Court Opinion

ID: 9654772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:50:32.43815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.313128
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I, frankly, am reluctant to write this dissent because I am concerned that it could be construed as criticism of an officer who in all ways displayed a conscientious respect for the law and treated Appellant with courtesy. In short, Officer Chris Miller behaved as I would hope all our law enforcement officers would. But I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not believe that the record supports a finding that Officer Miller had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant when the officer turned on his *422overhead lights and Appellant submitted to his show of authority.
The majority states that Officer Miller was driving eastbound on Highway 183, also known as Airport Freeway, at about 12:45 a.m. when he noticed Appellant’s dark-colored Volkswagen driving in front of him on the highway. Although the majority is correct in stating that he testified that the time was 12:45 a.m., the record actually shows that Officer Miller first saw Appellant’s vehicle twenty minutes earlier at 12:25 a.m.:
Q. Okay. So it wasn’t 12:45,1:00?
A. When I initially observed the vehicle?
Q. Correct.
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Specifically, Officer Miller testified, “This was noted in my report that it was 25 minutes after midnight on the date in question.”
As the majority notes, he testified that Appellant “had been driving away from an area of Bedford that contained several bars and restaurants that served alcohol” and that he had previously pulled over other drivers for driving while intoxicated (DWI) in that same area.1 But the video reveals that Appellant was on a freeway that is a major state highway with restricted ingress and egress and that passes through residential areas, warehouse areas, office areas, and areas with bars and restaurants. The portion of Highway 183 visible on the videotape made by Officer Miller is raised and well separated from the structures along the access road. He did not see Appellant enter the freeway. He first saw her driving on Highway 183.
Officer Miller testified that he “was on routine patrol [and] was driving westbound [sic] on 183 about to get on 121 and go north.... There was a — it was a dark-colored Volkswagen four-door sedan driving in front of [him] on the highway.” On cross-examination he clarified his testimony:
A. Again, it’s just — it’s just an observation. I’m not saying that she was leaving a bar. It was just I observed her leaving a part of our city that has many bars. It’s just an observation.
Q. And you didn’t see her on any side streets because, I mean, you can’t— let me back up. You would have to get off the highway or get on to the highway to get to or leave from a bar in Bedford, right?
A. Yes.
[[Image here]]
Q. So you just see her driving down the highway. You never saw her enter onto the highway; is that correct?
A. No.
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Q. So, again, you didn’t ever see her leave a bar?
A. No, I didn’t see her leave a bar.
Officer Miller testified that he never saw Appellant enter or leave a bar or a restaurant; he only saw her drive past bars and restaurants on a major state highway that passes above them. If we hold that merely driving past a bar provides reasonable suspicion justifying the detention of a motor vehicle and requiring the driver to submit to questioning and field sobriety tests, every person leaving downtown Fort Worth, or driving down 6th Street in Austin, or driving down a highway or freeway through any commercial area will be fair game to be pulled over, questioned, searched for the officer’s safety, and *423hauled out of the car to perform feats of line-walking, nose-touching, and balancing on one foot. Indeed, if one lives across the street from fraternity row, one should be prepared to be pulled over every time he leaves home because everyone knows fraternity houses are rife with alcohol.
The majority says that Officer Miller testified that he believed that Appellant was driving while intoxicated because of the time of night, her driving, the area of the city that she had been coming from, and his experience with intoxicated drivers exhibiting similar driving characteristics.2 But Officer Miller actually testified that it was less the time of night than the fact that it was night:
Q. But, nevertheless, it’s not in your report what time it was or — it doesn’t — your report is not reflective of—
A. I think it’s fair to say that the number of impaired drivers increase[s] in the nighttime hours especially leaving an area of the City that has several bars or restaurants that — if you will, that serve alcohol.
Our sister court in Austin was faced with a similar set of circumstances in Foster v. State.3 First, the Foster court noted,
While the Court of Criminal Appeals no longer employs the “as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity” test for reasonable suspicion, the plausibility of an innocent explanation in this case affects our determination of whether there was a reasonable basis for suspecting that Foster was intoxicated.4
With that caveat in mind, I would look at the trial court’s determination of credibility; that is, the trial court’s findings of fact. Officer Miller testified that he pulled Appellant over because he saw her commit a traffic violation. But he was mistaken. What he observed was not a violation of the law. As this court has previously explained, reasonable suspicion of an alleged traffic violation cannot be based on a police officer’s mistaken understanding of traffic laws.5
As the Foster court posited, “In the absence of a traffic offense, was there reasonable siispicion of intoxication'?”6 A reviewing court must determine whether “the combined weight of [the] circumstances is ... so much greater than the aggregation of their individual weights that it allows for a rational inference of intoxication.”7 The majority points out that the trial court found no traffic violation, no unsafe driving, very light traffic, and no erratic speed changes.8
The majority then properly addresses the remaining justifications for the detention.
1. Time of night. “Time of day, by itself, is ‘owed virtually no weight’ as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” 9
*4242. Leaving a bar area. Actually, Officer Miller did not see Appellant leaving a bar area but, rather, driving on a freeway/major state highway that was routed through an area that had some bars and restaurants. He did not observe her leaving any parking lot or even driving on a roadway other than Highway 183 with limited ingress and egress. He did not observe her at any point before she was driving on Highway 183. As the Foster court stated, “[LJocation is generally ‘an insufficient basis for a rational inference that would lead to a reasonable suspicion.’ ”10
3. Crossing on to the shoulder of the roadway, once by one-half the width of the vehicle and a second time by a few inches and “[u]nusual use of turn signal.”
The trial court correctly concluded that the record reveals that Appellant committed no traffic offense.11 Was the use of the turn indicator, combined with the other circumstances, sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant? Officer Miller suggested that he thought that Appellant’s signal was a violation of the law.
Section 545.104(b) of the transportation code provides in pertinent part that “[a]n operator intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the vehicle before the turn.”12 The statute does not provide for a maximum distance beyond which a person may not signal a turn, only a minimum distance. Officer Miller did not see Appellant violate the law by engaging her turn indicator more than 100 feet before changing lanes or exiting the freeway.
An officer’s reasonable suspicion of an alleged traffic violation cannot be based on a mistaken understanding of traffic laws. And an officer’s honest but mistaken understanding of the traffic law which prompted a stop is not an exception to the reasonable suspicion requirement.13
The issue, then, is whether the non-violation was a circumstance providing, in light of all the circumstances, reasonable suspicion for Officer Miller to stop Appellant. This question requires close examination of the videotape.
The videotape shows that when Appellant first engaged her turn signal, there was a traffic lane to her right and a sign indicating the Harwood exit from the freeway. After she engaged the turn indicator, it became clear that the lane to her right merged into the lane she was in. At this point she had a choice to make. She could disengage the turn indicator, and then immediately re-engage it in order to signal her intent to exit the freeway, or she could leave the turn indicator on. Was one choice really so much more rational than the other that to make the other choice indicated intoxication? Was her de-*425cisión not to flick the indicator off and then immediately on even unreasonable?
The detention cannot be justified by the fruits of the detention. The reasonable suspicion for the stop must exist at the time the officer exercises a show of authority and the suspect indicates an intent to or actually acquiesces to the show of authority.14 Officer Miller engaged his overhead lights before Appellant exited the freeway.
I would hold that the combined circumstances of Officer Miller’s seeing Appellant’s vehicle traveling at 12:25 a.m. on a limited ingress/egress major highway through an area containing bars and restaurants, seeing the vehicle’s tires crossing or touching the right lane line twice, and seeing Appellant indicating her exit from the freeway for more than 100 feet do not provide reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was committing the offense of DWI. I would hold, therefore, that the State did not sustain its burden of proving that the warrantless stop was lawful, and I would further hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the stop. Because the majority does not, I must respectfully dissent.

. Majority op. at 418-19.

. Id.

. 297 S.W.3d 386 (Tex.App.-Austin 2009, pet. granted).

. Id. at 393 (citing Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)).

. Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd); see United States v. Granado, 302 F.3d 421, 423 (5th Cir.2002).

. 297 S.W.3d at 393.

. Id. (citing State v. Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars & no/100, 136 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied)).

. Majority op. at 419.

. Foster, 297 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars & no/100, 136 S.W.3d at 400).

. Id. (quoting Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Dollars & no/100, 136 S.W.3d at 401).

. See Fowler, 266 S.W.3d at 504-05; State v. Huddleston, 164 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex.App.Austin 2005, no pet.).

. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(b) (Vernon 1999).

. Fowler, 266 S.W.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

. St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725-26 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).