Court Opinion

ID: 2965098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:24.878885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:05.431630
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 97-1321

                         IN THE MATTER OF:  THE COMPLAINT OF
                             METLIFE CAPITAL CORP., ETC.,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                 ____________________

                         COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellees,

                                          v.

                             M/V EMILY S., ETC., ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

          No. 97-1322

                    IN THE MATTER OF:  BUNKER GROUP, INC., ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                 ____________________

                         COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellees,

                                          v.

                             M/V EMILY S., ETC., ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                             and Keeton,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                                _____________________

               Michael  Mirande, with  whom Robert  F.  Bakemeier, Bogle  &
               ________________             _____________________  ________
          Gates P.L.L.C., Jos   E. Alfaro-Delgado and Calvesbert,  Alfaro &
          ______________  _______________________     _____________________
          L pez-Conway  were  on   brief  for  appellant   Metlife  Capital
          ____________
          Corporation.
               John M. Woods, with whom  Andrew J. Garger, Thacher Proffitt
               _____________             ________________  ________________
          & Wood,  William  A. Graffam,  Patricia  A. Garrity  and  Jim nez
          ______   ___________________   ____________________       _______
          Graffam & Lausell were on brief for appellant Bunker Group, Inc.
          _________________
               Mee Lon Lam,  Trial Attorney, Torts Branch,  Civil Division,
               ___________
          U.S. Department of Justice, with  whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant
                                                 _______________
          Attorney General,  Civil  Division,  and  Guillermo  Gil,  United
                                                    ______________
          States  Attorney, were  on  brief for  appellee United  States of
          America.
               Antonio  J.  Rodr guez,  with  whom  Rice  Fowler,  Jos   A.
               ______________________               ____________   ________
          Fuentes-Agostini, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Puerto  Rico,
          ________________
          John F.  Nevares and Smith &  Nevares were on brief  for appellee
          ________________     ________________
          Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 24, 1997
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                                         -2-

                    TORRUELLA,   Chief   Judge.      These   two   actions,
                    TORRUELLA,   Chief   Judge.
                                 _____________

          consolidated for  appeal, challenge  the district  court's ruling

          that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"), 33 U.S.C.    2701-61,

          repealed  the Limitation  of Shipowner's  Liability  Act of  1851

          ("Limitation Act"),  46 U.S.C.  app.    181-96,  as to  oil spill

          claims for removal  costs and damages arising under  the OPA.  We

          hold that  claims arising  under the OPA  (for pollution  removal

          costs  and  damages)  are  not  subject  to  the  substantive  or

          procedural  law of  the Limitation  Act  or to  the concursus  of

          claims  under  Rule  F  of the  Supplemental  Rules  for  Certain

          Admiralty  and Maritime  Claims  of the  Federal  Rules of  Civil

          Procedure ("Rule F").

                                    I.  BACKGROUND
                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                    On January 7, 1994, the towing wire between the tug M/V

          EMILY  S and  the barge  MORRIS J.  BERMAN parted,  grounding the

          barge  off  of Punta  Escambr n,  San  Juan,  Puerto Rico.    The

          grounding caused much of the MORRIS J. BERMAN's cargo of fuel oil

          to spill into the waters of the Commonwealth  of Puerto Rico (the

          "Commonwealth").  Soon after the spill, the Commonwealth  filed a

          damages action  in  the  United States  District  Court  for  the

          District of Puerto Rico naming numerous defendants including: (i)

          the demise charterer  of the EMILY S Bunker  Group, Inc. ("BGI");

          (ii) the operator  of the EMILY S Bunker Group  Puerto Rico, Inc.

          ("BGPR"); (iii)  the owner and  operator of the MORRIS  J. BERMAN

          and the  co-demise charterer  of the EMILY  S New  England Marine

                                         -3-

          Services ("NEMS"); (iv) the owner  of the EMILY S MetLife Capital

          Corporation  ("MetLife");  and (v)  the  EMILY  S  in rem.    The
                                                             __ ___

          Commonwealth arrested the  EMILY S and  sought damages under  the

          OPA,  general  federal   maritime  law,  and  Puerto   Rico  law.

          Subsequently,  several  other  civil actions  were  filed  in the

          District of Puerto Rico by private parties seeking recovery under

          a variety of  theories for  damages.  Each  of these actions  was

          either consolidated with the Commonwealth's action or dismissed.

                    Within  six months  of the  oil  spill, the  appellants

          NEMS, BGI,  and BGPR (collectively,  the "Bunker Group")  filed a

          complaint   under  the  Limitation   Act  and  Rule   F,  seeking

          exoneration from or  limitation of liability.  At  the same time,

          the appellant MetLife, as owner of  the EMILY S, filed a separate

          action  under  the Limitation  Act.    On  August 25,  1994,  the

          district court issued  a notice  to claimants  of the  limitation

          actions  and an order  of injunction, or  monition, enjoining the

          commencement of any actions against the limitation plaintiffs for

          claims  arising out  of the  grounding  of the  barge except  for

          actions filed in the limitation proceeding.  The monition created

          a concursus  of all claims  in a single  consolidated proceeding.

          NEMS,  BGI,  BGPR,  and  MetLife  (the  "Limitation  Plaintiffs")

          provided notice  to  actual claimants  as  well as  to  potential

          claimants in a Notice of  Monition in the newspaper El  Nuevo D a
                                                              _____________

          on August  26, 1994, directing  them to  file their claims  on or

          before October 15, 1994.

                    At   the  conclusion  of   the  monition   period,  the

                                         -4-

          Limitation  Plaintiffs filed motions for entry of default against

          all  persons  who   failed  to  file.     Subsequently,  numerous

          claimants,  including the Commonwealth and the United States (the

          "Government"),  filed  actions  in  the  limitation  proceedings,

          seeking recovery  of damages under the OPA, general maritime law,

          and other law.   In their claims,  both the Commonwealth and  the

          Government asserted that  their OPA claims should not  be subject

          to concursus.

                    Three other claimants,  Hilton International of  Puerto

          Rico,  Inc., Puerto Rico  Tourism Company, and  Hotel Development

          Corporation (collectively, the "Hilton claimants"), filed  claims

          under   seal   in   the   limitation   proceedings  while   their

          administrative  claims, which  had already  been  filed with  the

          National  Pollution Funds  Center ("NPFC"),  were  pending.   The

          Hilton  claimants  simultaneously  moved the  district  court for

          relief in  order to  preserve their OPA  claims if  they withdrew

          them from the concursus.  On June  28, 1996,  the district  court

          issued  an  order  suspending  the  August  25,  1994  order   of

          injunction  issued in  the limitation  proceedings.   This  order

          allows  "any  claims  for  oil  spill  removal  costs or  damages

          resulting from or in any way  connected with the grounding of the

          barge  MORRIS  J.  BERMAN  on  January 7,  1994  to  be  asserted

          independently  of  the  limitation  of  liability   proceedings."

          Subsequent to the  issuance of  the order,  the Hilton  claimants

          withdrew their limitation  claims in order to proceed  with their

          administrative  claims before the  NPFC.  However,  their motions

                                         -5-

          served as the vehicle for  all parties to brief the  question now

          presented to this court.  On August 7, 1996, the appellants NEMS,

          BGI, BGPR,  and MetLife timely filed this  appeal of the June 28,

          1996 order.

                                         -6-

                                   II.  DISCUSSION
                                   II.  DISCUSSION

                    Interpretations  of  federal  statutes  and  rules  are

          subject to de  novo review.  See Strickland  v. Commissioner, Me.
                     __  ____          ___ __________     _________________

          Dept. of Human Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996).
          _____________________

                    A.  The Limitation Act and the OPA
                    A.  The Limitation Act and the OPA

                    The  Limitation  Act  was enacted  in  1851  to promote

          shipbuilding and  to induce  investment in  the growing  American

          shipping  industry.    See  Hartford Accident  &  Indem.  Co.  v.
                                 ___  _________________________________

          Southern  Pac. Co.,  273 U.S.  207 (1927).   The law  permits the
          __________________

          shipowner to limit his or her  liability as to certain claims for

          damages arising  out of the  voyage of his  or her vessel  to the

          post-accident value of  the vessel plus pending freight.   See 46
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.    183, 186.

                    Rule  F  governs  the  filing  and  adjudication  of  a

          limitation action.   The  vessel owner must  file a  complaint no

          later  than  six months  after  receipt  of a  claim  as  well as

          depositing the amount of the limitation fund with the court.  See
                                                                        ___

          Rule F(1).  Rule F concursus, once  referred to as the "heart" of

          a limitation action, Maryland Cas.  Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409,
                               __________________    _______

          417 (1954),  requires multiple claimants  to pursue  relief in  a

          single forum and marshals the assets of a limited fund.  See Rule
                                                                   ___

          F(3),  F(7).   Concursus is  intended  to provide  a "prompt  and

          economical disposition to  controversies."  Cushing, 347  U.S. at
                                                      _______

          415.  Today, many question the  continued usefulness and vitality

          of  the Limitation  Act.    See, e.g.,  2  Thomas J.  Schoenbaum,
                                      ___  ____

          Admiralty and  Maritime Law (2d  ed. 1994) (the  Limitation Act's
          ___________________________

                                         -7-

          "original purpose . . . seems to have lost much of its force with

          the availability of insurance, bills of lading statutes  that put

          substantial  limits on liability for  cargo loss, and the ability

          to limit  claims  by contract").    However, Congress  has  never

          repealed  the act,  and therefore,  courts continue to  apply it.

          See, e.g., Keller v. Jennette, 940 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass. 1996).
          ___  ____  ______    ________

                    The Oil  Pollution Act  was passed in  the wake  of the

          1989   Exxon  Valdez   tanker  disaster   and   created  a   more

          comprehensive  compensation and  liability scheme  for oil  spill

          pollution than had  existed under earlier legislation.   Prior to

          the  OPA, the  Federal  Water  Pollution  Control  Act  ("FWPCA")

          (commonly known as the Clean  Water Act), 33 U.S.C.    1251-1387,

          provided  liability  limitations  for federal  pollution  removal

          costs associated with  oil spills.  See  id.   1321(c).   The OPA
                                              ___  __

          imposes  strict liability for pollution removal costs and damages

          on the "responsible party" for a vessel  or a facility from which

          oil is discharged.  See 33 U.S.C.   2702(a).  Responsible parties
                              ___

          include owners, operators, or demise charterers of a vessel.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.   2701(32).
          __

                    The  OPA limits  the  liability of  responsible parties

          based upon the type of vessel and its tonnage.  For tank vessels,

          the limit can be as high as $10 million.  Id.    2704(a)(1).  For
                                                    __

          all other vessels, the limit is the greater of $600 per gross ton

          or $500,000.   Id.    2704(a)(2).   Responsible parties  may face
                         __

          unlimited  liability for, inter alia, acts of gross negligence or
                                    _____ ____

          willful misconduct.  In addition, state law applies free of these

                                         -8-

          liability limits.  See id.    2718(a), 2718(b).  Finally, the OPA
                             ___ __

          consolidated previously established oil  pollution funds into the

          Oil Spill Liability  Trust Fund (the  "Fund"), which pays  claims

          brought under the OPA after they have first been presented to the

          responsible party,  if the  responsible party  is  entitled to  a

          defense,  or  the  liability limit  under  the  statute has  been

          reached.  See 33 U.S.C.    2708(a), 2713(b)(1)(B).  See generally
                    ___                                       ___ _________

          Schoenbaum, supra, at 384.
                      _____

                    B.  The OPA's Impact on the Limitation Act
                    B.  The OPA's Impact on the Limitation Act

                    The  OPA specifically  addresses its  relationship with

          the Limitation Act and other legislation when it states:

                      Notwithstanding  any  other  provision or
                      _________________________________________
                      rule   of  law,   and   subject  to   the
                      ______________
                      provisions   of   this    chapter,   each
                      responsible  party  for  a  vessel  or  a
                      facility from which oil is discharged, or
                      which poses  the substantial threat  of a
                      discharge of oil, . . . is liable for the
                      removal  costs and  damages specified  in
                      subsection  (b)  that  result  from  such
                      incident.

          33 U.S.C.   2702(a) (emphasis added).   Appellant MetLife asserts

          that  this provision imposes the OPA's increased liability limits

          notwithstanding any previously  applicable limitations under  the
                                                     ___________

          Limitation Act,  but does  not eviscerate  preexisting limitation

          procedure under the Limitation Act.   Thus, the appellant argues,
          _________

          Limitation  Act  concursus   remains  available  to   responsible

          parties.

                    However, a  plain reading  of  the subsection  suggests

          that the OPA repealed the  Limitation Act with respect to removal

          cost and damages  claims against responsible parties.   See In re
                                                                  ___ _____

                                         -9-

          JAHRE SPRAY II K/S, 1996  WL 451315, *4 (D.N.J. 1996);  accord In
          __________________                                      ______ __

          re Odin Marine  Corp., No. 96-5438, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y.  Aug.
          _____________________

          7, 1997); Tug Capt. Fred Bouchard Corp.  v. M/V BALSA 37, No. 93-
                    _____________________________     ____________

          1321, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 1996).   Accordingly, the

          procedural  rules  incorporated  into  the  Limitation   Act  are

          inapplicable as well  to such  claims.   In interpreting  similar

          language  in  the FWPCA,  courts  have  held  that the  statute's

          "notwithstanding" phrase precludes application of the  Limitation

          Act to  claims by the  United States for FWPCA  pollution removal

          costs.  See  In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340 (2d Cir.
                  ___  ________________________

          1981); In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.  Supp. 631, 643
                 __________________________________

          (D.  Alaska 1981).   See  also  Schoenbaum, supra,  at 376  ("OPA
                               _________  __________  _____

          broadly supersedes the  Limitation of Liability Act  with respect

          to damages  and removal costs  under both federal and  state law,

          including common  law").   We find these  cases to  be persuasive

          because  "[n]either the  language  of  OPA  nor  its  legislative

          history  suggests  that  OPA's  provisions  should  be  construed

          contrary  to the  settled law  applicable to  FWPCA when  OPA was

          enacted."   William M.  Duncan, The Oil  Pollution Act  of 1990's

          Effect  on the Shipowner's Limitation of  Liability Act, 5 U.S.F.

          L. Rev. 303, 316 (1993).

                    In addition to the  "notwithstanding" clause, at  least

          four  other provisions  in  the  statute  explicitly  repeal  the

          Limitation Act with  respect to certain types of claims.   See 33
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.    2702(d)(1)(A) (repealing the Limitation Act as to third

          parties solely responsible  for a spill); 2718(a)  (repealing the

                                         -10-

          Limitation  Act  as  to  state  and  local  statutory  remedies);

          2718(c)(1)  (repealing  the  Limitation   Act  as  to  additional

          liability  imposed by the United  States, any state, or political

          subdivision);  2718(c)(2)  (repealing the  Limitation  Act  as to

          fines  or penalties).   The  appellants contend that,  outside of

          these specific instances,  the Limitation Act continues  to apply

          to the OPA.  The Bunker Group, citing one commentator, notes that

          "[i]f Congress'  intent in  enacting OPA  had been  to completely

          repeal  the Limitation  Act,  it  would  not  have  painstakingly

          repealed  it only  with  respect to  certain  types of  actions."

          Duncan, supra, at 319.
                  _____

                    When  we  consider  these  five  OPA  provisions  which

          explicitly repeal the  Limitation Act as well as  others that are

          irreconcilably in conflict,  see infra, we find that  the OPA has
                                       ___ _____

          repealed  the  Limitation Act  as to  oil spill  pollution claims

          arising under the OPA in  the instant case.  "'[W]here provisions

          in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act  to

          the extent of  the conflict constitutes an implied  repeal of the

          earlier one . . . .'"   See Radzanower v. Touche Ross &  Co., 426
                                  ___ __________    __________________

          U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting  Posadas v. National City Bank, 296
                                         _______    __________________

          U.S.   497,   503   (1936)  (noting   standard   for   repeal  by

          implication)). 

                    While  the   repeal  of  statutes  by   implication  is

          disfavored, see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189
                      ___ ______________________    ____

          (1978),  several key provisions  of the two  statutes are plainly

          inconsistent.  First,  the Limitation Act limits  the shipowner's

                                         -11-

          liability to the  post-accident value of the  vessel plus pending

          freight, 46  U.S.C.    183, while the  OPA contemplates  a strict

          liability regime with statutory limits of at least $2 million for

          tanks vessels and $.5 million for  all other vessels.  33  U.S.C.

             2702, 2704.  Moreover,  in certain instances, the OPA  imposes

          virtually unlimited liability on  the responsible party.   See 33
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.    2704(c).  Second, the provisions on jurisdiction are in

          obvious  tension.   Only federal  courts  have jurisdiction  over

          limitation  proceedings.   See,  e.g.,  Complaint  of  Dammers  &
                                     ___   ____   _________________________

          Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V., 836 F.2d 750, 755
          ______________________________________________

          (2d Cir.  1988).  In  contrast, the OPA grants  federal and state
                                                                  _________

          courts jurisdiction  to decide  oil pollution  cases.  33  U.S.C.

             2717(b), 2717(c).    Finally, the  provisions of  Rule F,  the

          procedural  rule that implements  and which is  incorporated into

          the Limitation Act,  cannot be  reconciled with  sections of  the

          OPA.  See Part C, infra.
                ___         _____

                    Even assuming arguendo that  the language is ambiguous,
                                  ________

          the legislative history  is consistent  with our  interpretation.

          As  this  court has  noted,  the  "chief objective  of  statutory

          interpretation   is  to   give   effect  to   legislative  will."

          Passamaquoddy Tribe v. State of Me., 75 F.3d 784 (1st Cir. 1996).
          ___________________    ____________

          In considering the OPA's liability provision, Congress stated:

                      Liability under  this Act  is established
                      notwithstanding  any  other  provision or
                      rule of  the law.   This  means that  the
                      liability  provisions of  this Act  would
                      govern   limitations   compensation   for
                      removal costs and damages notwithstanding
                      any limitations  under existing  statutes
                      such as the act of March 3, 1851 . . . .

                                         -12-

          H.R. Conf.  Rep. No.  101-653, at 103  (1990), reprinted  in 1990
                                                         _____________

          U.S.C.C.A.N.  779,  781  (Joint   Explanatory  Statement  of  the

          Conference  Committee explaining    2702(a)).   Furthermore,  the

          Senate Report  on the OPA  bill asserts that the  OPA "completely

          supersedes  the  1851  statute with  respect  to  oil pollution."

          S. Rep. No. 101-94,at 14, reprinted in 1990U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 736.
                                    ____________

                    More  generally,  as  the  Ninth  Circuit  reasoned  in

          finding an implicit repeal of the Limitation Act by the liability

          provisions  of the  Trans-Alaska Pipeline  Authorization Act,  43

          U.S.C.    1651-1655, "[a]pplication of the Limitation Act to [the

          OPA]  would   frustrate  completely  [the   OPA]'s  comprehensive

          remedial nature."  See In re Glacier  Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 583 (9th
                             ___ __________________

          Cir.  1991).   "The purpose  of OPA,  as well  as other  remedial

          legislation   passed  by  Congress  and  the  states  to  address

          environmental  disasters such  as oil  spills,  was to  encourage

          rapid private party responses."   JAHRE SPRAY, 1996 WL 451315, at
                                            ___________

          *4.  However, the Limitation  Act "allows vessel owners virtually

          to eliminate liability  for catastrophic damages."   Glacier Bay,
                                                               ___________

          944  F.2d at 583.   Hence, the OPA's  scheme is in irreconcilable

          conflict with the Limitation Act.

                    Some  claims  arising  from an  incident  in  which oil

          pollution occurs do not escape  the Limitation Act.  For example,

          that Act  remains in  force for general  maritime claims  such as

          maritime tort  actions for harms to  persons or vessels.   See 33
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.     2751(e)  ("[e]xcept  as  otherwise  provided  in  this

          chapter,  this  chapter does  not  affect  .  . .  admiralty  and

                                         -13-

          maritime law").   The district  court below, in keeping  with the

          OPA's savings  provision in    2751(e),  reserved the  Limitation

          Plaintiffs'  right "to  seek limitation  of  liability for  those

          claims   subject   to  reduction   under  the   Limitation  Act."

          Therefore,  the  Bunker  Group's  contention  that  the  district

          court's order exempts  from Rule F  concursus all claims  arising

          from  the grounding, whether or not they  arise under the OPA, is

          without merit.  The appellants remain free to avail themselves of

          the Limitation Act and Rule F concursus for their non-OPA claims.

                    C.  The Independent Application of Rule F Concursus
                    C.  The Independent Application of Rule F Concursus

                    The  appellants claim that  even if the  OPA supersedes

          the Limitation Act, because the OPA fails to provide any guidance

          on the  procedure  necessary to  implement it,  Rule F  concursus

          applies to  actions under the OPA independently of the Limitation

          Act.  To support their  contention, the appellants note that Rule

          F  is  framed  generally  to  address  "limitation  of  liability

          pursuant to statute."  Rule F(1).  Rule F was originally  written
                      _______

          by the Supreme Court  to implement the 1851  Limitation Act.   In

          redrafting  the rules,  the Supreme  Court  substituted a  direct

          reference to  the 1851 statute  in Rule F  with the "pursuant  to

          statute"  language, which we find  reveals a more general purpose

          for Rule F.

                    We  conclude, however,  that Rule  F's requirements  on

          venue and limitation of  liability cannot be reconciled  with the

          OPA's provisions  regarding oil spill  damages.  Under Rule  F, a

          limitation of liability  proceeding may be commenced  only in the

                                         -14-

          district where the vessel has  been seized, or if the  vessel has

          not been  seized, in  any district  in which  the owner  has been

          sued.  See Rule F(9).  If neither the vessel has  been seized nor
                 ___

          action commenced against the owner, the limitation  action may be

          filed in the district where the vessel may be.  See id.  Venue is
                                                          ___ __

          proper in any district only if there is no pending litigation and

          the vessel  is not within any district.  See  id.  Under the OPA,
                                                   ___  __

          in  contrast,  venue is  proper  in  any  district in  which  the

          discharge of oil or  injury or damages occurred, or  in which the

          defendant resides, may be found, has its principal office, or has

          appointed an agent for service of process.  33  U.S.C.   2717(b).

          Thus, the  OPA offers claimants  a much broader choice  of forums

          while  Rule   F's  venue  requirements   are  significantly  more

          restrictive.

                    Rule  F's deadline for claims is also inconsistent with

          the OPA's  statute of  limitation.  Once  a limitation  action is

          commenced, the court issues a  notice to claimants requiring them

          to file  their claims by the date fixed  in the notice.  See Rule
                                                                   ___

          F(4).   The court may fix a date that requires claims to be filed

          in  as little as 30 days  after issuance of the  notice.  Id.  In
                                                                    __

          the  instant case,  the monition period  terminated approximately

          ten months  after the date  of the MORRIS J.  BERMAN's grounding.

          The  OPA, however,  allows claimants  three years to  commence an

          action to  recover removal costs and  damages.  See 33  U.S.C.   
                                                          ___

          2717(f)(1),  2717(f)(2).  In addition, if the claimant decides to

          seek  recovery from  the  Fund,  the claimant  has  six years  to

                                         -15-

          present removal  costs claims,  see 33  U.S.C.    2712(h)(1), and
                                          ___

          three  years to  present damage  claims.   See id.    2712(h)(2).
                                                     ___ __

          Finally,  section 2717(f)(4)  extends the  limitation period  for

          subrogation actions by  three years from the date the Fund pays a

          subrogated claim.  See 33 U.S.C.   2717(f)(4).
                             ___

                    One  concern we have  with the shortened  claims period

          under  Rule F is that it would  interfere with the United States'

          subrogation  rights under  the  OPA.   If  oil  spill claims  are

          subject  to Rule  F concursus,  claimants who  are barred  by the

          court imposed  deadline from  recovering against  the responsible

          party, are likely  to present their claims to the Fund.  Once the

          Fund  pays a  claim, the  United  States acquires  all rights  of

          subrogation.  See 33 U.S.C.     2712(f), 2713, 2715(a).  However,
                        ___

          at that point, the United States may then be denied access to the

          proceedings against  the responsible party, and consequently, the

          Fund will bear the financial burden of these late claims.

                    The  appellants   respond  that,  under  Rule   F,  the

          government's subrogation rights do not  necessarily lapse because

          "[f]or cause shown,  the court may enlarge the  time within which

          claims may  be  filed."   Rule  F(4).   We  believe  though  that

          subjecting  the government's subrogation rights to the discretion

          of the trial court in every oil spill action  fails to adequately

          secure those rights.   Congress specifically examined  this issue

          in creating the OPA's statute of limitation and giving the courts

          discretion  over this matter  is contrary to  legislative intent.

          Moreover,  even if the  courts consistently enlarge  the monition

                                         -16-

          period for  subrogation claims,  in many  instances, the  limited

          fund established  by the  concursus procedure  will already  have

          been exhausted.

                    Finally,  contrary to  the appellants'  contention that

          the OPA  fails to provide  any procedural guidance, the  OPA does
                                     ___

          establish a  claims procedure.   The OPA requires all  claims for

          removal costs or damages to be presented first to the responsible

          party or guarantor.  See 33 U.S.C.   2713(a).  If the responsible
                               ___

          party  denies liability  or the  claim is  not settled  within 90

          days, the claimant  may proceed against the  responsible party in

          court or present the claim  to the Fund.  See id.    2713(c).  In
                                                    ___ __

          some  enumerated instances, claims  may be presented  directly to

          the Fund without first presenting them to  the responsible party.

          See  id.    2713(b).   "The  purpose  of  the  claim presentation
          ___  __

          procedure  is   to  promote  settlement  and  avoid  litigation."

          Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 830 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Va.
          _______    _____________________

          1993).  In contrast to the OPA's claims procedure, Rule F  forces

          all claimants  into litigation  against the vessel  owner.   If a

          claimant  fails to  appear in  the limitation  action within  the

          monition period, he  or she is enjoined from  raising any claims.

          See Rule  F(3).   In view of  these inconsistencies,  we conclude
          ___

          that Rule F  concursus even if independent of  the Limitation Act

          is inapplicable to OPA claims.

                                   III.  CONCLUSION
                                   III.  CONCLUSION

                    For  the reasons stated  in this opinion,  the district

                                         -17-

          court's order is affirmed.
                           affirmed.
                           ________

                    Costs to be assessed against appellants.

                                         -18-