Court Opinion

ID: 9367835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 22:01:00.29617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.656444
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1137

                          HENRY DIAZ,

                     Plaintiff, Appellant,

                               v.

                      CITY OF SOMERVILLE,

                      Defendant, Appellee.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Jennifer C. Boal, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

                             Before

                     Barron, Chief Judge,
              Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

     James J. Heggie on brief for appellant.
     Leonard H. Kesten, Michael Stefanilo, Jr., Deidre Brennan
Regan, and Brody, Hardoon, Perkins & Kesten, LLP on brief for
appellee.

                        February 1, 2023
            SELYA, Circuit Judge.          Police officers occupy positions

of trust and authority and, thus, are understandably held to high

standards of conduct.      Notwithstanding those standards, plaintiff-

appellant Henry Diaz, a police officer, contends that the City of

Somerville (the City) wrongfully discharged him after he was

involved in an off-duty altercation with a civilian and lied about

the altercation during an internal investigation.                 Diaz, who is

both Black and Hispanic, contends that his discharge was based on

his race in violation of Title VII and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

The     district   court   concluded       that   Diaz's    contentions     were

unsupported and entered summary judgment in favor of the City.               We

affirm.

                                       I

            We draw the relevant facts from the summary judgment

record, construing all disputed facts and reasonable inferences

therefrom "in the light most flattering to the party against whom

summary judgment was entered" (here, Diaz).             Pleasantdale Condos.,

LLC v. Wakefield, 37 F.4th 728, 730 (1st Cir. 2022).

            In the early morning hours of June 30, 2017, Diaz (an

off-duty    Somerville     police   officer)      was   driving   through   East

Boston when he was forced to stop because a pedestrian stepped in

front of his car.      A confrontation ensued, during which Diaz got

out of his car and repeatedly punched the pedestrian before driving

away.    The pedestrian reported the incident to the authorities in

                                    - 2 -
East Boston but did not appear at the subsequent hearing on the

matter.     As a result, the case was dismissed without prejudice.

             The Somerville Police Department was apprised of the

incident and conducted its own internal investigation.                During

this investigation, Diaz maintained that he had merely defended

himself out of fear for his own safety.            Withal, the East Boston

police report, a video of the incident, and witness interviews

suggested     otherwise.         The     Somerville     Police   Department

investigation concluded that Diaz had been the aggressor and that

the incident manifested conduct unbecoming an officer.                   That

investigation also concluded that Diaz had not been truthful during

the course of the probe.         And after reviewing the report of the

investigation, the City's police chief recommended disciplinary

action up to and including dismissal.

             In November of 2017, the City held a hearing to review

the police department's findings and to present a disciplinary

recommendation to the mayor.          Diaz was given notice of the hearing

and   was   represented    by   counsel.       After   considering   evidence

presented by both the police department and Diaz, the hearing

officer     concurred   with    the   police   department's   findings   and

determined that just cause existed to terminate Diaz's employment.

The mayor adopted the findings of the hearing officer and fired

Diaz.

                                      - 3 -
          Diaz appealed the termination of his employment to the

Massachusetts Civil Service Commission (the Commission).                   See

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, § 43.          After three days of hearings, the

Commission found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Diaz

had "engaged in substantial misconduct which adversely affect[ed]

the public interest" and had violated departmental rules and

regulations by engaging in conduct unbecoming an officer and by

prevaricating during the investigation.

          The    Commission     proceeded     to   consider    whether   those

violations    justified   the   City's    decision    to    terminate    Diaz's

employment.    Diaz argued that he, as a Black Hispanic officer, had

been disciplined more severely than officers of other races who

had committed similar, or worse, infractions.                 The Commission

found,   however,        that    the      proffered        comparators    were

distinguishable because the misconduct in those cases "was not as

serious," the comparators themselves were "no longer employed as

police officers," and/or those matters had been resolved through

settlements.

          The Commission went on to consider other potentially

mitigating circumstances, including Diaz's previously unblemished

disciplinary    record    and   its    own    preference     for   progressive

discipline.    Even after taking those matters into account, though,

the Commission concluded that "the seriousness of the misconduct

here, which includes pummeling a private citizen who was not posing

                                      - 4 -
a physical threat to Mr. Diaz, and then lying about the reasons

for this misconduct, warrant termination."    The Commission issued

its final decision on April 11, 2019, upholding the termination of

Diaz's employment as a police officer.   Diaz did not seek judicial

review of that decision and the appeal period has expired.

          But even while the Commission's proceedings were still

in progress, Diaz charted a parallel course.       Just before the

Commission's final hearing, he lodged a charge of discrimination

with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (the

MCAD).   See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5.   In May of 2019, Diaz

sued the City in a Massachusetts state court, alleging that he was

discharged because of his race.1    See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1);

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.   The City removed the case to the United

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.     See 28

U.S.C. § 1441.   After some pretrial skirmishing and the expiration

of the discovery period, the City moved for summary judgment.2   See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

     1 Diaz did not receive a right-to-sue letter but filed his
complaint more than ninety days after lodging his charge of
discrimination with the MCAD. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9
("Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a practice made unlawful
under [chapter 151B], may, at the expiration of ninety days after
the filing of a complaint with the commission, . . . bring a civil
action for damages or injunctive relief or both in the
superior . . . court for the county in which the alleged unlawful
practice occurred . . . .").
     2By consent of the parties, the case was heard and determined
by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P.
73.

                               - 5 -
           The district court held that, for purposes of Diaz's

chapter 151B claim, the Commission's unappealed decision precluded

Diaz from relitigating the issues of whether the City had a

legitimate reason for terminating his employment and whether he

had been subject to disparate treatment.    And although the Title

VII claim was not precluded by the Commission's decision, the

district court determined that the comparators submitted by Diaz

were insufficient to show that the City's stated reasons for

termination were pretextual.

           Based upon these rulings, the district court granted the

City's motion for summary judgment.    This timely appeal followed.

                                II

           We review a district court's entry of summary judgment

de novo.    See Faiella v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 928 F.3d 141,

145 (1st Cir. 2019).   "In the course of that review, we take the

facts in the light most hospitable to the nonmovant . . . and draw

all reasonable inferences therefrom to that party's behoof."   Gen.

Hosp. Corp. v. Esoterix Genetic Lab'ys, LLC, 16 F.4th 304, 308

(1st Cir. 2021).

           With this standard as our guide, we turn to Diaz's

claims.    We start with his state-law claim and then address his

federal claim.

                               - 6 -
                                      A

            Diaz's state-law claim is a disparate-treatment claim

under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.           That statute makes it unlawful

for "an employer, by himself or his agent, because of []race [or]

color, . . . to discharge from employment [an] individual."            Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(1).           Massachusetts courts borrow from

federal law and employ a framework similar — but not identical —

to that established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), when analyzing chapter 151B disparate-treatment claims

in which there is no direct evidence of discrimination. See, e.g.,

Knight v. Avon Prods., Inc., 780 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 (Mass. 2003).

            As is true in federal cases, the first step of the

framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case

by showing that "(1) he is a member of a [protected class]; (2) he

performed   his   job   at   an   acceptable   level;   [and]   (3)   he   was

terminated."      Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc.,

646 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Mass. 1995); see Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp.,

46 N.E.3d 24, 32-33 (Mass. 2016).           If the plaintiff successfully

negotiates that step, the second step — which is the same under

both federal and state law — comes into play.            At that step, the

burden of production shifts to the employer.            There, the employer

must articulate "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

[adverse] decision."     Blare, 646 N.E.2d at 115.

                                    - 7 -
          So long as the employer makes this modest second-step

showing, the burden reverts to the plaintiff.     At this final step,

the Massachusetts approach diverges from the classic McDonnell

Douglas   framework.       Massachusetts     is   a    "pretext   only

jurisdiction," where a plaintiff "need only present evidence from

which a reasonable jury could infer that 'the [employer's] facially

proper reasons given for its action against [him] were not the

real reasons'" in order to survive summary judgment.        Theidon v.

Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477, 505 (1st Cir. 2020) (first alteration

in original) (quoting Bulwer, 46 N.E.3d at 33).       Thus, even though

a plaintiff pressing a Title VII claim must at a minimum present

evidence of animus — which may be done by demonstrating that the

employer's stated reason for the adverse action is so "unworthy of

credence" as to suggest animus, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) — a plaintiff pressing a

chapter 151B claim need only present evidence that could create

the inference that the employer's stated reason for the adverse

action is not the real reason.3       And that showing can be made by

"demonstrat[ing]   that   similarly    situated . . . employees   were

     3 There is an additional difference.    Unlike federal law,
Massachusetts law places the burden of persuasion on the moving
party (here, the City) throughout the framework. See Bulwer, 46
N.E.3d at 34; Sullivan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 825 N.E.2d 522,
529 (Mass. 2005).

                                - 8 -
treated differently."        Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.,

686 N.E.2d 1303, 1309-10 (Mass. 1997).

                                           1

             In the case at hand, the district court supportably

determined — and the parties do not contest — that Diaz stated a

prima facie case of discrimination.                  The court went no further

with respect to Diaz's chapter 151B claim because it concluded

that the Commission's findings precluded Diaz from relitigating

the     issues   of    whether   the    City        articulated    a   legitimate,

nondiscriminatory justification for terminating his employment and

whether he had been treated disparately in comparison to other

similarly situated officers.           Testing this conclusion requires us

to weigh the preclusive effect, if any, of the Commission's

findings.4

             "[W]hen     a   state     agency        'acting      in   a   judicial

capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it

which     the    parties     have    had       an    adequate     opportunity   to

litigate,' . . . federal courts must give the agency's factfinding

the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the

State's courts."        Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799

(1986) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384

U.S. 394, 422 (1966)); see Baez-Cruz v. Mun. of Comerio, 140 F.3d

      4On appeal, Diaz contests the district court's determination
only as to disparate treatment.

                                       - 9 -
24,    28    (1st     Cir.    1998).       Consequently,    we     must    look   to

Massachusetts law to determine what preclusive effect, if any, the

Commission's decision has on Diaz's state-law claim.                      See Baez-

Cruz, 140 F.3d at 28-29.

             Under Massachusetts law, a previously litigated issue is

precluded when

             "(1) there was a final judgment on the merits
             in the prior adjudication; (2) the party
             against whom preclusion is asserted was a
             party (or in privity with a party) to the prior
             adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior
             adjudication was identical to the issue in the
             current adjudication," was essential to the
             earlier judgment, and was actually litigated
             in the prior action.

Degiacomo v. City of Quincy, 63 N.E.3d 365, 369 (Mass. 2016)

(quoting Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 832 N.E.2d 628,

634 (Mass. 2005)).           If those conditions are satisfied, "[a] final

order of an administrative agency in an adjudicatory proceeding,

not appealed from and as to which the appeal period has expired,

precludes relitigation of the same issues between the same parties,

just    as    would     a    final     judgment   of   a   court    of    competent

jurisdiction."        Stowe v. Bologna, 610 N.E.2d 961, 963 (Mass. 1993)

(alteration in original) (quoting Stowe v. Bologna, 592 N.E.2d

764, 766 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)); see Alba v. Raytheon Co., 809

N.E.2d 516, 521-22 (Mass. 2004) (holding that issue preclusion

estopped plaintiff from relitigating issues in chapter 151B claim

                                         - 10 -
that   were    previously   determined    in     unappealed      administrative

proceeding).

              Diaz does not gainsay that the Commission's decision was

a final adjudication on the merits and that he was a party to that

proceeding.        Nor   does   he     dispute     that    the    Commission's

determination that he failed to identify comparators of sufficient

similarity to show disparate treatment was actually litigated and

was essential to the Commission's judgment.               Instead, he asserts

that the issue of disparate treatment raised before the Commission

was not identical to the issue of disparate treatment presented to

the district court through his chapter 151B claim. The difference,

he says, is that the Commission was determining whether just cause

existed for his firing, whereas the district court was being asked

to adjudicate his claim of discrimination.

              For present purposes, that is a distinction without a

difference.     Just as the City bore the burden of persuasion on the

chapter 151B claim throughout the course of the modified McDonnell

Douglas framework, so too it bore the burden of persuasion before

the Commission.     Massachusetts Ass'n of Minority L. Enf't Officers

v. Abban, 748 N.E.2d 455, 461 (Mass. 2001).                 And the issue of

whether Diaz had been treated differently than other similarly

situated officers was essential to, and precisely the same in,

both proceedings.     The Commission examined the comparators offered

by Diaz and determined that they failed to show that he had been

                                     - 11 -
subjected to harsher discipline than others similarly situated

because    the   proposed   comparators    were   different   in   material

respects. By offering comparators as his sole evidence of pretext,

Diaz sought to relitigate that very same issue before the district

court. The overlap between the issue of disparate treatment raised

before the Commission and the issue of disparate treatment raised

before the district court was "so substantial that preclusion [was]

plainly appropriate."       Comm'r of Dep't of Emp't & Training v.

Dugan, 697 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Mass. 1998).

            Diaz has another blade in his scabbard.           He contends

that he should not be precluded from relitigating the issue of

disparate treatment because he offered additional comparators at

summary judgment — comparators that had not been displayed before

the Commission.       That contention does not gain him any traction:

"issue preclusion is premised on a party's prior opportunity to

litigate an issue, not on whether the party made the best use of

that opportunity."       In re Goldstone, 839 N.E.2d 825, 833 (Mass.

2005).    Diaz had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue

of disparate treatment before the Commission; that he did so

without presenting all the evidence available to him does not

require that he be given a second bite at the cherry.

                                    2

            Diaz next assays a broader argument.         He submits that

the      Commission     lacked   jurisdiction      to   adjudicate     his

                                  - 12 -
discrimination claim because he filed an MCAD complaint before the

Commission issued its final decision. The filing of the complaint,

he reasons, afforded the MCAD exclusive jurisdiction over his

discrimination claim.       In support, he cites Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

151B, § 9, which requires a plaintiff seeking to bring claims under

chapter 151B first to satisfy the administrative requirement of

filing a charge of discrimination with the MCAD.               See Charland v.

Muzi Motors, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 555, 557-58 (Mass. 1994).                  Section

9   further    provides    that   once     such   a   charge   is   filed,    the

administrative proceedings of the MCAD are "exclusive" as to any

"acts declared unlawful" under chapter 151B and that "the final

determination on the merits" of any such complaint "shall exclude

any   other    civil   action,    based    on   the   same   grievance   of   the

individual concerned."       Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9.

              But there is a rub.         At no time did Diaz either raise

this issue before the Commission or challenge the Commission's

jurisdiction through an appeal in state court.                   Nor did Diaz

advance this argument, face up and squarely, in the court below.

Indeed, at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment in

that court, Diaz's counsel stated that although the Commission

typically       abstains    from      addressing        issues      of   racial

discrimination, "they have jurisdiction where they could [address

those issues]."        Under these circumstances, we hold that the

                                    - 13 -
argument has been waived.5 See Teamsters, Local No. 59 v. Superline

Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[L]egal theories

not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the

first time on appeal.").

                                      3

           That ends this aspect of the matter.              We hold — as did

the district court — that Diaz was precluded from relitigating,

within the context of his chapter 151B claim, the issue of whether

he had received disparate treatment compared to other similarly

situated   officers.     Because      Diaz    does    not   contend      that    he

demonstrated   pretext   in    some   manner     other      than   by    offering

comparators,   he   perforce   has    failed     to   carry    his      burden   of

producing evidence showing that the City's stated reasons for

terminating him were pretextual.             It follows that the district

court did not err in granting summary judgment for the City on

Diaz's chapter 151B claim.

     5 In all events, Diaz fails to provide dispositive legal
authority to bolster his interpretation of chapter 151B's
exclusivity provision.     Although he argues that the Supreme
Judicial Court's decision in Town of Brookline v. Alston, 167
N.E.3d 385 (Mass. 2021), stands for the proposition that a pending
charge of discrimination before the MCAD divests the Commission of
jurisdiction to consider conduct that might relate to a claim of
discrimination, the court did not reach that issue in Alston — a
case in which the MCAD proceeding had concluded several years
before the plaintiff filed his civil service appeal. See id. at
399; see also id. (stating that the Commission's consideration of
"racist or retaliatory statements and acts" when determining
whether just cause existed to discharge an employee "[did] not
displace or undermine the purpose served by [chapter] 151B").

                                 - 14 -
                                         B

           This brings us to Diaz's federal disparate-treatment

claim.    Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual . . . because          of    such       individual's    race,      color,

religion, sex, or national origin."                 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

Federal law employs the classic McDonnell Douglas framework in

Title VII cases in which the plaintiff does not offer direct

evidence of discrimination.            As indicated above, see supra Part

II(A), this framework diverges from its Massachusetts counterpart

at the third step.        See Theidon, 948 F.3d at 505 n.39 (citing

Bulwer, 46 N.E.3d at 33); see also Reeves, 560 U.S. at 147-48.

           The district court determined that Diaz stated a prima

facie    case   and     that   the      City       articulated    a   legitimate,

nondiscriminatory justification for terminating his employment.

For summary judgment purposes, then, Diaz's Title VII claim turns

on whether he has made out a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the third step of the framework:                  whether the City's

stated   reason   for    firing    Diaz      was    pretextual    and,   in   fact,

motivated by some discriminatory animus.               Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9,

13 (1st Cir. 1995).

           Once again, Diaz attempts to prove pretext by showing

"that others similarly situated to him in all relevant respects

were treated differently by" the City.               Conward v. Cambridge Sch.

                                       - 15 -
Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999).              Unlike Diaz's state-law

claim,   though,    his   Title   VII   claim   is    not    precluded   by   the

Commission's unreviewed conclusions regarding comparator evidence.

State administrative proceedings, not judicially reviewed, do not

have preclusive effect with regard to Title VII claims.               See Univ.

of Tenn., 478 U.S. at 796.        Thus, we train the lens of our inquiry

on the proffered comparators.

           When evaluating such comparators, "[r]easonableness is

the touchstone:       while the plaintiff's case and the comparison

cases that he advances need not be perfect replicas, they must

closely resemble one another in respect to relevant facts and

circumstances."      Conward, 171 F.3d at 20.         As we have said,

           [t]he test is whether a prudent person,
           looking objectively at the incidents, would
           think   them   roughly   equivalent  and   the
           protagonists similarly situated. Much as in
           the lawyer's art of distinguishing cases, the
           "relevant aspects" are those factual elements
           which determine whether reasoned analogy
           supports, or demands, a like result.     Exact
           correlation is neither likely nor necessary,
           but the cases must be fair congeners. In other
           words, apples should be compared with apples.

Dartmouth Rev. v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989),

overruled on other grounds by Educadores Puertorriqueños En Acción

v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 64, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2004).

           The     district   court     determined    that    the   comparators

offered by Diaz were not sufficiently similar to show pretext

                                    - 16 -
because the comparator incidents did not involve officers found

both to have committed violent assaults and to have dissembled

during the ensuing investigations. See Diaz v. City of Somerville,

583 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (D. Mass. 2022).                Diaz assigns error and

points       to     several     comparator-officers      who   committed    violent

assaults yet were not discharged.              He maintains, in essence, that

comparator cases showing leniency for violent assaults, without

any ensuing dishonesty, are sufficiently similar to demonstrate

pretext.          So, too, he maintains (at least by fair implication)

that       comparator      cases   depicting    instances      of   untruthfulness,

without any attendant violence, are adequate to carry his burden.

                  We do not agree.        The egregiousness of Diaz's conduct

and the City's stated reasons for his dismissal hinged on the

combined force of both his assaultive conduct and his subsequent

prevarication.6          In other words, it was the combustible mixture of

unrestrained aggression and unmitigated mendacity that separated

this case from Diaz's proffered comparators. Removing an important

ingredient          of   that   mixture     (say,   untruthfulness      about   what

happened       or    the   presence    of    violence)    renders     any   proposed

comparison inappropriate.             For a comparison to be apt, "apples

       6Although Diaz suggests in passing that he was not
untruthful, he fails either to develop that argument in his
appellate briefing or to explain why we should take his violence-
only cases as adequate comparators in light of that argument. We
therefore deem any such challenge waived. See United States v.
Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

                                          - 17 -
should be compared with apples."        Dartmouth Rev., 889 F.2d at 19.

Diaz,    however,   invites   us   to   compare   apples   with   apricots.

Consequently, the district court did not err in determining that

proposed comparators lacking both the elements of aggression and

mendacity were not similarly situated and, thus, that Diaz's

proposed comparators were insufficient to ground a finding that

the City's reasons for terminating him were pretextual.7

            The absence of any evidence of pretext is fatal to Diaz's

Title VII claim.     See Conward, 171 F.3d at 22.          Accordingly, we

uphold the district court's entry of summary judgment on that

claim.

                                    III

            We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

     7 The district court did address one comparator in which an
officer was found both to have committed an assault and to have
been untruthful. The court determined, though, that this incident
was an inapt comparator because the officer did not "lie[] about
the assault itself."    Diaz, 583 F. Supp. 3d at 312 n.39.     On
appeal, Diaz neither mentions this incident in his brief nor
challenges the district court's determination. We therefore deem
any such challenge waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d
1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

                                   - 18 -