Court Opinion

ID: 9917146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 18:01:09.083627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:41.295369
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALEXANDER THOMAS                          No. 22-35327
HEBRARD,
                                             D.C. No.
              Plaintiff-Appellant,        6:19-cv-01498-
                                                YY
 v.

JEREMY M. NOFZIGER;                         OPINION
BRANDON KELLY; JASON
BROWN; C. GOVE,

              Defendants-Appellees.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Oregon
      Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted April 17, 2023
                   Portland, Oregon

                 Filed January 11, 2024

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Carlos T. Bea, and Jennifer
                 Sung, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge Bea;
                 Dissent by Judge Sung
2                      HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

                          SUMMARY*

         Prisoner Civil Rights/Heck v. Humphrey

    The panel affirmed the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of Oregon inmate Alexander Hebrard’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994).
    Hebrard alleged that he was disciplined in prison without
due process of law and sought damages for the disciplinary
sanctions imposed, but did not seek relief for the revocation
of 27 days of his earned-time credits. Three years after
Hebrard’s complaint was filed, the district court sua sponte
requested briefing on whether Heck barred his claim. Under
Heck, a section 1983 suit for damages that would necessarily
imply the invalidity of the length of an inmate’s sentence
must be dismissed unless the inmate first challenges his
sentence in habeas and obtains relief.
    The panel determined that defendant’s failure to plead
Heck as an affirmative defense constituted a forfeiture rather
than a waiver. The district court did not err when it sua
sponte resurrected defendant’s forfeited Heck defense at the
summary judgment stage and dismissed the complaint under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which provides that dismissals for failure
to state a claim are obligatory, even when the legal basis for
the dismissal is raised sua sponte.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                     3

    Addressing the merits of the dismissal, the panel held
that it was clear from the face of the complaint that Hebrard’s
claim necessarily implicated the validity of the revocation of
his earned-time credits, which extended his stay in prison.
Under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), Hebrard’s
decision not to request relief for the loss of his earned-time
credits did not mean his claim did not challenge the validity
of the duration of his confinement. A successful challenge to
the validity of the procedures employed during Hebrard’s
disciplinary      hearing    necessarily    encompassed       a
determination that the prison could not validly impose any
sanctions—including the revocation of plaintiff’s earned-
time credits. To comply with Heck, Hebrard had to obtain
habeas relief before filing this § 1983 action. Because he did
not do so, his claim was barred by Heck.
    Dissenting, Judge Sung stated that on this record, it was
uncertain whether the restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time
credits would necessarily lead to his immediate or speedier
release from custody. Under Oregon law, it is possible that
Hebrard is receiving earned-time credits that cannot lead to
his immediate or speedier release. She therefore disagreed
with the conclusion that the district court properly dismissed
Hebrard’s claim as Heck-barred.

                         COUNSEL

Jeremy A. Carp (argued), Erick J. Haynie, and Craig Streit,
Perkins Coie LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jon Zunkel-Decoursey (argued), Assistant Attorney
General; Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General; Oregon Department of
Justice, Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.
4                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

                          OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

    Plaintiff-Appellant Alexander Hebrard (“Hebrard”), an
Oregon state inmate proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals
the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Hebrard claimed
that he was disciplined in prison without due process of law
because he was prevented from presenting an adequate
defense and therefore was found guilty of what he claims are
baseless rule violations by Defendant-Appellee Jeremy
Nofziger (“Nofziger”), the prison official who presided over
his disciplinary hearing. Hebrard sought damages for the
sanctions Nofziger imposed, save for the revocation of 27
days of his earned-time credits, as to which he requested no
relief in this case.
    Three years after Hebrard’s complaint was filed, the
district court sua sponte requested briefing on whether Heck
barred his claim. Under Heck, “a § 1983 suit for damages
that would . . . ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of the length
of an inmate’s sentence” must be dismissed unless the
inmate first challenged his sentence in habeas and obtained
relief. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 646 (2004). The
district court held that Heck required a dismissal of
Hebrard’s claim. Hebrard sought to expunge all of his
disciplinary convictions, on a basis which would thereby
necessarily invalidate all the sanctions imposed—including
the revocation of his earned-time credits. And because the
revocation of Hebrard’s credits lengthened his sentence, the
district court held that Hebrard should have first filed his
claim in habeas. His failure to do so meant the court was
required to dismiss the action as barred by Heck.
                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                        5

    We conclude that the district court did not err. Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), it was authorized
to dismiss Hebrard’s in forma pauperis complaint for failure
to state a claim, even though it had raised Heck sua sponte.
And the court correctly held that were Hebrard’s claim
successful, it would call into doubt the proper duration of his
confinement. As a result, to comply with Heck, Hebrard
needed to obtain habeas relief before filing this § 1983
action. Because he did not do so, his claim must be
dismissed as Heck-barred. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
    A. Factual Background
    In 2018, prison officials began to suspect that Hebrard
had used his prison account to launder money and had
smuggled drugs into prison. As a result, he was charged with
violating the prison’s rules against racketeering, distribution
of a controlled substance, possession of drugs, and
possession of contraband. Prior to the disciplinary hearing,
Hebrard submitted written requests for the production of
evidence related to the charges. He demanded that the prison
produce the letters Hebrard purportedly wrote to his
confederates discussing illicit activities, the videos of his
prison visits with these individuals, and the transcripts of the
phone calls he had with them.
   Nofziger presided over Hebrard’s disciplinary hearing,
which was held on November 27, 2018. At the hearing,
Nofziger read the charges against Hebrard and denied each
of Hebrard’s written evidentiary requests—allegedly

1
 Except where otherwise stated, these facts are taken from Hebrard’s
complaint and are accepted as true. See Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch.
Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992).
6                      HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

without “a valid or reasonable reason.” The transcript of the
disciplinary hearing reveals that Nofziger had informed
Hebrard that these requests were denied because they were
either moot, or because the requested information was
confidential.     Nofziger then reviewed the evidence
supporting the charges against Hebrard. Nofziger read
transcripts of Hebrard’s calls that involved Hebrard’s
conversations with his associates regarding drug smuggling
and money his associates deposited into his prison account
that was not theirs. And Nofziger stated on the record that
several letters in Hebrard’s handwriting described how he
planned to smuggle drugs into the prison. Hebrard was not
permitted to see either the transcripts or the letters.
    At the end of the hearing, Nofziger found Hebrard guilty
of the drug possession, distribution of a controlled substance,
and racketeering charges and was sanctioned. Hebrard was
fined $100, had $1,050 confiscated from his prison account,
was placed in segregated housing for 120 days, lost 365 days
of visitation rights, and had 27 days of his earned-time
credits revoked. The final disciplinary report reveals that the
sanctions were imposed collectively and that the rule
violations had been merged together. The prison denied
Hebrard’s administrative appeal on February 6, 2019.
    B. Procedural History
    On September 17, 2019, Hebrard filed this § 1983 action.
The complaint named several defendants, but only Nofziger
remains.2 Hebrard claimed that Nofziger’s actions during
the disciplinary hearing violated his procedural due process

2
  Hebrard voluntarily agreed to have the district court enter summary
judgment in favor of the other named defendants. Thus, only Hebrard’s
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Nofziger
is before us on appeal.
                        HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           7

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, he
claimed that Nofziger lacked an evidentiary basis to find him
guilty of the rule violations: Nofziger was alleged not to have
called witnesses, produced documentary evidence, or
provided an adequate explanation for his denial of Hebrard’s
request for an investigation into the charges. In his prayer
for relief, Hebrard sought damages for the sanctions
imposed. He specifically sought to recoup the confiscated
money and the fine as well as to recover damages for his
placement in segregated housing and for his loss of visitation
rights. But Hebrard did not seek damages for the revocation
of his earned-time credits.3
    Hebrard filed an application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, which the district court granted. On May
14, 2020, approximately one year and three months after
Hebrard’s administrative appeal was denied, Nofziger filed
his answer. Nofziger raised qualified immunity and the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement as affirmative defenses.
    On June 28, 2021, Nofziger moved for summary
judgment contending that he had not violated Hebrard’s due
process rights and that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
Following briefing and a hearing on the motion, the district
court requested supplemental briefing on whether Heck v.
Humphrey barred Hebrard’s claim. This was the first time

3
  Hebrard’s briefing describes these 27 days as “good-time” credits
whereas Nofziger’s briefing and Hebrard’s complaint describe them as
“earned-time” credits. The difference in terminology is immaterial
because the parties use the terms synonymously. See Samson v. Brown,
486 P.3d 59, 61 (Or. Ct. App. 2021). Given the complaint and final
disciplinary report use the term “earned-time” credits, we will do so as
well.
8                        HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

anyone had raised Heck as a potential bar to Hebrard’s
ability to obtain relief.
    After the parties filed supplemental briefing regarding
Heck, the district court issued its opinion and order which
dismissed Hebrard’s suit. The court held that the PLRA
authorized its sua sponte dismissal under Heck because “it
[wa]s apparent on the face of the complaint that Heck
bar[red] [hi]s claim[].” The court held that were Hebrard to
succeed on his claim that his procedural due process rights
were violated at his disciplinary hearing, the favorable ruling
would implicitly call into doubt the revocation of his earned-
time credits, which had extended his stay in prison. Because
Hebrard had not overturned his disciplinary conviction in a
habeas proceeding as Heck required, the court dismissed his
claim without prejudice and entered judgment. Hebrard
timely appealed.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the dismissal of a complaint as Heck-barred
de novo. Beets v. Cnty. of L.A., 669 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2012). And we review the district court’s interpretation
and application of the PLRA de novo. Andrews v.
Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). Like Rule

4
  Although no party raised the issue, we must ensure we have appellate
jurisdiction over this appeal. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cali., 891
F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2018). This court has appellate jurisdiction
over dismissals without prejudice for failure to satisfy an exhaustion
requirement. Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842,
845–46 (9th Cir. 2009). Under our case law, Heck is akin to such an
exhaustion requirement. Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833
F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016). It is clear we have appellate jurisdiction
here.
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                     9

12(b)(6) dismissals, dismissals of in forma pauperis
complaints for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) are reviewed de novo. Barren v. Harrington, 152
F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
III. THE   DISTRICT          COURT’S        SUA      SPONTE
     DISMISSAL
    Before we assess whether Heck bars Hebrard’s claim, we
must resolve his preliminary challenges to the district court’s
sua sponte dismissal of his claim. Hebrard contends the
dismissal was improper because Nofziger waived Heck.
And he contends that even were Nofziger’s failure to raise
Heck only a forfeiture, the court’s sua sponte dismissal of
his complaint as Heck-barred at the summary judgment stage
must be reversed because it was prejudicial.
    We agree with Hebrard that Heck is an affirmative
defense that may be waived or forfeited. Washington v. Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056
& n.5 (9th Cir. 2016). But as explained below, Nofziger did
not waive Heck. Nofziger’s failure to plead Heck as an
affirmative defense clearly constituted only a forfeiture.
And as is further explained below, we also hold that the
district court did not err when it looked past Nofziger’s
forfeiture and sua sponte evaluated whether Heck barred
Hebrard’s claim. This is because the PLRA expressly
authorized the district court to dismiss Hebrard’s complaint
for failure to state a claim at any time, even when it raised
the legal basis for the dismissal of its own accord.
   A. Nofziger’s Alleged Waiver
    Hebrard’s waiver argument is based solely on the fact
that Nofziger “[n]ever raised Heck as a defense.” But as we
have explained, the failure to raise an argument in a timely
10                    HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

fashion is a forfeiture not a waiver. Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs.,
LLC, 59 F.4th 457, 472 n.18 (9th Cir. 2023). Even at oral
argument when pressed to distinguish between the two,
Hebrard continued to argue that Nofziger’s failure to raise
Heck and the “sheer passage of time” were sufficient to
constitute a waiver. They are not. A finding of waiver
requires evidence of a party’s actions that evince his
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Id. at 471–79;
accord United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th
Cir. 2019). Hebrard’s failure to identify any of Nofziger’s
actions in this case that even remotely suggest he
“intentionally relinquished” his Heck defense compels us to
conclude that the Heck defense was not waived. Crowley v.
Epicept Corp., 883 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2018).
     B. Sua Sponte Dismissals under the PLRA
   Hebrard next contends that the sua sponte dismissal was
improper because the district court’s resurrection of
Nofziger’s forfeited Heck defense was prejudicial. This
argument fails under the plain terms of the PLRA.
      Hebrard proceeded in forma pauperis below, which
means he is subject to the PLRA. Under the PLRA, a “court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
. . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This provision
authorizes “sua sponte dismissals of in forma pauperis
cases” that fail to state a claim for relief. Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 214 (2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
Thus, § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires a district
court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to
state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (emphasis added). And, under the PLRA,
this mandatory sua sponte dismissal may occur at “at any
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                             11

time.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Admittedly, the same substantive rules
apply to Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e) dismissals for failure
to state a claim. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–28. But under the
plain text of the PLRA, § 1915(e) dismissals for failure to
state a claim, unlike Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, are obligatory,
even if the court raised the legal basis for the dismissal sua
sponte. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127, 1130.
    Thus, Nofziger’s forfeiture did not bar the court’s sua
sponte application of Heck to Hebrard’s claim. Given his in
forma pauperis status, § 1915(e) authorized the district court
to raise Heck as a defense to his claim at any time of its own
accord. And because the district court found that Heck was
“an obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the
complaint,” Washington, 833 F.3d at 1056 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)—the standard that
governs whether a complaint fails to state a claim for relief
because the cause of action is barred by Heck—the plain
terms of the PLRA mandated the dismissal of Hebrard’s
complaint for failure to state a claim.5 Thus, under

5
  Hebrard suffered no prejudice as a result of the district court’s sua
sponte application of Heck. His underlying due process claim is almost
certainly meritless. A disciplinary conviction comports with due process
if the prison’s disciplinary findings are supported “by some evidence in
the record.” Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). And due process
permits officials to limit a prisoner’s access to evidence if such access
would create a risk to the safety of others or the operations of the prison.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566–67 (1974). Nofziger satisfied
due process here. He discussed Hebrard’s phone calls and letters, which
contained evidence that substantiated the disciplinary charges. And
Nofziger informed Hebrard that his requests for witnesses and further
documentary evidence would create a risk to the safety and security of
the prison’s operations. Given Hebrard’s underlying challenge would
not otherwise merit relief, the delay in the court’s sua sponte dismissal
12                      HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

§ 1915(e), the district court did not err when it sua sponte
resurrected Nofziger’s forfeited Heck defense at the
summary judgment stage.
IV. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
     Because the PLRA authorized the district court to
evaluate whether Heck barred Hebrard’s claim of its own
accord, we must assess whether it properly dismissed
Hebrard’s complaint for failure to state a claim for relief.
We will affirm the district court’s dismissal of his claim only
if the Heck bar is obvious from the face of his complaint.
Washington, 833 F.3d at 1056.
    The Heck-bar, or required favorable termination rule, is
a rule of preclusion named after Heck v. Humphrey—the
Supreme Court case that outlined the doctrine. Heck
involved a state criminal defendant who filed a § 1983
damages claim for a purportedly unlawful arrest and
investigation that resulted in his manslaughter conviction.
512 U.S. at 478–79. The Court held that the defendant’s
§ 1983 action was properly dismissed because his state court
conviction, which had not yet been overturned, precluded his
civil claim for damages. Id. at 483. It adopted this rule
because the defendant’s § 1983 claim was analogous to the
malicious prosecution tort. Id. at 484. At common law, to
maintain a malicious prosecution claim (i.e., a claim for
“damages for confinement [improperly] imposed pursuant to
legal process”), a party had “to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confinement.” Id. at 484, 486. The
requirement that a criminal defendant first obtain a favorable
termination of his conviction before filing a malicious
prosecution claim ensured that he could not collaterally

of his claim as Heck-barred was not prejudicial.
                        HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                         13

“challeng[e] the validity of [an] outstanding criminal
judgment[]” via a “civil tort action[].” Id. at 486. As a result,
the Heck Court held that to prevent a dismissal of his cause
of action, a plaintiff, whose § 1983 claim arose from “harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his]
conviction or sentence invalid,” needed to prove that he had
first overturned his conviction or sentence in another
proceeding. Id. at 486–87.
    The Supreme Court extended the application of Heck to
the prison context in Edwards v. Balisok. 520 U.S. 641
(1997). The prisoner in Edwards filed a § 1983 cause of
action claiming that his prison disciplinary conviction
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
because he was “denied the opportunity to put on a defense”
or “to present [] extant exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 643,
646–47. He was found guilty of violating four prison rules
for which he was sentenced to spend 10 days in isolation, to
spend 20 days in segregated housing, and to lose 30 days of
earned time that would have shortened his sentence.6 Id. at
643. The prisoner in Edwards sought a declaration that the
procedures used at his disciplinary hearing violated his due
process rights and requested “compensatory and punitive
damages for use of the unconstitutional procedures.” Id.
But notably, he had “amended [his] complaint [so as] not [to]
request restoration of the lost credits.” Id. at 643–44.
Despite the prisoner’s express attempt to avoid challenging
the duration of his confinement in his complaint, the
Edwards Court held that Heck barred his due process
challenge to his disciplinary conviction. Id. at 646. Namely,
because “[t]he principal procedural defect complained of by

6
  As explained in further detail below, see infra Section IV.A, earned-
time credits generally affect the length of an inmate’s sentence.
14                    HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

[the prisoner] would,” if proven, demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of the procedures used at his disciplinary
hearing, it would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the
deprivation of his [earned]-time credits” in addition to the
impropriety of his placement in isolated and segregated
housing. Id. at 646. Thus, after Edwards, Heck applies to a
prisoner’s due process challenge to his disciplinary
conviction that claims the “conviction was wrongful,” even
if he “does not seek damages directly attributable to [his] . . .
confinement.” Id. (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n.6).
    As explained in more detail below, we find that under
this case law, it is clear from the face of Hebrard’s complaint
that his claim is Heck-barred. His claim is materially similar
to the claim in Edwards that was found to be barred by Heck.
     A. Oregon’s Earned-Time Credits Reduce Inmates’
        Sentences
    Before we evaluate whether Heck bars Hebrard’s claim,
we must resolve a preliminary issue. While Hebrard does
not argue that the loss of his earned-time credits had no effect
on the duration of his confinement, Heck cannot apply to
Hebrard’s claim unless the prison’s revocation of his earned-
time credits “ha[d] an effect on ‘the duration of time to be
served.’” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 928–29, 929 n.4
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540
U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004)). Thus, we must first ascertain
whether Hebrard could have used the lost earned-time
credits to reduce his sentence.
    Under Oregon law, “[earned-]time credits [] have the
effect of reducing the sentence served.” Burns v. Newell, 507
P.2d 414, 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (emphasis added); accord
Oregon v. Berger, 392 P.3d 792, 796 (Or. Ct. App. 2017)
(holding that the statutory scheme that governs earned-time
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           15

credits constitutes “a sentence reduction program” (citation
omitted)). Only those prisoners serving sentences amenable
to a reduction by law are eligible to obtain these credits.
Oregon ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook, 133 P.3d 904, 908 & n.7
(Or. 2006). And “‘earned time’ may [not] be granted by the
[Oregon] Department of Corrections . . . [unless] the
sentencing court specifically orders that the defendant is
eligible for such a reduction.” Berger, 392 P.3d at 796. In
light of this authority, Hebrard could not have obtained his
earned-time credits unless he were legally eligible to have
his sentence reduced.7 See generally Or. Admin. R. 291-
097-0240 (outlining the periodic review of an inmate’s file
during which a prison official must certify whether the
inmate was entitled to receive earned-time credits for good
behavior).

7
  For this reason, Nettles v. Grounds does not require a reversal of the
district court’s dismissal of Hebrard’s claim. In Nettles, a California
inmate serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole sought to
overturn a disciplinary hearing to restore the earned-time credits revoked
as a sanction for his rule violations. 830 F.3d at 924–25, 927. We held
that Nettles’s claim could not proceed in habeas. Id. at 925. This is
because under California law, the restoration of Nettles’s earned-time
credits would not have had any effect on his sentence. Id. at 934 n.12.
Rather, his release from confinement was dependent on the discretionary
decision of the parole board. Id. at 935.
Nettles is a straightforward application of Heck. If a prisoner’s claim
does not affect the length of his confinement, Heck does not apply. Cf.
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754–55. In contrast, as explained above,
Hebrard could not obtain earned-time credits under Oregon law unless
his sentence were legally amenable to a reduction. Berger, 392 P.3d at
796. Thus, unlike the disciplinary conviction at issue in Nettles,
Hebrard’s conviction had the effect of lengthening the duration of his
confinement. As a result, Nettles is simply not factually analogous to the
case at bar and thus does not govern our resolution of this appeal.
16                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

    Certainly, an Oregon state official could have made a
mistake. But “in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts [are to] presume that [public officials] have
properly discharged their official duties.” United States v.
Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926); accord Red Top
Mercury Mines, Inc. v. United States, 887 F.2d 198, 202–03
(9th Cir. 1989). This presumption of regularity applies
equally to a state official’s compliance with state law.
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1723 (2019) (applying
the presumption of regularity to a state prosecutor’s charging
decisions under state law). Because Hebrard does not
contest that the earned-time credits shortened his sentence
and given there is no record evidence to the contrary, we
conclude, under the presumption of regularity, that Hebrard
received earned-time credits because they reduced the
duration of his confinement.8 Thus satisfied that the
revocation of Hebrard’s earned-time credits thereby
extended “the duration of time to be served,” we now can
proceed to the heart of the Heck analysis. Muhammad, 540
U.S. at 754–55.

8
  The dissent maintains that the restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time
credits would not necessarily reduce the duration of his confinement, but
it reaches this conclusion by relying on argumentation that Hebrard
never raised. The party presentation rule therefore bars our consideration
of the hypothetical scenarios the dissent presents. See United States v.
Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (‘“[I]n both civil and
criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal . . . , we rely on the
parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of
neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’”) (quoting Greenlaw v.
United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008)); Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d
1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n appellate court will not consider issues
not properly raised before the district court.”).
                        HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           17

    B. Hebrard’s Complaint Is Heck-Barred
    As the Supreme Court has summarized, under Edwards,
a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is Heck-barred “if success in th[e]
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of . . .
[the] duration” of a prisoner’s confinement “no matter the
relief sought.”9 Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82
(2005). So long as the claim “indirectly [seeks] a judicial
determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of
the [duration of the] State’s custody,” Heck and Edwards
require his § 1983 cause of action to be dismissed—“only
habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies” can be used to
obtain such a ruling. Id. at 81. Thus, if Hebrard’s complaint
makes clear that he wants to obtain a judicial determination
that his disciplinary “conviction was wrongful,” his claim is
barred by Heck even though he did not request “damages
directly attributable to” the loss of his earned-time credits in
his prayer for relief. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646 (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n.6). A plain reading of Hebrard’s
complaint reveals that his § 1983 claim seeks such a ruling.
    According to Hebrard’s complaint, his desired resolution
of this § 1983 litigation is to have his conviction for the three

9
  For this reason, Hebrard’s contention that his claim cannot be barred
by Heck because he “chose not to challenge his loss of [earned]-time
credits” by failing to request damages for that penalty is without merit.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this position in Edwards. It held
that even though the prisoner’s “§ 1983 action [] d[id] not seek damages
directly attributable to” his loss of earned-time credits, he was
nonetheless “subject to the limitation announced in Heck.” Edwards,
520 U.S. at 646. The Court explained that Heck still applied because if
the prisoner prevailed on his legal theory that his disciplinary hearing
employed invalid procedures, it “would necessarily imply that [hi]s
[disciplinary] conviction was wrongful” and that his earned-time credits
should not have been revoked. Id.
18                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

rule violations overturned. Namely, Hebrard claims that his
procedural due process rights were violated and that his
disciplinary conviction was unlawful because Nofziger
purportedly lacked any evidentiary support for finding him
guilty of the infractions. Hebrard bolsters this claim with
allegations that he was denied any opportunity to put on a
defense to the charges levied against him. Nofziger
allegedly refused “to call or [to] investigate [his proffered]
witnesses,” who were “indirectly . . . or directly related to
the misconduct and charge[d]” rule violations. And
Nofziger allegedly did not “provide certain requested
documents prior [to] or during [the] hearing,” let alone any
“meaningful explanation for [the] finding of guilt.” Namely,
Hebrard alleged he was convicted even though “the
dispositive items of proof” were absent from the disciplinary
record.
    Because of these procedural defects, Hebrard requests
relief from “[t]he actions of Defendant Nofziger . . . [that]
f[ound] him guilty of Racketeering, Drug Possession and
Distribution I with no evidence to support [the] charges.”
Put another way, Hebrard wants his disciplinary conviction
to be set aside as unlawful because the disciplinary
proceeding failed to comport with the dictates of due
process.10 If Hebrard were to prove that Nofziger lacked an

10
    This straightforward conclusion follows from the fact that the
allegations in Hebrard’s complaint strike at the heart of the disciplinary
investigation and hearing itself—rather than at any particular procedural
defects related to the imposition of specific sanctions. For this reason,
we reject Hebrard’s argument on appeal that his complaint challenges
only those rule violations that are unrelated to his earned-time credits.
As the district court succinctly stated, Hebrard alleged “there was one
investigation, one disciplinary hearing, and one set of disciplinary
convictions.” According to the plain language in Hebrard’s complaint,
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           19

evidentiary basis to find him guilty of the rule violations and
that he was wholly denied an opportunity to present a
defense, all three of his guilty convictions would need to be
overturned as unlawful. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646–47 (The
“deni[al of] the opportunity to put on a defense” constitutes
an “obvious procedural defect[ that has led] state and federal
courts” to set aside prison convictions.). And given the
sanctions were a collective penalty for all of Hebrard’s
prison infractions, to reverse the convictions as unlawful
“necessarily impl[ies]” that the sanctions imposed were
unlawful as well.11 See id. at 645–47. Thus, a favorable
legal ruling on Hebrard’s due process claim encompasses a
determination that the prison had no lawful basis to impose
any sanctions. And were the prison to lack a valid basis to
impose any sanctions, its revocation of Hebrard’s earned-
time credits—and resulting extension of his sentence, see

each of the three convictions lacks “evidence to support the charges” due
to the constitutionally defective procedures employed—Nofziger failed
to provide any “requested documents” or “video evidence,” “to allow
any testimony,” to include any “arguments . . . [or] defense[s]” in the
final disciplinary report, or to explain the “denial of an investigation.”
Despite the more limited request for damages, Hebrard plainly seeks a
determination that his disciplinary convictions must be expunged in toto.
11
   That a successful challenge to the entire disciplinary proceeding would
overturn all of the sanctions imposed is confirmed by the prison’s
disciplinary report. This report, which is judicially noticeable, see Lee
v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the documents are
not physically attached to the complaint, they may be considered if the
documents’ authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s complaint
necessarily relies on them.”), reveals that the sanctions were applied
collectively and that all of the rule violations were merged together.
Thus, were a court to overturn any of the rule violations, it would also
necessarily invalidate all of the sanctions imposed.
20                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

supra Section IV.A—would necessarily be deemed
unlawful.
    Simply put, Hebrard’s due process claim “indirectly
[seeks] a judicial determination that necessarily implies the
unlawfulness of the [duration of the] State’s custody.”
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A successful challenge to the
validity of the procedures employed during his disciplinary
hearing necessarily encompasses a determination that the
prison could not validly impose any sanctions—including
the revocation of his earned-time credits. Id.; accord
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646–47. As a result, because
Hebrard’s claim plainly calls into question the proper
duration of his confinement, Hebrard is required under Heck
to proceed in habeas first before he can request damages
under § 1983.12 Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646, 648; see Nettles,
830 F.3d at 928–29. His failure to seek such habeas relief
means his suit must be dismissed as Heck-barred. 512 U.S.
at 489–90.
     C. Hebrard’s Arguments Why Heck Does Not Apply
        Lack Merit
   While the Heck-bar is clear from the face of his
complaint, Hebrard argues there are two reasons why Heck
should not apply to his case. Neither has merit.

12
  Put another way, Hebrard’s outstanding disciplinary conviction, which
legally supports the validity of the revocation of Hebrard’s earned-time
credits, precludes this § 1983 claim because it could result in inconsistent
judgments regarding the validity of the sanctions imposed. See Heck,
512 U.S. at 484–46, 484 n.4. Thus, Heck requires Hebrard’s challenge
to the legal basis for the prison’s revocation of his earned-time credits to
be resolved in habeas where his conviction can be overturned, rather than
to have his conviction indirectly challenged in a § 1983 action. Id.;
Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928–29 (citing Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754–55).
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    21

       1. Peralta v. Vasquez conflicts with Edwards
    Hebrard first contends that we should follow the Second
Circuit’s analysis in Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 104
(2d Cir. 2006). Akin to the case before us, the prisoner in
Peralta brought a due process challenge to his prison
disciplinary hearing, which had resulted in sanctions
affecting both the duration and conditions of his
confinement. Id. at 100. The Second Circuit declined to
apply Heck to the prisoner’s § 1983 claim because the court
concluded that the prisoner’s decision not to request the
reinstatement of his earned-time credits in his complaint
implied that his claim did not challenge the duration of his
confinement. Id. at 104.
    But Peralta is of no help to Hebrard because it plainly
conflicts with Edwards. As noted above, Edwards resolved
a materially similar claim to the one in Hebrard’s complaint.
Both Hebrard and the prisoner in Edwards had their earned-
time credits revoked and were placed in segregated housing
for violating several prison rules. 520 U.S. at 643. And like
Hebrard, the prisoner in Edwards alleged that “he was
completely denied the opportunity to put on a defense
through specifically identified witnesses who possessed
exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 646. Moreover, neither
Hebrard nor the prisoner in Edwards requested damages for
or the restoration of their earned-time credits. Id. at 643–44.
In fact, the prisoner in Edwards affirmatively “amended
[his] complaint [so as] not [to] request” relief related to the
“lost credits.” Id. But despite the prisoner’s affirmative
decision in Edwards not to recover for his lost earned-time
credits, the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the
complaint was barred by Heck. Id. at 648.
22                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

    Thus, contrary to the position taken by the Second
Circuit in Peralta, 467 F.3d at 104, a prisoner’s conscious
decision not to request relief for the loss of his earned-time
credits does not mean his claim does not challenge the
validity of the duration of his confinement. See Skinner v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Bureau of Prisons, 584 F.3d 1093,
1100 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming the dismissal of a challenge
to a prison disciplinary hearing under Heck because
“recovery for the ‘other, separate disciplinary harms’
[unrelated to the inmate’s sentence] depend[ed] on
overturning the adverse determination that also led to his
loss of [earned]-time credits[—]if [he] were to win damages
for the former, he would necessarily have demonstrated the
invalidity of the latter”). Rather, as the Edwards Court
explained, a prisoner’s due process challenge “to the
procedures” employed at his disciplinary hearing
“necessarily impl[ies] the invalidity of the deprivation of his
[earned]-time credits”—even if he affirmatively declines to
bring a direct challenge to “the result[ing]” revocation of his
earned-time credits—so long as the alleged “procedural
defect,” if proven, would demonstrate the “invalidity of the
judgment” in his disciplinary hearing. 520 U.S. at 645–47;
cf. Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir.
2016) (holding that Heck and Edwards created “a version of
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel), under which the
outstanding criminal judgment or disciplinary sanction, as
long as it stands, blocks any inconsistent civil judgment”).
    That is precisely what Hebrard’s due process claim
demands. See supra Section IV.B. He seeks a judicial
determination that he was improperly adjudged guilty and
thereby impermissibly sanctioned for baseless rule
violations because of Nofziger’s unconstitutional actions:
Nofziger’s alleged refusal to call witnesses, to present
                        HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           23

evidence of wrongdoing, to conduct an investigation, or to
permit Hebrard to put on a defense. Because Edwards
resolved a due process challenge that is factually analogous
to the claim in Hebrard’s complaint, it compels the result we
reach here. Namely, although Hebrard does not seek to
recover for his lost earned-time credits, his claim is barred
by Heck because he challenges the constitutional validity of
his disciplinary conviction, which constitutes an implied
challenge to the validity of the sanctions imposed as a result.
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 643–46.
         2. Hebrard had an effective constitutional
            remedy
   Lastly, Hebrard argues that Heck should not apply
because he supposedly has no other remedy at this time.
This argument cannot be credited.
     While a habeas challenge to the revocation of his earned-
time credits would currently be untimely, Hebrard identifies
no legal impediments at the outset that barred him from
filing a habeas petition instead of this § 1983 claim.13 Thus,
the current time-bar that prevents him from obtaining habeas
relief does not mean he lacks an effective remedy. It simply
means he did not timely seek the proper remedy. Guerrero

13
   Namely, Hebrard could have overturned his disciplinary hearing in
habeas, see Barrett v. Belleque, 176 P.3d 1272, 1278–79 (Or. 2008);
Burns, 507 P.2d at 414–15, and then filed a subsequent § 1983 action to
recover damages for the other sanctions imposed, Edwards, 520 U.S. at
643, 645–46. Because his § 1983 claim would not accrue until he
overturned the disciplinary hearing, the subsequent action would be
timely. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2154–55 (2019).
Furthermore, any legal determination in the habeas proceeding would be
“afforded issue-preclusive” effect in the § 1983 action. Gonzales v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, Hebrard’s
assertion that he is “left with no remedy” is not well-taken.
24                    HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]hough
habeas relief . . . may be ‘impossible as a matter of law,’ . . .
[Hebrard] cannot now use his ‘failure timely to pursue
habeas remedies’ as a shield against the implications of
Heck.”).
                              ***
    The bottom line: Heck bars Hebrard’s suit. It is clear
from the face of his complaint that his claim necessarily
implicates the validity of the prison’s revocation of his
earned-time credits, which revocation extended his stay in
prison. The district court correctly applied Heck to this case
and dismissed Hebrard’s § 1983 claim.
V. CONCLUSION
    For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
Hebrard’s complaint was properly dismissed as barred by
Heck. The district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his in
forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim was
authorized by the PLRA. And this mandatory dismissal was
warranted given it is clear from the face of the complaint that
Hebrard’s due process claim, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the prison’s revocation of
his earned-time credits—a claim that must proceed in
habeas. That Hebrard has not obtained any such habeas
relief means his § 1983 claim is Heck-barred. Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hebrard’s § 1983
cause of action.
     AFFIRMED.
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    25

SUNG, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    Plaintiff Alexander Hebrard, an Oregon state prisoner,
filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a prison
disciplinary action that resulted in various sanctions,
including revocation of 27 days of earned-time credits. The
district court sua sponte dismissed Hebrard’s § 1983 claim
for failure to state a claim based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). I agree with the majority that Heck is an
affirmative defense, and that the defendant, Nofziger, bears
the burden of proving it applies. I also agree with the
majority that Hebrard’s § 1983 action, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the revocation of
Hebrard’s earned-time credits—even though his complaint
does not seek restoration of those credits. See Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997). However, I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that the district court properly
dismissed Hebrard’s claim as Heck-barred.
    “Heck applies only to administrative determinations that
‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of time to be
served.’” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 929 n.4 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749,
754–55 (2004) and citing Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d
834, 840 (9th Cir. 2014)). Further, restoration of a prisoner’s
earned-time credits does not, in all cases, necessarily affect
the duration of time to be served. See, e.g., Nettles, 830 F.3d
at 934–35 (determining that restoration of Nettles’
postconviction credits “would not necessarily lead to
immediate or speedier release”).
    Accordingly, the question at the heart of this case is:
Would restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time credits
necessarily lead to his immediate or speedier release from
custody?
26                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

    On this record, we simply do not know the answer to that
question. Under Oregon law, it is possible that Hebrard is
receiving earned-time credits that cannot lead to his
immediate or speedier release. And we can’t rule out that
possibility because we don’t know what sentence or
sentences Hebrard is serving, or what his underlying
conviction or convictions are. Because we can’t be certain
that restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time credits would
necessarily affect the duration of his custody, we can’t be
certain that his claim is Heck-barred.
    Below, I first explain in more detail why, under Nettles,
a claim that would effectively restore a prisoner’s earned-
time credits is not necessarily Heck-barred. Second, I explain
why we can’t be certain, on this record and under Oregon
law, that restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time credits will
necessarily have the required effect on his duration of
custody. Third, I explain that the district court erred in two
ways: (1) by concluding that Hebrard’s claim is Heck-
barred, and (2) by sua sponte dismissing Hebrard’s § 1983
claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure to state a claim, even though it is
not obvious from the face of the complaint that the claim is
barred by Heck. Finally, I explain how dismissing a § 1983
claim—without certainty that it would, if successful,
necessarily affect the duration of confinement—is at odds
with precedent and could have unfair consequences for
Hebrard and other prisoners.
                      BACKGROUND
    Hebrard challenges a prison disciplinary action that
resulted in confiscation of $1,050 from Hebrard’s trust
account, a $100 fine, disciplinary segregation for 120 days,
limited visitation for a year, and retraction of 27 days of
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           27

earned-time credits. He filed a handwritten, pro se § 1983
complaint in September 2019, claiming that he was denied
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment during the
disciplinary proceeding.1 Hebrard’s complaint seeks
monetary damages, but it does not seek restoration of the
revoked earned-time credits.2
    Nofziger filed an answer to Hebrard’s complaint, raising
the affirmative defenses of qualified immunity and PLRA
exhaustion—but Nofziger did not mention Heck. Nofziger
also filed a motion for summary judgment—and again,
Nofziger did not mention Heck. After Nofziger briefed the
summary judgment motion, however, the district court
raised Heck sua sponte and ordered supplemental briefing.
In the supplemental briefing, Nofziger still did not provide
any information about Hebrard’s underlying conviction(s) or
the sentence(s) he is serving. Despite the absence of such
information in the record, the district court concluded that
Hebrard’s § 1983 claim is Heck-barred and exercised its
authority under the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to sua
sponte dismiss Hebrard’s complaint for failure to state a
claim.

1
 It is undisputed that Hebrard’s § 1983 claim seeks to challenge only the
prison disciplinary action and not Hebrard’s underlying state criminal
conviction.
2
  Even though Hebrard does not explicitly seek restoration of the earned-
time credits in his complaint, I agree with the majority that Hebrard’s
challenge to the disciplinary action, if successful, would also invalidate
the revocation of his earned-time credits.
28                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

                       DISCUSSION
                              I
    As noted above, I agree with the majority that Hebrard’s
§ 1983 claim, if successful, would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his disciplinary hearing and effectively restore
his earned-time credits. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641 (1997). However, that does not necessarily mean that
Hebrard’s § 1983 claim is Heck-barred.
    In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court held that a plaintiff
could not bring a § 1983 action “that necessarily require[d]
the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or
confinement,” unless the plaintiff first proved that the
conviction or sentence was eliminated, including “by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” 512 U.S.
477, 486–87 (1994). “This favorable termination rule polices
the intersection of the two most fertile sources of federal-
court prisoner litigation—§ 1983, and the federal habeas
corpus statute, by ensuring that a court cannot address a
§ 1983 claim if doing so would require it to first resolve a
claim that falls within the core of habeas corpus.” Nettles,
830 F.3d at 928 (cleaned up).
    In Edwards, the Court held that a state prisoner’s § 1983
claim regarding a disciplinary proceeding that necessarily
implied the invalidity of his loss of postconviction credits
“fell within habeas’s exclusive domain and was barred by
the rule in Heck.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928 (citing Edwards,
520 U.S. at 644, 648). But “[t]he Court later clarified, in
Muhammad v. Close, that such challenges to disciplinary
proceedings are barred by Heck only if the § 1983 action
would be ‘seeking a judgment at odds with [the prisoner’s]
conviction or with the State’s calculation of time to be
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    29

served.’” Id. at 928–29 (quoting 540 U.S. at 754–55)
(alteration in original).
   Hebrard’s § 1983 claim has no bearing on his underlying
conviction(s) or prison sentence(s) (whatever they may
be)—at most, his claim could restore his 27 days of earned-
time credits. Our en banc decision in Nettles addressed a
similar claim and clarified several principles regarding the
scope of habeas jurisdiction, § 1983, and the application of
Heck to such claims, that are important in this case.
    Like Hebrard, Nettles was a state prisoner who
challenged a prison disciplinary action that resulted in the
revocation of postconviction credits. 830 F.3d at 924–27.
Unlike Hebrard, however, Nettles challenged his
disciplinary action and sought restoration of his
postconviction credits in a habeas petition. Id. at 927.
Although Nettles’ claim would effectively restore his
postconviction credits, we determined that his claim would
not necessarily affect the duration of his custody. Id. at 934–
35. Consequently, we concluded that Nettles’ claim was not
“within the core of habeas,” and that the district court
properly dismissed Nettles’ habeas petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 935. Further, we held that § 1983 is the
“exclusive vehicle” for such claims about prison life “that
are not within the core of habeas.” Id. at 932–33. A claim
that may only be brought under § 1983 because it is not
within the core of habeas should not be dismissed under
Heck. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82–84 (reversing Heck
dismissal of prisoners’ § 1983 claims because “neither lies
at ‘the core of habeas corpus’” (quoting Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973))).
    Nettles clarifies that a claim that would effectively
restore postconviction credits is not within the core of
30                  HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

habeas—and therefore, not Heck-barred—unless it would
necessarily affect the duration of custody. See Nettles, 830
F.3d at 929 n.4 (“Heck applies only to administrative
determinations,” including prison disciplinary actions, “that
‘necessarily’ have an effect on ‘the duration of time to be
served.’” (quoting Muhammad, 540 U.S at 754–55, and
citing Wilkerson, 772 F.3d at 840)).
    An “effect on the duration of custody” means
“immediate or earlier release from confinement.” Id. at 935;
see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82–84 (clarifying that Heck
bars only claims that would result in “immediate release
from confinement or a shorter stay in prison”).
    “Necessarily” in this context means “inevitable.” See
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82 (holding claims did not lie at “the
core of habeas corpus” because “claims would not inevitably
lead to release”); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 534
(2011) (“Success in [Skinner’s] suit for DNA testing would
not ‘necessarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction.
While test results might prove exculpatory, that outcome is
hardly inevitable[.]”); Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 843
(9th Cir. 2013) (“We have held that a claim does not
necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence
under Heck unless its success will inevitably call into
question the state court judgment that led to the plaintiff’s
custody.” (quotation marks omitted)). Even claims that
“would be likely to lead to an earlier release” or “could
potentially affect the duration of a prisoner’s confinement”
are not within the core of habeas. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at
933–34 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)
(overruling Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir.
1989), and Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir.
2004)).
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                     31

    Nettles also makes clear that in some circumstances, a
claim that would restore a prisoner’s earned-time credits
would not necessarily affect the duration of their custody.
Restoration of a prisoner’s earned-time credits might lead to
a prisoner’s immediate or earlier release from custody—but
it does not necessarily do so in every case. For example, in
Nettles, we determined that restoration of his postconviction
credits would not necessarily have the required effect
because Nettles was serving an indeterminate sentence,
expungement of his disciplinary infraction would not
necessarily lead to a grant of parole, and the panel would not
calculate a release date that could be affected by the
postconviction credits. 830 F.3d at 934–35.
    Thus, when a prisoner’s claim challenges a disciplinary
action that revoked postconviction credits, we must
determine on a case-by-case basis whether that claim is
within the core of habeas. More specifically, we must
determine whether, considering the prisoner’s sentence(s)
and state law, restoration of the prisoner’s credits would
inevitably lead to the prisoner’s immediate or speedier
release. “If the invalidity of the disciplinary proceedings, and
therefore the restoration of [postconviction] credits, would
not necessarily affect the length of time to be served, then
the claim falls outside the core of habeas” and the claim must
be “brought in § 1983.” Nettles, 830 F.3d at 929.
    Importantly, we have reversed Heck dismissals when we
couldn’t tell from the record whether restoration of a
prisoner’s postconviction credits would necessarily affect
the length of time to be served. See, e.g., Delgado v.
Gonzalez, 686 F. App’x 434, 435 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing
Nettles and rejecting application of the Heck bar because
“[o]n this record, we do not know whether Delgado’s rules
violation and loss of sixty days of good-time credit would
32                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

necessarily affect the length of time he must serve”
(emphasis in original)); Brownlee v. Murphy, 231 F. App’x
642, 644 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If, under the applicable scheme of
state law and regulation, this revocation [of good-time
credits] directly and necessarily increased the duration of
Brownlee’s confinement, . . . the district court’s dismissal
[under Heck] would be proper. However, we cannot be sure
on the record before us of the effect of any such revocation
under the applicable legal regime.”). As explained below, we
should reverse the dismissal of Hebrard’s claim for the same
reason.
                              II
    We can’t tell from the record whether restoration of
Hebrard’s earned-time credits would necessarily affect the
length of time he must serve. Therefore, we can’t tell
whether his claim was properly dismissed under Heck.
    Hebrard’s pro se, handwritten complaint indicates that
earned-time credits were deducted as a result of the
challenged prison disciplinary sanction. But the complaint
contains no other information about what Hebrard’s
underlying conviction(s) is/are, or the type or length of
sentence(s) he is serving. That critical information is not
anywhere else in the record—as Nofziger conceded multiple
times at oral argument. Oral Arg. at 17:00, 22:32, 23:54,
28:30. Even after the district court ordered supplemental
briefing on the application of Heck, Nofziger did not provide
the factual and state law information needed to determine
whether restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time credits would
necessarily lead to his immediate or speedier release.
    The majority assumes that restoration of Hebrard’s
earned-time credits will necessarily affect the duration of his
custody because, under Oregon law, prisons cannot award
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                           33

earned-time credits unless a prisoner has an earned-time
credit-eligible sentence. The majority ignores, however, at
least two circumstances under which it is possible for
Oregon prisoners to lawfully receive earned-time credits that
can’t have any effect on their release date:3

3
  I disagree with the majority’s assertion that this dissent violates the
party presentation rule by presenting hypothetical scenarios that Hebrard
never identified. Maj. Op. 16 n.8. The majority and I agree it is
Nofziger’s burden to prove that the revocation of Hebrard’s earned-time
credits necessarily affected his duration of custody. The hypothetical
scenarios that the majority declines to consider merely show that
Nofziger has not met that burden.
     Additionally, all the issues addressed in this dissent were presented
by the parties. Hebrard’s opening brief states that the issues presented
include whether the district court erred “when it sua sponte dismissed
Mr. Hebrard’s due process claim as barred by Heck even though his
claim does not necessarily implicate the fact or duration of his
confinement[.]” Dkt. 10 at 5 (Issue Presented #2). Hebrard also argues
that the district court erred because Nofziger bears the burden of proving
Heck applies (Dkt. 10 at 13–14) and the Heck bar is not obvious on the
face of the complaint (Dkt. 10 at 21–22). Further, Hebrard argues that
“ambiguity over whether an action necessarily implicates the fact or
duration of the inmate’s sentence precludes dismissal.” Dkt. 10 at 24–25
(citing and discussing Brownlee v. Murphy, 231 F. App’x 642, 644 (9th
Cir. 2007) and Delgado v. Gonzales, 686 F. App’x 434, 434–35 (9th Cir.
2017)).
     Moreover, the majority recognizes that to resolve the issues
presented, we “must resolve [the] preliminary issue” of whether the loss
of earned-time credits had an effect on the duration of Hebard’s
confinement “because Heck cannot apply to Hebrard’s claim unless the
prison’s revocation of his earned-time credits ‘ha[d] an effect on the
duration of time to be served.’” Maj. Op. 14 (quoting Nettles, 830 F.3d
at 928–29 & n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted)). I dissent because I
disagree with the majority’s resolution of this preliminary issue, but I
agree that we must resolve it. And, to do so, both the majority and this
dissent consider state law and arguments that were not explicitly
34                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

     (1) Hebrard could be in the exact same position as
Nettles. In Oregon, a prisoner serving an indeterminate life
sentence may still receive earned-time credits, but the loss or
restoration of those credits will not necessarily affect the
prisoner’s duration of custody because, as in Nettles, any
release date is ultimately set at the discretion of the parole
board. See State ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook (“Engweiler IV”),
133 P.3d 904 (Or. 2006); Engweiler v. Persson (“Engweiler
VIII”), 316 P.3d 264 (Or. 2013). In Engweiler IV, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that an Oregon state prisoner
serving an indeterminate life sentence for a crime committed
on or after November 1, 1989, is eligible to receive earned-
time credits. See Engweiler VIII, 316 P.3d at 270
(summarizing the holding of Engweiler IV). Then, in
Engweiler VIII, the Court held that those earned-time credits
do not necessarily determine a prisoner’s release date.
Engweiler argued that he was entitled to be immediately
released because application of his earned-time credits to his
initial board-estimated release date meant that he should
have already been released from custody. Id. at 273. The
Court, however, rejected that argument and held that even

presented by the parties. Compare Maj. Op. 14–16 (discussing and
relying on Burns v. Newell, 507 P.2d 414, 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1973);
Oregon v. Berger, 392 P.3d 792, 796 (Or. Ct. App. 2017); and Oregon
ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook, 133 P.3d 904, 908 & n.7 (Or. 2006)), with
Dkt. 21 (Nofziger’s Answering Brief). Yet, the majority asserts that only
this dissent violates the party presentation rule. Either both the majority
and the dissent are violating the party presentation rule, or neither of us
are. In my view, neither of us are. Where, as here, the issue has been
presented by the parties, our analysis of that issue need “not perfectly
track the arguments [a party] presents in her briefing.” Machowski v. 333
N. Placentia Prop., LLC, 38 F.4th 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2022); see also
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1581 (2020) (“[A]
court is not hidebound by the precise arguments of counsel[.]”).
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    35

when a prisoner could be released based on earned-time
credits applied to their estimated release date, the Oregon
parole board has the discretion to keep the prisoner in
custody and schedule their actual release for a future date.
Id. at 274–75. That is, the prisoner’s actual release date (if
any) would ultimately be determined by the parole board’s
discretionary review process, which “exists to ensure that
offenders are not released to parole unless and until the board
is satisfied that their release is consistent with community
safety.” Id.
    In this case, Nofziger conceded at oral argument that we
have no way of knowing on this record that Hebrard is not
serving an indeterminate sentence. This means it is possible
that Hebrard (like Engweiler and Nettles) is serving an
indeterminate sentence that is eligible for earned-time
credits but a parole board retains discretion to decide when
to release him (if ever). If so, then restoration of Hebrard’s
earned-time credits would not necessarily lead to his
immediate or earlier release, and his claim is not Heck-
barred.
    (2) Under Oregon law, a prisoner can be serving two (or
more) sentences—one that is eligible for earned-time credits,
and one that is not. Samson v. Brown, 486 P.3d 59, 64 (Or.
Ct. App. 2021) (interpreting ORS 137.635, which makes
sentences for certain crimes ineligible for earned-time
credits); Woods v. Hendricks, 537 P.3d 974, 977–79 (Or. Ct.
App. 2023) (interpreting ORS 137.700, which also makes
certain sentences ineligible for earned-time credits). A
prisoner in this circumstance must be awarded earned-time
credits on the eligible sentence—even though the earned-
time credits won’t have any effect on the prisoner’s
ineligible sentence. Samson, 486 P.3d at 64 (“If a person is
serving prison time on two sentences simultaneously, one of
36                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

which is subject to ORS 137.635 and one of which is not,
then the earned-time prohibition in ORS 137.635 applies at
all times to the sentence that is subject to ORS 137.635, but
it never applies to the sentence that is not subject to ORS
137.635.”); Woods, 537 P.3d at 977–79 (agreeing with
Samson and reaching same conclusion regarding ORS
137.700).
    If a prisoner is serving credit-eligible and -ineligible
sentences concurrently and the credit-eligible sentence is
shorter than the ineligible one, then the prison is legally
required to award the prisoner earned-time credits on the
shorter sentence, but those earned-time credits would have
no effect on the prisoner’s release date. Because revocation
of those credits would have no effect on the length of time
to be served, a § 1983 claim that would effectively restore
those credits would not lie within the core of habeas and
would not be Heck-barred.
    In Oregon, it is reasonably possible that prisoners are
serving such concurrent sentences. For example, a prisoner
could receive a 60-month sentence for first degree burglary
(ineligible for credits under ORS 137.635 if the prisoner is a
repeat offender with a qualifying previous conviction), to be
served concurrently with a 40-month sentence for attempted
second-degree assault (eligible for credits).4 For another
example, a prisoner could receive a 70-month sentence for
assault in the second degree (ineligible for credits under

4
  This example is close to the circumstances presented in Samson:
Samson received a credit-ineligible 60-month sentence for first degree
burglary, to be served concurrently with a credit-eligible 40-month
sentence for attempted second degree robbery and a credit-eligible 40-
month sentence for attempted second degree assault. 486 P.3d at 60.
                         HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                            37

ORS 137.700), to be served concurrently with a 24-month
sentence for a lesser offense that is eligible for credits.5
    We can’t rule out the real possibility that Hebrard is
serving such concurrent sentences because the record
contains no information about Hebrard’s convictions or
sentences. Consequently, we can’t be certain that Hebrard’s
claim is Heck-barred.
                                   III
    The district court erred in two ways.
    First, the district court erred by concluding that
Hebrard’s § 1983 claim is barred under Heck. For the
reasons explained above, the district court could not know,
on this record, that restoration of Hebrard’s earned-time
credits would necessarily lead to his immediate or speedier
release. If not, his claim does not sound in the core of habeas,
and it is not Heck-barred.
    Second, the district court erred by sua sponte dismissing
Hebrard’s complaint for “failure to state a claim” pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Although Nofziger did not
raise Heck as an affirmative defense, the district court
correctly noted that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) obligates it to
dismiss a case “at any time if the court determines” that the
action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”

5
  Massachusetts has a similar sentencing regime, and there, the courts
have considered cases in which a prisoner’s postconviction credits had
no effect on the duration of custody. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Superintendent, Old Colony Corr. Ctr., 809 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass.
2004) (“Whenever, as here, a sentence on a charge that does not qualify
for good time is being served concurrently with a sentence on a separate
charge that does qualify, it may turn out that good time is of no practical
benefit to the prisoner.”); Rampino v. Superintendent, Old Colony Corr.
Ctr., 814 N.E.2d 1094, 1095–96 (Mass. 2004) (same).
38                       HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

I agree with the majority that, because the district court
dismissed Hebrard’s complaint for failure to state a claim,
we should “affirm the district court’s dismissal of his claim
only if the Heck bar is obvious from the face of his
complaint.” However, I disagree with the majority’s
conclusion that the Heck bar is obvious from the face of
Hebrard’s complaint.6
    In Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, we held that “Heck dismissals” do not
“categorically count as dismissals for failure to state a
claim.” 833 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016). Rather, a Heck
dismissal “may constitute a PLRA strike for failure to state
a claim when Heck’s bar to relief is obvious from the face of
the complaint.” Id.
    Here, the Heck bar was not obvious from the face of
Hebrard’s complaint. As explained above, the only pertinent
fact we know from Hebrard’s complaint is that the
challenged disciplinary action resulted in multiple sanctions,
including revocation of 27 earned-time credits. That fact
alone is simply not enough to establish that restoration of
those credits would necessarily lead to Hebrard’s immediate
or speedier release—and if they would not, then the Heck bar
does not apply.
   Moreover, it was Nofziger’s burden to prove that the
Heck affirmative defense applies—Hebrard was not required

6
  Hebrard argues that Nofziger waived the Heck affirmative defense, but
the majority concludes that Nofziger merely forfeited it. I do not need to
resolve that issue because, even assuming that Nofziger merely forfeited
the Heck defense and the district court was obliged under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) to consider sua sponte whether Hebrard’s complaint
failed to state a claim under Heck, I conclude that the district court erred
in concluding that the Heck bar is obvious on the face of the complaint.
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    39

to plead enough facts in his complaint to show that Heck
does not apply. The majority and I agree that Heck is an
affirmative defense. Therefore, compliance with Heck is
“not a pleading requirement.” Washington, 833 F.3d at 1056.
Even under the PLRA, prisoners are not required “to
specially plead” around affirmative defenses in their
complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007); see
also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex
Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 8 does
not require plaintiffs to plead around affirmative defenses.”
(citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 216)).
    Because it is not obvious from the face of Hebrard’s
complaint that his claim is Heck-barred, and Heck
compliance is not a pleading requirement, the district court
erred in concluding that Hebrard “failed to state a claim”
based on Heck. Further, because Hebrard did not fail to state
a claim, the district court erred in concluding that it was
obliged to dismiss his claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
                              IV
   We don’t know whether Hebrard’s claim is actually
Heck-barred. But even assuming that Nofziger could have
met his burden to prove that Heck applies (and simply
neglected to do so), I fear that the majority’s decision will
have unintended consequences for future cases.
     In effect, the majority’s decision sets a double-standard:
If a prisoner challenges a disciplinary action that revoked
some postconviction credits in a § 1983 complaint, the
defendant may get that complaint dismissed as Heck-barred
(or the court may dismiss sua sponte)—even if the defendant
fails to provide the court with any additional information.
But if the prisoner challenges the same disciplinary action in
40                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

a habeas petition, the prisoner will have to prove not only
that their claim would effectively restore the credits, but also
that restoration of those credits would inevitably lead to their
immediate or earlier release. To meet that burden, the
prisoner would have to provide information about their
convictions, sentences, and the operation of state law—or
else their habeas petition will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
    The majority’s decision also effectively turns the Heck
affirmative defense into a pleading requirement for prisoners
proceeding in forma pauperis under the PLRA, at least in
cases that involve postconviction credits. Unless the prisoner
makes clear on the face of the complaint that restoration of
the prisoner’s credits would not necessarily lead to their
immediate or earlier release, then, under the precedent set by
the majority’s opinion, the district court will be required
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) to sua sponte dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim.
    And what if Hebrard’s claim is not actually Heck-barred
because restoring his earned-time credits would not
necessarily affect the duration of his custody? If so, then the
dismissal of his complaint as Heck-barred was not only
incorrect but unfair, for several reasons.
    Hebrard was proceeding in forma pauperis under the
PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Under § 1915(g), a prisoner who
proceeds in forma pauperis risks incurring a “strike” if their
complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, and a
prisoner who incurs three strikes is barred from proceeding
in forma pauperis in any future claims. Id.; Washington, 833
F.3d at 1054. Because the district court dismissed Hebrard’s
complaint for failure to state a claim, he likely incurred a
                     HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER                    41

strike. If Hebrard’s complaint is not actually Heck-barred,
then that strike is unwarranted.
    Additionally, if Hebrard’s complaint is not actually
Heck-barred, he has no reasonable option for correcting the
error and re-filing his § 1983 claim. In theory, he could
remedy the error by filing a habeas petition that satisfies all
of AEDPA’s exhaustion and procedural requirements,
proving that his claim is not within the core of habeas,
getting his own petition dismissed, and then re-filing his
§ 1983 complaint. This option, however, effectively shifts
the Heck burden of proof from the defendant to the prisoner.
And forcing a prisoner (especially one proceeding in forma
pauperis) to run this gauntlet to remedy an incorrect Heck
dismissal is unduly burdensome.
    In any event, this option is not actually available to
Hebrard because, as the majority notes, he is now time-
barred from filing a habeas petition. And if Hebrard correctly
filed his claim under § 1983, then he is not to blame for
missing that deadline. In Nettles, we noted that AEDPA and
the PLRA impose different requirements, and we predicted
that the “rule that habeas is available only for actions in the
‘core of habeas’” would “give needed clarity to state
prisoners” about whether they should bring their claim in
habeas or under § 1983. 830 F.3d at 932 n.8 & 934. If
Hebrard correctly applied the rule that habeas is available
only for actions in the core of habeas, then he correctly
followed the PLRA’s requirements instead of AEDPA’s.
                            *****
    On this record, we do not have the information we need
to be certain that Hebrard’s claim is within the core of habeas
and properly dismissed as Heck-barred. Because the record
does not include that essential information, the district court
42                   HEBRARD V. NOFZIGER

erred in (1) determining that the Heck bars Hebrard’s claim,
and (2) dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.
Hebrard was not required to plead around the Heck
affirmative defense. Moreover, Nofziger forfeited (and
possibly waived) the Heck affirmative defense and failed to
meet his burden to prove that Heck applies despite having
multiple opportunities to do so. For these reasons, I would
reverse the district court’s dismissal of Hebrard’s § 1983
claim as barred by Heck, and I respectfully dissent.