Court Opinion

ID: 9715736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:13:15.6605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.686067
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority that a police officer whose self-stated primary duty is to investigate and prevent criminal activity may search a student on school grounds on a lesser fourth amendment standard than probable cause merely because the police officer is permanently assigned to the school and is listed in the student handbook as a member of the school staff. The majority’s departure from a unanimous line of Federal and State decisions places form over substance and opens the door for widespread abuse and erosion of students’ fourth amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement officers. The majority reaches its conclusion by: (1) relying on the faulty premise that Ruettiger is a school official for fourth amendment purposes; (2) misreading the line of school search decisions involving police; and (3) relying on conclusions from factually distinguishable United States Supreme Court decisions rather than utilizing the rationale the Court used to reach those conclusions. I address each issue in turn. I The majority takes the position that for the purposes of the fourth amendment, Ruettiger is a school official similar to a teacher or principal. However, Ruettiger is a police officer. He is employed by the City of Joliet police department and is assigned to patrol the Alternate School grounds as a police liaison officer. Ruettiger’s self-stated primary duty at the school is to investigate and prevent criminal activity. When Ruettiger discovers such activity, he arrests the offender and takes him or her to the police station. Ruettiger is not employed by the Alternate School and is not a teacher or administrator. Ruettiger is also not a member of the Alternate School security staff, which the school employs. Although Ruettiger is listed in the school handbook as a member of the school support staff, and had the authority to give a detention, and handles "some” disciplinary problems, these additional factors do not detract from the fact that Ruettiger was still a police officer whose primary duty was the same as any police officer assigned to patrol any area: to investigate and prevent criminal activity. The fact that Ruettiger was a police officer, and acted as one in seizing and searching defendant’s flashlight, is clear from the record. After observing and questioning defendant in the hallway, Ruettiger seized and searched defendant’s flashlight because he suspected it contained drugs. After finding cocaine, Ruettiger chased and captured defendant, arrested him, placed him in custody, handcuffed him, placed him in the squad car, and took him down to the investigative division of the Joliet police station. There, Ruettiger handcuffed defendant to a wall, read him his Miranda rights, and interrogated him. These were the acts of a police officer, not a school official, a point the State has acknowledged in its brief: "The search of defendant in the present case is best characterized as one conducted solely by a member of law enforcement, since Officer Ruettiger was not directed by any school official to search the defendant. Likewise, no school officials participated, even to a minor extent, in the search.” (Emphasis added.) See also In re E.M. (1994), 262 Ill. App. 3d 302, where our appellate court noted that a school principal’s interrogation of a student at school was for school disciplinary purposes while a police liaison officer’s subsequent interrogation of that student at school regarding the same incident was for law enforcement purposes. Cf. People v. Bowers (1974), 77 Misc. 2d 697, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432, where a school security officer, unlike a faculty member, was required to have probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion in searching a student because: (1) the security guard was under the control of the police commissioner and had to abide by the police department’s guidelines; and (2) the security guard was placed on school grounds solely for security purposes and served no educational function at the school. The majority, however, fails to acknowledge this clear point and argues that I place undue emphasis on Ruettiger’s testimony that his primary purpose at the school was to investigate and prevent criminal activity. However, I only emphasize so strongly Ruettiger’s testimony as to his primary duty at the school because the majority cannot see what is so obvious in this case: Ruettiger’s self-stated primary duty at the school, as displayed by his actions in arresting defendant, is that of a police officer, not a school official. See In re F.P. v. State (Fla. App. 1988), 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254 n.l (where the school resource officer, an employee of the local sheriffs department assigned to the school, worked "primarily in delinquent prevention, education and counseling, but also handle[d] any law enforcement matter[ ] that [arose]” (emphasis added)). In addition to relying on the fiction that Ruettiger is a school official, the majority argues that support for its decision exists in previous case law, and specifically in two United States Supreme Court decisions, for its holding that Ruettiger was allowed to search defendant based only on reasonable suspicion. However, there is no support for the majority’s conclusion in any previous decision. II Federal and State Decisions The majority examines the line of Federal and State decisions involving police searches of students at school and concludes that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to Ruettiger’s action here. This conclusion, however, is based on a misreading of two decisions. Every Federal and State decision on this matter has rejected the majority’s view. All Federal and State decisions reviewed indicate that police officers, including police liaison officers, are required to have probable cause to search a student if they are significantly involved in the search. This was the law prior to T.L.O. (see Picha v. Wielgos (N.D. Ill. 1976), 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (cited by the United States Supreme Court in T.L.O. in declining to address whether the reasonable suspicion standard applies to school searches involving police); M.J. v. State (Fla. App. 1981), 399 So. 2d 996, 998; M. v. Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School District No. 5 (S.D. Ill. 1977), 429 F. Supp. 288, 292; State v. Young (1975), 234 Ga. 488, 499-500, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594), and has also been the law after T.L.O. As Professor LaFave has noted: "Lower courts have held or suggested that the usual probable cause test obtains if the police are involved in the search in a significant way.” (4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 10.11(b) (3d ed. 1996) (hereinafter LaFave).) (See A.J.M. v. State (Fla. App. 1993), 617 So. 2d 1137; In re Devon T. (1991), 85 Md. App. 674, 701, 584 A.2d 1287, 1300; F.P. v. State (Fla. App. 1988), 528 So. 2d 1253.) This analysis applies to police liaison officers as well. See Coronado v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), 806 S.W.2d 302, rev’d on other grounds (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), 835 S.W.2d 636; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir. 1987), 810 F.2d 188. Although several decisions have allowed student searches under the reasonable suspicion standard where police have participated in the search (see Martens v. District No. 220, Board of Education (N.D. Ill. 1985), 620 F. Supp 29; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir. 1987), 810 F.2d 188), these decisions have stressed that police involvement in the searches was minimal. See also Coronado v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), 806 S.W.2d 302, rev’d on other grounds (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), 835 S.W.2d 636; In re Alexander (1990), 220 Cal. App. 3d 1572, 1577 n.l, 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 n.l (where courts held that the reasonable suspicion standard applies where school officials request police assistance in searching a student because the police are not the primary actors but are merely assisting school officials). The majority attempts to find support for its holding by stating that the reasonable suspicion standard applies in those cases "involving school police or liaison officers.” (169 Ill. 2d at 207.) The two decisions on which the majority relies for this assertion, however, Wilcher v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), 876 S.W.2d 466, and In re S.F. (1992), 414 Pa. Super. 529, 607 A.2d 793, not only fail to address the issue of what fourth amendment standard applies, they do not involve police liaison officers. The two decisions involve "school police,” which differ from police liaison officers in several significant respects. First, school police are employed by a school district while police liaison officers are employed by the local police department. Thus, while a school police officer is employed by and is ultimately responsible to the school district, a police liaison officer, such as Ruettiger, is employed by and ultimately responsible to local law enforcement authorities. Obviously, school districts and local law enforcement authorities have different missions. Also, while Ruettiger is assigned to the school, he still operates out of the police station, as was seen in this case. Ruettiger arrested defendant, placed him in his squad car, brought him to the police station, and interrogated him there. School police also have duties that are significantly more limited than police liaison officers, such as Ruettiger, a point made clear in Wilcher. The Wilcher court noted that the duties of the school police officer there "entailed quelling disturbances and generally carrying out the various school policies applicable to her job assignment.” (Wilcher, 876 S.W.2d at 467.) In fact, the Wilcher court specifically noted that the school police officer there did not arrest the defendant after he emptied his pockets and revealed contraband. Instead, the school police officer called the Houston police department to have a police officer sent to the school to take over the search and investigation. (Cf. In re Frederick B. (1987), 192 Cal. App. 3d 79, 88-89, 237 Cal. Rptr. 338, 344 (noting that school security guards, although peace officers for purposes of carrying out their duties, are of a special category, and are carefully limited in their powers and scope of operation).) In contrast to school police, Ruettiger’s primary duty at the school was that of any police officer, to investigate and prevent criminal activity, arresting those he found violating the law. Unlike "school police,” Ruettiger’s duties were not limited in any manner. Ruettiger not only instigated the seizure and search, he arrested defendant, handcuffed him, took him to the station, read him his Miranda rights, and interrogated him. The distinction between school police and police liaison officers is significant because every case involving police liaison officers has indicated that probable cause is required if the officer acts on his own initiative, as Ruettiger did here. (See Coronado v. State (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), 806 S.W.2d 302; Cason v. Cook (8th Cir. 1987), 810 F.2d 188.) As the Coronado court noted, citing Cason: "This same standard [reasonableness] applies when school officials conduct the search in question in conjunction with, but not at the behest of, police officers who are assigned to the school.” (Emphasis added.) (Coronado, 806 S.W.2d at 303.) Surely, if the reasonable suspicion standard is not applicable to a police liaison officer directing a school official to conduct a search, it is not applicable where that same police liaison officer conducts a search on his own initiative, without the involvement of any school official, as was done here. The majority incorrectly assumes that I approve of the Wilcher and S.F. decisions that allow "school police” to search students on the basis of reasonable suspicion. I do not necessarily agree with those decisions, but instead analyze them only to (1) note that the issue of what standard to search applied was not raised or addressed in those cases, and (2) distinguish them from cases involving police liaison officers, such as Coronado and Cason, which require probable cause. The majority also attempts to find support for its conclusion in Boykin. However, Boykin provides the majority no support because it does not present the same facts as the instant case. As the majority acknowledges, the principal in Boykin wished to search a student and requested assistance from police assigned to the school. This court found the search reasonable. Thus, Boykin is similar to cases such as Coronado, which conclude that when police merely assist school officials in a search, the standard to search is reasonable suspicion. Those same cases note, however, that if a principal searches a student at the behest of law enforcement officials, probable cause is required. The same would certainly be true if the officer instigated and conducted the search on his own without the involvement of any school official. The majority also finds that Ruettiger initiated the search to further the school’s attempt to maintain a proper educational environment. However, any police search at a school, or even of a schoolchild outside of school, can be said to have been performed to maintain a proper educational environment. This does not allow a police officer, whose primary duty is to investigate and prevent criminal activity, the right to search a student on mere whim and less than probable cause in direct contravention of a student’s constitutional rights. In sum, not one case involving a police search of a student at school, including cases involving police liaison officers, supports the majority’s conclusion. In fact, every authority available has rejected the majority’s view. The majority finds support only by misreading the facts of Wilcher and S.F., decisions that involve "school police” rather than police liaison officers. The result is that this court has for the first time in a long line of cases departed from the overwhelming view that police officers, even liaison police officers, are required to have probable cause to search a student on school grounds when instigating and carrying out a search. Ill The majority also attempts to find support for its position in two Supreme Court decisions, T.L.O. and Vernonia. However, the majority errs in relying simply on the results of those two factually distinguishable decisions rather than on the analysis which led the court to its conclusions. Both T.L.O. and Vernonia allowed school officials, not police authorities, to search students for noncriminal purposes based on only a reasonable suspicion. The results of T.L.O. and Vernonia thus do not apply to the instant case because the search here was conducted by a police officer investigating criminal activity for the purpose of facilitating a criminal case against defendant. A thorough examination of the three-part test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Vernonia reveals this distinction and the flaws in the majority’s cursory analysis. (i) The first factor in balancing the competing interests of the individual and the State is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes. The majority in the instant case concludes that because defendant was a child in school, he had a lowered expectation of privacy. (169 Ill. 2d at 209.) This arbitrary and somewhat simplistic holding, however, fails to consider the factor the Vernonia Court found most relevant to this issue: defendant’s privacy interest in relation to the State’s role in conducting the search. The T.L.O. Court did not elaborate on the reasons for its finding that a schoolchild has a diminished expectation of privacy, a point noted by Justice Powell in his concurrence. Justice Powell, however, emphasized that school "teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between parent and child.” (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 739, 105 S. Ct. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring).) Justice Powell continued: "The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between [teachers] and [their] pupils. Instead, there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility for the student’s welfare as well as for his education.” (T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 740, 105 S. Ct. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring).) Justice Powell’s concurrence directly distinguishes the instant case from T.L.O. and Vernonia. In both T.L.O. and Vernonia, school officials, sharing a commonality of interests with their students, conducted the searches in question. Here, a police officer, charged with the adversarial responsibility of investigating criminal activity and arresting those who violate the law, conducted the search. The special relationship between student and teacher noted by Justice Powell was recently stressed by the United States Supreme Court in articulating the reasons why a schoolchild has a diminished expectation of privacy in school with respect to school officials. (See Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 115 S. Ct. 2386.) The Vernonia Court noted that while expectations of privacy vary according to context, such as whether an individual is in a car, at work, or in his home, "the legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-a-vis the State may depend upon the individual’s legal relationship with the State.” (Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 575, 115 S. Ct. at 2391.) The Court noted that the most important factor concerning the privacy interest of schoolchildren is the special relationship between the subject of the search, the schoolchildren, and the State in its role in conducting the search; as schoolmaster, guardian and tutor: "The most significant element in this case is the [privacy interest of school children]; that the [search] was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care. Just as when the government conducts a search in its capacity as employer (a warrantless search of an absent employee’s desk to obtain an urgently needed file, for example), the relevant question is whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that a reasonable employer might engage in [citation], [SJo also when the government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake.” (Emphasis added.) Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 582, 115 S. Ct. at 2396-97. In the instant case, the State did not act as guardian and tutor in conducting the search. Instead, the State acted as adversarial law enforcer. Ruettiger was not assigned to the school to act as guardian and tutor. He was at the school primarily to investigate and prevent criminal activity and arrest those who violate the law. Thus, the special relationship of the kind noted by Justice Powell in T.L.O., and by the majority in Vernonia, did not exist between defendant and Ruettiger. Listing Ruettiger as a member of the school staff and allowing him to give a detention does not alter his primary role at the school, which Ruettiger readily admitted was to investigate and prevent criminal activity. To find that Ruettiger acted as guardian and tutor for the purposes of the fourth amendment in his relationship with defendant denies the facts of the case. The relevant question to be asked here, then, is whether the search is one that a. reasonable police officer might undertake, one based on probable cause. The answer is no. Thus, while defendant was at school, his expectation of privacy was diminished in relation to school officials, such as teachers or principals, to whom he was entrusted and who served as guardian and tutor in a nonadversarial role. However, defendant’s right to an expectation of privacy was not diminished in relation to the State in its adversarial role as law enforcer. A school child’s expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the State as police officer, even a police liaison officer, is not diminished simply because the child is at school. See Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 483 U.S. 868, 873-76, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 717-19, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168-70 (where the Court noted that while a probationer has a lesser privacy interest with respect to the State acting as probation officer, the probation officer has in mind the welfare of the probationer and is not a police officer charged with the duty of investigating criminal activity). The majority finds that I have erred in using the special relationship between student and teacher noted by Justice Powell and emphasized by the Court in Vernonia. The majority believes that I find that the Supreme Court in T.L.O. and Vernonia applied a reasonableness standard because of this special relationship. I note, however, that my analysis is not so simplistic. The special relationship between pupil and teacher is relevant to the student’s legitimate expectation of privacy, which is but one of three factors the Supreme Court has balanced in lowering the standard to search students. Moreover, while the majority relies on Professor LaFave’s citation to W. Buss, who argues against the in loco parentis theory (169 Ill. 2d at 211), Professor LaFave thereafter notes that the Supreme Court in Vernonia "used the more straightforward proposition that the Fourth Amendment’s ' "reasonableness” inquiry cannot disregard the school’s custodial and tutelary responsibilities for children.’ ” LaFave § 10.11(a), at 806, quoting Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995), 515 U.S. 646, 656, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 576, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2392. The majority also notes Professor LaFave’s "more proper” theory of school search decisions. (169 Ill. 2d at 211-12.) However, Professor LaFave cautions that the matter is not "free of all doubt” (LaFave § 10.11(b), at 809) and further cautions at the end of this section: "[M]ention must be made of the fact that all of the preceding discussion has been premised on the assumption that the search of the student in question was conducted by school authorities without the inducement or involvement of police.” (LaFave § 10.11(b), at 832.) And, as noted previously, Professor LaFave concludes by noting that the usual probable cause test obtains where police are involved in the search in a significant manner. (LaFave § 10.11(b), at 832.) Ruettiger, a police officer whose self-stated primary duty at the school was that of a police officer, to investigate and prevent criminal activity, was involved in a significant manner in the search here. It is also important to note that while the majority finds that defendant had a diminished right to privacy in school, defendant was charged and sentenced to four years in the penitentiary as an adult. I find it fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with compulsory school attendance laws to conclude that defendant had diminished privacy rights in relation to a police officer assigned to a school, whose primary duty was to investigate and prevent criminal activity, and then to charge and sentence defendant as an adult with evidence obtained by that officer. (ii) The next factor considered in this balance is the character of the intrusion. The majority finds the intrusion minimal because Ruettiger limited his search to defendant’s flashlight. However, the majority cannot reconcile this finding with the Supreme Court’s holding in T.L.O. that a seizure and search of a child’s possessions, such as the handbag or purse at issue in T.L.O., or the flashlight involved here, "no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of *** privacy.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337-38, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 732, 105 S. Ct. at 740-41. The majority also cannot reconcile its finding with the readily apparent reason for the search, the investigation of criminal activity. The Supreme Court has noted the importance in fourth amendment analysis of the purpose for a search, whether it was instigated in order to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution or for some other purpose. In Vernonia, for instance, the Court noted that the search was not undertaken for evidentiary purposes for criminal prosecution, and that such searches generally require probable cause. (Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 578 n.2, 115 S. Ct. at 2393 n.2.) In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association (1989), 489 U.S. 602, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 109 S. Ct. 1402, the Court stressed that government-prescribed drug testing of railroad workers was "not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations.’ ” (Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 & n.5, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 662 & n.5, 109 S. Ct. at 1415 & n.5, quoting 49 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) (1987).) And in New York v. Burger (1987), 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27, 96 L. Ed. 2d 601, 623 n.27, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2651 n.27, the Court specifically noted that there was no evidence in the record to show that an administrative inspection was a "pretext” for obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution. The reason for the Court’s concern is that a government search for evidentiary purposes for a criminal prosecution involves a more substantial invasion of privacy than a search for other purposes. See LaFave § 10.1(b), at 378-79. It is significant that as a police officer, Ruettiger conducted the seizure and search of defendant’s personal noncontraband item, the flashlight, in furtherance of his self-stated primáry purpose at the school: "to take care of criminal activity.” A search of a student by a school official, however, such as a teacher or principal, is conducted primarily to maintain discipline and decorum in the classroom. Thus, the second factor of the balancing equation, the character of the intrusion complained of, also favors the standard of probable cause. This is a classic fourth amendment search in which a police officer seizes and searches a defendant’s noncontraband item in order to facilitate a criminal prosecution. (iii) The final factor in the balance is the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy of the means used for meeting that concern. I agree with the majority that the State’s interest in maintaining schools free from the ravages of drugs is compelling. (See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 579, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.) Yet, I do not believe that this interest is sufficiently compelling, even at the Alternate School, in light of students’ privacy interests vis-a-vis the State as law enforcer and the severe nature of the intrusion, to justify the lowering of the standard to search for a police officer in school from probable cause to reasonable suspicion. (See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 579, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.) I believe this compelling interest has been met by allowing teachers and school administrators, who have almost constant contact with and supervision over students, the right to search students based on only reasonable suspicion. Moreover, in addressing this issue, the Vernonia Court concluded that accusatory searches by school officials are more negative than random searches. (Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663-64, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.) The Court noted that in the school setting, random drug testing might be more acceptable to parents than accusatory drug testing because of the stigma attached to being accused, which would "transform[ ] the process into a badge of shame.” (Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.) In the present case, the search was accusatory. The present search was also conducted by a police officer, and not a teacher untrained in the intricacies of fourth amendment jurisprudence and probable cause. T.L.O. stated that the lowered level of suspicion was proper for teachers untrained in fourth amendment jurisprudence. (See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735, 105 S. Ct. at 743; cf. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 581, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.) Police officers such as Ruettiger, however, are trained in fourth amendment jurisprudence. Thus, the lower standard is appropriate for teachers and school administrators, but not for police officers. The majority tortures this logic by finding that because teachers and school administrators are not trained in the intricacies of the fourth amendment, police officers may patrol school hallways, searching and seizing based only on reasonable suspicion. (169 Ill. 2d at 210.) However, the Supreme Court’s point is that teachers and school administrators are allowed the lowered standard because they are untrained in fourth amendment jurisprudence. Conversely, since police officers are trained in fourth amendment jurisprudence, they are required to abide by its general requirement of probable cause to search. (iv) Upon consideration of these three factors, I find only one, the compelling interest in protecting school children from the influx of drugs into the school that prompted the Supreme Court in T.L.O. and in Vernonia to lower the fourth amendment standard for school officials to search schoolchildren. This factor, however, is not sufficiently compelling to allow this court to lower the standard for a police officer to search a student, even a police liaison officer assigned to an alternate school, from probable cause to reasonable suspicion. More significant is the severe intrusion of a schoolchild’s expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the State as law enforcer. My conclusion is supported by the Vernonia decision, which found the most important factor in balancing the interests between the individual and the State in a school search to be the relationship between the State as searcher and the subject of the search. The State conducted the seizure and search here as law enforcer and the standard required was probable cause. My conclusion is also consistent with the overwhelming weight of legal authority. Probable Cause I note briefly that Ruettiger did not have probable cause to search defendant’s flashlight. Probable cause has been defined as the presence of " ’facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge *** sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested has committed the offense.’ ” (People v. Creach (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 96, 101, quoting People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276.) Ruettiger clearly did not have such information when he seized and searched defendant’s flashlight. CONCLUSION The majority’s conclusion has been rejected by every decision addressing this issue. However, henceforth, a police officer assigned to a school whose primary duty at the school is that of a police officer, to investigate and prevent criminal activity, is now not a police officer, but a school official. The result is that local law enforcement agencies now have greater latitude to search students in school, based on the fact that they are children, and then have them charged and sentenced as adults with the evidence obtained. The majority’s conclusion is a threat to the rights of all children in school to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and from overzealous and aggressive police conduct. Children do not learn respect for their basic constitutional rights, or the rights of others, in such a setting. Instead, such a negative environment only fosters cynicism as well as suspicion of, and contempt for, all police activity. I cannot join the majority’s departure from logic, good sense, and established case law. Accordingly, I dissent. JUSTICES HARRISON and McMORROW join in this dissent.