Court Opinion

ID: 9626127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:03:11.451809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:24.236989
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
JACKSON, Vice Chief Justice.
In a petition for rehearing, defendants insist that the evidence was insufficient to establish primary negligence, or to show proximate cause, and that it was therefore error for the court to grant plaintiff’s motion for new trial, citing Kurn v. Cochran, 181 Okl. 205, 73 P.2d 433, and Oklahoma City-Ada-Atoka Ry. Co. v. Swink, 186 Okl. 292, 97 P.2d 72.
Plaintiff’s decedent, Mrs. Patricia Sturm, was cared for during most of her pregnancy by Dr. Green. On May 31st, during the seventh month of her pregnancy, Dr. Green told her that her baby had died in the womb, and advised her to carry the dead fetus to full term, if necessary, and to await a “spontaneous” termination of the pregnancy. Dr. Green went on vacation about July 15th, after having arranged for Dr. First to take care of Mrs. Sturm. He told Dr. First about the dead fetus, and he in turn had told Dr. Horn about it.
We find expert testimony to the effect that the retention of a dead fetus for as long as four weeks sets the stage for a situation called the “dead fetus syndrome” in which a substance in the blood called fibrinogen sinks to a dangerously low level, creating a condition called hypofibrinogen-emia; that when this occurs, the blood will not clot; that proper medical practice requires under such circumstances that fibrin-ogen be injected into the blood stream to reduce the possibility that the patient might bleed to death during or after the delivery of the dead fetus or surgery in connection therewith.
There is evidence to the effect that Mrs. Sturm entered the hospital on the morning of July 26th; that about 10:13 A.M. she was delivered of a dead fetus while under the care of Dr. First; that Dr. First was unable to control or stop the bleeding that followed, and called Dr. Horn about noon; that Dr. Horn arrived shortly thereafter and performed a vaginal hysterectomy; that both doctors, although knowing about the dead fetus, either failed to recognize the possibility of hypofibrinogenemia, or, having recognized it, failed to take proper corrective measures; that as a result thereof, Mrs. Sturm continued to bleed internally after the conclusion of the vaginal hysterectomy until she died on the morning of July 27th.
We also find expert testimony that a vaginal hysterectomy, although proper for the removal of the uterus of a non-pregnant woman, is not proper for the removal of the greatly enlarged uterus of a woman who has just given birth; that in such case, proper medical practice calls for the removal of the uterus through an incision in the abdomen; that when a vaginal hysterectomy is performed, the surgeon is working at least partially by “feel” because his field of vision is limited; that possibly for this reason, one of the arteries was not properly tied off during the hysterectomy *549hut continued to bleed; that this condition, together with the hypofibrinogenemia previously mentioned, caused the death of Mrs. Sturm on the morning of July 27th.
Since the question raised in defendants’ petitions for rehearing concerns only the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima facie case, and not the weight thereof, the above summary takes note only of the evidence favorable to plaintiff.
We are of the view that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence and proximate cause.
We have again examined the entire record in this case to determine whether the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion in granting a new trial. Being cognizant of the fact that a trial court is in a better position than this court to appraise the fairness of a trial conducted by it, Houston v. Pettigrew, Okl., 353 P.2d 489, and being unable to affirmatively say the trial court abused “sound legal discretion”, Cosmo Construction Co. v. Loden, Okl., 352 P.2d 910, we can not say the trial court erred in granting a new trial.
In Dr. John E. Horn’s original brief it was argued in Proposition 3-B that there was no evidence connecting Mrs. Sturm’s death with Dr. Horn’s operative and post operative procedures. This conclusion was based upon the argument that a pathologist’s autopsy report was improperly admitted, and that when the autopsy report is stricken from the record (as improperly admitted) there is no evidence that Dr. Horn was negligent. In petition for rehearing Dr. Horn points out that this same question will probably arise in re-trial of this action and that this court should express its views for the guidance of the trial court.
The record discloses that after Mrs. Sturm’s death hospital authorities obtained permission for Dr. G., a pathologist, to conduct an autopsy examination to ascertain the cause of death. A report of the autopsy examination was filed with the hospital librarian and made a part of the hospital records. When plaintiff sought to introduce the autopsy report as a routine hospital record the defendants objected upon the ground that (1) the pathologist is in the courtroom and available to testify; (2) it is not the best evidence; and (3) the autopsy report is not a report in connection with the care and treatment of Mrs. Sturm, since the autopsy examination and report was conducted after her death.
We are of the view that there is merit in this contention. In Hembree v. Von Keller, 189 Okl. 439, 119 P.2d 74, we held generally that hospital records to be admissible in evidence must have been kept in the ordinary course of business as an essential part of the system of business. In the Hembree case we cited Sharp v. Pawhuska Ice Co., 90 Okl. 211, 217 P. 214, which involved “books of account”, as authority for our holding that hospital records kept in the ordinary course of business were admissible.
As a general rule hospital records are prepared during such time as the patient is undergoing treatment. Such records are undoubtedly necessary for the benefit of the patient, the doctors, and the hospital staff. Such records would be harmful to the patient and of no benefit to the doctors and hospital staff unless dependable and accurate. Those who make and keep the records for doctors and hospitals which are to be used professionally in the further care and treatment of the patient must undoubtedly be guided by the highest and purest motives of the medical profession. For this reason hospital records may be accepted in evidence with a presumption of verity. However, after the death of a patient two motives could exist for conducting an autopsy: (1) To obtain information which will be useful in the treatment of future patients, and (2) to obtain information useful in prosecuting or defending a damage suit. In view of the fact that an autopsy could be prompted with litigation in mind we are of the view that it should not be placed in the category of a hospital record for evidentiary purposes. *550We therefore hold that the trial court erred in accepting the autopsy report as a hospital report, but should have required plaintiff to call the doctor as his witness to identify the autopsy report, to testify in regard thereto, and to admit it after proper identification. 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 537 h and i; Spiegel’s House Furnishing Co. v. Industrial Comm., 288 Ill. 422, 123 N.E. 606, 6 A.L.R. 540 (Coroner’s Inquest) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 176 Okl. 535, 56 P.2d 1179 (Coroner’s Verdict); Oklahoma Aid Ass’n v. Thomas, 125 Okl. 190, 256 P. 719 (Death Certificate) ; Gray v. Cosden, 141 Okl. 183, 284 P. 288 (Best Evidence); Vol. 1, No. 1, Tulsa (Oklahoma) Law Journal page 62 (Evidence-Hospital Records). However, we do not consider this reversible error in the instant case for the reason that the doctor who conducted the autopsy was available for, and was, examined as a defense witness.