Court Opinion

ID: 9534414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:39:19.023009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:34.420107
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, P. J.,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that there is a sufficient causal connection between plaintiffs use of his car and the injuries that were inflicted on him by Henderson in an effort to take that car, and because we are required to construe the policy’s undefined phrase “resulting from” in favor of the insured, I dissent.
Plaintiff was injured as a result of the fact that he was using a car that Henderson wanted to steal. The majority makes much of the fact that Henderson’s “discharge of a handgun” was the “direct cause” of plaintiffs injuries and even implies that coverage should be denied because the carjacking could have been accomplished without Henderson firing the gun. But there is no dispute that plaintiffs use of the car created the actual basis for the assault even if that assault was unnecessary to accomplish Henderson’s goal. Despite the criminal nature of Henderson’s act, it was not “wholly disassociated from” plaintiffs use of the car, as was the case in Jordan v. Lee, 76 Or App 472, 709 P2d 752, rev den 300 Or 545 (1985). Nor was his vehicle merely the means of transportation to the site of the assault, as in Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 121 Or App 292, 855 P2d 166, rev den 318 Or 26 (1993). Here, unlike Jordan and Worldwide, there was a direct nexus between plaintiffs use of his car and the assault, and a reasonable interpretation of the phrase “resulting from” encompasses such direct associations. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits.
I therefore dissent.