Court Opinion

ID: 9402750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 18:07:22.558469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.373635
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2023-Ohio-1997.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :
       Appellee                                     :   C.A. No. 29602
                                                    :
 v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00490
                                                    :
 RYAN C. JONES                                      :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                    :   Court)
       Appellant                                    :
                                                    :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                        Rendered on June 16, 2023

                                              ...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee

KRISTIN L. ARNOLD, Attorney for Appellant
                                  .............

HUFFMAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Ryan C. Jones appeals from a judgment of conviction

following his guilty plea. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

                               I.       Factual and Procedural Background

        {¶ 2} In February 2022, Jones was indicted for the following offenses: Count I,
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receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle; Count II, failure to comply with an order or

signal of a police officer; Count III, having weapons while under disability; Count IV,

vehicular assault; Count V, receiving stolen property, a firearm; Count VI, aggravated

robbery with a deadly weapon; and Count VII, improper handling of a firearm in a motor

vehicle. Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI each carried a three-year firearm specification under

R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145 and a one-year firearm specification under R.C. 2929.14 and

2941.141.

       {¶ 3} Jones’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 19, 2022. On September

8, 2022, Jones entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to Counts I, II, III,

IV, V, and VII. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss Count VI and

all firearm specifications except for the one-year specification attached to Count II.

       {¶ 4} During the plea hearing, Jones’s counsel indicated to the trial court that there

was an agreement with the State that the trial court would terminate Jones’s post-release

control in an unrelated case, but this was disputed by the State at that time. After a brief

pause in the proceedings and sidebar, Jones’s counsel confirmed that he had been

mistaken, that the termination of post-release control was not part of the plea agreement,

and that Jones would still enter his plea pursuant to the agreement. The trial court

proceeded with the plea colloquy and advised Jones that his post-release control from

the unrelated case could be terminated by the court or that the court could sentence him

for violating his parole.

       {¶ 5} At his disposition hearing, Jones was sentenced to 18 months in prison on

Counts I, IV, V, and VII and to 36 months on Counts II and III. On Count II, Jones was
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sentenced to an additional one year due to the firearm specification. Counts III, IV, V, and

VII were ordered to run concurrently with each other; Counts I and II were also ordered

to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to Counts III, IV, V, and VII.

       {¶ 6} At the plea hearing, the parties had a discussion and sidebar with the court

about whether the plea agreement included the termination of Jones’s post-release

control in another case. They eventually agreed that there was no agreement regarding

the termination of post-release control. The trial court then proceeded to conduct the plea

hearing by asking Jones questions and providing him with information to ensure that

Jones was entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. After doing so, the

trial court accepted Jones’s guilty plea and found him guilty.

       {¶ 7} The trial court sentenced Jones to a total of seven years in prison. Jones filed

a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment.

                                  II.     Assignment of Error

       {¶ 8} Jones’s sole assignment of error is as follows:

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY,

       AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA, AS HE WAS DENIED

       EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

       {¶ 9} Jones argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his

plea because his counsel did not fully inform him of the consequences of his plea. Jones

asserts that, during the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Jones whether he was currently

on community control sanctions, probation, or parole; Jones answered in the affirmative,

as he was on post-release control until 2027 in an unrelated case. According to Jones,
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he and his counsel were initially under the impression that, if Jones pled in this case,

Jones’s existing post-release control in the unrelated case would have been terminated.

During the plea hearing, however, Jones argues that confusion arose as to the terms of

the plea agreement with respect to the termination of Jones’s post-release control.

Ultimately, there was no agreement as to the termination of Jones’s post-release control.

Jones argues his trial counsel then moved forward with the plea proceedings without

specifically discussing with him that his post-release control in the unrelated case would

not be terminated. Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not providing

Jones with an explanation regarding his existing post-release control and, thus, that

Jones did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea.

       {¶ 10} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist.

Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9. A guilty plea waives all appealable

errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the

errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his

or her guilty plea. State v. Frazier, 2d. Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26495 and 26496, 2016-

Ohio-727, ¶ 81.

       {¶ 11} An appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively

demonstrates that a defendant’s plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

State v. Russell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25132, 2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7. “If a defendant’s

guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary, it has been obtained in violation of due process

and is void.” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520 and 24705, 2012-Ohio-

199, ¶ 13, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
                                                                                          -5-

(1969). For a plea to be entered knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the

mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). Id.

       {¶ 12} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires the trial court to address the defendant personally

and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding

of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the

defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions;

(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of

the plea of guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with

judgment and sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he

understands that, by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial,

to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,

and to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which

he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3.

       {¶ 13} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under

the two-pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v.

Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). “Pursuant to those cases, trial

counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable assistance.” State v. Leonard, 2d. Dist. Montgomery No. 27411,

2017-Ohio-8421, ¶ 10, citing Strickland. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective
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standard of reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a

reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been

different.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11. In other words, if a defendant pleads guilty on

the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not “within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” (Citations omitted.) Frazier, 2d

Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26495 and 26496, 2016-Ohio-727, at ¶ 81. Furthermore, “[o]nly if

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not

have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial will the judgment be

reversed.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Huddleson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20653, 2005-

Ohio-4029, ¶ 9, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203

(1985).

       {¶ 14} At the outset, we note that both parties suggested plain error as the

standard of review in this matter. However, plain error is wholly inapplicable to an

ineffective assistance of counsel argument.

       {¶ 15} Jones’s argument focuses on the terms of the plea agreement and whether

he understood that his existing post-release control was not guaranteed to be terminated

under the agreement. Specifically, Jones asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by proceeding with the plea hearing without discussing with him the fact that

termination of his existing post-release control was not a part of the plea agreement. On

this basis, Jones asserts that his plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

We do not agree.

       {¶ 16} The trial court conducted Jones’s plea hearing in accordance with Crim.R.
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11(C). Jones was 29 years old at the time of the hearing, had finished eleventh grade,

and could read. Jones appeared in open court and expressed to the trial court that he

understood the plea form, the constitutional rights that he waived by foregoing a trial, the

nature of the offenses, and the maximum penalties that could be imposed. Jones denied

being under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or medication and having any physical or

mental problems. Jones expressed that he understood that his existing post-release

control could be terminated or that the trial court could sentence him for violating his

parole, as could the parole board. Jones also expressed that he understood that there

was no agreement on sentencing and that he had not been promised that he would

receive community control sanctions and not receive a prison sentence. He understood

that there would be a mandatory period of post-release control in the disposition of this

case and pleading guilty would be a complete admission of guilt.

       {¶ 17} Jones indicated that he understood everything that the prosecutor had said

during the plea hearing, and that the facts stated in the indictment were true. He stated

that he had discussed with his attorney what the prosecutor would have to prove in order

for him to be found guilty and that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney.

Jones stated that he was entering his plea voluntarily.

       {¶ 18} The trial court informed Jones that, by pleading guilty, he waived the right

to appeal the court’s disposition with respect to any of his pretrial motions. The trial court

also inquired of Jones whether he had any emotional or mental issues that were hindering

his ability to understand the nature of the plea proceedings. The trial court asked Jones

whether any competency issues existed that would render his plea less than knowing,
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intelligent, and voluntary, and Jones denied any such concerns. Upon review, we

conclude that Jones knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea.

       {¶ 19} Further, to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient,

Jones was required to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

error, Jones would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Jones

complains that his attorney failed to properly explain that his existing post-release control

would not be terminated pursuant to the plea agreement as counsel originally stated was

his understanding. However, although it was determined at the plea hearing that the

termination of Jones’s existing post-release control was not, in fact, part of the plea

agreement, the trial court advised Jones that the court could terminate his existing post-

release control or could sentence him for violating his parole; Jones acknowledged his

understanding of the same without asking any questions about the plea agreement. The

plea agreement resulted in the dismissal of the most serious charge, aggravated robbery,

and all of the three-year firearm specifications attached to the counts to which Jones

entered guilty pleas. Moreover, when asked if he was satisfied with his trial counsel, Jones

answered in the affirmative. Jones has failed to show that, but for the alleged error of

counsel, he would not have entered into the plea agreement.

       {¶ 20} Jones has not demonstrated that his counsel’s advice was not within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases or that his counsel’s

conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Jones also has not

demonstrated that his counsel’s alleged error was serious enough to create a reasonable

probability that, but for the error, the outcome of Jones’s case would have been different.
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Jones did not even suggest that the outcome of his case would have been different had

he known in advance of the plea hearing that termination of his existing post-release

control was not part of the plea agreement. Thus, we conclude that Jones has not shown

that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore, Jones has not

demonstrated that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty plea.

       {¶ 21} Jones’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

                                        III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 22} Having overruled Jones’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

                                      .............

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.