Court Opinion

ID: 9668324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:09:36.504357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.606934
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe Deana offered legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that circumstantial evidence is no more than a scintilla of evidence if it gives rise to two equally consistent inferences and neither inference is more probable than the other. See Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 278 (Tex.1995). When the factfinder has before it conflicting evidence, however, it may resolve inconsistencies, believing all or any part of the testimony of any witness and disregarding all or any part of any witness’s testimony. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex.1993).
Although there are different inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in this ease, I do not believe they are equally consistent. Primarily, I disagree with the majority’s analysis regarding Blanca, Eduardo, and Monica taking down posters, which appellants testified was done to avoid embarrassment. The majority asserts appellants’ explanation is just as reasonable as the inference they took them down to delay Deana. Considering in isolation the evidence that appellants removed three of thousands of posters, each of which contained their home address, appellants’ explanation seems plausible, but in light of other evidence, it is not believable. First, when Blanca took down a poster, she simultaneously told Cal Evans that the poster was of her son, and that she did not want his picture up in a public place. Further, she told him he would not help “her,” presumably Deana, if he knew the truth and explained that he did not know about the child abuse. The jury also heard Warner’s deposition testimony, used for impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement, in which Warner testified that Blanca told her she was taking down a poster because Blanca did not appreciate her son being cast in “that role.” In addition, Eduardo admitted he told people at school that Junior took Bianca because she was abused. Finally, Blanca, Eduardo, and Monica each pleaded the Fifth Amendment in response to certain interrogatories, and Blanca invoked the Fifth Amendment at her deposition. All three refused to answer an interrogatory requesting plans to leave Texas as being speculative and having an improper time frame, but they left for Cancún, Mexico two days after filing this response.
Evidence easting doubt on an inference supporting one party’s position may make that inference less reasonable than an inference supporting the opposing party’s position. See, e.g., $9,050.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 874 S.W.2d 158, 162 (Tex.App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). I seriously question Blanca’s, Eduardo’s, and Monica’s motivation in tearing down posters in light of the above evidence, and, in fact, the evidence contradicts their stated explanation for doing so. As such, I think the inference that they tore down posters to avoid harassment is less reasonable than the inference that they did so to delay Deana and allows the jury to draw an inference in support of Deana’s position.
Furthermore, I do not believe the jury’s findings were based on “inference stacking,” which occurs when a jury draws an inference from circumstantial evidence and then, from that inference, draws another inference. Such “piling of inferences” is different than a cumulation of circumstantial evidence pointing toward a logical conclusion. See $9,050.00 in U.S. Currency, 874 S.W.2d at 162. The first is no evidence, Schlumberger *795Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex.1968); the second is not prohibited. In reviewing circumstantial evidence, we must look at the totality of the circumstances rather than considering each piece of evidence in isolation. See Felker v. Petrolon, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Here, the jury was not required to infer that appellants knew their actions would assist Junior from another inference arising from circumstantial evidence; rather, that inference can be drawn directly from the circumstantial evidence, and it is therefore competent evidence and is more than a scintilla of evidence. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry, 833 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
In conclusion, I would find that Deana presented sufficient proof that appellants Blanca, Eduardo, and Monica knew their actions would aid or assist Junior in Bianca’s abduction. Therefore, I would overrule appellants’ first and second points of error as to these appellants and affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding interference with Deana’s possessory rights.