Court Opinion

ID: 9739743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:20:18.619943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.695490
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Here, the Honorable John Konenkamp, Circuit Judge, transferred jurisdiction to the Rosebud Tribal Court. In my opinion, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed, not reversed, because the child was not denied any substantive due process.
Set forth, in toto, in the majority opinion, is the pertinent statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). There is no reason to repeat it.
Pertinent facts:
• May 4, 1992, Rosebud Sioux Tribe motions to intervene.
• Judge Konenkamp is assigned to the case and an advisory hearing is scheduled for May 21, 1992.
• R.W., mother, denies allegations of the formal complaint.
• On May 21, 1992, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe’s motion to intervene is granted. An adjudicatory hearing is set for July 1, 1992.
• Pending this hearing, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe motioned, on June 26, 1992, to transfer the case to the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court.
• IMPORTANT PROCEDURAL FACT: A hearing was set for June 30, 1992; thereat, the State and the child presented various arguments in oppos*603ing the motion to transfer. Rosebud Sioux Tribe presented its plans to Judge Konenkamp. These plans were deemed acceptable by the trial court.
• On June 30, 1992 (after this hearing), these arguments were denied on the merits; the motion to transfer to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe was granted on June 30, 1992.
There was no failure to afford due process. The Circuit Judge entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Under the Hobelsberger rule, Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970), announced many times in this Court, the Findings of Fact were not clearly erroneous; nor were the Conclusions of Law “mistakes of law” under the oft-repeated Permann rule. Permann v. Dept. of Labor, Unemp. Ins. D., 411 N.W.2d 113 (S.D.1987).
Under the controlling federal statute, Judge Konenkamp decided there was not good cause to deny the transfer. ' This was after all, an Indian child, with an Indian mother, and the transfer was to the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. We are involved with the Indian Child Welfare Act. The lower court’s ruling seems to be an outrage to the child’s counsel because of a perceived procedural flaw. I do not view it that way.
Nor do I agree with appellate counsel, per page 14 of appellant’s brief that “[Judge Konenkamp] decided the transfer and stay motions based on what he [Judge Konenkamp] perceived to be the politically correct decision.” Nor do I agree that “Issues of trust and confidence in the In-tervenor [Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court] are irrelevant on the motion for stay and only tangentially relevant on the motion for transfer,” as expressed by child’s brief. Respect of Indian courts by State courts and State courts by Indian courts are an absolute requirement for the understanding and resolution of legal questions confronting the two races. It is a legitimate goal. A system of mutual respect is vital to civil tranquility, stability, and law.
Finally, I call attention to the Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines, which were developed from the aforesaid federal act. These guidelines are interpretive and nonbinding. See Matter of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233 (S.D.1989). They were intended to act as “guidelines” for state courts — not absolute laws. Regarding the verbiage on the federal statute on “good cause to the contrary,” please note that those regulations mention the presentation of “views.” No question about it: Both parties in this case had the opportunity to present their views. At 44 Fed.Reg. 67591 we find these words:
... if the court believes or any party asserts that good cause to the contrary exists, the reasons for such belief or assertion shall be in writing and made available to the parties who are petitioning for transfer. The petitioners shall have the opportunity to provide the court with their views on whether or not good cause to deny the transfer exists.
Again, the word “views” is expressed on the same page thereof as follows:
... where it is proposed to deny transfer on the grounds of ‘good cause’, however, all parties need an opportunity to present their views to the court.
It is undisputed that child had that opportunity and did present views and arguments. These were considered by Judge Konen-kamp and rejected. In civil cases, due process requires an opportunity for a hearing on the merits granted at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner. An actual hearing on the merits is not required by the Constitution. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Northwest S.D. Production Credit v. Dale, 361 N.W.2d 275 (S.D.1985).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER joins this dissent.