Court Opinion

ID: 9551613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:56:18.985198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:17.671690
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I disagree with the conclusion reached by the court in regard to appellant’s fourth cause of action.
As the majority points out, appellant’s fourth cause of action is based on a claim for negligent misrepresentation. In short, appellant alleged that he relied on Pfeifer’s negligent statement that fire insurance had been obtained on the premises of the Italian Village. In its opinion the majority holds that the trial court “erred in instructing the jury that appellant could not recover without proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appellee had an actual purposeful intent to deceive or defraud appellant.” Left unresolved by the majority’s disposition is appellee’s contention that on the facts of this record appellant was not entitled to go to the jury on this cause of action. This is a question that was briefed and argued by the parties in the lower court and has been thoroughly argued by appellee in his brief before this court.1 In Ransom v. Haner2 it was stated:
In this connection the defendants argue that, if there are any grounds for upholding the summary judgment on their behalf, regardless of whether they are the grounds set forth by the trial judge, the judgment should be affirmed. We agree, for it is a rule of law that an ap-pellee may urge, and the appellate court should consider in defense of a decree or judgment any matter appearing in the record, even if rejected below and even if appellee’s argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it.
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the elements of an action for negligent misrepresentation do not include an intent to deceive or defraud, the majority’s opinion leaves unanswered the question of whether, on the facts appearing in this record, appellant was entitled to reach the jury on his negligent misrepresentation cause of action. In my view the questions raised by appellee in regard to appellant’s fourth cause of action should have been decided in this appeal.3 In light of the record below, the briefs before this court, and our own prior precedents, I am of the opinion that the issues raised by appellee were properly before this court.4

. At the trial counsel for appellant objected to the court’s failure to instruct the jury on negligent misrepresentation.

. 362 P.2d 282, 285 (Alaska 1961). See also our more recent decision in State v. Pete, Opinion No. 372, 420 P.2d 338, 341 (Alaska 1966), where we said:
This position we take is consistent with our rule in civil cases that we should consider in defense of a judgment below any matter appearing in the record, even if not passed upon by the lower court.

. These issues encompassed in part the following questions: whether privity is necessary to sustain an action for negligent misrepresentation where only pecuniary harm is shown; whether such an action can be sustained when Pfeifer’s and Stewart’s statements to appellant were gratuitous; and whether such an action can be maintained if the statements can be characterized as statements of opinion, not fact.

.See this court’s most recent opinion in Watts v. Seward School Bd., Opinion No. 380, 423 P.2d 678 (Alaska, December 7, 1966). Compare Island Homes, Inc. v. City of Fairbanks, Opinion No. 381, 421 P.2d 586 (Alaska, December 12, 1966).