Court Opinion

ID: 9763212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:46.807968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.007802
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree only with the last point in the majority opinion. It concerns the partial summary judgment.
Keeping in mind that the partial summary judgment was just that — partial, one needs only to read the motion for partial summary judgment to see that it covered three causes of action alleged against the City. These were: strict liability based on placing the allegedly defective gas regulator in the stream of commerce, violation of the deceptive trade practices act, and implied warranty. The last two were precluded by the statute of limitations. The motion as to the strict liability element was also granted and all three causes precluded. There were no special exceptions leveled against the motion regarding insuffi-ciencies.
Most important in this case is that there was never any cause of action pled against the City based on its placing gas as a natural product in the stream of commerce. The allegations are built only on the City distributing gas through the allegedly defective gas regulator. The three affidavits filed in response to the motion for partial summary judgment do not function to create a new cause of action which was never pled. Responsive affidavits cannot establish a cause of action and become pleadings in a case. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a.
The trial court submitted the question of products liability to the jury: “Was the gas pressure regulator a defective product as that term defective product is defined in this Charge?” Answer: NO. At that point any cause of action based on the defective gas regulator had been decided against the plaintiffs.
An examination of the Third Amended Original Petition filed after the motion for partial summary judgment was granted reveals that plaintiffs did not plead this new cause of action against the City. The pleadings set out causes of action based only on the defective gas regulator (strict liability), negligence, and gross negligence. Plaintiffs did not attempt to amend their pleadings at trial to add a new cause of action. Nor did they request any jury instructions on this new cause of action. They do not argue on appeal that the cause of action was tried by consent minus any pleadings.
While it is established that a cause of action may arise when an entity such as the City places in the stream of commerce a product of high risk such as electricity or gas, i.e., Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.1988), there never was alleged in the present case this particular cause of action, and the City was never put on notice to defend this cause of action. This court cannot create one from the responsive affidavits. It is not for the appellate court to give life to a cause of action which might have been pled, but was not. The appellate court does not have that authority. Plaintiffs either plead a cause of action, or they do not. These plaintiffs did not plead this cause of action.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the portion of the majority opinion regarding the partial summary judgment.