Court Opinion

ID: 9612271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:06:35.805765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:52.099810
License: Public Domain

Schwellenbach, J.
(dissenting)—It should be remembered that, on the facts, the jury found for the defendant.
Error is assigned in the failure of the trial court to give appellant’s proposed instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 6. They were:
“4. I instruct you that if you find that the defendant’s automobile was approaching plaintiff’s automobile and that plaintiff, acting as a reasonable man, could have anticipated that a collision was imminent, and if you find that in order to avoid such collision, and acting in the presence of an imminent collision, that the plaintiff turned to the left in an effort to avoid such imminent collision, notwithstanding the instructions elsewhere given you, the plaintiff, in so *144turning his automobile at the very last, to avoid a collision, into the left hand side of the road, is not guilty of negligence or contributory negligence, and if you find that the defendant was operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the road and the plaintiff, Raymond DeKoning, turned to the left and onto the left hand side of the road in an effort to avoid such collision, then you must find that the defendant was guilty of negligence and you must find that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence. Your verdict then will be for the plaintiff in such amount as will adequately compensate him for the injuries proximately caused by such negligence, if any, of the defendant.
“5. Even though you find Raymond DeKoning’s automobile was on the left hand side of the road at the point of impact, you may still find him free of negligence or contributory negligence if you find that his car was on the left hand side without fault on his part.
“If you find that his being on the left hand side of the road was because of his reasonable reaction to an emergency, then you should find his car was on the left hand side without fault on his part, and then if you find that the defendant was wholly or partially on the left hand side of the road and that his being on the left hand side of the road constituted negligence as elsewhere herein defined, and that such negligence proximately caused this accident, then you must return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
“6. A motorist confronted by a sudden emergency not .caused by him is not held to the same accuracy of judgment or degree of care as in ordinary circumstances. He is not necessarily negligent because he makes a mistake of judgment or fails to adopt the best or wisest course for averting injury and is not liable for injury if he exercises reasonable care or prudence, considering the circumstances. Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff saw defendant’s vehicle approaching him on plaintiff’s own side of the highway, and if you further find that plaintiff, in such position of sudden peril or emergency, turned to the left and upon the left hand side of the road in an effort to avoid said imminent collision, you must find plaintiff not guilty of negligence, or contributory negligence.”
Appellant’s theory was that he should have been absolved from contributory negligence because he was faced with a sudden emergency. He contends that he was entitled to an *145instruction (or better, instructions) on his theory. The trial court gave instruction No. 8:
“You are instructed that the operator of a vehicle who, by the negligence of another and not by his own negligence, is suddenly placed in a situation of emergency and compelled to act instantly to avoid a collision or injury, is not guilty of negligence if he makes such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence placed in such a position might make, even though he did not make the wisest choice and one that would have been required in the exercise of ordinary care, but for the emergency.”
The majority cites Allen v. Hart, 32 Wn. (2d) 173, 201 P. (2d) 145; Adjustment Department, Olympia Credit Bureau v. Smedegard, 40 Wn. (2d) 76, 241 P. (2d) 203; and Billington v. Schaal, 42 Wn. (2d) 878, 259 P. (2d) 634 in support of its holding. In the Allen and Credit Bureau cases, no instructions whatsoever were given on the appellant’s theories.
In the Billington case, appellant assigned as error the failure to give proposed instruction No. 10:
“ ‘You are instructed that the duty is upon the driver of a vehicle which is following another vehicle to keep such distance from the vehicle ahead of him, and to maintain such observation of the vehicle ahead of him, that by the exercise of reasonable care such emergency stop as may be dictated by ordinary traffic conditions may be safely made.’ ”
In discussing that assignment, we said:
“It was appellant’s contention throughout the trial that respondent had been negligent in driving in such close proximity to the rear of appellant’s automobile that respondent was unable to stop when confronted with an emergency which was reasonably to be anticipated. Evidence submitted by appellant tended to support this contention. The quoted instruction would have presented that theory of the case to the jury. It embodies a correct statement of the law. Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 Pac. 518, 79 A. L. R. 1270; Larpenteur v. Eldridge Motors, 185 Wash. 530, 55 P. (2d) 1064; Cronin v. Shell Oil Co., 8 Wn. (2d) 404, 112 P. (2d) 824; Miller v. Cody, 41 Wn. (2d) 775, 252 P. (2d) 303.
“Respondent does not deny what has just been said. He argues only that failure to give the instruction was not prej*146udicial. In support of this view, respondent asserts that appellant’s theory of the case was adequately covered by instructions Nos. 12, 13, 16 and 20.
“Instruction No. 12 was to the effect that a driver has the right to assume that other drivers will comply with the law, until he knows or should know to the contrary. No. 13 told the jury that it was the duty of a driver to keep a reasonably adequate lookout in view of existing circumstances and whatever dangers are reasonably to be apprehended. No. 16 advised that violation of an ordinance or statute by either driver would constitute negligence in and of itself, but that it was not necessary to show a violation of some specific ordinance or statute in order to establish negligence. No. 20 called attention to a Seattle traffic ordinance which requires drivers to keep a ‘safe distance’ behind an immediately preceding vehicle, and in no event to draw nearer to such vehicle than three feet.
“It will be noted that No. 20 is the only one of these instructions which makes any specific reference to the duty of a following driver. That instruction refers only to the Seattle ordinance which states in general terms the duty of such drivers, with the one specific requirement that a distance of at least three feet be maintained. Neither this nor any other instruction advised the jury, as proposed instruction No. 10 would have done, regarding the following driver’s duty to be prepared to meet emergencies which could reasonably be anticipated. As this went to the very heart of appellant’s case, we believe that failure to give proposed instruction No. 10 was prejudicial error. See Allen v. Hart, 32 Wn. (2d) 173, 201 P. (2d) 145.”
In the present case, if instruction No. 8 had not been given, a failure to give such an instruction would have constituted reversible error. But here, appellant’s theory was clearly and adequately presented to the jury.
A litigant’s theory of a case should not be so pin pointed or high lighted by an instruction or instructions as to give him an undue advantage over his opponent. Instructions are not given for the benefit of an attorney to be used in his argument to the jury. They are not given for the purpose of confusing the jury, but to assist it. They are given to advise the jury as to the issues involved, and as to the law which it must apply to the facts which it finds. I agree that a litigant is entitled to have his theory of the case presented *147to the jury. However, that does not mean that a trial judge, in order to “get by the Supreme Court” should take a batch of instructions proposed by the plaintiff and a- batch proposed by the defendant and throw them indiscriminately at the jury. It is the duty of the trial judge to advise the jury, without taking sides, as to what the law is which must guide it in its determination of the case. Here the trial court, without any favoritism, thoroughly, fairly, and adequately instructed the jury as to the law covering all of the issues involved, including appellant’s theory of the case.
If it be conceded that it was error not to instruct as to life expectancy, such error could not be prejudicial, because the jury found that appellant was not entitled to recover.
The judgment should be affirmed.
February 2, 1956. Petition for rehearing denied.