Court Opinion

ID: 9790220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:06.968764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:40.282815
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in the result). I concur in the result. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, the Withers, did not set forth any “points relied upon in the argument,” Rule 9(h), Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, nor set forth any genuine issues of material fact in order to reverse the summary judgment. This case cannot be heard on the merits. Withers claim that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment but the Withers were entitled to summary judgment. San Juan County claims it was immune to liability for damages under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, § 41-4-1, et seq., N.M.S.A. 1978, and Withers did not reply. San Juan County would be entitled to summary judgment under this Act, but the County did not raise the issue in the trial court. The Douglass defendants stated one sentence in a Memorandum Brief: Further, the County has immunity under the provisions of § 42-11-1 NMSA, 1979 Supp. This statute grants immunity to the State and its political subdivisions “from and may not be named a defendant in any suit, action, case or legal proceeding involving a claim of title to or interest in real property except as specifically authorized by law.” Laws 1979, ch. 110, § 1. This issue was abandoned in the appeal. These issues would be interesting to resolve but they shall have to await another lawsuit of this nature. The briefs filed in this Court are similar to those filed in the trial court. An independent view of this case is necessary. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS The chronology of events were as follows: 1. On April 18, 1968, by Escrow Agreement, Douglass purchased from Wilkes, the real estate that adjoins the land owned by San Juan County. 2. On July 12, 1977, Douglass entered into a Revocable Trust Agreement with the Seventh Day Adventist Association of Colorado. During Douglass’ lifetime, the Trust Agreement provided that the Trustee shall exercise no rights or duties with respect to the trust estate, and the Trustee shall hold title only to the real estate, but Douglass shall have all rights of possession. This Revocable Trust Agreement was not filed of record in San Juan County. Neither do I find any conveyance from Douglass to the Trustee. An endorsement to the trust agreement states: Trustee hereby acknowledges that on the 22nd day of May, 1977, it received the following assets which were made a part of the corpus of said Trust Agreement: Real estate property in the County of San Juan, New Mexico, described as to wit: [Description followed.] Although the Douglass’ affidavit states “that thereafter, the Affiant and her husband conveyed certain property in the attached Escrow Agreement and in the attached deed,” the attached deed was one from the Trustee to Douglass dated May 14, 1979, but recorded October 18, 1979. As far as the record shows, Douglass’ interest in the Escrow Agreement was never conveyed to the Trustee. It remained in Douglass. 3. Taxes for the year 1977 were assessed in names of Wilkes, Seventh Day Adventist, Attn. Douglass and paid November 29,1978 and May 7, 1979. 4. On Sunday, May 6, 1979, San Juan County published a Notice in the Farming-ton Daily Times, Farmington, New Mexico, in which it asked for sealed bids for its property to be publicly opened on May 11, 1979. The Notice stated: ****** 6. The Board of County Commissioners of San Juan County reserves the right to reject any and/or all bids without incurring legal liability. ****** 8. If the successful bid on any parcel to be sold is made by a bidder other than the owner or owners of land adjacent to such parcel and such owner or owners have also submitted a bid on the parcel, the Board of County Commissioners reserves the right to allow such adjacent and adjoining land owner or owners to meet the successful bid and to purchase the parcel if the successful bid is so met, if said adjoining land owner meets said bid before noon May 14, 1979, subject to all the requirements of the original bid. It is the responsibility of the adjoining land owner to determine whether he was the prevailing bidder and, if not, to meet the high bid before noon May 14, 1979. [Emphasis added.] 5.At the bid opening held in the County Commissioners’ room on Friday, May 11, 1979, the bids were opened and read aloud. Withers made the highest bid of 2.9 cents per square foot which amounted to $1,263.24. The only one who made any attempt to match their bid was Douglass. There was no evidence that Douglass met the bid made by Withers. An administrative assistant of the county manager in charge of this administrative bidding and bid award stated by affidavit to those present: After reading the bids, and in regard to Mr. Douglas's [sic] bid, I commented that I did not think the County would make the deed out in another person’s name as was requested on the bid sheet, that it would be the Douglas’s [sic] business to make any assignments or transfers after it was deeded to them by the County, if they chose to meet the high bid of Mr. Withers. I do not recall that Mr. Withers made any comment at the bid opening. However he came back to my office and checked the maps for parcel # 55 and then went to the clerk’s office to check the title. Mr. Withers then protested the bid of Mr. Douglas’s [sic]. [Emphasis added.] 6. At the meeting of the County Commissioners on June 5, 1979, Mr. Reed Frost, attorney for Douglass said “the property could be returned to Mr. and Mrs. Douglass.” 7. On June 7, 1979, a quit claim deed was executed by San Juan County to Douglass and filed of record. 8. In Withers’ Brief-In-Chief, Withers states: Plaintiffs submitted the highest bid. Before the deadline, Defendants Douglass submitted a matching bid .... The County nevertheless awarded the parcel to the Defendants Douglass. [Emphasis added.] Withers admitted that Douglass submitted a matching bid. This admission was sufficient to supply the missing link in the bidding award made. At the time it was entered, Douglass was not entitled to summary judgment. Inadvertently, Douglass omitted producing evidence of compliance with the San Juan County Notice to Bidders. Inasmuch as the error was cured on appeal, a reversal on this issue would be purposeless. A. San Juan County was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. In its notice, San Juan County reserved the right to reject Withers’ bid without incurring legal liability. Withers had read this Notice. The Notice alerted him to the bidding and the award. The Commissioners wanted to avoid any liability growing out of this public event. In the absence of any statutory or constitutional violations, they have the right to protect themselves against liability for damages. Summary judgment was properly granted San Juan County. B. Douglass was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Withers’ Brief-In-Chief states: Defendants Douglass had been the owners of the adjacent [land] to the parcel sold, but on October 21, 1977, they deeded that property to the Seventh-Day Adventist Association of Colorado (hereinafter referred to as the Church). {Withers’ Affidavit attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and deed attached hereto. . . . [Emphasis added.] Withers’ affidavit did not have any deed attached to it. Its motion for summary judgment did have attached to it a Memorandum Brief. Attached to the Brief was a deed from Seventh Day Adventist to Douglass. Inasmuch as Withers admits that Douglass was the owner of the adjacent land, any discussion of the meaning of “owner” is superfluous. Douglass was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Withers was not. Costs of appeal should be assessed against Withers.