Court Opinion

ID: 9676625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:28:54.323018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.829184
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting in Landrum). We agree with the result and much of the reasoning set forth in Justice Archer’s dissenting opinion. We write separately to address the following:
1) A woman’s right to use force — deadly force if necessary — to prevent a sexual assault.
2) The adequacy of the trial court’s instructions regarding Landrum’s claim of self-defense.
3) Gross-negligence involuntary manslaughter *551as it relates to the excessive use of force in self-defense, and "unlawful-act” involuntary manslaughter in general.
4) The "objective” theory of self-defense — an issue not raised in the instant cases yet discussed in the lead opinion.
i
The lead opinion would hold that a woman1 is permitted to use deadly force to prevent a sexual assault only when she has an honest and reasonable belief that she is in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm.2 The opinion would thus apply general principles of the law of self-defense —which permit a person to use deadly force only to prevent death or serious bodily harm — to the situation where a woman is confronted with a possible sexual assault.3 In determining whether a *552woman is threatened with "death or serious bodily harm,” the opinion focuses on the means by which the assailant attempts to accomplish his criminal object.4
The lead opinion does not consider the unique characteristics of a sexual assault that justify a woman’s use of force — deadly force if necessary— whether or not she believes that she is in danger of imminent death or other serious bodily harm.
A
Instead of focusing on whether the assailant presents a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm in furtherance of the sexual assault, we would focus on whether the woman consented to the sexual activity with which she was confronted. Nonconsensual intercourse — whether or not it is accompanied by a belief that one is in danger of imminent death or other serious bodily harm — is an attack on a woman’s autonomy and bodily integrity.
A woman’s right to determine who will have access to her body — and under what conditions — is a fundamental component of her individual autonomy. The quality of a woman’s autonomy suffers when she is subjected to a physical assault. When the assault is a sexual assault, the damage to a woman’s autonomy is even more severe.
Sex is a personal matter which often is a medium for the expression of fundamental human emotions. A woman’s ability to express basic human emotions may suffer when another person gains sexual access to her body without her consent.
Nonconsensual intercourse is a profoundly *553harmful experience whether or not a woman believes she is in danger of imminent death or other serious bodily harm. Nonconsensual intercourse— in itself — is a form of "serious bodily harm” included within the common-law definition of the threatened injuries that justify the use of deadly force.5 It is a bodily invasion immeasurably more severe than a nonconsensual injection with a hypodermic needle. It may often cause other significant physical, emotional, and psychological injuries.
We would hold that a woman is entitled to use force — deadly force if necessary — to prevent any nonconsensual intercourse. It is enough that the woman — for whatever reason — does not consent to have sex with the assailant.6
B
The lead opinion cites § 520b(l)(f)(iii) of the Penal Code, which proscribes as first-degree criminal sexual conduct sexual penetration accomplished by a threat of future retaliation,7 in arguing against *554the adoption of a blanket rule that would require a trial court to instruct the jury that a woman is entitled to use force to prevent any "forcible” rape.8 The opinion explains that "[ujnlike common-law rape, under these statutory provisions, forcible criminal sexual conduct may arise from circumstances in which the victim never had an honest and reasonable belief that his life is in imminent danger or threat of serious bodily harm.”9 On the basis that the woman in such a case would fear future — as opposed to imminent — death or serious bodily harm, it is said that she would not be justified in using deadly force to prevent this form of sexual assault.
The analysis in the lead opinion ignores that nonconsensual intercourse — in itself — is a form of "serious bodily harm” that justifies the use of deadly force. Whether an assailant says "Submit or I will kill you now,” or "Submit or I will kill you next week,” a woman is confronted with the threat of imminent nonconsensual intercourse. It is the possibility of imminent infliction of that harm — not the possibility of imminent or future infliction of some other "serious bodily harm”— that entitles a woman to use force to prevent the sexual assault.10_
*555The lead opinion says that a woman is entitled to use deadly force to prevent "common-law rape.”11 At common law, "rape” was sexual intercourse accompanied by a significant physical struggle between the assailant and the victim.12 The present statutory scheme, however, proscribes as first-degree criminal sexual conduct nonconsensual intercourse that might not have constituted rape at common law.13
The lead opinion regards the difference between common-law rape and statutory criminal sexual conduct as a reason why trial courts should not be required to instruct on self-defense whenever a woman is confronted with a potential "rape.”14 The difference, however, reflects a legislative judgment —a judgment that should inform this Court’s decision — that nonconsensual intercourse may constitute a serious bodily harm whether or not broken bones and bruises are also threatened or actually occur. There is no basis in logic or legislation for the adoption of a doctrine of "rape plus,” under which the threat of imminent nonconsensual inter*556course is insufficient to justify the use of force— deadly force if necessary — unless there is also a threat of imminent other "serious bodily harm.”
If the Court were to rule that nonconsensual intercourse is not in itself "serious bodily harm,” then a woman who is told "Submit, and I won’t hurt you,” might not be justified in using significant force to prevent the unwanted sexual advance. There would be no need to resist to avoid "physical injury.” The only purpose of resistance would be to avoid being "raped.” Resistance might result in an escalation of a confrontation which theretofore had not posed a threat of "physical injury.” It might be urged that the woman should be seen as the initial aggressor,15 and that she could not regain the right of self-defense unless she withdrew and clearly communicated her intention to do so. And that was, indeed, the prosecutor’s theory and argument in this case.
c
The lead opinion would hold that "a trial court should instruct the jury that a person may use deadly force in self-defense to repel a criminal sexual assault when confronted with force that the person reasonably believes could result in imminent death or serious bodily harm.”16 The opinion would not require a trial court to expressly instruct the jury that a woman may use deadly force to prevent a particular form of threatened sexual assault or that threatened sexual assault constitutes "serious bodily harm” as a matter of law.
*557We all would agree that a sexual assault causes extremely serious harm — harm that cannot be adequately measured in terms of broken bones and bruises. We also would all agree that under certain circumstances a woman is entitled to use force — deadly force if necessary — to prevent a threatened sexual assault. We disagree how to clearly inform the jury that a woman is entitled to use such force.17
A court does not adequately inform the jury that a woman is entitled to use deadly force to prevent a threatened sexual assault when it instructs the jury that a woman is entitled to use deadly force to prevent "serious bodily harm.” The common-law formulation is inadequate — not because sexual assault is not a "serious harm” — but because in some situations a significant portion of the harm caused by a sexual assault might not be characterized by the jury as "bodily harm.”
In common parlance, "bodily harm” refers to physical — not psychological or emotional — injury.18 In many cases, however, the violation of a woman’s bodily autonomy and the accompanying psychological and emotional trauma may be the most severe and long-lasting injury. As trial courts customarily instruct the jury, a woman’s fear of those harms does not support her claim of self-defense.
This Court has the luxury of interpreting common-law formulations to reach a correct result. The Court can say that a tomato is a vegetable even though it is a fruit. A jury, however, is instructed that it has a duty to apply the law as explained by the court. If a court instructs the jury that a woman is entitled to use deadly force *558to prevent "serious bodily harm” and the jury finds that the woman used deadly force to prevent serious nonbodily harm, the jury is obligated to reject the woman’s claim of self-defense. Although the jury has the power to disregard the court’s instructions on the law, this Court does not ordinarily assume that the jury will do so.
In many cases, a jury will conclude — despite a needlessly opaque instruction — that a threatened sexual assault was "serious bodily harm” and that the woman was entitled to use deadly force to prevent the assault. In other cases, however, a jury might not conclude that a particular form of threatened sexual assault is "serious bodily harm.”
Where, for example, a woman used deadly force to prevent "sexual penetration”19 other than intercourse, a jury might conclude — absent evidence that the assailant used significant bodily force— that the woman did not act on the basis of a belief that she was in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm. Although a jury might regard nonconsensual intercourse as "serious bodily harm” per se,20 this cannot be said — with any degree of certainty — with respect to fellatio and cunnilingus. Yet, a woman who is confronted with nonconsensual fellatio or cunnilingus may be threatened with much the same harm from the violation of her bodily autonomy as a woman who *559is confronted with nonconsensual intercourse. In the Legislature’s judgment, unlawful fellatio and cunnilingus are offenses of the same magnitude as unlawful sexual intercourse.21
In most contexts, the common-law formulation of "death or serious bodily harm” adequately describes the range of threatened conduct that justifies one person taking the life of another. The common-law formulation is not adequate in the context of sexual assault.
n
If one believes that $30 is all that is at stake in the instant case, the instructions on self-defense were adequate.
This case involves something more than $30 — it concerns a woman’s right to control with whom she has sex, and under what conditions. The instructions in the instant case did not inform the jury that Landrum was entitled to use force— deadly force if necessary — to prevent Thomas from having intercourse with her even if her only reason for not consenting was Thomas’ unwillingness to pay $30. The instructions did not adequately present Landrum’s theory of self-defense.
A
The-’success of Landrum’s claim of self-defense hinged on the manner in which the jury evaluated her testimony regarding the commencement of the physical struggle that culminated in Thomas’ death. The court instructed the jury that if Landrum was the initial aggressor, she did not have *560the right to use force in self-defense unless she withdrew from the fight and clearly informed Thomas of her desire for peace.22 Since Landrum’s testimony — the only evidence on the matter — indicates there was one continuous struggle beginning in the bedroom and ending in the bathroom,23 if the jury found that Landrum was the initial aggressor her claim of self-defense would be defeated.
The first incident of significant violence between Landrum and Thomas occurred when Landrum hit Thomas with a telephone as Thomas was about to have intercourse with her against her will.24 Landrum’s testimony regarding the events that immediately preceded this incident, and her state of mind when she struck Thomas with the telephone, was somewhat inconsistent. On direct examination, Landrum testified that she was frightened and that Thomas had threatened her with death *561and serious injury.25 On cross-examination, however, she testified that when she hit him with the telephone she was not afraid that Thomas would kill.26 Landrum testified further that she hit *562Thomas with the telephone to prevent him from having sex with her without paying first.27
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that when Landrum hit Thomas with the telephone, she was not acting on the basis of a belief that she was in danger of death or serious bodily harm. More specifically, the prosecutor argued that Lan*563drum’s desire to prevent Thomas from having sex with her without first paying was not a sufficient justification for striking Thomas with the telephone.28 The prosecutor also argued that Landrum was the initial aggressor and that there was no evidence of communicated withdrawal.29
In his closing argument, Landrum’s lawyer argued that "rape” was a form of serious bodily harm and that Landrum hit Thomas to prevent being "raped.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor again argued that Landrum hit Thomas with the telephone to prevent him from having sex without paying — not to prevent serious bodily harm or "rape.”30_^
*564The trial court instructed the jury on a "subjective”- theory of self-defense. The jury was instructed that the requirements of self-defense would be satisfied, and that Landrum would not be guilty of any crime, if (1) at the time of the altercation with the decedent Landrum had an honest belief that she was in danger of death or serious bodily harm, and (2) Landrum used only that amount of force that appeared to her to be immediately necessary to repel the attack.31 The instructions did not expressly mention "rape,” but instead referred generally to "death or serious bodily harm.”
B
This case illustrates the difference between one approach and another on the threshold question whether a woman may use force — deadly force if necessary — to prevent a sexual assault. Landrum testified on cross-examination that when she struck Thomas with the telephone she was not afraid that Thomas would kill her,32 and that she hit Thomas to prevent him from having inter*565course with her without paying first.33 There was thus evidence from which the jury could have found that Landrum hit Thomas with the telephone to prevent nonconsensual intercourse — not to prevent other serious bodily harm.34 By limiting the availability of self-defense to the situation where the defendant acted on the basis of an honest belief that she was in danger of death or "serious bodily harm,”35 the court may have conveyed to the jury the impression that Landrum was not entitled to use deadly force in self-defense if the only reason she did not want to have sex with Thomas at the time she hit him with the telephone was that Thomas had not yet paid the $30.
This is not a case where the Court can rely on the assumption, perhaps reasonable in many situations, that the jury without further instruction would conclude that "rape” is a form of "serious bodily harm.”
The prosecutor and Landrum’s lawyer disagreed on the definition of "rape” and whether Landrum struck Thomas to prevent being "raped.” The prosecutor argued that there was a difference between "rape” and nonconsensual intercourse when the reason for nonconsent was the other person’s failure to pay initially, and that Landrum’s conduct was based on the failure to pay.36 Landrum’s law*566yer argued that Landrum hit Thomas with the telephone to prevent being "raped,” and Landrum testified that sex without initial payment was "rape.”37 The instructions did not assist the jury respecting the definitional question. Nor did the instructions provide guidance in resolving the disagreement, reflected in counsel’s arguments, respecting Landrum’s right to use force, however one categorizes the nonconsensual intercourse with which she was confronted.
The court’s failure to provide the jury with meaningful guidance in applying the law of self-defense to the facts of this case was especially prejudicial to Landrum’s defense under the circumstance that she was a prostitute. The jury may have concluded that since Landrum was otherwise willing to have intercourse with Thomas, the prospect of having intercourse with him without initial payment, or with no payment at all, was a "slight or insignificant injury.”38 Professor Perkins stated:
But to speak of sexual intercourse with a prostitute without her consent as an "outrage to her person and feelings” is in the nature of mockery. Her unlawful career has not placed her beyond the protection of the law, it is true; but when her only grievance is that she was taken without being paid, the law of assault and battery would seem more appropriate than to include such an act within the scope of one of the gravest felonies .... [Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), ch 2, § 5, part C, p 158.]_
*567A trial in which the prosecutor’s theory and argument reflected the sentiments expressed by Professor Perkins, and in which the court’s instructions failed to prevent or even to discourage a verdict based on such sentiments, is not a fair trial.
hi
Common-law involuntary manslaughter has been defined as the unintentional killing of a person without malice, occurring in (1) the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or serious bodily harm, (2) the commission of a lawful act negligently performed, or (3) the negligent omission to perform a legal duty.39 The lead opinion would hold that the evidence in this case did not justify a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, and thus the trial court did not err in failing, sua sponte, to give an instruction on involuntary manslaughter even though it gave an instruction, sua sponte, on voluntary manslaughter.
A
The lead opinion says that the evidence did not justify a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under the second part of the definition:
As we stated in Heflin, supra, "the killing of another person in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes that his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious bodily harm.” Thus, an act committed in self-defense which conforms to *568this definition constitutes a lawful act. However, an act committed in self-defense but with excessive force or in which defendant was the initial aggressor does not meet the elements of lawful self-defense. Therefore, by definition, "imperfect self-defense” is an unlawful act that does not fall within the definition of common-law involuntary manslaughter: a lawful act negligently performed.[40]
By defining "act” with reference to the ultimate result of Landrum’s conduct (i.e., Thomas’ death), the opinion obviates the need for substantive analysis because Landrum does not contend that a homicide, if committed under circumstances that do not satisfy the requirements for self-defense, is not a crime.
The opinion’s mode of analysis — equating the "act” with the killing — would effectively eliminate this form of involuntary manslaughter. For a killing — which, under the opinion’s approach, is the predicate — to be a lawful act, the killing must be neither manslaughter nor murder. Under the opinion’s approach, the only act that can serve as the basis for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is an act which, "by definition,” cannot constitute manslaughter.
The result is that a person who commits a homicide — where there is evidence justifying a finding that the killing was unintentional and there is no evidence regarding voluntary manslaughter or the other two forms of common-law involuntary manslaughter — is guilty of murder or is not guilty of any crime. This is contrary to the function of involuntary manslaughter which is to attach criminal liability to some unintentional killings.
*569Analogous is People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621; 212 NW2d 918 (1973). Jackson shot and killed Wilson during a shootout with Holmes. A witness testified that Holmes fired first and that Jackson then returned fire. The Court observed:
The unintended killing of an innocent bystander is not murder if justifiably committed in proper self-defense. It may, however, be manslaughter.
"If A in proper self-defense aims at his adversary b but misses b and unintentionally strikes innocent bystander c, he is not liable for c’s injury or death unless his conduct, under all of the circumstances (including the need to defend himself) was reckless with regard to c. In such a case he would be liable for battery if he merely injures, involuntary manslaughter if he kills, c.” LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p 396. [Id., p 624.]
Since A, who recklessly — yet unintentionally — kills c in an attempt to defend himself from b, may be guilty of involuntary manslaughter, then A may be guilty of that offense if he recklessly — yet unintentionally — kills b in attempting to defend himself from b. In both cases, A unintentionally kills a person while using force in self-defense. In Jackson —and the same should also be true here — the "act,” which must have been "lawful” for purposes of gross negligence analysis, was defined with reference to what the defendant intended to do, not what he did.
The lead opinion distinguishes Jackson, saying that the Court’s decision "would be analogous to the instant case if the defendant [in Jackson] intentionally killed his adversary, but not in proper self-defense.”41 The basis on which the opinion seeks to distinguish Jackson reflects the signers’ view of the evidence and the credibility of *570Landrum who testified that she did not intend to kill Thomas.
There was evidence from which the jury could have found that Landrum did not intend to kill Thomas.42 There also was evidence from which the jury could have found that Landrum administered blows to Thomas in a lawful attempt to protect herself from imminent "death or serious bodily harm.” We agree with Justice Archer’s conclusion in dissent that there was evidence from which the jury could have found that in performing the lawful act of defending herself against imminent "death or serious bodily harm,” Landrum used more force than was necessary and acted in a grossly43 negligent manner.
B
More fundamentally, the analysis in the lead opinion is flawed in its emphasis on whether Landrum’s "acts” — however defined — were lawful or unlawful. The opinion says that the evidence did not justify a conviction of involuntary manslaugh*571ter under the second part of the definition44 because when Landrum killed Thomas she was not performing a lawful act.45 Proceeding from the assumption that Landrum was engaged in an unlawful act when she killed Thomas, the opinion says that the evidence did not justify a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under the first part of the definition because Landrum’s actions "either constituted a felonious act (assault with a dangerous weapon) or an act naturally tending to cause great bodily harm (assault with intent to do great bodily harm).”46
The distinction between a lawful act and an unlawful act as the analytical predicate for defining the elements of involuntary manslaughter may once have been maintainable. It is, however, a distinction that is no longer tenable.
1
The distinction between a lawful and unlawful act was first noted by Bracton.47 In a discussion of misadventure (accident), Bracton observed that a person would be held liable for an unintentional killing that occurred during the performance of an unlawful act, but would not be held liable where the unintentional killing occurred during the performance of a lawful act at least when the person had exercised due diligence.48
When Bracton wrote, there was only one form of criminal homicide. By Coke’s time, however, criminal homicide had been divided into murder and *572manslaughter.49 According to Coke, an unintentional killing that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act — even the most trivial misdemeanor — was murder.50
The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule emerged in response to the harshness of the rule stated by Coke.51 Hale reported that an unintentional killing that occurred during the commission of a felony was murder, but that an unintentional killing that occurred during the commission of any other unlawful act was not more than manslaughter.52
AccordingtoHale,themisdemeanor-manslaughter rule did not apply to an unintentional killing that occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor "malum prohibitum.”53 In such a case, an unintentional killing was neither manslaughter not murder.54 Foster later coined the term "malum in se” to describe those offenses to which the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule would apply.55_
*573The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule was thus developed to ameliorate a rule of law that the intention to commit any unlawful act presumptively supplied the mens rea for murder. Where an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a felony, the prior presumption — that the intention to commit the underlying criminal act supplied the mens rea for murder — was retained; this, of course, was the felony-murder rule.
Where an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor, a new presumption — that the intention to commit the underlying criminal act supplied the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter — was adopted. The operation of this presumption was limited to situations where the unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor that was inherently dangerous. Where an unintentional killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor that was not inherently dangerous, there was no presumption of mens rea.
2
In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), this Court abolished the common-law rule that the mens rea for murder was supplied by the intention to commit the underlying felony.56 The holding in Aaron necessarily implies that a killing *574which occurred during the commission of a felony could — consistent with the evidence — be involuntary manslaughter or an innocent homicide. As the Court noted,
The facts and circumstances involved in the perpetration of a felony may evidence an intent to kill, an intent to cause great bodily harm, or a wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm; however, the conclusion must be left to the jury to infer from all the evidence. Otherwise, 'juries might be required to find the fact of malice where they were satisñed from the whole evidence it did not exist.” [Id., pp 728-729 (quoting Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 218 [1862]). Emphasis added.]
The reason for holding involuntary manslaughter not applicable where the killing occurred during the commission of a felony — that the killing was presumptively murder — no longer has validity in light of Aaron. When a request to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of murder is denied because the killing occurred during the commission of a felony, the presumption that was abolished in Aaron is allowed to resurface. If the jury finds that a defendant committed a criminal homicide, but that he did not act with the intention to kill, the jury is forced to choose between acquitting the defendant altogether or convicting him of a crime he did not commit. The possibility that the jury might convict of murder although not satisfied that the defendant acted with malice is the precise problem that this Court identified in Aaron and sought to remedy when it abolished the common-law felony-murder rule.
The second limitation on unlawful-act involun*575tary manslaughter — that involuntary manslaughter does not apply where the unintentional killing occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that naturally tends to cause death or great bodily harm — had independent force only when the killing occurred during the commission of a misdemeanor.57 Thus, where an unintentional killing occurred during the course of an "inherently dangerous” misdemeanor, the defendant was guilty of murder, not manslaughter.58
The definition as stated in the lead opinion, and in the decisions on which the opinion relies, thus includes a "misdemeanor-murder” rule, and provides involuntary manslaughter liability for unintentional killings that occur during the commission of misdemeanors that do not naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm. In both respects, the "Michigan rule” appears to be more extreme than its historical counterpart in England.59 It is also more extreme than the "better view” as reported by the commentators.60
In apparent harmony with the "better view,” the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions provide that to convict a defendant of unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter, the jury must find that the killing occurred during the commission of "an unlawful act which was inherently and naturally *576dangerous to human life.”61 The proof that is required to convict a person of unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter according to the standard jury instruction is the same proof which relieves the trial court of the obligation to instruct on unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter according to the view expressed in the lead opinion. Something is amiss.
Limiting the scope of unlawful-act manslaughter so that an unintentional killing is presumptively murder if in the judgment of the court it occurred during the course of an unlawful act that has a natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm no longer has validity in light of Aaron.62 A request to instruct on involuntary manslaughter cannot be denied — consistent with Aaron — solely on the basis that the killing occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that in the judgment of the court has a natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm.
In determining whether the evidence would justify a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent with respect to the safety of other persons.63 Resolution of the ques*577tions: 1) whether the homicide was committed during the course of a lawful or unlawful act, 2) if the homicide was committed during the course of an unlawful act, whether the act was a felony or misdemeanor, and 3) if the unlawful act was a misdemeanor, whether the offense naturally tended to cause death or great bodily harm, does not further the inquiry into whether the defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent.
The abolition of unlawful-act manslaughter— with the resulting application of a gross negligence standard — would not result in a significant increase in the number of verdicts that the homicide was not criminal. Many acts are unlawful precisely because they create a significant risk of injury to other persons. When a defendant commits a homicide during the course of one of those acts, the result will be the same whether the decision is based on the unlawfulness of the act or its inherently dangerous nature.
With respect to the situations where unlawful-act manslaughter might lead to a different result than gross-negligence manslaughter, Professors LaFave and Scott observed:
There is no logical reason for inflicting manslaughter punishment on one who unintentionally kills another simply because he is committing a traffic violation, unless it makes sense to punish the one-in-a-thousand traffic violation, which by bad luck produces an unexpected death, far more severely than the nine hundred and ninety-nine violations which happily do not produce any such devastating result. [LaFave & Scott, supra, p 602.]
The unlawful-act manslaughter doctrine should be abolished because in most cases it is unneces*578sary — gross negligence will be sufficient where liability for involuntary manslaughter is warranted — and in a few cases it will lead to unjustifiable results. The rule has been abolished in England64 and in at least some American jurisdictions,65 rejected by the Model Penal Code,66 and criticized by commentators.67 The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule should be abandoned because there was no good reason for adopting it and there is no good reason for keeping it.
Notwithstanding one’s views on the rule’s merits, the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule should be abolished because it is inconsistent with this Court’s precedents. In Aaron, the Court held that the intention to commit a felony (there, arson and armed robbery) does not establish as a matter of *579law the mens rea for murder. A holding that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because he was committing a felony or other unlawful, "inherently dangerous” act amounts to a holding that such unintentional killings — if criminal — are presumed as a matter of law to be murder. That is inconsistent with Aaron.68
3
In the instant case, the lead opinion says that Landrum’s conduct in resisting Thomas "constituted a felonious act (assault with a dangerous weapon),” and as a result the evidence did not justify a conviction of unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter.69 Before Aaron, the intention to commit a felony presumptively established the mens rea for murder. It is consistent with preAaron law to hold involuntary manslaughter not applicable on the basis that Landrum killed Thomas during the commission of a felonious assault. After Aaron, however, such a holding is inconsistent with Aaron.70
The lead opinion also says that Landrum’s conduct in resisting Thomas constituted "an act naturally tending to cause great bodily harm (assault with intent to do great bodily harm),” and that as a result the evidence would not justify a conviction *580of unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter.71 It is, again, inconsistent with Aaron to hold that involuntary manslaughter is not applicable on that basis.
Further, the opinion’s assertion that Landrum’s conduct constituted assault with intent to do great bodily harm is based on the signers’ view of the evidence and the credibility of Landrum. In addition to testifying that she did not intend to kill Thomas,72 Landrum testified that she did not intend to inflict serious bodily harm.73 It is one thing for the Court to assume that a defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm where the record does not contain any direct evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state and intent is thus a question of circumstantial inference.74 It is another — and even more inappropriate — for the Court to disregard a defendant’s direct testimony regarding her mental state. Questions of credibility are for the jury. This Court cannot properly find as a fact that Landrum was lying when she testified that she did not intend to cause serious bodily harm.
There was evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Landrum did not act with the mens rea for murder. She testified that she did not intend to kill or seriously injure Thomas. It is not “obvious” that she intended to create a significant *581risk of death or serious injury and proceeded in a course of conduct despite that risk. She testified that her only intention was to avoid being "raped.” The jury could have inferred that Landrum did not intend to kill Thomas, but that she failed to exercise care in repelling his sexual assault and that it was apparent to the ordinary mind that a failure to exercise such care was likely to result in serious bodily injury or death.
iv
The lead opinion calls attention to, and purports to resolve, the conflict in Michigan decisions on the question whether a defendant who asserts self-defense must have entertained an honest, as distinguished from an honest and reasonable, belief that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. The opinion says that an honest and reasonable belief is required.75
In Doss the Court said that an honest and reasonable belief is required.76 The Court did not there hold, however, that an honest and reasonable belief is required. Resolution of the question whether the justification of self-defense requires an honest, or honest and reasonable, belief does not appear to have been necessary to decision in Doss, which concerned the propriety of a bindover. Judicial opinions often contain statements that are not necessary to decision, and ordinarily those statements are regarded as just that: unnecessary statements. Apparently, that is how the authors of the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions interpreted the Court’s statement in Doss.77_
*582The question whether to adopt a "subjective,” "objective,” or mixed standard for determining when a person has the right to use force — deadly force if necessary — is an issue of jurisprudential significance. If an "objective” standard were adopted, additional questions would be raised, e.g., how is "reasonableness” to be determined, what is the effect of a defendant’s "reasonable” or "unreasonable” mistake of fact. Application of an "objective” standard to a defendant’s beliefs — with respect to the presence of a threat of imminent death or serious hodily harm, or the necessity of the force used to repel the perceived threat — has significant implications for the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense,”78 an issue on which the Court expressly determined not to grant leave to appeal79 and another "issue” which the lead opinion nonetheless discusses.80
There is no reason at this juncture to address the question whether an honest, or honest and reasonable, belief should be required. Resolution of the question is not necessary to decision in the instant cases. The parties have not asked the Court to decide the question, nor is the question mentioned in the Court’s limited grant order in Landrum. The Court’s failure to definitively an*583swer the question does not appear to be causing any difficulties in practice. The prosecutor in Heflin did not object to the trial court’s instructions, and the prosecutor in Landrum objected to the self-defense instructions on the basis that Landrum did not fear death or serious bodily harm, not on the basis that a "reasonable” belief should also have been required.
Given the complexities involved, it is not prudent to resolve this question in a case in which it is entirely unnecessary to do so. It is difficult to imagine a more inopportune moment to adopt a rule whereby the jury is allowed — and required— to evaluate the "reasonableness” of a person’s beliefs regarding the need to use force in self-defense. The determinations whether a woman’s fear of sexual assault is "reasonable,” and whether her belief that a particular form of nonconsensual sexual activity is "serious bodily harm” is "reasonable,” seems fraught with difficulty. In all events, the question should not be resolved without a discussion of the merits of the competing positions.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Because the defendant in the instant case is female, our discussion refers to a woman’s right to use force to prevent a sexual assault. The same principles would apply to all cases of sexual assault regardless of the sex of the victim or the assailant.

 [W]e would hold that a person may use deadly force in self-defense to repel a criminal sexual assault when confronted with force that the person reasonably believes could result in imminent death or serious bodily harm. [Ante, p 512. Emphasis added.]
Although the passage refers to a "reasonable belief,” the lead opinion elsewhere "holds” that an "honest and reasonable belief” is required to sustain a claim of self-defense. See ante, pp 502, 503, n 16, 508, 510, n 23, and 512. Presumably, no difference in meaning is intended.

 The lead opinion claims that its holding, and a corresponding jury instruction, "addresses the delicate balance between the well-established doctrine of self-defense on the one hand, and the extremely egregious and personally intrusive crime of criminal sexual conduct on the other.” Ante, p 512.
The opinion does not strike a balance. A woman who has an honest and reasonable belief that she is in danger of imminent death or serious bodily harm would always be entitled to use force — deadly force if necessary — whether the threat to her well-being occurred in the form of a sexual assault or a nonsexual assault.

 See ante, p 512 (quoted in n 2).

 We thus would not adopt a "different and special rule.” Cf. ante, p 511, n 26.
The lead opinion adopts a "different and special rule” under which nonconsensual intercourse is the one form of serious bodily harm against which a person may not use deadly force when necessary.

 Justice Cooley observed:
The outrage upon the woman, and the injury to society, is just as great in these cases as if actual force had been employed; and we have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said to be any less against the will of the woman when her consent is obtained by fraud, than when it is extorted by threats or force. [People v Crosswell, 13 Mich 427, 438 (1865).]

 (1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or *554coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited to any of the following circumstances:
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim, or any other person, and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to execute .this threat. As used in this subdivision, "to retaliate” includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or extortion. [MCL 750.520b(l)(f)(iii); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f)(iii).]

 See ante, p 512.

 Ante, p 512.

 We agree with the statement in the lead opinion that when one *555person acts in defense of another, he "steps into the shoes” of the threatened individual. See ante, p 511, n 26. In our opinion, a third person would be entitled to use force — deadly force if necessary — to prevent nonconsensual intercourse under the circumstances specified in § 520b(lXf>(iii).

 See ante, p 511.

 The opinion does not explain what it means by "common-law rape.”
It is often said that rape at common law was the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by force and without her consent. See Clark & Marshall, Crimes (7th ed), §11.01, p 752. If a woman "consciously consent[ed] to the act of intercourse, however tardily or reluctantly, and however persistently she may [have] resisted] for a time,” the act was not rape. Id., p 754. In 1864, the Court said that "[t]he general rule requires, not only that there should be force, but that the utmost reluctance and resistance on the part of the woman, should appear . . . .” Crosswell, n 6 supra, p 433. Resistance, as distinguished from nonconsent, is not an element of the statutory offense of criminal sexual conduct. MCL 750.520Í; MSA 28.788(9).

 See, e.g., § 520b(l)(f)(iii).

 See ante, pp 510-513.

 In the instant case, Landrum testified that she used nondeadly, albeit significant, force when she first attempted to resist the assailant’s sexual assault, and that it was not until the assailant responded with significant force that Landrum used additional force.

 Ante, pp 512-513.
The opinion would require that a person’s belief be honest in addition to reasonable. See n 2.

 We also disagree more fundamentally. See § i, parts a and b.

 According to one source, "bodily” means "Physical as opposed to mental or spiritual: bodily welfare.” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982), p 193 (emphasis in original).

 "Sexual penetration” means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required. [MCL 750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1X1).]

 Por reasons which are discussed in § n, when the defendant is a prostitute a jury might not conclude that nonconsensual intercourse is "serious bodily harm.” Similar concerns also might be present when there is a prior history of sexual relations between the woman and the assailant. See 1988 PA 138, amending MCL 750.5201; MSA 28.788(12) (abolishing spousal immunity in prosecutions for criminal sexual conduct).

 For the definition of the degrees of "criminal sexual conduct” involving "sexual penetration” and the corresponding punishment, see MCL 750.520b, 750.520d; MSA 28.788(2), 28.788(4). For the definition of "sexual penetration,” see n 19.

 Now, a person who begins an assault upon another with a dangerous or deadly weapon cannot claim the right of self-defense unless she has withdrawn from the fight in good faith and clearly informed the other person of her desire for peace and an end to the fight.

 With respect to the question of communicated withdrawal, Landrum gave the following testimony on direct examination:
A. The handle of the telephone was laying down by the tub and I picked it up and I hit him again in the head and he just kept getting up and I just hit him again. I kept saying, "If you would just leave me alone and let me go home, I will be just fine,” and he just kept getting up and I kept hitting him and finally I guess he got tired, I don’t know, but he just laid down like and said he was going to sleep.
To the extent this testimony indicates that Landrum "clearly informed [Thomas] of her desire for peace and an end to the fight” (n 22), this communicated withdrawal would not have affected the jury’s evaluation of the vast majority of the blows administered by Landrum which occurred before the above described incident in the bathtub.

 On direct examination, Landrum gave the following account:
A. He got into bed and he went to climb up on top of me and I reached for the phone and hit him in the head.

 A. He told me, he says, "Bitch, if you don’t take your clothes off we will fight, but we are going to fuck or fight either way you want to do.”
Q. How did you feel at that point?
A. Scared, and I took my clothes off.
A. I just laid there and then he took his clothes off after I got into bed and laid down, after I laid all the way down, and then he took his clothes off.
Q. Was there any conversation during the time that he was taking off his clothes?
A. No. He was just telling me that we were going to have sex and that if we didn’t, we would fight, and then he said that he would hurt me if I didn’t, you know, fight and he said he would hurt me and then he said that because I had told him I wasn’t just going to let him just hurt me and that, I didn’t see why he was doing it that way because he understood the agreement, and then he stated that he would kill me one way or the other and that I would have sex and he would kill me and it would be either one way or the other.

 Q. And you were afraid that he was going to kill you, is that right?
A. At first I was not, no.
Q. When did you become afraid he was going to kill you?
A. When he just kept coming, yes.
Q. When he kept coming?
A. When he kept fighting.
Q. When you first hit him with the telephone, you weren’t afraid he was going to lull you?
A. At that point, no, because . . .
Q. When he pushed you and told you to take your clothes off in the bedroom, you weren’t afraid he was going to kill you?
A. No. I was not then afraid, no.
Q. So you weren’t afraid he was going to kill you when you took your clothes off?
A. No, I wasn’t.
Q. You weren’t afraid he was going to kill you when you got to bed?
A. No.
Q. And you weren’t afraid he was going to kill you when you hit him with the phone, is that right?
A. No.
*562Q. So you weren’t in fear for your life at that time, is that right?
A. At that particular point, no.
Q. So you didn’t have any fear for your life when you hit him with that phone, is that right?
A. No, I didn’t.

 Q. Why did you hit him in the face with the phone? You weren’t afraid for your life and you weren’t afraid he was going to kill you, so why did you hit him?
A. Because I wasn’t going to give him no sex because he hadn’t paid me.
Q. So you hit him because he wasn’t going to pay?
A. Right ....
On redirect examination, Landrum testified:
Q. Celest, in answer to one of Mr. Ray’s questions, did you have any intention of letting this man rape you?
A. No, sir.
On recross-examination, Landrum testified:
Q. You were going to sell him some sex, right?
A. Selling and raping is two different things.
Q. Is that an answer of yes or no, ma’am?
A. Yes. I was going to sell him some sex.
Q. Up until the time you hit him with the phone, this is when he says, "Take your clothes off and get into bed” and had he produced the money and paid you for the sex would you have went [sic] ahead and provided him with the sex, ma’am?
A. Yes, I would have.
Q. When did you decide he was going to try and rape you?
A. When he actually got his clothes off and got into the bed, yes.
Q. Your definition of rape was that he hadn’t paid you so therefore he is going to rape you?
A. If he carries out the initial act, yes, or if he tries to.

 What did she say on cross-examination? "He told me to take my clothes off. Were you in fear for your life? No, told me to get into bed. Were you in fear for your life? No, told me he wasn’t going to pay me. Were you in fear for your life? No. When you hit him with the phone, were you in fear for your life? No.” For self-defense, at the time of the act the Defendant must honestly believe that she is in danger of being killed or receiving serious bodily harm. The Defendant said she was not. The degree of danger must be serious bodily harm or death. The Defendant said she did not have that fear and said she was not afraid. In fact, the Defendant said, "Up until the point at which I hit him with the phone, had he produced the money, we would have continued with the sexual intercourse that the money was supposed to have been paid for.” That is what she said on cross-examination. She was not afraid.

 See n 22 and the accompanying text.

 [S]he says, "I wasn’t afraid.” Did she ever say, "He tried to rape me?” She never said that. She says, "I thought he wasn’t going to pay and told me he wasn’t going to pay.” She never says, "I was afraid he was going to rape me. I was afraid he was going to hurt me.”
[The judge] will say that the degree of danger must be serious bodily harm or death. The Defendant said no, not afraid that he was going to kill her. The Defendant said, "Had he come up with the thirty bucks after he ordered me into bed, after he ordered me into bed, after he told me to take my clothes off and before I hit him with the phone, had he come up with the thirty bucks, I would have still had sexual intercourse with him, yes. No, I was not afraid.” She was not afraid, ladies and *564gentlemen. She is not concerned she is going to be raped. She is concerned that she is not going to get paid. This is up until the point that she hit him with the phone that she was not afraid.

 The trial court’s instructions were based on CJI 7:9:01 and 7:9:02. The essential passages were as follows:
First, at the time of the act, the Defendant must have honestly believed she is in danger of being killed or of receiving serious bodily harm. If she so believes, she may immediately act and defend herself even to the extent of taking human life if necessary.
Third, you must be satisfied that the act or acts taken by the Defendant must have appeared to the Defendant at the time to be immediately necessary.

 See n 26.

 See n 27.

 This was the prosecutor’s argument. See n 28.

 See n 31.

 You would think that if this is what happened, that he tried to rape her or he tried to kill her, she would kind of mention that in passing to Mr. Bonds, the first person she saw after this. You would think that. She didn’t do that, not until the next day when she has had time to think about it that she bothers to say something about and she didn’t say, "He tried to rape me.” She said, "He tried to have sex without paying me.” *
*566Rita White says, "No, [she] didn’t tell me he tried to rape her.” They both said, "She told me that he said he wasn’t going to pay.” That is not rape. That is failure to pay. That is not rape, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. She said she was not in fear. [See also n 30.]

 See n 27.

 See CJI 7:9:01.

 See People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 477; 418 NW2d 861 (1988), People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590-591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), and People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923).

 Ante, pp 508-509 (emphasis in original).

 Ante, p 509, n 21.

 The following exchanges took place during Landrum’s direct examination:
Q. Celest, at any time did you intend to kill Mr. Thomas?
A. No, I didn’t.
Q. Will you tell the Court and jury what your actions were at all times that you were in this fracas or in this fight?
A. To keep him from hurting me so I could leave to get my clothes on and leave and keep him from hurting me.
Q. At any time did you intend to kill Mr. Thomas?
A. No, sir. I didn’t.

 The negligence required to establish involuntary manslaughter is different in kind from ordinary negligence. Such negligence is variously referred to as "criminal negligence” or "gross negligence” .... [Townes, n 39 supra, p 590, n 4.]

 See the text accompanying n 39.

 See ante, pp 508-509 (quoted in the text accompanying n 40).

 Ante, p 508, n 19 (parentheticals in original).

 The historical discussion which follows is based on Moreland, Law of Homicide, ch 11, pp 183-195.

 2 Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England (Thorne trans, 1968), p 341. See also Moreland, n 47 supra, pp 183-184.

 See Moreland, n 47 supra, p 184.

 See Moreland, n 47 supra, pp 184-185.

 See Moreland, n 47 supra, p 186.

 See Moreland, n 47 supra, p 186. See, generally, 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, ch 39, pp 471-477.

 By "malum prohibitum,” Hale meant an act which was not inherently dangerous. See Moreland, n 47 supra, p 187. Hale gave the example of a violation of a statute which prohibited a person who did not possess land with a yearly value of one hundred pounds from keeping or using a gun. See Hale, n 52 supra, p 475 (quoted in n 54, infra).

 Suppose therefore such a person not qualified shoots with a gun at a bird, or at crows, and by mischance it kills a bystander by the breaking of the gun, or some other accident, that in another case would have amounted only to chance-medley, this will be no more than chance-medley in him, for though the statute prohibit him to keep or use a gun, yet the same was but malum prohibitum, and that only under a penalty, and will not inhanse the effect beyond its nature. [Hale, n 52 supra, pp 475-476. See also Moreland, n 47 supra, p 186.]

 By "malum in se,” Poster meant an act which was inherently dangerous. See Moreland, n 47 supra, pp 186-187.

 Our review of Michigan case law persuades us that we should abolish the rule which defines malice as the intent to commit the underlying felony. . . .
Although the circumstances surrounding the commission of the felony may evidence a greater intent beyond the intent to commit the felony, or a wanton and willful act in disregard of the possible consequence of death or serious injury, the intent to commit the felony, of itself, does not connote a "man-endangering-state-of-mind.” Hence, we do not believe that it constitutes a sufficient mens rea to establish the crime of murder. [Id., pp 727-728. Emphasis in original.]

 Under the felony-murder rule, an unintentional killing was murder if it occurred during the commission of a felony.

 The exclusion of such killings from the scope of involuntary manslaughter was presumably not intended to immunize those killings from all criminal liability.

 As developed in England, the rule was that an unintentional killing during the commission of a misdemeanor "malum in se” was involuntary manslaughter and an unintentional killing during the commission of a misdemeanor "malum prohibitum” was not a criminal homicide. See ns 51-55, and the accompanying text.

 See LaFave & Scott, supra, p 594, 2 Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law (14th ed), § 167, pp 266-269, and Perkins, supra, § 1, part C(B), p 73.

 CJI 16:4:03. See also CJI 16:4:04 (involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder).

 Two of the cases consolidated for appeal in Aaron involved killings that occurred during the commission of armed robberies; the third case involved arson.
Armed robbery and arson may be thought by some to have a natural tendency to cause death or great bodily harm. The Aaron Court held, however, that the intention to commit these crimes did not establish the mens rea for murder, and recognized that killings which occur during the commission of these acts could constitute involuntary manslaughter.

 The standard jury instructions recognize the importance of gross negligence to unlawful-act involuntary manslaughter. See CJI 16:4:03 ("the defendant must have been committing an unlawful act which was inherently and naturally dangerous to human life, that is, an act which was grossly negligent of human life”) (emphasis added). See *577also CJI 16:4:04 (involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder).

 See Perkins, supra, § 1, part D, p 79, n 86.

 See LaFave & Scott, supra, p 602 ("Involuntary manslaughter, therefore, ought, on principle, to be limited to the situation of unintended homicide by criminal negligence. Today’s trend, barely beginning, is properly in this direction”), and Torcía, n 60 supra, p 269 ("The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule has been abandoned in England, the Model Penal Code, and in a growing number of states. Manslaughter is now committed in such jurisdictions, whether the act be lawful or unlawful, only if the death is caused 'recklessly’ ”).

 American Law Institute, Model Penal Code & Commentaries, § 210.3, p 51 ("Section 210.3 departs from prevailing norms in abandoning the conception that a homicide should be ipso facto manslaughter if it resulted from an otherwise unlawful act. The misdemeanor-manslaughter analogue of the felony-murder rule is thus rejected”). The reasons for rejecting the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule are summarized:
However explained and confined, the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is objectionable on the same ground as the felony-murder rule. It dispenses with proof of culpability and imposes liability for a serious crime without reference to the actor’s state of mind. This result is not only morally unjustified, but it also operates quite inequitably among individuals. . . . [T]he Model Code rejects any form of strict liability in the law of homicide. [Id., p 77.]

 See Moreland, n 47 supra, pp 188-195, LaFave & Scott, supra, pp 601-602, Perkins, supra, § 1, part C(B), pp 78-79.

 See n 62.

 Ante, p 508, n 19.

 Even when a homicide is committed with a deadly weapon, malice is a permissible inference, not a mandatory presumption. People v Martin, 392 Mich 553, 561; 221 NW2d 336 (1974) ("The law does not imply malice where a deadly weapon is used. Michigan has long ago considered malice a permissible inference to be drawn by the jury rather than a presumption of law”). See also People v Jacobson, 400 Mich 859; 282 NW2d 922 (1977), rev’g People v Jacobson, 72 Mich App 489; 250 NW2d 105 (1976).

 Ante, p 508, n 19.

 See n 42.

 Q. Did you attempt at any time to get that knife?
A. No.
Q. And why?
A. Because I had no intention to do no bodily harm with nobody with a knife.
The jury could have inferred from this testimony that Landrum did not intend to cause serious bodily harm with instruments other than a knife.

 See People v Heflin, ante, p 539.

 See ante, p 502.

 See ante, p 503, n 16.

 The first edition of the standard jury instructions was published in 1977, two years before Doss was decided. CJI 7:9:01 required an honest, not honest and reasonable, belief.
*582The second edition of the standard jury instructions was published in 1989. Although the Commentary contains a discussion of the statement in Doss, CJI2d 7.15 continues to require only an honest belief.

 We agree that if a "subjective” standard is applied, the "unreasonableness” of a defendant’s belief does not mitigate to involuntary manslaughter a homicide that is otherwise murder. Cf. ante, p 503, n 16.

 In granting leave to appeal this Court said:
The Court has determined not to entertain argument regarding the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. [People v Landrum, 431 Mich 906 (1988).]

 See ante, pp 507-509.