Court Opinion

ID: 9859724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:31:14.752741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:12.027183
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice,
concurring specially.
Because of the factual situation involved in this case, I believe an explanation of my understanding of the opinion and my concurrence therein is appropriate.
The opinion, in footnote 4, states that the consumption of alcohol, which was self-induced, and its after-effect did not vitiate voluntariness of consent. The same is true regarding the pain in the hand and his state of being tired, which were the product of his own behavior. As I understand the opinion, none of the foregoing items (consumption of alcohol and aftereffect, pain in hand, and tired feeling) individually or collectively constitute grounds for vitiating the voluntariness of consent. In my opinion, these items may not be used as grounds for suppressing evidence. In this respect, paragraphs I, II, III, IV, V, and VI in the trial court’s findings in regard to the suppression hearing do not constitute grounds for suppressing any of the evidence. However, the other items “unequal confrontation” and the promise of getting the defendant out of the fix if he would make a drug purchase, if believed by the court to be true, would constitute grounds for vitiating the voluntariness, and would constitute a basis for suppressing the evidence under the current “exclusionary rule,” and it is for this reason I concur in the opinion.