Court Opinion

ID: 9683360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:27:14.802521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.341984
License: Public Domain

Lee, J.,
dissenting.
This cause recurs here on a motion to remand.
In the original decision of the case, three liens were involved: (1) A deed of trust, dated May 7, 1952, to W. A. Hall and another for $15,000 to pay for labor and materials; (2) liens of Frank M. Rinehart in the sum of $4,144.02 under a written contract, dated May 3, 1952, for labor and materials for the construction of a building, and L. A. Chambless and F. R. Long under a written contract, dated June 4, 1952, in the sum of $825.86 for mechanical work in installing a heating system in the building; and (3) a lien of the United States in the sum of $46,729.23 for unpaid income taxes and penalties, filed in the office of the chancery clerk on December 8, 1952.
The construction work of Rinehart, Chambless and Long was completed on November 3, 1952, at which time the above balances on their contracts became due and payable. Thereafter, on March 26, 1953, they filed their suit to recover and to have the property sold under their liens.
The chancery court, after a hearing, entered a decree which ordered the sale of the property and the payment of the liens in the order in which they are listed above. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decree of the trial court. 79 So. 2d 474. The opinion dealt fully with the provisions of Section 356, Code of 1942, which created a lien on the building and curtilage thereof to secure the payment of labor done and materials furnished in its construction, and to Section 360, Code of 1942, which provided the method of enforcement. This lien is not new in this State. After admission into the Union on December 10, 1817, the State Legislature thereafter on February 5, 1819, passed the first law on this subject; and by February 22, 1940, the statutes had been so co*47ordinated that they were substantially the same as the present laws. These statutes have been in effect through the intervening years. See Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, Chapter 45, Hutchinson’s Code 1798 to 1848; Articles 1-14, Chapter 39, Code of 1857; Articles 1 and 11, Sections 1603 et seq., Code of 1871; Chapter 53, Sections 1378 et seq., Code of 1880; Sections 2698 et seq., Code of 1892; Sections 3058 et seq., Code of 1906; Sections 2258 et seq., Code of 1930; Sections 356 et seq., Code of 1942. In the earlier days, the period within which the suit had to be brought was six months; and as was pointed out in the original opinion, this Court in Dinkins v. Bowers, 49 Miss. 219, in 1873 held that: “The statute preserves the lien for six months after the mechanic’s debt becomes due and gives that time for suit to enforce it.” Over fifty years ago, the time was increased from six to twelve months. Hence it may now be said that the statute preserves the lien for twelve months after the mechanic’s and materialman’s debt becomes due and gives that time for suit to enforce.
Thus, for more than a century, the State of Mississippi, by its statutes, has given assurance to those who perform and furnish materials in the construction of a building that they have a lien on the building and curtilage thereof to enforce payment for their labor and materials. The owner of a building, from such statutes, likewise knows that, if he fails to pay for the labor and materials necessary to construct his building, such building can be sold to enforce payment.
The building in question was not completed until November 3, 1952. The debt, which was owing the lienees on account of labor and materials, did not become due until the building had been completed; and of course, they could not begin their suit until after that time. But, if the period of twelve months in which to enforce the lien is to be brushed aside, and if the United States, in the interim between the completion of the building and the acquisition of a judgment by the lienees, can obtain *48priority oil its lien, then, even though suit had been filed on November 4, 1952, the day after completion of the building, such suit would have been without avail, because it would have been impossible, under our trial procedure and schedule of court terms, to have obtained judgments and had them enrolled prior to December 8, 1952, the date on which the Director of Internal Revenue filed the lien of the United States for income taxes in the Office of the Chancery Clerk of Sunflower County.
If such a course is open to the United States in collecting debts from its citizens, then it is privileged to reach in ahead of breadwinners and materialmen, take from them their wages and competence with which they feed and clothe themselves and families, and leave them and their dependents in poverty, destitution and want, notwithstanding such breadwinners and materialmen, by their labor and with their materials, created and constructed the building, and without which labor and materials the building would not exist.
United States v. City of New Britain, Conn., 347 U. S. 81, 74 S. Ct. 367, 98 L. Ed. 520, was cited in the original opinion, and adherence to that principle would preclude the occurrence of the possible disaster in this case.
The common-law doctrine of first in order of time stands first in order of rank, approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat. 177, 6 L. Ed. 592, was cited in the original opinion.
The debt of the lienees arose by virtue of written contracts. The lien was imposed by statute. “In its broadest sense and common acceptation a lien is understood and used to denote a legal claim or charge on property, either real or personal, as security for the payment of some debt or obligation, a hold or claim which one person has on the property of another as a security for some debt or charge, although the property is not in the possession of the one to whom the debt or obligation is due. It includes every case in which personal or real property is charged with the payment of a debt. Its meaning is *49more extensive than the jus retentionis (derecho de retención) of the civil law.” 53 C. J. S., Liens, Section 1 a., p. 826. See p. 828 thereof as follows: “* * * in a technical sense the term ‘lien’ is more comprehensive than the term ‘mortgage’ * * * The term ‘lien’ is somewhat analogous to the term ‘pledge,’ and, in the sense that a lien includes every case in which personal or real property is charged with the payment of a debt, a pledge is a lien. In a technical sense, however, the term ‘ lien ’ is more comprehensive than the term ‘pledge,’ and has a different legal signification, and, when they are used in the same connection in a statute or instrument, they serve to explain each other’s meaning.” See also d., p. 832, as follows: “By the civil law, a lien or ‘privilege’ is a right to detain a thing until a demand is satisfied; a right which entitles a creditor to be preferred before other creditors. Various terms, such as ‘gravamen,’ ‘carga,’ ‘hypoteca,’ or ‘privilagium,’ are employed in the civil law to designate different forms of liens or preferences.” See also same volume, Section 13, p. 859, as follows: “Asa general rule a valid lien created on real or personal property is enforceable against the property in the hands of any person who subsequently acquires it, except a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the lien. ’ ’
By Section 3670, 26 U. S. C., 1952 Ed., the amount of unpaid taxes becomes a lien in favor of the United States upon all property or rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to the debtor; but, in Section 3672 thereof, the lien is not valid as to prior mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or judgment-creditors. But, if the lien for labor and materials is more comprehensive than that of a mortgagee or pledgee, I am unable to see how it becomes secondary to the federal lien for taxes, filed after the completion of the building, but before the judgment for the labor and material could be obtained.
If the United States has priority in this kind of a case, then contemplate what may also happen to landlords in *50this State. By Section 908, Code of 1942, a landlord has a lien on the agricultural products of the leased premises paramount to all other liens, claims or demands, to secure the payment of rent and money and supplies advanced for the purpose of producing the crop. But, if the United States, before the crops are harvested and the rent money and supplies are paid, enrolls its lien for unpaid income taxes against a tenant, then by the same token, it may reach in and require that the agricultural products, which, under our law, guarantee payment of the landlord’s rent and advances, be condemned and sold for the satisfaction of its tax lien, thereby depriving the landlord of rent for the use of his land and of payment for money and supplies to make the crops, in spite of the fact that no crops could have been produced at all without his land and the advance of money and supplies.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of this Court, and, by its mandate of October 10,1955, in its Cause No. 271, reversed the judgment of this Court, and remanded the cause to us. No opinion was written. By that judgment, it of course said that this court had committed error; but it did not point out wherein this Court had erred. Our decision was based on sound authority and on the laws of this State which have been in effect and unquestioned for more than a century.
To me it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that our statutes are a nullity, or that it has construed the Federal statutes so as to deprive breadwinners and materialmen of their wages and competence, as pointed out above, and so unjustly victimize them. The reversal was not limited in scope. The briefs on certiorari was not before us. With reason it may be said that the cause will have to be tried again in its entirety. There is no opinion. We do not know why the case has been reversed.
If this Court reverses the case, it must, in writing, state its reason therefor. See Section 1963, Code of *511942, as follows: “In all cases settling important principles, in cases to be remanded, and in all eases where the judgment or decree of the court below is reversed, and in all felonies where the punishment prescribed is ten years or more, the opinion of the Supreme Court shall be in writing stating the reasons upon which the decision is made; and the opinion shall be recorded by the Clerk in a well-bound book to be kept for that purpose.”
If we remand the case tQ the trial court, we cannot state the reason of the Supreme Court of the United States for the reversal. Any reason of our own, in justification of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, would be hazarded out of puré speculation and conjecture. I think it would be a mistake, as we grope around in the maze of darkness as to what that Court has decided, to try to point out to the trial court what has been decided, or give it directions as to what it should do. Personally, since I do not know what to do, I would withhold action pending further enlightenment.
Hall and Holmes, JJ., join in this dissent.