Court Opinion

ID: 9963577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 19:27:30.011031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:53.194293
License: Public Domain

J-A29022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 LORI A. SCHMITT                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
               v.                          :
                                           :
                                           :
 ROBERT T. SCHMITT (DECEASED)              :
                                           :
                     Appellant             :   No. 424 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Domestic Relations at
                       No(s): F.C. No. 16-90773-D

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                            FILED: April 25, 2024

        Carol A. Schmitt (Appellant), on behalf of her deceased son, Robert T.

Schmitt (Decedent), appeals the order dismissing Decedent’s complaint in

divorce against his wife, Lori A. Schmitt (Appellee). Appellant claims the trial

court erred when it granted Appellee’s petition to abate the divorce action,

pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 (“Abatement of action for failure to take out

letters”). After careful review, we affirm.

        In a thorough opinion, the Honorable William C. Robinson, Jr. of the

Butler County Court of Common Pleas set forth the following history of this

case:

          Robert T. [Schmitt] (“Husband”) [(Decedent)] commenced
          a divorce action against Lori A. [Schmitt] (“Wife”) [Appellee]
          on February 23, 2018. Appellee filed an answer and
          counterclaims against Decedent on March 8, 2018. A
          economic claim raised by the pleadings included equitable
          division of marital property. Decedent died on May 31,
          2020. A decree in divorce was not entered at the time
J-A29022-23

       Decedent passed away. On August 13, 2020, Decedent’s
       mother,    Carol     A.   [Schmitt]    (“Plaintiff’s Mother”)
       [(Appellant)], filed a Notice of Death with the Butler County
       Prothonotary.

       Soon after Decedent’s death, Appellee filed a motion for
       special relief, docketed June 22, 2020, asserting the divorce
       action abated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1) due to
       Husband’s death. A reply was filed on behalf of the
       Decedent, despite there being no proper party substitution.
       An estate administration was not open, such as by a
       fiduciary named in Decedent’s will, if one existed, or by the
       appointment of an administrator duly qualified by statute.

       Also on August 13, 2020, oral argument was held on
       Appellee’s motion seeking abatement of the divorce action
       and on Decedent’s reply opposing abatement. By order of
       court issued October 15, 2020, the trial court denied
       Appellee’s request to abate the divorce action and the
       ancillary economic issue of equitable distribution. Wife filed
       a timely appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On
       January 14, 2021, the appeal was quashed sua sponte on
       the basis that the trial court’s order was not a final order or
       otherwise appealable, as of right. A fiduciary or other
       appropriate third-party had yet to be appointed to substitute
       as a party on behalf of Decedent in the divorce action.

       [On May 2, 2022 with the certificate of death finally in hand,
       Appellant presented a petition for Letters of Administration
       to the Orphans’ Court Division in the Allegheny County Court
       of Common Pleas […]. However, she was informed Appellee
       lodged a caveat, requesting notice in the event Letters
       Testamentary or Letters of Administration were to be issued
       to open an estate administration for Decedent. Appellant
       subsequently filed a petition for citation to show cause why
       letters of administration should not be granted to her. The
       posture of this litigation is unknown.]

       On May 31, 2022, approximately 14 months after remand
       by the Superior Court, counsel for Appellee filed a motion to
       dismiss the complaint in divorce. Appellant, while not a
       properly substituted party in the divorce action, filed an
       answer and later, an amended answer to Appellee’s motion.
       In an effort to bring finality to the divorce action commenced
       in 2018, and in view of Decedent’s intervening passing on

                                    -2-
J-A29022-23

          May 31, 2020, Appellee filed a petition to abate the divorce
          action pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 on June 21, 2022.

          An evidentiary hearing was held on September 26, 2022.
          Appellant in her own right and not as a fiduciary for
          Decedent’s estate, and James R. Jobe, the funeral director
          handling the arrangements for Decedent’s family, both
          testified remotely. Appellee testified in-person. Briefs in
          lieu of oral argument were filed post-hearing on behalf of
          Decedent and Appellee.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/13/2023, at 1-3 (style adjusted) (paragraph

reordered).

       On March 13, 2023, the trial court granted Appellee’s abatement petition

and dismissed the divorce action with prejudice. Appellant timely filed this

appeal. She presents two issues for our review:

              1. Did [Appellee] waive grounds for abatement by
                 waiting to file her “Petition to Abate Divorce Action
                 Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375” […] ?

              2. Did [Appellant] reasonably explain the delay in taking
                 out Letters of Administration […]?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.1

       A brief explanation of abatement vis-à-vis the Divorce Code is helpful to

address Appellant’s claims. Traditionally, Pennsylvania courts have long held

that an action in divorce abates upon the death of either party. See, e.g.,

Berry v. Berry, 197 A.3d 788, 802-03 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Estate of

____________________________________________

1 We remind counsel that “the statement of the questions involved must state

concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and circumstances
of the case but without unnecessary detail.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (emphasis
added).

                                           -3-
J-A29022-23

Pinkerton v. Pinkerton, 646 A.2d 1184 (Pa. 1994)). “The primary purpose

of divorce is to change the relation of the parties; and, when the death of a

party occurs, that purpose can no longer be achieved because the marital

relationship has been ended by death.”           Berry, 197 A.3d at 803 (citing

Drumheller v. Marcello, 532 A.2d 807, 808 (Pa. 1987)). “However, this

created the possibility that although spouses may be in the process of dividing

their marital estate, a surviving spouse could receive an unintended windfall

(to the detriment of the deceased spouse’s estate and natural objects of his

or her bounty) not only laying claim to all marital property but also exercising

the right to the elective share of one-third of decedent’s non-marital

property.” In re Estate of Easterday, 209 A.3d 331, 339 n.8 (Pa. 2019)

(citations omitted).

       The Divorce Code was amended in 2005 to provide an exception to this

common law rule. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1) (“Death of a party.”).2 Under

this amendment, a divorce action will not abate upon the death of a party, if

the grounds for divorce have been established prior to the death, as provided

____________________________________________

2 Section 3323(d.1) provides :

          In the event one party dies during the course of divorce
          proceedings, no decree of divorce has been entered and
          grounds have been established as provided in subsection
          (g), the parties' economic rights and obligations arising
          under the marriage shall be determined under this part
          rather than under 20 Pa.C.S. (relating to decedents, estates
          and fiduciaries).

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1).

                                           -4-
J-A29022-23

in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(g) (“Grounds established.”).3 Id. If the grounds

enumerated in Section 3323(g) have been met, then the parties’ economic

rights and obligations will be determined under the Divorce Code rather than

the elective share provision of the Probate Code. § 3323(d.1); see also

Berry, 197 A.3d at 803).

       Initially, Appellee sought to abate the divorce action under the Section

3323(d.1) by filing a motion for special relief.        However, the trial court

determined that abatement was improper because grounds for the divorce

were established, prior to Decedent’s death, under Section 3323(g). Appellee

____________________________________________

3 Section 3323(g) provides:

          For purposes of subsections [(d.1.)(“Death of a party”)],
          grounds are established as follows:

              (1) In the case of an action for divorce under section
              3301(a) or (b) (relating to grounds for divorce), the court
              adopts a report of the master or makes its own findings
              that grounds for divorce exist.

              (2) In the case of an action for divorce under section
              3301(c), both parties have filed affidavits of consent or,
              if the presumption in section 3301(c)(2) is established,
              one party has filed an affidavit of consent.

              (3) In the case of an action for divorce under section
              3301(d), an affidavit has been filed and no counter-
              affidavit has been filed or, if a counter-affidavit has been
              filed denying the affidavit's averments, the court
              determines that the marriage is irretrievably broken and
              the parties have lived separate and apart for at least one
              year at the time of the filing of the affidavit.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(g).

                                           -5-
J-A29022-23

appealed, and this Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory.               After our

remittal, Appellee and the Decedent’s estate were poised to litigate the parties’

economic rights and obligations under the Divorce Code. However, a personal

representative needed to step in for the decedent’s estate. See Salvadia v.

Ashbrook, 932 A2d 436, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“all actions that survive a

decedent must be brought by or against the personal representative” and “a

decedent’s    estate   cannot   be   party   to   litigation   unless   a   personal

representative exists.”) (citation omitted); see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3371-

3377 (“Abatement, Survival and Control of Action”); and see Pa.R.C.P. 2351-

2374 (“Substitution of Parties”).

      Over the next 14 months, no one took any action to advance the parties’

claims under the Divorce Code. Significantly, there was no proper substitution

of a personal representative for Decedent’s estate as the plaintiff in the divorce

action.   Finally, in May 2022, Appellee again sought abatement, this time

under the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, specifically 20 Pa.C.S.A. §

3375 (“Abatement of action for failure to take out letters”). Section 3375

provides for abatement in any action involving a deceased plaintiff:

          If a plaintiff or petitioner in any action or proceeding now
          pending or hereafter brought dies and a personal
          representative is not appointed within one year after a
          suggestion of such death is filed in the action or proceeding,
          any defendant or respondent may petition the court to abate
          the action as to the cause of action of the decedent. Copies
          of the petition shall be served upon the executor named in
          the will, if known to the defendant, and otherwise upon all
          known next of kin entitled to letters of administration. The
          court shall abate the action as to the cause of action of the

                                      -6-
J-A29022-23

         decedent if the delay in taking out letters is not reasonably
         explained.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375 (emphasis added).

      Pursuant to the statute, Appellee provided proper notice of the

abatement petition.     Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court

determined that the requisite amount of time had elapsed to enable Appellee

to petition for abatement under Section 3375. The trial court then determined

that Appellant’s delay in taking out letters was not reasonably explained. As

such, the trial court granted Appellee’s abatement petition and dismissed the

divorce action with prejudice.

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court misapplied Section 3375.

Specifically, Appellant claims Appellee waived her ability to bring the

abatement petition because she waited so long to file. Alternatively, Appellant

claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that her

delay was unreasonable.

      We begin with Appellant’s first issue concerning waiver, which implicates

the interpretation of Section 3375 and turns on a question of law.         The

following precepts guide our review. Issues involving statutory interpretation

present questions of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our

scope of review is plenary.      Salvadia, 923 A.2d at 439 (citing Kopko v.

Miller, 892 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2006)).

      Both Appellant and Appellee rely on our decision in Salvadia. There,

the plaintiffs were parents who filed an action for medical malpractice on

                                      -7-
J-A29022-23

behalf of their child against the child’s pediatrician group. While the action

was pending, the child died. In April 2003, the plaintiffs’ attorney filed a notice

of death, but the attorney did not take out letters of administration at that

time.    Over a year later, in July 2004, the defendants filed a petition for

abatement under Section 3375.        In August 2004, almost a year and four

months from the filing of the notice of death, plaintiffs requested and were

granted letters of administration.         The court ultimately granted the

defendants’ abatement petition. Id., 923 A.2d at 441.

        On appeal, the plaintiffs in Salvadia argued that the defendants waived

their grounds for abatement, because they actively litigated the malpractice

case after the notice of death was filed. Id. at 442. The plaintiffs relied on a

similar malpractice case from the Washington County Court of Common Pleas

for the proposition that grounds for abatement can be waived if the defendant

“tak[es] any step towards the determination of the cause on its merits, such

as participating in arbitration, appearing generally, participating in the trial,

or permitting the entry of judgment without objection…” See id.; see also

Berdine v. Washington Hospital, 17 Pa. D. & C. 3d 26, at *29-30

(Washinton Cty. 1980)(citing 1 P.L.E., Abatement and Revival § 10).

        In Salvadia, we distinguished Berdine, notwithstanding its limited

value as a common pleas decision. First, we clarified that waiver was not the

primary basis for the holding in Berdine.        Abatement failed in Berdine,

because the abatement petition was filed after the estate was substituted as

a party plaintiff. In Salvadia, by contrast, the petition for abatement was

                                       -8-
J-A29022-23

properly filed before the parents took out letters of administration. Salvadia,

923 A.2d at 443. Even if a defendant could waive abatement under Berdine,

we concluded that abatement in Salvadia was still proper. Id.            If waiver

occurs when a defendant takes “steps toward the determination of the cause

on its merits,” we reasoned that the defendants did not take steps toward

determining the medical malpractice action; rather, they merely engaged in a

single act of discovery – specifically, the filing of a certificate prerequisite to

filing a subpoena. Id. Under these facts, we found that the defendants did

not waive abatement. Id.

      Returning to the instant case, Appellant argues that Appellee waived

grounds for abatement of the divorce case, not because she took active “steps

toward determination of the cause on its merits,” but because she took no

steps for too long. Instead of filing for abatement immediately after one year

passed, per Section 3375, Appellee waited nearly two calendar years. See

Appellant’s Brief at 14.

      We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. First, Appellee took no

steps in the divorce litigation after Decedent’s death, other than seeking

abatement under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 3323(d.1) and filing the previous appeal. In

that sense, Appellee did even less than the defendants in Salvadia, who

participated in a single act of discovery prior to filing their abatement petition.

Second, as we noted in Salvadia, the use of the word “may” in Section 3375

(“may petition the court to abate the action”) means that Appellant had the

                                       -9-
J-A29022-23

option to decide whether to file an abatement petition. Salvadia, 923 A.2d

at 440.

       For a time, it seems that neither Appellee, nor Appellant was aware of

her rights and responsibilities.         Appellee could have filed for abatement

sooner, but instead she waited. She waited even as Appellant attempted to

obtain a substitution of personal representative.4 Appellee waited to file an

abatement petition, even though she filed a caveat with the Allegheny County

Register of Wills. Appellant would have us hold that Appellee’s failure to file

for abatement at the first possible moment of eligibility constitutes waiver.

However, to rule this way would be to rewrite the statute’s unambiguous plain

language. See id. at 444. We will not replace the word “may” with the word

“shall,” to make something that is permissive under the statute, mandatory.

See id. at 440-41.

____________________________________________

4 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2355(a) provides: “If a named party

dies after the commencement of an action, the attorney of record for the
deceased shall file a notice of death with the prothonotary. The procedure to
substitute the personal representative of the deceased party shall be in
accordance with Rule 2352.

Rule 2352 provides: “The successor may become a party to a pending action
by filing of record a statement of the material facts on which the right to
substitution is based.” Pa.R.C.P. 2352(a).

On April 20, 2022, in attempting to comply with these rules, Appellant filed a
handwritten pleading, titled “Notice of Death, Substitute of Personal
Representative.” The pleading was stricken, without prejudice, for failure to
set forth material facts on which the right to substitution is based. See Order
of Court, 4/25/22.

                                          - 10 -
J-A29022-23

      We are similarly unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that Appellee

“blocked” her from taking out letters. Appellant maintains that she attempted

to take out letters of administration prior to Appellee filing for abatement, but

she was blocked from doing so by Appellee’s filing of a caveat.        Appellant

concludes that she beat Appellee to the courthouse doors, only for Appellant

to block her entry. See Appellant’s Brief at 12.

      We agree with Appellant that the inaction of both parties created a “race

to the courthouse.” For a time, either party could have prevailed, depending

on who filed their respective pleading first. But we dispute the premise of

Appellant's argument - that Appellee’s filing of a caveat blocked Appellant from

taking out letters. Appellee had legitimate reasons for filing a caveat, i.e., so

she would receive notice of any filing regarding Decedent’s estate.           As

Appellant recognizes, Appellee could not serve as administrator for Decedent’s

estate, but she still had an interest in the estate. If the caveat had the effect

of preventing Appellant from immediately obtaining letters, the same does

not excuse Appellant’s failure to obtain letters earlier. Appellant could have

taken out letters at any time during the preceding two years. Moreover, it

cannot be said that Appellee filed the caveat to buy time to beat Appellant to

the courthouse. Appellee could have filed for abatement at the same time she

filed the caveat, and Appellee waited an additional four weeks before

                                     - 11 -
J-A29022-23

petitioning for abatement.5 For these reasons, we conclude Appellant’s first

issued is without merit.

       In her second issue, Appellant argues that her delay in taking out letters

was not unreasonable under Section 3375. This section provides, the court

“shall” abate the action unless the plaintiff presents a reasonable explanation

for their delay in taking out letters of administration. See 20 Pa.C.S.A. §

3375. “The use of ‘shall’ in the context of this statute reveals the legislature’s

mandatory directive to the court, i.e., the court must abate the action if the

plaintiff fails to present a reasonable explanation for the delay in taking out

letters.” Salvadia, 923 A.3d at 441 (emphasis original) (citation omitted).

       Before we discuss Appellant’s claim any further, we note the shift in our

standard of review.       Under Section 3375, the trial court has discretion to

determine whether the explanation for delay in taking out letters was

reasonable.     On appeal, we review whether the trial court abused that

discretion:

           The findings of [the trial court] must be accorded the same
           weight and effect as a jury verdict. This Court can modify
           the [trial court’s decision] only if it is unsupported by
           competent or adequate evidence or if an error of law, abuse
           of discretion or capricious disbelief of competent evidence
           has taken place.

Salvadia, 923 A.2d at 441 (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

5 Under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, the caveat would have delayed the grant of letters

10 days.

                                          - 12 -
J-A29022-23

      During the abatement hearing, Appellant provided several explanations

for the delay. In its opinion accompanying the order, the trial court thoroughly

discussed   Appellant’s   excuses   and   explained    why   it   deemed   them

unreasonable:

         The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in March
         of 2020 were unquestionably devastating to everyone.
         Appellant offers COVID-related delays as a reasonable
         explanation for her inaction. Specifically, she asserts the
         disruption in U.S. mail service and other unspecified matters
         caused by the pandemic as a reasonable basis to deny
         Appellee’s request for abatement under Section 3375 of the
         divorce action. However, there is no credible evidence to
         support this assertion. On the other hand, on June 14,
         2020, Appellee ordered a certificate of death issued on her
         estranged husband’s passing on May 31, 2020 (see
         Appellee’s trial exhibit #5). Appellee received the certificate
         from the Pennsylvania Department of Health, Division of
         Vital Statistics, via U.S. Mail by letter postmarked
         September 1, 2020 (see Appellee’s trial exhibit #6). While
         mail delivery may have been somewhat delayed or
         interrupted by the COVID pandemic’s fallout, Appellee’s
         diligence clearly shows Appellant reasonably could have
         used the same process [that Appellee used] to obtain a
         death certificate, namely by ordering it online and receiving
         delivery by U.S. Mail.

         A second reason set forth by Appellant to justify the over
         one year delay substituting a fiduciary for Decedent focuses
         upon the specific language under this court’s order issued
         October 15, 2020. In granting Decedent’s requested relief
         denying abatement of the divorce action pursuant to 23
         Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1), this court ordered Appellee, “…to
         preserve any and all assets acquired during the course of
         her marriage to [Decedent] regardless of title, pending the
         substitution of the appropriate fiduciary to proceed
         on behalf of the estate of [Decedent] for equitable
         division of marital property until further order of court.
         ([emphasis in the original trial court opinion]). Appellant
         unreasonably believed that, since there was no specific
         deadline stated in this order to appoint a personal

                                     - 13 -
J-A29022-23

          representative to substitute as a party fiduciary in the
          divorce action, then a reasonable basis exists to explain her
          inaction. She unreasonably believed the relevant language
          stated in the order dated October 15, 2020 usurped the
          statutory mandate under Section 3375. This basis for
          denying abatement is unreasonable and not supported by
          existing law. This argument will result in litigation involving
          a deceased claimant grinding to a halt without any remedy
          available to a defendant to move a case forward.

          [A third] reason advanced by Appellant is best described as
          the “complexity of circumstances surrounding [Decedent’s]
          death, the number of people involved, and the existence of
          two women named [‘Mrs. Schmitt.’] [6] factors into the
          reasonableness of the matter.” [Appellant’s trial brief at 3].
          The funeral arrangements involved James R. Jobe of the
          Jobe Funeral Home & Crematory, Inc. located in Turtle
          Creek, Pennsylvania communicating with Appellant residing
          in Prosper, Texas. The unique feature of this particular
          funeral arrangement involved transporting Decedent’s body
          by air from Pennsylvania to Texas, but Mr. Jobe was familiar
          with this circumstance. He sent Appellant an email on June
          5, 2020 requesting her to, “Please review the death
          certificate and email back approved or call me with any
          corrections.”      To which Appellant promptly replied,
          “Everything looks in order on the death certificate.” (See
          Appellee’s trial exhibit #2). Five certified copies of the death
          certificate were requested, as shown on the funeral
          purchase agreement (Appellee’s trial exhibit #1).

          Appellant repeatedly testified that she never received any
          of the death certificates from the Jobe Funeral Home. She
          speculates the death certificates have been sent to
          Decedent’s Brother, Dan [Schmitt], who also lives in
          Prosper, Texas. There was no testimony indicating whether
          Dan [Schmitt] received any death certificates and, if he
          received them, then it is unreasonable to believe he would
          not communicate his receipt of the death certificates to his
          mother [(Appellant)] residing in the same Texas town.
          While Dan [Schmitt] is named as the party on the funeral
          purchase agreement as the ”person making arrangements,”
____________________________________________

6 In an apparent typographical error, the trial court spelled the parties’

surname as “Schmidt.” Their surname is “Schmitt.”

                                          - 14 -
J-A29022-23

        Mr. Jobe credibly testified his dealings were with [Appellant]
        because she is technically the next of kin, as opposed to
        Decedent’s brother, Dan [Schmitt]. Appellant failed to offer
        any reasonable explanation for not following up with Mr.
        Jobe in order to procure the certificates of death.

        [As a fourth reason,] Appellant argues the one-year
        limitation under Section 3375 was tolled by Appellee’s
        appeal to the Superior Court from the [trial court’s order
        denying abatement under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(d.1)] dated
        October 15, 2020. This argument, too, is unreasonable on
        its face. On August 13, 2020, the notice of death was filed
        by Appellant. Appellee’s notice of appeal was filed on
        November 6, 2020. The Superior Court’s remittal/remand of
        record was effective March 1, 2021. Under this theory of
        reasonableness, and in view of the plain language set forth
        at Section 3375 (“…within one year after a suggestion of
        death is filed in the action…”), the substitution of the
        personal representative for deceased Husband should have
        been accomplished no later than March 1, 2022. Appellant
        had plenty of time to obtain the certificate of death, petition
        the Allegheny County Register of Wills for Letters of
        Administration, and proceed to substitute the personal
        representative in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of
        Civil Procedure.

  T.C.O. at 4-6 (style adjusted) (footnote added).

     As noted above, the trial court had discretion to determine the

reasonableness of Appellant’s delay. Our standard of review permits us to

modify the trial court’s decision only if the court abused its discretion. See

Salvadia, supra at 441. “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable exercise

of judgment.” Johnson v. Johnson, 222 A.3d 787, 789 (Pa. Super. 2019).

In mounting an abuse-of-discretion challenge, an appellant must demonstrate

how the trial court’s ruling “overrode the law, was manifestly unreasonable,

                                    - 15 -
J-A29022-23

or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality.” Commonwealth v.

Rogers, 259 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2021).

      Under our standard of review, it is incumbent upon Appellant to explain

how the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that her delay in

taking out letters was unreasonable. For instance, were the court’s findings

based on incompetent or inadequate evidence of record, or did the trial court

commit an error of law, or was the trial court’s decision a product of bias or

ill-will, etc. Appellant’s de novo arguments on this issue do not answer those

questions. Instead, Appellant invites us to substitute our judgement for that

of the trial court. It is not the role of the Superior Court to re-find facts, re-

weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility. See, e.g., D.R.L. v. K.L.C., 216

A.3d 276, 285-86 (Pa. Super. 2019).         Even if we disagreed with the trial

court’s judgment, we have long held that “an abuse of discretion is not merely

an error of judgment. Johnson, 222 A.3d at 789. Because Appellant has not

persuaded us that an abuse of discretion occurred, we conclude that her

second appellate issue is meritless.

      In sum, the trial court did not err when it granted Appellee’s petition for

abatement under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3375. Appellee did not waive these grounds

by taking steps toward the determination of the equitable distribution of the

marital estate under the Divorce Code, or by failing to petition for abatement

sooner. We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined that Appellant’s explanations for her delay in the taking

out of letters were unreasonable.

                                       - 16 -
J-A29022-23

     Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Murray joins.

     Judge Bowes concurs in result.

DATE: 04/25/2024

                                   - 17 -