Court Opinion

ID: 9683665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:34:50.742286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.479752
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
The writer respectfully submits the following views and reasons for dissenting from the majority opinion:
*7281. The trial court by its action in sustaining appellee’s motion for summary judgment found as a matter of law that appellant failed to establish a fact issue.
2. There is no question but that appellant established a fact issue as to whether he had a meritorious defense to the original suit.
3. One of the few grounds for setting a final judgment aside is that the movant must prove he was prevented from making a valid defense to the original cause of action by extrinsic fraud, accident or wrongful act of the opposite party, unmixed with any fault or negligence on his part. Garcia v. Ramos, Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W.2d 111, writ refused.
The writer believes the following taken from appellant’s verified pleading, brought forward in his fourth point, raises, in his mind, an ’issue of fact under the law as to whether appellant was unlawfully misled by the opposing party: “Plaintiff would further show unto the court that as a defendant in Cause No. 23251-FA he was led to believe and understand that it would not be necessary for him to attend court after his deposition was taken; that on or about the 29th day of April, 1949, when the plaintiff’s deposition was taken in said cause as alleged hereinabove, the attorney for defendant J. Leslie Smith stated that this deposition of plaintiff would be sufficient for the trial and that plaintiff did not need to be at court; that plaintiff, knowing that he had fully paid the commission that he had promised to Gragg and having just shown the check by which that payment was made to the attorney for defendant Smith, reasonably and without any negligence on his part interpreted the statement by said attorney to mean that plaintiff would not have to further defend the suit when it was called for a jury trial at some future date, and that the defendant Smith would only prosecute said suit against defendant Gragg who admits the indebtedness to Smith.”
In the writer’s opinion, appellant should have the questions presented to a trier of the facts, first, as to whether or .not he had a meritorious defense to the original law suit; and, second, taking all facts under consideration, as to whether the above sworn statement to the effect that appel-lee’s attorney told him his deposition would be sufficient for the trial and he need not appear in court was of such a nature as to prevent him or a prudent person of ordinary care from appearing in court and defending the law suit.
The writer recognizes the rigid rule of law imposed upon a party undertaking to set aside a final judgment, but when a fact issue is raised, even though apparently-mixed with contradictory remarks, sworn to while advancing other defenses, same-should be submitted to the trier of facts as readily as is done in all other civil cases.
4.It is undisputed that neither appellant nor anyone representing him was notified of the setting for February 13 when judgment was rendered. The writer is unable to find in the record where the case was set for February 13, 1950. The majority opinion does reveal “Indeed, so far as the record shows, the appellant Richards had no actual notice of the setting on February 13th. It is reasonable to presume, however, that having placed his reliance in his co-defendant Gragg and not having appeared in person or by his attorney on the pretrial setting in December, 1949, he would not have responded to any notice of a subsequent hearing.” The writer further disagrees with the presumption indulged in the last quoted sentence of the majority opinion. A portion of appellant’s affidavit pertaining thereto is at follows: “Plaintiff would show unto the court that he had no notice, knowledge, or information of any kind whatsoever that Cause No. 23251-FA was to be called for trial on February 13, 1950; that if plaintiff had received any notice, or had in any way gained knowledge that this case was coming for trial on that day or any other day that he would have personally attended court and retained attorneys so that he could have presented evidence to the jury to sustain favorable findings on the defenses alleged in the foregoing paragraph; * *
Appellee’s reason for not informing appellant of the setting is taken from his *729affidavit, as follows: “Smith says that after the firm of Eades & Eades withdrew from said Cause 23251-F, Mr. Lee Smith, an attorney at the Dallas bar, Telephoned the attorneys for Smith with reference to said Cause and told said attorneys that ■Gragg was attempting to raise the money to pay Smith the commission which was claimed by Smith in said cause. Thereafter said attorney informed the attorneys for Smith that Gragg had been unable to raise the money and that he did not oppose the taking of judgment in the case. .Smith’s attorneys reasonably believed that ■said attorney was acting on behalf of both Gragg and Richards and that, therefore, there existed no need or reason for Smith’s .iattorneys to notify Richards or Gragg personally that said cause mould be tried ■or that judgment mould be taken. Furthermore, the allegations in Richards’ amended ■petition show as a matter of law that 'Richards made his co-defendant Gragg his agent for the employment of attorneys •■and he is, therefore, bound by the actions -of Gragg in employing Mr. Lee Smith, if Gragg did so employ him, to represent -.the defendants in said cause.”
Be that as it may, the record is silent •■as to the case having been set for trial according to law. See Rules 245 and 247, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court’s judgment in the original suit recites that appellant’s attorneys had ■withdrawn from the case by its permission. This was sufficient to place the court on ¡notice that appellant had no attorney of •.record. Said judgment also recites that the defendants were notified of the setting for February 13, when judgment was •entered. While in most instances the ■courts will not go behind such recitations in a judgment, yet since the record in this ■case is undisputed by appellee that neither appellant nor anyone representing him was .given actual notice, the writer feels that the recitation in the judgment is based •upon some statement made to it by defendants’ attorney, as is set out in his "brief, to the effect that since appellant was notified of the pre-trial, he therefore should have known of the setting. There -is nothing in the record to indicate that even the pre-trial was actually had on the date set out in the letter to appellant by his former attorneys. There .is certainly nothing in the record to indicate at that time, if the pre-trial was had, that the setting was made on that day for February 13, 1950. Said judgment does not state that the case had been previously set for said date.
It is the writer’s thought that since the record does not reveal the case was set and tried in the regular order and since there was no previous setting of the case and no notice given appellant or anyone purporting to represent him of such setting, the trial 'court abused its discretion in not setting aside and cancelling its judgment of February 13, 1950. See Cotten v. Stanford, Tex.Civ.App., 169 S.W.2d 489. The least that can be said is that the motion for summary judgment should have been overruled and the case submitted to a trier of the facts according to the rules announced in the Garcia case, supra, and in Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996.
5. A jury fee in this case had been paid by plaintiff and appellant, having filed his answer, had the right to assume that the case'would be tried before a jury; he had no opportunity to avail himself of Rule 220, T.R.C.P., since he was not notified of the setting.
6. A photostatic copy of appellant’s check to J. F. Gragg in the sum of $1325, which he paid Gragg as commissions for selling his house, is shown on page 26 of the transcript.
7. It is undisputed also that appellant had on file an answer setting up, among other defenses, the provisions of Article 6573a Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., which defense, if presented against appellee’s cause of action, would be fatal to same and therefore the only way appellee could recover judgment against appellant was by the method used, to-wit, a snap judgment. Appellee admits that he had no written contract with appellant to recover commissions for the sale of real estate, but he undertakes to collect the -same by the indirect method indicated even though he is prohibited from a recovery directly. *730There was a written contract between appellant and Gragg but same was unenforceable under the ruling in the case of Buratti & Montandon v. Tennant, 147 Tex. 536, 218 S.W.2d 842, 9 A.L.R.2d 742, because it did not provide for a stipulated amount to be paid for commissions; therefore, even if appellee’s contentions are correct, he still could not collect through an oral assignment from Gragg.
8. Appellee submits in his brief that his summary judgment is supported by the holding of our Supreme Court in the case of Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996. To this the writer disagrees because the facts in the Hagedorn case are distinguishable from the facts in this case in the following: First, appellant in this case filed an answer setting up a complete and absolute defense to appellee’s cause of action, evidencing his intention to legally prosecute the suit, while in the Hagedorn case the judgment was one of default. Second, one of appellant’s allegations upon which he relies to set the judgment aside in the present cause of action is based upon fraud or wrongful act of the opposite party. Such fact issue is set out in the Hagedorn case as one of the few allegations that may be urged in setting aside a final judgment, wherein Hagedorn was merely misled by a statement of a third party.
Under all attending circumstances, the writer believes the majority holding is to the effect that the courts are not sufficiently flexible to prevent a party, such as appellant in this case, from sustaining irreparable injuries without having his day in court.
The trial court has stayed execution until a final disposition of this case by temporary restraining orders, which in the writer’s opinion, should be continued until the case is tried on its merits.
While a summary judgment may be entered in only those cases where no fact issue is to be determined, yet, if there is any doubt as to whether same should be entered, such doubt should be resolved against the motion.