Court Opinion

ID: 9595078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:35:30.470694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:46.685368
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Division 1. I concur in the result in Division 2 but not in all that is written. I do agree that the basis for the claim of effectiveness of counsel yields to a ruling on the existing record, as a matter of law, rejecting that basis.
Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a mistrial after the court instructed the defendant, who had taken the witness stand, of his rights. See OCGA § 24-9-20. Failure to object or move for a mistrial would, in effect, waive alleged error so that it could not be raised for the first time in a motion for new trial. Roberts v. State, 231 Ga. 395, 396 (202 SE2d 43) (1973). Thus it might constitute ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to raise it timely.
However, as described in the majority opinion, all of what the trial court advised defendant is preceded by the following colloquy:
The court: “Mr. Anderson (appellant’s trial counsel), would you like the Court to advise Mr. Brundage of his rights?”
Mr. Anderson: “Yes, Your Honor. I would like those rights laid out on the record please.”
Appellant does not assert that counsel was ineffective because he made this request, but only because he failed to seek a mistrial when the request was granted. A party cannot invite error and then complain of it. Smith v. State, 202 Ga. App. 362 (414 SE2d 504) (1991). Since counsel for defendant had asked for this advice to be given when the jury was present, it would not have been a valid ground for mistrial. Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432 (3) (175 SE2d 654) (1970). That being so, counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for not moving for a mistrial because there was no valid ground for it.
Appellant does not contend that counsel’s request in the first place constituted ineffectiveness of counsel. So this case differs from Wynn v. State, 230 Ga. 202 (196 SE2d 401) (1973), where the trial court on its own “insisted on advising [defendant] in the presence of the jury concerning his right to be sworn as a witness and to make an unsworn statement.” Wynn’s counsel did not ask for such.
The conclusion must be reached that counsel was not deficient in failing to seek a mistrial. That being so, I agree that it serves no purpose to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, because the result must be the same. Lee v. State, 199 Ga. App. 246, 247 (3) (404 SE2d 598) (1991), in disposing of the first two bases of appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance, illustrates that where such a claim is newly raised on appeal by new counsel, it need not always be remanded but may be subject to decision as a matter of law. The same procedural *61principle is recognized in Phillips v. State, 204 Ga. App. 698, 703 (420 SE2d 316) (1992), where the posture of the case prevented the court from determining, as a matter of law, whether appellant was denied effective assistance. The Supreme Court, in Smith v. State, 262 Ga. 480 (422 SE2d 173) (1992), ruled on the merits of the claim without a trial court hearing or decision on the merits.
Decided March 19, 1993.
Mullís, Marshall, Lindley & Powell, A. G. Knowles, for appellant.
Willis B. Sparks III, District Attorney, Howard Z. Simms, Thomas J. Matthews, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
It should be pointed out that, although counsel on appeal was not appointed until after the motion for new trial was denied, he could have filed an extraordinary motion for new trial raising the ground and had it ruled on by the trial court before bringing it to this court. OCGA § 5-5-41 (b).