Court Opinion

ID: 9826471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:58:22.999533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:04.165089
License: Public Domain

*373Mr. Justice Jones.
3 I concur in overruling the appellant’s exceptions and in affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, but I do not assent to the proposition that the regulation of the railroad company requiring an “excess fare” of twenty-five cents over regular rates to be paid by all persons seeking to travel upon said road who, after reasonable opportunity therefor, have failed to purchase a ticket, is unlawful. Such a requirement is not unreasonable. It is the duty of one who wishes to become a passenger on a,.railroad train to comply with all reasonable regulations of the company. His right to board the train and become a passenger thereon is not absolute under all circumstances. His primary duty is to purchase a ticket at the designated agencies for the purpose, if reasonable opportunity is offered, and. then to enter the train as an accepted passenger, having complied with the rules of the company. If he negligently or wilfully fails in this, then he is liable to be rejected as a passenger for want of a ticket, or as a much milder alternative, to deliver to the conductor the sum of twenty-five cents, called “excess fare,” in addition to paying the regular fare, which “excess fare” is to be refunded to the passenger and demanded at any station of the company in the State. This regulation, as much for the convenience of the passengers, who might otherwise be rejected as passengers for want of a ticket, as it is for the advantage of the company in the conduct of its business, cannot fairly be said to be unreasonable. The tendency of such regulation is to promote the convenience and safety of passengers generally, by relieving conductors of selling tickets, making change, discussing fares, &c., consuming his time and attention, which should be devoted to the control and management of his train and its connections, and to the general comfort and safety of the passengers. Such a regulation, in its tendency to cause passengers to buy tickets at the designated agencies, certainly comports with correct business methods in securing proper oversight and custody of the company’s revenues. The inconvenience to which it subjects the passenger, who *374negligently or wilfully fails to purchase a ticket from the station agent, is very small compared with the inconvenience which it entails upon the railroad company, to sell tickets by conductors in charge of running trains. The regulation, too, is one approved by the railroad commissioners of the State. It is true, the railroad commissioners have no power to approve a regulation in conflict with the law of the State, but the regulation does not conflict with any law of the State. The statute provides that “the rate for transportation of passengers * * * shall not exceed three cents per mile for every mile traveled.” The language evidently contemplates a charge for service rendered in transportation to be retained by the railroad company as its own property, but the money paid or delivered by way of “excess fare,” so called, is not intended to be the property of the railroad company, but is refundable on demand at any station of the company within the State. If on reaching his destination the passenger should, as he has the right to do, present his return check and receive back his money, how can it be said that his “rate of transportation” had been increased. If he neglects or refuses to demand return of the money, his loss of such money results from his own neglect or conduct and not because it was exacted from him in charge for his transportation. This question was squarely presented in Reese v. Pennsylvania, R. Co., 6 L. R. A., 529, and decided in accordance with the views above stated.
I cannot subscribe to the view that this question has already been decided adversely in the case of Kibler v. the Southern R. R. Co., reported in 62 S. C., 272, 40 S. E., 556, and 64 S. C., 245. In the first appeal, the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Pope, then Associate Justice, said: “So far as the twenty-five cents extra fare is concerned, that question does not enter into this appeal.” In the second appeal, exception was taken to refusal to charge defendant’s eighth request, as follows: “A railroad company has the right to impose an excess charge of twenty-five cents upon passengers who fail to buy tickets when opportunity is offered and re*375bate check is furnished.” Responding to this exception, the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Pope, said: “We think Judge Gary was right in refusing to charge the eighth request of defendant.” This language, isolated from its connection, would indicate that in the opinion of the Court the refusal to charge the request was right, because the request contained an erroneous proposition of law; but when the following connected language is noticed, it will be seen that the refusal of the request was right, because, whether it contained a sound or unsound proposition of law, it was inapplicable to the case before the Court. The language of the Court was: “But whether he was right or wrong in such declaration of the law, it will not affect this case, for the reason that defendant railroad had no tickets for sale at its agency in Nefvberry for less than ten cents. Its own agent testified that he would not have sold the plaintiff a ticket from Newberry to Helena for three cents, or rather for any amount less than ten cents. This being so, such ruling was not necessary in this cause — it became an abstract question of law. This ruling, as before said, whether right or wrong, did not affect the case. So, therefore, subdivisions (1) (2) (3) of the third exception do not fairly arise upon the record, and are, therefore, overruled” (the italics-mine). This shows conclusively that the question which has been discussed was not decided in Kibler’s case. The point decided was that the act of 1900, limiting the rate for transportation of passengers to three cents per mile, operated as a repeal of the provisions of sec. 1 of the act of 1884, 23 Stat., 759, because such provisions were inconsistent with the act of 1900, but this left untouched sec. 2 of the act of 1884, which gave the right to charge twenty-five cents extra under certain conditions. There is great force in the view, however, that any extra charge for transportation over three cents per mile is inconsistent with the limitation to three cents, and If the “excess fare,” as collected in this case, was a charge for transportation or rate for transportation, in the sense of the statute, I am willing to concede that as a charge or rate for transporta*376tion it would be unlawful under the act of 1900, being in excess of three cents per mile. But I have attempted to show that money received temporarily and to be refunded upon demand is in no proper sense a rate or charge which involves absolute right of property and retention in the receiver. The regulation as to such “excess fare” is, therefore, sustained as a reasonable regulation, not in conflict with any law of the State, and approved by the railroad commissioners of the State. I have said this much because the question was considered in the opinion by Chief Justice Pope, and I wish to make clear my attitude with reference to the subject, and to prevent any further misapprehension of the point decided in Kibler’s case, supra; but I do not regard that the question is even now properly before us for discussion. The case shows this statement: “Throughout the trial the plaintiff did not contend that the defendant was limited to a charge of three cents per mile, as fixed by statute, but conceded that defendant had the right to impose a reasonable excess charge, where opportunity was offered for purchase of ticket and none was purchased.” The charge of Judge Watts was in conformity with this concession of plaintiff’s counsel, and the contention of defendant’s counsel, and, as I think, in accordance with the law; and no exception had been taken to the charge in this regard by either side. It ought, therefore, to be treated as the law of this case.
4 The exceptions to the charge raise an interesting question about which there is some conflict among the authorities, and I regret that the time now at my disposal will not permit a full discussion. I will content myself with briefly stating the reasons which induce me to vote for an affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court. Under the admissions of counsel, the first cause of action was practically abandoned, except in so far as the manner of performing a lawful ejection from the train was unlawful; for having conceded the defendant’s right to collect the “excess fare,” and it being undisputed that the plaintiff upon demand therefor was unable to pay, it necessarily followed *377that defendant had the right to eject him as a trespasser, provided it was done in a lawful manner. Moore v. R. R. Co., 38 S. C., 1, 18 S. E., 120. The main contest, therefore, was upon the second cause of action, which involved the right of one who had been ejected from the railroad train at a station where passengers were received, to re-enter the same train for the purpose of becoming a passenger, with an honest intention to comply with the company’s reasonable regulations and with the means of complying. The Judge charged substantially, that under such circumstances it was the duty of the common carrier to receive him, and I do not think there was error in such charge, when applied to the facts in the case. The paintiff was prevented from re-entering the train as passenger under circumstances of unusual harshness of conduct by the conductor. The plaintiff did not refuse to pay the “excess fare,” in. the first instance, from any spirit of wilfulness or in denial of the defendant’s right to collect such “excess fare,” but because he only had thirty-five or forty cents in money, and the regular fare was thirty cents — having failed to purchase a ticket because he only reached the station in time to board the train. When the conductor demanded his fare, plaintiff handed him thirty-five cents, which plaintiff testified the conductor took off with him, but afterwards returned and handed it back to him, demanding the “excess fare” in addition. • The plaintiff was put off at Bonham, a station between Union and Jones-ville. Plaintiff lived at Jonesvile, with a wife and a large family of children, five of whom were sick, and had gone to Union and procured some medicine and soup material for them and was returning home. When the “excess fare” was demanded, he tried to borrow it on the train, but failed. After being put off at Bonham, a passenger gave him twenty-five cents, and he then sought to re-enter the train, informing the conductor that he had the money, declaring, “Here is your money, I want to go on this train. My family is sick.” To this appeal the conductor gave no heed, but with force prevented the plaintiff from entering the train, *378notwithstanding other passengers pleaded with the conductor to desist, offering to pay whatever was demanded. The conductor acted on the theory that having been put to the trouble of stopping his train to eject plaintiff for failure to pay the “excess fare,” the plaintiff had lost all right to reenter that train. Some cases do hold, that “after a person has refused to pay his fare and is being put off the train, he acquires no right to the passage by then tendering the fare demanded.” O’Bien v. Railway, 15 Gray, 20; Hoffbauer v. Railway, 35 Am. Rports, 278. The general principle upon which this view rests is thus stated in 15 Gray, 20: “After being rightfully expelled from the train, he could not again enter the same car and require the defendant to perform the same contract he had broken.” But I think the Texas, California and.Tennessee Courts are right in limiting the application of such rule to cases of wilful violation of contract on the part of the passenger. Texas &c. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Bond, 62 Texas, 442, 50 Am. Rep., 532; Bland v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 55 Cal., 590, 36 Am. Rep., 50; Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 9 Lea, 180, 42 Am. Rep., 668; and L. N. & Gt. S. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 Lea, 98, 47 Am. Rep., 279. There being no evidence of any fractious or wilful opposition by plaintiff to the reasonable regulations of the company, the trial Judge fairly stated to' the jury the law applicable to the case, and the verdict should not be disturbed.