Court Opinion

ID: 9569424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:42.728311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:32.563252
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge.
Joey D. Griffin and Karen Griffin, on behalf of their nine-year-old son, Bo Griffin, brought an action against Lavern Supan for injuries Bo Griffin sustained when he was attacked by Lavern Supan’s “Rottweiler and Chow mix” dog. Supan moved for summary judgment under Georgia’s so-called “first bite” rule on the basis that he had no prior knowledge of this dog’s propensity to bite. The trial court denied this motion, and this Court granted Supan’s application for interlocutory appeal. We affirm because evidence of Supan’s statement to a neighbor, who was menaced by four or five of Supan’s dogs, including the dog that bit young Bo Griffin, less than a month *405before the attack on this child, “to do whatever was necessary ... to keep the dogs from attacking” raises genuine issues of material fact as to Supan’s prior knowledge of his dogs’ tendency to attack humans. See McBride v. Wasik, 179 Ga. App. 244 (345 SE2d 921).
Joey D. Griffin testified during his deposition that he and his two minor sons, Bo and Troy, were driving on a road adjacent to the Supan home place when they came upon a motor vehicle collision involving Lavern Supan’s 14-year-old son, Eddie Supan. Joey D. Griffin discovered that a car was “straddling a motor cycle [and that] Eddie [Supan] was right on the side of the road, on the edge of the road.” Joey D. Griffin observed that Eddie Supan had been driving the motorcycle and that his leg was “messed up.” Joey D. Griffin placed Eddie Supan in his truck and asked Eddie Supan if he “want[ed Joey D. Griffin] to take him down to his [Supan’s] house [and] he said yes, please.” They then set out for Supan’s home. As the Griffin truck approached the Supan residence, several dogs (four or five) came outside and began barking. Eddie Supan informed Joey D. Griffin that the dogs would not bite, so Joey D. Griffin exited his truck and began walking Eddie Supan to the house. Young Bo Griffin followed in his father’s footsteps.
Meanwhile, Eddie Supan’s mother came out of the house and assured Joey D. Griffin that the dogs would not bite. She said, “don’t worry about the dogs.” Joey D. Griffin then turned and instructed young Bo Griffin to return to the truck and sit with his three-year-old brother, Troy Griffin, who was crying at the time. Bo Griffin turned to comply, but was immediately attacked by Lavern Supan’s “Rottweiler and Chow mix” dog. This animal “charged at him [Bo Griffin] and attacked him from the back[,] biting him in his leg, pushing] him across the ground and was shaking him.” Joey D. Griffin forced the attacking dog off his son and rushed the injured child to a hospital emergency room.
Lavern Supan’s affidavit indicates that the attack on Bo Griffin was the first knowledge he had of his dog’s propensity to bite. The-Griffins challenged this statement with an affidavit from Steven Lee Keller, Lavern Supan’s neighbor. Keller deposed that, about three months before Lavern Supan’s dog bit Bo Griffin, a number of Supan’s dogs (four or five in all) came onto his (Keller’s) home’s front porch, including the “Rottweiler and Chow mix” that bit Bo Griffin, “viciously attacked [Keller’s] small dog,” and threatened him (Keller) with “bared fangs, vicious growls and attack behavior.” Keller deposed that he was “able, by opening and closing his screen door, to finally get the Supan dogs to leave his residence.” Keller further deposed that, “because they [the dogs] were so vicious, he followed the dogs and they went back to the home of Lavern Supan.” Keller explained that he then
*406approached Mr. Lavern Supan and told Mr. Supan of the incident with the dogs and that they were vicious and should be locked up[; that] Mr. Supan acknowledged that the dogs were a problem and told [Keller] that if the dogs ever came back on [Keller’s] property, to do whatever was necessary ... to keep the dogs from attacking and off of [Keller’s] property.
Held:
Steven Keller’s report regarding Supan’s dogs’ prior vicious and aggressive behavior on Keller’s property brings the case sub judice within this Court’s holding in McBride v. Wasik, 179 Ga. App. 244, supra. In McBride v. Wasik, supra, which this Court determined was governed by OCGA § 51-2-7, that defendant pet owner’s prior statement concerning a desire for his dog to attack that plaintiff, without proof that the dog had ever bitten anyone, raised genuine issues of material fact as to that defendant’s liability for his dog’s subsequent attack on that plaintiff based on that defendant’s prior knowledge of his dog’s propensity to attack people. Id. at 244-245 (2). Applying the same logic in the case sub judice, we find that Lavern Supan’s statement to Steven Keller, about three months before Supan’s dog bit Bo Griffin, for Keller “to do whatever was necessary ... to keep the dogs from attacking” raises genuine issues of material fact as to Supan’s prior knowledge of his dogs’ tendency to attack humans. This proof distinguishes the case sub judice from the recent whole court decision in Hamilton v. Walker, 235 Ga. App. 635 (510 SE2d 120), where this Court narrowly held that a dog’s aggressive and menacing behavior remains insufficient, despite legislative revision of Georgia’s dog bite liability statute (OCGA § 51-2-7) in 1985, to show the animal’s propensity to bite.
Evidence that Bo Griffin was on Lavern Supan’s property as a “Good Samaritan” invitee, rather than as a visitor-licensee, also distinguishes this case from dog bite cases based on simple negligence. With proof regarding Lavern Supan’s prior knowledge of his dog’s vicious tendencies, the true test of liability in the case sub judice is Lavern Supan’s superior knowledge of his dog’s temperament. See Pickard v. Cook, 223 Ga. App. 595, 596 (2) (478 SE2d 432); Sutton v. Sutton, 145 Ga. App. 22 (1), 25 (243 SE2d 310). Accordingly, under the authority of OCGA § 51-2-7 (1985), the trial court was absolutely correct in denying defendant Lavern Supan’s motion for summary judgment and allowing this case to be resolved by a jury.

Judgment affirmed.

Johnson, C. J., Pope, P. J., Smith, Ruffin and Eldridge, JJ., concur. Andrews, J., dissents.