Court Opinion

ID: 9796493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:58:31.860499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:23.677811
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
19 With one exception,1 I concur in Part I of the main opinion, but I must dissent from Part II. It is simply not proper to reach the constitutional issue in this case because we have concluded that our long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims.
{20 Under our jurisprudence, if a case may be resolved on statutory grounds, we are obliged to resist the temptation to render unnecessary advisory opinions about constitutional issues, even if they interest us. *1278See, e.g., In re Estate of Cosby, 2003 UT 3, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 1184 (stating that due to the court's disposition of two other issues presented by the parties, one involving a rule of evidence, "it [was]. not necessary to reach [the appellant's] constitutional challenges"); Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980) ("[Clourts do not busy themselves with advisory opinions, nor [do they] exercise the delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract, hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases.... [A] constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case ... may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues."); Estes v. Talbot, 597 P.2d 1324, 1326 (Utah 1979) ("It is not necessary ... to reach the important constitutional questions of just which or whether all State officers are subject to impeachment.... The fact is that under no reasonable construction of the statutes in question could this action be maintained."); Heathman v. Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839, 841 (1962) ("In regard to the issue of constitutionality: it is generally held, and we think properly so, that after having determined that a statute does not apply to the case in hand, the court will not go beyond and consider its constitutionality.") (footnote omitted); Whitcher v. Bonneville Irrigation Dist., 69 Utah 510, 256 P. 785, 788 (1927) (discussing that "it [was] not necessary to consider or determine the questions ... respecting the constitutionality of the provisions" because "the assessments made and taxes levied ... [were] void and of no effect" for a different reason); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157, 169-70 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (concurring opinion joined in by majority of panel) (invoking the institutional proscription against reaching constitutional issues unnee-essarily and noting that because "the commissioner's actions were not even authorized by statute or rule," there was "no need to opine about the constitutional implications of such actions").
121 No exception to this sound policy has been recognized for selective use in long-arm cases. On the contrary, the general rule has been embraced and consistently followed by the appellate courts of this state:
Generally, whether a state can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is determined by two factors: the breadth of the forum state's jurisdictional statute and the due process limitations on jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the relevant state statute does not permit jurisdiction, then the inquiry is ended; if it does, then the question is whether the statute's reach comports with due process.
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1989); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). We have demonstrated in Part I of the main opinion that the applicable statute does not permit jurisdiction. Thus, our "inquiry is ended," Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122-or should be.
1 22 It is true that a number of Utah cases have discussed the Due Process implications of the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction after dealing with the statute, and it is apparently this familiar pattern that explains my colleagues' gratuitous foray into constitutional law in this case. However, unlike in this case, in every one of those other cases the appellate court reached the Due Process issue only after it first concluded or assumed that the statute itself would confer jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fenn v. Mleads Enters. Inc., 2006 UT 8, ¶ 9, 137 P.3d 706 ("Both parties agree that the Utah long-arm statute extends to [the defendant]'s actions in this case and that the [pJlaintiff's claim arises out of those acts or contacts. Hence, we granted certio-rari only to review the due process analysis of the court of appeals[.]"); Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 1999 UT 50, ¶¶ 7-8, 980 P.2d 204 ("[ Wle conclude that subparagraph (8) of the long-arm statute encompasses the defendants' acts as alleged by the uncontroverted portions of [the plaintiff's] complaint. We next consider whether holding the defendants subject to this state's jurisdiction accords with due process."); Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1122 (assuming "subparagraph (1) or (3) of the long-arm statute will be satisfied" before moving to consider Due Process implications of exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to those statutory provisions). In contrast, if the ap*1279peal can be decided on straightforward statutory grounds, the theoretical Due Process implications of the exercise of jurisdiction are not broached.2 See, e.g., Dahnken, Inc. v. Marshinsky, 580 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Utah 1978); White v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 549 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); Mack Fin. Corp. v. Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., 529 P.2d 429, 430-31 (Utah 1974).
123 While I agree that the long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction in this case, I do not join in the wholly unnecessary advisory opinion on constitutional law, given that this case can properly be resolved on statutory grounds.

. I fail to see the "[mJoreover" significance of a letter from Pohl's counsel stating that ISME "hald] no contract, of any kind, with Pohl." Main Opinion, 110. After all, Pohl has consistently acknowledged it had no contract with ISME and, as the majority recognizes, is suing ISME only in tort. See Main Opinion, MM 3-4.

. I can find only a single Utah appellate opinion where both statutory and constitutional analysis are treated by the court in a case where, as in our case, the statute was held not to confer jurisdiction. See Kocha v. Gibson Prods. Co., 535 P.2d 680 (Utah 1975). In this six paragraph opinion authored by Justice Tuckett, the Utah Supreme Court's relevant analysis was confined to a single sentence: ''There is no showing of 'significant minimal contacts' in this State which would satisfy the due process clause of the federal constitution nor 'transaction of business within this state' as defined by Section 78-27-23, T.C.A.1953." Id. at 681 (footnotes omitted).