Court Opinion

ID: 9460405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:49:35.801083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:36.472149
License: Public Domain

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
In my view the admission of evidence that Holley had been arrested for transporting illegal aliens and the introduction of evidence of his 30-year-old conviction for forgery were errors requiring reversal.
The majority opinion concludes that appellant’s May 1972 arrest for transporting illegal aliens was admissible for the purpose of proving his knowledge that the persons he transported in his taxicab in 1973 were aliens illegally in *585this country. The Government’s foundation for the introduction of this evidence was inadequate because it failed to demonstrate sufficient similarity between the events that anteceded Holley’s 1972 arrest and those that led to the charges that brought him here. (See, e. g., Parker v. United States (9th Cir. 1968) 400 F.2d 248, 251-252; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§ 302, 324.) In 1972, Holley picked up a well-dressed man and woman who were hitchhiking near his cab garage and gave them a ride in his private automobile. He drove them through the DeLuz Canyon, a route that circumvents a highway alien checkpoint. A border patrol agent ascertained that the couple were illegal aliens. The 1973 incident from which this conviction resulted involved transporting four alien males in his taxicab after he had responded to a radio call from the company dispatcher. The locality of the 1973 pick-up was an urban area a substantial distance from the cab garage. The number, age, sex, and attire of the aliens in each instance were different. The mode of transportation and the locations were different. Indeed, no similarity whatever exists between the two sets of events except that the persons transported eventually were identified as illegal aliens. However, even if the two incidents were substantially similar, the prior arrest was in no way relevant to the issue of Holley’s knowledge that the four persons he transported in his taxicab in 1973 were illegally in the country. To infer Holley's knowledge from the fact that a year earlier he had transported different people under different circumstances who were also illegal aliens is rationally permissive only if common experience teaches that a person who has seen two illegal aliens can distinguish on sight any other illegal aliens. Common experience is to the contrary. (See generally United States v. Mallides (9th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 859, 861.)1
The introduction of this evidence over objection was not harmless error. The only seriously contested factual issue was knowledge; upon this issue the circumstantial evidence was equivocal. The propriety of the introduction of evidence of prior illegal acts is always an unusually sensitive question because of the inherent tendency of fact finders to give it excessive weight. (1 Wigmore, supra § 192; cf. Parker v. United States, supra.) In a case like this one, where the jury might have credited the defense testimony on knowledge, the improper admission of the evidence could well have had a substantial effect on the jury. (See, e. g., Kotteakos v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 750, 764-765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557; United States v. Lopez-Cruz (9th Cir. 1972) 470 F.2d 193, 194.)
Use of Holley’s 1942 forgery conviction to impeach his credibility as a witness was also reversible error. It has been recognized in recent years that the probative value of prior felony convictions on the issue of credibility can be outweighed by the prejudice which revelation of the defendant’s past crime would cause. (See, e. g., Luck v. United States (1965) 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763; United States v. Palumbo (2d Cir. 1968) 401 F.2d 270.) One of the factors of particular importance in balancing possible prejudice against probative value is the remoteness of the conviction : “The nearness or remoteness of the prior conviction is also a factor of no small importance. Even one involving fraud or stealing, for example, if it occurred long before and has been followed by a legally blameless life, should *586generally be excluded on the ground of remoteness.” (Gordon v. United States (1967) 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (Burger, J.); see United States v. Puco (2d Cir. 1971) 453 F.2d 539, 543.)
To be sure, the so-called Luck rule has not been fully adopted by our court. (United States v. Valle-Rojas (9th Cir. 1972) 469 F.2d 79, 80. Compare United States v. Walling (9th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 229, 237-238 (there is a division of opinion in the circuit as to the applicability of the Luck doctrine) and United States v. Stroud (9th Cir. 1973) 474 F. 2d 737, 739 (“It is not clear whether the Luck rationale has been adopted in this Circuit.”) with United States v. Villegas (9th Cir. 1973) 487 F.2d 882, 883 (“The point of our prior decisions is that in this circuit reversible error cannot be predicated upon a refusal to follow the Luck rule.”).) Nevertheless, we have frequently recognized that old convictions are not a meaningful index of propensity to lie and therefore have followed the well-established rule that some convictions may be too hoary to bear reasonably on the present credibility of a defendant. (E.g., United States v. Allison (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 407, 412 (“proof of prior convictions for impeachment should be excluded' if the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, concludes that it lacks sufficient probative value because of the remoteness in time of the convictions”); Singleton v. United States (9th Cir. 1967) 381 F.2d 1, 4; see McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 43, at 91.)
The district court apparently recognized its responsibility to exclude unduly old convictions, for it actually ruled, during a colloquy at the bench, that the conviction was not too remote to be used. This ruling was an abuse of discretion.
The conviction used to impeach Holley was more than 30 years old; that is approximately 20 years older than those convictions which will be permitted in federal court for impeachment purposes once the proposed rules of evidence are adopted. (See Proposed Rule 609(b).) Although the 10-year limit is not yet the law of our circuit, and while it may be preferable not to establish rigid age limitations on the use of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, I believe that use of a 30-year-old conviction in the case at bench unduly prejudiced the defendant. Accordingly, we should hold that the district court abused its discretion in not excluding Holley’s conviction. Again, because the issues in the case were close, it is not possible to hold that the error was harmless.
I would reverse.

. Because the Government failed to establish that introduction of evidence concerning the May 1972 incident was permissible under an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of prior misconduct, it is unnecessary to consider the problems inherent in using an arrest, which is in effect only an accusation, as evidence of prior misconduct. (See generally Lyda v. United States (9th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 788, 796; Davis v. United States (8th Cir. 1956) 229 F.2d 181, 185.)