Court Opinion

ID: 9774360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:17:38.325906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:07.078848
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING MARCH 14, 1994 Petition for Rehearing denied. Tom Glaze, Justice. The state files its petition suggesting that our decision and opinion rendered on January 31, 1994 in this cause overruled this court’s earlier holding in Boyd v. State, 313 Ark. 171, 853 S.W.2d 263 (1993). In particular, the state points to this court’s concluding paragraph of its opinion.  In Boyd, we held that, when the prosecutor chooses to prosecute a juvenile in circuit court as an adult, the juvenile becomes subject to the procedures and penalties prescribed for adults. There, the state filed charges against juvenile-Boyd in circuit court, so accordingly, we rejected Boyd’s argument that the waiver of right to counsel provisions of the Juvenile Code applied. As we stated, Boyd was never prosecuted as a delinquent in the juvenile division of juvenile court. In the present case and unlike in Boyd, the state chose to file its petition in juvenile court to adjudicate juvenile-Rhoades as a delinquent. As a consequence, we concluded that the Juvenile Code provisions were applicable.1 For these reasons, we reject the state’s contention that the holding in Boyd has been overruled. Therefore, we deny its petition for rehearing.   The wording in the court’s concluding paragraph of its earlier opinion actually states that “the Juvenile Code was indeed applicable at the time Rhoades gave his statement.” This sentence is poorly written since the point we intend to make is that, when the state chooses to file its petition in juvenile court, the Juvenile Code provisions control. See also Justice Newbern’s dissent in Boyd, 313 Ark. at 174, 853 S.W.2d at 265. This supplemental opinion hopefully clarifies this point.