Court Opinion

ID: 9946511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 20:00:54.013349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.637006
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENA GUADALUPE MOLINA                         No. 23-50
MENJIVAR,                                       Agency No.
                                                A215-674-989
             Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 7, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: BUMATAY and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, and MOSKOWITZ, District
Judge. ***

      Petitioner Lorena Guadalupe Molina-Menjivar (“Molina”) petitions for

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her motion to

reopen proceedings to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on changed circumstances in El

Salvador. In her petition for review, Molina presents the following issues alleging

the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. First, she argues

that the BIA erred in concluding she failed to show a material change in country

conditions in El Salvador. Next, she asserts the BIA erred by misapplying the law

in its analysis of one of her delineated particular social groups: deportees to El

Salvador from the United States. Further, she asserts the BIA erred by failing to

address the question of changed country conditions specifically with respect to her

two other delineated particular social groups and her imputed political opinion.

Finally, she asserts the BIA erred in denying her motion to reopen despite her

allegation that she presented material and previously unavailable evidence of

changed conditions and established a prima facie claim for relief.

      A motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA can be filed no later than 90

days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be

reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). “However, the ninety-day time limit does not

apply where the motion to reopen is ‘based on changed circumstances arising in

the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,

if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been

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discovered or presented at the previous hearing.’” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d

983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). Molina filed her

motion to reopen beyond the 90-day period, and thus, she must establish changed

country conditions material to her claims for relief. See id.

      We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1992). Under the abuse of discretion

standard, the decision of the BIA must be upheld unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or

contrary to law. Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012). The “failure

to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought” and “failure to introduce

previously unavailable, material evidence” are each grounds that are independently

sufficient for the BIA to deny a motion to reopen. Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986

(quoting Doherty, 502 U.S. at 323).

      Where the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is based on a question of law,

however, it is reviewed de novo. Alali-Amin v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2008). “Whether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ under the

[Immigration and Nationality Act] is a question of law that we review de novo.”

Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Pirir-Boc v. Holder,

750 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition for review.

      The BIA did not abuse its discretion because its conclusions were not

                                           3
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. First, the BIA did not abuse its discretion

in finding no material change in country conditions since Molina’s initial asylum

proceeding. Though “[g]eneral references to ‘continuing’ or ‘remaining’ problems

[are] not evidence of a change in a country’s conditions,” Rodriguez v. Garland,

990 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis in original) (citing Najmabadi, 597

F.3d at 989), evidence of the same type of harassment can constitute changed

conditions where the harassment has materially increased or worsened, see, e.g.,

Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding evidence that

“conditions for Christians have ‘changed dramatically’” is “sufficient to support a

motion to reopen”); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2004)

(finding new evidence that “the harassment had increased to the level of

persecution” was “qualitatively different”).

      Here, the majority of Molina’s evidence of changed circumstances either

refers to conditions from before her initial asylum proceeding or does not refer to

any specific time period. The few sources that discuss conditions after her initial

asylum proceeding fail to show that those conditions are distinct from earlier

conditions, or they show an increase or change that is not “qualitatively different

from the evidence presented at [her] asylum hearing.” Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.

Finally, any changed conditions Molina showed affect the population of El

Salvador at large and are not specific to her. Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 985, 989

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(finding changed circumstances must have “individualized relevancy” or “level of

change that is linked” to applicant’s specific circumstances). Though Molina was

being threatened by a gang, her evidence does not show that these threats were

connected to her delineated particular social groups or her political opinion.

      Second, the BIA did not misapply the law while analyzing Molina’s

proposed social group of deportees. Even if Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d

1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) is distinguishable from the instant case, as Molina

argues, there remains substantial Ninth Circuit precedent denying proposed social

groups based on deportation status as overbroad and not sufficiently particular.

E.g., Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Certainly,

‘[i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic division

naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse

cultures, and contrary political leanings.’”) (citations omitted); Reyes v. Lynch, 842

F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (petitioner “presented scarcely any contrary

evidence” to refute BIA’s finding that proposed group was “too amorphous,

overbroad and diffuse.”); Barbosa; 926 F.3d at 1059–60. The BIA’s reasoning

follows this precedent.

      Third, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it did not explicitly analyze

changed country conditions for the particular social groups of women in El

Salvador or female former business owners in El Salvador who owe unpaid

                                           5
extortion money to gangs, or for Molina’s imputed political opinion. While the

BIA “must show proper consideration of all factors . . . in determining whether to

grant a motion to reopen . . . and must articulate its reasons for denying such a

motion,” Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations

omitted), “‘[t]he [BIA] does not have to write an exegesis on every contention.

What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its

decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard

and thought and not merely reacted,’” Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990 (citations

omitted) (alterations in original).

      Here, the BIA concluded that Molina failed to show a material change in

country conditions overall, which applies to all of her proposed social groups and

her imputed political opinion. This finding and the reasoning provided are

sufficient to show the BIA meaningfully engaged with the evidence and

arguments. Further, remand on this ground would be futile because the BIA would

still have to deny the claims. See Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991 (declining to remand

where BIA did not directly reference some evidence because BIA would have

come to the same conclusion, even considering this evidence). Even if the BIA

were to analyze the conditions for these groups or this political opinion

specifically, the evidence does not show a material increase in harm to women,

business owners, people who owe money to gangs, and/or people with a political

                                          6
opinion of refusing to pay rent to gangs in El Salvador since Molina’s initial

asylum proceeding in 2018. In addition, Molina failed to show that any changed

conditions are individually relevant to her specific circumstances.

      Fourth, the BIA further did not abuse its discretion when it did not explicitly

analyze changed country conditions for Molina’s imputed political opinion. In

addition to the reasons explained above in issue three, Molina failed to exhaust the

issue of political opinion before the BIA. To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must

raise it in the administrative proceedings below with sufficient information about

the claim “to put the BIA on notice of what was being challenged.” Bare v. Barr,

975 F.3d 952, 960 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). Here, Molina did not

explain what political opinion she purports to hold before the IJ or BIA.

Additionally, her imputed political opinion of refusing to continue to pay rent to

the gangs is not a cognizable political opinion under the Immigration and

Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). See, e.g., Rodriguez-Zuniga

v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2023) (“If merely resisting a robbery

could constitute expressing a political opinion, then every person who avoided

being the victim of a crime could seek asylum. But most people who resist

criminal activity directed towards them do so for obvious non-political self-

interested reasons – they don’t want to be the victim of a crime.”).

      Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Molina’s motion to

                                          7
reopen. This question improperly presupposes that Molina showed a material

change in country conditions and established a prima facie claim for relief, but that

the BIA denied her motion regardless. However, the evidence shows no material

change in conditions. Molina also failed to establish a prima facie case because

the evidence does not show that the gang threatened her because of her

membership in any of her proposed groups, and some of Molina’s proposed social

groups and political opinion are not cognizable. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A noncitizen’s] desire to be free from harassment by

criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus

to a protected ground.” (citations omitted)).

      PETITION DENIED.

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