Court Opinion

ID: 9400427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 14:06:44.131738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:44.936208
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-226

                    DARRIEN GOETZENDANNER,1 petitioner.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The petitioner appeals from the denial by a Superior Court

 judge of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under G. L.

 c. 248, § 1, and from the denial of his motion for relief from

 that order pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828

 (1974) (rule 60 [b]).       The petitioner contends that he is

 entitled to immediate release from serving the balance of his

 sentences on his 1983 convictions because, following convictions

 of intervening offenses he committed while out on parole in

 1993, this court's belated modification of his sentencing scheme

 in Goetzendanner v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst.,

 Norfolk, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 533, 541 (2008) (Goetzendanner I),

 violated double jeopardy principles and clearly established

 Federal law.     The petitioner also argues that the Commonwealth's

 1 Also known as Jahrab S. Allah. The petitioner reportedly
 legally changed his name around 2001. As is our custom, we use
 the name that appears on the complaint.
ten-year delay in implementing the change in his sentencing

structure waived its right to enforce the remainder of his 1983

sentences, and the failure to schedule a timely final parole

revocation hearing for those sentences violated his due process

rights.   We affirm.

     Background.   We summarize the procedural history of this

case that led to our decision in Goetzendanner I, and to the

present issues on appeal.

     In February 1983, the petitioner was convicted of, among

other crimes, armed assault with intent to rob and murder.       He

was ordered to serve concurrent sentences (reformatory

sentences),2 the longest of which was twenty years.

     Eight years later, in June 1991, the petitioner was

released on parole from these sentences.    The petitioner was

charged with new crimes while out on parole, including multiple

counts of aggravated rape and kidnapping.   In response, the

parole board (board) provisionally revoked the petitioner's

2 A "reformatory sentence," also known as a "Concord sentence,"
was a "sentencing option widely used by Superior Court judges in
the 1980's," until its abolition in 1994. Commonwealth v.
Thurston, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 548, 554-555 (2002). This type of
sentence involved "the imposition of an apparently long sentence
on an individual deemed capable of rehabilitation . . ., not to
the State prison at M.C.I., Walpole (now called Cedar Junction)
but rather to the State 'reformatory' at M.C.I., Concord, with
parole eligibility arising after a small fraction . . . of the
stated sentence pursuant to parole board policies and
regulations." Id. at 555.

                                2
parole, and issued a parole violation warrant on March 31, 1992.

Pending the outcome of the petitioner's new criminal charges,

the parole violation warrant was lodged against the petitioner

as a detainer.3

     On February 5, 1993, the petitioner was convicted of

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, two counts

of aggravated rape, and kidnapping (intervening offenses),4 for

which he received concurrent sentences, including committed

sentences of from twenty to thirty years in prison.5   At this

time, the petitioner had about four years left to serve on his

reformatory sentences.   See Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct.

at 541.   The Department of Correction (department) deemed the

effective date of return of the parole violation warrant as

February 5, 1993, and "treated [the petitioner] as a returned

parole violator with new sentences to be served after completion

of the reformatory sentences."   Id. at 535.   "On this basis, the

department calculated that [the petitioner] completed his

3 A detainer is "[a] writ authorizing a prison official to
continue holding a prisoner in custody." Black's Law Dictionary
543 (10th ed. 2014).
4 "Any sentence for a crime committed while the petitioner is on

parole, that is imposed prior to service of the parole violation
warrant, is an intervening sentence." Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass.
App. Ct. at 534 n.3.
5 The sentencing judge ordered that the intervening sentences "be

served from and after the exp[i]ration of all previous sentences
which [the petitioner] has been ordered to serve."
Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 540.

                                 3
reformatory sentences on February 1, 1997, and on that date

formally discharged him [of those sentences]," and "invoked the

intervening sentences."    Id. at 535-536.

    In 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the Superior Court.     The petitioner sought

immediate release on the grounds that he was serving illegal or

improperly imposed sentences because the law required him to

first complete his intervening sentences before serving the

remainder of his reformatory sentences.      See Goetzendanner I, 71

Mass. App. Ct. at 534.    A Superior Court judge denied the

petition.   Id.   The petitioner appealed.

    In an April 2008 decision, this court denied the

petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief, and instead

treated his petition as a claim for declaratory relief.

Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 534-535.     We held that

"the department improperly executed [the petitioner's] sentences

when it required [the petitioner] first to serve the four years

remaining on his reformatory sentences and, on February 1, 1997,

discharged him of those sentences, prior to invoking his

intervening sentences."    Id. at 541.   We vacated the judgment

and remanded the matter to the Superior Court, ordering that a

declaration enter that the petitioner "began serving his 1993

intervening sentences on February 5, 1993, with 320 days of

credit, and that the remaining time of his reformatory sentences

                                 4
will not commence until the expiration by parole or otherwise of

his intervening sentences."6   Id.   On August 8, 2008, the Norfolk

Superior Court issued a modified judgment in accordance with

this court's directive.

     Over ten years later, in November 2018, the department

reportedly notified the board that the petitioner would complete

his intervening sentences on February 28, 2019.    Soon

thereafter, in January 2019, the board amended the date of the

petitioner's parole violation warrant for his reformatory

sentences in accordance with the 2008 modified judgment.      The

warrant was then lodged as a detainer behind the petitioner's

intervening sentences.    When the petitioner's intervening

sentences expired, on February 28, 2019, the service of the

parole warrant was deemed effective, and the petitioner remained

in custody.

     Soon thereafter, the board scheduled a final parole

revocation hearing for the petitioner's reformatory sentences,

on April 5, 2019.7   The hearing was postponed at the petitioner's

6 The petitioner sought further appellate review, which the
Supreme Judicial Court denied. Goetzendanner v. Superintendent,
Mass. Correctional Inst., Norfolk, 451 Mass. 1107 (2008).
7 "The purpose of the final revocation hearing is to determine,

whether the parolee violated one or more conditions of parole;
if a violation occurred, whether parole status should be finally
revoked; and, if parole status is revoked, whether release to
the community is appropriate." 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 303.16(1)
(2017).

                                 5
request.8   Later that month, on April 19, the petitioner filed a

second petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior

Court seeking his immediate release.       The petition raised four

grounds for relief:   (1) the board's failure to schedule a

timely final parole revocation hearing on the petitioner's

reformatory sentences in 2008, at the same time of his initial

parole release hearing on the intervening sentences, violated

due process; (2) the Commonwealth waived its right to execute

the parole violation warrant and impose the balance of the

petitioner's reformatory sentences when it failed to implement

the modification in his sentencing scheme for over ten years;

and (3) this court's 2008 decision in Goetzendanner I,

restructuring the petitioner's sentencing scheme, violated

double jeopardy and clearly established Federal law.       A Superior

Court judge denied the petition.       The petitioner appealed.

     In March 2021, the petitioner filed a "motion for relief

from order" in the Superior Court, arguing that relief was

warranted under rule 60 (b) because the judge that ruled on his

habeas petition erred in finding that his double jeopardy

argument lacked merit because the length of his sentences had

not increased due to the change in his sentencing structure.

8 The petitioner's final parole revocation hearing was held in
May 2020. The petitioner was later released from custody on
parole supervision on November 16, 2020.

                                   6
According to the petitioner, the duration of his reformatory

sentences increased by nearly two years because of this court's

2008 decision.   The same Superior Court judge also denied this

motion, and the petitioner again appealed.    The petitioner's

appeals from the order denying his April 2019 writ of habeas

corpus petition and the order denying his March 2021 motion for

rule 60 (b) relief have been consolidated here.

     Discussion.   "A habeas corpus petitioner must establish

that (1) there has been a violation of the State or Federal

Constitution or laws; (2) the violation has deprived him of his

personal liberty; and (3) he is entitled to immediate release

from the custody of the respondent."     Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass.

App. Ct. at 538.   The petitioner asserts that he is entitled to

immediate release from serving the balance of his reformatory

sentences on the same grounds set forth in his motions in the

Superior Court, listed supra.    We address each in turn.

     1.   Due Process.   a.   Final parole revocation hearing.   The

petitioner first argues that he was deprived of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest secured under the

due process clause of the Fourteen Amendment when the board

failed to schedule a timely final parole revocation hearing,9 as

required by applicable regulations.

9 "The Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]
prohibits any State from depriving a person of life, liberty, or

                                  7
     The parties agree that under 120 Code Mass. Regs.

§ 303.18(2) (1997),10 the petitioner was entitled to a final

parole revocation hearing on his reformatory sentences in 2008,11

at the same time of his initial parole release hearing for his

intervening sentences.   See Royce v. Commissioner of Correction,

390 Mass. 425, 427 (1983) ("[A]gency regulations have the 'force

of law'" [citation omitted]).   The petitioner alleges that the

ten-year delay in holding his final parole revocation hearing

denied him the protections set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. 471, 488-489 (1972), including the right to a revocation

hearing "within a reasonable time after [being] taken into

property without due process of law" (citation omitted). Butler
v. Turco, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 80, 83 (2018). "A liberty interest
may arise from the Constitution itself, or it may arise from an
expectation or interest created by State laws or regulations."
Id., and cases cited. Generally, in the prison context, liberty
interests are limited to "freedom from restraint which . . .
imposes atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id., quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
10 "Where the parolee is serving an intervening sentence, the

Massachusetts Parole Board schedules the final parole revocation
hearing at the same time as the initial parole release hearing
for that intervening sentence unless the Board Members choose,
by office vote, to conduct a revocation hearing at an earlier
time." 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 303.18(2) (1997). The current
regulations employ essentially the same language, with one
material difference being the use of the words "shall schedule."
See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 303.17(2) (2017).
11 The petitioner was offered a final parole revocation hearing

on his reformatory sentences in April 1994, pursuant to the
original parole violation warrant, which this court later found
to be ineffective. See Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at
540. The petitioner refused to appear for the hearing, and the
board denied parole.

                                 8
custody."   Id. at 488.   The due process procedures discussed in

Morrissey, supra at 489, however, concerned the accuracy of the

factual determination of a violation.12   Here, the gravamen of

the petitioner's claim is that, had his final parole revocation

hearing been timely scheduled (or at least held sometime before

the expiration of his intervening sentences), the board may have

elected to terminate his reformatory sentences or have them run

concurrent with his intervening sentences.   Thus, the issue is

not that the petitioner was denied due process in defending

against the revocation of his parole,13 see United States v.

Throneburg, 87 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1996) ("due process

concerns about delay come into play only when the delay has

prejudiced the defendant's ability to contest the validity of

the revocation"), but rather, that he was denied opportunities

12 Those minimum due process procedures included "(a) written
notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . .;
(e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to
the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole."
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
13 The basis of the revocation of the petitioner's parole on his

reformatory sentences was his convictions of the intervening
offenses, which included aggravated rape and kidnapping. As
argued by the board, given these new criminal convictions, the
revocation of the petitioner's parole status was all but
certain. See 120 Code Mass. Regs. § 303.22(4) (2017) (parole
revocation determination based on preponderance of evidence
standard).

                                 9
to request that the board terminate his reformatory sentences or

permit him to serve his sentences concurrently.

     We have previously suggested that, "[u]pon a liberal

reading" of the Supreme Court's decision in Moody v. Daggett,

429 U.S. 78 (1976),14 an individual might, "on particular facts,"

be able to establish a due process violation from a delayed

parole revocation determination based on prejudice arising from

a missed opportunity to secure parole for an intervening

sentence.   Smith v. State Parole Bd., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 145,

151-152 (1983).   However, that is not this case.

     While we do not condone the significant delay in holding

the petitioner's final revocation hearing, in the circumstances

presented, see Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 488 Mass. 449,

457 (2021) ("due process is flexible and calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation demands"

[citation omitted]), we "conclude that it did not 'amount to

legal prejudice that permits a conclusion that a due process

violation . . . occurred" (citation omitted).   Doucette v.

Massachusetts Parole Bd., 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 538 (2014).

The petitioner's assertion of prejudice rests primarily on

14"[T]here is no constitutional right to a prompt parole
revocation hearing when the parolee is serving an independent
intervening sentence in the same jurisdiction." Smith v. State
Parole Bd., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 145, 151 (1983), quoting Hopper v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 702 F.2d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 1983).

                                10
speculation over decisions that the board may have made --

decisions that, on this record, were not likely to come to

fruition.15   The petitioner had no right to serve his sentences

concurrently.   See Commonwealth v. Collins, 31 Mass. App. Ct.

679, 684 (1991).   Nor did he have a liberty interest in a future

grant of parole.   See Doe v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 82 Mass.

App. Ct. 851, 858 (2012).   Even if we were to conclude that the

petitioner's due process rights were infringed due to the

prolonged delay of his final revocation hearing, the petitioner

has not cited any authority to support his claim that he is

entitled to immediate release from serving the balance of his

reformatory sentences in these circumstances.16   See Stewart,

15 The board revoked the petitioner's parole on at least three
separate occasions between 1985 and 1991. See Goetzendanner I,
71 Mass. App. Ct. at 535 n.5. Given the severity of the
petitioner's intervening offenses, which served as the basis for
the fourth revocation of his parole, it is unlikely that the
board would have been inclined to grant his request to serve his
reformatory sentences concurrently with his intervening
sentences, particularly where the sentencing judge had specified
that the intervening sentences (including twenty to thirty
years) be served consecutive to any other sentence the defendant
had been ordered to serve. The petitioner's claim of prejudice
is further belied by the fact that he refused to attend his
initial parole release hearing on his intervening sentences in
July 2008, and subsequently waived or refused to appear before
the board for each of his annual review hearings from 2009 to
2018.
16 Although the loss of opportunities to seek reparole and

concurrent sentences from the board is certainly evidence of
actual, not just theoretical, prejudice, we conclude that, on
this record, it is "not so substantial as to justify the
[petitioner's] release" from serving the remainder of his
sentences. Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 281 (2009)

                                 11
petitioner, 411 Mass. 566, 569 (1992).     Accordingly, habeas

relief is not permitted.   See Sheriff of Suffolk County v.

Pires, 438 Mass. 96, 100 (2002) (habeas relief "available only

where granting the writ would result in the petitioner's

immediate release from custody").

    b.   Waiver.   Next, the petitioner asserts that the board --

or, broadly speaking, the Commonwealth -- waived its right to

enforce his parole violation warrant and impose the balance of

his reformatory sentences when it waited over ten years to amend

the petitioner's parole violation warrant and implement the

modification of his sentencing structure.    Again, we disagree.

    To support this claim, the petitioner first directs us to

Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. 872 (1995).    There, the Supreme

Judicial Court considered whether "the belated service of a

parole revocation warrant results in the board's loss of the

authority to seek revocation of parole."    Id. at 873.   The court

explained that the weight of authority from other jurisdictions

that have addressed the issue was:

    "if the whereabouts of the parole violator was known . . .
    and an 'unreasonable' amount of time elapsed during which
    the State authorities took no action to enforce the parole
    violation, the State has waived its right to execute the
    balance of the parolee's prison sentence and the State
    courts have no 'jurisdiction' to revoke parole."

(Gants, J., concurring). See also Commonwealth v. Burhoe, 3
Mass. App. Ct. 590, 595 (1975) (alleged loss of opportunities
for parole and concurrent sentences because of pretrial delay
"too speculative and insubstantial" to warrant dismissal).

                                12
Id. at 875.17   This principle is not applicable in the instant

case.

     Here, the petitioner's parole violation warrant was lodged

as a detainer behind his intervening sentences.   As we stated in

Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 540, "[a]ny purported

service of the parole warrant [before the petitioner completed

his intervening sentences] was ineffective."   See G. L. c. 127,

§ 149.18   Once the petitioner's intervening sentences concluded,

the warrant was executed, and the petitioner remained in

custody.   There was thus no delay in the service or enforcement

of the warrant.   Further, absent from the record is evidence

that the petitioner reasonably relied on any government

inaction,19 or that he suffered prejudice warranting the relief

17 The court emphasized two relevant factors for consideration:
"(a) the extent to which the parolee reasonably relied on the
inaction of the enforcing authorities, and (b) the prejudice
that the delay in the attempted enforcement may have caused to
the parolee in defending against the attempt to revoke parole or
otherwise." Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. at 876. A third
consideration was the reasonableness of the delay. Id. at 877.
18 "Service of the parole violation warrant shall be made

effective forthwith upon arrest and imprisonment of the parole
violator unless he is convicted of commission of a crime or
found guilty of violating the conditions of federal or another
state's parole or probation, then service of said parole
violation warrant shall not be effective until the expiration of
any additional sentences by parole or otherwise." G. L. c. 127,
§ 149.
19 The petitioner contends that during the ten-year delay at

issue, his parole officer repeatedly told him that he had
completed his reformatory sentences and would not have to serve
them again. Although we appreciate the frustration this may

                                 13
he seeks.    Cf. Commonwealth v. Vith Ly, 450 Mass. 16, 22

(2007);20 Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. at 876.     There was no

waiver here.

     3.     Remaining claims.   Finally, the petitioner argues that

this court's 2008 decision, correcting his sentencing scheme to

require that he serve the remainder of his reformatory sentences

after the completion of his intervening sentences, violated

have caused, this is not the type of reliance contemplated to
warrant the removal of the board's jurisdiction to revoke
parole. Cf. Zullo, petitioner, 420 Mass. at 876. Moreover,
this court's 2008 decision should have placed the petitioner on
notice that he would serve the remainder of his reformatory
sentences once his intervening sentences expired. See
Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 541.
20 Vith Ly, 450 Mass. at 22, on which the petitioner relies, is

also inapposite. In that case, the defendant's State prison
sentences were stayed pending an appeal that was ultimately
unsuccessful. See id. at 16-17. Due to an error, the stay was
not lifted, and the Commonwealth did not seek to execute the
defendant's sentences until sixteen years later. Id. at 21. In
the interim, the defendant lived in the community, where he
maintained steady employment, raised three children, and
believed that his "case was over." Id. at 18, 21. The Supreme
Judicial Court held that the enforcement of the defendant's
sentences after such an "unexplained delay" violated due process
and principles of fundamental fairness. Id. at 17. In
contrast, here, there has been no showing of fundamental
unfairness or substantial prejudice in the board's failure to
promptly amend the petitioner's parole violation warrant. The
petitioner remained in lawful custody on his intervening
sentences throughout the delay at issue. Once the petitioner's
intervening sentences expired, the service of the parole
violation warrant became effective, as required by statute. See
G. L. c. 127, § 149. And, contrary to the petitioner's
assertion, as explained at pages forty-seven through forty-nine
of the board's brief, the duration of his sentences was not
increased because of any inaction by Commonwealth authorities.

                                   14
double jeopardy and clearly established Federal law.21   It is

well settled that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "cannot

be employed as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure"

(citation omitted).   Sheriff of Suffolk County, 438 Mass. at 99.

The petitioner therefore may not use a habeas petition to

collaterally attack this court's 2008 decision.   See Kauffman,

petitioner, 413 Mass. 1010, 1011 (1992) (writ of habeas corpus

"may not be used to raise issues that should have been raised on

appeal").   Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not

a proper vehicle to bring these claims,22 we decline to address

them here.23   See Doyle v. Commonwealth, 472 Mass. 1002, 1003

21 The petitioner also sought a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
A Federal District Court judge denied the petition, in which the
petitioner raised, among other claims, that this court's 2008
decision violated double jeopardy.
22 The petitioner's assertion that this court's 2008 decision

violated art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is
also not properly before us.
23 We briefly note that the petitioner's reliance on Commonwealth

v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 509 (2014), in support of his double
jeopardy claim is misplaced. Selavka, supra at 510-514,
addressed whether the long-delayed correction of an illegal
sentence that imposed new burdens on a defendant violated the
prohibition against multiple punishments for the same crime.
Unlike in Selavka, supra at 514, here, the petitioner's
sentences were legal, and no new burdens or punishments were
imposed. The finality in the petitioner's overall sentencing
scheme did not change. All that changed was the sequence in
which he served his sentences. See Goetzendanner I, 71 Mass.
App. Ct. at 541. The petitioner received credit for each day
that he originally (improperly) served toward his reformatory
sentences, which were eventually applied to his intervening
sentences following the Superior Court's issuance of the
modified judgment in 2008. Finally, as noted supra, the

                                 15
(2015), and cases cited.   Since the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus was properly denied, the judge did not err in

denying relief from that order.

                                       Order denying petition for
                                         writ of habeas corpus
                                         affirmed.

                                       Order denying rule 60 (b)
                                         motion affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Vuono,
                                         Sullivan & Singh, JJ.24),

                                       Clerk

Entered: June 8, 2023.

petitioner was put on notice by this court's 2008 decision that
he would resume service of his reformatory sentences once his
intervening sentences expired. Any alleged expectation of
finality in his original (improperly executed) sentences would
not have been reasonable.
24 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  16