Court Opinion

ID: 9399740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 13:12:51.883344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.297018
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 46

                  SUPREME COURT              OF    WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP1764

COMPLETE TITLE:        Thomas G. Miller,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Lyndon
                       Station and Village Board of Lyndon Station,
                                 Defendants,
                       Larry Whaley and Kristi Whaley,
                                 Intervenors-Appellants.

                             REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                             Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 539, 980 N.W.2d 295
                                 PDC No: 2022 WI App 51 - Published

OPINION FILED:         June 6, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         March 13, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Juneau
   JUDGE:              William Andrew Sharp

JUSTICES:
DALLET,      J.,     delivered    the   majority   opinion   for   a   unanimous
Court.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed       by    Kathleen    Henry   and   Dairyland   Public   Interest   Law,
Madison. There was an oral argument by Kathleen Henry.

       For the intervenors-appellants, there was a brief filed by
Mitchell R. Olson, Zachariah J. Sibley, Michael P. Van Kleunen,
and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by
Zachariah J. Sibley.
                                                                             2023 WI 46
                                                                    NOTICE
                                                      This opinion is subject to further
                                                      editing and modification.   The final
                                                      version will appear in the bound
                                                      volume of the official reports.
No.     2021AP1764
(L.C. No.   2020CV178)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                                :             IN SUPREME COURT

Thomas G. Miller,

              Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

      v.                                                                 FILED
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of
Lyndon Station and Village Board of Lyndon                            JUN 6, 2023
Station,
                                                                       Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                    Clerk of Supreme Court
              Defendants,

Larry Whaley and Kristi Whaley,

              Intervenors-Appellants.

DALLET,     J.,   delivered    the     majority       opinion     for    a   unanimous
Court.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                     Affirmed.

      ¶1      REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.             Trustee Jan Miller serves

on the Village Board of Lyndon Station.                     She cast the deciding

vote in favor of her daughter and son-in-law's application to

amend   the    Village's     zoning    ordinance       to    rezone     their     vacant

residential       property    for     commercial       development.           A    local
business owner, Thomas Miller (no relation), argues that the
                                                                                No.    2021AP1764

vote violated his right to due process because Trustee Miller

was        partial       to     her   daughter         and     son-in-law's             rezoning

application.          We reject this argument because there is no due

process right to impartial decision-makers when a legislative

body       like    the    Village     Board     enacts,        repeals,         or    amends    a

generally           applicable        law       like       the         zoning         ordinance.

Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.

                                                I

       ¶2         Kristi and Larry Whaley own a 1.87 acre property in

Lyndon Station.               Although most nearby properties are zoned as

commercial, their property was zoned as residential.

       ¶3         The Whaleys contracted to sell their property on the

condition that it be rezoned for commercial development.                                     They

then       applied    for     rezoning       pursuant     to     the    Village's       regular

process, which proceeds as follows:                        The application is first

sent to the Village's five-member Plan Commission1 for a public

meeting and vote on whether to recommend the zoning change.                                    If
the    Plan       Commission      recommends        the    change,       the     three-member

Village      Board       then   holds    a    public      hearing       at   which      it   must

consider statements by the applicant and anyone else who wants

to speak.          Finally, the Village Board votes on whether to amend

the zoning ordinance.

       Although the Village Code provides for a seven-member Plan
       1

Commission, just five members were serving at the time the
Whaleys submitted their application. See Village Code § 101.4.

                                                2
                                                                         No.    2021AP1764

      ¶4     Trustee Miller serves on both the Plan Commission and

the Village Board.        She is also Kristi Whaley's mother and lived

with the Whaleys during the relevant period.2                       Shortly after the

Whaleys     filed     their     rezoning       application,          some       residents

expressed     concerns       that   Trustee      Miller       had    a    conflict     of

interest.3

      ¶5     The      Plan      Commission            (with         Trustee        Miller

participating) voted to recommend that the Village Board approve

the   Whaleys'      application      and       amend    the     zoning         ordinance.

Subsequently,       the   Village   Board      held    a   public        hearing    where

Thomas Miller and others spoke against the proposed rezoning.

Miller owns Miller's General Store and opposed the rezoning for

several reasons, including because the prospective buyer planned

to redevelop the property into a chain store that would compete

with his business.           Miller and other residents also questioned

whether Trustee Miller had a conflict of interest that should

preclude her from participating in the vote.

      2The Whaleys move to strike the facts regarding Trustee
Miller's relationship to the Whaleys because they were not a
part of the certiorari record compiled by the Village. Because
we rule for the Whaleys on the merits, we deny this motion as
moot.
      3The Village's attorney determined that there was no
statutory conflict of interest under Wis. Stat. § 19.59 (2021-
22) since Trustee Miller would not receive "any monetary values
[sic] from the [rez]oning of the property in question."
Although Miller argued in the circuit court that Trustee
Miller's participation in the Village Board's vote nevertheless
violated this statute, he now concedes that it did not.
Accordingly, we do not address § 19.59 further.

                                           3
                                                                        No.        2021AP1764

      ¶6    Trustee      Miller's     participation       was     decisive          in   the

Village Board's 2-1 vote to grant the Whaleys' application and

amend the zoning ordinance.             Miller appealed to the Village's

Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) arguing that "[t]here was a clear

conflict    of    interest     involving      the    vote       from      Trustee        Jan

Miller."     The ZBA subsequently upheld the Village Board's vote

to amend the zoning ordinance.

      ¶7    Miller sought certiorari review of the ZBA's decision

pursuant    to    Wis.     Stat.      § 62.23(7)(e)10.          (2021-22),4            again

alleging that Trustee Miller should not have participated in the

Village Board vote.        The Whaleys intervened to defend the ZBA's

decision.        The   circuit      court5   reversed       the    ZBA's       decision,

concluding that Trustee Miller's participation in the Village

Board vote violated due process because she was not a fair and

impartial decision-maker.

      ¶8    The    Whaleys6      appealed     and     the       court     of        appeals

reversed.    See Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2022 WI App 51,

¶2,   404   Wis. 2d 539,      980    N.W.2d 295.          The     court       of    appeals
assumed that Trustee Miller "was partial to her daughter and

son-in-law's rezoning request," but nonetheless concluded that

her participation in the vote did not violate due process.                               See

      4All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.
      5The Honorable William Andrew Sharp of the Juneau County
Circuit Court presided.
      6Neither the        Village     nor    the    ZBA   appealed        the       circuit
court's decision.

                                         4
                                                                           No.    2021AP1764

id.     ¶¶26,     33.       To     explain        why,     the     court     of    appeals

distinguished           between        adjudicative         acts,     which        involve

"application of [a] zoning ordinance to a particular set of

facts and circumstances," and legislative acts like amending a

zoning ordinance.           Id., ¶¶40-41.           For adjudicative acts, the

court      of    appeals    explained        that     due    process        requires     an

impartial decision-maker.              Id., ¶40.         But according to the court

of appeals, the same is not true of legislative determinations

like those at issue here——deciding whether to enact, repeal, or

amend a generally applicable law like a zoning ordinance.                               See

id., ¶¶39-42.          In that context, the court of appeals held that

an impartial decision-maker is not required.                       See id.

                                             II

      ¶9        We review the ZBA's decision pursuant to Wis. Stat.

§ 62.23(7)(e)10., which permits statutory certiorari review of

such decisions.          Statutory certiorari review encompasses, among

other considerations,7 whether the ZBA "proceeded on a correct
theory of law."           Moreschi v. Village of Williams Bay, 2020 WI

95,     ¶15,     395    Wis. 2d 55,         953    N.W.2d 318       (quoting       another

source).         Proceeding       on    a   correct       theory    of     law    includes

complying with the requirements of due process.                            See Marris v.

      7The other considerations are: (1) whether the ZBA acted
within   its   jurisdiction;  (2)   whether   its  actions   were
"arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will
and not its judgment"; and (3) "whether the board might
reasonably make the order or determination in question based on
the evidence."   See State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd.
of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.

                                             5
                                                                   No.    2021AP1764

City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 24, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993).

Whether    the   ZBA    proceeded    on    a    correct   theory    of   law   is   a

question of law we review de novo while according a "presumption

of correctness and validity" to the ZBA's decision.                       State ex

rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23,

¶¶13-14, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 N.W.2d 401.

                                          III

     ¶10     Miller's      central    claim       is   that    Trustee    Miller's

participation in the Village Board's vote to amend the zoning

ordinance violated his right to due process.8

     ¶11    This claim is grounded in the guarantees of procedural

due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States     Constitution     and     Article      I,    § 1    of   the   Wisconsin

Constitution.9         Procedural due process bars "a deprivation by

state action of a constitutionally protected interest in life,

     8 At times Miller's brief suggests that Trustee Miller's
participation in the Plan Commission's decision to recommend
that the Village Board amend the zoning ordinance also violated
due process.   The relief he seeks, however, is "revers[al of]
the decision of the ZBA and [Village] Board," not the Plan
Commission.    Moreover, Miller does not develop a separate
argument for why the requirements of procedural due process
would differ before the Plan Commission and the Village Board.
Accordingly, we focus solely on whether Trustee Miller's
participation in the Village Board's vote to amend the zoning
ordinance violated due process.
     9  Although the text of Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution differ, Miller does not argue that they provide
different procedural due process protections.  Accordingly, we
treat these two provisions as coextensive for purposes of this
discussion.

                                          6
                                                                 No.    2021AP1764

liberty, or property without due process of law."                Thorp v. Town

of Lebanon, 2000 WI 60,           ¶53, 235 Wis. 2d 610, 612 N.W.2d 59

(quoting Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458,

473, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997)).         As this language implies, in order

to establish a violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff

must    demonstrate   both:    (1)    the   deprivation     of    a     protected

liberty interest——"life, liberty, or property"——by state action

and (2) that the process he received before that deprivation

fell short of the minimum the Constitution requires.                     See Ky.

Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989).                      We

focus on the second of these two requirements because it is

dispositive of Miller's claim.

       ¶12   The minimum procedural protections required by the Due

Process Clause vary depending on the context.                See Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ("Due process is flexible and

calls    for   such    procedural      protections     as   the        particular

situation demands." (quoting another source)).               "[I]n deciding

what the Due Process Clause requires when the State deprives
persons of life, liberty or property, the Supreme Court has long

distinguished      between    legislative      and   adjudicative        action."

Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239

U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915)).

       ¶13   For   adjudicative      actions    like   deciding        civil   or

criminal cases, "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic

requirement of due process."          Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
                                       7
                                                                    No.     2021AP1764

136   (1955)).      Thus,    even     though    we    presume    that     judges   act

"fairly, impartially, and without bias," proof of a "serious

risk of actual bias can objectively rise to the level of a due

process violation."         Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, ¶¶21-22, 392

Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 868).

This standard applies not only to formal judicial proceedings

but also to "administrative agencies which adjudicate."                      Withrow

v.    Larkin,     421    U.S.   35,     46     (1975).        Accordingly,         when

adjudicative acts are involved, procedural due process requires

impartial decision-makers.            See, e.g., 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-

Dade County, 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).

      ¶14    When legislative actions are at issue, however, those

affected by legislation "are not entitled to any process beyond

that provided by the legislative process."                   Jones, 975 F.3d at

1048 (emphasis in original).                 That is because "[t]he act of

legislating necessarily entails political trading, compromise,

and ad hoc decisionmaking."              Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616

F.2d 680, 693 (3d Cir. 1980).                In other words, legislators are
partial to legislation all the time; indeed, they often run for

office promising to use legislative power to accomplish specific

policy objectives.        And the primary check on legislators acting

contrary     to    the   public      interest        when   legislating      is     the

political process.          See id. at 694; see also Bi-Metallic, 239

U.S. at 445 (explaining that the rights of those affected by

legislation "are protected in the only way that they can be in a

complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those
who   make   the    rule").         Accordingly,       because    "a    legislative
                                         8
                                                                   No.      2021AP1764

determination provides all the process that is due," partiality

on the part of legislators does not violate the Due Process

Clause.       Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d

722, 738 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting another source); see also,

e.g., Santa Fe All. for Pub. Health & Safety v. City of Santa

Fe,    993    F.3d   802,    818    (10th    Cir.   2021);   Samson    v.    City    of

Bainbridge Island, 683 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2012); Grand

River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 174 (2d

Cir. 2005).

       ¶15    Our    cases   similarly       distinguish     between   legislative

and    adjudicative      acts       when    determining    what   procedural        due

process protections are required.                For example, in Quinn v. Town

of Dodgeville, 122 Wis. 2d 570, 364 N.W.2d 149 (1985), we held

that a town board resolution blocking a county board proposal to

amend a zoning ordinance was a legislative act.10                      See id. at

584-85; see also Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146,

146 N.W.2d 403 (1966) ("[Z]oning is a legislative function.").

That    was    because      "[a]n    ordinance      amendment,"   even      one   that
affects only a small amount of land or a handful of people,

"changes the ordinance but does not execute or implement its

       Wisconsin Stat. § 59.97(5)(e)6. (1983-84), now renumbered
       10

as Wis. Stat. § 59.59(5)(e)6., gives town boards the power to
block certain county board amendments to zoning ordinances.

                                             9
                                                                       No.    2021AP1764

provisions."11       Quinn, 122 Wis. 2d at 584-85.                 We therefore held

that    due    process    did    not    require      additional        notice     to    a

landowner or an opportunity to be heard beyond that already

guaranteed by statute before the town board blocked the zoning

amendment.     See id.

       ¶16    Miller argues that the distinction between legislative

and adjudicative acts is not relevant to deciding whether due

process requires impartial decision-makers.                        Instead, he says

that    our    decision     in   Marris       v.    City      of     Cedarburg,        176

Wis. 2d 14,     498    N.W.2d 842      (1993)      held    that     there    is   a    due

process right to impartial decision-makers in rezoning matters,

regardless      of    whether    the    rezoning          decision    at     issue     is

legislative or adjudicative.

       ¶17    In Marris, a landowner applied to her local zoning

board of appeals for recognition of a legal non-conforming use

of her property.         Id. at 19.     She argued that she was denied "a

fair and impartial hearing under . . . common law concepts of

due process and fair play" when the zoning board's chairperson
indicated that he had prejudged her application.                      Id. at 24; see

also id. at 24-29.         We agreed that the landowner was denied a

        "Spot zoning," "the practice whereby a single lot or area
       11

is granted privileges which are not granted or extended to other
land in the vicinity . . . is not illegal per se in Wisconsin."
Cushman v. City of Racine, 39 Wis. 2d 303, 306-07, 159 N.W.2d 67
(1968).    It may, however, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause under certain circumstances.          See
Buhler, 33 Wis. 2d at 145-46.      Nevertheless, Miller does not
allege that the Board's vote to amend the Village's zoning
ordinance constitutes spot zoning or violates the Equal
Protection Clause.

                                         10
                                                                           No.     2021AP1764

fair    hearing,       and     observed         that     "[a]lthough        the     parties

characterize the Board's hearing as adjudicative, we need not

label these proceedings quasi-legislative or [adjudicative] to

determine whether the decision-maker must be impartial."                                Id. at

24 n.6.      Rather, we explained that "[w]e need look only to the

characteristics        of    the     proceeding        to    determine          whether    the

decision-maker must be impartial."                  Id.      Because the application

required the zoning board to make "factual determinations about

an individual property owner and then apply those facts to the

ordinance,"       we    held     that      an     impartial         decision-maker         was

required.     Id.

       ¶18   Marris     does    not,    as      Miller      asserts,      hold     that    the

legislative/adjudicative distinction is irrelevant to deciding

whether due process requires an impartial decision-maker in a

particular    context.          On   the     contrary,           Marris   emphasized       the

importance     of      the     "characteristics             of    the     proceeding"       to

determining what process is due.                  See id.          When Marris examined

those characteristics, it held that an impartial decision-maker
was    required     because        "[t]he       zoning      decision       in    this     case

require[d] that the [b]oard examine a specific piece of land and

the activities of a particular property owner," "engage in fact-

finding and then make a decision based on the application of

those facts to the [existing zoning] ordinance."                                 Id. at 26.

Thus, even though we did not label it as such, the board's

decision in Marris was adjudicative——it focused on how to apply

the existing zoning law to particular facts and circumstances,
not on whether to enact, alter, or repeal the existing zoning
                                             11
                                                                                      No.     2021AP1764

law.     See id.; see also Step Now Citizens Grp. v. Town of Utica

Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 2003 WI App 109, ¶48, 264 Wis. 2d 662,

663 N.W.2d 833 (explaining that Marris involved an adjudicative,

not legislative, decision).                      The approach in Marris is therefore

consistent            with    the       one    taken       by   Quinn,      which      examined       the

circumstances           of     the      specific       government          action      at     issue    to

determine         whether       it       was    legislative          or     adjudicative.             See

Quinn,       120        Wis. 2d at             585     ("An        ordinance          amendment        is

legislation since it changes the ordinance but does not execute

or implement its provisions.").

       ¶19       Applying that approach to this case, we hold that the

Village Board's vote to amend the zoning ordinance and rezone

the Whaleys' property was a legislative act.                                   The Village Board

rezoned          the     Whaleys'         property           by     amending         the     Village's

generally         applicable            zoning       ordinance.           In   other        words,    the

Village Board changed the law.                         It did not apply existing law to

individual facts or circumstances, as it would if it were making

an adjudicative decision like whether to grant a variance or
permit       a    legal       non-conforming               use.        See,         e.g.,    State     v.

Outagamie         Cnty.       Bd.       of     Adjustment,          2001       WI    78,     ¶41,     244

Wis. 2d 613,            628    N.W.2d 376            (stating       that       a     decision       about

whether          to    grant        a    variance          excusing       compliance          with    an

ordinance         was    adjudicative);               Step      Now,   264         Wis. 2d 662,       ¶48

(describing            determinations                about        whether      to      permit        non-

conforming uses of property as adjudicative).                                       Moreover, unlike

an adjudicative decision, the Village Board's amendment to the
zoning ordinance applies "prospectively, [and does] not impos[e]
                                                      12
                                                                No.     2021AP1764

a sanction for past conduct."           L C & S, Inc. v. Warren Cnty.

Area Plan Comm'n, 244 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2001).

       ¶20     It is true, of course, that this particular amendment

came about only after the Whaleys applied for the zoning change

and affected only the Whaleys' property directly.               But that does

not alter our analysis.           As we explained in Quinn, rezoning by

amending a local government's zoning ordinance "does not lose

its legislative character simply because the number of people

affected or the size of the land is small."12                  122 Wis. 2d at

584.        What matters is that the Village Board made a prospective

change by enacting, repealing, or amending existing generally

applicable law.        The Village Board's action was thus legislative

in nature, and for that reason, Miller was not entitled to an

impartial decision-maker.          Accordingly, we affirm the court of

appeals' decision.13

       By     the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of     appeals   is

affirmed.

       In passing, Miller's reply brief suggests that we should
       12

overrule Quinn. We decline to address this argument because it
is undeveloped.   See Sw. Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, ¶32
n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384 (explaining that "we
generally do not address undeveloped arguments").

       Because we reject Miller's claim on the merits we need
       13

not address the Whaleys' argument that we should vacate the
lower courts' and ZBA's decisions because the ZBA lacked
jurisdiction to review the Village Board's vote to amend the
zoning ordinance under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)7.b.

                                       13
    No.   2021AP1764

1