Court Opinion

ID: 9485882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:32:45.613344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:25.208316
License: Public Domain

*161HOOD, District Judge.
In this case, we are asked to review dismissal of the indictment against Ronald J. Honaker [Honaker] for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), receiving and concealing stolen firearms that have moved in interstate commerce, having reasonable cause to believe that the firearms were stolen. The district court judge dismissed the indictment because the interstate commerce transportation occurred prior to the theft of the firearms. Finding that the district court erred in its interpretation of § 922(j), we reverse.
I
On April 23, 1991, Honaker was arrested along with James Walter Clark [Clark] on suspicion of burglary in Memphis, Tennessee. The arresting officers handcuffed Honaker and Clark and placed them in the police car. At that time, Clark >was carrying a gun, stolen earlier in the day, which he concealed with him in the back seat. While being transported, Clark freed himself from his handcuffs, took the gun and shot both of the police officers..
Clark then removed another gun from one of the officers and fled on foot with Honaker. Clark and Honaker were recaptured and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), aiding and abetting one another in receiving and concealing firearms that have been transported in interstate commerce, having reasonable cause to believe that the firearms were stolen. The United States amended its indictment to add that the firearms in question were stolen at the time of receipt and concealment and that they had been transported in interstate commerce at some point in time. The United States concedes that the firearms in question were not stolen at the time of their interstate transportation.
Clark and Honaker moved to dismiss the indictments on the basis that the interstate commerce nexus had occurred before the firearms in question were stolen. Following a recommendation by the magistrate judge, the district court granted the motions. The district court agreed, with Clark and Honaker, premising its decision on an interpretation of § 922(j) that would require the interstate commerce transportation to occur after the theft of the firearms. The United States appeals dismissal of the indictment against Honaker.1
II
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th Cir.1989); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 308 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946, 109 S.Ct. 377, 102 L.Ed.2d 365 (1988). Although Honaker would have us apply an abuse of discretion standard because such is the standard applied to review a district court’s refusal to dismiss an indictment, the true issue here is the interpretation and application of § 922(j). Construction of a statute is a question of law, and thus receives de novo review.
B. Interpretation of § 922(j)
“In determining the meaning of [a] statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.” Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987)). The object and policy of a statute, of course,’ are reflected in the legislative history of that statute. If, after reference to the language, structure and legislative history of a statute, the intended scope of the statute remains ambiguous, the rule of lenity will apply. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990).
In construing § 922(j), it is important to compare its present form with how it previously read. Formerly, § 922(j) stated:
*162It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm ..., or to pledge or accept as security for a loan any stolen firearm ..., which is moving as, which is part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm ... was stolen.
This language gave rise to two requirements: First, that defendants receive and conceal the firearms while the interstate commerce transportation was ongoing, United States v. Ruffin, 490 F.2d 557 (8th Cir.1974), and second, that the firearms be stolen at the time of the interstate shipment. United States v. West, 562 F.2d 375 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 1484, 55 L.Ed.2d 515 (1978).
In 1990, however, Congress amended § 922(j) to its current form, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any stolen firearm ... which is moving as, which is a part of, which constitutes, or which has been shipped or transported in, interstate or foreign commerce, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the firearm ... was stolen.
The parties here dispute whether the statute, as amended, requires that the firearms be stolen at the time of their interstate transportation. Although the language may be somewhat ambiguous, the legislative history makes clear Congress’ intent and resolves any perceived ambiguity. See United States v. R.L.C., — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 1334, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992).
In its report on proposed changes to § 922, the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary explained that the change in § 922(j) would “expand Federal jurisdiction to permit prosecution for transactions involving stolen firearms ... where the firearms have already moved in interstate or foreign commerce.” H.R.Rep. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 106 (1990), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News pp. 6472, 6510. Furthermore, in proposing the amendment to § 922(j), the office of the Attorney General indicated that the amendment would “expand federal jurisdiction to permit federal prosecution for trafficking in firearms which have been stolen ... and which have moved in interstate commerce at any time.” Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subeomm. on Crime of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1990) (statement of Edward S.G. Dennis, Assistant Attorney General).
These two statements leave no doubt that Congress intended § 922(j) to apply to firearms that have travelled in interstate commerce, both prior to or after being stolen. As such, we find that the district court incorrectly interpreted § 922(j) and erroneously dismissed the indictment against Honaker.
m
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

. The United States does not appeal dismissal of the indictment against Clark pursuant to a subsequent plea agreement.