Court Opinion

ID: 9373186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:17.599022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.985047
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LISA MAGIN,                                     DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  NY-1221-15-0069-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: December 2, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James E. Carney, Buffalo, New York, for the appellant.

           Sheila Q. Weimer, Esquire, Buffalo, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     granted the appellant’s request for corrective action in this individual right of
     action (IRA) appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the
     field office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant was a Medical Supply Technician at a n agency medical center
     in Buffalo, New York, working in the Sterile Processing Service (SPS)
     department. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 18 at 15, Tab 56, Initial Decision (ID)
     at 4. She alleged that, beginning in 2010, she reported to her managers that some
     of her coworkers were not performing their work, and that medical equipment
     was not being properly cleaned and maintained. E.g., IAF, Tab 3 at 5, Tab 11
     at 6, Tab 36, Subtab C.     According to the appellant, her coworkers retaliated
     against her for making these reports by leaving her to work alone. IAF, Tab 11
     at 6. She further alleged that in November 2011, one coworker hit her with his
     shoulder, and in January 2012, another coworker swore at her during a workplace
     dispute. IAF, Tab 36, Subtab C at 6-7. She stopped reporting to work 3 days
     after the latter incident, citing work-related depression, anxiety, and panic
     disorder. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 18 at 43-46, 53, 56-67.
¶3        Over the following months,         the appellant   requested   a reasonable
     accommodation and filed a claim for workers compensation benefits, both of
     which were denied.        ID at 6-7; IAF, Tab 18 at 41.     She also filed equal
     employment opportunity complaints, which appear to have challenged the denial
     of her accommodation request and alleged racial harassment and d iscrimination
     by her managers and coworkers. IAF, Tab 18 at 26, 27-29.
¶4        During the appellant’s absence, the agency appointed a new director of the
     medical center.     ID at 6.    The new director reassigned and replaced the
     appellant’s former supervisor and manager. ID at 7. The appellant’s new acting
     manager proposed the appellant’s removal in January 2013 for excessive absence.
     IAF, Tab 18 at 33-34.      The director sustained the charge and removed the
     appellant, effective March 2013. Id. at 22-23.
                                                                                            3

¶5         Following her removal, the appellant filed a whistleblower retaliation
     complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). 2 IAF, Tab 3 at 11-15. After
     closing its case, OSC notified the appellant of her Board appeal rights. IAF,
     Tab 3 at 5, Tab 11 at 4-7. This IRA appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1.
¶6         The administrative judge held the appellant’s requested hearing and issued
     an initial decision, granting corrective action. ID at 2. The agency has filed a
     petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2. The appellant has
     filed a response. 3 PFR File, Tab 5. The agency has replied. PFR File, Tab 4.

     The administrative judge must make new jurisdictional findings, specifically
     identifying the disclosures and personnel actions that are properly before
     the Board.
¶7         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
     administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that:
     (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), or
     engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
     in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 4 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(e)(1). The Board has recently

     2
       In its decision to remove the appellant, the agency provided notice that she could file
     an adverse action appeal with the Board or a whistleblower complaint with OSC, and
     the preclusive effect of her choice. IAF, Tab 18 at 22-23. The appellant elected to file
     a complaint with OSC. IAF, Tab 3 at 11-15.
     3
       In addition to her response to the agency’s petition for review, the appellant filed a
     motion for consequential and other damages. PFR File, Tab 9. The agency has
     responded to that motion. PFR File, Tabs 6, 8. In light of our disposition, we will not
     address these matters at this time.
     4
       As detailed above, this case involves alleged disclosures that occurred prior to the
     effective date of the Whistleblower Enhancement Protection Act of 2012 (WPEA), and
     alleged personnel actions that occurred both before and after that date. See WPEA,
     Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476 (indicating that the WPEA would take
     effect 30 days after its enactment date of November 27, 2012). The Board has held
     that, when the appellant’s protected disclosure or activity occurred before, but the
     relevant personnel actions occurred after the December 27, 2012 effective date of the
     WPEA, the WPEA should be applied because the agency knew of the pa rties’ rights,
                                                                                        4

     clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion. Chambers v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11. The requirements are met when an
     appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Id.
¶8         Although the appellant submitted what appears to be her initial complaint to
     OSC, it does not detail her alleged disclosures. IAF, Tab 3 at 11-15. The record
     does, however, include notes dated April 2010 to January 2012, which the
     appellant reportedly provided to OSC in concert with her complaint.             IAF,
     Tab 36, Subtab C; ID at 5. Many of those notes detail interpersonal conflicts she
     had with coworkers in the SPS department, and some suggest that she may have
     raised these and other issues with managers. IAF, Tab 36, Subtab C. The record
     next includes OSC’s preliminary determination letter, which described the a lleged
     disclosures before it as follows:
           [Y]ou reported to [the SPS manager] that medical equipment was not
           being thoroughly cleaned, employees were not wearing the
           appropriate personal protective equipment, dental hand pieces were
           not being properly sanitized, crash carts were not being stocked with
           respiratory equipment, and other issues.
     IAF, Tab 11 at 6.    Through her representative, the appellant responded to this
     preliminary determination letter from OSC, asserting that her disclosures began in
     2010 and were ongoing. Id. at 8. She further alleged that her disclosures were
     protected because they identified a “significant adverse effect on public health
     and safety.” Id. at 9. In addition, she asserted that while OSC’s letter referred
     only to disclosures to the SPS manager, the OSC and an inspector general “were
     also made aware.” Id. at 8. OSC’s subsequent closeout letter does not further
     describe the appellant’s disclosures, except to conclude that while she did make
     disclosures to OSC and an inspector general, those disclosures occurred after her
     removal. Id. at 4; IAF, Tab 26 at 45-48.

     liabilities, and duties under the WPEA when it took, or failed to take, the personnel
     actions. See Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 50-51. On
     remand, the administrative judge should apply the law as appropriat e to each
     personnel action.
                                                                                             5

¶9          In concert with this IRA appeal, the appellant has described her disclosures
      in a number of ways. For example, in her initial pleading, she described her
      disclosures as ones of “gross safety and health violations having significant effect
      on public health and safety.”        IAF, Tab 1 at 6.       Later, she described her
      disclosures as concerning “coworkers’ non-adherence to proper safety and health
      procedures.” IAF, Tab 16 at 5. In yet another pleading, in which she responded
      to an agency interrogatory asking that she identify and detail each disclosure, the
      appellant presented somewhat different allegations, as follows:
            Informed [her SPS manager and four other individuals at her medical
            center] of problems in SPS such as black employees playing the
            radio loudly on a racially biased station and not allowing anyone to
            change the channel, loudly goldbricking, talking on the phone while
            they were supposed to be working[,] their failure to use personal
            protective equipment, improper sterilization techniques, non
            attendance [sic] to proper cleaning techniques, leaving the work site
            for hours on end, leaving complainant to take up the slack.
      IAF, Tab 26 at 11-12, 33-34. 5
¶10         The record is similarly unclear regarding the personnel actions properly
      before us.   OSC’s preliminary determination and closeout letters identify the
      appellant’s removal and an alleged hostile work environment. IAF, Tab 11 at 4-7.
      However, the appellant’s interim response also may implicate other matters,
      including an alleged failure to accommodate, retain, restore, transfer, or reassign
      her. Id. at 15.
¶11         In the pleadings submitted throughout this IRA appeal, the appellant
      initially referred to a hostile work environment, removal, and refusal to
      accommodate or transfer. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. She later responded to the agency’s

      5
        It does not appear that the appellant alleged below that she was retaliated against for
      protected activity. See Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security,
      122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 5-7 (2015) (discussing the WPEA’s expansion of the grounds
      upon which an IRA appeal may be filed to include protected activity); ID at 10-11.
      However, if she raised these issues below or asserts them on remand, the administrative
      judge should adjudicate them consistent with this order.
                                                                                              6

      motion to dismiss by alleging that her disclosures were a contributing factor in
      her removal, while also referring to reasonable accommodation, generally. IAF,
      Tab 16 at 4-5.
¶12        The administrative judge issued an order finding that the Board had
      jurisdiction over the instant appeal.     IAF, Tab 9 at 1.       However, she did not
      identify the alleged disclosures and personnel actions that the appellant proved
      she exhausted with OSC.        She identified the personnel action at issue as the
      appellant’s removal, but did not identify the alleged protected disclosures,
      mention any other alleged personnel actions, or make findings as to whether the
      appellant’s allegations were nonfrivolous.        Id. at 1, 3.    The initial decision
      provides little clarity on these matters.         ID at 10-13.         For example, the
      administrative judge reversed the appellant’s removal because she found that the
      appellant’s absence was caused by her coworkers’ retaliatory harassment.               ID
      at 10-13 & n.3. Yet, there is no finding that the Board has jurisdiction over this
      alleged harassment. ID at 2.
¶13        An initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law,
      summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
      administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests.         Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980).           Because the administrative judge
      failed to identify and fully analyze each of the appellant’s alleged disclosures and
      personnel actions, we must remand this appeal.               See, e.g., Mastrullo v.
      Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 14 (2015) (remanding for an
      administrative   judge   to    identify   and   analyze   each    of     the   appellant’s
      alleged disclosures).
¶14        On remand, the administrative judge should issue an order directing the
      appellant to identify each disclosure and personnel action at issue in this appeal.
      See Keefer v. Department of Agriculture, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 18 n.2 (2002)
      (cautioning that an appellant who fails to articulate his claims with reasonable
                                                                                         7

      clarity and precision risks being found to have failed to meet his burden). The
      order should direct the appellant to identify the nature of the disclosure or action,
      when it occurred, and the individuals involved. The order also should direct the
      appellant to prove she has met the requirements of exhaustion.         The Board’s
      jurisdiction is limited to those issues that have been previously raised with OSC.
      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11.         However, an appellant may give a more
      detailed account of her whistleblowing activities before the Board than she did to
      OSC.     An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through her initial OSC
      complaint, evidence that she amended the original complaint, including but not
      limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any
      amended allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC referencing
      the amended allegations.    An appellant may also establish exhaustion through
      other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting
      that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the Board
      appeal. Id.
¶15          In advising the appellant of her burden, the administrative judge should
      include the standard for establishing a harassment claim articulated in Skarada v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 14-16. As we explained in
      Skarada, only agency actions that, individually or collectively, have practical and
      significant effects on the overall nature and quality of an employee’s working
      conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be found to constitute a pers onnel
      action under the Whistleblower Protection Act. Id.
¶16          The administrative judge should then make jurisdictional determinations,
      specifically identifying those disclosures and personnel actions that are within the
      Board’s jurisdiction. See Keefer, 92 M.S.P.R. 476, ¶ 16 (remanding for further
      adjudication when the administrative judge failed to specify which allegations of
      protected disclosures and personnel actions he found were nonfrivolous and
      whether the appellants exhausted their OSC remedy with respect to those
      disclosures and actions).
                                                                                           8

      For any alleged disclosures and personnel actions the administrative judge finds
      to be within the Board’s jurisdiction, she must provide a complete analysis on
      the merits.
¶17         After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, an appellant
      bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by
      proving by preponderant evidence that she made a protected disclosure that was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action taken against her. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1);
      Mattil v. Department of State, 118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 11 (2012). If an appellant
      makes out a prima facie case, the agency is given an opportunity to prove, by
      clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same personnel action
      in the absence of the protected disclosure.       5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Mattil,
      118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 11.
¶18         In determining whether an agency has met this burden, the Board will
      consider the following factors (“Carr factors”): (1) the strength of the agency’s
      evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision;
      and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who
      are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated.               Soto v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see Carr v. Social Security
      Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 6 The Board does not view
      these factors as discrete elements, each of which the a gency must prove by clear
      and convincing evidence, but rather weighs these factors together to determine
      whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a whole. Alarid v. Department of
      the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14 (2015).
      6
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on this issue. However, as a result of changes initiated by the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat.
      1465, extended for 3 years in the All Circuit Review Extension Act, Pub. L.
      No. 113-170, 128 Stat. 1894, and eventually made permanent in the All Circuit Review
      Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file petitions for judicial
      review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court of
      appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
                                                                                          9

¶19         Although the administrative judge found that the appellant met her burden
      of establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, generally, she
      improperly did so in summary fashion. ID at 10-11. The administrative judge
      did not, for example, specify which disclosures were protected, delineate the
      category of protected disclosure, or explain how the appellant met her burden.
      Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (providing that a disclosure is protected if an
      individual reasonably believes that it evidences a violation of any law, rule, or
      regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
      or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety). She also failed to
      adequately explain the contributing factor element.         She concluded that the
      appellant proved this element through the knowledge/timing test, at least with
      respect to her removal. See ID at 10-11. However, in doing so, she found that
      the deciding official knew that the appellant previously had complained to her
      SPS manager, generally; the administrative judge did not, for example, specify
      whether the deciding official’s knowledge of complaints included knowledge of
      protected disclosures. Id.
¶20         On remand, if the administrative judge finds jurisdiction, then she must
      explain in her remand initial decision how the appellant met, or did not meet , her
      burden to prove her prima facie case.
¶21         The administrative judge’s findings similarly lack specificity concerning
      the agency’s burden. ID at 11-12. For the first Carr factor, i.e., the strength of
      the agency’s evidence in support of its action, the administrative judge seemed to
      rely entirely on a finding that, as to the appellant’s removal, the deciding official
      altogether failed to consider the connection between her absence and hostility she
      reportedly faced from coworkers. ID at 12. She did so without explanation or
      citation and despite evidence to the contrary, including the agency’s notes from
      the appellant’s oral reply, the appellant’s written reply, and the deciding official’s
      detailed penalty analysis. ID at 9; IAF, Tab 18 at 24-28.
                                                                                         10

¶22            For the second Carr factor, i.e., the existence and strength of any motive to
      retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the decision, the
      administrative judge found that the proposing and deciding officials had no
      motive to retaliate because the disclosures did no t negatively reflect on them. ID
      at 12.     The administrative judge should consider the motive of the agency
      generally, not merely the motive of the individual managers.                 Wilson v
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 65 (addressing the second Carr
      factor to find that the appellant’s disclosures generally put higher -level
      management officials in a critical light by disclosing probl ems for which they
      were responsible); Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 28-29
      (addressing the second Carr factor to find that the misconduct the appellant
      disclosed was egregious and generated negative publicity, thereby reflecting
      poorly on the agency’s general institutional interests).      Moreover, she did not
      fully discuss other considerations, such as whether any other individual that did
      have a motive to retaliate influenced their decisions . ID at 12. Nevertheless, the
      alleged harassment by the appellant’s coworkers cannot shield her from the
      consequences of her misconduct, and the administrative judge erred to the extent
      that she inferred retaliatory motive from the agency’s failure to take t his alleged
      harassment into account to mitigate the penalty of removal.          ID at 11-12; see
      Carr, 185 F.3d at 1324, 1326 (declining to consider the allegedly false reports of
      misconduct by an employee’s coworkers, who were subjects of her disclosures, in
      weighing the motive to retaliate on the part of the officials who removed her).
  ¶23          For the third Carr factor, i.e., any evidence that the agency takes similar
      actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
      similarly situated, the administrative judge recognized that the agency had
      removed other employees for excessive absences. ID at 12. However, she seems
      to altogether dismiss this evidence, rather than account for any differences,
      because those instances did not involve an alleged hostile work environ ment.
      Id.; cf. Mattil v. Department of State, 118 M.S.P.R. 662, 675 (2012).          To the
                                                                                     11

      extent that the agency has not accounted for the differences in the kinds and
      degrees of conduct and otherwise explained the context of its comparator
      evidence, it is taking a risk in failing to provide such information . The Board
      has previously adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
      Federal Circuit that “the failure to produce such evidence if it exists ‘may be at
      the agency’s peril,’ and ‘may well cause the agency to fail to prove its case
      overall.’” Smith, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 30 (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374).
¶24        On remand, if the administrative judge again finds that the appellant met
      her burden of establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the
      remand initial decision must provide complete findings regarding the agen cy’s
      burden. Spithaler, 1 M.S.P.R. at 589.

                                          ORDER
¶25        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.          To the extent
      necessary, the administrative judge should permit the parties to supplement the
      record with additional argument, evidence, and testimony before issuing a
      new decision.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.