Court Opinion

ID: 9635644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:57:57.903656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:54.025971
License: Public Domain

Concurring and dissenting opinion by
DEL SOLE, P.J.
¶ 11 concur in the result reached by the Majority, and most of its holdings. However, I write separately because, on several points, I reach the same conclusions through different reasoning. Additionally, I would remand for a modified remedy.
¶ 2 I agree with the Majority on two relevant points. First, I agree that we need not be concerned with the date of the business’ incorporation, because there is no question the business existed, in some form, prior to the parties’ separation, and, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501(a)(4), all property acquired in exchange for marital assets constitutes marital property. Thus, whether the Husband owned the stock at the time of separation, or owned a sole proprietorship for which he received the stock, is irrelevant.
¶ 3 I also agree with the Majority that a spouse can not use a claim of “estate planning” and unilaterally distribute marital assets to defeat another spouse’s equitable distribution claim.
¶ 4 Further, I agree with the conclusion that the conveyance of stock in this case was fraudulent, and, accordingly, agree that the imposition of a constructive trust was appropriate. However, unlike the Majority, I do not believe we need to answer the question of whether a marital asset can be distributed as compensation to a paid employee in order to affirm the trial court’s decision. Rather, I would affirm the decision because, as the trial court found, sufficient evidence of a fraudulent conveyance was introduced at the hearing.
¶ 5 Additionally, on the issue of the imposition of the constructive trust and the resultant award of the stock to Husband and Wife, I would remand for a different remedy. Rather than force Appellant to repay both Husband and Wife for the full value of the stock, I would allow whatever portion of the stock can be attributed solely to Husband to remain Appellant’s. This action is concerned only with the amount of stock Wife has a right to as her share of the marital estate. The unjust enrichment caused by the fraudulent transfer was detrimental only to Wife’s interests. Thus, a remedy to protect her interests should be limited to that goal. Husband is free to distribute any or all of his share of the marital estate. Accordingly, I would remand for a determination of what portion of Appellant’s stock rightfully belongs to Wife, and order the remedy to be limited to that stock.
¶ 6 The Majority disagrees with my proposed revised remedy analysis, finding this issue is beyond the scope of this appeal. However, in my view, Appellant’s challenge to the larger issue of the propriety of the imposition of the constructive trust encompasses the issue of the propriety of the method by which the constructive trust was imposed and executed.
¶ 7 Finally, while I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s decision to value the business on the date of distribution was proper, I do so on the basis of the preference of this Commonwealth’s courts for this method and the lack of a compelling reason to do otherwise. I do not subscribe to the apparent significance the Majority places on Appellant’s knowledge of his parents’ separation and his subsequent continuation of his *823work at the business. Majority Opinion at 18. I believe these factors are irrelevant.