Court Opinion

ID: 9353292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:00:32.917501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:05.764182
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0023n.06

                                       Case No. 22-5274

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                   FILED
                                                                                 Jan 11, 2023
                                                    )                        DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                    )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                          )
                                                    )      ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v.                                                  )      STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                    )      THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WILLIAM HILL, JR.,                                  )      TENNESSEE
       Defendant-Appellant.                         )
                                                    )                                  OPINION

Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

       SILER, Circuit Judge. William Hill appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiring to

possess with the intent to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846, and possessing with the intent to distribute over 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). According to Hill, his conviction is invalid because the district court

wrongly denied his motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment standing grounds, and his sentence

is unreasonable because the district court wrongly applied an enhancement for maintaining a

premises for the purpose of distributing drugs under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12). We affirm.

                                                I

       The undisputed facts show the following. In 2018, Hill’s friend, James Sneed, checked

into a hotel room with his girlfriend, Haley Sweat. Hotel staff began receiving complaints of the

smell of marijuana and heavy foot traffic to and from the room.
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

       The next day Hill and his girlfriend, Daphne Cook, arrived from Texas and stayed with

Sneed and Sweat in their hotel room. Hill made the trip so Sneed could connect him with a drug

buyer. The morning after Hill arrived, Sneed and Sweat left the hotel, although they intended to

return. After Sneed and Sweat left, Cook went to the front desk, walking unsteadily and spilling

things. She said she was Sweat and paid for another night. Hotel staff, recognizing that Cook was

not Sweat, informed the manager, who called the police. Officers arrived at the hotel and asked if

the staff wanted to evict the room’s occupants, which they did. Under the hotel’s policies,

unregistered guests and smoking were prohibited, and the hotel staff could evict people who

violated these policies or otherwise broke the law.

       The officers accompanied hotel staff to the room and could smell marijuana from the door.

The housekeeper knocked and received no response.              She opened the door and said

“housekeeping” but received no answer. From the door, she could hear water running. As the

housekeeper entered the room, she could identify the shower running and saw a meth pipe on the

bed. At that point, she left the room and told the officers what she had seen.

       The officers then entered the room and found Hill and Cook in the bathroom. En route to

the bathroom, they saw the glass pipe with residue on the bed and money and marijuana in an

unlocked safe. The officers exited the room while a colleague applied for a warrant. The officers

executed the warrant and seized small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and pills; over 400

grams of meth; baggies, scales, cutting agent, and the pipe; and $2,530 in cash.

       The government charged Hill with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Hill moved to suppress the evidence

                                               -2-
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

from the hotel room.1 He argued that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the

hotel room without first obtaining consent or a warrant. The district court denied the motion

because Hill did not have standing as an unregistered guest. It did not address whether there was

a Fourth Amendment violation. Hill was convicted on both charges.

         During sentencing, the district court applied a two-point enhancement under USSG §

2D1.1(b)(12) because Hill maintained a hotel room for the purpose of storing and distributing

meth. It overruled Hill’s objection because Hill remained in the room after Sneed and Sweat left,

controlled access to the room, opened the door to the room to housekeeping to discuss room issues,

and purchased a safe for the room. Plus, the district court noted the amount of foot traffic to and

from the room and the smell of marijuana coming from it. It concluded that Hill maintained the

room “primarily, or . . . to a significant degree, for the purpose of distributing a controlled

substance.”     The district court calculated Hill’s Guidelines range as 262 to 327 months

imprisonment and sentenced him to 272 months imprisonment on each count to run concurrently.

                                                     II

         Hill raises two issues on appeal. He argues that his conviction is invalid because the district

court improperly allowed evidence that was fruit of the poisonous tree under the Fourth

Amendment. He also argues that his sentence was improperly calculated because the court

incorrectly applied the enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12). Hill is not entitled to relief on either

issue.

1
 Hill also moved to suppress a post-arrest statement he made to police pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). On appeal, Hill argues that this statement should have been suppressed but fails to
cite any authority or explain how the statement violated Miranda. Moreover, the government argues in
response that the issue is moot because it did not introduce the statement at trial, and Hill makes no reply.
For these reasons, Hill waived the issue. See, e.g., McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir.
1997).
                                                    -3-
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

                                                  A

       Courts generally require a warrant before searching or seizing persons or property but will

excuse the requirement if a valid exception to the warrant requirement exists. United States v.

Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698–99 (6th Cir. 1997). Hill argues that the officers violated the Fourth

Amendment by entering the hotel room and conducting a protective sweep without first obtaining

a warrant.2 Thus, he says, the evidence seized from the second search, even though supported by

a warrant, was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree, and the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress it.

       When considering suppression orders, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de

novo and can affirm a suppression motion’s denial on any basis supported by the record. United

States v. Gill, 685 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2012). To prevail, Hill must show his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1 (1978). But

where the government conducts a search without a warrant, it bears the burden of showing a

warrant exception applies. United States v. Killibrew, 560 F.2d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 1977). Here,

the government argues that the officers’ warrantless entry into and protective sweep of the hotel

room was justified by exigent circumstances. We agree.

       Exigent circumstances excuse the warrant requirement in certain situations when

immediate police action is needed, including when there is the danger of lost evidence. United

States v. Haddix, 239 F.3d 766, 767 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the government argues the entry was

justified based on the danger of lost evidence, which means it must show that the officers had “a

2
 Hill also challenges the district court’s legal conclusion that Hill lacked standing under the Fourth
Amendment. However, even if Hill could show he had standing as the unregistered and
unauthorized guest of a person who had already vacated the hotel, the entry and protective sweep
were justified under exigent circumstances. We thus decline to address standing here.
                                                -4-
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

reasonable belief that third parties [were] inside” and that “loss or destruction of evidence [was]

imminent.” United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991). Hill concedes that

the officers had a reasonable belief that people were inside the hotel room. As for the destruction

of evidence, the officers could hear running water from the bathroom, knew a meth pipe was in

the room, and could smell marijuana coming from the door. Because a common method of drug

disposal is flushing it down a toilet or drain, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to

think that the destruction of evidence was not just possible, but, in fact occurring while they were

standing in the hallway. As we have said, the need for exigent circumstances can “be particularly

compelling where narcotics are involved, for narcotics can be easily and quickly destroyed while

a search is progressing.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir.

1988). So it is here.

       When the officers entered the hotel room, they conducted what amounts to a protective

sweep to check for weapons, secure the drug evidence, and locate Hill and Cook. Because the

entry was focused on securing evidence and ensuring officer safety, the “warrantless entry was

limited in scope and proportionate to the exigency excusing the warrant requirement.” Id. at 1513.

Once the area was secured, the officers then waited outside while another officer secured a warrant.

See United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]ecause evidence may be

removed or destroyed before a warrant can be obtained, an officer does not violate the Fourth

Amendment by securing the area to be searched and waiting until a warrant is obtained.” (citing

Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984))). For these reasons, the officers conducted

both the initial entry and protective sweep under a valid warrant exception.

                                                 B

                                               -5-
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

        In addition to challenging his conviction, Hill argues his sentence is unreasonable. During

sentencing, the district court applied an enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12). The § 2D1.1(b)(12)

enhancement adds two levels to a defendant’s total-offense level when “the defendant maintained

a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” Hill argues

that the district court misapplied the enhancement and miscalculated his Guideline range. Thus,

he asks us to review the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, which we review for an abuse

of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that procedural

sentencing errors include improperly calculating the Guidelines range or assigning a sentence on

clearly erroneous findings). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion in

applying the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement, we have applied both de novo and clear error review.

See United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing cases). Here, under either

standard, Hill’s challenge fails.

        A district court can apply § 2D1.1(b)(12) when the government shows by a preponderance

of the evidence that a defendant “(1) knowingly (2) open[ed] or maintain[ed] any place (3) for the

purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” United States v. Johnson, 737

F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Hill seems to challenge the second element by

arguing that the district court erred because he did not hold a possessory interest in or exercise

control over the hotel room sufficient to show that he opened or maintained it. But Hill possessed

the hotel room for a few days. He slept, bathed, hung out with friends, and stored his clothes,

drugs, safe, and cash in the room. And he controlled who entered the room and refused to admit

hotel staff.

        That Hill was not a registered guest with a legal right to possess the room, see United States

v. Lanier, 636 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a hotel guest has a limited right to

                                                -6-
Case No. 22-5274, United States v. Hill

occupy a room during the pre-agreed rental period), has no bearing here. Maintaining a premises

can be done illegally, e.g., actual possession can occur without a corresponding right to possession,

while still triggering the enhancement. To hold otherwise would mean that a defendant could run

a drug operation in an abandoned house without triggering the enhancement so long as he was not

the house’s lawful owner. We have said: “Where a defendant lives in the [premises], this element

is normally easily proved,” even if the defendant does not “lease or own” the property. United

States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 644 (6th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, Hill has failed to show the

district court abused its discretion by applying the enhancement. Thus, Hill’s challenge to the

procedural reasonableness of his sentences fails.

       AFFIRMED.

                                                -7-