Court Opinion

ID: 9381962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 14:05:07.635392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.901869
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-356

                              CAROLYN S. ELMORE

                                       vs.

                               JAMES F. ELMORE.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In 2021 James Elmore (father) filed a complaint for

 modification of a 2015 divorce judgment, seeking to reduce or

 terminate his child support obligation to Carolyn S. Elmore

 (mother) on the ground that the parties' two grown daughters

 were emancipated.      The mother counterclaimed, seeking to reduce

 or terminate her obligation to pay alimony and provide life

 insurance for the father.        Following a three-day trial in the

 Probate and Family Court, the judge issued a modification

 judgment in favor of the father, reducing his child support

 obligation and leaving the mother's alimony and life insurance

 obligations undisturbed.        The mother timely filed a motion for a

 new trial under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 59, which was denied, an

 order from which the mother also timely appealed.              On appeal the

 mother claims that the judge violated her procedural due process
rights by adhering to a previously-issued temporary order,

quashing her discovery requests, and denying her motion to

present expert testimony and related documents at trial.        We

affirm.

    Background.      The parties were involved in contentious

divorce proceedings, which resulted in the entry of a judgment

of divorce in 2015.    Shortly thereafter, the parties filed

complaints for contempt and modification, with numerous

associated motions, prompting the judge assigned to hear those

matters to enter a temporary order dated September 20, 2016,

requiring the parties to seek permission of the court before

filing additional pleadings or motions.     About one month later

the parties jointly moved to dismiss the pending claims.

Although the temporary order was addressed to the anticipated

trial on the matters then pending, neither party moved to vacate

it, and both parties continued to abide by its terms in

subsequent proceedings.

    Thus, when the father filed his current complaint for

modification, he also filed a motion for permission to file it,

which was granted.    The mother responded by filing an answer and

her counterclaim, without first seeking permission.     At the same

time, the mother served the father with twenty-six

interrogatories and sixty-one requests for production of

documents with respect to the years 2016 through 2021.     In

                                  2
addition, she served seven recordkeeper deposition notices (on

the husband's bank, employer, accountant, and mortgage lenders)

seeking documents for the same five-year period, and a notice of

deposition on the father's girlfriend.     The father asked the

court's permission to file a motion to dismiss the mother's

counterclaim and to file a motion to quash and for a protective

order.   The judge granted the father permission to file his

motions and scheduled them for hearing on the date of the

already-scheduled pretrial conference.1

     The father's motions were addressed at the pretrial

conference.   The father argued that his complaint for

modification was very simple, that the matters before the court

could be decided on the financial documents already available to

the mother, and that the mother's discovery requests were part

of a recurring pattern of over-litigating.    The mother argued

that the discovery was relevant to the father's request to

terminate his child support obligation -- which turned primarily

on whether the parties' younger daughter, who was twenty years

old, had the ability to work full-time.2    The judge allowed the

1 In response to the father's motion to quash, the mother filed a
motion for permission to file a dueling motion to compel. On
the same day that the judge scheduled the father's motions for
hearing, she denied the mother permission to file the motion to
compel. The mother did, however, file a comprehensive
opposition to the motion to quash.
2 The judge ultimately ruled that the daughter would be

considered emancipated on her twenty-first birthday, and that

                                 3
motion to quash, noting that the parties' financial statements

were "signed under pains and penalties of perjury" and that the

mother had more financial resources available than the father.

    As to the father's motion to dismiss the mother's

counterclaim, the father argued, among other things, that the

mother had failed to seek permission to file it.       The mother

argued that the temporary order requiring permission for filing

dissolved when the parties' 2016 complaints were dismissed.         The

judge disagreed, stating that such orders remain in effect once

they are issued, as the parties' subsequent conduct confirmed.

The judge nonetheless denied the father's motion to dismiss and

allowed the mother to proceed on her counterclaim.       Noting that

the father had estimated the trial would take thirty minutes,

the judge asked the mother's counsel how long she anticipated

the trial would last.     When mother's counsel answered "two

days," the judge responded, "No.       It's not going to take two

days to try this case."    The judge ordered the parties to return

at 3 P.M. for trial.

    The mother filed an emergency motion to continue the trial

(accompanied by a motion for permission to file the motion).

The judge denied the mother's motion, stating that "this seems

like a very simple complaint for modification and simple issues,

the father's child support obligation would be reduced to $74
per week until then.

                                   4
and for Court's efficiency and time I believe that all parties

are better served to have this trial today."    Before the second

day of trial, the mother sought permission to file an emergency

motion in limine to be permitted to call two expert witnesses, a

vocational expert and an accounting expert, to establish that

the father's income was higher than he represented in his

financial statement.    The judge denied the motion on the ground

that the presentation of previously-undisclosed expert testimony

would be prejudicial to the father and because the judge did not

believe the mother "need[ed] to over litigate this with

experts."   On the third day of trial the mother discussed

presenting a third expert to rebut the husband's testimony about

the state of the real estate market, and she filed an offer of

proof regarding the proposed testimony of all three experts.

She also sought to introduce documents concerning the value of

the properties that the father had sold as a real estate agent,

which the judge excluded, partly on hearsay grounds.

    Discussion.    1.   The temporary order.   The mother argues on

appeal that the judge erred by enforcing the temporary order

because it had expired by its own terms and, if it was still in

effect, the order deprived her of access to the courts.      Putting

aside the fact that the mother never moved to vacate the

temporary order, she has not shown prejudice, or any due process

violation, arising from the temporary order.    See Mass. R. Dom.

                                 5
Rel. P. 61 (identical to Mass. R. Civ. P. 61, 365 Mass. 829

[1974]).   In the only context in which the mother questioned the

order's continuing validity -- her opposition to the father's

motion to dismiss the counterclaim -- she prevailed.     Although

she was not permitted to file her motion to compel discovery,

she had a full and fair opportunity to oppose the father's

motion to quash, see note 1 supra, which raised identical

issues.    Similarly, although she was not given permission to

file her motion to present expert testimony, as discussed below,

the judge denied that motion on grounds unrelated to the

temporary order.   The existence of the temporary order did not

interfere with the mother's ability to litigate the father's

complaint or her counterclaim, or in any way deprive her of

meaningful access to the court.

    2.     Discovery.   As noted, the mother made sixty-one

requests for production of documents and propounded twenty-six

interrogatories on the father, sought to obtain records from

seven business entities, and also sought to depose the father's

girlfriend about details of the father's finances since the

entry of the divorce judgment.    These requests were made in the

context of divorce proceedings that had already been so

contentious that the parties were required to obtain leave of

the court before filing papers.

                                  6
    Under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 26 (c) (identical to Mass. R.

Civ. P. 26 [c], as amended, 474 Mass. 1401 [2016]), "Upon motion

by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and

for good cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which

justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including

. . . that the discovery not be had" or limiting the scope of

discovery.   Likewise, under Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 45 (b)

(identical to Mass. R. Civ. P 45 [b], as appearing in 470 Mass.

1402 [2015]), the court may, upon motion, quash or modify a

request for documents from a third party if the request is

"unreasonable and oppressive."    "Trial judges have broad

discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive

to the conduct of a fair and orderly trial" (quotation and

citation omitted).   Mattoon v. Pittsfield, 56 Mass. App. Ct.

124, 131 (2002).

    Faced with the mother's argument that the discovery she

requested was necessary to address the question of child

support, the judge reasonably concluded that the matter could be

decided based on the parties' financial statements.    As the

judge noted, the trial presented "simple issues," and she was

"not going to let this get out of hand and make it something

bigger than it actually is."     The mother did not respond by

proposing more reasonable, targeted, or limited discovery.       In

                                  7
these circumstances, in a case in which the mother undeniably

had more financial resources available than the father and was

using those resources in a manner that the judge found to be

unreasonable and oppressive, we discern no abuse of discretion

in the allowance of the father's motion to quash and for a

protective order.

    3.   Expert testimony.   The mother argues that the judge

abused her discretion by precluding the mother from calling

expert witnesses to testify at trial.   "The decision to exclude

expert testimony rests in the broad discretion of the judge and

will not be disturbed unless the exercise of that discretion

constitutes an abuse of discretion or other error of law."

Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 104 (2006).   In denying the

mother's requests, the judge explained that allowing the mother

to present expert testimony not previously provided to the

father and designated in her pretrial memorandum only as "expert

witnesses as needed" would be "highly prejudicial to him,

because he can't counter any experts, because he doesn't have

time."   See Elias v. Suran, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 7, 10 (1993) ("a

trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to permit

expert testimony when the proponent has not given proper notice

of the identity of the expert or the subject matter of the

expert's anticipated testimony").   We discern no abuse of

discretion.

                                8
    4.    Prejudice.   Even if we were to conclude that the judge

abused her discretion in quashing the mother's discovery

requests and excluding her proffered expert testimony, the

mother is unable to show that her inability to minutely

challenge the father's financial statement caused her prejudice.

See Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., 399 Mass. 790, 799 (1987) (in

reviewing discovery orders "we do not interfere with the judge's

exercise of discretion in the absence of a showing of

prejudicial error resulting from an abuse of discretion");

Fourth St. Pub, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 28 Mass.

App. Ct. 157, 163 (1989) ("The erroneous exclusion of expert

testimony does not warrant a new trial unless the substantial

rights of a party are adversely affected").

    "To be successful in an action to modify a judgment for

alimony . . . the petitioner must demonstrate a material change

of circumstances since the entry of the earlier judgment"

(citation omitted).    Vedensky v. Vedensky, 86 Mass. App. Ct.

768, 772 (2014).     "In determining whether a payor has met his or

her burden of demonstrating a material change in circumstances

warranting a downward modification of alimony, it is well

settled that a judge must consider the totality of the payor's

financial circumstances, including his or her income and

available assets."     Dolan v. Dolan, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 289

(2021).

                                  9
     Here, based on the financial statements, the judge found no

material change since the entry of the divorce judgment, in the

father's income or in the mother's ability to pay, that would

warrant a reduction of alimony.    The judge found the father's

income to be $22,054.24 annually, not including alimony, which

was less than the income of $27,000 imputed to him at the time

of the divorce judgment.   According to the mother's offer of

proof, her vocational expert would testify that the father's

earning capacity as a real estate agent was from $80,000 to

$87,000 annually, about $50,000 more than the father claimed he

earned.   Her proffered real estate agent testimony and proffered

documents concerning the properties the father sold as an agent

would presumably support her claim that the father's financial

statements understated his earnings.3

     The judge found the mother's income to be $935,054.12

annually, a sum far greater than the income of $350,000 used to

calculate her alimony obligation.4     The judge found that "there

3 The mother also proffered accounting expert testimony that,
based on the tax payments reported in the father's financial
statement, his gross earnings in 2020 were at least $175,000,
including alimony received. As the father received alimony
payments of $106,590.12 in 2020, this would result in earnings
of less than $70,000.
4 In a footnote, the mother argues that the judge's focus on the

mother's increased income was misplaced because the father had
been receiving equalizing payments based on the value of the
mother's law practice. We disagree. The equalizing payments
were based on the division of the parties' assets, not on the
mother's income from her law practice.

                                  10
was a disparity in the parties' income" at the time of the

divorce judgment, and that "there continues to be a disparity in

the parties' current income."   Even if we assume that the

father's income had increased to as much as $87,000, the gross

disparity in the parties' relative resources remained.    We are

confident that even if the mother had been permitted to present

expert testimony and evidence concerning the father's earnings,

it would not have made a material difference in the outcome of

the trial.

    Conclusion.   We recognize that the trial judge placed

rather extreme limits on the mother's ability to conduct

discovery and present evidence at the trial.    However, the judge

acted in the context of a protracted divorce contest that had,

over the course of many years, burdened the Probate and Family

Court and several of its judges.     In such circumstances, we

accord substantial deference to the trial judge's decisions

concerning how to manage the docket and control the proceedings,

and based on the record as a whole, the judge's restrictions

appear commensurate with the nature and complexity of the issues

before her.   Moreover, even as restricted, the modification

trial carried over three days, and the mother had ample

opportunity to cross-examine the father and present her own

                                11
testimony.    We discern no abuse of discretion affecting the

mother's substantial rights or requiring a new trial.

                                      Modification judgment
                                        affirmed.

                                      Order denying motion for new
                                        trial affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Massing,
                                        Sacks & Walsh, JJ.5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    March 24, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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