Court Opinion

ID: 9624757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:17:00.261701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:21.961921
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
Two state troopers stopped defendant’s pickup truck at a drivers’ license and vehicle registration checkpoint.1 Trooper Becker politely asked defendant for his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Defendant gave his license to *628Becker, who recognized the name on the license as being a person involved with narcotics.2 Defendant told Becker that there was some problem with the registration; the truck actually belonged to his former wife, who had a different name and address. As defendant was searching for the vehicle registration, Becker took a step toward the rear of the truck and “sniffed” the truck’s open bed. He smelled what he believed to be marijuana.3
Becker told defendant that he had smelled marijuana. He gave defendant Miranda warnings. Defendant signed a Miranda form acknowledging receipt of the warnings. Becker then asked if he could search the truck, specifically advising defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a search. Defendant said that he did not want Becker to search and that he wanted to leave. Becker told defendant that he could consent to a search, or Becker would detain the truck until he could contact the district attorney and attempt to obtain a search warrant; the decision was up to defendant.4 Defendant does not contend that he was under arrest before Becker searched the truck.
Several minutes passed during which defendant tried to negotiate with Becker. In response to defendant’s questions *629as to what the troopers would do if they found marijuana, Becker stated that it would depend on the quantity; if the quantity was small, they would probably only issue a citation. Defendant does not argue that Becker misled him. Eventually, saying “[tjhere’s not much [marijuana] in there” and that the marijuana was being grown for his own use, defendant consented to a search and signed a consent-to-search form.5 Defendant’s words indicate that he believed the quantity of marijuana in his truck was small and the worst that could happen to him would be that he would be cited. Becker seized 37 marijuana plants.
On appeal, the state concedes that the stop was unlawful.6 Therefore, the only issue is whether the consent was voluntary. The trial court concluded that it was. I agree.
The taint of an illegal stop may be purged by a subsequent valid consent. State v. Kennedy, 290 Or 493, 502-03, 624 P2d 99 (1981); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 393-97, 623 P2d 630 (1981). If valid consent is given, the illegality of the stop is irrelevant to all evidence obtained after the consent.7 Examining the totality of the facts and circumstances here, I conclude that defendant’s consent was given by his free will and not as a result of coercion.
To review the evidence, defendant was stopped by *630two state troopers on a public highway during daylight hours. Marked police cars were parked alongside the road. The stop was conducted in accordance with written state police procedures which gave the troopers no discretion as to whom they would stop. The purpose of the checkpoint was to check license plates, vehicle registrations and drivers’ licenses. There is no claim that in initially stopping defendant’s truck the troopers singled him out for special treatment. In context, it would be difficult to imagine a less coercive atmosphere.
At every stage of the proceedings defendant was advised of his legal rights. Becker advised defendant of his Miranda rights and defendant acknowledged in writing receipt of the warnings. Becker advised defendant of his right to refuse to consent to a search. The entire conversation appears to have occurred while defendant was seated in his truck. Defendant tried to negotiate a citation rather than an arrest, a course of action that indicates that he knew he could refuse to consent. He was given a clear choice between consenting to the search or being temporarily inconvenienced by having his truck detained while Becker tried to obtain a search warrant. At all times, the choice was defendant’s. Based on what he thought would be most convenient for him, he voluntarily chose to consent to the search, and he acknowledged his consent in writing.
Becker had recognized defendant’s name as that of a person who was involved in narcotics. Becker had smelled marijuana in the truck bed. Defendant had admitted that there was marijuana in the truck bed. Defendant’s consent was not the result of any deception by the troopers. At all times, Becker truthfully and forthrightly explained his options and the consequences to defendant. After confiscating the marijuana, Becker issued defendant a citation and permitted him to drive away. That was precisely what defendant expected and what he had bargained for.
The record shows that defendant’s consent was not gained by “exploitation” of the unlawful stop. Rather, it was the product of his informed and reasoned choice. Defendant’s free will was not tainted by the unlawful stop. By consenting, he made the illegality of the stop irrelevant to subsequently obtained evidence. Therefore, the ruling of the trial court should be upheld.
*631Peterson, C. J., and Jones, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

 The stop in this case occurred before the Court of Appeals’ decision in Nelson v. Lane County, 79 Or App 753, 720 P2d 1291 (1986).
At the hearing, without objection, the state offered excerpts from the Oregon State Police manual detailing OSP’s procedures for license plate, driver’s license and vehicle registration stops. Defendant’s counsel told the trial court that he was not contesting that the stop had been conducted pursuant to the manual. During oral argument in this court defendant’s counsel conceded that the troopers had had no reason to believe this stop was unlawful. Therefore, if there was any legal error in this case, it was not the fault of the troopers. They followed their manual and at all times acted in good faith. The state, however, does not argue that this court should recognize a good faith exception in this case.

 On cross-examination, defendant’s counsel asked Becker:
“Q. Did you ever run across Mr. Williamson before?
“A. I’ve heard the name.
“Q. And what have you heard the name in regard to?
“A. Narcotics.
«* * * * *
“A. I had never met Mr. Williamson prior to this. Mr. Williamson’s name had come up when I worked the marijuana thing involved in the Applegate, and that information came from another detective that worked drugs.”

 By “sniffing” the open bed of the pickup, Becker did not invade any constitutionally protected privacy interest of defendant. See State v. Slowikowski, 307 Or 19, 761 P2d 1315 (1988).

 The Court of Appeals opinion incorrectly states that “Becker told defendant that, if he did not consent to a search, he would not be allowed to leave until the officer attempted to get a search warrant.” 92 Or App at 428. (Emphasis added). Becker’s testimony, quoted in the Court of Appeals opinion, 92 Or App at 428-29, shows only that Becker told defendant that he would detain the truck. This difference is significant. Defendant was not told that he could not leave. Defendant could have told Becker, “You can hold my truck, but I am going.” Nothing in the record indicates that defendant could not have walked away, called a taxi, or asked a friend to drive him elsewhere.

 At the hearing, defendant testified that he “wasn’t going to sign [the consent-to-search form] unless [Becker] assured [him] that [he] wouldn’t be taken to jail * * Becker denied making any promises to defendant. The trial court specifically found Becker credible and believed his testimony.

 The state’s concession is unfortunate. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 743 P2d 692 (1987), and State v. Boyanoosky, 304 Or 131, 743 P2d 711 (1987), involved criminal law enforcement stops. In this case, the prosecutor told the trial court that the stop was a regulatory inspection, not a criminal law enforcement stop condemned by the Court of Appeals in Nelson, 79 Or App at 753, and that the threshold question for the trial court was the validity of the stop. The state, however, does not pursue that argument on appeal.
Even though it was aware of the Court of Appeals decision in Nelson, the trial court made no finding as to the legality of the stop, relying only on its finding of consent in denying the motion to suppress. This court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly instructed trial courts to make specific findings of fact when presented with multiple issues relating to the admissibility of evidence.

 The Court of Appeals apparently misread this court’s decision in Pooler v. MVD, 306 Or 47, 755 P2d 701 (1988). Pooler is inapposite here. Consent was not an issue in that case. Pooler explains that an arrest is not invalid simply because a stop is unlawful. 306 Or at 52. Similarly, a search is not invalid simply because a stop is unlawful. If the defendant consents, the illegality of the stop is irrelevant.