Court Opinion

ID: 9954697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:11:58.844211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:50.491115
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Prinkey v. Emerine's Towing, Inc., 2024-Ohio-1137.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Paul Prinkey, Jr.,                        :

                 Relator,                               :                       No. 22AP-264

v.                                                      :                    (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Emerine’s Towing, Inc. et al.,                          :

                 Respondents.                           :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                     Rendered on March 26, 2024

                 On brief: Schiavoni, Schiavoni, Bush & Muldowney, and
                 Shawn R. Muldowney, for relator.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Denise A.
                 Corea, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

                                   IN MANDAMUS
                    ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
        {¶ 1} Relator, Paul Prinkey, Jr., initiated this original action requesting this court
issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio
(“commission”) to amend its order finding it had no jurisdiction to address Prinkey’s
second application for permanent total disability (“PTD”) compensation under R.C.
4123.58(G), and to issue a new order finding Prinkey is entitled to PTD compensation.
        {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals, this court referred the matter to a magistrate. The magistrate issued the
appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The magistrate
determined the commission failed to explain the basis for its determination that Prinkey
did not demonstrate new and changed circumstances. Thus, the magistrate recommends
No. 22AP-264                                                                               2

this court issue a limited writ of mandamus returning the matter to the commission to
issue a new order: (1) specifically stating the evidence the commission relied upon in
reaching its decision, and (2) briefly explaining the reasoning for the commission’s
decision.
       {¶ 3} The commission filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Therefore, we
must independently review the decision to ascertain whether “the magistrate has properly
determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). The
commission does not challenge the magistrate’s recitation of the pertinent facts; however,
the commission objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that Prinkey is entitled to a limited
writ of mandamus. More specifically, the commission sets forth the following objections:
              [1.] The magistrate erred in finding that the commission
              applied R.C. 4123.58(G) retroactively.

              [2.] The magistrate erred in finding that the commission did
              not adequately cite to the evidence relied upon or adequately
              explain the reasoning for its decision.

       {¶ 4} A brief summary of the factual circumstances is pertinent to our discussion.
As set forth more fully in the magistrate’s decision, Prinkey sustained a work-related injury
in January 2015, and his workers’ compensation claim was allowed for the conditions of:
(1) myocardial infarction and substantial aggravation of pre-existing coronary artery
disease (“allowed cardiac condition”), and (2) major depressive disorder, single episode
(“allowed psychological condition”).       Prinkey filed his first application for PTD
compensation on February 4, 2019, relying on the reports of Dr. Randall J. Hartwig and
Dr. Lynn Ross DiMarzio, both of whom opined Prinkey was permanently and totally
disabled from any sustained, remunerative employment.           In denying Prinkey’s first
application for PTD compensation, however, the commission relied on the reports of two
other examining healthcare providers, Dr. Gary Greenspan and Dr. Lynn A. Luna Jones,
both of whom concluded Prinkey was capable of working. Specifically, Dr. Greenspan
found a whole person impairment of 30 percent due to the allowed cardiac condition but
found Prinkey was capable of sedentary work. Dr. Jones found a 3 percent whole person
impairment due to the allowed psychological condition and, considering only that
condition, concluded Prinkey was capable of working.
No. 22AP-264                                                                               3

       {¶ 5} Prinkey then filed a second application for PTD compensation on June 4,
2021, supporting his application with new reports from Dr. DiMarzio and Dr. Hartwig,
both of whom again opined Prinkey was permanently and totally disabled from all forms
of sustained, remunerative employment. Two other healthcare providers then examined
Prinkey for purposes of his second application for PTD compensation. Dr. Joseph P.
Percorelli found that Prinkey’s allowed psychological condition alone resulted in a 35
percent whole person impairment and would prevent Prinkey from returning to gainful
employment. Additionally, Dr. Boris Gliner found Prinkey’s symptoms related to the
allowed cardiac condition to be unchanged and found that Prinkey had a whole person
impairment of 30 percent due to that allowed condition but that Prinkey was capable of
sedentary work.     In a November 12, 2021 order, the commission found it lacked
jurisdiction to consider Prinkey’s second application for PTD compensation because
Prinkey failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances as required by R.C.
4123.58(G). Prinkey filed a request for reconsideration, and the commission again
determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider Prinkey’s second application for PTD
compensation. This instant mandamus action followed.
       {¶ 6} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Prinkey must show a clear legal right
to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief.
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a
writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows the commission abused its discretion by
entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott
v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76, 78-79 (1986). But when the record contains some
evidence to support the commission’s findings, there has been no abuse of discretion and
mandamus is not appropriate. State ex rel. Lewis v. Diamond Foundry Co., 29 Ohio St.3d
56, 58 (1987).
       {¶ 7} In its first objection to the magistrate’s decision, the commission argues the
magistrate erred in finding the commission applied R.C. 4123.58(G) retroactively to
Prinkey’s claim which was already pending when R.C. 4123.58(G) went into effect.
Because the amendment to the PTD statute would not render any fully adjudicated claims
invalid, and because Prinkey’s claim was merely pending but not fully adjudicated when
No. 22AP-264                                                                                4

the statute went into effect, the commission asserts there is no need to consider whether
R.C. 4123.58(G) is unconstitutionally retroactive.
       {¶ 8} As the magistrate more fully explained, a court considering whether a statute
is unconstitutionally retroactive applies a two-part test “asking (1) whether the General
Assembly expressly made the statute retroactive and, if so, (2) whether the statute is
substantive or remedial.” State v. Hubbard, 167 Ohio St.3d 77, 2021-Ohio-3710, ¶ 14,
citing State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, ¶ 8. “ ‘It is well established
that a statute is substantive if it impairs or takes away vested rights, affects an accrued
substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities as
to a past transaction, or creates a new right.’ ” Williams at ¶ 9, quoting Pratte v. Stewart,
125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860, ¶ 37. “ ‘Remedial laws, however, are those affecting
only the remedy provided, and include laws that merely substitute a new or more
appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.’ ” Id., quoting Pratte at ¶ 37.
Here, the commission does not object to the magistrate’s determination that R.C.
4123.58(G) is remedial rather than substantive. Instead, the commission’s objection
relates to the first prong of the test for constitutional retroactivity and disagrees with the
magistrate’s determination that the General Assembly expressly made R.C. 4123.58(G)
retroactive.
       {¶ 9} Amended effective September 28, 2021, R.C. 4123.58(G) provides:
               If the industrial commission has adjudicated a claimant’s
               application for compensation payable under this section for
               permanent total disability and issued a final order denying
               compensation for that application, the claimant shall present
               evidence of new and changed circumstances before the
               industrial commission may consider a subsequent application
               filed by the claimant for compensation under this section for
               the same injury or occupational disease identified in the
               previous application.

The commission notes there is nothing in the language of R.C. 4123.58(G) expressly
making its application retroactive. However, in finding R.C. 4123.58(G) to be expressly
retroactive, the magistrate looked to the enacting language of 2021 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 75
(“H.B. 75”) and determined from that language the General Assembly expressed a clear
intent to make R.C. 4123.58(G) apply retroactively. In pertinent part, H.B. 75 provides
No. 22AP-264                                                                               5

“[s]ections 4123.57 and 4123.58 of the Revised Code, as amended by this act, apply to
claims pending on or arising after the effective date of this section.” The commission
acknowledges this enacting language but nonetheless argues the magistrate erred in
finding R.C. 4123.58(G) to be expressly retroactive.
       {¶ 10} The commission relies on State ex rel. Hamilton v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist.
No. 19AP-510, 2021-Ohio-1824, for its position that R.C. 4123.58(G) cannot be considered
to be expressly retroactive because the enacting language of R.C. 4123.58(G) contained in
H.B. 75 is nearly identical to the enacting language of R.C. 4123.56(F), the statute at issue
in Hamilton, contained in 2019 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 81 (“H.B. 81”). Compare H.B. 75
(“[s]ections 4123.57 and 4123.58 of the Revised Code, as amended by this act, apply to
claims pending on or arising after the effective date of this section”) and H.B. 81 (“[t]he
amendments made to sections 4123.56, 4123.58, and 4123.65 of the Revised Code by this
act apply to claims pending on or arising after the effective date of this section”). Because
this court in Hamilton determined R.C. 4123.56(F) was not made expressly retroactive,
the commission asserts we must similarly conclude R.C. 4123.58(G) is not expressly
retroactive.   Hamilton at ¶ 28 (in considering the two-part test for constitutional
retroactivity, the court concluded “that the first factor is not met in the present case
because the legislature did not clearly express an intent for the new language of R.C.
4123.56(F) to apply retroactively”).
       {¶ 11} Though the commission is correct that the language in H.B. 75 mirrors the
language in H.B. 81, we note that this court in Hamilton never considered the interplay
between the enacting language from H.B. 81 with the statutory text of R.C. 4123.56(F). As
no party called the enacting language of H.B. 81 to the attention of the court, this court
looked only to the statutory text of R.C. 4123.56(F). By contrast, the magistrate in the
instant case considered R.C. 4123.58(G) in the full context of the enacting language of H.B.
75. Accordingly, we do not agree with the commission that we are bound by this court’s
holding in Hamilton. Instead, we agree with the magistrate’s conclusion that, through the
enacting language contained in H.B. 75, the legislature expressed a clear intent for R.C.
4123.58(G) to apply retroactively.        Accordingly, we overrule the commission’s first
objection to the magistrate’s decision.
No. 22AP-264                                                                                6

       {¶ 12} In its second objection to the magistrate’s decision, the commission argues
the magistrate erred in finding the commission did not adequately cite to the evidence it
relied upon or adequately explain the reasoning for its decision that Prinkey had not
presented sufficient evidence of new or changed circumstances. The Supreme Court of
Ohio has repeatedly held that “[i]n an order granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the
commission must ‘specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly
explain the reasoning for its decision.’ ” State ex rel. Merritt v. Indus. Comm., 161 Ohio
St.3d 180, 2020-Ohio-4379, ¶ 3, quoting State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d
203 (1991), syllabus; and State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481,
483-84 (1983) (the commission “must specifically state which evidence and only that
evidence which has been relied upon to reach [its] conclusion, and a brief explanation
stating why the claimant is or is not entitled to the benefits requested”). Where the
commission fails to comply with Noll, the commission has abused its discretion. Merritt
at ¶ 3, citing State ex rel. Gemind v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 457, 460 (1998).
       {¶ 13} Although the commission stated it had reviewed the prior staff hearing
officer (“SHO”) order denying the first application for PTD compensation and the entirety
of the claim file, it made only a conclusory statement that “there is insufficient evidence of
new and changed circumstances * * * to permit the [commission] to consider this
subsequent application.” (Nov. 12, 2021 SHO Order at 1.) The commission argues it was
not required to explain why it did not find sufficient evidence of new and changed
circumstances because it cannot be required to cite to something that does not exist. We
disagree. The Supreme Court is clear that even where the commission concludes a
claimant is not entitled to the requested benefits, the commission must still briefly explain
why it reached that conclusion. State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc., 137 Ohio St.3d
557, 2013-Ohio-5159, ¶ 14, 18 (finding the commission’s order violates Noll where “[t]he
commission failed to specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reasoning
behind its decision that [the claimant] had voluntarily abandoned his employment * * *
thus making him ineligible for temporary-total-disability compensation,” specifically
explaining “[t]he hearing officer did not identify the evidence relied upon but merely
concluded that as a result of the termination, [the claimant] was barred from receiving
compensation for temporary total disability”); Merritt at ¶ 5-6 (although the commission
No. 22AP-264                                                                                  7

stated “[a]ll evidence on file has been reviewed and considered in making this finding,” the
commission’s order nonetheless failed to comply with Noll “[b]ecause the order does not
specifically state what evidence the staff hearing officer relied on to reach the conclusion
that [the claimant] was terminated for violating his employer’s drug-free-workplace
policy, thereby voluntarily abandoning his employment”). In other words, the conclusion,
itself, does not constitute the explanation required by Noll and its progeny. Thus, we agree
with the magistrate that the commission abused its discretion in failing to briefly explain
the reasons for its decision that Prinkey had not demonstrated new and changed
circumstances. State ex rel. Campbell v. Conrad, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1158, 2002-Ohio-
2773, ¶ 47 (the commission’s order was “a clear violation of Noll” where “the [district
hearing officer] found that no new and changed circumstances were established, but he
failed to provide any reasoning for this finding that connects to the evidence of record”).
       {¶ 14} Despite the perfunctory, conclusory language in the commission’s decision
and the lack of explanation of the basis for its decision, the commission argues we should
nonetheless deny the requested writ because the evidence in the file does not demonstrate
new and changed circumstances. See State ex rel. Ross v. Indus. Comm., 118 Ohio St.3d
73, 2008-Ohio-1739, ¶ 17-18 (“the mere submission of new evidence is not automatically
a new and changed circumstance,” and simply submitting reports of a doctor who
disagreed with the opinion of the doctor in a prior application is not enough to show new
and changed circumstances; instead, the evidence must show an exacerbation of the
condition or the allowance of a new condition), citing State ex rel. Keith v. Indus. Comm.,
62 Ohio St.3d 139, 141-42 (1991), and State ex rel. Poneris v. Indus. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d
264, 2006-Ohio-5702. Through this argument, the commission essentially asks us to
weigh the evidence before the commission, but such is not the role of this court. State ex
rel. Perez v. Indus. Comm., 147 Ohio St.3d 383, 2016-Ohio-5084, ¶ 20 (“[t]he commission
is the exclusive fact-finder with sole responsibility to evaluate the weight and credibility of
the evidence”).
       {¶ 15} Accordingly, because we agree with the magistrate that the commission
abused its discretion in failing to briefly explain the reasons for its decision finding no new
and changed circumstances, we overrule the commission’s second objection to the
magistrate’s decision. We note that nothing in this decision should be construed as
No. 22AP-264                                                                                  8

requiring the commission to discuss or rely on any specific piece of evidence in the record;
instead, we reiterate that the commission must provide a brief explanation for its decision.
See State ex rel. Digiacinto v. Indus. Comm., 159 Ohio St.3d 346, 2020-Ohio-707, ¶ 15
(while “[t]he commission is required to consider all of the evidence that is properly before
it, * * * the commission is not required to list in its order each piece of evidence that it has
considered,” but instead “the commission’s order need list only the evidence that the
commission relied on in reaching its conclusion”) (Emphasis sic.), citing State ex rel.
Buttolph v. Gen. Motors Corp., Terex Div., 79 Ohio St.3d 73, 77 (1997), and State ex rel.
Metz v. GTC, Inc., 142 Ohio St.3d 359, 2015-Ohio-1348, ¶ 14. Thus, we agree with the
magistrate that the appropriate remedy in this case is to grant a limited writ of mandamus
ordering the commission to (1) specifically state the evidence the commission relied on in
reaching its decision, and (2) briefly explain the reasoning for its decision. See Cline at
¶ 18; Merritt at ¶ 6.
       {¶ 16} Following our independent review of the record pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we
find the magistrate did not err in determining Prinkey is entitled to a limited writ of
mandamus. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
and overrule the commission’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. We grant Prinkey’s
request for a limited writ of mandamus, and we remand this matter to the commission for
further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision.
                                                                        Objections overruled;
                                                         limited writ of mandamus granted;
                                                                            cause remanded.

                           DORRIAN and LELAND, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-264                                                                              9

                                          APPENDIX

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Paul Prinkey, Jr.,                :

               Relator,                         :

v.                                              :                   No. 22AP-264

Emerine’s Towing, Inc. et al.,                  :                (REGULAR CALENDAR)

               Respondents.                     :

               __________________________________________

                          MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

                                   Rendered on August 18, 2023

               Schiavoni, Schiavoni, Bush & Muldowney, and Shawn R.
               Muldowney, for relator.

               Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Denise A. Corea, for
               respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.
                                                              ____
                                    IN MANDAMUS

       {¶ 17} Relator, Paul Prinkey, Jr., seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to amend its order finding that it had no
jurisdiction to address relator’s second application for permanent total disability (“PTD”)
compensation under R.C. 4123.58(G), and to issue a new order finding relator is entitled
to PTD.

I. Findings of Fact:
       {¶ 18} 1. Relator suffered an injury on January 19, 2015 in the course of and arising
out of his employment with respondent Emerine’s Towing, Inc. (“Emerine’s Towing”).
No. 22AP-264                                                                             10

       {¶ 19} 2. Relator’s claim was allowed for the conditions of (1) myocardial infarction
and substantial aggravation of preexisting coronary artery disease; and (2) major
depressive disorder, single episode.
       {¶ 20} 3. For purposes of evaluating PTD, relator was examined by two healthcare
providers prior to filing his first PTD application. Relator was first examined by Randall
J. Hartwig, D.O., on November 30, 2018. Dr. Hartwig submitted a report dated December
4, 2018, in which he opined that relator was permanently and totally disabled from any
and all sustained, gainful, and remunerative employment as a result of the allowed
conditions in the claim.
       {¶ 21} 4. Relator was examined by Lynn Ross DiMarzio, Ph.D., on March 1, 2017.
On December 6, 2018, Dr. DiMarzio again examined relator for purposes of determining
whether his psychiatric condition was permanent and whether relator was permanently
and totally disabled from any and all gainful forms of employment as a result of such
condition. Dr. DiMarzio found that relator’s allowed condition of major depressive
disorder, single episode constituted approximately 25 percent disability due to the
psychiatric condition alone. Dr. DiMarzio found that relator was permanently and totally
disabled from any and all forms of remunerative employment, noting that relator’s
psychiatric condition was directly related to relator’s approved physical conditions, and
recommended that relator continue with psychological counseling and psychiatric
medication management.
       {¶ 22} 5. Relator filed his first application for PTD on February 4, 2019.
       {¶ 23} 6. Following his PTD application, relator was first examined by Gary A.
Greenspan, M.D., on October 18, 2019. In a report dated October 29, 2019, Dr. Greenspan
found that relator had a whole person impairment of 30 percent due to the allowed
condition of myocardial infarction and substantial aggravation of pre-existing coronary
artery disease. Dr. Greenspan opined that relator was capable of sedentary work exerting
up to ten pounds of force occasionally.
       {¶ 24} 7. Relator was next examined by Lynn A. Luna Jones, Ph.D., on October 25,
2019. In a report dated October 31, 2019, Dr. Jones found that relator appeared to be at
maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) and was “functioning fairly well from a
psychological standpoint.” (Stip. at 32.) Dr. Jones opined that relator had a three percent
No. 22AP-264                                                                             11

whole person impairment due to the allowed psychological condition of major depressive
disorder, single episode. Considering only that allowed psychological condition, Dr. Jones
concluded that relator would be capable of working.
       {¶ 25} 8. On November 25, 2019, relator was examined by Shannon C. Valentine,
MRC, CRC, a vocational specialist. Valentine opined that relator would not be capable of
engaging in any sustained, remunerative employment.
       {¶ 26} 9. Relator’s first application for PTD was heard by a commission staff
hearing officer (“SHO”) on January 14, 2020. Denying the application for PTD in an order
mailed on January 18, 2020, the SHO, relying on the reports of Drs. Greenspan and Jones,
found that relator was not precluded from engaging in sustained remunerative
employment and was therefore not permanently and totally disabled.
       {¶ 27} 10. Following the denial of his first PTD application, relator was examined
by two healthcare providers prior to filing his second PTD application. On September 30,
2020, Dr. DiMarzio conducted another evaluation of relator including a mental status
examination, clinical interview, and psychological testing. In a report dated November 9,
2020, Dr. DiMarzio again found that relator had a disability of approximately 30 percent
based solely on relator’s allowed psychiatric condition of major depressive disorder, single
episode. Dr. DiMarzio again concluded that relator was permanently and totally disabled
from any and all forms of remunerative employment.
       {¶ 28} 11. Relator was again examined by Dr. Hartwig on May 20, 2021. In a report
dated May 22, 2021, Dr. Hartwig opined that relator was permanently and totally disabled
from any and all sustained, gainful, and remunerative employment as a result of the
allowed conditions in the claim.
       {¶ 29} 12. Relator filed a second application for PTD on June 4, 2021.
       {¶ 30} 13. Following his second application, relator was examined by Joseph P.
Pecorelli, Ph.D., on August 17, 2021. In a report dated August 27, 2021, Dr. Pecorelli
concluded that relator’s allowed psychological condition of major depressive disorder,
single episode had reached MMI. Dr. Pecorelli found that the allowed psychological
condition alone resulted in a 35 percent whole person impairment and would interfere
with and prevent relator from returning to gainful employment.
No. 22AP-264                                                                           12

       {¶ 31} 14. Relator was next examined by Boris Gliner, M.D., on August 23, 2021. In
a report dated August 26, 2021, Dr. Gliner reported that according to relator, his
“symptoms overall are unchanged.”(Stip. at 59.) Regarding whether relator had reached
MMI with regard to the allowed conditions, Dr. Gliner opined as follows:
              The injured worker sustained a myocardial infarction on
              January 19th, 2015, and underwent quadruple bypass on
              January 20th, 2015. He is not experiencing chest pain or
              shortness of breath. He is not scheduled for any tests or
              procedures. His medical therapy is unchanged. In my opinion,
              based on the history and physical examination and review of
              the file provided to me, the injured worker has reached
              maximal medical improvement with regard to allowed
              condition of myocardial infarction and substantial
              aggravation of pre-existing coronary artery disease. No
              fundamental functional or physiological change can be
              expected within reasonable probability in spite of continued
              medical or rehabilitative procedures of his condition.

(Stip. at 60.) Dr. Gliner found that relator had a whole person impairment of 30 percent
due to the allowed condition of myocardial infarction and substantial aggravation of
preexisting coronary artery disease. Dr. Gliner opined that relator was capable of
sedentary work exerting up to ten pounds of force occasionally.
       {¶ 32} 15. Relator’s second application for PTD was heard by a commission SHO on
November 9, 2021. In an order dated November 12, 2021, the SHO found the commission
lacked jurisdiction to consider relator’s second PTD application because relator failed to
present evidence of new and changed circumstances as required by R.C. 4123.58(G).
Noting the denial of relator’s first PTD application on January 18, 2020, the SHO found
that “there is insufficient evidence of new and changed circumstances, prior to the
06/04/2021 filing of this Application for Permanent Total Disability Compensation to
permit the Industrial Commission to consider this subsequent Application.” (Stip. at 79.)
The SHO stated the decision was based on a review of the January 18, 2020 SHO order
and a review of the claim file.
       {¶ 33} 16. On November 17, 2021, relator filed a request for reconsideration of the
SHO’s November 12, 2021 order.
No. 22AP-264                                                                             13

       {¶ 34} 17. The commission determined that it did not have continuing jurisdiction
and stated that the November 12, 2021 SHO order remained in full force and effect.

II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law
       {¶ 35} Relator seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to award him
PTD compensation. Two questions are presented in this mandamus action: (1) whether
R.C. 4123.58(G) is unconstitutionally retroactive; and (2) if R.C. 4123.58(G) is not
unconstitutionally retroactive, whether the SHO erred in concluding relator failed to meet
his burden under the statute of presenting evidence of new and changed circumstances to
enable the commission to consider the application.

A. Requirements for Mandamus
       {¶ 36} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a
determination of the commission, a relator must establish a clear legal right to the
requested relief, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief, and the
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Belle Tire
Distribs. v. Indus. Comm., 154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122; State ex rel. Pressley v.
Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). With regard to factual determinations, where the
commission’s determination is supported by some evidence, it has not abused its
discretion and this court must uphold the decision. State ex rel. Seibert v. Richard Cyr,
Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 266, 2019-Ohio-3341, ¶ 44, citing State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T.
Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1996). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. State
ex rel. Autozone Stores, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-294, 2023-Ohio-633,
¶ 16. See State v. Leyh, 166 Ohio St.3d 365, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 14; Hanna v. Groom, 10th
Dist. No. 07AP-502, 2008-Ohio-765, ¶ 10.

B. Permanent Total Disability under Workers’ Compensation System
       {¶ 37} “[T]he purpose of permanent and total disability benefits is to compensate
injured persons for impairment of earning capacity.” State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus.
Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 170 (1987), citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus.
Comm., 42 Ohio St.2d 278 (1975). “Permanent total disability is the inability to do any
sustained remunerative work.” State ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d 27,
2002-Ohio-3316, ¶ 61, citing Stephenson at 170. See Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1).
No. 22AP-264                                                                        14

      {¶ 38} R.C. 4123.58 governs compensation for PTD, allowing compensation only
when one of the following conditions is met:
             (1) The claimant has lost, or lost the use of both hands or both
             arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two
             thereof; however, the loss or loss of use of one limb does not
             constitute the loss or loss of use of two body parts;
             (2) The impairment resulting from the employee’s injury or
             occupational disease prevents the employee from engaging in
             sustained    remunerative     employment     utilizing the
             employment skills that the employee has or may reasonably
             be expected to develop.
R.C. 4123.58(C). PTD compensation is prohibited when the reason the applicant is unable
to engage in sustained remunerative employment is due to any of the following reasons,
whether individually or in combination:
             (1) Impairments of the employee that are not the result of an
             allowed injury or occupational disease;
             (2) Solely the employee’s age or aging;
             (3) The employee retired or otherwise is not working for
             reasons unrelated to the allowed injury or occupational
             disease.
             (4) The employee has not engaged in educational or
             rehabilitative efforts to enhance the employee’s employability,
             unless such efforts are determined to be in vain.
R.C. 4123.58(D).
No. 22AP-264                                                                                              15

        {¶ 39} R.C. 4123.58 was amended by 2021 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 75 (“H.B. 75”), which
in part added R.C. 4123.58(G).1 Effective September 28, 2021, the statute provides:
                If the industrial commission has adjudicated a claimant’s
                application for compensation payable under this section for
                permanent total disability and issued a final order denying
                compensation for that application, the claimant shall present
                evidence of new and changed circumstances before the
                industrial commission may consider a subsequent application
                filed by the claimant for compensation under this section for
                the same injury or occupational disease identified in the
                previous application.

1 Following the amendments to R.C. 4123.58 enacted in H.B. 75, R.C. 4123.58 was amended by the 134th

General Assembly a second time in Am.Sub.H.B. No. 281 (“H.B. 281”). H.B. 281, which became effective
April 6, 2023, made a minor change to R.C. 4123.58(F) by striking through and thereby deleting the word
“handicapped,” which immediately preceded “individuals,” and inserting the word “with disabilities” after
the aforementioned “individuals.” However, the remaining text of R.C. 4123.58 in H.B. 281 did not include
the text of R.C. 4123.58(G). H.B. 281 gave no specific indication that it intended to amend R.C. 4123.58 by
removing R.C. 4123.58(G) through the usual means of striking through the existing text of R.C. 4123.58(G).
See Ohio Adm.Code 103-5-01 (“Old matter that is to be omitted from an existing codified or uncodified
section is indicated by retaining the matter as it appears in the section and striking it through with a
horizontal line.”). Section 2 of H.B. 281 provided in pertinent part: “That existing sections * * * 4123.58
* * * of the Revised Code are hereby repealed.” See State v. Wilson, 77 Ohio St.3d 334, 337 (1997) (stating
in considering the effect of a former version of R.C. 151.52 that “[m]atter to be affected by an ‘existing
sections’ repeal must appear in the body of the enrolled Act and must be stricken through”).
The Legislative Service Commission includes the text of R.C. 4123.58(G) in its official online version of the
Revised Code. The following note from the Legislative Service Commission appears after the text of R.C.
4123.58 on its website: “The Legislative Service Commission presents the text of this section as a composite
of the section as amended by multiple acts of the General Assembly. This presentation recognizes the
principle stated in R.C. 1.52(B) that amendments are to be harmonized if reasonably capable of
simultaneous operation.” Legislative Service Commission, Section 4123.58, https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-
revised-code/section-4123.58 (accessed August 8, 2023).
The provision in R.C. 1.52 noted by the Legislative Service Commission provides:
                If amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or different
                sessions of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another,
                the amendments are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be
                given to each. If the amendments are substantively irreconcilable, the latest
                in date of enactment prevails. The fact that a later amendment restates
                language deleted by an earlier amendment, or fails to include language
                inserted by an earlier amendment, does not of itself make the amendments
                irreconcilable. Amendments are irreconcilable only when changes made by
                each cannot reasonably be put into simultaneous operation.
R.C. 1.52(B). See State v. McCullough, 9th Dist. No. 28917, 2018-Ohio-4499, ¶ 11-12; Wilson at 337.
The magistrate infers the absence of R.C. 4123.58(G) from H.B. 281 may have occurred because H.B. 281
was initially passed by the House on June 16, 2021, which was before the effective date of H.B. 75.
Regardless, in the instant matter, no party contends that R.C. 4123.58(G) was not in effect at the time of
the SHO’s order denying relator’s second application for PTD in this matter. As a result, it is not necessary
at this time to resolve the impact, if any, of H.B. 281 to R.C. 4123.58(G).
No. 22AP-264                                                                             16

R.C. 4123.58(G).
       {¶ 40} Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34 governs the processing and adjudication of
applications for PTD. The applicant bears the burden to prove permanent total disability
by establishing under a preponderance of the evidence that the disability is permanent and
that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed conditions. Ohio Adm.Code
4121-3-34(D)(3)(a). See State ex rel. Sheppard v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 223, 2014-
Ohio-1904, ¶ 16; State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 22, 23 (1992).
The application must “identify, if already on file, or be accompanied by medical evidence
from a physician, or a psychologist or a psychiatric specialist in a claim that has been
allowed for a psychiatric or psychological condition(s), that supports an application for
compensation for permanent total disability.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(1). See State
ex rel. Kent State Univ. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-416, 2016-Ohio-1032
(stating that under Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(C)(1) an application can be dismissed if it
is filed without the required medical evidence).
       {¶ 41} The relevant inquiry in PTD cases is whether the applicant engages in or is
medically capable of sustained remunerative employment. Seibert, 2019-Ohio-3341, at
¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086,
¶ 16; State ex rel. Franta v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-530, 2021-Ohio-
1501, ¶ 6. The term “sustained” has not been precisely defined for workers’ compensation
purposes. In order to be considered sustained, remunerative activity does not have to
occur on a regular or daily basis, but “any ‘ongoing pattern’ of activity can be categorized
as sustained activity.” State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm., 131 Ohio St.3d 408, 2012-
Ohio-1296, ¶ 13, quoting Schultz, 2002-Ohio-3316, at ¶ 63. The Supreme Court of Ohio
has held that “part-time work constitutes sustained remunerative employment.” State ex
rel. Toth v. Indus. Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 360, 362 (1997). Importantly, however, there is
no bright-line numerical analysis for determining whether part-time work meets the
qualifications for sustained remunerative employment in PTD cases. State ex rel.
Bonnlander v. Hamon, 150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, ¶ 20 (stating that “there is
no hourly standard for determining one’s capability to perform sustained remunerative
employment on a part-time basis,” but rather the “commission decides whether a claimant
is capable of sustained remunerative employment on a case-by-case basis”).
No. 22AP-264                                                                              17

       {¶ 42} “Entitlement to permanent total disability compensation requires a showing
that the medical impairment due to the allowed conditions, either alone or together with
nonmedical disability factors, prevents claimant from engaging in sustained remunerative
employment.” State ex rel. Waddle v. Indus. Comm., 67 Ohio St.3d 452, 455 (1993),
quoting LTV Steel Co., 65 Ohio St.3d at 24. Nonmedical factors include the “claimant’s age,
education, work record, and all other factors, such as physical, psychological, and
sociological, that are contained within the record.” Stephenson, 31 Ohio St.3d at 173. “[A]
claimant’s medical capacity to work is not dispositive if the claimant’s age, experience,
education, etc., foreclose the claimant’s employability.” State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm, 68 Ohio
St.3d 315, 321 (1994). See State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 160 Ohio St.3d 7,
2020-Ohio-712, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Galion Mfg. Div., Dresser Indus., Inc. v.
Haygood, 60 Ohio St.3d 38, 40 (1991) (“While the commission may not deny PTD
compensation without considering nonmedical factors, it may grant PTD compensation
without considering nonmedical factors when ‘medical factors alone preclude sustained
remunerative employment.’ ”).

C. Whether R.C. 4123.58(G) Is Unconstitutionally Retroactive
       {¶ 43} Relator argues that the commission erred by applying R.C. 4123.58(G) to his
application for PTD compensation since it was filed before the effective date of the statute.
Relator contends that applying R.C. 4123.58(G) to PTD applications already pending at
the time the statutory provisions became effective constitutes an impermissible retroactive
application.
       {¶ 44} Before turning to the merits of the question presented, it is necessary to
consider the appropriate standard of review. Relator argues the commission abused its
discretion by applying the statute retroactively in the absence of clear intent. The
commission does not specifically articulate a standard of review with regard to the
constitutional question, but instead provides a general abuse of discretion standard. The
magistrate finds this issue to be a constitutional challenge involving statutory
interpretation, which is therefore reviewed de novo. Newburgh Hts. v. State, 168 Ohio
St.3d 513, 2022-Ohio-1642, ¶ 18, quoting Put-In-Bay v. Mathys, 163 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-
Ohio-4421, ¶ 11 (“ ‘We review constitutional challenges to state and local legislation de
No. 22AP-264                                                                                         18

novo.’ ”); TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers &
Surveyors, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 42-43; State ex rel. McDonald v. Indus.
Comm., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-386, 2021-Ohio-4494, ¶ 12, citing State ex rel. Natl. Lime &
Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, ¶ 14
(“Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to a de novo standard of
review.”). When considering questions of statutory interpretation under Ohio law, “ ‘it is
never mandatory for a court to defer to the judgment of an administrative agency’ and a
court should never do so to ‘alter the meaning of clear text.’ ” Autozone, 2023-Ohio-633,
at ¶ 16, quoting TWISM at ¶ 42.
        {¶ 45} To begin, statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v.
Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1998), quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164
Ohio St. 142, 147 (1955) (“A regularly enacted statute of Ohio is presumed to be
constitutional and is therefore entitled to the benefit of every presumption in favor of its
constitutionality.”). Therefore, “ ‘ “before any legislative power, as expressed in a statute,
can be held invalid, it must appear that such power is clearly denied by some constitutional
provision.” ’ ” Newburgh at ¶ 19, quoting Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd.
of Trustees v. Boyce, 127 Ohio St.3d 511, 2010-Ohio-6207, ¶ 10, quoting Williams v.
Scudder, 102 Ohio St. 305, 307 (1921).
        {¶ 46} The Ohio Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from passing
retroactive laws and protects vested rights from new legislative encroachments as follows:
                The general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive
                laws, or laws impairing the obligation of contracts; but may,
                by general laws, authorize courts to carry into effect, upon
                such terms as shall be just and equitable, the manifest
                intention of parties, and officers, by curing omissions, defects,
                and errors, in instruments and proceedings, arising out of
                their want of conformity with the laws of this state.
Article II, Section 28, Ohio Constitution.2 See State v. Lasalle, 96 Ohio St.3d 178, 2002-
Ohio-4009, ¶ 13; Coca-Cola Bottling Corp. v. Lindley, 54 Ohio St.2d 1, 6 (1978), quoting
Lakengren, Inc. v. Kosydar, 44 Ohio St.2d 199, 201 (1975) (stating that the constitutional

2 The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that the terms “retroactive” and “retrospective” have historically

been used interchangeably. State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 1, fn. 1; Bielat v.
Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 353 (2000).
No. 22AP-264                                                                              19

“prohibition against retroactive laws ‘is a bar against the state’s imposing new duties and
obligations upon a person’s past conduct and transactions, and it is a protection for the
individual who is assured that he may rely upon the law as it is written and not later be
subject to new obligations thereby’ ”). “[T]he presumption against retroactive legislation
is deeply rooted * * * and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.”
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
       {¶ 47} Courts considering whether a statute is unconstitutionally retroactive must
apply a two-part test articulated in Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St.3d
100 (1988). Lasalle at ¶ 14. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the General
Assembly expressly made the statute retroactive. See Van Fossen at 106 (stating that “[t]he
issue of whether a statute may constitutionally be applied retrospectively does not arise
unless there has been a prior determination that the General Assembly has specified that
the statute so apply”); State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295, 2007-Ohio-4163, ¶ 10.
Pursuant to R.C. 1.48, “[a] statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless
expressly made retrospective.” Thus, where a statute contains “no clear indication of
retroactive application, then the statute may only apply to cases which arise subsequent to
its enactment.” Kiser v. Coleman, 28 Ohio St.3d 259, 262 (1986). See Consilio at ¶ 15
(“Retroactivity is not to be inferred.”).
       {¶ 48} The commission argues R.C. 4123.58(G) does not apply retroactively
because “a retroactive application of the statute would mean that the newly amended
version would apply to all previously adjudicated second applications for PTD.” (Comm.
Brief at 6.) This argument, however, does not comport with the statutory text enacting R.C.
4123.58(G). Under the terms of H.B. 75, R.C. 4123.58(G) “appl[ies] to claims pending on
or arising on or after the effective date of this section,” which was September 28, 2021.
2021 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 75, Section 8. Based on this express indication, it is clear the
General Assembly made the statute in question retroactive. See State ex rel. Kilbane v.
Indus. Comm., 91 Ohio St.3d 258, 259 (2001) (finding the “express legislative intent for
retroactivity is obvious here because uncodified law makes the [amendment] applicable to
all ‘pending’ claims for compensation, with certain exceptions,” thereby “chang[ing] the
way the commission reviews applications to settle claims and applies to causes of action
* * * that arose prior to the effective date of the statute”); Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co.,
No. 22AP-264                                                                                 20

120 Ohio St.3d 228, 2008-Ohio-5243, ¶ 13 (finding statute expressly made retroactive
where General Assembly directed that amended statutory provisions applied to cases
pending on and thus filed before the effective date of the amendments); Thorton v.
Montville Plastics & Rubber, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-360, ¶ 19 (finding
amendment to R.C. 4123.512(H) that was applicable to claims pending on the effective
date of the amendment applied retroactively); Van Fossen at 106. The commission also
cites to this court’s decision in State ex rel. Hamilton v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
19AP-510, 2021-Ohio-1824, in arguing that R.C. 4123.58(G) does not apply retroactively.
In Hamilton, however, it was found that the first factor was not met “because the
legislature did not clearly express an intent for the new language [in the statute] to apply
retroactively.” Id. at ¶ 28. That case did not involve statutory language similar to that found
in H.B. 75 applying the amendments to claims pending on the effective date of
R.C. 4123.58(G). As a result, Hamilton is not determinative of the question presented in
this case.
       {¶ 49} Here, relator’s second application for PTD compensation was filed on
June 4, 2021. Because the second PTD application was filed before and remained pending
when R.C. 4123.58(G) became effective on September 28, 2021, the statute applied
retroactively to relator’s claim. However, this does not end the analysis, but instead
requires consideration of the second part of the retroactivity test—whether the statute is
unconstitutionally retroactive.
       {¶ 50} Under this second part of the analysis, a court will find that “[a] statutory
enactment is repugnant to Section 28, Article II if it is expressly retroactive and is
substantive, as opposed to merely remedial.” Lasalle, 2002-Ohio-4009, at ¶ 13.
“Substantive law” has been defined as “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and
regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1658 (10th
Ed.2014). “It is well established that a statute is substantive if it impairs or takes away
vested rights, affects an accrued substantive right, imposes new or additional burdens,
duties, obligations, or liabilities as to a past transaction, or creates a new right.” Pratte v.
Stewart, 125 Ohio St.3d 473, 2010-Ohio-1860, ¶ 37, citing Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at
107. See Bielat v. Bielat, 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 354 (2000) (stating that a retroactive law is
one “that is ‘made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights accruing, before it came into
No. 22AP-264                                                                                           21

force’ ”); Hope Academy Broadway Campus v. State Dept. of Edn., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-
758, 2008-Ohio-4694, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Matz v. Brown, 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 281
(1988) (“A statutory provision that attaches a new disability to a past transaction or
consideration is not invalid unless the past transaction or consideration created at least a
‘reasonable expectation of finality.’ ”); State v. Brooks, 170 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-2478,
¶ 10 (stating that “laws affecting rights, which may be protected by procedure, are
substantive in nature.”).
           {¶ 51} On the other hand, remedial statutes are “are those affecting only the remedy
provided” and “include laws which merely substitute a new or more appropriate remedy
for the enforcement of an existing right.” Van Fossen at 107. A remedy has been defined
as “[t]he means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or equitable
relief.” Black’s at 1485.3 Laws altering a tribunal’s jurisdiction have also been found not to
violate the constitutional ban on retroactive laws. State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-
Ohio-5059, ¶ 19; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506,
508 (1916) (“Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually ‘takes away no substantive
right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.’ ”). Additionally, statutes
“relating to procedures—rules of practice, courses of procedure, and methods of review—
are ordinarily remedial in nature.” Brooks at ¶ 10, citing Van Fossen at 108. See Pivonka

3 The distinctions between substantive law, remedies, and procedure have been further explained as

follows:
                  “A remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant who has been wronged
                  or is about to be wronged. The two most common remedies are judgments
                  that plaintiffs are entitled to collect sums of money from defendants
                  (damages) and orders to defendants to refrain from their wrongful
                  conduct or to undo its consequences (injunctions). The court decides
                  whether the litigant has been wronged under the substantive law that
                  governs primary rights and duties; it conducts its inquiry in accordance
                  with the procedural law. The law of remedies falls somewhere in between
                  procedure and primary substantive rights. Remedies are substantive, but
                  they are distinct from the rest of substantive law, and sometimes their
                  details blur into procedure. For long periods in our past, remedies were
                  casually equated with procedure.”
Black’s at 1485, quoting Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 1 (4th Ed.2010.). Additionally, and
somewhat contradictorily, the following explanation is given: “So far as the administration of justice is
concerned with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law defines
the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application
of one to the other.” Black’s at 1658, quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 476 (10th Ed.1947.).
No. 22AP-264                                                                                 22

v. Corcoran, 162 Ohio St.3d 326, 2020-Ohio-3476, ¶ 28 (“Litigants have no right to a
particular remedy or procedure, and nothing prohibits the legislature from altering or
modifying methods, procedures or remedies as it sees fit.”); Estate of Johnson v. Randall
Smith, Inc., 135 Ohio St.3d 440, 2013-Ohio-1507, ¶ 20; Landgraf at 275 (stating that
“[c]hanges in procedural rules,” which “regulate secondary rather than primary conduct,”
may frequently “be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns
about retroactivity”); Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc., 139 Ohio St. 198, 205 (1942)
(stating that remedies “have to do with the methods and procedure by which rights are
recognized, protected and enforced, not with the rights themselves”); Kilbreath v. Rudy,
16 Ohio St.2d 70 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus. A “procedural law” has been
defined as “[t]he rules that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced,
as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.” Black’s at 1398.
       {¶ 52} Nearly as often as courts have classified laws as substantive, procedural, or
remedial, they have acknowledged the difficulty in precisely defining and distinguishing
between these formalistic classifications. See State ex rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm., 11
Ohio St.2d 175, 178 (1967) (“It is doubtful if a perfect definition of ‘substantive law’ or
‘procedural or remedial law’ could be devised.”); Van Fossen at paragraph 3 of the syllabus
(“While in some cases the line between substantive and remedial may be difficult to
ascertain, these terms, as applied, provide readily distinguishable contours.”); Landgraf
at 270 (stating that “[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard
cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect
philosophical clarity,” but noting that “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable
reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance”); Heyman v. Heyman, 10th Dist.
No. 05AP-475, 2006-Ohio-1345, ¶ 12 (“The distinction between substantive and remedial
statutes can be difficult to define, as a statute often contains attributes of both.”); State ex
rel. Romans v. Elder Beerman Stores Corp., 100 Ohio St.3d 165, 2003-Ohio-5363, ¶ 14;
In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 12 (6th Dist.1991). Given this difficulty, a review of pertinent
cases is warranted.
       {¶ 53} The Supreme Court of Ohio in Van Fossen considered whether a newly
enacted amendment to the workers’ compensation act, which placed stricter conditions on
employer-employee intentional tort actions, was able to be applied retroactively to cases
No. 22AP-264                                                                                23

pending in a court of appeals on the effective date of the statute. At issue was a provision
in the new statute providing a definition of the term “substantially certain.” The new
statute provided that “ ‘ “Substantially certain” means that an employer acts with
deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death.’ ”
(Emphasis sic.) Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 108. However, at the time the claim was
pending, the intentional tort requirement of substantial certainty was given the following
definition under the common law: “ ‘[A] specific intent to injure is not an essential element
of an intentional tort where the actor proceeds despite a perceived threat of harm to others
which is substantially certain * * * to occur.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 108-09, quoting Jones
v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio St.3d 90, 95 (1984). Because the new statute “would remove
appellees’ potentially viable, court-enunciated cause of action by imposing a new, more
difficult statutory restriction upon appellees’ ability to bring the instant action,” the court
held that “this result constitutes a limitation, or denial of, a substantive right, and
consequently causes the statute to fall within the ban against retroactive laws established
by Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.” Id. at 109.
       {¶ 54} In Holdridge, a workers’ compensation claimant had lost function in both
eyes, the second one due to an industrial accident. He had been declared permanently and
totally disabled in 1947 under a statute that provided that “[i]n cases of permanent total
disability, the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly wages,
and shall continue until the death of such person so totally disabled,” and further stated
that “[t]he loss of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any
two thereof, shall prima facie constitute total and permanent disability, to be
compensated according to the provisions of this section.” (Emphasis sic.) Holdridge at
177-78, quoting G.C. 1465-81. Several years later, Holdridge had “through persistent and
determined efforts” developed accommodations that enabled him to have employment. Id.
at 176. Based on this, the commission declared in 1964 that Holdridge was no longer
permanently and totally disabled. However, the statute providing for Holdridge’s disability
benefits had been amended in 1959 to provide that “ ‘[i]n cases of permanent total
disability, the employee shall receive an award to continue until his death” of certain
specified amounts and further stated that “[t]he loss of both hands or both arms, or both
feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, constitutes total and permanent
No. 22AP-264                                                                                24

disability, to be compensated according to this section.” (Emphasis sic.) Holdridge at 178,
quoting R.C. 4123.58.
       {¶ 55} The Holdridge court examined the distinctions between substantive and
procedural aspects of the statutes, stating:
              Each of the two statutes defines the loss of both eyes as a
              permanent and total disability. This is substantive law. Such a
              disability imposes a duty or obligation upon the employer
              under the law of Ohio to meet and overcome the prima facie
              evidence of total and permanent disability. The employer
              failed to overcome and, so far as we can determine from the
              record, did not endeavor to overcome the presumption of total
              disability. The Industrial Commission apparently recognized
              that the relator suffered a permanent and total disability and
              allowed compensation under both statutes. It follows,
              therefore, that since the prima facie proof factor concerned
              only the manner of arriving at a fact conclusion, upon which
              the substantive law would operate, it was itself procedural or
              remedial rather than substantive.
Id. at 178. With regard to retroactive application of remedial legislation, the court held that
“[l]aws of a remedial nature providing rules of practice, courses of procedure, or methods
of review are applicable to any proceedings conducted after the adoption of such laws.” Id.
at paragraph one of the syllabus.
       {¶ 56} In Kilbane, the court considered amendments to a workers’ compensation
statute regarding claim settlement hearings that applied to all pending claims for
compensation with certain exceptions. The new statute removed the provision for
commission hearings on applications for settlement approval. The former statute also
permitted claimants to apply independently for the commission approval, whereas the
new statute required the employer’s signed assent to the application and a settlement
agreement as a prerequisite. The court found that the former settlement hearing
provisions represented a “course of procedure” in that “[t]hey existed as part of the process
by which Kilbane, upon qualifying for compensation, enforced her right to receive it.”
Kilbane, 91 Ohio St.3d at 260. Therefore, the court held that “those provisions were
remedial in nature and may be changed or revoked by the legislature without offending
the Constitution” because although “entitlement to workers’ compensation, being a
No. 22AP-264                                                                                  25

substantive right, is measured by the statutes in force on the date of her injury, * * * the
same is not true for laws affecting only the enforcement of that right.” Id. at 259-60.
       {¶ 57} Outside of the workers’ compensation context, the court in Ackison
considered legislation that added certain threshold requirements to asbestos claims.
Under the legislation, a party seeking to bring such claim was required to file with the court
certain qualifying medical evidence of physical impairment, with such evidence being
supported by the written opinion of a competent medical authority stating the claimant’s
exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to the medical condition. A
claimant’s failure to file the required preliminary evidence and medical opinion resulted
in the claim being dismissed without prejudice, enabling refiling when the threshold
requirements were met. The legislation provided that the threshold requirements and
dismissal provision applied to all asbestos cases pending in Ohio courts, regardless of
whether they were filed before or after the effective date of the legislation. The trial court
applied the legislation to dismiss Ackison’s asbestos claims, but the court of appeals
reversed, holding that because Ackison’s suit had been filed before the effective date of the
statutory changes, she had a vested substantive right to pursue recovery for her husband’s
illness and death under the statutory scheme in effect at the time she filed her complaint.
       {¶ 58} The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, stating the amended statutes were
procedural, not substantive because they “ ‘do not relate to the rights and duties that give
rise to this cause of action or otherwise make it more difficult for a claimant to succeed on
the merits of a claim’ ” but instead “ ‘pertain to the machinery for carrying on a suit.’ ”
Ackison, 2008-Ohio-5243, at ¶ 16, quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bogle, 115 Ohio St.3d 455,
2007-Ohio-5248, ¶ 17. The court recognized that the amended statutes “establish[ed] ‘a
procedural prioritization’ of asbestos-related cases” by “ ‘prioritiz[ing] the administration
and resolution of a cause of action that already exists.’ ” Id. at ¶ 17, quoting Norfolk at ¶ 16.
The court concluded that the statutes placed “ ‘[n]o new substantive burdens’ ” on
claimants, but “ ‘merely substitute[d] a new or more appropriate remedy for the
enforcement of an existing right.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 411.
       {¶ 59} As the foregoing recitation of cases demonstrates, the “readily
distinguishable contours” between substantive and remedial laws oftentimes become
blurred when the laws in question appear to contain both substantive and procedural
No. 22AP-264                                                                             26

characteristics. Van Fossen at paragraph three of the syllabus. Here, relator argues the
retroactive application of R.C. 4123.58(G) is substantive and not remedial though without
providing specific reasons for such conclusion. The commission argues R.C. 4123.58(G) is
remedial in nature because it does not preclude the filing of a second PTD application, but
rather merely describes how the filing and processing is to occur for all second PTD
applications. In order to distinguish whether the statute at issue in this matter is
substantive or remedial, it is necessary to understand the differences between the state of
the law before and after H.B. 75.
       {¶ 60} Prior to H.B. 75, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “a showing of new and
changed circumstances is not ‘a prerequisite to commission consideration of a subsequent
application for permanent total disability compensation after an initial denial.’ ” State ex
rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 86 (1997), quoting State ex rel.
Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St. 3d 351, 352-53 (1992). See
State ex rel. Pactive Corp./Tenneco Packaging v. Harvey, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1272,
2004-Ohio-5158, ¶ 5. Notably, in Youghiogheny, the claimant’s second application for
PTD compensation was granted even though it was filed a mere four weeks after the
commission denied his first application.
       {¶ 61} Under the new law, following a final order of the commission denying a prior
application for PTD, a claimant must “present evidence of new and changed circumstances
before the industrial commission may consider a subsequent application.” (Emphasis
added.) R.C. 4123.58(G). The phrase “new and changed circumstances” is not defined
under the statute. However, this concept is not new to the law of workers’ compensation,
having application with regard to the commission’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction
under R.C. 4123.52 and claims for an increase in percentage of permanent partial disability
(“PPD”) under R.C. 4123.57(A).
       {¶ 62} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.52, the commission has continuing jurisdiction over
each case and, subject to certain temporal limitations, it “may make such modification or
change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion is
justified.” R.C. 4123.52(A). Despite this “broad statutory language,” the Supreme Court of
Ohio has construed R.C. 4123.52 to limit the commission’s continuing jurisdiction, holding
that “the prerequisites for its exercise are (1) new and changed circumstances, (2) fraud,
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(3) clear mistake of fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by an inferior tribunal,”
despite the absence of statutory language to that effect. State ex rel. Knapp v. Indus.
Comm., 134 Ohio St.3d 134, 2012-Ohio-5379, ¶ 13, citing State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus.
Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 458-59 (1998), citing State ex rel. Cuyahoga Hts. Local School
Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Johnston, 58 Ohio St.2d 132 (1979). See State ex rel. Griffey v. Indus.
Comm., 125 Ohio St. 27, 31 (1932) (stating that G.C. 1465-86, which allowed the
commission to “ ‘from time to time make such modification or change with respect to
former findings or orders with respect thereto, as, in its opinion may be justified’ * * *
could not have been intended to take away all finality to the orders and findings of the
commission”). Similar to R.C. 4123.52, applications for an increase in PPD must be
“supported by substantial evidence of new and changed circumstances developing since
the time of the hearing on the original or last determination.” R.C. 4123.57(A).
       {¶ 63} Given the inherently factual nature of the determination, the parameters of
what type and quantity of evidence is sufficient to establish “new and changed
circumstances” have not been precisely defined. Instead, the commission and courts have
examined this on a case-by-case basis, developing some guiding principles along the way.
See State ex rel. Ross v. Indus. Comm., 118 Ohio St.3d 73, 2008-Ohio-1739, ¶ 17 (stating
that “the mere submission of new evidence is not automatically a new and changed
circumstance”); State ex rel. Keith v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.3d 139, 141-42 (1991)
(finding that establishing new and changed circumstances entails demonstrating that
“conditions have changed subsequent to the initial award,” and not simply evidence which
was “newly acquired”); State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div. v. Indus.
Comm., 54 Ohio St.2d 333, 334 (1978) (holding that “a medical report or reports
concluding percentage increases, beyond percentages previously reported in connection
with the original claim, is not an improper consideration under R. C. 4123.57(B) of ‘new
and changed circumstances developing since the time of the hearing on the original or last
determination’ ”); State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta, 131 Ohio St.3d 231,
2012-Ohio-542, ¶ 17 (stating that “the worsening of an existing medical condition or a
newly allowed medical condition often serves as new and changed circumstances justifying
the exercise of continuing jurisdiction to modify a previous order”); Knapp, 2012-Ohio-
5379, at ¶ 17 (applying a previously effective industrial commission resolution pertaining
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to the exercise of continuing jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 4123.52 to find that “[n]ew and
changed circumstances means ‘there exists newly discovered evidence’ ”); State ex rel.
Rocktenn Co. v. Long, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-862, 2013-Ohio-5296, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 64} Review of R.C. 4123.58(G) reveals that it is remedial, not substantive
because it is concerned with “the methods and procedure by which rights are recognized,
protected and enforced, not with the rights themselves.” Weil, 139 Ohio St. at 205. First,
R.C. 4123.58(G) does not foreclose a claimant’s ability to make a subsequent application
for PTD after the failure of a prior application. Instead, similar to the prima facie filing
requirements considered in Ackison, it adds a procedural component requiring a claimant
to make an initial showing sufficient to permit consideration of the PTD application.
Importantly, this preliminary determination of new and changed circumstances occurs
before the commission is permitted to consider the merits of the application and does not
change the analysis of the merits of the PTD application.
       {¶ 65} In this way, and perhaps most importantly with regard to retroactivity,
R.C. 4123.58 does not change the burden, nature, or quantum of proof needed to establish
entitlement to PTD compensation. The burden remains on the applicant to prove
permanent total disability by establishing under a preponderance of the evidence that the
disability is permanent and that the inability to work is causally related to the allowed
conditions. Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(a); Sheppard, 2014-Ohio-1904, at ¶ 16. The
pertinent inquiry remains the same—whether the applicant engages in or is medically
capable of sustained remunerative employment. Compare Hearing v. Wylie, 173 Ohio St.
221 (1962), paragraph two of the syllabus (holding that the alteration of the definition of
“injury” by an amendment, which applied to claims pending at the time the amendment
became effective, was unconstitutionally retroactive because a worker’s right “to
compensation for an injury is a substantive right, and a change by the General Assembly
in the statutory definition of ‘injury’ theretofore not compensable is a change in a
substantive right”); Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St.3d at 108-09.
       {¶ 66} Rather than taking away or impairing a substantive right to PTD
compensation, R.C. 4123.58(G) creates a procedure or mechanism for enforcement of that
right by which subsequent PTD applications are to be adjudicated following the denial of
an initial application. Thus, the requirement under R.C. 4123.58(G) to demonstrate new
No. 22AP-264                                                                               29

and changed circumstances “ ‘do[es] not relate to the rights and duties that give rise to this
cause of action or otherwise make it more difficult for a claimant to succeed on the merits
of a claim’ ” for PTD compensation but instead “ ‘pertain[s] to the machinery for carrying
on a suit’ ” by regulating secondary conduct. Ackison, 2008-Ohio-5243, at ¶ 16, quoting
Norfolk, 2007-Ohio-5248, at ¶ 17. See Holdridge, 11 Ohio St.2d at 178 (stating that because
the “prima facie proof factor concerned only the manner of arriving at a fact conclusion,
upon which the substantive law would operate, it was itself procedural or remedial rather
than substantive”); Romans, 2003-Ohio-5363, at ¶ 20 (finding that amendment altering
time limitations with respect to the continuing jurisdiction of the commission under R.C.
4123.52 was remedial because the alteration “did not alter claimants’ already established
right to participate” but instead fashioned a more appropriate remedy for the enforcement
of that right); Longbottom v. Mercy Hosp. Clermont, 137 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-
4068, ¶ 26; Morgan v. W. Elec. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 278, 281 (1982), fn. 5; Kilbane, 91 Ohio
St.3d at 259-60.
       {¶ 67} Based on the foregoing, the magistrate concludes the application of
R.C. 4123.58(G) to pending claims does not violate the constitutional prohibition on
retroactive laws. Therefore, it was not error for the commission to apply R.C. 4123.58(G)
to relator’s claim as it was pending when the statutory provision became effective on
September 28, 2021.

D. Whether the Requirements of R.C. 4123.58(G) Were Met
       {¶ 68} Having found R.C. 4123.58(G) is not unconstitutionally retroactive, the
remaining question is whether the SHO erred in concluding relator failed to meet his
burden under the statute of presenting evidence of new and changed circumstances to
enable the commission to consider the application. Relator argues his allowed condition
of major depressive disorder has regressed to a point that prevents him from performing
any sustained remunerative employment. In support of this argument, relator points to
the difference in assessed impairment and restrictions between the report of Dr. Jones in
support of the initial PTD application and the reports of Drs. DiMarzio and Pecorelli in the
subsequent years.
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       {¶ 69} The commission is “exclusively responsible for assessing the weight and
credibility of evidence.” State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-
Ohio-6036, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18 (1987).
Given the commission’s role as the exclusive factfinder, this court “cannot second guess
the commission’s judgments either as to witness credibility or on the proper weight to
accord particular evidence.” State ex rel. Welsh Ents., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
19AP-127, 2020-Ohio-2801, ¶ 26. In reviewing a decision of the commission regarding
new and changed circumstances, a relator has the burden of showing the commission
abused its discretion by entering an order not supported by any evidence in the record.
Akron Paint, 2012-Ohio-542, at ¶ 11 (finding commission abused its discretion in
determining there existed evidence to support a finding of new and changed circumstances
to exercise continuing jurisdiction under R.C. 4123.52). Furthermore, the commission is
required to “specifically state what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the
reasoning for its decision.” State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d 203 (1991),
paragraph one of the syllabus. See State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio
St.3d 481, 484 (1983).
       {¶ 70} Prior to the adjudication of the first application for PTD compensation,
relator was examined by Drs. DiMarzio and Jones with regard to the allowed psychological
condition of major depressive disorder, single episode. In the 2018 report that was
submitted in support of the first PTD application, Dr. DiMarzio found a 25 percent
disability due to the allowed psychiatric condition alone. Dr. DiMarzio concluded relator
was permanently and totally disabled from any and all forms of remunerative
employment. At the request of the commission, Dr. Jones examined relator in 2019. Dr.
Jones opined that relator’s allowed psychological condition had reached MMI and resulted
in a three percent whole person impairment.           Dr. Jones stated that relator was
“functioning fairly well from a psychological standpoint,” and concluded relator would be
capable of working. (Stip. at 32.)
       {¶ 71} In the 2020 order denying relator’s first PTD application, the SHO stated
that the order was “based upon the narrative report from the state’s orthopedic physician
Gary Greenspan, M.D., and state examining psychologist Lynn Luna-Jones, Ph.D.” (Stip.
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at 38.) With regard to relator’s allowed psychological condition, the SHO made the
following findings:
              Dr. Jones who examined [relator] on behalf of the Industrial
              Commission strictly regarding [relator’s] psychiatric
              condition only, indicated that [relator’s] condition has also
              reached maximum medical improvement, and that he can
              return to his former position of employment without any
              restrictions at all. She further indicated that [relator] has a
              three percent permanent partial impairment with respect to
              her [sic] whole person as it relates to [relator’s] psychiatric
              condition currently recognized in [relator’s] sole industrial
              injury.
(Stip. at 38.) The SHO made the following conclusions:
              Therefore, based upon the opinions of Dr. Greenspan and
              Dr. Jones who combined have examined [relator] on all of the
              allowed conditions for which [relator’s] sole industrial injury
              is recognized, the [SHO] concludes on a whole that [relator] is
              medically capable of performing some sustained remunerative
              employment ie sedentary work.
              ***
              Therefore, based upon the limited physical and psychological
              restrictions as indicated by Dr. Jones and Dr. Greenspan who
              both indicate on a whole that [relator] can perform sedentary
              work coupled with [relator’s] young age, high school
              education and work history in various settings, the [SHO]
              finds that [relator] is not precluded from engaging [in]
              sustained remunerative employment, and is therefore not
              permanently and totally disabled.
(Stip. at 39-40.) The SHO did not rely on or otherwise mention the report of Dr. DiMarzio.
       {¶ 72} For purposes of the second PTD application, relator was again examined by
Dr. DiMarzio in addition to an exam conducted by Dr. Pecorelli. Dr. DiMarzio found in the
2020 report that relator had a disability of approximately 30 percent based solely on the
allowed psychiatric condition. Dr. DiMarzio stated that relator’s “[d]epressive symptoms
are still within severe ranges, despite psychiatric and psychological interventions,” and
noted that relator “has had psychotherapy, and has not made significant improvement.”
(Stip. at 51.) Dr. DiMarzio again concluded that relator was permanently and totally
disabled from any and all forms of remunerative employment. Dr. Pecorelli, who examined
relator at the request of the commission, found in a 2021 report that relator’s allowed
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psychological condition had reached MMI and resulted in a 35 percent whole person
impairment. Dr. Pecorelli found that relator “continues to experience moderately severe
emotional distress characterized as a Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode that
interfere with his mental and behavioral capacities.” (Stip. at 74.) Dr. Pecorelli stated that
relator “may likely have difficulty being aware of the normal hazards in the work
environment and maintaining safety awareness.” (Stip. at 74.) In conclusion, Dr. Pecorelli
found that “[t]he residual symptoms associated with the allowed psychological conditions
would interfere with and prevent a successful return to gainful employment” and indicated
in the occupational activity assessment that relator was incapable of work. (Stip. at 74.)
       {¶ 73} The SHO made the following findings in support of the determination that
relator failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances in order to permit
consideration of the second PTD application:
              The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the Injured Worker has
              failed to present evidence of new and changed circumstances
              for the Industrial Commission to consider this subsequent
              Application for Permanent Total Disability Compensation
              filed 06/04/2021.
              The Staff Hearing Officer specifically finds that a previous
              Application for Permanent Total Disability Compensation
              filed 02/06/2019, was denied by way of the Staff Hearing
              Officer order issued 01/18/2020.
              ***
              The Staff Hearing Officer finds that there is insufficient
              evidence of new and changed circumstances, prior to the
              06/04/2021 filing of this Application for Permanent Total
              Disability Compensation to permit the Industrial Commission
              to consider this subsequent Application.
              This decision is based on a review of the Staff Hearing Officer
              order issued 01/18/2020, and a review of the State claim file.
              This order is being placed pursuant to R.C. 4123.58(G).
              All of the evidence was reviewed and considered in rendering
              this decision.
(Stip. at 79-80.)
       {¶ 74} Here, the SHO does not briefly explain the basis for the determination that
relator failed to demonstrate new and changed circumstances with reference to the
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evidence in the record. Following the denial of relator’s initial application for PTD
compensation, Drs. DiMarzio, Hartwig, Gliner, and Pecorelli issued reports regarding
relator’s condition. The SHO does not specifically mention any medical reports that were
relied upon in reaching its conclusion, but rather makes a boilerplate statement regarding
a review of the entire claim file and all of the evidence.
       {¶ 75} Most problematically, the SHO does not explain the difference in
percentages of disability between the 2019 report of Dr. Jones, the only psychological
report relied upon in the order denying relator’s first application for PTD compensation,
and the percentages found in the 2020 report of Dr. DiMarzio and the 2021 report of
Dr. Pecorelli, which were available for consideration with respect to relator’s second PTD
application. Again, Dr. Jones, who served as the commission’s psychological examiner for
the first PTD application, found a 3 percent impairment and concluded relator was capable
of working. Dr. DiMarzio found relator had a 30 percent impairment, an increase of 5
percent from Dr. DiMarzio’s 2018 report and 27 percent higher than the conclusion of
Dr. Jones. Dr. Pecorelli, the commission’s examiner for the allowed psychological
condition in the second PTD application, found that relator had a 35 percent impairment,
an increase of 32 percent from Dr. Jones. Both Drs. DiMarzio and Pecorelli concluded
relator was incapable of work. Although the SHO references the order denying relator’s
initial PTD application, the SHO does not explain how that order’s reliance on the report
of Dr. Jones alone for relator’s allowed psychological condition relates to the evidence
submitted in support of the second PTD application.
       {¶ 76} As previously noted, findings of percentage increases in medical reports may
serve as a proper consideration for finding new and changed circumstances. Gen. Motors,
54 Ohio St.2d at 334. Furthermore, “the worsening of an existing medical condition or a
newly allowed medical condition” can support a finding of new and changed
circumstances. Akron Paint, 2012-Ohio-542, at ¶ 17. In the absence of sufficient reasoning
from the commission with reference to the evidence in the record, it is exceedingly difficult
to determine whether there exists some evidence to support the conclusion that was
reached. As this court has previously stated, “where the evidence cited by the commission
suggests a different result than the conclusion announced by the commission, the
commission’s reasoning is critical.” State ex rel. Shipley v. Ludowici-Celadon, 10th Dist.
No. 22AP-264                                                                             34

No. 05AP-1172, 2006-Ohio-6893, ¶ 4. See State ex rel. Campbell v. Conrad, 10th Dist. No.
01AP-1158, 2002-Ohio-2773, ¶ 47 (stating that “the DHO found that no new and changed
circumstances were established, but he failed to provide any reasoning for this finding that
connects to the evidence of record”). Therefore, the circumstances present in this case
warrant granting a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to (1) specifically
state the evidence the commission relied on in reaching its decision and (2) briefly explain
the reasoning for the commission’s decision. See State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc.,
137 Ohio St.3d 557, 2013-Ohio-5159, ¶ 18 (issuing a limited writ of mandamus returning
the matter to the commission to issue a new order that specifically states the evidence
relied upon and briefly explains its reasoning); State ex rel. Merritt v. Indus. Comm., 161
Ohio St.3d 380, 2020-Ohio-4379, ¶ 6.

E. Conclusion
       {¶ 77} Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that a
limited writ of mandamus should be granted returning the matter to the commission to
issue a new order that (1) specifically states the evidence the commission relied on in
reaching its decision and (2) briefly explains the reasoning for the commission’s decision.

                                              /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                               JOSEPH E. WENGER IV

                             NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

              Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
              error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
              legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
              finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
              53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
              to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
              53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
              magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
              decision.