Court Opinion

ID: 9671033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:29:55.06267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.805333
License: Public Domain

Beasley, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority finds error in the refusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury regarding the ele*653merits of manslaughter and that a possible verdict was guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The majority bases this conclusion on People v Chamblis1 and People v Ora Jones.2
The flaw in this reasoning is that defendant never requested a manslaughter instruction based on provocation. Rather, defendant claimed that his victim solicited him to perform sexual acts and attacked him with a hammer when he refused. Based on this assertion, defendant requested a duress instruction. But this request was clearly inappropriate because duress is never a defense to murder.3 The alleged attack by the housewife on defendant with a hammer would give rise to a claim of self-defense on the part of defendant. Of course, for obvious reasons, defendant did not claim self-defense. The physical evidence made a claim of self-defense preposterous and, consequently, defendant did not choose to claim self-defense.
The majority correctly claims that a defendant is entitled to raise inconsistent defenses.4 But, it should be noted that the defendant must raise the defenses. A case does not try itself and defenses do not arise unless a defendant asserts them.
In this case, the question on appeal is whether we should disregard the defense of duress asserted by defendant at trial and search the evidence in an effort to find another interpretation than that adopted by defendant that would require an instruction on manslaughter.
*654In People v John Willie Williams,5 this Court said:
"The general rule appears to be well established that a judge is not obliged to instruct a jury that it may convict one charged with murder of the lesser offense of manslaughter unless evidence has been introduced tending to show that the lesser offense has been committed.”
Here, the prosecution’s case depended upon defendant’s statement. I would agree with the majority that the only possible evidence supporting a verdict of manslaughter was defendant’s statement.
At trial, defendant adopted inconsistent defenses. First, he repudiated his statement, claiming it was an effort to get himself out of a "jam”. Second, he said he was under duress when he battered her to death with a hammer. Neither claim entitled defendant to a manslaughter instruction. If, as he contends, the statement was a total fabrication, it did not constitute evidence that he had committed manslaughter. For the reasons previously indicated, neither was there a showing of duress requiring a manslaughter instruction.
For the trial judge to instruct the jury regarding manslaughter based on some theory of self-defense or provocation, when the same were neither argued nor presented at trial, only would have served to confuse the jury. I do not read People v Williams, supra, to require a manslaughter instruction under facts and circumstances such as exist in the within case.
The evidence must be viewed within the framework in which it was offered and admitted. While the current state of the law appears to permit a *655defendant to assert inconsistent defenses (a luxury which, incidentally, is denied the prosecution), a defendant must raise his own defenses. In this case, defendant simply did not assert a defense based on the evidence that entitled him to a manslaughter instruction.
Since this is a dissent, I see no reason to deal with the defendant’s other claims of error, except to indicate I believe they are without merit. I would not find any miscarriage of justice in this guilty verdict and, consequently, would affirm.

 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).

 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975).

 40 ALR2d, pp 908, 909; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries (1854), p 29; Perkins On Criminal Law (2d ed), pp 951-959; LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, §49, p 377; 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, §148, pp 283-284; 22 CJS, Criminal Law, § 44, pp 135-136.

 People v Hansma, 84 Mich App 138, 145; 269 NW2d 504 (1978).

 26 Mich App 218, 221; 182 NW2d 347 (1970).