Court Opinion

ID: 9853346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:46:58.461988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.087367
License: Public Domain

Judge WELLS
dissenting.
There being insufficient evidence presented of grounds to terminate the parental rights of respondent-appellant Sandra Ballard Ard, I must respectfully dissent.
The statute, G.S. 7A-289.32, provides in pertinent part, that parental rights may be terminated where:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child. . . .
*588(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive years without showing to the satisfaction of the court that substantial progress has been made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the child for neglect, or without showing positive response within two years to the diligent efforts of a county department of social services, a child-caring institution or licensed child-placing agency to encourage the parent to strengthen the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through with constructive planning for the future of the child.
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services, a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring institution and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child.
It is clear that Ms. Ballard’s daughter, Christie Lynn, has been in foster care for less than two years, and therefore termination may not be based on G.S. 7A-289.32(3). Further, there was insufficient evidence to terminate parental rights on the grounds of nonsupport under G.S. 7A-289.32(4). A finding that a parent has ability to pay support is essential to termination for nonsupport. In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 281 S.E. 2d 47 (1981). At the trial below, the judge made no finding of fact that Ms. Ard was able to contribute to her daughter’s support.
The issue of termination of parental rights on the grounds of neglect requires more detailed discussion. There are two contexts in which the issue of parental neglect becomes important. First, neglect may be alleged as grounds for transferring temporary custody (non-secure custody order) from the parent to a social welfare organization under the provisions of G.S. 7A-576. Second, neglect is one of the three possible grounds discussed above for permanent termination of parental rights. A neglected child for purposes of either proceeding is
[a] juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care or other remedial care recognized under State *589law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law. G.S. 7A-517(21). See In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E. 2d 440 (1982).
In the case at bar, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services (DSS), obtained temporary custody of Christie in January, 1981, based on a judicial finding that Christie was a neglected child within the meaning of G.S. 7A-517(21). Neglect was also found as a basis for termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights at the hearing in June, 1982. The trial court purported to “adopt” the findings of fact and conclusion of neglect made in the 1980 custody hearing as evidence of neglect to support termination in the 1982 hearing.
The question before us therefore is what weight the judge in the termination hearing could properly accord the finding of neglect made in the temporary custody hearing a year earlier.
Clearly, the prior finding of neglect may not be the sole factor relied upon in a later termination hearing, for to do so would render the termination provisions in the statute meaningless. Further, the finding of neglect is only relevant for conditions up through December, 1980, when the non-secure hearing was held. In the Matter of Chosa, 290 N.W. 2d 766 (Minn. 1980); In re Bender, 170 Ind. App. 274, 352 N.E. 2d 797 (1976). The issue of a prior finding of neglect in a custody hearing used in a termination hearing arose in In re Smith, supra, but was not decided because the parties in that case stipulated that the finding could be judicially noticed in the termination proceeding. No such stipulation was made in the case at bar, however.1
Although there have been relatively few cases decided on this point, some courts considering the issue have held that a judge in a termination hearing must consider all evidence in the case, and make an independent finding of the existence of neglect as of the time of filing of the petition for termination of parental rights. Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290, 607 P. 2d 1141 (1980); *590In the Matter of Chosa, supra; In re Terry D., 148 Cal. Rptr. 221, 83 Cal. App. 3d 890 (1978); In the Matter of Mirelez, 18 Wash. App. 790, 571 P. 2d 969 (1977); In re Bender, supra. Other courts have held that findings in a temporary custody proceeding may be judicially noticed by the court in a later termination hearing. In re Interest of Adkins, 298 N.W. 2d 273 (Iowa 1980); In re Interest of Norwood, 203 Neb. 201, 277 N.W. 2d 709 (1979); In re Adoption of K, 417 S.W. 2d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). These decisions do not state clearly what effect the taking of judicial notice has upon the evidence, but seem to indicate that the only issue to be considered in the termination hearing is whether neglect has occurred after the temporary custody proceeding.
The question of what effect the trial court’s prior findings in a non-secure custody proceeding should have in the termination hearing is not confined to mere relevance, but must be examined in light of due process requirements. A petition for non-secure custody does not put the parent on notice of the threat of termination of parental rights. In a temporary custody hearing, the trial court is not faced with the same awesome responsibility involved in a parental rights termination case. This is not to say that temporary custody proceedings are not profound; but the orders flowing from them are only temporary; while in a termination proceeding a possible result is that the parent’s rights will be forever terminated. I, therefore, am persuaded that the trial court, in order to afford due process in termination proceedings, must in every case make its own findings, based on evidence presented in support of the petition for termination, and must afford the parent the opportunity to refute or rebut all the evidence at the termination proceeding. Under my interpretation of what due process requires, the petitioner might offer into evidence the prior orders of the court, but such orders would constitute only some evidence of the issues tried previously, and would be subject to refutation or rebuttal. The record in this case makes it clear that Judge Jones took judicial notice of Judge Bennett’s prior order, accepting his findings as conclusive and his conclusions as binding. This was error.
The judgment below should be reversed. First, the record shows that Judge Jones failed to make an independent finding of neglect based on all the evidence in the case, including events before and after the January, 1981 order placing custody of *591Christie with DSS. Second, there was no showing of neglect following the custody order sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence test. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71 L.Ed. 2d 599, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982); In re Matter of Smith, supra.
Courts have no power to terminate parental rights merely upon showing that a parent is a transient and has a troubled marriage. Not only are the standards of behavior used by the trial court in the case at bar suspect, but there is no showing in the record that Ms. Ard’s nomadic lifestyle after January, 1981, in any way harmed her daughter, Christie. Indeed, where DSS has custody of a child, it will be difficult in many cases to prove evidence of neglect at all. Where a parent is not in physical control of a child, neglect in the form of failure to provide shelter, food, clothing or medical attention simply cannot occur. The issue of nonsupport is of course a different matter. Accord, Chapman v. Chapman, supra (neglect cannot be established “when a child is left by a parent in an environment where the child is known to be receiving proper care.”) No one in the case at bar suggests that Christie received improper care from DSS or her foster family.
While there are ways in which neglect may be shown even when DSS has custody of a child, e.g., failure to maintain contact and affection with a child, See In re Smith, supra, and In re APA, 59 N.C. App. 322, 296 S.E. 2d 811 (1982), in this case there was ample evidence that respondent-mother maintained regular, loving contacts with her daughter during the entire time Christie was in foster care. On at least one occasion, Ms. Ard requested more visitation rights than DSS was willing to permit.
Petitioner-DSS’ arguments about Ms. Ard’s failure to change her lifestyle to a more stable, conventional routine are more properly addressed to a petition to terminate parental rights under G.S. 7A-289.32(3). Under that portion of the statute, parental rights may be terminated if a parent fails to show sufficient progress toward correcting conditions which led to the initial determination of neglect, after the child had been in DSS custody for more than two years. This portion of the statute is designed to encourage courts and social services organizations to permit a parent to “rehabilitate” himself or herself, with help and counseling from social service agencies. It also places a two-year limit, to permit termination of parental rights and possible adoption in cases where no progress is made. See Note, Protecting Children *592From, Parents Who Provide Insufficient Care — Temporary and Permanent Statutory Limits on Parental Custody, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 953, 969-73.
Because there was no finding of clear and convincing evidence of neglect based on all the facts up to the time of the 1982 termination petition, due process was not accorded the respondent-mother in this case and I respectfully dissent.

. Following recognition of the stipulation of the court’s earlier finding of neglect, Judge Martin noted “. . . the court was correct in recognizing that this case could not be decided in a vacuum. The procedural and factual history of the case was relevant and necessary to a full and fair determination of the issues.” Id.