Court Opinion

ID: 9765788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:19:29.981904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:15.736342
License: Public Domain

BATEMAN, Justice
(concurring).
I concur fully with everything written by my Brother Dixon in his opinion and would like to enlarge somewhat on several of the decisions contained therein.
By its seventh point of error on appeal the appellant Interstate Circuit, Inc. says the court erred in refusing to hold that Article 527 of the Texas Penal Code preempted the field of regulating motion pictures, thus making invalid such attempted action by the City. The first two sections of Article 527, Penal Code of Texas, as amended in 1961, prohibit the doing of certain things, including the exhibition of obscene motion pictures, but Section 5 provides, in part, as follows:
“The provisions of this Act shall not apply to any motion pictures produced or manufactured as commercial motion pictures which (1) have the seal under the Production Code of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; or (2) legally move in interstate commerce under Federal Law; or (3) are legally imported from foreign countries into the United States and have been passed by a Customs Office of the United States Government at any port of entry.”
The evidence clearly shows that the film in question is what is known as a “commercial motion picture” and that it has moved, and will probably continue to move, in interstate commerce. We think we can safely assume that such movements in interstate commerce will be “legal.” Therefore, this motion picture, being one of a class specifically excepted from the effect of Article 527, is subject to regulation by the City.
Moreover, the City of Dallas, being a home rule city deriving its powers from Article 11, Section 5 of the Texas Constitution, has plenary charter powers which include the power to enact the ordinance here in question, its powers being subject only to the limitation that its charter and ordinances shall contain nothing inconsistent with the Texas and Federal Constitutions or the general laws enacted by the State Legislature. City of Fort Worth v. McDonald, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W.2d 256, wr. ref. n. r. e.; Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, Tex.Civ.App., 354 S.W.2d 597, wr. ref. n. r. e. per curiam, 163 Tex. 616, 358 S.W.2d 589. Home rule cities have full authority to do anything the Legislature could have authorized them to do prior to adoption of the Home-Rule Amendment, the result being that it is not necessary to look to the acts of the Legislature for grants of power to such cities, but only for limitations on their powers. Forwood v. City of Taylor, 147 Tex. 161, 214 S.W.2d 282, 286; Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Tuck, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 455, wr. ref.
Appellants take the position that in the light of certain pronouncements by the Supreme Court the picture “Viva Maria” is entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution unless it can be properly said that it is obscene; and that in determining whether it is obscene three tests must be applied, to wit:
“1. It must deal with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest, judged by the average person, applying contemporary community standards, and considering its dominant theme as a whole. Roth v. United States, 344 [354] U.S. 476 [77 S.Ct. 1304], 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957); and,
“2. It must be patently offensive — so offensive on its face as to affront community standards of decency. Manual
*778Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 [82 S.Ct. 1432], 8 L.Ed.2d 639 (1962); and,
“3. It must be utterly without redeeming value; hence, the good may not be weighed against the bad. Jacobellis v. [State of] Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 [84 S.Ct. 1676], 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964).”
It is my firm opinion that the constitutional guaranties of free speech may not properly be invoked to defeat the worthy purposes of the ordinance in question. The classification of a motion picture as “not suitable for young persons” is not by the terms of the ordinance made to depend on whether the motion picture is obscene, and I do not believe the United States Supreme Court intended, in Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, 1367, or in any other case, to make such a stringent limitation on the powers of a state or city in this field.
The ordinance under examination, in defining the phrase “not suitable for young persons,” does not employ the words “obscene” or “obscenity.” The portrayal of sexual promiscuity in a motion picture may be accomplished with such finesse, or in such a subtle manner, that many would not consider it obscene; yet, by its very adroitness or subtlety promiscuity would be made to appear to a young person to be highly desirable or praiseworthy and acceptable or commonly accepted. Conveying to young persons the idea that to be able to enjoy the pleasures of sexual gratification without being burdened with any accompanying responsibility or commitment, and with no retributive consequences, or even the slightest remorse, is acceptable behavior according to accepted standards of the American community, would in my opinion have a much more pernicious effect on the morals of the community than mere obscenities. To say that a community is powerless to protect itself and its youth from such damage because of the constitutional safeguards of free speech is to my mind unconscionable and unacceptable.
We are also asked to dissolve the temporary injunction because the order does not contain a recitation of the judge’s reasons for issuing the same, as required by Rule 683, T.R.C.P. It is true that this order merely recites that all parties were represented by attorneys and in person, that they announced ready for trial and that the court, after hearing the testimony and argument of counsel, and after having fully considered the same, together with the viewing in person of the motion picture “Viva Maria”, is of the opinion and finds that the appellee is entitled to a temporary injunction. The order then proceeds to grant the temporary injunction. It is also true that several Texas cases have held that this requirement of Rule 683 is mandatory and that the omission of the reasons for granting the injunction is fatal and requires reversal. Miller v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 305 S.W.2d 663, no wr. hist.; Northcutt v. Waren, Tex.Civ.App., 326 S.W.2d 10, wr. ref. n. r. e.; City of Houston v. Rose, Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 477, no wr. hist.
In Miller v. State, supra, the temporary injunction had been granted without notice to the defendant and without a hearing. There was neither pleading nor evidence that irreparable wrong, damage or injury was imminently threatened. The order did not state the reasons for its issuance. For all of these reasons the order was reversed and remanded.
In Northcutt v. Waren, supra, there were also additional substantial grounds for reversal.
In City of Houston v. Rose, supra, although the failure to state the reasons for the injunction seems to have been the only ground on which the order was reversed, it was pointed out in the opinion that in several cases it had been held that the failure to set forth the reasons for granting a temporary injunction would not require a reversal “where the record affirmatively shows that no harm resulted.”
It seems to be well settled by the following authorities that Rule 683 does not require a reversal when the record “affirmatively shows that no harm resulted.” 31 *779Tex.Jur.2d, Injunctions, § 157, p. 274; O’Daniel v. Libal, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W.2d 211, no wr. hist.; Gonzalez v. Rodriguez, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W.2d 253, no wr. hist.; Rothermel v. Goodrich, Tex.Civ.App., 292 S.W.2d 882, 884; Payton v. Hurst, etc. Clinic, Tex.Civ.App., 318 S.W.2d 726, wr. ref. n. r. e. See also Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, and Garcia v. Sun Oil Co., Tex.Civ.App., 300 S.W.2d 724, 735, wr. ref. n. r. e.
As pointed out in O’Daniel v. Libal, supra, “The purpose of the rule above referred to is to inform a party just what he is enjoined from doing and the reasons why he is so enjoined.” It was also pointed out in that opinion that the application for temporary injunction was set down for hearing and that the appellant filed his answer, that both parties introduced several witnesses, some twenty witnesses testifying at the hearing, and that “the main and sole inquiry” was whether or not the act sought to be enj oined had or would result in a nuisance; that the appellant was familiar with the prayer of appellee’s petition, had heard the statement of the court when he pronounced the judgment and that there could be “no doubt but what appellant knew what he was enjoined from doing and the reasons why.”
With slight exception, the same may be said of the case at bar. Without further lengthening this opinion by reciting the evidence and the statements of the trial judge at the time he announced his decision in the presence of counsel for all parties, I would simply state that this record does affirmatively show that no harm resulted from the failure of the judge to recite specifically in his order the reasons why he granted the temporary injunction. Certainly, it will not be argued that such omission probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented appellants from making a proper presentation of the case to this court. Rule 434,
Appellants and appellee are each asserting substantive rights under Federal law. Appellants say the film in question is protected under the United States Constitution, while appellee asserts that the exercise of its substantive right to regulate the exhibition of the film is within the bounds of that same Constitution. Yet, we are asked to reverse this case on a purely technical, procedural rule. This we are in effect prohibited from doing by the Supreme Court of the United States in Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889, wherein the court said that “ * * * the assertion of Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.”
Rule 683, T.R.C.P., under discussion here, is purely procedural and does not involve any substantive rights of the parties. It cannot be invoked to deny the parties, appellants and appellee, of their rights under the Constitution of the United States. For this additional reason the point is overruled.
I am fully persuaded that the temporary injunction was properly granted and that it is our duty to affirm.