Court Opinion

ID: 9959017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:05:54.756712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:23.798868
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-1314
                               Filed April 10, 2024

REHNEA A. BARTHOLOMEW,
    Petitioner-Appellee,

vs.

JASON R. STANBROUGH,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County, Margaret Reyes,

Judge.

      The father appeals the denial of his petition to modify a custody decree.

AFFIRMED.

      Jon H. Johnson of Johnson Law, P.L.C., Sidney, for appellant.

      DeShawne L. Bird-Sell of Sell Law, PLC, Glenwood, for appellee.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard D. Arnold and Gary J. Otting,

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State of Iowa.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Jason Stanbrough appeals the district court’s denial of his petition to modify

the physical-care provision of the custody decree for his child with Rehnea

Bartholomew. On our review, we find Jason failed to prove a substantial change

in circumstances. We affirm the denial of his petition.

       I.      Background Facts and Proceedings

       Jason and Rehnea were in a relationship from 2010 until 2017. The two

never married but had a child together in 2011. A 2018 stipulated parenting plan

established Rehnea would have physical care of the child and Jason would have

liberal visitation.   That visitation included Jason having the child every other

weekend and one day during the week.

       Jason filed a petition to modify that plan in 2022, seeking physical care of

the child based on Rehnea’s new job. Rehnea worked at the United States Postal

Service as a mail carrier until that year, when she took a new job with the county

sheriff. In her new employment, Rehnea works twelve-hour shifts (6:00 a.m. to

6:00 p.m.) on a rotation. In her words: “It’s a two-week rotation. This week on

Friday, Saturday, Sunday I’m off. This is my weekend with my son. I will work

Monday, Tuesday next week. Then I will be off Wednesday, Thursday. And then

I will work Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and that is his dad’s weekend.”

       Jason changed his request to shared physical care of the child at trial. He

expressed concern the child would spend twelve hours per day outside the care of

his parents, though Jason admitted he did not know the exact details of Rehnea’s

work schedule. Jason wanted the child to stay with him while Rehnea was working,

reasoning that he could provide superior care during those times.          The only
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negative incident Jason cited was that the child called him a couple of times after

10:00 p.m. “bored and just lonely” and missing Jason. Rehnea was home but in

bed, as was the child’s brother.

          Rehnea agreed her work and living arrangements had changed some since

she and Jason ended their relationship. But she maintained those changes were

to better provide and care for the child and his brother. She emphasized she only

worked weekends when Jason had the child, and that she had two days off during

the week—so her new position afforded more parenting time at home, not less.

          The district court denied Jason’s petition, finding he failed to prove a

substantial change in circumstances. He appeals.

   II.       Standard of Review

          “Our review of a modification proceeding is de novo in light of the fact the

case was heard in equity.” Christy v. Lenz, 878 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Iowa Ct. App.

2016).      “At the same time, we recognize the virtues inherent in listening to and

observing the parties and witnesses.” In re Marriage of Pendergast, 565 N.W.2d

354, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “In equity cases, especially when considering the

credibility of witnesses, the appellate court gives weight to the fact-findings of the

district court, but is not bound by them.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

   III.      Discussion

          On appeal, Jason advances two arguments: that the district court erred in

finding Rehnea’s new employment was not a substantial change in circumstances

and that the district court should have ordered shared physical care. Because we

find no substantial change in circumstances, the district court correctly denied

Jason’s petition and we need not consider shared physical care.
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       In seeking to disturb the physical-care status quo, Jason had to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that conditions related to parenting the child have

materially and substantially changed since the 2018 custody decree. See In re

Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). To be material and

substantial, changed circumstances must meet three criteria: (1) the court did not

contemplate those circumstances when entering the decree; (2) the changes are

essentially permanent; and (3) the changed circumstances relate to the welfare of

the child. See id. To warrant modification, the parent seeking to change custody

bears the burden to prove a superior ability to care for the child. In re Marriage of

Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015).

       The district court found no material and substantial change relating to the

child’s welfare. While Rehnea’s work schedule had changed, the court found this

was not to the detriment of the child as Rehnea could now spend more time with

him. We also recognize Jason has care of the child on the weekends Rehnea is

required to work and at least some days Rehnea works during the week. And

when she does have care of the child on a day she works, the child is in school

most of the hours Rehnea is away from the home—the same as most working

parents. Jason has neither alleged nor proven Rehnea was negligent or remiss in

her caretaking since starting her new job. Thus, Jason has not established a

negative effect on the child’s welfare.

       “The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems from the

principle that once custody of children has been fixed it should be disturbed only
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for the most cogent reasons.” Frederici, 228 N.W.2d at 158. Because there was

no cogent reason to disturb the status quo here, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.