Court Opinion

ID: 9927432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-27 07:15:56.89724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.139233
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed January 25, 2024

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                                 No. 11-22-00270-CR
                                     __________

                     JAVEEONTAE EVANS, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 104th District Court
                             Taylor County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 22533-B

                                    OPINION
      Appellant, Javeeontae Evans, was indicted on two counts: capital murder
(Count One, Paragraph One) and murder (Count One, Paragraph Two), and
aggravated robbery (Count Two). Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each
offense and, after a jury trial, he was acquitted of capital murder but convicted
of murder. Upon Appellant’s election, the trial court assessed his punishment at
eighty-five years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division, and sentenced him accordingly.
        In two issues, Appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred when it
cumulated Appellant’s sentence in this case with the sentence it imposed in a
separate revocation case—the eighty-five year sentence imposed for the murder
conviction was ordered to be served before the ten-year revocation sentence
commenced; and (2) the trial court committed harmful error when it denied
Appellant’s Batson 1 challenge to the rationale offered by the State when it used a
peremptory challenge to strike the only black male juror from the venire panel, in
violation of Appellant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. We affirm.
                                      I. Factual Background
        Certain events occurred before voir dire commenced in this case. First,
Appellant moved to submit a jury questionnaire to the venire panel. A questionnaire
was approved by the trial court and submitted to the panel by the district clerk. Next,
the trial court heard the State’s motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision
that was pending in a separate case (cause no. 21925-B), in which he had previously
been placed on community supervision for the offense of engaging in organized
criminal activity—Appellant had originally received a ten-year sentence that was
suspended and probated for ten years. The State’s motion to revoke contained fifteen
allegations; allegations one and two pertained to the murder and aggravated robbery
offenses for which Appellant was on trial. During the revocation hearing, the trial
court advised the parties that allegations one and two would be considered with the

        1
         For the sake of simplicity, we use the style Batson to encompass both race and gender-based
challenges to the State’s use of its peremptory strikes. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(forbidding race-based peremptory strikes); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (forbidding
gender-based peremptory strikes).
                                                      2
evidence that was presented to the jury in the instant case, and that further evidence
on the other allegations could be considered during jury deliberations.
      After the jury panel was questioned by counsel for the State and Appellant,
Appellant’s trial counsel raised a Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike
to Venireperson No. 19, a black male. As a result, the following discussion occurred
between the trial court and counsel:
            THE COURT: The State peremptorily struck [Juror No.] 19, . . .
      [Juror No. 19] identifies, I believe, as [a] black [male] on his
      questionnaire. And, Ms. Henley, my understanding is that you want to
      make a Batson challenge.
             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do, Your Honor. [Juror No. 19] is the
      only black male juror that is on this panel. He’s been struck by the State
      without a single question asked. I understand that the State will make
      argument based upon the juror questionnaire, but we believe there’s a
      prima facie case presented that, with no questioning, the State has
      struck the only black male juror on this panel. In addition, there was
      one other black female juror who answered similar answers to the juror
      questionnaire as [Juror No. 19], but she was a female. And so we don’t
      believe that the State can rely simply on the juror questionnaire without
      further questioning. We believe that there has been discrimination in
      the selection of [Juror No. 19] as a State’s Strike Number 6.
             ....
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The prima facie case under Batson is,
      first the Defendant has to provide the objection, provide a prima facie
      case of discrimination on the jury panel for a Batson challenge, the State
      then has to respond and give a race neutral reason, and the Court will
      then make a decision.
             THE COURT: Okay, then, Mr. Wilks?
             [THE STATE]: And so, Judge, looking at -- there were two
      African-American jurors, Number 1 and Number 19, and -- I’m sorry
      -- and, basically, Ms. Henley brings out the fact that [Juror No. 1], who
      was not struck by either side, and I do -- I think that is going to be a
      juror in the case, Ms. Henley says that she had similar questions to Juror
      Number 19 on the questionnaire, and I disagree with that. And
      essentially, Your Honor, the reason that we did is we looked at Question
                                          3
50 on the two of 50, and it was the ranking of your -- Question 50 is:
“What is your general feeling about the honesty and integrity of the
following people.” And they were to rate, with four being very honest,
down to one is dishonest, or zero is no opinion. Juror Number 19 . . . I
believe, ranked law enforcement officers as a one, where criminal
defendants was a two, prosecutors it looks like a three. It looks like he
wrote something and then changed it. I think originally there were
checkmarks. It looks like judges four, prosecutors three, defense
lawyers two, defendants two, law enforcement officers one. So he
ranked law enforcement officers as lower than criminal defendants,
where Juror Number 1, on the other hand, had criminal defendants as
no opinion, but had law enforcement officers as a three. And so when
we look at that judgment, then she had -- and she left prosecutors blank.
But where she had law enforcement officers up on three, which would
be somewhat honest, as opposed to very dishonest. I think that
whenever someone marks law enforcement officers, which by necessity
are going to be the majority of the State’s witnesses, as very dishonest,
then we are within our rights to exercise a peremptory challenge.
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And while I agree that [Juror No. 1]
made some marks on her juror questionnaire, the State questioned her
about those marks, and apparently she rehabilitated herself with regard
to her lower scores. Not one question was asked of Juror 19 by the
State of Texas, and they based their decision on a piece of paper, juror
questionnaire, that [Juror No. 19] had responded to without further
questioning, which we don’t believe overcomes the prima facie case of
discrimination in the strike.
     THE COURT: Do you have any authority for that? Is your
argument, Ms. Henley, that we can’t rely on the questionnaire?
       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That is not my argument, Your Honor.
My argument is that the State had some questions about the juror
questionnaire and the lower ranking for police officers to a three to the
only black female juror. The lower question of one for Question 50,
answer dishonest for police officers, one, was not questioned in any
manner, so no clarification was made. No questions were made. The
strike comes, and then later we say -- the State says, “Oh, well, we’ll
look at Question 50. He said police officers were dishonest,” didn’t
bother to ask any questions. And so we’re asking that the Court rule
that that relying completing on the juror questionnaire without further

                                   4
inquiry, which was done by the State in regard to Juror 1, is
discriminatory in nature.
      THE COURT: Did the defense make some peremptory strikes
based solely on the questionnaire?
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We did not.
      THE COURT: Mr. Wilks, any response?
       [THE STATE]: Well, Your Honor, Ms. Henley moved to have a
questionnaire used. Had I known that the questionnaire were not to be
relied upon, I would have objected to the questionnaires. I thought that
the questionnaires were to aid in voir dire, were to speed the process
along, and that we could rely upon 50. I’m now told that we can’t rely
upon 50. Also, Your Honor, whenever speaking with Juror Number 1,
I don’t recall exactly what I said, but I don’t think I went into officer
credibility at all. When we look at 50, saying that law enforcement
officers are a three, which is somewhat honest, is very different as a
one, which is very dishonest. And I don’t remember what I asked Juror
Number 1 at all. I asked her about being from Baltimore, I know that.
But I don’t think we went into any great detail. But to say that we can’t
rely upon someone saying that law enforcement officers are very
dishonest on the questionnaire is absurd.
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I? Judge, I didn’t say that at all.
I’m not trying to say that we don’t rely on juror questionnaires for
looking to aid and assist us in voir dire. But what I’m saying is, there
were two black jurors on the panel, and with regard to a question with
regard to police officers and the distrust that she had and relationships
she had, which Mr. Wilks talked about, he went into detail about the
question that she answered and verified that. And so I’m not saying
that we can’t rely on juror questionnaires to assist us and aid us in voir
dire. I’m just making a Batson challenge and indicating to the Court
that we made a prima facie case that the only black male juror was
struck from this jury and it was based on a question that wasn’t even
talked about by the State.
      ....
       THE COURT: All right. I find that the Defendant did establish a
prima facie case; however -- and the burden at that point shifts to the
attorney representing the State. The attorney representing the State did
give a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. In particular, that
                                    5
      on Question 50 of the questionnaire, State’s Batson 1, that the panelist
      in question ranked law enforcement officers as less trustworthy than
      criminal defendants. That is a racially neutral reason. And the burden
      of persuasion being with the Defendant, the Defendant has not carried
      that burden of persuasion. I would also note that Juror Number 1 also
      is black, identifies as black, and based on different questions on the
      questionnaire, the State did not move to strike her. If there was
      purposeful discrimination on the part of the State, then I would expect
      to see Juror Number 1 stricken as well. So I find that there is a racially
      neutral reason, and the Defense’s Batson objection is overruled.
We note that, although the State disclaimed any memory of the content of its
discussion with Venireperson No. 1 and expressed doubt that it had addressed her
opinion concerning the honesty of law enforcement officers, the record shows, as
indicated below, that such a discussion did occur:
             [THE STATE]: But, also, it caught my attention and so I wanted
      to visit with you, because, in some ways, you had some very mixed
      opinions of the criminal justice system, because I saw you giving
      credibility to some people, lack of credibility to some other people, and
      you also -- I’m not going to go into it, but you also had some specific
      things that you mentioned in those questions as to concerns of yours.
      And so I just kind of wanted to visit with you a little bit. And if you
      were to be on this jury, what do you think about -- and I know you
      answered this question in the questionnaire, but I’m going to ask
      anyway. But what do you think about the credibility of police officers
      who would be testifying?
              [VENIREPERSON NO. 1]: I was thinking on, you know, stuff.
      It’s like half and half. Stuff that you see in my community, where I’m
      from, in stuff like that, it makes you think, like, are they here to protect
      us or are they not? But I also feel like if it comes with facts, I have to
      go with that. That’s nothing I -- I can’t put my emotions in that. If
      that’s shown, then I have to go with it. There’s nothing I can do about
      it.
      After the above discussions concluded and the trial court ruled on Appellant’s
Batson challenge, the jury (which included Venireperson No. 1, a black female) was
seated and sworn, and the trial commenced. At trial, witnesses testified as to the

                                           6
shooting death of the victim, Jaden Hernandez. In addition to other evidence,
Appellant’s videotaped interview with law enforcement was admitted and published
to the jury. In the video, Appellant admitted to shooting Hernandez while robbing
him.
       The jury convicted Appellant of murder as charged in Count One, Paragraph
Two of the indictment. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court also
found allegations one (the murder offense) and two (the aggravated robbery offense)
in the State’s motion to revoke to be “true,” and the State waived the remaining
allegations in its motion. Nevertheless, the trial court did not revoke Appellant’s
community supervision at that time, nor did it pronounce a sentence for either case.
       A unified punishment hearing for both cases was held some months later.
After hearing and considering the punishment evidence, the trial court revoked
Appellant’s community supervision and pronounced its sentences for both cause
numbers:
              THE COURT: All right. We’re back on the record in 22533-B
       and 21925-B, State of Texas v. Javeeontae Evans. I have considered
       the evidence, I’ve considered the arguments of counsel, and I’ve
       considered the presentence investigation report. Mr. Evans, you have
       done one of the worst things that you could have done. You took a
       young man’s life. You took him away from his family and the people
       that love him and you cut his life short with no justification. And it’s
       clear that society needs to be protected from you. Therefore, based on
       the jury’s verdict, which I accept, I find you guilty of the offense of
       murder as stated in the indictment, and I sentence you to 85 years in the
       Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division. I assess
       court costs in that case. In Cause Number 21925-B, I find Allegations
       1 and 2 to be true. I revoke your community supervision and I sentence
       you to ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-
       Institutional Division. Those sentences will be served consecutively.
This appeal followed.

                                          7
                                     II. Analysis
      A. The Cumulation of Appellant’s Sentences
      In his first issue, Appellant complains that the trial court erred when it
cumulated his ten-year revocation sentence and his eighty-five-year sentence for the
murder conviction. Appellant frames this issue as turning on “whether there is a
subsequent conviction pursuant to [Article] 42.08.”         See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a) (West Supp. 2023). Because his conviction in cause
no. 21925-B (the revocation proceeding) occurred prior to his murder conviction in
the instant case, Appellant reasons that the trial court’s cumulation order, which
requires that he serve his sentence in cause no. 21925-B consecutively to the
sentence imposed for the murder conviction in the instant case, is void and not
authorized under Article 42.08. As such, Appellant argues that the trial court’s
cumulation decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and he requests that we order
the trial court to amend its special cumulation findings in both judgments of
conviction and in any directives to TDCJ.
             1. Standard of Review
      We review a trial court’s decision to cumulate sentences for an abuse of
discretion. Byrd v. State, 499 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “‘Normally,
the trial [court] has absolute discretion to cumulate sentences,’ so long as the law
authorizes the imposition of cumulative sentences.” Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 575
S.W.2d 41, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979)). In a sentencing context, an
abuse of discretion will generally be found only if (1) the trial court imposes
consecutive sentences when the law requires concurrent sentences, (2) the trial court
imposes concurrent sentences when the law requires consecutive sentences, or
(3) the trial court otherwise fails to observe the statutory requirements that pertain
to sentencing. Id.; Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d).
                                          8
             2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
      We decline Appellant’s request that we order the trial court to amend its
special cumulation findings in the judgments of conviction because Article 42.08
permits the trial court to cumulate sentences in the manner in which it did here. See
CRIM. PROC. art. 42.08(a) (the trial court has the discretion to order sentences for two
or more convictions to be served consecutively). In Pettigrew v. State, the Court of
Criminal Appeals upheld a trial court’s cumulation order under nearly identical
circumstances.    48 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (citing CRIM. PROC.
art. 42.08(a)). In that case, Pettigrew was first convicted of aggravated sexual
assault, for which he received a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment, that was
suspended and probated for ten years. Id. at 770. Pettigrew was later convicted of
murder in a separate case for which he was sentenced to seventy-five years’
imprisonment. Id. The trial court subsequently revoked Pettigrew’s community
supervision for the aggravated-sexual-assault conviction, sentenced him to ten years’
imprisonment, and ordered that the ten-year revocation sentence be consecutive to
and commence after the seventy-five-year sentence for the murder conviction had
been served. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court’s cumulation
order and stated: “for the purpose of stacking, a case could be treated as a
‘conviction’ at the time sentence is suspended or at the time sentence is imposed.”
Id. at 771. The court observed that this followed the legislative scheme to “give the
trial court the maximum flexibility possible in stacking sentences.” Id. at 773.
      In keeping with Pettigrew, the trial court here orally pronounced Appellant’s
sentence of eighty-five years imprisonment for the murder conviction in this case,
then revoked Appellant’s community supervision in the revocation proceeding
(cause no. 21925-B) and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment for that offense.
The trial court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively, and it was
authorized and within its discretion to order that Appellant’s sentences be served in
                                           9
this sequence. See id. at 770–71, 773. Because the law authorizes the imposition of
cumulative sentences in this circumstance, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it cumulated Appellant’s sentences. Byrd, 499 S.W.3d at
446. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.
      B. Appellant’s Batson Challenge
      In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court committed harmful
error when it overruled his Batson challenge to the State’s peremptory strike as to
Venireperson No. 19.         Specifically, Appellant argues that the reasons and
explanations advanced by the State for its peremptory strike, as well as the trial
court’s ruling on the State’s reasons, failed to address Appellant’s full argument—
that striking Venireperson No. 19 was purposefully discriminatory due to the
intersection of his race and gender, not only because of his race.           Because
Venireperson No. 19’s status as a black male was not addressed by the State’s
explanations or the trial court’s ruling, Appellant contends that the State did not
overcome its burden to articulate a neutral reason for exercising a peremptory strike
on this prospective juror.
      As we discuss below, we disagree with Appellant’s account of the Batson
hearing. Therefore, based on our review of the record, we conclude that (1) the State
and the trial court did, in fact, address Appellant’s full challenge and (2) the trial
court’s ruling was not erroneous.
             1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
      The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror because of the
juror’s race or gender violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (forbidding race-based
peremptory strikes); see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994)
(forbidding gender-based peremptory strikes). The exclusion of even one juror on
either basis constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, invalidates the
                                         10
jury selection process, and requires a new trial. See Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d
707, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
      Resolving a claim that the prosecution exercised a peremptory strike based on
either race or gender grounds involves a three-step process: (1) the defendant must
first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor deliberately used a peremptory
strike for the purpose of eliminating a prospective juror on the basis of either race or
gender; (2) if the defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor
to articulate a neutral reason for exercising the strike on the prospective juror in
question; and (3) based on the parties’ arguments, the trial court must then determine
if the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. Compton v. State, 666
S.W.3d 685, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 2, 2023)
(No. 23-5682) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476–77 (2008)); see
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98; Nieto v. State, 365 S.W.3d 673, 675–76 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 245–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
      The consideration in step two of the process is the facial validity of the
prosecutor’s explanation for exercising the peremptory strike, and “[u]nless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered
will be deemed [to be] race neutral.” Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at 246 (quoting Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). When the prosecutor offers a neutral explanation,
which is necessary, the defendant then has “the burden to show that the explanation
given was merely a pretext for discrimination.” Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644,
649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698. It is only at the third
step of the process “that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant—
the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has
carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.” Guzman, 85 S.W.3d at
246 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).

                                          11
      In reviewing a trial court’s ruling of a Batson challenge, we must uphold the
trial court’s decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Nieto, 365 S.W.3d at 676 (citing
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477). “The clearly erroneous standard is highly deferential
because the trial court is in the best position to [make a credibility assessment and]
determine if the prosecutor’s explanation is genuinely race neutral.” Id. (citing
Gibson v. State, 144 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Whether the
defendant satisfies his burden to show that the prosecutor’s facially neutral
explanation for his strike is pretextual, and not genuine, is a question of fact for the
trial court to resolve in the first instance. Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698; Watkins v.
State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Such a determination requires
the trial court to evaluate the prosecutor’s credibility and demeanor. Compton, 666
S.W.3d at 698. In the end, we defer to the trial court’s ruling in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Nieto, 365 S.W.3d at 676 (citing Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991)).
      We consider the entire voir dire examination record and do not confine our
review to the specific arguments offered to the trial court by the parties. Blackman v.
State, 414 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Nieto, 365 S.W.3d at 676 (citing
Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 448). Factors that we may consider in our analysis include:
(1) statistical evidence, (2) evidence of disparate questioning of similarly situated
venirepersons, (3) side-by-side comparisons of the stricken venirepersons and
accepted venirepersons, (4) whether the record supports the State’s explanations for
its peremptory strikes, and (5) any other relevant circumstances bearing on the issue
of purposeful discrimination. Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698 (citing Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2243 (2019)).
      Moreover, we may not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s in
determining whether the prosecutor’s explanation was pretextual.            Nieto, 365
S.W.3d at 676 (citing Gibson, 144 S.W.3d at 534). Like the trial court, we must
                                          12
focus on the genuineness, rather than the reasonableness, of the prosecutor’s
explanation and asserted non-racial motive.          Id.    Ultimately, purposeful
discrimination is shown when all the relevant facts and circumstances taken together
establish that the trial court committed clear error by concluding that the State’s
peremptory strikes were not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.
See Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698 (citing Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2235).
             2. The Trial Court’s Ruling Was Not Clearly Erroneous
      Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the State’s use of a peremptory strike
against Venireperson No. 19, who is a black male, and noted that Venireperson
No. 1, who is a black female, was not struck by either party. Appellant argues that
because the State used a peremptory strike against Venireperson No. 19, without
seeking clarification or asking him any questions regarding his answers to the
juror questionnaire, its strategy constitutes a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination under Batson.
      The State explained that Question Fifty of the juror questionnaire was a scaled
question that asked, “What is your general feeling about the honesty and integrity of
the following people?” with a scale ranging from four for “very honest” to one for
“very dishonest.” Based on the questionnaire’s ranking format, Venireperson No. 19
ranked law enforcement officers as a one, criminal defendants as a two, and
prosecutors as a three. By contrast, Venireperson No. 1 ranked law enforcement
officers as a three and criminal defendants as “no opinion.” The State asserted and
explained that the reason for exercising a peremptory strike on Venireperson No. 19
was because he had indicated he believed that law enforcement officers are “very
dishonest,” more so than criminal defendants. The trial court found that this
explanation constituted a race-neutral reason for the State’s exercise of this
peremptory strike; the trial court also observed and stated that another venireperson

                                         13
(number one), who is also black but who indicated different answers to Question
Fifty, was not struck.
      We note at the outset that, although the State and the trial court exclusively
used the term “race-neutral” during the hearing on Appellant’s Batson challenge,
the nature of Appellant’s challenge and the arguments his trial counsel raised in
support of it made clear that the challenge concerned both Venireperson No. 19’s
race and gender. When Appellant’s trial counsel first raised the Batson challenge,
she specified that “there was one other black female juror who answered similar
answers to the juror questionnaire as [Venireperson No. 19], but she was a female.”
(emphasis added). And, having previously referred to Venireperson No. 19 as a
male and having explained its reasons for striking him, the State acknowledged that
Venireperson No. 1 was a female when it offered its reasons for not striking her:
      And so, Judge, looking at -- there were two African-American jurors,
      Number 1 and Number 19, and -- I’m sorry -- and, basically,
      Ms. Henley brings out the fact that [Juror No. 1], who was not struck
      by either side, and I do -- I think that is going to be a juror in the case,
      Ms. Henley says that she had similar questions to Juror Number 19 on
      the questionnaire, and I disagree with that. And essentially, Your
      Honor, the reason that we did is we looked at Question 50. . . .
      Appellant’s primary argument in raising the Batson challenge relied on a
comparison of the State’s treatment of Venireperson Nos. 1 and 19, both of whom
are black. The only relevant difference between these two prospective jurors, for
purposes of Appellant’s Batson challenge, is their gender. Therefore, although the
State and the trial court exclusively used the term “race-neutral” when referring to
the objectionable juror during the Batson hearing, the record supports our conclusion
that the parties and the trial court all understood that the crux of Appellant’s
challenge concerned Venireperson No. 19’s race and gender.
      Appellant’s trial counsel specified that the State asked Venireperson No. 1
questions regarding her answers to Question Fifty of the juror questionnaire, whereas
                                          14
the State did not ask any questions of Venireperson No. 19 regarding his answers to
the same question. In essence, Appellant’s trial counsel argued that if the State
believed it was necessary to address and clarify, as it did, Venireperson No. 1’s
answer that law enforcement officers merited a ranking of “three” out of four on a
scale of honesty—that is, that they are somewhat honest—then the only logical,
nondiscriminatory action the State could pursue regarding Venireperson No. 19’s
response to the same question, in which he ranked law enforcement officers at a
“one” out of four—indicating that they are very dishonest—was to address and
question him in a similar manner. Appellant’s trial counsel also requested that the
trial court “rule that . . . relying completely on the juror questionnaire without further
inquiry . . . is discriminatory in nature.”
      There is no support for Appellant’s logic. Nor do statistical and comparative
analyses compel us to conclude that the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous.
The only juror questionnaire in the record before us is that of Venireperson No. 19.
As such, our ability to compare the State’s treatment of other venirepersons is
limited. See Whitfield v. State, 408 S.W.3d 709, 716 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013,
pet. ref’d) (“Appellant did not offer the juror information cards into evidence and
has not directed us to any other evidence in the record showing that the reasons given
were [a] pretext for a racially motivated strike.”); see also Young v. State, 826
S.W.2d 141, 145–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (urging the parties to make
comparisons of the discrepancies between the proffered reasons for a strike and the
relevant circumstances during voir dire as part of rebuttal but permitting the parties
for the first time on appeal to give “the appellate court a more accurate picture of the
voir dire than a cold record.”). Even so, Appellant does not argue that the status of
any other member of the jury panel would inform our analysis. Rather, on this point,
Appellant relies solely on the comparison between Venireperson Nos. 1 and 19.

                                              15
      The parties, in their briefs and as shown in the voir dire transcript, agree that
Venireperson Nos. 1 and 19 were the only black venirepersons on the venire panel,
and that Venireperson No. 19 was the only black male. Therefore, the State struck
the only black male on the panel. But statistical evidence alone cannot establish
purposeful discrimination. Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 711 (citing Watkins, 245
S.W.3d at 452); see also Hassan v. State, 369 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012) (“[A] prima facie case [of discrimination] can rarely, if ever, be based solely
on a statistical analysis when fewer than three strikes have been exercised against
persons belonging to [a] cognizable group.”). Further, there is no evidence of any
discriminatory, disparate questioning, despite Appellant’s assertions to the contrary.
      A side-by-side comparison of the only available comparator—Venireperson
No. 1—supports the trial court’s acceptance of the State’s proffered reasons and
explanation for exercising its peremptory strike on Venireperson No. 19. The State
specifically pointed to the venirepersons’ different responses regarding their
opinions as to the honesty of law enforcement officers, the testimony of which was
crucial to the State’s case. Venireperson No. 1 stated they were somewhat honest,
while Venireperson No. 19 noted that they were very dishonest. We conclude that
this distinction constitutes a race-neutral and gender-neutral reason for the State to
strike Venireperson No. 19.
      Similarly, the State’s explanation for striking Venireperson No. 19 does not
support Appellant’s argument that the State disparately questioned similarly situated
venirepersons. See Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698. The State could have believed
that Venireperson No. 1’s noted opinion of the honesty of law enforcement officers
was acceptable for purposes of the State’s voir dire and trial strategy. By contrast,
Venireperson No. 19’s much more negative response to the same question
concerning the honesty of law enforcement officers may have been, in the State’s
opinion, beyond the pale for the State’s purposes and therefore no amount of
                                          16
rehabilitation would have assuaged the State’s concerns about Venireperson
No. 19’s views of law enforcement officers’ credibility. See Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at
649 (even after rehabilitation, the State is entitled to assume that venirepersons will
remain adverse to the State’s interest based on their initial responses to the questions
presented). Irrespective of the State’s beliefs, the record before us does not reveal
disparate questioning of similarly situated individuals, as Appellant suggests. See
Compton, 666 S.W.3d at 698.
        As relevant here, the Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated that the lack
of individual questioning of a struck venireperson is one of several factors an
appellate court should consider in determining whether a peremptory strike was
racially motivated. See Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 713–14; Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d
861, 865–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 2 However, the court has also held that no one
factor should be given dispositive weight in our determination; rather, “[t]he
overriding standard is still whether the trial judge’s decision was supported by the
record so that it is not clearly erroneous.” Grant v. State, 325 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Vargas v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992)). This is not to say that an additional factor must always be present to support
a finding of discriminatory intent. Id. at 659–60 (citing Chambers v. State, 866
S.W.2d 9, 24–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
        Although it may arise in conjunction with other factors, the failure to direct
questioning to a struck venireperson, alone, may be sufficient evidence of
discriminatory intent, depending on the circumstances. Id. at 660. The lack of

        2
          In Whitsey, the court employed five factors in its analysis: (1) the reason given was not related to
the facts of the case, (2) the lack of questioning of the challenged juror or the lack of meaningful questions,
(3) persons with the same or similar characteristics were not struck, (4) the challenged juror was questioned
so as to evoke a certain response and the lack of questioning of other prospective jurors as to the same
question, and (5) the explanation given by the prosecutor for exercising the strike was based on a group
bias where the group trait was not shown to apply to the challenged juror. Whitsey, 796 S.W.2d at 713–14.
                                                        17
questioning can be evidence that is “suggestive of pretext” because it may constitute
a “failure to engage in meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State
alleges it is concerned about.” Id. at 659 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
246 (2005)). But the circumstances and context are important in weighing this
factor: “the evidentiary value of [the] lack of questioning is likely to be significantly
less when jurors are examined in a group,” as they were here, rather than when they
are examined individually and apart from other prospective jurors. Id.
      Here, the State explained: “I think that whenever someone marks law
enforcement officers, which by necessity are going to be the majority of the State’s
witnesses, as very dishonest, then we are within our rights to exercise a peremptory
strike.” We conclude that this explanation (1) is a race-neutral and gender-neutral
reason to strike Venireperson No. 19 (and, in comparison, not to strike Venireperson
No. 1), (2) is logically related to this case, and (3) is based directly on the responses
of Venireperson Nos. 1 and 19 to Question Fifty of the juror questionnaire and any
related follow-up questions presented by counsel. See, e.g., Hill v. State, No. 13-20-
00069-CR, 2021 WL 2461252, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
June 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that a
venireperson’s personal distrust of law enforcement is a neutral reason to strike her).
      We have reviewed the entire record in accordance with the applicable standard
of review and conclude that Appellant has not met his burden to rebut the State’s
reasons and explanation for striking Venireperson No. 19 nor has Appellant shown
that the State’s reasons and explanation for doing so were merely pretextual.
Because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s ruling
on Appellant’s Batson challenge, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s denial of
Appellant’s challenge was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue
is overruled.

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                                   III. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                 W. STACY TROTTER
                                                 JUSTICE

January 25, 2024
Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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