Court Opinion

ID: 9400188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 16:09:37.117297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.821820
License: Public Domain

J-A27036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
    SAGE IFILL                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1657 MDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 5, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0000242-2019

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
    SAGE SKYLER IFILL                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1658 MDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 5, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0006633-2017

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                      FILED: JUNE 7, 2023

        Sage Skyler Ifill appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following a consolidated jury trial in which he was found guilty of three counts

of rape and three counts of sexual assault.1 For these offenses, Ifill was
____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(3) (unconscious complainant), and 18 Pa.C.S. §
3124.1, respectively.
J-A27036-22

sentenced to twenty-two and one-half to forty-five years of incarceration. On

appeal, Ifill raises seven issues, chiefly challenging the court’s consolidation

of the charges that were against him. In addition, Ifill contests the ‘excessive’

aggregate sentence that he received, questions the sufficiency and the weight

of the evidence employed against him, and avers that the Commonwealth

failed to demonstrate that he is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). After a

thorough review of the record, we vacate the judgment of sentence and

remand for resentencing. However, in all other respects, we affirm.

      The jury trial featured testimony from two incidents: one happening on

October 15, 2016, and the other occurring on October 15, 2017. Distilling

down these events, the trial cogently wrote, as to the facts underpinning the

first set of criminal charges, that:

              On the night of October 15, 2016, Jenna McMillen
      (hereinafter, “Jenna”) dropped off Cheyenne Moore (hereinafter,
      “Cheyenne”) at a friend’s house. Later the same night, Jenna and
      Cheyenne met at a bar and restaurant named Arooga’s. Jenna
      testified that Cheyenne appeared to be very intoxicated when she
      saw Cheyenne at Arooga’s. Cheyenne consumed a large amount
      of alcohol at Arooga’s and she cannot remember everything she
      did or said at Arooga’s. Around 2 a.m. on October 16, 2016, Jenna
      and Cheyenne left Arooga’s and drove back to the friend’s house.
      [Ifill had already been present at this friend’s house.] Jenna and
      Cheyenne continued to drink alcohol at the friend’s house.
      Cheyenne began to speak to [Ifill] as they had a friend in common.

            Cheyenne started feeling physically sick and nauseous. She
      vomits and states that she needs to go to the hospital. [Ifill] sat
      next to Cheyenne and told her that she just needs to “throw it
      up.” Cheyenne again stated that she felt like she needed to go to
      the hospital because she had never felt like that before. When
      Cheyenne stated that she needed a hospital, [Ifill] said “don’t take
      her to the hospital.” Jenna stated that she did not see any type of

                                       -2-
J-A27036-22

     physical touching between [Ifill] and Cheyenne prior to Cheyenne
     getting sick.

            Approximately half an hour later, Cheyenne disappeared
     from the lower level of the home. Jenna asked the owner of the
     home where Cheyenne went, and she stated that Cheyenne was
     upstairs taking a bath. Cheyenne remembers being in the
     bathroom, sitting on the toilet, and warm clothes being put on her
     body. Jenna went upstairs to check on Cheyenne but received no
     answer when she knocked on the locked bathroom door. After a
     third knock, [Ifill] answered from inside the locked bathroom that
     Cheyenne was fine. Jenna knocked again and asked if she was
     okay and Cheyenne answered that she was okay. Jenna testified
     that Cheyenne sounded “really groggy and out of it” when she
     answered through the locked door. Jenna could not hear any water
     running or water sloshing around. Jenna then asked the
     homeowner to come and unlock the bathroom door. When Jenna
     made her way back upstairs, Cheyenne was out of the bathroom
     and dressed in a bright green or blue long t-shirt and sweatpants.
     Cheyenne stumbled through the hallway and threw herself onto
     the homeowner’s bed. Jenna asked Cheyenne to leave with her,
     but Cheyenne stated that she was comfortable on the bed.
     Cheyenne does not remember how she got to the upstairs
     bathroom, nor does she remember taking a bath.

            When Cheyenne woke up the next morning, she attempted
     to insert a tampon, but it felt very [uncomfortable] and painful,
     so she took the tampon out. Cheyenne testified that she did not
     feel [like] herself and felt that something was off.

             The next day, on October 17, 2016, Jenna called Cheyenne
     to check on her and encourage her to go to the hospital. Cheyenne
     went to the hospital and had a [sexual assault forensic examiner
     (“SAFE”)] exam, or a rape kit test, completed. During the course
     of the internal exam, the nurse found a tampon inside of her. This
     is a tampon that she inserted before going to Arooga’s. Cheyenne
     contacted the police approximately one year later when she saw
     [Ifill] on the news being charged with multiple counts of rape and
     sexual assault.

             Santiago Steven Soto (hereinafter, “Santiago”), a friend of
     [Ifill], testified that he was present at the friend’s home with
     Cheyenne, Jenna, and [Ifill]. Santiago testified that Cheyenne
     appeared to be intoxicated. Santiago testified that he heard sexual

                                    -3-
J-A27036-22

      moaning at some point during the evening or early morning. When
      he was ready to leave, he went upstairs and observed Cheyenne
      asleep on [Ifill’s] chest with her hand on his penis. Santiago and
      [Ifill] left the residence. During a[ police] interview …, Santiago
      stated that [Ifill] mentioned having sexual intercourse with
      Cheyenne while she was on her period.

              Adma Arvelo [nicknamed “China”] is the owner of the home
      in which the assault on Cheyenne took place. China stated that
      Cheyenne became too intoxicated and vomited. China told her to
      take a shower and lay down. China took Cheyenne upstairs, [p]ut
      her in the bathroom, then went back downstairs. China testified
      that Cheyenne called [Ifill] to come upstairs. China went back
      upstairs to the bathroom and observed Cheyenne in the bathtub
      with [Ifill] in the bathroom. Cheyenne stated to China “it’s cool,
      we’re just talking.” China also testified that she heard [Ifill] and
      Cheyenne having intercourse. When China went back upstairs,
      [Ifill] exited the bathroom and China made sure that Cheyenne
      got dressed for bed. In conversations that took place after that
      night, [Ifill] stated to China that he had sexual intercourse with
      Cheyenne.

            Nicole Baselj (hereinafter, “Nurse Baselj”) examined
      Cheyenne on October 17, 2016. Cheyenne indicated to Nurse
      Baselj that she was intoxicated at the time of the incident and that
      she did not remember what happened. Nurse Baselj testified that,
      in her experience as a SAFE nurse, it is not likely that date rape
      drugs will show up in a drug panel as those specific types of drugs
      can stay in the system for as little as six … to twelve … hours.
      Nurse Baselj included in her records that Cheyenne showered,
      used the bathroom, and changed her clothing prior to the SAFE
      exam. Nurse Baselj also indicated in her report that a tampon was
      removed during the exam.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/22, at 2-6 (footnotes and record citations omitted).

Then, in summarizing what had happened in the separate incident, which

occurred exactly one year later:

           On October 15, 2017, Rachel Elliot (hereinafter, “Rachel”)
      and Lindsey Taylor (hereinafter, “Lindsey”) went to Joe K’s
      Brewhouse at around 10:00 p.m. Rachel and Lindsey both knew

                                     -4-
J-A27036-22

     [Ifill] personally. On that night, [Ifill was] sitting with them at the
     brewhouse. At some point during the night, Rachel, Lindsey, and
     [Ifill] drove back to Lindsey’s home. Rachel and Lindsey testified
     that Lindsey had been drinking too much. Lindsey fell while
     attempting to walk up the stairs to her apartment. Rachel also
     testified that she should not have been driving as she had been
     drinking too much as well. Lindsey further testified that she had
     never felt that level of intoxication before, but that she did not
     drink enough to feel that way. Rachel testified that she was
     impaired enough that she felt she could not stand straight. Once
     inside Lindsey’s apartment, Lindsey vomited. Lindsey was not
     coherent and was not speaking at this point. Lindsey fell asleep
     on her couch while Rachel went to Lindsey’s bed to sleep. Prior to
     going to bed, [Ifill] and Rachel kissed. When [Ifill] attempted to
     touch Rachel underneath her shirt, Rachel told him she did not
     want that.

             After going to bed, Rachel remembers [Ifill] coming to the
     bed and saying to her “let me taste you.” The next thing Rachel
     remembers is being on her back while [Ifill] penetrated her with
     her pants and underwear around her ankles. Rachel told him “no”
     and “stop, I don’t want this.” [Ifill] kept penetrating her. Rachel
     began pushing him off again and he said “fine” and stepped away.
     [Ifill] went into the living room and Rachel fell back asleep.
     Lindsey testified that she woke up on the couch to [Ifill]
     penetrating her while on top of her body. She pushed him away
     and ran into the bathroom. While crying in the bathroom, [Ifill]
     knocked on the door. [Ifill] stopped knocking after Lindsey did not
     open the door. When he walked away from the door, Lindsey
     exited the bathroom and crawled into bed with Rachel.

            Rachel and Lindsey woke up the next morning with [Ifill] in
     the bed with him. [Ifill] left the apartment soon after. Rachel then
     left the apartment without talking to Lindsey about [Ifill]. That
     same day, Lindsey called Rachel and told her [Ifill] had raped her.
     Rachel told Lindsey that [Ifill] had raped her as well. Rachel and
     Lindsey then contacted the police and went to the hospital for a
     SAFE exam. Both Rachel and Lindsey agreed to contacting [Ifill]
     while being recorded.

           Prior to the contact initiated by police, [Ifill] contacted
     Lindsey through [the social media application] Snapchat in a
     message that stated:

                                      -5-
J-A27036-22

          Lindsey, I’m so fucking sorry!!!! I don’t remember and
          Rach just told me. It’s absolutely unacceptable. I am
          so sorry. I really hope to be forgiven and for us to be
          able to speak about it and get [it] off of our chest. I’m
          so ashamed of what I did. I’d appreciate it if we kept
          it between us, and if not I understand. Please get in
          touch with…

            Faith Mong (hereinafter, “Nurse Mong”) completed the SAFE
     exam on Rachel and Lindsey on October 16, 2017. Nurse Mong
     testified that Rachel’s exam took place approximately twenty-four
     … hours after the assault occurred. Most substances in the body
     would have been removed by that point. Rachel had a tear down
     in the posterior fourchette, or the bottom part of the vaginal
     orifice. Rachel had showered, urinated, defecated and changed
     her clothing prior to the exam. Rachel also indicated that she did
     have consensual intercourse in the prior five … days. Lindsey
     indicated to Nurse Mong that she had showered, brushed her
     teeth, changed her clothing, and urinated prior to the
     examination. Lindsey indicated that she did not have sexual
     intercourse in the prior five … days. Lindsey did not have tears
     present in or around the vaginal area.

            Kelsey Gober (hereinafter, “Ms. Gober”), a forensic
     scientist, prepared DNA samples from the evidence collected
     during Rachel and Lindsey’s SAFE exams. Ms. Gober did not find
     any seminal materials in the swabs; however, the vaginal swabs
     were sent for DNA testing. Cheslie Weaver, [also] a forensic
     scientist, performed the technical review of the DNA testing
     results in this case. Lindsey’s vaginal swabs showed two
     individuals, Lindsey and another person. However, the component
     was too small to make a determination. Rachel’s vaginal swabs
     showed two individuals, Rachel and a male. This DNA sample
     retrieved from the vaginal swabs is a partial DNA profile. The
     results partially matched to the known DNA sample from [Ifill;]
     however, as Ms. Gober testified to, [Ifill] cannot be definitively
     linked nor excluded as a contributor of the DNA.

           Jeffrey Corcoran (hereinafter, “Detective Corcoran”)
     became involved in this case after Rachel and Lindsey came to the
     police department to give statements. Upon learning that
     potential DNA evidence was collected, Detective Corcoran
     obtained a buccal swab from [Ifill]. Rachel and Lindsey provided
     conversations that took place over text message. Rachel asked

                                    -6-
J-A27036-22

      [Ifill] if he was aware that he attempted to have sexual intercourse
      with both Rachel and Lindsey and that it was not consensual. [Ifill]
      replied with an apology. Rachel asked if [Ifill] remembered, and
      [Ifill] replied that he did not remember why he was at Lindsey’s
      home. [Ifill] also told Rachel to tell Lindsey that he was sorry.
      Rachel told [Ifill] that he raped both of them and [Ifill] stated that
      it was unacceptable and that he apologizes. He then asked for
      Lindsey’s phone number so that he could apologize to her. He
      asked Rachel who all knew about the incident and Rachel
      answered that only Lindsey and Rachel knew. [Ifill] then asked
      Rachel to keep this incident between them. [Ifill] stated that what
      he did was not right and that he was ashamed of what he did. He
      further stated that it was a horrible mistake and that he would do
      whatever it takes to be forgiven.

Id., at 6-9 (footnotes and record citations omitted).

      After a jury found Ifill guilty of the above-mentioned offenses, the lower

court, contemporaneous with sentencing, considered whether Ifill should be

classified as a sexually violent predator:

              The Commonwealth received a report on June 22, 2021,
      completed by Dr. Robert Stein (hereinafter, “Dr. Stein”). Dr. Stein
      indicated in the report that [Ifill] met the criteria to be classified
      as a sexually violent predator. [Ifill] did not provide any type of
      expert testimony to rebut Dr. Stein’s conclusions. [Ifill] further
      stipulated to the report that was completed by Dr. Stein. As both
      parties stipulated to the report, no testimony was taken, and the
      [c]ourt accepted arguments from both parties. [Ifill] argued that
      the Commonwealth did not provide definitive evidence of non-
      consensual arousal because [Ifill] may have been intoxicated as
      well. He further argued that the Commonwealth did not provide
      definitive evidence that [Ifill] demonstrated predatory behavior.
      [Ifill’s] argument in support of this assertion was that predator
      behavior relates to defendants who target women with young
      children and not those who were drinking with others of the same
      age.

             The Commonwealth [argued] that [Ifill] had an opportunity
      after the first scenario to step back and reflect and to either seek
      out treatment or become self-aware of what he had done to the
      first victim. Instead, [Ifill] again assaulted two additional women

                                      -7-
J-A27036-22

      a year later. Further, the Commonwealth argued that the jury
      found [Ifill] guilty of rape and sexual assault, thus finding that the
      assaults occurred without the victims’ consent.

Id., at 10 (record citations omitted). Ultimately, the court adjudicated Ifill to

be an SVP.

      After receiving the aforementioned twenty-two and one-half to forty-

five year term of incarceration, Ifill filed a post-sentence motion, which was

denied. Thereafter, Ifill filed a timely notice of appeal from his judgment of

sentence. Additionally, the relevant parties have complied with their

respective obligations pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

      On appeal, Ifill presents seven issues for review:

      1. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to join
         Ifill’s two docket numbers together and further by denying his
         motion for severance?

      2. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Ifill of rape of an
         unconscious victim, as the Commonwealth failed to prove
         beyond a reasonable doubt that Cheyenne was either
         unconscious or unaware that sexual activity was occurring
         without her consent?

      3. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Ifill of sexual assault, as
         the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
         that sexual intercourse occurred against Cheyenne’s consent?

      4. Was the evidence sufficient to convict Ifill of two counts of rape
         of an unconscious victim and two counts of sexual assault as
         to Rachel and Lindsey?

      5. Did the Commonwealth prove by clear and convincing evidence
         that Ifill is a sexually violent predator?

      6. Is the sentence that was imposed manifestly excessive and

                                      -8-
J-A27036-22

          unreasonable?

       7. Were Ifill’s rape of an unconscious victim and sexual assault
          convictions as to Cheyenne against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7.2

       In his first issue, Ifill contests the Commonwealth’s request to, and

court’s subsequent acquiescence in, joining both of his dockets together for

trial purposes. We conclude that Ifill has failed to demonstrate that the court

erred in this particular instance.

       Preliminarily, we note that “[w]hether to join or sever offenses for trial

is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent

a manifest abuse thereof, or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Knoble, 188 A.3d 1199, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

       Substantively, “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E.

404(b)(1).     However,     “[o]ffenses        charged   in   separate   indictments   or

informations may be tried together if … the evidence of each of the offenses

____________________________________________

2 We have reordered the issues to correspond with their respective positions
in the argument section of Ifill’s brief. However, the seventh claim, challenging
weight of the evidence, does not appear to have been argued in the argument
section. Correspondingly, that claim as been waived. See Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585 n.5 (Pa. 1999) (“[Our Supreme Court] has held
that an issue will be deemed to be waived when an appellant fails to properly
explain or develop it in his brief.”) (citation omitted).

                                           -9-
J-A27036-22

would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of

separation by the jury so that there is not danger of confusion[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P.

582(A)(1)(a). Specifically, cross admissibility may occur to prove “motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (requiring, further, that the

probative value of such evidence outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice).

      As correctly illuminated by Ifill, courts are to employ a three-part

consideration in order to ascertain whether joinder or severance is

appropriate. Courts must determine:

      (1) whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
      admissible in a separate trial for the other;

      (2) whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so
      as to avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these
      inquiries are in the affirmative,

      (3) whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the
      consolidation of offenses.

Commonwealth v. Brookins, 10 A.3d 1251, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(formatting altered) (citations omitted).

      Here, the lower court “found that the two inciden[t]s would be

admissible in a separate trial for the other as the inciden[t]s show a common

plan, intent, preparation, knowledge, and absence of mistake.” Trial Court

Opinion, 3/17/22, at 12. To fit the “common plan” exception:

      the Commonwealth must show more than that the other crimes
      are of the same class as the one for which the defendant is being
      tried. Rather, there must be such a high correlation in the details
      of the crimes that proof that the defendant committed one makes

                                     - 10 -
J-A27036-22

      it very unlikely that anyone else but the defendant committed the
      others.

Commonwealth v. Kasko, 469 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citation

omitted). Explained further, “both crimes must be so nearly identical in their

unusual or distinctive aspects as to bear the ‘signature’ or to be the

‘handiwork’ of the same person.” Id., at 184-85 (citation omitted).

Conversely, “[s]imilarities cannot be confined to insignificant details that

would likely be common elements regardless of the individual committing the

crime.” Commonwealth v. Bidwell, 195 A.3d 610, 618-19 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted).

      Ifill   asserts   that   the   court   erroneously   predicated   its   joinder

determination on generic facts that are present in a lot of sexual assault cases.

In particular, Ifill summarizes the correlative details between the two

incidents: (1) the victims were “unconscious” at the time the sexual assaults

were committed: (2) the assaults occurred in a “party environment”; and (3)

the victims were concerned they had been drugged. See Appellant’s Brief, at

28. Ifill then discusses how “[i]ntoxicants play a significant role in most

acquaintance-rapes.” Id., at 28-29 (remarking, further, that use of

involuntary intoxicants are present in thirty-three percent of sexual assault

cases) (citation omitted).

      To demonstrate the inappropriateness of the court joining his two

dockets together, Ifill relies on Kasko, supra. Therein, that appellant was

alleged to have sexually molested his girlfriend’s six-year-old niece in the

                                        - 11 -
J-A27036-22

presence of the girlfriend on or about February or March of 1980. See Kasko,

469 A.2d at 183. Additionally, the appellant was alleged to have engaged in

similar sexual misconduct between December 1980 and January 1981 with

another victim: the four-year-old daughter of his step-sister. See Id. During

that same timeframe, Appellant also encouraged “corruption” of this step-

sister’s daughter by “teaching or encouraging” her to have indecent contact

with the five-year-old son of appellant’s other step-sister. Id., at 184-85.

These latter incidents “were not alleged to have been committed in the

presence of appellant’s girlfriend or any other adult.” Id., at 185. The crimes

stemming from both events were tried together.

      Ultimately, on appeal, the Kasko panel determined that while the two

cases had “certain similarities,” the court should have severed the cases. In

particular, there was a substantial period of time between the two events,

they involved different victims, the one occurred in the presence of appellant’s

girlfriend while the other assaults did not, they involved victims of different

sexes, and, finally, the misconduct was, in the Court’s determination, a

common form of child abuse. Id.

      Apply the Kasko holding to the present facts, Ifill states that nothing

between the two cases demonstrates a “common scheme.” Appellant’s Brief,

at 31. Whereas Rachel and Lindsey were both sleeping before the assault,

Cheyenne was awake during the sexual encounter. Moreover, the prologue to

each incident was different: Rachel and Lindsey were with Ifill at a bar and

                                     - 12 -
J-A27036-22

invited him back to Lindsey’s residence. Conversely, Cheyenne arrived at a

house where Ifill had already been.

      Finally,   Ifill   asserts   that   the   court   failed   to   analyze   whether

consolidation’s probative value outweighed the prejudice he would face.

Instead, consolidation acted to “shield weaknesses in the Commonwealth’s

cases and to suggest that, based on the number of accusers alone, the contact

had to be unwanted.” Appellant’s Brief, at 32. In effect, consolidation “stripped

Ifill of his presumption of innocence.” Id.

      In Commonwealth v. Smith, 47 A.3d 862 (Pa. Super. 2012), the

defendant challenged the consolidation of charges, which asserted that he

raped two minors. See 47 A.3d at 863, 866. In affirming the lower court’s

consolidation determination, the Smith Court summarized the following

cases:

      In [Commonwealth v. Newman, 598 A.2d 275 (Pa. 1991)], the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that consolidation was proper
      where: 1) both rapes occurred in the x-ray department; 2) each
      occurred late at night when [the defendant] was the only
      technician on duty; 3) both victims were females suffering from
      head injuries; 4) both victims were half the size of [the
      defendant]; 5) [the defendant] began kissing the victims, hugging
      the victims, and fondling the victims’ breasts before climbing onto
      the examination table and raping them.

      In [Commonwealth v. Keaton, 729 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1999)], the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court again held that consolidation was
      proper where:

         1) the offenses were committed over a period of less than
         six months; 2) each was committed at night; 3) in each
         case, [the defendant] forced his victim into an abandoned
         house; 4) the abandoned houses were all in the same

                                          - 13 -
J-A27036-22

        neighborhood in which [the defendant] and the victims
        lived; 5) the abandoned houses were within a two-block
        radius of each other; 6) each offense involved a combination
        of bondage or strangulation of the victim; 7) each offense
        involved the rape of the victim; and 8) all victims shared
        similar personal characteristics: all were black females in
        their late twenties or thirties, all were acquainted with [the
        defendant], and all were crack cocaine addicts.

     In [Commonwealth v. Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 1989)], the
     Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the crimes shared
     sufficient similarities in their details warranting consolidation,
     where:

        1) both crimes involved young females; 2) both victims
        were non-Caucasian; 3) both crimes occurred during the
        daytime; 4) both crimes took place within a four-block
        radius; 5) both crimes took place within a five-minute walk
        from [the defendant’s] home; 6) both crimes involved
        circumstances in which the victim was lured or strong-
        armed off the street; 7) both victims were taken to upstairs
        bedrooms of vacant buildings; 8) in both crimes [the
        defendant] ordered the victims to undress; 9) both crimes
        involved rape, other sex acts, and manual strangulation;
        and 10) both crimes involved circumstances in which [the
        defendant] and the victims previously were acquainted.

     In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the details were not
     sufficiently similar to warrant consolidation where:

        1) the victims were of totally different ages ...; 2) the
        weapons used were not identical; and, 3) nothing distinctive
        separated the two crimes involved from other street
        crimes[;] 4) the rape charged occurred in a garage while
        the other occurred in [the defendant’s] apartment; 5) while
        both rapists wore sunglasses, the rapist here wore rose
        colored, light tinted sunglasses and, in the other he wore
        dark sunglasses; and, 6) the first rape also involved a
        robbery, violence by choking, and tying the victim, but there
        were no such incidents in the second rape.

     Commonwealth v. Patterson, [399 A.2d 123, 127 (Pa. 1979)].

Smith, 47 A.3d at 867-68 (some citations omitted) (formatting altered). In

                                    - 14 -
J-A27036-22

summary, the Smith Court remarked that “[o]ur Supreme Court previously

has held that consolidation was appropriate where the ages and races of the

victims were similar, where the assaults occurred close in time and at similar

locations, where the assaults were achieved through similar means, and where

the assaults involved similar crimes.” Id., at 869 (citations omitted).

      Synthesizing all of the abovementioned cases and in relying on the

immediately preceding set of precepts, we hold that the slight differences

between the two sexual assaults are vastly outweighed by their similarities.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to

consolidate the dockets.

      We acknowledge that the genesis of each incident appears to be

different, with Ifill having already been present when Cheyenne appeared at

China’s residence, which is in contrast to Ifill having been at a bar with Lindsey

and Rachel before going back with them to Lindsey’s house. However, that is

where the material distinctions end.

      First, we emphasize that Ifill has not argued that the victims, all females,

were of a drastically different age or that their races were different from one

another. Second, although the series of offenses occurred one year apart from

each another, Ifill has not shown that this one-year separation inherently

demonstrates the inappropriateness of consolidation, especially as both sets

of crimes occurred on the exact same day, October 15th. Third, without Ifill

raising any distance-related concerns, the locations are similar insofar as they

                                     - 15 -
J-A27036-22

occurred at residences in the same county. Fourth, the sexual assaults

occurred through similar means: during party environments featuring the

consumption of alcohol. Fifth, the victims all strongly suggested during their

testimonies that Ifill drugged them,3 rendering them either completely

unconscious      or    intoxicated     to      the     point   of   legally   establishing

unconsciousness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1044-

45 (Pa. Super. 2016) (finding that “unconsciousness” could be found in

conjunction with a sexual assault when the victim was “blacking in and out,”

notwithstanding that victim remembering some of the events preceding and

during the assault). Sixth, the assaults occurred late at night. With all of these

circumstances in mind, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded

that there was a high enough correlation between the two cases to

demonstrate a common plan, scheme, or design. As such, the evidence of the

offenses at both dockets would have been admissible in a separate trial for

the other. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).

       With regard to the prejudice component of the joinder calculus, the

appellant     “bears    the     burden      of       establishing   [undue]    prejudice.”

Commonwealth v. Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 901 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

____________________________________________

3 The evidence at trial highlighted the evanescent nature of “date rape drugs.”
Specifically, those types of drugs “come into the system within minutes and
they can leave within … hours to … six hours to 12 hours depending on the
type of drugs that is used.” N.T., 4/5/21, at 170. As such, given that each
occurred beyond that twelve-hour window of time, it was unlikely for any of
the SAFE exams, here, to produce positive clinical indicia of such drugs.

                                            - 16 -
J-A27036-22

omitted). Specifically, the prejudice must be “greater than the general

prejudice any defendant suffers when the Commonwealth’s evidence links him

to a crime.” Id., at 901 (citation omitted). Distilled down, prejudice refers to

evidence that would either only show a defendant’s propensity to commit

crimes or, in effect, confuse the jury to the point of it being unable to separate

the evidence it is presented. See id. (citation omitted).

      As Ifill does not raise any concern regarding jury confusion, we solely

focus on whether he successfully demonstrated undue prejudice. See

Brookins, supra. We conclude that he has not. While the evidence presented

by the Commonwealth implicated Ifill in the separate sexual assaults, “the

admission of relevant evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged

is a natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for severance

by itself.” Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citation omitted). Notwithstanding the cross admissibility of evidence from

both cases, Ifill baldly claims that, as a basis for prejudice, the Commonwealth

sought consolidation because its cases were independently weak and further

that the aggregation of evidence only showed his propensity to commit sexual

assaults. Ifill has not cited any statements made by the Commonwealth

evidencing such accusations, nor has he supported these suppositions with

any authority. Given the aforementioned similarities between the crimes, we

reiterate that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the facts at

each docket fit squarely under the auspice of a common plan or scheme.

                                     - 17 -
J-A27036-22

Consequently, Ifill has failed to show that he suffered from the heightened

level of prejudice required to warrant reversal of the court’s consolidation

determination.

     Ifill’s next three claims “aver that the evidence was insufficient to convict

Ifill of rape of an unconscious victim and sexual assault, in either docket.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 33. For sufficiency claims, we apply a well-settled

standard of review:

     The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
     is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
     most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
     to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
     a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
     the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
     addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
     the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
     innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
     resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
     inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
     drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
     may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
     beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
     evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-44 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

     For rape of an unconscious person, the Commonwealth was required to

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ifill engaged “in sexual intercourse

with a complainant … who [was] unconscious or where the person knows that

the complainant is unaware that the sexual intercourse is occurring.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(3). Similarly, for sexual assault, the Commonwealth was

                                     - 18 -
J-A27036-22

required to show that Ifill engaged “in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual

intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.” 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3124.1.

      Ifill first delves into the assault involving Cheyenne. Ifill summarizes the

lower court’s rationale in its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to find

that the victim was unconscious and convict him at this docket. Specifically,

as framed by Ifill, the court relied on: (1) the fact that Cheyenne was

physically ill and vomiting at the time; (2) her lack of initial response when

Jenna knocked on the bathroom door while she was in the bathroom with Ifill;

(3) the “groggy” sound of her voice when she eventually did respond; and (4)

her not remembering how she made her way into the bathroom, nor did she

remember taking a bath. See Appellant’s Brief, at 36 (record citations

omitted). However, Ifill highlights that the testimony does not actually indicate

why Cheyenne did not promptly respond when there was knocking at the

bathroom door. In fact, the record shows that she eventually did respond.

      Additionally, Ifill avers that “[t]here is no evidence anything illicit

occurred in the bathroom.” Appellant’s Brief, at 37. Instead, the testimony

shows China taking Cheyenne to the bathroom, Cheyenne calling for Ifill to

join her, and then her and Ifill eventually ending up in a bedroom. See id., at

37-38 (record citations omitted). After Cheyenne and Ifill were in that

bedroom, others in the residence, including China, heard noises coming from

that room, which were understood to be sexual in nature. From these series

                                     - 19 -
J-A27036-22

of events, in which Cheyenne specifically asked for Ifill’s presence, Ifill argues

that “Cheyenne was not unconscious at the time of the contact” and “she was

aware of external events and consented[.]” Id., at 38. Ifill also mentions that

Cheyenne took a picture the next morning with Ifill’s shirt, further evidencing

her consent to what had happened between her and Ifill.

      We reiterate that the facts and circumstances of the situation involving

Cheyenne need not preclude every possibility of innocence. See Antidormi,

supra. Further, specifically apt to the present claim, the Commonwealth may

prove unconsciousness by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

      As stated, supra, the element of unconsciousness can be legally satisfied

if an individual is intoxicated. See, e.g., Diaz, 152 A.3d at 1045 (“[The

victim’s] complete lack of awareness of the duration of the assault … indicates

that she was not conscious throughout its entirety.”) (citation omitted). Here,

approximately one hour after arriving at China’s residence, Cheyenne started

to feel violently ill. See N.T., 4/5/21, at 71. She “started getting really sick,

throwing up.” Id. She also indicated that she needed to go to the hospital and

was described as acting in an “hysterical” manner. See id. Cheyenne

personally felt as though she could not sit up straight. See id., at 120. She

did not remember how she arrived in the bathroom and had no memory of

being in a bathtub or taking a bath. See id., at 122-23. Cheyenne did not

remember anyone else being in the bathroom with her besides China. See

id., at 125. While she was in the bathroom, Cheyenne was noted as sounding

                                     - 20 -
J-A27036-22

“really groggy and out of it.” Id., at 78.

      After spending time in the bathroom, without any further recollection of

events, Cheyenne only remembered “crashing into the pillow” contained on a

bed in China’s bedroom. Id., at 125. That following morning, upon waking up,

Cheyenne did not recall speaking to anybody at China’s residence,

notwithstanding China’s later testimony. See id., at 127. Subsequently,

Cheyenne’s worries about what had transpired the night before led to a SAFE

exam being performed on her. During that exam, which uncovered a

previously unknown tampon inside of her, Cheyenne believed Ifill had sex with

her “because there’s no reason why a tampon was shoved up [her] to the

point that [she] couldn’t feel it even when [she] went to the bathroom.” Id.,

at 132.

      While he provides testimonial evidence that could have served to

weaken the Commonwealth’s case, Ifill does not provide any authority to

distinguish Cheyenne’s obvious level of impairment from other cases finding

that unconsciousness encompasses the term intoxication. The record clearly

shows that Cheyenne did not remember large parts of what happened upon

arrival at China’s residence. Notwithstanding testimony indicating some level

of responsiveness or her having some, albeit minimal, recollection of events,

the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict

winner, supports the finding that she “was at all relevant times in such

impaired physical and mental condition so as to be unable to knowingly

                                     - 21 -
J-A27036-22

consent[.]” Commonwealth v. Erney, 698 A.2d 56, 59 (Pa. 1997). As such,

“her submission to intercourse was involuntary … [and was] therefore …

sufficient to constitute rape of an unconscious individual.” Id. With Cheyenne

being unconscious at all relevant points, the sexual interaction between her

and Ifill was also inherently nonconsensual, too. As such, Ifill’s sufficiency

claim, as to this set of facts, fails.

      In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underpinning the other

rape and sexual assault convictions, Ifill describes Rachel and Lindsey’s

testimony. However, although Ifill provides numerous record citations in this

section of his brief, it is unclear what, exactly, Ifill is arguing, given his lack of

concomitant authority serving to demonstrate insufficiency.

      Ifill describes that Rachel was fine with him kissing her, but that she

wanted him to stop when he began to touch underneath her shirt. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 40 (record citation omitted). Rachel then went back to

Lindsey’s bedroom. Ifill, at some point, followed Rachel back to the bedroom

and subsequently began vaginally penetrating her with his penis. Although,

throughout this interaction, she felt as though she could not stand straight,

Rachel eventually “came to” and told Ifill to stop, which he did eventually.

      As to Lindsey, who was located on her couch, she was “fuzzy”

throughout the experience, but felt someone pulling off her pants. Appellant’s

Brief, at 41 (record citation omitted). Thereafter, through Lindsey’s testimony,

Ifill climbed on top of her and, like what had happened to Rachel, began to

                                         - 22 -
J-A27036-22

vaginally penetrate her with his penis. Lindsey then pushed Ifill off of her and

went to the bathroom. Ultimately, Lindsey, Rachel, and Ifill ended up in the

same bed together, but Ifill left in haste the following morning when all three

woke up.

      Other than vaguely asserting that the evidence was insufficient as to

these two victims, Ifill does not present any sort of argument that establishes

why the evidence was insufficient. In fact, other than his brief mentioning that

“[t]he SAFE exams did not reveal any genetic material associated with Ifill[,]”

Appellant’s Brief, at 41, the factual summary, which almost exclusively

highlights Rachel and Lindsey’s testimony, casts Ifill in an inculpatory light,

showing that the victims did not consent, were at varying levels of intoxication

or completely unconscious throughout the incident, and that he engaged in

sexual intercourse with both of them. We “will not act as counsel and will not

develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Hardy,

918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). Therefore, without any compelling basis

that would indicate the evidence was insufficient to find Ifill guilty of rape and

sexual assaults as to these two victims, we find no validity to Ifill’s sufficiency

claim in this domain.

      In his next claim, Ifill suggests that the Commonwealth failed to present

sufficient evidence to adjudicate him an SVP.

      Review of SVP status requires us to employ yet another well-settled

standard of review:

                                      - 23 -
J-A27036-22

      The determination of a defendant's SVP status may only be made
      following an assessment by the [Sexual Offenders Assessment
      Board (“SOAB”)] and hearing before the trial court. In order to
      affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court, must be able
      to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and convincing
      evidence that the individual is a sexually violent predator. As with
      any sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all the evidence and
      reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
      SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
      convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
      satisfied.

      The standard of proof governing the determination of SVP status,
      i.e., “clear and convincing evidence,” has been described as an
      “intermediate” test, which is more exacting than a preponderance
      of the evidence test, but less exacting than proof beyond a
      reasonable doubt.

***

      The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that is “so
      clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [trier of
      fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth
      of the precise facts [in] issue.”

Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991 A.2d 935, 941–42 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en

banc) (citations omitted).

      Providing background to the SVP determination process:

      After a person has been convicted of an offense listed in 42 Pa.C.S.
      § 9799.14, the trial court then orders an assessment to be done
      by the SOAB to help determine if that person should be classified
      as an SVP. An SVP is defined as a person who has been convicted
      of a sexually violent offense and who has a mental abnormality or
      personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in
      predatory sexually violent offenses. In order to show that the
      offender suffers from a mental abnormality or personality
      disorder, the evidence must show that the defendant suffers from
      a congenital or acquired condition that affects the emotional or
      volitional capacity of the person in a manner that predisposes that
      person to the commission of criminal sexual acts to a degree that

                                     - 24 -
J-A27036-22

      makes the person a menace to the health and safety of other
      persons. Moreover, there must be a showing that the defendant’s
      conduct was predatory. Furthermore, in reaching a determination,
      we must examine the driving force behind the commission of
      these acts, as well as looking at the offender’s propensity to
      reoffend, an opinion about which the Commonwealth’s expert is
      required to opine. However, the risk of reoffending is but one
      factor to be considered when making an assessment; it is not an
      independent element.

      When performing an SVP assessment, a mental health
      professional must consider the following 15 factors: whether the
      instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the defendant
      exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense; the nature
      of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the defendant’s
      relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s); whether the
      instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty by the
      defendant during the commission of the offense; the victim(s)’
      mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal record;
      whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s); whether
      the defendant participated in available programs for sexual
      offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant's use of illegal
      drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
      mental     disability,  or    mental     abnormality;    behavioral
      characteristics that contribute to the defendant's conduct; and any
      other factor reasonably related to the defendant's risk of
      reoffending. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(b).

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189-90 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(some citations omitted) (formatting altered).

      Ifill concedes that, prior to the court determining him to be an SVP, he

stipulated to the report of Robert M. Stein, Ph.D. See Appellant’s Brief, at 46.

In that report, Dr. Stein concluded that “within a reasonable degree of

professional certainty … Ifill meets the criteria to be classified as a [SVP.]”

Sexually Violent Predator Assessment, 5/27/21, at 7 (emphasis in original).

Ifill notes that the assessment also states that he has a mental abnormality

                                     - 25 -
J-A27036-22

as it pertains to arousal from nonconsensual contact. Ifill contests this latter

premise because “Cheyenne was neither unconscious nor unaware of the

sexual contact[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 46. As to the other portion of the

assessment that indicates Ifill could not control his urges to have sex with the

victims, Ifill states that “[b]oth Rachel and Lindsey testified Ifill stopped

contact when they asked him.” Id., at 47 (record citations omitted).

Therefore, Ifill “is able to control his ‘urges’ and is not aroused by non-

consensual sex.” Id.

      We have already established, supra, that, from a legal perspective,

Cheyenne was intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness when the events

between her and Ifill transpired. Therefore, his argument that Cheyenne was

not unconscious necessarily fails. With regard to Ifill’s suggestion that Ifill was

able to control his urges as it related to Rachel and Lindsey, such a contention

is refuted by the record. When Lindsey was “pushing him off and saying no,”

N.T., 4/5/21, at 249, Ifill “didn’t stop.” Id. “He continued until [Lindsey]

pushed him off of [her].” Id. As to Rachel, when she told Ifill to stop and

pushed him off of her, Ifill said no and kept going until she “pushed him off

again[.]” N.T., 4/4/21, at 216-17.

      As both of the proffered reasons why the court made an erroneous SVP

determinations hold no merit and, too, in the absence of any kind of direct

factor-based refutation of the SVP assessment, we find that the court utilized

sufficient evidence, satisfying the clear and convincing evidence standard, to

                                      - 26 -
J-A27036-22

adjudicate Ifill an SVP.

      In his final issue, Ifill argues, inter alia, that the court imposed a

manifestly excessive sentence and failed to consider mitigating factors. Ifill’s

claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, so we employ the

following standard of review:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

      The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a
      sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for
      permission to appeal. An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to
      invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary
      aspects of a sentence.

      [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue
      was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
      and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal
      defect[, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code.

                                    ****

      A substantial question will be found where an appellant advances
      a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either
      inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is
      contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
      process. At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must
      articulate what particular provision of the code is violated, what
      fundamental norms the sentence violates, and the manner in
      which it violates that norm.

                                     - 27 -
J-A27036-22

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      Here, Ifill has filed a timely notice of appeal, he has filed the requisite

motion to preserve the issue on appeal, and through his inclusion of a facially

appropriate 2119(f) statement, there is no fatal defect in his brief. Therefore,

we proceed to Ifill’s brief to ascertain whether he has raised a substantial

question.

      In total, Ifill’s “substantial question” maintains that his aggravated-

range sentence was manifestly excessive, that the court failed to properly

explain why it imposed this aggravated-range sentence, that the court failed

to consider mitigating factors, that the court imposed consecutive sentences,

that the court violated the Sentencing Code by solely focusing on retribution,

and that the court impermissibly relied on a fourth victim’s impact statement

who was not a party to the case. See Appellant’s Brief, 47-49.

      “[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the

seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a

substantial question ... [and] an allegation that the court considered an

impermissible    sentencing     factor   raises    a   substantial    question.”

Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal

citations omitted). Furthermore, a claim that “the trial court failed to consider

relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public, the gravity

of the underlying offense and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, as 42

                                     - 28 -
J-A27036-22

Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b) requires[,]” presents a substantial question for our

review. Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012). With

both of these cases as guideposts, we conclude that Ifill has presented a

substantial question, and we proceed to review the merits of his claims.

      This Court “shall vacate” a sentence if we find:

      (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
      sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;

      (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
      guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
      application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or

      (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
      guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

      The gravamen of Ifill’s sentencing argument is that the court improperly

relied upon a fourth alleged victim’s statement in crafting his sentence. Ifill

points to the court’s sentencing order, which prohibits him from, inter alia,

contacting this fourth victim “who testified as part of the sentencing.”

Sentencing Order, 10/5/21, at 2 (unpaginated). In addition, although Ifill

acknowledges that the court mentioned its review of a pre-sentence

investigation (“PSI”) report, “it did not reflect upon the mitigating factors and

[his] characteristics[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 54. Instead, it imposed an

aggravated-range sentence without reason. See id. Ifill then writes that he is

capable of rehabilitation and was relatively young at the time the aggregate

sentence was imposed. See id.

                                     - 29 -
J-A27036-22

      Preliminarily, we note that “where, as here, the sentencing court had

the benefit of a [PSI] report, we can assume the sentencing court was aware

of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

      After observing the entire trial, reviewing the PSI, listening to the victim

impact statements, and hearing mitigating evidence from those connected to

Ifill, the court concluded an aggravated-range sentence was warranted. In

effect, Ifill was sentenced to three consecutive terms of seven-and-one-half

to fifteen years’ incarceration at each of the rape offenses.

      As part of the sentencing transcript, the court noted that “[Ifill] was able

to manipulate and figure out exactly where he needed to be at all times. …

Bait and switch doesn’t even begin to classify what he did to these victims.”

Sentencing Hearing, 10/5/21, at 30. The court also relied upon “the factual

circumstance … that these victims had all woken up and then tried to resist

the defendant and he did not then listen to what they had indicated as well[.]”

Id., at 35. Therefore, the court adequately explained why it placed Ifill’s

sentences in the aggravated range.

      As to the relevance of a non-party victim impact statement, in its

subsequent opinion, the court wrote that it “did not consider the victim impact

statement of an alleged fourth victim when sentencing [Ifill].” Trial Court

                                     - 30 -
J-A27036-22

Opinion, 3/17/22, at 16. When the Commonwealth provided the court with

this alleged fourth victim’s statement, it expressly indicated to the court that

such a statement could not “be used in terms of the sentencing itself for the

three named victims[.]” Sentencing Hearing, 10/5/21, at 9.

       Under certain circumstances, such as “when a prior record score

inadequately reflects a defendant’s criminal background,” a sentencing court

may “consider unprosecuted criminal conduct” when imposing its sentence.

Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 894 A.2d 120, 131 (Pa. Super. 2006). However,

“uncharged criminal conduct may not be used for sentencing purposes when

the record is devoid of the necessary evidentiary link between the defendant

and the uncharged prior conduct.” Id.

       In P.L.S., the sentencing court considered a SOAB investigator’s

testimony wherein it was established that the defendant had admitted to

another non-testifying investigator that he had abused two additional minor

victims. See id., at 128.4 Moreover, when asked by the testifying investigator

whether he engaged in that additional sexual abuse, the defendant did not

deny having made such a statement. See id.

       This Court determined that the sentencing court was permitted to

consider the investigator’s testimony, which delved into prior, uncharged

criminal conduct. First, it was noted that the sentencing court “was allowed to

____________________________________________

4  The defendant in P.L.S. had been convicted of sexually abusing his
girlfriend’s minor daughter.

                                          - 31 -
J-A27036-22

rely upon the SOAB assessment information when imposing [its] sentence.”

Id., at 132. Second, “the evidence linking [the defendant] to these other

crimes stood unrefuted. That evidence sprang from [the defendant’s] own

mouth and was confirmed by the victims.” Id. As such, “the sentencing court

was permitted to rely upon [the defendant’s] admissions when it imposed [its]

sentence.” Id.

      In addition, … this sentence was increased beyond the guidelines
      not merely because [the defendant] could not be prosecuted for
      his abuse of the two other children. The sentencing court clearly
      found, based upon [the defendant’s] abuse of those victims, that
      he was a threat to children and needed to be sentenced above the
      guidelines ranges for the protection of the public.

      Finally, even if [this Court] were to conclude that the uncharged
      conduct should not have been considered by the sentencing court,
      the court offered significant other support for sentencing in excess
      of the guidelines in this case. [The defendant] sexually abused his
      victim nearly weekly for two years. As the sentencing court noted,
      the effect of this ongoing sexual abuse was substantial and long-
      term. The court also was appalled that [the defendant] would
      abuse a child in retaliation against the child’s mother and attempt
      to justify his actions on that basis.

Id., at 133 (citation omitted).

      Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Vernille, this Court concluded that

“[i]t was not improper for the judge to consider [that] appellant’s alleged

involvement in other unlawful activity for which he was not charged, tried, or

convicted[,]” because the appellant “admitted most of [the at-issue] facts”

and the “information was contained in the presentence investigation report

and was also developed at trial, during which time [the] appellant had ample

opportunity to respond to the allegations.” 418 A.2d 713, 719 (Pa. Super.

                                     - 32 -
J-A27036-22

1980).

      Here, information pertaining to the alleged fourth victim first made its

appearance in the SOAB report, see Sexually Violent Predator Assessment,

5/27/21, at 3-4, and Ifill’s counsel did not object to the report’s admission into

evidence.   See    Sentencing    Hearing,      10/5/21,   at   4.   Thereafter,   the

Commonwealth introduced a written statement from the alleged fourth victim,

which received an objection from Ifill’s counsel. See id., at 9. That statement,

inter alia, expressly accused Ifill of sexual assault. See, e.g., id., at 10-11 (“I

said no and told you to stop, but instead you became forceful and aggressive.

You laughed until I was finally able to push you off of me and run out of the

room.”).

      Contrary to P.L.S., which involved the incorporation of uncharged and

undenied allegations into an SOAB report, there does not appear to be any

SOAB inquiry directed at Ifill to ascertain the veracity of this supposed victim’s

statement. Moreover, Ifill did not specifically admit to the behavior alleged by

the putative fourth victim. When the statement against Ifill was admitted at

the sentencing hearing, there is nothing more that Ifill’s counsel could have

done to deny his involvement in this untested accusation beyond making an

objection, which is what, in fact, occurred. In addition, although the

sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI, it does not appear that the alleged

fourth victim’s accusations were documented or reviewed for the purposes of

that report. Furthermore, unlike Vernille, Ifill’s involvement in uncharged

                                      - 33 -
J-A27036-22

criminal activity was not, as best can be discerned, developed, or even alluded

to, at trial. As such, because there was no opportunity for Ifill to contest or

assent to this additional victim impact statement, Ifill’s alleged sexual assault

on a fourth victim should not have been considered by the court at sentencing.

       Nevertheless, vacation of a sentence is only appropriate if the court

relied upon an impermissible factor at sentencing:

       In deciding whether a trial judge considered only permissible
       factors in sentencing a defendant, an appellate court must, of
       necessity, review all of the judge’s comments. Moreover, in
       making this determination it is not necessary that an appellate
       court be convinced that the trial judge in fact relied upon an
       erroneous consideration; it is sufficient to render a sentence
       invalid if it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court
       relied in whole or in part upon such a factor.

Commonwealth v. Scott, 860 A.2d 1029, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2004).

       Although the court, here, disclaimed any utilization of the alleged fourth

victim’s impact statement, see Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/22, at 16,5 it strains

credulity to find that such a statement played no impact in its ultimate

sentencing determinations. Specifically, the court, in its sentencing order,

____________________________________________

5 While the court relies on the statement of the Commonwealth attorney at
the sentencing hearing that the fourth victim’s impact statement victim impact
statement would not be considered when sentencing Ifill, see Trial Court
Opinion, 3/17/22, at 16 (citing Sentencing Hearing, 10/5/21, at 9), the court,
itself, did not expressly disclaim its consideration of the fourth victim’s
statement either at the sentencing hearing or in its sentencing order.
Moreover, it defies explanation as to what other purpose the reading of the
victim impact statement at the hearing could possibly have served, as the
court had already determined that Ifill was an SVP, see Sentencing Hearing,
10/5/21, at 8, and the only remaining matter for the court’s consideration was
Ifill’s sentence.

                                          - 34 -
J-A27036-22

referred to “all four victims,” Sentencing Order, 10/5/21, at 2 (unpaginated)

(prohibiting Ifill from contact with these individuals), notwithstanding the fact

that there had been no adjudication of Ifill’s guilt as to this fourth victim.

Therefore, in light of the explicit consideration given to this untested fourth

victim’s impact statement, memorialized in the sentencing order, it reasonably

appears from the record that the court relied on this impermissible factor in

making its sentencing determination. While there may have been other

reasons why the court imposed three sentences that were all in the

aggravated range, the weight ascribed by the court to this impermissible

factor is facially evident.

      Consequently, because the court relied upon this impermissible factor

in imposing three sentences that were all in the aggravated range, we vacate

the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. As to all of the other

issues raised by Ifill, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/7/2023

                                     - 35 -