Court Opinion

ID: 9790013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:45:12.460794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:24.922053
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER., J., Dissenting.
I agree that under existing law the city may properly impose a tax for revenue purposes upon the business of petitioner. Such tax creates a civil debt due from petitioner to the city. Whether the city may properly enforce collection of that debt by penal sanction through an *160ordinance appropriate to that end is not an issue now before us.
I do not agree that on the record which is before us petitioner’s conviction can be sustained on the theory invoiced by the majority. According to the petition and the return the charge on which petitioner was brought to trial is as follows: ‘‘ That the Crime of Misdemeanor, to-wit, Violation of Section 2111 of Division 2 of the ‘Palm Springs Ordinance Code,’ has been committed by the above-named defendant as follows: That said defendant on or about the 13th day of November, 1959, operated an ice cream emporium known as the ‘Pink Palace,’ at 182 South Indian Ave in the said City of Palm Springs, without having first secured a business license as required by Section 2111 of Division 2 of the ‘Palm Springs Ordinance Code.’ ”
Mere reading of the above quoted charge from the complaint discloses that the only crime charged is “the Crime of Misdemeanor, to-wit, Violation of Section 2111 of Division 2 of the ‘Palm Springs Ordinance Code.’ ” But the majority, while admitting as they must that section 2132.1 of the Palm Springs Ordinance Code provides that “The criminal penalties provided for by this Code shall not be applied to businesses . . . requiring a State license . . . nor as a method of obtaining collection of the license fees,” seek to circumvent the city’s proscription of penal sanction by invoking section 16240 of the state’s Business and Professions Code. That state law provides that “Every person who commences or carries on any business . . . for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this State, without . . . procuring the license prescribed by such law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
To support this ingenious theory the majority say that “A city ordinance is a ‘law of this State’ within the meaning of this section” and remand petitioner to custody.
Two obstacles preclude my concurrence: 1. As hereinabove shown the petitioner has been charged solely with “Violation of Section 2111 of Division 2 of the ‘Palm Springs Ordinance Code’ ” and he has never (at least not in any relevant proceeding) been charged with, or brought to trial for, violation of Business and Professions Code, section 16240.
2. Whether petitioner could, on the facts shown by the petition and return, be successfully charged with, tried on, and convicted for, violation of Business and Professions Code, section 16240, is something which probably no court should *161assume to determine without the full procedures essential to a fair trial on such charge having been had. In any event it appears here that petitioner will be denied due process if he is remanded on the theory of the majority.
In the petition it is alleged, and in the return is not denied, “That this petitioner is licensed by the State of California, Department of Agriculture as a manufacturer of ice cream produces, License No. 13086, Factory No. 4825, File No. 447861 18 LMA. That the factory premises are at the complained of place of business at 182 South Indian Avenue in the City of Palm Springs, California.” Petitioner further alleges “that he is under the rule of Agnew vs. Culver City, as set forth in the original Petition herein, so that he is being deprived of his property without ‘due process of law,’ as set forth herein-above” and “that he is duly licensed by the State of California, Department of Agriculture under Code 661, as a licensed manufacturer and purveyor of milk and ice cream products. ’ ’
Examination of California’s state Agricultural Code, Division IV, discloses an elaborate and detailed code of laws governing the production, processing, manufacturing and marketing of “Milk and Dairy Products,” which encompasses the business petitioner commenced in Palm Springs. The state code requires, among other things, the procurement of licenses or permits for various operations including the business in which petitioner was engaged, and prescribes penalties for violations of the requirements. Likewise, examination of the Business and Professions Code reveals more than 16 pages of index devoted to the one word “Licenses’’ in relation to “any business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this State,” and in respect to which section 16240 provides that “Every person who commences or carries on any [such activity] . . . without taking out or procuring the license prescribed by such law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Italics added.) Petitioner’s undenied possession of the above described “license prescribed by such law” would appear to constitute a prima facie (if not conclusive) defense to a charge of violating “such law.”
If it is not altogether clear that section 16240 in its use of the words “required by any law of this State” means just what it says—a law of this state and not an ordinance of a city—the question is at least substantial enough to entitle a defendant to a hearing and a fair trial on a pleading charging *162him with violation of the identified law before convicting and remanding him.
In connection with the proper construction of section 16240 it of course should be noted that such section appears in chapter 3, part 1, division YII of the Business and Professions Code. Chapter 3 includes the subheadings of “Definitions” (art. 1), “Actions” (art. 2) and “Penalties” (art. 3). Reference to articles 1 and 2 shows that they are concerned exclusively with state and not county or city laws. For example, section 16204 declares that “ ‘Officer’ includes director, chief, commissioner, chairman, department, division, bureau, commission, board and any other person, officer or employee, and any agency, of or in the Government of this State.” (Consistently, if the majority’s view is correct, the above quoted language should be deemed to include “mayor, councilman, city police officer, city treasurer,” etc.) Section 16201 says that “ ‘Fee’ includes every tax, fee, penalty and other monetary exaction, and interest and costs in connection therewith, imposed or collected in connection with or as a prerequisite to or condition for the issuance, renewal or continued validity of any license, certificate or registration required by law.” (Italics added; presumably, by the majority’s view the word “fee” should be understood to include the Palm Springs city license fee.) Section 16224 provides that “All sums collected in suits under this chapter shall be reported to the Controller and deposited in the State Treasury to the credit of the fund in which would be deposited the fee, tax or charge for which the suit was brought.” If Palm Springs can rely on Business and Professions Code, section 16240, for collection of the “license” fee imposed by its ordinance or a “penalty” imposed by state law then it would seem to follow that such fee or penalty when collected should be paid over, not to the treasurer of Palm Springs, but to the State Treasury of California.
Regardless of any such problem as is last above mentioned it appears more reasonable to me to construe the language of section 16240 in the light of its context in chapter 3 of the Business and Professions Code (hereinabove described and quoted in part) and to relate its reach to the enforcement of . state laws which it purports to contemplate rather than to city ordinances enacted exclusively for revenue purposes of the city and concerning which the city’s code expressly declares that “The criminal penalties provided for by this Code shall not be applied ... as a method of obtaining collection *163of the license fees.” It is, of course, our duty, where the applicable law is uncertain, to resolve any uncertainty in favor of the accused person. (In re Tartar (1959), 52 Cal.2d 250, 256-257 [9, 10] [339 P.2d 553] ; Chessman v. Superior Court (1958), 50 Cal.2d 835, 843 [6] [330 P.2d 225]; People v. Carskaddon (1957), 49 Cal.2d 423, 427 [6] [318 P.2d 4]; People v. Stuart (1956), 47 Cal.2d 167, 175 [7] [302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705]; People v. Smith (1955), 44 Cal.2d 77, 79 [2] [279 P.2d 33] ; In re Bramble (1947), 31 Cal.2d 43, 51 [6, 7] [187 P.2d 411] ; In re McVickers (1946), 29 Cal.2d 264, 278 [176 P.2d 40] ; People v. Valentine (1946), 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [20] [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Ralph (1944), 24 Cal. 2d 575, 581 [2] [150 P.2d 401]; Ex parte Rosenheim (1890), 83 Cal. 388, 391 [23 P. 372].)
. For the reasons hereinabove related I dissent from the majority holding, and if there be no tenable basis for sustaining the conviction of petitioner (which issue, as indicated at the outset of this dissent, I do not reach but as to which the majority have failed to find a supportable theory) the writ should be granted.
McComb, J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied June 8, 1960. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.