Court Opinion

ID: 9381977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 15:00:20.373076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.171817
License: Public Domain

22-365-cr
     United States v. Melendez

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                            SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
 2   the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 3   on the 24th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6                       PIERRE N. LEVAL,
 7                       DENNY CHIN,
 8                       MYRNA PÉREZ,
 9
10                     Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   United States of America,
14
15                                 Appellee,
16
17                       v.                                                                    No. 22-365-cr
18
19   Alex Melendez, AKA Bori B,
20
21                     Defendant-Appellant. *
22   _____________________________________
23
24
25   FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                                           DAWN M. CARDI, Cardi & Edgar LLP, New
26                                                                      York, NY.
27
28
29   FOR APPELLEE:                                                      NICHOLAS W. CHIUCHIOLO, Assistant United
30                                                                      States Attorney (Peter J. Davis, Stephen J.

     *
         The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.

                                                                  1
 1                                                        Ritchin, Assistant United States Attorneys,
 2                                                        on the brief), for Damian Williams, United
 3                                                        States Attorney for the Southern District of
 4                                                        New York, New York, NY.
 5
 6      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

 7   York (Castel, J.).

 8      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the February 16, 2022 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

10      Defendant-Appellant Alex Melendez (“Melendez”) pleaded guilty to a two-count superseding

11   information pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. Count One charged Melendez

12   with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute mixtures and substances

13   containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C),

14   and 846. Count Two charged Melendez with possession of a firearm knowing he had previously

15   been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year, in violation

16   of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (2).

17      The district court sentenced Melendez principally to an above-Guidelines term of 65 months’

18   imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal, Melendez challenges the

19   reasonableness of his sentence. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

20   procedural history, and the issues on appeal, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our

21   decision to affirm.

22      I.      Factual and Procedural Background

23      In April 2020, Melendez and his associates attempted to execute a sham drug sale. Their plan

24   was to sell a substance resembling cocaine to prospective buyers and flee with the profits. In order

25   to induce the prospective buyers to enter into the sale, Melendez and his associates provided them

26   with a 10-gram sample of cocaine.

                                                      2
 1       On the evening of the transaction, Melendez and his associates met the buyers outside an

 2   apartment complex. Melendez received a white plastic bag containing approximately $33,000

 3   from the buyers and returned to his vehicle. He then fled the scene. His associates followed in a

 4   separate vehicle. The buyers, realizing they had been deceived, began shooting. A bullet struck

 5   one of Melendez’s associates in the spine. The man later died. Melendez escaped.

 6       Approximately one month later, Melendez was involved in two traffic stops four days apart.

 7   During the second stop, the police conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered a hidden

 8   firearm. After being arrested and advised of his rights, Melendez admitted to the officers that there

 9   had been an undetected firearm in the vehicle during the first stop but disclaimed any knowledge

10   of the firearm found during the second. Subsequent testing revealed that Melendez’s DNA was

11   on the firearm located during the second stop, which had previously been shipped and transported

12   in interstate commerce.

13       In July 2021, Melendez pleaded guilty to a two-count superseding information pursuant to a

14   plea agreement with the government. As per the plea agreement, Melendez could not appeal his

15   sentence unless the district court sentenced him above the stipulated Guidelines range, which the

16   parties agreed was 41 to 51 months. 1

17       The district court principally sentenced Melendez to a term of 65 months’ imprisonment

18   followed by five years of supervised release. The sentence upwardly varied 24 months from the

19   top of the Guidelines range. Explaining its sentencing decision, the district court stated that it was

20   “foreseeable” that the result of a sham drug transaction would be “violent retaliation,” something

21   which the “sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the United States

22   Sentencing Commission . . . d[o] not fully take account of.” App’x at 133–34. The district court

     1
      The parties later acknowledged that the Guidelines range stipulated to in the plea agreement was incorrect and that
     the presentence report correctly calculated the Guidelines range as 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment.
                                                              3
 1   also pointed to Melendez’s previous assault conviction, and to the fact that Melendez was on parole

 2   when he committed this drug offense to support the upward variance. Id. at 134–35. The district

 3   court acknowledged Melendez’s “many deficits in life” and the “extremely difficult

 4   circumstances” under which he was incarcerated during the pandemic, but concluded “based on

 5   all of the surrounding circumstances . . .[,] that a sentence above the advisory guidelines is

 6   appropriate in this case.” Id. at 136.

 7      In its statement of reasons, the district court noted it “considered all of the written submissions

 8   and arguments of the parties, as well as their oral statements,” and “all the factors under section

 9   3553(a),” the “Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements, and Official Commentary of the United

10   States Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 149, 151. It decided to upwardly vary, it explained,

11   because the Sentencing Guidelines “do not account for the full circumstances of the [drug] offense

12   in Count 1.” Id. at 151. Melendez timely appealed.

13      II.     Standard of Review

14      “We review a challenged sentence for reasonableness.” United States v. Friedberg, 558 F.3d

15   131, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The reasonableness of a

16   sentence is reviewed “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Ingram,

17   721 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This inquiry has

18   both procedural and substantive components.” Friedberg, 558 F.3d at 133.

19      “Procedural reasonableness concerns the procedures a district court employs in arriving at a

20   sentence.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2007). Where, as here, a

21   defendant fails to raise a procedural objection in the district court, we review for plain error. To

22   show plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that:

23               (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to
24               reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights,

                                                      4
 1              which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court
 2              proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
 3              reputation of judicial proceedings.
 4
 5   United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (internal quotation marks, citations, and

 6   alteration omitted); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 775 F.3d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 2014). Our

 7   authority to correct plain error “should be employed ‘in those circumstances in which a miscarriage

 8   of justice would otherwise result.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting

 9   United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).

10      Substantive reasonableness concerns the severity of a sentence. United States v. Verkhoglyad,

11   516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). “Our review of a sentence for substantive reasonableness is

12   governed by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181,

13   187 (2d Cir. 2017).

14      III.    Discussion

15              A. Melendez’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.

16      Melendez fails to demonstrate that the district court committed procedural error, much less

17   plain error. Errors classed as procedural error include circumstances where the district court “fails

18   to calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing

19   Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly

20   erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Robinson,

21   702 F.3d 22, 38 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). In addition,

22   “where [a] sentence is outside an advisory Guidelines range, the court must also state the specific

23   reason for the sentence imposed, in open court as well as in writing—with specificity in a statement

24   of reasons form that is part of the judgment.” United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 251–52 (2d

                                                       5
 1   Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds

 2   as recognized in United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2020).

 3      Melendez contends, without citing supporting case law, that the district court plainly erred

 4   because it wrongly assumed the applicable Guidelines range did not take into consideration the

 5   violence likely to result from the sham drug transaction. According to Melendez, the Guidelines

 6   range “was driven by Count 2,” which, “adequately [took] into account the circumstances about

 7   which the district court was primarily concerned: 1) violence or the threat of violence associated

8    with guns; and 2) recidivism,” and, as a result, the district court's justification “was premised on

 9   faulty reasoning.” Appellant Br. at 19. This argument is simply wrong. The Guidelines offense

10   level for Count 1, as applied to Melendez, takes into account only the weight of the sample of

11   cocaine he provided to the buyers, not the predictable retaliatory violence associated with a sham

12   drug transaction. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(14). The Guidelines range for Count 2, as

13   applied to Melendez, while it does appear to take into account the likelihood of violence resulting

14   from gun possession by a person, who, prior to committing a gun possession offense, had “one

15   felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. §

16   2K2.1(a)(4)(A)), does not consider the specific type of violence that concerned the district court—

17   the heightened risk of violence likely to result from scamming drug dealers by selling them fake

18   drugs, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).

19              B. Melendez’s sentence was substantively reasonable.

20      Although Melendez’s sentence is above the Guidelines range, this is not the rare case in which

21   the sentence imposed “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States

22   v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation

23   omitted). Our review for substantive reasonableness is “particularly deferential,” United States v.

                                                      6
 1   Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012), and “is governed by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

 2   § 3553(a),” Jenkins, 854 F.3d at 187.

 3      Applying this deferential standard of review, we identify no abuse of the district court’s

 4   sentencing discretion. The district court weighed the § 3553(a) factors and provided several

 5   reasons for its sentencing decision. It imposed a 65-month sentence to account for the “full

 6   circumstances” of Melendez’s decision to participate in a drug offense. App’x at 151. The district

 7   court also considered the fact that Melendez was on parole for an assault conviction connected to

 8   a drug dispute when he participated in the drug offense. Moreover, Melendez’s claim that the

 9   district court did not consider his traumatic childhood, resulting mental health and substance use

10   issues, and need for intensive mental health care is belied by the record. The district court

11   expressly considered all of these factors and concluded that the sentence was “sufficient, but not

12   greater than necessary,” to effectuate the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

13      Given our deferential standard of review and the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a)

14   factors, Melendez’s sentence falls within the range of reasonable sentences in this case.

15   Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

16      We have considered all of Melendez’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without

17   merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

18                                                 FOR THE COURT:
19                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                                      7