Court Opinion

ID: 9594636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:34.99855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:54.059106
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s decision that the registry ordinance and the anti-discrimination ordinance are valid exercises of the authority of the municipality. Majority at (1) and (3). However, I would hold that the benefits ordinance is also valid under the Home Rule Act.
The power granted municipalities by the Home Rule Act does “not include the power to take any action affecting the private or civil law governing private or civil relationships, except as is incident to the exercise of an independent governmental power.” OCGA § 36-35-6 (b). However, the benefits ordinance under consideration in this case in no way affects existing “private or civil law.” Furthermore, the municipality has the “independent governmental power” to provide benefits for “its employees, their dependents, and their survivors.” OCGA § 36-35-4 (a). The benefits ordinance simply defines a category of persons eligible for benefits as dependents by defining “domestic partners” as persons who are “mutually interdependent” and who “agree to be jointly obligated and responsible for the necessities of life for each other.” There is no one general law in this state establishing a uniform definition of “dependent,” see majority at 164-165, and the requirements of a domestic partnership certainly indicate that a city employee’s domestic partner must rely, at least in part, on the employee for financial support. See Ins. Co. of N. America v. Cooley, 118 Ga. App. 46, 48 (162 SE2d 821) (1968) (dependency depends on whether the alleged dependent was supported in whole or in part by the other party).
For these reasons, I dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.