Court Opinion

ID: 9890893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 19:03:32.383134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:12.621697
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 P. v. LaCroix CA2/5

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B318742

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. GA102302)
       v.

 JEREMIAH LACROIX,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charlaine F. Olmedo, Judge. Dismissed.
      Patricia A. Scott, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       In 2019, defendant Jeremiah LaCroix was convicted of
murder with gang and gun enhancements. In his direct appeal
from that conviction, he raised various sentencing errors, which
the People conceded. We modified the judgment to correct the
errors, affirmed the judgment as modified, and remanded the
matter with directions to the trial court to prepare a new abstract
of judgment reflecting the modified sentence.
       On appeal after remand, defendant argues he is entitled to
the ameliorative benefits of several changes to the law enacted
after judgment was imposed in his case. Although the People
initially conceded these issues, they retracted those concessions
in response to our request for letter briefs. The People now
contend, and we agree, that the trial court did not resentence
defendant on remand. It was this court that modified the
judgment, and as such, there is no new trial court judgment from
which defendant can appeal. As we lack jurisdiction over this
matter, the appeal is dismissed.
                          BACKGROUND1
       After exchanging words with members of another gang at a
bar, defendant left the bar and returned with a gun. Hostilities
ensued, and defendant shot three people, one of them fatally.
       Defendant was convicted by jury of second degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1); attempted voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder
(§§ 664/192, subd. (a); count 2); possession of a firearm as a felon

1     Most of the evidence presented at trial is irrelevant to
defendant’s claims on appeal; we address only that evidence
necessary to resolve the appeal and otherwise to provide context.

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(§ 19800, subd. (a)(1); count 13); and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 17).2 The jury
found gang enhancements true as to all four counts (§ 186.22,
subds. (b)(1)(A), (B), (C)). The jury also found defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d); count 1), personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (b)), and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7;
counts 2 & 17). Defendant was acquitted of two additional counts
of attempted murder, and the court dismissed a third count of
attempted murder under section 1118.1.
       The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of
50 years to life and a consecutive determinate term of 15 years,
8 months. For the indeterminate term, the court imposed 15
years to life for count 1 (§ 187, subd. (a)) plus 15 years to life for
the gun enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and 10 years for the
gang enhancement (§ 182.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate determinate term of 15
years, 8 months. The court selected count 17 as the base count
and sentenced defendant to 12 years: the high term of nine years
(§ 245, subd. (b)), plus three years for the great-bodily-injury
enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court imposed a
consecutive two-year term for count 2: one year (one-third the
mid-term) for the substantive offense (§§ 664/192, subd. (a)) and
one year (one-third the mid-term) for the great-bodily-injury
enhancement. Finally, the court imposed a consecutive one year,
eight month term for count 13: eight months (one-third the mid-
term) for the substantive offense (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and one

2       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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year (one-third the mid-term) for the gang enhancement
(§ 186.22, subd. (a)(1)(A)). The court stayed the gang and gun
enhancements for counts 2 and 13 under section 654.
       When the case first came before us on appeal, defendant
raised various sentencing errors. By unpublished opinion, we
modified the judgment and affirmed as modified. (People v.
LaCroix (Aug. 28, 2021, B304354) [nonpub. opn.].) As discussed
in more detail below, we remanded with directions to the trial
court to prepare a new abstract of judgment reflecting the
modified judgment and to send a certified copy of the new
abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
(Id. at p. 5.) In all other respects, we affirmed. (Ibid.)
       Upon remand, at an in-person hearing, the trial court made
the changes to the judgment indicated in the disposition.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
       After both parties’ appellate briefs alluded to the in-person
proceeding as a “resentencing hearing,” we requested
supplemental briefing on whether the hearing “resulted in an
appealable order from which this court has jurisdiction to decide
the appeal.” (See Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126
(Jennings) [reviewing courts have an independent duty to raise
the issue when doubt exists about their own jurisdiction].)
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Proceedings on Remand
       On August 28, 2021, we issued an unpublished opinion in
defendant’s direct appeal, People v. LaCroix. (People v. LaCroix
(Aug. 28, 2021, B304354).) Our disposition stated: “The
judgment is modified as follows: (1) as to count 1, murder, the
10-year enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C)
is stricken and a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term

                                 4
imposed; and (2) as to count 13, possession of a firearm by a felon,
the sentence and related enhancement are stayed pursuant to
section 654. The trial court is directed to prepare a new abstract
of judgment reflecting these changes. The clerk shall forward the
new abstract to the Department of Corrections [and
Rehabilitation]. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.” (Id. at
p. 5.)
       On February 17, 2022, upon remand, the trial court held a
hearing at which counsel for defendant and counsel for the
prosecution were present. The court stated: “All we’ll do is
modify the judgment as indicated by the Court of Appeal, and I’ll
put that on the record. And then we’ll make sure we transmit
that to the California Department of Corrections.” Counsel for
defendant and the prosecution agreed to that procedure. The
court then continued: “So, looking at the remittitur and the
decision and remittitur filed October 18th of 2021, the court has
been directed to strike the ten-year enhancement pursuant to
186.22(b)(1)(C) and simply indicate to impose a 15-year minimum
parole eligibility term; and as to count 2 and count 13, stay the
sentences pursuant to Penal Code section 654.” Counsel for both
parties accepted the modification.
2.     The Trial Court Did Not Enter an Appealable
       Judgment or Order
       In California, the right to appeal is statutory. (People v.
Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 [“The right to appeal is
statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute”].) The existence of an appealable
judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.
(Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 126.) Section 1237 sets forth the

                                 5
situations under which a criminal defendant may appeal.3 The
statute authorizes appeals from “final judgments[,] those orders
deemed by statute to be final judgments,” and any “order made
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”
(People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792 (Mazurette);
§ 1237, subds. (a) & (b).)
       A newly imposed sentence following resentencing
constitutes an appealable “final judgment of conviction.” (People
v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219–221.) But not all
proceedings on remand trigger the right to appeal. The rule
remains that absent a judgment, a judgment substitute, or a
qualifying postjudgment order, a defendant cannot appeal.
(Mazurette, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 792–793.)
       Defendant contends that the proceedings below must be
understood as a resentencing hearing resulting in a new
appealable judgment. We disagree. Our disposition did not
authorize resentencing, a point plainly understood by the trial
court, which did not characterize the remand proceeding as a
resentencing hearing. Inviting counsel to attend a hearing for

3      Section 1237 provides: “An appeal may be taken by the
defendant: [¶] (a) From a final judgment of conviction except as
provided in Section 1237.1 and Section 1237.5. A sentence, an
order granting probation, or the commitment of a defendant for
insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a defendant as a
mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a
defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to
be a final judgment within the meaning of this section. Upon
appeal from a final judgment the court may review any order
denying a motion for a new trial. [¶] (b) From any order made
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”

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the purposes of observing changes the court was making to the
abstract of judgment did not covert the appearance into a
resentencing hearing. To the contrary, the court’s statement that
“all we’ll do is modify the judgment as indicated by the court of
appeal” must be understood to refer to modifying the abstract of
judgment, not the judgment itself, as that was the only course of
action “indicated by the court of appeal.” In other words, the
court’s statement suggests it was appropriately complying with
the directions contained in the remittitur. (See People v. Dutra
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366 [trial court’s jurisdiction upon
remand limited to carrying out directions contained in
remittitur].)
       Because the trial court did not resentence defendant, there
is no appealable judgment or order in this case. And because
there is no judgment or order from which defendant may properly
appeal, we lack jurisdiction over this matter.

                        DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.

                                    RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  BAKER, J.                     MOOR, J.

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