Court Opinion

ID: 9779440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:50:46.334891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.440055
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
To me at least, given the calibre of the attorneys in this cause, and one of the *72issues before this Court, it is amazing that none of them sets out in either the briefs or the petitions that were filed in this cause a summary of the facts of this cause, that went to the guilt or punishment that was assessed by the trial judge. Therefore, I shall later perform that duty. Perhaps this causes the majority to act as it does.
The record reflects that Lemard De-vaughn, henceforth appellant, was charged with committing the offense of burglary, by intentionally and knowingly entering a habitation, “and therein attempted to commit and committed theft, without the effective consent of JOYCE ERNEST, the owner of said habitation.” One of the ways that a “person” might commit the offense of burglary is “if, without the effective consent of the owner, he enters a habitation and [thereafter] commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft.” Y.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02(a)(2). The indictment in this cause clearly alleged that method of burglary, and the State’s proof established beyond any doubt that appellant committed the alleged crime.
For reasons stated in Judge Clinton’s majority opinion, however, the indictment in this cause was subject to appellant’s motion to quash. To that extent, I agree wholeheartedly with what Judge Clinton’s majority opinion states and holds. It is, in part, to the majority’s decision to remand this cause to the court of appeals to perform “a harmless error analysis” that causes me to file this opinion; especially, when that can be done in a minimum amount of time by this Court. By failing to perform this minimal task, we put this cause into appellate orbit.
The facts of this cause reflect that William Frederick Liskow, Jr., whose last name is spelled in the record either as “Liskow” or “Liscow”, and because it is more often spelled “Liskow” than any other way I will spell it “Liskow”, testified that he was a next door neighbor of the complainant. Liskow testified that on the day in question he observed an individual, who he identified as appellant, running from the complainant’s residence with a sack in his hand. Liskow testified that he chased and stopped appellant. Liskow recognized appellant as being the son of a neighbor “who lived down the street”. Appellant admitted to Liskow that he had broken into the complainant’s residence.
Although he did not expressly identify any of the items in the bag, appellant did admit to Liskow that the items in the bag he was carrying came from the complainant’s residence. Appellant also admitted to Liskow that he got inside of the house through a window, which window he showed Liskow. Appellant pleaded with Liskow not to call the police because, as he represented to Liskow, he was scheduled to be inducted into the United States Army in New York. When Liskow told appellant that “they don’t have any army up there”, appellant told him he was not going to enlist in the Army, but was going to enlist in the United States Navy. Liskow told him that they also “did not have any navy there.” Appellant then told him that he was going to New York to enlist in the United States Air Force. Liskow told him they “don’t have air force there [either].” Liskow then concluded from appellant’s inconsistent statements: “I was pretty sure he wasn’t telling me the truth.” Appellant, however, continued pleading with Liskow not to call the police. On the pretext that he was going to return the items to the complainant’s residence, appellant managed to escape from Liskow’s presence. This occurred shortly before the police arrived on the scene. Liskow later attended “a photo lineup” that was held on September 9, 1982, where he formally identified appellant as the person he had come into contact with on the day in question. Liskow notified the police that based upon what he had witnessed he believed that his neighbor’s house had been burglarized by appellant. The police were summoned and came to the complainant’s residence.
The complainant, a recent divorcee, testified that although she had put her home up for sale with Century 21, she was still living in it with her thirteen year old son Billy, who had just returned from California the night before the alleged burglary occurred. The complainant also testified that after returning to their home from *73lunch and a movie on the day in question, near mid-afternoon on August 22, 1982, they soon discovered that the residence had been burglarized and personal property had been taken therefrom. Only employees of Century 21 had permission to go inside the residence while she and her son were gone to lunch and the movie. Although no direct testimony was presented through any employee of Century 21, I believe that one can infer from this record that no one from that business unlawfully went inside the complainant’s house and took anything therefrom while she and her son were gone. And appellant made no such assertion on direct appeal or before this Court. The complainant further testified that she did not know appellant. The complainant’s son did not testify. The complainant also testified that after the burglary in this cause occurred she was again burglarized on November 21, 1982. She believed that appellant or a neighbor’s son, who the complainant characterized as a “nuisance”, committed the second burglary.
Appellant, however, could not have committed the second burglary, either individually or as a party, because the evidence reflects that he was then incarcerated in the Bexar County Jail on the charge at bar.
Several police officers also testified concerning their response to the burglary and their investigation of the burglary, which testimony I do not find adds anything of a material nature to the State’s case.
I find that the circumstantial evidence adduced easily shows that appellant unlawfully entered the residence and took from inside of the complainant’s residence personal property.
Appellant neither testified nor presented any defensive evidence at the guilt stage of the trial.
After appellant was found guilty by the jury, the trial judge conducted a punishment hearing, at which appellant’s father testified. Appellant's father testified that at the time the burglary occurred appellant was not allowed to live in his residence: “He was living on the street.” However, when the punishment hearing was conducted, appellant and his father “had made peace.” Appellant also had one of the investigating officers testify that he could, “as far as the law, at least, [be] trouble-free in the Live Oak community” if he had “strict supervision.” The trial judge assessed punishment at ten (10) years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections, rejecting appellant’s counsel’s plea for probation. Appellant, through counsel, elected to then be sent to the Department of Corrections where he could commence serving his sentence. The trial judge indicated that he would later consider “shock probation” for appellant.
Thereafter, appellant pled “true” to the State’s motion to revoke his five year probation that he had received on April 1, 1982, for committing the offense of burglary of a building. The trial judge revoked the probation. The offense at bar was the basis for the order of revocation. Sentence was five years’ confinement in the Department of Corrections. Appellant waived his right to appeal the trial court’s order of revocation, and then accepted the five year sentence. I assume, given the time that has elapsed since appellant was sentenced, and the overcrowded conditions of the Department of Corrections, appellant is now released on parole or mandatory supervision for that offense. I am not so confident to make such a statement about appellant’s ten year sentence; therefore, will not.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that the State presented that established beyond any doubt appellant’s guilt, a majority of this Court votes to remand this cause to the court of appeals, so that it can make the determination “whether, in the context of the case, [the error in not granting appellant’s motion to quash the indictment in this cause] had an impact on the defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, and finally, how great an impact.” Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
In case the reader is unaware, Adams, supra, is the case in which a majority of this Court opted to expressly overrule this Court’s well written and well reasoned opinion of Jeffers v. State, 646 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Opinion on State’s Mo*74tion for Rehearing), which had overruled this Court’s panel opinion of Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Thus, by overruling Jeffers, supra, a majority of this Court “restore[d] the essence of Craven.” Adams, supra, (Clinton, J., concurring opinion).
Notwithstanding my continuing belief that a majority of this Court erred in what it stated and held in Adams, supra, but adhering to stare decisis, and given the above, to remand this cause to the court of appeals for it to make some sort of “harmless error” analysis causes me to repeat, as modified to fit this case, what Presiding Judge Onion stated in the dissenting opinion that he filed in Adkins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1986): “I dissent to the remand to the Court of Appeals ... I would decide the [issue of harmless error] here. We needlessly keep too many cases in appellate orbit.”
Given the above, and believing that the San Antonio Court of Appeals, as well as this Court, has better things to do, I vote to hold, pursuant to Rule 81(b)(2), Rules of Appellate Procedure, that given the facts of this cause the error that exists does not constitute reversible error because this Court can unequivocally state, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error made no contribution to the appellant’s conviction by the jury, or to the punishment that was assessed by the trial judge. Thus, there is no need to remand this cause to the court of appeals for that court to make a “harmless error” analysis. Because the majority declines to accept my suggestion, I respectfully dissent.
For the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur and dissent to what the majority opinion states and holds in this cause.