Court Opinion

ID: 9383813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 13:11:11.339778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.168782
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 24

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP1876-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle,
                                 Defendant-Appellant.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 402 Wis. 2d 308, 974 N.W.2d 893
                                    (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         March 31, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         December 13, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Chippewa
   JUDGE:              James M. Isaacson

JUSTICES:
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which   ROGGENSACK,  REBECCA    GRASSL BRADLEY,  HAGEDORN,   and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.       HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.    DALLET,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.,
joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant attorney general,
with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.
There was an oral argument by Jennifer L. Vandermeuse, assistant
attorney general.
       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Thomas B. Aquino, assistant state public defender. There was an
oral   argument   by   Thomas   B.   Aquino,   assistant   state   public
defender.

                                     2
                                                                   2023 WI 24
                                                           NOTICE
                                             This opinion is subject to further
                                             editing and modification.   The final
                                             version will appear in the bound
                                             volume of the official reports.
No.       2020AP1876-CR
(L.C. No.    2015CF1159)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                       :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                FILED
      v.                                                   MAR 31, 2023

Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle,                                      Sheila T. Reiff
                                                           Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Appellant.

ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which   ROGGENSACK,  REBECCA    GRASSL BRADLEY,  HAGEDORN,   and
KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.       HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.    DALLET,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.,
joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.           Reversed.

      ¶1     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.        This is a review of

an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Hoyle,

No. 2020AP1876-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 26,

2022), reversing the Chippewa County circuit court's1 judgment of

conviction against Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle for two counts each

of second-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault

      1   The Honorable James M. Isaacson presided.
                                                                              No.       2020AP1876-CR

of a child, and also reversing the circuit court's order denying

Hoyle's motion for postconviction relief.                         We reverse.

       ¶2      Hoyle      argues    that    he       is    entitled       to        a    new   trial

because       the   prosecutor       at    Hoyle's         trial     violated            his   Fifth

Amendment       right      against    self-incrimination                 under          Griffin    v.

California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), by adversely commenting on his

decision not to testify.                  According to Hoyle, the prosecutor

argued      "that    Hoyle    should       be       convicted      because           the    alleged

victim's testimony was 'uncontroverted'" and that this was a

comment on Hoyle's decision not to testify because "[o]nly Hoyle

could have contradicted [the alleged victim's] sexual assault

allegations."

       ¶3      We    conclude        that        Hoyle       is         not         entitled       to

postconviction relief.              The prosecutor at Hoyle's criminal trial

did not violate Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin

because the prosecutor did not comment on Hoyle's silence.                                        The

prosecutor          instead        described          the      State's              evidence       as

"uncontroverted" to remind the jury that they could evaluate
only the evidence presented at trial and not speculate about

other possible evidence.                  Additionally, the jury likely would

not have thought only Hoyle could have controverted the State's

evidence      because      defense     counsel         explicitly         identified           other

kinds    of    evidence      not    presented         at    trial.        In        context,      the

prosecutor's           remarks       that           the     State's            evidence           was

"uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended to be" nor

"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily
take     [them]      to    be"     adverse          comments       on    Hoyle's           silence.
                                                2
                                                                    No.   2020AP1876-CR

Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 1925).                           The

prosecutor therefore did not comment on Hoyle's silence, and the

circuit      court     was    correct        to      deny    Hoyle's      motion   for

postconviction relief.             We reverse the court of appeals.

              I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

       ¶4     On March 14, 2017, Hannah,2 then a 15-year-old minor,

disclosed to her school resource officer, Officer Joseph Nelson

of the Chippewa Falls Police Department, that she was sexually

assaulted in February 2017.               Officer Nelson emailed Investigator

Kari Szotkowski, Chippewa County Sheriff's Department, that same

day    reporting      the    sexual       assault.      Investigator       Szotkowski

interviewed Hannah at Hannah's school on March 15, during which

Hannah reported her account of the sexual assault but did not

say who assaulted her.             Hannah later disclosed to Officer Nelson

in    May    2017    that    she    was    assaulted        by   Hoyle,   who   was    a

stepbrother to one of Hannah's friends and 20 years old at the

time of the alleged assault.                 Hoyle was subsequently arrested

and charged with two counts each of second-degree sexual assault
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.225(2) (2021-22)3 and second-degree

sexual assault of a child less than 16 years of age contrary to

Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).

       ¶5     The trial took place over two days in December, 2018.

According to pretrial filings, Hoyle did not plan to call any

       2   "Hannah" is a pseudonym used in place of the victim's
name.      See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.86(4).

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       3

the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                             3
                                                                      No.     2020AP1876-CR

witnesses during trial.                Prior to the start of Hoyle's trial

while discussing motions in limine, the prosecutor asked the

circuit court if he would be permitted to refer to the State's

case    as    "uncontroverted"         during   his    closing      argument         should

Hoyle invoke his right not to testify.                The prosecutor argued,

       So should the defendant not testify, I think the State
       is   allowed   to   argue    that   the   evidence   is
       uncontroverted, meaning that you only have heard from
       [Hannah].   That's not commenting upon the defense's
       right to silence but commenting upon the evidence in
       front of the jurors at that time.     I can't say it's
       uncontroverted because the defendant didn't testify,
       but I can say that her testimony is uncontroverted and
       that you haven't heard any testimony to the contrary.
The    court        granted    the     prosecutor's         request     over        defense

counsel's objection.

       ¶6      The State presented two witnesses at trial:                           Hannah

and Investigator Szotkowski.               Hannah testified that the day of

the assault she "had taken some Vicodin and drank some alcohol"

and that she "obviously was high" but "still had a sense of what

was going on."          Hoyle drove up to Hannah while she was walking

to a friend's house and asked if she "wanted to hang out," to
which Hannah agreed.           Hannah said that Hoyle "kept poking [her]

legs" during the drive.              At one point, Hoyle drove down a dead-

end road and stopped in the middle of the road.                             Hannah exited

the    car,    and    Hoyle    "told    [her]   to    get    back     into     the    car."

Hannah got into the "back seat passenger side" because she "was

scared"       and    "didn't   want     [Hoyle]   touching       [her]        any    more."

Hoyle then climbed into the back seat, pulled down Hannah's
pants and underwear, and sexually assaulted her.                             Hoyle drove

                                           4
                                                             No.    2020AP1876-CR

Hannah     back   home,   dropped   her   off    at   "the   bar    across     the

street," and said to Hannah, "if anyone finds out about this,

someone is going to end up dead."

      ¶7     Investigator Szotkowski testified that she determined

the   location      of    the   sexual    assault       based      on     Hannah's

description.      She otherwise had difficulty investigating because

she "didn't know who the suspect was" at the time.

      ¶8     Hoyle exercised his right under the Fifth Amendment

not   to    testify.      The   defense    did    not    present        any   other

witnesses.

      ¶9     Before closing arguments, the court read instructions

to the jury.        As relevant to this case, the court gave the

following standard jury instructions:

           The burden of establishing every fact necessary
      to constitute guilt is upon the State. Before you can
      return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy
      you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty.   If you can reconcile the evidence upon any
      reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's
      innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of
      not guilty. [Wis. JI——Criminal 140 (2019).]

             . . . .

           A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based
      upon mere guesswork or speculation. . . . While it is
      your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every
      reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt.
      You are to search for the truth. [Id.]

             . . . .

           . . . [E]vidence is   the   sworn  testimony   of
      witnesses   both   on direct   and   cross-examination
      regardless of who called that witness. . . .     [T]he
      evidence in this case to be considered is the

                                      5
                                           No.   2020AP1876-CR

testimony of witnesses only.   [Wis. JI——Criminal 103
(2000).]

    . . . .

     . . . In weighing the evidence, you may take into
account matters of your own common knowledge and your
observations and experiences in the affairs of life.
[Wis. JI——Criminal 195 (2000).]

    . . . .

     It is the duty of the jury to scrutinize and to
weigh the testimony of witnesses and determine the
effect of the evidence as a whole.    You are the sole
judges of the credibility, that is, the believability
of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony.   In determining the credibility of each
witness and the weight you give to the testimony of
each witness, consider these factors:

     Whether the witness has an interest or lack of
interest in the result of the trial; the witness'
conduct, appearance, and demeanor on the witness
stand; the clearness or lack of clearness of the
witness' recollections; the opportunity the witness
had for observing and for knowing the matters about
which she testified about; the reasonableness of the
witness' testimony; the apparent intelligence of the
witness; bias or prejudice, if any has been shown;
possible motives for falsifying testimony, and all
other facts and circumstances during a trial which
tend either to support or to discredit the testimony.
Then give to the testimony of each witness the weight
you believe it should receive. [Wis. JI——Criminal 300
(2000).]

    . . . .

     In this case the defendant has elected not to
testify.   In a criminal case, he has the absolute
constitutional right not to testify.   The defendant's
decision not to testify must not be considered by you
in any way and must not influence your verdict in any
manner. [Wis. JI——Criminal 315 (2001).]

                          6
                                                     No.    2020AP1876-CR

    ¶10   The prosecutor began his closing argument immediately

after the court finished reading the jury instructions.               He

began by restating and emphasizing certain instructions:

    [Y]ou are to decide this case solely, solely on the
    evidence offered and received at the trial. What that
    means is you're only to base it upon what you heard
    yesterday when the evidence was coming in at trial.
    You're not to speculate about other things that may be
    out there.   You're not to think about other things.
    You're to focus solely on the evidence that was
    presented to you yesterday in this trial.

         In fact, in order to reemphasize that, it's
    mentioned again in another instruction where it says,
    you are to consider only the evidence received during
    the trial. Once again, not to consider anything else.
    You're supposed to just focus on what you heard
    yesterday with the testimony.    [Hannah's] testimony
    that she gave here yesterday is uncontroverted.   You
    have heard no evidence disputing her account of that
    sexual assault.   You heard nothing. . . . You heard
    her testify[, and] . . . [t]hat is what the testimony
    is.
The prosecutor summarized Hannah's testimony and described it as

"uncontroverted"   because   "[t]here   is   absolutely    no   evidence

disputing her account of what occurred."        He further explained
that the jury could not "speculate":

    I can pretty much guarantee that the defense is going
    to get up here and say, what about this?    What about
    this in the investigation? What about that in the
    investigation?   Why didn't they do this?   Why didn't
    they do that?   Once again, the Judge instructed you,
    and you need to read that in the jury instructions,
    that you're not to base your decision, you're not to
    base doubt on guesswork or speculation. In fact, the
    Judge instructed you, you are not to search for doubt.
    You are to search for the truth.

         You are not to sit there and say, what if I had
    this information, what if I had that information, what

                                  7
                                                           No.    2020AP1876-CR

    if this was different, what if that was different?
    You're not to speculate. You're not to guess. You're
    to focus on what you heard yesterday, and what you
    heard yesterday was this young lady testifying about
    how she was assaulted by this defendant. . . .

         . . . None of that was controverted, meaning it
    was all uncontroverted, meaning there was nothing
    controverting    her  statements  about   what   had
    occurred . . . .

         They will want you to speculate about what you
    could know, what they think you should have known, but
    it's not about speculation.      It's about what you
    heard.   In this case, because you only heard from
    [Hannah] about it, you didn't hear from any of her
    friends or anyone else testifying about it, it all
    comes down to her credibility.
He then argued that the jury should evaluate Hannah's testimony

based on their "common experiences of life" and that Hannah was

a credible witness based on her demeanor, lack of testimony

establishing     a    motive     to   lie,   and    the   clarity     of     her

recollections.       On rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury,

    You need to make the decision based upon the
    uncontroverted testimony of what she says occurred.
    They don't disagree it's uncontroverted.    They just
    say you should ask for more. It's not my job to give
    you information I don't have. I'm not going to argue
    and say this is why you don't have it or that is why
    you don't have it. You don't have it. I will agree
    to that, you don't have that additional information,
    but the jury instruction says you are not to speculate
    about that.
    ¶11   The jury found Hoyle guilty on all counts.                The court

sentenced Hoyle to eight years of initial confinement and 10

years of extended supervision.

    ¶12   Hoyle      filed   a   motion    for   postconviction     relief   on
August 11, 2020, arguing, among other things, that he should

                                       8
                                                                            No.    2020AP1876-CR

receive a new trial because "the [S]tate repeatedly stated in

its closing argument that the evidence is 'uncontroverted'" in

violation of Hoyle's right not to testify.4                               The circuit court

orally denied Hoyle's motion during a hearing, concluding, "I

don't think that was a comment on the defendant's failure to

testify" because the prosecutor was arguing, "the only result

that       could   be   reached       from   what         the    testimony        was,    if   you

believed      [Hannah],        was    that   the          defendant    raped       her."       The

circuit       court     later    issued      a       written      order     denying      Hoyle's

motion for postconviction relief.

       ¶13     Hoyle     appealed      the       circuit        court's     order,       and   the

court of       appeals      reversed.        The court of appeals concluded,

"[T]he       State's       repeated        argument          that     the     evidence         was

'uncontroverted' was improper under the circumstances of this

case, where the only person who could controvert the alleged

victim's testimony was Hoyle" and "thus violated Hoyle's Fifth

Amendment          right    not       to     testify             at   trial."              Hoyle,

No. 2020AP1876-CR, ¶2.
       ¶14     The State petitioned this court for review, which we

granted.

                                II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶15     This     case     requires            us    to     "determine        whether      a

defendant's         Fifth       Amendment            privilege        against       compulsory

incrimination [has been] violated."                             State v. Ernst, 2005 WI

       Hoyle raised six additional bases for postconviction
       4

relief. None of these additional claims were raised before this
court.

                                                 9
                                                                           No.     2020AP1876-CR

107, ¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92.                               This involves "the

application      of   constitutional         principles            to    facts,"     which      we

review de novo as questions of law.                       State v. Spaeth, 2012 WI

95, ¶30, 343 Wis. 2d 220, 819 N.W.2d 769.

                                    III.     ANALYSIS

    ¶16     We begin with an overview of United States Supreme

Court cases developing the right against adverse comment on a

defendant's      decision      not     to    testify.              We    then      proceed      by

reviewing      how    the     federal       circuit       courts           of     appeals      and

Wisconsin courts have applied the Supreme Court's precedent in

the area of indirect comment on a defendant's silence.                                   Finally,

we analyze Hoyle's claim that the prosecutor violated his rights

under    Griffin       by     referring          to     the     State's          evidence       as

"uncontroverted"        and    conclude          that     the       prosecutor           did   not

comment on Hoyle's silence.

            A.   Text And United States Supreme Court Cases

    ¶17     Under      the     Fifth       Amendment          to     the        United     States

Constitution,         "No    person . . . shall               be        compelled        in    any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."                                   U.S. Const.

amend.    V;     accord       Malloy        v.    Hogan,           378     U.S.     1      (1964)

(incorporating the Fifth Amendment against the states).

    ¶18     In Griffin, 380 U.S. 609, the United States Supreme

Court    interpreted          the     Fifth           Amendment          as      providing       a

constitutional right for defendants to remain silent at trial

without the jury drawing an adverse inference from that silence.

The defendant in Griffin was on trial for first-degree murder
and invoked his right not to testify.                     Id. at 609-10.             The court
                                             10
                                                                         No.     2020AP1876-CR

instructed the jury, "As to any evidence or facts against him

which   the    defendant      can    reasonably            be   expected        to    deny    or

explain . . . if       he   does     not    testify . . . the             jury       may    take

that failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth

of such evidence . . . ."             Id. at 610.                 The prosecutor acted

accordingly in closing argument:                  "These things he has not seen

fit to take the stand and deny or explain"; "[the victim] is

dead, she can't tell you her side of the story.                                The defendant

won't."    Id. at 611.

     ¶19      The Supreme Court concluded both the court's and the

prosecutor's actions were unconstitutional, holding the Fifth

Amendment     "forbids      either    comment         by    the    prosecution         on    the

accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence

is   evidence    of    guilt."         Id.       at    614.         In     reaching         this

conclusion,      the     Court      first        noted      the     federal          statutory

prohibition      against      drawing       an        adverse       inference         from     a

defendant's silence.         Id. at 612-13.            It then reasoned,

     If the words "fifth Amendment" are substituted for
     "act" and for "statute" [in Wilson, which held that
     adverse comment on silence was statutorily prohibited]
     the spirit of the Self-Incrimination         Clause is
     reflected. For comment on the refusal to testify is a
     remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal
     justice," which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a
     penalty   imposed   by   courts    for   exercising  a
     constitutional privilege.      It cuts down on the
     privilege by making its assertion costly.
Id. at 614 (citation and footnote omitted).

     ¶20      The Court clarified the rule against adverse comment
on a defendant's silence in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333

                                            11
                                                                        No.    2020AP1876-CR

(1978).     There, the Court held a trial court could instruct a

jury,     over     a     defendant's        objection,          not     to     consider      a

defendant's silence.             Id. at 338.            Examining its decision in

Griffin, the Court observed, "It is clear from even a cursory

review of the facts and the square holding of the Griffin case

that the Court was there concerned only with adverse comment,"

which is comment "that such silence is evidence of guilt."                                 Id.

at 338–39 (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615).

      ¶21   Accordingly,          "[a]lthough           Griffin       can     be   read     to

prohibit    any        direct    reference        to    a    defendant's       failure      to

testify," the Supreme Court "has declined to adopt such a broad

reading of Griffin."             United States v. Wing, 104 F.3d 986, 990

(7th Cir. 1997) (citing Lakeside, 435 U.S. 333).                               The Griffin

rule is concerned only with adverse comment——that is, comment on

"the evil to which Griffin addressed itself:                           the invitation to

infer guilt from a defendant's decision not to take the stand."

Id.

      ¶22   The case before us does not involve a direct comment
on a defendant's silence but rather an alleged indirect comment.

"[T]he    Supreme       Court     has     never    clearly        established       that     a

prosecutor       may    not     comment    on     the       evidence    in    a    way    that

indirectly       refers    to    the    defendant's          silence."         Edwards      v.

                                            12
                                                                  No.      2020AP1876-CR

Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 460 (8th Cir. 2012).                  However, it has come

close.5

       ¶23       In United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), a

prosecutor stated during closing argument, "Let's look at the

evidence the defendant[s] put on here for you so that we can put

that       in     perspective.       I'm   going     to    tell      you      what   the

defendant[s] did not do. . . .              The defendants at no time ever

challenged any of the rapes . . . ."                Id. at 502.         Resolving the

case on harmless error, the Court did not decide whether the

prosecutor's          remarks     constituted      adverse     comments        on    the

defendant's silence.             Id. at 509.        In a concurring opinion,

Justice Stevens took the view that there was no constitutional

error because, "[i]n reviewing the evidence adduced at the 5-day

trial,          the   prosecutor    identified      the      weaknesses        in    the

defendants' presentations and invited inferences from the main

focus of the evidence presented by the five defendants."                         Id. at

514 (Stevens, J., concurring).              In other words, Justice Stevens

explained         that   the    prosecutor's    comments      were      not    improper
because "the protective shield of the Fifth Amendment should

       The Supreme Court addressed a factual scenario similar to
       5

this case in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In Lockett,
the Court "quickly dismissed the argument that the prosecutor
had violated the defendant's right to remain silent when he
repeatedly remarked that the evidence was uncontradicted."
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988) (citing
Lockett, 438 U.S. 586).    However, the Court "did not need to
decide whether such comment was generally improper, because in
that case 'Lockett's own counsel had clearly focused the jury's
attention on her silence.'"   Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at
595). Hoyle's trial counsel did not make any similar statement
in this case.

                                           13
                                                                         No.    2020AP1876-CR

[not] be converted into a sword that cuts back on the area of

legitimate comment by the prosecutor on the weaknesses in the

defense case."6           Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring).

     ¶24    Though these cases make clear that the Griffin rule

prohibits adverse comment on a defendant's silence, the Supreme

Court     has       not    established     a        framework      for    deciding      if    a

statement is a comment on a defendant's silence and whether such

comment is adverse.

    B.    Federal Circuit Courts Of Appeals And Wisconsin Cases

     ¶25    The       prevailing       standard        among    the      federal     circuit

courts of appeals for determining whether a prosecutor violates

the Fifth Amendment by adversely commenting on a defendant's

silence    first          appeared    in   the      Eighth     Circuit's       decision      in

Morrison,       6    F.2d    809.      Morrison        did   not    analyze      the    Fifth

Amendment but rather the federal statutory prohibition against

adverse    comment          on   a   defendant's       silence.          See   id.     at    811

(citing Act of March 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at

18 U.S.C. § 3481)).              The prosecutor made the following comments
to the jury in closing argument:

     6 The Supreme Court later favorably cited Justice Stevens'
Hastings concurrence in Robinson, 485 U.S. 25.        That case
involved a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence in
response to defense counsel's assertion that the government did
not permit the defendant to explain his side of the story. 485
U.S. at 27-28.    The Court held that the prosecutor's comments
did not violate the Fifth Amendment, explaining that in some
cases "the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's opportunity
to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or
his counsel." Id. at 32.

                                               14
                                                                              No.     2020AP1876-CR

           While you are the sole judges of the facts in the
      case, you would not be at liberty, of course, to
      arbitrarily disregard or reject testimony in the case,
      and especially where it is not contradicted, unless in
      the consideration of that testimony in some way you
      find it necessary in the performance of your duty to
      discredit or reject it.    Then, of course, you should
      give it the weight and consideration you think it
      should receive at your hands.
Id. (emphasis added).               The Eighth Circuit first concluded, "It

is clear that this language contained no direct comment on the

failure of accused to testify."                      Id.     The court then considered
whether      it    was    an   "indirect             comment"         using     the     following

test:      "Was the language used manifestly intended to be, or was

it    of    such    character        that       the        jury       would    naturally        and

necessarily        take   it   to    be     a   comment          on    the    failure      of   the

accused to testify?"                Id. (emphases added).                      Employing this

test, the court concluded the prosecutor did not comment on the

defendant's silence because "[t]estimony by the defendant was

not   the    only    method     of    contradicting              the    story       told   by   the

government's witnesses, if untrue."                        Id.        The court also noted,

"Comment      by    court      and        counsel      that       certain           testimony    is

uncontradicted is common, oftentimes helpful, and very generally
held to be without error."                 Id. (collecting sources).

      ¶26    Since the Eighth Circuit's decision in Morrison, every

federal      circuit      court      has     applied         a    substantially            similar

version     of     this   test       in    Fifth       Amendment         comment-on-silence

                                                15
                                                                   No.     2020AP1876-CR

cases.7    The Wisconsin Court of Appeals likewise has applied the

Morrison    test.    It   first   did     so    in    State     v.       Johnson,   121

Wis. 2d 237, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), where a pro se

defendant delivered an opening statement to the jury but did not

testify.     Id. at 242.     The prosecutor cautioned the jury that

the defendant's "statements were not evidence and were not given

under oath or subject to cross-examination."                   Id.       The court of

appeals    cited    the   Morrison   formulation          as       the     "test    for

determining    whether    remarks    are       directed       to     a    defendant's

failure to testify."       Id. at 246 (quoting Bontempo v. Fenton,

692 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982)).                   The court concluded the

prosecutor did not indirectly comment on the defendant's failure

to testify, reasoning,

          While   the   prosecutor's  remarks  might  have
     prompted the jury to recall and reflect upon [the
     defendant's] failure to testify, we do not conclude
     that the remarks highlighted such a failure to
     testify.   The remarks were directed at the manner in
     which the jury should consider the opening statement
     and did not address [the defendant's] failure to take
     the stand. . . . [T]hese remarks were not manifestly
     intended or of such a character that the jury would

     7   See, e.g., Taylor v. Medeiros, 983 F.3d 566, 576 (1st Cir.
2020);    United States v. Daugerdas, 837 F.3d 212, 227 (2d Cir.
2016);     United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217, 308 (3d Cir.
2020);   United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d 451, 466 (4th Cir. 2016);
United     States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 341 (5th Cir. 2022);
United   States v. Gonzalez, 512 F.3d 285, 292-93 (6th Cir. 2008);
United    States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2014);
United    States v. LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2017);
United    States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1060 (9th Cir. 2018);
United    States v. Christy, 916 F.3d 814, 830 (10th Cir. 2019);
United    States v. Hano, 922 F.3d 1272, 1295 (11th Cir. 2019);
United   States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

                                     16
                                                                              No.     2020AP1876-CR

       naturally and necessarily take them to be a comment on
       the failure of the accused to testify.
Id. at 248.

       ¶27   The court of appeals later applied the Morrison test

again in State v. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715

N.W.2d 669.        There, a prosecutor commented that other alleged

collaborators were not "going to walk into court . . . and waive

[their] Fifth Amendment rights . . . .                             My God, they have the

same rights that [the defendant] does."                            Id., ¶22.         The court of

appeals,     based        on     United       States           Supreme       Court     precedent,

identified three factors which "must be present" to demonstrate

a     Griffin   violation:         "(1)        the           comment     must       constitute      a

reference to the defendant's failure to testify; (2) the comment

must propose that the failure to testify demonstrates guilt; and

(3)    the   comment      must     not     be       a    fair      response     to     a    defense

argument."         Id.,    ¶21.         The     court         first     concluded         under   the

Morrison     test      that      this     was       a        comment    on    the     defendant's

decision     not    to     testify,       but           it    nonetheless       concluded         the

prosecutor's       statement       was        not       improper        because      it    was    not
"adverse"——"the prosecutor did not state or intimate that [the

defendant's] failure to testify indicated guilt."8                                        Id., ¶23.

Though it is possible that the jury could have interpreted the

prosecutor's comment in an adverse manner, the court of appeals

recognized      that      mere    possibility                is   not   enough:       "[A]    court

       The court of appeals also concluded that the prosecutor's
       8

comment was "a fair response to a defense argument" regarding
why the alleged collaborators did not testify. State v. Jaimes,
2006 WI App 93, ¶24, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 N.W.2d 669.

                                                17
                                                                   No.    2020AP1876-CR

should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous

remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting

through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the

plethora of less damaging interpretations."                      Id., ¶23 (quoting

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)).

    ¶28     Accordingly, the mere possibility that a jury could

understand a prosecutor as adversely commenting on a defendant's

silence does not demonstrate a violation of Griffin.                          See id.

Rather,    the    prosecutor's       language    must     have    been    "manifestly

intended to be" or was "of such character that the jury would

naturally and necessarily take it to be" an adverse comment on

the defendant's silence for there to be a Griffin violation.

Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811 (emphases added); see also Clark v.

Lashbrook, 906 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the

argument     that     a      prosecutor      violated      Griffin       because     it

"assumes . . . that           the    prosecution's         statement        is     only

susceptible to one meaning"); United States v. Rand, 835 F.3d

451, 466 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding there was no Griffin violation
because,    though     the    jury   could     understand    the     prosecutor      as

commenting       on   the    defendant's       silence,     this    was     not    "the

'necessar[y]' conclusion the jury would draw"); United States v.

LaFontaine, 847 F.3d 974, 980 (8th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added)

(holding "the jury would not have necessarily understood the

government's statement as an attempt to call attention to [the

defendant's] failure to testify").

    ¶29     Based on the Supreme Court's precedent and the test
from Morrison, unanimously adopted by all federal circuits and
                                          18
                                                           No.    2020AP1876-CR

applied by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, we hold that three

elements    must    be     present   for    a     prosecutor     to   violate

Griffin:   First,    the     prosecutor's   language      must    have      been

"manifestly intended to be" or was "of such character that the

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be" a "comment

on the failure of the [defendant] to testify."             Morrison, 6 F.2d

at 811; Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611.                Second, the prosecutor's

language must also have been "manifestly intended to be" or was

"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily

take it to be" "adverse," meaning comment "that such silence is

evidence of guilt."        Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811; Lakeside, 435 U.S.

at 338–39 (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615); Donnelly, 416 U.S.

at 647.    Finally, the prosecutor's comments must not have been

"a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel."

United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988).

           C.   Comments That Evidence Is "Uncontroverted."

     ¶30   Hoyle claims that the prosecutor in this case violated

Griffin    by   repeatedly     describing       the   State's    evidence    as
"uncontroverted"9 during closing argument.             We conclude that the

prosecutor's comments, taken in context, were not comments on

Hoyle's silence and therefore did not violate Griffin.                Because

     9 The prosecutor in this case used the term "uncontroverted"
during his closing arguments.     Though most cases have reviewed
prosecutors'   use   of   "uncontradicted"   instead,   the   terms
"'uncontradicted,'    'undenied,'    'unrebutted,'    'undisputed,'
'unchallenged,' [and] 'uncontroverted'" are often treated the
same.   United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 548 (7th Cir.
1999).

                                     19
                                                                             No.     2020AP1876-CR

we   conclude      that       the     prosecutor        did    not    comment        on    Hoyle's

silence, there is no need for us to analyze whether such comment

was adverse or a fair response to a defense argument.

       ¶31    We first note that there is no per se rule that a

prosecutor's description of evidence as "uncontroverted" is a

comment      on    a    defendant's          silence.            "Generally,         it    is    not

improper for the prosecuting attorney to remark that testimony

for the prosecution is unexplained or uncontradicted, especially

[as here] where the jury is instructed to disregard such comment

as bearing on the accused's failure to testify."                                        23A C.J.S.

Criminal      Procedure          &    Rights       of    the     Accused       § 1762       (2022)

(footnote omitted).              It is notable that the Eighth Circuit in

Morrison——the case that first announced the test for an indirect

comment      on    a    defendant's          failure      to     testify——approved              of    a

prosecutor's           comment       that    testimony         was    "not     contradicted."

Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.                    It reasoned that the "[t]estimony by

the defendant was not the only method of contradicting the story

told    by   the       government's          witnesses,        if    untrue,"        and    noted,
"[c]omment        by    court        and    counsel       that      certain        testimony         is

uncontradicted is common, oftentimes helpful, and very generally

held to be without error."                        Id.    Similarly, we recognized in

Bies v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 322, 48-49, 193 N.W.2d 47 (1972),

"that   it    is       proper    for       the     district      attorney      to       point    out

generally     that       no    evidence          has    been   introduced          to     show   the

innocence of the defendant."                      A prosecutor may refer to evidence

as   "uncontroverted"            when       the    comment     was    neither        "manifestly
intended to be" nor was "of such character that the jury would
                                                  20
                                                                   No.    2020AP1876-CR

naturally     and    necessarily      take    it   to    be"   a   comment    on   the

defendant's silence.         Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.

      ¶32    Some courts have held that a prosecutor's statement

that evidence is "uncontroverted" is a comment on a defendant's

silence "if the only person who could have contradicted, denied,

rebutted or disputed the government's evidence was the defendant

himself."      United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.

1996).       For example, the Seventh Circuit in Cotnam concluded

that a prosecutor's description of testimony as "uncontroverted"

was manifestly intended as a comment on the defendant's silence

because the prosecutor focused attention on the defendant by

asking   a    witness,      "When    these    discussions      were      taking   place

between the defendant and yourself, did you keep the discussions

basically to yourself or were other people around the house?"

Id. at 499.         Similarly, in United States v. Triplett, 195 F.3d

990 (8th Cir. 1999), the Eighth Circuit concluded a prosecutor's

statement, "What you didn't hear was evidence that the defendant

didn't possess the drugs," was a comment on the defendant's
silence "because, according to the government's own theory of

the   case,    no     one    other    than    Triplett      himself       could    have

testified about his possession of the drugs.                       Triplett 'alone

had the information to do so.'"               Id. at 995 (quoting Sidebottom

v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 759 (8th Cir. 1995)).

      ¶33    Analyzing      the     prosecutor's        remarks    during     Hoyle's

trial in context reveals that his statements that the State's

evidence was "uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended
to be" nor "of such character that the jury would naturally and
                                         21
                                                                           No.     2020AP1876-CR

necessarily          take   [them]    to   be"      comments          on   the     defendant's

silence.     Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.

       ¶34   The main issue at Hoyle's trial was the credibility of

the    State's        witnesses.        Defense          counsel      began       his    opening

statement by noting, "There is no burden on the defense to put

witnesses up.              There is no burden on the defense to provide

testimony.       The State has to provide you with every single thing

that they're alleging."                He told the jury, "you will not be

given     any    scientific,          physical,          or   medical          evidence       that

connects Mr. Hoyle to [Hannah] whatsoever.                                 You will not be

given any corroborating witnesses in this case. . . .                                  What that

comes down to is you have to determine [Hannah's] credibility."

       ¶35   During the State's closing argument, the                                 prosecutor

anticipated defense counsel would argue reasonable doubt based

on a lack of corroborating evidence and chose to lean on the

jury    instructions.           The    prosecutor         made      all    statements         that

Hannah's     testimony         was    "uncontroverted"              in     the    context       of

explaining       to     the    jury    what    evidence          it      was     permitted      to
consider.            The    prosecutor        reminded        the      jury,      "the       judge

instructed you that you are to decide this case solely, solely

on the evidence offered and received at the trial. . . .                                     You're

not to speculate about other things that may be out there."

"You're supposed to just focus on what you heard yesterday with

the     testimony.            [Hannah's]      testimony          that       she       gave    here

yesterday       is    uncontroverted."             The    prosecutor           then     recounted

Hannah's testimony and said, "All of that is uncontroverted."
He further explained, "There is absolutely no evidence disputing
                                              22
                                                                         No.    2020AP1876-CR

her account of what occurred.                 I can pretty much guarantee that

the    defense     is    going    to    get    up     here       and    say,    what      about

this? . . .           You're not to speculate.                   You're not to guess.

You're    to    focus     on   what     you    heard       yesterday . . . ."               One

portion summarizes his argument particularly well:

            They will want you to speculate about what you
       could know, what they think you should have known, but
       it's not about speculation.      It's about what you
       heard.   In this case, because you only heard from
       [Hannah] about it, you didn't hear from any of her
       friends or anyone else testifying about it, it all
       comes down to her credibility.
       ¶36     This     context     makes      clear        that        the    prosecutor's

description        of    Hannah's       testimony          as     "uncontroverted"         was

entirely meant to focus the jury's attention on what evidence it

was permitted to consider.              The jury could consider only whether

the    evidence       presented   by     the       State    was    credible,        and    that

evidence     was      "uncontroverted,"        meaning          there    was   no   contrary

evidence for the jury to also evaluate.                            The jury could not

"speculate" that there was some other evidence not presented

that    might    exonerate       Hoyle.        They    were       to    focus    solely     on

whether the State's witnesses were credible.                              The prosecutor

never argued that the lack of a defense case made the State's

witnesses more credible.               He instead walked through the court's

instruction on credibility and told the jury to evaluate the

testimony they heard based on their "own experiences in life";

"the victim's conduct, appearance, and demeanor"; "the clearness

or lack of clearness of her recollection"; "[t]he reasonableness
of her testimony"; "[t]he apparent intelligence of the witness";

                                              23
                                                                      No.     2020AP1876-CR

and     "possible      motives       for     falsifying          testimony."           The

prosecutor's       description       of    the   evidence       as    "uncontroverted"

was, in context, comment on the evidence the jury was permitted

to consider, not on Hoyle's silence.

       ¶37   It is also not the case that "the only person who

could    have    contradicted,        denied,         rebutted       or     disputed   the

government's evidence was the defendant himself" and, therefore,

the jury would have "naturally and necessarily" understood the

prosecutor as commenting on Hoyle's silence.                       Cotnam, 88 F.3d at

497.    It is possible that other evidence might exist that would

controvert      the   State's    witnesses.            In    fact,    defense     counsel

identified several types of evidence that, if presented, might

controvert them.        Defense counsel told the jury:                    "We heard from

the investigator yesterday.                She did not go talk to [Hannah's]

mother at all.         That's important. . . . What was her demeanor

when she came back?"            "We heard that [Hannah] also lived with

her stepfather and her two sisters."                        "[Hannah] tells us that

she was going to go and see a friend. . . .                               That avenue is
ignored."       "We heard that the police never went to canvas the

neighborhood."        "We heard from [Hannah] that she was dropped off

at this gas station or bar.               The investigator says she had never

went to those to find out if they had surveillance . . . ."                             "I

think we all agree when two people engage in sex, their bodies

are    touching.      There     is   going       to   be    some     sort    of   physical

evidence . . . .        We know that she didn't go through a medical

                                            24
                                                              No.    2020AP1876-CR

evaluation or physical evaluation."           It is possible that some of

this evidence could have controverted the State's witnesses.10

      ¶38    Read in context, the prosecutor described the evidence

as "uncontroverted" in order to keep the jury from speculating

about any other evidence, including the evidence defense counsel

mentioned in his opening statement and closing argument, and to

instead focus on whether the State's witnesses were credible.

He argued that defense counsel was asking the jury to speculate

about other evidence, which the jury could not do.                   Even if it

is possible that the jury could have understood the prosecutor

as commenting on Hoyle's decision not to testify, the jury would

not   have   "necessarily"     done    so,   and   we   "should     not   lightly

infer"     that   the   jury   would   have    drawn    the   "most       damaging

meaning"     from   the   prosecutor's       statements.11          Jaimes,    292

Wis. 2d 656, ¶23 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647).

       We consider defense counsel's argument in this case only
      10

because it provides context as to how the jury would understand
the prosecutor's argument, not because the prosecutor's argument
was a "fair response to a defense argument."        Jaimes, 292
Wis. 2d 656, ¶21.

       Assuming arguendo that the jury would have naturally and
      11

necessarily understood the prosecutor to be commenting on
Hoyle's silence, there would still be no error.    The argument
was never adverse because the prosecutor never asked or
intimated that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as an
admission of guilt.    Had the prosecutor commented on Hoyle's
silence——which he did not——such comment only directed the jury
away from speculation regarding the evidence they did not hear
and toward the evidence they did hear.     Any mere possibility
that the jury could instead have made the prohibited inference
is insufficient.

                                       25
                                                                               No.       2020AP1876-CR

       ¶39    We therefore conclude the prosecutor did not violate

Griffin because, taking the prosecutor's remarks in context, the

description        of     the    State's        evidence         as    "uncontroverted"            was

neither "manifestly intended to be" nor "of such character that

the jury would naturally and necessarily take [them] to be" a

comment on Hoyle's silence.                     Morrison, 6 F.2d at 811.                       Because

we conclude the prosecutor did not comment at all on Hoyle's

silence,      it    is        unnecessary       for       us     to    analyze       whether      such

comment      "propose[d]         that     the       failure       to    testify       demonstrates

guilt"       or    whether       it     was     a        "fair    response       to      a     defense

argument."         Jaimes, 292 Wis. 2d 656, ¶21.

       ¶40    Because we conclude the prosecution's description of

the evidence as "uncontroverted" was not an error under Griffin,

there is no need for us to engage in a harmless error analysis.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).

                                        IV.     CONCLUSION

       ¶41    Hoyle       argues      that      he       is    entitled     to       a    new    trial

because      the    prosecutor          at    Hoyle's          trial     violated         his   Fifth
Amendment         right       against    self-incrimination               under          Griffin    by

adversely commenting on his decision not to testify.                                         According

to Hoyle, the prosecutor argued "that Hoyle should be convicted

because the alleged victim's testimony was 'uncontroverted'" and

that   this       was     a    comment    on     Hoyle's         decision      not       to    testify

because      "[o]nly          Hoyle   could         have       contradicted          [the      alleged

victim's] sexual assault allegations."

       ¶42    We        conclude         that        Hoyle        is     not         entitled       to
postconviction relief.                The prosecutor at Hoyle's criminal trial
                                                    26
                                                                             No.     2020AP1876-CR

did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights under Griffin because

the     prosecutor        did    not    comment           on    Hoyle's      silence.           The

prosecutor          instead       described           the        State's           evidence     as

"uncontroverted" to remind the jury that they could evaluate

only the evidence presented at trial and not speculate about

other possible evidence.                Additionally, the jury likely would

not have thought only Hoyle could have controverted the State's

evidence       because     defense      counsel        explicitly          identified         other

kinds    of    evidence     not    presented          at       trial.      In      context,     the

prosecutor's          remarks          that         the         State's       evidence         was

"uncontroverted" were neither "manifestly intended to be" nor

"of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily

take     [them]      to    be"    adverse           comments         on    Hoyle's      silence.

Morrison,      6    F.2d   at    811.         The    prosecutor           therefore     did    not

comment on Hoyle's silence, and the circuit court was correct to

deny Hoyle's motion for postconviction relief.                                We reverse the

court of appeals.

       By     the   Court.—The      decision         of        the   court    of     appeals     is
reversed.

                                               27
                                                              No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

      ¶43     BRIAN     HAGEDORN,    J.       (concurring).               The      Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No person

shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against     himself."        U.S.   Const.     amend.    V.         In    Griffin     v.

California, the United States Supreme Court arguably went beyond

the original meaning of this clause and held that it forbids

"comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence."                               380

U.S. 609, 615 (1965).         Hoyle's claim before us is premised on

the   Fifth    Amendment    alone;    no      argument   is    made        under    the

Wisconsin Constitution.         We are therefore duty-bound to apply

the precedent of the United States Supreme Court.                        The majority

opinion does so, and I join it.

      ¶44     I write separately, however, to discuss the original

meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment,

and to consider how that meaning might inform our approach in

cases such as this.         The short story is that the right to not

accuse oneself was widely understood to be one of our natural,

God-given, inalienable rights.            And our founders were cognizant
of the historical abuse of this right during the Inquisition and

later by ecclesiastical and English prerogative courts.                         Little

to nothing in the historical record suggests that this right

protected those accused of crimes——who were not even allowed to

testify in their own defense at the time——against comments on

and adverse inferences from their decision not to testify.

      ¶45     So how did Griffin arise?           In brief, criminal trials

in America evolved to give those accused of crimes the statutory
right to testify.        And as jurisdictions moved in this direction,

                                          1
                                                                    No.   2020AP1876-CR.bh

some    states       and    the   federal       government      enacted       laws    that

protected      defendants         against       adverse       inferences      from      the

decision not to testify——although this policy choice was not

universal.       Soon       enough,    a    body   of       cases     interpreting     and

applying     these     principles      arose,      yielding      Griffin-type         rules

rooted in both statute and common law.                    As we shall see, Griffin

then incorporated this body of law at least in part and rooted

it in the Fifth Amendment.

       ¶46    This    history      reveals,      at     the    very       least,     strong

arguments that Griffin and its progeny go beyond the original

meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Given this, how should courts that must apply Griffin respond

when faced with cases asking us to extend precedent that has a

weak foundation in the original meaning of the Constitution?                             In

my view, we should tread cautiously.                    Where possible, we should

aim to "resolve questions about the scope of those precedents in

light of and in the direction of the constitutional text and

constitutional history."              Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,

J., dissenting).           Being mindful of the text and history of the

Fifth   Amendment          provides   further      support       to    the    majority's

decision not to extend Griffin to the facts of the case before

us.     For    these       reasons,    I    join      the     majority      opinion    and

respectfully concur.

                                            2
                                                                     No.   2020AP1876-CR.bh

               I.    GRIFFIN & THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE

                    A.    Nemo Tenetur & the Ex Officio Oath

    ¶47     In      the     twelfth         century,        Bolognese      monk       Gratian

authored the Decretum——a compilation of the body of Catholic

rules and pronouncements that had circulated in collections of

"canons."      J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History

110 (2d ed. 1979).              The Decretum systematized these canons "in

accordance with a hierarchical scheme of authority with the pope

at the earthly summit."               Id.     Study of "Canon law became all the

rage" as European universities picked it up, and a new system of

courts applying these canons——known as ecclesiastical courts——

soon developed.          Id.

    ¶48     We      begin      the    story    of   the     Fifth    Amendment's       Self-

Incrimination Clause here because one of the enduring maxims

recognized     in    canon      law    was    known    in    Latin    as    nemo      tenetur

prodere seipsum——that is, "No one is bound to betray oneself."

Richard   H.     Helmholz,       Origins       of   the     Privilege      against      Self-

Incrimination:           The Role of the European Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 962, 962 (1990).                 The maxim's origins are a bit of a

mystery, but by the Middle Ages it was widely referenced and

widely    accepted.1            Leonard       W.    Levy,    Origins       of   the     Fifth

    1  A prominent fourth-century Church Father, St. John
Chrysostom, referenced the idea when discussing St. Paul's
letter to the Hebrews.     Richard H. Helmholz, Origins of the
Privilege against Self-Incrimination:   The Role of the European
Ius Commune, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 982 (1990).    St. Augustine
did as well around the same time.    Leonard W. Levy, Origins of
the Fifth Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821, 831
(1997) [hereinafter Levy, Critics].        The maxim made more
concrete appearances as a legal concept during the Middle Ages,
first in Gratian's Decretum (twelfth century) and then in the
                                3
                                                             No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

Amendment and its Critics, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 821, 831 (1997).

The theological driver behind this principle was that "men and

women should confess their sins to God, but they should not be

compelled to make their crimes known to anyone else."                     Helmholz,

supra at 982.         Eventually, the maxim would mean much more as

government power was seen as transgressing its command.

      ¶49    That    brings    us    to    the   Inquisition——a    period       during

early medieval times in which the Catholic Church sought to

protect itself from widespread heresy.                 Leonard W. Levy, Origins

of   the    Fifth    Amendment      20-21    (Oxford   University    Press      1968)

[hereinafter Levy, Origins].                While the ancient maxim against

self-betrayal was accepted as such, it had its limits.                            St.

Thomas Aquinas reflected and reinforced the thinking at the time

that in order to protect the theological purity of the church,

"truthful answers to incriminating questions" must be demanded,

and those embracing heresy should be put to death.                     Id. at 21.

Even torture was an authorized tool to root out heresy.                    Id.

      ¶50    In     1215,   Pope    Innocent     III   remodeled    the    criminal
procedures of canon law, permitting three modes of prosecution.

Id. at 22.        The first was accusatio——accusation from a private

person.       Id.     This mode came with a catch; it exposed the

accuser     to    punishment   if    his    prosecution    failed.        Id.     The

second      was   denunciatio——a          private   accusation     allowing      "the

private accuser to avoid the danger and burden of accusatio."

Id. at 22-23.        In denunciatio the judge proceeded "ex officio"——

glossa ordinaria to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX (thirteenth
century). Helmholz, supra at 967; Levy, Critics, supra at 831.

                                            4
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"by   virtue      of      his   office"——and           became      a    party   to     the   suit,

conducting the prosecution for the secret accuser.                                   Id. at 23.

The third was inquisitio——a mode "by which the judge combined in

his person all roles."                      Id.   He sat as accuser, prosecutor,

judge, and jury.            Id.

      ¶51      The        common      procedure         employed         by     ecclesiastical

courts, by which they implemented these types of prosecution,

was the oath de veritate dicenda.                            Id.       This oath required a

party to swear to tell the truth to all questions that might be

asked.      Id.      The oath, however, could become an "an inescapable

trap" because an accused had to either take the oath (and risk

being condemned for perjury if the court didn't believe the

answers)     or      be    condemned         as   guilty      for      refusing      to   answer.

Id. at 23-24.             As such, it operated in all respects as a self-

incriminatory oath.               Id. at 24.          And because the oath took place

during inquisitorial procedures in which the judge operated ex

officio, the oath became known as the ex officio oath.                                 Id.

      ¶52      By the early fourteenth century, English monarchs had
created the king's council, a political body made up of the most

powerful state officers, nobles, bishops, and judges.                                        Id. at

49.   This council eventually "developed into the House of Lords

and the central courts of the common law"——"the Court of Common

Pleas (civil) and the Court of King's Bench (criminal)."                                       Id.

But it also spun off what were called conciliar or prerogative

courts,     supplementing             the    general     jurisdiction           of     the   other

courts    at      the      time.       Baker,         supra    at      101.      The      original
justification           for     the    creation         of    these      courts      "was     that

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extraordinary action by the king and his magnates offered the

only escape from the kind of undue influence which could corrupt

sheriffs and juries."             Id.

       ¶53    Because many of the chancellors serving on the king's

council were assisted by bishops and doctors of canon law, its

procedures     largely       emulated       those    used   in   the    ecclesiastical

courts.      Levy, Origins, supra at 50.                For example, they had no

juries.       Id.        The common criminal procedure involved                     secret

accusations         by      informers        (called        an   "information"           or

"suggestion") instead of the typical grand jury process of the

common law.          Id.     After the court commanded attendance of a

person through a writ of citation, it would require them to take

the ex officio oath.              Id.     "The defendant was required to swear

the    oath        and     then     was     confronted       with       a      series    of

interrogatories which were based on the information obtained by

suggestions and the examination of witnesses."                      Id. at 51.          "Any

discrepancies or contradictions in his answers were used against

him in an effort to break him down and force a confession of
guilt."      Id.

       ¶54    The prerogative courts changed dramatically during the

Elizabethan (1558-1603) and early Stuart (1603-1640s) periods.

John   H.     Langbein,      The        Historical    Origins    of     the      Privilege

Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1047,

1073 (1994).         As those monarchies began imposing Anglican forms

of worship on the British people, they enlarged the jurisdiction

of the prerogative courts to "suppress religious and political
heterodoxy."        United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1436 (11th

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Cir.       1997).       The   oath    became     "especially       problematic          for

religious        dissenters,    as    they   were     'typically      guilty       of   the

nonconformist         religious      practices    for   which   they        were    being

investigated.'"         In re Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th 176, 214 (6th

Cir. 2022) (Thapar, J., concurring in part) (quoting another

source).         "Anyone who refused this 'inquisitional oath' could be

held in contempt, imprisoned, and even tortured."                       Id. (quoting

another source); Langbein, supra at 1073.

       ¶55       So, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both

the prerogative courts and ecclesiastical courts used the ex

officio oath to impose their political and religious will upon

the people.          Many pushed back and resented what they saw as a

grand abuse of power.             Levy, Origins, supra at 268-69.                  The ex

officio oath, they argued, violated the laws of God, drawing

upon       the   ancient    principle    that    no   one   should     be    forced      to

accuse oneself.2           Helmholz, supra at 967-68.

       ¶56       In 1637, tensions boiled over.             Levy, Origins, supra

at 271-72.          That year, the Star Chamber, probably the most well-
known of the prerogative courts, brought charges against English

activist John Lilburne for shipping seditious books into England

from Holland (among other charges).                     Id. at 273.           The Star

Chamber found him guilty of contempt for refusing to take the

oath.       Lilburne's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (Star Chamber 1637).

He condemned the oath as "against the law of God; for that law

      In addition to the nemo tenetur maxim, some historians
       2

also point to the "rights of conscience" as an additional basis
for rejecting forced self-accusations. Levy, Critics, supra at
836.

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                                                                     No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

requires no man to accuse himself."                          Levy, Origins, supra at

277.        Lilburne's trial was likely the final nail in the coffin

for     England's          prerogative          courts.            Reflecting         popular

objections, Parliament abolished the Star Chamber in 1641, and

forbade use of the ex officio oath procedure in the English

ecclesiastical courts.              Langbein, supra at 1073-74.

       B.    Impact on Founders & Ratification of Fifth Amendment

       ¶57        The experience of our English forebears in their fight

against the inquisition-style persecutions had a profound effect

on the founders.              In 1735, a Presbyterian special commission in

Philadelphia           investigated       the       unorthodox      beliefs      of     local

minister Samuel Hemphill because of his deistic ideas.                                  Levy,

Origins, supra at 382-83.                 Hemphill reportedly refused a demand

to give the commission his sermons because it was "contrary to

the common Rights of Mankind, no Man being obligated to furnish

Matter       of    Accusation       against      himself."          Id. at      383.      The

commission took his refusal as a "virtual confession of guilt,"
and suspended him for "Unsound and Dangerous" beliefs.                            Id.     But

a young Benjamin Franklin came to Hemphill's defense, writing

that     the       commission       resembled        "that    hellish       Tribunal      the

Inquisition."           Id.

       ¶58        In   1788,    during    the       debate    in   Massachusetts        over

ratifying the newly proposed federal Constitution, one delegate

objected to the charter because nothing prevented "Congress from

passing       laws     which    shall     compel      a   man,     who     is   accused    or
suspected         of   a   crime,    to   furnish      evidence      against     himself."

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Remarks by Abraham Holmes in the Massachusetts Debates, in 2 The

Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the

Federal Constitution 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).                 He warned

that the Constitution as proposed gave Congress the power to

create judicial bodies resembling "that diabolical institution,

the Inquisition."      Id.

       ¶59    This widespread acceptance of the ancient right to not

accuse oneself was reflected in the first constitutions in the

new American states.         Virginia led the way, establishing that no

one    may    "be   compelled    to   give     evidence   against     himself."

Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776).                Seven other states

included similar provisions, granting rights against compulsion

"to give evidence" or "to furnish evidence" against oneself.

United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 52 (2000) (Thomas, J.,

concurring); Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th at 215 (Thapar, J.,

concurring).

       ¶60    And when James Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment to

the United States Constitution, he used language similar to that
in    state   constitutions     and   wrote,    "No   person . . . shall      be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."3

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring); U.S. Const.

amend. V.       Historians generally believe Madison's use of the

phrase "to be a witness" was synonymous with the "giving" or

       The Wisconsin Constitution uses substantially the same
       3

language. See Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1) ("No person . . . may
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself or herself.").

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"furnishing" of evidence as phrased in many state constitutions.

Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring).

    ¶61    In sum, although scholars debate the precise weight

different historical practices may have had in forming their

convictions,     the   general     consensus         is   that      the   people    who

adopted our Constitution had in mind the inquisitorial practices

of the ecclesiastical and prerogative courts along with their

forerunners.      Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S 422, 446 (1956)

(Douglas, J., dissenting); Flint Water Cases, 53 F.4th at 215

(Thapar,   J.,    concurring      in       part);    Sharon    R.      Gromer,     Fifth

Amendment——The      Right    to        a    no      "Adverse     Inference"         Jury

Instruction, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1307, 1307-08 (1981).

Moreover, they believed that this kind of violation of the basic

rights of mankind should be protected against, and did so in

their constitutions.

    ¶62    The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth

Amendment, therefore, invokes the pre-existing God-given right

of all persons to not be compelled to be a witness against
themselves.      The word "compelled" at the time the amendment was

ratified   meant    forced   or    constrained.            Compelled,        New    and

Complete Dictionary of the English Language (Edward & Charles

Dilly, eds. 1775).       And the amendment gives this protection to

all persons "in any criminal case."                 U.S. Const. amend. V.           The

text of the amendment does not say anything about what a jury

might permissibly infer from a failure to testify, or whether

attorneys may comment upon the failure to testify.                        And as the
next part of the story reveals, our founders would not have had

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the testimony of criminal defendants in mind when enshrining the

right against self-incrimination in the Constitution.

               C.     The Common Law Rule of Disqualification

      ¶63      During the Founding Era, common law rules disqualified

criminal     defendants           from        testifying        under     oath     in    their      own

trials.        Ferguson          v.      Georgia,        365    U.S. 570,         573-74     (1961).

While     this       may      seem        foreign         to     us     today,      the      central

justification for this rule at the time was that a party to a

case could not be trusted.                     Id. at 573.            The theory was that the

witness stand should be open only to "those presumably honest,

appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by

the result, and free from any of the temptations of interest."

Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892).

      ¶64      To be sure, defendants still often spoke at trial.

But   they     did      so    pro        se    in   their       own     defense     since         legal

representation          for      the     accused         was    uncommon     (and       in   earlier

times, not even permitted).                     John Henry Wigmore, Treatise on the
System    of     Evidence         in      Trials     at        Common    Law:     Including        the

Statutes     and      Judicial           Decisions        of    All     Jurisdictions         of    the

United States 697 (1904).                      Thus, defendants often had to argue

their    own     case      and      on    occasion        give     their     account         of    what

happened.       Id.     But their unsworn statements were not considered

testimony, and therefore were not viewed as evidence for the

jury to consider.             Id.

      ¶65      Moreover, the historical record supports the notion
that juries could draw adverse inferences from a defendant's

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silence even though his statements weren't technically evidence.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 333-34 (1999) (Scalia,

J., dissenting).                If a defendant did not defend himself, the

assumption was "that could only be because he was unable to deny

the truth of the evidence."                      Id. at 334 (quoting J. Beattie,

Crime     and    the      Courts      in    England:      1660–1800        348–349          (1986)).

Fact finders "did not hesitate to draw inferences of guilt when

defendants remained silent."                     Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar

Privilege       in     Historical           Perspective:            The   Right        to    Remain

Silent, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2625, 2631 (1996).

      ¶66       Some evidence also suggests that a defendant's silence

was   directly        commented        upon.        A    typical     process          was    that   a

magistrate       would          examine     a   defendant       pre-trial,         getting      the

defendant's          story.4          And   while       the   defendant         was    unable       to

testify     himself,            the   magistrate        could    and      would       report    the

defendant's answers to the jury as testimonial evidence.                                       John

H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal Procedure:

the   Sixteenth           to    the   Eighteenth         Centuries,       in     The    Privilege
Against     Self–Incrimination:                  Its     Origins      and       Development         92

(1997).         If    a    defendant        refused      to   answer      the     magistrate's

questions, the magistrate would report as much to the jury.                                     Id.

Therefore, in this way, a defendant's decision not to answer

questions       would          be   commented    on      to   the    jury,       with       negative

inferences from that front and center.

      4This process was dictated by the Marian Committal Statute.
John H. Langbein, The Privilege and Common Law Criminal
Procedure:   The Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, in The
Privilege   Against   Self–Incrimination:     Its   Origins   and
Development 91-92 (1997).
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                                                                         No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

       ¶67    When    the        Fifth     Amendment          was   adopted,        the    rule

disqualifying         parties        from        testifying——including                  criminal

defendants——was ubiquitous.                 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 574; Richard

A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97

Mich. L. Rev. 1063, 1113 (1999).                           Thus, the historical record

strongly weighs against any notion that the Fifth Amendment at

the time of its adoption was meant to prohibit comment upon or

adverse inferences regarding the failure of a criminal defendant

to testify in his trial——because that kind of testimony did not

happen,      and    comment       upon    and    inferences         from       a   defendant's

refusal to defend himself was commonplace.

       D.    Abolition of the Common Law Rule of Disqualification

       ¶68    This approach to criminal prosecutions, however, did

not    hold.         By    the    turn     of        the    nineteenth         century,    some

dissenters began to voice concern with the status quo.                                     John

Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth:                         The Constitutionalization of

American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 Tex. L. Rev.
825, 864 (1999).           In 1805, a passionate Philadelphian circulated

a pamphlet calling the practice of disqualifying parties from

testifying (including criminal defendants) the "prodigious evil

of our jurisprudence."              Id.     Serious public debate about these

rules began to take place in the 1830s, starting in England.

Id.;    Ferguson,         365    U.S. at    575.            Englishman         Jeremy   Bentham

assailed      the    practice       of    excluding          a   party    from      testifying

because, he argued, it effectively excluded truth.                                 Witt, supra
at 863-64.         He insisted that evidence "is the basis of justice;

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                                                                No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

exclude evidence, you exclude justice."                     Id. (quoting 5 Jeremy

Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 1 (London, Hunt & Clarke

1827)).        Bentham's arguments caught on across the Atlantic, with

American contemporaries similarly maintaining that exclusion of

relevant witnesses "obstructed the 'discovery of the truth.'"

Id.       at   865   (quoting        another     source);     id. at    864    n.    147

(collecting sources).

      ¶69      By the dawn of the Civil War, the stage was set for

change.        Maine led the way in 1859 by permitting defendants to

testify in some circumstances.                 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577.           When

the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, nine states had

followed       suit.5        Mitchell,    526     U.S at    335-36      (Scalia,    J.,

dissenting).            In   1869,     Wisconsin     joined     in     and    qualified

defendants for all trials.              § 1, ch. 72, Laws of 1869.             And the

federal government passed its own qualification statute in 1878.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3481.             By the end of the nineteenth century,

      5The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Fourteenth Amendment as rendering the Fifth Amendment applicable
against the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964).
Thus, some scholars believe that the period surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment should also be examined
when a state action is challenged.    See, e.g., New York State
Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2138
(2022) (describing the debate). Here, the evidence from either
time period cuts the same way. By the time Congress adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, only nine states qualified
defendants to testify. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314,
335-36 & n.1 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).    Of those nine,
six prohibited adverse inferences while three didn't.     Id. at
335-36. Thus, since so few states prohibited adverse inferences
in 1868, it cannot "reasonably be argued that the new statutes
somehow created a 'revised' understanding of the Fifth Amendment
that was incorporated into . . . the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 335.

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nearly every state made provision for criminal defendants to

testify in their own defense.                   See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577 &

n.6.

       ¶70     This change naturally led to new policy debates.                           If a

defendant could testify, how should prosecutors and juries be

permitted to characterize this decision?                         Id. at 579-80; Gromer,

supra     at    1308.      The        answer        was    not    uniform.          But   many

jurisdictions enacted laws along the lines of that adopted by

the     federal       government          in   1878,        which       provided     that    a

defendant's          "failure        to    [testify]        shall       not      create     any

presumption against him."                 18 U.S.C. § 3481.

       ¶71     In 1893, the United States Supreme Court was asked

whether a prosecutor's reference to a defendant's failure to

testify violated the no-presumption proscription in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3481.        In Wilson v. United States, the Court said yes.                              149

U.S. 60,       66-67    (1893).           It   reasoned          that    the    prosecutor's

comment induced the jury "to disregard entirely the presumption

of innocence to which by the law he was entitled."                                Id. at 66.
The thinking reflected in Wilson——rooted in a mix of statutory

and    common    law——began          to   proliferate        around      the    country     and

embed itself into American law over the next half century.                                  See

J.     Evans,    Comment        or    Argument        by    Court       or     Counsel    that

Prosecution Evidence is Uncontradicted as Amounting to Improper

Reference       to    Accused's       Failure       to     Testify,      14    A.L.R.3d     723

(originally published in 1967) (collecting pre-Griffin cases).

       ¶72     With time, courts built out analytical frameworks for
how to analyze whether a prosecutor actually commented on a

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                                                 No.   2020AP1876-CR.bh

defendant's failure to testify.     The most well-known and oft-

cited of these cases is the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Morrison

v. United States, which is discussed extensively in the court's

opinion today.   6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925).      In Morrison, the

court was asked to interpret and apply the same federal law

interpreted in Wilson (18 U.S.C. § 3481).        Id. at 811.       The

Eighth Circuit framed the following test for analyzing whether a

prosecutor crossed over the line:     whether "the language used

manifestly intended to be, or was it of such character that the

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on

the failure of the accused to testify?"   Id.

    ¶73   It is important to emphasize that even well into the

twentieth century, however, not every jurisdiction adopted this

approach or even forbade comments on an accused's silence.         For

example, in 1934, California adopted a constitutional provision

that made entirely the opposite policy choice:

    No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal
    case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived
    of life, liberty, or property without due process of
    law; but in any criminal case, whether the defendant
    testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by
    his testimony any evidence or facts in the case
    against him may be commented upon by the court and by
    counsel, and may be considered by the court or the
    jury.
Cal. Const. art. I, § 13 (1938); see 1934 Enacted Proposition 5

(amending Art. I, § 13 of the California Constitution).

    ¶74   Therefore, before the United States Supreme Court's

decision in Griffin in 1965, most jurisdictions, including the
federal government, had a legal framework rooted in statutes and

cases that protected defendants from comments upon or adverse
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                                                                  No.   2020AP1876-CR.bh

inferences      based        on   a   criminal     defendant's    decision        not    to

testify.       But this was not a universally shared approach.

                             D.   Griffin & Its Aftermath

       ¶75    After     initially       rejecting     the    incorporation        of    the

Self-Incrimination Clause via the Fourteenth Amendment in 1908,6

the Supreme Court reversed course in 1964.7                      That paved the way

for Griffin, decided the very next year.                     In Griffin, the State

of California tried the defendant for first degree murder.                              380

U.S. at 609.          When the trial court instructed the jury on the

issue of guilt, it told them that they could infer guilt from

the    defendant's       failure       to     testify.      Id. at      609-10.         The

prosecutor made hay, telling the jury that the defendant "has

not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain."                              Id. at

611.       The jury convicted the defendant and he appealed.                  Id.

       ¶76    The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the

Wilson decision——which forbade comment by the prosecution on a

defendant's failure to take the stand——"rested not on the Fifth
Amendment, but on an Act of Congress, now 18 U.S.C. [§] 3481."

Id. at      612.       But    the     court    nonetheless    concluded      that       the

"comment       rule"    approved        by     California     violated     the     Fifth

Amendment.         Id. at 613.

       ¶77    The Court quoted the following excerpt from Wilson,

which described the reasoning behind 18 U.S.C. § 3481:

       6   Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
       7   Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11.

                                              17
                                                                          No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

       [T]he act was framed with a due regard also to those
       who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of
       innocence which the law gives to everyone . . . . The
       statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who
       from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a
       witness . . . declares that the failure of a defendant
       in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall
       not create any presumption against him.
Id. at       613        (quoting       Wilson,       149     U.S. at       66).           Griffin

extrapolated            that      if     "the     words          'fifth     Amendment'         are

substituted for 'act' and for 'statute' the spirit of the Self-

Incrimination            Clause     is     reflected"       because       "comment        on   the
refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of

criminal justice.'"               Id. at 613-14.           Accordingly, the Court held

that     the     Fifth         Amendment       forbids      "either        comment        by   the

prosecution         on    the     accused's      silence         or    instructions       by   the

court that such silence is evidence of guilt."                            Id. at 615.

       ¶78     This      constitutional          rule      has    not     been       without   its

critics.           In    Mitchell,       the    Supreme      Court       was    asked     whether

Griffin        prohibits        a      trial    court      from        drawing       an   adverse

inference        from      a     defendant's         silence          during     a    sentencing

hearing.        Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 316-17, 327-28.                           The Court said

it did.         Id. at 328-29.              Justice Scalia dissented, observing

that "Griffin is out of sync with the historical understanding

of the Fifth Amendment."                   Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

However, he cautioned that he would not overrule Griffin because

of the rule's widespread acceptance.                        Id.       Justice Thomas agreed

with   Justice          Scalia      that    Griffin        lacked      "foundation        in   the

Constitution's text, history, or logic."                               Id. at 341 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).               But he wrote that he would reconsider Griffin

in the appropriate case.                 Id. at 343.
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                                                                             No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

       ¶79    Critiques aside, much of the application of Griffin

has been left to lower courts.                   If a prosecutor made an explicit

comment about the defendant's failure to testify, then a court

easily found a Griffin violation.                    But what if a prosecutor made

an    indirect       or   implicit      comment?           This        gave        "lower   federal

courts problems."            Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 (6th Cir.

1982) (en banc).             All lower federal courts——and most states——

eventually responded by adopting the test created by the Eighth

Circuit in       Morrison.           Id. at 1170 & n.6 (collecting cases);

Moore    v.     State,    669    N.E.2d 733,             738    (Ind.        1996)     (collecting

cases).       Even though Morrison was premised on interpretation of

the   federal        statute,    Griffin       has        been       understood        as     largely

incorporating         this     preexisting          body        of     law      into    the    Fifth

Amendment.

                                E.    Historical Summary

       ¶80    The     bottom         line   is      this.              Griffin         holds     that

commenting on a criminal defendant's failure to testify violates
the     Fifth    Amendment.            There        is    precious           little      evidence,

however,      that    the    original       meaning        of        the     Self-Incrimination

Clause of the Fifth Amendment extends this far.                                     The text does

not say this, and the history does not bear this out.                                       Rather,

Griffin appears aimed at fulfilling the "spirit" of the Fifth

Amendment       by    adding     an     additional             layer       of   protection       for

defendants above and beyond the text.                          It enshrines the right to

remain silent enumerated in the text, and functionally prohibits

                                               19
                                                                No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

improper     inferences       against     defendants       who        exercise       this

constitutional right.

                II.   ORIGINAL MEANING & BINDING PRECEDENT

     ¶81    In this case, our obligation as a lower court is to

faithfully apply United States Supreme Court precedent.                           State

v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142;

United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 1001 (11th Cir. 2019)

(en banc).      But Hoyle asks us to protect defendants even further

by applying Griffin in a more robust way to cover the comments

made by the prosecutor here.              I do not believe Griffin or its

progeny require us to do so for the reasons explained in the

majority opinion, and I therefore join it.                      But the original

meaning and historical record provide additional support for the

decision not to extend Griffin further.

     ¶82    Justice Thomas has remarked that when there is little

evidence suggesting a legal doctrine is grounded in the original

meaning of the Constitution, "the Court should tread carefully
before     extending    our     precedents."            Garza     v.     Idaho,       139

S. Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas, dissenting).                      I agree.           When

faced    with     the     choice     to        extend    precedent         in     these

circumstances, we should "resolve questions about the scope of

those    precedents     in   light   of    and     in   the     direction       of    the

constitutional text and constitutional history."                         Free Enter.

Fund, 537 F.3d at 698 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).8

     8 See also Josh Blackman, Originalism and Stare Decisis in
the Lower Courts, 13 NYU J. L. & Liberty 44 (2019).

                                          20
                                                              No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

      ¶83    The dissent rejects this approach, largely because it

rejects originalism as a methodology.                Several reasons underlie

its     objections.       First,      the     dissent     proclaims    originalism

insufficiently determinate.             In the dissent's view, originalism

wrongly     "assumes     that    each       constitutional     provision       had   a

single,     accepted     original       understanding."             Dissent,     ¶106

(quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse Than Nothing:                      The Dangerous

Fallacy of Originalism 56 (2022)).                  And in a case like this,

reasonable judges will disagree about what constitutes extending

precedent and what constitutes faithfully applying it.                           Id.,

¶105.       Therefore,    my    approach,      as   the    dissent    sees   it,     is

susceptible to judges using originalism selectively to achieve

their     preferred    results.          Second,     the    dissent     says     that

originalism     will     lead    to     unacceptable       results,    potentially

undermining certain currently-accepted constitutional principles

it thinks should not be up for debate.                  Id., ¶106.    Finally, the

dissent suggests the original meaning is just one tool among

many in the task of interpreting legal texts.                 Id., ¶109.
      ¶84    I will not endeavor in this concurrence to provide a

comprehensive response to these arguments, but I offer several

brief points.     First, in the abstract, the dissent is not wrong

that originalism fails to give clear answers to every question,

and is therefore vulnerable to manipulation.                  But originalism is

not preferable simply for its clarity or ability to restrain

judges (although in the main I believe it offers these virtues

as well).      The foremost reason judges must discern and follow
the original meaning is because a written constitution is the

                                         21
                                                                   No.       2020AP1876-CR.bh

law, and all written laws should be construed to mean what they

meant when they were written.                 District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)

1, 188 (1824); Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020

WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35; State v. Roundtree,

2021 WI 1, ¶112, 395 Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765 (Hagedorn, J.,

dissenting).          Originalism,        like      textualism,        flows      from    the

conviction that the text is the law, and our obligation is to be

faithful to the meaning of the text.                      Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶28;

State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis. 1849).

       ¶85    It is true that other considerations may impact how we

decide cases.         Precedent, for example, has an important role to

play   in    disputes       over   legal      issues      that    have       already     been

decided.         It    is     also     true        that    sometimes          fidelity    to

constitutional         commands       calls        for     judicial          judgment——for

example, upholding the right of the people against "unreasonable

searches and seizures."              See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wis. Const.

art. I, § 11.         The dissent's objections on these grounds mistake
originalism as a methodology for discerning the meaning of the

Constitution     with       originalism       as    the    only   component        of    case

adjudication.         The divergent approaches of Justice Scalia and

Justice      Thomas    on   how    they    would      respond     to     a    hypothetical

request to overrule Griffin are a prime example of this.

       ¶86    Yes, constitutional language can be hard to interpret

in the first instance, and even harder to apply in practice.

                                           22
                                                             No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

The same is true for statutes.9                But difficult cases do not

change    our    obligation    or   goal.      A   textual   puzzle       is    not   a

license to impose our own take on what the law should be.                           Our

job when facing an unclear law is still to get as close as we

can to what the text actually means.               The dissent points to the

competing history-filled opinions in Heller as a reason to doubt

the   utility     of   originalism.          Dissent,   ¶106       n.4.        On   the

contrary, Heller is a fine example of what judges should do when

confronted with a hard-to-understand law:                 comb the evidence,

debate it, and try to get it right.                  Smart judges doing this

well will disagree sometimes.           That's okay.     Indeterminacy is an

inherent feature of law written by people.               Thus, the dissent's

criticism "isn't an attack against originalism so much as it is

an attack on written law."           Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If You Can

Keep It 113 (2019).            And yes, some judges may exploit legal

uncertainty or be inconsistent in their professed methodology.

But   the       judiciary     is    filled    with    imperfect       people        who

nonetheless swear an oath to faithfully read and apply the law
impartially in every case.             The fallibility of judges is the

price we must pay for an independent judiciary.                      This reality

says nothing about how judges should endeavor to carry out their

      9 See e.g., Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI 63, ¶¶9-22, 403
Wis. 2d 424, 977 N.W.2d 390 (interpreting the meaning of
"reasonable and necessary" in Wis. Stat. § 252.03); Friends of
Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶¶13-25, 403
Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263 (lead op.) (interpreting the meaning
of "prevails in whole or in substantial part" in Wis. Stat.
§ 19.37(2)(a)); State v. Perez, 2001 WI 79, ¶¶15-60, 244
Wis. 2d 582, 628 N.W.2d 820 (interpreting the meaning of "a
crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon" in Wis. Stat.
§ 968.20(1m)(b)).

                                        23
                                                                  No.    2020AP1876-CR.bh

responsibility to say what the law is, not what they wish the

law to be.

      ¶87      Finally, the dissent fails to offer a competing vision

for how to read the law accurately.                  Rather, the dissent lists a

series    of    legal    tools   judges     can      consider:          text,   history,

precedent, context, historical practice and tradition, and the

"need to balance 'the majority's values against the values that

should be protected from society's majorities.'"                         Dissent, ¶109

(quoting Chemerinsky, supra at 207).                 What the dissent misses is

the end goal of these legal tools.                   They are not an a la carte

menu from which judges can cherry-pick their preferred legal

rationale.          Rather,        legal    evidence        and         authority    are

legitimately and appropriately deployed when used in service of

getting     the    law    right.       Several        of   these——text,         history,

context, historical practice, and even some precedent——can be

relevant to discerning the original meaning of the Constitution.

But where the meaning of the law comes into view, as it usually

does even in hard cases, we do not have a license to override it
by   balancing     competing       values       or   any   other    outcome-focused

concern.

      ¶88      At the end of the day, the dissent's method of picking

the legal tools you like——what the text meant when written being

merely one data point to consider——is a subtle invitation for

judges to decide what the Constitution should mean, rather than

to keep the focus on what it does mean.                    This must not be.         Our

founders did not establish a system of government where judges
in our highest courts are unconstrained by the meaning of the

                                           24
                                                                        No.   2020AP1876-CR.bh

law the people have enacted, free to import their own values

into    the       Constitution.             Originalism          may    not   answer      every

question.         Originalist judges may not always be consistent.                          But

we can be sure of this:                    A choose-your-own-adventure judicial

methodology poses an even greater danger because it offers no

rubric to grade one's fidelity to the law.

       ¶89    As        I    see   it,     where     United       States      Supreme     Court

precedent is on point, we must apply it faithfully.                                But where

we are asked to extend the logic of precedent into new areas,

the original meaning ought to serve as the North Star toward

which     unresolved           questions        regarding         the    scope     of     those

precedents should aim.                  In this case, I believe Griffin does not

prohibit the prosecutor's comments.                        Furthermore, not extending

Griffin      to    this       factual     scenario        appropriately       resolves     this

case    in        the       direction      of   the        original      meaning     of     the

constitutional              text   as    best   as    I    can    discern.        For     these

reasons, I respectfully concur.

       ¶90    I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY joins this concurrence.

                                                25
                                                                 No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

       ¶91     REBECCA FRANK DALLET,            J.     (dissenting).          The Fifth

Amendment      provides    that     no    one    "shall    be    compelled       in   any

criminal case to be a witness against himself."                        U.S. Const. am.

V.     For that constitutional privilege to be meaningful, it must

also prohibit the prosecutor or the court from telling the jury

that the defendant's decision not to testify is evidence of

guilt.       See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).

Otherwise, such direct commentary on the defendant's exercise of

his constitutional rights would "cut[] down on the privilege by

making its assertion costly" and allow the prosecution or the

court to penalize the defendant for holding the government to

its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.                          See id.

at 613-14.

       ¶92     But a defendant can also be penalized by an indirect

comment on the failure to testify.                    That is because an oblique

reference to the defendant's decision not to take the stand

might nevertheless invite the jury to draw the natural, but
impermissible          inference         that        the   defendant's           silence

demonstrates guilt.           See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 345

(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even if jurors try faithfully

to obey their instructions, the connection between silence and

guilt is often too direct and too natural to be resisted.").

For that reason, federal and state courts across the country

have    held    that   even    an   indirect         comment    on     the   defendant's

decision not to testify violates the Fifth Amendment if it is
"manifestly intended to be or [is] of such a character that the

                                           1
                                                                     No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on

the failure of the accused to testify."                       See Butler v. Rose, 686

F.2d   1163,     1170     (6th       Cir.    1982)    (en   banc);     see    also    United

States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 1996) ("We have

repeatedly recognized that indirect commentary on a defendant's

failure to take the stand can also constitute a violation of the

defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify."); State

v.    Johnson,      121   Wis. 2d 237,         248,     358     N.W.2d 824       (Ct.    App.

1984).

       ¶93    One    type       of     indirect       comment     that       juries     would

"naturally and necessarily" understand as a reference to the

decision not to testify occurs when the prosecutor repeatedly

characterizes evidence as "undisputed" or "uncontradicted" and

the    only   person      who    could       reasonably       have   contradicted        that

evidence is the defendant.                  See, e.g., Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d

1252, 1254-55, 1261 (7th Cir. 1992) (repeated statements that

evidence only the defendant could dispute was "unrebutted" and

"uncontradicted" violated the Fifth Amendment); Lent v. Wells,
861 F.2d 972, 974-77 (6th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor's comments in a

sexual assault case that evidence only the defendant could rebut

was "uncontradicted," and "unrebutted" were improper commentary

on the defendant's decision not to testify).                               Statements like

these "naturally and necessarily" refer to the decision not to

testify because they "'can only cause the jury to naturally look

to    the    only   other    evidence         there    is——the       defendant.'"         See

United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987)).

                                               2
                                                                           No.      2020AP1876-CR.rfd

       ¶94        Applying these cases, it is clear that the prosecutor

violated          Hoyle's         Fifth           Amendment        rights        by        repeatedly

characterizing             as   "uncontroverted"             evidence       only       Hoyle       could

dispute.           Hoyle        was    prosecuted         for      a    sexual       assault       that

occurred when he and the victim were alone in a car on a dead-

end road in a rural area.                         There was no physical evidence, and

accordingly, just Hoyle and the victim could have testified to

what happened in that car.                        And because the jury heard only from

the     victim,        her       testimony          about       the     sexual        assault       was

uncontroverted.

       ¶95        Rather than focusing solely on the credibility of the

victim's          testimony,          the    prosecutor         made     the     fact       that    her

statements          were        uncontroverted            the    theme         of     his     closing

argument.             In   fact,       this       theme    was     so    important          that    the

prosecutor asked the circuit court to rule before trial that it

was    permissible.1              In        his    closing      argument,        the       prosecutor

hammered        his    point      relentlessly,           repeatedly        telling         the     jury

that the victim's testimony was uncontroverted.                                       In just nine
pages      of     transcript,          he    described       the       victim's       testimony      as

uncontroverted four times, and twice told the jury there was "no

evidence disputing" her account.                          On rebuttal, he returned to

that       same    theme,       telling       the     jury      "[y]ou     need       to    make    the

decision based on the uncontroverted testimony of what she says

       In support of his motion, the prosecutor stated "I can't
       1

say [the evidence] is uncontroverted because the defendant
didn't   testify,  but  I   can  say  that   her  testimony  is
uncontroverted and that [the jury] ha[sn't] heard any testimony
to the contrary." The circuit court granted the motion.

                                                     3
                                                                  No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

occurred.            They     [the        defense]        don't         disagree     it's

uncontroverted."        But only Hoyle could have controverted the

victim's testimony about what happened in his car that day.                            And

for that reason, the jury would naturally and necessarily have

taken the prosecutor's repeated characterization of the victim's

testimony as "uncontroverted" as a comment on Hoyle's decision

to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial.

See Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Only

[the defendant] could possibly have rebutted both [the victim's]

version of what happened after he pulled his car over . . . and

her testimony that she did not consent.").

    ¶96     According       to    the     majority,       that    is    not   enough    to

establish a Fifth Amendment violation, since the prosecutor's

comments weren't "adverse" to Hoyle.                      See majority op., ¶38,

n.11.     In   other        words,      the   prosecutor         did    not   "ask[]    or

intimate[] that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as an

admission of guilt."             Id.    The majority cites no authority for

the supposed requirement, but it appears to be drawing on State
v. Jaimes, 2006 WI App 93, ¶22, 292 Wis. 2d 656, 715 N.W.2d 669,

which said that a "comment must propose that the failure to

testify   demonstrates           guilt"    in     order    to    violate      the   Fifth

Amendment.     Id.     The problem is that none of the other federal

cases discussed earlier contain such a requirement, and the case

Jaimes cites as support, United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25,

                                              4
                                                                             No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

34 (1988), doesn't say that either.2                                That makes sense.          "Given

the prosecutor's institutional role, when the prosecutor merely

'comments'            on    the    failure          of       an    accused    to     testify,    the

reference is in all likelihood calculated to encourage the jury

to equate silence with guilt."                              United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d

1522, 1534 (11th Cir. 1989).                         And that is especially true when

the    comment             references        the     defendant's         failure       to    dispute

evidence that only he could rebut.                                Indeed, I can't imagine how

such       a    comment      could      be    taken          as   anything    but    "adverse"     or

"intimat[ing] that the jury should interpret Hoyle's silence as

an admission of guilt."                  See majority op., ¶38 n.11.

       ¶97          Setting aside the majority's supposed requirement that

the    prosecutor's               comments         be       "adverse,"       it     concedes    that

repeatedly           calling      evidence         only       the    defendant      could     dispute

"uncontroverted"              violates        the       Fifth      Amendment.        See     majority

op., ¶37.            Nevertheless, the majority asserts that Hoyle's Fifth

Amendment rights weren't violated here because "other evidence

might exist that would controvert the State's witnesses."                                         See
id.            In   support,      the    majority             points   to    defense        counsel's

statements in his closing argument about hypothetical evidence

the police did not gather, namely statements from the victim's

family members that they did not interview, physical evidence

       Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 338 (1978) does suggest
       2

that Griffin is "concerned only with adverse comment" on the
defendant's decision not to testify. Nevertheless, Lakeside is
distinguishable because it dealt with an instruction to the jury
that it could not infer guilt from the defendant's failure to
testify.   See id.    By contrast, the prosecutor's comments in
this case drew negative attention to Hoyle's decision not to
testify.

                                                        5
                                                                       No.   2020AP1876-CR.rfd

they did not collect, and surveillance footage from the place

where the victim was dropped off after the assault that they did

not obtain.       See id.          But the prosecutor's refrain throughout

his   closing    argument         was    that       the   victim's       account         of    what

happened in Hoyle's car was undisputed.                            None of this other

evidence,    even      if    it    existed,         could    have       contradicted          that

account——only Hoyle could have done so.                          See Freeman, 962 F.2d

at 1261 ("The only witness to this crime who was available to

testify was [the victim], who identified [the defendant] as his

assailant.            Realistically,            the       only      person         who        could

satisfactorily         rebut       this        testimony         was     [the       defendant]

himself." (citing Williams, 826 F.2d at 665)).                               Moreover, "[a]

speculative     possibility             that    some      third        party       could      have

testified for the defense is not enough" to demonstrate that

someone "'other than the defendant could rebut the evidence.'"

United   States       v.    Tanner,      628    F.3d      890,    899    (7th      Cir.       2010)

(quoting Freeman, 962             F.2d    at    1260).       Despite         the    majority's

speculation about other possible evidence, the jury knew that
only the victim and Hoyle could testify as to what happened in

his   car.      For    that       reason,      repeatedly        calling       the    victim's

testimony uncontroverted "impermissibly focus[ed] attention on

the defendant's decision not to testify," and violated Hoyle's

Fifth Amendment rights.             See Freeman, 962 F.2d at 1260; see also

Commonwealth v. Robertson, 431 S.W.3d 430, 437 (Ky. Ct. App.

2013) (concluding that comments in closing argument about the

victims' "un-refuted" testimony were improper where "only one

                                                6
                                                            No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

person     possessed      the   knowledge       to    conclusively       rebut     the

testimony of the [victims]," the defendant).

    ¶98     The      majority's        alternative        argument——that            the

prosecutor's       comments     were   simply        references    to     the      jury

instructions, which properly told jurors to evaluate only the

evidence in reaching its verdict——is similarly unavailing.                          See

majority    op.,    ¶¶34-36.      To    begin    with,    only     a    few   of    the

prosecutor's comments can fairly be read as references to the

jury instructions, rather than Hoyle's decision not to testify.

Before   closing     arguments    began,      the     circuit    court    correctly

instructed the jury that its job was to weigh the evidence,

including the credibility of witnesses, and not to engage in

speculation or to consider "in any manner" Hoyle's decision not

to testify.        And the prosecutor began his closing argument by

referring back to those same instructions, noting that the jury

was "supposed to just focus on what you heard yesterday with the

testimony.         [The    victim's]    testimony        that     she    gave      here

yesterday is uncontroverted."                Likewise, after summarizing the
victim's testimony, the prosecutor again returned to the jury

instructions, reminding jurors "[y]ou are not to sit there and

say, what if I had this information, what if this was different,

what if that was different?             You're not to speculate . . . .

You're to focus on what you heard yesterday . . . about how [the

victim] was assaulted by this defendant."                If the prosecutor had

stopped there, I might agree with the majority that his comments

did not cross the line.          After all, the majority is right that
there is no categorical prohibition on characterizing evidence

                                         7
                                                                      No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

as uncontroverted, especially in the context of reminding jurors

that their verdict must be based on the evidence presented at

trial and not on speculation.                   See id., ¶31

      ¶99    But the prosecutor didn't stop there, or merely "lean

on the jury instructions."                   Id., ¶35.        Instead, he all but told

the   jury   that     it        had    to    convict     Hoyle     because     "[t]here       is

absolutely no evidence disputing" the victim's account of the

sexual assault.            The prosecutor emphasized that the victim's

statements      to        law     enforcement          were       "uncontroverted,"          her

testimony    at    trial         was    "uncontroverted,"           the     jury   "heard     no

evidence disputing her account of that sexual assault,"                                    "You

heard nothing," and most troublingly, that they "didn't hear

from . . . anyone else testifying about" the assault.                                Then, on

rebuttal, he tied the victim's undisputed testimony even more

directly to the Hoyle's failure to testify, telling jurors that

the defense did not "disagree [that the victim's testimony was]

uncontroverted."            His        point,    which       he   reiterated       again     and

again, was that the victim's testimony about the sexual assault
was   uncontroverted,            not     that    the    jury      should     focus    on     the

evidence and the court's instructions.

      ¶100 As      many     other           courts    have    concluded,       the    more     a

prosecutor repeats statements like these, the more likely they

are to be perceived by the jury as comments on the defendant's

decision     not     to    testify.            See,    e.g.,      Rodriguez-Sandoval          v.

United   States,      409       F.2d     529,    531    (1st      Cir.    1969);     State    v.

McMurry, 143 P.3d 400, 404 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006); People v.
Johnson, 429 N.E.2d 905, 910-11 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981).                                And that

                                                 8
                                                                          No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

is    particularly          true    when,      as       here,   those     repeated        comments

occurred during a short closing argument and referred to the

defense directly.                Compare Rodriguez-Sandoval, 409 F.2d at 531

(describing        a    prosecutor's           five      references       to     uncontradicted

testimony in his closing argument as "extremely aggravated from

the quantitative standpoint"), with Webb v. Mitchell, 586 F.3d

383, 397 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that an isolated comment did

not    "establish           an   extensive       pattern        in      the     context    of    the

prosecutor's           summation,        which          spanned      ninety-four        pages.").

Accordingly, the jury in this case would not have perceived the

prosecutor's           statements         as     mere       commentary           on    the      jury

instructions or the evidence the jury should consider.                                    Rather,

the jury would "naturally and necessarily" understand them as a

repeated reminder that Hoyle——the only person who could have

disputed the victim's account of what happened——did not testify.

See Butler, 686 F.2d at 1170.

       ¶101 Additionally, the circuit court's decision to allow

these comments was not a harmless error.                              An error is harmless
if the State proves "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

complained     of       did      not    contribute         to     the    verdict      obtained."

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).                                    The State did

not argue that allowing the prosecutor's comments was harmless.

But    even   if       it    had,      such    an       argument     would      be    unavailing.

Although the evidence presented at trial was certainly enough to

support a guilty verdict, the prosecutor's repeated statements

might have led the jury to give the victim's testimony too much
weight or, worse yet, to treat Hoyle's decision not to testify

                                                    9
                                                               No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

as a reason to find him guilty.                   The State therefore cannot

demonstrate   beyond       a    reasonable      doubt   that    the    violation    of

Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights was harmless.                   See id.

    ¶102 In    sum,    a       faithful    application    of     Griffin     and   the

principles    it   announced       leads    to   just   one     conclusion:        The

prosecutor's comments violated Hoyle's Fifth Amendment rights.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶103 In closing, I want to address several points made by

the concurrence about the supposed original public meaning of

the Fifth Amendment and the role that meaning should play in

this case and others.             For starters, it's not clear what——if

anything——the history of the Fifth Amendment can tell us about

how its protections should apply today.                 If, as the concurrence

asserts, defendants were not permitted to testify at the time of

the founding,3 then of course the framers of the Fifth Amendment

weren't concerned with prosecutors commenting on the defendant's

failure to testify.            There would be no point in making such a

comment since all defendants were required to remain silent.
And for that reason, a jury obviously wouldn't draw any negative

inferences from a defendant's silence either.                        But our courts

have thankfully moved a long way from the practices of the Star

Chamber and its ex officio oath, and legislatures across the

country eliminated most prohibitions on defendants testifying

    3  State laws enacted shortly after the founding also
prohibited slaves or people of color from testifying at trial if
a white person was a party. See, e.g., Amanda Carlin, Comment,
The   Courtroom   As   White   Space:   Racial   Performance  As
Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 450, 454-58 (2016).

                                           10
                                                                     No.    2020AP1876-CR.rfd

more than a century ago.                   See concurrence, ¶¶57-74.                   Yet the

concurrence simply assumes that, because the Fifth Amendment was

adopted      in        a       radically     different         context       than       today,

contemporary courts must stand silent when prosecutors use a

defendant's decision not to testify against him.

      ¶104 I disagree.               Griffin and the cases addressing indirect

commentary        on       a    defendant's    decision        not     to     testify       all

recognize that comments suggesting that a defendant's silence is

indicative of guilt are the functional equivalent of compelling

a defendant to testify.                See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614-15;

Butler, 686 F.2d at 1170.                  Such comments penalize the defendant

for exercising his constitutional right to remain silent——little

different than the Star Chamber holding Lilburne in contempt for

his silence.           See concurrence, ¶56.              If the Fifth Amendment's

privilege against self-incrimination is to mean anything today,

it   must    protect           against     prosecutors     who    invite         the    jury——

directly or indirectly——to penalize the defendant for exercising

his constitutional right to remain silent.
      ¶105 More            fundamentally     though,     there       are    at    least     two

reasons to reject the concurrence's proposal that "when there is

little evidence suggesting a legal doctrine is grounded in the

original     meaning            of   the    Constitution,        '[we]       should      tread

carefully before extending [that] precedent[].'"                                 Concurrence

¶82 (quoting Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2019) (Thomas,

J., dissenting)).                First, we are bound by all United States

Supreme     Court          decisions——not      just      the    ones       any   individual
justice     feels      are      "grounded     in   the    original         meaning     of   the

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Constitution."       Concurrence, ¶82.          And although the concurrence

concedes this point, it fails to acknowledge that reasonable

judges    can      disagree     about     whether       a       particular        decision

"extends"    or    merely     faithfully      applies       existing      precedent       to

different facts or circumstances.              See United States v. Johnson,

921 F.3d 991, 1001 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) ("[W]e must apply

Supreme   Court     precedent     neither      narrowly         nor     liberally——only

faithfully.").       There is no objective test for deciding whether

or not we are "extending" a prior precedent.                             Accordingly, a

results-oriented judge could use the concurrence's approach to

distinguish existing precedent on superficial grounds, and then

decline to "extend" that precedent in order to achieve their

desired result.       See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic

Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 Wake Forest L. Rev.

617, 618 (2018) (describing the United States Supreme Court's

use of originalism as "opportunistic because sometimes the Court

relies on it, and sometimes it does not.").

    ¶106 Second,       but     more     importantly,        I    disagree         with   the
concurrence's       conclusion        that    constitutional             interpretation

should always be guided by the original public meaning of the

provision    at     issue.      "[T]he       search     for      'original        meaning'

assumes     that    each     constitutional       provision             had   a    single,

accepted original understanding."               See Erwin Chemerinsky, Worse

Than Nothing: The Dangerous Fallacy of Originalism 56 (2022).

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But in reality, that consensus often didn't exist.4                               See id.

Given that originalism bills itself as a determinate and value-

neutral          alternative     to         other     methods     of     constitutional

interpretation, this is a problem.                         See Frank B. Cross, The

Failed Promises of Originalism 13 (2013) ("The best functional

case       for    originalism        lies    in     its    claimed     objectivity     and

neutrality.")              Because    a     single,       objective    original    public

meaning      often    doesn't        exist,    originalism       cannot      deliver   the

objective answers that it promises, let alone constrain judges

who might want to decide cases in ways that fit with their

preferences.          See Chermerinsky, supra at 56-58.                      And in that

respect, originalism is no different than any other interpretive

methodology, only it allows its adherents to hide their lack of

constraints behind a false patina of objectivity.                         Worse yet, if

originalism is taken to its logical conclusion, it would result

in     the       radical     rejection         of     long-settled       constitutional

principles.         Indeed, one of the opinions the concurrence cites

argues       that    the    Sixth     Amendment's         guarantee     of   counsel    to
indigent criminal defendants is at odds with the Constitution's

original public meaning.               See Garza, 139 S. Ct. at 757 (Thomas,

J., dissenting).             That's not all though.               Brown v. Board of

       This point is illustrated by the United States Supreme
       4

Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008). Justice Scalia's majority opinion argued that the text
and history of the Second Amendment supported a constitutional
right to possess a gun for self-defense in the home. See id. at
595.    But Justice Stevens' dissent contended that text and
history supported the opposite result.         See id. at 640
(Stevens, J., dissenting).   In short, history is often in the
eye of the beholder.

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Education,5 same sex marriage, virtually all rights of women6 and

racial minorities, and any number of other fundamental rights

are    difficult,        if   not      impossible,             to    justify      on    originalist

grounds.       See Chemerinsky, supra at 92-114.                            As one scholar put

it,     "[t]he       only     kind         of    originalism              that    is    reasonably

determinate         leads       to     conclusions             that       practically      no     one

accepts.           But   less    determinate               forms     of    originalism      can    be

enlisted to support pretty much anything."                                    David A. Strauss,

Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1162 (2012).

       ¶107 The concurrence concedes that "originalism fails to

give       clear     answers         to     every          question,        and    is    therefore

vulnerable to manipulation," but nonetheless argues that we must

adopt it because "a written constitution is the law, and all

written laws should be construed to mean what they meant when

they were written."                  Concurrence, ¶84.                 But this argument for

originalism         is   circular.              It    simply        defines      "interpretation"

"as synonymous with originalist interpretation" and then uses

that definition as evidence that only originalist interpretation
is     permissible.             See       Andrew          B.   Coan,      The     Irrelevance      of

Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev.

       5   347 U.S. 483 (1954).

       Indeed, just last year, the United States Supreme Court
       6

concluded that "history and tradition" led to the "clear
answer . . . that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect the
right to an abortion."    Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.,
142 S. Ct. 2228, 2248 (2022). But as in Heller, the history on
which the majority relied is contested.        See id. at 2324
(Breyer,     Sotomayor,    and     Kagan,    JJ.,    dissenting)
("[E]mbarrassingly for the majority . . . early law in fact does
provide some support for abortion rights.").

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1025,     1030    (2010);    see      also    Cherminsky,        supra       at     26

("[A]rguments from definition aren't arguments at all; they do

not   defend     their   conclusion    but    assume    it.").         There      are,

however, any number of non-originalist ways of interpreting the

Constitution that nevertheless give effect to its text.                            See

Coan, supra at 1047 (identifying, for example, an approach that

treats the text as "one of many legitimate ingredients in a

pluralistic practice of constitutional adjudication.").                      Simply

observing that the Constitution was written down isn't enough to

demonstrate that originalism is required.

      ¶108 No matter our approach, however, it is important to

emphasize that constitutional interpretation is rarely as simple

as merely reading the words and applying them.                        Most of the

Constitution's     key   provisions,     like     the   guarantees      of   "equal

protection of the laws" and "due process," or the protections

against    "unreasonable     searches       and   seizures"      or   "cruel       and

unusual    punishment"      are    vague——and      deliberately        so.         See

generally U.S. Const. am. IV, V, VIII, XIV.                   In writing these
open-ended clauses, the Framers weren't trying to settle every

legal question that might arise under these provisions for all

time.7    They were instead trying to create a document that would

      7Moreover, even when the Constitution uses more precise
language, like the First Amendment's statement that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . .
or abridging the freedom of speech," it often doesn't mean what
it says. See U.S. Const. am. I. Nobody would say, for example,
that "[b]oth the President and the federal courts could abridge
the freedom of speech and prohibit the free exercise of
religion, because the First Amendment, by its terms, applies
only to 'Congress.'"   See David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the
Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015).

                                       15
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endure by "provid[ing] a political platform wide enough to allow

for considerable latitude within which future generations could

make    their    own    decisions."           Joseph     J.   Ellis,    The   Quartet:

Orchestrating the Second American Revolution, 1783-1789, at 219

(2015); see also Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 27 (2011)

("[C]onstitutional framers and ratifiers very often use open-

ended     language        that      deliberately         delegates     questions         of

application      to       future     interpreters.").             In   making       those

decisions, the Framers did not expect their views would govern

over those of future generations either.                      Indeed, James Madison

himself said that his notes from the Constitutional Convention

"could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the

Constitution."         Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution:

Is the Intent of the Framers Controlling? If Not, What Is?, 19

Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 9, 32 (1995) (quoting 5 Annals of Cong.

776     (1796)).            And     Thomas        Jefferson     cautioned         that   a

"sanctimonious         reverence"       for        the    Framers      was    akin       to

"requir[ing] a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when
a boy."    Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July

12,    1816),    in    10    Paul    Leicester        Ford,     Writings     of    Thomas

Jefferson 42-43 (1899).

       ¶109 In     sum,     constitutional         interpretation      nearly      always

requires more than merely construing the text "to mean what [it]

meant when [it] w[as] written."                   See concurrence, ¶84.       And that

is true whether one is an originalist or not.                           No method of

constitutional         interpretation        can      provide    objective,        value-
neutral decisions in all cases.                    But that doesn't mean that we

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are engaged in a "choose-your-own-adventure" exercise, deciding

cases based on what we think "the Constitution should mean,

rather than . . . what it does mean."              See concurrence, ¶88.        In

my view, interpreting the Constitution faithfully requires us to

read   its   text    and   history    carefully,     but    also     to   consider

precedent, context, historical practice and tradition, and the

need to balance "the majority's values against the values that

should be protected from society's majorities."                    Chemerinsky,

supra, at 207.       That, after all, is what the Constitution is all

about.

       ¶110 I   am   authorized      to    state   that    Justice    ANN    WALSH

BRADLEY joins this opinion.

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