Court Opinion

ID: 9931098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 16:01:27.432476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:19.036173
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1419
                         ___________________________

                                   Yashica Peaster

                                       Plaintiff - Appellant

                                          v.

                           Spinnaker Insurance Company

                                      Defendant - Appellee
                                   ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                   ____________

                           Submitted: December 13, 2023
                              Filed: February 8, 2024
                                   [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                              ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Yashica Peaster appeals after the district court1 dismissed her complaint as a
discovery sanction and for failure to follow the court’s orders. We review the district
court’s decision for abuse of discretion and its underlying factual findings for clear

      1
        The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
error. See Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 775 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2014);
Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526 F.3d 402, 404 (8th Cir. 2008).

       “[I]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the
court . . . may issue further just orders,” such as an order “dismissing the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Dismissal under Rule 37 is permitted only where
there is an order compelling discovery, a willful violation of that order, and
prejudice. See Comstock, 775 F.3d at 992. If the violation is willful and in bad faith,
then the appropriateness of dismissal as a sanction is “entrusted to the sound
discretion of the district court.” Avionic Co. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 957 F.2d 555,
558 (8th Cir. 1992).

       “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court
order,” a district court may dismiss the action on motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), or
on its own initiative, Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962). Under Rule
41(b), the foremost focus is on the egregiousness of the plaintiff’s conduct and only
to a lesser extent on the prejudice to the defendant or the administration of justice in
the district court. See Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
“An action may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) if a plaintiff has failed to
comply with any order of the court.” Aziz v. Wright, 34 F.3d 587, 589 (8th Cir.
1994).

       Peaster argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing her
complaint with prejudice as a discovery sanction. After many months of extensions,
the district court ordered that Peaster provide “full and complete answers” to
Spinnaker’s interrogatories and requests for production. Peaster purported to
comply, but the district court found Peaster’s putative compliance woefully
deficient. In a detailed order, the district court painstakingly explained why
Peaster’s responses were not “full and complete.” Even Peaster’s counsel admitted
that many responses were “copout[s]” and “oversight[s].” Despite counsel’s candid
admissions and ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies, no attempt was made to
do so. The district court also articulated why Peaster’s actions prejudiced Spinnaker:

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“As a direct result of Ms. Peaster’s actions (or lack thereof), Spinnaker has had to
spend additional resources granting extensions, filing motions, and appearing before
the Court.” We see no clear error in the findings that Peaster violated the discovery
order, that she did so willfully and in bad faith, and that Spinnaker was prejudiced
by the denial of information to which it was entitled. See Comstock, 775 F.3d at
992. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Peaster’s
complaint with prejudice as a discovery sanction.

       Peaster also argues that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
her complaint with prejudice for failure to follow the court’s orders. The district
court did not clearly err in finding that Peaster did not submit full and complete
responses to many of Spinnaker’s interrogatories and requests for production, that
she did not appear for a hearing to address these discovery issues, and that she failed
to submit an affidavit explaining her failure to appear. See Aziz, 34 F.3d at 589. The
district court offered Peaster numerous opportunities to cure these failings, yet
Peaster never did so. Her failure to correct course buttresses the district court’s
finding that Peaster “consistently and willfully failed to prosecute her claim.” See
Sterling v. United States, 985 F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (explaining
that, under Rule 41(b), a complaint “should be dismissed with prejudice only where
the plaintiff has intentionally delayed the action or where the plaintiff has
consistently and willfully failed to prosecute his claim” (citation omitted)). The
district court likewise did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Peaster’s
complaint with prejudice for failure to follow the court’s orders.

      Affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
                     ______________________________

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