Court Opinion

ID: 9768023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:38:59.841055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.437019
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ESQUIVEL, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege.
Patterson Services, Inc., d/b/a Patterson Rental Tools (Patterson) initiated a law suit against appellant Joe E. Schero and appel-*359lee Clinton Manges, cause number 1243 on the docket of the 49th Judicial District Court of Zapata County, Texas. The operative pleading in cause number 1243 was Plaintiff’s Third Amended Original Petition, and it was alleged therein that, from the period of August 2, 1978 to December 28,1980, Patterson delivered certain Hydrill tubing which was to be placed at a certain well in Zapata County. The essence of the cause of action alleged in the petition was that appellant Schero and appellee Manges, jointly owed Patterson money for rental of the tubing and for wrongfully withholding the tubing and using the same for their own use and benefit. Appellant Schero in his First Amended Original Answer answered Patterson’s suit by a general and special denial and a cross-action against appellee Manges for contribution and indemnity.
Appellee Manges answered appellant Schero’s cross-action with a general denial and a motion for severance. On March 25, 1981, appellee Manges’ motion for severance was granted and appellant Schero’s cross-action was ordered to be docketed as number 1243-A. On April 13, 1981, appel-lee Manges filed a counterclaim against appellant Schero in cause number 1243-A seeking to hold Schero accountable for other business deals between them. In response to such counterclaim appellant Sche-ro filed his plea of privilege. After hearing the argument of counsel and receiving certain joint-stipulated exhibits, but hearing no testimony, the court took the plea of privilege under advisement. On July 13, 1981, the court entered its order overruling appellant Schero’s plea of privilege resulting in this appeal.
In point of error number three, appellant Schero raises the issue of inadequate notice as required by Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A(c). Rule 166-A(c) applies to motions and proceedings in summary judgments. Since a summary judgment is not now before this court, we find Rule 166-A(c) inapplicable. Point of error number three is overruled.
In points of error numbers one and two appellant Schero alleges that the court erred in overruling his plea of privilege because the controverting affidavit was insufficient as a matter of law in that it did not state a cause of action and because it failed to state an exception to the general venue statute. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995 (Vernon Supp.1982-83).
At the outset we note that appellant did not file any special exceptions to the counterclaim or controverting affidavit filed by appellee Manges. By his failure to except to the contents of the controverting affidavit at the trial level he has waived any like complaint for the first time on appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 90; Wade v. Superior Insurance Co., 244 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1951, writ ref’d). Appellant Schero’s points of error numbers one and two are overruled.
We agree with appellee Manges that the controverting affidavit speaks only to waiver. Accordingly, appellant Schero’s final two points will be discussed together since they involve the issue of whether appellant Schero waived his venue rights by filing the cross-claim against appellee Manges.
It is well settled that a plaintiff who institutes a suit in a county other than that of his residence submits to the jurisdiction of the court of that county as to all matters growing directly out of the subject matter of the suit, and thereby waives his right to insist on his privilege to be sued in the county of his domicile on a cause of action of that character asserted in a cross-action. Zachry v. Robertson, 147 Tex. 307, 214 S.W.2d 949, 952 (1948); Skidmore v. Cook, 417 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ dism’d). The trial court did not hear any evidence and only considered the pleadings filed in the case. We therefore only have the pleadings to assist us in determining the true nature of appellant Manges’ counterclaim. The nature of the claims can be determined by looking to the pleadings. Powell v. Short, 308 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1958, no writ). We have examined the pleadings in cause number 1243-A and we can reach no other conclusion but that appellee Manges’ coun*360terclaim in no way relates to, or arises out of appellant Sehero’s cross-action against appellee Manges for contribution and indemnity. Under the evidence before us, we hold that appellee Manges has failed to show that appellant Schero waived his right to be sued in Harris County. The court erred in overruling appellant Schero’s plea of privilege. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is hereby remanded with instructions to sever appel-lee Manges’ counterclaim in cause number 1243-A and transfer same to the District Court of Harris County.