Court Opinion

ID: 9893911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 21:03:53.750836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:56.194480
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/30/23 Valencia v. Board of Registered Nursing CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 JANET ANNE BAENA VALENCIA,
         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                      A164976
                           v.                                          (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
 BOARD OF REGISTERED                                                   No. N18358)
 NURSING,
         Defendant and Respondent.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Appellant Janet Anne Baena Valencia obtained mandamus relief from
the trial court requiring the Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) to vacate
certain discipline imposed by BRN against her nursing license, and now
appeals the denial of her post-judgment application for an award of attorney’s
fees. We see no abuse of discretion and shall affirm.
         This is the second appeal arising out of Valencia’s dispute with BRN
over the discipline imposed against her license. In the first appeal, resolved

         1 We conclude this matter is proper for disposition by memorandum

opinion in accordance with the California Standards of Judicial
Administration, section 8.1. (See Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules, rule 19,
Abbreviated opinions.) We therefore recite the facts only as necessary to
resolve the issues on appeal.

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by unpublished opinion in May 2021 (Valencia v. Board of Registered Nursing
(May 28, 2021, A159249) [2021 WL 2177046] (Valencia I)), Valencia
challenged the grounds on which the trial court ruled in her favor when it
issued the writ, arguing that the court did not go far enough. She asked us to
uphold the grant of writ relief, but on broader grounds than the trial court
adopted. In this second appeal, rather than repeat the full factual and
procedural background, we will assume familiarity with the background as
recited in Valencia I.
      Stated in summary, Valencia argued in Valencia I “that, by making its
[discipline] decision immediately effective, the BRN cut off her right to seek
reconsideration and impaired her right to seek judicial review, thus violating
due process rights and abusing its discretion. Valencia also argued that,
because the alleged medication error was neither an error she personally
made nor did it occur in the course of her duties as a registered nurse, the
discipline imposed went beyond the BRN’s statutory authority.” (Valencia I,
supra, A159249 [2021 WL 2177046 at p. *3].) In addition, she attacked the
standard of review applied by the trial court on writ review. She argued that
we should extend the California Supreme Court’s then recent decision in
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, and hold that, in applying
substantial evidence review in a writ of mandate proceeding, the trial court
mistakenly determined that BRN’s clear and convincing burden of proof was
“irrelevant.” None of these issues was outcome-determinative. If we had
agreed with Valencia on any of them, “[s]he would still have prevailed, but
based on different reasoning.” (Valencia I, supra, A159249 [2021 WL
2177046 at p. *3.])
      We declined to address the merits of any of the claimed errors in
Valencia I. Because Valencia obtained full relief in the trial court and sought
to appeal a judgment on which she was the prevailing party, we dismissed

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her appeal for lack of justiciability. (Valencia I, supra, A159249 [WL 2177046
at p. *4–*6].) We “conclude[d] that th[e] appeal [was] being pursued as a
means to pave the way for later collection of attorney fees by her counsel,”
and held that that was “insufficient to establish aggrievement under Code of
Civil Procedure section 902.” (Id. at p. *5.) We declined to state any “view as
to the issue of entitlement to attorney fees,” but “simply conclude[d] that,” on
the record presented, “Valencia [was] not an aggrieved party entitled to
appeal a judgment entered in her favor.” (Ibid.) “The issues raised in this
case must await decision in some future case presenting a justiciable
controversy,” we explained. (Ibid.)
      On remand, Valencia elected to litigate the attorney’s fees issue we left
open in Valencia I. The trial court declined to award fees under either Code
of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 or 42 U.S.C. section 1988. For purposes of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the court reasoned that Valencia “did
not successfully vindicate an important public right or confer a benefit on a
large class of persons or demonstrate the necessity of private enforcement for
the public good.” For purposes of 42 U.S.C. section 1988, the court ruled that
Valencia “has failed to establish that she succeeded in bringing a civil rights
action substantial enough to support federal jurisdiction.” Noting that
Valencia did not plead a federal claim in her writ petition, the court also
ruled that “it would be unfair and prejudicial to [BRN] to belatedly consider”
a fee award under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 “solely on the fee motion.”
      “An appellate court may reverse a trial court decision denying attorney
fees under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1021.5 for a prejudicial abuse of
discretion.” (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)
“If the trial court is mistaken about the scope of its discretion, the mistaken
position may be ‘reasonable’, i.e., one as to which reasonable judges could
differ. . . . But if the trial court acts in accord with its mistaken view the

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action is nonetheless error; it is wrong on the law. [¶] . . . The pertinent
question is whether the grounds given by the court for its denial of an award
are consistent with the substantive law of section 1021.5 and, if so, whether
their application to the facts . . . is within the range of discretion conferred
upon the trial courts under section 1021.5, read in light of the purposes and
policy of the statute.” (Id. at pp. 1297–1298.) Denials of fee awards under
42 U.S.C. section 1988 are similarly reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(McFadden v. Villa (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 235, 237.)
      We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying fees
under either Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 or 42 U.S.C. section 1988.
Nothing in the trial court’s order denying Valencia’s fee application states the
law incorrectly, and the court’s assessment of how the relevant legal criteria
apply to the facts presented was within the ranges of discretion respectively
conferred by these statutes.
      Valencia attempts to interpret our opinion in the prior appeal as an
endorsement of the legal positions she took there. She does this, apparently,
in an effort to ascribe greater significance to what she achieved in these writ
proceedings than is actually the case. But she seems to overlook the fact that
we dismissed her earlier appeal and declined to make new law in the manner
she urged us to do. We did not view the case then, and we do not view it now,
as a matter having much significance beyond the particulars of Valencia’s
fact-specific situation. She prevailed in righting what she argued was an
injustice to her personally, but in doing so she failed to obtain a result
significant enough to the public more broadly to warrant a fee award under
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
      We also think the trial court was within its discretion to reject
Valencia’s fee application under section 42 U.S.C. section 1988, both
(1) because her writ petition was not framed or litigated as a federal civil

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rights claim (Board of Administration v. Wilson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 967,
974), and (2) to the extent the writ petition can be construed in retrospect as
having raised such a claim, it would be unfairly prejudicial to force BRN to
respond to a fee claim based on a federal statutory theory that was expressly
articulated only after the administrative record closed. We decline to address
the merits of an issue the trial court never had an opportunity to address in
the first instance on what BRN may view as an incomplete record.
                                DISPOSITION
      Affirmed. Costs shall be awarded to BRN.

                                                    STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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