Court Opinion

ID: 9696288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:43:46.428291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:20.746145
License: Public Domain

Danhoe, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority on their interpretation of MCLA § 712A.23 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178 [598.23]). This statute provides:
“A disposition of any child under this chapter or any evidence given in such case, shall not in any civil, criminal or any other cause or proceeding whatever in any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such child for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent eases against the same child under this chapter.” (Emphasis added.)
*28On cross-examination the witness, Brudna, was asked, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime?” Earlier the defense attorney had established that the witness was 14 years old at the time of the offense and 15 years old at the time of the trial. Thus, defense counsel was aware that the only court in which the witness could have been convicted of anything was the juvenile court. A conviction is a disposition and hence barred by the statute.
The majority cites People v. Smallwood (1943), 306 Mich 49 as authority for their decision, but Smallivood is clearly distinguishable. In Small-wood the question asked was,
“Now, Cathleen, you have been in trouble with the juvenile authorities before?”
The Supreme Court stated (p 54):
“While we agree with the judge that the juvenile records are not admissible, the question asked did not refer to the ‘disposition of the child’ or any evidence given in the case. The question as framed was proper and it should not have been excluded.”
In the instant case the question asked did refer to the disposition of the child. I agree with the dissent of Chief Justice Boyles who said (pp 57, 58):
“A reading of Mr. Justice Butzel’s entire opinion leads to a fair inference that the real reason therein for reversal and granting a new trial is because the conviction was against the great weight of the evidence and that the motion for new trial should have been granted.”
Further, I agree with our Court when it said in People v. Luther (1969), 20 Mich App 42, 47:
“While Smallwood remains good law in its factual context, we do not choose to extend it to include *29blanket coverage of a defendant’s testimony for impeachment purposes.” (Emphasis added.)
The decision of the majority will prohibit the use of a juvenile’s record when he is a party litigant, but will allow it when he is a witness. When faced with this question many years ago, under a similar statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Kelly (1930), 169 La 753, 757 (126 So 49, 51) said:
“It would be strange, indeed, if the law made the proceedings had in the juvenile court, or the sentence to the Louisiana Training Institute, inadmissible against the once juvenile offender, whenever thereafter he took the witness stand in a case to which he was a party litigant, but permitted them to be admitted, to affect his credibility, in all cases in which he was not a party litigant. This, indeed, would be arbitrary legislation.
“Section 8 of the act of 1926, in our opinion, contemplates that an inquiry, to show one’s record as a juvenile offender, to affect his credibility as a witness, whether he be a party to the litigation or not, is a ‘proceeding affecting such person.’ ”
I have read the entire instructions of the trial court and believe that the judge fairly and accurately instructed on the law. Defendant having made no objections to the instructions at the trial cannot now raise them on appeal.
I would affirm.