Court Opinion

ID: 9953572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:23:39.106042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:55.892919
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: David Nigro                       :
                                             :
From a Decision of:                          :
Bureau of Administrative                     : No. 1348 C.D. 2022
Adjudication                                 :
                                             :
Appeal of: David Nigro                       : Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                   FILED: March 22, 2024

       Appellant David Nigro (Nigro) appeals pro se from the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (Common Pleas) June 23, 2022 order, through which
Common Pleas affirmed Appellee Bureau of Administrative Adjudication’s (BAA)
issuance of a citation to Nigro. Through that citation, the BAA assessed Nigro a
monetary fine for removing an immobilizing “boot” that had been placed by the
Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) on a black Jeep Cherokee, license plate
#KKB-1258, that was registered in Nigro’s name. We affirm.

                                       I. Background
       On August 10, 2021, PPA employees located the Jeep at 924 Wynnewood
Road in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and placed a boot on one of the vehicle’s wheels
at 2:19 PM, due to Nigro’s nonpayment of eight vehicle citations (the oldest of which
was issued in 2012). BAA Certified Record (C.R.) at 1-2, 8.1 PPA employees

       1
          Nigro did not file a reproduced record; however, we note that he was under no obligation
to do so, because this Court has granted him in forma pauperis status. See Pa. R.A.P. 2151(b).
returned approximately 10 hours later with the intent to tow the Jeep, only to
discover that the vehicle was no longer there; accordingly, the employees issued a
new citation for escaping the boot, which carried with it a $1000 fine. Id. at 3, 8. As
Nigro was the Jeep’s registered owner, the PPA mailed this escape citation to him,
along with a letter that he could either pay the fine or challenge the citation’s validity.
Id. at 6-7.
       Nigro chose the latter option, contesting the escape citation through a letter he
sent to the BAA on August 20, 2021. Id. at 4-5. In this letter, Nigro expressed
confusion as to why he had been cited; explained that the Jeep “was at the mechanic
shop and still is”; and stated that he had unspecified “proof that [he had] paid those
[previous] tickets and the Jeep was not booted or towed[.]” Id. The BAA responded
on September 10, 2021, via a letter in which it notified Nigro that his challenge had
been denied; therein, the BAA explained that
              the matter has now been reviewed by a hearing examiner .
              . . . Once properly issued, a ticket is prima facie evidence
              of a violation and to be overturned upon appeal there must
              be evidence and testimony that the ticket was not valid.
              After review of the [PPA’s] prima facie evidence and
              careful evaluation of the evidence/testimony you
              submitted, it was found that there was insufficient basis
              for dismissal. Therefore the finding of the hearing
              examiner is that you are liable [for the escape citation].
Id. at 10. The BAA also informed Nigro that he could seek administrative review of
this denial by the BAA’s Appeals Panel, but that any appeal hearing thereon would
“not take place in person”; accordingly, the BAA directed him to “include a copy of
this letter along with any additional evidence and/or testimony that [he wished to]
include [with any such appeal] filing.” Id.
       On September 27, 2021, Nigro sent another letter to the BAA, through which
he administratively appealed the hearing examiner’s denial of his citation challenge.

                                            2
Id. at 13-14. In this letter, Nigro essentially argued to the BAA’s Appeals Panel that
the PPA had failed to present evidence establishing that its employees had booted
his Jeep in August 2021 at the location identified on the escape citation, or that Nigro
had been the individual who had removed the boot from the Jeep, as well as that
there was no evidence that the citation had been properly issued. Id. Accordingly,
Nigro “demand[ed] that the [PPA] provide proof of the alleged violation against
[him,]” as well as “a hearing date so that [he could] properly defend [himself against]
the allegations against [him].” Id. at 14. The BAA responded on October 5, 2021,
via a letter in which it informed Nigro that its Appeals Panel had sustained the
hearing examiner’s denial of his challenge to the escape citation. Id. at 18.
       On November 4, 2021, Nigro appealed this decision to Common Pleas. The
lower court took no additional evidence and, on June 23, 2022, issued the
aforementioned order affirming the decision. This appeal to our Court followed
shortly thereafter.
                                        II. Discussion
       Nigro’s appellate arguments are somewhat difficult to parse, but they appear
to fall into two categories, which we summarize as follows.2 First, the BAA’s
decision to uphold the escape citation is not supported by substantial evidence, as
there is no proof in the record establishing that (a) the PPA booted Nigro’s Jeep at
the claimed time and location; (b) there were other outstanding, unpaid citations,
such that the PPA had cause to boot the vehicle; or (c) Nigro removed the boot from

       2
          Where, as here, Common Pleas took no additional evidence, our review is limited to
determining whether the BAA committed errors of law, violated constitutional rights, or employed
procedures that contravened statutory requirements, as well as whether the BAA’s findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence. Kovler v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060,
1062 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing 2 Pa. C.S. § 754). “By ‘substantial evidence’ we mean such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Valley
View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983) (citations omitted).

                                               3
his Jeep. Nigro’s Br. at 20-23. Second, the BAA’s failure to convene a hearing
violated Nigro’s procedural due process rights, by preventing him from having an
adequate opportunity to challenge the escape citation. Id. at 23-24.
       Nigro’s first argument is completely spurious and without merit. As explained
by Common Pleas, the record evidence supports the conclusion that the PPA booted
Nigro’s Jeep at the claimed time and location, as well as that the boot was removed
shortly thereafter without PPA authorization:
              Before the BAA, the PPA presented a copy of the executed
              notice of immobilization that was left on . . . Nigro’s
              vehicle. [C.R. at 1.] The PPA also presented photographs
              taken by a camera mounted to the top of the PPA van that
              supplied the booting device. [Id. at 2.] The photographs
              include a date and time stamp. [Id.] The photographs
              [i]ndisputably show images of . . . Nigro’s vehicle, with
              license plate [#]KKB[-]1258, parked on the 900 block of
              Wynnewood Road shortly before the PPA applied the boot
              to the vehicle. [Id.]
              PPA’s official logs show that its officers returned to . . .
              Nigro’s vehicle several hours later for the purpose of
              towing it. [Id. at 23]. The log entry, however, has the
              notation “MIA,” meaning that the vehicle was no longer
              in that location. [Id. at 24.] A second team went to the
              same spot the next morning and confirmed that the vehicle
              was still not there. [Id. at 23.]
Common Pleas Op., 12/19/22, at 3. Furthermore, it is immaterial to this matter
whether the PPA justifiably booted the Jeep, as this matter is simply about the
subsequent escape citation.3 Finally, the PPA did not have to prove that Nigro
personally removed the boot from the Jeep, because Nigro, as a registered owner of

       3
          To state the obvious, the proper way for someone to contest a booting is by filing a
challenge with the BAA, not by removing the boot themselves. See Phila. Traffic Code § 12-2406,
THE PHILADELPHIA CODE, Title 12, as amended, added by ordinance effective May 6, 1958
(establishing process by which an individual may contest the PPA’s immobilization or
impoundment of a vehicle).

                                              4
the Jeep, was legally liable for any citations assessed against his vehicle. See Phila.
Traffic Code §§ 12-2405, 12-2804-2805 (owners are responsible for all traffic
citations, including those that are booting-related, that have been issued against their
vehicles); Nigro’s Br. at 21(Nigro admits that he was the Jeep’s co-owner).
      As for Nigro’s remaining argument, he did not argue to the BAA that its
failure to provide him with an in-person hearing violated his constitutional right to
due process. Pursuant to Section 753(a) of the Local Agency Law, “if a full and
complete record of the proceedings before the agency was made such party may not
raise upon appeal any other question not raised before the agency . . . unless allowed
by the court upon due cause shown.” 2 Pa. C.S. § 753(a); see Bedford Downs Mgmt.
Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm’n, 926 A.2d 908, 923 (Pa. 2007) (a due process
challenge to an administrative agency’s adjudication can be waived if the assertion
was not first raised before the agency itself). Nigro neither offers an explanation for
why he did not present his due process claim to the BAA, nor articulates why there
would be good cause for allowing him to nevertheless make such a challenge at this
point. Therefore, he has waived this argument.
                                   III. Conclusion
      In keeping with the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas’ June 23,
2022 order.

                                        ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                           5
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of: David Nigro             :
                                   :
From a Decision of:                :
Bureau of Administrative           : No. 1348 C.D. 2022
Adjudication                       :
                                   :
Appeal of: David Nigro             :

                                ORDER

      AND NOW, this 22nd day of March, 2024, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County’s June 23, 2022 order is AFFIRMED.

                                   ELLEN CEISLER, Judge