Court Opinion

ID: 9381276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 16:01:43.326597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.321786
License: Public Domain

In the United States Court of Federal Claims
                                  OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
                                           No. 14-837V
                                       Filed: April 22, 2022
                                           PUBLISHED

    L.C., a minor by and through her
    guardian ad litem, DANIELA                                Special Master Horner
    CRUMPTON,
                                                              Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs;
                         Petitioner,                          Excessive Travel Costs; Reasonable
    v.                                                        Rates; Vague Billing; Excessive
                                                              Billing
    SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
    HUMAN SERVICES,

                        Respondent.

Danny Chia-Chi Soong, Law Office of Danny Soong, West Covina, CA, for petitioner.
Althea Walker Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

                 DECISION AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

       On November 11, 2020, petitioner moved for an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs in this compensated case totaling $501,230.11, including $465,999.95 in
attorneys’ fees and $35,230.16 in attorneys’ costs. (ECF No. 77.) In response,
respondent confirmed he is satisfied the statutory requirements for such an award have
been met in this case, but deferred the special master regarding the amount. (ECF No.
78.) On April 22, 2021, petitioner filed a supplemental motion seeking additional
reimbursement of $10,872.50 for attorneys’ fees and costs related to establishment of
guardianship and a special needs trust, bringing the total request to $512,102.61. (ECF
No. 86.) Respondent objects to this supplemental request to the extent of any
requested reimbursement for establishment of the special needs trust. (ECF No. 87.)
Petitioner confirmed that she did not personally incur any expenses in connection with

1
  Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the special master’s action in this case, it will
be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government
Act of 2002. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic
Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the
Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact
medical or other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
If the special master, upon review, agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, it will be
redacted from public access.

                                                       1
her prosecution of this case. (ECF No. 85.) For the reasons discussed below, I award
petitioner attorneys’ fees and costs in the reduced amount of $333,218.74.

   I.     Legal Standard for Determining Reasonable Fees and Costs

        Section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act allows for the special master to award
“reasonable attorneys' fees, and other costs.” § 300aa–15(e)(1)(A)–(B). The
determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the special master's
discretion. See, e.g. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520
(Fed. Cir. 1993). Special Masters have “wide latitude in determining the
reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.” Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). Moreover, special masters are entitled to
rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff’d in relevant part, 988
F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Special Masters use the lodestar approach to
determine what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Vaccine Act. Avera v.
Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The lodestar
approach involves first determining “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fee by
‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a
reasonable hourly rate.’” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). Once a court makes that initial calculation, it may then make an
upward or downward departure to the fee award based on other specific findings. Id.
        Petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended” and the
reasonableness of the requested fee award. Wasson, 24 Cl. Ct. at 484.
Notwithstanding that respondent has not raised any specific objections to petitioner’s
fee application, “the Special Master has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself
that the fee award is appropriate and [is] not limited to endorsing or rejecting
respondent’s critique.” Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-455V, 2008
WL 4743493 (Fed. Cl. 2008); see also McIntosh v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
139 Fed Cl. 238, 250 (2018) (finding that the special master “abused his discretion by
failing to independently review the petitioner’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and
reimbursement of case costs to determine if the requested fees and costs were
reasonable.”). Furthermore, “the Special Master [has] no additional obligation to warn
petitioners that he might go beyond the particularized list of respondent’s challenges.”
Duncan, 2008 WL 4743493.
   II.    Analysis

          a. Petitioner’s Counsel’s Hourly Rate

        A reasonable hourly rate is “the prevailing market rate defined as the rate
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable
skill, experience, and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (citation and quotation
omitted). In Avera, the Federal Circuit found that in Vaccine Act cases, the special
master should use the rate prevailing in the forum, i.e., Washington, D.C., in
determining an award of attorneys’ fees unless the bulk of the work is completed

                                            2
outside of the forum and there is a “very significant difference” between the forum hourly
rate and the local hourly rate. 515 F.3d at 1349 (citing Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt.
& Energy Recovery Spec. Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755 (D.C.
Cir. 1999)).
        For attorneys receiving forum rates, the decision in McCulloch v. Secretary of
Health & Human Services provides a further framework for consideration of appropriate
ranges for attorneys’ fees based upon the experience of the practicing attorney. 2 No.
09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323, at *19 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of
Special Masters has since updated the McCulloch rates, and the Attorneys’ Forum
Hourly Rate Fee Schedules for 2015-2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 can be accessed
online. 3 Petitioner asserts that Mr. Soong (who is located near Lost Angeles, California)
should receive forum rates in accordance with McCulloch and the Attorneys’ Forum
Hourly Rate Fee Schedules. (ECF No. 77, p. 3.) Respondent did not raise any
objection. (ECF No. 78.)
       In this case, petitioner requests the following hourly rates for Mr. Soong: $375
per hour for work performed from 2014 through 2016; $424 per hour for work performed
in 2017; $439 per hour for work performed in 2018; $448 per hour for work performed in
2019; and $467 per hour for work performed in 2020. (ECF No. 77, p. 3.) Petitioner
seeks paralegal rates of $135 per hour for 2014 through 2016, $140 per hour for 2017,
$145 per hour for 2018, $150 per hour for 2019, and $155 per hour for 2020. (Id.) The
requested paralegal rates are in line with what is typically awarded under the Attorneys’
Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedules; however, Mr. Soong’s requested rates are
excessive.
       Mr. Soong represents that he has been practicing law since 1997. (ECF No. 77,
p. 3.) Accordingly, when this case commenced in 2014 he had approximately 17 years
of experience, placing him within the “11-19 years of experience in practice” tier of the
Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedules. Beginning with his work performed in
2017, he could be categorized as falling within the “20-30 years of experience in
practice” tier, though as a practical matter the low end of that tier overlaps with the high
end of the preceding tier. The $375 per hour Mr. Soong seeks for work performed in
2014-2016 corresponds to the uppermost limit of the relevant tier (11-19 years) under
the 2015-2016 Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule. The $424 he seeks for

2
  After discussing the potential approaches to setting a forum rate and reviewing cases and material from
both within and without the Vaccine Program, the special master concluded that the following factors
should be considered: (1) the prevailing rate for comparable legal work in Washington, DC; (2) the
prevailing rate for cases in the Vaccine Program; (3) the experience of the attorney(s) in question within
the Vaccine Program; (4) the overall legal experience of the attorney(s); (5) the quality of work performed
by the attorney(s) in vaccine cases; and (6) the reputation of the attorney(s) in the legal community and
community at large. McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323, at *17.
3
  Each of the Fee Schedules for 2015 through 2019 can be accessed at
http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/node/2914. The hourly rates contained within the schedules are derived
from the decision in McCulloch, 2015 WL 5634323. The schedules for 2017, 2018, and 2019 are adjusted
for inflation using the Producer Price Index for Offices of Lawyers (“PPI-OL”).

                                                     3
2017 work corresponds to the uppermost limit of the relevant tier (20-30 years) under
the 2017 Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule. For each year thereafter, his
requested rate matches the inflation-adjusted uppermost limit of that tier for each year’s
Attorneys’ Forum Hourly Rate Fee Schedule.
        Three McCulloch factors weigh heavily in setting Mr. Soong’s rate – overall legal
experience, legal experience specific to this Program, and performance. (See n. 2,
supra.) First, it is not reasonable for Mr. Soong to seek the top rate for attorneys having
20-30 years of experience when he only just gained the minimum number of years for
that tier during the pendency of the case. Even in the abstract, his appropriate rate
would lie toward the bottom of that range, and even then, only after 2017. Based on his
experience at the beginning of the case and his performance throughout the pendency
of the case, 4 his rates are better determined based on the “11-19” years of experience
metric. Second, Mr. Soong represents that this is only his second vaccine injury case. 5
(ECF No. 77, p. 3.) In that regard, his billing records demonstrate that he did not
prosecute this case with the type of efficiency expected from an attorney seasoned in

4
  Mr. Soong touts the size of the settlement in this case, presumably as an implied metric of his
performance. (ECF No. 77, p. 2.) However, it is important to note that it took an unusually long period of
time to resolve the case, including referral to an extended year and a half long ADR process, with
substantial involvement by the ADR Special Master, to ultimately resolve the case. The ADR Special
Master took great pains explaining to petitioner what information was needed to substantiate the available
damages in this case. (ECF Nos. 69-70.) This after petitioner’s counsel had already spent a year and a
half seeking to negotiate a settlement even before the case entered ADR. Because this case resolved
within the ADR process, the undersigned is not privy to whether or how petitioner’s counsel’s own legal
acumen contributed to the ultimate outcome; however, the record of this case is clear that counsel’s
performance in the case was inefficient and inexperienced, causing delayed resolution.
5
  It should be noted that petitioner’s counsel’s prosecution of his first Vaccine Act case would charitably
be described as unsuccessful. After commencing settlement discussions, petitioner’s counsel moved for
voluntary dismissal on the assumption that petitioner could achieve a larger award in civil court by suing
the vaccine manufacturer. Petitioner’s counsel then commenced suit in Los Angeles Superior Court
alleging manufacturing and design defects as well as failure to warn, apparently unaware that these
claims were preempted by the Vaccine Act. Petitioner moved for relief from the judgment dismissing her
case in this forum on the basis that her counsel’s ignorance of the law was excusable neglect.
Petitioner’s motion was denied. G.G.M. by and Through Mora v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No.
13-421V, 2015 WL 1275389 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 27, 2015). A motion for review and subsequent
appeal to the Federal Circuit did not succeed in reopening judgment. 122 Fed Cl. 199, aff’d 673
Fed.Appx. 991. Although the petitioner was eventually able to succeed in reopening judgment and
achieved an award of damages via settlement, she was by that time represented by a different attorney
who was ultimately responsible for achieving the settlement. 2018 WL 6822408 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.
Nov. 27, 2018). Counsel conspicuously did not offer the name of his first Vaccine Act case in his motion
or discuss the course or outcome of the case, merely noting the injury and vaccine at issue, potentially
raising a question of candor. But in any event, based on this history and the fact that a different attorney
ultimately achieved the settlement in that case, it does not appear that Mr. Soong’s prior case contributed
significantly to his understanding of the damages and settlement issues that informed much of the work
done in this specific case. (Also of note: an unpublished decision was issued in that case awarding Mr.
Soong interim fees and costs; however, the award was based on the total amount requested, which was
unopposed, and Mr. Soong’s hourly rates were not discussed.)

                                                     4
this program. 6 Under the McCulloch framework, top rates for each tier are reserved for
such attorneys.

       Balancing all of the relevant considerations as well as the record as a whole, I
find that the following hourly rates are appropriate for Mr. Soong’s work in this
case: $320 per hour for 2014 through 2016, $330 for 2017, $340 for 2018, $350 for
2019, and $360 for 2020.
            b. Petitioner’s Counsel’s Hours Expended

        Special masters may rely on their experience with the Vaccine Program to
determine the reasonable number of hours expended. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1991), rev’d on other grounds and aff’d in relevant
part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special masters have previously reduced the fees
paid to petitioners due to excessive and duplicative billing. See Ericzon v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., No. 10-103V, 2016 WL 447770 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15,
2016) (reduced overall fee award by 10 percent due to excessive and duplicative
billing); Raymo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-654V, 2016 WL 7212323
(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 2, 2016) (reduced overall fee award by 20 percent), mot. for
rev. denied, 129 Fed. Cl. 691 (2016). Petitioner’s counsel “should make a good faith
effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such
hours from his fee submission.” Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). Upon
review of the billing records in this case, several reductions are necessary.

        First, petitioner’s counsel billed for hours spent conducting background research
into this program, its procedures, and people. 7 This court has previously held that “it is
inappropriate for counsel to bill time for educating themselves about basic aspects of
the Vaccine Program.” Matthews v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 14-1111V,
2016 WL 2853910, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 18, 2016). This results in the

6
   For example, Mr. Soong’s billing records reflect that he billed for research into seminal caselaw that
experienced vaccine practitioners would know (e.g. Althen, Knudsen, Capizzano). (ECF No. 77-1, pp.
11-12.) He also billed for research regarding medical concepts considered foundational to this practice
area as well as for time consulting with attorneys more experienced in the Program. (Id. at 12-13.) I will
allow this billing because it was substantive and advanced petitioner’s claim; however, it does speak to
the appropriate hourly rate. Mr. Soong simply does not (or did not at the time) operate with the type of
knowledge that warrants a higher hourly rate. In fact, additional billing (disallowed as discussed below)
further shows a deficit of understanding that is not even consistent with this being Mr. Soong’s second
Vaccine Act case. For example, despite having filed a prior case, Mr. Soong billed for “research who can
file a petition” and “how to file a petition.” (Ex. 77-1, p. 1.)
7
   This is distinguishable from the basic, but nonetheless substantive, research referenced in n. 6, supra.
Here, I refer to the following: 2/25/2014 (7 entries totaling researching “Who can file a petition,” “How to
file a petition,” etc.); 7/10/14 and 7/17/14 (reading Guidelines for Practice); 9/5/14 (researching sample
petition); 9/11/14 (conducting background research on Special Master Millman); 10/2/2014 (researching
procedures regarding initial orders and respondent’s Rule 4 report); 1/16/2015 (time spent reviewing a
GAO report regarding the Vaccine Program); 5/8/2015 (researching opposing counsel); 8/24/2016
(learning about Rule 4 reports); 8/13/2018 (reading news articles about vaccines); 1/29/2019 (researching
Special Master Roth).

                                                     5
following reductions: 10.49 hours in 2014; 6 hours in 2015; 1.5 hours in 2016; 1
hour in 2018; and 1 hour in 2019.

        Second, Mr. Soong travelled three times during the course of this case and
overbilled for travel time each time. Mr. Soong travelled to a mediation session that was
held in this case with Special Master Roth on June 11, 2019, in Greenville, South
Carolina. (See Minute Entry for proceeding, 6/17/2019.) For reasons that are not
explained, he flew cross country on June 7, three days prior to the scheduled mediation.
(ECF No. 77-1, p. 21.) He billed 12.5 hour of travel time on June 7, then billed three 24-
hour blocks of time representing the full three days he was in the Carolinas prior to the
mediation. The billing records state “layover for mediation” with no explanation of any
work being performed during that period. He billed 13.8 hours on June 11 which he
attributed to “travel to and from S.C. for mediation.” (Id.) He did not create any billing
entry for the mediation itself. In March of 2018, Mr. Soong billed a total of 34.25 hours
over the course of March 14 and 15 for “Travel to and from L.A. to Oklahoma (billed for
the day)” (13.5 hours) and “Overnight stay in OK, Bethany meeting, transfer flight ba”
(20.75 hours). (ECF No. 77-1, p. 16.) Similarly, Mr. Soong travelled to Oklahoma to
meet with petitioner early in his handling of this case in February of 2014. (ECF No. 77-
1, p. 1.) On February 23, 2014, he billed 18.75 hours to “fly to OK and stay overnight
for a meeting.” (Id.) The next day, his meeting lasted for 8.5 hours, and then on the
same day he billed 7.5 hours for his return travel. (Id.)
        It is not reasonable for Mr. Soong to seek compensation for time he was not
spending working on this case merely because he was away from home due to the
case. “One test of the ‘reasonableness’ of a fee or cost item is whether a hypothetical
petitioner, who had to use his own resources to pay his attorney for Vaccine Act
representation would be willing to pay for such expenditure.” Hardy v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., No. 08-108V, 2016 WL 4729530 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 16, 2016)
(citing Riggins v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-382V, 2009 WL 3319819, at
*3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 15, 2009); Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No.
02-1627, 2008 WL 4426040, at *28 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 29, 2008)). For example,
no reasonable hypothetical petitioner would agree to pay for Mr. Soong’s time spent
sleeping (which is clearly the result of his billing the full 24 hours for three days straight
or where he explicitly billed time in 2018 for his overnight stay). Moreover, it is not even
clear why Mr. Soong spent 72 hours in the Carolinas ahead of the single day mediation.
No explanation is discernable from the billing records as Mr. Soong did not bill for any
specific work activity during that period. Accordingly, Mr. Soong’s hours are reduced
by 72 hours for 2019, 12 hours in 2018, 8 and 11.25 for 2014. 9
        Additionally, travel time in this program is usually billed at 50% of an attorneys’
typical rate. E.g. O’Neill v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-243V, 2015 WL

8
  The billing records are inadequate to determine precisely how much of Mr. Soong’s time was
legitimately spent in meeting and in travel. I will estimate the overnight period at 12 hours.
9
  Because Mr. Soong separately documented 7.5 hours of travel time on February 24, I will assume his
legitimate travel time on February 23 was also 7.5 hours.

                                                    6
2399211, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. April 28, 2015) (explaining that there is no bright
line rule, but that the Vaccine Program commonly awards attorneys half their
established billing rate for time travelling). Here, Mr. Soong’s billing records reflect time
billed for travel at a full rate, 25.8 hours in 2019, 22.25 hours in 2018, 10 and 15 hours in
2014. Although this is technically a rate reduction, for ease of calculation I will reduce
the hours by 50%, an equivalent reduction. This results in a reduction of 12.9 hours
for 2019, 11.13 hours for 2018, and 7.5 hours for 2014.

         Finally, Mr. Soong’s overall billing appears to be excessive. (See n. 4, supra.)
Additionally, he has not used a standard or consistent interval for his billing. Typically,
attorneys in this program are expected to bill in tenth of an hour increments. E.g.
Franceschini v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No 16-1112V, 2019 WL 7372724, at
*4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Dec. 10, 2019) (observing that counsel’s minimum billing
increment was 12 minutes instead of the typical 6 minutes and that this resulted in a
pattern of excessive billing for simple tasks); see also Guidelines for Practice Under the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Chapter 3 (Applications for Fees and
Costs), Section B(1)(b) (Time Records)(“Preferred time increments are tenths of an
hour). 11 However, in most instances Mr. Soong appears to use quarter hour units while
in still others he uses third of an hour units. For brief tasks (such as reading single page
orders), the minimum interval he bills is .17 hours where most attorneys would have
billed .10. This billing method inflates the time entries for each task and makes it more
difficult to determine whether the amount of time billed was appropriate and reasonable
or whether the time billed accurately reflects the time spent. Assessment is further
hindered by the fact that each billing entry is relatively short and often vague. E.g. Barry
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-039V, 2016 WL 6835542 (Fed. Cl. Spec.
Mstr. Oct. 25, 2016) (reducing for vague and block billing). 12

       For vague and excessive billing, I reduce Mr. Soong’s remaining billing by a
further 10%. Special masters have previously reduced the fees paid to petitioners due
to excessive billing based on percentage reductions. E.g. Ericzon v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., No. 10-103V, 2016 WL 447770 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 15, 2016)
(reduced overall fee award by 10 percent due to excessive and duplicative billing);

10
  After reducing the March 2018 billing for the overnight stay, it still remains unclear what portion of Mr.
Soong’s 22.25 hours of billing is attributable to travel and what portion is attributable to his meeting.
Because petitioner bears the burden of proof, I will reduce the entire billing by half without differentiating
the unknown number of hours that would have been spent in meeting.
11
  Of note, Mr. Soong billed 3.25 hours for reading through the Guidelines for Practice in July of 2014.
(ECF No. 77-1, p. 3.) Only the current version of the Guidelines, last updated in April of 202, is currently
available on the court’s website: http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-guidelines
12
   I do note in the interest of completeness that the issue of vague billing is often coupled with block
billing, resulting in large periods for which the character of the work performed cannot be discerned. Mr.
Soong appears to have avoided block billing; however, many of his entries do remain vague. For
example, between October 31, 2014, and December 4, 2014, Mr. Soong billed 4.75 hours for 6 different
phone conversations with petitioner all of which were identified only as somehow relating to her daughter,
L.C. (ECF No. 77-1, p. 4.) Given that L.C. was the subject of this petition, these descriptions amount to
nothing more than identifying the fact of a phone call between petitioner and counsel.

                                                       7
Raymo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 11-654V, 2016 WL 7212323 (Fed. Cl.
Spec. Mstr. Nov. 2, 2016) (reduced overall fee award by 20 percent), mot. for rev.
denied, 129 Fed. Cl. 691 (2016).
           c. Petitioner’s Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fee Calculation

2014

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified            Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount              (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                       (Rate x Hours)
 $64,230.00        $320     29.24      $45,452.8         $40,907.52        $1,540.35
 ($375 x 171.28)                       ($320 x 142.04)                     ($135 x 11.41)
 Total:            $42,447.87

2015

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified            Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount              (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                       (Rate x Hours)
 $38,550.00        $320     6          $30,976.00        $27,878.40        $0.00
 ($375 x 102.8)                        ($320 x 96.8)                       ($135 x 0)
 Total:            $27,878.40

2016

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified            Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount              (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                       (Rate x Hours)
 $30,033.75        $320     1.5        $25,148.80        $22,633.92        $168.75
 ($375 x 80.09)                        ($320 x 78.59)                      ($135 x 1.25)
 Total:            $22,802.67

2017

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified            Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount              (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                       (Rate x Hours)
 $52,597.20        $330     0          $40,936.50        $36,842.85        $1,715.00
 ($424 x 124.05)                       ($330 x 124.05)                     ($140 x 12.25)
 Total:            $38,557.85

2018

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified            Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount              (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                       (Rate x Hours)

                                          8
 $87,233.69        $340      24.13       $59,357.20        $53,421.48        $797.50
 ($439 x 198.71)                         ($340 x 174.58)                     ($145 x 5.5)
 Total:            $54,218.98

2019

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified              Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount                (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                         (Rate x Hours)
 $104,321.28       $350      85.9        $51,436.00        $46,292.40        $1,687.50
 ($448 x 232.86)                         ($350 x 146.96)                     ($150 x 11.25)
 Total:            $47,979.90

2020

 Request           Awarded Hour      Modified              Less 10%          Paralegal
 (Rate x Hours)    Rate    Reduction Amount                (amount x 0.90)   (Rate x Hours)
                                         (Rate x Hours)
 $81,556.88        $360      0           $62,870.40        $56,583.36        $1,644.55
 ($467 x 174.64)                         ($360 x 174.64)                     ($155 x 10.61)
 Total:            $58,227.91

Total Attorneys’ Fees Awarded:
 2014:             $42,447.87
 2015:             $27,878.40
 2016:             $22,802.67
 2017:             $38,557.85
 2018:             $54,218.98
 2019:             $47,979.90
 2020:             $58,227.91
 Total:            $292,113.58 (a total reduction of $173,886.37 from the requested
                               amount of $465,999.95)

           d. Petitioner’s Counsel’s Attorneys’ costs

       Attorneys’ costs are subject to the same reasonableness requirements as
attorneys’ fees. See Perriera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34
(1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375. Petitioner bears the burden of documenting her costs and
demonstrating that they are reasonable. E.g. Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., No. 99-533, 2011 WL 3705153, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011)
(explaining that petitioner bears the burden of presenting documentation of costs “at the
time he submits his fee application” and that “the documentation must be sufficiently
detailed to enable the reviewing judge to determine its reasonableness.”), mot. rev.
denied 201 WL 6292218.

                                            9
        Here, several of petitioner’s costs are not documented. In fact, petitioner’s
counsel specifically indicated that some of these costs were “estimated.” 13 Accordingly,
the following costs, which are not documented, are disallowed:
            •   $400 for hotel dated 2/25/2014
            •   $100 for rental car dated 2/25/2014
            •   $200 for hotel dated 3/15/2018
            •   $875 for hotel dated 6/11/2019
            •   $200 for car rental dated 9/19/2019

        This results in a reduction of $1,775.00 from the $35,230.16 in attorneys’ costs
requested in petitioner’s initial motion. Upon my review, the remainder of the costs are
sufficiently documented and were reasonably incurred. Thus, petitioner is awarded
reduced costs in the amount of $33,455.16.
            e. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Associated with Special Needs Trust

        In addition to all of the above, petitioner has requested $10,872.50 for attorneys’
fees and costs payable to attorney Aaron DeBruin, Esq., and related to establishment of
guardianship and a special needs trust in probate court in South Carolina. (ECF No.
86.) Petitioner indicates that “[a]ll of the law previously cited by Petitioner’s counsel is
likewise applicable for Mr. DeBruin’s request for attorney’s fees and costs,” but does not
otherwise substantively discuss the reasonableness or need for the special needs trust.
(Id. at 1.) Nothing in Mr. DeBruin’s accompanying billing records specifically
distinguishes time that may have been spent on guardianship issues from time spent in
pursuit of the special needs trust, though some specific tasks reference the trust and
others do not.
        In response, respondent requested that this supplemental request be denied with
respect to reimbursement of fees and costs related to the special needs trust. (ECF No.
87.) Respondent explained that requests for costs associated with the creation of a
special needs trust have been repeatedly denied by special masters as not being
sufficiently related to proceedings on the petition. (Id. at 2-3 (citing Torres v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., No. 09-867V, 2013 WL 2256136 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. April
30, 2013); Alvardo v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., No. 15-02V, 2017 WL
4053419 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 7, 2017); J.R. by Revaitis v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., No. 16-813V, 2018 WL 5629723 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 28, 2018).)

13
  The “estimated” expenses tend to be travel expenses. Given that this travel did occur, I have no doubt
that travel costs were incurred; however, the lack of proper documentation frustrates any effort to assess
the reasonableness of the amounts or the accuracy of the estimations. For example, Mr. Soong
estimates that he spent $400 for a two night stay at a hotel during his February 2014 trip to Oklahoma
(ECF No. 77-2, p. 1.) However, there is no information in his application regarding the hotel at issue that
would allow any opportunity to even attempt to confirm relevant room rates. Moreover, Mr. Soong’s billing
records show that he spent only one night in Oklahoma during that trip rather than the two nights
referenced in his estimate. (ECF No. 77-1, p. 1.) Similarly, Mr. Soong’s 6/11/2019 charge for a hotel
during the mediation in South Carolina is based on a five-night occupancy whereas nothing in his motion
or records substantiates why he flew to South Carolina three days prior to what was a single day
mediation and, again, the hotel is not identified.

                                                    10
Respondent stressed that nothing in the settlement agreement reached by the parties
required petitioner to establish a special needs trust. Respondent noted that Mr.
DeBruin’s timekeeping appeared to intermingle potentially compensable guardianship
work with the unreimbursable time spent pursuing the special needs trust. (Id. at 3.)
        In reply, petitioner filed a supplemental or revised declaration by Mr. DeBruin.
(ECF No. 88.) Seemingly in response to respondent’s position, Mr. DeBruin’s revised
declaration reduces the hours he billed from 32.75 hours to 25.5 hours. (Compare ECF
No. 86, p. 4 and ECF No. 88, p. 4.) Based on my comparison of the billing records I am
satisfied that Mr. DeBruin has excised the hours spent pursuing the special needs trust
from his overall billing. The remainder of the billing appears reasonable and
appropriate. However, as respondent observes, documentation has not been provided
to substantiate the court costs incurred or whether they relate to the guardianship or the
trust.
       Accordingly, petitioner is reimbursed for her attorneys’ fees and costs
related to her probate proceedings in the reduced amount of $7,650.00.
     III.      Conclusion

    In light of the above, petitioner’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs is
GRANTED with reductions and:

            Petitioner is awarded a lump sum in the amount of $333,218.74,
            representing reimbursement for attorneys’ fees and costs, in the form
            of a check made payable to petitioner and her counsel, Danny Chia-
            Chi Soong, Esq.

       In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the
clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment herewith. 14

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                         s/Daniel T. Horner
                                                         Daniel T. Horner
                                                         Special Master

14
  Entry of judgment can be expedited by each party’s filing of a notice renouncing the right to seek
review. Vaccine Rule 11(a).

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