Court Opinion

ID: 9702710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:21:39.065193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.737656
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in Pickens and dissenting in Wallace). I join in affirming Dwayne Pickens’ conviction because he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
I would hold, however, that Ralph Wallace was *357prejudiced by his lawyer’s deficient representation, and would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.
i
Judicial vindication of the right to the effective assistance of counsel reduces the risk that an innocent person was convicted, and provides some assurance that a conviction was obtained through fundamentally fair procedures.1 The standard for determining whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel should seek to secure procedural fairness, and legal representation that enables an accused to meet the charges.
The majority adopts the standard for determining ineffective assistance set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). The majority expounds a textual and historical analysis of Michigan’s adoption of the substance of the Sixth Amendment, citing state constitutional and common-law history, state law before adoption, structural differences between the state and federal constitutions, and matters of peculiarly state or local interest.2
The issue in Strickland concerned federal habeas corpus relief for ineffective assistance rendered at the sentencing phase of a state murder conviction. This Court, in arriving at a fair and workable standard may seek guidance from federal law, but is not bound to do so, as the majority explains.3
A federal constitutional standard is necessarily *358a minimum standard. Otherwise, the United States Supreme Court would be imposing its own policy preferences on the fifty states. It is understandably reluctant to do so.
The states are free to apply a standard higher than the federal standard for habeas corpus relief, a standard higher than the standard required by the United States Supreme Court of the least progressive state in the union.
It appears that a few states, Alaska,4 Hawaii,5 Massachusetts,6 have adopted a standard more *359protective of the right to the effective assistance of counsel than the one set forth in Strickland.
I would, for reasons stated in part v, adhere to the standard set forth in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 NW2d 547 (1976).7
n
A reviewing court is obliged to examine the record to determine whether a convicted defendant claiming ineffective assistance was fairly represented by counsel. Such review will not indulge hindsight analysis of strategy, nor require perfect representation. Whatever test is applied, be it Strickland, Garcia, or the former "sham and mockery” test,8 a reviewing court should examine the challenged representation in light of the purpose of the Sixth Amendment. The inquiry should focus on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding.9
To justify reversal under the Strickland standard, a convicted defendant must show that the lawyer’s "performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” The convicted defendant must further show that *360the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . . This requires "showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”10
A
The errors of Wallace’s lawyer were objectively unreasonable and prejudicial. The prejudice in this case arose from the failure to present a diminished capacity defense, coupled with cumulative lawyer errors concerning procedural and substantive law. Serious lawyer error pervaded the trial, undermining confidence that the verdict convicting Wallace of first-degree murder was based on the evidence rather than a "breakdown of the adversarial process.”
The defense presented two theories: Wallace was legally insane as a result of long-term alcohol abuse and organic brain syndrome, and Wallace was guilty at most of manslaughter based on legally adequate provocation of marital infidelity.
Before the opening statements, the trial judge asked Wallace’s lawyer several times whether he was offering a diminished capacity defense. After the lawyer’s evasive and confusing responses to *361the judge’s questions, the judge said that, absent direction from the defense, he would not provide an instruction on diminished capacity.
The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, not guilty by reason of insanity, guilty but mentally ill, and voluntary manslaughter.
The majority concludes that Wallace was not prejudiced because evidence of "guilt was truly overwhelming.”11 The concurring opinion states that the author was unable to determine that the lawyer’s decision "not to focus on the alcohol and substance abuse aspect of the insanity defense was not made for reasons of sound trial strategy.”12
The lead and concurring opinions thus ignore that factual guilt was not an issue. Wallace admitted shooting his wife. The sole issue was the degree of criminal responsibility and the level of culpability.
B
The evidence, both lay and expert, supported a diminished capacity defense.13 Wallace’s psychiatric expert, who was also his treating physician, testified that Wallace suffered from organic brain *362syndrome, brought about by long-term alcohol abuse. Dr. Bhama reported Wallace’s iq as 82, considered dull/normal on the basis of objective medical testing, and corroborated his findings with a ct scan. Dr. Bhama testified that Wallace had suffered hallucinations and blackouts from 1982 to 1983.14
Dr. Bhama opined that Wallace suffered from mental illness, a substantial disorder of thought or mood, that prevented him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. The essence of the psychiatrist’s opinion was that alcohol abuse syndrome and resultant physical deterioration of the brain over a forty-year period caused the underlying mental illness, rendering Wallace insane at the time of the shooting.
Wallace and his supervisor, Larry Truxal, testified that Wallace had taken a prescription tranquilizer on the day of the shooting, and that Wallace was unusually agitated and incoherent just hours before the murder. Wallace testified regarding an hallucination that occurred moments before the shooting, and that he could not recall the sequence of events immediately before or after his wife’s murder.
The lawyer acknowledged that he was aware that Wallace’s iq was in the 80’s, of Wallace’s history of hallucinations, drug and alcohol abuse, previous inpatient psychiatric hospitalizations, and of his use of Elavil, Tolectin, and Serax, prescription medications prescribed for another person, and ingestion of two to eight beers shortly before the shooting.
Wallace’s lawyer was alerted to the possibility that diminished capacity might provide a defense well in advance of trial. The prosecutor’s expert *363psychologist recommended a diminished capacity evaluation at a pretrial hearing on forensic testing two months before trial. At the hearing on Wallace’s motion for a private forensic evaluation, his lawyer said that the results of such an evaluation would be delivered to the prosecutor, and referred "specifically to the diminished capacity so that he’ll be aware of it, so that he won’t overlook that.”
During voir dire, Wallace’s lawyer informed prospective jurors that they would hear testimony concerning a diminished capacity defense. Although Wallace’s lawyer indicated to the judge that he was not advancing a diminished capacity theory, he argued in opening that, at the time of the murder, longstanding alcohol addiction, preexisting mental illness, coupled with prescription medication and an hallucination at the bar where he shot his wife, resulted in his client not functioning at "full capacity,” and that he thus was not guilty of first-degree murder.15
The prosecutor’s expert witnesses testified that while Wallace did indeed suffer from long-term alcohol abuse and had an iq of 89, he was not legally insane. On the basis of the sequence of events and the eyewitness testimony,16 it is not *364surprising that the jury rejected the insanity defense and found Wallace sane.
Wallace’s lawyer failed to marshal the medical evidence and facts preceding the murder to mount a coherent defense. He erroneously stated at the Ginther hearing that insanity and diminished capacity are mutually exclusive defenses. Although the standard jury instruction respecting the diminished capacity defense had been brought to his attention by the judge, and explained by the prosecutor, Wallace’s lawyer rejected, without reason, a substantial defense.
The decision of Wallace’s lawyer not to pursue a diminished capacity defense cannot be regarded as sound trial strategy. Dr. Bhama’s testimony, and Wallace’s and Truxal’s testimony of alcohol and drug consumption, supported a defense that Wallace was unable to form the requisite specific intent at the time of the murder.
Had the jury been instructed on diminished capacity, the jurors would have deliberated on whether the combined effects of retardation, preexisting mental illness, alcohol abuse syndrome, tranquilizers and the documented psychiatric history rendered Wallace unable to form the specific intent for first-degree murder.
The lawyer said he did not present a diminished-capacity defense because, as he explained at the Ginther hearing, "I felt I didn’t want to present them. Those I left out, I left out on purpose. I didn’t feel they were that good.” It appears that *365the lawyer simply was not aware, nor did he understand the significance of the defense. "I want to confess to you that in the case I was arguing here, I thought his instructions were fine. And if he had confusion, the Judge, I added to his confusion. My hope was that confusion would benefit Mr. Wallace.”
c
Diminished capacity is in the nature of a mitigation defense, reducing first-degree murder to a lesser offense as a result of a jury finding that specific intent was not established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the jury might have accepted, if instructed, a diminished capacity defense, which allows the jury to consider past history of mental illness and retardation coupled with consumption of alcohol and medication. Failure to present mitigation evidence in a capital case is objectively unreasonable and prejudicial to the accused.
State and federal courts, applying a Strickland analysis, have accorded special consideration to mitigation claims, at both the guilt and sentencing phases. Counsel’s failure to investigate or present evidence of mental illness, or other "humanizing” mitigation factors has been held to constitute ineffective assistance.17
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a conviction in which the lawyer failed to recognize and pursue a diminished capacity defense, finding error requiring reversal at both the guilt and the *366sentencing phases.18 With overwhelming evidence of mental disturbance,19 the lawyer’s failure to pursue the defense was found to have materially contributed to the conviction, and that there was a reasonable probability that the result at the guilt phase would have been different. The court vacated the sentence for failure to interview potential witnesses regarding mental state, although the lawyer knew that the defendant was previously hospitalized with a psychiatric diagnosis.
Failure to assert a statutorily available defense supported by evidence was found to be error requiring reversal under a Strickland analysis by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.20 Because the jury was precluded from giving effect to the defense, "[t]hat in itself undermines our confidence in the conviction sufficiently to convince us that the result of the trial might have been different had the instruction been requested and given.”21
In the instant case, the lawyer’s failure to assert an available, meritorious defense, with significant factual and legal support, similarly undermines confidence in the verdict, satisfying the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim.
m
A court may find prejudice on the basis of the totality of counsel’s errors and omissions.22 The *367failure of Wallace’s lawyer to raise the viable diminished capacity defense was only one error among many. Cumulative error is evident in the lawyer’s lack of preparation, and ignorance of basic principles of substantive and procedural law.23
A
Wallace’s lawyer made numerous errors of law. He did not understand the difference between first- and second-degree murder.24
*368Wallace’s lawyer did not know that the trial judge hears a motion to disqualify the judge.25 He was also unaware that a forensic evaluation was required within sixty days of filing notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. He incorrectly characterized his questions and comments during voir dire as "testimony,” and was surprised to learn that the court is required to instruct on second-degree murder in a first-degree murder prosecution.
Wallace’s lawyer did not know, until informed by the judge, that a defendant, not the prosecutor, moves for a directed verdict. His ignorance regarding the purpose of opening statement was apparent in his objection to the prosecutor’s "telling of the whole story” in his opening statement, and in his request for the same "leeway” when it was his turn for opening statement.
Wallace’s lawyer did not understand the Rules of Evidence. He repeatedly offered hearsay testimony and documents that were hearsay during the five-day trial.26 In responding to numerous hearsay objections, he merely requested "a little latitude from the court,” and not once cited a specific exception to the hearsay rule.
He misunderstood MRE 404. On numerous occasions, he sought to introduce irrelevant character evidence concerning the victim.27 When cautioned by the Court that certain character evidence was prohibited , under "404,” he asked "Michigan Court Rule?”_
*369Wallace’s lawyer was unaware that an expert can testify about his opinions based on a previously prepared report. He seemed similarly unaware that a trial transcript could be made available to the defense upon request. In closing, he improperly referred to possible punishment for first-degree murder. He made what the judge called a "glaring mistake” — he submitted a proposed jury instruction that requested that Wallace be placed in an institution for treatment of the insane.
B
Wallace’s lawyer failed to prepare adequately for trial. He did not provide Dr. Bhama with psychiatric testing data from the Recorder’s Court forensic evaluation that Dr. Bhama had requested. This was a serious error of omission, as Wallace’s mental state was crucial to the defense.
In a first-degree murder prosecution, with insanity as the central defense, Wallace’s lawyer was unable to provide a factual basis for his proposed irresistible impulse theory during a pretrial hearing where he sought authorization for private forensic testing, prompting the court’s expression of astonishment at the degree of unpreparedness in a capital case. He admitted at trial to neglecting to read a statement of a prosecution witness that had been provided before trial.
c
Wallace’s lawyer’s demeanor was unprofessional and provocative. He objected to the prosecutor’s "third grade questions,” and accused the court of making gestures indicating boredom or displeasure with the defense. He charged the court reporter *370with purposely withholding transcripts, and interrupted the prosecutor’s lengthy closing argument by asking for a glass of water so that he could stay awake. On redirect examination of his witness, Dr. Bhama, he asked three times if Dr. Bhama was to be paid for his time in court. He then dismissed his own expert witness saying "You’re too expensive to keep here.”
Those comments illustrate an appalling lack of respect for the court, and a capacity for self-inflicted damage evident throughout the trial.
D
The cumulative effect of the lawyer’s ignorance of basic law critical to his client’s case, inadequate factual preparation, and unacceptable use of "confusion” as a trial strategy, undermines confidence in the verdict.
Wallace was prejudiced by his lawyer’s deficient performance, for there was a reasonable probability that the conviction of first-degree murder was the result of the lawyer’s failure to present and to seek an instruction on a mitigating defense, coupled with the cumulative error at trial.
I would reverse Wallace’s conviction, and remand for a new trial.
IV
Pickens was convicted of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine in a controlled purchase. His defense was alibi. In her opening statement, Pick-ens’ lawyer told the jury that she had an alibi witness. The trial judge refused to permit her to present the alibi witness because she had not filed *371the required statutory notice.28 The arresting officers testified at trial that the marked $20 bill was found on Pickens’ person when he was arrested.
The Court of Appeals remanded for a Ginther hearing. Pickens lawyer was the sole witness. She testified that she knew of the alibi witness two months before the trial, and directed her investigator to interview and subpoena him.
Pickens failed, however, to establish that the deficient representation created a reasonable probability that the verdict was a result of the failure to produce the alibi witness. When the alibi witness failed to appear at an adjourned Ginther hearing, Pickens waived production of the witness, indicating to the court’s satisfaction that he fully understood the consequences. There is no evidence that the alibi witness would have testified favorably.29 Absent prejudice, and being persuaded that the verdict followed a fundamentally fair trial, I join in affirmance of his conviction.
v
The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the appointment of counsel, as set forth in Recorder’s Court Bar Ass’n v Wayne Circuit Court, 443 Mich 110; 503 NW2d 885 (1993), is statutory. Before Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), circuit judges appointed assigned counsel in appropriate cases at public expense.
The supervision of the administration of justice in this state is confided to this Court under article 6 of this state’s constitution. This Court has broad power and responsibility at every level. Lawyers are admitted to practice, and permitted to con*372tinue to practice, under authority conferred by this Court.
Although a statute confers on the trial bench the authority to appoint a lawyer,30 that power, like all power confided to trial and intermediate appellate court judges, is subject to the supervisory power of this Court.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is a continuing problem in part because, unfortunately, too many lawyers who accept assignments to represent indigents or accept money as retained counsel to represent persons that become involved in the criminal justice system do not, in fact, perform adequately. Neither the trial bench nor the Court of Appeals nor this Court has put in place a meaningful system for removing inadequate lawyers from the rosters of lawyers eligible to represent defendants in criminal cases.31
I do not mean to suggest that the problem is readily solvable. The counties are expected to fund indigent defense. The compensation is generally inadequate. It is difficult to raise standards. But nothing meaningful has been done, although many of us have been talking about it for at least twenty-five years of which I am aware.
The problem is further exacerbated by the continuation of the patronage system in Recorder’s Court and many other courts. I do not mean to *373suggest that unqualified lawyers are generally appointed, but rather that far too many unqualified lawyers continue to be appointed.
I find it most difficult to join in a standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel that places the burden on the defendant — often uneducated, without resources, financial or familial — to show that omissions and errors of a lawyer, licensed by this Court to accept his retainer32 or public funds for his defense, in fact prejudiced the outcome.
This Court has failed to provide indigent persons with a realistic opportunity to obtain effective legal representation and advocacy in this Court of their claims, although a commitment was made over four years ago to do so.33

 Strickland v Washington, 446 US 668, 708; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also United States v Decoster, 199 US App DC 359, 454-457; 624 F2d 196 (1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).

 Ante, pp 319-320.

 Ante, pp 312-314.

 Wilson v State, 711 P2d 547, 549 (Alas App, 1985). To obtain postconviction relief on the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that counsel’s conduct either generally throughout the trial or in one or more specific instances did not conform to the standard of competence displayed by a person of ordinary training and skill in the criminal law, and that the lack of competency contributed to the conviction. (Citing Risher v State, 523 P2d 421 [Alas, 1974].)
The appellate court declined to rule on the merits of defendant’s ineffective assistance challenge, as the trial court failed to articulate a test of prejudice. If, as the defendant claimed, an actual conflict of interest existed, prejudice would be presumed and the conviction reversed. Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US 335; 100 S Ct 1708; 64 L Ed 2d 333 (1980).

 State v Smith, 712 P2d 496 (Hawaii, 1986). In reversing a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a claim of inadequate assistance will be sustained only if defendant can show specific errors or omissions reflecting counsel’s lack of skill, judgment or diligence, and that the error or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially meritorious defense. Id., p 501.
The court held that defense counsel’s direct examination of the defendant eliciting testimony of six prior burglary convictions and his habit of exposing himself in a prosecution for sodomy was outside the range of professional competence. The errors reflected counsel’s lack of skill substantially impairing a potentially meritorious defense. Id., p 502.

 Commonwealth v White, 409 Mass 266, 272; 565 NE2d 1185 (1991). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defense counsel’s performance must fall measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer, and that the defendant’s case was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct by a likely deprivation of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense, citing Commonwealth v Saferian, 366 Mass 89, 96; 315 NE2d 878 (1974).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convic*359tion, as the lawyer’s failure to call and interview two witnesses was within legitimate trial strategy, and therefore not prejudicial.

 In Garcia, this Court adopted the standard for evaluating Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance set forth in Beasley v United States, 491 F2d 687, 696 (CA 6, 1974).
Under Garcia, a defendant’s lawyer must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law, and must conscientiously protect his client’s interests, undeflected by conflicting considerations. Prejudice is not presumed once this test is met. A defendant would be entitled to a new trial only if, but for the attorney’s error, the defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. People v Degraffenreid, 19 Mich App 702; 173 NW2d 317 (1969) was cited.

 Williams v Beto, 354 F2d 698 (CA 5, 1963).

 Strickland, supra, p 686.

 Strickland, supra, p 687.
The two-part Strickland test for ineffective assistance requires that defendant show that counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable, based on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The defendant must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id., pp 689, 694.

 Ante, p 330 (opinion of Riley, J.).

 Ante, p 354 (opinion of Mallett, J.).

 Wallace’s lawyer testified at the Ginther hearing that he chose not to request an instruction on diminished capacity because it would confuse the jury. He testified that he wanted the jury to find his client insane — "so why would I want . . . the Judge to read a person who is under the influence of voluntarily consumed alcohol or controlled substance at the time of the alleged offense is not for those reasons alone to be judged legally insane?”
Wallace’s lawyer did not understand that a diminished capacity defense allows the jury to reach the issue of insanity, combining the effects of past mental illness/retardation and substance abuse as contributory factors to legal insanity. This corresponds to the findings of Dr. Bhama, and was partially corroborated by the forensic center responsibility examination.

 Dr. Bhama saw Wallace both as an outpatient and an inpatient during this period.

 During the discussion of jury instructions, the prosecutor observed that, although Wallace’s lawyer had submitted instructions concerning a diminished capacity defense, the lawyer had before the trial specifically rejected diminished capacity as a defense. The ensuing discussion illustrates the lawyer’s utter confusion, or his all-too-late realization that the evidence supported a defense of diminished capacity.

 There was credible testimony that Wallace appeared in control and lucid at the time of the murder. There was evidence of premeditation. Wallace worked full time as an electrical inspector and otherwise conducted his daily affairs in an outwardly normal manner. A neighbor of Wallace’s testified that several days before the shooting, Wallace said he would kill his wife to end his marital difficulties. Wallace brought a .357 magnum to the bar where he shot his wife.
Employees and bar patrons testified that Wallace sat with his wife, *364quietly drinking and talking for some time, before he fired the first shot. Eyewitnesses recounted that Wallace shot his wife a second time as she fell to the floor, and finally fired a third shot into her motionless body beneath a table. The second and third shots were anywhere from one to five minutes apart. Wallace calmly placed his gun on the table and went to the restroom. When he emerged, he submitted to arrest, telling the police that he had shot his wife.

 Waters v Zant, 979 F2d 1473 (CA 11, 1992); Evans v Lewis, 855 F2d 631 (CA 9, 1988). Failure to fully investigate cannot be characterized as a trial tactic, and the omission of relevant and material evidence at sentencing seriously undermined confidence in the outcome, requiring reversal.

 State v Savage, 120 NJ 594, 622; 577 A2d 455 (1990).

 The defendant carried the victim’s dismembered torso in a suitcase for days, attempted suicide while hospitalized, and had a history of cocaine use.

 Vasquez v State, 830 SW2d 948 (Tex Crim App, 1992).

 Id. at 950. See also Watrous v State, 842 SW2d 792 (Tex App, 1992), in which the court reversed a sexual assault conviction because the attorney failed to request an instruction on a statutory defense.

 Mak v Blodgett, 970 F2d 614, 622 (CA 9, 1992), citing Ewing v Williams, 596 F2d 391, 395 (CA 9, 1979) (prejudice may result from *367the cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies), citing Cooper v Fitzharris, 586 F2d 1325 (CA 9, 1978) (en banc), cert den 440 US 974 (1979).
Habeas corpus relief was granted in Harris v Dugger, 874 F2d 756 (CA 11, 1989), on the basis of cumulative error. Because there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have rejected the death penalty in light of favorable evidence, the defendant was prejudiced by his lawyer’s omissions. Accord Horton v Zant, 941 F2d 1449 (CA 11, 1991); Cave v Singletary, 971 F2d 1513 (CA 11, 1992), the failure to present favorable evidence and witnesses at sentencing greatly undermined the jury verdict, establishing prejudice.

 At the Ginther hearing, the lawyer repeatedly misstated the rules of evidence. Midtrial, the judge gave the lawyer a book of the Michigan Rules of Evidence after various baseless objections. At the Ginther hearing, the lawyer testified, "Not all objections were made based upon my knowledge or expertise or lack thereof. Lots of times, I was trying to do things to grandstand for the Jury. I was often trying to interrupt and sometimes trying to confuse.”
The lawyer also testified that "[ajfter twenty years in this business, I can tell you something, I am more confused now than I was the day I got out of law school, okay.”
Errors of omission included the lawyer’s failure to cross-examine the forensic psychologist on his conclusion that Wallace did not suffer from acute mental organic disorder, a conclusion that contradicted Wallace’s expert testimony. The lawyer failed to provide his own expert with police reports in preparation for trial.

 [Lawyer]: I would ask the Court that it instruct the Jury that part of Second Degree Murder includes plan, purpose, premeditation.
[The Court]: That’s not the law, Mr. [Wallace’s lawyer],
[Lawyer]: I think that instruction should be given.
[The Court]: That’s not the law.
[Lawyer]: What is the law?
[The Court explains the elements.]
[Lawyer]: Requests malice aforethought instruction for sec*368ond degree murder — Court refuses, [Lawyer] want[s] objection on the record.

 MCR 2.003(C)(3).

 He argued, in response to the prosecutor’s hearsay objection, "[i]f two men are both in the room and I’m asking him to tell the conversation they had at that time . . . .”

 Ten-year-old incidents of work absenteeism, for example.

 MCL 768.20(1); MSA 28.1043(1).

 Compare People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698; 273 NW2d 856 (1979).

 MCL 775.16; MSA 28.1253.

 As Anthony Lewis observed after the Gideon decision:
It will be an enormous social task to bring to life the dream of Gideon v Wainwright — the dream of a vast, diverse country in which every man charged with crime will be capably defended, no matter what his economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the support needed to make an adequate defense. [Gideon’s Trumpet, p 205.]

 Wallace’s lawyer was retained.

 Administrative Order No. 1990-2, ¶ 2(C)(3)(b); Mich Ct R, pp A 1-42 to A 1-43.