Court Opinion

ID: 9819296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:56.847205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.815929
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GALASSO, dissenting: I dissent because I believe that the current interpretation of section 2 — 401(b) exacts too harsh a penalty on litigants. As embodied by such cases as Zito, the relief afforded by section 2 — 401(b) to a party who misnames a defendant is not available where the “misnamed person” actually exists. Such an interpretation makes sense if the “misnamed person” actually exists but has no connection with the occurrence or the parties involved in the occurrence from which the lawsuit arose. However, where, as in the instant case, the “misnamed person” actually exists but was also the owner of the car involved in the accident, was the father of the driver and resided in the same residence as the driver, the plaintiff should be entitled to relief under that section. Section 2 — 401(b) was enacted to allow a plaintiff the benefit of correcting a pleading or a person named therein without being impacted by the running of the statute of limitations. The Zito court acknowledged that what the trial court must do is to determine whom the plaintiff intended to sue. That test must be an objective one and must be resolved based upon all of the facts and the conduct of the plaintiff. If we continue to follow that line of cases of which Zito is the latest example, then in all cases, regardless of their individual facts, where the party was sued by the wrong name and, in fact, there is an existing person who is known by that wrong name, section 2 — 401(b) relief will not be afforded to the plaintiff. In effect, the results of the objective tests regarding the plaintiffs intent are irrelevant. I believe that reviewing courts should strive to give a reasonable meaning to the intent of section 2 — 401(b). This can only be done by reviewing the proceedings that occurred before the trial court and determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the plaintiff sued the intended party under the wrong name. In this case, I would conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court followed the logic of Zito and did not allow the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to present objective evidence of whom the plaintiff intended to sue because the named party actually existed. In addition, the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice precluded the plaintiff from filing a motion pursuant to section 2 — 616(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(d) (West 1994)). While Zito suggests that a reviewing court may determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under that section even though that issue was not before the trial court, I believe that, when the reviewing court affirms the denial of relief to a plaintiff pursuant to section 2 — 401(b), the interests of justice would require a remand to the trial court for the purpose of allowing a plaintiff to request a section 2 — 616(d) hearing. For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.