Court Opinion

ID: 9576145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:15.00152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:31.480619
License: Public Domain

ON THE MERITS
*650jRobert M. Mulvey, Oregon City, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
William E. Frazier, Deputy District Attorney, Oregon City, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, Salem, and Winston L. Bradshaw, District Attorney, Oregon City.
Before McAllister, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Warner, Perry, Sloan, O’Connell and Goodwin, Justices.
SLOAN, J.
Defendant was convicted by a verdict of a jury of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape. He appeals. The assignments of error require reference to some of the evidence. The actual parties will be referred to as the state and defendant; the complaining witness by her given name of Peggy.
The charging part of the indictment reads:
“The said Jack Robert Delaney on or about the 6th day of March, A. D., 1958, in the said County of Clackamas and State of Oregon, then and there being, did then and unlawfully and feloniously assault one, Peggy Joyce Wilson, who was then and there a female over the age of sixteen years, to-wit: *651of the age of twenty-five years, by then and there forcibly and violently grasping, seizing, assaulting, grappling, clinching, beating and threatening the said Peggy Joyce Wilson, with intent then and there on the part of him, the said Jack Robert Delaney, to then and there unlawfully and feloniously forcibly ravish the said Peggy Joyce Wilson, said act of defendant being contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon.”
The evidence presented by the state to support the indictment disclosed that on the night in question Peggy was employed in a beer tavern some place on 82nd Street in Portland. Defendant had been a frequenter of this tavern, was acquainted with Peggy and had been in the tavern during the evening of March 5, 1958. Defendant left the tavern before it was closed. Closing time was 1:00 a.m. Peggy testified that when she completed her duties for the night and entered her car to leave defendant was in the back seat of her car. He held a gun in his hand pointed to her and commanded her to drive as he directed. Peggy testified that defendant forced her to drive her car into the mountains east of Molalla to an abandoned logger’s shack in a cut-over timber area. This was in Clackamas county.
We will omit the details of the assault alleged to have followed their arrival at the shack. Peggy testified that after they reached the shack the defendant bound her hands and feet with adhesive tape and then forcibly attempted to rape her; that despite her handicap of bound hands and feet she was able to resist defendant and that defendant did not consummate his design. They remained at the shack the remainder of the night.
There is no need to relate their activity of the next day other than to say that during the course of the *652day the car became stuck in the mud. There is conflict as to how this occurred. In any event, they were forced to walk out of the place. They stopped at a house along their route and the occupant thereof drove them to the house of a friend of defendant in Molalla. Peggy swore that the entire episode was the result of force and threats of force on the part of defendant. At Molalla she caused defendant to be arrested.
The defendant testified in his own behalf. He admits that he encountered Peggy at her car as she left work. He claims, however, that his purpose was to ask her to push his stalled car. He said that she suggested they go some place for a drink and that while driving she suggested that she accompany him on his planned camping trip to the abandoned shack. He admitted the trip to the shack but contended that it was voluntary upon Peggy’s part. Defendant’s testimony was that everything was voluntary and cooperative until the car became stuck in the mud the next day and that Peggy then became alarmed about her husband’s reaction to her absence. Defendant’s principal defense was that the alleged assault was a device and scheme Peggy concocted to avoid trouble with her husband.
The verdict demonstrates that the jury believed Peggy and not the defendant.
The first assignment of error challenges the indictment. The defendant demurred to the indictment on the ground that it charged two crimes. One, the crime of assault to commit rape and, secondly, that it charged a threat to commit a felony. The defendant seizes upon the words in the indictment “and threatening the said Peggy Joyce Wilson . . . to then and there . . .ravish her” as the basis for contending the indictment charges the crime of threatening to commit a felony in viola*653tion of ORS 161.330. The trial court overruled the demurrer. No error was committed by the trial court in doing so.
 The indictment charges but a single offense. The nature of the assault is described as having been committed by more than one form of act. That is, by “grasping, seizing, assaulting, grappling, clinching, beating and threatening. . . .” The fact that the indictment describes the alleged assault by more than one form of act gives no license for the defendant to strike intervening words and attempt to alter the clear meaning of the indictment. It is not required that an indictment may charge only one means by which a crime may have been committed.
“The general rule is that where a single offense may be committed by several means it may be charged in a single count to have been so committed, if the ways or means are not repugant [sic]; and in this state as in other states it is provided by statute that when the crime may be committed by the use of different means the indictment may allege the means in the alternative: Section 1442, Or. L. [ORS 132.560]” State v. Laundy, (1922) 103 Or 443, 466, 204 P 958, 206 P 290.
“We do not believe that two different crimes are stated in the indictment. We think the defendants are charged with only one offense. There are two different statements of the way in which this offense was committed. Either statement standing alone would constitute a crime; but both statements combined would be only one offense. If only one of the ways in which the defendants are charged with having violated the act had been alleged and they had been tried upon that one charge, they could not thereafter have been tried on an indictment charging another violation of the act based upon the same transaction. * * *” State v. Gerritson et al, (1928) 124 Or 525, 532, 265 P 422.
*654See also State v. Anderson, (1958) 215 Or 72, 332 P2d 884; State v. Fiester, (1897) 32 Or 254, 50 P 561.
In this case the indictment advised the defendant in plain words the nature of the charge. A “person of common understanding” would have no difficulty in knowing the crime charged. ORS 132.520 (2).
The next assignment contends that the court erred in permitting the defendant to be asked on cross-examination if he had engaged in intercourse with Peggy during the time they were at the shack. It is argued that the defendant’s affirmative answer to such a question rendered him guilty of a crime other than that charged in the indictment.
It has already been mentioned that defendant’s defense was that this was a voluntary lark. Even though defendant, on direct examination, did not assert that he had had intercourse with Peggy, the implication was certainly there. It is difficult to see how this could have prejudiced the defendant when it was merely added emphasis to his defense that not force but voluntary, if not enthusiastic, acquiescence was involved. There is no error in the assignment.
The third assignment is directed at the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser crime of assault. No request was made of the court to so instruct nor was it otherwise called to the court’s attention. We are asked, however, to apply former rule 50 and notice the error regardless. It is said that the error was so prejudicial as to require us to notice the error and allow a new trial.
In this case we doubt that if the trial court, even upon proper request, had refused to instruct as to assault only that such refusal would have been error. We are certain it would not have been prejudicial error. *655An instruction as to a lesser offense is only required when the evidence permits a finding that an offense of lesser degree than charged may have been committed. State v. Nodine, (1953) 198 Or 679, 687, 259 P2d 1056; State v. Coffman, (1943) 171 Or 166, 171, 136 P2d 687; State v. Duffy, (1931) 135 Or 290, 308, 295 P 953. In State v. Coffman, supra, the following is adopted from an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States:
“ ‘To instruct the jury in a criminal case that the defendant cannot properly be convicted of a crime less than that charged, or to refuse to instruct them in respect to the lesser offense that might, under some circumstances, be included in the one so charged, there being no evidence whatever upon which any verdict could be properly returned except one of guilty or one of not guilty of the particular offense charged—is not error; for the instructing or refusing to instruct, under the circumstances named, rests upon legal principles or presumptions which it is the province of the court to declare for the guidance of the jury.’ Sparf, et al. v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 15 S. Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343.” 171 Or at p 171.
In the present case the defendant testified that there was no assault of any kind with any intent; he denied any conduct toward Peggy that partook of any of the elements of assault. To the contrary, as before mentioned, he claimed acquiescence in every part of the relationship that had reference to the actual crime charged. The defendant’s testimony that after the car got stuck Peggy’s attitude changed has nothing to do with whether or not he assaulted her several hours before. That testimony did no more than cast reflection on the truth or falsity of the claimed assault. It had no direct relationship to the actual crime.
Consequently, in this case it was a clear-cut issue: Did defendant have to assault the woman in order to *656accomplish Ms purpose or did he proceed by the consent route? The evidence does not show any in-between. If defendant assaulted her at all it was only for the one purpose. Under such circumstances there was no prejudicial error in the court’s failure to instruct upon the lesser crime of assault. State v. Duffy, supra. That is particularly true when no request for such an instruction was made. State v. Nodine, supra.
The last assignment is based upon the admission of certain evidence which defendant claims was highly prejudicial. No exception was taken during the trial to the admission of any of the evidence now complained of. The defendant now argues that he was poorly defended by counsel appointed for that purpose and asks that we find that he did not have a fair trial. He relies on State v. Bouse, (1953) 199 Or 676, 264 P2d 800; State v. Nodine, supra, and similar eases.
We find no reason to decide if it was error to admit the evidence complained of. In no event was it prejudicial error. At least not sufficiently so to warrant a new trial because of it. There is no occasion here to recite the evidence in question. Its purpose was to corroborate, in certain details, some of Peggy’s testimony. It could not be said that any part or all of the challenged evidence had a particularly material bearing on the truth or falsity of Peggy’s story. There was otherwise submitted substantial evidence to permit the jury to believe or doubt Peggy’s story. There was sharp conflict in the testimony of the participants and evidence to corroborate the testimony of both Peggy and defendant. The details complained of could not have been decisive. The admission of the evidence does not raise even an implication that defendant did not have a fair trial.
It is appropriate to mention that the trial court *657was careful to preserve to the defendant every right and opportunity to adequately present his defense. The record in the case presents every part of the trial from the voir dire examination of the jury to the final arguments of counsel. Every conference in chambers is reported. The only exception is a discussion of the law involved on one issue. Otherwise, we are favored with a complete record. The record reflects that the trial judge presided with painstaking thoroughness and care for defendant’s rights. He gave to the defendant every possible benefit.
Neither has the defendant any reason to complain of his appointed defense counsel. The record shows that counsel proceeded with diligence and care. He was handicapped by intrusions into the case by the defendant. In fact, the record shows that the defense of the case was engineered by defendant himself. If any mistakes were made they were his own.
We have no hesitancy in demanding high standards of duty of attorneys appointed to defend indigent persons charged with crime. And, upon a proper showing, the court has not refused to grant a new trial when the record reflects a prejudicial lack of attention and diligence upon the part of such counsel. But when the appointed attorney has faithfully discharged his duty we will not listen to irresponsible and unlicensed abuse. And particularly so when the record, as here, shows patently that the defendant has seen fit to govern the Conduct of his defense. So if the one being defended desires to run his own show he must pay the piper.
Both the attorney appointed to defend the defendant on trial and the attorney who prepared and presented this appeal fully performed their duty to the defendant. There is nothing in this record to establish any departure from the requirements of a fair trial.
*658We are well aware that the defendant himself wants ns to reweigh the evidence, as a jury, and find him not guilty. That we cannot do. The defendant presented all of his evidence to the jury and that body found him guilty. That is conclusive.
The judgment is affirmed.