Court Opinion

ID: 2963452
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:56.647487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:03.749094
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-2138

                WILFREDO MARTINEZ, a/k/a WILFREDO MARTINEZ RODRIGUEZ,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                  RAFAEL COLON, a/k/a RAFAEL COLON PIZARRO, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              __________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              __________________________

               John  E. Mudd,  with whom  Howard Charles  and Ortiz  Toro &
               _____________              ______________      _____________
          Ortiz Brunet Law Offices were on brief, for appellant.
          ________________________
               Edgardo  Rodriguez-Quilichini, Assistant  Solicitor General,
               _____________________________
          with whom Pedro Delgado  Hernandez, Solicitor General, and Carlos
                    ________________________                         ______
          Lugo  Fiol,   Deputy  Solicitor  General,  were   on  brief,  for
          __________
          appellees.

                              _________________________

                                     May 31, 1995

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.  This appeal  raises interesting
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          questions  about the contours of 42 U.S.C.    1983 (1988) and the

          reach  of  the  Supreme  Court's  core  holding  in  DeShaney  v.
                                                               ________

          Winnebago  County  Social  Servs.  Dep't, 489  U.S.  189  (1989).
          ________________________________________

          Concluding, as we do, that the court  below appropriately applied

          DeShaney,  we  affirm  the  entry  of  summary  judgment  in  the
          ________

          defendants' favor.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    Consistent  with the method of  Fed. R. Civ.  P. 56, we

          canvass the material facts in a light that flatters, but does not

          impermissibly distort,  the plaintiff's claims.   We then recount

          the travel of the case.

                                    A.  The Facts.
                                    A.  The Facts.
                                        _________

                    We outline  the facts, omitting the  graphic details on

          which  our dissenting  brother prefers  to dwell.   In  our view,

          these  details  are not  relevant to  the  legal issues  posed on

          appeal.

                    In the early morning hours  of May 26, 1988, plaintiff-

          appellant  Wilfredo Martinez  Rodriguez  (Martinez),  a  youthful

          member of Puerto Rico's  police force, drove to the  Loiza Street

          Precinct,  located in  the  San Juan  metropolitan area.   Though

          Martinez was not scheduled to begin his shift until 4:00 a.m., he

          arrived  early, pursuant to local custom, in order to procure his

          post  assignment.  Martinez alleges that he  was on duty from the

          moment  he arrived    even before his shift  began   because from

          that  point  forward he  was  subject  to  the shift  commander's

                                          2

          orders.

                    Upon  Martinez' arrival,  a fellow  officer who  was on

          duty at  the time,  Angel Valentin Corali  (Valentin), approached

          Martinez' car and called him "pretty boy" ("papito lindo").  When

          Martinez alighted, Valentin drew his service revolver, pointed it

          at Martinez' stomach, cocked the hammer, placed his finger on the

          trigger,  and  inquired if  Martinez was  afraid.   Valentin then

          disarmed  the weapon,  and Martinez  hurried inside  the station,

          first telling  Valentin:  "Don't  horse around with  that because

          you will kill me."

                    Shortly  after  this  fracas  had   occurred,  Valentin

          accosted Martinez in the  radio room, inserted his finger  into a

          small hole in Martinez'  undershirt, and ripped it.   Once again,

          Martinez walked away  from Valentin.   He then  changed into  his

          uniform, entered  the waiting  room, and  reported  to his  shift

          supervisor, defendant-appellee Juan Trinidad Marrero (Trinidad).

                    Soon  thereafter,  Valentin  reappeared,   pointed  his

          revolver at Martinez' genitals, cocked  the hammer, and, with his

          finger on the trigger, threatened to "blow away" Martinez'  penis

          (asking  him, somewhat  rhetorically, if  he was  scared).   When

          Valentin lowered the weapon, Martinez immediately moved away from

          him.   Within minutes Valentin again  approached Martinez, cocked

          the  revolver,  aimed  it  at Martinez'  groin,  and  resumed his

          taunting.     The   revolver  accidentally   discharged,  maiming

          Martinez.

                    The  first  encounter  took  place  in  the  precinct's

                                          3

          parking lot and  the rest transpired  inside the police  station.

          According to Martinez, roughly  twenty minutes elapsed from start

          to finish.  All  parties agree that the shooting,  which occurred

          before the 4:00 a.m. shift change, was unintentional.1

                               B.  Travel of the Case.
                               B.  Travel of the Case.
                                   __________________

                    On  May  22,  1989,  Martinez  filed  suit  in  federal

          district  court  against   numerous  defendants,  including,   as

          relevant here, Rafael Colon Pizarro (Colon), Luis A. Velez Rentas

          (Velez),  and  Trinidad  (collectively, "the  officers"  or  "the

          defendants").2     Invoking  42  U.S.C.      1983  and  premising

          jurisdiction  on the  existence  of a  federal  question, see  28
                                                                    ___

          U.S.C.     1331  (1988), he  alleged  that  his  rights had  been

          abridged in that each  defendant owed him a duty to intervene and

          protect  him  from readily  discernible harm  at  the hands  of a

          fellow  officer,  but  each   defendant  breached  this  duty  by

          subsequent  inaction.3   Martinez  asserted  pendent tort  claims

          with respect  to  all  three  defendants  and,  with  respect  to
                              
          ____________________

               1In  his memorandum of law  in support of  his opposition to
          defendant  Carlos Lopez-Feliciano's  motion to  dismiss, Martinez
          stated that  "the revolver apparently fired by accident."  Record
          Appendix  at  21.   At  any  rate,  the  summary judgment  record
          contains no facts that would support a contrary finding; and, for
          aught  that appears,  Martinez has  never asserted  that Valentin
          shot him intentionally.

               2Plaintiff asserted claims against several other defendants,
          including  Valentin and  Lopez-Feliciano.   Those claims  are not
          before us, and we ignore them for purposes of this opinion.

               3Although  the underlying  facts  are  hotly  contested,  we
          assume  for purposes of this  appeal, as Martinez  would have it,
          that  all three  defendants witnessed  the entire  progression of
          events and had a meaningful opportunity to intervene at each step
          along the way.

                                          4

          Trinidad,  asserted a  section  1983 claim  based on  supervisory

          liability.

                    After  a  flurry of  pretrial  discovery,  the officers

          moved for  summary  judgment.   They  argued,  inter  alia,  that
                                                         _____  ____

          Valentin was not acting under color  of state law when the mishap

          occurred; and that, therefore,  onlooker officers did not have  a

          constitutional  duty  to  intervene  on Martinez'  behalf.    The

          district  court   referred  the  motions  and   Martinez'  timely

          opposition to a magistrate judge.  The magistrate concluded that,

          under DeShaney, the officers  had no constitutional obligation to
                ________

          protect Martinez from Valentin's  actions, and urged the district

          court to grant summary  judgment.  The plaintiff objected  to the

          magistrate's report and  recommendation, but the  district court,

          affording de novo review, see Fed. R. Civ.  P. 72(b), adopted the
                    __ ____         ___

          report,  accepted   the  recommendation,  and   entered  judgment

          accordingly.  This appeal followed.

          II.  THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
          II.  THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

                    A district  court may  grant summary judgment  only "if

          the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and

          admissions on  file, together with  the affidavits, if  any, show

          that there is  no genuine issue as to any  material fact and that

          the  moving party is entitled to a  judgment as a matter of law."

          Fed.  R. Civ. P.  56(c). We have  charted the boundaries  of this

          rule in case after  case, see, e.g., Coyne  v. Taber Partners  I,
                                    ___  ____  _____     _________________

          ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1995) [No. 94-2231, slip op. at 4-5];

          National Amusements, Inc.  v. Town  of Dedham, 43  F.3d 731,  735
          _________________________     _______________

                                          5

          (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S.
                           ________ ___ _____ _____

          Apr. 4, 1995) (No. 94-1630); Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 32
                                       _________    _______

          (1st Cir. 1994); Dow v. United  Bhd. of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58
                           ___    __________________________

          (1st Cir.  1993); Pagano v.  Frank, 983 F.2d  343, 347 (1st  Cir.
                            ______     _____

          1993); Wynne  v. Tufts Univ. Sch.  of Med., 976 F.2d  791, 793-94
                 _____     _________________________

          (1st Cir. 1992),  cert. denied,  113 S. Ct.  1845 (1993);  United
                            _____ ______                             ______

          States v. One  Parcel of  Real Property (Great  Harbor Neck,  New
          ______    _____________________________  ________________________

          Shoreham, R.I.),  960  F.2d 200,  204  (1st Cir.  1992);  Rivera-
          ______________                                            _______

          Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d  349, 351-52 (1st Cir. 1992);
          ________    _____________

          Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds  Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5,  7-8 (1st
          ____________    __________________________

          Cir. 1990); Garside v.  Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46,  48-49 (1st
                      _______     _______________

          Cir.  1990); Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 191-92 (1st Cir.
                       _______    _________

          1989), and  it would  serve no  useful purpose  to draw that  map

          anew.

                    For  present purposes,  we need  say no more  than that

          summary judgment will  lie if the record, even when  taken in the

          aspect most favorable to  the nonmovant, see Rivera-Muriente, 959
                                                   ___ _______________

          F.2d at  352, fails  to  yield a  trialworthy  issue as  to  some

          material  fact.  In applying  this principle, it  is important to

          bear in mind that not every genuine factual conflict necessitates

          a trial.  It is  only when a disputed  fact has the potential  to

          change the outcome of  the suit under the governing law  if found

          favorably  to  the  nonmovant  that  the  materiality  hurdle  is

          cleared.   See One  Parcel, 960  F.2d at 204.   Here,  the record
                     ___ ___________

          reflects a veritable salmagundi of bitterly  disputed facts   but

          none that is material.

                                          6

                    To  that   extent,  then,   our  task   is  simplified.

          Exercising  de  novo review,  see Pagano,  983  F.2d at  347, and
                      __  ____          ___ ______

          adopting the  plaintiff's version of all  controverted facts (but

          not,  however,  giving   credence  to  "conclusory   allegations,

          improbable  inferences,  [or]  unsupported speculation,"  Medina-
                                                                    _______

          Munoz, 896 F.2d  at 8), we conclude that the  court below did not
          _____

          err in jettisoning the section 1983 claims.

          III.  ANALYSIS
          III.  ANALYSIS

                    There  are two  essential elements  of an  action under

          section  1983:   "(i)  that the  conduct  complained of  has been

          committed  under color of state  law, and (ii)  that this conduct

          worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws  of

          the  United States."  Chongris v. Board  of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36,
                                ________    _________________

          40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987); accord West v.
                         _____ ______                        ______ ____

          Atkins, 487 U.S.  42, 48  (1988); Daniels v.  Williams, 474  U.S.
          ______                            _______     ________

          327,  330-31 (1986).   Of  course, the  reference to  "state law"

          cannot  be taken literally, for Puerto Rico enjoys the functional

          equivalent  of statehood  in regard  to section  1983 and,  thus,

          state law includes Puerto Rico law.  See Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
                                               ___ _____________________

          Public  Serv. Comm'n  of P.R., 906  F.2d 25,  31 n.8  (1st Cir.),
          _____________________________

          cert.  denied, 498 U.S. 959  (1990); Berrios v.  Inter Am. Univ.,
          _____  ______                        _______     _______________

          535  F.2d 1330, 1331 n.3  (1st Cir.), appeal  dismissed, 426 U.S.
                                                ______  _________

          942 (1976).

                    For  purposes of  this  appeal, the  defendants do  not

          contest the  plaintiff's allegation that, at  all relevant times,

          the  defendants were on duty and acting under color of state law.

                                          7

          This concession  reduces our inquiry to whether  the facts, taken

          most congenially to the plaintiff, can support a finding that the

          defendants violated  a right secured  to the plaintiff  either by

          the  Constitution or by federal law.  Since the plaintiff has not

          alleged the transgression  of any  right secured to  him under  a

          federal  statute,  we  may  narrow  the  inquiry  still  further,

          limiting   it  to  whether  the  facts  show  a  violation  of  a

          constitutional right.   It is  to this elusive  question that  we

          next proceed.

                              A.  The Duty to Intervene.
                              A.  The Duty to Intervene.
                                  _____________________

                    Plaintiff pins  his hopes  principally on a  claim that

          the defendants'  failure to protect  him from the  imminent peril

          posed by Valentin  abridged his right to substantive due process.

          The  touchstone of the  law in this  area is  the Supreme Court's

          opinion  in DeShaney.  There,  a child sued  for damages under 42
                      ________

          U.S.C.     1983, claiming  that employees  of a  state-run social

          service  agency,  on  notice  of  a  parent's  abusive  behavior,

          nonetheless  failed  to  protect   the  child  from  the  readily

          foreseeable danger.   See DeShaney, 489  U.S. at 193.   The Court
                                ___ ________

          affirmed  the entry  of  summary judgment  in defendants'  favor.

          Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, explained that

          the Due Process Clause  ordinarily does not require the  state to

          protect  an  individual's life,  limb,  or  property against  the

          marauding of third parties not acting to the state's behoof.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.  at  196.   Consequently, "a  State's  failure to  protect an
          ___

          individual against private violence  simply does not constitute a

                                          8

          violation of the Due Process Clause."  Id. at 197.
                                                 ___

                    Although the  DeShaney Court left open  the possibility
                                  ________

          of  certain  circumscribed  exceptions  to the  general  rule  of

          nonliability,  Martinez makes no effort to slide within them.  He

          does not  argue that he was in the  custody of the state, see id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          at 198-200  (discussing right to  protection arising in  favor of

          incarcerated   prisoners   and  involuntarily   committed  mental

          patients), or that he was in its "functional custody," see id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          201 n.9 (discussing possible existence of situations analogous to

          incarceration or institutionalization),  or that  the state  made

          him  more  vulnerable to  Valentin's  actions,  see id.  at  201.
                                                          ___ ___

          Rather, Martinez contends that DeShaney is altogether inapposite.
                                         ________

                    To the extent  that this contention is based simply and

          solely  on the fact that, unlike in DeShaney, the defendants here
                                              ________

          are  police officers,  not  social workers,  we  reject it.    Of

          course,  police officers  sometimes have  an affirmative  duty to
                                    _________

          intervene  that is enforceable under the Due Process Clause.  For

          example, "[a]n officer who is present at the scene [of an arrest]

          and who fails  to take reasonable steps to protect  the victim of

          another officer's use of excessive force can be held liable under

          section  1983  for  his  nonfeasance,"  provided  that  he had  a

          "realistic opportunity"  to prevent the other  officer's actions.

          Gaudreault v. Municipality of  Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207  n.3 (1st
          __________    ______________________

          Cir.  1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956 (1991); accord O'Neill v.
                       _____ ______                       ______ _______

          Krzeminski,  839 F.2d 9, 11-12 (2d Cir.  1988).  But this line of
          __________

          cases does not,  as plaintiff importunes, carve out  an exception

                                          9

          to  the DeShaney  rule.   Instead,  such  cases escape  the  rule
                  ________

          because the aggressor is acting under color of his public office.

                    Gaudreault illustrates the point.  The quoted statement
                    __________

          specifically  contemplates that  the underlying  tortious conduct

          take  place within the  context of  an arrest,  interrogation, or

          similar  maneuver, see Gaudreault, 923  F.2d at 206-07  & n.3, in
                             ___ __________

          which a differential  exists between the  victim and the  officer

          precisely  because of  the latter's  status  as one  empowered to

          enforce  the law,  coercively if  necessary, against  the former.

          Similarly, O'Neill involved  the beating of  a handcuffed man  by
                     _______

          law enforcement officers during an interrogation in the detention

          area of  a police station.   See  O'Neill, 839  F.2d at  10.   We
                                       ___  _______

          cannot imagine  a more  paradigmatic exercise of  state authority

          than the processes of handcuffing, detaining, and interrogating a

          citizen.   Gaudreault and O'Neill,  then, are cases  in which the
                     __________     _______

          aggressor is acting under color of  state law.  The DeShaney rule
                                                              ________

            which addresses  the "State's failure to protect  an individual

          against private  violence," DeShaney,  489 U.S. at  197 (emphasis
                  _______             ________

          supplied)    is not implicated in such cases because the violence

          in question  is not private  but "public," i.e.,  attributable to
                                                     ____

          state action.4
                              
          ____________________

               4A  constitutional  duty  to  intervene may  also  arise  if
          onlooker  officers  are  instrumental  in  assisting  the  actual
          attacker  to place  the victim  in a  vulnerable position.   See,
                                                                       ___
          e.g., Byrd  v. Brishke,  466 F.2d  6, 9-11  (7th Cir. 1972);  cf.
          ____  ____     _______                                        ___
          DeShaney,  489 U.S.  at 201  (recognizing a  possible affirmative
          ________
          constitutional  duty to  protect against  certain dangers  if the
          state takes "part in their creation" or does something "to render
          [the  victim] more vulnerable to them").  In such a scenario, the
          onlooker officers and the aggressor officer are essentially joint

                                          10

                    Private violence   even  private violence engaged in by

          one  who happens  to work  for the  state    has  different legal

          ramifications than  violence attributable to state  action.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Hughes v.  Halifax County  Sch. Bd., 855  F.2d 183,  186-87
          ____  ______     ________________________

          (4th  Cir.  1988)  (distinguishing  private  actions  of   county

          maintenance workers  from cases in which  "the actions complained

          of were committed  while the  defendants were  purporting to  act

          under  the authority  vested  in  them  by  the  state,  or  were

          otherwise  made  possible  because  of the  privileges  of  their

          employment"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1042 (1989).
                        _____ ______

                    Thus we  recently held,  in light  of DeShaney,  that a
                                                          ________

          district attorney's  office had no  constitutional obligation  to

          protect a citizen against self-inflicted private violence (there,

          noncustodial suicide) alleged to have been caused  by the state's

          implication of him in a multiple murder case.  See Souza v. Pina,
                                                         ___ _____    ____

          ___ F.3d  ___, ___ (1st Cir.  1995) [No. 94-2079, slip  op. at 9-

          11].   Interpreting  DeShaney  to  say  that  the  state  has  no
                               ________

          generalized  duty to  protect its  citizens from  violence except

          when it sets the stage by acting affirmatively (as in a custodial

          setting),  see id.  at ___ [slip  op. at  9], we  concluded that,
                     ___ ___

          although the state's acts may have "rendered [the  decedent] more

          vulnerable  to danger  in  the sense  that  those acts  may  have

                              
          ____________________

          tortfeasors  and,  therefore,  may  incur  shared  constitutional
          responsibility.   See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
                            ___ _________ ______    ____
          (1961) (advising courts to read section 1983 against the backdrop
          of historical tort liability).  Because there is no indication of
          any  such joint enterprise here,  we have no  occasion to explore
          the viability of the theory.

                                          11

          exacerbated    or even brought about    [the decedent's] suicidal

          tendencies .  . . these are not the kind of `affirmative acts' by

          the  state that  would  give rise  to  a constitutional  duty  to

          protect."   Id.  at  ___ [slip  op.  at 10]  (citing  Monahan  v.
                      ___                                       _______

          Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987,  992-93 (1st Cir.
          ________________________________

          1992)).

                    Translated to the police  milieu, these cases mean that

          when an on-duty police  officer witnesses violence, the existence

          vel non of  a constitutional  duty to intervene  will most  often
          ___ ___

          hinge on whether  he is witnessing  private violence or  violence

          attributable to state  action.   It remains  to be  seen how  and

          where the line that separates one from the other should be drawn.

                                 B.  Private Action.
                                 B.  Private Action.
                                     ______________

                    In  attempting  to  distinguish  private  violence from

          violence attributable  to state  action for purposes  of applying

          the DeShaney rule, courts  must beware simplistic solutions.   To
              ________

          be  sure,  violence  is  attributable  to  state  action  if  the

          perpetrator  is  acting under  color  of  state law,  see,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Earnest  v. Lowentritt,  690  F.2d  1198,  1200 (5th  Cir.  1982)
          _______     __________

          ("Section 1983  does not  reach all constitutional  injuries, but

          only  those  caused  by  persons  acting  `under  color of  state

          law.'"),  but  that is  a  virtual tautology.    Furthermore, the

          construct   "acting under color of state law"   rarely depends on

          any single, easily determinable fact, such as a policeman's garb,

          see, e.g., Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438,  441 (6th Cir. 1975)
          ___  ____  _______    _______

          (explaining  that whether  a  police officer  is  "in or  out  of

                                          12

          uniform  is  not controlling"),  cert.  dismissed,  429 U.S.  118
                                           _____  _________

          (1976),  duty status, see, e.g., Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545,
                                ___  ____  ________    ______

          548 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that "whether an officer was on or

          off  duty   when  the   challenged  incident  occurred"   is  not

          dispositive); Stengel,  522 F.2d  at 441 (same),  or whereabouts,
                        _______

          see,  e.g., Delcambre v. Delcambre,  635 F.2d 407,  408 (5th Cir.
          ___   ____  _________    _________

          1981)  (per curiam) (holding that  a police chief's  assault on a

          private citizen was not conduct under color of law even though it

          occurred at police  headquarters).  Nor does  "acting under color

          of  state law" depend on whether an officer stays strictly within

          the line of duty, or oversteps it.  See Monroe v. Pape, 365  U.S.
                                              ___ ______    ____

          167,  172 (1961);  Screws  v. United  States,  325 U.S.  91,  111
                             ______     ______________

          (1945).   For  instance,  a police  officer  who  exercises,  but

          misuses or exceeds, his lawfully possessed authority is generally

          thought to  be acting under color  of law.  See,  e.g., Gibson v.
                                                      ___   ____  ______

          City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1518 (7th Cir. 1990).
          _______________

                    The point is that segregating private action from state

          action  calls for  a more  sophisticated analysis.   In  general,

          section  1983 is  not implicated unless  a state  actor's conduct

          occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent  duty of

          his office, or  unless the conduct is  such that the  actor could

          not have behaved in that way but for the authority of his office.

          Thus, whether a police officer is acting under color of state law

          turns on  the nature and  circumstances of the  officer's conduct

          and  the relationship of that  conduct to the  performance of his

          official duties.   See Pickrel  v. City of  Springfield, 45  F.3d
                             ___ _______     ____________________

                                          13

          1115,  1118 (7th Cir. 1995); Anthony v. County of Sacramento, 845
                                       _______    ____________________

          F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

                    We think this focus follows inexorably from West, where
                                                                ____

          the  Court wrote  that  "[t]he traditional  definition of  acting

          under color of state law  requires that the defendant . .  . have

          exercised  power  `possessed  by virtue  of  state  law  and made

          possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority

          of state law.'"  West,  487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United  States v.
                           ____                           ______________

          Classic, 313  U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).   Hence, a person acts under
          _______

          color  of state law "when he abuses  the position given to him by

          the  State."   Id. at  50.   The key  determinant is  whether the
                         ___

          actor, at the time  in question, purposes  to act in an  official

          capacity or  to exercise  official  responsibilities pursuant  to

          state law.  See id.
                      ___ ___

                    Logically,  then,  not  every action  undertaken  by  a

          person who happens to be a  police officer is attributable to the

          state.   Though "under `color'  of law means  under `pretense' of

          law," even so, the acts of state officials "in the ambit of their

          personal pursuits" are  not state  action.  Screws,  325 U.S.  at
                                                      ______

          111;  see  also  Gibson,  910  F.2d  at  1518.    Accordingly,  a
                ___  ____  ______

          policeman's private conduct, outside the line of duty and unaided

          by  any indicia of actual  or ostensible state  authority, is not

          conduct occurring under color of state law.  See Barna v. City of
                                                       ___ _____    _______

          Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d  809, 816 (3d Cir.  1994); United States  v.
          ___________                                     _____________

          Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1991),  cert. denied, 112 S.
          _______                                      _____ ______

          Ct. 1960  (1992); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476,
                            _________    ___________________

                                          14

          479  (9th Cir.  1991); Murphy  v. Chicago  Transit Auth.,  638 F.
                                 ______     ______________________

          Supp. 464, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp.
                                           _______    _______

          933,  937 (E.D. Pa.  1968).  Even  though "acting  under color of

          law"  includes "acting under pretense  of law" for  purposes of a

          state action analysis, there can be no pretense if the challenged

          conduct  is  not related  in some  meaningful  way either  to the

          officer's  governmental  status  or  to the  performance  of  his

          duties.

                           C.  Separating Wheat from Chaff.
                           C.  Separating Wheat from Chaff.
                               ___________________________

                    Explicating the standard for segregating private action

          from action attributable to the state does not complete our task.

          Since the private conduct of police officers does  not constitute

          action attributable to  the state and,  therefore, does not  give

          rise  to section 1983  liability under DeShaney  or otherwise, we
                                                 ________

          must  determine whether  Valentin,  at  the  time  and  place  in

          question, was engaged in purely personal pursuits or, conversely,

          whether he was  acting under color  of state law.   To do so,  we

          must assess the nature of his conduct in light of the totality of

          surrounding circumstances.  See Pitchell, 13 F.3d at 548;  Revene
                                      ___ ________                   ______

          v.  Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 872-73 (4th Cir. 1989);
              ______________________

          Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980).
          ______    _______

                    Here,   the   record  is   transpicuously   clear  that

          throughout  the  course  of  Martinez' ordeal  Valentin  did  not

          exercise, or purport to  exercise, any power (real or  pretended)

          possessed by virtue of state law.  To  the contrary, Valentin was

                                          15

          bent   on  a   singularly   personal  frolic:     tormenting   an

          acquaintance.5  Though on duty  and in uniform, Valentin's status

          as  a  police officer  simply did  not  enter into  his benighted

          harassment  of his fellow officer.   Hazing of  this sort, though

          reprehensible, is not action under color or pretense of law.

                    Nor  can it be said that Valentin's actions were in any

          meaningful  way related either to  his official status  or to the

          performance of his police duties.  In this regard, the case bears

          a  resemblance to Delcambre.  There, the Fifth Circuit ruled that
                            _________

          the  plaintiff, who  had been  assaulted on  the premises  of the

          municipal police station by her brother-in-law, the police chief,

          had no cognizable  claim under 42 U.S.C.    1983.  See Delcambre,
                                                             ___ _________

          635 F.2d at 408.  The assault arose out of a family squabble, and

          the court found that the  police chief, though on duty, "was  not

          acting  under color  of  law  as  required  for  liability  under

          [section 1983]."  Id.
                            ___

                    To  be sure,  Valentin shot  Martinez with  his service

          revolver, and  in that sense it might be argued that the shooting

          was made possible by Valentin's status  as a police officer.  See
                                                                        ___

          Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding
          _______    _______

          that,  in "allegedly flourishing and threatening  to use his gun"

          against  a coworker, the defendant acted under color of state law

          because he "had authority or  power to carry the gun in  the jail

                              
          ____________________

               5To  use the  plaintiff's spoken  characterization, Valentin
          was "hors[ing] around";  or, as  plaintiff put it  in his  second
          amended complaint, "playing `Russian roulette' with another man's
          genitalia."

                                          16

          only  because he  was  [the  county's]  elected jailer").    This

          argument succumbs for  a very  basic reason:   plaintiff did  not

          proffer  it  either in  the district  court  or in  his appellate

          brief.   The argument is, therefore, not properly before us.  See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Slade, 980  F.2d 27,  30 n.3  (1st Cir.  1992)
          ______________     _____

          (stating  that  theories  not  briefed  on  appeal  are  waived);

          Teamsters, Chauffeurs,  Warehousemen & Helpers Union v. Superline
          ____________________________________________________    _________

          Transp. Co., 953  F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992)  ("If any principle
          ___________

          is  settled  in  this  circuit,  it  is  that,  absent  the  most

          extraordinary circumstances, legal  theories not raised  squarely

          in  the  lower court  cannot be  broached for  the first  time on

          appeal.").

                    Even if the  argument were properly before us, we would

          not embrace it.   We do not think  it is reasonable to hold  that

          every  use of  a policeman's  gun, even in  the course  of purely
          _____

          personal pursuits, creates a cause of  action under section 1983.

          Instead, we are of the  view that the context in which  a service

          revolver is  used, not  just the  mere fact of  its use,  must be

          consulted  to  determine  the  constitutional  relevance  of  the

          officer's conduct.   See Payne  v. Government of  D.C., 559  F.2d
                               ___ _____     ___________________

          809, 825 n.9 (D.C.  Cir. 1977).  Consequently, "[w]hile  a police

          officer's use of a  state-issue weapon in the pursuit  of private

          activities  will  have  `furthered'  the    1983  violation  in a

          literal  sense,"  a  court  needs "additional  indicia  of  state

          authority to conclude that the officer acted under color of state

          law."  Barna, 42  F.3d at 817-18 (holding that  "unauthorized use
                 _____

                                          17

          of  a police-issue nightstick is  simply not enough  to color [a]

          clearly  personal family  dispute  with the  imprimatur of  state

          authority").

                    Here,  plaintiff has not  produced any evidence tending

          to  show that his  tormentor, when  brandishing the  firearm, was

          exercising  or purporting  to  exercise police  power.6   In  the

          absence of any  additional indicia  of state  action, we  believe

          that the  unauthorized use  of a government-issue  weapon is  too

          attenuated a link  to hold together  a section 1983  claim.   See
                                                                        ___

          Barna, 42  F.3d at 818-19; Payne,  559 F.2d at 825  n.9; see also
          _____                      _____                         ___ ____

          Bonsignore v. City of  N.Y., 683 F.2d 635, 638-39 (2d  Cir. 1982)
          __________    _____________

          (holding  that a police officer  who wounded his  wife and killed

          himself  using a gun which he was  authorized to carry because of

          his status as an officer "was not acting under color of state law

          since his actions were  not `committed in the performance  of any
                              
          ____________________

               6Had Martinez been a civilian rather than a  fellow officer,
          the significance of Valentin's uniform and weapon for purposes of
          the  color-of-law  determination  might well  have  been greater.
          See, e.g., Jones  v. Gutschenritter, 909 F.2d  1208, 1212-13 (8th
          ___  ____  _____     ______________
          Cir.  1990) (observing that the presence of a uniformed and armed
          police officer may  reasonably cause a  civilian to refrain  from
          taking  action to protect  his rights).   But when  the victim is
          himself a  fellow officer and the  particular interaction between
          the  two officers is of  a distinctively personal  nature, it can
          generally  be assumed  that the  aggressor's  official trappings,
          without  more, will  not  lead the  victim  to believe  that  the
          aggressor  is acting  with the  imprimatur of  the state  and, in
          turn, to  forgo exercising his  legal rights.  The  facts in this
          case  are congruent with this hypothesis.  The campaign of terror
          that  Valentin  mounted  was  patently personal  in  nature,  and
          Martinez unquestionably  realized as much; indeed,  there was not
          the slightest indication that  Valentin's conduct was  undertaken
          pursuant to the authority of his office.   Plainly, the fact that
          Martinez walked away  numerous times  shows that he  was not  "so
          intimidated" by Valentin's status as a policeman "as to cause him
          to refrain from exercising his legal right[s]."  Id. at 1212.
                                                           ___

                                          18

          actual  or pretended duty,' but  were performed `in  the ambit of

          [his]  personal pursuits'")  (quoting  Screws, 325  U.S. at  111;
                                                 ______

          Johnson, 284 F. Supp. at 937).
          _______

                    We   add  an   eschatocol  of   sorts.     Even   if  a

          constitutional duty  to intervene conceivably  could be dragooned

          from these facts, then in that event the location of this case in

          the penumbra of DeShaney dictates that the defendants nonetheless
                          ________

          would enjoy  qualified immunity and, since  appellant's suit only

          seeks  money damages,  the  defendants would  be  entitled to  an

          affirmance on  this alternative ground.  See,  e.g., Garside, 895
                                                   ___   ____  _______

          F.2d at 48-49 (explaining that a grant of summary judgment can be

          affirmed on any independently  sufficient ground made manifest in

          the record).  We elaborate below.

                    "In analyzing a claim  of qualified immunity, . .  . we

          are   concerned  with   clearly  established   constitutional  or
                                  ____________________

          statutory rights of which  a reasonable officer would  have known

          at the time he took action."  Crooker v. Metallo, 5 F.3d 583, 584
                                        _______    _______

          (1st  Cir. 1993) (emphasis supplied).  When used in this context,

          the phrase "clearly established" has a well-defined meaning.   It

          denotes  that at  the time  the challenged  conduct occurred  the

          contours  of the right were sufficiently  plain that a reasonably

          prudent  state  actor would  have  realized not  merely  that his

          conduct  might  be  wrong,  but  that  it violated  a  particular

          constitutional right.  See  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.  635,
                                 ___  ________    _________

          640  (1987); Buenrostro  v. Collazo,  973 F.2d  39, 42  (1st Cir.
                       __________     _______

          1992).  The inquiry into the nature of a constitutional right for

                                          19

          the purpose of ascertaining clear establishment seeks to discover

          whether the right was  reasonably well settled at the time of the

          challenged  conduct and  whether  the manner  in which  the right

          related to the conduct was apparent.  See Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d
                                                ___ _____    _____

          993,  995 (4th Cir.  1994) (Powell, J.,  sitting by designation).

          In mounting this inquiry,  courts may neither require that  state

          actors faultlessly  anticipate the future trajectory  of the law,

          see Crooker,  5 F.3d at  585 (noting  that a state  actor is  not
          ___ _______

          "expected  to  carry  a  crystal ball"),  nor  permit  claims  of

          qualified  immunity to turn on the eventual outcome of a hitherto

          problematic  constitutional  analysis,  see,  e.g.,   Collins  v.
                                                  ___   ____    _______

          Marina-Martinez, 894  F.2d 474, 478 (1st  Cir. 1990) (recognizing
          _______________

          that "a plaintiff who is entitled to prevail on the merits is not

          necessarily  entitled  to  prevail  on  the  issue  of  qualified

          immunity");  accord Amsden  v. Moran,  904 F.2d 748,  751-52 (1st
                       ______ ______     _____

          Cir.  1990)  (citing other  cases), cert.  denied, 498  U.S. 1041
                                              _____  ______

          (1991).

                    Here, there can  be no  doubt that, at  the moment  the

          maiming of Martinez  materialized, legitimate questions  abounded

          as   to  whether   the  conduct   at  issue   violated  Martinez'

          constitutional  rights.   After  all, DeShaney  had not  yet been
                                                ________

          decided; thus,  the whole  question of  a constitutional duty  to

          intervene  was  cloaked  in  uncertainty.    Even now,  with  the

          guidance furnished by the DeShaney Court, the precise contours of
                                    ________

          the  rule  as  it   applies  to  onlooker  officers   are  murky.

          Consequently,  even if Martinez had  some basis for  a claim that

                                          20

          the  defendants owed him a duty grounded in the Constitution, the

          dimensions of  the right  were dimly  perceived (if  perceived at

          all).    It  follows  inexorably  that  the  defendants would  be

          entitled  to qualified  immunity and,  hence, entitled  to brevis
                                                                     ______

          disposition.

                                 D.  Other Theories.
                                 D.  Other Theories.
                                     ______________

                    In  addition   to  his  principal  due  process  claim,

          Martinez advances  several other  theories.  All  are unavailing.

          We mention three of them (rejecting the remainder without further

          elaboration).

                    1.   Violation of Local  Law.  Martinez  urges that the
                    1.   Violation of Local  Law.
                         _______________________

          defendants' breach  of a provision  of Puerto Rico's  Civil Code,

          P.R. Laws Ann.  tit. 25,    1003 (1980),7  furnishes a basis  for

          liability under 42 U.S.C.   1983.  He is wrong.

                    It  is established  beyond  peradventure  that a  state

          actor's  failure to observe a duty imposed by state law, standing

          alone, is not a sufficient foundation on which to erect a section

          1983 claim.   See, e.g., Amsden,  904 F.2d at  757; Chongris, 811
                        ___  ____  ______                     ________

          F.2d  at  42-43.    Although  it  is  true  that   constitutional

          significance  may attach  to certain  interests created  by state
                              
          ____________________

               7The statute provides in pertinent part that police officers
          have a duty

                    to protect persons and property,  to maintain
                    and keep  the public  order,  to observe  and
                    secure  the utmost  protection  of the  civil
                    rights  of the  citizens,  to prevent  . .  .
                    crime and . . . enforce obedience to the laws
                    . . . .

          P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 25,   1003 (1980).

                                          21

          law,  see, e.g.,  Chongris,  811  F.2d  at 43  (recognizing  that
                ___  ____   ________

          "property rights,  while protected  by the  federal Constitution,

          are creatures  of state law"),  not every transgression  of state

          law  does  double  duty  as  a  constitutional  violation.    The

          Constitution  is a  charter  of carefully  enumerated rights  and

          responsibilities,  defining the  relationship between  the people

          and  a government of limited  powers.  Its  scope and application

          are necessarily determined by its own terms.  Though grand in its

          design and eloquent in  its phrasing, the Constitution is  not an

          empty  ledger  awaiting  the  entry of  an  aggrieved  litigant's

          recitation  of  alleged state  law  violations    no  matter  how

          egregious  those violations  may  appear within  the local  legal

          framework.8

                    Moreover, while  the plaintiff states that section 1003

          creates a constitutionally protected "entitlement" under Board of
                                                                   ________

          Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972), he does not develop
          _______    ____

          the thesis   and we do not see  how Roth applies.  Neither Roth's
                                              ____                   ____

          focus  nor its procedural design bears any similarity to the case

          at  hand.   For  one  thing, the  Roth  Court's  conception of  a
                                            ____

          cognizable constitutional  entitlement  was limited  to  property

          interests.    See id.  (citing Goldberg  v.  Kelly, 397  U.S. 254
                        ___ ___          ________      _____

          (1970)).  We  fail to  intuit how Roth  supports the  plaintiff's
                                            ____

                              
          ____________________

               8The absence of a constitutional duty to intervene in no way
                                 ______________
          detracts from the callous nature of the conduct attributed to the
          officers in this case,  nor does it imply that  onlooker officers
          confronted by  private violence may not have  a state law duty to
          intervene.   That question, quite simply, lies beyond the borders
          of this opinion.

                                          22

          claim that he had an entitlement, pursuant to section 1003, to be

          protected  in  his  physical  person.   For  another  thing,  the

          remedial framework contemplated by Roth   procedural due process,
                                             ____

          principally in the form of notice and a hearing, see id. at 577  
                                                           ___ ___

          has no applicability at all to Martinez'  remonstrance.  Whatever

          other  uncertainties  may  plague this  case,  it  is  clear that

          Martinez is claiming a  substantive due process violation,  not a
                                  ___________

          procedural due process violation.  See, e.g., Amsden, 904 F.2d at
          __________                         ___  ____  ______

          753-54 (delineating differences).

                    In  sum, Roth is a round hole, and Martinez' square peg
                             ____

          of a case does not fit within it.

                    2.   Equal Protection.   The plaintiff  makes the  bold
                    2.   Equal Protection.
                         ________________

          assertion  that he  was denied  rights secured  to him  under the

          Equal Protection Clause because, were  he a private citizen,  the

          defendants  would almost certainly have  come to his  rescue.  He

          does  not embellish this ipse  dixit in any  way.9  Consequently,
                                   ____  _____

          it  does not assist  his cause.   "It is settled  in this circuit

          that  issues  adverted to  on  appeal  in a  perfunctory  manner,

          unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed to have

          been abandoned."   Ryan v. Royal  Ins. Co. of Am.,  916 F.2d 731,
                             ____    ______________________

          734 (1st Cir. 1990); accord United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1,
                               ______ _____________    _______
                              
          ____________________

               9This criticism  rests neither  on the economy  of Martinez'
          asseveration nor  on its  potential incoherence, but,  rather, on
          the  utter lack of any  legal foundation provided  for the claim;
                                  _____
          Martinez  makes  reference  to  no constitutional  provision,  no
          statute, no case law, no treatise, not even a law review article.
          Parties  to   legal  controversies  must  do   more  than  allege
          unsupported  facts to survive summary judgment;  they must at the
          very  least explain the basis for, and the legal significance of,
          those facts.

                                          23

          17 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  494 U.S. 1082  (1990); Collins  v.
                          _____ ______                          _______

          Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474, 481 n.9 (1st Cir. 1990).  So it is
          _______________

          here:   the  plaintiff's fleeting  reference to  equal protection

          does not succeed in preserving the issue for review.10

                    3.   Supervisory  Liability.   Finally,  the  plaintiff
                    3.   Supervisory  Liability.
                         ______________________

          maintains that Trinidad, if  not liable under section 1983  as an

          onlooker officer, may  be held  liable qua  shift supervisor  for
                                                 ___

          Valentin's  acts.   "Supervisory  liability  attaches  only if  a

          plaintiff can  demonstrate by material of  evidentiary quality an

          affirmative  link  between  the  supervisor's   conduct  and  the

          underlying section 1983 violation."  Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-
                                               _______________    _________

          Rodriguez,  23 F.3d  576, 583  (1st Cir.  1994); see  also Febus-
          _________                                        ___  ____ ______

          Rodriguez  v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d  87, 92 (1st Cir. 1994);
          _________     _________________

          Gutierrez-Rodriguez  v. Cartagena,  882 F.2d  553, 562  (1st Cir.
          ___________________     _________

          1989).   Because no  underlying constitutional violation  in fact

          occurred, see supra Part III(C), no  supervisory liability can be
                    ___ _____

                              
          ____________________

               10To the extent that  our dissenting colleague proposes that
          the defendants'  nonintervention cannot be  deemed rational,  see
                                                                        ___
          post at pp. 30-31, this is merely another way of disagreeing with
          our conclusion  that Valentin's conduct was  private, not public.
          As  for  the larger  issue  of drawing  distinctions  between the
          private and the public, we note simply that such distinctions are
          regularly  and validly  drawn by  courts and  legislatures alike.
          See, e.g., Westlands  Water Dist.  v. Amoco Chem.  Co., 953  F.2d
          ___  ____  ______________________     ________________
          1109,  1113  (9th  Cir.  1991)  (finding  a  rational  basis  for
          distinguishing between  public and private tortfeasors  in regard
          to  recovery of  punitive damages); Southern  Cal. Edison  Co. v.
                                              __________________________
          United States, 415 F.2d  758, 760 (9th Cir.) (noting  that "under
          _____________
          the  equal  protection  clause  the  separate  classification  of
          privately  and  publicly  owned  utilities  has  long  been  held
          justifiable"), cert. denied,  396 U.S.  957 (1969).   It is  this
                         _____ ______
          very  distinction   public  versus private    that undergirds not
          only DeShaney but also the Bill of Rights itself.
               ________

                                          24

          attributed to Trinidad under section 1983.11

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go no further.  Because the defendants' failure

          to intervene and protect the plaintiff against Valentin's private

          actions,  though regrettable,  cannot  be said  to have  violated

          rights   secured  to   the   plaintiff  by   the  United   States

          Constitution,  see DeShaney,  489  U.S. at  196-97, the  district
                         ___ ________

          court did not err  in summarily disposing of the  federal claims.

          And, once the court determined so far in advance of trial that no

          legitimate federal question existed, the jurisdictional basis for

          plaintiff's pendent claims under Puerto Rico law evaporated.  See
                                                                        ___

          Brennan, 888 F.2d at 196.  Thus, the court properly dismissed the
          _______

          balance of the complaint.12

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                    Dissent follows  

                              
          ____________________

               11Moreover,  Trinidad was not  the supervisor  on Valentin's
          shift  (during  which Martinez  was  shot), but,  rather,  on the
          subsequent 4:00  a.m. to  12 noon  shift.  Thus,  it is  far from
          clear that supervisory liability would be a  viable theory vis-a-
          vis Trinidad even if an underlying constitutional violation could
          be shown.

               12Of course,  the  dismissal operates  without prejudice  to
          whatever  rights  plaintiff may  have  to  prosecute the  pendent
          claims in the courts of  Puerto Rico.  See Feinstein v.  RTC, 942
                                                 ___ _________     ___
          F.2d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 1991).

                                          25

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.   For the
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              ____________________

            reasons that follow, I  cannot join the majority opinion.   I

            start  with  the  facts.   Although  the  majority's  factual

            recitation  is  not  inaccurate,  it  is  not  a  full-bodied

            portrayal of what happened.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                      Plaintiff, Martinez,  was a young (age  twenty) and

            comparatively new member of the Puerto Rico Police Force.  On

            the day of the events giving rise to this case, he arrived at

            the police station  sufficiently early to  be given his  duty

            assignment.   Martinez parked  his car in  the police parking

            lot.   He got out of  his car and started  towards the police

            station to get his orders for the day.  There were four other

            police officers in the  lot:  the defendants --  Colon, V lez

            and Trinidad -- and Valentin, who is not a defendant.  As the

            majority  acknowledges, the defendants  were, at all relevant

            times, on duty as  police officers and acting under  color of

            state  law.   The three  defendants observed the  events that

            took  place in  the parking  lot and  the police  station and

            heard Valentin's  denigrating remarks  to Martinez.   None of

            the defendants asked Valentin to stop his verbal and physical

            assaults  against Martinez.  To put it starkly, they stood by

            and  watched without protest  Valentin "blow away" Martinez's

            penis.

                                          26

                      As Martinez walked across the parking lot, Valentin

            said  to the defendants,  "Here comes Pretty  Boy."  Valentin

            then accosted Martinez, drew his service revolver, pointed it

            directly  at  Martinez's genital  area,  cocked  it, put  his

            finger on the trigger,  asked Martinez if he was  afraid, and

            then  lowered the revolver.  Martinez  told Valentin:  "Don't

            horse around with that  because you will kill me."   Martinez

            then  proceeded into the station  house.  A  short time later

            Valentin again  confronted Martinez; this time  he pushed his

            finger through a hole in Martinez's undershirt and ripped the

            shirt open.  The  record does not disclose whether  any words

            were  spoken  at this  juncture.    Martinez put  his  police

            uniform on  and reported  to his shift  supervisor, defendant

            Trinidad.

                      A  short   time  later  Valentin   again  assaulted

            Martinez.     This   assault   was  similar   to  the   first

            confrontation,  but  with  an  ominous  threat.    This  time

            Valentin pushed  the muzzle of his loaded and cocked revolver

            into the front of  Martinez's pants  and threatened  to "blow

            away" Martinez's penis.   Valentin then asked Martinez  if he

            was  scared.   After Valentin  withdrew the  weapon, Martinez

            moved away from him.

                      A short time later, within minutes,  Valentin again

            accosted Martinez.   He loaded  and cocked  his revolver  and

            then inserted  it into  the front  of Martinez's pants  while

                                          27

            continuing to verbally  abuse him.   The  charade ended  when

            Valentin's  revolver  discharged.    Valentin's  prior threat

            became a reality; Martinez's penis was in fact blown away and

            he was rendered permanently impotent.

                      The  majority  calls  the  shooting  accidental and

            says,  "All parties  agree  that  the  shooting  .  .  .  was

            unintentional."    Ante at  4.    Whether  the  shooting  was
                               ____

            accidental or not, it can  be concluded, based on  Valentin's

            words and actions, that it was an accident  that was bound to

            happen.  What Valentin did makes Russian roulette seem like a

            parlor game.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                      The  majority's central  holding is  premised on  a

            ruling that Valentin was not acting under color of state law.

            In my view,  the facts taken  in the light most  favorable to

            plaintiff establish  that Valentin was acting  under color of

            state law.  

                      As  the majority  points out:   "`[T]he traditional

            definition of acting under  color of state law  requires that

            the  defendant have  exercised power  possessed by  virtue of

            state law  and made  possible only  because the  wrongdoer is

            clothed  with the  authority  of the  state.'"   Ante  at  13
                                                             ____

            (quoting West  v. Atkins, 487  U.S. 42, 49  (1988)) (ellipses
                     ____     ______

            and  internal quotation  marks omitted).   Simply  stated, "a

            person  acts under  color of  state law  `when he  abuses the

                                          28

            position  given him by the  State.'"  Id.  (quoting West, 487
                                                  ___           ____

            U.S. at 50).  I think that Valentin exercised power possessed

            by virtue of Puerto  Rico law and made possible  only because

            he was clothed with the authority of Puerto Rico, and that he

            abused that power.

                      Even if  I disregard  the obvious --  that Valentin

            was in uniform, on duty, in the police station, and used  his

            service  revolver to commit  the tort (all  of which militate

            heavily  in  favor  of a  finding  that  Valentin  abused his

            position as a  police officer) --  I believe that  Valentin's

            status as a police officer was the only reason the defendants

            took  no action.  If Valentin  had been a private citizen and

            had  been  tormenting  Martinez   in  the  same  manner,  the

            bystander  officers certainly  would  have  intervened.   The

            record gives  rise to a reasonable  inference that Valentin's

            police-officer status led the bystander officers  to conclude

            that:   (1) Valentin was not mentally unbalanced to the point

            that he  might actually shoot  Martinez, but a  stable person

            only engaged in harassment or horseplay; and (2) Valentin was

            skilled  enough with firearms to be allowed to engage in this

            sort of stupidity.  Consequently, the record gives rise to an

            inference that Valentin's  police-officer status  was a  sine
                                                                     ____

            qua non of  the bystander officers' non-intervention.   In my
            ___ ___

            view,  this inference  establishes  that Valentin  was acting

            under color of state law. 

                                          29

                      The majority suggests  that Martinez's status as  a
                                                  __________

            police  officer somehow reduced  the likelihood that Martinez

            perceived Valentin  to be acting  with the imprimatur  of the

            Commonwealth.  See  id. at 17  n.6.  I  believe the  opposite
                           ___  ___

            conclusion is  at least  as likely  to be  true.   After  the

            bystander officers  (including Trinidad, who  had supervisory

            authority) failed  to intervene during the  initial rounds of

            abuse by  Valentin, Martinez  could well have  concluded that

            this  type of hazing of  young officers was  standard fare in

            the Loiza  Street Precinct.   Therefore, Martinez  could well

            have  believed that the Commonwealth acquiesced in Valentin's

            actions.

                      Because Valentin  was acting  under color  of state

            law,  I think  it pellucid  that DeShaney  does not  bar this
                                             ________

            suit.    At most,  DeShaney  precludes  civil rights  actions
                               ________

            against state actors under the Due Process Clause for failing

            to protect an individual against  private violence.  See  489
                                              _______            ___

            U.S. at 197.  The DeShaney majority took pains to distinguish
                              ________

            the case before  it from situations  where the state  itself,

            through its own affirmative action prior to the complained-of

            non-intervention, limited the victim's  freedom.  Id. at 198-
                                                              ___

            201 (contrasting situations where the state has taken custody

            of   certain   individuals   and   thereby   incurred   "some

            responsibility for  [their] safety and  well-being").   Here,

            the  Commonwealth,  acting through  the  person of  Valentin,

                                          30

            compromised Martinez's freedom by successively assaulting him

            three  times with a loaded  service revolver.   See West, 487
                                                            ___ ____

            U.S. at  49.   In my  view, this  infringement was  more than

            sufficient  to support  Martinez's  substantive  due  process

            claim.   DeShaney, 489 U.S.  at 200 ("In  the substantive due
                     ________

            process  analysis,  it  is  the State's  affirmative  act  of

            restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf

            --  through  incarceration,  institutionalization,  or  other

            similar  restraint  of  personal  liberty  --  which  is  the

            `deprivation of  liberty' triggering the  protections of  the

            Due Process Clause.").   

                      I believe it important to comment on three discrete

            parts of the  majority opinion.   The majority concedes  that

            Valentin's use  of his service revolver  might arguably bring

            his actions within the color of state law.  Ante at 16.  This
                                                        ____

            is  then rejected on two grounds:   that it was not raised in

            the district court or plaintiff's appellate brief; and on the

            merits.  I cannot help but wonder why the straw man  approach

            was used.  In any event, I disagree on both grounds.

                      Fairly   construed,    Martinez's   argument   that

            Valentin's status  as an  on-duty police  officer made  him a

            state actor incorporates the  argument that Valentin used the

            indicia  and  tools  of  his  trade  (including  his  service

            revolver) to  carry out the shooting.   For me,  this is more

            than enough to  allow us  to consider Valentin's  use of  his

                                          31

            service  revolver as a factor in determining whether he was a

            state actor.

                      I  am also  am troubled  by the  majority's finding

            that  Martinez waived his equal protection claim.  Id. at 22.
                                                               ___

            As an initial  matter, I think it important to state that the

            claim appears to have some substance.  How, after all, can it

            be rational  for bystander  officers not to  intervene simply

            because one  of their own --  as opposed to a  civilian -- is

            being   victimized  by  violence?     What  legitimate  state

            objective could such inaction serve?

                      The majority  finds  that Martinez  abandoned  this

            claim because he failed to  "embellish" it sufficiently.  Id.
                                                                      ___

            I do  not think that the  issue needed any  embellishing.  It

            was called  an equal  protection claim and  stated relatively

            clearly:  "If Wilfredo  had been a private citizen,  it seems

            clear that defendants-appellees would have realized that they

            were obliged under the law to protect  him from the threat of

            serious damages."  Appellant's Brief at 9.  In my view,  this

            was sufficient to put the claim in issue.

                      Finally,  I  think  it   important  to  refute  the

            majority's  suggestion  that  Valentin might  not  have  been

            acting under color  of state law even if Martinez  had been a
                                             ____ __

            civilian.   Ante  at 17  n.6 ("Had  Martinez been  a civilian
                        ____

            rather than a fellow  officer, the significance of Valentin's

            uniform   and  weapon   for  purposes  of   the  color-of-law

                                          32

            determination  might  well  have  been  greater.")  (emphasis
                           _____  ____  ____  ____

            supplied).   I find the suggestion remarkable.  If a civilian

            had suffered the  abuse Martinez experienced at  the hands of

            an  on-duty,  uniformed  police  officer  using  his  service
                _________________________________________________________

            revolver  in front  of other  officers in  a police  station,
            ____________________________________________________________

            well-settled  precedent  would  dictate a  finding  that  the

            civilian  was victimized under color of state law.  We should

            not even hint that this may not be so.

                                         III.
                                         III.

                      I also cannot agree with the majority's  conclusion

            that  an  unargued  qualified  immunity  theory  provides  an

            alternative ground for affirmance  in this case.  See  id. at
                                                              ___  ___

            18-20.

                      Under the qualified immunity  doctrine, "government

            officials performing discretionary functions[]  generally are

            shielded from  liability for  civil damages insofar  as their

            conduct  does not  violate  clearly established  statutory or

            constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

            known."  Harlow v.  Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  In
                     ______     __________

            determining whether a right  was "clearly established" at the

            relevant  point  in  time,  courts must  analyze  it  at  the

            appropriate  level  of specificity.    Thus, a  right  is not

            "clearly established" for qualified immunity  purposes unless

            its  contours are  sufficiently clear  so "that  a reasonable

                                          33

            official would understand that what he is doing violated that

            right."  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
                     ________    _________

                      The majority suggests that Martinez's right to have

            the bystander  officers intervene on his  behalf was "cloaked

            in uncertainty" and was  "murky" at the time of  the relevant

            events.   I  disagree.   As  the  majority concedes,  it  was

            settled at the time of the events in this case that 

                      [a]n officer who is present  at the scene
                      [of  an  arrest]  and who  fails  to take
                      reasonable steps to protect the victim of
                      another officer's use of  excessive force
                      can be held liable under section 1983 for
                      his nonfeasance,  provided that he  had a
                      realistic  opportunity   to  prevent  the
                      other officer's actions.   

            Ante at  9 (citations and internal  quotation marks omitted).
            ____

            In my view, this line of authority controls here.  

                      The  majority  distinguishes   this  precedent   by

            suggesting  that it  is  inapplicable  where  the  tortfeasor

            officer is not acting under the  color of state law, and then

            concludes  that Valentin  was not  so acting  here.   For the

            reasons I have explained above (and despite the opinion of my

            esteemed  colleagues), I  do  not think  that an  objectively

            reasonable police officer could have seen Valentin's  actions

            as purely private.  And because Valentin was acting under the

            color  of  state  law,   the  aforementioned  authority   was

            sufficient to have informed defendants of their obligation to

            intervene  on Martinez's behalf.   See Anderson,  483 U.S. at
                                               ___ ________

            640 ("This is not to say that an official action is protected

                                          34

            by qualified immunity unless the very  action in question has

            previously been held unlawful, but  it is to say that  in the

            light   of  pre-existing   law   the  unlawfulness   must  be

            apparent.")  (citation omitted).   If excessive  force during

            the course of  a lawful arrest requires  intervention, so too

            should an  assault with a  deadly weapon taking  place during

            the  course of  an entirely  unlawful seizure.    I therefore
                                         ________

            disagree with the majority's qualified immunity analysis.

                                         IV.
                                         IV.

                      Police  officers are entrusted with great powers --

            including the privileged use of force -- for the very purpose

            of preventing lawless violence.  When an officer abuses those

            powers in front  of his  peers, he in  effect presumes  their

            tacit  acquiescence,  if  not  outright approval.    In  this

            situation, the  other officers have a  constitutional duty to

            intervene.  I therefore respectfully dissent.

                                          35