Court Opinion

ID: 9407590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:09:20.162426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.042644
License: Public Domain

J-A02023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 DARRICK WA-KEEN BAILEY                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1038 WDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 20, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0014153-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: July 7, 2023

      Appellant, Darrick Wa-Keen Bailey, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on July 20, 2021, as made final by the denial of his

post-sentence motion on August 3, 2021. We affirm, in part, vacate, in part,

and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

      The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.         On

November 27, 2019, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Gino Macioce of the

Pittsburgh Police Department was dispatched to a residence in the East Hills

section of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, following a report of “a violent domestic

[incident] involving a male and female.” N.T. Trial, 4/7/21, at 18-19. Upon

arrival, Officer Macioce met with the victim who “related to the officers that

she was physically assaulted by her intimate partner, [Appellant].” Trial Court

Opinion, 1/18/22, at 2. In particular, the victim stated that the altercation

began after Appellant arrived at her apartment in a “bad mood” and after the
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victim confronted Appellant about living with her without paying bills. Id. at

48. The victim also confronted Appellant about a dinner receipt she found

wherein Appellant spent a large amount of money, causing her to believe that

he had a romantic dinner with another individual. Id. at 80. Thus, the victim

started removing Appellant’s belongings from the apartment. Id. at 49. At

that time, Appellant “began to assault [her].” Trial Court Opinion, 1/18/22,

at 2. Specifically, Appellant

       struck the victim in the head with his fists, bit her and strangled
       her until she became unconscious. [Appellant also] threatened
       [her, stating] that if she called the police[,] he would have
       people find her.

Id.

      Then, Appellant left the victim’s apartment. Shortly thereafter,

       [p]olice officers located [Appellant] not far from the residence.
       [Appellant] fled from the police [] but was eventually
       apprehended. [Appellant also] refused to comply with the
       police officers’ commands but he was eventually taken into
       custody. Marijuana and packaging materials were recovered
       from [Appellant upon his seizure].

Id.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with strangulation; robbery;

intimidation of a witness; simple assault; resisting arrest; possession with

intent to deliver; two counts of possession of a controlled substance; and

possession of drug paraphernalia. The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial

on April 7, 2021, during which the victim, as well as other police officers

testified. During the victim’s testimony, the Commonwealth sought to admit

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five photographs of the victim depicting her injuries from the November 27,

2019 assault.      N.T. Trial, 4/7/21, at 69.    Counsel for Appellant objected,

claiming that the photographs were not provided to Appellant prior to trial.

Id. at 70. While the Commonwealth disputed counsel’s statement, the trial

court accepted defense counsel’s assertion that the photographs “somehow

escaped production.” Id. at 72-73. The court, however overruled counsel’s

objection and the photographs were admitted into evidence. Id. at 73 and

77.     Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant guilty of strangulation,1

intimidation of a witness,2 simple assault,3 resisting arrest,4 and possession of

drug paraphernalia.5

        The matter proceeded to sentencing, which occurred on July 20, 2021.

That day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 36 to 72 months’

imprisonment followed by five years’ probation for Appellant’s conviction for

strangulation. The trial court also imposed a sentence of six to 12 months’

incarceration relating to Appellant’s conviction for intimidation of a witness.

The trial court ordered Appellant’s sentence for intimidation of a witness to

run consecutive to his sentence for strangulation.       No further penalty was

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1).

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(1).

3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

4   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104.

5   35 P.S. §§ 780–113(a)(32).

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imposed as to Appellant’s remaining convictions.              Appellant filed a

post-sentence motion for a new trial on July 28, 2021, which the trial court

denied on August 3, 2021. This timely appeal followed.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
          photographic evidence the Commonwealth failed to turn over
          in mandatory discovery, causing [Appellant] prejudice?

       2. Whether [Appellant’s] sentence [for] [s]trangulation is illegal
          because his aggregate sentence of 132 months is in excess
          of the statutory maximum allowable sentence of 120 months
          under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 106?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      In his first issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting

photographic    evidence   depicting    the   victim’s   injuries   because   the

Commonwealth failed to produce or disclose the photographs in violation of

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573 prior to trial. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant asserts that

admission of the photographs, despite nondisclosure, prejudiced him because

the photographs impermissibly bolstered the victim’s testimony which, he

claims the trial court characterized as “shaky.” Id. at 18. We disagree.

      “We note that questions involving discovery in criminal cases lie within

the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Rucci, 670 A.2d 1129,

1140 (Pa. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1121 (1997). Pennsylvania Rule 573

of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, as follows:

       (B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.

            (1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the
            defendant, and subject to any protective order which the

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            Commonwealth might obtain under this rule, the
            Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant's attorney
            all of the following requested items or information,
            provided they are material to the instant case. The
            Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the
            defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph
            such items.

                                      ***

                 (g) any tangible objects,       including documents,
                 photographs,  fingerprints       or   other  tangible
                 evidence[.]

Pa.R.Crim P. 573(B)(1)(g). If a party fails to comply with Rule 573(B), the

court may

       grant a continuance, or may prohibit such a party from
       introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the
       defendant, or it may enter such other order it deems just under
       the circumstances.

Pa.R.Crim P. 573(E).

      Herein, on February 25, 2020, Appellant asked the Commonwealth to

provide   him   with   information   and   material   discoverable   under   Rule

573B(1)(a-g). Appellant's Pro Se Request for Pre-Trial Discovery, 2/25/20, at

1. Yet, the Commonwealth failed to produce the photographs of the victim’s

injuries to Appellant until trial.   N.T. Trial, 4/7/21, at 72-73.      Delayed

production of materials subject to mandatory disclosure “‘does not[,

however,] automatically entitle [A]ppellant [to relief].’” Commonwealth v.

Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 171 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). To obtain

relief, Appellant must show prejudice. Id. To establish prejudice, Appellant

“must demonstrate how a more timely disclosure would have affected his trial

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strategy or how he was otherwise prejudiced by the alleged late disclosure.”

Id.   Appellant claims he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure

because the photographs, in essence, bolstered the victim’s testimony, which

“was ‘shaky’ according to the trial court.” Appellant’s Brief at 18.

      Initially, we note that, while Appellant argues that the trial court

considered the victim to be a “shaky” witness, the record belies this claim.

The full exchange from which Appellant highlights the court’s statement is as

follows:

       [Defense Counsel]: [] Your Honor, I would argue that the
       Commonwealth has not proven their case beyond a reasonable
       doubt with the exception of possession.

       The court: You want to attack the credibility of [the victim] and
       say that her testimony is such that it does [not] rise to the level
       of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for, among other reasons,
       she argued with him, she went after him after he left, she was
       throwing stuff out of the apartment, showing that she had her
       own aggressive behavior. Fair?

       [Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. In addition to that, I
       would ask you to acknowledge her demeanor and the fact that
       she showed up for court several hours later, because – she
       showed up for court several hours late.

                                      ***

       I [am] not going to go through everything that you just heard
       because we have all been sitting here all morning, but I would
       submit to the court that when you are looking at cases like this,
       you have to look at the credibility of all the witnesses, and I
       would say not just [the victim.]

       The court: All right. [Assistant District Attorney] Stelzer, your
       witness is a little shaky. That [is] what – [defense counsel]
       says your witness is shaky to the point where I should not rely
       on her testimony, which I have to do to find him guilty of the

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        strangulation, the robbery, the intimidation and the assault.
        What do you think?

N.T. Trial, 4/7/21, at 122-124 (superfluous capitalization omitted). Thus, it is

evident that, in making the statement that the victim was a “shaky witness,”

the court was simply summarizing Appellant’s argument, not judging the

victim’s credibility.

      Moreover, a further review of the record undercuts Appellant’s current

claim of prejudice because, as admitted by Appellant’s counsel during trial,

the photographs in question depicted injuries attested to by the victim, as well

as Detective Macioce.     See N.T. Trial, 4/7/21, at 73 (Appellant’s counsel

agreeing with the court’s statement that the photographs “only show what

you already heard about, not a different injury”); see also id. at 72 (the court

asking if the photographs showed “the bruises that the witness already

identified” and included the “ones on her hand and arm, the bite mark, that

kind of thing?” to which the Commonwealth answered in the affirmative).

Indeed, during trial, the victim described the altercation that occurred

between her and Appellant, including that he struck her in the head multiple

times, “choked her up against [the bathroom] wall,” “threw [her] to the

ground,” and bit her arm. Id. at 50, 53, 60-61, at 63. In addition, the victim

specifically described her injuries, stating that she “got bit . . . had marks on

[her] face, the side of [her] face, [her] back” and “had scratches on [her]

neck.” Id. at 66. The victim also showed a scar from the bite mark during

her testimony.      Id. at 63-64.   Importantly, the victim’s testimony was

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corroborated by Detective Macioce, who explained that he responded to the

scene and observed the injuries to the victim’s head, face, neck and upper

right arm. Id. at 20 and 41-42. Hence, in view of the cumulative nature of

the photographs, the prejudicial impact of the photographic evidence, if any,

was de minimus. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim of error fails.

       In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the legality of his sentence

regarding his conviction for strangulation.6 In particular, Appellant claims that

his sentence of 36 to 72 months incarceration, followed by an additional five

years of probation, exceeds the statutory maximum for strangulation.

Appellant’s Brief at 21. We agree.

       The relevant standard and scope of review are as follows:

        [T]he determination as to whether the trial court imposed an
        illegal sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in
        cases dealing with questions of law is plenary. This case will
        also necessarily call upon us to engage in statutory
        construction, which similarly presents a pure question of law
        and also implicates the legality of [the] sentence. Thus, our
        standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
        plenary.

____________________________________________

6 In general, issues not properly raised and preserved before the trial court
“are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P.
302(a). “A challenge that implicates the legality of an appellant's sentence,
however, is an exception to this issue preservation requirement.”
Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1196 (Pa. 2022). “Stated
succinctly, an appellate court can address an appellant's challenge to the
legality of his sentence even if that issue was not preserved in the trial court;
indeed, an appellate court may [even] raise and address such an issue sua
sponte.” Id.; Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399, 407 (Pa. 2020). Hence,
because Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence, his failure to raise
the claim by way of post-sentence motion does not preclude our review.

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Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

       It is well-settled that a sentencing court “may imposed a split sentence

including both incarceration and probation.”     Commonwealth v. Eid, 249

A.3d 1030, 1036 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). “When determining the lawful

maximum allowable on a split sentence, [however,] the time originally

imposed cannot exceed the statutory maximum.”             Commonwealth v.

Crump, 995 A.2d 1280-1283 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Thus, where the maximum

is ten years, a defendant cannot receive a term of incarceration of three to six

years followed by five years probation.” Id.

       Herein, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 36 to 72 months’

incarceration, followed by a five-year term of probation, for his strangulation

conviction, a felony of the second degree. Hence, the trial court imposed a

maximum sentence of 132 months (11 years), which exceeds the statutory

maximum. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 106(b)(3) (“A crime is a felony of the second

degree if it is so designated in this title or if a person convicted thereof may

be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more

than ten years.”). As such, the trial court imposed an illegal sentence under

Section 106(b)(3).7

____________________________________________

7  Both the Commonwealth and the trial court agreed with Appellant’s
contention that he received an illegal sentence with respect to his conviction
for strangulation. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/18/22, at 4-5; see also
Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-18.

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      Based upon the foregoing, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence

with respect to his strangulation conviction and remand for resentencing. In

all other respects, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed, in part, and vacated, in part.    Case

remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2023

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