Court Opinion

ID: 9781197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:22:08.091052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:21.077952
License: Public Domain

CAKLEY, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
The duties of innkeepers are hardly limited to their duties with respect to their guests’ property pursuant to OCGA § 43-21-1 et seq. or to their statutory duty to keep the premises and approaches reasonably safe for their guests. See OCGA § 51-3-1; Motel Properties v. Miller, 263 Ga. 484, 485 (1) (436 SE2d 196) (1993). “It is the duty of an innkeeper not only to furnish his guest or patron with shelter and comforts but also to exercise ordinary care to protect him from danger. [Cit.]” Newton v. Candace, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 385 (2) (94 SE2d 739) (1956). This common-law duty is widely recognized in other jurisdictions. 1 J.D. Lee & Barry Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 3:22 (2d ed.); 43A CJS Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 32; 40A AmJur2d Hotels, Motels, and Restaurants § 69; Estate of Hutchins v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 2006 WL 2365590, at *2 (E.D. Ark. August 14, 2006) (applying Arkansas law, quoting Catlett v. Stewart, 804 SW2d 699, 702 (Ark. 1991)).
Moreover, Georgia allows further development of the common law, as we recognize in Supreme Court Rule 34 (3). Thus, this Court has previously adopted portions of the Second Restatement of Torts. BDO Seidman v. Mindis Acquisition Corp., 276 Ga. 311 (1) (578 SE2d 400) (2003); Huggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 245 Ga. 248 (264 SE2d 191) (1980). “A majority of jurisdictions have adopted the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A. Many of these jurisdictions have applied Section 314A to cases related to illness or injury. [Cits.]” Hoff v. Elkhorn Bar, 613 *571FSupp.2d 1146, 1157 (IV) (B) (D.N.D. 2009). Under that section, an “innkeeper is under a . . . duty to his guests” “(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.” Restatement, supra. Therefore, “in certain circumstances the relationship between a guest and an innkeeper may give rise to a duty to render aid in case of illness or injury. [Cit.]” Fish v. Paul, 574 A2d 1365, 1366 (Me. 1990). See also 43A CJS, supra. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, § 314A is not limited to “situations in which the owner or operator of the premises had knowledge that its invitee was in imminent danger because of observation of the physical peril. . . .” (Majority opinion, p. 568.) Instead, § 314A applies when the innkeeper either “knows or has reason to know” that his guest is ill or injured.
In Estate of Hutchins, the evidence on motion for summary judgment showed that the deceased’s girlfriend was going to meet him at a hotel late one evening but could not reach him on the phone. She opened his room door only partially because of a security latch, saw him passed out drunk, but breathing normally, and she eventually fell asleep in her car. When she awoke, she returned to the room door, where he was in the same position and did not respond. She asked the desk clerk to call 911 because something was wrong. She told the clerk that she could not get into the deceased’s room or get him to answer the telephone, but she did not tell any motel employee how long the deceased had been lying in the same position or provide any other information from which the clerk could reasonably conclude that the deceased was in a medical emergency. Thus, the defendant motel contended that nothing in the record established that it was on notice that the deceased was in immediate danger and that time was of the essence. Nevertheless, because the clerk called the manager first, who did not arrive for at least 30 minutes and did not call 911 until he had opened the room door, the federal district court found “genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Motel 6 employee acted in a negligent manner. The evidence raises a jury question as to how a reasonably careful person would act under the circumstances.” Estate of Hutchins v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., supra at *3.
The record here presents a significantly more compelling case for the denial of summary judgment. In her deposition, Ms. Rasnick testified that her 77-year-old husband had recently recovered from prostate cancer, was suffering from a bad cold when he came to Georgia, was on medication for high blood pressure, and was taking a cough suppressant containing codeine. Ms. Rasnick and her husband established a regular pattern of telephone calls. He would *572call her during the day from work, and she would call his motel room soon after the work day had ended. On the day of Mr. Rasnick’s death, Ms. Rasnick called the motel at 6:51 p.m. and 7:36 p.m. and asked to be connected with his room, but he did not answer. At 7:55 p.m., she called the plant where Mr. Rasnick worked and was informed that he had left two hours earlier. She tried the motel again immediately and informed the man who answered that she lived in Texas, that she was very worried about her husband, that he was on medication, and that she needed someone to check on him. The operator told her that she was disturbing her husband and hung up on her. At 8:16 p.m., Ms. Rasnick called again, and a female operator told her that the manager would be back shortly and connected her to Mr. Rasnick’s room, where there was still no answer. When Ms. Rasnick called at 8:30 p.m., she asked the male operator if he had found out about her husband. The operator ranted that her husband may be working overtime or resting and that she was disturbing Mr. Rasnick. She told the operator that she had checked with his office and he was not working overtime. Furthermore, knowing that he did not drive at night, she denied that he had gone out. The operator told her to dial the room number and hung up on her again. Ms. Rasnick made five more calls to the motel that evening, each time receiving only an automated response from the motel switchboard.
The question of a violation of the duty to protect guests from danger, like an innkeeper’s other duties, “‘“is a question of negligence and this court is bound by the rule that such matters are for the jury except in plain, palpable and indisputable cases. (Cit.)”’” Robinson v. Western Intl. Hotels Co., 170 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) (318 SE2d 235) (1984). See also Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Coleman, 246 Ga. 559, 561 (272 SE2d 251) (1980); 40A AmJur2d, supra at §119 (“Unless evidence allows only a single conclusion, [cit.] it is for the jury to determine whether ... the proprietor of a hotel . . . has exercised ordinary or reasonable care for the protection of guests .... [Cits.]”). This is “[o]ne of the most frequently cited propositions in all of Georgia jurisprudence . . . .” Charles R. Adams III, Ga. Law of Torts § 3-2 (2010-2011 ed.). The evidence in this case shows that the defendant motel was placed on notice of Mr. Rasnick’s medication, his likely presence in the hotel room due to his earlier departure from work, his failure to respond to phone calls, and his wife’s great concern. Under this evidence, a jury could find that the motel had reason to know that Mr. Rasnick was ill or injured, thereby triggering its duty to protect him from further danger. In my opinion, therefore, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment, since there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the motel exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. Estate of Hutchins v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., supra. Accordingly, I respectfully *573dissent to the affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. I further urge the General Assembly to close the gap in the common law resulting from the majority opinion’s unnecessary limitation on the duties of an innkeeper and its inexplicable rejection of the application of § 314A to this case.
Decided July 5, 2011
Reconsideration denied July 21, 2011.
James M. Poe, for appellants.
Carlock, Copeland & Stair, Hugh M. Ruppersburg, David F. Root, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join in this dissent.