Court Opinion

ID: 9673069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:05:49.585422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.895870
License: Public Domain

Kyle, J.,
Dissenting in part:
I think the legislature bad the power to authorize the creation of a water supply district for the purposes set forth in Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 1724, Laws of 1958, known as the Pearl River Water Supply District Act. The legislature also was authorized to confer upon such district the power of eminent .domain, for the purpose of acquiring lands for the construction of the reservoir and any other necessary or useful related facilities. But, I am unable to agree with the majority bolding in this case that all of the land lying within the one-quarter mile perimeter area referred to in Sec. 11, paragraph (f) of the Act may be taken by eminent domain proceedings under the claim that there is a public necessity for the taking or that the lands are to be taken for a public use. Whether any particular tract of land which the District *822may hereafter seek to acquire by eminent domain proceeding is to be taken for a use which is public is a question which, in my opinion, must be determined by the Court at the time of the taking after a proper hearing, either in the eminent domain proceeding or in some other proper proceeding.
Section 17 of the Miss. Constitution of 1890 expressly provides that “whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.”
Section 11 of Senate Bill 1724, Laws of 1958, provides that the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, through its board of directors, is empowered to ‘ ‘ acquire by condemnation any and all property of any kind, real, personal or mixed, or any interest therein, within the project area not exceeding one quarter mile from the outside line of the 300 foot above sea level contour on each side of Pearl River except as provided for rights of way under Subsection (g) of this section, within or without the boundaries of the District necessary for the project and the exercise of the powers, rights, privileges and functions conferred upon the District by this Act, according to the procedure provided by law for the condemnation of lands or other property taken for rights of way or other purposes by railroads, telephone or telegraph companies.”
Section 2751, Code of 1942, provides: “When any person or corporation having the right so to do shall desire to exercise the right of eminent domain, he or it shall make application therefor in writing, and the owners of the property sought to be condemned and mortgagees, trustees, or other persons having an interest therein or a lien thereon, shall be made defendants thereto, which shall state with certainty the right and describe *823the property sought to he condemned, showing that of each defendant separately. ”
Section 2756, Code of 1942, provides that: “Where the application seeks to condemn the property of more than one defendant interested in different property, a separate trial shall he had for each; and the court may set the trial of any one or more of the issues for a time and place to he fixed by order of the court, and the parties and jury shall be compelled to attend accordingly.”
It is only after the evidence has been presented in the eminent domain suit that the court can determine whether the particular tract of land owned by the defendant in that suit is being taken for a public use. The learned chancellor who tried this case recognized that fact, and in his opinion stated that the question of whether the use for which particular lands would be taken would be a public use was a judicial question to be determined in a court of eminent domain, and that question was not an issue in this proceeding. It is admitted that the legislature could not settle that question by legislative fiat for the reason that Section 17 of the State Constitution makes it a judicial question, to be determined by the court after the court has acquired jurisdiction of the parties and after a hearing of the condemnation suit upon its merits. This Court, in my opinion, has no authority in this proceeding to prejudge the rights of the individual land owner whose land at some later date may be made the object of a condemnation proceeding by holding in advance that “the one quarter mile perimeter area, if taken by eminent domain, will be for a public use. ’ ’ That is the question which should be determined at the time of the hearing of the application for the taking. The Court can then determine whether the land is to be acquired for public use or whether it is being acquired for the purpose of resale to other persons or corporations for private use or the operation of recreational facilities thereon for profit.
*824In the case of Tulsa v. Williams, et al, (Okla. 1924), 227 P. 876, which is cited in the majority opinion, the court held that: “Where a municipal corporation seeks to create a waterworks plant and water reservoir outside of its corporate limits, it has a right, under the law of eminent domain, to condemn such land as shall be submerged by its reservoir up to the high water line; and also has the right to condemn such margin of land above the high water line of its reservoir as may be needed, where the perpetual use and absolute control thereof is required, to protect its water supply from pollution and for policing and patrolling the shore of its reservoir; but how much margin above the high water line should be taken for such purpose is a judicial question to be determined by the court upon evidence of the necessity. ’ ’ The court in its opinion in that case also said: “It is conceivable that in many places only a short distance from the highwater line would be sufficient, while in many other places a much greater distance from the high water line-would be required. The necessity is a question of fact as to the necessary line of absolute control above the high water line on each piece of land sought to be condemned, and is a matter for judicial determination based upon evidence.”
In City of Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 Ill. 468, 104 N. E. 829, the Court said: ‘ ‘ The question whether the sovereign power of eminent domain shall be conferred upon corporations or municipalities to appropriate private property for public use is legislative and not subject to interference by the courts (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake, 71 Ill. 333), but the question of whether the particular property sought to be appropriated is necessary for the public use is for the courts. If the necessity does not exist, the land cannot be taken, and the property cannot be taken, and the property owner would be without the protection to which he is entitled if the determination of a corporation, private *825or municipal, to take Ms property conclusively settled the necessity of the taking.”
Inasmuch as property cannot constitutionally he taken by eminent domain except for the public use, it follows that no more property shall be taken than the public use requires. The fallacy in the majority holding in tMs case, as I see it, is that the holding in effect deprives the individual landowner of his property without a hearing, as required by Sec. 17 of the State Constitution, on the question whether the property is being taken for a public use.
Roberds, P. J., joins in tMs opinion.