Court Opinion

ID: 9543203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:43:10.242176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:57.359807
License: Public Domain

On the Merits

The parties were married in 1965. At the time of the decree in 1975 the wife was 50 and the husband 67. There were no children. Both parties had been gainfully employed as court reporters, although at the time of the decree Mr. Libby was. “semi-retired.” He was, however, receiving social security in the amount of $272 a month and a pension from the state of Illinois in the amount of $435 a month for his services as a court reporter.
Each party had brought substantial assets into the marriage and they owned considerable property at the time of the decree.
The court’s two opinions in this matter, as set forth in appellant’s abstract,③ succinctly summarize its findings relating to the property as follows:
“March 7, 1975
“A decree may be entered dissolving the marriage *231and it will terminate 60 days from the date you gentlemen agree.
“The following shall be awarded to Mrs. Libby:
1. Home
2. Household furniture, fixtures and appliances
3. The stock she has and that is in her name
4. Her auto
5. Her business machines
6. Bank accounts
7. Jewelry and personal items.
“The following to Mr. Libby:
1. His stock in his name
2. His auto
3. The business machines in his possession
4. His bank accounts.
“In addition, Mrs. Libby is to give him one typewriter and one stenorette machine as well as his steel desk. Further, he shall have judgment against her in the sum of $17,500.00, payable at the rate of $150.00 per month, no interest so long as the payments are made monthly. The payments to be made until either the entire sum is paid, or the death of Mr. Libby, after which time, the judgment shall be considered paid.
“Mrs. Libby came into the marriage with assets of $28,500.00. Allowing an increase of $1,500.00 for jewelry, she is ending up with gross assets of $58,-972.00. Deducting the $17,500.00, leaves her net assets of $41,472.00, or an increase over the original amount of $12,972.00.
“Mr. Libby came into the marriage with assets of $37,000.00. The value of those items I have given him is $22,902.00, plus the $17,500.00 or a total of $40,402.00, or, an increase of $3,402.00.
“This is the best I can figure out.”
“March 12, 1975
“I overlooked this in my original order. I want the *232decree to provide the $150.00 payments are by way of support, this will not particularly hurt Mr. Libby tax wise but it will help Mrs. Libby.”
The decree generally incorporated the foregoing, though in greater detail. Its final provision was:
“Petitioner is ordered and directed to pay to respondent the sum of $18,150.00 in 121 regular consecutive monthly payments, with the first payment to be made on the 15th day of April, 1975 and to continue each month thereafter until such time as the said $18,150.00 shall have been paid or until such time as respondent shall die; said judgment shall not bear interest so long as .petitioner shall make the 150.00 payments each month thereafter.”
The increase to $18,150, according to appellant’s brief, was at the respondent’s request “to gain tax benefits which would apply by reason of the higher judgment.” The respondent does not contradict this. Appellant also concedes in his. brief: “The judgment therefore became one for support rather than for a settlement of property rights.”
As previously stated, we do not find it necessary, since it is a self-destruct provision, to consider whether or not this court has jurisdiction to review a provision for support when the benefited spouse has died,④ as here.
In Wirthlin and Wirthlin, 19 Or App 256, 527 P2d 147 (1974), we said:
# [T]he underlying rationale of our opinions applying the ‘no-fault’ doctrine, OES 107.036, *233is to put tlxe parties in a position financially, in so far as possible, that they would have been in had the marriage not been dissolved. Cf., Kitson and Kitson, 17 Or App 648, 523 P2d 575, Sup Ct review denied (1974). This case is a departure from the usual because here the wife has. been regularly employed, is presently capable of producing a reasonably good income and the husband’s future earning capacity is limited and uncertain because of his physical disabilities. Therefore, it is the husband who needs, as appellant puts it in her brief, ‘the long half’ of the assets.” (Footnote omitted.) 19 Or App at 258-59.
See also: Ray v. Ray, 11 Or App 246, 502 P2d 397 (1972).
From our review of the evidence, we conclude that consistent with the above authorities, the decree should be modified by awarding to the appellant the additional amount of $10,000 payable in three equal annual installments. If not paid when due each installment shall bear interest from the date of the decree; otherwise no interest shall be payable. As so modified the decree is affirmed without costs to either party.
Affirmed as modified.

The actual opinions are not included in the trial court file, nor do they appear in the record. Respondent, however, does not challenge them.

 See: Shields v. Bosch, Executor (n 2, supra), 190 Or at 158, where the court said:
“Moreover, the right to alimony is strictly a personal right as distinguished from a property right, and a cause of suit therefor does not survive to the personal representatives of a deceased person; death terminates the right. [Citation omitted.]”