Court Opinion

ID: 9948463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 13:02:47.732127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:43.010499
License: Public Domain

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        DAVID O’SULLIVAN v. ALAN F. HAUGHT
                     (SC 20722)
     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The plaintiff, the decedent’s only child, sought to recover damages from
   the defendant, the decedent’s second husband, for, inter alia, tortious
   interference with the plaintiff’s expected inheritance from the decedent’s
   estate. The decedent had executed a will that left her entire estate to the
   defendant and expressly disinherited the plaintiff. After the decedent’s
   death, the defendant applied to have that will admitted to probate in
   the Probate Court. The plaintiff contested the will on various grounds,
   including undue influence, but the Probate Court rejected those claims
   and admitted the will to probate. The plaintiff appealed from the Probate
   Court’s decree to the Superior Court, where the appeal was to take the
   form of a trial de novo pursuant to statute (§ 45a-186). While the probate
   appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed the present action, which the trial
   court consolidated with the probate appeal. Thereafter, the defendant
   moved for summary judgment in the tort action, claiming, inter alia,
   that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata
   and collateral estoppel. The trial court, however, denied the motion for
   summary judgment as to the count alleging tortious interference with the
   plaintiff’s expected inheritance, concluding that the doctrine of collateral
   estoppel was inapplicable because the plaintiff did not have an adequate
   opportunity to fully litigate that claim in the Probate Court. The defen-
   dant appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court’s partial denial
   of his motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Court dismissed
   the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that there
   was no appealable final judgment. On the granting of certification, the
   plaintiff appealed to this court.

Held that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the defendant’s appeal
   from the trial court’s partial denial of the defendant’s motion for sum-
   mary judgment, and, because the trial court properly rejected the defen-
   dant’s collateral estoppel claim, albeit on different grounds, this court
   reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case to that
   court with direction to affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
   motion for summary judgment as to the tortious interference with an
   expected inheritance claim and to direct the trial court to conduct
   further proceedings:

   It is well established, and the plaintiff conceded, that a trial court’s
   denial of a motion for summary judgment may constitute an immediately
   appealable final judgment when it is based on the ground of collateral
   estoppel or res judicata, and, because the defendant in the present case
   established a colorable claim that the plaintiff’s tortious interference with
   an expected inheritance claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral
   estoppel, the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the appeal for lack
   of jurisdiction.

   Specifically, there was an identity of the issues between the proceedings
   in the Probate Court and the trial court, insofar as both the plaintiff’s
   complaint in the tort action and her challenge to the will in the Probate
   Court relied on the defendant’s allegedly undue influence over the dece-
   dent when the decedent created her will, the plaintiff’s presentation of
   the undue influence issue to the Probate Court involved a contested
   evidentiary hearing and posttrial briefs, and the undue influence issue
   was actually decided by the Probate Court and necessary to the Probate
   Court’s decree, insofar as that court was required to make a finding as
   to whether the defendant had exerted undue influence over the decedent
   in order to determine the will’s validity.

   Although this court, having found that the Appellate Court improperly
   dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ordinarily would
   reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment and remand the case to that
   court for consideration of the merits of the appeal, in the present case,
  it was preferable for this court to consider the merits of the collateral
  estoppel issue in the first instance pursuant to its supervisory authority
  over the administration of justice because the record was adequate for
  review, the issue presented a pure question of law, and the parties briefed
  the issue and had the opportunity to address it during oral argument.

  Addressing the merits of the appeal, this court determined that the
  present case was governed by its recent decision in Barash v. Lembo
  (348 Conn. 264), in which it held that an appeal, such as a probate appeal,
  that is conducted as a trial de novo suspends the preclusive effect of
  the underlying judgment or decree for purposes of the preclusion doc-
  trines, and concluded that, because the defendant’s probate appeal was
  pending in the Superior Court and was to be tried de novo, the probate
  decree did not have a preclusive effect as to the plaintiff’s tortious
  interference with an expected inheritance claim.

  This court explained that the Probate Court’s decision regarding the
  plaintiff’s undue influence claim had no force in the probate appeal
  because the trial court, sitting as a Probate Court and conducting a trial
  de novo, would admit or preclude evidence, make factual findings, and
  arrive at its own conclusion with respect to the undue influence claim
  without regard to the Probate Court’s findings or rulings, and, therefore,
  the Probate Court decree did not contain the necessary attributes of
  finality to warrant application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

  Moreover, although the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s
  collateral estoppel claim and correctly concluded that the probate decree
  had no preclusive effect, this court emphasized that the trial court’s
  ultimate conclusion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply
  because the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction over the tortious
  interference with an expected inheritance claim was incorrect, and,
  instead, the probate decree had no preclusive effect because the issue
  of undue influence could not be determined with finality until the comple-
  tion of the probate appeal in the form of a trial de novo.
                (Two justices dissenting in one opinion)
    Argued September 13, 2023—officially released March 12, 2024

                           Procedural History

   Action to recover damages for, inter alia, tortious
interference with an expected inheritance, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Hartford, where the court, Sheridan, J., denied
in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
which granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the
appeal, and the defendant, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed;
further proceedings.
  Kirk D. Tavtigian, with whom, on the brief, was
Peter J. Alter, for the appellant (defendant).
   Jesse A. Mangiardi, with whom was John L. Bonee
III, for the appellee (plaintiff).
                          Opinion

   ROBINSON, C. J. In this certified appeal, we consider
the scope of an appellate court’s jurisdiction over an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for
summary judgment on the ground of collateral estoppel
that is based on the preclusive effect of a Probate Court
decree. The defendant, Alan F. Haught, appeals, upon
our grant of his petition for certification,1 from the
Appellate Court’s dismissal of his appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment with
respect to the claim of tortious interference with an
expected inheritance brought in a tort action by the
plaintiff, David O’Sullivan. Specifically, the defendant
claims that the Appellate Court improperly granted the
motion to dismiss his appeal because a trial court’s
denial of a summary judgment motion based on a color-
able claim of collateral estoppel is an immediately
appealable final judgment. We agree with the defendant
and conclude that the Appellate Court improperly dis-
missed the defendant’s appeal from the decision of the
trial court.
   Reaching the merits of the defendant’s collateral estop-
pel claim pursuant to our supervisory powers over the
administration of justice, and guided by our recent deci-
sion in Barash v. Lembo, 348 Conn. 264, 303 A.3d 577
(2023), we also conclude that, because there is an
appeal pending in the trial court from the decree of the
Glastonbury-Hebron Probate Court (Probate Court),
which is in the form of a trial de novo, the probate
decree does not have a preclusive effect on the issue
of undue influence in the plaintiff’s tortious interference
with an expected inheritance claim. Accordingly, we
remand the case to the Appellate Court with direction
to affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment
as to count three of the complaint on the ground of
collateral estoppel.
   The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. The underlying case involves a pro-
bate dispute over the will of Stephanie B. Haught (dece-
dent), between the plaintiff, the decedent’s only child,
and the defendant, the decedent’s second husband. In
2013, the decedent revoked a preexisting will that had
left her entire estate to the plaintiff and executed a new
will (2013 will). The 2013 will named the defendant as
the decedent’s sole beneficiary and expressly disinher-
ited the plaintiff. Following the decedent’s death in
2017, the defendant applied to have the 2013 will admit-
ted to probate in the Probate Court. The plaintiff con-
tested the 2013 will, claiming, among other things, that
the defendant had exercised undue influence over the
decedent in the creation of the 2013 will by isolating
her from her family and friends and by tricking her
into naming the defendant as her sole beneficiary. The
Probate Court, following a contested evidentiary hear-
ing and posttrial briefs, found ‘‘no evidence to support
a finding that the decedent was not exercising her own
free will in altering her estate plan’’ and admitted the
2013 will to probate. The plaintiff appealed from the
decree of the Probate Court to the trial court. That
appeal remains pending before the trial court and will
be heard as a trial de novo pursuant to General Statutes
§ 45a-186.
   While the probate appeal was pending, the plaintiff
also filed a separate tort action in the trial court that
asserted three claims: (1) the inter vivos transfer of the
decedent’s assets to the defendant was invalid because
of the defendant’s undue influence, (2) the inter vivos
transfer of the decedent’s assets to the defendant was
invalid because of the defendant’s breach of his fidu-
ciary duty, and (3) the defendant had tortiously inter-
fered with the plaintiff’s expected inheritance. The trial
court subsequently consolidated the probate appeal
with the tort action.
   The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
in the tort action, claiming, among other things, that
the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel. The trial court
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to counts one and two on the ground of res judicata
but denied the motion as to count three, alleging tor-
tious interference with the plaintiff’s expected inheri-
tance. With respect to the third count, the trial court
concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel were inapplicable because the plaintiff
did not have an adequate opportunity to fully litigate
the interference with an expected inheritance claim in
the Probate Court.
   The defendant appealed from the trial court’s partial
denial of his motion for summary judgment to the Appel-
late Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had
denied his motion for summary judgment as to count
three, alleging tortious interference with an expected
inheritance. In a summary order, the Appellate Court
subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
the defendant’s appeal for lack of subject matter juris-
diction on the ground that there was no appealable
final judgment. The defendant then filed a motion for
reconsideration en banc, which the Appellate Court denied,
also by summary order. This certified appeal followed.
See footnote 1 of this opinion.
  With respect to the certified question, the defendant
claims that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed
his appeal because it is well established that a trial
court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, when
based on the ground of collateral estoppel, is an immedi-
ately appealable final judgment. See, e.g., Santorso v.
Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 346 n.7, 63 A.3d 940
(2013) (‘‘[w]hen the decision on a motion for summary
judgment . . . is based on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, the denial of that motion does constitute a
final judgment for purposes of appeal’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Convalescent Center of Bloom-
field, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn.
187, 194, 544 A.2d 604 (1988) (‘‘we view the issue of
collateral estoppel as ripe for immediate appellate
review’’); Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates,
Inc., 173 Conn. App. 630, 647–48, 164 A.3d 731 (2017)
(‘‘Although, as a general matter, this court . . . has
jurisdiction to hear appeals [only] from final judgments,
there are particular circumstances in which we may
hear an appeal from an otherwise interlocutory judg-
ment. The trial court’s denial of a motion for summary
judgment raising a claim of res judicata or collateral
estoppel presents such an instance.’’), aff’d, 332 Conn.
67, 208 A.3d 1223 (2019). In response, the plaintiff con-
cedes that this court has concluded that the denial
of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of
collateral estoppel can be an appealable final judgment.
Nevertheless, he argues that, because the defendant
cannot prevail on the merits of his collateral estoppel
claim, the Appellate Court’s dismissal of the defendant’s
appeal was ultimately proper.
   We begin our analysis by setting forth the legal princi-
ples that govern our review of the certified question.
Because an appellate court’s jurisdiction over appeals
is prescribed by statute, specifically, General Statutes
§ 52-263,2 ‘‘we must always determine the threshold
question of whether the appeal is taken from a final
judgment . . . .’’ State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463
A.2d 566 (1983). ‘‘[W]e have recognized that limiting
appeals to final judgments serves the important public
policy of minimizing interference with and delay in the
resolution of trial court proceedings.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Smith v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928,
937, 293 A.3d 851 (2023). Although the ‘‘subject matter
jurisdiction of our appellate courts is limited by statute
to appeals from final judgments . . . the courts may
deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attri-
butes of a final judgment . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323
Conn. 741, 745, 150 A.3d 1109 (2016). In Curcio, we
determined that there are two circumstances in which
an otherwise interlocutory order is appealable under
§ 52-263, namely, ‘‘(1) [when] the order or action termi-
nates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) [when]
the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties
that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ State v.
Curcio, supra, 31. Relevant here is the second prong
of the Curcio test, which ‘‘boils down to whether, as a
practical and policy matter, not allowing an immediate
appeal will create irreparable harm insofar as allowing
the litigation to proceed before the trial court will—in
and of itself—function to deprive a party of that right.’’
Halladay v. Commissioner of Correction, 340 Conn.
52, 62–63, 262 A.3d 823 (2021). ‘‘The second prong of the
Curcio test focuses on the nature of the right involved.
It requires the parties seeking to appeal to establish
that the trial court’s order threatens the preservation
of a right already secured to them and that that right will
be irretrievably lost and the [party] irreparably harmed
unless they may immediately appeal. . . . Thus, a bald
assertion that the defendant will be irreparably harmed
if appellate review is delayed until final adjudication
. . . is insufficient to make an otherwise interlocutory
order a final judgment. One must make at least a color-
able claim that some recognized statutory or constitu-
tional right is at risk.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Smith v. Supple, supra, 940.
   ‘‘It is well established that [a] colorable claim is one
that is superficially well founded but that may ultimately
be deemed invalid . . . . For a claim to be colorable,
the defendant need not convince the trial court that he
necessarily will prevail; he must demonstrate simply
that he might prevail.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 961; see, e.g., State v.
Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 36 (‘‘[u]ndoubtedly, [when]
defendants make a colorable claim that a trial court
proceeding subjects them to double jeopardy, they are
entitled to have this challenge heard on appeal before
trial’’). ‘‘[O]ur examination of whether a colorable claim
exists focuses on the plausibility of the appellant’s chal-
lenge . . . when the pleadings and motion are viewed
in light of the relevant legal principles.’’ In re Santiago
G., 325 Conn. 221, 233, 157 A.3d 60 (2017).
   In considering whether the defendant can demon-
strate the existence of a colorable claim that the plain-
tiff’s claim of tortious interference with an expected
inheritance is barred by collateral estoppel as a result
of the probate decree, we must consider the scope of
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ‘‘The common-law
doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
embodies a judicial policy in favor of judicial economy,
the stability of former judgments and finality. . . . For
an issue to be subject to collateral estoppel, it must
have been fully and fairly litigated in the first action.
It also must have been actually decided and the decision
must have been necessary to the judgment. . . .
   ‘‘An issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised
in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determina-
tion, and in fact determined. . . . An issue is necessar-
ily determined if, in the absence of a determination of
the issue, the judgment could not have been validly
rendered. . . . If an issue has been determined, but the
judgment is not dependent [on] the determination of the
issue, the parties may relitigate the issue in a subsequent
action. . . . Before collateral estoppel applies [how-
ever] there must be an identity of issues between the
prior and subsequent proceedings. To invoke collateral
estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new
proceeding must be identical to those considered in
the prior proceeding. . . . Further, an overlap in issues
does not necessitate a finding of identity of issues for
the purposes of collateral estoppel.’’ (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 739–40,
183 A.3d 611 (2018).
   We conclude that the defendant has established a
colorable claim that the issue of undue influence in
the plaintiff’s tortious interference with an expected
inheritance claim was fully and fairly litigated in the
will contest proceeding before the Probate Court, and
that there was an identity of the issues between the
two proceedings. With respect to identity of the issues,
both the complaint in the tort action and the challenge
to the 2013 will in the Probate Court rely on the allegedly
undue influence of the defendant over the decedent in
the creation of the 2013 will. The plaintiff presented
his case regarding undue influence to the Probate Court,
which included a contested evidentiary hearing and
posttrial briefs. Further, the issue of undue influence
was actually decided and necessary to the judgment of
the Probate Court. In order to determine the validity
of the 2013 will, the Probate Court was required to
make a finding as to whether the defendant had exerted
undue influence over the decedent in the course of her
making the 2013 will. The Probate Court admitted the
will to probate after finding that the plaintiff had failed
to sustain his burden of proof as to, among other things,
undue influence. We, therefore, conclude that the defen-
dant has raised a colorable claim that the plaintiff’s
claim of tortious interference with an expected inheri-
tance is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Because the defendant has raised a colorable claim,
the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s appeal
from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment as to
count three of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging tortious
interference with an expected inheritance.
   Ordinarily, our conclusion that the Appellate Court
improperly dismissed an appeal for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction would result in a reversal of the Appel-
late Court’s judgment and a remand to that court for
consideration of the merits of the appeal. See, e.g., Pryor
v. Brignole, 346 Conn. 534, 546, 292 A.3d 701 (2023).
Although the certified question in this appeal contem-
plates only the subject matter jurisdiction of the Appel-
late Court, we may, in the interest of judicial economy,
invoke our supervisory powers, pursuant to Practice
Book § 60-2, to address issues outside the scope of the
certified question, rather than remand the case to the
Appellate Court for consideration of those issues in the
first instance. See, e.g., Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v.
Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 605 n.9, 181 A.3d 550 (2018)
(addressing claim beyond scope of certified question in
interest of judicial economy); State v. James, 261 Conn.
395, 410–12, 802 A.2d 820 (2002) (same). The exercise of
our supervisory power is appropriate when the record
is adequate to allow review of the merits, the parties
have briefed the issues, and there is an opportunity to
address the issue at oral argument. See, e.g., Finan v.
Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 498, 949 A.2d 468 (2008). ‘‘Invoca-
tion of our supervisory powers [when] appropriate . . .
carries the benefit of avoid[ing] the necessity of inordi-
nate further delay . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. James, supra, 411.
   This case is a paradigmatic example of one in which
it is preferable for us to consider the merits of the
appeal in the first instance pursuant to our supervisory
powers, rather than to remand the case to the Appellate
Court. In the present case, the record is adequate for
our review of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on the ground of collat-
eral estoppel, which presents a pure question of law.
Both parties dedicated significant portions of their
respective briefs to this court to the merits of the collat-
eral estoppel issue and had the opportunity during oral
argument to address the merits. Accordingly, we con-
clude that, in the interest of judicial economy, the exer-
cise of our supervisory power is appropriate in this
case. We now turn to the merits of the collateral estop-
pel issue.
   The defendant argues that the tortious interference
with an expected inheritance claim is founded on the
same undue influence issue that was fully litigated in
the Probate Court. Relying on Satti v. Rago, 186 Conn.
360, 364–65, 441 A.2d 615 (1982), he contends that,
because the probate decree, which contains no finding
of undue influence, has not been reversed or modified,
it remains in full force, and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel must apply. The plaintiff argues in response
that, pursuant to the Appellate Court’s decision in In
re Probate Appeal of Cadle Co., 152 Conn. App. 427,
440, 100 A.3d 30 (2014), although the probate decree
remains in full force until it is modified or reversed by
the trial court, the decree cannot have preclusive effect
because the probate appeal is tried de novo, and all
matters of fact and law are subject to de novo review.
If the court applies collateral estoppel despite the de
novo appeal, the plaintiff claims, the entire purpose of
de novo review would be eliminated. Guided by our
recent decision in Barash v. Lembo, supra, 348 Conn.
264, we agree with the plaintiff and conclude that the
probate decree does not have preclusive effect with
respect to the plaintiff’s tortious interference with an
expected inheritance claim.
  Generally, a Probate Court decree is a final judgment
for purposes of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Solon v.
Slater, 345 Conn. 794, 809, 287 A.3d 574 (2023); Heus-
sner v. Day, Berry & Howard, LLP, 94 Conn. App. 569,
576, 893 A.2d 486, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 912, 899 A.2d
38 (2006). This court consistently has held that a pend-
ing appeal does not deprive a Probate Court order,
judgment, or decree of finality for purposes of collateral
estoppel. See Barash v. Lembo, supra, 348 Conn. 278.
Indeed, the mere act of appealing from a Probate Court
decree to the Superior Court ‘‘does not in and of itself
vacate or suspend the decree.’’ Kerin v. Stangle, 209
Conn. 260, 265, 550 A.2d 1069 (1988). The Probate Court
decree remains in full force until it is modified or set
aside on appeal. Id.
   ‘‘An appeal from a Probate Court to the Superior
Court [however] is not an ordinary civil action. . . .
When entertaining an appeal from an order or decree
of a Probate Court, the Superior Court takes the place
of and sits as the court of probate. . . . In ruling on a
probate appeal, the Superior Court exercises the pow-
ers, not of a constitutional court of general or [common-
law] jurisdiction, but of a Probate Court.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Salce v. Cardello, 348 Conn. 90,
103, 301 A.3d 1031 (2023). ‘‘Although the Superior Court
may not consider events transpiring after the Probate
Court hearing; Satti v. Rago, [supra, 186 Conn. 369]; it
may receive evidence that could have been offered in
the Probate Court, whether or not it actually was offered.’’
Gardner v. Balboni, 218 Conn. 220, 225, 588 A.2d 634
(1991). Under § 45a-186, ‘‘if a record, including a tran-
script, of the testimony was made before the Probate
Court pursuant to [General Statutes] §§ 51-723 and 51-
73,4 the Superior Court shall review the decree of the
Probate Court using an abuse of discretion standard.’’
(Footnotes added.) Andrews v. Gorby, 237 Conn. 12,
16, 675 A.2d 449 (1996); see also In re Probate Appeal
of Harris, 214 Conn. App. 596, 600–601, 282 A.3d 467
(discussing more limited standard of review for appeals
taken from matter heard on record in Probate Court),
cert. denied, 345 Conn. 918, 284 A.3d 299 (2022). When
‘‘no record was made of the probate proceedings,’’ how-
ever, ‘‘the Superior Court [is] required to undertake a de
novo review of the Probate Court’s decision.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Salce v. Cardello, supra, 104.
In conducting a trial de novo in an appeal from a Probate
Court decree, the Superior Court must arrive at ‘‘an
independent determination, without regard to the result
reached by the [P]robate [C]ourt.’’ Prince v. Sheffield,
158 Conn. 286, 299, 259 A.2d 621 (1969). That is, the
trial court decides a de novo probate appeal ‘‘as an
original proposition unfettered by, and ignoring, the
result reached in the [P]robate [C]ourt.’’ Id., 298.
  Our recent decision in Barash v. Lembo, supra, 348
Conn. 264, governs our conclusion with respect to the
preclusive effect of a Probate Court decree that is the
subject of a pending de novo probate appeal. In Barash,
we considered, for the first time, whether the require-
ment of a trial de novo in a pending appeal from an
order, judgment, or decree of the Probate Court renders
inapplicable the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel as to probate decrees. Id., 279. That case con-
cerned the proper administration of the residue of a
decedent’s estate, which had been bequeathed to a trust.
Id., 269–70. The plaintiffs, who included the beneficiar-
ies of the trust, alleged that the defendant had breached
her fiduciary duty as trustee by failing to, among other
things, investigate the alleged misconduct of the execu-
tor of the estate. Id. A prior Probate Court decree,
however, rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that the execu-
tor had breached his fiduciary duty to the estate. Id., 276.
The plaintiffs appealed from the decree of the Probate
Court, which was scheduled for a trial de novo. Id., 277.
We considered whether, although the appeal from the
decree denying the petition to remove the executor was
pending, the Probate Court’s rejection of the allegations
against the executor precluded the plaintiff from reliti-
gating the same misconduct issues in a separate action.
Id.
   In Barash, we adopted the rule applied by the federal
courts, namely, ‘‘that an appeal that is conducted as
a trial de novo suspends the preclusive effect of the
underlying judgment.’’ Id., 279; see id., 284; see also In
re Parmalat Securities Litigation, 493 F. Supp. 2d 723,
737 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (‘‘[T]he pendency of an appeal ordi-
narily does not suspend the preclusive effect of an oth-
erwise final judgment. But there is an exception for
situations in which the appeal actually involves a trial
de novo.’’ (Footnote omitted.)), aff’d sub nom. Bondi
v. Capital & Finance Asset Management S.A., 535 F.3d
87 (2d Cir. 2008). Our reasons for adopting this approach
are set forth in Barash. ‘‘[W]hen an appeal requires a
trial de novo pursuant to . . . § 45a-186, the appellant
is entitled to relitigate the issues that were addressed
by the Probate Court without regard to the factual find-
ings or legal conclusions there obtained. . . . Although
the Superior Court may not consider events transpiring
after the Probate Court hearing . . . it may receive
evidence that could have been offered in the Probate
Court, whether or not it actually was offered. . . .
[T]he Superior Court possesses the same discretionary
power as that exercised by the Probate Court, which
the Superior Court must exercise in arriving at an inde-
pendent determination, without regard to the result
reached by the [P]robate [C]ourt.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Barash v. Lembo,
supra, 348 Conn. 281–82. Accordingly, we concluded
that, because a Probate Court decree carries no force on
appeal, such a decree ‘‘should not be accorded outcome
determinative, preclusive effect in different litigation
while that appeal is pending.’’ Id., 284.
  Pursuant to the rule that we adopted in Barash, we
conclude that the pending appeal from the Probate
Court to the trial court in the present case, which will
be tried de novo, strips the Probate Court decree of
any preclusive effect that it may otherwise have had
on the subsequent action for tortious interference with
an expected inheritance. Hypothetically, during the de
novo appeal, the plaintiff could present new evidence
of the defendant’s allegedly undue influence, if it existed
at the time of the original probate hearing, even if that
particular evidence was not presented at the original
hearing. See Gardner v. Balboni, supra, 218 Conn. 225.
If that new evidence leads the trial court to conclude
that the defendant exercised undue influence over the
decedent when she created the 2013 will, the trial court
need not consider the Probate Court’s finding before
coming to that conclusion. The trial court could also
conclude that the defendant had exercised undue influ-
ence with no new evidence from the plaintiff. Put differ-
ently, the decision of the Probate Court regarding the
plaintiff’s undue influence claim has no force in that
probate appeal. Because the trial court, sitting as a
probate court, will admit or preclude evidence, make
factual findings, and arrive at its own conclusion with
respect to the undue influence claim without according
any force to the Probate Court’s findings or rulings,
‘‘we cannot say that the Probate Court decree contains
the necessary attributes of finality to warrant applica-
tion of collateral estoppel.’’ Barash v. Lembo, supra,
348 Conn. 282.
   Finally, although we conclude that the trial court prop-
erly rejected the defendant’s collateral estoppel claim,
we emphasize that we reach our conclusion on the basis
of different reasoning. The trial court’s analysis with
respect to its denial of the defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment as to count three on the ground of collat-
eral estoppel is inconsistent with our recent decision
in Solon v. Slater, supra, 345 Conn. 794. In Solon, we
considered the scope of the preclusive effect of an
unappealed Probate Court decree. Id., 798. As in this
case, the plaintiff in Solon contended that her tortious
interference with an expected inheritance claims were
not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because
the Probate Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the
tort claims. See id., 807–808. We concluded in Solon
that it ‘‘is not uncommon that issue preclusion will be
asserted in an action over which the court rendering
the prior judgment would not have had subject matter
jurisdiction’’ and that, ‘‘[i]n such circumstances, there
is no reason why preclusion should not apply if the
procedures followed in the two courts are comparable
in quality and extensiveness, and the first court was
fully competent to render a determination of the issue
on which preclusion is sought.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 824–25. Although the trial court is
ultimately correct that the probate decree should have
no preclusive effect, the trial court’s conclusion that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply because
the Probate Court did not have jurisdiction over the
tortious interference with an expected inheritance claim
is incorrect. Instead, the probate decree has no preclu-
sive effect because the issue of undue influence will
not be determined with finality until the completion of
the probate appeal, which takes the form of a trial
de novo.
   The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to count three of the plaintiff’s
complaint and to remand the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
  In this opinion McDONALD and ECKER, Js., con-
curred.
  1
     We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal, limited
to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss, for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendant’s appeal from the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on collateral
estoppel?’’ O’Sullivan v. Haught, 343 Conn. 930, 281 A.3d 1187 (2022).
   2
     General Statutes § 52-263 provides: ‘‘Upon the trial of all matters of fact
in any cause or action in the Superior Court, whether to the court or jury,
or before any judge thereof when the jurisdiction of any action or proceeding
is vested in him, if either party is aggrieved by the decision of the court or
judge upon any question or questions of law arising in the trial, including
the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict, he may appeal to the court
having jurisdiction from the final judgment of the court or of such judge,
or from the decision of the court granting a motion to set aside a verdict,
except in small claims cases, which shall not be appealable, and appeals
as provided in sections 8-8 and 8-9.’’
   3
     General Statutes § 51-72 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever, in any
court of probate, the parties or their attorneys so agree in writing, the judge
of the court may call in a competent and disinterested person who is capable
to act as a stenographer to act as the official stenographer in the whole or
in such portion of the cause or matter as may be agreed upon. . . .’’
   4
     General Statutes § 51-73 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Evidence taken by
any such stenographer shall have the same effect and be evidence to the
same extent as evidence taken by the official court reporter of the Superior
Court. Appeals from any decision rendered in any case after a record is
made under this section and section 51-72, shall be on such record and shall
not be a trial de novo.’’