Court Opinion

ID: 9797640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:26:44.439847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:42.687071
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority concludes that claimant does not have a constitutional right to testify at his extent of disability hearing. Because I disagree with the majority’s application of the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 335, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), three-part due process analysis, I respectfully dissent.1 I also believe that the majority’s opinion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or 362,15 P3d 548 (2000).
The issue here is the extent of claimant’s unscheduled permanent partial disability (PPD), which is calculated by determining the “loss of earning capacity due to the compensable injury.” ORS 656.214(5).
“The extent of disability, expressed as a percentage {e.g., T4 percent PPD’), depends in turn on the seriousness of the injury ‘as modified by factors of age, education and adaptability to perform a given job.’ ORS 656.726(4)(f)(A). The Department of Consumer and Business Services provides formulas for expressing these modifying factors as numbers. A high number adds to the extent of disability, which, in turn, adds to the injured worker’s compensation.”
SAIF v. Fister, 177 Or App 13,15, 33 P3d 320 (2001). A comparison is made between claimant’s physical capacity to work before the compensable injury, described as base functional capacity (BFC), OAR 436-035-0310(3)(a), and his remaining physical ability to work once medically stationary, described as residual functional capacity (RFC), OAR 436-035-0310(3)(b).
“These statutes and rules reflect the proposition that a worker whose injury causes a significant loss of working capacity deserves more compensation than a worker whose *311injury inflicts minimal harm to working capacity, even if both workers end up identically disabled.”
Id. at 15. See also Ford v. SAIF, 7 Or App 549, 552-53, 492 P2d 491 (1972).
Claimant sustained a compensable injury to his neck, upper back, and right shoulder. A June 1996 notice of closure awarded claimant 16 percent unscheduled PPD. This award considered the relevant social and vocational factors plus claimant’s impairment. The specific dispute here concerns claimant’s work during the five years before the injury. The closure order determined that claimant’s work history consisted of one job, production assembler, which was described as light work. OAR 436-035-0310(3)(f) defines light work as “the ability to occasionally lift 20 pounds and can frequently lift or carry objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”
Claimant submitted evidence during reconsideration that his past work was “heavy.” OAR 436-035-0310(3)(j) defines “heavy” work as “the ability to occasionally lift 100 pounds and the ability to frequently lift or carry objects weighing 50 pounds.” The specific jobs and their accompanying strength levels that claimant submitted at reconsideration are: (1) Christmas-tree farm worker, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) strength level, Heavy; (2) Cannery worker, DOT strength level, Light; (3) Farm worker, fruit II, DOT strength level, Medium; (4) Vine pruner, DOT strength level, Light; (5) Lumber handler, DOT strength level, Heavy; and (6) Assembler, production, DOT strength level, Light.
The reconsideration order still classified claimant’s work as light and affirmed the award of 16 percent PPD. Claimant requested a hearing and sought to testify regarding his actual job duties for his employer and past employers. In an offer of proof, claimant indicated that his testimony would establish that his past work was heavy. If claimant was correct that his past work was heavy, then he should have received an award of 36 percent PPD, rather than the 16 percent PPD award he actually received.
The majority holds that there is no statutory right to testify at an extent of disability hearing and that claimant *312does not have a constitutional right, based on the Due Process Clause, to testify at hearing. I disagree.
Due Process Analysis
Although I agree that the three-part analysis from Mathews applies, as required by Koskela, I disagree with the way in which those factors are applied by the majority. Those three factors are:
“First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.”
Mathews, 424 US at 335.1 will address each factor in turn.
Private Interest Affected
First, the majority unjustifiably minimizes the importance of the interest at stake by focusing on the fact that permanent partial disability benefits are at issue. The majority distinguishes that interest from the permanent total disability benefits that were involved in Koskela, concluding that an award of PPD is not as significant. The majority supports its position by relying on the fact that a claimant who is partially disabled still remains able to work and therefore the “issue of economic self-sufficiency is not so directly implicated.” 181 Or App at 306.1 disagree. Disability benefits, whether partial or total, are designed to provide a substitute for income lost due to a worker’s inability to be self-supporting, as before the injury. The loss of partial disability compensation can be significant and can adversely affect the claimant and his or her dependents. See ORS 656.012(2)(a) (The objective of the workers’ compensation law is “ [t] o provide, regardless of fault, * * * fair, adequate and reasonable income benefits to injured workers and their dependents [.]”).
In Koskela, the court concluded that the claimant’s interest in permanent total disability benefits was great because the benefits provide economic self-sufficiency and *313because of the finality of an adverse determination. 331 Or at 379. Here, although PPD benefits do not continue indefinitely, the nature of the interest at stake is the same — maintaining economic self-sufficiency. Furthermore, an adverse PPD decision is no less final than an adverse permanent total disability decision. Thus, an award of PPD benefits involves a significant interest and should be given greater weight than the majority gives to it.
Risk of Erroneous Decisions
The second Mathews factor is the risk of erroneous decisions and the probable value of additional safeguards. The majority states that the facts of this case are more similar to those involved in Mathews than those in Koskela. As I discussed in my dissent in Koskela, the analogy is not perfect. Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 159 Or App 229, 256-57, 978 P2d 1018 (1999) (Wollheim, J., dissenting). In Mathews, the issue was whether the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before the termination of his social security disability benefits where he received a full evidentiary hearing after termination and, if he prevailed, would receive full retroactive benefits. For the analogy to be perfect, the issue in Mathews would have to have been the constitutionality of the claimant’s right to challenge the benefit amount without the opportunity to testify at all. Claimant, unlike the petitioner in Mathews, has no right to an evidentiary hearing before his award of PPD is determined and no statutory right to testify at hearing.
The majority also cites Mathews as authoritative in the question of whether credibility is invoked in the determination of a worker’s BFC. In Mathews, the Court said that a determination of when a claimant’s disability ceases is an issue of medical proof that is generally determined by reference to routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports and thus witness credibility and veracity are rarely involved. 424 US at 344. Here, on the other hand, the issue is the calculation of claimant’s BFC, which, in this case, was determined solely by reference to the DOT.
There is a difference between a determination of when a person’s disability ceases and a determination of one’s BFC. The former is a question of medical proof that can *314be determined by reference to medical records.2 In that situation, a physician has examined and spoken with the claimant about his or her injury and can provide an opinion about the status of that person’s injury and whether it continues to materially improve. Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the determination of one’s BFC simply involves a dictionary definition of a worker’s job description, in general, and does not take into account the specific job duties of the person who actually does the job. The majority summarily acknowledges and dismisses that fact when it states that “[although it is conceivable that, in at least some cases, a claimant could take issue with the accuracy of a job description, the resolution of such a dispute does not inherently involve matters of credibility and veracity.” 181 Or App at 307.
I disagree. When the board relied on the “facts” as stated in the DOT, claimant was precluded from challenging those “facts” and explaining how his job duties exceeded those described in the DOT. The BFC determination requires the decisionmaker to resolve factual disputes as to the claimant’s past work and, in so doing, to make judgments about credibility and veracity.
The claimant has the burden of proving the extent of disability. ORS 656.266(1). Claimant argues that his BFC was classified incorrectly. In an adversarial hearing process, the only fair method to determine a claimant’s BFC is through testimony from the claimant as to what the job duties were. If the employer disagrees, it can cross-examine the claimant or present evidence that refutes the claimant’s testimony.3 In any event, the factfinder — i.e., the administrative law judge (ALJ) — not a book — should decide what the claimant’s work entailed.
*315Safeguarding against mistakes in the process is the purpose of procedural due process requirements. Mathews, 424 US at 345. Thus, the value of an opportunity for the presentation of evidence at an oral hearing about the extent of PPD is no less substantial than the interests at stake in Koskela.
Government Interest & Fiscal and Administrative Burden
The majority overstates the burden of allowing a claimant to testify about BFC. The opinion states that there are 6,000 annual claim closures and 12 annual permanent total disability awards.4 The opinion ignores that the legislature already provides an injured worker with the right to a hearing before the AU. Further, in response to Koskela, the 2001 Legislative Assembly amended the reconsideration process to allow a worker to testify by deposition.5 ORS 656.268(6)(a)(A). Any increased costs would be minimal, not substantial as the majority suggests.
Finally, as a matter of fundamental fairness, claimant should have been given the opportunity to testify.
“The essence of fundamental fairness is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fundamental fairness emphasizes factfinding procedures. The requirements of notice, adequate counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standards of proof flow from this emphasis.”
State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Geist, 310 Or 176,189-90, 796 P2d 1193 (1990) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
The fundamental consideration that the majority fails to acknowledge is the key distinction between the facts *316of Mathews and the facts of this case. In Mathews, the petitioner had the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing after his benefits were terminated. Here, on the other hand, claimant has no similar right. Unlike the petitioner in Mathews, claimant’s due process rights will never be satisfied if he is not given the opportunity to testify at his extent of disability hearing.
For the reasons stated in this dissent and my dissents in Logsdon v. SAIF, 181 Or App, 317,45 P3d 990 (2002) (Wollheim, J., dissenting), and Mount v. DCBS, 181 Or App 458, 46 P3d 210 (2002) (Wollheim, J., dissenting), the majority wrongly concludes that claimant does not have a constitutional right to testify at his extent of disability hearing.
Edmonds and Armstrong, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.

 I concur with the result reached because I would conclude that the case must be remanded to the board because the board made inconsistent findings.

 However, the best way to test the accuracy of those medical records is through cross-examination. See Logsdon v. SAIF, 181 Or App 317, 326,45 P3d 990 (2002) (Wollheim, J., dissenting).

 Our dispute resolution system is premised on the belief that the adversarial system will produce the “truth” and that cross-examination is the best method for discovering the “truth.”
“It may be that in more than one sense, [cross-examination] takes the place in our system which torture occupied in the mediaeval system of the civilians. Nevertheless, it is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. However difficult it may be for the layman, the scientist, or the foreign jurist to appreciate this its wonderful power, there has probably *315never been a moment’s doubt upon this point in the mind of a lawyer of experience. * * * [C]ross-examination, not trial by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to improved methods of trial procedure.”
John Henry Wigmore, 5 Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367, 32 (1979).

 I assume the majority’s numbers are correct, although it does not state its source.

 Whether such a procedure satisfies the Due Process Clause is not an issue here. The point is that the legislature determined that allowing an injured worker to testify is appropriate.