Court Opinion

ID: 9673688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:16:23.549016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.562866
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion and with what I take to be the real reasons for reaching it. On the question of liability, it should be noted that the court has not yet embraced the doctrine that proof of proximate causation by a plaintiff in this or a similar factual situation should be eliminated, and that parties jointly sued must become adversaries sharing a burden not specifically placed upon one or the other. The opinion demonstrates that there is ample authority based upon sound logic for the result on this point. The real purpose of this opinion is to express my point of view as to the treatment of certain precedents which I consider to be valid, binding and correct. I refer particularly to Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Godfrey, 178 Ark. 103, 10 S. W. 2d 894. The Godfrey court did say that relative degrees of fault were immaterial in a case such as this. It held that since there was only one injury, each joint tort-feasor whose independent negligence contributed to the resulting damage was liable for the whole damage, so that there could be no greater recovery than the smallest amount of damages arrived at by the same jury in separate verdicts. This result is logical because there cannot be two separate measures of the damages. See also Nowlin-Carr Co. v. Cook, 171 Ark. 51, 283 S. W. 7. To this extent, in spite of the broad language of the opinion in Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S. W. 2d 648, the holding in Godfrey is and should be unimpaired. The only effect of the Uniform Contribution among Tort-feasors [Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1001 — 1009 (Repl. 1962)] was to permit the apportionment of damages between multiple tort-feasors solely for the purpose ot .determining rights of contribution among them. See Act 515 of 1941; 9 U. L. A. 235 and Commissioners’ Note, p. 236. Any question, which might have resulted from the broad language of the Shultz court, was completely laid to rest by the General Assembly by Act 35 of 1949. Subsequent to our adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act, we have approved apportionment of damages, even in cases where the jury was not specifically instructed in that regard. See Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 240 Ark. 280, 399 S. W. 2d 258.1 The court made it quite clear that its holding did not mean that where the damages were apportioned, a plaintiff could not recover the full amount of its damages from any one of the joint tort-feasors. The verdict in the first trial was a joint one, even though the forms of verdict submitted would have permitted separate ones. Even so, both Johnson and Woodward were severally as well as jointly liable to appellee since the jury found them to be joint tort-feasors, and the judgment was so entered. The several liability of the individual tort-feasors was not affected by the contribution act. Dunaway v. Trout, 232 Ark. 615, 339 S. W. 2d 613. But this judgment was reversed as to appellant and the cause remanded for a new trial. Insofar as the parties here were concerned, the case stood as if no action whatever had been taken. They were restored to the same condition as they were before the first judgment was rendered. That judgment, insofar as they are concerned, became a nullity. Palmer v. Carden, 239 Ark. 336, 389 S. W. 2d 428. Still the judgment against Johnson, who did not appeal, was not in anywise affected by the reversal insofar as appellee and Johnson are concerned. Rook v. Moseley, 236 Ark. 290, 365 S. W. 2d 718. But as between appellee and appellant, their controversy was subject to retrial on all issues. Callaway v. Cherry, 229 Ark. 297, 314 S. W. 2d 506. One of these issues was the amount of damages. Since there is no privity between Johnson and Woodward and no possibility of any vicarious or derivative liability, the amount of damages awarded in the first trial should not be a limit, either maximum or minimum, on the amount of damages awarded by a jury in a new trial. Of course, no question as to the rights of Johnson and Woodward, as between them, is now before us.   The forms of verdict in this case indicated separate verdicts, but not a joint one, as the forms gave the jury no opportunity to find against the defendants jointly.