Court Opinion

ID: 9904868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 13:02:22.628495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:34.146765
License: Public Domain

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            STATE v. SAMUEL U.—CONCURRENCE

   ECKER, J., with whom McDONALD, J., joins, concur-
ring. I agree with the majority that there was no consti-
tutional violation in the present case and that the defen-
dant, Samuel U., therefore cannot prevail on his unpre-
served claim that the state’s notice of intent to admit
evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct was inade-
quate under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317
Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). I further agree that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual abuse of his
daughter, S, to establish that he had a propensity to
commit the type of crimes with which he was charged.
I write separately, however, to highlight the grave dan-
gers posed by the admission of evidence of uncharged
sexual misconduct and the concomitant obligation of
the state to provide timely, accurate and specific notice
of such evidence so that the defendant has a full and
fair opportunity to prepare a defense. I encourage the
appropriate rule-making committee, whether that be
the Code of Evidence Oversight Committee or the Rules
Committee of the Superior Court, to consider proposing
the adoption of a rule governing the timing and content
of the state’s notice of disclosure.
   Pursuant to our case law and the Connecticut Code
of Evidence, evidence of prior uncharged sexual mis-
conduct ‘‘is admissible in a criminal case to establish
that the defendant had a tendency or a propensity to
engage in aberrant and compulsive sexual misconduct’’
if certain requirements are met. Conn. Code Evid. § 4-
5 (b); see, e.g., State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 473,
953 A.2d 45 (2008). I do not doubt that evidence of prior
bad acts may be highly probative of the defendant’s
guilt. But that is precisely the problem—the incriminat-
ing impact of the defendant’s past transgressions can
impair the fact finder’s ability to determine whether
the evidence demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant committed the crime with which he
is charged in this case. See, e.g., State v. Antonaras,
137 Conn. App. 703, 722, 49 A.3d 783 (recognizing that
‘‘evidence of child sex abuse is undoubtedly harmful
to [a] defendant’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 936, 56 A.3d
716 (2012). It is no overstatement to say that evidence
of prior uncharged misconduct is ‘‘the most prejudicial
evidence imaginable against an accused.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. McCarthy, 156 Vt. 148,
155, 589 A.2d 869 (1991). This evidence consequently ‘‘can
have a devastating effect on the defense.’’ E. Imwinkel-
ried, ‘‘The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial
Discovery of the Prosecution’s Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence,’’ 56 Fordham L. Rev. 247, 249 (1987); see
United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (exclusion of propensity evidence typically
is ‘‘founded not on a belief that the evidence is irrele-
vant, but rather on a fear that juries will tend to give
it excessive weight, and on a fundamental sense that
no one should be convicted of a crime based on his or
her previous misdeeds’’); State v. Skillicorn, 367 Or.
464, 478, 479 P.3d 254 (2021) (propensity evidence carries
‘‘the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused’’ because,
‘‘[a]mong other [reasons], propensity evidence can
cause [fact finders] to convict for crimes other than
those charged or [to] give more weight to the evidence
than it deserves in assessing . . . guilt of [the] crime
charged’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that the admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence ‘‘significantly increases
the likelihood of a finding of guilt’’ and can ‘‘effectively
[strip] the defendant of the presumption of innocence.’’
E. Imwinkelried, supra, 249.
   Because of the devastating impact that uncharged
misconduct evidence can have on the defense, proce-
dural safeguards must be employed to ensure that the
risk of prejudice is reduced to the greatest extent possi-
ble. Timely and adequate notice to the defendant is one
critical component of this protection. To minimize the
risk of prejudice to the defendant, the federal courts
require the government to ‘‘(A) provide reasonable
notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends
to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportu-
nity to meet it; (B) articulate in the notice the permitted
purpose for which the prosecutor intends to offer the
evidence and the reasoning that supports the purpose;
and (C) do so in writing before trial . . . .’’ Fed. R.
Evid. 404 (b) (3). In sexual assault or child molestation
cases, the federal rules are even more stringent. To
admit evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct in
these types of cases, the government ‘‘must disclose it
to the defendant, including witnesses’ statements or a
summary of the expected testimony . . . at least [fif-
teen] days before trial . . . .’’ Fed. R. Evid. 413 (b);
accord Fed. R. Evid. 414 (b).
   Consistent with the federal rules, many of our sister
states have enacted rules or statutes requiring the state
to provide the defendant with pretrial notice of its intent
to admit evidence of uncharged misconduct. Some
states have patterned their notice requirements on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 27-414 (2) (2016); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-19-404 (b)
(3) (West 2023); Ala. R. Evid. 404 (b) (3); Colo. R. Evid.
404 (b) (3); N.M. R. Evid. 11-404 (B) (3); N.D. R. Evid.
404 (b) (2) (LexisNexis 2018); Ohio R. Evid. 404 (B)
(West Supp. 2021); Pa. R. Evid. 404 (b) (3). Other states
have promulgated their own unique pretrial notice
requirements. For example, in Florida, ‘‘[w]hen the state
in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other
criminal offenses . . . no fewer than 10 days before
trial, the state shall furnish to the defendant or to the
defendant’s counsel a written statement of the acts or
offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the
particularity required of an indictment or information.’’
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.404 (2) (d) (1) (West Cum. Supp.
2021). In Illinois, ‘‘[i]n a criminal case in which the
prosecution intends to offer evidence [of uncharged
misconduct], it must disclose the evidence, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance
of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of
trial . . . .’’ 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/115-7.3 (d) (West
Cum. Supp. 2020); accord Ill. R. Evid. 404 (c); see also
Ariz. R. Evid. 404 (b) (3) (A) and (B) (West 2022) (requir-
ing state to ‘‘make disclosure to the defendant as to
such acts [of uncharged misconduct] . . . no later than
45 days before the final trial setting’’ and to ‘‘articulate
in the disclosure the permitted purpose for which the
state intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning
that supports the purpose’’); Cal. Evid. Code § 1108 (b)
(Deering Supp. 2021) (requiring state to ‘‘disclose the
evidence to the defendant, including statements of wit-
nesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony
that is expected to be offered’’).
  Pretrial notice of evidence of uncharged misconduct
that includes a particularized description of the witness’
anticipated testimony or the details of the alleged crimes
serves the important purpose of avoiding undue ‘‘sur-
prise’’ and ‘‘trial by ambush.’’ E. Imwinkelried, supra, 56
Fordham L. Rev. 258. By providing the defense with
advance notice of the uncharged misconduct evidence
that the state seeks to admit, the defendant is given the
opportunity to investigate the accuracy of the evidence,
test its reliability, and produce witnesses to contradict,
challenge, or rebut the evidence. See id., 258–59. Timely
and adequate notice, in short, ‘‘give[s] the defendant
an opportunity to meet the prosecution’s case’’ and to
mount an effective defense.1 Id., 259.
  For these reasons, I strongly encourage the adoption
of a standardized rule governing the timing and content
of the state’s notice of disclosure of intent to admit
evidence of uncharged misconduct at trial.
  1
    These concerns are not merely hypothetical. Although the defendant’s
claim of deficient notice is not one of constitutional magnitude under the
second prong of Golding, the state’s notice of intent to introduce evidence
of uncharged misconduct in the present case left much to be desired. The
notice did not identify the name of the witness (S), summarize her anticipated
trial testimony, or accurately describe the acts of uncharged sexual miscon-
duct to which she ultimately testified at trial. I agree with the majority that
these deficiencies did not render the testimony of S inadmissible under
existing law, but I believe that they illustrate the need for a rule governing
the adequacy of the notice that the state must provide.