Court Opinion

ID: 9625439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:41:06.595556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:08.684122
License: Public Domain

CURETON, Judge
(Concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in Parts I and III of the majority opinion, but disagree with Part II of the opinion. Therefore, Part I of my prior opinion in this case, Eargle v. Horry County, Op. No. 2880 (filed August 17, 1998) (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 29), with minor modifications, is published as my dissent.
The Home Rule Act, codified at S.C.Code Ann. §§ 4-9-10 through -1230 (1986 & Supp.1998), was enacted to comply with the mandate of Article VIII, § 7 of the South Carolina Constitution, which requires the General Assembly to provide for the structure and organization of not more than five alternative forms of county government. See Hospitality Ass’n of South Carolina, Inc. v. County of Charleston, 320 S.C. 219, 464 S.E.2d 113 (1995); Duncan v. York County, 267 S.C. 327, 228 S.E.2d 92 (1976); see also Act No. 283, 1975 S.C.Acts 692, § 1. The Home Rule Act further provides by general law for the “... powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties.” See S.C. Const. Art. VIII §§ 7 and 9; se also Brown v. County of Horry, 308 S.C. 180, 417 S.E.2d 565 (1992); Act No. 283, 1975 S.C.Acts 692, § 1.
South Carolina Code Ann. § 4-9-30(7) (Supp.1998) authorizes a council-administrator form of government with authority to:
develop personnel system policies and procedures for county employees by which all county employees are regulated except those elected directly by the people, and to be responsible for the employment and discharge of county personnel in those county departments in which the employment authority is vested in the county government. This employment and discharge authority does not extend to any personnel employed in departments or agencies under the direction of an elected official or an official appointed by an authority outside county government----
*436Angus argues Sections 4-9-30 and 4-9-6301 give her authority to discipline all county employees pursuant to policies adopted by Horry County. She further argues that Section 4-9-30(7) limits her authority to enforce county personnel policies and procedures pertaining to employees of elected officials only with regard to their hiring and firing.
In its order, the circuit court found that “[a]s a supervisor of county employees, [Eargle] has the responsibility to advise the employees of the county of the personnel policies and procedures as well as to enforce these policies.” Likewise, the court found “[Angus] does have the right to administer and enforce the county’s personnel policies and procedures.” The circuit court further found that Eargle’s employees are subject to these personnel policies and procedures. The circuit court, however, determined the “[suspension of an employee stems from the right to hire and fire an employee since it removes the employee from the workplace for a definite or indefinite period of time depending on the circumstances.” The court also concluded “[r]emoval of employees from the workplace by suspension interferes with an elected official’s ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of his or her office.” Thus, the circuit court concluded Angus’s “authority to administer personnel policies did not extend to the right to suspend an elected official’s employees.”
The trial court’s holding that the county policies in question apply to Eargle’s employees2 is the law of this case, as is its holding that Angus has the right to enforce the policies. On the other hand, Angus has not appealed the trial court’s finding that Eargle also has the authority to enforce the county’s personnel policies. Likewise, both Eargle and Angus agree that the appropriateness3 of the sanctions imposed is not an issue in this appeal. Under the unique posture of this case, the only pertinent inquiry is whether by virtue of Section *4374-9-650,4 Angus is deprived of the right to discipline Eargle’s employees because the discipline involves temporary suspensions, although such discipline is provided for by valid county personnel policies.
Eargle argues that under Section 4-9-650, the county administrator has no authority over her as an elected official and that prohibition also relates to county employees hired by her. Further, that inasmuch as the right to temporarily suspend her employees interferes with the execution of her duties, by implication Angus does not have the right to temporarily suspend, even as a disciplinary measure. She also argues that while county personnel policies may provide for the right to suspend employees, that power may not be exercised by Angus because such right is encompassed in the right to discharge, which only she possesses.
The South Carolina cases I have been able to locate on this subject address only interim suspensions incident to the right to remove public officials. The consensus of the cases appears to be that an official with the authority to remove another official for cause also has the authority to temporarily suspend if the suspension is taken with the view toward removing the official from office. State ex rel. Thompson v. Seigler, 230 S.C. 115, 94 S.E.2d 231 (1956); State v. Hough, 103 S.C. 87, 87 S.E. 436 (1915); McDowell v. Burnett, 92 S.C. 469, 75 S.E. 873 (1912); but see Rose v. Beasley, 327 S.C. 197, 489 S.E.2d 625 (1997) (holding the governor’s right to suspend a state official for reasons not encompassed in S.C. Const. Art VI, § 8 or statutory law, is not incident to the right of removal). This consensus accords with the general law. James v. Hunt, 43 N.C.App. 109, 258 S.E.2d 481 (1979); 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions § 312 (1971); 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 504 (1949).
The Seigler, McDowell and Hough cases, however, are not very helpful in resolving this dispute because they involve public officers5 with fixed terms of office, rather than employ*438ees with no fixed term of office or even the right to continued employment. More importantly, the suspensions which were ordered in those cases were taken in conjunction with the officials’ authority to remove for misconduct in office. Here, the temporary suspensions were imposed as disciplinary measures on employees, not in contemplation of removal from office or discharge.
The trial court did not conclude, nor is it argued on appeal, that the statutes in issue are ambiguous. Thus, we are required to construe them according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. The School District of Greenville County, 331 S.C. 19, 501 S.E.2d 725 (1998). I am convinced from reading the statutes that the legislature intended to grant to counties the authority to discipline their employees and to regulate employees working for elected officials, except in the areas of hiring and firing. To that end, counties must necessarily be able to enforce their disciplinary measures within the framework of their personnel policies and procedures. The fact that Eargle may also be authorized to enforce Horry County’s policies does not eviscerate the authority of the administrator. After all, Eargle is the head of a county department or office that employs county personnel and, as such, is expected to enforce county personnel policies and procedures relating to those employees.
Nevertheless, there is a clear message in the Home Rule Act that elected officials are solely responsible for the execution of the duties of their offices. Moreover, the operation of these offices is dependent on the work of county employees. Like the circuit court, I am also concerned that in the abstract, but not in the instance involved here, to permit an administrator to temporarily suspend the employees of an elected official could adversely impact the official’s ability to perform her statutory duties. However, there are numerous actions that could be taken by the county that could adversely *439affect the operation of an elected official’s office, the most obvious being reductions in funding and reductions in force.
The public has an interest in the smooth operation of all public offices, whether those offices are operated by elected officials or department heads answerable to county officials. See Anders v. County Council, 284 S.C. 142, 325 S.E.2d 538 (1985). The responsibility to satisfy this concern of the public should be shared by both the elected official and the county council through its administrator. I believe the power granted the county by Section 4-9-30(7) to “develop personnel system policies and procedures” for “regulation” of county employees and the provisions of Section 4-9-630(7) giving the administrator the authority to administer personnel would be lacking if there were no means by which to enforce these policies and procedures short of total reliance on the good graces of the elected official. To ensure a county’s “smooth operation,” it must be able to even-handedly and consistently enforce its personnel policies. Section 4-9-30(7) authorizes the county to accomplish this worthy goal by permitting the county, through its administrator, to discipline individuals employed in the offices of elected officials, including the ability to temporarily suspend6 such employees.
This conclusion is supported by the case of Heath v. Aiken County (Heath I), 295 S.C. 416, 368 S.E.2d 904 (1988). In Heath I, the supreme court concluded that while a sheriff had the unfettered authority to discharge his deputies, the discharge of other office employees, notwithstanding Section 4-9-30(7), was subject to reinstatement by the county grievance committee. The court stated:
The common and statutory law which shapes the relationship between sheriff and deputy does not carry over to a sheriffs relationship with other department personnel. Sheriff Heath asserts no reason, nor do we discern any, why the legislature cannot grant a sheriff the power to hire and fire personnel yet limit that power through the grievance *440hearing procedure. Section 23-13-10 grants a sheriff unreviewable employment and discharge authority over deputies; no corresponding statute exists for other department personnel. The legislature’s intent to include sheriffs department personnel other than deputies as “employees” under Section 4-9-30(7) is clear from the statutory language itself.
Id. at 420, 368 S.E.2d at 906.7 Under the Heath I scenario, Eargle’s employees fall into the category of the “other department personnel.” Sheriff Heath no doubt had the same concern that Eargle has that interference with the discipline of any of his personnel could affect his ability to carry out the duties of his office.
Finally, I would reject any suggestion that the right to temporarily suspend Eargle’s employees is encompassed in her exclusive right to discharge such employees. This claim is effectively disposed of by the case of Rose v. Beasley, 327 S.C. 197, 489 S.E.2d 625 (1997). There, our supreme court rejected the governor’s argument that the power of suspension was “an incident of his statutory power of removal.” Id. at 206, 489 S.E.2d at 629. The court found “this proposition clearly conflicts with well-established South Carolina precedent” and that “the governor can neither appoint to office nor suspend or remove from office unless the power to do so is conferred upon him by the Constitution or statute.” Id. The Home Rule Act grants to Eargle only the authority to hire and fire county personnel working for her. I would therefore hold the right to discipline county personnel by way of temporary suspension is specifically authorized by Section 4-9-30(7). Even if it is not specifically authorized by Section 4-9-30(7), such authority is by implication reserved to the county by Section 4-9-25.
In summary, the plain language of Section 4-9-30(7) supports the authority of Angus to discipline county employees working in Eargle’s office, including under the unique posture of this case, the right to temporarily suspend those employees. That is not to say that Angus may not, as she apparently does, *441and should, for other department heads who are not elected officials, delegate that authority.
GOOLSBY, J., concurs.

. Section 4-9-630(7) (1986) makes the administrator "responsible for the administration of county personnel policies____”

. It is to be noted that Eargle does not claim the county personnel policies are unconstitutional or in excess of statutory authorization.

. It is difficult not to focus on the appropriateness of the sanctions under the circumstances of this case. However, the affected employees may pursue this matter through the county's grievance procedure.

. Section 4-9-650 (1986) states “the county administrator shall exercise no authority over any elected officials of the county whose offices were created either by the Constitution or by the general law of the State.”

. A public officer is defined in Sanders v. Belue, 78 S.C. 171, 58 S.E. 762 (1907), as “one who is charged by law with duties involving an *438exercise of some part of the sovereign power, either small or great, in the performance of which the public is concerned, and which are continuing, and not occasional or intermittent.... Conversely, one who merely performs the duties required of him by persons employing him under an express contract or otherwise, though such persons be themselves public officers, and though the employment be in or about a public work or business, is a mere employee.”

. We are not asked to decide whether a county administrator has the right to indefinitely suspend a county employee who works for an elected official, inasmuch as an indefinite or long-term suspension may be tantamount to discharge. Nevertheless, the proper vehicle for addressing such an issue would be to challenge the validity of a county regulation which authorized such an action.

. Section 4-9-30(7) was amended by Act No. 312, 1988 S.C.Acts 2528, § 1 to state that “any employee discharged shall follow the grievance procedures as established by county council in those counties where the grievance procedures are operative, retaining all appellate rights provided for in the procedures.”