Court Opinion

ID: 9666707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:26:04.335685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.332602
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with much of the lead opinion. I agree that the trial court erred in Jones by failing to advise the defendant of the dangers of self-representation as expressly required by People v Anderson, 398 Mich 361; 247 NW2d 857 (1976), and the unambiguous language of MCR 6.101(C)(3).1 I also agree that the trial court erred in Dennany by erroneously concluding that Dennanny’s waiver was not knowingly made. Accordingly, both defendants must have new trials.
*450I write separately, however, for three reasons: (1) to express my disagreement with the unnecessary interpretation of our constitution in part in of the lead opinion, (2) to point out the trap that the lead opinion creates for an unwary defendant, and (3) to voice my belief that strict compliance with the court rules will do more to reduce appeals than requiring anything less.
I
It is a well-established rule of construction that this Court will avoid interpreting our constitution when a case can be decided on an alternate basis. Lisee v Secretary of State, 388 Mich 32, 40; 199 NW2d 188 (1972). I cannot endorse part m of the lead opinion that interprets Const 1963, art 1, § 13, because that interpretation is unnecessary to decide these cases.
As the lead opinion correctly observes, established Michigan law requires that an assertion of the right of self-representation must be: (1) unequivocal; (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and, finally, (3) a defendant’s self-representation must not disrupt, burden, or unduly inconvenience the administration of the court’s business. Ante at 432. This test, coupled with the procedure outlined in the court rules, is all that this Court needs to decide these cases. Therefore, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the Michigan Constitution provides a "right” to standby counsel.
It is true that defendant Dennany urges this Court to establish that right. It is interesting to note, however, that he never asserted a right to standby counsel at trial. At trial, Dennany made the following request:
In reference to my request to have Mr. Mequio *451[defendant’s court-appointed attorney], another person available to advise me in this procedure, what’s intended isn’t a conditional request at all, but rather had to do with an expediency, if you will. . . .
That doesn’t have anything to do with my reluctance or lack of reluctance to represent myself, it’s absolutely essential, I say that unequivocally, it’s absolutely essential that I represent myself. But it is a convenience as it were, as much for the Court as for myself if there’s counsel available .... [Emphasis added.]
Thus, Dennany never asserted a "right” to have standby counsel. He merely observed that such counsel would be a benefit both to himself and the court in facilitating the trial. And with good reason, Dennany apparently realized that if he demanded standby counsel his assertion would be deemed "equivocal” and thus ineffective. The trial court recognized as much:
Mr. Dennany is saying it’s [his assertion of the right to represent himself] unequivocal, he wants to represent himself and he wants counsel here as a convenience. And then he uses his words very carefully, and it is not merely a difference in words without a substantive distinction. I think I take what Mr. Dennany is saying to me to be this:
"I unequivocally wish to represent myself. I recognize that I’m not a lawyer, I’m not familiar with courtroom proceeding^] and perhaps the rules that everyone abides by, but I still feel that I can deliver the services I think are necessary in this case most effectively by myself. And if Mr. Mequio was here to help me overcome any road blocks to delivering my message, that would be helpful.”
So the — it’s clear to me that he’s stating unequivocally within the meaning of that word in the context of an assertion of the right to represent one’s self that he’s saying in no uncertain *452terms "I want to represent myself.” [Emphasis added.]
The trial court did not deny defendant’s motion because his waiver was unequivocal. It denied it because it believed that the waiver was not knowingly made. The trial court remarked:
My ultimate conclusion on this is while you have made your statement unequivocally and you’re aware of some of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, your involvement with this case and your subjective state is such that you’re not doing it with your eyes completely opened ....
The trial transcript of Dennany’s motion to represent himself clearly shows that it was knowingly made. The test for a knowing assertion of the right to represent oneself was established in Anderson:
[T]he existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver must depend in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. [Id. at 370.]
Applying this test to Dennany leads to the conclusion that his request was knowingly made. As the trial court observed, Dennany’s request was so sophisticated that he carefully limited it so as not to make it "equivocal.” This level of sophistication, and the comprehensive nature of the request as reflected by the record, belies any conclusion other than a knowing and intelligent assertion of his constitutional right of self-representation.
Furthermore, Dennany’s request was voluntary. He was fully advised of the dangers and disadvan*453tages of representing himself. Dennany’s demeanor, conduct, and early2 assertion of his right to represent himself obviated any claim that granting his motion would unduly inconvenience, disrupt, or burden the court.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of Anderson and its constitutional requirements. The record in this case clearly shows that Dennany’s assertion of his right to represent himself was unequivocal, knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, Dennany was impermissibly denied his constitutional right of self-representation.
Similarly, defendant Jones’ appeal may be resolved on the basis that the trial court utterly failed to follow Anderson. Speaking on his own behalf, Jones said:
[I]f you would allow an attorney to assist me, I would, I mean ask to appear in pro per, but I do recognize my need for having certain motions Xeroxed as I am currently in the county jail, I don’t have current facilities to Xerox and type motions. I will do the research, and I would need them served on the Court and it is hard for me to get in and get a docket number and get dates on cases and if an attorney would assist me, I would have no objection to that.
Defendant’s motion was granted with absolutely no inquiry regarding whether defendant’s assertion of his right to represent himself was knowing and intelligent or whether he understood the dangers and disadvantages of that course of action. This is a clear Anderson violation. Defendant *454Jones’ conviction may, therefore, be overturned on this basis alone.
In sum, neither defendant asserted a "right” to standby or hybrid counsel at trial. Even if either had, it is still unnecessary for this Court to decide whether art 1, § 13 provides for such a right. Both cases may be decided on the basis of established Michigan law, and neither calls for a new analysis of art 1, § 13. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part hi of the lead opinion.3
ii
The lead opinion creates a trap for the unwary defendant by holding that a request to proceed pro se with standby counsel — be it to help either with procedural or trial issues — is an equivocal, and thereby ineffective, assertion of the defendant’s constitutional right to represent himself as a matter of law.
The trap is demonstrated by contrasting what happened to Dennany and Jones. Dennany realized that if he demanded standby counsel his waiver would be deemed "equivocal.” Therefore, Dennany went out of his way to point out that this was not what he intended. It is clear that Dennany would have preferred to have assistance from counsel. It is equally clear, however, that had Dennany been given a choice of going it alone and waiving all right to counsel, standby or otherwise, he would have happily done so.
Unfortunately, Jones did not possess the same level of sophistication. At the same time that he asserted his right to represent himself, he also *455asked that standby counsel be available to assist him. Thus, unknowingly, he made the waiver of his right to counsel "equivocal” simply by acknowledging the fact that it would be easier for someone not in jail to make copies and serve them on the court than it would be for him while in jail.
If this Court is going to make such combined requests "equivocal” as a matter of law, then it should also demand that a defendant be so informed before the request is made or allow a defendant to renew the request after the trap has been sprung.4 Michigan, as well as federal, law requires that a pro se defendant be alerted to the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Anderson at 368, and citing People v Holcomb, 395 Mich 326, 337; 235 NW2d 343 (1975), and Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975). A defendant does not "know what he is doing” and does not have his "eyes open” when he is not informed that a request to have an attorney assist with such mundane matters as making copies will vitiate the very right he seeks to assert. As Faretta noted:
"There is something specially repugnant to justice in using rules of practice in such a manner as to debar a prisoner from defending himself, especially when the professed object of the rules so used is to provide for his defence.” [Faretta at 822-823, quoting 1 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 341-342 (1883).]
*456The injustice of such an approach is compounded by the fact that common wisdom, and actual experience, indicate that standby counsel is almost invariably appointed whenever a defendant chooses to represent himself.5 It is fundamentally unfair to punish a defendant for requesting what all assume will be provided in the first place.6 To allow the uninformed to unwittingly waive their right of self-representation merely by requesting standby counsel "is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.” Adams v United States ex rel McCann, 317 US 269, 280; 63 S Ct 236; 87 L Ed 268 (1942).
III
Implicit in the lead opinion is the conclusion that strict compliance with MCR 6.005 and the Anderson requirements will prevent creating an "appellate parachute” in cases in which a criminal defendant chooses to exercise the right of self-representation. Ante at 447. I wholeheartedly agree. I would not, however, be so subtle about it. I would explicitly require strict compliance with the court rules.
The court rules provide the minimum level of procedural protection that must be afforded every criminal defendant in this state when asserting the Michigan constitutional right of self-representation. They speak in an unambiguous, mandatory fashion:
(D) Appointment or Waiver of a Lawyer. If the *457court determines that the defendant is financially unable to retain a lawyer, it must promptly appoint a lawyer and promptly notify the lawyer of the appointment. The court may not permit the defendant tb waive the right to be represented by a lawyer without ñrst
(1) advising the defendant of the charge, the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense, any mandatory minimum sentence required by law, and the risk involved in self-representation, and
(2) offering the defendant the opportunity to consult with a retained lawyer or, if the defendant is indigent, the opportunity to consult with an appointed lawyer.
(E) Advice at Subsequent Proceedings. Even though a defendant has waived the assistance of a lawyer, the record of each subsequent proceeding (e.g., preliminary examination, arraignment, proceedings leading to possible revocation of youthful trainee status, hearings, trial or sentencing) must affirmatively show that the court advised the defendant of the right to a lawyer’s assistance (at public expense if the defendant is indigent) and that the defendant waived that right. Before the court begins such proceedings,
(1) the defendant must reaffirm that a lawyer’s assistance is not wanted; or
(2) if the defendant requests a lawyer and is financially unable to retain one, the court must appoint one; or
(3) if the defendant wants to retain a lawyer and has the financial ability to do so, the court must allow the defendant a reasonable opportunity to retain one. [MCR 6.005. Emphasis added.]
The best way to foreclose appeals in these situations is to follow the letter of the court rules. In light of the explicit and comprehensive nature of the rules, their simple recitation virtually guarantees that an appellate parachute is not created. This Court should be demanding strict compliance *458with the court rules if for no other reason than to forestall the onslaught of appellate claims that will surely arise as courts struggle to determine just how imprecise a recital must be before a defendant’s constitutional rights will be protected. See ante at 439.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 Presently MCR 6.005(E).

 I agree with the lead opinion that pretrial requests to proceed pro se are not absolute. The Anderson requirements must be satisfied in all cases. However, pretrial requests significantly diminish the chance that a defendant’s request will "unduly inconvenience” or "burden” administration of the court’s business.

 I do, however, endorse that portion of part iii in which the lead opinion would hold that "the presence of standby counsel does not legitimize a waiver-of-counsel inquiry that does not comport with legal standards.” Ante at 446.

 Neither Faretta v California, 422 US 806; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975), Anderson, nor the court rules limit the number of times such requests can be made. In fact, Dennany made no less than four of them. Theoretically then, if a defendant fell into this trap, the defendant could simply renew his request without the offending plea for standby counsel.

 As the lead opinion notes, many federal circuits and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice require as much. Ante at 441-442 and n 20.

 This is exactly what happened to Jones. Just before his motion, his appointed attorney told the court: "I have indicated to him [Jones] that I am assuming the Court will probably ask me to stay on [in] an advisory capacity.” After granting the motion, the court did just that.