Court Opinion

ID: 2964397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:04.642089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:55.316820
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________
          No. 96-1002

                              WILLIAM L. TAYLOR, ET AL.,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                            STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                            and Cummings,* Circuit Judge.
                                           _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

               Thomas  A. Palombo, Special Assistant Attorney General, with
               __________________
          whom  Jeffrey  B.   Pine,  Attorney   General,  Rebecca   Tedford
                __________________                        _________________
          Partington, Special Assistant Attorney  General, and Ellen  Evans
          __________                                           ____________
          Alexander,  Deputy Chief Legal Counsel, were on brief for appell-
          _________
          ants.
               Richard A. Sinapi, with whom Sinapi Law Associates, Ltd. and
               _________________            ___________________________
          American Civil Liberties Union, were on brief for appellees.
          ______________________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   December 4, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

               *Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   The  Rhode Island  Department of
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          Corrections ("Department") appeals from a district court judgment

          declaring  ultra  vires  and  unconstitutional  the  Department's
                     _____  _____

          application of  a  Rhode  Island statute  which  would  impose  a

          monthly  offender fee upon the  appellees, all of  whom were sen-

          tenced to  probationary terms  under  Department supervision  for

          criminal offenses committed  prior to the  effective date of  the

          statute as implemented by  regulations promulgated by the Depart-

          ment.  The district court  held that the Department's interpreta-

          tion  of the  statute exceeded its  authority under  the enabling

          statute and that  the statute, as applied  to appellees, violated

          the ex post  facto clauses in the United  States and Rhode Island
              __ ____  _____

          Constitutions.  We  vacate the district court judgment and remand

          for the entry  of summary  judgment for appellants  on the  ultra
                                                                      _____

          vires  and ex post facto  claims, and for  further proceedings on
          _____      __ ____ _____

          appellees' procedural due process claims. 

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Rhode Island  General Laws    42-56-38, P.L.  1992, ch.

          133,  art.  97,    2,  directs  that "[e]ach  sentenced  offender

          committed to  the care, custody,  or control of  the [Department]

          shall  reimburse the state for the cost or the reasonable portion
                 _________

          thereof  incurred  by the  state  relating  to such  commitment."

          (Emphasis  added.)   The  offender fee  statute itself  expressly
                                                                  _________

          delegates to the Department the power  to determine its effective
          _________

          date by  declaring that  its provisions "shall  not be  effective

                                          2

          until the date rules  and regulations implementing its provisions

          are filed with the office of the Secretary of State."  Id.
                                                                 ___

                    The Department  responded by promulgating,  inter alia,
                                                                _____ ____

          Regulation 10.07.03,  designating July  1, 1994 as  the effective
                                            _____________

          date of the "offender  fee" program, following its filing  of the

          implementing regulations  with the Secretary of State on June 17,

          1994.   See  also R.I.  Gen. Laws     42-56-10(v) (Powers  of the
                  ___  ____

          director);  R.I. Gen. Laws   42-56-38 (Assessment of costs).  The

          Regulation  further provides for  "offender fee" waivers based on

          inability to pay, see Regulation   10.07.03(II)(E), and, in cases
                            ___

          of nonpayment, authorizes notification of the  appropriate crimi-

          nal  court at any parole  or probation revocation  hearing, id.  
                                                                      __

          10.07.03(II)(D),  as  well as  civil  actions  to collect  unpaid

          offender  fees, id.  Mere nonpayment does not constitute a parole
                          __

          or probation  violation, however.  Id.   10.07.03(II)(D)(3).  Nor
                                             __

          are offenders  in "banked" status (i.e.,  either residing outside

          Rhode Island or not on supervised status) liable for the fee, id.
                                                                        __

            10.07.03(II)(C)(3).  

                    Appellees,  all convicted offenders sentenced to proba-
                                                        _________ __ ______

          tion  prior to July 1, 1994, each received advance written notice
          ____  _____ __ ____ _  ____

          that the $15.00 offender fee would become effective July 1, 1994,

          and subsequently  received monthly  bills.   Appellees thereafter

          commenced  suit  in  federal  district court  claiming  that  the

          offender  fee statute, as applied, violates the Ex Post Facto and

          Due Process clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Consti-

          tutions.   In due course, the parties submitted cross-motions for

                                          3

          summary judgment on  a stipulated record  and the district  court

          ruled that  (i) the Department  had exceeded its  authority under

          the  enabling statute by interpreting the statute so as to render

          the offender fee retroactive as to appellees and (ii) the statute

          violated the  Ex  Post Facto  Clause since  it retroactively  in-

          creased  the "punishment"  for  their preenactment  crimes.   See
                                                                        ___

          Taylor  v. State  of Rhode  Island Dept.  of Corrections,  908 F.
          ______     _____________________________________________

          Supp. 92 (D.R.I. 1995). 

                                          II
                                          II

                                     DISCUSSION1
                                     DISCUSSION1
                                     __________

          A.   The Ultra Vires Claim
          A.   The Ultra Vires Claim
               _____________________

                    The district court concluded that the statutory  inter-

          pretation adopted  by the  Department exceeded  the scope of  its

          delegated  authority because  it (i)  results in  an unauthorized

          "retroactive" application  and (ii) would not  be accorded defer-

          ence by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.  As the plain language of

          the statute demonstrates  that the Department did not  exceed its

          mandate, we demur. 

                    Under Rhode Island law,  it "is well established .  . .

          that statutes and their amendments are presumed to apply prospec-

          tively."   Hydro-Manufacturing v. Kayser-Roth, 640  A.2d 950, 954
                     ___________________    ___________

          (R.I. 1994).   See also VanMarter v.  Royal Indem. Co., 556  A.2d
                         ___ ____ _________     ________________

                              
          ____________________

               1We review summary judgment rulings de novo, and must uphold
                                                   __ ____
          them if  the record, "viewed in  the light most favorable  to the
          nonmoving party,  reveals no  trialworthy issue of  material fact
          and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
          Velez-Gomez  v. SMA Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874-75 (1st Cir.
          ___________     ___________________
          1993).

                                          4

          41, 44 (R.I.  1989); Lawrence v.  Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523  A.2d
                               ________     ____________________

          864, 869 (R.I. 1987).   It  is only in the event that "it appears

          by  strong,  clear language  or  necessary  implication that  the

          Legislature intended the  statute or amendment to have a retroac-

          tive effect," id.; see also Pion  v. Bess Eaton Donuts Flour Co.,
                        ___  ___ ____ ____     ____________________________

          Inc., 637 A.2d 367, 371 (R.I. 1994), that the new enactment "will
          ____

          be interpreted to  operate retrospectively."     Avanzo v.  Rhode
                                                           ______     _____

          Island Dept. of Human Servs., 625 A.2d 208, 211 (R.I. 1993). 
          ____________________________

                    The statute itself explicitly  states that the offender

          fee "shall not  be effective until the date the rules and regula-

          tions are  filed."  R.I. Gen.  Laws   42-56-38.   Thus, its plain

          language requires  no interpretation, see  Whitehouse v.  Rumford
                                                ___  __________     _______

          Liability  &  Ins. Co.,  658 A.2d  506,  508 (R.I.  1995),  as it
          ______________________

          mandates  prospective application.   See, e.g., Hydro-Manufactur-
                                               ___  ____  _________________

          ing,  640 A.2d at 955  (statute which states  that it "shall take
          ___

          effect upon passage" evinces plain legislative  intent that it be

          given  only prospective  application);  Avanzo, 625  A.2d at  211
                                                  ______

          (holding  that phrase "shall  take effect"  indicates legislative

          intent that statute be  given prospective effect).  As  the Rhode

          Island Legislature  explicitly delegated  to  the Department  the

          responsibility for  promulgating and  filing the required  imple-

          menting rules and  regulations with the Secretary of State before

          the offender fee program could take effect, R.I. Gen. Laws    42-

          56-38, and there is no claim that the Department failed to comply

          with the legislative mandate, its designation of a later (July 1,

          1994) effective  date could not render  its interpretation either

                                          5

          ultra vires or retroactive.2
          _____ _____

          B.   The Ex Post Facto Claim
          B.   The Ex Post Facto Claim
               _______________________

                    The district  court awarded appellees  summary judgment

          on their claims  that the  offender fee statute  violates the  Ex

          Post Facto Clause under both  the United States Constitution  and

          the Rhode  Island Constitution.3   As  the  Rhode Island  Supreme

          Court has held  that Federal Ex  Post Facto Clause  jurisprudence

          likewise  guides the  required  analysis under  the Rhode  Island

          Constitution, Lerner  v. Gill, 463  A.2d 1352, 1356  (R.I. 1983),
                        ______     ____

          cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1010 (1985), these claims merge. 
          _____ ______

                    The Ex  Post  Facto Clause  effectively prohibits  laws

                              
          ____________________

               2It  appears that the district court may have been misled by
          an ambiguity  in the  statutory language,  which states  that the
          offender fee shall apply to "each sentenced offender committed to
                                                               _________
          the care, custody  or control  of the [Department]."   R.I.  Gen.
          Laws   42-56-38 (emphasis added).  The court correctly noted that
          "[t]he word 'committed'  could mean either 'who  has been commit-
          ted,'  which  would include  existing  probationers,  or 'who  is
          committed,'  which   would  implicate  only   new  probationers."
          Taylor, 908  F. Supp. at 104.   However that may  be, we suggest,
          ______
          the Department's interpretation cannot be considered ultra vires.
                                                               _____ _____
          As  the agency  responsible  for implementing  and enforcing  the
          statute,  it   was  entirely  appropriate  that   the  Department
          disambiguate  the statutory  language.   See Gallison  v. Bristol
                                                   ___ ________     _______
          Sch. Comm., 493 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 1985).  
          __________
               We  need  not decide  at  this  time, however,  whether  the
          Department's  interpretation  of the  term  "committed"  would be
          material under a due process analysis.   See Avanzo, 625 A.2d  at
                                                   ___ ______
          208 (retroactive application violates due process); Lawrence, 523
                                                              ________
          A.2d  at 864  (due  process  challenge to  explicitly-retroactive
          legislation); but see Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection
                        ___ ___ ___________________________________________
          Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 103 (R.I.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
          _____    _____                           _____ ______
          476 (1995) (retrospectivity alone  does not render statute viola-
          tive of due process).  

               3Article 1,    10, of  the United  States Constitution  pro-
          vides:  "No State shall . . .  pass any . . . ex post facto Law."
          Article 1,   12, of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island
          reads:  "No ex post facto law . . . shall be passed."

                                          6

          "'retroactively   alter[ing]  the   definition   of   crimes   or

          increas[ing]  the punishment  for  criminal  acts.'"   California
                                                                 __________

          Dept. of Corrections  v. Morales,  115 S. Ct.  1597, 1601  (1995)
          ____________________     _______

          (quoting Collins v.  Youngblood, 497  U.S. 37, 43  (1990)).   See
                   _______     __________                               ___

          also Hamm  v. Latessa, 72 F.  3d 947, 956 (1st  Cir. 1995), cert.
          ____ ____     _______                                       _____

          denied, 117 S. Ct. 154 (1996).   Thus, ex post facto laws operate
          ______                                 __ ____ _____

          retroactively either to redefine a crime or increase its "punish-

          ment."  Morales, 115 S. Ct.  at 1602 n.3.  See also  Dominique v.
                  _______                            ___ ____  _________

          Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1162 (1st Cir. 1996).
          ____

                  It  would  appear that  the  parties failed  to  call the

          district  court's attention  to significant  precedents governing

          the pivotal determination whether civil fees constitute  "punish-

          ment."  See Taylor,  908 F. Supp. at 98.   Although it involved a
                  ___ ______

          "double  jeopardy" claim, United  States v. Halper,  490 U.S. 435
                                    ______________    ______

          (1989), applies as well in the ex post facto context.  See Martel
                                         __ ____ _____           ___ ______

          v. Fridovich, 14 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Halper for the
             _________                                       ______

          view  that a civil sanction  is "punishment" only  when it serves

          the aims of retribution or deterrence).4  As we explained recent-

          ly, the Halper "punishment"  test applies to "fines, forfeitures,
                  ______

          and other monetary penalties designed to make the sovereign whole

          for harm or loss that is quantifiable in monetary terms."  United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 717 (1st Cir.) , cert. dismissed,
          ______    _______                                _____ _________

             S. Ct.       (1996).   Since it  is clear that  the challenged
          __         ____
                              
          ____________________

               4Subsequent to the district court decision in this case, the
          Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the  Halper test for determin-
                                                  ______
          ing whether a civil fee constitutes "punishment" under the Double
          Jeopardy Clause.   See State v.  One Lot of $8,560,  670 A.2d 772
                             ___ _____     _________________
          (R.I. 1996).  

                                          7

          offender fee fits the Stoller mold, the Halper "punishment"  test
                                _______           ______

          applies.  See  also Artway  v. Attorney General  of State of  New
                    ___  ____ ______     __________________________________

          Jersey, 81  F.3d 1235,  1256 n. 18  (3d Cir. 1996)  (noting that
          ______

          Halper  test applies  because Ex  Post Facto  Clause  serves aims
          ______

          similar to Double Jeopardy Clause); DiCola v. Food & Drug Admin.,
                                              ______    __________________

          77 F.3d 504,  506-07 (D.C.  Cir. 1996) (applying  Halper test  to
                                                            ______

          both ex post facto  and double jeopardy claims); Bae  v. Shalala,
               __ ____ _____                               ___     _______

          44 F.3d 489, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1995) (employing Halper standard to
                                                         ______

          determine whether  civil sanction  implicates ex post  facto con-
                                                        __ ____  _____

          cerns).

                    Halper adapted the Supreme Court's longstanding subjec-
                    ______

          tive test for defining "punishment," see DeVeau v.  Braisted, 363
                                               ___ ______     ________

          U.S. 144, 160 (1960) ("The question is . . . whether the legisla-

          tive aim was to  punish that individual for past  activity."), by

          coupling it with an  objective standard.  Accordingly, under  the

          current regime  governing civil  provisions, we inquire  not only

          whether  the  legislative  intent  was punitive  in  nature,  but
                                     ______

          whether the challenged civil provision is "so extreme . . . as to

          constitute punishment."  Halper, 490 U.S. at 442.  
                                   ______

                    For purposes of  determining whether a law  is penal in

          nature,  "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil'  are not of paramount

          importance."  Id. at 447.  Rather, the court must  "assess[]. . .
                        ___

          the [sanction] imposed and  the purposes [it] may fairly  be said

          to serve.  Simply put, a civil . . . sanction constitutes punish-

          ment when the sanction  as applied in the individual  case serves

          the goals of punishment[,]" id. at 448; see Martel, 14 F.3d at 3;
                                      ___         ___ ______

                                          8

          that is to say, retribution and deterrence.  Halper, 490 U.S.  at
                                                       ______

          448.

                    On its face, the offender fee statute, suitably located

          among other Rhode Island civil statutes, imposes a civil charge.5

          The modest fee authorized by the statute comprises no part of any

          sentence imposed  for the crimes committed by offenders.  Rather,

          it is expressly designed to "reimburse"  the Department for costs

          directly associated with providing goods and services required to

          supervise  probationers and  parolees  living  in the  community.

          R.I. Gen. Laws    42-56-38.  Moreover, all offender  fee revenues

          are dedicated to such use, Regulation 1.12.01(IV)(K), and waivers

          are   available   to   offenders   unable   to   pay,  Regulation

          10.07.03(II)(E).    Finally, the  same  monthly  fee is  assessed

          against  all offenders released  into the community  who are cur-

          rently under Department supervision, without regard to the nature

          or severity of their  respective offenses.6  In our  judgment, so
                              
          ____________________

               5Our research discloses no relevant legislative history. 

               6In determining  that the offender fee  constituted "punish-
          ment," the  district court  ruled that  it was  part of  "the law
          annexed  to the crime,"  Calder v. Bull, 3  U.S. 386, 390 (1798),
                                   ______    ____
          since probation is punishment  and the offender fee is  linked to
          appellees' probationary  sentences.   In our view,  this analysis
          overlooks several determinative distinctions.  
               First,  though a probationary  sentence is "punishment," the
          supervisory services for probationers released into the community
          are largely rehabilitative, both in nature and purpose.  See R.I.
                                                                   ___
          Gen. Laws   42-56-4(c) (Organization of department) ("Rehabilita-
          tive services shall include . . . intermediary sanctions (includ-
          ing but not limited  to . . . probation, parole, restitution, and
          community service) . . . .").  See also United States v. Cardona,
                                         ___ ____ _____________    _______
          903 F.2d 60,  62 (1st  Cir. 1990) (noting  that probation  serves
          goals  of rehabilitation  and public  safety), cert.  denied, 498
                                                         _____  ______
          U.S.  1049 (1991); Tillinghast v. Howard, 287 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I.
                             ___________    ______
          1972) ("[I]t is for the purpose of giving a convicted accused the

                                          9

          modest a  cost-based supervisory fee reasonably  cannot be deemed

          punitive in purpose, especially since any conceivable retributive
                      _______

          or  deterrent effect could only be  inconsequential.  See Martel,
                                                                ___ ______

          14 F.3d at 3. 

                    Finally, we  inquire whether the  fee nonetheless  runs

          afoul  of the  objective test  announced in  Halper:   a monetary
                                                       ______

          assessment  "that  cannot  be said  solely  to  serve a  remedial

          purpose,  but rather can only be explained as also serving either

          retributive or deterrent purposes, is  punishment as we have come

          to understand  the term."  Halper,  490 U.S. at 448.   Under this
                                     ______

          standard, the offender fee must be deemed "punitive" if it "bears

          no  rational relation to the goal of compensating the [State] for

          its  loss."  Id. at 449.7  To  state the question in this case is
                       ___

          to answer it.

                              
          ____________________

          opportunity for rehabilitation that he retains his liberty and is
          placed on probation.").   Second, the monthly fee is  not imposed
          on  all offenders sentenced to probation, but only those actually
          receiving the  supervisory services  whose costs are  defrayed by
          the fee.  Regulation 10.07.03(II)(C)(3).  
               Thus, the offender fee differs  materially from the fees  at
          issue in  a case relied upon  by appellees and cited  by the dis-
          trict court, see In re Petition  of Delaware for a Writ of Manda-
                       ___ ________________________________________________
          mus, 603 A.2d 814  (Del. 1992), in which monetary  sanctions were
          ___
          imposed on the  offenders at  sentencing.  The  fees involved  in
                                    __  __________
          that case  were blanket surcharges, calculated  as percentages of
          the criminal penalty, fine,  or forfeiture imposed at sentencing,
          rather than reimbursements for the costs of providing services to
          the offenders.  As the Halper Court explained, "it is the purpos-
                                 ______
          es  actually served by the sanction in question, not the underly-
          ing  nature of the proceeding  giving rise to  the sanction, that
          must be evaluated."  Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7.  
                               ______

               7We note no  contention, and  no evidence,  that the  $15.00
          monthly fee  exceeds the costs associated  with providing Depart-
          ment supervision of  offenders released into the community.   See
                                                                        ___
          Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.  
          ______

                                          10

                    The   offender  fee  statute  mandates  that  "[m]onies

          received under this  section will accrue first  to the department

          of  corrections for use  to offset costs of  the specific care or

          service."  R.I. Gen.  Laws   42-56-38.  The  implementing regula-

          tions in turn  make clear  that the offender  fee was  rationally

          designed to promote  its legislative objective;  viz., reimburse-
                                                           ___

          ment  of the Department for  its costs in  providing the required

          supervisory services  to its probationers and  parolees.  Regula-

          tion 1.12.01(IV)(K).   Furthermore, the  implementing regulations

          explicitly state that the offender fees collected from probation-

          ers  and parolees  must  be deposited  in  a restricted  account,

          exclusively available for defraying Department costs in affording

          offenders the required community  supervision.8  Thus, the legis-

          lative  intent actuating  the  offender fee  program is  entirely

          remedial  and its  practical  effect is  neither retributive  nor

          deterrent  in  nature.   Under  the Halper  test,  therefore, the
                                              ______

          offender fee is not punitive.9   
                              
          ____________________

               8Moreover,  as already noted,  see supra p.  3, the offender
                                              ___ _____
          fee is imposed only on probationers and parolees currently  under
          Department supervision in the community, not upon probationers in
          "banked"  status.   Regulation 10.07.03(II)(C)(3).   Thus, rather
          than a blanket fee  assessed at sentencing without regard  to the
          commencement or  duration of  any term of  community supervision,
          the  Rhode Island offender fee is directly and rationally related
          to recouping the  State's costs in  providing supervision to  the
          individual offenders for whose benefit the services are rendered.
          Cf. In re Petition of  Delaware for a Writ of Mandamus,  603 A.2d
          __  __________________________________________________
          814 (Del. 1992); note 4 supra.
                                  _____

               9The fact that  nonpayment of the fee can be  brought to the
          attention of the court  at a parole/probation revocation hearing,
          see supra p.3, does not transform the fee into punishment.  While
          ___ _____
          revocation  of parole/probation might  constitute punishment, the
          Supreme  Court explained  in Morales  that courts  must determine
                                       _______

                                          11

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    For the foregoing reasons, the  district court judgment

          is reversed and the  case is remanded for further  proceedings on

          appellees' procedural due process  claims under state and federal

          law.  The parties shall bear their own costs. 

                    SO ORDERED.
                    SO ORDERED
                    __ _______

                              
          ____________________

          whether  a  legislative change  "produces  a  sufficient risk  of
          increasing  the measure of punishment."   Morales, 115  S. Ct. at
                                                    _______
          1603.  A legislative change which creates only a "speculative and
          attenuated  possibility of  producing  the  prohibited effect  of
          increasing the  measure of  punishment" is insufficient  to raise
          the ex  post facto specter.   Id.   As the district  court recog-
              __  ____ _____            ___
          nized, any possible  link between nonpayment of  the offender fee
          and  the  revocation of  parole/probation  is  too attenuated  to
          render  the offender fee violative  of the Ex  Post Facto Clause,
          Taylor,  908 F. Supp. at  101, especially since  inability to pay
          ______                                           _________ __ ___
          constitutes grounds for waiver. 

                                          12