Court Opinion

ID: 9760470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:56:12.240499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.554195
License: Public Domain

Ray Thornton, Justice, concurring. I agree with the majority decision affirming the decision of the trial court, but only because the trial court’s decision is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. This Court should not base its decision upon an interpretation of Rule 2.2(a) that could have a chilling effect upon the exercise of discretion by an officer charged with preventing and deterring criminal activities. Preventing the endangerment of a child is, in my view, a valid reason for a lawful stop of a vehicle when it is reasonably believed that the occupants of the vehicle possess information about the missing child. Police officers should be assured that stopping a vehicle belonging to friends or family of a missing child to ask for information about the child is not prohibited by this decision. Here, there was substantial evidence before the trial court that the missing juvenile was not in danger and that the officer did not consider that a crime had been committed. While I might have reached a decision contrary to the trial court on the basis of my own interpretation of the evidence, I recognize that the trial court was able to listen to the testimony, observe the demeanor of the witnesses, evaluate their credibility, and conclude that the vehicle was not lawfully stopped. In these circumstances, I would affirm, but only because I could not find that the trial court’s decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. We should recognize that another trial court in similar factual circumstances might decide a lawful stop was permitted, and I believe that decision should also be supported on review unless it was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. I concur.