Court Opinion

ID: 9900964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 21:03:27.374883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:23.114561
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 P. v. Eaton CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096853

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 93F04514)

           v.

 JOHN ALLEN EATON,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 1993, defendant John Allen Eaton was convicted of first degree murder and
second degree robbery with numerous enhancements and sentenced to 41 years to life. In
2022, Eaton petitioned for resentencing. After striking Eaton’s prior prison term
enhancement as legally invalid, the trial court declined to further modify his sentence and
otherwise reimposed the original sentence. On appeal, Eaton argues the court erred by
failing to strike all but one of his enhancements and by relying on aggravating
circumstances that were not properly proven. We will affirm the judgment. Due to a
clerical error in the abstract, we shall order the clerk of the superior court to correct the
abstract of judgment to delete Eaton’s prior prison term enhancement.

                                                             1
                                      BACKGROUND
       On October 9, 1992, T.F. and his grandmother E.S.1 were leaving a restaurant
when they were confronted by Eaton and Walter Maurice Savage. Savage grabbed E.S.’s
purse while Eaton pointed a semiautomatic handgun at T.F. and demanded his wallet.
When T.F. did not respond, Eaton shot T.F. in the right temple, killing him. A jury found
Eaton guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))2 and second degree
robbery (§ 211) with firearm use enhancements for both offenses (former § 12022.5,
subd. (a)). The trial court found true that Eaton had a prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court
sentenced Eaton to 25 years to life for the murder conviction; five years (the upper term)
for the robbery conviction; five years (the upper term at the time) for the firearm use
enhancement for the murder; five years for the prior serious felony enhancement; and one
year for the prior prison term enhancement.
       In June 2022, Eaton petitioned for resentencing on numerous grounds, asserting
that: (1) the sentence for his prior prison term enhancement was now legally invalid
pursuant to section 1172.75 (former section 1171.1); (2) all but one of his enhancements
should be stricken pursuant to section 1385; and (3) he should be sentenced to the lower
term for the robbery conviction.3 As to that final argument, Eaton contended that he was

1 To protect their privacy, we refer to the victims by their first and last name initials.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) Undesignated rule references are to the California
Rules of Court.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 The record is silent as to whether the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
provided Eaton’s name and case number to the trial court prior to the resentencing. (See
§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) We presume the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
performed its duty by the statutory deadline of July 1, 2022—well before the trial court
recalled and resentenced Eaton in this case. (See Evid. Code, § 664.)

                                              2
“eligible” for the lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B) because he was
under 26 years old at the time of the offense. He further argued that the lower term was
appropriate because the aggravating circumstances from his original sentencing could not
be considered now as they had not been properly proven under section 1170.
       At the resentencing hearing, the trial court first noted that Eaton was 22 years old
at the time of the offense but made no finding that his youth was a contributing factor in
the commission of the offense. The court then stated that “[t]he aggravating factors in
this particular case include the following:” (1) a prior 1991 conviction for receiving
stolen property and a prior 1989 conviction for battery causing serious bodily injury (rule
4.421(b)(2)); (2) prior prison terms for both of those convictions (rule 4.421(b)(3));
(3) that “defendant engaged in multiple conduct violations including violence and
demonstrating he is a serious danger to society,” citing specifically his 1988 battery of
multiple security guards while committing theft, his 1989 battery causing serious bodily
injury to a vice principal, and the present robbery and murder convictions (rule
4.421(b)(1)); (4) that his “prior performance on probation or under juvenile supervision is
clearly unsatisfactory” (rule 4.421(b)(5)); and (5) that “defendant was on parole at the
time of the commission of this current crime” (rule 4.421(b)(4)).
       Next, the trial court found that Eaton’s “CDC&R performance includes the
following,” before listing on the record Eaton’s numerous prison rule violations. Finally,
immediately before pronouncing the sentence, the court noted that the original sentencing
judge in 1993 found Eaton’s past crimes were “numerous and of increasing seriousness.”
       The trial court ultimately agreed that the one-year sentence for Eaton’s prior
prison term was no longer valid but disagreed that section 1385 mandated the dismissal
of all but a single enhancement. The court went on to conclude that Eaton was not
entitled to any relief under section 1385 because “he is a continuing danger to the
community.” It then reimposed the upper term of five years for both the robbery
conviction and the firearm use enhancement, and five years for the prior serious felony

                                             3
enhancement. In total, Eaton’s sentence was reduced by one year due to the court
striking the prior prison term enhancement. Eaton filed a notice of appeal with this court
in August 2022. His opening brief was filed in December 2022, and this case was fully
briefed on June 14, 2023.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                            Striking All But a Single Enhancement
       Eaton argues that the trial court was required to strike all but a single enhancement
pursuant to section 1385. We disagree.
       “In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) . . .
which amended section 1385 to specify factors that the trial court must consider when
deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of
justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.)
Subdivision (c)(1) of section 1385 as amended provides: “Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,
except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.”
Subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 provides in relevant part: “In exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” The pertinent
factor here is contained in subdivision (c)(2)(B) of section 1385: “Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a
single enhancement shall be dismissed.”

                                              4
        Taken together, these provisions provide the trial court with the discretion to
decide not to dismiss the enhancement due to the mitigating factors in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), if the court finds the dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18; People v. Walker (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 386, 391, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.) Here, the trial court
made such a finding when it found Eaton was “a continuing danger to society” and thus
declined to dismiss all enhancements beyond a single enhancement. Eaton does not
challenge this factual finding on appeal. We conclude that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion under section 1385.
                                               II
             Upper Terms for Robbery Conviction and Firearm Enhancement
        Eaton next argues that the trial court violated his constitutional and statutory rights
by reimposing the upper terms for the robbery conviction and the firearm enhancement
based on aggravating circumstances not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or
stipulated to by Eaton. More specifically, Eaton contends that three of the aggravating
factors found by the court involve subjective determinations and thus had to be submitted
to a jury: (1) that “defendant engaged in multiple conduct violations including violence
and demonstrating he is a serious danger to society”; (2) that his “prior performance on
probation or under juvenile supervision is clearly unsatisfactory”; and (3) that his
offenses were “numerous and of increasing seriousness.” (Bolding omitted.) We find no
constitutional error but agree that the court relied on aggravators not proven in
accordance with section 1170. We further conclude that this error was harmless.
        As an initial matter, Eaton argued in the trial court that he should be resentenced to
only the lower term for the robbery conviction—not for both the robbery conviction and
the firearm enhancement, as he now argues. Because Eaton’s argument as to the firearm
enhancement was not raised below, it is forfeited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331,
356.)

                                               5
       Turning to Eaton’s constitutional challenge, the trial court did not violate his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing an upper term sentence in this case. In
general, “imposition of the upper term does not infringe upon the defendant’s
constitutional right to jury trial so long as one legally sufficient aggravating circumstance
has been found to exist by the jury, has been admitted by the defendant, or is justified
based upon the defendant’s record of prior convictions.” (People v. Black (2007)
41 Cal.4th 799, 816.) This is true because under current California law, like under prior
law in place until 2007, a jury’s finding of a single aggravating circumstance is sufficient
to make a defendant eligible for an upper term sentence. (Id. at pp. 812-816; see also
People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1111-1112 (Zabelle).)
       Here, numerous aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court were
found in compliance with the Sixth Amendment. First, the trial court found that Eaton
had two prior convictions. Eaton did not object below to the records establishing these
convictions nor does he challenge these aggravating circumstances on appeal. As
findings of prior convictions, the trial court established these facts in compliance with the
Sixth Amendment. Similarly, the trial court established that Eaton had served two prior
prison terms and was on parole at the time he robbed and murdered T.F. Our Supreme
Court has held that these findings do not infringe the right to a jury trial. (People v.
Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 81-82.) Because any one of these aggravating
circumstances rendered Eaton eligible for an upper term sentence under current law, the
trial court’s reliance on other factors did not violate his constitutional rights. (See id. at
p. 86; Harris v. United States (2002) 536 U.S. 545, 558 [“Judicial factfinding in the
course of selecting a sentence within the authorized range does not implicate the
indictment, jury-trial, and reasonable-doubt components of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments”].)

                                               6
       Though the trial court did not violate the Sixth Amendment, it did violate
section 1170, subdivision (b). Under this provision, an upper term sentence must be
justified by circumstances in aggravation, and the facts underlying those circumstances
must have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2).) An exception
to this rule authorizes the court to consider Eaton’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on certified records of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to the jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) Here, none of the aggravating
circumstances were found in compliance with section 1170, as they were not stipulated to
by Eaton, found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or by the judge in a bench trial,
or based on certified records of conviction.4
       That said, the California Constitution forbids us from vacating Eaton’s sentence
based on this error alone. Rather, we must determine, “after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence,” whether the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) In other words, we must affirm a judgment unless “it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) In
this context, we first determine whether a jury would have found any of the underlying
facts not true and “then, with the aggravating facts that survive this review, consider
whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence
had it considered only these aggravating facts.” (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1112.)

4 The People note that Eaton waived his right to a jury trial as to the fact of his prior
convictions and prior prison terms at the original trial in 1993. But there is no evidence
of this jury trial waiver in the appellate record, and regardless, the People do not rely on
this waiver in their opposition.

                                                7
       We are confident a jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts
underlying Eaton’s prior convictions, prior prison terms, and his parole status at the time
of the offense. The probation report detailed Eaton’s criminal history and parole status,
and we presume the probation officer performed his statutory duty properly. (Evid.
Code, § 664; § 1203, subds. (b), (g).) Importantly, Eaton did not object to or dispute this
evidence at the resentencing hearing, despite having the opportunity to do so (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(4)) and despite the relative ease with which Eaton could have obtained records
from these cases if the probation officer was mistaken (see, e.g., §§ 11120-11127; Gov.
Code, § 68152, subd. (c)). And as noted, Eaton does not even challenge these
aggravators in the present appeal.
       We are also confident the jury would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
Eaton’s prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory. Not only did Eaton
commit the present robbery and murder while on parole, but the probation report details
numerous other instances in which he violated probation or parole. For instance, he had
been sentenced to three years of informal probation on April 5, 1989, only to be arrested
seven days later for a battery causing serious bodily injury, an offense for which he was
ultimately convicted. Similarly, he violated his parole when he was found in possession
of stolen property in 1991. His parole officer also notes that Eaton “could be considered
a failure on parole” and that he “had made minimal progress.”
       On the other hand, we are not confident a jury would have found true the facts
underlying the two remaining aggravating circumstances relied on by the trial court.
Whether Eaton “engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society”
and whether his past offenses were “numerous and of increasing seriousness” rest on a
somewhat vague and subjective standard, which makes it difficult “to conclude with
confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed
the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” (People v. Sandoval (2007)
41 Cal.4th 825, 840.) We are also mindful that we “cannot necessarily assume that the

                                             8
record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented had aggravating
circumstances been submitted to the jury.” (Id. at p. 839.) Accordingly, we cannot say
with confidence that the jury would have found the facts underlying these circumstances
true beyond a reasonable doubt.
       As to Eaton’s prison rule violations, the People submit that the trial court did not
consider those violations as an aggravating circumstance in selecting the upper terms but,
rather, only considered them when denying relief under section 1385. We agree. The
sentencing pronouncement started with the court expressly listing Eaton’s aggravating
circumstances, saying, “[t]he aggravating factors in this particular case include the
following.” Then, subsequently and distinctly, the court went on to list Eaton’s prison
rule violations, saying, “[h]is CDC&R performance includes the following.” As such, the
court did not consider Eaton’s prison rule violations to be an aggravating circumstance
but instead considered those violations only for the purposes of the court’s section 1385
finding. This is consistent with the prosecution’s sentencing brief below, as Eaton’s
prison rule violations were discussed only as to the section 1385 issue and not mentioned
when arguing against the lower term for the robbery conviction.
       Having determined that four of the six aggravating circumstances would have
been found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, we next determine whether there is a
reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence had the court
known it could not rely on the two improper aggravating circumstances. (Zabelle, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.) A reasonable probability “does not mean more likely than
not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (College
Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.) In this context, a reasonable
probability of a more favorable result exists where the improper factor was determinative
for the sentencing court or where the reviewing court cannot determine whether the
improper factor was determinative. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233.)

                                             9
       We see no reasonable probability the trial court would impose a lesser sentence
had the trial court relied solely on the four aggravating circumstances that remain. Under
section 1170, subdivision (b) the middle term is the presumptive sentence for a term of
imprisonment. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464.) While Eaton
argued he was eligible for the lower term due to his age at the time of his offense, the
court made no finding that his age “was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The court placed particular emphasis on the violence of
Eaton’s criminal history when considering his prior convictions, specifically citing to his
1988 battery of multiple security guards while committing theft; his 1989 conviction for
battery causing serious bodily injury for attacking a vice principal at Encina High School
causing multiple fractures (which the trial court mentioned several times); and the present
robbery and murder of T.F. Considered together with the remaining aggravators—
Eaton’s multiple prior prison terms, the fact that he was on parole at the time of the
offense, and his prior poor performance on parole—we conclude there is no reasonable
probability the court would have imposed a lesser sentence, even without relying on two
of the aggravating circumstances. As such, the court’s improper reliance on those two
factors was a harmless error.
                                             III
                                   Abstract of Judgment
       The abstract of judgment indicates that the punishment was stricken for the prior
prison term enhancement under section 667.5. Eaton submits that because the
enhancement is legally invalid, it should be removed from the abstract of judgment
entirely. The People agree, as do we.

                                             10
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment with Eaton’s section 667.5 enhancement removed and to
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                       /s/
                                                   BOULWARE EURIE, J.

I concur:

    /s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

I concur; as to part II of the Discussion, I concur in the result.

   /s/
MAURO, J.

                                              11