Court Opinion

ID: 7941983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 23:15:56.469837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:33:45.856894
License: Public Domain

Moore, J.
(dissenting in part). As stated by Justice Montgomery, the authorities are not agreed as to whether the indictment charges an offense known to the laws of this State, nor are they agreed 'as to the admissibility of the telegrams without first showing that Mr. Hammond sent them. I agree with him that the weight of authority and the better reasoning sustain his disposition of these two questions; but I cannot agree with him in his conclusion that the argument of the prosecuting officer was not harmful. The record discloses the following:
*430“Now, speaking of the telegrams, I want to call your attention — and I should not call your attention to this fact if it had not been for the gentleman who represents the defendant in this case making the assertion. He says that those men took the stand, and testified to the substantial contents of those telegrams. He said he should argue to you that there was no use disputing it, because he said they alone and God are the only ones who know what was in the telegrams; they and God alone are the only ones that know. My brother forgot his client, whom it is alleged the telegrams were sent to, and who it was alleged sent one of them.
“'Mr. Zimmermann: I take an exception to that remark.
“Mr. Humphrey: I am simply answering the argument he made, which is not a true statement of the evidence in the case, and the jury know to the contrary, and know that the argument made by the gentleman is not true.
‘ ‘ Mr. Gordon: I desire to enter a formal exception to the argument of counsel, who are stating that some one besides the witness and God Almighty knows about the telegrams, and calling the attention of the jury to the fact that my client, the defendant, possibly does, and presuming his guilt; and I take an exception to the remark of counsel.
“Mr. Humphrey: If I said any such thing, I have simply said it in answer to their argument when they say that these men and God Almighty are the only ones that know the contents of that telegram; that if the evidence is true, and those telegrams were sent, there is another man knows.”
The plea of not guilty interposed by defendant made it the duty of the people to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is difficult to see how this could be done in this case without showing by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. .Hammond wrote and sent the telegrams. His plea denied that he had done so. The argument of the counsel is based entirely upon the assumption that Mr. Hammond had knowledge of these telegrams, and the only possible purpose of making the statement was to call the attention of the jury to that fact, and that Mr. Ham*431mond did not state what he knew about it, and that he would do so if the inference drawn by the counsel from the evidence offered on the part of the people was not true. The circuit judge did not at once say the argument of counsel was contrary to the provisions of the statute, but left the effect of the argument with the jury until he gave them his charge. The statute (3 Comp. Laws, § 10211) which authorizes one accused of crime to be a witness has this proviso:
“Provided, however, that a defendant in any criminal case or proceeding shall only at his own request be deemed a competent witness, and his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor shall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such neglect.”
This language is not ambiguous. The argument of counsel is not excusable, upon the ground that his zeal has led him to draw inferences from the testimony not warranted by it, the effect of which has been at once corrected by the circuit judge, but it called the attention of the jury to the fact that accused was not sworn, and the statute says this shall not be permitted. The mischief done to the accused in the minds of the jurors by such an argument cannot be repaired by giving a written request to charge, any more than you can cure the effect of throwing into the air a handful of thistle down by attempting to pick up the seeds. I do not see how the case can be distinguished from the recent case of People v. Payne, 131 Mich. 474 (91 N. W. 739).
For the reason stated, the verdict should be set aside, and a new trial ordered.