Court Opinion

ID: 9458936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:05:55.369753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.188007
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
A divergent view of which portions of the evidence produced in this case may be used to support the conviction, compels me to a separate opinion, concurring in affirming the conviction, differing on the basis.
Appellant, Finnerty, was tried on an indictment charging two counts of uttering counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve Notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, and one count of possessing counterfeit notes. Essential to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472 is proof that the accused passed the notes with intent to defraud and knowledge of their falsity.1
The incidents from which this indictment arose occurred in Scranton on December 19, 1970. Within approximately an hour, two counterfeit bills were proffered for payment of purchases at two neighboring retailers, the Mertz Store and the Beverly Shop. It is upon these two transactions that Count I and Count II rest.2
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defendant moved for directed verdicts of acquittal on each count. Proper identification linking Finnerty to the Mertz utterance being lacking, the trial judge granted the directed verdict as to Count I, but denied the request as to the *83Beverly Shop transaction, Count II. The identity of Finnerty as the passer of the bill at the Beverly Shop, and the bogus nature of the bill being conclusively established, the only issue remaining was whether Finnerty knew that the note was false when he attempted to make his Beverly Shop purchase.
After granting Finnerty’s motion for acquittal on Count I, the trial judge unequivocally instructed the jury that they were “not to consider for any purpose any testimony concerning what occurred at the Mertz Store.” Without debating whether the dismissal of Count I required such a total exclusion of that evidence from the case, such evidence was, by his instruction, excluded. Thus, the question that must be answered on this appeal becomes simply, was there a sufficient quantum of evidence remaining at the close of the trial to permit a finding of knowledge,3 looking only to that evidence involving the transaction at the Beverly Store.
The probative evidence from which the inference of knowledge may be drawn is not overwhelming. Nevertheless, the question must be answered in the affirmative and, therefore, the judgment sustained.
In an appeal from a conviction, the findings of a jury are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution in order to sustain the verdict. United States v. DeCavalcante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1273 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Anderson, 409 F.2d 836, 837 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1969). Here the jury found Fin-nerty guilty on Count II, by implication deciding that he had the requisite knowledge. Examining the record with the presumption stated above, limiting the examination to the evidence not removed from the case by the trial judge’s instruction, sufficient evidence can be found to support the jury’s verdict in this case.4
Therefore, I concur in the result reached, and would affirm Finnerty’s conviction.

. E. g., United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768, 770 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1966).

. The third count, charging possession, was dismissed at the close of the trial.

. Knowledge of the counterfeit nature of the money can seldom be proven by direct evidence. Tims, circumstantial evidence is generally relied upon to provide a basis from which knowledge may be inferred. United States v. Carlson, 359 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 879, 87 S.Ct. 161, 17 L.Ed.2d 106 (1966).

. A review of the testimony of defendant, Finnerty, reveals inconsistencies, previous lies, and past convictions for crimes of dishonesty, indicative perhaps, of a proclivity towards false dealings. In these actions and words of the defendant are sufficient bases on which the jury could find that Finnerty knew that the bill he attempted to pass was counterfeit.