Court Opinion

ID: 9645086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:12:22.075658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:31.013333
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
(dissenting).
The statute under which this prosecution rests is void and in contravention of the Constitution of this state and of the Uuited States.
The statute makes unlawful the mere possession of property and merchandise which is neither contraband nor so dangerous to the public health and welfare as to authorize the legislature, under its police power, to prohibit the ownership and possession thereof. The statute therefore violates and is in contravention of Art. 1, Sec. 19, of the Constitution of this state and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The offense created by the statute is in no manner dependent upon some unlawful use or intended use of a can of gasoline. Rather, it prohibits and makes unlawful the ownership and possession of the gasoline in the container and therefore violates due process of law.
The statute is void and unconstitutional because the exemptions contained therein render it class legislation and therefore violative of equal protection as guaranteed by Art. 1, Sec. 3, of the Constitution of this state and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
There is an entire absence of any reasonable basis for authorizing the possession and ownership of a can of gasoline, susceptible of being exploded, by all those persons, individuals, or corporations who are exempted from the statute and at the same time making it unlawful for others not so exempted to do so. The exemptions constitute the statute class legislation.
It will be noticed that the exemptions are not limited to the possession and ownership of a can of gasoline in the conduct or operation of business or professions. The business or purpose or *609intent with which the can of gasoline is possessed is not material or an element of the offense.
The mere possession of the can of gasoline is lawful as to such parties but is unlawful to this appellant.
The statute is destroyed and rendered nugatory by the exemption of a can of gasoline which is used or intended to be used for industrial or mechanical purposes.
If the possession of a can of gasoline is authorized for such purposes, then what reason exists to make it unlawful for one to possess a can of gasoline for some other equally lawful and legitimate purpose ? There is none. Hence the statute is void, as class legislation.
The statute is also destroyed by the exemption which takes from the provisions thereof “small arms propellent powder” and “old fashioned black powder.”
There appears to be an entire absence of any reason for saying that the possession of such articles is lawful, while the possession of a can of gasoline is unlawful.
The entire statute, however, fails as a valid criminal statute by exempting “fuels” therefrom.
It is a matter of common knowledge that gasoline is a fuel, yet fuels are wholly and entirely exempted from the act. Accordingly, the construction must be given to this exemption as destroying gasoline as a substance out of which a bomb may be constructed.
Under that exemption, the can of gasoline described in the indictment could not be and was not a bomb within the definition of that term, because a bomb can not be constructed of a fuel and gasoline is a fuel.
The statute under which appellant has been convicted is null and void.
I have here limited a discussion of the question of constitutionality of the statute to general terms. At a later date I may extend my views at length, together with the citation and discussion of authorities supporting those views. What I have here *610said is deemed sufficient in view of the fact that the court does not discuss the question.
I dissent.