Court Opinion

ID: 9497398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:50:48.514888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:10.823132
License: Public Domain

BYBEE, Circuit Judge,
concurring and concurring in the judgment:
I join Part I of the court’s opinion and agree with much of what is written in Parts II and III, but I do not join those sections. I nevertheless agree that the petition should be granted and the matter remanded to the BIA.
INS’s regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture define torture as severe pain or suffering, intentionally inflicted on a person “at the instigation of or with the consent of or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2004). The regulations further provide that “[acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have aware*790ness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” Id. § 208.18(a)(7). We have held that “[t]he correct inquiry ... is whether a respondent can show that public officials demonstrate ‘willful blindness’ to the torture.of their citizens by third parties, or as stated by the Fifth Circuit, whether public officials ‘would turn a blind eye to torture.’ ” Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir.2002)). Our decisions “leave little doubt” that an applicant for withholding of removal “may qualify for Torture Convention relief without demonstrating that she would suffer ■torture while in public officials’ custody or physical control.” Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir.2004). It is sufficient if the applicant demonstrates that “she would likely suffer torture while under private parties’ exclusive custody or physical control” so long as public officials consent or acquiesce to the torture. Id. (emphasis in original).
The principal opinion faults the immigration judge for requiring Reyes-Reyes to prove that he was tortured or will be tortured by someone in the government of El Salvador if he is returned. According to the opinion, “the IJ effectively excised the phrase ‘or with the consent or acquiescence of from the regulation.” Maj. op. at 787. I do not believe that the IJ misstated the rule, although he could have been more clear at the outset. The IJ’s oral opinion, as quoted in the principal opinion, states that “an alien must establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured in the country of -removal by someone in the government or acting on behalf of the government if returned to that country.” Maj. op. at 787. In the same paragraph, however, the IJ went on: “Torture must be inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official or someone acting in an official capacity, or it must be inflicted with the consent or acquiescence of a public official, or person acting in an official capacity.” (Emphasis added). That is a complete and correct statement of the law.
The IJ rejected Reyes-Reyes claims because the IJ found that Reyes-Reyes “never reported [his kidnaping and rape] to anyone.” Because he was only 13 at the time of this horrific incident he “never reported these incidents to his family nor the police ... because of the threat of these street individuals. He felt that he might be hit or something worse would happen to him.” When the IJ “questioned [Reyes-Reyes] and asked [him] if anyone in the government or acting on behalf of the government would want to torture him,” he answered “no” and “testified that the only individuals that would want to harm him are the thieves on the streets.” The IJ concluded that to qualify for withholding of removal, Reyes-Reyes “would have had to [have] reported [the incidents] to an official or to a family member and they would have had to refuse to act upon his outcry.” The IJ found that Reyes-Reyes had failed to meet his burden of proof.
The fault in the record is the IJ’s failure to address whether any public official might have been “aware[ ] of such activity and thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7). See Azanor, 364 F.3d at 1021. I would grant the petition and remand for the purpose of addressing this question.