Court Opinion

ID: 9642776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:08:52.285231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:52.416479
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting:
That part of the charge which the trial court gave covering the law of threats is as follows:
“Bearing in mind the instructions hereinbefore and elsewhere given you upon the law of threats, if you find and believe from the evidence that, at the time and place alleged in the indictment, the defendant killed the said deceased but if you further find and believe from the evidence that the said deceased had theretofore made a threat or threats to kill the defendant or do him serious bodily injury, either directly to the defendant or to any other person or persons, and by such person or persons information of such threat or threats was communicated to the defendant before the homicide, and if you further find and believe from the evidence that, at the time of such homicide, the said deceased did any act or made any demonstrations manifesting an intention or which appeared to the defendant to be manifestation of an intention, to then and there immediately execute such threat or threats, if so made, *420and that by reason thereof it then and there reasonably appeared to the defendant, in view of all the circumstances, and from his standpoint at the time, that such threat or threats, if any so made, were then and there about to be executed by the deceased, and that he, the defendant, was in an immediate danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily injury at the hands of the deceased, then and in such event, he had the right to stand his ground and defend himself, and if, acting under such circumstances, he did so shoot and kill the deceased, he would be justified therein under the law, and if you so find and believe from the evidence or have a reasonable doubt thereof, you should acquit him.” (Emphasis, supplied.)
The appellant pertinently excepted to that charge because it required the jury to find and believe that the threats by the deceased were, in fact, made.
In connection with that exception, appellant called to the trial court’s attention the fact that the jury should have been instructed that his right to act thereon did not depend upon whether the jury believed that the threats had in fact been made by the deceased, but that the issue for the jury to determine, in that connection, was whether appellant believed that the threats had been made.
It has always been the holding of this court that the right of defense based upon threats by the deceased has never been made to depend upon the jury’s belief that threats were, in fact, made, but rather that belief on the part of the accused that threats had been made is all that is necessary. Branch’s P.C., Sec. 2984 and Sec. 2085.
That the charge, as given, was subject to the exception urged and was therefore erroneous is conceded by my brethren.
But my brethren justify the giving of the erroneous charge for the reason that there was no testimony from any witness that the deceased did not make the threats.
So, my brethren dispose of the error in the charge as being harmless, notwithstanding the fact that it related directly to one of appellant’s defenses in the case.
But let us see if the charge, itself, did not raise the issue as to whether the threats were, in truth and in fact, made by the deceased. Attention is called to the fact that each time the *421trial court referred to the belief by the jury of threats on the part of the deceased, in the charge as given, he coupled therewith the limitation: “if so made” and “if any so made.”
The use of such words constituted a direct charge on the part of the trial judge to the jury that they were required not only to find that the threats had been in fact made but that any question as to whether the threats had been made was entirely resting in their discretion.
Not only is this the necessary construction to be given the charge but, in addition thereto, when the trial court told the jury that if the threats were “so made” or “if any” were “so made,” he directly conveyed to the jury the idea that there was a doubt existing in his mind as to whether the threats had been made.
If the question of threats was to be left with the jury as not being disputed, no authority existed to place a limitation thereon. The fact that there was a limitation placed thereon conveyed to the jury that there was a very definite question as to whether the threats were made.
It is thus apparent that the trial court, in his charge, definitely raised an issue as to whether the threats were made. Therefore, there is no place, here, for an application of the rule of harmless error which the majority opinion relies upon.
Appellant was entitled to a correct charge submitting his defense. This was not accorded to him.
I respectfully dissent.