Court Opinion

ID: 9925254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:19.959342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:47.371451
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 362695
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
JIMMIE CARD,                                                        LC No. 20-001587-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., AND MURRAY AND PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         Defendant, Jimmie Card, appeals as of right his judgment of sentence resulting from his
jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84(1)(a); discharging a firearm in a building causing death, MCL
750.234b(5); discharging a firearm in or at a building causing injury, MCL 750.234b(3);
possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; and six counts of felony-firearm, MCL
750.227b(1). We affirm.

                                     I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
        This case arose from a January 31, 2020 incident when officers arrived at a home on Braile
Street, entered the premises and observed one victim, Sheila Hall, in a pool of blood, and a second
victim, Jonathan Thomas, shot in the shoulder. Hall would be declared deceased from a gunshot
wound. Thomas opined that defendant came to the premises looking for Hall. According to
Thomas, he was in the basement stairwell of the premises when he first noticed defendant holding
a revolver. Thomas reported that a physical altercation ensued between the men for control of the
revolver, leading to defendant shooting Thomas once in the left shoulder. Thomas further reported
that he heard two more shots fired, one of which fatally wounded the victim.
       Because defendant was charged as a serious violent fourth-offense habitual offender or
subsequent offender, MCL 769.12(1)(a), a minimum 25-year sentence was required as to the
murder and assault convictions. At sentencing, the court determined that defendant’s minimum
recommended sentencing guidelines’ range was 365 to 600 months or life for the second-degree
murder conviction. The court sentenced defendant to 30 to 60 years’ incarceration for second-

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degree murder, 25 to 50 years for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder; 5
to 15 years for discharging a firearm in or at a building causing death or injury; 1 to 5 years for
possession of a firearm by a felon to be served consecutively to mandatory two-year sentences for
the felony-firearm convictions, but concurrently with the sixth felony-firearm conviction.

                  II. VAGUENESS AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT’S CASE

        Defendant first argues that MCL 777.35, which governs Offense Variable (OV) 5, is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of his case because MCL 777.35 gives the
sentencing court unlimited discretion. Defendant argues that the statute’s language permits the
trial court to subjectively evaluate whether a serious psychological injury requiring professional
treatment has occurred to a member of the victim’s family. Defendant argues that the requirements
for OV-5 are very easy to satisfy in any case involving an assault.

       Defendant did not establish that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because
the evidence presented at sentencing correctly showed that the victim’s family was seeking
psychological treatment. Thus, the sentencing court did not commit plain error.

        Defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of MCL 777.35 in the trial court. The
issue is therefore unpreserved. People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 160; 680 NW2d 500 (2004).
An unpreserved argument that a statute is unconstitutional is reviewed for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Sands, 261 Mich App at 160. To avoid forfeiture under the plain
error rule, defendant must show that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain or obvious, and
(3) the plain error affected defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). This Court reviews de novo whether a statute is constitutional. STC, Inc
v Dep’t of Treasury, 257 Mich App 528, 538-539; 669 NW2d 594 (2003).

       Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and are construed to be constitutional if at all
possible. Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v State, 459 Mich 291, 303; 586 NW2d 894 (1998); People v
Deroche, 299 Mich App 301, 305; 829 NW2d 891 (2013). Defendant, as the party challenging
the constitutionality of MCL 777.35, has the burden to establish the statute’s invalidity. People v
Sadows, 283 Mich App 65, 67; 768 NW2d 93 (2009).

        An as applied challenge to the constitutionality of a statute “ ‘considers the specific
application of a facially valid law to individual facts.’ ” Promote the Vote v Secretary of State,
333 Mich App 93, 117; 958 NW2d 861 (2020), quoting In re Request for Advisory Opinion, 479
Mich 1, 11 n 20; 740 NW2d 444 (2007). A statute is void for vagueness if “ ‘(1) it is overbroad
and impinges on First Amendment freedoms, (2) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct it
regulates, or (3) it gives the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion in determining
whether the statute has been violated.’ ” Kenefick v City of Battle Creek, 284 Mich App 653, 655;
774 NW2d 925 (2009), quoting Proctor v White Lake Twp Police Dep’t, 248 Mich App 457, 476;
639 NW2d 332 (2001). As explained by this Court in People v Hrlic, 277 Mich App 260, 263;
744 NW2d 221 (2007):

       To evaluate a vagueness challenge, this Court must examine the entire text of the
       statute and give the words of the statute their ordinary meaning. To afford proper

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       notice of the conduct proscribed, a statute must give a person of ordinary
       intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. A term that
       requires persons of ordinary intelligence to speculate about its meaning and differ
       on its application may not be used. To be sufficiently definite, the meaning of a
       term must be fairly ascertainable by reference to judicial interpretations, the
       common law, dictionaries, treatises, or the commonly accepted meanings of words.
       [Quotations marks and citations omitted.]

As stated above, defendant argues that MCL 777.35 is unconstitutionally vague under the third
scenario (i.e., unlimited discretion).

         Our Supreme Court has determined that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are advisory
only. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 391; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). Although the guidelines
are not mandatory, a trial court must still consider them during sentencing. Id. MCL 777.35 states
in full:

               (1) Offense Variable 5 is psychological injury to a member of a victim’s
       family. Score offense variable 5 by determining which of the following apply and
       by assigning the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number
       of points.

               (a) Serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred
       to a victim’s family…………………………… 15 points

              (b) No serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment
       occurred to a victim’s family…………………. 0 points

              (2) Score 15 points if the serious psychological injury to the victim’s family
       may require professional treatment. In making this determination, the fact that
       treatment has not been sought is not conclusive.

       The phrase “serious injury” is defined as “having important or dangerous possible
consequences.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (5th ed). The word “psychological” is
defined as related to the mental state and/or mind. Id. Finally, “professional treatment” is defined
as “the action or management and care to prevent, cure or slow progression of a medical
condition.” Id.

       Since MCL 777.35(1) is a “general” provision and subsection two is a “specific provision,”
subsection two controls. People v Calloway, 500 Mich 180, 185-186; 895 NW2d 165 (2017).
Thus, 15 points may be assessed by a trial court under OV 5 if a victim’s family member has
suffered a serious psychological injury that “may require professional treatment in the future,”
even though the family member has no present intent to seek treatment. Id. “[E]ven when
professional treatment has not yet been sought or received, points are properly assessed for OV 5
when a victim’s family member has suffered a serious psychological injury that may require
professional treatment in the future.” Id. at 186. When scoring OV 5, a trial court is required to
consider the context of what makes the injury “serious.” For example, a trial court ought to
consider “the severity of the injury and the consequences that flow from it.” Id. Although MCL

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777.35(1)(a)-(b) and (2) could appear to be inconsistent, our Supreme Court has held that
subsection two of MCL 777.35 further explains the circumstances where a 15-point score is
warranted. Calloway, 500 Mich at 185. Thus, MCL 777.35(1)(a) requires that OV 5 be assessed
15 points when “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a
victim’s family.” But zero points are scored if there is not any serious psychological injury
requiring professional treatment. MCL 777.35(1)(b). In addition, MCL 777.35(2) requires that
OV 5 be assessed 15 points if the serious psychological injury may require professional treatment.

        Defendant cites Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104; 92 S Ct 2294; 33 L Ed 2d 222
(1972), for the proposition that MCL 777.35 creates an easy threshold for a trial court to assess 15
points for OV 5, because the statutory language allows a trial court to subjectively determine
whether serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment to a victim’s family member
has occurred. Defendant does not explain why MCL 777.35 is not sufficiently definite. However,
the statute as written and interpreted precludes a finding of vagueness as applied to defendant.

         Contrary to defendant’s argument, MCL 777.35(2) does not give the trial court “unbridled
discretion” in determining whether the victim’s family may seek psychological treatment in the
future. Kenefick, 284 Mich App at 657. The statute contains readily understood terms that need
little explanation or definition to apply. Moreover, the terms are definite enough to provide
guidance to the trial court in deciding whether to assess 15 points for OV 5, and caselaw has
adequately provided additional guidance on the meaning of OV 5. As discussed below, the trial
court correctly utilized statements made at the sentencing hearing to conclude that the victim’s
family members suffered serious psychological injuries that may require future treatment.

        Applying the language of MCL 777.35 to defendant’s case, the prosecution indicated at
the sentencing hearing that the victim’s daughter was seeking treatment over the loss of her mother.
In addition, Crystal Hall, the victim’s sister, appeared at the sentencing hearing and read a victim
impact statement that established how the victim’s family members have suffered serious
psychological injuries that may require professional treatment in the future. Calloway, 500 Mich
at 186. Specifically, in her victim impact statement, Hall discussed the difficulty her niece, the
victim’s daughter, has had in dealing with the loss of the victim. Talking about the loss of the
victim, Hall stated, “[i]t’s a light passed on that I don’t even know if I can get it back.” Further,
when discussing how the family has been coping with the victim’s death, Hall stated, “[n]ow we
all have to get counseling because we don’t know about ourselves. We can’t explain it right
without projecting our anger.”

        Defendant’s contention that MCL 777.35 is unconstitutional as applied to this case has no
merit since the evidence showed that the victim’s daughter was seeking professional treatment for
her psychological injury. Hall’s victim impact statement was sufficient to demonstrate to the
sentencing court that serious psychological injury had occurred to the victim’s family. In any
event, because the terms of OV 5 are easily understood and defined, and because the evidence of
serious psychological injury was undisputed, defendant’s constitutional challenge does not survive
plain error review because no error occurred, and the purported error did not affect defendant’s
substantial rights.

                               III. 25-POINT SCORE FOR OV 13

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        Defendant next argues that the sentencing court should not have assessed 25 points for OV
13 because defendant’s actions in entering the home on Braile Street and discharging three shots
from a revolver were one felonious event and cannot constitute a pattern of felonious criminal
activity, citing People v Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 704-706; 915 NW2d 387 (2018).

       We review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted the sentencing guidelines.
People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 123; 771 NW2d 655 (2009); People v Johnson, 298 Mich App
128, 130; 826 NW2d 170 (2012). De novo review is independent review without any deference
given to the trial court. People v Bruner, 501 Mich 220, 226; 912 NW2d 514 (2018); People v
Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 268; 547 NW2d 280 (1996). As well, we review de novo issues
concerning the interpretation of any sentencing variables. People v Sours, 315 Mich App 346,
348; 890 NW2d 401 (2016).

        A trial court’s findings in scoring the guidelines “are reviewed for clear error and must be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Lowrey, 342 Mich App 99, 120; 993
NW2d 62 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.”
People v Barnes, 332 Mich App 494, 499; 957 NW2d 62 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed
by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which
an appellate court reviews de novo.” Lowrey, 342 Mich App at 120 (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

        When scoring OVs, a court is able to entertain any and all evidence from the record, such
as testimony presented at a preliminary examination or trial. Johnson, 298 Mich App at 131.
Under MCL 777.43(1)(c), the sentencing court assessed 25 points for OV 13, for a “continuing
pattern of criminal behavior” when “[t]he offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal
activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person.” When considering which crimes fall within
the sentencing guidelines for OV 13, a trial court should include “all crimes within a 5-year period,
including the sentencing offense . . . regardless of whether the offense resulted in a conviction.”
MCL 777.43(2)(a). For the sentencing offense to constitute a part of the pattern, “it must be
encompassed by the same five-year period as the other crimes constituting the pattern.” People v
Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 87; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). MCL 777.43(1)(g) directs a sentencing court
to assess zero points for OV 13 when a defendant did not engage in the necessary pattern of
criminal behavior. People v Bonilla-Machado, 489 Mich 412, 427; 803 NW2d 217 (2011).

        In Carll, the defendant appealed his convictions for one count of reckless driving causing
death under MCL 257.626(4), and three counts of reckless driving causing serious impairment of
a bodily function under MCL 257.626(3). Carll, 322 Mich App at 693. The defendant had driven
through a stop sign, crashed into another vehicle, and killed the other vehicle’s driver, seriously
injured the other vehicle’s passenger, and seriously injured two passengers in his vehicle. Id. at
694-694. This Court defined a “continuing pattern of criminal activity” as “more than one
felonious event.” Id. at 704-705. This Court held that the trial court improperly assessed OV 13
at 25 points, reasoning that the record showed separate acts committed by a defendant in a single
event, because the defendant’s “reckless driving constitute[d] a single act[.]” Id. at 705-706.

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        However, the present case does not present the circumstances evidenced in Carll, since the
sentencing offenses constitute more than one felonious event and are to be counted separately for
determining whether there was a pattern of felonious criminal activity. Here, the jury convicted
defendant of second- degree murder, MCL 750.317; assault with intent to do great bodily harm
less than murder, MCL 750.84(1)(a); and discharging a firearm in a building causing death and
causing injury, MCL 750.234b(3) and (5). Three of the four crimes are statutorily defined as
“crimes against a person.” See MCL 777.16d, MCL 777.16m, and MCL 777.16p. When
defendant entered the Braile Street home with a revolver, struggled with Thomas for control of the
revolver, and fired three shots within the residence that struck the victims, these actions constituted
a pattern of criminal activity within the meaning of MCL 777.43. Each of these acts resulted in a
different felony charge that was within the five-year period described by MCL 777.43. Thus, the
trial court did not err in assessing 25 points for OV 13 because defendant’s convictions for crimes
against a person constituted a pattern of criminal activity.
1

                             IV. 15 POINTS ASSESSED FOR OV 5

        Defendant next argues that the sentencing court should not have assessed 15 points for OV
5 because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the victim’s family suffered a serious
psychological injury requiring professional treatment. In addition, defendant argues that the record
evidence included the testimony of one family member but lacked a written impact statement from
the purported victim. In defendant’s view, the testimony of one family member alone was
insufficient to establish a serious psychological injury.

        We review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted the sentencing guidelines.
McGraw, 484 Mich at 123; Johnson, 298 Mich App at 130. De novo review is independent review
without any deference given to the trial court. Bruner, 501 Mich at 226. Again, we review de
novo issues concerning the interpretation of any sentencing variables, Sours, 315 Mich App at 348,
and for clear error any factual findings by the trial court, Lowrey, 342 Mich App at 120.

       The sentencing court assessed 15 points for OV 5 since the court found that the victim’s
family members suffered serious psychological injury that required professional treatment. When
scoring OVs, a court may entertain any and all evidence from the record, such as testimony

1
  And, even if the shooting inside the residence that resulted in Hall’s death and the second-degree
murder conviction were treated as arising from a single act, defendant would not be entitled to
sentencing relief for two reasons. First, the record reveals that well within the five-year timeframe,
defendant assaulted and stalked Hall, including threatening to kill her, and that defendant also
assaulted another woman he had previously dated. Because no conviction is required to assess
points under OV 13, MCL 777.43(2)(a), defendant’s prior acts constituting domestic violence,
third, MCL 750.81(5), and aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i(2)(c) and (3)(a), could be properly
considered as additional felonious crimes against a person. See MCL 777.16d and MCL 777.16t.
Second, any error in scoring OV 13 would not require resentencing because it would not alter
defendant’s appropriate sentencing guidelines’ range. See Francisco, 474 Mich at 89 n 8 (“Where
a scoring error does not alter the appropriate guidelines range, resentencing is not required.”).

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presented at a preliminary examination or trial, and apply the evidence to make a sentencing
decision. Johnson, 298 Mich App at 131. A victim’s impact statement or testimony that includes
statements of anger, fright, or feelings of being violated supports assessing 15 points for OV 5.
People v Wellman, 320 Mich App 603, 609; 910 NW2d 304 (2017); People v Williams, 298 Mich
App 121, 124; 825 NW2d 671 (2012). As our Supreme Court has reasoned in upholding the trial
court’s decision to assess 15 points for OV 5, MCL 777.35 does not require that a victim’s family
member to be presently seeking or receiving professional treatment or intending to do so.
Calloway, 500 Mich at 186. See also People v Baskerville, 333 Mich App 276, 292-294; 963
NW2d 620 (2020) (upholding a 15-point assessment under OV 5, where the victim’s sister
expressed her anger and grief, need for medication to sleep, nightmares, and daily sadness and
pain.)

        We are persuaded that both Calloway and Baskerville support the assessment of 15 points
for OV 5. In Calloway, the victim’s stepfather testified that his family felt horrible since the
incident. Calloway, 500 Mich at 188-189. In addition, he stated that, “I want you to feel my pain,
your Honor . . . [b]ecause something happened that was final, we can’t change it.” After reviewing
this evidence, the court found sufficient evidence of the seriousness of the injuries and their long-
lasting effect on the victims. Id. at 189.

         At sentencing in this case, the victim’s daughter had already sought counseling for the
trauma she had experienced. In addition, the statements made by Hall are similar to the statements
made by the victims in Calloway and Baskerville, because the statements evidence the pain and
anger felt after the loss of a loved one. In her statement, Hall depicted a resilient family dealing
with indelible loss. She discussed how every member of their family is hurting differently and
how the victim’s child asks, “[w]hen is Mommy coming home?” and “if Auntie Pam is sad today?”
Hall indicated that the incident had caused her to no longer attend church or partake in other daily
activities because of the anger she feels. At the end of her statement, Ms. Hall discussed how
troubled she was that this incident took place and how “[i]t’s not okay for a little girl to not have
her mom.”

       Based on this evidence, the trial court did not err in assessing 15 points for OV 5 because
the record showed that the victim’s daughter had already sought treatment, and the statements
made by the victim’s family expressing their anger and heartbreak are sufficient to support the
assessment of 15 points for OV 5. See Calloway, 500 Mich at 188-189; People v Baskerville, 333
Mich App at 292-294.
                         V. DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

        After oral argument defendant was afforded the opportunity to file a supplemental brief on
appeal after the remaining trial transcripts were filed. Defendant did so, and though the
prosecution was provided an opportunity to respond, it declined to do so. In his supplemental
brief, defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury with the missing
witness instruction, M Crim JI 5.12. We review this preserved issue for an abuse of discretion.
People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 485; 769 NW2d 256 (2009).

       The relevant part of the res gestae witness statute, MCL 767.40a(5), provides as follows:

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       The prosecuting attorney or investigative law enforcement agency shall provide to
       the defendant, or defense counsel, upon request, reasonable assistance, including
       investigative assistance, as may be necessary to locate and serve process upon a
       witness. The request for assistance shall be made in writing by defendant or defense
       counsel not less than 10 days before the trial of the case or at such other time as the
       court directs. If the prosecuting attorney objects to a request by the defendant on
       the grounds that it is unreasonable, the prosecuting attorney shall file a pretrial
       motion before the court to hold a hearing to determine the reasonableness of the
       request.

The prosecution’s duty under the statute is in part to provide reasonable assistance to locate
witnesses on a defendant’s request. People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 289; 537 NW2d 813 (1995);
People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 585-586; 633 NW2d 843 (2001).

         The two endorsed witnesses who could not be located for trial were Keithan Blue and
Anthony Hicks. In a written opinion the trial court found that the prosecution met its obligation
under MCL 767.40a(5), and thus there was no need to provide the missing witness instruction.
The trial court did not err in that regard, as the evidence supported its conclusions. For example,
at the due diligence hearing, Detective Flanders testified that as to both witnesses he located last
known phone numbers and addresses that they provided when giving earlier witness statements,
and attempted to contact the witnesses at each of those numbers and locations. He also searched
a database containing the most recent contact information available to police. With respect to Blue
specifically, the detective also spoke with Blue’s father and grandmother about Blue’s
whereabouts, but neither provided any additional information that led to getting ahold of Blue. As
for Hicks, the detective testified that each address and phone number was a dead-end, and although
he left a message with Hicks’s sister, she never returned the detective’s call.

        The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the prosecution established
reasonable efforts to locate these witnesses. Defendant’s argument, that the detective should have
also sent text messages to the phones and searched social media for their locations, does not alter
our conclusion. See People v Eccles, 260 Mich App 379, 391; 677 NW2d 76 (2004) (due diligence
requires the prosecution to “do everything reasonable, not everything possible, to obtain the
presence of a witness.”). Because the prosecution met its burden, defendant was not entitled to
the missing witness instruction.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Anica Letica
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel

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