Court Opinion

ID: 9894923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 17:00:29.255981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.814877
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 22-3029
                                       __________

                                   SEAN DONAHUE,
                                             Appellant

                                             v.

     CITY OF HAZLETON, PA; FRANK V. DEANDREA; JOHN LEONARD;
    DAVID COFFMAN; JASON ZOLA; DARRYL LEDGER; KEVIN WAGNER;
             KIRK L. WETZEL; MARK ZOLA; THOMAS KING;
              WILLIAM GALLAGHER; KENNETH ZIPOVSKY;
       HPD SPECIAL OPERATIONS OFFICERS JOHN AND JANE DOES
                 ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                          (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-01351)
                     District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                  November 1, 2023

              Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: November 3, 2023)
                                      ___________

                                        OPINION*
                                       ___________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

       Appellant Sean Donahue, proceeding pro se, appeals from multiple dispositive and

evidentiary District Court orders. For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment

of the District Court.

       In 2012, the Hazleton Police Department conducted a raid on Donahue’s home,

which resulted in his arrest and subsequent conviction for terroristic threats. See

Commonwealth v. Donahue, No. 1949 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 4001623, at *2 (Pa. Super.

Ct. Aug. 22, 2018). In 2014, Donahue sued numerous police officers in relation to the

raid, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1. He alleged violations of the First, Fourth,

and Fifth Amendments, including claims of excessive force and unlawful takings. Id. at

19-36. He also alleged a municipal liability claim against the City of Hazleton under

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. at 18.

       The District Court stayed the case until 2018, when the Superior Court affirmed

Donahue’s conviction. The defendants moved for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 80. The

District Court granted the motion on all claims except Donahue’s excessive force claim

and its associated Monell claim, which were based on Donahue’s allegations that

defendants aimed weapons at him while he was handcuffed. Dkt. Nos. 105, 129, 130.

The case proceeded to trial, and the District Court granted defendants’ Rule 50 motion on

Donahue’s Monell claim. Dkt. No. 299 at 151. The jury then found in favor of the

defendants on Donahue’s remaining excessive force claim. Dkt. Nos. 294. Donahue

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timely filed motions for a new trial and to alter or amend judgment, which the District

Court denied. Dkt. Nos. 301, 305, 312-13. Donahue filed a timely notice of appeal. Dkt.

No. 315.

       We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over

the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law. See

Kars 4 Kids v. Am. Can!, 8 F.4th 209, 218 n.8 (3d Cir. 2021); Blunt v. Lower Merion

Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2009).

       On appeal, Donahue argues that the District Court erred in granting the defendants

judgment as a matter of law on his Monell claim. C.A. Dkt. No. 26 at 25-26, 29-38, 73-

75. He contends that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the City failed to

train its officers to avoid civil rights violations during arrests. Id. at 26, 29-33, 74.

Although failure-to-train can be a cognizable basis for municipal liability, it generally

requires that a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees” have

occurred, sufficient to put the policymaker on notice of a training deficiency. Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (citation omitted). Here, Donahue did not identify a

single prior excessive force violation to put the City on notice of a need for additional

training. Although Donahue argues that the City’s “Use of Force” policy could

potentially lead to civil rights violations, C.A. Dkt. No. 26 at 30-34, a pattern of actual

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violations is required—not a speculative risk of a violation,1 see Connick, 563 U.S. at 62-

63; see also Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d Cir. 2020)

(“Accidents occur . . . [b]ut the Monell inquiry asks whether a municipality was

deliberately indifferent to the risk of a constitutional violation.”).

       Donahue also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment

for the defendants on his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings claim. C.A. Dkt. No.

26 at 28, 68-69, 86. We disagree. First, Donahue could not proceed under the Fifth

Amendment because he did not allege that any federal actor was involved. See B & G

Const., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 662 F.3d 233, 246 n.14 (3d Cir.

2011). Second, as to his Fourteenth Amendment claim, no federal constitutional

procedural due process violation is stated where adequate procedures are available to a

plaintiff to redress his injury. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

Donahue has an adequate remedy for wrongs committed by state officials through the

Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8522(b)(3), 8542(b)(2), 8550.

Although Donahue alleges that defendants refuse to follow a state judge’s order regarding

his property, he can file a claim under the PTCA or a motion pursuant to Pennsylvania

Rule of Criminal Procedure 588 for the return of that property.

1
 To the extent he argues otherwise, Donahue also failed to present any evidence of a
policy or custom of the City that would render it liable for an excessive force violation
under Monell. See Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 175 (3d Cir. 2017).

                                               4
       Donahue challenges numerous District Court evidentiary rulings, wherein the

District Court deemed Donahue’s proposed exhibits inadmissible or rejected his requests

for subpoenas.2 C.A. Dkt. No. 26 at 25-28, 44-60, 63-64, 67-68, 74-86. Those rulings

were largely based on the irrelevance of the proposed evidence to Donahue’s surviving—

and narrow—excessive force claim regarding the defendants’ alleged conduct while he

was handcuffed. See Dkt. No. 129 at 15; Dkt. Nos. 197, 248, 275. We discern no abuse

of discretion by the District Court, as it was reasonable to conclude that the proposed

evidence was of no consequence to the remaining claim.3 See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Ansell

v. Green Acres Contracting Co., Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We will not

disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person would adopt the

district court’s view.” (citation omitted)).

       Finally, Donahue contends on appeal that defendants lied during trial. C.A. Dkt.

No. 26 at 26-28, 38-44, 61-67, 83-85. He is not entitled to relief based on these

2
  These rulings included the preclusion of a South African news segment, video of
Donahue’s home after the raid, a report about carbon monoxide in his home during the
raid, and photographs of an unrelated police incident, as well as testimony about those
topics. Donahue challenged these rulings in the District Court prior to and following
trial. See Dkt. Nos. 257, 260, 263, 266, 269, 301, 305.
3
  Donahue also asserts that the trial court erred by “repeatedly scolding” him in front of
the jury when making the evidentiary rulings. C.A. Dkt. No. 26 at 26-27, 35-36, 44, 58-
59, 67-68, 73-78. We disagree, especially because the contested comments were
responses to Donahue’s efforts to press beyond the bounds the District Court had set. See
United States v. Olgin, 745 F.2d 263, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1984) (outlining the factors used to
determine if a trial court’s remarks would “unduly influence a jury”).
                                               5
allegations, as a court must not substitute its judgment regarding witness credibility for

that of the jury, especially on appeal. See William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d

138, 143 (3d Cir. 2011). To the extent he argues otherwise, Donahue has not met the

“stringent standard” of establishing that a miscarriage of justice would result if the jury’s

verdict stands.4 See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076

(3d Cir. 1996).

       Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

4
  Donahue also cursorily argues that the District Court erred by preventing him from
presenting character witnesses from around the country. C.A. Dkt. No. 26 at 28, 68, 86.
Donahue provided no support for this assertion, so he has forfeited the argument. See In
re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016).
                                             6