Court Opinion

ID: 9939683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 15:03:13.296417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:48.161113
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-2120    Document: 28    Page: 1    Filed: 02/12/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   LARRY GOLDEN,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

     SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
               Defendant-Appellee
             ______________________

                       2023-2120
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in No. 3:23-cv-00048-WHO,
 Judge William H. Orrick, III.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 12, 2024
                 ______________________

    LARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se.

     RICHARD L. RAINEY, Covington & Burling LLP, Wash-
 ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 JAY I. ALEXANDER, BRIAN GERARD BIELUCH; HYUN SIK
 BYUN, Redwood Shores, CA; ROBERT HASLAM, MICHAEL
 MOREY, Palo Alto, CA.
                  ______________________

    Before PROST, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28    Page: 2    Filed: 02/12/2024

 2              GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 PER CURIAM.
     Larry Golden filed a complaint against Samsung Elec-
 tronics America, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the
 Northern District of California alleging infringement by
 Samsung of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,163,287, 9,589,439, and
 9,096,189. Samsung moved to dismiss the complaint for
 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
 dure 12(b)(6); Mr. Golden opposed Samsung’s motion and
 cross-moved for summary judgment of infringement. The
 district court granted Samsung’s motion, dismissed the
 complaint with prejudice, and denied Mr. Golden’s motion
 for summary judgment. Golden v. Samsung Electronics
 America, Inc., No. 23-cv-00048, 2023 WL 3919466 (N.D.
 Cal. June 8, 2023). Mr. Golden filed a timely appeal, which
 we have jurisdiction to decide under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
 We affirm.
                              I
      Mr. Golden owns a family of patents that describe and
 claim systems for locking, unlocking, or disabling a lock
 when a detector or sensor in the system detects a chemical,
 biological, radiological, or explosive agent. See generally,
 e.g., Appx13–96. 1 Mr. Golden has previously asserted his
 patents in a variety of suits and venues against other de-
 fendants. See Golden v. Apple Inc., No. 2023-1161, 2023
 WL 3400595, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 2023) (detailing the
 history of Mr. Golden’s patent-infringement filings);
 Golden v. United States, 955 F.3d 981, 983–86 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (same).
     Mr. Golden filed the present action in January 2023,
 alleging infringement of the ’287, ’439, and ’189 patents
 based on several of Samsung’s smartphone products.
 Appx97–129. Those patents have materially identical

     1    “Appx” refers to the appendix that Samsung filed
 in this court with its brief as appellee.
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28      Page: 3     Filed: 02/12/2024

 GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.                   3

 specifications and describe “a chemical/biological/radiolog-
 ical detector unit with a disabling locking system for pro-
 tecting products . . . and also for preventing unauthorized
 access to and tampering with the storage and transport of
 ordnance and weapons.” See, e.g., ’287 patent, col. 3, lines
 36–41. The patents explain that the claimed “multi sensor
 and lock disabling system” may “include[] a plurality of de-
 tectors” where each detector may be “adapted for and set
 up to sample for a specific agent or compound (biological,
 chemical, or radiological).” Id., col. 8, lines 31–35; see also,
 e.g., id., col. 18, lines 56–58 (claim 5 reciting the limitation
 “one or more detectors . . . for detecting at least one of
 chemical, biological, radiological, or explosive agents”).
      Mr. Golden’s complaint alleged, in part, that Sam-
 sung’s smartphones possess that claimed detector/sensor
 functionality on three alternative bases: (1) through the
 “Android Team Awareness Kit, ATAK,” which is “[b]uilt on
 the Android operating system,” involves “plug-ins” and
 “app specific software,” was “[i]nitially created” by the “Air
 Force Research Laboratory” together with the “Defense
 Threat Reduction Agency,” and is “available to warfighters
 throughout the DoD,” Appx112 ¶ 55; Appx119, 127;
 (2) through add-on devices or modifications that utilize the
 smartphone’s built-in camera, Appx111 ¶ 54, Appx124–25;
 and (3) through nine “standard sensors” which “can be used
 as ‘biosensors,’” Appx126.
      Samsung moved to dismiss Mr. Golden’s complaint, ar-
 guing that, among other things, Mr. Golden’s complaint
 failed to plausibly state a patent-infringement claim.
 Appx146–48. More specifically, Samsung argued that Mr.
 Golden’s complaint stated no alleged facts that went be-
 yond allegations that Samsung was making and selling
 smartphones that could be modified post-sale by others to
 perform the accused detector/sensor functionality. On that
 basis, Samsung said, there are no plausible allegations
 Samsung was engaged in directly infringing activities.
 Appx146–47. Nor, said Samsung, did Mr. Golden plausibly
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28      Page: 4   Filed: 02/12/2024

 4              GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 allege that Samsung committed inducement or contribu-
 tory infringement, even if its smartphones were in fact
 modified by others post-sale to have the accused function-
 ality. Appx147–48.
      The district court agreed and dismissed Mr. Golden’s
 complaint with prejudice, concluding, in part, that “[t]he
 allegations that his patents cover the identified functional-
 ities included in Samsung’s products are wholly unsup-
 ported and implausible on their face.” Golden, 2023 WL
 3919466, at *2. Mr. Golden filed a motion for reconsidera-
 tion, which was denied. Appx10. Mr. Golden then timely
 appealed. Appx10.
                               II
     We apply regional circuit law on the standard for re-
 view of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, In re Bill of Lading
 Transmission & Processing System Patent Litigation, 681
 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and that standard is re-
 view without deference under Ninth Circuit law, Decker v.
 Advantage Fund Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2004).
 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a com-
 plaint must state “well-pleaded facts, not legal conclusions,
 that ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Whit-
 aker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir.
 2021) (citations omitted) (first citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); and then quoting Ash-
 croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). “[A] pro se com-
 plaint . . . must be held to ‘less stringent standards than
 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Estelle v. Gamble,
 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
 519, 520–21 (1972)). “However, a pro se plaintiff must still
 meet minimal standards to avoid dismissal under Rule
 12(b)(6).” Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135, 1141 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018). We reject Mr. Golden’s appeal arguments and
 therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of his com-
 plaint.
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28      Page: 5    Filed: 02/12/2024

 GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.                  5

      Mr. Golden argues that this court’s prior holding that
 a different complaint of his—filed in a separate proceeding
 against Google in the District of South Carolina but alleg-
 ing infringement of the same patents—was “not facially
 frivolous,” Golden v. Apple Inc., No. 2022-1229, 2022 WL
 4103285, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022), precluded the dis-
 trict court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a
 claim in this proceeding, Golden Informal Opening Br. at
 14–22. We disagree.
      Although we previously held that Mr. Golden’s com-
 plaint against Google in a separate proceeding was “not fa-
 cially frivolous,” Golden, 2022 WL 4103285, at *2, we also
 stated that “[o]ur decision does not preclude subsequent
 motions to dismiss by the defendant for failure to state a
 claim,” and we “express[ed] no opinion as to the adequacy
 of the complaint.” Id. Our prior holding that Mr. Golden’s
 complaint—alleging patent-infringement claims against
 Google, not Samsung, based on Google’s products, not Sam-
 sung’s—was not facially frivolous does not answer the
 question of the sufficiency of Mr. Golden’s complaint
 against Samsung in this proceeding. The district court did
 not err by so determining. Golden, 2023 WL 3919466, at
 *2 n.6. See also Golden v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 2023-1818,
 2023 WL 6561044, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2023) (rejecting
 a similar contention by Mr. Golden).
     On the merits of the district court’s infringement-alle-
 gation analysis, also challenged by Mr. Golden, see Golden
 Informal Opening Br. at 27; Golden Informal Reply Br. at
 9, we also see no reversible error. Mr. Golden’s complaint
 does not plausibly allege that Samsung itself has commit-
 ted any of the acts specified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), as the
 factual allegations plausibly show, at the most, only that
 Samsung-made-and-sold smartphones could be modified
 post-sale by others. There is no plausible allegation that
 Samsung itself is making, selling (or offering to sell), using,
 or importing smartphones that have the claimed detec-
 tor/sensor functionality, either literally or by equivalents.
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28     Page: 6    Filed: 02/12/2024

 6              GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

 And without such a plausible allegation, Mr. Golden has
 presented no basis for survival of the complaint.
     Mr. Golden’s complaint may be understood to allege
 three ways the accused products practice the detector/sen-
 sor functionality, but each is deficient for infringement
 even at the pleading stage. Regarding ATAK, the com-
 plaint itself indicates that plugins and app-specific soft-
 ware, not developed by Samsung and only available
 “throughout the DoD,” are required for the accused detec-
 tor/sensor functionality. Appx112 ¶ 55; Appx119, 127. Re-
 garding Samsung’s built-in cameras, the complaint relies
 on proof-of-concept articles that support nothing more than
 that, through post-sale add-on devices or modifications,
 commercially available smartphones could one day con-
 ceivably perform the accused detector/sensor functionality.
 Appx124–25, 1716–21.
     Finally, regarding the complaint’s statement, without
 elaboration, that “standard sensors” “can be used as ‘bio-
 sensors’”: That statement on its face does not assert that
 “standard sensors” can be so used without add-ons; it is not
 included in Mr. Golden’s claim charts; and in any event it
 is wholly conclusory. Appx126 (emphasis added); see
 Appx119, 124. This lone statement, lacking any concrete
 specifics, fails to satisfy basic pleading standards for, as
 relevant here, plausibly alleging that any of Samsung’s
 smartphones, as made and sold by Samsung, i.e., without
 any addition of hardware or software, contain “biosensors”
 that perform the claimed sensing/detecting of hazardous
 agents. See Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of America, 4 F.4th
 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[A] plaintiff cannot assert a
 plausible claim for infringement . . . by reciting the claim
 elements and merely concluding that the accused product
 has those elements. There must be some factual allega-
 tions that, when taken as true, articulate why it is plausi-
 ble that the accused product infringes the patent claim.”).
 The failure is particularly apparent in light of the articles
 that Mr. Golden’s complaint cites for the proposition that
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28     Page: 7    Filed: 02/12/2024

 GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.                 7

 cell phone cameras might, one day, be modified to perform
 the accused detector/sensor functionality, Appx1716–21.
 Cf. Bot M8, 4 F.4th at 1354 (“Where, as here, the factual
 allegations are actually inconsistent with and contradict in-
 fringement, they are likewise insufficient to state a plausi-
 ble claim.”).
     In short, Mr. Golden’s allegations, even if true, at best
 establish that Samsung’s smartphones might be modified
 post-sale to perform the accused detector/sensor function-
 ality, which is not enough for direct infringement on the
 claims here. See High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc.
 v. New Image Industries, Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir.
 1995) (“[A] device does not infringe simply because it is pos-
 sible to alter it in a way that would satisfy all the limita-
 tions of a patent claim.”). And Mr. Golden’s complaint does
 not allege facts plausibly showing that Samsung had the
 knowledge and intent regarding its customers’ activities
 for Samsung to be liable for inducement under 35 U.S.C.
 § 271(b). See Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1339; Appx108–
 129. Likewise missing are allegations of facts plausibly
 showing (contrary to the complaint’s own allegations) that
 Samsung’s smartphones have “no substantial noninfring-
 ing uses,” as required to establish contributory infringe-
 ment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
 620 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
     Mr. Golden argues, in his reply brief, that the district
 court, in conducting its analysis of the complaint, improp-
 erly reduced the scope of his inventions to a single, gener-
 alized claim limitation. Golden Informal Reply Br. at 13.
 But this allegation about the district court’s analysis is no
 substitute for Mr. Golden’s task on appeal—to focus di-
 rectly on the complaint and demonstrate its sufficiency, a
 matter we decide de novo on appeal. In any event, we dis-
 agree with Mr. Golden’s allegation about what the district
 court did.
Case: 23-2120     Document: 28     Page: 8     Filed: 02/12/2024

 8              GOLDEN v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.

     In the district court’s statement that Mr. Golden ap-
 pears to challenge, the court merely summarized, at a high
 level, the subject matter of Mr. Golden’s patents. Golden,
 2023 WL 3919466, at *1 & n.2. The court then went on to
 analyze the legal sufficiency of Mr. Golden’s specific in-
 fringement allegations as stated in his complaint. It was
 on that basis that the court concluded that “[t]he allega-
 tions that his patents cover the identified functionalities
 included in Samsung’s products are wholly unsupported
 and implausible on their face.” Id. at *2. There was no
 improper narrowing.
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Mr. Golden
 has shown no error in the district court’s determination
 that his complaint insufficiently alleged infringement.
 That conclusion suffices to affirm the dismissal of the com-
 plaint. We need not address the district court’s alternative
 ground for dismissal—that Mr. Golden’s suit against Sam-
 sung was precluded because Mr. Golden had already un-
 successfully asserted the same patent-infringement claims
 against the United States based on materially the same
 Samsung products. See Golden, 2023 WL 3919466, at *2 &
 n.7 (discussing Golden v. United States, 156 Fed. Cl. 623
 (2021), aff’d, No. 2022-1196, 2022 WL 4103287 (Fed. Cir.
 Sept. 8, 2022)).
                             III
     The dismissal of Mr. Golden’s complaint is affirmed.
     The parties shall bear their own costs.
                        AFFIRMED