Court Opinion

ID: 1001158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:51:25.153529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:13.531837
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 99-4403

RAYMOND BLACKWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(CR-97-232-CCB)

Submitted: February 29, 2000

Decided: March 20, 2000

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

James E. McCollum, Jr., Carla M. Mathers, JAMES E. MCCOL-
LUM, JR. & ASSOCIATES, P.C., College Park, Maryland, for
Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Andrea L.
Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, James M. Webster, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Raymond Blackwell appeals from a 235-month sentence imposed
following his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute
crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994). A review of the record dis-
closes no reversible error. Thus, we affirm his conviction and sen-
tence.

On appeal, Blackwell claims that the district court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. We find that the district court did not clearly
err in finding that Blackwell consented to the search. See United
States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Fur-
ther, we find that the trooper did not impermissibly exceed the scope
of the original traffic stop because the car's registration had been sus-
pended, and the trooper needed to ask additional questions to decide
whether to have the vehicle towed immediately or whether to permit
Blackwell to drive to a nearby rest stop and leave the car there. Cf.
United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1992) (once
a driver has produced a valid license and registration, the police must
allow him to go on his way, and any further questioning exceeds the
scope of the traffic stop "unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion
of a serious crime"). Blackwell's responses and behavior in reaction
to these questions were adequate to arouse the trooper's suspicion and
led him to ask for consent to the search of the vehicle.

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting evidence of Blackwell's 1994 traffic stop and that, even
if the court erred, such error was harmless. See United States v. Van
Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Queen, 132
F.2d 991, 996 (4th Cir. 1997). Similarly, we find that district court's
Allen* instruction was evenly balanced and did not suggest that jurors
_________________________________________________________________
*Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

                     2
abandon their conscientious objections. Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in giving the challenged Allen charge. See United
States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 1997). We also reject
Blackwell's claim that the district court's second inquiry into the sta-
tus of deliberation at the close of the day was coercive. Moreover, if
the district court's second inquiry was improperly coercive, Blackwell
cannot complain because the court's second inquiry was made at
Blackwell's request. See United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 617
(4th Cir. 1997) (an appeal may not lie from an error that the defendant
himself has caused).

Accordingly, we affirm his conviction and sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3