Court Opinion

ID: 9925948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 16:00:53.810671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:52.451592
License: Public Domain

21-6407
    Sherpa v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           A213 078 013

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of January, two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
                    DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                          Chief Judge,
                    STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                    ALISON J. NATHAN,
                          Circuit Judges.

    DAWA PHINJO SHERPA,
            Petitioner,

                    v.                                           21-6407
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
FOR PETITIONER:                     Ramesh K. Shrestha, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                    Attorney General; Jennifer P. Levings,
                                    Assistant Director; James A. Hurley,
                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                    United States Department of Justice,
                                    Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Dawa Phinjo Sherpa, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review

of a June 29, 2021 decision of the BIA denying his motions to reconsider its

dismissal of his appeal as untimely and to reopen his removal proceedings. In re

Dawa Phinjo Sherpa, No. A213 078 013 (B.I.A. June 29, 2021). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      As an initial matter, we note that Sherpa has abandoned any challenge to

the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider by not addressing that ruling in his

brief and thus we do not consider the BIA’s decision as to that issue. See Debique

v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir. 2023). We review the BIA’s denial of Sherpa’s

motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, though we review conclusions of law de

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novo. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006); Jiang v. Garland, 18 F.4th

730, 734 (2d Cir. 2021). “An abuse of discretion may be found . . . where the

Board’s decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from

established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has acted in an arbitrary or

capricious manner.” Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.

2001) (citations omitted).

      We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Sherpa’s motion to reopen. Whether framed as a jurisdictional rule or a claim-

processing rule, the BIA followed its regulations and precedent to decline to rule

on Sherpa’s motion to reopen because it had not adjudicated the merits of his

underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Matter of Mladineo, 14 I. & N. Dec. 591,

592 (B.I.A. 1974) (“Where, as here, dismissal by the Board was solely for lack of

jurisdiction, so that [it] made no adjudication on the merits, the attempted appeal

is nugatory and the decision of the immigration judge remains undisturbed. If

thereafter a motion is made to reopen or reconsider that decision, there appears to

be no reason why the immigration judge should not adjudicate it . . . .”); see also In

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re Lopez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 16, 17 (B.I.A. 1998) (“[W]here the Board dismisses an appeal

solely for lack of jurisdiction, without adjudication on the merits, . . . the

Immigration Judge retains jurisdiction over any subsequent motion to reopen or

reconsider.”).   Further, in summarily dismissing Sherpa’s appeal, the BIA

informed him that he should file any motion to reopen with the immigration court.

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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