Court Opinion

ID: 9931579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 15:04:47.631655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:25.278335
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–1531

             Submitted October 11, 2023—Filed February 9, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellant,

vs.

MORGAN MARIE MCMICKLE,

      Appellee.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Stephen A. Owen,

Judge.

      Discretionary review of a district court order granting a defendant’s motion

to suppress evidence of a chemical breath test and statements made during the

course of an OWI investigation. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which all justices

joined. McDermott, J. filed a concurring opinion.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellant.

      Matthew T. Lindholm of Gourley, Rehkemper, & Lindholm, P.L.C., West

Des Moines, for appellee.
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MCDONALD, Justice.
      This appeal presents two questions. First, may a peace officer investigating

a suspected offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated use a search

warrant to obtain from a driver a blood sample for chemical testing rather than

invoking the statutory implied consent procedure set forth in Iowa Code

chapter 321J (2022)? The district court answered this question in the negative

and granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the result of a chemical test

performed on her blood. Second, when a peace officer fails to honor an arrestee’s

request to speak with counsel pursuant to Iowa Code section 804.20, does the

statutory violation require the suppression of evidence unrelated to the statutory

violation? The district court answered this question in the affirmative and

granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the chemical test performed on her

blood as well as the defendant’s statements made to law enforcement officers

during the investigation. We granted the State’s application for discretionary

review.

      On the night of February 11, 2022, Morgan McMickle was driving her

vehicle in Boone County. She rear-ended a stopped vehicle, left the scene, and

continued driving. The driver of the other vehicle followed McMickle, and a
passenger in that vehicle called 911 for assistance. After some period of time,

McMickle pulled over to the side of the road. The trailing vehicle did the same.

Boone County Deputy Sheriff Nathan Benjamin came upon the vehicles parked

on the roadside.

      Deputy Benjamin approached the driver’s side window of McMickle’s

vehicle and asked McMickle for her license, registration, and proof of insurance.

The bodycam video showed McMickle was in a stupor and was slow to respond.

She opened her glove box, pulled out a pile of documents, and handed them to
Deputy Benjamin. Deputy Benjamin informed McMickle that he believed she was
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driving while impaired. Deputy Benjamin suspected McMickle was impaired

based on the collision, the smell of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the

vehicle, McMickle’s slurred speech, and McMickle’s difficulty in providing the

requested documentation. While Deputy Benjamin was standing outside the

vehicle, McMickle tried to call her lawyer using her cell phone. Deputy Benjamin

informed her that she would not be able to do that right now and asked her to

get out of the vehicle. When McMickle did not comply, Deputy Benjamin opened

the driver’s side door and instructed McMickle to exit the vehicle. She did so. By

this time, another deputy had arrived at the scene. The second deputy took

McMickle’s cell phone from her hands. Deputy Benjamin instructed McMickle to

walk to the rear of the vehicle, and she complied. Deputy Benjamin began to

explain field sobriety testing to McMickle. While Deputy Benjamin was explaining

field sobriety testing to McMickle, she asked five different times to call her lawyer.

When it became apparent that McMickle was not going to cooperate,

Deputy Benjamin instructed McMickle to turn around and put her hands behind

her back. She did so. Deputy Benjamin handcuffed her, placed her in the front

seat of his vehicle, and transported her to the law enforcement center for further

investigation.
      At the law enforcement center, McMickle asked to speak to her lawyer.

Deputy Benjamin told her that she “need[ed] to comply with what’s going on

here, we’re in a correctional institute, you need to do what they ask you to do.”

McMickle responded, “When do I get to talk to my lawyer?” Deputy Benjamin

replied, “When my investigation is complete.” Iowa Code section 804.20 provides,

among other things, that any peace officer having custody of an arrested person

“shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of

detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person’s family or an attorney
of the person’s choice, or both.” The parties do not dispute that McMickle was
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never advised of her rights under Iowa Code section 804.20 and was never

afforded the opportunity to call her lawyer despite her repeated requests.

      To complete his investigation, Deputy Benjamin applied for and obtained

a search warrant authorizing the collection and testing of a blood specimen. After

obtaining the search warrant, Deputy Benjamin transported McMickle to a local

hospital for a blood draw. Chemical testing of the blood specimen showed

McMickle had blood alcohol content of .274, more than three times the legal

limit. Deputy Benjamin testified that he had been instructed by the local county

attorney to apply for a search warrant rather than invoke the statutory implied

consent procedure set forth in chapter 321J when a suspect will not participate

in field sobriety testing. Deputy Benjamin was also of the understanding that he

should apply for a search warrant when there had been a motor vehicle accident

involving the suspect or when the suspect had left the scene of a motor vehicle

accident.

      McMickle    was    charged    with       operating   a   motor   vehicle   while

intoxicated (OWI), first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a).

She filed a motion to suppress evidence. She first argued that Deputy Benjamin’s

use of a search warrant to obtain and test a blood sample was illegal. Specifically,
McMickle argued that the deputy was required to invoke the statutory implied

consent procedure set forth in Iowa Code chapter 321J and afford McMickle the

opportunity to refuse to provide a bodily specimen. McMickle also argued that

Iowa Code chapter 808, governing the issuance of search warrants, does not

authorize search warrants for the collection of bodily specimens. McMickle

further argued that use of a search warrant to collect evidence in lieu of the

statutory implied consent procedure violated her federal and state constitutional

rights to equal protection of the laws and due process of law. Finally, McMickle
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argued that the deputy violated her statutory right under Iowa Code

section 804.20 to call and consult with her lawyer.

      The district court granted McMickle’s motion on all four grounds. The

district court held Deputy Benjamin was not authorized to obtain a search

warrant to collect and test McMickle’s blood. The district court reasoned that the

statutory implied consent procedure was the exclusive means by which a law

enforcement officer can investigate suspected OWI offenses. The district court

also held that Deputy Benjamin had no statutory authority to obtain a search

warrant to collect and test bodily specimens. The district court reasoned that

chapter 808 does not provide any authority for the collection of bodily specimens.

The district court also held that Deputy Benjamin’s decision to apply for and

execute a search warrant violated McMickle’s right to equal protection of the laws

and McMickle’s right to due process of law under the United States and Iowa

Constitutions. Finally, the district court held that Deputy Benjamin’s refusal of

McMickle’s repeated requests to speak to her lawyer violated her rights under

section 804.20. The district court ordered the following evidence suppressed:

“any verbal or non-verbal assertion” McMickle made “upon being handcuffed;”

“any statements and non-verbal assertions of an incriminating nature” “made at
the Boone County [law enforcement center];” and “the search warrant

documents, blood testing procedures[,] and blood test results.”

      We first address the district court’s ruling regarding the legality of

Deputy Benjamin’s decision to obtain a search warrant for the collection and

testing of McMickle’s blood. In State v. Laub, filed today, we held that

chapter 321J is not the exclusive means by which an officer can investigate

suspected OWI offenses. ___ N.W.3d ___, ___ (Iowa 2023). We also held that

chapter 808 of the Iowa Code authorizes law enforcement officers to apply for,
obtain, and execute search warrants for bodily specimens and nothing in
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chapter 321J precludes an officer from using the search warrant authority

granted in chapter 808 to investigate suspected OWI offenses. Id. at ___. We

further held that a law enforcement officer’s decision to obtain and execute a

search warrant to investigate suspected OWI offenses does not violate a suspect’s

federal or state constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws or due

process of law. Id. at ___. Those holdings apply to this case. We reverse the

district court’s suppression ruling on these issues.

      We next address the district court’s ruling regarding Iowa Code

section 804.20. The State concedes for the purposes of this interlocutory appeal

that section 804.20 was violated, but it contests the scope of the district court’s

suppression order. The district court held that the State’s violation of

section 804.20 required the suppression of “any statements and non-verbal

assertions of an incriminating nature [McMickle] made at the Boone County [law

enforcement center]” as well as “the blood test results.” The State concedes that

McMickle’s incriminating statements should be suppressed, see State v. Hicks,

791 N.W.2d 89, 97 (Iowa 2010) (“The remedy associated with a section 804.20

violation is the exclusion of evidence . . . .”), but it argues that suppression of

the blood test results was an improper application of the exclusionary rule.
      The “exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence discovered as

a result of illegal government activity.” State v. Watts, 801 N.W.2d 845, 853 (Iowa

2011) (quoting State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa 2007)). The

exclusionary rule also requires the suppression of additional evidence tainted by

the original illegality. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392

(1920). Such tainted evidence is colloquially referred to as the “fruit of the

poisonous tree.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). There are

generally recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule. “One exception permits
use of certain evidence when circumstances independent of the initial illegality
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have so attenuated the causal connection as to purge the taint of the unlawful

police action.” State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 111 (Iowa 2001). A second

exception allows the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence where “the

discovery of the evidence by lawful means was inevitable.” Id. A third exception

provides that “[e]vidence may also be admitted if the discovery of the evidence

can be traced to a source independent of the originally illegally obtained fruits.”

Id. The three identified exceptions are specific instantiations of a more general

principle: the exclusionary rule should not be used to suppress evidence where

there is no causal connection between the government’s illegal activity and the

challenged evidence. To apply the exclusionary rule in the absence of a causal

connection between the government’s illegal activity and the challenged evidence

“would ‘put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent

any error or violation.’ ” Id. at 112 (quoting State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 211

(Iowa 1997)).

      The district court erred in holding the blood test results should be

suppressed due to a violation of section 804.20. The blood test results can be

traced to a source independent of any violation of section 804.20. See id. at 111.

Specifically, the test results were obtained pursuant to a lawfully issued search
warrant. The search warrant application was based on Deputy Benjamin’s

knowledge that McMickle rear-ended a vehicle and left the scene. The search

warrant application was also based on his observations of McMickle during their

initial encounter on the roadside. He observed she had bloodshot and watery

eyes. Her speech was slurred and mumbled. She smelled of an alcoholic

beverage. She had an unsteady gait. The search warrant application rested on

these observations only. It did not contain any statements from McMickle

obtained in violation of section 804.20. The blood specimen and chemical test of
the same were thus wholly independent of any violation of section 804.20 and
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should not have been suppressed. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533,

537–38, 542 (1988) (stating “[t]he ultimate question . . . is whether the search

pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the . . .

evidence at issue” and so suppression is not required for “evidence acquired in

a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-gathering activity”); Naujoks, 637

N.W.2d at 111–12; Seager, 571 N.W.2d at 214 (holding “the exclusionary rule

does not apply and the district court erred in sustaining the defendant’s motion

to suppress” where evidence was obtained pursuant to a search warrant

untainted by illegal activity).

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.
      All justices concur. McDermott, J., files a concurring opinion.
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                                                      #22–1531, State v. McMickle

MCDERMOTT, Justice (concurring).
      I join the majority opinion but write separately to address the violation of

McMickle’s rights under Iowa Code § 804.20 (2022). The State concedes that

McMickle was denied her right to communicate with a lawyer or family member

after arriving at the law enforcement center. McMickle argues that the results of

the blood test she was later ordered to provide should thus be suppressed. The

court, in my view, correctly concludes that suppression is unjustified in this case

because the evidence used to get the search warrant for her blood was acquired

within the first minutes of the encounter—before McMickle had any right to

make a call—and was thus severed from the violation of her § 804.20 rights.

      But this is not to put a stamp of approval on the § 804.20 violation. The

statute provides that an officer, having “arrested or restrained . . . [a] person’s

liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary

delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of

the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both.” Id. The right

belongs not merely to drunk driving suspects but to any person restrained for

any reason. Id.; State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Iowa 2005). Notably,
the right extends beyond one’s constitutional right to speak to a lawyer; it

requires that police also allow the arrestee to speak or meet with a family

member. Iowa Code § 804.20. The inclusion of family members makes it clear

that the right is intended to provide a detained suspect with more than legal

advice alone. It might also provide, for example, a way to inform an arrestee’s

family about the arrestee’s whereabouts and circumstances, or to afford the

arrestee some measure of familial support after arriving at the place of detention.

      Our cases have held that a violation of § 804.20 may justify suppression
of evidence. See Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 674–75. The statute itself, though,
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says nothing about suppression. Iowa Code § 804.20. The legislature specifies a

different remedy in the statute for violating an arrestee’s right to call or meet

with a lawyer or family member. Id. It provides that “[a] violation of this section

shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.” Id.

      So while we reverse the suppression order despite the separate § 804.20

violation, one would be mistaken to read into it an endorsement of police action

that bulldozes a detained person’s right to contact family and counsel without

unnecessary delay. The statutory remedy imposing criminal liability exists

notwithstanding a court’s refusal to suppress evidence when an officer violates

§ 804.20. Simply because an officer validly obtains evidence against a suspect

through other means does not grant the officer immunity from criminal

prosecution for infringing this right.