Court Opinion

ID: 9374670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 18:01:08.912411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.961019
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950       Date Filed: 02/23/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 23, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  CHARIE CLIFFORD,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 22-4090
                                                     (D.C. No. 2:18-CV-00522-RJS)
  DEWBURY HOMES; HOUSING                                        (D. Utah)
  AUTHORITY OF SALT LAKE
  COUNTY,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MCHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Charie Clifford appeals the dismissal by the United States District Court for the

 District of Utah of her complaint for failure to prosecute. We affirm.

 I.    BACKGROUND

       On January 5, 2013, Ms. Clifford signed a lease agreement with Dewbury

 Homes (Dewbury) for a duplex unit in West Valley City, Utah. This landlord-tenant

       *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
 appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950        Date Filed: 02/23/2023     Page: 2

 relationship arose out of a housing-assistance program run by the Housing Authority

 of Salt Lake County (the Housing Authority). On January 3, 2015, Ms. Clifford moved

 out of the unit. Ms. Clifford had two later Housing Authority-funded tenancies (one

 with a nonparty private landlord and one with the Housing Authority as landlord).

        Ms. Clifford’s initial complaint against Dewbury and the Housing Authority

 (collectively, Defendants) was filed on July 3, 2018. In her amended complaint filed

 about four months later, Ms. Clifford alleged that Defendants had violated a number

 of federal statutes and regulations. Most of her claims were dismissed by the district

 court on January 11, 2022, leaving Ms. Clifford with two claims (the Surviving

 Claims): “(1) that Dewbury violated [24 C.F.R. § 247.4(d)] in modifying [Ms.]

 Clifford’s lease, and (2) that [both Defendants] violated 24 C.F.R. §§ 92.253(c) and

 274.4(c)’s eviction requirements when they evicted [Ms.] Clifford [at the end of]

 2014.” Clifford v. Dewbury Homes, No. 2:18-cv-00522-RJS-DAO, 2022 WL 102279,

 at *1 (D. Utah Jan. 11, 2022) (Clifford I). On appeal Ms. Clifford briefly refers to

 Clifford I but does not mention the individual claims that the district court dismissed

 in that decision, let alone explain how the district court erred in dismissing them. We

 therefore do not consider the propriety of the district court’s decision in Clifford I. See

 Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1286 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[A]rguments that are

 inadequately presented in an opening brief, such as those presented only in a

 perfunctory manner,” are “deemed abandoned or waived.” (original brackets, ellipsis,

 and internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                             2
Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950        Date Filed: 02/23/2023     Page: 3

        On August 8, 2022, the district court sua sponte issued an order for “[Ms.]

 Clifford to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.”

 Aplt. App. at 441. The court recounted that “[o]n multiple occasions since June 2020,

 mail ha[d] been sent to the address on file for [Ms.] Clifford, only to be returned” to

 the court. Id. The court also noted that it had sent the Clifford I order to the address on

 file for Ms. Clifford, only for it to be returned as unclaimed. Although the court had

 issued a docket text order “directing the parties to meet and confer regarding the

 Surviving Claims” and “to submit a stipulated scheduling order . . . within fourteen

 (14) days” of April 25, 2022, that deadline had passed without any scheduling order

 being submitted. Id. at 443. A copy of the April 25 docket order had been mailed to

 Ms. Clifford, but that, too, was returned as unclaimed. The court warned that it would

 “dismiss the Surviving Claims without prejudice and close the case in twenty-one (21)

 days unless [Ms.] Clifford show[ed] cause why this case should not be dismissed for

 failure to prosecute.” Id. On September 1, 2022, the mailed order to show cause was

 also returned to the court as unclaimed.

        On September 14, 2022, the district court dismissed Ms. Clifford’s Surviving

 Claims without prejudice for failure to prosecute, and it ordered the case closed. See

 Clifford v. Dewbury Homes, No. 2:18-cv-00522-RJS-DAO, 2022 WL 4591089, at *1

 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2022) (Clifford II). Ms. Clifford timely appealed. We have

 jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Coffey v. Whirlpool Corp.,

 591 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Where a dismissal without prejudice

                                             3
Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950        Date Filed: 02/23/2023     Page: 4

 “is intended to dispose of the cause of action, as where the dismissal is for failure to

 prosecute, then it is appealable.”).

 II.   DISCUSSION

       “A trial court may, on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, dismiss an

 action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute it with reasonable diligence.” SEC v.

 Power Res. Corp., 495 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). We review for

 abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute. See

 Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, we will

 reverse only if the district court has “made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the

 bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Fresquez v. BNSF Ry. Co., 52

 F.4th 1280, 1311 (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Because Ms. Clifford is a pro se litigant, we construe her filings liberally, but

 we will not make arguments on her behalf. See Firstenberg v. City of Santa Fe, 696

 F.3d 1018, 1024 (10th Cir. 2012). Her sole adequately preserved argument on appeal

 is that she “did not get notice of [the] order to show cause” entered on August 8, 2022,

 because “the notice was returned to [the] court as undeliverable.” Aplt. Br. at 4. But

 the record demonstrates that if she did not get notice, it was her fault. Ms. Clifford sent

 the court a change-of-address form on August 7, 2020; the court received it on August 14,

 2020. The address listed on this change-of-address form matches the addresses appearing

 through the windows of envelopes later returned to the district court as “unclaimed.”1 The

       1
          The address listed on Ms. Clifford’s August 2020 change-of-address form is
 that of a United States Post Office in Magna, Utah; we take judicial notice of this fact
                                             4
Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950         Date Filed: 02/23/2023     Page: 5

 identity between the address provided by Ms. Clifford and the addresses for the envelopes

 sent by (and returned to) the court shows that the failure to communicate was not the result

 of an error by the clerk; and we presume that the mail was delivered as addressed. See

 Crude Oil Corp. of Am. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 161 F.2d 809, 810 (10th Cir. 1947)

 (“When mail matter is properly addressed and deposited in the United States mails, with

 postage duly prepaid thereon, there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received

 by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail.”). Ms. Clifford does not claim she was

 unable to access the post office during the relevant time period. Cf. Haynes v. Turner Bass

 & Assocs., No. 20-40787, 2022 WL 2383855, at *1 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022) (per curiam)

 (unpublished) (dismissal for failure to prosecute was abuse of discretion when “the church

 to which [the plaintiff’s] mail had been sent” had been “closed due to the pandemic,” and

 the plaintiff “had repeatedly called the district court for updates,” and “had promptly

 provided a new address and filed the motion to reopen and request for reconsideration after

 she received [the mailed] notification of the dismissal” upon the church’s reopening).

        Perhaps Ms. Clifford changed mailing addresses without notifying the court (and

 without setting up a forwarding address). But we have said that parties “bear the burden

 of filing notice of a change of address in such a way that will bring the attention of the

 court to the address change.” Theede v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 172 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th

 because it is a matter of public record and is not subject to reasonable dispute. See
 Tatten v. City & County of Denver, 730 F. App’x 620, 624 n.2 (10th Cir. 2018); Fed.
 R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The change-of-address form was not included in the record on
 appeal, but we may take judicial notice of the contents of district-court docket entries.
 See Stan Lee Media, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 774 F.3d 1292, 1298 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014).
                                              5
Appellate Case: 22-4090     Document: 010110816950        Date Filed: 02/23/2023     Page: 6

 Cir. 1999). “The fact that [a party] is acting pro se does not eliminate this burden.” Id.

 The District of Utah has codified this requirement in Local Civil Rule 83–1.3(e), which

 provides: “In all cases, counsel and parties appearing pro se must notify the Clerk’s

 Office immediately of any change in address, email address, or telephone number.” If

 Ms. Clifford’s address changed after August 2020, she needed to update the district

 court in a reasonably prompt manner. She must suffer the consequences of failing to

 do so, including dismissal. See Theede, 172 F.3d at 1267 (appellant waived right to

 appellate review because he failed to timely object to magistrate’s recommendation;

 he did not receive the recommendation in time but that was because of his “failure to

 direct the district court’s attention to [his] change of address”); Carey v. King, 856

 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for failure to

 prosecute where “Order Directing Service of Process and Procedures” sent to plaintiff

 by court was returned as undeliverable; local rule “confer[red] discretion on the court

 to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s action if the plaintiff fail[ed] to keep the court apprised

 of his correct address”); see also Bradenburg v. Beaman, 632 F.2d 120, 122 (10th Cir.

 1980) (per curiam) (“It is incumbent on litigants, even those proceeding pro se, to

 follow the federal rules of procedure. The same is true of simple, nonburdensome local

 rules such as [using required forms for habeas petitions and civil-rights claims].”

 (citation omitted)).

        An alternative possibility is simply that Ms. Clifford went an unreasonably long

 time without checking for her mail at the post office. But “a litigant who invokes the

 processes of the federal courts is responsible for maintaining communication with the court

                                             6
Appellate Case: 22-4090      Document: 010110816950          Date Filed: 02/23/2023      Page: 7

 during the pendency of h[er] lawsuit.” Soliman v. Johanns, 412 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir.

 2005). By “repeatedly ignor[ing] court orders” mailed to the address that she provided—

 and by not taking other steps to keep abreast of the litigation, such as consulting the online

 docket or calling the court for updates—Ms. Clifford “hindered the court’s management of

 its docket and its efforts to avoid unnecessary burdens on the court and the opposing party.”

 Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Summit Park Townhome Ass’n, 886 F.3d 852, 860 (10th Cir. 2018)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). That failure, too, can justify dismissal. See id.; Jones v.

 Thompson, 996 F.2d 261, 265 (10th Cir. 1993).

        Ms. Clifford has not suggested any legitimate ground for failing to claim her mail.

 We do not regard the sanction of dismissal as unduly harsh under the circumstances. Given

 Ms. Clifford’s incommunicado status, any attempt to “contact [Ms. Clifford] to threaten

 h[er] with some lesser sanction . . . would only find itself taking a round trip tour through

 the United States mail.” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1441. We therefore conclude that the district

 court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Ms. Clifford’s action for failure to

 prosecute.

 III.   CONCLUSION

        We AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Harris L Hartz
                                                Circuit Judge

                                               7