Court Opinion

ID: 9474300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:53:27.356925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:00.721842
License: Public Domain

NELSON, Circuit Judge,
with whom
GOODWIN and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part II and in sections A, B, and C of Part VI, but respectfully dissent from the remainder of the opinion.
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.1980) (“Blue Belli”), we protected Strauss’ pant pocket tab against Blue Bell’s infringement in the casual pants market. Here, Strauss seeks relief when Blue Bell places the identical tab on casual shirts. Casual pants and casual shirts are “related goods” — they are complementary items,1 sold through the same channels of trade,2 used by the same purchasers,3 and sold within the same price range.4 There could be no clearer case for application of the related goods doctrine. Casual pants and shirts satisfy every one of the requirements for protection. The district court erred in not applying the related goods doctrine to pants and shirts.
*1363By summarily rejecting the related goods claim, the district court did not even consider the secondary meaning of the pant pocket tab in the shirt market, an issue resolved in Blue Bell I. This should be done on remand.
The district court’s rejection of the related goods claim resulted, further, in its failure to apply the multi-factor framework set forth by our cases for determining likelihood of consumer confusion. In addition, where the district court did purport to apply the multi-factor test — in Strauss’ claim of infringement upon its shirt tab — it did so incorrectly. Accordingly, the case should be remanded for proper application of the multi-factor framework.
I.

Related Goods Doctrine

Strauss seeks two forms of relief in this lawsuit. First, it seeks protection of its shirt pocket tab in the shirt market. Blue Bell shirts and Strauss shirts are directly competitive goods; the related goods doctrine is inapplicable to this contention. However, Strauss also seeks protection of its pant pocket tab in the shirt market. Pants and shirts are not competitive goods, so the related goods doctrine should be used to determine if relief is warranted.
Related goods are those goods which, though not identical, are related in the minds of consumers. In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 152-53 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1963), this circuit determined that whiskey and beer were related goods, and reversed a district court judgment that had denied trademark protection solely on the basis that the two products were “different.” Id. at 152. In Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.1928), the Second Circuit (per Judge Learned Hand) held that a lock manufacturer could be protected against trademark infringement by a flashlight manufacturer, despite the differences in the underlying goods. Yet in this case, the district court truncated consideration of Strauss’ claim for protection of its pant tab by saying only that “pants and shirts are different.” It refused to consider Strauss’ proof that, in many ways, pants and shirts are “related” in the eyes of consumers.
The casual pants and casual shirts at issue here are certainly related goods. They are complementary items, brought to market through the same channels of trade, used by the same purchasers, and sold within the same price range. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350. Furthermore, Trademark courts routinely consider all items of wearing apparel to be related. See, e.g., In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638 (TT & A Bd.1974); In re Sox Unlimited, Inc., 169 USPQ 682 (TT & A Bd.1971); In re Cosmetically Yours, 171 USPQ 563 (TT & A Bd.1971). The district court’s denial of related goods protection based upon its articulated rationale that “pants and shirts are different” should be reversed.
II.

Secondary Meaning

A. Strauss’s Pants versus Blue Bell’s Shirts.
When the district court summarily rejected the related goods claims, it failed to consider the secondary meaning of the pant pocket tab. It should do so on remand when applying the related goods test.
Blue Bell I clearly established the secondary meaning of the pant tab. In that case, we affirmed a finding that the pant “pocket tab trademark has acquired a secondary meaning in the marketplace and is distinctive of [Strauss’] garments in commerce.” 632 F.2d at 821. We also held: “The evidence of secondary meaning is strong and the Strauss mark is entitled to a broad scope of protection.” Id. (emphasis added). Since the district court erroneously thought this suit concerned only shirts, it ruled that collateral estoppel did not apply because Blue Bell I concerned pants. However, under the related goods doctrine, the issue of secondary meaning of the pant tab is a part of this action. It was *1364litigated in Blue Bell I by the two parties to this litigation. Under ordinary principles of collateral estoppel, parties cannot relitigate factual issues that were conclusively determined in an earlier lawsuit. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). Neither party suggests that the pant pocket tab has been altered since Blue Bell I or that consumers no longer associate the pant tab with Strauss. Therefore, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Strauss pant pocket tab has secondary meaning which should have been considered by the district court in considering the related goods claim of the infringement of Strauss’ pant tab trademark.
B. Strauss’ Shirts versus Blue Bell’s Shirts.
I agree with the majority that Blue Bell I does not have collateral estoppel effect upon a finding of secondary meaning of the shirt tab. This issue has never before been litigated by the parties. Secondary meaning in the pant tab does not necessarily inhere in the shirt tab, since the pant tab was registered as a location-specific trademark. See In re Levi Strauss, 165 USPQ 348, 350 (TT & A Bd.1970).
III.

Likelihood of Confusion

Our cases have defined a multi-factor framework to determine the likelihood of consumer confusion. See New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir.1979); J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1110, 47 L.Ed.2d 317 (1976); K-S-H Plastics, Inc. v. Carolite, Inc., 408 F.2d 54, 57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825, 90 S.Ct. 69, 24 L.Ed.2d 76 (1969). AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.1979) sets forth eight factors to be considered:
1. strength of the mark;
2. proximity of the goods;
3. similarity of the marks;
4. evidence of actual confusion;
5. marketing channels used;
6. type of good and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser;
7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and
8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines;
Id. at 348-49.
I agree with the majority that the clearly erroneous standard of review should be applied to a trial court’s determination of likelihood of confusion — but only if that determination is arrived at through the proper application of the multi-factor test. The district court’s failure to apply the multi-factor test to the pants versus shirts claim, and its failure to apply all of that test’s factors to the shirts versus shirts claim are errors of law. They must be reviewed de novo. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1959-60 & n. 17, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (“Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an appellate court’s power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law.”). Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir.1984) (“Nor will the clearly erroneous rule protect findings which have been made on the basis of the application of incorrect legal standards or made in disregard of applicable legal standards— ”); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 384 (5th Cir.1977) (if test applied is incorrect as a matter of law, “findings lose the shield of the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard”). When, as here, the appropriate legal standard is not applied at all or applied incorrectly, remand is necessary for factual determinations to be made on the basis of the correct legal standard. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1792, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174, 194 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1773, 1784 n. 9, 10 L.Ed.2d 823 (1963). See Bose Corp., 104 S.Ct. at 1959-60 & n. 17.
With respect to the related goods claim, the district court should be directed to ap*1365ply the multi-factor test. With respect to the shirts versus shirt claim, the district court should be directed to apply that test properly. For while the district court did attempt to apply the multi-factor test to the shirts versus shirts claim, it failed to consider all the relevant factors. The majority opinion attempts to legitimize the district court’s focus on only one factor — the survey evidence — by characterizing that factor as “direct evidence” and stigmatizing the others as “circumstantial.” However, the district court’s failure to make sufficiently detailed findings on some of the factors and its misconstruction of others cannot be overlooked.
For instance, when considering the strength of the mark with respect to the Strauss shirt tab, the district court erred as a matter of law in excluding the pant tab’s secondary meaning from its determination of the shirt tab’s strength of the mark; consequently, its conclusion that the shirt tab is a weak mark cannot be sustained.
On the question of marketing channels, the district court found that the fact that Strauss and Blue Bell shirts were sold in the same stores did not render confusion as “more like[ly] to occur.” It miscited a case for this proposition, Interstate Brands Corp. v. Celestial Seasonings, 576 F.2d 926 (C.C.P.A.1978), and the rule is to the contrary.
On the question of similarity of the marks, the district court found that the similarity of the marks was reduced by Blue Bell’s distinctive point of sale packaging and advertising materials. The proper inquiry, however, considers the similarity of the marks as encountered by consumers throughout the marketplace, and not merely at the point of sale. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir.1984); Blue Bell I, 632 F.2d at 822.
Finally, among the factors not even considered by the district court were proximity of goods, type of goods, and degree of care exercised by purchasers. Nor did it consider the degree of competition between Strauss’ shirts and Blue Bell’s shirts, although highly competitive goods receive greater trademark protection. Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354; see also New West, 595 F.2d at 1202; Paul Sachs Original, 325 F.2d at 215.
CONCLUSION
While I concur in Part II and in sections A, B, and C of Part VI of the majority opinion, I would reverse and remand this case to the district court for application of the related goods doctrine, a consideration of the secondary meaning of the pant tab as applied to the related goods doctrine, and for application of this Circuit’s multifactor test to both the infringement of Strauss’ pant tab by Blue Bell’s shirt tab and the infringement of Strauss’ shirt tab by Blue Bell’s shirt tab.
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART.

. E.g., Valmor Products Co. v. Standard Products Corp., 464 F.2d 200, 202-03 (1st Cir.1972).

. E.g., David Crystal, Inc. v. Soo Valley Co., 471 F.2d 1245, 1246 (C.C.P.A.1973).

. E.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Products Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1341, 1352 (E.D.Pa.1972), aff’d, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.1973).

. E.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Scoa Industries, Inc., 187 U.S.P.Q. 49, 56 (S.D.N.Y.*13631975) (expensive goods not likely to be confused with moderately priced goods.)