Court Opinion

ID: 9529272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:23.921445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:43.357174
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
specially concurring.
This case continues the demonstration of improvidence proffered by this court’s application of procedural default to issues of failure to raise ineffectiveness of counsel within the original appeal. Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 115 (Wyo.1991); Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo.1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1989); Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo.1989); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988). We add both complexity and confusion to resolve contentions that a properly conducted hearing in the first post-conviction appeal would have resolved. The cases are beyond count in number, but for illustration in state courts, see State v. Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 770 P.2d 313 (1989) and for the federal courts, see United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540 (6th Cir.1992).
Having that continued concern, I write here to question confinement of the present remand hearing as the majority decision would direct. Simplistically, as this litigation has developed in context of a life sentence involved, this court does not have a properly developed factual record to assay any contended ineffectiveness issues. Consequently, I would leave for counsel and the trial court evidentiary issues and determination of what may be legally valid and what is factually established without predisposition as this decision does in most regards. I would remand for a hearing on contended ineffectiveness of counsel in trial and perforce appellate briefing and leave the original decision with the trial court to develop a record properly establishing whether on all contentions there is a viable issue presented of ineffectiveness of counsel. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135 (Wyo.1986); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Consequently, I concur in remand for hearing, but would not predetermine the scope of the issues appellant might submit relating to his contention of ineffectiveness of trial counsel and subsequent ineffectiveness of appellate counsel in procedurally defaulting his constitutional right to the assistance of effective counsel. Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir.1988).
I neither surmise nor determine that any viable issue can be factually developed, but alternatively I would leave responsibility for the litigants and would not, at this juncture, limit the issues that might be resolutely presented for trial court decision by this court’s present fact finding decision. Initial fact finding and judicial decision should remain with the trial court where the evidence can be developed and effective and comprehensive legal argument provided. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540; Harley v. State, 594 So.2d 352 (Fla.App. 1992); Smith v. State, 260 Ga. 274, 393 S.E.2d 229 (1990); State v. Wickline, 184 W.Va. 12, 399 S.E.2d 42 (1990). Cf. Ross v. Kemp, 260 Ga. 312, 393 S.E.2d 244 (1990).
Consequently, I specially concur to the degree of the remand, but I would leave the subject for resolution more appropriately extended to reach the manifold issues passionately argued by the convicted defen*341dant by every forum available since the original appeal was affirmed four years ago. Smizer v. State, 763 P.2d 1254 (Wyo.1988).