Court Opinion

ID: 9883771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:18:08.715365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:17.941335
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would remand to the trial court for entry of a current support order consistent with the requirements of Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859 (Minn.1986) and applicable statutes.
The majority categorizes the trial court’s order directing respondent to pay $450 per month as one for “past and ongoing reimbursement to the welfare department.” Being so categorized, the majority requires neither the specific findings dictated by Moylan nor compliance with statutory requirements.
Although there exist in this case both a dissolution decree and a separate proceeding under Minn.Stat. § 256.87 (Supp.1985), the only order even remotely concerned with support of the minor children is one designated “past and ongoing reimbursement.” If tomorrow the minor children were to cease receiving AFDC benefits, there would be no permanent current support available to assist them in meeting their ongoing needs. Such a circumstance cannot possibly serve their best interests. Instead, it seems the interests of the county are being protected at the expense of the children.
Ideally in a fact situation such as this, both mother and father should have independent counsel and the decree of dissolution should be amended to include a reasonable support order that would reflect current receipt of AFDC benefits, but would continue during the minority of the children irrespective of AFDC involvement. *163With such protection, the custodial parent would be assured of ongoing support without having to return to court for a support order when AFDC benefits ended.
Entry of a permanent support order would be consistent with the philosophy expressed by this court in Hennepin County v. Geshick, 387 N.W.2d 439 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), when it observed that “[t]he county was obligated to seek a current support order not only to protect its own rights but also to protect the rights of the mother, whom it represented.” Id. at 441. Here the county also represents the mother (and the minor children). They deserve to be protected in their own right in the manner directed by this court in Geshick.
Finally, it is questionable whether the order affirmed by the majority today provides to the minor children even those slim protections which Minn.Stat. § 256.87, subd. la (Supp.1985) provides. That section reads in pertinent part:
In addition to granting * * * a money judgment, the court may * * * order continuing support contributions by a parent found able to reimburse the county or state agency. * * * [T]he order shall be effective for the period of time during which the recipient receives public assistance from any county or state agency and for five months thereafter the order shall require support according to chapter 518.
The majority describes the order it affirms today as one for “past and ongoing reimbursement under § 256.87, subd. 1 and la.” If, in fact, it is solely a reimbursement order and not a current support order, it is not entirely clear that payments would even continue for five months after AFDC benefits cease. Certainly, the majority does not require the same compliance with chapter 518 that section 256.87, subd. la appears to.
The order approved by the majority today escapes scrutiny under critical statutory and case law standards. The interests of both these parents and their minor children are poorly served by an affirmance in this matter.