Court Opinion

ID: 9927423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-27 01:00:43.574384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:31.285458
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292        Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit
                               ____________                                FILED
                                                                    January 26, 2024
                                No. 22-10866
                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                Clerk

   Rolex Watch USA, Incorporated,

                                           Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                      versus

   Beckertime, L.L.C.; Matthew Becker,

                                Defendants—Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:20-CV-1060
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
         Following a bench trial for this trademark infringement dispute
   brought under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, et seq., the district court
   determined that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark but refused to
   disgorge BeckerTime of its profits after finding that the laches defense
   applied. It then enjoined BeckerTime from further infringement, subject to
   various exceptions.   The parties cross-appealed, with Rolex seeking a
   modification to the injunction, treble profits, and attorneys’ fees, and
   BeckerTime seeking the application of an alternative test to determine
Case: 22-10866      Document: 00517046292          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                    No. 22-10866

   infringement. As explained below, we AFFIRM in part, MODIFY in part,
   and REMAND in part.

                                         I
          This is a trademark infringement dispute involving allegations of
   counterfeit and infringing use of Rolex’s marks by BeckerTime. Rolex is a
   luxury watch seller with a legally protectable interest in numerous
   trademarks. BeckerTime sells primarily decades-old preowned watches
   containing Rolex branded parts. The at-issue watches in this case are
   watches sold by BeckerTime that are identified as “Genuine Rolex,” but
   contain both Rolex and non-Rolex parts. The watches specifically considered
   by the district court contained additional diamonds, which were added “as
   hour markers to the refinished dials by drilling holes in the dials and placing
   aftermarket diamonds or other stones and settings in the holes.” To refinish
   dials, BeckerTime “strips the dial down to bare metal, then, after the
   refurbishing process is complete, reapplies Rolex’s trademarks.” These
   “modifications” are not performed or authorized by Rolex.
          BeckerTime lists the retail prices of their modified watches with
   comparison prices to new Rolex watches, but for the watches considered, the
   district court found that “Rolex has never sold a watch matching the
   description” provided by BeckerTime. The at-issue watches contain “at
   least one Rolex trademark” and “aftermarket bezels (not made or endorsed
   by Rolex) . . . including bezels with added diamonds.” BeckerTime further
   applies “aftermarket bands or straps (not made or endorsed by Rolex)” that
   “sometimes include a genuine Rolex clasp or buckle displaying Rolex’s
   trademarks.” The parts BeckerTime adds to the at-issue watches “do not
   bear any markings indicating BeckerTime is the source.” Further, the district
   court found that the parts replaced, such as the bezel, dials, and bracelets,
   “are integral and necessary to the at-issue watches.”

                                         2
Case: 22-10866        Document: 00517046292          Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                      No. 22-10866

          In September 2020, Rolex sued BeckerTime alleging counterfeit and
   infringing use of Rolex’s trademark in connection with the advertising,
   promotion, service, and sale of watches and individual watch parts that are
   not authorized or sponsored by Rolex and that are not genuine products of
   Rolex. Rolex sought to enjoin BeckerTime from infringing its trademark and
   to force it to disgorge its profits related to infringement. The parties waived
   a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on October 25, 2021.
          The district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order, and set
   out its Final Judgment which enjoined BeckerTime from using Rolex’s
   trademark in specific applications. It held that “BeckerTime infringed
   Rolex’s trademark protection by counterfeiting Rolex watches.” However,
   after balancing the equities, the district court concluded that Rolex was not
   entitled to disgorge BeckerTime’s profits because laches applied. It made no
   rulings as to attorneys’ fees or treble damages under the Lanham Act. This
   appeal followed.

                                           II
          Following a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual findings
   for clear error and review any legal issues de novo. Guzman v. Hacienda Recs.
   & Recording Studio, Inc., 808 F.3d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir. 2015). Likelihood of
   confusion is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. Elvis Presley Enters.,
   Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 196 (5th Cir. 1998). Factual findings made during
   a bench trial deserve “great deference.” Guzman, 808 F.3d at 1036. A
   district court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if it is “implausible in
   the light of the record considered as a whole.” Brumfield v. Cain, 808 F.3d
   1041, 1057 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Though we review legal issues de novo, we review the scope of the
   district court’s injunction and its application of laches for an abuse of
   discretion. Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 334 (5th

                                           3
Case: 22-10866      Document: 00517046292           Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                     No. 22-10866

   Cir. 2008). “A district court’s ruling regarding [15 U.S.C.] §§ 1116 and 1117
   remedies is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Quick
   Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
   Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000)).

                                         III
                               A. Infringement
          We first address whether the district court applied the correct legal
   framework to determine that BeckerTime infringed on Rolex’s trademarks.
   We conclude that it did.
          BeckerTime argues that a modified test for infringement involving
   “decades’ old” products arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in
   Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947). According to
   BeckerTime, the district court improperly applied the traditional digits of
   confusion factors without any discussion of Champion. Rolex counters that
   the district court applied the correct legal framework, noting that it
   appropriately followed Rolex Watch USA, Inc. v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816 (1998),
   and other established precedent involving altered watches. Rather than
   suggesting that Champion is inapplicable, Rolex argues that the district court
   implicitly concluded that Champion’s “misnomer” exception applied in the
   instant case.
          The district court did not address Champion. It instead relied on the
   traditional “likelihood of confusion” analysis. “To recover on a claim of
   trademark infringement, a plaintiff must first show that the mark is legally
   protectable and must then establish infringement by showing a likelihood of
   confusion.” Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 329. First, the district court determined
   that Rolex’s marks were registered and incontestable, as required by statute.
   15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a)-(b). Next, the district court determined that
   Rolex had shown that BeckerTime’s use of the mark “creates a likelihood of

                                          4
Case: 22-10866         Document: 00517046292               Page: 5      Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                          No. 22-10866

   confusion in the minds of potential consumers” relying on the non-
   exhaustive list of factors set forth in Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
   Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 2000). 1 It concluded that these factors
   “point towards a likelihood of confusion and therefore infringement.”
           BeckerTime urges us to reject the district court’s analysis, noting that
   “these factors are insufficient on their own to balance Rolex’s trademark
   rights with the rights of an owner (such as BeckerTime) of a used (here,
   vintage) watch in repairing and customizing that watch without having to
   remove the underlying Rolex marks.” Pointing to district court cases in our
   circuit, BeckerTime requests we consider additional factors, including (1) the
   extent and nature of changes made to the product, (2) the clarity and
   distinctiveness of the labeling on the rebuilt product, and (3) the degree to
   which any inferior qualities associated with the reconditioned product would
   likely be identified by the typical purchaser with the manufacturer. See Neles-
   Jamesbury, Inc. v. Valve Dynamics, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 964, 970 (S.D. Tex.
   1997); Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Prudhomme, 765 F. Supp. 1551, 1567 (N.D.
   Tex. 1991).
           We decline today to consider these additional factors because there is
   no need in this case. Although the district court did not expressly cite
   Champion, our review of the record indicates it properly considered and
   applied Champion. 2

           _____________________
           1
            These factors include “(1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) similarity of design
   between the marks; (3) similarity of the products; (4) identity of retail outlets and
   purchasers; (5) similarity of advertising media used; (6) the defendant’s intent; (7) actual
   confusion; and (8) degree of care exercised by potential purchasers.” Am Rice., 518 F.3d at
   329.
           2
             Although the district court did not expressly mention Champion in its ruling
   following the bench trial, it addressed BeckerTime’s Champion argument in the context of
   disclosures in ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. It noted that BeckerTime

                                                 5
Case: 22-10866         Document: 00517046292              Page: 6       Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                          No. 22-10866

           In Champion, the plaintiff was a manufacturer of spark plugs which it
   sold under the trademark “Champion.” 331 U.S. at 126. The defendant
   collected these used plugs, repaired and reconditioned them, and resold
   them, while retaining the word “Champion” on the repaired and
   reconditioned plugs. Id. The district court concluded that the defendant
   infringed the Champion trademark and enjoined the defendant from offering
   or selling any of the plugs that had been repaired or reconditioned unless,
   inter alia, the trademark and type and style marks were removed. Id. at 126-
   27.
           On appeal, the Second Circuit found infringement and unfair
   competition, but it eliminated the requirement that the trademark and type
   and style marks be removed from the repaired or reconditioned plugs. Id. at
   127. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Second Circuit’s
   relief was adequate—particularly its decision that the defendant was not
   required to remove the trademark “Champion” from the resold plugs. Id. at
   128.
           The Supreme Court clarified that Champion dealt with “second-hand
   goods,” as BeckerTime does in the instant matter. Id. “We put to one side
   the case of a manufacturer or distributer who markets new or used spark
   plugs of one make under the trade mark of another.” Id. But the plugs at
   issue “are nevertheless Champion plugs and not those of another make.” Id.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision because the
   plugs were “clearly and distinctively sold as repaired or reconditioned rather
   than as new.” Id. at 130.

           _____________________
   was unable to show that its disclosures were sufficient because Rolex had “successfully
   shown that there has been at least some level of confusion,” so a genuine dispute of material
   fact existed as to whether the disclosures were sufficient under Champion.

                                                6
Case: 22-10866       Document: 00517046292         Page: 7   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                    No. 22-10866

          The Supreme Court carved out an exception (the “misnomer”
   exception) in “[c]ases . . . where the reconditioning or repair would be so
   extensive or so basic that it would be a misnomer to call the article by its
   original name, even though the words ‘used’ or ‘repaired’ were added.” Id.
   at 129. In Champion, the misnomer exception did not apply because it
   involved “no more than a restoration . . . of their original condition,” not a
   new design. Id.
          Thus, Champion instructs that a reseller may utilize the trademark of
   another, so long as it involves nothing more than a restoration to the original
   condition, and not a new design. In that case, “[f]ull disclosure gives the
   manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled.” Id. at 130.
          Here, BeckerTime does more than recondition or repair vintage Rolex
   watches. As the district court found, BeckerTime produced “modified
   watches,” with “added diamonds,” “aftermarket bezels,” and aftermarket
   bracelets or straps. It found that the watches sold by BeckerTime were
   “materially different than those sold by Rolex.” In fact, the district court
   found that Rolex has never sold watches matching the descriptions provided
   by BeckerTime. Unlike the plugs in Champion that “are nevertheless
   Champion plugs and not those of another make,” BeckerTime’s watches are
   of another make and cannot properly be called genuine Rolex watches. See
   Champion, 331 U.S. at 128. Moreover, throughout its brief, BeckerTime
   describes this process as “customization,” not restoration. Accordingly,
   Champion’s misnomer exception properly applied to the facts of this case and
   the district court did not err by conducting a traditional digits of confusion
   analysis.
          In applying the correct test, the district court concluded that “the
   digits of confusion point towards a likelihood of confusion and therefore
   infringement.” The district court found that customers had “inquired as to

                                          7
Case: 22-10866      Document: 00517046292           Page: 8    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                     No. 22-10866

   the authenticity,” stating “they are confused as to whether the watch is fully
   genuine Rolex.” The district court also found that BeckerTime “ha[d]
   received complaints about the quality of the watches and complaints that the
   watch was not actually composed of exclusively genuine Rolex parts.”
   Although BeckerTime includes many disclaimers, the district court found
   these were insufficient because “[s]ubsequent potential purchasers” may
   not have access to those, and because the “disclosures mislead purchasers
   into thinking there is a comparable genuine Rolex, when in fact, there is not
   always one.”
          We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that
   BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademark because its watches, lacking
   sufficient disclosures, created a likelihood of confusion in consumers. See
   Capece, 141 F.3d at 196. After applying the correct test, the district court
   made factual findings that are well supported by the record.
                                  B. Remedies
          We next turn to Rolex’s arguments about the scope of relief granted
   by the district court. We first consider the district court’s application of the
   laches defense precluding disgorgement of BeckerTime’s profits. We then
   address the district court’s decision not to award treble profits and attorneys’
   fees. Finally, we consider the proper scope of the injunction.
          i. Laches Defense
          Rolex argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that
   BeckerTime’s “deliberate counterfeiting” did not bar laches, claiming
   BeckerTime’s “unclean hands” preclude it from relying on this equitable
   defense. Further, assuming arguendo that BeckerTime acted in good faith,
   Rolex argues that BeckerTime has failed to show that it suffered undue
   prejudice caused by Rolex’s delay in filing suit. BeckerTime counters that
   the district court correctly found insufficient evidence of unclean hands to

                                          8
Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292            Page: 9   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                     No. 22-10866

   preclude equitable defenses, and that sufficient evidence shows that
   BeckerTime was unduly prejudiced by Rolex’s delay in pursuing its
   remedies.
          “A laches defense cannot be asserted by a party with unclean hands
   because it is equitable.” Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th
   Cir. 2013). “A defendant who intentionally infringes a trademark with the
   bad faith intent to capitalize on the markholder’s good will lacks the clean
   hands necessary to assert the equitable defense.” Id. (quoting Bd. of
   Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550
   F.3d 465, 490 (5th Cir. 2008)).
          The district court found that there was “insufficient evidence to show
   [BeckerTime] had unclean hands” and that “Rolex failed to show [the]
   subjective and knowing bad faith necessary to foreclose [BeckerTime’s]
   equitable defenses.” This finding considered the “inherent” aspect of
   reselling luxury goods—that sellers wish to benefit from the reputation and
   goodwill of the brand name. But it rejected that this alone is sufficient to
   show unclean hands. The record supports the district court’s conclusion, as
   the emails between BeckerTime and its customers show it goes to great
   lengths to clarify which parts are original Rolex, which are customized or
   modified, and which are aftermarket. This supports the district court’s
   conclusion that BeckerTime did not intentionally infringe Rolex’s mark and
   thus was not precluded from raising this equitable defense.
          A defendant urging a laches defense for inexcusable delay that causes
   prejudice must establish: “(1) delay in asserting one’s trademark rights, (2)
   lack of excuse for the delay, and (3) undue prejudice to the alleged infringer
   caused by the delay.” Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 334 (quoting Westchester Media,
   214 F.3d at 668). The time period for laches “begins when an owner of a
   mark first has knowledge of the accused use.” Id. (citation omitted); see also

                                          9
Case: 22-10866       Document: 00517046292         Page: 10   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                    No. 22-10866

   Capece, 141 F.3d at 205 (“The period for laches begins when the plaintiff
   knew or should have known of the infringement.”).
          The district court concluded that at a minimum, Rolex’s agent
   “should have known about BeckerTime in 2010, ten years prior to the filing
   of the lawsuit, and no later than 2013 when [a Rolex employee] wrote that
   BeckerTime watches were junk.” It further found that “Rolex offer[ed] no
   valid justification for this delay.” It determined that “BeckerTime likely
   would not have shifted its business model to be reliant on the sale of altered
   Rolex watches if Rolex had brought this suit promptly. BeckerTime relied on
   Rolex’s cooperation in building this valuable business, and Rolex assisted
   BeckerTime with the importation of watches for repair or return.”
   Accordingly, the district court determined that Rolex may not disgorge
   BeckerTime of its profits. This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
   See Am. Rice, 518 F.3d at 334.
          On appeal, Rolex offers no justification for the delay, instead arguing
   that BeckerTime failed to show prejudice. But the record supports that the
   ten years of permitted sales enabled BeckerTime to build up a successful
   business that it would not otherwise have invested in absent Rolex’s delay in
   filing suit. This is clear prejudice. Accordingly, the district court correctly
   decided that BeckerTime not be disgorged of profits resulting from Rolex’s
   delay in filing suit.
          ii. Attorneys’ Fees and Treble Profits
          Next, Rolex claims that the district court erred in not awarding treble
   profits and attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). BeckerTime claims
   that the district court correctly applied principles of equity to bar monetary
   recovery by Rolex and that Rolex has waived any argument concerning
   trebling or attorneys’ fees by failing to move for such relief below.
   BeckerTime emphasizes the district court’s finding that there was

                                         10
Case: 22-10866      Document: 00517046292            Page: 11    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                      No. 22-10866

   insufficient evidence of deliberate counterfeiting by BeckerTime to warrant
   the imposition of treble profits and attorneys’ fees.
          Section 1117 of the Lanham Act sets forth the statutory scheme for
   awarding profits in a trademark infringement case. Section 1117(a) entitles a
   mark holder to recover the defendant’s profits, subject to the principles of
   equity. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 582,
   584 (5th Cir. 1980). “A plaintiff’s entitlement to disgorged profits is
   assessed based on the equities of the case and does not automatically follow
   from liability.” Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 919 F.3d 869,
   875 (5th Cir. 2019). Further, Champion instructs that where the equities of
   the case may be satisfied by an injunction, the court will not award profits to
   the plaintiff. See Champion, 331 U.S. at 131 (denying accounting in unfair
   competition and trademark infringement case where injunction satisfied
   equities of case). Here, the record supports the district court’s denial of
   profits to Rolex pursuant to § 1117(a) because it properly found that the
   laches defense applied and refused to disgorge BeckerTime of its profits.
   Further, we are satisfied that the injunction properly addresses the equities
   of the case.
          But when counterfeit marks are involved, as appears to be the case
   here, § 1117(b) of the Lanham Act applies. Under this subsection, when a
   defendant knowingly and intentionally uses the mark or designation of
   another, a plaintiff seeking a remedy under § 1117(a) is entitled to three times
   the defendant’s profits plus reasonable attorneys’ fees in every case, except
   where there are “extenuating circumstances.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).
          The district court did not express any opinion regarding treble profits
   and attorneys’ fees. Rolex is not entitled to treble profits, as the district court
   refused to disgorge BeckerTime of any profits because it properly applied the
   defense of laches. Although § 1117(b) also contemplates attorneys’ fees, we

                                           11
Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292            Page: 12   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                     No. 22-10866

   agree with BeckerTime that Rolex’s requested relief is foreclosed. First, the
   district court made no finding of intentionality. It specifically stated that
   “Rolex failed to show subjective and knowing bad faith necessary to foreclose
   equitable defenses.” Accordingly, Rolex has not met its burden of showing
   intentionality under § 1117(b). Additionally, Rolex waived its request for
   attorneys’ fees. Our precedent is clear—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   54(d)(2) requires parties to move for attorneys’ fees within fourteen days of
   entry of final judgment, and failure to do so constitutes waiver. United Indus.,
   Inc. v. Simon-Hartley, Ltd., 91 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1996). There is no
   dispute that Rolex failed to move for attorneys’ fees with the district court
   and it cites no authority to excuse that failure. Accordingly, the district court
   did not err in opting not to award treble profits and attorneys’ fees.
          iii. Scope of Injunction
          Finally, Rolex argues that the district court erred by not enjoining
   BeckerTime from using non-genuine bezels and non-genuine dials on Rolex-
   branded watches. BeckerTime argues that the injunction comports with the
   district court’s factual findings and the equitable principles it considered.
          We agree with Rolex that the district court should have enjoined the
   sale of Rolex watches with non-genuine bezels. The district court specifically
   found that “advertisements labeling watches with a non-genuine bezel as a
   Rolex is likely to confuse customers” and that, like dials and bracelets, bezels
   “are integral and necessary to the at-issue watches.” Consistent with these
   findings, the district court prohibited BeckerTime from displaying the
   “GENUINE ROLEX” trademark “in any disclosures in connection with
   goods or services of watches that include: non-genuine (i.e. not made by
   Rolex) bezels.” Yet by excluding non-genuine bezels from parts 1(a) and (b)
   of its injunction, the district court treated “integral and necessary” watch
   parts inconsistently, authorized BeckerTime to sell what it believed would
   likely cause confusion if advertised, and permitted BeckerTime to use Rolex

                                          12
Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292            Page: 13   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                     No. 22-10866

   trademarks on watches with non-genuine bezels, but prohibited the same
   action if it used the GENUINE ROLEX trademark in a disclosure.
          These orders are difficult to reconcile, and we therefore grant Rolex’s
   requested relief and add non-genuine bezels to parts 1(a) and (b) of the
   district court’s injunction to make it consistent with the district court’s other
   findings and to treat all “integral and necessary” watch parts the same. See
   Meece, 158 F.3d at 825.
          However, we reject Rolex’s argument that the district court erred by
   excluding all non-genuine dials from parts 1(a) and (b) of the injunction. The
   district court enjoined “dials where the dial is stripped of the original
   paint/coating and markings, then repainted/recoated, . . . or to which other
   words have been added.” It specifically excluded customized dials that do
   not involve the removal or reapplication of Rolex’s trademarks, and which
   may have added diamonds, stones, or other embellishments.
          First, under Champion, there is a difference between adding diamonds
   to a dial and refinishing a dial—the former is customization, the latter
   restoration.   With the right disclosures, as required by the injunction,
   BeckerTime is free to customize watches for customers upon request. See
   Champion, 331 U.S. at 130 (“Full disclosure gives the manufacturer all the
   protection to which he is entitled.”).
          Further, the district court’s order is supported by the fact that
   BeckerTime’s refinishing process necessarily required removing and
   reapplying Rolex’s trademarks.        As Rolex concedes, “[t]here was no
   evidence that BeckerTime ‘customized’ dials in a manner other than using a
   refinishing process that involved removing and reapplying Rolex’s
   trademarks.” The district court here appropriately enjoined BeckerTime
   from doing what it was doing, not what it could do.

                                            13
Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292           Page: 14   Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                    No. 22-10866

          We likewise reject Rolex’s argument that the district court erred in
   requiring that BeckerTime inscribe “CUSTOMIZED BY BECKERTIME”
   on the back of the watches, claiming it should not permit them to continue
   selling “counterfeit” watches at all. But the district court here specifically
   found that the disclosures BeckerTime made did not “fully alleviate
   confusion,” and it is reasonable that the district court required an additional
   disclosure to adequately alleviate any remaining confusion.
          Finally, we reject Rolex’s argument that the district court improperly
   permitted BeckerTime to sell counterfeit watches upon customer request.
   The district court reasonably found that, with the required disclosures, no
   customer requesting a customized watch by BeckerTime would confuse it
   with a genuine Rolex watch.
          However, turning to section 1(c), we agree with Rolex that the
   typographical errors in the section render it vague and unqualified. See State
   of Louisiana. v. Biden, 45 F.4th 841, 846 (5th Cir. 2022) (“To comply with
   Rule 65(d) a district court’s order should state its terms specifically and
   describe in reasonable detail the conduct restrained or required.”).
   However, we cannot understand the district court’s intent as to this section.
   Accordingly, we order a limited remand solely for the district court to clarify
   its language in part 1(c). Specifically, it should correct the two following
   typographical errors by filling in the missing language as it deems
   appropriate: (1) “where the (including. . .” and (2) “or to which other have
   been added.” The remainder is affirmed as modified.
                                        IV
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
   insofar as it concluded that BeckerTime infringed Rolex’s trademarks, that
   the laches defense prevented disgorgement of BeckerTime’s profits, and that
   Rolex was not entitled to treble profits or attorneys’ fees. We AFFIRM AS

                                         14
Case: 22-10866     Document: 00517046292           Page: 15    Date Filed: 01/26/2024

                                    No. 22-10866

   MODIFIED the district court’s injunction in part and REMAND in part
   to correct the errors outlined above. This is a limited remand. Accordingly,
   should either party seek appellate review following modification of the
   injunction by the district court, the appeal will be assigned to this panel. See
   M. D. by Stukenberg v. Abbott, 907 F.3d 237, 288 (5th Cir. 2018).

                                          15