Court Opinion

ID: 9897246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:11.923943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.500843
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Oct 27 2023, 9:18 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark A. Bates                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Lake County Public Defender Office                         Attorney General of Indiana
Crown Point, Indiana                                       Tyler Banks
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Louis J. Kalozi,                                           October 27, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2797
        v.                                                 Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                           Lake Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Salvador Vasquez,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           45G01-1004-FC-48

                                Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                              Judges Bailey and Tavitas concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023                           Page 1 of 8
      Case Summary
[1]   In this interlocutory appeal, Louis J. Kalozi raises one issue for our review,

      which we restate as: Does Indiana’s double jeopardy statute bar the State from

      prosecuting him on state criminal charges after he pleaded guilty in federal

      court to similar charges? Concluding the statute does not bar his state

      prosecution, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In early April 2010, Kalozi took four minor children—two male, two female—

      on a trip from Michigan to Chicago. The group stopped at a hotel in

      Hammond, Indiana. During the night of April 8 and into the morning of April

      9, Kalozi slept in the same bed as one of the minor males, A.R. At some point,

      Kalozi “began massaging” A.R.’s back. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. Kalozi

      worked his hands down A.R.’s back and reached the boy’s backside. Kalozi

      was “hugging” and holding A.R. so tight he could feel Kalozi’s penis press

      against his back and behind. Id. Later in the night, Kalozi flipped A.R. over,

      pulled A.R.’s pants down, and began “masturbating” A.R. Id. Kalozi’s

      conduct was reported to the police.

[3]   On April 15, 2010, the State charged Kalozi with two counts of sexual

      misconduct with a minor. 1 Then, on September 22, 2010, the federal

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9 (2007).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023      Page 2 of 8
      government charged Kalozi with five criminal offenses. Count 1 of the

      indictment—alleging transportation of a minor for sexual exploitation 2—stated:

               LOUIS JOSEPH KALOZI knowingly transported an individual
               who had not attained the age of 18 years in interstate commerce
               with the intent that such individual engage in sexual activity and
               attempted to engage in criminal sexual activity.

               Specifically, LOUIS JOSEPH KALOZI and a 14-year-old boy
               traveled from Kent County, Michigan to Hammond, Indiana,
               and back. LOUIS JOSEPH KALOZI knew the boy was 14
               years old, and he transported the boy for the purpose of engaging
               in sexual activity, and attempted sexual conduct with the 14-
               year-old boy; sexual conduct would be Fourth Degree Criminal
               Sexual Conduct, a violation of MCL § 750.520e under the laws
               of the State of Michigan, and would be Sexual Misconduct with
               a minor, a violation of Indiana Criminal Code 35-42-4-9.

      Id. at 45–46. Kalozi pleaded guilty to two counts in his federal case, including

      Count 1, and received a fifteen-year aggregate sentence.

[4]   In June 2022, Kalozi was brought to Indiana to face his pending state charges.

      Kalozi moved to dismiss, alleging the state-court prosecution subjected him to

      double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion and Kalozi sought an

      2
        “A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or
      foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the
      individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
      criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.” 18 U.S.C. §
      2423(a) (2006).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023                                  Page 3 of 8
      interlocutory appeal. The trial court certified its order and this Court accepted

      jurisdiction.

      Indiana’s Double-Jeopardy Statute Does Not Bar Kalozi’s
      State Prosecution
[5]   Kalozi argues the State is barred from prosecuting him on charges of sexual

      misconduct with a minor following his guilty plea on his federal charges.

      When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the defendant has the burden of

      proving—by a preponderance of the evidence—all facts necessary to support a

      motion to dismiss. Ackerman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 171, 177 (Ind. 2016). Because

      Kalozi appeals from a negative judgment, “we will reverse only if the evidence

      is without conflict and leads inescapably to the conclusion that [Kalozi] is

      entitled to a dismissal.” Id. (quotation omitted). Whether a prosecution is

      barred by double jeopardy is a question of law, which we review de novo.

      Swenson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). To the extent

      resolving this issue involves statutory construction, we also review those

      matters de novo. State v. Johnson, 183 N.E.3d 1118, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022),

      trans. denied.

[6]   Because the state and federal governments are considered “separate” or “dual”

      sovereigns, the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Indiana

      Constitutions do not prevent a state prosecution for conduct which was the

      subject of a prior federal prosecution. Haggard v. State, 445 N.E.2d 969, 972

      (Ind. 1983) (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)). But our state

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023       Page 4 of 8
      legislature has provided protection against multiple prosecutions from different

      jurisdictions through Indiana’s double jeopardy statute. This statute provides:

              In a case in which the alleged conduct constitutes an offense
              within the concurrent jurisdiction of Indiana and another
              jurisdiction, a former prosecution in any other jurisdiction is a
              bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same conduct in Indiana, if
              the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of
              the defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 of
              this chapter.

      I.C. § 35-41-4-5 (emphasis added). Essentially, “a prior conviction or acquittal

      in another jurisdiction bars a subsequent Indiana state prosecution for the ‘same

      conduct.’” Johnson, 183 N.E.3d at 1123.

[7]   When determining whether a prosecution is barred under Indiana’s double

      jeopardy statute because it is based on the same conduct, we do not employ the

      tests used in a constitutionally-based double jeopardy analysis. Id. Instead, we

      consider the “‘overt acts’ alleged in the sister jurisdiction’s charge in

      juxtaposition with the allegation in the State’s charge.” Id. (quoting Brewer v.

      State, 35 N.E.3d 284, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)); see also Dill v. State, 82 N.E.3d

      909, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (describing this analysis as “comparing the

      statutory charges brought and the evidence in support of the allegations”), trans.

      denied. Thus, “our analysis centers on comparing the substance of the specific

      factual allegations contained in the charging instruments to determine if the

      offenses alleged therein are based on the same conduct.” Johnson, 183 N.E.3d

      at 1123; see also Smith v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023          Page 5 of 8
      (“The plain language of the statute requires a comparison of the conduct alleged

      to constitute an offense in Indiana with the conduct alleged to constitute an

      offense in another jurisdiction[.]”), trans. denied.

[8]   As discussed above, the federal government charged Kalozi with transportation

      of a minor for sexual exploitation. The overt act alleged in his federal charge

      was that Kalozi traveled across state lines with A.R. with the intent to engage in

      criminal sexual activity with him. Although the federal charge alleged Kalozi

      attempted sexual conduct with A.R., Section 2423(a) does not require proof of

      actual sexual conduct to obtain a conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a); see, e.g.,

      U.S. v. Nicholson, 24 F.4th 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) (recognizing the

      government does not have to prove actual sexual activity to convict under

      Section 2423), cert. denied. Instead, interstate travel “with the intent that the

      individual engage . . . in any sexual activity for which any person can be

      charged with a criminal offense” is sufficient. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (emphasis

      added); see also Johnson, 183 N.E.3d at 1125 (considering the elements of a

      federal statute only to determine which allegations were essential to the federal

      charge). Put differently, the portion of Kalozi’s federal indictment alleging he

      attempted sexual conduct with A.R. was mere surplusage and not essential to

      the federal charge. Rather, Kalozi violated Section 2423(a) once he transported

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023         Page 6 of 8
      A.R. from Michigan to Indiana with the intent to engage in sexual activity with

      him. 3

[9]   With this in mind, we turn to the specific factual allegations contained in

      Kalozi’s state charges. The relevant portions of Kalozi’s sexual misconduct

      with a minor charges provide:

               Louis Joseph Kalozi, being at least twenty-one (21) years of age
               or older, did perform or submit to the fondling or touching of
               [A.R.] with intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of Louis
               Joseph Kalozi, or [A.R.], a child at least fourteen (14) years of
               age or older but under sixteen (16) years of age, contrary to I.C.
               35-42-4-9[.]

      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. 4 The operative allegations in these charges are

      Kalozi either performed or submitted to the fondling or touching of A.R. with

      3
        Kalozi directs our attention to the factual basis supporting his guilty plea in federal court to show the State
      is attempting to prosecute him for the same conduct underlying his federal charge. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2
      at 53. His argument is unavailing. During Kalozi’s plea hearing, the district court judge instructed Kalozi:
      “Tell me what you did that makes you guilty of Count 1 which was the charge that you engaged in
      transportation of a child for sexual exploitation.” Id. at 112. After Kalozi described transporting A.R. across
      state borders with the requisite intent, the court clarified: “So you crossed from Michigan to Indiana with the
      intent of in the future engaging in sexual conduct with a minor?” Id. Kalozi responded: “Yes.” Id. at 113.
      The court further inquired: “And what kind of sexual conduct did you engage in?” Id. Kalozi responded: “It
      was inappropriate touching of the back, the buttocks, and the genitalia” of A.R. Id. For the reasons stated
      above, the court’s inquiry on this point merely established Kalozi’s intent to engage in conduct for which he
      could have been charged with a crime in Indiana or Michigan. That is all the statute requires. See 18 U.S.C. §
      2423(a). To be certain, the court concluded its discussion of Count 1 by reiterating the essential elements of
      the charge: “[T]here was travel from Michigan with the 14-year-old boy to Indiana with the intention of
      engaging in sexual conduct?” Id. Again, Kalozi answered, “[y]es.” Id. We cannot say the court’s slight
      probe into the actual sexual misconduct is sufficient to mandate a finding the state and federal charges are
      based on the “same conduct,” thereby prohibiting Kalozi’s state prosecution.
      4
       The State charged Kalozi with two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor. The counts differ only in the
      date the alleged offense occurred.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023                                 Page 7 of 8
       intent to arouse or satisfy his or A.R.’s sexual desires. This is not the same

       overt act alleged in Kalozi’s federal charge. So, the State is not statutorily

       barred from prosecuting Kalozi for sexual misconduct with a minor following

       his guilty plea to transportation of a minor for sexual exploitation. 5

       Conclusion
[10]   Indiana’s double jeopardy statute does not bar Kalozi’s state prosecution.

       Therefore, we affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss and remand for further

       proceedings.

[11]   Affirmed and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J. concur.

       5
         To the extent Kalozi argues he has already been punished for his sexual misconduct with a minor, we
       disagree. As already noted, Count 1 of Kalozi’s federal charge and Kalozi’s state charges are not based on
       the “same conduct.” So, Kalozi has not already been punished for the conduct underlying his state charges.
       Besides, the district court sentenced Kalozi to ten years for transportation of a minor for sexual exploitation.
       Ten years was the minimum sentence permitted under Section 2423(a). 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). And on appeal,
       Kalozi has not provided us with the transcript from his sentencing hearing to show how his sentence was
       aggravated based on his sexual misconduct in Indiana. At bottom, nothing indicates his fondling of A.R.
       somehow increased his sentence for transportation of a minor for sexual exploitation. In fact, his sentence
       could not have been shorter.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2797 | October 27, 2023                                Page 8 of 8