Court Opinion

ID: 9828046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:02:32.477683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:42.185066
License: Public Domain

On Motion of Appellee for a Rehearing.
In the motion it is insisted this court erred in holding on the authority of Stromberg v. Hansen, 177 Minn. 307, 225 N. W. 148, 149, that the doctrine of trespass ab initio invoked by appellants in support of the judgment applied in a case “only when the. legal arrest is intentionally made and used as a cover to subsequent illegal conduct,” and attention is again called to cases cited by Bryson in his brief, which, it -is asserted, hold to the contrary. We have re-examined those of said cases accessible to us, to wit, Anderson v. Cowles, 72 Conn. 335, 44 A. 477, 77 Am. St. Rep. 310; Dehm v. Hinman, 56 Conn. 320, 15 A. 741, 1 L. R. A. 374; Wright v. Marvin, 59 Vt. 437, 9 A. 601;. Williams v. Babbitt, 14 Gray (Mass.) 141, 74 Am. Dec. 670, and note; and Wright v. Templeton, 80 Vt. 358, 67 A. 817, 130 Am. St. Rep. 990; and, as we construe them, none of them support appellants’ view. On the other hand, the holding in the Strpm-berg Case has support in reason and by Modesett v. Emmons (Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S. W. 276; Id. (Tex. Com. App.) 292 S. W. 855; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hinsdell, 76 Kan. 74, 90 P. 800, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94, 13 Ann. Cas. 981; McGlenny v. Inverarity, 80 Kan. 569, 103 P. 82, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 301; and see note to Barrett v. White, 14 Am. Dec. 365.
It ,is asserted in the motion that this court “erred (quoting) in holding that Smith had a right to handcuff: Bryson because Bryson would not go with him to jail.” But this-court did not so hold, as will be seen if the opinion disposing of the appeal is examined. Nor did this court hold, as is charged against it in the motion, that, “if Bryson told Smith he would not make bond and refused to go before a magistrate that this would justify Smith in placing Bryson in jail and making no complaint against him.” This court did say in said opinion, as is charged further in said motion, that it did not understand Bryson to be “in the attitude of claiming the evidence would not have supported a finding that he assaulted Brewer.” Appellee insists such was his attitude, and in the motion asserts -that it appeared he acted in self-defense if he struck Brewer with a hammer, and therefore, in that event, was not guilty of an unlawful assault on Brewer. The burden of proving Bryson did not act in self-defense if he struck Brewer was on appellants (25 C. J. 538), and the writer is inclined to think the trial court had a right to say it appeared as a matter of law that they had not discharged the burden. However, the conclusion of the other members of the court that the evidence would have warranted a finding by the jury that Bryson did not act in self-defense is unchanged. Therefore (the court being of the opinion that other contentions presented by appellants should not be sustained) .the motion is overruled.