Court Opinion

ID: 9896937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:18.982366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:53.955630
License: Public Domain

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      COMPANIONS AND HOMEMAKERS, INC. v.
         A&B HOMECARE SOLUTIONS, LLC
                  (SC 20642)
          McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for its allegedly
   tortious interference with contractual relations and its alleged violation
   of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et
   seq.). The parties are home care service providers that participate in
   the Connecticut Home Care Program for Elders, which is operated by
   the Department of Social Services. In connection with that program,
   the parties each entered into a provider enrollment agreement with the
   department, pursuant to which the department matched each party with
   elderly individuals who were at risk of being placed in nursing homes,
   to whom the parties’ employees provided nonmedical personal, home-
   making and companion care. In 2016, the department notified program
   participants that they would be required to use a new electronic billing
   system effective January 1, 2017. The plaintiff invited other program
   participants to join in a lawsuit challenging the implementation of the
   new billing system, which the defendant and three other program partici-
   pants accepted. The defendant’s chief executive officer, G, represented
   to the plaintiff that the defendant had operational concerns about the
   new system and had not been given enough time to train its employees,
   and he personally approved the filing of a legal action against the depart-
   ment. In that action, the program participants alleged that they were
   unable to implement the new system and sought injunctive relief. The
   plaintiff subsequently learned that the defendant had been using the
   new system to bill the department, but G assured the plaintiff that the
   defendant had only been testing the system and was convinced that it
   was unworkable. In December, 2016, the program participants were
   denied prejudgment relief against the department, and, after G confirmed
   that the defendant would like to continue participating in the lawsuit,
   the plaintiff filed an appeal that included the defendant as an appellant.
   The day after the decision denying prejudgment relief was issued, G
   communicated with B, a director at the department, about the defen-
   dant’s successful efforts to implement the new billing system and its
   commitment to bill using the system. G nonetheless assured the plain-
   tiff’s general counsel that the defendant would not take any of the
   plaintiff’s clients or recruit any of its employees, who were bound by
   noncompete agreements with the plaintiff. On December 29, 2016, the
   plaintiff informed the department via letter that it would not meet the
   deadline for implementation of the billing system. Days later, the depart-
   ment terminated the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement due to
   the plaintiff’s refusal to comply with the billing system requirement.
   Thereafter, the department immediately began to refer the plaintiff’s
   clients to the defendant, and between eighty and eighty-five of the
   plaintiff’s clients ultimately were transferred to the defendant. Subse-
   quently, the plaintiff filed the present action against the defendant,
   specifically alleging that the defendant had tortiously interfered with
   the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement with the department, and
   with the plaintiff’s noncompete agreements with its employees, and that
   the allegedly tortious interference constituted a violation of CUTPA.
   Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff
   on all counts. The court’s conclusion that the defendant had tortiously
   interfered with the provider enrollment agreement was based on its
   finding that the defendant’s conduct during the billing system litigation
   against the department, and, specifically, G’s numerous statements and
   assurances to the plaintiff, constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.
   The court reasoned that the defendant’s misrepresentations throughout
   that litigation had been meant to interfere with the provider enrollment
   agreement between the plaintiff and the department, and had harmed
   the plaintiff, insofar as the defendant’s scheme undermined the plaintiff’s
   position in the billing system litigation against the department and dem-
    onstrated to the department that the defendant was prepared to use the
    new billing system and willing to take the plaintiff’s clients. The court
    also found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s
    noncompete agreements with its employees and that the defendant’s
    interference with the plaintiff’s contractual relations violated CUTPA.
    The court awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount
    of $118,008 for the lost profits relating to the transfer of its clients to
    the defendant, as well as punitive damages and attorney’s fees pursuant
    to CUTPA. On the defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s judgment,
    held:

1. There was no merit to the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly
    found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the plaintiff’s
    provider enrollment agreement with the department on the ground that
    the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty to disclose:

   The trial court did not base its finding of fraudulent misrepresentation
   on the defendant’s failure to disclose but, rather, on express misrepresen-
   tations, as the trial court made clear that it found that the defendant,
   through G, had made multiple false, express representations to the plain-
   tiff, which the plaintiff relied on to its detriment.

   Specifically, the trial court found that G had approved the filing of the
   complaint in the billing system litigation, in which it was alleged that
   the defendant was unable to implement the new billing system, and that
   G made other statements about the defendant’s concerns with the new
   billing system, even as the defendant continued to implement that system.

   The trial court also found that the extent of the defendant’s use of the
   new system undermined the representations made in the complaint in
   the billing system litigation and belied G’s representation that the defen-
   dant had tested the system only on a limited basis, and that the plaintiff
   acted on G’s assurances that the defendant would not take the plain-
   tiff’s clients.

   Moreover, the trial court found that G’s statements were deceptive both
   because G had repeatedly assured the plaintiff that the defendant could
   not implement the new system even though it did so and because G
   assured the plaintiff that the defendant would not take the plaintiff’s
   clients even though it made a concerted effort to do so, and that this
   deception was actuated, at least in part, by an improper purpose, namely,
   to interfere with the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement with the
   department.

2. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the
    defendant’s tortious conduct caused the plaintiff to sustain damages:

   Contrary to the defendant’s argument that there was no evidence that
   it caused or played a role in the department’s decision to terminate the
   plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement, the evidence was sufficient to
   support the trial court’s finding that the department had relied on G’s
   assurances that the defendant could take over the plaintiff’s clients if
   the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement was terminated because,
   although certain department officials testified that the department had
   not relied on any communications with G in deciding to terminate the
   plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement, the trial court apparently did
   not credit that testimony and reached a contrary conclusion on the basis
   of other evidence.

   Specifically, in concluding that the department knew that the defendant
   was available to take over the plaintiff’s clients and relied on that fact
   in deciding to terminate the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement,
   the trial court reasonably could have relied on the ample, circumstantial
   evidence presented at trial, including B’s testimony that she was aware of
   the defendant’s use of the new billing system, that she had communicated
   directly with G about the defendant’s taking over the plaintiff’s clients,
   and that she was involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s
   provider enrollment agreement.

   Moreover, the trial court found that the plaintiff’s decision to inform the
   department that it would not meet the billing system implementation
   deadline was made in reliance on G’s assurances that the defendant
   would not take the plaintiff’s clients or recruit the plaintiff’s employees,
   and the defendant did not dispute that the decision to so inform the
   department led directly to the department’s decision to terminate the
   plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement.

   Furthermore, the record supported the trial court’s finding regarding the
   amount of damages that the plaintiff had sustained as a result of the
   defendant’s conduct, insofar as the court relied on the testimony of the
   plaintiff’s expert, who determined that the plaintiff had incurred $118,008
   in lost profits as a result of the department’s transfer of the plaintiff’s
   clients to the defendant after the department terminated the plaintiff’s
   provider enrollment agreement.

3. In light of this court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to
    support the trial court’s finding that the defendant had tortiously inter-
    fered with the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement, the defendant
    could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly found that
    the defendant had violated CUTPA on the ground that it did not engage
    in such tortious conduct.

4. This court declined to address the defendant’s claim that the trial court
    improperly found that the defendant had tortiously interfered with the
    noncompete agreements between the plaintiff and its employees, as any
    error in this regard was harmless because the court’s award of damages
    was independently supported by its finding that the defendant had tor-
    tiously interfered with the plaintiff’s provider enrollment agreement with
    the department.
     Argued December 14, 2022—officially released October 10, 2023

                            Procedural History

   Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious
interference with contractual relations, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford and tried to the court, Hon. Robert B.
Shapiro, judge trial referee, who, exercising the powers
of the Superior Court, rendered judgment for the plain-
tiff, from which the defendant appealed; thereafter, the
defendant filed an amended appeal, and the plaintiff
filed a cross appeal; subsequently, C&H Holdco, Inc.,
was substituted as the plaintiff, and the cross appeal
was withdrawn. Affirmed.
  Thomas J. Donlon, with whom were Patrick W. Begos
and, on the brief, Trevor L. Bradley, for the appellant
(defendant).
  James P. Sexton, with whom were John R. Weikart
and, on the brief, Julia K. Conlin and Megan L. Wade,
for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
                          Opinion

   ECKER, J. This is an appeal from a judgment, ren-
dered after a bench trial, awarding damages to the plain-
tiff, Companions and Homemakers, Inc. (Companions),1
for tortious interference with contractual and business
relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-
110a et seq.2 The defendant, A&B Homecare Solutions,
LLC (A&B), doing business as Northwest Homecare,
raises four claims of error: (1) the trial court improperly
found that A&B’s misrepresentations were tortious
because it did not owe a legal duty of disclosure to
Companions, (2) the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish that A&B’s allegedly tortious interference caused
Companions to suffer any losses or damages, (3) there
was no violation of CUTPA because there was no tor-
tious interference, and (4) the trial court improperly
found that A&B had tortiously interfered with noncompete
agreements between Companions and its employees
because those agreements are void as against public
policy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
   The trial court found the following facts. Companions
is the largest provider of Medicaid and state funded
home care services in Connecticut. It provides in-home
assistance to elderly Connecticut residents who are at
risk of nursing home placement. Some of these services
are provided through a provider enrollment agreement
with the Department of Social Services (DSS), which
operates a Medicaid and state funded program called
the Connecticut Home Care Program for Elders (CHCPE).
Pursuant to the provider enrollment agreement, Com-
panions matched at risk seniors with its employees,
who would provide ‘‘nonmedical personal, homemak-
ing, and companion care to clients.’’ A&B, a competitor
of Companions, is the third largest provider of such
services in the state. A&B is also assigned at risk
patients under a provider enrollment agreement with
DSS. Companions’ provider enrollment agreement with
DSS became the focus of one significant part of Com-
panions’ claim of tortious interference against A&B.
  In March, 2016, DSS implemented a new billing and
timekeeping system, the Electronic Visit Verification
system (EVV), for Medicaid home care providers such
as the parties. DSS notified its home care providers that
they would be required to use EVV effective January 1,
2017. Unhappy with this new requirement, Companions
contacted other large, home care providers, including
A&B, to see if they would be interested in joining a legal
challenge, under the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., against
the implementation of EVV. Companions offered to
cover all costs of the litigation. A&B and three other
home care providers agreed to join Companions in the
lawsuit.
   From the start, A&B’s chief executive officer, Aron
Galinovsky, represented to Companions that he had
‘‘concerns about being able to bill or pay correctly
through EVV.’’ Galinovsky gave Companions a list of
operational concerns about EVV and asserted that A&
B had not been given enough time to train its employees.
Galinovsky personally approved the filing of a verified
complaint in the Superior Court, seeking injunctive
relief from DSS’s implementation of EVV and alleging
that the EVV program was an unpromulgated regula-
tion, in violation of the UAPA. In that complaint, the
home care providers alleged that they ‘‘were unable to
implement EVV’’ and would be irreparably harmed if it
became mandatory. A&B also agreed to send a letter
to DSS, in which the home care providers involved in
the litigation stated ‘‘that [they] had found the platform
for EVV to be unworkable . . . .’’
   Despite these representations, and without informing
Companions or the other home care providers, A&B
began to implement EVV by using it to submit claims
and bills for Medicaid services. By November, 2016, A&B
had billed DSS more than $234,000 through EVV, where-
as the other home care providers had billed nothing
using the new system. Galinovsky hid this activity from
Companions, despite knowing that Companions was re-
lying on his representations that A&B was unable to
use EVV.
  The first time that Companions heard of A&B’s using
EVV was at a court hearing on November 21, 2016, when
that fact was mentioned by DSS’s counsel. Companions
confronted A&B regarding its use of EVV, but Galinov-
sky assured Companions that A&B ‘‘had only used EVV
for testing and remained convinced [that] it was unwork-
able.’’ The court found that this misrepresentation mis-
led Companions. Additionally, the court concluded that
A&B’s use of EVV ‘‘demonstrated to DSS that A&B was
ready to take business from noncompliant providers.’’
    On December 15, 2016, the home care providers were
denied prejudgment relief in their litigation against DSS.
Galinovsky told Companions that A&B ‘‘would like to
be part of an appeal’’ from the trial court’s order, and
Companions filed an appeal including A&B as an appel-
lant. Galinovsky concealed from Companions the fact
that, ‘‘the very next day after the issuance of the [trial]
court’s decision, he was directly communicating with
Kathy Bruni, the director of DSS’s Community Options
Unit, about A&B’s successful efforts to implement
EVV.’’ Galinovsky told Bruni that A&B was committed
‘‘to ‘use, bill, and work with’ the EVV system’’ and that,
‘‘ ‘with each passing week, [it] utilize[s] the system more
and more and ha[s] billed [more] through the system.’’
Galinovsky’s communications with Bruni directly con-
tradicted his representations to Companions and under-
mined the position that Companions and the other providers,
including A&B, were taking in their ongoing litigation.
   The trial court found that Galinovsky had intention-
ally ‘‘played both sides of the litigation’’ because doing
so ‘‘enabled him to continue to receive strategic infor-
mation from the [other providers] and to plan to benefit
at their expense from their nonuse of EVV.3 At the same
time, his communications to Bruni negatively impacted
the bargaining power of the other [providers].’’ (Foot-
note added.) By late December, 2016, A&B had billed
more than $715,000 through EVV, whereas Companions
and the other providers in the lawsuit still ‘‘had not
billed a single claim . . . .’’
   As the January 1, 2017 deadline for the implementa-
tion of EVV approached, Companions’ general counsel
sought and received Galinovsky’s agreement that A&B
would not take clients or employees from Companions.
The trial court found that, ‘‘[i]n reliance on assurances
from A&B and the other providers,’’ Companions sent
a letter to DSS advising it that Companions could not
use EVV and planned to continue to bill outside of the
system. Companions argued that it could not use EVV
because it would ‘‘violate existing laws,’’ including laws
pertaining to ‘‘employee rights with regard to personally
identifiable data’’ and ‘‘state and federal wage and hour
laws.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Days later, DSS terminated
its provider enrollment agreement with Companions,
effective February 3, 2017, due to Companions’ deliber-
ate refusal to comply with the EVV requirement.
   DSS’s decision to terminate its provider enrollment
agreement with Companions was based, in part, on
its knowledge that A&B had successfully implemented
EVV and that it could rely on A&B to take on Compan-
ions’ clients. Before DSS terminated its agreement with
Companions, Bruni spoke to A&B about taking on Com-
panions’ clients. When DSS terminated its agreement
with Companions, A&B immediately began taking Com-
panions’ clients through referrals from DSS. In fact, A&
B admitted that it took at least eighty to eighty-five of
Companions’ clients in the Litchfield area in January,
2017. At that time, A&B had never received this volume
of referrals before. Galinovsky also worked to hire Com-
panions’ employees, even though he was aware that
those employees were bound by noncompete agree-
ments. Galinovsky sent his staff a list of attorneys who
could help Companions’ employees challenge their non-
compete agreements. He remained in touch with Bruni
and gave her a status update on the transfer of clients
from Companions to A&B.
  Following DSS’s decision to terminate its provider
enrollment agreement with Companions, the litigation
against DSS continued with the parties as coplaintiffs.
A mediation was scheduled for January 17, 2017, and
Galinovsky agreed to provide Companions’ general
counsel with ‘‘bullet points’’ for use in negotiations.
Galinovsky’s conduct was deceptive in that he misled
Companions as to the extent of A&B’s ongoing prob-
lems with EVV and did not disclose that A&B was mak-
ing a concerted effort to take Companions’ clients and
employees.
    Two days before the mediation, Galinovsky informed
Companions that he would not attend. He told Compan-
ions that A&B ‘‘ ‘should probably stay away from things
as [it] will only hurt your case since [A&B has] billed and
received nearly [$800,000].’ ’’ Galinovsky’s reference to
‘‘ ‘your case’ ’’ ignored the fact that A&B remained a
coplaintiff and a party to the appeal, and never with-
drew from the litigation. Galinovsky gave Companions
authority to settle the case, but, after the case success-
fully settled, he objected to the proposed settlement.
The trial court observed that, every day the case was
not settled, A&B was permitted to obtain additional
clients from Companions, and found that A&B’s objec-
tion to the settlement, after providing settlement
authority, was an attempt to keep Companions from
being reinstated.
   Companions filed the present action against A&B,
alleging tortious interference with contractual and busi-
ness relations and a violation of CUTPA. The first count
of the complaint alleged that A&B had tortiously inter-
fered with Companions’ provider enrollment agreement
with DSS, and with Companions’ noncompete agree-
ments with its employees. The second count alleged
that A&B’s tortious interference with those contractual
relationships constituted ‘‘unfair and deceptive acts and
practices in the conduct of trade or commerce [that]
are unethical, unscrupulous and offensive to public pol-
icy,’’ in violation of CUTPA.
   The trial court rendered judgment for Companions
following a fourteen day bench trial. The court deter-
mined that A&B had tortiously interfered with both
Companions’ contractual relationship with DSS and its
noncompete agreements with its employees. The trial
court’s conclusion of tortious interference with the pro-
vider enrollment agreement was based on its finding
that A&B’s conduct in the litigation against DSS—and,
in particular, numerous statements and assurances
made by Galinovsky to Companions in connection with
the litigation—‘‘amount[ed] to misrepresentation and
[was] tortious.’’ The court explained that A&B’s ‘‘decep-
tive conduct was actuated, at least in part, by an
improper purpose, [namely] to interfere with Compan-
ions’ provider enrollment agreement with DSS and to
drive Companions from the CHCPE program, which
would render Companions ineligible to provide home
assistance services . . . to elderly beneficiaries, who
make up a significant portion of [its] client base.’’ The
court found that A&B’s misrepresentations to Compan-
ions throughout the litigation caused harm to Compan-
ions because A&B’s scheme ‘‘undermined Companions’
position in the . . . litigation [against DSS] and demon-
strated to DSS that [A&B] was prepared to utilize EVV
and to serve clients in a geographically difficult service
area (Litchfield County). Without A&B’s willingness to
take Companions’ matches, Companions would not
have lost the [eighty to eighty-five] clients taken by A&
B. A&B’s tortious conduct was a proximate cause of
losses incurred by Companions in that, as a result, DSS
terminated Companions’ provider enrollment agree-
ment, reassigned clients away from Companions,
stopped referring new clients to Companions, and did
not rescind the notice of termination until after the
mediated settlement.’’
   The court also found tortious interference with Com-
panions’ noncompete agreements on the ground that
A&B had ‘‘assur[ed] Companions that it would not take
Companions’ [employees] but (1) then did so anyway
(2) with [the] knowledge that noncompete agreements
existed between the [employees] and Companions, and
(3) A&B provided access to legal counsel to [Compan-
ions’ employees] to assist them in avoiding their obliga-
tions under the noncompete agreements.’’ In arriving
at this determination, the court declined to address A&
B’s claim that the noncompete agreements were unen-
forceable on the ground that they violated public policy,
concluding that a contract need not be enforceable to
be the object of tortious interference with a contractual
relations claim. The court further found that A&B’s
tortious interference with Companions’ contractual
relationships violated CUTPA.
  The trial court awarded Companions compensatory
damages in the amount of $118,008 for lost profits
related to the reassignment of CHCPE clients from
Companions to A&B. Pursuant to CUTPA, the court
awarded Companions punitive damages in the amount
of $354,000 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
$533,242.57 after a separate hearing. This appeal fol-
lowed.
                            I
 TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH COMPANIONS’
    PROVIDER ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT
                WITH DSS
   A&B argues that it did not tortiously interfere with
Companions’ contractual relationship with DSS as a
matter of law. A&B argues that ‘‘the trial court relied
[on its] failure to disclose as a basis for [fraudulent]
misrepresentation’’ and that ‘‘[a] failure to disclose can
. . . constitute a misrepresentation [only] if there is a
duty to disclose.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) A&B contends
that it owed Companions no duty to disclose and, there-
fore, did not tortiously interfere with Companions’ pro-
vider enrollment agreement with DSS. Whether the trial
court erred in finding liability without determining that
A&B owed Companions a duty to disclose is a question
of law, which we review de novo. See, e.g., Glazer v.
Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33, 84, 873 A.2d 929 (2005).
   ‘‘A claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the exis-
tence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the
[defendant’s] knowledge of that relationship, (3) the
[defendant’s] intent to interfere with the relationship,
(4) the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered
by the plaintiff that was caused by the [defendant’s]
tortious conduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. CALCO Con-
struction & Development Co., 318 Conn. 847, 864, 124
A.3d 847 (2015). The trial court found that A&B’s con-
duct was tortious because it constituted fraudulent mis-
representation. That tort has four elements: (1) a false
representation was made by the defendant as a state-
ment of fact; (2) the statement was known to be untrue
by the defendant; (3) the statement was made with the
intent to induce reliance; and (4) the other party relied
on the statement to its detriment.4 See Nazami v.
Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 628, 910 A.2d
209 (2006). Fraudulent misrepresentation can be based
either on express statements or on a failure to disclose
information when there is a duty to disclose. See, e.g.,
Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 695, 882 A.2d
53 (2005); see also Pospisil v. Pospisil, 59 Conn. App.
446, 450, 757 A.2d 655, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940,
761 A.2d 762 (2000) (‘‘[f]raud by nondisclosure, which
expands on the first three of [the] four elements [of
fraud], involves the failure to make a full and fair disclo-
sure of known facts connected with a matter about
which a party has assumed to speak, under circum-
stances in which there is a duty to speak’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
   We disagree with the fundamental premise of A&B’s
argument disputing liability: its contention that ‘‘[t]he
trial court did not find that [it] made any express misrep-
resentation[s] . . . .’’ To the contrary, the court very
clearly found that A&B made multiple, false representa-
tions to Companions, which Companions relied on to
its detriment. For example, the court found: Galinovsky,
on behalf of A&B, ‘‘approved the filing of the verified
complaint’’ alleging that A&B was ‘‘unable to implement
EVV’’; ‘‘[o]n December 8, 2016, [Galinovsky] provided an
email [to Companions] detailing operational problems’’
with EVV; these statements ‘‘misled Companions as A&
B continued to implement EVV’’; and the extent of A&
B’s use of EVV ‘‘undermined the representations made
by A&B in the verified complaint’’ and ‘‘belied its previ-
ous representation that it had . . . tested the system
[only] on a limited basis.’’ The court also found that
Companions ‘‘received Galinovsky’s agreement that A&
B would not take Companions’ matches’’ and acted ‘‘[i]n
reliance on assurances from A&B . . . that [it] would
not take Companions’ matches . . . .’’ In summary, the
court found that Companions ‘‘relied on A&B’s repre-
sentations in the course of the legal challenge to EVV.’’
(Emphasis added.) We previously have held that ‘‘[a]
duty to disclose will be imposed . . . on a party insofar
as he voluntarily makes disclosure. A party who
assumes to speak must make a full and fair disclosure
as to the matters about which he assumes to speak.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomber v. Trav-
elers Property & Casualty Corp., 261 Conn. 620, 636, 804
A.2d 180 (2002). The trial court found that Galinovsky’s
statements were ‘‘deceptive,’’ both because he repeat-
edly ‘‘assured Companions that A&B could not imple-
ment EVV’’ while simultaneously ‘‘implement[ing] and
. . . using the system,’’ and because Galinovsky
assured Companions ‘‘that [A&B] would not take Com-
panions’ matches’’ while ‘‘making a concerted effort to
take Companions’ matches.’’ The trial court noted that
this ‘‘deceptive conduct was actuated, at least in part,
by an improper purpose, [namely] to interfere with Com-
panions’ provider enrollment agreement with DSS . . . .’’

   The memorandum of decision is abundantly clear
that the trial court based its finding of tortious interfer-
ence with Companions’ provider enrollment agreement
with DSS on A&B’s false representations, not its mere
silence. There was, therefore, no error in failing to iden-
tify an affirmative duty to disclose on the part of A&B.5
                             II
             CAUSATION AND DAMAGES
   A&B next claims that there was insufficient evidence
to support the trial court’s factual finding that its con-
duct caused Companions to suffer any damages. Specif-
ically, A&B argues that ‘‘[t]here was no evidence that
[it] caused or played a role in’’ DSS’s decision to termi-
nate the agreement with Companions and that ‘‘all of
the evidence demonstrated that DSS’s decision was
reached independently, and was not influenced or
affected by A&B.’’ In support of this assertion, A&B
argues that Bruni, the person at DSS who had been in
contact with Galinovsky, was not directly involved in
the decision to terminate the agreement with Compan-
ions and that ‘‘[e]ach of the DSS officials who testified
agreed that the sole reason for the termination [of the
agreement] was [Companions’] written refusal to imple-
ment EVV,’’ as opposed to any misrepresentation made
by A&B. The record does not support this assertion.
   To prevail on a claim of tortious interference with
contractual relations or business expectancies, the
plaintiff must establish that, ‘‘as a result of the interfer-
ence, [it] suffer[ed] actual loss.’’ Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v.
Com-Tronics, Inc., 255 Conn. 20, 27, 761 A.2d 1268
(2000). ‘‘Thus, it must appear that, except for the tor-
tious interference of the defendant, there was a reason-
able probability that the plaintiff would have entered
into [or retained] a contract or made a profit. . . . Such
a determination is a question for the trier of fact, as is
the question of whether the plaintiff has suffered an
actual loss.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) American Diamond Exchange, Inc. v. Alpert,
101 Conn. App. 83, 97, 920 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 284
Conn. 901, 931 A.2d 261 (2007); see Landmark Invest-
ment Group, LLC v. CALCO Construction & Develop-
ment Co., 318 Conn. 847, 874, 124 A.3d 847 (2015)
(‘‘[p]roof that some damage has been sustained is neces-
sary to [support a cause of action for tortious interfer-
ence]’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   ‘‘The determination of causation in the present case
is a finding of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review on appeal. A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to
support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Lipshie v. George M. Taylor & Son, Inc., 265
Conn. 173, 182, 828 A.2d 110 (2003). Similarly, ‘‘[t]he
determination of damages involves a question of fact
that will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.
. . . In a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the
sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given specific testimony. . . . On appeal,
we will give the evidence the most favorable reasonable
construction in support of the verdict to which it is
entitled. . . . We are, therefore, constrained to accord
substantial deference to the fact finder on the issue of
damages.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz &
Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 247 Conn. 48, 68–69, 717
A.2d 724 (1998).
   The trial court found that A&B’s tortious conduct
caused Companions to suffer an actual loss because
DSS ‘‘terminated Companions’ provider enrollment
agreement, reassigned clients away from Companions,
stopped referring new clients to Companions, and did
not rescind the notice of termination until after the
mediated settlement.’’ A&B claims that these factual
findings are not supported by the evidence because
there was insufficient evidence to conclude that DSS
relied on A&B’s assurances that it could take over Com-
panions’ clients if DSS terminated its agreement with
Companions.
   This argument fails for two reasons. First, there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that DSS relied on A&B’s assurances that it could take
over Companions’ clients. A&B contends that the two
most senior DSS officials maintained at trial that the
decision to terminate Companions’ provider enrollment
agreement was not made in reliance on communica-
tions with A&B. It appears that the trial court did not
find that testimony credible and reached a contrary
conclusion on the basis of other evidence. See, e.g.,
Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 346
Conn. 391, 413 n.16, 291 A.3d 64 (2023) (‘‘[i]t is well
established that the trial court, as the finder of fact,
has discretion to reject even uncontested evidence, on
the theory that the fact finder is uniquely well situated
to make determinations of witness credibility’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Another DSS official, Bruni,
testified that she was aware of A&B’s use of EVV, had
communicated directly with Galinovsky about A&B’s
taking over Companions’ clients, and was indeed
involved in the termination decision. The trial court
could have credited Bruni’s testimony that her ‘‘primary
responsibility, as director of community options, [was]
to ensure that the clients . . . are getting the services
[they] need,’’ that she was aware at the time that A&
B had been using EVV and was willing to take over
Companions’ clients, and that she ‘‘was involved in’’ the
decision to terminate Companions’ provider enrollment
agreement. In short, the trial court reasonably could
have relied on the ample, circumstantial evidence to
conclude that DSS knew that A&B was available to take
over Companions’ clients and relied on that fact in
making its decision to terminate Companions’ provider
enrollment agreement. We cannot conclude on this
record that the trial court’s factual findings on causation
were clearly erroneous.
   Second, the fact that DSS relied on A&B’s assurances
that it could take over Companions’ clients was not
the only basis for the trial court’s finding that A&B’s
conduct was a cause of the termination of the provider
enrollment agreement. The court identified other ways
in which A&B’s conduct was a cause of Companions’
loss. The memorandum of decision repeatedly empha-
sized the fact that A&B misled Companions about A&
B’s use of EVV and its willingness to take Companions’
matches, and that Companions relied on these mis-
leading statements throughout its litigation with DSS.
In particular, the court found that Companions’ crucial
decision to send a letter to DSS on December 29, 2016,
stating that it would not meet the January 1, 2017 dead-
line to implement EVV, was made ‘‘[i]n reliance on [Gali-
novsky’s] assurances . . . that [A&B] would not take
Companions’ matches, and after reviewing its strategy
with’’ A&B. There was ample evidence to support this
finding. For example, Companions’ chief operating offi-
cer, William Geiger, testified that the decision to send
the December 29 letter was based on the ‘‘overall strat-
egy . . . [that] we had strength in numbers . . . .’’
Geiger continued: ‘‘We felt like we had assurances from
all the providers . . . that [our] matches would be hon-
ored and . . . that there would be no way for DSS to
provide alternat[ive] care for those clients.’’ A&B does
not dispute that the decision to send the December
29 letter directly led to DSS’s decision to terminate
Companions’ provider enrollment agreement.
   There likewise was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court’s finding regarding the damages sustained
by Companions. The court relied on the testimony of
Companions’ expert, Karen H. Cusato. Cusato calcu-
lated the lost profits incurred by Companions as a result
of its clients being transferred by DSS to A&B during the
relatively brief period in 2017 when DSS had terminated
Companions’ provider enrollment agreement. She cal-
culated lost profits from the time a client was trans-
ferred from Companions until the day that client was
returned or, for clients who did not return, for one
year from the day the client was transferred. Using this
method, Cusato calculated Companions’ lost profits to
be $118,008.6 The record supports the trial court’s fac-
tual finding regarding the amount of damages that Com-
panions sustained as a result of A&B’s tortious interfer-
ence with its provider enrollment agreement with DSS.7
                                     III
                                  CUTPA
   The trial court found that A&B’s conduct violated
CUTPA because A&B had tortiously interfered with
Companions’ contractual relations. See, e.g., Sports-
men’s Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 757,
474 A.2d 780 (1984) (‘‘it is difficult to conceive of a
situation [in which] tortious interference would be
found but a CUTPA violation would not’’). On appeal,
A&B argues that it did not engage in tortious interfer-
ence and that the trial court therefore erred in conclud-
ing that A&B violated CUTPA. In light of our conclusion
that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that A&B had tortiously interfered with
Companions’ contractual relationship with DSS; see
parts I and II of this opinion; we uphold the trial court’s
decision that A&B’s conduct was a violation of CUTPA.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     While this appeal was pending, this court granted Companions’ motion
to substitute C&H Holdco, Inc., as the plaintiff.
   2
     The defendant, A&B Homecare Solutions, LLC (A&B), doing business
as Northwest Homecare, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment
of the trial court. The trial court subsequently awarded Companions punitive
damages and attorney’s fees, and A&B amended its appeal to account for
that award. Thereafter, we transferred the amended appeal to this court
pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
   3
     There is no evidence in the record that Companions and A&B were
parties to a joint agreement defining their duties to one another in the
litigation to which they both were parties.
   4
     Although there are circumstances in which the plaintiff’s reliance must
be reasonable for the false representation to be actionable, we do not address
this issue because it has not been raised or briefed by the parties. See 3
Restatement (Second), Torts § 537, p. 80 (1977) (‘‘[t]he recipient of a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation can recover against its maker for pecuniary loss
resulting from it if, but only if, (a) he relies on the misrepresentation in
acting or refraining from action, and (b) his reliance is justifiable’’).
   5
     There are facts of record that we do not include in our discussion because
we find them irrelevant to our resolution of the issues raised on appeal,
and there are legal claims that either have not been preserved, were not
argued on appeal, or are obviated by our determination that at least one of
A&B’s affirmative misrepresentations supports the trial court’s finding of
tortious interference. For example, because we conclude that Galinovsky
made affirmative statements to Companions that were false and on which
Companions relied, we do not need to reach the issue, raised by the substitute
plaintiff, of whether jointly represented coplaintiffs in litigation have affirma-
tive duties to disclose material information. Also, because A&B has not
raised the issue on appeal, we do not consider whether Companions reason-
ably relied on its competitor’s false representations about its state of compli-
ance with the EVV program and whether A&B would take Companions’
matches. See footnote 4 of this opinion. Finally, because the trial court
declined to reach the issue on the ground that it was not adequately briefed,
we do not consider whether an agreement among these competitors not to
implement EVV while agreeing not to take one another’s clients violated
the law. We have no occasion to decide whether any of these facts or claims
might have affected the analysis of a claim of tortious interference.
   6
     Cusato provided two different methods to calculate Companions’ lost
profits. First, she used the growth in Companions’ profit from 2015 to 2016
to extrapolate what its profit would have been in 2017 but for A&B’s interfer-
ence, and then subtracted its saved operating expenses to determine the
total amount of its lost profits. That method resulted in lost profits of
$1,386,479. Second, as an alternative damages model, she calculated the
lost profits from each individual client who was identified as having been
transferred from Companions to A&B after DSS terminated Companions’
provider enrollment agreement. This second method resulted in lost profits
of $118,008. The trial court evidently credited the second method, which
was considerably more precise and better supported, although it resulted
in a substantially lower award for Companions.
   7
     Having upheld the trial court’s finding that A&B caused these damages
by tortiously interfering with Companions’ provider enrollment agreement
with DSS, we need not reach the issue, raised by A&B, of whether it tortiously
interfered with Companions’ noncompete agreements with its employees.
Any error with respect to the noncompete agreements was harmless because
the court’s award of damages is independently supported by its finding
that A&B had tortiously interfered with Companions’ provider enrollment
agreement. The court adopted the same measure of damages for each of
the two different findings of tortious interference. The court’s award of
punitive damages and attorney’s fees, made after a separate hearing, likewise
appears to be entirely supported by the finding that A&B had tortiously
interfered with Companions’ provider enrollment agreement. A&B, which
bears the burden of showing harmful error, has not made any argument to
the contrary. See, e.g., Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc., 280 Conn. 336, 358,
907 A.2d 1204 (2006) (trial court’s error ‘‘will result in a new trial only if
the ruling was both wrong and harmful’’ (emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1266, 127 S. Ct. 1494, 167
L. Ed. 2d 230 (2007); Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 611, 452 A.2d
1157 (1982) (‘‘[t]he burden of proving harmful error rests on the party
asserting it’’). We therefore conclude that any error by the trial court with
respect to A&B’s interference with the noncompete agreements likely did
not affect its finding of liability or award of damages and, therefore, was
harmless.