Court Opinion

ID: 9654978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:56:44.622477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.967893
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Appellant contended in the Dallas Court of Appeals that he has been “twice tried for the same offense.” The State argued, however, that “appellant was not placed in double jeopardy because he was not tried twice for the same offense,” and also that “having moved for a directed verdict [appellant] was, therefore, responsible for the judgment against him.” After distinguishing the cases relied on by the State, the Dallas Court reasoned that since “there was only one complainant whose name was incorrectly set out in the indictment” and “the prior indictments were not void or fundamentally defective,” the trial court erred in not dismissing the last indictment against appellant on grounds of “former jeopardy.” Fulmer v. State (Tex.App.—Dallas No 05-84-01252-CR, delivered July 3, 1985). Slip Opinion, pp, 1, 14, 15-17.
Thus the conclusion of the Dallas Court must be that the offense alleged in the indictment first tried to a jury verdict is the same offense alleged in the third indictment for purposes of a jeopardy analysis. On that point the opinion of this Court is content to discuss two prior decisions: Escobar v. State, 578 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.Cr.App 1979) (which is not a jeopardy case and cites no authority for the advisory opinion delivered in note 1, at page 140) and Reynolds v. State, 58 Tex.Cr.R. 273, 124 S.W. 931 (1910), which is a jeopardy case and does cite and describe one prior jeopardy decision, Branch v. State, 20 Tex.App. 599 (Ct.App.1886), to conclude:
“So it would seem to follow that where there is a distinct, unquestioned error in the name of the person assaulted as set out in the information, and an acquittal thereafter had, this would not bar prosecution for an assault under the correct name.”
Ibid. (All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise noted.)
That a line of precedent has established the bare rule in Texas cannot be gainsaid, but thus far the opinions mentioned above, including Branch v. State, supra, have never identified any reason for it. In Branch, upon learning at trial that the victim of a theft was not Fabian Flores, as alleged, the State entered a nolle prosequi; another indictment alleged the victim to be Antonio Flores, a different person. Defendant pleaded jeopardy, which plea, the appellate court noted, was “supported by the facts” of the matter it had just set out. However, without elucidation the court held the plea “not good” — giving instead a string of citations beginning with several pages in Bishop Cr.L.Vol 1, and followed by a handful of cases from other jurisdictions. Branch, at 602-603. Thus the formulation is that provided by Mr. Bishop and other authorities.
The work cited is not readily available, but a close successor is, namely, 1 Bishop’s New Criminal Law (1892). At pages 629-630 under § 1052, titled “1. Variance,” from most of the cases cited in Branch, supra, Mr. Bishop finds that “a defendant, acquitted because of the variance [in name of victim], may be prosecuted on a new indictment in which the fact is truly stated,” and continues, “2. The Test — is, whether if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a conviction; when there could, the second cannot be maintained; when there could not, it can be.”
Among other cases cited by Mr. Bishop are two from the former court of appeals: Nance v. State, 17 Tex.App. 385 (Ct.App.1885), and Ex parte Rogers, 10 Tex.App. 655 (1881).*
The former is almost directly on point in the instant cause. The accused in Nance was first acquitted of incest with Pauline *948Leitz; he was then charged for incest with Pauline Seitz. Though the statutory offense was the same, the criminal act was the same and the victim was the same female, the court held acquittal as to Pauline Leitz did not bar the second prosecution as to Pauline Seitz — “names are neither the same nor idem sonans.” Id., at 388-389.
The holding in Nance was explained by Judge Harper, concurring in Murff v. State, 76 Tex.Cr.R. 5, 172 S.W. 239 (1914), viz:
“[The plea of former acquittal] was held not to be good, as evidence in the first case that he had carnal knowledge of ‘Pauline Seitz’ would not have sustained a conviction under indictment alleging the name of the girl to be ‘Pauline Leitz.’ The state, having alleged the girl’s name to be ‘Pauline Leitz,’ had to prove not only that he had carnal knowledge of a girl, but that her name was ‘Pauline Leitz,’ and, failing to make that proof, an acquittal followed, but this did not prevent an indictment for incest with ‘Pauline Seitz,’ although it was the same girl intended to be alleged in the first indictment, and the evidence was identical, the witnesses the same and the facts the same, except that the girl was named ‘Pauline Seitz’ instead of ‘Pauline Leitz.’ ”
Id., 172 S.W. at 250.
Manifestly in the instant cause “Kim Nguyet” is different from “Kim Ngo.” The names are neither the same nor idem sonans. Proof of one will not prove the other. That trial on the indictment resulting in an acquittal is not void or fundamentally defective is of no moment. The offenses are not the same.
Therefore, as supplemented herein I join this part of the opinion of the Court correctly disposing of the reason for the decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals, and join the balance of the opinion.

 The latter is a habeas corpus proceeding to prohibit a second prosecution for forgery. Without passing on propriety of that procedure, the court held a plea in bar on account of double jeopardy could not be sustained under the general variance rule: the second charge must be for the same offense and the proof the same— question is whether the same evidence neces*948sary to support second prosecution would have supported the first. Id., at 655-667.