Court Opinion

ID: 9559597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:32:10.336999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:41.359634
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice VOLLACK
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Brian Raitz, allowing him to recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits on behalf of Tristan Naranjo, who was injured after falling off the roof of a van driven by Raitz. The van, which was owned by James E. and Margaret Dahlin (the Dahlins), was insured under a policy issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). The majority concludes that under the initial permission rule announced in Wiglesworth v. Farmers Insurance. Exchange, 917 P.2d 288, 291 (Colo.1996), Raitz was an “insured” as that term is defined in the section 10-4-703(6) of the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, §§ 10-4-701 to -726, 3 C.R.S. (1997) (the No Fault Act), because he had the Dahlins’ implied consent to drive the van. The majority also concludes that because Naranjo “occupied” the van with the consent of an insured (Raitz), he is entitled to PIP benefits. I disagree. In my view, Raitz was not an “insured” because he was not authorized to drive the van by the named insured. Consequently, Naranjo was not occupying the van with the consent of an insured and is not entitled to PIP benefits. Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
The Dahlins owned a 1983 Dodge B-150 van which was insured under a State Farm policy describing them as the named insureds. The Dahlins’ daughter, Kristin, had the Dahlins’ express permission to drive the van but was told on more than one occasion that she was not to permit anyone other than family members to drive the van. This prohibition came after a former boyfriend of Kristin’s wrecked another of the Dahlins’ cars.
On the afternoon of October 24,1992, Kristin drove the van and several friends to a park in Boulder where they began drinking beer. After several hours, the group decided to return to Arvada. On the way home, Kristin’s boyfriend, Alan Angelopulous, climbed through the van’s back doors and onto the roof while the van was moving at forty-five to fifty miles per hour.1 Kristin, who was driving at the time, stopped the van and “yelled at [Angelopulous] and told him not to do it.” However, another passenger, Tim Lemley, subsequently climbed up on the roof. Upon seeing Lemley through the top of the windshield, Kristin stopped the van and told him “don’t you ever do that.”
That evening, Kristin, Angelopulous, and several other friends went to Lemley’s house where they continued drinking beer. Kristin eventually fell asleep on a couch in the basement because she was “too drunk” after drinking “too many” beers. After Kristin “passed out,” Angelopulous awakened her to ask for the keys to the van so that he and some others could drive to get some food. Angelopulous claims that Kristin opened her eyes, handed him the keys and went back to *1189sleep. Kristin has no recollection of being awoken or of handing the keys to Angelopu-lous. In her deposition, Kristin testified that she would have refused to give Angelopulous the keys if “he was drunk and had been drinking.”
Upon obtaining the keys to the van, Angel-opulous, Naranjo, Raitz, and another person proceeded outside where, Angelopulous testified, they began feeling “like crazy idiots.” Naranjo drove the van while Angelopulous and Raitz rode on the roof. After stopping at Angelopulous’ house for money, Raitz drove while Angelopulous and Naranjo rode on the van’s roof. Naranjo subsequently fell off the van’s roof and was seriously injured.
Raitz instituted this action as Naranjo’s assignee seeking PIP benefits: pursuant to the Dahlins’ State Farm policy. Both .sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Raitz’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Naranjo was entitled to PIP benefits under the Dahlins’ policy because he “was an occupant of a vehicle operating on the public highways of Colorado, and had the permission of the named insured.” In. denying State Farm’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court also referred to what it considered a valid “chain of consent” from the Dahlins to Kristin to An-gelopulous to Raitz.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in determining that Naranjo was entitled to receive PIP benefits under either the insurance policy or the No Fault Act. See Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 P.2d 657 (Colo.App.1997). The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
II.
Section 10-4-707(1)(c), 3 C.R.S. (1997), provides that the coverage described in the No Fault Act shall be applicable to:
Accidental bodily injury arising out of accidents occurring within this state sustained by any other person while occupying the described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured....”
(Emphasis added.) Section 10-4-703(6), 3 C.R.S. (1997), defines “insured” as “the named insured, relatives of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named insured, or any person using the described motor vehicle with the permission of the named insured.” (Emphasis added.)
In Wiglesworth v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 917 P.2d 288, 291 (Colo.1996), we adopted the initial permission rule, which provides that once the owner of a vehicle gives another permission to operate the vehicle, subsequent changes in the character dr scope of the use do not require additional, specific consent. See id. For example, in Wiglesworth, even though the driver had only received permission to drive the named insured’s truck to work, we held that the driver was an “insured” for purposes of section 10-4-703(6) despite using the truck for drag racing. Under these circumstances we held that coverage would be precluded only where the deviation from the permitted use rose to the level of theft or conversion. See id.
Relying upon Wiglesworth, the majority asserts that once the Dahlins gave Kristin permission to use the van, they impliedly consented to any subsequent permission she, or her permittees, might give to others wishing- to use the van. In other words, the majority contends that once the Dahlins permitted Kristin’s use of the vehicle, they impliedly authorized an indeterminate number of other people to use it as well so long as their use did not involve theft or conversion. As a result, the majority reverses the court of appeals, concluding that
[bjecause Raitz, the driver of the van at the time of the accident, received permission to drive it.-from Angelopulous, and Angelopulous received valid permission from the initial borrower, Kristin, ... Raitz operated the vehicle with the implied consent of the named insureds, the Dah-lins. Consequently, coverage for Naran-jo’s injuries' is mandatory under section 10-4-707(1)(c) because Naranjo occupied the van with the consent of an insured.
Maj. op. at 1188.
Contrary to the majority, I believe that Wiglesworth is not dispositive here because *1190that case concerned only one level of permission between the named insured and the vehicle’s driver. For this reason, our consideration was limited to a deviation from the initially permitted use. Wiglesworth, and the initial permission rule we announced therein, does not address situations where permission to use the vehicle is passed from the initial permittee to subsequent drivers. In my view, these subsequent permission eases must be analyzed using the plain meaning of the No Fault Act, which does not include subsequent permittees within the term “insured.” See § 10-4-703(6).
Furthermore, we explicitly rejected the majority’s implied permission rationale in McConnell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 906 P.2d 109, 114 (Colo.1995), when we explained that
section 10—4—707(1)(c) requires an occupier to have consent from one authorized to give such consent in order to qualify for mandatory coverage under the Act. This consent must come from the named insured, a resident relative of the named insured, or the named insured’s permittee. A named insured may allow a permissive user a wide scope of discretion, including the authority to permit others to ride in or use the vehicle.
However, this certainly does not mean that if a named insured permits one person to use the vehicle, he or she thereby permits everyone to use the vehicle. Where a named insured expressly forbids an individual to use his or her car, we fail to see how permitting another to use the car would affect this prohibition.
Id. (emphasis added).2
In this case, it is undisputed that the named insureds, the Dahlins, prohibited anyone other than family members from driving the van. Clearly then, neither Angelopulous nor Raitz had permission from the named insureds to drive the van on the night in question and are therefore not “insureds” under the plain meaning of section 10—4-703(6). For this reason, Naranjo was not authorized to occupy the van by an insured and cannot recover under the Dahlins’ State Farm policy.3 See McConnell, 906 P.2d at 114.
Even if, as the majority concludes, the initial permission rule covers situations where there is a chain of consent from the initial permittee to subsequent drivers, the chain in this case was broken once Angelopu-lous obtained the keys from Kristin. In my view, Angelopulous acted as a converter which forecloses any subsequent claims against the Dahlins’ policy. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058, 1065 (Colo.1994). Although the trial court determined that “there is no evidence to contradict the fact that Kristin willingly gave An-gelopulous the keys to allow him to drive the van,” the trial court’s conclusion is not supported by the record. See Arapahoe County Bd. of Equalization v. Podoll, 935 P.2d 14, 18 (Colo.1997) (“Ordinarily, we will defer to the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and not supported by the record.”).
Kristin permitted Angelopulous to drive the van on- prior occasions; however, she testified that she would never allow him to drive the van if he had been drinking or was drunk. Both Kristin and Angelopulous admitted in their depositions that Angelopulous had been drinking on the day and evening in question. Furthermore, Kristin’s “willingness” to hand over the keys is doubtful con*1191sidering that she has no recollection of ever giving them to Angelopulous after being momentarily awoken from a deep, alcohol-induced sleep. Finally, the fact that earlier that day Kristin admonished Angelopulous and another passenger for climbing onto the van’s roof further indicates that, if she had been coherent, she would have been hesitant about handing Angelopulous the keys.
III.
In my view, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Raitz. For this reason, I would affirm the court of appeals.

. In his deposition, Angelopulous described the roof of the van as follows:
It's not straight. It's got these little groove things on it, but basically there's no luggage racks or anything. It’s basically pretty much flat, but there’s these little groove things in the top of it, and I held on spread-eagle from side to side; James Bond deal.

. In McConnell, we also explained that
[t]he status of a passenger is necessarily dependent upon the status of the driver. If the driver does not have permission to use the vehicle, the driver has no authority to consent to the passenger's use. The passenger’s good faith belief that the driver has such authority does not change the driver's status.
Id. at 113.

. Although the parties do not argue that the terms of the State Farm policy differ from the provisions of the No Fault Act, there is one important difference. The State Farm policy includes within the term "insured” "any ... person who sustains bodily injury while occupying the vehicle with the consent of [the named insured], or a relative." (Emphasis added.) Although the definition of "insured" in the State Farm policy includes any person who receives permission to occupy the vehicle from a relative, Naranjo did not receive Kristin's permission to occupy the van. Therefore, Naranjo is not an "insured” pursuant to the terms of the State Farm policy.