Court Opinion

ID: 9925270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:32.732293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.602079
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

HURON VALLEY OUTFITTERS, LLC,                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 361871
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF LYON,                                            LC No. 2020-179677-CK

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this appeal by right, plaintiff Huron Valley Outfitters, LLC, challenges the trial court’s
grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant Charter Township of Lyon (the Township) on
plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       In 2016, plaintiff purchased vacant land from the Township. The Purchase Agreement
contained the following clause:

               2.2    Seller shall reserve unto itself, a non-exclusive and assignable
       Easement for the construction of a Ring Road which shall traverse the Property in
       a roughly easterly/westerly direction and which Ring Road shall ultimately connect
       to Milford Road and Grand River Avenue, as generally depicted on attached
       “Exhibit C” (the “Ring Road”). The Ring Road, when constructed, shall be entirely
       located within the area reserved by Seller as illustrated in Exhibit C. The easement
       shall reserve unto Seller a 120’ wide easement area for the construction of the
       planned Ring Road, which, when constructed, shall be a dedicated public roadway,
       along with the installation and maintenance of any and all utilities which Seller
       shall desire to place or cause to be placed within the easement, and such other
       ancillary items as may be reasonably related to the development and construction
       of the Ring Road, including the construction of same. Upon the establishment of
       the final specific location of the roadway and utilities, such easement shall be
       reduced to the actual size required to accommodate the required road right-of-way,

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       and the easement over the residual area shall be terminated and released so as to
       provide for Ring Road frontage and unencumbered Ring Road access along the
       entire length of the Property. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
       in this Agreement, Purchaser shall not be responsible for the performance of work
       or the payment of any costs associated with the reservation of the Ring Road
       Easement or the construction and installation of the Ring Road or any utilities or
       such ancillary items as may be placed within the Ring Road Easement area or which
       may be reasonably related to the development and construction of the Ring Road.

       The parties also executed an agreement titled “Roadway Easement Agreement.” This
agreement, in which plaintiff was designated “Grantor” and the Township was designated
“Grantee,” provided in relevant part as follows:

               1. Grant of Easement. For the sum of One Dollar ($1.00), Grantor, as the
       owner of certain land located in the Township of Lyon, County of Oakland, State
       of Michigan, and more particularly described on the attached Exhibit A,
       incorporated herein by reference (the “Property”) does hereby grant to Grantee a
       non-exclusive, perpetual, assignable easement for public roadway purposes (the
       “Roadway Easement”) and to construct, operate, maintain, repair, and/or replace
       roadways, utilities (either overhead or underground), and other infrastructure
       improvements in, over, under, upon, and through the following described portion
       of the Property:

       SEE LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF 120 FOOT WIDE RIGHT OF WAY AND
       SURVEY DRAWING ATTACHED AS EXHIBIT B AND INCORPORATED
       HEREIN BY REFERENCE (the “Roadway Easement Area”).

               2. Construction. Grantee and/or its assigns shall have the right to design,
       construct, improve, repair, and maintain a road (the “Roadway”) and/or public and
       franchise utilities and such other improvements that Grantee, in its sole discretion
       deems necessary to provide continuous, adequate, convenient, and reasonable
       means of ingress and egress access through the Roadway Easement Area to, from,
       and throughout the Property, and the neighboring properties (collectively, the
       “Roadway Improvements”). Any such Roadway Improvements contemplated
       herein shall be at no cost to Grantor, except that any improvements required to
       provide Grantor with access to the Roadway Easement Area, when so improved,
       shall be the responsibility of Grantor.

        In 2020, after the Township had not initiated construction of the Ring Road over plaintiff’s
property, plaintiff filed the present action alleging, as relevant to the instant appeal, that the
Township had breached the parties’ agreement by not constructing the road. Plaintiff contended
that the Township was contractually required to build the Ring Road.

      On June 3, 2020, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(9) on the contract claim and allowed the parties to engage in discovery. On
September 14, 2020, the trial court denied the Township’s motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the contract claim, concluding that § 2.2 of the Purchase Agreement was

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“unambiguous as to the party’s intent to reserve the easement, its purpose, and its location,” but
that the language was ambiguous “as to its construction (e.g., who and when).” The judge
originally assigned to this case retired and was replaced by a successor judge. On September 1,
2021, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the Township under MCR
2.116(C)(10) on the contract claim, reasoning that “this Court cannot find that defendant
[Township] breached the terms of the Purchase Agreement or the Roadway Easement Agreement
because it did not expressly obligate defendant to construct Ring Road or that the construction had
to be completed by a certain timeframe.” The court therefore dismissed the breach of contract
claim.

       The Township subsequently sought attorney fees and costs pursuant to § 14 of the Purchase
Agreement. The trial court denied the Township’s motion in a June 8, 2022 order. This appeal
followed. Further facts relevant to the resolution of the issues on appeal will be discussed as
necessary below.

                                        II. JURISDICTION

         We first address the Township’s challenge to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction over “any
issues adjudicated by the trial court on, or prior to, December 10, 2021, including the September
1, 2021 Opinion and Order.” The Township previously filed a motion in this Court to limit the
scope of this appeal to issues related to the June 8, 2022 order and to dismiss as untimely the appeal
of any issues related to the September 1, 2021 or December 10, 2021 orders. The Township argued
that a December 10, 2021 order was a final order under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i) because it was “the
first judgment or order that dispose[d] of all the claims and adjudicate[d] the rights and liabilities
of all the parties . . . .” Additionally, the Township further argued that the June 8, 2022 order was
a subsequent, separate final order under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iv) because it was a postjudgment order
awarding or denying attorney fees. Plaintiff filed its appeal on June 21, 2022. Consequently, the
Township argued that although plaintiff’s appeal was timely filed within 21 days of the June 8,
2022 order, see MCR 7.204(A)(1), plaintiff’s appeal was limited to the issues decided in the June
8, 2022 order regarding attorney fees and costs. See MCR 7.203(A)(1) (“An appeal from an order
described in MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii)-(v) is limited to the portion of the order with respect to which
there is an appeal of right.”). The Township contended that plaintiff’s appeal of issues decided in
the earlier orders were untimely and should be dismissed. See MCR 7.204(A) (“The time limit for
an appeal of right is jurisdictional.”). This Court denied the Township’s motion.1

        The Township has reasserted its jurisdictional challenge in its appellate brief. “Whether
this Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal is always within the scope of this Court’s review.”
Chen v Wayne State Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). Under MCR
7.202(6)(a)(iv), a “postjudgment order awarding or denying attorney fees and costs under court
rule or other law” is a final order in a civil case.

1
 Huron Valley Outfitters LLC v Charter Twp of Lyon, unpublished order of the Michigan Court
of Appeals, entered November 23, 2022 (Docket No. 361871).

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        Here, the Township specifically moved in the trial court for attorney fees and costs based
plaintiff’s failure to prevail on its breach of contract claim and an attorney fee/cost shifting clause
in § 14 of the parties’ purchase agreement that entitled the prevailing party in “any litigation or
arbitration . . . arising out of [the] parties’ actions to enforce the terms of this Agreement” to
“recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs it has incurred in the defense or prosecution of such
action.”

        A “contractual clause providing that in the event of a dispute the prevailing party is entitled
to recover attorney fees is valid. And [a]ttorney fees awarded under [such] contractual provisions
are considered damages, not costs.” Fleet Business Credit v Krapohl Ford Lincoln Mercury Co,
274 Mich App 584, 589; 735 NW2d 644 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alterations
in original). When the amount of damages remains unresolved, a trial court’s order regarding the
issue of liability alone is not a final judgment or order. Children’s Hosp of Mich v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 450 Mich 670, 674-675, 677; 545 NW2d 592 (1996).

        In its September 1, 2021 opinion and order, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s breach-of-
contract claim with prejudice based on its finding that the terms of the Purchase Agreement and
Easement Agreement did not expressly obligate the Township to construct the Ring Road. The
trial court denied summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s other claims. In an October 12,
2021 order, the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.

        In the December 10, 2021 order, the trial court dismissed the remaining two counts of
plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. This order also expressly provided that
the order had no effect on the Township’s pending motion for attorney fees and costs under the
contract. Accordingly, at this point, the issue of liability had been determined in the Township’s
favor on the breach-of-contract claim but the issue of damages in the form of prevailing party
attorney fees and costs pursuant to the contract’s fee-shifting clause remained pending. Fleet
Business Credit, 274 Mich App at 589. Thus, the December 10, 2021 order was not a final order.
Children’s Hosp of Mich, 450 Mich at 674-675, 677; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i) (providing that “the first
judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the
parties” is a final order or final judgment).

        Plaintiff was therefore not entitled to an appeal by right from the December 10, 2021 order.
MCR 7.203(A)(1) (“The court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party
from . . . [a] final judgment or final order of the circuit court, or court of claims, as defined in MCR
7.202(6) . . . .”); MCR 2.604(A) (stating in relevant part that “an order or other form of decision
adjudicating fewer than all the claims . . . does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, . . . is subject to revision before entry of final judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties[, and] . . . is not appealable as of right before entry of final
judgment”).

        The June 8, 2022 order addressed the Township’s motion for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the contract and was the “first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties . . . .” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i). “[A] party
claiming an appeal of right from a final order is free to raise issues on appeal related to prior
orders.” Green v Ziegelman, 282 Mich App 292, 301 n 6; 767 NW2d 660 (2009) (quotation marks

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and citation omitted; alteration in original). We thus have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims
related to the previous orders that plaintiff challenges on appeal.

                                 III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

        On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s various rulings throughout the proceedings
regarding summary disposition on plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Plaintiff argues that the
trial court erred by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition on this claim and that the
trial court also erred by subsequently granting summary disposition in the Township’s favor on
this claim.

        A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Summary
disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(9) when “[t]he opposing party has failed to state a
valid defense to the claim asserted against him or her.” MCR 2.116(C)(9). A “motion under MCR
2.116(C)(9) tests the sufficiency of a defendant’s pleadings by accepting all well-pleaded
allegations as true.” Village of Edmore v Crystal Automation Sys, Inc, 322 Mich App 244, 261;
911 NW2d 241 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the defenses are so clearly
untenable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly deny the plaintiff’s right
to recovery, then summary disposition under this rule is proper.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. A genuine issue of material fact exists if, after
considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party, “the record leaves open
an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        The essential issue of dispute between the parties is whether the Township was
contractually obligated to build the Ring Road as a result of the language creating the easement in
favor of the Township over plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff maintains that the relevant language
unambiguously requires the Township to build the Ring Road or, alternatively, that the language
is at least ambiguous such that extrinsic evidence may be considered to determine the parties’
intent and that the interpretation of the contract presents a question of fact to be resolved by the
fact finder at trial. Thus, the first issue that we must address with respect to all of plaintiff’s
appellate arguments is whether the easement language was ambiguous with respect to the
Township’s obligation, or lack thereof, to build the Ring Road.

        “The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent.”
Village of Edmore, 322 Mich App at 262 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To discern
the parties’ intent, we must “read[] the agreement as a whole and attempt[] to apply the plain
language of the contract itself,” giving the contract language its “ordinary, plain meaning.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the language of the contract is unambiguous, we
construe and enforce the contract as written” because “an unambiguous contractual provision is
reflective of the parties’ intent as a matter of law.” Quality Prod & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision,
Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). “Once discerned, the intent of the parties will be
enforced unless it is contrary to public policy.” Id.

       Relevant extrinsic evidence may be considered to aid in the interpretation of a contract,
without violating the parol evidence rule, if the contract language is ambiguous. Klapp v United

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Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 469-470; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). A contract is ambiguous
if “its words can reasonably be understood in different ways,” Village of Edmore, 322 Mich app
at 262, or “two provisions of the same contract irreconcilably conflict with each other,” Klapp,
468 Mich at 467. “The construction of the terms of a contract is generally a question of law for
the court; however, where a contract’s meaning is ambiguous, the question of interpretation should
be submitted to the fact-finder.” Village of Edmore, 322 Mich App at 262.

         Here, there is no language in the Purchase Agreement or the Roadway Easement
Agreement that expressly imposes an obligation on the Township to actually construct the Ring
Road. It is apparent that the parties merely set forth conditions for the creation, location, and
permitted use of an easement. Although § 2.2 of the Purchase Agreement provides that the Ring
Road must be within the location of the easement and will be a dedicated public roadway “when
constructed,” this language still does not indicate that the Township agreed to actually construct
Ring Road. The only reasonable understanding of the language in the Purchase Agreement and
the Roadway Easement Agreement is that the Township was required to meet certain conditions
if it decided to exercise its right to build Ring Road within the easement. Because the language is
unambiguous, it reflects the parties’ intent as a matter of law and must be enforced as written.
Quality Prod & Concepts, 469 Mich at 375. Because there is no language in the contract from
which this Court could infer that the parties agreed the Township was obligated to construct the
road, the Township could not be in breach for not constructing the road and plaintiff has not shown
that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of the Township on plaintiff’s
contract claim.

         To the extent that plaintiff argues that the trial court found in earlier orders by the original
trial court judge that the Purchase Agreement language reserving the easement was ambiguous and
that the successor judge essentially vacated these orders improperly by granting summary
disposition in favor of the Township on the basis that the language unambiguously did not obligate
the Township to build the Ring Road, plaintiff fails to state a meritorious claim of error requiring
reversal. A nonfinal order that does not adjudicate all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties, such as the earlier orders to which plaintiff refers, is subject to revision before entry
of a final order, even by a successor judge. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 718;
565 NW2d 401 (1997); MCR 2.604(A).

        In light of the above conclusions, which are dispositive of this appeal, we need not address
plaintiff’s additional arguments for reversal.

        Affirmed. Defendant having prevailed in full is entitled to costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                                 /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                                 /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                                 /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

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