Court Opinion

ID: 9962261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 14:07:55.317897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:12.499576
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3290-21

THOMAS NUSCIS,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOHN KEE and NEW JERSEY
DIVISION OF TAXATION,

     Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________

                   Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided April 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Cape May County, Docket No. L-0440-18.

                   Jacobs & Barbone, PA, attorneys for appellant (David
                   A. Castaldi, on the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondents (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
                   General, of counsel; Justine Marie Longa, Deputy
                   Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff appeals from the Law Division's dismissal of his civil rights

complaint against the Division of Taxation (Division) and one of its employees.

The Law Division applied the entire controversy doctrine (ECD) to reach its

conclusion. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the dismissal, but on

different grounds than the trial court. See Brown v. Brown, 470 N.J. Super. 457,

463 (App. Div. 2022) (noting "we review orders and not opinions").

Specifically, we affirm the state's motion to dismiss because we find a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

                                       I.

      In 2015, the Division commenced an audit of plaintiff's business. Co-

defendant, John Kee, a Division employee, oversaw the audit. The audit lasted

ten months, and acrimony developed between plaintiff and Kee during their

frequent interactions.   During this period, plaintiff locked Kee out of his

business, and Kee admitted that he told plaintiff, "[t]he harder you are on me,

the harder it's going to be on you in the end." In October 2016, the Division

conducted a post-audit conference that ended abruptly when Division

representatives, including Kee, believed plaintiff was recording them without

their knowledge or consent.

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        On December 7, 2017, the Division issued a final administrative decision

fixing the amount of corporate and personal taxes plaintiff and his spouse owed

to the State at $70,000. On February 27, 2018, plaintiff sued the Division in the

Tax Court, challenging its assessment.1

        On October 18, 2018, plaintiff filed a second complaint, but in the Law

Division. Plaintiff alleged the Division and co-defendant Kee violated his rights

under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 to -2, by a combination

of intentional and negligent acts during the course of plaintiff's audit.

Defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the civil rights complaint for

failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), or in the alternative, remove

the matter to Tax Court. After the trial court denied defendants' motion, plaintiff

amended his complaint to incorporate the allegation that defendants also

violated the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law (The Taxpayer Bill of Rights),

N.J.S.A. 54:48-1, -7.

        Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted,

after finding several grounds for dismissal not relevant here. Plaintiff filed for

reconsideration of the court's February 7, 2022 order. Noting the unusual

procedural posture of the case and the risk of inconsistent outcomes due to

1
    Plaintiff's Tax Court appeal, docket no. 001468-2018, is currently pending.
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plaintiff "proceeding in two different cases in two different courts . . . ," the

court found dismissal was appropriate, but narrowed its grounds to a single

rationale, the ECD. Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration and

following oral arguments, the court again denied plaintiff's motion.

      On appeal, plaintiff seeks reversal, arguing that he has the right to pursue

his civil rights claim in the Law Division, separate and apart from his Tax Court

appeal, and that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint using the ECD.

                                       II.

      "We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court order dismissing

a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e)." Arsenis v. Borough of Bernardsville, 476 N.J.

Super. 195, 205 (App. Div. 2023) (citing Stop & Shop Supermarkets Co. v. Cty.

of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017)). "Under the rule, we owe

no deference to the motion judge's conclusions." Ibid. (citing Rezem Fam.

Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div.

2011)). We limit our inquiry to "examin[ing] 'the legal sufficiency of the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint.'" Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin,

Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 107 (2019) (quoting

Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). As

such, "[a] pleading should be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and

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discovery would not provide one." Arsenis, 476 N.J. Super. at 205 (quoting

Rezem Fam. Assocs., 423 N.J. Super. at 113).

      Subject matter jurisdiction involves "a threshold determination as to

whether [a court] is legally authorized to decide the question presented."

Robertelli v. N.J. Office of Att'y. Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 479 (2016) (quoting

Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 280-81 (1981)). When a court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, its authority to consider the case is "wholly and immediately

foreclosed." Ibid.

                                       III.

      We affirm the order dismissing plaintiff's civil rights complaint with

prejudice; however, we engage in a different analysis.

      N.J.S.A. 54:49-18(a) states in pertinent part:

                   If any taxpayer shall be aggrieved by any finding
            or assessment of the director, he may, within 90 days
            after the giving of the notice of assessment or finding,
            file a protest in writing signed by himself or his duly
            authorized agent, certified to be true, which shall set
            forth the reason therefor, and may request a hearing.
            Thereafter the director shall grant a hearing to the
            taxpayer, if the same shall be requested, and shall make
            a final determination confirming, modifying[,] or
            vacating any such finding or assessment.

                     ....

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             The time for appeal to the Tax Court . . . shall
             commence from the date of the final determination by
             the director.

      Rule 2:2-3(a)(1) governs appeals taken from orders of the Tax Court. It

states in pertinent part: "appeals may be taken to the Appellate Division as of

right . . . from final judgments of . . . the Tax Court."

      We have considered our exclusive role in reviewing appeals of

administrative agency actions, stating:

                   "Judicial review of administrative agency action
             is a matter of constitutional right in New Jersey."
             Pursuant to that constitutional provision, the Supreme
             Court adopted Rules 2:2-3 and 2:2-4, vesting the
             Appellate Division with exclusive jurisdiction for the
             review of administrative agency action and inaction,
             "with the intention that every proceeding to review the
             action or inaction of a state administrative agency
             would be by appeal to the Appellate Division."

                    The exclusivity of our jurisdiction may not be
             circumvented by framing a claim as one ordinarily
             presented in the trial court, such as actions in lieu of
             prerogative writs or declaratory judgments, or through
             procedural maneuvers such as consolidating an
             administrative action with a legal action in the trial
             court.

             [N.J. Election Law Enf't Comm'n v. DiVencenzo, 451
             N.J. Super. 554, 568-9 (App. Div. 2017) (internal
             citations omitted).]

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      The principles we articulated in DiVencenzo resonate clearly with the

facts before us and are dispositive. The trial court's effort to address the matter

using an entire controversy analysis was misplaced, as the court had no

jurisdiction, on this record, to entertain any complaint by plaintiff related to the

tax audit. The record shows plaintiff was aggrieved by the audit findings and

assessments of the Division and one of its employees, John Kee. Plaintiff's

position was, and remains, that Kee's alleged hostility towards him can somehow

be linked to the accuracy of the Division's audit.

      Plaintiff's statutory remedy—when contesting the accuracy of the

Division's audit—is limited to appealing from the Division's final administrative

decision. We have exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals, and our jurisdiction

"does not turn on the theory of the challenging party's claim or the nature of the

relief sought." Beaver v. Magellan Health Servs., Inc., 433 N.J. Super. 430, 442

(App. Div. 2013) (quoting Mutschler v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmental

Protection, 337 N.J. Super 1, 9 (App. Div. 2001)).           Plaintiff's attempt to

bootstrap complaints about the results of his tax audit to the New Jersey Civil

Rights Act in order to purchase a foothold in the Law Division does not change

the outcome. And our exclusive jurisdiction only "extends to claims that are

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joined with claims that are within the jurisdiction of another court or division of

this court." Ibid. (citation omitted).

      While we find the trial court was unable to consider this matter due to lack

of subject matter jurisdiction, we add the following brief comment. Our New

Jersey Civil Rights Act jurisprudence does not countenance actions against the

State itself. We have found that the State is not a person for purposes of the Act

and "is immune from a suit for damages under the [New Jersey] Civil Rights

Act." Brown v. State, 442 N.J. Super. 406, 426 (App. Div. 2015) rev'd on other

grounds 230 N.J. 84 (2017). As to co-defendant Kee, our careful review of this

record reveals no facts which would defeat his affirmative defense of qualified

immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

("Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather

is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against

the State itself.").

      To the extent we have not addressed any arguments by plaintiff, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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