Court Opinion

ID: 9697454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:17:03.68728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.641902
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Chief Judge,
concurring:
Despite some tempering language in the majority opinion, referring to reinvigoration of the unavailability rule, see majority opinion at 381, I respectfully suggest that the majority has misconstrued United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), as confining Ohio v. Roberts 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), to instances involving prior testimony, or at the least to situations so closely analogous as to be virtually indistinguishable. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that Ohio v. Roberts continues to set forth the “general approach” which must be employed to determine whether the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against her. See Idaho v. Wright, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) *383(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538).8
Although the Court in Ohio v. Roberts disclaimed any intention to state a rule which would be uniformly applicable to all hearsay exceptions, it stated that “a general approach to the problem is discernible.” Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538.9 The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause restricts the admissibility of hearsay evidence against an accused in two ways. The first, representing a “rule of necessity,” involves the general requirement that the prosecutor either produce the witness or demonstrate the witness’ unavailability before introducing the witness’ out-of-court statement. Id. The second restriction is triggered once unavailability has been shown, and requires that there be adequate proof of the trustworthiness of the challenged statement to fulfill the purpose of the general rule against admitting hearsay. Id.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (footnotes omitted).
The Court’s subsequent opinion in Inadi, supra, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, does not undermine the validity of the general approach set forth in Ohio v. Roberts. In Inadi, the Court addressed the narrow question of “whether the Confrontation Clause requires a showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-of-court statements of a nontestifying co-conspirator, when those statements otherwise satisfy the requirements of [the hearsay exception].” 475 U.S. at 391, 106 S.Ct. at 1124. The Court emphasized that Ohio v. Roberts, by its own terms, had not purported to set forth an inflexible rule, and “cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable.” Id. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1125. That declaration, which is simply a restatement of the acknowledgement in Ohio v. Roberts that no bright-line test can be crafted to govern all cases involving the intersection of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay exceptions, does not undermine the Court’s steadfast view that Ohio v. Roberts continues to describe the correct “general approach,” with exceptions to be made only in unusual circumstances.
Had the Court attempted in Inadi to confine Ohio v. Roberts to prior testimony, the opinion could have ended with the discussion of Ohio v. Roberts. Instead, the Inadi Court discusses at length the “good reasons why the unavailability rule, developed in cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to co-conspirators’ out-of-court statements.” Id. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1125-26. The reasons focus on the unique and irreplaceable nature of statements made while the conspiracy is ongoing, the *384lack of benefit to be obtained from adopting a rule of unavailability, as well as the burdens that would result if such a rule were imposed. Id. at 394-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1125-28. This explanation would only be required if the Court found it necessary to explain its departure from an otherwise generally applicable rule.
Accordingly, in the absence of unique characteristics sufficient to justify a departure from the unavailability restriction set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, the Confrontation Clause requirements would not have been met,10 and, in the instant case, in view of the critical nature of the evidence and the absence of any showing that the courtroom clerk was unavailable to testify, the error could not be deemed harmless.11 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Yet this court’s decisions would require a contrary conclusion.
In Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.1984), and thereafter in Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C.1988), the court upheld against a Confrontation Clause challenge the admission of a chemist’s report on the results of tests performed on samples of controlled substances seized from the defendant. Neither opinion suggested that the chemists who performed the tests and prepared the reports were required to testify in the absence of a showing of their unavailability. Instead, the Howard court proceeded on the basis of the observation that it is “well established that certain types of hearsay are inherently reliable and therefore admissible as exceptions to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.” 473 A.2d at 838 (emphasis added) (citing Ohio v. Roberts supra, and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44, 15 S.Ct. 337, 340, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895), and C. McCormick, Evidence, §§ 252, 253 (2d ed. 1972)). Thereupon, the court proceeded to examine the reliability of the evidence, and was satisfied that the Confrontation Clause requirements were met because the chemists’ reports were sufficiently trustworthy, containing objective facts and routinely prepared by a person who “generally d[id] not have an interest in the outcome of the trial” and acted pursuant to a duty to make accurate reports. Id. at 839. The court further observed that:
The business and public records hearsay exceptions are among the exceptions that rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the substance of the constitutional protection.
Id. at 838. Turning to the unavailability restriction of Ohio v. Roberts, the court observed first, that the defendant was “not precluded from inquiring into the reliability of the testing procedure or the qualification of the chemist,” (“[A] defendant is free to subpoena the reporting chemist without cost. Thus, a defendant is not substantially disadvantaged by the government’s failure to call the out-of-court declarant and *385confrontation rights are effectively observed.”), and second, that the legislature, in providing for admission of chemists’ reports without the presence at trial of the chemist, has noted the burden of calling chemists as witnesses at trial to vouch for the chain of custody of the report where the results of the chemists’ report are not in dispute. Id. at 839. Jones, supra, in turn, simply relied on Howard, stating:
Having concluded that the EMIT test results are presumptively reliable and thus properly admissible into evidence, and that the Agency’s record reporting the test result falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule ... we believe it is immaterial that neither a scientific expert on the EMIT system nor the technician who actually conducted the test was presented at trial.
Jones, supra, 548 A.2d at 47 (citations omitted).
To the extent that this court has viewed Ohio v. Roberts as leaving open the possibility that upon “a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, evidence would be admissible without regard to a showing of unavailability, the court has adopted an analysis yet to appear in Supreme Court decisions. At first blush there appears to be a suggestion in a footnote in Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 n. 8, that business and public records would be admissible without regard to the unavailability of the declarant. 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 n. 8 (citing to Comment, 30 La.L.Rev. 651, 668 (1970)). But the reference cited by the Court concludes that in order to prevent abuse in the treatment of these exceptions:
courts should start with the proposition that as a general rule confrontation prohibits the use of business or agency records in criminal trials. However, there are cases in which the records have very high probative value and should be used. Certainly, before considering the evidence the Court should require a showing that the witness who made the record is absent and that a good faith effort to procure his attendance has been made. Then, weighing the probable reliability of the records, their significance in proving the charge against the defendant, and the seriousness of the charge the evidence would be admitted at the court’s discretion.
30 La.L.Rev. at 668-69.12
While there may on occasion be language in Supreme Court decisions to suggest that the Court is placing greater emphasis on “the necessities of trial and the adversary process” than on “[t]he central concern of the Confrontation Clause ... to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact,” see, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, supra note 1, 110 S.Ct. at 3165-66, the Court continues to emphasize that the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not easily dispensed with, and is only disposed of when “necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is *386otherwise assured.” Id. at 3166 (citing, inter alia, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988)). See id. 110 S.Ct. at 3167 (“The critical inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether use of the procedure [one-way closed circuit television in case involving child abuse victim] ... is necessary to further an important state interest. We ... conclude today that a State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.”). No such “important state interest” or necessity has been suggested in the instant case; rather, administrative convenience has prevailed in the absence of a claim by appellant disputing the accuracy of the docket entries.13
Accordingly, because I am unable to join the majority’s rationale for dispensing with the unavailability requirement, but am bound by our decisions in Howard, supra, and Jones, supra, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of conviction for willfully failing to appear. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971).

. In Idaho v. Wright, supra, the Court was not presented with an issue relating to the unavailability of the child in deciding whether the child’s out of court statements were admissible. 110 S.Ct. at 3147 (trial court’s finding that child was incapable of communicating with jury was not at issue; only issue was reliability). In another case decided the same day, Maryland v. Craig, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3165, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), the Court also cited Ohio v. Roberts for the proposition that the Confrontation Clause expresses a constitutional preference for face-to-face encounters, but observed that the preference "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case."

. The Court noted the complexity of reconciling Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules, and ”reject[ed] the invitation to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence” by altering its basic approach to cases in this area. Id. 448 U.S. at 66 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 2539 n. 9. The Court also stated, however, that it had not sought to “ 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all ... hearsay exceptions.’ ” Id. at 64-65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1937, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)).

. Upon applying Ohio v. Roberts, it is at least doubtful whether special circumstances exist in the instant case to justify a departure from Ohio v. Roberts’ restriction of unavailability. Unlike co-conspirator statements, public records are not unique evidence of the context of past events. Inadi, supra, 475 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. Instead, somewhat like prior testimony, they merely represent a “weaker version," id. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1126, of the same evidence that would be supplied by live testimony. In addition, application of the unavailability restriction would result in the production of additional relevant testimony, see Inadi, supra, at 396-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1126-27, since there would at least be direct testimony by the maker of the docket entries that he, in fact, made them.

. The evidence of the docket entries, which, according to the supervisor, were made by Mr. Baumgartner, was crucial to proving that appellant failed to appear; no other witness testified on this point, and no evidence other than the disputed hearsay provided corroboration of the supervisor’s testimony. By contrast with the restricted cross-examination for bias at issue in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, the evidence of Mr. Baumgartner’s docket entries was not subject to cross-examination at all. The instant case also is unlike Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule), where it was noted that while the hearsay evidence provided an element of the offense (whether the defendant had taken something of value) that fact was "virtually evident from the eyewitness account itself." 435 A.2d at 739 (Ferren, J., concurring).

. The Comment discussed United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.1967), cert, denied, 391 U.S. 936, 88 S.Ct. 1835, 20 L.Ed.2d 856 (1968), involving a conviction for failing to report for conscientious objector civilian work based on a note that the defendant had not reported as ordered:
The note which apparently was sent the Selective Service Board by the civilian employer was not dated or signed and there was no indication who wrote and mailed it. It seems clear that the defendant had no opportunity to cross examine the witness against him and indeed did not even know who the witness was. It is equally clear that the circumstances surrounding the note do not protect the defendant’s right of confrontation.
30 La.L.Rev. at 668 (citing, inter alia, Morales v. Superior Court, 239 Cal.App.2d 947, 49 Cal.Rptr. 173 (1966) (reliance on clerk’s reports of tardiness in contempt proceedings possibly denied contemnor the right of confrontation), and State v. Tims, 9 Ohio St.2d 136, 224 N.E.2d 348 (1967) (document labelled "Report of Examination for Alleged Rape" was admitted at statutory rape trial; confrontation violated). Contra, McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.1965) (admission of business records is largely discretionary with the trial court); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825, 79 S.Ct. 42, 3 L.Ed.2d 65 (1958).

. In Inadi, supra, the Court concluded that administrative burdens outweighed any benefits to be gained from confrontation only after concluding that there were no benefits to be gained. 475 U.S. at 398, 106 S.Ct. at 1127. Thus, balanced against nonexistent benefits from a requirement of live testimony, the administrative burdens associated with such a requirement tipped the scales. However, there is nothing in Inadi to suggest that administrative convenience could outweigh substantive benefits of confrontation where such benefits are found to exist in a particular case.