Court Opinion

ID: 9585769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:43.353882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:14.394003
License: Public Domain

*534Banke, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
An appointed counsel is obviously in a categorically different position from a retained counsel in deciding whether to pursue the representation of a criminal defendant on appeal. If retained counsel determines, in the exercise of his best professional judgment, that there are no arguably meritorious grounds for the appeal, he can simply advise his client of that fact, tell him he does not believe he can help him, and decline to undertake the representation. A court-appointed counsel, on the other hand, is stuck with the case unless and until he is relieved by the court.
Ethical Consideration 7-4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifies that “a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous.” 252 Ga. at 618. Ethical Consideration 7-5 specifies that a lawyer “may continue in the representation of his client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct or to take a frivolous legal position.” Id. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, by depriving appointed attorneys of any method by which they can withdraw from a criminal appeal for which they can discern no arguably meritorious grounds, we are in effect forcing them to engage in unethical conduct.
The argument that Anders motions force us to do too much work is, I believe, a specious one. A properly prepared Anders brief should provide the court with as much guidance in reviewing the record and transcript as would a properly prepared brief in any other appeal. In Simpson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 377, 378 (359 SE2d 13) (1987), we denied an Anders motion based, in part, on the inadequacy of the supporting brief, stating: “[C]ounsel should, at a minimum, endeavor to provide the court with a statement of the facts of the case, identifying the offense of which the defendant was convicted and summarizing the evidence presented at trial. Also, if any significant rulings were made by the court in connection with the proceedings, these should be identified.” Perhaps we simply have not insisted on strict compliance with the Anders procedure in this regard.
If we require appointed counsel in criminal cases to pursue appeals which they believe to be frivolous, the first straw at which they will grasp will undoubtedly be the so-called “general grounds.” In that event, there is absolutely no guarantee that we will not be placed in the same position that the Georgia Supreme Court sought to avoid in Huguley v. State, 253 Ga. 709 (324 SE2d 729) (1985) — i.e., having to undertake an examination of “the entire . . . transcript with very little assistance from counsel who is in a far better position to perceive error than is an appellate court looking at a cold record.”
Based on these considerations, I respectfully dissent to this *535court’s decision to eliminate any procedure by which an appointed counsel may withdraw from a criminal appeal which he believes is lacking in arguable merit. I concur, however, in the court’s decision to grant the Anders motion at issue in this case.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Benham join in this opinion.