Court Opinion

ID: 9829668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:31:06.089475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.001718
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING.'
In overruling the motion„for rehearing, we desire to state in full the case of Abney v. Moore, 18 So. Rep., 61, decided in 1895 by the Supreme *441Court of Alabama. On the ,13th of Feburarjq 1880, William Walker, a resident of the county of Chilton, State of Alabama, as the ancestor of his vendee, executed a deed which was properly acknowledged, conveying certain lands. Walker after the execution of the deed continued in possession of the land until his death, exercising acts of ownership over same, and the defendants, that is his vendees, resided on the land Avith him until some time in January, 1891, Avhen at said time Walker died, and since his death said vendees have been in continuous possession.
Moore, the administrator of Walker’s estate, brought suit against Martha Abney and others, the vendees of Walker, for the land described in the deed. The deed in terms is as follows:
“Know all men by these presents that I, William Walker, a resident of the county of Chilton and State of Alabama, for and in consideration of the natural affection and love I have and bear unto my children hereinafter named, besides the further sum of ten dollars to me in hand paid by my said children, to wit (naming the defendants in the present suit), the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have given, granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do give, grant, bargain, sell and convey, unto my said named children, their heirs and assigns, all my rights, title and interest and estate to and in the following described lands, lying in said county of Chilton and State of Alabama, to wit: (here follows a description of the lands sued for) to have and to hold unto my said above named children, their heirs and assigns, together with all and singular the tenements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in any manner thereto pertaining to the same, provided always, and it is expressly understood, that this conveyance is not to take effect until after my death, and that at my death the title to the foregoing described lands is to vest immediately in my said children. In testimony of the same I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this the 13th day of February, A. D. 1880. (Signed) William Walker. (Seal.)”
The contention of the administrator was that the deed was testamentary in character. Martha Abney and the vendees in the deed who were the children of William Walker, contended that the instrument was a deed, and that, it seems, was the sole question before the Supreme Court. As the opinion of that court so satisfactorily states our views as to the construction that should properly be given to the instrument before us, we set it out in full:
“The instrument to be construed—Avhich will be set out in the report of the case—perfect in form as a conveyance concludes with the folloAving provision: ‘Provided always, and it is expressly understood, that this conveyance is not to take effect until after my death, and that at my death the title to the foregoing described lands is to vest immediately in my said children.’ These are the only words employed in the instrument to suggest the idea that it is a Avill and not a deed. ‘In determining whether an instrument be a deed or Avill, the main question is: Did the maker intend any estate or interest whatever to vest before his death, and before the execution of the paper? Or, on the other hand, did he intend that all the interest and estate should take effect only after his death? If the former, it is a deed; if the latter, *442a will. And it is immaterial whether he calls it a will or a deed; the instrument will have operation according to its legal effect.” (Gillham v. Mustin, 42 Ala., 366; Trawick v. Davis, 85 Ala., 345, 5 South., 83.) Another rule of construction in such cases is, that when the paper on its face is equivocal, the presumption is against its operating as testamentary, unless it is made clearly to appear that it was executed animo iestandi, or being intended by the maker to operate as a posthumous disposition of his estate. (Rice v. Rice, 68 Ala., 218; 1 Redf. Wills, 170-172.) When the paper can have no effect as a deed, the court will incline to regard it as a will, if in that character effect can be given to the evident intent of the maker, which at last is the question of controlling importance. (Trawick v. Davis, supra; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala., 114, 5 South., 497; Adams v. Broughton, 13 Ala., 731.) Wills are ambulatory during the life of the testator, and are necessarily revocable; but deeds take effect by delivery, and are operative and" binding during the life of the grantor. As was said in Crocker v. Smith, 94 Ala., 297, 10 South., 258: ‘The intention of the maker is the ultimate object of the inquiry, whether it was intended to be ambulatory and revocable, or to create rights and interests at the time of the execution which are irrevocable. If the instrument can not be revoked, defeated or impaired by the act of the grantor, it is a deed; but if the estate, title -or interest is dependent on the death of the testator—if in him resides the unqualified power of revocation—it is a will.' (Jordan v. Jordan, 65 Ala., 306.) In the case before us, we have as perfect a fee simple deed as can be -drawn to convey land from the grantor to. the grantees, and the only condition prescribed upon its operation in presentí is the one we have quoted above. It was executed without the attestation of a witness, so as to make it a will in any event. We must presume the maker knew that a will could not be executed without a witness, and this is a fact of very controlling importance, when the intention in the execution of the instrument is sought. Construing his intentions by his acts, he must have known, ‘that an acknowledgment before a notary public" in due form, was sufficient to make the paper a deed, so far as related to its execution, and that this was not sufficient for its legal execution as a will. The grantor delivered the instrument the day he executed it to the grantees, who were his children; he reserved in it no power of revocation; he continued to live on the lands with his children, in possession and control of them during his life, and never made any other disposition of them. Hnder these circumstances we must hold that when he provided that the conveyance was not to take effect until after his death and that at his death ‘the title to the foregoing lands is to vest immediately in my said children/ he intended no more than to reserve to himself the use and enjoyment of the property during his lifetime, and that the operation of the gift, so far as possession was concerned, was to be postponed until his death, up to which time the property was to remain, not his own, but as his for -use and enjoyment. If this was not his intention, why should he have gone to the trouble and care to make and execute a paper which he called a conveyance in its body, perfect in form, as an absolute conveyance—such as is usually employed for such a purpose—and which is unusual and unnecessary in making a will; and have acknowledged it *443in the manner most usually employed to make it a deed, but never effectually done, and generally known to be ineffectual, to make it a will; and have delivered it to the grantees—the usual and necessary mode of perfecting a deed, and not usual or necessary to make a will operative—and have reserved no power of revocation—why should he have done all this, so like the conduct of one intending to make a conveyance in presentí, if his intention was not to pass the title until after his death? He had already used the necessary and proper words to make an absolute, vested title by the instrument in his children, and when he provided that the conveyance should not take effect until after his death when the title should immediately vest, he necessarily meant, if we are to give effect to what he was doing—to use the word title in this connection as a synonym of possession, which at his death should pass to the grantees. Such a construction comports, as we have shown with the general tenor of the deed, and is sanctioned by reason and authority. Any other construction would defeat the instrument, either as a deed or will, a result which should be avoided, if it can be upheld as either. (Golding v. Golding, 24 Ala., 126; Elmore v. Mustin, 28 Ala., 313; McGuire v. Bank of Mobile, 42 Ala., 591; Hall v. Burkham, 59 Ala., 353; and authorities cited supra.) The plaintiff as administrator of the deceased grantor had no right of recovery in this case. The creditor Johnson, if entitled to payment of his note out of the land, must seek relief in another forum.”
Motion for rehearing is overruled.

Overruled.

Application for writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction.