Court Opinion

ID: 9763356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:43:00.540928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:03.289653
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the summary judgment was improperly granted and the cause should be remanded. However, I write separately to express my analysis of the question of the applicability of the statute of limitation relied on by the state bar to defeat the summary judgment.
The difficulties are two: that the bar does not rely on a “statute of limitation” in the usual sense and the absence of a response by the state bar to the motion for summary judgment.
The enactment relied on by the state bar is not a statute. Rather it is a rule promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court in its grant of power to the State Bar of Texas to discipline members of the bar. The Supreme Court has been granted authority by the legislature to promulgate rules governing the state bar. TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.-024(a) (Vernon 1988).
The particular rule, Art. X, § 16(J) of the State Bar Rules, limits the authority of the State Bar to reprimand, suspend or disbar a *411member unless no more than four years have expired between the conduct complained of and the making of the complaint. Traditional statutes of limitation limit the time by which suit must be filed after the accrual of the cause of action, or its discovery. The state bar rule does not speak to when the action for disbarment must be filed in court. Rather, it commands that the complaint be made to the state bar be within four years of the condemned activity at the peril of the bar being unable to discipline its member for it.
Tinning, respondent below, moved for summary judgment on several grounds, the first of which was that the action by the State Bar was barred by limitations, being filed more than four years after the alleged incidents of misconduct occurred.1 The general statute of limitations, Tbx.Cxv.PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.051 (Vernon) 1986 provides a limitation period of four years when there is no other express limitations period.2
The State Bar did not file a timely response to Tinning’s motion. Nonetheless, appellant, the State Bar, urges the application of a special limitations rule contained in the State Bar Rules3.
Rule 166a(c), governing summary judgments, provides that “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.” The Supreme Court, in City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 676-78 (Tex.1979), held the failure of a non-movant to respond does not result in a summary judgment by default. No response is necessary “to contend on appeal that the grounds expressly presented in the motion are insufficient as a matter of law to support summary judgment. The non-movant, however, may not raise any other issues as grounds for reversal.” (emphasis in original). Id. at 678. In the absence of response, the movant is still required to establish his entitlement to summary judgment by proving all the elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law.
There are two issues on the matter of the statute of limitations; first, whether the special limitations rule may be urged for the first time on appeal and, second, whether the special rule prevails over the general statute of limitations urged by appellee Tinning.
In M & M Distributors v. Dunn, 819 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ), the movant relied on a two year statute of limitations to bar an action sounding in fraud. Although the non-movant did not respond that the four year statute was applicable rather than the shorter statute, he successfully argued that on appeal. This court held that the movant failed to establish his right to summary judgment because the question of which statute of limitations to be applied is a matter of law. Id. at 640. The defense of limitations is an affirmative defense, all aspects of which must be proven by the movant. See Delgado v. Burns, 656 S.W.2d 428, 429 (Tex.1983).
The general four year statute only applies if there is no other statute of limitations applicable. State Bar Rules are given the status of statutes in certain situations. They were construed to be the equivalent of statutes in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s direct appeal jurisdiction in determining their constitutionality. O’Quinn v. State Bar of Texas, 763 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.1988). The rule in question here should similarly be considered the equivalent of a statute of limitation, barring the State Bar of Texas from taking action against a member if more than *412four years have elapsed between the activity complained of and the making of a complaint to the counsel for the State Bar.
The general four year statute of limitations runs from the day the cause of action accrues. When does the cause of action to discipline a member for misconduct accrue? Reading the State Bar rule of limitation with the general statute of limitations, I would have to conclude that the cause of action does not accrue until the allegation of misconduct is brought to the attention of counsel of the State Bar of Texas.
Appellee did not negate the applicability of the State Bar Rule at the trial court nor did he establish the applicability of the general statute. He has not established his right to summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law.

. The most recent act alleged by the State Bar is dated March 21, 1986. The State Bar’s original petition was filed June 25, 1990.

. The provision reads “Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.” Id. (emphasis added).

. "No member shall be reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred for misconduct occurring more than four (4) years prior to the time such allegation is brought to the attention of counsel except in cases in which disbarment or suspension is compulsory as provided herein. Limitations, however, will not run where fraud or concealment is involved until such misconduct is discovered or should have been discovered by reasonable diligence by counsel.” State Bar Rules, art. X, § 16(J) reprinted in TexGov’t Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1988).