Court Opinion

ID: 9575208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:25.762903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.630790
License: Public Domain

MITCHELL, Justice.
The defendant brings forward assignments of error in which he contends that the indictment for first degree kidnapping is fatally defective and that the trial court erred in denying him the right to exercise a peremptory challenge. We conclude that the indictment for kidnapping is not defective. The trial court’s error in denying the defendant the use of his remaining peremptory challenge, however, entitles him to a new trial.
The State presented evidence which tended to show that on the evening of March 24, 1984, the victim returned to High Point from a vacation. As she was unpacking her car, a man identified at the trial as the defendant, approached her. He pointed a gun at the victim’s head and ordered her to come with him or he would kill her. The defendant took the victim to an abandoned house near her apartment complex. The defendant forced the victim to disrobe. He then placed a knife to her throat and forced her to engage in sexual intercourse. He also forced her to perform fellatio.
Subsequently the defendant forced the victim to accompany him to her apartment to search for a twenty-four hour bank card. *434The card was soon located, and the defendant ordered the victim to drive him to a local shopping center where a twenty-four hour bank machine was located. The victim was forced at gunpoint to withdraw one hundred dollars and to turn it over to the defendant.
After returning to the apartment the defendant discovered that the victim was employed by a pizza restaurant. He then forced her to drive him to the restaurant in order to get money. When they arrived the restaurant was occupied, and the defendant instructed the victim to drive back to the apartment. He then released her. She called the police and subsequently gave a statement including a full description of her assailant. She also discovered that a gold bracelet and a gold necklace were missing from her jewelry box. The defendant was apprehended two days later at the High Point Bus Station.
The defendant testified that he met the victim at a bar on the night of March 24 and bought some illicit drugs from her. He further testified that he took some LSD later that evening and began hallucinating. He denied committing any of the alleged crimes.
At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him. The motion was denied and the case was submitted to the jury.
The defendant first assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash the indictment for first degree kidnapping on the ground that it was fatally defective. The indictment alleges that:
The jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did kidnap [the victim], a person over the age of sixteen (16) years of age, by unlawfully confining, restraining, or removing her from one place to another without her consent, for the purpose of committing a felony: Rape or Robbery; said victim having been sexually assaulted.
The defendant argues that the phrase “rape or robbery” is an allegation in the alternative or disjunctive and in this case ren*435ders the kidnapping indictment fatally defective. We do not agree.
N.C.G.S. 15A-924(a)(5) provides in pertinent part that an indictment or other criminal pleading must contain:
A plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant’s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.
This provision incorporates the view expressed in prior holdings of this Court that an indictment must allege all of the essential elements of the offense charged. E.g., State v. Riera, 276 N.C. 361, 172 S.E. 2d 535 (1970); State v. Gallimore, 272 N.C. 528, 158 S.E. 2d 505 (1968); State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 117 S.E. 2d 849 (1961). It also incorporates our long held view that the purposes of an indictment include giving a defendant notice of the charge against him so that he may prepare his defense and be in a position to plead prior jeopardy if he is again brought to trial for the same offense. E.g., State v. Burton, 243 N.C. 277, 90 S.E. 2d 390 (1955); State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E. 2d 917 (1953).
The indictment in question complies with N.C.G.S. 15A-924 (a)(5). An essential element of kidnapping under N.C.G.S. 14-39 (a)(2) is that the confinement, restraint or removal be for the purpose of facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating escape following the commission of a felony. The requirements of N.C.G.S. 15A-924(a)(5) are met for purposes of alleging this element by the allegation in the indictment that the confinement, restraint, or removal was carried out for the purpose of facilitating “a felony” or escape following “a felony.” The allegations in the indictment adequately notify the defendant that he is charged with the crime of kidnapping. It is not required that the indictment specify the felony referred to in N.C.G.S. 14-39(a)(2).
The indictment in the present case alleges that the defendant kidnapped the victim “by unlawfully confining, restraining, or removing her from one place to another without her consent for the purpose of committing a felony .... (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the indictment charges the offense in the language of *436the statute and is sufficient. See State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E. 2d 339 (1983). All of the elements of the crime of kidnapping are clearly alleged in the indictment. The additional “Rape or Robbery” language in the indictment is mere harmless surplus-age and may properly be disregarded in passing upon its validity. State v. Moore, 284 N.C. 485, 202 S.E. 2d 169 (1974).
We are well aware that in burglary cases we have required that the indictment specify the particular felony which the defendant intended to commit. E.g., State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E. 2d 253 (1976); State v. Cooper, 288 N.C. 496, 219 S.E. 2d 45 (1975); State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 155 S.E. 2d 269 (1967); State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504 (1923). It is unnecessary for us to decide here whether that rule drawn from the ancient strict pleading requirements of the common law has survived the more liberal criminal pleading requirements of our new Criminal Procedure Act and other recent legislation designed to remove from our law unnecessary technicalities which tend to obstruct justice. It is sufficient here to say that, in light of the adoption of our new Criminal Procedure Act, our new Evidence Code, and other statutory revisions, this Court will not engraft additional unnecessary burdens upon the due administration of justice. The new statutory enactments were adopted for the purpose of making the law more understandable and improving the administration of justice. N.C.G.S. 15A-924, a part of our new Criminal Procedure Act, only requires that an indictment contain a plain and concise factual statement supporting every element of a criminal offense with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation. Evidentiary allegations are not required. The purpose of the statute is to simplify criminal proceedings. N.C.G.S. 15A-924, Official Commentary (1983).
The indictment here charges the offense of kidnapping in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner and contains sufficient allegations to enable the trial court to proceed to judgment and to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and it is sufficient. State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E. 2d 253 (1976). It also informs the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient certainty to enable him to prepare his defense. State v. Gates, 107 N.C. 832, 12 S.E. 319 (1890). A part of that preparation is the making of a motion for a bill of particulars if the defendant *437feels he is in need of further factual information. N.C.G.S. ISA-925. This assignment of error is overruled.
The defendant’s next assignment of error concerns his contention that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to peremptorily challenge a juror. The record indicates that during jury selection, a juror who had previously been passed by both sides spontaneously told the trial court that she had mistakenly stated earlier that she had not heard about the case. She said that she had in fact heard about the case at work. The trial court permitted both the defendant and the State to reexamine her. The juror stated that she gave no credence to what she had heard, that she had no preconceived ideas regarding the case and that she could be fair and impartial. Counsel for the defendant then sought to use his final peremptory challenge to remove her. The request was denied and jury selection continued.
In noncapital cases each defendant is allotted six peremptory challenges. N.C.G.S. 15A-1217(b)(l). The defendant in the present case had used five of his peremptory challenges and sought to use his remaining peremptory challenge to excuse the juror after she had been accepted by both parties. Under N.C.G.S. 15A-1214(g) a party in certain situations may use a remaining peremptory challenge to remove a juror he has already accepted if the challenge is made before the jury is impaneled. When construing this statute we have explicitly stated: “The decision whether to reopen examination of a juror previously accepted by both the State and defendant and to excuse such juror either peremptorily or for cause is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Parton, 303. N.C. 55, 70-71, 277 S.E. 2d 410, 421 (1981) (emphasis added). Upon further reflection, however, we conclude that the quoted sentence from Parton was overbroad and must be disavowed in part.
In Parton we cited and relied upon State v. Matthews, 299 N.C. 284, 261 S.E. 2d 872 (1980) and State v. Kirkman, 293 N.C. 447, 238 S.E. 2d 456 (1977). Those cases and the statute itself justified our stated view that the decision whether to reopen examination of a juror previously accepted by the parties is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. N.C.G.S. 15A-1214(g)(l). But they do not support the proposition that once the trial court has decided to reopen the examination, the deci*438sion whether to permit a defendant to use one of his peremptory challenges to excuse such a juror is discretionary. Instead, we conclude that the intent of the legislature in adopting N.C.G.S. 15A-1214(g) was that the trial court have discretion as to whether to reopen examination of a juror under certain specific conditions, but that the parties have an absolute right to exercise any remaining peremptory challenges to excuse such a juror once the trial court in its discretion reopened the examination. This interpretation of the law better reflects the unchanging principle that: “The right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused . . . .” Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894). See State v. Colbert, 311 N.C. 283, 285, 316 S.E. 2d 79-80 (1984).
To the extent that the previously quoted statement in State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 70-71, 277 S.E. 2d 410, 421 is inconsistent with our conclusion and holding in the present case, it is disavowed. The trial court having committed reversible error by failing to permit the defendant to use his remaining peremptory challenge, the defendant must be awarded a new trial on the charges against him which are the subject of this appeal.
New trial.
Justice BILLINGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.