Court Opinion

ID: 9364225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:02:00.482134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.760053
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Salazar CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B315866

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. KA121755)
           v.

  RAFAEL ROBERT SALAZAR,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rogelio G. Delgado, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
      Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________
       A jury convicted Rafael Salazar of various sex offenses
against a child. On appeal, he contends that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of a prior sex offense and of Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS), the prosecutor
committed prejudicial misconduct, and there are sentencing
errors. We modify the judgment to correct sentencing errors,
reject Salazar’s remaining contentions, and affirm the judgment
as modified.
                         BACKGROUND
I.    Evidence of the sexual assaults
      At Salazar’s trial, the victim Isabella M. testified that she
was three years old when her mother and Salazar began dating.1
He became like a father to Isabella. Salazar sexually assaulted
Isabella twice when she was a child. The first incident occurred
when Isabella was nine years old. While she was cleaning the
bathroom, Salazar came in, undid his belt and boxers, and pulled
out his penis. He grabbed Isabella’s hair, forced her to her knees,
and pushed her head towards his penis. She bit his penis. It felt
“weird,” and she wanted it to be over. Salazar made Isabella
orally copulate him. Isabella tasted something sour in her
mouth, and she swallowed some of it and spat some of it out.
Isabella did not tell her mother what happened. When Isabella
told Salazar that she was going to tell her mother, Salazar acted
like he was going to slap her but didn’t and said she had better
not tell.
      The second assault happened when Isabella was 10 years
old. She and Salazar were arguing in the living room. Isabella
called him a “bitch,” and Salazar pushed her onto a futon, got on

1
      At trial, Isabella was 14 years old.

                                 2
top of her, and pulled down her leggings. Although Isabella
kicked at him and told him to stop, he inserted his penis into her
vagina and touched her breasts under her shirt. She kicked at
him, and his penis slipped out. Isabella ran to the bathroom,
where she stayed until her mother came home. Not knowing how
to tell her mother, she said nothing.
       Isabella did not tell anyone about the assaults until she
was 12 years old, when she told her older sister, Preciosa. By
this time, Salazar had moved out of the house. According to
Preciosa, Isabella had been behaving badly and had gotten
uncharacteristically bad grades, so Preciosa knew something was
wrong. One day in the summer of 2019, the sisters were arguing,
and Preciosa asked Isabella what was wrong. Isabella told
Preciosa that Salazar had violated her. Isabella said that
Salazar tried to force her to orally copulate him, but she bit his
penis. Isabella denied that she and Salazar had intercourse.
According to Isabella, she only told Preciosa about the first
incident in the bathroom but not about second one on the futon
because it was too hard to talk about the second incident.2
       Preciosa immediately told their mother about what Isabella
had said, and their mother called the police. At a forensic
interview, Isabella said that during the bathroom incident she
tried to choke Salazar, but he grabbed her hands and bent them,
hurting her. He forced her head down, and although she bit his
penis, he didn’t stop. She also told the interviewer about the
second incident, saying he spread her legs and “put it inside of”

2
      Isabella testified that after she told Preciosa about Salazar,
Isabella told a friend that she had been touched when she was a
kid.

                                 3
her. She had thought choking might weaken him, but it didn’t do
anything. Isabella said that Salazar was “like pushing my hands
down on my legs.”
II.    Evidence that Salazar had previously committed a sex
       offense
       The trial court admitted evidence that Salazar committed a
prior sex offense against a child. In 2013, Salazar pleaded guilty
to violating Penal Code former section 288a against Abby N.
Abby testified that when she was 13 years old and Salazar was
22 years old they were “lovers” for less than a month. Salazar
initiated the sexual contact. They would kiss and touch each
other’s bodies, and Salazar touched Abby’s breasts and vagina
over her clothes. Salazar would grab or guide her hand to his
penis. But when Abby said she was uncomfortable, he stopped
making her touch him. Sometimes she wanted him to stop, but
she was scared to tell him. While she was okay with the kissing,
she was not okay with the touching.
III.   CSAAS evidence
       Dr. Jayme Jones, a clinical psychologist, testified about
myths affiliated with children who have suffered sexual abuse.
The myths include that an abused child will fight back and will
immediately disclose the abuse, fully and consistently. The
reality is that abused children rarely tell anybody, and when they
do tell, it’s years after the abuse occurred. To judge the support
of the person they are telling, they disclose a little at a time. It is
also untrue that molesters are often strangers. A person is three
times as likely to be assaulted by someone they know.
       The doctor also testified about CSAAS, which is a model
describing the context in which abuse occurs. The model refers to

                                  4
five factors. The first is secrecy; that is, the abuse occurs in
private. The second factor is helplessness, in that children are
often physically helpless and mentally trained to do what adults
say. Third, children try to accommodate—live with—the abuse.
This leads to the fourth factor, delayed disclosure, which can
occur months to years after the abuse. Finally, children recant
when faced with the consequences of a disclosure, for example,
being put in a foster home or having to testify.
       In Dr. Jones’s experience, it is common for sexual assault
victims not to report the abuse right away and to minimize what
they’ve gone through. It is also common to forget details, in part
because of the way memory works.
       The doctor did not interview Isabella or review any matter
related to this case. However, based on hypotheticals modeled on
the facts of this case, Dr. Jones testified that the hypotheticals
showed a consistent pattern of delayed disclosure. Also, telling
the sister one story and the forensic interviewer another was
consistent with CSAAS because the child would want to avoid
upsetting the sister, whereas the forensic interviewer would not
have a big reaction.

                                5
IV.    Verdict and sentence
      A jury found Salazar guilty of forcible copulation with a
person under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, former § 288a(c)(2)(B);3
count 1); oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10
years or younger (id., § 288.7, subd. (b); count 2); forcible rape of
a child under 14 years (id., § 261, subd. (a)(2); count 3); and
engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of
age or younger (id., § 288.7, subd. (a); count 4). As to counts 1
and 3, the jury found true the allegation that Salazar had a prior
conviction of Penal Code former section 288a.
      Per the One Strike law (Pen. Code, § 667.61), the trial court
sentenced Salazar to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)
on counts 1 and 3. The trial court also imposed but stayed
determinate terms on those and the remaining counts. The trial
court imposed fines and fees, which we discuss in detail below.
                          DISCUSSION
I.     Evidence Code4 section 1108
       Over a defense objection under section 352, the trial court
admitted evidence that Salazar had committed a prior sex offense
against Abby, finding that the evidence was not remote in time,
involved similar conduct, and was not more inflammatory than
the charged crime. Salazar now contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, and that its
admission violated his constitutional rights to due process and to
a fair trial. We disagree.

3
       Penal Code section 288a has been renumbered as section
287.
4
     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.

                                 6
       Evidence of prior criminal acts is generally inadmissible to
prove the defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion. (§ 1101,
subd. (a).) But where a defendant is charged with a sexual
offense, evidence the defendant committed other sexual offenses
is admissible to prove the defendant’s propensity to commit
crimes of a sexual nature if the evidence is not inadmissible
under section 352. (§ 1108, subd. (a); see generally People v.
Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911; People v. Christensen (2014)
229 Cal.App.4th 781, 795–796.) Accordingly, evidence a
defendant committed other sexual offenses should be excluded
under section 352 “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.”
       Otherwise, admissibility of uncharged acts depends on (1)
whether the propensity evidence is similar enough to the charged
behavior so that it tends to show the defendant committed the
charged offense; (2) whether the propensity evidence is stronger
and more inflammatory than evidence of the defendant’s charged
acts; (3) whether the uncharged conduct is remote or stale; (4)
whether the propensity evidence is likely to confuse or distract
the jurors from their main inquiry; and (5) whether admitting the
propensity evidence will require an undue consumption of time.
(People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1117.)
       We review a challenge to a trial court’s admission of section
1108 evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 824.)
       Here, the evidence was strongly probative to show that
Salazar had a sexual interest in underage girls. It was also

                                 7
probative to counter Salazar’s defense, that he was sexually
interested in men.5 (See, e.g., People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th
104, 134 [prior crimes evidence relevant to rebut defense theory
that defendant’s sperm entered victim’s body by innocent
means].)
       Salazar concedes that the prior crime evidence was not
remote and did not consume an undue amount of time at trial.
Instead, he argues that the evidence was materially different and
thus lacked probative value because the prior offense did not
involve force. Rather, he describes what happened between Abby
and him as “wanted conduct.” Not so. Abby testified that she
was okay with kissing but not with the touching, in particular
touching Salazar’s penis. Also, that Salazar did not use the same
force against Abby that he used against Isabella does not
sufficiently undermine the probative value of the evidence to
establish Salazar’s interest in underaged girls. Indeed, that
Salazar did not use the same level of force against Abby, as well
as that Salazar was not a father figure to Abby, made the prior
offense less inflammatory than the current one and reduced any
prejudicial effect. (See, e.g., People v. Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th
at p. 133; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1287 [that
uncharged offense was “less inflammatory” than charged offenses
supported conclusion trial court did not abuse discretion].)
       Salazar also argues that the age difference between the
victims—Abby was 13 years old while Isabella was nine years old
when he first assaulted her—renders the prior offense materially
distinct. We disagree that the four year age gap was significant,
given that both girls were adolescents who would have been in

5
       In his defense, Salazar introduced evidence he had a sexual
relationship with a man.

                                 8
elementary or middle school. We also disagree with Salazar’s
assertion that there is a significant emotional, physical, and
sexual gap between the age groups, and he cites no authority for
that assertion. In any event, courts have found greater age gaps
between victims to be immaterial. (See, e.g., People v. Daveggio
and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 825–826 [13-year-old prior
victim and 22-year-old current victim]; People v. Williams (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1166, 1169, 1174, 1197 [six-year old prior victim and
14-year old current victim].)
      Finally, Salazar does not argue that the evidence was likely
to confuse or distract the jurors from their main inquiry, and we
discern no such likelihood. Rather, the evidence concerning Abby
was relatively brief and distinct from evidence concerning
Isabella.
      We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the prior offense evidence and that
Salazar’s due process right was not violated. (See generally
People v. Jandres (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 340, 357 [application of
ordinary rules of evidence generally doesn’t implicate federal
Constitution].)
II.   Admissibility of CSAAS evidence
      Salazar next contends that Dr. Jones’s testimony about
CSAAS was irrelevant and that the trial court failed to fulfill its
gatekeeper role in determining the admissibility of the evidence.
(See generally Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 770; Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579.)
      The first problem with Salazar’s contention is that he never
objected to Dr. Jones’s testimony under Sargon and Daubert or
otherwise. He therefore forfeited any issue regarding the

                                 9
admissibility of the evidence. (§ 353; see People v. Flinner (2020)
10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [defendant forfeits argument on appeal
where no objection made below].)
       Recognizing the forfeiture problem, Salazar argues that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object.
(See generally Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668
[claim requires error and prejudice].) Because Salazar raises this
claim, we address the merits of his contention about the
admissibility of the expert’s testimony.
       Expert testimony is admissible if it concerns a subject
sufficiently beyond common experience, and the expert’s opinion
would assist the trier of fact. (§ 801, subd. (a).) As the expert
Dr. Jones testified here, CSAAS is designed for use in therapeutic
settings to treat children who have suffered sexual abuse, as it
purports to explain why child victims of sexual abuse exhibit
certain behaviors. (See generally People v. Bowker (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 385, 392, fn. 8.) Our California courts have long held
that such evidence is admissible to rehabilitate a complaining
witness’s “credibility when the defendant suggests that the
child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is
inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation,”
although expert testimony on the common reactions of child
molestation victims is inadmissible to prove that the complaining
witness in fact has been sexually abused. (People v. McAlpin
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300; accord, People v. Lapenias (2021) 67

                                10
Cal.App.5th 162, 171 [collecting cases] (Lapenias); People v.
Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 (Munch).)6
      This is exactly why the evidence was relevant here: to
explain why Isabella might have delayed telling her family about
the abuse and why Isabella did not disclose the extent of the
abuse to Preciosa, failings the defense suggested lessened
Isabella’s credibility. The CSAAS factors of secrecy,
accommodation, and delayed disclosure thus went to explain
Isabella’s behavior after being sexually assaulted. (See, e.g.,
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172 [CSAAS evidence
relevant for purpose of assessing victim’s behavior]; see also
People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 896, 905–906 [citing
CSAAS in finding admissible expert testimony about behavior of
domestic violence victims].)
      Salazar argues that the trial court should have nonetheless
determined the admissibility of CSAAS evidence under People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 and Frye v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F.
1013 (the Kelly/Frye test). As Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
pages 472 to 473, summarized, the Kelly/Frye test applies to
expert testimony based on a new scientific technique. When such
evidence is offered, its proponent must first establish the
reliability of the method, meaning its acceptance in the scientific
community, and the witness’s qualifications. (Munch, at p. 472.)
CSAAS evidence, however, is not new evidence but has been

6
      McAlpin is binding on this state’s lower courts. (Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
That out-of-state courts may disagree about the admissibility of
CSAAS evidence (see, e.g., State of New Jersey v. J.L.G. (2018)
234 N.J. 265) does not change its impact on California cases.
(Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.)

                                11
found to have been properly admitted by courts in this state for
decades. (Ibid.) Moreover, the Kelly/Frye test does not apply to
expert testimony like that given by Dr. Jones here, which
concerns an expert’s clinical experience with child sexual abuse
victims and professional literature on the topic. (Munch, at p.
473; accord, Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.) “CSAAS
testimony does not purport to provide a definitive truth; rather,
the expert testimony attempts to disabuse jurors of
misconceptions they might hold about the conduct of children
who have been sexually abused.” (Lapenias, at p. 173.) “Such
expert testimony meets ‘traditional standards for competent
expert opinion, without need for additional screening procedures
[under Kelly/Frye].’ ” (Munch, at p. 473.)
       Salazar’s remaining contention concerning CSAAS is that
the standard instruction on it, CALCRIM No. 1193, improperly
bolstered Isabella’s credibility. We review such a claim of
instructional error under a de novo standard of review.
(Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.)
       The trial court here instructed the jury with CALCRIM No.
1193, that Dr. Jones’s testimony about CSAAS “is not evidence
that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against
him or any conduct or crimes with which he was not charged. [¶]
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
Isabella M.’s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of
someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the
believability of his [sic] testimony.”7
       Appellate courts have found that CALCRIM No. 1193 “does
not: (a) improperly allow an alleged minor victim of sexual abuse

7
      Although Salazar’s trial counsel did not object to CALCRIM
No. 1193, we address his contention.

                               12
to corroborate her own testimony; (b) violate due process; or (c)
misapply the burden of proof.” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at p. 175, citing People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494,
503–504.) In Gonzales, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193. The defendant in that case argued that the
instruction asked for an impossibility, telling the jury it could use
CSAAS testimony to evaluate the victim’s testimony but not as
proof the defendant committed the crime. (Gonzales, at p. 503.)
The appellate court responded that a “reasonable juror would
understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use
[the expert’s] testimony to conclude that [the child’s] behavior
does not mean she lied when she said she was abused. The jury
also would understand it cannot use [the expert’s] testimony to
conclude [the child] was, in fact, molested. The CSAAS evidence
simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching
behavior. Thus, under CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes
[the expert’s] testimony will find both that the [victim’s]
apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her
believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence
does not show she had been molested.” (Gonzales, at p. 504;
accord, Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474.)
       CALCRIM No. 1193 makes clear that CSAAS evidence is
not evidence the defendant committed the crimes. It is evidence
to explain the victim’s conduct, which the jury may rely on to
evaluate the victim’s credibility. We therefore do not agree that
the instruction compels a finding of guilt.

                                 13
III.   Prosecutorial misconduct
     Salazar contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
during argument. We discern no misconduct.
       A.   Applicable legal principles
       The federal and state standards governing prosecutorial
misconduct are well settled. “ ‘When a prosecutor’s intemperate
behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with
such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent
conviction a denial of due process, the federal Constitution is
violated. Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering
the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct
under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.’ ” (People v.
Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1052; People v. Wright (2021) 12
Cal.5th 419, 443–444.) When a claim of misconduct is based on
the prosecutor’s arguments before the jury, we consider whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied the
challenged remarks in an objectionable fashion. (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) We consider the statements
in context and view the argument and instructions as a whole.
(Ibid.) “We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an
abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Dworak (2021) 11
Cal.5th 881, 910.)
       A “claim of prosecutorial misconduct is forfeited when there
was neither a timely and specific objection nor a request for
admonition.” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 182; People
v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 306.) As Salazar
acknowledges, his trial counsel did not object to any of the alleged
misconduct. He nonetheless argues that, to the extent forfeiture

                                  14
is at issue, his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. As
we have said, to establish that claim, a defendant must show
both that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms, and that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in
prejudice. (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125.) As we now
explain, no misconduct occurred.
      B.    Improper appeals to the passion of the jury
        Salazar’s first claim of misconduct concerns the
prosecutor’s argument that Salazar is a “predator” who “preys on
little girls,” and the jury’s “job is to hold this predator
accountable.” He argues that this was an improper appeal to the
passions of the jury because the jury’s job is to evaluate whether
the prosecutor met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
not to hold a defendant accountable. While a prosecutor may not
suggest to the jury it should allow emotion to reign over reason
and a critical and neutral evaluation of the evidence (see
generally People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12
Cal.5th 719, 788–789), the prosecutor’s argument here did not
suggest that. Asking a jury to hold the defendant accountable is
not tantamount to a request the jury ignore the burden of proof.
(See People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 894–895
[prosecutor can tell jurors they are litmus test as to what
community will tolerate].) It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to
remind the jury that its function is to determine whether the
defendant broke any laws. (Id. at p. 894.)
        Nor was it misconduct for the prosecutor to call Salazar a
“predator.” “Argument may be vigorous and may include
opprobrious epithets reasonably warranted by the evidence.”
(People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1030 [calling

                                 15
defendant “ ‘contract killer,’ ” “ ‘snake in the jungle,’ ” “ ‘slick,’ ” a
“ ‘pathological liar,’ ” and “ ‘one of the greatest liars in the history
of Fresno County’ ” not misconduct]; accord, People v. Farnam
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168 [describing defendant as
“ ‘monstrous,’ ” “ ‘cold-blooded,’ ” vicious, and a “ ‘predator,’ ” and
calling evidence “ ‘horrifying’ ” and “ ‘more horrifying than your
worst nightmare’ ” not misconduct].) Abby was 13 years old and
Isabella was nine and 10 years old when Salazar sexually
assaulted them; hence, there was evidence that Salazar preyed
on young girls, i.e., was a predator.
      C.     Arguing facts not in evidence
       A prosecutor commits misconduct by arguing facts not in
evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 474, 480.)
Salazar argues that the prosecutor committed such misconduct
by telling the jury that he ejaculated with Abby. However, a
prosecutor may make a fair comment on the evidence and has
wide latitude to draw inferences from the evidence. (People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1363.) That is what the
prosecutor did here. When the prosecutor asked Abby if Salazar
ejaculated, Abby answered, “I do remember feeling like it was
wet. I never looked at it. I just remember wiping it on my pants
and told him I don’t want to do that.” Abby’s testimony raised
the reasonable inference that Salazar ejaculated. No misconduct
occurred.
IV.   Sentencing
     Salazar argues that the sentences imposed on counts 1 and
3 were unauthorized. On those counts, the trial court imposed
LWOP per the One Strike law and imposed but stayed
determinate terms on each count per the Three Strikes law (12

                                    16
years doubled to 24 years on count 1 and 13 years doubled to 26
years on count 3). Salazar argues that the trial court could
sentence him only under one sentencing scheme and therefore
the determinate terms imposed under the Three Strikes law
should be reversed and stricken. The People counter that our
California Supreme Court held in People v. Acosta (2002) 29
Cal.4th 105 that sentencing under both schemes is appropriate.
       The People are correct. People v. Acosta, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at page 127, noted that the One Strike and the Three Strikes
laws have different objectives. The objective of the One Strike
law is to provide life sentences for aggravated sex offenders.
(Ibid.) The objective of the Three Strikes law is to provide
greater punishment for recidivists. (Ibid.) Because the two laws
serve separate objectives, ignoring one statutory scheme where a
defendant meets the criteria of both would defeat one of the
Legislature’s objectives. (Ibid.) A defendant may therefore be
sentenced under both schemes.8
       The People, however, further argue that while Salazar
could be sentenced under both laws, the appropriate sentence
was to double his LWOP terms rather than impose determinate
terms. People v. Hardy (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1433 to 1434,
held that doubling an LWOP sentence is proper. Other courts
have disagreed with Hardy, because the Three Strikes law allows
doubling of only a determinate term and the minimum term of an
indeterminate term. (E.g., People v. Smithson (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 480, 503–504; accord, People v. Mason (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 355, 367–368 [Three Strikes law doesn’t permit

8
      Although Salazar urges us to follow the dissent in Acosta,
we are not at liberty to do so. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)

                                 17
tripling LWOP term]; People v. Coyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 209,
219 [same]; see Couzens, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: California
Three Strikes Sentencing (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 7:3
[Smithson and Coyle are better reasoned].) Those cases reason
that since an LWOP sentence is an indeterminate sentence with
no minimum term, the Three Strikes Law does not apply.
       In the absence of guidance from our California Supreme
Court, we agree that the Smithson line of cases is more
persuasive. Accordingly, we disagree with Salazar that the
sentence is unauthorized, and we disagree with the People that
the sentence must be modified. In sum, the trial court correctly
sentenced Salazar on counts 1 and 3.
V.    Fines and fees
       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed on count
1 a $300 restitution fine, a $40 court operations fee, and a $30
criminal conviction assessment fee. The trial court imposed the
same fines and fees on count 3. It then ordered Salazar to “pay a
sex offender fine of $300 plus penalty assessments.” Salazar
assigns several errors to the trial court’s imposition of these fines
and fees.
       First, the trial court erred in imposing separate restitution
fines on counts 1 and 3 under Penal Code section 1202.4,
subdivision (b). Rather, as the People concede, the trial court
could impose only one fine under that section. (People v. Sencion
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 480, 483.) Although the judgment must
be so modified, the abstract of judgment need not be modified
because it correctly contains only one restitution fine.
       Second, the abstract of judgment includes a $300 fine under
Penal Code section 1202.45 that the trial court never orally
imposed. The People again concede that the abstract of judgment

                                 18
must be modified because the trial court did not orally impose
this fine.9
       Third, the trial court failed to state at the sentencing
hearing the statutory basis for the $300 sex offender fine plus
penalty assessments.10 Penalty assessments attendant to a Penal
Code section 290.3 sex offender fine should be specified in the
trial court’s oral pronouncement and listed in the abstract of
judgment, although any correction can be accomplished via
modification to the abstract of judgment rather than remand.
(People v. Hamed (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 928, 937–941; People v.
Sharret (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 859, 864 [trial court may impose
penalty assessments by shorthand, leaving it to court clerk to list
them in minutes and abstract of judgment].) The People concede
that the abstract of judgment should be modified to reflect the
following assessments: (1) $300 (Pen. Code, § 1464, subd. (a)(1)),
(2) $60 (id., § 1465.7, subd. (a)(1)), (3) $90 (Gov. Code, § 70373),
(4) $210 (id., § 76000, subd. (a)(1)), (5) $60 (id., § 76000.5,
subd. (a)(1)), (6) $30 (id., § 76104.6, subd. (a)(1)), and (7) $30 (id.,
§ 76104.7).

9
       Given this concession, we need not decide whether the trial
court could have imposed the fine. (Compare People v. Montes
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 35, 48–49 [parole revocation fine generally
improper where defendant sentenced to LWOP]; with People v.
Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075 [parole revocation fine
permissible where LWOP sentence includes determinate term].)
10
       The minute order of the sentencing hearing states that the
trial court imposed a $300 fine under Penal Code section 290.3, a
$60 surcharge, and $870 in penalties and assessments.

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                        DISPOSITION

      The judgment is modified to strike the restitution fine
imposed on count 3 under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision
(b). The clerk of the Superior Court is directed to modify the
abstract of judgment to strike the $300 restitution fine under
Penal Code section 1202.45 and to list the amounts of and
statutory bases for the Penal Code section 290.3 fine and penalty
assessments. The clerk of the Superior Court shall forward the
modified abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed as modified.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                         EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                       LAVIN, J.

                       EGERTON, J.

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