Court Opinion

ID: 9730539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:15:06.66672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.301940
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that appellant’s decision to withdraw his post-verdict motions was not knowing and intelligent and therefore remands to the trial court for the filing of new post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. In so doing, the majority reaches and decides an issue not properly before the Court. Hence this dissent.
*152The only Issue briefed and presented to this Court in the present appeal is whether counsel for appellant should be allowed to withdraw from the case. All other issues have been waived by the failure to file post-trial motions. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). The majority nonetheless concludes that appellant’s withdrawal of his post-trial motions was invalid. That issue was never presented to this Court and we should not endeavor to reach such an issue.1 Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975).
I would affirm the judgments of sentence.2 Should appellant wish to attack the validity of the withdrawal of his post-trial motions, he may do so by way of collateral relief.3 See the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. 1580 (1965), § 1 et seq. 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq.; Commonwealth v. Tunnell, 463 Pa. 462, 345 A.2d 611 (1975).
EAGEN, C. J., and LARSEN, J., join in this opinion.

. It is true that at one point in appellant’s brief, while stating that no grounds for appeal exist (because of the withdrawal of the post-trial motions), counsel does state that he might argue that the appellant did not intelligently withdraw his motions. Counsel’s basis for such a claim would not be' the invalidity of the colloquy supporting the withdrawal, but rather a theory that appellant lacked the capacity to withdraw his motions because he was a “schizophrenic reaction-latent type.” There is, however, no support in the record for such an argument. Moreover, counsel concedes that appellant was “aware of what he was doing and that withdrawing the motion for a new trial was what he desired.” Appellant’s Brief at p. 8. Accordingly, I see no ground upon which to conclude that the issue addressed by the majority — the sufficiency of the waiver colloquy — was at any time placed before this Court.

. Because our affirmance of appellant’s conviction would serve to terminate his right of direct appeal, the duties of appellate counsel would likewise be terminated. I therefore see no reason to pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw; appellant retains his right to seek appointment of new counsel should he pursue collateral relief.

. Since appellant’s trial counsel also served as appellate counsel, appellant may still argue ineffectiveness of counsel as an extraordinary circumstance justifying his failure to raise the validity of the withdrawal of post-trial motions on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975). Compare Commonwealth v. Tunnell, supra.