Court Opinion

ID: 9765843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:21:42.690012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.152498
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority opinion because I think the statement of May 14, 1982 should have been excluded. It is basic that in order for a confession to be admissible it must be given freely and voluntarily and must not have been extracted by threats or violence nor by direct or implied promises. Hutto v. Rose, 429 U.S. 28 (1976); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Freeman v. State, 258 Ark. 617, 527 S.W.2d 909 (1975). Also, the burden of proving that a custodial statement was voluntary rests upon the state. Freeman, supra; Scott v. State, 251 Ark. 918, 475 S.W.2d 699 (1972). The appellant notified the police that he would like to make a statement in the presence of the prosecuting attorney and his own attorney. Not having heard from the officers, the appellant made another call to the same effect the next day. This call resulted in the statement of May 14, 1982. According to the officer and the deputy prosecutor, the appellant’s attorney was not available. In return for the statement the charge against the appellant was reduced from capital murder to murder in the first degree. It was admitted by the officer and the deputy prosecutor that the charge was reduced in exchange for the incriminating statement. The reduction in the charge against appellant is absolute proof that the statement was given in exchange for a promise of reward. The majority rely on Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S.W.2d 1 (1982). They quote a section of the opinion stating that if a false promise was given the statement would be involuntary. However, another portion of the Davis opinion said: “A statement induced by fear or hope of reward is not voluntary.” Also included in the Davis opinion was a quotation from Tatum v. State, 266 Ark. 506, 585 S.W.2d 957 (1979), stating that prisoner vulnerability coupled with the statement, “I’ll help you any way I can,” caused the suppression of a confession. We reversed the conviction on the ground that the statement was given with a promise of reward. When a deputy prosecutor told a prisoner he would help him all that he could, we held the confession to be involuntary. Shelton v. State, 251 Ark. 890, 475 S.W.2d 538 (1972). The fact that a statement was given as a result of a promise of reward, which promise was kept, does not make it any more voluntary than if a promise of reward had not been kept. In either case, at the time the statement is given the accused is hoping for and expecting a reward. The fact that the reward was given leaves no doubt but that the appellant gave the statement with the expectation that the charge against him would be reduced, and it was.