Court Opinion

ID: 9829729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:34:08.082096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.884052
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
This case was affirmed at a former term of this court and is now before us on appellant’s motion for rehearing.
Appellant seriously insists that we were in error in failing to sustain his first proposition in his brief to the effect that the trial court erroneously overruled his challenge to the array of talesmen. The motion to challenge the array shows that after the jury for the week had been drawn and after the state had made its challenges and the defendant had' made his challenges that five jurors had been accepted by the state and defendant, that the court thereupon directed the sheriff to summon twenty talesmen to report at 11:30 o’clock on the day of the trial and that twenty men so summoned were in court at that time and were sworn and tested. One of them was excused for cause and that of the remaining nineteen talesmen thirteen stated that they were members or had been members of the Ku Klux Klan, and six members stated that they were not members of the said Klan, that thereupon the defendant asked permission from the court to file a motion to quash the panel of talesmen so summoned by the sheriff, and receiving permission from the court to do so appellant filed his motion setting up as a reason why they should be discharged that the Ku Klux Klan and its members were taking active steps to secure conviction of all persons accused of violating the prohibition law; and that the sheriff and his deputies were members of the Ku Klux Klan and in sympathy with its activities and that in summoning the said talesmen the sheriff and his deputies had summoned men known to be members of the Ku Klux Klan and had not summoned citizens without reference to such membership; and that appellant was being forced to trial and deprived of his constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. On the issue thus made evidence was introduced. This evidence shows that the Cyclops of the Klan in Milam County had stated that the Klan was actively in the prosecution of people charged with violating the liquor law, and stated that they were going to continue in that regard. The Cyclops was called as a witness and testified that the Klan had' not been any more actively engaged in the enforcement of the liquor law than any other good citizen; that they had not published in their literature or otherwise that they were going to do all they could to secure convictions of persons charged with violations of the liquor law any more especially than any other law. Said Cyclops also testified that the Klan had issued a circular at one time offering a reward of $25 to any officer in *225the county for the arrest and conviction of bootleggers but that said reward had been withdrawn because it ivas believed that it would disqualify all members of the Klan from jury service; that this reward was offered some time in January, 1923.
Testimony from the district clerk shows that the population of Milam County is forty or' fifty thousand people and that there is probably two thousand or two thousand five hundred jurors in the county. The witness Kennedy, one of the deputies who summoned the jurors testified that he wras a member of the Klan but that nobody gave him any list to go out and summon the talesmen in question and that he did not have any list; that he summoned fourteen of the tales-men in question and Mr. Rogers summoned six. Rogers, the sheriff, testified that he was a member of the Klan, but also testified that when he took the oath to summon good and sober men he got the best men he could get and that he got people whom he believed would render a fair and impartial verdict, and that his only purpose in summoning the jurors in this case; that he had no intention of summoning Ku Klux Klan members any more than any other good citizen; that he just tried to get good men. Similar testimony was given by deputy sheriff Kennedy. All of the talesmen were asked the question, “If they knew of any reason why by virtue of their belonging to the Klan or not belonging to the Klan they could not render a fair and impartial verdict in the case? and the talesmen all answered “No.” Those who were members of the Klan testified on their voir dire that the fact that they were members would cause them to have no bias in favor of the prosecution in the case. Each of the talesmen testified that they could try the case according to the law and evidence, and that their membership in the Klan would’ not in any wise influence them. The only serious question raised by this motion is that pertaining to the reward by the Klan. It seems this reward was offered in January, 1923, and this case was not tried until the January term of 1924. It also appears from the record that the reward was withdrawn in a very few days after it was offered. There is nothing in this record to show that any of the talesmen summoned in this ease were members of the Ku Klux Klan in January, 1923, at the time the reward Avas offered, and the record is also silent as to how many members or Avhat members kneAV of, endorsed or ratified the offering of the reward at the time it was done, and the record is entirely silent as to any member of the jury Avho tried this case having any connection with the offer of the reward in January 1923. Therefore, we have a simple question as to whether or not membership in the Ku Klux Klan would of itself disqualify a person from serving on the jury in the trial of a liquor case. Appellant presents a very strong and ingenious argument on this question, cites many illustrations of alleged outrages on the part of this organization AArhich he contends *226disqualifies the membership from jury service. We regret that we can not agree with appellant’s contention in this respect. We think that the question of a man’s qualifications for jury service is one of fact with reference to the particular individual. Belonging to this order might or might not disqualify any individual. It would all depend upon the peculiar facts surrounding the individual juror. In this case we find the record entirely silent as to any disqualifying reason touching any particular talesmen called upon for jury service, unless it should be held that membership in the Ku Klux Klan alone is sufficient to disqualify. This we can not hold sufficient.
Believing, therefore, that the case was correctly decided in the original opinion, it is ordered, that the appellant’s motion for rehearing be in all things overruled.

Overruled.