Court Opinion

ID: 9683211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:24:36.197709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.247770
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
HAMLIN, Justice.
On original hearing, we set aside the conviction and sentence of defendant for the crime of “Public Intimidation,” holding that at the time of the occurrence of the alleged misconduct, defendant, a convict inmate at the State Penitentiary, did not have the specific intent required for the commission of the crime charged.
Two bills of exceptions were reserved during the course of trial. On this rehearing, we shall consider Bill of Exceptions No. 2,1 reserved to the denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial, in which' motion he alleged:
“ * * * there was no evidence of any nature whatsoever adduced upon trial hereof to justify a conviction under the provisions of [LSA-] R.S. 14:-122 since there was no evidence of any kind with respect to defendant, Freddie Daniels, using any violence, force or threats upon any of the persons enumerated in said article with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment or duty.”
All evidence taken during the course of trial is annexed to Bill of Exceptions No. 2. The pertinent testimony with respect to the crime herein charged is as follows:
“Q. Tell the Judge what happened, Mr. Edwards. [Correctional Officer at Angola State Prison] A. Well, on this particular evening I was turning out for feed. They have a rule down there that they will line up in a single line, single file going to chow, and they must hold that line, and in case that one breaks the line we tell him to get back in line, and in case he don’t,' why, we have the authority to send them to the tail-end of the line before chow. This evening Freddie *1018Daniels was out of the line out in the middle of the road, passing the whole line. I told him twice to get back in line. Well, he didn’t get in line and I went up the walk, overtaken him and took him by the upper part of his arm right here at the shoulder and told him to go to the tail of the line. At that time, he shoved me on the shoulder and said, ‘No, you don’t push me around, not here,’ and drawed his fist back to hit me.
“Q. What happened then? A. Well, at that time, when I seen that he was going to hit me and had started his swing, well, I swung, too, to knock his lick off to protect myself.
“Q. Well, what happened? ' A. Well, we both hit, and he knocked me to my knees and hands, and when I got up, he started down the walk, and I told him that — and I told him that was all right. I immediately went to the phone and called Captain D. J. Derrick, my supervisor.
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“Q. What was he trying to make you do ? Was he trying to make you do anything or was he just standing out there in line? A. No, he wasn’t in line. He was out of the line.
“Q. Well, I say, what was he trying to make you do ? Was he trying to make you do something — give him something or hand him something or— A. No, I told him to go to the end of the line — back to the tail end of the line.
“Q. What was he trying to make you do, though, Mr. Edwards ? A. Well, I don’t know that. He just shoved me and told me I wasn’t shoving him around there. That’s all.
“Q. Was he trying to do anything to influence you to do something? A. Well, he wouldn’t go to the end of the line when I told him to go to the end of the line. He shoved me back and told me I couldn’t shove him around there—
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“Q. He didn’t come up to you and try to make you do anything, did he? A. No, sir, he wasn’t supposed to.
“Q. But he didn’t do that, did he? A. No, sir.
* * * * * >fc
“Q. Did he at any time go to the end of the line as you ordered him to? A. No, sir.
******
“Q. Now, do you remember — He drew back to hit you, and you drew back to hit him — Do you remember who hit first or anything like that? A. Well, we hit about the same time.” (Emphasis ours.)
*1020Posed for our determination is the question of whether or not the above described conduct constitutes “Public Intimidation” and is prohibited by LSA-R.S. 14:122, which reads:
“Public intimidation is the use of violence, force, or threats upon any of •the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty:
“(1) Public officer or public employee ; or
“(2) Grand or petit juror; or
“(3) Witness, or person about to be called as a witness upon a trial or other proceeding before any court, board 'or officer authorized to hear evidence or to take testimony; or
“(4) Voter or election official at any general, primary, or special election.
“Whoever commits the crime of public intimidation shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both.”2
Under the “Comment” of Article1 740-122, Louisiana Code of Criminal Law and Procedure,3 we find the following:
“ * * * The public intimidation article includes the same parties and requires the same purpose as that article. [Public Bribery] The principal differences in the two articles is the .method used to accomplish the purpose. Also voters and election officials are included.
“The words ‘violence, force, or 'threats’ should include threats of harm or injury to the character of the person threatened as well as actual or threatened physical violence.”
Preceding LSA-R.S. 14:118, “Public Bribery,” we find Sub-Part B., “Bribery and Intimidation.” Thereunder, is quoted the following:
“Comparison of prior criminal law. Dale E. Bennett, 5 La.L.Rev. 6, 45 (Dec. 1942). Mr.’Bennett stated:
“ ‘Existing bribery statutes were numerous and confusing. The new Code correlates and combines all these various special statutes in one general article (section) on public bribery, which embraces the bribery of public officers or employees, election officials, jurors, and witnesses. Upon a suggestion of the Advisers, bribery of voters was made a separate and lesser offense. Bribery is defined to include the giving or receiving, and also the promising or soliciting, of a bribe. The intent element of the offense is simply *1022stated. It is enough that the bribe was given or offered “with the intent to influence his (the recipient’s) conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty.” The action induced need not be corrupt or illegal. The buying or selling of appointments to office, or extra payments to induce a public officer or employee to do what he is already legally bound to do, would clearly constitute public bribery.
“ ‘Public intimidation includes the same parties and requires the same intention as public bribery. The principal distinction between the two offenses is the method employed to accomplish that purpose. The phrase “violence, force, or threats” is broad enough to include threats of injury to character as well as threats of physical violence.
“ ‘The public bribery and public intimidation articles (sections) are supplemented by two special articles (sections) which cover a related type of improper conduct particularly affecting jurors. Any attempt to influence jurors in respect to their verdict, except in the regular course of the trial, will constitute jury tampering; while any juror who intentionally permits such undue influencing or pledges his verdict will be guilty of jury misconduct.’ ” 4
In arriving at an answer to the question posed, supra, we must adhere to the rules laid down for the interpretation of criminal statutes, namely:
“* * * Nothing is a crime under our law which is not made so by statute. The court cannot by construction make that a crime which is not expressly made so by the Legislature. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall (United States v. Wiltzberger, 5 Wheat. [76] 95, 5 L.Ed. [35] 37), ‘It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle that a case which is within the reason or mischief of the statute is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity or of kindred character with those which are enumerated.’ On the same subject, Bishop, Stat.Crimes, § 220, quotes from Hawkins as follows: ‘No parallel case which comes within the same mischief shall be considered to be within the purview of the statute unless it can be brought within the meaning of *1024the words.’ * * *” State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630, 635.
“It has long been the unshaken rule of this State that penal statutes must be strictly construed and cannot be extended to cases not included within the clear import of its language.” State v. Viator, 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115, 117.
“Important to consider here, moreover, is the well settled principle that in a criminal prosecution the statute on which it is based must be strictly construed and any doubt as to its interpretation must be resolved in favor of the accused. State v. DeGeneres, 194 La. 574, 194 So. 24; State v. Gehlbach, 205 La. 340, 17 So.2d 349; State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758.” State v. Bowden, 220 La. 13, 55 So.2d 764, 767. Cf., State v. Palanque, 133 La. 36, 62 So. 224.
“Criminal laws are strictly construed; only those acts are offenses which are clearly made so by the language of the statute, which cannot be extended further. LSA-R.S. 14:7; * * *” State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724, 726.
“Criminal laws are stricti juris, and this Court has consistently refused to usurp legislative prerogatives by supplying definitions omitted in such statutes. * * * State v. Penniman, 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770, 771.
“Courts can do no more than interpret and construe statutes. They cannot, under the guise of interpretation, assume legislative function. * * * ” State v. Murtes, 232 La. 486, 94 So.2d 446, 448.
“ * * * It is too well settled to need reference to authority that penal laws must be construed strictly in accord with their letter, and that a wrong which does not come within the letter of such a law does not subject the offender to the penalty.” State v. Hebert, 179 La. 190, 153 So. 688, 689.
A review of the evidence, supra, shows that the defendant became indignant and resented correctional officer Otis Edwards’ admonition. He exhibited an attitude of resentment. The defendant spoke back to the officer, after twice receiving an order, and then drew his fist back to hit the officer. At this point, the officer hit the defendant and at the same time the defendant hit the officer.
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, defines “Resent” as follows:
“ * * * to feel or show displeasure and indignation at (some act, remark, etc.) or toward (a person), from a sense of being injured or offended.”
In 77 C.J.S. Resentment, p. 283, defined as:
“A feeling of indignant displeasure because of something regarded as a *1026wrong, insult, or the like; umbrage. * »
Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language College Edition defines “Influence” to mean:
“ * * * to exert or have influence on; have an effect on the nature or behavior of; affect the action or thought of; modify.”
State Bar v. Raffetto, 64 Nev. 390, 183 P. 2d 621, 624, states:
“ * * * A synonym of the verb ‘influence’ is ‘determine.’ Another is ‘induce.’ ” See, 43 C.J.S. Influence p. 382; State v. Hurd, Wash., 105 P.2d 59, 61; Loewer v. Arkansas Rice Growers’ Co-op Ass’n, 180 Ark. 484, 22 S.W.2d 17; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034.
The evidence reflects that the resentment of the defendant displayed itself in a spontaneous act of mild violence and nothing more. It does not contain any showing that the resentment and mild violence were for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the officer in relation to his position, employment, or duty. Under the comments quoted, supra, it is pointed out that the crime of “Public Intimidation” requires the same purpose as that of “Public Bribery,” the only difference being in the method employed. The conduct of the defendant as set forth in the evidence is not even akin to that expressed by the commentators. We conclude that the evidence is devoid of circumstances which show a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:122.
To extend the statute to the present situation would be tantamount to allowing the State to do what the law and jurisprudence reprobates; i. e'., to punish defendant by extending the application of a State law to a case and circumstances not intended by the lawmakers. A reading of LSA-R.S. 14:122 provokes the thought that the article could not possibly apply to the instant case and the defendant herein, an inmate of the State Penitentiary. It goes without saying that, rather than charge defendant with the commission of a felony, the disciplinary rules and procedure of the penitentiary should have been invoked and enforced.5
*1028' “The superintendent, subject to the approval-of the governor, shall make all rules .and regulations necessary for the .government of the penitentiary and all its departments. * * * The superintendent shall also enact rules for the grading and classifying of the convicts according to the most modern and enlightened system of reformation, the assignment and character of work, the prohibition of harsh or cruel punishment, the right of a convict to communicate directly with the superintendent without interference of an officer, the purpose being to restore and reform the individual to a better man, physically, intellectually, and morally LSA-R.S. IS :854.. (Emphasis ours.)
“ * * * And there is, incident to the office of prison officials, a power to make reasonable rules arid regulations for the government of prisoners, and to inflict punishment for the infraction of such rules. * * * ” 41 Am.Jur., Sec. 36, “Prisons and Prisoners,” p. 910. See, 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 11, p. 862.
“The custodian of a penal institution has no arbitrary- power to select such a mode of inflicting discipline on a prisoner as he may deem adequate, * * * ” 41 Am.Jur., Sec. 37, “Prisons and Prisoners,” p. 910.
We conclude that the conduct of the defendant was subject to the discretionary reprimand or punishment of the penitentiary authorities (such power being granted by law, supra) and was not such as would constitute a felony under LSA-R.S. 14:122.
Counsel for appellant aptly states in brief:
“ * * * if this argument [that the conduct of the defendant is prohibited by LSA-R.S. 14:122] is followed to its logical conclusion, any person that resists any simple order or direction of a police officer is resisting the police officer’s influence and is likewise guilty of the crime of public intimidation. We respectfully submit that such a construction of the facts presented in this case would pervert the very purpose of the Statute and bring a wealth of cases not heretofore considered pertinent within full application of the Public Intimidation Statute.”
*1030Our finding that the defendant’s conduct did not come within the prohibitions of LSA-R.S. 14:122 precludes the necessity of our reconsideration of the question of “Intent.”
For the reasons assigned, our original decree, annulling and setting aside the j udgment of the trial court and ordering the defendant discharged, is reinstated and made the judgment of this Court.
McCALEB, J., dissents with written reasons.
HAWTHORNE, J., dissents.

. Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved to the trial court’s overruling defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment.

. The defendant was sentenced to serve five years in the State Penitentiary.

. This article is identical to LSA-R.S. 14:-122.

. “This court has previously pointed out that the comments to the various articles of the Criminal Code, printed as footnotes, have legislative sanction, and that it is appropriate and proper to take into consideration these comments in endeavoring to interpret and construe the provisions of the articles found therein. See State v. Davis, 208 La. 954, 977, 23 So.2d 801.” State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604, 609.

. The incident involved occurred on February 22, 1958; the defendant was released from the penitentiary in April, 1958; the bill of information herein was filed on May 9, 1958. On trial, the defendant testified as follows:
“Q. You were released from the penitentiary. When was that? A. I was released in April.
“Q. This matter was’nt brought up on your record, was it? A. No, sir, it wasn’t.
“Q. You weren’t charged with any offense? A. No, sir.
“Q. This was more or less a matter between you- and Mr. Edwards, wasn’t it? A. Yes, sir, because at the time they, said there wasn’t anything to it. I also *1028had my supervisor. I was going to school down there. I had an interview with him, a fellow on the Board. He is a preacher there, and he -said that he taken notes of the whole case and he went down talking to them, if I am not mistaken, the record clerk, or Mr. Walker, the security guard, and he sat on the Board like I said, and I made the Board. It wasn’t — • He said it wasn’t even brought up on the Board down there in Baton Rouge.”