Court Opinion

ID: 9389015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 07:08:52.235471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.571764
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-22-00487-CV
      ___________________________

    IN THE INTEREST OF C.F., A CHILD

   On Appeal from the 322nd District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 322-712742-22

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant C.F. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her

son, C.F. (Son). But Mother’s appointed appellate counsel (Counsel) has filed an

Anders brief indicating that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. After

reviewing the Anders brief and conducting an independent review of the record, we

agree with Counsel. We will affirm.

                                      I. Discussion

       Between November 2021 and February 2022, the Department of Family and

Protective Services received reports that Mother was using methamphetamines, that

she was exposing Son to domestic violence, and that she was suffering from

significant mental health issues. 1

       During one mental health incident, Mother broke into a neighbor’s vehicle and

was found hiding in the back seat with Son. She was admitted to a mental health

hospital on an emergency detention and was suspected to be using illegal substances.

About a month later, Mother suffered another mental health incident, and when she

was taken back to the mental health hospital, she tested positive for

methamphetamines and marijuana.

       1
        The Department offered limited testimony regarding Mother’s pre-removal
actions, but a copy of the affidavit supporting Son’s removal was admitted into
evidence without objection. Cf. In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 582–83 (Tex. 2014)
(considering removal affidavit as evidence when affidavit was admitted without
objection). That affidavit is the source of many of the facts recited herein.

                                           2
        In February 2022, Mother left Son in the custody of a family friend, G.G.

(Conservator Mother), and told Conservator Mother that she needed her to keep Son.

But Mother did not sign any legal documentation to give Conservator Mother the

ability to obtain services for Son, and Mother retained the right to retrieve Son at any

time.

        The trial court ordered Son’s emergency removal later that month. At the time,

Son was living with Conservator Mother, and Mother’s location was unknown.

        A short time later, Mother was finally located—in jail. The trial court held an

adversary hearing on Son’s removal, and it entered a temporary removal order setting

forth the conditions for Son’s return.2 One such condition was Mother’s compliance

with the Department’s service plan. The Department required Mother to complete,

among other things, a drug assessment, psychiatric and psychological evaluations,

parenting classes, FOCUS for Mothers classes, individual counseling, and domestic-

        The removal order required Mother to “provide the Department with any
        2

information regarding whether the child or the child’s family has Native American
heritage and [to] identify any Native American Tribe with which the child may be
associated.” Mother told her caseworker that she “believe[d] that she had Indian
heritage,” but she did not identify a specific tribe or clarify where her alleged lineage
traced from. The Department sent notification of Son’s pending termination case to
the Anadarko Regional Director for the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.11(b)(4) (2023). The Bureau confirmed receipt but noted that the Department
had not provided any documentation to show that Son met the definition of an
“Indian child.” See 25 C.F.R. § 23.2 (2023) (defining “Indian child”).

                                           3
violence-related services.   In the meantime, Son remained in the possession of

Conservator Mother and H.R.B. (Conservator Father). 3

      When Mother was released from jail in June 2022, the Department connected

Mother with the relevant service providers and asked her to submit to monthly drug

tests. Mother did not complete any of the services or submit to any of the drug tests

required of her. Although Mother attended some of the scheduled visitations with

Son, Mother’s caseworker testified that she “had a history of no[-]showing multiple

times.”   And at one point, Mother went to Conservator Mother’s home and

attempted to remove Son from her care.

      The trial court heard Mother’s termination case in December 2022, 4 and it

found that termination was in Son’s best interest and that Mother had (1) “knowingly

placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which

endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child;” (2) “engaged in conduct

or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers

the physical or emotional well-being of the child;” and (3) “failed to comply with the

provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the

parent to obtain the return of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

      3
       Conservator Mother and Conservator Father had adopted another of Mother’s
children.
      4
       The termination trial took place in one day, and the trial court entered an order
of termination that same day. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.4011(a) (requiring court
to render final order “not later than the 90th day after the date the trial commences”).

                                           4
(b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(O), (b)(2).   Conservator Mother and Conservator Father were

appointed as Son’s permanent managing conservators. See id. § 153.371.

                                    II. Discussion

      Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief indicating that

Mother’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396,

1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth,

order) (holding Anders procedures apply to parental termination appeals), disp. on

merits, 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1,

2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). Counsel states that she “cannot identify any

legally non-frivolous grounds for appeal” and has “conclude[d that] the appeal is

without merit.” Counsel informed Mother of her right to file a pro se response to the

Anders brief, 5 see Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400, but Mother has not

exercised that right.6 The Department, too, has declined to file a brief.

      Nonetheless, we must independently examine the record to determine if any

arguable, nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist. See In re C.J., 501 S.W.3d 254, 255

      5
       Counsel also informed Mother of her right to request the appellate record,
provided Mother with a motion for pro se access to the appellate record, and
informed her of this court’s mailing address. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
      6
        After the deadline had passed for Mother’s pro se response, Mother moved
for access to the appellate record and for an extension of time to file her response.
We granted the motion, mailed Mother copies of the appellate record and Anders
brief, and extended the deadline for her to file a response. The extended deadline has
since passed, but we have not received a response.

                                            5
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Having done so, we conclude that—

although the evidence presented by the Department is far from overwhelming—no

nonfrivolous grounds for appeal exist. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400;

see also In re M.G., No. 02-21-00149-CV, 2021 WL 4319708, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Sept. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (conducting similar Anders analysis and

reaching similar conclusion); In re W.J., No. 02-20-00275-CV, 2021 WL 62132, at *1–2

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (similar).

                                  III. Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship

between Mother and Son.7

                                                    /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                    Bonnie Sudderth
                                                    Chief Justice

Delivered: April 20, 2023

      7
       Although Counsel filed a motion to withdraw based on her conclusion that
Mother’s appeal is frivolous, Counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the
Texas Supreme Court unless she is relieved of her duties for good cause. In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order).

                                          6