Court Opinion

ID: 9902437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:06:47.59002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:51.337137
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0230-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JIM HENDRIX,
a/k/a JIM M. HENDRIX,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 13, 2023 – Decided November 27, 2023

                   Before Judges Sabatino and Mawla.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment Nos. 15-02-0264
                   and 16-03-0475.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Boris Moczula, Deputy Attorney General,
                   of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
       Defendant Jim Hendrix appeals the trial court's order denying his petition

for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

       The pertinent background is as follows.       After a series of incidents,

defendant was charged in two successive indictments in February 2015 and

March 2016 with numerous crimes, including, among others, murder, felony

murder, armed robbery, aggravated sexual assault, kidnapping, endangering the

welfare of a child, child abuse, and witness tampering. A third indictment, not

at issue in this appeal, charged him with making terroristic threats to a

corrections officer.

       Defendant's trial counsel was partially successful at a Wade1 hearing in

suppressing the identification made by one of the State's eyewitnesses, although

the court denied suppression as to two other witnesses.

       Thereafter, the defense attorney negotiated a plea agreement in which

defendant pled guilty in October 2016 to amended charges of first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1), on the first indictment, and

second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), on the second

indictment. All other charges were dismissed. As part of the agreement, the

third indictment charging terroristic threats was dismissed in its entirety.

1
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
                                                                               A-0230-22
                                        2
        The plea agreement capped defendant's exposure on the manslaughter

offense to a custodial term of twenty years, subject to an 85% parole disqualifier

under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ("NERA"), with a

concurrent sentence not to exceed seven years on the aggravated assault offense,

also subject to NERA.

        Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant on

January 13, 2017, imposing a twenty-year term on the manslaughter offense with

a concurrent seven-year term on the aggravated assault offense. An 85% parole

disqualifier was applied to each term under the NERA. Defendant appealed his

sentence without briefing, pursuant to the Sentence Oral Argument ("SOA")

program set forth in Rule 2:9-11. On September 25, 2018, the SOA panel issued

an order denying his appeal.

        In his PCR petition, defendant claimed his trial counsel and appellate

counsel were ineffective in various respects.        The PCR court rejected his

contentions without an evidentiary hearing, issuing a written decision on July 6,

2022.

        In his brief on appeal, defendant argues:

              POINT I

              DEFENDANT           RECEIVED            INEFFECTIVE
              ASSISTANCE        OF TRIAL            COUNSEL FOR

                                                                            A-0230-22
                                         3
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ARGUE MITIGATING
FACTOR 14 AT SENTENCING, FOR NOT HAVING
CHALLENGED THE FACTS OF THE CASE
ESTABLISHING    A    CONVICTION     FOR
AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER, AND FOR NOT
IMPEACHING WITNESSES USED TO IDENTIFY
HIM AS THE SHOOTER.

     (A)   APPLICABLE LAW.

     (B) TRIAL    COUNSEL     WAS
     INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
     ARGUE MITIGATING FACTOR 14
     DURING SENTENCING WHICH GIVES
     CONSIDERATION TO THE FACT
     DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE AGE
     OF 26 WHEN HE COMMITED THE
     CRIME.

     (C) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
     FOR    HAVING   FAILED   TO
     CHALLENGE THE FACTUAL BASIS
     OFFERED   FOR  A   PLEA  OF
     AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER.

     (D) COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
     FOR HAVING FAILED TO CALL
     WITNESSES AT THE WADE HEARING
     TO IMPEACH THEIR CRED[I]BILITY
     OF THEIR IDENTIFICATION OF THE
     DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER.

POINT II

APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT HAVING SCHEDULED DEFENDANT'S
APPEAL ON THE PLENARY CALENDAR.

                                          A-0230-22
                     4
      Having duly considered these arguments in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm. We do so for substantially the same sound reasons

expressed in the sixteen-page written decision of PCR Judge Nesle A.

Rodriguez. We add only some brief comments.

      It is well established that a defendant appealing the alleged

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate: (1) deficient

performance by counsel, and (2) actual prejudice flowing from that

performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987). As the PCR judge correctly found,

defendant fails to establish these two requirements. Each of his claims of

ineffectiveness lack merit. We address them in chronological order.

      First, defendant claims that his trial counsel should have called additional

witnesses at the Wade hearing on identification. In particular, he contends his

attorney should have required the testimony of two witnesses who originally had

been unable to identify him as the shooter in the robbery but who later identified

him from a photo array. The PCR judge concluded that defense counsel's

decision to not call those witnesses and instead focus on the identifications that

were the actual subject of the Wade hearing was a reasonable strategic choice.

State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 320 (2005) (noting the highly deferential review

                                                                            A-0230-22
                                        5
afforded to a trial attorney's strategic decision on which witnesses to call to the

stand). As it turned out, trial counsel was able to persuade the court at the Wade

hearing to suppress one of the identifications, thereby weakening the State's

case.    Defendant fails to show actual prejudice resulting from counsel's

assistance at the Wade hearing.

        Second, defendant contends his trial attorney was ineffective by

negotiating a plea to aggravated manslaughter rather than reckless manslaughter

and in not arguing a theory of mere reckless conduct. We concur with the PCR

judge that this argument is unavailing.       The record shows that defendant

purposely fired a gun at and killed the victim during the course of a robbery.

The factual basis defendant provided at the plea hearing reflects an extreme

indifference to human life, which meets the definition of aggravated

manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1); see also State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398,

409 (2008) (noting that a defendant is guilty of aggravated manslaughter if the

defendant "causes death with 'an awareness and conscious disregard of the

probability of death'") (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 363 (2004)).

Defendant agreed under oath at the plea proceeding that he had exhibited such

extreme indifference. The record amply supports the court's conclusion that this

                                                                             A-0230-22
                                        6
was not a merely reckless shooting, but rather one reflecting the severity of

aggravated manslaughter.

      Third, defendant argues in vain that his trial counsel should have argued

at sentencing that his relative youth should have been weighed as a mitigating

factor, since defendant was under the age of twenty-six at the time of his

criminal offenses.   This argument fails as a matter of law, because the

Legislature did not enact mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14)

(defendant under the age of twenty-six at the time of the offense's commission)

until October 19, 2020, more than three years after defendant's January 13, 2017

sentencing. The Supreme Court has made clear that new mitigating factor

fourteen does not apply retroactively to sentences that were imposed before the

date of its adoption in 2020. State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 87-88 (2022).

      Finally, we concur with the PCR judge's rejection of defendant's argument

that his appellate counsel was deficient in not moving for supplemental briefing

on his sentencing appeal. The arguments raised by appellate counsel at the SOA

proceeding advocating for a lighter sentence, although unsuccessful, were

competently presented, and defendant fails to show how briefing of those

arguments would have made a difference to the outcome.

                                                                          A-0230-22
                                       7
      Because defendant failed to present a prime facie case of counsel's

ineffectiveness, the PCR court was not obligated to conduct an evidentiary

hearing. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992).

      As a parting observation, we note that trial counsel did a commendable

job in the plea negotiations in protecting defendant from a sentence of up to life

in prison and a mandatory thirty-year minimum term, had he been convicted at

trial for murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1).

      Affirmed.

                                                                            A-0230-22
                                        8