Court Opinion

ID: 9721110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:48:40.63709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:13.347168
License: Public Domain

HARTEN, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority’s opinion exceeds the scope of this court’s authority and violates the principle of finality of judgments.
“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.” Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn.App.1987), revieiu denied (Minn. 18 Dec. 1987). The legislature has determined that, generally, a judgment may be enforced within ten years of its entry. Minn.Stat. § 550.01 (2008). The legislature has specifically applied this determination to maintenance judgments. See Minn.Stat. § 548.091, subd. 2 (2008) (“[A maintenance] judgment survives ... for ten years after its entry.”). The legislature has equally specifically exempted child-support judgments from the determination. See Minn.Stat. § 548.091, subd. 3b (2008) (“Child support judgments may be renewed multiple times until paid.”).
Thus, the legislature both explicitly, in Minn.Stat. § 548.091, subd. 2, and implicitly, in Minn.Stat. § 548.091, subd. 3b, restricted maintenance judgments to ten years: the exemption of child-support judgments from the ten-year period implies that other judgments are not exempt. See Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn.2006) (explaining that the canon of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio al-teráis” means that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). Extending the existing law provided by the legislature is not the province of this court. Tereault, 413 N.W.2d at 286; see also Ullom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 112, 515 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Minn.App.1994) (holding that a court may not add to a statute what the legislature deliberately omitted or inadvertently overlooked). The majority opinion, in effect, extends the legislature’s provision of multiple renewals for child-support judgments to maintenance judgments.*4141
Moreover, the appellate courts have also addressed the issue of renewal of judgments and determined that one renewal is permissible. This court held that “[a] party may bring a civil action to renew a judgment, provided that the action is commenced within ten years after entry of the original judgment and the party complies with all the requirements for commencing a civil action.”2 Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 737 N.W.2d 372, 374 (Minn.App.2007) (emphasis added), rev’d on other grounds, 754 N.W.2d 377 (Minn.2008); see also Shamrock Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 754 N.W.2d 377, 380 n. 2 (Minn.2008) (assuming “without deciding that a civil judgment may be renewed by the entry of judgment in a new civil action commenced within the statutory limitations period for enforcement of the original judgment” (emphasis added)).
The majority argues that the word “original” in “original judgment” does not mean “first.” But “original” is defined: “1. Preceding all others in time, first.” The American Heritage College Dictionary 963 (3d ed. 1997); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1134 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “original source” as “[t]he person or persons who first disclosed fraud to the government”). “First” is an accepted meaning of “original.”
The majority not only rejects “first” as a synonym for “original”; it adopts “any,” arguing that, because the Shamrock cases do not specify that they concern the renewal of “only” original judgments, they concern the renewal of any judgments. But “original” is arguably an antonym for “any”; “original” denotes a specific entity, not a generic entity. Our statutes, rules, and caselaw reflect this usage. See, e.g., MinmStat. § 15B.01(4) (2008) (including in purposes of Capitol Area Architectural and Planning Board “to establish a flexible framework for growth ... in keeping with the spirit of the original design”); Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.01 (referring to “the original complaint”); Minn. R. Evid. 1002 (requiring production of “original” writing, recording, or photography to prove content); State v. Lessley, 779 N.W.2d 825, 834 n. 8 (Minn.2010) (referring to provisions of “original” Constitution); Brua v. Minn. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn.2010) (referring to “original” defendants, i.e., defendants in underlying action, as opposed to their insurer, defendant in the case on appeal); S.M. Hentges & Sons v. Mensing, 777 N.W.2d 228, 231 n. 1 (Minn.2010) (noting relevance of headnote depends on its presence in “original” legislative process); DeRosier v. Util. Sys. of Am., Inc., 780 N.W.2d 1, 8 n. 4 (Minn.App.2010) (referring to “original” contract as opposed to new agreement between parties); QBE Ins. Corp. v. Twin Homes of French Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, 778 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn.App.2010) (referring to unavailable shingles of “original” root); Vickla v. State, 778 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Minn.App.2010) (referring to “original” as opposed to amended criminal charge), review granted (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010); Carse v. State, 778 N.W.2d 361, 362 n. 2 (Minn.App.2010) (noting after seeing defendant in handcuffs, “original venire was replaced with a new panel”), *415review denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2010); Juetten v. LCA-Vision, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Minn.App.2010) (referring to “original” corporate defendant), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 2010); Hennepin County v. Hill, 777 N.W.2d 252, 257, 258 (Minn.App.2010) (referring to “original” child support order, as opposed to subsequent orders).
It is for the supreme court, not this court, to state that “original” is being used in a sense other than the accepted sense in a supreme court opinion. The majority usurps the roles of the legislature and the supreme court by extending existing law.
Moreover, the majority’s opinion contravenes the basic principle of finality of judgments that “is a cornerstone of our judicial system.” Harris v. Martin, 834 F.2d 361, 366 (3rd.Cir.1987). Minnesota appellate courts have repeatedly endorsed this principle. See, e.g., In re A Petition for Instructions to Construe Basic Resolution 876 of the Port Auth. of the City of St. Paul, 772 N.W.2d 488, 496 (Minn.2009) (quoting 7 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 60.27 (2d ed. 1955) for the proposition that there is a “general desirability that judgments be final”); Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Minn.2002) (noting in the criminal-law context that “[pjublic policy favors the finality of judgments”); Nussbaumer v. Fetrow, 556 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Minn.App.1996) (“[PJublic policy favors the finality of judgments and the ability of parties to rely on court orders.”), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997). Particularly in the marriage dissolution context, “the need for finality becomes of central importance.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn.1997) (noting that “[t]he legislature also has recognized the importance of finality in dissolution proceedings” by enacting Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2, to set out specific requirements for reopening dissolution judgments).
There is no finality to a judgment when the party to whom it was awarded is never required to either enforce it or lose it. The majority opens the door to maintenance judgments that share the traits of the judicial process deplored by Charles Dickens in Bleak House:
Jarndyce and Jarndyce drones on. This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause; innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse when Jarndyce and Jarndyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real horse, and trotted away into the other world. Fair wards of court have faded into mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out; the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are not three Jarndyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jarn-dyce in despair blew his brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery Lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags its dreary length before the Court, perennially hopeless.
Charles Dickens, Works of Charles Dickens vol. VII, Bleak House 4 (Andrew Lang et al. eds., Collier Press, 1911).
*416I would affirm the district court’s decision.

. I do not address whether public policy supports or refutes permitting maintenance judgment creditors the same right as child-support judgment creditors: that question is irrelevant. "Because this court is limited in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.'' LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. May 16, 2002).

. This quotation is taken from the syllabus; it cannot be argued that the quoted material is merely dicta.