Court Opinion

ID: 9384032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 17:00:30.712352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.903534
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               ________________

                                      No. 21-2886
                                   ________________

                                   EMILIO ROMERO,
                                              Appellant
                                          v.

TOWNSHIP OF TOBYHANNA; CHIEF OF POLICE CHRIS WAGNER; DETECTIVE
 LUCAS BRAY; DETECTIVE MARK WEBB; BOROUGH OF MOUNT POCONO;
TOWNSHIP OF COOLBAUGH; TOWNSHIP OF TUNKHANNOCK; TOWNSHIP OF
  BARRETT; TOWNSHIP OF PARADISE; ADA MICHAEL RACKACZEWSKI
                        ________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                                (D. C. No. 3-19-cv-01038)
                    District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
                                   ________________

                       Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                  on October 20, 2022

            Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 31, 2023)

                                   ________________

                                       OPINION*
                                   ________________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
ROTH, Circuit Judge

       Emilio Romero brought a civil rights action, arising from his arrest on rape and

related charges. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which was granted by the

District Court. Romero appealed. He contends on appeal that the District Court improperly

granted summary judgment and that it abused its discretion by striking his statements of

facts and deeming the defendants’ statements of facts admitted. For the reasons below, we

will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                                I.

       Romero was arrested and charged with rape and other offenses after a sexual

encounter with his wife, which he recorded on his cellphone.1 Police recovered various

graphic videos that Romero produced of his wife without her knowledge, using hidden

recording devices. Romero was tried by a jury in state court and acquitted on the sex

offenses but convicted on related charges.2 He was sentenced to serve five to twelve years

in prison followed by three years’ probation.

       Romero subsequently brought federal civil rights claims against law enforcement

officials and municipal entities, primarily under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1981, as well as

1
  Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and proceedings to
the extent necessary to resolve this case.
2
  The other charges included criminal use of a communication facility, possession of the
instrument of a crime with intent to employ it criminally, possession of a controlled
substance, interception of communications, possession of a device for intercepting
communications, invasion of privacy, and tampering with evidence.
                                             2
several state-law tort claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment.3 Romero,

however, failed to file responsive statements of facts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)

and M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Nor did he file timely briefs, responding to defendants’ motions

to have their statements of facts deemed admitted for the purposes of summary judgment,

despite the court’s explicit instructions and multiple extensions of time to do so. As a

result, the court ordered Romero’s statements of facts stricken from the record and

defendants’ statements of facts admitted for the purposes of summary judgment.

       The District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. That

evening, Romero filed two motions to vacate the District Court’s order striking his

statements of facts and deeming defendants’ statements admitted. Romero cited no rule or

other legal basis for the motions. The District Court construed them to be motions to

reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) because they were filed after entry of final judgment.

The court denied them.

       Romero appeals both the District Court’s order, striking his statements of facts and

deeming the defendants’ statements admitted, and the grant of summary judgment.

                                              II.

       The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s application and

3
  Defendants sorted themselves into two separately represented groups in response to
Romero’s complaint in the District Court and on appeal: The Township defendants and
the County defendants. For the purposes of this opinion, we refer to all defendants
collectively.
                                             3
interpretation of its local rules for abuse of discretion.4 We review orders, granting

summary judgment, de novo.5

       First, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s order to strike Romero’s

statements of facts and to deem defendants’ statements admitted. “[L]ocal rules play a

‘vital role in the district courts’ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets,” and

“facilitate the implementation of court policy. . ..”6 For this reason, it is both fitting and

“beyond question that the District Court has the authority to strike filings that fail to comply

with its local rules.”7 Local Rule 56.1 makes plain that “[t]he papers opposing a motion

for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the [moving party’s] statement.” 8

The Rule further requires such statements to “include references to the parts of the record

that support the statements.” 9 As we have previously observed, “the Rule ‘is essential to

the Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion’ due to its role in ‘organizing the

evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side

proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’” 10

4
  Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018).
5
  Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017).
6
  Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1990)
(quoting Smith v. Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1988)).
7
  Weitzner, 909 F.3d at 614.
8
  M. D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
9
  Id.
10
   Weitzner, 909 F.3d at 613 (quoting Kramer v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 3:CV-08-
2096, 2010 WL 11553711, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2010)).
                                               4
       Here, the District Court was well within its discretion in striking Romero’s untimely

responses to the defendants’ statements of material facts. The responses failed to include

required references to the record. Also, Romero failed to file a brief in opposition to the

defendants’ motions, as explicitly directed both by Local Rule 7.6 and the court’s own

order.11 We note that the court granted Romero multiple extensions of time to comply with

these requirements, including one sua sponte extension entered three weeks after the

expiration of Romero’s time to respond. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court

properly struck Romero’s statements of facts.

       We also conclude that the District Court’s Sept. 15, 2021 Order, denying Romero’s

motions to reconsider, was proper.12 We discern no error (and Romero indicates none) in

the court’s construction of his filings as motions to reconsider under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

On appeal, Romero presents no factual or legal basis for his claim that the District Court

abused its discretion in denying these motions. Instead, he appears to assert that the District

11
   See Md. Pa. L.R. 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion . . . shall file a brief in
opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant’s brief . . . . Any party
who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”); Feb. 4,
2021, Minute Order ECF No. 93. (“[O]pposition briefs to Docs. 84, 86 and 88 due
within 14 days of date of Order or motions shall be deemed unopposed.”).
12
   See Order (Sept. 15, 2021), ECF No. 106. We generally review a denial of a motion
for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, and we review the District Court’s underlying
legal determinations de novo and factual determinations for clear error. Howard Hess
Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Max’s
Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining “the
purpose of a motion for reconsideration . . . is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or
to present newly discovered evidence” and noting a court may alter or amend a judgment
if the moving party demonstrates “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion
for summary judgment; [and/]or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
prevent manifest injustice.’”).
                                              5
Court’s denial constituted an abuse of discretion simply because he filed his motion to

vacate within the filing deadlines contemplated by Local Rules 7.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.

Such a position is facially meritless. Romero’s claim that the District Court’s denial will

result in manifest injustice is not supported by any factual basis or legal authority, and we

find none in the record.

       Finally, both the record and relevant case law support the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment.      On appeal, Romero raises four challenges, each reliant on the

underlying premise that the District Court improperly found there was probable cause for

his arrest and prosecution. Reviewing the District Court’s determination de novo, we agree

with the District Court that “it is clear from the record on summary judgment that, on June

22, 2017, authorities had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings against

Romero.”13 Even the facts set forth in Romero’s own appellate brief would support such

a result, including the graphic, detailed witness statement provided by his wife to the

investigating detective shortly after the sexual encounter that precipitated his arrest, and

the corroborating evidence police found in Romero’s home upon execution of a duly-issued

search warrant.14 Romero’s remaining contentions are without merit.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

13
   Op. 28–31.
14
   See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000) (Without “[i]ndependent
exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness’s own unreliability that is
known by the arresting officers” to outweigh it, “a positive identification by a victim
witness, without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause.”); Sharrar
v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997) (“When a police officer has received a
reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause to
arrest.”).
                                             6