Court Opinion

ID: 9646791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:11:19.760697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.903656
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The issue before us is whether in an arbitration proceeding an arbitrator can apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel to conversations between an individual bargaining unit member and members of management, under the type of circumstances present here, and modify a collective *245bargaining agreement, I would hold that he cannot and would affirm the decision of Commonwealth Court, essentially for the reasons stated by the court below.
In Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty, 473 Pa. 576, 593-594, 375 A.2d 1267, 1275 (1977), this Court stated the appropriate standard for judicial review of arbitration awards:
. . . where a task of an arbitrator .. . has been to determine the intention of the contracting parties as evidenced by their collective bargaining agreement and the circumstances surrounding its execution, then the arbitrator’s award is based on a resolution of a question of fact and is to be respected by the judiciary if “the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention. . . . ” Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969)
In Community College of Beaver County, supra, we noted that our standard of review and that first announced by the United States Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), are not significantly different and that we perceive no conflict between the standards of review. The federal standard and policy are expressed as follows:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.
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(A)n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. . He may, of course, look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence *246from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. 363 U.S. at 596, 80 S.Ct. at 1360-1361.
In the instant proceeding the arbitrator himself rules that grievant had no right to the benefits claimed under the terms of the agreement and then specifically went outside the agreement for the basis for his award. Unless we are to repudiate the standard of review we articulated in Community College of Beaver County, the award cannot be sustained. Not only do I perceive no reasons of policy to justify changing our present standard even though application of the rule works an apparent injustice here, but I perceive the possibility of substantial damage to the administration of collective bargaining agreements were the standard changed.
I note that this dissent deals only with the power of an arbitrator under a collective bargaining agreement. It does not deal with the possible remedy that grievant probably has in a court of law.