Court Opinion

ID: 9760267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:45:13.93179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:10.044413
License: Public Domain

Melvin Mayfield, Chief Judge, dissenting. In this suit against a Chevrolet car dealer in Berryville, Arkansas, the appellee, a Chevrolet dealer in Uniontown, Alabama, testified that the market value of the 1978 Pace Car Corvette involved here was $22,500. He then offered in evidence a copy of the classified ad section of the Wall Street Journal dated May 5, 1978, in which there were seven separate advertisements offering to sell 1978 Corvette Pace cars or “Indy” Pace Cars for prices ranging from a low of $21,500 to a high of $50,000. The appellant objected to the introduction of this page of the newspaper on grounds that it was hearsay and not admissible to prove market value under either the Uniform Rules of Evidence or the Commercial Code. The court overruled the objection saying, “I am going to admit it for the limited purpose of going to the question of how he arrived at the fair market value that he’s stated on these cars.” I think the court was clearly in error. In Golenternek v. Kurth, 213 Ark. 643, 212 S.W. 2d 14 (1948), the court quoted with approval from American Jurisprudence to the effect that proof of mere offers to buy or sell is not competent to show the value of property. Golenternek involved an automobile and the case was cited in Hinton v. Bryant, 232 Ark. 688, 339 S.W. 2d 621 (1960), a case involving a set of platform scales, where the court said “isolated offers for the purchase of property are not ordinarily competent evidence of its value.” And in Arkansas Hwy. Comm. v. Hambuchen, 243 Ark. 832, 422 S.W. 2d 688 (1968) the court said: “As we pointed out in Hinton v. Bryant . . . isolated offers to purchase are mere hearsay declarations of third persons, not made under oath and not subject to cross-examination.” This rule is not peculiar to Arkansas. See Peterson v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix, 102 Ariz. 434, 432 P. 2d 446 (1967); State v. Morehouse Holding Co., 357 P. 2d 266 (Or. 1960); United States v. Smith, 355 F. 2d 807 (5th Cir. 1966); and see generally III Wigmore, Evidence § 719 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Now it should be noted that the page of the newspaper introduced into evidence did not contain market reports or quotations which would be admissible under Rule 803 (17) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, but mere offers to sell —hearsay and inadmissible. The majority admits the ads were hearsay but says “we fail to see any harm suffered by appellant because of their introduction.” In Hanna Lumber Co. v. Neff Design Builder, 265 Ark. 462, 579 S.W. 2d 95 (1979) where hearsay had been improperly introduced, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed saying: “Error is presumed to be prejudicial unless it is demonstrated to be otherwise or is manifestly not prejudicial.” And in Wallin v. Ins. Co. of North America, 268 Ark. 847, 596 S.W. 2d 716 (Ark. App. 1980) the Arkansas Court of Appeals in reversing because hearsay evidence had been admitted said: While unquestionably there was ample competent evidence in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury, we could only speculate or surmise as to whether the incompetent evidence influenced the jury in finding for the appellees. Under such circumstances we cannot say the ultimate result was not affected and that there was no prejudice to the appellants. The rule is that error in the trial is presumed to be prejudicial unless the court on appeal can say with assurance the error is harmless. (Citations omitted.) I am unable to share the majority’s assurance that the admission of the ads in the Wall Street Journal offering to sell a 1978 Corvette Pace Car for as much as $50,000 failed to cause the appellant any harm. I cannot escape the feeling that this Arkansas j ury paid about as much attention to what the Wall Street Journal said as they did to what the Alabama car dealer said. I am sure the appellee and his attorney hoped it would. I know the trial judge said he was admitting the evidence so the jury could see how the appellee “arrived at the fair market value that he’s stated on these cars.” And I understand that the appellant thinks that this evidence had something to do with the finding of the jury that a car in Berryville, Arkansas, with a list price of $14,410 was actually worth $22,500. I would reverse.