Court Opinion

ID: 9895437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 14:04:46.333302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:48.952671
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: November 7, 2023

   S23Y1160. IN THE MATTER OF W. MCCALL CALHOUN, JR.

        PER CURIAM.

         This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation, issued after a show cause hearing pursuant to

Rule 4-106 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (the

“Rules”), of Special Master LaRae Dixon Moore, who recommends

that W. McCall Calhoun, Jr. (State Bar No. 103915), a member of

the State Bar of Georgia since 1990, be suspended from the practice

of law pending the outcome of the appeal of his federal court felony

and misdemeanor judgments of guilt related to his participation in

the events of January 6, 2021 at the United States Capitol. The

Special Master’s recommendation is based on her finding that

Calhoun violated Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and (3) found in Bar Rule 4-102
(d). The maximum penalty for violating Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and (3) is

disbarment.

      Calhoun filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and

recommendation, and the State Bar responded.                      Having now

undertaken our own review of the record, we agree that suspension

from the practice of law pending the outcome of Calhoun’s appeal is

appropriate.

      1. The Facts.

      In her report, the Special Master laid out the underlying facts

as follows. On March 20, 2023, in connection with the January 6,

2021 “breach and siege of the U.S. Capitol” following the 2020

Presidential Election, Calhoun, following a bench trial, was found

guilty of the following criminal offenses: (1) 18 USC § 1512 (c) (2)

and 18 USC § 2, obstruction of an official proceeding before

Congress, a felony1; (2) 18 USC § 1752 (a) (1), entering and

      1 We note that the district court’s order finding Calhoun guilty, which is

included in the record, specifically found him guilty of “corruptly obstructing
. . . an official proceeding . . . , specifically, Congress’s certification of the
Electoral College vote as set out in the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution
. . . .”

                                        2
remaining in a restricted building or grounds, a misdemeanor; (3)

18 USC § 1752 (a) (2), disorderly and disruptive conduct in a

restricted building or grounds, a misdemeanor; (4) 40 USC § 5104

(e) (2) (D), disorderly conduct in a Capitol building, a misdemeanor;

and (5) 40 USC § 5104 (e) (2) (G), parading, demonstrating, or

picketing in a Capitol building, a misdemeanor. Calhoun had not

been sentenced at the time the Special Master issued her report.

      Additionally, we note that Calhoun testified at the show cause

hearing2 that: (1) he was present at the United States Capitol on

January 6; (2) he went into the Capitol building; (3) he understood

that he could be “charged with some type of trespass,” but he

engaged in the conduct because “civil rights [were] at stake,” and he

believed he was exercising peacefully his First Amendment rights,

and therefore he would “take a misdemeanor for the cause”; (4) he

      2 At the hearing, Calhoun argued that: (1) the State Bar has no evidence

that he has been “convicted” of a crime; (2) he cannot be disciplined for
committing a felony based on conduct that amounts to only a misdemeanor
under Georgia law; (3) the safe-harbor in Comment [5] to Rule 8.4 applies and
prevents discipline pursuant to Rule 8.4; and (4) application of Rule 8.4 (a) (2)
to suspend his law license would violate his due process rights and deprive his
clients of the lawyer of their choice.

                                       3
did not break anything, open any doors that were not open, or

engage in violence; and (5) when asked if he had remorse for his

conduct, he responded “[w]hy would I have remorse?”

     2. Disciplinary Analysis by Special Master.

     The Special Master recounted the relevant Rules as follows. It

is a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) for a lawyer to “be convicted of a

felony.” It is a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) for a lawyer to “be

convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the

underlying conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”

Rule 8.4 (b) (1) provides that, for purposes of Rule 8.4, “conviction”

shall have the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e), and Rule 8.4 (b) (2)

provides that the record of a conviction or disposition in any

jurisdiction based upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a

verdict of guilty, a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or imposition of

first offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such

conviction or disposition and shall be admissible in proceedings

under the Rules.       Rule 1.0 (e) provides that “conviction” or

“convicted” denotes any of the following accepted by a court, whether

                                   4
or not a sentence has been imposed: “(1) a guilty plea; (2) a plea of

nolo contendere; (3) a verdict of guilty; (4) a verdict of guilty but

mentally ill; or (5) a plea entered under the Georgia First Offender

Act, OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq., or a substantially similar statute in

Georgia or another jurisdiction.”

     The Special Master then considered and rejected three specific

arguments raised by Calhoun.            As to Calhoun’s argument that

suspending him now would deprive his current clients of their choice

of counsel, the special master stated that “[t]he right to counsel does

not mean the right to the counsel of one’s own choosing in every

situation.” In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581, 582 (272 SE2d 313)

(1980).

     Next, the Special Master addressed Calhoun’s argument that

there is no evidence that he violated Rule 8.4 because, under the

language of Rule 1.0 (e), the only definition of “conviction” that could

apply to him is a “verdict of guilty,” and verdicts are rendered by a

jury, whereas Calhoun was found guilty by the court following a

bench trial. The Special Master found this argument unavailing for

                                    5
two reasons: (1) the definition found in Rule 1.0 (e) is not exclusive,

as it illustrates dispositions that fall within the definition of

“conviction” but leaves the definition open to dispositions that are

not mentioned; and (2) Calhoun’s reading of the Rule is inconsistent

with the history and purpose of the Rule because, by Calhoun’s logic,

a lawyer accused of a crime could avoid disciplinary consequences

simply by asking for a bench trial instead of a trial by jury.

     Finally, the Special Master responded to Calhoun’s argument

that his conduct would not have been a felony if it had been

committed in Georgia—see OCGA § 16-11-34.1, titled “Disruption of

the Senate or House of Representatives” and the violation of which

is a misdemeanor—meaning only Rule 8.4 (a) (3) applies and the

State Bar must prove that his underlying conduct involved both

moral turpitude and was related to the practice of law. In response,

the Special Master stated that whether the conduct for which

Calhoun was convicted would have been a misdemeanor had he

committed it in Georgia was irrelevant to the matter at hand, citing

Rule 4-106 (g) (“[A] certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction

                                  6
shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 . . . .”).

According to the Special Master, the Rules are clear that all that is

required for a violation of 8.4 (a) (2) is a felony conviction, regardless

of where it was obtained; the offense need not involve moral

turpitude or reflect on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.3

     Thus, the Special Master found that Calhoun had been

convicted of a felony and several misdemeanors in violation of Rules

8.4 (a) (2) and (3). Accordingly, the Special Master recommended

that Calhoun be suspended from the practice of law pending the

outcome of the appeal of his convictions.

     3. Calhoun’s Exceptions Before this Court.

     Calhoun filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and

recommendation, asserting four main arguments. First, Calhoun

argues that the Special Master’s conclusion that he violated Rules

8.4 (a) (2) and (3) was error. Calhoun argues that the judgment

finding him guilty of certain crimes does not constitute a “conviction”

     The Special Master did not address Calhoun’s argument regarding
     3

Comment [5] to Rule 8.4.

                                    7
for purposes of the Rules because it was the result of a bench trial,

not a jury trial. Calhoun argues that the definition of “conviction”

and “convicted” in Rule 1.0 (e) defines those terms only as including

pleas and verdicts, and here, there was no plea and no verdict. In

support of this proposition, Calhoun cites Woodham v. State, 253 Ga.

App. 112, 113 (558 SE2d 454) (2001) (“[T]he trial court could not

have directed a verdict of acquittal because there is no verdict in a

bench trial. Therefore, even if a motion for a directed verdict was

made, such a motion has no meaning when a case is tried without a

jury.”). Calhoun also asserts that there is no support for the Special

Master’s conclusion that the list under Rule 1.0 (e) is non-

exhaustive. Calhoun concludes that a judgment of guilty entered

after a bench trial, having not been included in Rule 1.0 (e)’s list of

final dispositions constituting “convictions,” is excluded from the

definition and cannot form the basis for a violation of Rules 8.4 (a)

(2) or (3).

      Calhoun argues that the Special Master’s finding that he is in

violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) is wrong because the Special Master did

                                  8
not analyze whether his misdemeanors involved “moral turpitude”

or underlying conduct related to his fitness to practice law. Rule 8.4

(a) (3).

      Next, Calhoun argues that he cannot be disciplined for

committing a felony based on conduct that amounts to only a

misdemeanor under Georgia law. See OCGA § 16-11-34.1 (a), (h) (1)

(providing that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person recklessly or

knowingly to commit any act which may reasonably be expected to

prevent or disrupt a session or meeting of the Senate or House of

Representatives” and that the first violation of the statute is a

misdemeanor). Calhoun contends that nothing in the law of the

jurisdiction where a conviction is had should control over the laws

of Georgia, and thus the Special Master erred in determining that

he can be disciplined under Rule 8.4 (a) (2) for a crime that is

punishable in Georgia only as a misdemeanor.

      Next, Calhoun argues that the Special Master ignored

Comment [5] to Rule 8.4. Comment [5] to Rule 8.4 provides that “[a]

lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon

                                  9
a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of

Rule 1.2 (d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope,

meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of a legal

regulation of the practice of law.” Calhoun argues that, to the extent

he committed a trespass in entering the Capitol, his actions were

nonetheless protected as peaceful political protest in good faith and

in defense of civil rights. Calhoun states that his good faith belief

meets the subjective standard under Comment [5].

     Finally, Calhoun argues that the imposition of the Special

Master’s recommended suspension would be an unreasonable

restriction on his right to practice his chosen profession and would

violate his due process rights.        Calhoun asserts that a felony

conviction on its own is not evidence that his continued practice of

law would be a danger to the public or to the courts, and there is no

rational basis to treat felonies, especially when defined by another

jurisdiction, any different than misdemeanors, which do not warrant

discipline unless the circumstances suggest the attorney is, in fact,

unfit to practice. Calhoun states that his interest in pursuing his

                                  10
livelihood, and his clients’ right to counsel of their choice, should

outweigh the State Bar’s interest in ensuring the public holds

lawyers in high esteem.      Calhoun concludes that imposing the

recommended discipline without an inquiry into the nature or

circumstances of the conduct underlying Calhoun’s alleged crimes

violates his constitutional rights.

     4. The State Bar’s Response to Calhoun’s Exceptions.

     In response to Calhoun’s argument that the Special Master’s

conclusion that Calhoun violated Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and (3) was error,

the State Bar contends that it is not aware of any instance in which

this Court has allowed a convicted felon to continue practicing law

while pursuing appeals.      The State Bar asserts that, although

“verdict” is commonly used in reference to a jury’s fact-finding, there

is no reason judicial fact-finding cannot be called a “verdict.” The

State Bar points out that the docket for Calhoun’s criminal case on

the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records

(“PACER”) database references a “verdict,” and so does his own

notice of appeal in his criminal case. Next, the State Bar asserts

                                  11
that, although it believes Calhoun’s misdemeanor convictions

involve moral turpitude, it is unnecessary to reach that conclusion

currently, because Calhoun’s felony conviction is sufficient to justify

his suspension pending termination of his appeals.

     Next, the State Bar contends that Calhoun’s argument that

had he disrupted the Georgia Senate or House of Representatives,

he would have been convicted only of a misdemeanor, is unavailing

because that is not what he actually did. Thus, the State Bar argues,

the statute Calhoun references is irrelevant here.

     Next, with regard to Calhoun’s argument that he cannot be

disciplined for his conduct on January 6 under Rule 8.4 because of

Comment [5] to that Rule, the State Bar asserts that Calhoun

ignores the second sentence in the Comment. The State Bar argues

that that language refers to a lawyer’s right as described in Rule 1.2

(d) to assist a client in making a good faith effort to determine the

validity or scope of the law, but the Comment does not exonerate a

lawyer convicted of a felony simply because he believes he was not

acting illegally.

                                  12
     Finally, with regard to Calhoun’s argument that suspending

him would violate his due process rights and the constitutional

rights of his clients, the State Bar argues that the Court has already

addressed this situation in Stoner in a manner adverse to Calhoun’s

argument.      Stoner, 246 Ga. at 582 (rejecting argument that

suspension of lawyer’s law license before his appeals were final

violated his due process rights).

     The State Bar concludes by stating that Calhoun should be

suspended pending the termination of his appeal.4

     5. Analysis.

     (a) Whether Calhoun Violated Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and (3).

     Calhoun’s argument that he cannot be disciplined under Rules

8.4 (a) (2) or (3) because he was not “convicted” is unavailing. It is a

violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) for a lawyer to “be convicted of a felony.”

It is a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) for a lawyer to “be convicted of a

     4 The State Bar noted that Calhoun had not been sentenced at the time

of the Special Master’s report, and has since been sentenced to eighteen
months of incarceration, twenty-four months of supervised release, $2,000 in
restitution, and $170 as a special assessment.

                                    13
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude where the underlying

conduct relates to the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” Rule 8.4 (b)

(1) provides that, for purposes of Rule 8.4, “conviction” shall have

the meaning set forth in Rule 1.0 (e). The term “conviction” or

“convicted” is defined in Rule 1.0 (e) solely in terms of pleas and

“verdict[s].” The term at issue here is “verdict.”

     We construe the Rules “according to the principles that we

ordinarily apply in the interpretation of legal text.”     Matter of

Mignott, __ Ga. __ (__ SE2d __) (2023 Ga. LEXIS 229, 2023 WL

6976464) (Case No. S23Y0974, decided Oct. 24, 2023) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).           According to those

principles, “we must afford the [ ] text its plain and ordinary

meaning, we must view the [ ] text in the context in which it appears,

and we must read the [ ] text in its most natural and reasonable way,

as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” Deal v.

Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-73 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (cleaned up).

The Rules provide no textual definition of “verdict,” nor do they

provide any exclusions as to what is considered a “verdict.”

                                  14
     Calhoun cites to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Woodham for

the proposition that “verdict” only encompasses judgments of guilt

rendered by a jury and not by a judge in a bench trial. However, the

issue in Woodham, and in other cases announcing the same rule,

was whether the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict after

a bench trial. See Brown v. State, 298 Ga. App. 545, 545 (680 SE2d

579) (2009); Sistrunk v. State, 287 Ga. App. 39, 39 (651 SE2d 350)

(2007); Drake v. Wallace, 259 Ga. App. 111, 112 (576 SE2d 87)

(2003); Fluellen v. State, 264 Ga. App. 19, 22 (589 SE2d 847) (2003);

Poole v. State, 249 Ga. App. 409, 410 (548 SE2d 113) (2001); Goodson

v. State, 242 Ga. App. 167, 167-68 (529 SE2d 175) (2000); Jones v.

State, 226 Ga. App. 608, 608 (487 SE2d 89) (1997); Adkins v. State,

221 Ga. App. 460, 460 (471 SE2d 896) (1996); Blair v. State, 216 Ga.

App. 545, 546 (455 SE2d 97) (1995); In Int. of L.D.H., 213 Ga. App.

297, 298 (444 SE2d 387) (1994); Daniels v. State, 211 Ga. App. 23,

25 (438 SE2d 99) (1993), reversed on other grounds, 264 Ga. 460

(448 SE2d 185) (1994); Lee v. State, 201 Ga. App. 827, 828 (412 SE2d

563) (1991) (citing Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 (212

                                 15
SE2d 447) (1975) for the proposition that “[t]here is no verdict in a

bench trial”5). In this line of cases, the Court of Appeals decided that

a motion for directed verdict stands to be denied in a bench trial

because there is no “verdict” in a bench trial.6 However, the true

reason a judge cannot direct a verdict in a bench trial is not because

there can be no verdict in a bench trial, but because a directed

verdict asks the court to take the decision away from the jury, see

Serv. Merch., Inc. v. Jackson, 221 Ga. App. 897, 898 (1996) (by

granting directed verdict, “the case is taken away from the jury, and

the court substitutes its own judgment for the combined judgment

of the jury”), and in a bench trial there is no jury from which to take

      5 It appears that the rule articulated by the Court of Appeals originates

from Kennery’s uncontroversial statement that “[i]n a non-jury case, it is
procedurally incorrect to move for a directed verdict.” Kennery, 133 Ga. App.
at 880.
      6 Other cases where the Court of Appeals has reiterated the rule are

without analysis of the rule and/or are derived from the directed verdict cases.
See Kea v. State, 344 Ga. App. 251, 253 (810 SE2d 152) (2018) (citing Woodham
and stating “there is no verdict in a bench trial” but that a motion for new trial
raising general grounds is a proper means of seeking retrial in the trial court
of that same court’s decision on an issue of fact); Smith v. State, 350 Ga. App.
336, 337 (829 SE2d 408) (2019) (another motion for new trial case citing Kea
for the rule); see also Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga. App. 213, 216-17 (641 SE2d
189) (2006) (holding trial court could not have improperly altered the verdict
because a ruling in a bench trial is not a verdict).

                                       16
the decision and a judge cannot take the decision from himself or

herself.   This Court has not found any other cases interpreting

“verdict” as narrowly as the definition urged by Calhoun, and

Calhoun offers none.

     Because there is no textual or decisional authority requiring a

narrow interpretation of “verdict,” it is appropriate to apply the

common usage of the term. Read in its most natural and reasonable

way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would, “verdict”

encompasses a finding of guilt in a bench trial. See Webster’s Ninth

New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) (defining “verdict” as not only “the

finding or decision of a jury on the matter submitted to it in trial”

but also as “opinion, judgment”); Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged

Dictionary (2d ed. 1983) (defining “verdict” in part as “decision;

judgment; opinion pronounced”); see also McBrayer v. Scarbrough,

__ Ga. __, (__ SE2d __) (2023 Ga. LEXIS 221, 2023 WL 6611019)

(Case No. S22G1152, decided Oct. 11, 2023) (“In ascertaining the

ordinary meaning of a word that is not defined in a statute, it is often

helpful to consult dictionaries that were in use when the statutes

                                  17
were enacted. Although dictionaries offer a useful reference for any

such analysis, they cannot be the definitive source of ordinary

meaning in questions of textual interpretation because they are

acontextual, and context is a critical determinant of meaning.

Nevertheless, they do provide a useful starting point.” (cleaned up)).7

Indeed, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has reached a similar

conclusion. See State v. Alexander, 380 N.C. 572, 588-89 (869 SE2d

215) (2022) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary and two other dictionaries

to hold that “the term ‘verdict’ can be understood in a broader sense”

than “‘a jury’s finding or decision on the factual issues of a case,’”

depending on the context, structure, and history of the provision at

issue (citation omitted)).8

     Moreover, this Court routinely uses the word “verdict” to

describe a judgment in a bench trial. See, e.g., Session v. State, 316

     7 The definition of “conviction” at issue here first appeared in the Rules

and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the State Bar of
Georgia in 1985. See 254 Ga. 873, 880 (1985) (amending State Bar Rule 4-102
to revise Standard 66).
     8 Additionally, as noted by the State Bar, both the PACER docket and

Calhoun’s notice of appeal reference the “verdict” in his criminal case as a
result of his bench trial.

                                     18
Ga. 179, 181 (887 SE2d 317) (2023) (“Similar to appeals from a jury

trial resulting in a criminal conviction, on appeal from a bench trial,

we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

verdict . . . .” (quoting Jones v. State, 307 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (837 SE2d

288) (2019))); Torres v. State, 314 Ga. 838, 838 (878 SE2d 453) (2022)

(same); Wimberly v. State, 302 Ga. 321, 323 (806 SE2d 599) (2017)

(“On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal conviction, we

view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

verdict . . . .” (quoting Dougherty v. State, 341 Ga. App. 120, 123 (799

SE2d 257) (2017))).

     Thus, we see no reason judicial determinations of guilt would

be excluded from the term “verdict,” as it is used in Rule 1.0 (e). We

see nothing in the context or structure of the Rules to support

Calhoun’s proposed interpretation of the meaning of “verdict” in the

context of Rule 1.0 (e) in the absence of some indication that the

Rules intend for there to be a distinction between convictions after

jury trials and those after bench trials. Moreover, we know of no

                                  19
reason for treating the two differently in matters of attorney

discipline.

     In sum, we can discern no basis for assigning to the term

“verdict” the stricter meaning that would exclude convictions

entered on a judge’s finding of guilt. Thus, findings of guilt in bench

trials constitute “verdict[s]” for the purposes of Rule 1.0 (e). As a

result, the meaning of “convicted” in Rule 8.4 does not exclude

Calhoun from either suspension pending appeal or the potential

imposition of a maximum penalty of disbarment based on his

convictions that were entered on a trial judge’s finding of guilt.

Further, because judicial determinations of guilt are “verdict[s],” it

is not necessary for us to determine whether or not Rule 1.0 (e)’s list

is exhaustive.

     Next, we note that the Special Master’s determination that

Calhoun violated Rule 8.4 (a) (3) is premature, as the Special Master

made no effort to analyze whether the conduct underlying Calhoun’s

misdemeanor convictions involved moral turpitude or related to his

fitness to practice law. However, as the State Bar notes, Calhoun’s

                                  20
suspension does not hinge on this point since his felony conviction is

sufficient to justify his suspension.

     (b) Whether Calhoun can be Disciplined for Committing a
Felony Based on Conduct that Purportedly Amounts to Only a
Misdemeanor Under Georgia Law.

      Calhoun’s contention in this regard is without merit. Section

16-11-34.1 concerns a different crime which Calhoun did not

commit, rendering it irrelevant here.         Further, with respect to

imposing attorney discipline, the Rules reflect that Georgia respects

the classifications other jurisdictions assign to crimes. See Rule 4-

106 (“[A] certified copy of a conviction in any jurisdiction shall be

prima facie evidence of a violation of Rule 8.4 . . . .”); Rule 8.4 (b) (2)

(“[T]he record of a conviction or disposition in any jurisdiction based

upon a guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere, a verdict of guilty or a

verdict of guilty but mentally ill, or upon the imposition of first

offender probation shall be conclusive evidence of such conviction or

disposition . . . .”).

     (c) Whether Comment [5] to Rule 8.4 Saves Calhoun from
Discipline.

                                    21
     This contention is also without merit. The Scope section of the

Rules’ Preamble provides that “[t]he comment accompanying each

rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the

rule. . . . The comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but

the text of each rule is authoritative.” Rules, Preamble and Scope,

at Par. 21; see also Mignott, 2023 WL 6976464 *2 (“[A] comment to

a rule cannot change that rule’s text . . . .”). Comment [5] to Rule

8.4 does not nullify the imposition of discipline pursuant to the Rule,

as urged by Calhoun, just because an individual charged with a

violation of that Rule believed his conduct and cause to be righteous.

Moreover, Calhoun’s testimony reflects that he knew he would be

charged at least “with some type of trespass” for his conduct on

January 6 where he determined he would “take a misdemeanor for

the cause,” indicating that he knew that a valid obligation existed to

refrain from entering the Capitol building to obstruct Congress’s

certification of the Electoral College votes. Further, it is not entirely

clear that Comment [5] actually applies to Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and (3),

as Rule 8.4 encompasses a number of different types of misconduct,

                                   22
several of which seem like more obvious fits with the Comment. See,

e.g., Rule 8.4 (a) (1) (“It shall be a violation [of the Rules] to: (1)

violate or knowingly attempt to violate the [Rules], knowingly assist

or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.”).

     (d) Whether the Special Master’s Recommendation Would
Violate Calhoun’s Due Process Rights.

     In Stoner, where the attorney argued that suspending him

from the practice of law before his appeals were final violated his

right to due process, this Court declared that “[w]e find that

promoting public confidence in the judicial system is a legitimate

state end and that suspending attorneys upon conviction of a crime

of moral turpitude, even before all appeals are final, is rationally

related to that end.” 246 Ga. at 582. Further, we have held in the

context of attorney discipline based upon conviction of a crime that

“all felonies are crimes involving moral turpitude.” Rehberger v.

State, 269 Ga. 576, 576 (502 SE2d 222) (1998).            Accordingly,

suspending Calhoun pending the outcome of his appeal does not

violate his due process rights.

                                  23
     (e) Conclusion.

     For these reasons, it is hereby ordered that W. McCall

Calhoun, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law in this State until

the final disposition of his direct appeal by the United States Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and until further order of this

Court. He is also ordered to notify the State Bar’s Office of General

Counsel in writing within 10 days of the final disposition of his direct

appeal, and he is further ordered to comply with the notification and

other requirements of Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Suspension until further order of this Court. All the Justices
concur.

                                  24