Court Opinion

ID: 9901654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 07:09:36.892825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:36.220053
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED; and Opinion Filed November 14, 2023

                                            S   In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                          Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-23-00847-CV

        IN THE INTEREST OF K.P.P., K.K.P., J.D.K.P.-G., AND K.D.L.,
                            CHILDREN

                   On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
                               Grayson County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. FA-22-0717

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
                                 Opinion by Justice Smith
        Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her four children,

K.P.P., K.K.P., J.D.K.P.-G., and K.D.L. In a single issue, she contends the trial court

abused its discretion in denying her motion for continuance. We affirm.

                                           Background1

        On June 9, 2022, Mother left the children in the care of her father

(Grandfather). Beginning June 10, Grandfather left K.P.P., then thirteen-years-old,

    1
      This background includes facts taken from the trial court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Final Order; Mother does not separately challenge the trial court’s findings of fact in this appeal.
and K.D.L., then three-years-old, at Mother’s home with no adult present. On June

12, K.P.P. left K.D.L. alone and K.D.L. fell out of a window.

        On June 16, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

(Department) filed a petition for protection of a child, conservatorship, and

termination in suit affecting the parent-child relationship. The trial court entered

orders placing the children in the Department’s care.2 Counsel was appointed to

represent Mother and filed an answer on her behalf. Grandfather filed a petition in

intervention, requesting that he be appointed sole managing conservator of the

children.

        On May 1, 2023, the trial court commenced the final hearing on the

Department’s petition. After four witnesses testified, the trial court recessed the

hearing, which was ultimately set to resume on July 20.

        On June 16, 2023, Mother’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw after he fell

and suffered a concussion. During a June 26 status hearing, counsel explained that

he had memory issues as a result of the concussion. He was slowly returning “to

more of a normal status,” but could only work a limited amount of time each day

and was concerned that he could not fully represent Mother at the hearing. Counsel

    2
       The trial court subsequently entered an interlocutory judgment, which terminated the parental rights
of the alleged fathers of K.P.P. and K.K.P. and the unknown father of J.D.K.P.-G. based on their failure to
register with the paternity registry. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002(b). K.D.L. was placed in her
father’s care while the case was pending, and the trial court appointed her father as her sole managing
conservator following the final hearing.
                                                   –2–
advised that he would be willing to work a situation in which someone “sub[bed] in”

as co-counsel.

        The trial court carried the motion to withdraw but appointed another attorney

as co-counsel to help. The trial court authorized the court reporter to prepare a

transcript of the first day of the final hearing for co-counsel’s review but did not

authorize transcription of two prior permanency hearings in the case.3 Instead, the

trial court noted that other counsel in the case could inform co-counsel what

transpired at the hearings. The Department’s counsel advised that she had transcripts

of two other prior hearings that could be made available to co-counsel. The trial

court told Mother’s counsel to get co-counsel “up to speed,” and he agreed to do so.

On June 29, the trial court signed an order appointing co-counsel to represent

Mother.

        On July 11, Mother filed a motion for continuance of the final hearing. Citing

co-counsel’s recent appointment, the motion sought a continuance because he

required “more time in preparation for the case.”

    3
       The trial court expressed its opinion that co-counsel would need only the transcript from the first day
of the final hearing. The trial court summarized the permanency hearings, each of which lasted only twenty
to thirty minutes, as follows:

        [Mother] had a service plan, she did nothing. She has to take drug tests, she did none. She
        doesn’t want to let her father see the children. She didn’t do it. She has issues
        communicating with her children. Every time she sees them, they start misbehaving, or
        they don’t want to talk to her.”

The court then stated, “I think somebody can tell [co-counsel] that. They can also tell him that she won last
time, that I already gave the kids back once, and then she’s right back here. So he might need to know that,
too.”
                                                    –3–
        The final hearing resumed on July 20. Co-counsel re-urged his motion for

continuance, explaining that he had issues with preparation, including responding to

discovery requests from the guardian ad litem and “as far as getting everything in

order with my client.” The trial court denied the motion, noting that the case had

already “been extended way too long” and Mother’s original counsel had been

available to bring co-counsel up to speed.4 Seven additional witnesses then testified.

At the close of the evidence, the trial court requested that the parties provide their

arguments and recommendations in a letter brief.

        On August 18, the trial court signed a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law and Final Order. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that

Mother’s parental rights with regard to the children should be terminated based on

sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) of the Texas Family Code and that

termination was the children’s best interests.5 The trial court also found that

appointing Grandfather as a conservator was not in the best interest of the children.

    4
       The reporter’s record indicates that both co-counsel and original counsel appeared when the final
hearing resumed on July 20.
    5
       See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (knowingly placing or knowingly allowing child to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger child’s physical or emotional well-being); §
161.001(b)(1)(E) (engaging in conduct, or knowingly placing child with persons who engaged in conduct,
that endangers child’s physical or emotional well-being); 161.001(b)(1)(N) (constructively abandoning
child who has been in permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of Department for not less than
six months, and (i) Department made reasonable efforts to return child to parent; (ii) parent has not regularly
visited or maintained significant contact with child; and (iii) parent demonstrated an inability to provide
child with safe environment); § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (failing to comply with provisions of court order that
specifically established actions necessary for parent to obtain return of child who has been in permanent or
temporary managing conservatorship of Department for not less than nine months as a result of child’s
removal from parent under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect of child); § 161.001(b)(2) (termination is in
child’s best interest).
                                                    –4–
On August 29, the trial court signed an Order of Termination and Final Order in Suit

Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship.

        This appeal followed.

                                     Motion for Continuance

        Mother does not challenge the grounds for termination of her parental rights

or the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s

best interests. Instead, in a single issue, she asserts the trial court abused its

discretion by denying her motion for continuance. The Department responds that

Mother failed to establish “sufficient cause” for continuing the final hearing and

cannot demonstrate that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had

she had additional time to prepare.

        A party moving for continuance must show sufficient cause supported by

affidavit, by consent of the parties, or by operation of law.6 TEX. R. CIV. P. 251;

Hitselberger v. Bakos, No. 05-21-00146-CV, 2022 WL 16735374, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). An attorney’s unsworn declaration

satisfies Rule 251’s affidavit requirement. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §

132.001 (unsworn declaration may be used in lieu of verification, certification, or

affidavit).

    6
        In addition to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, Mother’s motion for continuance cited section
263.4011 of Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.4011 (requiring a trial court to “render
a final order not later than the 90th day after the date the trial commences” unless the court extends the 90-
day period in writing and for good cause). On appeal, however, Mother cites only Rule 251, so we limit
our review to whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance under that rule.
                                                    –5–
      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance in a termination

of parental rights case for an abuse of discretion. See In re R.F. III, 423 S.W.3d 486,

490 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); In re L.C.W., 411 S.W.3d 116, 123

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). We reverse the denial only if the trial court

acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, such that its ruling was

arbitrary or unreasonable. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d

789, 800 (Tex. 2002); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,

241–42 (Tex. 1985). “Whether a continuance should have been granted is to be

judged in light of the facts before the trial judge at the time the motion was

presented.” Wade v. Vertical Comput. Sys., Inc., No. 05-22-00454-CV, 2023 WL

3114671, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2023, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing

Hitselberger, 2022 WL 16735374, at *2).

      Mother’s motion for continuance, supported by a declaration by co-counsel,

stated only that co-counsel required “more time in preparation for this case.” When

re-urging the motion before the final hearing resumed, co-counsel explained only

that he needed to respond to discovery requests and get “everything in order with”

Mother. Neither Mother’s motion nor co-counsel’s statements identified for the trial

court what additional preparation was needed. And, “absent a strong and specific

showing of what additional preparation might have been made had the continuance

been granted, [a] trial court may deny a continuance without abusing its discretion.”

In re P.M., No. 07-04-0595-CV, 2006 WL 407077, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb.

                                         –6–
22, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Standard Sav. Ass’n v. Cromwell, 714

S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ)).

        Mother nevertheless complains that the trial court’s termination of her

parental rights was based on “significantly more information than was presented at

either day of trial” and, because co-counsel was not present for prior hearings, he

would have no way to have known what occurred in those hearings or what exhibits

had been previously admitted. As support, she cites the trial court’s statements

during the final hearing that: (1) it was “taking judicial notice of every hearing [it

has] ever had in this matter, and any testimony that [it has] heard along the various

hearings that we have been talking about”; and (2) it previously had heard testimony

regarding Mother’s drug use. Co-counsel, however, did not re-urge the motion for

continuance or otherwise object in either instance.7 Nor did co-counsel ever indicate

that he had not had an opportunity to learn about the earlier hearings, including what

exhibits had been admitted.

        A trial court must afford new counsel reasonable time to prepare for trial. See

Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). In this case, co-counsel was

appointed only three weeks before the final hearing resumed. However, the record

also shows that, prior to co-counsel’s appointment, the trial court told Mother’s

    7
       To show that co-counsel was unable to prepare for the final hearing with her, Mother also cites to
her testimony during the final hearing that she had evidence to prove she was employed and attended
AA/NA classes on her phone. To the extent that her argument implies that she did not share this information
with co-counsel before the final hearing resumed, neither the motion for continuance nor co-counsel’s
statements to the trial court reflect the extent to which, if any, co-counsel was precluded from preparing
with Mother or what additional information he needed from her.
                                                   –7–
original counsel to get co-counsel “up to speed” and he agreed to do so. The

reporter’s record indicates that original counsel also was present when the final

hearing resumed. The trial court had the transcript of the first day of the hearing

prepared for co-counsel, the Department’s counsel advised that she had transcripts

of two other prior hearings, and the trial court told counsel present at the hearing on

the motion to withdraw to summarize two additional hearings for co-counsel. Co-

counsel did not explain to the trial court why these measures were insufficient, why

he had been unable to adequately prepare with Mother during those three weeks, or,

specifically, what additional preparation might have been made had a continuance

been granted. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying the motion for continuance.

      We overrule Mother’s sole issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s Order of Termination and Final Order in Suit

Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship.

                                            /Craig Smith/
                                            CRAIG SMITH
                                            JUSTICE
230847F.P05

                                         –8–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF K.P.P.,                    On Appeal from the 397th Judicial
K.K.P., J.D.K.P.-G., AND K.D.L,               District Court, Grayson County,
CHILDREN                                      Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. FA-22-0717.
No. 05-23-00847-CV           V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                              Justices Molberg and Carlyle
                                              participating.

     In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s Order of
Termination and Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 14th day of November 2023.

                                        –9–