Court Opinion

ID: 9688854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:09:23.26158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:57.362330
License: Public Domain

*611On Rehearing
HARWOOD, Justice.
On brief in support of the application for rehearing counsel for appellant contend that we have in effect overruled the opinion of this court in the third appeal (267 Ala. 301, 101 So.2d 78), in that counsel assert that this court in the third appeal undertook to hold unequivocally that the lower court should take jurisdiction for the purposes of ordering an accounting and ordering specific performance as to altering' the second floor merchandising or award damages for failure to make such alterations.
A reading of the opinion in the third appeal in reference to ordering an accounting shows clearly that there was nothing in the language in that opinion, read in its entirety, showing any intention to depart from the well recognized principle that a large amount of discretion is invested in a court of equity, and it will take or refuse jurisdiction according to the circumstances. In the third appeal it was stated:
“Therefore, since an accounting will be necessary to adjudicate the rights of the parties in this case, and it is here sought in connection with other equitable relief, equity may retain jurisdiction and determine this question, too.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The court below having found that no fraud in its procurement vitiated the lease, it was well within its discretion in refusing to order an accounting. We find no actual conflict in the conclusions reached in our opinion above, and the opinion in the third appeal.
In the opinion in the third .appeal, we find the following:
“In the alternative, the cross-complainant asks that the promises made by Darling be specifically enforced by the court. There are two types of relief which may be granted when a suit is based upon fraud. One is a rescission or cancellation of the instrument which was the result of the .alleged fraudulent promise. The other remedy and the one plead alternatively by the appellant, is specific enforcement by which the fraudulent party is compelled to perform the very specific obligation which rests upon him, and the defrauded party obtains that which was promised him at the inception of the contract, but of which he was deprived because of fraud. 3 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 910, p. 576. This alternative averment therefore contains equity. Whether or not specific performance should be ordered will address itself to the sound discretion of the trial court on final hearing after considering the evidence and the exigencies of the case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Again the court having found no fraud in the procurement of the lease, no occasion arose for ordering specific performance of any agreement to alter the premises, or to award damages for failure to alter the lease itself giving to Darling the determination of whether alterations would or would not be made.
It is true that in our opinion we did point out that equity will not decree the specific performance of a construction contract. This in no wise conflicts with the general rules of specific performance that may be imposed on a fraudulent promisor adverted to in the opinion in the third appeal. Such general rules, however, cannot be applied to a building contract.
Other matters are argued in the briefs in support of the application for rehearing. The matters already written to are in our opinion decisive of this appeal, and no purpose would be served in a discussion of the matters sought to be raised in the rather voluminous briefs and their accompanying appendix.

Petition for Mandamus, Certiorari, or other Remedial Writ

This petition is in two aspects, one relating to the order of the court denying appellant’s motion for a decree pro confesso, and/or a rule nisi for contempt for failure *612of appellee to produce books, records and documents as ordered by previous decrees of thp court.
The second aspect of the petition seeks to have annulled the orders of the court denying appellant’s motions for a decree pro confesso because of Darling’s alleged refusal to answer fully, truthfully, and non evasively interrogatories propounded by the appellant.
As we pointed out in our opinion, contempt proceedings are not reviewable on appeal. In brief counsel for appellant in this connection stated: “However, we expect to file later the necessary application for certiorari or mandamus.” No such proceedings had been instituted at the time of the rendition of the opinion.
As to the denial of appellant’s various motions for a decree pro confesso because of alleged inadequate or untrue answers to appellant’s interrogatories, it appears to be well settled under our decisions that mandamus is likewise the appropriate remedy for review of a lower court’s rulings in either granting or refusing a motion to require answers or fuller answers to interrogatories. Ex parte Markle, 264 Ala. 376, 88 So.2d 363, and authorities cited therein.
The appellant now seeks by mandamus to review the lower court’s denial of its motions for decrees pro confesso made respectively because of alleged non production of certain records of appellee, and also the alleged inadequacy of the answers to appellant’s interrogatories. In each instance the orders were made after a hearing.
The opinion and judgment in this case was announced and rendered on 28 February 1963. An application for rehearing was filed on 15 March 1963. This petition for mandamus was filed on 13 May 1963. This was too late to invite our consideration. It should have been submitted upon submission of the cause. Robinson Co., Inc. v. Beck, 261 Ala. 531, 74 So.2d 915, Ex parte State ex rel. Denson, 248 Ala. 161, 26 So.2d 563; Preddy v. Herren Sales Co., 215 Ala. 216, 110 So. 131. The application is therefore denied.

Motion for Oral Argument and Consent to File Supplemental Brief

Counsel for appellant have filed a motion that this cause be set down for re-argument orally, and that they be permitted to file a supplemental brief.
The basis of this request is that the Justice, who prepared the opinion for the court in this case, was not a member of the court at the time this case was argued orally.
This Justice was appointed to this court on 15 May 1962, to succeed Justice Davis F. Stakely who had elected to go on supernumerary status. A number of cases which had been assigned to Justice Stakely were re-assigned to this Justice, including the present case.
Section 7, Title 13, Code of Alabama 1940, provides that: “Whenever a case is argued orally, the opinion must be delivered by a justice who heard the oral argument; * * *.”
This court, as a matter of policy, has over the years, attempted to follow the provisions of Section 7, supra, though as early as 1909, in Alabama Western Railroad Co. v. Talley-Bates Const. Co., 162 Ala. 396, 50 So. 341, it was stated in reference to this section :
“Without conceding the power of the Legislature to control this court in the discharge of its constitutional duty to render decisions in causes brought here —for it appears to us to be doubtful to say the least, whether the Legislature has any such power * *
At a full conference of this court it was decided unanimously that in the interest of expeditious transaction of the business of this court, it would be impractical to have those cases which had been argued and assigned to Justice Stakely to be re-argued upon their reassignment to another Justice though he had not heard the argument. For these reasons appellant’s request for a reargument of this case is denied.
*613Nor do we feel that any further supplemental briefs would be of assistance. The appellant’s original brief totals some 322 pages, with an appendix of 116 pages; their reply brief and supplemental brief totals some 443 pages; another brief entitled “Complete Appellant’s reply to Appellee’s Supplemental reply Brief” totals 75 pages, with an appendix of 15 pages; appellant’s brief in support of their application for rehearing totals 93 pages, with an appendix of 13 pages; their brief in support of the petition for mandamus totals 366 pages with an appendix of 23 pages; their reply to appellee’s supplemental reply brief totals 16 pages, with an appendix of 3 pages. Thus appellant has already filed briefs in connection with this .appeal of some 1585 legal cap pages.
This motion is accordingly denied. Opinion extended; application for rehearing denied; application for writ of mandamus, certiorari, or other remedial writ denied; application for re-argument and permission to file supplemental brief denied.
LIVINGSTON, C. J, and MERRILL and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.