Court Opinion

ID: 9532604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:23:04.610467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.524698
License: Public Domain

Judge NEY
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part II of the majority opinion. However, I dissent as to part I and, thus, would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Because, as the majority correctly concludes, the trial court erroneously determined that § 13-71-104, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.) “eliminated” the specific provisions in § 16-10-103(l)(k), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) requiring the court to grant a challenge for cause if the challenged juror is “a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency,” the trial court did not apply the standard set forth in § 16 — 10—103(l)(k). Although I concur with the majority’s use of that standard, I would conclude that the undisputed facts contained in the record are, at best, ambiguous regarding whether, at the time of defendant’s trial, the prospective juror was the functional equivalent of a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency who should have been excused as a matter of law pursuant to § 16-10-103(l)(k).
In my opinion, the voir dire of the prospective juror (the content of which is undisputed) does not, as a matter of law, compel the conclusion that the challenge for cause to this juror should have been denied.
The prospective juror testified that she had been a reserve police officer for approximately one year prior to the trial, had attended the police academy in her capacity as a reserve officer, and, at the time of voir dire, was working approximately 30 hours per week in that capacity. She further testified that she performed the same duties as a police officer, viewed herself as a career police officer, and that she, as a reserve officer, accepted compensated off-duty jobs. The substance of her testimony strongly implies that these off-duty jobs were available to the prospective juror solely because she was a reserve police officer.
*534She testified, moreover, that she had attained her goal as a reserve officer by obtaining a full-time compensated position with the police department that was scheduled to commence within the month dining which voir dire was conducted. It appears to me that the prospective juror’s acceptance of the offer for compensated employment as a police officer brought her within the provisions of § 16 — 10—103(l)(k).
Both the prosecution and the defense unsuccessfully challenged the prospective juror for cause.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the prospective juror was not a “compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency” under § 16-10-103(l)(k). Such conclusion follows here only if one considers this active reserve police officer to retain her objectivity until she begins her compensated employment as a police officer. I cannot accept such a scenario.
Furthermore, the trial court here did not apply the § 16-10-103(l)(k) standard, and even if it had, based on the facts developed in voir dire, the denial of defendant’s challenge for cause may still have constituted an abuse of discretion.
In my opinion, under the facts here, the determination whether the juror was “a compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency” cannot be made as a matter of law and, because the trial court did not make factual findings in this regard, this court may not do so. See M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380 (Colo.1994) (absent certain circumstances, such as when the undisputed facts are presented to the trial court by stipulation, an appellate court does not decide facts).
I would also conclude that Grim. P. 24(b)(l)(XII), requiring a court to sustain a challenge for cause if the challenged juror is “an employee of a public law enforcement agency or public defender’s office,” compels the court to sustain a challenge for cause of this prospective juror.
In the alternative, I would conclude, in view of the prospective juror’s responses, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause under § 16 — 10—103(l)(j) based on alleged juror bias.
I would, therefore, reverse defendant’s conviction and order a new trial.