Court Opinion

ID: 9667154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:36:48.253812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.395422
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The court’s opinion accurately recognizes the general rule that “[a] vehicle is presumed subject to forfeiture ... if ... the driver is convicted of the designated offense upon which forfeiture is based.” MinmStat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(a)(1) (2006). But based on the proposition that forfeiture laws are tainted with a punitive and disfavored nature, the opinion liberally construes the innocent-owner exception to void the operation of the plainly stated forfeiture rule to resolve what it perceives to be doubt about the application of the exception, ultimately disallowing forfeiture. I do not read the rule and the exception as accommodating any doubt concerning whether a car owned by an offender may be subject to forfeiture under section 169A.63. I believe that the exception does not apply in this situation.
For our purposes, the statutory language stating the rule and then the exception is as follows: “A vehicle is presumed subject to forfeiture under this section if ... the driver is convicted of the designated offense upon which the forfeiture is based.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 7(a)(1). “A motor vehicle is not subject to forfeiture under this section if its owner can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law or that the owner took reasonable steps to prevent use of the vehicle by the offender.” Id., subd. 7(d).
*28In my view, in context of the entire statute, the innocent-owner exception applies when “the owner,” meaning the only owner or in the case of joint ownership all owners, prove by clear and convincing evidence that “the owner” did not know that the vehicle would be used contrary to law or that “the owner” took reasonable steps to prevent use by “the offender.” It is plain to me for two reasons that the legislature did not draft the innocent-owner exception to apply in cases such as this, when “the offender” jointly owns the vehicle with a nonoffending spouse or family member.
First, the literal reading of the exception supports this conclusion. The subdivision 7(d) operative language regards “the owner” and “the offender” clearly as separate persons or classes of persons. Following the legislative directive to apply the plain language to construe unambiguous provisions of its statutes, Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2006), I would urge that we take the most logical reading of the exception at face value. This leads me to conclude that it applies only when the owner, or in the case of multiple owners, all owners, prove a lack of knowledge of the offender’s illegal use. My reading is buttressed by the legislature’s guidance explaining that when construing statutes, “the singular includes the plural.” Id. The exception’s singular reference to “the owner” therefore must refer to all owners where, as here, there is more than one owner. And this conclusion finds further support in the next sentence of the subdivision. That sentence specifically addresses the situation in which “the offender” is “a family or household member of the owner,” indicating again that the legislature did not intend for the exception to apply unless the offender is neither the single owner nor among the class of plural owners. Here, all owners cannot establish lack of knowledge by clear and convincing evidence, since one of them is “the offender.”
Second, the legislature knew how to, easily could have, but chose not to, use simple language that applies the exception in situations when the vehicle is owned jointly by two or more people, one of whom is the offender, as in the present case. When the legislature defined the term “owner” as applied to section 169A.63, it prescribed that the term means “a person” entitled to use the vehicle, including certain lessees, and it explained that “a person registered as the owner” is presumptively “the owner.” Minn.Stat. § 169A.63, subd. 1(h) (2006). In that same definition, the legislature specifically declared the ownership interest of a vehicle that “is owned jointly by two or more people.” Id. This informs us that the legislature knew how linguistically to address joint ownership situations. I do not think we can overlook that the legislature chose not to use this simple language addressing jointly owned vehicles just six subdivisions later in the same section when setting forth the forfeiture exception as applying to “the owner” in contrast with “the offender.” I add that the legislature was also obviously mindful of competing ownership interests when it enacted the subdivision. Subdivision 7’s second and third paragraphs address forfeiture of seized vehicles that are subject to a lease or to a perfected security interest. Id., subd. 7(b), (c) (2006). In similar fashion, it could have imposed forfeiture limits, including the innocent-owner exception, in cases of jointly owned vehicles. It did not.
I agree with the concurring opinion that forfeiture provisions ought to be strictly construed. But strict construction of “disfavored” forfeiture laws nevertheless allow forfeiture when the forfeiture falls “within both letter and spirit of the law.” Schug v. Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Fifty Cents in U.S. Currency, *29669 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn.App.2003) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Dec. 16, 2003). The court’s opinion dismisses the county’s argument by treating it as relying on the spirit rather than the letter of the law. While we certainly ought not to disregard the letter in search of the spirit, Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2006), I construe the letter plainly to presume forfeiture and to make exceptions only as plainly articulated in subdivision 7(d).
My dissent depends on a literal construction of the statute; I would not presume that the legislature intended the exception to apply beyond the language of that section in joint ownership cases, especially when it imbedded the exception in a provision that makes sense only when the offender is a nonowner. I add that although I see no ambiguity, if there is any ambiguity in the statute, it lies only in the exception (subdivision 7(d)), not in the rule (subdivision 7(a)). Under a straightforward textual review, the rule expressly and plainly authorizes vehicle forfeiture with the implied presumption either that the offender is the owner or that the owner consents to the offender’s illegal use. There is no ambiguity to be found here. The exception, which is where both the majority and concurring opinions suggest an ambiguity, exists only in the context of the rule. If the exception is indeed ambiguous, it is not our prerogative to apply it any more broadly than its strictest interpretation would allow.
In this case, Ms. Laase was “the offender.” For that reason, I would apply the statute expressly and hold that the exception does not apply to prevent forfeiture of the vehicle that she owned and operated while impaired. I would therefore reverse.