Court Opinion

ID: 9444702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:09:26.876119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:58.437684
License: Public Domain

FINNEGAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
We are asked to review a final judgment rendered below, August 9,1954, discharging relator Touhy from further imprisonment and detention “by reason of the writ issued by the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois * * * and the writ issued by the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois * * Though I approve reversing this judgment I think it imperative to face up to the reasoning embodied in the district judge’s memorandum. He applied certain legal principles, arriving at conclusions and findings with which I now disagree. But his final judgment, formidable intellectual enterprise that it is, is an end-product of arduous thoughtful labors deserving, at least by way of courtesy, some detailed discussion demonstrating the basis for reversal. Of paramount importance is that relator also be fully advised of the basis for striking down those considered reasons which led to his release below. After all this is a writ of habeas corpus with which we treat and I am loath to avoid, rather than meet head-on, some of the problems posed! by relator’s appeal. Long ago Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for a majority in Ex parte Tom Tong, 1883, 108 U.S. 556, 559, 2.S.Ct 871, 872, 27 L.Ed. 826 pointed out that:
“The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty. * * * the judicial proceeding under it is not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into the right to liberty notwithstanding the act. Proceedings to enforce civil rights are civil proceedings * *
Relator has invoked various remedies at different intervals since his two convictions. On first blush they present a startling array when tabulated yet in *618none of them did he challenge the constitutionality of Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 38, part. 228, § 92:
1934 Feb. 24. Relator sentenced by the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Cause No. 71236.
1935 May 15. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied for want of jurisdiction by the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois (T.R. 349).
1935 June 14. Conviction for kidnapping affirmed by Illinois Supreme Court on Writ of Error. Rehearing denied October 2, 1935; People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849. This opinion contains a lengthy recital of facts. Relator did not sue out a writ of certiorari from the U. S. Supreme Court to review People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849.
1938 Feb. 18. Habeas Corpus dismissed without opinion by Illinois Supreme Court. Touhy v. Ragen, No. 24616.
1938 Mar. 28. Certiorari sought to review denial of Habeas Corpus No. 24616, dismissed, without opinion by U. S. Supreme Court, Touhy v. Ragen, 1938, 303 U.S. 657, 58 S.Ct. 760, 82 L.Ed. 1116.
1942 Dec. 31. Eleanor Touhy filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus against a special agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Apparently this petition was filed while Touhy was held by Federal officers after his escape from the Illinois penitentiary.” (T.R. 350).
1943 Sept. 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus dismissed by Barnes, district judge, for failure to exhaust state remedies.
1943 Nov. 30. Relator sentenced by the Circuit Court, of Will County, Illinois, for the crime of aiding a prisoner to escape from the penitentiary.
1944 Mar. 15. Petition for Writ of error Coram Nobis (No. C.N. 41) filed in Criminal Court of Cook County, Ill., denied.
1945 Mar. Petition (No. 105-518 497-19) for writ of habeas corpus dismissed by Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois for want of jurisdiction. Relator challenged detention under both writs, i. e., kidnapping and escape.
1945 Mar. 27. Petition for writ of habeas corpus, for release from both convictions, denied by the U. S. District Court for failure to exhaust State court remedies (T.R. 351).
1945 June 8. Petition (No. 29479) for writ of habeas corpus denied by the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois (T.R. 35).
1946 Oct. 24. State trial court dismissed Coram Nobis, Doc. No. C.N. 72, on grounds that 5 year period of limitations had expired. People’s plea in bar and demurrer sustained.
1947 Mar. 19. Coram Nobis dismissal affirmed by Illinois Supreme Court; Rehearing denied May 19, 1947. People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827, holding that expiration of 5 year period barred use of Coram Nobis.
[In its opinion (397 Ill. 28, 72 N.E.2d 832) the Illinois Supreme Court noted: “This court, in 1934, thoroughly reviewed the record upon the writ of error sued out of this court to the criminal court of Cook county seeking a reversal of the judgment of conviction on the charge of kidnapping John Factor. People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849. In 1938, we carefully considered the petition for habeas corpus (People ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, No. 24616,) and the Supreme Court of the United States denied a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking a further review. Touhy v. Ragen, 303 U.S. 657, 58 S.Ct. 760, 82 L.Ed. 1116.”]
1947 Oct. 20. Certiorari denied, without opinion, by the U. S. Supreme Court. Attempted review of State Supreme Court affirmance of Coram Nobis decision. Touhy v. Illinois, 1947, 332 U.S. 791, 68 S.Ct. 99, 92 L.Ed. 372.
1948 Apr. 2. Relator’s petition filed below (48C-448) leading to judgment under review here.
1948 June 14. Petition (Nos. 109-465 52230) for writ of habeas corpus dismissed by the Circuit Court of Will *619County, Illinois, for want of jurisdiction.
1948 Oct. 11. Petition for certiorari to obtain review of Will County court’s dismissal of petition (Nos. 109-465 522-30) for habeas corpus denied by U. S. Supreme Court. Touhy v. Ragen, 1948, 335 U.S. 831, 69 S.Ct. 16, 93 L.Ed. 384.
1949 Aug. 4. Effective date of the Illinois Post Conviction Remedies Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, pars. 826-832.
1949 Dec. 12. Cause below continued generally to afford relator opportunity to invoke Illinois Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
1950 Dec. 11. State trial court dismissed Relator’s petition filed under Ill. Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
1951 May 24. Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed petition for writ of error in the Post-Conviction Hearing matter.
1952 Jan. 2. U. S. Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois on the Post-Conviction petition. Touhy v. State of Illinois, 1952, 342 U.S. 905, 72 S.Ct. 297, 96 L.Ed. 678.
1954 Aug. 9. Final judgment, appealed here, was entered below.
Faced with these persistent efforts by relator, the district judge literally framed this issue for himself to answer (Memo, 353): “The first question that presents itself is, Has the Relator exhausted his State court remedies with respect to each of the two writs under which he is held in the Illinois State penitentiary” ?; then found:
“Even after the writ was issued here and this case partially heard, the case was continued generally to permit Relator to exhaust the newly created remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act of the State of Illinois. That was done as to the imprisonment under the conviction for kidnapping for ransom by a proceeding No. PC43, filed in the Criminal Court of Cook County in December, 1949, amended October 23, 1950, denied without a hearing December 13, 1951, writ of error denied by the Supreme Court of Illinois June 26, 1951, petition for cer-tiorari denied by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 3, 1952, Touhy v. [State of] Illinois, 342 U.S. 905 [72 S.Ct. 297, 96 L.Ed. 678]. Concerning the sentence for aiding a prisoner to escape, counsel for the Relator in their reply brief say:
“ ‘Relator did not use the Post-Conviction Hearing Act with respect to this second sentence because his counsel, in the light of the Novotny case, believed this to be unnecessary. Actually the time limit for a proceeding under this Act expired in August 1952 (3 years after the adoption of the Act) and the remedy is consequently not available, in any event.’
“Since the trial of this case and since the court has studied the three cases in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, the four cases in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, the three cases in the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the three cases in the Supreme Court of the United States which antedated Touhy v. [State of] Illinois, 342 U. S. 905 [72 S.Ct. 297, 96 L.Ed. 678], and which, like it, must be regarded as a continuation of State court proceedings, the court has come to the conclusion that the Relator had already exhausted his State court remedies when on December 12, 1949 this cause was continued generally and that the proceedings which culminated in the decision noted in Touhy v. [State of] Illinois, 342 U. S. 905 [72 S.Ct. 297, 96 L.Ed. 678], was unnecessary and that the resultant delay was, of course, unnecessary. The court is now of the opinion that the proceeding filed in the Supreme Court of Illinois on February 15, 1938, and which finally *620resulted in the action noted in Touhy v. Ragen, 1938, 303 U.S. 657 [58 S.Ct. 760, 82 L.Ed. 1116], exhausted the Relator’s State court remedies with respect to the Relator’s imprisonment for kidnapping for ransom.
“The court is further of the opinion that if the Relator had not already exhausted his State court remedies with respect to his imprisonment for the crime of kidnapping for ransom, then the proceeding which was filed in the Criminal Court of Cook County on August 10, 1946, which resulted in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois of People v. Touhy, 1947, 397 Ill. 19 [72 N.E.2d 827], and the action of the Supreme Court of the United States noted in Touhy v. Illinois, 1947, 332 U.S. 791 [68 S.Ct. 99, 92 L.Ed. 372], Aid exhaust the Relator’s State court remedies.
“It has been noted that on June 14, 1948, Touhy filed in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein he complained of his detention under the two writs, one for kidnapping for ransom and one for aiding an escape; that this petition was denied by the Circuit Judge on July 14, 1948 for lack of jurisdiction; and that a petition to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari was denied on October 11, 1948. Touhy v. Ragen, Warden, 335 U.S. 831 [69 S.Ct. 16, 93 L.Ed. 384]. The Court has been and is of the opinion that Touhy thereby sufficiently exhausted his State court remedies in respect of both sentences of imprisonment to require this Court to entertain the present petition for habeas corpus. Respondent contends, however, that Relator, by failing to seek appellate review by writ of error in the Illinois Supreme Court of his judgment of conviction for aiding an escape, has failed to exhaust his State court remedies in respect of that conviction.” (Italics supplied.)
It was at that juncture that the court below concluded relator had “sufficiently exhausted his State court remedies in respect of both sentences of imprisonment to require this Court to entertain the present petition for habeas corpus.” The nub of this finding lies in the district judge’s reasoning from Wade v. Mayo, 1948, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647 to Darr v. Burford, 1950, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761. For he thought, and so stated, that the Wade case was not overruled by Darr. This latter decision was rendered by a divided court. Mr. Justice Reed delivered the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision, Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Clark joined concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Black and Jackson joined. The trial judge’s evaluation of Darr was quite understandable when I found this passage in Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s dissent to the Darr majority, 339 U.S. at page 221, 70 S.Ct. at page 599:
“The real question before us in this case is whether Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647, should be overruled. Whether this overruling is to be done forthrightly by two words saying the case ‘is overruled’ or the overruling is euphemistically done by fifteen words hardly changes the fact. Respect for an explicit adjudication on a matter of procedure very recently rendered after the fullest consideration, as well as the soundness of the decision, should lead us to adhere to Wade v. Mayo.”
On close examination of relator’s contentions presented in connection with his motion for habeas corpus filed April 28, 1945, in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois (as No. 105-518 49719) it appears that he challenged the legality of his detention for conviction under the *621escape statute, so-called, only insofar as the running of his sentence, i. e., concurrently or consecutively. There is one other flat allegation, made there, viz.: “That the sentence is illegal and without effect.” (T.R. 262.) Nothing in the record, filed in our court, discloses any attempt, by relator, to have that Will County circuit court’s decision (No. 497-19) reviewed, after dismissing relator’s petition.
From my study of relator’s subsequent motion for habeas corpus filed in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, June 14, 1948 (Law No. 52230; T.R. 269, 309) it appears he asserted “* * * That the Subsequent Conviction and Sentence Are Void, Having Been Entered Contrary to the Law of the State of Illinois.” His argument focused upon the Illinois statutory provision concerning escape, Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, c. 38, par. 228, § 92, and pivoted on the theory relator’s conviction “could not have occurred without the illegal prior (kidnapping) conviction” (T.R. 310-311) and that his sentence, for the second conviction, was illegal since it was concurrent rather than consecutive. But I find relator omitted any mention of the constitutionality of Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 38, par. 228, § 92. All this goes further because after the Will County court dismissed, June 14,1948, relator’s petition he sought a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied October 11, 1948, Touhy v. Ragen, 1948, 335 U.S. 831, 69 S.Ct. 16, 93 L.Ed. 384. What is significant about all the remedies utilized since 1943 by relator, save the one we are now reviewing, is that from the moment of his conviction November 30, 1943 for aiding the escape of a fellow prisoner (T.R. 348), relator has never put into issue, nor raised any point, concerning the validity of the statutory section which the district judge held (T.R. 760-761) “* * violative of the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”
Actually, then, I think the court below could not or should not have reached the merits, as it did, underlying the crime of kidnapping for ransom, as long as relator was incarcerated on one valid sentence — or, one that was invulnerable to an attack on federal grounds. McNally v. Hill, 1934, 293 U.S. 131, 134, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238; United States ex rel. Parker v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 792. Even assuming, arguendo that People v. Nicholson, 1948, 401 Ill. 546, 82 N.E.2d 656, sustaining the validity of the State criminal provision imposing penalties for aiding escape, was only persuasive in a federal court, there are two other phases of this problem: (i) waiver of the constitutional question and, (ii) avoidance of ruling on a constitutional question when a case can be disposed of on other grounds. Parenthetically, I also note, that because relator might be deemed to have waived his constitutional points through inaction it cannot now be said that a writ of error is futile, hence unnecessary. Quite the contrary that is the remedy open to relator and we cannot, any more than relator, anticipate the possible disposition by the Illinois Supreme Court. Yakus v. United States, 1944, 321 U.S. 414, 435, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834.
Regardless of the certiorari problem stimulated by Brown v. Allen, 1953, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469, it is important to note that when certiorari was denied in the Will County habeas corpus No. 52230 that original motion contained no issue of constitutionality of the belatedly challenged Illinois Statute. I find it exceedingly difficult to perceive how a prisoner can be held to have exhausted his state remedies when he has failed to put in issue the very question he uses for asserting a claim to freedom in a federal court. The Illinois Supreme Court has, as yet, never had the opportunity to squarely pass upon the validity of Touhy’s detention under Ill.Rev.Stat.1947 (or now 1953), chap. 38, par. 228, § 92.
*622Nor do I think Frisbie v. Collins, 1952, 342 U.S. 519, 520, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541, supplies a bridge consisting of a “special situation” to carry relator over the gap created by his failure to exhaust state remedies and waiver. As I have already mentioned, by quoting the memorandum filed below, the district judge continued relator’s case to give him a chance to invoke the Post-Conviction Hearing Act of Illinois, and yet relator refrained from testing his conviction under the Illinois statute concerning escape.
I find it difficult to reconcile the following recitations found in the district judge’s memorandum with any basis for issuing a writ of habeas corpus:
(A) “On December 12, 1949, Respondent filed an amendment to the return stating that the Illinois Legislature had enacted and the Govern- or on August 4, 1949 had approved the so-called Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and that Relator, having failed to exhaust the remedies made available to him by this Act, this court was without jurisdiction. On that date, December 12, 1949, this cause was continued generally. On December 22, 1949, Touhy filed in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, a petition for relief under said Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and on December 11, 1950, that court sustained the State’s motion to dismiss an amended petition and entered an order of dismissal. On May 24,1952, the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed a petition for writ of error in the Post Conviction Hearing Matter. On January 2, 1952, the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois * * *” (T.R. 349).
(B) Later in his memorandum (T.R. 352) referring to this Post-Conviction proceeding the trial judge states: “That was done as to the imprisonment under the conviction for kidnapping for ransom * * *. Concerning the sentence for aiding a prisoner to escape counsel for the Relator in their reply brief say:
“ ‘Relator did not use the Post-Conviction Hearing Act with respect to this second sentence because his counsel, in light of the Novotny case, believed this to be unnecessary. Actually the time limit for a proceeding under this Act expired in August 1952 (3 years after the adoption of the Act) and the remedy is consequently not available, in any event.’ ” (Italics added)
Clearly, the “second sentence” was never subjected to state scrutiny under the Post-Conviction Act. The Act’s effective date did not bar relator from testing his second conviction if he filed in time— as he did his petition involving the kidnapping conviction. People v. Lewis, 1954, 2 Ill.2d 328, 118 N.E.2d 259. If by “Novotny,” relator’s counsel was referring to Judge Evans’ opinion in Novotny v. Ragen, 7 Cir., 1937, 88 F.2d 72 that ease could hardly be used to justify failure to employ a post-conviction remedy provided at the state level and enacted some 12 years later. If I have selected the wrong Novotny case (which I assume is the same one cited in relator’s brief here) it still remains that counsel admits the relator’s second conviction was untested, under Illinois Post-Conviction legislation. I think this, alone, demonstrates failure to exhaust state remedies and consequently precluded any further consideration of the kidnapping conviction, much less allow issuance of the writ.
For all these reasons I think the district judge erroneously discharged relator and erred in overruling respondent’s motion to dismiss relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.