Court Opinion

ID: 9505472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:05:11.323434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:31.216335
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Although the majority's opinion dismisses this appeal, the effect of it is to affirm summarily the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case on all issues except for its analysis of the availability of consent as a defense to the plaintiff's claim of battery. Because I agree with the Court of Appeals on this issue, I respectfully dissent.
In this case, plaintiff Robins sued a county jail officer named Soules, the county sheriff, and the county commissioners alleging that they were liable for injuries she suffered when Soules sexually assaulted her while she was an inmate in the county jail. Soules had previously pled guilty to Official Misconduct as a Class A misdemeanor in exchange for the dismissal of a charge of Sexual Misconduct by a Service Provider, a Class D felony. One of the issues addressed by the Court of Appeals in its opinion was the availability of consent as a defense to Robins's sexual assault claim. On that issue, the Court of Appeals said:
We also note that consent is not available has a defense to Robins's sexual assault claim. Under I.C. § 35-44-1-5(b), a service provider may not claim consent as a defense for sexual miscon*588duct with a detainee. Given Robinsg's - general lack of autonomy as an inmate, it would be incongruous to withhold the defense of consent in the eriminal context but to allow Soules the defense in a civil claim.
Robins v. Harris 740 N.E.2d 914, 917 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). I agree with this analysis.
Our Legislature has made a public policy determination that the position of authority a jailer holds over a prisoner dictates that there be no exception for consent in our criminal law to the rule against sexual contact between jailer and prisoner. 'Our state's civil . law should further the public policy objective the Legislature has adopted in the criminal context.