Court Opinion

ID: 9640757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:14:31.723321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.653999
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Appellant argues, in his motion for rehearing, that his trial counsel’s statements, about the court’s statement concerning probation, were not simply representations of “belief” or “expectation,” but instead, were counsel's firm “guarantees” that probation would be granted. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at his motion for new trial conclusively established the involuntary nature of his plea and the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.
We disagree with appellant’s assessment of the evidence presented at the new trial hearing. On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged the trial court’s admonishments that the court would consider the full range or punishment for a first-degree felony and that the court’s determination of punishment would be influenced by the presentence investigation report. Appellant further admitted that neither he nor his attorney had made any objections to the court’s statements at that time. Appellant testified:
Q Okay. You didn’t say, “Judge, why is the full range of punishment open? I’ve been told I’m going to get probation”?
A No, ma’am, I did not.
Q And you did never, when the Judge asked you anything about influencing you into making this plea, you never said, “Yes, I’ve been promised probation by my attorney”?
A No, ma’am. I did not.
Q Okay. And when you came into the courtroom on the date that you were sentenced, which was a week ago today, and you took the stand, you — made no representations at that time that you expected the Court to give you probation?
A No, ma’am.
On further cross-examination, appellant admitted that at the time he entered his plea of no contest, he knew the effect of the plea would be that the judge would conduct a presentence investigation and would then sentence him. He also testified that when the judge asked him questions concerning the voluntariness of the plea, he answered those questions to the best of his ability, and he admitted that no one during the course of the plea proceedings ever said anything to him about receiving probation and a fine. Specifically, he testified:
Q And you at no point indicated to the Judge that that was the reason why you were pleading no contest, did you?
A No, ma’am.
Q And you at no point during the Sentencing Hearing which was held last Friday indicated to the Court that the reason that you had pled no contest was because of some type of promise or expectation that you would receive eight years’ probation of any type?
A No, ma’am. I did not.
Based on this testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, we conclude that appellant did not conclusively establish the involuntariness of his plea.
We also conclude that the appellant failed to conclusively establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The granting of a motion for new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel is a matter entirely within the trial court’s discretion. Jiminez v. State, 727 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.). In considering a motion for new trial, the trial judge possesses broad discretion in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in weighing the evidence to determine whether a different result would occur upon retrial. Morris v. State, 696 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), aff'd, 739 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); see also Carr v. State, *828646 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, pet ref’d); Marinez v. State, 654 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
In assessing the evidence presented at the new trial hearing, the trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, could properly consider the interest and bias of any witness, Costello v. State, 98 Tex.Crim. 406, 266 S.W. 158 (1925), and the judge was not required to accept as true the testimony of the accused or any defense witness simply because it was not contradicted. Key v. State, 99 Tex.Crim. 612, 270 S.W. 1027 (1925).
Here, the testimony presented by appellant and his counsel at the new trial hearing shows that counsel was fully apprised of the trial court’s intent to consider all factors before making an assessment of punishment. Having assured the court that his plea was voluntary and not based on any promises or inducements, and having stood by silently while the court assessed his punishment at the sentencing hearing, appellant cannot now complain that his counsel was ineffective in advising him about the court’s intent in assessing punishment.
Appellant's motion for rehearing is overruled.