Court Opinion

ID: 9419868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:51:53.798606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:14.338910
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Reed,
dissenting.
Petitioner, Hust, a fireman and watertender on the S. S. Mark Hanna, brought an action in an Oregon Circuit *739Court1 against the respondent, the Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. The suit was under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the Jones Act, § 33.2 It sought damages against the respondent as employer. As § 33 shows on its face, a seaman has the advantages of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act only against his employer.3 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon denying petitioner the right to recover in this action would then be correct unless the respondent is petitioner’s employer or unless congressional legislation since the Merchant Marine Act grants petitioner a right of recovery against respondent even though the employer-employee relationship does not exist.
The S. S. Mark Hanna, a Liberty ship, was owned by the United States. So far as appears from the record, it had never belonged to anyone else. Its operation was under the direction of the War Shipping Administration. In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Administration employed respondent as its General Agent to conduct the business of certain ships assigned to respondent for handling. From the excerpts from the contract, set out *740below, we think it clear that this was a conventional agency contract under which respondent managed certain matters connected with the ship for the United States. We think it clear, as did the Supreme Court of Oregon, that so far as the crew is concerned the respondent only procured the members, such as Hust, and made them available to the Master, a United States agent, for employment by said Master for the account of the United States.4 Such a contract makes the United States the *741employer under the Merchant Marine Act, not the Master and not respondent, the General Agent. This is an action under the Merchant Marine Act and the question of liability of the respondent for any negligence under any other statute or rule of law, admiralty or otherwise, is not before us.
Since 1920, employees of the United States upon merchant vessels of the United States have had a right of action in admiralty against the vessels in all cases where the employees would have had a right if the vessel were privately owned or operated. This came from § 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act.5 This right of action was enforceable exclusively in admiralty.6 There was no right to a trial and assessment of damages by a jury.
When the War Shipping Administration became the operator of practically the entire American merchant marine, doubts sometimes arose as to whether a particular vessel was a “merchant” vessel, operated by the United States or not. Therefore to clarify this situation and to assure all “employees of the United States through the War Shipping Administration” all “rights” for “injuries” applicable to seamen “employed on privately owned and operated American vessels,” Congress enacted an act to clarify the law relating to functions of the Administra*742tion. Provisions from the first section which are important here are set out below.7
As will be seen by an examination of the reports of the House and Senate8 in connection with the specific requirement of the first section, supra, for enforcement of these rights, Congress declared its purpose in no uncertain terms to grant the power to enforce these rights only through the Suits in Admiralty Act. That is, the seaman could not submit his claim to a jury.9 It will be noted that the words “right” and “status” are used with care, so that *743it is plain Congress intended to give all Administration seamen rights under the Merchant Marine Act and remedies under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
*744As there might be instances where a seaman was an employee of the Administration but his boat was not a merchant vessel of the United States, the Clarification *745Act of March 24, 1943, was made retroactive to October 1, 1941.10 Probably other compensation for injuries may have existed prior to the enactment of this Act.
It is said by the Court that if a seaman employed by the United States is limited to the remedies of the Suits in Admiralty Act for recovery in tort, the holding in Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Lustgarten, 280 U. S. 320, is restored as a rule of law. The Lustgarten case was overruled by Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575, 578. We think that this misconceives the effect of the Brady case. We do not think the requirement that seamen, employees of the United States, must seek their remedy against their employer under the Suits in Admiralty Act has any relation to the Lustgarten or Brady cases.
Lustgarten, a seaman, sought recovery at law for a tort against the Navigation Company, an agent of the United States. It was held that he could only recover under *746the Suits in Admiralty Act. In the Brady case, under a petition of a visitor to the boat to recover against a similar agent, it was held a cause of action in tort at law would lie. The Lustgarten case was overruled. The only effect of the Brady decision was to hold that actions could be maintained against agents of the United States at common law for the agent’s own torts. The case had nothing whatever to do with the right to recover against employers under the Jones Act. The opinion said, 317 U. S. at 577, “The sole question here is whether the Suits in Admiralty Act makes private operators such as respondent non-suable for their torts.” “The liability of an agent for his own negligence has long been embedded in the law.” Id., at 580. “But it is a non sequitur to say that because the Act takes away the remedy of libel in rem in all cases involving government vessels and restricts the remedies against the United States and its wholly owned corporations, it must be presumed to have abolished all right to proceed against all other parties.” Id., at 582. “The question is not whether the Commission had authority to delegate to respondent responsibilities for managing and operating the vessel as its agent. It is whether respondent can escape liability for a negligent exercise of that delegated power if we assume that by contract it will be exonerated or indemnified for any damages it must pay.” Id., at 583-84. The case was then sent back to the Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether a cause of action against the agent was established. All that was meant or said in Brady about Lustgarten was that the Lustgarten case was in error in saying that a seaman could not sue an agent for the agent’s own tort. The Brady final statement on Lustgarten was, “Our conclusion, however, is that that position is untenable and that the Lustgarten case so far as it would prevent a private operator from being sued under the circumstances of this case *747must be considered as no longer controlling.” Id., at 578. There is no reason here why the petitioner should not sue respondent for its alleged tort. What petitioner is attempting is to hold respondent liable as employer for negligence of petitioner’s fellow servants, of petitioner’s superiors or the Master under the Merchant Marine Act. This it cannot do under this record.11
It is suggested that the respondent may be in the position of an employer, as a charterer or owner pro hac vice. But a charterer or owner pro hac vice, who is also an employer, is one who takes over “the exclusive possession, command, and navigation of the vessel.” Reed v. United States, 11 Wall. 591, 600. That is a bareboat charter. Under the contract in this case, the respondent had no *748such authority. As we have pointed out above, and as the contract shows, he acted for the United States under its command and then only in certain matters not connected with actual navigation.
The Court does not challenge the respondent’s assertion that the Merchant Marine Act requires the employer-employee relationship. It is said, “But it does not follow from the fact that Hust was technically the Government’s employee that he lost all remedies against the operating ‘agent’ for such injuries as he incurred.” Certainly Hust did not lose his remedies against the agent for the agent’s torts. He still has those remedies but petitioner wishes to hold the agent as an employer. There is here no “disruption” of the normal and past relationship between seaman and employer. This Court errs, we think, in suggesting any seaman has been deprived of any right by the Clarification Act of 1943 under the construction of the Oregon Supreme Court. No seaman ever had a right of recovery under the Merchant Marine Act except against his employer. That the seaman still has.
What the Clarification Act does and what it obviously was intended to do, see notes 7 and 9, supra, was to continue the policy of requiring seamen who were employees of the United States to continue to vindicate those rights through the Suits in Admiralty Act. Congress has been generous in permitting seamen to recover in court against the United States for torts. It felt that the traditional proceeding in admiralty offered the best opportunity for justice to all such injured seamen when they were employees of the United States.12
A convenient summary of the attitude of the administrative agencies toward this problem is found in a letter of the War Shipping Administration to the National Labor *749Relations Board of October 20, 1942.13 Such administrative determination is entitled to weight.
We think that the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Burton join in this dissent.

 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 245.

 41 Stat. 1007,46 U. S. C. § 688:
“Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; . . .”

 Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 389; Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp., 112 F. 2d 515, 517; The Norland, 101 F. 2d 967; Baker v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207, 208; Eggleston v. Republic Steel Corp., 47 F. Supp. 658, 659; Gardiner v. Agwilines, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 348.
Compare Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, 94:
“We are of the opinion that Congress used the words 'employe’ and 'employed’ in the statute in their natural sense, and intended to describe the conventional relation of employer and employé.”
Hull v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 252 U. S. 475.

 “Witnesseth: That in consideration of the reciprocal undertakings and promises of the parties herein expressed:
“Article 1. The United States appoints the General Agent as its agent and not as an independent contractor, to manage and conduct the business of vessels assigned to it by the United States from time to time.
“Article 2. The General Agent accepts the appointment and undertakes and promises so to manage and conduct the business for the United States, in accordance with such directions, orders, or regulations as the latter has prescribed, or from time to time may prescribe, and upon the terms and conditions herein provided, of such vessels as have been or may be by the United States assigned to and accepted by the General Agent for that purpose.
“Article 3A. To the best of its ability, the General Agent shall for the account of the United States:
“(d) The General Agent shall procure the Master of the vessels operated hereunder, subject to the approval of the United States. The Master shall be an agent and employee of the United States, and shall have and exercise full control, responsibility and authority with respect to the navigation and management of the vessel. The General Agent shall procure and make available to the Master for engagement by him the officers and men required by him to fill the complement of the vessel. Such officers and men shall be procured by the General Agent through the usual channels and in accordance with the customary practices of commercial operators and upon the terms and conditions prevailing in the particular service or services in which the vessels are to be operated from time to time. The officers and members of the crew shall be subject only to the orders of the *741Master. All such persons shall be paid in the customary manner with funds provided by the United States hereunder.”

 41 Stat. 525-26:
“Sec. 2. That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a libel in personam may be brought against the United States or against such corporation, as the ease may be, provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat operated by such corporation. . . .”

 Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg Bros., 276 U. S. 202; Johnson v. Fleet Corp., 280 U. S. 320.

 57 Stat. 45-46:
“That (a) officers and members of crews (hereinafter referred to as ‘seamen’) employed on United States or foreign flag vessels as employees of the United States through the War Shipping Administration shall, with respect to ... (2) death, injuries, illness, . . . have all of the rights, benefits, exemptions, privileges, and liabilities, under law applicable to citizens of the United States employed as seamen on privately owned and operated American vessels. . . . Any claim referred to in clause (2) or (3) hereof shall, if administratively disallowed in whole or in part, be enforced pursuant to the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act, notwithstanding the vessel on which the seaman is employed is not a merchant vessel within the meaning of such Act. Any claim, right, or cause of action of or in respect of any such seaman accruing on or after October 1, 1941, and prior to the date of enactment of this section may be enforced, and upon the election of the seaman or his surviving dependent or beneficiary, or his legal representative to do so shall be governed, as if this section had been in effect when such claim, right, or cause of action accrued, such election to be made in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. ...”

 S. Rep. No. 62, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 107, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.

 This purpose is made plain by a few excerpts from the reports.
S. Rep. No. 62,78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 5-6,11,14:
“Seamen employed as Government employees on vessels owned by, or bareboat-chartered to, the War Shipping Administration are sometimes precluded from enforcing against the United States the rights and benefits in case of death, injury, illness, detention, and so on that would be available to them if employed by private employers, except under the Suits in Admiralty Act. If they were private employees, rights to redress for death, injury, or illness could be prosecuted under the Jones Act and the general maritime law. These same rights may be asserted against the *743United States as the employer under the Suits in Admiralty Act providing the vessel involved is a merchant vessel. In case of public vessels the seaman must rely for compensation upon the Administrator’s policy recognizing contractual liability which this legislation recognizes. Present-day operating conditions often make uncertain in some cases whether the vessel is a merchant or a public vessel. As a consequence, even though the vessels are generally merchant vessels and not public vessels, there are some cases in which the aforementioned rights of such seamen are in doubt. In addition to these rights which, at times, are uncertain for the reasons mentioned, the seamen who are employees of the United States probably have rights under the United States Employees’ Compensation Act in the event of injury or death. Such compensation benefits are not presently enjoyed by seamen under private employment. Thus vital differences in these rights are made to depend upon whether the seaman happens to be employed aboard a vessel time-chartered to the War Shipping Administration or owned by or bareboatchartered to the War Shipping Administration. Since seamen constantly change from one vessel to another, their rights for death, injury, or illness also constantly change, depending upon the relationship of the War Shipping Administration to the vessel. This fluctuation and lack of uniformity of rights leads to dependency of vital rights upon chance with a result of confusion and inequities. The bill is designed to remove this confusion and these inequities. The bill does not affect seamen employed on vessels time-chartered to the War Shipping Administration where the vessels are supplied with crews employed by the company from which the vessel is chartered. As to them their status and the status of the Government employees mentioned will be made uniform.
“. . . They will continue to have the right to indemnity through court action for injury resulting from unseaworthiness of the vessel or defects in vessel appliances, and they (and their dependents) will have the right to action under the Jones Act (1920) for injury or death resulting from negligence of the employer. Such seamen will have the right to enforce claims for these benefits according to the procedure of the Suits in Admiralty Act, except that claims with respect to social-security benefits shall be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure provided in the social-security law. . . .
“The provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act that suit lies thereunder only if the ship involved is employed as a merchant vessel or a tugboat is waived for the purposes of section 1 so *744that the claim may be enforced regardless of the nature of the vessel on which the seaman is serving as an employee of the War Shipping Administration. To prevent unnecessary or premature litigation against the United States, it is required that before suit there shall be an administrative disallowance of the same in accord with rules or regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator, War Shipping Administration.”
H. Rep. No. 107,78th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3,21:
“The basic scope and philosophy of the measure is to preserve private rights of seamen while utilizing the merchant marine to the utmost for public wartime benefit. Except in rare cases the ships themselves are being operated as merchant vessels, and are therefore subject to the Suits in Admiralty Act. Granting seamen rights to sue under that act is therefore entirely consistent with the underlying pattern of the measure. This should follow even in the extraordinary case where vessels might otherwise technically be classed as public vessels.
“The various rights and remedies under statute and general maritime law with respect to death, injury, illness, and other casualty to seamen, have been rather fully set forth hereinabove. Under clause 2 of section 1 (a) these substantive rights would be governed by existing law relating to privately employed seamen. The only modification thereof arises from the remedial provision that they shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act. This procedure is appropriate in view of the fact that the suits will be against the Government of the United States. In such a suit no provision is made for a jury trial as may otherwise be had in a proceeding such as one under the Jones Act for reasons set forth in the letter of the Attorney General (September 14,1942). The provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act that suit lies thereunder only if the ship involved is employed as a merchant vessel or a tugboat is waived for the purposes of section 1 so that the claim may be enforced regardless of the nature of the vessel on which the seaman is serving as an employee of the War Shipping Administration. To prevent unnecessary or premature litigation against the United States, it is required that before suit there shall be an administrative disallowance of the same in accord with rules or regulations to be prescribed by the Administrator, War Shipping Administration.”
The desirability of a jury trial was commented upon by a representative of the National Maritime Union and the Attorney General in reply. See Hearings on H. R. 7424, House Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 30-33.

 S. Rep. No. 62,78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 13:
“Inasmuch as certain vessel operations on account of the Government were undertaken prior to the establishment of the War Shipping Administration by or through the Maritime Commission, the provisions of section 1 and all amendments therein are made applicable to the United States Maritime Commission with respect to the period beginning October 1, 1941, to the time of taking office of the Administrator, War Shipping Administration (February 11, 1942). To avoid administrative confusion and uncertainty as to the exact status of employment of seamen employed on War Shipping Administration vessels, it is provided that seamen employed through that agency shall be included under the provisions of section 1 even though the seamen may be employed on a vessel chartered or made available to another department or agency of the United States for purposes of convenience in the war effort.
“With respect to seamen on foreign-flag vessels, the remedy provided by this legislation is, of course, in substitution for remedies that might exist under the laws of a country in which the vessel may be documented, and seamen proceeding under this section by such choice of remedies will have waived benefits under laws of any other country that might otherwise be available.”
See also H. Report No. 107, supra, pp. 21 and 22.

 176 Ore. 662, 665, 668-669, 680, 695, 158 P. 2d 275, 276, 277-78, 282, 287-88:
“On the trial the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was not employed by it and that his injury was not caused by its negligence. The court denied the motion, and in its charge left it to the jury to determine as a question of fact whether the relation of employer and employee existed between defendant and plaintiff.”
“There is no evidence that the defendant did anything in connection with the business of the vessel not contemplated by the terms of the service agreement, or that it exercised or attempted to exercise any control over the master or crew. Indeed, the uneontradicted evidence is that when it was the duty of the defendant to assist in the loading of the vessel it acted under the instructions of the master as to the time, place and method of loading.”
“As stated, the trial judge left to the jury the question of employer-employee relationship as one of fact. The propriety of that submission is not defended here, and it seems to be agreed by both parties that the question is one of law to be determined by the court. Of the correctness of this view we think there can be no doubt.”
“We find no such basis of liability in this case. The defendant was not responsible for a negligent order of the boatswain which sent the plaintiff into a place of danger. There is no evidence that the vessel was not properly equipped when it started on its voyage.”

 See Remedies of Merchant Seamen Injured on Government Owned Vessels, 55 Yale Law Journal 584, 591.

 “The War Shipping Administrator has been advised that under the contractual arrangements mentioned above and for other reasons, the Master, officers and members of the crew of all vessels owned by or bareboat chartered to the War Shipping Administration are employees of the United States and particularly of the War Shipping Administration, and are so considered and treated at the present time by other governmental departments and agencies for the purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act, the United States Employees' Compensation Act, the Federal Social Security Laws, and the Federal Employment Tax laws. Furthermore, the wages of such personnel are exempt from attachment as government employees.”