Court Opinion

ID: 9833009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:22:19.32042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:25.266018
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant in motion for rehearing hinges points of error to avoid liability for breach of the contract being in contravention of zoning ordinances of the City of Dallas, perforce of appellees’ pleadings without other proof by appellant to sustain such defense. The portion of the pleadings urged to sustain this contention is as follows:
“That at all times since the execution of the above described contract, plaintiffs have been ready, willing and able to carry out their part of the terms of the contract. Thai upon application to the City of Dallas, Texas, for a construction permit covering the above described building, it was learned that such permit could not be issued until a change could be made in the zoning ordinance of the City of Dallas, Texas. That defendant Carras then informed plaintiffs that he could and would secure said permit *1004and would advise plaintiffs immediately upon its receipt.”
We emphasize in italics the portion related which appellant contends is an admission or waiver by appellees to the introduction of ordinances of the City of Dallas, or other evidentiary matter by appellant to show that the construction of the building within the contemplated area would be in contravention of the City ordinances, thus the contract was void ab initio and the breach, or resulting damage, is damnum absque injuria. We think the above recited allegation is no admission or waiver of proof by appellant to sustain his contention., the burden being on him to sustain his defense that the contract was void. The mere allegation that after the contract was entered into by the parties, they learned from some unrelatéd source that a construction permit could not be issued “until a change could be made in the zoning ordinance of the City of Dallas” is no admission as a fact that the City ordinances then in force affected this property, or that, as a matter of law, a contractual permit could not have been secured by some means agreeable to law. The reasonable inference is that refusal of the permit at the time the application therefor was made, as alleged, was to afford the City to change “the zoning ordinance of the City of Dallas,” evidencing that the area was either not then zoned, or that some restriction of use or construction on the property was to be made by the City, certainly not a legal, concluded bar, or hindrance to a final issuance. Such is evidenced by the immediate succeeding sentence to the allegation: “That defendant Carras then informed plaintiff that he could and would secure said permit and would advise plaintiff immediately upon its receipt”; and from evidence, on trial signally showing that at the time the contract was entered into the area where, the building was to be erected was a part of a proposed commercial center outside the limits of the City of Dallas, and subsequent efforts of the appellant' to contact appellees to advise them that the permit had been secured by him in furtherance of the contract obligations. The defendant testified without objection to questions as follows:
“Q. Now, what kind of a building do you have across the street directly from your place?. A. Nothing — vacant lot.
“Q. Well, isn’t there a — aren’t there two buildings across the street from.you? A. Yes.
“Q. What are they? A. One is a laundry, the other is a home further down from my property. It’s a home.
“Q. This home has — there is a grocery store across the street from you? A. Yes, there is a home with a grocery store on one side.
"Q. Didn’t they have a beauty parlor or some other type of business there? A. I don’t know what you have on the other side. I know there is a grocery store there.
“Q. But they are commercial and retail businesses across the street? A. I guess so.
“Q. And a building stationed on the corner? A. Yes.- * * *
“Q. All right, Mr. Carras, you intended in the construction and operation of your business there to be a law abiding citizen, did you not? A. Yes.
“Q. That’s right. Now, when did you first learn that the City would not at that time grant a permit to build it just like you wanted it? A. The property is off of the City limits — they put it on the City limits — and I thought it was business property at the time I made the agreement with these boys.
“Q. You think it was business property? A. Yes. * * *
“Q. As soon as they told you that the City had not — at that time the' City was making — taking in a lot of territory in the City limits, were they not? A. Yes.
“Q. I see. And you know that at that time they were zoning and rezoning and setting up business and building code restrictions of the City? A. No, I find out at the time the boys go there to get the permit. * * *
“Q. Wait just a minute; just answer the question. You told them at the time they said they couldn’t get the permit right then that you would get a lawyer and go up there and get that permit, did you not?
A. No. .. •
*1005“Q. Did you get a lawyer and go up to the City about changing that and getting a permit? A. Yes, I got a lawyer.
“Q. You got — Do you know John But-era ? A. Yes.
“Q. And you hired John Butera to get that permit for you? A. Yes.
“Q. And John Butera got that permit? A. Yes.”
On the same issue plaintiff Birge testified, without objection, to questions, as follows:
“* * * Well, Mr. Birge, what type of buildings are in that vicinity on Gilpin Street? A. Well, across the street on your right, looking west, there is a cleaning plant; on the left, on the opposite side, there is another building being erected now right across the street from Mr. Car-ras’s building.
“Q. Now was that somewhere about the time that this particular piece of property was taken into the City limits of Dallas? A. I don’t know when the property was taken into the City limits.
“Q. Did you have any discussion with Mr. Carras with relation to the question of building this particular type of building on that particular piece of property? A. That was — that is a part of a proposed shopping center to be eventually built there.
“Q. To be built into a shopping center? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And did you have any discussion with Mr. Carras about whether or not you would have any difficulty in securing a per-' mit? A. At the time we thought the permit would be available because it wasn’t in the City limits and there was business buildings all around this property.
“Q. It was in an area where business buildings were located? A. Yes, sir,
“Q. There are no residences in that block, are there? A. No, sir.”
. The appellant having failed to offer evidence, or in anyway advise the trial court of the existence of a legal obstacle affecting the parties from carrying out the contract, the court would not have been warranted to assume the contract was void, simply because, in the light of the record here presented, the applicant 'for .permit “learned” that a “construction permit” could not be issued “until a change” could be made in the City ordinance. If the area involved was zoned as to effectively prevent construction, voiding the contract, the zoning ordinance should have been brought to the attention of the trial court, and to this court. In absence of which, we have sustained the action of the trial court; appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.