Court Opinion

ID: 9909787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 03:05:20.969513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:05.066927
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance ()pinto,   5-5
                         IN THE COUR.T OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    TASHAMI J. SIMS,                                     No. 84904-COA
                    Appellant,
                    vs.
                    THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                       FILE
                    Respondent.
                                                                               DEC 07 2023
                                                                                      H A. BROWN
                                                                                     UPR    E QDRT

                                                                                1EF DEPUTY CLERK

                              Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a
                   guilty plea, of assault with the use of a deadly weapon. Eighth Judicial
                   District. Court, Clark County; Jasmin D. Lilly-Spells, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   Zaman Legal LLC and Waleed Zaman, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. 'Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, and Jonathan E VanBoskerck, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
                   Clark County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GII3BONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

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                                                       OPINION
                   PER CURIAM:
                                  Criminal defendants have the unqualified right to represent
                   themselves at trial so long as their waiver of the right to counsel is knowing,
                   voluntary, and intelligent. To protect this fundamental right, district courts
                   should generally conduct a Faretta1 canvass when a competent defendant
                   makes a timely and unequivocal request for self-representation. See O'Neill
                   v. State, 123 Nev. 9, 17, 153 P.3d 38, 43 (2007). In this case, we address, for
                   the first time, whether an unequivocal request for self-representation can
                   be subsequently abandoned by the defendant, obviating the need for a
                   Faretta canvass. We conclude that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal
                   request to represent themselves where the district court has not
                   conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances,
                   including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has
                   abandoned their request. As discussed in detail below, we further conclude
                   that appellant Tashami J. Sims unequivocally requested to represent
                   himself, the district court did not conclusively deny the request, and Sims
                   subsequently abandoned his request. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
                   conviction.
                                     PROCEDURAL AlVD FACTUAL HISTORY
                                  Sims pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon.
                   The district court set a sentencing date of April 25, 2022. Sims' counsel was
                   unable to appear on that date because of a personal matter, and an associate
                   of counsel's appeared instead. •At that hearing, the district court indicated
                   it was still waiting for an update from the mental health court as to whether

                         1   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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                   that specialty court would accept Sims. Based on these circumstances,
                   associated counsel asked that the sentencing hearing be continued for 7 to
                   10 days.
                               Sims did not want the hearing continued, and when he learned
                   that associated counsel was not prepared to go forward with the sentencing
                   on that date, Sims stated, "Okay. Well, I'll go pro per." The district court
                   informed Sims that sentencing was not going forward that day, and Sims
                   reiterated that he could represent himself at sentencing:
                              THE DEFENDANT: I can—I can go pro per and
                              then I'll go do my own sentencing. And I'll do it just
                              like that. 'Cause I don't want—we've been doing
                              this—we just waiVed it.
                              THE COURT: I understand Mr. Sims, but we're
                              only going to continue it 'till like Wednesday to see
                              an update. It's not going to be—
                              THE DEFENDANT: That's still—Your Honor, I'm
                              just trying to see if I got accepted. If I didn't get
                              accepted then I'm ready to proceed right now.
                              THE COURT: Okay. We are not proceeding today.
                              So I can continue it to Wednesday or we can
                              continue it for a minute for you to find out.
                              THE DEFENDANT: I would like—I would like to
                              exercise my Faretta rights
                              THE COURT: Mr. Sims, rt's not happening right
                              now.
                              THE DEFENDANT: So I can't—
                              THE COURT: Continue it to Wednesday.
                              THE DEFENDANT: So I can't go pro per right now?
                              THE COURT: No, Sir.
                              Two days later, Sims appeared at the continued sentencing
                   hearing with associated counsel• anJ before the same judge who had
                   presided over the previous hearing.     continuance was again granted to
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                   allow the State to procure the victim witn.esses and for Sims to provide
                   further evidence to the specialty court regarding his mental health history.
                   Associated counsel stated he talked with Sims and they were collaborating
                   to get Sims' mental health records to the mental health court. The district
                   court asked Sims if this was correct, and he agreed. Sims did not reassert
                   his request to represent himself, and the sentencing hearing Was continued
                   a final time to May 25, 202.2.
                             At the final Senten.cing hearing, the:district cOurt asked'if there
                   was [a]ny legal reason or cause why we Can't move forWard." Counsel
                   answered in the negative. Shortly thereafter, Siins was allowed to sPeak,
                   and again, he did not reassert his request to represent himself. Instead, he
                   explained he has a history of drug abuse and mental health issues and that
                   he • Wanted ta be placed in -either the mental 'health court or - drug court.
                   Counsel stated that the mental health court had rejected Sims but that the
                   drug court had accepted'him.- and'argued. that Sims shoUld participate inthe
                   drug court. Although the district' CoUrt thought Sims 'could benefit' from
                   freatment, it determined that Sims was a danger tO society and sentenced
                   him to 20 to 72 months in. prison.
                                                  ANALYSIS
                               Sims argues the district court erred by not conducting a Faretta
                   canvass prior to denying his unequivocal request to represent .himself.
                   Criminal defendant's have a Sixth Amendment right                   . represent
                   themselves so long as the waiver Of the- right, to counsel is intelligeilt. and
                   volinitarY. See O'Neill, 123 Nev. at 17, 153 P.-3d at 43; Upon invocation of
                   the right to Self-representation, the district court should conduct a Faretta
                   canvass. to ensure the waiver of the right to counsel is made knowingly,
                   voluntarily, and intelligently.      Id.   "A district court may      deny .a
                   defendant's request for self-representation where the requeSt is untithely,
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                   the request is equivocal, the request is made solely for the purpose of delay,
                   the defendant abuses his right by disrupting the judicial process, or the
                   defendant is incompetent to waive his right to counsel." ld. at 17, 153 P.3d
                   at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                               The parties do not dispute that Sims' request to represent
                   himself was unequivocal. Further, the State does not allege, and the record
                   does not reflect, the existence of any of the reasons listed in O'Neill for
                   denying a defendant's request to represent themselves. Rather, the State
                   argues that Sims abandoned hiS request for self-representation by not
                   renewing the request in subsequent hearings.2 Sims replies that his failure
                   to reiterate his request for self-representation did not absolve the district
                   court of its initial duty to conduct a Faretta canvass and, in turn, the district
                   court's failure to conduct a canvass was reversible error.
                               The improper denial of a defendant's right to self-
                   representation at trial is a structural error that is not subject to harmless

                         2The State also argues that Sims is not entitled to relief because he
                   did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. In
                   explanation, the State emphasizes that (a) Sinis said he wanted to represent
                   himself in order to avoid any delay in sentencing but (b) the sentencing
                   court was determined to continue the hearing regardless. The State's
                   argument necessarily fails. It wrongly suggests 'that a defendant may
                   automatically negate their right to self-representation by stating a motive.
                   See Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 794 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A] defendant's
                   constitutional right of self-representation is not automatically negated bÿ
                   his/her motivation for asserting it."). More importantly, the State's circular
                   argument overlooks that the very purpose of a Faretta canvass is to
                   determine whether a request for self-representation constitutes a knowing,
                   voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. See O'Neill, 123
                   Nev. at 17, 153 P.3d at 43. Because the purpose of the canvass is to
                   determine the validity of the waiver, a canvass cannot be avoided by a
                   predetermination that the waiver is not valid. In light of these
                   considerations, the State's argument is unpersuasive.
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                   error analysis when the error is both preserved and not abandoned. United
                   States v. Williams, 29 F.4th 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022); see also United
                   States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006) (explaining
                   structural error and listing the right to self-representation as an example);
                   McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984). 1(AI-ice a defendant
                   affirmatively states his desire to proceed pro se, a court should cease other
                   business and make the required inquiry . . . ." United States v. Rice, 776
                   F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Raulerson
                   v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 366, 369 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also
                   Batchelor v. Cain, 682 F.3d 400, 412 (5th Cir. 2012) (providing that "the
                   trial court should have initiated a colloquy").       However, it does not

                   necessarily follow that a failure to conduct a Faretta canvass is the
                   equivalent of denying a defendant the right of self-representation.       See

                   Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52, 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that
                   "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se
                   require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13, 111 P.3d 1092,
                   1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth
                   Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately
                   conduct a Faretta canvass). Rather, "the primary focus must be on whether
                   the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way."
                   McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177.
                               Just as "a defendant's 'pre-trial decision to Proceed with counsel
                   does not constitute an absolute waiver of his right to represent himself,'
                   once the right, to self-representation has been asserted, it "may be waived
                   through conduct indicating that one is vacillating on the issue or has

                   abandoned one's request altogether." Williams v. Bartlett, 44 F.3d. 95, 100
                   (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Matsushita, 794 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir.

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                   1986)); see also Brown u. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 1982).
                   This is because, whereas the right to counsel is presu.med, see U.S..Const.
                   amend. 6 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
                   right . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."), the right to
                   represent oneself must be affirmatively asserted, see O'Neill, 123 Nev. at
                   17, 153 P.3d. at 44 (providing a trial court may deny an equivocal request.
                   for self-representation.). Accordingly, it stands to reason that the right to
                   self-representation is more easily lost than is the right to counsel. Brown,
                   665 F.2d at 611 ("Since the right of 4,elf-representation is waived More easily
                   than the .right to coUnsel at the outset, before assertion, it is reaSonable to
                   conclude it is more easily waived at a later point, after assertion.").
                               However, as Sims points out, a defendant should not have to
                   continuously reassert a right in order to preserVe for review the denial of
                   that right. See Buhl, 233 F.3d at 796 (stating-that a defendant's failure to
                   renew their request for self-representation "is irrelevant because the law
                   irnilbses no sUch obligation as a condition precedent to preserving one s. right
                   to proceed pro se"). "[A] defendant is not required continually to.renew a
                   request once it is conclusively denied or to 'make fruitless motions or forego
                   cooperation with defense counsel in order to preserve the issue on .appeal.'
                   Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting DorMan v.
                   Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1367 (11th Cir. 1986)). That is; once the district
                   court has conclusively denied a request .for self-representation, the issue iS
                   preserved for appeal. But 'where the district court has .h.ot conclusively
                   denied a request for self-representation, the right to self-representatiori
                   May be abandoned -if the defendant does not reašsert the request. See
                   Wilson v. Walker, 204 F.3d 33, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2000).

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                               Because Sims made an unequivocal request to represent
                   himself, the district court, ideally, should have canvassed him as to the
                   validity of his waiver. However, the district court did not. We therefore
                   must determine whether the district court conclusively denied the request
                   or if Sims abandoned that request.
                   The district court did not conclusively deny the request
                                First, this court must determine whether the district court
                   conclusively denied Sims' request to represent himself. The weight of
                   authority indicates that. a trial-level court conclusively denies a request for
                   self-representation when the reason given for denial would make any future
                   request futile.
                               For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
                   Circuit reasoned that any future request by a defendant would be futile
                   where the lower court had "made absolutely clear that [his] first choice, self-
                   representation, was not an available option." United States v. Arlt, 41. F.3d
                   516, 522 (9th Cir. 1994). There, the lower court had denied a request for
                   self-representation upon finding that the defendant could not represent
                   himself competently because his motion was "rambling and illogical." Id. at
                   518. Similarly, in another case from the same circuit, the lower court denied
                   the defendant's request for self-representation because the defendant was
                   incapable of putting on an effective defense. United States v. Hernandez,
                   203 F.3d 614, 621-23 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Indiana
                   v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164. 1.77-78 (2008). The Ninth Circuit concluded that,
                   given the reason for the denial, "there was no reason for Hernandez to
                   believe that on the day of trial the judge would suddenly change his mind
                   and decide that Hernandez had become a competent trial advocate." Id. at
                   622.

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                              Other jurisdictions have employed similar reasoning. The
                   United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a lower
                   court's ruling (that the defendant lacked the education to represent himself)
                    was categorical, and expressly relied on the advanced stage of proceedings
                   and the defendant's lack of education—obstacles that were not going to be
                   removed before trial." Williams, 44 F.3d at 101. And the California
                   Supreme Court held that a trial court ruling that a defendant could not
                   represent himself because he was facing the death penalty was
                   (4unequivocal, and foreclosed any realistic possibility defendant • would

                   perceive self-representation as an available option." People v. Dent, 65 P.3d
                   1286, 1289 (Cal. 2003).
                               The common theme in each of these cases is that the appellate
                   courts concluded that the explanation given for denying a defendant the
                   right of self-representation made it clear that any future request would be
                   futile. A person's education, ability to put on a defense, and potential
                   punishment are not subject to change before trial. Because• any future
                   requests would be futile, the lower court rulings constituted conclusive
                   denials of the defendants' requests for self-representation.
                               Conversely, courts have held that the denial of the right to•self-
                   representation is not conclusive when a future request would not
                   necessarily be futile. For example, the trial-level court does not conclusively
                   deny a defendant the right to self-representation when the defendant is
                   informed they can reassert the right at a later time. See, e.g., People v. Tena,
                   67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 422-23 (Ct. App. 2007); Swan v. Commonwealth, 384
                   S.W.3d 77, 92-93 (Ky. 2012) (observing the defendant was told to consult
                   with counsel and to reassert the motion if necessary). A delayed ruling is
                   also not a conclusive denial. See, e.g., Cheney v. State, 236 So. 3d 500, 502-

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                   03.(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding that there was no conclusive denial
                   when the defendant agrecd to continue with counsel while being evaluated
                   for a particular defense). In each of these examples, the reason given for
                   denying the defendant the right of self-representation did not. suggest that
                   any future request would be futile.        Therefore, none of the denials
                   constituted conclusive denials of the defendants requests for self-
                   representation.
                               In the instant case, the'district Court's reason for denying •Sims'
                   request did not foreclose' the possibility that a future .request mig•ht -be
                   granted. Specifically, the district court denied the request "right noW,"
                   indicating that the request could be revisited:. And Sims appeared to
                   understand that he could reassert his request in the future because he
                   clarified that he was not being allowed to represent himself"right now." We
                   conclud.e • the district court's denial of Sims' oral motion for self-
                   representation-was not a conclusive denial because the denial Was not based
                   on. something that would render a future request futile.
                   Sims' conduct indicated he abandoned his request
                              Having concluded that Sims' request was unequivocal and that
                   the district court did not conclusively deny it, this court must n.ow consider
                   whether Sims' conduct after the denial demonstrated that he abandoned his
                   request. There .are two competing approaches to determine - whether a
                   defendant, through their subsequent conduct, has demonstrated they have
                   abandoned their request.
                               Some jurisdictions follow a per se rule when determining
                   whether .a defendant has -abandoned their right to self-representation.
                   Under this rule, if a defendant makes an unequivocal reqUeSt to represent
                   theinselves, their failure to follow up on the request when they have-the
                   time and oppOrtunity to do so conStitutes an• abandonment of the request.
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                   People v. Kenner, 272 Cal. Rptr. 551, 555 (Ct. App. 1990).3 The attraction
                   of this rule is that it creates an easy-to-apply, bright-line test: if the
                   defendant makes a request that is not conclusively denied and the
                   defendant does not reassert the request, it is abandoned.                  TWo
                   . considerations militate against this approach. First, such a bright-line rule
                   may inadvertently encourage trial courts to unduly defer ruling on a
                   defendant's unequivocal. request to represent themselves sim.ply because
                   the defendant may change their mind. Second, • by virtne of its being a
                   bright-line test, the per se rule does not allow for nuance or extenuating
                   circumStanceS.
                                Indeed, other jurisdictions have found the per se rule to be too
                   strict• and instead look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
                   whether a defendant has abandOned their request for self-representation.
                   The Arizona Court of .Appeals has ad.opted this approach and set forth
                   several factors tO consider, including
                                 the defendant's opportunities to remind the court of:
                               . a. pending motion, defense counsel's awareness of
                                 the motion, any affirmative conduct by the
                                 defendant that would run counter to a desire for -
                                 self-representation, whether the defendant waited
                                 until after a conviction to complain ..., and the
                                 defendant's experience in the criminal justice.
                                 system and with waiving counsel.
                   McLemore, 288 P.3d. at 786.       They also consider whether there was a
                   relatively short period of tirne between the request and subsequent hearings
                   such that the defendant did not. have time to forget about their request. Id.
                   at 786-87. Although lAcking the simplicity of a per Se rule, courts are

                         3It was first referred to as the. "per se" rule in State v. McLernore, 288
                   P.3d 775, 784-86 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
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                   familiar with reviewing the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Taylor
                   v. State, 132 Nev. 309, 320, 371 P.3d 1036. 1044 (2016) (applying a totality
                   of the circumstances test to the reliability of pretrial identification
                   procedures); Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 603, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281
                   (2015) (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether
                   permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing would be fair and
                   just); Harkins v. State, 1.22 Nev. 974, 987, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (2006)
                   (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a
                   hearsay statement is testimonial for confrontation purposes); Doyle v. State,
                   116 Nev. 148, 158, 995 P.2d 465, 471 (2000) (applying a totality of the
                   circumstances test to determine whether probable cause is present to
                   support a search warrant); Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 214, 735 P.2d
                   321, 323 (1987) (applying a totality of the circumstances test to determine
                   whether a confession was voluntary). And it has the benefit of allowing
                   courts to consider circumstances unique to a particular case.
                               Because it is both flexible and familiar, a test that considers the
                   totality of the circumstances best serves the interests of both defendants
                   who assert their right to represent themselves and the courts. Accordingly,
                   we will review whether a defendant has abandoned their request for self-
                   representation by considering the. totality of the circumstances, including
                   their conduct. We further adopt the factors set forth in McLernore to guide
                   us in that consideration.
                               Applying the MeLemore factors, we conclude Sims abandoned
                   his request for self-representation. First, Sims had two opportunities to
                   remind the district court in person of his request but did not, and nothing
                   in the record before this court suggests that he atternpted to file a written
                   motion to dismiss counsel in the month. between his initial request and his

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                      final sentencing hearing. See EDCR 3.70 (stating a defendant who has
                      counsel may file a motion to withdraw counsel pursuant to N.R.Cr.P.
                      3(2)(B)(ii)).Second, the defense team knew of Sims' request because
                      associated counsel was present when Sims rnade it. Third, Sims' actions of
                      collaborating with counsel regarding his mental health records ran counter
                      to a desire to represent himself. Fourth, Sims waited until after his
                      conviction to complain about the denial of his request. Fifth, Sims has
                      experience in the criminal justice system, although the record does not
                      indicate whether 8ims ever sought to represent• hiniself in his prior cases.
                      Finally, the time between hearings was relatively short: there were only 2
                      days between the initial request and the next hearing and 30 days between
                      the initial request and sentencing, making it unlikely that Sims forgot his
                      expressed desire to represent himself.          Thus, the totality of the
                      circumstances demonstrates Sims abandoned his request to represent
                      himself.
                                                     CONCLUSION
                                      A defendant may abandon an unequivocal request for self-
                      representation where the district court did not conclusively deny the
                      request.    And we will consider the totality of the circumstances in
                      determining whether a defendant has in fact abandoned such a request.
                      Here, Sims made an unequivocal request to represent himself, which the
                      district court did not conclusively deny. After considering the totality of the
                      circumstances, we conclude that Sims abandoned his request for self-
                      representation and, thus, that Sims is not entitled to relief for the district

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                   court's failure to conduct a Faretta canvass.   Therefore, we affirm the
                   judgment of conviction.

                                                      (     ALI                 ,   C.J.
                                                    Gi bons r7-4

                                                                                ,   J.
                                                    Bulla

                                                                                    J.
                                                    Westbrook

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