Court Opinion

ID: 9851332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:45.815815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.516601
License: Public Domain

OPINION RIORDAN, Justice. Carl Case (defendant) was previously convicted of ten counts of contempt of court and received ten one-year consecutive sentences. These convictions were reversed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Case, 100 N.M. 173, 667 P.2d 978 (Ct.App.1983). Defendant was retried and again convicted of criminal contempt. His subsequent sentence of ten years for one count of contempt of court was upheld by the Court of Appeals and we granted certiorari. We now set aside the sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding. Defendant raises five issues in his petition for certiorari. We address only one— the length of the sentence — and affirm the Court of Appeals on the other issues. The facts and background are adequately stated in the Court of Appeals’ opinion and we do not restate them here.  In this case, defendant was given use immunity against prosecution for his testimony but refused to answer the questions asked of him regarding the involved homicide. Defendant informed the court that he would continue to refuse to answer any questions. It appears that no matter what sentence was imposed, defendant would have refused, and did in fact refuse, to answer questions concerning the homicide. Imprisonment or fine in such cases is imposed to preserve the court’s authority and as punishment for disobedience of the court’s orders, and is not intended to be remedial (i.e., to coerce defendant to answer questions he refused to answer). Thus, the trial court properly concluded that the purpose of the contempt proceeding was not remedial but rather to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court. It would have done no good to have defendant imprisoned until he answered the questions since the trial had concluded. We should also point out that defendant is already to be imprisoned for life plus eighteen years. State v. Case, 100 N.M. 714, 676 P.2d 241 (1984).  In imposing punishment for contempt, the following matters are to be considered by the trial court: the seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the public interest in enforcing a termination of defendant’s defiance, and the importance of deterring future defiance. State v. Our Chapel of Memories of New Mexico, Inc., 74 N.M. 201, 392 P.2d 347 (1964). The punishment imposed should be reasonably related to the nature and gravity of the contumacious conduct. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958); United States v. Conole, 365 F.2d 306 (3rd Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1025, 87 S.Ct. 743, 17 L.Ed.2d 673 (1967).  The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts. City of Bernalillo v. Aragon, 100 N.M. 547, 673 P.2d 831 (1983). This innate power of the courts has also been recognized by the legislature in NMSA 1978, Section 34-1-2 (Repl.Pamp. 1981) which states in pertinent part: It shall be within the power of * * * the several courts of this state * * * to preserve order and decorum, and for that purpose to punish contempts by reprimand, arrest, fine or imprisonment. * * Trial courts are charged with the duty and necessity of guarding their proceedings against whatever interferes or tends to interfere with the orderly administration of justice. State v. Kayser, 25 N.M. 245, 181 P. 278 (1919). However, contempt powers of the court should be used cautiously and sparingly. In re Hooker, 94 N.M. 798, 617 P.2d 1313 (1980); Corliss v. Corliss, 89 N.M. 235, 549 P.2d 1070 (1976). The trial court’s use of its contempt powers was to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court. It is the responsibility of the judiciary to exercise that power wisely and always within its limitations. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Local 890, 57 N.M. 617, 261 P.2d 648 (1953). The only limit on a contempt sentence is the trial court’s discretion, which is reviewable on appeal. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); Green v. United States. Though the trial court is accorded wide discretion in criminal contempt proceedings, State v. Our Chapel of Memories of New Mexico, Inc., its decisions are reviewable for arbitrariness and abuse of discretion. State v. Sanchez, 89 N.M. 673, 556 P.2d 359 (Ct.App.1976). Abuse of discretion has been defined as a conclusion and judgment clearly against the logic of the facts before the court; a decision that is clearly untenable and clearly against reason and evidence. State v. Hargrove, 81 N.M. 145, 464 P.2d 564 (Ct.App.1970).  Originally defendant was sentenced to one year for each count of contempt. We determine that the sentence herein (ten years for one count of contempt) is excessive under the circumstances and, in light of its excessiveness, an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Contempt case history would support this determination. See e.g., State v. Our Chapel of Memories of New Mexico, Inc. (sentences ranging from six months to two years — suspended); State v. Chavez, 100 N.M. 612, 673 P.2d 1345 (Ct.App.1983) (sixty days); State v. Sanchez (six months). This opinion is not intended as a limitation on the number of counts of contempt that may be appropriately brought nor as a limitation as to whether any sentence for contempt may be consecutive or concurrent to other counts or other sentences being served.1  Defendant’s sentence of ten years for one count of criminal contempt is vacated. The cause is remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of the sentence. IT IS SO ORDERED. FEDERICI, C.J., and SOSA and WALTERS, JJ., concur. STOWERS, J., dissents.  . This case is one tried by a jury. If the defendant is ordered to jail for punishment in a case that is not tried by a jury and not remedial, the length of the sentence may not exceed six months. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966); State v. Case, 100 N.M. 173, 667 P.2d 978 (Ct.App.1983).