Court Opinion

ID: 9467239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:42:30.844411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:14.613913
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the reversal of Eades’ conviction for the reasons expressed in the panel majority opinion. United States v. Eades, 615 F.2d 617 (4 Cir. 1980). I would write no more except that I am constrained to call attention to the fact that, in my view, the dissenting panel opinion on which the in banc court relies contains an internal inconsistency.1 That inconsistency is one which was adopted by the government and, notwithstanding its protestations to the contrary, appears to be adopted by the majority of the in banc court.2 As a consequence, I believe that the district courts and the United States Attorneys of this circuit will be hard pressed to fathom what prosecutions are authorized under the Assimila-tive Crimes Act for acts in violation of Maryland’s Third Degree Sexual Offense statute.
In the panel opinion, the panel unanimously reversed the conviction of Wilson, and a majority of the panel reversed the conviction of Eades, with Chief Judge Haynsworth in dissent. With regard to Wilson who was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) and of a third degree sexual offense under the Maryland statute, it was Judge Haynsworth’s view that, because the former offense is “a greater offense than” the latter, Congress preempted the state crime and rendered it inapplicable. 615 F.2d at 624. With regard to Eades, however, it was Judge Haynsworth’s view, now adopted by the majority of the in banc court, that Congress did not preempt his conviction under the Maryland statute because he was convicted only of simple assault under 18 U.S.C. 113(e). Id. at 625.
A state statute may not be incorporated through the Assimilative Crimes Act if Congress has preempted the punishment of conduct under that statute by enacting a federal criminal statute that proscribes the same conduct. United States v. Williams, 327 U.S. 711, 66 S.Ct. 778, 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946). The reach Congress intended the federal criminal statute to have is thus determinative of whether a similar state statute may be assimilated. It is illogical and inconsistent to affirm Eades’ conviction if that of Wilson is reversed. Conversely, if it is correct to reverse Wilson’s conviction because § 113(a)-the section proscribing assault with intent to rape-preempted the Maryland sexual offense statute, Eades’ conviction must be reversed also. Once preemption as to Wilson is found, there is preemption as to Eades. If the state statute is preempted, it is preempted as to all defendants charged under that state statute regardless of which, if any, section of the *1079federal assault statute they may be charged with violating. The distinction between Eades and Wilson-that one was convicted of simple assault and the other of assault with intent to rape-is simply irrelevant to the determination of whether the Maryland sexual offense statute was preempted by federal criminal law.
When the majority asserts that federal preemption of a state statute in one context when the defendant’s conduct is clearly proscribed by a federal statute does not necessarily preempt the state statute in other contexts, it cites no authority to support it. It seems to me that the majority is speaking of merger and confusing merger with preemption.3 In my view the very concept of preemption is that, if a state statute is preempted by any federal statute, it is totally preempted and is not available for any other federal prosecution.

. Because it was a dissenting opinion, there was no need to call attention in the majority panel opinion, to the inconsistency.

. Accepting the correctness of the panel’s decision with respect to Wilson, the government sought rehearing only as to Eades. Although the court granted rehearing in banc as to Eades, it did not on its own motion grant rehearing as to Wilson. I interpret this inaction as implying approval of the decision as to Wilson notwithstanding what is said in the per curiam opinion of the in banc court.

. The rationale of the panel dissenting opinion that Wilson was convicted under federal law of “a greater offense than a third degree sexual offense under the Maryland statute” and therefore there was preemption suggests the notion of merger. The correct test is not whether the federal offense is greater than the state offense; the test is whether the precise acts have been made penal by an Act of Congress, irrespective if the “offense as enacted by Congress results in a narrower scope for the offense than that given to it by the State ...” Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 717, 66 S.Ct. 778, 781, 90 L.Ed. 962 (1946).