Court Opinion

ID: 9489961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:29:11.840694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:49.631951
License: Public Domain

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority’s otherwise fine opinion is lacking in one important regard: it fails to identify any error on the part of the district court. This court reviews denials of motions to withdraw guilty pleas for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1206 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“we have long held that a district court’s [denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea] should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion”). The majority never suggests that the district court abused its discretion in denying this plea. It justifies the reversal by writing, “[a]t this stage it is enough to say that Idowu presented a ‘fair and just reason’ to allow him to withdraw his plea.” Mqj. Op. at 732. But this is not enough^ Rule 32(e) provides that a district court “may permit [a] plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just reason.” Fed.R.CeimP. 32(e) (emphasis added). It does not provide that the district court must permit a plea to be withdrawn. Just because the district court could have allowed Idowu to withdraw, his plea does not mean that it was an abuse of discretion to decline to do so. Cf. American Message Ctrs. v. FCC, 50 F.3d 35, 41 (D.C.Cir.1995) (“While the Commission certainly could have chosen to allow AMC discovery into Sprint’s billing practices in cases of toll fraud, it did not abuse its discretion by denying AMC’s motion to compel.”); Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C.Cir.) (“The recordings were evidentiary, and therefore ... the trial court in its discretion could have required pre-trial production. However, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s requests -”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872, 77 S.Ct. 94, 1 L.Ed.2d 76 (1956).
In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a gufity plea, “the key to th[e] inquiry is whether the plea was entered in accordance with Rule 11.” Cray, 47 F.3d at 1206. Rule 11 provides a protocol “designed to assist the district judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary.” United States v. Dewalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1211 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal quotations omitted). The majority never suggests that the district court violated Rule 11 in accepting the original guilty plea. The only possible problem with the Rule 11 proceeding is that the district court did not give adequate weight to the existence of a defense based on § 1182. There are two reasons why this is not an adequate ground to reverse the district court under an abuse of discretion standard.
First, I am not convinced that the late-proffered defense is a real one. It is axiomatic that “where, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Entrs., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotations omitted); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) (“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law*733making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”)- The language of the statute in this instance could hardly be more clear. Section 1326 contains no time limit on its effectiveness. That should end our analysis. Courts have no authority to create a time limit that Congress has not imposed.
Second, and more importantly, holding that the district court violated Rule 11 by not explaining a possible defense confuses the roles of the judge and the defense lawyer. A judge in a Rule 11 proceeding is required to ensure that the defendant understands the “nature of the charge, its substance.” United States v. Liboro, 10 F.3d 861, 865 (D.C.Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted). This Judge Lamberth did. Rule 11 does not require the judge to explore potential defenses. It certainly does not require the judge to create defenses that are never even suggested to him. The § 1182-based defense to this charge was never explicitly raised until this appeal. It is possible that Idowu had a constitutional right to an attorney who would make this argument. Remedy for a violation of this right, however, is properly sought in a petition for ineffective assistance of counsel brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Because I believe that the district court committed no error in denying the appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, I respectfully dissent.