Court Opinion

ID: 9882544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:26.581211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:20.110335
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bailey, 2023-Ohio-2919.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LAWRENCE COUNTY

State of Ohio,                               :   Case No. 22CA10

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                 DECISION AND
        v.                                   :   JUDGMENT ENTRY

Linessa R. Bailey,                           :

        Defendant-Appellant.                 :   RELEASED 8/17/2023

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Autumn D. Adams, Adams Legal, LLC, Toledo, Ohio, for appellant.

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea M.
Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for
appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Linessa R. Bailey appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Court

of Common Pleas convicting her, following a guilty plea, of reckless homicide. In her sole

assignment of error, Bailey contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

However, she failed in her burden to show that counsel’s performance was both deficient

and prejudicial. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                             I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        {¶2}     On January 26, 2022, the Lawrence County grand jury indicted Bailey on

two counts: Count One, complicity to trafficking in marijuana, a fifth-degree felony, and

Count Two, complicity to involuntary manslaughter, a first-degree felony. Bailey initially
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                  2

pleaded not guilty but then entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. After she

was found competent to stand trial, Bailey pleaded guilty to Count Two, which was

amended to a charge of reckless homicide, a third-degree felony. Before the change of

plea hearing, Bailey answered a series of questions in a “proceeding on plea of guilty”

form. One question stated: “Were any promises, threats or inducements made to you to

persuade you to plead guilty?” Bailey wrote, “No.” During the change of plea hearing,

Bailey and defense counsel told the court they believed her answers on the form were

true and correct. However, also during the hearing, after moving to amend Count Two,

the assistant prosecutor stated:

      STATE: * * * We anticipate a change of plea to guilty to that amended
      charge, Judge. If she does that, we’ll ask you to dismiss Count 1. And the
      agreed upon sentence recommendation for the Court to consider is three
      years in the approp… two years in the appropriate penal institution, excuse
      me. Uh, test…

                                            ***

      STATE: …testify truthfully at trial for [Aaron] Scott, and uh, the State will not
      resist a judicial release at one year pending a clean institutional report and
      the Court’s discretion.

The trial court granted the motion to amend, Bailey pleaded guilty to Count Two as

amended, and the trial court accepted the plea.

      {¶3}   A few weeks later, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The

attorneys who represented the state at this hearing did not represent the state at the

change of plea hearing. After the victim’s sister addressed the court, the parties made

the following statements:

      STATE: Your Honor, this is a negotiated plea and sentence. Our
      recommendation is three years in the appropriate penal institution. She…
      the Defendant pled guilty to an amended indictment * * *. Uh, the State has
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                   3

       agreed that we will not oppose a judicial release after one year, in exchange
       for her testimony in the Aaron Scott trial, which she did fulfill.

                                            ***

       DEFENSE: Your Honor, we find ourselves in a predicament at this point. I
       won’t go through the facts, the Court’s heard them. The Court heard the
       trial of Aaron Scott, and the Court knows fully went [sic] on at the --at the
       scene that day. Uhm, what I will ask the Court to do… and [the prosecutor]
       is right, that was a negotiated plea. Uh, that is --is the agreement, but I just
       want the Court to consider all of the factors. All the other… the co-defendant
       in this case, and just to make a decision and the sentence and equitable
       [sic] in this case.”

The court asked Bailey whether she wanted to say anything before the court imposed

sentence, and she apologized to the victim’s family.

       {¶4}   The court announced that after considering the statements of counsel, the

defendant, and the victim’s sister, weighing “the purposes and principles of sentencing”

in R.C. 2929.11 and “seriousness and recidivism factors” in R.C. 2929.12, and “following

the guidance of” R.C. 2929.13, the court was adopting “the recommended sentence” and

sentencing Bailey to 36 months in prison—the maximum term allowed. R.C.

2929.14(A)(3)(b) (“For a felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division

(A)(3)(a) of this section applies, the prison term shall be a definite term of nine, twelve,

eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, or thirty-six months”). The court explained Bailey’s right to

appeal and asked her to consult with defense counsel about whether she wanted to

exercise that right. Then, the following occurred:

       DEFENSE: (Consults with client) (Defense speaks to State) That’s right,
       you did do that. You said you’d drop it to two years, out in one.

       STATE: Let me see what I have. That’s not what my notes say.

       DEFENSE: Well, we talked about it out in the hallway. (Pause) And I was
       trying to get you to come down to Community Control.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                               4

     STATE: I mean, I didn’t have that in here * * *.

     COURT: (Speaking to Court Reporter) Do you have anything in your notes
     from the sentencing hearing as the what the State [sic]…

     COURT REPORTER: (Unintelligible) started before I got here.

     COURT: Oh, that’s fine. I just wondered if… I just wondered if anything
     was announced that you may written down because I don’t anything [sic] on
     my case information sheet.

     DEFENSE: I remember the conversation now that Ms. Bailey reminded me
     of it.

     STATE: Was that June 1st? Or June 6th? Because my notes reflect that
     that was the deal.

     COURT: Well, here’s… I may be able to help you all out in this a little bit
     because if it was twenty-four months instead of thirty-six month [sic], with
     not a… no opposition to J.R. after twelve months, are you going to join in
     that recommendation? Are you still going to ask the Court to sentence…

     DEFENSE: Well, I know the answer to that now.

     COURT: Well, I’m just asking. Does that make… because that will make a
     difference in the grand scheme of things.

     DEFENSE: Yes, Your Honor. We would join in that recommendation, if
     that’s what we made, and I do recall us having that conversation uh, out in
     the hallway. And I did…

     COURT: Because right now, there is… I mean… because if you noticed,
     when I sentenced on that I said in accordance with the State’s
     recommendation because I didn’t have a joinder on that recommendation
     from you. So it’s not truly a jointly recommended sentence that has been
     imposed by the Court at this time.

     DEFENSE: Right.

     COURT: So…

     STATE:       Because he wasn’t going to abide by whatever the
     recommendation was from me, so I think it’s kind of… and my notes don’t
     indicate that. The only note I have is “[defense counsel] believes that he
     will continue to negotiate and try to get a better deal than current offer,” is
     what my notes say.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                                    5

        {¶5}    The court then stated: “All right. Well, my sentence has been set forth on

this case. I did not note in the record that it was jointly recommended because it was

not.” The court made comments about judicial release, and defense counsel asked for a

moment to consult with Bailey. After doing so, defense counsel stated: “Since I can’t get

an answer, I would suggest that appoint [sic] Ms. Bailey an attorney for appeal.” The

court stated that it would note Bailey wished to appeal. Defense counsel then stated,

“Well, now she’s telling me she doesn’t. So, I don’t know...” The court said, “Okay,” and

defense counsel said, “I don’t know.” The court said, “Well, safer better…” Bailey said,

“I’ll take the three years, and out in one. I’ll take the deal.” The court said: “Okay, safer

better than sorry. For right now, and purposes of the record, I am going to note that you

wish to appeal it. You can always change your mind.”

        {¶6}    Subsequently, the trial court issued a judgment entry sentencing Bailey to

36 months in prison on Count Two as amended. The court noted that the state would

“consider a judicial release once the defendant has completed twelve (12) months of

incarceration” but that “judicial release is at the sole discretion of the Court.” The court

also stated that it granted the state’s motion to nolle Count One.

                                   II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        {¶7}    Bailey presents one assignment of error:

        Bailey suffered ineffective assistance of counsel when her defense counsel
        jointly recommended a sentencing that was the maximum sentence that
        could be imposed even though Bailey agreed to a guilty plea in exchange
        for a two-year prison sentence and testifying against her co-defendant.1

1 We have taken the assignment of error from page two of Bailey’s appellate brief.     However, we observe
that on page ii, Bailey states that her “Assignment of Error and Argument in Favor of Reversal” is: “The
State failed to fulfill [its] promise to recommend a 2-year prison sentence and Appellant suffered ineffective
assistance of counsel when the State reneged on [its] plea sentencing recommendation and trial counsel
joined in that modified sentencing recommendation.”
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                  6

                    III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

                                A. Positions of the Parties

       {¶8}   In her sole assignment of error, Bailey contends she received ineffective

assistance of counsel when defense counsel “jointly recommended” the maximum

sentence even though she had agreed to plead guilty “in exchange for a two-year prison

sentence and testifying against her co-defendant.” In her argument, Bailey asserts that

she entered into the plea agreement in good faith and fulfilled her duties under it. She

asserts that the state acted in bad faith by reneging on its promise to recommend a two-

year sentence, “[e]ven if it was inadvertent bad faith due to poor record keeping.” Bailey

suggests that pursuant to Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.E.2d

427 (1971), the breach entitled her to either specific performance of the plea agreement

and sentencing by a different judge or an opportunity to withdraw her plea. Bailey

maintains that “the State should have been held to [its] duties and [defense counsel’s]

refusal to hold the State to [its] duties and to actually join in the recommendation for her

to receive the maximum sentence is a clear violation of reasonable representation.”

Bailey asserts that defense counsel “could have asked for a recess to review the transcript

from the plea hearing” or taken her “into the hallway to address this new recommendation

once the State refused to budge from [its] 3-year recommendation.” She claims defense

counsel “failed to adequately represent her when he not only agreed to recommend a

maximum sentence but also failed to explain to Bailey the ramifications of this new

sentencing recommendation and her options based upon the State backing out of [its]

promise.” Bailey asserts that “[o]ne factor the trial judge takes into consideration when
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                    7

fashioning a sentence is the recommendation for the sentence” and that her sentence

“could have been 12-months shorter had the State fulfilled [its] promises.”

       {¶9}   The state contends defense counsel was not ineffective because counsel

did not join the state’s sentencing recommendation. The state asserts defense counsel

“only joined the recommendation by the State if it was the offer that was made,” and the

trial court “clearly stated” that the sentence it imposed “was not a joint recommended

sentence.” The state also asserts Bailey cannot show prejudice because Bailey herself

“took the offer recommended by the State at her sentencing hearing” when she stated,

“I’ll take the three years, and out in one. I’ll take the deal.”

                                   B. Standard of Review

       {¶10} To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show: “(1)

deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard

of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different.” State v. Short, 129

Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 113, citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Failure

to satisfy either part of the test is fatal to the claim. See Strickland at 697. The defendant

“has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed

competent.” State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 62.

We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                8

sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101,

76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.E. 83 (1955).

                                      C. Analysis

      {¶11} The assignment of error is based on an incorrect factual premise. The

assignment of error identifies counsel’s deficient performance as jointly recommending a

maximum sentence. However, defense counsel did not join the state’s recommendation

for a three-year sentence. After the state made its recommendation, defense counsel did

not recommend a specific sentence. Instead, defense counsel asked the court to make

an equitable decision.

      {¶12} The page of the sentencing transcript which Bailey cites for the position that

defense counsel jointly recommended a three-year sentence includes the following

exchange which occurred after the court had orally pronounced sentence:

      COURT: Well, here’s… I may be able to help you all out in this a little bit
      because if it was twenty-four months instead of thirty-six month [sic], with
      not a… no opposition to J.R. after twelve months, are you going to join in
      that recommendation? Are you still going to ask the Court to sentence…

      DEFENSE: Well, I know the answer to that now.

      COURT: Well, I’m just asking. Does that make… because that will make a
      difference in the grand scheme of things.

      DEFENSE: Yes, Your Honor. We would join in that recommendation, if
      that’s what we made, and I do recall us having that conversation uh, out in
      the hallway. And I did…

Although this exchange is confusing, we do not interpret defense counsel’s statement

that “[w]e would join in that recommendation, if that’s what we made” to mean that counsel

joined the state’s three-year sentence recommendation. It appears that defense counsel

was expressing a willingness to join a recommendation of 24 months, or 2 years, if the
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                    9

parties had previously agreed to make that recommendation. After defense counsel

made this statement, the trial court emphasized the fact that the 36-month sentence it

had imposed was not a jointly recommended sentence because the court did not “have a

joinder” on the state’s recommendation from defense counsel. Because defense counsel

did not join the state’s recommendation for a three-year sentence, Bailey cannot show

that defense counsel was deficient because counsel “jointly recommended a sentencing

that was the maximum sentence that could be imposed” as stated in the assignment of

error. Therefore, we conclude the assignment of error lacks merit.

       {¶13} We observe that in her appellate brief, Bailey identifies purported

deficiencies of defense counsel which go beyond the scope of the assignment of error.

She argues that defense counsel refused “to hold the State to [its] duties,” failed to request

“a recess to review the transcript from the plea hearing,” failed to take her “into the

hallway” to discuss the state’s new sentencing recommendation, and failed to explain to

her the ramifications of the new recommendation and the options she had. However, “we

are charged with deciding assignments of error, not mere arguments.” State v. Fannon,

2018-Ohio-5242, 117 N.E.3d 10, ¶ 135 (4th Dist.). See App.R. 16(A)(3) (an appellant’s

brief “shall include * * * [a] statement of the assignments of error presented for review,

with reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected”); App.R. 12(A)(1)(b)

(an appellate court “shall * * * [d]etermine the appeal on its merits on the assignments of

error set forth in the briefs under App. R. 16 * * * ”).

       {¶14} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the sole assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                  JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA10                                                                 10

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

         It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

         The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
LAWRENCE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into
execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.