Court Opinion

ID: 9828440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:22:28.42897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:48.111833
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] Appellant strenuously insists that we erred in concluding that the trial court did not err in holding that it appeared upon the face of the plaintiff's petition that all matters therein alleged as constituting his cause of action had been adjudicated in the suit of Carrie B. Shook v. J. O. Shook, and treats in his argument the language of this court in closing the discussion of that question as an erroneous finding of fact and asks a correction of the same. The language referred to is as follows: “That plaintiff’s claim, however, to a lien upon the property in controversy to secure a reimbursement of his one-half of the amount of the community funds expended in building the house upon said property was directly put in issue in the divorce suit, is manifest from the allegations of his petition filed in this suit, and he was properly denied the right by the action of the district court to re-litigate that matter in this suit.” We did not intend to be understood, by the use of this language, as asserting that it appeared upon the face of plaintiff’s petition in this suit that he had expressly alleged in the divorce suit between himself and wife, that the brick storehouse and improvements claimed by him to have been erected on the lot purchased from Riddle and wife were erected thereon after the purchase of the same and paid for out of the community funds of plaintiff and defendant and that the said J. O. Shook had a lien upon said lot to reimburse himself for his one-half of such fund. The language was intended to express our deduction from all the allegations of plaintiff’s petition that the issue of the alleged lien and right of reimbursement was put in issue in the divorce suit. It is expressly alleged in plaintiff’s pleadings, touching this matter, that on the trial of the divorce suit, and while the plaintiff was testifying as a witness, he was asked to state the value of each separate parcel of real estate alleged to be the separate property of Carrie B. Shook, which question was by him answered, and that he was then asked, “I-Iow long after the Riddle property was purchased before the brick storehouse was erected thereupon and how was the same paid for, whether'out of the community funds or separate estate of Carrie B. Shook?” that, “before the question could be answered, the court interfered and stated that it was not necessary for the question to be answered, that the plaintiff had testified that neither party owned anything when they were married, and that all property had been acquired since marriage, and paid for out of community funds, and that he would instruct the jury that all property was community estate, and that it was not necessary to go further into the question, and that the court would not allow the defendant in said divorce suit to offer any evidence to show when the brick storehouse was built and how the same was paid for, or what the same cost.”
Again, after alleging that the court first prepared a charge to the jury to the effect that all property was community property, but from some cause changed his mind and gave a peremptory instruction to the jury to the effect that the real estate, except the residence, was plaintiff’s (Carrie B. Shook) separate estate, plaintiff further alleges that as soon as counsel discovered that the court had changed his views, and was going to charge the jury that the property was separate property, counsel called attention of *707the court to the fact that the court had misled counsel all through the trial as to what his charge would be, and that defendant desired to reopen the case upon the evidence in order to show that there were no valid judgments existing against him, and that defendant had the right to shield his property from unjust claims, and to show that the hricls storehouse on the Biddle lot was erected long after same was purchased, and that it was built and paid for from the parcels of community estate; that “the court replied that the evidence was closed, and he would not reopen the case.” It will be observed that the pleadings do not show that the testimony offered was excluded because of the want of allegations to authorize it, but for other reasons stated, and if the issue, as to the building of the brick storehouse with community funds after the purchase of the Biddle lot and plaintiff’s right to recover one-half of said fund was not regarded then by J. O. Shook and his counsel as being involved in the divorce suit, it is difficult to understand why the efforts alleged to introduce said testimony were made.
[8] Plaintiff in the present suit did allege, in effect, that the only issue involved in the divorce suit was “one of title only as to the read estate and as to the lot in controversy herein, and that it was not made an issue therein that plaintiff was entitled to an equitable lien upon and against the lot involved herein to the extent of one-half the value of the improvements erected upon said lot after the purchase of the same.” These allegations merely reflect in our opinion an indorreet conclusion of the pleader, and not the actual fact in regard to the matter to which they relate.
That it appears from a fair interpretation of plaintiff’s pleadings that the issue here referred to was involved in the divorce suit between the plaintiff and defendant is a question about which we think there can be no serious doubt.
We are also satisfied that our opinion in this case is not in conflict with the eases cited by appellant, or other opinions of our appellate courts upon the same subject.
Appellant’s motion for a rehearing is therefore overruled.