Court Opinion

ID: 9488494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:47:13.705607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:55.374335
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur with the majority’s determination that there exists appellate jurisdiction here, I respectfully dissent as to its holding that only the district court in Florida where seizure took place has jurisdiction to try the ease. The majority’s conclusion on the second point is at war with the existing authority in the few circuits that have addressed the issue, specifically the Second Circuit in United States v. Giovanelli, 998 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.1993), and the Eighth Circuit in Thompson v. Covington, 47 F.3d 974 (8th Cir.1995). Although we are not bound to follow the law of our sister circuits, I find their interpretation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) persuasive. I therefore dissent. We should not push unnecessarily for a conflict among the circuits.
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, I do not find that the language of Rule 41(e) is dispositive of the issue of jurisdiction. Rule 41(e) asserts merely the positive rule that a person aggrieved by an deprivation of property “may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return of the property.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(e) (emphasis added). It in no way therefore mandates the negative rule that such person “may not sue elsewhere.” Thus, at the very least, the language of the rule does not preclude the application of the general principles of ancillary jurisdiction to the case at bar.
Ancillary jurisdiction is afforded in special eases to courts, which would otherwise lack jurisdiction, in order to ensure that a particular case is handled in its entirety by one court and to further the principles of judicial economy. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 740 (D.C.Cir.1969). In particular, ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate where: (1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course of the main proceeding, or is an integral part of the main matter; (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial new fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter would not deprive a party of a substantial procedural or substantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter can be settled to protect the integrity of the main proceeding or to ensure that the disposition in the main proceeding will not be frustrated. Id. The application of those principles to the instant case suggests that ancillary jurisdiction would be appropriate here in light of the fact that all of the other aspects of the government’s case against Garcia were handled by the district court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Additionally, the majority’s interpretation of Rule 41(e) would be most unfortunate in any of the numerous cases in which the unlawful seizure of property occurs in several districts rather than in one district. (There are other districts in North Carolina than the Eastern District of North Carolina and more than 50 throughout the other United States.) Indeed, under the majority’s interpretation of the rule, persons whose property has been seized in several districts would be forced to file separate post-trial motions for return of property in each of the individual districts in which seizure occurred rather than in the one district (here, the Eastern District of North Carolina) in which the individual was tried. The basic principles of judicial economy suggest that such an outcome would be regrettable and unduly burdensome.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent as to the majority’s finding that jurisdiction would be appropriate only in the district in which the seizure of property occurred even when the trial took place in another district.