Court Opinion

ID: 9690504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:17:18.26326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:58.204062
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(dissenting).*
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plain language of section 256J.20, subdivision 3, does not lead to an absurd result and that Basal is not entitled to the benefits of an amendment to section 256J.20, subdivision 3(1). I would reverse Basal’s conviction.

A. Interpretation of Statute

A statute should be construed “to give effect to all its provisions,” and if possible, “no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Am. Family Ins. Group v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000) (quotation omitted). “Finally, courts should construe a statute to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.” Id. at 278; see also State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn.1996) (rejecting a narrow interpretation of the terroristic threats statute that would produce absurd results); State v. Campbell, 756 N.W.2d 263, 274 (Minn.App.2008), review denied (Dec. 23, 2008) (rejecting interpretation of statute criminalizing failure to use financial resources of vulnerable adult to care for adult that would create absurd result).
*337Minnesota law defines “equity value” as “the amount of equity in real or personal property owned by a person and is determined by subtracting any outstanding encumbrances from the fair market value.” Minn.Stat. § 256J.08, subd. 29 (2004). “Encumbrance,” for purposes of the applicable statutes, “means a legal claim against real or personal property that is payable upon the sale of that property.” Minn.Stat. § 256J.08, subd. 28a (2004). This logically makes sense. A'person who owns a homestead worth $100,000, but encumbered by a $95,000 mortgage, for instance, only has $5,000 in equity in the homestead.
Section 256J.20, subdivision 1, reflects this reality, directing a county agency to use the “equity value of legally available real and personal property” owned by applicants seeking MFIP assistance. The majority’s interpretation of subdivision 3(1), however, turns this logical proposition on its head. Under that interpretation, the statute instead directs a county agency to subtract the value of the loan, up to only $7,500, and then “apply any excess loan value as if it were equity value.” Minn. Stat. § 256J.20, subd. 3(1). Thus, the majority’s interpretation of subdivision 3(1) directs a county agency to count a loan, the very thing section 256J.08, subdivision 29, excepts from equity value, as equity value.
Under the district court’s conclusion, a person applying for MFIP assistance may offset encumbrances on real property such as homesteads or mobile homes, so that only the equity value of those properties may be counted as assets. An applicant, however, may not similarly offset an encumbrance on a vehicle. As a result, a vehicle, even one encumbered with a loan for 100% of its value, is considered an asset if the vehicle’s value is over $7,500.
That result should fly in the face of legislative intent: to assist people who are down on their luck. As the majority reads subdivision 3(1), a person, with a vehicle worth $20,000, encumbered by a loan of $20,000, is considered to have $12,500 in assets, making her ineligible for MFIP assistance, notwithstanding the fact that if she actually sold the vehicle for $20,000, she would walk away with not one dollar. This result is “inconsistent with the plain dictates of common sense” and is “logically contradictory.” Black’s Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed.1979) (defining “absurdity”). This should not be what the legislature intended.

B. Amendment to Minn. Stat. § 256J.20, subd. 3(1)

The district court found that Basal is not entitled to the benefit of a statutory amendment that would have made her not responsible for restitution. I respectfully disagree.
The majority relies on Edstrom v. State, 326 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.1982), to limit the holding in State v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511 (Minn.1979). The statute at issue in Edstrom, however, is distinguishable from the statute at issue here. In Edstrom, the postconviction petitioner pleaded guilty to criminal-sexual-conduct charges from conduct that occurred in March 1975. 326 N.W.2d at 10. Subsequent to his conviction, the legislature amended the applicable statute to reduce the penalty for such a conviction from a 30-year sentence to a 20-year sentence. Id. The supreme court noted that in passing the legislation, the legislature enacted a separate section that specifically states that “crimes committed prior to August 1, 1975, are not affected by [the amendment’s] provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 609.351 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Edstrom, 326 N.W.2d at 10. Here, although the enacting legislation provides *338that the 2007 amendment becomes effective January 1, 2008, the legislation does not contain a specific provision prohibiting the retroactive application of the statute to still-pending convictions. 2007 Minn. Laws ch. 147, art. 2, § 64, at 1901.
Coolidge provides that “where criminal law in effect is repealed ... all prosecutions are barred where not reduced to a final judgment.” 282 N.W.2d at 514. I understand the majority’s analysis of Edst-rom/Coolidge. It can be said that differing/ambiguous results can happen when precedent is not “on all four corners” but is at least near the mark. The statutory rules of construction are crystal clear that on penal statutes, ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant (criminal or civil) and against the government. State v. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Minn.1987) (affirming dismissal of two counts of indictment and declining to hold that a violation of an ethics regulation is necessarily illegal); see also State v. Colvin, 645 N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn.2002) (“A rule of strict construction applies to penal statutes, and all reasonable doubt concerning legislative intent should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”). Coolidge provides that “a statute mitigating punishment is applied to acts committed before its effective date, as long as no final judgment has been reached.” 282 N.W.2d at 514 (emphasis added). This mandate of Coolidge applies. No restitution is mitigation of punishment. If Basal received the benefits of the amendment, she would be entitled to exclude the value of the Jeep in calculating her assets and eligibility for assistance. See Minn.Stat. § 256J.20, subd. 3(1) (2008) (allowing for a vehicle exception for “a licensed vehicle up to a loan value of less than or equal to $15,000”). As a result, if she sought assistance today and reported the Jeep, she would be eligible. There would be no loss from a failure to report the Jeep because she would be entitled to assistance. With no loss, there would be no restitution obligation.
The Dakota County Department of Employment and Economic Assistance administers Basal’s MFIP benefits. With Basal, that bureaucracy took an overly technical, narrow approach to her petition for welfare benefits. In this day and age, in this economy, poor people are desperate to have some slack cut for them when there is at least a reasonable interpretation that they are entitled to benefits. My sense of judicial review is that based on the law and the facts, Dakota County government cut this one too close. The job of the courts is to look over the shoulder of state and local government, not be its partner.
I note that there are entitlement programs for large corporations, wealthy citizens, huge agri-business corporate farms, oil/mineral exploration, corporations doing business overseas, and a host of others listed in the IRS code, which cannot be detailed in this opinion as Minnesota only has so many trees left available for paper pulp, and I do not want to contribute to any more “clearcutting.” If as to those entities just described entitlement programs are construed narrowly to save the taxpayers a buck or two here and a buck or two there, I would say go for it. But to those of our people who are so destitute that they need access to the limited benefits of welfare just to eat, to clothe themselves, and to have a roof over their heads at night, I suggest a more empathetie view of the guidelines surrounding entitlement is prudent.
Anatole France, an articulate and passionate critic of the French government/bureaucracy of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, said in chapter 7 of his novel The Red Lily (as part of a larger quote):
*339For the poor it consists in sustaining and preserving the wealthy in their power and their laziness. The poor must work for this, in presence of the majestic quality of the law which prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from stealing bread.
Anatole France, The Red Lily 91 (Winifred Stephens trans., Dodd, Mead, and Company 1925) (1894).
I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand this case to Dakota County for a recalculation of Basal’s application for MFIP assistance.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 10.