Court Opinion

ID: 9906679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 21:27:57.350693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:21.308765
License: Public Domain

12/04/2023

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT NASHVILLE
                    Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2023

                              IN RE RAYLON S. ET AL.

               Appeal from the Chancery Court for Van Buren County
                   No. 1481     Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Chancellor

                             No. M2023-00573-COA-R3-PT

A mother and stepfather sued to terminate a father’s parental rights based on the grounds
of abandonment by failure to visit and abandonment by failure to support as well as the
best interest of the children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that
both grounds for termination existed and that it was in the best interest of the children to
terminate the father’s parental rights. The father appealed. We affirm.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Jeffrey Vires, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dakota S.

Robert Wesley Newman, McMinnville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Cierston M. and
Terry M., Jr.

                                        OPINION

       Dakota S. (“Father”) was married to Cierston M. (“Mother”), and three children
were born to them during the marriage: Raylon S., Rynn S., and Remy S. (“the children”).
They divorced in 2019, and Mother has since remarried to Terry M. (“Stepfather”). On
March 23, 2022, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of
Father and for the adoption of the children by Stepfather. The trial court found that Father
had abandoned the children by failing to visit and failing to support them and that
termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. Father
appealed. Specific facts relating to each ground and best interest will be addressed below.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A parent’s right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child is fundamental.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn.
2010) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921
S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn.
1994)). This right, however, is not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. The
Tennessee legislature has established “‘those situations in which the state’s interest in the
welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting forth
grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.’” In re Jacobe M.J., 434
S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B., IV., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-
R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29,
2005)).

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 establishes the method and grounds
for terminating parental rights. Initially, a petitioner seeking to terminate the parental rights
of another must prove that at least one ground for termination exists. Tenn. Code Ann. §
36-1-113(c)(1); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 251. Then, the petitioner must prove that
terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2);
In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “In light of the interests and
consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair
procedures[] in termination proceedings.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tenn.
2016) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)).

       As our Supreme Court has stated:

               Among the constitutionally mandated fundamentally fair procedures[]
       is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence. Santosky,
       455 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. This standard minimizes the risk of
       unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental
       parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010).
       Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief
       or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or
       substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re
       Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-and-
       convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly
       probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182
       S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660
       (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Id. Thus, on appeal, we apply the following principles:

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              An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in
       termination proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P.
       13(d). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at
       246. Under Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on
       the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the
       evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In
       re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215
       S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in
       termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own
       determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as
       supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and
       convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.
       In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s ruling that the
       evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion
       of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of
       correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of
       A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in
       parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with
       no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

Id. at 523-24.

                                          ANALYSIS

I. Termination Grounds

        The petition for termination and adoption alleged the ground of abandonment found
in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), which references the definition set forth in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-102. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A) provides
several definitions for abandonment. For purposes of this action, the petition alleged facts
related to the definition of abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, as set
forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i):

       For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing
       of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the
       parental rights of the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians of the
       child who is the subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or
       adoption, that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians either have
       failed to visit or have failed to support or have failed to make reasonable
       payments toward the support of the child[.][1]

   1
     Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) has since been amended by 2023 PUB. ACTS,
ch. 373, §1, eff. July 1, 2023.
                                              -3-
                                   Failure to Visit

        A parent abandons his or her child when he or she, “for a period of four (4)
consecutive months, [fails] to visit or engage in more than token visitation.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(E). “Token visitation” means visitation that, “under the circumstances
of the individual case, constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation or visitation of
such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or
insubstantial contact with the child[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(C). In this case,
the relevant four-month period for determining whether Father abandoned the children by
failing to visit them is December 23, 2021, through March 22, 2022.

       Father visited the children on Christmas Eve in 2019. He was drunk and took actions
that scared and endangered the children, such as throwing a chair through a glass door. He
also pushed the children’s grandmother to the ground, breaking several of her ribs. Father
pled guilty to aggravated burglary, domestic assault, reckless endangerment, and DUI
second offense. Consequently, he spent time in jail for his actions. Upon his release in
June 2020, Father was the subject of a no contact order as part of his criminal judgment,
preventing him from having contact with the children until he completed the
recommendations of the children’s counselors. Father testified that he attempted to
complete the counselors’ recommendations—such as completing a mental health
evaluation, an alcohol and drug assessment, alcohol education classes, a victim impact
panel, and attending therapy—so he could see his children. Nevertheless, Father failed to
complete all of the recommendations and has had no contact with the children since
December 24, 2019, except for at a funeral and sending Valentine cards in 2023.

        Father blames the no contact order and the COVID pandemic for impeding his
progress toward completing the counselors’ recommendations. Thus, Father claims that his
failure to visit during the four months immediately preceding the filing of the termination
petition was not willful. Since July 1, 2018, lack of willfulness has been an affirmative
defense, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.03, which the parent facing
termination has the burden to prove. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(I); 2018 TENN. PUB.
ACTS, ch. 875, § 2. We note that Father failed to plead willfulness as an affirmative defense
in his answer to the petition. During trial, however, he stated without objection that the
COVID pandemic “made everything a lot harder” and maintained that not having a driver’s
license for two years made getting to appointments difficult.

        “When a parent’s contact with a child is limited by court order, the parent may
abandon the child through failure to visit if ‘the parent has the ability to demonstrate a
change in situation or behavior that would warrant reinstating visitation but fails to do
so[.]’” In re C.N., No. M2020-01021-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 94403, at *9 (Jan. 10, 2022)
(quoting In re Kiara C., No. E2013-02066-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2993845, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 30, 2014)). The no contact order stated: “The defendant shall have no contact
with the children until Defendant has completed recommendations set out by the children’s

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counselors at the Personal Health & Growth Center.” Shelia Masters, a counselor at the
Personal Growth Counseling Center2 who treated Raylon, testified that her
recommendation for Father was individual therapy to address anger and impulsiveness
issues. Even though Father was released from jail in June 2020 and was told what he needed
to do in August 2020, Ms. Masters did not see him again until April 28, 2022, and did not
begin seeing him regularly until December 1, 2022. While Ms. Masters conceded that she
told Father in August 2020 that getting in with a counselor could take months, he did not
seek an appointment at that time and did not see her until April 28, 2022. Ms. Masters’s
appointment availability during the COVID pandemic did not change. During that period,
the amount of time since he had visited his children was lengthening. Father could have
shortened that time away from his children by entering therapy much sooner, but he did
not. He argues that the no contact order and the COVID pandemic prevented him from
initiating his therapy sooner, but the matter was within his control. He just put it off.

      We agree with the trial court that the failure to visit ground was proven by clear and
convincing evidence.

                                   Failure to Support

       Abandonment by failure to support occurs when a parent, “for a period of four (4)
consecutive months, [fails] to provide monetary support or . . . [fails] to provide more than
token payments toward the support of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(D).
“Token support” is support that, “under the circumstances of the individual case, is
insignificant given the parent’s means[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(B). Like the
ground above, the relevant four-month time period for determining whether Father
abandoned the children by failing to support them is December 23, 2021, through March
22, 2022.

       Father has been under a duty to pay child support since Father and Mother divorced
on April 22, 2019. Father testified that he had been employed since leaving jail. Despite
having employment, Father made two payments in March 2021 and no more payments
until after the termination petition was filed on March, 23, 2022. Thus, Father made no
support payments during the relevant four-month period.

        Father’s brief admits that no payments were made during the four months preceding
the filing of the petition and makes no argument in defense of his lack of payment.

       We agree with the trial court that the failure to support ground was proven
by clear and convincing evidence.

   2
     The transcript references the Personal Growth Counseling Center, the Personal Growth Health and
Growth Center, the Personal Health and Growth Center, and Personal Growth Counseling. From the
context, we are confident the references are all to the same facility.
                                               -5-
II. Best Interest

      Father maintains that the termination of his parental rights was not shown by clear
and convincing evidence to be in the best interest of the children. We disagree.

        When examining the best interest of the children in the termination of parental rights
context, we are directed by statute to consider the nonexclusive factors listed in Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1). The statute enumerates factors that the court “shall consider,” In re
Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 251, but a court is not required to find that each of the enumerated
factors exists before concluding that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a
parent’s rights. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The statute
similarly does not call for a mechanical determination of each of the statute’s factors, but
rather the relevancy and weight of each factor will be unique to each case. In re Marr, 194
S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, in certain circumstances, the
consideration of one factor may be determinative. Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
at 878). However, this does not relieve a court of its duty to consider each factor and, even
in cases where one factor is outcome determinative, the court must consider all factors and
relevant proof that a party offers. In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 682 (Tenn. 2017).
In the best interest analysis, the facts considered must be proven by “‘a preponderance of
the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. at 681 (quoting In re Kaliyah S.,
455 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2015)). “‘After making the underlying factual findings, the
trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether
they amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best
interest[s].’” Id. (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555).

         The trial testimony is rife with facts, events, and professional opinions reflecting on
the best interest of these children. None reflect well on Father. The children are afraid of
him, and seeing him or hearing from him causes them to have problems. When Father sent
them Valentine’s Day cards in 2023, the children regressed. Rynn began bedwetting and
having nightmares. He checked the doors every night to make sure they were locked. Rynn
is terrified of motorcycles because he thinks it might be his Father. Father almost hit Rynn
while riding his motorcycle after drinking. Raylon pushed Rynn out of harm’s way. The
Christmas presents Father sent in 2022 distressed Raylon, and the Valentine’s Day cards
distressed her further. She did not sleep well. She also checked the doors and feared Father
would appear at her ballgames. Raylon associates her Father’s drinking with aggression
and fear. When told this by Raylon’s counselor, Father said that he was a grown man and
he could drink if he wanted to. After receiving her Valentine’s Day card, Remy became
afraid that Father would come to the school and take her. These facts and incidents
demonstrate that the children do not have a secure and healthy attachment to their father
and that there is no reasonable expectation of one; the children are fearful of Father and the
mere thought of Father or any sort of contact with Father, even by mail, exacerbates the
children’s experience of trauma. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i)(1)(D), (F). As we
have already discussed, there has been no visitation or child support from Father. See Tenn.

                                             -6-
Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i)(1)(E), (S). Father is resistant to taking responsibility for his
actions and was extremely slow in beginning therapy. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113
(i)(1)(J),(K),(M), (Q). The counselors for both Raylon and Rynn indicated that contact with
Father would be detrimental. Fortunately, the children have developed a strong parental
relationship with Stepfather. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (i)(1)(H).

        The facts of this case show that, even four years after the parents’ divorce, the
children remain emotionally fragile and afraid of Father due to his actions. There is
virtually no prospect of these children healing and living normal lives in proximity to
Father. No statutory termination factors favor Father, and a multitude of them individually
and collectively indicate that Father’s parental rights should be terminated. We agree with
the trial court that clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that it is in the best
interest of the children to terminate Father’s parental rights.

                                       CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against
the appellant, Dakota S., for which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                    _/s/ Andy D. Bennett______________
                                                   ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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