Court Opinion

ID: 9773016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:12.367996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.719582
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the right of confrontation was not violated when the defendant was excluded from the competency hearing prior to trial. The majority decision misapplies and over extends the right to confrontation.
There never was at common law any recognized right to an indispensable thing called “confrontation” as distinguished from cross-examination. See Wigmore on Evidence § 1397 (Chadbourn Revision 1979).
The in-chambers hearing to determine the competency of child witnesses is not a critical stage of the proceedings related to the ultimate question of innocence or guilt. The competency determination is one which rests in the discretion of the trial judge. It is the responsibility of the trial judge to examine the witness to ascertain capacity. See Muncie v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 155, 213 S.W.2d 1019 (1948). Reserving discretion to the trial judge to exclude the defendant does not interfere with the right of the accused to confrontation because if the child witness is determined to be competent, the defendant will have an ample opportunity to fully assist counsel in the right of cross-examination in open court before the jury. A defendant does not have an absolute right to attend the proceedings when his presence would be useless or the benefit but a shadow. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).
It should be recognized that many children as well as adults are intimidated by the technical legal process. I agree with the Minnesota Court of Appeals when it said that children of sexual abuse have enough difficulty testifying in open court without the added burden of the possibility of an in-chambers intimidation factor arising from the presence of the defendant. See Moll v. State, Minn.App., 351 N.W.2d 639 (1984).
In addition to consideration of fairness to all, the burden of the young sex victims should be made lighter and not more onerous, not only to insure that the abusers are fully prosecuted but to aid in the victim’s recovery from this traumatic experience. Moll, supra.
In State v. Braggs, Tenn.Crim.App., 604 S.W.2d 883 (1980), it was held that an examination of a child outside of the defendant’s presence was harmless error. In that case, defense counsel was allowed to ques*943tion the child in open court concerning her competency. Here, defense counsel examined the children as to their competency before the jury.
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution permits an accused to meet the witnesses face-to-face. The principal purpose of the confrontation rule is to insure the right of cross-examination and to protect the defendant from conviction by means of ex parte testimony given in his absence. See Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 315 S.W.2d 630 (1958). The witness confrontation rule concerns the method by which evidence is presented to the jury during the trial.
The essential purpose of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him is to secure the opportunity of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and the obtaining of immediate answers. This right is basically a trial right and includes the right to cross-examine and the right of the accused to have the trier of fact weigh the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses against him. See 21A Am. Jur.2d § 720 Confrontation, Criminal Law; Wigmore on Evidence § 1395 et seq., Purpose and Theory of Confrontation.
The common law right to confrontation is not without certain well recognized exceptions. Such exceptions may be enlarged from time to time if there is no material departure from the reason underlying the constitutional mandate guaranteeing to the accused the right of confrontation.
The right to be confronted by the witnesses relates only to the actual trial for the commission of the offense. A witness’s testimony from a prior preliminary hearing may be admissible against the defendant provided the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment is not violated. See 21 Am.Jur.2d § 723.
The presence of the accused is not necessary during preliminary proceedings which do not affect the question of his guilt or innocence. See Harris v. Commonwealth, supra; Hoskins v. Commonwealth, 188 Ky. 80, 221 S.W. 230 (1920).
The purpose of a competency hearing is to determine the appropriateness of the testimony from a witness who is under some disability. Such a hearing does not directly relate to the innocence or guilt of the accused but only to the propriety of admitting the testimony of a witness to the jury. The jury is the trier of the ultimate fact of innocence or guilt.
It is a maxim of Kentucky law that the courts must be careful to preserve the right of a defendant to be present at every stage of the trial, beginning with the swearing of the jury and ending with the return of the verdict. Obviously, the defendant is not entitled to be in the jury deliberations, consequently there are other proceedings which he may not be entitled to be' present. The better definition of this marvelous legal phrase is that the defendant is entitled to be present at all phases of the trial which have a direct relationship to a determination of guilt or innocence by the trier of fact.
Clearly the jury as trier of fact witnessed both the direct examination and the cross-examination. They were able to reach a verdict based on the evidence presented to them. It is not appropriate that this Court disturb that verdict. There is no demonstration of prejudice to the accused in this case.
The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution adopted in 1787 requires that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to confront the witnesses against him. Kentucky, as well as almost every state in the nation, has a similar provision. If literally applied, such requirements would prevent entirely the use for the prosecution of former testimony, dying declarations, public records or other evidence coming under the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule. They have not been literally applied.
In the late 1700’s when these provisions were first included in the American Bill of Rights, the general rule against hearsay had been accepted in England for a hundred years, but it was equally well established that the former testimony taken in *944the presence of the accused and subject to cross-examination was received against him if the witness was dead or unavailable. It seems very probable that the purpose of the American provisions for confrontation was to guarantee the maintenance in criminal cases of the hard-won principle of the hearsay rule without abandoning the accepted practice of using former testimony given subject to cross-examination. It forbade the practice of using depositions taken in the absence of the accused which had been much complained of and was later abandoned by the English system and forbidden by statute.
As stated by Justice Cardozo in Snyder, supra, 291 U.S. at 114, 54 S.Ct. at 335, 78 L.Ed. at page 682, “A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of labels.” The phrases “right to confrontation” and “right to be present at every stage of the trial,” must be applied in such a way as to produce a fair result. The right to be present and the right to confront does not confer a right to intimidate. It is the duty of the court to balance the rights of the accused with those of the victim. I believe that the sound discretion of the trial judge is the best barometer to determine fairness. A competency examination of a child witness is within the particular responsibility of the trial judge. In the absence of abuse of discretion or prejudice to the accused, I believe a reviewing court should not disturb the decision of the trial judge. Consequently, I would affirm the conviction.
WHITE, J., joins in this dissent.