Court Opinion

ID: 9629016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:35:51.708859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:14.445455
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR:
(specially concurring in result).
While I do not agree with all that is said in the foregoing opinion I concur in the disposition therein made of the appeal.
The facts stated in the information constitute a public offense  under the statutes of this state, hence defendant’s demurrer thereto should have been overruled and defendant should have been ordered to plead to the information.
In Montana the people have withheld from their state  legislative assembly the “power to authorize lotteries, or gift enterprises for any purpose”. Mont. Const. Art. XIX, sec. 2, clause 1.
Idaho’s Constitution provides: “The legislature shall not authorize any lottery or gift enterprise under any pretense or for any purpose whatever.” Idaho Const. Art. Ill, sec. 20.
Montana’s Constitution also contains the express mandate that the state legislative assembly “shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise ticket^ in this state.” Art. XIX, sec. 2, clause 2.
In compliance with the above express mandate the state legislative assembly enacted R. C. M. 1947, secs. 94-3001 to 94-3011, inclusive.
A lottery is defined by section 94-3001 of the Revised Codes *511of Montana of 1947 and the same definition appears as section 18-4901 of the Idaho Codes.
In the well considered case of State ex rel. Anderson v. Village of Garden City, Idaho, 265 Pac. (2d) 328, 330, decided December 23, 1953, the Supreme Court of Idaho determined the law points and questions which are here involved and I quote therefrom with approval. There, after quoting the legislative definition of a lottery appearing in section 18-4901, I. C., the Idaho court said:
‘ ‘ This definition in substance conforms to that of the common law which has defined a lottery as a species of gaming, wherein prizes are distributed by chance among persons paying a consideration for the chance to win; a game of hazard in which sums are paid for the chance to obtain a larger value in money or articles.
"All lotteries are gambling. To constitute a lottery, as distinguished from other methods or forms of gambling, it is generally held there are three essential elements, namely, chance, consideration and prize. "When these three elements are present, the scheme is a lottery. 54 C. J. S., Lotteries, sec. 2(a), p. 845; 34 Am. Jur. 647, see. 3. * * *
"The definitions above quoted and contained in the acts by which the Legislature attempted to legalize slot machines, designated as coin-operated amusement devices, punchboards, chance spindles and chance prize games, when analyzed, simply define lotteries by other names, and the parts of the acts which define the various devices as gaming and not lotteries, are of no importance. While the acts herein asserted by appellants to be constitutional are adriotly and cleverly drawn, the fact remains that the instrumentalities and devices so defined and permitted are no more nor less than lotteries. The Legislature cannot amend or repeal the constitution, or any part of it, by legislative act, nor interpret it. Under prescribed procedure the constitution may be .amended by the electors of the State, not otherwise. Art. 20, sec. 1 of the Constitution. The interpretation of the constitution is a matter for the courts to determine; and desig*512nating the devices complained of by other names than lotteries does not change the essential characteristics of the contrivances attempted to be legalized by stating that they are gambling-devices and not lotteries. A lottery is a well recognized evil and mischief regardless of the name it may be called, or the manner in which it operates. The fact that the name of a gambling device may be changed or new forms of games invented, probably never seen nor heard of by the framers of the constitution, does not change the law. All such similar contrivances and devices, by whatever name they may be called, or however operated, in a vast majority of cases submitted to the courts of last resort have been held to be lotteries, and where the constitution of a particular state prohibits lotteries, such pretended licensing- of similar devices and schemes has been declared unconstitutional. Thus in State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. (2d) 133, 247 Pac. (2d) 787, 788, a statute legalizing the operation of slot machines under prescribed conditions was attacked as unconstitutional and in violation of a provision in the Washington Constitution, Art. 2, sec. 24, which provides: ‘The legislature shall never authorize any lottery * '* *’, the Supreme Court of Washington held that slot machines are mechanical lotteries and said:
“ ‘The statutory provision, exempting non-profit, benevolent, educational, fraternal, athletic or social clubs from provisions of statute penalizing possession, use or operation of slot machines as felony, is unconstitutional as authorizing- lottery. ’ * * *
“What has been said relative to slot machines or mechanical amusement devices, so called, in the act attempting to legalize the same, applies equally to punchboards, chance spindles and chance prize games. These latter contrivances, schemes, and devices, by whatever name they may be called or known, or however operated, have been held to be lotteries in numerous decisions in courts of last resort. [Citing cases.]
“It therefore follows that slot machines, mechanical amusement devices, punchboards, chance spindles, chance prize games, as defined in the acts attempting to legalize them, and all other *513similar contrivances, devices and schemes are lotteries, and any legislative act authorizing, or attempting to authorize their operation in any manner, is unconstitutional, being prohibited by Art. 3, sec. 20, of the Idaho Constitution.
“We therefore conclude that the acts of the Legislature above referred to, attempting to legalize their operation, are unconstitutional and void. * * *
“It is claimed that the State accepted a license fee to operate the devices in question, hence the right to operate them cannot be challenged in the manner done. The fact that a license fee was accepted, if it was, is no defense. Payment of taxes on, or license for a gambling machine or device furnishes no justification for its operation in violation of the constitution or the anti-gambling laws. [Citing case.]
“An unconstitutional act is not a law. Hence the statutes here attacked, being unconstitutional, the appellants cannot successfully contend that the nuisance complained of was carried on under authority of the State, or that such devices were operated under authority of the provisions of an ordinance of Garden City. State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 Pac. 977.
“All the people of the State are bound by constitutional limitations and Art. 3, sec. 20 of the Constitution is, with the other provisions, the supreme law of the land. [Citing cases.] Hence there is no valid statute or ordinance authorizing the businesses in which the appellants were engaged, and here complained of.
“Appellants contend that the policy-making body of the State is the Legislature and not the courts. The public policy of the State relative to the licensing or operation of lotteries was fixed by the framers of the Constitution. The constitutional inhibition, Art. 3, sec. 20 of the Constitution, cannot be modified or changed by the Legislature. The public policy of legislative enactments cannot be questioned by the courts and avoided simply because the courts might not agree with the public policy so announced. It is the duty of officials who act under a valid legislative enactment to abide by its terms. It is the court’s duty *514to interpret the meaning of legislative enactments without regard to possible results. [Citing cases.] The determination and announcing of the public policy-of the State by the Legislature, within its sphere, does not empower the Legislature to pass unconstitutional acts. * * *
‘ ‘ This provision of the Constitution, Art. 3, sec. 20, is negative and prohibitory, is self-acting and needs no legislation to carry it into effect, and it cannot be annulled in the manner attempted. ’ ’
It was reversible error for the trial judge to sustain defendant’s demurrer to the information and to render and cause to be entered a judgment of dismissal.
MR. JUSTICE FREEBOURN, dissents.