Court Opinion

ID: 9391065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-29 09:11:03.807472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.329565
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-23-00080-CV

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                           TYLER, TEXAS

CHRISTINE REULE,                                          §        APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
APPELLANT

V.                                                        §        JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

BERNARD JOHN CHISM, ET AL,
APPELLEES                                                 §        SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
                                           PER CURIAM
       Christine Reule, acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal “in this wrongfully severed
case[.]” The notice of appeal further states that Reule filed a motion for reconsideration of the
severance order.
       However, Reule has been declared a vexatious litigant and the order declaring Reule
vexatious includes a prefiling order which states, “Plaintiff is required to obtain permission from
the local administrative judges of a court in which she intends to file litigation in this state and
Smith County prior to filing any new litigation.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 11.101(a) (West 2017) (court may enter order prohibiting person from filing, pro se, new
litigation in a court to which order applies without permission of appropriate local administrative
judge if court finds person is vexatious).                  Reule is included in the Office of Court
Administration’s list of vexatious litigants subject to a prefiling order.
       A prefiling order entered by a district court applies to each court in this state. Id.
§ 11.101(e). A vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order is prohibited from filing, pro se,
new litigation in a court to which the order applies without seeking the permission of:

       (1) the local administrative judge of the type of court in which the vexatious litigant intends to file,
       except as provided by Subdivision (2); or
         (2) the local administrative district judge of the county in which the vexatious litigant intends to
         file if the litigant intends to file in a justice or constitutional county court.

Id. § 11.102(a) (West 2017). A clerk of a court may not file a litigation, original proceeding,
appeal, or other claim presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order unless
the litigant obtains an order from the appropriate local administrative judge described permitting
the filing. Id. § 11.103(a) (West 2017). 1
         On March 30, 2023, the Clerk of this Court notified Reule that her appeal would be
dismissed unless she filed a copy of an order from the local administrative judge permitting the
filing of the appeal on or before April 10. 2 We granted Reule’s request for an extension to obtain
the order to April 17. That deadline passed without an order permitting the filing. Absent an
order granting Ruele permission to file this appeal, we lack jurisdiction; therefore, we dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 11.1035(b) (West 2017)
(court shall dismiss litigation unless plaintiff obtains order from appropriate local administrative
judge permitting filing of litigation); see also Yazdchi v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 01-

          1
            There is an exception for appeals from the prefiling order. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
11.103(d) (West 2017) (appellate clerk “may file an appeal from a prefiling order entered under Section 11.101
designating a person a vexatious litigant”). In her motion for extension of time, Reule states, “[Appellant] would
like to point out that CPRC, Section 11.101(c) allows for this appeal without the permission of the local
administrative judge as she understands it.” See id. § 11.101(c) (West 2017) (“litigant may appeal from a prefiling
order entered under Subsection (a) designating the person a vexatious litigant”). But Reule’s notice of appeal
reflects a challenge to the severance order, not the prefiling order. Additionally, the prefiling order was signed on
May 21, 2019; thus, Reule’s notice of appeal filed on March 20, 2023, is untimely for perfecting an appeal from the
prefiling order. See Restrepo v. Alliance Riggers and Constructors, Ltd, No. 08-15-00011-CV, 2015 WL 999950,
at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction purported appeal
from prefiling order for untimely notice of appeal); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1 (time to perfect appeal in civil
cases).
         2 In her motion for extension of time, Reule claims that she requested permission from the local
administrative judge, but that the clerk (presumably the trial court clerk) told her “the Judge didn’t need to do
anything, that he wasn’t required to sign an order.” Assuming this representation was indeed communicated to
Reule, the clerk is incorrect. Section 11.103(a) provides that a clerk may not file a litigation, original proceeding,
appeal, or other claim presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order “unless the litigant
obtains an order from the appropriate local administrative judge described by Section 11.102(a) permitting the
filing.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.103(a) (emphasis added). Thus, to proceed with this appeal, an
order granting permission is required. Additionally, the local administrative judge’s decision denying a litigant
permission to file litigation, or conditioning permission to file litigation on the furnishing of security, may be
challenged by a writ of mandamus filed no later than the thirtieth day after the date of the decision. See id. §
11.102(f) (West 2017). It serves that a written order would be the best practice for notifying the litigant of the trial
court’s decision, such that the litigant could timely pursue mandamus relief if necessary. See e.g. In re Nixon, No.
03-22-00299-CV, 2022 WL 1720087, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 27, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting
when litigant was notified in writing of denial of permission to file litigation when discussing timeliness of original
proceeding).
17-00301-CV, 2017 WL 2255773, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017, no pet.)
(per curiam) (mem. op.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal by vexatious litigant for
failure to obtain permission from local administrative judge). 3
Opinion delivered April 28, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

         3
          We previously dismissed Reule’s petition for writ of mandamus for failure to obtain permission from the
local administrative judge. See In re Reule, No. 12-22-00271-CV, 2022 WL 17350927 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 30,
2022, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                            APRIL 28, 2023

                                         NO. 12-23-00080-CV

                                    CHRISTINE REULE,
                                         Appellant
                                            V.
                                BERNARD JOHN CHISM, ET AL,
                                         Appellee

                                Appeal from the 241st District Court
                         of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 18-1871-C/S)

                    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record; and the same being
considered, it is the opinion of this Court that this appeal should be dismissed.
                    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that
this appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction; and that this decision
be certified to the court below for observance.
                    By per curiam opinion.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.