Court Opinion

ID: 9377528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 07:00:14.890633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.775538
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LENIAL M. BRITE,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-0432-15-0940-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: March 7, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Norman Jackson, Esquire, Lincoln, New Hampshire, for the appellant.

           Paul A. Raaf, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal for unacceptable performance pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     chapter 43. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition
     for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

     office for further adjudication consistent with Santos v. National Aeronautics and
     Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2        On     August   27,   2012,   the   appellant   joined   the    agency   under   a
     career-conditional appointment as an Accountant, GS-0510-07.             Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 5 at 245. In that position, the appellant was expected to progress
     from a GS-07 to a GS-11 over the course of 24 months.                Id. at 119.   After
     successfully completing his first year in the position, the appellant was
     noncompetitively promoted to the GS-09 level. IAF, Tab 39 at 48.
¶3        On August 25, 2014, the appellant was informed that, because he performed
     unacceptably during two rotational assignments, he would not be promoted to the
     GS-11 level. IAF, Tab 5 at 28-29. He also was informed, however, that he would
     be afforded another opportunity to successfully complete his rotational
     assignments. Id. On August 28, 2014, the appellant was placed on a 90-day
     Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Id. at 11-13.
¶4        On February 10, 2015, the appellant’s supervisor determined that the
     appellant performed unacceptably during the PIP period in part because he did not
     successfully complete the Audit Readiness rotation and because he did not
     complete, or submitted incomplete, meeting minutes. Id. at 92-99. The agency
     removed the appellant for unacceptable performance on June 9, 2015. IAF, Tab 4
     at 19-20.
¶5        On appeal to the Board, the appellant alleged that he was wrongfully
     removed and that the agency discriminated against him based on his race, age,
     sex, and in reprisal for a prior complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
     Commission. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. Although the appellant requested a hearing, the
     administrative judge canceled the hearing as a sanction.            IAF, Tab 33.    She
     provided the parties the opportunity to submit additional evidence and argum ent
     before closing the record.         IAF, Tab 34.       On September 2, 2016, the
                                                                                      3

     administrative judge issued an initial decision based on the written record,
     finding that the agency proved its charge of unacceptable performance and that
     the appellant failed to prove his claims of discrimination or retaliation.   IAF,
     Tab 42, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-24.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a
     response, and the appellant has filed a reply to the response. Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4, 6.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         An agency may propose a reduction-in-grade or removal action based on an
     employee’s unacceptable performance in a critical element if it affords him a
     reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance pursuant to
     5 C.F.R. § 432.104 and his performance during or following that opportunity is
     unacceptable in that critical element.       5 C.F.R. § 432.105(a)(1).        The
     administrative judge found that the agency proved by substantial evidence that
     these conditions were satisfied here. ID at 17-18.

     Remand is required in light of recent case law to make findings as to the
     appellant’s performance prior to the implementation of the PIP.
¶8         On review, the appellant argues that his PIP did not meet the requirements
     of 5 C.F.R. § 432.104 because, among other things, he was not told prior to the
     PIP that his performance was unacceptable. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. At the time the
     initial decision was issued, the Board had held that an agency need not prove
     unacceptable performance prior to the PIP. See Wright v. Department of Labor,
     82 M.S.P.R. 186, ¶ 12 (1999); Brown v. Veterans Administration, 44 M.S.P.R.
     635, 640-41 (1990). The administrative judge noted in the initial decision that to
     prevail in a performance-based action under 5 U.S.C. § 4303, the agency was
     required to prove the following by substantial evidence: (1) it took its action
     under a performance appraisal system approved by the Office of Personnel
     Management; (2) the agency had valid performance standards and those
                                                                                              4

     standards, along with the critical elements of the appellant’s position, were
     communicated to the appellant; (3) the appellant’s performance was found to be
     unacceptable in one or more critical elements of his position ; and (4) the agency
     afforded the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve his performance. 2 ID
     at 6.
¶9           However, during the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the
     U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61,
     which held that, in addition to the elements contained in ¶ 8 & n.3, the agency
     also must justify the institution of a PIP by proving by substantial evidence that
     the employee’s performance was unacceptable prior to the PIP.                The Federal
     Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases, including this one,
     regardless of when the events took place. Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. Accordingly, we remand the appeal to give the parties the
     opportunity to present additional evidence as to whether the appellant’s
     performance during the period leading up to the PIP was unacceptable in one or
     more critical elements. See id. On remand, the administrative judge shall accept
     argument and evidence on this issue, and shall hold a supplemental hearing
     limited to this issue if requested. 3 Id., ¶ 17. The administrative judge shall then
     issue a new initial decision consistent with Santos. See id. If the agency makes
     the additional showing required under Santos on remand that the appellant’s
     performance was at an unacceptable level prior to his placement on the PIP, and

     2
       In the initial decision, the administrative judge’s description of the agency’s burden is
     worded differently than the standard set forth in other pre-Santos cases. For example,
     the administrative judge did not expressly include a fifth element, i.e., that an agency
     must show by substantial evidence that the employee’s performan ce remained
     unacceptable in one or more critical elements. Compare ID at 6, with White v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013). Nevertheless, she
     addressed this element in the initial decision. ID at 14-16.
     3
       As discussed infra ¶¶ 13-17, we find that the administrative judge did not abuse her
     discretion in cancelling the hearing as a sanction for failure to comply with Board
     orders. However, we clarify that, if requested, a hearing must be held on remand
     regarding the appellant’s pre-PIP performance.
                                                                                          5

      if the administrative judge also finds that the agency proved all the other elements
      as they existed pre-Santos, she may incorporate her prior findings in the remand
      initial decision.   Regardless of whether the agency meets its burden, if the
      argument or evidence on remand regarding the appellant’s pre-PIP performance
      affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s affirmative defenses
      or any other finding contained in the initial decision, she should address such
      argument or evidence in the remand initial decision.

      The agency demonstrated that it otherwise issued the PIP in accordance with
      applicable law and regulations.
¶10         The appellant further argues that the agency violated 5 C.F.R. § 432.104
      because (1) the PIP did not identify specific examples of his poor performance ;
      (2) he was not informed of what, specifically, he would have to do to meet the
      standards of his position; and (3) he was not offered any assistance to ove rcome
      his deficiencies, such as training, counseling, or extra help from his supervisor.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6.
¶11         First, as the administrative judge found, the PIP identified specific
      examples of the appellant’s unacceptable performance.         ID at 16; IAF, Tab 5
      at 11-12. Second, we find that the agency provided the appellant with adequate
      instructions on how he was to meet the standards of his position through issuance
      of the PIP with its attachments, as well as the PIP counseling memoranda with
      their attachments. IAF, Tab 5 at 11-29, 38-91. Third, we find that the agency
      provided the appellant with adequate assistance to overcome his deficiencies by
      providing him with weekly counseling, which is memorialized in memoranda that
      were issued to him. 4 Id. at 13, 38-91.

      4
        Under 5 C.F.R. § 432.104, “[a]s part of the employee’s opportunity to demonstrate
      acceptable performance, the agency shall offer assistance to the employee in improving
      unacceptable performance.” We find that the agency complied with this requirement.
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      The appellant’s argument that the agency did not provide him the opportunity to
      successfully complete his rotational assignment is unavailing.
¶12        The appellant also argues on review that the agency did not provide him an
      opportunity to successfully complete his assignments, specifically, that he was
      unable to acceptably perform in one of his rotational assig nments because the
      agency cut the rotation short. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. We find that the appellant is
      referring to a rotational assignment that he was required to complete prior to the
      PIP. IAF, Tab 1 at 28. As discussed above, supra ¶¶ 8-9, this appeal must be
      remanded for the administrative judge to make findings as to the appellant’s
      pre-PIP performance. To the extent the appellant is arguing that the agency failed
      to prove that his performance was unacceptable during the PIP period, we
      disagree. E.g., IAF, Tab 5 at 92-99, 243-44, Tab 39 at 54. The decision letter on
      the proposed removal states that the appellant failed to meet the first element of
      his performance standards because he “failed to complete Audit Readiness
      Training in weeks 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Performance Improvement Plan (PIP)
      period and in weeks 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the PIP period [he] did not provide minutes
      of meetings at all or timely.” IAF, Tab 4 at 19-20, Tab 5 at 92-99. Though the
      appellant asserts on review that a performance evaluation covering the PIP period
      noted that he completed the Audit Readiness Training, PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, he
      does not assert that he completed the Audit Readiness Training “in a timely
      manner,” “attended all meetings pertinent” to the rotation, or “prepare[d]
      inclusive, informative and meaningful meeting minutes,” as required by the PIP.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 92. In fact, the performance review that the appellant refers to
      states that the appellant required “several deadline extensions” to complete the
      training and that he “[d]id not consistently provide meeting notes as directed.”
      Id. at 244. Accordingly, we find that the agency proved by substantial evidence
      that the appellant’s performance was deficient during the PIP period.
                                                                                       7

      The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the administrative judge improperly
      canceled his request for a hearing.
¶13        The appellant argues that the administrative judge improperly denied his
      request for a hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The Board’s regulations authorize an
      administrative judge to cancel a hearing as a sanction when an appellant engages
      in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.   5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(e).
      The imposition of sanctions is a matter for the administrative judge’s sound
      discretion, and, absent a showing that such discretion has been abused, the
      administrative judge’s determination will not constitute reversible error. Pecard
      v. Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 15 (2010).          The abuse of
      discretion standard is a very high standard, and it allows for great deference to
      the administrative judge. Id.
¶14        The circumstances leading up to the cancellation of the hearing in this case
      are as follows.   After the appellant untimely filed substantively unresponsive
      answers to the agency’s discovery requests, the agency filed a motion to compel,
      which the administrative judge granted. IAF, Tab 11 at 1-3. The administrative
      judge ordered the appellant to provide specific answers to each of the agency’s
      interrogatories and requests for admission. Id. at 2. The appellant’s response,
      however, demonstrated little effort to earnestly answer the agency’s requests.
      IAF, Tab 22 at 4-22. Specifically, he provided the same answer to a multitude of
      varied requests, and he was essentially nonresponsive to many of the requests.
      Id. After the agency filed a motion for sanctions for the appellant’s refusal to
      comply with its motion to compel, the administrative judge ordered the appellant
      to submit evidence and argument demonstrating why sanctions should not be
      imposed. IAF, Tab 29. In his responses to the show cause order, the appellant
      provided some commentary about the discovery requests and offered add itional
      evidence and argument regarding the merits of his appeal. IAF, Tabs 30-32. The
      appellant failed to provide, however, virtually any explanation for his not
      submitting responsive answers to the discovery requests.      Id.   In light of the
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      appellant’s   unresponsiveness    to   the   agency’s    discovery   requests,     the
      administrative judge found that the agency would be hindered in its ability to
      prepare for a hearing. IAF, Tab 33 at 6. Accordingly, the administrative judge
      found the appropriate sanction was to cancel the appellant’s requested hearing.
      Id. at 6-7.
¶15         The Board has held that, when an appellant fails to satisfy an order to
      provide adequate responses to an agency’s discovery requests, it would be
      appropriate to sanction the appellant by precluding him from introducing
      evidence concerning the information sought. Wagner v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 105 M.S.P.R. 67, ¶ 13 (2007) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(a)(2)).           In
      addition, the Board’s regulations provide that an appropriate sanction in such a
      case might include, among other things, drawing an inference in fav or of the
      agency regarding the information sought.        5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(a)(1).        Here,
      despite the appellant’s failure to satisfy an order to provide adequate discovery
      responses, the administrative judge neither precluded the appellant from
      introducing any evidence nor drew any inferences in favor of the agency. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 19-51, Tab 22 at 6-22, Tab 26 at 10-12.
¶16         Instead, the administrative judge canceled the hearing and provided t he
      parties the opportunity to introduce additional evidence and argument before she
      decided the appeal based on the written record. IAF, Tab 34. The Board has
      recognized that an appellant’s right to a hearing should not be denied as a
      sanction absent extraordinary circumstances and that a single failure to comply
      with an order is generally not sufficient to justify such a drastic sanction. Sims v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 7 (2001).        The Board has also held,
      however, that a single failure to comply with a discovery order may allow for the
      more extreme sanction of dismissal if the appellant’s defiance of the discovery
      order is willful. Roth v. Department of Transportation, 54 M.S.P.R. 172, 176-77
      (1992), aff’d, 988 F.2d 130 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table).
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¶17        Here, considering the administrative judge’s granting of the agency’s
      motion to compel, the clarity of the administrative judge’s instructions, the
      appellant’s failure to comply with those instructions, and the appellant’s
      responses to the show cause order, we find that preponderant evidence
      demonstrates that the appellant intended to provide nonresponsive answers to the
      agency’s discovery requests and disobey the administrative judge’s order. See id.
      We further find that the appellant’s failure to answer the agency’s discovery
      requests in good faith constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of
      justice and that cancelling the hearing was appropriate to prevent unfair prejudice
      to the agency.   See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43(e).     We also find that the appellant’s
      arguments that the administrative judge failed to give appropriate consideration
      to his pro se status, that the information sought by the agency was immaterial,
      and that the Board should have appointed an attorney to rep resent him, are all
      without merit. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9.

      We decline to consider the appellant’s other arguments because he failed to raise
      them below.
¶18        Regarding the agency’s decision to fault him for failing to adequately
      prepare and file minutes of meetings, the appellant argues in his petition for
      review that he prepared and filed “all such minutes that he felt were required,”
      and that he had no training on how to prepare such minutes.       Id. at 5-6. The
      appellant further argues that the agency violated its own policy by failing to
      prepare special evaluations of his performance. Id. at 6. However, the appellant
      failed to raise these arguments before the administrative judge.       The Board
      generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for
      review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not
      previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Holton v. Department of
      the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 688, ¶ 18 (2016), aff’d, 884 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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      Because the appellant made no such showing concerning t hese arguments, we will
      not consider them on review. 5

                                             ORDER
¶19         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      5
        The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings that he did not
      prove that his race, sex, age, or protected equal employment opportunity activity was a
      motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove him, and we find no reason to
      disturb those findings. ID at 18-23; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-9. Because we discern no
      error with the administrative judge’s motivating factor analysis or conclusion regarding
      these claims, we do not reach the question of whether discrimination or retaliation was
      a “but-for” cause of the removal action. Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,
      2022 MSPB 31.