Court Opinion

ID: 9575043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:52.741306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:50.362736
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that appellant has demonstrated that he received deficient representation at trial, I cannot agree that he has shown such prejudice from that deficiency as to warrant a new trial. For that reason, I must dissent to the reversal of his conviction on that ground.
My review of appellant’s numerous allegations of ineffectiveness and of the record at trial leads me to separate the allegations of ineffectiveness into three groups. The first group includes matters as to which the record does not support appellant’s contentions and matters about which there was a conflict in the evidence. The former includes, by way of illustration, the assertion that counsel failed to impeach the testimony of the medical examiner that there were no drugs in the victim’s body. In fact, the medical examiner testified only that he had not tested the victim’s body for drugs. The latter is represented by the assertion that counsel did nothing to prepare appellant for testifying: although appellant testified that counsel told him only to be calm, counsel testified that they discussed appellant’s testimony prior to his taking the stand. There being evidence to support a finding that the allegations in this group were not factually correct, we must accept as to these allegations the trial court’s finding, implicit in the denial of the motion for new trial on this ground, that there was no ineffectiveness. The second group involves decisions made at trial with regard to voir dire and the admission of evidence. Bearing in mind
that every effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time [cit.] . . . [and] that counsel is entitled to a “strong presumption” (which the defendant must overcome) that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct and that all signifi*109cant decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment [cit.]. [Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 (1) (325 SE2d 362) (1985)],
I conclude that none of the conduct in that second group meets the first step in the analysis adopted in Smith, supra, i.e., “that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id.
The third group of allegations is more problematical. These allegations primarily concern counsel’s failure to prepare adequately for trial. “Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). The record establishes clearly that counsel failed to file any motions or to conduct any investigation, both of which failures limited counsel’s effectiveness at trial in examining witnesses, and failed to file any written requests for jury charges. Counsel admitted these failures to act during testimony at the motion for new trial and attributed them to a lack of time to work on this case. I conclude, therefore, that appellant was not given the benefit of the duty to investigate mentioned in Strickland, and that trial counsel was ineffective in that regard.
I do not, however, agree with appellant and the majority that Jowers v. State, 260 Ga. 459 (396 SE2d 891) (1990), controls this appeal and requires reversal. In contrast to that case, appellant here has not borne the burden of showing
that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Cits.] [Id. at 462.]
The appellant in Jowers showed that trial counsel permitted the prosecution to advance arguments and present evidence, without refutation, directly contradicting reports with which the defense had been supplied. The present case is more directly comparable to Brown v. State, 257 Ga. 277 (2) (357 SE2d 590) (1987). Here, as in Brown, there has been no showing that further investigation, pursuit of discovery, or calling additional witnesses would have resulted in any benefit to appellant at trial. Consequently, I would hold that appellant
has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [Smith v. Francis, supra at 784.]
*110Decided March 13, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 1, 1992.
Rubin, Winter & Rapoport, S. Richard Rubin, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Richard E. Hicks, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Robert D. McCullers, Staff Attorney, for appellee.
It follows, then, that appellant is not entitled to a new trial on the ground of ineffectiveness of counsel.