Court Opinion

ID: 9919482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:32.928949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.617601
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0470-KB

RODERICK ANIBAL TEJEDA                                                MOVANT

V.                               IN SUPREME COURT

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION                                         RESPONDENT

               ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
                    AND SUA SPONTE MODIFYING

      The Petition for Rehearing filed by Roderick Anibal Tejada, of the Opinion

and Order of the Court, rendered September 28, 2023, is DENIED. This Court

sua sponte elects to modify its Opinion and Order of the Court, rendered

September 28, 2023, to correct language in numerical paragraph 3 of the

Opinion and Order. The original Opinion and Order is modified as set forth in

the attached Opinion and Order.

      All sitting. All concur.

      ENTERED: January 18, 2024.

                                      ______________________________________
                                      CHIEF JUSTICE
                                           RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                              MODIFIED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                        TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0470-KB

RODERICK ANIBAL TEJEDA                                                 MOVANT

V.                           IN SUPREME COURT

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION                                         RESPONDENT

                            OPINION AND ORDER

     Roderick Anibal Tejeda applied for reinstatement to the practice of law

pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court (SCR) 3.502 after this Court imposed

a four-year suspension from the practice of law for misconduct following his

plea of guilty to reckless homicide stemming from an automobile accident in

which the driver of the other vehicle was killed. See Tejeda v. Kentucky Bar

Association, 456 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2015). The Board of Governors of the

Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) by a unanimous vote of 20-0 (one member

absent) recommended Tejeda’s reinstatement. We ordered further review

pursuant to SCR 3.370(9). The parties filed briefs, and this matter stands

submitted. Following review, we have determined to accept the Board’s

recommendation to reinstate Tejeda upon the conditions set forth herein.

      Tejeda was licensed to practice law in 1996. His bar roster address is

listed 102 Sundae Drive, Richmond, KY 40475-8540, although he currently
does not reside in Kentucky. Tejeda initially worked in private practice

handling bankruptcy, divorce, and criminal defense matters. After two years in

private practice, he worked as a patrol agent for the United States Border

Patrol. After four years as a patrol agent, Tejeda moved to the Dominican

Republic to teach English and study Spanish. In 2005, Tejeda returned to

Kentucky after accepting a position as an assistant Wayne County Attorney.

After working in that position for one-and-a-half years, Tejeda was employed as

an assistant Madison County Attorney for one year. He then returned to Wayne

County and worked as an assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney for six months

before resuming his employment as an assistant County Attorney. Tejeda

remained in that role until he was terminated in 2012 following a fatal motor

vehicle collision which underlies the present reinstatement proceeding.

      Tejeda, by his own admission, is a recovering alcoholic. His problems

with alcohol began in his late high school and early college years. Tejeda

realized he needed to address his problems with alcohol after meeting a group

of missionaries from Los Angeles while he was living in the Dominican

Republic. Soon afterward, he became involved with Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).

Tejeda maintained sobriety for approximately one-and-a-half years until he

stopped participating in AA consistently. He alternated between several months

of sobriety and several months of alcohol use.

                                        2
      On November 21, 2006, Tejeda was arrested for DUI in Laurel County.

He was eventually found guilty of DUI in 2010 following the entry of an Alford 1

plea. Between 2007 and 2012, Tejeda returned to AA sporadically and

continued his pattern of alternating between sobriety and alcohol use.

      On April 19, 2012, Tejeda was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision

in Monticello, Kentucky. He had consumed “a lot” of vodka at approximately

6:30 a.m. after drinking on and off the entire night before. Around 9:00 a.m.,

Tejeda was driving under the influence of alcohol at an excessive rate of speed

and struck another vehicle. The collision resulted in the death of the other

driver, Jarus Helen Neal.

      Tejeda was indicted for vehicular homicide. He filed a motion to suppress

the blood test results, which the trial court granted. The Commonwealth’s

appeal from the suppression order was dismissed by the Court of Appeals as

untimely. Under a subsequent agreement with the Commonwealth, Tejeda pled

guilty to an amended charge of reckless homicide, a class D felony, and entered

pre-trial diversion. Pursuant to SCR 3.166, Tejeda was automatically

suspended from the practice of law on September 11, 2013, the day after the

entry of his guilty plea.

      On December 3, 2013, the KBA Inquiry Commission charged Tejeda with

violating SCR 3.130-8.4(b) by “committing a criminal act that reflects adversely

on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness and fitness.” Tejeda answered the

      1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

                                           3
charge and later filed a motion for a negotiated sanction in this Court pursuant

to SCR 3.480(2). The KBA filed a response in support of Tejeda’s motion. This

Court granted the motion for a negotiated sanction and issued an opinion and

order suspending Tejeda from the practice of law for four years retroactive to

September 11, 2013, the effective date of the automatic suspension following

his guilty plea, or until he was finally released from probation and parole.

Tejeda, 456 S.W.3d at 407. We additionally ordered Tejeda to remain drug and

alcohol free and to continue ongoing monitoring by the Kentucky Lawyer

Assistance Program (KYLAP). Id.

      While on probation, Tejeda completed a six-month impatient treatment

program at The Healing Place. He became a peer mentor and eventually a peer

mentor supervisor, helping other patients who entered the program. While

receiving in-patient treatment, Tejeda also took advantage of vocational

training and obtained a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and ultimately

obtained employment as a truck driver.

      While continuing his work as a truck driver, Tejeda also received training

to become a certified drug and alcohol counselor. He is licensed to practice

counseling in Kentucky and Georgia. Tejeda also received specific training and

became a DUI education instructor. From the time of his suspension until the

present, Tejeda has been continuously employed as a certified alcohol and drug

counselor or as a commercial truck driver.

                                        4
        On August 13, 2018, Tejeda pro se applied for reinstatement. Tejeda had

maintained sobriety throughout his probation in the criminal case and was

finally released from supervision on September 17, 2018. 2

        While the investigation into Tejeda’s application was pending, Tejeda

experienced a relapse in October 2019. He attributed the relapse to a personal

financial crisis and academic difficulties. 3 By his own words, Tejeda’s addiction

to alcohol was “immediately . . . back out of control.” Tejeda was drinking

approximately twelve beers a day for the duration of the relapse. He denied

driving while intoxicated during the period of relapse.

        In December 2019, Tejeda attended the Kentucky Law Update (KLU) in

Lexington where he saw KYLAP Director Yvette Hourigan. Hourigan

subsequently requested a meeting with Tejeda and Tejeda’s KYLAP monitor. At

the meeting, Hourigan indicated she smelled alcohol on Tejeda at the KLU.

Tejeda lied and denied consuming alcohol. Following this incident, Tejeda

recommitted himself to participation in AA and has remained sober. However,

Tejeda did not disclose his relapse to anyone in his support system.

        Approximately eighteen months later, on July 31, 2021, after retaining

counsel to represent him in the pending reinstatement proceedings, Tejeda

apologized to Hourigan and disclosed the circumstances of the relapse to the

Character and Fitness Committee.

        2 The felony charge was later dismissed as diverted on September 21,

2021.
        3 Tejeda was pursuing a master’s degree program at the time.

                                           5
      The Character and Fitness Committee conducted a formal hearing on

Tejeda’s application on March 8, 2022. At the conclusion of the hearing, Chief

Bar Counsel and the applicant, by counsel, conferred and Bar Counsel agreed

to recommend Tejeda’s reinstatement conditioned on him submitting to

immediate enhanced monitoring with KYLAP. Enhanced monitoring consists of

weekly in-person contact with an impartial monitor, random drug testing, and

a requirement to enter a 5-year KYLAP agreement with continued enhanced

monitoring should reinstatement be granted. Bar Counsel withdrew its

agreement to conditional reinstatement after Tejeda advised he could not

comply with immediate enhanced monitoring because he was living out-of-state

and on the road as a commercial truck driver. On July 5, 2022, the Character

and Fitness Committee approved Tejeda’s reinstatement but conditioned such

approval on Tejeda immediately submitting to enhanced monitoring as

previously negotiated by Bar Counsel.

      Tejeda appealed to the Board of Governors and sought to remove the

requirement of immediate enhanced monitoring. Bar Counsel opposed Tejeda’s

reinstatement before the Board. Following a hearing, the Board unanimously

recommended Tejeda’s reinstatement and concluded the imposition of

enhanced monitoring on a pre-reinstatement basis was unduly burdensome

due to the nature of Tejeda’s employment as a truck driver. Instead, the Board

recommended the imposition of enhanced monitoring within ninety days of

reinstatement in addition to any conditions arising from Tejeda’s prior KYLAP

agreement which would continue under a new agreement for a period of five

                                        6
years. 4 The parties did not file a notice of review under SCR 3.370(8), but this

Court notified the parties of our decision to review the decision of the Board

pursuant to SCR 3.370(9).

      Under Kentucky law, the suspension or disbarment of an attorney is not

necessarily a permanent disability. In re May, 249 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1952). Our

predecessor Court explained the principle:

      We are not willing to say that no matter what a disbarred
      attorney’s subsequent conduct may be; no matter how hard and
      successfully he has tried to live down his past and atone for his
      offense; no matter how complete his reformation—the door to
      restoration is forever sealed against him. Even wrongdoers
      convicted of crime are given another chance.

In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1097 (1938). Nevertheless, “re-

entrance into the profession is not a matter of grace or pardon for past

offenses.” Lester v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 532 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ky. 1975). This Court

has a duty to protect “the interests of the public and the profession as well as

those of the applicant for reinstatement.” In re Cohen, 706 S.W.2d 832, 834

(Ky. 1986). (citing In re Weaks, 407 S,W,2d 408 (1966)).

      The Board and Committee considered Tejeda’s reinstatement application

under the standards set forth in SCR 2.300(6) 5 which provides as follows:

      (a) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing
      evidence that he/she has complied with every term of the order of
      suspension or disbarment.

      4 Tejeda’s prior KYLAP agreement had lapsed and could not be renewed because

he was residing out-of-state.
      5 SCR 2.300 was deleted by order of this Court effective April 1, 2022. SCR

3.503 was promulgated to replace SCR 2.300 and provides the current standard for
reinstatement. The standards for reinstatement under SCR 3.503(1)-(2) are
substantively the same as those previously set forth in SCR 2.300(6)-(7).

                                          7
      (b) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing
      evidence that his/her conduct while under suspension shows that
      he/she is worthy of the trust and confidence of the public.

      (c) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing
      evidence that he/she possesses sufficient professional capabilities
      to serve the public as a lawyer.

      (d) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing
      evidence that he/she presently exhibits good moral character.

      (e) Whether the applicant has presented clear and convincing
      evidence that he/she appreciates the wrongfulness of his/her prior
      misconduct, that he/she has manifest contrition for his/her prior
      professional misconduct, and has rehabilitated himself/herself
      from past derelictions.

“Failure to meet any of these criteria may constitute a sufficient basis for denial

of a petitioner’s application.” Id.

      Additionally, an applicant for reinstatement is “held to a substantially

more rigorous standard than a first-time applicant for an initial admission to

the Bar,” and “[t]he prior determination that [the applicant] engaged in

professional misconduct continues to be evidence against him[.]” SCR 2.300(7).

In addition to the criteria listed above that must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence, the Committee is to consider and weigh the following

factors:

      •    The nature of the misconduct for which the applicant was
           suspended or disbarred.

      •    The applicant’s conception of the serious nature of his or her
           act.

      •    The applicant’s sense of wrongdoing.

                                         8
      •   The applicant’s previous and subsequent conduct and attitude
          toward the courts and the practice, including the element of
          time elapsed since disbarment.

      •   The applicant’s candor in dealing with the Character and
          Fitness Committee.

      •   The relevant knowledge of witnesses called by the applicant.

Id.

      This Court determines the question of whether an applicant has satisfied

the reinstatement standards using a totality of the circumstances approach.

Greene v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 904 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Ky. 1995). While the nature of

the underlying misconduct is a factor to be considered, it is not the most

important factor. Id. “The ultimate and decisive question is whether the

applicant is now of good moral character and is a fit and proper person to be

reentrusted with the confidence and privilege of being an attorney at law.” Id.

at 236 (quoting Cohen, 706 S.W.2d at 834).

      Historically, we have tended to follow the Board’s recommendations

“unless we entertain more than a doubt as to their correctness.” In re

Rosenberg, 313 Ky. 236, 230 S.W.2d 434, 436 (1950). However, while we

carefully consider the Board’s recommendations, they are not binding because

this Court possesses the sole authority “to enter a final order granting or

denying reinstatement.” Howell v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 617 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Ky.

2021).

      At the outset, the severity of the misconduct for which Tejeda was

suspended cannot be overstated. His reckless behavior, committed while in a

                                        9
position of public trust, caused the death of another person. We have not

discovered any comparable Kentucky precedents granting reinstatement where

an attorney’s criminal conduct resulted in a person’s death. The highest courts

of other jurisdictions have however considered the question and reinstated

attorneys following similar misconduct. See In re Guzzino, 185 N.J. 601, 889

A.2d 1056 (2006) (summarily reinstating attorney convicted of vehicular

homicide); Matter of Barber, 143 N.J. 559, 674 A.2d 169 (1996) (same); Off. of

Disciplinary Couns. v. Michaels, 50 Ohio St.3d 607, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990)

(summarily reinstating attorney who pleaded guilty to involuntary

manslaughter and DUI); Matter of Reinstatement of Arnett, 2022 OK 87, 520

P.3d 840, 846 (2022) (reinstating attorney who pleaded guilty to first-degree

manslaughter following alcohol-related collision); In re Morgan, 2014 OK 110,

340 P.3d 1, 6 (2014) (same); In re Evans, 380 S.C. 108, 669 S.E.2d 85, 88

(2008) (reinstating attorney who pleaded guilty to felony DUI causing death).

      This Court has also been mindful of the effects of addiction in its

determinations. We expressed the rule for when mental health disabilities may

be accorded mitigation effect in a lawyer disciplinary case as follows:

      For evidence of a lawyer’s disability to be accorded a mitigating
      effect in a KBA disciplinary case, it must be shown that the
      disability caused the misconduct. KBA v. Steiner, 157 S.W.3d 209,
      213 (Ky. 2005) (the burden of establishing a successful mitigation
      defense remains with the attorney); KBA v. Christian, 320 S.W.3d
      687 (Ky. 2010). The attorney must also show a recovery from the
      condition demonstrated by “meaningful and sustained proof of
      successful rehabilitation.” Id. at 690 (citing ABA Standards for
      Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Section 9.32(i)(3)). Moreover, “the
      misconduct must have stopped and recurrence proved to be

                                       10
      unlikely.” Id. In this vein, consideration should also be given to the
      attorney’s involvement in Alcoholics Anonymous and “earnest
      participation in the Kentucky Lawyer’s Assistance Program.” KBA
      v. Hawkins, 260 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky. 2008); ABA Standards for
      Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Section 9.32. 6

Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Hill, 476 S.W.3d 874, 884 (Ky. 2015).

      This Court is also mindful of its own decisions imposing suspension,

rather than permanent disbarment, as proper professional discipline in cases

involving reckless homicide. 7 Tejeda, 456 S.W.3d at 407; Ky. Bar Ass’n v.

Jones, 759 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Ky. 1988). Based upon the foregoing authority, we

conclude the seriousness of the misconduct for which Tejeda was suspended

does not, in itself, preclude his reinstatement.

      While reinstatement is available, the severity of Tejeda’s initial

misconduct continues to weigh heavily against his application. SCR 2.300(7).

Further, Tejeda failed to exhibit the necessary candor concerning relapse in the

fall of 2019 and that fact alone would be sufficient cause to deny his

application. See SCR 2.300(6). Tejeda did not inform anyone of his ongoing and

      6 Section 9.32 factors which may be considered in mitigation.

             . . . . Mitigating factors include: (i) mental disability or chemical
      dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse when: (1) there is
      medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical
      dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical dependency or mental
      disability caused the misconduct; (3) the respondent's recovery from the
      chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a
      meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the
      recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is
      unlikely[.]

     7 Permanent disbarment disqualifies an attorney from seeking reinstatement.

Huffman v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 422 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Ky. 2013); SCR 3.380.

                                          11
excessive alcohol use until it was discovered by chance at a KLU event and

then he lied about it. This lie directly related to a primary object of the

reinstatement inquiry—Tejeda’s management of his addiction to alcohol. See

Character & Fitness Comm. v. Sowell, 599 S.W.3d 439, 443-44 (Ky. 2020).

      This Court understands “[t]he potential for relapses is always present”

during the recovery process. Strasser v. Character & Fitness Comm., 160

S.W.3d 789, 797 (Ky. 2005) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). While Tejeda’s

response to his relapse will not be the basis for the rejection of his application,

it will serve to fashion the conditions included within this Order.

      This Court has carefully reviewed the record and acknowledges the

substantial and praiseworthy efforts Tejeda has made toward positive change.

He has worked to reform himself as well as to educate and assist other

struggling people in the hope they will avoid the devastations of addiction. The

record contains several reference letters attesting to the quality of Tejeda’s

character. Tejeda also testified that it is his intention to return to Kentucky to

practice law, be closer to his child, and be of service to the substance abuse

recovery community. For these reasons, we grant Tejada’s reinstatement

provided he complies with the conditions which we will now address.

      Given the serious nature of his original offense, his later relapse, and the

obvious benefits of maintaining sobriety, we agree with the Board’s

recommendation to impose enhanced monitoring (consisting of weekly in-

person contact with an impartial monitor and random testing) in addition to

any conditions arising from Tejeda’s prior KYLAP agreement which would

                                         12
resume under a new KYLAP agreement for a period of no less than five years.

      However, we do not agree with the Board’s recommendation that Tejeda

be allowed to first be reinstated and only thereafter enter a new KYLAP

Agreement and submit to enhanced monitoring. Such compliance will be a

condition precedent to his reinstatement. Given that Tejada was not residing in

Kentucky during the period of his reapplication, and could therefore not enter

into a renewed KYLAP agreement, one of his conditions of readmission will be

that he first acquire, and thereafter maintain, a Kentucky residence so as to

allow direct and unhindered KYLAP monitoring.

      Therefore, pursuant to SCR 3.503, it is hereby ORDERED that Roderick

Anibal Tejeda’s application for reinstatement to the practice of law in the

Commonwealth of Kentucky is granted conditioned upon the following:

      1. Payment of all costs associated with these proceedings in accordance

with SCR 3.503(5), said sum being $2,743.15;

      2. Prior to reinstatement, Tejeda establishing and thereafter maintaining

a Kentucky residence so that he may be subject to enhanced monitoring and

participate in a new KLAP agreement. He shall promptly notify Bar Counsel

and KYLAP of this address once acquired;

      3. Tejeda submitting to enhanced monitoring as set out by the Board in

its Recommendation and such other terms and provisions as authorized to be

implemented by KYLAP pursuant to SCR 3.980 concerning his ongoing

recovery at the direction and discretion of KYLAP.

                                       13
      4. Tejeda entering a new agreement with KYLAP for a minimum period of

five years or as long thereafter as KYLAP deems necessary. KYLAP may amend

the conditions of Tejeda’s participation in the program, and his agreement with

it, as it deems appropriate. Tejeda shall execute a release to allow Bar Counsel

to access KYLAP monitoring reports; and,

      5. Payment of any outstanding bar dues and current CLE compliance;

      6. Completion of any other conditions of reinstatement as set forth within

SCR 3.503.

      All sitting. Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Thompson, JJ., concur. Nickell,

J., dissents by separate opinion in which VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, J., join.

      NICKELL, J., DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. This Court’s rules

and precedents require an applicant for reinstatement to demonstrate

exemplary conduct following suspension from the practice of law. Lester v. Ky.

Bar Ass’n, 532 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Ky. 1975). On the present record, Tejeda’s

manifest lack of candor concerning the management of his addiction to alcohol

“call[s] for denial of the reinstatement application.” Burns v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 318

S.W.3d 591, 597 (Ky. 2010).

      Contrary to the initial imposition of discipline, our caselaw maintains

that “[s]ympathy and mitigation . . . should not be a valid consideration in

judging the merits of reinstatement.” In re Cohen, 706 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky.

1986). Similarly, the mere passage of time cannot offset an applicant’s failure

to satisfy the stringent reinstatement criteria set forth in SCR 2.300(6). Burns,

318 S.W.3d at 597. Although the disease of addiction may explain Tejeda’s

                                       14
behavior, it does not excuse his lack of candor. See Deters v. Ky. Bar Ass’n,

627 S.W.3d 917, 926 n.14 (Ky. 2021) (noting the presence of addictive

behaviors may reflect an applicant’s moral character, “but in the context of an

attorney’s reinstatement, honesty, truthfulness, candor, honor, professionalism

and integrity are also important.”). To be clear, the fact of relapse is not itself

deserving of censure; the blameworthiness stems from Tejeda’s avoidance of

truth. An applicant’s honesty is the “crux of a reinstatement proceeding”

because a lack of candor may indicate “a lack of rehabilitation.” Skaggs v.

Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 954 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1997); Futrell v. Kentucky Bar

Ass’n, 189 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Ky. 2006). Moreover, candor is of paramount

importance to the reinstatement process because “a general lack of candor with

the Committee . . . could foreshadow a future lack of candor with courts.”

Burns, 318 S.W.3d at 594.

      It is axiomatic that an applicant for reinstatement faces a higher

standard than that of a first-time applicant. SCR 2.300(7). In Character &

Fitness Comm. of Ky. Off. of Bar Admis. v. Sowell, 599 S.W.3d 439, 442 (Ky.

2020), we recently revoked an impaired attorney’s conditional admission after a

series of relapses that culminated in the attorney’s failure to report a positive

screen for alcohol and cocaine “to KYLAP or to his KYLAP monitor, as required

by his KYLAP Supervision Agreement.” We refused to discount the attorney’s

violation as “a minor breach, such as a speeding ticket” because “[t]he violation

was for what must be considered the primary reason [the attorney] has been

under conditional admission[.]” Id. at 443-44. The reasoning of Sowell

                                         15
compels the denial of the present application considering Tejeda’s higher

burden of proof, the greater magnitude of his prior misconduct, and his similar

lack of candor concerning relapse.

      During the pendency of the present application, Tejeda experienced a

prolonged relapse. When he was confronted with publicly being under the

influence of alcohol, Tejeda lied to the KYLAP director because he subjectively

associated the program with the disciplinary authorities. He continued

abusing alcohol on a daily basis for several weeks thereafter until he had a

dream where he was threatened with arrest for drinking. While Tejeda

returned to AA in the aftermath of the fear instilled by this dream, there is no

indication he ever disclosed the circumstances of his relapse to anyone in his

support system. Neither does the record reveal the reason Tejeda waited one-

and-a-half years to disclose the relapse to the Committee. I cannot conceive an

adequate justification for such delay given the crucial significance of this

information. In re Meredith, 272 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky. 1954) (requiring an

applicant for reinstatement “to deal fairly with all facts known to him which are

relevant to a matter in issue”).

      With due respect to the indisputable strides Tejeda has made toward

positive change, the present record belies his claim to have fully and

realistically accepted responsibility for the management of his addiction.

Although Tejeda “has taken steps toward rehabilitation,” his lack of candor

regarding the central subject of this application precludes reinstatement at this

time. Burns, 318 S.W.3d at 597. Consistent with our decision in Sowell, I

                                        16
would deny Tejeda’s application for reinstatement with leave to submit a new

application in two years from the date of this Order. 599 S.W.3d at 444.

Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

      VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, J., join.

      ENTERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

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