Court Opinion

ID: 9844768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:08:40.741833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.623039
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
In no way do I fault the rationale of the majority opinion, but I see the picture under a different light. The Court’s opinion has the virtue of judicial integrity, because undoubtedly it will be wrongly interpreted as favoritism on behalf of the legal profession when contrasted with the Court’s pioneer decisions adopting discovery rules in medical malpractice cases. See, Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 244 (1964).
The choice facing the Court today is either to create a new discovery rule for legal negligence cases postured as is this one, or to defer to the legislative intent found in a statute which all agree does not apply to the present case. I would choose the former as the path which most “accords with our concept of justice and reason.” Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho at 840, 475 P.2d at 534. The weight of authority in recent years clearly inclines toward applying a discovery rule to acts of legal negligence which, by their very nature, are rarely discovered until after the applicable statutes have run. See, Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal.3d 176, 98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 419 P.2d 421 (1971); Edwards v. Ford, 279 So.2d 851 (Fla.1973); Kohler v. Woollen, Brown & Hawkins, 15 Ill.App.3d 455, 304 N.E.2d 677 (1973); Corley v. Logan, 35 Mich.App. 199, 192 N.W.2d 319 (1971); Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974).
The majority’s decision to defer to the legislative intent found in the 1971 amendment to I.C. § 5-219(4) is defensible as a matter of general judicial practice. It seems to me, however, to be inappropriate in light of the heightened scrutiny which this Court has recently leveled at a legislative enactment designed to relieve the medical community from its own alleged malpractice insurance crisis. Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
It should also be noted that in several of the cases cited above, legal malpractice has been analyzed along the lines of a theory of “constructive fraud” because of the fiduciary relationship involved. Such an analysis would bring into play the discovery rule exception created in I.C. § 5-219(4). The important point to be made is that the atmosphere of trust and confidence which is integral to the maintenance of a healthy professional-client relationship can exist only when the professional is willing to admit and pay for his mistakes. There are very few who are not willing. In this instance, it is all too likely that the legal profession alone will be given the credit for the 1971 amendment, notwithstanding the fact that the benefits therefrom are more likely to be realized by the various companies underwriting malpractice insurance for any number of professions, including the legal profession.