Court Opinion

ID: 9952479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 20:09:29.438655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:52.387501
License: Public Domain

Gaviola v Lamarre
               2024 NY Slip Op 30803(U)
                     March 13, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 158138/2023
                  Judge: Hasa A. Kingo
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                                                                                                                     INDEX NO. 158138/2023
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 12                                                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/13/2024

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:                            HON. HASA A. KINGO                               PART                              05M
                                                           Justice
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X   INDEX NO.          158138/2023
             GIRLIE GAVIOLA, GIRLIE GAVIOLA
                                                                                                 MOTION DATE         12/22/2023
                                                         Plaintiff,
                                                                                                 MOTION SEQ. NO.         001
                                                 -v-
             MICHAEL LAMARRE, PAUL KASHMAN,                                                        DECISION + ORDER ON
                                                                                                         MOTION
                                                         Defendant.
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
            were read on this motion to/for                                                       DISMISSAL                        .

                     Defendants MICHAEL LAMARRE                        (“Lamarre”) and PAUL KASHMAN
            (“Kashman)(collectively “defendants”) move, unopposed, for an order: (1) Pursuant to CPLR
            §3211(a)(8), CPLR §306-b, and CPLR §214(5), dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as asserted
            against defendants; (2) Pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(5) dismissing plaintiff’s causes of action
            sounding in intentional tort against defendants as such causes of action are time-barred; and (3)
            Pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7) dismissing plaintiff’s complaint as asserted against defendants in
            its entirety, as plaintiff’s Complaint fails to assert any viable cause of action as against defendants.

                    CPLR §3211(a)(8) states that a party may move for dismissal on the ground that “the court
            has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.” On a motion brought under CPLR §3211(a)(8),
            the plaintiff bears the “burden of presenting sufficient evidence, through affidavits and relevant
            documents, to demonstrate jurisdiction” (Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v. Gasarch, 149 AD3d 485,
            486 [1st Dept 2017]). Pursuant to CPLR §306-b, where 120 days has elapsed since the filing of
            the original summons and complaint without effective service of process, and where the running
            of a three-year statute of limitations of CPLR §214(5) has not been tolled and has lapsed, dismissal
            may be warranted.

                    Although CPLR §306-b calls for process to be served “within one hundred twenty days
            after the commencement of the action or proceeding,” the “120-day service provision of CPLR
            §306-b can be extended by a court, upon motion, ‘upon good cause shown or in the interest of
            justice’ (see CPLR §306-b)” (Bumpus v. New York City Transit Authority, 66 AD3d 26, 31 [2d
            Dept 2009]). The court may also extend the 120-day service provision sua sponte upon such a
            showing (see Gurevitch v. Goodman, 269 AD2d 355, 356 [2d Dept 2000]; see also Practice
            Commentary, McKinney's Cons Law of NY, 2018 Electronic Update, CPLR §306-b).
             158138/2023 GAVIOLA, GIRLIE ET AL vs. LAMARRE, MICHAEL ET AL                                            Page 1 of 4
             Motion No. 001

                                                                           1 of 4
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                                                                                                       INDEX NO. 158138/2023
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 12                                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/13/2024

            Nonetheless, “Good cause” and “interest of justice” are two separate and independent statutory
            standards (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95, 104 [2001]). To establish
            good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service. Good cause
            will not exist where a plaintiff fails to make any effort at service, or fails to make at least a
            reasonably diligent effort at service.

                    If good cause for an extension is not established, courts must consider the ‘interest of
            justice’ standard of CPLR 306-b. The interest of justice standard does not require reasonably
            diligent efforts at service, but courts, in making their determinations, may consider the presence
            or absence of diligence, along with other factors (see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97
            NY2d at 105, supra). The interest of justice standard is broader than the good cause standard (see
            Mead v. Singleman, 24 AD3d 1142, 1144 [3d Dept 2005]), as its factors also include the expiration
            of the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the action, the length of delay in service, the
            promptness of a request by the plaintiff for an extension, and prejudice to the defendant (Bumpus
            v. New York City Transit Authority, 66 AD3d at 31-32, supra).

                    Here, as sufficiently attested to by defendants, plaintiff has not effectuated service of the
            summons and complaint in this matter on either Lamarre, or Kashman. Indeed, plaintiff has not
            even attempted to effectuate service. Plaintiff has not filed any affidavits of service on this matter’s
            NYSCEF docket within the timeframe required by the CPLR as to defendants. Moreover, as
            attested to by defendants, plaintiff has not served either Lamarre, or Kashman, personally or by
            mail, with the summons and complaint in this matter. Consequently, plaintiff’s Complaint must be
            dismissed as plaintiff has failed to comply with CPLR §306-b.

                    Next, “[o]n a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(5) on the
            ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of
            establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired” (Benn v Benn, 82 AD3d 548,
            548 [1st Dept 2011][quoting Island ADC, Inc. v Baldassano Architectural Group, P.C., 49 AD3d
            815, 816 [2d Dept 2008]); see also Gravel v Cicola, 297 AD2d 620 [2d Dept 2002]). “The burden
            then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations has been
            tolled or was otherwise inapplicable, or whether the action was actually commenced within the
            period propounded by the defendant” (QK Healthcare, Inc. v InSource, Inc., 108 AD3d 56, 65 [2d
            Dept 2013]; see MTGLQ Investor, LP v Wozencraft, 172 AD3d 644 [1st Dept 2019]; Epiphany
            Community Nursery School v Levey, 171 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2019]; J.A. Lee Elec., Inc. v City of
            New York, 119 AD3d 652 [2d Dept 2014]). A plaintiff's submissions in response to the motion
            “must be given their most favorable intendment” (Benn, 82 AD3d at 548, supra quoting Arrington
            v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982]).

                    Here, defendants have sufficiently shown that plaintiff’s causes of action sounding in
            intentional tort must be dismissed as time-barred by the statute of limitations. To be sure, the
            alleged incident giving rise to the instant matter occurred on August 27, 2020. The time-period
            within which to timely commence a cause of action sounding in intentional tort is one year, and
            thus, the time to commence causes of action for Defamation; Injurious Falsehood; Abuse of
            Process; and Prima Facie Tort expired on August 27, 2021. Thus, these causes of action must be
            dismissed. As plaintiff has proffered no opposition to dismissal, and has failed to assert application

             158138/2023 GAVIOLA, GIRLIE ET AL vs. LAMARRE, MICHAEL ET AL                              Page 2 of 4
             Motion No. 001

                                                            2 of 4
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                                                                                                      INDEX NO. 158138/2023
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 12                                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/13/2024

            of any tolling provisions to rebut defendants’ assertions, the aforementioned causes of action are
            dismissed.

                     Finally, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR §3211
            (a)(7), courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint
            as true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference. (Leon v Martinez,
            84 NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764
            [2015].) Ordinarily, the court's inquiry is limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's
            pleadings; accordingly, the court's only function is to determine whether the facts as alleged fit
            within a cognizable legal theory (JF Capital Advisors, 25 NY3d at 764, supra). However, where
            the complaint consists of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity (Godfrey v Spano, 13
            NY3d 358, 373 [2009]) or where the statements in a pleading are not sufficiently particular to give
            the court and parties notice of the transactions and/or occurrences intended to be proven (CPLR
            §3013; Mid-Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union v Quartararo & Lois, PLLC, 31 NY3d 1090, 1091
            [2018]), the motion to dismiss should be granted. Indeed, “allegations consisting of bare legal
            conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled
            to any such consideration” (Garber v Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY, 38 AD3d 833, 834
            [2d Dept 2007], quoting Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999]). CPLR §2013, states that
            “[s]tatements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of
            the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and
            the material elements of each cause of action or defense.” Thus, conclusory allegations will not
            suffice (see DiMauro v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 105 AD2d 236, 239 [2d Dept 1984];
            Fowler v American Lawyer Media, 306 AD2d 113, 113 [1st Dept 2003]; Sheriff v Murray, 33
            AD3d 688 [2d Dept 2006]). When the allegations in a complaint are vague or conclusory, dismissal
            for failure to state a cause of action is warranted (see Schuckman Realty v Marine Midland Bank,
            N.A., 244 AD2d 400, 401 [2d Dept 1997]; O'Riordan v Suffolk Ch., Local No. 852, Civ. Serv.
            Empls. Assn., 95 AD2d 800, 800 [2d Dept 1983]).

                    Here, even granting plaintiff all favorable inferences, there is no factual basis upon which
            plaintiff may allege negligent misrepresentation; “words negligently spoken”; failure to warn and
            protect; injury on premises; “landlord’s servant causing injury”; negligent infliction of emotional
            distress; aiding and abetting tortious conduct; trespass to chattels; conversion; and survivorship.
            Likewise, plaintiff’s cause of action for loss of consortium must be dismissed (see De Angelis v.
            Lutheran Medical Center, 84 A.D.2d 17, 20-21 [2d Dept 1981][wherein Appellate Division,
            Second Department, affirmed dismissal of cause of action on behalf of a child for the loss of
            parental consortium by reasoning that while the real and significant harm suffered by children of
            parents who are physically injured cannot be denied, not every loss can be made compensable, and
            the courts must draw the line where liability terminates]).

                    Accordingly, it is hereby

                   ORDERED that the instant motion is granted, unopposed, and plaintiff’s complaint is
            dismissed in its entirety as asserted against defendants Kashman and Lamarre; and it is further

                    ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment dismissing this matter
            as against defendants Kashman and Lamarre in accordance with this court’s decision and order.

             158138/2023 GAVIOLA, GIRLIE ET AL vs. LAMARRE, MICHAEL ET AL                             Page 3 of 4
             Motion No. 001

                                                            3 of 4
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                                                                                                     INDEX NO. 158138/2023
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 12                                                                           RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/13/2024

                   This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

                   3/13/2024
                     DATE                                                           HASA A. KINGO, J.S.C.
            CHECK ONE:               X   CASE DISPOSED                     NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                     X   GRANTED             DENIED        GRANTED IN PART             OTHER

            APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                      SUBMIT ORDER

            CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:        INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN        FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT       REFERENCE

            158138/2023 GAVIOLA, GIRLIE ET AL vs. LAMARRE, MICHAEL ET AL                             Page 4 of 4
            Motion No. 001

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