Court Opinion

ID: 9864988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:19:38.154256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:39.992749
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissenting.
I think that in so far as the contract involved provides for payment of money to defendant in error— and only as to that promise is breach alleged — the contract is void of mutuality and without consideration. The contract was entered into December 26, 1940, and reads as follows:
“These articles of agreement made and entered into by and between Arthur B. Cooper, hereinafter referred to as the party of the first part, and Helen E. Cooper, hereinafter referred to as the party of the second part, each of the City and County of Denver, Colorado:
“Witnesseth: That,
*146“Whereas: The parties hereto were lawfully intermarried on or about the 30th day of June, A. D. 1930 and are now husband and wife, and
“Whereas: Unfortunate, sundry and substantial differences have arisen between the parties hereto, and they are now living separate and apart as a result thereof, and
“Whereas: It is the desire of each of the parties hereto that they continue to live separate and apart, free from molestation or interference of one by the other, and
“Whereas: The party of the first part is steadily employed at a substantial salary and desires to make suitable provision for the maintenance and support of the party of the second part:
“Now, therefore, this agreement:
“For and in consideration of the keeping of the covenants, conditions and obligations herein contained, the parties herein have agreed, and by these presents do agree, as follows:
“1. The parties hereto will always and hereafter continue to live separate and apart, one from the other, and neither will annoy, molest or interfere with the other, and in all respects each of the parties will conduct himself and herself toward the other just as if the parties hereto had never been, and were not now, married.
“2. The party of the first part agrees to, and by these presents does, convey to the party of the second part all his right, title and interest in and to the household goods, furniture and fixtures now in the home of the parties hereto located at 360 Clarkson Street, Denver, Colorado; and the party of the second part agrees to, and by these presents does, convey to the party of the first part all her right, title and interest in and to a certain 1940 De Sota [sic] Automobile now registered in the name of the party of the first part.
“3. The party of the first part agrees to-pay the outstanding family bills and expenses of the parties hereto, *147to the extent that the same are included in this agreement and made a part hereof by list attached hereto, marked “Exhibit.”
“4. The party of the first part agrees to pay to the party of the second part the sum of Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) each and every week after the date of this agreement, for the support and maintenance of said party of the second part, and to continue said payments during the natural life time of said party of the second part, or until said party of the second part shall remarry, in the event that a divorce should eventually be procured by either of the parties hereto.
“5. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as preventing either party hereto from legally divorcing the other, nor as relieving either party from the legal effect of any misconduct prohibited by statute.
“6. This agreement may be enforced by either of the parties hereto, by legal action or by proceeding in the nature of an action for specific performance, however, this section is in no sense to be construed as a limitation of the right to any other right of action which either of the parties may be entitled to hereunder in the event of a breach of any of the conditions hereof.
“In witness whereof, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals, at Denver, Colorado, this 26th day of December, A. D. 1940.”
(Properly signed by the parties.)
Other than as to the provisions of paragraph 2 of the contract, to have attention hereinafter, the wife’s promise was to live separate and apart from her husband, and not “annoy, molest or interfere with” him, and to conduct herself toward her husband as if they never had been, and were not married. That, I submit, does not constitute consideration for the husband’s promise to pay his wife money, nor, contrariwise, does the husband’s promise to pay his wife money, constitute consideration for her promise to live separate and apart from him. Indeed, the contract is devoid of fact recitals *148which justify agreements of husbands and wives to live apart. “At the time of the making of such an agreement the relations between the husband and wife must be of such a character as to render the separation a matter of reasonable necessity for the health or happiness of the one or the other. There must be a moving cause for it in addition to the mere volition of the parties. If it is the outcome of mutual caprice only, or a reckless disregard of the obligation of the marriage tie, then the courts will not enforce it. In almost all the cases that we have investigated, either from the recitals in the agreement for separation itself or from extrinsic evidence offered in connection therewith, the court has had before it an unhappy condition of marital relations as a moving cause for the contract. Judges have carefully discriminated between agreements for separation, outgrowths of domestic sorrow, entered into for the purpose of avoiding public scandal or notoriety, and those which have resulted from a wanton or reckless disregard of one of the highest obligations of life —the duty which the husband and wife mutually owe to each other and to the public at large. In this view of the law, an agreement for separation of the latter kind would be a mere usurpation of the power conferred upon the courts alone to adjust marital dissensions in decrees of divorce.” Stebbins v. Morris, 19 Mont. 115, 47 Pac. 642. The Montana case is of kind with the one here. There, as here, the wife, proceeding soon after the execution of the contract, sued for divorce which was awarded. There, again as here, the wife, “relying upon the terms and provisions” of a contract to live separate and apart, and to enjoy material relief from the husband, quite as here, “did not make any demand or claim for any adjustment or decree as to their said property or right therein, but relied upon said contract, and believed that the defendant would carry the same out.” A demurrer to the complaint there was sustained, and the like challenge to the complaint here, in *149my opinion, should have moved the court to a similar ruling.
The only authority cited by the court is Jones v. Jones, 1 Colo. App. 28, 27 Pac. 85. The parties there entered into a separation agreement, the provisions of which were observed until the husband obtained a divorce, and thereafter until the making of a new contract differently termed. In short, the first contract, entered into correspondingly as of the time of the one here, was never defaulted. It was superseded by a new contract executed by the parties after the divorce, and the enforcement sought was upon that contract. The distinction is evident.
Only in paragraph 2 of the separation agreement is there mutuality of promise, and these promises were mutually kept and performed. No relief in relation thereto is sought by either party.
The court quotes section 29, chapter 56, ’35 C.S.A., a remedial statute enacted in the interest of enforcing marriage and separate maintenance agreements. That statute, like the Jones case, is devoid of point. That there may be enforcement of such contracts by remedy not previously obtaining, does not foreclose inquiry as to the legal sufficiency of a contract thus sought to be enforced. In my view, the court opinion does violence to the law of contracts.