Court Opinion

ID: 9628428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:20:14.573398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:02.897170
License: Public Domain

Springer, J.,
dissenting:
I dissent because this case represents an excellent example of when the judicial branch of government should keep its nose out of administrative affairs. In compliance with the statutory scheme a Nevada Personnel Hearing Officer, after a full-day hearing, involving ten witnesses and the introduction of numerous exhibits, ruled that Dredge’s actions did not warrant his permanent dismissal from state civil service. Now, for reasons far from satisfactory, this court intrudes into the prescribed scheme of things and destroys this man’s career. I disapprove.
The first excuse employed by the majority for disrupting the administrative machinery is that “the hearing officer excluded substantial evidence from the decisional process.” It is true that at first the hearing officer was reluctant to hear the rather ridiculous charge that Dredge was a security risk because “it’s not charged”; but, still, as admitted in the majority opinion, the hearing officer later said that he would take it into consideration. What more do they want? The majority opinion states that the hearing officer’s ruling is “equivocal.” Even if it were, the supposed equivocation should be resolved in favor of the hearing officer, who, after all, said that he considered these matters in making a decision.
Had the hearing officer actually refused to consider certain evidence of Dredge’s supposed association with Ellis, we might *46be inclined to agree with the district court’s conclusion. This is not the case, however. Not only is it undisputed that testimony relating to the contact was admitted into evidence, the transcript of the hearing clearly indicates that the hearing officer considered this matter. Expressing his concern that Dredge had not received adequate notice of the evidence to be presented against him, the hearing officer stated, “I said it’s been in and we’ve beat it to death ad nauseam. I’ll take it into my consideration, yes, but it’s not properly set forth in the NPD-41.” (Emphasis supplied.) As no other cognizable error of law manifests itself in the record, the district court lacked authority to set aside the hearing officer’s decision on the basis of its being unfounded as a matter of law.
On this question of Dredge’s supposed breach of prison security by association with ex-convicts, it appears to me that the charge was an afterthought and a “hook” on which to base additional, previously unthought-of charges. No one seriously contends that Dredge fraternizes with former prisoners or is in any way a threat to prison security. This was a very isolated event; Dredge was drinking and did strike up a conversation with a former convict with whom he had become acquainted at the prison. The rest followed from Dredge’s unfortunate willingness to do a favor for the man.
Expressing concern that the NDOP’s “‘association’ regulations are ambiguous and incomplete as to what is incidental ‘contact’ and impermissible ‘association,’” the hearing officer noted that Webster’s Dictionary defines “association” as “the act of joining in the company of another and [connotes] that the joining be as a partner, companion or similar intimate, on-going relationship.” Based on this definition, the hearing officer concluded that “[c]ertainly, an isolated, limited contact with an ex-inmate does not fall within the ambit of ‘association.’” Cf. Arcinieaga v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971); State v. Morales, 668 P.2d 910 (Ariz.App. 1983). Given the substantial evidence of the unplanned and incidental nature of the particular Contact in question, and the complete lack of any evidence of an ongoing relationship of any kind between the two men, I believe that the hearing officer’s decision is entirely consistent with the record.1 Also arguing strongly against the conclusion that Dredge’s contact with Ellis compromised Dredge’s effectiveness as an employee at NNCC is the undisputed evidence that Dredge worked for eight months without incident following his reinstatement.
*47The majority says that it is “unnecessary to address the issue arising from the hearing officer’s conclusion that the appointing authority’s determination that Dredge had engaged in disgraceful conduct is unproved.” They then go on to consider the issue. If they really mean that they did not consider this part of the charge, then the opinion has absolutely no substance, because a permanent employee with a good record like Dredge’s obviously should not be permanently terminated on the “association” charge alone — a single afternoon’s encounter with an ex-convict. On the other hand, if they did consider the drunken driving episode, which I suspect they did, then I too must consider it.
The hearing officer did not believe that Dredge’s alleged uncooperative conduct at the time of his arrest was sufficiently “disgraceful” to justify the complete termination of Dredge’s civil service appointment. While Dredge arguably exercised bad judgment in pleading with the arresting officer and initially refusing to take a blood-alcohol test, such behavior is easily understandable: Dredge feared that his driving privileges would be revoked and that he would be suspended without pay for the duration of the revocation. As stated earlier, whether Dredge refused to take the blood-alcohol test on Ellis’s advice is unclear from the record. The arresting officer testified that he believed Dredge was following Ellis’s advice in refusing to take the test; however, Dredge testified that he refused to take the test because he had overheard other police officers discussing the fact that the “breathalyzer” had been giving inaccurate readings all day. The arresting officer confirmed that the “breathalyzer” appeared to malfunction after tests were begun on Dredge. Finally, I would point out that the arresting officer testified that Dredge at one point attempted to restrain Ellis from interfering with the course of Dredge’s arrest. Such conduct can hardly be described as “disgraceful.” The hearing officer’s favorable conclusion with respect to the charge of “uncooperativeness” was not clearly erroneous.
The state concedes that it is the prison’s position that none of these charges alone would support Dredge’s permanent termination. This being the case, the majority’s basing its opinion on the so-called “association” charge alone is contrary to the NDOP’s concession that one charge alone does not warrant dismissal.
The hearing officer took into consideration the aggregate of charges and held that the proofs did not justify permanent termination of an employee with Dredge’s good record. I believe the hearing officer’s decision should stand.
The reason for Nevada’s administrative personnel structure, which allows charged employees to have a hearing before an impartial hearing officer instead of before some agent of his state employer, is to give some insulation and objectivity to the contested hearing process. The majority opinion is an intrusion into *48the procedures which effectuate this sound personnel policy. The majority appears to object to the- hearing officer’s “view[ing] the evidence in a more benevolent light than George Sumner, the Director of the Nevada Department of prisons, who made the decision to terminate Dredge.” Talcing a new and impartial view of the evidence is exactly what personnel hearing officers are supposed to do. I see this court as siding with the appointing authority and setting aside a clearly justifiable decision of an administrative officer. There is no reason that I can discern for this kind of unwarranted intrusion into the administrative process by either the district court or by this court; so I dissent.

 Much is made of the fact that Dredge paid Ellis’s bail, but this act is easy to understand. Dredge thought (at the time) that Ellis had loyally taken his side in the matter and felt obligated to get Ellis out of jail. It is difficult to imagine how such a one-sided and spontaneous act of ordinary humanity is in any sense an “association” prohibited by prison regulations.