Court Opinion

ID: 9909075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 16:02:21.056011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:57.221074
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                 JONATHAN EUGENE FLOYD, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0591
                               FILED 12-12-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
                        No. P1300CR202001399
                The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Law Offices of Stephen L. Duncan P.L.C., Scottsdale
By Stephen L. Duncan
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Casey D. Ball
Counsel for Appellee
                            STATE v. FLOYD
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1            Jonathan Floyd appeals his convictions for second-degree
murder, aggravated assault, endangerment, and criminal damage arising
out of an automobile crash that caused the deaths of two children. Floyd
argues the superior court erred by: (1) admitting photographs of the
children, and separately, their belongings; (2) allowing a medical
examiner to testify about autopsy photographs of the children; and (3)
denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Because the rulings Floyd
challenges were supported by the record and the law, he has not shown
the superior court committed reversible error. We affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      A.     Floyd Swerved into a Van Containing a Family of Seven
             While Driving Southbound from Nevada to Arizona.

¶2            On October 3, 2020, at around 5:20 a.m., Floyd was driving
south on Highway 93, about thirty miles north of Wickenburg. Floyd’s
side of the highway had two lanes, while northbound traffic had a single
lane. A semi-truck was driving north on the other side of the highway. A
family of seven in a van was traveling a safe distance behind the
northbound semi-truck driver.

¶3            The semi-truck driver noticed Floyd’s truck was veering too
close to the northbound traffic, grazing the double yellow lines separating
north and southbound traffic. As Floyd’s truck crossed over the double
yellow lines, the semi-truck driver swerved onto the highway shoulder,
unsuccessfully seeking to avoid a collision.

¶4            Floyd’s vehicle collided with the semi-truck’s rear tires,
projecting his vehicle onto the van. Because the van’s driver saw Floyd
spinning head-on towards him, he swerved right. Despite swerving, the
van’s rear end was struck by Floyd’s truck. After the van stopped, its
driver (the family’s father) saw that the mother (in the passenger seat) and
three children (in the middle row) were injured but conscious. Father

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                            STATE v. FLOYD
                           Decision of the Court

saw the back of the van was torn open and that C.C. had severe head
injuries and J.C. had no pulse. A reconstructionist testified that after
hitting the semi-truck first, Floyd’s speed was likely thirty to forty-three
miles per hour.

¶5           After the crash, a paramedic treated Floyd and asked him
questions. The paramedic asked Floyd twice whether he had consumed
alcohol and he eventually admitted he had. The paramedic ordered Floyd
a helicopter that transferred Floyd to Banner Thunderbird Hospital in
Phoenix.

      B.     Floyd had a Blood Alcohol Content Level (“BAC”) of at
             Least 0.066 Combined with Benadryl in His System.

¶6            At the hospital, Floyd explained that he was on three
different blood pressure medications to help with his heart issues. About
four to five hours after the crash, a police officer with a valid search
warrant took a sample of Floyd’s blood. At 9:57 am, Floyd’s BAC was
0.066. Floyd tested positive for Benadryl but was not tested for the three
blood pressure medications.

¶7           A toxicologist later testified that a retrograde analysis of
Floyd’s BAC indicated an alcohol level ranging from 0.092 to 0.145 at the
time of the crash. The toxicologist explained that alcohol and Benadryl
together can increase drowsiness as compared to ingesting either one
individually. Floyd’s expert later explained Floyd’s BAC could have
ranged anywhere from 0.066 to 0.204.

      C.     At Trial, the State Introduced Photographs and Testimony
             Concerning the Deceased Children to Which Floyd
             Objected Before Moving for Judgment of Acquittal.

¶8           The state moved to admit photographs of snacks, luggage,
pillows, and personal belongings such as a soccer ball, all within Exhibit
18. Floyd objected to Exhibit 18 before and at trial, arguing these
photographs lacked relevance and were prejudicial as being overly
emotional.    The state argued the photographs were relevant in
reconstructing the scene and depicted debris at the scene. The superior
court overruled Floyd’s objections and admitted the photographs.

¶9            Next, the state moved to admit three in-life photographs of
the victims, including a photograph of each of C.C. and J.C., and also a
family photograph. Before trial, Floyd moved to preclude all three

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                           STATE v. FLOYD
                          Decision of the Court

photographs. The superior court denied the motion on the two individual
photographs of the children but precluded the family photograph.

¶10           The state introduced testimony from a medical examiner. At
trial, Floyd objected to the medical examiner’s conclusion as to the cause
of death. Floyd argued that because the term for cause of death is a legal
conclusion, if the medical examiner said “homicide,” it would go directly
to the heart of the case – whether this was second-degree murder or a
lesser offense. The state responded that the medical examiner’s answer
was not a legal conclusion but was instead a medical term. The superior
court overruled the objection, finding it relevant and not prejudicial so
long as the medical examiner did not conclude it was a “homicide” and
used the medical term “accident” instead.

¶11           The medical examiner described C.C.’s autopsy photographs
of his bellybutton, legs, dirt covered feet, hands, backside, abrasions
covering his lower backside, and hip. The medical examiner also
described photographs indicating C.C. was well-nourished and had lost
blood circulation. The medical examiner went on to testify that C.C. had
massive trauma to his skull, such that his injury was “immediately fatal.”

¶12           The medical examiner described autopsy photographs of
J.C.’s upper body, lower body, feet, ankles, legs, abrasions and bruises,
arms, hands, and mouth. The medical examiner described a diagram he
made for J.C., where he marked various fractures on J.C.’s body. Finally,
the medical examiner testified that J.C.’s cause of death was skull and
spinal injuries.

¶13          The state did not introduce any of C.C.’s autopsy
photographs and selectively introduced J.C.’s autopsy photographs.
Floyd did not object to the medical examiner’s descriptions of the autopsy
photographs or the state’s introduction of J.C.’s autopsy photographs.

¶14            After the state presented its evidence, Floyd moved for a
judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”)
20. Floyd argued the only evidence the state presented was a BAC level
range, a possibility that Benadryl influenced Floyd’s drowsiness, and a
possibility that Floyd ingested blood pressure medications. Floyd argued
there was no evidence that amounted to extreme indifference to human
life, including that the state did not present evidence that Floyd had been
weaving in and out of traffic. The superior court disagreed because “there
has been substantial evidence presented by the state to overcome a rule 20
motion, with the exception of only . . . Count 12.”

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                              STATE v. FLOYD
                             Decision of the Court

       D.     The Jury Convicted Floyd of Second-Degree Murder,
              Aggravated Assault, Endangerment, and Criminal
              Damage, and This Appeal Followed.

¶15          The jury deliberated for over seven hours before returning a
unanimous verdict, convicting Floyd of second-degree murder,
aggravated assault, endangerment, and criminal damage. Floyd timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                                DISCUSSION

¶16          Floyd argues the superior court erred by: (1) admitting in-
life photographs of the children; (2) admitting photographs of the
children’s belongings; (3) allowing the medical examiner’s testimony
describing the autopsy photographs; and (4) denying Floyd’s Rule 20
motion for judgment of acquittal.

I.     The Superior Court Did Not Err By Admitting Photographs of the
       Children While Living or of Their Belongings.

       A.     The Superior Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
              Admitting the In-Life Photographs of the Children.

¶17            We review the court’s admission of in-life photographs of
victims for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cota, 229 Ariz. 136, 147 ¶ 45
(2012); see State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 64 ¶¶ 29, 32 (1998) (explaining “[i]t is
for the trial court in each instance to exercise sound discretion” to review
in-life photographs). First, the photographs must be relevant to be
admitted. Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 64 ¶ 29. A photograph is relevant if it helps
the jury resolve an issue of fact. Id. Second, the court must determine if
the photograph is likely to “inflame or incite passion in the jurors.” Id. If
the answer to that question is yes, the court must weigh the “photograph’s
probative value against its prejudicial effect.” Id. Where a photograph’s
probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, it
is admitted. See id. Third, even if the court abuses its discretion by
admitting a photograph that is substantially more prejudicial than
probative, we will not reverse if the error is harmless. Id. at 64 ¶ 33.

¶18          We first consider whether the photographs were relevant.
Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 64 ¶ 29. Floyd argues the photographs were not
relevant because the children’s identities were known. That view sweeps
too broadly. Photographs may be admissible to prove a crime, identify a
victim, demonstrate a crime’s nature and location, or corroborate the

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                             STATE v. FLOYD
                            Decision of the Court

state’s theory of a crime. State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 391 (1986).
Here, the photographs were relevant because they “personalize the
victim[s] and help to complete the story for the jurors.” Doerr, 193 Ariz. at
64 ¶ 32.

¶19           As to prejudice, we are cautious in ratifying the admission of
in-life photographs to complete the story of a criminal case because they
can “generate sympathy for the victim” and have a prejudicial effect.
Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 64 ¶ 32. But again, Floyd’s argument against these
photographs extends too far. They are benign in comparison to the
autopsy photographs, and it would unreasonably hamstring the state to
forbid any depiction of the crash’s aftermath (because it would show
children’s possessions) or any depiction of the crash’s victims. State v.
Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 141 ¶ 115 (2006) (holding that superior court did not
abuse its discretion when allowing admission of in-life photographs
because they were “benign” when compared to post-mortem
photographs). Moreover, the court balanced considerations of relevance
and prejudice by barring admission of a family photograph, thus showing
the victims but not further emphasizing the crash’s effect on survivors and
the family unit. Because the photographs were used to complete the
prosecution’s story to the jury and would have minimal prejudicial effect,
the court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted them.

       B.     The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
              Admitting Photographs of the Children’s Belongings.

¶20          We analyze the superior court’s admission of the
photographs of belongings using a three-part analysis like that in Doerr.
State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 28 (1995) (explaining the need to analyze
photographs for relevance and potential to arouse prejudice, then
weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect).

¶21           First, we determine if the photographs of the children’s
luggage, snacks, soccer balls, and pillows were relevant. Doerr, 193 Ariz.
at 64 ¶ 29. The prosecution used these photographs to reconstruct the
scene and help the jury understand the crash that lay at the core of this
trial, making them relevant as they corroborated the state’s reconstruction
of the crash. See id. In particular, the state’s reconstructionist testified that
these photos were within the debris field, which showed tire marks,
engine fluid, transmissions, skidding, and helped explain the type of stop
the van made.

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                            STATE v. FLOYD
                           Decision of the Court

¶22             As to prejudice, we take Floyd’s point that photographs of a
crime scene have a lesser probative value when the defendant does not
contest the fact at issue. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 209 ¶ 63 (2004)
(holding court abused its discretion by admitting crime scene photographs
of victims’ charred bodies because the defendant did not contest fact at
issue and photographs were both cumulative and likely to inflame jury).
It is also true Floyd was not contesting the scene reconstruction.

¶23           Even so, the photographs of objects here were not
particularly inflammatory. Moreover, the state had a legitimate interest in
showing the jury the debris field in the reconstructed scene. Accordingly,
the photographs’ probative value was not substantially outweighed by
any unfair prejudice to which Floyd points. We thus conclude the court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs.1

II.    The Superior Court Did Not Err by Admitting the Medical
       Examiner’s Testimony Describing the Autopsy Photographs.

       A.     We Review the Superior Court’s Decision to Admit the
              Medical Examiner’s Testimony for Fundamental Error.

¶24           Floyd argues we should review the superior court’s decision
to admit the medical examiner’s testimony for abuse of discretion, the
standard that applies to properly raised objections to the admission of
evidence at trial. See State v. Chappell, 225 Ariz. 229, 238 ¶ 28 (2010). The
state counters that we should review this issue for fundamental error
because Floyd raised it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Escalante,
245 Ariz. 135, 138 ¶ 1 (2018). The state is correct. Though Floyd objected
to other portions of the medical examiner’s testimony, he never objected

1      Even if Floyd was correct that the court abused its discretion by
admitting the in-life photographs and photographs of the crash debris,
their admission would be harmless error. Error is harmless if the state
shows, “beyond a reasonable doubt[] that the error did not contribute to
or affect the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 209 ¶ 64; State v. Arias, 248 Ariz. 546,
555 ¶ 31 (App. 2020) (noting the state’s burden under harmless error
review). Because the state presented ample evidence justifying the jury’s
verdict - that Floyd was driving with Benadryl and alcohol in his system
and that he knowingly drove while impaired - the crash scene
photographs did not contribute to the verdict.

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                           STATE v. FLOYD
                          Decision of the Court

to the medical examiner’s testimony describing the autopsy photographs.
Floyd has the burden of showing fundamental, prejudicial error. Id.

       B.    Admitting the Medical Examiner’s Testimony Concerning
             the Autopsy Photographs Was Not Error, Much Less
             Fundamental Error.

¶25          To assess fundamental error, we must first determine if there
was error. Id. Cause of death is always relevant. State v. Rushing, 243
Ariz. 212, 219 ¶ 27 (2017); State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 141–42 (1997).
Testimony describing cause of death is also relevant even if the defendant
does not dispute the injury. See Rushing, 243 Ariz. at 219 ¶ 27 (holding
that doctor could testify about autopsy photographs regarding injuries
even though defendant did not dispute the nature of those injuries).

¶26          At trial, the state introduced testimony from the medical
examiner. The medical examiner testified as to the children’s causes of
death and explained the distinct medical categories for causes of death,
noting they were not legal conclusions. Then, the medical examiner
described the autopsy photographs of the children’s body parts and
abrasions. Finally, the medical examiner concluded that C.C.’s injury was
“immediately fatal,” and J.C.’s cause of death was due to skull and spinal
injuries.

¶27           The medical examiner’s testimony was relevant because it
was related to the children’s causes of death. Rushing, 243 Ariz. at 219 ¶
27 (finding that cause of death is always relevant). Floyd has not shown
the court erred by allowing the examiner’s testimony because the medical
examiner testified as to the cause of death and merely described the
autopsy photographs. Id.

III.   The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying the Rule 20 Motion
       for Judgment of Acquittal.

¶28           The superior court should grant the motion for judgment of
acquittal if there is “no substantial evidence to support a conviction.”
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). Sufficiency of evidence is a question of law,
which we review de novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562 ¶ 15 (2011). We
consider whether any trier of fact, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the state, could find the essential elements beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. at 562 ¶ 16.

¶29         Here, Floyd argues there was insufficient evidence to show
extreme indifference to human life − an essential element for second-

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                            STATE v. FLOYD
                           Decision of the Court

degree murder. Floyd explains that the only evidence the state presented
concerned his potential blood alcohol content, Benadryl may have affected
how drowsy Floyd was, and that his blood pressure medications could
have been in his system. Floyd argues there was no evidence that
amounted to extreme indifference to human life, including evidence like
the truck weaving in and out of traffic as opposed to only evidence that
the truck swerved. The court disagreed and responded that “there has
been substantial evidence presented by the state to overcome a [R]ule 20
motion, with the exception of only . . . Count 12.”

¶30           Reviewing this record de novo, the state presented substantial
evidence showing extreme indifference to human life. To find whether a
defendant exhibited extreme indifference to human life, we look at all the
surrounding evidence. Id. Here, the state’s toxicologist explained that
Floyd’s BAC was 0.066 about four to five hours after the crash, and
according to a retrograde analysis, it would have been in the range of
0.092-0.145 at the time of the crash. Floyd’s own expert retrograde
analysis further confirmed the state’s toxicologist, explaining Floyd’s BAC
could have ranged from 0.066 to 0.204 at the time of the crash. Finally,
Floyd was positive for Benadryl and the state’s toxicologist explained the
combination of alcohol, Benadryl, and prescription medication was likely
to make Floyd drowsier when operating his truck. All of this evidence
supported Floyd behaving with extreme indifference to human life.

¶31           The state also presented testimony from a collision
reconstructionist. The reconstructionist testified Floyd’s truck crossed the
double yellow lines, sideswiped a semi-truck, began spinning, and then
hit the van. The state also presented testimony that Floyd’s truck was
moving at thirty to forty-three miles per hour when it struck the van and
was not moving faster because it struck the semi-truck first. Additionally,
the state presented evidence that Floyd’s truck was “grazing” the double
yellow lines separating traffic, and that Floyd swerved into northbound
traffic. This evidence is sufficient to support denying a judgment of
acquittal. See generally State v. Woodall, 155 Ariz. 1, 5 (App. 1987) (finding
that the state presented ample evidence by showing the defendant had a
prior DUI, had been warned of the repercussions from drinking and
driving, had turned down a ride before leaving the bar, drove over the
speed limit, had a similar driving history, and had a BAC three times the
threshold).

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                    STATE v. FLOYD
                   Decision of the Court

                      CONCLUSION

¶32   For these reasons, we affirm.

                  AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                  FILED: AA

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