Court Opinion

ID: 9738334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:50:21.90905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.457105
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER concurring in part, dissenting in part: I join with the opinion of the majority in affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence for the crime of rape. I believe however that the judgment of conviction for the offense of indecent liberties should be reversed. At the outset it should be noted that no question is raised concerning the often troublesome problem of whether two offenses arise from the same act. The trial court, both of the parties to this appeal and the majority of the court concede the two offenses of rape and indecent liberties did arise from the same act. (People v. Duszkewycz (1963), 27 Ill.2d 257, 189 N.E.2d 299, and People v. Ruiz, 82 Ill.App.2d 184, 226 N.E.2d 438.) Nor is there any question raised with respect to the right of the State to submit both charges to the jury for its consideration. The description and characterization of the same act or conduct in terms of multiple criminal offenses is within the discretion of the State’s Attorney and is independent of any particular or special criminality of the conduct. In the instant case defendant was charged with two offenses arising from the same act or conduct. Several other offenses could have been charged based on the same conduct and could have been supported just as readily as the two offenses in fact charged. For instance the defendant could have been charged with kidnapping, assault, aggravated assault, battery or perhaps even the illegal use of a weapon. Yet the offense of rape and punishment for its component misconduct includes all of the varied aspects of such other misconduct. If there be judgments of conviction for more than one offense growing out of the same act even though only one sentence be imposed and that for the greater offense, the question remains as to the disposition of the lesser offense. When multiple charges arising from the same act or conduct result in finding of guilt of more than one offense whether by plea or determination of a jury or court it seems to me that the same rationale which authorizes a sentence only for the most serious offense is equally applicable and persuasively supports the conclusion that the conviction or judgment of conviction for the lesser offense ought not be entered or if entered should be vacated. In saying that a criminal defendant should not be sentenced for more than one offense growing out of the same act or conduct we are in effect saying that punishment under such circumstances is neither fair, just nor warranted. In saying that double punishment for the same occurrence or act is not justified we are recognizing that the result is based on the initial discretion of the State and its desire to cover all contingencies rather than any claim of enhanced criminality or aggravated conduct. By requiring only that no sentence be imposed on the lesser offense we would continue in effect, both legally and in common parlance, the conclusion that the defendant has been convicted of multiple, apparently independent, felonies while the rationale supporting the rule of one sentence only is based on the contrary belief. People v. Leggett, 2 Ill.App.3d 962, 275 N.E.2d 651, and People v. Short, 4 Ill.App.3d 849, 281 N.E.2d 785, are based on the premise that reversing the conviction for the lesser offense growing out of the same conduct is a complimentary application of the main rule even though the issue has not been specifically discussed in Supreme Court decisions. In part the resolution of this issue has depended upon hints in prior precedents that may be garnered from the dispositional provisions of cases involving the principle issue, whether the multiple charges did arise from the same act or conduct. For instance in People v. Duszkewycz (1963), 27 Ill.2d 257, 189 N.E.2d 299, the judgment regarding the offense of rape was affirmed and the judgment regarding the lesser offense, incest, was reversed. To the same effect are People v. Whittington, 46 Ill.2d 405, 265 N.E.2d 679, and People v. Ruiz, 82 Ill.App.2d 184, 226 N.E.2d 438. People v. Brown, 52 Ill.2d 94, 285 N.E.2d 1, cited in the majority opinion as supporting a conclusion contrary to that reached in Leggett and Short, likewise bears on this issue only to the extent of an intimation which might be derived from the dispositional provision of the opinion. As is disclosed by the opinion in Brown, the only issue of multiple offenses arising from the same act was concerned first with whether the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant on the lesser charge, the opinion concluding in the negative, and, second, that the sentence was not clearly imposed for the greater offense. Consequently the Court modified the “judgments” by providing that the sentence was applicable only to the offense of rape and affirming the “judgments” as so modified. Reliance on dispositional provisions such as those either in Duszkewycz or Brown is at best of doubtful support for either side of this issue and the issue deserves resolution on its merits. As I have suggested I believe this issue should be resolved in accord with the general principle that the same act or conduct should be punished only once and that any record or procedure which detracts from or is contrary to this rule should be avoided.