Court Opinion

ID: 9648715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:33:19.333258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:04.864849
License: Public Domain

KAUFFMAN, Justice,
concurring.
To the extent that the Opinion of the Court reverses the Order of the trial court closing the pretrial suppression hearing, I join. However, in light of the fundamental, *440historical and constitutional importance of the right of public access to judicial proceedings, I would go on to hold explicitly that petitioner’s reporters and the general public have a constitutionally protected right to be present at all adjudicative judicial proceedings, and that this right of access may be limited only when strictly and inescapably necessary to protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Accordingly, I would remand this matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and a careful balancing of these two competing constitutional rights.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This controversy initially arose as a result of criminal proceedings instituted by the Commonwealth against David Hayes in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Because defendant is a representative in the State Legislature, and because he is charged with sexually assaulting and supplying drugs to a seventeen year old male high school student, this case has attracted the attention of both the public and press.1
At the start of the suppression hearing, which had been scheduled to commence immediately prior to trial, defendant, by oral motion concurred in by the prosecution, requested the trial court to close the hearing to the public and the press.2 Petitioner, The Pittsburgh Press Company (hereinafter “The Press”), thereupon successfully petitioned the *441trial court for leave to intervene for the purpose of opposing the closure motion. See generally United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1978).
Arguing against closure, The Press suggested that the jury be selected and sequestered prior to the hearing. Such a course of action, it was argued, would protect the jury from any exposure to media reports concerning the suppression hearing and would be convenient because the trial was scheduled to commence immediately. Without any effort by defendant to demonstrate that he would be deprived of a fair trial by an open suppression hearing, the trial court rejected the procedure proposed by The Press and ordered the hearing closed.3
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS
The threshold inquiry is whether the public has a constitutionally protected right of access to judicial proceedings in general, under either the United States or the Pennsylvania Constitution, and, if so, whether that right extends to pretrial suppression hearings.
A. The United States Constitution
In Gannett Company v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), a sharply divided United States Supreme Court narrowly affirmed an order excluding the public and press from a pretrial suppression hearing, holding that the closure order in that case did not conflict with current constitutional standards. A majority of the Court, however, in two separate opinions, expressly recognized a federal constitutional right of access to pretrial suppression *442hearings. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by Messrs. Justice Brennan, White and Marshall, concluded that the public has a right under the Sixth Amendment to attend criminal proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that it is the accused who seeks closure. 99 S.Ct. at 2921-33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).4 In Mr. Justice Blackmun’s view, this right of access extends to pretrial suppression hearings, id. at 2933-36, and must be balanced against a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Id. at 2936-39. Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded:
I emphasize that the trial court should begin with the assumption that the Sixth Amendment requires that a pretrial suppression hearing be conducted in open court unless a defendant carries his burden to demonstrate a strict and inescapable necessity for closure.
Id. at 2938.
Although the majority in Gannett expressly reserved consideration of the applicability of the First Amendment, 99 S.Ct. at 2911-12, Mr. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the public’s right of access to pretrial suppression hearings, 99 S.Ct. at 2914-16 (Powell, J., concurring):
Because of the importance of the public’s having accurate information concerning the operation of its criminal justice system, I would hold explicitly that petitioner’s reporter had an interest protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression hearings.
Id. at 2914 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).5
*443In the “Opinion of the Court,”6 Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not give the public a constitutional right of access to pretrial suppression hearings. 99 S.Ct. at 2904 — 13. Although Mr. Justice Stewart recognized “a strong societal interest in public trials,” he construed the language of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing to “the accused” the right to a public trial literally to mean that the protective right was intended solely for the benefit of the defendant. Id. at 2905, 2907. Mr. Justice Stewart further concluded that even if the Sixth Amendment did establish a right of public access, that right would not extend to pretrial proceedings.7 Id. at 2907.
*444Thus, five Justices in Gannett expressly recognized a federal constitutional right of public and press access to pretrial suppression hearings. They did not, however, agree on either the appropriate standard of review or the specific constitutional underpinnings of the right.8 Accordingly, I now turn to the Constitution of this Commonwealth.9
B. The Pennsylvania Constitution
Article 1, Section 11 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth provides: “All courts shall be open.” This constitutional mandate has been a part of Pennsylvania jurisprudence since colonial days. The Pennsylvania Frame of Government of 1682, “[i]n many ways, [one of] the most influential documents protecting individual rights,” provided that in the Pennsylvania colony “all courts shall be open.” IB Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 130, 140 (1971). This provision was later incorporated into Section 26 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776. Id. at 271.
*445Our state constitutional requirement that “[a]ll courts shall be open” is derived from the strong common law policy in favor of public proceedings. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-71, 68 S.Ct. 499, 505-507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). The rule that all judicial proceedings are presumed to be public was considered at common law as a check on judicial power and a deterrent to perjury. In describing trial procedures, Blackstone noted that “all . . . evidence is to be publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country; which must curb any secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries * 372. Blackstone also viewed the public proceeding as a deterrent to perjury, since “a witness may frequently depose that in private which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal.” Id. at * 373.
Wigmore noted that public proceedings serve a vital societal function in that they move the court, the parties and the witnesses “more strongly ... to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of duty.” 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1834 at 438 (Chadbourne rev. 1976). Moreover, public proceedings were recognized as an important means of educating the public about the processes of government and of instilling confidence in the judgment of the courts:
Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintence acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy.
Id. (footnote omitted). See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 505, 506, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948).
In 1827, Jeremy Bentham forcefully commented on the relationship between public confidence in the judicial system and open proceedings:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of checks, *446would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.
1 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827).
When construed in the light of its common law origins, there can be little doubt that the “open courts” clause of our Constitution was intended to establish a public right of access to adjudicative judicial proceedings. Indeed, the provision that “[a]ll courts shall be open,” unless it is to be construed as a mere constitutional frill, admits of no other reasonable interpretation.10 That our “[a]ll courts shall be open” language was intended to create a public right to open civil and criminal adjudicative judicial proceedings was expressly recognized by Mr. Justice Stewart in Gannett. In reaching his conclusion that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not afford the public a federal constitutional right to attend criminal trials, Mr. Justice Stewart discussed “whether the common-law rule of open proceedings was incorporated, rejected or left undisturbed by the Sixth Amendment.” 99 S.Ct. at 2908. Although he concluded that the common law rule had not been incorporated by the Sixth Amendment, he noted:
In conspicuous contrast with some of the early state constitutions that provided for a public right to open civil and criminal trials, the Sixth Amendment confers the *447right to a public trial only upon a defendant and only in a criminal case.
Id. at 2908-09 (emphasis supplied). Among the “early state constitutions” referred to and quoted by Mr. Justice Stewart were the Pennsylvania Constitutions of 1682 and 1776, both of which provided that “[a]ll courts shall be open.” Id. at 2908-09 & nn.15-16. Thus, Mr. Justice Stewart recognized in Gannett that Article 1, Section 11 “providefs] for a public right to open civil and criminal trials.” Id. at 2908-09.
As was stated almost 100 years ago in a commentary on Article 1, Section 11:
The meaning of the words all courts shall be open, used in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, is that all courts shall be open for the administration of law, right and justice, in controversies between suitors, as matter of right, and not as of grace or favor. . . . The general public also have the right of admission to the court, as they are largely interested in the public administration of law and justice.
Pierce, J., All Courts Shall be Open, 30 Pitts.LJ. 362 (1883).
The concerns that prompted the framers of the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide the “open courts” guarantee described above are no less vital today. Indeed, confidence in the proper functioning of our judicial system is of particular concern in light of the general public distrust of government institutions engendered by recent disclosures of misconduct at all levels of government. Anything that impairs the open nature of judicial proceedings threatens to undermine the confidence of the public in judicial remedies and to impede the ability of the courts to function. Secret hearings will always be suspect, and public confidence cannot long be maintained if important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978).
For this reason, the appearance of impropriety in the administration of criminal justice is as destructive as its reality. For, the tenuous fabric of public confidence in our criminal justice system will surely unravel when those cases *448which receive the most public attention are closed to public and press scrutiny precisely because of the public notoriety and, perhaps, public controversy surrounding the proceedings. Indeed, the bitter irony of any test which exalts closure at the expense of "openness is that those criminal proceedings most in need of scrutiny to maintain the confidence of the public in the administration of criminal justice, such as the instant case involving the alleged homosexual rape of a teenager by a state legislator, will be shrouded in secrecy.
That the public’s right of access extends to pretrial suppression hearings is clear not only from the language of Article 1, Section 11,11 but from a consideration of the societal interests sought to be protected as well. A suppression hearing differs significantly from those incidental or collateral discussions held outside the presence of the jury, such as sidebar conferences on points of law or conferences in chambers, from which the public traditionally has been excluded. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 849 (3d Cir. 1978), citing, Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 1969). A suppression hearing has “more of the characteristics of a testimonial hearing, which is the essence of a trial proceeding.” Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 1969). Moreover, the pretrial suppression hearing often is critical since it may result in either a dismissal of the charges or a plea of guilty. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2933, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1978) (Black-mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 848-51 (3d Cir. *4491972) ; United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973) . As Mr. Justice Powell noted in Gannett:
In our criminal justice system as it has developed, suppression hearings often are as important as the trial which may follow. The government’s case may turn upon the confession or other evidence that the defendant seeks to suppress, and the trial court’s ruling on such evidence may determine the outcome of the case. Indeed, in this case there was no trial as, following the suppression hearing, plea bargaining occurred that resulted in guilty pleas. In view of the special significance of a suppression hearing, the public’s interest in this proceeding often is comparable to its interest in the trial itself.
99 S.Ct. at 2914 n.l (Powell, J., concurring).
Of equal importance, suppression hearings typically involve objections to the propriety of police or prosecutorial conduct. In fact, the suppression hearing may be the only point in the trial process at which the conduct of law enforcement officers is at issue. United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 247 (2d Cir. 1973). Such conduct frequently occurs outside the public view, Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969); therefore, beneficial public scrutiny may never take place if not at the hearing itself. Id. See also Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. at 2930, 2934 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).12 Our strong constitutional requirement of public access to judicial proceedings emphasizes that publicity is “of critical importance to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public business.” Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975).
*450Again, as Mr. Justice Stewart acknowledged in Gannett, although “[n]ot many common-law rules have been elevated to the status of constitutional rights,” 99 S.Ct. at 2908, the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings has been accorded such status in Pennsylvania since 1682. Id. at 2909. See 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 271 (1971). Therefore, in order to protect the societal interests involved, and because of the clear constitutional language, I would hold that the public’s right of access to pretrial suppression hearings is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.13
III. A CAREFUL BALANCING IS NECESSARY FOR ANY LIMITATION ON ACCESS
The policies underlying the Pennsylvania Constitution’s guarantee that “[a]ll courts shall be open” require that there be a strong presumption in favor of public access to adjudicative judicial proceedings. This presumption, however, does not require that all proceedings be held in open court when to do so would deprive a defendant of a fair trial. The right of access is not absolute, and when faced with a demonstrable conflict between the public’s right of access and a defendant’s ability to obtain a fair trial, the rights of the criminal defendant must prevail. Any other balance would be unjust and would conflict with both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. U.S.Const. amend. VI; Pa.Const, art. 1, § 9. See Lucas v. Michigan, 420 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970); Sudekum v. Hayes, 414 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1969).
Although the right of access under Article 1, Section 11 does not absolutely prevent a trial court from ordering closure in those few exceptional cases where, on balance, *451such extraordinary relief is necessary to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial, the trial court must begin with the presumption that the judicial proceedings will be open. An accused who seeks closure must then establish that any limitation of the right of access is “strictly and inescapably necessary” in order to protect the fair trial guarantee. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. at 2936 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 607 (3rd Cir. 1969). This standard will protect the public’s right of access without unnecessarily impairing the rights of the accused. For the future guidance of trial courts in dealing with the recurring confrontation between these vital constitutional guarantees, I would adopt the approach essentially defined by Mr. Justice Black-mun in Gannett and hold that in meeting this admittedly heavy burden, the criminal defendant who seeks closure must, at a minimum, establish the following:
First, that there is a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his fair trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in public. Such a showing will necessarily involve evidence of the nature and extent of publicity prior to the closure motion and the impact of that publicity on the jury pool. In this regard, the trial court should be aware of the fact that “[i]n the overwhelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable threats” to the right of the accused to a fair trial. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2799, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). A high level of publicity is not necessarily inconsistent with the ability of a defendant to obtain a fair trial when the publicity has been largely factual in nature, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 542-45 & 557-58, 82 S.Ct. 955, 956-958, 958-959, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962), or when it abated some time prior to trial. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-94, 72 S.Ct. 599, 604-606, 96 L.Ed. 872 (1952). In those cases where a court has found publicity sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant reversal on due process grounds, the publicity went far beyond the normal bounds of coverage. See, e. g., *452Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). See also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 551-56, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2799-2801, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798-99, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035-2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). But “[c]ases such as these are relatively rare,” Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), and the decisions-of the Supreme Court, “[t]aken together, . . . demonstrate that pretrial publicity — even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.” Id.
Second, a criminal defendant seeking closure must establish that there is a substantial probability that alternatives to closure will not adequately protect his right to a fair trial. Such a showing will necessarily involve consideration of the available alternatives, including continuance, severance, change of venue, change of venire,14 voir dire, peremptory challenges, sequestration, and admonition of the jury. See American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard 8-3.2 at 16 (Approved Draft 1978). See also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-65, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2804 — 2806, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 n.9 & 358-62, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1518 n.9, and 1519-1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).
Third, the accused must demonstrate that there is a substantial probability that closure will be effective in protect*453ing against the perceived harm. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 503, 387 A.2d 425, 434-35 (1978). For example, where significant prejudicial information already has been published, the justification for closure dissipates. Moreover, the fact that a pretrial suppression hearing is closed may, by itself, result in prejudice to a defendant similar to the bias which sometimes results from a criminal defendant’s failure to testify on his own behalf. See generally Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 440 Pa. 361, 269 A.2d 724 (1970).
Fourth, the defendant must establish the extent to which closure is necessary to ensure a fair trial. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 854 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723, 725 (2d Cir. 1973).15 Thus, only that portion of the public may be excluded from only that portion of the proceeding that the court finds to be strictly and inescapably necessary to protect the interests asserted by the defendant.16
In light of the societal interests which are advanced by open judicial proceedings, the critical role of the organized *454press — the newspapers and other established news media— in our judicial system must be considered in evaluating the need for closure. See generally Stewart, P., “Or of the Press,” 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975). Judicial proceedings by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a “public benefit” is performed by the accurate reporting of judicial proceedings by the media. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1046, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). For that reason, truthful reports of public judicial proceedings have been afforded special protection against subsequent sanctions, either criminal or civil. Id. at 492-93, 95 S.ct. 1029, at 1044 — 1045. See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947). Even when the Supreme Court has reversed a criminal conviction because of prejudicial publicity, the critically important role of the press in our judicial system has been reaffirmed:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Accord Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2802-2803, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). Without public criminal trial proceedings, the conduct and misconduct of judges as well as police and prosecutors could be shrouded in secrecy and the ordinary citizen would be unable to scrutinize and evaluate the performance of his appointed and elected officials. Therefore, whether the foundation for this fundamental right of access is the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 11 of Article 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, no one can deny the necessity for an ever-vigilant press *455to disclose misconduct, corruption and ineptitude in the administration of criminal justice.
Finally, if the right of access is to have any real meaning, representatives of the press and public must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the question of this exclusion from the courtroom.17 Upon timely motion, it is incumbent upon the trial court to afford the opportunity for those representatives of the press and public present in the courtroom to move to intervene and be heard on the issue of whether the closure of the proceeding is strictly and inescapably necessary. At such hearing, it is the burden of the party requesting closure to make the requisite showing of prejudice.
As a critical part of the hearing procedure, the trial court must state on the record the findings it considered in balancing the alleged need for closure against the constitutionally protected right of access. This procedure was not followed by the trial court in this case. The record before us discloses nothing more than that the defendant sought closure, the prosecution did not object, and the trial court, without any balancing of the competing constitutionally protected rights, simply agreed.18
The foregoing standards articulate a burden of proof significantly higher than that adopted in this Court’s prior decisions. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. *456484, 387 A.2d 425 (1978), was the combined appeal of three cases in which writs of mandamus and prohibition were sought to end the closure of pretrial hearings. Id., 478 Pa. at 489-90, 387 A.2d at 427-28. Therein, this Court upheld the constitutionality of Rules 323(f)-(g), 326 and 327 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure which permit a trial court, at the request of the defendant, to enter an order limiting public access to a pretrial suppression hearing. While acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court had suggested that the public’s interest in open criminal proceedings is protected by the Sixth Amendment, Id., 478 Pa. at 501-02, 387 A.2d at 433-34, citing, Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965) (dictum), this Court stated that the Supreme Court had not held that either the First or Sixth Amendment creates a constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. 478 Pa. at 502, 387 A.2d at 433. Thus, this Court recognized only a “strong interest” on the part of the public with respect to access to judicial proceedings.
Nevertheless, this Court held that any limitation on access should be carefully drawn to comply with the following standards: (1) the right of access should not be limited except for the compelling state obligation to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants and achieve the fair, orderly, prompt and final disposition of criminal proceedings; (2) the right of access should not be limited unless the threat posed to the protected interest is serious; (3) the right of access should not be limited unless the limitations imposed effectively limit the threatened harm and are no broader in scope than necessary to do so. Id., 478 Pa. at 503-04, 387 A.2d at 434-35. In the instant case, the lower court failed to follow even these guidelines, and reversal of the closure order would be appropriate for that reason.19
*457Our decision in Jerome, however, preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Gannett, and must be reevaluated in light of that decision.20 More importantly, the effect of Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was not considered in Jerome, and the stricter standards set forth in this opinion appear to be more appropriately suited to protect the public access right envisioned by that constitutional guarantee.
IV. CONCLUSION
It has long been held that “justice cannot survive behind walls of silence.” Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). This maxim is true even when those walls are erected at the behest of a criminal defendant. The confluence of the need to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the administration of criminal justice, the need to expose misconduct or ineptitude in the criminal justice process, and the right of the public to be informed of the alleged crimes of accused persons, requires that pretrial suppression hearings be shrouded in secrecy only when it is strictly and inescapably necessary to do so in order to preserve the right of an accused to a fair trial.
A democratic society ultimately can survive only so long as its leaders and institutions have the consent of its citizens. Secret judicial proceedings would be a significant first step in undermining that consent.
I would hold that the public and the press have a right of access to pretrial suppression hearings protected by both the *458United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, reverse the Order of the trial court21 and remand for a hearing22 in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion.23

. On the record before us, it is impossible to measure the nature and extent of press attention in this case because the trial judge did not require evidence of either actual or potential prejudicial publicity.

. The motion for closure was made pursuant to Rule 323(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
The hearing, either before or at trial, shall be held in open court unless defendant moves that it be held only in the presence of the defendant, counsel for the parties, court officers and necessary witnesses. If the hearing is held after the jury has been sworn, it shall be held outside the hearing and presence of the jury. In all cases the court may make such order concerning publicity of the proceedings as it deems appropriate under Rules 326 and 327.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(f). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(g), 326 & 327.

. Following this ruling, the trial court granted The Press a temporary stay in order to seek review by this Court. The Press filed a Petition for Stay which was granted by Mr. Justice O’Brien. The Press also filed petitions urging that this Court exercise its plenary jurisdiction, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 726 (Purdon Pamph.1979), and summarily reverse the trial court’s closure order. This Court agreed to exercise jurisdiction, granted permission to all media representatives to intervene, and, on March 11, 1980, heard oral arguments on the Petition for Summary Reversal.

. Because Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded that Sixth Amendment standards were sufficient to protect the right of public access, he deemed it unnecessary to reach the issue of access under the First Amendment. 99 S.Ct. at 2940 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

. In my view, freedom of the press as guaranteed by the First Amendment embraces three essential rights: (1) right of access, (2) right of publication, and (3) right of circulation. Although none of these rights is absolute, arbitrary curtailment of any of them would *443cripple the ability of the press to perform its vital functions. The United States Supreme Court has established a heavy presumption against the validity of any order restraining publication, see Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), and the right of circulation also has been carefully guarded. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Swarthmore, 381 F.Supp. 228, 240 (E.D.Pa.1974). See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); Re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1878). The right of access has not yet been accorded the same protection as the other two, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), but there should be no doubt that press access to as critical a governmental function as pretrial suppression hearings must be constitutionally protected if freedom of the press is to have any vitality whatsoever.

. Although Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion in Gannett was denominated the “Opinion of the Court,” it obtained that designation only because Mr. Justice Powell joined in affirming the trial court’s closure order based upon his belief that the trial court had “recognized the constitutional right of the press and public to be present at criminal proceedings” and had “concluded, however, that in the ‘very unique situation’ presented to it, closure had been appropriate . . .” 99 S.Ct. at 2916-17 (Powell, J., concurring). In stark contrast, the trial court in the instant case gave no recognition or weight to the constitutional right of the press and public to be present at the pretrial suppression hearing.

. While reserving decision on the question of whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee public and press access, Mr. Justice Stewart concluded that, even if that were so, the trial court *444had adequately “balanced the ‘constitutional right of the press and the public’ against the ‘defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ ” 99 S.Ct. at 2912.

. It is unclear whether the right of access is protected under the First or the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 846-51 & 861-63 (3d Cir. 1978). It is also unsettled whether the right of access may be limited at trial. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Va., cert. granted, 444 U.S. 896, 100 S.Ct. 204, 62 L.Ed.2d 132 (1979). Several members of the Supreme Court have attempted to clarify the meaning of Gannett in an unprecedented series of extrajudicial statements. See The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 60, 65 n. 32 (1979). These comments underscore the confusion and uncertainty which pervades this area of federal constitutional law.

. The Court in Gannett made clear that although a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the public trial clause does not guarantee to a criminal defendant the correlative right to waive a public proceeding and compel closure. 99 S.Ct. at 2907. See also 99 S.Ct. at 2924-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the Court implicitly acknowledged the power of the states to afford greater protection to the public’s right of access than that recognized by the federal constitution. 99 S.Ct. at 2912-13.

. Mr. Justice Nix correctly observed in the Opinion of the Court that some of our cases have inferred that the primary concern of Article 1, Section 11 was “to assure the accused of protection against star-chamber proceedings.” Opinion of the Court at 322. This protection, however, is fully covered by the independent constitutional guarantee found in Article 1, Section 9. To construe the open courts provision as nothing more than a guarantee of a “speedy public trial” would disregard the plain language of Article 1, Section 11 and in conflict with basic canons of constitutional interpretation, relegate it to a simple redundancy. See Commonwealth v. Russo, 388 Pa. 462, 131 A.2d 83 (1957). Significantly, in contrast to the language of Article 1, Section 9 guaranteeing the accused a speedy public trial, the “open courts” provision is not framed as a right of the accused or indeed of any specific party in a judicial proceeding. Given the generality with which it has been framed, it is obvious that the right to “open courts” is to be enjoyed by the public generally and may be asserted by any member of the public.

. The Constitution of Pennsylvania should be interpreted in the light of ordinary language. Peoples Bridge Co. of Harrisburg v. Shroyer, 355 Pa. 599, 50 A.2d 499 (1947). In construing the language of a constitutional provision, the words used, unless they are technical, are to be interpreted in their popular, natural, and ordinary meaning. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hiltner, 307 Pa. 343, 161 A. 323 (1932). Furthermore, the courts have no right to disregard, erode or distort any provision of the Constitution, especially where its plain language makes its meaning unmistakably clear. Commonwealth v. Russo, 388 Pa. 462, 131 A.2d 83 (1957).

. The modem suppression hearing was unknown at common law where objections to the admissibility of evidence were made in open court during trial, and “[tjhere is no federal requirement that states conduct suppression hearings prior to trial.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2935 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32, 88 S.Ct. 192, 193, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967).

. See Commonwealth v. Klinger, 75 D. & C.2d 664 (1976), in which the court held that since the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that “all courts shall be open,” representatives of the media could not be excluded from a preliminary hearing on a charge of murder in order to prevent publicity which may be prejudicial to a defendant’s case. Id. at 664-65. The court, however, did note that an exception might be made if the court were confronted with unique and compelling evidence of a clear and present danger of uncorrectable prejudice to the right of the defendant to secure a fair trial. Id. at 665.

. On April 1, 1980, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8702 became effective and provides, in part:
§ 8702. Impaneling jury from another county (A) General rule. — If, upon motion and following a hearing, the court of common pleas determines that a fair and impartial jury cannot be impaneled in the county where the criminal complaint is filed, as an alternative to issuing an order for a change of venue the court may direct that jurors be impaneled from another county. The order for impanelment of a jury from smother county shall be certified forthwith to the Supreme Court which shall designate and notify the county of impanelment.

. Even a narrowly drawn closure order, however, may not adequately protect the public’s right of access. Delayed access to the transcript of a closed proceeding, for example, rarely will be an adequate substitute for attendance at the hearing itself. The inherent delay may defeat the purpose of a public proceeding because later events may diminish the public’s interest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268, 62 S.Ct. 190, 196, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941). “As a practical matter . the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the public promptly.” Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2803, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).

. For example, it may be possible in many cases to determine the admissibility of evidence without disclosing the substance thereof. Issues often concern not so much the contents of a confession or the nature of evidence seized, but the circumstances under which the prosecution obtained the material. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2937 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 858 (3d Cir. 1978).

. Because of the unique position which the press occupies in our society, special consideration must be given to its role in evaluating the need for closure. This special consideration derives not because the press enjoys a special status, but because “[i]n seeking out the news, the press acts as an agent of the public at large,” each individual member of which cannot obtain for himself “the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.” Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 2821, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). Cf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-78, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1415-1416, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978).

. It should be noted that the trial court’s procedure in this case failed to satisfy not only the standards adopted in Gannett by Messrs. Justice Blackmun, Brennan, White and Marshall, but those advocated by Mr. Justice Powell as well. See 99 S.Ct. at 2916 (Powell, J., concurring).

. Defendant Hayes made no effort to demonstrate that his right to a fair trial would be prejudiced by an open suppression hearing. Moreover, the trial court failed to balance the defendant’s right to a fair trial against the constitutionally protected right of public access and failed to consider the alternatives to closure that were available.

. Although the origin and scope of the public’s federal constitutional right of access to pretrial suppression hearings remains unsettled, a majority of the Supreme Court has now expressly recognized such a right based solely on the United States Constitution. In Jerome, this Court premised its decision, at least in part, on the need to avoid delayed trials and retrials and the concomitant expenditure of public funds and judicial resources. 478 Pa. at 507, 387 A.2d at 436. While this objective is a salutary one in a context where the constitutional right of the public and the press is not present, it cannot, as Gannett demonstrates, be used to tip the scales in favor of closing a pretrial suppression hearing.

. Implicit in the conclusions which I have reached is a finding that Rules 323(f)-(g), 326 and 327 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure must be read to include a requirement for evidentiary hearings as described in this opinion. Otherwise, those rules, which facially permit closure of a judicial proceeding simply upon motion by the defendant, would be unconstitutional.

. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether any restriction on access is strictly and inescapably necessary in order to protect defendant’s right to a fair trial. In making that determination, all available alternatives to closure should be carefully and expressly considered.

. The accused public official in this case asserted at oral argument that an open suppression hearing would jeopardize his right of privacy. I join the Opinion of the Court in rejecting this claim.