Court Opinion

ID: 9741532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:57:23.610494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.592681
License: Public Domain

Markey, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent in respect to the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order denying Joseph Morinelli’s (hereafter plaintiff) motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov).
As the majority notes, ante at 260-261, in reviewing a decision regarding a motion for jnov, “ [i]f reasona*272ble jurors could have honestly reached different conclusions, the jury verdict must stand.” Further, this Court must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, i.e., defendant in the present case. Severn v Sperry Corp, 212 Mich App 406, 412; 538 NW2d 50 (1995). After applying these standards to this case, I cannot agree that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion for JNOV. In order to reach its conclusion that the trial court should have granted plaintiffs motion for JNOV, the majority has to make several preliminary findings. Then, using these findings, the majority sets in action a “domino effect” resulting in its conclusion that the jury’s determination was unreasonable. First, the majority concludes that the testimony of Dr. James LaFleur was improperly admitted opinion testimony. To make this determination, this Court must find that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. Dep’t of Transportation v VanElslander, 460 Mich 127, 129; 594 NW2d 841 (1999). For this Court to find an abuse of discretion, we must find that the trial court’s decision is “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Dacon v Transue, 441 Mich 315, 329; 490 NW2d 369 (1992), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).
Because the majority has decided that JNOV should have been granted on the basis of the improper admission of Dr. LaFleur’s testimony, I will first address that issue. Without question, the disability insurance contract required plaintiff to prove two *273requirements: first, that he was unable to perform the “substantial and material duties of his occupation” as a perfusionist, and, second, that he was “receiving care by a Physician which [was] appropriate for the condition causing the disability.” Here, because we have the benefit of a special jury verdict form, we know that the jury did, indeed, find that plaintiff was so ill that he was unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his occupation, thereby satisfying the first prong of the condition set forth by the insurance disability contract. On the other hand, we also know that the jury found that plaintiff was not receiving care “appropriate for the condition” causing his disability, i.e., diabetes. The jury had received a specific instruction setting forth these two prongs and properly allocating the burden of proof to plaintiff. I agree with defendant that plaintiff cannot on one hand agree that he had the burden of proving his disability as set forth in the policy and as the jury was instructed, but then on the other hand also argue that defendant could not attempt to demonstrate that plaintiff was not, in fact, receiving “appropriate care” for his'diabetic condition.
I also do not believe that the phrase “care by a Physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the disability” is in any way ambiguous. The majority agrees that this language is not ambiguous and that “appropriate care” means “care that is necessary and causally related to the condition forming the basis of the disability claim.” Ante at 263. Where I split with the majority’s analysis is that they also conclude that this does not mean that the treatment must comply with the appropriate and applicable standard of medical care. If, however, one accepts that the word *274“appropriate” is defined as “particularly suitable; fitting; compatible,” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed, 1997), and as “[s]uitable for a particular person, condition, occasion, or place; proper; fitting,” The American Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition (1985), and compares it to the definition of standard of care; I believe one must conclude that “appropriate care” is care that is within the norm of proper, reasonable, and ordinary care. Although I do not and need not conclude here that the term “appropriate care” is completely synonymous with “standard of care” treatment, I do believe that there is correlation between the two.
The definition for standard of care in a medical malpractice case varies somewhat depending on whether the treatment at issue was provided by a general or specialized physician. MCL 600.2912a(l); MSA 27A.2912(1)(1). For example, in an action alleging medical malpractice against a specialist, the plaintiff must prove that in light of the state of art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice, the specialist “failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances . . . .” MCL 600.2912a(l)(b); MSA 27A.2912(l)(l)(b). Thus, for the majority to conclude, ante at 263, that “whether the level of treatment met the standard of care is not pertinent to a determination whether the care was appropriate” is simply contrary to both logic and the obvious wording of the contract at issue.
In respect to Dr. LaFleur’s testimony, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in *275allowing his testimony. Again, I concur with defendant in that the only issue preserved here is whether Dr. LaFleur’s testimony should have been excluded as a sanction for failure to supplement answers to interrogatories. Plaintiff does, indeed, claim that he was surprised at trial because he did not expect Dr. LaFleur to testify regarding “quality of care.” In reviewing the answer to the interrogatory at issue, I understand how plaintiff may have been somewhat “sandbagged” by Dr. LaFleur’s testimony. Nonetheless, the interrogatory did highlight the fact that Dr. LaFleur was going to testify that Mr. Morinelli was not disabled. As already noted and agreed on by all the parties, the contract set forth two requirements that plaintiff must establish in order to be deemed disabled under the policy. Part of the definition is, of course, that at issue: whether plaintiff was receiving “appropriate care.” Specifically, Dr. LaFleur testified that had plaintiff been receiving appropriate care for his condition, he would have been able to return to work. In other words, under the unambiguous wording of the disability insurance contract, the jury appropriately found that because plaintiff was not receiving appropriate care, he did not meet the definition of total disability or totally disabled. Because plaintiff had the burden of proof regarding the entire definition of disability, he cannot complain now that the jury did not find that he met his burden of proof. Dr. LaFleur’s testimony was relevant to an important issue of the trial, and the substance of it was sufficiently identified in the answers to interrogatories so that an abuse of discretion, in my opinion, cannot be found. The jury’s finding was in no respect “unreasonable,” nor was the court’s initial decision to admit the *276testimony “ ‘so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’ ” Dacon, supra at 329, quoting Spalding, supra at 384-385.
I also note that in addition to Dr. LaFleur’s testimony questioning the appropriateness of plaintiff’s treatment for his diabetes, other physicians, specifically Dr. George Grunberger, an internist, also opined that he did not believe plaintiff’s diabetes was well controlled and that he believed a failure in his treatment would likely disable him from his occupation. So, again, the appropriateness of plaintiff’s care for his diabetic condition obviously interrelates with whether he was able to perform his functions and duties as a perfusionist.
The majority, ante at 264, concludes that “the jury erred in concluding that the course of treatment Morinelli received was not appropriate care as contemplated by the policy.” Again, this finding is inadequate for a determination that the trial court erred in failing to grant plaintiff’s motion for jnov. Certainly the testimony in this case was such that reasonable minds could differ with regard to whether plaintiff met his burden of proof. That is the case even if Dr. LaFleur’s testimony were omitted. We are legally able to conclude that a JNOV was required when all evidence and legitimate inferences being viewed in a light most favorable to defendant fail to establish a claim as a matter of law. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 524-525; 564 NW2d 532 (1997). This high hurdle, in my opinion, was simply not met, and the majority is unfortunately and impermissibly sub*277stituting its own judgment as trier of fact. This is an inappropriate role for ail appellate court.
For these reasons, I would affirm with regard to both issues.