Court Opinion

ID: 9574661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:06:52.532219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:09.582177
License: Public Domain

Eggleston, J.,
dissenting.
It is an elementary rule of construction of insurance contracts that statutory provisions prescribing the duties and obligations of the contracting parties are as much a part of the policy as if incorporated therein. This court has applied that principle in numerous cases. Among them are Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pollard, 94 Va. 146, 153, 26 S. E. 421, 64 Am. St. Rep. 715, 36 L. R. A. 271; Maxey v. American Cas. Co., 180 Va. 285, 290, 23 S. E. (2d) 221, 223. See also, Newton v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., C. C. A. 4, 107 F. (2d) 164, 166 (applying the law of Virginia); Cyc. of Insurance Law (Couch), Vol. I, sec. 150, p. 297 ff.
As I read the majority opinion, it holds that such rule of construction is to be applied if the statutory, provision which is omitted from the policy is adverse to the insurer, but is not to be applied if it is favorable to the insurer.
I cannot agree with such holding. Some such statutory provisions are designed to protect the insured or the beneficiary from imposition, others are intended to protect the insurer from fraud or injustice. The statute here involved is of the latter type. But whichever may be the purpose of the particular provision, it embodies the public policy of the State with respect to,the subject matter and, whether actually transcribed in the policy or not, becomes “as much a part of the contract as if it were incorporated in it.” (Maxey v. American Cas. Co., supra, 180 Va., at page 290, 23 S. E. (2d) at page 223.)
Consequently, I am of opinion that the Insurance Company had the right, under the terms of the statute (Michie’s Code of 1942, sec. 4251c), to contest the policy for fraud or misrepresentation of material facts pertaining to the reinstatement within “the same period after reinstatement as provided *199in the policy with respect to original issue,” that is, within one year of the date of such reinstatement.
The .policy here involved was issued without medical examination and was based on a written application signed December 17, 1943, in which the insured answered certain questions indicating that she was not suffering from any serious disease and had not recently consulted a physician. It lapsed for non-payment of premiums in May, 1945, and was reinstated without medical examination on a written application dated July 17, in which the insured made the same statements.
In January, 1946, the policy again lapsed for non-payment of premiums and was reinstated without medical examination on an application dated March 28, in which the insured again stated that she was not suffering from serious disease and had not recently consulted a physician.
On October 4, 1946, the insured died of heart trouble. The undisputed evidence is that she had suffered from a serious heart ailment continuously since before the issuance of the policy. It also shows, contrary to the statement in the application on which the policy had been last reinstated, that she had recently been examined and treated by a physician for this heart condition.
The chief underwriter for the Insurance Company testified that the policy would not have been written or reinstated if the true condition as to the health of the insured had been disclosed in these applications.
While there was evidence which tended to show that at the time the first two applications were signed the insured told the soliciting agent of her condition and he did not correctly transcribe such information in the applications, there is no such evidence with respect to the application for the final reinstatement of the policy which was taken by a different agent. It is thus conclusively shown that the policy was last reinstated on the basis of statements of the insured *200with respect to her health which were untrue and were material to the risk assumed.
I agree with the trial court that under such circumstances a recovery on the policy should be denied.
Gregory and Spratley, JJ., concur in this dissent.