Court Opinion

ID: 9419566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:50:11.866674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:18.962272
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s judgment insofar as it sustains the decree of the District Judge.
I cannot, however, agree to many of the modifications of that decree. These appellants have violated the antitrust laws. The District Court’s decree, taken as a whole, is an effective remedy, admirably suited to neutralize the consequences of such violations, to guard against repetition of similar illegal activities, and to dissipate the unlawful aggregate of economic power which arose out of, and fed upon, monopolization and restraints. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173. Many *436of this Court’s modifications seriously impair the decree and frustrate its purposes.
It would probably serve no useful purpose to state at length the reasons which justify the District Court’s decree, since they are set forth clearly and well in its opinion. In particular, however, it is my belief that any reasonable assurance that these appellants will not continue to violate the anti-trust law requires that we leave intact the District Court’s decree insofar as it (1) provides for appointment of a receiver and the impounding of Hartford’s royalties (Paragraphs 10-20 of the Decree); (2) requires that glassware machines should be disposed of by outright sale rather than by leases (Paragraphs 21, 22, 23); (3) requires that patents, already owned, be licensed royalty free; (4) prohibits the restrictive licensing practices which the appellants so effectively used to create and maintain their monopoly (Paragraph 29); (5) enjoins the appellants from the practice of obtaining patents for the purpose of “fencing in” and “blocking off” new inventions, (Paragraph 52).
The District Court’s opinion in my judgment laid a careful and well-reasoned foundation establishing the necessity for every one of these Paragraphs. It would be difficult to add to what the court there said. It is sufficient for me to say only a few words.
The District Court found that these defendants started out in 1916 to acquire a monopoly on a large segment of the glass industry. Their efforts were rewarded by complete success. They have become absolute masters of that domain of our public economy. They achieved this result largely through the manipulation of patents and licensing agreements. They obtained patents for the express purpose of furthering their monopoly. They utilized various types of restrictions in connection with leasing those patents so as to retain their dominance in that industry. The history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny *437over any field of industry than that accomplished by these appellants. They planned their monopolistic program on the basis of getting and keeping and using patents, which they dedicated to the destruction of free competition in the glass container industry. Their declared object was “To block the development of machines which might be constructed by others . . .” and “To secure patents on possible improvements of competing machines, so as to ‘fence in’ those and prevent their reaching an improved state.” These patents were the major weapons in the campaign to subjugate the industry; they were also the fruits of appellants’ victory. The restoration of competition in the glass container industry demands that appellants be deprived of these weapons. The most effective way to accomplish this end is to require, as the District Court did, that these patents be licensed royalty free.
The decree of the court below was well fashioned to prevent a continuation of appellants’ monopolistic, practices. The decree as modified leaves them free, in a large measure, to continue to follow the competition-destroying methods by which they achieved control of the industry. In fact, they have received much milder treatment from this Court than they anticipated. This is shown by a memorandum of one of Hartford’s officers made in 1925. That memorandum which discussed plans for suppression of a number of competitors, with particular reference to possible prosecutions under the Sherman Act, read in part as follows:
“Of course, the court might order that we transfer the entire Federal licensing business to some other party and turn over to that party the Federal patents. This, of course, would simply restore to a certain extent the existing situation and establish a competitor. ... I ... do not see much danger of having any of these deals upset. . . . If they are upset, I still believe that by that time, we will be in a better position even with such dissolution than we would be otherwise; and I see no danger whatso*438ever of any criminal liability because the cases are necessarily so doubtful in the matter of law that they could never get any jury to convict and I doubt if any prosecuting officer would ever attempt any criminal action. Criminal action in cases of this sort, so far, has practically been nonexistent.”
I would sustain the decree of the District Court, for the reasons it gave, in all of the paragraphs mentioned.