Court Opinion

ID: 9840831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 15:06:08.485146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:06.698020
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                             OF THE
                                   STATE OF DELAWARE
VIVIAN L. MEDINILLA                                                LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
          JUDGE                                                    500 NORTH KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                          WILMINGTON, DE 19801-3733
                                                                            TELEPHONE (302) 255-0626

                                     September 19, 2023

    Tyler Sacchetta, Esquire                      Kenneth Doss, Esquire
    Sacchetta & Baldino                           Casarino, Christman, Shalk, Ransom &
    1201 North Orange St. Suite 7543              Doss, P.A.
    Wilmington, DE 19801                          1000 N. West Street, Suite 1450
                                                  P.O. Box 1276
                                                  Wilmington, DE 19899

         Re: Jamie Frei v. Jask, Inc.
            C.A. No.: N23C-04-118 VLM

Dear Counsel:

      This is the Court’s decision on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Superior
Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

                           Relevant Facts & Procedural History

       Jamie Frei (“Plaintiff”) was a business invitee at Tyler’s Bar and Grille on the
evening of February 11, 2022. During the early morning hours of February 12, 2022,
he was assaulted and beaten by an assailant who was also a patron at the
establishment.1 Jask, Inc. (“Defendant”) is the owner of Tyler’s Bar and Grille.
      On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant, alleging
negligence, carelessness, or recklessness, namely that Defendant’s conduct failed to

1
  Compl. ¶ 11, D.I. 1. Unless otherwise stated, the facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and
the attached exhibits. The Court accepts these allegations as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss.
prevent foreseeable harm through proper security and safety measures,2 and caused
Plaintiff’s injuries.3
      On June 13, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss in Lieu of an Answer
pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6).4 On July 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
Response.5 On July 20, 2023, Defendant filed a Reply. Oral arguments were heard
on August 24, 2023. The matter is ripe for review.
                                            Party Contentions
       Defendant argues that it cannot be held liable for actions of a third-party
assailant under Delaware law.6 In support of Defendant’s Motion, it contends that
Delaware case law is clear that a patron has no cause of action against a bar or tavern
operator for personal injuries related to intoxication at the establishment.7 It argues
that the allegations, albeit guised as failures to provide “security,” should be
dismissed where “the allegations arise out of the same claim as intoxication of
another patron [and] do not change the type of claim being made against [the] tavern
owner.” 8 Lastly, it argues that any extension of liability to encompass the
circumstances in this case falls to the General Assembly, and not the courts. 9
        Plaintiff states that Delaware courts have held that taverns and bars can be
held liable to patrons as a result of their negligent conduct, 10 that they are not
immune from all lawsuits, and may be held liable—as any possessor of land may
be—if they are negligent in their actions. 11 Plaintiff maintains this case is a
negligence action and not to be considered under the rubric of the “dram shop”
liability cases.12
                                      Standard of Review

      Under Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate
when the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.13

2
  Id. ¶ 25.
3
  Id. ¶ 28.
4
  Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 14.
5
  Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 17.
6
  Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 6.
7
  Id. ¶ 3.
8
  Id. ¶ 7.
9
  Id. ¶ 6.
10
   Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 3-6.
11
   Id. ¶ 7.
12
   Id.
13
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12.
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                 When reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we (1) accept
                 all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague
                 allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party
                 notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
                 the non-moving party, and (4) do not affirm a dismissal unless
                 the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
                 reasonably      conceivable      set     of     circumstances. 14

Further, this Court considers whether a plaintiff may recover under any “reasonably
conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the complaint.”15 If this
Court determines that the plaintiff may recover, then the motion to dismiss must be
denied.16
                                     Discussion

       The Dram Shop Act is a law imposing civil liability on the owner of an
establishment that sells alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person who causes
injury to another as a result of the intoxication.17 It is true that “dram shop” liability
does not exist in Delaware.18 Our Supreme Court has reasoned that “[t]he creation
of a [dram shop liability] cause of action against one who is licensed to sell alcoholic
beverages … involves public policy considerations which can best be considered by
the General Assembly.”19
      Yet, Delaware law does impose upon commercial property owners an
obligation of reasonable care to protect business invitees from the acts of third
persons through the adoption of Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965).20 In Jardel, it was “[t]he jury [that] concluded that the plaintiff’s injuries
were attributable to the combined neglect of the mall and its parent corporation in
not providing adequate security.”21 There, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s

14
   Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011)
(citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del.2002).)
15
   Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978) (citing Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 94 A.2d 385
(Del. 1952), opinion adhered to on reargument, 95 A.2d 460 (Del. 1953).)
16
   Id.
17
   12 Am. Jur. Trials 729 (Originally published in 1966).
18
   Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554, 554 (Del. 1981) (“We conclude that such a cause of action does
not exist in this State either under the common law or present statutes . . . .”).
19
   Id. at 556.
20
     Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 524 (Del. 1987).
21
     Id. at 521–22.
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verdict, adopting Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which
holds a possessor of land liable to members of the public for their failure to exercise
reasonable care to discover acts that are being done; or give a warning adequate to
enable the visitors to avoid the harm.22 The Court reasoned that “[t]he extent of the
security protection provided by Jardel . . . raised a factual issue and the jury was
entitled to conclude that under the circumstances, that protection was an insufficient
response to the known history of criminal activity.”23
       Here, Plaintiff has pled that Defendant knew or should have known of
incidents of violence and criminal acts on Defendant’s premises. 24              These
allegations do not involve the serving—or overserving—of alcohol. Plaintiff alleges
Defendant was negligent, careless, or reckless in its hiring, training, and supervision
of security personnel, failed to take necessary action to prevent foreseeable harm,
and failed to supervise, control, manage, and keep safe the establishment for
business invitees.25 Accepting these allegations as true, dismissal at this juncture is
not appropriate. These types of cases, such as in Jardel (assuming they survive
summary judgment), should proceed to the factfinder for resolution. Until more is
developed through discovery, the same applies here.
       Understandably, Defendant relies on various “dram shop” cases such as
Wright v. Moffitt in support of dismissal. In Wright, though the plaintiff became
clearly intoxicated at a tavern, he was continuously served drinks while there. 26
Shortly after leaving the tavern, he was hit by a car and sustained bodily injuries.27
The plaintiff sued the tavern for continuing to serve him despite his intoxication,28
and this Court granted dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. 29 The Supreme Court affirmed for the reasons previously stated
regarding the imposition of dram shop liability in this State.
       Defendant also relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in Samson v. Smith. 30
In Samson, the defendant was intoxicated after leaving a bar and crashed his vehicle
into the rear of appellant’s vehicle.31 There, the Court reiterated: “there is no cause

22
   Id. at 524 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965)).
23
   Id. at 525–26. Citing Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 445 A.2d 1141, 1146 (N.J. 1982).
24
   Compl. ¶ 7.
25
   Id. ¶ 25.
26
   Wright, 437 A.2d at 554-55.
27
   Id. at 555.
28
   Id.
29
   Id.
30
   Samson v. Smith, 560 A.2d 1024 (Del. 1989).
31
   Id. at 1025.
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of action against a tavern operator, by a third party who is injured off the premises
of the tavern by a patron, who became intoxicated at the tavern.”32
       This case is distinguishable from Wright and Samson, where those involved
injuries that took place outside of the establishment and involved additional motor
vehicle accidents. In Wright, the plaintiff (the intoxicated individual) was injured
outside of the establishment when he was struck by a car. 33 In Samson, the
intoxicated defendant crashed his car into appellant’s vehicle. 34 Here, Plaintiff
suffered injuries from an assailant who was inside the establishment without an
ensuing motor vehicle collision. Lastly, this case is also distinguishable from
McCall v. Villa Pizza, Inc., where that patron later drove his vehicle, injuring himself
in a single vehicle accident.35
       At first blush, the facts of this case are more aligned with Eastridge v. Thomas
where defendant struck plaintiff in the face after an altercation ensued within the
establishment.36 There, this Court held that “[t]he testimony by both Eastridge and
Thomas concerning their exchange of words, the refusal of the manager to allow the
barmaid to call the police . . . , and the continued dispensing of alcoholic beverages
to [plaintiff] and [defendant] . . . clearly raises a factual issue [which may preclude
granting summary judgment].” 37 In Eastridge, this Court reasoned that an
establishment “has a duty to exercise reasonable care to discover and protect patrons
from reasonably foreseeable harm inflicted by other patrons.”38
        Notably, Eastridge was decided during the summary judgment stage, as were
all the cases cited by Defendant. The benefit of discovery here is appropriate. Thus,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
                                                          Sincerely,

                                                          /s/ Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                          Vivian L. Medinilla
                                                          Judge

32
   Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
33
   Wright, 437 A.2d at 555.
34
   Samson, 560 A.2d at 1024.
35
   McCall v. Villa Pizza, Inc, 636. A.2d 912 (Del. 1994).
36
   Eastridge v. Thomas, 1987 WL 9605, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987).
37
   Id. at *2.
38
   Id.

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