Court Opinion

ID: 9792813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:37:12.631798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:19.903665
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority relies on cases in which the officer asked for consent to search before the traffic stop had concluded. Here, the majority ignores the fact that the traffic stop had ended and ignores the trial court’s express finding on that point when it concludes that the stop continued. Curiously, in this case, the trial court held that the stop had concluded before the question was asked about narcotics was irrelevant. That question not only is relevant, the answer to it in fact should determine the outcome of this case. It should *174determine whether the officer could engage defendant in a conversation unrelated to the reason for the stop.
ORS 810.410 “defines the parameters of police authority to detain and investigate during a traffic stop.” State v. Dominguez-Martinez, 321 Or 206, 210, 895 P2d 306 (1995) (emphasis supplied). It is a limited grant of authority. Id. at 213 n 7. In relying on Dominguez-Martinez, the majority assumes, without saying so, that State v. Bonham, 120 Or App 371, 852 P2d 905, rev den 317 Or 584 (1993), and State v. Allen, 112 Or App 70, 826 P2d 127, rev den 314 Or 176 (1992), are no longer viable authority. However, Dominguez-Martinez is factually and legally different from the case at hand, and the authority of Bonham and Allen is not affected by it.
In Dominguez-Martinez, the trooper stopped the defendant for failing to signal but proceeded to question the car’s occupants about matters unrelated to the reason for the stop, before the traffic stop had terminated. Although the trooper expressly told the defendant that he was free to go, the objective evidence was that he could not leave:
“[A]t the same time that the trooper was telling [the car’s occupants] that they were free to go, he stood in the [car’s] open doorway, and defendant could not have driven away. The trooper immediately began to question [the occupants] about narcotics trafficking and illegal weapons.” 321 Or at 213.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trooper exceeded his statutory authority by asking questions during the stop that were unrelated to the reason for the stop. Id. at 213. In other words, in Dominguez-Martinez, the stop had not ended no matter what the trooper said.
The majority asserts that our decisions in State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 912 P2d 379, rev den 323 Or 265 (1996), and State v. Foster, 139 Or App 303, 912 P2d 377, rev den 323 Or 691 (1996), are controlling. They are mistaken. In Aguilar, the officer exceeded his statutory authority by inquiring, during the course of the traffic stop, if the defendant had any drugs. Id. at 178 n 1. That question was not *175related to the traffic infraction and thus unlawfully broadened the scope of the investigation beyond that permitted under the statute.
The majority’s reliance on Foster is also misplaced. Again, in Foster, the officer unlawfully sought the defendant’s consent to search for drugs during the course of the traffic stop. 139 Or App at 305. The officer lacked authority to make that inquiry because, at that point, he had completed his investigation relating to the traffic infraction. Although he had no independent basis for further investigation, the officer continued the contact with the defendant, and thus, the stop remained in effect. In Foster, however, we made the mistake of stating that the stop had ended at the conclusion of the officer’s investigation. Id. at 307. That characterization was not necessary to our disposition of the case; it was also incorrect. In holding that the officer had no authority to ask the defendant for consent to search for drugs, we cited Dominguez-Martinez for the following rule:
“In the absence of an independent basis, once the investigation for the traffic infraction has ended an officer lacks authority under ORS 810.410 to continue to detain and question the persons stopped for the traffic infraction. [Dominquez-Martinez, 321 Or at 212].” Id. at 306.
Our inquiry in Foster went to the basis for the officer’s authority to ask the defendant for consent to search for drugs, it did not go to the nature of the contact between the two. Therefore, in concluding that “the stop for the traffic infraction ended when [the officer] arrested Thompson” we said more than we needed to.1 The reason for the stop had *176ended, the stop had not. The officer had no authority to seek the defendant’s consent to search because, by then, even the officer’s limited statutory authority to inquire about matters relating to the reason for the stop had dissipated.
None of the three cases that the majority relies on, Dominquez-Martinez, Aguilar and Foster, is on point factually with this case because in each the traffic stop had not ended. The stop in this case had ended as a matter of law.
There is nothing impermissible about a separate exchange between an officer and a car’s occupants after a traffic stop has concluded. That constitutes mere conversation. Once a stop has concluded, mere conversation does not implicate ORS 810.410 and an officer can ask anything, including for consent to search. Bonham; Allen. The statute only governs what occurs during a traffic stop.
As the trial court found, Johnson turned off the overhead lights on his vehicle, gave defendant a citation, returned his identification, explained the citation and court process to defendant, said, “[T]ake care” and began walking way. At that point, the trial court found that defendant believed he was free to leave.2 Although the officer did not expressly say that defendant was free to go, the objective evidence was that he was. Allen, 112 Or App at 73-74. Johnson’s subsequent inquiry was a separate contact, and there was nothing impermissible about the question or the conversation that followed. Bonham; Allen. The stop had concluded as a matter of law.
Moreover, this rationale is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Dominguez-Martinez. That case appears to stand for two propositions. First, it stands for the unremarkable proposition that a police officer cannot ask for consent to search during the course of a traffic stop. Such a *177request, without some independent basis other than the traffic infraction, exceeds the officer’s limited statutory authority to investigate only those matters reasonably related to the traffic infraction. Second, once the reason for the traffic stop dissipates, the officer cannot seek consent to search because then even the officer’s limited statutory authority to inquire about matters relating to the reason for the stop has ended. The officer has no basis for any further investigation. Otherwise, the stop continues in effect, and that line of inquiry is tainted by the coerciveness of the stop.
In this case, the majority disregards the trial court’s findings that defendant felt free to leave. It also disregards our holdings in Bonham and Allen when it says that the officer’s request for consent after the conclusion of the traffic stop detained defendant and prevented him from driving away. 146 Or App at 173. As a matter of law, when a stop has concluded and defendant is free to leave, he is not detained in any legally significant way.3
This rationale squares with our disposition in Aguilar, in which we simply applied the rule from Dominguez-Martinez but in a different factual setting from that before us here. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s rationale in Dominguez-Martinez has no place in our present deliberations because we are presented with a different factual setting: The traffic stop had concluded, as a matter of law, and the officer’s contact with defendant was a separate exchange. There was nothing impermissible about that under existing law.
I dissent.
Deits and Edmonds, JJ., join in this dissent.

 In Foster, we cited State v. Herrin, 123 Or App 117, 858 P2d 921 (1993), rev’d 323 Or 188 (1996), as authority for concluding that the stop in Foster ended after the officer had completed his investigation into the traffic infraction. By reversing our decision in Herrin, the Supreme Court rejected our analysis and necessarily rejected that proposition. Our decision in Herrin, therefore, cannot now be understood to stand for the proposition that the stop in Foster ended after the officer had completed his investigation into the traffic infraction.
That rationale is also flawed because that is not what Herrin was about. In Herrin, we held that the officer’s search of the defendant’s car for drugs was proper because there was an independent basis for it. Again, our inquiry went solely to the source of authority for the officer’s search. We did not characterize the nature of the contact between the investigating officer and the defendant, nor did we intend to. We simply noted that the statute played no part in our deliberations:
*176“From that point forward, ORS 810.410(3) no longer limited [the officer’s] actions; neither did it authorize them in this case.” Id. at 120.

 The trial court’s findings of fact in its “Order on Motion to Suppress” provide:
“6. Defendant felt free to leave after issuance of the initial traffic citation.”
On review, we are bound by that finding because there is evidence in the record to support it. State v. Miller, 300 Or 203, 227, 709 P2d 225 (1985).

 As a practical matter, I would agree with the majority’s disposition of the case if we were starting from a clean slate. Although the law is clear, I also recognize that it depends on a fiction. In reality, the coercion inherent in all police-citizen encounters does not disappear simply because the officer tells the citizen that he or she is “free to go” and takes a step to leave the scene before pivoting to recontact the stopped individual. The bright line established by the case law does not reflect true coercive forces at work in the real world. The citizen must have a “meaningful opportunity” actually to leave the scene without further contact with the police before the exchange truly can be said to have concluded. The coercive effect of a stop does not dissipate until that occurs. Only at that time should an officer be free to initiate a conversation about matters beyond those related to the reason for the stop.