Court Opinion

ID: 9774744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:32:26.677994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.029380
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals correctly reversed appellant’s conviction because the trial court permitted the State to waive the death penalty prior to the commencement of the voir dire examination. In its decision, the Court of Appeals relied upon several leading decisions of this Court for authority, namely, Batten v. State, 533 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (A unanimous opinion authored by our presiding judge); Ex parte Dowden, 580 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (A 6-3 opinion authored by our presiding judge); Ex parte Jackson, 606 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Another unanimous opinion authored by our presiding judge). Also see Eads v. State, 598 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Ex parte Bailey, 626 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). In each of these cases, this Court held that Articles 1.13 and 1.14, Y.A.C.C.P., preclude either the State or the defendant from waiving trial by jury on the issue of guilt or punishment where the accusation is capital murder.
Today, however, a majority of this Court amends Art. 1.13, supra, to read as follows: “The State may not waive trial by jury where the accusation is capital murder unless it is shown that the defendant was convicted of some lesser offense.”
I find from what is stated in the majority opinion that the majority, in order to reach its result, evaluates, analyzes, and discusses the issue from hindsight, i.e., by first looking to the verdict of the jury to see what offense the jury found that appellant had committed, it is able to conclude that he was not harmed by the State abandoning, at the commencement of the voir dire, the death penalty.
However, what the majority has conveniently overlooked is what the Legislature of this State mandated when it enacted Articles 1.13 and 1.14, supra. The latter statute expressly states: “The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case.” Implicit therein is that the State also may not waive the right of trial by jury as to punishment where the charge is capital murder. It is obvious to me, if no one else, that the majority has concluded that what the Legislature has mandated may now be rendered impotent if the defendant is not convicted of capital murder.
I must ask: If the defendant cannot waive the right of trial by jury, as to guilt as well as punishment, where the charge is capital murder, then how can the State waive the death penalty where the charge is capital murder? If the State has the right to waive the death penalty, where the accusation is capital murder, then why cannot the defendant waive a jury where the *333accusation is capital murder? However, as recently as November 25, 1981, this Court held in Ex parte Bailey, supra, that even where the prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel, the defendant, and the trial judge all agreed in a capital murder case that the death penalty was being waived, nevertheless, the trial judge could not assess the penalty. Presiding Judge Onion, in his concurring opinion therein, pointedly remarked: “Thus, even if it could be said that the applicant waived trial by jury, the State could not waive the death penalty and the trial judge would be without authority to assess punishment.” (748).
I need not discuss the faulty reasons the majority gives why the principle of law stated in Batten and the other above cases do not apply to this cause, because Presiding Judge Onion has more than adequately done that in the concurring opinion he filed in Ex parte Bailey, supra.
Upon close analysis and reflection, I find that the majority has not really changed the law; instead, it has picked up enough votes to adopt what the dissent stated in Ex parte Bailey.
I recently stated the following in the dissenting opinion I filed in Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1983): “[A]t the present time, the criminal law of this State, subject to Federal review and intervention, is determined by the predilections of at least five members of this Court.” Today, I find myself witnessing the application of that egregious “principle of law.”
Because the Court of Appeals correctly decided this cause, the State’s petition for discretionary review should be dismissed as improvidently granted. To the majority not doing that, and additionally sub silentio overruling a sound principle of law, I must respectfully dissent.