Court Opinion

ID: 9898408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:30.439919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.807880
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                  No. 84018-5-I
 In the Matter of:
                                                  DIVISION ONE
 the Postsentence Review of:
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 ARTHUR SEAN LONGWORTH,

                             Respondent.

       DÍAZ, J. — In 1986, a court sentenced petitioner to life in prison without the

possibility of parole (LWOP) following his conviction for aggravated murder in the

first degree. He was 20 years old. Following Matter of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305,

307, 482 P.3d 276 (2021), which prohibited LWOP for 19- and 20-year-olds, the

court resentenced Longworth and included a term of community custody. The

Department of Corrections (DOC) asks us to reverse the court’s refusal to strike

that condition, which all parties now agree is appropriate. We agree with DOC,

grant the postsentence petition (PSP), and decline to reach any further issues.

                                 BACKGROUND

       On February 15, 1985, Arthur Longworth killed 25-year-old Cynthia Nelson.

State v. Longworth, 52 Wn. App. 453, 455, 468, 761 P.2d 67 (1988). A jury

convicted Longworth of aggravated murder in the first degree and the trial court

sentenced him to LWOP. Longworth, 52 Wn. App. at 459.
No. 84018-5-I/2

      In 2021, our Supreme Court decided Monschke, which extended the

prohibition against mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders to 19- and 20-year-old

offenders sentenced under RCW 10.95.030. 197 Wn.2d at 306-307. Because

such a sentence was imposed on Longworth when he was 20 years old, 1 he is a

member of the “Monschke class.”

      On February 15 2022, the trial court resentenced Longworth pursuant to

Monschke.     The court imposed a term of 360 months confinement, which

Longworth had already served, and added 60 months of community custody.

Longworth was then released onto community custody.

      Shortly after the imposition of Longworth’s new sentence, DOC contacted

the State and Longworth’s counsel via email, advising that the sentence needed

correction or clarification, and specifically asking the parties to jointly move the

court to strike the condition of community custody because, at the time Longworth

was originally sentenced, aggravated murder in the first degree was ineligible for

community custody. Neither party acted on the email from DOC. DOC then filed

its PSP in the sentencing court to correct the judgment and sentence. At the

hearing on the PSP, the court heard argument from DOC, Longworth, and the

deputy prosecutor on behalf of the State. The court denied the PSP and left the

1 The parties agree Longworth was 20 years old at the time of the offense, though

his birth date is redacted and does not appear in the record.

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condition of community custody in place. DOC then filed this postsentence review

(PSR), 2 to which all parties responded. 3

                                     ANALYSIS

       Inquiries of compliance with the Sentencing Reform Act 4 (SRA) are

questions of law, which we review de novo. In re Combs, 176 Wn. App. 112, 116,

308 P.3d 763 (2013).

       A trial court may only impose a sentence that is authorized by the state

legislature, and this restriction includes sentences with terms of community

custody. Postsentence Review of Leach, 161 Wn.2d 180, 184, 163 P.3d 782

(2007).

       In Leach, the court sentenced Leach to confinement and a term of

community custody for the attempted assault of a child. Id. at 183. The DOC filed

a PSP, arguing the community custody term was improper because, under the

statute Leach was sentenced, “crimes at issue” did not include attempted assault

2 DOC asked this court to stay consideration of the petition until July 1, 2023, in

the event “Monschke-fix” legislation passed during the 2023 legislative session
might have clarified the sentencing court’s authority. This court denied the motion
and requested additional briefing. However, no relevant statutory changes
occurred, and the parties have indicated their readiness to proceed. See Ruling
Den. Stay, Postsentence Petition of Longworth, No. 84018-5-I, at 1, (Wash. Ct.
App. Feb. 17, 2023)
3 On August 25, 2022, Longworth filed a motion for permission to file a reply to the

State's Response. That motion is granted.
4 Ch. 9.94A RCW.

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No. 84018-5-I/4

of a child, but just assault of a child. Id. at 183-184. Our Supreme Court, on de

novo review, held that the plain text of the statute represented an exclusive list of

categories of crime for which community custody could be ordered. Id. at 184-185.

Attempted assault was excluded from that list. Id. at 187. The Court declined to

construe the list more generously because “[t]o do so is a ‘usurpation of legislative

power for its results in destruction of the legislative purpose.’” Id. at 186 (quoting

State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728, 649 P.2d 633 (1982)).

       Longworth committed aggravated murder in the first degree on February

15, 1985. Longworth, 52 Wn. App. at 459. At the time, the SRA did not authorize

community custody for Longworth’s offense, but only for certain non-violent

offenses. Former RCW 9.94A.120(5)-(7) (1984). 5 In other words, at the time of

his original sentence, Longworth was not eligible for community custody under any

of those provisions. Id.

       Moreover, while our Supreme Court has expanded constitutional

protections for youthful offenders, such expansions have not affected the

sentencing structures in place at the time of Longworth’s original sentence. For

example, in State v. Houston-Sconiers, the Court held that “trial courts must

5 An archived version of former RCW 9.94A.120(5)-(7) is available here:

https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/RCWArchive/Documents/1984/1984pt1.pdf. The
statutes in effect before the 1984 amendment to the Sentencing Reform Act are
available here:
https://leg.wa.gov/CodeReviser/RCWArchive/Documents/1983/Vol1.pdf.

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No. 84018-5-I/5

consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to

impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence

enhancements.” 188 Wn.2d 1, 21, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). However, cases later

interpreting Houston-Sconiers have not granted courts authority to impose

community custody unless expressly authorized. See, e.g., State v. Bacon, 190

Wn.2d 458, 467, 415 P.3d 207 (2018) (Houston-Sconiers did not authorize juvenile

courts to suspend dispositions, and that the legislature must authorize such).

      Monschke, and the case upon which it is based, State v. Bassett, 192

Wn.2d 67, 91, 428 P.3d 343 (2018), are similarly silent. Neither grant, even if they

could, the trial court authority to impose community custody. In short, there is no

authority to deviate from our Supreme Court’s holding that the legislature has

retained its sole power to determine when someone may be sentenced to

community custody. Leach, 161 Wn.2d at 187.

      The parties each acknowledge that the new 60-month community custody

term should be stricken, but disagree on the appropriate scope of this court’s

review. 6 In particular, the State asks this court to vacate Longworth’s entire

6  According to the clerk’s minutes (attached as exhibit 5 to the PSP), the
resentencing court stated that it had “absolute discretion” to sentence Longworth
to a term of community custody because it had the underlying authority to sentence
Longworth to life. The court said it would be “unfathomable” to resentence a
defendant, who has been convicted of aggravated murder, to almost immediate
release and no supervision. Again, however, a trial court may only impose a
sentence authorized by this state’s legislature. See, e.g., Leach, 161 Wn.2d at

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No. 84018-5-I/6

sentence and remand this matter for entry of a new sentence that complies with

the current sentencing statutes.

       As DOC notes, it did not assign error to Longworth’s term of confinement in

its PSP.    As Longworth notes, the State had the opportunity to appeal this

sentence, but chose not to do so. They are both correct.

       RCW 9.94A.585(7) creates a unique action to resolve the conundrum DOC

faces when it discovers an error in the judgment and sentence. Sentence of

Chatman, 59 Wn. App. 258, 264, 796 P.2d 755 (1990) (analyzing former RCW

9.94A.210). There is no language in the statute allows the defendant or the State

to file a postsentence petition or, in one filed by DOC, to seek affirmative relief in

response to a postsentence petition.

       Moreover, a party “may not raise a new issue in response to a postsentence

review petition.” Postsentence Review of Bercier, 178 Wn. App. 148, 151, 313

P.3d 491 (2013); see also Wandell v. State, 175 Wn. App. 447, 452-53, 311 P.3d

28 (2013) (refusing to consider a constitutional challenge made in response to a

postsentence petition because the argument was not raised on direct appeal or

collateral attack); RAP 16.18(d)(5) (providing that DOC is to identify the “error of

law at issue.”).

186.

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No. 84018-5-I/7

      Here, DOC limited its postsentence petition to a single legal error

concerning a term of community custody not authorized by statute. We therefore

decline to address the other issues raised by the State that exceed this narrow

issue of whether Longworth’s 60-month term of community custody should stand.

                                CONCLUSION

      We grant the petition and remand for the court to strike the term of

community custody from the judgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR:

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