Court Opinion

ID: 9828135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:08:23.249464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:46.469741
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee, in its motion for a rehearing, says that this court was in error in holding that appellant could not be required to pay taxes on that portion of the second bond issue of $70,000.00 that was used in the construction of new and additional improvements in carrying out of the supplemental plan of reclamation and which were not set up in the original plan. Appellee contends that if the failure of the commissioners of appraisement to assess damages and benefits that would accrue to each tract of land in said district by reason of the supplemental plan of reclamation was error, that such error, if any, was cured and validated by Article 8007a of Vernon’s Civil Statutes.
The legislature, in passing the improvement districts act and authorizing the issuance of bonds and the levying of taxes, etc., derived its power from Art. 16, Section 59a of the Constitution, which reads as follows: “The Legislature shall authorize all such indebtedness as may be necessary to provide all improvements and the maintenance thereof requisite to the achievement of the purposes of this amendment, and all such indebtedness may be evidenced by bonds of such conservation and reclamation districts, to be issued under such regulations as may be prescribed by law and shall also, authorize the levy and collection within such districts of all such taxes, equitably distributed, as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for the payment of such bonds; * * * provided the Legislature shall not authorize the issrtance of any bonds or provide for any indebtedness against any reclamation district unless such proposition shall first be submitted to the qualified property taxpaying voters of such district and the proposition adopted.”
 Appellee says “that the only inhibition placed upon the powers of the legislature in such cases by the Constitution is the requirement of an election, otherwise the manner and method to be followed is to be prescribed by the legislature as authorized by the constitutional amendment.” The legislature did, from the power granted to it by said provision of the constitution, enact the statute authorizing the creation of improvement districts, and provided that in the levying and assessing of taxes that the same should be based upon the assessed benefit that would accrue to each tract of land in the district as found by the commissioners of appraisement. The appellant is making no attack upon the validity of the bonds and their validity is not an issue in this case, but he is questioning the manner in which the taxes were levied and assessed against him in respect to the. $70,000.00 bond issue. There was only one assessment made 'by the commissioners of appraisement of the benefits and damages that would accrue to the land herein involved, and that was in connection with the first bond issue of $220,000.00, and the amount of the benefits so fixed by the commissioners of appraisement was the sum of $8860.00, which formed the basis of taxation by reason of putting through the original plan of reclamation; but the commissioners of appraisement made no assessment of the benefits and damages that would accrue to this land by reason .of carrying out of the supplemental plan of reclamation. The commissioners court adopted and fixed as a basis for taxation for the $70,000.00 bond issue the amount of $8860.00 that had been fixed in respect to the original plan. We think it is but common knowledge that in creating and constructing an improvement district as was done in this instance,, that all tracts of land within said district would not be affected *238in the same manner; that some tracts would be benefited more than others, and that the legislature realized that such a condition would exist and provided that the benefits and damages that would accrue should be fixed by commissioners of ap-praisement duly appointed and qualified for that purpose and their findings should be used as a ‘basis for taxation. The evidence shows that in the carrying out of the supplemental plan of reclamation this tract was damaged and no doubt other tracts in this district were greatly benefited in the construction of said supplemental plan of reclamation. Article 16 section 59a of the Constitution also provides that the legislature shall also authorize the levy and collection within such district of all such taxes equitably distributed as may be necessary for the payment of the interest and the creation of a sinking fund for their retirement at maturity. When the commissioners court arbitrarily adopted the findings of the commissioners of appraisement made in connection with the original plan and used it as a basis for taxation for both the first and second bond issue in the absence of a finding by the commissioners of appraisement of the amount of benefits, if any, that 'would accrue to the tract o.f land by reason of- the completion of the supplemental plan, not giving the landowner an opportunity to appear and be heard in his own behalf and thereby denying him his day in court, it violated the foregoing provision of the Constitution, as well as Article 8, Section 1 of the Constitution, wherein it is provided that “Taxation shall be equal and uniform, [and] All property in this State, whethfcr owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, which shall be ascertained as may be provided by law.” This the legislature did authorize, and provided that the amount of benefits that would accrue should be found by commissioners of appraisement and their findings used as a basis for taxation, but this procedure was not followed in respect to the second bond issue. See: Ogburn v. Ward County Irrigation Dist., Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 169, approved by the Supreme Court, in which case it was shown that the board of equalization of the district had arbitrarily subdivided the real property in such irrigation district into zones and placed the same value per acre upon all property which was situated in the same zone, disregarding the character of the land or the nature of the improvements thereon. The commissioners court did practically the same thing in this case. It adopted the findings of the commissioners of appraisement made in the first instance without regard to the amount of damages or benefits that would result to each tract of land in said district by reason of the construction and completion of the supplemental plan of improvement. See also : Johnson v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 239 U.S. 234, 36 S.Ct. 62, 60 L.Ed. 243; Rowland .v. City of Tyler, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 756; Thomas v. Dallas County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 6, Tex.Com.App., 23 S.W.2d 325, 327, approved by the Supreme Court, wherein it was held that the landowner was entitled, under the Constitution, to a hearing on the assessment of benefits to his land before the tax could be legally levied. We quote from the opinion in that case as follows:
“We conclude that it was contemplated under the plain terms of the Laney Act that, when a levee district sought to create an indebtedness against the district by the issuance of bonds, it could not lawfully levy a tax upon the property situated within the district to meet such indebtedness, except upon the basis of benefits that might accrue to the property by reason of the contemplated improvements. Of course, if the improvements sought to be made were merely a completion of those shown by the original plan of reclamation, then a second hearing would be unnecessary, as the taxpayer has already had his hearing based upon the theory of the completion of the improvements according to the original-plan of reclamation. Where, however, as here, improvements are sought to be made that are not a part of the original plan of' reclamation, but are such as to constitute new and additional work not contemplated or covered by the original plan, the property holder is entitled to a hearing and the-assessment of benefits before his property-*239can be burdened with the taxes necessary to pay the indebtedness created thereby.”
The court held that the levying of such tax without giving the .landowner a hearing deprived him of his constitutional rights. See also Vance v. Town of Pleasanton, Tex.Civ.App., 261 S.W. 457; Id., Tex.Com.App., 277 S.W. 89.
 Appellee cites the case of Utter v. Franklin, 172 U.S. 416, 418, 19 S.Ct. 183, 43 L.Ed. 498, and 43 Amer.Jur. at pages 466 to 470, in support of its contention that Article 8007a rendered valid the levy in question. We do not believe that it was the intention of the legislature, some eight or ten years later, to cure the error herein involved by passing said validating article. We agree with appellee that the legislature has the power to grant to the district such authority in respect to levying taxes after the taxes are levied that it could have given prior to the levying of same, but the question is: Has the legislature the power to grant to the district authority to levy taxes against anyone’s property without giving such party a right to be heard? We think not.
Appellee says that the case of Vance v. Town of Pleasanton, supra, does not apply to this case in that “it did not involve a ■question of the levy of taxes to pay bonds. It did not involve the question of a validating statute, and it did not involve the question of the validity of a tax which had been imposed by consent of those to be taxed at an election held for that specific purpose.” It is true that a majority of the property owners voting at said election consented to the issuance of the bonds and the levying ■of the tax, but there is no evidence that they consented to be taxed in any other manner than that provided by law, and we are still of the opinion that appellant cannot be held liable for taxes on that portion of the $70,000.00 bond issue that was used for the construction of new and additional improvements in the carrying out of the supplemental plan of reclamation until they are properly levied and appellant afforded a hearing.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.