Court Opinion

ID: 9649677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:05:51.835902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:13.684097
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
(dissenting).

INTRODUCTION

The Court has chosen to consider and review the constitutionality of the Public School Education Act of 1975, L. 1975, c. 212 (1975 Act). Intended as a legislative response *513to the Court’s May 1975 order, Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N. J. 133 (1975) (Robinson IV), the 1975 Act introduces a new phase in the four-year progression of this case. Unlike the earlier hearings on this matter, the Court passes judgment on an alternative to the State School Aid Law of 1954, as amended, L. 1954, c. 85; N. J. 8. A. 18A:58-1 et seq. (Bateman Act) as the means for securing a “thorough and efficient” education in compliance with the education clause of the Constitution of 1947, N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1. In so doing, the Court must decide if the 1975 Act transcends constitutional infirmities which were found • in its predecessor. Similarly, it must determine whether the Act meets the standards which were posited in the Court’s earlier efforts to define the parameters of a “thorough and efficient” system of free public schools.
Despite the unique posture of this case, it must be evaluated in the light of our previous holdings. In Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473 (1973) (Robinson I), New Jersey’s system of financing public education, which relies heavily on local taxation, was found to be unconstitutional and inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of a “thorough and efficient” system of public education. Recognizing the confusion which would have resulted from the sudden imposition of a new statewide scheme of financing public education, the Court deferred judicial action to permit the Legislature to correct the objections noted by the Court in its original opinion. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N. J. 196 (1973) (Robinson II). Nonetheless, to assure expeditious implementation of a constitutional system, the Court chose December 31, 1974 as a deadline for legislative compliance and retained jurisdiction to afford judicial relief should it be warranted by the circumstances. Such a need became apparent early last year in the absence of definitive action by the Legislature. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N. J. 33 (1975) (Robinson III). While the Court declined taking immediate action in deference to alleged exigencies in the school budgetary *514process, it scheduled a hearing for March 1975 to determine the means by which relief could be afforded. This resulted in the Court’s most recent opinion which ordered that funds earmarked for the minimum aid support and save-harmless provisions of the Bateman Act -be distributed according to the incentive equalization aid formula of that Act. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 150, 155. Because the Court itself acknowledged that the interim order was only a temporary solution and was far from a perfect plan (69 N. J. at 151), its continued effectiveness was made “subject to the contingency set forth in this opinion, namely the possible eventuation of timely and constitutionally appropriate legislative action.” 69 N. J. at 155.
This judicial invitation to legislative action was accepted by the Legislature and resulted in the passage of the 1975 Act — the focal point of the instant ease. The ostensible purpose of the 1975 Act is, as enunciated in its prefatory paragraph, to provide:
[F]or a thorough and efficient system of free public schools, a State aid program implementing such system, revising parts of the statutory law and supplementing Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes.
To achieve this purpose, the Act relies on a two-pronged effort consisting of the reformation of public school financing and the formulation of a much-needed definition of “thorough and efficient.” The first of these objectives is undertaken in the Act itself, whose Article III purports to rectify the constitutional objections found in the Bateman Act. While the guidelines for defining a “thorough and efficient” education are similarly included in the 1975 Act under Article II, their implementation is primarily delegated to the State Board of Education and its local counterparts. See infra, at 520. We are now asked to rule upon the constitutional validity of this Act.
*515In a letter to the Court dated September 29, 1975, Governor Brendan T. Byrne wrote: “I herewith respectfully submit the ‘Public School Education Act of 1975’ for your review to determine whether it complies with the constitutional mandate and may be permitted to go into effect for the next school year.” Thereafter, the parties filed motions for relief with respect to our May 1975 order (Robinson IF).
While this Court, consistent with constitutional and regulatory limitations, has held that it “will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract” (Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities Corp. of N. Y., 58 N. J. 98 (1971)), I do not believe that this doctrine precludes consideration of these motions. None of the objections addressed by this doctrine appears to exist in the instant matter. The parties before the Court are the same as in the earlier hearings; their claims are consistent with those which they previously advanced; and the issue upon which they seek judicial determination — the constitutionality of New Jersey’s school financing system — is essentially the same as that posed in Robinson I-IV. Moreover, I find the actual interests of the various parties sufficiently adverse so that an objection to rendering advisory opinions would be inappropriate. Finally, the Court itself contemplated judicial review of a legislative alternative to the May 1975 order as part of this litigation. Robinson IV, sufra, 69 N. J. at 144 n. 4. The present applications for relief from our May 1975 order represent another phase of the existing cause of action. Plaintiffs therefore need not initiate a new cause of action specifically challenging the 1975 Act.
Nevertheless, for the reasons which I set forth below more fully, I would defer consideration of the 1975 Act by this Court at this time. Instead, I would remand for a plenary hearing as to the operational effect and the constitutionality of the Act.
*516I

DEFER REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1975 ACT BY THE COURT AT THE PRESENT TIME

In our most recent decision in this case, we ordered limited relief for plaintiffs by redistributing minimum aid and save-harmless funds according to the equalized aid formula of the Bateman Act. Rohinson, IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 150. This plan, while intended as a first step towards the elimination of inequities which had been found inherent in the Statewide system of public education was readily conceded to be both an interim resolution and far “short of a perfect plan.” 69 N. J. at 151.
Therefore, in footnote 4 of that decision, ¿he majority established a contingency upon which the Court’s order might he vacated:
If implementing- legislation for financing and the attendant administrative process is completed before October 1, 1975, but not in time to permit review thereof by the Court by that date, the Court will then, in the light of the nature of the entire plan submitted, consider whether it may be permitted to g-o into effect for 1976-1977, with or without terms, or be deferred to subsequent years if ultimately sustained by the Court. [69 N. J. at 144 n. 4],
The eommonsense meaning of this statement clearly conveys the Court’s intention at that time:
1. Any legislative alternative to.the Rohinson IV order was to become operational only after it had been reviewed and approved by this Court. This prerequisite follows from the role which the Court established for itself in the instant case, namely, “the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution’s command,” Rohinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 154.
2. In turn, review of any such legislative alternative’ was to be contingent upon submission of the proposed legislation in a form which would make thorough consideration possible. Implementing legislation for financing and the attendant ad*517ministrative regulations were to have been completed prior to our review. Through this requirement, we sought to avoid a review process whose hypothetical and fragmentary nature would frustrate the consideration which this legislation obviously requires and deserves.
3. To assure that any legislative alternative to the Bob in-son TV order would be forthcoming in time for preparation of the 1976-1977 school budgets, we set October 1, 1975 as a deadline for submitting the legislation. The Court did not envision that mere submission of an alternative educational plan would itself satisfy the contingency set forth in footnote 4. Our May 1975 order was to be vacated only after the Court had had an opportunity to review and, if warranted, sustain the statute.
4. Accordingly, the Court reserved the option either to permit any submitted legislation to be effective immediately or to defer implementation and subject the legislation to further consideration. To suggest that the Court did not retain this option would be to negate the Court’s powers of review in this case and would further contradict the language of the Robinson IV footnote in which we expressly reserved such an option.
Therefore, in Robinson IV the Court not only established the basis and- scope of its review of any legislative alternatives, but also the posture in which such legislation would have to be presented before review could proceed. Tracking the language of footnote 4, the legislation would have to be an “entire plan” for which the “implementing legislation for financing and the attendant administrative process [had been] completed.” Robinson TV, supra, 69 N. J. at 144 n. 4. Consequently the Court must first address itself to the threshold question of whether the 1975 Act is in an appropriate posture for review.
The 1975 Act was enacted on September 29, 1975, two days before the October 1, 1975 deadline fixed by this Court in Robinson IV. Although the Act contained provisions concerning the distribution of State school aid (Article III) *518and provisions defining, in general terms, the contours of a thorough and efficient system of education (Article II), no regulations had been promulgated to implement the Act and no moneys had been appropriated to fund it at the time of its enactment. In light of the contingencies set forth in footnote 4, plaintiffs and supporting amici argued before us that the Act was not in a proper posture for review.
In choosing to review the facial constitutionality of the 1975 Act, the majority today rejects this contention. With respect to the argument that “attendant administrative” regulations must be completed prior to review, the majority observes that:
Whether they are valid and adequate must await later determination and in no event can directly affect the constitutionality of the Act. [Ante, at 454 n. 2].
Accordingly, the majority confines its examination to the facial constitutionality of the Act and abandons all questions concerning the adequacy of its subsequent operational impact. Ante, at 454. The concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Conford agrees with this proposition. I find such partial and intermittent review to be both unsupportable and inappropriate in the instant case.
Pirst, the issue before the Court is noi whether the 1975 Act contravenes some constitutional guarantee or proscription, but whether it fully comforts with the constitutional mandate imposed upon the State by the education clause. N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. To review the Act in a piecemeal fashion, as the majority has done, constitutes a clear retreat from Robinson I, where we held:
Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local government, the end product must he what the Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry *519the burden, the State must itself meet its continuing obligation. [62 N. J. at 513; emphasis added].
We repeat that if the State chooses to assign its obligation under the 1875 amendment to local government, the State must do so by a plan which xoill fxilfill the State’s continuing obligation. [62 N. J. at 519; emphasis added].
Obviously, an Act which is facially constitutional will not satisfy the State’s continuing obligation, if the legislation fails to redress the wrongs identified in Robinson I or is otherwise found to be unconstitutional as applied.
Second, in Robinson J, this Court expressly held that the State has a constitutional duty to “define in some discernible way the educational obligation” mandated by the Constitution. 62 N. J. at 519. As will be discussed more fully below, the Legislature confronts this obligation in Article II of the Act. While this article purports to define the “goal” of a thorough and efficient educational system and outline the “major elements” of that system, it does so only in the broadest of terms. Consequently, administrative regulations are necessary to clarify and implement the statutory framework. The Act itself recognizes that there exists a need for regulations to fill in the broad interstices remaining in the general language of the statute. Accordingly, the Act delegates to the appropriate State and local agencies the tasks of establishing “goals and objectives consistent with legislative guidelines” and defining “standards of performance necessary to indicate achievement of the goals and objectives.” § 2b (3); see also §§ 6, 7. Without these additional standards and objectives, the statutory scheme is neither in a proper form for review nor constitutionally sufficient. In this last respect, the instant case is analogous to cases where implementing regulations were found to be a prerequisite to judicial review because, without such regulations, the statutory mandates were too vague and too general to permit judicial construction and interpretation. United States v. Boyd, 491 F. 2d 1163, 1169-70 (9 Cir. 1973); United States v. Approximately 633.79 T. Yellowfin Tuna, 383 F. Supp. 659 (S. D. *520Cal. 1974); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D. D. C. 1971).
Third, the amorphus guidelines of Article II, standing alone, give little insight to the courts which must interpret them and little guidance to the local boards which must comply with them. The reviewing court is afforded scant assistance in determining the proper bounds of administrative discretion and the Act’s constitutional sufficiency. Similarly, the absence of regulations prevents the Court from determining the adequacy of the fiscal provisions of Article III. Standards of educational quality are needed in order for the Court to ascertain whether the State school aid formulae comply with constitutional dictates. Moreover, without attendant administrative regulation, the 1975 Act might well approach a level of constitutional vagueness. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399, 86 S. Ct. 518, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1966); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969).1
Finally, review of the Act under these circumstances directly contradicts both the language and intent of this Court, *521as expressed in footnote 4 of Robinson IV. 69 N. J. at 144 n. 4.
For these reasons, I find that promulgation of attendant administrative regulations is a prerequisite for both review of this statute and its constitutionality.2 As previously noted, at the time motions were filed initiating the current phase of this litigation the State Board had not yet promulgated regulations implementing the Act. However, I now take judicial notice that on January 7, 1975 these regulations were officially promulgated (Reg. 1976 docket #3). Therefore, at least with respect to this requirement, the 1975 Act is now-ripe for review.
As noted in footnote 4, fiscal implementation is just as important a prerequisite to a valid legislative scheme as administrative regulations. Consequently, one might similarly require full funding as a condition to judicial consideration of the Act. However, the practicalities and difficulties of the legislative process impel me to the contrary. Within the timetable which I set out below, such a task could not realistically be accomplished prior to a plenary hearing. Thus, I would permit the trial court to consider this legislation for which regulations have been promulgated even though the funding necessary for its operation has not yet been appropriated. I would, however, as does the majority, retain full funding as a condition precedent to finding the Act constitutional.
*522II

REMAND CASE TO TRIAL COURT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF A FACTUAL RECORD

Although I find that the 1975 Act is now in a proper posture for review, I nonetheless would defer such review by this Court and would instead remand to the trial court for development of a factual record as to the operational effect and constitutionality of the Act. This course of action, which would include a timetable to facilitate consideration of the remand, is one which I have previously advocated in our efforts to adduce the content and meaning of a “thorough and efficient” education. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 162-65 (Pashman, J., dissenting). I find such a remand to be necessary if the Court is to avoid rendering a hypothetical and fragmentary decision based on an outdated and sketchy record.
A combination of the passage of time, the paucity of factual data and the new subject-matter of this litigation contribute to the need for an updated factual record. When the constitutionality of this State’s system of financing public education first came before this Court in 1973, we were presented with both a voluminous factual record and a concise but comprehensive summary of factual findings. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223 (Law Div. 1972). These findings concerned, among other things, levels of state funding, the ability of local districts to provide additional funding, deficiencies in the system, disparities in local expenditures per pupil, and ultimately, the constitutional infirmities which were inherent in the State’s school financing scheme. The record which was thus compiled, afforded a factual basis for the resolution of the pertinent legal issues.
While the data which was analyzed in that early decision may still provide a starting point for transitional studies, its continued usefulness is mitigated by factors of timeliness and relevance. If nothing else, the passage of so many years casts *523a pall of antiquity on the 1971 statistics and the conclusions which can be drawn from them. Due to the unavailability of certain statistics at the time, much of the evidence originally presented to the trial court was not even current when first submitted. 118 N. J. Super, at 236.
More importantly, the very relevance of the 1971 information has been undermined by the introduction of an entirely new legislative scheme. The information which was compiled to evaluate the Bateman Act is not only outdated, but is of limited use in evaluating those provisions and formulae of the 1975 Act which differ from the earlier legislation. In short, the inability of this information to reflect changed circumstances undermines its utility in the present proceedings.
Finally, without a remand, our evaluation of the 1975 Act may be effectively frustrated due to the lack of available information concerning the costs involved in satisfying the constitutional standard for public education. Of the statistical data before the Court, only that presented by the Commissioner of Education can even pretend to be current. This information, however, is itself fragmentary and lacks the probity necessary to be persuasive. Furthermore, while the figures which the 'Commissioner has presented represent an impressive array of statistics, their relevance has gone unexplained and their accuracy unchallenged. In addition, other information which might be of equal importance may have been overlooked.
I would therefore remand for a plenary hearing on the constitutionality of the 1975 Act. The plenary hearing which I recommend would perform the following functions:
1. It would be supplementary in the sense of augmenting the factual record which was developed in 1972. This would, of course, necessitate the presentation of revised figures for such items as the equalized non-school and total (school and non-school) tax rates, current Statewide and local per pupil expenditure levels, the ratios of teachers, other staff, facilities and programs to pupils in each district and the cost of pro-*524Tiding essential services and programs. It would also require an assessment of the steps which have been taken to cure the deficiencies which were previously recognized.
2. The hearing would perform an evidentiary function by eliciting information particularly related to the operations and implementation of the 1975 Act. This would permit the collection of data concerning provisions of the Act which were either absent from its predecessor or altered to some degree.
3. At the heart of the hearing would be an evaluative function, which would determine whether the 1975 Act comports with the constitutional mandate to provide a “thorough and efficient” system of education. While the imagination can suggest numerous avenues of inquiry, at the very least, the trial court should consider whether the level of funding and State aid formulae under the 1975 Act are sufficient to assure adequate per pupil expenditure levels; whether local tax resources per pupil are sufficiently equalized; whether the implementing regulations sufficiently define the content of the constitutional educational opportunity; whether the Act proves an effective mechanism for compelling deficient or recalcitrant districts to comply with statewide standards; and whether specific problems, such as municipal overburden, the absence of weighting factors, use of the prebudget years, and the State support and spending increase limits, undermine the Act’s constitutionality. See infra Part III.
I should note that the majority is not blind to the considerations that I have listed which impel me to remand for an evidentiary hearing. On the contrary, it explicitly states:
We hesitated to entertain the motions. No lower court determination of this underlying issue was before us for review; the parties had had no opportunity to avail themselves of an evidentiary hearing at which a record could be made . . . [Ante, at 454]
Nevertheless, the majority proceeds to review the constitutionality of the Act, on the ground that these considerations are. “outweighed by the desirability of reaching a speedy *525decision as to the constitutionality of the enactment.” Ante, at 454. Judge Conford agrees with the majority on this point, adding in his separate opinion that a “great amount of work, study, consultation and money has been invested,” that the “public educational establishment . . . has been in a state of tension and uncertainty . . . during the period of this litigation” and that “[planning has periodically been disorganized and frustrated.” Ante, at 499, 500.
While these considerations may be legitimate, I cannot agree that they justify a hasty review of the Act, in a partial and intermittent fashion and on the basis of an incomplete and seriously outdated record. Nor do they justify prematurely placing this Gourt’s imprimatur on an unfunded, incomplete and constitutionally suspect act. As I have noted on another occasion, the possibility of “administrative confusion,” “tension” and “uncertainty” does not warrant acceptance of a less-than-adequate legislative scheme for the financing of public education:
A certain amount of confusion and a great deal of dissatisfaction would undoubtedly result. . . . [But] the real question is: Can this Court, consistently with its obligations to uphold' and to enforce the Constitution, trade the constitutionally guaranteed rights of hundreds of thousands of children to an equal educational opportunity for the possibility of avoiding some difficulties in meeting local budget-making deadlines. I do not see how this question can be answered in any way but in the negative. [Robinson III, supra, 67 N. J. at 43].
See also Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 167-168 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 646, 94 S. Ct. 791, 39 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 690, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1973). Moreover, as I stated in Robinson IV, when a legislative scheme does not fully comply with the constitutional mandate, it should not be sustained by this ‘Court no matter how much “work, study, consultation and money” has been invested:
*526The obligation [of providing a thorough and efficient system of education] is not met by unsuccessful efforts by the legislative and executive branches to devise a plan to achieve the results demanded by the Constitution, however arduous and bona fide those efforts may have been. To the children of New Jersey it matters not at all whether the State’s failure to provide the constitutional opportunities guaranteed by the Constitution is the consequence of a deliberate policy of intransigence or merely the by-product of deadlock within the coordinate branches of government. [69 TS. J. at 173].
I do not believe that the majority has acted in the best interest of the school children of this State by finding the 1975 Act to be facially constitutional, in the absence of a full evidentiary examination of its operational effect. I cannot see how sanctioning an act which is constitutionally questionable will serve the interests of those children. Were the Act to be held unconstitutional after a plenary hearing or were there to be insufficient time in which to fully review the Act prior to the upcoming school year, the Court could still protect the interests of New Jersey’s school children by issuing a remedial order to continue in effect until such time as the Legislature corrected the deficiencies in the Act or the Court completed its review of the Act, respectively. Issuance of interim, remedial orders to redress the violation of constitutional rights is undeniably within the power of this Court. Robinson IV, supra,, 69 N. J. at 146-147, 152 (and cases cited therein). In light of this alternative course of action (see infra Part IV), ill-considered and premature approval of the 1975 Act seems both unnecessary and conceivably detrimental to the very pupils whom the majority wishes to help.
Nevertheless, I too believe that the matters before us should be resolved as expeditiously as possible and that a constitutionally adequate system of public education should be implemented at the earliest possible date. Therefore, I would propose that the evidentiary hearing and all subsequent review should proceed in accordance with a strict timetable which would assure completion of the review in a fairly expeditious fashion. Accordingly, I would schedule the plenary *527hearing to begin, on or about February 16, 1976 and to be completed by March 1. The hearing would solicit presentations by the parties and amici now before the Court, as well as others should the trial court determine the necessity or relevance of additional information. The hearing would result in a decision by the court which should be filed by March 10. On the basis of the decision, this Court could then properly consider and hear oral arguments on the constitutionality of the Act on or about March 22 and a decision would be rendered on or about April 15.
The timetable which I have proposed is admittedly one which places a premium on expeditious action and a burden on the parties who must make factual presentations. The first of these “can be ameliorated by diligence on the part of the State and local officials.” Robinson III, supra, 67 N. J. at 43 (Pashman, J., dissenting). That the timetable would still permit State and local school officials to prepare their 1976-77 school budgets has been acknowledged by the majority itself which has also selected April 15 as a date for concluding judicial review in the event that the 1975 Act is not fully funded. Timetables for budget deadlines were pushed back last year. Robinson III, supra, 67 N. J. at 42. If necessary, this may be done again this year.
Ill

REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 1975 ACT

As just noted, I would have deferred ruling upon the constitutionality of the 1975 Act and, instead, would have remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The majority has rejected this approach and has chosen to review the Act. Having registered my dissent regarding the majority’s decision to examine the facial constitutionality of the Act at this time, I could stop here. However, two very important considerations impel me to comment further on the constitutionality of this legislation.
*528First, in their briefs and at oral argument, plaintiffs and supporting amici raise numerous objections to the constitutional validity of certain portions of the 1975 Act. They vigorously attack some provisions as being facially unconstitutional. They contend that others might be shown to be invalid-as-applied. Consideration of their contentions is conspicuously absent from the majority’s opinion. Not only does the majority fail to address plaintiffs’ and amici’s objections to the 1975 Act, it displays a regrettable degree of temerity by not even acknowledging them. Because of this failing and because I find many of these contentions to be potentially meritorious, I feel obliged to discuss them in this portion of my dissent.
Second, by means of this discussion I hope to identify those aspects of the 1975 Act which are constitutionally suspect and, thereby, provide the trial court with guidance concerning the issues to be raised at the plenary hearing. I also hope to provide some criteria upon which the trial judge may test the constitutional bouyancy of the Act.
I will first examine the objections raised by plaintiffs and amici with respect to Article II of the Act and then analyze their contentions regarding Article III.
A. Article II of the 1975 Act: Goals, Standards and Guidelines: Procedures of Evaluation: Enforcement
In Robinson I, this Court held that, as part of the State’s continuing obligation to provide for a thorough and efficient system of free public schools, the State must define the content of the educational opportunity required by the Constitution. Specifically, the Court stated:
We repeat that if tbe State chooses to assign, its obligation under the 1875 amendment to local government, the State must do so by a plan which will fulfill the State’s continuing obligation. To that end the State must define in some discernible way the educational obligation . . . The State has never spelled out the content of the constitutionally mandated educational opportunity. [62 If. J. at 519]
*529As the majority correctly observes, the Legislature finally undertakes to do this in Article II of the 1975 Act. Ante, at 456.
Section 4 of that article defines the overall goal of a thorough and efficient system by stating that said goal
. . . shall be to provide to all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society.
Section 5 elaborates upon this general statement by outlining those elements which the State system of education must contain in order to comply with the “thorough and efficient” standard. These elements, intended to serve as guidelines for implementing the Act, include, inter alia, establishment of educational goals at both the State and local level [§ 5a]; “instruction intended to produce the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in the basic communications and computational skills” [§ 5c] ; efficient administration [§ 5h] and adequate evaluation procedures [§ 6j]-
Article II of the 1975 Act then delegates the more detailed formulation of statewide goals and standards to the State Board of Education (State Board), after consultation with the Commissioner of Education (Commissioner) and review by the Joint Committee on the Public Schools. [§ 6]. It further delegates establishment of local educational goals, objectives and standards to the local boards of education (local boards). [§ 7], Finally, Article II provides for periodic review of these statewide and local goals and standards [§§ 8, 9], for additional monitoring procedures [§§ 10, 11, 12] and for remedial powers to be used when necessary to correct deficiencies in the system. [§§ 14, 15, 16],
The majority blithely reviews these provisions and concludes :
*530What is meant by a thorough and efficient education has now been defined; the goal of such an education has been stated; the elements of which it is to consist have been enumerated [Ante, at 463].
The majority reaches this conclusion without any consideration whatsoever of the attendant regulations of the Act. Ante, at 454 n 2. I agree that the provisions of Article II, when viewed separately, do not transgress the constitutional precepts previously enunciated by this Court (e. g., Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 515), and that the delegation of responsibility contained therein is clearly permissible.3 Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 510; Ante, at 458. However, as I have stated previously, these provisions, without full regulatory implementation, are constitutionally insufficient because they fail to fully comport with the mandate of the education clause. Supra Part I.4 Therefore, standing alone, Article II of the Act cannot be sustained. To be constitutional, the statute requires proper and complete regulatory implementation. Furthermore, the Act and its attendant *531regulations, when taken together, must meet additional requirements. The legality and the thoroughness of the regulations are just as important as the legality and thoroughness of the Act itself. The verbiage in the regulations is the seat of power. In accordance with my expressed efforts to assist the trial court before which a plenary hearing would be held, I set forth a series of criteria by which the recently promulgated implementing regulations may be evaluated.
(1) Regulations Must Be Specific.
It is well settled that the education clause requires the State or its agents to “define in some discernible way the educational obligation” mandated by the Constitution. Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 519; Ante, at 456. Accordingly, they must prescribe the statewide standards of a constitutionally minimum quality education to which local school districts must adhere. These standards are especially important where the State chooses to assign much of its responsibility to local government. Without such standards there is no way of ascertaining whether school districts are, in fact, providing that level of educational opportunity which the Constitution mandates. Opinions of this Court and the provisions of the 1975 Act itself recognize the importance of establishing minimum standards of performance for measuring and evaluating the educational opportunity being afforded by local school districts. Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 516, 519; Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 159-65 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting). Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 175—76 (Mountain and Clifford, JJ., dissenting) ; L. 1975, c. 212, §§ 2b(3), 5a, 6, 7. The majority as well recognizes this fact when it points out that the State must define the content of the constitutionally required educational opportunity “so that fin some discernible way’ the scope of this obligation [will] be made apparent.” Ante, at 456. See also Levin, “A Conceptual Eramework for Accountability in Education,” 82 School Rev. 363 (1974). It *532follows that, to fully comply with the education clause, the Act must be supplemented by State Board regulations which set forth goals and standards that are specific enough to provide a meaningful way to evaluate local efforts and measure local performance.
(2) Regulations Must Provide for Standards of . Performance and Levels of Proficiency
In addition to being specific, the goals and standards promulgated under § 6 of the Act must be sufficiently rigorous to guarantee that local districts are, in fact, providing the constitutionally minimum educational opportunity. The broad contours of this constitutional opportunity can be inferred from the language of our opinions. The former Supreme Court characterized the significance of the education clause as follows:
Its purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a thorough and efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to every child such instruction as is necessary to fit it for ordinary duties of citizenship. * * * [Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N. J. L. 509, 512 (Sup. Ct. 1895)].
In Bd. of Ed., Elizabeth v. City Coun., Elizabeth, 55 N. J. 501 (1970), this Court elaborated upon the meaning of “thorough and efficient”:
Thus it is the duty of the Commissioner to see to it that every district provides a thorough and efficient school system. This necessarily includes adequate physical facilities and educational materials, proper curriculum and staff and sufficient funds. [55 N. J. at 506]
Finally, in Robinson I, we defined the contours of a thorough and efficient system in the following manner:
The Constitution’s guarantee must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market. [62 N. J. at 515]
*533In its definition of what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” education, § 4 of the 1975 Act substantially adopts the above language.
It follows that, to be constitutionally and statutorily sufficient, statewide standards must define with some degree of specificity, the minimally required programs, facilities and attendant staff which each local district must provide in order to meet the mandate of a thorough and efficient educational system. Certainly, without requisite planning, facilities and staff, provision of an “equal educational opportunity” (62 N. J. at 516) is impossible. Although these standards need not be rigid and inflexible (and may be subject to change in accordance with policy determinations by appropriate State agencies), they must specify, in some workable fashion, levels of constitutional adequacy for each of the above elements. § 5.
I draw special attention to one particular type of standard — standards of pupil performance. Without this type of standard it will be difficult to determine the success of individual school districts in preparing their pupils for active citizenship and productive lives. I find that, to conform to both constitutional and statutory requirements, the regulations promulgated under § 6 must contain standards of pupil performance.
These standards necessarily contemplate that the pupils of a district will attain a reasonable degree of proficiency in such basic skills as reading, writing and simple mathematics.5 A school system which fails to impart these basic skills to its students, with at least a reasonable degree of success, *534is undoubtedly falling short of its obligation under the education clause.6
I agree with the majority that “diversity . . . will inevitably exist” among the separate school districts. Ante, at 459. However, this certainly does not mean that failure to assure a constitutionally minimal education to children from disadvantaged districts can be justified or tolerated on the basis of “diversity.” To achieve the consistent degree of success which is contemplated by the “thorough and efficient” standard, everybody must be involved in this project — teachers, administrators, children, parents, advisors and an army of educational consultants. If this effort takes a child from a welfare family living in a city slum, places him in a classroom and thoroughly and efficiently overcomes the education he is getting in the streets, New Jersey will be proud of its commitment to the equality of all people.
Eormulation and enforcement of minimum standards of pupil performance are particularly important in light of recent findings by the National Assessment of Educational *535Progress which reveal alarming reductions in levels of writing performance among our youth and in light of the severe inadequacies found by the trial court to exist in many of New Jersey’s school districts. 118 N. J. Super, at 248-57. The fact that disparities in levels of proficiency may stem from economic, social, geographic or racial factors — or that greater resources may be necessary to educate children with deprived backgrounds — does not justify the failure to fix such minimum standards. 118 N. J. Super, at 243, 252-53; Guthrie Kleindorfer, Levin & Stout, Schools and Inequality (1970); McDermott & Klein, “The Cost-Quality Debate in School Einance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference,” 38 Law <& Gontemp. Prob., 415 (1974). In Robinson I the Court so held by stating that “[w]hatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to rectify it.” 62 N. J. at 513 (emphasis supplied).
The necessity for promulgating standards of pupil performance and levels of proficiency derives not only from the language of our opinions but from the 1975 Act as well. In § 5, the Act specifically lists, as one of the “major elements” of a thorough and efficient system of public schools:
Instruction intended to produce tbe attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in tbe basic communications and computational skills. IL. 1975, c. 212, § 5(c)]
That the 1975 Act ultimately considers the performance of pupils as one measure of a “thorough and efficient” system is borne out by language in Sections 2b (3), 3 [definitions of “administrative order,” “goals,” “objective,” “standards,” “state compensatory education pupil”], 8, 9, 10, 11(b), 11(d), 11(h). Section 3, for example, defines “standards” as “the process and stated levels of proficiency used in determining the extent to which goals and objectives are being met” (emphasis added). Section 10 expressly requires the Commissioner to develop and administer a “uniform, Statewide system for evaluating the performance of each school,” which “shall be based in part on annual testing for achieve*536ment in basic shill areas.” § 10 (emphasis supplied). In promulgating “goals, standards and procedures,” the State Board and the Commissioner must comply with these statutory mandates.
(3) Regulations Must Provide for Remedial Plans and Corrective Action
Without an effective mechanism for enforcing its standards and objectives, the legislative plan for financing public education will fail to satisfy the continuing obligation of the State.' Therefore, either the Act itself or its implementing regulations must provide the necessary means of enforcement.
The 1975 Act recognizes this requirement in § 3b(5) and purports to fulfill it in §§ 14 through 16. Section 14 provides that if the Commissioner, upon review of the reports and evaluations submitted pursuant to preceding sections, finds that a district has failed to show sufficient progress in reaching pertinent goals and standards, he must direct the local board of education to prepare and submit a remedial plan for his approval. If the Commissioner approves the plan, he then supervises its implementation; if, however, he finds the plan to be deficient, he must order the local board to show cause why corrective action should not be taken pursuant to § 15. Section 15 states that, if after a plenary hearing, the Commissioner still finds it necessary to take corrective action, he is empowered to “order necessary budgetary changes within the school district, . . . order in-service training programs for teachers ... or both.” Where these sanctions are inadequate, the Commissioner can recommend that the State Board take appropriate action, as follows:
. . . The State Board, on determining that the school district is not providing a thorough and efficient education, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, shall have the power to issue an administrative order specifying a remedial plan to the local board of education, which plan may include budgetary changes or other measures the State hoard determines to he appro*537priate. Nothing herein shall limit the right of any party to appeal the administrative order to the Superior Court. [Section 15; emphasis added]
In the event that the local board becomes recalcitrant, § 16 authorizes the State Board to obtain an order from the Superior Court directing the local school board to comply with the administrative order issued under § 15.
Identifying these remedial provisions as “crucial to the success of the legislative plan,” the majority finds that they impose a continuing two-fold obligation on the Commissioner and the State Board, as the State’s representatives. Ante, at 459. This obligation includes monitoring the content of the evolving, constitutionally mandated system and insuring “that over the years and throughout the State each pupil shall be offered an equal opportunity to receive an education of such excellence as will meet the constitutional standard.” Ante, at 459. As the majority admits, this is a “great and ongoing responsibility.” Ante, at 461.
The Court then enables the Commissioner and the State Board to meet this enormous responsibility by finding that they have been given “a vast grant of power” such “as may be needed to fulfill the obligation.” Ante, at 461. On this basis, the Court rejects the contention that the power given to the State Board and the Commissioner to make “budgetary changes” does not include the power to compel an increase in local school budgets above that fixed by local authorities. Reasoning that such a limitation would undermine the State’s authority to compel local districts to make the financial commitments necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate, thereby emasculating the legislative scheme, the Court concludes:
But where it is clear that an inadequacy stems from a failure of fiscal resources, then the power given to the Commissioner and tbe State Board to effect changes in local budgets does include the power to increase such budgets beyond the amounts locally determined. Such power must of course be wisely exercised and any such exercise will always be subject to judicial review, but there *538is no doubt that under the terms of the Act of 1975 such power exists. [Ante, at 462]
While I agree that, to be constitutional, the State’s legislative scheme must delegate to its agents the authority to order increases in local school budgets, I doubt that the Legislature, in fact, intended to confer such power upon the Commissioner or the State Board. First, § 15 authorizes the Commissioner or the State Board to undertake “necessary budget changes” (i. e., to interchange line items), but it does not expressly mention budget increases. Second, the stringent limitations imposed by § 25 on annual increases in the school budget reflect a legislative intent diametrically opposed to that found by the majority. Finally, the Act fails to specify in what manner and from whose pockets such agency-ordered budget increases are to be paid. Had the Legislature intended to confer this power upon the Commissioner or the State Board, it probably would have addressed these problems. Nevertheless, without the remedial power to increase local budgets the State would be unable to effectively ameliorate those deficiencies which arise solely or primarily from the local board’s failure to prepare an adequate budget.7
To summarize with respect to Article II: In order to survive a constitutional challenge, Article II of the 1975 Act and its attendant regulations, taken together, must (1) formulate goals and standards of performance with sufficient specificity to provide a means for measuring and evaluating local efforts; (2) develop effective procedures for determining whether local school districts are, in fact, complying with statewide standards, including standards of pupil per*539formance, and (3) establish a mechanism for compelling local school districts to remedy deficiencies when they fall below such standards.
B. Article III: State School Aid: Equalization Formula
In addition to requiring that the State define the educational opportunity mandated by the Constitution, the education clause also demands a financial commitment on the part of the State. Specifically, the State, as part of its overall obligation, must guarantee that “local effort plus the State aid will yield to all the pupils in the State that level of educational opportunity” which the Constitution requires. Robinson I, supi-a, 62 N. J. at 519. Therefore, with respect to the fiscal provisions of the 1975 Act, the litmus test of constitutional validity is whether its provisions assure that each school district has adequate funds available to provide a constitutionally sufficient education for all its students. The test is not, as the majority contends, whether the fiscal provisions of the Act “afford sufficient financial support for the system of public education that will emerge from the implementation of the plan set forth in the statute.” Ante, at 464. This latter test is unreliable. By presuming that the legislative plan is constitutionally valid, the test requires only that the fiscal provisions provide the plan with sufficient funding. If, however, the plan were found to be constitutionally suspect, the test would no longer be workable since the mere funding of a constitutionally deficient scheme obviously would not satisfy the State’s financial commitment.
In the instant case, the State purports to satisfy its financial responsibility through the equalization support provision (§18) and the other State aid formulae contained in Article III of the Act. Plaintiffs and several amici curiae argue to the contrary that these provisions fail to comport with the State’s constitutional obligation. I will discuss their contentions in the enumerated sections below.
*540(1) Equalization Support for Current Expenses (§ 18) ; Equalization of Tax Resources versus Equalization of Per Pupil Expenditures
Defendants and supporting amici curiae rely heavily upon § 18 for their claim that the 1975 Act alleviates the wide disparities in district expenditures which have resulted from discordancies in their tax bases and which were identified in Robinson I as “the principle cause of the constitutional deficiency.” 62 N. J. at 515; see Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 141. Because State aid for debt service and budgeted capital outlay (§ 19) utilizes the State support formula set forth in § 18, the following comments are equally applicable to those provisions.
Under the formula set forth in § 18, the amount of State aid to which a district will be entitled is determined by first dividing the district equalized valuation per pupil8 by the “guaranteed valuation per pupil” and then subtracting the quotient from 1.0000. The resulting fraction is designated the district “State support ratio.” In order to obtain the exact amount of State aid which the district will receive under this provision, the “State support ratio” is then multiplied by the lesser of (1) the district’s net current expense budget for the prebudget year or (2) the resident enrollment times the “State support limit.” “State support limit” is defined as the 65th percentile net current expense budget per pupil for the prebudget year when all districts’ figures are ranked from low to high. (§3). The impact which the “State support limit” has on State aid in general will be discussed below. Infra, at 551. “Guaranteed valuation per pupil” means *5411.3 (1.35 each year after the 1976-77 school year) times the State average of equalized assessed valuations per pupil enrolled in the public schools. The intended purpose of § 18 is to make available to each student that amount of district current expenses (but not in excess of the statewide 65th percentile) which would presumably be available if the district had an equalized assessed valuation of 1.35 times the State average of assessed valuations.
The majority seems to accept § 18 as valid, almost without discussion. I find this “acceptance” to be premature and without sound justification. At least two grounds exist upon which the equalization support formula of § 18 may fall. First, this provision may not sufficiently reduce the current disparity among school districts with respect to their tax-resources per pupil to adequately redress the constitutional objections identified in Robinson I. Second, the provision may not, in fact, guarantee constitutionally adequate dollar-inputs-per pupil for the State’s poorer districts. While neither contention has been proven as a facial matter, both are sufficiently plausible to merit a full evidentiary hearing.
As to the first contention, our opinions have identified the disparity of tax resources per enrolled pupil among the school districts as one of the primary causes of current constitutional deficiencies. Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 515; Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 141. Therefore, to pass constitutional muster, any legislative scheme must substantially reduce these disparities. In this regard, the 1975 Act represents an improvement over the Bateman Act. Nevertheless, it still fails to alleviate much of the disparity. For instance, although the number of districts whose tax resources are equalized by guaranteed valuations under the 1975 Act (59%)9 substantially exceeds the number of such *542districts equalized under the Bateman Act (27.2%), it still falls short of the total number of districts by 41%. Similarly, the number of pupils in such districts falls short of the total number of students by 32.7% and the aggregate equalized assessed valuations in such districts falls short of the total by 50.8%. Even if minimum support aid were to be eliminated from the Act, equalization would continue to be well below required levels. Based on these statistics, it is likely that, upon remand, the trial court will find that the 1975 Act does not achieve a sufficiently high degree of equalization among the districts to alleviate disparities. In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Conford discusses this objection to the 1975 Act at length. Ante, at 476-477, 485 — 493. (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting) . To a large extent, I am philosophically in accord with that discussion.10
*543However, as to the second contention, I would go one step further than my dissenting Brother and require that the 1975 Act guarantee adequate and relatively equalized expenditures per pupil as well as equalized per-pupil tax resources.11 This requirement stems from the principles set forth in the various opinions in this case.
In Robinson I, for example, “dollar input per pupil,” not “guaranteed valuation per pupil” provided the primary criterion for measuring legislative compliance with the education clause. This criterion was supported hy a trial court finding that there is a substantial correlation between financial input and the quality of education. 118 N. J. Super. 223 passim. Although the entire discussion need not be repeated here, it is helpful to recite a portion of it:
In most cases, rich districts spend more money per pupil than poor districts; rich districts spend more money on teachers’ salaries per pupil; rich districts have more teachers and more professional staff per pupil, and rich districts manage this with tax rates that are lower than poor districts, despite “equalizing” aid . . . Other input factors include school buildings, equipment, text books and library facilities. There is ample evidence to show the correlation between wealth and the quality of these facilities, and that severe inadequacies exist in many poor districts. [118 N. J. Super, at 237-38, 249]
Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for the Court in Robinson I, expressly adopted the trial court’s finding:
... [I] t is nonetheless clear that there is a significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity . . . Hence we accept the proposition that the quality of educational opportunity does depend in substantial measure upon the number of dollars invested, notwithstanding that the impact *544upon students may be unequal because of other factors, natural or environmental. [62 N. J. at 481]
While there has been much debate concerning the degree to which expenditures on education canj affect the quality of education, see e. g., McDermott Klein, "The Cost-Quality Debate in School Einance Litigation: Do Dollars Mahe a Difference?”, 38 Law <& Contemp. Prob. 415 (1974); Mosteller & Moymhan, eds., On Equality of Education (1974); Guthrie, Kleindorfer, Levin <& Stout, Schools <& Inequality (1971); Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity (1966), there can be little doubt that adequate financing is a necessary condition for an effective educational system, even if not a sufficient one. McDermott & Klein, supra at 429-40.
Relying on these findings, Chief Justice Weintraub held that, in the absence of other relevant suggestions, the Court would evaluate State school aid legislation on the basis of its success in reducing discrepancies between school districts in their dollar inputs per pupil :12
The trial court found the constitutional demand had not been met and did so on the basis of discrepancies in dollar input per pupil. We agree. We deal with the problem in those terms because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate. [62 N. J. at 515-16; emphasis added]
Although the majority recognizes this criterion, its discussion of the requisite dollar input is notably brief:
We cannot say that under these circumstances the dollar input per pupil . . . will not be sufficient to offer each pupil an equal educational opportunity as required by the Constitution. [Ante, at 464]
*545This statement reflects an unfortunate emasculation of the State’s responsibility to provide sufficient funds to meet its constitutional obligation, and a concurrent abdication of this Uourt’s duty to oversee the legislative function. The question here is not whether the dollar input levels per pupil may be adequate, but whether they mil be adequate. In Robinson IV, Chief Jurtice Hughes reaffirmed the primary importance of this factor by equating the concept of “dollar input per pupil” to that of “expenditure per pupil.” 69 N. J. at 141.13
In Robinson I itself, the Court found it unnecessary to establish precisely what level of dollar input per pupil would meet constitutional standards because “[o]n its face the statutory scheme [then under consideration] [bore] no ap*546parent relation to the mandate for equal educational opportunity.” 62 N. J. at 516. That the statute failed to guarantee adequate levels of per pupil expenditure was equally apparent :
The constitutional mandate could not be said to be satisfied unless we were to suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance happens to coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are attributable to local decisions to do more than the State was obliged to do.
Surely the existing statutory system is not visibly geared to the mandate that there be “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all children in this state between the ages of five and eighteen years.” [62 N. J. at 516]
The situation before us today differs markedly from that presented in Robinson I because the 1975 Act is no longer as clearly and facially inadequate as the Bateman Act with respect to attaining adequate dollar inputs per pupil. Nevertheless, we should not place this Court’s imprimatur on a constitutionally suspect statute. Rather, we should defer ruling upon the constitutionality of the equalization support provisions until after an evidentiary hearing has produced factual determinations as to the operational impact of these provisions.
(2) Minimum Support § 18(c) and Save Harmless Aid (§§ 55, 56)
Section 18(c) provides that no district shall receive less in current expense equalization support than 10% of the “State support limit.” The “save-harmless” provisions assure that no district shall receive less in total State aid for 1976-1977 than it received during the 1974^1975 school year (§ 55), nor less in total State aid for 1977-1978 than one-half of the difference between what it received in 1974-1975 and what it is otherwise entitled to receive in the current year (§ 56).
In Robinson IV, we found similar flat grant provisions contained in the Bateman Act to be inconsistent with the *547goal of equality of educational opportunity because they left “existing arbitrary ratios of tax resources per pupil unaffected.” 69 N. J. at 149. In a world of limited resources and serious disparities in the wealth and expenditure levels of local districts, these forms of State aid tend to exacerbate rather than alleviate current inequities. By distributing State aid without regard to need, they at once increase the existing gap between rich and poor districts and reduce the amount of State revenues available to close the gap. Even though they devote only a small percentage of funds to these forms of aid, the minimum aid provisions of the 1975 Act are in one sense even more inequitable than those of the Bateman Act. While under the Bateman Act all districts received minimum aid, under the 1975 Act only those districts which exceed the guaranteed level of valuation do. In light of this factor, I note my disagreement with the Chief Justice’s view that “the magnitude” of minimum aid under the 1975 Act is “not such as to require excision.” Ante, at 472 (Hughes, C. J., concurring). If these provisions are inconsistent with the constitutional mandate, then they must be stricken regardless of their magnitude.
Although I might otherwise argue for invalidation of both the minimum support and save-harmless provisions of the 1975 Act (see, e. g., Ante, at 493 -495 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting)), I would prefer to await the results of the plenary hearing on the Act. In all fairness, defendants should be given an opportunity to defend retention of these provisions and to establish that they are consistent with fulfillment of the constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, it is clear that in an educational system which is marked by glaring disparities, it makes little sense to disburse State funds to self-sufficient districts while simultaneously depriving poorer districts of needed assistance. Therefore, if the court below finds that the equalization support provisions of the 1975 Act are inadequate as applied, then it must invalidate the minimum aid provisions as well.
*548(3) Categorical Program Support ®0) and Transportation Aid f§§ 84, 35)
Section 20 authorizes distribution of additional State aid to provide for the increased cost of educating handicapped children or those with other special needs. This is accomplished for pupils attending special education classes by assigning additional “weight” for the cost of their education according to a schedule of “additional cost factors.” A district’s categorical support is calculated by multiplying its number of additional cost units by the State average net current expense budget (§ 20(d)). Under §§ 34 and 35, respectively, the State provides for the full cost of transporting all handicapped children and all other pupils residing beyond a specified distance from school.
Plaintiffs and certain amici argue forcefully that, as with minimum support and save-harmless aid, these forms of aid are disbursed without regard to need and, hence, are inconsistent with the goals of eliminating current disparities between school districts. See Robinson TV, supra, 69 N. J. at 166-67 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting).
The majority fails to even recognize this argument.14 Contrary to its apparent indifference, I find plaintiffs’ contention to have some merit. Regardless of the laudable intentions upon which these categorical aid provisions are based, they *549cannot pass constitutional muster if, by their manner of distributing aid, they withdraw sufficient funds from the State’s coffers so that the State can no longer assure each district an adequate and equalized level of expenditure per pupil. So long as any school district is underfinanced, no valid legislative purpose is served in distributing this form of State aid in the manner set forth in the 1975 Act. If, however, it can be shown that the equalization support program of the 1975 Act will assure an adequate level of per pupil expenditure for each district in the State, then I would find the constitutionality of the above provisions to be unimpeachable. The facts needed to make this determination, however, are not now before us. Eor this reason, I would reserve judgment on the constitutionality of these provisions, as well as that of the 1975 Act, until a plenary hearing can determine their operational effect.
(4) Mimvnation of Weighted Pupil Factors as provided for in the Bateman Act
It is now widely recognized that children from lower socioeconomic level homes often require greater input of educational resources if they are to realize progress comparable to that realized by children from more fortunate backgrounds. Bateman Report (1968) at 48. Public education in disadvantaged areas is frequently more expensive due to the greater demand for compensatory education programs. This fact was substantiated by findings of the trial court, 118 N. J. Super, at 243, 245, 252-53, 262-63, and repeated by Chief Justice Weintraub in Robinson J, where he stated:
Although we have dealt with the constitutional problem in terms of dollar input per pupil, we should not be understood to mean that the State may not recognize differences in area costs, or a need for additional dollar input to equip classes of disadvantaged children for the educational opportunity. [62 W. J. at 520]
The Bateman Act sought to address this concern by assigning additional weight to deprived children for purposes *550of calculating the amount of State aid which a district would receive under the act’s equalization support provisions. When determining the number of weighted pupils in a given district, children who were recipients of AEDC (aid to families with dependent children) would be given a factor of 1.75 (as compared with the factor of 1 which they otherwise would have been assigned). 118 N. J. Super, at 259. In reviewing the constitutionality of the Bateman Act, the trial court found this weighting factor to be one of the most equitable and constitutionally relevant provisions of the act. 118 N. J. Super, at 263.
Plaintiffs and amici claim that in eliminating the AEDC weighting factor from the 1975 Act, the Legislature has failed to comport with its constitutional obligation. They add that the granting of additional weight to pupils enrolled in bilingual or State compensatory programs under § 20 (0.16 and 0.11, respectively), though intended to deal with the additional cost of educating disadvantaged children, is a poor and constitutionally inadequate substitute for the AEDC provision.
The majority rejects this contention and sanctions the 1975 Act which notably excludes provisions for such underprivileged children. Similarly, my dissenting Brother would relegate this problem to the level of legislative discretion. Ante, at 508. (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting). I must register my strong dissent to both of these approaches. The Constitution requires the State to provide a "thorough and efficient” education to all pupils in the State. There is nothing discretionary about this requirement. If it costs more to provide a thorough and efficient education to children in an economically or socially disadvantaged area, then the additional funding must be made available. While the Legislature is not bound to employ an AEDC weighting factor formula or any other predetermined formula, Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 145, it may not choose to ignore the problem. Therefore, if the 1975 Act, when viewed in its entirety, fails to assure certain *551districts adequate dollar input per pupil because it fails to recognize the additional cost of educating impoverished children, then plaintiffs’ objection may reach constitutional dimensions. Hence, as already noted, I would remand for a plenary hearing to determine whether spending levels adequately compensate for these additional costs.
(5) Use of Prebudget Year in Calculating Allocation of Aid under the ^Equalization Support, Debt Service and Capital Outlay Provisions
Plaintiffs and amici contend that use of the prebudget year budget in calculating equalization support, debt service and capital outlay grants tends to perpetuate inequities since it fails to account for inflation and it makes State aid dependent upon past expenditures.
Again, the majority fails to address this claim. While I believe that the use of prebudget year budgets is facially reasonable and justified by considerations of administrative convenience, I would not preclude plaintiffs from proving the contrary on remand. Eor example, it may be that this device, by failing to account for inflation, prevents poorer districts from meeting those levels of per pupil expenditure necessary to provide a thorough and efficient system of education. The use of prebudget year figures is certainly one of the factors which must be examined by the trial court when reviewing the overall operational effect of the 1975 Act.15
(6) State Support Limit
The “State support” limit is defined supra at 540. The purpose of this limitation is to prevent the State from pay*552ing its full share of a local school budget (i. e., the share resulting from use of'the “State support ratio,” see supra at 540), where the local budget is considered to be extravagant in terms of per pupil expenditures. The cut-off point is designated as the 65th percentile net expense budget per pupil.
Plaintiffs and amici challenge this provision on the ground that when a district’s actual needs run above the State 65th percentile of all districts, State aid must be provided on the basis of that district’s needs and not be subject to the arbitrary restriction set by the State support limit.
While the majority rejects plaintiffs’ challenge by endorsing the 1975 Act, I would, consistent with my approach throughout this case, provide plaintiffs or amici the opportunity to prove on remand that the operation of the State support limit does, in fact, prevent one or more school districts from meeting their needs or satisfying standards of performance established pursuant to Article II of the Act.
(7) Spending Increase Limit (Section 25) :
Section 25 places a cap on permissible yearly increases in the net current expense budget per pupil. It limits such spending increases in accordance with a stated formula, which treats districts with per pupil expenditure levels below the State average somewhat more generously than districts which are above the State average. In particular, it should be noted that this section inhibits and may even undermine efforts by low-spending districts to equal the per pupil expenditure levels of the higher-spending districts. Consequently, gaps between district current expenditure levels will be closed very slowly.16 In addition, § 25 makes it particu*553larly difficult for low-spending districts to catch up to those districts spending above the State average. Finally, as the majority points out, the intended purpose of this section is unclear. Ante, at 466. Therefore, I find this provision to be constitutionally suspect. See also Judge Conford’s discussion on this point, Ante, at 494-495.17
However, since the State may wish to present some countervailing justification for this provision, I would remand this question to the trial court for a determination as to whether § 25 is at all consistent with the goal of a “thorough and efficient” system of education. If it is not, it must be stricken.
(8) Municipal Overburden
The problem of municipal overburden was first identified in the trial court’s opinion, 118 N. J. Super, at 273, and again in Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 477, 519. Chief Justice Weintraub, labeling the problem a “critical” factor “in any system of local responsibility,” described it as follows :
One difficulty with the design for local fiscal responsibility is that the tax base to which the school districts are remitted is already overloaded, particularly in the major cities, by the- other demands for local service. [62 N. J. at 519]
In Robinson IT the Court reemphasized the seriousness of *554the problem, 69 N. J. at 150-51 and, in a separate opinion, I more fully discussed its implications and parameters.18
However, at that time, this Court chose not to address the problem — a decision which was attributable to its complexity, the necessity for a quick judicial disposition and-the recognition that the Court order was merely an interim remedy and not a final plan. Implicit in the majority’s position, however, was the notion that any permanent program for State aid to education ought to account for municipal overburden. The “guaranteed valuation per pupil” formula, as set forth in § 18 of the 1975 Act, fails to do so. Equaliza*555tion of taz resources under that provision will not necessarily guarantee adequate per pupil ezpenditures in those districts plagued with municipal overburden. Since the overburdened municipality may he unable to obtain adequate funding for that portion of its budget for which the locality is responsible, it may not he able to provide the requisite levels of educational opportunity.
The majority clearly recognizes these facts. However, it disposes of the issue simply by speculating that the problem of municipal overburden “may never occur,” since the “State school aid may obviate that predicament,” and by advising the Legislature “to address itself to this potential problem.” Ante, at 466. I cannot concur with this disposition. The Constitution imposes on the State an affirmative duty to provide for a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. Any system of education which falls short of this constitutional command must be rejected. As Chief Justice Weintraub said:
A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State’s to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the (¡urden the State must itself meet its continuing obligation. [62 N. J. at 513; emphasis supplied]
This statement of our Court is directly relevant to the point at hand. The majority should not discard plaintiffs’ admittedly sound contention with respect to municipal overburden on the basis of mere supposition. Instead, the matter should he remanded for a factual determination as to whether the “State school aid” provisions do, in fact, alleviate the problem of municipal overburden or whether that problem remains in spite of the 1975 Act. If the latter is found to be true, then the Act cannot be sustained without some *556modification to account fox this problem.19 An idle suggestion that the Legislature address itself to the problem surely will not satisfy the Court’s responsibility.
To summarize, the problems and contentions which I have just outlined do not necessarily support the conclusion that any particular provision, or the Act in its entirety, is unconstitutional on its face. The Legislature is free to choose whatever mechanism it deems proper to meet its continuing obligation under the educational clause. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 145. However, in the final analysis, the Legislature’s product must provide a thorough and efficient system of free public schools. Any act which falls short of that goal is constitutionally inadequate and, hence, invalid. *557In light of the problems and contentions discussed above, the constitutionality of the 1975 Act has clearly been brought into question. While each of the challenged provisions might be able to stand on its own, when viewed together, they raise serious doubts as to whether the 1975 Act is constitutional as applied.
IY

REMEDIES AND CONCLUSION

The majority today undertakes a course of action whose implications for the future are problematical and whose bases contradict our prior decisions in this same matter. By sustaining the constitutionality of the 1975 Act, subject, of course, -to provision of full funding, the majority embarks upon a path whose uncharted direction can only take us further from those objectives which we posited in Robinson I, and to which we have adhered in later adjudications of this case. The covert objective of the majority’s mission is not difficult to discern. Essentially, I find its “fresh look” approach to be a euphemistic device for retreating from those fundamental principles which underlie a “thorough and efficient” educational system as defined in Robinson I—IV, as for example, the integral correlation between per pupil expenditure levels and quality education.
Contrary to the majority, I am not prepared to review, much less pass judgment on the constitutionality of the Act upon the sketchy record which is now before us. The majority’s decision to undertake this determination can only confirm the fragmentary and hypothetical basis upon which it is founded.
Any constitutional confrontation which may have arisen during the course of this litigation has not been undertaken in a spirit of contentiousness or vindictiveness. The decisions which we have rendered have not been written with an eye to impugning either the integrity or good faith of the Governor or the Legislature. The dispositions which we *558ordered have not altered the constitutional balance which relies on the fundamental separation of powers. Our incursions from the judicial realm have been marked by a restraint and a reluctance which have often exceeded that warranted by the circumstances.
nonetheless, the majority today, in a gesture of intergovernmental coexistence, beats a hasty retreat from a position which it had occupied on a different day. In so doing, it leaves a demilitarized zone of discretion to be filled by whatever course of action or inaction the other branches of government choose to follow. In today’s decision, the majority suggests that questions of constitutional conformity may be reasonably entrusted to the governmental agencies from whom that conformity is necessary. At another time, it had followed, reluctantly though resolutely, a different route, retaining its function as overseer of constitutional rights. I have found the majority’s new position to be unfortunate.
Because I cannot sanction the hasty and ill-considered adjudication undertaken by the majority, I would defer ruling upon the constitutionality of the 1975 Act at this time so that the matter could be remanded for a plenary hearing as to the operational effect and the constitutionality of the 1975 Act. In the meantime, I would retain jurisdiction in order to review the trial court’s disposition.
I also take exception to the remedial proposals which the majority presents in Part IY of its opinion. Should the Legislature fail to provide funding in full by April 6, the majority would direct, as its first course of action, the redistribution of State aid funds appropriated for the upcoming year in accordance with the equalization provisions of the 1975 Act, §§ 18, 19. The redistribution of such funds would proceed until these provisions were satisfied in full, with any excess funds to be devoted to a pro rala satisfaction of the other State aid provisions of the 1975 Act. While I do not question the salutary objective which this relief is intended *559to serve, I find the redistribution to be less than a satisfactory resolution of the underlying problem. In fact, to the extent that the redistributed funds would not be directed towards meeting a “thorough and efficient” standard, but would only represent a stop-gap measure, the majority’s suggestion is no better than the May 1975 order.
In contrast to the majority, my approach envisions the following possible dispositions for the 1976-1977 school year. If the trial court and/or our Court find the 1975 Act, as implemented, to be constitutional20 and the Legislature fully funds it before April 15, then the 1975 Act will go into effect for the 1976-1977 school year.
If, however, the Act is held to be constitutional but is not fully funded by April 15, or if the trial court and/or this Court find the Act to be unconstitutional whether or not it is fully funded, our Court should then issue an order to show cause why a remedial order should not be entered. Said order would assure adequate funding of the entire educational system by supplementing those moneys appropriated by the Legislature with the funds to be raised by local school districts in accordance with a fair and equitable formula. It would also determine the formula for the distribution among the school districts of all moneys available for State aid.
Without foreclosing consideration of any other fair and equitable formulae, I would very seriously consider funding on the following terms. The Commissioner of Education would be directed to calculate an average State school tax rate by dividing the total of all school budgets for the entire State (minus any moneys appropriated by the State Legislature) by the total equalized assessed valuation of all *560ratables within the State. Each school district would then be required to raise, through its local school tax, an amount equal to the said average State school tax rate multiplied by the district’s equalized assessed valuation. These funds would then be forwarded to the State Treasurer who would distribute them (together with State appropriated funds) according to the amounts required to fully fund each local school budget. Of course, the Commissioner would review each budget, mate appropriate revisions and indicate final approval.
This suggested order, which was first anticipated in my dissenting opinion in Robinson III, supra,, 67 N. J. at 41, is both “fair and equitable.” Furthermore, it is geared toward implementation of a fully constitutional system of financing public education.
Increased State aid will effectively reduce the school tax rate in all districts.
The power to enter such a remedial order is expressly approved in Robinson IV, where Chief Justice Hughes said:
What we have already said is not, of course, to imply that the provisional remedy for the year 1976-1977 we hereinafter order [the May 1975 order] represents our concept of the full reach of our power, duty or responsibility in effectuating the promise of the Constitution to the school children of the State should the other Branches delay action beyond availability of a remedy in time for the school year 1977-1978. [Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 146]
See also Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 152-53 and cases cited therein.
The Court has the power to obtain funds to finance increases in school expenditures if mandated by the education clause. While N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § II, ¶ 2, may bar the Court from ordering the Legislature to appropriate money or from imposing its own revenue raising measures, East Orange v. Palmer, 52 N. J. 329, 337-38 (1968); Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N. J. 106 (1960); Gallena v. Scott, 11 N. J. 231, 238-39 (1950), that provision does not prevent the *561Court from exercising its equitable powers to compel funds to be raised by inferior political subdivisions. Van Riper v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 137 N. J. L. 714 (E. & A. 1948); Hudson County v. Zink, 135 N. J. L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1946); cf. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218, 84 S. Ct. 1226, 12 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1964).
The Court also has the power to reallocate moneys appropriated by the Legislature for school purposes so that they may be used constitutionally rather than unconstitutionally. See East Orange v. Palmer, 47 N. J. 307, 330 (1966); cf. Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D. D. C. 1972).
This case involves difficult choices and controversial resolutions. The potential unpopularity or controversiality of a decision, however, has been a singularly unpersuasive basis upon which to premise this Court’s inaction. Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 31 N. J. 420, 431 (1960); Robinson III, supra, 67 N. J. at 43 (Pashman, J., dissenting) . Not only would such a position represent the abdication of our responsibility to interpret the Constitution, Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 154-55, 175 (Pashman, J., concurring in part only and dissenting), but the concurrent emasculation of the State’s constitutional promise to provide a “thorough and efficient” education. Cooper v. Nutley Sun Publishing Co., 36 N. J. 189, 196-97 (1961); King v. South Jersey Nat’l Bank, 66 N. J. 161, 177 (1974) (dictum); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N. J. 1 (1960); Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 153-54 (see cases cited therein), 159 and 173-74 (Pashman, J., concurring in part only and dissenting); Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 513. The mere suggestion of this sort of resolution must be rejected if for no other reason than for the sake of the thorough and efficient education of almost one and a half million children and their successors.
*562I continue to believe that every step we take on this highway to a constitutionally thorough and efficient education for all children should bring us closer to a plan which one day would be entirely funded by the State. After the 1875 Amendment to our State 'Constitution, the statewide school property taz paid for 90% of school costs in the State. This surely gave our children something of an equal chance for a public school education. Por various reasons connected with statewide equalized tax assessments, we drifted into a formula of apportionment in which ratables rather than pupils constituted the basis for distributing tax proceeds. Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 508.
We must remain faithful to the tenets enunciated in Robinson v. Cahill, I, II, III and IV. Having made this commitment, we cannot place our imprimatur on any decision that does not substantially implement the education clause. Deviation from this objective will only perpetuate an educational system which at this writing has permitted four more classes of students to have entered a constitutionally disapproved system and four more classes to have been graduated from it. They surely did not receive the quality education to which they were entitled. I cannot concur in such a result.
Accordingly, I would order the relief which I have outlined in this opinion.
Concurring—Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sullivan, Clieeoed and Schbeibee—4.
Concurring in part—Justice Mountain and Judge Coneoed—2.
Dissenting—Justice Pashman—1.

it should be noted that the implementation, of the 1975 Act without promulgation of sufficiently specified statewide goals and standards could raise problems in yet another respect. Failure to ade>quately formulate such goals and standards potentially exposes local school districts to State intervention under the remedial provisions of Art. II (§§ 14,15) based upon ad hoc determinations rather than upon pre-existing, properly published and adequately defined standards to which local boards might conform their actions. Nothing in the 1975 Act itself enables a local school district to determine whether it is operating a “thorough and efficient” system of public schools. Standards of due process and administrative fairness, therefore, might require that regulations be promulgated before the act goes into effect. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1974) ; Davis, “Some Administratvie Law Surprises in the Ruiz Case,” 75 Cohim. L. Rev. 823, 827-28 nn. 26, 27 (1975). Cf. Avant v. Clifford, 67 N. J. 496 (1975) ; Donaldson v. North Wildwood Bd. of Education, 65 N. J. 236 (1974).

The Chief Justice appears to concur in my view that the constitutionality of the Act is conditioned upon “the final promulgation of standards and regulations effective to fulfill the legislative purpose and meet the constitutional norm.” Ante, at 470 (Hughes, C. J. concurring). Nevertheless, he joins the majority in deciding to review and then sustain the facial constitutionality of the Act, even though said majority fails to give any consideration whatsoever to the administrative regulations of the Act. Review of constitutional validity of the 1975 Act must necessarily entail an examination of these implementing regulations. See infra. Part III (A).

in fact, in Robinson TV, I specifically noted that not only is the State Board of Education and its administrative officer, the Commissioner of Education, statutorily empowered to formulate statewide standards of educational quality and promulgate rules and regulations to implement these standards, N. J. S. A. 18A:4-10, 18A :4-15, 18A:4r-23, 18A:4-24; of. L. 1975, e. 212, §§ 6, 8, 9, 10, 44, but they are uniquely qualified to do so, in light of their special expertise in educational matters. Robinson TV, supra, 69 N. J. at 162-63 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting).

In this regard, Judge Conford misconstrues the position of amici, Education Committee NAACP (Newark) and ACLU of New Jersey. Ante, at 500 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting). While these amici readily concede the facial constitutionality of the guidelines, they should not be understood as simultaneously conceding the constitutionality of the entire 1975 Act. As the amici state in their brief:
There is nothing in the statute itself which would enable a local school district to ascertain whether it was operating a “thorough and efficient” system of public schools, and there is nothing which would enable the Court to determine to what degree the various local districts are failing to provide a constitutionallly adequate quality of education to their students. [Amici brief at 10],

I do not mean to imply that a “thorough and efficient” system of public education should not or need not provide its students with a reasonable degree of proficiency in non-basic skills. See, to the contrary, Robinson IV, where the Court opined that “a system of public education which did not offer high school education would hardly be thorough and efficient.” [62 N. J. at 515]

In stating that local school districts must show a “reasonable degree of success” in imparting to their students certain necessary and fundamental skills, I do not intend to imply that the education clause requires of the State educational system that every student be able to meet prescribed levels of proficiency, although such a goal is certainly laudable. Rather, I envision that after establishing statewide minimum “levels of proficiency,” in each of the “basic skills,” either the State Board or some other appropriate agency will formulate “levels of success” which local school districts must meet in order to avoid sanctions under §§ 14, 15 and their implementing regulations. N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-14, 15. Such “levels of success,” which necessarily will be somewhere below 100%, will assure that State initiated sanctions are based upon failures in the system rather than the failure of individual students in the “annual testing process” conducted pursuant to § 10 of the Act. Clearly, the initial responsibility for formulating the various “levels of proficiency,” “levels of success,” and standards of performance rests with the Legislature or, by implication, with the administrative agencies to which the Legislature delegates its authority. N. J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1. 69 N. J. at 144-45. This does not mean, however, that they may abdicate this responsibility. [69 N. J. at 152 and cases cited therein.]

For similar reasons, I would also find that the State Board and the Commissioner must be empowered to direct local boards to alter or modify their goals, objectives and standards (§ 7) where such goals and standards are either inconsistent with statewide standards (§ 2b (3)) or not “visibly geared to the mandate” of a thorough and efficient educational system. Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 516.

An equalized valuation is an aggregate assessment of district ratables adjusted to produce an equalized or true market value for the district. See N. J. S. A. 54:1-35.1 et seg., In re Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N. J. 21, 26-27 (1961). This figure is then divided by the number of students enrolled in the district’s school system to obtain the “district equalized valuation per pupil.”

This figure would be slightly higher if one were to base these calculations on the 1.35 guaranteed ratio which is to go into effect after the 1976-1977 school year. § 18. See Ante, at 485 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting).

Apparently, the Chief Justice also agrees that, in failing to effectuate substantial equalization of tax resources per pupil, the 1975 Act fa^s short of a constitutional scheme. Ante, at 470, 473-474. Nevertheless, noting that “there is room for accommodation to the exigencies of government,” he joins with the majority and would put off until another day implementation of a fully constitutional plan, vindication of the constitutional rights of New Jersey’s school children and enforcement of the concept of substantial equalization among school districts. Ante, at 474-475. Like the majority, he seems perfectly satisfied, at this juncture, to await further action on the part of the Legislature! — action which will not likely be forthcoming. With all due respect, I can wait no longer. Three years have passed since Chief Justice Weintraub memorialized in Robinson I the need to bring about substantial equalization of tax resources; four years have gone by since the trial court first identified these deficiencies. In Robinson IV, the Chief Justice himself unequivocally reaffirmed the important principles set forth in these decisions. Even in the face of such clear constitutional infirmities, this Court has exercised restraint on three separate occasions, Robinson I, II and III. For the Court to again delay would be a clear violation of this Court’s duty to px*otect the constitutional rights of the citizens of this State and would, in fact, contribute to a profound violation of our Constitution. At this late date, “accommodation to the exigencies of government” represents a weak justification for abdicating this Court’s' constitutional obligation.

The Constitution does not require perfect equality. As a matter of constitutional fiat, such expenditures must be equal only up to levels of adequacy. Beyond that, local school districts are perfectly free to spend additional sums on its educational program through local efforts (69 N. J. at 141 n. 3) and State statutes may authorize them to do so. Robinson J, supra, 62 N. J. at 520.

The question of adequate dollar input per pupil is inextricably related to the formulation of specific goals and standards discussed supra in relation to Article II. Therefore, a determination as to the former must await formulation of the latter. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 162, n. 3 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting).

I note that in their separate opinions, the Chief Justice and Judge Conford seem to retreat from this position, asserting now that the sole criterion for judging the constitutional validity of the 1975 Act is whether it produces substantial equalization of tax resources per pupil. Ante, at 489-481 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting). Ante, at 470-471, 473-474 (Hughes, C. J., concurring). Judge Conford argues that this follows from the fact that “[t]he most basic cause of the existing wide disparities in expenditure levels is the discordancies in taxable wealth per pupil.” Ante, at 503. He rejects adequate “dollar input per pupil” as an alternative and equally important criterion on the ground that it is a “symptom” not a “cause” of the constitutional deficiency. Id.
In response, I need only note the following: First, even perfect equalization of tax resources may not eliminate all of the root “causes” of the current disparities and the constitutional deficiencies in the State’s system of public school financing. For instance, absolute equalization of tax resources fails to address the problem of municipal' overburden, a problem which everyone admits is a “partial” cause of current inequities. Ante, at 494; Ante, at 508-509 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting) ; Bobmson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 150-51; Bobinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 499, 519 ; 118 N. J. Super, at 273. Second, whether or not “dollar input per pupil” is called a “symptom” or a “cause,” it still must be raised to an adequate level in every school district in this State in order to assure that each school district provides that educational opportunity which the Constitution mandates. Finally, the language of our opinions speaks in terms of both “dollar input per pupil” and “equalization of tax resources.” E. g., Bobinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 515-16; Bobinson IV, supra, 69 N. J. at 141.

I observe, on the other hand, that my dissenting Brother does concede that this “argument has a certain plausibility.” Ante, at 509 (Conford, P. J. A. D., t/a, concurring and dissenting). Nevertheless, he too rejects plaintiffs’ contention by finding “colorable reasons, well within legislative policy judgment, for structuring categorical aid along specific rather than equalizing grounds.” Id., see also Ante, at 473 (Hughes, C. J., concurring). As I previously stated, I do not perceive full equalization of tax resources to be “the sole and absolute criterion of whether the demands of the Education Clause are met.” (Id.) However, even if it were, no legislative policy, no matter how “colorable,” could sustain these provisions if, through their operation, some districts in this State would be unable to provide a constitutionally minimum quality education. Therefore, I would remand for a plenary hearing.

I note that while Judge Conford discusses plaintiffs’ claims with respect to use of the prebudge-t year and imposition of the State Support Limit, Ante, at 510-511, he nevertheless would find these provisions to be unimpeachable if tax resources were otherwise equalized. Because equalization of tax resources alone does not necessarily assure full compliance with the educational clause, I must dissent from this approach.

I note that the trial court in Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 (Sup. Ct. L. A. Cty., April 10, 1974) required that within a maximum period of six years disparities between school districts in per pupil expenditures be reduced to “insignificant differences, which means amounts considerably less than $1,000 per pupil.” [Memorandum opinion at 102].

I note that the majority and the concurrence find § 25 to be facially constitutional^on the grounds that the Commissioner may, under the “escape valve” provision, override the spending limitation when such action is necessary to fulfill the constitutional mandate. Ante, at 467; Ante, at 473 (Hughes, C. J. concurring). Because full compliance with the education clause — not just facial compliance — is constitutionally mandated, I find the majority’s defense of § 25 to be unpersuasive. In any event, as Judge Conford aptly states, “[u]nless the Commissioner is to exercise his power of exemption on a practically wholesale basis, the operation of Section 25 plainly conflicts with the purported object of the act.” Ante, at 495.

In my dissent to Robinson IV, I specifically noted:
“There is a third reason why a district, even though it taxes itself heavily, might not be able to raise enough revenues to meet its educational needs. Some areas, particularly urban areas, have exceptionally high non-educational expenses which must be financed through property taxes. Expenses which are exceptionally high in urban areas include county and municipal welfare, police and fire protection, and sanitation. In these areas, revenues raised by property taxes which might otherwise be used for education, must be diverted to non-educational purposes. In addition, a substantial number of municipalities because of their size, density, and special social problems, have quite properly become involved in developing a broad range of public services, particularly in the area of human health and welfare, not provided by other smaller and more affluent communities. This, too, has contributed to the staggering rise in city expenditures, further eroding the one and the same tax base — local real estate ratables.
“Hence a district situated in an area which has a heavy burden of non-education expenses may not be able to meet its educational needs, even though another district with the same property tax base, the same number of weighted pupils, and the same heavy tax rate could do so. The effects of this problem, which has been labeled ‘municipal overburden,’ on the ability of some urban areas to meet their educational needs is now well documented. See, e. g., Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N. J. Super. 223, 273 (Law Div. 1972). Berke, Answers to Inequity, 82-86 (1974) ; Grubb & Miehelson, ‘Public School Finance in a Post-Serrano World,’ 8 Harv. Civ. Rights — Oiv. 'Lib. L. Rev. 550, 564-66 (1973) ; Note, ‘A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles & Losing Wars,’ 81 Vale L. J. 1303, 1314r-15 (1972) ; Coons, GUne & Sugar-man, Private Wealth ■<& Public Education, 233-36 (1970).” [69 R. J. at 169-73 (Pashman, J., dissenting and concurring)].

I note that my dissenting Brother claims that “no specific feasible proposals [have been advanced] as to how a State school-aid formula could fairly and uniformly reflect municipal overburden.” Ante, at 507.
While measuring municipal overburden with perfect accuracy is certainly a formidable task, there are a number of simple ways of adequately approximating it. 69 N. J. at 172. In the present context, the value for the local property tax law used in the equalization support formula of § 18 could be modified to reflect the fact that in some district? much of the apparent tax base is unavailable for financing schools because of the disproportionate noneducational demands made upon it. In particular, the equalized support formula in § 18 could be adjusted by replacing the district equalized valuation per pupil with the equalized valuation per pupil multiplied by the ratio of the percentage of local revenues used for school purposes to the statewide average percentage of local revenues used for school purposes.
Where the necessary information is available, the equalized valuation could be multiplied by the ratio of the local nonschool tax rate to the statewide average local nonsehool’ tax rate. Where one is presented with ratables assessed at less than 100% valuation, the following formula should be used: multiply the district equalized valuation per pupil in the § 18 formula by the quotient of the ratio of the local school tax rate to the total local property tax rate divided by the ratio of the statewide mean school tax rate to the statewide mean property tax rate. Bateman Report, supra at 97-98; Grubb & Michelson, “Public School Finance in a Post-Serrano World,” 8 Rmv. Civ. Rights — Civ. Lib. L. Rev., 550, 562-63 (1973).

This disposition presumes that the trial judge will adhere to the settled judicial principle that if only a few of the Act’s provisions are found to be unconstitutional and these few provisions may be severed without altering the Legislature’s intended purpose, then the court should sever them in order to preserve the Act’s constitutionality.