Court Opinion

ID: 9905691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 21:03:10.027723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:50.467419
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 (unmodified opn. attached)

                          CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION FOUR

 In re Marriage of DALE MOTISKA
 and CAROLINE FORD.                             A166543

                                                (Solano County Super. Ct.
 DALE MOTISKA,                                  No. FFL122184)
       Appellant,
                     v.
                                                ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
 CAROLINE FORD,                                 AND DENYING REHEARING;
       Respondent.                              NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

BY THE COURT:
       It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 8, 2023, be
modified as follows:
       1.    On page 2, in the first full paragraph, in the first sentence, replace
             “contribution” with “reimbursement” so the sentence reads:
                 We publish our opinion resolving this appeal because the
                 principal question raised here—whether a spouse’s sale of
                 property to the marital community for the nominal amount of
                 $1 constitutes a de facto gift, triggering a right to
                 reimbursement under section 2640—is a matter of first
                 impression.
       2.    On page 10, in the last paragraph, in the first sentence, replace
             “Buxup Corp” with “Buxup” so the sentence reads:
                 Ford argues that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
                 implied finding that the sale of Neon Palm to Buxup fairly
                 reflected its value to Motiska at the time of the sale.

                                            1
     There is no change in the judgment.
     The petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated: November 29, 2023                     BROWN, P. J.

                                      2
Trial Court:   Superior Court of California, County of Solano

Trial Judge:   Hon. Dora M. Rios

Counsel:       C. Athena Roussos; Law Offices of Michael L. Gums
               and Michael L. Gums, for Appellant.

               Montagna Family Law and Stephen A. Montagna, for
               Respondent.

                             3
Filed 11/8/23 (unmodified opinion)

                          CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION FOUR

 In re Marriage of DALE MOTISKA
 and CAROLINE FORD.                            A166543

                                               (Solano County Super. Ct.
 DALE MOTISKA,                                 No. FFL122184)
       Appellant,
                     v.
 CAROLINE FORD,
       Respondent.

       This interlocutory appeal arises from a marital dissolution proceeding
involving appellant Dale Motiska and respondent Caroline Ford, who
married in January 2001 and separated in 2011. Motiska challenges a trial
court order determining he did not have a reimbursement claim under
Family Code1 section 2640 based on an asserted contribution of separate
property to a corporation that the court found was a community asset.2

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

       2 Section 2640, subdivision (b) states in part:“In the division of the
community estate under this division, unless a party has made a written
waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has the
effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party’s contributions
to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to the extent
the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.”

                                           1
Motiska argues the court erred by declining to allow him to present evidence
of his separate property contributions and by concluding he had no claim
under the statute.
      We publish our opinion resolving this appeal because the principal
question raised here—whether a spouse’s sale of property to the marital
community for the nominal amount of $1 constitutes a de facto gift,
triggering a right to contribution under section 2640—is a matter of first
impression. We answer that question no. Finding no error, we affirm the
challenged order.
                             I. BACKGROUND3
    A. Neon Palm Nursery and Buxup Corporation
      In 1983, Motiska began operating a nursery business called Neon Palm
Nursery (Neon Palm) as a sole proprietorship. Prior to his January 2001
marriage to Ford, Motiska was married to Cynthia Motiska (Cynthia).4
Motiska and Cynthia divorced pursuant to a status-only judgment in 1999,
but litigation pertaining to Neon Palm continued and was ongoing when
Motiska and Ford married. As part of a mediated agreement in that
litigation, Motiska was awarded Neon Palm as his sole property. This award
was confirmed in an interspousal deed filed on April 3, 2002.
      In early 2001, shortly after his marriage to Ford, Motiska formed a
corporation called Buxup Corporation (Buxup) and began using the business

      3 As we discuss further below, prior to issuing the order that Motiska

challenges in this appeal, the trial court held two trials on related issues and
issued statements of decision. We derive our summary of the underlying
facts in part from the court’s findings in those statements of decision.
      4 Because Cynthia Motiska shares a surname with appellant Dale

Motiska, we refer to her by her first name for clarity. We intend no
disrespect.

                                       2
name Palm Island Nursery (or Palm Island Nursery Outlet); we will
sometimes refer to the latter as Palm Island. Specifically, the court found
that, in March 2001, Motiska filed a fictitious business name statement
registering the name Palm Island Nursery, and that articles of incorporation
for Buxup were filed by the Secretary of State on May 15, 2001. The court
found that Palm Island began doing business on February 26, 2001, and that
both Palm Island and Buxup “were created early in 2001 and began fully
operating by August 2001,” i.e., “within the first year of [Motiska’s] marriage
to [Ford].”5
      The court found that Neon Palm, the preexisting sole proprietorship,
ceased doing business in December 2003 and was sold to Buxup for $1.
Based on conflicting evidence as to whether the sale occurred in 2001 or 2003
(including discrepancies within Motiska’s own testimony, as well as
inconsistent corporate minutes), the court found the sale was in 2003, after
Motiska’s ownership of Neon Palm had been confirmed in the litigation with
his previous wife.6

      5 Motiska states in his appellate brief that Palm Island was “merely a

dba of Buxup,” while Ford states Palm Island was formed as a business and
“later incorporated into” Buxup. In its statements of decision, the trial court
referred to the corporation at one point as “Buxup Corporation DBA Palm
Island Nursery,” while at times discussing Palm Island and Buxup
separately. For purposes of this appeal, these varying descriptions of the
relationship between Palm Island and Buxup are not material. As we shall
discuss, the important question resolved by the trial court was the
relationship between Neon Palm (Motiska’s preexisting sole proprietorship)
and Buxup (the later-formed corporation).
      6 In his appellate briefing, Motiska states he does not dispute that

Neon Palm was sold to Buxup for $1. He asserts in a one-sentence footnote,
however, that there is no evidence he “was actually paid the dollar for the
sale.” We decline to address this undeveloped point or to question the trial
court findings and underlying evidence that the sale occurred.

                                       3
      In the present dissolution matter, Motiska initially took the position
that Neon Palm and Buxup were the same nursery business, and that Buxup
resulted from the incorporation of that business. In briefing in the trial
court, Motiska stated both the Neon Palm and Palm Island names were used
for a period of time, with different types of purchases invoiced using the
different names. But after conducting a trial on the question, the court
rejected Motiska’s contention Buxup was a continuation of Neon Palm
resulting from incorporation.
      The court stated Motiska’s formation of Buxup and Palm Island in 2001
was part of an “attempt to ‘incorporate’ ” Neon Palm, but the court found that
an incorporation of Neon Palm did not in fact occur and that Buxup was
instead “a new and distinct business acquired during the marriage of ”
Motiska and Ford, thus giving rise to a presumption that it was a community
property asset. In summarizing these events, the court stated that, “[j]ust
prior to and early in the marriage to Ms. Ford, Mr. Motiska began the process
of ‘incorporating’ ” Neon Palm, after “a crane accident that revealed to Mr.
Motiska the liability risks involved as an owner of a sole proprietorship.” The
court also noted that, at that time, the business “was subject to litigation
between Mr. Motiska and his previous wife.”
      After considering the evidence presented at trial, the court rejected the
argument that Neon Palm was incorporated, finding instead that Neon Palm
was purchased by Buxup in 2003. The court concluded in part: “Neon Palm
Nursery was an asset that was subject of continued litigation during the time
that Buxup Corporation and Palm Island Nursery were created. Neon Palm
Nursery did not go through the process of incorporation, and it was only after
the nursery was confirmed to Mr. Motiska as his separate property that
Buxup Corporation was able to purchase it. Thus, rather than having been

                                        4
incorporated, Neon Palm Nursery was acquired by Buxup Corporation, a
separate business established during the marriage.”
    B. Trial Court Proceedings
      In the present dissolution matter involving Motiska and Ford, the court
conducted extensive proceedings pertaining to the characterization of Buxup
as community property or separate property and related claims pertaining to
the business.
      1. The 2018 Stipulation
      In April 2018, the parties entered a stipulation (which the trial court
approved as an order) about how these and other matters would be tried,
entitled “stipulation regarding trial issues and reserved issues.” The
stipulation states there first will be a trial on “[c]haracterization (only)”;
although the language as to what property would be characterized is crossed
out, the parties’ trial court briefing reflects they understood the property at
issue was Buxup.
      The stipulation then states: “The Court specifically reserves
jurisdiction over the following issues, inter alia, which will be reserved to a
trial on reserved issues.” On the list of reserved issues are several relating to
“the business,” including (1) “In the event that the Court finds that the
business is presumptively community property, any rebuttal of the
community property presumption via tracing of the acquisition of the
business to [Motiska’s] separate property,” and (2) “Any Family Code
section 2640 claims related to the business.”
      2. The 2019 Trial and the January 2020 Statement of Decision
      The court first held a trial addressing whether the creation of Buxup
was an acquisition during marriage that would give rise to a presumption

                                         5
that it was community property under section 760.7 The trial occurred over
five days between February and December 2019, and the court issued a
statement of decision on January 16, 2020. As discussed, the court found
Buxup was a business acquired during the marriage, giving rise to the
presumption it was a community property asset. The court found Neon Palm
was not incorporated and was instead purchased by Buxup in 2003.
      3. The 2021 Trial and Statement of Decision
      The court held another trial over three days in February and
March 2021, again focused on Buxup. In a statement of decision issued on
May 28, 2021, the court noted that, based on the findings it made after the
previous trial, Buxup “is a presumptive community property business.” The
second trial was held to give Motiska an opportunity to rebut that
presumption. The court found Motiska failed to meet his burden of proof and
did not rebut the presumption.8
      Specifically, the statement of decision reflects that Motiska failed to
show separate property funds were used to provide the initial funding for
Buxup. The court found Motiska did not keep adequate records to show “the
funds used to acquire Palm Island Nursery and Buxup Corp. came
exclusively from separate property funds.” The court concluded that, because
Motiska failed to meet his burden to rebut the community property

      7 Section 760 states: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all
property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person
during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.”
      8 As the trial court noted, the presumption that property acquired by a

spouse during marriage is community property may be rebutted by tracing
the marital acquisition to a separate property source. (In re Marriage of Valli
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396, 1400.) “A spouse’s claim that property acquired
during a marriage is separate property must be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence.” (Ibid.)

                                       6
presumption, “Buxup Corporation and DBA Palm Island Nursery remain
community property.”9
      4. Subsequent Proceedings and the Court’s October 27, 2022
         Order
      The parties reconvened on January 6, 2022, for a trial on remaining
issues. During the January 6 trial session and in subsequent briefing and
oral argument, the parties disputed whether Motiska had a viable claim for
reimbursement under section 2640 for separate property contributions to
Buxup. Ford contended the court’s prior rulings had resolved all separate
property claims to the business. Motiska argued his claim for reimbursement
under section 2640 was a separate issue that had not been adjudicated and
that could only arise after the court had determined Buxup was community
property.
      The court concluded Motiska did not have a claim for reimbursement
under section 2640, because the asserted claim was based on Motiska’s
purported contribution of Neon Palm to Buxup, and the court had previously
determined Motiska sold Neon Palm to Buxup for $1. At a hearing in
July 2022, the court summarized its conclusion, stating in part: “[I]n my
view, Neon Palm includes the dustpan, the crane, the truck, et cetera. And
he made a decision to sell it for a dollar. And you can writ this, or you can do
whatever you need to do with this. [¶] . . . [¶] But to me, Neon Palm was sold.
It was a sale. It was a sale. He received. He set the value himself. There
was no undue influence. There was no interference by Miss Ford. He set the
value at a dollar. He sold it for a dollar. He received the dollar. It is a sale.
It is done.”

      9 In his appellate briefing, Motiska states he does not dispute, “for

purposes of this appeal,” the trial court’s finding that Buxup is community
property.

                                        7
      On October 27, 2022, the court issued a written order. In the order, the
court reaffirmed its previous finding that Motiska sold Neon Palm to Buxup
for $1. The court ruled Motiska did not have a section 2640 claim and would
not be allowed to present evidence to substantiate such a claim if it related to
Neon Palm.
      At Motiska’s request, the trial court certified there was probable cause
to appeal the October 27, 2022 order, and this court granted Motiska’s motion
to appeal the order. (§ 2025; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.392.)
                              II. DISCUSSION
      Motiska contends his sale of Neon Palm (his separate property sole
proprietorship) to Buxup (a community property corporation) was a
contribution to the acquisition of a community asset within the meaning of
section 2640, triggering a right to reimbursement. He argues the court erred
by ruling he had no reimbursement claim under the statute and by declining
to allow him to present evidence to substantiate such a claim.
      As noted, section 2640, subdivision (b) provides in part: “In the division
of the community estate under this division, unless a party has made a
written waiver of the right to reimbursement or has signed a writing that has
the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for the party’s
contributions to the acquisition of property of the community property estate to
the extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property source.”10

      10 Subdivision (a) of section 2640 defines the above italicized language:

“ ‘Contributions to the acquisition of property,’ as used in this section, include
downpayments, payments for improvements, and payments that reduce the
principal of a loan used to finance the purchase or improvement of the
property but do not include payments of interest on the loan or payments
made for maintenance, insurance, or taxation of the property.” The forms of
reimbursable contributions listed in subdivision (a) of the statute are not

                                        8
(Italics added.) “This provision ‘creates a substantive right of reimbursement
that can be relinquished only by an express written waiver by the
contributing spouse. [Citation.] “In the absence of such a written waiver the
donative intent of the contributing spouse does not bar reimbursement.
. . .” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Buie & Neighbors (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1170,
1175.)
        There is no evidence Motiska made a written waiver of section 2640
reimbursement rights. The issue presented is antecedent to that: whether
his sale of Neon Palm to Buxup was a contribution triggering such a right.
As a threshold matter, we think Motiska’s failure to raise this issue in May
2021 in the form of an objection—factually and legally—constrains his ability
to raise the issue now. In the May 2021 statement of decision, the trial court
decided that Motiska had not shown that “the funds used to acquire Palm
Island Nursery and Buxup Corp. came exclusively from separate property
funds.” The court also reaffirmed its finding that Neon Palm was sold to
Buxup for $1. If Motiska believed it to be the case that Neon Palm was not,
in fact, acquired, but was donated, thereby making clear that later
proceedings would be needed to further address the issue of tracing in the
context of a reimbursement claim from Motiska, he needed to raise the issue
then.
        Motiska’s failure to raise his section 2640 issue in May 2021 means
that, factually, we must imply all necessary adverse findings that will
support a determination against him on the issue he failed to raise. Under
Code of Civil Procedure section 634, “if [a] statement of decision does not

exclusive; other contributions may be reimbursable as long as they
contributed to equity acquisition or improvements and are not expressly
excluded by the statute. (In re Marriage of Nicholson and Sparks (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 289, 296.)

                                        9
resolve a controverted issue or is ambiguous, and the omission or ambiguity
was brought to the attention of the trial court, ‘it shall not be inferred on
appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to
those facts or on that issue.’ ” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970,
981; see In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133–1134.)
      “The statutory statement of decision process following ‘ “the trial of a
question of fact by the court” . . . [¶] . . . “is for the benefit of the court and the
parties. To the court it gives an opportunity to place upon [the] record, in
definite written form, its view of the facts and the law of the case, and to
make the case easily reviewable on appeal by exhibiting the exact grounds
upon which judgment rests. To the parties, it furnishes the means, in many
instances, of having their cause reviewed without great expense.” ’ [Citation.]
A proper statement of decision is thus essential to effective appellate review.
‘Without a statement of decision, the judgment is effectively insulated from
review by the substantial evidence rule,’ as we would have no means of
ascertaining the trial court’s reasoning or determining whether its findings
on disputed factual issues support the judgment as a matter of law.”
(Thompson v. Asimos, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at pp. 981–982.)
      Ford argues that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
finding that the sale of Neon Palm to Buxup Corp fairly reflected its value to
Motiska at the time of the sale. We agree, particularly since he may have
had any number of reasons for making this sale as he did at the chosen price
point. We know, for example, that Motiska’s choice of a $1 sale price was
designed to avoid business transfer taxes. There could have been other
reasons that we cannot know because the record on this point was not
developed. But the bottom line is that low consideration does not necessarily
mean there was no consideration. On this record, we are not persuaded the

                                          10
dollar amount Motiska chose provides a basis to treat the transaction as
something other than a sale, as the court found it to be, a finding that, again,
Motiska states he does not challenge.
      Even were it necessary to go beyond the unchallenged factual finding
that Motiska sold Neon Palm to Buxup for $1, we would sustain the trial
court’s finding as a matter of law. We review de novo the court’s
determination as to whether the sale was a contribution triggering a
reimbursement right under section 2640. (See In re Marriage of G.C. & R.W.
(2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1, 23 [“Since the relevant facts are undisputed, and the
issue on appeal turns on whether the trial court properly applied the law
governing the characterization of assets upon dissolution, we apply the de
novo standard of review.”].) Applying this standard, we hold the court
correctly ruled Motiska’s sale of Neon Palm to Buxup—at the sale price of $1
set by Motiska—was not a contribution to the acquisition of property of the
community estate that would entitle him to reimbursement under
section 2640. As a result, there was no need for the court to take additional
evidence as to the amount of the purported contribution.11
      In our view, a spouse’s sale of property to the community (or, as here, to
a business that is a community asset) differs from a freely given contribution
that is subject to reimbursement under section 2640. Beginning with the
language of the statute, the phrase “contributions to the acquisition of
property” in section 2640, subdivision (b)—both its plain meaning and in light

      11 Because we conclude Motiska had no section 2640 reimbursement

claim (and therefore no right to present evidence in support of such a claim),
we need not address the parties’ arguments as to whether prior proceedings
addressed the section 2640 issue or provided Motiska an opportunity to
litigate it. And because the court did not err, we need not consider the
parties’ contentions about whether the asserted error was prejudicial.

                                        11
of the items identified as qualifying payments in section 2640, subdivision (a)
(e.g., “downpayments” and “payments for improvements”)—suggests a
voluntary transfer of funds or assets to benefit the community. In contrast, a
sale of property (i.e., the exchange of property for consideration) is not
commonly viewed as a contribution by the seller to the buyer.
      In reaching our conclusion, we also note that our Supreme Court, in a
leading decision interpreting the scope of section 2640, emphasized that an
important policy consideration in this context is the encouragement of
contributions to benefit the community and protection of the expectations
that arise from such contributions. (In re Marriage of Walrath (1998)
17 Cal.4th 907, 919 (Walrath).) In Walrath, the court addressed the question
whether a party’s right to reimbursement under section 2640 was “limited to
the original community property to which the contribution was made” or
could instead be traced to other community assets that were obtained when
the original community asset was refinanced. (Walrath, at p. 913.)
      As one consideration supporting its conclusion that tracing to
subsequently acquired community assets is permitted, the court stated this
interpretation “is supported by important policy considerations. It
encourages married persons to freely and without reservation contribute their
separate property assets to benefit the community, and alleviates the need for
spouses to negotiate with each other during marriage regarding continuing
reimbursement rights. Under this interpretation, section 2640 protects the
general expectations of most people in marriage, i.e., that spouses will be
reimbursed for significant monetary contributions to the community should
the community dissolve.” (Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 919, italics added;
id. at p. 918 [“The effect of section 2640 was ‘to overturn a long line of cases
which had held that absent an agreement to the contrary, separate property

                                        12
contributions to the community were deemed to be gifts to the community’ ”;
legislative history “reveals a ‘legislative judgment that it would be fairer to
the contributing party to allow separate property reimbursement upon
dissolution.’ ”].)
      As a rule, and on this record, these considerations do not support
treating a spouse’s sale of separate property to the community for a single
dollar as a contribution triggering a reimbursement right under section 2640.
A spouse who decides to sell property to the community is electing not to
contribute the property “freely and without reservation” “to benefit the
community.” (Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 919.) It also is not a “general
expectation” (ibid.) of most spouses that if they sell separate property to the
community, they will nevertheless receive additional reimbursement for the
transferred property, over and above the sale price, if the community
dissolves. There is no clear guidance on this point in the section 2640 case
law to date. But we believe the most predictable rule, and the one that
facilitates planning by prospective spouses contemplating whether to transfer
separate property to a marital community, is not to allow second-guessing of
whether a seller’s unilaterally chosen sale price amounts to a de facto gift.
      Motiska insists that his sale of Neon Palm to Buxup should be treated
differently from other sales. He contends the $1 sale price he selected does
not accurately reflect the value of Neon Palm, so the court should have
disregarded the sale price, treated the transaction as being “akin to a gift to
the community,” determined the actual value of Neon Palm, and awarded
that amount to Motiska as reimbursement under section 2640. We are not
persuaded that, in the absence of undue influence or other circumstantial
evidence that a selected price should be treated as a sham, the value the

                                       13
parties placed on property in a sale should be subject to ad hoc
reexamination.
      For the reasons we have discussed, transfer of property by sale to the
community is not the same as transfer of property by contribution to the
community. The need to determine the amount or value of a spouse’s
separate property contribution under section 2640—the exercise Motiska
contends the court should have undertaken here—arises when the spouse has
in fact made a contribution. (§ 2640, subd. (b); see, e.g., Walrath, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 924 [reimbursement is based on amount of separate property
contribution]; In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1432
[separate property contribution is measured by value of contribution at time
it was made; community is entitled to any appreciation].) But when a spouse
transfers property to the community by sale, the price establishes its value.
      This accords with established principles of contract law, where the sale
price set by the parties to a transaction is generally honored as representing
valid consideration. (See 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2023)
Contracts, § 205 [“[T]he consideration need not necessarily be useful, and
there is no requirement of adequacy to make the contract enforceable in an
action at law.”].) As the trial court emphasized, Motiska decided to sell Neon
Palm to Buxup, and he decided to set the sale price at $1, without any
involvement or interference by Ford or others. As noted above, he had tax-
driven financial reasons for choosing $1, and years later, under different
circumstances, we decline to permit him to disavow the validity of the sale
and characterize the transaction as something other than what he claimed it
was in making the transfer. We are particularly concerned with the line-
drawing problems the rule proposed by Motiska would present. If a spouse
who sells property to the community can later ignore the price he or she

                                       14
selected, then even a sale for a substantial price could be revisited based on a
claim the price does not reflect the actual value of the property sold. In our
view, the better rule in this context is to treat an otherwise valid sale as a
completed transaction in which the selling spouse has already received
reimbursement for transferring property to the community, rather than as a
“contribution” potentially warranting additional reimbursement under
section 2640 whenever there is a discrepancy between the sale price and the
claimed value of the property. A sale for $1 may test that rule at its limit,
but if the rule is discarded here we see no principled way of distinguishing
between cases in which a sale price must be respected and cases in which it
will be open to later reexamination.
      Motiska notes courts have in various contexts referred to $1 as a
nominal amount (although that fact did not generally invalidate the claims or
transactions at issue). (Schraier v. Schraier (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 587, 588–
590 [alimony award of $1 per month appropriately allowed trial court to
retain jurisdiction to consider future modification requests]; Heritage Pacific
Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 986, 1006–1007
[statutory damages award of $1 established plaintiff was prevailing party for
purposes of attorney fees]; Davis v. Fresno Unified School Dist. (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 261, 277 [lease of school property for $1 as component of
statutory “lease-leaseback” financing method].) Even if $1 is often considered
a nominal amount, that general observation does not persuade us that the
sale price selected by Motiska should be disregarded, or that he should
receive additional reimbursement above that price.
      Motiska argues “[a] sale for a nominal amount is akin to a gift.” In
support, he cites Bertelsen v. Bertelsen (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 479, 484, in
which the court stated that a party acting as “attorney in fact” for another

                                       15
person lacked authority to make a gift of the principal’s property, and that a
grant deed listing a price of $10 was also ineffective to convey title, because
“a gift deed and a deed for a nominal sum are in effect the same.” Bertelsen
provides no basis to set aside Motiska’s sale of Neon Palm or to question the
price he set. Unlike the attorney in fact in Bertelsen, Motiska by 2003 was
the sole owner of Neon Palm and had full authority to sell it and to set the
sale price.
      Finally, Motiska argues that the sale price was “not indicative of value”
because it was a “related-party transaction,” and that factors other than the
sale price must be considered to determine the “value” of his “contribution” to
the community. We disagree. The authorities Motiska cites on these points
involve different circumstances. (See In re Estate of Spitly (1932)
124 Cal.App. 642, 643, 645–646 [in computing inheritance tax, value of
corporate securities held by estate must be measured by fair market value at
decedent’s death rather than by later appraisal that arguably reflected
inflated value due to “slimy foundation of false statements” and
“manipulation of the stock market” by stock issuer]; Golden Day Schools, Inc.
v. Office of Administrative Hearings (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1012, 1034, 1017–
1018 [conditions in contracts between nonprofit corporation and regulatory
agency required that, when an expense charged by corporation was a related-
party transaction, corporation had to “establish the transaction as ‘fair and
reasonable and conducted at arm’s length’ ”]; 26 U.S.C. § 2512(b) [addressing
valuation of gifts for purposes of gift tax “[w]here property is transferred for
less than an adequate and full consideration”].)12 Because of the heightened

      12 See also Stroman v. Lynch (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 406, 408 (value of

household furniture and furnishings in conversion action); People v. Grant
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 329 (fair market value of stolen property to prove

                                       16
importance of objectively accurate asset values in such contexts as accounting
and tax, it makes sense that courts are sometimes willing to second-guess
subjectively reported values in some circumstances. But that is not what we
are dealing with here. These cases do not persuade us that, in the present
context, we should ignore the sale price Motiska selected.
                           III. DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s October 27, 2022 order determining Motiska has no
section 2640 claim pertaining to Neon Palm is affirmed. Ford shall recover
her costs on appeal.

                                                    STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J.*

grand theft and burglary); In re Marriage of Hewitson (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d
874, 882, fn. 8 (general definition of fair market value).
      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                      17
Trial Court:          Superior Court of California, County of Solano

Trial Judge:          Hon. Dora M. Rios

Counsel:              C. Athena Roussos; Law Offices of Michael L. Gums
                      and Michael L. Gums, for Appellant.

                      Montagna Family Law and Stephen A. Montagna, for
                      Respondent.

In re Marriage of Motiska and Ford – A166543