Court Opinion

ID: 4657689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-02-05 07:19:49.894757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:49.219261
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-20-00229-CV
                               __________________

                     WILLIAM T. MORAN III, Appellant

                                         V.

 STEPHEN T. SCOTT, TRUSTEE OF THE JAMES P. POINSETT TRUST;
              LEROY M. POINSETT, ET AL, Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 457th District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 17-12-15679-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This appeal involves a suit for partition of tracts of land. On November 6,

2018, the trial court signed two judgments both styled as “Interlocutory Judgments:”

one pertaining to the “Darden Tracts” and one pertaining to the “Moran Ranch.”

Both judgments stated, “This Interlocutory Judgment is appealable.” Included in

both judgments was a finding that the land was not susceptible to partition, and both

judgments ordered the land to be sold for cash. Thereafter, the trial court signed

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decrees confirming the sale of property on June 14, 2019, July 5, 2019, and August

16, 2019.

       “A partition case, unlike other proceedings, has two final judgments[,] and

the first one is appealable as a final judgment.” Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466,

466-67 (Tex. 1980). The first judgment, which is often referred to as an interlocutory

decree, determines ownership of the land and whether the land may be partitioned

in kind or must be sold. Yturria v. Kimbro, 921 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). The second judgment is a confirmation decree, which

“sets aside to the parties their separate share.” Ellis v. First City Nat’l Bank, 864

S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no writ).

      Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed with this Court on October 8, 2020,

more than thirty days from the date of the judgments and outside the period for which

we may grant an extension of time to perfect appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a),

26.3. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

                                                    PER CURIAM

Submitted on February 3, 2021
Opinion Delivered February 4, 2021

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.

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