Court Opinion

ID: 9581873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:19:56.450001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:18.057727
License: Public Domain

Larson, C. J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to concur in the conclusions reached in Division III of the majority opinion. Having correctly determined in Divisions I and II that Iowa does recognize the right of privacy, and that the court did not adjudicate against plaintiffs under B. G. P. 105 by overruling their motion to strike certain divisions of defendant’s answer, the opinion announces the rule that as to newsworthy matter the press is accorded a privilege to publish, limited only as to indecent matter. Then the majority conclude that plaintiffs’ petition did not state a cause of action, although they concede it set forth that “the mutilated and decomposed body of Jimmy Bremmer # * * was exposed to public view and more particularly to the view of the parents * * They say: “There is no suggestion of indecent exposure.” I am unable to adopt that conclusion, for I think that under those allegations plaintiffs could show what might be determined was an indecent picture of the boy’s body.
Under this record, however, the court refuses to examine *829the alleged improper picture. As to whether or not it would fall within the indecent category cannot be determined even by the court under this inconsistent determination. Actually by dismissing this petition at this time, without a hearing thereon, we shall be going much further than any of the authorities cited by the defendant or set forth in the majority opinion. In those eases the court at least saw and heard the evidence before summarily dismissing the cause. Here the majority holds that once it appears the matter is of legitimate public interest, the privilege of the press is absolute — unless possibly the picture is alleged to be indecent — and the individuals’ right of privacy is completely abrogated. With such a determination I cannot agree.
I also cánnot agree with the application of this rule by the courts of Georgia and Alabama in their apparent determination that pictures of news interest,'no matter how morbid and repulsive they may be, or how much they may needlessly hurt anyone concerned, are privileged and that publishers are thereafter governed solely by their own consciences' ¿nd sense of decency in determining whether or not such pictures are printed.,
I am not advocating that the courts or anyone else try to act as censors of the press, but who will protect the invaded rights of citizens if the courts do not? It is not censoring, as I view it, to provide a remedy for a wrong, once the wrong has been done.
It is my feeling that we should take this opportunity to clearly express a sound position on this important question. We should recognize the right of privacy by more than lip service. We should limit and define the privilege accorded the press .and radio to invade this right of individual privacy here in Iowa. It must be done sometime. This is not-a new thought, for in Prosser on Torts, 2d Ed., pages 643, 644, we find the following statement:
“Again the privilege is not unlimited, but the line is a most difficult one to draw. The cases in which the privilege has been found to be exceeded have involved outrageous methods such as the theft of a photograph, or extreme catering to the- morbid and the sensational, such as the publication of the picture of the *830plaintiff’s dead deformed child, # * *. The best statement that can be made is that the distinction probably is that found in other cases of the intentional infliction of mental suffering, between conduct which outrages the common decencies and goes beyond what the public mores will tolerate, and that which the plaintiff must be expected under the circumstances to endure.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, then, the privilege of the publisher is not absolute. But because the line is difficult to draw, we should not try to avoid it this way. We are constantly called upon to draw distinctions just as difficult, and we try to do so for the benefit of bench and bar. I would reverse this judgment and order the trial court to at least hear and see the evidence before determining, under such guidance as we can provide at this time, whether or not as a matter of law defendant did breach the privilege to invade plaintiffs’ right of privacy extended to it under these circumstances.
Bliss and Hays, JJ., join in this dissent.