Court Opinion

ID: 9640774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:15:00.509791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.762207
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court’s comments can be construed as demonstrating that the judge predetermined the defendant’s sentence prior to hearing any evidence on punishment. Further, I believe this is the only construction that can be placed on these comments, and this practice violates the due process to which every defendant is entitled under the Texas Constitution and the United States Constitution.
The difficult question is whether the trial court’s error was waived by the defendant. Chief Justice Guittard’s opinion in Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) (Guittard, C.J., dissenting), addresses a very similar fact situation and is very persuasive in many respects. Justice Guittard found that there had been no waiver. He defined waiver as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,” citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Paprskar v. State, 484 S.W.2d 731, 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
In reviewing criminal cases in which the appellate courts were faced with the question of waiver, it appears that failure to object generally equates to waiver. However, there are some limited exceptions to this general rule. In Rabb v. State, 730 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that failing to object to the unconstitutionality of a statute did not waive the right to raise that point on appeal. Misjoinder of offenses is another situation in which the Court of Criminal Appeals did not require an objection at trial to preserve error. Keimig v. State, 753 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Crim.App.,1988) (not yet reported); Holcomb v. State, 745 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); Fortune v. State, 745 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
Tex.R.App.P. 52(a) (made applicable to criminal cases on June 1, 1987) sets forth the requirements for preserving a complaint for appellate review. This rule provides no exception to the requirement of an objection to preserve error. However, in the recent decision of Williams v. State, No. 69,582 (Tex.Crim.App., June 22, 1988) (not yet reported), the Court of Criminal Appeals requires an objection for the purposes of preserving an error in a case "where the implication of the new constitutional right could have been reasonably anticipated.” This is stated another way in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court states that “where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.”
A claim to entitlement to due process certainly cannot be said to be novel, nor can it be said that it is a new constitutional right which could not have been reasonably anticipated. Nevertheless, the setting in which this denial occurred is not an area of law that has received significant attention. The Fielding case and a federal case that arose in Mississippi, United States v. Long, 656 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir.1981),1 are two cases that are similar in nature to the present case, but no parallel cases have been cited to us from the Court of Criminal Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. The recent case of Norton v. State, 755 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, n.p.h.), is the first case I have found in which an appellate court found a violation of due process for the failure of the trial judge to recuse because of the judge’s pretrial statement on punishment.
In the present case, I would hold that Cole had not waived his basic right of *868constitutional due process. Waiver will not be lightly inferred and courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). While it is understandable that a judge may wish to impress the offender with the serious possible consequences of any violation of the conditions of his probation, he must do so in a manner not to prejudge the ultimate sentence before hearing the evidence on punishment. I would reverse the judgment insofar as it sets his punishment and would remand the case to the trial court with an instruction (as Judge Guittard sets forth as the appropriate action in Fielding, supra) to conduct a punishment hearing before a different judge.

. In the Long case, the trial judge stated twice on the record that no presentence report could change his mind, thus closing his mind to a factor that the law required him to consider. The appellate court reversed the trial court on the basis that consideration of the presentence report was mandatory. The opinion does not indicate that any objection was made at the trial level.