Court Opinion

ID: 9897886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:41.385031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:47.126174
License: Public Domain

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             FILE                                                THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                                     FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                         AUGUST 3, 2023
        IN CLERK’S OFFICE
 SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
         AUGUST 3, 2023
                                                                                           ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                        SUPREME COURT CLERK

                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         BROCK MASLONKA and DIANE                        )
         MASLONKA, a marital community,                  )
                                                         )
                                      Respondents,       )               No. 101241-1
                                                         )
                v.                                       )                 En Banc
                                                         )
         PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF                )
         PEND OREILLE COUNTY and PORT OF                 )     Filed : August 3, 2023
         PEND OREILLE,                                   )
                                                         )
                                      Petitioners.       )
                                                         )

                OWENS, J. —Eminent domain principles apply when a governmental entity

         takes or damages private property for public use. If a taking occurs without the

         formal exercise of eminent domain, a landowner may file an inverse condemnation

         claim to recover the loss of property value. The right to inverse condemnation

         belongs to the property owner at the time of the taking; the right does not pass to a

         subsequent purchaser unless expressly conveyed.

                In 1993, respondents Brock and Diane Maslonka purchased land bordering the

         Pend Oreille River. The Pend Oreille Public Utility District (PUD) constructed a dam
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       Maslonka v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County
       No. 101241-1

       on the river in 1955. The PUD operates the dam, raising and lowering the water

       levels based on seasonal flow. The previous owners informed the Maslonkas that the

       land occasionally floods.

              In 2016, the Maslonkas sued the PUD, alleging its operation of the dam entitled

       them to damages based on inverse condemnation, trespass, nuisance, and negligence.

       The trial court found the subsequent purchaser rule barred the inverse condemnation

       claim, and that the PUD established a prescriptive easement barring the trespass and

       nuisance claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the PUD could not

       benefit from the subsequent purchaser rule because it failed to prove its conduct

       constituted a taking prior to the Maslonkas’ purchase. The Court of Appeals also

       rejected the PUD’s alternative argument that the Maslonkas could not bring their tort

       claims alongside their inverse condemnation claim.

              This case asks us to decide who bears the burden of proving whether the

       “subsequent purchaser rule” applies; in other words, whether the rule is a doctrine of

       standing or an affirmative defense. Also at issue is whether an inverse condemnation

       claimant who is barred by the subsequent purchaser rule may nonetheless pursue tort

       claims based on the same alleged governmental conduct.

              We hold that an inverse condemnation claimant must show that the subsequent

       purchaser rule does not bar their suit. It is a doctrine of standing in that it limits who

       may bring a claim; it is not a defense that must be proved by the government. We

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       also hold that an inverse condemnation claimant who is barred from suit by the

       subsequent purchaser rule has no viable tort claim if the tort is based on the same

       governmental conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for

       the trial court to reinstate its summary judgment orders.

                                                      FACTS

       Box Canyon Hydroelectric Project

              The Box Canyon Hydroelectric Project is a run-of-river 1 facility located on the

       Pend Oreille River in northeastern Washington. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 74. The Box

       Canyon Dam was built in 1955 to generate low-cost electricity for customers and is

       owned and operated by the PUD. Id. The dam’s turbine and spillway gates control

       the water surface elevation of the river. Id. at 75. The level of the gates affects the

       backwater, which is the difference in surface elevation between the natural water

       (without the dam) and the raised water (caused by the dam). Id. Generally, the PUD

       raises the gates when the river flowrate increases and lowers the gates when the

       flowrate decreases. Id. Before the dam was constructed, the natural high-water

       elevation at the Cusick Gage2 was 2,028.0 feet above sea level, id. at 12; it is now

       2,030.6 feet above sea level, id. at 75.

       1
         A run-of-river facility’s ability to generate electricity is subject to seasonal variations in
       river flow. Clerk’s Papers at 108.
       2
         The PUD adjusts the dam’s gates based on the water levels at the Cusick Gage. CP at
       78. The gage is roughly the same elevation as the Maslonkas’ property, thus, the
       elevations in this opinion refer to those measured at the Cusick Gage. Id. at 485.

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              The PUD operates the dam within the constraints of its Federal Energy

       Regulatory Commission (FERC) license. Id. at 74. As they now stand, the first

       constraint requires that the water surface level at the Cusick Gage not exceed

       elevation 2,041 feet. Id. at 75. The second requires that the backwater below Albeni

       Falls Dam (which regulates the upstream flow to the dam) not exceed 2 feet above

       natural levels. Id. The third requires the drawdown not to exceed three 3 per hour.

       Id. at 99, 203. To comply with its operational parameters, the PUD monitors the

       river’s elevation and adjusts the gates on a daily and sometimes hourly basis. Id. at

       1630-32.

              The dam’s FERC license has been amended several times since its issuance. A

       1963 amendment allowed 2 feet rather than 1 foot of backwater at Albeni Falls Dam.

       Id. at 78-79. A 1999 amendment, which incorporated a settlement between the PUD

       and the Kalispel Tribe, “include[d] in the project boundary the full extent of the lands

       inundated by the project reservoir” up to elevation 2,041 feet. Id. at 199-200, 654-61,

       666-69. The “lands inundated” include the Maslonkas’ property up to elevation 2,041

       feet. Id. at 205. The order approving the amendment recognizes that under the

       proposed changes, “the project would continue operating as it has under the 1963

       license amendment.” Id. at 669. In expanding the project boundary, FERC

       acknowledged that a denial of the amendment “would likely force the PUD to change

       project operations so that waters from the Box Canyon reservoir did not rise above

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       elevation 2028 [feet] at Cusick, except at times when water would be that high

       naturally.” Id. at 670. A 2005 amendment imposed the drawdown rate of 3 inches

       per hour, which requires the spillway gates to be raised or lowered gradually. Id. at

       99, 203.

              In addition to the license amendments, the PUD updated its equipment and gate

       hoists in 2015. Id. at 102. “Neither of these projects, separately or combined, has

       changed how the Box Canyon Project affects water levels in the Pend Oreille River.”

       Id.

       The Maslonkas’ property

              In July 1993, the Maslonkas bought 535 acres of pastureland bordering the

       Pend Oreille River from Herbert and Evelyn Cordes. Id. at 127, 420. The property is

       upstream of the Box Canyon Dam and downstream of Albeni Falls Dam. Id. at 486.

       Prior to the sale, Cordes and the Maslonkas discussed the flood hazards on the

       property. Id. at 880-81. Specifically, Cordes informed them that the lower part of the

       river flooded periodically, in “abnormally wet years or high water years.” Id. at 153-

       55, 159-60.

              When the dam was constructed, the Maslonkas’ predecessors in interest

       (J. Lester and Florine Sullivan) sold express easements to the PUD. Id. at 328-33.

       The easements, recorded in 1955 and 1960, allow the PUD to “intermittently or

       continuously overflow, flood and submerge, or to damage by wash, erosion,

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       sloughage, seepage, inundation, or other cause,” the land with water from the river “in

       the construction, operation and maintenance” of the dam. Id. at 328. The easements

       cover the majority of the flooding caused by the river and dam up to elevation 2,041.0

       feet. Id. at 1412. When the river’s flow rate exceeds 90,000 cubic feet per second,

       which occurs seasonally due to snow melt, the PUD lifts all the gates and the river

       floods above elevation 2,041.0 feet as if there were no dam in place. Id. at 75-76,

       116. When this happens, the river’s elevation surpasses the PUD’s express

       easements. Verbatim Tr. of Proc. (VTP) (July 16, 2019) at 60; CP at 75-76, 1235.

       Since 1955, the river has flooded above elevation 2,035.5 feet about 12 percent of the

       year. CP at 75-80. The flooding erodes the shoreline and causes related property

       damage; these damages form the basis of these proceedings.

       Procedure

              In December 2016, the Maslonkas filed a complaint against the PUD for

       (1) governmental taking, (2) statutory trespass, (3) nuisance, and (4) negligence. Id. at

       1-9. They sought damages, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. Id.

              The PUD counterclaimed to quiet title to a prescriptive easement. Id. at 30-31.

       The PUD alleged it had continuously used the Maslonkas’ property above elevation

       2,035.5 feet since it began operating the dam in 1955, and the Maslonkas and their

       predecessors in interest knew this but failed to timely assert or enforce any right they

       may have had. Id.

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              The parties engaged in extensive discovery. The Maslonkas’ expert witness,

       Vince Barthels, opined that the shoreline is actively being eroded above the PUD’s

       express easement elevation of 2,035.5 feet. Id. at 489. Barthels estimated that the

       dam increases the river’s elevation by 6.0 to 8.0 feet near the Maslonkas’ property,

       “thereby regularly creating inundation and waves above the elevation of 2035.5

       [feet]” and eroding the shoreline. Id. at 485, 489.

              Lawrence Cordes, a former diking commissioner, testified that the area’s

       flooding problems began around 2011 or 2012. Id. at 573-74. He stated that the river

       did not back up into the valley until the dam’s operators changed. Id. Brock

       Maslonka testified that although he has no records of the flooding, he believes the

       PUD began backing up the water to elevation 2,041 feet in 1999. Id. at 880-83.

              The PUD rebutted the Maslonkas’ erosion assessment with two expert

       witnesses. One expert “strongly disagree[d]” with Barthels’ estimate that the dam

       raises the water by 6.0 to 8.0 feet on the Maslonkas’ property, opining instead that the

       water rises by 2.5 feet above natural levels. Id. at 106. The expert noted that Barthels

       visited just months after unusually high flooding in 2018, which the expert believed

       caused the recent erosion between elevations 2,035.5 feet and 2,038.0 feet and would

       have occurred regardless of the dam. Id.

              The PUD moved for partial summary judgment, arguing among other things

       that the subsequent purchaser rule barred Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation, nuisance,

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       and trespass claims. Id. at 54-61. The Maslonkas responded with their own evidence

       tending to show the flooding resulted in a $288,500 diminution in property value. Id.

       at 418-51, 703.

              After hearing arguments, the trial court later issued a lengthy oral ruling.

       Noting that an inverse condemnation claim is actionable only by the property owner at

       the time of the taking, the court ruled:

              [W]e have all of the agreements about the flooding of the property. Mr.
              Maslonka had conversations with the prior owner about the flooding so
              the flooding problems were evident at the time of purchase. County
              records contained notice of the land[’]s propensity to flood. The
              purchase either did or should have reflected the diminished value of the
              land caused by its propensity to flood.

                     And so the Maslonkas—did not acquire the property until after the
              alleged inverse condemnation was complete. So that would have
              happened with the original—property owners, the Sullivans, and there is
              no evidence that they conveyed the right to an inverse condemnation
              claim to the subsequent purchaser . . . from that point, forward.

                     So,—as a matter of law the Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation
              claim is foreclosed by the subsequent purchaser doctrine.

       VTP (July 16, 2019) at 61-62.

              The court clarified that the Maslonkas vaguely asserted a new taking, but it

       found no evidence in support: “[T]he dam has operated consistently within its legal

       parameters. There’s been no change.” Id. at 62.

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              The court then denied summary judgment on the trespass and nuisance claims,

       finding a genuine question of fact as to whether they are continuing or permanent. Id.

       at 62-63. The trial court incorporated its oral ruling in an order. CP at 824-27.

              The PUD later moved for summary dismissal of the trespass and nuisance

       claims on the grounds that it established a prescriptive easement up to elevation 2,041

       feet. Id. at 834-56. The trial court granted the motion. Id. at 1881-82.

              Both parties appealed. Division Three of the Court of Appeals reversed the

       dismissal of the inverse condemnation, trespass, and nuisance claims. 3 Maslonka v.

       Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, 23 Wn. App. 2d 1, 56, 514 P.3d 203

       (2022). It held that the trial court erred in determining the subsequent purchaser rule

       barred the inverse condemnation claim, id. at 47-49, and that that claim did not

       subsume the Maslonkas’ alternative theory of recovery in tort, id. at 50-51.

              We granted review on the subsequent purchaser rule and tort issues. Maslonka

       v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, 200 Wn.2d 1016 (2022). The

       Washington Public Utility Districts Association and the Washington State Department

       of Transportation filed amici curiae briefs in support of the PUD.

       3
         The Court of Appeals opinion focused largely on the PUD’s prescriptive easement
       claim. Neither party raised that issue to this court.

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                                                  ISSUES

          1. Does the subsequent purchaser rule bar the Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation

       claim?

          2. Are the Maslonkas’ tort claims incompatible with their inverse condemnation

       claim?

                                                ANALYSIS

       Standard of Review

                Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any

       material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

       CR 56(c). We review summary judgment orders de novo, engaging in the same

       inquiry as the trial court and viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light

       most favorable to the nonmoving party. Owen v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. Co.,

       153 Wn.2d 780, 787, 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). Mere speculation cannot defeat a

       summary judgment motion. White v. State, 131 Wn.2d 1, 9, 929 P.2d 396 (1997).

                1. The subsequent purchaser rule bars the Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation
                   claim

                   A. Background on eminent domain and inverse condemnation

                Under constitutional eminent domain principles, the government cannot take or

       damage private property for public use without just compensation. WASH. CONST.

       art. I, § 16. An inverse condemnation action seeks to recover the value of property

       affected by a governmental taking or damaging that occurred without a formal

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       exercise of the power of eminent domain. Dickgieser v. State, 153 Wn.2d 530, 534-

       35, 105 P.3d 26 (2005) (citing Phillips v. King County, 136 Wn.2d 946, 957, 968 P.2d

       871 (1998)). To prevail, an inverse condemnation claimant must show there has been

       “(1) a taking or damaging (2) of private property (3) for public use (4) without just

       compensation being paid (5) by a governmental entity that has not instituted formal

       proceedings.” Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan County, 169 Wn.2d 598, 605-06, 238 P.3d

       1129 (2010).

              Not all landowners can recover for damages caused by governmental conduct

       through an inverse condemnation action. The subsequent purchaser rule prohibits

       landowners from suing for property damage caused by governmental conduct that

       occurred prior to their ownership. See Hoover v. Pierce County, 79 Wn. App. 427,

       433-34, 903 P.2d 464 (1995) (citing 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 390, at 461 (1965));

       see also 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 383, at 757 (1992) (“‘[W]here property is

       taken or injured under the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the owner thereof

       at the time of the taking or injury is the proper person to initiate proceedings or sue

       therefor.’”). “Because the right to damages for an injury to property is a personal

       right belonging to the property owner, the right does not pass to a subsequent

       purchaser unless expressly conveyed.” Hoover, 79 Wn. App. at 433-34 (emphasis

       added); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 150

       L. Ed. 2d 592 (2001) (“[I]t is a general rule of the law of eminent domain that any

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       award goes to the owner at the time of the taking, and that the right to compensation is

       not passed to a subsequent purchaser.”). No damages should be awarded to plaintiffs

       who acquired property for a price commensurate with its diminished value. Hoover,

       79 Wn. App. at 434.

                  B. The subsequent purchaser rule is a doctrine of standing and not an
                     affirmative defense

              In reversing the trial court’s inverse condemnation ruling, the Court of Appeals

       reasoned that “the subsequent purchaser rule is a defense,” so the PUD must prove

       that it permanently reduced the value of the property before the Maslonkas’ purchase.

       Maslonka, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 48. It held that the PUD failed to carry this burden,

       bringing only nonspecific evidence that the Maslonkas knew the property flooded

       periodically up to the recorded easement limit. Thus, the court found a genuine issue

       of material fact precluded the application of the subsequent purchaser rule on

       summary judgment.

              The PUD and amici curiae argue the subsequent purchaser rule is not a defense

       and is instead a doctrine of standing. We agree. Standing requires a party to have a

       real interest in the litigation and generally prohibits a litigant from asserting the legal

       rights of another. Dean v. Lehman, 143 Wn.2d 12, 18-19, 18 P.3d 523 (2001). As a

       threshold matter, the plaintiff must clearly demonstrate that they are the proper party

       to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S.

       Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975). If a plaintiff lacks standing, the court need not

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       hear the case. See Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wn.2d 862, 875 n.6, 101 P.3d 67

       (2004). Although our case law does not expressly characterize the subsequent

       purchaser rule as one of standing,4 it limits who may sue for inverse condemnation by

       prohibiting a subsequent purchaser from asserting the legal rights of the owner at the

       time of the alleged taking.

              This conclusion is consistent with other jurisdictions that recognize the

       subsequent purchaser rule as a doctrine of standing rather than as an affirmative

       defense. See, e.g., Russell Real Prop. Servs., LLC v. State, 200 So. 3d 426, 429-30

       (Miss. 2016) (plaintiff lacked standing to pursue inverse condemnation claim based on

       actions predating ownership of the property); State ex rel. City of Blue Springs v.

       Nixon, 250 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Mo. 2008) (“[T]he cause of action for inverse

       condemnation vested in the prior owners. As subsequent grantees, the [plaintiffs]

       would not have standing to bring a claim for inverse condemnation.” (citation

       omitted)); Johns v. Black Hills Power, Inc., 722 N.W.2d 554, 558 (S.D. 2006)

       (because the challenged conduct occurred prior to the plaintiffs’ purchase, “any cause

       of action for inverse condemnation belongs to the prior owner and [the plaintiffs] lack

       4
         One unpublished opinion has categorized the rule as a standing issue. See City of
       Woodinville v. Fowler P’ship, No. 72417-7-I, slip. op. at 8 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 24,
       2015) (unpublished) (plaintiff “lacks standing to challenge the taking now, because of the
       subsequent purchaser rule”), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/724177.pdf.
       Unpublished cases have no precedential value. GR 14.1. The Hoover court
       acknowledged the argument that subsequent purchasers lack standing to sue but did not
       include that language in its holding. See Hoover, 79 Wn. App. at 433, 436.

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       standing to maintain an action for the taking”); Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont.

       165, 176, 642 P.2d 141, 147 (1982) (the right to a remedy does not pass to subsequent

       purchaser after the inverse condemnation occurred). The Maslonkas cite no case that

       categorizes the subsequent purchaser rule as an affirmative defense.

              The Maslonkas are correct that standing refers to a party’s right to bring a legal

       claim and is not intended to be a “high bar” to overcome. Yet they overlook that the

       subsequent purchase rule governs a party’s right to bring a legal claim. That is, it

       limits the right of a subsequent purchaser from bringing an inverse condemnation

       claim unless such a right was properly conveyed. It is not necessarily a high bar to

       overcome; it simply requires the proper plaintiffs to bring suit.

              The Court of Appeals opinion essentially flips the standing burden by requiring

       the PUD to show that Maslonkas lacked standing. It held that the PUD failed to show

       that it permanently reduced the property value before the Maslonkas acquired it,

       therefore it could not benefit from the subsequent purchaser rule. However, the rule is

       a doctrine of standing, which the plaintiff must establish.

                  C. Under this holding, the Maslonkas cannot bring an inverse condemnation
                     claim

                     i.   The Maslonkas are subsequent purchasers

              The taking occurred when the dam was built in 1955; thus, the proper inverse

       condemnation claimants were the Sullivans, who owned the land at that time. The

       Maslonkas bought the land in 1993. Implicit in the subsequent purchaser rule is the

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       principle that the purchase price of land subject to a governmental taking reflects the

       diminution of value. The PUD’s dam operations have flooded the property since

       1955, and we assume the Maslonkas’ purchase price reflected this known seasonal

       flooding. As subsequent purchasers, the Maslonkas have no inverse condemnation

       claim unless they establish a new taking occurred after 1993.

                     ii.   The Maslonkas failed to establish new taking

              To avoid dismissal of their inverse condemnation claim under the subsequent

       purchaser rule, the Maslonkas must prove a new governmental action or taking

       occurred after their purchase. See Hoover, 79 Wn. App. at 434. A new taking occurs

       when additional governmental action causes a measurable decline in market value of

       the property. Id. at 434-35. However, when a governmental action causes known

       flooding prior to a plaintiff’s acquisition, a new cause of action does not arise with

       each flood absent additional governmental action. Id. at 435-36.

              The Court of Appeals implied there are disputed facts as to whether there has

       been a new taking: “PUD has received significant license amendments at least twice

       since the Maslonkas purchased the property. It is not inconceivable to think that the

       PUD altered or expanded its operations as a result of those amendments in such a way

       as to cause new damage to the Maslonkas’ property.” Maslonka, 23 Wn. App. 2d at

       49. The record does not support this conclusion, and summary judgment cannot be

       defeated by relying on speculation.

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              Brock Maslonka surmised that flooding increased in 1999; Cordes thought it

       increased in 2011 or 2012. Neither deponent supported these statements, and the

       PUD’s evidence firmly rebuts this testimony. See CP at 199-200 (1999 amendment

       included lands already being flooded up to elevation 2,041 feet), 102-03 (2015

       amendments had no effect on river elevation). The Maslonkas produced no evidence

       that the dam’s operations changed after 1993 to increase flooding; any increase

       cannot be, on this record, attributed to the PUD. Without evidence of a new taking,

       the Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation claim cannot survive summary judgment.

              The Maslonkas attempt to distinguish Hoover and cases involving “fixed and

       unmovable construction projects” completed before the property was acquired from

       the PUD’s continued “discretionary operation” of the dam. Maslonkas’ Answer to

       Amicus Curiae Brs. at 14 (emphasis omitted). It is difficult to understand how the

       dam is not a fixed and unmovable construction project, notwithstanding the fact that

       the gates are adjustable. Over a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held,

       “There is no difference of kind, but only of degree, between a permanent condition of

       continual overflow by back-water and a permanent liability to intermittent but

       inevitably recurring overflows; and, on principle, the right to compensation must arise

       in the one case as in the other.” United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328, 37 S. Ct.

       380, 61 L. Ed. 746 (1917). The dam is, in the words of Cress, “a permanent liability

       to intermittent but inevitably recurring overflows.” Id.

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              The trial court properly dismissed the Maslonkas’ inverse condemnation claim

       based on the subsequent purchaser rule and their failure to bring evidence of a new

       taking. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue and remand with

       instructions for the trial court to reinstate its summary judgment order.

              2. The Maslonkas’ tort claims are incompatible with their inverse
                 condemnation claim

              Generally, when the government takes private property from an individual for

       public use, eminent domain principles apply. Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of

       Seattle, 87 Wn.2d 6, 17, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976). We have long distinguished takings

       claims from tort claims. Wong Kee Jun v. City of Seattle, 143 Wash. 479, 255 P. 645

       (1927).

              The Court of Appeals held that inverse condemnation claims do not foreclose

       tort recovery, pointing out that the cited cases merely held that viable inverse

       condemnation claims mooted tort recovery. Maslonka, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 50-51. It is

       true that tort actions are unnecessary where the defendant is a governmental entity and

       “‘the recovery sought is only for loss of property rights, not personal or other

       injuries.’” Id. (quoting Highline, 87 Wn.2d at 17). Indeed, this court has explained:

              In circumstances where the inverse condemnation theory is available,
              potential plaintiffs are not disadvantaged if they are denied recourse to a
              nuisance cause of action. Of course, where a plaintiff seeks to recover
              damages for other than loss of property rights or where the defendant is
              not an entity to which eminent domain principles apply, the nuisance
              remedy is still available.

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       Highline, 87 Wn.2d at 17-18 (footnote omitted).

              The parties agree that a taking has occurred. Thus, notwithstanding our holding

       above, an inverse condemnation theory is available to the Maslonkas. They sought

       damages for loss of property rights (a taking) against a defendant to which eminent

       principles apply (the PUD). The Maslonkas simply could not show the taking

       occurred after their purchase. Under these facts and Highline, the Maslonkas are not

       disadvantaged if they are denied recourse to a nuisance cause of action.

              The Maslonkas point to several cases 5 to support their position that tort actions

       are not necessarily subsumed by inverse condemnation claims. See Dickgieser, 153

       Wn.2d 530; Olson v. King County, 71 Wn.2d 279, 284-85, 428 P.2d 562 (1967);

       Eggleston v. Pierce County, 148 Wn.2d 760, 64 P.3d 618 (2003). These cases are not

       on point.

              In Dickgieser, we rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ inverse

       condemnation claim was based on mere negligence and held that factual disputes

       remained as to whether the conduct was reasonably necessary for the public use. 153

       5
         The Maslonkas and the Court of Appeals cite Pac. Hwy. Park v. Dep’t of Transp., No.
       44198-5-II, slip op. at 10-11 (Wash. Ct. App. June 3, 2014) (unpublished),
       https://courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2044198-5-II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf
       where Division Two rejected an argument that inverse condemnation claims subsume tort
       claims. There, like here, the subsequent purchaser rule barred the inverse condemnation
       claim; it therefore could not subsume any tort claims. Moreover, unpublished cases lack
       precedential value. GR 14.1.

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       No. 101241-1

       Wn.2d at 541. We did not discuss whether a tort claim could be a viable alternate

       theory of recovery to an inverse condemnation claim.

              In Olson, we explained that “[e]very trespass upon, or tortious damaging of real

       property does not become a constitutional taking or damaging simply because the

       trespasser or tort-feasor is the [government].” 71 Wn.2d at 284. But there, the

       damage was a “‘mere temporary interference with a private property right’” that

       “‘might have been avoided by due care’” which did not rise to the level of a taking.

       Id. at 285 (quoting Wong Kee Jun, 143 Wash. at 505. Here, the parties do not dispute

       that the flooding rises to the level of a taking; it is the subsequent purchaser rule that

       precludes the Maslonkas from pursuing their inverse condemnation action. Olson

       does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff whose claims are barred by

       subsequent purchaser rule gets to file a negligence suit instead.

              Eggleston arose from a criminal investigation in which the execution of a

       search warrant rendered the plaintiff’s house uninhabitable. 148 Wn.2d at 764-66.

       The plaintiff alleged the damages from the police activity amounted to a taking. Id. at

       766. We held that although the loss may have been compensable under a variety of

       legal theories, it was not a cognizable taking and was instead incidental to the State’s

       exercise of its police powers. Id. at 766-67, 768-76. Eggleston does not suggest that

       a tort claim can be brought as an alternative theory of recovery to an inverse

       condemnation claim.

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              The Court of Appeals noted that Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d

       909, 296 P.3d 860 (2013), addressed the merits of tort claims alongside inverse

       condemnation claims. But Lakey considered claims based on different actions by

       different defendants. We considered a nuisance claim against an energy company for

       operating a substation alongside an inverse condemnation claim against a city for

       issuing the substation permit. Id. at 921-31. In other words, the tort claim was against

       a private company while the condemnation claim was against the government. The

       tort claim was not a “backup” theory of recovery if the takings claim was barred by

       the subsequent purchaser rule. And unlike the plaintiffs in Lakey, the Maslonkas

       named the PUD as both the tort defendant and the inverse condemnation defendant.

              In sum, there is no authority that inverse condemnation claimants barred by the

       subsequent purchaser rule are entitled to alternative tort recovery. There may be a

       case where a plaintiff may pursue tort recovery when the governmental action does

       not rise to a taking, but that is not the case here. Indeed, the parties do not dispute that

       a taking occurred. The Maslonkas allege one governmental action—the continuous

       flooding caused by the dam’s construction in 1955—as the basis for both their tort and

       inverse condemnation claims. If tort claims exist as a backup theory of recovery for

       otherwise barred inverse condemnation claims, subsequent purchasers could endlessly

       sue governmental entities in tort. The Maslonkas should not be permitted to proceed

       in tort if they cannot prove inverse condemnation as subsequent purchasers. In other

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       Maslonka v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County
       No. 101241-1

       words, they cannot maintain a tort action for conduct that undisputedly constitutes a

       taking. We therefore reverse and remand to reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the

       trespass and nuisance claims.

                                             CONCLUSION

              We hold that the subsequent purchaser rule is a doctrine of standing, requiring

       the Maslonkas to prove they are the proper plaintiffs to bring their inverse

       condemnation claim. The Maslonkas failed to do so and did not proffer evidence of a

       new taking to survive summary judgment. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals

       on this issue and remand to reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment order.

              We also hold that where the subsequent purchaser rule bars their underlying

       takings claim, the Maslonkas cannot sue the PUD in tort for the same underlying

       conduct. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding on this issue and

       remand to reinstate the trial court’s dismissal of the Maslonkas’ trespass and nuisance

       claims.

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       WE CONCUR:

                                                                   Leach, J.P.T.

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