Court Opinion

ID: 9539059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:46:03.863954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:25.188244
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice.
The issue presented by this case is whether a malpractice action, which includes both a claim for personal injury to the patient and a damage claim for loss of consortium by the spouse, generates the “each claim” liability limit or the “annual aggregate” liability limit under this particular liability insurance policy.
Dr. Thompson purchased an insurance policy from St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. (St. Paul) to insure against claims first made during the policy period and arising out of the performance of professional services. During the policy period a complaint was filed against Thompson claiming personal injury to a woman patient and loss of consortium to the patient’s spouse.1 No other claims were made during the policy period. St. Paul undertook the defense of Thompson in this malpractice action, and the record does not reflect the final resolution, if any, of that case.
The declarations page of Thompson’s liability policy lists the limits of liability as $150,000 for “each claim” and $300,000 for the “annual aggregate.” The policy further states:
“The limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each claim’ is the limit of the company’s liability for loss resulting from any one claim or suit or all claims or suits first made during the policy year because of injury to or death of any one person____”
While the malpractice action was pending, Thompson filed a complaint in this case against St. Paul seeking a declaration that “there are two separate and distinct claims within the meaning of the policy, being brought by [patient] and [spouse], and that the limits of liability provided by [the poli*803cy] would be up to $150,000 for each claim separately____” Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted St. Paul’s motion by stating:
“The paragraph which appears [in the policy] ... makes clear that the contract envisions multiple claims or suits arising from a single injury to one person, and it treats these multiple claims arising from the treatment of one person as coming under a single limit — in this case $150,-000.”
Thompson has appealed.
We have recently held that “the claim for loss of consortium is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a third party’s tortious injury to a spouse.” Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 394, 690 P.2d 324, 329 (1984). See also Coddington v. City of Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135, 525 P.2d 330 (1974). In Runcorn we were urged to adopt the view of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669 (1974), that a claim for loss of consortium is completely separate and distinct from the physically injured spouse. The plaintiffs in Runcorn urged this view in order to strengthen their position that the spouse’s damages for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the percentage of comparative negligence attributable to the physically injured person. We refused to adopt such a view in Run-corn, and we again refuse this view which Thompson asserts in order to strengthen his position that the claim for loss of consortium generates a separate claim liability limit under the policy. However, we do not find the derivative nature of a claim for loss of consortium to be dispositive of the present case. Regardless of the nature of a claim for loss of consortium under Idaho law, the insurance policy would be free to include or not include the spouse’s claim for loss of consortium with the patient’s claim for physical injuries for purposes of the “each claim” liability limit.
Therefore, the ultimate issue is whether or not both claims are “for loss resulting from any one claim or suit or all claims or suits first made during the policy year because of injury to ... any one person,” as defined by the policy language. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the policy language is clear and unambiguous as a matter of law when applied to the facts of this case.
It is clear that both claims were “claims or suits first made during the policy year because of injury to ... one person,” the patient. The patient was “any one person” who was allegedly “injured,” and the spouse’s claim for loss of consortium was “first made during the policy year because of injury to” the patient. Without the patient’s alleged injury, the spouse’s damage claim for loss of consortium would be nonexistent and would never have been made. Therefore, the claim for loss of consortium was made “because of injury to” the patient. The loss of consortium claim is a damage claim resulting from injury to the patient, and it falls within the policy definition of the “each claim” liability limit. The insurance policy “must be construed and understood in its plain, ordinary and proper sense according to the meaning as determined from the plain wording thereof.” Clark v. St. Paul Property & Liability Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 756, 758, 639 P.2d 454, 456 (1981). Even in California, which supposedly follows the “separate and distinct” view of a claim for loss of consortium, it has been held that a loss of consortium claim resulting from injury to another person does not trigger a second liability limitation for the damages. United Services Automobile Ass’n v. Warner, 64 Cal.App.3d 957, 135 Cal.Rptr. 34 (1977). Although the ultimate determination in every case would depend upon the particular policy language, other jurisdictions and authorities are in accord with this position under analogous circumstances. E.g., Smith v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 252 Ark. 57, 477 S.W.2d 186 (1972); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Comelson, 272 Md. 48, 321 A.2d 149 (1974); Williams v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, 188 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.1951); 8 Appleman on Insurance, § 4893, p. 60 (1981).
*804We find Thompson’s other arguments and interpretations asserted in an attempt to create an ambiguity out of the plain language of the policy to be without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to appellant. No attorney fees.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.

. The complaint of Dr. Thompson’s patient and her spouse is not included in the record.