Court Opinion

ID: 9720393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:07.256996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:29.201560
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
I concur in the result reached by my Brother Mallett. I believe that the analytical approach employed by my colleague of interpreting Michigan’s constitutional privilege against -self-incrimination, Const 1963, art 1, § 17, more broadly than the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment in Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986), is entirely supportable, and I agree *156with it as far as it goes.1 I write separately, however, to express my view that my colleague’s conclusion is even more clearly supported on the ground that the police conduct in this case violated the defendant’s right to counsel under Const 1963, art 1, § 20.2
i
In interpreting our state constitutional right-to-counsel provision, this Court must recognize the law as it existed in Michigan at the time Const 1963, art 1, § 20 was adopted. As this Court recently declared: "[I]t must be presumed that a constitutional provision has been framed and adopted mindful of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.” People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 492; 487 NW2d 404 (1992); see also People v *157Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 32-37; 485 NW2d 672 (1992) (interpreting Const 1963, art 1, § 16 more broadly than the federal Eighth Amendment on the basis, in part, of established federal and state case law preceding the adoption of the 1963 constitution).
It was established long before the adoption of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 that it is unlawful, in this state, for the police to deny an attorney access to his client. See People v Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 680, 686; 225 NW 501 (1929):
[H]olding an accused incommunicable, is condemned by every principle of fairness, ... is forbidden by the constitutional guaranty of due process of law, and inhibited by the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel. . . . Holding an accused incommunicable to parents and counsel is a subtle and insidious method of intimidating and cowing ....
Although this Court in Cavanaugh was clearly concerned, in part, with the alleged refusal of police to honor a suspect’s requests to see parents or legal counsel, the holding clearly encompassed the refusal of police to honor requests by a lawyer and others to see the suspect. The Court, for example, quoted police testimony that the suspect
"did not ask me to see Father Dunnigan nor to see his lawyer. ...”
"I don’t remember [the suspect] asking to see his father, but I do remember his father asking to see [him], and I told him he could not see him. ... I don’t recall [the suspect] asking to see an attorney. I remember when you (defendant’s attorney) asked to see him, and we refused you permission to see him . . . .” [Id. at 687. Emphasis added.]
Citing these facts, and not just the alleged refusal by police to honor the suspect’s own requests to *158see outsiders, the Court condemned such conduct and declared:
In this State a parent may not be denied the right to see and have conversation with a child in jail and accused of crime. Neither may police, having custody of one accused of crime, deny an attorney, employed by or in behalf of a prisoner, the right to see and advise the accused. [Id. at 688. Emphasis added.]
This Court has previously recognized that Cavanaugh, although not specifying which constitutional provision it was applying, must have been referring to the state constitutional guarantee of "due process of law” then contained in Const 1908, art 2, § 16, and now embodied in Const 1963, art 1, § 17. See People v Conte, 421 Mich 704, 722; 365 NW2d 648 (1984). But Cavanaugh also declared that the police conduct violated the right of an accused "to have the assistance of counsel,” Cavanaugh, 246 Mich 686, a phrase taken verbatim from Const 1908, art 2, § 19, the antecedent of Const 1963, art 1, § 20. It seems clear that the Cavanaugh Court employed the general phrase, "due process of law,” to refer to then § 16 (now § 17) and the more specific phrase, "the assistance of counsel,” to refer to then § 19 (now § 20). In any event, it is clear that Cavanaugh, in view of its reference to the law "[i]n this State,” id. at 688 (emphasis added), was not referring to any rights under the federal constitution; rather, it was referring to the rights existing under our state constitution.3___
*159The United States Supreme Court, in Moran v Burbine, supra, stated that while the police conduct at issue did not violate the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would prohibit such conduct after that right has attached:
It is clear, of course, that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially attaches. And we readily agree that once the right has attached, it follows that the police may not interfere with the efforts of a defendant’s attorney to act as a " 'medium’ between [the suspect] and the State” during the interrogation. [475 US 428. Emphasis in original; citations omitted.]
In Michigan, the federal limitation on when the right to counsel attaches, enunciated in Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972), was at least partially rejected in People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973), and People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323, 338; 217 NW2d 22 (1974) ("independent of any Federal constitutional mandate, . . . both before and after commencement of the judicial phase of a prosecution, a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel at a corporeal identification or a photographic identification . . .”). Although Jackson and Anderson were not explicitly premised on either the Sixth Amendment or Const 1963, art 1, *160§ 20, they support the view that prearraignment events can trigger our state constitutional right to counsel.
The Kirby restriction on the right to counsel is an arbitrary one and should not be adopted for purposes of interpreting the Michigan Constitution. The arbitrariness of the limitation is demonstrated by Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285; 108 S Ct 2389; 101 L Ed 2d 261 (1988), where the Court held that postindictment Miranda waivers are sufficient only until an actual attorney-client relationship is established. The Court emphasized that nothing changed at the time of formal charging if there was no attorney-client relationship yet established:
We note as a matter of some significance that petitioner had not retained, or accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned by authorities. Once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship takes effect. [Patterson, 487 US 290, n 3.]
The converse must also hold true: If an attorney-client relationship exists before arraignment, nothing will change at the time of arraignment to cause the right to counsel to suddenly blossom where none existed before. Our Court has correctly recognized that there are "critical stages” in prosecution that can occur before formal charging. See, e.g., Anderson and Jackson, supra. In my view, custodial interrogation of an accused who is represented by counsel is just such a situation.4 And the *161police can be held accountable for knowing that the accused is represented by counsel "to the extent that the attorney or the suspect informs the police of the representation.” Moran, 475 US 460, n 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).5
*162II
My Brother Mallett, in summarizing his analysis, states:
[W]e conclude that Mr. Wright did not make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights when the police, before he made a statement, refused to inform him that retained counsel tried or was currently trying to contact him. [Ante, p 153.]
Yet, in concluding his opinion, my colleague limits this sound rule, without explanation, to situations where the police withhold "information of retained counsel’s in-person efforts to contact a suspect.” Ante, p 154 (emphasis added). I would not so limit the rule established by today’s decision.
In my view, the difference between telephone contact and in-person contact by an attorney does not rise to the level of constitutional significance. Moran v Burbine itself involved telephone contact, and neither the majority nor the dissent in that case appeared to vest any importance in that fact. See 475 US 420 (describing the question presented); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting *163that the suspect "was not told that his attorney had phoned”) (emphasis added). This does not mean that police would necessarily be required to permit the attorney to advise the suspect over the telephone:
The state constitutional right to counsel requires that police relay a message — however received— that the suspect’s attorney wishes to speak with him. If upon receiving that message the suspect indicates his desire to speak with counsel, questioning must cease. The police may still insist that the attorney come to the station before the attorney may speak with the suspect. [People v Houston, 42 Cal 3d 595, 616; 230 Cal Rptr 141; 724 P2d 1166 (1986).]
Rather, as one court has held:
The key factor should be whether the attorney has reasonably informed the police that he represents the suspect and not the methodology by which the police are informed. [People v McCauley, 228 Ill App 3d 893, —; 595 NE2d 583, 586 (1992).]
I agree with Justice Mallett that the police conduct in this case was "reprehensible and unconstitutional.” Ante, p 155. But I do not see how the reprehensibility or unconstitutionality of this type of conduct is materially affected by whether the suspect’s attorney attempts to contact his client in person or by telephone. Drawing such fine distinctions does not serve the goal of providing law enforcement officials with clear guidance regarding their constitutional responsibilities. I would hold simply that if an attorney takes diligent steps to inform the police that he represents and wishes to contact a suspect held in custody, the police must take prompt and diligent steps to inform the sus*164pect of that fact, or render subsequent statements by the suspect inadmissible as taken in derogation of the right to counsel.

 I agree with my colleague’s reliance, for persuasive support, upon the decisions of other state courts that have rejected the reasoning of Moran v Burbine. See ante, pp 148-152.1 would add to those cases the recent decision by an Illinois appellate court in People v McCauley, 228 Ill App 3d 893; 595 NE2d 583 (1992).

 In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense .... [Const 1963, art 1, § 20.]
There is some overlap between the privilege against self-incrimination (commonly referred to as "Miranda rights,” see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 [1966]) and the right to counsel. The two rights, however, "vindicate different interests .... While Miranda concerns compulsion, the right to counsel cases are concerned with the integrity of the adversarial process.” Loewy, Police-obtained evidence and the constitution: Distinguishing unconstitutionally obtained evidence from unconstitutionally used evidence, 87 Mich L R 907, 928 (1989).
The police deception in this case threatens the adversarial system by allowing the police to manipulate the interrogation process. The police can, thanks to this Court’s decision in People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), purposely delay the arraignment of a suspect. Now we are being asked to sanction police efforts, during that prearraignment period, to obstruct the suspect’s lawyer’s attempts to contact and advise his client, and to keep the suspect in the dark about the lawyer’s attempts.

 In 1929, the federal privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel had not yet been held to apply to the states. See, e.g., Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78; 29 S Ct 14; 53 L Ed 97 (1908) (refusing to apply the federal privilege against self-incrimination to the states); Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45; 53 S Ct 55; 77 L Ed 158 *159(1932) (applying only a limited version of the federal right to counsel to the states); Betts v Brady, 316 US 455; 62 S Ct 1252; 86 L Ed 1595 (1942) (same); Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (overruling Betts and at last applying the federal right to counsel in full force to the states); Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964) (overruling Twining and at last applying the federal privilege against self-incrimination in full force to the states).

 The dissent suggests that this view of our state constitutional right to counsel is precluded by dicta appearing in People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich 39, 52; 365 NW2d 56 (1984), and People v Crusoe, 433 Mich 666, 685-686; 449 NW2d 641 (1989). See Riley, J„ *161post, p 173, n 4. This Court in Bladel was not presented with the issue when the right to counsel attaches for state constitutional purposes, because it was undisputed that the interrogations in Bladel took place subsequent to arraignment, and that the right to counsel, even under the more restrictive federal Sixth Amendment standard, had clearly attached. See Bladel, 421 Mich 45-46, 52. My opinion for the Court in Bladel simply cited the prevailing federal rule; I did not suggest that a different interpretation of the state constitution was foreclosed. Any such suggestion would have been mere dicta in any event. Likewise, in Crusoe, the Court merely referred to the prevailing federal rule, and did not engage in any analysis of whether the state constitutional right to counsel should be interpreted differently. In any event, I continue to believe that Crusoe was wrongly decided. See Crusoe, 433 Mich 697-709 (Cavanagh, J., joined by Levin and Archer, JJ., dissenting). My own reference, in my Crusoe dissent, to the prevailing federal rule regarding attachment of the right to counsel, was, as in Bladel, passing dicta unaccompanied by analysis. That reference occurred in a footnote explaining why it was "unnecessary to review” the question whether a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel violation occurred in that case. See id. at 698, n 1 (emphasis added).

 Justice Mallett, applying his self-incrimination analysis, states that "[w]e must determine . . . whether defendant’s statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.” Ante, p 147 (emphasis added). More precisely stated, the inquiry is whether the defendant’s waiver of his rights was voluntary. That question does ultimately turn on a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. However, the essence of my colleague’s holding, as I perceive it, is that the type of police deception and interference with the right to counsel presented by this case is alone sufficient to render the waiver involuntary, without regard to other obtaining circumstances. This is consistent with Justice Stevens’ persuasive reasoning in his dissent in Moran v Burbine, 475 US 450-456.
Under my right-to-counsel approach, of course, it is unnecessary to address any question of "voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances,” nor is it necessary to address, as Justices Stevens and Mallett do, whether the suspect’s knowledge that his attorney is immediately available and trying to contact him is sufficiently important, in context, to render the suspect’s waiver of rights generally invalid for self-incrimination purposes when the police withhold or conceal that crucial knowledge. The fact that the defendant in this case purported to waive, in general terms, his right to counsel, is simply irrelevant under my analysis. A defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive his speciñc right to speak with an attorney who is immediately available and trying to contact him, when he is unaware that the attorney is available and trying to contact him. *162Because I would hold that a suspect faced with custodial interrogation has the specific right, as part of his overall right to counsel, to be informed of his attorney’s attempts to contact him, a waiver of that right cannot be valid when the police merely inform the suspect, in generalized terms, that he has the right to a lawyer if he wishes. Rather, the waiver can only be valid if the suspect is timely and accurately informed of his attorney’s immediate availability and attempts to contact him, and then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to see the attorney.
Once it is established that a statement has been obtained in derogation of the right to counsel, it is, of course, automatically subject to exclusion on that ground. See, e.g., Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 397; 97 S Ct 1232; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977) (noting that right-to-counsel holding rendered it "unnecessary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that Williams’ self-incriminating statements were, indeed, voluntarily made”); Massiah v United States, 377 US 201; 84 S Ct 1199; 12 L Ed 2d 246 (1964).