Court Opinion

ID: 9404349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 19:10:32.229755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.258704
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re L.R.-L., 2023-Ohio-2071.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[In re: L.R.-L.,                                  :

                                                  :          No. 22AP-381
                                                        (C.P.C. No. 19JU-12209)
E.D., Mother,                                     :
                                                       (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                 Appellant.]                      :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on June 22, 2023

                 On brief: William T. Cramer, for appellant.

                 On brief: Jessica M. Ismond, for appellee Franklin County
                 Children Services.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                       Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch
LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, E.D. (“mother”), appeals a judgment of the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, that terminated her
parental rights and granted permanent custody of her daughter, L.R.-L., to Franklin County
Children Services (“FCCS” or “the agency”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} Mother gave birth to L.R.-L. on July 24, 2019. Mother and L.R.-L.’s father,
L.R.-L., III (“father”), were not married at the time of L.R.-L.’s birth. Father established his
paternity of L.R.-L. by completing a paternity affidavit.
        {¶ 3} Prior to L.R.-L.’s birth, FCCS had removed three of mother’s children from
her custody.       In random drug screens mother completed from August 23 through
November 13, 2018, mother consistently tested positive for marijuana. Mother admitted
to FCCS that she uses marijuana to relieve stress. Mother did not complete any drug
No. 22AP-381                                                                             2

screens between November 13, 2018 and L.R.-L.’s birth on July 24, 2019. In the months
before L.R.-L.’s birth, mother reported to FCCS that she was receiving Suboxone to treat
her drug addiction. Mother, however, did not test positive for Suboxone at L.R.-L.’s birth.
Instead, when L.R.-L. was born, mother tested positive for marijuana and Oxycodone.
L.R.-L. tested positive for Suboxone and Oxycodone, and suffered from withdrawal
symptoms, including minor tremors and excessive sucking.
       {¶ 4} Two days after L.R.-L.’s birth, FCCS filed a complaint alleging that L.R.-L.
was an abused, neglected, and dependent child based on the facts set forth above. FCCS
also sought and received an emergency care order for L.R.-L. A magistrate granted FCCS a
temporary order of custody for L.R.-L. on July 29, 2019.
       {¶ 5} The trial court dismissed the July 26, 2019 complaint because a dispositional
hearing did not occur within 90 days of the filing of the complaint as required by R.C.
2151.35(B)(1). FCCS refiled the complaint on October 21, 2019. In addition to the facts
alleged in the original complaint, the refiled complaint stated mother had completed 3 drug
screens at her drug treatment center after L.R.-L.’s birth. Those screens were positive for
Suboxone, noroxycodone, oxycodone, oxymorphone, and marijuana. On September 13,
2019, mother also began screening through American Court Services, and all those drug
screens tested positive for Suboxone and marijuana.
       {¶ 6} On December 10, 2019, a magistrate held a combined adjudicatory and
dispositional hearing regarding L.R.-L. Neither parent attended the hearing. In a decision
issued December 30, 2019, the magistrate found that, based on the uncontested facts
alleged in the complaint, L.R.-L. was abused as defined in R.C. 2151.031(C) and (D),
neglected as defined in R.C. 2151.03(A)(2), and dependent as defined in R.C. 2151.04(C).
The magistrate made L.R.-L. a ward of the court and committed her to the temporary
custody of FCCS. Finally, the magistrate approved and adopted the case plan, and made
the case plan an order of the court. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision in
whole without modification.
       {¶ 7} On November 30, 2020, FCCS moved for permanent custody of L.R.-L. The
trial court held a hearing on FCCS’s motion on May 23 and 24, 2022. Mother, father, the
FCCS caseworker assigned to the family, and the guardian ad litem for L.R.-L. testified at
that hearing.
No. 22AP-381                                                                                3

       {¶ 8} In a judgment dated June 9, 2022, the trial court granted FCCS permanent
custody of L.R.-L. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that, pursuant to
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), L.R.-L. had been in FCCS’s custody for 12 months out of a consecutive
22-month period and awarding FCCS permanent custody was in L.R.-L.’s best interest.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 9} Mother appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error for our
review:
              [I.] The agency failed to make intensive efforts to identify and
              engage kinship caregivers and the juvenile court failed to make
              the findings necessary to relieve the agency of that obligation.

              [II.] The weight of the evidence does not support a grant of
              permanent custody to the agency.

III. Analysis
       {¶ 10} By the first assignment of error, mother argues FCCS and the trial court failed
to comply with a recently enacted statutory scheme designed to secure kinship caregivers
for children who are in FCCS’s temporary custody. We conclude that mother has failed to
show any non-compliance that constitutes reversible error.
       {¶ 11} R.C. 2151.4115 through 2151.4122 (the “Kinship Caregiver Act”) became
effective on September 30, 2021. The Act requires a public children services agency, such
as FCCS, to “make intensive efforts to identify and engage an appropriate and willing
kinship caregiver for the care of a child who is in [the] [t]emporary custody of the agency.”
R.C. 2151.4116(A). A “kinship caregiver” includes individuals related to the child by blood
or adoption, such as grandparents or siblings, as well as stepparents and stepsiblings, legal
custodians or guardians, and “[a]ny nonrelative adult that has a familiar and long-standing
relationship or bond with the child or the family, which relationship or bond will ensure the
child’s social ties.”   R.C. 5101.85(F); R.C. 2151.4115(A)(1) (adopting the definition of
“kinship caregiver” in R.C. 5101.85 for application to R.C. 2151.4116 through 2151.4122).
       {¶ 12} Once a child is in an agency’s temporary custody, the juvenile court must
determine at every hearing regarding the child whether the agency has satisfied its duty to
use intensive efforts to identify and engage an appropriate and willing kinship caregiver.
R.C. 2151.4117. However, the juvenile court may issue an order relieving the agency of its
obligation to exercise intensive efforts if it determines that continuation of the child’s
No. 22AP-381                                                                                4

current placement is in the child’s best interest and that continued intensive efforts are
unnecessary based on the findings in R.C. 2151.4119. R.C. 2151.4118. To issue an order
relieving the agency of its statutory obligation under R.C. 2151.4116, the juvenile court must
find: (1) “[t]he child has been living in a stable home environment with the child’s current
caregivers for the past twelve consecutive months,” (2) “[t]he current caregivers have
expressed interest in providing permanency for the child,” and (3) “[t]he removal of the
child from the current caregivers would be detrimental to the child’s emotional well-being.”
R.C. 2151.4119(A) through (C). If the juvenile court makes the findings under R.C.
2151.4119, then the juvenile court and the public children services agency “may consider the
child’s current caregiver as having a kin relationship with the child and at an equal standing
to other kin in regards to permanency.” R.C. 2151.4120.
       {¶ 13} In the case at bar, L.R.-L. entered FCCS’s temporary custody on July 29,
2019—over two years before the Kinship Caregiver Act became effective. Nevertheless,
FCCS attempted to locate and engage a kinship caregiver for L.R.-L. FCCS considered L.R.-
L.’s paternal grandmother, but she informed the agency she was unable to care for L.R.-L.
L.R.-L.’s maternal grandmother was already caring for L.R.-L.’s three siblings, and she
could not care for a fourth child. L.R.-L.’s maternal grandfather declined a home study,
stating he had health issues.
       {¶ 14} Although FCCS considered L.R.-L.’s paternal aunt, it rejected her as a
possible kinship caregiver because she had an open educational neglect case with FCCS,
and she was not compliant with her own case plan. FCCS also rejected a friend of mother’s
who expressed interest in caring for L.R.-L. Mother did not share the friend’s name with
FCCS until 2021, when L.R.-L. was in her second year of living with her foster parents.
FCCS determined that L.R.-L. had bonded with her foster parents and transferring her to a
stranger’s care would cause L.R.-L. emotional harm. Consequently, FCCS did not consider
placing L.R.-L. with mother’s friend.
       {¶ 15} Finally, FCCS did not place L.R.-L. with the paternal grandfather’s girlfriend.
FCCS initially considered the girlfriend a few months after it received temporary custody of
L.R.-L., but the girlfriend withdrew from consideration when she and the grandfather
separated. In 2021, the now ex-girlfriend again contacted FCCS about caring for L.R.-L.
FCCS, however, did not consider the ex-girlfriend as a potential placement for L.R.-L. at
No. 22AP-381                                                                                   5

that time. FCCS had the same concerns that it had with mother’s friend regarding upsetting
L.R.-L.’s emotional well-being. By 2021, L.R.-L. had bonded with her foster parents, and
FCCS determined that transferring her to the ex-girlfriend’s care would cause emotional
harm.
        {¶ 16} On appeal, mother contends FCCS violated its obligation under R.C.
2151.4116 because it rejected mother’s friend and the ex-girlfriend as kinship caregivers for
L.R.-L. in 2021. The record, however, does not clearly establish whether R.C. 2151.4116 was
in effect when FCCS considered mother’s friend and the ex-girlfriend as caregivers for L.R.-
L.   As we stated above, the Kinship Caregiver Act did not become effective until
September 30, 2021. The caseworker assigned to L.R.-L.’s family testified that FCCS
evaluated mother’s friend and the ex-girlfriend as potential placements for L.R.-L. in 2021,
but she could not pinpoint a more specific date. Consequently, mother failed to prove that
the Kinship Caregiver Act yet applied to FCCS when it decided not to place L.R.-L. with
mother’s friend or the ex-girlfriend.
        {¶ 17} Second, mother contends the trial court erred by not making the findings
necessary to relieve FCCS of its obligation to exercise intensive efforts under R.C. 2151.4116.
We are not persuaded by this argument because the timing of this case made the findings
moot.
        {¶ 18} The purpose of the Kinship Caregiver Act is to compel agencies to exercise
intensive efforts to place children who are in their temporary custody in kinship care rather
than in foster care. R.C. 2151.4116. Nevertheless, the Kinship Caregiver Act grants the
juvenile court the authority to allow the cessation of efforts to find a kinship caregiver if the
court makes certain findings. R.C. 2151.4118. These findings recognize that the time a child
spends in the care of foster parents can affect a child’s best interest regarding her placement
while in FCCS’s temporary custody. See R.C. 2151.4119(A) through (C).
        {¶ 19} Here, the trial court could have made the determination to relieve FCCS from
its R.C. 2151.4116 statutory obligation because the court had evidence before it to make all
the necessary R.C. 2151.4119 findings. According to the evidence adduced at trial, L.R.-L.
had lived in her foster home for over two years, that home was a prospective adoptive home,
and FCCS feared that L.R.-L.’s removal from the foster home to live with strangers would
harm her well-being.
No. 22AP-381                                                                                   6

       {¶ 20} This case, however, is complicated by the fact that the Kinship Caregiver Act
became effective over two years after L.R.-L. entered FCCS’s temporary custody and her
foster parents’ care. Due to that timing, the issue of FCCS’s efforts to find kinship care for
L.R.-L. first arose at the permanent custody hearing. Once a child enters the permanent
custody of a public children services agency, the question of whether the child should reside
in foster care or with a kinship caregiver while the child is in the agency’s temporary custody
becomes moot.       Consequently, the trial court’s ruling granting FCCS’s motion for
permanent custody rendered the question of who would care for L.R.-L. while she was in
FCCS’s temporary custody moot. The trial court, therefore, did not err by failing to issue
an order relieving FCCS of the duty to exercise intensive efforts to identify and engage an
appropriate and willing kinship caregiver. Accordingly, we overrule mother’s first
assignment of error.
       {¶ 21} By the second assignment of error, mother argues the trial court’s decision to
grant permanent custody of L.R.-L. to FCCS is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We disagree.
       {¶ 22} An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court’s determination in a
permanent custody case unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Andy-
Jones, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1167, 2004-Ohio-3312, ¶ 28. “ ‘Weight of the evidence concerns
“the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one
side of the issue rather than the other. * * * Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on [the evidence’s] effect in inducing belief.” ’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Eastley v.
Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). Thus, in
reviewing a judgment under the manifest weight standard, an appellate court weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and
determines whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed
and a new trial ordered. Id. at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 23} Additionally, in conducting a manifest weight review, an appellate court must
make every reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s judgment and findings of
fact. Id. at ¶ 21. If the evidence is susceptible to more than one construction, an appellate
No. 22AP-381                                                                                 7

court must interpret it in the manner most consistent with the judgment. Id. Moreover,
“ ‘[t]he discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of
permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect,
given the nature of the proceedings and the impact the court’s determination will have on
the lives of the parties concerned.’ ” In re H.H., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-158, 2019-Ohio-4953,
¶ 49, quoting In re W.D., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-589, 2009-Ohio-6903, ¶ 34.
       {¶ 24} Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control
of their children. In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 39. However, the right
to parent one’s children is not absolute; it does not give a parent a right to abuse or neglect
a child. Id. at ¶ 40. The state has broad authority to intervene to protect children from
abuse and neglect. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing R.C. 2151.01.
An award of permanent custody, which terminates parental rights, is a last resort and is
only justified when it is necessary for the welfare of the child. In re L.B., 10th Dist. No.
19AP-644, 2020-Ohio-3045, ¶ 23.         Because granting permanent custody terminates
parental rights, “parents ‘must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the
law allows.’ ” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d
1, 16 (6th Dist.1991).
       {¶ 25} A juvenile court may grant permanent custody of a child to a public children
services agency “if the court determines * * *, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in
the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency * * * and
that any of the following apply:”
              (a) * * * [T]he child cannot be placed with either of the child’s
              parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
              the child’s parents.

              (b) The child is abandoned.

              (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child
              who are able to take permanent custody.

              (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
              public children services agencies or private child placing
              agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-
              two-month period * * *.
No. 22AP-381                                                                                    8

               (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or
               parents from whose custody the child has been removed has
               been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on
               three separate occasions by any court in this state or another
               state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e).
       {¶ 26} Once the juvenile court concludes that one of the circumstances in R.C.
2151.414(B)(1) applies, the court turns to R.C. 2151.414(D) to decide if a grant of permanent
custody is in the child’s best interest. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), in determining a
child’s best interest, the juvenile court “shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not
limited to, the following:”
               (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
               child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-
               home providers, and any other person who may significantly
               affect the child;

               (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child
               or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for
               the maturity of the child;

               (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the
               child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
               children services agencies or private child placing agencies for
               twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month
               period * * *;

               (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement
               and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
               grant of permanent custody to the agency;

               (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
               section apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).
       {¶ 27} Here, the trial court found that L.R.-L. met the criteria of R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(d), as she had been in FCCS’s temporary custody for 12 months of a
consecutive 22-month period when FCCS moved for permanent custody. After
consideration of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors, the trial court concluded that granting
FCCS permanent custody of L.R.-L. was in her best interest. On appeal, mother does not
contest the finding that L.R.-L. had been in FCCS’s custody for 12 out of 22 months. Rather,
No. 22AP-381                                                                               9

mother only argues the trial court erred in concluding it was in L.R.-L.’s best interest to
grant FCCS permanent custody.
       {¶ 28} Under the first best-interest factor, the trial court must consider “[t]he
interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly
affect the child.”   R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a).    Here, the trial court looked at L.R.-L.’s
relationship with her mother, as well as her foster family. According to the caseworker,
during visits L.R.-L. and mother play games, color pictures, and watch movies together.
L.R.-L. is comfortable with mother; she lets mother hug her and change her diaper or pull-
up. The caseworker testified that “there [is] some degree of bonding” between L.R.-L. and
mother. (May 23, 2022 Tr. at 160.)
       {¶ 29} On the other hand, the caseworker described L.R.-L. as “[c]lose” to her foster
mother and father. (May 23, 2022 Tr. at 162.) The guardian ad litem concurred that L.R.-
L. and her foster parents share a “strong bond.” (May 24, 2022 Tr. at 21.) L.R.-L. calls her
foster mother “mom” and her foster father “[d]ad” or “[d]addy.” (May 23, 2022 Tr. at 162.)
L.R.-L. goes to her foster parents to fulfill her basic needs, which the trial court found
demonstrates that she views them as her primary parents and caregivers. L.R.-L. is also
close with her foster parents’ two biological children, and she takes a tumbling class with
her foster sister. The foster home is the only home L.R.-L. has ever known, and it is a
prospective adoptive home for L.R.-L.
       {¶ 30} Mother asserts that because both she and the foster family have a good
relationship and bond with L.R.-L., the first factor “appears to be a draw.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 28.) This assessment of the evidence ignores that the trial court also considered
the sporadic nature of mother’s visits with L.R.-L. while she was in FCCS’s temporary
custody. Indeed, in reviewing the first best-interest factor, a court may consider both the
bond between the parent and child, and the consistency of a parent’s visitation with a child.
In re M.W., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-769, 2020-Ohio-5199, ¶ 21.
       {¶ 31} In this case, mother failed to consistently visit L.R.-L. The caseworker
removed mother from the visitation schedule more than once for missing visits with L.R.-
L. Mother wanted FCCS to pay for cab rides to transport her to the visitation center, but
she failed to provide the requested documentation from her physician confirming a medical
No. 22AP-381                                                                               10

need for them. In January 2022, mother attended one in-person visit and one virtual visit.
In February 2022, mother attended one in-person visit. Mother did not visit with L.R.-L.
again before the permanent custody hearing commenced on May 23, 2022.
       {¶ 32} Under the second best-interest factor, the trial court must consider “[t]he
wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad
litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). Here, the trial
court found, in accordance with the guardian ad litem’s testimony, that L.R.-L. could not
express her wishes due to her young age. At the time of the hearing, L.R.-L. was only two
years old. The guardian ad litem recommended the trial court grant FCCS permanent
custody of L.R.-L., and she opined that an award of permanent custody to FCCS was in L.R.-
L.’s best interest.
       {¶ 33} Under the third best-interest factor, the trial court must consider “[t]he
custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody
of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). With
regard to L.R.-L.’s custodial history, the trial court found L.R.-L. had been in FCCS’s
temporary custody for 14 months and 3 days when FCCS filed its motion for permanent
custody. L.R.-L. had been in FCCS’s temporary custody for over 2 years and 6 months when
the permanent custody hearing started. In her appellate brief, mother concedes that the
third best-interest factor does not favor her because L.R.-L. has spent almost all her life in
FCCS’s temporary custody.
       {¶ 34} Under the fourth best-interest factor, the trial court must consider “[t]he
child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement
can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.” R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(d). In considering this factor, the trial court examined whether mother
could provide a legally secure permanent placement for L.R.-L.
       {¶ 35} The court-ordered case plan required mother to complete certain objectives
in order to remedy the conditions that led to L.R.-L.’s removal from mother’s custody.
Those objectives included: undergoing a mental health assessment and alcohol and other
drugs assessment, and following through with any recommendations; completing random
drug screens; taking parenting classes; maintaining a relationship with L.R.-L.; and
No. 22AP-381                                                                               11

obtaining appropriate housing and a legal source of income in order to provide for L.R.-L.’s
basic needs.
       {¶ 36} Mother completed alcohol and other drugs assessments at three different
facilities, and all three assessments resulted in a recommendation that she complete drug
treatment. Over the years, mother has received medical-assisted drug treatment at four
different facilities, but has not completed treatment at any of the facilities. In random drug
screens mother completed in 2019 through 2021 at different drug treatment facilities,
mother tested positive for drugs mother was not prescribed. Mother also admittedly used
marijuana in 2021, and confessed to the caseworker she smoked marijuana to relax.
       {¶ 37} Mother’s drug treatment was interrupted twice during the period L.R.-L. was
in FCCS’s temporary custody. On January 4, 2021, L.R.-L.’s father shot mother in her face.
Although mother survived the shooting, she had to undergo multiple surgeries to repair the
damage caused by the bullet. In March 2021, mother had to leave a ten-day detox program
because her physicians did not want her to take both Suboxone for drug treatment and pain
medication for her injuries.
       {¶ 38} Next, on August 25, 2021, mother robbed a Family Dollar store while high on
methamphetamine.       Mother was jailed from August 25 to November 4, 2021.              On
November 4, 2021, mother pled guilty to one count of robbery, a second-degree felony. The
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentenced mother to four years of community
control, and it required mother to complete any behavioral health assessments as
determined by the Adult Probation Department and comply with any recommended
treatment, as well as submit to random urine screens. If mother violates community
control, she will receive an indefinite prison sentence of four to six years.
       {¶ 39} The Adult Probation Department required mother to undergo an alcohol and
other drugs assessment at Community Medical Services. Since April 2022, mother has
attended medical-assisted drug treatment at Community Medical Services as part of her
community control.
       {¶ 40} Although mother completes random drug screens as required by the Adult
Probation Department, mother does not complete random drug screens for FCCS. Mother
last completed a random drug screen for FCCS in October 2019.
No. 22AP-381                                                                               12

       {¶ 41} The caseworker made multiple referrals so mother could undergo a mental
health assessment at Forum Ohio. Mother did not appear for any of the scheduled
appointments. Sometime prior to January 8, 2021, mother reported to the caseworker that
she was receiving mental health counseling at Access Ohio. Through Access Ohio, mother
was receiving medication to treat her depression and anxiety. However, in April 2021,
mother terminated all mental health treatment. Mother asserts that in March 2022 she
attended an intake appointment for mental health treatment at Southeast Healthcare.
Mother is currently waiting for Southeast Healthcare to schedule a mental health
assessment for her.
       {¶ 42} Mother lives with her father. She has been unemployed since December
2020. According to mother, she is disabled due to the shooting and a car accident that
occurred in January 2022. As a result of the shooting, mother is blind in her right eye, and
she suffers from balance and memory issues. Mother states the car accident permanently
damaged her back and neck. For financial support, mother relies on her family and $250
a month in food stamps. Mother is attempting to obtain disability payments and expects
to receive a monetary settlement as a result of the January 2022 car accident. Mother also
believes that L.R.-L.’s father would provide her with financial assistance if she received
custody of L.R.-L.
       {¶ 43} As mother points out in her appellate brief, she has attended parenting
classes. Additionally, the home she shares with her father, L.R.-L.’s maternal grandfather,
is safe and appropriate for L.R.-L. Mother has purchased a bed and clothing for L.R.-L.
Although mother has relapsed, she ultimately returned to drug treatment. In all these
respects, mother has complied with the case plan. Moreover, from mother’s testimony, it
is clear mother loves L.R.-L. and wants to care for her.
       {¶ 44} However, a finding that a parent has satisfied some case plan goals does not
necessarily equate to a finding that the parent has the ability to assume custody of a child.
In re T.M., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-943, 2020-Ohio-815, ¶ 31. That is the problem here.
Mother’s battle against drug addiction continues unabated, and she has yet to demonstrate
that she can maintain her sobriety. Although mother has abundant love for L.R.-L., she still
lacks a stable income sufficient to provide for L.R.-L.’s needs, and she has not sustained her
mental health treatment.
No. 22AP-381                                                                                 13

       {¶ 45} Looking at all the evidence relevant to the fourth best-interest factor, the trial
court found mother could not provide a legally secure permanent placement for L.R.-L. We
conclude that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
       {¶ 46} Under the fifth best-interest factor, the trial court must consider “[w]hether
any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents
and child.” R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). The trial court found no R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through
(11) factors applied. Mother concurs.
       {¶ 47} After weighing all relevant factors, the trial court found that a grant of
permanent custody to FCCS was in L.R.-L.’s best interest. The manifest weight of the
evidence supports that finding. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 48} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule mother’s two assignments of error,
and we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
                                                                          Judgment affirmed.
                             MENTEL and BOGGS, JJ., concur.