Court Opinion

ID: 9547186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:43:02.46792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:25.658758
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
Judge Carpeneti rejected Ison’s proposed mitigating factor that “the facts surrounding the commission of the offense and any previous offenses by the defendant establish that the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor and inconsistent with the imposition of a substantial period of imprisonment.” This mitigating factor is set forth in AS 12.55.155(d)(13). In rejecting this proposed mitigating factor, Judge Car-peneti relied on our decision in Jordan v. State, 895 P.2d 994, 1000 (Alaska App.1995). In Jordan we stated:
Alaska Statute 12.55.155(d)(13) calls for a two-prong determination: first, the court must determine on a case-by-case basis that the defendant’s present and prior crimes are consistently minor; second, the court must find that the past and present crimes, taken as a whole, are inconsistent with a sub-stantial term of imprisonment. Because the first prong of factor (d)(13) focuses on the seriousness of [the defendant’s] current and past crimes, requiring a finding of minor harm for each offense, our conclusion that his current offense is not among the least serious in its class precludes finding that the mitigating factor has been established.
(Citations omitted.) Judge Carpeneti concluded that because he had rejected the “least serious conduct” mitigating factor, he was also required to reject the “consistently minor harm” mitigating factor under Jordan. Judge Carpeneti stated that, in the absence of the authority of Jordan, there was some possibility that he might have been able to find the existence of the “consistently minor harm” mitigating factor and might have concluded that it was appropriate to impose less than the presumptive term. He stated that he thought Jordan was not correctly decided but that he was obligated to follow the decision of a higher court.
It seems clear to me, to the extent that Jordan requires the trial court to find that the defendant’s present offense “was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense” in order to find the “consistently minor harm” mitigator, that Jordan is too rigid. In most cases where a defendant’s current offense is a serious felony offense, the facts of the present offense would preclude finding “the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor.” However, where the defendant’s present offense is not egregious it would be possible for a court to find that “the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor” without having to find that his present offense “was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense.” For instance, a defendant might not have engaged in the least serious conduct in committing a class C felony, yet, in evaluating the offender’s overall record, the judge could properly . conclude that “the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor and inconsistent with the imposition of a substantial period of imprisonment.”
To rule that a defendant must establish that his present offense “was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of *200the offense” before he can prove the consistently minor harm” mitigator tends to read that mitigator out of existence. It becomes a “make weight” mitigator which can exist only if the court finds a prior mitigating factor. It seems clear to me that this is not what the legislature intended. The “consistently minor harm” mitigator asks the court to focus on the defendant’s overall conduct rather than merely his conduct in his current offense. The focus of the court’s attention is different and the court should be able to find that “the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor” without having to find that his present offense “was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense.” In my view we should explicitly say this to clarify the overbroad language.
After clarifying the Jordan decision, I would then remand the case to Judge Car-peneti to redetermine the application of the mitigating factor. Sentencing is primarily a trial court function. Trial judges are generally in a much better position than we are to evaluate offenders, current and prior offenses, and prospects for rehabilitation. In my view, as an appellate court, we should defer to the trial court’s primary role in sentencing and remand the case to Judge Carpeneti to reevaluate the sentence.