Court Opinion

ID: 9628922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:34:23.913212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:12.997199
License: Public Domain

HANSEN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
The majority reverses a judgment on a verdict wherein a jury found Appellants were negligent, possibly in the manner in which they packed Manning’s parachute. The majority, by reversing this finding, holds as a matter of law, that the waiver Manning signed absolved Appellants from any responsibility for their negligent acts.
Although the majority correctly recognizes the courts of Oklahoma have stated a person may, by contract, expressly agree to accept a risk of harm arising from a defendant’s negligent or reckless conduct, the Supreme Court has consistently added the caveat that such an agreement is invalid if it is contrary to public policy.
The facts in Schmidt v. United States, 912 P.2d 871 (Okla.1996) are strikingly different from those set out here. The case before the federal court, certifying questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, involved a waiver of liability contained in a rental horseback riding agreement. That waiver was not *161nearly as broad as the one Manning signed. The plaintiff in Schmidt claimed during her ride a ride leader employed by the stables negligently rode up behind her, frightened her horse and caused it to throw her to the ground causing her injuries. The Supreme Court held: “The validity of the Schmidt/Stables exculpatory clause in suit depends on the outcome of the fact-finding investigation to be conducted in the certifying court, (emphasis supplied). If — under the test we announce today — that court should determine that any single requirement for the clause’s enforceability has not been met, its decision could not uphold the contract and exonerate the United States.” This holding certainly opens the door for fact determinations by a jury-
In my view a party should not be permitted to contract to exculpate himself from responsibility for severe personal injury resulting from his acts in willful or reckless disregard for the safety of others, particularly where any negligence would create a strong potential of immediate and violent death. In such an instance, to require a participant to allow Appellants to be negligent in packing a parachute certainly violates the public policy of this state.
Article 23 § 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides:
The defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.
Article 2 § 6 further provides:
The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.
And further amplifying these provisions is Article 23 § 8 of our Constitution.
Any provision of a contract, express or implied, made by any person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and void.
In addition to 15 O.S.1991 § 212 cited by the majority provides:
All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.
And 15 O.S.1991 § 211 states:
Those contracts are unlawful which are:
1. Contrary to an express provision of law.
2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited; or,
3. Otherwise contrary to good morals.
Although it may be argued that none of these provisions expressly invalidates the agreement Manning signed, I cannot agree the waiver permitted Appellants to be negligent as a matter of law. These constitutional provisions and statutes, read together, do reflect the public policy of this state. They further strengthen the concept of legal responsibility for death or severe personal injury caused by one’s active negligence. And they certainly mandate that a jury should decide these questions.
The majority’s ruling today seems to approve, as a matter of law, a defendant’s right to require a participant in its activities to expressly assume the risk of any negligence, no matter how egregious the consequences might be. I dissent to that concept. I cannot hold, as a matter of law, that Manning assumed all the risk of such severe injury or death that might result from any kind or degree of negligence by Appellants.
The waiver is evidence Manning may have assumed the risk. But whether the waiver constituted assumption of all risks possible should be decided by the jury and not, as a matter of law, by this Court. Perhaps some day Oklahoma will allow a person to “contract against his own negligence” to exculpate him from liability for death or severe personal injuries to another, no matter how wanton or reckless that person’s disregard for another’s safety might be. I sincerely hope not.