Court Opinion

ID: 9910167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 22:00:24.461427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:14.046831
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit

Nos. 22-1543, 22-1552

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                              Appellee,

                                 v.

                           AUGUSTO VALDEZ,

                        Defendant, Appellant.

         APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

        [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

                               Before

                  Gelpí, Howard, and Rikelman,
                        Circuit Judges.

     Marie Theriault, for appellant.
     Karen L. Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Joshua S. Levy, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief,
for appellee.

                          December 14, 2023
            GELPÍ,   Circuit   Judge.       Defendant-Appellant   Augusto

Valdez appeals from his guilty plea and conviction, for which he

received 120 months' imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of

supervised release.     He raises two issues.     First, he asserts that

the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea because he conspired only with a confidential source

("CS") and the district court did not ensure that he knew that he

could not conspire illegally with a government agent -- two legal

errors that he alleges tainted the underlying conspiracy charge.

Second, he seeks to vacate his sentence because the district court

should have, sua sponte, verified his eligibility for the safety

valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2.

            We affirm, addressing each issue seriatim.

                               I. BACKGROUND

            We recite only the facts necessary to resolve this

appeal.     Because Valdez challenges his guilty plea and an alleged

sentencing error, we gather these "facts from the change-of-plea

colloquy,     the    unchallenged     portions    of   the   presentence

investigation report (PSR), and the record of the disposition

hearing."     United States v. Cahill, 85 F.4th 616, 619 (1st Cir.

2023) (quoting United States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir.

2009)).

                                    - 2 -
          A. Relevant Facts and Initial Legal Proceedings

           In July 2019, law enforcement officers received a report

from a confidential source ("CS") that Valdez "was attempting to

purchase a large quantity of cocaine from a source of supply in

Texas."   According to CS, Valdez offered to pay CS if CS, using

Valdez's money, bought several kilograms of cocaine from the Texas

source.

           On July 10, 2019, CS and Valdez discussed logistics

while law enforcement officers monitored the conversation.             Valdez

told CS that he had "paid participants well for helping him with

prior drug shipments." On July 11, 2019, Valdez delivered $450,000

to CS for the cocaine.

           On July 15, 2019, at a meeting in Texas that Valdez

arranged, CS delivered the money to the Texas source.                Two days

later, at Valdez’s instruction, CS received eighteen kilograms of

cocaine from the Texas source to transport to Valdez, who was in

Boston.   Anticipating the delivery, law enforcement agents gave CS

"[seventeen] sham kilogram packages and [one] kilogram of actual

cocaine for delivery to Valdez."         CS then met Valdez and delivered

these   packages,   but   Valdez   was    stopped   and   arrested    by   law

enforcement.

           A grand jury in the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts indicted Valdez in August 2019, charging

him with (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess, with intent to

                                   - 3 -
distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846

("Count One"); and (2) possession with intent to distribute 500

grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii)

("Count Two").

            Valdez         and     the        government       attended     a     discovery

conference        before     the        United       States     Magistrate       Judge     on

December 23, 2019.          At the conference, the government informed the

Magistrate Judge that it had provided all required discovery under

District     of     Massachusetts             Local     Rule    116.1.          Local    Rule

116.1(c)(1)(E)       obligates           the     government       to    provide     to    the

defendant "the name of any person asserted to be a known unindicted

coconspirator."       L.R., D. Mass. R. 116.1(c)(1)(E).

                             B. Valdez's Guilty Plea

            Valdez     appeared             before    the   district     court    to     plead

guilty    without     entering          a    plea     agreement    to    both    counts    on

September 21, 2020.          The district court conducted a Federal Rule

of   Criminal     Procedure        11       colloquy    with    Valdez.1        First,    the

district court verified that Valdez was a high school graduate and

asked if he was competent to plead guilty, ascertaining that he

was not previously treated for mental illness and was not presently

      1Although it is undisputed that Valdez can "understand some
English," he primarily speaks Spanish.     So the district court
proceeded with the assistance of a certified court interpreter,
having Valdez respond in Spanish and the interpreter translate his
responses into English.

                                              - 4 -
under the influence of alcohol, narcotics, or medication of any

kind.   Second, the district court asked Valdez if he had "received

a copy of the indictment . . . and . . . discussed those charges

and the case in general with" his attorneys, to which Valdez

replied, "Yes."      The district court followed up on this point in

the following exchange:

           THE COURT: And in your own words, Mr. Valdez,
           what do you understand that you are being
           charged with here this afternoon?

           VALDEZ:    Yes.

           THE COURT: What crime do you understand that
           you are being charged with        here this
           afternoon?

           VALDEZ: I'm not sure. I'm not sure how to
           call them, how to call the charges.

           THE COURT:   Well, I don't need a technical
           name. What do you understand you're here for?

           VALDEZ:    Conspiracy for 5 kilos or more.

           THE COURT:    5 kilos of what?

           VALDEZ:    Cocaine.

           Third, the district court inquired into whether Valdez

understood the consequences of his guilty plea.     Beyond informing

him that he would give up certain civil rights, the district court

asked the government to read the charges and note "if there [were]

any mandatory minimums."      The government did so for both counts,

noting that (1) Count One carried a ten-year mandatory minimum,

and (2) Count Two carried a five-year mandatory minimum.         The

                                 - 5 -
district court then asked if Valdez understood these consequences,

to which he replied that he did.             Finally, the district court

explained   to   Valdez     the   advisory    nature   of    the   Sentencing

Guidelines, the district court's wide discretion in imposing a

sentence, and the constitutional rights -- such as the right to a

trial by jury and the right to counsel at trial -- that he would

give up by pleading guilty, before asking Valdez once more if he

understood the consequences of his guilty plea.             Valdez said that

he indeed understood.

            The government then recited the facts, as stated above,

underlying Valdez's plan to purchase cocaine from the Texas source.

The district court asked Valdez if he disagreed with what the

government claimed it could prove were the case to go to trial.

Valdez said "[n]o" and pled guilty.           The district court accepted

his plea.

            Five months later, on February 21, 2021, Valdez filed a

pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea to Count One. On April 2,

2021, Valdez received substitute counsel, who filed a supplemental

memorandum supporting the motion.            The motion (and memorandum)

contended that the district court should vacate Valdez's plea

because he conspired only with a government source, nullifying the

underlying conspiracy.

            The district court denied the motion.           It conceded that

"one   cannot    conspire    solely    with    a   government      agent" but

                                   - 6 -
recognized that this conspiracy featured three coconspirators:

Valdez, CS, and the Texas source, who was not a government agent.

The district court further remarked that Valdez did not argue "that

his plea was made without his knowledge, intelligence and volition"

beyond this point.

              Valdez filed two additional pro se motions on April 15

and June 3, 2022.        His first motion sought to dismiss Count One on

the same basis as his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.2                     His

second      motion   presented    a   new    issue;   in   Valdez's    view,   the

government      improperly      enhanced    his   mandatory-minimum     sentence

based on a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) without

providing       notice     to     the       court,    as    required     by     21

U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).          The district court denied Valdez's first

motion for the reasons it explained in its earlier opinion.                    And

it denied the second motion without prejudice, reasoning that it

concerned an issue better suited for the sentencing hearing.

                                  C. Sentencing

              The district court held Valdez's sentencing hearing on

July 6, 2022.        It began the hearing by noting that it considered

both parties' memoranda, the letters supporting Valdez, and the

PSR.       Neither party objected to the PSR, which articulated the

       This motion included an affidavit, in which Valdez stated
       2

that his trial counsel did not explain the charges to him because
his trial counsel did not inform him that he could not "conspire
with a [g]overnment informant."

                                        - 7 -
same facts that we have summarized.       Both parties agreed with how

the PSR calculated Valdez's advisory sentencing guideline range,

which the district court adopted -- finding that Valdez had a total

offense level of twenty-nine under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(a)(5) and

3E1.1(a)-(b) and a criminal history category of I, resulting in a

recommendation of 87 to 108 months imprisonment.           Nevertheless,

the PSR noted, and both Valdez and the government agreed, that

Valdez was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months'

imprisonment.

           The PSR acknowledged that Valdez met the first four

criteria   to   qualify   for   the   safety   valve   under   18   U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(1)-(4) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, which permits a federal

district court to sentence an offender below a statutory mandatory

minimum.   According to the PSR, if the district court found that

Valdez met the fifth criterion by proving that he "truthfully

provided to the Government all information and evidence [he] has

concerning the . . . offenses[,]" U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5), then the

district court could reduce Valdez's offense level by two points

to twenty-seven.    This would place his advisory sentencing range

between seventy and eighty-seven months.

           No one brought compliance with the fifth safety-valve

factor to the district court's attention at the sentencing hearing.

Instead, Valdez's counsel acknowledged that "[t]his [was] one of

those . . . occasions where the guidelines are lower than the

                                  - 8 -
mandatory minimum" but requested a 120-month mandatory-minimum

sentence anyway.         The district court afforded Valdez and his

counsel a chance to raise any other issue before pronouncing a

sentence,     but   neither   chose   to   do    so.      The   district   court,

therefore, sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment on Count One

and   sixty    months'   imprisonment       on   Count    Two,   to   be   served

concurrently, followed by five years of supervised release (a

sentence which is not at issue here). This timely appeal followed.

                               II. DISCUSSION

                    A. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

              Valdez's argument -- that the district court should have

granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea "because it is a

legal impossibility to conspire with a governmental agent to commit

a crime" -- is a moving target.            At times, he contends that this

principle invalidates his plea and Count One altogether, and thus

the district court should have granted his motion to withdraw his

plea.     At other points, Valdez posits that the district court

should have granted his motion to withdraw because his plea was

not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.               In doing so, he contends

that the district court should have clarified whether he understood

that he could not illegally conspire with a government agent.3

      3Valdez believes that his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for "pressuring him to plead guilty" to Count One, and
he asks us to consider this in determining whether his plea was
knowing,    intelligent,     and    voluntary.         Where    an

                                      - 9 -
          We begin our analysis with the Rule 11 standard.     "A

defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before sentence is imposed if

he shows 'a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.'"

United States v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting

United States v. Sousa, 468 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2006); Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)).   Generally, we weigh "the totality of the

circumstances"4 in determining whether a defendant has met that

burden.   United States v. Fonseca, 49 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2022)

ineffective-assistance of counsel claim was not raised below,
"[w]e typically require that [the] claim be presented first to the
district court in a collateral proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
so that the district court may create a factual record. United
States v. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing
United States v. Campbell, 268 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001)); see
United States v. García-Núñez, 71 F.4th 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2023).
Indeed, to litigate the effectiveness of counsel as grounds to
withdraw a guilty plea in an ongoing criminal proceeding, the
defendant must both raise the issue below and develop a record
that "would allow us to fairly consider his claim." United States
v. Fernández-Santos, 856 F.3d 10, 17 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2017). Upon
review, the record appears to be too sparse to rule on this claim
right now, so we decline to address the issue here.       See id.;
García-Núñez, 71 F.4th at 11. We note that, in so declining, our
decision is "without prejudice to [Valdez's] right to pursue [the
claim] later" in a collateral proceeding. Fernández-Santos, 856
F.3d at 18 (citing United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st
Cir. 1993)).
     4 We have expressed alternative formulations of this test
regarding when we must consider prejudice to the government.
Compare United States v. Dunfee, 821 F.3d 120, 127 (1st Cir. 2016)
(per curiam), and Isom, 580 F.3d at 52, with United States v.
Adams, 971 F.3d 22, 38 (1st Cir. 2020), and United States v.
Gardner, 5 F.4th 110, 123 (1st Cir. 2021) (Lynch, J., dissenting).
The circumstances here, however, weigh against Valdez so much that
we need not consider prejudice at all. See Fonseca, 49 F.4th at
7 n.1.

                              - 10 -
(citing United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th 110, 118 (1st Cir.

2021)).        Such   circumstances       include     "whether    the     plea    was

voluntary, intelligent, knowing and in compliance with Rule 11;

the strength of the reasons offered in support of the motion;

whether there is a serious claim of actual innocence; [and] the

timing of the motion."          United States v. García-Núñez, 71 F.4th 1,

9 (1st Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Isom, 580

F.3d at 52).      "[T]he 'core concerns of Rule 11,' whether the plea

was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, are the most important

when reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw

a guilty plea."       Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Isom, 580 F.3d at

52).

              Under Rule 11, the district court must inform a defendant

of "the elements of the charges that the prosecution would have to

prove at trial."        United States v. Fernández-Santos, 856 F.3d 10,

16 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227

F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2000)).             "The manner in which the charge is

explained      and    the   method      for   determining       the     defendant's

understanding of the charge will vary from case to case depending

upon the complexity of the charges, the capacity of the defendant,

and the attendant circumstances."                United States v. Ketchen, 877

F.3d   429,    432–33    (1st    Cir.    2017)     (quoting    United    States    v.

Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995)).                  "Ordinarily, 'it is

sufficient in a plea colloquy for a district court to ascertain

                                        - 11 -
that a defendant is aware of the nature of the charge[s] against

him by reading the charge[s] in the indictment to the defendant

and obtaining his competent acknowledgment that he understands the

charge[s].'"    Fernández-Santos, 856 F.3d at 16 (alterations in

original) (quoting United States v. Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d 12, 15

(1st Cir. 2013)).

                         1. Standard of Review

            "We review an unpreserved Rule 11 claim for plain error."

United States v. Williams, 48 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing

United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58–59 (2002)).                   Preserved

claims, however, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.                  See

García-Núñez,    71    F.4th   at   9.       Valdez   raised   his     primary

argument -- that he pled guilty to conspiring with a government

agent, which is not a crime, so his motions should have been

granted -- below.      For that issue, we use the abuse-of-discretion

standard.    See id.

            But the same cannot be said for his claim that his plea

was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.               Nothing in the

record5 reveals that this claim was raised squarely to the district

     5 To be clear, tucked away in an attachment to his pro se
motion, Valdez claimed that his guilty plea was "not knowingly nor
was it intelligently made because . . . I was never told that I
cannot be held responsible for me conspiring with a government's
informant." Reading this in context, however, reveals that Valdez
was reiterating his contention that he could not be convicted of
conspiracy. And, in any event, this "perfunctory" reference did
not preserve the issue for appeal. United States v. Zannino, 895

                                    - 12 -
court, and that is a necessary predicate to evade plain error

review.       See id. at 9-10.               Therefore, we take a bifurcated

approach,     asking     whether       the    district   court:      (1) abused    its

discretion when it denied Valdez's motion to withdraw because he

could not be convicted for conspiring with a government agent; or

(2) plainly erred when it denied his motion because Valdez did not

know, and was not informed, of this requirement.

                   2. Conspiring with a Government Agent

              Although a person may not be convicted for conspiring

only   with    a   government      agent,      "the   plurality      requirement   is

satisfied by the participation of 'two' true conspirators . . . ."

United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir. 1987); see also

United    States    v.    Cordero,      668    F.2d   32,    43   (1st   Cir.   1981)

(rejecting legal-innocence argument where government agent was

interlocutor between two non-governmental co-conspirators); United

States v. Cordero, 973 F.3d 603, 617 (6th Cir. 2020) ("[I]t is

well-settled       law    that     a    defendant's      conversations      with    a

government agent may be used to establish the existence of a

conspiracy      between    the     defendant       and      other,   non-government

co-conspirators." (citations omitted)); United States v. Wenxia

Man, 891 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2018) ("[A] government informer

may serve as the connecting link between conspirators." (internal

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Zenon-
Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2002).

                                        - 13 -
quotation marks and original alterations omitted) (quoting Sears

v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965))).    The facts

that Valdez agreed to at the change-of-plea hearing revealed two

true conspirators: Valdez and the Texas source.

          Valdez approached CS only to secure the shipment of

cocaine from the Texas source.      He also arranged the meeting in

Texas between CS and the Texas source, gave $450,000 to CS to

deliver to the Texas source, and directed CS to bring the drugs

back to Boston from the Texas source.      Thus, Valdez admitted to

arranging a three-way drug deal, in which one of the coconspirators

was not a government agent.

          Considering these facts, Valdez's motion to withdraw his

guilty plea rested on faulty grounds.    Cf. United States v. Ramos,

810 F.2d 308, 312 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[I]f [a] defendant's factual

contentions create no 'legally cognizable defense' to the charges,

'he has not effectively denied his culpability,' and the motion

can be denied." (quoting United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208,

220 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc))).    It was enough that Valdez pled

guilty "to participating in a conspiracy that involved at least

one other person" who was not a government agent to be "guilty of

conspiracy."   United States v. Delarosa Arias, 979 F.3d 80, 82

(1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d

14, 21 (1st Cir. 2006)) (citing United States v. Penagaricano-

Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 840 n.5 (1st Cir. 1990)).    The district court

                              - 14 -
correctly recognized this, so it acted within its discretion when

it denied Valdez's motion.

              3. Understanding of the Conspiracy Charge

            "The defendant's burden under the plain error standard

is a heavy one."      United States v. Ramirez-Benitez, 292 F.3d 22,

27   (1st   Cir.   2002).   This   requires   Valdez   to    show   "(1) 'an

error . . . (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only

(3) affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously

impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.'"      United States v. Abraham, 63 F.4th 102, 110 (1st

Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.

Pennue, 770 F.3d 985, 989 (1st Cir. 2014)).       With this in mind, we

find no error here for a few reasons.

            First, the record belies his claim that he was unaware

of the identity of his coconspirator in Texas.              The government

provided Valdez with all required discovery at the discovery

conference, including "the name of any . . . known unindicted

coconspirator."      L.R., D. Mass. 116.1(c)(1)(E).         Valdez does not

dispute this, so he cannot fault the district court for not

informing him of information that he possessed.

            Second, the colloquy at Valdez's Rule 11 hearing shows

that he understood enough about the charges to satisfy the Rule's

requirements. Valdez, who was a high school graduate, acknowledged

that he understood the charges and the mandatory minimum sentence

                                   - 15 -
that he faced at the change-of-plea hearing.       He explained that he

was pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute five or more

kilograms of cocaine. He told the district court that he discussed

the charges, and the case in general, with his counsel.              And he

reassured the district court that he understood the consequences

of his guilty plea.       See, e.g., Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d at 15–16

(affirming the acceptance of a guilty plea where the defendant

acknowledged that he understood the charges, reviewed them with

his    counsel,   and   comprehended   the   consequences      of   pleading

guilty).

            The nature of the conspiracy charge did not require more

in-depth discussion.      "[W]hile the subtleties of conspiracy law

may be the bane of criminal law students, the basic principle is

easily understood: a group of people agreeing to do something

illegal."    United States v. Carter, 815 F.2d 827, 829 (1st Cir.

1987).     Thus, the district court could recite the charges, the

possible punishments, and the facts proving that Valdez committed

this   run-of-the-mill    crime   to   satisfy   Rule   11's    explanation

requirement.      See id. (affirming where the judge read the charges

to the defendant, a high school graduate, who replied that he

understood them); United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 382–83

(1st Cir. 2015).

            We have rejected calls to require district courts to

explain the nuances of criminal law under similar circumstances.

                                  - 16 -
See Jones, 778 F.3d at 382–83 (conspiracy to traffic cocaine);

Fernández-Santos,   856    F.3d   at   16   (possession   with   intent   to

distribute cocaine).      For example, in United States v. Cahill, we

rejected a defendant's attempt to invalidate a guilty plea on the

basis that the district court did not confirm that he understood

the requisite intent for constructive possession of a firearm as

a convicted felon. 85 F.4th at 621-23 (reviewing for plain error).

We focused first on the defendant's assurances to the district

court that he understood the charges and reviewed them with

counsel, who explained them to him.          Id. at 622.     Because "the

district court was not required . . . 'to explain the elements of

each charge to the defendant on the record[,]'" it was not required

to go over, in detail, the legal rationale for the defendant's

culpability where the record showed that he reviewed his charges

with counsel and had them explained to him.        Id. (quoting Bradshaw

v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005)) (citing United States v.

Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2004)).

          So too here.       Valdez explained to the district court

that he understood the charges, that he reviewed the charges with

his counsel, and that he understood the consequences of pleading

guilty.   The district court "did not have to then explain" to

Valdez "the 'intricacies' of" the plurality requirement "or the

other legal doctrines that might be at issue in his case."                Id.

(citing Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d at 13).         Accordingly, we affirm the

                                  - 17 -
district court's denial of Valdez's motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

                      B. Application of the Safety Valve

            Valdez next submits that his sentence was "procedurally

and substanti[vely] unreasonable" because the district court did

not explain why it did not find Valdez eligible for the safety

valve.    Valdez, however, waived this argument.

            "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment

of a known right."         United States v. Carter, 19 F.4th 520, 524

(1st Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435,

437 (1st Cir. 2002)).          "[A] party waives an issue by 'purposefully

abandon[ing] it, either expressly or by taking a contrary position'

in the district court[.]"           United States v. Ruiz-Valle, 68 F.4th

741, 746 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Chen, 998 F.3d

1, 6 (1st Cir. 2021)).          "Waivers allow trial courts to narrow the

issues and concentrate scarce judicial resources on genuinely

contested matters -- and when a trial court makes a reasoned

decision, it is unfair to allow a party to subvert that decision

by resurrecting a waived claim."                United States v. Orsini, 907

F.3d     115,   119     (1st    Cir.   2018)     (citing   United   States   v.

Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2011)).

            Valdez was aware of the statement in the PSR yet took a

contrary position by asking for the mandatory-minimum sentence.

The PSR informed Valdez and his counsel that he qualified for the

                                       - 18 -
safety valve if he met the fifth criterion.     At the sentencing

hearing, the district court asked Valdez and his counsel repeatedly

if they agreed with the advisory sentencing range in the PSR, if

they had any objections to the PSR, and if they had anything else

to bring to the district court's attention.         Neither did so.

Instead, they sought the mandatory-minimum sentence.       "And by

telling the district court that it could sentence him" to 120

months in prison, Valdez "waived any claim that the court could

not do so" without considering the safety valve.6    Ruiz-Valle, 68

F.4th at 745–46; see also, e.g., United States v. Escobar-Figueroa,

454 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that the defendant waived

     6  In limited instances we have excepted "purely legal
questions" from waiver. Orsini, 907 F.3d at 120; see United States
v. Mulkern, 49 F.4th 623, 641 (1st Cir. 2022) (Barron, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).        We apply this
exception "only sparingly," Orsini, 907 F.3d at 120, where "the
equities heavily preponderate in favor of such a step." Mulkern,
49 F.4th at 635 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood,
69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995)).     And we, in part, "consider
factors 'such as whether the inadequately preserved arguments are
purely legal, are amenable to resolution without additional
factfinding, are susceptible to resolution without causing undue
prejudice, are highly convincing, are capable of repetition, and
implicate matters of significant public concern.'"     Orsini, 907
F.3d at 120-21 (quoting Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 28 (1st
Cir. 2018)).   This "hen's teeth rare" exception does not apply
here. Id. at 120. Valdez's challenge revolves around whether he
"truthfully provided" information to the government to qualify for
the safety valve, which requires factfinding. United States v.
Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 98 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that a defendant
must prove entitlement to the safety valve by a preponderance of
the evidence).   This alone counsels strongly against exempting
Valdez from the consequences of his waiver, so we shall not do so
here.

                              - 19 -
an argument that § 3B1.2(b) applied where he did not raise the

issue and his counsel expressed satisfaction with the sentence

absent that provision).

           Valdez's pro se7 motion concerning § 851 does not alter

this conclusion.    He argued only that the government did not file

a § 851 notice, as it must do when it seeks to enhance the

statutory minimum or maximum penalties that apply to a given

defendant based on a prior conviction for a relevant drug offense.

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).       However, the government did not seek to

increase   the   applicable        mandatory-minimum       sentence   based   on

Valdez's prior convictions.          Cf. Suveges v. United States, 7 F.3d

6, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[S]ection 851 is not in play . . . where,

as here, the defendant is sentenced . . . to a prison term that

falls within a non-enhanced statutory minimum-maximum range.")

Valdez's   pro     se     motion -- making        an   irrelevant      argument

under § 851,     which       would         not    affect      the     baseline,

mandatory-minimum       sentence    that    he   requested -- thus     did    not

     7 Valdez's pro se status would not permit us to treat his
motion as one made under § 5C1.2 and preserved or raised below to
the district court.   We hold pro se filings "to less demanding
standards than those drafted by lawyers and endeavor, within
reasonable limits, to guard against the loss of pro se claims due
to technical defects." Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st
Cir. 2008) (citing Bolvin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir.
2000)).   Holding him to those "reasonable limits," we cannot
discern any basis upon which the district court would glean that
Valdez's motion really took aim at the baseline, mandatory-minimum
sentence of ten years. Id.

                                     - 20 -
prevent his waiver here.   Cf. United States v. Colón-De Jesús, 85

F.4th 15, 25 (1st Cir. 2023) (recognizing that general objections

to a sentence do not preserve unsaid issues); United States v.

Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017).

                           III. CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Valdez's motion

and the judgment below are affirmed.

                               - 21 -