Court Opinion

ID: 9552854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:18:26.924706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:14.349596
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which reverses the suppression of the defendant’s confession and the items seized from his place of business pursuant to the consent search conducted immediately after his arrest. Under the totality of circumstances the officers’ conduct in effectuating the arrest violated Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. Because the defendant’s confession as well as the consent search followed so closely upon the unconstitutional arrest, the district court properly suppressed both the confession and the fruits of the search. I agree with that part of the majority opinion reversing the suppression of the defendant’s conversations with the police informer, since the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these pre-arrest conversations.
Although the court concedes the Denver officers had no statutory authority to effectuate the warrantless arrest of the defendant, nevertheless it upholds the arrest because, in its view, “a peace officer outside the territorial limits of his authority does not have less authority to arrest than a person who is a private citizen.” I find this “private citizen” rationale unacceptable. It frustrates the legislative scheme circumscribing the arrest powers of police officers beyond the territorial boundaries of their authority and pro tanto undercuts the constitutional protection against the unreasonable seizure of one’s person as guaranteed by Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution.
The General Assembly, by granting statutory powers of arrest to private persons, section 16-3-201, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), did not thereby intend to grant municipal officers statewide commissions to cross clearly defined governmental boundaries in order to effectuate arrests beyond the territorial limits of their authority. If such were the legislative intent, the “fresh pursuit” provisions of section 16-3-106, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), would be utterly superfluous. Far from unessential, these provisions help to preserve the political autonomy of municipal and county subdivisions of government by limiting the extraterritorial authority of municipal police officers to the carefully defined exigencies therein described.
This reasonable circumscription of arrest powers is not without constitutional signifi-*219canee to the security of one’s person from unreasonable searches and seizures. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 7. Conceding that a statutory violation by a governmental officer need not rise per se to the level of constitutional significance for purposes of the exclusionary rule, our prior case law indicates that the unjustified exercise of extraterritorial arrest powers by a police officer does implicate constitutional interests. People v. Lott, 197 Colo. 78, 589 P.2d 945 (1979), illustrates this principle. There, officers of the Wheat Ridge police department learned of a burglary in Wheat Ridge and, without having obtained an arrest warrant or having enlisted the assistance of Denver police, crossed over into Denver several hours after the burglary and arrested the defendants at a halfway house where they resided. In upholding the trial court’s suppression of the evidence seized incident to the arrest, this court stated:
“The district court ruled that since they were not in fresh pursuit, the officers lacked authority to arrest outside the territorial limits of their authority. Sections 16-3-106, 201 and 202, C.R.S.1973 and People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 577 P.2d 288 (1978).
“We agree with the trial court that the officers were not in fresh pursuit. The officers had received notice of the alleged burglary at approximately 12:30 p.m. Between 12:30 and 6:00 p.m. the officers investigated the crime. By 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. the investigation had focused on the appellees. The district court ruled, and we agree, that there was time to have obtained an arrest warrant or to have enlisted the assistance of Denver police before arresting the appellees at 6:00 p.m.” 197 Colo, at 81, 589 P.2d at 947.
Likewise, in People v. Schultz, Colo., 611 P.2d 977 (1978), where Larimer County sheriff’s officers obtained an arrest warrant and arrested the defendant in Weld County, this court upheld the arrest on the basis of the very factors which are noticeably lacking in the instant case:
“In this case, the arresting officers obtained a warrant and enlisted the aid of both the Greeley police and the Weld County Sheriff’s office, both of whom were authorized to execute warrants in Weld County. Since officers with authority to arrest in Weld County were present during the defendant’s arrest, we can perceive no reason to hold the arrest invalid.” Colo., 611 P.2d at 978-79.
People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 577 P.2d 288 (1978), relied upon by the majority to sustain the arrest, is clearly distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Bloom, the Littleton police officer making the arrest in Denver was a member of an L.E.A.A. funded Metropolitan Enforcement Group which had been formed by the written agreement of several municipalities for the purpose of combatting the drug problem in Denver. Although not mentioned in the Bloom opinion, it is reasonable to assume that the Littleton officer was specially commissioned as a police officer in the respective municipalities which were parties to the agreement. But even if he were not, it is clear from the opinion that the officer effecting the arrest was assisted by two Denver police officers, both of whom had lawful authority to make the arrest.
If the Denver officers in this case had been confronted with an extraterritorial emergency calling for an immediate police response, there would have been no constitutional impediment to their crossing into Adams County and, if necessary, making an arrest. No such emergency existed here, however. Nor did the extraterritorial arrest result from an inadvertent or good faith mistake on the part of the officers about the legality of their conduct. On the contrary the officers, at all times acting in their official capacities, knew they were exceeding the territorial boundaries of their authority in making the arrest. Although their pre-arrest investigation took place from 9:00 a. m. to 2:00 p. m., they made no effort to solicit the assistance of officers in Adams County, where the criminal activity was taking place, or to obtain an arrest warrant under Crim.P. 4. Their knowing disregard of the territorial boundaries of their authority, coupled with their failure to avail themselves of simple procedures readi*220ly available for legitimizing an extraterritorial arrest, place their actions within the zone of constitutional unreasonableness under Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution.
Since both the confession and the search followed immediately upon the illegal arrest, I would uphold the district court’s suppression of the defendant’s confession and the objects seized in the consent search. See, e. g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981); People v. Lowe, Colo., 616 P.2d 118 (1980); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 491 P.2d 575 (1981).
I am authorized to say that DUBOFSKY and LOHR, JJ., join me in this dissent.