Court Opinion

ID: 9678929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:36:22.966133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.201097
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the principal opinion is contrary to the plain meaning and settled interpretation of the sales tax law, I dissent. The principal opinion’s novel conclusions do not withstand analysis under the touchstone for statutory construction in this state:
The primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain the lawmakers’ intent, from the words used if possible; and to put upon the language of the Legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object, and the manifest purpose of the statute, considered historically, is properly given consideration.
Cummins v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 334 Mo. 672, 66 S.W.2d 920, 925 (1933).
I. Statutory History
The principal opinion ignores the sixty-five-year history of subdivision 144.020.1(2)— all dismissed with one word: “Inexplicably.” Subdivision 144.020.1(2)1 provides:
A tax is hereby levied and imposed upon all sellers for the privilege of engaging in the business of selling tangible personal property or rendering taxable service at retail in this state. The rate of tax shall be as follows:
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(2) A tax equivalent to four percent of the amount paid for admission and seating accommodations, or fees paid to, or in any place of amusement, entertainment or recreation, games and athletic events. The language of the sales tax law, through its enactment and amendment, shows that the *812General Assembly has not linked together “recreation, games and athletic events,” but instead has created alternative categories of 1) places of amusement, entertainment or recreation, 2) games and 3) athletic events.
The language of the sales tax law, through its enactment and amendment, shows that the General Assembly has not linked together “recreation, games and athletic events,” but instead has created alternative categories of 1) places of amusement, entertainment or recreation, 2) games and 3) athletic events.
A. Original Enactment and Early Amendments
“The history of the evolution of the law into its present shape throws light upon the intention of the lawmakers, and aids in arriving at the true meaning” of subdivision 144.020.1(2). State ex rel. Frisby v. Stone, 152 Mo. 202, 53 S.W. 1069, 1070 (1899). As originally enacted in 1933, the Sales Tax Act applied to charges and fees to “places of amusement, games and athletic events.” 1983-1934. Mo. Laws Extra Session 157, sec. 2A(a); see also L & R Distrib., Inc. v. Missouri Dep’t of Revenue, 529 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Mo. banc 1975). In 1935, the words “entertainment or recreation” were inserted into the list. 1935 Mo. Laws 415, sec 2. The 1935 law carried forward the original categories of “places of amusement, ... games and athletic events.” Id. When a section of law is amended, only the added part is treated as a new law, and the remainder is a continuation of the former law. Sec. 1.120; Stone, 53 S.W. at 1071.
The original and early enactments demonstrate that “recreation” is not linked with “games” and “athletic events.” If linked with any concept in this law, it is “entertainment.” In 1937, the phrase “or in” was added to section 144.020.1(2) after “fees paid to.” 1937 Mo. Laws 557, sec. 2. Otherwise, section 144.020.1(2)⅛ language has remained unchanged since 1935.
B. 1985 Amendment to Section 144.020
Other subdivisions of section 144.020, however, have been amended. A section of law should be interpreted with reference to subsequent amendments. City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Mo. banc 1980). The “legislature’s action of repeal and enactment is presumed to have some substantive effect such that it will not be found to be a meaningless act of housekeeping.” Clair v. Whittaker, 557 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Mo. banc 1977).
In 1985, the General Assembly reenacted all of section 144.020, adding this sentence to subdivision 144.020.1(8):
In no event shall the rental or lease of boats and outboard motors be considered a sale, charge, or fee to, for or in places of amusement, entertainment or recreation nor shall any such rental or lease be subject to any tax imposed to, for, or in such places of amusement, entertainment or recreation.
H.B. 280, 1985 Mo. Laws 693, 697 (emphasis added). Subdivision 144.020.1(8) — within the very section the principal opinion focuses on — twice uses the phrase “places of amusement, entertainment or recreation” without mentioning “games” and “athletic events.” The legislature has never recognized the category proposed by the principal opinion, but has recognized a category of “places of amusement, entertainment or recreation.”
This principle that statutes should be construed harmoniously when they relate to the same subject matter is all the more compelling when the statutes are passed in the same legislative session. Moreover, when the same or similar words are used in different places within the same legislative act and relate to the same or similar subject matter, then the statutes are in pari materia and should be construed to achieve a harmonious interpretation of the statutes.
State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. banc 1992) (internal quote marks and citations omitted); see also Hagely v. Board of Educ. of Webster Groves Sch. Dist., 841 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Mo. banc 1992); Marre v. Reed, 775 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Mo. banc 1989). In subsection 144.020.1(8), the legislature — in the same act during the same 1985 session— drew the line that “places of amusement, entertainment or recreation” did not include “games” and “athletic events.”
*813C. 1992 Enactment of Section 144.041
Further evidence that the legislature treats “games” as a separate category is found in section 144.041, which refers solely to “games.” The legislature enacted section 144.041 in 1992 in order to exempt admissions to the 1994 World Cup Soccer Tournament games. S.B. 533, 1992 Mo. Laws 578. Section 144.041 refers solely to “charges for admissions, as defined in section 144.010, to any of the games.” Thus, the legislature created an exemption for “games” and did not mention “recreation” and “athletic events.” The General Assembly in section 144.041 recognized that admissions to “games” alone were normally taxable.
II. Legislative Adoption of Settled Judicial Interpretation
In Part II, the principal opinion claims that a long line of this Court’s cases indicates the “tendency to mix and match” the terms of subdivision 144.020.1(2). Rather, these cases — which treat “places of amusement, entertainment or recreation” as a separate category from “games” and “athletic events”— reflect a settled judicial construction of the statute.
More than twenty years ago, this Court held: “[T]he statute [144.020.1(2)] plainly provides for a sales tax on receipts from amounts paid for admission to places of amusement, entertainment or recreation, os well as to games and athletic events.” Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling, 551 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. banc 1977) (emphasis added). This Court could not have been clearer that places of amusement, entertainment or recreation were a different category from games and athletic events. This Court then followed this distinction in at least the six cases cited by the principal opinion: Moon Shadow, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 945 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Mo. banc 1997); High Adventure Game Ranch, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Mo. banc 1992); Fostaire Harbor, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 679 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. banc 1984); L & R Distrib. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 648 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. banc 1983); Spudich v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Mo. banc 1988); Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 599. Since subdivision 144.020.1(2) was originally enacted, this Court has consistently interpreted it as providing alternative categories.
Construction of a statute by this Court becomes part of the statute as if it had been amended by the legislature. Dow Chemical, 834 S.W.2d at 745. Where the legislature, after a statute has received settled judicial construction by the courts of last resort, reenacts the statute, or carries it over without change, it will be presumed that the legislature knew of and adopted the construction. Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 600-01; Dow Chemical, 834 S.W.2d at 742; Roy F. Stamm Elec. Co. v. Hamilton-Browm Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 1178, 171 S.W.2d 580, 583 (1943).
In this case there is more than a presumption that the legislature adopted the judicial construction. As outlined in section I.B above, the legislature in 1985 enacted the category “amusement, entertainment or recreation” without mentioning “games and athletic events.” See section 144.020.1(8).
The principal opinion seeks to change the accepted judicial construction of the statute by requiring that fees to or in a recreational business are taxable only if it also has games and athletic events. This Court cannot change the uniformly followed and legislatively adopted judicial construction of a statute.
However we might construe these sections if they were now before us on first impression, it is sufficient to say that they are not incapable of the construction then judicially given them and legislatorially adopted. If at the time the law was enacted there was any room for doubt as to the legislative intent, it has long since disappeared in view of the legislative sanction given this construction under which the law has proved workable. If this sanction is removed, it should be by legislative rather than judicial intervention.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ranson, 328 Mo. 524, 41 S.W.2d 169 (1931).
*814III. Grammar and Conjunctions
In view of the statute’s history and the accepted judicial construction, it is no mystery that “this Court has never focused on the manner in which conjunctions and commas are used” in this statute, at 812. Courts in this state are reluctant to construe the intent of the legislature based solely on punctuation and grammatical construction. Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Exp., 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1991). Even examined from a grammatical point of view, the statute does not read as the principal opinion suggests. In Part II, the principal opinion would rigidly restrict the word “and” in order to cluster “recreation” with “games” and “athletic events.”
The legislature occasionally uses “and” and “or” interchangeably. “[I]t is certain ‘or’ is often interpreted to mean ‘and’ and vice ver-sa, if the context shows that meaning was intended, or when, as said, an absurd consequence, or frustration of the object of the enactment, would otherwise follow.” Hurley v. Eidson, 258 S.W.2d 607, 608-09 (Mo. banc 1953).
The context of subdivision 144.020.1(2) and 144.020.1(8) is clear from the statutory history and settled judicial interpretation. Thus, the “and” separating “games” from “athletic events” means that the terms are alternatives in a series.
The very next subsection of section 144.020 also provides context and demonstrates the absurd results of the principal opinion’s interpretation of “and.” Subdivision 144.020.1(3) imposes: “A tax ... on all sales of electricity or electrical current, water and gas, natural or artificial ...” Under the principal opinion’s proposed strict reading of conjunctions, sales of “electricity” are subject to sales tax, but sales of “electrical current” are not — unless the sale also includes “water and gas.” Clearly, the legislature intended these terms as alternatives, each subject to sales tax, just as it did in the preceding subdivision 144.020.1(2).
The principal opinion claims that “placement of commas within the clause” is critical, without explaining the effect on the meaning of the statute. The comma placement in this statute, in fact, supports the accepted construction of the statute: it contains a series within a series. The series “entertainment, amusement or recreation” is contained within the series of “places of ..., games and athletic events. In both series, the legislature omitted a comma before the conjunction, which indicates that the three terms following “places of’ are part of a single series.
IV.
For all these reasons, I disagree with the principal opinion’s conclusion in Part II. The plain language of the statute and the precedent of this Court demonstrate that subdivision 144.020.1(2) provides alternative taxable categories, and the issue in this case is whether Columbia Athletic Club is in one or more of them. Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 596. Contrary to Part III of the principal opinion, I would hold that exercise is recreation, that CAC is a place of recreation, and thus that fees paid to it are taxable.
A.
This Court’s cases applying subdivision 144.020.1(2) have focused on the plain meaning of the terms of this statute. The term “recreation” is not defined in the sales tax law, so this Court has consistently given this term its plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary. Moon Shadow, 945 S.W.2d at 437; St. Louis Country Club v. Administrative Hearing Comm’n, 657 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo. banc 1983). In applying dictionary definitions, this Court has held that an activity is classified as “amusement, entertainment or recreation” if it is so “within normal contemplation” or if it would “normally be treated” as such. Bally’s Leman’s Family Fun v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Mo. banc 1988); Spudich, 745 S.W.2d at 681; Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 598; L & R, 529 S.W.2d at 378. Applying the dictionary definition of “recreation” to the exercise and other amenities that members pay for at CAC, I conclude that it is a place of recreation.
Recreation is defined as “refreshment of the strength and spirits after toil: DIVERSION, PLAY ... a means of getting *815diversion or entertainment.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1899, cited in Spudich, 745 S.W.2d at 680.
Refreshment is “restoration of the strength, spirit, vigor, or liveliness, esp. after fatigue or depression.” Id. at 1910.
Diversion means “2a. something that turns the mind from serious concerns or ordinary matters and relaxes or amuses: RELAXATION, AMUSEMENT, PASTIME ... b. the turning of the mind to pleasure: the act of receiving pleasure or amusement.” Id. at 662.
When people pay to exercise, they do so for the diversion of refreshing the mind and body. By the dictionary definition, that is recreation. The Administrative Hearing Commission specifically found that exercise relaxes. The AHC found that some members join CAC to start an exercise program in order to overcome physical or mental illnesses such as depression or high blood pressure — in dictionary terms, to refresh their strength and spirits. Others join to build muscle and improve cardiovascular fitness. Indeed, “exercise” is defined in the dictionary as “bodily exertion for the sake of developing and maintaining physical fitness.” Id. at 795. The satisfaction of improving one’s strength, speed, endurance, body composition or agility is sufficient to qualify exercise at CAC as a pleasant or enjoyable diversion. The General Assembly used the broad word “recreation,” which includes activities that require contracting muscles and breaking a sweat.
The principal opinion makes the subjective conclusion that the types of exercise that CAC facilitates are not recreational because they are not “fun” enough. According to the principal opinion, tennis is fun, but pushups are not. In fact, running on a treadmill may be invigorating and pleasurable to some, while others would find it boring and arduous. The principal opinion appears to marvel at the notion that anyone would join an athletic club for fun. This Court need not and should not make such a subjective evaluation; CAC members’ enjoyment is demonstrated by their continued patronage.
When a taxpayer argued that hunters did not necessarily enjoy hunting at a private wild game ranch, this Court characterized their argument as one that “borders on the frivolous.” High Adventure, 824 S.W.2d at 905. This Court discussed a federal district court case involving a “walkathon” attended by spectators. Id. at 906 n. 1. That court described the event and observed: “Marvelous to say, people seem to be entertained by the spectacle and are willing to pay for their entertainment.” Nonetheless, the walka-thon, like the wild game ranch, successfully attracted customers. Likewise, operating an athletic club is a business for profit that charges a fee to people who want to exercise there. Whether or not this type of exercise is this Court’s idea of “fun” is irrelevant; the fact that CAC members patronize the athletic club is evidence of their enjoyment.
B.
According to Part III of the principal opinion, exercise at CAC has a dual nature— health and recreation — and the health aspects predominate. CAC markets itself to the public as a facility (“Gold’s Gym”) where members can improve their health through physical exercise. The principal opinion reasons that if promoting health is the “primary” or “basic” “purpose” or “focus” of such a place, it is not a place of recreation.
There is no precedent for a “basic purpose” test in delimiting a place of recreation. As for a primary purpose test, this Court has rejected such a test in this area of law. The new test proposed by the principal opinion overrules Spudich, in which this Court rejected the argument “that Section 144.020.1(2) permits taxation only of fees paid within locations which are primarily or exclusively places of amusement.” 745 S.W.2d at 680 (emphasis added). Further, in applying section 144.020.1(2), this Court looks to the nature of an activity, not the business owner’s purpose for engaging in a particular business. Fostaire, 679 S.W.2d at 273.
The principal opinion treats health and recreation as mutually exclusive categories, as though the General Assembly had divided businesses into two groups: those that offer strenuous recreational activities and those that offer less strenuous recreational activi*816ties. In Spudich, this Court recognized that “a location or an activity can partake of a dual nature.” 745 S.W.2d at 680. Spudich cited and discussed Fostaire Harbor, Inc. v. Missouri Director of Revenue, 679 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. banc 1984). In Fostaire, this Court held that “helicopter tours of historic sites can be educational, but they are also entertaining and recreational. These are not mutually exclusive.” Id. at 273. The helicopter tours were held to be a “place of amusement.” Likewise, many forms of recreation involve physical activity, and physical activity is healthy. If health and recreational aspects co-exist, “the place is no less a place of [recreation].” Fostaire, 679 S.W.2d at 273.
C.
Having determined that exercise is recreation, the next step is to determine whether CAC is a “place of recreation.” Spudich, 745 S.W.2d at 681-82. First, the athletic club is clearly a “place” — a building or locality used for a special purpose. Moon Shadow, 945 S.W.2d at 437.
In Spudich, this Court determined that a business is a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation if those activities comprise more than a de minimis portion of the business activities of the location. Id. at 682. In this case, this Court need not reexamine or apply the de minimis test because the Director' and CAC agree that all or none of the membership fees are subject to tax. Because exercise is recreation, CAC is a place of recreation. By the precedents of this Court and the statutes of the legislature, the fees paid in or to CAC are subject to sales tax.
VI.
I would affirm the decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission.

. All statutory references are to RSMo 1994 unless otherwise noted.