Court Opinion

ID: 9899893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:13.856123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.125927
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 Barba v. Bonta CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 ASHLEYMARIE BARBA et al.,                                            D081194

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
 ROB BONTA, as Attorney General,                                      00003676-CU-CR-CTL)
 etc.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Katherine A. Bacal, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney
General, R. Matthew Wise, Ryan R. Davis, Paul E. Stein and Sebastian
Brady, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Benbrook Law Group, Bradley A. Benbrook and Stephen M. Duvernay
for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                                            I. INTRODUCTION
         California state law has required the California Department of Justice
(the DOJ) to maintain records of essentially all handgun transfers occurring
in the state of California since at least the 1950’s, and has further mandated
the inclusion of long gun transfers since 2014. (Pen. Code § 11106, originally

enacted by Stats. 1953, ch. 1385, § 1)1 In 2015, the California electorate
passed a voter initiative that requires the DOJ to maintain similar records
regarding any sale or transfer of ammunition. (Prop. 63, as approved by
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016); § 30352.) This data provides a unique
opportunity for research not available anywhere else. Since at least 1989,
researchers at the University of California, Davis have been utilizing that
data in research studies aimed at understanding and preventing various
forms of firearm violence.
      In 2016, the Legislature directed the Regents of the University of
California to establish a Firearm Violence Research Center (the Center) with
the goals of overseeing interdisciplinary research addressing the nature and
consequences of firearm violence, and working with policymakers “to identify,
implement, and evaluate innovative firearm violence prevention policies and
programs.” (Pen. Code §§ 14230, 14231.) To aid in those goals, the
Legislature mandated that several state agencies, including the DOJ, provide
the Center with “the data necessary for [it] to conduct its research.” (§ 14231,
former subd. (c), current subd. (c)(2).) However, the DOJ began restricting the
Center’s access to data in the following years. In response, the Legislature
passed Assembly Bill No. 173 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 173), which
amended several statutory provisions to make clear the Legislature’s intent
that the DOJ provide all necessary data, including personally identifying
data, to the Center upon proper request.
      Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the
amendments. Among other claims, they assert that the data sharing
prescribed by the amendments violates their right to privacy under the

1     All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        2
California Constitution. The Attorney General demurred, and Plaintiffs filed
a motion for preliminary injunction. Following a combined hearing in
October 2022, the trial court overruled the demurrer as to the privacy claim
and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from transferring any
additional personal identifying information from the firearm and ammunition
databases to researchers until further notice.
      On appeal, the Attorney General asserts the trial court erred by
conflating the legal standards for the co-pending demurrer and preliminary
injunction motions and that, under the proper standard, it was an abuse of
discretion to grant the injunction. We agree. Even assuming that Plaintiffs
have met the threshold inquiries to establish a privacy claim, the Attorney
General presented a legitimate countervailing interest and presented
evidence explaining why Plaintiffs’ proposed alternatives are not adequate or
sufficient. Having failed to rebut that evidence, Plaintiffs cannot establish a
probability of success on the merits as a matter of law, and we therefore
reverse the trial court’s order granting the preliminary injunction and
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a new order
denying the motion for a preliminary injunction.
          II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. California’s Long History of Retaining Firearm Transfer Data
      California has required dealers to retain records regarding firearm
transfers since at least 1917. (See Stats. 1917, ch.145, § 7, pp. 222–223.)
Under the original statute, “[e]very person in the business of selling, leasing,
or otherwise transferring a pistol, revolver or other firearm, of a size capable
of being concealed upon the person,” was to “keep a register in which [they]
entered the time of sale, the date of sale, the name of the salesman making
the sale, the place where sold, the make, model, manufacturer’s number,

                                        3
caliber or other marks of identification on such pistol, revolver or other
firearm.” (Ibid.) The law required the purchaser to sign the form and affix
their address, and required the dealer to mail a duplicate of the form to the
municipal police department or county clerk where the firearm was sold.
(Ibid.) Failure to comply with those requirements or the use of a fictitious
name or address on the form gave rise to a misdemeanor offense. (Ibid.)
      This same basic system for recording firearm transfers persists today
but has now been expanded to include all firearms—not just handguns or
those capable of being concealed upon the person—and to provide for digital
transfer of the data to the DOJ. (See Assembly Bill 809, Stats. 2011, ch. 745,
§ 2.5, operative Jan. 1, 2014 [conforming the law so that transfers of
handguns and firearms other than handguns (i.e., long guns) are treated the
same]; § 28205 [addressing electronic transfers of firearm purchaser
information to the DOJ].) With some limited exceptions, every sale or
transfer of a firearm in California must now go through a licensed dealer,
under the Dealer’s Record of Sale (DROS) process. (§§ 26500, 28050.)
      Under that process, an individual wishing to obtain a firearm must
first fill out a DROS form, provided by the dealer. (§§ 28100, 28160.) The
contents of the DROS form are statutorily mandated, and include
information regarding the firearm, such as the make, model, and serial
number; information regarding the dealer; and information about the
purchaser, including their full name, date of birth, address, telephone
number, occupation, gender, and a physical description. (§ 28160.) The form
also contains mandatory questions regarding the purchaser’s criminal and
mental health history and requires an imprint of the purchaser’s right
thumbprint. (§ 28160, subds. (a)(29), (b).) The dealer must submit the
information on the DROS form to the DOJ, which allows the DOJ to conduct

                                        4
a background check to ensure the purchaser is not precluded from possessing
a firearm. (§§ 28205, 28220.) If the DOJ approves the transaction, the dealer
may deliver the firearm to the purchaser following a 10-day waiting period.
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 4230, subd. (a).)
      Beyond enabling background checks, the DROS data has long served as
the basis for a firearm registration system maintained by the DOJ. As
originally enacted in 1953, section 11106 required the DOJ to “properly file a
complete record of all copies of fingerprints[ and] duplicate carbon copies of
applications for licenses to carry concealed weapons and dealers’ records of
sales of deadly weapons,” among other items, “to assist in the investigation of
crime, the arrest and prosecution of criminals and the recovery of lost, stolen
or found property.” (§ 11106, as originally enacted, Stats.1953, ch. 1385, § 1,
p. 2966.) The DOJ has maintained these records in a repository known as
the Automated Firearms System (the AFS) for all known handgun
acquisitions since approximately 1980, and for all new legally acquired

firearms, including both handguns and long guns, since January 1, 2014.2
(Code Regs., tit. 11, §§ 4350, 4281, subds. (a), (d) [defining the “Automated
Firearm System”]; Cal. Attorney General, “APPS Database”
https://oag.ca.gov/ogvp/apps-database [last visited, Aug. 25, 2023].)
      Section 11106 has expanded over time, and now requires the Attorney
General to maintain records of numerous other statutorily specified items.
(§ 11106, subd. (a)(1)(A)–(I).) But the primary purpose has not changed. As
the statute specifies, these records are retained “to assist in the investigation

2     The AFS “is populated by way of firearm purchases or transfers at a
California licensed firearm dealer, registration of assault weapons, an
individual’s report of firearm ownership to the Department, Carry Concealed
Weapons Permit records, or records entered by law enforcement agencies.”
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 4350.)

                                         5
of crime, the prosecution of civil actions by city attorneys pursuant to
paragraph (3) of subdivision (b), the arrest and prosecution of criminals, and

the recovery of lost, stolen, or found property.”3 (§ 11106, subd. (a)(1).)
Consistent with that goal, section 11106, subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)(3) require
the Attorney General to furnish the information, upon proper application, “to
the officers referred to in Section 11105,” which similarly requires the DOJ to
maintain and provide “state summary criminal history information”
(§ 11105). Section 11105, subdivision (b), in turn, delineates numerous
circumstances under which the Attorney General must provide information
to courts, peace officers, city attorneys, and other public agencies.
B. California’s More Recent Retention of Ammunition Transfer Data
      More recently, the Legislature enacted similar laws requiring vendors
to keep records of firearm ammunition transfers. (See § 12061, enacted by
Stats. 2009, ch. 628, § 2 (Assem. Bill 962); renumbered without substantive
change to § 30352, et seq. by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6 (Sen. Bill 1080).) Like
the DROS system, the ammunition transfer data includes information
regarding the type of ammunition and the purchaser’s name, address, date of
birth, state issued identification number, and an image of the purchaser’s
right thumbprint. (Former § 30352, subd. (a)(3)(A)–(H), eff. Jan. 1, 2012 to
Nov. 8, 2016.) Vendors must maintain these records for at least five years
and make them available to any peace officer who is “conducting an
investigation where access to those records is or may be relevant, is seeking

3     Section 11106, subdivision (b)(3) provides further: “Information in the
registry referred to in this subdivision shall, upon proper application
therefor, be furnished to the officers referred to in Section 11105, to a city
attorney prosecuting a civil action, solely for use in prosecuting that civil
action and not for any other purpose, or to the person listed in the registry as
the owner or person who is listed as being loaned the particular firearm.”

                                        6
information about persons prohibited from owning a firearm or ammunition,
or is engaged in ensuring compliance with the Dangerous Weapons Control
Law, as defined in Section 23500, or any other laws pertaining to firearms or
ammunition.” (§ 30357, subd. (a).)
      In 2016, the California electorate voted to approve Proposition 63,
commonly known as “The Safety for All Act of 2016” (Prop. 63). The
proposition amended various provisions of the Penal Code to increase
oversight of ammunition sales in the state and to enhance the record keeping
associated with ammunition transfers. (Prop. 63, supra.) In doing so, the
people made the following findings and declarations:
      “1. Gun violence destroys lives, families and communities. From
          2002 to 2013, California lost 38,576 individuals to gun
          violence. . . .

      “2. In 2013, guns were used to kill 2,900 Californians, including
          251 children and teens. That year, at least 6,035 others were
          hospitalized or treated in emergency rooms for non-fatal
          gunshot wounds, including 1,275 children and teens.

          [¶] . . . [¶]

      “4. This tragic violence imposes significant economic burdens on
          our society. Researchers conservatively estimate that gun
          violence costs the economy at least $229 billion every year, or
          more than $700 per American per year. In 2013 alone,
          California gun deaths and injuries imposed $83 million in
          medical costs and $4.24 billion in lost productivity.

(Ibid.)

      Among other provisions, Proposition 63 amended section 30352 to
require the DOJ to create and maintain a database like the AFS to track and
record ammunition sales. Under the amended statute, vendors submit the
ammunition transfer data they were previously required to obtain to the DOJ
and the DOJ retains the information in a database called the Ammunition

                                       7
Purchase Records File (APRF). (Prop. 63, supra; § 30352, former subd. (b),
current subd. (b)(1).) The amended section 30352 specifies that the APRF
data “shall remain confidential and may be used by the department and those
entities specified in, and pursuant to, subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 11105,
through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System
[CLETS], only for law enforcement purposes.” (§ 30352, former subd. (b),
current subd. (b)(1).)
C. California’s History of Utilizing DROS Data in Research Aimed at
   Informing Policies to Reduce Firearm Violence

      The DROS system and the associated AFS and APRF databases create
a unique data set regarding gun and ammunition ownership not available
anywhere else. Researchers in California have used this data to conduct

empirical research4 regarding firearm-related violence for some time.
      The DOJ first provided DROS records to researchers at the University
of California, Davis (UC Davis), in approximately 1989. The researchers
used the data to conduct “research on risk factors for criminal activity among
legal purchasers of firearms that was supported by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention” (the CDC). At the time, the CDC viewed gun
violence as a public health issue and was funding studies aimed at reducing
injuries and deaths resulting from such violence. (See Rostron, Allen, The
Dickey Amendment on Federal Funding for Research on Gun Violence: A
Legal Dissection (2018) Am. J. of Public Health, Vol. 108, No. 7, pp. 865–867.)
Not long after, Congress passed an amendment to a CDC appropriations bill,

4     “An ‘empirical study’ is commonly understood to mean a research study
that relies on empirical evidence; it is designed to test a theory or hypotheses
by collecting independently verifiable data or information and making
conclusions based on that information.” (Wendz v. State Dept. of Education
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 652.)

                                        8
commonly referred to as the “Dickey Amendment,” that essentially ended
CDC funding for research concerning firearm violence. (Ibid.) Nevertheless,
researchers at UC Davis continued to study firearm violence using data
supplied by the DOJ.
      1.      The Creation of the Firearm Violence Research Center

      In 2016, apparently sharing many of the same concerns as the
electorate, the Legislature declared its intent that the Regents of the
University of California establish and administer a Firearm Violence
Research Center to expand and continue this valuable research. (Assembly
Bill No. 1602 (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.), ch. 24, § 30 (Assem. Bill 1602).) In
newly enacted section 14230, the Legislature made the following findings:
           “(a) Firearm violence is a significant public health and
               public safety problem in California and nationwide.
               Nationally, rates of fatal firearm violence have
               remained essentially unchanged for more than a
               decade, as declines in homicide have been offset by
               increases in suicide.

              [¶] . . . [¶]

           “(c) Nationwide, the annual societal cost of firearm violence
                was estimated at $229,000,000,000 in 2012. A
                significant share of this burden falls on California. In
                2013, the Office of Statewide Health Planning and
                Development noted that government-sponsored
                insurance programs covered nearly two-thirds of the
                costs of hospitalizations for firearm assaults in
                California, and about one-half of the costs of
                hospitalizations for unintentional injuries or those
                resulting from deliberate self-harm.

           “(d) California has been a leader in responding to this
               continuing crisis. However, although rates of fatal
               firearm violence in California are well below average
               for the 50 states, they are not low enough.

                                         9
         “(e) Too little is known about firearm violence and its
              prevention. This is in substantial part because too little
              research has been done. The need for more research
              and more sophisticated research has repeatedly been
              emphasized. . . . Because there has been so little
              support for research, only a small number of trained
              investigators are available.

         “(f) When confronted by other major health and social
              problems, California and the nation have mounted
              effective responses, coupling an expanded research
              effort with policy reform in the public’s interest. Motor
              vehicle accidents, cancer, heart disease, and tobacco use
              are all examples of the benefits of this approach.

         “(g) Federal funding for firearm violence research through
              the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
              has been virtually eliminated by Congress since 1996,
              leaving a major gap that must be filled by other
              sources.”

      Based on these findings, the Legislature enacted section 14231, in
which it requested that the University of California establish and administer
the Firearm Violence Research Center. (§ 14231, subds. (a), (e).) Statutorily
enumerated goals and principals provide that the Center is to conduct
interdisciplinary research addressing:
         “(A) The nature of firearm violence, including individual
              and societal determinants of risk for involvement in
              firearm violence, whether as a victim or a perpetrator.

         “(B) The individual, community, and societal consequences
             of firearm violence.

         “(C) Prevention and treatment of firearm violence at the
              individual, community, and societal levels.”

(Id. at subd. (a)(1)(A)–(C).)

      In addition, the Center is to “work on a continuing basis with
policymakers in the Legislature and state agencies to identify, implement,

                                       10
and evaluate innovative firearm violence prevention policies and programs.”
(§ 14231, subd. (a)(3).) To achieve those goals, the Legislature mandated
further that, “[s]ubject to the conditions and requirements established
elsewhere in statute, state agencies, including, but not limited to, the
Department of Justice, the State Department of Public Health, the State
Department of Health Care Services, the Office of Statewide Health Planning
and Development, and the Department of Motor Vehicles, shall provide to the
[C]enter, upon proper request, . . . the data necessary for the [C]enter to
conduct its research.” (Id., current subd. (c)(2), former subd. (c).)
      2.    The DOJ’s Restriction of the Center’s Access to Data, and
            the Legislature’s Response

      Despite the Legislature’s emphasis on the importance of the Center’s
research, the DOJ stopped providing data to the Center sometime around
2017 and, in 2021, then Attorney General Becerra announced that the DOJ
was considering a rule change based on privacy concerns that would restrict
the release of certain personal identifying information to the Center. In a
statement issued at the time, the DOJ said that it valued the Center’s
research and policy impacts, but also took seriously its “ ‘duty to protect
Californians’ sensitive personally identifying information.’ ”
      The Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 173 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Assem. Bill 173) in response, making several amendments to the law,
solidifying the DOJ’s ability, and obligation, to provide data to the Center.
      First, the Legislature amended the findings enumerated in section
14230 to add: “California’s uniquely rich data related to firearm violence
have made possible important, timely, policy-relevant research that cannot
be conducted elsewhere.” (§14230, subd. (e), as amended by Assem. Bill 173,
2021 Stats., ch. 253, § 4.)

                                        11
      Second, the Legislature amended sections 14231, 11106, and 30352 to
clarify the data sharing requirement for both the AFS and APRS. Section
14231, subdivision (c)(1) now clarifies that “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature
that the [C]enter be provided with access to data kept by state agencies that
is necessary for the conduct of its research.” Section 14231, subdivision (c)(2)
maintains the previous language regarding requests for data, and newly
added subdivision (c)(3) now states, more specifically:
         “Material identifying individuals shall only be provided for
         research or statistical activities and shall not be
         transferred, revealed, or used for purposes other than
         research or statistical activities, and reports or publications
         derived therefrom shall not identify specific individuals.
         Recognizing the time-sensitive nature of the [C]enter’s
         research, data shall be provided in a timely manner. . . . If
         a request for data or letter of support for research using the
         data is denied, the state agency shall provide a written
         statement of the specific reasons for the denial.”

      That same language is repeated in newly added section 11106,
subdivision (d) and 30352, subdivision (b)(2).
      In addition, section 11106, subdivision (d) provides:
         “All information collected pursuant to this section shall be
         maintained by the department and shall be available to
         researchers affiliated with the California Firearm Violence
         Research Center at UC Davis for academic and policy
         research purposes upon proper request and following
         approval by the [C]enter’s governing institutional review
         board when required. At the department’s discretion, and
         subject to Section 14240, information collected pursuant to
         this section may be provided to any other nonprofit bona
         fide research institution accredited by the United States
         Department of Education or the Council for Higher
         Education Accreditation for the study of the prevention of
         violence and following approval by the institution’s
         governing institutional review board or human subjects
         committee when required.”

                                        12
      And section 30352, subdivision (b)(2), provides:

         “The information collected by the department as provided
         in paragraph (1) shall be available to researchers affiliated
         with the California Firearm Violence Research Center at
         UC Davis following approval by the institution’s governing
         institutional review board, when required. At the
         department’s discretion, and subject to Section 14240, the
         data may be provided to any other nonprofit bona fide
         research institution accredited by the United States
         Department of Education or the Council for Higher
         Education Accreditation for the study of the prevention of
         violence, following approval by the institution’s governing
         institutional review board or human subjects committee,
         when required, for academic and policy research purposes.”

      The foregoing provisions went into effect on September 23, 2021. On
November 29, 2021, the DOJ approved the Center’s most recent application
and authorized 19 users to access data from the DROS and AFS system. The
data that the DOJ allowed the researchers to access included all available
personal identifying information. On July 1, 2021, the DOJ approved an
application from Stanford University and authorized similar access for an
additional 8 researchers and, on November 15, 2021, the DOJ provided DROS
data extracts to Stanford. As of April 2022, there were no further
applications for AFS or DROS data pending before the DOJ. As of that same
date, neither the Center nor any other research institution had submitted a
request for APRS data.
D. Plaintiffs Challenge to the Sharing of Firearm and Ammunition
   Data and the Associated Preliminary Injunction

      In early 2022, Plaintiffs Ashleymarie Barba (an individual gun owner),
Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation, California
Gun Rights Foundation, San Diego County Gun Owners PAC, Orange County
Gun Owners PAC, and the Inland Empire Gun Owners PAC (collectively,

                                      13
Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against Rob Bonta, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of California, challenging the constitutionality of the
amendments enacted by Assem. Bill 173. In the operative first amended
complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the amendments are invalid for three
reasons: 1) the disclosure of personal identifying information permitted by
the amended statutes violates their right to privacy under Article I, section I
of the California Constitution; 2) Assem. Bill 173 improperly amends
Proposition 63, a voter initiative; and 3) the amendments violate the Second
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Based on these claims,
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief precluding the DOJ from
sharing personal identifying information from the AFS or APRS databases.
      On March 3, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction,
asking the trial court to enjoin the DOJ from sharing personal identifying
information collected pursuant to sections 11106 and 30352. In addition,
they asked the court for a mandatory injunction requiring the DOJ to retrieve
all previously transferred personal identifying information. Although they
had raised other arguments in the complaint, Plaintiffs premised their
motion for preliminary injunction solely on their right to privacy under
Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. Later that same month,
the Attorney General filed a demurrer, asserting that all three of Plaintiffs’
claims fail as a matter of law. At the parties’ request, the trial court stayed
the demurrer as to the third claim, based on the Second Amendment, pending
resolution of the same issue in a different matter pending in the federal

courts.5

5     On January 12, 2023, while the present appeal was pending, the
federal district court granted the Attorney General’s request to dismiss the
complaint in the federal matter. (See Doe v. Bonta (S.D.Cal. 2023) 650
F.Supp.3d 1062.)

                                       14
      The trial court heard both motions at a consolidated hearing in October
2022. The court began with the demurrer. After hearing argument, the court
indicated it was inclined to confirm its tentative on the demurrer, overruling
the demurrer as to the first cause of action alleging violations of the right to
privacy under the California Constitution, and sustaining it as to the second
cause of action alleging that Assem. Bill 173 improperly amends a voter
initiative.
      The court then turned its attention to the preliminary injunction
motion. The Attorney General began by pointing out that the injunction was
based on a different standard than the demurrer. He argued that Plaintiffs
had the burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits to obtain
an injunction and that, because they had brought only a facial challenge to
the amended statutes, they first had to overcome the inherent presumption
that the statutes are constitutional. In response, the court pointed out that
the standard for a preliminary injunction was a balancing test that did not
necessarily rest primarily on the likelihood of success on the merits. The
Attorney General went on to address the state’s countervailing interest in
conducting research aimed at preventing or reducing firearm violence and the
imminent harms resulting from precluding or delaying that research. He
concluded: “This court has to look beyond whether we have raised factual
issues in the pleadings and must address whether the plaintiffs have shown
they are likely to succeed on the merits on their facial challenge to [Assem.
Bill] 173. And because they have not and because the balance of harms cuts
against denying Californians the benefit of critical research into an
extraordinarily pressing problem, the injunction should be denied.”
      After hearing argument from Plaintiffs, the trial court confirmed its
tentative decision to grant the preliminary injunction, in part. In a

                                       15
subsequent written order, the court found that “the balancing of plaintiffs’
privacy interest against the state’s interest in reducing firearms violence, is
not an appropriate inquiry at the demurrer stage.” It then incorporated that
ruling into its discussion of the preliminary injunction ruling, and stated:
“Just as plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of privacy under the California
Constitution survived defendant’s demurrer, for the same reasons plaintiffs
have also shown a likelihood of success on the merits to satisfy the factor of
the preliminary injunction inquiry.” Turning to the balance of harms, the
court weighed the fact that much of the information had already been shared
with researchers, against the alleged harms associated with additional
transfers, and concluded the balance of harms weighed in favor of issuing a
prohibitory, but not mandatory, injunction.
      Based on that ruling, the court issued the following preliminary
injunction: “The California Department of Justice is enjoined from
transferring to researchers (1) personal identifying information collected in
the Automated Firearms System pursuant to Penal Code section 11106(d)
and (2) personal identifying information collected in the Ammunition
Purchase Records File pursuant to Penal Code section 30352(b)(2), until
further notice and order by the Court.”
      The Attorney General filed a timely notice of appeal.
                              III. DISCUSSION
      The Attorney General asserts the trial court erred by misapplying the
demurrer standard to its ruling on the preliminary injunction, and that
under the correct legal standard, the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary
injunction was an abuse of its discretion. Plaintiffs respond that the trial
court was not required to make express findings as to each element of the
preliminary injunction test, that the trial court’s balance of harms analysis

                                       16
shows that it did consider the appropriate legal standard, and that the trial

court did not err by issuing the injunction.6
A.    Relevant Legal Principals Regarding Preliminary Injunctions

     “[T]he question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted
involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to
result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v.
Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “ ‘The ultimate goal . . . is to minimize the
harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause.’ ” (Ibid., italics
omitted.) The party seeking injunctive relief has the burden to show all
elements necessary to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
(O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 (O’Connell).)
       We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion. (See Cohen v. Board of Supervisors
(1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286.) “Generally, the ruling on an application for a
preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The
exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing
that it has been abused.” (Ibid.) However, “[t]he abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according
to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review.” (Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.) “For instance, the superior court’s express
and implied findings of fact are accepted by appellate courts if supported by
substantial evidence, and the superior court’s conclusions on issues of pure
law are subject to independent review.” (Smith v. Adventist Health
System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 739 (Smith).) In addition, “ ‘ “[a]

6   Neither party disputes the trial court’s ruling on the Attorney General’s
demurrer.

                                       17
trial court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standards
applicable to the issue at hand.” ’ ” (Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1493.)
      Because the preliminary injunction at issue here arises from Plaintiffs’
claim that the disclosure of personal identifying information permitted by
amended sections 11106 and 30352 violates their right to privacy under
Article I, section I of the California Constitution, we must consider the trial
court’s ruling in the context of the law surrounding the right to privacy under
the California Constitution.
B.   Relevant Legal Principals Regarding the Right to Privacy
     Established by Article I, Section I of the California Constitution

      In 1972, the People of the State of California voted to approve a ballot
initiative commonly referred to as “The Privacy Initiative,” which amended
Article I, Section I of the California Constitution to include a universal right
to privacy. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (2017 3 Cal.5th 561, 569 (Lewis).)
As our high court has explained, “The Privacy Initiative addressed the
‘accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by
increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society.’ ”
(Ibid.) The initiative addressed three primary concerns: “ ‘(1) “government
snooping” and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad
collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government
and business interests; (3) the improper use of information properly obtained
for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the
disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack of a reasonable check on
the accuracy of existing records.’ ” (Ibid.)
      The ballot materials suggest that proponents of the amendment were
primarily concerned with the government compiling secret dossiers, or
“ ‘cradle to grave’ profiles,” on citizens, without affording individual citizens

                                        18
any right or ability to review the information contained therein for accuracy.
(Voter Initiative Guide for 1972 General Election (1972), pp. 26–27.) The
proponents asserted the right to privacy “should be abridged only when there
is a compelling public need. Some information may remain as designated
public records but only when the availability of such information is clearly in
the public interest.” (Id. at p. 27.) Plaintiffs now assert that the sharing of
firearm and ammunition data with researchers in accordance with amended
sections 11106 and 30352 is not in the public interest and violates their right
to privacy under the California Constitution.
      The California Supreme Court considered an analogous question in
Lewis. The issue there was whether the patients’ right to privacy was
violated when the Medical Board of California accessed data from a database
used to monitor prescription drugs during an investigation of the patients’
physician. (Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 565.) In evaluating the merits of
that claim, the Court applied the two-part inquiry for determining whether
there has been a violation of the right to privacy under the California
Constitution, previously articulated by the Court in its decision in Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill). (Lewis, supra,
3 Cal.5th at p. 571.)
      “First, the complaining party must meet three ‘ “threshold elements”
. . . utilized to screen out claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on
a privacy interest protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 571.) They “must demonstrate: ‘(1) a legally
protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion
of privacy.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 39–40.) “Whether a
legally recognized privacy interest is present in a given case is a question of

                                        19
law to be decided by the court. [Citations.] Whether plaintiff has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and whether
defendant’s conduct constitutes a serious invasion of privacy are mixed
questions of law and fact. If the undisputed material facts show no
reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy
interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.”
(Hill, at p. 40.)
      Second, any such privacy interest “must be balanced against other
important [or countervailing] interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37;
accord Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 572.) Thus, even if a plaintiff is able to
establish a serious invasion of privacy under the threshold inquiry, the
defendant may still prevail by “ ‘proving, as an affirmative defense, that the
invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more
countervailing interests.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 572.) “ ‘The plaintiff, in turn, may
rebut a defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are
feasible and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct which have a lesser
impact on privacy interests.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Hill, at p. 40.)
      “The standard that a defendant’s proffered countervailing interests
must satisfy varies based on the privacy interest asserted: ‘Where the case
involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to
pursue consensual familial relationships, a “compelling interest” must be
present to overcome the vital privacy interest. If in contrast, the privacy
interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are
employed.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 572, quoting Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th
at p. 34.) “ ‘The existence of a sufficient countervailing interest or an
alternative course of conduct present[s] threshold questions of law for the

                                        20
court. The relative strength of countervailing interests and the feasibility of
alternatives present mixed questions of law and fact. . . . [I]n cases where
material facts are undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be
appropriate.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 572, quoting Hill, at p. 40.)
C.   The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Granting the Injunction

     Here, by relying on its analysis on the demurrer to resolve the motion for
preliminary injunction, it appears that the trial court failed to consider the
second step of the Hill analysis. Applying the full analysis compelled by Hill,
we conclude that the Attorney General established a legitimate
countervailing interest and that, although Plaintiffs proposed some
alternatives, they did not rebut the Attorney General’s evidence regarding
the lack of feasibility of those alternatives. Thus, on the record before us,
Plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits as a matter of
law, and the preliminary injunction must be reversed.
      1.    The Trial Court Did Not Apply the Correct Legal Standard

      The trial court began by considering the constitutional privacy claim in
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action in the context of the Attorney General’s
demurrer. As the trial court explained, the standard for reviewing the
sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer is well settled. (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The reviewing court is to treat the
demurrer as accepting all material facts properly pleaded and, doing so, must
determine simply whether the complaint states facts, if taken as true,
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Ibid.) Addressing the demurrer
here, the trial court acknowledged the threshold requirements to state a
claim for an invasion of privacy set forth in Hill and concluded that Plaintiffs
had alleged facts sufficient to satisfy each requirement.

                                        21
      In overruling the demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, the
trial court concluded that Plaintiffs adequately alleged (1) that they had a
legally protected privacy interest in the personal information collected in
conjunction with firearm and ammunition transactions; (2) that they had a
“reasonable expectation of privacy in this information not being disclosed for
reasons other than law enforcement and not being disclosed to third parties
who are hostile to their interests”; and (3) that the transfer and use of the
data constituted a serious invasion of privacy insofar as it was done without
their knowledge or consent. The court went on to explain that issues such as
the reasonableness of Plaintiffs’ expectations of privacy and the seriousness
of the alleged invasion were questions of fact not suitable for resolution at the
demurrer stage. Similarly, the court expressly stated that “the balancing of
plaintiffs’ privacy interest against the state’s interest in reducing firearms
violence, is not an appropriate inquiry at the demurrer stage.” (Italics added.)
      The trial court then incorporated this same analysis into its decision on
the preliminary injunction motion. Addressing Plaintiffs’ likelihood of
success on the merits, the trial court stated: “Just as plaintiffs’ cause of
action for violation of privacy under the California Constitution survived
defendant’s demurrer, for the same reasons plaintiffs have also shown a
likelihood of success on the merits to satisfy the factor of the preliminary
injunction inquiry. Defendant’s arguments do not compel a different
outcome.” (Italics added.)
      The Attorney General asserts that this was error, and argues that the
trial court had to go beyond the adequacy of the facially accepted allegations
in the complaint to adequately consider whether Plaintiffs had established a
likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. In other words, the trial
court needed to consider those issues that it had deemed not appropriate for

                                        22
consideration at the demurrer stage and, in doing so, needed to consider the
supporting materials submitted by the parties. Because the trial court
declined to conduct that analysis, it abused its discretion.
      Plaintiffs do not dispute that the standard for overcoming a demurrer
differs from the standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Rather,
they contend that we must presume that the court applied the correct
analysis, even if it did not make express findings as to each element of the
preliminary injunction test, particularly where, as here, the trial court
referenced the correct standard in its ruling. As Plaintiffs explain, further,
“[r]ecognition of, and deference to, implied findings is derived from the
principle that an appellate court must interpret the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and indulge all reasonable inferences in
support of the trial court’s decision regarding the preliminary injunction.”
(Smith, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 739, italics added.)
      The fact that the trial court relied, to some extent, on its reasoning in
ruling on the demurrer in ruling on the preliminary injunction motion is not
in and of itself sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. As the trial court
pointed out, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is
“ ‘guided by a “mix” of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the
greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to
support an injunction,’ ” and, thus, the court only had to conclude that
Plaintiffs established at least a minimal probability of success on the merits.
(See Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678 (Butt).) However, a
“trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance
of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would
ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim.” (Ibid.; Law School Admission
Counsel, Inc. v. State of California (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1280.)

                                        23
Because Plaintiffs, as the moving party, had the burden to show all elements
necessary to support the issuance of the injunction, they had to establish at
least some likelihood of success on the merits of their privacy claim to prevail
on their motion for a preliminary injunction. (See O’Connell, supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 1481.) The trial court could not determine whether
Plaintiffs had done so without applying the full two-step analysis set forth in
Hill.
        In ruling on the demurrer, the trial court explicitly declined to balance
Plaintiffs’ privacy interest against the state’s alleged countervailing interest
in conducting empirical research aimed at reducing firearm violence. By
subsequently incorporating that analysis into the ruling on the preliminary
injunction motion, it appears the trial court overlooked the second step of the
two-party inquiry set forth in Hill. Indeed, the trial court does not mention
the Attorney General’s asserted countervailing interest or Plaintiffs’ alleged
feasible alternatives at all in its ruling. Thus, it appears that the trial court
did not apply the full, or correct, legal standard in determining whether
Plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits. This was
error. And, although we generally presume the trial court did apply the
correct analysis, as Plaintiffs assert, “[w]here the record demonstrates the
trial judge did not weigh the evidence, the presumption of correctness is
overcome.” (Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.)
        As we explain next, under the correct legal standard, the trial court’s
granting of the preliminary injunction was likewise an abuse of its discretion.
Assuming that Plaintiffs met their burden under the threshold inquiry, the
Attorney General presented a legitimate countervailing interest—promoting
research informing policy decisions aimed at preventing or reducing firearm

                                        24
violence—and presented detailed declarations from several individual
researchers explaining the importance of and need to use personally
identifiable data to conduct that research. Although Plaintiffs offered some
argument as to feasible alternatives, the declarations submitted by the
Attorney General explained why those alternatives are not adequate.
Plaintiffs did not seriously dispute that evidence or provide any evidence of
their own establishing a material dispute of fact as to either issue. Thus,
although we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s
decision, we conclude, on the record before us, that Plaintiffs cannot establish
a likelihood of success on the merits as a matter of law. (See Lewis, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 572, quoting Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40 [“ ‘The relative
strength of countervailing interests and the feasibility of alternatives present
mixed questions of law and fact. . . . [I]n cases where material facts are
undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate’ ”].)
      2.    Under the Correct Legal Standard, Plaintiffs Have Not
            Established a Likelihood of Success on the Merits

                   a.   Threshold Inquiry
      We begin with the three-part threshold inquiry “ ‘utilized to screen out
claims that do not involve a significant intrusion on a privacy interest
protected by the state constitutional privacy provision.’ ” (See Lewis, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 571; Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 34.)
      The trial court found that Plaintiffs’ allegations as to each of the three
threshold factors were adequate to survive a demurrer, and that Plaintiffs
established a likelihood of success on the merits “for the same reasons.” In
doing so, the court expressly declined to consider whether it was reasonable
for Plaintiffs to expect the state to refrain from sharing DROS data with
researchers despite the history of the DOJ doing so, or whether the narrow
scope of the disclosure prevented it from being a serious invasion of privacy.

                                        25
The parties argue both points on appeal, but we need not, and expressly do
not, decide these issues here. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiffs are
able to satisfy each prong of the threshold inquiry, we nevertheless conclude
that they cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits because they
do not rebut the Attorney General’s evidence supporting its claims that the
statutory amendments substantively further a countervailing interest and
that there are no feasible alternatives.
                  b.   The Attorney General Presented Uncontested
                       Evidence Establishing That the Statutory
                       Amendments Substantively Further One or
                       More Countervailing Interests

      Setting aside the threshold inquiry, “[a] defendant may prevail in a
state constitutional privacy case by . . . pleading and proving, as an
affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it
substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests. Plaintiff, in
turn, may rebut a defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by
showing there are feasible and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct
which have a lesser impact on privacy interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 40.) “The existence of a sufficient countervailing interest or an alternative
course of conduct present threshold questions of law for the court. The
relative strength of countervailing interests and the feasibility of alternatives
present mixed questions of law and fact. Again, in cases where material facts
are undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate.” (Ibid.)
      Even a serious “[i]nvasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the
state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing
interest. Legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially
beneficial activities of government and private entities. Their relative
importance is determined by their proximity to the central functions of a

                                       26
particular public or private enterprise. Conduct alleged to be an invasion of
privacy is to be evaluated based on the extent to which it furthers legitimate
and important competing interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 38.)
      Before turning to the Attorney General’s proffered countervailing
interest, we note that “[l]egally recognized privacy interests are generally of
two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of
sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’); and
(2) interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal
activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (‘autonomy
privacy’).” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 35.) In Hill, the Court explained,
“[w]here the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to
personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the
freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a ‘compelling interest’
must be present to overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the
privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing
tests are employed.” (Id. at p. 34.)
      More recently, in Lewis, the California Supreme Court noted that it
had applied the general balancing test “without requiring the asserted
countervailing interest to be compelling” in all but one case since Hill.
(Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 573.) That one case, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307 (Lungren), plainly fell into the
second category of privacy interests as it “involved a challenge to a statute
requiring a pregnant minor to obtain parental consent or judicial
authorization before having an abortion, an issue that ‘unquestionably
impinges upon “an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” ’ ” (Lewis, at
p. 573.) By contrast, the class of privacy interest at issue here is
informational; it involves the dissemination of sensitive information and not

                                       27
an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy like the
one at issue in Lungren. Plaintiffs summarily assert that the compelling
interest standard applied in Lungren applies here, but they offer no
explanation or argument to support that conclusion. In our view, under Hill
and Lewis, the general balancing test applies in this case. (Hill, supra,
7 Cal.4th at pp. 34–35.)
      The People of California, the Legislature, and the Attorney General
have identified the following countervailing interest justifying any invasion of
privacy resulting from the DOJ transferring firearm and ammunition data
containing personally identifying information for approved research projects:
empirical research supporting informed policymaking aimed at reducing and
preventing firearm violence. In passing Proposition 63 in 2016, the electorate
acknowledged both the large number of lives lost, and the high costs
associated with medical care and lost productivity resulting from various
forms of firearm violence in recent years. (Prop. 63, supra.) The Legislature
made similar findings when enacting section 14230, also in 2016 (§ 14230,
subd. (b)) and found that “[t]oo little is known about firearm violence and its
prevention,” because “too little research has been done. The need for more
research and more sophisticated research has been repeatedly emphasized.”
(Id., subd. (e), italics added.)
      The Legislature noted further that California has a history of mounting
effective responses to similar concerns, by “coupling an expanded research
effort with policy reform in the public’s interest.” (§ 14230, subd. (f).) And
California is even more uniquely situated in its ability to analyze and develop
novel policy initiatives reducing the impacts of firearm violence. As the
Legislature added in 2021, “California’s uniquely rich data related to firearm

                                       28
violence have made possible important, timely, policy-relevant research that
cannot be conducted elsewhere.” (§ 14230, subd. (e).)
      Plaintiffs rely on Lungren, supra, 16 Cal.4th 307, to assert that the
courts should not give deference to these legislative findings. But Lungren is
not directly on point. As noted, in Lungren, the Court addressed the validity
of a statutory provision that required pregnant individuals under the age of
18 to secure parental consent or judicial authorization before obtaining an
abortion. (Id. at p. 313.) Thus, “the case involve[d] an obvious invasion of an
interest fundamental to personal autonomy,” that could only be overcome by
a compelling interest. (Id. at p. 329.) In that context, the Court addressed
certain legislative findings supporting the asserted countervailing interests of
protecting “the physical, emotional, and psychological health of minors,” and
preserving and promoting “the parent-child relationship.” (Lungren, supra,
16 Cal.4th at pp. 325, fn. 12, 348.) The Court agreed that these were, on
their face, “ ‘compelling interests,’ ” but went on to find that the statute did
not actually further those interests. (Ibid.) In doing so, the Court
acknowledged that courts generally do give deference to legislative findings
but concluded that legislative findings regarding “the need for, or probable
effect of, [a] statutory provision” are not “determinative for constitutional
purposes.” (Id. at pp. 349–350, italics added.)
      By contrast, the privacy interest at issue here is informational, such
that the general balancing tests applies, and the legislative findings that the
Attorney General relies on do not concern such private and constitutionally
protected matters as the parent-child relationship. Nor are those findings
limited to the Legislature. Rather, both the electorate and the Legislature
found that firearm violence is a public health and safety concern requiring
the attention of policymakers. And the Legislature then determined that

                                        29
they, as policymakers, would benefit from “timely, policy-relevant research.”
Plaintiffs do not seriously dispute the statistics regarding the impact of
firearm violence set forth in the Proposition 63 materials or the findings set
forth in section 14230. Nor do they present any evidence contradicting the
Legislature’s findings that there is a dearth of available research concerning
firearm violence and that California is uniquely situated to fill that gap by
conducting “important, timely, policy-relevant research that cannot be
conducted elsewhere.” (See § 14230, subd. (e).)
      In any event, the Attorney General did not rely solely on the legislative
findings in the trial court. Rather, in opposition to the preliminary injunction
motion, the Attorney General presented evidentiary support detailing the
importance of the asserted countervailing interest. Professor Garen J.
Wintemute, the director of the Center, presented a detailed declaration
concerning the importance of the research at issue. As he explained, “The
lack of basic information on the epidemiology of firearm violence; personal,
community, and societal risk factors for that violence; its personal,
community, and societal consequences; and optimal measures for addressing
it has led to widespread misunderstanding of the problem and has impeded
prevention efforts. Evidence of the effects of state policies and programs for
reducing firearm violence as well as basic information on benefits, risks, and
prevalence of firearm ownership in California are also lacking.”
      The Attorney General also submitted a declaration from David M.
Studdert, a professor at Stanford University who has also utilized firearm
data provided by the DOJ. Professor Studdert explains: “Gun violence is an
important public health problem. Nearly 40,000 Americans die each year
from firearm-related suicides, homicides, and accidents. These deaths occur
in all segments of the community—among men and women, among the young

                                       30
and the old, among all racial and ethnic groups, among city-dwellers and
people who live in rural areas, and among gun owners and non-owners.”
Accordingly, a major focus of his team’s “research is to advance
understanding of the nature of the relationship between access to firearms
and risks of firearm-related mortality, including suicide, homicide, and
accidental deaths.” In 2016, his team “launched the Longitudinal Study of
Handgun Ownership and Transfer (LongSHOT),” “a large, population-level
cohort study . . . examining the mortality risks and benefits associated with
access to firearms.” The LongSHOT study is “one of the largest studies of
firearm injury ever undertaken.” The researchers have published six peer-
reviewed manuscripts based on the study—two addressing risk factors
associated with firearm suicides—and expect to produce at least as many
more.
        Finally, Professor Daniel Webster, an independent expert on evidence-
based firearm policy, submitted a declaration in which he opined that “[t]here
have been many important research questions answered because of
researchers’ access to information in [California] DOJ’s records, specifically
the DROS System and AFS, that are relevant to efforts to reduce homicide,
violent crime, suicide, and accidents.” These include, among others, how the
risk of use of a firearm in a suicide is distributed over time; which prior
criminal offenses are predictive of future risk of criminal activity involving a
firearm; and whether denial of a handgun purchase application after a
background check reduces risks of subsequent commission of crime. “For
example, Wintemute and colleagues reported that in the first week after the
purchase of a handgun, the rate of suicide by means of firearms among
purchasers was 57 times as high as the adjusted rate in the general
population,” suggesting that suicidal ideation drives gun acquisition in at

                                       31
least some cases. As Professor Webster explained further: “Each of these
finding are incredibly important for shaping fair and effective gun policy and
even for personal decision-making for those considering whether to purchase
a handgun.”
      Plaintiffs offer no evidence of their own to negate the existence, or
extent, of the asserted impacts of firearm violence or the importance of
empirical research in developing and evaluating policies to reduce such
violence. Rather, they present several arguments as to why the state does
not have a legitimate countervailing interest in promoting this vital research,
none of which are availing.
      First, Plaintiffs assert that research is not a constitutionally identified
function of any branch of the state government. Plaintiffs adopt too narrow a
view. As the Legislature itself has explained, the primary focus of the
research is to inform policymaking, which is a central function of the
legislative branch. (See Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. California
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 299 [“ ‘Essentials of the legislative function include the
determination and formulation of legislative policy.’ ”].) The Legislature is in
the best position to determine what materials or resources are helpful to it in
performing that function. While there may be a wide range of opinions
surrounding the appropriate policy responses to firearm violence, it is
undoubtedly a topic that the Legislature must consider.
      Plaintiffs do not dispute the general notion that empirical research may
be valuable to policymakers. Instead, they dispute the value of the research
at issue here and assert that it will be used only to “promote reduced access
to firearms” and “justify limitations on firearm rights.” Again, the Attorney
General presented evidence to refute this claim. As Professor Wintemute
explains, the researchers “seek to contribute to a clear and objective

                                       32
understanding of firearm violence and its prevention, and in that effort, we
go where the data take us.” Moreover, the research covers a broad range of
topics; it has been used to inform policies aimed at preventing unintentional
and intentionally inflicted self-injury and has, in some cases, questioned the
effectiveness of firearm control policies. Plaintiffs have not directly
addressed or disputed these specific claims, nor have they provided any
evidence to the contrary. Regardless, the potential, yet to be determined,
outcomes of the research should not be used to evaluate its inherent value.
      Finally, Plaintiffs assert that there is no evidence the research has
enhanced public policy or resulted in any “tangible public policy change[s].”
To the contrary, the Attorney General presented evidence that the findings
made by researchers using the DROS and AFS data—including, for example,
the elevated risks for firearm violence associated with prior convictions for
alcohol related offenses like driving under the influence—“are incredibly
important for shaping fair and effective gun policy and even for personal
decision-making for those considering whether to purchase a handgun.”
Plaintiffs provide no authority or evidence of their own suggesting that the
state does not have a countervailing interest in the research absent a direct
link between a specific research project and a specific policy change.
      Rather, much of the research is expressly aimed at assessing the
effectiveness of firearm control policies that are put into place by the
Legislature. For example, Professor Wintemute explained that, “In 1991,
California prohibited the purchase or possession of firearms by persons
convicted of violent misdemeanor crimes for 10 years. [His team] conducted a
study, funded by the National Institute of Justice, that used [linkage
procedures] to perform a rigorous evaluation of the law’s effectiveness.”
Likewise, Professor Wintemute’s team has conducted similar studies to

                                       33
assess the effectiveness of California’s unique Armed and Prohibited Persons
System (APPS), and is currently studying the effectiveness of California’s
extreme risk protection order (ERPO) law. Empirical studies like these
“provide shape and guidance to California’s understanding of violence and its
prevention and facilitate the development of evidence-based policies and
programs.” Moreover, as Professor Wintemute explained, “Another study in
progress, funded by the National Institute of Justice, shows great promise in
offering new methods for assessing threats of violence, including mass
shootings,” and could lead to such policies in the future.
      These types of studies are consistent with the Legislature’s stated
intent that the Center “work on a continuing basis with policymakers in the
Legislature and state agencies to identify, implement, and evaluate
innovative firearm violence prevention policies and programs.” (§ 14231,
subd. (a)(3).) Plaintiffs did not present any evidence to the contrary.
                  c.   Plaintiffs Did Not Present Evidence Sufficient to
                       Establish the Existence of Any Feasible
                       Alternatives

      Beyond disputing the importance of the research itself, Plaintiffs seek
to rebut the Attorney General’s assertion that it constitutes an important
countervailing interest by asserting that there are at least two feasible and
effective alternatives that would reduce or avoid the privacy intrusion:

                                       34
1) individuals could be given the option of opting out of having their

information shared; and 2) the data could be de-identified.7
      Plaintiffs presented these proposed alternatives in their preliminary
injunction motion. They also provided a “Compendium of Evidentiary
Documents” in support of their motion. The compendium is comprised of
several news articles concerning the DOJ’s approach to data sharing,
information from the DOJ’s website about the firearm and ammunition data
collection process and the AFS and DROS databases, scientific papers
published by the researchers using the AFS and DROS data, an article from
the United States Department of Commerce entitled “De-Identification of
Personal Information,” and several federal court opinions.
      In response, the Attorney General asserted, and maintains, that the
proposed alternatives are neither feasible nor effective to serve the asserted
countervailing interest. The Attorney General argued, and now maintains,
further, that the evidence Plaintiffs provided is not sufficient to establish the
effectiveness or feasibility of the proposed alternatives. By contrast, the
Attorney General points to its own expert declarations, which include
detailed explanations as to why the alternatives are not feasible, as well as
additional declarations detailing the safeguards surrounding the information
sharing at issue.

7     Plaintiffs also presented a third alternative, that the DOJ hire its own
researchers to conduct the same studies in house. Although they claim that
this option would be “less harmful to plaintiffs’ privacy interests,” they do not
concede that it would eliminate the privacy concerns altogether. Regardless,
Plaintiffs do not explain how this would minimize their privacy concerns, and
we perceive no material difference between the DOJ providing data to
researchers at accredited research institutions subject to an extensive
application process and hiring independent researchers itself to conduct the
same research using the same data.

                                       35
      As to the first proposal—giving individuals the option to opt out of
having their data shared—the researchers explained in their declarations
that it was not feasible because it would create selection bias that would
undermine the results of the studies. Professor Wintemute stated, “I believe
this suggestion violates widely-accepted standards for the conduct of
scientific research. Records-based research such as ours is regularly
conducted on other major health problems, such as heart disease and cancer,
without such an opt-out mechanism.” In these types of studies, “where
individual risk factors are very important, identified individual-level data
linked across multiple datasets are frequently essential.” “These projects
proceed only with Institutional Review Board approval and are subject to
strict identity protection requirements, as is the case with our research. The
individuals whose records provide the data for the research are not aware of
the existence of the research.” Beyond the one article generally discussing
various de-identification methods, which we discuss further, post, Plaintiffs
do not dispute Professor Wintemute’s explanation of the research norms or
offer any evidence to the contrary.
      Consistent with Professor Wintemute’s explanation, the statutory
amendments effectuated by Assem. Bill 173 expressly require that the DOJ
make the data available to researchers at the Center—and permit the DOJ to
make it available to researchers at other bona fide and accredited nonprofit
research institutions—only “upon proper request and following approval by
the [C]enter’s governing institutional review board [or human subjects
committee] when required.” (§§ 11106, subd. (d); 30352, subd. (b)(2).)
Professor Webster provided a detailed description of the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) and data protection protocols required to access firearm and
ammunition data containing personally identifying information, and both

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Professors Wintemute and Studdert averred that the studies they conducted
were in fact subject to IRB approval and review.
      The Attorney General also provided declarations from a research data
supervisor and an information security officer detailing the strict security
protocols associated with any data transfers. They explained that the DOJ
shares data only after an extensive application process, during which the
researchers must identify each individual that will have access to the data.
Moreover, the security requirements vary with the type of data request,
becoming increasingly stricter when more sensitive data is requested. The
researchers must agree to notify the DOJ of any data breaches and, to date,
none of the researchers have had a breach, or otherwise inadvertently
disclosed personally identifying information to any unauthorized person.
This evidence establishes that the DOJ is already minimizing the privacy
intrusion to the extent feasible while still permitting the important research
to proceed, and Plaintiffs provide no evidence establishing these procedures
are inconsistent with typical human subject research protocols or otherwise
insufficient. (See Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 576 [“ ‘[p]rotective measures,
safeguards and other alternatives may minimize the privacy intrusion’ and
thus should be considered when balancing a plaintiff’s privacy interest
against a defendant’s countervailing interests”].)
      In addition, Professor Webster explained the important differences
between the empirical research that is currently being conducted using
individually identifiable DROS and AFS data and the prior research, which
necessarily relied on “temporal and spatial associations between the adoption
of policies and various [measurable] outcomes.” As he explained, the use of
individually identifiable data cures many of the limitations of the prior
studies, and “[t]here is simply no way to accurately assess risk” in the way

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these studies have been able to do without the use of personal identifiers. “If
those who opt out differ in important ways with respect to risks for future
involvement in violence or suicide from those who do not opt out, the findings
from the research will be biased and, therefore, of much less value.” And, he
opined further that “[d]esigning and implementing an opt-out process would
be extremely expensive, time-intensive, and almost likely infeasible.”
      Professor Wintemute likewise explained, “[a]ccurate research results
depend on having a population of research subjects that represents (i.e.,
closely resembles) the larger population from which it is derived. An opt-out
approach would introduce important bias into research on firearm violence
and reduce the validity of its findings.” Professor Studdert agreed, stating
that “[f]or these and other reasons, large-scale, population-level
epidemiological studies that use administrative data, like LongSHOT, rarely
if ever use the kind of consent and notification procedures that are common
in other types of research.” Thus, all three professors agreed that requiring
individual consent “as a pre-requisite for data use would, for practical
purposes, render the research undoable,” both because of the cost and
because it would “leave a non-representative group of firearm purchasers.”
And, as Professor Wintemute concluded: “This is not a hypothetical matter.
When access to federal firearm tracing data for research was lost under the
terms of the Tiahrt amendment (a change in federal law that limited use of
tracing data in ATF’s possession), research on the structure and function of
criminal firearms markets was severely impaired.”
      Plaintiffs do not dispute these specific explanations or offer any
evidence to the contrary. Plaintiffs simply assert, in conclusory fashion, that
these declarations do not adequately explain why an opt-out mechanism
would not be feasible. They offer no argument or evidence rebutting the

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specific explanations given as to why personal identifying information
allowing for linkage is essential to the research being conducted, nor do they
provide any affirmative evidence suggesting that an opt-out mechanism
would be feasible or effective.
      As to the second proposed alternative—having the DOJ de-identify the
data before providing it to researchers—Plaintiffs do provide some evidence
regarding the various methods that can be employed to de-identify personal
information from a given data set. In his declaration, Professor Studdert
candidly concedes that “[f]or some studies, deidentifying data before sharing
it with researchers is entirely appropriate—indeed, good research practice
dictates that it should be done. A core principle in the responsible conduct of
research involving sensitive data is the ‘minimum necessary’ principle:
researchers should receive/collect and use the least amount of personal
information needed to perform the study,” and that “[s]ome types of gun
violence research can be conducted without any significant compromise in
their quality without personally-identifying information.”
      However, for many of the same reasons already explained in the
context of the proposed opt-out procedure, the DOJ’s data transfer policies
already follow this core principle and provide personally identifying data only
in cases where it is necessary to conduct the research. Professor Studdert
averred that “LongSHOT falls into this latter category; it is a type of study
that cannot be done without the use of personal identifiers” for the reasons
already explained. And Professor Wintemute similarly averred that many of
the key studies he and his team published concerning firearm violence “could
not have been conducted without identified individual-level data. In each
case, the studies assess the relationship, at the individual level, between
behavior in the past and events in the future. This is simply not possible

                                       39
with aggregate, population-level data, or without the ability to link records
for identified individuals across multiple datasets.” As he explained further,
this proposed alternative “misapprehends the research process because [the
researchers] do not request identified individual-level information unless it is
necessary to our research. Before obtaining that type of data, we must obtain
UC Davis IRB approval. The IRB’s mandate is to ensure that research
projects are designed and executed in such a way that subject’s personal
identifying information is given a very high degree of protection. It reviews a
detailed protocol describing the study’s rationale, design, execution, and
security procedures.”
      As with the first proposed alternative, Plaintiffs generally dispute
these assertions, and claim that “public policy researchers will always want
to gather as much data as possible to conduct ever more research.” But
Plaintiffs do not provide any argument or evidence of their own in response to
the declarations presented by the Attorney General, and do not explain why
de-identification would be both feasible and effective in these specific types of
studies. Without doing so, they have not carried their burden to establish the
existence of a feasible and effective alternative. (See Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 575 [plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating the existence of a
feasible and effective alternative by substantial evidence].)
      In sum, the Attorney General presented evidence in the trial court
sufficient to establish a countervailing interest that outweighed any
associated invasion of privacy and Plaintiffs did not provide evidence or
argument sufficient to establish the existence of a feasible and effective
alternative in response. (See Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 572.) However, by
incorporating its analysis on the demurrer into its analysis on the
preliminary injunction motion, it appears the trial court did not fully consider

                                       40
the arguments and evidence concerning the state’s countervailing interest in
determining whether Plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the
merits. Because Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Attorney General’s evidence
establishing a legitimate countervailing interest or establish a feasible
alternative, Plaintiffs could not establish the requisite likelihood of success
on the merits as a matter of law, and the trial court could not properly grant

the preliminary injunction.8 (See Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678; see also
Lewis, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 572, quoting Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 40
[“ ‘The relative strength of countervailing interests and the feasibility of
alternatives present mixed questions of law and fact. . . . [I]n cases where
material facts are undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be
appropriate’ ”].)

8     Having concluded that Plaintiffs cannot establish a probability of
success on the merits as a matter of law, we need not consider the relative
balance of potential harms.

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                            IV. DISPOSITION
     The order granting the preliminary injunction is reversed and the
matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to enter a new order
denying Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Appellant is awarded costs
on appeal.

                                                                 KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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