Court Opinion

ID: 9868742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:54:28.390715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:54.514584
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
In view of appellee’s statement in its motion to the effect that until the decision of this court was rendered it was not aware that it was required to controvert statements in appellant’s brief, we deem it proper to direct attention to Court of Civil Appeals Rule 31 with reference to briefing. This rule requires the appellant to make “a clear and accurate statement of the record bearing upon the respective propositions.” The rule further provides: “If the statement from the record thus made is not distinctly challenged by the opposing party, it may be accepted by the court as correct.”
This is a salutary rule. Its purpose is to relieve the court of the burden of checking unchallenged statements from the record in appellant’s brief. The necessity for the rule increases with the increase in volume of records, especially of statements of facts in question and answer form. The statement of facts in the instant case is almost 400 pages long.
Statements in briefs are made by counsel upon their professional responsibility as officers of court; and, independently of this rule, should be accepted as correct where not challenged.
Appellee’s brief further asserts that its failure to traverse statements in appellant’s brief “was occasioned solely through our desire to achieve brevity.” Such objective is highly commendable, but is secondary in importance to compliance with the above rule. In presenting a case to the appellate court, it should always be held in mind that the controlling facts in a case (where issues on appeal are based thereon) are of prime importance; from which it follows that appellants’ briefs primarily should reflect an accurate picture of the case factually. The above rule requires appellant to present such picture, and requires appellee to point out wherein the picture is inaccurate.
Appellee’s brief contains 31 typewritten pages. The first 12 pages are *770devoted to an elaborate resume of the pleadings. The remainder of the brief consists in the main of propositions and arguments upon the law of the cáse, with citations of, and quotations from, authorities. The statements under the several propositions consist largely of references to the pleadings. References to the statement of facts are quite meager and do not controvert the statement in appellant’s brief, which we accepted in our opinion as uncon-troverted.
The case is brought to this court solely upon assignments of error which question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the several fact findings of the trial court and the judgment thereon. No question of pleading is involved. The facts, therefore, are of prime importance.
We are confident this court was fully justified in accepting the uncontroverted statements in appellant’s brief.
Independently of this conclusion, however, a re-examination of the case, in the light of appellee’s motion, leads to the conclusion that the presentation of the case in our original opinion is correct, in so far as the controlling facts and issues are concerned. If there are any inaccuracies they are not important.
A large portion of the motion is devoted to the proposition that we were in error in holding that the burden of proof was cast upon the Commission as regards ground 8, because this ground was not indorsed upon the application as a basis for refusal of tender. This proposition is predicated upon the well-established rule that orders and rulings of the Commission are presumptively valid, and the burden rests upon one attacking them to establish their invalidity. Our holding in no way contravenes this salutary rule, but is predicated upon the statute which requires the Commission, in refusing applications for tender, to indorse thereon its reasons therefor. The rule still obtains that the action of the Commission in refusing the tender is presumptively valid. But this presumption extends only to the grounds upon which it acted. If it relies upon other grounds to uphold its order when attacked, the burden is upon it to establish them. This was the holding of this court in the cited case of Railroad Comm.' v. Morgan, 92 S.W.2d 1131; and was also the effect of our holdings in the following prior ' decisions: Davenport v. Railroad Comm. Tex.Civ.App., 91 S.W.2d 399; Id., Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 1006, error dismissed; Id., Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 661; Railroad Comm. v. Patton, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 1010.
We are clear in the view that the legislative purpose in requiring’ the Commission to indorse the reasons for its refusal of such applications was intended, at least prima facie, to constitute such reasons the basis of any attack on the order. We can conceive of no other purpose of this statutory requirement.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.