Court Opinion

ID: 9825499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:14:27.349296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:54.671912
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In Illinois there is a statute quite similar to that in Alabama, requiring, in substance, that-the complainant’s bond must be made before the receiver shall be appointed. In the case of Ayres v. Graham Steamship C. & L. Co., 150 Ill. App. 137, a receiver was appointed and the property required to be delivered to him forthwith, but complainant was ordered to give bond within four days. This was not made a condition to the effect of the order, and the receiver’s authority under it was not postponed until the bond was executed. The court said that there was no power to appoint without first requiring complainant to give bond. This rule has been observed in that state in the later cases. In Labowitch v. Labowitch, 202 Ill. App. 35, it is said, “On the appointment of a receiver, complainant must be required to give bond.”
California also has a similar statute. In the case of Ryan v. Murphy, 39 Cal. App. 640, 179 P. 517, it is said to be mandatory that the order appointing the receiver shall require a bond of the applicant, and, where it has not been complied with, the appointment is void.
In none of the cases do we find that a statute of this nature is not observed if the order appointing the receiver is not to become operative until the complainant gives bond.
The effect of our statute was involved in our case of Engle v. Bronaugh, 210 Ala. 467, 98 So. 283. In that case, following Pagett v. Brooks, 140 Ala. 257, 37 So. 263, this court held that on collateral attack the appointment of a receiver without requiring bond by complainant was not void. The court of equity had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. Its failure to comply with the statute should have been remedied on direct attack, and not otherwise. The attack of com*455plainants in the Montgomery county case, supra, upon the appointment of the receiver in Jefferson county, is collateral, and, even though bond had not been required, the order would not be void on such attack, upon the authority of those cases. But the order of the Jefferson county court did not ignore that statute, but made the execution of the bond a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the appointment.
But, as we have pointed out, when the bond is given, the order of appointment was then effective from its date. Engle v. Bronaugh, supra. In the meantime the court had assumed to exercise constructive dominion over the property. The bond when made protected defendant; for until then he sustained no damage by a constructive seizure. The statute can mean nothing else in effect but that the bond must be made a condition precedent to the right of the receiver to function as such, and we have been cited to nothing to the contrary.
We are not impressed with the argument now made for the first time that the writ may not issue unless1 the complainants in the Montgomery county case are made respondents.
In overruling the application for rehearing whereby the writ of prohibition shall issue as heretofore directed, it will not have the effect to prohibit the circuit court from causing the receiver to make final settlement of his acts as such, and to make due account for the property and effects 'which went into his possession, nor from directing .the proper disposition of such effects, nor such other action as may be necessary to make final disposition of the cause pursuant to the views we have expressed.
Application for rehearing overruled.
ANDERSON, O. J., and GARDNER and BOULDIN, JJ., concur.