Court Opinion

ID: 9385575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 14:06:18.050567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.812782
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
04/07/2023 09:06 AM CDT

                                                           - 981 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        313 Nebraska Reports
                                                  STATE V. WILLIAMS
                                                   Cite as 313 Neb. 981

                                         State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                        Peirce Deon Williams, appellant.
                                                      ___ N.W.2d ___

                                            Filed April 7, 2023.     No. S-22-566.

                 1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
                    determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial
                    grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
                    clearly erroneous.
                 2. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an
                    analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
                    before it.
                 3. Speedy Trial: Complaints: Ordinances. The speedy trial statutes, Neb.
                    Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016), apply to prosecu-
                    tions on complaint and of city ordinance violations.
                 4. Speedy Trial. If a defendant is not brought to trial by the 6-month
                    speedy trial deadline, as extended by any excluded periods, he or she is
                    entitled to absolute discharge from the offense charged and for any other
                    offense required by law to be joined with that offense.
                 5. ____. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must
                    exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months,
                    back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat.
                    § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can
                    be tried.
                 6. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Words and Phrases. “Good cause,” for
                    purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016), means a
                    substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. Good cause is some-
                    thing that must be substantial but is also a factual question dealt with on
                    a case-by-case basis.
                 7. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. When a trial court relies on Neb. Rev.
                    Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy
                    trial calculation, a general finding of “good cause” will not suffice.
                                   - 982 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. WILLIAMS
                             Cite as 313 Neb. 981

    Instead, the court must make specific findings as to the good cause
    which resulted in the delay.
 8. Good Cause: Proof: Appeal and Error. A trial court’s good cause find-
    ings must be supported by evidence in the record, and the State bears
    the burden of establishing facts showing that good cause existed. An
    appellate court will give deference to such factual findings unless they
    are clearly erroneous.
 9. Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Proof. A continuance by the court’s own
    motion, or judicial delay, does not toll the speedy trial statute absent a
    showing by the State of good cause.
10. Rules of the Supreme Court. Under Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1403 (rev. 2010),
    all persons entering a county court courtroom while court is in session
    shall conduct themselves in a quiet and orderly manner.

  Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Lori
A. Maret, Judge. Affirmed.
    Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellant.
  Robert E. Caples, Assistant Lincoln City Prosecutor, for
appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Heavican, C.J.
                        INTRODUCTION
   Peirce Deon Williams appeals from an order of the district
court affirming the county court’s decision to overrule his
motion for absolute discharge pursuant to our speedy trial
statutes. 1 Williams argues that the time for trial ran, entitling
him to absolute discharge, and that the district court erred in
concluding that two periods of time were excludable under
§ 29-1207(4). Because we conclude that the county court’s
finding to exclude one of the periods for good cause 2 was not
clearly erroneous, and the time to bring Williams to trial did
not run, we affirm the district court’s order.
1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).
2
    See § 29-1207(4)(f).
                                  - 983 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. WILLIAMS
                            Cite as 313 Neb. 981

                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
   On or about September 21 to October 12, 2020, Williams
was issued a handwritten “Uniform Citation and Complaint”
(UC&C) by the Lincoln Police Department for an incident
that occurred on September 21. 3 The copy of the UC&C in
the record on appeal fails to show that the UC&C included
the offense charged and the date of issuance. 4 The UC&C
purported to summon Williams to appear before the Lancaster
County Court on November 4 at 1:30 p.m. On October 12,
the city of Lincoln (State) filed a separate complaint in
the Lancaster County Court, which “attached and incorpo-
rated” the copy of the UC&C. The State’s complaint charged
Williams with one count of assault and battery, in viola-
tion of Lincoln Mun. Code § 9.12.010 (1990). The record
fails to show that Williams was served with the State’s
filed complaint. 5
                    Initial Proceedings
   On November 4, 2020, the matter came before the county
court, and Williams did not appear. The court’s journal entry
and order from that date stated, “telephone message on
file,” and showed the county court continued the matter to
November 12 “on motion of Defense.” The record shows
that an order to appear in court was “[m]ailed to defendant,”
ordering Williams to appear in the Lancaster County Court
on November 12, 2020, at 1:30 p.m. for “[a]rraignment”
and “[f]urther [a]rraignment.” Williams did not appear on
November 12. The county court issued a bench warrant for
Williams’ immediate arrest and granted the State leave to
amend the complaint to add a count for failure to appear.
Williams was charged with failure to appear under Lincoln
Mun. Code § 9.08.110 (1997).
3
    See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-422 (Cum. Supp. 2022); Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1463
    (rev. 2019).
4
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-423 and 29-424 (Reissue 2016).
5
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-404 and 29-425 (Reissue 2016).
                              - 984 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. WILLIAMS
                        Cite as 313 Neb. 981

   On January 27, 2021, Williams voluntarily appeared before
the county court. The county court held a hearing and advised
Williams of the charges against him for assault and battery and
failure to appear. Williams pled not guilty, and a docket call
hearing was set for February 24. On February 24, the court set
the matter for trial on April 12, precisely 6 months after the
State filed its complaint.
   On April 12, 2021, when the matter came before the county
court for trial, Williams began to record a video of the pro-
ceeding with his cellular telephone. The court made multiple
requests for Williams to cease recording, citing local court
rules. In response, Williams stated that “if you don’t let me
[record], then . . . I can’t do nothing about that.” He continued
that “if it was a problem, Your Honor, I believe you would
have [taken] my phone.” Williams told the court to “do what-
ever you feel you need to do,” but that he would not voluntarily
stop recording. On its own motion, the court continued the case
“to give [Williams] an opportunity to seek some advice, to con-
sider what the Court is directing here and to come back and be
ready for trial without your phone on.”
   The matter again came before the court for trial on June 8,
2021, and Williams did not appear. The court issued a bench
warrant and gave the State leave to amend the complaint to
add another count for failure to appear. On July 12, Williams
appeared at a docket call hearing, and a third trial date was
set for the morning of August 23. Williams did not appear for
the morning trial date. The court issued a bench warrant and
gave the State leave to amend the complaint to add another
count for failure to appear. Williams appeared that same after-
noon, and the court set a fourth trial date for September 21.
Williams did not appear on the fourth trial date. The court
issued a bench warrant and gave the State leave to amend
the complaint to add another count for failure to appear. The
amended complaint charged one count of assault and bat-
tery and four counts of failure to appear. Because the State
                                  - 985 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. WILLIAMS
                            Cite as 313 Neb. 981

now sought to impose a jail sentence, the court appointed a
public defender.
   On September 22, 2021, Williams appeared before the
court. The court ordered Williams detained and set bond,
and a fifth trial date was set for October 20. On September
24, Williams filed a motion for discovery. On October 13,
the State moved to continue the trial, and the matter was set
for trial on November 10. On November 10, a seventh trial
date was set for December 13 at the State’s request and over
Williams’ objection.
               Motion for Absolute Discharge
   On November 11, 2021, Williams moved for an absolute
discharge of the assault and battery charge on statutory speedy
trial grounds. 6 At a hearing on the motion, the judicial admin-
istrator for Lancaster County Court testified for the State.
Relevant to this appeal, the judicial administrator testified
that the court had a system of taking telephonic messages by
writing messages on a “purple half sheet of paper,” initial-
ing it, and placing it on the court file. The State introduced
a copy of a telephone message sheet that was attached to
Williams’ file on November 4. The copy indicated a triangle
in the space designated for the name of the caller. The judicial
administrator testified that a triangle is used to indicate the
defendant and that thus, the message indicated that Williams
called the court before his initial scheduled court appearance
and asked for a continuance. She then testified that message
sheets are not “imaged in,” and do not become part of a certi-
fied court file, and that she did not create this message sheet
or speak with Williams on November 4. The State offered
the copy of the telephonic message, and Williams objected on
the grounds of hearsay, authentication, and lack of foundation.
Over Williams’ objections, the court received the copy of the
telephonic message into evidence as exhibit 2.
6
    See §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208.
                                  - 986 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     313 Nebraska Reports
                           STATE V. WILLIAMS
                            Cite as 313 Neb. 981

   The county court found that the period from November
4, 2020, through April 12, 2021, was excludable under
§ 29-1207(4)(b) and (d) because Williams requested the initial
November 4, 2020, appearance to be continued 7 and, due to his
failure to appear on November 20, 8 trial was not to begin in the
matter until April 12, 2021. The county court also found that
the period from April 12 through June 8 was excludable for
good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f), due to Williams’ behavior
“making it impossible for the trial to go forward” on April 12.
Williams timely appealed from the county court’s order over-
ruling his motion to the district court.
                  Appeal to District Court
   On appeal to the district court, Williams raised two pri-
mary arguments relevant to this appeal. First, he argued that
the period between November 4, 2020, and April 12, 2021,
was not excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) or (d) because the
UC&C was void and, thus, an ineffective summons. Second,
Williams argued that the period from April 12 through June
8 was not excludable because no good cause existed under
§ 29-1207(4)(f). Williams asserted that the record showed he
was prepared to proceed with the trial on April 12. Williams
contended that instead of continuing the matter, the county
court could have ordered a sheriff’s deputy to seize Williams’
cellular telephone and proceeded with the trial as scheduled or
found Williams in contempt.
   The district court rejected Williams’ arguments. It con-
cluded that the period from November 4, 2020, through April
12, 2021, was excludable under § 29-1207(4)(b) because
Williams requested an indefinite continuance on November 4
and that consequently, his failure to appear on November 12
had no bearing under § 29-1207(4). The court also concluded
that good cause existed to exclude the period from April
7
    See § 29-1207(4)(b).
8
    See § 29-1207(4)(d).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. WILLIAMS
                              Cite as 313 Neb. 981

12 to June 8, 2021, because Williams’ conduct prevented the
trial from occurring, since “[a] trial cannot proceed if a party
refuses to listen to the judge’s directions.” Williams appeals.

                 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Williams assigns the district court erred in (1) affirming the
county court’s denial of his motion for absolute discharge and
(2) finding no error in the county court’s receipt of exhibit 2,
the copy of the telephonic message, into evidence.

                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a
factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. 9 Statutory interpretation presents a question
of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the
lower court. 10

                           ANALYSIS
   [2] On appeal, Williams challenges only the excludability
under § 29-1207(4) of the time periods from November 4,
2020, through April 12, 2021, and April 12 through June 8.
Williams conceded at oral argument that reversal was war-
ranted only if we concluded that both periods were chargeable
to the State. Because we conclude that good cause existed to
exclude the period from April 12 through June 8, we do not
address Williams’ other arguments or his second assignment of
error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analy-
sis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy
before it. 11
 9
     State v. Coomes, 309 Neb. 749, 962 N.W.2d 510 (2021).
10
     132 Ventures v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, ante p. 45, 982 N.W.2d 778
     (2022).
11
     State v. Yzeta, ante p. 202, 983 N.W.2d 124 (2023).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. WILLIAMS
                              Cite as 313 Neb. 981

   [3-5] It is well-established that our speedy trial statutes,
§§ 29-1207 and 29-1208, apply to prosecutions on complaint
and of city ordinance violations. 12 If a defendant is not brought
to trial by the 6-month speedy trial deadline, as extended by
any excluded periods, he or she is entitled to absolute dis-
charge from the offense charged and for any other offense
required by law to be joined with that offense. 13 To calculate
the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must exclude the
day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, back up
1 day, and then add any time excluded under § 29-1207(4) to
determine the last day the defendant can be tried. 14 In this case,
the complaint was filed on October 12, 2020, so absent any
excludable time, the State had until April 12, 2021, to bring
Williams to trial.
   [6] Section 29-1207(4)(f) provides that “[o]ther periods
of delay not specifically enumerated” in the statute shall be
excluded in the speedy trial computation, “but only if the
court finds that they are for good cause.” We have held that
“good cause,” for purposes of § 29-1207(4)(f), means a sub-
stantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse. 15 We have
also recognized that good cause is something that must be
substantial but is also a factual question dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. 16
   [7-9] When a trial court relies on § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude
time from the speedy trial calculation, a general finding
12
     See, State v. Lebeau, 280 Neb. 238, 784 N.W.2d 921 (2010); State v.
     Stevens, 189 Neb. 487, 203 N.W.2d 499 (1973). See, also, State v. Webb,
     311 Neb. 694, 974 N.W.2d 317 (2022); State v. Chapman, 307 Neb. 443,
     949 N.W.2d 490 (2020).
13
     State v. Space, 312 Neb. 456, 980 N.W.2d 1 (2022). See § 29-1208.
14
     State v. Nelson, ante p. 464, 984 N.W.2d 620 (2023).
15
     State v. Coomes, supra note 9. See, State v. Moody, 311 Neb. 143, 970
     N.W.2d 770 (2022); State v. Brown, 310 Neb. 224, 964 N.W.2d 682
     (2021).
16
     See State v. Coomes, supra note 9.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. WILLIAMS
                             Cite as 313 Neb. 981

of “good cause” will not suffice. 17 Instead, the court must
make specific findings as to the good cause which resulted
in the delay. 18 A trial court’s good cause findings must be
supported by evidence in the record, and the State bears the
burden of establishing facts showing that good cause existed. 19
An appellate court will give deference to such factual find-
ings unless they are clearly erroneous. 20 Under § 29-1207, a
continuance by the court’s own motion, or judicial delay, does
not toll the speedy trial statute absent a showing by the State
of good cause. 21
   The county court found that good cause existed to exclude
the period from April 12 to June 8, 2021, based on Williams’
conduct and refusal to stop recording the proceeding with his
phone. It is somewhat puzzling that the State did not offer the
transcript of the April 12, 2021, proceeding, or at least join in
the offer made by Williams. However, to meet its burden of
proving excludable time under § 29-1207(4), the State is enti-
tled to rely on evidence offered by the defendant and received
by the court. 22 We agree with the district court that this finding
was not clearly erroneous.
   Although Williams was entitled to a trial, he was not enti-
tled to a trial in the manner of his choosing. Trials have rules.
For the effectual administration of justice and the prompt
disposition of judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court may
promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts. 23
Likewise, each county court may recommend local rules
17
     See id.
18
     Id.
19
     Id.
20
     Id.
21
     State v. Moody, supra note 15. See State v. Chase, 310 Neb. 160, 964
     N.W.2d 254 (2021).
22
     State v. Coomes, supra note 9.
23
     Neb. Const. art V, § 25.
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      313 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. WILLIAMS
                             Cite as 313 Neb. 981

for approval by the Supreme Court. 24 The Lancaster County
Court permits recording in the courtroom only under particu-
lar conditions for the purpose of gathering and disseminating
news to the public. 25 Williams has not argued, nor is any
evidence found in the record, that he satisfied the enumerated
conditions to record the April 12, 2021, proceeding.
   [10] Moreover, in Nebraska, all persons entering a county
court courtroom while court is in session shall conduct them-
selves in a quiet and orderly manner. 26 Williams acknowl-
edged before the county court that the court “has vast pow-
ers to control its courtroom.” Yet, he argues that instead of
continuing the matter, the county court should have exercised
its authority by “confiscat[ing his] phone for the duration
of the trial” or holding him in contempt. 27 But it is within
the inherent power of the court, not at Williams’ discretion,
to choose how the court exercises its authority to control
its courtroom. 28
   Williams conceded before the county court that had he
been held in contempt, the resulting period of delay would
be excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a) as an “other proceeding[]
concerning the defendant.” Compared with the court’s option
to hold Williams in contempt, we view the county court’s deci-
sion to continue the matter as one of leniency. We decline to
hold that the county court misused its authority in affording
leniency to Williams.
24
     See Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1448 (rev. 2022).
25
     See Rules for Expanded Media Coverage in Neb. Trial Cts: Third Jud.
     Dist. Cty. Ct. (rev. 2014).
26
     Neb. Ct. R. § 6-1403 (rev. 2010).
27
     Brief for appellant at 29.
28
     See, Ecker v. E & A Consulting Group, 302 Neb. 578, 924 N.W.2d 671
     (2019); Kovarik v. County of Banner, 192 Neb. 816, 224 N.W.2d 761
     (1975); Pressey v. State, 173 Neb. 652, 114 N.W.2d 518 (1962); In re
     Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120 (1909).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  313 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. WILLIAMS
                        Cite as 313 Neb. 981

   Still, the court’s leniency has limits. It was Williams’ dis-
orderly conduct and failure to comply with court rules that
impeded the business of the court. The county court was
not clearly erroneous in finding that there was a substantial
reason that afforded a legal excuse to exclude the resulting
period of delay.
                       CONCLUSION
   The county court’s finding that good cause existed to
exclude the period from April 12 through June 8, 2021, was
not clearly erroneous. In light of Williams’ concession that
every day from June 8 through the filing of his motion to dis-
charge was excluded, the time to bring Williams to trial has not
passed. Accordingly, the district court did not err in affirming
the county court’s overruling of Williams’ motion for abso-
lute discharge.
                                                    Affirmed.