Court Opinion

ID: 9676483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:25:36.365405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.672749
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). As this Court recognized in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 595; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), "[t]he heart of the [governmental immunity] act is § 7,1 which provides broad immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function . . . .” Section 7(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.
When a governmental agency engages in the design, construction, maintenance, or repair of a highway, it performs a governmental function within the meaning of § 7(1) if such "activities] [are] expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law.” See Ross, supra at 625; Thomas v State Hwy Dep’t, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976).
One of the statutory exceptions to governmental immunity is set forth in § 2,2 which provides in pertinent part:
*25Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency. [Emphasis supplied.]
There is no dispute that the Department of Transportation did not have jurisdiction over either of the highways in question at the times of the accidents which gave rise to these lawsuits.
A
Plaintiffs in the cases before us rely upon Hargis v Dearborn Heights, 34 Mich App 594; 192 NW2d 44 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 751 (1971), wherein a county road commission constructed a bridge and then relinquished jurisdiction in 1963 to the city. Thereafter, in 1965 a young boy fell from the bridge and drowned, and his father sued both the county and the city. The Court of Appeals held that "[wjhile the defect is one of design, both the county and, after the county relinquished jurisdiction, the city had a continuing obligation to keep the bridge and culvert 'reasonably safe and convenient [or fit] for travel.’ Thus, they both had a continuing obligation to correct the defective design.” Id. at 601.
On the other hand, the defendant Department of Transportation relies upon the later, 1983 decision of the Court of Appeals in Potes, supra. The facts of Potes were almost identical to the facts in Killeen and even involved the same stretch of *26highway. As in these cases, the plaintiff in Potes sought to hold the state liable for design and construction defects allegedly created before the state returned jurisdiction to the county.
The Potes panel construed § 2 as limiting liability to the governmental agency having jurisdiction of the highway at the time of the accident:3
[W]e view that statutory exception [§ 2] as parting the immunity curtain only as to the governmental unit having jurisdiction of the subject roadway at the time of the accident. Application of this rule is compatible with the language of MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121, which places the duty to keep county roads in reasonable repair exclusively upon the counties. See Mullins v Wayne Co, 16 Mich App 365; 168 NW2d 246 (1969), lv den 382 Mich 791 (1969). To hold two governmental units responsible for correcting design or construction defects could result in confusion and inefficiency. [128 Mich App 769.]
Potes is consistent with a line of Court of Appeals decisions which, except for Hargis, have held that there can be no concurrent jurisdiction over a highway. See Austin v City of Romulus, 101 Mich App 662; 300 NW2d 672 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 955 (1981); Furness v Public Service Comm, 100 Mich App 365; 299 NW2d 35 (1980); Summerville v Kalamazoo Co Road Comm, 77 Mich App 580; 259 NW2d 206 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 924 (1978); Bennett v City of Lansing, 52 Mich App 289; 217 NW2d 54 (1974), lv den 399 Mich 840 (1977).
B
Plaintiffs would have us judicially amend the *27language of § 2 so as to waive immunity with respect to any governmental agency which ever had jurisdiction over a highway. In construing a statute, words and phrases are to be given their ordinary and common-sense meaning. Stadle v Battle Creek Twp, 346 Mich 64, 68; 77 NW2d 329 (1956); MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1). The common-sense meaning of "having jurisdiction” is jurisdiction at the present time or at the time in question. I agree with the Court of Appeals in Killeen, at 11-12, where it stated:
Had the Legislature intended to impose liability on governmental units which at one time had jurisdiction over a highway but did not have such jurisdiction at the time of the accident, the Legislature could easily have worded the statute to read "failure ... to keep any highway which at any time was under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair.” [Emphasis in original.]
Statutory exceptions to governmental immunity are to be strictly construed. See Ross, supra at 606-607.4 As this Court said in Peters v Dep’t of State Hwys, 400 Mich 50, 57; 252 NW2d 799 (1977):
*28[T]he conditions precedent to establishing the state’s liability are questions for the Legislature and it is not the proper function of this Court to limit or to enlarge clear statutory provisions by construction.
It would be beyond the "proper function of this Court” to judicially expand the meaning of § 2 so as to impose liability upon any governmental entity which at any time had jurisdiction over the highways in question.
c
Our interpretation of § 2 of the governmental immunity act is reinforced by constitutional and statutory provisions which evince a general scheme for establishing exclusive jurisdiction over each of Michigan’s roads and highways.
Const 1963, art 7, § 29 provides for local governmental control and jurisdiction over nonstate highways:
Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all counties, townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government.
By statute each governmental unit is required to maintain the highways under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair. For example, MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121 imposes such a duty upon the counties:
It is hereby made the duty of the counties to *29keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, all county roads, bridges and culverts that are within their jurisdiction and under their care and control and which are open to public travel.
At the time of the accident in each of the two cases before us, the roads involved, Ballenger Highway and Clark and DeWitt Roads, were under the control and jurisdiction of Genesee and Clinton Counties, respectively. To superimpose continuing liability on the state, which no longer had jurisdiction over the roads in question, would undermine the responsibility and control conferred by the Legislature upon the counties.
Furthermore, such reasoning runs counter to the purpose and intent of another statute, 1969 PA 296,5 which is entitled:
An act to provide for the transfer of jurisdiction over highways; to provide for the final determination of disputes involving transfers of highway jurisdiction; and to supersede certain acts and parts of acts. [Emphasis supplied.]
This statute establishes a "highway jurisdiction determination board” to finally resolve disputes relating to the transfer of jurisdiction over a highway,6 and requires that the transferring governmental unit must bring the highway up to "reasonable acceptable standards” prior to the transfer. The logical inference is that after the transfer, the transferee unit takes control and becomes responsible. This inference is consistent with sub*30sections (3) and (4) of § 8 of that statute, which provide:
(3) In lieu of undertaking the renovation, repair or reconstruction of a highway to be transferred pursuant to this act, the transferring highway authority may do 1 of the following, with the concurrence of the receiving highway authority:
(a) Pay the estimated cost of such work to the receiving highway authority in order that the work may be undertaken by it.
(b) Enter into a contract with the receiving highway authority for the receiving highway authority to perform the work and be reimbursed by the transferring highway authority. The contracts shall include such terms and conditions as agreed to and shall be subject to such approvals as may be required for other contracts of the highway authorities.
(4) The cost of renovation, repair or reconstruction of the highway shall be paid by the highway authority relinquishing jurisdiction except to the extent that the highway authority gaining jurisdiction is required to participate in such cost in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 51 of the Public Acts of 1951, as amended, being sections 247.651 to 247.673 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [MCL 247.858; MSA 9.393(38).]
Obviously, this statute is designed for the protection of the transferee governmental unit, by making certain that the transferring unit, prior to the act of transfer, will undertake any responsibility it may have for renovation, repair, or reconstruction.
This statutory scheme plainly reflects a policy on the part of the Legislature to place responsibility for maintenance and repair of a highway upon only one entity of government at any given time. It is well established that "[statutes in pari materia should be construed together . . . .” Webster v *31Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 531; 33 NW2d 69 (1948).
Sound reasoning undergirds the Legislature’s policy. If § 2 were to be given the expansive interpretation urged by plaintiffs, a governmental agency which once had jurisdiction over a highway would forever be required to review the condition of the highway. Further, confusion and disagreement inevitably would arise between governmental units as to whether particular "defects” were related to design and construction. Although plaintiff in Kuripla contends that concurrent jurisdiction and multiple liability would encourage cooperation among governmental units, the Legislature has opted for exclusive jurisdiction, a scheme which presumably it considers is more efficient and is designed to minimize controversy among governmental units.
For the reasons stated, I would hold that such liability as is imposed by § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not extend to a governmental agency which has no jurisdiction over the highway at the time of the accident.7

 MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).

 MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).

 In addition, the Potes Court distinguished Hargis on the ground that the cause of action in Hargis accrued prior to July 1, 1965, the effective date of 1964 PA 170, the governmental immunity act. MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq.

 See, generally, 57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability, § 60, p 69; 89 ALR 394; Genesee Co Rd Comm v State Hwy Comm, 86 Mich App 294; 272 NW2d 632 (1978). See also Hammond & Osborne, Annual survey of Michigan law: June 1, 1986—May 31, 1986, Government law, 33 Wayne L R 645, 655 (1987): "Courts must strictly construe statutory exceptions to immunity to achieve the legislative intent of immunizing governmental agencies engaged in governmental functions. The statute codifying the highway exception clearly limits liability to the failure to maintain highways in reasonable repair.”
Also 39 Am Jur 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges, § 346, pp 728-729:
In many jurisdictions, liability for injuries caused by defective highways, streets, and bridges is expressly or by necessary implication imposed on counties and towns (or townships). Such statutes are generally regarded as being in derogation of the common law, and hence are strictly construed. They are not *28extended by construction beyond the plain meaning of the terms used, nor can an action be maintained under them unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of the act.

 MCL 247.851 et seq.; MSA 9.393(31) et seq.

 Section 2 of the act provides in part that "a highway may not be transferred from the jurisdiction of the state to the county . . . without the consent of both parties, except as provided by this act.” By refusing to consent to a transfer, a county may invoke the protection of the act. MCL 247.852; MSA 9.393(32).

 I would not decide, nor do I intend to imply, that a county having jurisdiction at the time of an accident should be liable for negligence on the part of the state prior to its transfer of jurisdiction to the county. That question is not before us.