Court Opinion

ID: 9852312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:28:24.621901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:25.388344
License: Public Domain

BIGGS, Judge
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding of no error by the trial court. It was error to permit Dr. Prakash to testify, without a proper foundation, that the child “was sexually assaulted and [that there was] also maltreatment, emotionally, physically and sexually.” Moreover, on the facts of this case, the testimony was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute plain error, entitling defendant to a new trial.
A qualified expert may testify, like any other witness, to his or her own observations. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979). Further, a medical expert offering testimony in a case involving sexual abuse may testify as to whether these observations are “consistent with” sexual abuse. State v. Aguallo, 322 N.C. 818, 370 S.E.2d 676 (1988) (holding that doctor’s testimony that physical examination was ‘consistent with’ victim’s earlier statements is “vastly different *246from” comments on victim’s credibility); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 357 S.E.2d 359 (1987). However, it is well settled that an expert may not testify that a child “was sexually abused” if the expert’s conclusion is based solely on the child’s account of events. State v. Parker, 350 N.C. 411, 516 S.E.2d 106 (1999); State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 359 S.E.2d 463 (1987); State v. Dick, 126 N.C. App. 312, 485 S.E.2d 88, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 551, 488 S.E.2d 813 (1997). Before an expert may testify unequivocally that abuse did occur, “[t]he State [is] required to lay a sufficient foundation to show that the opinion expressed by [the expert] was really based upon [the expert’s] special expertise, or stated differently, that [the expert] was in a better position than the jury to have an opinion on the subject.” State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 614, 359 S.E.2d 463, 465. Absent this foundation, the expert’s testimony is reduced to a validation of the honesty of the child; such testimony is inadmissible as an improper comment on a witness’s credibility.
The testimony offered by the State in this case is similar to testimony offered in State v. Trent, 320 N.C. 610, 359 S.E.2d 463 and State v. Parker, 111 N.C. App. 359, 432 S.E.2d 705, in which the Court found the opinions inadmissible because the State failed to lay sufficient foundation. A proper foundation must include information other than the child’s statements; such evidence may be emotional, see State v. Youngs, 141 N.C. App. 220, 540 S.E.2d 794 (2000) (psychologist who treated victim for psychological disorders properly permitted to state that in her opinion child had been abused), or physical, see State v. Dick, 126 N.C. App. 312, 485 S.E.2d 88, (abnormality of child’s hymen supported her statements to doctor).
In the instant case, Dr. Prakash testified that she had reviewed an interview between the child and a social worker, Mr. Ragsdale, in which the child repeated her account of the alleged incident, and had conducted a thorough physical examination. Prakash then testified as follows:
Q: Was Stephanie’s history and demeanor consistent with some of the other patients you’ve seen?
A: Well, every case is different. Every history is different.
Q: Stephanie was, did she become tearful or cry or—
A: She was scared, she was scared.
Q: Again, was that unusual or anything different from what vou normally see with a child?
*247A: No. I would be scared too to get examination done at eight years of ase.
Q: Would you say that Stephanie’s history, demeanor and exam was consistent with sexual abuse?
A: Yes.
Q: And why do you say that?
A: Because of this history that I took from her and because of physical examination, too, that is consistent with the history.
Q: You mean she did not allege something where you would expect to find something; is that correct? She didn’t allege a penetration then you don’t find it.
A: I don’t find it.
Q: Dr. Prakash, after discussing the medical history that you received from Mr. Ragsdale and then examining Stephanie, did you reach a medical conclusion?
A: Yes I did.
Q: And what was that conclusion?
A: She was sexually assaulted and also maltreatment, emotionally. physically and sexually.
(emphasis added)
Dr. Prakash’s opinion testimony lacked any real basis beyond her belief in the child’s credibility. On cross-examination, Dr. Prakash testified that the lack of physical findings was consistent with either abuse or with the absence of any abuse. Prakash testified that the child’s demeanor during the examination was essentially normal. The physical examination did not reveal any supporting findings. The child made only one additional visit to Dr. Prakash, for treatment of headaches and abdominal pain. No psychological tests were administered; nor was the child-witness being treated for any ongoing physical or emotional disorders. In sum, the doctor’s testimony that sexual abuse had occurred, “vastly different from” more appropriate testimony about the consistency of her findings with other evidence, lacked a proper foundation and should not have been admitted.
Further, on the facts of this case, the admission of this testimony constituted plain error. There were no witnesses to the alleged inci*248dent other than the child and the defendant. No other witnesses testified to any inappropriate behavior by defendant. No physical injuries were inflicted, and no physical corroboration was presented. Most of the witnesses were “interested;” e.g., the child, her family, and the defendant’s sister. The evidence provided little basis, other than the child’s testimony, for the jury to determine whether the defendant had committed the charged offense. Against this backdrop, Dr. Prakash’s unequivocal and dramatic testimony that the child “was sexually assaulted and also maltreatment, emotionally, physically and sexually” likely “tipped the scales” and determined the outcome of the trial. While there are few more serious crimes than sexual abuse of a child, we must be careful not to disregard the rights of one to protect the rights of another.
The defendant is entitled to a new trial.