Court Opinion

ID: 9834040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:15:13.248478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.155893
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We have been surprised by the argument of appellees on rehearing. They agree that the effect of the answer that failure to inspect was the proximate cause of the injury is that the jury found that an inspection would have resulted in actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the stove, and-that, with such actual knowledge, appellant would either have relieved it or have given warning thereof. But they contend that there was no finding of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, of the stove in the answer to special issue No. 2. It is urged that a- finding of actual knowledge of the presence of water or other explosives in the stove was not a finding of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition thereof. It is assumed that, perhaps, the jury thought Mrs. Gibbs was not acquainted with the laws of physics, and that, although she might have known that water was in the stove, a finding that the company, through her, knew such facts, was not tantamount to a finding of knowledge of the dangerous condition. This argument pursued to its conclusion would be that the gas company was guilty of negligence in employing an incompetent saleswoman and placing her in charge of its salesroom. No such ground of negligence was pleaded or submitted to the jury, and the judgment can certainly not be affirmed on that theory. It may be that the theory now advanced is the one which should have been pleaded and submitted. That was the basis of recovery in Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Davis, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 508, 60 S. W. 453. But that question is not before us.
The theory of appellees presented in their motion for rehearing, that there was no finding of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the stove, is in direct conflict with the theory upon which the case was pleaded ; it is in conflict with the theory upon which it was tried; and is expressly refuted many times in their own briefs filed in this court. In their petition upon which they went to trial they specifically alleged in paragraph No. 9 that the defendant knew of the facts that constituted said stove an inherently dangerous instrument, and predicated a theory of liability thereon in that, with such knowledge, it failed to warn. The theory of liability by failure to inspect was pleaded in the alternative only. The court did not submit the issues alternatively, and therein lies the trouble in arriving at any theory of liability here that is not contradicted by some finding of the jury.-
In their brief filed in this court, on page 2 •thereof, they epitomize their petition under seven headings, the third of which is: “Defendant knew the facts that constituted the stove dangerous or at least was in possession of such facts as to estop it to deny knowledge.” The brief contains thirteen counter propositions, the first of which reads as follows: “The jury having found that the stove in the condition in which it was sold and. delivered by defendant was imminently dangerous to persons coming in contact therewith when used for the purpose it was intended, and that such condition was known to the defendant, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have been known, the defendant was liable to plaintiffs, even though the deceased *372was not in privity of contract with the defendant.”
Other propositions contain the assertion that the jury found that the dangerous condition of the instrument was known to the defendant. The opening, page of the argument in this brief states that appellees pleaded and proved, and the court submitted, this case on three theories. The first theory stated is: “That where the vendor of an article has actual knowledge of its defective condition, rendering it highly and imminently dangerous, and gives no warning to the purchaser, he is liable to third persons for injuries therefrom, even though thpy are not in privity with him.”
From the next page of this brief we copy the following paragraph: “However, the statement just made of the general rule is not entirely accurate, as a seller has ever been held liable to a third person, not only where the article sold is inherently dangerous, but also where it was designed to preserve, destroy or affect human life, or where the seller had actual knowledge of the defect and gave no writing of it." (Italics by appellees.)
The same argument is reiterated in other language on page 18 of the brief, from which we quote:
“In the case at bar the jury found that the water was in the wall of the stove, and that the defendant actually knew it, and that defendant closed the holes, which rendered the stove imminently dangerous to one coming in contact therewith (and who can doubt the justice of the last finding?)
“Under this unattacked finding of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, and failure to warn, we are not relegated to the modern doctrine, but can plant our colors with confidence on the ancient doctrine stated in Harvard Law Review, and recognized in the decisions cited in appellant’s brief, that knowledge of the dangerous condition without warning renders the seller liable to third persons.” (Italics by appellees.)
The first two issues contained in the court’s charge, each of which the jury answered, “Tes,” are as follows:
“Special Issue No. 1: Was there water or other explosive substance within and between the walls of said stove at th.e time it was sold and delivered that when confined and heated would become explosive?
“Special Issue No. 2: Did defendant, Stamford & Western Gas Company, have knowledge through its agents, servants and employees acting in the scope or apparent scope of their authority that water or other explosive substance when confined and heated was in said stove at the time of the sale and delivery thereof?”
We are now urged to disregard these findings as findings of actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of this stove, notwithstanding the pleading upon which the case was tried, and notwithstanding the construction which appellees have heretofore placed upon these findings. We are unable so to construe these issues. We do not think the jury, meant to find, or did find, in answer thereto, merely that Mrs. .Gibbs, saleslady, knew that water was in the stove, but did not know that its presence rendered same dangerous. No such theory was pleaded or has been heretofore asserted.
It is also urged that we are in conflict with the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals at Waco in Perez v. H. & T. C. Ry. Co., 5 S.W.(2d) 782. We can see no conflict at all between the decisions in the two cases. That case decided the same question which we decided in Lanius v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co., 7 S.W.(2d) 1099.
The least that can be said of the rights of a defendant in a damage suit is that, before he is compelled to pay money to the plaintiff on findings of the jury, he must know of what wrong he has been convicted. This to us seems elementary, and it certainly is in agreement with very many decisions in this state. The finding that failure to inspect was the proximate cause of the injury is, in effect, a finding that appellant had no actual knowledge of the dangerous condition of the stove. We cannot reconcile that finding with the findings that it had actual knowledge of the presence of water between the walls; that it failed to warn; and that its failure to warn was negligence, which was the proximate cause of the injury.
We failed to state in our original opinion that the cause is remanded for another trial between appellant and appellees only. The judgment in favor of- Mrs. Gibbs is not before us, and that portion of the judgment below will not be disturbed.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.