Court Opinion

ID: 9953014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 14:00:58.15203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:35.922799
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11310    Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 03/21/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11310
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       RILEY MITCHELL,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
       ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                                Respondents-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00457-MSS-TGW
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11310

                             ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Riley Mitchell appeals the district court’s denial of his federal
       habeas petition. During his state court trial, the government intro-
       duced Mitchell’s testimony that was obtained in violation of his Mi-
       randa rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but his
       counsel did not pursue a motion to suppress that testimony. The
       district court held that although Mitchell’s counsel’s performance
       was deficient, Mitchell could not establish that deficiency preju-
       diced him under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
       district court granted a certificate of appealability for Mitchell’s ar-
       gument that the state court unreasonably applied Miranda and
       Strickland under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) by denying his claim for inef-
       fective assistance of counsel. We agree with the district court that
       Mitchell cannot establish that any of his counsel’s deficiencies were
       prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                       I.

              Riley Mitchell was arrested and questioned on two separate
       occasions in late 2010. He was first arrested on November 13 for
       dealing in stolen property. He was questioned in relation to that
       arrest on December 1, invoked his Miranda rights during that ques-
       tioning, and was released from jail on December 12. He was again
       arrested on December 15 and charged with burglary of a dwelling
       and grand theft. Detectives brought Mitchell to an interview room
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       22-11310               Opinion of the Court                         3

       and attempted to read him his Miranda rights, but Mitchell inter-
       rupted the detectives and stated that he had gone into abandoned
       homes to collect metal to scrap and that he knew it was wrong to
       break into those abandoned buildings.
              At Mitchell’s trial for the burglary and grand theft charges,
       the government introduced Mitchell’s statements after the Decem-
       ber 15 arrest. The government also introduced evidence that
       Mitchell’s blood and flesh were found on the exterior of a broken
       window of the house the copper tubing was stolen from and that
       Mitchell did not have permission to enter the home. And the de-
       tectives who interviewed Mitchell after his arrest testified that they
       noticed and photographed scars on Mitchell’s arms. The jury found
       Mitchell guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to thirty
       years.
              Mitchell appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida
       Second District Court of Appeal, which affirmed his conviction and
       sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling but vacated his
       conviction and sentence for grand theft. The court of appeals di-
       rected the trial court to enter a judgment and sentence for first-de-
       gree petit theft instead of grand theft.
              Mitchell later filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief
       that argued, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffec-
       tive for failing to file a motion to suppress his statements to the
       police that he said were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.
       He argued that because he invoked his Miranda rights during a cus-
       todial interrogation on December 1, 2010, the police were
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11310

       prohibited from reinitiating an interrogation on December 15,
       2010. The state postconviction court denied relief, reasoning that
       his counsel was not deficient because his first invocation of his Mi-
       randa rights was in an unrelated case and therefore did not apply to
       police interrogation related to the offense here. Mitchell appealed
       that denial, and the Florida Second District Court of Appeal af-
       firmed.
                Mitchell filed a pro se habeas petition on February 18, 2019.
       The district court denied that petition. It held that the state court
       unreasonably applied Strickland and its progeny when it deter-
       mined Mitchell’s trial counsel was not deficient, but that Mitchell
       could not establish prejudice because of that deficiency. The dis-
       trict court granted a certificate of appealability as to whether Mitch-
       ell’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sup-
       press Mitchell’s statements to police.
                                       II.

              “We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of ha-
       beas corpus.” Morrow v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 886 F.3d
       1138, 1146 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Williamson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
       805 F.3d 1009, 1016 (11th Cir. 2015)). Moreover, “[a]n ineffective
       assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact[,]
       which we review de novo.” Williams v. Alabama, 73 F.4th 900, 905
       (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304
       (11th Cir. 1998)).
              Because these claims were adjudicated in state court, we will
       not grant habeas relief unless the state court decision “was contrary
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       22-11310                Opinion of the Court                          5

       to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
       Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
       States” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the
       facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceed-
       ing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly estab-
       lished Federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion oppo-
       site to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a
       question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than
       [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indis-
       tinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A
       decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established fed-
       eral law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
       principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably
       applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. To
       show that a state court decision was an unreasonable application
       of clearly established federal law, the prisoner must show the deci-
       sion “is so obviously wrong that its error lies ‘beyond any possibil-
       ity for fairminded disagreement.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118
       (2020) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
               Mitchell argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because his
       trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress
       his statements to detectives that were offered at trial. A claim for
       ineffective assistance of counsel requires the defendant to establish
       his counsel was deficient and that deficiency resulted in prejudice
       to the defendant. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11310

               The state court held that Mitchell did not establish that his
       trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of his
       statements to police. It reasoned that Mitchell’s counsel was not
       deficient because his first invocation of his Miranda rights was in an
       unrelated case and therefore did not apply to police interrogation
       related to the offense here.
              We disagree and hold that the state court unreasonably ap-
       plied Supreme Court caselaw in holding that Mitchell’s counsel
       was not deficient. A suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights
       during a custodial interrogation is not subject to further interroga-
       tion until counsel has been made available or the suspect initiates
       further communication. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–
       85 (1981). This rule prevents an interrogation for 14 days after the
       suspect’s release from custody. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98,
       110 (2010). And the rule prevents reinitiating interrogation about
       any crime, even if the new questioning relates to a different crime
       than the suspect was originally questioned about. See Arizona v.
       Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1988).
               Mitchell invoked his Miranda rights on December 1, 2010, in
       an unrelated case. He was released from custody on December 12,
       2010, and detectives reinitiated interrogation on December 15,
       2010, when he was rearrested in relation to the burglary and stolen
       copper tubing. Because Mitchell’s interrogation regarding the bur-
       glary took place within 14 days of his release from custody, and
       because Mitchell invoked his Miranda rights during that custody,
       his trial counsel—who knew of these facts—should have filed a
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       22-11310                Opinion of the Court                           7

       motion to suppress the statements he gave to the detectives. His
       failure to do so was deficient, and the state court unreasonably ap-
       plied Supreme Court precedent when it determined the counsel
       was not deficient.
              However, the state court was correct to reject Mitchell’s in-
       effective assistance of counsel claim because Mitchell’s counsel’s
       deficient performance did not prejudice Mitchell. To prove preju-
       dice, Mitchell must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
       counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
       have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The errors must
       be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
       result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The state court did not engage in a
       prejudice analysis because it determined Mitchell’s counsel was not
       deficient, so we review Strickland’s prejudice element de novo.
              The evidence presented at trial establishes there is no rea-
       sonable probability that Mitchell would have been acquitted if the
       jury had not heard Mitchell’s statements to police about scrapping
       copper. Thus, even though Mitchell’s counsel was deficient, Mitch-
       ell was not prejudiced by that deficiency.
              Mitchell was charged with burglary under Florida law,
       which requires the government to prove he unlawfully entered or
       remained in a dwelling with the intent to commit an offense
       therein. Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1)(b)(3)(b). A dwelling includes a home’s
       curtilage, and a fenced-in back yard is part of the curtilage of the
       home. See id. § 810.011(2); Baker v. State, 636 So.2d 1342, 1343 (Fla.
       1994). And under Florida law, “[s]tealthy entry, together with the
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11310

       absence of owner or occupant consent, is an evidentiary tool with
       which to establish prima facie proof of intent to commit an of-
       fense.” Baker, 636 So.2d at 1344. The government offered evidence
       that the backyard of the burglarized home was fenced in, that
       Mitchell’s blood and flesh were found on a broken window used to
       gain entry into the home, that the detectives observed scrapes and
       scars on Mitchell’s arms, and that Mitchell did not have permission
       to enter the home. Thus, even though Mitchell’s counsel erred by
       not filing a motion to suppress his statements to police, that error
       was not serious enough to deprive Mitchell of a fair trial with a re-
       liable result. Instead, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find
       Mitchell guilty of burglary under Florida law.
              Mitchell separately argues that he was prejudiced because he
       might have elected to testify had his counsel filed a motion to sup-
       press his statements to police. But Mitchell does not explain why
       the suppression of those statements would have made him decide
       to testify at trial or how his testimony could have overcome the
       weight of the evidence against him. At Mitchell’s postconviction
       hearing Mitchell’s trial attorney explained that Mitchell admitted
       to him that he burglarized the home. Because of that admission,
       the attorney could not have advised Mitchell to take the stand and
       perjure himself. See Scott v. Dugger, 891 F.2d 800, 803 (11th Cir.
       1989). Moreover, had Mitchell testified contrary to the statements
       that he made to the police, the prosecution could have impeached
       him with those statements even if they had been excluded from the
       prosecution’s case-in-chief. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
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       22-11310             Opinion of the Court                    9

       (1971). There is no connection between the suppression of these
       statements and Mitchell’s right to testify.
                                   III.

             The district court is AFFIRMED.