Court Opinion

ID: 9519083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:08:29.574585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:28.594438
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s determination that the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) may be required to pay the costs of the in-patient alcoholism and drug abuse treatment ordered in these consolidated cases. I believe that the present orders exceed the Department’s statutorily defined duties, and therefore I dissent. I agree with the Department that its responsibility in these circumstances is more limited than the majority envisions. An examination of the relevant statutes demonstrates that the Department is to make referrals for treatment of alcoholism and drug abuse, but there is no provision that expressly authorizes or requires the Department to pay the costs of in-patient treatment for those conditions. Courts customarily defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language that the agency is charged with enforcing. Reed v. Kusper, 154 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1992); City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1988); Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 152-53 (1983). I would apply that principle here and would hold that the Department cannot be compelled to pay the costs of in-patient alcoholism and drug abuse treatment programs for parents of minors who come within the Department’s jurisdiction. A general statement of the trial court’s powers in cases such as these is found in section 2 — 10(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, which says: "If the minor is ordered placed in a shelter care facility of the Department of Children and Family Services or a licensed child welfare agency, the court shall, upon request of the appropriate Department or other agency, appoint the Department of Children and Family Services Guardianship Administrator or other appropriate agency executive temporary custodian of the minor and the court may enter such other orders related to the temporary custody as it deems fit and proper, including the provision of services to the minor or his family to ameliorate the causes contributing to the finding of probable cause or to the finding of the existence of immediate and urgent necessity.” 705 ILCS 405/2 — 10(2) (West 1994). The language of section 2 — 10(2) authorizing the trial court to enter orders designed to "ameliorate the causes” giving rise to judicial intervention cannot be read so broadly that it produces an absurd result. For example, I do not believe that the Department could be compelled to pay the costs of a parent’s vocational training, even if the trial court believed that employment in a particular calling would ameliorate the problems that resulted in the Department’s involvement in the case. Rather, the broad language of section 2 — 10(2) must be read in conjunction with the other statutes pertaining to the Department’s powers and duties. Unlike the majority, I do not discern in section 2 — 10(2) or in the related statutes a legislative intent to make the Department responsible for the costs of in-patient alcoholism and drug abuse treatment programs. Section 5(g) of the Children and Family Services Act provides: "Rules and regulations established by the Department shall include provisions for training Department staff and the staff of Department grantees, through contracts with other agencies or resources, in alcohol and drug abuse screening techniques to identify children and adults who should be referred to an alcohol and drug abuse treatment program for professional evaluation.” 20 ILCS 505/ 5(g) (West 1994). In addition, section 34.4 of the Children and Family Services Act authorizes the Department "[t]o enter into referral agreements, on its own behalf and on behalf of agencies funded by the Department, with licensed alcohol and drug abuse treatment programs for the referral and treatment of clients with alcohol and drug abuse problems.” 20 ILCS 505/34.4 (West 1994). Regarding the drug and alcohol problems of clients’ family members, section 34.5 of the Children and Family Services Act directs the Department: "To make such inquiry as may be appropriate, in any intake or investigation which the Department is required or authorized to conduct, to determine whether drug or alcohol abuse is a factor contributing to the problem necessitating the Department’s involvement, and, when appropriate, to refer a person to a licensed alcohol or drug treatment program, and to include any treatment recommendations in the person’s case plan.” 20 ILCS 505/34.5 (West 1994). "Where appropriate, the case plan shall include recommendations concerning alcohol or drug abuse evaluation.” 20 ILCS 505/6a(a) (West 1994). The legislature has placed restrictions on the facilities to which the Department of Children and Family Services may make referrals for alcoholism and drug abuse treatment. Discussing the Department’s duty to make referrals, section 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act provides, in pertinent part, "In any case where there is evidence that the perpetrator of the abuse or neglect is an addict or alcoholic as defined in the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act, the Department, when making referrals for drug or alcohol abuse services, shall make such referrals to facilities licensed by the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse or the Department of Public Health.” 325 ILCS 5/8.2 (West 1994). Noticeably absent from all of these provisions is any indication that the Department may be required to pay the costs of in-patient treatment for parents’ alcoholism or drug abuse. The preceding measures must be contrasted with the provisions of the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act, which sets forth the powers and duties of the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse. In doing so, the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act clearly indicates the responsibility of the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse to establish and fund treatment programs. The legislature has denominated that department to be the exclusive state agency to accept, receive, and expend funds for substance abuse services. 20 ILCS 301/5 — 10(a)(2) (West 1994). While the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse is to assist DCFS in identifying substance abuse problems among the latter agency’s clients and in developing programs and services for those problems, none of the enumerated activities involve the providing of in-patient treatment programs. 20 ILCS 301/5 — 10(a)(4)(D), (a)(4)(E) (West 1994). Indeed, the majority’s result in this case undermines the role of the Department of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse as the primary state agency charged with the prevention and treatment of alcohol and drug problems among residents of Illinois. In sum, there is no clear expression of legislative intent that the Department should be responsible for the costs ordered by the trial judges in the cases consolidated here. Given the lack of a clear expression of legislative intent on this important matter, I would defer to the Department’s own construction of its governing statutes and conclude that the Department may not be ordered to pay the costs of in-patient alcoholism and drug abuse treatment for parents of minors who are within the Department’s jurisdiction. No one disputes the terrible toll that substance abuse problems can take on minors and their families. I believe, however, that the determination whether to pay the costs of providing in-patient treatment for those conditions is committed to the legislature rather than to the judiciary. In the absence of a directive from the legislature, we should not add further financial obligations to the Department’s already lengthy list of duties and responsibilities. Because I do not believe that the orders here were authorized by statute, I do not address the separate question whether the Department was required to have developed service plans by the time the court. hearings were held in these cases. JUSTICES HEIPLE and McMORROW join in this dissent.