Court Opinion

ID: 9656031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:31:40.528811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:26.922000
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion is bred in speculation, nurtured by massive quantities of wishful thinking, and has given birth to a new and, to this writer, frightening concept of criminal jurisprudence. I must therefore vigorously dissent.
The clear and unmistakable signal being given here is that the mere utterance of the word “attorney” or “lawyer,” when a suspect is being questioned, will deny the prosecution the right to continue any questioning. Anything said after those magic words will be locked into a constitutionally protected error, and its use will be denied to the prosecution regardless of the existence of other overwhelming evidence and any admission made by the defendant prior to his utterance of such words. Neither Miranda nor its progeny dictates such an absurd result. This court, while giving lip service to the rights and concerns of the victim,1 enlarges the rights of an accused to such a degree that these rights have no boundaries.
While I have my doubts that it was error to admit the defendant’s tape-recorded statement, I believe that the *676alleged error in this case was, in any event, clearly harmless.
As the majority notes, the question of whether a court can find harmless error when the state introduces into its case-in-chief statements made by an accused after he received Miranda warnings and after the police failed to honor his request for counsel has not been explicitly considered or decided by either this court or the United States Supreme Court. It is clear that the use of a coerced or involuntary confession cannot be deemed harmless error even in the presence of other evidence which might well have constituted independent proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Schwamb v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 173 N.W.2d 666 (1970); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); McKinley v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 26, 154 N.W.2d 344 (1967). What is not clear is whether a confession obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights, after he has been informed of those rights, is involuntary per se.2 The United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), seemed to indicate that it was:
[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.
Id. at 474. However, decisions since Miranda have shown that such a per se rule does not exist. These cases have *677pointed up a distinction between involuntary statements and statements that are unlawful because they were obtained in violation of a defendant’s Miranda rights.
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the supreme court approved the admission of a defendant’s post-arrest statements for impeachment purposes, even though the police had failed to first inform him of his right to appointed counsel. Two later decisions clearly make a distinction between unlawful and involuntary statements. In Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), the defendant was in police custody and had been given his Miranda warnings. While on his way to the police station he asked to telephone his attorney, but was told that he could not do so until he arrived at the station. Before arriving, however, he made incriminating statements to the police. The court allowed the use of the statements for impeachment purposes because it appeared that the statements were voluntary and trustworthy. In Mincey v. Arizona, the court reiterated that harmless error cannot apply to the admission of involuntary statements, but that unlawful but voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment purposes. 437 U.S. at 397-98.
It must be noted, of course, that the statements in Mincey, Harris and Hass were admitted only for impeachment purposes. Such a situation may well present a stronger case for admitting voluntary statements obtained in violation of Miranda, since a defendant should not be able to commit perjury by hiding behind the shield of his Miranda rights. Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
However, in cases where a defendant’s statements were admitted as a part of the state’s case-in-chief, courts have indicated that harmless error might apply. Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 797 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 988 (1972). In both Wilson and Collins, the defendant argued that his right to cut off questioning *678had not been scrupulously honored. The court in those cases ultimately concluded that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination had not been violated by the continued questioning because of the lack of coercive circumstances. The court in Wilson nevertheless stated:
Even if the admission of the statement to [the detective] had been improper [under Miranda], we would be inclined to find the error harmless.
584 F.2d at 1189. In Collins, the court noted that
even if [the defendant’s] confession were in response to [the agent’s] request, it was not made involuntarily.
462 F.2d at 797.
In Micale v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 251 N.W.2d 458 (1977), the defendant affirmatively stated that he understood his rights after his Miranda warnings had been read to him. The defendant also stated that “ ‘he couldn’t afford an attorney.’" Id. at 373. The questioning continued, and the defendant made incriminating statements. The confession was erroneously admitted into evidence as part of the state’s case-in-chief. The state relied heavily on the confession, since its other evidence was not strong. This court applied a test of harmless error and held that the admission of the confession was prejudicial and required reversal of the conviction. Id.
Under this analysis, which I think states the better rule, even if a statement is obtained in violation of an asserted Miranda right, the error might be harmless if the tactics employed are noncoercive.
I believe that the instant case involves, at the most, the admission into evidence of an unlawful but nonco-erced statement. As the court of appeals noted:
Those Wisconsin cases in which the harmless error rule was found to be inapplicable involve coercive tactics *679considerably more repugnant than merely telling a defendant he needs a doctor rather than a lawyer.3
The record clearly demonstrates that Billings’ statement was voluntary. Indeed, the tape recording shows that he was questioned in a fair and noncoercive manner. Moreover, after the initial reading of his Miranda rights, Billings was twice again informed of those rights, once with the waiver of rights he executed and, shortly thereafter, during the taped interrogation. Before trial, Billings had moved to suppress his statement, arguing that he might have been intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at the time he was questioned and that, therefore, his statement had not been voluntarily given.4 The trial court found that the statement was “the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will reflecting a deliberateness of choice.”5 As this court has noted on several occasions, whether a statement is voluntary and not the result of coercion is determined by reference to the totality of the circumstances in which it was given. State v. Wedgeworth, 100 Wis. 2d 514, 524, 302 N.W.2d 810 (1981); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 223 N.W. *6802d 521 (1974); Grennier v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 204, 234 N.W.2d 316 (1975). The defendant’s personal characteristics must be carefully balanced against any pressures to which he was subjected in order to induce the statement. Wedgeworth, 100 Wis.2d at 524; State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 81, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973). At the hearing, there was testimony that Billings did not appear to have been under the influence of drugs. Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to listen to the tape-recorded statement and draw its own conclusions about the defendant’s condition. On review, conflicting factual evidence must be resolved in favor of the trial court’s finding. State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis. 2d 531, 544, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
The majority opinion asserts that “the record clearly shows that the constitutional error in this case was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Supra at 666.) The majority attempts to minimize the significance of certain facts and omits others in order to justify its conclusion that the erroneously admitted evidence was not merely “duplicative” of untainted evidence.
The majority states that the defendant’s statements are not duplicative of the testimony of the victim’s neighbor, because the neighbor testified that he saw the defendant outside the victim’s house before the assault, and the defendant’s statements put the defendant in the basement of the house, the actual scene of the crime. In fact, the neighbor’s testimony placed the defendant on the victim’s property, inside a chain link fence separating it from the adjoining property (certainly not more than twenty feet from the rear door). Using a commonsense approach, such facts would be sufficient to place a suspect at “the scene of the crime.”
Moreover, when one considers the photograph of the defendant’s shoe print in the basement (which, matched the shoes he was wearing the day he went to the police *681station), the conclusion is inescapable that the defendant’s testimony is merely duplicative of the untainted evidence. Additionally, the victim’s testimony, which also placed the defendant in the basement of the victim’s home, could properly be characterized as “overwhelming.” The victim did not merely identify the defendant. Her description of him was so detailed and accurate that the artist’s composite sketch of the assailant was recognized as being the defendant by an anonymous caller, who instructed the police to go to the service station where the defendant worked. Thus, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this case is not distinguishable from Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1189 (2d Cir. 1978), where the court, in explaining why it would be inclined to find the error of admitting an unlawfully obtained statement to be harmless, noted:
The allegedly tainted evidence did no more than place [the defendant] at the scene of the crime, a fact which was confirmed by the testimony of several eyewitnesses. The statement, therefore, was cumulative evidence, and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
As in Wilson v. Henderson, the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative, since it only placed Billings at the scene of the crime. The majority, referring to the defendant’s lapses of memory, states that “some parts of his statements came very close to constituting a confession.” (Supra at 673.) Apparently, the majority would like to ignore the fact that Billings never admitted that any sexual contact occurred. It is not beyond dispute that the defendant’s testimony at trial was damaging to him. Even with his selective lapses of memory, the jury did not, as the majority asserts, find the defendant’s testimony wholly incredible. Billings did indeed benefit from taking the stand since, as to the second count, the jury did not find him guilty of entry into a dwelling *682with intent to commit a felony6 (second-degree sexual assault) as charged, but instead only found him guilty of the lesser included offense of trespass to dwelling.7 The defendant’s statements did not establish the elements of second-degree sexual assault; the victim’s testimony did. As noted above, she had positively identified Billings as her assailant. She testified that Billings did more than make her remove her bathing suit; indeed, she stated that she fought him for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. The victim’s resulting injuries would have dispelled any doubt concerning the truth of her version of the incident. It is my firm belief that under the “reasonable possibility standard” of Chapman v. California, any error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.8
In addition, as I stated at the outset of this dissent, I view the majority decision as an inappropriate extension of Miranda. Therefore, I would affirm the judgments of conviction.

 In State v. Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 329 N.W.2d 399, 406, 707, also decided today, this court approved the increase in the defendant’s sentence for second degree sexual assault, explaining:
“He obviously, with his demonstrated modus operandi, deliberately chose to attack her in the privacy of her living quarters. She will now no longer feel completely secure in her own home. The law respects the sanctity of a person’s dwelling. No longer will this victim be able to relax and feel secure in the one area where all citizens should be able to feel safe, that is, in her home. She has been attacked in that ‘safe’ area and will always have doubts concerning her security.”

 This court has already decided that confessions which are unlawful because they were obtained in the absence of Miranda warnings, but were nevertheless not involuntary, are subject to the harmelss error rule. LaTender v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 383, 391, 253 N.W.2d 221 (1977); Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 492, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).

 See, e.g., McKinley v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 26, 154 N.W.2d 344 (1967); State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964). Cf. Bradley v. State, 36 Wis. 2d 345, 153 N.W.2d 38, reh’g denied 155 N.W.2d 564 (1967).

 Since the intoxication issue was not raised in the appellant’s post-conviction motion, the trial court’s decision on the motion did not discuss how the voluntariness of the appellant’s statement was affected by his alleged state of intoxication.

 At the Miranda-Goodehild hearing, Billings argued that his statement was involuntary because he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs at the time he made the statement. On this question, the court found that Billings was of average intelligence, that he was twice advised of his rights after the request for an attorney, that his statements regarding what he remembered and what he did not remember were entirely consistent, that he was functioning in the same state as he did at his place of employment and that Miranda had been complied with.

 Section 943.10(1) (a), Stats.

 Section 943.14, Stats.

 As the majority notes, the judgment by a reviewing court that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is to be based on the court’s own reading of the record and on what seems to have been the probable impact of the confession on the minds of an average jury. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
This court held in Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 357, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973), that the test for harmless error should be based on “reasonable probabilities.” (Emphasis added.) Because the untainted evidence against the defendant, considered in the context of all the evidence, was overwhelming and because the improperly admitted evidence was merely cumulative, the error here was harmless under either definition of “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”