Court Opinion

ID: 9848741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:26:27.579888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:41.335068
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the remand of this case for proceedings to fully determine whether defendant’s statements made to the police of*11ficers were an intervening, independent product of his free will so as to dissipate the taint of his patently illegal detention. Even so, however, there is substantial evidence on this record, unless otherwise refuted, which would establish that the subsequent confession was untainted by the confinement. On the evening of May 3, following the inception of his confinement, it appears from this record that Kathleen Biel, mother of the deceased child, contacted John Barry, an agent for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation, and indicated that defendant wished to talk to him. Barry, after again advising defendant of his constitutional rights, received and transcribed defendant’s statement, which defendant signed the next day, May 4.1 At no time did defendant indicate that he had in any way been coerced into making his statement. At trial, moreover, defendant took the stand in his own defense and repeated virtually verbatim the contents of his statement to Agent Barry.

 The lapse of time is itself significant in distinguishing this case from the situation in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 45 L. ed. 2d 416 (1975). In Brown the defendant had made the first of two incriminating statements within 2 hours after his illegal arrest. Here the intervening period Of time was closer to 2 days. The United States Supreme Court in Brown (422 U. S. 603, 95 S. Ct. 2261, 45 L. ed. 2d 427) had indicated that the “temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,” as well as the giving of Miranda warnings, were among the circumstances to be considered in assessing the admissibility of the statements.