Court Opinion

ID: 9391163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 13:07:31.879363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.843797
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Speis, 2023-Ohio-1422.]

                                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                             TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                            CLERMONT COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

        Appellee,                                  :        CASE NO. CA2022-07-032

                                                   :                  OPINION
     - vs -                                                            5/1/2023
                                                   :

 ERIC J. SPEIS,                                    :

        Appellant.                                 :

    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                         Case No. 2020 CR 01043

Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas Horton, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Samuel H. Shamansky Co., L.P.A., and Samuel H. Shamansky and David J. Betras, for
appellant.

        HENDRICKSON, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Eric Speis, appeals from his conviction in the Clermont County

Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of seven counts of gross sexual

imposition. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm his convictions.

                                    I. Facts and Procedural History

        {¶2}     In December 2020, Speis was indicted on seven counts of gross sexual
                                                                    Clermont CA2022-07-032

imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), all third-degree felonies. The charges stemmed from

allegations that Speis had sexually abused M.R., the eight-year-old daughter of his

girlfriend, over an eight-month period. At the time, Speis was living with his girlfriend, M.R.

and M.R.'s maternal grandmother in the girlfriend's home. In May of 2020, the girlfriend

observed Speis sitting in a recliner with M.R. on his lap. When M.R. saw her mother, she

jumped off Speis's lap and ran to the couch. Later, M.R. revealed that she and Speis had

been kissing when her mother saw them. The girlfriend had Speis run an errand with her

so she could confront him about the incident. When she did, Speis remained silent and did

not respond.

       {¶3}    When they returned to the home, the girlfriend and grandmother gathered

Speis and M.R. into the living room so that they could address Speis about the allegations

M.R. had made. Initially, Speis acted like he didn't know what they were talking about but

later admitted to "innocuous touching" and claimed he was trying to teach M.R. so that boys

would not take advantage of her.

       {¶4}    At this point, the girlfriend became irate and started yelling at Speis and told

him to leave. She then went outside and started throwing around patio furniture that was

on the back deck. This caused the neighbors to call the police. When the girlfriend went

back inside the home, she found Speis with a gun to his head threatening to kill himself.

Fortunately, the girlfriend and grandmother were successful in persuading him not to go

through with it.

       {¶5}    Sometime later, two police officers arrived at the scene. M.R. told them that

Speis had made her touch his penis. The police then found Spies packing up his belongings

and he advised them that he had been kicked out of the house by his girlfriend. Spies

appeared calm and questioned why they were there. The police asked him to make a

statement, but he declined and left.

                                             -2-
                                                                  Clermont CA2022-07-032

       {¶6}   M.R. was taken to Cincinnati Children's Hospital where she revealed that

Speis had engaged in a variety of sexual acts with her. She also reported that Speis had

told her not to tell anybody. A physical examination disclosed an abrasion in her vagina.

       {¶7}   In April 2022, the case was tried to a jury. During opening statements, the

prosecutor told the jury:

              We'll hear that Officers Taylor and Rees responded to that call
              [from the neighbor] about the disturbance and encountered
              [M.R.'s mother] and [grandmother]. We'll hear that by the time
              that they arrived the Defendant was already packing up his
              belongings. He had been kicked out of the house by [Mother].
              But at first he acted like he had no idea what was going on when
              they got there. We'll hear that [Mother] and [Grandmother] told
              the officers what had happened. They approached the
              Defendant to make a statement but he declined.

(Emphasis added.) When the prosecutor finished, the trial court sua sponte questioned

whether Speis's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had been impinged

upon by the prosecutor's comment about Speis's silence. Speis then moved for a mistrial.

The court denied the motion and instead gave the jury a limiting instruction.

       {¶8}   The trial proceeded with the testimony of several witnesses. M.R. testified

about the sexual conduct that occurred. Her mother testified about her discovery of the

abuse. The two officers mentioned above in opening statements testified that when they

arrived Speis was packing up his car and that he soon left. One officer testified that Speis

was not arrested that day, was not handcuffed, and that he was free to leave pending further

investigation. Speis did not take the stand at trial.

       {¶9}   Also testifying was Cecelia Freihofer, a social worker and a forensic

interviewer at the Mayerson Center at Cincinnati Children's Hospital, where M.R.'s mother

had taken her after discovering the sexual abuse. Freihofer conducted a forensic interview

with M.R. While she conducted the interview, Freihofer had Mother complete a Traumatic

Symptoms Checklist for Young Children (TSCYC). Freihofer explained that the TSCYC

                                             -3-
                                                                   Clermont CA2022-07-032

was a screening tool that listed several behaviors potentially indicative of mental stress and

asked the parent to identify the behaviors the parent has noticed and their frequency. After

the interview, she reviewed the TSCYC with Mother. Based on Mother's responses, the

TSCYC was positive for trauma symptoms and sexual concerns. Freihofer found that what

M.R. told her during the interview was consistent with inappropriate sexual contact and

indicated abuse. Freihofer recommended that Mother seek mental health treatment for

M.R. Freihofer summarized her findings in a written "Report of Suspected Child Abuse" for

the Mayerson Center, which was admitted into evidence.

       {¶10} Freihofer testified about her extensive training and experience and explained

how forensic interviews at the Mayerson Center were conducted. She recounted what M.R.

told her about the abuse and found that it was consistent with inappropriate sexual contact

and indicated abuse. Concerning the TSCYC, Freihofer testified that it was not a diagnostic

tool and was not made part of M.R.'s medical record. Rather, it was simply a screening tool

that could indicate if further mental health treatment would be beneficial. Freihofer said that

the TSCYC was only one piece of information that she used in her recommendations for

follow-up care. She was clear that she did not diagnose M.R. as being traumatized, nor did

she use the TSCYC to conclude that M.R. was definitively positive for trauma symptoms

and sexual concerns. Freihofer noted that there have been many occasions where the

TSCYC was negative for trauma symptoms and sexual concerns and that she still

recommended follow-up mental health treatment. In this case, said Freihofer, based on her

interview with M.R., she would have made the same recommendation for follow-up mental

health treatment regardless of what the TSCYC showed.

       {¶11} The jury found Speis guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to a

total of 20 years in prison and designated him as a Tier II sex offender.

       {¶12} Speis now appeals his conviction raising two assignments of error.

                                             -4-
                                                                    Clermont CA2022-07-032

                                         II. Analysis

       {¶13} Speis first challenges the denial of his motion for a mistrial and then, secondly,

challenges the admission of Freihofer's testimony.

                       A. The denial of Speis's motion for a mistrial

       {¶14} The first assignment of error alleges:

       {¶15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL AFTER

THE    PROSECUTOR,         DURING      OPENING      STATEMENT        AND    WITHOUT       ANY

REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION, COMMENTED UPON APPELLANT'S INVOCATION OF

HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.

       {¶16} The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself." Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Speis contends that the prosecutor's comment in opening statements on his pre-arrest

silence improperly impinged on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The state agrees that the comment was improper but argues that it was harmless. We

disagree that the comment was improper.

       {¶17} Our conclusion is based on Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 133 S.Ct. 2174

(2013), in which a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of a defendant's

pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt does not violate the Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if the defendant fails to expressly invoke the

privilege. In Salinas, the defendant agreed to accompany the police to the station for

questioning.   There was no dispute that the interview was noncustodial and that the

defendant was not read Miranda warnings. The Court described what happened during the

interview:

               For most of the interview, petitioner answered the officer's
               questions. But when asked whether his shotgun "would match
               the shells recovered at the scene of the murder," * * * petitioner

                                             -5-
                                                                      Clermont CA2022-07-032

               declined to answer. Instead, petitioner "[l]ooked down at the
               floor, shuffled his feet, bit his bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in
               his lap, [and] began to tighten up." * * * After a few moments of
               silence, the officer asked additional questions, which petitioner
               answered.

Salinas at 182. The defendant did not testify at trial. Over the defendant's objection, the

prosecutor used the defendant's reaction to the officer's question during the interview as

substantive evidence of guilt. The Court held that the defendant's silence could be used as

evidence against him because he did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent. Therefore, the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim failed

"because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to

the officer's question." Id. at 181.

       {¶18} The Court explained that the Fifth Amendment has an "express invocation

requirement." Id. at 183. The "general rule" is that "a witness must assert the privilege to

subsequently benefit from it." Id. at 186. Silence is not sufficient to invoke the privilege.

The express invocation requirement is subject to only two exceptions. Id. at 183. The first

is that a defendant need not take the stand at trial and assert the privilege. Id. at 184. And

the second is when the circumstances of the questioning are coercive (e.g., custodial

interrogation). Id. at 185. The "critical question," said the Court, is "whether, under the

'circumstances' of this case, [the defendant] was deprived of the ability to voluntarily invoke

the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 186. "So long as police do not deprive a witness of the ability

to voluntarily invoke the privilege, there is no Fifth Amendment violation." Id. at 191. The

Court pointedly stated that "the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be 'compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'; it does not establish an unqualified

'right to remain silent.'" Id. at 189.

       {¶19} The coercion exception did not apply to the defendant in Salinas because it

was undisputed that his interview with police was voluntary. He agreed to accompany the

                                               -6-
                                                                   Clermont CA2022-07-032

officers to the station and was free to leave at any time. Because the defendant did not

expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, there was no violation. See Abby v. Howe,

742 F.3d 221, 228 (6th Cir.2014) (acknowledging that Salinas "held that prosecutors may

use a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of his guilt if the defendant did

not expressly invoke his right to remain silent"); State v. Horwitz, 191 So.3d 429, 440

(Fla.2016) (stating that Salinas permits pre-arrest silence to be used as substantive

evidence of a defendant's guilt).

        {¶20} Here, the state relied upon an earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision, State v.

Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147. In that case, the state presented testimony

from a police officer that the defendant had left him a message saying that he wanted to

speak with an attorney before talking to the police.        The prosecutor referred to the

defendant's pre-arrest silence during opening arguments as well. The defendant did not

testify at trial. The state argued that this evidence was admissible as substantive evidence

of guilt.

        {¶21} The question before the Leach Court was whether the Fifth Amendment was

violated with the admission of testimony that a defendant, who had not yet been arrested

or Mirandized, remained silent and/or asserted his right to counsel in the face of questioning

by law enforcement. The Court noted that whether the admission of such evidence violates

the Fifth Amendment was a question that the U.S. Supreme Court has not answered. The

Supreme Court "has not yet addressed the issue of whether a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-

Miranda silence may be used as substantive evidence of guilt in the state's case-in-chief."

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 20.

        {¶22} Using a two-pronged Fifth Amendment analysis, the Court concluded that the

substantive use of the defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence subverts the policies

behind the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is not a legitimate

                                            -7-
                                                                   Clermont CA2022-07-032

governmental practice." Id. at ¶ 37. Thus the Ohio Supreme Court held that the "use of a

defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at ¶ 38.

       {¶23} Leach, though, is factually distinguishable from the case before us and from

Salinas. The silence of the Leach defendant came after a reference to his right to counsel.

But Speis was completely silent, as was the Salinas defendant. Thus, Leach applies in the

case of a defendant not yet been arrested or Mirandized who asserted his right to counsel

in the face of questioning by law enforcement. But Salinas applies in a case, like the present

one, where, in the face of questioning, a defendant remained completely silent.

       {¶24} Here, as the prosecutor said in opening statements, officers approached

Speis to see if he wanted to make a statement, but he declined. There is no evidence even

suggesting that Speis invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at

that time.    As Salinas taught, Speis's silence was not sufficient.          Moreover, the

circumstances of the police officers' question were not coercive. Speis was not deprived of

the ability to voluntarily invoke the Fifth Amendment, as there is no allegation or evidence

that his failure to assert the privilege was involuntary. The state could have used Speis's

silence as substantive evidence of his guilt without a Fifth Amendment problem. Therefore,

by merely referring to his silence during opening statements, the prosecutor did not

improperly impinge Speis's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

       {¶25} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                  B. Freihofer's testimony

       {¶26} The second assignment of error alleges:

       {¶27} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO ELICIT

EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM CECILIA FREIHOFER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF AN

EXPERT REPORT AND DEMONSTRABLE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH OHIO CRIM.R.

                                              -8-
                                                                      Clermont CA2022-07-032

16(K).

         {¶28} Speis argues that the state failed to provide him with a copy of the TSCYC,

on which Freihofer's assessment was based in part, which he says was a violation of the

discovery rule in Crim.R. 16(K). Speis contends that the failure to provide the TSCYC

rendered it impossible for him to meaningfully confront Freihofer or her opinions, so the

testimony should have been excluded.

         {¶29} Crim.R. 16(K) provides that any expert witness must "prepare a written report

summarizing the expert witness's testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and

shall include a summary of the expert's qualifications" and that the report must be timely

disclosed to the opposing party. "Failure to disclose the written report to opposing counsel

shall preclude the expert's testimony at trial." Crim.R. 16(K).

         {¶30} The trial court permitted Freihofer to testify as a lay witness.    Evid.R.   701

governs opinion testimony by lay witnesses and provides that such testimony "is limited to

those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness

and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a

fact in issue." "A trial court has considerable discretion in admitting the opinion testimony

of lay witnesses." (Citation omitted.) State v. Marshall, 191 Ohio App.3d 444, 2010-Ohio-

5160, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.).

         {¶31} The Ohio Supreme Court has said that lay opinions may be based on the

witness's training and experience:

                [C]ourts have permitted lay witnesses to express their opinions
                in areas in which it would ordinarily be expected that an expert
                must be qualified under Evid.R. 702. * * * Although these cases
                are of a technical nature in that they allow lay opinion testimony
                on a subject outside the realm of common knowledge, they still
                fall within the ambit of the rule's requirement that a lay witness's
                opinion be rationally based on firsthand observations and
                helpful in determining a fact in issue. These cases are not
                based on specialized knowledge within the scope of Evid.R.

                                               -9-
                                                                  Clermont CA2022-07-032

              702, but rather are based upon a layperson's personal
              knowledge and experience.

State v. McKee, 91 Ohio St.3d 292, 296-297 (2001). Thus, for example, "[i]t is well-settled

that a police officer may testify concerning matters that are within his experience and

observations that may aid the trier of fact in understanding the other testimony pursuant to

Evid.R. 701." State v. Tatum, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-626, 2011-Ohio-907, ¶ 17. See

also State v. Bowling, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-08-159, 2014-Ohio-1690, ¶ 14 (officer's

training and experience permitted him to testify as to what chemicals are used to

manufacture methamphetamine). Also, relevant here, "[s]ocial workers are permitted to

testify to their disposition in an alleged sexual abuse case." State v. Schentur, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 108448, 2020-Ohio-1603, ¶ 48. But the social worker may not testify as to

the veracity of the victim or whether the crime occurred. Id. at ¶ 50.

       {¶32} Here, Freihofer testified that what M.R. told her during the interview was

"consistent with sexual contact and concerning for sexual abuse" and that the TSCYC was

"positive for trauma symptoms and sexual concerns." Based on this information, Freihofer

recommended mental health services.        She did not testify that sexual contact in fact

occurred but merely that the sexual contact as described by eight-year-old M.R. was

inappropriate and suggested abuse.

       {¶33} We find that this testimony was well within Freihofer's personal knowledge

and experience. Freihofer was a social worker and a forensic interviewer at the Mayerson

Center, where she had worked for over 15 years. She testified that she has had ongoing

training in forensic interviewing and has conducted well over 3,500 forensic interviews.

Freihofer's testimony was rationally based on her training and personal experience in child-

abuse cases and aided the trier of fact in determining M.R.'s credibility. The trial court

reasonably admitted her testimony as lay opinion under Evid.R. 701. Therefore, Crim.R.

                                            - 10 -
                                                                    Clermont CA2022-07-032

16(K) did not apply.

       {¶34} Even if Freihofer were an expert witness, she prepared a written report that

was disclosed to Speis.      Her "Report of Suspected Child Abuse" (State's Exhibit 2)

summarizes her "testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion" as required by

Crim.R. 16(K). It is true that the report does not include "a summary of the expert's

qualifications." Crim.R. 16(K). But Speis fails to show that this was a willful violation of the

rule, that knowing Freihofer's qualifications would have benefited him in the preparation of

his defense, or that he suffered prejudice. See State v. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 458

(1995) ("Prosecutorial violations of Crim.R. 16 are reversible only when there is a showing

that (1) the prosecution's failure to disclose was a willful violation of the rule, (2)

foreknowledge of the information would have benefited the accused in the preparation of

his defense, and (3) the accused suffered some prejudicial effect").

       {¶35} Lastly, regarding Speis's claim that the TSCYC was not disclosed to him,

Crim.R. 16(K) does not require that an expert report include the documentary basis for the

expert's "testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion."          Indeed, we have

questioned whether Crim.R. 16 requires a TSCYC to be disclosed at all. State v. Robinson,

12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-01-013, 2015-Ohio-4533, ¶ 23, fn. 1 (12th Dist.) ("Without

providing any opinion on the matter, we question whether a TSCYC assessment is required

to be disclosed pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B)(3), (B)(4) and (E)(1) as the trial court found. As

the state indicated at trial, a TSCYC assessment is not kept as part of the child's medical

records and is not used as a diagnostic tool of any kind").

       {¶36} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting

Freihofer's testimony. The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                             - 11 -
                                                               Clermont CA2022-07-032

                                    III. Conclusion

      {¶37} Having overruled both the assignments of error presented, we the affirm trial

court's judgment.

      S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

                                         - 12 -