Court Opinion

ID: 9366605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 15:04:19.204868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:53.947058
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2020-CA-1581-MR

PRESTON R. WRIGHT                                                     APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE JOHN T. ALEXANDER, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 16-CR-00192

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Preston R. Wright appeals from the order denying his RCr1

11.42 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment of guilt and sentence,

entered on September 24, 2020, by the Barren Circuit Court. Following a careful

review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
              BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                 Direct appeal of this case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of

Kentucky in Wright v. Commonwealth, 590 S.W.3d 255 (Ky. 2019). “Wright was

charged with one count of sodomizing his then-girlfriend’s five-year-old daughter

Tammy.2 Because the issues raised on appeal are limited to the circumstances

surrounding . . . the jury’s deliberations, we will not discuss the details of the crime

itself.” Id. at 257 (footnote renumbered from original). We adopt those facts:

                       On the second day of trial the jury began its
                 deliberations at about one o’clock. An hour later the jury
                 requested, and was permitted, to see the video of
                 Tammy’s testimony again. The jury went back in to
                 deliberate at 2:38 PM.

                        At 3 PM the foreperson told the court that several
                 jurors were “not comfortable making a decision yea or
                 nay, guilty or not guilty, based on the evidence.” The
                 judge admitted he had never encountered that situation
                 before and wanted to talk to counsel about their preferred
                 course of action. The judge suggested reading through
                 the instructions again, telling the jury to think about those
                 instructions, and to make it clear that each individual
                 juror had a duty to either vote guilty or not guilty; that
                 they could not abstain from voting altogether. The
                 Commonwealth agreed, but the defense argued that the
                 only thing they could do was to bring the jury out, read
                 the Allen[3] charge to them and send them back in, or
                 declare a mistrial. The judge replied that an Allen charge
                 is read to a deadlocked jury, and that was not what they
                 had. They simply had jurors that were unwilling to vote

2
    This pseudonym is used to protect the child’s privacy.
3
    Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896).

                                                 -2-
either way. The judge further noted that juries come out
with questions all the time about a myriad of things, and
the court has options beyond reading them an Allen
charge.

       So, at 3:08 PM the court explained to the jury that
they each had an individual obligation to vote guilty or
not guilty based on the instructions and the evidence. He
told them that if they reached a point where everyone
voted and it was not unanimous, then they could let the
court know and they would deal with that issue. He then
sent them back in to deliberate.

       At 3:24 PM the foreperson reported that everyone
had voted, but they were now deadlocked. The judge
read them the Allen charge verbatim and sent them back
in to deliberate at 3:26 PM.

       At 3:46 PM the foreperson informed the court that
they had another issue. Anticipating that they were still
deadlocked, the court asked counsel what they wanted to
do if that was indeed the case. The Commonwealth
suggested asking the foreperson if he thought further
deliberations would be helpful, while the defense
suggested declaring a mistrial. The court proposed
telling the foreperson the court’s only two options were
to either read the Allen charge again and continue
deliberations or declare a mistrial and get the
foreperson’s opinion. The defense agreed.

       The court therefore asked the foreperson if he
thought there would be any utility in having them
deliberate further. The foreperson said that if the court
would have asked him that an hour ago, he would have
said no. But a few jurors had changed their opinion,
while a couple of jurors were holding firm. The trial
court then brought the jury out and explained that he was
not trying to “twist their arm,” but that he was required to
read the Allen charge again because they were still
deadlocked. He read it again verbatim and said “I’ll ask

                            -3-
              you to return to the jury room and continue your
              deliberations. I’m not asking for a specific amount of
              time. If and when you come to a decision one way or the
              other or convince yourselves you’re at an intractable
              spot, then just let us know and we’ll go from there,
              okay?” The jury was sent back in to deliberate at 3:57
              PM.

                     At 4:58 PM, the foreperson came out and asked if
              the judge could provide a definition of “reasonable
              doubt.” The judge explained that he could not, that what
              constitutes reasonable doubt is a judgment call for each
              individual juror. The foreperson went back to deliver the
              court’s answer at 5 PM.

                    At 5:11 PM, after a total of four hours of
              deliberation, the jury came back with a guilty verdict.

Id. at 258-59 (footnote omitted).

              After the Supreme Court affirmed, Wright, pro se, moved the trial

court to vacate the judgment and sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42. The

Commonwealth responded, and the trial court denied the motion without holding

an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              As established in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12

(Ky. 2002):

              [t]he Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for
              ineffective assistance of counsel:

                    [f]irst, the defendant must show that
                    counsel’s performance was deficient. This
                    requires showing that counsel made errors

                                          -4-
                   so serious that counsel was not functioning
                   as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
                   Amendment. Second, the defendant must
                   show that the deficient performance
                   prejudiced the defense. This requires
                   showing that counsel’s errors were so
                   serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
                   trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

             Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
             2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984).

             To show prejudice, the

                   defendant must show there is a reasonable
                   probability that, but for counsel’s
                   unprofessional errors, the result of the
                   proceeding would have been different. A
                   reasonable probability is the probability
                   sufficient to undermine the confidence in the
                   outcome.

             Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.

Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief may be granted. “Unless a

defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted

from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In the instant case, we need not

determine whether Wright’s counsel’s performance was adequate on the issue

raised on this appeal because Wright fails to demonstrate prejudice resulting from

counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

                                         -5-
             To establish prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable probability

exists that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In short, one must

demonstrate that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Fairness is

measured in terms of reliability. “The likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable.” Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867,

876 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Harrington v. Ritcher, 562 U.S. 86,

100, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067)).

             The standard for evaluating claims of ineffective appellate counsel is

the same as the “deficient-performance plus prejudice” standard applied to claims

of ineffective trial counsel in Strickland. Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d

431, 436 (Ky. 2010), as modified on denial of reh’g (Apr. 21, 2011).

             Respondent [defendant] must first show that his counsel
             was objectively unreasonable . . . in failing to find
             arguable issues to appeal – that is, that counsel
             unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and
             to file a merits brief raising them. If [defendant]
             succeeds in such a showing, he then has the burden of
             demonstrating prejudice. That is, he must show a
             reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s
             unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, he would have
             prevailed on his appeal.

                                           -6-
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285, 120 S. Ct. 746, 145 L. Ed. 2d 756 (2000)

(emphasis added).

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             On appeal herein, Wright alleges the trial court erred in denying his

RCr 11.42 motion because: (1) trial counsel failed to object to the court’s

improper communication with the jury foreperson outside the presence of the

entire jury, and (2) appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of that improper

communication on appeal. We will address each argument, in turn.

             Wright first argues his trial counsel’s failure to object to the court’s

improper communication with the jury foreperson outside the presence of the

entire jury constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. RCr 9.74 mandates:

             No information requested by the jury or any juror after
             the jury has retired for deliberation shall be given except
             in open court in the presence of the defendant (unless the
             defendant is being tried in absentia) and the entire jury,
             and in the presence of or after reasonable notice to
             counsel for the parties.

(Emphasis added.)

             On direct appeal, the Supreme Court noted “on at least three separate

occasions the trial court conversed with the foreperson out of the presence of the

rest of the jury. These actions, though done in good faith, were a clear violation of

RCr 9.74[.]” Wright, 590 S.W.3d at 265. It further held “this error was waived by

                                          -7-
defense counsel’s lack of objection to said discussions” but “reiterate[d] that our

trial courts are bound to follow RCr 9.74 and its corresponding case law.” Id.

             For the appeal herein, Wright asserts the trial court’s communication

with the foreperson outside the presence of the entire jury intentionally or

inadvertently coerced the verdict in this case. Although the Supreme Court found

that issue to be waived, we may review whether counsel was ineffective in waiving

the issue. Prescott v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Ky. App. 2019)

(“[A]n adverse ruling from the Court on direct appeal does not preclude the same

claim of error from being considered again as ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

             It is well established:

             When analyzing whether a trial court has coerced a jury
             verdict, this Court has explained that the ultimate test of
             coercion is whether the instruction actually forces an
             agreement on a verdict or whether it merely forces
             deliberation which results in an agreement. We analyze
             the totality of the circumstances. The time lapse
             between the alleged coercive comment and the verdict
             may be relevant as part of the totality of circumstances,
             though not decisive. [S]tatements which merely impress
             upon the jury the propriety and importance of coming to
             an agreement do not rise to the level of reversible error.
             At the same time, however, it must be remembered that
             the words and acts of a presiding judge have great weight
             with juries, and for that reason we have often written that
             he should at all times be cautious in what he says or does
             in the presence of the jury.

                                         -8-
Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 742-43 (Ky. 2008), overruled on other

grounds by Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. 2008) (emphasis added)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             When the Supreme Court considered whether the trial court’s Allen

charges to the entire jury were coercive, it held:

             There is nothing in either of these statements, or the
             circumstances surrounding their delivery, that
             convinces this Court that the jury was forced to reach a
             verdict. The trial judge specifically stated no one was
             trying to twist the jury’s arm, or even that they should
             deliberate for a specific period of time. Further, the
             jury deliberated for a total of four hours, which
             cannot be considered a coercive factor. This is an
             instance where the Allen instructions were given merely
             to encourage continued deliberations. We therefore find
             no error.

Wright, 590 S.W.3d at 264 (emphasis added).

             The court’s statements to the foreperson outside the presence of the

entire jury were made in a like manner and consisted of similar language. Portions

of the exchanges between the court and foreperson were lifted from their context in

Wright’s briefs to make the trial court appear coercive. Examination of the full

exchanges clearly shows no coercion. Further, the court brought in and addressed

the entire jury immediately after having its exchanges with the foreperson, which

in this case mitigated any potentially harmful effects of the improper

communication. Our review reveals only one instance – the last exchange between

                                          -9-
the court and the foreperson – when the court did not also address the entire jury.

On that occasion, the foreperson asked the court if it could define the phrase

“reasonable doubt,” to which the court responded it could not. Additionally, more

than an hour passed between when the jury was sent back for deliberations after

the second Allen charge and when the foreperson emerged to request the court

define “reasonable doubt.” Our review of the exchanges that violated RCr 9.74

reveals no intentional or inadvertent coercion. Accordingly, Wright has not

demonstrated prejudice required to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel.

                Wright’s second argument concerns ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. He claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

issue of improper jury communication on direct appeal. For the reasons discussed

herein, the improper communication between the court and the jury foreperson did

not constitute reversible error. Thus, appellate counsel’s failure to include the

issue in the direct appeal brief did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel.4

4
    The Supreme Court of the United States has held:

                appellate counsel who files a merits brief need not (and should not)
                raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among
                them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal . . .
                it is still possible to bring a Strickland claim based on counsel’s
                failure to raise a particular claim, but it is difficult to demonstrate
                that counsel was incompetent.

                                                 -10-
                                       CONCLUSION

               Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order upholding

Wright’s judgment and sentence entered by the Barren Circuit Court is

AFFIRMED.

               ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                         BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Andrea Reed                                   Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                           Attorney General of Kentucky

                                               Christopher Henry
                                               Assistant Attorney General
                                               Frankfort, Kentucky

Smith, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S. Ct. at 765.

                                             -11-