Court Opinion

ID: 9683086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:22:14.096747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:44.636981
License: Public Domain

BLATZ, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
“[T]he interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures is not included in that ‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Only a statute can create a liberty interest in a specified date of supervised release, which gives rise to due process procedural protections before that date can be extended for violating a disciplinary rule. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Because I believe Minnesota’s statutes do not create a liberty interest in a specified date of supervised release, I respectfully dissent.
Critical to the analysis of the question before this court are the United States Supreme Court decisions in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, and Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293. In Wolff, the Supreme Court addressed whether Nebraska’s prison disciplinary procedures complied with due process. 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The Court concluded that, while the federal constitution does not guarantee an inmate good-time credit for satisfactory behavior in prison, a state can provide a statutory right to good-time credit, giving rise to a protectible liberty interest. Id. at 556-57, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
In determining whether Nebraska’s statutes had in fact created a liberty interest, the Supreme Court looked at relevant provisions of the Nebraska statute, which expressly provided for good time stating that:
The chief executive officer of a [correctional] facility shall reduce, for parole purposes, for good behavior and faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility the term of a committed offender.
Id. at 546 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (quoting Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83 — 1,107 (Cum.Supp.1972)) (emphasis added). The “good-time” reduction by statute could only be forfeited if a disciplinary committee found that the inmate had been engaged in “flagrant or serious misconduct.” Id. at 545 n. 5, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (quoting Neb.Rev.Stat. § 83-185 (Cum.Supp.1972)).
After reviewing these provisions of the Nebraska statute, the Court stated:
It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time *780but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior. Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior, and it is true that the Due Process Clause does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
Id. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (citation omitted). Thus, in holding that the prisoner was entitled to “the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances,” the Court focused on the fact that the Nebraska statute created a statutory right to good time and the statute specified that good time could be forfeited only for “serious misconduct.” Id. at 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963.
In Sandin v. Conner, the Supreme Court again addressed whether prison disciplinary procedures implicated a liberty interest, requiring procedural protections under the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The prisoner in Sandin, Demont Connor, challenged the imposition of disciplinary segregation for misconduct. The prison regulation in question required a finding of guilt when the allegation of misconduct was “supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 475-77, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Although Connor was not allowed to present witnesses at the disciplinary hearing, a fact-finding committee nonetheless found him guilty of misconduct and put him in disciplinary segregation. Id. at 475-76, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Connor brought an action against the prison officials in federal district court alleging a deprivation of procedural due process in connection with the disciplinary hearing. Id. at 476, 115 S.Ct. 2293. The federal district court granted the state’s motion for summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Connor had a liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation and therefore held that the inmate was entitled to call witnesses at the disciplinary hearing pursuant to Wolff. Id. at 476-77, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the inmate was entitled to procedural protections set forth in Wolff was based on an incorrect “negative inference that the [disciplinary] committee may not impose segregation if it does not find substantial evidence of misconduct.” Id. at 477, 115 S.Ct. 2293. It was this “negative inference” creation of a liberty interest by the Ninth Circuit that the United States Supreme Court rejected in Sandin, stating:
Inferring] from the mandatory directive that a finding of guilt “shall” be imposed under certain conditions the conclusion that the absence of such conditions prevents a finding of guilt * * * may be entirely sensible in the ordinary task of construing a statute defining rights and remedies available to the general public. It is a good deal less sensible in the case of a prison regulation primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison. Not only are such regulations not designed to confer rights on inmates, but the result of the negative implication jurisprudence is not to require the prison officials to follow *781the negative implication drawn from the regulation, but is instead to attach procedural protections that may be of quite a different nature.
Id. at 481-82, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Again recognizing that states can create liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court concluded that “Con-nor’s discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Thus, the Court held that “neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the Due Process Clause itself, afforded [the defendant] a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff.” Id. at 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293.
While the United States Supreme Court has clearly ruled that state statutes are the source of any due process right to be accorded to inmates in prison disciplinary procedures, the majority nonetheless states that “it is inappropriate to analyze Carrillo’s liberty interest by looking solely to statutory language; rather, we must examine the nature of the deprivation and the extent to which that deprivation departs from the basic conditions of Carrillo’s sentence.” In so stating, the majority in effect interprets Wolff and Sandin as creating an analytical framework that has two separate legal considerations: (1) the statutory right and (2) the nature of the deprivation. Using this framework, the majority then concludes that Carrillo has a liberty interest in a specific supervised release date. This framework, I respectfully submit, is not grounded in or supported by Supreme Court precedent because the Court’s precedent does not bifurcate the analysis, but rather looks to the statute to see if there has been a deprivation. Accordingly, because a liberty interest, if created, is created by state statute, I begin by analyzing the applicable Minnesota statutes to determine whether they provide a protectible entitlement to a specified date of supervised release.
Under Minnesota statutes, an executed sentence “consists of two parts: (1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equal to two-thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2004). Importantly, the statutes provide that “[t]he amount of time the inmate actually serves in prison and on supervised release is subject to the provisions of [Minn.Stat.] § 244.05, subd. lb.” Minn.Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1. Section 244.05 provides that an inmate convicted for a crime committed after August 1, 1993, “shall serve a supervised release term upon completion of the inmate’s term of imprisonment and any disciplinary confinement period imposed by the commissioner due to the inmate’s violation of any disciplinary rule adopted by the commissioner.” Minn.Stat. § 244.05, subd. lb (2004) (emphasis added). Minnesota statutes further require that the district court explain the two parts of the sentence — the minimum term of imprisonment and the maximum term of supervised release — to the defendant when the sentence is pronounced. MinmStat. § 244.101, subd. 2 (2004). As set forth in the statute, at sentencing the court must specifically “explain that the amount of time the defendant actually serves in prison may be extended by the commissioner if the defendant commits any disciplinary offenses in prison.” Id. These provisions clearly demonstrate that there is no statutory right to a specified period of supervised release.
Reinforcing this clear expression of legislative intent is the statutory provision entitled “No right to supervised release” which provides: “Notwithstanding the court’s explanation of the potential length *782of a defendant’s supervised release term, the court’s explanation creates no right of a defendant to any specific, minimum length of a supervised release term.” Minn.Stat. § 244.101, subd. 3 (2004). In my view, this statement and the totality of the other relevant statutory provisions is determinative of the issue before us; the legislature clearly did not intend to create a liberty interest in a specified date of supervised release.
The majority’s reliance on Sandin to look at the “deprivation” 1 suffered by the defendant, notwithstanding the plain language of our statute stating there is “no right,” ignores the holding of Wolff — that there is no right to supervised release unless it is created by the state. Thus, the majority’s analysis is in direct conflict with Wolff and, in consequence, with the Supreme Court’s statement in Sandin that “the time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were correctly established and applied in Wolff and Meachum.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Moreover, by ignoring the express language that there is “no right,” the majority violates the canon of construction that we construe every law to give effect to all its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2004) (emphasis added).2
In summary, there can be no deprivation if there is no constitutional or statutory right.3 Indeed, there can be no deprivation where our statute specifically provides that a defendant has “no right * * * to any specific, minimum length of a supervised release term.” Minn.Stat. § 244.101, subd. 3. With such statutory language, I cannot conclude that an inmate was deprived, much less that, as the majority concludes, the deprivation caused “a significant departure from the basic conditions of the inmate’s sentence.”
While it may be preferable policy or practice to have such a statutory right, it is not the responsibility of this court to create one. It is our responsibility to afford inmates the process necessary to protect any right created by statute. Here, no right is created and I would so hold.

. The majority states: "It appears to us that Carrillo's deprivation is more similar to the deprivation experienced by the inmate in Wolff, where the Supreme Court held that the inmate had a liberty interest in the date of his release from prison.” While his deprivation may be similar, the statutes are not. Unlike Minnesota Statutes, Nebraska's statute did not contain a provision stating that the prisoner had "no right” to supervised release, but in fact expressly provided that the chief executive officer of a prison "shall reduce” an inmates sentence for good behavior. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 2963.

. The majority suggests that the statute is "internally inconsistent” if not interpreted to provide a liberty interest to Carrillo despite the provision stating that there is "no right.” However, the Supreme Court in Sandin recognized that while there may be prison regulations "designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison,” "such regulations [are] not designed to confer rights on inmates.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Similarly, our statute is not designed to confer rights on inmates.

.The majority distinguishes a "liberty interest” from a "right” in order to circumvent the legislature's express language that there is "no right.” In doing so, the majority concludes that while there is no "right” to supervised release, an inmate has a "liberty interest” in a specific period of supervised release. This is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff where the Court concluded that the inmate had an interest of "real substance” because the state "created the right to good time.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963.