Court Opinion

ID: 9548848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:09:42.100543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:28.786086
License: Public Domain

NELSON, Judge
(dissenting).
My brother has very carefully and accurately outlined both the facts of this case and the principles of law applicable thereto and they need not be extensively repeated here. Because of my view that the accident not only occurred within the course of *394petitioner’s employment but also arose out of it, I must dissent.
The award of the Industrial Commission should be set aside for two reasons: First, and most decisive of the cause, the second sentence of the majority opinion highlights the misplaced emphasis on the cause of petitioner’s accident: “Petitioner (Pottinger) claims that burns received in the act of smoking . . . ” (emphasis supplied).
Petitioner was injured because he was so intoxicated that he couldn’t successfully complete a task he had probably accomplished thousands of times before without incident — the striking of a match. I fail to see how this set of circumstances significantly differs from the facts of Peterson v. Industrial Commission, supra. In that case, the deceased was so intoxicated that he couldn’t successfully sleep without becoming entangled in the bed and suffocating. The primary cause of petitioner’s injury was his state of intoxication. Since my brothers have held that he was within the course of his employment when the accident took place, Peterson, supra, requires that the award of the Industrial Commission be set aside.
Similarly, Sacks v. Industrial Commission, supra, is distinguishable on the ground that nothing in that case arose out of the applicant’s employment to impair his ability to make normal use of the toilet. In the case at bar, Pottinger was intoxicated as a direct result of his employment and therefore unable to light his cigarette with the caution which normally accompanies that act.
Even without the issue of intoxication, which I believe to be controlling here, I would set aside the award on the smoking question. I support the view of the California decision cited above, Wiseman v. Industrial Commission, supra. Generally, that case and others regard smoking essentially as a matter of personal comfort which must be tolerated by an employer. Our Supreme Court has opened the door to application of the personal comfort doctrine in Arizona in Pauley v. Industrial Commission, supra. However, the majority herein distinguishes the Pauley case from the case at bar on the ground that Pottinger’s accident did not occur on his employer’s premises. I submit that this is a distinction without substance which frustrates the policy underlying the personal comfort doctrine where, as here, the employee was required to be on certain premises for the benefit of his employer.
If I could intellectually do so, I would be happy to join my brothers in adding to the ever-growing list of: “Are there any other reasons to stop smoking?” Unfortunately, I think the problem of smoking, like that of drinking, is one industry must be prepared to live with and compensate fpr in the event of injury while in the course of employment.