Court Opinion

ID: 9781514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:50:15.209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.500890
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 42] I respectfully dissent because the circumstances of this case simply cannot be forced into the procrustean framework the district court and the majority here have assembled.
[¶ 43] Wyoming’s adoption statutes clearly establish that the foremost aspiration of the adoption process is the best interests and welfare of the child. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-22-111 (LexisNexis 2003); and see 1 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, et al., Adoption Law and Practice, § 1.01[1] (“The guiding principle of adoption is to promote the welfare of children, as well as to serve the interests of biological parents, adoptive parents and the state.”) (1988 and Supp.2003). The record reflects that the child at issue was born on January 31, 1997, and has had a relationship with her paternal grandparents until recently. The child’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights and to the adoption. Mother also consented to the adoption, thus terminating her own rights to the child. However, the adoptive parents are her parents and, thus, her child is now her sibling. The maternal grandparents, now parents, refuse to honor grandparental visitation rights that were accorded to paternal grandparents after a long and bitter struggle with the child’s biological mother.
*176[¶44] As is evident from the majority opinion, the caption of this case, as well as the mere realities of this litigation, confidentiality is not of any particular concern here, because the adoptive parents are well known to all parties who have an interest in this matter. See generally 3 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, et al., Adoption Law and Practice, § 13.01[l][c] (“Changing Views About Confidentiality and Anonymity”) (1988 and Supp. 1989).
[¶ 45] Clearly the adoption statutes did not contemplate a situation such as this, the advent of grandparents’ rights to visitation, or the permutations of family relationships in the 21st century. In this context, it should be noted that the “permutations” are not so much a reflection of declining morals, as it is a function of an ever-growing attentiveness to the needs of children. Wyoming’s adoption statutes were first put in place in 1876, and though they have been amended many times in the intervening years, it appears that change has been reactive rather than proactive. The circumstances of this case require us to put aside the artificial barriers of statutory construction. The principles valued by the customs of adoption and the principles at the core of grandparental visitation can coexist quite readily so long as, in the process of interpreting them both, we do not lose sight of the ultimate goal — the best interests of the affected child.
[¶ 46] There is rational authority to assist the courts in a process such as this, without doing violence to either the adoption statutes or the grandparent visitation statutes. It is well summarized in 3 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, et al., supra, § 13.03, at 13-81, (“Post-Adoption Contact with Grandparents”) (1988); and see Beckman v. Boggs, 337 Md. 688, 655 A.2d 901 (Md.1995) (adoption by maternal grandparents did not extinguish paternal grandparents rights to petition for visitation).
[¶ 47] Here, it is apparent that the child has an established relationship with the paternal grandparents. The paternal grandparents were awarded a right to visitation with the child, prior to the adoption. The adoptive parents are the maternal grandparents, and the limited record available to us suggests that the adoption was designed, at least in part, to frustrate the relationship between the child and her paternal grandparents. Based on the authority noted above, I would reverse and remand to the district court for a hearing on whether continued visitation with the paternal grandparents is in the best interests of the child.