Court Opinion

ID: 9587591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:02.274222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:03.697523
License: Public Domain

GREENE, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe the investigation ordered in this case and mandated by section 7B-302 constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent.
Section 7B-302 mandates the Director of the Department of Social Services (the Director) to make a “prompt and thorough investigation” of all reports of abuse, neglect, and dependency. N.C.G.S. § 7B-302(a) (1999). Although the statute does not define what is required to accomplish a “thorough investigation,” it does provide the “investigation ... shall include a visit to the place where the juvenile resides.” Id. The statute also provides the Director is to “have personal access to the juvenile” and interview the child in private. N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(b) (1999). The North Carolina Administrative Code (Code) sets out, in some detail, the requirements for a “thorough” investigation. 10 NCAC 411.0305 (June 2000). The Code mandates the Director, among other things, assess “whether the specific environment in which the child or children is found meets the child’s or children’s need for care and protection^” make a “visit to the place where the child or children reside,” and interview the “victim child.” 10 NCAC 411 .0305 (a),(d) & (e) (June 2000). Thus, the Director is required to make an inspection of the residence in which the child (the subject of the child abuse/neglect report) resides, necessitating *384an entry into the home, and to speak personally with the reported victim child.1
Entry into the home of a person suspected of child abuse/neglect by the Director for the purpose of ascertaining if the child has been abused/neglected is a search by a government actor and thus implicates the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Ferguson v. Charleston, U.S. -, — , - L. Ed. 2d -, -, 69 U.S.L.W. 4184, 4187 (2001) (testing of urine for drugs by private hospital is search by state actor). An interview of a reported victim child by the Director, without the consent of the child’s parents, constitutes a seizure of the child within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 104 L. E. 2d 443, 455 n.10 (1989) (“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs when government actors “by means of [a] physical force or show of authority ... in some way restraint] the liberty of a citizen”); see also Tenebaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 602 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098, 146 L. Ed. 2d 776 (2000). This Fourth Amendment right can be asserted by the child’s parents on behalf of the child. Tenebaum, 193 F.3d at 601.
Whether the search or seizure violates the teaching of the Fourth Amendment is dependent on the reasonableness of the search or seizure, as only unreasonable searches and seizures are proscribed. Whether the search or seizure is reasonable requires balancing the intrusion of the individual’s interest in privacy against the “importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify” the search. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719, 94 L. Ed. 2d 714, 724 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Stated another way, a party’s interest in privacy must be balanced against some “special need” advanced by the State. Ferguson, - U.S. at -, — L. Ed. 2d at , 69 U.S.L.W. at 4188. Depending on the strength of the competing interest, our courts have on occasion: completely suspended probable cause, Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 633, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 670 (1989) (drug testing of railroad employees); required a showing of probable cause, Ferguson, - U.S. at -, - L. Ed. 2d at -, 69 U.S.L.W. at 4189-90 (testing for drugs in pregnant women); and required a showing of reasonable suspicion, O’Connor, 480 U.S at 726, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 729 (search of public employee’s desk by employer); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, *385341, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 734 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause,” our courts “have not hesitated to adopt such a standard”).
The privacy interest of property owners/lessees (home owner) in their property is, without dispute, substantial. The right of any person, including minor children, to be free from governmental seizure is substantial. Likewise, governmental interest in protecting the safety and well-being of children is substantial and is well served by mandating a timely section 7B-302 investigation of reports of child abuse/neglect. This substantial governmental interest must, however, be weighed in the context of the Director’s obligation to “make an immediate oral and subsequent written report” of its findings to the district attorney and the “appropriate local law enforcement agency.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-307(a) (1999). The district attorney, after receipt of this report, is required to initiate a criminal investigation and determine whether criminal prosecution is appropriate.2 Id. Indeed, this statutorily mandated disclosure to law enforcement “provides an affirmative reason for enforcing the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” Ferguson, - U.S. at -, - L. Ed. 2d at -, 69 U.S.L.W. at 4190. Furthermore, if the person suspected of child abuse/neglect fails to comply with a section 7B-303 order directing non-interference with the investigation, that person can be imprisoned pursuant to a finding of civil or criminal contempt,3 thus, further subjecting the person to criminal penalties. N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(f) (1999).
A proper balance of these competing interests suggests an intermediate standard of reasonableness as a prerequisite to obtaining a section 7B-303(c) order. In other words, the Director must be required to show by clear and convincing evidence there are reason*386able grounds for suspecting a person(s) has abused/neglected the child being investigated and has, without lawful excuse, obstructed or interfered with the investigation mandated by section 7B-302.4 Because of the substantial governmental interest in protecting children and the need to act quickly, as well as the additional time likely required to gather evidence in support of probable cause, it would be ill advised to utilize the probable cause standard.5 Also, due to the sanctity of private dwellings and the potential for criminal investigation/prosecution arising from the section 7B-302 investigation, a total suspension of the probable cause standard is not appropriate. A total suspension would permit entry into a home and interviews with the reported victim child, based simply on a totally unsubstantiated report of abuse/neglect, as long as there is a showing that the home owner/person “without lawful excuse, has obstructed or interfered with [the] investigation.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(c) (1999).
In this case, the trial court entered an order directing respondents not to obstruct or interfere with any investigation by DSS “as required by 7B-302.”6 As this investigation mandated DSS inspect the residence in which the child lived to interview Joanie Stumbo, the trial court was required, prior to issuing a section 7B-303(c) order, to make a finding there existed reasonable grounds for suspecting the respondents had abused/neglected Joanie Stumbo.7 The failure to *387make this finding requires reversal of the order. This case must be remanded for a new hearing, at which time DSS must be given the opportunity to present new evidence.

. The majority construes section 7B-302(a) as only requiring “a personal visit to the home” and not “physical entry into the home itself.” I disagree. Without physically entering the home, the Director would be unable to assess whether the environment in which the child is found meets the child’s need'for care and protection.

. A parent or other person providing care to or supervision of a child less than 16 years of age is subject to prosecution for criminal child abuse. N.C.G.S. §§ 14-318.2 & 14-318.4 (1999). More generally, parents have “an affirmative legal duty to protect and provide for their minor children,” State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 473, 293 S.E.2d 780, 785 (1982), and a violation of this duty is a misdemeanor, N.C.G.S. § 14-316.1 (1999).

. Because a person refusing to open his house for inspection by a social worker investigating a report of child abuse/neglect does subject himself to imprisonment, this situation is different from the facts presented in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 27 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1971) (Fourth Amendment not implicated by inspection of home of recipient of monies under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children because the refusal to permit the inspection resulted only in loss of benefits, with no criminal penalties).

. An anonymous report of abuse/neglect, which is permitted under section 7B-301, would rarely, in itself, constitute reasonable grounds for suspecting a person to have abused/ neglected a child. Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 260 (2000) (“an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

. I do note the Legislature has mandated use of the probable cause standard for issuance of an ex parte order entered pursuant to section 7B-303(d). N.C.G.S. § 7B-303(d) (1999) (there must be “probable cause to believe ... the juvenile is at risk of immediate harm”). This is an obvious recognition by our Legislature of the need to protect the privacy interest of the person to be investigated in the face of a report of abuse/neglect of a child.

. The evidence in the record reveals the DSS worker (agent of the Director) testified the respondents did not allow her to conduct interviews with the children and did not allow her to enter the house. The petition filed seeking the section 7B-303(c) order alleges respondents’ attorney “advised [respondents] not to allow a private interview with the children nor access [to] their home.” The trial court found as fact that the DSS worker “was not allowed to speak with the children nor was she allowed to go into the house.” The trial court further found the DSS worker “is required to conduct a private [interview] with all the children in the household.”

. It is not every investigative act of the Director that implicates the Fourth Amendment. For examples: the Director is to interview any person identified in the report “having information concerning the condition of the child[;]” the Director is to review any school, medical, etc. records that may provide information about the child; *387and the Director “shall check the county agency’s records and the North Carolina Central Registry of child abuse, neglect, and dependency reports to ascertain if any previous reports . . . have been made.” 10 NCAC 411.0305(b),(g) & (h)(4).