Court Opinion

ID: 9628980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:35:21.740732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:28.847700
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
BRETT, Judge.
The defendant in his second petition for ' rehearing, urges that t,his court cannot take, judicial notice of 'rules and regulations of the Highway and Public Safety Department' 'as set" forth in the exemplified 'graphic interjfretátion symbolizing the provisions of Title 47, § 116.1, subd. 4 (a) and (b), O.S.1941, as amended in. 1949 because there was no- reference to the rules and .regulations in 'the record thereof in the trial court. He contends neither the prosecutor nor other parties were' cognizant of the promulgation of the symbolized regulations of' the statute, and therefore it was not properly before this court on appeal, and - cannot be considered by this -court. We believe this contention is contrary to th'e great weight of authority. 3 Am.Jur. 375, § 834.
Every court has the right to take judicial notice from the highest to - the lowest. 23 C.J. 172, § 2004, 31 C.J.S., Evidence, § 13; Chiulla De Luca v. Hartford-Park Com’rs, 94 Conn. 7, 107 A. 611.
*164It is generally held that orders and regulations by the political branches of the government, within the scope of their - authority, which have the same effect as law will be judicially noticed by the courts. 20 Am.Jur. 67, § 44. And particular cognizance will be taken of the rules, orders, and decisions of the executive departments of the government. Thornton v. United States, 271 U.S. 414, 46 S.Ct. 585, 70 L.Ed. 1013; Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 33 S.Ct. 1011, 57 L.Ed. 1363; Cosmos Exploration Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co., 190 U.S. 301, 23 S.Ct. 692, 24 S.Ct. 860, 47 L.Ed. 1064; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456; Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 14 S.Ct. 513, 38 L.Ed. 415; Knight v. United Land Ass’n, 142 U.S. 161, 12 S.Ct. 258, 35 L.Ed. 974; The E. A. Packer, 140 U.S. 360, 11 S.Ct. 794, 35 L.Ed. 453; Heath v. Wallace, 138 U.S. 573, 11 S.Ct. 380, 34 L.Ed. 1063; Richelieu & O. Nav. Co. v. Boston M. Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 408, 10 S.Ct. 934, 34 L.Ed. 398; Coffee v. Groover, 123 U.S. 1, 8 S.Ct. 1, 31 L.Ed. 51; Romero v. United States, 1 Wall. 721, 17 L.Ed. 627; United States v. Teschmaker, 22 How. 392, 16 L.Ed. 353; Lyons Mill. Co. v. Goffe & Carkener, 10 Cir., 46 F.2d 241, 83 A.L.R. 501; Whitney v. Spratt, 25 Wash. 62, 64 P. 919, 87 Am.St.Rep. 738, affirmed in Thayer v. Spratt, 189 U.S. 346, 23 S.Ct. 576, 47 L.Ed. 845. In Peters v. U. S., 2 Okl. 116, 33 P. 1031, it was held that the courts may take judicial notice of the rules and regulations of the General Land Office even though not pleaded or proved.
Generally speaking, an appellate court may take judicial cognizance of any matter of which the court of original jurisdiction may take such notice; but it cannot judicially notice matters which could not have been so noticed by the court below. See also 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, p. 1713, § 1212; “Matters of which an appellate court can take judicial notice, in accordance with the rules stated in Evidence §§ 6-102 (23 C.J. p. 58, Note 1-p 174, Note 35), will be considered by such court although they are not incorporated in the record.” Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. New York Cent. R. Co., 339 Ill. 201, 171 N.E. 148; Kieselbach v. Feuer, 183 Ind. 582, 109 N.E. 842; Rosenzweig v. Wells, 308 Mo. 617, 273 S.W. 1071; Regenvetter v. Ball, 131 Wash. 155, 229 P. 321, and 4 C.J. 560, Note 66, 4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1212 and cases cited thereunder. In New York Indians v. U.S., 170 U.S. 1, 18 S.Ct. 531, 539, 42 L.Ed. 927, 938, it was said:
“Our attention has also been called to certain documents emanating from the executive and legislative departments of the government, some of which tend to strengthen the idea that these departments never intended to treat the action of the Indians as a forfeiture of their grant, and acquiesced in the justice of the claims the Indians now make, and have already made under the treaty of Buffalo creek. It is insisted by the attorney general that, as these documents are not referred to in the findings of fact by the court below, this court cannot consider them; but, as they are documents of which we may take judicial notice, we think the fact that they are not incorporated in the findings of the court will not preclude us from examining them, with a view of inquiring whether they have the bearing claimed. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 214, 11 S.Ct. 80, (34 L.Ed. 691, 696).
“While it is ordinarily true that this court takes notice of only such facts as are found by the court below, it may take notice of matters of common observation, of statutes, records, or public documents which were not called to its attention, or other similar matters of judicial cognizance.”
In Rogers v. Cady, 104 Cal. 288, 38 P. 81, wherein the right of the appellate court to take judicial knowledge of the matter of the location of certain lands covering which no evidence was introduced in the *165lower court the California Supreme Court said:
“The county in which lands so described are situated is a matter within the judicial knowledge of the court, and is to be determined by it in the same manner as a legal proposition, and cannot be made an ‘issue’ between the parties, to be determined by the court, in each case, upon conflicting evidence presented in that case. For the purpose of informing itself the court might inquire of others, or refer to books or documents, or any other source of information which it might deem authentic, but its action in this respect is not a part of the trial of issues in' the action. Matters of which a court takes judicial knowledge are uniform and fixed, and do not depend upon uncertain testimony, and the failure or refusal of a trial court to take such notice does not prevent the appellate court from giving proper effect thereto. See Hunter v. New York, O. & W. Railroad Co., 116 N.Y. 615, 23 N.E. 9, [6 L.R.A. 246].”
An appellate court can properly take judicial notice of, any matter of which a court of original jurisdiction may properly take notice. In Varcoe v. Lee, 180 Cal. 338, 181 P. 223, 225:
“An appellate court can properly take judicial notice of any matter of which the court of original jurisdiction may properly take notice. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65, 14 L. Ed. 847; Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah, 260, 116 P. 442, 35 L.R.A., N.S., 610, Ann.Cas.1913E, 61; 15 Ruling Case Law, 1063.
“In fact, a particularly salutary use of the principle of judicial notice is to sustain on appeal, a' judgment clearly in favor of the right party, but as to which there is in the evidence an omission of some necessary fact which is yet indisputable and a matter of common knowledge, and was probably assumed without strict proof for that very reason. Campbell v. Wood, 116 Mo. 196, 22 S.W. 796. * * *
“Judicial notice is a judicial short cut, a doing away, in the case of evidence, with the formal necessity for evidence, because there is no real necessity for it. * * * The rule in this respect is well stated in 15 R.C.L. 1057, as follows:
“ ‘It may be stated generally with regard to the question as to what matters are properly of judicial cognizance that, while the power of judicial notice is to he exercised with caution, courts should take notice of whatever is or ought to- he generally known, * * * for justice does not require that courts profess to be more ignorant than the rest of mankind. This rule enumerates three material requisites : (1) The matter- of which a court will take judicial notice must be a matter of common and general knowledge. The fact- that the belief is not universal,. however, is not controlling, far-there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by every one. Courts take judicial notice of those things which are common knozvledge to- the majority of mankind, or to those persons familiar with- the particular matter in question. * * * (In this case truck operators and manufacturers.) (2) A matter-properly a subject of judicial notice must be “known”; that is, well established and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. In every instance the test is whether sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact involved as to make it safe and proper to assume its existence without proof. In harmony with that view it has been said that courts must “judicially recognize whatever has the requisite certainty and notoriety in every field of knowledge, in every walk of practical life.” (3) A matter, to be within judicial cognizance, must be known “within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.” ’ * * *
“It is truly said that the power of judicial notice is, as to matters claimed *166to be matters of general knowledge, one to be used with caution. If there is any doubt whatever, cither as to the fact itself or as to its being a matter of common knowledge, evidence should be required;, but, if the court is of the certain opinion that these requirements exist, there can properly.be no hesitation. ín such a case there is, on the one hand, no danger of a wrong conclusion as to the fact — and such danger is the reason for the caution in dispensing with the evidence — and, on the other hand, purely formal and useless proceedings will be avoided.
“Little assistance, can be had by a search of the authorities for exactly similar cases.”
The second petition for rehearing consists largely of an attempt to take advantage of the lack of knowledge of the prosecutor and the unfortunate misunderstanding on the part-of the Assistant Commissioner of Public Safety -of the law as' expressed in his letter construing the statute herein in question as set. forth in the original opinion, but the Attorney General. cannot be charged with the ignorance of other parties. As soon . as the new’ regulations promulgated in June 1949 were called to his attention, he confronted this court with them:- The promulgation thereof, the existence and dissemination of them by the executive department cannot be successfully disputed. Moreover the court is convinced of the correctness of the departmental symbolized interpretation of the statute, Title 47, § 116.1, subd. 4 (a) and (b), as set forth on the chart contained in the original opinion herein. Moreover the chart is an aid to intelligent understanding of the intent of the law. Clear understanding of the law and its intent leads to better observance and enforcement of the law. . . :
Furthermore this court’s check of the matters asserted in the Attorney General’s supplemental brief calling for judicial notice are matters of general knowledge among persons who should be familiar therewith, It is a question of applying a correct interpretation of the provisions of Title 47, § 116.1, subd. 4 (a) and (b). , We have found the interpretation in the graphic chart of June 1949 a correct interpretation, the Assistant Commissioner’s letter of 1948 an erroneous interpretation, which had clearly been superseded by the chart or symbolized rules and regulations prescribed by the statute. Three years after the correct interpretation of the law has 'been graphically asserted the defendant cannot avail himself of an overruled interpretation to evade the statute. Now two legislative sessions have passed and no attempt to read into the law the contention the defendant asserts has been made. Hence there is no danger in accepting said matter upon the basis of judicial notice, since it is now well established as having been promulgated by authority of law, Peters v. U. S., supra, and it would be a vain gesture and a senseless procedure to reverse this case and send it back to receive in 'evidence, proof of the law of which this court should take judicial notice. We know of no basis upon which the state in this case would not be entitled to prevail. The evidence submitted in the record herein when supplemented by the rules and regulations a matter of law, applying to the facts of the case all of which we have taken judicial knowledge, presents a situation where there could be but one outcome in light of the court’s interpretation placed upon-the statute. And as was said in Var-coe v. Lee, supra, to reverse this case under the conditions merely because of matters of which we, should .take , judicial notice would constitute' purely, a fprmal and useless proceeding. We are not unmindful that all the courts hold as does this one, that judicial notice should be resorted to with caution. Nevertheless in a particular case, 'to prevent and avoid needless litigation, where as herein the meaning and- intent of the statute in question is clear, and the rules and regulations contained in the graphic chart of which we take judicial notice expresses the law, presents a proper case for application of the principle of judicial notice. For all the above and foregoing reasons the petition for rehearing and motion for oral argument are accordingly overruled. .
POWELL, P. J., and JONES, J., concur.