Court Opinion

ID: 9771864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:56:48.144144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:38.500936
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Appellant’s petition asserts the court erred in following federal case authority decided under the Lanham Act and suggests federal and Tennessee case law differ in that the latter presumably predicates infringement of state tradename rights on demonstrated public consumer confusion. Neither Century Homes nor other Tennessee decisions support this conclusion. Century Homes essentially states what both federal authority and general principles of trade-mark law hold, viz., that the central test for trade-mark or trade name infringement is “likelihood of confusion”. As the chancellor in that case noted in his memorandum opinion, which the court largely adopted, “confusion developed substantially when Century 21 began using that name in this area. And ... there is a fair likelihood that prospects will be diverted from plaintiff to people using Century 21.” 621 S.W.2d 758. M.M. Newcomer essentially follows the “likelihood of confusion” analysis:
[I]t is not necessary to prove that the public has actually been deceived by the similarity in names. It is the liability to deception and consequent injury which justifies the issuance of an injunction. If the court can see that confusion and deception is liable to result from the similarity of names it will not refuse injunc-tive relief because the damage has not already been done. 142 Tenn., at 120, 217 S.W. 822.
Accord: Kay Jewelry Co. of Chattanooga v. Morris, 26 Tenn.App. 285, 171 S.W.2d 410 (1942).
There is nothing to suggest a divergence among federal law, Tennessee common law or general principles of trade-mark law with respect to the issues in the instant case; moreover, the Lanham Act has usually been interpreted as an embodiment of the common law. The legislative history of the Act indicates congressional intent to fashion a new federal remedy “against the particular kind of unfair competition that the common law had effectively protected.” Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. *49Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.1963). Registration under the Act has been held to confer jurisdiction on federal courts but not create rights or enlarge any pre-existing rights of the owner of the mark. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F.Supp. 973 (M.D.Tenn.1971); aff'd., 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir.1971).
Appellant further argues that it was error to apply principles of trade-mark law; however, for all practical purposes, the legal principles governing trade-marks and trade names are virtually identical. 87 C.J.S., Trade-marks, Trade-names, and Unfair Competition, § 8 (1954).
Finally, appellant insists that our analysis of the name was based on a doctrine specifically rejected in the Century Homes decision. That case does not support appellant’s contentions. The chancellor’s opinion in Century Homes, as quoted by this court, states: “[i]n order for plaintiff to have any rights in such a name the evidence must establish that it has developed what is called a secondary meaning.” 621 S.W.2d at 758. [Emphasis supplied.] This language requires courts to construe the phrase “such a name”. The name “Century” is clearly a weak trade name entitled to protection only on a showing of secondary meaning. Under appellant’s contention, all trade names would require proof of secondary meaning in order to receive legal protection. This is not a rule of trade-mark law. See AMP Inc. v. Foy, 540 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir.1975); DCA Food Industries, Inc. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F.Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y.1979).
The petition for rehearing is respectfully denied.