Court Opinion

ID: 9897352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:31.274304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:58.200354
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   Jun 29 2023, 10:30 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

APPELLANT, PRO SE                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas J. Herr                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Herr & Phillips, LLC                                        Attorney General
Lafayette, Indiana                                          Natalie F. Weiss
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas J. Herr,                                             June 29, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-PL-142
        v.                                                  Appeal from the
                                                            Tippecanoe Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable
Appellee-Defendant                                          Randy J. Williams, Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            79D01-2207-PL-63

                                  Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                               Judges Mathias and Pyle concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023                            Page 1 of 14
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Thomas J. Herr challenges the constitutionality of the primary-election system

      in Tippecanoe County. Indiana has adopted a closed primary system, in which

      each eligible political party (usually the Republican and Democratic parties)

      holds a separate primary to choose its nominees for the general election, and

      only voters affiliated with that party may vote in that party’s primary. In most

      counties in Indiana, including Tippecanoe County, this system is used not only

      to nominate executive and legislative candidates but also judicial candidates. As

      such, in order to vote for judicial candidates in a Tippecanoe County primary, a

      voter must affiliate themselves with an eligible political party and vote only

      among that party’s candidates.

[2]   Herr, who lives in Tippecanoe County, does not want to affiliate with a single

      political party, but he cannot participate in the primary elections without doing

      so. He argues this violates his right to vote under the state and federal

      constitutions. Furthermore, he notes that other counties in Indiana hold non-

      partisan elections for judicial officers and argues this disparate treatment

      between counties also violates the state and federal constitutions. The trial court

      found no constitutional violation. We agree and affirm.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023            Page 2 of 14
      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Indiana Code chapter 3-10-1 governs the procedures for primary elections that

      occur in general-election years. A primary election is held in May of each

      general-election year. Ind. Code § 3-10-1-3. Most counties in Indiana hold

      “closed” partisan primaries, wherein each political party’s nominees are

      selected only by those affiliated with that party. See Common Cause Ind. v.

      Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm’n, 800 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2015)

      (“Indiana uses a closed primary system”); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530

      U.S. 567, 570 (2000) (defining closed partisan primary as one “in which only

      persons who are members of the political party . . . can vote on its nominee”).1

      Each political party “whose nominee received at least ten percent (10%) of the

      votes cast in the state for secretary of state at the last election” selects nominees

      to be voted for in the general election. I.C. § 3-10-1-2. Eligible political parties

      have separate tickets containing that party’s candidates, and voters select one

      ticket and vote only among that party’s candidates. I.C. § 3-10-1-15. To vote in

      a party’s primary, the voter must be registered to vote and have “at the last

      general election, voted for a majority of the regular nominees of the political

      1
        Indiana’s primary system may be more akin to a “semi-closed” primary, in which a political party’s primary
      is open not only to members but also to independent voters, given that under Indiana’s system no formal
      membership, enrollment, or registration with the party is required. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 584
      (2005) (defining a semi-closed primary as one in which a party’s members and, if the party wishes, voters
      registered as independents, could vote in the party’s primary). However, given that both parties, as well as the
      Seventh Circuit, refer to Indiana’s system as a “closed primary,” we will do the same. And notably, our
      analysis would be the same for either system, as Herr’s arguments hinge on the fact that he must choose a
      particular political party’s ticket to vote for judicial candidates, which he must do under either a closed or
      semi-closed system.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023                                   Page 3 of 14
      party holding the primary election” or intend “to vote at the next general

      election for a majority of the regular nominees of the political party holding the

      primary election.” I.C. § 3-10-1-6.

[4]   In primary elections, political parties nominate candidates for United States

      Senator, Governor, United States Representative, legislative offices, and local

      offices, which may include local judges. I.C. §§ 3-10-1-4; 3-5-2-29. Most

      counties in Indiana, including Tippecanoe County, have partisan judges who

      are elected using the closed primary system described above—each political

      party selects candidates, voters affiliated with the parties (based either on their

      voting history in the previous general election or their intent in the next) vote

      among those candidates for that party’s nominee, and the winner of each

      party’s primary then runs in the general election. I.C. § 33-33-79-3. However, in

      Allen and Vanderburgh Counties, the elections for judges are nonpartisan.

      Therefore, candidates for judicial office are not on the primary ballot and

      instead appear on the general-election ballot without party designation. I.C. §§

      33-33-2-9; 33-33-82-31.

[5]   In 2022, Herr, who lives and works as a practicing attorney in Tippecanoe

      County, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that its primary-election

      system is unconstitutional. Specifically, he challenged the closed, partisan

      nature of judicial elections in Tippecanoe County, arguing that to vote for

      judicial candidates in the primary he must select one political party and vote

      only among that party’s candidates and that this violates both the state and

      federal constitutions. Both Herr and the State filed cross-motions for summary

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023           Page 4 of 14
      judgment. The trial court granted the State’s motion and denied Herr’s, finding

      that Tippecanoe County’s closed primary-election system is not

      unconstitutional.

[6]   Herr now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Herr renews his argument that Tippecanoe County’s closed primary system for

      electing judges is unconstitutional. This system is laid out in state statute, see

      I.C. ch. 3-10-1, and we review the constitutionality of statutes de novo. Himsel v.

      Himsel, 122 N.E.3d 935, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

      “Statutes come before us ‘clothed with the presumption of constitutionality

      until clearly overcome by a contrary showing.’” Id. (quoting Zoeller v. Sweeney,

      19 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2014)). “The party challenging the constitutionality of

      a statute bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that

      party and in favor of the legislature.” Id. (citation omitted).

      I. Federal Claims
[8]   Herr first asserts Tippecanoe County’s primary voting system places an

      unconstitutional burden on his federal right to vote and violates equal

      protection. “Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right

      of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections.” Reynolds

      v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 1377-78 (1964). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized

      the right to vote is fundamental and that burdens on voting can violate the First

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023             Page 5 of 14
      and Fourteenth Amendments. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.

      208, 214 (1986).

[9]   In addressing a challenge to state election laws under both the First and

      Fourteenth Amendments, we apply the test laid out in Anderson v. Celebrezze,

      460 U.S. 780 (1983). See Acevedo v. Cook Cnty. Officers Electoral Bd., 925 F.3d 944,

      948 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasizing Anderson applies to “all First and Fourteenth

      Amendment challenges to state election laws” and applying it to an equal-

      protection claim). There, the Court acknowledged that although the rights of

      voters were “fundamental,” there must also “be a substantial regulation of

      elections if they are to be fair and honest.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. And these

      regulations, whether they govern “the registration and qualifications of voters,

      the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably

      [affect]—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to

      associate with others for political ends.” Id. To subject every voting regulation

      to strict scrutiny “would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections

      are operated equitably and efficiently.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433

      (1992). Therefore, we apply a “more flexible” standard:

              A court considering a challenge to a state election law must
              weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
              rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
              the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put
              forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
              its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those
              interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023             Page 6 of 14
       Id. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89). Under this standard, a

       regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling

       importance only when it subjects the voters’ rights to severe restrictions. Id. If it

       imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon those rights,

       the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the

       restrictions. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.

       A. First Amendment
[10]   Herr first asserts that Tippecanoe County’s closed primaries inflict an

       unconstitutional burden on his right to vote. Specifically, he argues closed

       primaries “require that [he] express objectionable views and accept unwanted

       associations” in order to vote, in violation of the First Amendment. Appellant’s

       Br. p. 18. The U.S. Supreme Court seemingly rejected an identical challenge to

       closed primaries by summarily affirming Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D.

       Conn. 1976), summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976). There, unaffiliated voters

       challenged a state statute limiting primary voting to those people enrolled in

       political parties, arguing in part that this requirement infringed on their right to

       vote. The district court held there was no constitutional violation, finding the

       enrollment process—filing an application—to be “not particularly burdensome”

       and noting that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting both the

       associational rights of party members and the integrity of primary elections. Id.

       at 847. Other courts have similarly found closed partisan primary elections do

       not violate the First Amendment. See Ziskis v. Symington, 47 F.3d 1004, 1006

       (9th Cir. 1995) (closed primary-election system did not violate independent

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023             Page 7 of 14
       voter’s rights under First or Fourteenth Amendments); Balsam v. Sec’y of N.J.,

       607 Fed. Appx. 177, 183 (3rd Cir. 2015) (same).

[11]   Even assuming, given the “limited precedential effect” given to summary

       dispositions, Nader is not binding on us, we agree with its conclusion. Anderson,

       460 U.S. at 784.2 To vote in Tippecanoe County’s primary election, a voter

       must have simply voted for the majority of that party’s candidates in the

       previous general election or intend to do so in the next. This is not particularly

       burdensome. Unlike other systems the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld, it does

       not even require prior action on the part of the voter or formal enrollment with

       the party. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973) (upholding closed

       primary-election law that required voter to formally enroll as a member of a

       party several months before the primary). Nor does it “lock in” voters, who are

       free to decide at each primary which party’s ticket to choose. See id. at 759

       (noting the closed primary system allowed voters to easily vote in a different

       party primary each year if they chose to do so). The only burden Herr points to

       is the closed nature of the primary itself—that he must choose a party’s primary

       to participate in and vote only among that party’s candidates. But this burden, if

       any, is minimal, as Herr does not have a strong interest, let alone a right, to

       choose the nominee for a party he does not belong to. See Cal. Democratic Party,

       530 U.S. at 574 (“As for the associational ‘interest’ in selecting the candidate of

       2
        The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Nader as the controlling precedent when addressing claims made “by
       nonmembers of a party seeking to vote in that party’s primary despite the party’s opposition.” Tashjian, 479
       U.S. at 215 n.6.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023                                 Page 8 of 14
       a group to which one does not belong, that falls far short of a constitutional

       right, if indeed it can even fairly be characterized as an interest.”); Clingman v.

       Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 588-89 (2005) (questioning whether an election law

       preventing members of other political parties from voting in another party’s

       primary burdened associational rights and determining that if so the burden was

       less severe than others the Court had upheld).

[12]   Furthermore, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, states have important

       interests in the regulation of elections, including the preservation of political

       parties as viable and identifiable interest groups, the enhancement of parties’

       electioneering and party-building efforts, and in maintaining the integrity of

       elections against party raiding and “sore loser” candidacies by spurned primary

       contenders. Id. at 594. Given that the closed primary system here does not place

       a heavy burden on Herr’s First Amendment rights, the State’s regulatory

       interests justify its restrictions.

       B. Fourteenth Amendment
[13]   Herr also argues this system violates the Equal Protection Clause of the

       Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “[n]o State shall deny to any person

       within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is “essentially a

       direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of

       Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Herr challenges

       the requirement that he must participate in a partisan primary in order to vote

       for a judicial candidate, while voters in Allen and Vanderburgh Counties are

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023            Page 9 of 14
       not subject to partisan primaries for judges. He argues that this is disparate

       treatment that violates equal protection.

[14]   But we see no equal-protection violation here. Herr’s argument is premised on

       the idea that he is similarly situated to voters in other counties. But “there is no

       rule that counties, as counties, must be treated alike; the Equal Protection

       Clause relates to equal protection of the laws between persons as such rather

       than between areas.” Griffin v. Cnty Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218,

       230 (1964). Because Herr is treated the same as other voters in his county, there

       is no equal-protection issue. See Citizen Ctr. v. Gessler, 770 F.3d 900, 918 (10th

       Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires only that each county treat

       similarly situated voters the same.”).

[15]   Herr has failed to show Tippecanoe’s closed primary system for electing judges

       violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court did not err in

       denying his motion for summary judgment and granting the State’s.

       II. Indiana Claims
       A. Article 2, Section 2
[16]   Herr also argues the system violates Article 2, Section 2 of the Indiana

       Constitution, which provides:

               (a) A citizen of the United States, who is at least eighteen (18)
               years of age and who has been a resident of a precinct thirty (30)
               days immediately preceding an election may vote in that precinct
               at the election.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023           Page 10 of 14
               (b) A citizen may not be disenfranchised under subsection (a), if
               the citizen is entitled to vote in a precinct under subsection (c) or
               federal law.

               (c) The General Assembly may provide that a citizen who ceases
               to be a resident of a precinct before an election may vote in a
               precinct where the citizen previously resided if, on the date of the
               election, the citizen’s name appears on the registration rolls for
               the precinct.

       “[V]oting is a fundamental right of all voters who meet the enumerated

       qualifications” in Article 2, Section 2. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v.

       Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Ind. 2010). However, the legislature “has power

       to determine what regulations shall be complied with by a qualified voter in

       order that his ballot may be counted, so long as [the regulation] is not so grossly

       unreasonable that compliance therewith is practically impossible.” Simmons v.

       Byrd, 136 N.E. 14, 18 (Ind. 1922). In determining whether a voting regulation is

       constitutional, we look to its “reasonableness and uniformity.” League of Women

       Voters of Ind., 929 N.E.2d at 766. Herr challenges only reasonableness, arguing

       he is required “to express loyalty to the Republican Party or the Democratic

       Party as a condition to [his] effective participation in judicial elections” and that

       this is unreasonable. Appellant’s Br. p. 19.

[17]   As an initial matter, we disagree with Herr’s contention that the closed primary

       system in Tippecanoe County requires him to express loyalty to the Republican

       or Democratic Party in order to vote. Primary elections are not limited to

       Republican or Democratic candidates, but rather to political parties whose

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023            Page 11 of 14
       nominee received at least ten percent of the votes cast in the state for secretary

       of state at the last election, I.C. § 3-10-1-2, although generally only the

       Republican and Democratic Parties have met this threshold.3 Furthermore, the

       statutes do not require an expression of “loyalty.” Instead, a voter merely must

       have voted for the majority of that party’s candidates in the last election or

       intend to do so in the next. See I.C. § 3-10-1-6.

[18]   The question here is whether that requirement is a reasonable regulation. Our

       Supreme Court has not had much occasion to address the reasonableness

       requirement of voting regulations under Article 2, Section 2. However, in

       League of Women Voters of Indiana, the Court addressed the reasonableness of

       voter-identification requirements. In finding that the voter-identification

       requirements were reasonable, the Court noted the relatively minor burdens the

       regulations placed on voters—Indiana law provided that individuals may

       receive an identification card after providing some basic information—and

       served a substantial interest of protecting “the integrity and reliability of the

       electoral process.” League of Women Voters of Ind., 929 N.E.2d at 768. This is like

       the Anderson analysis conducted above, and we find the primary system

       reasonable under Article 2, Section 2 for the same reasons. The burden on

       voters is low, arguably lower than voter-identification requirements, which

       3
         “Since at least 1952, only the Republican and Democratic parties have met this threshold.” Common Cause
       Ind. v. Individual Members of the Ind. Election Comm’n, 800 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2015).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023                             Page 12 of 14
       require voters to acquire identification in advance and bring it to the polls, and

       the system serves a substantial interest in safeguarding primary elections.

[19]   The trial court did not err in determining Tippecanoe County’s closed primary

       system does not violate Herr’s right to vote under the Indiana Constitution.

       B. Article 1, Section 23
[20]   Herr also argues that the primary system violates the Equal Privileges and

       Immunities Clause found in Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution,

       which provides “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class

       of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not

       equally belong to all citizens.” Similar to his equal-protection claim above, Herr

       argues that voters in Allen and Vanderburgh Counties who participate in non-

       partisan elections for judges are receiving a privilege not given to him.

[21]   Indiana’s Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes two requirements:

               First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be
               reasonably related to inherent characteristics [that] distinguish
               the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment
               must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons
               similarly situated. In addition, in determining whether a statute
               complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise
               substantial deference to legislative discretion.

       League of Women Voters of Ind., 929 N.E.2d at 770 (citations omitted). As noted

       above, Herr has not shown he was treated differently than other similarly

       situated individuals. He is treated the same as other voters in his county. As

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023            Page 13 of 14
       such, there is no Article 1, Section 23 violation. See Lomont v. State, 852 N.E.2d

       1002, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s privileges-and-

       immunities claim because, while other counties may offer diversion programs,

       he was treated no differently than other similarly situated offenders in his

       county).

[22]   The trial court did not err in determining the closed primary system in

       Tippecanoe County does not violate Herr’s rights under the Privileges and

       Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

       Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-142 | June 29. 2023          Page 14 of 14