Court Opinion

ID: 9566052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:32:44.535576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:59.695383
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result reached by the majority that Denver Ordinance No. 669 is constitutional. I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination that this case does not require us to decide whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. I therefore write separately to emphasize my belief that we are required by the specific issue raised here, that is, whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, by the procedural posture of this case, by the relevant case law, and by the fundamental principles of judicial review, to evaluate the ordinance’s constitutionality in conformity with established constitutional standards of review.
The legal premise underlying the majority opinion is that our prior decisions where we have considered article II, section 13, reveal that,
when confronted with a challenge to the validity of a statute or ordinance regulating the exercise of the right to bear arms guaranteed under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution, a reviewing court need not determine the status of that right. Rather, the question in each case is whether the law at issue constitutes a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.
Maj. op. at 329. The majority therefore concludes that the trial court erred in reaching the question of the status to be accorded the right to bear arms. I disagree.
In light of modem established principles defining fundamental constitutional rights, the right to bear arms under article II, section 13, of the Colorado Constitution is not a' right which, in my opinion, has been recognized as having a value essential to individual liberties in our society. I would therefore hold that the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right.
I.
At issue in this case is the scope of article II, section 13, of the Colorado Constitution, which provides that “[t]he right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons.”
*340The scope of the right of individuals to bear arms under the Colorado Constitution must be analyzed in conformity with modern established principles of constitutional review. When the constitutionality of an ordinance is challenged, the court must determine the appropriate standard of review in order to evaluate the constitutionality of the ordinance. Zavala v. City and County of Denver, 759 P.2d 664 (Colo.1988). The first step in this analysis is to determine the nature of the right, that is, whether a fundamental right is involved. In United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), the Supreme Court distinguished two kinds of rights — fundamental and nonfundamental. Courts vary the level of scrutiny applied depending on the right involved. In Colorado, we have recognized three standards of review: the strict scrutiny test,1 the intermediate scrutiny test,2 or the rational basis test.3
The United States Supreme Court has given added protection to rights considered fundamental. A fundamental right is a right that has been recognized as having a value essential to individual liberties in our society. Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1015 n. 7 (Colo.1982); see also John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional Law ch. 13, § 4, at 465 (3d ed. 1986). Black’s Law Dictionary 674 (6th ed. 1990) defines “fundamental right” as “[t]hose rights which have their source, and are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution ... and state constitutions.”
Strict scrutiny is applied whenever a legislative enactment contains a suspect classification or limits a fundamental right. Id. at 1015. Thus, a court will uphold a law that restricts fundamental rights under the strict scrutiny test only if the law is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest and the law is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.
The United States Supreme Court has found only a limited group of fundamental rights and has been reluctant to expand the list of fundamental constitutional rights. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1291 (Colo.) (Erickson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993). For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the right to marry,4 to vote,5 and the right to interstate travel 6 are fundamental rights. In contrast, the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right to education, housing, welfare payments, or government employment. Id. Where a fundamental right is not in*341volved, a legislative enactment is tested under the rational basis test which requires the government to show that the ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1016.
The majority acknowledges that the right to bear arms is an important constitutional right but nevertheless believes that this case does not require us to determine whether that right is fundamental. Maj. op. at 328. Despite well-established principles of law on the interpretation of constitutional guarantees, the majority does not address the nature of the right involved and the level of scrutiny applied. Rather, the majority avoids a constitutional review of the trial court’s ruling, that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny, and instead disposes of this issue by determining that the ordinance constituted a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power.
The majority has applied, in my opinion, an unprecedented legal standard, an exercise of police power, which, to my knowledge, has never been deemed an independent standard and which contravenes basic constitutional principles of the three standards of review. Further, acknowledging these established concepts of constitutional review, I am not convinced that we need not determine whether the right to bear arms is or is not a fundamental right.
A.
I am guided by the constitutional review this court and other appellate courts have applied in evaluating a trial court’s decision whether a fundamental right is implicated in a particular situation.
For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986),7 a majority of the Supreme Court engaged in a fundamental rights analysis by directly addressing whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to indulge in sodomy. Id. at 190, 106 S.Ct. at 2843. In upholding Georgia’s statute criminalizing sodomy, the majority concluded that there is no such fundamental right under the Constitution. Id. at 191,106 S.Ct. at 2844.
In Evans v. Romer, 864 P.2d 1270 (Colo.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993), we addressed whether the trial court correctly determined, in granting a preliminary injunction, that Amendment 2 “may burden fundamental rights of an identifiable group.” Because the trial court identified a fundamental right, it applied a strict scrutiny standard of review and found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional. In reviewing whether Amendment 2 infringed on a fundamental right, we engaged in a constitutional standard of review analysis and ultimately concluded that the right to participate equally in the political process is a fundamental right which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
Further, in Mayo v. National Farmers Union, 833 P.2d 54 (Colo.1992), we reviewed a statute authorizing household exclusion clauses in automobile policies. The district court rejected the insureds’ contention that the classification created by the statute unconstitutionally impaired their fundamental right to travel. We directly addressed the question, whether a fundamental right is implicated by the statutory provision. We found that neither the statute nor the household exclusion clause infringed on the fundamental right to travel of insureds whose policy contained such an exclusion. We therefore concluded that the statute passed muster under the rational basis test. We performed this judicial standard of review based on the district court’s determination that the statute survived an equal protection challenge.8
*342The approach adopted by the majority is appealing in its simplicity but does not follow the analytical constitutional framework we have previously applied. In the present case, the trial court’s ruling to hold the ordinance unconstitutional was based upon a finding that a fundamental right to bear arms existed. The trial court found that the Denver ordinance banning the manufacture, sale, or possession of assault weapons did not withstand strict scrutiny review. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that this ordinance deprives them of the fundamental right to bear arms and the defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the right to bear arms in the defense of home, person, and property is a fundamental right. Indeed, one of the questions presented for our review, as conceded in the main opinion in footnote 5, is whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. Guided by the fore-
going principles and given the procedural posture of this case, I believe that this case requires a determination of whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right.
B.
The question of whether there is a fundamental right to bear arms is not novel and has already been decided by several states. Recent state jurisprudence indicates that statutory classifications affecting firearms have not been held to infringe a fundamental right. Rather, courts have opined that the legislature may impose reasonable regulations over the constitutional right to bear arms in order to promote safety and welfare.9 An examination of the way other states have construed their constitutional right to bear arms statutes10 further sup*343ports my belief that no fundamental right to possess an assault weapon exists.
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 268 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863, 104 S.Ct. 194, 78 L.Ed.2d 170 (1983), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that the Village of Morton Grove’s gun control ordinance, which prohibited the possession of handguns within the village’s border but did not prohibit the possession of all firearms, did not infringe on a constitutionally protected right. The court of appeals determined that the ordinance was properly directed at protecting the safety and health of Morton Grove citizens, was a valid exercise of Morton Grove’s police power, and did not violate any of the appellant’s rights guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.11
In State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 816 (Me.1990), the defendant, a convicted felon, challenged the Maine statute that forbade him to possess firearms on the ground that it violated his state constitutional right to bear arms. The court determined that the state constitutional right to keep and bear arms is not an absolute right and the possession-by-a-felon statute does not exceed the permissible bounds of reasonable regulation under the state’s constitutional police power.12
Furthermore, in the Application of Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 396 (Minn.1980), the plaintiff, seeking to carry a loaded gun in his car while traveling on the public highways was denied issuance of a handgun permit. The Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that the state may reasonably exercise its police power to regulate the carrying of loaded weapons by individuals in the interest of public safety. The court further concluded that no absolute common-law constitutional right to carry weapons for individual self-defense exists.
In People v. Kuri, 132 Misc.2d 1036, 506 N.Y.S.2d 245 (N.Y.City Crim.Ct.1986), the court held that a provision of the New York penal law requiring that a person with a valid statewide pistol permit obtain a special permit to carry or possess a weapon within the city of New York is rationally related to the legislative goal of ensuring order in a densely populated high-crime area. In this case, the People asserted and the court agreed that the privilege of carrying a gun does not rise to the level of a fundamental right.13
In Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F.Supp. 1415 (E.D.Cal.1990), a case factually similar to ours, an action was brought challenging the validity of a California statute regulating the manufacture and transfer of assault weapons. The district court held that the statute violated neither rights conferred by the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution nor privacy rights guaranteed by the federal and California Constitutions.
Several courts have upheld firearms statutes against an equal protection challenge by applying a rational basis test since no fundamental right was affected.14 In Sklar v. *344Byrne, 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1984), the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a city firearms ordinance which prohibited the registration of handguns after a specified date. The court of appeals held that the handgun ordinance did not affect a fundamental right or suspect classification. Although the case was decided based on a federal equal protection analysis, the Seventh Circuit determined that a rational basis standard of review applied and, under such standard, the ordinance rationally furthered a legitimate governmental goal of protecting the safety of the city residents.
In response to the argument that the ordinance infringed upon a fundamental right guaranteed the plaintiff by the Illinois Constitution,15 the court stated:
Examination of section 22 ... demonstrates that an individual’s right to bear arms in Illinois is narrow and subject to extensive regulation. First, the individual’s right to bear arms is expressly “subject” to the “police power.” ... Second, the right is only a qualified right to bear some unspecified “arms” rather than a right to bear any particular type of firearm.... Since the state constitutional right is narrowly circumscribed by the police power, the fact that the Chicago ordinance as a whole affects the right does not trigger compelling state interest analysis of the ordinance.
Id. at 637.
Similarly, In re Application of Wolstenholme, 1992 WL 207245 (Del.Super.1992), the court determined that a fundamental right to bear arms did not exist and a restriction or condition on a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon may be imposed without violating the applicant’s right to substantive due process. The court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 20, of the Constitution of the State of Delaware16 did not invalidate the court’s authority to impose reasonable restrictions on a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon.
C.
This court has had several occasions to review article II, section 13, and has never before determined that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. The majority seizes on the litany of cases in our jurisdiction that have considered article II, section 13, in determining that “we have never found it necessary to decide the status accorded th[e] [right to bear arms].” Maj. op. at 328.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, we have specifically never reached this conclu*345sion since the issue before us was never presented to this court in any of these cases. In People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 62 P.2d 246 (1936),17 and its progeny, the cases were resolved by subjecting the ordinances to a legitimate exercise of police power because whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right was not at issue in any of these cases. We therefore did not need to nor did we reach whether a fundamental right was at stake given the procedural posture of these cases.
In construing this provision in the past, we have found that the right to bear arms is not absolute, People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), and have therefore analyzed constitutional challenges under the rational basis standard, that is, whether the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.
In City of Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 501 P.2d 744 (1972), we invalidated a local ordinance that prohibited the possession, use, or carrying of all types of firearms outside of one’s home. Although we indicated that the regulation of firearms “may be constitutionally subject to state or municipal regulation under the police power,” we found that this absolute prohibition, which we read to prevent an individual from transporting a weapon from a gun store to his home, was too broad to be a legitimate exercise of that power. Id. at 23, 501 P.2d at 745. We did not need to determine whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right because the trial court merely declared the ordinance invalid based “on its finding that the subject matter of the ordinance is a matter of statewide concern and is therefore preempted by a state statute pertaining to the carrying of a concealed weapon.” Id. at 21-22, 501 P.2d at 744.
In People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975), the defendants, convicted felons, argued that a statute prohibiting possession of weapons by previous offenders violated their constitutional right to bear arms. We reviewed the case based on the trial court’s ruling that the statute was constitutionally overbroad and violated article II, section 13. We determined that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power. Id. at 104, 544 P.2d at 391. The statute, we said, did not conflict with the constitution merely because it limited the possession of weapons by persons likely to abuse such possession. In reaching this conclusion, we noted:
We do not read the Colorado Constitution as granting an absolute right to bear arms under all situations. It has limiting language dealing with defense of home, person, and property. These limitations have been recognized by the General Assembly in the enactment of section 18-12-105, C.R.S. 1973, which restricts the right to bear arms in certain circumstances, while permitting in other circumstances the carrying of a concealed weapon in defense of home, person, and property, and also when specifically authorized by written permit.
Id. at 103, 544 P.2d at 391.
The conflicting rights involved here are the individual’s rights to bear' arms and the state’s right, indeed its duty under its inherent police power, to make reasonable regulations for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of the people. ...
... [T]he state legislature cannot, in the name of the police power, enact laws which render nugatory our Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections.
Id. at 103, 544 P.2d at 390-91. In concluding that the statute constituted a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power, again, we were not confronted with a ruling by the trial court that a fundamental right was implicated.
Further, in People v. Ford, 193 Colo. 459, 568 P.2d 26 (1977), the defendant was charged under a statute proscribing an offense of possession of weapons by previous offenders. The defendant contended that the statute’s application to him was unconstitutional because it violated his right to keep and bear arms in defense of his “home, per*346son and property,” as guaranteed by the Colorado Constitution, article II, section 13. We held:
In People v. Blue, we recognized that the right to bear arms is not absolute; the Colorado Constitution limits that right to the defense of one’s home, person, and property. Thus, statutes enacted pursuant to the state’s police power may validly restrict or regulate the right to possess arms where the purpose of such possession is not a constitutionally protected one.
Id. at 462, 668 P.2d at 28 (citation omitted). In Blue, the trial court merely held that the statute violated the defendant’s right to keep and bear arms without holding that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right.
Finally, in People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 595 P.2d 228 (1979), which involved a challenge to a statute which prohibited possession of a firearm by an intoxicated person, we found that the right to bear arms could be regulated by the reasonable exercise of police powers and that the rational relationship test was the appropriate standard of review. The case was before us based on the trial court declaring this statute to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In holding that the statute “did not restrict the exercise of any fundamental right,” we implicitly refused to recognize a fundamental right to bear arms. Id. at 553, 595 P.2d at 230.
In analyzing the Denver ordinance, I recognize that the right of individuals to bear arms under the Colorado Constitution is entitled to constitutional protection subject to government restrictions. Keeping the foregoing principles in mind from the above-cited cases, I conclude that Denver Ordinance No. 669 does not trammel a constitutional right. This court must therefore presume the statute’s validity and accordingly use the rational basis standard of review.18 I find the ordinance to be clearly reasonable and would uphold it as a valid exercise of the police power.
The statement of legislative intent contained in the ordinance provides:
The city council hereby finds and declares that the use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety and security of all citizens of the City and County of Denver. Further, the council finds that assault weapons are capable both of a rapid rate of fire as well as of a capacity to fire an inordinately large number of rounds without reloading and are designed primarily for military or antipersonnel use.
The city council finds that law enforcement agencies report increased use of assault weapons for criminal activities. This has resulted in a record number of related homicides and injuries to citizens and law enforcement officers. It is, therefore, the intent of the city council to place reasonable and necessary restrictions on the sale and possession of assault weapons while placing no restrictions on the right of citizens to use weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target practice and other legitimate sports or recreational activities and the protection of home, person and property.
§ 38-130(a).
Thus, the city council’s purpose in enacting Ordinance No. 669 is to protect the health and safety of the citizens of Denver by deterring the manufacture, sale, and possession of assault weapons, a class of weapons that the city council has determined presents a higher risk of danger to the public. In my view, the ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the municipality’s police power to protect the citizens of Denver from violence stemming from the use of assault weapons.
The majority correctly concludes that Denver Ordinance No. 669 is constitutional: it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and does not unreasonably restrict the exercise of the right to bear arms.
III.
In my view, the appropriate analysis should have been an initial determination of whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right and the applicable standard of *347review. The majority’s analytical framework does not follow modern established principles of constitutional review. While the majority and I differ in our constitutional analyses, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Denver ordinance banning the manufacture, sale, or possession of assault weapons is constitutional. Furthermore, I believe that the right to bear arms is not a fundamental right.

. Under the strict scrutiny standard of review, the most exacting standard of review, an ordinance which imposes a burden on or significantly interferes with a fundamental right must be narrowly drawn to a compelling state interest in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Evans v. Earner, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993); Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194, 613 P.2d 884 (1980).

. The United States Supreme Court has adopted an intermediate standard of review for specific classifications such as alienage, Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 98 S.Ct. 1067, 55 L.Ed.2d 287 (1978); illegitimacy, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265, 99 S.Ct. 518, 523, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978); and gender, Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). Under this standard, the burden is on the state to show that the classification is substantially related to an important governmental objective. R.McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980); People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973).

. If no fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, then the regulation needs to be rationally related to a constitutionally permissible purpose to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978).

. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 98 S.Ct. 673, 679, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (establishing a constitutional right to marriage and striking down a statute requiring a parent without child custody but with child support obligations to seek court approval before remarrying); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (finding that marriage is a fundamental right and invalidating a law against racial intermarriage).

. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1000, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (holding that the right to vote is fundamental).

. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) (holding that the right to interstate travel occupies a position “fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union”).

. In Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (11th Cir.1985), rev’d, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the right to enter into private and intimate associations, even with the same gender, is a fundamental right. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the Georgia law was unconstitutional unless it could pass the strict scrutiny test. Id. at 1213.

. Other federal and state courts, when considering lower court determinations that a fundamental right is implicated, have applied a standard of review harmonious with established principles of constitutional review. For example, in Trinsey v. *342Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 658, 116 L.Ed.2d 750 (1991), the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was faced with a constitutional challenge to its vacancy election law which permits each of the major political parties to select a candidate to run for the vacancy. A voter and prospective candidate challenged this provision as unconstitutional, claiming it violated his Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with Trinsey and issued a declaratory judgment finding the statute unconstitutional "because it operate[d] to abridge the right to vote of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” The district court reviewed the statute under a strict scrutiny analysis because it found that a fundamental right had been implicated by the operation of the election law. Trinsey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 766 F.Supp. 1338, 1345-46 (E.D.Pa.1991). On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that "the Seventeenth Amendment does not mandate that Pennsylvania conduct a primary before holding a general election” and that therefore "no fundamental right [was] infringed by the Pennsylvania statute at issue.” Trinsey, 941 F.2d at 234. Accordingly, the Third Circuit applied a deferential standard and upheld the provision. Id. at 233-34.
Similarly, in Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Public Utilities District, 21 Cal.App. 4th 1631, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793 (3d Dist.1994), the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in concluding that the plaintiff had a fundamental right to continue his public employment since the trial court confused a fundamental right for purposes of the judicial standard of review of administrative decisions with a fundamental right for purposes of constitutional analysis. The court of appeals therefore determined that the right to pursue a lawful occupation does not constitute a fundamental constitutional right invoking strict scrutiny. Id. at 1642 — 43, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 793.

. See, e.g., State v. Comeau, 233 Neb. 907, 448 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1989); Carfield v. State, 649 P.2d 865, 872 (Wyo.1982); State v. Rupp, 282 N.W.2d 125, 130 (Iowa 1979); Bristow v. State, 418 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 669 P.2d 261, 264 (App.1983).

. Forty-four states have constitutional guarantees on the right to keep and bear arms. Six states do not have a constitutional provision on arms: California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Hoskins v. State, 449 So.2d 1269 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (finding that a statute prohibiting a person convicted of committing a crime of violence from owning or possessing a pistol does not deny a right to keep and bear arms); Rabbitt v. Leonard, 36 Conn.Supp. 108, 413 A.2d 489 (Super.Ct.1979) (holding that a statute permitting revocation of pistol permit for cause and providing notice of revocation and opportunity for de novo post-revocation hearing does not violate citizen's right to bear arms); State v. Friel, 508 A.2d 123 (Me.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 843, 107 S.Ct. 156, 93 L.Ed.2d 96 (1986) (holding that a statute prohibiting possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not violate federal and state constitutional right to keep and bear arms); People v. Smelter, 175 Mich.App. 153, 437 N.W.2d 341 (1989) (concluding that a statute prohibiting possession of stun guns does not impermissibly infringe upon a person's right to keep and bear arms for his own defense).

. Article I, § 22, of the Illinois Constitution reads: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."

. Article I, § 16, of the Maine Constitution states: "Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms and this right shall never be questioned."

. Article 2, § 4, of the New York Constitution, Civil Rights Law, states: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms cannot be infringed." N.Y.Civ.Rights Law art. 2, § 4 (McKinney 1992).

. In framing the. question as to whether the ordinance constitutes a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power without engaging in a fundamental rights analysis, the majority relies on a wealth of cases from other jurisdictions which are readily distinguishable on a procedural basis. A careful review demonstrates that in none of these cases, except for Sklar v. Byrne, discussed infra, did the trial court rule whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. Maj. op. at 330. These cases therefore provide limited support for the majority's proposition since the procedural postures of these cases differ significantly from the present case.
I am aware of no cases that have not engaged in a fundamental rights analysis where the trial court either determined whether the right to bear arms is a fundamental right or upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance regulating the right to bear arms. For example, in Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1984), the district court determined that the firearms ordinance' does not infringe any federal constitutional right and therefore applied the rational basis standard of review *344to a non-fundamental right. Upon review, the Seventh Circuit addressed the appropriate standard of review of the ordinance's classification scheme and concluded that the ordinance withstands a rational basis review.
Similarly, in Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, 83 Ill.Dec. 308, 319, 470 N.E.2d 266, 277 (1984), the Supreme Court of Illinois, in reviewing the constitutionality of a village ordinance prohibiting the possession of operable handguns, engaged in a fundamental rights analysis and determined that the rational basis test is the appropriate level of scrutiny where no fundamental right is involved. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and therefore it was appropriate for the supreme court to determine whether a fundamental right was implicated.
Furthermore, in Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), the issue on appeal concerned the constitutionality of an ordinance which banned the possession and stile of assault weapons. The appellants challenged the ordinance as an overbroad restriction on their constitutional right to bear arms and defend themselves and that the ordinance violates the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution. The court of common pleas ruled that the ordinance was constitutional. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded, inter alia, that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the state's police power and that the ordinance did not violate the right-to-bear-arms provision of the Ohio Constitution. The supreme court concluded that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, but is not absolute and therefore the ordinance is subject to a reasonable exercise of police power.

. Section 22 of the Illinois Constitution gives Illinois citizens the right to bear arms, but the constitution itself clearly limits that right, stating that, "[sjubject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”

. This provision provides: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and State, and for hunting and recreational use.”

. We struck down a statute prohibiting unnatu-ralized foreign-born residents from keeping and bearing arms. It was not necessary for us to engage in a fundamental rights analysis since the trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional only.

. Legislation designed to protect the public's health and safely is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171, 106 S.Ct. 2894, 90 L.Ed.2d 981 (1986); People v. Riley, 708 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Colo.1985).