Court Opinion

ID: 8638200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:48:45.4645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:56:00.243414
License: Public Domain

STORY, Circuit Justice.
I do not think that the act for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchants’ service (Act 1790, e. ’56 [1 Story’s Laws, 102; 1 Stat. 131, c. 29]) has any bearing on the. present case. The third section of that act merely provides for the case, where the mate and a majority of the crew of a vessel bound on a foreign voyage, after the voyage is begun, and before the vessel shall have left the land, shall discover the vessel to be too leaky or otherwise unfit to proceed on the voyage; and under such circumstances it makes it the duty of the master to return to port. It does not. in the slightest man*874ner, trench upon the general rights and duties of the seamen under the maritime law; but merely imposes an absolute duty on the master in the case specified. All other eases and circumstances remain, therefore, as they were before, to be governed by the general principles of law. In the present case the combination to resist the authority of the master is clearly established; and unless the seamen were, by the circumstances. justified in compelling the master to return home, the offence charged in the indictment is fully made out; and the onus is on the seamen to establish the justification. If the ship was at the time clearly seaworthy, and fit for the voyage, whether the seamen acted by fraud, or by mistake, or upon a fair but false judgment of the facts, it seems to me the offence was committed. If, on the other hand, the ship was at the time clearly unseaworthy and unfit for the voyage, they were fully justified in insisting upon her return home: and were guilty of no offence. The law deems the lives of all persons far more valuable than any property; and will not permit a master, under color of his acknowledged authority on board of the ship, from rashness or passion or ignorance, to hazard the lives of the crew in a crazy ship, or compel them to encounter risks and perform duties, which are so imminent and overwhelming, that they can escape only by the most extraordinary chances, and, as it were, by miraculous exertions. If he should order them into a boat on the ocean, at a time when they could scarcely fail of being swamped or foundered, they would not be bound to obey. His commands, to be entitled to obedience, must, under the circumstances, be reasonable. The proposition cannot for a moment be maintained, that the crew are bound to proceed on the voyage in an unseaworthy and rotten ship, at the imminent hazard of their lives, merely because the master and officers choose in their rashness of judgment to proceed. It is true, that in all cases of doubt the judgment of the master and officers ought to have great weight, and from' their superior intelligence, ability and skill, it may be relied on with far more confidence than that of the crew. They are embarked in the same common enterprise and risks, and it cannot be ordinarily presumed that they will hazard their own lives in a vehicle, which is really unfit for the voyage. Still, if the case does occur, if they will insist on proceeding, no matter at what hazard to life, and the ship is unseaworthy, I am clear, that the crew have a right to resist, and to refuse obedience. It is a case of justifiable self-defence against an undue exercise of power. Neither of these cases is of any real difficulty. But the case of difficulty is this, —suppose the ship to be in that state, in which the presumption of apparent unsea-w-orthiness really arises, and the crew bona fide act upon that presumption, and the jury should be of opinion, that they acted justifiably upon that presumption at the time; and suppose upon the trial it should turn out, (as in the present case it may) that there is real doubt, whether the ship be seaworthy or not; or upon the evidence the case is nearly balanced in the conflict of credible as well as competent testimony, and the jury should on the whole deem the preponderance of evidence just enough to turn .the scale in favor of seaworthiness; but not to place it entirely beyond doubt — I ask, whether, under such circumstances, the crew ought to be convicted of the offence charged, having acted upon their best judgment fairly, and in a case where respectable, intelligent. and impartial witnesses should assert, that they should have done the same; and where even the jury themselves might adopt the same opinion, although there might be an error in the fact of seaworthiness, as established at the trial? I have great difficulty in coming to the conclusion, that under such circumstances the crew were guilty of the offence charged. I am aware of the dangers of not upholding with a steady hand the authority of the master; but I am not the less aware of the necessity of having a just and tender regard for life. Seamen, when they contract for a voyage, do not contract to hazard their lives against all perils which the master may choose they shall encounter. They contract only to do their duty and meet the ordinary perils, and to obey reasonable orders. The relation between master and seamen is created by the contract; but that relation, when created, is governed by the general principles of law. Unlimited submission does not belong to that relation. I have great repugnance to creating constructive offences, and especially where there is perfect integrity of intention. I am aware, that in some cases crimes may be committed independently of any supposed intention to do wrong. But in most cases, and I think in a case of this nature., the intention and the act must both concur to constitute an offence. There are cases even of the highest crimes, as of homicide, where an honest and innocent mistake in .killing another, under circumstances of a reasonable presumption, though a mistaken one, that the party killed intended to kill the other party, when the latter will be excused by law.
I have had this subject a good deal in my thoughts during the progress of this trial, (and the point is certainly a new one); and the strong inclination of my opinion at present is, subject to be changed by any argument hereafter urged, that the defendants ought not to be found guilty, if they acted bona fide upon reasonable grou'nds of belief, that the ship was unseaworthy, and if.the jury, from all the circumstances, are doubtful, whether the ship was seaworthy, ni-even in a measuring cast should incline to believe the ship seaworthy. If she was *875clearly seaworthy beyond reasonable doubt, then the defendants ought to be convicted, for the facts of the combination and resistance are admitted.
Upon these suggestions of the court, the district attorney said, that his own opinion coincided with that of the court, and that he would enter a nolle prosequi. But he had thought it his duty to bring the- case before the court. And the court said, that the case was very properly brought before it for decision.