Court Opinion

ID: 9846698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:45:49.675305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:43.918105
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that a defendant does not have a right to demand a bench trial, the majority errs in granting *418unrestricted veto power to the prosecution over a defendant’s request for one. Accordingly, I dissent to the majority opinion.
The majority correctly states the rule that a defendant does not have the right to unilaterally demand that a trial court conduct a bench trial.1 However, there is nothing in Georgia law that requires that the State have a veto power over a defendant’s request for a bench trial. Further, although the federal rule requires the government to consent to such a request, I believe Georgia would be better served by this Court adopting a rule requiring only the consent of the trial court to a defendant’s request for a bench trial.
The federal rule is based largely on the historical importance of trial by jury in this country.2 However, although “the historical importance of trial by jury may supply an argument against permitting the defendant to waive this right, it does not establish a reason for making the government either the beneficiary or the safekeeper of the traditional importance of trial by jury.”3 Moreover, given that a trial court has the right in Georgia to require a jury trial even when the defendant has requested a bench trial,4 and thus can more than adequately safeguard any interest in a trial by jury, it is completely unwarranted to grant the prosecution veto power over a defendant’s request for a bench trial. Finally, because the right to a jury trial is a privilege granted not to the government but “to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government,”5 it is wrong to grant the government the privilege to require a jury trial if the defendant has decided to waive the privilege that has been granted for his benefit.
For these reasons, I dissent to the majority’s decision granting the prosecution a veto power over a defendant’s request for a bench trial.
*419Decided November 30, 2006
Reconsideration denied December 15, 2006.
Perry & Walters, George P. Donaldson III, Misty G. Haskins, J. Randall Hicks, for appellants.
Joseph K. Mulholland, District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Marion T. Pope, Jr., Special Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Joseph F. Burford, amicus curiae.

 See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 668-669 (25 SE2d 295) (1943).

 See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 312 (50 SC 253, 74 LE 854) (1930) (“Trial by jury is the normal and, with occasional exceptions, the preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases above the grade of petty offenses. In such cases the value and appropriateness of jury trial have been established by long experience, and are not now to be denied. Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.”).

 Jon Fieldman, Singer v. United States and the Misapprehended Source of the Nonconsensual Bench Trial, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 222, 239 (1984).

 Palmer, 195 Ga. at 668-669.

 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 155 (88 SC 1444, 20 LE2d 491) (1968).