Court Opinion

ID: 9715590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:09:35.764141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:36.177981
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN concurring in part and dissenting in part: I disagree with part II of the majority’s opinion. There, the majority concludes that respondent waived the opportunity to argue the untimeliness of the State’s petition for continued hospitalization or alternative treatment. (153 Ill. 2d at 420-21.) The majority nevertheless concludes that the late filing of the petition was harmless. (153 Ill. 2d at 421.) Those conclusions, I believe, are flawed. Therefore, I dissent. Waiver, as relied upon by the majority in part II, cannot apply here. Section 3 — 813 of the Code mandates discharge of a patient if a petition for continued hospitalization or alternative treatment is not filed before expiration of the initial order of involuntary admission. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 3 — 813.) Either the section operates to discharge a patient if such a petition is not filed, or it does not. In either event, the outcome is independent of respondent’s conduct. The result of an untimely petition is directed by statute. Whether or not respondent directed attention by objection to what is statutorily mandated is immaterial. See Cuny v. Annunzio (1952), 411 Ill. 613, 617 (holding that express statutory requirements rendered it immaterial that no objections were made regarding naming certain parties as defendants in administrative review proceedings). More troubling is the conclusion that the State’s late filing of the petition was harmless. The majority acknowledges, without comment, four decisions in which the appellate court held similarly late petitions invalid. (153 Ill. 2d at 421, citing In re Hatala (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 163; In re Walker (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 159; In re Bloyer (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 245; In re Vancil (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 204.) Two of those cases, Hatala and Walker, involved late filings of a single day. The majority fails to distinguish the four decisions or the reasoning underlying the holdings. Instead, the majority finds support in People v. Lang (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 384, to apply an analysis which considers the prejudice resulting from the State’s late filing. I believe the rationale underlying Lang is suspect. More importantly, as with the majority’s application of waiver, reliance on Lang to reach the conclusion that respondent was not prejudiced results in ignoring the Code’s plain language. Lang, like Hatala, Walker and this case, involved a petition which was filed one day after the expiration of a preceding order of involuntary admission. The focus of attention in Lang was a tenth consecutive petition filed by the State. That petition, like that preceding it, sought an additional 180-day period of treatment pursuant to section 3 — 813(b) of the Code. The appellate court declined to dismiss the tenth petition even though the State had filed it on the 181st day following a ninth order of additional treatment for 180 days. The court did not directly address the petition’s untimeliness — a curious fact given that the court expressly identified that as the issue presented. (Lang, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 388.) Instead, the court simply noted that petitions for additional periods of treatment under section 3 — 813(b) were subject to the same procedures governing initial petitions. (Lang, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 388.) The court justified the additional period of treatment ordered pursuant to the tenth petition in consideration of the evidence which supported the initial period of involuntary admission. Lang, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 388. Upon a first reading of Lang, the support the majority finds for its holding in part II appears weak given that the untimeliness issue is not directly addressed. A closer examination shows that that support is not weak, it is illusory. The appellate court misapprehended section 3— 813(b), the basis for its decision. Section 3 — 813(b) permits additional 180-day periods of treatment to be sought “so long as the patient continues to be subject to involuntary admission.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. QlVz, par. 3 — 813(b).) But, as pointed out above, section 3— 813(a) requires the discharge of a patient if a petition for continued hospitalization or treatment is not timely filed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 3 — 813(b).) A discharged patient cannot be “subject to involuntary admission.” Discharge defeats application of section 3 — 813(b). The fact that section 3 — 813(b) incorporates the same procedures as for initial petitions simply has no bearing on the effect of a late petition. Certainly, the substantial liberty interests implicated in involuntary admissions procedures must be balanced against the objectives of providing care for those who are unable to care for themselves and to protect society from the dangerously mentally' ill. (In re Robinson (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 126, 130-31.) There is no worth, however, in striking that balance at a sacrifice of adherence to the rule of law. It is too easy in cases which present facts as compelling as this one to ignore the strictures of the Code in the aim, albeit valid, of protecting society from the dangerously mentally ill. In striving to protect potential victims at the expense of enforcing what the Code mandates, the system our legislature has instituted for that protection itself falls victim. Ironically, a careful reading of the Code reveals that provisions are available to legitimately seek to immediately reestablish a condition of involuntary admission following an untimely petition. Section 3 — 902 governs discharge. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91V2, par. 3 — 902.) Subsection (b) tracks the language of section 3 — 813(b) in providing that discharge follows when the patient is “no longer subject to involuntary admission.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 911/2, par. 3 — 902(b).) Subsection (d) provides that where a discharge results, the State’s Attorney of the pertinent county may be promptly notified. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 9IV2, par. 3 — 902(d).) Nothing in the Code prevents the State’s Attorney, informed of such discharge, to then immediately seek an emergency admission by certification pursuant to sections 3 — 600 through 3 — 611 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91x/2, pars. 3 — 600 through 3 — 601). Section 3 — 601(a) permits such admission when “immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection of *** others from physical harm.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 9IV2, par. 601(a).) Subsequent steps then may be taken to impose further involuntary admission in a mental health facility (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91x/2, pars. 3 — 700 through 3 — 706). Some might argue that following those steps amounts to an empty exercise. Quite the contrary is true. Adherence to the procedures established by the Code is the only way to ensure that the efforts taken to subject individuals to involuntary admission in a hospital or mental health facility are properly scrutinized. And only through such adherence are the Code’s goals and the liberty interests implicated in involuntary admission procedures simultaneously honored. That said, I must point out that I do not disagree that, under certain circumstances, the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Code may be excused where the Code’s purposes are achieved. (Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d at 131, citing In re Splett (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 225.) For example, I agree with the majority’s conclusion in part I of the opinion regarding non-compliance with the notice requirements of section 3 — 611. (153 Ill. 2d at 415-20; see also Robinson, 151 Ill. 2d 126.) The purpose of the Code was clearly satisfied given that the respondent had actual notice of the proceedings. (153 Ill. 2d at 419-20.) There is, however, a fundamental distinction between part I, where such analysis is proper, and part II, where it is not. Unlike the mandate of discharge upon an untimely .petition for continued hospitalization or treatment, the Code does not direct the result upon noncompliance with its provisions for notice.