Court Opinion

ID: 9631730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:47:51.496627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:00.061125
License: Public Domain

WOOD, Chief Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Plaintiffs’ first point on appeal is that the trial court ignored the pre-trial order and tried the case on the pleadings in a disorderly and confusing manner. During arguments to the court prior to the taking of evidence, reference was made to the pleadings. Reference could of course have been made to the pre-trial order but there is no way to determine what factual contentions are related to what legal theories in the pre-trial order. This relationship between factual claims and legal theories could be determined .by reference to the complaint. The record clearly shows the trial court was. seeking to understand plaintiffs’ contentions. References to the complaint in seeking such understanding did not amount to legal error. If, as plaintiffs now contend, the references to the complaint amounted to “ignoring” the pre-trial order, such a contention was never clearly brought to the attention of the trial court. The record does not support the claim that the case was tried on the “pleadings” and in a “disorderly and confusing” manner. The case was tried on the theories remaining after the trial court dismissed certain claims on the basis of the statute of limitations. There was, at the beginning of the trial, some uncertainty as to what malpractice theories remained in the case after this ruling, but this uncertainty was cleared when evidence as to the remaining malpractice theories was admitted. The record does not support plaintiffs’ first point. The second point is that the trial court erred in its application of the statute of limitations. Some factual references are necessary for an understanding of this contention. Mrs. Mantz had received treatment in Las Vegas, Nevada, in 1964. This treatment included a left radical mastectomy. This treatment was on the basis that she had cancer. Defendant performed a simple mastectomy on Mrs. Mantz’ right breast in 1965. When pathological reports indicated the right breast was not cancerous (although other disease was reported), Mrs. Mantz was informed of that fact. Subsequent to the simple mastectomy, defendant caused certain records and reports of the Las Vegas surgery to be examined and formed the opinion that she had not had cancer' at the time of the Las Vegas treatment. Defendant did not inform Mrs. Mantz of his opinion (that she had not had cancer at the time of the Las Vegas treatment) until January, 1969. He disclosed his opinion to her when a question arose as to administering estrogen in treatment of a premenopausal condition. One claim made against defendant was that of assault and battery in performing the simple mastectomy in 1965. Another claim alleged various items of malpractice in connection with the simple mastectomy. The trial court ruled that the three year statute of limitations applied. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant on still another claim' — that of breach of contract. It did so on the basis that plaintiffs’ claim was for personal injuries and the three year limitation applied. The trial court’s rulings were correct because the complaint was not filed until 1969. Roybal v. White, supra; Chavez v. Kitsch, supra. The facts applicable to the statute of limitations claim were before the court at the time of its ruling. Thus, it was not premature. The trial court’s rulings as to the exclusion of evidence, the instructions given and the scope of jury argument were consistent with its ruling on the statute of limitations question. Only one aspect of this ruling needs further comment. In ruling that malpractice claims in connection with the simple mastectomy were barred by the statute of limitations, the uncertainty previously referred to arose. The malpractice claims dismissed were included in Count IV of the first cause of action. One of those claims was that defendant failed to disclose to Mrs. Mantz his opinion that she did not have cancer at the time of the Las Vegas treatment. This uncertainty was cleared when evidence on this claim was admitted and the issue was ultimately submitted to the’jury. Plaintiffs’ second point is without merit. Plaintiffs’ third point is that the trial court erred in not submitting four of their theories of liability to the jury. The previous discussion answers the contention as to two of the theories — the assault and battey claim and the breach of contract claim. The remaining two theories are: misrepresentation and intentional infliction of mental suffering. The factual basis for the “misrepresentation” theory is that defendant had a duty to tell Mrs. Mantz the truth as to her condition; that he failed to do so; “ . and that his silence led appellant to continue in her fear of dying of cancer.” Thus, the factual basis is defendant’s nondisclosure of his opinion that Mrs. Mantz did not have cancer at the time of the Las Vegas treatment. The authority relied on by plaintiffs is Maxey v. Quintana, 84 N.M. 38, 499 P.2d 356 (Ct.App.1972). That case held an action exists for “negligent misrepresentation;” that the action is determined by the general principles of the law of negligence. The majority opinion quotes the instruction that submitted to the jury the issue of defendant’s liability for nondisclosure of his opinion. The instruction is based on the theory of negligence. The fact that the instruction did not contain the word “misrepresentation” does not demonstrate error because the substance of the theory —negligence by nondisclosure — was submitted to and decided by the jury. As to the theory of intentional infliction of mental suffering, the authorities discussed in the majority opinion define the tort in terms of “extreme and outrageous” conduct. Assuming, but not deciding, this standard applies in New Mexico, the evidence was insufficient for submission of this claim to the jury. Plaintiffs’ third point is without merit. Plaintiffs’ fourth point is that their cross-examination of Dr. Floyd was unduly restricted. Because of the asserted “undue restriction,” plaintiffs claim their motion for a new trial should, have been granted. The answer is that the record does not show any restriction. There is no merit to •this point. On the basis of the foregoing, I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion on all issues except the point concerning costs. On fees for expert witnesses, § 20-1-4(B), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, Supp.1971) allows a maximum of $750.-00. That section also limits the expert fee to one witness, absent findings of the court which are not here present. Compare Schrib v. Seidenberg, 80 N.M. 573, 458 P.2d 825 (Ct.App.1969). Thus, the expert fee in this case is limited to that of one witness. It cannot be determined from the cost bill, the objections thereto, or defendant’s response, what cost should be allowed for the “one witness.” Thus, I disagree with the majority opinion and would remand for a determination of the expert witness fee. I agree with the majority disposition of the deposition charges, since the bills submitted support the amount awarded. I disagree with the amount allowed for services of subpoenas because I can find no support in the record that these charges were incurred. Thus, I would disallow this amount.