Court Opinion

ID: 9593468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:22:35.68671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:56.194017
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While concurring fully with Divisions 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the per curiam opinion, I must dissent from Division 3. Under the facts of this case, it was unnecessary to define “under the influence” as meaning that Wallace was a less safe driver because of his alcohol consumption.
The trial court instructed the jury that “[a] person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” The trial court also charged the jury that if chemical analysis of a person’s blood shows that “there was at that time 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of alcohol.” Wallace’s blood alcohol content was shown to be .11 percent, and the trial court’s instructions on driving under the influence thus were exactly adjusted to the evidence.
The per curiam opinion misplaces its reliance upon Taylor v. State, 184 Ga. App. 368, 369 (2) (361 SE2d 667) (1987), and the cases cited therein, because it does not appear that any of those cases involved a situation where a chemical analysis revealed the driver’s blood alcohol content to be at a level where one is presumed by law to be “under the influence.” Where the State obtains no chemical analysis of the driver’s blood, or one that indicates a blood alcohol content of less than the presumptive level, a definition of “under the influence” as meaning “less safe” would be necessary, but no such need exists where the State’s evidence travels on the unrebutted presumption of being “under the influence” arising by virtue of a certain blood *81alcohol content.
Decided July 15, 1988
Rehearing denied July 28, 1988
Robert E. Surrency, H. Samuel Atkins, Jr., for appellant.
Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, for appellee.
The appellant’s convictions should be affirmed entirely.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this opinion.