Court Opinion

ID: 9788650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:14:02.102127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:15.613406
License: Public Domain

*92ESPINOSA, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 34 I respectfully disagree, on a number of grounds, with the majority’s conclusion that the dog sniff at issue here may have violated the Arizona Constitution and is subject to a new standard of reasonable suspicion.13 First and foremost, this court should not be reaching out to decide a ease on a basis that was never argued below. No mention of a new and unprecedented right of “tranquility and repose” barring a dog sniff outside one’s home was ever made nor was such a concept suggested during either the suppression hearing or the bench trial below. It is well established that we will not reverse a trial court on an issue and argument it never had an opportunity to consider or address. See State v. Hamblin, 217 Ariz. 481, n. 2, 176 P.3d 49, 51 n. 2 (App.2008) (argument made for first time on appeal forfeited absent fundamental error); State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, ¶ 13, 169 P.3d 651, 654 (App. 2007) (same). Moreover, we will not address a state constitutional argument unless it is separated from a federal constitutional argu-' ment at trial or on appeal. State v. Carr, 216 Ariz. 444, n. 2, 167 P.3d 131, 134 n. 2 (App. 2007); State v. Freeland, 176 Ariz. 544, 549, 863 P.2d 263, 268 (App.1993) (defendant waived new version of suppression argument made for first time on appeal absent fundamental error). Passing reference to “Article II, Section 8” in a motion to suppress, as here, preserves nothing for appeal.14 See State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, n. 1, 76 P.3d 429, 432 n. 1 (2003) (when party asserts violation of Arizona Constitution, but cites only Fourth Amendment authority and does not argue state constitutional analysis should differ, decision confined to Fourth Amendment); In re Leopoldo L., 209 Ariz. 249, n. 1, 99 P.3d 578, 581 n. 1 (App.2004) (same); State v. Watson, 198 Ariz. 48, n. 2, 6 P.3d 752, 756, n. 2 (App.2000) (argument that article II, § 8 renders “a man’s home his castle” insufficient to preserve issue for appeal); State v. Calabrese, 157 Ariz. 189, 191, 755 P.2d 1177, 1179 (App.1988) (state constitutional objections waived if not raised in trial court).
¶ 35 Furthermore, this argument on state constitutional grounds was not made in any form in Guillen’s appellate briefing to this court.15 As a result, the state had no opportunity to respond to or otherwise brief the issue, demonstrating one of the reasons why arguments not raised by an appellant are waived on appeal. See Meiners v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 213 Ariz. 536, n. 2, 145 P.3d 633, 635 n. 2 (App.2006) (court refrains from ruling oh unbriefed issues to avoid surprising parties and deciding case without benefit of *93research and analysis by parties); State v. Curry, 187 Ariz. 623, 626-27, 931 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (App.1996) (deciding issue raised sua sponte without benefit of supplemental briefing runs “counter to notions of procedural due process”); see also State v. Hardesty, 220 Ariz. 149, n. 6, 204 P.3d 407, 413 n. 6 (App.2008) (bald assertion that state constitutional rights were violated does not preserve issue on appeal), review granted (Ariz. Jan. 6, 2009) (No. CR-08-0244-PR); State v. Tarkington, 218 Ariz. 369, n. 1, 187 P.3d 94, 95 n. 1 (App.2008) (suppression argument not developed in briefs waived on appeal); State v. Cons, 208 Ariz. 409, ¶ 18, 94 P.3d 609, 616 (App.2004) (court of appeals disregards arguments not developed in briefs). Thus, as the state rightly urged at oral argument, this court should not decide this ease on an issue that has never before been raised, argued, or briefed by the parties, either in the trial court or on appeal.16
¶ 36 Nonetheless, without the benefit of any briefing on a novel issue of statewide importance, the majority sua sponte reaches out to broadly reshape the law of Arizona through an expansive reading of article II, § 8 of the Arizona Constitution that I believe is contrary to our case law. The majority, however, relies on a 1604 case allowing the king’s sheriff to break down the doors of a home so long as he first announced his presence, see Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 195 (K.B.), and on the dissent in an eighty-year-old federal ease that does not involve an invasion of a home or even its curtilage, see Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457, 475-76, 48 S.Ct. 564 (Brandéis, J., dissenting and urging Fourth Amendment should shield against telephonic wiretapping because it reveals private details of person’s life) (emphasis added). Deriving from these cases a right of “repose” that apparently extends beyond the confines of a home out to the public walkway, my colleagues take two indisputably constitutional acts of law enforcement and find that, employed together, they create a violation of the Arizona Constitution.
Article II, § 8
¶ 37 The majority cites two Arizona cases in support of its proposition that, within article II, § 8, resides a previously unknown right of “tranquility and repose” that mandates today’s outcome. State v. Bolt, 142 Ariz. 260, 263, 689 P.2d 519, 522 (1984) and State v. Ault, 150 Ariz. 459, 724 P.2d 545 (1986), however, are the only decisions that have interpreted this part of our constitution independently of its federal counterpart and determined, in a narrow factual context, that our state protections are broader. More importantly, neither supplies the validation the majority seeks.
¶ 38 Although our supreme court has interpreted article II, § 8 independently of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it has done so narrowly and with an eye toward the federal constitution. The cases cited in the majority opinion for the proposition that Arizona’s constitution affords greater protections than the Fourth Amendment both .dealt with actual physical intrusions into a defendant’s home. In Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 263, 689 P.2d at 522, police officers “secured” a residence by entering while they awaited a telephonic warrant and searching anywhere suspected eo-conspira-tors in a drug ring might be hiding. Our supreme court first determined that federal law was not conclusive on this issue. Id. at 264, 689 P.2d 519. It then concluded that, absent exigent circumstances, such police action would nevertheless be unconstitutional under our state constitution. Id. at 264-65, 689 P.2d 519.
¶ 39 In Ault, the court again considered the state constitutional implications of a war-rantless entry into a home after police officers entered illegally and obtained evidence that our supreme court held should be sup*94pressed on state constitutional grounds. Id. at 462-63, 465-66, 724 P.2d 545. In deciding the ease independently of the United States Constitution, the court nonetheless stated it “believe[d] that the Supreme Court would require suppression of this evidence under the [FJourth [AJmendment” as well. Id. at 466, 724 P.2d 545.
¶ 40 It is true that, in some circumstances, our constitution may provide more protection than does the federal constitution, see State v. Allen, 216 Ariz. 320, ¶ 28, 166 P.3d 111, 118 (App.2007) (state constitution provides additional protection against warrantless home entry), cert. denied, -U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 70, 172 L.Ed.2d 27 (2008), and Arizona courts have the right to interpret our constitution independently, see Turley, 48 Ariz. at 70-71, 59 P.2d at 316-17. But today’s ruling radically departs from our supreme court’s independent-state-constitutional analysis. In Bolt and Ault, our supreme court decided matters on which federal authority was silent or inconclusive and attempted to harmonize Arizona and federal law. Here, the majority has identified the likely outcome under federal analysis and made the affirmative decision to reject it.
¶41 Not only does the majority depart from our traditional deference to federal search-and-seizure authority, it deviates substantially from Arizona constitutional law. “[TJhe right to privacy afforded by [ajrticle [II, § ] 8 has not resulted in more cases being resolved on independent and adequate state grounds ... because, except in the home search context, [this provision] has historically been construed as imposing limits on search and seizure consistent with the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Juarez, 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 15, 55 P.3d 784, 788 (App.2002). Although the majority relies on Bolt and Ault, the facts of those cases bear no resemblance to the facts here. In Bolt, police officers crossed the threshold into a suspect’s home without a warrant and searched every room and closet for people and evidence. 142 Ariz. at 263, 689 P.2d at 522. Ault involved a similar unwarranted entry, even over the suspect’s refusal to admit the officers and his repeated objections to their entering his home. 150 Ariz. at 462, 724 P.2d at 548. Such intrusive acts are not involved in this case.
¶ 42 Furthermore, even assuming there is a latent right of “tranquility and repose” in the Arizona Constitution, it is not readily apparent that an officer’s walking a dog past a garage, when the occupant is not even home, and the dog’s doing nothing more than sniffing in an area open to anyone, would necessarily “disrupt” these intangible interests.17 Cf. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26, 54 (2006) (“dog sniff will not result in the slightest touching of the individual,” so privacy concerns not implicated). The majority disagrees, asserting that the presence of a uniformed officer with a dog outside a person’s home is “reasonably perceive[d] ... as an unsettling and embarrassing event,” either at the time or after the fact. Indeed, unless summoned by the resident, law enforcement officers’ unexpected presence at one’s home, even if for a “benign” reason, in-itself is unsettling and potentially embarrassing, but this does not make it unconstitutional. If a uniformed, armed police officer’s standing on the doorstep is constitutionally permissible, it is difficult to see how the addition of a police dog transforms the situation into one so distressing that our constitution cannot countenance it. And the risk of a dog’s returning a false positive response resulting in a search ■warrant is not a risk unique to dog sniffs, but one society faces and accepts every day. Unfortunately, any criminal investigation can involve the risk of bad information or incorrect inferences leading to the issuance of a search warrant for an innocent person’s home.
¶ 43 As the majority repeatedly concedes, “[o]ur constitutional provisions were intended to give our citizens a sense of security in their homes ....” Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 265, 689 *95P.2d at 524 (emphasis added). The majority opinion emphasizes the general “sense of security” our constitution provides, but downplays that this extra protection only applies “in [citizens’] homes.” Quite simply, police officers did not enter Guillen’s home. And by walking the dog past the garage, the officers did not “probe” the home as they neither gathered, tried to gather, nor even had the possibility of gathering any evidence or information about the home in which Guillen would have had a protected privacy interest. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406, 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834 (dog sniff discloses only the presence or absence of contraband in which person has no privacy interest).
Privacy Interests Outside the Home
¶ 44 Our ease law illustrates that the areas outside a home are not generally considered private when they are accessible or partially accessible to the public, an assessment that does not change in the presence of law enforcement officers, even those engaged in police business. Peace officers can, without violating an individual’s privacy interests, enter a walkway or a driveway to a home. See Baker v. Clover, 177 Ariz. 37, 39, 864 P.2d 1069, 1071 (App. 1993) (no reasonable expectation of privacy on property adjacent to residence including threshold of home, driveway, or semiprivate walkway). Officers may constitutionally stand outside the door of an apartment and perceive the odors emanating from within. See State v. Kosman, 181 Ariz. 487, 490, 892 P.2d 207, 210 (App.1995) (defendant has no privacy interest in area around apartment door, where officers could smell odor of marijuana, regardless of their reason for being outside door). They may gaze into a fenced backyard from the home of a neighbor who enjoys an unobstructed view. See State v. Platt, 130 Ariz. 570, 572-73, 637 P.2d 1073, 1075-76 (App.1981) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in backyard totally visible and accessible from neighbor’s backyard that police had permission to enter). When a backyard is unfenced, police may walk onto the property and investigate a carport located in the rear. See State v. Lopez, 115 Ariz. 40, 42, 563 P.2d 295, 297 (App.1976) (no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to marijuana odor emanating from carport in rear yard). Given the latitude police officers have, like any other member of the public, to enter the curtilage of a home, walk on a semiprivate walkway to the front door, linger outside the front door, and walk into an unfenced backyard to a rear carport, all without violating any reasonable expectations of privacy, I find it illogical to nevertheless conclude such an expectation arises if an officer is accompanied by a dog.
Dog Sniffs
¶ 45 The addition of a trained narcotics-detection dog to the equation does not change anything. No Arizona ease has recognized or suggested there is any disruption, fear, or intimidation inherent in a situation when a police drug dog is present. And our courts have expressly endorsed the legitimacy of their use. See In re Twenty-Four Thousand Dollars, 217 Ariz. 199, ¶ 29, 171 P.3d 1240, 1247 (App.2007) (recognizing “scientific validity of an alert by a properly trained detection dog”).18 Furthermore, our supreme court has held that dog sniffs are not searches and that odors are akin to items in plain view. State v. Morrow, 128 Ariz. 309, 312-13, 625 P.2d 898, 901-02 (1981).
¶ 46 In Morrow, a customs officer used his trained narcotics dog to screen luggage at Tucson International Airport. At Morrow’s bag, the dog reacted, and a subsequent search revealed the bag contained marijuana. Id. at 311, 625 P.2d 898. In upholding Morrow’s conviction, our supreme court held that odor emanations are exposed to the public and not subject to Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis. Id. at 313, 625 P.2d 898. “In the case of a dog, superior olfactory senses make it easier to detect certain odors.... That does not change the fact *96that what the dog smells is in the area surrounding the bag and that is not a search of the bag itself.” Id. at 313, 625 P.2d 898 (emphasis added). A dog’s sniffing in a place where it is entitled to be is “akin to the ‘plain view’ doctrine and is in ‘plain smell.’ The sniffing of the dog [i]s not a search.” Id. Importantly, the holding in Morrow did not turn on the privacy interest in the bag itself but on the odors emanating from the bag into the air. Thus, that the Arizona Constitution may afford the interior of a garage greater protection than luggage at an airport has no bearing on Morrow’s applicability to the present case. See State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, n. 3, 170 P.3d 266, 271 n. 3 (App.2007) (“Except in cases involving ‘unlawful’ war-rantless home entries, the right of privacy afforded by [a]rtiele [II, § ] 8, has not been expanded beyond that provided by the Fourth Amendment.”). An odor and its source are not one and the same, and scent particles, once released into the air, do not retain whatever protected status their source may enjoy. See, e.g., Kosman, 181 Ariz. at 490, 892 P.2d at 210 (no privacy interest in odor of marijuana smelled outside apartment door).
¶47 The majority’s contention that Kyllo supersedes Morrow’s holding is flawed. In Kyllo the Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument that, because the heat sensors only detected energy that had permeated walls and left the home, they did not actually look into the home, but rather only detected the heat present outside the home. 533 U.S. at 35-36, 121 S.Ct. 2038. The Court rejected this distinction because the radiating heat disclosed information about areas and details inside a home, information which it found to be private and protected. Id. at 37-38, 121 S.Ct. 2038. But a dog sniff does not expose private information that would otherwise be hidden from view. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406, 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834. If a dog sniff could detect anything more than the likely presence of contraband inside a concealed area based on scents detectable outside, perhaps Kyllo would undercut Morrow’s logic. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834. But that is not the case. And, as the majority notes, later case law governs earlier decisions. Caballes was decided after Kyllo, and the Court expressly considered Kyllo’s holding and reasoning, id. at 409-10, 125 S.Ct. 834, in determining that a drug dog’s sniff of the outside of a vehicle — an event that necessarily and logically involved scent emanations leaving a protected area as in Morrow — was not a search. Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (dog sniff of luggage not a search), cited with approval in Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834. Because Morrow is consistent with Caballes, which, in turn, is consistent with Kyllo, the majority erroneously discounts Morrow’s holding and precedential authority.
¶ 48 In sum, because our supreme court has adopted a “plain smell” standard, there is no privacy interest in the odors wafting from a constitutionally protected space, see Morrow, 128 Ariz. at 313, 625 P.2d at 902; Kos-man, 181 Ariz. at 490, 892 P.2d at 210, regardless of whether such odors are apparent to the human nose or can only be detected by the superior senses of a canine, see Morrow, 128 Ariz. at 312-13, 625 P.2d at 901-02. Thus, the only way the canine sniff of Guillen’s garage can be deemed an unconstitutional “search” is if Guillen had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his garage, but existing case law establishes he did not. It seems illogical, then, to conclude that the convergence of two constitutional events — the presence of an officer and the presence of a drug dog, in a place each is entitled to be — would, together, amount to a violation of our state constitution.
Other State Cases
¶ 49 The majority’s reliance on cases from other jurisdictions to bolster its conclusion appears misplaced for several reasons.19 All *97cases cited by the majority are derived from different state law heritages than our own, and many do not deal with dog sniffs outside a home but, rather, with sniffs in general or in other contexts about which Arizona law is clear.
¶ 50 First, out-of-state cases that do not deal specifically with dog sniffs outside a residence should be disregarded. These ref-, erences are irrelevant because their holdings are contrary to established Arizona law. Boylcm, the Colorado case cited by the majority, not only does not specifically consider the issue of a dog sniff around a home, but it also relies on Colorado case law holding that a dog sniff is a search and requiring reasonable suspicion to conduct one. 854 P.2d at 808-09. Similarly, in Johnston, a Pennsylvania case involving a storage facility, the court determined a dog sniff is a search requiring reasonable suspicion. 530 A.2d at 79-80. Likewise, Alaska’s decision in Pooley also concluded that a dog sniff is a search. 705 P.2d at 1311. As noted above, Arizona does not regard a dog sniff as a search, see Morrow, 128 Ariz. at 312-13, 625 P.2d at 901-02, and thus does not require reasonable suspicion before one is performed. See also State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d 623, 627-28 (App.2003) (no reasonable suspicion required to conduct dog sniff of car during traffic stop). The New Hampshire and Minnesota cases likewise did not consider a dog sniff on the curtilage of a home but, rather, the sniff of a ear in the course of a traffic stop. See Pellicci, 580 A.2d at 712, 716; Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 135. Again, Arizona case law does not require reasonable suspicion for this, see Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, n. 7, 170 P.3d at 276 n. 7; Box, 205 Ariz. 492, ¶ 15, 73 P.3d at 627-28; State v. Weinstein, 190 Ariz. 306, 310, 947 P.2d 880, 884 (App. 1997); State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 613, 810 P.2d 607, 611 (App.1991); State v. Martinez, 26 Ariz.App. 210, 212, 547 P.2d 62, 64, aff'd, 113 Ariz. 345, 554 P.2d 1272 (1976), and, unless the United States Supreme Court were to require reasonable suspicion in such a case, our state constitution would not require it. See State v. Reyna, 205 Ariz. 374, ¶ 14, 71 P.3d 366, 369 (App.2003) (“Our supreme court long ago held that [ajrticle [II, § ] 8 of the Arizona Constitution ‘is of the same general effect and purpose as the Fourth Amendment’ and that the decisions concerning the scope of allowable vehicle searches under the federal constitution are ‘well on point ----’”), quoting Malmin v. State, 30 Ariz. at 261, 246 P. at 549.
¶ 51 The cited cases involving dog sniffs near the perimeter of a residence are more on point factually, but are nevertheless unavailing because they were derived from state law wholly different from our own. For example, in citing Dearman, the majority notes it was decided under a constitutional provision identical to our article II, § 8. On these points, Washington’s and Arizona’s constitutions, however, are like identical twins separated at birth, and our constitutional law has not developed in a similar way. See Juarez, 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d at 789-90 (describing different evolutions of article II, § 8 and Washington’s analogous provision). Dearman relied heavily on existing Washington case law that reached an opposite conclusion from our supreme court’s conclusion in Morrow, rejecting a “plain sniff’ argument.20 *98962 P.2d at 853-54. Similarly, in concluding police officers needed reasonable suspicion to conduct a dog sniff in an apartment hallway, Nebraska found a legitimate expectation of privacy in the corridor, Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d at 817, a finding at odds with our decision in Kosman. 181 Ariz. at 490, 892 P.2d at 210. Likewise, in holding its constitution required reasonable suspicion to conduct a dog sniff outside an apartment, New York concluded both that the dog sniff was a search and that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy outside the apartment, both of which holdings conflict with Arizona law. See Dunn, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
Legitimacy of Privacy Interest
¶ 52 Even assuming a dog sniff could be characterized as a cognizable event under Arizona’s constitution, Guillen could not obtain relief unless the officers had invaded a legitimate privacy interest. As noted above, although our constitution can offer broader protection than the federal constitution in some circumstances, “Arizona courts have consistently applied the Fourth Amendment’s ‘legitimate expectation of privacy requirement when determining unlawful search or seizure claims made pursuant to [a]rticle III, § ] 8.” Juarez, 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 788. For an expectation of privacy to be constitutionally protected, “a person must show both an ‘actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ and that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘justifiable’ under the circumstances.” Allen, 216 Ariz. 320, ¶ 13, 166 P.3d at 114, quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); see also Juarez, 203 Ariz. 441, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 785 (defendant has burden of showing privacy interest). Guillen cannot make either part of the necessary showing.
¶ 53 The record does not reflect that Guil-len manifested any subjective expectation of privacy in the area outside his garage. The front entrance to the home was accessible by the driveway. It faced the street and there were no fences or walls to inhibit direct and open approach. The driveway on which Officer Moreno walked led “directly to the garage,” and a sidewalk continued to the front door. Guillen had erected no barriers or signs prohibiting entry to the property. He did not testify at the suppression hearing or otherwise offer any evidence that he regarded the area surrounding his garage as private rather than public or semipublic space.
¶ 54 Not only did Guillen not demonstrate a subjective interest in privacy, he has failed to articulate a privacy interest society is prepared to recognize. “A ‘legitimate’ expectation of privacy is not synonymous with a subjective expectation of not being discovered” but is instead determined through reference to property law and social understandings of property. State v. Johnson, 132 Ariz. 5, 7, 643 P.2d 708, 710 (App.1981). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence consistently holds that society is unwilling to recognize as reasonable a privacy interest in the areas surrounding a home. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) (no expectation of privacy in doorway exposed to “public view, speech, hearing, and touch”); State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 486-87, 675 P.2d 1301, 1305-06 (1983) (no expectation of privacy in generally public area between back door of mobile home and place where vehicle parked); State v. Caldwell, 20 Ariz.App. 331, 335, 512 P.2d 863, 867 (1973) (no expectation of privacy in boxes found “in an area where someone from the general public was apt to wander”); cf. State v. Krantz, 174 Ariz. 211, 215-16, 848 P.2d 296, 300-01 (App.1992) (broader protection of article II, § 8 will not render unreasonable search or seizure found reasonable under well-developed case law). Therefore, even if Arizona precedent were abandoned and a dog sniff effectively treated as a search for purposes of our constitution, the majority’s theory is still contrary to Arizona case law.
Conclusion
¶ 55 Since the time Arizona was a new state, it has been a fundamental principle of *99our jurisprudence that when the jurisdiction of the court “is invoked ... it is [the court’s] duty to interpret and construe the law as [it] find[s] it.” McCall v. State, 18 Ariz. 408, 417, 161 P. 893, 895 (1916). In our case law, it is well established that the outside of a home enjoys no additional privacy protections under the state constitution than it does under the Fourth Amendment. It is also well established that mere dog sniffs are not searches in Arizona. And equally well established is that privacy interests in the curtilage or publicly accessible area outside a doorway or garage are not ones society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. I cannot, then, in keeping with our duty to apply the law as we find it, join in the conclusion the majority announces. To the extent the majority opinion is contrary to pronouncements by our supreme court, we have no power to disagree. And, to the extent the majority disregards the substantial precedent of Arizona in reaching its result, its decision ought not stand. See Town of Gilbert Prosecutor’s Office v. Downie ex. rel. County of Maricopa, 218 Ariz. 466, ¶ 45, 189 P.3d 393, 402 (2008) (McGregor, J., dissenting) (“When we ignore precedent without a compelling reason for doing so, we undermine public trust in the integrity of the law.”).
¶ 56 In sum, because this issue was neither properly raised nor argued below or on appeal, because I find no Arizona precedent for reading our constitution as the majority does today, and because I believe our existing case law commands an opposite result, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the tidal court’s denial of Guillen’s motion to suppress the marijuana and other evidence found in his garage.

. I also disagree with the majority’s views that a dog sniff "reach[es] into a home” and that the federal constitutional question is "vexingly close.” But I concur with their ultimate conclusion that a canine sniff at the so-called "seams" of a home does not rise to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment and cannot mandate suppression here. Because this case now turns on questions of state constitutional law, I will refrain from rehashing the federal discussion or highlighting how my analysis would differ. I am also unconvinced the trial court erred in concluding Mrs. Guillen's consent obviated the need to discuss the constitutionality of the dog sniff. But, because my primary dispute with the majority opinion is in its state constitutional analysis, I limit my comments to this issue.

. The only substantive reference Guillen made to the Arizona Constitution below is a solitary sentence in his motion to suppress, which asserted: "Officer Moreno's venture onto the Defendant's property constituted a violation of Defendant's rights as protected by the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section Eight of the Arizona Constitution." Not only did Guillen fail to argue that the Arizona Constitution would prohibit the dog sniff of his garage, he made no mention of it at the hearing before the trial court.

. Guillen’s references to the Arizona Constitution on appeal are just as scant as in the trial court. In his opening brief, Guillen simply repeats his assertion that, "Officer Moreno's venture onto Mr. Guillen's property was a violation of his rights pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, 4th Amendment and the Arizona Constitution Section 8.” He does not develop this argument or even identify the portion of the Arizona Constitution on which the majority decision hinges. He provides us with the standard of review only for a Fourth Amendment violation and identifies tire trial court's error as stemming from failure to find such a violation. As noted above, arguments not made on appeal are waived. See Hamblin, 217 Ariz. 481, n. 2, 176 P.3d at 51 n. 2. I find unpersuasive the majority’s protracted rationale characterizing Guillen’s Fourth Amendment argument as “equally germane” to a state constitutional claim that was never articulated below or on appeal. See Dean; Hardesty.

. The majority asserts that, because this court ordered oral argument and provided a draft decision, the state had an opportunity to “develop and present” its argument. But I cannot agree that a draft decision received a few days prior to ot a\ argument, disposing of the case on an unprecedented theory never previously raised, is comparable to a full opportunity to brief the issue. And, the rule permitting the filing of supplemental authorities, which the state provided, does not permit a party to make legal arguments or expand the scope of its briefs. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 31.22.

. To the extent the majority invokes an Orwellian specter of "indiscriminate canine sweeps,” we need not consider this parade of horribles that is not before the court today nor a likely law enforcement technique. The fact is, under the law as it currently exists, at least until today's majority opinion, such sweeps would be neither unconstitutional nor prohibited by any law. But roving police dogs randomly sniffing Arizona homes and neighborhoods have yet to materialize.

. Somewhat inconsistently, the majority repeatedly analogizes dog sniffs to the sophisticated electronic heat sensors in Kyllo but also invokes Justice Souter’s Caballes dissent, describing dog sniffs as unreliable. 543 U.S. at 411-12, 125 S.Ct. 834 (Souter, J., dissenting). As noted above, our case law supports the view that dog sniffs are scientifically valid and any suggestion that they are otherwise is not based on any study or evidence in the record before us.

. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the conclusion they reach today does not appear to be the majority viewpoint among other states. The majority has identified three cases that support its conclusion on this particular issue. But there are at least three other states that have found, under their constitutions, a dog’s sniffing the area around a home is not a search. Stabler v. State, 990 So.2d 1258, 1260, 1261 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2008) (dog sniff at front door not search); *97People v. Jones, 279 Mich.App. 86, 755 N.W.2d 224, 227-29 (2008) (same); Rodriguez v. State, 106 S.W.3d 224, 230 (Tex.App.2003) (sniff outside residence not search). Moreover, a large number of states have not and may never reach this question because they have concluded that dog sniffs in general are simply not searches under their own constitutions. See People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal.3d 335, 337, 182 Cal.Rptr. 617, 644 P.2d 810 (1982) (dog sniff not search); O’Keefe v. State, 189 Ga.App. 519, 376 S.E.2d 406, 412 (1988) (because no privacy interest in odors escaping car, dog sniff not search); People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26, 46 (2006) (dog sniff not search); Padilla v. State, 180 Md.App. 210, 949 A.2d 68, 82 (2008) (dog sniff of motor vehicle does not require reasonable suspicion); State v. Cancel, 256 N.J.Super. 430, 607 A.2d 199, 202-03 (App.Div. 1992) (sniff of luggage not search because not “rummag[ing]” through personal belongings); State v. Villanueva, 110 N.M. 359, 796 P.2d 252, 256 (Ct.App.1990) (sniff of luggage not search because no right of privacy in airspace around object); State v. Waldroup, 100 Ohio App.3d 508, 654 N.E.2d 390, 394 (1995) (dog sniff of vehicle not search); State v. Smith, 327 Or. 366, 963 P.2d 642, 644, 647 (1998) (dog sniff of storage facility not search).

. We have no authority to overrule decisions of our supreme court and are bound by them. See City of Phoenix v. Leroy's Liquors, Inc., 177 Ariz. *98375, 378, 868 P.2d 958, 961 (App.1993) (court of appeals bound by decisions of our supreme court).