Court Opinion

ID: 9462528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:42:59.743131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:37.259740
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I would affirm the judgment of the district court. The critical testimony of both Wilmoth and Ballard was clearly admissible under well recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.
It is obvious from reading all of Wilmoth’s testimony that the government did not call him simply for the purposes of impeachment. Wilmoth’s testimony established and corroborated many of the circumstances surrounding the conspiracy, including the fact that Morlang was a partner with other conspirators in one of the real estate ventures. Wilmoth also described the land they sought to develop, discussed their dealings with Haught, an FHA official whom he bribed, and stated that Ballard and Barron contributed money for the bribe. He equivocated when asked if he had told Morlang about the bribe. Only then did the government impeach Wilmoth by showing that, despite his denial, he had told a fellow prisoner that he had pleaded guilty to bribery so that an associate could stay out of jail and take care of the business. The district court admitted the testimony on this point only for the purpose of disparaging Wilmoth’s credibility.
*193The best reasoned cases recognize that it is not realistic to require a party to vouch for the veracity of his witness. Accordingly, courts have long allowed a party to impeach his own witness even when the party was not taken by surprise at the witness’s testimony. See, e. g., United States v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 932-34 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1962); see also, Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C. Rule of Evidence 607. I would affirm the district judge’s application of these sound authorities.
Also, there was no error in the admission of Ballard’s prior inconsistent statement for the purpose of impeaching him. The transcript refutes the assertion that he was not evasive. On direct examination by an assistant United States Attorney, the following colloquy took place:
“Q. Who represented Mr. Morlang in these transactions?
“A. Well, I never was certain, but I assumed it was Mr. Wilmoth.
“Q. As far as you were concerned, did you consider Mr. Wilmoth was the spokesman for Mr. Morlang?
“A. I never gave it a lot of thought on that question.”
In contrast, Ballard testified before the grand jury:
“Q. Governor Barron came to meet with you too?
“A. No. Fred Wilmoth was the speaker for Ted Morlang.”
There can be no doubt that Ballard’s evasiveness at the trial was inconsistent with his unequivocal grand jury testimony. We have long deferred to a trial judge’s discretion in allowing the impeachment of a recalcitrant witness. Harman v. United States, 199 F.2d 34, 36 (4th Cir. 1952). I would apply this salutary precept here. A comparison of Ballard’s testimony at the trial and his testimony before the grand jury shows no abuse of the district court’s discretion.