Court Opinion

ID: 9862870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:21:32.345459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:36:40.460266
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellee complains in his Motion for Rehearing that in our original opinion, we erroneously stated that the record reflects separate division orders were distributed to the royalty owners but each was identical in language, as none of the division orders except the one signed by appellee was in the record. The affidavit of William L. Kirkpatrick is in the transcript styled “AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S PLEA IN ABATEMENT,” and the affidavit contains the language:
“ * * * They (the other royalty owners) executed exact copies of the same division order which is attached to this affidavit.”
The affidavit also sets out that the other royalty owners executed such counterparts of the division order and returned them to Pan American Petroleum Corporation.
There is no objection in the record to this affidavit. It was before the Court on the hearing on the plea in abatement by agreement of the parties. Even though the affiant Kirkpatrick was an employee of appellant, these facts are not challenged in the record.
Appellee also contends that the trial as well as the plea in abatement being before the Court, and their being no findings of fact or conclusions of law, the appellate court would not be justified in reviewing the action of the trial court upon a plea in abatement without a statement of facts or findings and conclusions. Appellee cites cases, including Richardson v. Raby, 376 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Civ.App., Tyler, 1964, n. w. h.), to the effect that there being no findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment would be affirmed on any theory having support in the pleadings and evidence. The hearing on the plea in abatement was not a trial before the court as provided for in Rules 296 and 297, T.R. C.P., and so far as the record shows, the affidavit of Kirkpatrick was the only evidence before the Court. Appellee agreed to its admission and submission to the Court. Further, appellee contends that we cannot review the trial court’s action upon this particular plea in abatement because appellant failed to properly preserve any error which might have been committed by the court below in overruling the plea. Assuming, arguendo, that such contention is correct, we would but point out that the absence of indispensable parties is an error fundamental in nature of which this court may take judicial notice without the point being raised by any party to this appeal. However, appellant did all that was necessary to preserve its error for appeal.
In his Motion for Rehearing, appellee insists that the word “shall” in Article 2524 — 1, Sec. V.A.T.S., is not mandatory but permissive or directory and cites Thomas v. Groebl, 147 Tex. 70, 212 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Sup., 1948), for authority. The Thomas case was an election contest case, and the question before the Court was the interpretation of an amendment in 1945 to Article 2968 (Article 5.16, Texas Election Code, V.A.T.S., repealed effective February 1, 1967), reading: “All certificates of exemption shall be renewed or reissued annually.” The Supreme Court in that case said:
“It is true that a construction of amended Article 2968 which permits electors to vote without having procured annually a renewed or reissued certificate gives the article a liberal construction in favor of the voter and that it treats as directory what appears by reason of the *915use of the word 'shall’ to be mandatory. That construction is justified by sound authority. The right to vote is so fundamental in our form of government that it should be as zealously safeguarded as are our natural rights. It has been said that ‘laws abridging the natural right of the citizen should be restrained by rigorous constructions within their narrowest limits.’ * * * It is sufficient, however, that we apply here the less extreme and well established rule of construction that statutes regulating the right to vote should be given a liberal interpretation in favor of that right. * * * ”
We believe that case may be distinguished from the case at bar.
The Motion for Rehearing is overruled.