Court Opinion

ID: 9411084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 19:02:25.367306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:03.765518
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40171
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                   Ryan PARINO-RAMCHARAN
          First Lieutenant (O-2), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                        Decided 25 July 2023
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Elizabeth M. Hernandez.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 28 April 2021 by GCM convened at the
federal courthouse in Enid, Oklahoma. Sentence entered by military
judge on 18 May 2021: Forfeiture of $2,000.00 pay per month for 3
months and a reprimand.
For Appellant: William E. Cassara, Esquire; Julie C. Haines, Esquire.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Major Morgan
R. Christie, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before JOHNSON, ANNEXSTAD, and GRUEN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Chief Judge JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Judge ANNEXSTAD and Judge GRUEN joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                       ________________________
              United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

JOHNSON, Chief Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Appellant
guilty, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of using lysergic acid diethyl-
amide (LSD) in violation of Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 912a. 1 The military judge sentenced Appellant to forfei-
ture of $2,000.00 pay per month for three months and a reprimand. The con-
vening authority provided the adjudged reprimand but otherwise took no ac-
tion on the findings or sentence.
   On 14 September 2021, a designated judge advocate completed a review of
the record of trial pursuant to Article 65(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 865(d). The
judge advocate found “[t]he findings and sentence are correct in law and fact.”
    On 23 November 2021, pursuant to Article 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869, Ap-
pellant submitted an application requesting The Judge Advocate General
(TJAG) set aside the findings and sentence on two grounds: (1) the military
judge abused her discretion by failing to suppress Appellant’s statements to
law enforcement for lack of corroboration; and (2) the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to support the findings of guilty. On 11 August 2022,
TJAG found no error prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights and denied
relief.
    On 28 September 2022, Appellant applied to this court for grant of review
pursuant to Article 69(d)(1)(B), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869(d)(1)(B), raising two
issues: (1) whether the military judge abused her discretion by failing to sup-
press Appellant’s statements to law enforcement for lack of corroboration; and
(2) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the findings of guilty.
On 5 January 2023, this court specified four issues for briefing by the parties. 2

1 All references to the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and the Military Rules of

Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
2 This court specified the following issues:

        [(1)] WHETHER THE REFERENCES TO ARTICLE 65(B), UCMJ, [10
        U.S.C. § 865(b),] WHERE THEY APPEAR IN ARTICLE 69, UCMJ, AS
        AMENDED IN SECTION 5333 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AU-
        THORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017, NEGATE (A) THE
        AUTHORITY OF [TJAG] TO REVIEW APPLICATIONS FOR RELIEF
        UNDER ARTICLE 69(C), UCMJ; OR (B) THE AUTHORITY OF THIS
        COURT UNDER ARTICLE 69(D), UCMJ, TO REVIEW THE ACTION
        OF [TJAG].
        [(2)] WHETHER THE APPLICATION FOR RELIEF TO [TJAG] WAS
        PROPERLY THE SUBJECT OF REVIEW BY [TJAG] UNDER

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            United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

The parties filed responsive briefs on 6 and 10 February 2023, and Appellant
filed a reply to the Government’s brief on 17 February 2023.
   On 3 March 2023, this court granted Appellant’s application for review and
ordered the Government to file an answer brief, which the Government did on
3 April 2023. Appellant filed a reply brief on 5 April 2023.
    We have carefully considered the parties’ briefs regarding the specified is-
sues. We are satisfied that pursuant to Article 69(d), UCMJ, this court has
jurisdiction to review TJAG’s determination that no error prejudicial to Appel-
lant’s substantial rights occurred, and no further discussion of the specified
issues is required here. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A.
1987). With regard to the issues Appellant has raised, we find no relief is war-
ranted, and we affirm the findings and sentence.
                               I. BACKGROUND
    On 4 July 2020, Appellant, who was stationed at Vance Air Force Base
(AFB), Oklahoma, was visiting his friend First Lieutenant (Lt) JD, who was
stationed at Cannon AFB, New Mexico. Lt JD lived in an off-base house in
Clovis, New Mexico. Lt JD’s wife was out of town at the time.
    On the night of 4–5 July 2020, one of Lt JD’s neighbors, Staff Sergeant
(SSgt) GG, was socializing outdoors with his wife and several friends and
neighbors. Sometime close to midnight, they noticed Lt JD’s dog had gotten out
of Lt JD’s house. SSgt GG and the others took control of the dog and decided
to keep it overnight for safety and return it to Lt JD in the morning.
    Shortly thereafter Lt JD came toward the group, “yelling and screaming”
and asking where his dog was. SSgt GG and the others told Lt JD they had the
dog and agreed to return it. According to SSgt GG’s trial testimony, Lt JD then
“screamed” at them that he was “high on LSD.” Lt JD began walking up and
down the street screaming as the others followed him and attempted to talk to
him. At one point, Lt JD punched another friend of his, Lt KF, who was trying

       ARTICLE 69, UCMJ, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 5333 OF THE NA-
       TIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
       2017, OR BY ANY OTHER LAW.
       [(3)] IF THE APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF REVIEW IS NOT
       PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, WHAT RELIEF, IF ANY, DOES
       THIS COURT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ORDER?
       [(4)] IF THE APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF REVIEW IS
       PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IF THIS COURT GRANTS
       REVIEW, WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW UNDER ARTI-
       CLE 69(D), UCMJ?

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              United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

to talk to him. At another point, Lt JD attempted to enter the locked home of
another neighbor without permission.
    During this disturbance, Appellant exited Lt JD’s house and stood in the
front yard. According to SSgt GG, Appellant then joined the group that was
following Lt JD as he wandered around the street.
    When SSgt GG tried to prevent Lt JD from entering a neighbor’s garage,
Lt JD punched SSgt GG in the face. Lt JD then left the garage, and SSgt GG
went into the backyard of the neighbor’s house. Appellant came into the back-
yard to speak with SSgt GG, accidentally breaking a screen door in the process.
According to SSgt GG, Appellant repeatedly said to him, “Do we have a prob-
lem? I think we have a problem. What’s going on?” SSgt GG noticed that, like
Lt JD, Appellant’s eyes were “completely glassed over and [with] large pupils.”
SSgt GG convinced Appellant to return to the street to look for Lt JD’s dog.
    Civilian police began to arrive shortly thereafter. The first to arrive was
Officer TR, who approached Lt JD and Appellant who were on the street. Lt JD
told Officer TR that “[Lt JD] and his buddy w[ere] on LSD and it was the smart-
est thing they’ve done.” Shortly thereafter, Lt JD also punched Officer TR in
the face. SSgt GG saw Appellant sit down on his knees when Lt JD struck
Officer TR. With difficulty, Officer TR and other officers were eventually able
to subdue and restrain Lt JD, who resisted despite being hit repeatedly with a
taser, pepper spray, and a baton. After Lt JD was apprehended, he persisted
in incessantly shouting repetitive and incoherent statements. 3
    At trial, Officer TR described his observations of Appellant that night. He
noticed Appellant had blood on his shirt. Appellant’s pupils were dilated. Ap-
pellant “asked multiple times what was going on” and “was having trouble fol-
lowing the situation.” Appellant exhibited what Officer TR considered strange
behavior by attempting to interject and introduce himself when Officer TR was
initially trying to speak with Lt JD, and later by offering Officer TR a beer.
Officer TR opined that Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of
alcohol because, although apparently confused, he was not “slow” or “lethargic”
and did not smell like alcohol.
    Officer AO, another civilian police officer who responded to the incident,
also testified at trial. Officer AO spoke with Appellant for approximately 20

3 Examples of such statements recorded on police body camera video include: “We have

literally lived out every reality;” “The hacker likes to think we’re going to hell;” “Ryan!
We hit the quadrillionth, so the brain named itself;” “This is the hundred millionth
time that the brain has named itself;” “It’s so smart on an LSD trip that I just hit a
hundred billion times in the universe in which I—the brain named itself;” and “This is
the classic example of one human being getting too smart to even finish this sentence.”

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            United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

minutes after other officers had restrained Lt JD. Officer AO noticed Appellant
had blood on his arm and neck and a bruise on his eyebrow. Appellant seemed
“disoriented,” “a little confused, [and] not in tune to the whole situation that
was going on.” Appellant seemed unable to “maintain a conversation” with the
police officers or with a medical technician who was attempting to ask Appel-
lant questions about Lt JD. Officer AO opined Appellant seemed “impaired”
but did not seem drunk, did not smell like alcohol, and was not swaying, stag-
gering, or slurring his speech. Appellant’s pupils were dilated, but his eyes
were not bloodshot or watery. Officer AO noted Appellant repeatedly offered
the police beer, which Officer AO thought was “odd” under the circumstances.
   In response to questions, Appellant told Officer AO multiple times that he
and Lt JD had taken “acid,” meaning LSD. When Officer AO asked Appellant
when they took “acid,” Appellant responded “about an hour ago.” Officer AO
advised Appellant of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and continued to ask about Appellant’s use of “acid.” When Officer AO
asked if they had used “acid” in the form of “strips,” Appellant said they had.
Eventually Appellant asked to speak with a lawyer.
    Officer AO and other officers went into Lt JD’s house to ensure there were
no other individuals requiring medical attention. The police found empty alco-
hol containers and a firearm belonging to Lt JD, which they secured, but they
did not find LSD or other physical evidence of illicit drug use.
     The police arrested and removed Lt JD, but Appellant was left at Lt JD’s
house. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) BA, Lt JD’s squadron commander, was no-
tified by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) that Appellant
was at Lt JD’s house and needed to be “pick[ed] up for questioning and possible
urinalysis.” Lt Col BA and a senior noncommissioned officer (SNCO) met two
AFOSI agents at the house at approximately 0730 on 5 July 2020. Appellant
eventually answered the door, appearing “disheveled.” Lt Col BA explained to
Appellant who he was and that he was giving Appellant an order to go with
them to Cannon AFB. Lt Col BA testified Appellant was initially not compli-
ant, and that Appellant repeatedly asked who Lt Col BA was, what they were
doing, and where Lt JD was. Lt Col BA described Appellant as “spacey.” It took
Appellant approximately ten minutes to find socks to wear, and Appellant
asked about a barking dog that neither Lt Col BA nor the SNCO could hear.
Later that morning, Appellant was initially not compliant in providing a urine
sample. According to Lt Col BA, Appellant did not provide a urine sample until
they called Appellant’s squadron at Vance AFB and Appellant spoke with his
commander. Lt Col BA saw Appellant again on 6 July 2020 and, in contrast to
Appellant’s behavior on 5 July 2020, described him as “[d]ifferent from the in-
dividual I had first met . . . very respectful in his communication with me[,]
[j]ust like a well put together officer.”

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             United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

    Appellant’s urine sample was sent to the Air Force Drug Testing Labora-
tory for analysis. For reasons that are not entirely clear from the evidence in-
troduced at trial, the sample was not tested for the presence of LSD or its me-
tabolite. Appellant’s urine sample tested negative for the presence of other
drugs, and was subsequently destroyed. The Government introduced no evi-
dence that Lt JD’s urine was tested for the presence of LSD.
                                  II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Suppress Admissions for Lack of Corroboration
   1. Additional Background
    Before trial, the Defense moved to suppress certain statements Appellant
had made, including inter alia his admissions to Officer AO that he had used
“acid.” The Defense emphasized the lack of forensic evidence or independent
witness testimony that Appellant had used LSD, and contended Appellant’s
admissions lacked sufficient corroboration required by Military Rule of Evi-
dence (Mil. R. Evid.) 304(c). The Government opposed the motion.
    The military judge conducted a hearing on the motion during which she
received testimony from four witnesses. Lt JD, testifying under a grant of im-
munity and an order to testify from the General Court-Martial Convening Au-
thority, stated he had been at a party at a friend’s house with Appellant drink-
ing alcohol on 4 July 2020, and had no memory of events between that point
and waking up in a hospital the following day. He denied seeing Appellant use
controlled substances during the period of time that he could remember on 4
July 2020. AM, a civilian who attended the same party and who was also pre-
sent for some of the later events outside Lt JD’s house, testified that Lt JD
began acting “weird” and “paranoid” at the party, which was confusing to Ap-
pellant and others. She did not observe Appellant or Lt JD ingest controlled
substances. Officers TR and AO also testified at the hearing and were gener-
ally consistent with their trial testimony described above. The military judge
also considered police body camera video recordings depicting Appellant’s be-
havior and interactions with Officer AO.
   The military judge issued a written ruling denying the Defense’s motion. 4
She determined Appellant’s “multiple instances of incongruent or inappropri-
ate behavior” constituted “sufficient independent evidence establishing the
trustworthiness of [Appellant’s] admissions of using LSD.” In particular, the
military judge cited evidence that Appellant and Lt JD were running outside
barefoot in the rain; Lt JD’s admissions that he and Appellant had used LSD;

4 In her ruling, the military judge noted that during the motion hearing, trial counsel

clarified the Government’s intent to introduce only those admissions Appellant made
to Officer AO before Appellant requested to speak with a lawyer.

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             United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

Appellant’s presence with Lt JD in Lt JD’s home; Appellant’s interruption of
Officer TR when he was attempting to speak with Lt JD; Appellant’s apparent
confusion, distraction, and disorientation when speaking with others; Appel-
lant’s inappropriately happy affect at times, given the circumstances; the po-
lice officers’ impression that Appellant was not under the influence of alcohol;
and Appellant’s uncooperative and delaying behavior during the urine sample
collection, suggesting consciousness of guilt. The military judge further found
the probative value of the evidence was high and not substantially outweighed
by the dangers of unfair prejudice, misleading the court members, or confusion
of the issues.
   2. Law
    We review a military judge’s decision to admit a statement under Mil. R.
Evid. 304(c) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Whiteeyes, 82 M.J. 168,
172 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citing United States v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F.
2018)). “A military judge abuses [her] discretion when: (1) the findings of fact
upon which [she] predicates [her] ruling are not supported by the evidence of
record; (2) if incorrect legal principles were used; or (3) if [her] application of
the correct legal principles to the facts is clearly unreasonable.” United States
v. Ellis, 68 M.J. 341, 344 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted). “For [a] ruling to
be an abuse of discretion, it must be ‘more than a mere difference of opinion’;
rather, it must be ‘arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable’ or ‘clearly errone-
ous.’” United States v. Collier, 67 M.J. 347, 353 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting United
States v. McElhaney, 54 M.J. 120, 130 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
   “An admission or a confession of the accused may be considered as evidence
against the accused on the question of guilt or innocence only if independent
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, has been admitted into evidence that
would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the admission or confession.”
Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)(1).
       If the independent evidence raises an inference of the truth of
       the admission or confession, then it may be considered as evi-
       dence against the accused. Not every element or fact contained
       in the confession or admission must be independently proven for
       the confession or admission to be admitted into evidence in its
       entirety.
Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)(2). The corroborating evidence “need not be sufficient of
itself to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of facts stated in the
admission or confession.” Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)(4).
   In Whiteeyes, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) explained the procedures and standards a military judge is to apply
when determining whether an accused’s admission or confession has been

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             United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

corroborated in accordance with the version of Mil. R. Evid. 304(c) that went
into effect in 2016. 82 M.J. at 174. First, the Government must proffer inde-
pendent direct or circumstantial evidence it believes corroborates the accused’s
statement. Id. The military judge must determine whether the proffered cor-
roboration is in fact “independent evidence,” which does not include other un-
corroborated confessions or admissions of the accused. Id. (citing Mil. R. Evid.
304(c)(2)). Next, the military judge must decide whether each piece of proffered
corroboration, either individually or in conjunction with other evidence, raises
an inference of truth as to the admission or confession. Id. (citing Mil. R. Evid.
304(c)(2)). Finally, the military judge must determine whether the proffered
“pieces of independent evidence, considered together, corroborate the accused’s
admission or confession”—that is, “whether the pieces of independent evidence
‘would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the admission or confession.’”
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 304(c)(1)). “[T]he two quantum
thresholds contained in [Mil. R. Evid.] 304 are low.” Id. at 174 n.6.
    The military judge may exclude relevant evidence that is otherwise admis-
sible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a countervailing con-
cern, including inter alia unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the members. Mil. R. Evid. 403. “A military judge enjoys ‘wide discretion’
in applying Mil. R. Evid. 403.” United States v. Harris, 46 M.J. 221, 225
(C.A.A.F. 1997) (citation omitted).
   3. Analysis
    The military judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling Appellant’s ad-
missions to Officer AO were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence
as required by Mil. R. Evid. 304(c). Her material findings of fact were sup-
ported by the evidence. She quoted the correct version of Mil. R. Evid. 304(c),
recognizing in 2016 the prior “essential facts test was replaced with a trust-
worthiness standard” as stated in United States v. Delgado, No. 201900065,
2019 CCA LEXIS 314, at *6 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 31 Jul. 2019) (unpub. op.),
rev. denied, 82 M.J. 315 (C.A.A.F. 2022). Her application of the rule to the evi-
dence was not clearly unreasonable. Although the military judge did not have
the benefit of the CAAF’s explanation of the current rule in Whiteeyes, her rul-
ing is consistent with the CAAF’s guidance. The military judge could reasona-
bly determine the pieces of evidence she cited, although circumstantial, tended
to suggest on the night in question Appellant was under the influence of a sub-
stance other than alcohol, and raise an inference of truth as to his admissions
that he knowingly ingested LSD with Lt JD. Considered together, this evidence
meets the low standard to corroborate his admissions by tending to establish
the trustworthiness of his admissions. Moreover, we find the military judge
properly applied the Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test.

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              United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

    Arguing the military judge erred, Appellant cites several “critical facts”
that the military judge “failed to include in her findings of fact,” including inter
alia: that other substances besides LSD could produce the symptoms Appellant
exhibited; that the police found empty beer bottles in Lt JD’s house; that the
police found no physical evidence of LSD or drug paraphernalia; and that be-
fore Appellant spoke with Officer AO, Appellant told a medical technician he
had not used any substances other than alcohol. However, the existence of this
other evidence does not materially undermine the military judge’s determina-
tion that the Government did offer independent pieces of evidence that raised
an inference of truth as to Appellant’s admissions, and considered together
tended to establish the trustworthiness of those admissions.
    Applying the Whiteeyes framework, 5 Appellant further argues the military
judge “erred in concluding that the Government’s proffered evidence consti-
tuted ‘independent evidence,’” “erred in concluding that the corroborating evi-
dence raised an inference of truth,” and “erred in concluding that the evidence
tended to establish the trustworthiness of Appellant’s admissions.” We do not
find these arguments persuasive. Appellant largely focuses on other evidence
in the record, besides the proffered corroboration, that he argues tends to make
Appellant’s admissions to using LSD less reliable—for example, the fact that
Appellant exhibited very different behavior than Lt JD, and AM’s testimony
that she did not observe Appellant use any controlled substance before Lt JD
began acting strangely. However, the Mil. R. Evid. 304(c) analysis the CAAF
explained in Whiteeyes focuses on the proffered corroboration evidence itself,
and whether that evidence tends to establish the trustworthiness of the admis-
sions; the analysis is not a comparison or balancing between the proffered cor-
roborating evidence and other evidence that may weigh against reliability. In
the exercise of her discretion, the military judge may choose to evaluate what,
if any, corroborating effect the proffered evidence has, while also taking into
consideration the other available evidence. In the instant case, we find the mil-
itary judge’s conclusion that Appellant’s admissions were corroborated by in-
dependent evidence was not arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or clearly
erroneous. See Collier, 67 M.J. at 353 (citation omitted).
B. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
    1. Law

5 Appellant submitted his original petition to this court before the CAAF decided
Whiteeyes. Appellant’s reply brief to the Government’s answer essentially concedes
some of the legal arguments made in the original petition, although “an appropriate
exploration of the state of the law at the time,” have effectively been overtaken by
Whiteeyes. Accordingly, Appellant’s reply brief significantly reframes some of his argu-
ments in terms of the CAAF’s explanation of Mil. R. Evid. 304(c) in Whiteeyes.

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             United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

    “Notwithstanding [Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866], in any case reviewed
by a Court of Criminal Appeals under [Article 69(d), UCMJ], the Court may
take action only with respect to matters of law.” Article 69(e), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 869(e).
    We review legal sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Wash-
ington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). Our review of legal
sufficiency “is limited to the evidence produced at trial.” United States v.
Rodela, 82 M.J. 521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (citation omitted), rev. de-
nied, 82 M.J. 312 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted).
“[T]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ does not mean that the evidence must be free
from any conflict . . . .” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(citation omitted). “[I]n resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are bound
to draw every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the
prosecution.” United States v. Barner, 56 M.J. 131, 134 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (cita-
tions omitted). Thus, “[t]he standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low
threshold to sustain a conviction.” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
    “Findings may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence. Rule for
Courts-Martial 918(c); see also King, 78 M.J. at 221 (“[T]he [G]overnment is
free to meet its burden of proof with circumstantial evidence.”) (citations omit-
ted).
      In order to convict Appellant of violating Article 112a, UCMJ, as charged
here, the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant used LSD, and such use was wrongful. See 10 U.S.C. § 912a; Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (MCM), pt. IV, ¶ 50.b.(2). “[U]se
. . . of a controlled substance is wrongful if it is without legal justification or
authorization.” MCM, pt. IV, ¶ 50.c.(5). “[U]se . . . of a controlled substance
may be inferred to be wrongful in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Id.
   2. Analysis
   Despite the absence of forensic evidence, we find Appellant’s conviction for
wrongfully using LSD meets the low threshold for legal sufficiency. Appellant
admitted to Officer AO that he and Lt JD used “acid,” meaning LSD, in the
form of paper strips. Circumstantial evidence reinforced the credibility of these
admissions. The testimony of multiple witnesses who observed and spoke with
Appellant on 4 and 5 July 2020 suggests Appellant was under the influence of
an intoxicating substance. Appellant’s pupils were dilated. He seemed

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            United States v. Parino-Ramcharan, No. ACM 40171

disoriented and confused, and he apparently had difficulty grasping the events
occurring around him. He repeatedly asked the same questions and made the
same comments over and over again. The video recording from Officer AO’s
body camera, admitted as a prosecution exhibit, portrays Appellant in a simi-
lar light. Officers TR and AO opined that based on their experience, Appellant
did not exhibit typical symptoms of being drunk from alcohol, such as lethargy,
slurred speech, or difficulty standing or moving. Moreover, Lt JD—who Appel-
lant had been with—also repeatedly asserted he and Appellant had used LSD,
although Lt JD exhibited much more dramatic symptoms of being under its
influence. Moreover, there is no evidence of any legal justification or authori-
zation for Appellant to have used LSD.
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a ra-
tional finder of fact could credit Appellant’s admission that he used LSD at or
near Clovis, New Mexico, between on or about 4 July 2020 and on or about 5
July 2020. Accordingly, we find the evidence is legally sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction for wrongful use of LSD.
                              III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law, and no error ma-
terially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Articles
59(a) and 69(e), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 869(e). Accordingly, the findings
and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                 FOR THE COURT

                 FLEMING E. KEEFE, Capt, USAF
                 Acting Clerk of the Court

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