Court Opinion

ID: 9520076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:31:00.921292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:30.538246
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
concurring in part.
I concur in the opinion of the court insofar as it holds that the amendment to Article VIII, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution, resulting from the proposal of Legislature Resolution 1, Eighty-fifth Legislature, First Special Session, 1978, subsequently adopted by the people in the election of November 1978, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. For reasons which I will state later, I do not concur in the balance of the opinion.
Before stating why I do not join in the court’s opinion on the due process issue, I wish to add a few words of my own on the equal protection ground. *146The opinion of the court sets forth one glaring example of the inequalities in taxation which would arise as a result of implementation of the amendment, viz., the school district located in parts of Gage, Pawnee, and Johnson Counties. The example is an accurate, although a rather complex, one. It might be useful to the general understanding of the court’s opinion if a somewhat simpler example were used.
Before giving the simpler example, it will add clarity to restate the premise on which the amendment would operate. The proposed amendment operates on the assumption that equality in valuation of property between counties does not exist in certain instances. The amendment is designed to achieve uniformity in taxation by adjusting the levy to compensate for the lack of uniformity in value. It follows, of course, that in cases where uniformity in valuation exists for the taxable year in question, adjustment of the levy will result in the lack of uniformity.
Now the example. Motor vehicles are uniformly valued, as near as can be, throughout the state. § 77-1238 et seq., R. R. S. 1943. The levy on such vehicles is computed “at a rate equal to the ad valorem rate for all purposes for the preceding year in the several taxing units of the state” in which the vehicle has tax situs. § 77-1240.01, R. R. S. 1943. Under the amendment, equally valued motor vehicles would, because of the adjustment of the levy, be taxed at different rates within the same taxing district, e.g., the school district lying in more than one county, and so owners of property of identical value would pay unequal amounts of taxes for the same purpose.
Because the amendment assumes as a basic premise that inequality exists, it makes no provision for the cases where equalization between counties has been accomplished. If, e.g., the State Board of Equalization and Assessment has, in 1979, carried *147out (as nearly as can be done) its statutory function of equalizing valuation between counties, then, despite that fact, implementation of the amendment because of the arbitrary imposition of a base year would almost completely unsettle the equalization presumably accomplished throughout the state.
Let us now turn to the due process question. If the amendment is unconstitutional under the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, then it is, of course, unnecessary to consider the due process claim and I would not do so. On this point, however, I find the paragraph in the opinion referring to “the failure of the amendment to provide for an opportunity to the taxpayer to be heard in connection with a change in the amount of his levy,’’ to be so vague as to cast doubt upon historic procedures pertaining to the fixing of the levy. I believe the statement may be read as saying something not intended, so in the hope of avoiding some future misunderstanding, I wish to say something about it.
Neither the Constitution of the United States nor of this state requires notice before levy of general taxes. Hansen v. County of Lincoln, 188 Neb. 461, 197 N. W. 2d 651; Frye v. Haas, 182 Neb. 73, 152 N. W. 2d 121; Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743, 78 L. Ed. 1323. Levy of taxes is. a legislative matter. It is sufficient if there is an opportunity to challenge the legality of the tax before it is collected.
Under our statutory scheme, even notice of valuation changes is necessary only when such changes are made by the assessor. The pertinent statutes relative to notice do not apply to changes in valuations of classes of property or percentage changes made over a whole taxing district by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment. Hansen v. County of Lincoln, supra. We there said: “Plaintiff relies upon the provision of section 77-1315, R. R. S. 1943, requiring a notice to the taxpayer where his prop*148erty ‘has been assessed at a higher figure than at the last previous assessment.’ We hold that this provision pertains, obviously it seems to us, only to individual valuation changes made by the assessor. It does not and was not intended to apply to changes in classes of property or percentages which were over a whole taxing district made by the State Board of Equalization and Assessment. Nor do the constitutional requirements of due process make such notice mandatory. Frye v. Haas, 182 Neb. 73, 152 N. W. 2d 121.”
In Frye v. Haas, supra, we said: ‘‘The rule is stated in Nickey v. State of Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393, 54 S. Ct. 743, 78 L. Ed. 1323, as follows: ‘There is no constitutional command that notice of the assessment of a tax, and opportunity to contest it, must be given in advance of the assessment. It is enough that all available defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax and before the command of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable. Wells, F. & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 146; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; see American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 168.’ ”
In State ex rel. City of Omaha v. Lynch, 181 Neb. 810, 151 N. W. 2d 278, we said: “ ‘The levy of a tax is not a judicial function, nor is it merely the ministerial action of ascertaining the rate per cent; but it is a legislative function to be exercised only by the state or some inferior political division to which the state has delegated the power.’ ”
I do not believe that the majority opinion was intended to place in question the foregoing fundamentals. I think what may be implied from the statement which I question is that changes in the levy under the proposed amendment are tantamount to valuation changes in only a portion of a taxing district and hence result in unequal taxation for the same purpose and in the same district, and hence *149are unconstitutional. I do not believe the majority want to be understood as saying that the levy of a tax without notice is unconstitutional. If it were, none of us would be required to pay because none of us are given special notice of the levy prior to its setting.