Court Opinion

ID: 9906153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 05:05:11.15106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:07.573964
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     November 30, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362238
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
MUHAMMED BALDEH,                                                     LC No. 2019-271343-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (CSC-I committed
by an individual 17 years of age or older against an individual less than 13 years of age). Defendant
was sentenced to consecutive terms of 25 to 60 years’ imprisonment for each of the CSC-I
convictions. We affirm defendant’s convictions but vacate his sentences and remand to the trial
court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        This case is about the sexual assaults of HG and NG that took place in 2012. At the time
of the assaults HG was eight years old, NG was seven years old, and defendant was 21 years old.
At trial, the first victim, HG, stated that defendant often babysat the children while their mother
was at work. On one such occasion, HG explained that defendant attempted to engage in fellatio
with her, but she resisted. At another time, HG stated that defendant made her perform fellatio on
him. She did not inform anyone of the incidents because defendant threatened to “to do this or do
that,” although she could not recall what “that” was.

        The second victim, NG, testified that defendant also engaged in fellatio with her. In
addition, NG witnessed defendant assault HG. Like HG, NG initially did not report the incidents
but informed her mother after defendant kicked her. Their mother phoned the police and witnessed
defendant fleeing. The primary investigator testified that she was unable to locate defendant after
the incident and reported his flight to the Fugitive Apprehension Team. Defendant eventually was
apprehended out-of-state in 2019, at which time criminal proceedings were initiated.

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       The jury convicted defendant as noted above. This appeal followed.

                            II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       Defendant first contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support his
two convictions of CSC-I. We disagree.

                                 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

          “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his or her conviction.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 57; 862 NW2d 446 (2014).
“In analyzing these sufficiency claims, this Court must review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Powell, 278
Mich App 318, 320; 750 NW2d 607 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standard
of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make
credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614
NW2d 78 (2000).

                                   B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       There was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions of two counts of CSC-I.

       Defendant argues that the guilty verdicts of two counts of CSC-I should be vacated, and
the charges against him dismissed with prejudice because the prosecution did not prove essential
elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court recently reiterated the law
regarding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:

       In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence—
       whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and
       determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
       the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury, and not an appellate
       court, observes the witnesses and listens to their testimony; therefore, an appellate
       court must not interfere with the jury’s role in assessing the weight of the evidence
       and the credibility of the witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
       inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
       elements of a crime. The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of
       innocence; it need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever
       contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant. All conflicts in the evidence
       must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. [People v Johnson, 340 Mich App
       531, 548; 986 NW2d 672 (2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

         As established above, defendant was convicted of two counts of CSC-I. The statute
proscribing CSC-I, in relevant part, states: “A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and . . . [t]hat other
person is under 13 years of age.” MCL 750.520b(1)(a). Furthermore, the statute states that CSC-
I is a felony punishable, “[f]or a violation that is committed by an individual 17 years of age or

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older against an individual less than 13 years of age by imprisonment for life or any term of years,
but not less than 25 years.” MCL 750.520b(2)(b).

        “The elements of CSC-I in this case are: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration,
(2) with a person under 13 years of age.” People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 106; 854 NW2d
531 (2014).1 “ ‘Sexual penetration’ means ‘sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal
intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object
into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body . . . .’ ” Id., quoting MCL 750.520a(r)
(ellipses in Duenaz). This Court defined fellatio as “ ‘oral stimulation of the penis.’ ” People v
Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 677; 780 NW2d 321 (2009), quoting Random House Webster’s
College Dictionary (2d ed), p 478. Here, the parties stipulated that HG and NG were under the
age of 13, and defendant was over the age of 17 at the time of the assaults, satisfying the statutory
age requirements. Defendant argues that because the prosecution relied solely on the victims’
testimony, it failed to meet its burden of proof and provided insufficient evidence that the sexual
penetrations, in the form of fellatio, took place.

         The victims testified at trial that on multiple occasions defendant engaged in fellatio with
them, an essential element of the crime of which defendant was convicted. Defendant contends
that the prosecution provided no scientific or medical evidence of these assaults, and proof of
fellatio was established solely by the victims’ testimony. Although “[d]efendant correctly notes
that there was no forensic evidence corroborating the victims’ testimony . . . it has long been settled
that a complainant’s testimony regarding a defendant’s commission of sexual acts is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for CSC-I[.]” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 713-714; 873
NW2d 855 (2015). See also MCL 750.520h (“The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated
in prosecutions under [MCL 750.520b to MCL 750.520g.]”). Consequently, the testimony of HG
and NG regarding the assaults is sufficient, even without corroboration, as evidence for a jury to
find the fellatio took place.

        Defendant further asserts that HG gave contradictory testimony about details surrounding
the assault, implying reasonable doubt may be inferred on the basis of this contradiction. Yet, this
Court has found that contradictions in testimony alone do not render evidence insufficient. Indeed:

               The substance of defendant’s argument is that there was conflicting
       evidence presented concerning his guilt. However, the question is not whether
       there was conflicting evidence, but rather whether there was evidence that the jury,
       sitting as the trier of fact, could choose to believe and, if it did so believe that
       evidence, that the evidence would justify convicting defendant . . . . If the jury
       chose to believe the victim’s testimony, they would be justified in convicting
       defendant of [CSC-I]. [People v Smith, 205 Mich App 69, 71; 517 NW2d 255
       (1994), aff’d sub nom People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349; 537 NW2d 857 (1995),
       amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995).]

1
  In addition, the 25-year mandatory minimum applies if the defendant was “17 years of age or
older” at the time of the offense. MCL 750.520b(2)(b). Defendant stipulated at trial that he
satisfied this age requirement.

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         We must defer to the jury’s determination of witness veracity and credibility. Id. Even if
defendant identified a true inconsistency in HG’s testimony, the jury still was permitted to believe
her when she testified that defendant made her perform fellatio on him. Id. Moreover, HG
explained the apparent contradictions in her testimony by stating that the abuse occurred on
multiple occasions. Consequently, the jury had reason to believe HG’s testimony was not
inconsistent, but instead, simply pertained to two separate incidents. On appeal, we must presume
the jury found HG’s statements throughout the trial, and those of her sister NG, were materially
consistent with their prior accounts of the assaults and truthful to the extent they established
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. As a result, the jury could find, on the basis of
this testimony, defendant engaged in fellatio with the victims when they were under the age of 13
and he was over the age of 17.

        Additionally, defendant’s argument that the jury’s verdict relied solely on the victims’
testimony is incorrect. Relevantly, evidence was introduced at trial that defendant fled when the
victims’ mother called the police, and he eventually was apprehended out of state. The prosecution
drew the jury’s attention to this fact in closing argument, informing the jury that it could use
defendant’s flight as proof of consciousness of guilt. Indeed, “[e]vidence of flight is admissible to
support an inference of ‘consciousness of guilt’ and the term ‘flight’ includes such actions as
fleeing the scene of the crime.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 226; 749 NW2d 272 (2008)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such evidence is probative because it may indicate
consciousness of guilt, although evidence of flight by itself is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”
People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995). It is reasonable to conclude that
the jury considered this evidence in its determination of guilt.

        In sum, defendant has advocated for this Court to vacate his convictions because the jury
should have disbelieved the victims. Deciding in the manner suggested by defendant would cause
us to overlook how the jury weighed the evidence presented to it. This Court has clearly stated:

               Juries, not appellate courts, see and hear witnesses and are in a much better
       position to decide the weight and credibility to be given to their testimony. Where
       sufficient evidence exists, which may be believed by the jury, to sustain a verdict
       of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the decision of the jury should not be disturbed
       by an appellate court. [Bailey, 310 Mich App at 714 (quotation marks and citations
       omitted).]

        As a result, the victims’ testimony, standing alone, was sufficient evidence of fellatio, and
any contradictions in the testimony are not fatal to its sufficiency. Further, defendant’s flight after
being accused of the crime was additional evidence of guilt, which the jury could have considered,
and likely did so. See Unger, 278 Mich App at 226. In sum, the jury, as trier of fact, considered
and weighed all of the evidence, found that the witnesses and their testimony were credible, and
consequently delivered two guilty verdicts. Because there was legally sufficient evidence to
sustain his convictions, defendant neither is entitled to have his convictions vacated nor to have
the charges dismissed with prejudice.

                                 III. IMPROPER SENTENCING

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        Defendant next argues that because the trial court made no findings, nor was there evidence
on the record, that the two penetrations were part of the same criminal transaction, it did not set
forth sufficient grounds to justify its imposition of consecutive sentences. We agree in part.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “[T]he decision to impose a consecutive sentence when not mandated by statute is
reviewable for an abuse of discretion.” People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 664; 897 NW2d
195 (2016). In defining “abuse of discretion,” our Supreme Court has stated:

       At its core, an abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be
       circumstances in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will
       be more than one reasonable and principled outcome. When the trial court selects
       one of these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and,
       thus, it is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court’s judgment. An
       abuse of discretion occurs, however, when the trial court chooses an outcome
       falling outside this principled range of outcomes. [People v Babcock, 469 Mich
       247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003) (citations omitted).]

       “[T]he standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion articulated
in Babcock [is] the appropriate vehicle by which to review a sentencing court’s discretionary
decision to impose consecutive sentences[.]” Norfleet, 317 Mich App at 664.

                                   B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       The trial court abused its discretion because it lacked the statutory authority to impose
consecutive sentences without stating a sufficient justification.

        Defendant argues that because the trial court made no findings, nor was there evidence on
the record that the two penetrations were part of the same criminal transaction, it did not set forth
sufficient grounds to justify its imposition of consecutive sentences. “In Michigan, concurrent
sentencing is the norm, and a consecutive sentence may be imposed only if specifically authorized
by statute.” People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 401; 819 NW2d 55 (2012) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Under the statute which defendant was convicted, the trial court “may order a
term of imprisonment imposed under this section to be served consecutively to any term of
imprisonment imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same transaction.” MCL
750.520b(3).

        As established above, the trial court invoked its statutory discretion and imposed
consecutive sentences. “The statutory language clearly limits this authority to cases in which the
multiple offenses arose from the ‘same transaction,’ and the relevant caselaw is consistent with
that legislative determination.” Bailey, 310 Mich App at 723. In Ryan, 295 Mich App at 393, this
Court found that two CSC-I assaults occurred in the same transaction when the defendant
penetrated the victim sequentially. The sequential nature of the assaults in Ryan is significant
because, as this Court has found in a subsequent case, “[f]or multiple penetrations to be considered
as part of the same transaction, they must be a part of a ‘continuous time sequence,’ not merely
part of a continuous course of conduct.” Bailey, 310 Mich App at 725 (citation omitted). “[A]n

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ongoing course of sexually abusive conduct involving episodes of assault does not in and of itself
render the crimes part of the same transaction.” Id.

        At sentencing, defendant explicitly requested concurrent terms; the prosecution did not
request consecutive sentences. The trial court cited MCL 750.520b(3), invoked its discretion to
sentence consecutively, and justified this discretion by referring to the age of the victims and the
significant traumatic impact of the assaults.

        Defendant was convicted of two counts of CSC-I involving two victims, HG and NG,
occurring in 2012. While the two offenses took place over the same time frame, this Court has
said that temporal overlap alone is insufficient to find the assaults occurred during the same
transaction as necessitated by statute. Bailey, 310 Mich App at 725-726. HG and NG were
assaulted separately on separate occasions, at least with respect to the assaults underlying the
respective convictions. While the record certainly indicates that the assaults arose from an ongoing
course of conduct, there was, however, no judicial finding that the assaults against the two victims
occurred within a continuous time sequence.

       In its brief, the prosecution argues that NG’s witnessing of HG’s assault may be construed
as being part of the same transaction. This argument lacks merit. In People v Brown, 495 Mich
962, 963 (2014), our Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s imposition of seven consecutive
sentences for CSC-I because, while the assaults occurred over 10 days, only “three sexual
penetrations that resulted in those convictions ar[ose] from the same transaction. That is, the three
sexual penetrations grew out of a continuous time sequence and had a connective relationship that
was more than incidental.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

        At most, the trial court in Brown was permitted to sentence the defendant to serve
consecutive terms for only three of the CSC-I convictions. It may be inferred from the ruling in
Brown that the penetrations must occur during a continuous time sequence to be considered as part
of the same criminal transaction under the statute. There is no judicial finding that this occurred
in the instant case.

         We decline to resolve whether the assaults against HG and NG arose from the same
transaction. At issue is whether the trial court erred by abusing its discretion under the statute and
imposing consecutive sentences on defendant. Based on this Court’s precedent, the trial court did.
The trial court invoked its discretion by referencing the age and trauma suffered by the victims;
however, this information did not grant the trial court statutory authority to impose consecutive
sentences. See id. To warrant consecutive sentences, the trial court was required to find that the
two CSC-I convictions arose from the same transaction under MCL 750.520b(3). The trial court,
in failing to make the necessary finding, chose “an outcome falling outside this principled range
of outcomes” granted to it by statute, and abused its discretion. Babcock, 469 Mich at 269. We
therefore vacate defendant’s sentences and remand to the trial court to either articulate facts
sufficient to justify consecutive sentences under MCL 750.520b(3), or resentence defendant to
concurrent terms.

                                        IV. CONCLUSION

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        For the reasons stated above, we affirm defendant’s convictions, vacate his sentences, and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                            /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                            /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                            /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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