Court Opinion

ID: 9370661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 15:05:47.477368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:22.980608
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                                     OPINION
Court of Appeals                                       This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
                                                         before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 3
 Krystalo Hetelekides, &c.,
         Appellant,
      v.
 County of Ontario et al.,
         Respondents.

 Mary Jo S. Korona, for appellant.
 Jason S. DiPonzio, for respondents.
 Pacific Legal Foundation, amicus curiae

 RIVERA, J.:

       Two fundamental legal principles govern our decision in this appeal. First, a tax

 foreclosure proceeding is in rem against the “res”—the taxable real property—and not an

 action in personam commenced against an individual to establish personal liability.
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                                              -2-                                          No. 3

Second, New York statutory law and state and federal constitutional guarantees of due

process require that the petitioner in a foreclosure proceeding must attempt notice that is

reasonably calculated to alert all parties with an interest in the property.

       Here, defendants commenced an in rem tax foreclosure proceeding and mailed the

statutorily-required notice to the publicly-listed owners of the property, posted and filed

the notice, and publicized the notice in the press. Upon learning that a person listed as an

owner died before the notices were issued, defendant County Treasurer also personally

contacted the sole business located on the property in an effort to identify and personally

inform a manager, owner, or any person in charge of the pending foreclosure proceeding.

Under these circumstances, defendants provided legally adequate notice of a validly

commenced tax foreclosure action. We therefore affirm the Appellate Division’s order.

                                               I.

       Plaintiff Krystalo Hetelekides, individually as the owner of the property and as

executor of the estate of her husband, decedent Demetrios Hetelekides (also known as

James Hetelekides), commenced this action against defendants County of Ontario and

County Treasurer Gary G. Baxter for damages plaintiff allegedly incurred as a result of the

tax foreclosure sale of decedent’s property in the Town of Hopewell. At the time of suit,

plaintiff had obtained title to the property after a third party purchased the property at public

auction and assigned the bid to plaintiff, who paid the entire purchase price. Plaintiff

alleged that she was owed the difference between the unpaid tax arrears and the auction

purchase price and interest.

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                                               -3-                                           No. 3

       According to the record of the bench trial, decedent owned the property and—with

plaintiff—operated a restaurant there. Until his death, decedent was responsible for paying

the real property taxes. He had not paid the annual tax by the January 1, 2005 deadline

when a tax lien was created by operation of law.

       Defendants took action pursuant to RPTL article 11 to collect the overdue tax. First,

the Treasurer hired a private commercial abstract company to identify the interested

parties; the investigator reported that, as of August 31, 2005, and again on May 31, 2006,

decedent was the publicly-listed property owner.1 Thereafter, on November 14, 2005, the

Treasurer included the property on a list of delinquent taxes and executed and filed the list

with the Clerk of the County in accordance with RPTL 1122.2 The tax remained unpaid

when decedent died on August 1, 2006, a year and a half after the tax became due and

almost a year after the filing of the delinquent taxes list.

1
  The abstract also listed Geo-Tas, Inc. as an owner of the property, but noted that it did
not have title. Our resolution of this appeal does not require us to consider whether the
separate notifications to Geo-Tas satisfied due process.
2
  RPTL 1122 (1) provides, in relevant part, that at least “one month after the receipt of the
return of unpaid taxes,” and at the first opportunity after 10 months from the lien date, “the
enforcing officer of each tax district shall execute a list of all parcels of real property[ ] . . .
affected by delinquent tax liens held and owned by such tax district.” The list of delinquent
taxes must describe each parcel, list “[t]he name or names of the owner or owners of each
such parcel as appearing on the tax roll,” and state the “amount of each tax lien upon such
parcel” (RPTL 1122 [6]).
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       As provided by RPTL 1123, on October 1, 2006—21 months after the lien date—

the Treasurer filed an in rem foreclosure petition in Ontario County Court.3 The same day,

the Treasurer’s Office sent notices of foreclosure and copies of the petition by certified

mail, return receipt requested, and by ordinary first class mail to the property, each

addressed separately to “James Hetelekides”; “Hetelekides, James”; and “Geo-Tas, Inc.”

All told, six separate mailings were sent to the property. The notice listed January 12, 2007,

as the final day to redeem the property.4 On October 2, the Treasurer also posted a copy of

the notice and petition in the Ontario County Clerk’s Office, published the notice in two

local newspapers, and ran additional publications in the newspapers on October 16 and

November 1. The certified mailings arrived on October 3, and a long-time employee of the

restaurant signed the return receipts, which were then returned to the Treasurer’s Office.

       During the bench trial, the Treasurer testified that he first became aware of

decedent’s death and that plaintiff was operating the restaurant in late December 2006 or

early January 2007. Thereafter, on three consecutive days during afternoon business hours,

the Treasurer personally contacted the restaurant to speak with someone regarding the

property. First, on Tuesday, January 9, 2007, the Treasurer called, identified himself, and

3
  RPTL 1123 requires an enforcing officer to file a petition of foreclosure, in a specified
form, “[t]wenty-one months after [the] lien date, or as soon thereafter as is practicable”
(RPTL 1123 [1]; see [2]-[4]).
4
  In New York, a taxpayer has a statutory right to “redeem” their property—that is, to pay
the delinquent taxes plus any charges in full—before a foreclosure becomes final (see
RPTL 1110). The concept of redemption developed as an equitable principle in the English
courts of chancery (see generally BFP v Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 US 531, 541
[1994]; 5 Tiffany Real Property § 1379 [3d ed, Sept. 2022 update])
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                                            -5-                                         No. 3

asked to “speak to the owner, the manager, [or] someone that’s in charge of the business.”

When he was told that no one was available, he said that “[i]t’s very imperative or very

important that I talk to somebody that owns the business or manages it or has control over

it,” and asked to be called back. Nobody responded. The Treasurer then called again the

following day and asked to “talk to somebody, the owner, somebody who is in charge, a

manager, anyone that can -- that has any authority [over the] business, please, I need to talk

to somebody.” The person who answered the phone said that no one was available, and the

Treasurer responded that he had “called yesterday” and “[i]t’s very important that I talk to

somebody.” The Treasurer did not hear back and, the next day at roughly 1:30 p.m., he

personally visited the restaurant, identified himself, and repeated to an employee that he

needed to speak with a manager or anyone with authority. He was told a third time that no

one was available. The Treasurer left his business card, asked for a return call, and

reiterated that it was “very important” that he speak with someone. It is undisputed that, at

the time of the Treasurer’s phone calls and visit, plaintiff worked daily at the restaurant.

       By plaintiff’s own testimony, the Treasurer’s Office and a Town employee gave her

conflicting information regarding whether the tax was paid in full. According to plaintiff,

after she received her residential tax bill, she went to the Treasurer’s Office in either late

December 2006 or early January 2007, paid that tax, and asked whether the tax on the

restaurant property had been paid. She maintained that a clerk in the Treasurer’s Office

informed her that the property tax had been paid. However, when she checked with the

Town’s offices, she was told by an employee that the tax was unpaid. She spoke to the

clerk at the Treasurer’s Office on two additional occasions and each time was told that the

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                                            -6-                                           No. 3

property tax was paid. The clerk testified that she did not recall those conversations, and

that, as a matter of course, an in-person inquiry related to a property would have been noted

in the Office’s records, but that no such record existed confirming plaintiff’s visits.

       The tax was still unpaid by the redemption deadline and it is undisputed that the

Treasurer declined plaintiff’s late offer to redeem. Thereafter, on February 5, 2007,

defendants successfully moved for a default judgment in the foreclosure proceeding.

Plaintiff, who at that point had retained counsel, did not move to vacate the default and

instead unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the County Board of Supervisors to allow her

to redeem the property. She also filed a petition in Surrogate’s Court, after the default

judgment issued, as the named executor to probate decedent’s will, under which she was

the named heir to the property. Subsequently, in May 2007 an individual purchased the

property at public auction and assigned the bid to plaintiff, who then paid the purchase

price and received title to the property. The following month, Surrogate’s Court issued

letters testamentary to plaintiff.

       Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court alleging that the in rem

foreclosure proceeding was a nullity and that defendants had violated her due process

rights; she also asserted additional claims under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1988, contending

that the County had adopted a policy, custom, or practice precluding the Treasurer from

providing adequate due process to persons with interests in real property. Following a

bench trial, Supreme Court rendered a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, except as to the federal

statutory claims, concluding that the Treasurer’s mailings failed to comply with RPTL

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                                            -7-                                         No. 3

1125 because they were addressed to decedent rather than his estate or plaintiff and that

the foreclosure proceeding was a nullity because it was brought against a deceased person.

       The Appellate Division modified the judgment, on the law, by vacating those parts

that declared the foreclosure proceeding a nullity and granted plaintiff monetary relief, and,

as so modified, affirmed (193 AD3d 1414 [4th Dept 2021]). The Court concluded that the

evidence presented at the bench trial established compliance with all statutory and due

process requirements (see id. at 1417). The Court also held that, assuming, arguendo, that

defendants were required to take additional steps to ensure that plaintiff received due

process, defendants took sufficient steps because the Treasurer made “three personal

attempts to talk to someone with authority” and could not have further determined who

owned the property because plaintiff had not yet filed a petition in Surrogate’s Court (id.

at 1419). Finally, the Court rejected the Second Department’s reasoning in Matter of

Foreclosure of Tax Liens (165 AD3d 1112 [2d Dept 2018] [Goldman], appeal dismissed

& lv denied 35 NY3d 998 [2020])—which had held that a tax foreclosure proceeding may

not be maintained against a deceased person—because the proceeding was in rem against

the property and not in personam against decedent personally. Plaintiff appealed as of right

on constitutional grounds and alternatively moved for leave to appeal. We denied the

motion for leave as unnecessary (37 NY3d 1103 [2021]).

                                             II.

       Plaintiff, relying on Goldman, first alleges that the in rem foreclosure proceeding

was a nullity, and that County Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter a default

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                                           -8-                                       No. 3

judgment, because defendants had brought the action against a deceased person.

Defendants respond that the in rem foreclosure proceeding was brought against the

property, not against the owner, and thus County Court had jurisdiction.

       Plaintiff’s contention that the foreclosure proceeding was a nullity is based on a

misunderstanding of the difference between in rem and in personam jurisdiction, and a

conflation of those differences with respect to notice requirements. “Distinctions between

actions in rem and those in personam are ancient and originally expressed[,] in procedural

terms[,] what seems really to have been a distinction in the substantive law of property

under a system quite unlike our own” (Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339

US 306, 312 [1950]; see generally 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence

as Administered in England and America § 1007 at 273-274 [1836]; J. Inst. 4.6.1; G. Inst.

4.2-4.3). In New York, the CPLR makes clear that those distinctions continue to exist: “A

court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been

exercised heretofore” (CPLR 301). In their modern form, those distinctions rest upon the

nature of the action and the source of a court’s authority to enter judgment (see generally

Vincent C. Alexander, Prac Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, CPLR

C301:1).

       “An action in personam, giving the persons all the rights and remedies incident to a

judgment in such action, is very different from a proceeding by special process in rem,

either against specified property, or the property at large of the debtor” (Lowry v Inman,

46 NY 119, 128 [1871]). “An action or proceeding in rem has for its subject specific

property which is within the jurisdiction and control of the court to which application for

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                                             -9-                                          No. 3

relief is made” (Hanna v Stedman, 230 NY 326, 335 [1921]). “The foundation of [in rem]

jurisdiction is physical power” (McDonald v Mabee, 243 US 90, 91 [1917]), and in an

action in rem, a court obtains jurisdiction over the “res”—the property at issue in the

proceeding (see Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 246 [1958] [“The basis of jurisdiction is

the presence of the subject property within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum (s)tate”];

see generally David D. Siegel & Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 101 [6th ed,

Dec. 2022 update]). Thus, “[an] action [in rem] proceeds against such specific property

and its object is to have the court define the rights therein of various and conflicting

claimants” (Hanna, 230 NY at 335; see e.g. Freeman v Alderson, 119 US 185, 187 [1886]

[“Actions in rem, strictly considered, are proceedings against property alone treated as

responsible for the claims asserted by the libelants or plaintiffs. The property itself is in

such actions the defendant . . .”]; Black’s Law Dictionary [11th ed 2019], action in rem).

“The result of such an action is a judgment which operates upon the property and which

has no element of personal claim or personal liability” (Hanna, 230 NY at 335; see Hanson,

357 US at 246 n 12 [“A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated

property”]).

       In contrast, an action in personam is initiated against a person to determine their

personal rights and obligations (see e.g. Lowry, 46 NY at 128; Black’s Law Dictionary

[11th ed 2019], action in personam). Thus, “[a] judgment in personam imposes a personal

liability or obligation on one person in favor of another” (Hanson, 357 US at 246 n 12). In

such an action, “a state court base[s] its jurisdiction upon its authority over the defendant’s

person” (Mennonite Bd. of Missions v Adams, 462 US 791, 796 n 3 [1983]).

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                                             - 10 -                                        No. 3

       This Court has long recognized that “an action for foreclosure ‘is in the nature of a

proceeding in rem to appropriate the land’ ” (Jo Ann Homes at Bellmore v Dworetz, 25

NY2d 112, 122 [1969], quoting Reichert v Stilwell, 172 NY 83, 89 [1902]; see Dudley v

Congregation of Third Order of St. Francis, 138 NY 451, 458 [1893]; see generally 59A

CJS, Mortgages § 873). Indeed, this Court has clearly described tax foreclosure

proceedings as being governed by a “detailed . . . in rem foreclosure procedure” set forth

in RPTL article 11 (Sonmax, Inc. v City of New York, 43 NY2d 253, 256 [1977]).5 The

legislative history of article 11—originally enacted as article 7-a of the Tax Law by chapter

692 of the Laws of 1939—confirms that tax foreclosure proceedings involve “proceed[ing]

directly against the land” instead of the owner of the taxable real property (Mem of George

Xanthaky, Councilmember, City of Long Beach, Bill Jacket, L 1939, ch 692 at 12, 14

[emphasis added]; see Arnold Frye, The Tax Foreclosure Procedure Problem—a Solution,

Bill Jacket, L 1939, ch 692 at 22-27).

       Nevertheless, plaintiff, relying on Goldman’s reasoning, contends that decisions of

the United States Supreme Court and this Court have eroded the distinction between actions

in rem and in personam. That argument is meritless as it proceeds from a misunderstanding

of fundamental legal principles regarding jurisdiction and notice. First, the assumption that

a civil action or proceeding must be brought against a person is ahistorical and contrary to

5
  Alternatively, the legislature has approved of an in personam method allowing a tax
collector to “impose personal liability for . . . unpaid taxes” (City of Buffalo v Cargill, Inc.,
44 NY2d 7, 11 [1978]; see RPTL 926; Kennedy v Mossafa, 100 NY2d 1, 7 n 1 [2003];
Goldman, 165 AD3d at 1125-1126 [Scheinkman, P.J., dissenting]; see also Matter of Ueck,
286 NY 1, 7 [1941]).
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                                            - 11 -                                       No. 3

established law. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have continued to recognize the

“usefulness of distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam in many branches

of law” (Mullane, 339 US at 312; see Matter of McCann v Scaduto, 71 NY2d 164, 173

[1987]; see also e.g. United States v Bajakajian, 524 US 321, 329-334 [1998] [asset

forfeiture proceedings]; Thyssen, Inc. v Calypso Shipping Corp., 310 F3d 102, 106-107 [2d

Cir 2002] [admiralty proceedings]; Geary v Geary, 272 NY 390, 399 [1936] [matrimonial

actions]). Indeed, CPLR 301 provides that a court may maintain jurisdiction over property

as had been done under the common law, including through an action in rem (see

Alexander, Prac Commentaries, CPLR C301:1). The legislature did not abrogate this

common understanding of foreclosure law and in rem jurisdiction when it enacted RPTL

article 11 (see Arbegast v Board of Educ. of S. New Berlin Cent. School, 65 NY2d 161, 169

[1985]; see also NY Const, art I, § 14; Matter of Carnegie Trust Co., 206 NY 390, 397-

398 [1912]). Of course, a dead person cannot be sued but, as long understood, an action in

rem, like the tax foreclosure proceeding here, is not an action against a person, but rather

the subject property on which the tax was charged and due. Put another way, the County

did not sue the owner of the property; it merely took steps to notify the owner and others

with a potential interest in the property so that they could protect their interests if they so

chose.

         Second, plaintiff and Goldman’s reliance on due process and notice by publication

case law is misplaced. Before Mullane, “notice by publication was good enough” to satisfy

due process in proceedings in rem (Matter of McCann, 71 NY2d at 173, citing Longyear v

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Toolan, 209 US 414 [1908], Ballard v Hunter, 204 US 241 [1907], and Leigh v Green, 193

US 79 [1904]).

              “Several justifications were commonly advanced for the
              sufficiency of constructive notice in in rem proceedings. First,
              nonresident landowners—who themselves could not be
              served—often had local caretakers to watch over their land and
              advise them of published notices affecting their property.
              Second, all landowners were charged with a duty to keep
              informed about the status of their land and presumed to know
              the consequences of nonpayment of taxes. Third, in in rem
              proceedings, only ‘the land itself’ was in issue; affected
              individuals did not have to be present. Finally, costly notice
              requirements impeded the State’s vital interest in collecting its
              revenues quickly and inexpensively, making constructive
              notice a reasonable balance of the competing interests” (id.
              [citations omitted]; see e.g. Picquet v Swan, 19 F Cas 609, 612-
              615 [D Mass 1828, No. 11,134, Story, C.J.]).

Mullane and subsequent case law, however, recognized that “[s]ervice by publication

amounts only to a gesture[,] and ‘when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere

gesture is not due process’ ” (New York Practice § 107, quoting Mullane, 339 US at 315;

see e.g. Mennonite Bd., 462 US at 796 n 3 [1983]; Matter of McCann, 71 NY2d at 173-

176). That case law “marked a departure from the early justifications underlying the

conclusion that published notice was due notice, and a recognition that the ‘caretaker’

theory, the presumption that every landowner read every newspaper of general circulation,

and the notion that only ‘the land itself’ was affected, had become increasingly unrealistic”

(Matter of McCann, 71 NY2d at 174). Contrary to Goldman’s conclusion that “the United

States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the fiction that an in rem proceeding is not

asserted against any individuals, but only against the property itself” (165 AD3d at 1120,

citing Shaffer v Heitner, 433 US 186, 216 [1977]), the Court has merely recognized that

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property owners and interested parties are owed adequate process where their property

rights are at stake through an in rem foreclosure proceeding. Put another way, case law

relating to notice and due process set forth “requirements of service imposed in the modern

era to address concerns of due process. These are not matters which go to the jurisdiction

of the court to entertain the action on its merits” (Goldman, 165 AD3d at 1127

[Scheinkman, P.J., dissenting]).

       In sum, we reject plaintiff’s claim that the tax foreclosure proceeding is a nullity.

Goldman rests on an erroneous legal premise and should not be followed.6

                                              III.

       Plaintiff’s alternative claim that defendants failed to provide her with adequate

notice is similarly without merit. Defendants satisfied both their statutory and

constitutional notice obligations.

                                               A.

       Former and current RPTL 1125 (1) require that notice of a tax foreclosure

proceeding be provided to “each owner and persons whose right, title, or interest was a

matter of public record as of the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed, which right, title

or interest will be affected by the termination of the redemption period, and whose name

6
 Matter of City of Schenectady (Permaul) (201 AD3d 1 [3d Dept 2021], appeal dismissed
& lv denied 38 NY3d 994 [2022]) is also abrogated to the extent that it relied upon
Goldman.
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and address are reasonably ascertainable from the public record” (emphasis added). The

“public record” includes “the records in the offices of the surrogate of the county” (id.).

RPTL 1125 former (1) provided for notice to owners by certified mail and to interested

persons by first class mail, whereas the current RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i), as amended effective

November 23, 2006 (see L 2006, ch 415, § 2), requires both types of mailings for all

notices. Moreover, RPTL 1125 (1) (b) (i) provides that “notice shall be deemed received

unless both the certified mailing and the ordinary first class mailing are returned . . . within

forty-five days after being mailed.”

       Here, it is undisputed that on the date the list of delinquent taxes was filed, plaintiff

was not a publicly-listed owner or person with an interest in the property. Indeed, plaintiff

did not file a petition in Surrogate’s Court until after the redemption deadline and letters

testamentary were issued to plaintiff as the named executor over seven months after the

notices had been served and well after the court entered a default judgment for lack of

appearance of an interested party. When defendants performed the required search of

public records, decedent was alive and listed as an owner under the name “James

Hetelekides.” The notices were sent by certified mail and first class mail to him at the

property address, the mailings were not returned, and the return receipts were signed for

by a restaurant employee. Thus, the notice was sent in compliance with the statutory

requirements.

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                                            B.

       Plaintiff contends that defendants’ compliance with the statute is insufficient

because defendants failed to provide notice consistent with the requirements of due

process. We disagree. Here, defendants complied with the statutory notice requirements,

including publication (see RPTL 1124), and, upon learning of decedent’s death, determined

that they would take additional steps to provide notice to potential interested parties. We

therefore reject plaintiff’s argument that defendants’ actions, under the totality of the

circumstances, were constitutionally deficient.

       The standard for determining whether notice is adequate under the Due Process

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 6

of the New York Constitution is well settled:

              “Due process is a flexible concept, requiring a case-by-case
              analysis that measures the reasonableness of a municipality’s
              actions in seeking to provide adequate notice. A balance must
              be struck between the State’s interest in collecting delinquent
              property taxes and those of the property owner in receiving
              notice (see Kennedy, 110 NY2d at 9; see also Matter of
              Zaccaro v Cahill, 100 NY2d 884, 890 [2003]). In striking such
              a balance, the courts may take ‘into account the status and
              conduct of the owner in determining whether notice was
              reasonable’ (Kennedy, 100 NY2d at 11, citing Matter of ISCA
              Enters. v City of New York, 77 NY2d 688, 700 [1991])” (Matter
              of Harner v County of Tioga, 5 NY3d 136, 140 [2005]).

“The means employed [to effect service] must be such as one desirous of actually

informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it” (Mullane, 339 US at 315).

In other words, actual notice is not required, but any attempted notice must be reasonably

calculated to provide the recipient with the intended advisement under the particular

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circumstances of the case, taking into account the recipient’s conduct and the demands that

may be fairly imposed on a municipality to effectuate service given the government’s

interests (see e.g. Jones v Flowers, 547 US 220, 230 [2006]; Covey v Town of Somers, 351

US 141, 145-146 [1956]; see also e.g. Robinson v Hanrahan, 409 US 38, 39-40 [1972]).

       As discussed, a municipality is required to notify “each owner and persons whose

right, title, or interest [would] be affected by the termination of the redemption period”

(RPTL 1125 [1]). However, once defendants learned of decedent’s death, due process

mandated that they consider whether that “unique information” about decedent, obtained

after the notices were sent, required additional efforts “regardless of whether [the] statutory

scheme is reasonably calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case” (Jones, 547 US at

230). Otherwise, a municipality could rely on notification efforts that it knows have failed

and without determining whether due process requires additional efforts to identify and

inform those persons with interests in the property (see Covey, 351 US at 145-146).

       We conclude that defendants’ efforts were sufficient. Defendants publicized the

notice and petition in two local newspapers—including the same newspaper where

decedent’s obituary was published—on three different days. Defendants also mailed six

copies of the notice to the property, four of which were addressed to “James Hetelekides.”

Once defendants learned that decedent had died, the Treasurer decided to make additional

efforts to notify living interested parties before the time to redeem had expired, visiting the

business located on the property three days in a row during midweek, regular business

hours. On the first two days, the Treasurer called the restaurant—the sole business situated

on the property and the business decedent and plaintiff ran together when decedent was

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alive—identified himself, and made clear that “[i]t’s very imperative or very important that

[he] talk to somebody that owns the business or manages it or has control over it.” When

no one returned his calls, he visited the restaurant in person on the third day during regular

business hours, identified himself, and asked to speak with the manager or owner about an

important matter. When he was again told that no one was available, he left his business

card and reiterated that it was “very important” that the owner or a person in control of the

restaurant contact him. It is undisputed that throughout this period plaintiff worked at the

restaurant seven days a week and that she handled its mail. Under these circumstances, the

publications and the Treasurer’s personal efforts were reasonably calculated to ascertain

and notify any persons who might have had a legal interest in the property that might have

been affected by the pending foreclosure action and redemption period.

       Plaintiff’s “status and conduct” is also relevant to our analysis (Kennedy, 100 NY2d

at 11). First, even though defendants did not know that plaintiff was the executor of

decedent’s estate and his heir, they could make the reasonable assumption that the

executor—whoever that might be—would seek to apprise themself of any issue with the

property and preserve any heirs’ interests. As the Second Circuit has recognized, “if the

mail contains a notice that the government is taking some action against property of the

decedent, it is reasonable to assume that the administrator will take steps to preserve the

property,” and thus a taxing authority “[is] entitled to expect that those appointed to

administer estates that include real property would place something on the land record to

put the world on notice of the owner’s death and would also obtain mail addressed to their

decedent” (Bender v City of Rochester, 765 F2d 7, 12 [2d Cir 1985]). Moreover, by calling

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and visiting the restaurant in person during its hours of operation, the Treasurer went to a

presumably readily available source for information about persons with an interest in the

property at a time when a manager or the owner would likely be present.

       Second, plaintiff, who was represented by counsel before defendants sought a

default judgment, failed to avail herself of recourse under RPTL article 11. Plaintiff was

aware before the last day to redeem that there was a potential outstanding tax on the

property, given the conflicting information from the County Treasurer and Town office

employees, and yet she did not take actions to ensure that the Treasurer was aware of her

status, nor did she attempt to pay the tax to avoid foreclosure. Section 1126 (1) provides

that “[a]ny mortgagee, lienor, lessee or other person having a legally protected interest in

real property who wishes to receive copies of the notices required by this article may file

with the enforcing officer a declaration of interest,” which “shall include the name and

mailing address of the person submitting such declaration, a description of the parcel or

parcels in which such person claims an interest, and a description of the nature of such

interest.” Even though decedent’s will named plaintiff as executor of his estate and

inheritor of the property, plaintiff did not file such a declaration. Nor did she seek to vacate

the default judgment, even though RPTL 1131 provides up to one month after entry of

judgment to reopen a default. Instead, she sought extra-statutory relief from the County by

requesting to pay the taxes after the redemption deadline.

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                                              C.

       Plaintiff argues that the Treasurer could have done more to attempt to effect service

on her, in particular, by posting the notice and petition on the restaurant’s door or another

public-facing location, mailing additional copies to plaintiff, or leaving copies during his

personal visit to the restaurant. None of those specific actions were required as a matter of

due process. Due process requires only that attempts to provide notice be reasonably

calculated to inform an interested party of pending action against the property (see

Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 US at 795, quoting Mullane, 339 US at 314; Matter of

McCann, 71 NY2d at 173-176). “The key word is ‘reasonably,’ which balances the

interests of the State against the rights of the parties” (Kennedy, 110 NY2d at 9). Posting

the notice and petition on the door or hand-delivering additional copies to the restaurant

would have provided no greater certainty of notice since the certified and first class

mailings were not returned and an employee signed for them (see Jones, 547 US at 235;

Mullane, 339 US at 314; Mac Naughton v Warren County, 20 NY3d 252, 257 [2012]; see

also RPTL 1125 [1] [b] [i]). Likewise, mailing additional copies to plaintiff would not have

been reasonably calculated to provide service to a known interested party in the

circumstances presented here. Defendants did not know whether plaintiff was a person with

an ownership interest in the property since she did not probate the will until after the default

judgment was issued. Finally, when the Treasurer visited the restaurant to ascertain the

identity of the property’s new owner, he identified himself and made clear to plaintiff’s

employees that the matter was important. Despite the Treasurer’s efforts, plaintiff did not

immediately return his calls.

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                                           - 20 -                                      No. 3

       We reject plaintiff’s additional argument that a taxing authority should seek

appointment of an administrator where the taxpayer is deceased, as that would impose an

undue burden on municipalities; extend the time of proceedings, where the taxes have

usually been outstanding for at least two years; and disincentivize executors or other

interested parties from timely disposing of the estate and preserving the property. Here,

defendants struck an appropriate balance between the government’s interest in collecting

the delinquent tax and the interests of persons connected to the property in receiving notice

when it publicized and mailed the notice and contacted the restaurant several times.

       In sum, under the circumstances presented here, defendants made an adequate

attempt at service, satisfying due process requirements.

                                            IV.

       Plaintiff’s federal statutory claims under sections 1983 and 1988 were properly

dismissed. To establish a policy or custom, plaintiff was required to show “an official

policy or custom of the [County] government itself [that] caused the [Treasurer or his

employees] to violate her constitutional rights” (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742,

768 [2016]). “Under Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (436 US 658 [1978])

and its progeny, ‘official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s

lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and

widespread as to practically have the force of law’ ” (id. [alterations omitted], quoting

Connick v Thompson, 563 US 51, 61 [2011]).

                                           - 20 -
                                            - 21 -                                       No. 3

       As Supreme Court held, even assuming that plaintiff made out a case that defendants

denied her due process, the record fails to establish an official policy or custom that caused

a violation of her constitutional rights. Plaintiff did not provide evidence that defendants

routinely failed to notify estate administrators or parties who informed defendants of their

interests or an owner’s death. Indeed, as discussed, once defendants learned of decedent’s

death, the Treasurer took steps to identify and provide notice to parties with a legal interest

in the property that would be affected by the foreclosure and redemption deadline by

personally contacting the restaurant to identify an owner or manager. Thus, plaintiff failed

to carry her burden since nothing in the record establishes an official policy or a widespread

custom violative of due process.

                                              V.

       A tax foreclosure proceeding is an action against the real property. In such a

proceeding, the taxing authority has a statutory and constitutional obligation to attempt to

provide adequate notice to owners and persons with an interest in the property who may be

affected by a foreclosure action or the redemption deadline. If the authority learns of the

death of an owner, the authority must determine whether, in the unique circumstances of

each case, due process requires additional reasonable efforts to identify interested parties

and, if so, attempt to provide those interested parties with notice of the pending foreclosure.

Courts should assess those efforts based on the totality of the authority’s actions and the

status and conduct of the potential interested party. Defendants’ efforts here were

sufficient.

                                            - 21 -
                                         - 22 -                                    No. 3

      Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Order affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge Rivera. Acting Chief Judge Cannataro and
Judges Garcia, Wilson, Singas and Troutman concur.

Decided February 14, 2023

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