Court Opinion

ID: 9697940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:37:42.696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.073034
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that this matter must be remanded for further proceedings on the question of the correct common level ratio for the years in question and to that extent I join that portion of the majority opinion which disposes of that issue. I dissent, however, to that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the fair market values as found by the trial judge.
The majority correctly notes that, under the General County Assessment Law, 72 P.S. § 5020-518.1, the trial court has the duty to hear, without a jury, a tax assessment appeal; that such appeals are heard de novo; that the court is to consider the competent and credible evidence and thereafter make a determination as to the fair market value based upon the competent and credible evidence presented, and that the trial court (unlike a jury), as finder of fact, must explain its reasons for arriving at its conclusions. (Opinion, p. 1312).
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, heard and accepted as credible, relevant and reliable the testimony from two competing and controverting experts who gave differing opinions as to the fair market values and, without articulating any basis or reason, the trial judge, in essence, split the difference between the two extremes and fixed the fair market values. The majority finds this treatment proper and affirms.
Although each expert testified at length and produced large amounts of evidence to support his opinion as to values, the trial judge did not articulate what parts of the evidence he relied upon to make his findings.
*474The majority also correctly states that, “Our scope of review in a tax assessment appeal is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence.” (Opinion, p. 1309). How are we to know what evidence is relied upon by the trial judge when he does not articulate same?
When there is a plethora of conflicting evidence, it has to be the burden of the trial judge to articulate what portions of all the evidence was chosen to support the findings of fact made and for the appellate courts to determine whether the articulated evidence is substantial enough to support the findings of the trial judge. Did the trial judge rely on capitalization of net income, gross income multiplier, market comparables, reproduction costs? What available proofs were used?
In his statement, the trial judge simply states, “The Court based on his consideration of the evidence as we have indicated, we disagree with both experts, and we find the fair market value for the year 1977 is twenty-six million dollars [$26,000,-000].” Merely accepting all the conflicting evidence as credible, reliable and relevant and then “splitting the difference” is nothing more than pure guess work. The parties are entitled to know, and the appellate courts must know, what portions of the evidence were relied upon and what parts were rejected.
The findings of the trial judge, must be based upon substantial evidence. Did the trial judge here conclude that the evidence supporting the lower evaluations was substantial and thus support a higher evaluation? Or did the trial judge conclude that the evidence supporting the higher evaluations was substantial and thus supports a lower evaluation? Who knows? I don’t and I am sure the parties don’t!
Obviously, the trial judge cannot accept all of the evidence of one expert and use it as a basis for a higher or lower evaluation than that given by the expert. The trial judge, of course, can accept the opinion of one expert and reject the opinion of any contradictory expert and find the fair market value as proposed by the expert relied upon. There then is no *475need for specificity in writing an opinion and articulating the evidence relied upon. The appellate courts can review the whole body of evidence relied upon by the trial judge and decide whether it is substantial.
If the trial judge does not rely completely upon the opinion of one expert to the exclusion of all others, the trial judge must, of necessity, select those portions of all the evidence which support the findings of fact as to fair market values. The trial judge in this case did not rely upon the opinion of either expert and he failed to tell us what portions of the evidence introduced'by all the experts were used to support his conclusions.
It is not for the appellate jurists to sift through the hundreds of pages of testimony and exhibits to pick and choose the evidence which substantially supports the findings of fact as to evaluations. It is for the trial judge to do so. Our duty is to determine whether the evidence the trial judge articulates as credible is substantial enough to support the findings of fact.
The rule now established by the majority simply means that, henceforth, the parties in a tax assessment appeal can simply have their experts testify to low values for the taxpayer and extremely high values for the assessors and taxing bodies. The judge can then simply split the difference without explanation. I find this to be jurisprudentially wrong. On the other hand, maybe this new rule will bring about more settlements and avoid the necessity of de novo trials. The parties can just as easily split the difference as can- the trial judge.
Simply stated, I believe the trial judge, as fact finder, must complete the question, “I find the fair market value (or common level ratio) to be x number of dollars BECAUSE ----”1 This has not been done here and I dissent.
CAPPY, J., joins this Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

. It is interesting to note that in each case cited by the majority to support the scheme of splitting the difference, the trial judge wrote a full opinion articulating the evidence relied upon to support the finding of fair market value.