Court Opinion

ID: 9927345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 21:00:45.954469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:14.520125
License: Public Domain

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                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 21-4668

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

              v.

        JEREMY NICHOLAS MYNES,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cr-00468-CCE-1)

        Submitted: November 9, 2023                                       Decided: January 25, 2024

        Before AGEE, THACKER and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
        for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro,
        North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jeremy Mynes pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e), and one count of possession of child pornography,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court sentenced Mynes

        to thirty years’ imprisonment on the production count and a consecutive term of ten years’

        imprisonment on the possession count. In addition, it imposed fifteen-year terms of

        supervised release, to run concurrently, and set various conditions of that release. Lastly,

        it imposed various monetary penalties. Mynes’ sentences are all within the Guidelines

        range and statutory requirements.

               Mynes appealed, and counsel filed an Anders 1 brief raising several potential grounds

        for appeal and Mynes filed a supplemental pro se brief raising additional grounds. The

        Court ordered supplemental briefing on two issues: (1) whether a sufficient factual basis

        existed to support the production count, and (2) whether a condition of supervised release

        restricting Mynes’ computer and internet use was overbroad.

               For the reasons provided below, we affirm Mynes’ convictions and sentences.

                                                      I.

               In mid-2020, Mynes came to the attention of law enforcement after they connected

        him to a Dropbox, Inc., account containing uploaded files depicting “child pornography.”

        Law enforcement obtained a warrant permitting them to search (among other items)

               1
                   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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        Mynes’ residence, computer, electronic storage devices, and cell phones. The search of his

        computer, hard drives, and cell phones found scores of photographs and videos depicting

        child pornography. In addition, Mynes’ cell phones contained dozens of images that Mynes

        had taken and which depicted the exposed genitalia of two minor females, identified here

        as “child victim 1” and “child victim 2.”

               Mynes was charged with receiving and attempting to receive child pornography, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (Count 1); two counts of production of child

        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (Counts 2 and 3); and one count of

        possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) (Count

        4). Each of the production counts focused on one of the child victims, meaning Count 2

        was based on the images depicting child victim 1 and Count 3 was based on images

        depicting child victim 2. 2 The possession count (Count 4) related to images Mynes had

        created of child victims 1 and 2 as well as ones he possessed depicting other minors.

               Mynes and the Government entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty

        to two of the four charged offenses, Count 2 (production of child pornography relating to

        child victim 1) and Count 4 (possession of child pornography depicting multiple minors,

        including child victims 1 and 2). In exchange, the Government agreed to dismiss Counts 1

        and 3 and to move for a one-level reduction in Mynes’ Guidelines offense-level calculation

        based on acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).

               2
                Mynes’ brief contains arguments that relate to both child victims when discussing
        his Count 2 conviction, but we have limited our review of that offense to the images
        depicting child victim 1, consistent with the indictment.

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              At the plea hearing, Mynes affirmed that he’d reviewed the factual basis for his plea

        and had no objection to it. Following the Rule 11 colloquy, the district court accepted

        Mynes’ guilty plea.

              The sentencing hearing went similarly smoothly, with neither party noting

        objections to the presentence report (PSR). Once again, Mynes affirmed that he’d reviewed

        the PSR’s contents, understood it, and had no concerns to raise to the court. The district

        court calculated Mynes’ total offense level to be forty-three. When coupled with his

        criminal history category of one, Mynes’ Guidelines range was set at 480 months’

        imprisonment (the statutory maximum).

              After hearing from the parties and Mynes personally on the question of an

        appropriate sentence under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced

        Mynes to thirty years’ imprisonment on the production count and to ten years’

        imprisonment on the possession count, to run consecutively. In so doing, it recounted

        several mitigating factors that it believed had been adequately “taken into account in the

        charging decisions and the plea agreement,” because had Mynes been “convicted of all of

        the things that he actually did,” he would be facing a much higher sentence. J.A. 100. The

        court concluded that the Guidelines recommendation of the statutory maximum term of

        imprisonment was appropriate given the seriousness of the offenses, which involved

        “repeated occurrences over time, long term involvement in viewing and collecting child

        pornography,” followed by Mynes’ decision to create child pornography depicting “more

        than one victim” and (as to some images of child victim 2) documenting “touching” and

        “sexual assault.” J.A. 100–01.

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               The district court then imposed a fifteen-year term of supervised release as well as

        numerous conditions of release. Some of the conditions were mandatory and some were

        standing or special conditions recommended in the PSR based on the nature of Mynes’

        offenses. Noting that the conditions had been set out in the PSR for Mynes’ prior review,

        the district court obtained Mynes’ consent to summarize and incorporate them by reference

        rather than reading them aloud in open court in detail. Particularly relevant here, the court

        imposed a condition that would include “[s]ignificant limits on [Mynes’] possession or use

        of a computer and internet.” J.A. 105. The court acknowledged that technology would

        change by the time Mynes would be released and therefore “you pretty much need the

        internet to function in society, so I would anticipate appropriate allowing [him] to have

        some access under whatever conditions exist when he is released,” but only as monitored

        and permitted by a probation officer. J.A. 105. 3

               3
                   The written judgment expresses this computer and internet restriction as follows:
               The defendant shall not possess or use a computer, or any other means to
               access any ‘on-line computer service’ at any location (including
               employment) without the prior approval of the probation officer. This
               includes any Internet Service Provider, peer-to-peer network or file sharing
               programs, or any other public or private computer network. If granted access
               to an ‘on-line computer service,’ the defendant shall consent to the probation
               officer conducting periodic or unannounced examinations of any internet
               capable devices, similar electronic devices, or computer equipment, which
               may include hardware, software, and related computer peripherals. This may
               also include the removal of such equipment, when necessary, for the purpose
               of conducting a more thorough examination. The defendant shall not have
               any social networking accounts without the approval of the probation officer.
        J.A. 115.

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               Lastly, the district court imposed several monetary penalties, as authorized by

        Congress to help victims of child pornography. These included, consistent with the parties’

        stipulation, $3,000 in restitution to the victim “Tara” because Mynes had possessed and

        received files depicting her. In addition, consistent with the PSR’s recommendation, the

        court ordered Mynes to pay a $17,000 special assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 2259A.

               Mynes noted a timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

        18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

                                                      II.

               Counsel initially filed an Anders brief, which required us to review the entire record

        for potentially meritorious issues for review. Our review spurred us to direct the parties to

        file supplemental briefs on the sufficiency of the factual basis to support the guilty plea as

        to Count 2 and the potential overbreadth of the special condition of supervised release

        relating to Mynes’ computer and internet access.

               Because Mynes did not challenge either issue in the district court, we review each

        for plain error. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). Under the

        Supreme Court’s familiar recitation of this standard in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

        725 (1993), to prevail, a defendant must establish (1) error; (2) that is “clear” or “obvious”;

        and (3) that implicates the defendant’s “substantial rights,” meaning that it “affected the

        outcome of the district court proceedings,” id. at 732, 734 (cleaned up); see also Fed. R.

        Crim. P. 52(b). Even when the first three requirements are met, then the Court still has

        discretion whether to remedy the error, considering whether it “seriously affects the

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        fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732

        (cleaned up).

                                                     A.

               “Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a

        factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). This process “ensures that the court

        make[s] clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those admissions are

        factually sufficient to constitute the alleged crime.” United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d

        114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). In undertaking that duty, the district court can consider the Rule

        11 plea colloquy and anything else in the record, including the stipulated facts and the PSR.

        See id. On appeal, this Court can similarly examine the entire district court record to

        confirm that “the district court could reasonably have determined that there was a sufficient

        factual basis based on the record before it,” regardless of the specific findings the court

        made or the more limited contents of the written factual basis for a plea. Mastrapa, 509

        F.3d at 660.

               Count 2 charged Mynes with violating § 2251(a), which prohibits individuals from

        using “any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of

        producing any visual depiction of such conduct.” Most of the elements warrant little

        discussion—it’s undisputed that Mynes took images depicting a minor female.

               Our review of the record also confirms that those images depict “sexually explicit

        conduct.” This phrase is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A), though just one of its

        definitions applies here—“the lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of

        any person.” No federal statute defines “lascivious exhibition,” so courts have taken

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        various approaches to doing so. In United States v. Courtade, 929 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2019),

        we adopted a definition using the dictionary definitions of the component words,

        concluding that a “lascivious exhibition” is “a depiction which displays or brings forth to

        view in order to attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite

        lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer.” Id. at 192 (citation omitted). In Courtade

        and elsewhere, we have also cautioned that “the statute by its terms requires more than

        mere nudity, because the phrase ‘exhibition of the genitals or pubic area’ is qualified by

        the word ‘lascivious.’” Id. at 191 (cleaned up); accord United States v. Cohen, 63 F.4th

        250, 256 (4th Cir. 2023) (“We agree it would be legal error to” “conclud[e] the pictures at

        issue were lascivious based solely on the fact that they contain an erect penis.”). Of final

        relevance to our review, we are not the only jurisdiction to recognize that the context in

        which the visual depictions were taken is often a relevant factor when determining whether

        they constitute a “lascivious exhibition.” Cohen, 63 F.4th at 256; United States v. Kolhoff,

        No. 22-4601, 2023 WL 6442529, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2023) (per curiam) (listing cases);

        United States v. Heinrich, 57 F.4th 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2023) (observing that “the ultimate

        inquiry is holistic” and that the minor’s age and circumstances surrounding the taking of

        the photograph help distinguish “innocent beach or bathtub photos from child porn”);

        United States v. Spoor, 904 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2018) (concluding that a jury could find

        the element satisfied based on features in the images suggesting they “serve[d] no obvious

        purpose other than to present the child as a sexual object”).

               Applying these principles to the images of child victim 1 at issue in Count 2, we

        readily conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in finding that the images

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        depict a “lascivious exhibition” of child victim 1’s genitals and pubic area. See, e.g., United

        States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that plain error occurs when

        “the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred”

        and that “a district court does not commit plain error by following the reasoning of another

        circuit” (citation omitted)). Here, Mynes took a series of images in his living room when

        child victim 1 was seven years old. She is sitting “on a couch without any underwear” and

        the images were “focused on her vagina, which was fully exposed.” J.A. 129. The series as

        a whole reflects not just a decision to focus the images on child victim 1’s genitals, but to

        obtain “close-up shot[s] of the girl’s genitals” in the later image. J.A. 32. Although the girl

        was at Mynes’ residence with her mother’s permission, her mother was unaware that these

        photographs had been taken. The individual images, the series as a whole, the environment

        in which they were taken, and the general context, taken together, sufficiently support the

        factual basis for Mynes’ plea so that we can affirm on plain-error review. 4

               Mynes also challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis to support a finding that

        he possessed the specific intent to take the images at issue in Count 2. In United States v.

               4
                 Many courts have relied on some variation of a six-factor test first set out in United
        States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), to assist with analyzing whether a visual
        depiction constitutes “lascivious exhibition.” In their briefs, the parties orient their
        arguments around these factors. We have not yet opined on the utility of these factors, nor
        need we do so here. Even in jurisdictions that rely on them, the Dost factors are neither
        exhaustive nor mandatory, and whatever utility they provide in appropriate cases, we need
        not delve into them here because the images in the record plainly satisfy the definition
        supplied in Courtade. See 929 F.3d at 192 (concluding it was unnecessary to consider the
        relevance of the Dost factors or undertake that analysis based on the images clearly falling
        within the definition supplied).

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        Palomino-Coronado, 805 F.3d 127 (4th Cir. 2015), the Court recognized that § 2251

        “contains a specific intent element” requiring that “a purpose” for taking the images was

        the “production of a visual depiction,” id. at 130 (emphasis added). Intent can be shown

        through circumstantial evidence. Id. at 131. The cases in which we have concluded that the

        evidence did not support this element have typically been where the circumstances

        surrounding the taking of the images showed that the defendant acted unthinkingly or

        spontaneously during the course of unlawful sexual activity with a minor. See id. at 132–

        33; see also United States v. McCauley, 983 F.3d 690, 696 (4th Cir. 2020) (observing that

        “§ 2251(a) does not criminalize a spontaneous decision to create a visual depiction in the

        middle of sexual activity without some sufficient pause or other evidence to demonstrate

        that the production of child pornography was at least a significant purpose” for taking the

        image). Those cases are readily distinguishable from the record in this case, which reflects

        that Mynes intentionally took photographs of child victim 1’s exposed genitalia, focused

        and closed-in on that part of her body for later images, and retained them on his phone. A

        reasonable inference from this record is that at least one purpose for his conduct was to

        produce the images, thus demonstrating his intent.

               For all these reasons, the district court did not err—let alone commit plain error—

        in accepting the plea as to Count II. We therefore affirm the conviction.

                                                     B.

               Next we consider the special condition of supervised release relating to Mynes’

        computer and internet access, and we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in

        imposing this comprehensive of a restriction. This issue implicates the district court’s broad

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        sentencing discretion to “impose any . . . condition it considers to be appropriate, as long

        as that condition is ‘reasonably related’ to [the] statutory factors referred to in

        § 3583(d)(1).” United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003). The statutory

        factors are: “the nature and circumstances of the offenses and the history and characteristics

        of the defendant; providing adequate deterrence; protecting the public from further crimes;

        and providing the defendant with training, medical care, or treatment.” Id. (citations

        omitted). In addition, conditions must “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is

        reasonably necessary” to achieve those goals, and they must be consistent with the

        Sentencing Commission policy statements about supervised release. 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(d)(2)–(3).

               Recognizing that a restriction on computer and internet access imposes a significant

        burden in modern life, we have reviewed such conditions carefully, but have approved of

        them when coupled with an adequate explanation in appropriate cases. E.g., United States

        v. Arce, 49 F.4th 382, 396 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 421

        (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. Ellis, 984 F.3d 1092, 1104–05 (4th Cir. 2021). Applying

        the precepts from our past cases to this one reveals multiple reasons why the district court

        did not plainly err in imposing the condition at issue. At the outset, and contrary to Mynes’

        representation, the conditions do not impose a lifetime ban, but rather accompany his

        fifteen-year term of supervised release, so their duration is limited. More importantly,

        Mynes did more than possess child pornography; he produced it. Although we have

        recognized that a computer and internet ban “is almost always excessive for non-contact

        child pornography activity, or similar conduct where there was no actual contact with the

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        victim,” Arce, 49 F.4th at 396 (cleaned up), we have recognized that such a condition “may

        be appropriate” in the event of a contact-based offense, United States v. Morris, 37 F.4th

        971, 977 (4th Cir. 2022). Here, Mynes’ offense conduct reflects that he escalated from

        accessing child pornography online to creating his own visual depictions of child

        pornography, including documentation of sexual contact with a minor. Specifically, the

        images Mynes took and retained of child victim 2 depict physical contact between his penis

        and the victim’s exposed genitalia. Mynes’ computer use and internet access fueled his

        behavior and endangered children, thus creating the appropriate individualized

        circumstances supporting the special condition. Further, the text of the condition avoids

        the parade of horribles that Mynes forecasts, allowing for access with appropriate

        monitoring and limitations. Given the totality of the record, we discern no plain error in

        the district court’s decision.

                                                   III.

               Having performed our review under Anders, we find no meritorious issues on appeal

        and therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this Court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process. 5

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

               5
                 Pending before the Court is Mynes’ post-argument pro se motion to file a
        supplemental brief in support of his appeal. Considering the totality of the circumstances,
        we grant his motion.

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