Court Opinion

ID: 9522825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:39.467931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:03.685135
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 32. dissenting. It is absurd, on this record, for the University of Vermont to claim that plaintiff failed to provide it with notice of “conduct that may constitute harassment,” and that plaintiff thereby failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Plaintiff followed the precise reporting process urged upon her by the university. She informed the Victim’s Advocate that she had been sexually assaulted by another student. Following the advocate’s advice, she filed another complaint with the university’s Center for Student Ethics and Standards (CSES). Her failure to file a third complaint with one of two individuals designated by the university to receive harassment claims — individuals whose identities were available only online — was an error invited by the university and it was harmless. The purpose underlying the statutory notice requirement was plainly satisfied in this case, and the university was not entitled to dismissal on exhaustion grounds. I would reverse the trial court’s decision and I therefore dissent.
¶ 33. In enacting the laws at issue in this case, the Legislature recognized both that “students should be free of harassment in educational institutions” and that “educational institutions should have the opportunity to remedy promptly and appropriately allegations of harassment.” 2003, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.), § 1(3), (4). The notice and exhaustion requirements in 16 V.S.A. § 14 serve these goals. Thus, the statute requires that when an educational institution receives “actual notice of alleged conduct that may constitute harassment,” it must “promptly investigate to determine whether harassment occurred.” 16 V.S.A. § 14(a). If, after notice, the school “finds that the alleged conduct occurred and that it *534constitutes harassment,” it must “take prompt and appropriate remedial action reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.” Id. § 14(b). The statute defines “notice” as oral or written information that harassment may have occurred provided to certain designated officials. This presumably ensures that individuals with the ability to address the alleged conduct are aware of the allegations. Cf. Ross v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1346, 1346 n.30 (M.D. Ga. 2007) (explaining that recovery for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), is predicated on a showing that an “appropriate person” had actual knowledge of alleged discrimination or harassment, and stating that an appropriate person “ ‘is, at a minimum, an official . . . with authority to take corrective action to end the discrimination’ ” (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998))).
¶ 34. As an additional protection, 16 V.S.A. § 14(b) requires that a claimant exhaust any administrative remedies available under a school’s harassment policy before filing a discrimination claim under the Vermont Public Accommodations Act, 9 V.S.A. §§4500-4508. We have stated that this standard “eliminates the necessity of a separate inquiry into the state of the school’s knowledge or the notice received by the school” because “notice on the part of the school would follow logically from a showing that the plaintiff exhausted his or her remedies.” Washington v. Pierce, 2005 VT 125, ¶ 36, 179 Vt. 318, 895 A.2d 173. Additionally, we have noted that the exhaustion requirement provides “courts with objective criteria for evaluating the conduct of the parties in a hostile school environment harassment case,” more so than a “knew or should have known” standard as employed in Title VII cases, or one that evaluates whether a school has been deliberately indifferent to known student-on-student harassment in its schools as applied in Title IX cases. Id. ¶ 37 (quotation omitted). As relevant here, the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where the claimant demonstrates that exhaustion would be futile. 16 V.S.A. § 14(b)(4).
¶ 35. In Washington, the plaintiff, a high school student, claimed that she was denied access to full and equal educational opportunities because of a hostile environment caused by pervasive student-on-student racial and sexual harassment. We concluded, as a matter of law, that the claim failed because plaintiff could not demonstrate that she had exhausted her administrative remedies *535or “that she somehow was relieved of that responsibility.” Washington, 2005 VT 125, ¶40. In Washington, the plaintiff did not lodge any complaint with the school administration, nor did she present any evidence that misconduct had occurred in the presence of school personnel. While plaintiffs mother had made general complaints to unidentified school officials, none of these complaints were specific to plaintiff’s case. Accordingly, we concluded that “by choosing not to raise any complaints with a school official, plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.” Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 36. The majority misreads Washington to support dismissal of this case on similar grounds. Unlike Washington, however, the university here had both notice of the alleged conduct and an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff repeatedly complained to the university about being sexually assaulted by another student, and she complained to those individuals specifically identified by the university as appropriate. The university cqneluded that a proper response to a claim of sexual violence was to hold a student disciplinary hearing with the alleged victim acting as the prosecutor. Plaintiff engaged in this hearing process — she availed herself of the administrative remedies offered to her by the university and she exhausted them.
¶ 37. Indeed, the university created the very procedure it now claims is insufficient. It advised its students to contact the Victim’s Advocate “[i]f you or someone you care about experiences sexual violence (including rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment, unwanted sexual touching or contact, etc.).” The student handbook stated that the Victim’s Advocate would provide assistance and information “about what services exist on and off campus” and that she would “help you decide what to do after an assault.” This advice was reiterated several times throughout the student handbook. The sexual harassment policy, in contrast, was not included in the handbook but was instead available only online.
¶ 38. Thus, following the university’s direction, plaintiff contacted the Vctim’s Advocate, first by email and then in person. She reported being raped — conduct that, from an objective standpoint, “may constitute harassment.”2 16 V.S.A. § 14(a); see *536also id. § ll(a)(26)(A) (defining “harassment” in part as “an incident or incidents of . . . physical conduct based on or motivated by a student’s . . . sex . . . that has the purpose or effect of objectively and substantially undermining and detracting from or interfering with a student’s educational performance . . . or creating an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment”); Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Sexual Harassment: It’s Not Academic 4, 7 (2008), available at http:// www.ed.gov/about/offices/hst/ocr/docs/ocrshpam.pdf (explaining that “[sjexual harassment includes conduct that is criminal in nature, such as rape, sexual assault, [and], dating violence,” and noting that if sufficiently severe, single or isolated incidents of sexual harassment can create a hostile environment for purposes of Title IX); Univ. of Vt., Sexual Harassment: Students (effective January 2, 2008) (defining sexual harassment to include physical conduct of a sexual nature where conduct has effect of objectively and substantially undermining and detracting from or interfering with a student’s educational performance or access to school resources or creating an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment, and providing as an example “unwelcome touching”), available at http://www.uvm.edu/~uvmppg/ppg/student/sexharassstudent.pdf. Certainly, “[i]t goes without saying that forcible rape is ‘unwelcome physical conduct of a sexual nature,’ ” and that “[r]ape is also, by definition, a form of harassment based on sex.” Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 982-83 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[r]ape is unquestionably among the most severe forms of sexual harassment,” and citing cases recognizing that an isolated incident, if sufficiently serious, can create hostile work environment). Plaintiff plainly described both sexual assault and sexual harassment to the Victim’s Advocate. Cf. Brock v. United States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Just as every murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee’s sex.”).
¶ 39. Yet the Victim’s Advocate, and apparently the university, did not consider sexual assault to be a form of sexual harassment, and despite the handbook’s promise, the Victim’s Advocate did not *537advise plaintiff of all of the services available to her. She did not inform plaintiff that the university would conduct an investigation into her allegations only if plaintiff filed an additional complaint with one of two individuals designated by the university to receive harassment complaints. The Victim’s Advocate did not report the alleged conduct to the designated individuals herself. She did not refer plaintiff to the online sexual harassment policy. Instead, the Victim’s Advocate informed plaintiff that she had two choices — she could file a complaint with the CSES alleging a violation of the Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities, or she could file a criminal complaint with the police.3
¶40. Plaintiff, an eighteen year old freshman, opted to pursue a complaint with the CSES, and she executed a written document that described being drugged and sexually assaulted on campus by another student. The Assistant Director of the CSES, who oversaw the hearing process, again saw no need to have the university independently investigate plaintiff’s allegations. Rather, plaintiff, acting alone, was required to prove her rape case against the alleged perpetrator, who brought three of his friends as witnesses, in a hearing before the student judicial council. Approximately six weeks after this hearing, the alleged perpetrator was found “not responsible” for the alleged violations of the student code, including “offenses against persons,” a nonconsensual sexual act, sexual assault, and possession or use of an illegal substance.
¶ 41. Both before and after this decision, plaintiff’s father contacted the university, expressing his concerns about the way in *538which plaintiffs sexual assault complaint was being addressed. In April 2006, the university’s associate general counsel informed plaintiffs father that the university had violated no law or right of plaintiff in following the CSES process. At no time did the university assert that plaintiff had made the wrong claim or that she needed to file another complaint before the university would promptly investigate whether harassment had occurred. In May 2006, plaintiff withdrew from the university.
¶ 42. Given this record, the university cannot credibly assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It relies on a statutory provision designed to protect schools that have no notice of conduct that may constitute harassment and, thus, have no opportunity to take appropriate action to investigate the claims before being accused of discrimination. That the university chose not to treat this as a case of harassment, in violation of its own policy and a common-sense definition of the term, does not show that it had no notice. Nor does it absolve the university of its obligation to conduct an investigation into the alleged conduct. The question is not whether the victim “viewed the episode as harassment,” ante, ¶ 17, but whether her description of being raped was “conduct that may constitute harassment,” 16 V.S.A. § 14(a).
¶ 43. Particularly galling is the university’s assertion that it “would simply be unworkable and unfair — and contrary to the expressed intent of the legislature” — to hold it responsible “where a student has complained to some University employee or official somewhere on campus of conduct that may [or may not] constitute harassment.” The university would have us ignore the fact that it encouraged students to report rape, sexual harassment, and other conduct to the Victim’s Advocate in multiple places throughout the student handbook, while at the same time, it made its sexual harassment policy available only online.
¶ 44. In keeping with its circular reasoning, the university also claims the right to take disciplinary steps against a student found to have engaged in harassment, while at the same time avoiding liability under the VPAA until a victim “at the very least provide[s] the institution with notice of the harassment, and allow[s] it an opportunity to ‘take prompt and remedial action reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.’ ” This is nonsensical. If the university is conducting a student hearing on a harassment claim, it plainly has notice of the alleged harassment. *539To hold otherwise allows the university to avoid liability under the VPAA if it succeeds in frustrating a student’s ability to make a harassment complaint. Nothing could be further from the Legislature’s intent in enacting 16 V.S.A. § 14.
¶ 45. The majority nonetheless credits the university’s position, relying on a cramped interpretation of 16 V.S.A. § 14(b) that undermines the very purpose the statute is designed to serve. We have construed the exhaustion requirement in § 14(b) as a means of showing that an educational institution had notice of conduct that may constitute harassment. Washington, 2005 VT 125, ¶ 36 (stating that “notice on the part of the school would follow logically from a showing that the plaintiff exhausted his or her remedies”). There is nothing talismanic about the two individuals designated by the university to receive harassment complaints — these individuals merely serve to ensure that the university has notice and an opportunity to respond to claims of harassment. Where, as here, the university plainly had notice of the alleged conduct, and in fact, responded in a way it believed was appropriate, how can dismissal possibly be appropriate on exhaustion grounds?
¶ 46. This case does not require the Court to evaluate whether the university should have known about alleged harassment, as the majority suggests, or to examine plaintiffs “report of sexual assault and determine whether university officials should have understood it to be a claim of harassment.” Ante, ¶ 14. It does not require us to engage in a “separate inquiry into the state of the school’s knowledge or the notice received by the school.” Washington, 2005 VT 125, ¶36. Unlike Washington, it is undisputed here that the university did know about the conduct, and its refusal to view the conduct as harassment is not dispositive. This Court need only review whether the conduct complained about — rape — was within the objectively stated definition of harassment. This does not present a close case, and it is certainly not an inquiry that the Court intended to foreclose in Washington.
¶ 47. The majority also fails to recognize that the result in this case would have been exactly the same even if plaintiff had reported the conduct, for a third time, to the designated employees. The university suggests that the conduct reported by plaintiff “does not substantively describe sexual harassment which the University could address in any way differently than it treated her sexual assault complaint.” It faults plaintiff for failing to identify *540“what additional remedial measures the University might have taken had she initiated the harassment-investigation process.” The university’s associate general counsel provided plaintiff’s father with essentially the same message.
¶ 48. The majority nonetheless reasons that one “cannot presume that the university would have refused to recognize or investigate a harassment claim simply because, in the context of defending against a lawsuit where all defensive theories must ordinarily be asserted or waived, its outside legal counsel later took a position that the conduct claimed as triggering plaintiffs right to sue was legally insufficient to constitute harassment.” Ante, ¶ 25. The facts do not fit the majority’s theory. The university refused to recognize and investigate this as a harassment claim at the outset, and it reiterates the validity of that position in this appeal. Giving plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences, one can certainly presume from this record that the university would not have responded any differently in addressing plaintiffs claim had it been couched in terms of “harassment.” Under these circumstances, exhaustion, if not already proven, would have been futile.
¶49. Finally, I fail to grasp the majority’s argument that the plaintiff could have easily filed a complaint -with one of the university’s “designated employees” after she filed this lawsuit to avoid dismissal on exhaustion grounds. Ante, ¶ 17. As discussed above, the university had advised plaintiff prior to this lawsuit that it had done nothing wrong in addressing her sexual assault claim through the CSES process. Plaintiff no longer attends the university. If filing a complaint with the university at this late stage would satisfy the majority, notwithstanding the fact that the university has provided plaintiff with all of the process it believes was appropriate, then the majority has truly turned the exhaustion provision into a meaningless requirement.
¶ 50. This is not a case, as the majority asserts, where “plaintiff chose to pursue her harassment claim in the first instance” in superior court. Ante, ¶ 19. To the contrary, plaintiff followed the precise procedure contemplated by the statute and described in Washington — she “look[ed] first to the school’s mechanisms to redress in-school harassment,” and the university had the “opportunity to respond to alleged harassment before being subject to litigation.” Washington, 2005 VT 125, ¶¶ 34, 32. To allow the university to escape the lawsuit at this stage, given the labyrinth *541it created, its failure to disclose critical information to the student, and its failure to respond to the complained-of conduct, makes a mockery of the Legislature’s purpose. This case was wrongly dismissed on exhaustion grounds, and I therefore dissent.

 The question of whether plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to support her discrimination claim is not before us, and her failure to describe “pervasive” misconduct to the Victim’s Advocate is immaterial. Ante, ¶ 16. The university has *536an obligation to respond to complaints of conduct that may constitute harassment, not merely claims of pervasive misconduct.

 In fact, the Student Code allows members of the university staff to report code violations to the CSES, and it also states that “[p]ereeived criminal activity should be reported immediately to UVM Police Services, which will then share information with the Dean of Students or CSES as appropriate.” The Dean of Students is the university official responsible for oversight of the Student Code; he was also one of the two employees designated by the university to receive harassment complaints. I note that the university’s “Procedures for Investigating and Resolving Discrimination Complaints,” effective April 18, 2007, now requires certain university officials who become aware of conduct that they believe may violate the University’s nondiscrimination policies to report that conduct to the Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity Office. This includes, but is not limited to: supervisors or managers; a chair, director or dean of an academic unit; any other person with a title at the level of Director or higher; and Student Affairs personnel with oversight responsibilities for students or employees. See Univ. of Vt., Procedures for Investigating and Resolving Discrimination Complaints, available at http:// www.uvm.edu/~aaeo/pdffdiscrimination.pdf.