Court Opinion

ID: 9770325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:58:31.653083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.474749
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOE REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery. After a jury found him guilty, the court assessed punishment at seventy-five (75) years’ imprisonment.
The evidence reveals that appellant was one of two men who on September 18,1977 entered a Kentucky Fried Chicken store located at 5440 Mockingbird Lane in Dallas and robbed the employees there.
On original submission a panel opinion reversed this conviction stating:
“We therefore hold that the trial court erred by admitting before the jury proof of appellant’s misdemeanor conviction for possession of marihuana, an offense (which, by statute, does not involve moral turpitude. Article 4476-15, V.T.C.A., Civil Statutes, Section 4.05(c).” (Emphasis supplied.)
As the panel opinion noted, the ground of error involved is ground of error No. 5 in appellant’s pro se brief. The panel opinion states:
“This ground complains of the trial court’s admission, over objection, of proof of a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of marihuana, apparently under the theory that appellant had ‘opened the door’ for the introduction of such evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
An examination of the record shows that appellant’s counsel timely filed a brief in the trial court raising two grounds of error. See Article 40.09, § 9, V.A.C.C.P. Appellant’s pro se brief raising said ground of error No. 5 was filed only in this court. Since it was untimely filed, the error, if any, may be considered only as an unassigned error “in the interest of justice.” See Article 40.09, § 13, V.A.C.C.P.1 In considering the error, the panel opinion does not take note of this matter. In view of the circumstances, as shall be discussed, it may well be questionable whether the “unassigned error” should be considered “in the interest of justice.” Further, the objection was to the inquiry of the appellant on cross-examination about his arrest for possession of marihuana. When proof of the conviction was subsequently elicited from the appellant by the State, there was no objection to such interrogation.
The actual ground of error reads:
“The trial court erred in allowing the appellant to be questioned about extraneous offenses which was (sic) not a felony nor a crime of moral turpitude.”
In his argument under said ground, appellant refers to interrogation both as to the offense of fleeing from a police officer (to which there was no objection) and to the possession of marihuana charge.
To put the issue in proper perspective, the entire interrogation of the appellant needs to be examined.
On direct examination appellant’s counsel reads:
“Q Did I advise you that should you take the stand that the State of Texas by and through her ... by and through the Criminal District Attorney would go into your past, if there was anything criminal in your past they would bring it out in front of the jury?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Have you anything in your past that is of a criminal nature?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q You have been down to what we call the joint, Texas Department of Corrections?
*124“A Yes, sir.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, appellant testified the conviction was for embezzlement committed on June 20, 1973, and he received a two-year sentence. He related he served seven months and then spent “a year parole on the streets” and did not have any problem with parole. He testified this was the only time he had been down to the “joint.” Appellant then denied his participation in the instant robbery case.
After having the court reporter read back the questions on direct examination about appellant’s criminal past, the prosecutor, giving the date, the court and cause number, asked the appellant if he was given “a fine of one hundred dollars for the criminal offense of fleeing from a police officer?” Appellant answered in the affirmative. There was no objection. Appellant was then interrogated about his earlier admitted embezzlement conviction, and the pen packet concerning the same was introduced without objection. The cross-examination continued:
“Q Now, I’ll ask you whether or not you are also the same Marvin Earl Bell who on June the 25th of 1976 in Cause No. CCR-75-5084-B was arrested for the charge of possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor offense?
“MR. GREGORY (Defense Counsel): Your Honor, I would object. That is to inflame the minds of the jury. This is not against moral turpitude.
“MR. SPARKS: Judge, I would love to answer that objection. He asked this witness the question, ‘Have you anything in your past of a criminal nature,’ and he has opened the door for anything regarding criminal activity. I didn’t ask it, he did. And I am certainly entitled to show—
“THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
“Q (By Mr. Sparks) Is that you?
“A Yes.
“MR. GREGORY: Your Honor, you overruled our objection?
“THE COURT: Yes, sir.
“A Yes, sir.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thereafter, without objection, the prosecutor established that appellant had been convicted in that “cause.” The penalty was shown to be thirty days and a $150.00 fine though a difference arose between the appellant and the prosecutor about whether the penalty was probated for six months or a year.
Further, on cross examination the prosecutor elicited from the appellant that he was arrested on September 27, 1977 for aggravated robbery at Church’s Fried Chicken at 3103 Lemmon Avenue, Dallas, and and was arrested on September 28, 1977, for aggravated robbery at a Kentucky Fried Chicken store located at 3414 South Lancaster in Dallas. All of this was without objection.
On redirect examination appellant’s counsel elicited from him that he had filed a pro se motion to be tried on all three robbery cases at the same time and had been blocked by the District Attorney. Further, on redirect examination it was established that appellant possessed “two joints” in the marihuana case, and that when convicted of fleeing from an officer he was not represented by counsel.2
It is well settled that when a defendant chooses to waive his privilege against self-incrimination by voluntarily taking the witness stand he is generally subject to the same rules as any other witness. He may be contradicted, impeached, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matter, and treated in every respect as any other witness testifying in behalf of the defendant, except when some statute forbids certain matters to be used against him, such as proof of his conviction on a former trial of the present case or his failure to testify on a former trial or hearing. Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
*125Mere arrests or charges of offenses are generally inadmissible for impeachment purposes. Normally the State cannot impeach a witness concerning his criminal record unless the charges have resulted in final convictions for felonies or other final convictions involving moral turpitude, none of which are too remote. Ochoa v. State, 481 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In Ochoa this court wrote:
“As to impeachment under Article 38.-29, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., it must be remembered that the conviction must be a final one and must be for a felony offense or one involving moral turpitude, and even then it must not be too remote. See Stephens v. State, 417 S.W.2d 286 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) ...
“An exception to the foregoing prevails, however, where the witness makes blanket statements concerning his exemplary conduct such as having never been arrested, charged or convicted of any offense, or having never been ‘in trouble,’ or purports to detail his convictions leaving the impression there are no others. Stephens v. State, supra; Orozco v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 630, 301 S.W.2d 634 (1957) and cases there cited. In such cases, the State may refute such testimony despite the nature of the conviction used or its remoteness. Stephens v. State, supra.”
In Nelson v. State, 503 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this court stated:
“... The exception arises when the witness, by his direct testimony, leaves a false impression of his ‘trouble’ with the police. In that situation, it is legitimate to prove that the witness had been ‘in trouble’ on occasions other than those about which he offered direct testimony.”
In Nelson the defendant on direct examination was asked, “... [Hjave you ever been in trouble before?” This inquiry established he had been convicted and placed on probation for “forgery and passing.” The defendant was then asked, “Is that all of the trouble you have been in?” Nelson answered he had served 30 months in the pen as a result of a conviction for assault with a prohibited weapon. He then proclaimed his innocence of the robbery for which he was being tried.
On cross-examination the prosecutor was permitted to ask about a number of arrests which had not resulted in final convictions. Such cross-examination was held proper under the exception to the general rule discussed above.
In Alexander v. State, 476 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), where the defendant testified on direct examination that “he had not been in trouble before,” the State on cross-examination was permitted to inquire about prior arrests for extraneous offenses to refuse the defendant’s blanket statement concerning his exemplary conduct. In Heartfield v. State, 470 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.Cr. App.1971), questions on cross-examination concerning the defendant’s arrest were held proper after he had testified on direct examination that “since 1949 he had not been in trouble with the law.” And in Barnett v. State, 445 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), we held that cross-examination on arrests, which the defendant denied, after he had testified that he had not “been in any trouble with the law in the past eight years” was not error over an objection that it was improper cross-examination. See Reese v. State, 531 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
The panel opinion in the instant case notes that appellant’s counsel established on direct examination he had informed the appellant the State could go into anything of a criminal nature in his past. The opinion then seemingly views the following question, “Have you anything in your past that is of a criminal nature?” as a question limited to final convictions for felonies or offenses involving moral turpitude, none of which is too remote. The panel opinion regards the defense strategy to defuse the impact of any possible impeachment of the appellant as going no further than the general rule would have permitted the State to go. Therefore, the panel concluded it was error for the trial court to admit on cross-examination proof of appellant’s misdemeanor conviction for possession of marihuana, although the objection, such as it was, was addressed to the question concern*126ing the arrest for such offense and not to the proof of the conviction. I cannot agree.
Under all the circumstances, the ground of error advanced in appellant’s untimely filed pro se brief should not be considered as unassigned error “in the interest of justice.” See Article 40.09, § 13, V.A.C. C.P. This ground of error, under the circumstances, was not what was envisioned by that statutory provision. The contention is not one of constitutional dimension nor such a serious question of law that “justice” requires its discussion. Bellah v. State, 415 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
Secondly, if the ground is to be considered, it is noted the objection to the question of the arrest for possession of marihuana to the effect it would inflame the minds of the jurors and “This is not against moral turpitude” was not sufficient to preserve the error now claimed on appeal either as stated by the appellant or restated for him by the panel on original submission.
Thirdly, even if the objection was sufficient, the State had the right to inquire under the exception to the general rule about the arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana since the appellant had “opened the door” on direct examination. Despite the characterization to the contrary by the panel, the question asked and answered on direct examination could not have left any other impression with the jury except that he had nothing in his criminal past except the embezzlement conviction, particularly when it was established on direct examination that this was the only time appellant had been to the “joint” and had done well on parole. Nelson v. State, supra; Ochoa v. State, supra.
. Fourthly, if there was any conceivable error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). This is particularly true in view of the fact that appellant’s conviction for fleeing from a police officer, and the two pending robbery charges were admitted without objection, and the fact that on redirect examination appellant established he wanted all three robbery cases tried together, and elicited details about the marihuana possession case about which the State could not legally prove and did not try to do so.
Appellant’s ground of error No. 5 in his pro se brief is overruled. State’s motion for rehearing is granted.
Appellant’s counsel advances two grounds of error. First is that the “court erred by allowing the State to introduce photographic lineup pictures of the defendant to bolster the in-court identification of the State’s witnesses.”
Neither the ground of error nor argument thereunder points out what State’s witnesses the appellant has in mind nor does the appellant call our attention to any portion of the record where we may identify the action complained of. This ground of error is not in compliance with Article 40.09, § 9, V.A.C.C.P. Nothing is presented for review. This court, with its tremendous caseload, should not be asked to search through a voluminous record trying to guess and identify the action of which a defendant complains.
We do find in our search of the record that the State’s Exhibits 8 through 13 were introduced through the testimony of Charles Adair, the complaining witness, manager of the Kentucky Fried Chicken store in question, and Edward Brooks, the assistant manager.3 Both witnesses identified the exhibits as the photographic display or spread they were shown individually by the police. They testified they identified appellant’s picture from the photographic spread. The exhibits were introduced over the objection of “bolstering.”
Appellant cites and relies upon Lyons v. State, 388 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Cr.App.1965), where this court stated:
*127“... While a witness who has identified her assailant at the trial may testify that she also identified him while he was in custody of the police, others may not bolster her unimpeached testimony by corroborating the fact that she did identify him.”
Adair and Brooks identified the appellant at trial as one of the two robbers and stated they had identified his picture from a photographic spread. We do not find that others were permitted to bolster their testimony. Lyons is not in point.
The State also notes that the witnesses were cross-examined about the details of the photographic identification and the exhibits were thus admissible. See George v. State, 498 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hubbard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Alejandro v. State, 394 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1965).
No error is presented. The ground of error is overruled.
Secondly, appellant’s counsel contends the trial court erred by its failure to grant appellant’s pro se motion to shuffle the jurors. See Article 35.11, V.A.C.C.P.
The record does not show that the pro se motion was ever presented to the court nor does it show that the jury panel was not in fact shuffled. In Dynes v. State, 479 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), this court wrote:
“If the court failed to shuffle the panel once they arrived at his court, as appellant contends in his brief and by oral argument, he should have made this fact known to this court by a bill of exception or otherwise.”
There is nothing to show that the jury was selected in violation of any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The contention is overruled.
We have examined the contentions in appellant’s pro se briefs and do not find any that should be considered “in the interest of justice.” See Article 40.09, § 13, V.A.C.C.P.
State’s motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is affirmed.
TEAGUE, J., dissents.

. It is sad to note that S.B. 265, Acts 1981, 67th Legislature, R.S., amending Article 40.09, V.A. C.C.P., deleted said § 13 as it now reads including the right of this court to consider an unassigned error “in the interest of justice.” It is hoped that the Legislature will quickly correct this blunder.

. No relief on this basis was requested by the appellant.

. Tinya Meeker, an employee of the store at the time of the robbery, testified she was shown a photographic spread by a police officer and selected appellant’s picture. There was no objection to this testimony, and the photographs were not introduced.