Court Opinion

ID: 9644829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:05:48.089194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:32.822592
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.
(dissenting). We are called upon here to determine a question of importance relating to certain incidents of tenancies by the entirety, which oddly enough has never *416been directly decided by the court of last resort in this State. The decision, no matter which way it goes, will be of retrospective effect and so will be bound to affect titles, since there have been divergent views on the question to some extent among New Jersey lawyers. The obligation of the court in such a situation is, of course, to determine what our law is on the subject, as an original proposition, and if at all possible, to arrive at that conclusion primarily on the basis of past expressions of our highest court bearing closest on the question, which therefor may well be said to have been relied upon by the bar in passing upon titles or advising as to rights under a judgment against one spouse. This approach will wreak the least havoc. Cf. Kimble v. City of Newark, 91 N. J. L. 249, 253 (E. & A. 1917); Fox v. Snow, 6 N. J. 12, 14, 21 — 25 (1950). I therefore do not conceive it to be a proper exercise of our function, and indeed it may be a grave disservice, to determine the question on the basis of what we think our law might well be or ought to be in the light of modern social and economic considerations or what the law may be elsewhere.
The majority opinion really comes down to this:
At common law the husband could voluntarily alienate the possibility of a fee simple interest (so-called “right of survivorship”) subject to defeasance if the wife survived him, and so it was subject to execution for his debts and involuntary alienation by sheriff’s sale to the same extent. The Married Women’s Act in New Jersey affected only the husband’s common law right (the estate by the marital right or jure uxoris) to her share of the rents, issues and profits during their joint lives, so that she became entitled to hold and receive the possession and usufructs of one-half of the estate, in common with her husband, as if a single female, and this result placed her on a complete par with him. Therefore her defeasible survivorship interest became likewise voluntarily alienable by her act and so subject to involuntary alienation at the hands of her creditors.
*417On the basis of the considerations mentioned I submit that the majority’s syllogistic approach and reasoning arrives at and rests upon an incorrect major premise, i. e., the voluntary alienability of the husband’s chance of survivorship at common law. This is not only in disregard of expressions of the Court of Errors and Appeals specifically referring to the question and two recent trial court decisions squarely in point, but is at odds with the long-standing basic theory of this “peculiar” estate. The final result reached is, I am firmly convinced, fundamentally wrong from the standpoint of principle and local precedent and is likely to have maximum adverse effect on an incalculable number of titles.
The essential primary inquiry should be, I suggest, to discover what our courts have decided was the effect of our Married Women’s Act of 1852 on this tenancy and its incidents. This is so because such would necessarily supersede the common law, and in other states the effect of such statutes has been determined with great contrariety of opinion, running all the way from abolition of the estate and conversion into a complete tenancy in common to holding that the statute is inapplicable to entireties and so has no effect. 2 American Law of Property, § 6.6, pp. 28-30 (1952); 2 Walsh, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property, pp. 32-39 (1947). There is no real difficulty in determining New Jersey’s holding on this point and I do not disagree fundamentally with the majority in this respect. The effect was early settled in the leading case of Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N. J. Eq. 651 (E. & A. 1887), and has been reiterated without deviation since, gee Gery v. Gery, 113 N. J. Eq. 59 (E. & A. 1933), in which Justice Case cogently reviews and analyzes the leading cases beginning with Buttlar. Eor our purposes, the New Jersey rule is that the statute had no effect on the incident of survivorship, which, as Buttlar put it, “still exists as at common law.” (42 N. J. Eq., at page 657). What the act did without question, and all it did, as was well put in Gery (113 N. J. Eq., at pages 64, 65), was to destroy the husband’s estate by the *418marital right and make the spouses "tenants in common as to the right of possession and the use of the property and as to the right of either spouse to convey his or her estate for the term of the joint lives to a third party,” with the stranger becoming a tenant in common with the retaining spouse for the same term. Incidentally, I believe Justice Case in Gery put into final discard the concept suggested in a few cases since 1852, probably more by way of graphic language than of technical holding, that the right of survivor-ship had become, by virtue of the statute, a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor. See e. g., Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N. J. Eq. 199, 201 (E. & A. 1912), and Zubler v. Porter, 98 N. J. L. 444, 446, 447 (E. & A. 1922).
The new rule of tenancy in common during the joint lives of course meant that, since each spouse was separately entitled to one-half of the possession and profits and each could now alienate such interest for the term of the joint lives, the same interest could be reached by a creditor of the particular spouse to the same extent. There was no longer any distinction between the spouses. Each could do what the other could.
The retention of survivorship "as at common law” leads one to consider what that common law was in the respect in question as it existed in New Jersey before 1852, and it is here where I respectfully say the majority has fallen into underlying error. In considering this phase of the question before us it may well be suggested that the common-law theory and consequent incidents have little reason and less logic to support them, but to me such can be of little or no concern. The technical aspects of the common law of real property are what they are from ancient days, and generally they can and should only be changed by prospective legislation if different conditions and policies of modern times indicate the desirability of modification. Until then, a court should be bound by them and the chips must fall where they may.
*419The tenancy rests fundamentally, as the majority points out, on the fiction or artificial contrivance of the unity of the spouses as if they constituted a separate juristic third person, with the property being held by each spouse seized of the whole and not of a share or divisible part. And that unity is indestructible by the unilateral act of either so long as the marriage subsists. Such was the theory on origin in England and has always been accepted in New Jersey both before and after the Married Women’s Act. Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N. J. L. 42 (Sup. Ct. 1828); Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N. J. L. 556 (Sup. Ct. 1846); Washburn v. Burns, 34 N. J. L. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1869); Gery v. Gery, supra. A consequence early said in England (principally by Blackstone in his Commentaries) to flow from this concept (whether rightly or wrongly from the theoretical viewpoint is presently immaterial) was that neither spouse could separately, or without the assent of the other, dispose of or convey away any part. In the first case on the estate in New Jersey this consequence was repeated and recognized. Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, supra, 10 N. J. L., at page 45. It was shortly modified here, however (and we are not concerned with how the law remained in England or elsewhere, see Hopper v. Gurtman, 126 N. J. L. 263, 276 (E. & A. 1940)), by our holding that the unity could be broken during the joint lives to the extent that the husband, without the wife’s concurrence, “could devise, alien or mortgage his interest during his own life” so long as such did not “prejudice her rights in case she survive.” Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, supra, 20 N. J. L., at pages 560, 563. And by virtue of jure uxoris, he could do the same with the wife’s interest. The majority concludes, by reasoning therefrom, that because of the absence of such prejudice the husband could convey his chance of survivorship and so the ultimate fee simple, to be nullified if he predeceased. This, I submit, is unwarranted. (The confessed inability to find any English cases before 1776 on the question is significant *420to me. Quite probably no one conceived there was any such right in view of the indestructible unity theory.) In Gardner the wife was still alive and the only question before the court was whether the husband alone could validly mortgage his interest (which of course included the wife’s) for his life. All the court held was that he could and that the mortgagee was entitled to possession on default. It was not concerned with the situation in the event the wife died first, and the opinions must be read in that light. To me they are no authority for the majority’s position.
While it may sound logical to reason from the language in Gardner, as the majority does, logic cannot overcome the theoretical incidents of the tenancy. Lack of prejudice to the wife if the majority’s view is followed, the supposed incongruity of an opposite result with the husband’s power over property held solely by the wife and pure logic are, fortunately or unfortunately, quite beside the point in dealing with this “peculiar estate.”
The reason I feel the majority arrives at what to me is this legally wrong premise goes back to the unity theory previously mentioned and what takes place when the first spouse dies. On this event, as Chief Justice Weintraub so tersely puts it in his dissenting opinion, nothing accrues. During coverture neither spouse “owns a separate, distinct interest in the fee; rather each and both as an entity own the entire interest. Neither takes anything by survivorship; there is nothing to pass because the survivor always has the entirety.” While this may seem incomprehensible to the modern legal mind, and I confess to a somewhat similar feeling, the concept must remain immutable so long as the tenancy exists in this State in its present form. Thus the unity cannot be broken and the right of survivorship destroyed at law, presently or contingently, by unilateral action. Such to me is the only sound view, best expressed by Professor Walsh in his authoritative Commeniaries (op. cit.):
“The right of survivorship cannot be destroyed at law by a conveyance by either breaking the unities. That is the essential dif*421ference between a joint tenancy and an estate in entirety. Therefore such conveyance in fee is void at law, and the chance or possibility of survivorship is inalienable at law.” (vol. 2, p. 35)
But this does not mean that voluntary deeds or mortgages of the whole interest of one spouse are not and should not be given effect to put the entire fee in the grantee if and when, that spouse survives. Such result is and should be reached, not on the erroneous theory of power to alienate the right of survivorship, but by equitable estoppel. Again I quote Walsh:
“But the deed void at law becomes effective in equity on the grantor’s survival because equity by estoppel does not permit him to set up the invalidity of the deed; he is bound by his act in selling or mortgaging the property or his interest therein in fee and accepting the purchase price or loan, and justice demands that the void deed or mortgage be given effect as though it were valid.” (vol. 2, pp. 35-36)
This approach has been approved in New Jersey. Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, supra, 20 N. J. L., at pages 560-561, 563. Cf. Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N. J. Eq. 169, 172 (Ch. 1907). I submit that it can be the only true basis of decisions in other states purportedly supporting the majority’s premise, see 2 American Law of Property, p. 28, n. 21; 166 A. L. R. 969, 971-974 (except, of course, in those jurisdictions, of which New York is an example, in which married women’s acts and other similar legislation have been given a much broader effect than in New Jersey. See Bilder v. Robinson, supra, 73 N. J. Eq., at page 173).
It must follow that, absent the legal right to alienate the chance of survivorship voluntarily, there is no right to involuntarily alienate through execution sale. Professor Walsh says:
“On a sale on execution of the separate interest of a spouse in the event of the survival of such debtor thereafter, see Hoffman[n] v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 &. W. 2d 607 [89 A. L. R. 489] (1933), arguing that the expectancy passes subject to defeat by survivorship of the other spouse; Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 60, 64 A. 866 (1906) ; Pos[r]ohenski v. Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 410, 176 A. 205 (1935) ; Cole Mfg. v. Collier, 95 Penn. 115, 31 S. W. *4221000 [30 L. R. A. 315] (1895). As explained above, the sale of the separate interest of each in the fee is given effect in equity based on estoppel, and as [sic] a sale on execution is at law, with no elements of estoppel. It is clear that these cases cannot be approved as against the cases in most states holding contra.” (op. cit., p. 37, n. 16)
The result may be said to give in modern times, as a matter of policy, an undesirable shield from creditors, even those willing to speculate. Perhaps that was one of the original purposes for the creation of the estate. However, any change should be brought about only by prospective legislation and not by retrospective judicial fiat.
So much for theory. Turning to expressions by our highest court which it may well be said the bar has relied upon, I find a direct statement in Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N. J. Eq. 199 (E. & A. 1912), in the quoted opinion below of Vice-Chancellor Walker, substantially adopted by Justice Parker for the court in a unanimous decision. There a father and mother were tenants by the entirety. The father conveyed his entire interest to his daughter, who sought partition against her mother. A motion to strike the bill was denied and the decree affirmed. The vice-chancellor said:
“What they became by virtue of the father’s conveyance to the daughter was tenants in common for the joint lives of the parents. The father’s conveyance to the daughter did not operate in anywise to limit the estate of the wife or her right to the survivorship, and it seems that it will not defeat his right of survivorship, but that it amounts only to a conveyance of his right of possession during his life, and that it cannot operate to let in a third party as tenant by entirety with his wife. That estate exists only between husband and wife, and neither can dispose of any part of it without the assent of the other; the peculiar interest and estate not being severable. Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N. J. L. (Spenc.) 556. The husband can, however, alienate his interest in the estate for his own life. Ibid. See also Servis v. Dorn, 76 N. J. Eq. (6 Buch.) 241. Life tenants may be tenants in common and their estates may be partitioned. Roarty v. Smith, 53 N. J. Eg. (8 Dick.) 253, 255. The defendant is entitled to the enjoyment of her estate in the lands during the lifetime of herself and her husband by virtue of the married woman’s act of 1S52. Servis v. Dorn, supra. The complainant is entitled to the enjoyment of the estate and interest in *423the lands which she derived from her father’s conveyance during the joint lives of her father and her mother, the defendant. The first section of our partition act (P. L. 1898, p. 644; [C. S. p. 3897]), gives the right to partition to tenants in common, and the parties to this suit are such. True, their estate is less than a fee simple, but it is an estate for the joint lives of the parents of the complainant, and such an estate is partible. If the premises should prove not to be susceptible of division between the parties, and shall be ordered to be sold, the purchaser’s estate will terminate upon the death of either Mr. or Mrs. Ziegler.” (80 N. J. Eq., at page 200; emphasis added)
Even closer is the statement by the same judge, then Chancellor, in Zubler v. Porter, 98 N. J. L. 444 (E. & A. 1922), also unanimous:
“This conveyance [a sheriff’s deed to the wife following execution on a judgment against the husband] divested out of Mr. Butterworth and vested in Mrs. Butterworth, as trustee, the former’s estate in the land as potential tenant in common with her for the joint lives of both of them, leaving him only the remainder of the entire estate in the event of his surviving her.” (98 N. J. L., at page 447; emphasis added).
The rationale of the decision, and indeed the very language of Justice Case for the same unanimous court in Qery in 1933, appears to me to have the same connotation. See 113 N. J. Eq., at pages 64-65.
While the statements in all these opinions may be said to have been unnecessary to the actual decision and therefore dictum, they are to me expressions of the strongest effect in that category and of the character lawyers would naturally and justifiably rely upon. It is hard to imagine judges of the learning of Walker, Parker and Case in the field of real property at common law expressing or approving such views without being certain of their correctness. The majority seems to think Schulz, Zubler and Qery are not persuasive, and this upon contrary assertions hy single judges, one at the trial level and citing no authority and the other sitting alone on an appeal from the district court. Taub v. Shampanier, 95 N. J. L. 349 (Sup. Ct. 1920); J. & A. Steinberg Co. v. Pastive, 97 N. J. Eq. 52 (Ch. 1925). To *424me these statements are just as much dictum as those in the Court of Errors and Appeals, but entitled to very little -weight. And then we have the holdings precisely in point in recent years of trial judges by -well-documented opinions in Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N. J. Misc. 153 (Sup. Ct. 1946) and Dworan v. Miloszewski, 17 N. J. Super. 269 (Cty. Ct. 1952), -which the bar must also have relied upon. Nor can I see how it can be seriously urged that a seemingly contrary observation in one Appellate Division opinion subsequent to the cases just cited, and a query in another, would completely reverse reliance by lawyers on the three highest court statements, one almost half a century old, and the two recent exact decisions at the trial level.
I agree thoroughly with the observation of the Chief Justice, borne out by the observations of the amicus curiae and my own experience in practice, that the bar generally has been of the opinion that the ultimate fee was not involved as a result of a judgment against or bankruptcy of one tenant by the entirety and has acted accordingly in passing titles or advising action concerning such judgments. The opposite point of view, illustrated by defendants in this case, would seem to be a rarity. So, to my mind, the result reached by the majority has the definite and dangerous possibility of upsetting many more titles relied upon for years and causing activation of dormant judgments with similar effect than if we were to hold that the contingency of survivorship cannot legally be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated. And, as I have said, the latter to me is the only sound and correct conclusion.
Eor the reasons here expressed, as well as for those set forth in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in which I concur, I would affirm the judgment below.
For reversal — Justices Bueling, Jacobs, Eeaetcxs, Peoctoe and Schettino — 5.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Weinteaub, and Justice Hall — 2.