Court Opinion

ID: 9728864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:17:52.102749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.621170
License: Public Domain

Cynar, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s opinion for the reasons set forth in Judge Bronson’s opinion in People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich App 674; 272 NW2d 567 (1978). There are no reported cases to date where the double jeopardy clause has been used to frustrate a legislative intent to punish a defendant twice for different aspects of the same act.
There is no reason to extend the protection of the double jeopardy clause in this case. The statute under consideration was enacted to meet a pressing societal problem. This problem might better have been counteracted by enacting a sentence-enhancement scheme similar to that of the habitual offender act, MCL 769.10-769.13; MSA 28.1082-28.1085. However, the failure to draft the felony-firearm statute in that manner does not render it constitutionally infirm. See Gore v United States, 357 US 386, 392-393; 78 S Ct 1280; 2 L Ed 2d 1405 (1958).
I would affirm both convictions and would order the trial judge to impose sentence in accordance with the felony-firearm statute.