Court Opinion

ID: 9370378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 09:10:13.591771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.239074
License: Public Domain

In the
                 Court of Appeals
         Second Appellate District of Texas
                  at Fort Worth
               ___________________________
                    No. 02-22-00148-CV
               ___________________________

                BRANDON FORD, Appellant

                              V.

RANDELL CUTBURTH AND BRENDA CUTBURTH, D/B/A CUTBURTH
               CONSTRUCTION, Appellees

            On Appeal from the 415th District Court
                    Parker County, Texas
                 Trial Court No. CV19-0598

            Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
           Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                 I. INTRODUCTION

      Appellant Brandon Ford sued Appellees Randell Cutburth and Brenda

Cutburth d/b/a Cutburth Construction for damages resulting from the dissolution of

their business agreement. The Cutburths filed a joint no-evidence and traditional

motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. Ford argues in

a sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred by granting the motion for summary

judgment because he presented sufficient summary judgment evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact. We will affirm.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

      Ford and the Cutburths entered into an oral agreement in 2012 in which Ford

would perform construction projects with Cutburth Construction and they would

share the profits. In early 2015, Ford informed the Cutburths that he would no

longer be able to work on the joint projects, and the agreement between Ford and the

Cutburths ended in June 2015. There was a dispute between Ford and the Cutburths

over unpaid invoices and the division of equipment.

      Ford filed suit against the Cutburths for breach of contract, conversion and

theft of property, fraud, and fraudulent inducement seeking $1 million in damages.

Ford asserted that he had discovered in August 2018 that the Cutburths had not

distributed to him his share of the profits in the amount of $275,009.65. Ford further

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alleged that the Cutburths had retained his personal property and did not comply with

the terms of their agreement in dividing the equipment.

       The Cutburths filed a joint traditional and no-evidence motion for summary

judgment. In the motion, they asserted that there was no evidence to support Ford’s

claims for fraud and fraudulent inducement, as well as for breach of contract. They

argued that they were also entitled to traditional summary judgment on Ford’s claims

for breach of contract and for conversion and theft of property because Ford could

not establish one or more of the essential elements of those claims. They further

contended that Ford’s claim for conversion and theft of property was barred by the

statute of limitations.

       The Cutburths attached as summary judgment evidence the affidavit of Brenda

Cutburth. In her affidavit, Brenda1 stated that the agreement between Ford and

Cutburth Construction provided that Ford would “receive half of all labor profit on

all jobs that were not part of Cutburth Construction[’s] suction jobs.” According to

Brenda, the payment structure was never formal. She and Ford would sit down and

discuss the division of the income, and she would issue Ford a check based upon his

instructions. The Cutburths also included as summary judgment evidence a list of the

invoices that Ford claimed were unpaid. Brenda stated that Ford never sent invoices

for his work and that Cutburth Construction had issued payment by check directly to

       1
        Given the common surname, we use the first name of Brenda and Randell for
ease of reference.

                                          3
Ford through his company, Lillab, LLC. Brenda stated that she was “certain any and

all partnership distributions [had] been paid.” The Cutburths’ summary judgment

evidence additionally included copies of the checks Cutburth Construction had issued

to Lillab.

       In his response to the Cutburths’ no-evidence motion, Ford argued that he had

“produced evidence to meet all elements of Defendants’ no-evidence motion for

summary judgment grounds.” As to the Cutburths’ traditional motion for summary

judgment, Ford argued that the attached summary judgment evidence was “sufficient

to create a disputed issue of material fact as to every ground asserted in Defendants’

traditional motion.”

       Ford attached his own affidavit as summary judgment evidence.           In his

affidavit, he stated that Randell had approached him and had asked if he would be

interested in splitting profits from projects that he worked on with Cutburth

Construction. Ford stated that there was never any partnership discussed but rather it

was a joint venture where he was paid a “split of the profits on any projects we

worked together.” Ford did not know if the split was 50/50.

       Ford acknowledged in his affidavit that the agreement as to payment was “fluid

and inconsistent.” Ford stated that Brenda would total the work completed and

                                          4
would email Connie’s Bookkeeping Services2 to generate an invoice.             Connie’s

Bookkeeping Services would prepare the invoice pursuant to Brenda’s instructions

and send the invoice to Cutburth Construction for payment.

      Ford also attached the affidavit of Connie Lindley as summary judgment

evidence. In her affidavit, Lindley stated that she began providing bookkeeping

services to Lillab in 2012.    Lindley further stated that Ford had informed the

bookkeeping service that it was to submit invoices to Cutburth Construction and that

the invoices were to be made out per Brenda’s instructions. Lindley attached an

exhibit to her affidavit that included a list of open invoices that were owed to Ford by

Cutburth Construction as of March 23, 2018. Lindley stated that she had forwarded

this information to David Flynn, a certified public accountant.

      Ford additionally attached as summary judgment evidence the affidavit of

Flynn. Flynn stated that he prepares taxes and other related financial matters for Ford

and Lillab. According to Flynn, he notified Ford on March 23, 2018 that there were

unpaid invoices owed to Ford by Cutburth Construction.

     The trial court granted the Cutburths’ motion for summary judgment without

specifying the grounds for its judgment. The trial court ordered that Ford take

nothing on his breach of contract, conversion and theft of property, fraudulent

inducement, and fraud causes of action. This appeal followed.

      2
        We note that Ford referred to the bookkeeping service as “Connie’s
Bookkeeping Services” in his affidavit; however, Connie Lindley stated in her affidavit
that she is the owner of “Connie’s Bookkeeping Solutions.”

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                                  III. DISCUSSION

      Ford argues in his sole issue on appeal that the trial court erred in granting the

traditional and no evidence motion for summary judgment.

A. Summary Judgment Standards of Review

      We review a summary judgment de novo.              Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim,

315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if

reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless

reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding,

289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve

any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex.

2008). A defendant that conclusively negates at least one essential element of a

plaintiff’s cause of action is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Frost Nat’l

Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c). A

defendant is entitled to summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant

conclusively proves all elements of that defense. Frost Nat’l Bank, 315 S.W.3d at 508-

09; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b) (c). To accomplish this, the defendant must present

summary judgment evidence that conclusively establishes each element of the

affirmative defense. See Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. 2008).

      After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof

may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that

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no evidence supports an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex.

R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must specifically state the elements for which no

evidence exists. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). The

trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary judgment

evidence that raises a genuine, material fact issue. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & 1997

cmt.; B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 598 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Tex. 2020).

      When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire

record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable

inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d

291, 292 (Tex. 2006). We review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that

would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions.

Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson,

168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if

reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless

reasonable jurors could not. Timpte Indus., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Mack Trucks, Inc.

v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)). If the nonmovant brings forward more

than a scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a

no-evidence summary judgment is not proper. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417,

424 (Tex. 2009); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).

      When a party moves for summary judgment under both Rules 166a(c) and

166a(i), we will first review the trial court’s judgment under the standards of Rule

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166a(i). Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). But see D.R.

Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Savannah Props. Assocs., L.P., 416 S.W.3d 217, 225 n.7 (Tex. App—

Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (addressing traditional summary judgment first because

movant’s release affirmative defense was dispositive).     If the appellant failed to

produce more than a scintilla of evidence under that burden, there is no need to

analyze whether the appellee’s summary judgment proof satisfied the Rule 166a(c)

burden. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600.

B. Fraud and Fraudulent Inducement

       Fraudulent inducement shares the same basic elements as a claim for fraud:

(1) a material misrepresentation; (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or asserted

without knowledge of its truth; (3) made with the intention that it should be acted on

by the other party; (4) on which the other party relied; and (5) that caused injury.

Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018). In their motion for summary

judgment, the Cutburths argued that Ford could not establish any of the elements for

either claim.

       The Cutburths specifically contended that there was no evidence of a material

misrepresentation that Ford had relied upon to his detriment. In his live pleading,

Ford claimed that the Cutburths had intended to fraudulently induce him into the

“contract” and into possession of his property to prevent him from the enjoyment

and use of his property. But pleadings, even if sworn to, do not constitute summary

                                          8
judgment proof. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660

(Tex. 1995).

      In his response to the Cutburths’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment,

Ford did not provide any evidence of a material misrepresentation. In his affidavit,

Ford contends that “it was fraudulent on Cutburth Constructions’ part to tell me that

I would be paid on projects and then not pay me.” But he did not identify any

misrepresentation made by the Cutburths on which he relied to his detriment.

      Ford acknowledged that the payment arrangement with the Cutburths was

“fluid and inconsistent.” He stated that he had no input on how Brenda arranged for

his payment and that he did not know if they split the profits evenly. Ford relies on

Lindley’s affidavit, which states there were unpaid invoices owed to him by the

Cutburths, as evidence of fraudulent inducement. However, the failure to perform a

contract is not evidence of fraud. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs &

Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). Lindley’s affidavit thus does not

provide evidence of a material representation by the Cutburths.

      Examining the entire record in the light most favorable to Ford and indulging

every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the Cutburths’ motion,

Ford failed to produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material

fact that the Cutburths had made a misrepresentation to him and that he had relied on

said misrepresentation to his detriment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Anderson, 550

                                          9
S.W.3d at 614. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by granting

summary judgment in favor of the Cutburths on Ford’s fraud and fraudulent

inducement claims. We overrule this portion of Ford’s sole issue.

C. Breach of Contract

      In a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a

valid contract; (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance as the contract

required; (3) the defendant breached the contract by failing to perform or tender

performance as the contract required; and (4) the plaintiff sustained damages as a

result of the breach. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.21

(Tex. 2018); see, e.g., Ifiesimama v. Haile, 522 S.W.3d 675, 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). In their no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the

Cutburths argued that there was no evidence to show that they breached their

contract with Ford.

      The specific terms of the agreement between Ford and the Cutburths are not

part of the summary judgment evidence.3 But the parties agree that there was an oral

contract between them that Ford would provide services to Cutburth Construction

and that they would share in the profits from those projects. They disagree, however,

on whether the Cutburths breached that contract.

      3
       Ford acknowledged that the payment agreement was “fluid and inconsistent”
and that he did not know if they split the profits evenly. Brenda stated that the
payment structure was never formal and that she and Ford would sit down and
discuss the division of the income.

                                          10
       Ford’s claim for a breach of contract is based upon information from Lindley

that there were unpaid invoices owed to Ford by Cutburth Construction. In her

affidavit, Lindley stated that

       We entered activity in an ‘after-the-fact’ manner; not daily activity such
       as paying bills or creating invoices, etc. We simply entered prior-month
       activity as it appeared on bank statements and credit card statements.

              Around June 2013, Brandon Ford informed us that we were to
       submit invoices to Cutburth Construction; invoices to be made out per
       Brenda Cutburth’s instructions via weekly emails. My recollection was
       that Brandon Ford had no input whatsoever to the amounts or
       frequency of invoices; that he deferred to Brenda Cutburth for invoicing
       dates and amounts.

       According to Lindley, the invoices were created to give Cutburth Construction

“documentation reflecting the payments that had been paid to Lillab, LLC.” Lindley

attached to her affidavit a list of open invoices for Lillab as of March 23, 2018,

totaling over $275,000. But neither the actual invoices not the emails from Brenda to

Lindley were part of the summary judgment evidence.

       In his affidavit, Flynn stated that he prepared taxes and other related financial

matters for Ford and Ford’s company Lillab, LLC. Flynn further stated:

       On or about March 2018, as part of my regular scope of work for Mr.
       Ford and Lillab, I received a list as part of a QuickBooks File from
       Connie Lindley’s Bookkeeping Solutions that showed open, unpaid
       invoices owed by Cutburth Construction to Lillab and Brandon Ford. I
       printed that list, and forwarded it to Mr. Ford on March 23, 2018.

The QuickBooks file showing open and unpaid invoices owed to Ford was not part of

the summary judgment evidence.

                                          11
      Because Lindley and Flynn failed to attach the documents referenced in their

affidavits that provided the factual bases for their respective conclusions, their

affidavits are rendered conclusory. See Camarillo v. Cabinets by Michael, Inc., No. 02-17-

00154-CV, 2018 WL 3153539, at * 5 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth June 28, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). Conclusory affidavits are not enough to raise fact issues. Ryland

Grp., Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. 1996).         Therefore, the conclusory

affidavits of Lindley and Flynn are no evidence that the Cutburths breached their

agreement with Ford to pay him a share of the profits. Moreover, Lindley stated that

she had prepared the invoices “after-the-fact” to provide documentation of payments

made by Cutburth Construction to Lillab.

      Examining the entire record in the light most favorable to Ford and indulging

every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the Cutburths’ motion,

Ford has not provided more than a scintilla of summary judgment evidence raising a

genuine issue of material fact that the Cutburths breached the contract by failing to

perform or tender performance as the contract required. See Smith, 288 S.W.3d at 424;

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). We overrule this portion of Ford’s sole issue.

C. Conversion and Theft of Property

      In his live pleading, Ford claimed that the Cutburths converted his equipment

by wrongfully exercising dominion and control over the property and by refusing to

return the property, essentially committing theft.      In their motion for summary

judgment, the Cutburths argue that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

                                           12
      The Cutburths contended that the cause of action accrued when the

partnership ended in June 2015. A person must bring suit for conversion of personal

property and the taking or detaining of the property of another no later than two

years after the date the cause of action accrues. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 16.003(a). Ford filed suit in November 2018.

      A defendant who moves for summary judgment based on the statute

of limitations bears the burden of proving when the cause of action accrued. Erikson

v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019). The plaintiff may plead the discovery rule

in response to a limitations defense. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Pasko, 544 S.W.3d

830, 834 (Tex. 2018). The defendant need not negate the discovery rule to prove

when the cause of action accrued unless the plaintiff pleads the discovery rule.

Erikson, 590 S.W.3d at 563; In re Est. of Matejek, 960 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. 1997). If

the plaintiff pleads the discovery rule, the defendant may disprove the discovery rule

by proving that (1) it does not apply or (2) it applies but summary judgment evidence

demonstrates that the plaintiff discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, its

injury within the limitations period. Schlumberger, 544 S.W.3d at 834.

      Ford responded that the discovery rule applied to extend the statute of

limitations because he did not discover the wrong until March 23, 2018, when he

learned of the unpaid invoices. Ford stated in his affidavit:

      My wife, Sadie Ford, filed for divorce on November 20, 2014. I kept
      Randell and Brenda Cutburth informed about my divorce, what was
      going on, custody of Lillian, and what would happen if I received

                                           13
      custody of Lillian. If I received custody of Lillian, I would not be able to
      work for Cutburth Construction unless it was during a time I did not
      have Lillian. Whenever my divorce was finalized and I was awarded
      custody of Lillian, I informed Cutburth Construction that I would no
      longer be able to be a part and that I would give them a few weeks’ time
      to decide what equipment they wanted to have.

             Approximately 3 weeks later, I returned to South Texas . . .to
      retrieve the equipment that I personally owned. . . . After going through
      the list with Brenda Cutburth and being told what items Cutburth
      Construction wanted to keep, I was able to tell them which items I
      wanted to keep and from that what items would be sold. With the
      understanding that those items would not be used and when put up for
      sale at that time, the profits would be split. However, after leaving that
      day, I was informed by employees of Cutburth Construction that the
      equipment to be sold had been used on jobs for the benefit of Cutburth
      Construction. I also saw for myself the equipment being moved from
      South Texas to Weatherford, Texas and used to clear lots and assist in
      Attconstruction [sic] of a new building, as well as the construction
      business for Cutburth Construction.

      Ford’s affidavit established that he was aware that the Cutburths were in

possession of his property shortly after his divorce was finalized. Brenda stated in her

affidavit that Ford informed them in “early 2015” that he had “received joint custody

of his daughter” and that the Cutburths’ agreement with Ford ended in “summer of

2015.” Therefore, the summary judgment evidence shows that Ford’s cause of action

for conversion and theft accrued in 2015. Ford was thus required to bring suit for

conversion and theft of property no later than two years after the cause of action

accrued in 2015. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §16.003(a). Because Ford did

not bring suit until November 2018, the Cutburths conclusively established that

Ford’s claims for conversion of property and theft were barred by the statute of

                                          14
limitations. See Schlumberger, 44 S.W.3d at 834. We overrule this portion of Ford’s sole

issue.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

         We hold that the trial court did not err by granting the Cutburths’ motion for

summary judgment. We overrule Ford’s sole issue on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Dana Womack

                                                      Dana Womack
                                                      Justice

Delivered: February 9, 2023

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