Court Opinion

ID: 9564525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:02:16.262157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:28.298003
License: Public Domain

*659SPENCE, J.
I concur in the judgment.
In the present proceeding the parties have discussed grave constitutional questions in the determination of which this court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. With respect to some of those questions the decisions of the United States Supreme Court offer no certain guide, but upon the single question which appears to be decisive of this controversy, the decisions of that court clearly indicate that the statute before us (Lab. Code, §§ 1131, 1136) and the restraining order issued thereunder (which restraining order follows the wording of section 1134 of the Labor Code in its essential provisions) must be declared invalid as trenching upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
Much is said in the briefs, as well as in the majority and dissenting opinions herein, regarding the power of a state to prohibit picketing. The majority opinion stresses the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which tend to identify the right to picket with the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. The dissenting opinion stresses the recent decisions of that court which indicate that such rights are not identical, and that picketing may be declared unlawful and may be enjoined under various circumstances. The question here, however, is not the general one of whether picketing, in its relation to that which is commonly termed “hot cargo" or “secondary boycott," may be constitutionally proscribed. The precise question for determination is whether the statute before us, defining “hot cargo” and “secondary boycott" in a particular manner (§1134, subds. (a) and (b)) and declaring them to be unlawful and enjoin-able (§§ 1131,1133), infringes upon constitutional guarantees. Having determined that the answer to the last question is that said statute does infringe upon constitutional guarantees, it may be assumed in this discussion that such picketing can be constitutionally proscribed by an appropriate statute drawn for the accomplishment of that purpose.
It should be emphasized that this particular statute is not merely an antipicketing statute. While the prevention of picketing may well have been one of the primary purposes of the framers of this legislation (despite the fact that the word “picketing" does not appear therein), the statute goes much further and covers a multitude of other activities. It will be sufficient to mention but a few. The broad language *660of section 1134, subdivision (a), makes unlawful and enjoin-able the mere agreement on the part of the employees engaged in the primary labor dispute to publish the facts of that dispute if such agreement and publication result in a refusal by the employees of another employer to perform any services for such other employer; and the broad language of section 1134, subdivision (b), makes unlawful and enjoinable any agreement on the part of such employees engaged in the primary labor dispute to publicize the facts of such dispute even among their fellow-employees for the purpose of inducing such employees to withhold patronage from other employers and for the ultimate purpose of inducing such other employers to refrain from doing business with the employer engaged in the primary dispute. Thus it appears that the language of said section 1134, subdivisions (a) and (b), purports to make unlawful and enjoinable certain acts, not involving such coercive methods as picketing, which acts are clearly protected by the guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press as found in our federal Constitution (U. S. Const., Amendments 1 and 14) and as construed by the United States Supreme Court in numerous cases cited in the majority opinion.
That which has been said regarding the infringement upon constitutional guarantees made by the provisions of section 1134, subdivisions (a) and (b) of the Labor Code, may likewise be said with greater force with respect to the provisions of section 1132. The last-mentioned section is not confined to any “combination or agreement” but it further declares unlawful “any act . . . which directly or indirectly ... induces ... a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Thus under that section a single individual might be doing an unlawful and enjoinable act if he should merely voice or otherwise publicize the facts of a labor dispute under certain circumstances. It cannot be seriously contended that section 1132 can stand the constitutional tests laid down by the United States Supreme Court. While it is true that the provisions of that section were not made the basis of the restraining order in the present case, it is perhaps significant to note that the dissenting opinion makes no attempt to defend those provisions. They are mentioned here only to demonstrate further the wide range of activities which the statute purports to declare unlawful.
This court reviewed certain decisions of the United States Supreme Court in James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 *661[155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900], and, in recognizing both the legislative power and its limitations, said at page 730: “Thus a state may impose limitations upon picketing or other concerted action if the ‘end sought’ is not permissible under state law and public policy, though any such limitations are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court, and will be annulled if they unreasonably interfere with labor’s right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute.” Under any view of the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it is clear that the above-mentioned provisions of the statute do “unreasonably interfere with labor’s right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute,” and that they must be declared unconstitutional for that reason. It is immaterial that a constitutional statute might have been drawn proscribing the specific acts which Blaney was found to have done in violation of the broad terms of the restraining order. Here both the restraining order and the section of the statute upon which it was based (§ 1134) cover acts which cannot be constitutionally proscribed as well as those which can, and I agree with the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that the provisions of said section are not mechanically severable so as to permit reliance upon the severability clause (Lab. Code, § 1136) to save the statute or to sustain the judgment of contempt which is under attack. It therefore follows that petitioner is entitled to his discharge.
Edmonds, J., concurred.