Court Opinion

ID: 9918372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 19:00:32.862086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:42.978083
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20026        Document: 00517031302             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                        FILED
                                                                                     January 12, 2024
                                      No. 23-20026
                                     ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk
   Gemini Insurance Company,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Indemnity Insurance Company of North America,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CV-3889
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         This is an insurance coverage dispute that arose out of the tragic death
   of an employee on a construction site. For the reasons set forth below, we
   REVERSE the district court’s grant of Indemnity Insurance Company of
   North America’s motion for summary judgment, and REMAND to the
   district court with instructions to: (1) grant Gemini Insurance Company’s

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 23-20026

   motion for summary judgment on Indemnity’s duties to defend and
   indemnify under the Policy, and (2) consider the subrogation issues in the
   first instance.

                                    I.     Background
      A. Facts
          1.         Owner Controlled Insurance Program
          ExxonMobil Corporation (“Exxon Mobil”) retained Bechtel Oil, Gas,
   and Chemicals, Inc. (“Bechtel”) as a general contractor to build a new
   hydrocarbon processing facility in Beaumont, Texas (the “Project”). As part
   of its contract with Bechtel, Exxon Mobil implemented an Owner Controlled
   Insurance Program (“OCIP”), which provided workers’ compensation and
   employers’ liability coverage to Bechtel and all of its subcontractors. Bechtel,
   in turn, retained Echo Maintenance, L.L.C. (“Echo”) as a subcontractor to
   perform mechanical, structural, and piping work on the Project. Bechtel and
   Echo subsequently entered into a contract that incorporated the OCIP and
   required Echo to enroll in the program (the “Subcontract”). Both Bechtel
   and Echo were enrolled in the OCIP.
          2.         Indemnity’s   Workers’       Compensation     and   Employers’
                     Liability Policies Issued Under The OCIP
          Under the OCIP, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America
   (“Indemnity”) issued a workers’ compensation and employers’ liability
   insurance policy to Bechtel (“OCIP Policy”). Separately, Gemini Insurance
   Company (“Gemini”) issued a general commercial liability policy to Echo
   under which Bechtel was an additional insured.
          Two portions of the OCIP Policy are at issue in this case: (1) Part
   Two – Employers’ Liability Insurance (“Part Two”); and (2) the Voluntary
   Compensation and Employers’ Liability Coverage Endorsement (“VCEL
   Endorsement”).

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          Part Two sets forth the type of covered claim that Indemnity agrees to
   defend and indemnify Bechtel for. Specifically, it provides that “employers
   liability insurance applies to bodily injury by accident,” which includes death,
   so long as “[t]he bodily injury . . . arise[s] out of and in the course of the
   injured employee’s employment by you” and the “employment [is]
   necessary or incidental to your work in a state . . . listed in Item 3.A of the
   Information Page.” “[Y]ou” is defined in this policy under the “General
   Section” to mean the “employer named in Item 1 of the Information Page,”
   which is Bechtel. Item 3.A of the Information Page lists Texas.
          The VCEL Endorsement contains three relevant provisions. The first
   provision explains that the endorsement “adds Voluntary Compensation
   Insurance to the policy,” and that this insurance applies to bodily injury by
   accident so long as it is “sustained by an employee included in the group of
   employees described in the Schedule” and “arise[s] out of and in the course
   of employment necessary or incidental to work in a state listed in the
   Schedule.” The second provision, as the name of the endorsement suggests,
   explains how Part Two-Employers’ Liability Insurance is impacted:
          F. Employers[’] Liability Insurance
          Part Two (Employers[’] Liabi[lity] Insurance) applies to bodily
          injury covered by this endorsement as though the State of
          Employment shown in the Schedule were shown in Item 3.A of
          the Information Page.
          This endorsement changes the policy to which it is attached
          and is effective on the date issued unless otherwise stated.
   The last provision is the aforementioned “Schedule,” which defines
   “Employee” as “employees of a contractor with whom the named insured
   has executed a written contract to provide workers compensation insurance
   in connection with the designated premises.” It further defines “State of

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   Employment” in relevant part as “Texas but only at the site indicated in the
   designated premises endorsement.”
          3.     Underlying Incident and Lawsuit
          In December 2017, Ms. Espinoza was working as a pipefitter helper on
   the Project when she was struck by a piece of pipe and sustained fatal injuries.
   Zachery Leatherwood, individually and on behalf of Ms. Espinoza’s two
   minor children, filed wrongful death and survival claims against Bechtel and
   Echo in Texas state court alleging negligence and gross negligence. Ms.
   Espinoza’s parents later joined the lawsuit as intervenors (collectively
   “Underlying Litigation”). In response, Bechtel sought coverage as an
   additional insured on the commercial general liability policy issued by Gemini
   to Echo and received a defense from Gemini under a reservation of rights.
          Bechtel moved for summary judgment against the Intervenors on the
   ground that because Exxon Mobil’s OCIP provided blanket workers’
   compensation insurance and coverage to Bechtel and Echo, Intervenors’ sole
   remedy in accordance with Texas Labor Code § 408.001 was workers’
   compensation benefits.     The state court granted Bechtel’s motion for
   summary judgment dismissing the Intervenors’ claims.
          In September 2020, Bechtel requested Indemnity assume Bechtel’s
   defense in the Underlying Litigation in accordance with the policy it had
   previously issued. Indemnity denied Bechtel’s request on the ground that its
   policy required an actual employment relationship between the injured
   employee and Bechtel and there were no allegations to that effect in the
   Underlying Litigation.
          The Leatherwood plaintiffs then settled their claims against Bechtel
   and Echo.     Gemini funded the settlement on behalf of Bechtel while
   Indemnity partially funded the settlement on behalf of Echo.

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       B. Procedural History
           Gemini filed suit against Indemnity seeking a declaratory judgment
   that Indemnity had a duty to defend and indemnify Bechtel in the Underlying
   Litigation based on the policy it issued to Bechtel and also asserted breach of
   contract, subrogation, and reimbursement claims for the costs it expended
   defending Bechtel and settling the Underlying Litigation.
           The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The main
   dispute was whether Ms. Espinoza qualified as an “employee” of Bechtel
   within the meaning of the OCIP Policy such that Indemnity had a duty to
   defend and indemnify Bechtel in the Underlying Litigation. Gemini raised
   two primary theories to support its argument that Ms. Espinoza was an
   “employee”: (1) VCEL Endorsement expanded the scope of Part Two so
   that employees of a Bechtel subcontractor constituted Bechtel “employees,”
   and, alternatively, (2) Bechtel was Ms. Espinoza’s “statutory employer”
   under § 408.001(a) thereby satisfying the actual employment relationship
   under Part Two.1 According to Gemini, because Ms. Espinoza was an
   “employee” of Bechtel, it was entitled to reimbursement through
   contractual or equitable subrogation.
           The district court denied Gemini’s motion but granted Indemnity’s
   motion and thereafter entered final judgment in favor of Indemnity. Gemini
   timely appealed.

                       II.    Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
           The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
   appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 636(c)(3) because the

           _____________________
           1
             Gemini raised another argument in the alterative—if the OCIP Policy is
   ambiguous, any ambiguities should be resolved in its favor. Given our ruling below, we do
   not address this issue.

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   parties consented to have a magistrate judge conduct all further proceeding
   in their case, and the magistrate judge entered a final judgment granting
   summary judgment. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 73(c) (“In accordance with
   28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), an appeal from a judgment entered at a magistrate
   judge’s direction may be taken to the court of appeals as would any other
   appeal from a district-court judgment.”).
          We review the “district court’s grant of summary judgment” de novo,
   applying the same standard as the district court. Brand Servs., L.L.C. v. Irex
   Corp., 909 F.3d 151, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Summary
   judgment is proper only when it appears that there is no genuine issue of
   material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.” Id. at 156 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). We view the facts in the
   light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all inferences in its favor.
   Id.
          Further, the interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of
   law reviewed de novo. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
   of Pittsburgh, 99 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1996). Because this is a diversity case,
   we are “bound to apply [Texas] law as interpreted by the state’s highest
   court.” Barfield v. Madison County., 212 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2000); see
   also Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel L.L.C., 620 F.3d 558,
   564 (5th Cir. 2010).

                                 III.    Discussion
          Gemini raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the VCEL
   Endorsement expanded the scope of Part Two-Employers Liability
   Insurance such that Ms. Espinoza was considered an “employee” of Bechtel;
   (2) whether Indemnity was obligated to defend Bechtel in the Underlying
   Litigation; (3) whether Indemnity was obligated to indemnify Bechtel in the
   Underlying Litigation; and (4) whether Gemini was contractually or

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   equitably subrogated to Bechtel’s rights. Because Indemnity’s duties to
   defend and indemnify Bechtel, and therefore Gemini’s right to
   reimbursement, turn on the scope of the policy, we start there.
          The Scope of the Workers’ Compensation and Employers’
          Liability Insurance Policy
          The main issue here is whether Ms. Espinoza was an “employee” of
   Bechtel within the terms of the OCIP policy. One of Gemini’s theories is
   correct: that the VCEL Endorsement expanded the scope of Part Two of the
   OCIP Policy so that employees of subcontractors are considered Bechtel
   employees. Thus, we need not address any other theories.
          1.     The VCEL Endorsement
          Under Texas law, we must apply the ordinary rules of contract
   interpretation to insurance policies. Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon
   Ins. Co., 267 S.W.3d 20, 23 (Tex. 2008). Given that rule, a policy’s “words
   and phrases” are “given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Aggreko, LLC
   v. Chartis Specialty Ins. Co., 942 F.3d 682, 688 (5th Cir. 2019). “An
   interpretation that gives each word meaning is preferable to one that renders
   one surplusage.” U.S. Metals, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., 490 S.W.3d 20,
   23–24 (Tex. 2015). “No one phrase, sentence or section of a contract should
   be isolated from its setting and considered apart from the other provisions.”
   RSUI Indem. Co. v. The Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015) (alteration
   adopted) (quotation omitted). Instead, courts must interpret the policy “as
   a whole.” Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex. 1994).
   Thus, if a policy includes an endorsement, the endorsement should not “be
   read apart from the main policy, and the added provisions will supersede the
   previous policy terms to the extent they are truly in conflict.” Primrose
   Operating Co. v. Nat’l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 558 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (quotation omitted); see JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460

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   S.W.3d 597, 605 n.7 (Tex. 2015) (explaining that generally an endorsement
   alters and expands coverage that would otherwise be excluded by the policy).
          Reading the VCEL Endorsement together with Part Two, the only
   reasonable interpretation is that the VCEL Endorsement expanded the
   definition of a Bechtel “employee.” Part Two provides coverage for “bodily
   injur[ies] by accident” if “the bodily injury [arose] out of and in the course
   of the injured employee’s employment with [Bechtel].” Outside of the
   VCEL Endorsement, the OCIP Policy does not define “employee,” so we
   look to the word’s ordinary meaning in these circumstances unless context
   suggests otherwise. See Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sink, 107 S.W.3d
   547, 551 (Tex. 2003). The ordinary meaning of “employee” is “someone
   who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express
   or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control
   the details of work performance.” Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am.
   Ins. Co., 642 S.W.3d 551, 558 n.6 (Tex. 2022) (alteration adopted) (quotation
   omitted).
          The VCEL Endorsement, by contrast, defines a Bechtel “employee”
   as “employees of a contractor with whom [Bechtel] has executed a written
   contract to provide workers compensation insurance in connection with the
   designated premises.” Notably, there is no requirement of direct contractual
   privity between Bechtel and the individual nor that Bechtel has the right to
   control the details of the individual’s work performance. It also clearly states
   that it “changes the policy to which it is attached.” See RSUI Indem. Co., 466
   S.W.3d at 121–22 (concluding an endorsement modified a policy when the
   endorsement stated “This Endorsement Changes The Policy. Please Read
   It Carefully,” and “This endorsement modifies insurance provided under . . .
   ALL COVERAGE PARTS”); Primrose Operating Co., 382 F.3d at 558–59
   (recognizing that an endorsement which provided that it “modifies insurance
   provided under the following: COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY

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   COVERAGE FORM” modified that form of the policy). Thus, there
   appears to be a true conflict between the VCEL Endorsement and Part Two.
          The district court and Indemnity both attempt to reconcile this
   conflict by relying on the “borrowed employee” doctrine. They contend that
   the VCEL Endorsement can be harmonized with Part Two if the VCEL
   Endorsement is interpreted as providing Bechtel with the option of offering
   voluntary compensation insurance to “borrowed employee[s]” of
   subcontractors. Under this doctrine, an employee “who would otherwise be
   in the general employment of one employer” becomes an employee of
   another employer if this “other employer . . . ha[s] the right to direct and
   control the details of the” employee’s work. St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94
   S.W.3d 513, 537 (Tex. 2002) (quotation omitted). According to the district
   court and Indemnity, under this interpretation there could be circumstances
   where an individual is both an “employee” under the VCEL Endorsement
   and also under Part Two—for example, an employee is directly employed by
   a subcontractor of Bechtel but is actually employed by Bechtel because it has
   the right to direct and control the details of that employee’s work. The are
   multiple problems with this interpretation.
          First, this proposed interpretation assumes that the definition of
   “employee” under Part Two is limited to whether the employer had the right
   to control that employee’s work. But this definition is inconsistent with the
   ordinary, plain meaning of “employee,” which is the meaning we adopted
   for Part Two. As noted above, the ordinary meaning of “employee” is
   “someone who works in the service of another person (the employer) under
   an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right
   to control the details of work performance.” Maxim Crane Works, L.P., 642
   S.W.3d at 558 n.6 (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted). So, there are
   actually two requirements for an individual to constitute an “employee”
   under Part Two: (1) someone who works in the service of another person

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                                          No. 23-20026

   under an express or implied contract for hire; and (2) under which the
   employer has the right to control the details of work performance. Just
   because Bechtel would have the right to control the work of another
   contractor’s employee does not mean there is an implied contract for hire,
   especially when the employee is on the payroll of the other contractor. See
   Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Advance’d Temporaries, Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 49
   (Tex. 2007) (concluding that even though the employer did not control the
   details of the work at the construction site, it did not cease being the
   employees’ employer and the borrowed-employee tort doctrine did not
   suggest otherwise because the case “is one of contract”).2 In short, under
   the circumstances hypothesized by the district court, that individual would
   not satisfy the definition of “employee” under Part Two.
           Likewise, this interpretation does not comport with Paragraph F of the
   VCEL Endorsement.              Paragraph F provides “Part Two (Employers
   Liabi[lity] Insurance) applies to bodily injury covered by this endorsement as
   though the State of Employment shown in the Schedule were shown in Item
   3.A. of the Information Page.” Paragraph A of the VCEL Endorsement
   explains what is meant by “bodily injury covered by this endorsement.” It
   provides in pertinent part that bodily injury must “be sustained by an
   employee included in the group of employees described in the Schedule.” If
   Indemnity only intended the VCEL Endorsement to apply to “borrowed
   employees,” there are far easier ways to explain this limitation than the
   circuitous interpretation proposed above.

           _____________________
           2
            Alternatively, to the extent an implied contract for hire logically follows from the
   right to direct and control the work of another contractor’s employee, then, in such
   circumstances, Bechtel would be that employee’s direct employer. This would effectively
   render Paragraph F of the VCEL Endorsement meaningless.

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           Indemnity’s other arguments to the contrary are unavailing.3 It first
   contends that the VCEL Endorsement adds only voluntary compensation
   insurance to the policy and does not modify Part Two – Employers’ Liability
   Insurance. Both the title of the Endorsement—Voluntary Compensation and
   Employers Liability Coverage Endorsement—and Paragraph F refute this
   argument. See Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777,
   793 (Tex. 2005) (declining to construe a provision as limited to one topic
   when “the title of the paragraph show[ed] that two different topics were
   addressed in it”).
           It next contends that Paragraph F only partially modifies Part Two
   because the phrase “as though” in Paragraph F demonstrates it only
   intended to add states to Item 3.A of the Information Page. But this argument
   cannot bear its weight because it ignores the beginning of Paragraph F—
   “Part Two (Employers[’] Liabi[l]ity Insurance) applies to bodily injury covered
   by this endorsement”—and the sentence immediately following Paragraph
   F—“[t]his endorsement changes the policy to which it is attached.”
           In sum, we conclude that the VCEL Endorsement expanded the OCIP
   Policy’s definition of “employee” to include employees of Bechtel’s

           _____________________
           3
              Indemnity also argues that Gemini forfeited certain contractual interpretation
   arguments on appeal because they were not raised below. We disagree with Indemnity’s
   characterization of Gemini’s arguments. Gemini is not raising new arguments but rather
   urging that the grounds relied on by the district court in denying its motion for summary
   judgment were wrong. Cf. Kaswatuka v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 7 F.4th 327, 329 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (“As [appellant] did not respond to the motion to dismiss, [appellant’s]
   appellate arguments are limited to urging that the grounds given by the district court for
   dismissing her complaint are wrong.” (quotation omitted)); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
   Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991) (“When an issue or claim is properly before the court,
   the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather
   retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing
   law.”).

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   subcontractors, such as Ms. Espinoza.
           The Duties to Defend and Indemnify
           With the scope of the OCIP Policy defined, we now consider whether
   Indemnity had a duty to defend and/or indemnify Bechtel for the Underlying
   Litigation.4
           1.      Duty to Defend
           Gemini contends Indemnity had a duty to defend Bechtel in the
   Underlying Litigation because the Leatherwood Plaintiffs’ and Intervenors’
   petitions contained sufficient allegations to potentially support a covered
   claim for an “employee” within the meaning of the VCEL Endorsement.5
   Gemini’s contention has merit.
           Texas law uses the “eight-corners” or “complaint-allegation” rule to
   determine whether a liability insurer has a duty to defend an insured against
   a third-party lawsuit. Laney Chiropractic & Sports Therapy, P.A. v. Nationwide
   Mut. Ins. Co., 866 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2017); Zurich Am. Ins. v. Nokia, Inc.,
   268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. 2008). Under that rule, courts look to the facts
   alleged within the four corners of the petition (or complaint) in the
   underlying lawsuit, “measure them against the language within the four
   corners of the insurance policy, and determine if the facts alleged present a
   matter that could potentially be covered by the insurance policy.” Ewing
   Constr. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 420 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex. 2014). If there is a
           _____________________
           4
             These two parts of an insurance policy are separate and have separate standards
   and requirements. There are cases where one or the other, but not both, apply, as well as
   cases where both do apply. See Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins., 664 F.3d 589, 601 (5th
   Cir. 2011).
           5
             Alternatively, Gemini contends that if the pleadings in the Underlying Litigation
   are not enough, by themselves, to establish a potentially covered claim, then extrinsic
   evidence, like the Subcontract, in conjunction with the pleadings, is enough. We need not
   reach this issue, however, because the operative pleadings, by themselves, are sufficient.

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   “doubt as to whether or not the allegations of a complaint against the insured
   state a cause of action within the coverage of a liability policy sufficient to
   compel the insurer to defend the action, such doubt will be resolved in [the]
   insured’s favor.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, v. Merchs. Fast Motor
   Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).
          The underlying pleadings allege that: (1) Ms. Espinoza was an
   employee of Echo; (2) Echo and Bechtel were involved in a construction
   project for Exxon Mobil at the designated premises; (3) Ms. Espinoza was
   “doing work for” Bechtel at the designated premises; and (4) Bechtel
   exercised and/or retained control over the operations, activities, and
   construction at the designated premises at the time of Ms. Espinoza’s death.
          Taken together, these allegations are sufficient to “potentially
   support a covered claim” under the OCIP Policy as modified by the VCEL
   Endorsement. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 268 S.W.3d at 490. The allegations
   easily establish that Ms. Espinoza was an employee of Echo, but also
   simultaneously working for Bechtel at the designated premises, thus
   satisfying the VCEL Endorsement. They further establish that Ms. Espinoza
   was tragically killed while working in the scope of her employment, thereby
   satisfying Part Two. As such, the allegations, construed liberally, constitute
   a claim potentially within the OCIP policy.6 In sum, we conclude that
   Indemnity had a duty to defend Bechtel in the Underlying Litigation.

           _____________________
           6
              Of course, the pleadings in the underlying case are not necessarily trying to
   address insurance. After all, they are seeking to recover from the defendants under tort
   law, not suing an insurance company. So, anything that merely raises doubts about
   coverage is not enough for us to conclude that Indemnity does not have a duty to defend.
   See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 939 S.W.2d at 141.

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          2.     Duty to Indemnify
          “The duty to indemnify is separate and distinct from the duty to
   defend.” Gilbane Bldg. Co., 664 F.3d at 601. “The duty to defend is
   circumscribed by the eight-corners doctrine; the duty to indemnify, on the
   other hand, is controlled by the facts proven in the underlying suit.” Id.
   Accordingly, we can consider facts outside of those alleged in the petition in
   determining the duty to indemnify. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Nat’l
   Union Fire Ins. Co., 334 S.W.3d 217, 219 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).
          Here, there is no dispute that Ms. Espinoza was an Echo employee,
   that Echo was a subcontractor of Bechtel, that Bechtel and Echo had a written
   contract, and that the work they performed was on a “designated premises”
   within the meaning of the OCIP Policy. The only dispute between the parties
   is whether the Subcontract between Bechtel and Echo established that
   Bechtel “provided” workers’ compensation to Echo. Gemini relies on
   HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. 2009) to support its contention
   that it “provided” workers’ compensation insurance. However, that case
   was interpreting the word “provide” under the Texas Workers’
   Compensation Act, not an insurance policy. See id. at 350. So, its holding is
   not binding. Nevertheless, the rationale employed by the Texas Supreme
   Court is persuasive, and we adopt it since it accords with the plain meaning
   of the word “provide.”
          In explaining that a general contractor “provides” workers’
   compensation insurance to a subcontractor within the meaning of the Texas
   Workers’ Compensation Act even though it is through an OCIP, the Texas
   Supreme Court explained “[h]ad the Legislature intended for ‘provide’ to
   mean ‘purchase,’ it could simply have used the word ‘purchase’ instead.”
   Id. at 358 (quotation omitted). Thus, “provide” is obviously broader than
   “purchase,” which accords with the plain meaning of “provide”—“to
   supply or to make available.”        See Provide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S

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   DICTIONARY,           https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/provide
   (last visited Dec. 13, 2023).       Here, Bechtel’s subcontract with Echo
   incorporated the OCIP and required Echo to enroll in the program. As such,
   Bechtel “provided” workers’ compensation insurance to Echo when they
   executed the Subcontractor. Accordingly, Indemnity has a duty to indemnify
   Bechtel as well.
          Contractual and Equitable Subrogation
          Gemini contends that it is entitled to reimbursement from Indemnity
   because Gemini is contractually or, alternatively, equitably subrogated to
   Bechtel’s rights.     While Indemnity disputes the merits of Gemini’s
   arguments, it contends the subrogation issues should be remanded to the
   district court to decide in the first instance. We agree.
          Because the district court concluded that Indemnity did not have a
   duty to defend or indemnify Gemini, it never addressed the substance of
   Gemini’s subrogation arguments. “It is the general rule . . . that a federal
   appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”
   Humphries v. Elliott Co., 760 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Singleton
   v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)). Therefore, we remand to the district
   court to consider whether Gemini is contractually or equitably subrogated to
   Bechtel’s rights such that it is entitled to reimbursement from Indemnity.

                                IV.      Conclusion
          For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the district court’s
   grant of Indemnity’s motion for summary judgment, and REMAND to the
   district court with instructions to: (1) grant Gemini’s motion for summary
   judgment on Indemnity’s duties to defend and indemnify under the Policy,
   and (2) consider the subrogation issues in the first instance.

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