Court Opinion

ID: 9663190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:31:03.381233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:46.448253
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. Plaintiff pled that at the time in question he was in the course and scope of his employment as a police officer. The defendant admitted such to be the fact.
Our prior holdings conclude that policemen and firemen assume the risks of their occupations and that, absent a statute or ordinance to the contrary, one creating a risk does not become liable to such public servants except for those damages proximately caused by design or by willful or wanton negligence. This result has been based on the theory that one owes no duty to be free of ordinary negligence to persons engaged in the occupations of fireman or policeman. Buchanan v. Prickett & Son, *102Inc., 203 Neb. 684, 279 N.W.2d 855 (1979); Nared v. School Dist. of Omaha, 191 Neb. 376, 215 N.W.2d 115 (1974); Wax v. Co-Operative Refinery Assn., 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d 707 (1951). We have also held it is immaterial that one engaged in such an occupation acts on his own initiative because of facts which come to his attention during the course of his duties. Nared v. School Dist. of Omaha, supra.
The majority opinion tells us that the reasons which justify the application of the fireman’s rule in cases where firemen are injured when involved with personal property are the same which support the rule in fires involving real property. It then asserts that a similar analogy cannot be made to policemen injured while performing their duties on other than private premises. The majority does not undertake to tell us why such an analogy cannot be made. Such an analogy not only can be made, it cannot be avoided. Both firemen and policemen are public servants paid to incur the risks of their occupations. That is the articulated rationale of the rule in this jurisdiction. No rational distinction can be made between firemen and policemen whether they are performing their duties on private premises or in circumstances involving personal property.
The fireman’s rule has withstood attack in other jurisdictions from those who misunderstand its genesis and underlying policy. See Walters v. Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977), which noted that the principle denying recovery to those voluntarily undertaking the hazard causing injury is fundamental in a number of doctrines, including nullification of the duty of care, satisfaction of the duty to warn because the hazard is known, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, as well as in the fireman’s rule. The rule finds its clearest application in a situation where a person who, fully aware of the hazard created by the defendant’s negligence, voluntarily confronts the *103risk for compensation. Firemen and policemen are paid for the work they perform and are prepared to face the hazards of their employment and deal with perils when they arise. When death, injury, or disability occurs, compensation is provided not only through the workmen’s compensation law but, in certain circumstances, by other special benefit statutes. As stated in Scheurer v. Trustees, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38 (1963), a suggestion that there is a difference between policemen and firemen is not impressive. Both act under authority of law, appear at any time, without notice or warning, and the owner of the property may not exclude them.
The result reached by the majority is not logically consistent with our prior pronouncements. If this case is to signal the abrogation of the fireman’s rule in this jurisdiction, we should say so forthrightly and not leave the world in a quandary as to what the rule means and whether it will be applied. Moreover, I would not agree that a departure from the rule is sound or desirable.
I would reverse with instructions to dismiss.
Boslaugh and Clinton, JJ., join in this dissent.