Court Opinion

ID: 9754099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:43:20.981914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:48.402173
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
STEVENS, J.:
¶ 1 I conclude that the trial court properly suppressed the evidence in this case because the Commonwealth did not meet the requirements of the “independent source doctrine," and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. “This right does not depend on a property right in the place of the search but it does depend on whether the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560, 567, 637 A.2d 251, 254 (1993). The right to privacy extends to medical records. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 564 Pa. 617, 770 A.2d 295 (2001) (holding that BAC test results must be suppressed where the blood was drawn for independent medical reasons and the results were released to the police without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement).
¶ 3 Here, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellee Speer Ruey’s medical records, including his BAC test results, should be admissible under the “independent source” doctrine, also known as the inevitable discovery doctrine.1 In Melendez, the Supreme Court discussed the independent source doctrine at length. In that case, police were conducting an undercover surveillance of a house.
An application for a search warrant was being drafted when the police observed the defendant leave the house, get into an automobile, and drive away. Police stopped the defendant, removed her from the vehicle, searched her purse, and discovered a gun, cash, and a drug tally sales sheet. After transporting the defendant to her home, police used her keys to gain access to the premises. Upon entering, police observed the defendant’s co-defendant holding a bag of cocaine. The police secured the scene and waited an hour for the arrival of a search warrant. Upon executing the search warrant, police discovered drugs, cash, and other evidence of narcotic trafficking.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 808 A.2d 215, 221 (Pa.Super.2002) (summarizing the facts of Melendez).
¶ 4 In discussing the independent source doctrine, the Supreme Court indicated that the doctrine provides that “if the prosecution can demonstrate that the evidence in question was procured from an independent origin, such evidence is admissible.” Melendez, 544 Pa. at 332, 676 A.2d at 230. The Supreme Court limited the application of the independent source doctrine and specifically stated that “[ajpplication of the ‘independent source doctrine’ is proper only in the very limited circumstances where the ‘independent source’ is truly independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was discovered.” Melendez, 544 Pa. at 333, 676 A.2d at 231 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
¶ 5 Applying the aforementioned standard in Melendez, the Supreme Court held that the conduct of the police in conducting *578an illegal search and seizure and then detaining the defendant and the co-defendant in the secured premises, all the while waiting to see if their application for a warrant was even approved, did not qualify under the independent source doctrine.
¶ 6 Recently, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 808 A.2d 215 (Pa.Super.2002), a three-judge panel of this Court examined Melendez and applied it to a situation where the appellant was operating her vehicle when she collided with another vehicle, thereby killing the other driver. The appellant was taken to the hospital where her blood was drawn for treatment purposes. Trooper Allen received a copy of the appellant’s BAC and the appellant was charged with various offenses. The appellant sought suppression of the BAC, and the motion was granted on the basis Trooper Allen had obtained an invalid search warrant for the appellant’s medical records. Subsequently, Detective Lindsay of the District Attorney’s Office conducted his own investigation, and he called the 911 center, from which he learned the identity of a witness. Based on various statements made by the witness, Detective Lindsay contacted the Bradford City Fire and Ambulance Association and spoke to an ambulance crew member who had responded to the scene. The crew member indicated that he had not spoken to any law enforcement official about the case. Based on statements made to him, Detective Lindsay applied for a search warrant for the appellant’s medical records, which was granted. The appellant once again moved for suppression of the records, and the trial court concluded that the records were obtained from information for the warrant through independent sources apart from the original taint. The appellant was subsequently convicted and filed an appeal to this Court.
¶ 7 On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress, indicating that, although Melendez applied, the circumstances in Smith were distinguishable from those presented in Melendez. Specifically, this Court concluded that the evidence was admissible under the independent source doctrine. In so concluding, we noted that a completely different investigator engaged in a totally separate investigation. The detective’s information came primarily from two witnesses who were not mentioned in Trooper Allen’s reports or relied upon by Trooper Allen.
¶ 8 Applying Melendez and Smith to the case sub judice, I conclude that Trooper Allen, who conducted the second investigation and applied for the second search warrant, was not truly independent from the original investigative team, as Detective Lindsay was in Smith. At the suppression hearing, as indicated supra, Trooper Allen testified that he went to the accident scene to deliver required supplies. He was present at the accident scene at the same time as Trooper Bryan and his primary purpose for being at the accident scene was to “bounce ideas off of each other.” N.T. 9/24/01 at 23. He testified that “[o]nce I got there, I spoke with Corporal Faust, pretty much trying to figure out what happened, the nature of the accident.” N.T. 9/24/01 at 22. Trooper Allen further indicated that he assisted in the accident reconstruction by helping to make the accident diagram. N.T. 9/24/01 at 23. Moreover, Trooper Bryan confirmed that Trooper Allen was present at the accident scene and that “[pjrimarily, he assisted at the scene, and eventually he helped with the reconstruction to take measurements.” N.T. 9/24/01 at 19. Trooper Bryan testified that Trooper Allen conferred with him while the case was pending, before Trooper Allen was asked by the Commonwealth to conduct his own “independent” investigation. Based on the aforementioned, I conclude that Trooper *579Allen was more than merely present at the accident scene during Trooper Bryan’s investigation, and, therefore, he was not independent of the original investigative team.
¶ 9 Trooper Allen admitted that he used Trooper Bryan’s file, contacted the exact same witnesses, learned of no new evidence or statements, and copied directly from Trooper Bryan’s report when he applied for the second search warrant. He even specifically admitted that “I didn’t do an investigation in addition to [Trooper Bryan’s],” he “looked at what [Trooper Bryan] did and looked to make sure it was correct,” and he conversed extensively with Trooper Bryan while preparing the second warrant. N.T. 9/24/01 at 33, 34. As such, I agree with the suppression court’s conclusion that “[t]he mere substitution of an officer for what is essentially a ‘walk through’ of the same investigation is merely an attempt to cure the illegality of the original investigation. The independent source doctrine was not established to provide for multiple attempts at the same investigation.... ” Suppression Court Order filed 11/14/01 at 5.2
¶ 10 For all of the reasons enunciated supra, I conclude the trial court properly suppressed the evidence in this case, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 11 Judges FORD ELLIOTT, JOYCE and MUSMANNO join this Dissenting Opinion. Judge JOYCE also files a separate Dissenting Opinion which is joined by Judges FORD ELLIOTT and MUSMAN-NO.

. As noted by the Majority, in its final claim, the Commonwealth requests this Court to overrule the Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez. However, the Commonwealth acknowledges that this Court cannot overrule a Supreme Court majority decision and indicates that the claim is included in its brief for preservation purposes only. As such, I agree with the Majority that this issue should not be examined further.