Court Opinion

ID: 9702624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:19:26.441978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:39.987173
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not *452err in refusing to provide an instruction on the felony of unauthorized driving away of an automobile (udaa). Udaa is a cognate lesser included offense of armed robbery because they are both of the same category of offenses.
i
A trial court is generally under no obligation to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense,1 yet it is obligated if the defendant requests the instruction. People v Henry, 395 Mich 367, 374; 236 NW2d 489 (1975). Michigan recognizes two types of lesser included offenses: (1) necessarily included and (2) cognate.2
The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser. 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1799. This definition includes only necessarily included lesser offenses. This definition, however, is generally conceded to be unduly restrictive, and thus most jurisdictions, including Michigan, have statutes that are broadly construed to permit conviction of "cognate” or allied offenses of the same nature, under a sufficient charge. These lesser offenses are related and hence "cognate” in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or *453category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense. [People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379, 387; 236 NW2d 461 (1975). Emphasis in original.]
The question whether an offense is a necessarily included offense of another can be determined by a review of the elements of each offense;3 however, an offense’s status as a cognate lesser included offense requires a more involved inquiry. A cognate lesser included offense is an offense "of the same class or category, or closely related to the originally charged offense . . . .” Ora Jones at 388. "The offenses are cognate [if] the elements shared by the two offenses coincide in the harm to the societal interest to be protected.” Id. at 390. Once a trial court determines that an offense is a cognate lesser included offense of the one originally charged, it is compelled to provide the requested instruction if the evidence presented at trial "would support a conviction of a lesser included offense . . . .’’Id.
n
While Ora Jones and its progeny enumerate the standard used to determine when a trial court must instruct the jury on cognate lesser included felony offenses, the majority relies on language found in cases enumerating the applicable standard for lesser included misdemeanor offenses.
First, the principal offense and the lesser offense must be of the same class or category, a requirement we have termed in a related context to be one of an "inherent relationship.” People v Ste*454phens, 416 Mich 252, 262; 330 NW2d 675 (1982); People v Steele, 429 Mich 13; 412 NW2d 206 (1987). [Ante at 444.]
Both Stephens and Steele apply the standard for lesser included misdemeanor offenses — this case involves a lesser included felony offense.4 The Michigan standard for lesser included felony offenses requires the offenses to be of the "same class or category,” see Ora Jones, supra; however, only those cases examining lesser included misdemeanor offenses utilize the "inherent relationship” requirement. The "inherent relationship” requirement finds its roots in federal case law. It is improper to use federal case law and federal standards in this instance because of this Court’s recognition that the federal standard is stricter than this state’s standard for cognate lesser included felony offenses.
The rule [for lesser included misdemeanor instructions] was adopted from the United States Court of Appeals decision in United States v Whitaker, 144 US App DC 344; 447 F2d 314 (1971). Indeed, our conditions parallel the Whitaker reasoning. Although we do not follow the federal approach for lesser included felony offenses, we do so in the separate misdemeanor realm. This distinction must be made because the federal courts acknowledge only necessarily lesser included offenses; cognate offenses instructions are simply not allowed. Hence, instructions for lesser misde*455meanor offenses are less freely given .... [Steele at 19.]
The "inherent relationship” requirement is not simply an alternative term for the "same class or category” requirement. This is evidenced by the majority’s own explanation:
[A]n inherent relationship between a greater and lesser offense requires that the two offenses " 'relate to the protection of the same interests’ ” and " 'must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense.’ ” [Ante at 445. Emphasis added.]
Although the Michigan standard for cognate lesser included felony offenses speaks in terms of the earlier requirement, it does not require the latter. In essence, the second requirement describes a necessarily included offense.5 The majority’s inclusion of the latter requirement changes the equation and unduly restricts the instances in which a trial judge will be compelled to instruct on a lesser included felony offense. While the majority asserts that "[t]he basis for the ... inherent relationship element is instructive in understanding the need for a correlation between a charged offense and a requested lesser offense in the cognate offense setting,” it goes beyond "instruction,” instead eroding the nearly twenty-year-old standard of Ora Jones. Ante at 445. The attempted lesson is neither necessary nor germane when reviewing the necessity for cognate lesser included felony instructions.
*456Ill
The majority concludes that udaa is not a cognate lesser included offense of armed robbery because it is in the category of property offenses and armed robbery is in the category of crimes against the person. Admittedly, the crime of robbery is an assaultive crime, but it does include an element of theft similar to udaa.6 Both offenses share the common purpose of deterring the deprivation of the use and enjoyment of property (even if only for a short time frame).7 Robbery falls into two catego*457ríes — property offenses and crimes against the person. Its presence in one category does not divest it of its position in the other. Because both offenses share a common purpose and category — the deterrence and punishment of theft — udaa is cognate lesser included offense of armed robbery.
A trial judge is compelled to provide a requested cognate lesser included offense instruction if the evidence introduced at trial "would support a conviction of a lesser included offense . . . .” Ora Jones at 390. Evidence was presented at trial that would support a conviction of udaa.8 Shirley Mc-Griff, owner of the seized vehicle, testified that the defendant drove away her automobile without permission. In this respect, the defendant agreed. Because the evidence would support a conviction of udaa, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury._
*458IV
The conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on udaa does not, however, end the inquiry. The question remains whether the error was harmless. People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496, 501-502; 495 NW2d 534 (1992); People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 466; 418 NW2d 861 (1988).9
Generally, the refusal to give an instruction on a lesser included offense is considered harmless if the jury finds the defendant guilty of a greater charge as opposed to an instructed intermediate charge. Mosko at 504, Beach at 490-491. The Court justifies this rule by reasoning that if the jury had doubts about the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense, it would have found the defendant guilty of the instructed lesser included offense. Id.
This rule is not applicable in the instant case, however, because the jury found the defendant guilty of the lowest crime on which it was instructed (larceny from a person). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the element that would have reduced the crime from the higher to the lesser offense was not at issue.10 In the case at bar, the defendant asserted that he did not intend to steal the car, but he took it temporarily to escape those trying to harm him. In light of the jury’s reluctance to convict the defendant of the charged offense and the presence of evidence that would *459support a conviction of the offense of udaa, I could not consider the error harmless.
Accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction of larceny from a person and remand the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of conviction of udaa and resentencing. See People v Stephens, 407 Mich 402, 406; 285 NW2d 664 (1979); People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482, 498; 275 NW2d 777 (1979); People v Thomas, 399 Mich 826; 249 NW2d 867 (1977). However, the prosecution could, at its option, retry the defendant.
Levin and Brickley, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 An exception to this general premise is that the trial court must instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the crime of second-degree murder in every first-degree murder case. See People v Jenkins, 395 Mich 440, 442; 236 NW2d 503 (1975).

 Unlike Michigan courts, federal courts are not obligated to instruct on requested, lesser included cognate offenses:
The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense. [FR Crim P 31(c).]

 Udaa is not a necessarily included offense of armed robbery because one does not necessarily commit udaa while committing armed robbery.

 The federal courts employ the "rational view of the evidence” standard when determining whether a federal court must instruct on a necessarily included offense. Michigan courts also apply this standard for lesser included misdemeanor offense instructions. The rational view of the evidence standard is not, however, the Michigan standard for lesser included felony instructions. "In adopting a rational basis test for lesser misdemeanor offense instructions, we do not wish to be understood as adopting such a rationale for lesser included felony offense instructions. People v Ora Jones is still controlling thereon.” People v Stephens, supra at 264.

 By definition a cognate lesser included offense will not share all the elements of the greater offense.

 The universal view at common law was that robbery was an aggravated form of larceny or theft. 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (1716-1721), p 95 (robbery is mixed or complicated larceny); 2 East, Pleas of the Crown (1803), p 707 (robbery is a species of aggravated larceny from the person); 23 RCL 1140, Robbery, § 1(2) ("Robbery may thus be said to be a compound larceny composed of the crime of larceny from the person with the aggravation of force, actual or constructive, used in the taking”). Textbooks published during the past century have continued to state that common-law robbery is larceny or theft aggravated by the use of force. See, e.g., Clark & Marshall, Crimes (7th ed), § 12.09, pp 881-882; LaPave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 94, p 692; Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 2, p 280; Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 434; Cross & Jones, Criminal Law (8th ed), § 11.2, p 215; Williams, Criminal Law, p 791. The courts, some defining the common-law offense and some construing a statutory codification of the offense, have also said that robbery is aggravated theft. And in People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79, 87-88; 289 NW2d 674 (1980), this Court declared that the robbery statute incorporated the common-law rule that robbery is aggravated theft:
"Robbery has long been defined' in this jurisdiction to be nothing more than a 'larceny committed by assault or putting in fear.’ . . . When the taking is accomplished by force or assault, the offense is aggravated to one of robbery.” [People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 127-128; 341 NW2d 68 (1983) (opinion of Levin, J.). Emphasis in original.]

 The udaa statute provides:
Any person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away, and any person who shall assist in or be a party to such taking possession, driving or taking away of any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years. [MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645.]
*457The armed robbery statute provides:
Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years. [MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797.]

 To convict a defendant of udaa, the prosecution must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(2) First, that the vehicle belonged to someone else.
(3) Second, that the defendant took possession of the vehicle and [drove/took] it away.
(4) Third, that these acts were both done [without authority/ without the owner’s permission],
(5) Fourth, that the defendant intended to take possession of the vehicle and [drive/take] it away. It does not matter whether the defendant intended to keep the vehicle. [CJI2d 24.1, see also MCL 750.413; MSA 28.645.]

 A harmless error analysis applies regardless whether the rejected jury instruction concerned a necessarily, Mosko, or a cognate, Beach, lesser included offense.

 In Mosko, supra at 505-506, the Court held that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the lesser included offense of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (charged offense first-degree criminal sexual conduct), was harmless because first- and third-degree criminal sexual conduct are "distinguished only by the presence or absence of a familial relationship” and the defendant never disputed that a family relationship existed.