Court Opinion

ID: 9738973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:06:27.984351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.520838
License: Public Domain

*1074BUCHANAN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In interpreting Ind.Code (1971) 35-1-111-1,1 the majority has erroneously adopted the traditional bilateral concept of conspiracy, rejecting the better-reasoned unilateral concept. Adoption of the bilateral concept is not dictated either by the express words of the statute or by prior Indiana case law.
To recapitulate, the bilateral view of conspiracy requires two “conspirators,” both with culpable intent. The unilateral view, however, focuses on the mental intent of each individual conspirator and allows a conviction even when the only “co-conspirator” was merely feigning acquiescence in the scheme (e. g. a police informant). See Garcia v. State (1979), Ind., 394 N.E.2d 106.
The basic premise of the bilateral concept is that a person cannot conspire with himself. As pointed out by Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 Modern L.Rev. 276, 282 (1956), this begs the question. From one perspective, the defendant is alone in his intent to consummate the crime, but from another perspective, he is planning his criminal activity with an ally. It is a policy determination whether a person will be held criminally culpable in such a situation.
Fridman suggests, and I agree that:
The fact that, unknown to a man who wishes to enter a conspiracy to commit some criminal purpose, the other person has no intention of fulfilling that purpose ought to be irrelevant as long as the first man does intend to fulfil it if he can
. [S]uch an approach is justified in that a man who believes he is conspiring to commit a crime and wishes to conspire to commit a crime has a guilty mind and has done all in his power to plot to commission of an unlawful purpose.
This view was adopted in State v. St. Christopher (1975), 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798, and should be adopted here.
This issue is but another aspect of factual impossibility problems in conspiracy prosecutions. Impossibility involves the existence of a fact, unknown to the conspirators, which makes it impossible for them to complete the intended crime. Impossibility does not generally exculpate the conspirators from criminal responsibility for their planning:
[W]hen the consequences sought by a defendant are forbidden by the law as criminal, it is no defense that the defendant could not succeed in reaching his goal because of circumstances unknown to him. (Footnote omitted).
37 A.L.R.3d 375, 387.
A defendant may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an illegal abortion, even though completion of the intended crime was impossible because the intended victim was not pregnant. State v. Moretti (1968), 52 N.J. 182, 244 A.2d 499, cert. denied 393 U.S. 952, 89 S.Ct. 376, 21 L.Ed.2d 363. Similarly, a conviction for conspiracy to obtain money by forgery may stand despite undisputed evidence that consummation of the crime was impossible because the Treasury Department would not have paid out the money due to a defect in the document. Beddow v. United States (8th Cir. 1934) 70 F.2d 674. Likewise, a conviction for conspiracy to commit rape is proper even though the crime was impossible because the intended victim was dead. United States v. Thomas (1962) 13 U.S.C.M.A. 278. See also, 37 A.L.R.3d 375, 409-13.
Factual impossibility is no defense to the crime of conspiracy. I see no reason to deviate from this rule simply when the impossibility is due to an unknown fact involving the “co-conspirator” (e. g., no intent to consummate the offense) rather than the victim (e. g., non-pregnancy, death, payment procedures).
[T]he fact that one of them does not intend to carry out the plan, so that the *1075purpose is incapable of fulfillment . is surely irrelevant, as was the fact, in the case of the conspiracy to abort, that the woman was not pregnant, so that the earlier purpose there was incapable of fulfillment.
19 Modern L.Rev. at 283.
The majority opinion quotes several Indiana cases as supporting its bilateral conspiracy view. However, none of these cases involve the issue now before the court. As the Minnesota Supreme court noted in State v. St. Christopher, supra, many courts adopting the bilateral conspiracy concept “have reached their conclusion by using as a starting point the definition of conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons, a definition which was framed in cases not involving [this] issue.” 305 Minn. at 231, 232 N.W.2d at 801. I do not find these Indiana cases conclusive, or particularly helpful in determining this issue.
In the final analysis, we must turn to the wording of Ind.Code 35-1-111-1 to see if it demanded a unilateral or bilateral approach to conspiracy. The statute stated:
Any person or persons who shall unite or combine with any other person or persons for the purpose of committing a felony
Unlike the majority I do not find this language emphasizes an “agreement between two or more persons who, each with culpable minds, agree to commit a felony.” Their interpretation requires reading into the statute words which are not there. My interpretation of the statute is that its plain and unambiguous language provides that in order to be convicted of conspiracy the defendant must have (1) united or combined with another person, and (2) the defendant’s purpose in uniting or combining with that person must have been to commit a crime . . and that is all. It did not require that the person with whom the defendant has combined or united must also have, as his purpose, the commission of a crime.
In conclusion, the policies behind the conspiracy laws are best served by the unilateral concept. More importantly, this unilateral view best represents the express language used by our former statute.
The conviction of the defendant should be affirmed.
I dissent.

. Repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24.
Our Supreme Court has already interpreted Indiana’s new penal code provision on conspiracy (Ind.Code 35-41-5-2 (West 1978)) as adopting the unilateral concept of conspiracy. But this issue had not been decided under prior Indiana conspiracy law, until this case.