Court Opinion

ID: 9598085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:05:09.345755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:39.113248
License: Public Domain

Hill, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I am unable to concur in Division 3 of the majority opinion. In that division, the majority hold: “If, at the time of the questioning, a party has knowledge of a prior statement by one of his witnesses which contradicts testimony that witness has just given, that party has been sufficiently entrapped so that he may impeach his witness by use of the prior inconsistent statement.” That is to say, if a party has a prior inconsistent statement, that party has been entrapped and can impeach the witness.
In Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858 (286 SE2d 717) (1982), we held that a prior inconsistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence when the maker of the statement takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination. The majority here do not acknowledge *315Gibbons.
In Ranger v. State, 249 Ga. 315 (290 SE2d 63) (1982), post, decided contemporaneously with the case before us, we hold that Code § 38-1801 (which is applicable to impeachment) is not applicable where a witness’ prior contradictory statement is introduced as substantive evidence pursuant to Gibbons v. State, supra. I would apply the rationale of Ranger here. I therefore concur in the judgment.