Court Opinion

ID: 9791847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:19:06.497665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.920925
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The appellant, a Negro, and the mother of the child, a white woman, lived together after the mother conceived a prior child during July 19S8. That child was born April 13, 1959. The appellant and the mother went through a purported marriage ceremony in Idaho on June 18, 1959. This marriage was void for the reason that appellant at that time had a wife living from whom he was not divorced until April 4, 1960. This divorce became final July 4, 1960. Appellant and the mother were ostensibly divorced in 1963 although they had never been legally married to each other.
•The mother gave her consent to the adoption of that child but later joined with appellant herein in attempting to secure custody of the child by means of a writ of habeas corpus.1
In that case a decision written by the author of the prevailing opinion stated:
* * * The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies no recognized paternal status at common-law or under our statutes. The law does not recognize him at all, except that it will make him pay for the child’s maintenance if it can find out who he is. * * *
That statement is as true now as it was when written. An illegitimate father has no legal claim upon or legal right in or to the custody of his child unless such claim or right can be found in a statutory modification of the common law.
Under our statutes the only ways an illegitimate father can get any rights in the child are: (a) publicly acknowledge the child as his own and take it into his home with the consent of his wife, if married, and treat it as if it were legitimate ;2 (b) marry the mother after an adjudication of being the father is made in a bastardy proceeding;3 (c) contingent rights after an adjudication of paternity in a bastardy proceeding;4 (d) adoption of the child;5 (e) possibility of some court declared rights after a judgment requiring support pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity.6
This appellant has not been adjudged to support the child in question nor has he either married the mother or taken the *109child into his home and treated it as if it were legitimate. While he did publicly acknowledge his paternity during the court proceedings, he has not qualified under any of our statutes as having any rights in or to the child.
The Juvenile Court is given exclusive authority to terminate all legal parent-child relationships,7 and the statute sets forth the grounds upon which that relationship can be terminated.8 The point to be kept in mind, however, is that the illegitimate father is not a parent within the meaning of the law.
Certainly such a father cannot maintain an action for damages under the wrongful death statute 9 nor could he have a preference in the appointment of a guardian for a minor under the age of fourteen years.10 Such a father has no rights at all in the child unless and until he brings himself within some statutory provision which will afford them to him.
I cannot agree that the court terminated the rights of the appellant solely upon the grounds that he had no such rights. I am of the opinion that the court could have done so, but such was not the case in this matter.
Here the Juvenile Court gave notice to the appellant and to the mother that they should appear on February 26, 1969, at the hearing of a petition to terminate all parental rights in and to the child in question. Both parties appeared and testified. Other witnesses were sworn and examined and cross-examined by the State, the court, and by appellant’s counsel.
Upon the conclusion of the evidence the appellant, through his counsel, moved for a continuance, which was granted by the judge. During the continuance the appellant filed a petition for custody of the child. Since the question before the court was whether the appellant and the mother should be deprived of all parental rights, the court did not need to have a further hearing on the petition and so denied it forthwith by the following order:
The above-entitled matter was before the Court on the 26th day of February, 1969, for a hearing on a Petition filed in the interest of the above child; subsequent to the hearing and prior to the decision made by the Court, the putative father of the child, James N. Thomas, filed a Petition for Custody and Affidavit and a Supplemental Affidavit requesting that consideration be given to the custody of the child being granted to him; although Mr. Thomas is the putative father, he is not the legal father *110and, therefore, has no legal rights to the child; FURTHER, this Court has previously deprived Mr. Thomas of custody of two other children, Vincent Andre Thomas and Keith Antoine Thomas, Case-Nos. 205941 and 205942; said action was taken on September 13, 1965 ; since that time the children have continued to live in foster homes and Court action has been required to force support payments from Mr. Thomas on behalf of the children; he still is unable' to provide for these two children after 3i/2 years of foster care; FURTHER, it would be contrary to the interest of the above child to follow the same foster care pattern as these other two children;
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Custody of the above child filed by James N. Thomas not be set for hearing and that it be. dismissed.
While the court was of the opinion (properly so, I think) that the appellant had no right to the child and therefore refused his petition for custody, nevertheless the court made the following finding of fact:
(6)' It is in the best interest of the child that the mother and putative father be deprived of the child’s custody and the child be placed in the care and custody of the State Department of Public Welfare and the parents should be permanently deprived of all parental rights. The decree of the court contained the
following order:
2. That all parental rights of the mother, Kathleen McMurtrey, and James N. Thomas are hereby permanently terminated and legal custody and guardianship of the person of the above child is hereby placed with the State Department of Public Welfare, a licensed child-placing agency, for placement in a suitable adoptive home;, that the said department is hereby ordered to pay for the support and maintenance of said child until the adoptive placement is made
This order was fully justified by the evidence given at the hearing wherein the appellant and his counsel participated fully, and this court should affirm the judgment.11
I would therefore affirm the judgment.

. Thomas v. Children’s Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P.2d 1029.

. Sec. 78-30-12, U.C.A.1953.

. Sec. 77-60-14, U.C.A.1953.

. See. 77-60-12, U.C.A.1953.

. Chap. 30, Title 78, U.O.A.1953 as amended.

. Chap. 45a, Title 78, U.O.A.1953 (1969 Pocket Sup.).

. Sec. 55-10-77, U.C.A.1953 (1969 Pocket Sup.).

. Sec. 55-10-109, U.C.A.1953 (1969 Pocket Sup.).

. See. 78-11-6, U.C.A.1953.

. See. 75-13-13, U.C.A.1953.

. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952).