Court Opinion

ID: 9713222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:11:15.543986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.197157
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(concurring). The basic question at issue in this suit in equity has reference to the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the case and to enter a decree. Plaintiff’s hill of complaint alleged that its garage business in the city of Escanaba was being *57caused to suffer irreparable injury because of unlawful conduct on tbe part of tbe defendants, said business embracing the sale of automobiles and parts therefor. Specifically it was averred that none of plaintiff’s employees belonged to the union, that defendants sought to compel them to join, and that picketing operations were instituted for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to coerce its employees and to obtain recognition of the union as the bargaining agent therefor. Defendants by answer denied that their conduct in the premises was unlawful, asserting that their purpose was to benefit union members and labor generally by the establishing of uniform conditions of employment throughout the territory in question. Defendants further asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction in the premises and that under the labor management relations act of 1947* exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the national labor relations board.
It is undisputed that the national labor relations board does not exercise the full measure of jurisdiction vested in it by the act of Congress. Prior to 1950 it declined to act in some cases, apparently on the theory that the carrying out of the purposes of the legislation did not require it to- do so. In 1950 definite standards of jurisdiction were adopted, said standards being amended in 1954 in such manner as to materially enlarge the class of controversies in which jurisdiction would be rejected. It is not disputed in the case at bar that under the standards as adopted by the board jurisdiction would not be exercised thereby for the purpose of determining the matters in dispute between the parties hereto. As pointed out by the trial judge in his opinion, the plaintiff here was without remedy to prevent the injuries to its business of which it complained, *58if the courts of the State are without jurisdiction. Faced with this situation, the issue of jurisdiction was decided in plaintiff’s favor.
After listening to the proofs the trial court concluded that defendants were guilty of the conduct charged against them, and that plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief. The following excerpt from the opinion filed indicates the circuit judge’s conclusions with reference to the factual situation:
“The results to the plaintiffs were disastrous to their small business. Receipts of and shipments by freight from trucking companies employing union men were cut off, as well as deliveries of other merchandise by union employees. Prospective customers turned away upon encountering the picket line. Plaintiffs’ business was unfavorably advertised to the general public. Plaintiffs’ business was substantially interfered with. Plaintiffs’ business ■dropped off about 50% over the corresponding period for the previous year.
“Apparently this is a test case. If the defendants ■prevail in this proceeding they can compel the owners ■of small enterprises, having employees eligible to join ■defendant union, to require such employees to join ■defendant union. Defendant union covers many types of enterprises. Defendant Alsten testified that .'it covered trucking, fuel, bakeries, beer and soft •drink distributors, wholesale fruits, shop employees, ■warehouse employees and clerical help employed. Particularly, by controlling trucking employees defendant union can throttle shipment of merchandise to and from practically all small legitimate enterprises. Defendant union is affiliated with the powerful National Teamsters Union, employing out-of-State counsel. The owners of small enterprises may be helpless to resist the demands of such an organization. The possibilities of the exercise of such ■dangerous potential power are almost without limit.”
*59A decree was entered in accordance with the opinion filed, and defendants have appealed.
It should he noted that the decree of the trial court was entered August 1, 1956. Thereafter, and under date of March 25, 1957, the supreme court of the United States rendered its decisions in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 US 1 (77 S Ct 598, 1 Led2d 601) ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 427, AFL, v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 US 20 (77 S Ct 604, 1 Led2d 613); and Ban Biego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 US 26 (77 S Ct 607, 1 Led2d 618). These decisions are determinative of the issue in the case at bar. The supreme court, 2 justices dissenting, there held that the States may not act in matters concerning which the Congress has granted authority to the national labor relations board, unless such board has, by agreement, ceded to a State agency such jurisdiction, as is provided in section 10(a)* of the Federal act as amended by the Taft-Hartley act of 1947. There has been no such delegation of power to any agency of the State of Michigan, nor does it appear from the record before us that there has been such delegation in other States. Under the interpretation of the Federal act by the United States supreme court the courts of this State were, and are, without power to grant preventive relief in a case of the nature here involved, even though, under the standards as fixed by the national labor relations board, said board declines to exercise its authority. The situation thus created was referred to in the majority opinion in the Guss Case, supra, as follows (pp 10, 11):
“We are told by appellee that to deny the State jurisdiction here will create a vast no-man’s-land, subject to regulation by no agency or court. We *60are told by appellant that to grant jurisdiction would produce confusion and conflicts with Federal policy. Unforunately, both may be right. We believe, however,, that Congress has expressed its judgment in favor of uniformity. Since Congress’ power in the area of commerce among the States is plenary, its judgment must be respected whatever policy objections there may be to creation of a no-man’s-land.
“Congress is free to change the situation at will. In 1954 the senate committee on labor and public welfare recognized the existence of a no-man’s-land and proposed an amendment which would have empowered State courts and agencies to act upon the national board’s declination of jurisdiction. The national labor relations board can greatly reduce the area of the no-man’s-land by reasserting its jurisdiction and, where States have brought their labor laws into conformity with Federal policy, by ceding jurisdiction under section 10(a).”
: The language of the court, above quoted, seems to tacitly recognize the right of the national board to establish standards by which it will be governed in accepting or refusing jurisdiction of cases sought to be submitted to it. Like recognition has been •extended in other cases. It does not appear that any ■challenge to the right of the board to adopt fixed standards of the character in question has been determined, or, in fact, made. As noted in the dissenting opinion in the above cited cases (p 14):
“Courts of appeals have approved the board’s practice and none of the parties to the instant cases •question it.”
Conceivably any question in this regard may be resolved by following the procedure suggested by the recent decision of the supreme court of the United States in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 US 184 (79 S Ct 180, 3 Led2d 210). Of interest, also in this •connection is Office Employes International Union, *61Local No. 11, AFL-CIO, v. National Labor Relations Board, 353 US 313 (77 S Ct 799, 1 Led2d 846).
Under the holding of the United States supreme court in the 3 cases first above cited, which must be regarded as establishing the existing law applicable in the instant case, the conclusion necessarily follows that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff. A like conclusion must, of course, follow in all cases as to which exclusive jurisdiction is granted by. the act of Congress to the national labor'relations board notwithstanding the fact that said board,"for economic. or other reasons, declines to act under the standards that it has established. The courts being barred from granting relief, the result is a “no-man’s-land,” thus presenting • an anomalous sitúa! tión. So long as':'such situation obtains, parties to a controversy of the nature here involved, in which the extent of the operations of the employer in interstate commerce prevents appeal to the national board, have no forum in which preventive relief against irreparable injury may be sought. Such limitation applies alike to employers and to employees and their representatives. As matters now stand it does not appear that the situation can be changed other than by action on the part of Congress or of the national labor relations board. An action in tort for damages may be permissible under proper circumstances. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 US 656 (74 S Ct 833, 98 L ed 1025); International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO) v. Russell, 356 US 634 (78 S Ct 932, 2 Led2d 1030). It is obvious that such remedy may prove wholly inadequate in many instances. It may not be regarded as an equal alternative for preventive relief of the nature that *62the trial court undertook to grant in the instant case.
For the reason indicated, we concur ill reversal.
Dethmers, C. J., and Kelly, J., concurred with Carr, J.

 29 USCA, §§ 141-187.

 29 TISCA, § 160(a).