Court Opinion

ID: 9773838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:00:40.574875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:59.740488
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30572         Document: 00516875751             Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/29/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                  August 29, 2023
                                       No. 22-30572
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________
                                                                                           Clerk
   Lauren Larpenter; Kevin P. Larpenter,

                                                                   Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   Nicholas Vera, an individual; Houma Police Department;
   Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government; Terre
   Carnival Club, Incorporated; Houma-Terrebonne Civic
   Center,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 2:21-CV-376
                      ______________________________

   Before Haynes and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges, and Saldaña,
   District Judge.*
   Per Curiam:†

          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
          †
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30572        Document: 00516875751             Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/29/2023

                                         No. 22-30572

           Kevin and Lauren Larpenter1 attended a Mardi Gras ball at a civic
   center where Nicholas Vera, an off-duty parole officer, was working as a
   private security guard.        A violent confrontation ensued in which Vera
   dragged Kevin out of the building by his neck, seriously injuring him. The
   Larpenters sued Vera, the civic center, and several governmental entities,
   asserting that (1) Vera’s conduct violated Kevin’s Fourth Amendment rights
   and several state laws, and (2) Vera was liable to Lauren for loss of
   consortium and bystander damages. The district court granted summary
   judgment for Vera and dismissed all of the Larpenters’ claims. They now
   appeal.
           For the following reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s entry of
   summary judgment as to Kevin’s claims against Vera. We AFFIRM the
   district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Lauren’s claims and its
   dismissal of the Larpenters’ remaining claims.
                                    I.      Background
       A. Facts
           Many of the pertinent facts are disputed. But because this is an appeal
   from a grant of summary judgment, we consider the relevant events in the
   light most favorable to the nonmovants, the Larpenters. See Deville v.
   Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In February
   2020, the Larpenters attended a Mardi Gras ball at the Houma-Terrebonne
   Civic Center (“Civic Center”). Vera, a parole officer with the Louisiana
   Department of Probation and Parole, was hired by the Civic Center to
   provide security for the event.

           _____________________
           1
           We will refer to the plaintiffs as follows: Kevin Larpenter as “Kevin,” and Lauren
   Larpenter as “Lauren.”

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                                    No. 22-30572

          By 1:00 a.m., most attendees had departed, and Kevin and a handful
   of remaining guests were cleaning up. As Kevin carried some decorations to
   his car, he noticed Vera screaming and cursing at a family. When Kevin
   approached, he heard Vera tell the group that if they did not “get the F--- out
   of the Civic Center[,] he [was] going to escort them out one by one.” Vera
   then turned, pointed at Kevin, and asked, “who are you and what are you
   doing coming back in the Civic Center[?]” Kevin identified himself and told
   Vera he was in the process of gathering his belongings and going home. Vera
   responded that Kevin “need[ed] to go back where [he] came from,” and if
   Kevin failed to do so, he was “going to escort [Kevin] out of the building.”
   When Vera continued to yell at guests, Kevin asked Vera to stop speaking in
   such a hostile tone and repeated that he was trying to leave.
          When Kevin turned around to pick up an item from one of the tables,
   he felt Vera grab him from behind. Vera then forcefully yanked Kevin’s left
   hand at his wrist and “ripped it” to the back of his head. At the same time,
   Vera “jabbed” his right thumb into a pressure point on Kevin’s neck and
   lifted him off of his feet. Per Kevin, Vera dragged him out of the Civic Center
   “off the ground by [his] neck” with his “arm strapped to the back of [his]
   head.” Kevin’s wife, Lauren, witnessed these events and followed Vera,
   screaming and hitting his head. Vera finally released Kevin outside the Civic
   Center, and the Larpenters immediately drove home. Kevin was never
   arrested or charged, and no incident report was filed. As a result of the
   encounter, Kevin claims he sustained painful injuries to his neck, shoulder,
   and arm which interfere with his daily activities.
          Vera, for his part, concedes he employed a “transport wrist lock”—a
   maneuver he learned at a prior job—on Kevin and forcibly dragged him out
   of the Civic Center. He further admits that while Civic Center management
   instructed him to clear out the building, he never received authorization to
   physically remove anyone. However, Vera nonetheless asserts his actions were

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   warranted. Despite Kevin’s contentions to the contrary, Vera claims he
   believed Kevin was intoxicated, behaving disrespectfully, and was non-
   compliant (though never violent) when asked to leave.
       B. Procedural History
           Kevin subsequently sued Vera, asserting Fourth Amendment claims
   for false arrest and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law
   assault, battery, and negligence claims. Lauren brought separate claims for
   bystander and loss of consortium damages. Additionally, the Larpenters
   sued the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, the Houma Police
   Department, and the Civic Center and its indemnitor, Terre Carnival Club,
   asserting claims for vicarious liability and failure to train.2
           Vera moved for summary judgment as to both Larpenters. The
   district court granted each of these motions, concluding that (1) qualified
   immunity barred Kevin’s federal claims, (2) discretionary immunity barred
   Kevin’s state law claims, and (3) Lauren had failed to raise a genuine issue of
   material fact as to her entitlement to bystander and loss of consortium
   damages. Additionally, though Vera alone moved for summary judgment,
   the court also sua sponte dismissed the Larpenters’ claims against the
   remaining defendants in the same order. The Larpenters timely appealed.
                                II.     Standard of Review
           The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Kevin’s federal
   law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It had supplemental jurisdiction over the
   Larpenters’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). We have appellate
   jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

           _____________________
           2
             The Larpenters also sued the State of Louisiana and Vera in his official capacity,
   but these claims were ultimately voluntarily dismissed.

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                                        No. 22-30572

          We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment based on
   both qualified immunity and state law immunity de novo. Griggs v. Brewer,
   841 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Addington v. Wells, No. 22-30220,
   2023 WL 2808466, at *5 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished).
   In conducting this review, we must “view the facts in the light most favorable
   to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
   Deville, 567 F.3d at 163–64. Summary judgment is proper where there are no
   genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter
   of law. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
                                 III.      Discussion
          On appeal, the Larpenters challenge the district court’s conclusions
   that (1) Vera was entitled to qualified immunity on Kevin’s false arrest and
   excessive force claims; (2) Vera was entitled to discretionary immunity on
   Kevin’s state law claims; and (3) Lauren failed to submit sufficient evidence
   to raise a fact issue as to her entitlement to bystander and loss of consortium
   damages. We consider each issue in turn.
      A. § 1983 Claims and Qualified Immunity
                 1.      “Under Color of State Law” Analysis
          At the outset, we address whether Vera—who committed the
   challenged conduct in his capacity as an off-duty, private security guard—
   was acting “under color of state law.” Though neither party raised this issue
   in their briefing, it is a prerequisite for asserting a § 1983 claim. See West v.
   Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
   must . . . show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting
   under color of state law.” (emphasis added)). We therefore consider it here.

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                                     No. 22-30572

          To conduct this inquiry, we ask: “(1) whether the officer misuse[d] or
   abuse[d] his official power, and (2) if there is a nexus between the victim, the
   improper conduct, and [the officer’s] performance of official duties.” See
   Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2010) (alterations
   in original) (quotation omitted). A defendant’s “on- or off-duty status at the
   time of the alleged violation” is not dispositive. Id. at 464. In the past, we
   have deemed relevant whether the defendant: (1) was in uniform, id. at 465,
   (2) “used an official weapon or threatened [the plaintiff] by asserting his
   [official] authority,” id., or (3) otherwise “acted like [a] police officer[]” or
   demonstrated an “air of authority,” see Gomez v. Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 776–
   77 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
          In light of these criteria, we conclude Vera acted “under color of state
   law.” Based on the undisputed facts, Vera displayed all of the hallmarks of a
   law enforcement official. During the encounter, he was wearing his official
   “probation and parole” uniform, gave guests “lawful” commands, and
   employed a maneuver on Kevin that he learned in previous police training.
   Accordingly, because “[t]he presence of police and the air of official
   authority pervaded the entire incident,” Vera is a proper defendant under
   § 1983. See United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1991).
                 2.      Qualified Immunity Framework
          Next, we consider whether Vera is entitled to qualified immunity on
   Kevin’s § 1983 claims. To make this determination, we ask two questions:
   (1) whether Vera’s “conduct violated a constitutional right,” and
   (2) “whether the right was clearly established.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983

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                                          No. 22-30572

   F.3d 185, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).3
           Before we proceed to the merits, we first note two defects in the
   district court’s application of this test. First, the district court considered
   Kevin’s Fourth Amendment claims together. But because excessive force
   and false arrest are distinct constitutional violations, we must consider these
   claims separately. See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2007).
   Second, at certain points, the district court seemed to credit Vera’s version
   of disputed facts.4 But this contradicts the well-established rule that, when
   deciding a motion for summary judgment, courts must “resolve factual
   controversies in favor of the nonmoving party.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
   F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We take no position on whether
   these errors are grounds for reversal in themselves. However, they are
   notable in that they likely negatively impacted the district court’s analysis of
   the merits, which—as discussed below—we disagree with.
                   3.       False Arrest
           With the proper framework in mind, we turn to Kevin’s false arrest
   claim. The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable seizures of both property
   and people. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). The Supreme
           _____________________
           3
             In their reply brief, the Larpenters contend that Vera’s status as an off-duty
   private security detail renders him ineligible for qualified immunity. Because we ultimately
   conclude that Vera was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified
   immunity, we need not reach this issue here. However, we stress that, regardless of how
   the factual disputes are resolved on remand, Vera cannot prove his entitlement to qualified
   immunity unless he demonstrates that his challenged conduct “was within the scope of his
   discretionary authority” according to state law. Sweetin v. City of Tex. City, 48 F.4th 387,
   392 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted).
           4
             For example, the court (1) assumed that Kevin and the other guests declined to
   leave after Vera asked them to, and (2) asserted that Kevin “both talked back to and turned
   his back to Vera after being told to leave.”

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                                          No. 22-30572

   Court has defined an arrest—a type of Fourth Amendment seizure—as
   “application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain.” Torres
   v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995, 996 (2021). For purposes of a § 1983 false
   arrest claim, it is irrelevant whether the suspect is ultimately released.5 See
   id. at 994, 995. Given that it is undisputed that Vera forcefully placed Kevin’s
   arm behind his back and removed him from the Civic Center, there’s no
   question Kevin was seized. The central inquiry, then, is whether this seizure
   was objectively reasonable.
           The standard for making this determination is well-settled. For this
   type of forceful seizure to be reasonable, it must be based on probable cause.
   See Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 208 (5th Cir. 2009).
   Accordingly, in the qualified immunity context, Kevin must raise genuine
   issues of material fact as to whether Vera (1) lacked probable cause to believe
   Kevin was engaging in criminal activity, and (2) was “objectively
   unreasonable in believing” such probable cause existed. Bey v. Prator, 53
   F.4th 854, 858 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quotation
   omitted).
           While the district court seemed to concede that Vera lacked probable
   cause, it determined that the aforementioned framework does not apply in
   this case. In its view, because Vera was working as the security detail for a
   private event, he could have reasonably believed he did not need probable
   cause to seize Kevin. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Heaney
   v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2017), which held that an off-duty officer
           _____________________
           5
              Vera contends that because Kevin was never charged or formally detained, his
   claim for false arrest necessarily fails. We disagree. Under Supreme Court precedent,
   apprehension of an individual with an “intent to restrain” triggers the Fourth Amendment,
   regardless of whether the suspect is ultimately charged or even subdued. See Torres, 141 S.
   Ct. at 994 (“The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain
   is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.” (emphasis added)).

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   providing security at a city council meeting acted reasonably when he
   removed a disruptive individual—despite lacking probable cause. Id. at 798,
   805.
          But the district court plainly misreads our precedent. Heaney does not
   authorize off-duty officers to violently seize individuals without any
   suspicion they have violated the law. Indeed, this interpretation would
   directly contravene well-established Supreme Court precedent and
   Louisiana law—both of which make plain that even brief, non-intrusive
   seizures must be justified by, at minimum, “reasonable cause” or
   “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity has occurred. See, e.g., Illinois
   v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (even a “brief, investigatory stop” must
   be supported by reasonable suspicion); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370
   (2003) (arrests must be supported by probable cause); see also La. Code
   Crim. Proc. art. 213(A)(3) (warrantless arrests must be supported by, at
   minimum, “reasonable cause” that a criminal offense has been committed).
   Rather, at most Heaney holds that, in very limited circumstances, an officer
   may reasonably believe that a particular method of removing an individual
   would fall short of a seizure—and therefore would not trigger the Fourth
   Amendment at all.
          However, such a belief would be entirely unreasonable here. In
   Heaney, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-officer “shoved” and
   “ejected” him out of a city council meeting and then “escorted” him down
   a flight of stairs—where the plaintiff then freely walked out of the building.
   846 F.3d at 799, 806. The plaintiff never suggested he was physically
   “restrained,” id. at 805–06—a key characteristic of a Fourth Amendment
   seizure under Supreme Court precedent. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626
   (defining a seizure, in this context, as “a laying on of hands or application of
   physical force to restrain movement”). Here, however, there’s simply no
   debate that Vera forcibly and violently restrained—and thus seized—Kevin.

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   Moreover, the defendant-officer in Heaney acted at the behest of a
   government official’s explicit directive. 846 F.3d at 799. But in this case, it
   is undisputed that Vera lacked any prior authorization to use physical force.
   Accordingly, we decline to adopt the district court’s expansive reading of
   Heaney. In order to establish his qualified immunity defense, Vera must show
   that he reasonably believed he had probable cause to seize Kevin.
          On Kevin’s version of the facts, there is at least a fact issue as to
   whether Vera made this showing. Vera contends that he had probable cause
   to believe Kevin was violating two Louisiana state laws. First, he urges that
   Kevin’s conduct contravened Louisiana’s prohibition on disturbing the
   peace by appearing intoxicated. See LA. R.S. § 14:103(A)(3). However,
   Kevin testified that he was sober and polite at the time of the encounter, and
   several guests corroborated this account. Therefore, there is a genuine issue
   of material fact as to whether Vera could have reasonably believed that Kevin
   was—or even appeared to be—“foreseeably disturb[ing] or alarm[ing] the
   public” by “[a]ppearing in an intoxicated condition.” Id.
          Second, Vera contends he reasonably believed Kevin was violating
   Louisiana’s prohibition on “remaining after forbidden” by lingering in the
   Civic Center after being asked to depart.         See LA. R.S. § 14:63.3(A).
   However, Kevin testified he was doing the exact opposite prior to the
   encounter. Per Kevin, when Vera confronted him, he was attempting to
   collect his belongings so he could leave the facility. We have previously held
   that officials may not properly expel an individual pursuant to § 14:63.3(A)
   without providing him with “a reasonable time to actually accomplish his
   departure.” Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2008) (overruled on
   other grounds) (quoting State v. Kology, 785 So. 2d 1045, 1048 (La. Ct. App.
   2001)). Accordingly, to the extent Vera assumed Kevin was breaking
   Louisiana law by gathering his personal effects as he exited the Civic Center,
   that belief was plainly unreasonable. Therefore, Kevin has raised a genuine

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   issue of material fact as to whether Vera’s conduct constituted an
   unconstitutional false arrest.
          We now turn to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,
   which requires Kevin to show that this constitutional violation was “clearly
   established at the time of [Vera’s] challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v. Rickard,
   572 U.S. 765, 778 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). A right is clearly established if it “is sufficiently clear that every
   reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
   right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation
   omitted). In determining whether this prong is met, we may consider any
   “controlling authority” or a robust “consensus of cases of persuasive
   authority.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). Because the clearly
   established law inquiry is a legal question reviewed de novo, we are not bound
   to considering only the cases cited in Kevin’s briefing. See Elder v. Holloway,
   510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). Rather, we may rely on our “full knowledge of [our]
   own [and other relevant] precedents.” Id. (second alteration in original)
   (quotation omitted).
          Kevin has also satisfied this prong. First, as discussed, both the
   Supreme Court’s and this court’s precedent are abundantly clear that
   forceful seizures must be supported by probable cause. See, e.g., Pringle, 540
   U.S. at 370; Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 191–92, 197, 203 (concluding that officers
   violated the Fourth Amendment when they lacked probable cause to remove
   three individuals from a nightclub during a raid). Second, Mesa—a highly
   factually similar case—solidifies that the requisite probable cause was
   missing here. 543 F.3d at 272. Mesa involved an encounter in which a police
   officer detained the plaintiff after she did not immediately comply with his
   request to move out of a public street. Id. at 268. The plaintiff sued the
   officer for false arrest under § 1983. Id. The officer, in turn, asserted
   qualified immunity on the grounds that he reasonably believed he had

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   probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for violations of the same Louisiana
   statutes at issue here. Id. We denied the officer’s motion for summary
   judgment, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to “what
   [the officer] said and how many times he said it, how quickly [the plaintiff]
   moved, and whether no reasonable officer would have thought he could
   arrest a person for her failure to move from a sidewalk.” Id. at 271. Similar
   factual disputes exist here. As a result, Kevin has raised genuine issues of
   material fact as to both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis, and
   therefore Vera is not entitled to summary judgment on Kevin’s false arrest
   claim.
                  4.     Excessive Force
            We now consider Kevin’s excessive force claim. To establish that an
   officer used excessive force, a plaintiff must show that he “suffer[ed] an
   injury that result[ed] directly and only from a clearly excessive and
   objectively unreasonable use of force.” Joseph ex. rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett,
   981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020). There’s no dispute that Kevin was
   seriously injured by Vera’s conduct. Therefore, the only issue is whether
   Vera’s use of force was reasonable. Several factors guide this inquiry,
   including “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect
   posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
   (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
   arrest by flight.” Id. (citing Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
   Accordingly, “[w]here a suspect committed no crime, posed no threat to
   anyone’s safety, and did not resist the officers or fail to comply with a
   command,” any injurious use of force is suspect. Johnson v. Hollins, 716 F.
   App’x 248, 253 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted); cf. Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2012).

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          Construing all factual disputes in Kevin’s favor, these principles
   dictate that Vera’s use of force was unwarranted. First, as discussed, there’s
   a fact issue as to whether Vera could have reasonably believed Kevin was
   even violating the law. Second, on Kevin’s facts, he was sober, polite, and
   therefore posed no threat to Vera’s safety. Finally, Kevin testified he was
   complying with Vera’s requests, and it is undisputed that Kevin did not resist
   when Vera apprehended him. Accordingly, it is questionable whether any
   use of force was justified—but certainly not the degree employed by Vera.
   Therefore, all three Graham factors squarely indicate that Vera’s use of force
   was excessive.
          Additionally, based on Kevin’s version of the facts, Vera’s use of force
   likely violated clearly-established law.           Vera’s actions were so
   disproportionate to the threat Kevin posed that this approaches an
   “obvious” case. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per
   curiam) (noting that “in an obvious case,” general standards can “clearly
   establish” a right, “even without a body of relevant case law”). Regardless,
   however, numerous Fifth Circuit precedents make plain that such injurious,
   violent force is a plainly excessive response to disrespectful behavior and
   other passive resistance. See, e.g., Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 742, 745–47
   (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining defendant officer’s rapid resort to force at a traffic
   stop was unwarranted when the plaintiff only demonstrated passive
   resistance—that is, disrespectful comments and a “small lateral step”);
   Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 337, 340–43 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding
   officers violated clearly established law by placing plaintiff suspected of
   committing a minor offense in a headlock when he did not attempt to flee and
   merely “pulled away”); Deville, 567 F.3d at 167–69 (determining that use of
   force on individual stopped for a traffic violation was unwarranted when
   plaintiff only passively resisted arrest); Newman, 703 F.3d at 762–63
   (concluding pushing plaintiff onto a car and striking him was unwarranted

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   when plaintiff did not pose a threat to officers, did not attempt to flee, and at
   most passively resisted arrest).
           Therefore, Vera is not entitled to summary judgment based on
   qualified immunity on either of Kevin’s § 1983 claims. Should the case
   proceed to trial, the factfinder can reassess whether the defense applies.6
       B. State Law Claims and Discretionary Immunity
           Next, we address whether Vera is entitled to discretionary immunity
   as to Kevin’s state law claims.7 Under Louisiana law, state public officials are
   presumptively entitled to immunity from liability stemming from
   “discretionary acts” that are “within the course and scope of their lawful
   powers and duties.” LA. R.S. § 9:2798.1(B); see also Dominique v. Parish, 313
   So. 3d 307, 316 (La. Ct. App. 2020) (noting that Louisiana law assumes that
   officers exercise their discretionary authority reasonably). To rebut that
   presumption, Kevin must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
   Vera’s actions constituted “criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional,
           _____________________
           6
            For instance, the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction for the qualified immunity
   defense provides:
           As to each claim for which Plaintiff [name] has proved each essential
           element, you must consider whether Defendant [name] is entitled to what
           the law calls “qualified immunity” . . . . Qualified immunity applies if a
           reasonable [officer/official] could have believed that [specify the disputed
           act, such as the arrest or the search] was lawful in light of clearly
           established law and the information Defendant [name] possessed.
   Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 10.3 (2020).
           7
             Vera argues that Kevin abandoned this argument on appeal by failing to provide
   any “legal analysis of why the district court erred in dismissing these claims.” But in
   determining Vera was entitled to discretionary immunity, the district court relied almost
   entirely on its prior reasoning pertaining to Kevin’s § 1983 claims. Accordingly, it was
   reasonable for Kevin, too, to assume we would apply his § 1983 arguments to our
   consideration of his state law claims. Therefore, we conclude this point of error is
   preserved.

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   willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”              LA. R.S.
   § 9:2798.1(C)(2); see, e.g., Rombach v. Culpepper, No. 20-30554, 2021 WL
   2944809, at *1, *9 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). For the reasons discussed
   above, we conclude that Kevin has made this showing. Accepting Kevin’s
   version of events, there is at least a fact issue as to whether the unprovoked,
   injurious, and forceful nature of Vera’s conduct evinced “a callous
   indifference to the risk of potential harm.” Mariana v. Magnolia Auto
   Transport, LLC, 341 So. 3d 1281, 1291 (La. Ct. App. 2022). Therefore, Vera
   was also not entitled to summary judgment on Kevin’s state law claims.
      C. Remaining Claims
          Finally, we consider Lauren’s claims and the claims against the
   remaining Defendants. Lauren asserts the district court erred in granting
   Vera’s motion for summary judgment as to her claims for bystander and loss
   of consortium damages. But while Lauren’s briefing discusses relevant legal
   principles, she wholly failed to challenge the district court’s reasoning or to
   cite to any additional evidence in the record supporting her claims.
   Therefore, she has abandoned these claims on appeal. See Yohey v. Collins,
   985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).
          Along the same lines, we note that the Larpenters forfeited any
   challenge to the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of their claims against
   the other Defendants. Their briefing does not so much as mention their
   claims against the Parish and the Houma Police Department, and they failed
   to address the dismissal of their claims against the Civic Center and its
   indemnitor until their reply brief. Therefore, they have also forfeited any
   claim to error relevant to the district court’s disposition of these claims. See
   Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021); Lockett v. EPA,
   319 F.3d 678, 684 n.16 (5th Cir. 2003).

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Case: 22-30572    Document: 00516875751             Page: 16   Date Filed: 08/29/2023

                                     No. 22-30572

                               IV.      Conclusion
         For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s entry of
   summary judgment as to Kevin’s § 1983 and state law claims, and we
   REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. We AFFIRM the
   district court’s entry of summary judgment as to Lauren’s claims and its
   dismissal of the Larpenters’ claims against the remaining Defendants.

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