Court Opinion

ID: 9725590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:55:01.97501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:16.872508
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. In its effort to uphold the convictions the majority *247places an unreasonable construction on Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c), Wis. Adm. Code.1
The majority, like the court of appeals, holds that the notice requirement of Ag 110.02(7) (c) is implicitly incorporated in Ag 110.02(7) (b) and that regulation Ag 110.02(7) (b) and Ag 110.02(7) (c) must be read together to mean that if the defendant does not give timely notice to the consumer of the reasons for delay, these reasons do not constitute a defense to the crime. See page 245 and note 11. The majority reasons that “[c]on-struing (7) (b) in isolation of the notice requirement [of (7) (c) ] would be unreasonable,” swpra p. 244, because the needs of the consumer require that the notice provision of Ag 110.02(7) (c) be read into Ag 110.02(7) (b). Nonetheless the majority, like the court of appeals, refuses to state whether subsections Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) define a single offense or two offenses.
The majority’s reading Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) together has no basis in the wording of the regulations. As the majority notes most sections and subsections of Ag ch. 110 set forth separate offenses. The wording of Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) clearly sets forth two offenses: *248(1) failure to complete the work within the time period specified in the contract unless one of the justifications specified in the regulation occurs, that is “labor stoppage, unavailability of supplies or materials, unavoidable casualties, or any other cause beyond the seller’s control,” Ag 110.02(7) (b) ; and (2) failure to give timely notice to the consumer “of reasons beyond the seller’s control for any delay in performance,” Ag 110.-02(7) (c). Ag 110.02(7) (b) makes no reference to notice. The court of appeals reads the notice of requirement of Ag 110.02(7) (c) into (b) reasoning that the notice requirement is implicit in the last sentence of Ag 110.02 (7) (b). While the majority is correct in rejecting the reasoning of the court of appeals, it is then left without any vehicle in the wording of Ag 110.02(7) (b) for incorporating the notice requirement of (c) into (b) .2
Further, the majority’s reading Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) together is not required to rénder the regulations reasonable or to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result. Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (e) can be read as separate offenses because two separate acts (or omissions) of the contractor are proscribed and two separate interests of the consumer are protected by these regulations: (1) The *249contractor’s failure to perform timely is penalized; the consumer’s interest in getting prompt performance is protected. Ag 110.02(7) (b). (2) The contractor’s failure to keep the consumer advised is penalized; the consumer’s interest in being kept informed is protected. Ag 110.02(7) (c). Under this interpretation, if a contractor does not have any valid reason for delay and does not notify the consumer of any reason for the delay, the contractor may be prosecuted for failing to obey both Ag 110.02(7) (b) and Ag 110.02(7) (c); if a contractor has a justifiable reason for delay but does not give timely notice to the consumer the contractor may be prosecuted for failing to obey Ag 110.02(7) (c); if a contractor notifies the buyer of the reasons for delay but those reasons are not justifiable, the contractor may be prosecuted for failing to obey Ag 110.02 (7) (b). The majority may not think the regulations creating two offenses are wise, but it is not the court’s job to rewrite the regulations if they can be read as written.
The majority’s reading Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) together and at the same time refusing to decide whether these regulations constitute one or two offenses (creates confusion for prosecutors, defense counsel and courts. The majority hints that separately charging, convicting and penalizing for violations of both (7) (b) and (7) (c) raises a question of multiplicity. State v. George, 69 Wis. 2d 92, 230 N.W.2d 263 (1976); Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure — Criminal sec. 142 (1969);. If there is a problem of multiplicity, it is of the majority’s own making. The majority refuses to decide whether Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (c) are single or multiple offenses and mixes the elements of (c) with those of (b). The majority thus creates confusion as to the proper approach to charging under the regulations.
Because I am unable to discern a reasonable rationale for the majority’s decision beyond a desire to uphold the convictions in the case at bar, I dissent.

 Ag 110.02(7) (b) and (7) (c) provides as follows:
“Ag 110.02 Prohibited trade practices. No seller shall engage in the following unfair methods of competition or unfair trade practices:
“(7) PERFORMANCE. . . .
“(b) Fail to begin or complete work on the dates or within the time' period specified in the home improvement contract, or as otherwise represented, unless the delay is for reason of labor stoppage, unavailability of supplies or materials, unavoidable casualties, or any other cause beyond the seller’s control. Any changes in the dates or time periods stated in a written contract shall be agreed to in writing.
“(c) Fail to give timely notice to the buyer of reasons beyond the seller’s control for any delay in performance, and when the work will begin or be completed.”

 The court of appeals concludes that the last sentence of (7) (b) requires that as part of the contractor’s defense of justifiable delay the contractor and the consumer must agree to a new contract setting forth starting and completing dates. The court of appeals then concludes that notice of delay is implicit in the requirement of the written agreement. Thus the court of appeals sets forth three elements of a contractor’s defense: (1) the contractor must have a justifiable reason for the delay; (2) the contractor must notify the consumer of the reasons for the delay; and (3) the contractor and consumer must successfully negotiate a written agreement as to new dates of starting and completion. The court of appeals’ reasoning leads to the absurd result of the consumer being able to wield the power of deciding whether the contractor can be convicted of a criminal offense. By not agreeing to a new written agreement the consumer can vitiate any defenses based on justifiable delay the contractor may have had.