Court Opinion

ID: 9644464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:57:03.428684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.891834
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Associate Justice
(dissenting).
I regret that I must dissent. In my opinion appellant comes clearly within the taxing provisions of the applicable statute and there is no reason why its employees should be deprived of the benefits of the District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Act, which Congress intended they should enjoy. The District Court held, correctly in my opinion, that appellant’s activities were not exclusively charitable, educational, or religious within the meaning of the extemptioif provisions of the statute j1 hence that it was liable for the tax.
It is not clear from the majority opinion upon just which one of the seven possible grounds of exemption it is based. It concludes “that appellant is within the exception clause of the Act; that what are denominated its political activities do not make its purposes less charitable or educational; and that it was the intent and purpose of Congress, in enacting the clause in question without including the limitation which appears in the revenue laws, to make the exception apply where, as here, the primary and hence the exclusive purpose is religious, charitable, or educational (Italics supplied.) Presumably the opinion proceeds upon the broad definitions of charitable purposes which are found in the trust cases; and which include religious, educational and many other purposes. This results in disregarding the fact, pointed out by the District Court, that the word charitable, as it appears in the statute, was used as designating a particular class in addition to other designated classes of charities, usually included in the larger meaning of the word. For the final, decisive step in its reasoning — that appellant’s primary purpose is either religious, charitable, or educational, hence that its exclusive purpose is either religious, charitable, or educational — no authority is cited.
The fallacy which, it seems to me, underlies the majority opinion is the assumption that a complete and controlling analogy exists between the definitions of charitable purposes which are found in the trust cases, and those which should be applied in the-tax cases. But, in fact, there is no necessary identity between the indicia of a charitable trust and those of a charitable pur*343pose -which will exempt an agency from taxation.2 In the latter case the words charitable purposes are customarily held to a narrower meaning.3 Gifts to charity are looked upon with such favor by the courts that every presumption consistent with the language used by the creator of the trust is indulged to sustain them.4 But it does not follow that the gift will be exempt from taxation because of its charitable character.5 The vital distinction between the trust cases and the tax cases, which, I think, destroys the reasoning of the majority opinion, is that the trust cases depend upon whether a charitable purpose can be found — whatever other purposes there may be — while the tax cases are based upon the requirement that the purpose must be exclusively charitable.6 Hence, the analogy must fail, it would seem, at the very point of its application.
The majority opinion relies upon the recent case of Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner ;7 but that case, carefully analyzed, fails, I think, to support its conclusion. Judge Goodrich was careful to base the decision of the court upon the religious character of the Methodist Church; the fact that the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the Methodist Church stands in close relation to the General Conference of the Church, as do such other bodies as its B-oard of Foreign Missions, and operates under the Articles of Discipline of the General Conference of the Church; the action of the governing body of the Church in condemning the liquor traffic; the fact that the Church has since its organization in 1874, regarded personal practices of its members with regard to the use of intoxicating liquors as an inherent part -of its religious practices. It was after laying this foundation for exemption, that the court went on to inquire whether the activity of the Board of Temperance, in attempting to influence certain legislation, would unclass an organization which was admittedly charitable, or educational, or religious in character. It was in this connection that it used the language quoted by the majority. The language omitted from the quotation is even more significant as indicating the reasoning of the third circuit court.8 In the present case, the Reform Federation was not admittedly religious, educational, or charitable in character. Neither was it connected with such an institution, or governed by the governing board, or operated under the articles of discipline of such an institution. It must stand or fall by itself. The very question which must be determined is whether it— standing alone — is religious, or educational, or charitable in character.
It is in this respect, also, that the majority opinion, I think, misapplies Judge Learned Pland’s opinion in Slee v. Commissioner.9 In that case the American Birth Control League was, admittedly, a charitable institution; because it operated a free clinic, “a recognized form oí charitable venture.” But the important question was whéther by agitating for the repeal of laws preventing birth control, the League was prevented from being exclusively charitable. The court said the effect *344of such agitation was to take the League out of the exempt class; in other words to unclass an otherwise admittedly charitable organization. It was in this connection that Judge Hand said: “Nevertheless, there are many charitable, literary and scientific ventures that as an incident to their success require changes in the law. A charity may need a special charter allowing it to receive larger gifts. * * * A society to prevent cruelty to children, or animals, needs the positive support of law to accomplish its ends. * * * A state university is constantly trying to get appropriations from the Legislature; for all that, it seems to us still an exclusively educational institution.” (Italics supplied.)
In other words, assuming an institution which is, normally speaking, religious, or educational, or charitable in character, its attempt to secure a change in the law, as an incident of its success, is not enough to unclass it and deprive it of the exemption from taxation. Thus, in the present case, assuming that the Reform Federation was in fact a religious organization, the fact that it might have attempted to secure legislation to change its corporate character, or to enable it to invest its surplus in common stocks, or even to secure exemption of its property from taxation, would not have unclassed it and deprived it of a privilege based upon its religious character.
But when the attempt to secure legislation goes beyond such incidents of success, then it does unclass even an otherwise admittedly exempt organization. In the Slee case, the clinic which the League maintained was confined to married women “who ought not bear children both for their own, and the children’s, sake.” 10 The legislation for which it agitated was the repeal of laws preventing birth control. Certainly, this was getting pretty close to the work of the clinic; close enough, in fact, so that the court was impelled to comment: “We cannot say that the Board [of Tax Appeals] was without warrant in concluding that this aspect of the League’s work was not confined solely to relieving its hospital work from legal obstacles.” The decision of the court, accordingly, was that the exemption provision could not be availed of to defeat liability for the tax.
In the present case, the Reform Federation should fail on both counts. It is not, normally speaking, a religious, educational, or charitable organization, and the lobbying activities in which it engaged were far from being, merely, incidental to its success. In judging its character we should look to its own professions and activities.11 It selected its own name and the words which it used to describe those activities.12 It seeks now to use descriptive words of love, charity, religion, education. But the words which it chose for its name and for its constitution do not connote love or charity. Instead, they connote strife, conflict and bitterness. It cannot reasonably be doubted that appellant deliberately propelled itself into an area of politics, propaganda, law enforcement, campaigning for office, and legislative reform. However commendable such activities may be, they do not bring it within the exemption clause of the applicable statute.
Its name alone is significant of its character: Reform Federation. The word reform is broad enough to cover all human interests and activities. The cases in which it has been defined do not attempt to limit it, beyond such general specifications as the lessening of evil and the increasing of good;13 to remove what is erroneous, superfluous, faulty; to supply deficiencies; a correction of faults or errors.14 Webster defines reform as meaning : “Amendment of what is defective, vicious, corrupt, or depraved, or a case' of it; reformation; a removal or correction of an abuse or wrong; as reform of elections; reform of government.”15 Certainly these are not the terms which are used to describe religion or education or charity. Certainly, they are the words. *345which are used to describe political activity.
In its constitution the Reform Federation did not pretend to define its activities in terms of particular purposes, educational, religious or charitable in character, or of charitable, religious or educational purposes generally. Consider its language: “* * * the promotion of those reforms on which the Churches sociologically agree while theologically differing, * * (Italics supplied.) Here seems to be an actual repudiation of religious purpose. It is difficult, indeed, to say in what respect, if at all, the churches agree sociologically upon anything. To many church people and to many sociologists religion and sociology are mutually exclusive.16 Of one thing we may be sure; namely, that in using the word sociologically to describe its activities, the Reform Federation again gave itself the widest possible range. Webster defines sociology as follows: “The science of the constitution, phenomena and development of society. Both the term sociology and the science, in its modern acceptation, date from Comte’s discrimination of it in 1838 as the science of the associated life of humanity. After Comte, Herbert Spencer was the chief founder of the science, his application of the doctrine of evolution to1 social development and this view of society as a ‘social organism’ contributing the main impetus and trend to its modern development.”17 (Italics supplied in part.)
Far from constituting an incident to an admittedly educational, religious or charitable purpose, the legislative activities of the Reform Federation were in themselves a major purpose. Far from limiting its activities to lobbying for certain specific legislation, the changes in the law which the Reform Federation sought, covered a wide variety of issues, several of which have been the subject of planks in party platforms and have been bitterly fought in local, state and national elections. In fact, the reforms for which it has sought legislative change would constitute a pretty formidable party platform in themselves: “ * * * gambling, lotteries, red light abatement, the liquor and narcotic traffic, Sabbath observance, Bible in the public schools, marriage and divorce”; “ * * * brutal sports, Sunday traffic, obscene prints, indecent shows and aU, promoted vices.” (Italics supplied.) In its constitution it lists also “the substitution of arbitration and conciliation for both industrial and international war.” One need be only a casual observer of the domestic and international scene to grasp the tremendous implications of this broad specification of purposes.
But the Reform Federation went far beyond the activities enumerated above. Its constitution provides that “there may be a legislative director who shall have charge under the direction of the General Superintendent, of securing the enactment of good Federal and state laws affecting mor-*346ais, and shall defeat and repeal bad legislation.” (Italics supplied.) In addition it had “a law enforcement director,” it “maintained a department of law enforcement, chiefly engaged in the suppression of race-track gambling, purging the mails and newsstands of erotic literature and the enforcement of moral laws in the cities, counties and states * * (Italics supplied.) More than this it engaged in the conduct of campaigns “for the election of public officials, whenever, in his [law enforcement director] judgment, there is a moral issue at stake of sufficient consequence to justify participation of the Federation * * (Italics supplied.)
There is implicit in tax exemption the theory that the agency exempted is, in each case, engaged in the performance of duties which, otherwise, the government would itself perform or which are of a nature which the government might properly perform; in other words, that by exempting from taxation, the government is in fact granting a subsidy to the agency in return for its relieving the government of a proper burden of government.18 Surely no government, in this country, would or should engage in the activities which constitute the major part of the Reform Federation’s work.
For all these reasons, and for what seem to me their obvious implications, in relation to the taxing functions of the District Government, I find' it necessary, regretfully, to depart from the conclusions of my associates.

 D.C.Unemployment Compensation Act of August 28, 1935, as amended, D.C. Code (1940) § 46 — 301(b) (7): “service performed in the employ of a corporation * * * organized and operated exclusively for [1] religious, [2] charitable,  scientific, [4] literary, [5] or educational purposes, [6] or for the prevention of cruelty to children [7] or animals, * * (Numbers and italics supplied)

 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 375.2: “It is to be constantly borne in mind that a decision that a trust or organization is not exempt from * * * taxes is not necessarily a decision that it is not charitable.”

 Industrial Commission v. Woodlawn Cemetery Ass’n, 232 Wis. 527, 534, 287 N.W. 750, 753.

 Summers v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 335 Ill. 564, 567, 167 N.E. 777, 778. See Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 97 N.E. 265, Ann.Cas.l913A, 135.

 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 374.4: “A decision to the effect that the donor or donee is not entitled to an exemption from the payment of a tax does not necessarily mean that the gift is not for other purposes a charitable gift.”

 3 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 374.4.

 3 Cir., 122 E.2d 108, 109, 110, 138 A L.R. 448.

 Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 122 F.2d 108, 110, 138 A.L.R. 448: “Nor has the law sought to draw such a bright line between the exercise of private and public influence. Judge Sand has pointed out that the promoters of charity are not unelassed when the charity seeks a special charter or when a society to prevent cruelty to children seeks positive support of law to accomplish Us ends or when a university seeks legislation to provide its appropriations. Surely a church would not lose its exemption as a religious institution if, pending a proposal to repeal Sunday observance laws, the congregation held a meeting on church property and authorized a committee to appear before a legislative body to protest against the repeal.” (Italics supplied.)

 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 184, 185, 72 A.L.R. 400.

 2 Cir., 42 F.2d 184, 185, 72 A.L.R. 400.

 Hazen v. National Rifle Ass'n, 69 App.D.C. 339, 101 F.2d 432.

 Cf. Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App.D.C. 161, 117 F.2d 774, 133 A.L.R. 914.

 Little v. State ex rel. Huey, 137 Ala. 659, 666, 35 So. 134, 136, overruled on another point sub. nom. State ex rel. Gamble v. Hubbard, 148 Ala. 391, 41 So. 903. Of. McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U.S. 432, 435, 29 S.Ct. 146, 53 L.Bd. 269, citing Rapalje, Law Dict. 1083; McCorquodale v. State, 54 Tex.Cr. 344, 365, 98 S.W. 879, 887.

 In re Pennsylvania Tel. Co., 2 Chest. Co. Rep., Pa., 129,131.

 Webster New International Dictionary (1931).

 Consider, for example, the following quotations, the first by a well known sociologist, the second taken from The Catholic Encyclopedia.
a. Harry Elmer Barnes, Sociology, 13 Nelson's Encyclopedia (1940): “The sociological influence upon ethics has been revolutionary in theory, however little it may have effected conduct in practice. It has made clear the group basis of all ethical guides and criteria, hcwe\ er self-assured a social group may be with respect to the allegation of the divinely-revealed nature of its ethical concepts and practices, It has also emphasized the necessity of adopting a secular basis for the judgment of human conduct, insisting that the object of ethics should be to produce an ever greater number of happy and efficient human beings here upon the earth, and not to save a vast throng of souls eagerly quitting their earthly misery.”
b. XIV The Catholic Encyclopedia (Special ed. 1912) 117: “Modern sociology hopes to arrive at a metaphysics through the systematic observation and interpretation of present and past social facts and processes. In the Christian view of life, however, the social sciences are guided by a smiotioned metaidiysies and ifiiilosoidiy. This philosophy is derived not from induction but from Revelation. This view of life accepts at the outset as divinely warranted the moral and social precepts taught or reenforced by Christ. * * * While modem sociology is seeking descriptive laws of human desires and is endeavoring to classify human interests and to account for social functions, it is secic-ing merely for changes, uniformities, and interpretations unconcerned with any relation of these to the Divine law.” (Italics supplied.)

 Webster New International Dictionary (1931).

 Hazen v. National Rifle Ass’n, 69 App.D.C. 339, 343, 101 F.2d 432, 436, at n. 16, and cases there cited.