Court Opinion

ID: 9791340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:09:08.587475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.650992
License: Public Domain

Stafford, J.
(dissenting) — This case encompasses the most important combination of constitutional, taxation and educational issues faced by the Supreme Court in its recent *732history. The decision has had a long, difficult, stormy, and ofttimes painful, period of gestation. Unfortunatély, in the end, the opinion characterized as the majority has given birth to a legal pygmy of doubtful origin.
The result may give temporary solace to some because it will be easy to live with on a temporary basis. But, the majority opinion cannot withstand a critical analysis either factually or legally. Thus, resting as it does on a shaky foundation the current comfortable “solution” may be short-lived.
Ordinarily I would write a dissent touching only on the differences that exist in legal concepts. However, my review of the majority opinion makes it clear that such an approach will not disclose the full nature of the problem. In this instance I am concerned with more than a difference in legal concepts. I am troubled by the cavalier manner by which the majority has brushed aside the trial court’s findings of fact. I am disturbed by the use of review tactics seldom experienced in appellate circles. Finally, I simply cannot accept the majority’s ultimate favorable ruling on the constitutionality of financing our public schools, based as it is upon the use of appellate methods which have long since been held unconstitutional by this court.
Thus, I shall approach the analysis in two parts. The first will discuss generally the faulty approach of the majority that, in my opinion, may have an unwarranted impact upon judicial procedure far beyond the issues of this case. The second portion will present the matter based upon the facts actually found by the trial court, applying the appropriate law thereto.
A
General Discussion
Initially, this court remanded the case to the trial court for a fact finding hearing. Pursuant to order, the trial judge held a lengthy hearing. Many witnesses testified, including experts, who opined about numerous statistical exhibits as well as other matters material to the issues before the court. Naturally, there was some conflicting testimony.
*733Thereafter, in the usual course of events, the trial court drafted a carefully considered set of findings of fact fully supported by the record. It is this set of findings that the majority has openly abandoned with an offhand assertion that the Supreme Court is “in an equally good position with the Superior Court to examine the whole record for a determination of those facts ultimately affecting the constitutionality of the state system of public schools.”
The majority has cited no legal support for its asserted power to disregard the trial court’s findings and for substituting therefor its own judgment. This is understandable because there is no legally supportable basis for such an arbitrary act. The majority’s rejection of the trial court’s findings rests on a misconstrued and misconceived application of a rule wholly irrelevant to these proceedings. That rule permits an appellate court to substitute its findings for those of a trial court, if, rather than being partially oral, the testimony considered by the trial court consists of depositions,3 affidavits,4 a bare written record,5 or, in some instances, a written record from an inferior board or administrative agency.6 The foregoing rule recognizes that the trial court has not seen, heard or evaluated live testimony but has merely considered the same written record as the reviewing court. Thus, both courts are equally capable of determining the facts.7 However, this rule is inapplicable both in reason and in law where, as here, the trial court has seen the witnesses, has heard the testimony and has weighed and resolved it in making findings of fact. In such *734event the rule is exactly the opposite of that resorted to by the majority. The credibility and weight to be attached to testimony and to the contents of exhibits is for the trier of fact and not for an appellate court. Zillah Feed Yards, Inc. v. Carlisle, 72 Wn.2d 240, 432 P.2d 650 (1967); Unosawa v. Wright, 44 Wn.2d 777, 270 P.2d 975 (1954). This includes the testimony of expert witnesses. Bard v. Intalco Aluminum Corp., 11 Wn. App. 342, 522 P.2d 1159 (1974).
Contrary to the majority’s unsupported assertion, the Supreme Court is not at liberty to reject a trial court’s findings of fact “if evidence is present in the record to support the findings.” Sylvester v. Imhoff, 81 Wn.2d 637, 639, 503 P.2d 734 (1972); Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959); see also Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738, 306 P.2d 751 (1957). The record makes it clear that there was ample evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact. Further, I note with interest that the majority has rejected numerous findings despite the fact that respondents have assigned no error to many findings most basic and crucial to the dissent’s position. Thus, they must be accepted as verities. State v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 81 Wn.2d 259, 264, 501 P.2d 290 (1972).
I must admit that if the trial court’s findings of fact are ignored, the editorialized opinion of the majority, based upon selected testimony, presents what appears to be a plausible position. I also must concede there is some testimony in the record which supports what has been written by the majority. But, based upon the foregoing discussion it should be clear that it is one thing for an appellate opinion to be based upon mere testimony. It is quite another to rely upon the trial court’s findings of fact. Not only do the critical facts related by the majority lack support in the trial court’s findings of fact, they frequently run counter thereto. This distinction between the majority opinion and the dissent is crucial because in this state we still adhere to Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., supra. We must follow the trial court’s findings of fact even though some of *735the testimony may seem to support a result that momentarily is more expedient.
Since the majority’s decision requires rejection of the trial court’s findings of fact, substituting therefor its own selective version of the facts based on selected testimony, the decision cannot stand under the above-cited law of this state.
The majority’s assertion that the State’s system of financing public schools is' constitutional must be rejected for another important reason. It has been reached by an unconstitutional, arbitrary, usurpation of appellate power. Even if the Supreme Court is of the opinion that a trial court should have resolved a factual dispute in another way, the constitution does not authorize this court to substitute its findings for those of the trial court. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., supra. To this I must add another statement; this court is not authorized to make findings of fact in either civil or criminal cases where the trial court has made none. State v. Marchand, 62 Wn.2d 767, 770, 384 P.2d 865 (1963).
If we resort to the procedural course suggested and used by the majority we might as well abandon Thorndike as well as reference hearings and begin trying factual issues in the Supreme Court. Of course to state the proposition is to refute it.
Before leaving the subject, I wish to make abundantly clear that every factual matter set forth in the dissent is supported by the trial court’s findings of fact. Further, each finding of fact is supported by oral testimony or exhibits contained in the record. The same cannot be said of the majority opinion.
In passing, I must comment on another matter. The majority admittedly relies on some evidence apparently obtained by the Clerk of the Supreme Court, presumably at the behest of the author of the majority opinion (see table, page 710, and the acknowledgment, page 722, as well as the table in footnote 2, page 723 and the acknowledg*736ment). This adds a new dimension to the realm of fact finding hearings and the appellate use thereof. I strongly suggest that we, as an appellate tribunal, must resist the temptation to resort to such practices. We should stay within the record. If we are unwilling to police ourselves in this regard we should at least notify the parties that we have gone on a fact-finding frolic of our own lest they be surprised by an unwarranted consideration of evidence that might have been explained had they been given the opportunity.
Next, the author of the majority opinion maintains that if the present system of public school financing is declared unconstitutional the legislature might face great difficulty if not an impossibility, in replacing it with a constitutional system. I do not share' this lack of faith in the legislative system. I am certain that, given the problem, the legislature is capable of reaching a proper solution.
Purely by way of anticipatory argument, the majority suggests seven changes it says “might” be required in the law if the present system of public school financing were declared unconstitutional. Some might be plausible while others are purely outlandish. The tactic is obvious. Lawyers frequently set up “strawmen” to knock down when- their cases are weak on the law. The same may be said of the majority’s lengthy use of the “parade of horribles” or “pandora’s box” argument as it discusses (a) drastic steps that “might” be needed to avert closing the entire educational system if the financing system is unconstitutional, or, (b) theoretical impacts upon statutes governing teachers’ pensions and other State activities. However, these are not facts. They are scare tactics and deserve no further comment. In this same vein, however, we must remember the respective constitutional duties of the legislature and the court. It is our duty to rule on the constitutionality of statutes. It is the legislature’s duty to pass legislation in a constitutional manner. We would be overstepping our constitutional bounds if we attempted to provide or suggest *737legislative solutions. The legislature is capable of solving the problem, and it is their duty to do so.
In passing I must comment on the majority’s frequent attempts to cast doubt upon the standing of some classes of petitioners (although the standing of only one would have been sufficient). The accompanying rhetoric and conclusionary comments are not supported by a single case. To the contrary, the dissent has gone to considerable length to establish by fact and law, the standing of all classes of petitioners. I will not comment further.
Moving to another area of the majority opinion, I am appalled by the majority’s assertion that the legislature and superintendent of public instruction, not the courts, are the determinants of whether and in what manner the State’s duty to make ample provision for the education of the State’s children is to be discharged. Without the slightest legal support the majority grants the legislature and superintendent of public instruction a carte blanche authority that places them above the law! If this is permitted, where will a citizen find his relief if it is felt that either the legislature or the Superintendent of Public Instruction is violating the constitutional duty? To suggest that the courts are somehow disabled in performing their historic function relegates us all to relying upon the fact that “Big Brother” or “Big Government” knows best. I cannot accept that ill-conceived idea.
At this point I must call attention to the majority’s lengthy attempt to depreciate Const, art. 9, § 1 and its use of the phrase “It is the paramount duty of the state” (Italics mine.). The attack is two-pronged. First, an attempt is made to minimize the importance of the phrase by means of an interpretation that is irrelevant to the issues at hand. I shall not discuss this further because it has been fully covered in sections B, V, and VI of this dissent. The second attack begins with the comment “we have never placed so sweéping and overriding an interpretation on the phrase ‘the paramount duty’ as petitioners now urge.” Thereafter, *738the majority opinion cites five cases which have upheld the constitutionality of certain specific statutes related, directly or indirectly, to public school financing. The first case, Pacific Mfg. Co. v. School Dist. 7, 6 Wash. 121, 33 P. 68 (1893) is not concerned with Const, art. 9, § 1 at all. It discusses section 2. The second case cited is State ex rel. DuPont-Fort Lewis School Dist. 7 v. Bruno, 62 Wn.2d 790, 384 P.2d 608 (1963). This deals basically with the power of the State Board of Education to control school accreditation. Const, art. 9, § 1 is mentioned only by way of indicating that the power is derived from the State’s constitutional obligation to provide an educational program as part of an integrated system of agencies created for that purpose. The third case, Island County Comm. on Assessment Ratios v. Department of Revenue, 81 Wn.2d 193, 500 P.2d 756 (1972) does not actually deal with Const, art. 9, § 1 at all. Rather, it is concerned with the right of school districts under section 2 to receive State funds appropriated by the legislature. Case number four is equally wide of the mark. Carroll v. Bruno, 81 Wn.2d 82, 499 P.2d 876 (1972) authorizes the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to consider federally generated forest funds as a part of funds distributed under the State’s equalization scheme. Finally, Newman v. Schlarb, 184 Wash. 147, 50 P.2d 36 (1935) deals with whether the State can preempt local taxes for school purposes, holding that it can do so in the exercise of its paramount duty. In citing the foregoing cases the majority opinion reaches the conclusion that in none was it “suspected that the whole statutory structure for funding and disbursing school moneys was void for unconstitutionality
After reviewing the above-cited cases, I can only say that neither they nor the quoted conclusion are relevant to the issues before us. One cannot know what the court may or may not have “suspected” about the constitutionality of the public school financing structure. All we know is what the issues were and what the court said about them and in none of the cases cited was the instant issue involved. Not *739one of the cases was required to pass on or even discuss the impact of the phrase “paramount duty of the state . . .” as it applies to the State’s currently asserted duty. The majority well knows this court considers only issues before it. Thus, it is a complete nonsequitur to contend that the present system of public school financing must be constitutional merely because the constitutional issues here involved have not been discussed adversely in prior cases.
Finally, I must emphasize the fact that the majority has misapplied San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) to the facts and law of the instant case. As pointed out later in Section B of this dissenting opinion, the constitution of Texas contains nothing similar to article 9 of the Washington Constitution. In fact, a review of the constitutions of all 50 states makes it abundantly clear that Const, art. 9, § 1 of our State constitution is unique. It is unnecessary to go into this further inasmuch as it is fully discussed in Section B, II through VI. At this point it is sufficient to say, however, that all Rodriguez held was that the Texas system did not violate the federal constitution. That is not the issue here. The issue before us is whether the Washington statutes violate Washington’s own more restrictive State constitution.
As I stated earlier, this is probably one of the most difficult and far-reaching cases to confront this court in years. That, however, should not deter us from facing the facts as they are and the law as it is rather than viewing them in a way we would like them to be as a matter of expediency.
I turn now to Section B which is based entirely upon the actual findings of fact and applicable law.
B
Legal Analysis Based Upon The Findings Op Fact
The central issue before this court is whether the public school financing system of this state violates the equal pro*740tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges and immunities clause of Const, art. 1, § 12, as well as Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2, which declare the State’s duty to make ample provision for the education of its children through a general and uniform system of public schools. I would hold, that the public school financing system does not withstand constitutional challenge under either the privileges and immunities clause of Const, art. 1, § 12 or Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2.
The brief of the various petitioners, respondents and amici curiae have referred only generally to the State’s public school financing “system”, “plan” or “scheme” impacted by the federal and state constitutions. They have not, however, referred us to the specific statutes, allied provisions of the Washington Administrative Code (WAC), administrative rulings of the Superintendent of Public Instruction or of the State Department of Revenue which would be in need of revision. Suffice it to say the suggestion of this dissent on the constitutional issues involved would require revision of numerous statutes, associated portions of WAC, as well as administrative rulings in conflict herewith. Among those directly in conflict are chapter 28A.41 RCW and the allied administrative rulings of the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The aforenamed statutes, related WAC sections, and associated administrative rulings are only examples, and are neither inclusive nor exclusive in light of the constitutional issues involved herein.
One must be acquainted with the parties and the framework of the claims to properly understand the issues. The defendants-respondents (hereafter respondents) are the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Director of the Department of Revenue, the State Treasurer and the members of the State Board of Education. The plaintiffs-petitioners (hereinafter petitioners) are children who attend public elementary and secondary schools located in specified school districts (each child being represented by a guardian ad litem), parents of the foregoing students, school directors of specified school districts who are also *741parents of some of the foregoing students, and numerous school districts. Respondents have challenged the standing of petitioner school districts to maintain this action although the standing of the other petitioners is not put in issue.
Very generally, petitioners have alleged that the children herein attend public elementary and secondary schools located in specified school districts. The public school system is maintained throughout the state by a financing plan that relies heavily on local property taxes thereby causing substantial disparity, among individual school districts, in the amount of revenue available per pupil for the districts’ educational programs. Thus, it is asserted, districts with a lower tax base are unable to spend as much money per child for education as are districts with a higher assessed valuation. This, it is said, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the privileges and immunities clause of Const, art 1, § 12 as well as Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2. The assertions of petitioner-parents are substantially the same except, in addition, they allege that as a result of the financing plan they are required to pay a higher tax rate than taxpayers in many other school districts to obtain the same or lesser educational opportunities for their children. Petitioner-parent-school directors make similar assertions, but add that they are responsible for the operation of the districts in which petitioner-children are schooled. They contend educational opportunities they are able to provide are substantially inferior to those made available to children attending public schools in many other districts of the state. Finally, petitioner-districts add that respondents, in pursuing the present system of public school finance, have breached a duty to the districts who act on behalf of the other petitioners.
Petitioners pray: (1) for a writ of mandate directing respondents to reallocate the funds available for financial support of the school system and to restructure the financing scheme along constitutional grounds; (2) for a writ of *742prohibition forbidding respondents from further allocation of such funds in violation of the state and federal constitutions; (3) for a declaration that the financing scheme is unconstitutional; and, (4) that this court retain jurisdiction affording respondents and the legislature a reasonable time in which to correct the alleged constitutional deficiencies.
Inasmuch as petitioners sought a writ of mandate and/or a writ of prohibition directed to respondent State Officers, the matter was filed directly in the Supreme Court pursuant to ROA 1-58(a). The parties were unable to agree upon the applicable facts and the matter was referred to the Superior Court for Thurston County for a hearing, preparation of a statement of facts and findings of fact. ROA 1-58 (b).
I have reviewed the findings of fact prepared by the trial judge and find them supported by substantial evidence and painstakingly complete insofar as the relevant facts are concerned. Based thereon I begin my examination of the State public school financing system which is the focal point of the constitutional dispute.
I. The Facts Pursuant To Trial Court’s Findings Of Fact
The 320 school districts in the state of Washington are governmental units in the integrated system of agencies which form the public education system created by the legislature to carry out the constitutional mandate of Const, art. 9, § 2. School districts have distinct boundaries and the mechanism for establishing boundaries is set out in State statutes, thus restricting each unit to a finite amount of taxable wealth.
Pursuant to RCW 28A.41.130 and 28A.48.010, State monies are distributed annually to the school districts. The balance necessary for operation of the districts is generated by property tax levies at the local school district level with minor sums coming from county and federal sources. The relative contribution from each source is as follows:

*743
Source 1960-61 1965-66 1970-71

Local Property Taxes 22.7% 24.8% 35.97%8
County Real Estate
Excise Tax 3.5 3.6 2.71
Federal Funds 5.0 7.5 6.4
State Funds 61.9 58.0 49.0
It will be noted that in the year 1970-71, 84.97 percent of public school funds were derived from two basic sources: (a) local school district taxes on real property, and (b) distribution of State funds to the local districts. These two major sources of local school revenue assume significance when it is considered that in the 10 years between 1960-61 and 1970-71 funds from State sources declined from 61.9 percent to 49.0 percent (i.e., a drop of 12.9 percent) whereas funds generated within the local school districts by means of property taxes increased from 22.7 percent to 35.97 percent (i.e., an increase of 13.27 percent). In short, as the State reduced its percentage of annual operational support, the local school districts were compelled to increase the percentage derived from local property taxes.
State operational support, called the “per pupil guarantee” is distributed to school districts to achieve a minimum guarantee of revenue for the “weighted student” enrollment of the district. This nonlevy support comes as the result of legislative appropriations based upon the budget request of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Currently, that guarantee is $365 per “weighted pupil.” Pursuant to chapter 28A.41 RCW, the guarantee is determined generally as follows:
(a) First the State computes the basic enrollment of the district, kindergarten students count as one-half.
(b) Next, the State computes the total number of “weighted students” in an effort to take into account the cost of educating different types of students. For example, .3 is added for each secondary student; .2 is added for each *744vocational pupil; .25 is added for students in interdistrict cooperation programs, etc. Other factors are also considered, for instance, additional funds are granted to districts with greater average staff experience, for the size of the district and whether the district is remote and necessary.
(c) The total “weighted” enrollment is multiplied by the $365 guarantee.
(d) Thereafter the State deducts 85 percent of the amount the school district would raise by levying an assumed or theoretical 14 mills against 25 percent of the true and fair value of the taxable real property within the district, and deducts the amounts raised from nonhigh school receipts, “in-lieu-of” tax receipts, real estate excise taxes, state forest taxes and a few other minor receipts.
(e) Finally, the total State contribution to the school district is the difference between (c) and (d) above.
In addition, the State reimburses school districts for 90 percent of their approved transportation costs. RCW 28A.41.160.
As previously indicated, the local real property tax is a major source of operating revenue.9 Further, if voters in a school district desire to obtain revenue in addition to normally available operating and maintenance funds, they may do so by means of an “excess levy.” Since revenue from excess levies is a product of the millage rate and the assessed value of the real property within the school district, it is at once apparent that the amount of taxable wealth or assessed valuation of the district will have an important effect on the capacity of the district to raise funds. Unfortunately, there is a substantial variation in assessed valuation per pupil among the State’s school districts, ranging from a low of $1,925 per pupil to a high of $776,567 per pupil.
The State recognizes the existence of the foregoing wide variations and attempts some degree of equalizing by *745means of the above mentioned “per pupil guarantee” based upon the “weighted pupil” or “weighted enrollment.” While the State has attempted to achieve some degree of equalization in school operation and maintenance revenue through the “per pupil guaranty,” the method of its computation significantly benefits those school districts which have a high assessed valuation. Further, the amount of the “per pupil guaranty” has not kept pace with increasing operational and maintenance costs of the schools and does not provide sufficient funds to operate the public schools in the state. For example, the mean expenditure for all school districts is $819 and the mean expenditure for all pupils is $721, as compared with the State’s “per pupil guaranty” of $365. Partial reimbursement of other expenses by the State has an additional nonequalizing effect. Some districts can more easily afford to incur the nonreimbursable portion of expense such as transportation, and hence can more easily qualify for larger amounts of reimbursement.
Beyond the State apportionment of funds, there is no equalization of school district finance. The low level of the State’s apportionment has forced many school districts to rely increasingly upon special levy revenue. Further, the standards adopted by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction for receipt of State apportioned funds have additionally compelled reliance upon special levies. In fact, the amount of money raised by special levy millage in the State’s school districts has increased sharply in the past 10 years from less than $10 million in 1957 to a high of $172 million in 1972. At the same time the percentage of State support of the public education system has steadily declined in the past 10 years. As previously indicated, in 1960-61 State funds comprised 61.9 percent of total funds (only 22.7 percent being locally generated) whereas in 1970-71 State funds had dropped to only 49 percent with a corresponding increase in local monies to 35.9 percent.
The problem facing numerous school districts becomes immediately apparent when it is realized that because of *746variations in assessed valuation per pupil, the ability of school districts to raise a given per-pupil dollar by special levy is substantially different. For example, among the State’s 320 school districts the range of per-pupil expenditure ranges from $4,517 per pupil to $470, the mean basic expenditure being $819 and the standard deviation between the basic expenditures per pupil being $392.
Reduced to its lowest common denominator, it is clear that the amount of money available to individual school districts is purely a function of the assessed valuation per pupil within the school district and the millage rate imposed (i.e., the tax burden). School districts with low assessed valuation per pupil can match the spending level of districts with a high taxable base per pupil only by méans of greater millage rates. To put it another way, in spite of the lower tax rate in districts with higher assessed valuation per pupil, their average expenditure per pupil is significantly greater than in the districts with lower assessed valuation per pupil. These variations not only occur among counties, but among school districts within counties.
Not only is there a relationship between per-pupil assessed valuation and per-pupil expenditures, but there is also a positive correlation between assessed valuation per pupil and median income (i.e., the higher the assessed valuation per pupil, the higher the median income) in the eight counties in the state with the largest school population. Similarly, in the same counties (Yakima, Spokane, Pierce, Thurston, Clark, Kitsap, Snohomish and King) there is negative correlation between assessed valuation per pupil and the percentage of families with income below the poverty level (i.e., the lower the county ranks in terms of assessed valuation per pupil, the higher the percentage of poverty families in the county). Parenthetically, it is of interest that respondents have assigned no error to the trial court’s findings of fact that support the matters just related in this paragraph. Thus, they must be accepted as verities. ROA 1-42 (g) (iii); ROA 1-43; Martin v. Clinton, 67 Wn.2d 608, 408 P.2d 895 (1965).
*747As can be seen, the current system of financing the State’s system of public schools creates the major portion of a vicious circle. Districts that have the lowest assessed valuations per pupil, and thus need additional operation and maintenance funds the most, must tax themselves at a higher rate than districts with a higher tax base per pupil. The final segment of the circle is closed when it is realized that a special levy, to produce a given amount of per-pupil dollars, has a better chance of passing within a district with higher assessed valuation per pupil, since the millage required in the district with higher assessed valuation per pupil will necessarily be less.
In the final analysis, there is a built-in discrimination contained in the per-pupil guarantee. For example, although in calculating the “per pupil guaranty,” the State deducts 85 percent of the amount the school district would raise by levying an assumed or theoretical 14 mills against 25 percent of the true and fair value of the taxable real property within the district, the apparent 15 percent bonus (or “leeway”) is not equalized and thus provides greater benefits to school districts with a higher assessed valuation per student. While each district will receive 15 percent, the dollar amounts per pupil will vary with differences in assessed valuation per pupil, inasmuch as the percentage figure is multiplied against the amount the respective districts produce by levying the basic millage — an amount which mathematically varies with the amount of assessed valuation in the districts.
Moreover, revenues from the 2-mill “state levy” are not equalized and thus provide greater benefits to districts with higher assessed value per pupil. The amount in dollars produced for a given district is the result of multiplying 2 mills times the assessed valuation of the district. Thus, school districts with higher assessed valuation per pupil will necessarily receive more per-pupil dollars from the 2-mill levy than will districts with a lower taxable base.
Still further, the weighting formula itself, which in*748creases the weighted enrollment figures to reflect staff training and experience, provides monetary benefits to districts which recruit and retain the more experienced and trained staff. Once again, districts which are better able to compete for experienced staff (i.e., those with higher per-pupil assessed valuation) receive a double benefit: better staff and additional State money from the per-pupil guaranty.
The same double benefit is afforded the more affluent districts under reimbursements- for transportation and other expenses. This, too, has a nonequalizing effect because some districts can more easily afford to incur the nonreimbursable portion of such expenses and hence can more easily qualify for greater reimbursement.
Beyond the discrimination found within the per-pupil guaranty, other inequities exist in the State’s system of financing the public schools herein. Aside from the per-pupil guaranty, school district finances for all districts are nonequalized. The dollars available for schools are purely a function of the assessed valuation per pupil of the district and the tax burden or millage rate imposed. As previously indicated, the per-pupil guaranty has not kept pace with increasing school costs compelling reliance upon special levy revenue. Further, as the percentage of State monies for support of the public education system has decreased, reliance upon the unequalized special levy has increased sharply.
Still further, the increasing share of the burden that has come to rest on local school district property levies has had a substantial effect on district spending abilities, because over and above the State guaranty the major factor in determining the amount of money available to a school district for education is the district’s assessed valuation per pupil. Wide variation in the assessed valuation of districts has caused a wide variance in the ability of districts to *749raise funds by special levies.10 Consequently, across the state, districts with high assessed valuation have found it necessary to tax themselves less than those with a low assessed valuation, to achieve the same basic expenditures per pupil.
The ultimate responsibility for this increased cost of education has fallen upon the individual taxpayer. Taxpayers’ ability to secure a given per-pupil level of expenditures is limited to their willingness to accept the required millage rate, since they have no control over the other variable, assessed valuation per pupil. Thus, taxpayers in districts with low assessed valuation per pupil must accept a higher millage rate to reach a given level of per-pupil expenditure than do taxpayers in districts with higher assessed valuation per pupil.
When a special levy fails, the effect upon the school district and its students is dramatic because financing is a key to the provision of educational services. At such times, a district may be forced to cut personnel, cut salaries, eliminate classes, and cut materials and texts. Such a district loses its ability to compete with other districts for staff and to retain staff. It may even be necessary to close buildings, increase staff-student ratios, and to split school days to accommodate more students with less staff.
There are also direct effects if districts are required to depend upon special levies for operation and maintenance. There is speculation, uncertainty and hesitation to make long-range planning and funding.
In short, the current system almost compels educational opportunity to vary from district to district dependent *750upon difference in per-pupil assessed valuation. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 599-601, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), in discussing a similar problem confronting the California high court, had this to say: '
Obviously, the richer district is favored when it can provide the same educational quality for its children with less tax effort. Furthermore, as a statistical matter, the poorer districts are financially unable to raise their taxes high enough to match the educational offerings of wealthier districts. . . . Thus, affluent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no cake at all.
. . . To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make the quality of a child’s education dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial establishments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of factors as the basis for educational financing.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Having outlined the basic framework of the State’s public school financing plan, I now turn to petitioners’ legal claims.
II. Application Of Rodriguez By Petitioners First, petitioners allege that, within the sphere of the federal constitution, the foregoing financing scheme operates to the disadvantage of suspect classes and interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties. It is argued that the system violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not agree. This issue was resolved in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973). The United States Supreme Court held therein that a similar plan of public school financing in the state of Texas was not a proper case for it to examine the state’s laws under standards of strict judicial scrutiny. It pointed out that the test was reserved for cases involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of suspect classes or interfere with the *751exercise of fundamental rights and liberties protected by the federal constitution. The court went on to determine in Rodriguez that the Texas school financing system did not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class and did not impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or liberty protected by the federal constitution thus rejecting both of the predicates for invoking the compelling state interest standard of review and the close scrutiny approach which that concept purports to involve. In sum, the court held that the Texas school financing system did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. Respondent’s Application Of Rodriguez Is Not In Point Under Washington State Constitution
Based upon the foregoing, respondents argue that Rodriguez is determinative of all issues before the court. They have, however, interpreted the impact of Rodriguez too broadly.
While the federal constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is controlling in its sphere, the question whether our State constitution has been offended is for us to decide. Rodriguez neither requires nor suggests a different view according to its later case history. Subsequent to Rodriguez the New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with a legislative attempt to finance state elementary and secondary public education by means of heavy reliance on local taxation. Unlike Rodriguez in which a federal district court was reversed after holding the Texas school financing system violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that state legislation contravened the New Jersey state constitution. In so doing, the New Jersey Court specifically acknowledgéd the holding in Rodriguez, as based on the federal constitution, but held that it was not deterred from deeming the state constitution more demanding. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (1973), modified on grounds not applicable here, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 *752(1973). We are in the same position in our consideration of the Washington State Constitution. We are concerned with the constitutionality of State legislation based upon our interpretation of the State constitution. At this juncture it is of interest that the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in the New Jersey case, sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219, 94 S. Ct. 292 (1973).
While the legislation here involved may meet the general federal criteria found in Rodriguez, it does not necessarily meet the more strict standards imposed by our own State constitution. Thus, it is necessary to consider the State system of public school financing in light of the Washington State Constitution.
IV. “Compelling State Interest” And “Rational Basis” Doctrines Not Applicable
Respondents suggest that Const, art. 1, § 1211 has the same impact as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus should be applied in the same manner, citing DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn.2d 11, 37, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S. 312, 40 L. Ed. 2d, 164, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974); Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Govan Inv. Trust, 78 Wn.2d 584, 478 P.2d 232 (1970) and similar holdings of this court. From this they reason that the public school financing system before us must be constitutional under Const, art. 1, § 12 because Rodriguez found that the similar Texas school financing system complied with the Fourteenth Amendment. I disagree with their conclusion.
In Rodriguez, at page 24, the state argued that “[b]y providing 12 years of free public-school education, and by assuring teachers, books, transportation, and operating funds, the Texas Legislature has endeavored to ‘guarantee, for the welfare of the state as a whole, that all people shall *753have at least an adequate program of education.” The court pointed out that there was no proof offered which discredited or refuted the state’s assertion. In the instant case, it is the uncontroverted finding of the trial court that the State’s per-pupil guaranty does not even provide sufficient funds with which to operate and maintain the public schools. Thus, while neither the equal protection nor privileges and immunities clause requires absolute equality, our State constitution, article 9, sections 1 and 2, specifically requires the State to make “ample provision for the education of all children.” (Italics mine.)
Respondents in Rodriguez also argued that the Texas financing system interfered with the exercise of a “fundamental right” and therefore a strict standard of judicial review was required. The court found that a “right” to education was neither explicitly nor implicitly guarantied by the federal constitution. Thus, the strict “compelling state interest” test was not applicable.
I also feel that neither the “compelling state interest” test nor the “rational basis” test is applicable herein. However, I would so hold for distinctly different reasons. As pointed out in Section VII of this dissent, a different question is presented. The issue is whether the State has met its “paramount duty ... to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders . . .” (Italics mine.) Const, art. 9, § 1.
V. Article 9, Sections 1 & 2 Are Unique, Explicit And Unlike The Texas Constitution
The Texas Constitution contains nothing similar to Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 which read as follows: Section 1:
It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.
(Italics mine.) Section 2:
The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.
*754(Italics mine.) To this further extent the Washington Constitution, .and thus this case, differ from Rodriguez. In fact, my research indicates that the introductory phrase of Const, art. 9, § 1 is unique among state constitutions. .
The intent of the framers of our State constitution is evident. Const, art. 9, § 1 was part of the original constitution and has not been amended. Review of The Journal of The Washington State Constitutional Convention 1889 (1962) reveals no indication that Const, art. 9, § 1 held or is to hold a secondary status or that it was or is to be construed in a manner other than by its plain language. Further, there is nothing to indicate that Const, art. 9, § 1 is other than declarative of the State’s social, economic and educational duty. Quite to the contrary, a perusal of the constitution reveals the framers declared only once in the entire document that a specified State function was to be the State’s paramount duty. That singular declaration of paramount duty is found in Const, art. 9, § 1.
While the passage of time often makes it difficult to ascertain the intent of constitutional provisions, there is no doubt the imperative wording of Const, art. 9, § 1 was intentional. Theodore L. Stiles, a member of the 1889 constitutional convention and later a justice of the first Supreme Court, wrote:
No other state has placed the common school on so high a pedestal. One who carefully reads Article JX. might also wonder whether, after giving to the school fund all that is here required to be given, anything would be left for other purposes. But the convention was familiar with the history of school funds in the older states, and the attempt was made to avoid the possibility of repeating the tale of dissipation and utter loss.
T. Stiles, The Constitution of the State and Its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4 Wash. Historical Q. 281, 284 (1913).
In the same vein, it is of interest that general English usage is consistent with Justice Stiles’ observation. The word “paramount” is' not a mere synonym of “important.” *755As pointed out in B. Eyans, A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage 350 (1957):
paramount is an adjective meaning above others in rank or authority, superior in power or jurisdiction . . . chief in importance, supreme, preeminent . . . When a thing is said to be paramount, it can only mean that it is more important than all other things concerned.
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1638 (1967) defines paramount in similar terms:
1: having a higher or the highest rank or authority . . ,. 2: superior to all others . . . Chief, Supreme, Preeminent . . . syn see Dominant
Such singular use of the term “paramount duty” plus its common English usage, give clear indication of the importance attached to public education of this State’s children.
By imposing upon the State a “paramount” constitutional “duty” to make ample provision for the education of all children within its borders, there has been created a “duty” that is preeminent or dominant. Flowing from the constitutionally imposed “duty,” or legal obligation, is that “duty’s” jural correlative, a “right”12 (i.e., control over another’s conduct13)'. Thus, children residing within the borders of the state possess a “right” to have the State make ample provision for their education; that “right” being created by the constitutional imposition of a “duty” upon the State. Further, since the constitution has characterized the “duty” as paramount, the correlative “right” must be accorded equal stature.
Const, art. 9, § 1 not only imposes upon the State a “paramount duty ... to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders,” but it requires that the goal be achieved “without distinction or *756preference on account of race, color, caste,14 or sex.” (Italics mine.) In essence, the latter part of the section assures the school children of this state that the nature or quality of their education shall not be affected by their racial or cultural heritage, material wealth, or gender. Thus, it is readily apparent that Const, art. 9, § 1, in and of itself, provides public school children an independent guaranty of equal protection , as to education in addition to whatever guaranties may be provided by article 1, section 12 of the State constitution.
From the foregoing analysis I can only conclude that the framers of our constitution meant what they said, that it is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the public education of all children residing within its borders, without discrimination.
I do not disagree with the majority’s observations concerning constitutional interpretation that: (1) “fundamental principles are of equal dignity and ‘neither must be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair the other’ ” (Citations omitted.); or (2) “ ‘[N]o constitutional guaranty enjoys preference, so none should suffer subordination or deletion,’ ” (Citations omitted.); or (3) “ ‘Every statement in a state constitution must be interpreted in the light of the entire document, and not sequestered from it, and none is to be considered alone.’ ” (Citations omitted.) I do say most emphatically, however, that the foregoing quotations and cases upon which they rely are not in point in the instant case.
The question here is not one of weighing fundamental principles of equal dignity or giving preference to one constitutional section over another abstract section of equal impact as a means of interpreting the document. In fact we are not here concerned with a matter of interpretation at all. Words in the constitution must be given their common *757and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. O’Connell v. PUD 1, 79 Wn.2d 237, 240, 484 P.2d 393 (1971); State ex rel. O’Connell v. Slavin, 75 Wn.2d 554, 557, 452 P.2d 943 (1969); State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wn.2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231 (1964); see also State ex rel. Graham v. Olympia, 80 Wn.2d 672, 497 P.2d 924 (1972). As indicated previously the constitutional phrase “paramount duty,” given its common and ordinary meaning is clear and unambiguous. Thus, any attempted interpretation of it other than in its normal and ordinary sense is clearly improper. State ex rel. O’Connell v. PUD 1, supra; State ex rel. O’Connell v. Slavin, supra. The real issue is whether the clear and unambiguous words of Const, art. 9, § 1 mean exactly what they say, particularly since the phrase “paramount duty” was used only once in the entire constitution. The issue is as simple as that. If the words do mean what they say, then we must follow them. State ex rel. O’Connell v. PUD 1, supra; State ex rel. O’Connell v. Slavin, supra.
If we do not like the direction in which they lead us under today’s economic and social conditions, we should change them by constitutional means. But, we should not resort to the subterfuge of judicial “interpretation” to destroy their constitutional life. A resort to such tactics is not only unwarranted, it is dangerous.
VI. Const. Art. 1, § 12 And Const. Art. 9, §§ 1 & 2
Not Singularly Exclusive But Mutually Supportive
It is suggested that article 1, section 12 of the State constitution15 (i.e., the privileges and immunities clause) and Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 are singularly exclusive, each being applicable only on its own terms. Thus, it is urged, public school financing cannot be brought within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause of the State *758constitution by means of Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2. I. do not agree with this concept. ..
First, as 1 pointed out in Section 'V above, in addition to those guaranties provided by Const, art. 1, § 12, Const; art. 9, § 1, in and of itself, provides public school children an independent guaranty of equal protection as to education.
Second, Const, art. 9, § 1 creates, constitutionally, a class of citizens to which the State owes the “paramount duty” of making “ample provision” for education (i.e., “all children residing within its borders” (Italics mine.)). Article-9, section 1 also declares that such provision for education shall be “without distinction or preference on account of face, color, caste, or sex.” (Italics burs.) Section 2 of article 9 provides further that the above-mentioned duty shall be carried out by means of a “general and uniform system of public schools.” (Italics mine.)
Comparison of the foregoing with Const, art. i, § 12 makes it abundantly clear that instead of being singularly exclusive, the two constitutional provisions are mutually supportive. Const, art. 9, § 1 constitutionally provides for a class of citizens (i.e., “áZZ children residing within its borders” (Italics mine.)). At the same time, Const, art. 1, § 12 deblares that the State shall pass no law that grants any citizen privileges or immunities upon which the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens. Considering the impact of both articles it is clear that within the class constitutionally created by Const, art. 9, § 1 there must be equality of treatment. If this court holds otherwise, the “paramount duty” so explicitly stated in Const, art. 9, § 1 and so positively emphasized by its singular use, would be relegated to a secondary position in the constitution. The same would be true of the constitutional mandate that the duty will be achieved by means of a “general and uniform system of public schools.” Const, art. 9, § 2.
This is not to say that the State may not provide for proper subclassifications within the constitutionally declared class of “children residing within its borders.” How*759evéí, • since Const, art. 9, § 1 has mandated it to be the “paramount duty” of the State to make “ample provision” for their education, the legislature should not be permitted to enact laws which derogate from the specifically declared duty owed the constitutionally created class.
VII. The State’s Duty To Provide An Ample Education And Student’s Right To Receive It
The petitioners have asked the court to apply the “compelling state interest” test to the legislation here involved, arguing that it will not survive the strict scrutiny required. On the other hand, the State has opted for the “rational relationship” test, contending the public school financing system is in fact rationally related to a legitimate State interest. I am convinced that neither test is applicable under Washington’s constitutional mandate.
As indicated in Section V, all children residing within the state’s borders have a “right” (in the true Hohfeldian sense) to be provided with an education. That “right” is constitutionally paramount. It is equally clear that the State’s implementation of that “right” must be achieved by means of a “general and uniform system of public schools,” Const, art. 9, § 2. Further, on a substantially equal basis, it must be “without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” Const, art. 9, § 1.
Since the children residing within the state’s borders possess such a “right” (with the State having a correlative “duty” to provide for the implementation of that “right”) the State may not escape its constitutional “duty” even by showing that it has a “compelling state interest” for so doing or that there is a “rational relationship” between the legislation enacted and the end sought to be accomplished. The State may discharge its “duty” only by the performance thereof or by the prevention of that performance by the holder of the “right.”16 Thus, in the instant case, neither *760the “compelling state interest” test nor the “rational relationship” test opted for by the respective parties are appli*761cable. Since there is no evidence that any of the petitioners have prevented performance of the State’s duty, the sole question is whether the State performed its mandated duty. Based upon the findings of fact, I would hold that the State has not met the constitutional duty imposed by Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 either singly or as supported by Const, art. 1, § 12.
VIII. Ample Education
Respondents argue that guidelines for what is an “ample” education must necessarily differ according to the variable costs of the 320 districts and the multitudinous need of the State’s school children. It is posited that while children in some school districts have less spent on their education than do those in other districts, expenditures per pupil are not an adequate criteria for measuring the quality of public school education. Further, it is argued that the public school system, in fact, provides an “ample” education for all children in the state.
Possibly it is true that there may be no exact standard for measuring the quality of education children receive in a given school district. Nevertheless, it is crystal clear that there exist vast discrepancies in dollar input per pupil, a fact that in the final analysis is very relevant in light of the *762further fact that financing is a key ingredient in the provision of educational services for children.
Most assuredly, it cannot be said that the constitutional mandate for an “ample” education has been met by the State unless the majority is prepared to adopt the strained position that the. lowest level of basic per-pupil State gúáranty (in dollars) provided to a given district coincides with the requirement and that all efforts beyond that lowest level are attributable to local decisions to furnish more than the State has a duty to provide.
Logic requires me to reject this concept. It does not comport with the trial court’s findings of fact which reflect that the State apportionment not only has failed to keep pace with increasing school costs but that the per-pupil guaranty does not even provide sufficient funds with which to operate the public schools. Rather, the low level of State support has compelled many districts to rely upon special levy revenue merely to provide operation and maintenance funds.
In terms of qualify, respondents assume that there is no conclusive, static or exact definition. This does not mean, however, that the State’s duty to make “ample” provision for education is thereby beyond scrutiny. There are ongoing factors as well as financial, current and historical considerations that have an impact upon the subject and are a commonsense aid in determining what may or may not be “ample.”
For example: the term “ample provision for education” appeared in the original draft of our State constitution and has remained without change. Nevertheless, one would hardly be heard to argue that the State’s mandated duty to provide an “ample” education has been met merely because the State’s “per weighted pupil guaranty” gives rise to more acceptable facilities than were provided at the time Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 were originally adopted. Times chánge. What may have been “ample” in 1889 may be, and probably is, wholly unsuited for today’s children con*763fronted, as they are, with contemporary demands and new complexities of life unknown to the drafters of the State constitution.
It must be made clear, however, that by recognizing changing times and the needs of a dynamic society, one does not thereby change the constitution. Quite the contrary. If we fail to interpret the constitution in accord with the demands of a modern society, the constitution stands in danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, will lose its original meaning. It is the duty of our courts, as guardians of the constitution, to ensure that our State constitution shall not become, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824). He further noted that a constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
In all candor, then, the State’s constitutional mandate must be understood to embrace the educational opportunity that is needed, in the contemporary setting, to equip the children of this state for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in the labor market and the marketplace of ideas. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629, 87 S. Ct. 675 (1967). In other words, education has a critical role in a free society. It must prepare children to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if the system is to survive. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972). It must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment “freedoms” (“liberties” or “privileges”) both as sources and receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding. The constitutional “right” to have the State “make ample provision for . . . education” will be hollow indeed, however, if *764the possessor of that “right” is unable to compete adequately in our open political system, in the labor market or in the marketplace of ideas.
With the foregoing thoughts in mind it can hardly be said that children who reside within school districts having an inadequate tax base to support even operating and maintenance budgets have had ample provision made for their education. Poorer districts are compelled to rely on special levies for the bare necessities of operating and maintenance. If their levies fail, as many have, those school districts are forced to close schools, discharge teachers, increase teacher-student ratios, eliminate classes, reduce hours Of instruction, cut material and texts, and even forego adequate planning for future betterment of the district’s school system. It cannot be said that such a system of financing education in public schools makes “ample provision for . . . education” by means of a “general and uniform” system of public schools. Too many children residing within the state are left on the outside looking in.
The high courts of California and New Jersey have each declared the system of public school financing, in their state, unconstitutional. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, supra. The problems there involved were not entirely dissimilar to those before us. These cases are of considerable interest, however, because the constitution in neither state imposes the unique explicit “duty” found in Const, art. 9, § 1 and neither requires a “general and uniform system of public schools.” Without question, the petitioners herein stand on much firmer constitutional ground than do their counterparts in either California or New Jersey.
IX. “Relative Wealth” Theory Not Applicable To Other Municipal Corporations
Respondents suggest that if the relative wealth of school districts may not be used as a major factor in determining the quality of public education, this court must be deemed to have directed the same command to all municipal corpo*765rations in respect to tax-supported public services. This argument is without merit. Although I do not at this time express my views on other governmental services, I am satisfied that I have explained the unique position of public education in the constitutional scheme. Only with the system of public schools has the constitution mandated that the State has a paramount duty.
X. Standing Of Petitioners
Next, respondents assert that petitioner school districts have no standing to bring the instant action. Respondents do not, however, challenge the standing of the petitioner children, their guardians ad litem, the several individual school directors or those who also assert one of those capacities and are also taxpayers.
Basically, respondents argue that petitioner school districts: (a) Do not state a claim for which relief can be granted, because municipal corporations are not entitled to the protections afforded by (1) the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Const, art. 1, § 12; or (3) Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2; (b) A school district, as a municipal corporation, may sue and be sued, pursuant to RCW 28A.58.010, to protect the rights of the district but there is no statutory provision authorizing it to sue on behalf of its children or the taxpayers of the district who are the only real parties in interest; (c) A municipality does not have standing to question the constitutionality of a statute unless it alleges that the questioned statute violates a constitutional provision designed to protect municipal corporations.
I agree with petitioner districts’ lack of standing to challenge the State system of public school financing under the Fourteenth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 12. Moses Lake School Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wn.2d 551, 503 P.2d 86 (1972). There is, however, a different issue involved in the districts’ challenge to the State’s public school financing system under RCW 28A.58.010 and Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2.
*766Without question, in the past, consideration of standing has been subject to rigid legalistic rules requiring an infringement of a specific legal right or interest. This has, however, been eroded over the years permitting a broader view of factual interests that will give rise to standing. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184, 90 S. Ct. 827 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 25 L. Ed. 2d 192, 90 S. Ct. 832 (1970); see also Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 710 (1970 Supp.). Not only has the United States Supreme Court seemingly abandoned strict reliance upon the over legalistic “interest-right” test of standing, it made the following comment in so doing, in Data Processing at page 153:
The “legal interest” test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the “case” or “controversy” test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
A review of our own more recent cases indicates that we too have shifted from the strict legalistic view to one which more correctly recognizes that standing may occur if there is injury in fact. For example in Moses Lake School Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, supra, we actually reviewed the merits of a dispute and concluded that the plaintiff school district had no rights against the State. There was, however, no hint that the school district lacked standing to raise constitutional issues and thus should have suffered the result without a hearing on the merits. Similarly in Snohomish County Bd. of Equalization v. Department of Revenue, 80 Wn.2d 262, 493 P.2d 1012 (1972), we went to the merits of a constitutional claim at the instance of a county board, expressly holding, at page 265, that the county had standing.17
*767Based on more recent liberalized views of standing, and turning to the instant case, the petitioner school districts clearly have standing to challenge the constitutionality of that legislation which creates the State’s system of public school financing. The districts’ interests are not theoretical, they are concerned with a real judicial controversy imposed upon them because they stand at the very vortex of the questioned system. In short, the interests sought to be protected by the districts are arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or the constitutional provision in question.
It is clear that the basic reason for the existence of school districts is the education of children through the development and maintenance of schools and educational programs associated therewith. Within that framework the district is authorized to sue and be sued. RCW 28A.58.010 provides:
A school district shall constitute a body corporate and shall possess all the usual powers of a public corporation, and in that name and style may sue and be sued and transact all business necessary for maintaining school and protecting the rights of the district, and enter into such obligations as are authorized therefor by law.
(Italics mine.)
In considering the question of standing, then, what could be more fundamental to the maintenance of schools, and the educational program, than an action the result of which is to provide sufficient revenue to keep schools open and basic programs intact in a manner required by the State constitution?
What could be more fundamental than the districts’ need for review of a legislatively created system of public school financing that undermines the very means of their existence?
What greater interest could there be in the outcome of this litigation than that possessed by the petitioner school districts? The current legislatively created system of public *768school financing compels them to rely upon special levies for the bare necessities required to keep schools open, maintain teaching staffs, and provide educational materials. Yet, upon failure of a special levy (which has been rather frequent of late) districts are often forced to consider and implement school closures and educational cutbacks which result in reduction of the teaching staff. This latter fact alone has culminated in school districts being sued by teachers separated from their positions. For example, see Thayer v. Anacortes School Dist., 81 Wn.2d 709, 504 P.2d 1130 (1972); Boyle v. Renton School Dist. 403, 10 Wn. App. 523, 518 P.2d 221 (1974). When school districts are forced into positions of potential litigation, as parties defendant, how can it be said that they lack interest or standing to challenge the constitutionality of the very system that forces them into that potential litigation? I would hold that the petitioner school districts have standing to maintain the instant action.
XI. Issues Not Before The Court
I have heretofore suggested how I believe this court should hold on specific issues. Because of the nature of the case, however, it is necessary to clarify some of the areas in which I have not suggested that we should act. The following list is neither inclusive nor exclusive, it is explanatory only.
1. I believe strongly that the present legislatively and administratively created State system of financing public school education is unconstitutional. Nothing will be gained by further explanation of the subject. In my analysis of the constitutional problem I called attention to, and criticized the current State system that has compelled petitioner districts to rely upon special levies to keep schools open, retain adequate professional teaching personnel, and even provide teaching materials. However, in this case it is and would be unnecessary to pass upon whether local special levies, as such, are unconstitutional or whether special levies adopted strictly at the option of local school districts, *769for the purpose of educational enrichment, are unconstitutional.
2. Our State constitution requires that the legislature “provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” Const, art. 9, § 2. It is and would be unnecessary to pass upon whether there may be a variance in State authorized spending in school districts for the purpose of encouraging temporary experimental programs or to meet temporary exigencies.
3. I have discussed at length the State’s constitutional duty to “make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” Const, art. 9, § 1. At this time, however, we would not, in my proposed opinion, be required to decide whether the system eventually to be adopted by the legislature must meet any particular level of spending beyond that heretofore held not to be ample.
4. In my discussion of the unconstitutionality of the State’s public education financing system, I commented critically upon the manner in which use of the local tax base of various districts created a financial imbalance. I have not suggested, however, that property taxes imposed by either the State or local districts are unconstitutional. In the same vein, I do not suggest the imposition of another type of tax. The choice, as well as the wisdom of that choice, is a legislative matter.
5. Although I would hold unconstitutional the current State system of public school financing, the status of this case does not call upon the court to pass upon whether local districts may or should set their own levels of spending, whether that is a State matter, or whether it should be divided. Again, this is a legislative matter.
6. Further, I find that the status of this case does not call upon us to resolve the merits or demerits of local versus State control of other school or educational matters. In connection with the entire picture, this is strictly a legislative matter.
*7707. Finally, it should be. pointed out that. I have not suggested an attempt to limit, or even suggested the alternative types of public school financing that are constitutionally available to the legislature. The legislature should, in my opinion, be provided with an adequate opportunity to give the entire problem thorough study. The choice of system and manner of providing for a constitutionally proper system of financing public schools is for the legislature.
XII. The Time Allotment For Suitable Remedy
It is not enough merely to suggest that the present' system is unconstitutional. One must also consider the available remedies. First, the relief should be prospective so that obligations incurred would not be impaired. Second, it is recognized that some period of time will be needed to establish another statutory system. In the meantime, operation of the State public educational system must continue. Thus, I would hold that obligations hereafter incurred pursuant to existing statutes should be valid in accordance with the terms of those statutes. However, I would require the legislature to enact legislation compatible with my dissent effective no later than July 1, 1977. There is nothing new in this procedure. Our own court used this plan in giving the State and counties necessary leeway to retool their procedures following our decision in Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wn.2d 617, 458 P.2d 280 (1969). A similar result is found in Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied, sub nom. Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976; see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 99 L. Ed. 1083, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955).
Finley and Utter, JJ., concur with Stafford, J.

In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wn.2d 623, 479 P.2d 1 (1970); Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wn.2d 505, 161 P.2d 200 (1945); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 10 Wn. App. 45, 516 P.2d 1043 (1973).

Holt Mfg. Co. v. Thomas, 69 Wash. 488, 125 P. 772 (1912).

Angelus v. Government Personnel Life Ins. Co., 51 Wn.2d 691, 321 P.2d 545 (1958).

Nygaard v. Department of Labor & Indus., 51 Wn.2d 659, 321 P.2d 257 (1958); In re Black, 47 Wn.2d 42, 45, 287 P.2d 96 (1955); see also Tunget v. Employment Security Dep’t, 78 Wn.2d 954, 481 P.2d 436 (1971).

See footnotes 3 through 7.

This includes 2 mills shifted from local collection to State collection in 1968 which accounts for 4.59 percent of the revenues in 1970-71.

The property tax revenues are a product of the assessed value of real property in the district and the authorized millage rate for collection of taxes.

For example, in 1971-72 in the metropolitan area of Seattle some of the levies and their products were:

Dollars Produced

District Special Levy Millage per Pupil

Seattle 11.09 392.47
Federal Way 24.20 211.71
Highline 24.40 296.33
Tacoma 15.88 278.12
NorthshQre 28.7 358.92

Const, art. 1, § 12 provides in part:
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen [or] class of citizens . . . privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens . ."

W. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16, 30-36 (1913).

W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, 65 (1964), see also the foreword by Arthur L. Corbin, at pages ix-xi, and introduction by Walter Wheeler Cook, at pages 5-11.

Caste is defined as: “ ... 3a: a division or class oí society comprised of persons within a separate and exclusive order based . . . upon differences of wealth . . . ’’(Italics mine.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 348 (1971).

Const, art. 1, § 12:
"Special Privileges and Immunities Prohibited. No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.”

Although a “right” is an absolute, imprecise reasoning has caused courts regularly to recognize different degrees or grades of “rights” from which flow different jural results. For example: (a) some “rights” are • deemed absolute; (b) others may be impaired but only upon *760showing of a “compelling state interest”; whereas, (c) a third group may be invaded with the existence of a mere “reasonable relationship” between legislation and the end sought to be accomplished. If, in fact, “rights” are absolute then clearly those so-called “rights” that are subject to invasion or impairment by either the “compelling state interest” or the “reasonable relationship” test are not true “rights.” They must have some other definition that gives rise to their different jural significance and thus justifies the dissimilar treatment.
This explanation of the difference in definition and consequent jural significance that supports current results is neither intended to limit the “privileges and immunities” protected by the federal and state constitutions nor to denigrate what the courts have referred to as “rights” therein. In fact, the drafters of the federal and state constitutions probably made no clear distinction in thought or their choice of words, in the Hohfeldian sense. Nevertheless, our reference to this precise method of legal thinking and terminology helps us to better understand what the courts have been attempting to say about the federal and state constitutions, and, as Arthur L. Corbin indicated in his foreword to W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions at xiv (1964), it also helps make it clear what the drafters of the constitutions intended.
Close observation of the federal and state constitutions, as well as the wealth of cases dealing with them, reveals that true “rights” exist either by reason of a positive grant in the constitution, or because it has been so interpreted. These “rights” are absolute and cannot be invaded or impaired. They give rise in others (in this case the State) to correlative “duties.” On the other hand, certain other legal entitlements exist which, although denominated “fundamental rights” by the courts, are not “rights” in the sense that they are absolutes. They exist because the constitutions have, in negative terms, provided for noninterference with specific legal entities. For example: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . .” U.S. Const, amend. 1.
The foregoing jural entities, while denominated by the courts as “fundamental rights,” are not treated as absolutes because they have held that these so-called “fundamental rights” may be invaded or interfered with if there exists a “compelling state interest.” Although having a somewhat lesser status than true “rights” (an absolute), the courts have also recognized them as extremely important and will tolerate societal interference only for reasons that are “compelling.” In short, society has no right to legislatively infringe upon one’s constitutional entitlement to noninterference except for “compelling” State reasons. Since it does not involve a true “right,” however, it should be denominated as a “fundamental freedom,” a “fundamental liberty” or a “fundamental privilege” (the italicized words being legally synonymous —see W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 47 (1964) and the *761discussion of “privilege” and its synonyms legal “freedom” and legal “liberty”).
In actuality, then, we do not have a single class of “rights” with a confusing plethora of protections ranging from an “absolute” on the one hand to the State’s power of infringement, on the other, if there is a mere reasonable relationship between legislative regulation and the end sought. Rather we have “rights” as absolutes and we have legal “freedoms,” legal “liberties” or legal “privileges” (as synonyms) which, although of a lesser stature than “fundamental rights,” are still so basically important that they may not be invaded unless there is a “compelling state interest.”
As stated in the body of the opinion, in the instant case the mandate of Const, art. 9, §§ 1 and 2 is concerned with a true “right” (an absolute). Thus, the State’s only answer is either compliance or a showing that its attempt to comply was met with interference by those claiming the “right.” We are not therefore, concerned herein with either the “compelling state interest” test or the lesser “rational relationship” test.

Although not directly in point, the extent to which this court has gone in liberalizing “standing” of interested persons-or parties is also *767illustrated by our decision in Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn.2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973).