Court Opinion

ID: 9530299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:53.603751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:04.279725
License: Public Domain

*80RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972), we recognized that the constitutions of the United States and Alaska “reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon such basic values as the preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent life styles.” In Breese, we further observed that “[t]here are few things more personal than one’s body and its appearance, and there could be few laws more destructive of the notion that there is a range of decision making within which the individual is autonomous than a rule regulating physical makeup.”
I think it clear that the courts of Alaska can require attorneys to dress in reasonable attire in order to preserve the dignity of the judiciary and judicial proceedings. Thus, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the courts of Alaska are authorized to impose minimum standards of dress for attorneys who make court appearances. My disagreement with the majority’s opinion in the case at bar focuses on the holding that a dress code which requires the wearing of a coat and tie is reasonable.
In my view, Judge England’s dissent in Sandstrom v. State, 336 So.2d 572, 578 (Fla.1976), is particularly persuasive. In part, Judge England observed:
There are those who will fear that small incursions on the formality of courtroom attire might lead to an erosion of our ability to perform important public work and in time contribute to a wholly unacceptable courtroom atmosphere. This case does not in fact present an incremental change, let alone one which would inevitably lead to that situation. It is not unusual in the contemporary governmental world for men of high purpose to go about their affairs without a necktie, and it can pose no threat to our judicial system to permit attorneys freedom to adopt the reasonable clothing styles of the time. I reject any inference that respect for the judicial system is dependent upon male attorneys wearing neckties. Surely the dignity of the judiciary rests on more substantial ground.1 (footnotes omitted)
Given the personal liberty interest involved, I am of the view that no attorney should be subject to contempt proceedings so long as her or his attire does not interfere with the judicial proceedings or manifest disrespect for the court. Distracting or bizarre attire should not be permitted to infringe upon the dignity of the judiciary and its proceedings. But where these interests are not implicated, it is my view that judicial infringement upon the personal liberty of counsel to choose their mode of attire is antithetical to Alaska’s constitution.

. Judge England’s full dissent should be read.