Court Opinion

ID: 9556742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 16:01:45.43119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:13.305904
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2346
                        ___________________________

                             United States of America,

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,

                                            v.

                              Michael Anthony Eckis,

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee.
                                       ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the District of North Dakota - Western
                                   ____________

                           Submitted: February 16, 2023
                             Filed: August 18, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       After Michael Eckis pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, the government moved under USSG § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) to reduce his sentence based on the provision of substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who committed an offense. The
district court granted the motions and reduced the sentence from a statutory minimum
term of 120 months’ imprisonment to ten months of time served. The government
appeals, arguing that the district court improperly relied on factors unrelated to
Eckis’s assistance when it determined the extent of the reduction. We remand for
further explanation and resentencing.

      In September 2020, a grand jury charged Eckis with conspiracy to distribute
500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The statutory minimum punishment for that
offense is 120 months’ imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846.

      A magistrate judge ordered Eckis detained pending trial in October 2020, but
eventually ordered him released on conditions in April 2021. In June 2021, Eckis
proffered a guilty plea to the drug charge pursuant to a plea agreement. The district
court deferred acceptance of Eckis’s guilty plea until sentencing, and continued
Eckis’s pretrial release.

       The probation office prepared a presentence report and recommended a
guideline range of 140 to 175 months’ imprisonment, based on a total offense level
of 29 and a criminal history category V. At sentencing, the parties jointly moved for
a downward variance to a guideline range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment. In
support of the motion for variance, the government cited a mistaken expectation of
the parties in the non-binding plea agreement that the guideline range would be lower
than what the evidence ultimately warranted. The propriety of a variance on that
basis is not before us on appeal. Cf. USSG § 6B1.4, comment.

       The government also moved under USSG § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) to
reduce Eckis’s sentence based on the provision of substantial assistance to the
government in investigating and prosecuting another person involved in drug
trafficking. A motion under § 5K1.1 authorizes the district court to depart below the
applicable advisory guideline range, and a motion under § 3553(e) permits the court

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to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. See Melendez v. United States, 518
U.S. 120, 128-29 (1996). A court may consider only factors relating to the
defendant’s assistance in reducing a sentence below the statutory minimum. United
States v. Johnson, 517 F.3d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 2008).

      The district court held a sentencing hearing in October 2021. The government
asked the court to grant its substantial-assistance motions, and recommended a
reduction of Eckis’s sentence from the statutory minimum of 120 months to 72
months’ imprisonment. Eckis requested a sentence of time served, and spoke with
the district court about his performance on pretrial release, including his
rehabilitation, employment, and sobriety.

       The court then continued the sentencing for six months. The court told Eckis
that “[h]ad I seen you six months ago or a year ago, I would have sentenced you to
federal prison without even losing an ounce of sleep over it.” But at this hearing in
October 2021, the court said, “I want to give you a little more chance to prove to me
and to everybody else that you can indeed live a sober, law-abiding lifestyle.” The
court further stated: “If we come back in six months . . . and you have continued to
do well and you’re doing all the positive things that you’ve been doing to date, then
I’m going to give you a break. I’m not going to send you to federal prison.”

       The district court held a second sentencing hearing in May 2022. The
government reiterated its recommendation that the court should reduce Eckis’s
sentence to 72 months, and suggested to the court that any reduction below the
statutory minimum must be based on Eckis’s assistance. The government explained
that Eckis’s assistance was “slightly better than average,” and recounted that he
participated in a pre-indictment proffer interview that allowed the government to
charge his co-codefendant. Eckis repeated his request for a sentence of time served
based on his assistance, and stated that he had “done everything that the Court has

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asked of him” since the October 2021 hearing. The court asked Eckis about his
conduct on release, including his employment, housing, and recreational activities.

       After calculating an advisory guideline range of 140 to 175 months, the court
varied downward to a range of 120 to 150 months based on “what was contemplated
in the Plea Agreement.” The court determined that Eckis was subject to a ten-year
statutory minimum sentence, and acknowledged that the court could consider only
assistance-related factors in granting a reduction below the statutory minimum.

       The court then reduced Eckis’s sentence to ten months of time served. The
court cited Eckis’s pre-indictment proffer interview that enabled the government to
charge his co-defendant, and observed that “sentencing judges are certainly free to
assess the defendant’s level of cooperation differently than what the government
might recommend.” In commenting on Eckis’s successful performance on pretrial
release, the court stated that “[h]ad I seen Mr. Eckis a year-and-a-half ago, I would
have sent him to federal prison without hesitation.”

       On appeal, the government argues that the district court considered
impermissible factors in determining the extent to which Eckis’s sentence should be
reduced below the statutory minimum. When a district court sentences below a
statutory minimum under § 3553(e), the court “may consider only factors related to
the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government.” United States v. Billue,
576 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2009). The court may not rely on the general sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to reduce a sentence further. Id. at 902-03. “If a
district court imposes a sentence below the statutory minimum in part so as to reflect
the history and characteristics of the defendant, then the court exceeds the limited
authority granted by § 3553(e).” United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

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       The most natural inference from the record is that the district court relied on
factors other than Eckis’s assistance to the government when it reduced the ten-year
statutory minimum to time served. Three aspects of the record lead to this
conclusion. First, at both sentencing hearings, the court said that it would not have
hesitated to sentence Eckis to a term of imprisonment if the sentencing had occurred
in October 2020. Yet there is no indication in the record that the value of Eckis’s
assistance to the government changed after his proffer interview in July 2020, so the
court’s statements suggest that the decision to eschew a term of imprisonment was
based on the defendant’s performance on pretrial release rather than his assistance.
Second, the court said at the October 2021 hearing that it would not sentence Eckis
to prison if he continued to behave well on pretrial release until the next hearing in
May 2022. That the decision about the term of imprisonment apparently turned on
Eckis’s performance on pretrial release for six months suggests that it was not the
degree of the defendant’s assistance that accounted entirely for the reduction from
120 months to time served. Third, the court’s written statement of reasons explains
that the court found “that a sentence of time served is sufficient but not greater than
necessary under the circumstances after a careful consideration of all the factors set
forth in Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.” In light of the previous
comments during the hearings, this written explanation suggests that the court may
impermissibly have blended the “sufficient but not greater than necessary” standard
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) with considerations of Eckis’s substantial assistance under
§ 3553(e). Cf. United States v. Madison, 585 F.3d 412, 413 n.1 (8th Cir. 2009).

       We acknowledge the district court’s statement that it was “fully cognizant” of
the requirement that a reduction below the statutory minimum under § 3553(e) must
be based on assistance alone. But this comment came six months after the court had
assured Eckis on the record that he would not go to prison if he performed well on
pretrial release. That assurance was appropriate under § 3553(e) only if the full
reduction was tethered to Eckis’s substantial assistance, but the discussion at the first
hearing focused on whether Eckis could prove his ability to live “a sober, law-abiding

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lifestyle.” Although a court may consider factors other than assistance in deciding
whether to limit a reduction that would otherwise be justified by assistance, United
States v. Rublee, 655 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2011), the record here suggests that
considerations other than substantial assistance may have influenced the court’s
decision to grant a ninety-percent reduction from the statutory minimum. The court’s
brief discussion of Eckis’s cooperation does not elucidate why the court believed that
his assistance warranted the sizeable reduction that was awarded. Therefore, given
the lack of clarity about the basis for the reduction, we vacate the sentence and
remand for further explanation and resentencing. See United States v. Peterson, 455
F.3d 834, 837-38 (8th Cir. 2006).

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

       The court remands this case for “further explanation,” and I concur because I
see no harm in doing so. But I write separately because it is worth providing a bit
more context to the district court’s comments. At the October 2021 hearing, the
government lodged no objection when the district court said it was going to continue
the hearing for six months to “give [Eckis] a little more chance to prove . . . that [he]
can indeed live a sober, law-abiding lifestyle.” See Rublee, 655 F.3d at 839 (holding
that a sentencing court may limit a substantial assistance reduction based on factors
unrelated to substantial assistance). It would not be unreasonable for the district
court, and Eckis, to have understood the government’s position to be that a time-
served sentence was acceptable, so long as Eckis did not engage in conduct in the
ensuing six months that would warrant “limiting” the extent of the substantial
assistance reduction he was to receive. See id. Yet, even though Eckis did not
engage in such conduct, the government changed tack and, at the May 2022 hearing,
challenged the time-served sentence and raised concerns for the first time about the
possibility that the district court was considering non-assistance-related factors in
sentencing Eckis.

                                          -6-
       Against this backdrop, the district court expressly stated that it was “only
allowed to consider sentencing factors under [§] 5K1.1” in reducing the sentence
below the statutory minimum. And in accordance with that statement, the district
court weighed Eckis’s substantial assistance. The reduction was substantially lower
than what the government recommended, but the court explained that it simply saw
“the level of cooperation differently than the federal government in this case.” The
district court emphasized that it was “fully cognizant of the fact that [it is] not allowed
to consider the [§] 3553(a) factors in determining a sentence that falls below the
mandatory minimum,” and I would take the court at its word. See United States v.
Trung Dang, 907 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting that this court presumes “that
district judges know the law, especially when it comes to clear rules in the area of
criminal sentencing” (quotations and citation omitted)); United States v. Gant, 663
F.3d 1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We presume that district judges know the law and
apply it when making their decisions.”).
                       ______________________________

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