Court Opinion

ID: 9396520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 20:03:55.857091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.582797
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/22/23 In re I.D. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re I.D. et al., Persons                                   B317786
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP04473)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 A.D.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from the dispositional order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Judge Pro Tempore.
Reversed.
      Karriem Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Timothy M. O’Crowley, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________

       The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over I.D. and Y.D.
after their parents engaged in multiple incidents of domestic
violence. The sustained allegations all concern violence inflicted
by mother against father. On appeal, father does not contest
these jurisdictional findings. Father contests the dispositional
order insofar as it removes the children from his custody.
       We conclude that no substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding that no reasonable means existed to
protect the children short of removal from father’s custody. Upon
remand, the trial court shall hold a new dispositional hearing and
order the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) to comply with Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 224.2 and the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA). As father points out, social
workers did not inquire of any extended family members
concerning the children’s potential Indian ancestry, and the
juvenile court’s ICWA finding was based merely on the parents’
ICWA forms, which we have held does not alone satisfy ICWA.

      1  Undesignated statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                   2
                          BACKGROUND
      Mother and father were not married.2 They dated for
four years and lived together on and off during that time period.
They had two children—I.D. and Y.D. Mother had a third child
from a different relationship. Father is I.D. and Y.D.’s presumed
father.
      Both mother and father have a dependency history from
childhood. Mother’s history as a juvenile resulted from maternal
grandmother’s substance abuse. Father was removed from his
paternal grandmother, but DCFS was unable to locate any
additional information. Mother also had a prior dependency
history as a parent involving her eldest child, the children’s half
sibling.3
      DCFS initiated an investigation in 2019 for domestic
violence involving mother and father. Mother had called law
enforcement after father allegedly pushed mother into a wall,
causing her to hit her head. According to mother, father pushed
her after mother asked father to “stop mocking” I.D. DCFS
reported that father would be charged with domestic battery and
simple assault, but the record does not show that the People
either charged or convicted him. It appears that DCFS’s
involvement in the 2019 case ended when mother stated she
would move out of the home and father agreed to get a
restraining order. The social worker involved in the prior
proceeding indicated, “At the time of the closure I had no

      2   Mother is not a party to this appeal.
      3 The father of the children’s half sibling indicated that
“mother has a pattern in which she would threaten to maliciously
and falsely call the police.”

                                     3
concerns as the mother started residing elsewhere . . . .” (Italics
omitted.)
       Both mother and father have an arrest record. Mother’s
arrests included battery and domestic violence. Father’s involved
grand theft, battery of a police officer, battery with serious bodily
injury, and domestic violence. The record does not indicate
whether any arrest resulted in a criminal conviction.
       Father did not want to cooperate with DCFS during the
current dependency proceedings. According to him, he “truly
believed that this case was like a criminal case and [he] wasn’t
supposed to talk to DCFS” without his attorney present.4
       During the dependency proceedings, the children were
removed from their foster placement because of allegations of
abuse and neglect in the placement home. A person (unidentified
by DCFS) “physically abused” Y.D. and I.D. was at risk of similar
abuse. Y.D. had bruises on his cheeks, left ear, lip, and eyelid.
I.D. reported that the children’s foster mother would hit the
children when she was angry.

1.    Petition
       In September 2021, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
identifying I.D. (then three years old) and Y.D. (10 months old) as
dependent children. (Their half sibling also was named in the
petition but is not part of the current appeal.) The petition
alleged that mother and father have a history of engaging in

      4  Both mother and father refused to be interviewed about
their background. Father told the social worker, “ ‘I’m not going
to have a conversation unless you bringing [sic]my kids back . . .
talking to you won’t help me.’ ” Father rebuffed other efforts by
social workers to contact him.

                                     4
violent altercations in the presence of the children. On July 27,
2021, mother threw a toy at father, and the toy hit I.D. and cut her
lip. Mother brandished a knife and threatened to stab father.
The petition alleged mother hit father’s forearm, chest, and neck
with a guitar. On prior occasions mother and father shoved each
other in the presence of the children resulting in her arrest for
intimate partner violence with injury. Mother also had a history
of domestic violence with the father of I.D. and Y.D.’s half sibling.
(I.D. and Y.D.’s half sibling had the same mother but a different
father.) After a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court
sustained these allegations against both parents under section
300, subdivision (b)(1), based on failure to protect the children.
The court struck the above italicized language as well as all
allegations under section 300, subdivision (a), governing serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally (§ 300, subd. (a)).5

      5  Section 300 provides in pertinent part: “A child who
comes within any of the following descriptions is within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person
to be a dependent child of the court:
       “(a) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.
For purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a
substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in
which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated
inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a
combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian
that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm. For
purposes of this subdivision, ‘serious physical harm’ does not
include reasonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks
if there is no evidence of serious physical injury.

                                     5
       According to DCFS, father told a law enforcement officer
that on July 27, 2021 (referencing the incident in the petition), he
left the family home after a verbal altercation with mother.
“When he returned to the location he discovered she had blocked
the door to the location. He was able to gain access to the
residence. She [mother] grab[bed] a box of toys and attempted to
throw it at him. The box missed him and struck one of their
children. Then she armed herself with [a] knife. She was
standing approximately 2 feet from him and stated, ‘I am going to
stab you.’ He advised she didn’t have the knife anymore. He
didn’t advise what happened to the knife. He stated she obtained
a guitar and then struck him 3 times with a guitar. Once in the
right forearm, once in the chest, and once in the back of the
neck.” DCFS reported that call logs from the Los Angeles Police

      “(b)(1) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a
result of any of the following:
           “(A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or
      guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.
             “(B) The willful or negligent failure of the child’s
      parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
      child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the
      child has been left.
            “(C) The willful or negligent failure of the parent or
      guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing,
      shelter, or medical treatment.
            “(D) The inability of the parent or guardian to
      provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or
      guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
      substance abuse.”

                                    6
Department showed “six calls to law enforcement regarding
domestic disturbances between the mother” and father from
January 2020 through July 2021.
       When a social worker asked about the incident described in
the petition father “indicated that he did not recall the
incident . . . .” Father reported that paramedics treated I.D.
because Y.D. hit her “with the crib . . . .” Father denied that
mother hit him with a guitar. Father denied any prior incidents
of domestic violence. Father denied that mother used a knife or
that she threatened to stab him. Father denied that mother hit
I.D. with a toy when mother threw the toy. Father also indicated
he had no intention of obtaining a restraining order against
mother. Father stated that he went to the police because mother
falsely accused him. Mother denied any domestic violence
between her and father.
       The children’s half sibling told a social worker that mother
and father “both push each other, kind of like a competition.”
(Boldface omitted.) Sometimes when mother and father argued,
the children were in the same room as mother and father. The
children’s half sibling estimated that mother and father argue
once a month. He further indicated that when mother and father
argue,“ ‘one of them leaves the home in order to cool off.’ ” Social
workers reported that during an interview, I.D. stated,
“ ‘[M]ommy and daddy fight, mommy called daddy stupid.’ ”
       On September 1, 2021, father told a social worker that he
and mother were separating and mother would move out of the
home. On September 3, 2021, mother told a social worker she
and father intended to pursue marriage counseling and to reside
together. On October 27, 2021, mother told a social worker that
she and father had ended their relationship a year earlier.

                                    7
Mother indicated she continued to live with father because a few
months earlier, the family quarantined together for COVID-19.
In November 2021, father told a social worker that he and
mother were in a relationship until DCFS removed the children
from the home. At that time, mother moved out of the home.
      Social workers interviewed mother and father prior to the
dispositional hearing. In a supplemental report dated November
2021, mother stated she and father had ended their relationship.
Mother reported she had moved into a shelter.
      Father again denied the allegations in the petition. Father
believed mother called the police “as a tactic to harm him.”
Father stated the children were never harmed in his care.
Father indicated that he was diagnosed with depression and met
with a therapist to treat his depression. Father further reported
mother had moved out of the home and their relationship had
ended. Paternal grandmother also told a social worker that
mother and father were no longer in a relationship and reported
father was participating in services.
      Prior to the dispositional hearing, father enrolled in a
“fatherhood program” and had attended two sessions but missed
three. Father enrolled in a domestic violence program and
counseling but did not consistently attend. Father explained he
was trying to reenroll and was on a waiting list. According to
father, he did not consistently attend his classes because the
timing conflicted with his visits with his children.
      DCFS concluded: “Since the start of this case, the
father . . . has demonstrated a lack of cooperation with the
Department, which has prevented the Department from
assessing his parental protective capacit[ies].” “The Department
remains concerned in that the end of the romantic relationship

                                   8
between the parents, does not suffice for the parent’s [sic] having
the skills, knowledge, and ability, to create a safe home
environment, free of violence in which the children can thrive in.
The parent’s [sic] have a history of engaging in domestic violence
incidents which they have not addressed. Additionally, [father]
has not made substantial progress in services which could further
mitigate the risk of harm to the children.”

2.    After a hearing, the court removes the children from
      father’s custody
       Father testified at the January 4, 2022 dispositional
hearing. According to father, he had enrolled in domestic
violence and parenting classes. Father testified the domestic
violence class was offered at the same time as monitored visits
with his children. Father chose to visit the children instead of
attending class. He testified he later reenrolled in a domestic
violence class at a different time. He also testified that he
notified the monitor of the conflict and she changed the time for
his visit, although she did not do so immediately.
       At the time of the hearing, father was enrolled in
individual counseling, a domestic violence program, and
parenting classes. Father had attended five domestic violence
classes. Father testified he and mother were no longer in a
romantic relationship and mother had moved out of the family
home. They ended their relationship to better parent their
children. Father testified he had learned about the indirect
consequences of domestic violence on his children’s lives. He also
thought about the children’s mental health and safety. Father
further testified he would cooperate with DCFS if the court
ordered the children returned to his care. Father added that he

                                    9
had been in therapy for depression for four years and was taking
his prescribed medication.
       On cross-examination, father acknowledged that he
continued to communicate with mother about the children and
the dependency proceedings. Father would sometimes add
mother through Facetime to his visits. Father had not yet signed
a release for DCFS to speak to his therapist or his domestic
violence counselor.
       DCFS argued that the children would not be safe if
released to father. DCFS stated that the petition involved
“mutual serious domestic violence between the mother” and
father—albeit the petition alleged only mother was the aggressor.
Counsel for DCFS argued father was not credible when he
testified that he and mother were no longer in a relationship.
       Father’s counsel emphasized that father was the victim in
the July 27, 2021 incident. Counsel asserted father was willing
to comply with any conditions if the court returned the children
to his care. The children’s counsel argued that father needed
“time to show progress in his programs.”
       The juvenile court ruled as follows: “Both parents’
attorneys don’t talk about anything other than this last incident
that happened. These parents have been in a toxic relationship
for four years. There was a referral back in 2019 [(two years
earlier)] with domestic violence. There has been, at least, four
times the police came out on domestic violence charges . . . .”
This is a total picture of a toxic parenting between mom and dad.
They argue and, ultimately, get into fights and they think just
because they’re not fighting that’s not domestic violence. And
these poor kids are living in this home where the parents are
yelling and screaming at each other . . . .” The court indicated

                                  10
that the calls to law enforcement were “because the parents are
arguing . . . with each other. So this is a relationship that is
beyond toxic. And these children . . . were living in it and they’re
not going to live in it until these parents reunite by getting
involved in programs.”
       The court found by clear and convincing evidence that
ordering the children in father’s custody would create a
substantial danger to the children’s physical and mental well-
being. The court found no reasonable means to protect the
children without removal. The court ordered father to complete a
26-week domestic violence class for perpetrators, a parenting
class, and individual counseling to address issues of domestic
violence and anger management. The court ordered father’s
visits to be monitored.

3.    Background regarding ICWA
       Father filed a form indicating that neither he nor the
children are members or eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe. Mother filed the same form also stating that neither she
nor the children are members or eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe. Mother told social workers that her “family is of
Moorish culture.” On September 28, 2021, the juvenile court
confirmed with mother and father’s counsel that mother and
father completed the forms. The form states in boldface: “Note:
This form is not intended to constitute a complete inquiry into
Indian heritage. Further inquiry may be required by the Indian
Child Welfare Act.”
       Based on those forms and counsel’s confirmation that the
parents had indicated no Indian heritage on those forms, the
juvenile court found it did not have reason to know that I.D. and
Y.D. are Indian children as defined by ICWA. The court ordered

                                    11
mother and father to alert their counsel and the court if they
obtained any new information.
      In October 2021, DCFS reported that they evaluated
maternal aunt and paternal grandmother for placement.
Maternal grandmother was not assessed because she had
extensive DCFS and criminal history. DCFS did not recommend
releasing the children to maternal aunt, who also had DCFS and
criminal history. DCFS recommended against releasing the
children to paternal grandmother because although she initially
wanted custody of I.D., she later changed her mind. Social
workers did not question maternal aunt, maternal grandmother,
or paternal grandmother about Indian ancestry.
      The juvenile court appears to have agreed with DCFS’s
finding that no extended family member should be considered for
custody. Specifically, the court noted in a minute order the
“minors to remain as suitably placed” because the relative
assessments were “negative.”

                          DISCUSSION

A.    No Substantial Evidence Supports the Order
      Removing I.R. From Father’s Custody
      Father argues that the juvenile court should not have
removed the children from his custody because his “home did not
pose a risk of substantial danger to the children at the time of the
dispositional hearing” and “other reasonable means existed by
which the children could have been protected other than removal
from Father’s home.” Specifically, father argues that the juvenile
court could have placed the children with him under strict
supervision, including unannounced visits. Respondent contests
these assertions.

                                    12
       In order to determine whether to remove a dependent child
from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court must assess “whether
a child will be in substantial danger if permitted to remain in the
parent’s physical custody, considering not only the parent’s past
conduct, but also current circumstances, and the parent’s
response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520 (I.R.) To
remove children from a parent’s custody the juvenile court must
find by clear and convincing evidence the children would be at
substantial risk of danger if they remained in the parent’s
custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We review the record as a whole to
determine if it “contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high
probability demanded by this standard of proof.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005; see I.R.,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.)
       In I.R., this court reviewed a challenge to a dispositional
order removing an infant I.R. from a father’s care after a finding
of domestic violence. The father threw a shoe at the mother’s
head and slapped one side of her face, causing redness and
swelling. (Supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 513.) Mother reported a
second incident eight months earlier, but indicated that the most
recent incident was the only time the father hit her. (Id. at p.
514.) I.R. remained in mother’s custody but was detained from
her father. (Id. at p. 515.) Although the father initially was
unwilling to communicate with DCFS during the detention
investigation, the father eventually reported that the incident
was a “ ‘one-time thing,’ ” that he was ashamed, and that he did
not “ ‘want that to happen again’ . . . .” (Id. at p. 516.) At the

                                   13
dispositional hearing, I.R.’s counsel was opposed to removing I.R.
from father’s care. (Id. at p. 518.)
       We reversed the order removing I.R. from father’s custody.
We explained: “A finding of parental abuse cannot alone provide
the clear and convincing evidence necessary to justify removing a
child. [Citations.] Rather, the juvenile court must determine
whether a child will be in substantial danger if permitted to
remain in the parent’s physical custody, considering not only the
parent’s past conduct, but also current circumstances, and the
parent’s response to the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court
intervention.” (I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) We
concluded that “two instances in which Father slapped Mother,
the second of which also involved him throwing a baby shoe at
her—do not support a reasonable inference that he is a generally
violent or abusive person.” (Id. at p. 521.) Father had no
criminal record or prior referrals and the danger I.R. resulted
from the violence between father and mother “not danger
resulting from I.R. being in Father’s care.” (Ibid.) Further, the
record contained no substantial evidence that the domestic
violence between father and mother was likely to continue.
(Ibid.) There was no basis to conclude that mother and father
would not stay away from each other. (Ibid.)
       Here, the petition alleges mother was the aggressor, and it
was undisputed that mother had moved out of the family home
even though DCFS argued that mother and father continued
having a romantic relationship. Respondent emphasizes that
mother and father have a long history of domestic violence, but
there was no evidence the children were harmed or that either
parent targeted the children. Also, there was evidence that when
mother and father would argue, one of them would leave the

                                   14
house in order to “ ‘cool off.’ ” Father also testified he had learned
“the importance of having his children not exposed to domestic
violence.” Even though the juvenile court did not have to credit
father’s testimony, the court had to assess risk to the children at
the time of the hearing if left in father’s custody, not simply
emphasize the “toxic” nature of mother and father’s relationship.
In addition, no substantial evidence supported the conclusion
that no other means short of removal were available to protect
the children.
       We reject respondents’ effort to distinguish I.R., supra,
61 Cal.App.5th 510. Respondent incorrectly asserts that unlike
in I.R., this case involved a prior “child abuse referral.” The 2019
referral—the only prior referral involving father—contained
allegations of domestic violence, not child abuse. According to
DCFS, I.D. “was in her crib during the DV incident; child was not
hurt.” Additionally, DCFS found the referral “[i]nconclusive.”
       Respondent correctly points out that in contrast to I.R.,
mother and father lived in the same city and continued to have
contact. The fact that mother and father live in the same city
and communicate with each other does not show that the
children are at risk of harm in father’s custody. Even if father’s
testimony that he and mother spoke only about the children and
the case were discredited, there was no other evidence that at the
time of the dispositional hearing, father and mother continued
their romantic relationship or continued to engage in violent
interactions. Although we agree with respondent that this case
involves a greater number of incidents of domestic violence than
the two described in I.R. and that father has an arrest record, the
governing statute requires focusing on potential harm to the
children at the time of the dispositional hearing. Here the

                                     15
children were not harmed while they lived with father, and as
noted above, there was no evidence parents continued to be
involved in a romantic relationship.
       Respondent argues that substantial evidence supports
removing the children from father’s custody “because the parents’
relationship was toxic, resulting in repeated incidents of domestic
violence, often requiring law enforcement interventions.”
Respondent quotes the following from In re T.V. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 (T.V.): “Even if a child suffers no
physical harm due to domestic violence, a ‘cycle of violence
between . . . parents constitute[s] a failure to protect [a child]
“from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and
suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.” [Citations.]’
[Citation.]”
       Respondent’s argument supports the juvenile court’s
assumption of jurisdiction, which father does not contest. The
cycle of violence described in T.V. upon which respondent relies
was the basis for upholding dependency court jurisdiction.
(Supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) Relying on evidence
supporting jurisdiction, however, is not sufficient because the
burden of proof is “ ‘ “substantially greater at the dispositional
phase than it is at the jurisdictional phase if the minor is to be
removed from his or her home” ’ or the physical custody of a
parent.” (I.R., supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) Respondent’s
reliance on mother and father’s “toxic” relationship does not,
without a showing of substantial risk of harm to the children and
no other alternative means of providing safety, demonstrate that
it was necessary to remove the children from father’s custody.
       Finally, we reject respondent’s argument that its “belief” is
sufficient to show a substantial risk by clear and convincing

                                    16
evidence. Specifically, respondent argues it “believed that
despite parents’ claim that their ‘romantic relationship’ had
ended, that did not mean they had the skill, knowledge, [or]
ability to create a safe home environment free of violence for the
children.” Respondent’s “belief” cannot substitute for evidence of
risk of harm to the children. Respondent cites no evidence to
support its conclusion that father did not have the skill,
knowledge, or ability to create a safe home. The record,
moreover, shows that father did try to minimize harm to the
children by leaving the home when he and mother argued. Also,
as father contends, the juvenile court could have imposed
restrictions on father’s custody and required social workers
conduct unannounced visits to protect the children instead of
removing them from his custody.

B.    The Initial ICWA Inquiry Was Insufficient
       Father asserts DCFS failed to satisfy its initial duty of
inquiry under section 224.2. Respondent does not dispute that
DCFS should have asked available extended family members
about the children’s possible Indian heritage but claims this
failure was not prejudicial.
       “At the outset of a dependency case, the child welfare
agency and the juvenile court have a statutory initial duty to
inquire into whether a child is, or may be, an Indian child. ‘The
child welfare department’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re
Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, 507, fn. & italics omitted.)

                                   17
Under ICWA, the term “ ‘extended family member’ ” is “defined
by the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence
of such law or custom, shall be a person who has reached the age
of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2).) “DCFS’s failure to inquire of extended family
members does not result in automatic reversal. [Citations.]
Instead, we must examine the record and reverse or remand only
if that review shows prejudice because there was ‘ “information
that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether the child is an
Indian child.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Adrian L. (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 342, 350 (Adrian L).)
       It is undisputed that social workers did not satisfy their
initial duty of inquiry. There is no evidence they asked the
children’s extended family members about the children’s
potential Indian ancestry. The juvenile court made its finding
that ICWA did not apply based merely on forms completed by
mother and father. Following In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1015–1016, we conclude that the reliance exclusively on the
forms prejudiced father. The forms themselves state that the
forms do not “constitute a complete inquiry into Indian heritage.”
(Boldface omitted.) We recognize that social workers evaluated
extended family members for custody, but neither the social
workers nor the court proceeded to evaluate these relatives
because of their dependency or criminal histories. In contrast to
Adrian L., supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 345, there was no
“extensive efforts by Mother, Mother’s counsel, extended family
members, and minor’s counsel” to have the children placed with
the extended family members such that “additional inquiry

                                   18
would not have yielded information that was likely to bear
meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian
child.” (Ibid.) We find no record support for respondent’s
conclusion that it is “not likely these relatives ‘possessed
knowledge of the children’s possible tribal affiliation superior to
Mother’s and Father’s disclaimer of any such ancestry.’ ” Upon
remand, the juvenile court should ensure compliance with the
requirements of section 224.2.

                          DISPOSITION
       The dispositional order is reversed. The juvenile court is
directed to hold a new dispositional hearing within 30 days of the
issuance of the remittitur. On remand, the court may consider
new evidence and changed circumstances that may have occurred
during the pendency of this appeal. The juvenile court is directed
to instruct the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services to comply with the requirements of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 224.2.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                            BENDIX, J.

We concur:

      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                     WEINGART, J.

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