Court Opinion

ID: 9622977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:25:58.454875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.936410
License: Public Domain

Bernes, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that the trustees dedicated the curb cut and driveway to public use, I respectfully dissent. “To prove a dedication of land to public use, there must be an offer, either express or implied, by the owner of the land and an acceptance, either express or implied, by the appropriate public authorities or by the general public.” Smith v. State, 248 Ga. 154, 158 (2) (282 SE2d 76) (1981). See OCGA§ 44-5-230. In this case, the evidence is insufficient to establish either an express or implied offer of dedication.
The majority opines that an express dedication to the public occurred in 1976 when the trustees granted the developer of the *732adjoining shopping center permission to access the Loridans Easement by way of a curb cut.28 In my view, the majority unduly expands the scope of the grant. Construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant trustees, as we are obliged to do, the evidence shows merely that the trustees “granted a permissive use of the easement to the customers and invitees” of the adjoining commercial businesses, a limited class of individuals, in order to enhance access to the trustees’ property.
That other members of the general public may have used the curb cut for convenience or as a short cut does not alter this conclusion. “It would be inequitable to impose a public easement on a[n] ... owner’s property because he tolerated liberties from the public which did not interfere with his private enjoyment.” Lines v. State, 245 Ga. 390, 395 (5) (264 SE2d 891) (1980). See also Thrash v. Wood, 215 Ga. 609, 613-614 (1) (112 SE2d 578) (1960) (“a property owner who permits customer vehicular parking on his land in connection with the operation of his business should not be penalized by a taking of his property on the theory that he had made a dedication to the public where there was no intent on his part to do so ...”). See also Shapiro Bros. v. Jones-Festus Properties, 205 SW3d 270, 277-278 (Mo. App. 2006) (property owner’s acquiescence to fact that some members of the general public used parking lot of shopping establishment as a shortcut was insufficient to show an offer to dedicate); Security Fed. S & L Assn. v. C & C Investments, 448 NW2d 83, 87-89 (Minn. App. 1989) (property owner’s inaction in response to fact that some persons who used curb cut and parking lot of shopping center complex were not customers or patrons, but instead were simply using the curb cut and parking lot as a cut through, was insufficient to demonstrate an offer to dedicate); Blank v. Park Lane Center, 121 A2d 846, 848 (Md. App. 1956) (fact that driveway in commercial area was used “by persons not desiring to shop or to park, but who intended to drive [through] as a matter of convenience or to avoid a traffic light” was insufficient to show offer to dedicate by property owner).
“Merely because [the trustees] did not put up a sign forbidding general public use, or did not adopt some wholly impractical method of trying to ascertain the purpose of any vehicle [using the curb cut], does not indicate an intention to dedicate.” Security Fed. S & L Assn., 448 NW2d at 88. See also Shapiro Bros., 205 SW3d at 278 *733(owner should not have to “barricade or block entrances” to the general public in order to prevent a finding of an intent to dedicate).
Decided May 10, 2007
Reconsideration denied June 7, 2007.
Scheer, Jackson, Cohen & Schoenberg, Brant Jackson, Jr., for appellants.
We should not infer an intent to relinquish private property to the public simply because a business owner authorizes ingress and egress to his property for business purposes. “For why shall we infer that an individual makes a gift of his property to the public from an equivocal act, which equally proves an intention to grant a mere revocable license?” Security Fed. S & L Assn., 448 NW2d at 88. The burden of proving a public dedication lies upon the party asserting it. Lines, 245 Ga. at 392 (1). “[T]he facts relied upon must be such as to clearly indicate a purpose on the part of the owner to abandon his personal dominion over the property and to devote it to a definite public use.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) MDC Blackshear, LLC v. Littell, 273 Ga. 169, 170 (1) (537 SE2d 356) (2000). That standard was not met here.
Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there has been an express public dedication and implied acceptance by the general public. Since the evidence fails to reflect that there was an express or implied dedication in the first instance, it follows that there could be no implied public acceptance. The result reached by the majority calls into question the property rights of commercial businesses across this state that enter into agreements providing for the ingress and egress of customers and invitees. Likewise, the majority opinion has the result of potentially saddling public authorities with the upkeep and maintenance of large swaths of commercial property where commercial customers enter and exit.29 See Chatham Motorcycle Club v. Blount, 214 Ga. 770, 773 (1) (107 SE2d 806) (1959); Raines v. Petty, 170 Ga. 53, 55 (1) (152 SE 44) (1930). Consequently, I dissent and thus would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Chick-fil-Aand remand the case for further proceedings.
*734Schulten, Ward & Turner, Kevin L. Ward, Joseph L. Kelly, Hunton & Williams, Matthew J. Calvert, Ashley F. Cummings, for appellees.

 This grant was explained by a trustee as follows: “[w]e were informed that Small[, the developer,] had been assigned the right to use the Loridan’s Easement on our property and we had no problem with also giving him express permission to have his traffic access our property.... We believed that mutual access to and from the two shopping centers would be... mutually beneficial. . . .”

 In this case, there is no evidence that any public authority has exercised dominion or maintenance over the curb cut at issue. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the curb cut was maintained by Chick-fil-A.