Court Opinion

ID: 9956912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:03:01.5449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.616804
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed April 3, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                            No. 3D23-1854
                     Lower Tribunal No. F97-31824C
                          ________________

                         Fernando Sotolongo,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle
Delancy, Judge.

     Fernando Sotolongo, in proper person.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See § 775.021(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“Whoever, in the

course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which

constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and

adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense;

and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently

or consecutively. . . . [O]ffenses are separate if each offense requires proof

of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory

pleading or the proof adduced at trial.”); Collins v. State, 369 So. 3d 1231,

1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“[D]enial is appropriate where a legally sufficient

motion is conclusively refuted by the record, provided that the court reviews

the record and attaches relevant portions of the record to its order.”); Smith

v. State, 336 So. 3d 363, 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (holding 3.800(a) motion

may not challenge “the procedure leading to [defendant’s] sentence”);

George v. State, 213 So. 3d 966, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“[Double

jeopardy] claims are not cognizable in a rule 3.800(a) motion, as they are

procedurally barred.”); Jackson v. State, 29 So. 3d 1152, 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA

2010) (“[A]n upward departure sentence without written reasons . . . claim is

not cognizable under rule 3.800(a).”); see also Robertson v. State, 829 So.

2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002) (“[T]he ‘tipsy coachman’ doctrine[] allows an

appellate court to affirm a trial court that ‘reaches the right result, but for the

                                        2
wrong reasons’ so long as ‘there is any basis which would support the

judgment in the record.’”) (quoting Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station

WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644–45 (Fla. 1999)); Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d

238, 241 (Fla. 2007) (“[N]ot all errors committed at a criminal sentencing

require reversal.   The sentence may be affirmed if such errors are

harmless.”).

                                    3