Court Opinion

ID: 9474235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:51:35.555969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:58.533273
License: Public Domain

SPROUSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The rape or attempted rape of an eleven year old child is a reprehensible act. We cannot know, however, if John Ballou molested or attempted to rape the unfortunate young victim who accused him of the crime. One logical interpretation of the evidence suggests strongly that he did not. The more germane issue in this appeal, however, is whether he was competently represented so that a court or jury could even decide his guilt or innocence. My belief is that under the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), he was not competently represented. The majority in its opinion has fairly summarized the facts, but I must differ with its reasoning that Strickland requires a conclusion that there was not ineffective assistance of counsel to Ballou’s prejudice.
Strickland essentially requires that to prove constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel it must be shown that the representation was deficient to such an extent that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This test, of course, is highly fact specific, but, in my opinion, the facts describing Smith’s representation of Ballou offer a classic description of ineffective representation. Defense counsel failed to develop Ballou’s defense in three major areas: 1) his client’s mental and psychological condition; 2) inconsistency between the victim’s statements and the medical evidence; and 3) the victim’s own psychological history.
John Ballou is a thirty-seven year old man with a seventh grade education who was diagnosed early in life as bordering on being mentally retarded. Uncontradieted psychiatric testimony established that he was highly susceptible to suggestions such as allegedly made by the victim’s parents that he admit to unsuccessfully attempting intercourse with the young victim. Ballou’s attorney, Arthur Smith, was familiar with Ballou and his family, and he was aware that Ballou was mentally retarded. Smith had represented Ballou once before in 1973 on charges of sodomy stemming from an incident involving several neighborhood children. In connection with these earlier charges, Ballou had undergone a psychiatric evaluation which resulted in the doctor informing Smith in 1973 that Ballou’s mental state created “a real question concerning his competence for trial____” The sodomy charges, which Ballou denied, were never proven, but were taken under advisement by the court on the condition that Ballou continue psychiatric treatment on an out-patient basis. The prosecutor, to be sure, secured a psychiatric evaluation of Ballou which found him competent to stand trial. The fact that the prosecution met this minimal requirement, however, should not have stopped Smith from exploring a possible defense of mental incompetency.
Prior to his sentencing, Ballou received a psychiatric evaluation which concluded in part that he is “an extremely vulnerable individual, highly susceptible to the influences of persons and situations around him. His judgment tends to become impaired when placed in stressful situations, particularly those related to his needs for affection and self esteem.” Dr. Robert Showalter, who supervised Ballou’s evalua*916tion, confirmed these findings at the habeas corpus hearing. He stated that Ballou’s subnormal intelligence is manifested by a high degree of suggestibility, making Ballou very gullible and easily led. The psychiatric evidence in Smith’s possession or available to be developed should have been a starting point in this discrete defense against charges of rape.
Second, the victim’s statements conflicted sharply with the medical evidence. She said that Ballou penetrated her three times and she felt fluid go into her body. The pediatrician who examined her after the alleged rape, Dr. Frank Guilfoyle, testified at the habeas corpus hearing that her genitalia had not been penetrated, that there was no spermatozoa on the vaginal slides nor on her underclothing and that no pubic hair was discovered on her person or clothing. The mild genital irritation he found in the child was consistent with the “use of harsh soaps, bubble bath in particular, [or] self-manipulation.” Dr. Guilfoyle also testified that the girl had been treated for a similar genital irritation on two previous occasions. After describing suspected causes of the irritation, he went on to opine that, based on his examination and the results of the hospital tests, there had been no penetration and the girl had not been raped.
Smith conceded at the habeas corpus hearing that during his investigation, he became aware of Dr. Guilfoyle’s report and the hospital test results. Despite the obvious contradiction between the girl’s statement regarding penetration and the medical reports which found no evidence of sexual assault other than slight irritation, Smith never interviewed the girl, nor contacted Dr. Guilfoyle or the doctor who treated the girl at the hospital. In fact, at the evidentiary hearing below, Smith testified that he thought the medical evidence confirmed the girl’s statement.1 Had he taken the simple and obvious step of contacting Dr. Guilfoyle, Smith would have had his blunder corrected for him.
At his arraignment, Ballou pled guilty to the rape charge. Because Smith had agreed to stipulate the entire case against his client, the evidence was then recited in narrative form by the prosecutor. The recital of the evidence included the misleading statement that the pediatrician had “confirmed that she had been sexually molested____” The prosecutor did not introduce into evidence the doctor’s written report or the negative results of the hospital tests. The prosecutor concluded by introducing into evidence the girl’s statement made to police the day after the alleged rape. For his part, Smith failed to introduce any of the medical reports into evidence, and when the trial court advised him that all the witnesses were available for cross-examination, he declined the opportunity.
The child also had a history of the kind of psychiatric disturbance that would have been vital evidence in a trial. In January of 1975 — eight months prior to the alleged rape or attempted rape — a psychological evaluation revealed that she had a manipulative personality and was “an habitual liar.”
Smith also testified at the hearing that during his investigation he became aware that the girl had once been in an accident which resulted in brain damage and that she “was emotionally disturbed.” He also recalled learning of the psychological evaluations concerning the girl.
Smith testified that out of a desire to “curry some favor” with the prosecuting attorney and the girl’s family, he waived Ballou’s right to a preliminary hearing, thus relinquishing the opportunity to test the girl’s story and record her testimony for possible use at trial as impeaching evidence. Smith admitted that he received nothing from the prosecution in exchange for this waiver and, in fact, stated that he *917never even considered negotiating for something in return.
Although he was unable to recall whether or not he discussed the waiver of the preliminary hearing with Ballou, Smith felt sure that he did. The nature of the few conferences at the jail between Smith and Ballou, however, is entirely speculative. Ballou testified that Smith never discussed the elements of rape or possible defenses with him. Rather, according to Ballou, Smith was always in a rage during his visits over the fact that Ballou had told the police he unsuccessfully attempted intercourse with the girl. For his part, Smith was unable .to recall whether or not he discussed the elements of the crime or potential defenses with Ballou, but stated, “I expect that I did.” Rather, Smith’s testimony revealed that his practice in preparing the defense was to hold “strategy determinations” in his office with members of Ballou’s immediate family and then report the results of those sessions to Ballou in jail.
During the same period that Ballou was being evaluated for sentencing, the girl Ballou had pled guilty to raping was placed in the hospital by her parents for psychiatric evaluation. The girl’s parents reported that she was uncontrollable and that she was falsely accusing her father and brother of raping her. As noted earlier, Smith testified at the habeas hearing that during his investigation he became aware of her emotional problems including the psychological evaluations, but did nothing to develop this aspect of his client’s defense. Following the victim’s release from the hospital, Dr. James Shield, Jr., her treating psychiatrist, responded to a request from the prosecutor and sent him a letter which stated that much of the girl’s problems stemmed from the rape she had experienced. The prosecutor quoted extensively from this letter at Ballou’s sentencing hearing. Dr. Shield testified at the habeas corpus hearing below, however, that when he wrote that letter he relied on the representations of others that the girl had been raped. He stated that he would have doubted that she had been raped if the only basis for that conclusion was the young girl’s assertion. Dr. Shields also testified that the girl had a long history of emotional disturbance; he had diagnosed her as having chronic brain syndrome, with seizures, together with subnormal intelligence and an excessive neurotic condition manifested by a severe obsession with sex. According to Dr. Shield, the girl’s family described her as a pathological liar and his evaluation found that “[s]he did not have much regard for the truth____” The girl was recommended for long-term inpatient treatment.
Smith’s testimony that he had forty years trial experience and had represented defendants in over five hundred felony cases, in my view, only emphasizes the degree of incompetence displayed in Ballou’s defense. A trial attorney with that experience should have been energized to action with far less evidence and potential evidence than was handed to Smith.
In the absence of a trial, any conclusion as to prejudice in a case must, of course, be speculative to some degree. The range of speculation here, however, is narrow — how could a jury at least not have considered the victim’s overt contradictions, her chronic history of lying, particularly in fabricating sexual activity, her unfortunate emotional problems, and, finally, Ballou’s own mental retardation and susceptibility to suggestion. A jury certainly could not have ignored the uncontradicted medical evidence weighing heavily against the probability of actual rape. Finally, even a judge predisposed to a heavy sentence for this kind of crime might well have viewed his sentencing responsibility differently had he been alerted by counsel to existing evidentiary inconsistencies.

. When confronted with the results of the hospital tests at the evidentiary hearing, Smith admitted that they were "a little bit” in conflict with the girl’s statement. Although Smith testified that he had seen the test results during his investigation, he apparently failed to attribute any importance to them.