Court Opinion

ID: 9734204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:28:19.514667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:46.777475
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in the reversal of the Court of Appeals). The statute proscribes as a ninety-day misdemeanor transporting or possessing a loaded firearm other than a pistol in a motor vehicle.1 It further proscribes, as a two-year misde*199meanor, transporting or possessing a firearm, loaded or unloaded, except "[t]aken down,” "[enclosed in a case,” "[c]arried in the trunk of the vehicle,” or "[inaccessible from the interior of the vehicle.”2
I agree with the majority that the statute imposes on a person who would so transport or possess a firearm the obligations both to so render the firearm inaccessible and to unload the firearm. Before transporting or possessing a firearm other than a pistol in a motor vehicle a citizen is thus obliged to see to it that the firearm is "taken down,” or enclosed in a case, or placed in the trunk of the vehicle, or in a place inaccessible from the interior of the vehicle, and also to assure that it is unloaded.
Consistent with the statutory purpose to impose such obligations, a prima facie case of violation of the statutory proscriptions is made on evidence tending to show that the accused transported or possessed a loaded firearm in a vehicle. So far, the majority and I agree._
*200I write separately because I would hold that knowledge that the firearm is loaded is an element of the offense. Although the prosecutor makes a prima facie case on evidence tending to show that a loaded firearm was so transported or possessed, he has the burden of establishing and persuading the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused not only knowingly transported or possessed the firearm but also that he did so knowing that the firearm was loaded.3
The law does not impose on the plaintiff, in a civil or criminal case, an impossible burden of proof. It aids the plaintiff by permitting the trier of fact to infer knowledge or scienter from evidentiary facts that reasonably permit such an inference to be drawn.4 I would thus agree that it is reasonable to also conclude that the prosecutor makes a prima facie case of knowledge that the firearm was loaded upon adducing evidentiary facts tending to show no more than that the accused transported or possessed in a motor vehicle a loaded firearm other than a pistol, without proferring additional evidence respecting knowledge that the firearm was loaded.
On the facts of this case, this is somewhat academic. The evidence was overwhelming that Kevin Quinn, who was sentenced to serve a term of forty-five days, committed the lesser offense by transporting, loaded or unloaded, a large quantity of firearms readily accessible from the interior of the vehicle.
In another case, however, the accused might *201offer evidence that he dutifully took the firearm apart and carefully ascertained that it was unloaded before storing it in a case in the trunk of the vehicle. In the months following, he did not recheck to determine whether the firearm was still in the case or trunk, let alone whether it was loaded. Somehow or other, an errant child, or companion, or other person, "must have” "borrowed” the firearm and returned it without the accused’s knowledge to the case and the trunk loaded with a cartridge.
Unless the duty imposed by the statute requires a person to recheck the firearm to determine whether it is still unloaded every time he enters the vehicle, the trier of fact would, if persuaded by such an exculpatory factual recital, be justified in finding that the statute was not violated. Under the majority’s construction, the judge is obliged to instruct the jury that it must find the defendant guilty even if it believes the exculpatory recital.
The trier of fact, the jury in many cases, is bright enough to see through a defense asserting lack of knowledge where such defense is unwarranted. There is no need to eliminate knowledge as an element of the offense in order to effectively enforce this legislation, which was not aimed at a problem confronting prosecutors in establishing knowledge, but rather at the absence of any legislation proscribing the carrying of loaded firearms other than pistols in motor vehicles in urban areas.5

 1981 PA 103, adding § 227d to the Penal Code:
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by law, a person shall not transport or possess in or upon a motor vehicle or any self-propelled vehicle designed for land travel a firearm, other than a pistol, unless the firearm is unloaded and is 1 or more of the following:
(a) Taken down.
(b) Enclosed in a case.
(c) Carried in the trunk of the vehicle.
(d) Inaccessible from the interior of the vehicle.
*199(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both. [MCL 750.227d; MSA 28.424(4).]

 1981 PA 103, adding § 227c to the Penal Code:
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by law, a person shall not transport or possess in or upon a sailboat or a motor vehicle, aircraft, motorboat, or any other vehicle propelled by mechanical means, a firearm, other than a pistol, which is loaded.
(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years, or a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or both.
(3) This section does not apply to a person who violates section 10(1)(g) of chapter II of Act No. 286 of the Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being section 312.10 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. [MCL 750.227c; MSA 28.424(3).]
See n 5 for text of § 10(1)(g) referred to in § 227c(3).

 A jury finding that the accused did not ascertain that the firearm was unloaded before it was stored in the vehicle, would tend to discredit a claim that the accused did not know, when the firearm was transported or possessed, that it was loaded.

 See, generally, People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 315-316; 187 NW2d 434 (1971); 9 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 2486, p 288; 2 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), §§ 337, 342, 343, pp 427, 449-460.

 See majority ante, pp 191-194, discussing § 10(1)(g) of the Game Law (MCL 311.1 et seq.; MSA 13.1321 et seq., which provided that it is a ninety-day misdemeanor to transport, or have in possession, in a motor vehicle a loaded firearm in an area frequented by wild birds or wild animals, and the legislative purpose to proscribe transporting or possessing loaded firearms in motor vehicles in an urban area. Section 10(1)(g) provides:
Unless otherwise specified, a person shall not do any of the *202following:
Transport, or have in possession, in or upon an automobile, aircraft, motorboat, sailboat, or any other vehicle propelled by mechanical means, while in an area frequented by wild birds and wild animals, a gun or other firearm, except a pistol or revolver, unless the gun or firearm is unloaded in both the barrel and magazine; or a bow, unless it is unstrung. [MCL 312.10(1)(g); MSA 13.1339(1)(g).]