Court Opinion

ID: 9744984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:27:36.077636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.504391
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I dissent because in my opinion the holding of the majority disregards the plain meaning of section 8 — 102 and our prior decisions interpreting that provision. In effect, the majority opinion constitutes a partial repeal, by judicial fiat, of the statutory requirement of written notice embodied within section 8 — 102 and 8 — 103 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 85, par. 8-102, 8-103). One need not look back as far as Erford v. City of Peoria (1907), 229 Ill. 546, to discover decisions of this court which are at odds with that which the majority reaches today. In Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357, 361, we stated: “Section 8 — 102 is unambiguous and clearly expresses the legislative intent that a local public entity be given certain information, in writing, within the time provided, and we hold that the allegation of actual notice does not satisfy the statutory requirement of written notice.” The holding in Housewright was reiterated with approval as recently as Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185. In Repaskey, the express requirement of section 8 — 102 was given effect despite the fact that the plaintiff had given a sworn statement to the defendant concerning the occurrence which gave rise to the cause of action. Here, as the majority concedes, plaintiff’s complaint did not give defendant actual notice of all the information required by section 8 — 102. Nor does our recent decision in Saragusa v. City of Chicago (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 288, upon which the majority relies, support the conclusion that the notice requirement of section 8 — 102 is satisfied by the filing of suit within six months of the accrual of the cause of action. In Saragusa, a written notice of claim was served within six months of the date of injury. The written notice was, however, technically defective. We found these defects to be cured by the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint within the six-month period, stating, “Our holding is therefore that the service of the defective notice and the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint within six months following her injury entitled her to maintain the action.” 63 Ill. 2d at 295. Saragusa is thus distinguishable from the present situation because there the plaintiff attempted to comply with section 8 — 102 and substantially all of the information required by the statute was included in the defective notice. In our case compliance with the statute was never even attempted. In my opinion, the majority decision is grounded upon the belief that the notice requirements of section 8 — 102 have been rendered obsolete by modern discovery procedures. Whether or not this belief is in fact correct is unimportant as the determination of such issues is not the province of this court. The question of the necessity of the notice required by section 8 — 102 is entirely within the control of the legislature. (Ouimette v. City of Chicago (1909), 242 Ill. 501; Housewright v. City of LaHarpe (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 357.) The legislature has clearly provided in section 8 — 102 that notice must be given within six months of the accrual of the cause of action if a suit is to be maintained against a local public entity. The statute does not state that notice must be given within six months of the accrual of the cause of action unless a complaint is filed within the six-month period. It is a proper judicial function to construe the statute as not requiring compliance as a condition precedent to instituting suit, thereby permitting waiver of its requirements as we did in Housewright and Helle v. Brush (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 405, or to say that substantial compliance plus the filing of a complaint satisfied the statute, as we did in Saragusa. It is not a proper judicial function to rewrite the statute and say, quite contrary to its express language, that it need not be complied with in certain cases. I would give effect to the clear language of the statute and not impose a judicial engraftment on an unambiguous legislative enactment. . As that is the effect of the majority opinion, I cannot concur in the decision.