Court Opinion

ID: 9536663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:33.512835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:55.871830
License: Public Domain

SADLER, Justice (concurring in the result but dissenting in part). I concur in the foregoing opinion, except in one particular, namely, the approval therein of the extension by the majority in State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727, of the McNaghten rule, the time honored test of criminal responsibility, when insanity is a defense. The so-called McNaghten, or “right and wrong,” test had received our approval in Territory v. Kennedy, 15 N.M. 556, 110 P. 854; State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A.L.R. 1, and State v. Folk, 56 N.M. 583, 247 P.2d 165. As stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. White, supra, whatever the difference between the extension of that test made in State v. White and the generally repudiated doctrine of “irresistible impulse,” it is so shadowy as to be beyond lucid statement or clear differentiation. The “right and wrong” rule, the ability to distinguish the one from the other and to comprehend that the act about to be committed is wrong, has been tested in the crucible of time and experience and found not wanting. I am reluctant to see its effect destroyed by the so-called extension. I look forward to the day when we shall return to it. If a man knows right from wrong and deliberately does the wrong, he is responsible. It should be no defense that an irresistible impulse moved him so to act, or to plead that, though knowing the act to be wrong, he was helpless to avoid doing it. ■ Annotations 18 L.R.A. 224 and 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 150. If these observations will hold open the door against the day we are moved to' favor again the old test, they have not been in vain. Since the approval given the extension mentioned in the White case in no manner affects the result reached herein, I join in an affirmance of the judgment reviewed. COMPTON, C. J., concurs. On Motion for Rehearing PER CURIAM. Point one of the motion was fully covered in the opinion at pag'es three and four. Point two of the motion was fully covered in the opinion at pages five, six and seven. Regarding Point Three of the motion r On September 20, 1954, defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The case was called for trial on October 11, 1954, the district' attorney being present and defendant being-present with his attorneys. Both the state and the defendant by their respective attorneys announced that they were ready for trial whereupon defendant, by his attorneys, moved for a continuance on the ground of -incompetency of defendant. The court, without a jury, then heard testimony of Dr. A. B. Stewart with direct examination by defendant’s attorney. The doctor declared the defendant was not insane. Defendant offered no further testimony and the court overruled the motion. Thereupon defendant changed his plea so that it became a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Throughout the record, except for testimony of the officers connected with the arrest of defendant and those who had him in custody, there is much evidence which evidently is intended to show that defendant was in such condition that he had not been since his early years, mentally sound. His mother was called to testify and did testify of the hardships he had suffered as a boy and the peculiarities of his conduct. It was shown that he had been frequently incarcerated both in reform school and in California penal institutions and several times had been sent from such institutions to another for observation as to his mental condition. The climax of all this came when Dr. Jacobsen testified. This psychiatrist was called as a witness for the defendant and testified on examination of the court: “The Court: Doctor, I believe your diagnosis was — constitutional psychopathic personality. “A. That is right. “The Court: What is your finding, with psychosis' or without psychosis ? “A. Without psychosis. “The Court: That, is a psychiatric way of saying the person is sane? “A. That is a term we use to ’show that he does not possess psychotic mental illness, that is correct.’1’ • Then the doctor testified : “Mr. Tackett: Doctor, as a result of your examination could you tell the jury and Court whether or not the defendant is sane or insane as of today? “A. I feel * * * my feeling would'be that this individual within the meaning of the terms, sanity or insanity ; that this individual is sane and competent; knows the difference between right and wrong and that he possesses, again, the abstract ability to act upon that recommendation. * * * “The Court: Doctor, would you say that the defendant Upton was sane or insane on September 10, 1054? “A. I would say he was sane at that time.” We quote again: “The Court: Doctor, this defendant, you stated, knows the difference between right and wrong; does he have the mental capacity to adhere to the right, if he desires ? “A. I would say that he does, your Honor. “The Court: Is he working under any uncontrollable impulse ? “A. No.” • • The whole of the doctor’s testimony indicates that defendant was sane át the time of the homicide and at the time of trial. There is much evidence in the record to justify the court in instructing the jury as to insanity at the time of trial, in fact it is seriously doubted that defendant could at any time before any jury have had any more or better evidence than appears in this record to support the theory of present insanity.  Doubtless it is true that if the court had been in doubt as to defendant’s sanity when that question was first presented, he might have submitted the question of the present sanity to a jury with nothing else to consider. There is no requirement of law that the judge should do so and since he concluded, on such evidence as defendant offered, that no doubt of the sanity of defendant existed he had the authority to overrule the motion. As said in the original opinion his offer, because of the state of the record, to submit to the jury the question of the present sanity of defendant was more than defendant was entitled to have. The defendant expressed the desire not to have such instructions given and the court, accordingly, instructed on insanity at the time of the homicide. The motion for rehearing should be and is denied It is so ordered. COMPTON, C. J., and LUJAN, SAD-LER, McGHEE and KIKER, JJ., concur.