Court Opinion

ID: 9392330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:03:53.327336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.516092
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                   DEVIN ANDRICH, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                        v.

          JAMES MATTHEW ALLEN, et al., Defendant/Appellee.

                             No. 1 CA-CV 22-0480
                              FILED 5-4-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. CV2019-013251
               The Honorable Randall H. Warner, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Devin Andrich, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant

Ahwatukee Legal Office PC, Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
                        ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1           Devin Andrich appeals the superior court's grant of summary
judgment and award of attorney fees and costs to James Allen and James
M. Allen, P.C. (collectively "Allen"). For the following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2           In October 2014, Allen hired Andrich as a paralegal. At the
time, Andrich was homeless and facing criminal charges arising from
misconduct related to his own legal practice.

¶3             In December of that year, Allen helped Andrich to secure a
place to live from a mutual friend, Ronald Fried. Andrich lived in Fried's
apartment for free until Andrich began his prison sentence on February 3,
2015. When Andrich vacated the apartment, he asked Fried to deliver some
clothing and other personal items ("the Property") to Allen for safekeeping.

¶4           In September 2017, Andrich was released from prison. One
month later, he met with Allen about a potential job opportunity. At that
meeting, Andrich discovered that Fried never delivered the Property to
Allen.

¶5           Andrich reached out to Fried to retrieve the Property. When
that failed, Andrich sent an email to Allen in which Andrich
(i) acknowledged that Allen never received the Property, and (ii)
threatened to file suit, seek a temporary restraining order, and depose and
polygraph everyone involved if Allen did not "fix this."

¶6             Allen responded by offering Andrich a $200 gift card to
replace the lost clothing but warned that Allen would "forward" any more
"email[s] of this nature" to the State Bar, the County Attorney's Office, and
Andrich's parole officer. Andrich claims this warning caused him to "suffer
immediate and ongoing severe emotional distress."

¶7            In January 2018, Andrich sent a second demand letter to
Fried. Fried forwarded the letter to Allen and asked for advice on what he

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                         ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
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should do about it and how he could contact Andrich's parole officer. Allen
replied by suggesting that Fried have his attorney respond to Andrich's
letter and that Fried should "start with a google search" to find Andrich's
parole officer.

¶8              Fried did not return the Property, and Andrich filed suit
against Fried and Fried's ex-wife in October 2019. He later amended the
complaint twice, adding Allen as a defendant and asserting claims for
(1) aiding and abetting the conversion of Andrich's property; (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; and (3) tortious interference with a contract.

¶9            In response to a document production request, Allen
disclosed his January 2018 text message exchange with Fried. During
litigation, Andrich and Allen filed a Joint Statement of Disclosure Dispute
in which Andrich challenged the sufficiency of Allen's disclosures,
suggesting that Allen was in possession of additional electronically stored
information ("ESI") that he had failed to disclose and asking for leave to file
a motion to compel further disclosures and for sanctions against Allen.
Allen denied being in possession of any undisclosed ESI relevant to this
case. The court heard arguments from the parties and denied Andrich's
request for additional disclosure.

¶10            In June 2020, Fried found a bag containing some or all of the
Property and returned the bag to Andrich. Andrich and Fried later reached
a stipulation to dismiss the claims against Fried with prejudice.

¶11           In September 2021, Allen moved for summary judgment on
all claims against him. Following oral argument, the superior court granted
Allen's motion and awarded him a portion of his attorney fees and costs.
Andrich timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 12-2101(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

¶12            Andrich challenges the superior court's ruling on the parties'
disclosure dispute, its grant of summary judgment to Allen on Andrich's
claims for aiding and abetting and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and its decision to award Allen $100,000 in attorney fees pursuant
to A.R.S. § 12-349.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.

1       Andrich also challenges the court's denial of his motion for a new
trial, but he fails to develop this argument in his briefing. Therefore, he

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                         ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
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I.     The Disclosure Dispute.

¶13            "The disclosure rules are designed to provide parties 'a
reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial or settlement —nothing more,
nothing less.'" Zimmerman v. Shakman, 204 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 13 (App. 2003)
(quoting Bryan v. Riddel, 178 Ariz. 472, 476 n.5 (1994)). The superior court
has broad discretion on matters of disclosure and discovery, and we will
not disturb its ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion and resulting
prejudice. Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239, 241-42, ¶ 8 (App. 2018).
Because trial judges are better suited "to decide if a disclosure violation has
occurred . . . and the practical effect of any non-disclosure," Solimeno v.
Yonan, 224 Ariz. 74, 77, ¶ 9 (App. 2010), we review "whether a judicial mind,
in view of the law and circumstances, could have made the ruling without
exceeding the bounds of reason," Marquez v. Ortega, 231 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14
(App. 2013) (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 571
(1985)).

¶14            In response to Andrich's demand for additional discovery,
Allen repeatedly stated that he had provided all relevant documents and
had no additional information to disclose. The superior court considered
the arguments of the parties and held a hearing before denying Andrich's
requested relief. Because Andrich has not supplied a transcript of the
hearing, we assume that the superior court considered all relevant
information before denying relief. Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App.
1995) ("A party is responsible for making certain the record on appeal
contains all transcripts" and "we assume [missing transcripts] would
support the court's findings and conclusions."). Based on the record before
us, we discern no abuse of discretion in the superior court's decision not to
grant relief. See Braillard v. Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 481, 497, ¶ 52 (App.
2010) ("In matters of discovery a trial court has broad discretion which will
not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse." (cleaned up)); see also Allstate
Ins. Co. v. O'Toole, 182 Ariz. 284, 287-88 (1995) (stating that mandatory
sanctions are "unduly harsh, overly punitive, and inconsistent with the
purposes of the [] rules" and "the relevant question must be whether [a
violation] is harmful to the opposing party or to the justice system").

waives the issue on appeal. See In re 3567 E. Alvord Rd., 249 Ariz. 568, 572,
¶ 11 n.5 (App. 2020) ("We do not address this suggestion because
[appellant] has failed to fully develop this argument or meaningfully cite to
relevant authority . . . .").

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                         ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
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¶15           Because we find the superior court did not abuse its discretion
in ruling on the discovery dispute, we need not address whether the court
violated Andrich's First Amendment right to petition.

II.    Summary Judgment.

¶16           We review the superior court's grant of summary judgment
de novo. Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019). In doing
so, we must "view[] the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236,
240, ¶ 12 (2003). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party
"shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ariz. R. Civ. P.
56(a).

       A.     Aiding and Abetting.

¶17         Andrich claims the trial court erred in finding that no
evidence supports his aiding and abetting claim against Allen. We
disagree.

¶18             In order to succeed on his claim for aiding and abetting,
Andrich must prove three elements: (1) the primary tortfeasor committed a
tort that caused him injury; (2) Allen knew that the primary tortfeasor's
conduct constituted a breach of duty; and (3) Allen substantially assisted or
encouraged the primary tortfeasor in the achievement of the breach. Wells
Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension
Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 485, ¶ 34 (2002). "The third requirement, substantial
assistance by an aider and abettor, can take many forms, but means more
than 'a little aid.'" Id. at 488, ¶ 46. Indeed, a defendant will only be liable
"[i]f the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the
resulting tort . . . ." Gomez v. Hensley, 145 Ariz. 176, 178 (App. 1984) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1979)).

¶19            Andrich points to a short text message exchange as evidence
that Allen substantially assisted in Fried's alleged conversion of the
Property. In the exchange, Fried asks Allen how he should respond to
Andrich's demand letter and how to find Andrich's parole officer. Allen
responded by telling Fried to have his attorney respond to the letter and to
"start with a google search" to find Andrich's parole officer.

¶20          There is no dispute as to what Allen said in that exchange.
Andrich has acknowledged that "when a party receives a demand letter, the
attorney protocol is to respond to the demand letter, even if to dispute the

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                          ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
                            Decision of the Court

letter's allegations." But Andrich claims that Allen's advice resulted in Fried
evading this lawsuit and withholding the Property for almost three years.
Allen's advice that Fried should have his lawyer contact Andrich cannot be
"a substantial factor" in causing him to do the opposite. See id. at 178.
Therefore, we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment on
Andrich's claim of aiding and abetting.

       B.      Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

¶21            Andrich further claims the trial court erred in finding that no
evidence supports his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires the plaintiff
to show: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the
defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly
disregarded the near certainty that such distress would result; and (3) the
defendant's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.
Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 43 (1987).

¶22             The superior court's first task is to "determine whether the
acts complained of are sufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a claim
for relief." Mintz. v. Bell Atl. Sys. Leasing Int'l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 554 (App.
1995). To qualify, Allen's conduct must be "so outrageous in character and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community." Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (Am.
L. Inst. 1965). We agree with the superior court that none of Allen's conduct
met this standard.

¶23            Andrich claims the superior court erred in failing to account
for the relative positions of the parties and Allen's knowledge that Andrich
was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. See Lucchesi v. Frederic N.
Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 76, 79 (1986) (stating that these are two factors
courts should consider). But a defendant is "never liable . . . where he has
done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even
though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional
distress." Mintz, 183 Ariz. at 554 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
46 cmt. g).

¶24           Andrich's claims center on Allen's December 2017 email
where he warned Andrich to "tread lightly" and threatened to forward
future emails to the State Bar, the County Attorney's Office, and Andrich's
parole officers. Allen's conduct amounted to no more than a warning that
he may report further communications from Andrich to the proper

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                          ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
                            Decision of the Court

authorities. Allen's warning that he would do what he is legally entitled to
do cannot provide the basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See id. And the record provides no evidence of any other
potentially extreme and outrageous conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the
superior court's decision to grant summary judgment on the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

III.   Attorney Fees.

¶25            The determination of whether to award attorney fees and
whether the amount of the award is reasonable "is a matter peculiarly
within the discretion of the trial court . . . ." Harris v. Rsrv. Life Ins. Co., 158
Ariz. 380, 384 (App. 1988). As such, we review an award of attorney fees
for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless the trial court's supporting
findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Democratic Party of Pima Cnty. v. Ford,
228 Ariz. 545, 547, ¶ 6 (App. 2012). Andrich raises two issues with the
court's decision to award attorney fees.

¶26            First, Andrich challenges the court's statement that the parties
provided no evidence of their relative financial positions. Specifically, he
claims the court had "actual, judicial notice that Andrich was indigent." It
is true that Andrich had previously provided the court with an Application
for Deferral of Court Fees and Costs which "memorialized his $1,200
monthly income and $1,349 monthly expenses." However, when he filed a
response to Allen's motion seeking attorney fees, Andrich did not provide
any argument or evidence about the financial positions of either party.
Accordingly, Andrich waived any claim that an award of fees would
impose an undue financial hardship. See Rudinsky v. Harris, 231 Ariz. 95,
102, ¶ 32 (App. 2012) (in opposing the fee application, "the party asserting
financial hardship has the burden of coming forward with prima facie
evidence of financial hardship") (cleaned up).

¶27           Second, Andrich takes issue with the court's assessment that
he prosecuted the action in bad faith and Allen defended it in good faith.
Andrich's claim that Allen acted in bad faith focuses on the parties'
discovery dispute. We have already affirmed the court's ruling on that
dispute, supra ¶ 14, and its finding that Allen acted in good faith is not
clearly erroneous.

IV.    Attorney Fees on Appeal.

¶28           Allen requests attorney fees on appeal, arguing this appeal "is
as unjustified as the lawsuit from which it sprang." But an award of
attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-349 requires that the claims be "brought

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                        ANDRICH v. ALLEN et al.
                          Decision of the Court

without substantial justification or for delay or harassment." Sklar v. Town
of Fountain Hills, 220 Ariz. 449, 455, ¶ 23 (App. 2008). While we disagree
with Andrich's substantive arguments, the issues he raises on appeal are
not frivolous or otherwise unjustified. Accordingly, we deny Allen's
request for attorney fees. As the successful party, however, Allen is entitled
to his costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

                               CONCLUSION

¶29          For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the
superior court and award Allen his costs on appeal.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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