Court Opinion

ID: 9898111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:32.407858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:11.027985
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                            OCTOBER 31, 2023
                                        In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                       WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                          DIVISION THREE

TOM LATTA,                         )        No. 39261-9-III
                                   )
             Appellant,            )
                                   )
  v.                               )
                                   )
CHELAN COUNTY, a Washington        )
municipal corporation,             )
                                   )
             Respondent.           )
                                   )
                                   )
RIVERSIDE CABIN n/k/a RIVERSIDE    )
CABIN AND LOFT LLC, a Washington   )        UNPUBLISHED OPINION
limited liability company,         )
                                   )
             Appellant,            )
                                   )
  v.                               )
                                   )
CHELAN COUNTY, a Washington        )
municipal corporation,             )
                                   )
             Respondent.           )
                                   )
                                   )
CEA, LLC - RIVERSIDE VACATION      )
HOME, LLC, a Washington limited    )
liability company,                 )
                                   )
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

                  Appellant,                  )
                                              )
   v.                                         )
                                              )
CHELAN COUNTY, a Washington                   )
municipal corporation,                        )
                                              )
                  Respondent.                 )
                                              )
                                              )
SIMS KELLY, LLC, a Washington                 )
limited liability company,                    )
                                              )
                  Appellant,                  )
                                              )
   v.                                         )
                                              )
CHELAN COUNTY, a Washington                   )
municipal corporation,                        )
                                              )
                  Respondent.                 )

        PENNELL, J. — This is a consolidated appeal of land use decisions brought by four

owners of short-term rentals (STRs) 1 located in the city of Leavenworth’s Urban Growth

Area (UGA). 2 In 2021, each of the appellants applied for permits to continue their STR

        1
         STRs are, essentially, furnished dwellings rented as a single lodging unit by an
owner or operator to tourists or other guests, for a fee, for periods of less than one month.
See Chelan County Code 14.98.1691 (defining “short-term rental”); see also Leavenworth
Municipal Code 21.90.030 (providing a similar definition for “transient accommodation
and/or lodging”).
       2
         By interlocal agreement, Chelan County applies the city of Leavenworth’s zoning
regulations to the Leavenworth UGA; thus, Leavenworth’s city government apparently
zones for the UGA as well as within the city limits. See Clerk’s Papers at 400-01.

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

operations as existing nonconforming uses. Chelan County denied all four applications,

and the county’s hearing examiner affirmed. The STR owners 3 claim they are entitled

to nonconforming use permits because either their STRs qualify as preexisting lawful

uses or a 2021 county resolution provides broad amnesty for existing unpermitted STRs.

Both arguments are mistaken. We therefore affirm the hearing examiner.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       The primary question on appeal is whether the appellants lawfully operated their

properties as STRs before the enactment of local zoning prohibitions. Each of the

appellants began their STR operations sometime after 1999. By way of background,

we note that the properties of all four appellants are located in the Leavenworth UGA

and all the properties are zoned as low-density residential.

       The city of Leavenworth first adopted an ordinance prohibiting STRs (referred to

as “transient accommodation”) in low-density residential zones on December 12, 1989.

Ordinance 852 amended the portion of the Leavenworth Municipal Code (LMC) dealing

with permitted uses in low-density residential zones, and provided that structures in such

zones “not [be] used as a Bed and Breakfast or Transient Accommodation.” Clerk’s

Papers (CP) at 1459 (emphasis added). A “transient accommodation” was defined as

       3
           We alternatively refer to the appellants as either “appellants” or “STR owners.”

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

“a dwelling unit [4] or motel room regularly rented to transient guests with a less than

monthly rental period for each individual or group of guests.” Id. at 1458.

       Ordinance 852 granted a one-year amortization period, allowing preexisting

transient accommodations or bed and breakfasts to temporarily continue operating.

After that one-year period, ostensibly ending in December 1990, the ordinance provided

that “any such non-conforming use shall be considered a zoning violation and shall be

discontinued.” Id. at 1459.

       Ordinance 852’s prohibition on transient accommodations in Leavenworth’s

low-density residential zones was originally codified at former LMC 18.20.020

(repealed by Ordinance 1589), and has persisted within the code in the decades since. 5

       4
          “Dwelling unit” was defined as “one (1) room or rooms connected together
constituting a separate, independent housekeeping establishment for owner occupancy,
rent, or lease, to one individual family on a monthly or longer basis, and which is
physically separated from any other rooms or dwelling units which may be in the same
structure and which contains independent cooking and sleeping facilities.” Id.
        5
          In 2017, the city of Leavenworth adopted Ordinance 1542, which clarified
rules for the permitting of a bed and breakfast. See CP at 7147-56. None of the
appellants’ properties at issue here are operated as a “bed and breakfast,” which is defined
separately from a “transient accommodation.” LMC 21.90.030. A bed and breakfast is
the primary residence of the property owner, and the owner is required to live onsite
during any guest’s stay. LMC 18.52.120; see also CP at 1458, 7150-51, 7153. Nothing
in Ordinance 1542 altered the existing prohibition on transient accommodations in
low-density residential zones. To the contrary, the ordinance “reiterat[ed] [the City’s]
existing prohibition on the rental of entire dwellings as vacation rentals.” Id. at 7155
(emphasis added).

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

Since at least 2000, Chelan County has adopted Leavenworth’s land use designations for

the county’s unincorporated urban growth area around the city. See Chelan County Code

(CCC) 10.12.030. 6

      Despite the prohibition on STRs in low-density residential zones beginning in the

early 1990s, enforcement appears to have been fairly lax. That began to change in recent

years. In April 2017, the city of Leavenworth stepped up enforcement actions against

STRs. See CP at 5468.

      Chelan County subsequently established a task force to study the proliferation

of STRs. In 2021, after considering the task force’s recommendations, Chelan County

adopted an STR code. See CCC 11.88.290. The STR code’s purpose, in relevant part, is:

      to promote the public health and safety by protecting year-round residents’
      enjoyment of their homes and neighborhoods by minimizing the nuisance
      impact of short-term rentals on adjacent residences and by minimizing the
      detrimental impact of excessive short-term rentals on the affordable housing
      supply.

CCC 11.88.290(1)(C). In line with this purpose, the STR code places strict limits on

the number, location, and occupancy of STRs permitted in unincorporated Chelan

County, along with restricting the zones in which they can be operated, and providing for

      6
         First enacted in 2000, this provision adopts the city of Leavenworth’s
comprehensive plan and associated maps as they apply to the unincorporated portion
of the city’s UGA.

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

a permitting process for new and existing STRs. See CCC 11.88.290(2)(A)-(D), (3)-(4).

       The STR code also expressly “adopts the cities of Cashmere, Chelan, Entiat,

Leavenworth, and Wenatchee land use regulations, development standards and land use

designations, as they apply to [STRs]” insofar as those cities’ codes already regulated

STRs in each city’s respective UGA. CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv) (emphasis added).

The county’s STR code provides that “[a]ll” claims of existing nonconforming STRs

within a UGA are “subject to joint review by the county and the affected city.”

CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv)(b) (emphasis added).

       Following Chelan County’s adoption of its STR code, each of the four appellants

applied for permits to continue their STR operations. There is no indication in the record

that any of the STR owners’ properties had ever previously been granted a use permit.

After joint review by Chelan County and the city of Leavenworth, the county denied all

four permit applications. The STR owners then appealed to the county’s hearing

examiner.

       In arguments before the hearing examiner, the STR owners claimed that their

properties should be treated as preexisting lawful uses and, alternatively, that the 2021

STR code forgave any prior illegality. The hearing examiner rejected these arguments.

The examiner explained that none of the appellants’ STR operations were ever lawful

because STRs were not permitted in their respective zones of the Leavenworth UGA at

                                             6
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

the time they began operating. Because the STR owners’ operations were never at any

point lawfully established, the examiner found they were ineligible to be allowed as

nonconforming uses under the county’s code.

       Each STR owner petitioned in Douglas County Superior Court for review of the

hearing examiner’s decision. The owners then moved unopposed to consolidate their land

use appeals. With the parties’ consent, the superior court transferred the consolidated

appeal to this court for direct review. See Stipulation and Order for Transfer of Case to

Court of Appeals (Division III), Latta v. Chelan County, No. 22-2-00081-09, at 2-3

(Douglas County Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2022).

                                        ANALYSIS

       An aggrieved party may seek judicial review of a local government’s land

use decision under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW. See

RCW 36.70C.010; City of University Place v. McGuire, 144 Wn.2d 640, 647, 30 P.3d

453 (2001). Under RCW 36.70C.150(1), as here, a superior court may transfer the judicial

review of a land use decision to this court so long as the parties consent and agree the

existing record is sufficient for review. When considering a LUPA appeal, we stand in the

shoes of the superior court and review the record that was before the hearing examiner.

See McMilian v. King County, 161 Wn. App. 581, 589, 255 P.3d 739 (2011).

                                             7
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

       The appellants argue the hearing officer’s decision was contrary to fact and law,

based on the appellants’ alternate arguments that their properties either (1) qualified as

legal nonconforming uses, or (2) were granted amnesty by the county’s 2021 STR code.

This type of challenge falls under RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b), (c), and (d). We review

questions of law de novo and defer to factual findings so long as they are supported by

substantial evidence. See McGuire, 144 Wn.2d at 647; City of Redmond v. Cent. Puget

Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998).

Nonconforming use doctrine

       The nonconforming use doctrine is a “narrow exception” to the rule that

municipalities have “nearly plenary power” to zone for the public’s health, safety, and

welfare. King County Dep’t of Dev. & Env’t Servs. v. King County, 177 Wn.2d 636, 646,

305 P.3d 240 (2013). The nonconforming use doctrine allows some uses of property to

continue, notwithstanding that the use violates later-enacted zoning regulations, if the use

was “lawfully established” prior to the change in zoning law. McMilian, 161 Wn. App.

at 584; see Rhod-A-Zalea & 35th, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 136 Wn.2d 1, 6-7, 959 P.2d

1024 (1998); see also 36 MICHAEL F. CONNELLY, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON

LAND USE § 11:7, at 440 (2022 ed.) (noting nonconforming uses are “allowed to continue

in spite of zoning regulations to the contrary” only if they “lawfully existed” prior to the

change in zoning regulations).

                                              8
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

       The right to continue a nonconforming use encompasses only the right not to have

the use immediately terminated in the face of a zoning ordinance that prohibits the use.

See Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wn.2d at 6-7, 9-10, 12; McMilian, 161 Wn. App at 592. Cities

and counties may eventually terminate nonconforming uses, so long as they provide

landowners a reasonable amortization period. See Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wn.2d at 7-8;

McGuire, 144 Wn.2d at 648-49; Ackerley Comms., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d 905,

920, 602 P.2d 1177 (1979). Nonconforming uses are disfavored, and the desirable

policy of zoning legislation is to phase them out. See Rhod-A-Zalea, 136 Wn.2d at 7-8;

McMilian, 161 Wn. App. at 592; Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wn.2d

143, 150, 995 P.2d 33 (2000).

       “[T]he initial burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use is on the

land user making the assertion.” Van Sant v. City of Everett, 69 Wn. App. 641, 647-48,

849 P.2d 1276 (1993). This burden requires the landowner to demonstrate: (1) the use

existed prior to the contrary zoning ordinance, (2) the landowner has never abandoned or

discontinued the use, and (3) the use was lawful at the time it began. See First Pioneer

Trading Co. v. Pierce County, 146 Wn. App. 606, 614, 191 P.3d 928 (2008). A use must

be clearly established prior to the relevant change in zoning law. See Anderson v. Island

County, 81 Wn.2d 312, 321-22, 501 P.2d 594 (1972).

                                             9
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

       The appellants have not met their burden of establishing a nonconforming use.

Transient accommodations have been prohibited in Leavenworth’s low-density residential

zones since the December 1989 adoption of Ordinance 852. See CP at 1458. There is no

apparent reason why the appellants’ properties would not fall under the definition of

“transient accommodation,” nor do the appellants point to any such reason. And none

of the appellants began their STR operations prior to 1989. In any event, Ordinance 852

provided for a one-year amortization period, meaning all STRs in low-density residential

zones were required to have been phased out by December 1990, excepting any bed and

breakfast that obtained a permit. In sum, all of the appellants’ STR operations were

established in violation of valid provisions of the Leavenworth Municipal Code.

       Because none of their operations were lawfully established, the STR owners fail

to demonstrate they have a vested right to continue their uses. See First Pioneer Trading

Co., 146 Wn. App. at 617 (affirming hearing examiner’s finding that applicant failed to

establish a nonconforming use because applicant “failed to show that its industrial use of

the property was legal at any time”). The nonconforming use doctrine is “‘not intended

to protect uses which were not legally commenced.’” McMilian, 161 Wn. App. at 594

(quoting 2 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 12:11 at 12–38 (5th ed.

2010)); see also id. at 592-93 (noting the nonconforming use doctrine “‘prevents the

abrupt termination of what one had been doing lawfully’” and “‘does not generally

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

extend beyond this purpose’” (emphasis added) (quoting Meridian Minerals Co. v. King

County, 61 Wn. App. 195, 212, 810 P.2d 31 (1991)). 7

Amnesty argument under the 2021 STR code

      The appellants contend that, even if their operations are not legal nonconforming

uses under Washington common law, they nonetheless qualify as legal nonconforming

uses under several provisions of the county’s 2021 STR code. The appellants are

mistaken.

      The STR code allows amnesty only for “existing short-term rentals” that “have

      7
         The appellants rely heavily on Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass’n, 180 Wn.2d
241, 327 P.3d 614 (2014). But Wilkinson is inapposite. Wilkinson was a dispute between
a group of homeowners and their subdivision’s governing community association. The
dispute partially focused on whether covenants forbidding “commercial” uses but
allowing “residential” uses forbade homeowners’ operation of STRs. See Wilkinson,
180 Wn.2d at 244-47, 249-55. The Wilkinson Court reasoned that the language in the
covenants allowing “residential” uses was consistent with use of a property as an STR.
Id. at 252, 254-55. Wilkinson recognized the community association could have forbade
STRs had it used more specific language. See id. at 255 (“[O]ur holding does not prohibit
residential communities from prohibiting [STRs]. We merely hold that the Chiwawa
River Pines community did not do so . . . .” (emphasis added)). Wilkinson has no
application here, where Ordinance 852 used specific language, clearly and plainly
prohibiting STRs in low-density residential zones. Nor does the county’s STR
code here contravene Wilkinson by its reference to STRs as a “commercial” use.
CCC 11.88.290(1)(A). Wilkinson involved a case where the terms “residential” and
“commercial” were not specifically defined. Nothing in that decision restricts a zoning
authority’s decision to adopt a different conception of what is “residential” and what is
“commercial.” Wilkinson simply does not apply to a case where a zoning authority has
explicitly legislated about the permissibility of STRs.

                                           11
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

been in full legal compliance with any existing city codes adopted through prior

resolution by the county.” CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv)(a). An STR operating “in violation”

of existing law “must immediately cease all operation.” CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv)(a)(1).

“A property operating in violation of existing city UGA land use regulations has no legal

existing nonconforming status as a short-term rental.” Id.

       This requirement, that amnesty be afforded only to lawful preexisting uses, is

consistent with the common law on nonconforming uses. See McGuire, 144 Wn.2d at 648

(noting a nonconforming use is one that “lawfully existed prior to the enactment of a

zoning ordinance, and which is maintained after the effective date” (emphasis added)).

And absent clear evidence to the contrary, we interpret legal provisions in harmony with

the common law. See State v. Farnworth, 192 Wn.2d 468, 474, 430 P.3d 1127 (2018)

(noting courts should hesitate to recognize an abrogation of the common law absent clear

evidence of the legislature’s intent to do so); King County Dep’t of Dev. & Env’t Servs.,

177 Wn.2d at 645-46 (striving to interpret provisions of the King County Code to be

“consistent with our case law applying the nonconforming use doctrine” (emphasis

added)).

       Despite the Chelan County Code’s clear prohibition on STRs operating in violation

of existing city law, the appellants claim their properties fall under two purported

                                             12
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

loopholes in the STR code. We disagree with this assessment and address each provision

in turn.

       The appellants first point to subsections (2)(C)(v) and (2)(E)(i) of the Chelan

County STR code. These provisions identify conditions for STRs to continue to operate

as a legally nonconforming use. Contrary to the appellants’ arguments, these subsections

are facially inapplicable to this case. The provisions explicitly apply to “[e]xisting

nonconforming short-term rentals.” CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(v). The code defines a

“nonconforming” property as “a lot, use, building or structure which was lawful prior

to the adoption, revision or amendment of a zoning ordinance, but which fails by reason

of such adoption, revision or amendment to conform to the current requirements of the

zoning district.” CCC 14.98.1300 (emphasis added). 8 Because, as explained above,

the appellants’ properties were not lawful prior to adoption of the 2021 STR code, they

are not “nonconforming,” id., and therefore do not fall under the category of “existing

nonconforming short-term rentals.” CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(v).

       The STR owners also point to CCC 11.88.290(2)(E)(ii)(a). This provision identifies

four circumstances under which an existing STR operating as of September 27, 2021,

will be considered nonconforming. The second circumstance, on which appellants rely,

       8
         The definition of “nonconforming” set forth in CCC 14.98.1300 applies to
Title 11 of the code, including the STR code. See CCC 14.98.010.

                                              13
No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

is if the “zone does not expressly allow new [STRs].” CCC 11.88.290(2)(E)(ii)(a)(2).

The appellants appear to argue that because their zones explicitly prohibit STRs, and thus

do not expressly allow STRs, their prohibited STRs must be deemed nonconforming

and therefore lawful. To the extent this is the appellants’ argument, it strains credulity.

The wording of CCC 11.88.290(2)(E)(ii)(a)(2) is admittedly confusing. But it would be

manifestly absurd to read this subsection of the code as stating that a prohibited use must

also be deemed nonconforming and therefore legal. This clearly was not the county’s

intent, as set forth in CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv)(a)(1). We reject an interpretation that

would flout the express terms of the STR code. See Estate of Bunch v. McGraw

Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 433, 275 P.3d 1119 (2012) (noting the fundamental

rule in statutory interpretation to avoid absurd results).

       The appellants’ properties were not lawful prior to the county’s enactment of

the 2021 STR code. As a result, per the plain language of the code, the properties have

“no legal existing nonconforming status.” CCC 11.88.290(2)(C)(iv)(a)(1). The STR

code does not provide amnesty to existing STRs that operated in contravention of legal

authority. Thus, the appellants claim for relief under the 2021 STR code fails.

Constitutional arguments

       For the first time in their reply brief, the STR owners also advance constitutional

arguments. First, they posit the county’s denial of their permit applications ran afoul of

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No. 39261-9-III
Latta v. Chelan County

the state and federal constitutions’ prohibition on ex post facto laws. See U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 10, cl. 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 23. Second, they contend that relying on the

1989 adoption of Ordinance 852 as the date of the city of Leavenworth’s prohibition on

STRs subjects them to an ordinance that is void for vagueness. See A.W.R. Constr., Inc.

v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 152 Wn. App. 479, 489-90, 217 P.3d 349 (2009).

       We decline to address claims raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g.,

In re Dependency of G.M.W., 24 Wn. App. 2d 96, 115 n.6, 519 P.3d 272 (2022). While

RAP 2.5(a) allows a party to raise some constitutional arguments for the first time on

appeal, nothing in the rule permits an appellant to delay presentation of a constitutional

argument until their reply brief.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The hearing examiner’s decisions are affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                           _________________________________
                                           Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:

______________________________             _________________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.                    Staab, J.

                                              15