Court Opinion

ID: 9839381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 21:14:44.965421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:16.623926
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                  No. COA23-24

                             Filed 05 September 2023

Cabarrus County, No. 21CRS052240

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

            v.

JON ROSS ROBERTSON

      Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 23 August 2022 by Judge Gregory

R. Hayes in Cabarrus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8

August 2023.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alan D.
      McInnes, for the State-Appellee.

      Richard Croutharmel for Defendant-Appellant.

      COLLINS, Judge.

      Defendant appeals from judgment entered upon his guilty plea pursuant to a

plea arrangement. Defendant argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court

erred by denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea when the trial court

accepted the plea and subsequently announced that it would impose a sentence other

than the one agreed to by the State and Defendant in the plea arrangement. Because

the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the

judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.
                                STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                     Opinion of the Court

                                I.      Background

      On 13 September 2021, Defendant was indicted for felony fleeing to elude

arrest with a motor vehicle. Defendant entered a plea arrangement with the State

on 23 August 2022, which stated, “Defendant will plea as charged to Felony

Flee/Elude Arrest w/ a Motor Vehicle and receive a suspended sentence in the

presumptive range.”     At Defendant’s plea hearing, the trial court questioned

Defendant, in relevant part, as follows:

             THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty as a result of a plea
             bargain or plea arrangement?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
             THE COURT: And that says, Defendant will plead guilty
             as charged to felony fee to elude arrest with a motor
             vehicle, receive a suspended sentence in the presumptive
             range.
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
             THE COURT:       Is that correct as being your full plea
             arrangement?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
             THE COURT:         Do you now personally accept that
             arrangement?
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      The trial court accepted the plea arrangement, then announced:

             THE COURT: Class H felony, zero points, prior record
             level one. A presumptive sentence, presumptive sentence
             of 6 to 17, 6 to 17 months, suspended. Special supervised
             probation for 24 months, 24 months on these conditions.
             That he pay the cost, that he pay the costs, that he serve a
             split sentence of 30 days, 30 days in the Cabarrus County
             jail, pay fees for that.

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                                     STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                       Opinion of the Court

              Comply with all the regular conditions of probation.
              Surender his driver’s license pursuant to this felony fleeing
              to elude arrest conviction. And the case will transfer to
              Mecklenburg County for supervision.

       Defense Counsel immediately sought clarification that the trial court intended

to impose 24 months of probation with a 30-day split sentence and the trial court

confirmed that it did. The following exchange then took place:

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Our understanding of what the
              agreement was with the State was just plead to supervised.
              THE COURT: Wasn’t on here. I looked. There’s nothing
              tieing (sic) my hands. I could have given a longer split than
              that. That’s the sentence.
              [THE STATE]: Your Honor, the agreement was for --
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s for a suspended sentence.
              THE COURT: It is, I gave him a suspended. I gave him a
              24-month suspended sentence. Did I not? Did I give him
              a suspended sentence?
              THE CLERK: Yes, sir.
              THE COURT: I thought I did.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’d ask to strike the plea, Your
              Honor?
              THE COURT: Denied.

       After a brief discussion with the clerk, the trial court announced that “[t]he

30-day split is effective now” and that any credit for pretrial incarceration “can go

towards . . . the suspended sentence when it’s activated.”1

       1 The trial court misspoke here as any credit for pretrial incarceration would go towards the

suspended sentence if the sentence is activated. We do not presume that a defendant will violate
probation.

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                                 STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Based on Defendant’s prior record level of one, the trial court entered written

judgment imposing a sentence of 6 to 17 months’ imprisonment, suspended subject to

24 months’ supervised probation.       In addition, the judgment imposed an active

sentence of 30 days in the county sheriff’s custody as a special condition of probation.

Defendant appealed.

                                 II.   Discussion

      Defendant argues that the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1024 when

it denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the trial court accepted

the plea and subsequently announced that it would impose a sentence other than the

one agreed to by the State and Defendant in the plea arrangement.

      “Whether a trial court violated a statutory mandate is a question of law, subject

to de novo review on appeal.” State v. Hood, 273 N.C. App. 348, 351, 848 S.E.2d 515,

518 (2020) (citation omitted).

      The State and a defendant may agree to a plea arrangement wherein the

prosecutor agrees to recommend a particular sentence in exchange for the defendant’s

guilty plea.    See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1021(a) (2022).      A plea arrangement is

contractual in nature but differs from an ordinary commercial contract “as it involves

the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial.”

State v. Wentz, 284 N.C. App. 736, 739, 876 S.E.2d 814, 816-17 (2022) (citations

omitted).      Because a plea arrangement involves the waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights, when the trial court accepts a defendant’s plea pursuant to a

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                                 STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

plea arrangement, “the right to due process and basic contract principles require

strict adherence” to the terms of the arrangement. Id. at 740, 876 S.E.2d at 817

(citation omitted).

      “Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea arrangement in which the

prosecutor has agreed to recommend a particular sentence, the judge must advise the

parties whether he approves the arrangement and will dispose of the case

accordingly.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b) (2022).

             If at the time of sentencing, the judge for any reason
             determines to impose a sentence other than provided for in
             a plea arrangement between the parties, the judge must
             inform the defendant of that fact and inform the defendant
             that he may withdraw his plea. Upon withdrawal, the
             defendant is entitled to a continuance until the next
             session of court.

Id. § 15A-1024 (2022). “Under the express provisions of this statute a defendant is

entitled to withdraw his plea and as a matter of right have his case continued until

the next term.” State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446-47, 230 S.E.2d 515, 518 (1976).

“[A]ny change by the trial judge in the sentence that was agreed upon by the

defendant and the State . . . requires the judge to give the defendant an opportunity

to withdraw his guilty plea.” State v. Marsh, 265 N.C. App. 652, 655, 829 S.E.2d 245,

247 (2019) (emphasis omitted).

      Here, Defendant entered a plea arrangement with the State wherein the

prosecutor agreed to recommend that Defendant “receive a suspended sentence in the

presumptive range” in exchange for Defendant’s guilty plea. The trial court accepted

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                                STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

Defendant’s guilty plea and, pursuant to the arrangement, entered a suspended

sentence within the presumptive range for the offense and Defendant’s prior record

level. However, the trial court imposed an additional active sentence of 30 days in

the county sheriff’s custody as a special condition of probation. This additional

sentence deviates from the sentence that was agreed upon by Defendant and the

State; thus, Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea and have his case continued

until the next term. See id.; Williams, 291 N.C. at 446-47, 230 S.E.2d at 518.

      The trial court’s justification for the sentence it imposed was that supervised

probation “[w]asn’t on [the arrangement]. I looked. There’s nothing tieing (sic) my

hands. I could have given a longer split than that. That’s the sentence.” This

justification misconstrues the meaning of “strict adherence.” Our courts have held

that strict adherence to plea arrangements means giving the defendant what they

bargained for. See, e.g., State v. Carriker, 180 N.C. App. 470, 471, 637 S.E.2d 557,

558 (2006) (vacating sentence where the trial court required defendant to surrender

her nursing license, which was not contemplated in defendant’s plea arrangement);

State v. Wall, 167 N.C. App. 312, 317, 605 S.E.2d 205, 209 (2004) (vacating sentence

where trial court entered a shorter sentence than agreed upon by the parties); Marsh,

265 N.C. App. at 656, 829 S.E.2d at 248 (vacating sentence where trial court imposed

two concurrent sentences when the plea arrangement recommended only one).

      To the extent the terms of the arrangement—including whether the parties

had agreed to the imposition of a special condition of probation—were unclear, the

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                               STATE V. ROBERTSON

                                 Opinion of the Court

trial court should have sought clarification from the parties rather than impose a

sentence it decided was appropriate. This is especially true as both the State and

Defendant objected to the trial court’s understanding of the arrangement.

      Accordingly, because the sentence imposed by the trial court deviates from the

sentence that was agreed upon by Defendant and the State, the trial court erred by

denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

                              III.   Conclusion

      Because the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea, the judgment is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further

proceedings.

      VACATED AND REMANDED.

      Judges ZACHARY and RIGGS concur.

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