Court Opinion

ID: 9542297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:48.905119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:32.439131
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority's conclusion that the Schmidts are responsible for the expenses associated with M.S.'s medical care, which were necessary and reasonable.9 I write separately, however, because I disagree with several aspects of the majority's analysis.
In particular, while I agree with the majority that the Schmidts are responsible for the expenses of M.S.'s medical care provided in the "initial" emergency situation, I disagree that the emergency situation came to an end prior to M.S.'s release, such that the hospital should not have continued treating M.S. in the absence of parental consent or State intervention, pursuant to its parens patrice power. There is no evidence in the designated materials demonstrating that the emergency situation-which first presented itself on September 8, 1999-passed prior to M.S.'s release from the hospital.
To the contrary, the evidence reveals that, when Mrs. Schmidt-who was, at the time, approximately seven months pregnant-arrived at the hospital, she suffered from a condition known as pre-eclampsia, which required an immediate Caesarian section. In an affidavit, Doctor Tessa M. Asdell asserted that, without such treatment, "both patient and child would not have survived." Appellants' App. at 20. As a result of the Caesarian section, M.S. was born premature, at only thirty-one weeks of gestation, and was cared for in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. There, M.S. was apparently given blood transfusions and was treated for Hydrocephalous. See Appellants' App. at 27. Thus, the medical emergency, with respect to M.S., began in utero and persisted throughout her stay at the hospital.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, I take issue with the majority's conclusion that the hospital should have sought State intervention, via a CHINS or similar proceeding, before it continued to treat M.S., and that, by failing to do so, the hospital usurped the parents' right to determine M.S.'s best interests. Requiring State intervention in a situation where parents are continuing to refuse necessary medical treatment on behalf of their premature and ailing child, in my view, would only delay necessary, life-saving medical treatment to the child. Here, I would commend, rather than admonish, the hospital for its provision of the necessary medical services to M.S., especially in light of the hospital's knowledge that M.S.'s parents were refusing to pay for her care.10
Instead, I would have noted that, under the doctrine of necessaries-which imposes a legal obligation and duty on parents to provide support, including necessary medical expenses, for their children-the law may imply a promise by a parent to pay for necessaries furnished to his or her minor child. Bryant v. Mutual Hosp. *985Serv., 669 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The policy behind this law is to encourage a neglectful parent to assume responsibility for the welfare of the child. Id. However, where a parent is ready and willing to make suitable provision for the child, he or she will not be liable for necessaries furnished by others without his or her consent. Id.
In the present case, the undisputed evidence reveals that the Schmidts' refusal to give consent to the hospital for the provision of medical services to M.S. resulted from their religious beliefs, which required treatment by spiritual means through faith and prayer. Thus, the question becomes whether faith and prayer constituted "suitable provision" for the child's medical needs. The evidence demonstrates that, when Mrs. Schmidt arrived at the hospital, she required an immediate Caesarian seetion, without which, "it is highly likely that both patient and child would not have survived." Appellants' App. at 20. As a result of the Caesarian section, M.S. was born premature and required medical care in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. Under these cireumstances, and in a time when we have an established regimen for treatment of the medical conditions that afflicted Mrs. Schmidt and M.S., I believe that emergency medical care, in conjunction with faith and prayer, were the provisions necessary for the physical welfare of M.S.
It has been said that God sometimes works in mysterious ways. If that is true, it is possible that the "anonymous" 9-1-1 telephone call, which alerted EMS personnel to the impending danger, was in fact the divine intervention for which Mr. Schmidt had prayed. After all, it was only the means and not the result to which Mr. Schmidt objected.
For these reasons, I concur in result with the majority opinion.

. See op. at 979 n. 4.

. Indeed, because the hospital rendered medical services to Mrs. Schmidt under circumstances making such treatment necessary to preserve her life, Mutual Hospital Services could have also sought reimbursement for such medical expenses under the doctrine of quantum meruit. For this reason, I also disagree with the majority's inclusion of footnote 6 and would, further, note that Mrs. Schmidt did not refuse medical treatment on behalf of herself when she arrived at the hospital, as she was unconscious. Instead, Mr. Schmidt refused such treatment on her behalf.