Court Opinion

ID: 9638369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:42:22.023176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:06.087061
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
I.
The majority interprets the record in such a manner that its opinion will hang on one of the hooks of a rule that does not bear one for fundamental unfairness.
*695First, the majority’s interpretation of Nesbett’s testimony which “establish[ed] appellant’s membership in the Bandido Motorcycle Club.” Nesbett testified as follows:
“Q And when you arrived in this approximate location behind the cigarette machine — incidentally, is this a little foyer here outside the restroom?
“A Yes, sir, there is.
“Q Anybody standing outside the restroom door?
“A A man was standing there yes, sir.
“Q Did you know him as a member of any particular club or organization?
“A Yes, sir. I didn’t know him as a member, but I knew he was with the members of the organization already in there.
“Q And what organization is that?
“A The Bandido motorcycle gang.”
While Nesbett’s testimony established that the persons in the restroom were Deputy Morgan, the appellant and Wilhelm, the jury had just finished hearing Kelly’s testimony that other members of the “Bandi-dos” were in the lounge itself on the night of the offense. Nesbett’s testimony about “members of the organization already in there” does not answer whether he meant “in there” — in the restroom or “in there”— in the lounge itself. The jury did know that there were other members of the Ban-dido motorcycle gang in the lounge. But if Nesbett meant in the lounge, then his testimony merely stated that the mysterious man in the “little foyer here outside the restroom” was with members of the Bandi-dos already in the lounge.
Next, the “other testimony connecting the appellant with the Bandido organization.” (Emphasis added). Apparently, the majority feels that other evidence inferentially connected the appellant with the Ban-didos. They draw this inference from the fact that before his Bandido identification card was introduced there were numerous references to the Bandido motorcycle club itself; that Morgan’s and Dodd’s purpose at the bar was to investigate a member of the motorcycle club; that Kelly testified that members of the motorcycle club were in her establishment on the night of the offense; that Nesbett testified that the Bandidos’ girls were in the bar at the time of the altercation in the restroom; and that his statement to the police was not complete because he was fearful of “repercussions from the motorcycle gang.”
These facts, the majority feels, connected the appellant with the Bandidos. I concede that the jury was informed that the “Up Front Lounge” was a Bandido hangout and that Morgan’s and Dodd’s purpose at the bar was to investigate a member of the motorcycle club. However, I am not sure whether the majority feels the inference of a non sequitur or the hammer of an identification card. I am equally not sure what the jury felt.
Next, assuming strained arguendo that Nesbett’s testimony “directly connected” the appellant to the Bandidos and makes possible the application of the rules of Wood, supra, and Miles, supra, the majority shortsightedly applies these rules.
“It has long been held that the admission of improper evidence will not require reversal if the same facts are proved by ‘other and proper’ testimony. (Citation). Frequently referred to as the ‘General Rule,’ this rule has been cited so often that no useful purpose would be served at this point by canvassing the many cases in which it appears.” Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974, opinion on State’s second motion for rehearing).
The general rule is that if the same facts were proved by evidence not objected to the improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error. Miles, supra. This is not a strict rule of evidentiary, procedural or substantive law. This is another phase or shade of the principle that breathes through the appellate judiciary: the harmless error rule. “[I]f a fact be proven without objection, its erroneous proof over objection, although still error, is harmless error since the same facts have been proven without objection.” (Emphasis added). Nicholas v. State, 502 *696S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973, opinion on State’s motion for rehearing). The larger question we face in this appeal is whether to apply the harmless error rule. The question should be answered as follows:
II.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted over his objection, during the State’s case in chief, his Bandido membership card. The State had custody of appellant’s billfold until the time they sought to introduce the Bandido membership card into evidence, and apparently the billfold was recovered by the police during the incident at the lounge.
The record reveals that the jury probably was aware that the “Up Front Lounge” was a Bandido hangout. Also, they were informed that Morgan’s and Dodd’s purpose for being present at the “Up Front Lounge” that night was to investigate one “Alley Cat,” a known Bandido and narcotics trafficker. However, outside of appellant’s Bandido identification card which was introduced into evidence over his objection, nothing specifically tied the appellant to that organization.
The appellant did not take the stand and put his character in issue. As a general rule, the character of a person accused of a crime is not a fact in issue and the prosecution cannot, in its case in chief, introduce evidence tending to show the defendant’s bad character or reputation unless the accused first introduces evidence of good character or reputation. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); Lovett v. State, 158 Tex.Cr. 550, 258 S.W.2d 335, 336 (1953).
Gant v. State, 513 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), concerned the erroneous admission of character evidence. We reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding:
“It is clear that one’s character is no evidence of guilt. It should be even more obvious that the character of one’s associates is no evidence of guilt, and we have held that such evidence should not be admitted. (Citation). Indeed, it has been held that one may not even be impeached by the character of his associates. (Citation).” Id., at 53.
In Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975), the evidence included the defendant’s confession. We reversed the defendant’s conviction for numerous errors including a character attack by the prosecution. After noting the above-quoted holding of Gant, we stated:
“We are again forced to reassert the critical importance of convicting an accused only upon the evidence presented which shows that he is guilty of the offense charge, (citation), and not through attempting to inflame or prejudice the minds of the jurors. (Citations). The conduct of the prosecutor could have served no other purpose than to deprive the appellant of a fair trial by prejudicing the jury against him.” Id., at 378.
There was no reason for the appellant’s Bandido membership card to have been offered or admitted into evidence.
“Harmless error is intended to cover those inadvertent slips, which occasionally creep into a hotly contested trial, which do not severely prejudice the rights of the defendant. Harmless error should never be applied in those instances where the prosecution deliberately, or because of very careless procedures, injects prejudicial error into the proceedings.” State v. Atwater, 193 Neb. 563, 228 N.W.2d 274, 275 (1975).
I further note that the appellant timely requested a charge which would have instructed the jury that if appellant was a member of the Bandido motorcycle club it should not be considered as evidence of his guilt or innocence. The trial court denied this requested charge.
Appellant’s ground of error should be sustained and the judgment reversed. He had not placed his character in issue; the evidence introduced could only serve to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury; the trial court denied him the opportunity to cure, if he could have, the error committed. “The conduct of the prosecutor could have served no other purpose than to deprive the *697appellant of a fair trial by prejudicing the jury against him.” Koller, supra.
III.
The error created by the introduction into evidence at the State’s case in chief of appellant’s Bandido identification card should not be countenanced on the basis of “in there.” The judgment should be reversed, the cause remanded, and appellant retried for aggravated assault and not for being a Bandido.
ONION, P. J., joins in this dissent.