Court Opinion

ID: 9532563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:31.696336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:46.979915
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). On August 14, 1978, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to appear for trial and granting defendants-appellees’ counterclaim giving them free and clear title to a certain piece of disputed property in Branch County. Plaintiffs appeal as of right.
On January 2, 1976, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Max Haynes, his wife, Dora, and Randall Hudson. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of a certain piece of property and that they and their predecessors had used the property for at least 37 years. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants had destroyed a fence which was on plaintiffs’ property, defendants being the owners of an adjacent parcel of property. The complaint prayed for damages in the amount of $30,000, a restraining order forbidding defendants from activities on the disputed land, and reform of plaintiffs’ *293and defendants’ deeds to remove any cloud on plaintiffs’ title.
On January 23, 1976, defendants filed their answer, along with a counterclaim seeking to quiet title to the disputed property. In their counterclaim defendants alleged, inter alia, the defendants Haynes had conveyed their interest in the subject property to Randall T. Hudson and Patricia J. Hudson, by warranty deed dated December 10, 1975. A copy of the deed was attached to the pleadings. On February 13, 1976, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing with prejudice the complaint against defendants Haynes because they retained no interest in the subject property.
Trial commenced on June 23, 1977. After presenting testimony of five witnesses and after the trial court had visited the property in question, plaintiffs’ counsel moved on the second day of trial to add Patricia J. Hudson as a defendant, defense counsel having pointed out that Mrs. Hudson was a necessary party to the action. The trial court granted the motion to add Mrs. Hudson as a defendant, but refused to order the trial to continue as if she had been a party from the outset, unless Mrs. Hudson stipulated to such a procedure. At this point the proceedings were adjourned to allow plaintiffs’ counsel to serve Mrs. Hudson with a complaint and summons.
On August 10, 1977, an amended complaint was filed adding Patricia Hudson as a defendant. Apparently no stipulation was ever filed with regard to continuing the trial from the point of interruption on June 24, 1977, as the record discloses that plaintiffs’ counsel requested a new pretrial date on December 5, 1977, followed by a December 12, 1977, motion to advance the cause on the calendar.
The new pretrial conference was held January *29411, 1978, at which time the trial court indicated to both counsel that the trial date would be set in the pretrial summary sent to counsel.1 Although the pretrial summary was timely mailed to and received by counsel for plaintiffs, it was never signed by counsel and returned to the clerk of court, as required by court rule.
On July 27, 1978, the date set by the court for trial, plaintiffs failed to appear. The court telephoned the office of plaintiffs’ counsel and learned that counsel had neglected to place the date on his calendar. Plaintiffs’ counsel requested that the court adjourn the matter until the afternoon. The court refused, noting on the record that plaintiffs had requested an early trial date and that special arrangements had been made to secure the presence of a court reporter, but stated that defense counsel was free to stipulate to adjournment. Defense counsel declined to stipulate to adjournment. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to appear and, after hearing testimony, found in favor of defendants on their counterclaim. On August 14, 1978, plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the dismissal of their complaint and the verdict for defendants on their counterclaim was heard and denied by the trial court.
Counsel for plaintiffs argued in the trial court and urges on appeal that the pretrial summary was not a proper notice of trial under the court rules, and that plaintiffs therefore never had actual notice of the trial date. GCR 1963, 501.2 authorizes circuit courts to provide by rule a method for setting trial dates. Rule 10 of the *295Branch County Circuit Court, as quoted in plaintiffs’ brief, provides:
"Actions shall be assigned for trial at the pretrial conference, unless otherwise directed by the court.”
The trial court recalled stating at the pretrial conference that the trial date would be set in the pretrial summary. Counsel for plaintiffs recalled the court having said that notice of trial would be forthcoming. No matter whose memory is the more accurate, it cannot be denied that counsel in fact received the pretrial summary, that the summary unequivocally stated that trial was set for July 27, 1978, and that counsel failed both to return the pretrial summary and to appear for trial.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to enter a default judgment against a party who fails to appear at trial after proper notice has been given, Muscio v Muscio, 62 Mich App 167; 233 NW2d 224 (1975), Butler v Cann, 62 Mich App 663; 233 NW2d 827 (1975). I am of the opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that plaintiffs had actual and proper notice of trial and that their failure to appear was not excusable neglect, especially in view of the history of the case. The court had earlier expended one and one-half days hearing testimony which proved to be useless because a necessary party had not been joined by plaintiffs, despite the fact that defendants’ counterclaim put them on notice of her existence. Plaintiffs had moved to have the case advanced on the calendar, and a second pretrial conference had been held shortly thereafter. Two more days of court time had been set aside for the second attempt at trial. The trial court’s reluctance to allow further delays caused by plaintiffs’ *296counsel is certainly understandable under the circumstances. Defendants as well as the court had invested considerable time and effort in the case; through no fault of theirs, little, if any, progress had been made in the matter.
Had we been in the position of the trial court, we might have acted differently; however, the record does not show that the trial court acted out of passion or bias rather than logically and reasonably, and we should not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, In re Kyung Won Kim, 72 Mich App 85; 249 NW2d 305 (1976).
I would affirm.

 It should be noted that this same procedure was followed in setting the original trial date. That date was adjourned by stipulation of the parties, and a new date was set by the trial court and noticed to the parties.