Court Opinion

ID: 9373244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:41.24169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.407240
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JAMES ANDREW CARMICHAEL,                        DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DC-1221-15-0840-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: November 9, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

                M. J. Euchler, Esquire, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the appellant.

                Timothy O’Boyle, Hampton, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the follow ing
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrativ e
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to clarify the appellant’s status and to clarify that the agency, and
     not the appellant, has the burden of proof regarding evidence that it takes similar
     actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
     similarly situated, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency appointed the appellant to the excepted-service position of
     Clinical Pharmacist.      Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 27. 2           Upon the
     recommendation of the Chief of Pharmacy, the Human Resources Officer
     terminated the appellant less than 1 year after his appointment and prior to him

     2
       The administrative judge referred to the appellant as a probationary employee. IAF,
     Tab 102, Initial Decision (ID). This term refers to individuals who are serving a
     probationary period and, unlike the appellant, are in the competitive service and subject
     to 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. Instead, the appellant, a nonpreference eligible who was not
     serving an initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, was an
     excepted-service appointee under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(3) who had not completed the
     requisite 2-year trial period for becoming an “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(C). See Barrand v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210,
     ¶ 12 (2009); IAF, Tab 7 at 27. Any error by the administrative judge in referring to the
     appellant as a probationary employee is harmless because it has no effect on his
     substantive rights. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281,
     282 (1984).
                                                                                       3

     completing the applicable trial period. 3    Id. at 10-12.   After exhausting his
     administrative remedies with the Office of Special Counsel, the appellant filed
     the instant IRA appeal and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. The administrative
     judge conducted a hearing and then issued an initial decision denying the
     appellant’s request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 102, Initial Decision (ID).
¶3        The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has responded
     in opposition to his petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3, 5.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶4        On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
     the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
     terminated him absent his protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9-14. The
     administrative judge found that the appellant satisfied the proof requirement for
     establishing that his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in his
     termination because he made numerous disclosures between March 3, 2014, and
     January 30, 2015, and he was terminated less than a year later, on February 3,
     2015. ID at 50. However, she found that the agency’s evidence in support of its
     action was extremely strong, the acting agency officials did not have a strong
     motive to retaliate, and the appellant failed to identify similarly situated
     employees who were not terminated. ID at 52-62. She thus concluded that the
     agency showed that it would have terminated the appellant regardless of his
     protected disclosures. ID at 62. For the reasons discussed below, we agree.

     The appellant established a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation.
¶5        To establish a prima facie case of retaliation for whistleblowing under the
     Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, the appellant must prove, by

     3
       The appellant’s second-line supervisor left the agency in November 2014. Hearing
     Transcript (HT) Day 1 at 346 (testimony of the appellant’s second-line supervisor).
     After the appellant’s second-line supervisor left, the Chief of Pharmacy became his
     second-line supervisor and recommended the appellant’s removal. HT Day 1 at 240,
     303 (testimony of the Chief of Pharmacy).
                                                                                         4

     preponderant evidence, that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in
     protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take
     or fail to take a personnel action.       5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(e)(1), 2302(a), (b)(8),
     (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); 4 Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R.
     248, ¶ 6 (2015). He may meet this burden through circumstantial evidence, such
     as evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure
     and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
     reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in
     the personnel action. Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 18
     (2015). Here, the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant
     established, through the aforementioned knowledge-timing test, that several of
     the appellant’s protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s
     decision to terminate him. ID at 49-50.

     The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
     terminated the appellant absent his protected disclosures.
¶6         If the employee meets his burden of showing that the protected disclosures
     were a contributing factor in the relevant personnel action, the Board then will
     consider whether the agency has proven that it would have taken or failed to take
     the same personnel action absent his whistleblowing. Campbell v. Department of
     the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 12 (2016). In determining whether an agency has
     met its burden of proving that it would have terminated the appellant absent his
     whistleblowing, the Board will consider the following factors (Carr factors):
     (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence
     and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who
     were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar
     actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
     similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11;

     4
      We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
     and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                           5

     see also Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
     1999). 5   The Board does not view the Carr factors as discrete elements and
     instead will weigh the factors together to determine whether the evidence is clear
     and convincing as a whole. Campbell, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 12.

            The agency presented strong evidence in support of the termination action.
¶7         The administrative judge found that the agency provided strong evidence in
     support of the appellant’s termination, including by showing that he was resistant
     to his supervisor and lost his temper several times.       ID at 58.    The appellant
     challenges this finding. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11-12. He asserts that his dispute
     with an IV Room Technician and the fact that he was upset with his first-line
     supervisor when receiving his performance appraisal should not have formed the
     basis for his termination because the incidents were not mentioned in his
     performance appraisal, which his second-line supervisor upgraded to an excellent
     rating after he contested the initial rating. Id. First, the incident concerning his
     receipt of his performance appraisal occurred outside of the rating period , and it
     would have been inappropriate for the supervisor to consider the incident for that
     performance appraisal.     Second, the appellant’s first-line supervisor and the
     appellant both testified that, when the appellant initially received his appraisal,
     she informed him that his interactions with his coworkers were problematic, and
     we find it reasonable that those concerns were not reduced to writing. Hearing
     Transcript   (HT) Day 1 at 30-31 (testimony of            the   appellant’s   first-line
     supervisor); HT Day 2 at 314 (testimony of the appellant); IAF, Tab 38 at 32.

     5
       Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
     for the Federal Circuit on this issue. However, as a result of changes initiated by the
     Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat.
     1465, extended for 3 years in the All Circuit Review Extension Act, Pub. L.
     No. 113-170, 128 Stat. 1894, and eventually made permanent in the All Circuit Review
     Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file petitions for judicial
     review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court of
     appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). We are unaware of
     other circuit courts that have considered this issue.
                                                                                      6

     Third, although the appellant’s second-line supervisor raised the appellant’s
     rating to excellent, IAF, Tab 38 at 32, he properly viewed the incidents to be
     conduct, rather than performance-related, and, therefore, did not consider them in
     assessing the appellant’s performance during the rating period, HT Day 1
     at 365-66, 372, 375-76, 378 (testimony of the appellant’s second-line supervisor).
     Accordingly, we find no reason why the appellant’s raised performance
     evaluation would detract from the agency’s strong evidence in support of his
     termination based on conduct unbecoming.          See McCarthy v. International
     Boundary & Water Commission, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 61 (2011) (finding that the
     appellant’s conduct was problematic and that the agency had a strong basis for
     directing his termination during his trial period), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed.
     Cir. 2012).

           The acting agency officials did not have a strong motive to retaliate
           against the appellant.
¶8        The appellant next argues that his first-line supervisor should not have had
     the authority to terminate him because she was the subject of his disclosures.
     PFR File, Tab 3 at 12. We disagree, as those decisions are within an agency’s
     discretion. However, the Board will consider whether an official was the subject
     of the appellant’s disclosures in determining the strength of an agency official’s
     motive to retaliate. See Herman v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 642, ¶ 16
     (2013).    Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s first-line
     supervisor was the subject of only one of the appellant’s disclosures, which the
     administrative judge found was not protected. ID at 7-8, 46. The administrative
     judge also found that the supervisor was receptive to his criticism about other
     issues. ID at 59-60. For instance, she directed that the IV Room Technician be
     retrained regarding rules in the IV room after the appellant complained about her
     noncompliance and also included him on a working group about concerns in the
     IV room.      HT Day 1 at 32 (testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor).
     Thus, we find that she was receptive to at least some of the appellant’s comments.
                                                                                        7

¶9            We have considered that the appellant’s second-line supervisor received
      disclosures from him, which related to standards that the agency was required to
      meet.       HT Day 1 at 347, 350 (testimony of the appellant’s second-line
      supervisor). However, there is no basis for finding that these emails caused a
      strong motive to retaliate.     Further, we defer to the administrative judge’s
      conclusion that the Chief of Pharmacy had little motive to retaliate because she
      testified credibly that she welcomed disclosures and that they provided a means
      of learning about problems. ID at 59-60; see Purifoy v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016); IAF, Tab 18 at 10-17, Tab 72
      at 24-26.
¶10           The appellant next argues that the agency did not demonstrate that it would
      have terminated him absent his disclosures because the Human Resources Officer
      testified that the Chief of Pharmacy deliberately failed to tell her about the
      disclosures and that, if she knew about the disclosures, she would not have
      terminated him. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9-10; HT Day 1 at 337, 342, 344 (testimony
      of the Human Resources Officer). The appellant cites to her testimony, which he
      asserts establishes that she now questions the veracity and intent of the officials
      who requested his termination. PFR File, Tab 3 at 9; HT Day 1 at 344 (testimony
      of the Human Resources Officer).
¶11           To the extent that the appellant is arguing that the Human Resources
      Officer’s testimony demonstrates that agency officials concealed his protected
      disclosures despite the fact that this information normall y would be made
      available, this could indicate a retaliatory motive. However, the administrative
      judge found, based in part upon the testimony of the appellant’s first-line
      supervisor and the Chief of Pharmacy, that agency officials did not have a strong
      motive to retaliate. ID at 60. We defer to these findings, which are implicitly
      based upon these witnesses’ demeanor, and agree that the agency officials did not
      have a strong motive to retaliate. See Purifoy, 838 F.3d at 1372. Furthermore, in
      a whistleblower retaliation case, the Board ultimately must determine whether the
                                                                                             8

      agency would have taken the same action absent the appellant’s protected
      disclosures. Campbell, 123 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 12. The testimony of the Human
      Resources Officer is supportive of this ultimate conclusion because she testified
      that she terminated the appellant without actual knowledge of his disclosures.
¶12         The appellant next asserts that the agency attempted to further its retaliatory
      motive by collecting complaints from his coworkers to support his termination.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. However, the Procurement Narcotics Purchaser Pharmacy
      Supervisor (S.B.) testified that employees had complained to him about the
      appellant’s behavior and that he told the employees that they should put their
      complaints in writing. HT Day 1 at 418-20 (testimony of S.B.). This testimony
      is supported by the testimony of the Chief of Pharmacy, who confirmed that the
      employees confided in S.B., who would pass on their written complaints to the
      Chief of Pharmacy.       HT Day 1 at 258-59, 276 (testimony of the Chief of
      Pharmacy).    The IV Program Manager stated that he sent a written statement
      complaining about the appellant without being instructed to do so.            HT Day 2
      at 87-91 (testimony of the IV Program Manager).              The appellant’s general
      assertions do not contradict this evidence and testimony. Consequently, we find
      that the evidence reflects that the agency was not collecting complaints from the
      appellant’s coworkers simply to support its agenda of terminating him because of
      his protected disclosures. 6

      6
        On review, the appellant has submitted a consent order, entered into approximately
      1 month after the initial decision, in which S.B. agreed to the suspension of his
      pharmacy license. PFR File, Tab 3 at 16-22. The Board may grant a petition for review
      when the petitioner establishes that new and material evidence is available that, despite
      his due diligence, was not available when the record closed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d)(1).
      Evidence is material when it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different
      from that of the initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349
      (1980). To the extent that the appellant has submitted this order to impeach S.B.’s
      credibility, evidence submitted on review merely to impeach a witness’s credibility
      generally is not new and material, and we have not considered it as such. Bucci v.
      Department of Education, 42 M.S.P.R. 47, 55 (1989). Nevertheless, even if we did
      consider this evidence, it does not affect our determination that the agency established
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the appellant absent his
                                                                                           9

¶13         We further consider that the officials taking the personnel action against the
      appellant did not suffer ramifications as a result of his disclosures. ID at 60; HT
      Day 1 at 199 (testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor), 319 (testimony
      of the Chief of Pharmacy); see Runstrom v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      123 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 17 (2016).      We have found, however, that an appellant’s
      criticisms, which reflect negatively on employees in their capacities as managers,
      are sufficient to establish retaliatory motive. Chavez v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 33 (2013); see also Whitmore v. Department of
      Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012).             Nonetheless, weighing all
      evidence, including the testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor, his
      second-line supervisor, the Chief of Pharmacy, and the Human Resources Officer,
      we conclude that the agency did not have a strong motive to retaliate against
      the appellant.

            We agree with the administrative judge that there are no similarly situated
            employees who were not terminated.
¶14         Finally, the appellant argues that the agency treated him more harshly than
      another pharmacist with whom he had engaged in an altercation. 7            PFR File,
      Tab 3 at 11-12.     In considering the discipline imposed in response to the
      altercation with the other pharmacist, the administrative judge noted the
      testimony of the appellant’s first-line supervisor that she verbally counseled the
      other pharmacist but that she treated this employee less harshly than the appellant
      because she was unaware of other misconduct in which that pharmacist had
      engaged and because the other pharmacist had worked at the agency for a long

      protected disclosures. The appellant made disclosures to S.B., and S.B. was involved in
      the aftermath of an altercation in which the appellant was involved. However, S.B.
      was not involved with taking the personnel action against the appellant, and any
      connection of this evidence to the appeal is otherwise extremely remote.
      7
       The appellant argues that he was treated more harshly than the IV Room Technician.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 11. However, she was a longtime employee who retired. ID at 53.
      Accordingly, we find that she was not similarly situated to the appellant.
                                                                                            10

      time.    ID at 61; HT Day 1 at 193-94 (testimony of the appellant’s first-line
      supervisor). We agree with the administrative judge that this employee was not
      similarly situated to the appellant given that she was a tenured employee. Thus,
      we agree with the administrative judge that the agency did not treat the appellant
      more harshly than a similarly situated nonwhistleblower. 8                ID at 61-62.
      Nevertheless, we have considered that the agency has otherwise presented no
      evidence of similarly situated employees, under which circumstance the Board
      has held that the third Carr factor cannot weigh in favor of the agency. Soto,
      2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 18.
¶15           Regardless, considering that the agency presented strong evidence in
      support of its decision to terminate the appellant during his trial period and the
      lack of a strong motive to retaliate against him, we find that the agency proved by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the appellant absent
      his protected disclosures. McCarthy, 116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 66.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 9
              The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

      8
         The administrative judge found that the appellant did not identify any other
      nontenured employees who engaged in similar misconduct who were not terminated. ID
      at 61. We modify the initial decision to clarify that the appellant does not have the
      burden of identifying such employees. Instead, it is the agency’s burden to prove that it
      would have terminated the appellant absent his protected disclosures, and the Board
      will consider any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who
      are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly situated in determining whether
      the agency has met its burden. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶¶ 11, 18. Any error in this respect
      is harmless because there is no evidence of such employees. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R.
      at 282.
      9
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      11

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failu re to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                    12

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court ‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                     13

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review    pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)   other   than   practices   described    in   section 2302(b)(8),   or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 10 The court of appeals must receive your

10
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction e xpired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
                                                                                     14

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court a t the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscour ts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       15

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.