Court Opinion

ID: 9811760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:57.946512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:18.573669
License: Public Domain

ABATEMENT ORDER
PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s determination under section 263.405(d) of the Family Code that she is not indigent. Because of the accelerated timetables applicable to this type of appeal and because we have all the pertinent information needed, we review this determination without briefs. See In re S.T., 239 S.W.3d 452, 455-56 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, order), disp. on merits, 263 S.W.3d 394 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, pet. denied). We will abate this appeal so Appellant has an opportunity to amend her affidavit of indigence.
After the judgment was signed, Appellant filed a signed but unsworn indigence “affidavit.” Both the Department of Family and Protective Services and the attorney ad litem for the child objected to this document at the hearing to determine whether Appellant is indigent and whether her appeal is frivolous. See Tex. Fam.Code Akn. § 263.405(d) (Vernon 2008). Appellant did not attend this hearing, and no evidence was presented on her behalf. The trial court ruled that she “is not indigent, having failed to meet the requirements of Texas Family Code § 263.405(e).”
Section 263.405(e) requires an appellant claiming indigence “to file an affidavit of indigency.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(e) (Vernon 2008). An affidavit is a written statement “signed by the party making it, sworn to before an officer authorized to administer oaths, and officially certified to by the officer under his seal of office.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 312.011(1) (Vernon 2005); Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 645-46 (Tex.1995) (orig. proceeding); Medford v. Medford, 68 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); see Guinn v. Bosque Coun*18ty, 58 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, writ denied). An unsworn statement of indigence does not satisfy this definition. See Medford, 68 S.W.3d at 247; Guinn, 58 S.W.3d at 198-99.
Appellant did not file an affidavit of indigence, nor did she present any evidence to support her indigence claim. Thus, we cannot say that the trial judge erred by ruling that Appellant failed to comply with section 263.405(e). See In re A.S., 239 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, no pet.). Nevertheless, Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.3 provides that a trial court’s order “must not” be affirmed “for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregularities.” Tex.R.App. P. 44.3.
Following Rule 44.3, the Supreme Court has consistently reversed cases which have been dismissed for failure to pay a filing fee where the appellants had attempted to establish indigence but had filed a defective or untimely affidavit of indigence. See, e.g., Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff's Office, 257 S.W.3d 684, 688-89 (Tex.2008); Hood v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 829, 830 (Tex.2007) (per curiam); In re J.W., 52 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex.2001) (per curiam). These decisions “reflect[ ] the policy embodied in our appellate rules that disfavors disposing of appeals based upon harmless procedural defects.” Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 688 (quoting Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex.1997)).
In J.W., the appellants filed indigence affidavits for appeal after their parental rights were terminated, but their affidavits omitted some of the information required by Rule 20.1(b). See J.W., 52 S.W.3d at 731; see also Tex.R.App. P. 20.1(b). The district clerk filed a contest on the ground that the affidavits were defective. Id. The trial court sustained the contest and denied the appellants’ motion to amend. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the indigence ruling and ultimately dismissed the appeal because the appellants failed to pay for the appellate record. See In re J.W., 49 S.W.3d 7, 8 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000) (per curiam). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the court of appeals should have directed the trial court to allow petitioners a reasonable opportunity to amend their affidavits and to reconsider the contests based upon any additional information.” J.W., 52 S.W.3d at 733.
Here, as with the appellants in J.W. and Higgins, Appellant’s unsworn “affidavit” indicates that she does not have adequate resources to pay the requisite costs and fees for her appeal. See Higgins, 257 S.W.3d at 687-88 (although some required information was not included in his affidavit, “Higgins did clearly attest that he had no current or expected income of any kind, and that he had no prospects for receiving any money in the future”). Counsel also reminded the trial court during the indigence hearing that the court had appointed counsel to represent Appellant at trial and asked the court “to take notice of [the] previous indigency finding.” However, the Department objected to this request, and the court did not take judicial notice of the prior indigence determination. Nevertheless, the trial court had before it information indicating that Appellant is indigent and concluded otherwise solely because Appellant’s affidavit was not sworn to. “This was contrary to Rule 44.3, and the [trial court] should have [given Appellant] a reasonable opportunity to amend.” See J.W., 52 S.W.3d at 733.
Section 263.405(d) requires a trial court to hold a hearing on an indigence claim within thirty days after the termination decree is signed and rule on that claim within thirty-six days after the decree is signed. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405(d). *19Thus, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has concluded that an indigence affidavit filed after the expiration of these deadlines cannot be considered by a court. See In re M.A., 222 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (per curiam) (“applying Higgins to cases involving the termination of parental rights would frustrate the Legislature’s intent in enacting those deadlines”).
Notwithstanding the statutory deadlines, this Court and at least one other have abated such appeals for a hearing in the trial court in which the appellants could develop an evidentiary record on their ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See In re S.K.A., No. 10-08-00347-CV, 2009 WL 2645027, at *10, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 6535, at *27 (Tex.App.-Waco Aug. 19, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.); Doe v. Brazoria County Child Protective Servs., 226 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); In re T.N.F., 191 S.W.3d 329, 332 (Tex.App.Waco 2006, order) (per curiam); In re K.K., 180 S.W.3d 681, 687-88 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, order) (per curiam). As the Supreme Court has observed, the Texas Legislature “[u]nquestionably” intended section 263.405 “to yield just, fair, and reasonable results within the legislative goal of obtaining expedited disposition of appeals.” In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tex.2008). Thus, we apply the same rationale here as we have in the cited cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
We abate this appeal and remand the cause to the trial court to allow Appellant a reasonable opportunity to amend her indigence affidavit and to reconsider her indigence claim. See J.W., 52 S.W.3d at 733; see also Higgins v. Randall County Sheriff's Office, 193 S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex.2006) (per curiam). The trial court shall provide Appellant at least ten days after the date of this Order to amend her affidavit and, if she does so, shall hold an indigence hearing within twenty days after the date of this Order. A supplemental clerk’s record and a supplemental reporter’s record pertaining to the hearing, if held, shall be filed in this appeal within thirty days after the date of this Order.
Chief Justice GRAY dissenting.