Court Opinion

ID: 9481890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:34:40.375479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:38.510428
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the rationale employed by the majority in reaching the conclusion that Hux was improperly charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b). The majority’s conclusion rests upon a narrow interpretation of the legislative history which requires that the “design of the device renders it primarily useful for surreptitious listening.” S.Rep. No. 90-1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2112, 2183 (emphasis in original). However, “[a] device will not escape the prohibition merely because it may have innocent uses.” Id.
The majority appears to conclude that the legislative history of section 2512(l)(b) requires that the design of the general class of device, i.e., “descramblers,” must be primarily useful for the purpose of surreptitious listening. The majority reasons that because there are legitimate uses for “descramblers,” the manufacture of this particular descrambler, even though modified, cannot fall within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b). I disagree with this constricted interpretation of section 2512(l)(b).
*320In the present case, Hux was charged with manufacturing, assembling or possessing a modified version of a descrambler for the sole purpose of allowing unauthorized access to satellite programming. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning, the “specifically surreptitious characteristic,” at 317 (citing United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir.1991)), of the counterfeit descrambler was its similarity to legitimate descramblers, which in turn enabled the unauthorized access to satellite programming. This is not simply the surreptitious use of a legitimate electronic device; the counterfeit descramblers manufactured by Hux had no legitimate use other than to facilitate the unauthorized interception of satellite television signals.
Therefore, in my view, Hux’s actions fall squarely within the plain language of the statute and the legislative history. Because I believe that the majority adopts an excessively narrow interpretation of section 2512(l)(b), I respectfully dissent.