Court Opinion

ID: 9897364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:39.8262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:09.774908
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    Jun 19 2023, 8:37 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES –
Matthew C. Olsen                                           CHAEL, IMBODEN AND
Angela K. Hall                                             KLECKNER
Brian J. Paul                                              Paul R. Chael, Receiver
Emanuel L. McMiller                                        Merrillville, Indiana
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Thomas E. Moss
                                                           Portage, Indiana
                                                           Patrick A. Mysliwy
                                                           Hammond, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           RYAN FIRE PROTECTION, INC.
                                                           Grantland M. Clapacs
                                                           Dentons Bingham Greenebaum
                                                           LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           ADAMS MASONRY
                                                           Kevin E. Steele
                                                           Valparaiso, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           C&C IRON, INC.
                                                           Michael F. Drewry
                                                           Christopher S. Drewry
                                                           Jeffrey M. Kraft
                                                           Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
                                                           Carmel, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           KLECKNER INTERIOR SYSTEMS
                                                           Patrick A. Mysliwy
                                                           Stephen M. Maish

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023                           Page 1 of 18
                                                           Hammond, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           CIRCLE R MECHANICAL, INC.
                                                           Matthew J. Hagenow
                                                           Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones,
                                                           LLP
                                                           LaPorte, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           MIDWESTERN ELECTRIC, INC.
                                                           F. Joseph Jaskowiak
                                                           Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP
                                                           Merrillville, Indiana

                                                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE –
                                                           IMBODEN CONSTRUCTION
                                                           CORPORATION
                                                           Thomas E. Moss
                                                           Portage, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Porter Hospital, LLC d/b/a                                 June 19, 2023
Northwest Health-Porter,                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       22A-PL-2724
                                                           Appeal from the Porter Superior
        v.                                                 Court
                                                           The Honorable Jeffrey W. Clymer,
TRK Valpo, LLC, Imboden                                    Judge
Construction Corporation, TRK-                             Trial Court Cause Nos.
Construction-IN, LLC, Circle R                             64D02-2109-PL-8763
Mechanical, Inc., Gluth Brothers                           64D05-2109-PL-8802
Roofing Company, Inc.,
Kleckner Interior Systems, Inc.,
Midwestern Electric, Inc., Ryan

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023                      Page 2 of 18
      Fire Protection, Inc., Trout Glass
      & Mirror, Inc., Shaffner Heaney
      Associates, Inc., Allied Door &
      Hardware, LLC, Adam’s
      Masonry, Inc., C&C Iron, Inc.,
      Paul R. Chael, City of
      Valparaiso, Indiana,
      Appellees-Defendants.

                                        Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                     Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Porter Hospital, LLC, d/b/a Northwest Health-Porter (“Hospital”) appeals the

      trial court’s granting of a motion to set aside a judgment filed by Paul R. Chael

      (“Receiver”) and various contractors. 1 This appeal concerns the relationship

      between two actions filed against TRK Valpo, LLC (“TRK”). In the first

      action, various contractors filed a mechanic’s lien foreclosure action against

      property owned by TRK. In the second action, the Hospital filed an injunction

      against TRK regarding its use of the same property. After the Receiver was

      1
       The contractors include Imboden Construction Corporation (“Imboden”); TRK; TRK-Construction-IN,
      LLC; Circle R Mechanical, Inc.; Gluth Brothers Roofing Company, Inc.; Kleckner Interior Systems, Inc.;
      Midwestern Electric, Inc.; Ryan Fire Protection, Inc.; Trout Glass & Mirror, Inc.; Shaffner Heaney
      Associates, Inc.; Allied Door & Hardware, LLC; Adam’s Masonry, Inc.; C&C Iron, Inc.; and the City of
      Valparaiso, Indiana.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023                            Page 3 of 18
      appointed in the mechanic’s lien foreclosure action, a stipulated order was

      entered in litigation between the Hospital and TRK. Because the Receiver did

      not receive notice of the stipulated order and the stipulated order adversely

      impacted the property at issue, the trial court granted the motion to set aside the

      stipulated order. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

      granting the Receiver’s motion to set aside the stipulated order. Accordingly,

      we affirm.

      Issue
[2]   The Hospital raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred

      by granting the motion to set aside the judgment.

      Facts
[3]   The Hospital owned property located at 1425 Glendale Boulevard in Valparaiso

      (“Property”). In May 2016, the Hospital sold the Property to NWI Medical

      Realty, LLC (“NWI”). Certain use restrictions (“Use Restrictions”) were

      negotiated and included as Exhibit B to the parties’ contract. The purpose of

      the Use Restrictions was “to prevent future development on or use of the

      Property that would harm and materially impact [the Hospital’s] business and

      its operation of medical facilities in close proximity to the Property.”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 127. During negotiation of the contract and Use

      Restrictions, TRK was “brought in by NWI as a potential future developer for

      the Property.” Id. TRK was “an active participant in the negotiation and

      consummation of the Property’s sale to NWI . . . .” Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023          Page 4 of 18
[4]   The Use Restrictions provided, in part:

              The covenants, restrictions and rights of first refusal provided for
              in Article I shall be effective upon the date hereof and shall run
              with the Land. The agreements provided for herein shall inure to
              the benefit of and be binding upon (a) Grantor and its successors
              and assigns; (b) the Hospital Parcel Owner; (c) the Grantee, and
              (d) the respective successors, successors-in-title, assigns, heirs and
              lessees of Grantor, the Hospital Parcel Owner and the Grantee,
              and their respective agents, employees, lessees and invitees. The
              covenants and restrictions provided for in Article I shall remain
              in full force and effect and shall be unaffected by any change in
              ownership of the Property, or any portion thereof, or by any
              change of use, demolition, reconstruction, expansion or other
              circumstances, except as specified herein. Irreparable harm will
              result to Grantor and the Hospital Parcel Owner by reason of any
              breach of the agreements, covenants and restrictions set forth in
              this Deed and, therefore, Grantor and the Hospital Parcel Owner
              shall be entitled to relief by way of injunction or specific
              performance to enforce the provisions of this Deed, as well as
              any other relief available at law or equity.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 105. A Special Warranty Deed regarding the sale

      was recorded with the Porter County Recorder’s Office on July 13, 2016. The

      Use Restrictions, however, were not attached to the recorded deed.

[5]   In 2017, NWI sold the Property to TRK. The Warranty Deed provided that the

      conveyance was “subject to . . . the Use Restrictions and Covenants appended

      to the Deed dated 6/27/16 recorded 7/13/16 as Document No. 2016-016994

      from [the Hospital] to [NWI] . . . .” Id. at 107.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023           Page 5 of 18
[6]   At some point, TRK began to develop the Property. In 2021, the Hospital

      learned that “TRK intended to lease, use, or convey space in the Property to

      one or more physician groups competitive to [the Hospital], which is a violation

      of the Covenants.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 128. The Hospital then

      repeatedly expressed concerns to TRK that it was or would be violating the Use

      Restrictions.

[7]   Separately, after TRK allegedly failed to pay contractors for work performed on

      the Property, multiple contractors recorded mechanic’s liens against the

      Property. On September 27, 2021, Imboden filed a complaint in Porter

      Superior Court II for, in part, foreclosure of its mechanic’s lien and named

      TRK and the other contractors with mechanic’s liens on the Property as

      Defendants (“Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action”). The next day, on

      September 28, 2021, Imboden recorded a notice of lis pendens at 3:15 p.m.

[8]   Approximately one hour later, however, the Hospital filed a complaint in

      Porter Superior Court V against TRK seeking injunctive relief (“Injunction

      Action”). The Hospital alleged that TRK was violating the Use Restrictions

      and sought injunctive relief to prevent TRK from doing so. TRK was the only

      defendant named in the complaint, and the same attorney represented TRK in

      both the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action and the Injunction Action.

[9]   On October 8, 2021, in the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action, Imboden

      requested that Porter Superior Court II appoint a receiver to “take possession

      and control of the real property and improvements . . . .” Id. at 130. On

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023       Page 6 of 18
       November 10, 2021, Porter Superior Court II appointed Paul Chael as receiver.

       Porter Superior II’s order notes that TRK “did not object to the appointment of

       a receiver . . . . ” Id. at 205. Porter Superior Court II ordered that the Receiver

       “shall take possession of [the Property] and manage, operate, preserve, and

       maintain the property pending further order of this Court” and that the

       Receiver had all available powers allowed under Indiana Code Section 32-30-5-

       7. Id. at 206. The order further provided: “All parties to this action shall

       cooperate with the receiver and accommodate the receiver’s right to possess this

       property hereby placed in his control under the authority and jurisdiction of this

       Court, and shall not impair or disturb the receiver’s rights to possession and

       control of this property while this action remains pending before this Court.”

       Id. Chael accepted the appointment as Receiver on November 16, 2021.

[10]   On December 29, 2021, in the Injunction Action, the Hospital and TRK filed a

       joint motion for entry of a stipulated order for final judgment and permanent

       injunction. The parties agreed that “the Restrictive Covenants run with the

       Property” and that “the Restrictive Covenants were and continue to be valid

       and enforceable upon TRK, and that the Restrictive Covenants apply to the

       Parties and their respective successors, successors-in-title, assigns, heirs, lessees,

       agents, employees, and invitees.” Id. at 228. On January 11, 2022, Porter

       Superior Court V entered the stipulated order (“Stipulated Order”), which

       provided:

               1. The Parties, and their successors, successors-in-title, assigns,
               heirs, lessees, agents, employees, and invitees, are bound by the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023             Page 7 of 18
        Restrictive Covenants, attached hereto and fully incorporated
        herein as Exhibit A.

        2. This Order and the attached Restrictive Covenants shall apply
        to TRK and to all persons or entities in active concert or
        participation with it.

        3. TRK, and/or its successors, successors-in-title, assigns, heirs,
        and/or lessees, shall append a copy of this Stipulated Order and
        the attached Restrictive Covenants with any deed that is filed and
        recorded with the Porter County Recorder’s Office for any
        subsequent sale or transfer of the Property.

        4. TRK, and its successors, successors-in-title, assigns, heirs,
        and/or lessees, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED FROM
        using the Property in any manner prohibited by the Restrictive
        Covenants without the prior written consent of Porter Hospital
        which consent may be granted or denied in its sole and absolute
        discretion.

        5. TRK, and its successors, successors-in-title, assigns, heirs,
        and/or lessees, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED FROM
        leasing or selling the Property to any individual or entity that is
        categorically prohibited by the Restrictive Covenants without the
        prior written consent of Porter Hospital which consent may be
        granted or denied in its sole and absolute discretion.

        6. The Court will retain jurisdiction over the Parties and this
        matter to the extent necessary to enforce the terms and
        conditions of this Stipulated Order.

Id. at 228-29.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023          Page 8 of 18
[11]   On December 30, 2021, the Receiver filed a motion for authorization from

       Porter Superior II to sell the Property. The Receiver and the Hospital’s counsel

       exchanged emails in February 2022. Until those emails, the Receiver was

       unaware of the judgment in the Injunction Action between the Hospital and

       TRK. After a hearing, Porter Superior Court II granted the Receiver’s motion

       to sell the Property on February 15, 2022.

[12]   On May 12, 2022, in the Injunction Action, the Receiver filed a motion for

       relief from judgment regarding the Stipulated Order. The Receiver alleged that:

       (1) it did not receive notice of the proposed Stipulated Order or the Stipulated

       Order until February 2022; (2) the interests of the plaintiffs in the Mechanic’s

       Lien Foreclosure Action are “adversely impacted by the entry of the Stipulated

       Order”; (3) the Injunction Action should have been “pursued by intervention,

       rather than a stand-alone case”; and (4) the Stipulated Order was “a means to

       interfere with the Receiver’s control of the real estate, and to avoid the existing

       jurisdiction of the Court in [the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action] to

       authorize a sale of the real estate.” Id. at 238-39.

[13]   The Hospital filed a response to the Receiver’s motion for relief from judgment.

       The Hospital argued: (1) the Receiver is a non-party to the Injunction Action

       and did not file a motion to intervene in the matter; (2) the Stipulated Order

       merely reiterates that the Property is subject to the Use Restrictions; (3) the

       mechanic’s liens were recorded many years after the Use Restrictions were

       received by the Hospital; and (4) the Receiver can still sell the Property subject

       to the Use Restrictions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023          Page 9 of 18
[14]   The Receiver filed a motion to intervene in the Injunction Action, which Porter

       Superior Court V granted. The Receiver and some of the contractors filed

       motions to consolidate the two actions. Porter Superior Court V and Porter

       Superior Court II then granted the motion to consolidate the Injunction Action

       with the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action. See Ind. T.R. 21. Porter

       Superior Court II then set the motion for relief from judgment for hearing.

       Many of the mechanic’s lien claimants joined in the Receiver’s motion to set

       aside the Stipulated Order.

[15]   Porter Superior Court II held a hearing on the motion to set aside the Stipulated

       Order on October 18, 2022. Porter Superior Court II then granted the motion

       to set aside as follows:

               The Stipulated Order in the Injunction Case was entered without
               notice to the parties in the Lien Case, notwithstanding that a
               receiver had already been appointed in the Lien Case. The
               applicability of any Restrictions was never litigated on the merits
               in the injunction case.

               TRK stipulated to the entry of the Order in the injunction at the
               same time it was refusing to pay its contractors in the lien case.

               The stipulated order entered in the injunction case granted more
               relief than was allowed by the Restrictions, assuming arguendo
               that unrecorded Restrictions have any legal effect whatsoever.

               Therefore, the Receiver’s Motion for Relief from Judgment filed
               in the injunction case is GRANTED and the Stipulated Order of
               January 11, 2022 is vacated.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023        Page 10 of 18
               The January 11, 2022 stipulated order specifically applied to
               TRK and makes no reference to the Receiver’s ability to sell
               Property without Restrictions.

               These matters are now set for a further Status Hearing on
               December 20, 2022 @ 1:30 pm. Parties are encouraged to submit
               supplemental briefs, which specifically address the effect of
               unrecorded Restrictions.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 42-43. Thus, the trial court set aside the Stipulated

       Order, but the trial court has not yet considered whether the Use Restrictions

       will apply to a sale by the Receiver. The Hospital now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[16]   The Hospital challenges the trial court’s grant of the motion to set aside the

       Stipulated Order. We review a trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 60(B) motion

       for an abuse of discretion. Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021). An

       abuse of discretion occurs “where the trial court’s judgment is clearly against

       the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial

       court errs on a matter of law.” Id. “[W]here a ruling turns on a question of

       law, our review is de novo.” Id.

[17]   Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in part:

               On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve
               a party or his legal representative from a judgment, including a
               judgment by default, for the following reasons:

                                                      *****

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023        Page 11 of 18
               (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
               misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

                                                      *****

               (6) the judgment is void;

                                                      *****

               (8) any reason justifying relief from the operation of the
               judgment, other than those reasons set forth in sub-paragraphs
               (1), (2), (3), and (4).

[18]   The trial court here granted the motion to set aside the Stipulated Order

       because, in part, the Receiver did not receive notice of the Stipulated Order.

       On appeal, the Hospital argues that a non-party should not be allowed to attack

       the Stipulated Order under Trial Rule 60(B). Alternatively, the Hospital argues

       that the Receiver and mechanic’s lien claimants were required to demonstrate

       evidence of fraud in order to set aside the Stipulated Order. The Hospital

       further argues that the Stipulated Order merely enforced the Use Restrictions,

       which were agreed to many years earlier.

[19]   Appellees, however, argue that the motion to set aside was properly granted

       because: (1) Porter Superior Court V lacked jurisdiction to enter the Stipulated

       Order because Porter Superior Court II was vested with exclusive jurisdiction

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023        Page 12 of 18
       over the Property 2; (2) the Stipulated Order violated Porter Superior Court II’s

       order regarding the receivership; (3) the Receiver and mechanic’s lien claimants

       should have been given notice of the Injunction Action and proposed Stipulated

       Order; and (4) the failure to bring the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action and

       receivership to the attention of Porter Superior Court V worked to deceive the

       court. 3

[20]   We resolve this appeal, as the trial court did, on the basis of lack of notice to the

       Receiver. On November 10, 2021, in the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action,

       the trial court ordered that the Receiver “shall take possession of [the Property]

       and manage, operate, preserve, and maintain the property pending further order

       of this Court” and that the Receiver had all available powers allowed under

       2
           Our Supreme Court has held:
               It is well settled that two courts of concurrent jurisdiction cannot deal with the same subject
               matter at the same time. Once jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter has been
               secured, it is retained to the exclusion of other courts of equal competence until the case is
               resolved, and the rule applies where the subject matter before the separate courts is the same, but
               the actions are in different forms. Exclusive jurisdiction over a particular cause of action vests
               when the complaint or other equivalent pleading or document is filed.
       In re Marriage of Huss, 888 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ind. 2008) (quoting In re Paternity of Fox, 514 N.E.2d 638, 641
       (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), trans. denied). We cannot say that the subject matter of both cases was the same here;
       regardless, we resolve this appeal on other grounds and do not address this argument.
       3
         In the Hospital’s reply brief, the Hospital argues that “[n]early every material argument from the Appellees’
       joint brief is a new argument that was not previously raised or developed in any meaningful way in the trial
       court.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7. We disagree. The motion to set aside the Stipulated Order was based
       upon the lack of notice to the Receiver, and we resolve this appeal on that basis. Moreover, our Supreme
       Court has held that a prevailing party, typically the appellee, may defend the trial court’s ruling on any
       grounds, including grounds not raised at trial. Drake v. Dickey, 12 N.E.3d 875, 875 (Ind. 2014) (per curiam)
       (citing Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. 2012)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023                                  Page 13 of 18
       Indiana Code Section 32-30-5-7. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 206. Indiana

       Code Section 32-30-5-7 provides:

               The receiver may, under control of the court or the judge:

                        (1) bring and defend actions;

                        (2) take and keep possession of the property;

                        (3) receive rents;

                        (4) collect debts; and

                        (5) sell property;

               in the receiver’s own name, and generally do other acts
               respecting the property as the court or judge may authorize.

[21]   “[A]s soon as a receiver is appointed and qualified, the assets become

       receivership assets until final distribution by court order.” King v. King, 982

       N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Moreover, Porter

       Superior Court II’s order provided: “All parties to this action shall cooperate

       with the receiver and accommodate the receiver’s right to possess this property

       hereby placed in his control under the authority and jurisdiction of this Court,

       and shall not impair or disturb the receiver’s rights to possession and control

       of this property while this action remains pending before this Court.” Id.

       (emphasis added). TRK was a party to the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure

       Action and, thus, had a duty not to impair or disturb the Receiver’s rights to the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023        Page 14 of 18
       Property. By stipulating to the injunction on the Property, which was under the

       control of the Receiver, TRK failed to comply with Porter Superior Court II’s

       order.

[22]   The Hospital, however, argues that the Injunction Action resulted in an “in

       personam” judgment, which was applicable only to TRK, while the Mechanic’s

       Lien Foreclosure Action was an “in rem” action, which impacted the Property

       itself. 4 Accordingly, the Hospital contends that the Stipulated Order did not

       interfere with the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action. We find the Hospital’s

       argument unpersuasive.

[23]   TRK was a party to both the Injunction Action and the Mechanic’s Lien

       Foreclosure Action. The Receiver was granted control over the Property by the

       trial court in the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure Action. In the Injunction

       Action, the Hospital sought to enforce the unrecorded Use Restrictions against

       TRK and future owners of the Property, which may impact the Receiver’s

       ability to liquidate the property. Moreover, TRK was under court order not to

       4
         “A judgment in rem is one founded on proceedings instituted against or on something, the status of which
       is to be determined. It affects the interests of all persons in designated property but creates no personal
       liability and is distinguished from a judgment in personam that binds the defendant personally.” 17 IND.
       LAW ENCYC. Judgment § 5. “An in personam judgment imposes a personal liability or obligation on one
       person in favor of another.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023                              Page 15 of 18
       impair or disturb the Receiver’s rights of possession and control over the

       Property. The Stipulated Order, however, did just that.

[24]   Although not mentioned by the parties, we note that Trial Rules 19 and 21 are

       pertinent to this circumstance. Trial Rule 19(A) provides:

               A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a
               party in the action if:

                        (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
                        among those already parties; or

                        (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
                        action and is so situated that the disposition of the
                        action in his absence may:

                                 (a) as a practical matter impair or impede his
                                 ability to protect that interest, or

                                 (b) leave any of the persons already parties subject
                                 to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
                                 otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his
                                 claimed interest.

               If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be
               made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so,
               he may be made a defendant.

       (emphasis added).

[25]   By way of the order appointing a Receiver in the Mechanic’s Lien Foreclosure

       Action, the Receiver “claim[ed] an interest” in the Property, and the disposition

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023              Page 16 of 18
       of the injunction and entry of the Stipulated Order “as a practical matter

       impair[ed] or impede[d] [the Receiver’s] ability to protect that interest.” T.R.

       19(A). Accordingly, the Receiver should have been joined as a party to the

       Injunction Action. See, e.g., Sacks v. Am. Fletcher Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 258 Ind.

       189, 194, 279 N.E.2d 807, 811 (1972) (“If the corporation is in the hands of a

       receiver at the time of the derivative suit then the receiver, as he represents the

       corporation, is a necessary party.”); In re Paternity of C.M.R., 871 N.E.2d 346,

       349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“A ‘necessary party’ is one who must be joined in the

       action for a just adjudication.”).

[26]   The Receiver, however, was not joined in the Injunction Action and did not

       request to intervene prior to the entry of the Stipulated Order. In fact, it is

       unclear from the record presented to us whether the Receiver was even aware of

       the Injunction Action. Regardless, Trial Rule 21(A) provides that, where a

       party is not joined in an action, “[s]ubject to its sound discretion and on motion

       of any party or of its own initiative, the court may order parties dropped or

       added at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just and will avoid

       delay.” (emphasis added). The trial court in the Injunction Action allowed the

       Receiver to intervene, consolidated the Action with the Mechanic’s Lien

       Foreclosure Action, and granted the Receiver’s motion to set aside the

       Stipulated Order.

[27]   Given the lack of joinder of the Receiver in the Injunction Action and the

       failure of TRK to comply with Porter Superior Court II’s order regarding the

       Receiver’s control over the Property, the Receiver was entitled to relief from the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023          Page 17 of 18
       judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) for “any reason justifying relief from the

       operation of the judgment.” Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial

       court abused its discretion by granting the motion to set aside the Stipulated

       Order.

       Conclusion
[28]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to set aside

       the Stipulated Order. Accordingly, we affirm.

[29]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2724 | June 19, 2023        Page 18 of 18