Court Opinion

ID: 9942962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:07:38.87396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:40.226067
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1178-22

R.B.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP
HOUSING AUTHORITY,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

                   Submitted January 23, 2024 – Decided February 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0913-22.

                   R.B., appellant pro se.

                   Manfredi & Pellechio, attorneys for respondent
                   (Jennifer Leigh Barnes, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Plaintiff R.B.1 appeals from a December 1, 2022 order denying her motion

to reconsider an October 21, 2022 order dismissing without prejudice her

complaint against defendant Franklin Township Housing Authority (FTHA). 2

Given that plaintiff neither sought nor obtained leave to appeal from the

December 1 order—nor the underlying October 21, 2022 order—and the

December 1 order is interlocutory in nature, we are constrained to dismiss the

appeal.

                                          I.

        We briefly summarize the salient facts from the motion record. The

FTHA, a public housing agency, provides affordable housing to low-income

families and administers a United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development Voucher Program.           Under the Voucher Program, participants

apply for housing approved by the FTHA. Once approved, participants qualify

to have a portion of their rent subsidized by the federal government.

1
    Because the record is sealed, we use plaintiff's initials. R. 1:38-11.
2
  Only the December 1 order is listed in plaintiff's Notice of Appeal and Civil
Case Information Statement. However, the October 21 order also dismissed
plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. Thus, we reference both orders in this
opinion.
                                                                             A-1178-22
                                          2
      Plaintiff previously participated in a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher

Program. In December 2021, she sought to move from Virginia to New Jersey

for personal and medical reasons. Accordingly, she submitted a "port out

request form" to the Prince William County Office of Housing and Community

Development in Virginia, to relocate to New Jersey. Thereafter, plaintiff was

assigned a portability officer in Somerset County.

      In January 2022, plaintiff was approved for a housing choice voucher of

$1,851 per month.     Therefore, as a Voucher Program participant, she was

obliged to find a rental unit costing less than $1,851 per month. An FTHA staff

member, Andrea Eato-White, informed plaintiff that her voucher expired on

March 14, 2022, but extensions could be granted.

      Eato-White subsequently received an email from the leasing director of a

rental property in Franklin Township, informing Eato-White that plaintiff

reserved a unit costing $1,955 per month. The email also stated plaintiff was

eligible for a rental discount because her daughter was a full-time student. Even

with the discount, however, the monthly rent exceeded plaintiff's voucher

amount. Therefore, the FTHA denied approval for the rental unit.

      On February 9, 2022, plaintiff emailed Eato-White, complaining about the

denial. In her email, plaintiff stated she was "not . . . provide[d] with the

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                                       3
necessary resources, nor time to locate an apartment within Franklin Township

and [her] time [wa]s . . . wasted." Plaintiff further claimed it was "very hard to

understand [the FTHA's] port-in procedures" and she was "forced to cancel [her]

portability to [Somerset C]ounty."        Additionally, she asked the FTHA to

"withdraw [her] voucher transfer."

      In August 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint against the FTHA. In her three-

sentence complaint, plaintiff alleged: (1) she "was forced to resign from [her]

New Jersey based job[,] losing [her] source of income"; (2) she "was also forced

to withdraw [her] apartment rental after paying the application fee and security

deposit"; and (3) she "was recovering from a previous . . . condition" and "losing

everything caused [her] to sink further into depression and hopelessness." The

following month, plaintiff filed a motion for a protective order. Defendant

moved to dismiss the complaint.

      On October 21, 2022, Judge Robert A. Ballard, Jr. heard argument on the

parties' motions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge granted plaintiff's

motion for a protective order, finding she asked for this relief "to protect . . . the

privacy of [her] mental health" and he saw no "reason not to do that." The judge

also granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, finding

plaintiff's complaint "state[d] conclusions without providing any specifics with

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regard to a cause of action that[ was cognizable] in this state." However, the

judge clarified that the dismissal was "without prejudice," so plaintiff would

"have the opportunity . . . to file an amended complaint that ha[d] the necessary

specificity to put . . . defendant on notice as to [her] cause of action." Further,

the judge explained that "if [plaintiff] want[ed] the case to be resurrected," she

would need to "file an amended complaint with specificity." The judge signed

a conforming order that day.

      Rather than file an amended complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to

reconsider the October 21, 2022 order. Judge Ballard heard argument on the

motion on November 28, 2022. At the outset of the hearing, he confirmed

plaintiff's case remained under seal. Next, the judge noted that in seeking

reconsideration, plaintiff filed additional documents with the court, including

her medical records. Following argument, the judge reserved decision. On

December 1, 2022, he entered an order denying plaintiff's reconsideration

motion, and again dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.

      In his accompanying written opinion, Judge Ballard found "[p]laintiff did

not meet the standard to satisfy a [m]otion for [r]econsideration" because she

failed to "state[] matters or controlling decisions . . . which the court overlooked

or . . . [in] which it ha[d] erred." Judge Ballard also concluded "[p]laintiff . . .

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only relitigated prior factual assertions and [did] not offer[] any reason . . . why

the court erred in its [October 21, 2022] decision" granting defendant's motion

to dismiss her complaint without prejudice. Further, the judge found she "d[id]

not offer any new facts . . . that were not considered by the court prior," but

instead, "re[-]argu[ed] her prior motion."

                                        II.

      On appeal, plaintiff raises the following arguments for our consideration:3

(1) "[a]fter inquiring about HUD policies, procedures, after being denied rental

assistance, the [H]ousing [A]uthority retaliated against and failed to let [her]

exercise [her] rights"; (2) Judge Ballard "established that . . . [d]efendant's

[c]ounsel was put on notice of some retaliatory claim, but it was unclear in the

initial claim"; (3) "[t]he [trial c]ourt was not provided with legal proposition[s],

any cases cited and arguments being made other than a lot of emails back and

forth[,]" and "[t]hese items were later provided in [plaintiff's] motion for

reconsideration"; (4) "[t]he [FTHA] failed to let [plaintiff] exercise [her] due

process rights after [she] ask[ed] to speak with a supervisor to initiate

administrative oversight"; (5) "[t]he actions of the [FTHA] violated multiple

3
  We recite plaintiff's arguments verbatim, except where indicated, from the
"Legal Argument and Points" section of her brief.
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                                         6
statu[t]es and HUD policies"; (6) the "H[UD] declare[d] that they d[id] not have

jurisdiction over [plaintiff's] claims . . . and recommend[ed] [that plaintiff] get[]

an attorney"; (7) "[m]utliple agencies stated that they had no jurisdiction over

[plaintiff's] claims"; and (8) "[p]ro[]se litigants should be held to a less strict

legal standard."

      In another section of her brief entitled, "Conclusion," plaintiff separately

argues she "was denied [d]ue process on many occasions, and . . . [her]

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the [FTHA]."4 Additionally, she

contends she "suffered with loss of employment, emotional and mental distress,

and embarrassment amongst other things." Finally, she asserts she "attempted

to present" her arguments before the trial court as a self-represented litigant "but

was unclear on the court[']s procedures for filing motion[s] and amendments,

and stating claims." None of plaintiff's arguments are persuasive.

      "A dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit . . . .            It

adjudicates nothing. Another action may be instituted and the same facts urged,

4
  "An appellate court . . . may refrain from considering cursory arguments raised
at the end of a brief that are not properly submitted under proper point headings."
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 2:6-2(a)(6) (2024)
(citing Solar Energy Indus. v. Christie, 418 N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div.
2011)). Here, we considered plaintiff's contentions even though some of them
were not set forth in separate point headings.
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                                         7
either alone or in company with others as the basis of a claim for relief."

Malhame v. Borough of Demarest, 174 N.J. Super. 28, 30-31 (App. Div. 1980)

(quoting Christiansen v. Christiansen, 46 N.J. Super. 101, 109 (App. Div.

1957)).

      Rule 2:2-3(a)(1) permits an appeal as of right to the Appellate Division

only from a final judgment. "To be a final judgment, an order generally must

'dispose of all claims against all parties.'" Janicky v. Point Bay Fuel, Inc., 396

N.J. Super. 545, 549 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting S.N. Golden Ests., Inc. v. Cont'l

Cas. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 82, 87 (App. Div. 1998)); see also Grow Co. v.

Chokshi, 403 N.J. Super. 443, 460 (App. Div. 2008) (explaining a "dismissal

without prejudice of unadjudicated claims that have not been concluded in fact

but are left to be resurrected in a new suit" does not constitute a final judgment

allowing appellate review as of right).

      Therefore, absent the required finality, an order is interlocutory and

appellate review is only available by leave granted under Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-

6(a), unless the order falls within the limited class of interlocutory orders that

may be appealed as of right. See R. 2:2-3(b). "Interlocutory review is 'highly

discretionary' and is to be 'exercised only sparingly,' because of the strong policy

'that favors an uninterrupted proceeding at the trial level with a single and

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                                          8
complete review.'" Grow, 403 N.J. Super. at 461 (first quoting State v. Reldan,

100 N.J. 187, 205 (1985) and then quoting S.N. Golden Ests., Inc., 317 N.J.

Super. at 88).

        A motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is governed by a more

liberal standard than the standard for reconsideration of final orders under Rule

4:49-2.    Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021).

Reconsideration of interlocutory orders does not "require[] a showing that the

challenged order was the result of a 'palpably incorrect or irrational,' analysis or

of the judge's failure to 'consider' or 'appreciate' competent and probative

evidence." Id. at 134 (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384

(App. Div. 1996)). "Until entry of final judgment, only 'sound discretion' and

the 'interest of justice' guides the trial court, as Rule 4:42-2 expressly states."

Ibid.

        A trial court's decision to deny a motion for reconsideration will be upheld

on appeal unless the motion court's decision was an abuse of discretion. Granata

v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016). An abuse of discretion

"arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citation omitted).

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                                          9
      Finally, it is well settled that a self-represented litigant is not relieved

from the obligation to comply with the court rules. Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J.

Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997). In fact, self-represented litigants are bound

by the same laws and rules of court as parties represented by counsel. See Ridge

at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014).

      Governed by these standards, we have no basis to disturb the December

1, 2022 order. That order, like the October 21, 2022 order, dismissed plaintiff's

complaint without prejudice, and thus, is not final. Additionally, neither of

Judge Ballard's orders is an interlocutory order from which an appeal of right

may be taken under Rule 2:2-3(b). Accordingly, because plaintiff did not seek

or obtain leave to appeal, and given Judge Ballard crafted both of his orders to

allow plaintiff to return to court to pursue any legitimate claims she may have

against defendant, after the judge indulgently reviewed her complaint and found

it failed to set forth a cognizable claim, we dismiss plaintiff's appeal.

      To the extent we have not addressed plaintiff's remaining arguments, they

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.           R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Dismissed.

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