Court Opinion

ID: 9954420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 13:00:48.367643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:11.947337
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12106   Document: 54-1    Date Filed: 03/26/2024   Page: 1 of 15

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12106
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        SHERMAN ANDERSON MORTON, III,
        ASHLYN AIKEN MORTON,
                             Plaintiﬀs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
        versus
        LIEN FILERS, ETC. OF HEATH W. WILLIAMS, L.L.C.,

                               Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee,

        HEATH W. WILLIAMS, L.L.C.,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee.
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-12106

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03211-TWT
                           ____________________

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This case arises under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
        (“FDCPA”). Plaintiﬀs Sherman Anderson Morton, III and Ashyln
        Aiken Morton (“Mortons”) engaged in a dispute with Tigeski,
        L.L.C., over a bill Tigeski issued the Mortons for remediation work
        it performed at the Mortons’ residence. The Mortons, through
        their attorney Ronald Daniels, mailed Tigeski and its attorney,
        Heath Williams, from Lien Filers, Etc. of Heath W. Williams,
        L.L.C. (“Lien Filers”), a proposed settlement for $2,000. Without
        including Williams on the response e-mail, a Tigeski employee
        accepted the oﬀer. When Williams found out about the
        settlement, he expressed his strong disapproval of Daniels
        resolving a settlement with Williams’s client without Williams’s
        approval. Daniels then stated that he assumed Tigeski was no
        longer interested in the deal. Williams responded that Tigeski
        would take the deal but requested an additional $450 in attorneys’
        fees. The Mortons ﬁled a motion to enforce the original $2,000
        settlement, and Tigeski agreed to settle for $2,000.
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        22-12106                Opinion of the Court                          3

               After the parties settled, the Mortons brought this federal
        suit, alleging that Williams’ request for $450 in attorneys’ fees
        violated the FDCPA. The district court adopted a magistrate
        judge’s report and recommendation granting summary judgment
        to Williams. Because we ﬁnd that Williams’s e-mail was a
        counteroﬀer in an ongoing settlement negotiation, rather than an
        attempt to collect a debt, we hold that the e-mail falls outside the
        FDCPA. Accordingly, we aﬃrm.
                                 I.     Background
                In July 2019, the Mortons entered into a work authorization
        contract with Tigeski for Tigeski to perform water remediation
        work at the Mortons’ residence. The Mortons disputed the final
        bill. On August 28, 2019, Tigeski filed a “Materialman’s and
        Mechanic’s Claim of Lien.” On October 4, 2019, the Mortons filed
        and recorded a notice that they were contesting the lien. Tigeski
        then engaged the law firm, Lien Filers, to perfect its lien by
        initiating a lien action. On November 12, 2019, Williams, an
        attorney for Lien Filers, initiated the lien action by filing a claim in
        the Magistrate Court of Dekalb County.
               On December 11, 2019, Daniels, the Mortons’ lawyer,
        mailed a letter to both Williams and Tigeski proposing to settle “all
        of these interrelated claims” for $2,000. Daniels represented that if
        the offer was not accepted “by close of business on December 20,
        2019,” the Mortons would “be filing responsive pleadings including
        a counterclaim against [Tigeski] and seeking to have the case
        transferred to State Court.”
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12106

               On December 19, 2019, without including Williams, a
        Tigeski employee named Sue Jefcoat initiated a series of e-mails
        with Daniels and “communicated acceptance” of the settlement to
        Daniels. The day after, Jefcoat reached out to Daniels to confirm
        that he had received her “acceptance.” Daniels acknowledged that
        he had received the acceptance. On December 23, 2019, Jefcoat
        asked Daniels for an update on “the status of payment and
        settlement agreement.”
               On December 26, 2019, Daniels replied asking for Tigeski’s
        attorney’s e-mail information, noting that the rules of professional
        conduct required him to communicate with the company’s lawyer
        because the company was represented by counsel. Jefcoat
        responded with Williams’s e-mail address and phone number, this
        time copying Williams on the e-mail. On December 27, 2019,
        Williams responded, acknowledging receipt of Daniels’ and
        Jeffcoats’ e-mail, and stating that Daniels could either e-mail
        Williams or call him.
               On December 30, 2019, Daniels e-mailed Williams a
        “proposed release.” A contentious exchange followed. Williams
        responded, “Can you tell me why you negotiated a resolution with
        my client that has been represented by counsel since the outset?”
        Daniels then explained the nature of his e-mail communications
        with Jefcoat. But Williams responded that he “really [didn’t] care
        what [his] client did” and that Daniels “knew [Tigeski] w[as]
        represented by counsel” yet still communicated with a Tigeski
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        22-12106               Opinion of the Court                         5

        employee without involving counsel. Williams demanded to
        know how long Daniels had been practicing law.
               Based on the previous exchange, Daniels responded that he
        assumed Tigeski was “no longer interested in resolving this
        matter,” so he would “proceed accordingly.” Williams responded
        that Daniels was “intentionally avoiding the point” that Daniels
        “had absolutely no right to discuss anything with [Williams’s] client
        knowing they were represented and in doing so ha[d] violated
        several ethics guidelines.” Williams concluded the e-mail by again
        asking Daniels how long he had been practicing law, emphasizing
        that he “want[ed] an answer.” Daniels responded that he had been
        practicing since 2012, to which Williams responded, “Then [you]
        should know better.”
                Daniels then asked Williams to “[p]lease confirm whether
        your client still intends to accept the terms sent to your office on
        December 11, 2019 by 5:00 P.M. today[;] [o]therwise we will
        proceed as advised in the letter.” Williams responded telling
        Daniels to “[g]o fuck [him]self,” that Daniels was “[at] minimum .
        . . looking at a reprimand from the state bar if this [wa]s reported,”
        and that he would not “put up with [Daniels] placing any kind of
        arbitrary and short timeline” on the matter.
               The next day, December 31, 2019, Williams e-mailed
        Daniels, stating that Tigeski had told him they would “accept the
        $2,000 and split their attorneys fees to date of $900.00,” meaning
        “this [matter] would resolve for $2,450.00.” Daniels relayed this
        information to the Mortons. The same day, Daniels, on behalf of
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-12106

        the Mortons, filed responsive pleadings in the lien action, and a
        motion to enforce the settlement agreement, or alternatively, to
        transfer the case to DeKalb County State Court.
               On January 3, 2020, Williams e-mailed Daniels that,
        although the Mortons’ motion to enforce the settlement
        agreement had “zero” chance of being granted, Tigeski wished to
        go through with the original $2,000 deal. Daniels responded that
        he would forward the check to Williams as soon as it was received.
        Following payment, the parties filed a mutual dismissal of the lien
        action with prejudice.
               After the state action was dismissed, the Mortons, now
        represented by different counsel, brought the instant suit against
        Lien Filers and Williams in federal court. The Mortons alleged that
        Williams’s e-mails with Daniels violated several provisions of the
        FDCPA. Specifically, focusing on the e-mails from December 30
        and 31, 2019, the Mortons alleged that defendants, who were debt
        collectors within the meaning of the FDCPA, (1) violated 15 U.S.C.
        § 1692d by telling Daniels to “go fuck” himself, (2) violated §
        1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1) by “seeking to collect amounts” they
        “were not authorized to collect,” (3) violated § 1692e(11) by “not
        disclosing in the initial communication” that “the communication
        was from a debt collector and was an attempt to collect a debt,”
        and (4) violated § 1692g by not providing the required notices in its
        communications.
            After a contentious discovery period, defendants moved for
        summary judgment. Following oral argument on the motion, the
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        22-12106               Opinion of the Court                         7

        magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”),
        recommending that the defendants’ motion be granted. The
        magistrate judge divided his analysis of the communications into
        two parts: (1) the December 30, 2019 e-mail chain, ending with
        Williams telling Daniels to “go fuck” himself, and (2) the December
        31, 2019, e-mail where Williams told Daniels that Tigeski would
        settle the case for $2,000 plus an additional $450 in attorneys’ fees.
               As to the December 30, 2019, e-mail chain, the magistrate
        judge ruled that the communications were not made in connection
        with the collection of any debt, noting that the e-mails did not
        allege the Mortons owed a debt, demand payment, or threaten
        future collection proceedings. Instead, the magistrate judge held
        that the December 30, 2019, e-mails related to “Williams’s opinion”
        that Daniels had violated the rules of professional conduct “by
        communicating directly with [an entity] whom” Daniels knew was
        represented by counsel.
              As to the December 31, 2019, e-mail from Williams stating
        that Tigeski would settle for $2,000 plus an additional $450 in
        attorneys’ fees, the magistrate judge held that this e-mail was also
        not debt collection activity. While the magistrate judge
        acknowledged that this was a “closer call” because it was a request
        for payment of money, it held that “no reasonable jury could
        conclude” that the e-mail “qualified as debt collection activity”
        because it “lack[ed] virtually all the hallmarks of a debt collection
        communication.” Rather, according to the magistrate judge,
        Williams’s e-mail was prompted by Daniels’s request that Williams
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12106

        “confirm whether [Tigeski] still intend[ed] to accept the terms sent
        to [his] office on December 11, 2019 by 5:00 P.M. today.” Daniels’s
        request, the magistrate judge reasoned, “created an air of
        ambiguity about whether settlement had been reached in the
        parties’ minds.” Thus, the magistrate judge reasoned that
        Williams’s response was a counteroffer, not an affirmative demand
        for payment.
               The district court adopted the R&R over plaintiffs’
        objections, holding that “the only reasonable way to interpret Mr.
        Williams’s [December 31] e-mail is as an effort to continue
        negotiating the amount of a settlement payment to resolve the
        DeKalb Action, and not toward the collection of a debt.”
               The Mortons appealed.
                              II. Standard of Review
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo. Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327,
        1333 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 2465 (2023). Summary
        judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
        fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
        (quotations omitted). “A genuine issue of material fact does not
        exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
        party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor.” Chapman
        v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
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        22-12106                 Opinion of the Court                              9

        (quotations omitted). All submitted evidence is viewed in the light
        most favorable to the non-moving party. Owens, 52 F.4th at 1333.
                                     III. Discussion
                The Mortons raise two issues on appeal. First, they argue
        that a jury could find that Williams’s December 31, 2019, e-mail
        stating that Tigeski would settle for $2,450 was a demand for more
        money post-settlement in violation of the FDCPA. 1 Second, they
        argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment
        on grounds that were not raised by the parties: the unenforceability
        of the settlement agreement that Jefcoat accepted on December 19,
        2019.
               A. FDCPA Challenge
               As relevant to the Mortons’ challenge on appeal, the FDCPA
        prohibits a “debt collector” from using “any false, deceptive, or
        misleading representation or means in connection with the
        collection of any debt,” including a false representation of “the
        character, amount, or legal status of any debt[.]” 15 U.S.C.
        § 1692e(2)(A). The FDCPA also prohibits a “debt collector” from
        using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to
        collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Such prohibited conduct
        includes collecting “any amount (including any interest, fee,
        charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless

        1 The Mortons do not challenge the district court’s ruling as to the December

        30, 2019, e-mail exchange that ended with Williams telling Daniels to “go
        fuck” himself.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12106

        such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the
        debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). 2
               Thus, the FDCPA requires a plaintiff to show (1) that the
        defendant is a debt collector, (2) that the challenged conduct
        related to debt collection, and (3) that the challenged conduct was
        prohibited under the statute. See Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree &
        Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). Defendants
        concede that they qualify as a debt collector for purposes of the first
        element.
                As to the second element, we have held that “[a]
        communication has the necessary nexus to debt collection under
        the FDCPA if it conveys information about a debt and its aim is at
        least in part to induce the debtor to pay.” Lamirand v. Fay Servicing,
        LLC, 38 F.4th 976, 979 (11th Cir. 2022). We make this
        determination by viewing the communication “holistically.” Id.
                Several aspects of a communication suggest that it is
        connected to debt collection. For example, (1) explicit language
        that a lender is “attempting to collect a debt,” (2) demands for “full
        and immediate payment of all amounts due,” (3) threats that fees

        2 Along with violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) and § 1692f(1), the Mortons’

        complaint also alleged violations of § 1692a(2), § 1692d, § 1692e(11), and
        § 1692g. But the Mortons make no arguments related to these alleged other
        violations on appeal, so those claims are abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate
        Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that
        an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing references
        to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and
        authority.”).
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        22-12106                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        will be added or legal action will be commenced if all amounts on
        the debt are not paid, (4) instructions on how the debt must be paid,
        or (5) filing a lawsuit to collect the debt. See Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217
        (debt collection activity found where lender sent letter that
        demanded “full and immediate payment of all amounts due,”
        threatened that attorney’s fees would be added unless payment
        was made, and was enclosed with other documents that stated that
        the lender was “attempting to collect a debt” (emphasis omitted));
        Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (debt collection activity found where lender sent letter that stated
        it was “for the purpose of collecting a debt,” referred throughout
        to “collection efforts,” stated the debt amount and how to pay it,
        and stated that additional attorneys’ fees would accrue as collection
        efforts continued); Leblanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185,
        1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010) (debt collection activity found where
        lender sent letter stating legal action might ensue if debt was not
        resolved within 35 days, and lender subsequently filed lawsuit);
        Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 34 F.4th 1260, 1268 (11th Cir.
        2022) (debt collection activity plausibly stated where lender sent
        mortgage statement noting it was “an attempt to collect a debt,”
        asked for payment of a certain amount by a certain date, and
        provided for a late fee).
               The Mortons’ FDCPA challenge fails because Williams’s
        December 31, 2019, e-mail was not debt collection activity. The
        e-mail—stating that Tigeski would accept the proposed settlement
        of $2,000 but was requesting $450 additional dollars for attorneys’
        fees—contained none of the recognized hallmarks of debt
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 22-12106

        collection activity. The e-mail was not a letter stating that it was
        “attempting to collect a debt” or demanding “full and immediate
        payment.” See Reese, 678 F.3d at 1217. Nor did the e-mail threaten
        legal action or additional fees if the Mortons did not pay within a
        certain time. See Lamirand, 38 F.4th at 980; Leblanc, 601 F.3d at
        1188, 1193.
                Instead, given the context of the e-mail, we agree with the
        district court that the e-mail was a counteroffer in what was
        reasonably perceived to be an ongoing settlement negotiation.
        While the parties do not dispute that Jefcoat’s December 19, 2019,
        e-mail was an acceptance of the $2,000 settlement, the subsequent
        e-mails created ambiguity as to the finality of that agreement. To
        recap, because Tigeski’s counsel, Williams, was not copied on the
        e-mail when Jefcoat accepted Daniels’s offer, Williams told Daniels
        that Daniels “had absolutely no right” to do what he did and that a
        motion to enforce that settlement had “zero” chance of being
        granted. And after Williams expressed his strong disapproval of
        Daniels’s actions, Daniels stated that he assumed Tigeski was “no
        longer interested in resolving this matter,” and asked Williams to
        “confirm whether” Tigeski “still intend[ed] to accept” the $2,000
        settlement offer.
              These communications suggest that negotiations were still
        ongoing. Given this backdrop, Williams’s December 31, 2019,
        e-mail—accepting the proposed settlement agreement of $2,000,
        but requesting $450 additional dollars for attorneys’ fees—was a
        counteroffer in a continuing negotiation, rather than a demand for
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        22-12106                  Opinion of the Court                             13

        collection of a debt. See Daniels, 34 F.4th at 1271 (suggesting that
        “the history of the parties” reflects whether communication was a
        debt collection attempt). Thus, this e-mail was not debt collection
        activity and so falls outside the scope of the FDCPA.3
               B. Whether the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil
               Procedure 56(f)(2)
                The Mortons also argue that the district court violated
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(2) when it “ma[d]e the
        enforceability of the underlying settlement agreement an issue” in
        its ruling. They argue that neither party made arguments about
        the enforceability of the settlement agreement, nor did the district
        court give the parties notice and a reasonable time to respond that
        it was planning to rule on the enforceability of the underlying
        settlement agreement. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2) (providing that a
        court may grant a motion for summary judgment “on grounds not
        raised by a party” after “giving notice and a reasonable time to
        respond”).
               The Mortons’ challenge fails because the district court did
        not rule on the enforceability of the settlement agreement. Recall
        that the magistrate judge found that “Daniels’s request that Mr.
        Williams confirm the settlement amount created an air of

        3 Because a communication must be debt collection activity to fall within the

        FDCPA, our holding that Williams’s e-mail was not debt collection activity
        resolves the case. Thus, we need not address the third prong: whether the
        debt collection activity involved conduct that was prohibited by § 1692e(2)(A)
        and § 1692f.
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12106

        ambiguity about whether settlement had been reached in the
        parties’ minds.” It then clarified that “[w]hether the Mortons could
        move to enforce the terms of the $2,000 settlement is a separate
        question from whether the parties believed they were still
        negotiating, and whether those negotiations could have resulted in
        a modification of the settlement terms without offense to the
        FDCPA.” Thus, rather than ruling on the enforceability of the
        alleged settlement agreement, the magistrate judge, in
        determining whether the exchange constituted debt collection
        activity, merely considered the context of the e-mail exchange and
        concluded that Williams’s e-mail was intended to be a counteroffer
        and not a demand for payment of a debt. 4
                Regardless, even accepting the Mortons’ argument that the
        district court’s ruling effectively passed on the enforceability of the
        settlement, there still was no Rule 56(f) violation. First, the parties
        put the e-mail exchange related to the settlement directly at issue
        in this appeal by asserting that the e-mails violated the FDCPA.
        Second, the parties argued in their respective summary judgment
        motions that an enforceable settlement agreement existed. Third,
        the magistrate judge held oral argument and, according to
        Tigeski’s brief on appeal, questioned the parties about the existence

        4 Nor did the district court, in adopting the magistrate judge’s report and rec-

        ommendation, make a ruling as to the enforceability of the settlement agree-
        ment. It similarly stated that “the only reasonable way to interpret Mr. Wil-
        liams’s e-mail is as an effort to continue negotiating the amount of a settlement
        payment to resolve the DeKalb Action, and not toward the collection of a
        debt.”
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        22-12106                  Opinion of the Court                          15

        of the settlement agreement and advised the parties that the
        existence of a settlement agreement was a question of law for the
        court to decide.5 In other words, the parties had adequate notice
        and opportunity to be heard on the existence and enforceability of
        the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Mortons are not
        entitled to relief on this issue either.
               AFFIRMED.

        5 Although we do not have a transcript of the oral argument, the Mortons do

        not dispute Tigeski’s contention.