such an instruction:
The Legislature shall by law establish a Board of Pardons and Paroles and shall require it to keep record of its actions and the reasons for its actions. The Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws and laws that require or 'permit courts to inform juries about the effect of good conduct time and eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision on the period of incarceration served by a defendant convicted of a criminal offense.2
In its analysis of the history of article 37.07, section 4(a), the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the purpose for the amendment was to “establish a constitutional basis for any legislative efforts to provide courts with a jury charge regarding good conduct time and parole.” Oakley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). In Oakley, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the importance of the issue to citizens of this state:
[W]hen Texas voters approved the amendment to Article IV, Section 11(a) of the Texas Constitution on November 7, 1989, that amendment became part of the fundamental law of Texas with the same effect as if it had been adopted as part of the Constitution originally adopted in 1876. Moreover, by so explicitly changing the fundamental law, the people clearly articulated their will or intent that the Legislature be authorized to draft laws permitting trial courts to inform juries about the operation and effect of parole laws.
Id. at 109-10.
Passage of the constitutional amendment and the subsequent re-enactment of article 37.07, section 43 has thus woven the parole *916instruction into the very fabric of our state law. As a result, jury argument which accurately paraphrases or summarizes the parole instruction, as was the case here, must be construed as proper summation regardless of whether it appears to fit neatly into any of the Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 802-03 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987), categories for proper jury argument.

. See Act of May 24, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 576, § 1, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 2195, 2196.

. Tex. Const, art. IV, § 11(a) (emphasis added). The language of the then-proposed Constitutional Amendment was drafted by the Legislature. See Tex.S.J.Res. 4, 71st Leg., R.S., 1989 Tex.Gen. Laws 6414, and Act of May 3, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 103, § 1, 1989 Tex.Gen.Law. 442, 442. See also Oakley v. State, 830 S.W.2d 107, 109-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

.See Act of May 3, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 103, § 1, 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 442, 442 — 44, amended by Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 5.02, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 3743, 3743-745.