Court Opinion

ID: 9735710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:28:26.264184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.641777
License: Public Domain

Murphy, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
I am in complete agreement with the analysis, reasoning and holdings in both Horan v Brown, 148 Mich App 464; 384 NW2d 805 (1986), lv den 425 Mich 876 (1986), and Mielke v Waterman, 145 *77Mich App 22; 377 NW2d 328 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 873 (1985), which reflect the current state of the law in Michigan.
In Horan, supra, a case directly on point, this Court clearly and unequivocally held that a cause of action for damages for noneconomic losses from a serious impairment of body function does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the serious impairment of body function. The Court in Horan, supra, pp 466-468, stated:
The sole question on appeal is: When does a cause of action for serious impairment of body function accrue so as to begin the running of the period of limitations? In Mielke v Waterman, 145 Mich App 22; 377 NW2d 328 (1985) [lv den 424 Mich 873 (1985)], this Court held that a cause of action for damages for noneconomic losses from a serious impairment of body function does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the serious impairment of body function. We agree.
Under the no-fault act, a prerequisite for maintaining a suit for noneconomic loss arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle is that the injured person suffer death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement. MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1). Thus, while we hesitate to coin this statutory prerequisite as a "fifth element” of the plaintiff’s cause of action as did the Mielke Court, we do conclude that the threshold level is an essential element of damages without which the plaintiff is unable to proceed. Therefore, all of the elements of plaintiffs cause of action in this case did not occur until her injuries manifested themselves in a serious impairment of body function.
We disagree with defendants that this holding frustrates the legislative purpose of the no-fault *78act. The Legislature’s purpose in establishing the serious impairment threshold was to "weed out from the tort system claims for injuries less severe than the criteria” under the no-fault act while preserving tort liability for those injuries which are severe and serious. Byer v Smith, 419 Mich 541, 546; 357 NW2d 644 (1984). Our holding today is consistent with this purpose.
Nor do we believe our holding will provide the dilatory plaintiff with a method for circumventing the statute of limitations. Any plaintiff bringing such a claim will have to overcome at least two additional obstacles. First, the plaintiff will have to prove that the serious impairment of body function did not in fact occur until sometime after the injury, and second, that the serious impairment of body function was proximately caused by the now-distant injury. These obstacles will stem the chaos envisioned by the defendants. [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, this Court in Mielke v Waterman, supra, pp 25-27, stated:
Serious impairment of body function is a threshold established by MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135 for tort liability caused by ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. See Byer v Smith, 419 Mich 541; 357 NW2d 644 (1984). The serious impairment of body function is an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, not merely a later additional item of damages. In an action like that presented here, an additional element must be added to the four essential elements specified in Connelly [v Paul Ruddy’s Equipment Repair & Service Co, 388 Mich 146; 200 NW2d 70 (1972)] for an action for damages arising out of tortious injury to a person: (5) The plaintiff must have suffered a serious impairment of body function. A cause of action for damages for noneconomic losses from a serious impairment of body function cannot have accrued before the alleged serious impairment occurred.
*79Because plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until he could allege all of the essential elements of the cause of action in a proper complaint, plaintiff’s cause of action did not accrue until he discovered or should have discovered the serious impairment of body function. [Emphasis added.]
The preservation of a party’s third-party tort suit through application of a discovery rule is a well-reasoned approach in addressing claims such as this claim. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the purposes of the no-fault act are "thwarted by unpredictable application of a tolling doctrine to nearly all automobile accident injuries.” In my estimation, there are very few cases in which the individual will find himself or herself with a serious injury, linked to an automobile accident, which for some reason has not fully manifested itself shortly after the accident. Moreover, the party who suffers from an injury manifesting itself later or beyond the three-year period of limitation faces strong proof problems which serve to keep in check fraudulent and excessively stale claims. The party must not only meet the serious impairment threshold, but must also medically link the injuries to the automobile accident.
The Pennsylvania courts have aligned themselves with the reasoning in Horan and Mielke, supra, and hold that the period of limitation does not start to run until the claimant knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the no-fault threshold has been reached. Bond v Gallen, 292 Pa Super 207, 209; 437 A2d 7 (1981), aff'd 503 Pa 286; 469 A2d 556 (1983). A contrary holding would force automobile accident victims to file precautionary, even spurious, law suits in order to protect their legal rights *80if it would be at all conceivable that their injury might exceed the statutory threshold. 503 Pa 290-291.
Like Michigan, the Pennsylvania courts have sought to avoid the "Catch-22” that would arise if the period of limitation began to run on tort claims that had not yet ripened under the no-fault act. See, e.g., Dickerson v Brind Truck Leasing, 362 Pa Super 341, 347; 524 A2d 908, 911 (1987).
Had plaintiff in this case filed a third-party tort claim before the surgical implant of the silastic joint prosthesis, he would likely have been unable to meet the serious impairment threshold. Plaintiff would then have had what eventually amounted to a legitimate and compensable claim unfavorably disposed of by summary disposition. The no-fault law should not encourage such an unjust result. Again, a party’s cause of action should not accrue until the party meets the serious impairment threshold. Once that threshold is met, it is from that date that the three-year statute of limitation should apply.
I also see no distinction in Mielke and Horan, supra, being decided before the date of DiFranco, supra. This distinction noted by the majority is irrelevant because the real issue is when the claim accrues. The majority reasons that "due to the uncertainties inherent in our jury system, in most cases a plaintiff will not know whether his or her injuries constitute a serious impairment of body function until such time as the jury returns its verdict.” However, that analysis focuses on the plaintiff’s prevailing in the cause of action, not when the claim actually accrues. The claim accrues when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that the injuries suffered in the automobile accident constituted a serious im*81pairment of body function, not the date of the accident.
Finally, the message from the majority’s opinion is clear. If you are injured in an automobile accident and not sure of the severity of your injuries, the prudent and necessary course of action is to file suit and then prolong litigation and wait to see what the full extent of your injuries will be. This approach of filing suit before the severity of the injury is reasonably known would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s purpose in establishing the serious impairment threshold. That purpose is to weed out from the tort system claims for injuries less severe than the criteria under the no-fault act, while preserving tort liability for those injuries which are severe and serious. See Byer v Smith, supra. For the above reasons, I would affirm the circuit court.