Court Opinion

ID: 9560240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:45:53.481564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:29.538342
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
The majority holds that the time spent by the defendant in Denver County jail between the time of issuance of the Jefferson County warrant and the time he was transferred to the Jefferson County jail cannot be credited against a sentence imposed for *882his conviction in Jefferson County. I respectfully dissent.
Section 16-11-306, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), provided in relevant part that “[a] person who is confined prior to the imposition of sentence is entitled to credit against the term of his sentence for the entire period of such confinement.” In Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788 (Colo.1985), we held that this statute “requires a sentencing judge to credit a defendant with that period of time spent in custody as the result of the charge for which the sentence is imposed or as the result of the conduct on which such charge is based.” Id. at 795. In determining whether presentence confinement meets that test, it is appropriate to ask “[w]as the presentence confinement actually caused by the charge or conduct for which the offender is to be sentenced?” Id. at 795. “While causation in this context does not mean that the charge or conduct for which the sentence is to be imposed must be the exclusive cause of the offender’s confinement, it does mean that there must be a substantial nexus between such charge or conduct and the period of confinement for which credit is sought.” Id. at 795.
Admittedly, our formulation of the standard for determination of whether a charge is the cause of confinement is not calculated to yield litmus test certainty in application. In the present case, however, I would conclude that causation is amply established. The defendant was held in jail in Denver because of two charges, one filed in Denver and the other in Jefferson County. Dismissal of either would not have gained freedom for the defendant. Satisfying bail requirements for either alone would also not have resulted in the defendant’s release. Under these circumstances, I am persuaded that there is a substantial nexus between the Jefferson County charge and the period of the defendant’s confinement subsequent to the issuance of the Jefferson County warrant. But see Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d at 796-97 (defendant not entitled to credit on Jefferson County sentence for time spent in Boulder County jail awaiting disposition of Boulder County charges, even though Jefferson County first had custody of the defendant and transferred him to Boulder County for the purpose of resolving the charges in that latter county).
As Judge Pierce held in his opinion for the Colorado Court of Appeals in this case, the defendant is entitled to credit for the time spent in the Denver County jail from the time “the Jefferson County arrest warrant was issued and effected a hold on defendant’s release from the Denver jail.” People v. Freeman, 705 P.2d 528, 530 (Colo.App.1985). I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to say that Justice DUBOFSKY joins in this dissent.