Court Opinion

ID: 9686069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:25:03.922422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:14.205773
License: Public Domain

Jansen, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to find that the police do not owe a legal duty to a voluntary passenger in a fleeing vehicle. I believe that this Court in Cooper v Wade, 218 Mich App 649; 554 NW2d 919 (1996), correctly held that police officers may be held liable for negligence in a police pursuit of a passenger in a fleeing vehicle under the standard of care enunciated in Fiser v Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461; 339 NW2d 413 (1983). That is, the police officer must exercise that care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances. Id., p 470.
Further, contrary to the holding of the majority, I believe that our Legislature has imposed a duty on police officers. Specifically, MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) provides:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled laws of 1948.
*24In Fiser, supra, p 469, our Supreme Court stated that if the pursuit of the fleeing driver constituted negligent operation of the police vehicles, then the police officers and the governmental agency would not be immune from tort liability. Also, MCL 257.603; MSA 9.2303 and MCL 257.632; MSA 9.2332 require that emergency vehicles be driven with due regard for the safety of others. See Fiser, supra, p 472. Therefore, the question is not whether police officers owe a duty to passengers in a fleeing vehicle; they do.1 The question, rather, is whether the police acted reasonably under the circumstances presented. The reasonableness of the conduct will normally be an issue of fact for the jury to determine. See Fiser, supra, pp 471-472.
In Fiser, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile collision involving his car and a car fleeing a police vehicle. Our Supreme Court stated:
In determining whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants in this case, we must review the reasonableness of the officers’ actions and the question whether these actions could have been a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, and decide whether all reasonable [persons] would agree with the conclusions. [Id., p 470].
In evaluating the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct, the following factors are to be considered: whether there existed an emergency situation, the speed of the pursuit, the area of the pursuit, weather and road conditions, the presence of pedestrians and *25other traffic, the presence or absence of audible and visible warnings, and the reasons the officers pursued the vehicle. Id., p 472.
Although it is true that a police officer pursuing a fleeing suspect (the driver) does not owe a duty to refrain from a high-speed chase that endangers the safety of the suspect, Jackson v Oliver, 204 Mich App 122; 514 NW2d 195 (1994), this holding is entirely justified by the well-established policy consideration that a wrongdoer cannot assert a cause of action arising out of his or her illegal conduct. See Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 552; 537 NW2d 208 (1995). However, with respect to the voluntary passenger in a vehicle, I would hold that a police officer does owe a duty of care to act in a reasonable manner. Because this case is being decided on the narrow ground of whether the police owed a duty of care to the voluntary passenger in a vehicle being pursued by the police, other issues regarding the reasonableness of the officers’ conduct and proximate cause require further factual development.
Accordingly, I would follow Cooper and Fiser and hold that police officers owe a duty of care to act as reasonably prudent persons in the discharge of their official duties of a like nature under like circumstances. This duty would include owing a duty of care to voluntary passengers in a vehicle being pursued by the officers. Any further narrowing of Fiser can be done only by our Supreme Court, or by the Legislature. I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants and remand for further proceedings.
Neff, J., concurred.

 As noted in Fiser, supra, pp 470-472, this duty is imposed pursuant to the legislative intent expressed in MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), MCL 257.603; MSA 9.2303, and MCL 257.632; MSA 9.2332.