Court Opinion

ID: 9756913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:08:27.475606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.992972
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s compelling analysis of the pertinent release language in this case. I am constrained to find that the language used in the release between appellant Legnini and appellee Farrell is not so clear as to require affirmance of the trial court’s grant of preliminary objections.
The majority establishes the pertinent law in this area with precision. It is also true, however, that the effect of a release must be determined from its language. The ordinary meaning must be attributed to the language, unless a different meaning was clearly intended. Vogel v. Berkley, *178354 Pa.Super. 291, 297, 511 A.2d 878 (1986) (citing Wenger v. Ziegler, 424 Pa. 268, 226 A.2d 653 (1967)). With this in mind, I find that the release language used in this case is susceptible to varying constructions and a jury should decide what the parties intended by the release.
It is well established that a contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 201, 519 A.2d 385, 389 (1986). In this case, I find two different constructions of the release language. One construction is that which the majority has propounded — that the release only applies to any claims arising from the wrongful discharge suit. I find, however, that the release is also subject to the construction which appellant contends (i.e., appellee agreed to indemnify appellant for all claims arising from his employment ). This position is bolstered by express language used in the release which otherwise would not have been included. First, had the parties wished to limit the release to claims resulting from the wrongful discharge, they could have used language which restricted its scope. Cf. Vogel v. Berkley, supra (release agreement which discharged all claims arising from “above-described dispute” was unambiguous).
This writer is also mindful that the words of the release should not be construed to extend beyond the express consideration mentioned so as to make a release for the parties which they never intended or contemplated. Sparler v. Fireman’s Insurance Company of Newark, N.J., 360 Pa.Super. 597, 601, 521 A.2d 433, 435 (1987) (en banc), allocatur denied, 518 Pa. 613, 540 A.2d 535 (1988). However, the limitation of the release to claims arising from the wrongful discharge becomes a non sequiter in the face of the additional language which requires appellee to release and indemnify “[cjlaims which could be asserted by third parties as a result of Claims asserted by Farrell.” I find it difficult to envision claims appellee could assert against third parties arising in the context of a wrongful discharge *179action. Such suits naturally involve only the master and servant. Moreover, I am unable to accept the majority view, which states:
“[t]o imply from the release in the wrongful discharge action an agreement by Farrell to indemnify against a potential liability which Legnini had assumed by contracts of indemnity with third persons would be wholly unreasonable. It would be to insert a benefit for which no separate consideration had been paid and which did not appear to be within the contemplation of the parties.”
Majority opinion at 176-177. There is no indication in the record of this case of what consideration was paid in order to secure the settlement agreement and the contemporaneously executed release. Moreover, the majority overly concerns itself with the release between Legnini and the other defendants, rather than with the release at issue.
Finally, I must note that the settlement agreement and negotiation were entered into while the separate negligence suit was pending. It is quite plausible that appellant sought to insulate itself from further liability to Farrell as appellant had already settled with him.
Because the language of the release is conflicting, I would find the release sufficiently ambiguous to require a trial to ascertain the parties’ intent. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. at 201, 519 A.2d at 390. I would therefore reverse the order of the trial court sustaining appellee’s preliminary objections.