Court Opinion

ID: 9628202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:12:12.988401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:39.542846
License: Public Domain

Rosellini J.
(dissenting) — I concur in the opinion of Williams, J., holding that all prior convictions were felonies. I dissent to that part of the opinion which holds that a prosecutor is required to exercise discretion in filing habitual criminal information.
The majority misreads the holding of State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 558 P.2d 236 (1976). In that case the practice of the prosecutor was to file the habitual criminal information in certain selected cases rather than to prosecute all eligible individuals under the habitual criminal statute. This procedure was challenged as a denial of equal protection. The majority held that equal protection was not denied, because the decision whether to file a habitual criminal charge was based in part on the prosecutor's ability to prove the conviction of prior felonies. It appeared, however, that factors other than availability of proof were considered, and the appellant in Lee argued that he was denied due process of law because he was not allowed to participate in the process of deciding whether to file the habitual criminal charge. The majority upheld the prosecutor on this score, also, holding that the judicial hearing on the charge was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
*298My dissent, joined by Utter, C.J., maintained that the statute was mandatory and left no room for prosecutorial discretion, and that even if some discretion is allowed, it must be guided by justifiable standards.
That case does not stand for the proposition that a prosecutor must exercise discretion.
In the instant case, there is no denial of equal protection. It was the prosecutor's practice to file a habitual criminal information in every case where there were three prior felony convictions. All persons within the statutory classification were treated equally. RCW 9.92.090 provides in pertinent part:
Every person convicted ... of any felony, who shall previously have been twice convicted, whether in this state or elsewhere, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life.
The statute makes it clear that every person who falls into the ambit of the statute shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. This statute is mandatory and requires that the prosecutor file a supplemental information charging each such person with being a habitual criminal. It does not say that certain persons may be charged and others may not, and it provides no standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Here the prosecutor followed the mandate of the statute.
But assuming the prosecutor has discretion in seeking the enhanced penalty, the evidence nevertheless justifies his action here. The penalty for the status of habitual criminal (for one who has been previously convicted of two or more felonies) is imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life. This may appear to be a disproportionate punishment for the crimes committed by the petitioner. However, life imprisonment does not mean "life in prison." The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles has the authority to set the maximum and minimum terms a person must serve. The present rule of the Board sets the maximum sentence for a habitual criminal at 15 years. If the prisoner does not violate any rule of the institution, he is given one-third *299time off for good behavior. In that case, the sentence results in a 10-year minimum. The 10-year minimum is served concurrently with the sentence imposed for the crime of which the defendant was last convicted. Thus, "life imprisonment" means a 10-year sentence, with possible lifetime parole.
Let us examine whether the prosecutor acted unfairly in asking for the enhanced penalty. Pettitt is an Oregon resident with three prior felony convictions: (1) taking a motor vehicle without permission (1971); (2) second-degree burglary (1972); and (3) unauthorized use of a vehicle (1975).
The petitioner took a van from a Portland, Oregon, parking lot and drove it into Lewis County, Washington, where he was arrested in the van for driving while under the influence of intoxicants.
The statistics of the Washington State Patrol reveal that 50 percent of highway fatalities are caused by drunken drivers. The petitioner, in the act of driving this vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants, was a potential highway killer. His act involved violence or potential violence to property and persons.
The petitioner, since 1971 to the present, has repeatedly engaged in criminal activities. Three previous convictions and sentences did not deter the petitioner. He has continued to engage in criminal activities. Neither the majority nor any commentator known to me have explained how the public can protect itself from the predatory action of the habitual criminal, except by incarceration.
The petitioner has shown through his actions that he cannot conform his conduct to the behavioral requirements of society. The State has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from the criminal activities of recidivist offenders. Undoubtedly when the legislature enacted the habitual criminal statute, it had in mind this problem of recidivism. The statute was passed to protect the citizens of this state from such offenders.
A report of the Administrator for the Courts shows: Of 1,061 felony offenders who were sentenced during June *300through November 1979, 227 (or 21 percent) were committed to prison. Of those sent to prison:
1. 36.1 percent had two or more prior juvenile convictions;
2. 78.6 percent had one or more prior adult convictions; .
a. 35.8 percent had one or more prior adult convictions for crimes against persons and
b. 65.6 percent had one or more prior adult convictions for crimes against property; and
3. 61.7 percent had one or more prior adult incarcerations.
Thus the problem of recidivism is apparent.
The majority's remand does not serve the proper administration of justice. If the prosecutor decides to again file habitual criminal charges,6 it will be necessary to bring the defendant from the state penitentiary at Walla Walla, impanel a jury, and have a trial.
The judicial district of Lewis County has two superior court judges. The caseload of Lewis County in 1978 shows 1,836 filings; in 1979, the load was estimated to be 2,206, or 1,103 cases per judge. The standard of a manageable caseload is 700 filings per judge. If the standard is applied, another superior court judge will be needed to keep the trials current. The backlog of cases would indicate that there may be anywhere from 6 to 9 months' delay before a trial may be had.
After a second useless trial, undoubtedly we will be called upon to review the case again. Being an indigent defendant, the petitioner will be furnished a free attorney for his case. This total waste of judicial time will not improve the criminal justice system, but will frustrate it.
To what avail is such a trial? The petitioner has no defense. The State will prove the record of his past three convictions and he will again be found to have the status of habitual criminal.
*301The majority in its distaste for the habitual criminal statute evidently hopes that the prosecutor will not file habitual criminal charges again, in the interest of saving judicial time and money. To my mind, it is inappropriate for the court to place the prosecutor on the horns of a dilemma in order to frustrate the legislature's clearly manifested purpose.
I would affirm.
Wright, J., concurs with Rosellini, J.

The prosecutor in one of the series of cases of which this is a part stated in 'oen court that he would file a new charge against the defendant.