Court Opinion

ID: 9643678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:37:17.305243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:02.185011
License: Public Domain

On Motion fot Rehearing.
We do not hold that an appealing party does not have to show good cause before a trial judge may extend the time for filing a statement of facts in the trial court under Rule 381, Texas Civil Pro7 cedure. We do hold that the trial judge is allowed a broad discretion in determining what is good cause under the named rule, provided such extension of time does not operate to delay the filing of the record in the Court of Civil Appeals, as required by Rule 386, T.C.P.
In this case, appellee says that the trial court abused his discretion in granting appellant an extension of time beyond SO days to file the statement of facts in the trial court. Appellee’s basis for this contention is a long-distance telfephone conversation Sept. 20, 19S2, in which appellant asked for the extension. In that conversation appellant did not give his reasons for asking the extension, nor did the trial court ask for them. On the same day, Sept. 20, 1952, the court entered an order granting. the extension of ■ time. Thereafter on Sept. 24, 1952 the -statement of facts was filed in the trial court and-also iii the Court of Civil Appeals. ■ This was on the 55th day from, the -time the motion for new trial was overruled, so was well within the 60-day period allowed by Rule 386.
The fact that good cause was not mentioned in the one particular telephone conversation of Sept. 20, 1952 does not of itself show that good cause did not exist, or that the trial judge had not been informed in some other way of the circumstances which constituted good cause. Until the contrary is shown we are required to presume that the trial judge complied with the law and acted upon good cause. Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 60 S.W.2d 505; Dittman v. Model Baking Co., Tex.Com.App., 271 S.W. 75.
. On Sept. 24, 1952 the trial judge signed the statement of facts and ordered it filed, after stating in writing that, he had examined it, found it correct, and 'approved it. It has been held by our Supreme Court that this act alone is a sufficient extension of time to support a late filing of a record in the trial court. Luse v. Gibson, 119 Tex. 15, 23 S.W.2d 328. Therefore, to •support appellee’s contention we would have to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion first on Sept. 20, 1952 in entering an order to extend the time, and that he abused his discretion a second time on Sept. 24, 1952 in signing and approving the statement of facts and ordering it filed.
In Luse v. Gibson, supra, the Supreme Court was construing Art. 2246, V.R.C.S., upon which our present Rule 381 is based. The part of the Rule material here is the same as the statute except as to minor textual changes. As to the point we are discussing, Rule 381 has. been given -the same interpretation as -the statute. Lambert v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W.2d 405.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.