Court Opinion

ID: 9529260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:15.11165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.318269
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding vacating the superior court’s award of alimony and remanding the issue for findings concerning Virginia Jones’ financial needs.1 In my view the court’s analysis of this alimony issue overlooks relevant findings by the superior court as well as explicit statutory criteria which must be considered by the superior court in making an alimony determination.
In relevant part AS 25.24.160 provides as follows:
(a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
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(2) for the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money for maintenance, for a limited or indefinite period of time, in gross or in installments, as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the parties is in fault; an award of maintenance must fairly allocate the economic effect of di--vorce by being based on a consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under (4) of this subsection; and
(G) other factors the court determines to be relevant in each individual case;
In its finding number VII the superior court states:
For the reasons given in the decision of court, it is just and necessary that husband pay to wife the amount of $2,500 per month to begin October 1, 1990 and end upon ... the husband reaching age 65....
(Emphasis added.)
Review of the “Decision of Court” indicates that the superior court followed the mandate of AS 25.24.160(a)(2) in making its alimony determination. The superior court begins its analysis of this subject by stating its conclusion:
This court also determines that because of plaintiff’s economic dependency upon defendant as discussed below, she should be entitled to spousal maintenance until defendant’s retirement at the age of 65 in the amount of $2,500.00 per month.2
The superior court then notes that “This is a 38 year marriage”; that the parties are 57 years of age; that Virginia has “not worked outside of the home throughout this marriage”; that her education is less than ninth grade; that she has extensive physical impairments and psychological difficulties; and “[ajfter 38 years of marriage *1181and at her mature age and debilitated status, it is not reasonable to expect her to become economically employed.”
Of particular significance is the following portion of the superior court’s decision:
Until the time of retirement, however, it will be necessary for Mrs. Jones to be partially supported by Mr. Jones. Evidence indicates that $2,500.00 per month would be an appropriate level of alimony for Mr. Jones to pay during these remaining few years. This would maintain Mrs. Jones in an appropriate station in life although somewhat less than the standard of living to which she was accustomed in Alaska. It would also allow Mr. Jones to maintain an appropriate station in life and an appropriate standard of living as well.3
(Emphasis added.)
In contrast to the above, the court appears to focus exclusively upon Virginia Jones’ specific financial needs to the exclusion of all other relevant factors mandated for consideration by AS 25.24.160(a)(2).
As to the merits of this issue, I would affirm the superior court’s award of alimony. I think it important to recognize the compelling facts which support the superi- or court’s resolution of this issue. Here we have a marriage of 38 years’ duration in which it is obvious that the parties mutually decided that Virginia would remain at home and raise their four children. At no time during the parties’ 38 year marriage was Virginia employed outside the home (Virginia never completed the ninth grade). The record is also clear that given Virginia’s age (57 years old), and the debilitated status of her health (both physical and emotional), the superior court was correct in its conclusion that it is not reasonable to expect Virginia to work. On the other hand, the evidence is uncontradicted that Billie Jones earns at least $115,000 annually.
Given the above, and the record support for the superior court’s conclusion that Virginia’s reasonable needs are in excess of $2,500 per month and that this amount of alimony will maintain Virginia at an appropriate station in life (for the eight years in question), I would affirm the superior court’s award of alimony.4

. I agree with all of the court’s other holdings.

. The effect of this provision is that Billie G. Jones’ obligation to pay alimony terminates in eight years.

. See AS 25.24.160(a)(2)(A) note 1, supra.

. My view that the superior court’s award of alimony should be affirmed is based in part upon a construction of "just and necessary", and the other factors articulated in AS 25.24.-160(a)(2), which leads me to conclude that the legislature did not intend to limit alimony to subsistence levels for recipient spouses.