Court Opinion

ID: 9696801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:59:01.442197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:39.068192
License: Public Domain

Stephan, J.,
dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority that the appellants’ claim under Neb. U.C.C. § 2-302 (Reissue 2001) is without merit, I respectfully dissent with respect to its conclusion that the district court erred in dismissing the appellants’ claim under Nebraska’s Consumer Protection Act (Act), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1601 et seq. (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000). In my view, the provisions of the Act which define who may bring a private civil action for damages were, at all relevant times, substantially similar to corresponding language in § 4 of the Clayton Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000), and the district court was therefore correct in concluding that it was obligated under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-829 (Reissue 1998) to follow Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977), in construing the Nebraska statute.
*601Section 59-829 requires that when any language in the Act is “the same as or similar to the language of a federal antitrust law,” Nebraska courts in construing the Act “shall follow the construction given to the federal law by the federal courts.” It is difficult to imagine how the Legislature could have been more clear in articulating its intent that provisions of the Act which were modeled after federal antitrust law must be construed in the same manner that the U.S. Supreme Court construes the corresponding federal statutes. In carrying out this directive, it is imperative that we clearly identify the state and federal statutes which are counterparts of each other so that we do not commit the error of comparing state apples to federal oranges.
The appellants’ claim is based upon an alleged violation of the substantive provision of § 59-1604, which states: “It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of trade or commerce.” The corresponding substantive provision of federal antitrust law is § 2 of the Sherman Act, which provides: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. ..” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). While the federal statute applies to monopolization of “trade or commerce among the several States,” i.e., interstate commerce, the corresponding Nebraska statute uses only the phrase “[t]rade and commerce,” which is defined elsewhere in the Act as “the sale of assets or services and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the State of Nebraska.” § 59-1601(2). In Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258 Neb. 678, 684, 605 N.W.2d 136, 142 (2000), we held that this definitional language limited the scope of the Act to acts or practices which have “an impact upon the public interest,” and concluded that the Act is not available “to redress a private wrong where the public interest is unaffected.”
Thus, while it must be shown that challenged conduct affects interstate commerce in order to be actionable under the federal antitrust laws, it is only necessary to show that such conduct affects the public interest in order to fall within the scope of the Act. But that is not the issue before us. Assuming arguendo that *602the conduct at issue in this case is proscribed by the Act, the question presented here is whether the appellants, as indirect purchasers, are authorized by law to bring a civil action for damages resulting from such conduct. The Act, as it was written when this suit was commenced, authorized “[a]ny person who is injured in his business or property” by a violation of the substantive provisions of the Act to bring an action for injunctive relief and damages. § 59-1609. The corresponding provision of federal antitrust law is § 4 of the Clayton Act, which permits ' “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” to bring a civil action for treble damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). The U.S. Supreme Court construed this federal statutory provision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977). In that case, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach., 392 U.S. 481, 88 S. Ct. 2224, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1231 (1968), that a defendant in an antitrust suit could not assert as a defense that the plaintiff suffered no injury in its business as required by § 4 of the Clayton Act because it had passed on the claimed illegal overcharge to its customers. Specifically, the Court in Illinois Brick Co. declined “to construe § 4 [of the Clayton Act] to permit offensive use of a pass-on theory against an alleged violator that could not use the same theory as a defense in an action by direct purchasers.” Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.
Under both § 4 of the Clayton Act and § 59-1609 as it was written when this action was commenced, a private civil action may be maintained by one whose “business or property” is injured by the claimed substantive law violation. Because of the similar language employed by each statute in defining who may be a plaintiff, it is my view that § 59-829 requires this court to construe § 59-1609 in the same manner that the U.S. Súpreme Court construed § 4 of the Clayton Act in Illinois Brick Co. to exclude indirect purchasers from the class of potential plaintiffs. This is purely a matter of statutory construction.
As the majority notes, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that states are free to enact legislation permitting indirect purchasers to bring civil antitrust actions under state law. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 S. Ct. 1661, *603104 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1989). Indeed, the Nebraska Legislature did precisely that in 2002 when it amended § 59-1609 to permit a person injured in his or her business or property to sue “whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant.” 2002 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1278 (effective July 20, 2002). While that is the law in Nebraska now, it was not the law when this action was commenced on February 28, 2001, or when the district court dismissed the action in November 2001. If, in a subsequent amendment on the same or similar subject, the Legislature uses different terms in the same connection, a court interpreting the subsequent enactment must presume that the Legislature intended a change in the law. State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003); Johnson v. Kenney, 265 Neb. 47, 654 N.W.2d 191 (2002). In my view, the majority ignores both this principle and the harmonization provision of § 59-829 by concluding that § 59-1609 authorized suit by an indirect purchaser before the Legislature amended the statute to specifically create that right.
Nor am I persuaded that the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002), relieves this court of its responsibility to interpret the Act in accordance with the specific rule of construction prescribed by our Legislature in § 59-829. The Iowa case is distinguishable on at least two grounds. First, it interpreted language in the Iowa Competition Law authorizing a private civil action by a “ ‘person who is injured ... by conduct prohibited under this chapter.’ ” Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 443. This language is different from the language of § 59-1604 and § 4 of the Clayton Act as construed in Illinois Brick Co., which authorizes a civil suit by a “person injured in his business or property” as a result of claimed unlawful conduct. Second, the harmonization provision in the Iowa Competition Law differs from § 59-829 in that it directs Iowa courts to construe its statute “ ‘to complement and be harmonized with the applied laws of the United States’ ” having a similar purpose in order to achieve “ ‘uniform application of the state and federal laws prohibiting restraints of economic activity and monopolistic practices.’” (Emphasis omitted.) Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 446, citing and quoting Iowa Code Ann. § 553.2 (West 1997). Against this statutory background, the Iowa Supreme *604Court defined the issue as whether it “should interpret Iowa antitrust law in the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted federal antitrust law” and resolved the issue by concluding that Iowa courts were not required “to interpret the Iowa Competition Law the same way federal courts have interpreted federal law.” Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 445-46. I conclude that the opposite result is compelled by the language of § 59-829 requiring that Nebraska courts, in construing provisions of our Act using language similar to that of the federal antitrust laws, “shall follow the construction given to the federal law by the federal courts.”
For these reasons, on rehearing, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
Hendry, C.J., and Gerrard, L, join in this dissent.