Court Opinion

ID: 9774157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:10:20.478973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.024315
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing
Both parties have filed motions for rehearing.
Appellants’ motion is overruled. As regards Ground 2, plaintiffs’ allegations, about the drilling of a well and production. from this well are not made in the alternative and are not inconsistent with other' allegations of theirs.
Appellees’ motion is granted in part-Ground I assigns as error that the trial, court’s judgment should have been affirmed, as to the fenced area about the well. We-have reexamined the evidence and have concluded that, from all the circumstances, in proof, the evidence being considered as-a whole, it appears as a matter of law that the plaintiffs acquiesced in the exclusive appropriation of the area supporting and', enclosed by the fence around the well,, made by those of the defendants who. drilled this well, and did in fact abandon this area as a part of their homestead, if ever it was. a part of that homestead. There is no field note description of this area in the record, but Mr. Sawyer’s map shows that well and fence are on lot 3 of *253the land leased, and contains a scale of measurements by which a field note description, perhaps approximate, might be fabricated. The fence itself is an artificial monument which plainly would not be confused with any other. It may be that we could render final judgment here as regards this fenced area, but a more explicit and clearly accurate description of said area may be to the parties’ interest and to get this we amend our judgment as follows : On remand, the trial court is directed to sever the suit as respects this fenced area around the well from the suit as respects the rest of the land sued for by plaintiffs, and having done so, to procure an adequate field note description of this fenced area, that is, the land supporting and enclosed by this fence around the well, and then to render final judgment in defendants’ behalf, that, plaintiffs take nothing as regards said land.' See: Medlenka v. Downing, 59 Tex. 32, at page 39; Wynne v. Hudson, 66 Tex. 1, at pages 12-13, 17 S.W. 110, at pages 114-115; Cooper v. Austin, 58 Tex. 494; Fielder v. Houston Oil Co., Tex.Com.App., 208 S.W. 158; Id., Tex.Com.App., 210 S.W. 797; Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492, at page 498, 198 S.W.2d 879, at page 883. To this extent 'Ground I of appellees’ motion is sustained. All other grounds of appellees’ motion for rehearing are overruled, and except as amended our judgment of remand remains in force. In substance, we are directing a retrial of that branch of the cause which concerns the land in suit other than the fenced area around the well on Lot 3. ,We add the following comments.
We do not agree with appellees’ interpretation of the Commission’s opinion in Peterman v. Harborth, Tex.Com.App., 300 S.W. 33. The Commission did not give effect to a conveyance of homestead property. Instead, they gave effect to a conveyance of land which was not homestead. This land, because of the abandonment, had ceased to be homestead, and so the parol conveyance was enabled to operate as in other cases.
We remain of the opinion that the plaintiffs’ abandonment did not extend beyond the fenced area around the well. Abandonment of homestead rights is matter of intention and we see no reason to extend the intention beyond the surrender actually made; and this surrender was of a part only of the area alleged to be homestead. Retention and continued use of the rest of the homestead for homestead purposes logically ought to be, and we think is, a circumstance indicating that the owner intended nothing inconsistent with continuance of such use, and appropriation of any part of the surface for the purpose of the lease would be inconsistent, in fact,, with continuance of homestead use. Assuming for discussion, as we have done, that the well is on property once homestead, the question simply is, did the homestead owners intend to abandon more than: they actually gave up. Decisions that execution of an oil/gas lease does not, of itself, effect an abandonment of homestead’ rights in land leased are not in point because the intention to subordinate the surface to use for lease purposes is settled by an expression of intention and such a question as exists in this case does not exist in those cases.
Appellees have filed an offer to surrender the surface estate in lots 8, 7 and 6, and this, we assume, was done to support their contention that abandonment extended to all interests purportedly conveyed by the lease, by removing the possibility of interfering with homestead uses by using this surface area to get at the minerals below, or for other lease purposes. However, appellants have refused to accept this offer, and so the offer cannot be given any effect, since abandonment either did or did not occur before this suit was filed. If no abandonment happened, this offer cannot now effectuate one and so cannot help the argument that one should be declared.
On Appellees’ Second Motion for Rehearing
Grounds Land II are overruled on the authority of Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas, 129 Tex. 235, at pages 244, 245, 102 S.W.2d 1031, at page 1036. The evidence pertaining to these grounds *254has not been fully developed and the plaintiffs’ waiver of issues by failure to request is not material to our conclusion that a remand should be made.
Ground V apparently assigns error to our conclusion that the evidence proves as a matter of law that the lots on which plain-tiffs’ residence is situated were homestead property on the date of the lease. We have reconsidered this evidence and we adhere to our conclusion. The defendants, that is, the appellees, did not contest this- issue in the trial court yet plainly could have done so for, of their witnesses, at least Pipkin, Englin and Tebbs had information about the facts. On the other hand, the parties stipulated that the property, was community on the date of the lease. The photograph of the plaintiffs’ dwelling, defendants’ exhibit 1, shows shrubbery and trees which must be several years old. Mrs. Crews’ description of the dwelling where she signed the lease shows that it was the home of herself and her husband, and she described it and the dwelling in which she resided at the time of the trial in such a way as to identify the two. Her statements identifying trees destroyed by the drilling.- operations with trees on the property leased tend toward the same end. Mr. Coe’s testimony on direct examination shows that he was 29 years old at the time of trial, that he had been familiar with the property all of his 1¾, and that plaintiffs, who were his grandparents, had resided on the property all of that time. Plis testimony on cross-examination is consistent with this. That he was away in, or at some time in, 1948 does not detract from the force of his testimony concerning the long period before and after that year; and persistence of residence during the time of his actual knowledge is strong confirmation of Mrs. Crews’ testimony. Mr. Coe identified the photograph of plaintiffs’ present dwelling, defendants’ exhibit 1, as the plaintiffs’ house and said that "the house seems to be just like it always was.” This is plainly the house he had always known as plaintiffs’ residence. We have referred to defendants’ witnesses Pipkin, Englin and Tebbs. Mr. Pipkin said that after he procured Mr. Crews’ signature, he and Mr: Englin went over to “his residence”, that is, Mr. Crews’ residence, and procured Mrs. Crews’ signature and acknowledgment. On the date of the lease,' Mr. Englin, the notary, resided in the same town in which plaintiffs resided and he has lived there since. He said that he and Mr. Pipkin “went first to the store of" Mr. Crews over on the highway and I took his acknowledgment and then we went to the home of Mrs. Crews and took her acknowledgment to this instrument.” He said: “I believe the house faces east.” This statement is in accord with Mrs. Crews’ description of the house in which she signed the lease. Mr. Tebbs said that he had lived all of his life in Kountze, the town in which the property was situated; that he had known plaintiffs all of his life; and that he had had occasion to go on the premises many times before the well was drilled; and that he had only seen the plaintiffs in the house. Mrs. Crews’ testimony. shows that plaintiffs resided on the property while the well was being drilled. On the evidence, the question, whether any of the property leased was plaintiffs’ homestead on the date of the lease, depends on whether the house in which Mrs. Crews signed the lease is the same house in which she resided when the well was drilled and the cause was tried, and we think that the evidence proves as a matter of law that this was true. The statements of the defendants’ witnesses and, under the circumstances, defendants’ acquiescence in the testimony of Mrs. Crews and Mr. Coe afford sufficient confirmation of that testimony if any confirmation 'be needed.
Other • grounds for rehearing have been considered but are overruled, and appellees’, that- is, defendants’ second motion for rehearing is denied.