Court Opinion

ID: 9885583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:07:51.397201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.178615
License: Public Domain

Judge CONNELLY
dissenting.
The undisputed facts-defendant's truck hurdled a median onto the wrong side of the road and crashed into plaintiffs lawfully stopped car-rendered defendant presumptively negligent. Under Colorado's unusually robust version of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself"), defendant should have shouldered the burden of persuading the jury that she was not negligent. Because the trial court denied plaintiff a res ipsa instruction, we should order a new trial.
*390The elements of res ipsa are: "(1) the event is the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) other responsible causes, including the conduct of plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (8) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff." Stone's Farm Supply, Inc. v. Deacon, 805 P.2d 1109, 1114 n. 10 (Colo.1991) (Deacon). Colorado law is "clear that when a plaintiff introduces sufficient evidence to establish the presumption of negligence embodied in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the trial court must instruct the jury as to the nature and effect of that doctrine." Ravin v. Gambrel, 788 P.2d 817, 822 (Colo.1990).
Colorado applies this res ipsa presumption to "require[] the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [she was not negligent." Deacon, 805 P.2d at 1114 n. 10; but ef CRE 301 (presumptions generally shift only the burden of production); see Ochoa v. Vered, 212 P.3d 963, 970 (Colo.App. 2009) (despite "tension between Deacon and Rule 301," Deacon is controlling). Colorado is one of only a few states to "treat res ipsa loquitur as imposing the burden of proof upon the defendant." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 828D, emt. m (1965); see Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 40, at 258-59 (5th ed.1984) (listing Colorado as one of only three states that "have gone further" than others by shifting burden of proof).
The doctrine specifically has been applied to certain types of automobile accidents. For example, the law generally presumes negligence of defendants driving on the wrong side of the road. Trione v. Mike Wallen Standard, Inc., 902 P.2d 454, 459-60 (Colo.App.1995); CJI-Civ. 4th 11:10 (2008). The same presumption may arise when a driver's vehicle following another in close proximity hits the other vehicle in the rear. Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 454, 217 P.2d 266, 268 (1950); CJI-Civ. 4th 11:12 (2008).
The res ipsa doctrine is neither limited to nor automatic in rear-end and wrong-way collisions. That the doctrine is not limited to those types of cases is shown by Eddy v. McAninch, 141 Colo. 223, 230, 347 P.2d 499, 508-04 (1959) (holding a presumption of negligence arose where the defendant's brakes failed, causing him to run a red light and hit a car making a lawful turn). That the doe-trine is not automatic in those types of cases is shown by Bettner v. Boring, 764 P.2d 829, 882-35 (Colo.1988) (holding the appropriate ness of a rear-end collision instruction "can be determined satisfactorily only on a case by case basis" and instruction was not warranted "on the particular facts" of the case).
The right to an instruction thus turns not on shoehorning the case into a recurring fact pattern but rather on whether particular facts give rise to a res ipsa presumption. There must be "evidence 'which, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, establishes that the existence of each element of that doctrine is more probable than not' to establish a prima facie case of res ipsa loquitur." Ravin 788 P.2d at 822 (quoting Holmes v. Gamble, 655 P.2d 405, 409 (Colo.1982)). I would conclude plaintiff produced ample evidence on all three res ipsa elements.
The first res ipsa element-that the accident be one that does not "ordinarily" occur without negligence, Deacon, 805 P.2d at 1114 n. 10; Ravin, 788 P.2d at 822-is easily satisfied here. Ordinarily, cars do not hurdle medians onto the wrong side of the road and crash into lawfully stopped vehicles without driver fault. And there is no dispute as to the third element: defendant owed a duty of care to plaintiff and other drivers on the road that morning.
The only real dispute involves the second element of whether "other responsible causes, including the conduct of plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence." Deacon, 805 P.2d at 1114 n. 10. To satisfy this second element, a "plaintiff need not eliminate every possible cause other than the defendant's negligence." Ravin, 788 P.2d at 822. Res ipsa in this context is, after all, a burden-shifting presumption and not a directed verdict. The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence viewed most favorably to plaintiff supports a "prima facie" conclusion, id., that "defendant's negligence was the more probable explanation" for the accident. Minto v. Sprague, 124 P.3d 881, *391886 (Colo.App.2005) (citing Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66 (Colo.1980)).
The prima facie evidence viewed most favorably to plaintiff sufficiently eliminated causes other than defendant's negligence. Indeed, the only contrary evidence was defendant's own testimony that she encountered unexpectedly iey conditions on a snowy winter morning. Defendant was entitled to present this theory to the jury-and perhaps even entitled to the "sudden emergency" instruction-but her uncorroborated testimony did not defeat plaintiff's prima facie entitlement to a res ipsa instruction.
In my view, the majority applies the see-ond element too strictly. While the evidence must "sufficiently eliminate" other possible causes, the case law makes clear the emphasis is on the adverb rather than verb: to be "sufficient," a plaintiff's prima facie proof "need not eliminate every possible cause other than the defendant's negligence." Ravin, 788 P.2d at 822.
I view the undisputed facts of the present case as analogous to the cases, distinguished by the majority, requiring a res ipsa instruction. Among those cases is Eddy v. MeAn-inch, where the supreme court held that "a presumption arises that the failure of the brakes to operate resulted from a want of due care on the part of the defendant," but that the defendant's evidence, "if believed by the jury, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence." 141 Colo. at 230-81, 347 P.2d at 508-04; see also Trione, 902 P.2d at 459-60 (trial court erred in not giving tendered presumption instruction where towed vehicle swerved into oncoming traffic).
Conversely, I view the cases relied on by the majority as distinguishable. In Beftrer v. Boring, the presumption was not warrant, ed where the defendant's car veered off a highway, slid into a field, and hit the plaintiff's car that itself had slid off the highway into the field. 764 P.2d at 882-85. Also, a "semitractor-trailer had turned over and was blocking part of the highway." Id. at 880-31. There was, in short, unrebutted evidence (including the plaintiff's own experience sliding off the same road) providing a non-negligent explanation for the accident. Nor am I persuaded by the majority's reliance on Deven-yns v. Hartig, 983 P.2d 63 (Colo.App.1998). The division there did question whether a former version of the wrong-side of the road instruction applied where ice caused a defendant's car to spin out of control. Id. at 70. The division ultimately held, however, that the plaintiff's tendered instruction was legally incorrect because it was not limited to a presumption but would have required the jury to find negligence. Id.
Colorado's res ipsa presumption thus should apply here. I recognize that we lawyers and judges sometimes make things too complex by using Latin phrases and rebutta-ble presumptions that ultimately involve nothing more than common sense inferences from the facts. The issue in this case was a simple one that jurors were capable of answering without much judicial guidance: did defendant's actions in driving her truck into plaintiff's car fall below a standard of reasonable care? But the res ipsa doctrine has been applied for many years and with particular vigor in Colorado. And the prejudice from lack of a res ipsa instruction was exacerbated by the sudden emergency instruction favorable to defendant. That tenuously-supported instruction heightened the need for a countervailing instruction that defendant had the burden of proving she was not negligent in encountering and responding to the alleged sudden emergency of hitting ice on a snowy road.