Court Opinion

ID: 9625246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:33:16.215084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:04.370382
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
The rule prohibiting a court from charging on confessions where there has been no more than an admission is based on the most fundamental policy of avoiding any inference from the court that the defendant has acknowledged his guilt unless he has, in fact, done so. Covington v. State, 79 Ga. 687 (7 SE 153) (1887). "To say to the jury that the defendant had confessed to a crime, when the language relied upon was a protestation of innocence, could have no other but the most harmful effect.” Owens v. State, 120 Ga. 296, 300 (48 SE 21) (1904).
I fully agree that an admission of the main fact may support an inference of remaining elements in order to qualify the admission as a confession. Likewise, I agree that an admission of the main fact coupled with denial of any other essential element will not constitute a confession. However, I cannot agree that the defendant’s assertion here, that he intended to pay for the goods via earnings deductions, failed to deny an essential element of the crime of theft by taking. The majority has looked to Code § 26-1802 (b)(1), and to the wording of the accusation, in order to conclude that the defendant did not deny a necessary element of the crime since the Code states alternative intents which may accompany the act of taking: "the intent of appropriating merchandise to his own use or to deprive the owner of possession thereof or of the value thereof, in whole or in part.” In the majority’s *394view, only the last element of intent was negated by the defendant’s admission; therefore, the first two must be inferred in order to make out admission of the completed crime, hence, a confession.
As far as it goes, I believe the majority’s reasoning is correct. However, Code § 26-1802, theft by taking, must be read in conjunction with Code § 26-1810, claim of right. The latter section provides a defendant charged with theft by taking an affirmative defense if he "[a]cted under an honest claim of right to the property or under a right to acquire or dispose of it as he did.” Code § 26-1810 (b). The defendant’s statement very plainly asserts that he thought he had a right to acquire the property as he did, with the shop owner thereafter deducting its value from the defendant’s pay. An admission which also states an affirmative defense is not a confession of guilt, for "[a] confession is a statement inconsistent with the possibility of the accused’s innocence of the crime charged.” Davis v. State, 234 Ga. 730 (7) (218 SE2d 20) (1975).
Whether the defendant’s explanation is plausible under all the facts of the case is a question for the jury. However, he is entitled to have the jury consider this question without first being charged on the law relative to confessions. I would reverse the judgment and grant the defendant a new trial inasmuch as it was error for the judge to charge on confession as there was no confession involved, only an admission coupled with an affirmative defense.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.