Court Opinion

ID: 9725971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:25:08.893007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:22.236745
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in not including personal goodwill in the valuation of Earl’s dental practice. The result reached by my colleagues appears to hinge on the fact that Jodi waived maintenance. However, I believe that including personal goodwill in the valuation of the dental practice is contrary to the language expressed by our supreme court in Zells, 143 Ill. 2d at 255-56. In this case, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement in which both waived maintenance. In waiving maintenance, Jodi reserved the right to seek a disproportionate share of the assets. Consequently, the trial court considered Jodi’s decision to waive maintenance as a factor in awarding her 67% of the marital assets. Another factor the court considered in awarding Jodi a higher percentage of the assets was the future income-generating ability of each spouse. For this reason, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that Earl’s income-generating ability relative to a maintenance award was not a consideration before the trial court. Not only was it a consideration, it was one of the factors the court relied upon in awarding Jodi a disproportionate share of the assets. More important in terms of the outcome of this case, however, is the issue of child support. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Earl agreed to pay $5,400 per month until Ashley attained majority or graduated high school; $4,062.50 thereafter until Justin attained majority or graduated high school; and $3,250 per month thereafter until Jordan attained majority or graduated high school. As the majority states, child support in this case was based on Earl’s income from the dental practice. Because personal goodwill represents the ability to acquire future income (Trull, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 40), Zells recognized that the goodwill value of a business is necessarily reflected in maintenance and support awards. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d at 256. For this reason, to figure goodwill as a divisible marital asset and as a factor in examining income potential would be to double count and to reach an erroneous valuation. Zells, 143 Ill. 2d at 256. Here, it is clear that the personal goodwill value of Earl’s dental practice was reflected in the support award. Consequently, “[a]ny additional consideration of goodwill value is duplicative and improper.” Zells, 143 Ill. 2d at 256. Curiously, the majority in this case refuses to consider child support relative to the issue of goodwill. Instead, it claims that Zells does not apply when a maintenance award has been waived. The language in Zells, however, does not support the majority’s distinction. If our supreme court had intended to limit the consideration of personal goodwill only to cases involving an award of maintenance, it easily could have done so. Moreover, in focusing exclusively on the issues of maintenance and Jodi’s decision to waive it, the majority ignores what Jodi did, in fact, receive. As mentioned previously, the record is clear that Jodi received a disproportionate amount of the marital property as a result of Earl’s future income-generating ability and as a result of her decision to waive maintenance. In addition, Jodi received child support based on Earl’s future income-generating ability. The fact that Jodi received 67% of the assets offsets a maintenance award. Consequently, the simple fact that Jodi waived maintenance in this case should not be dispositive of the issue of goodwill. In sum, I believe that the majority’s decision to include personal goodwill in the valuation of the dental practice results in the very double counting prohibited in Zells. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court on this issue.