Court Opinion

ID: 9693380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:39:02.446512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:45.710170
License: Public Domain

KENNEY, Judge,
dissenting.
This case captures the spirit of the adage that if something appears too good to be true, it probably is.
Initially, it is important to point out that this dissent neither presupposes that appellees have engaged in malpractice or any other alleged wrongdoing nor precludes an ultimate determination that the circumstances surrounding the matters meticulously set out by the majority constitute inquiry notice. It simply reflects my belief that, under the circumstances of this case, the determination of when limitations began could not be made by the trial court pursuant to a motion for summary judgment.
It has been noted that the discovery rule is not a rigid rule. As stated in Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md.App. 169, 178, 689 A.2d 634 (1997):
In making a determination as to when the statute of limitations accrues in a particular circumstance, a court must do so ‘with awareness of the policy considerations unique to each situation.’ ... As we noted, the determina*420tion of when a cause of action accrues under the discovery rule is usually a determination made by the court____ When the viability of a statute of limitations defense hinges on a question of fact, however, the factual question is ordinarily resolved by the jury, rather than by the court____ ‘Depending upon the nature of the assertions being made with respect to the limitations plea, th[e] determination [of whether the action is barred] may be solely one of law, solely one of fact or one of law and fact.’ [Citations omitted.]
The ultimate issue is whether appellants had such knowledge prior to the dismissal of their suit against Wolf and Piper & Marbury as would cause reasonable people in their position to undertake an additional or more thorough investigation, which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to an earlier action against appellees for their alleged malpractice and related wrongdoing. As this Court found in Prande v. Bell, 105 Md.App. 636, 660 A.2d 1055 (1995), I believe the circumstances surrounding this case generate a question of fact.
Mr. Brown’s deposition confirms that his firm maintained a lawyer-client relationship with appellants from 1981 through 1994 in reference to the King Farm.
The affidavit of F. Lois Aschenbach, daughter of W. Lawson King, states:
3. [Appellees] represented me and my siblings without interruption throughout the entire series of events surrounding the transfer of the farm, in the United States Tax Court, and the subsequent law suit against Van Velsor Wolf and Piper & Marbury. I did not terminate my relationship with [appellees] until sometime after Judge Peter J. Messitte issued a written opinion in the law suit against Mr. Wolf and Piper & Marbury. At that time, I refused to participate in an appeal of Judge Messitte’s decision, and sought other counsel to represent my interests.
*4214. Throughout the period of time that [appellees] represented the family with regard to the transfer of the farm and the events which arose as a result of the transfer, my siblings and I placed trust and confidence in [appellees]. They provided legal advice, which we relied on. Whenever we had questions or concerns about issues which arose, [appellees] assured me and my siblings that they could handle the situation, were working to address or resolve the situation, and that there was nothing to worry about.
The affidavit of Conrad V. Aschenbach states:
9. When the notices of deficiency were issued, the family was not unduly concerned, because Mr. Brown had indicated that a challenge by the Internal Revenue Service was a possibility, and that he had been prepared all along to address the issue, should it arise. Upon receipt of the notices of deficiency, Mr. Brown once again reassured the family that the transaction was legitimate, and that the controversy with the Internal Revenue Service would be resolved without the payment of additional taxes.
10. During the time from when Montgomery County refused to record the deed throughout the duration of the litigation involving the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Brown provided constant assurances that the transaction was a bona fide sale, and that he would solve all of the problems that had arisen since the closing. Mr. Brown frequently used the phrase “no adjustment” to assure me and the family that the controversy would be resolved without having to pay additional taxes.
11. On numerous occasions, my wife and I and other members of the family spoke with Mr. Brown about developments in the case. In most, if not all, of these discussions, Mr. Brown assured us that there was nothing to worry about, that he was doing whatever was necessary to address the situation, and there *422would be no adverse tax adjustment arising from the sales transaction.
12. It was not until sometime after Judge Peter Messitte issued his written opinion in the legal malpractice case against Mr. Wolf and Piper & Marbury that my wife and I understood the malpractice and deception that [appellees] had exercised throughout this series of events. The affirmation of Judge Messitte’s opinion by the Court of Special Appeals only served to further reinforce our understanding of the nature and extent of the malpractice and deception committed by [appellees]. Investigations undertaken by our present attorneys thereafter brought to light Mr. Bonsall’s involvement and liability as well. [Emphasis in original.]
Although Lois Aschenbach does not expressly say appellees misled her, her statements that she placed trust and confidence in appellees, and that she and her siblings were consistently “assured” that there “was nothing to worry about” permit an inference that appellants were misled. The affidavit of Conrad Aschenbach states a “deception” that can be inferred from the continued assurances of no adverse tax adjustment, followed by the action against Mr. Wolf.
William I. King, son of W. Lawson King, expressly alleges concealment by appellees through control of the negotiations and litigation and lack of disclosure. In answers to interrogatories, William I. King states:
Defendants undertook to control the negotiations and litigation -with the IRS so as to conceal from the Plaintiff that it was the Defendants’ wrongdoing which led to the deficiency assessment in the first place____ At no time did the Defendants fully disclose their relationship in the transaction, or the inherent conflicts of interest which existed by continuing the representation of the Debtor throughout the various phases of the problem as it developed.
It is certainly obvious that appellees quickly and consistently ascribed blame to other counsel and were instrumental in the decision to file suit against Mr. Wolf and Piper & Mar-*423bury. They even sought out counsel for appellants for that purpose. From these activities, one could infer appellees created a smoke screen to obscure their own potential liability.
As stated by William I. King in answers to interrogatories from the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, “[t]he Defendants were instrumental in the retention of Bayard Z. Hochberg to bring the action and the Defendants consulted with Hochberg and reviewed the significant pleadings he prepared or filed in this case, prior to their filing.”
The affidavit of James Wriley Jacobs, Sr., states:
19. The family met with Mr. Hochberg, and Mr. Hochberg worked with Mr. Brown and Mr. Sturm to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the events that transpired from the fall of 1981 up to the settlement with the Internal Revenue Service. At no time did Mr. Hochberg or anyone else suggest to the family that Mr. Brown and Mr. Sturm were responsible for the losses suffered by the family.
The affidavit of Elizabeth Jeanne Jacobs, daughter of W. Lawson King, states the following:
14. Mr. Brown and Mr. Sturm told the family that Mr. Wolf and his law firm Piper & Marbury were the reason the family had to pay $20 million to the Internal Revenue Service to settle the tax case. They suggested that we file a law suit against Mr. Wolf and Piper & Marbury to recoup the money we had to pay to settle the tax case. Based on their advice, the family met with attorney Bayard Hochberg to discuss filing a law suit.
The active and ongoing involvement of appellees in the litigation with Wolf and Piper & Marbury is confirmed by Mr. Hochberg in deposition. His first meeting on this matter was with Mr. Bonsall and an appellee. His initial engagement letter was actually addressed to appellees. Much of his investigation was based on information provided by appellees. He sent them the original complaint for review and comment. As to the May 2,1991 letter from George Beall, Mr. Hochberg *424indicated that he did not agree with Mr. Beall’s conclusions as to the potential liability of appellees. It does not appear that Mr. Hochberg sent the letter to appellants, but he did send it to Mr. Brown.10 At no time did he advise or suggest to appellants that “any person other than Mr. Wolf or Piper „& Marbury were legally responsible to them.” The deposition of James Wriley Jacobs, Sr., goes on to state:
20. At no time did Mr. Brown, Mr. Sturm, or Mr. Hochberg advise the family that anyone other .than Mr. Wolf and Piper & Marbury were the cause of the damages the family suffered in settling the law suit with the Internal Revenue Service for $20 million. Instead, Mr. Brown, Mr. Sturm, and Mr. Hochberg advised the family that Mr. Wolf and Piper & Marbury were the sole cause of the damages the family suffered.
The forwarding by Mr. Hochberg of the Beall letter to Mr. Brown reflects the continued involvement of at least one of the appellees Ndn the proceedings and permits an inference of continuing control by appellees over the dissemination of information to appellants.
*425The concept of limitations is to balance the interests between diligent plaintiffs and would-be defendants in addition to the enhancement of administrative efficiency. Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 338 Md. 324, 635 A.2d 394 (1994); Doe v. Maskell, 342 Md. 684, 679 A.2d 1087 (1996) cert. denied, Roe v. Maskell, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 770, 136 L.Ed.2d 716 (1997); Doe v. Archdiocese of Washington, supra. Throughout the general discussion on limitations, we refer to the individual who has “slumbered on his rights.” Maskell, 342 Md. at 689-690, 679 A.2d 1087; Archdiocese of Washington, 114 Md.App. at 177, 689 A.2d 634. This does not appear to be a situation in which appellants truly slumbered, but if they have, an inference could be drawn that they were purposely lulled to sleep, if not sedated, by extended and diversionary litigation encouraged by appellees.
As to “policy considerations unique to each situation,” the actual circumstances surrounding the attorney-client relationship and an ongoing representation should be a factor for consideration by the fact finder on a case-by-case basis, even if continued representation by the attorney does not automatically toll the statute of limitations. See Watson v. Dorsey, 265 Md. 509, 290 A.2d 530 (1972).
In discussing the policy basis for the continued course of treatment rule relating to physicians and patients, the Court of Appeals in Hecht explains that the rule was applied because of the confidential relationship between the physician and the patient. “Because of this relationship of trust and reliance, the patient is excused from making inquiry questioning the physician’s care.” Id. at 337-338, 635 A.2d 394. Although the continuous course of treatment rule was subsequently limited by legislation, the policy reasoning remains instructive.
There should be no less societal interest in maintaining the confidential relationship between attorney and client than that in maintaining the physician and patient bond. The attorney-client relationship is also one of trust and reliance and, therefore, a factor that a fact finder should be able to consider in determining whether a client has acted reasonably under the *426circumstances and because of which he may be excused for limited or delayed inquiry.
Therefore, whether appellants acted reasonably in light of both their longtime and continuing professional relationship with appellees and the ongoing Wolf litigation is a question of fact. The inherently related question of whether appellants’ failure to discover the cause of action was due to lack of diligence or to appellees’ concealment is also ordinarily a question of fact. Herring v. Offutt, 266 Md. 593, 295 A.2d 876 (1972).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Air. Hochberg's deposition reflects the following regarding the Beall letter:
Q. Okay. And if in fact this letter, as we have noted it, that the letter carries the handwritten notation on the top of it "Please copy for Air. King,” and since this is 1991, can we assume that would be Air. Billy King?
A. I would assume.
Q. It appears as though his letter may have been sent to Mr. Billy King.
A. See, that’s not my writing up there.
Q. Okay.
A. I don’t think it is my office’s writing. My office’s writing is down at the lower left.
Q. Where you send a copy to Mr. Brown?
A. I said I know that I sent that to Mr. Brown. This letter I’m led to believe comes out of Mr. Brown’s file.
It appears that the correspondence may have been sent to William King by appellees. Lois Aschenbach stated in her deposition that she had not seen it. Conrad Aschenbach indicated he had seen it but had not read it in its entirety.