Court Opinion

ID: 9942362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 21:09:57.14627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:59.607262
License: Public Domain

Matter of Huggins
               2023 NY Slip Op 34620(U)
                   December 29, 2023
            Surrogate's Court, Bronx County
      Docket Number: File No. 2018-2367/B and C
             Judge: Nelida Malave-Gonzalez
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
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 This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
                       publication.
                       SURROGATE'S COURT, BRONX COUNTY

                                   December 29 , 2023

                   ESTATE OF WALTER ISSAC HUGGINS, Deceased
                           File No.: 2018-2367/B and C

                     Currently pending in this estate is a proceeding commenced

        by one of the decedent's sons (Emmanuel) to be appointed administrator

        (File No. 2018-2367/B) and a cross-petition (File No. 2018-2367/C) filed

        by another son (Walter Jr.), also seeking appointment as administrator. In

        addition, Walter Jr. filed objections to Emmanuel's application, despite

        having initially signed a waiver and consent.    Emmanuel now moves to

        strike Water Jr.'s cross-petition as well as his objections arguing there is

        no basis for the cross petition and given the filed waiver and consent, the

        objections should not have been taken in. Walter cross-moves seeking to

        set aside his previously executed and filed waiver and consent to

        Emmanuel's application so that he may pursue his objections to that

        petition and his cross-petition seeking to be appointed administrator.

                     The decedent died on October 2, 2018 survived by a spouse

        and four children. A decree appointing the spouse as administrator was

        entered on March 30, 2019 directing that letters would issue to her upon

        her filing a bond in the penal sum of $200,000. No bond was filed and

        letters never issued to the spouse.

                     Emmanuel's petition was filed on September 10, 2020 and

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        listed the spouse as having post-deceased. It also included documents

        indicating that Emmanuel had been appointed personal representative of

        the spouse's estate in South Carolina. He also filed waivers and consents

        from all of the decedent's other children, including Walter Jr. who signed

        his waiver and consent on July 8, 2020 which was filed with the court on

        September 10, 2020.      However, there appear to have been additional

        clerical requirements for the issuance of a decree to Emmanuel that may

        not have been conveyed to his attorney.

                      On December 1, 2021 Walter Jr., proceeding pro se, filed

        objections to Emmanuel's petition despite his filed waiver and consent to

        Emmanuel's application.      However, the proper procedural remedy for

        Walter Jr. was to seek withdrawal of the filed waiver and consent and then

        leave to file objections. Notwithstanding, Walter Jr. retained counsel who

        filed a cross-petition on September 16, 2022 and attempted to file

        objections in proper form that were not accepted for filing at that time.

        Walter's initial cross petition erroneously depicted certain additional

        individuals as distributees who were not named in Emmanuel's petition,

        causing delays in processing both applications. Those individuals were

        ultimately determined to be distributees of the post-deceased spouse from

        a prior marriage and not distributees of this estate.

                      Both sets of objections filed by Walter Jr. essentially allege

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        that Emmanuel is not qualified to serve as administrator of this estate as a

        result of the long delay in attempting to secure his appointment as

        administrator. He avers that the alleged deficiencies in Emmanuel's filings

        and the long delays in correcting those deficiencies resulted in the estate's

        languishing with no fiduciary. He further alleges that, as a result of this

        delay, assets of the estate may have been lost, misplaced or

        misappropriated and that Emmanuel has failed to secure additional estate

        property located outside of New York. Accordingly, he alleges Emmanuel

        is not qualified to serve as a fiduciary and Walter, Jr. should be appointed.

        Thereafter, the parties unsuccessfully engaged in mediation, and the

        estate remains unadministered.

                      In support of his motion Emmanuel argues that Walter Jr.

        signed a waiver and consent to his application and as he had not

        previously moved to set aside that waiver and consent his initial objections

        were improperly filed. Emmanuel further notes that it was not until the

        cross motion was filed that there was a formal request to withdraw

        Emmanuel's waiver and consent to his proceeding. In order to set aside

        the waiver and consent Walter Jr. has to allege proper grounds to do so.

        Although a decree has not yet entered, a waiver and consent can be

        deemed to be a stipulation which a court will only set it aside if the moving

        party can demonstrate good cause, i.e. fraud, collusion, mistake or some

        other similar ground, and Walter Jr. has not alleged any of these grounds.

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        Emmanuel also avers that a party seeking to set aside a stipulation must

        demonstrate a reasonable probability of success. Walter Jr. has failed to

        show that he will succeed in asserting his objections and the only reason

        he furnishes for seeking to withdraw his consent is his allegation that

        Emmanuel is not qualified to serve as a result of the delay in being

        appointed fiduciary.

                      In opposition to the motion and in support of his cross-

        motion Walter Jr. asserts the same allegations from his objections arguing

        that Emmanuel has failed to timely follow through with his petition and as

        a result of this failure the estate has been mishandled. Walter Jr. argues

        three years have passed since the filing of the original petition in 2020 and

        Emmanuel has not been appointed fiduciary to date, demonstrating he is

        not qualified to serve as fiduciary pursuant to SCPA 707(1 )(d).

                      In opposition to the cross-motion Emmanuel notes that it is

        Walter Jr.'s burden to prove grounds for setting aside his waiver and

        consent and he has not met that burden. Noting that Walter Jr. has not

        alleged any appropriate basis to set aside his waiver nor has he shown

        that he will succeed on the merits of his objection, his cross-motion should

        accordingly be dismissed. Moreover, based on the previously filed waiver

        and consent, the objections and cross-petition should likewise be

        dismissed and Emmanuel's petition granted.

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                      Filing a "waiver and consent" serves as a notice of

        appearance and serves to confer jurisdiction and waiver of the issuance of

        citation thereby functioning as a consent to the relief sought in the

        proceeding (SCPA 401 [4]; Estate of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143 [19711). "In

        this context, and absent any demonstrable consideration or other

        contractual element, the consent is clearly and essentially a stipulation

        made by a party to the proceeding; and it must be treated in accordance

        with the rules governing stipulations in actions generally" (see Estate of

        Frutiger, 29 NY2d at 148 [1971 ]). Courts reviewing requests to withdraw a

        waiver and consent use a different standard based on whether a decree

        has entered (see Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d 143, 149 [19711). Granting

        leave to withdraw a filed waiver and consent is discretionary with the

        Court, and upon a showing of good cause is available in instances of

        fraud, collusion, overreaching, material misrepresentations, misconduct by

        the respondent or newly discovered evidence (see Estate of Knapp, 220

        AD3d 529 [1 st Dept 2023][citations omitted]).

                      At the outset, the Court notes it was error to have taken in

        both the pro se objections and cross-petition filed by Walter Jr. since

        jurisdiction was rendered complete upon the filing of his waiver and

        consent. Emmanuel's counsel correctly notes that there should have been

        a request to set aside that waiver prior to any documents in opposition to

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        Emmanuel's petition being filed. Notwithstanding, the Court addresses the

        contentions contained in Walter Jr.'s motion.

                      Where, as here, the application for leave to withdraw a

        waiver and consent is made prior to the entry of a decree, courts liken the

        waiver and consent to a stipulation, and treat the application accordingly

        (see Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d at 143, 149-150 [19711). Specifically, in

        Frutiger, a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals stated that a

        waiver and consent could be withdrawn prior to the entry of a probate

        decree, even though the movant had "inadvertently, unadvisably or

        improvidently" executed the waiver, provided that it "would be inequitable

        to hold" him to the waiver and "all parties can be restored substantially to

        their former position" (29 NY2d at 150). Nonetheless, although proof of

        "good cause" may be more relaxed prior to the entry of a decree, there

        must still be a demonstration of merit and a reasonable probability of

        success (see Matter of Frutiger, 29 NY2d at 150; Matter of Gunz, NYLJ,

        Jun. 5, 1992, at 29, col 2).

                      Against this backdrop, it is clear there is no basis to set

        aside Walter Jr.'s filed waiver as he fails to demonstrate any of the

        requisite factors, for example, fraud, duress, material misrepresentation,

        overreaching, etc.    Instead, the crux of his argument stems from the

        grounds contained in the objections concerning revocation of letters and

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        petitioner's fitness in serving as fiduciary. While his allegations allege that

        the petitioner has delayed the matter, it is clear that the delays are not

        entirely attributable to Emmanuel's conduct but rather misdirection and

        miscommunication between counsel and the court -- matters that were not

        under Emmanuel's control. The allegations that Emmanuel is unfit to serve

        are all related to a delay in his appointment and not to any actions taken

        or not taken by Emmanuel. The only allegation that perhaps might be

        concerning is that he is alleged to have misappropriated funds. However,

        this is a bare allegation with no supporting evidence and can be

        addressed in an appropriate accounting proceeding and further mitigated

        by requiring Emmanuel to procure a bond. At this time, allowing Walter Jr.

        to withdraw his waiver and consent will only further delay this estate and

        possibly jeopardize the assets that he is concerned about preserving.

                      Accordingly, this decision constitutes the order of the court

        granting Emmanuel's motion striking the filed pro se objections and the

        cross-petition and denying the cross-petition in its entirety. A decree may

        be settled granting letters of administration to Emmanuel upon his filing a

        bond in the penal sum of$200,000.00
                                 _ _ __

                             Settle decree.                  /1                 ~

                                           1J_.
                                             i
                                            HC-t....J.
                                                         ~ - ~ - -:,----+-;•
                                                                     -
                                                           SURROGATE

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