Court Opinion

ID: 9775374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:55:55.778808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:25.620477
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority court misreads appellee Mike Gray’s and the State’s briefs. This case does not deal only with abandonment of the one pound of marijuana with which Gray was charged. Nor is this appeal about a trial judge who failed to follow or misapplied established precedent concerning abandonment of contraband. The issue argued and considered by the trial judge, and now on appeal by both parties, is as follows: Assuming Gray had no standing to suppress the marijuana because he threw it from his vehicle and abandoned it, did other earlier events, occurring that same evening, constitute an illegal seizure that made the marijuana the product of an unlawful seizure and therefore inadmissible? Gray cites Rule 16.2(a)(4) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of his argument that the trial court correctly suppressed the marijuana as having been unlawfully seized. Gray’s argument is that the one-pound bag of marijuana that was thrown from his vehicle had earlier been illegally seized by Officer Poe. Gray explains that, earlier the same evening when he was arrested, Poe was unlawfully positioned on the private property of Lavern Bruton when Poe saw Bruton come out of his house to enter Gray’s car parked in the driveway. Poe witnessed Bruton and Gray transact the sale of marijuana. Gray argues he had a legitimate expectation of privacy while his car was parked in Bruton’s driveway, and because Poe was on Bruton’s property without his consent, the one-pound bag of marijuana was deemed illegally seized at that stage. Specifically, Gray, utilizing language in Rule 16.2(a)(4), urges that the one pound of marijuana suppressed by the trial judge had been obtained as a result of “other evidence” unlawfully obtained. That “other evidence,” he claims, was Officer Poe’s unlawful observation of Gray. The State points out that, although our court has never addressed the issue raised here, other appellate courts have, and held the defendant in such circumstances does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in an open driveway. Again, the issue presented is precedent setting and, in my view, worthy of this court’s consideration under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 3(c). The precedent setting question aside, this court has said that, even when it has already decided the issue presented in a case and has created precedent which will assure the correct application of the law, the court still will permit an appeal that will foster uniform application of the law. State v. Rice, 329 Ark. 219, 947 S.W.2d 3 (1997); see also State v. Dennis, 318 Ark. 80, 883 S.W.2d 811 (1994). At the least, that is the situation here. Finally, I would be remiss if I failed to mention that even Gray in no way suggests by argument that the State’s appeal should not lie. Because I believe the Fourth Amendment issue and needed interpretation of Rule 16.2 fit well within the dictates of Criminal Appellate Rule 3(c), I would grant this appeal. 958 S.W.2d 302 Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by; Kelly Terry, Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellant. No response. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING DECEMBER 18, 1997 W.H. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice. The State files its petition suggesting that we erred in refusing to accept its appeal. While we agree that we misstated our guidelines regarding the acceptance of State’s appeals, we do not agree that we should have accepted the State’s appeal in Gray’s case.  Citing State v. Hart, 329 Ark. 582, 952 S.W.2d 138 (1997), State v. Rice, 329 Ark. 219, 947 S.W.2d 3 (1997), and State v. Townsend, 314 Ark. 427, 863 S.W.2d 288 (1993), we said that “we only accept appeals by the State when our holding would establish important precedent.” (Emphasis added.) Our review of State’s appeals is not limited to cases that would establish precedent. We correctly stated our guidelines for accepting State’s appeals under Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 3(c) in our recent decision in State v. Stephenson, 330 Ark. 594, 955 S.W.2d 518 (1997): We accept appeals by the State when our holding would be important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law. Rule 3(c). As a matter of practice, this court has only taken appeals “which are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law.” State v. Banks, 322 Ark. 344, 345, 909 S.W.2d 634, 635 (1995). Where an appeal does not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the law. State v. Harris, 315 Ark. 595, 868 S.W.2d 488 (1994). Appeals are not allowed merely to demonstrate the fact that the trial court erred. State v. Spear and Boyce, 123 Ark. 449, 185 S.W. 788 (1916). 330 Ark. at 595. Resolution of the issue of abandonment in the present appeal turned on the facts unique to Gray’s case, and thus did not require interpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramifications. Thus, because the issues presented by the State in this appeal did not involve the correct and uniform administration of justice, we correctly dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, we deny the State’s petition for rehearing. Glaze, J. dissents.