Court Opinion

ID: 9830913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:37:27.832449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:28.309214
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants again urge that the land in controversy, being the separate property of Angelina Collins, was not subject to sale in the administration on the estate of Grant Collins. The proposition stated as controlling is that the property of one person cannot be administered on and sold for the debts of another. As a general statement of the law that is correct, but there are some well-founded exceptions. The doctrine of innocent purchaser does, under certain conditions, apply to sales made by an administrator. Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 454, 26 Am. Rep. 304; Love v. Berry, 22 Tex. 372; Jackson v. Berliner (Tex. Civ. App.) 127 S. W. 1160; White v. Dupree, 91 Tex. 66, 40 S. W. 962; Bumpkin v. Adams, 74 Tex 964, 11 S. W. 1070. These eases hold that when the apparent title to property involved in an administration is in the decedent, sale by his administrator conveys a good title when purchased for a valuable consideration by one who had no notice of the right or title of another.
That question was directly involved in the case of Bradley v. Love, above referred to. The facts of that case show that James Dunn deeded the land to D. H. Love and Mary Love, husband and wife. The deed recited a cash consideration of $1,000 paid. Some time after the conveyance Mary Love died, leaving children. A few years later D. H. Love died. The administrator of Love’s estate inventoried the land as the community property of Love and his wife, Mary. In the course of the administration the land was sold for the purpose of paying community debts which had been contracted by D. H. Love, and Bradley became the purchaser. Suit was later filed against Bradley by the children and heirs of Mary Love, who claimed the land by inheritance from their mother. In the trial they offered evidence tending to show that no cash consideration had in fact been paid; that the conveyance was a gift from -James Dunn, who was the father of Mrs. Love. Bradley defended on the ground that he was an innocent purchaser. The court held, in effect, that if the conveyance was a gift it vested in each of the grantees a separate right to an undivided half interest. It was also held that while Mrs. Love’s interest was not subject to the payment of the community debts for which it had been sold, Bradley’s title would be good if he purchased without notice of the facts which made her interest in the land her. separate property. In that case, as in this, the interest which formed the subject-matter of the suit had been conveyed directly to the wife. But the court seems to have regarded that fact as of no importance in determining whether the property apparently belonged to the community or to the separate estate of the grantees. The issues were disposed of on the assumption that the deed, unexplained, evidenced a conveyance to the. community. Applying that construction of this case, it must be said that the original conveyance to Angelina Oollins vested an apparent title in the community of herself and husband. It became her separate property, not because of the form of the conveyance, but because the consideration was paid with funds belonging to her in her separate right.
Thq case of Vivion v. Nicholson, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 116 S. W. 386, is referred to as holding to the contrary of what has just been said. It was held in that case that the property of the wife could not be sold and conveyed by the administrator of the husband’s estate. But there the deed upon which the wife’s separate right depended showed upon its face that it was for her separate benefit. There was no apparent title in the community.
But it does not follow from what has been said in disposing of that question that the sale under which the appellee claims title was in all respects valid. The record of the probate proceedings introduced in evidence on the trial shows that an application was 'made for administration on the estate of *894Grant and Angelina Collins on December 16, 1920. The application states that the only-estate left consisted of 29 acres of land, of the probable value of $950. At the February term of the following year the application was granted, and J. R. Hampton was appointed administrator “upon the estate of the said Grant Collins and Angelina Collins.” The appraisers appointed reported:
“Separate property of the deceased, none. Community property 29 acres of land out of the A. J. Haynes headright survey, $750.”
On January 12, 1922, Hampton, the administrator, filed an application for the sale of the land. The exhibit which he attached to that application, as required by article 3490, Revised Civil Statutes of 1911, shows the following claims as the only debts against the estate:
“One account in favor of the Morris County National Bank, transferred to it by Hampton Bros., for the sum of $230.32 bearing date October 10, 1920. This was for the two coffins in which Grant Collins and Angelina Collins were buried.
“Account of C. A. Robison $29.05 for telephone service, dated October 10, 1920.
“Estimated expenses of administration, $125.
“Property on hand belonging to said estate liable for the payment of such charges and claims, 25 acres of land situated in Morris county (the land involved in this suit).”
That exhibit, which became a part oí the application, shows upon its face that these debts, for the payment of which the property was sold, were contracted after the death of Angelina. They were not community obligations and could not be a charge on her community interest. Appellee’s claim to this land depends on its being treated as belonging to the community estate. If, as to him, a purchaser without notice, it should be treated as community property, then the sale of Angelina’s half interest was without legal authority. When she died her interest descended and vested in her children, appellants in this appeal. The record warrants the conclusion that at the time of her death there were no community debts, nor any other obligations which might be made a charge upon Angelina’s interest in the land. The heirs therefore took it unincumbered, and so held the title at the time administration was commenced. In that state of the record the probate court had no authority to order the sale of that half interest for the payment of debts contracted after Angelina died. Arnold v. Hodge, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 211, 49 S. W. 714. The wife’s interest could not, after her death, Ibe sold to pay debts which she did not owe, or which could not be made a charge against her community interest. While a purchaser at an administration sale is not charged with notice of the entire probate proceedings, he is charged with notice of what the application for the sale discloses. McNally v. Haynes, 59 Tex. 583; Gillenwaters v. Scott, 62 Tex. 670.
We therefore conclude that the one-half community interest which the appellants inherited from their mother was not subject to the sale made in probate proceedings, and the sale of that interest by the administrator passed no title to the appellee.
The judgment of the trial court will be further modified so as to deny the appellee a recovery of the undivided one-half interest inherited by all of the appellants from their mother; In other respects the judgment as heretofore modified will not be disturbed.