Court Opinion

ID: 9838533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:01:27.219704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:37.698193
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20256        Document: 00516884942             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                            FILED
                                     ____________
                                                                              September 6, 2023
                                      No. 22-20256                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                                 Clerk
                                    ____________

   Elie Nassar,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Finance of America Reverse, L.L.C.; Reverse Mortgage
   Solutions, Incorporated; CELINK,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:18-CV-4695
                     ______________________________

   Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         At the conclusion of a four-day trial, a jury found defendants Finance
   of America Reverse, L.L.C. (FAR), Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc.
   (RMS), and CELINK had not violated the terms of Elie Nassar’s reverse
   mortgage contract. Nassar, proceeding pro se as he did at trial, contests the
   judgment on numerous bases. We liberally construe his brief. E.g., Erickson
          _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 22-20256

   v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally
   construed . . . .” (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, Nassar’s brief does not
   comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4), (6), or (8): he
   fails to cite applicable statutory provisions for jurisdiction; cites sparingly to
   the record; and does not address the applicable standards of review. Fed.
   R. App. P. 28(a). “[W]hile [this court] construe[s] pro se pleadings liberally,
   pro se litigants, like all other parties, must abide by the Federal Rules of
   Appellate Procedure”. United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir.
   1994).     Notwithstanding these serious omissions, “[t]his Court has
   discretion to consider a noncompliant brief, and it has allowed pro se plaintiffs
   to proceed when the plaintiff’s noncompliance did not prejudice the
   opposing party”. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1995) (footnote
   omitted) (citing Wilkes, 20 F.3d at 653). That is the situation at hand.
            First, Nassar contends there was insufficient evidence for the jury’s
   finding defendants:      correctly obtained and charged him for hazard
   insurance; correctly declared his mortgage loan due and payable; correctly
   assessed and charged him for expenses related to foreclosure; had not
   engaged in fraud; and had not violated the Texas Debt Collection Act.
   Because Nassar did not move for judgment as a matter of law under Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), he did not preserve these contentions in
   district court. See United States ex rel. Wallace v. Flintco Inc., 143 F.3d 955,
   960 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining Rule 50(a)’s requirement). Accordingly, we
   review the sufficiency of the evidence only for plain error. Seibert v. Jackson
   Cnty., 851 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2017). Under such review, the standard is
   “whether there was any evidence to support the jury verdict”. Id. at 436
   (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
            Under this very strict standard, his claims fail. For example, he
   contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding defendants
   had not engaged in fraud. At trial, both FAR and RMS denied making any

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                                     No. 22-20256

   misrepresentations to Nassar about the reverse mortgage and introduced
   various monthly statements that listed the specific assessments and charges
   against Nassar. He then admitted he did not read his monthly statements.
          Second, Nassar contends the court erred by excluding testimony from
   his accounting expert. We will not consider the merits of his contention
   because he fails to provide, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate
   Procedure 10(b), a transcript of the pretrial hearing addressing the motion to
   strike his expert. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)–(2); United States v.
   Johnson, 87 F.3d 133, 136 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (declining to consider merits of
   issue when pro se appellant did not provide transcript).
          Third, Nassar asserts the court erred by not allowing him to present
   evidence of RMS’ bankruptcy. Because Nassar did not make an offer of proof
   at trial regarding the bankruptcy, we again review only for plain error. Fed.
   R. Evid. 103(e); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1979)
   (explaining the court “will not even consider the propriety of the decision to
   exclude the evidence at issue, if no offer of proof was made at trial”). “Error
   is plain only when it is clear or obvious and it affects the [party]’s substantial
   rights.” U.S. ex rel. Small Bus. Admin. v. Com. Tech., Inc., 354 F.3d 378, 389
   (5th Cir. 2003). And, a party’s substantial rights are affected only if the error
   affected the outcome of the proceeding. Id. Nassar sought to introduce
   evidence of RMS’ bankruptcy proceeding to prove it never had his mailing
   address and could not have sent him notices regarding his mortgage. Nassar,
   however, acknowledged receipt of a letter from RMS. The refusal to allow
   Nassar’s bankruptcy evidence did not affect the outcome of the trial.
          Fourth, Nassar contends the court abused its discretion when it
   denied his motion to amend his complaint. Nassar did not offer, in district
   court or here, any reason for the delay in raising new claims and facts. The
   district court therefore plausibly inferred that Nassar’s amendments were

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   made in either bad faith or with a dilatory motive and did not abuse its
   discretion in denying the motion to amend. E.g., Aldridge v. Miss. Dep’t of
   Corr., 990 F.3d 868, 878 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding district court’s denial of
   leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
          Fifth, Nassar raises several challenges to the jury instructions and
   verdict forms issued by the court. Nassar first contends the instruction
   related to defendants’ right under the reverse-mortgage documents and
   HUD guidelines to assess charges was not warranted under the facts for this
   case. Because Nassar did not object to the challenged instruction under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, we again review only for plain error. See
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2). The reverse-mortgage documents and HUD
   regulations authorize a lender to charge an in-default borrower various costs.
   See 24 C.F.R. §§ 206.140, 206.207(a)(1)(ii). Consequently, Nassar has not
   demonstrated plain error. See Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150,
   1158 (5th Cir. 2006) (outlining plain-error elements for jury instructions).
          Nassar also contends the court erred when it declined to revise the
   verdict form’s initial breach-of-liability question to specify the coverage
   period for the hazard insurance and the date defendants assessed the charge.
   Nevertheless, Nassar is not entitled to his preferred wording of a jury
   instruction. E.g., United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 465 (5th Cir. 2008).
   In addition, the jury repeatedly heard the charge was for the applicable
   coverage. Finally, the proposed revision was not factually accurate for the
   date RMA assessed the charge. Therefore, Nassar has not shown the court
   abused its discretion in denying his proposed revision. E.g., Fiber Sys. Int’l,
   Inc., 470 F.3d at 1158 (explaining our court reviews jury instructions for abuse
   of discretion).
          Next, Nassar asserts the court erred when it refused a jury instruction
   related to claims arising under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37 (regulating insurance

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   obtained by servicer on behalf of owner). Because Nassar failed to raise a
   § 1024.37 claim in his complaints, the court did not err in refusing the
   instruction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a); Broad. Satellite Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l
   Digit. Television Ctr., Inc., 323 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Under Rule
   49(a) a district judge must submit to the jury all material issues raised by the
   pleadings and the evidence.”).
          Nassar additionally asserts the court erred by refusing his requested
   instruction on fraud, specifically a statement that fraud occurs when a person
   acts to deceive another for profit. This proposed instruction misstated Texas
   law regarding fraud. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P.,
   L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018) (outlining elements of Texas fraud
   claim). Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion. See HTC Corp. v.
   Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 12 F.4th 476, 484 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding
   court did not err in refusing requested instruction that misstated law).
          For the sixth, and final issue, Nassar challenges defendants’ closing
   arguments, asserting they knowingly lied about the evidence. Because
   Nassar did not object during the closing, our court again reviews only for
   plain error. E.g., McLendon v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 749 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir.
   2014) (comments unobjected to during closing reviewed for plain error).
   Again, to prevail under plain-error review, Nassar must show, inter alia, the
   claimed errors affected his “substantial rights”. Id. Defendants’ closing
   arguments were based upon evidence presented during trial. Taking also into
   consideration the jury charge, Nassar has not otherwise demonstrated any
   plain error related to this issue. See id.
          AFFIRMED.

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