Court Opinion

ID: 9536253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:43.957743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.616384
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE HASWELL
(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
*253I concur in the conclusion of the majority that section 95-1803(d), R.C.M.1947 as amended, is constitutional as applied to the defense of alibi. I dissent from the holding of the majority that this statute is constitutional as applied to the defenses of insanity and self-defense.
The majority draws no distinction between the three defenses in determining constitutionality, citing however, only cases involving the defense of alibi in support of its statement that “The cases uniformly reject the constitutional challenge here made” and proceeding to the dubious conclusion that “This same logic can be said for the pleading of the defense of insanity •or self-defense. ’ ’ Finally, the majority concludes that the statutory requirement that defendant furnish the prosecution the specified statement and list of witnesses is not mandatory but ■directory only.
In my view, there is a fundamental difference between these three defenses under Montana law insofar as the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination is concerned. The defense of alibi denies that the defendant committed the crime with which he is charged claiming that he was elsewhere at the time the crime was committed. Clearly no self-incrimination is involved here. Not so with the other two defenses. In pleading self-defense, the defendant admits committing the act constituting the crime but claims his act is legally justifiable. Montana law provides that ‘ ‘ Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases” enumerating various acts of self-defense. Section 94-2513, R.C.M.1947. Thus, under Montana law the defendant necessarily must admit he committed the act constituting the crime with which he is charged before self-defense applies. The same is true of the defense of insanity — defendant necessarily admits he did the killing but claims it to be legally excusable because of his lack of the requisite mental capacity.
The constitutional rationale is basic. Every person accused of crime has an absolute constitutional right not to be compelled *254to incriminate himself. This right against self-incrimination extends as well to compulsory incrimination to the prosecution prior to trial as to compulsory incrimination to the jury during' the course of trial. American law, being accusatorial rather than inquisitorial, clothes a person accused of crime with the-presumption of innocence which attends him at all stages during-the trial until the prosecution, unaided by the accused’s compulsory self-incrimination, proves him guilty beyond a reasonable-doubt.
The statute in question here, in effect, requires an accused to-admit commission of the act constituting the crime in advance-of trial as the price to be paid for using the defenses of insanity or self-defense. If he does not do so, at the very least he is. placed in jeopardy of being unable to use these defenses at his' trial precluding any voluntary choice on his part. It will not do to say that the statute is directory only in view of its plain language that “the defendant shall furnish to the prosecution * * “he shall also furnish to the prosecution * * and that after the trial commences “no witness may be called by the defendant in support of these defenses, unless the name is included on such list, except upon good cause shown.” A statute, depriving an accused of his constitutional rights is rendered no less objectionable by providing that “upon good cause shown” such rights may be restored.
For the foregoing reasons I would hold section 95-1803 (d), R.C.M.1947, unconstitutional in regard to the defenses of insanity and self-defense as violative of the 5th Amendment to-the United States Constitution as made applicable to the states under the “due process” clause of the 14th Amendment,