Court Opinion

ID: 9388024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 18:00:49.967761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.992705
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                   File Name: 23a0173n.06

                                            No. 22-5954

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                    FILED
                                                                                      Apr 19, 2023
                                                          )
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                          )
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                           )
                                                          )       ON APPEAL FROM THE
 v.                                                       )       UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                          )       COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
 DANIEL SILVA,                                            )       DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
            Defendant-Appellant.                          )
                                                          )                               OPINION
                                                          )

Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

           ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Daniel Silva appeals

the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment against him or to order his

hospitalization within seven days as relief for his having been waiting more than four months to

be hospitalized for his competency-restoration evaluation. Silva has now been hospitalized and

argues that his appeal is moot and that we should vacate the district court’s order denying the relief

he sought. We dismiss this appeal as moot but decline to vacate the district court’s order.

      I.      Background and Procedural History

           A federal grand jury indicted Silva for making threats to injure the person of another

through interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Both the prosecutor and defense counsel

questioned Silva’s competency immediately and agreed to a forensic evaluation. At Silva’s

competency hearing, the district court considered the doctor’s conclusion that Silva met the

standard for legal incompetence, as well as Silva’s demeanor, and found Silva incompetent. On
No. 22-5954, United States v. Silva

May 23, 2022, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1), the district court ordered the government to

hospitalize Silva in a suitable facility for up to four months to see if Silva’s competency can be

restored.

       On September 28, 2022, four months after the district court entered that order, Silva was

still in jail awaiting hospitalization. So he filed a motion either to dismiss the charges or to order

his hospitalization within seven days because the government had failed to “make a determination

of competence restorability within four months, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).” Silva

argued that the plain text of the statute requires the four-month time clock to begin when the district

court orders hospitalization. He also argued that the Speedy Trial Act and the Due Process Clause

support this interpretation. Silva proposed as alternative remedies that the court: (1) dismiss the

indictment, without prejudice, (2) find that his mental condition had not improved and commit him

civilly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246, 4248, or (3) order the government to hospitalize him within

seven days, as happened in United States v. Donnelly, 41 F.4th 1102 (9th Cir. 2022).

       The district court denied the motion, holding that the four-month time period in

§ 4241(d)(1) does not begin to run until the defendant is actually hospitalized. Because the clock

had not yet started, the court held that it was “without the power to expedite this process or to grant

the further relief requested by the defendant.”

       Silva appealed and sought expedited briefing and an expedited decision. We granted the

motion to expedite briefing. The government then filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,

arguing that this court had no jurisdiction because the ruling was neither a final decision under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, nor subject to the collateral order doctrine. The government informed the court

that the United States Marshals Service estimated that Silva would be hospitalized by the end of

December 2022. On January 5, 2023, the government informed the court that Silva was now

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No. 22-5954, United States v. Silva

projected to be placed in the hospital in February or March 2023. On February 17, 2023, the

government informed the court that Silva was hospitalized on February 7, 2023.

         We then asked the parties for supplemental briefing addressing the following two

questions:

         1. Does Silva’s now being hospitalized moot his request for the remedy of
            “hospitalization within 7 days”? Does it moot his request for the remedy of dismissal
            of the indictment?
         2. Does Silva’s now being hospitalized affect our exercise of jurisdiction under the
            collateral order doctrine over the appeal of the denial of the motion to dismiss the
            indictment?

         The parties’ supplemental briefs are before us now. Both parties agree that the two

remedies Silva sought from us—dismissal of the indictment without prejudice or, in the alternative,

an order to hospitalize Silva within seven days—are moot because Silva is now undergoing the

competency restoration evaluation. But the parties do not agree on whether the district court’s

order denying Silva’s requested relief should be vacated.

   II.       Discussion

             A. Mootness

         We agree with the parties that this appeal is moot. An appeal is moot and this court lacks

jurisdiction over it “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.” Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 898 (6th Cir.

2014) (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). It must become “impossible

for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. (quoting Chafin v.

Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). Here, neither of Silva’s requested forms of relief is available

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No. 22-5954, United States v. Silva

to him anymore because he has been hospitalized, and he has otherwise disclaimed any interest in

any other form of relief. The goal of his appeal has been achieved.

       Nor does the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine

apply here because Silva will not be subject to detention under a § 4241(d)(1) order again. A

dispute qualifies for this exception “only if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to

be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that

the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” United States v. Sanchez-

Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). While other defendants

may face the same issue that Silva did, Silva himself must be the one who would suffer the same

action again. But he will not be, because once his initial examination is complete, the results of

that examination will determine whether his hospitalization will continue. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).

Silva will not be subject to detention under § 4241(d)(1) again. This exception to the mootness

doctrine is inapplicable.

       There is no longer a live controversy before us and Silva lacks a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome of this narrow appeal. We therefore dismiss this appeal as moot and do not need

to consider the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

           B. Vacatur

       We do not agree with Silva that, based on the Munsingwear rule, we should vacate the

district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss. The “Munsingwear rule is an equitable one

that is employed where necessary ‘to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from

spawning any legal consequences.’” United States v. City of Detroit, 401 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.

2005) (quoting United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 41 (1950)) (emphasis omitted). This

rule ensures that a party is not harmed by “the precedential and preclusive effects of the adverse

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No. 22-5954, United States v. Silva

ruling without having had a chance to appeal it.” Teamsters Local Union No. 1199 v. Coca-Cola

Consolidated, Inc., 854 F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). But vacatur is an

“extraordinary remedy,” and the party seeking vacatur must demonstrate its “equitable

entitlement” to vacatur. Id. at 677 (quoting Blankenship v. Blackwell, 429 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir.

2005)).

          Silva has not demonstrated that the equities favor vacating the district court’s order. As an

initial matter, the Supreme Court has never applied Munsingwear in a criminal case, so it is not

clear that its general principles apply in this context. See United States v. Flute, 951 F.3d 908, 909

(8th Cir. 2020) (order). But even if Munsingwear’s general principles are applicable in criminal

cases, Silva fails to explain why vacatur should apply here.

          Silva does not explain why it is unfair for the district court’s order to remain in effect. All

the order says is that Silva is not entitled to the relief he sought. This does not have any long-

lasting legal consequences for Silva, as he has now been hospitalized. Nor is it clear that this order

is unreviewable. If Silva wants to appeal the decision at the conclusion of his case or argue that

his due process or Sixth Amendment rights were violated during his pre-hospitalization time in

jail, he is free to do so. Neither is the public interest served by vacating the order. U.S. Bancorp

Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23 (1994). Finally, the principle in U.S.

Bancorp that “vacatur must be granted where mootness results from the unilateral action of the

party who prevailed in the lower court” does not apply here. Id. The government was not acting

unilaterally when it hospitalized Silva, but instead acted pursuant to the court’s order. We

therefore deny Silva’s request to vacate the district court’s order.

                                            CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot.

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