Court Opinion

ID: 9944776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:38:15.367594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:06.401752
License: Public Domain

I am constrained to disagree with my astute colleagues upon the final result reached in this case. It is however apparent to me that the case should be reversed, because of erroneous instructions, and because of the refusal of the trial court to permit the introduction of certain admissible evidence, and I concur in that part of the majority opinion. I cannot agree, however, that this Court should substitute its judgment on the weight and worth of the testimony and hold the verdict to be against the overwhelming weight of the testimony. This is not a case in chancery where the Chancellor may disregard a verdict of the jury. This is a case where the law permits a jury to pass upon the validity of a will. Sections 508 and 1275, Miss Code 1942; 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 885, page 438.
It has been the rule in Mississippi for many years that a verdict rendered on conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed simply because the appellate court could have found otherwise, or may be of the opinion that it is against the preponderant weight of the testimony, unless the verdict evinced fraud, corruption or passion and *Page 108 
prejudice on the part of the jury; nor will the court reverse a case where there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusions of the jury. It is only when the verdict and judgment of the trial court is unsupported by sufficient evidence that this Court may safely hold the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
The appellate courts have been tempted often to substitute the court's own opinion of the evidence for that of the jury as to the genuineness of disputed documents. In 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, Section 884 reads: "The decisions are not in accord upon the question of the review on appeal of evidence as to the genuineness of disputed documents. In some instances the courts have refused to enter upon a comparison of the disputed handwriting with genuine writing for the purpose of setting aside the conclusion of the original trier of facts. However, in other cases the appellate court has been discovered to have made such comparison, sometimes agreeing and sometimes disagreeing with the decision of the original trier of the fact, sometimes holding that such trier erred in giving greater weight to the direct evidence in favor of the authenticity of the undisputed document than to the conclusions based on the testimony of experts, and sometimes rejecting such conclusions in favor of the direct evidence."
The question as to whether or not an alleged will was forged has been submitted to this Court in the case of Ellis v. Ellis,160 Miss. 345, 134 So. 150, and the Court in that case refused to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. In that case the Court said: "The appellant next contends that the verdict of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that consequently his motion for a new trial should have been sustained by the court below. We do not think there is any merit in this contention. The testimony bearing upon the issue as to whether the signature to the will was the genuine signature of George B. Ellis was in *Page 109 
sharp conflict, and there was ample testimony to support the verdict of the jury. It was peculiarly the province of the jury to pass upon this conflicting evidence, and the verdict cannot be set aside on the ground that it found no sufficient support in the evidence." See Kirk v. Kirk, 206 Miss. 668, 40 So.2d 548; Wallace v. Harrison, 218 Miss. 153, 65 So.2d 456; Lowrey v. Wilkinson, 222 Miss. 201, 75 So.2d 643.
In the case of Liles v. May, 105 Miss. 807, 63 So. 217, where a question of forgery was submitted to the jury, a verdict was returned in favor of the contestants, and the Court said: "On the evidence we think the cause was a proper one for the jury." In that case, however, one member of the Supreme Court dissented on the ground that he thought that the case should have been taken away from the jury.
This Court has uniformly held through the years that where there is a conflict of evidence the issue on a will contest, devisavit vel non, is an issue to be determined by the jury. Helm v. Sheeks, 116 Miss. 726, 77 So. 820; Tyson v. Utterback,154 Miss. 381, 122 So. 496; Barnett v. Barnett, 155 Miss. 449,124 So. 498; Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127; Isom v. Canedy, 128 Miss. 64, 88 So. 485; King v. King, 161 Miss. 51,134 So. 827; In Re Alexander's Estates, 216 Miss. 26, 61 So.2d 683; Rena v. Wells, 175 Miss. 458, 167 So. 620; Blalock v. Magee,205 Miss. 209, 38 So.2d 708.
In Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753, the Court said: "The conflicts in the testimony, however, were for the jury to pass upon, and, although we may not be entirely satisfied with their findings, we can not invade their province by setting aside this verdict which has been approved by the chancellor."
This Court has held that when it becomes evident that the jury decided a will case against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the appellate Court will grant a new trial. Fortenberry v. Herrington, 188 Miss. 735, *Page 110 196 So. 232; Dabbs v. Richardson, 137 Miss. 789, 102 So. 769. In the Fortenberry case, supra, the Court said: "In conclusion, the case is so strong for the proponent, and so weak for the contestant, that we feel it should be submitted to another jury. The most reasonable and convincing, as well as the overwhelming weight of the evidence upheld the validity of the will, * * *".
I do not believe the testimony in this case is so overwhelming that a new trial should be granted on that ground, because it is apparent to me that we are substituting our own opinion (from what we see in the record) for the verdict of the jury.
Did the jury have sufficient evidence on which to base its verdict? I think it did. The admitted writing of the deceased has been exhibited in long letters, checks, and notes. These exhibits show a precise even flow of up and down cursive pen strokes that glide and flit across the page, as gracefully as a butterfly in flight. The written line moves purposefully in a direct course across the page. The capital letter "J" has an even swing across the top in the form of a circle. The capital letter "L" has an unhesitating swing across the top and loops evenly to the left and at the bottom. Deceased made a loop and graceful swing to the left and under the capital letter "W" in his name.
Now look at the alleged will. The writing crawls across the paper, in a slow, hesitant, laborious manner of a caterpillar, stopping now and then to readjust its line of travel, and at one place even leaving its line of travel to start anew at a lower level. The letter "J" in the alleged will does not have the usual looping graceful swing at the top, but comes to a definite point to the right and at the top. The capital letter "L" does not have the graceful looping swing at the bottom and to the left, but is drawn slowly around to the left and down, ending in a thick stubby tail. The capital letter "W" in the alleged will no longer swings gracefully *Page 111 
down and under the letter, but it appears to have been drawn down and in a shaky uncertain stroke.
There are many exhibits in this record, and the jury may have come to their own conclusion from the exhibits alone; moreover the jury may have been aided in their verdict by the fact that the testimony tended to show that this case was a family affair, in which members of the family had not only become estranged, but hostile. The purpose of a part of the testimony introduced was to show a motive as to why the contest was instituted, but the jury could have very well considered this testimony as giving a reason and motive why a will could have been forged.
I cannot therefore agree that this Court should invade the province of the jury and pass upon the weight and worth of the evidence, and hold that the testimony is overwhelmingly in favor of the defendants. I would reverse the judgment of the lower court and grant a new trial permitting the introduction of the evidence erroneously rejected, and direct that the erroneous instructions should not be given in a new trial.