Court Opinion

ID: 9686997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:13:27.210807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.667256
License: Public Domain

CONNOR T. HANSEN, J.
(dissenting). I concur with the dissent of Mr. Justice ROBERT W. HANSEN to the extent that these convictions should be affirmed. I am in agreement with his opinion on the issues of change of venue and refusal to submit a verdict of manslaughter, unreasonable use of force.
In a number of eases, we have held that a trial judge must sua sponte exercise his judicial discretion to the end that a defendant receives a trial by an impartial jury. Now we have a case that stands for the proposition that if a trial judge is overly diligent in the exercise of that responsibility it is grounds for reversible error.
*188Of particular concern is the holding of the majority that refusal to submit a verdict of manslaughter, unreasonable use of force, is reversible error. Sec. 939.48 (1), Stats., self-defense provides in part: “. . . He [the actor] may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.”
In the case before us, the .defendant received a two-millimeter-Iong cut on the head, described by his own medical witness as “very superficial,” while he was engaged with the two officers during their attempted arrest. In State v. Bronston, 7 Wis.2d 627, 97 N.W.2d 504, 98 N.W.2d 468 (1959),1 a woman storekeeper was struck on the head with a rachet wrench during a robbery. She received a two inch laceration of the scalp as a result of the blow which required four sutures to close, was hospitalized a few hours, and had residual pain for a period of time following the incident. We reversed the conviction finding the woman did not sustain “great bodily harm” within the meaning of the sec. 939.22 (14), Stats.
Under the facts of the instant case, I cannot reach the conclusion that the failure to submit the manslaughter verdict was error. The officers knew the defendant had a weapon which he discharged in a residential area, and he had threatened to kill them. They were in immediate pursuit to make a lawful, arrest. When the officers finally cornered him between some cars, he was still armed. He claims to have protested the treatment he received while the officers were making the arrest. The fact is that by the testimony of his own medical witness, he received but a superficial cut on the head. While the officers were endeavoring to make the arrest, the defendant dropped his weapon to the ground and ultimately *189disarmed Officer Riley. It was because of the forbearance of the officer, prior to being disarmed, that the defendant was able to shoot and kill them both, shooting one of them once, the other twice.
Under the facts of this case, I see no justification for submission of a manslaughter verdict.
The majority of the court also looks upon this case as an opportunity to enlarge the polygraph rule of evidence set forth in State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis.2d 780, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974). Briefly stated, it is my understanding that the majority extends Stanislawski to provide for a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, on the admissibility of the results of the examination. This hearing is to include among other things the right to call other examiners to challenge the results of the polygraph examination administered by an examiner of their joint selection and whose opinion they had stipulated could be admitted into evidence. If a party can attempt to avoid the consequences of his original stipulation, when the results are unfavorable, by the subsequent calling of expert witnesses, it seems to me, the otherwise workable rule of Stanislawski is reduced to a nullity. The otherwise binding stipulation is, in effect, reduced to a conditional stipulation.
The minority of the court would enlarge the Stanis-lawski rule still further by permitting the attempted impeachment of the examiner, selected by stipulated agreement, to take place in open court. If this procedure were to be followed, the practical effect of the Stanis-lawski stipulation would be that the parties had really stipulated that polygraph evidence was admissible at the trial.
I would respectfully submit that the instant case and the complications it presents, afford an opportunity to examine the wisdom of the adoption of the Stanislawski rule in the first place. At oral argument, counsel for the *190state and the defendant both seriously urged this court to consider withdrawing the rule of Stanislawski. This writer would agree that the rule appears to be of questionable evidentiary value. The interest of judicial administration could best be served if we were to hold that the results of such examination were not admissible evidence.

 See: La Barge v. State, 74 Wis.2d 327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).