Court Opinion

ID: 9727785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:22.865051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.852654
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
Plaintiff, Jack Lorenz, appeals as of right the March 12, 1986, order of the Muskegon Circuit Court, denying his motion to amend the judgment of divorce. We remand for further findings by the trial court consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff and defendant, Paulette Lorenz, have *60two children: Melissia, born May 12, 1978, and Branden, born August 15, 1980. The March 31, 1983, judgment of divorce awarded defendant the physical custody of the two children and ordered plaintiff to pay support of $12.50 per week per child. Subsequently, on March 6, 1985, an amendment to the judgment of divorce was entered increasing the support payments to $62.50 per week per child.
In his motion to amend the judgment of divorce, filed on January 31, 1986, plaintiff states that he was informed by defendant that she intended to claim the two minor children as dependents for federal income tax purposes. Consequently, plaintiff brought his motion, asking the trial court to order defendant to sign and send whatever papers were necessary to the Internal Revenue Service so that plaintiff could claim the children as dependents for income tax purposes. Plaintiff subsequently amended his motion to seek the alternative relief of a reduction in support payments in the event that he could no longer claim the children as dependents.
In response to plaintiffs request for the court to order defendant to file the necessary papers with the irs so that plaintiff could take the dependency exemptions for the minor children, the trial court stated:
My position has always been that I don’t care for the irs; and until I see a state appellate court telling me I have to decide this issue, I do not decide this issue in any case — never have, never will. My position is that the Internal Revenue Service can’t tell me what to do, except on my taxes, and I am not about to tell what somebody else is going to do with reference to a federal issue. I do not rule on this issue, and as far as I’m concerned, I am not even sure I have discretion to *61tell somebody what to do on a tax question — but assuming that this is a case to go to the appellate court, I will recognize I have discretion, and, in the use of my discretion, I still choose not to order someone to release another person from this claim, or to order the irs that one or two people — one or the other person — can have these children for dependents.
This Court has previously held that a state court has the power to determine which parent is entitled to a dependency exemption. Westerhof v Westerhof, 137 Mich App 97, 108; 357 NW2d 820 (1984). However, at that time what was being interpreted was the 1967 amendment to the support test for children of divorced parents, 26 USC 152(e). Subsequent to Westerhof, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended 26 USC 152(e) and provided that a custodial parent gets the exemption unless it is expressly waived in writing for the particular tax year in question. Stickradt v Stickradt, 156 Mich App 141, 143; 401 NW2d 256 (1986). This amendment divested state courts of jurisdiction over which party could take the exemptions. Id. at 144.1 Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the first basis for defendant’s motion to amend the judgment of divorce.
However, plaintiff also presented an alternative theory to justify amending the divorce judgment. Plaintiff argued that support payments should be reduced in light of the fact that two federal income tax exemptions would no longer be available to plaintiff. When asked if the trial court would entertain his motion to reduce his support payments in light of the fact that his taxes would *62increase with the loss of the exemptions, thereby reducing his net income, the trial court responded:
No. As far as I’m concerned, he can talk with you, Mr. Carrozza, and see what his options are. I don’t want to make representations on what proper tax authority would be; but unless the law is changed, it seems to me you can do anything you want to do in good faith, as long as you can be prepared — it seems to me this issue is for the tax court, rather than a state divorce court.
The statement is plain wrong. It appears to be a device to avoid the issue.
A trial court has the power to modify child support orders if the petitioning party is able to show changed circumstances sufficient to justify the modification. . . . The modification is in the trial court’s discretion and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Wells v Wells, 144 Mich App 722, 733-734; 375 NW2d 800 (1985).]
In plaintiff’s amended motion, plaintiff requested a modification of his child support payments because of his reduced net income due to the fact that he could no longer claim the federal tax exemptions for his two minor children. On this claim, it is unclear from the transcript of the hearing and the order of the court that the trial court recognized the discretion it had to modify the support order due to plaintiffs changed financial status. For this reason, we remand this case to the trial court for a determination by the trial court of the impact of the new irs custodial parent rule, 26 USC 152(e), on the ability of plaintiff to pay the current rate of child support and whether or not the impact of this change in the federal tax law should be reflected by a consequent modifica*63tion of the amount of child support required to be paid by plaintiff.2
Reversed and remanded.
J. R. Kirwan, J., concurred.

 We are unpersuaded by the reasoning of other jurisdictions that state court allocation of tax dependency exemptions is still permissible. See Fundenberg v Molstad, 390 NW2d 19 (Minn App, 1986) and McCarthy, Who Gets Dependency Exemptions in a Divorce? 66 MSB J 1028, 1028-1029 (October, 1987).

 The reasonableness and mathematics of the support order have not been raised on appeal.