Court Opinion

ID: 9897665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:19:54.053808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.305836
License: Public Domain

10/30/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                                October 24, 2023 Session

       STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHRISTOPHER JAMES FUNK, SR.

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hawkins County
                  No. CC-20-CR-102        James F. Goodwin, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. E2022-01367-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher James Funk, Sr., of driving
under the influence of an intoxicant and possessing a firearm while under the influence of
alcohol. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months
and twenty-nine days after service of forty-eight hours in custody. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying both his motion to suppress and his
subsequent motion for an interlocutory appeal. The State asserts that the Defendant waived
any issue regarding his motion to suppress by failing to file a motion for a new trial. It also
argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct
appeal. On our review, we agree with the State and respectfully affirm the trial court’s
judgments.

                         Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;
                       Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,
JR., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Daniel G. Boyd, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christopher James Funk, Sr.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Senior Assistant
Attorney General (at argument) and Katharine K. Decker, Senior Assistant Attorney
General (on brief); Dan E. Armstrong, District Attorney General; and James Bradley
Mercer, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
                                                OPINION

                                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       The Defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident on the evening of August 4,
2019. When Tennessee Highway Patrol Sergeant Rex Bailey arrived at the scene, he
smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant’s breath and person. He also
noticed that the Defendant’s eyes were red and bloodshot and that the Defendant was
stumbling and limping. The Defendant admitted he had been drinking that evening, but he
refused to perform field sobriety tests or submit to a breathalyzer. Sergeant Bailey then
arrested the Defendant for operating the motorcycle under the influence of alcohol. He
also secured a firearm that the Defendant was carrying.

       The sergeant obtained a warrant for a blood draw, and the Defendant’s blood was
drawn about two and a half hours after the crash. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
later analyzed the Defendant’s blood sample and concluded that the sample had a blood
alcohol content of 0.177%.

       A Hawkins County Grand Jury charged the Defendant with driving under the
influence of an intoxicant and possessing a handgun while under the influence of alcohol.1
Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the warrant used to obtain his blood
sample. The motion alleged that Sergeant Bailey violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41 in the following ways: (1) by failing to provide a copy of the warrant to the
issuing magistrate and (2) by making his return directly to the clerk’s office instead of to
the issuing magistrate.

       After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress. The court
found that the sergeant did not comply with Rule 41 because the magistrate did not retain
a copy of the warrant and because the return was made directly to the clerk’s office.
However, the court reasoned that the “technical noncompliance [with Rule 41] was the
result of neglect” and that it did “not rise to the systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements.”

       The Defendant then made an oral motion for permission to seek an interlocutory
appeal. The trial court denied the motion, finding that an interlocutory appeal was not
needed to avoid protracted litigation or to develop a uniform body of law. The court also

        1
                The grand jury also charged the Defendant with violation of the financial responsibility
law. The State dismissed this charge prior to trial, and we do not address this charge further in this appeal.

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found that its order denying the motion to suppress “would obviously be reviewable upon
final entry.”

        Following a trial in September 2022, a jury found the Defendant guilty of driving
under the influence and possessing a handgun while under the influence of alcohol. The
trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days.
The court suspended the sentences to supervised probation after service of forty-eight hours
in custody.

       The Defendant did not file a motion for a new trial. He filed a premature notice of
appeal on September 28, 2022, and the trial court later filed its judgments on November
15, 2022.

                                         ANALYSIS

        In this appeal, the Defendant raises two issues. He first argues that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also asserts that the trial court erred in failing
to permit him to seek an interlocutory appeal of that denial. In response, the State argues
that the Defendant has waived any issue concerning his motion to suppress by not filing a
motion for a new trial. It also argues that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be
challenged in a later direct appeal. We agree with the State.

       A.     WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

        In his first issue, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress. Citing State v. Coffee, 54 S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. 2001), the Defendant contends
that the trial court was required to grant the motion to suppress upon finding that the issuing
magistrate failed to retain an exact copy of the search warrant. He also argues that the
circumstances of this case do not give rise to a good-faith exception to Rule 41’s
exclusionary rule. We respectfully disagree.

        Before a defendant may raise an issue on appeal as the basis for seeking a new trial,
the defendant must present the issue to the trial court in a timely, written motion for a new
trial. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33(b). Except for issues related to the
sufficiency of the convicting evidence and sentencing, the failure to file a motion for a new
trial waives plenary review of all issues on appeal that could have resulted in a new trial.
State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 808 (Tenn. 2010). In that circumstance, a defendant may
obtain relief, if at all, under the standards governing plain error review. See Howard v.
State, 604 S.W.3d 53, 62 (Tenn. 2020).

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        These principles apply to claims that a trial court erred in denying a pretrial motion
to suppress evidence. Indeed, we have specifically recognized that a defendant’s failure
“to raise the denial of his motion to suppress in his motion for new trial” will act “as a bar
to plenary appellate review of any claim with regard to the ruling of the trial court on the
motion.” State v. Lozano, No. M2017-01250-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4275919, at *3
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 7, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 20, 2019). Even if our
decision on appeal would result in the dismissal of the charges, the defendant must still
have presented the issues to the trial court in a timely motion for a new trial to preserve
those issues for plenary review. State v. Lee, No. M2021-01084-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
16843485, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2022), no perm. app. filed.

      In this case, the Defendant did not file a motion for a new trial. As such, we
conclude that he has waived plenary review of his suppression issue in this Court, and he
may obtain relief, if at all, under the standards governing plain error review.

       Importantly, our authority to review unpreserved issues for plain error is
discretionary, and our supreme court has emphasized that this authority is to be “sparingly
exercised.” See State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tenn. 2007). In this case, we
respectfully decline to exercise our discretion for two reasons.

        First, the Defendant did not request in his principal brief that we conduct a plain
error review, and he did not argue or analyze any of the factors that could justify plain error
relief. State v. Enix, 653 S.W.3d 692, 701 (Tenn. 2022) (setting forth criteria for plain error
review). This Court generally refrains from addressing issues not raised by the parties. See
State v. Nelson, 275 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008). Because the defendant
bears the burden of showing an entitlement to plain error relief, a defendant’s failure to
request this relief necessarily weighs against any such consideration on our own. See State
v. Cornwell, No. E2011-00248-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5304149, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Oct. 25, 2012), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 5, 2013).

       Second, and more importantly, the State specifically argued in its response brief that
the Defendant waived this issue by failing to raise it in a motion for a new trial. Despite
being on notice that his issue may be waived, the Defendant failed to respond to this
argument in a reply brief. “Where a defendant fails to respond to a waiver argument, only
particularly compelling or egregious circumstances could typically justify our sua sponte
consideration of plain error relief.” State v. Thompson, No. W2022-01535-CCA-R3-CD,
2023 WL 4552193, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2023), no perm. app. filed; State v.
Powell, No. W2011-02685-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 12185202, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 26, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2013). Because no “particularly
compelling or egregious circumstances” exist here, we decline to consider plain error relief
on our own.

                                             -4-
        To be clear, a party seeking plain error relief must generally raise and argue the issue
in the party’s briefing, just as the party would do with all other issues in the ordinary course
of an appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a). For these reasons, we respectfully decline to
exercise our discretion to review the Defendant’s issue under plain error review. The
Defendant is not entitled to relief.

       B.     DENIAL OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

       As his second issue, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant
permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The State responds
that the denial of an interlocutory appeal may not be challenged in a later direct appeal.
We agree with the State.

       When a trial court denies a motion for an interlocutory appeal, a defendant has two
options. First, the defendant may seek an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. State v. Lalone, No. E2016-00439-CCA-R3-CD,
2017 WL 2297653, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2017) (suggesting that the proper
remedy for the denial of an interlocutory appeal “is to apply directly to [the Court of
Criminal Appeals] for an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10.”), no perm. app. filed.
Second, the defendant may await the conclusion of the case and seek an appeal as of right.
See Tenn. R. App. P. 3. Once a defendant exercises either of these options, the trial court’s
previous denial of an interlocutory appeal is of “no effect.” State v. Johnson, No. E2010-
02659-CCA-R10-CD, 2012 WL 1306440, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2012), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 15, 2012); see also State v. Simmons, No. M2018-00937-COA-
R3-CV, 2018 WL 6721801, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018) (recognizing that any
error in failing to grant an interlocutory appeal “is harmless” where the defendant later
sought direct review of the same issues), no perm. app. filed.

       In this case, the Defendant did not seek an extraordinary appeal after the trial court
denied his motion for an interlocutory appeal. Instead, as was his right, he deferred seeking
an appeal until the conclusion of his case. Now that his case is on direct appeal, the earlier
denial of an interlocutory appeal is of no effect at all. Johnson, 2012 WL 1306440, at *10.
We may not set aside a judgment of conviction simply because a trial court failed to grant
an interlocutory appeal. Lalone, 2017 WL 2297653, at *9. Respectfully, this issue is
without merit.

                                       CONCLUSION

        In summary, we hold that because the Defendant failed to file a motion for a new
trial, he has waived any issue concerning the denial of his motion to suppress. In light of

                                             -5-
the Defendant’s direct appeal, we also hold that the trial court’s earlier denial of an
interlocutory appeal is of no effect now. We respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

                                          _____________________________________
                                                 TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

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