Court Opinion

ID: 9567040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:47:26.230469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:12.851508
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the reversal of the hijacking conviction because the permissible inference that defendant was “in possession of a firearm” was eliminated by the arresting officer’s direct testimony that defendant did not have a gun.
The inference that defendant did possess one at the time he threatened to kill the victim with a gun was reasonable. He twice told her he had one and said once that he would kill her with it if she was lying and in fact had the car keys (which she did). She could not see the hand which was not grasping her arm because the laundry basket she was holding with both hands was in the way, so she did not know whether or not the gun he stated he had was in that hand or not. She also testified that he wore a kind of bulky waist-length *427quilted jacket. The inference could be drawn that the gun was concealed in it. The victim took the defendant at his word. When the State’s attorney asked, “Now, when he told you that he had a gun and told you that if you were lying he would kill you, at that point did you believe that he possibly, in fact, did have a gun?” She responded unequivocally, ‘Tes.” She was “terrified,” “scared.” Defendant was threatening her and getting impatient with her when the police drove up.
This evidence, including the reasonable inferences, is comparable to the evidence in some of the armed robbery cases, where the conviction was affirmed even though no one testified to actually seeing a weapon. As stated in Johnson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) (a) (392 SE2d 280) (1990), “The question is whether the defendant’s acts create a ‘reasonable apprehension on the part of the victim that an offensive weapon (was) being used,’ regardless of whether the victim actually saw the weapon. Moody v. State, 258 Ga. 818, 820 (1) (375 SE2d 30) (1989).” The armed robbery statute prohibition “includes concealed offensive weapons provided there is either a physical manifestation of the weapon or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred. Hughes v. State, 185 Ga. App. 40, 41 (363 SE2d 336) (1987).” Johnson, supra.
.. Armed robbery occurs when a person, “with intent to commit theft, . . . takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon.” OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). Motor vehicle hijacking occurs when a person “while in possession of a firearm or weapon obtains a motor vehicle from the per: son or presence of another by force and violence or intimidation or attempts or conspires to do so.” OCGA § 16-5-44.1 (b). As indicated in the majority opinion, the two statutes require comparable proof, with respect to the weapon element.
In this case there was no direct physical manifestation of a weapon, but there was both physical and verbal evidence that strongly supported the inference that defendant possessed one. The physical evidence includes the fact that he grasped the victim by only one hand. The other hand was not seen, so its grasp of a gun was not precluded as fact. Thirdly, his clothing was such that a gun could have been in it without visual detection. There was also direct verbal evidence: defendant twice stated that he had a gun, both intimating that he would use it to compel her relinquishment of her car keys so he could take her car or its contents and directly threatening her with its use should she not surrender them.
The officer, who came upon the scene, could not see the hand of defendant which was not grasping the victim’s arm, when he came upon the scene. When the victim ran to the police, defendant stayed *428where he was and the officer approached him. The officer searched him and found no weapon, did not see any weapon around the vie-, tim’s car (which they were close to), and did not see him drop or throw a weapon although he would have seen it if such occurred. Defendant was intoxicated and submitted to the search. During cross-examination defendant’s counsel asked the officer, “There is no question that he did not have a gun?” He responded, “No, he did not have a gun.”
In light of this evidence, the jury could not find that defendant was “in possession of a firearm” when he attempted to hijack the victim’s car. The reasonable inference which was supported by the circumstantial evidence was removed by the stronger positive evidence that none was present.
This differs from, for example, the situation in Johnson with respect to the armed robbery of Perry. Johnson himself had intimated that he had a gun in that he threatened to shoot the cashier Perry if she did not give him the cash, and he kept one hand concealed, so she assumed he had a gun. He left the store and was not apprehended until the next month, shortly after obtaining cash from cashier Smith by demanding all the money and pointing at her through his jacket pocket as though he had a weapon concealed. Johnson’s conviction for armed robbery of Perry was affirmed, but there was no evidence that immediately after the incident he was searched and no weapon was found. He had ample time to dispose of it or otherwise distance it from his person. As to Smith, the search which yielded no weapon was positive, albeit not conclusive, evidence that he did not have a weapon at the time of the robbery. His conviction of robbery by intimidation for that incident was upheld.
The crime here approximates the victim Smith incident, not the victim Perry incident, because as to both Smith and the victim in this case, the defendant was found to have no weapon. Here the evidence was conclusive, as he was observed continuously by the officer from the time the crime was in progress until after the search of his person and the vicinity where he was standing.
Defendant’s own positive statements during the incident, which were effectively used to control the victim’s actions and compel her to do as he demanded, are not sufficient to prove he “possessed] a firearm,” which is an element of the offense. OCGA § 16-5-44.1 (b). Although they were an operative fact in the commission of the crime, as powerful under the circumstances as though he in fact had one, they proved to be fictitious.
The conviction for hijacking must be reversed. Unlike Talbot v. State, 198 Ga. App. 636, 638 (1) (402 SE2d 366) (1991), the case need not be remanded for a new trial or for resentencing for the lesser included offense of attempted robbery by intimidation; defendant *429already stands convicted of that offense, involving this incident.
Decided October 31, 1996.
Kathleen D. Kirwin, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Richard L. Dickson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.