Court Opinion

ID: 9430861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:45.657812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:26.201732
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Rehnquist,
with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting.
In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), this Court made clear that, where Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal funds, “it must do so unambiguously.” Id., at 17. This principle applies with full force to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which Congress limited in scope to “those who actually ‘receive’ federal financial assistance.” United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U. S. 597, 605 (1986). Yet, the Court today ignores this principle, resting its holding on its own sense of fairness and implied support from the Act. Ante, at 282-286. Such an approach, I believe, is foreclosed not only by Pennhurst, but also by our prior decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act.
Our decision in Pennhurst was premised on the view that federal legislation imposing obligations only on recipients of *290federal funds is “much in the nature of a contract.” 451 U. S., at 17. See also Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 204, n. 26 (1982). As we have stated in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, “ ‘Congress apparently determined it would require . . . grantees to bear the costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for the receipt of federal funds.”’ United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, supra, at 605, quoting Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, 465 U. S. 624, 633, n. 13 (1984). The legitimacy of this quid pro quo rests on whether recipients of federal funds voluntarily and knowingly accept the terms of the exchange. Pennhurst, supra, at 17. There can be no knowing acceptance unless Congress speaks “with a clear voice” in identifying the conditions attached to the receipt of funds. 451 U. S., at 17.
The requirement that Congress unambiguously express conditions imposed on federal moneys is particularly compelling in cases such as this where there exists longstanding state and federal regulation of the subject matter. From as early as 1796, Congress has legislated directly in the area of contagious diseases.1 Congress has also, however, left significant leeway to the States, which have enacted a myriad of public health statutes designed to protect against the introduction and spread of contagious diseases.2 When faced *291with such extensive regulation, this Court has declined to read the Rehabilitation Act expansively. See Bowen v. American Hospital Assn., 476 U. S. 610, 642-647 (1986); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287, 303, 307 (1985). Absent an expression of intent to the contrary, “Congress . . . ‘will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.’” Bowen v. American Hospital Assn., supra, at 644, quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971).
Applying these principles, I conclude that the Rehabilitation Act cannot be read to support the result reached by the Court. The record in this case leaves no doubt that Arline was discharged because of the contagious nature of tuberculosis, and not because of any diminished physical or mental capabilities resulting from her condition.3 Thus, in the language of §504, the central question here is whether discrimination on the basis of contagiousness constitutes discrimination “by reason of . . . handicap.” Because the language of the Act, regulations, and legislative history are *292silent on this issue,4 the principles outlined above compel the conclusion that contagiousness is not a handicap within the meaning of § 504. It is therefore clear that the protections of the Act do not extend to individuals such as Arline.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court never questions that Arline was discharged because of the threat her condition posed to others. Instead, it posits that the contagious effects of a disease cannot be “meaningfully” distinguished from the disease’s effect on a claimant under the Act. Ante, at 282. To support this position, the Court observes that Congress intended to extend the Act’s protections to individuals who have a condition that does not impair their mental and physical capabilities, but limits their major life activities because of the adverse reactions of others. This congressional recognition of a handicap resulting from the reactions of others, we are told, reveals that Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act to regulate discrimination on the basis of contagiousness. Ante, at 284.
This analysis misses the mark in several respects. To begin with, Congress’ recognition that an individual may be handicapped under the Act solely by reason of the reactions of others in no way demonstrates that, for the purposes of interpreting the Act, the reactions of others to the condition cannot be considered separately from the effect of the condition on the claimant. In addition, the Court provides no basis for extending the Act’s generalized coverage of individuals suffering discrimination as a result of the reactions of others to coverage of individuals with contagious diseases. Although citing examples of handicapped individuals described in the regulations and legislative history, the Court points to nothing in these materials suggesting that Congress contemplated that a person with a condition posing a threat to the health of others may be considered handicapped under *293the Act.5 Even in an ordinary case of statutory construction, such meager proof of congressional intent would not be determinative. The Court’s evidence, therefore, could not possibly provide the basis for “knowing acceptance” by such entities as the Nassau County School Board that their receipt of federal funds is conditioned on Rehabilitation Act regulation of public health issues. Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17.
In Alexander v. Choate, supra, at 299, this Court stated that “[a]ny interpretation of § 504 must... be responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations — the need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within manageable bounds.” The Court has wholly disregarded this admonition here.

See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§243, 264; Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474; see generally Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens from Communicable Diseases, 47 U. Cin. L. Rev. 537 (1978).

 The coverage of state statutes regulating contagious diseases is broad, addressing, inter alia, reporting requirements, quarantines, denial of marriage licenses based on the presence of certain diseases, compulsory immunization, and certification and medical testing requirements for school employees. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36.621 et seq. (1986) (reporting requirements); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 19a-207, 19a-221 (1985) (quarantines); Fla. Stat. §§ 741.051-741.055 (1985) (marriage licenses); Mass. Gen. Laws §71:55B (1984) (certification requirements for school employees); Miss. *291Code Ann. § 37-7-301(i) (Supp. 1986) (compulsory immunization of school students); W. Va. Code § 16-3-4a (1985) (medical testing).

 In testifying concerning his reasons for recommending Arline’s termination, petitioner Craig Marsh, Superintendent of Schools of Nassau County, Florida, stated that “I felt like that for the benefit of the total student population and . . . personnel in Nassau County and the public benefit, that it would be best if — not to continue or offer Mrs. Arline any employment.” App. 62. Marsh added:
“I am charged and so is the school board, with the responsibility for the protecting, the safety, health and welfare of students, every student in Nassau County. And the record clearly states that, you know, after all-after the third time that I had knowledge of Mrs. Arline’s recurring condition, which was infectious at the time of each reoccurrence, that I felt like it [was] in the best interest of the school system of Nassau County that she be dismissed from the classroom.” Id., at 81.
Before Arline’s termination, Marsh consulted with Dr. Marianne Mc-Euen, who testified that she recommended the termination because of the threat that Arline’s condition posed to the health of the small children with whom Arline was in constant contact. Id., at 12-17.

 See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. §701 et seq.; 46 CFR pt. 84 (1985); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1149 (1978); S. Rep. No. 95-890 (1978); S. Rep. No. 93-1297 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-244 (1973); S. Rep. No. 93-318 (1973).

 In fact, two of the examples cited by the Court may be read to support a contrary conclusion. The 1978 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, cited by the majority, ante, at 285, n. 14, specifically exclude from the definition of a handicapped person alcoholics and drug abusers that “constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.” 29 U. S. C. § 706(7)(B) (emphasis added). If anything, this exclusion evinces congressional intent to avoid the Act’s interference with public health and safety concerns. See Oversight Hearings on Rehabilitation Act of 1973 before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 503 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (“Congress needs to give thoughtful and wide-ranging consideration to the needs of handicapped persons, balanced against the realities of public safety, economics, and commonsense”). This intent is also present in the statements of Representative Vanik relied on by the Court. See ante, at 283, n. 9. Representative Vanik expressed apparent disapproval of a court ruling that “ ‘a cerebral palsied child, who was not a physical threat and was academically competitive, should be excluded from public school, because his teacher claimed his physical appearance “produced a nauseating effect” on his classmates.’” Ante, at 283, n. 9, quoting 117 Cong. Ree. 45974 (1971) (emphasis added).