Court Opinion

ID: 9737083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:15:02.924754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.391917
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
{dissenting). Although I disagree with Mr. Justice T. M. Kavanagh’s result, I am in complete accord with his statement “in law cases tried without a jury, * * * the trial judge may give such weight to the testimony as * * * he feels it should receive.” Such is the settled law, and of course binds the Court of Appeals.
However, I do not read the Court of Appeals’ opinion as contravening that principle. The Court *128of Appeals made no findings of fact separate or different from those of the trial judge. It did come to conclusions of law different from those of the circuit judge, but that is the province of an appellate court on review.
The difference between the two is well expressed by the Supreme Court of California. Levins v. Rovegno (1886), 71 Cal 273, 275, 278 (12 P 161, 162, 164):
“The line of demarcation between what are questions of fact and conclusions of law is not one easy to be drawn in all cases. * * * If, from the facts in evidence, the result can be reached by that process of natural reasoning adopted in the investigation of truth, it becomes an ultimate fact, to be found as such. If, on the other hand, resort must be had to the artificial processes of the law, in order to reach a final determination, the result is a conclusion of law.”
The circuit judge found that “in October 1960 * * * plaintiffs discovered an overpayment in excess of $1,800.” This is a finding of fact. It may be said that the finding by the circuit judge “which lead to plaintiffs’ dismissal" from this job” is an inference of fact which he was entitled to draw from the previously found fact. However, when the trial court held that “said dismissal was not justified under the circumstances” he left the realm of fact finding and entered' into - the area of “artificial processes' of the law’', in order to reach a final determination.” Clearly to me this was a conclusion of law. The Court of Appeals recognized the rule contended for by Justice T. M. Kavanagh (2 Mich App 305, 309):
“While there is some dispute in the testimony whether plaintiffs left the job or were not permitted to continue, the record supports the finding of the *129trial court that defendant refused to allow plaintiffs to continue.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals then accepting this finding of fact recites:
“This is the breach relied on by plaintiffs.”
The Court of Appeals then goes to the question of plaintiffs’ failure of performance “constituting a prior breach of contract which prevents plaintiffs from recovering”. The fact relied upon by the Court of Appeals to support this legal conclusion was “plaintiffs’ inability to meet their payroll of October 14, 1960.” This fact is uncontroverted. Justice T. M. KavaNagh seems to recognize this by his statement “defendant paid plaintffs’ October 14th payroll.” If plantiffs had met it, there would have been no occasion for defendant to have done so. The Court of Appeals then applies settled Michigan law to that fact (p 309):
“He who commits the first substantial breach of a contract cannot maintain an action against the other contracting party for failure to perform.” Ehlinger v. Bodi Lake Lumber Company (1949), 324 Mich 77, 89.
Correctly, then, to support its legal conclusion the Court of Appeals goes to the next legal step (p 309):
“The question becomes whether plaintiffs’ failure to meet [the] payroll on October 14th, was a substantial breach.”
The Court then examines this question in terms of the law of contracts.
Quoting the test of substantiality of breach in 1 Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 275, the Court applies the test to the case at bar. The Court carefully notes (p 310):
*130“That plaintiffs bad no money due them from defendant on October 14, 1960. The trial court so found when it determined a further advance from defendant to plaintiffs on October 14, 1960, would have to be from the 10% retention that plaintiffs were not entitled to until their work was completed.”
The Court of Appeals then makes its eminently proper decisional conclusion of law (p 311):
“We conclude plaintiffs’ breach in not meeting its payroll October 14, 1960 was a substantial breach.”
This substantial breach, having occurred first, defeats plaintiffs’ action alleging breach of the same contract.
I find no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals nor in the process by which it reached it.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. Cost to defendant appellee.
Dethmees, C. J., and BreNHAN, J., concurred with O’Hara, J.