Court Opinion

ID: 9931323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:04:13.65879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:08.127837
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24 In re A.L. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re A.L., a Person Coming                                     B314966
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02815A)
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 N.C.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Conditionally
affirmed and remanded with directions.
      Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION
      N.C. (Mother), the mother of minor A.L., appeals from the
juvenile court’s order at the 12-month review hearing held under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.21, subdivision (f).
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding that the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) provided her with reasonable services, and in ordering
that her visitation remain monitored. Mother also asserts the
juvenile court and DCFS failed to comply with the inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA;
25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law.
      We conclude Mother’s challenges to the reasonable services
finding and visitation order are moot, and even if not moot, they
lack merit. However, in light of DCFS’s concession that there
was reversible ICWA error, we conclude the matter should be
remanded for a proper ICWA inquiry of known and available
extended family members. Therefore, we conditionally affirm the
juvenile court’s order and remand for ICWA compliance.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Section 300 Petition
      Mother and C.L. (Father) are the parents of A.L., a boy
born in December 2019. This matter came to DCFS’s attention in
April 2020 based on a referral alleging that then five-month-old
A.L. was present during a violent physical altercation between
the parents. When a DCFS social worker first met with Mother
about the referral, Mother reported that Father hit her multiple
times on her head with his closed fist, and that A.L. was present

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
in the room during the incident. Mother also indicated that she
and Father had a history of domestic violence, but did not
disclose any details.
       While Mother denied any history of mental health issues,
the social worker observed that she appeared to have a cognitive
delay. The social worker discussed a safety plan and mental
health services with Mother, and provided her with a resource
packet. Mother’s health care provider later reported that Mother
had a significant mental health history, but she was not
currently receiving services.
       In her initial meeting with DCFS, Mother agreed to a seek
a restraining order against Father as part of a safety plan.
The following week, however, Mother indicated that she was no
longer interested in a restraining order, because she intended to
relocate and did not want DCFS “in her business.” She refused to
state whether Father had returned to the home. When the social
worker made an unannounced visit to the home, Mother refused
to allow her inside.
       The social worker later spoke with Father, the paternal
grandmother, and the adoptive maternal grandfather. Father
denied he ever engaged in domestic violence against Mother.
He also reported that he moved out of the home following his
release from jail. The paternal grandmother expressed that she
was interested in having A.L. placed with her, and that she
believed Mother was emotionally unstable. She noted that
Father had moved in with Mother following A.L.’s birth because
he felt Mother lacked the mental capacity to care for the child on
her own. The maternal grandfather indicated that he and the
maternal grandmother adopted Mother when she was a baby.

                                3
He was aware that Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia as
an adult, but he did not know her current situation.
      On May 22, 2020, DCFS filed a dependency petition for
A.L. under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition
alleged that Father had a history of committing domestic violence
against Mother in A.L.’s presence, and that Mother failed to
protect A.L. by allowing Father to reside in the home and have
unlimited access to the child.
II.   Detention hearing and ICWA finding
      At the May 28, 2020 detention hearing, both Mother and
Father appeared and were appointed counsel. They each
submitted a Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020)
form in which they indicated they did not have any Indian
ancestry. Based on these responses, the juvenile court found that
ICWA did not apply. The court made detention findings for A.L.,
and ordered monitored visitation for both parents.
      DCFS later placed A.L. with his paternal grandmother.
There is no indication in the record that DCFS ever asked the
paternal grandmother or any other extended family members
whether A.L. might have Indian ancestry.
III. Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
      For its June 25, 2020 jurisdictional and dispositional
report, DCFS interviewed Mother about the allegations in the
section 300 petition. Mother initially denied that Father hit her
during the April 2020 incident, and claimed that they solely had
a verbal disagreement. She later admitted that Father hit her
with an open hand or fist, but continued to minimize the incident
as not being “extremely violent” or involving “excessive force.”
Mother confirmed that she obtained a restraining order against
Father, and that they were no longer in a relationship or living

                                4
together. Although DCFS also attempted to interview Father for
its report, he did not respond to multiple attempts to reach him.
       On July 16, 2020, the juvenile court held a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing. The court sustained the
petition as alleged, and declared A.L. a dependent under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The court removed A.L.
from parental custody, and granted family reunification services
to both parents. Mother’s case plan included a domestic violence
support group, parenting education, mental health services, and
individual counseling to address case issues. The court ordered
monitored visitation for both parents a minimum of three times a
week on the condition that they not visit together, and granted
DCFS discretion to liberalize the parents’ visits.
IV. Six-month review hearing
       In its six-month status review report, DCFS stated that
A.L. remained suitably placed in the paternal grandmother’s
home. Father had not enrolled in any programs or had any
contact with DCFS. Mother initially failed to respond to DCFS’s
repeated efforts to contact her. In mid-February 2021, Mother
called the social worker, and said that she wanted to “reinstate”
her visits with A.L. She also indicated that she was taking
prescribed medication and participating in her court-ordered
services. Mother’s therapist reported, however, that Mother’s
services terminated due to her lack of participation, and that
Mother recently contacted the therapist about reinstating them.
       The paternal grandmother informed DCFS that both
parents continued to have monitored visitation. Father visited
A.L. on a daily basis for short periods of time before or after work.
Mother also visited A.L., but according to the paternal
grandmother, her visits “tend to get cut short due to [her] erratic

                                 5
behavior.” While Mother never endangered A.L. during the
visits, she exhibited concerning behaviors, such as talking to
herself, pulling out her hair, and stating that strangers wanted to
sexually assault and impregnate her. In February 2021, the
social worker spoke with Mother and the paternal grandmother
about these concerns with Mother’s visits. The paternal
grandmother indicated that she was willing to resume
monitoring Mother’s visits as long as they took place in a nearby
park.
       At the six-month review hearing held on March 2, 2021,
the juvenile court found that DCFS provided reasonable services.
The court further found that both Mother and Father failed to
make substantial progress with their case plans, and that
continued jurisdiction over A.L. was necessary. The court
extended reunification services for both parents, and set the
matter for a 12-month review hearing.
V.     12-month review hearing
       In its 12-month status review report, DCFS stated that
A.L. continued to do well in the paternal grandmother’s care.
Father maintained short daily visits with A.L. While Father
refused to participate in any court-ordered services, Mother’s
“cooperation with services and visitation drastically changed” in
the past six months. In March 2021, Mother completed programs
in domestic violence and parenting education. She continued to
participate in individual and mental health counseling, and was
taking prescribed psychotropic medication. Mother’s therapist
reported that, when Mother was not taking medication, she was
withdrawn and had difficulty remaining on topic. However,
Mother had been compliant with treatment, and the therapist
had no current concerns about her.

                                6
      In April 2021, Mother also enrolled in a residential drug
treatment program. She then began having virtual visits with
A.L. approximately three times per week. The paternal
grandmother reported that Mother was very attentive and
appropriate with A.L. during the visits. Mother was not able to
have any in-person visits during that time because the program’s
COVID-19 policy prohibited her from leaving the premises.
While participating in the program, Mother consistently tested
negative for drugs, and she was in the process of transitioning to
a sober living facility. In June 2021, however, Mother withdrew
from the program and relocated to a shelter so that she could
restart in-person visits. She also began full-time employment.
Mother stated that she wanted to demonstrate her intent to
reunify with A.L. and her compliance with her court-ordered
services.
      After leaving the drug treatment program, Mother resumed
in-person visits with A.L. in mid-June 2021. As of August 2021,
Mother was having monitored in-person visits two times per
week. The social worker observed two of the visits, and noted
that Mother was attentive to A.L.’s needs. In its report, DCFS
recommended that the court terminate Father’s reunification
services, and continue Mother’s reunification services for an
additional six months to allow her time to transition to
unmonitored visits.
      On August 31, 2021, the juvenile court held the 12-month
review hearing. The court terminated Father’s reunification
services. In response to Mother’s request for continued
reunification services and unmonitored visitation, counsel for
A.L. and counsel for DCFS joined in asking that the court extend
Mother’s reunification services, but not liberalize her visits to

                                7
unmonitored at that time. A.L.’s counsel explained that he
recently spoke with the paternal grandmother, who was
supportive of eventual reunification, but expressed concern that
Mother was not yet comfortable holding A.L. and did know how
to place the child in his car seat. In support of the request for
unmonitored visits, Mother’s counsel noted that Mother was fully
complying with her services and consistently attending in-person
visits with A.L. Mother’s counsel proposed that protective
“measures, such as a P.C.I.T. [parent-child interaction therapy
(PCIT)] referral can be put in place . . . to make sure [Mother] is
receiving the proper instruction and that all of the concerns that
have been raised by minor’s counsel can be adequately
addressed.”
       The court found that DCFS provided reasonable services,
and that continued jurisdiction over A.L. was necessary.
The court also found that Mother was compliant with her case
plan, and that “once she started, [Mother] has consistently and
regularly visited and she has made significant progress in
resolving the issues that [led] to the removal of her son.”
The court ordered an additional period of reunification services
for Mother. The court declined to grant Mother unmonitored
visits at that time, but ordered DCFS to assist her in enrolling in
a PCIT program. The court also granted DCFS continued
discretion to liberalize Mother’s visits. The court set the matter
for an 18-month review hearing.
       Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the
12-month review hearing.
VI. Postappeal orders
       DCFS requests this court take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s February 23, 2023 orders from the section 366.26 hearing

                                 8
held during the pendency of Mother’s appeal. We grant DCFS’s
unopposed request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
On our own motion, we also take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s January 20, 2022 and August 18, 2022 minute orders.
       As reflected in these postappeal orders, on January 20,
2022, the juvenile court held the 18-month review hearing, found
that DCFS had not provided reasonable services, and further
extended Mother’s reunification services. Then, on August 18,
2022, the court held a 24-month review hearing, found that
continued jurisdiction over A.L. was necessary, and terminated
Mother’s reunification services. Finally, on February 23, 2023,
the court held the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.
At that hearing, the court ordered a permanent plan for A.L. of
legal guardianship with the paternal grandmother, granted
Mother unmonitored visitation a minimum of three times per
week for three hours per visit, and terminated dependency
jurisdiction.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Reasonable services finding and visitation order
       Mother raises two arguments with respect to the juvenile
court’s findings and orders at the 12-month review hearing.
First, she contends the court erred in finding that DCFS provided
her with reasonable services, primarily because the agency failed
to ensure that she had in-person visits with A.L. for a portion of
the reunification period. Second, Mother asserts the court erred
in refusing to liberalize her visits with A.L. to unmonitored given
her substantial progress with her reunification services. We
conclude both claims are moot in light of subsequent events, and
even if not moot, the claims lack merit.

                                 9
      A.     Mother’s challenges to the reasonable services
             finding and visitation order are moot
       In challenging the juvenile court’s rulings at the 12-month
review hearing, Mother contends that the proper remedy is for
this court to reverse the reasonable services finding and the
visitation order, and to remand the matter for a new status
review hearing “to consider return to and/or unmonitored visits
for [M]other.” In its respondent’s brief, DCFS argues that this
court cannot provide any effective relief beyond that which
Mother already obtained, because the juvenile court granted her
additional reunification services at the 12-month review hearing
and unmonitored visitation at the permanency planning hearing.
Mother did not file a reply brief addressing DCFS’s mootness
argument. We agree with DCFS that this portion of Mother’s
appeal is moot.
       “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 276.) “[T]he critical factor in considering whether a
dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can
provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error.” (In re N.S.
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60.) “For relief to be ‘effective,’ two
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of
an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or
capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.”
(In re D.P., at p. 276.)
       As to reasonable services finding, “[t]he remedy for the
failure to provide court-ordered reunification services to a parent
is to provide an additional period of reunification services to that
parent and to make a finding on the record that reasonable

                                  10
services were not offered or provided to that parent.” (In re A.G.
(2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 994, 1005, italics omitted.) For a child
under the age of three at the time of removal, as A.L. was here,
the minimum period of reunification services is six months.
(§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B).) The maximum period of reunification
services is presumptively 18 months (id., subd. (a)(3)(A)), but
services “may be extended up to a maximum time period not to
exceed 24 months” after the original date of removal under
certain limited circumstances (id., subd. (a)(4)(A)). If the child is
not returned to the parent’s custody within these statutory time
limits, the court ordinarily must terminate reunification services
and set a permanency planning hearing. (Michael G. v. Superior
Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 627–628; see § 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)
      In this case, despite its reasonable services finding, the
juvenile court provided Mother with an additional period of
reunification services at the 12-month review hearing. The court
then extended Mother’s services for an additional six months at
the 18-month review hearing. By the time the court terminated
her services at the 24-month review hearing, Mother had
received the maximum period of reunification services allowed
under section 361.5. Mother does not argue that she is entitled to
more than 24 months of services, or that there is any relief this
court could grant for an alleged erroneous reasonable services
finding beyond the additional period of services that Mother
already received. Mother’s challenge to the reasonable services
finding at the 12-month review hearing is accordingly moot.
      As to the visitation order, we likewise cannot grant Mother
any effective relief for her claim that the juvenile court erred in
refusing to liberalize her visits to unmonitored at the 12-month
review hearing. As DCFS correctly asserts, the juvenile court

                                 11
already provided Mother with the very relief that she seeks by
this appeal for the alleged error. At the section 366.26 hearing on
February 23, 2023, the court ordered a permanent plan for A.L. of
legal guardianship with the paternal grandmother, and granted
Mother unmonitored visits a minimum of three times per week
for three hours per visit. Because Mother obtained the requested
relief in a subsequent proceeding, her challenge to the prior order
for monitored visitation is also moot. (See In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488–1489.)
       B.     Mother’s challenges to the reasonable services
              finding and visitation order lack merit
       Even if Mother’s claims were not moot, they fail on the
merits. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
lower court’s rulings, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in
(1) finding that DCFS provided Mother with reasonable services,
and (2) ordering that Mother’s visits remain monitored while she
continued participating in reunification services.
              1.    Reasonable services finding
       At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court must
“determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable
services that were designed to aid the parent . . . to overcome the
problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of
the child have been provided or offered to the parent.” (§ 366.21,
subd. (f)(1)(A).) “To support a finding that reasonable services
were offered or provided . . ., ‘the record should show that the
supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of
custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the
course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist
the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.’ ” (In re

                                12
A.G., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.) The standard is not
whether the services “ ‘were the best that might be provided in an
ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the
circumstances.’ ” (In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 566.)
We review the juvenile court’s reasonable services finding for
substantial evidence. (In re J.P. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 616, 624.)
       Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding at the August 31, 2021, 12-month review hearing that
DCFS provided reasonable services to Mother. Between the six-
and 12-month review hearings, DCFS adequately monitored
Mother’s progress with her court-ordered services, and reported
to the court that Mother was in compliance with her case plan.
As detailed in DCFS’s 12-month status review report, Mother
completed programs in domestic violence and parenting
education, and continued to participate in individual counseling
and mental health services. In April 2021, Mother also enrolled
in a residential drug treatment program. While Mother was in
the drug treatment program, she could only have virtual visits
with A.L. due to the program’s strict COVID-19 policy. Upon
withdrawing from the program in mid-June 2021, Mother
restarted in-person visits. DCFS observed two in-person visits
prior to the 12-month review hearing, and found that Mother was
appropriate and attentive to A.L. during those visits.
       Mother argues the evidence was insufficient to support the
reasonable services finding because DCFS failed to provide her
with in-person visits for a significant portion of the reunification
period. She also asserts DCFS improperly delegated authority
over her visits to the paternal grandmother. The record does not
support these claims. Rather, it shows that when DCFS spoke
with the paternal grandmother for its six-month status review

                                13
report, she reported that Mother’s visits “tend to get cut short”
because of her erratic behavior. Prior to the six-month review
hearing, DCFS discussed these concerns with both Mother and
the paternal grandmother, and it was agreed that the paternal
grandmother would continue monitoring Mother’s visits at a local
park. Between the six- and 12-month review hearings, Mother’s
residential drug treatment program, not the paternal
grandmother, precluded Mother from having in-person visits with
A.L. while she was in the program. Once she left the program,
Mother was able to resume regular in-person visits without
delay.
       In challenging the reasonable services finding, Mother also
contends DCFS failed to refer her to special parenting classes to
address any alleged cognitive needs. The record reflects that, at
the 12-month review hearing, A.L.’s counsel expressed concern
that, based on a recent conversation he had with the paternal
grandmother, Mother lacked certain essential parenting skills
during her monitored visits. At the request of Mother’s counsel,
the juvenile court agreed to address these concerns by referring
Mother for PCIT services. The court thus extended Mother’s
reunification services and ordered DCFS to assist her in enrolling
in a PCIT program. The court’s decision to order an additional
program for Mother that could aid her in reunifying with A.L.
does not show that DCFS failed to provide her with reasonable
services. Rather, considering DCFS’s efforts and Mother’s
progress, the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s finding that the services provided were reasonable.
             2.    Visitation order
       An order granting reunification services to a parent must
provide for visitation “as frequent as possible, consistent with the

                                14
well-being of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, “[n]o
visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (Id.,
subd. (a)(1)(B).) “The power to regulate visits between dependent
children and their parents rests with the juvenile court and its
visitation orders will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion.” (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.)
       Mother asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering that her visits with A.L. remain monitored subject to
DCFS’s discretion to liberalize, because DCFS gave the paternal
grandmother complete authority over whether any visits would
occur. As discussed, the record does not support Mother’s claim.
Instead, the evidence demonstrated that, as of the 12-month
review hearing, Mother had made commendable progress with
her reunification services, but only recently had resumed in-
person visits with A.L. after leaving her drug treatment program.
The evidence also showed that DCFS’s recommendation at that
time was to grant Mother an additional period of reunification
services specifically so that she could transition to unmonitored
visits. Based on the totality of the record, the court reasonably
could determine that A.L.’s safety and well-being necessitated
that Mother’s visits remain monitored while she received further
reunification services, including participating in a PCIT program
that could assist her in transitioning to unmonitored visits.
The juvenile court’s order for monitored visitation subject to
DCFS’s discretion to liberalize was not an abuse of discretion.
II.    ICWA inquiry
       On appeal, Mother contends, and DCFS concedes, that the
juvenile court failed to ensure compliance with ICWA’s inquiry
provisions because no inquiry was made of available extended
family members about A.L.’s possible Indian ancestry.

                                15
       A.     Governing law
       ICWA mandates that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a
[s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that
an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s
tribe” of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene.
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) Similarly, California law requires notice to
the child’s parent, Indian custodian, if any, and the child’s tribe if
there is “reason to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in
the proceeding. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Both juvenile courts and
child protective agencies “have an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section
300 . . . may be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14.)
       At the first appearance of each party, the juvenile court
must inquire whether that party “knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child,” and must “instruct the parties
to inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (c).) Additionally, when a child protective agency takes a
child into temporary custody, it must inquire of a nonexclusive
group that includes the child, the parents, and extended family
members “whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (Id.,
subd. (b)). Extended family members include adults who are the
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
       “If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been

                                 16
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We generally review the
juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the substantial evidence
test, “ ‘ “which requires us to determine if reasonable, credible
evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.” ’ ” (In re
Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
       B.     Remand is required for ICWA compliance
       In this case, DCFS acknowledges that it had contact with
A.L.’s paternal grandmother and adoptive maternal grandfather,
but it did not ask either of them whether A.L. is or might be an
Indian child. In the absence of any evidence that DCFS complied
with its duty to inquire of these known and available extended
family members, as required by section 224.2, subdivision (b), the
juvenile court’s finding that there was no reason to know A.L.
was an Indian child was not supported by substantial evidence.
(See, e.g., In re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 311 [ICWA
error where DCFS failed to inquire of available extended family
members for whom it had contact information]; In re J.W. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 384, 389 [ICWA error where DCFS did not ask
mother’s extended family members about their Indian ancestry,
despite having contact with maternal grandmother, uncle, and
aunt]; In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 70, review granted
Oct. 12, 2022, S276099 [ICWA error where no inquiry was made
of extended family members with whom DCFS was in contact].)
       Appellate courts have adopted several divergent standards
for deciding whether an ICWA inquiry error is prejudicial. (See
In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 611–618 [describing four
approaches for assessing prejudice at the inquiry stage and

                                17
adopting a fifth, injury-focused standard].) In this case, however,
we need not decide which standard of prejudice applies. DCFS
does not oppose a limited remand of the matter so that it can
conduct an ICWA inquiry of A.L.’s paternal grandmother and
adoptive maternal grandfather, and if required, proceed in
accordance with ICWA’s notice provisions.
       Additionally, as a majority panel of this division has
reasoned, placing the child with extended family members does
not obviate the need for remand because “[e]ven in such cases,
tribes may assert tribal jurisdiction or may formally intervene in
state court.” (In re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 711.)
“A ‘tribe’s rights are independent of the rights of other parties.’ ”
(Ibid.) Under these circumstances and in light of DCFS’s
concession, we agree that remand for compliance with ICWA and
related California law is the proper remedy.
                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s order at the 12-month status review
hearing is conditionally affirmed, and the matter is remanded for
compliance with ICWA and related California law. On remand,
the court must promptly direct DCFS to comply with its duty of
inquiry in accordance with section 224.2 by interviewing known
and available extended family members about A.L.’s possible
Indian status. If that information establishes a reason to know
that an Indian child is involved, notice must be provided in
accordance with ICWA and section 224.3. DCFS shall thereafter
notify the court of its actions and file certified mail return
receipts for any ICWA notices that were sent, together with any
responses received. The court must determine, on the record,
whether the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements have been
satisfied and whether A.L. is an Indian child. If the court

                                 18
determines that A.L. is an Indian child, it must vacate its order
and conduct a new status review hearing, as well as all further
proceedings, in accordance with ICWA and related California
law. If not, the court’s original order shall remain in effect.

                                          VIRAMONTES, J.

      I CONCUR:

                  WILEY, J.

                                19
STRATTON, P. J., Dissenting
       These proceedings started when A.L. was five months old.
He is now four years old. All agree DCFS erred in failing to
question extended family members despite having contact
information for them. I conclude the error was harmless. The
proposed permanency plan is to establish a legal guardianship for
A.L. with his paternal grandmother as legal guardian. A.L. has
been placed with paternal grandmother almost since the
inception of the proceedings. Paternal grandmother has also
been monitoring A.L.’s visitation with his mother for most of the
last four years.
       In enacting ICWA, Congress found “that an alarmingly
high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal,
often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal
public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high
percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions.” (25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).) ICWA
reflects the intent of Congress “to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and
by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of
child and family service programs.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The
court is obligated to ask each “participant” in the proceedings
whether they have reason to believe the child is an Indian child
and to instruct the parties to inform the court if they
subsequently receive information that provides a reason to know
the child is an Indian child. (In re Austin J. (2020)

                               1
47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882–883, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 147;
see 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2022).)
       As our Supreme Court has recognized, “Congress enacted
ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising concern in the mid-1970’s
over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and
Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices that resulted in
the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their
families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement,
usually in non-Indian homes.’ ” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1, 7.) In enacting these provisions, “ ‘Congress was concerned not
solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also
about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of
Indian children adopted by non-Indians.’ ” (Id. at p. 9.)
       The concern about separating Indian children from their
Indian families, heritage and culture was the topic of extensive
Congressional hearings when ICWA was enacted. As one
commentator wrote, the “ ‘wholesale separation of Indian
children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and
destructive aspect of American Indian life today.’ ” (Atwood,
Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance (2002) 51 Emory L.J.
587, 601, cited in In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1014.)
       ICWA authorizes states to provide even more protection
than the federal statute provides. In 2006, the California
legislature enacted parallel statutes to affirm ICWA’s purposes
and mandate compliance with ICWA in all Indian child custody
proceedings. (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706, fn. 3.)
In California, the child protection agency is obligated to ask “the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family

                                 2
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b); In re Dominick D. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 560, 566.)
       Here, the question is not error, but whether the error was
prejudicial. A prerequisite to reversal of a trial court’s decision
under California law is a showing of miscarriage of justice. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13.)
       I find no miscarriage of justice, that is, no prejudice. ICWA
itself sets out placement priorities. Section 1915 of title 25 of the
United States Code provides that in any adoptive placement of an
Indian child under state law, “a preference shall be given, in the
absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with [¶]
(1) a member of the child’s extended family; [¶] (2) other members
of the Indian child’s tribe; or [¶] (3) other Indian families.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).) Extended family under ICWA includes
grandparents. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
       In this case, a legal guardianship by paternal grandmother
satisfies first preference. A.L. is in no danger of being separated
from his biological family, the evil ICWA was enacted to prevent.
(In re J.W. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 384, 391.) Moreover, even if a
tribe had intervened, it would be bound by the placement
priorities of the statute if, as the court found here, the first
placement priority was in the minor’s best interest. Legal
guardianship with paternal grandmother does not sever his
connection to his biological family; it furthers it. I am hard
pressed to conclude that a tribe’s inability to participate trumps
the stability and benefits afforded by first placement with, and
then legal guardianship by, a family member with whom A.L. is
familiar.

                                 3
       I cannot find that ICWA and its California counterpart
were intended to elevate a tribe’s right to participate over this
child’s interest in a secure and safe placement within the bosom
of his own biological family. Tribes are included in the
proceedings to ensure that no unreasonable and unjustified
separation from biological family members occurs. Nothing like
that happened here. That the tribe may be the unofficial real
party in interest does not supersede the child’s best interests. I
oppose delaying this biological-family guardianship so that a
tribe can come in and suggest someone else within the first
preference category. Neither the interests of the tribe nor of A.L.
have been prejudicially trampled.

                                           STRATTON, P. J.

                                 4