Court Opinion

ID: 9680797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:50.204591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.562919
License: Public Domain

George Howard, Jr., Justice, dissenting. I am compelled to dissent in this case inasmuch as there were jurors who were excluded from serving on the jury that convicted the appellant simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious scruples against its infliction. The action of the trial court in excluding these jurors conflicts with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in reversing the death sentence in the case of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, where the Court stated: . . Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the hands of a tribunal so selected. “Whatever else might be said of capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be squared with the Constitution. The State of Illinois has stacked the deck against the petitioner. To execute this death sentence would deprive him of his life without due process of law.” The following is an exchange between the prosecuting attorney, the court and prospective jurors regarding their position on the death sentence resulting in the exclusion of the jurors from serving by the court which does not square with the Witherspoon doctrine: MRS. BOBBIE HARRIS, Juror: “Q. Ma’am, this is a murder case, two counts of murder, and one of the penalties in it is the death penalty and that is what I am going to be asking for. I am going to be asking the jury if they find this man guilty, I am going to ask them to put him in the electric chair and turn the juice on him until he dies. The shock goes all through him. THE COURT: Let’s quit getting so__ You are trying to prejudice this juror. MR. BAYNE: No, sir, I am not. Q Could you consider, if you were a juror, could you consider the death penalty? A No, sir, I don’t believe I could. Q Could you consider it in any kind of case? Are there any circumstances where you could give the death penalty? A No. Q Is it against your religion, your way of thinking? A It is against the way I think. Q You couldn’t give that as a penalty? A I don’t believe so. MR. BAYNE: Judge I challenge her. THE COURT: Mrs. Harris, if you were selected as a juror and the evidence convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant was guilty, would you consider all of the punishments that are provided by law for the crime that he is charged with? JUROR: That he was proved guilty of — THE COURT: If you determine in your own mind that he is guilty from the evidence you have heard, would you then consider all of the punishments that you could impose, that you could give him. One of them being death, one of them life without parole, one of them just straight life or one five to fifty years. Would you consider all of those punishments before you made your mind up which one you wanted to give him? JUROR: I don’t believe I could. THE COURT: Ma’am. JUROR: I don’t believe I could give him the death penalty. THE COURT: Regardless of what the circumstances were. In other words, would you go in there now — would you say now, not even knowing what the facts are going to be, would you say that I am not going to give anybody the death penalty. I am talking about before you hear the evidence. JUROR: Well, I don’t know. I don’t think I could. THE COURT: You just don’t think you could give the death penalty under any circumstances. You have got your mind already made up that you are not going to give the death penalty? JUROR: No, sir, I haven’t made my mind up. THE COURT: Well, would you consider giving the death penalty if you found the man to be guilty as charged from the evidence you heard from the witness stand. JUROR: I guess so. THE COURT: You would consider giving him the death penalty or would you say, no, I am not going to give anybody the death penalty. I don’t care what he did. Now, you are the only one that can answer that question, Mrs. Harris. That’s the reason I am asking you. JUROR: I don’t believe I could. THE COURT: You wouldn’t even consider giving it. JUROR: No, sir, I don’t think I could. THE COURT: Okay. The Court will excuse you.” MRS. MARTHA YOUNG, Juror: “Q Do you have moral, ethical or religious beliefs against giving the death penalty? A Yes, sir. MR. BAYNE: Challenge for cause Your Honor. THE COURT: Mrs. Young, would you even consider all the punishments that are provided by law if you found this man guilty of the crime. In other words if you found him guilty, after you listened to the evidence and you found him guilty, would you consider all of the possible punishments which would include the death penalty? JUROR: Could I answer by just saying I really don’t know. THE COURT: Let me ask you another way then. Can you right now, before you hear any evidence in this case made (sic) up your mind that you would not vote for the death penalty regardless of what the evidence turned out to be? JUROR: I might. I have just been through a terrible experience. I have just lost my husband. I really don’t know what I think. I might. I just might not believe in capital punishment. THE COURT: But under no circumstances would you vote for the death penalty even if you were convinced that the man was guilty, from the evidence, guilty of the crime charged. You would not even consider giving him the death penalty? JUROR: No, sir. THE COURT: You would not. The Court will excuse you then, Mrs. Young.” MRS. CORINE LUCAS, Juror: “Q, I am not required by law but I feel I should ask this question. If you were selected as a juror, to sit on the jury, would you, before the trial ever started and no witnesses had been called, would you automatically eliminate giving the death penalty regardless of any evidence that you heard during the trial? A No. Q You would not automatically vote against it? A No, sir. Q I am going to be asking for the death penalty. In Arkansas the death penalty is carried out by electrocution. Did you know that? A Yes, sir, I understand that. Q And they hook them up and the juice goes all through them like that? Now, could you vote— A No, sir, No, sir, I can’t. Q You see what I mean? A No, sir, I couldn’t do that. Q Regardless of what he did you just couldn’t vote for it? A I couldn’t do that. MR. BAYNE: Challenge for cause, Your Honor. THE COURT: Just a minute. Let me ask you these questions, Mrs. Lucas. They are basically the same as Mr. Bayne’s. If you are selected as a juror in this case, would you consider all punishments provided by law if you found the defendant guilty? JUROR: Yes. THE COURT: You would consider all the punishments? JUROR: Un huh. THE COURT: The law might provide a five year sentence or a life sentence or death. Would you consider all of those sentences if you found the defendant guilty before you finally arrived at which punishment you elected to give? Would you do that? Would you consider all of them? JUROR: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You would go into the jury box and just automatically say I wouldn’t give — before you heard any of the evidence — you have made up your mind already. Is that correct? JUROR: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I will excuse you for cause.” In Witherspoon, thirty-nine veniremen, including four of the six who indicated that they did not believe in capital punishment, had acknowledged having conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty or against its infliction in a proper case and were excluded without any effort being made to find out whether their scruples would invariably compel them to vote against capital punishment. One venireman who admitted to a religious scruple against the death penalty when asked: “You don’t believe in the death penalty?” She replied: “No.” But later she stated she had no religious scruples against capital punishment and further stated that she would not “like to be responsible for .. . deciding somebody should be put to death. ” She was excused. In Maxwell v. Bishop, Penitentiary Superintendent, 398 U.S. 262, the United States Supreme Court, in reversing the Arkansas Supreme Court’s affirmance of Maxwell’s death sentence,1 stated: “As was made clear in Witherspoon, ‘a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.’ ...” In Maxwell, one prospective juror was successfully challenged for cause solely on the basis of the following exchange: “Q. If you were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt at the end of this trial that the defendant was guilty and that his actions had been so shocking that they would merit the death penalty do you have any conscientious scruples about capital punishment that might prevent you from returning such a verdict? “A. I think I do.” (Emphasis supplied) Still another member of the panel was dismissed after the following dialogue: “Q. Mr. Adams, do you have any feeling concerning capital punishment that would prevent you or make you have any feelings about returning a death sentence if you felt beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty and that his crime was so bad as to merit the death sentence? “A. No, I don’t believe in capital punishment.” (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, veniremen were excused from serving on appellant’s jury for reasons essentially similar to the ones quoted above in Maxwell. In Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S. Ct. 399 (1976), the United States Supreme Court made the following comment in reversing the conviction of a death sentence: .. Unless a venireman is ‘irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings’ ... he cannot be excluded; if a venireman is improperly excluded even though not so committed, any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand.” In Davis, only one prospective juror had been excluded in violation of the Witherspoon standard. The majority, in addition to rejecting the doctrine in Witherspoon in this case, further asserts another reason for not applying the Witherspoon doctrine in the instant case by asserting: “Further, it is significant that no objections were raised to the court’s striking these jurors for cause. Failure to interpose an objection or raise the issue in a motion for a new trial prevents the issue from being raised for the first time on appeal in a capital case.” But, on the other hand, the majority concludes its opinion by asserting the following: “Here after reviewing the entire record, as required by § 43-2725, supra, and Rule 36.24, supra, and finding no errors prejudicial to appellant, the judgments are affirmed.” Upon reviewing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725 and Arkansas Criminal Rule 36.24, set out below, it is obvious that the majority is pursuing a contradictory course when it says that the Court may not consider the Witherspoon issue because counsel for appellant made no objections to the exclusion of the jurors: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725 provides as follows: “The Supreme Court need only review those matters briefed and argued by the appellant provided that where either a sentence for life imprisonment or death, the Supreme Court shall review all errors prejudicial to the rights of the appellant(Emphasis supplied) Arkansas Criminal Rule 36.24 provides: “The Supreme Court need only review those matters briefed and argued by the appellant provided that where either a sentence for life imprisonment or death was imposed, the Supreme Court shall review the entire record for errors prejudicial to the right of the appellant. ” (Emphasis added) Moreover, the failure of counsel to object to the exclusion of the jurors who manifested scruples against the death penalty was not dispositive of the Witherspoon issue, and accordingly, this Court is empowered under law to consider the issue whether there was an objection registered or not, for the following provisions make this crystal clear: Rule 102 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides as follows: “These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence, to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” Rule 103(a) (1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides: “(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the contest; ...” Rule 103 (2) (d) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides: “(d) Errors Affecting Substantial Rights. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial because of the improper exclusion of jurors under the doctrine of Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra.  See: Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370 S.W. 2d 113.