Court Opinion

ID: 9731675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:54:14.191534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.329458
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. I concur in the Court’s analysis with respect to the construction of the ordinance and the trial court’s conclusions on the effect of the project on the character of the area and the consistency of the project with town bylaws. I do not agree, however, that the trial court erred in concluding that the project as approved would not have an adverse affect on traffic on roads and highways in the vicinity. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s opinion and would affirm.
The heart of my disagreement with the Court lies in the standard of review, a statement of which is strikingly absent from the Court’s opinion. If we were a trial court, I could more readily accept the Court’s analysis. We are, however, an appellate court that must uphold trial court’s conclusions in a zoning case unless they are “clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or capri*189cious.” In re McDonald's Corp., 151 Vt. 346, 349, 560 A.2d 362, 364 (1989). That standard of review is now well entrenched. We have applied it recently in review of a conditional use approval, In re Duncan, 155 Vt. 402, 409, 584 A.2d 1140, 1145 (1990); in determinations of whether a particular use is an accessory use, In re White, 155 Vt. 612, 620, 587 A.2d 928, 932 (1990); in review of a site plan approval, In re Carrier, 155 Vt. 152,159, 582 A.2d 110, 114 (1990); in review of the construction of a zoning ordinance, Route I Assocs. v. Town of Sherburne Planning Comm’n, 154 Vt. 461, 462, 578 A.2d 112, 113 (1990); and in review of a determination of a preexisting nonconforming use, Franklin County v. City of St. Albans, 154 Vt. 327, 331, 576 A.2d 135,137 (1990). See also In re Town of Sherburne, 154 Vt. 596, 603-07, 581 A.2d 274, 278-80 (1990) (applying similar standard in Vermont Water Resources Board proceedings). Another standard is also applicable here. While we require that findings be consistent with conclusions, we “must, if possible, construe the findings so as to support the judgment.” LaFountain v. Vermont Employment Security Bd., 133 Vt. 42, 46, 330 A.2d 468, 471 (1974). I do not believe that one can reach the Court’s conclusion if these standards of review are applied.
The heart of the Court’s position appears to be in the next-to-last paragraph of the opinion. There, the opinion holds, presumably as a matter of law, that heavily loaded gravel trucks, traveling on roads that are “narrow, hilly, have sharp curves and steep inclines” and that should be traversed at only half the speed limit, present a significant hazard on the road network. Further, it concludes that there is no way to police the daily limit on the numbers of loads taken from the pit. Thus, the Court holds that there are adverse impacts as a matter of law, and the trial court’s permit conditions fail to eliminate them.
Any development has some adverse impact on traffic conditions. Thus, we must read into the ordinance a concept of reasonableness and give the trial court considerable discretion in drawing that line. See In re Walker, 156 Vt. 639, 639, 588 A.2d 1058, 1059 (1991) (mem.) (proper standard in conditional use case is material adverse effect). More important, we are considering the differential impact of the proposed development. The developer is not responsible for current substandard road conditions unless his activities will make them worse to an unreasonable extent.
*190The applicants’ case on the traffic issue was based entirely on the testimony of an expert witness, a civil engineer with experience in road design. This witness testified at length about the road systems and the impact of the project. He acknowledged all the deficiencies in the road system that are cited by the Court and the appellants. He concluded: “[W]ith that intermittent truck traffic, I really do not see a problem with the structural aspect of the road or in fact the safety aspect.” Variations of this conclusion are scattered throughout his testimony. Based on this testimony, the court determined that “[gjravel trucks, as opposed to other motor vehicles, do not present a significant hazard on the road network ....” In short, based on the evidence, the court concluded that there would be no significant differential impact from the gravel operation with the limitations imposed upon it. I do not see how the Court can conclude that there “is no support for [this] . . . conclusion.”
It is also important to emphasize the importance of the limitations, all based on the expert’s opinion. The court limited extraction to ten loads per day, with each load within the limit allowed by the town for the road system. This is approximately one truck trip per hour. Extraction was not allowed on weekends and holidays, nor between November 15th and April 1st, when the roads would be covered with snow or mud. The most important limit was that loaded trucks would exit in only one direction to safely enter and traverse Perry Hill Road. This stemmed from the expert’s opinion, based upon an analysis of the structure and condition of the road, that safety required loaded trucks to descend Perry Hill Road only in the direction that exited onto Kneeland Flats Road.
The Court has to ignore the expert’s evidence to find, as a matter of law, a conflict between the findings and the conclusions. If I understand the Court’s logic, there can never be significant development on substandard roads with speed limits that are too high for the conditions or in a town that sets too high a weight limit for vehicles on its roads. That is far too extreme a position to be a rule of law. Like many rural roads in Vermont, the road in question here has a high speed limit because it is unposted, not because high speeds are safe. As the expert testified here, we must look at the impact of development in light of prevailing speeds, not the maximum imagin*191able. No doubt the town will set an appropriate speed limit when the need becomes apparent. It is not the applicants’ responsibility to set that limit. I have a similar reaction to the Court’s concern about the weight of the vehicle and its impact on town roads.
Nor am I persuaded by the Court’s concern for policing the restrictions, raised at oral argument. Ultimately, the permit conditions can be enforced by enforcement actions since the applicants would, in effect, be operating without a permit. See 24 V.S.A. §§ 4444, 4445. It is preferable to impose clear performance standards, leaving it to the permit holder to create a method to ensure compliance, rather than dictating that method from these chambers. I am confident that the neighbors will be observant of the activities at the gravel pit and will report the presence of any truck traffic above that allowed by the permit.
As our cases indicate, gravel pits are highly controversial, and no land owner wants one to locate nearby. See In re R.E. Tucker, Inc., 149 Vt. 551, 547 A.2d 1314 (1988); In re H.A. Manosh Corp., 147 Vt. 367, 518 A.2d 18 (1986); In re Orzel, 145 Vt. 355, 491 A.2d 1013 (1985). On the other hand, a supply of gravel is necessary for road construction and improvement and other desirable purposes. I assume that everyone would agree that locating a gravel pit in a developed and urbanized area would be inappropriate. Under the standards imposed by the Court, it is likely that neighbors could keep a gravel pit out of most rural areas since the quality of road systems is unlikely to be very good where there are few people to use the roads. We are in serious danger of expanding not-in-my-backyard into not anywhere.
I am authorized to say that Justice Morse joins in this dissent.