Court Opinion

ID: 9757944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:05:25.924765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.744150
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and vote to reverse the Oldham Circuit Court’s judgment of conviction and to remand the case for a new trial. My most significant disagreement with the majority opinion concerns Part VI(C) (Right to Control Defense — Closing argument). While a majority of this Court rejects this allegation of error in a single paragraph, I do not believe that Appellant’s claim can be so easily dismissed. In fact, my review of the record leads me to the conclusion that the trial court committed structural error by denying Appellant his constitutional right to self-representation, and this error mandates a new trial notwithstanding the strength of the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant. Because I disagree with several other aspects of the majority’s analysis — specifically, Parts IV(A) (Jury Selection — Failure to excuse jurors for cause), VI(B) (Right to Control Defense — EED as a mitigating circumstance), VII(C)(2) (Evidence Issues — -Authentication—DD Form 214), VII(B) (Guilt Phase Instructions — Manslaughter in the second degree and assault in the second degree), IX(B)(5) (Penalty Phase Issues — Other penalty phase instructions — Concurrent/consecutive sentence recommendation), and X (Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct) — I also write *877separately to describe my views on those allegations of error.
I. DENIAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
In Faretta v. California,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 “does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”3 The Court thus explained that a state could not force a criminal defendant to proceed to trial with counsel because “the right to self-representation — to make one’s own defense personally — is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment.”4 A year earlier, in Wake v. Barker,5 our predecessor Court had addressed the same issue and, after analyzing the rights to counsel guaranteed by both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions,6 reached the same conclusion, ie., “an accused who has made a valid waiver of counsel has a right, if his waiver so indicates, to proceed to trial without counsel being in any way associated with him.”7 The Wake Court, however, further held that the rights of self-representation guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions permitted a criminal defendant to make a limited waiver of his or her right to counsel and proceed to trial under a “hybrid” of appointed legal counsel and self-representation:
[A]n accused may make a limited waiver of counsel, specifying the extent of services he desires, and he then is entitled to counsel whose duty will be confined to rendering the specified kind of services (within, of course, the normal scope of counsel services). We think that this is embraced within the right-to-counsel and equal-protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions. If the accused desires to have counsel available only for the purpose of consultation during the trial, why should he not be entitled to that?8
Recently, in Hill v. Commonwealth,9 we observed that “a prototypical example of a ‘structural error’ [for which harmless error review is inappropriate] is the denial of the *878right to proceed pro se [.]” 10 In this case, Appellant unquestionably sought to make a limited waiver of his right to counsel so that he could personally participate in trial proceedings, and the trial court erroneously denied Appellant that right.
A review of the record in this case plainly reveals that — beginning at least with Appellant’s decision to reject the Commonwealth’s plea offer of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole and continuing through strategy decisions regarding the capital sentencing phase — Appellant and his appointed trial counsel did not see eye-to-eye on many issues relating to the defense. In fact, on multiple occasions, Appellant voiced to the trial court his desire to represent himself by becoming “lead counsel” while his appointed attorneys would continue to represent him both by being available for consultation as well as by performing portions of the trial proceedings at his direction. Each time that Appellant articulated this request, the trial court brushed it aside. The record as to each request illustrates that either the trial court or Appellant’s appointed counsel, or both, failed to comprehend the nature of Appellant’s current or past requests or the scope of Appellant’s right to self-representation, especially hybrid representation permitted under Wake, which was never mentioned or addressed by either Appellant’s trial counsel or by the trial court.
A few months before the trial, Appellant wrote a letter to the trial judge in which he outlined his concern about his attorneys’ agreement to a trial date that, in Appellant’s view, denied him his constitutional right to a speedy trial. At a hearing scheduled by the trial court in response to Appellant’s letter, the trial court felt it necessary to broach the topic of whether Appellant wished to represent himself, and Appellant responded that he wished to be named lead counsel. The trial court clearly did not contemplate the possibility of a hybrid representation whereby Appellant would represent himself alongside appointed counsel and thus never specifically addressed Appellant’s request. Instead, the trial court merely verified that Appellant wanted his appointed counsel to continue to represent him and considered the issue closed:
Court: Let me step to representation. Do you want to represent yourself?
Soto: At this time your honor?
Court: At any time.
Soto: I can’t say that for any time. I can’t look in the future and see what happens.
Court: Do you have problem with current representation by the public defender?
Soto: At this time, I believe me as lead counsel would rectify any problems I might have in the future.
Court: I have no idea what you’re saying.
Soto: I’m trying to get my discovery, your honor. I’m trying to get my discovery less than two times a month, and with John’s caseload and Elizabeth’s caseload I can’t do that. The only way to get my discovery, they won’t allow me to have it upstairs in my cell because they’re afraid of people possibly looking into it
Court: You’re going way beyond, I have no idea what you’re talking about. My question to you is this. *879Do you want John West and Liz Curtain to represent you or not ?
Soto: At this time, yes.
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Court: That’s the second part of it. There are two attorneys on this case. Mr. Soto here on the record today with those comments you made, I specifically asked you do you want John West to continue representing you and Liz Curtain and you have told me, yes, that’s okay?
Soto: Yes.
Later, at trial, immediately after the Commonwealth’s opening statement, the parties met in chambers with the trial court and Appellant advised the court that he was dissatisfied with the opening statement that his attorney intended to make and asked the trial court to permit him to deliver his own opening statement. Again, Appellant’s trial counsel objected. The trial court concluded that Appellant had a right to deliver an opening statement, but apparently did not equate permitting Appellant to deliver the defense’s opening statement with permitting him to act as co-counsel:
Court: What’s your request Mr. Soto?
Soto: Your honor, simply what you just said, to opening my own statement. I’ve listened to John’s statement, I don’t agree with it as what he has in there. I worked on my own statement, John refused to look at it, I think it will benefit my case and my trial. My own statement.
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Court: Let me make a couple of rulings. First of all, in regard to matters that are not in front of me. Case law indicates that certain things are exclusively within control of trial counsel. The public defender is lead counsel in this case. They are not co-counsel. So as far as the how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept as tried, what trial motions should be made and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. So he has made the request and at this point what response by defense counsel is to whether or not he should be allowed to participate to that extent. I have excluded some things that I’m not going to get into later on concerning cross-examination. So I need to know as far as defense counsel’s statement progressing through this trial, can you advise the Court as to your position as to the defendant’s desire to make an opening statement on his own behalf?
Curtain: Judge, I’ll handle that one. I believe that under the law and under the rules that unless he has been declared co-counsel, he does not have a right to make an opening statement. Like directing cross-examination, all the other strategic decisions that we make during the course of the trial, what we present in opening is also can lead us to what we do during cross-examination and everything else. And in Faretta it’s clear. If he wants to be declared co-counsel, which he has declined to do so, then as such he has participated up to this point and time, presenting his case as he sees it, but I don’t believe that he has the right to participate in doing the opening.
West: Judge, just to clarify, I think there is a minor distinction between co-counsel and Faretta counsel. My understanding is if he is, if we are to *880be Faretta counsel, then we are whisper or standby as opposed to actually being co-counsel. Being co-counsel we would be somewhat concerned about our liability in this action since he is not trained. I don’t know that we have an objection to being Faretta counsel. We would object in a sense that I don’t think — if he’s insistent on participating.
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Comm: Judge, I think we feel that there may be a distinction to be made between opening statement and what Elizabeth correctly described as intra-trial, not my word but hers, but witness-to-witness, question-to-question, trial strategies. Without waiving any future objection to this getting out of hand in a sense where we have counsel examining a witness and then the defendant examining a witness and just glancing at the cases, it may be that offering his own opening statement is a different animal than making objections at trial and making tactical decisions as to what questions are asked. But I think the long and the short of it is without waiver of future objection the Commonwealth does not take position either in support or in objection to that request.
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Court: [Djealing with the Faretta case, you cannot force a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant because that’s contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to. So the Court recognized the importance of counsel at a fair trial the defendant’s right, to have counsel present is a constitutional entitlement but the right to defend is personal. The defendant and not his lawyer or the state will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case, counsel is to his advantage. So, what I’m thinking at this particular point is that a defendant can maintain his right to remain silent, stand upon reasonable doubt, and say to the Commonwealth “you’re going to have to prove that I did this beyond a reasonable doubt.” That does not remove his opportunity to make statements in opening to a jury. Now, I need to ask just a couple of questions. Mr. Soto, as far as the range of penalties, we have covered that. All I want to know is you have heard the Commonwealth cover the indictment and you understand the charges that were brought? Can you kind of summarize them? How many separate indictments are there?
Soto: There are six.
Court: There’s six? And what are those?
Soto: Two counts of murder. One count of attempted murder. Burglary in the first degree. Wanton endangerment and tampering with physical evidence. I’m not sure those two are in order. I think they are same Class D Felonies.
Court: And why has this jury been convened?
Soto: Because I have been indicted by a grand jury.
Court: And beyond that, you have entered a plea of what?
Soto: Not guilty.
Court: So this jury has to decide guilt or innocence in the case?
*881Soto: Correct, your honor.
Court: And what do you see as far as the role of John [West] and Liz Curtain in this case?
Soto: The role, I mean the conversations that we’ve had, the lawyer/elient privilege, I don’t feel they’re competent in supporting my plans to go through this trial. They’ve told me, I don’t feel comfortable, I’ve listened to John’s opening statement, it’s a good twenty seconds, it doesn’t cover what needs to be covered. I believe that needs to be covered in opening statement.
Court: When you say competent, you mean they’re not in agreement with your evaluation as to what needs to be given to the jury. Not that they’re competent as attorneys.
Soto: When you say competent, qualified. I think John and Liz are qualified as lawyers. At this point, I don’t believe they’re qualified to defend me in this trial. At one point, as you recall, I tried to go pro se, not pro se, but appoint myself lead counsel which you denied. And that way I will have John and Liz as stand by counsel. That was back in, I believe November of 99. I mean this is just an opening statement. I would like to run it by John but he refuses. And right there shows me that I get no support from him at all in this trial.
Court: He has prepared an opening statement?
Soto: He has.
Court: And he’s covered that opening statement with you?
Soto: Yes, your honor.
Court: And he’s asked for your comments and you have given them to him?
Soto: He has not asked me for any comments on his opening statement. He said just point blank, that’s it, that’s all he could do.
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Curtain: Judge, I would just ask for a clarification. Does he or does he not want to proceed as counsel in this case? I mean, we can’t keep running back here every five minutes
Court: I don’t think the Court will alter its previous rulings. He will not be lead counsel. You all are lead counsel and you make all decisions relating to decisions as to what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. Now, the only thing I’m into is on an opening statement, the right to defend. Let me go just a little bit further, have you ever gone through opening statements to a jury before?
Soto: Not...
Curtain: Judge, just a quick clarification, he was never overruled as being his own counsel in this case. He did withdraw it at that time.
Court: I understand.
West: Our position is, Judge, we do not want him to be co-counsel in this case. We would, if he is insistent, we would be Faretta counsel. We don’t think it’s in his best interest.
Court: You’re lead counsel. He has not requested to be co-counsel at this point. He’s just saying, I want to make my opening statement. That’s all I have in front of me.
*882West: Our position, Judge, is he would have to be co-counsel to make the opening statement.
Court: And this is where this Faretta and Treece [v. State, 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1987) ] case[s] carve out an exception in regard to opening statements. As I understand it. Am I, I guess I better read the case here.
Soto: If I was to assert my constitutional right to go pro se and keep my lawyers as stand by counsel, will that still work?
Court: I don’t have that motion in front of me and I’m not going to participate in what ifs. All I’m trying to do is make a determination as to whether or not you have a right over objection of lead counsel to make an opening statement. And there is case law that indicates that I’m obliged to conduct an inquiry to make sure that you’re aware and have been fully informed of the alternatives available and that you comprehend the consequences of any acts taken by yourself in asserting this right to make the opening statement. If you choose to waive those, then you are entitled to do it. You have been previously found competent by findings, I’m referring to information that has been given to the Court on prior occasion and I think it’s important for me to refer to that. I’m also of the opinion that he has a, I’m satisfied at this point that, let me back up just a minute. John, I’m not going to make an inquiry concerning discussion in regard to what discussions took place, but I think I do have a right to make an inquiry that these matters were covered. What was said doesn’t make any difference to me. But these matters concerning the opening statement were covered with you or covered with the defendant.
West: He covered with me what his side was, I’ve got in my possession documents indicating what his position is, he had written those out for me. With the specific regards of what is coming in an opening statement, I told him what I did not want to bring in, I don’t know and I haven’t seen his latest version but he probably worked on it over the weekend, what he does want to bring in. I saw him Saturday?, Sunday I saw him and today he’s got this opening statement. I have not seen the opening statement as of today. He wanted to share it with me this morning, I told him that at this point and time we are going to move forward.
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Court: Now this Treece case, was a decision by counsel overriding the statements of the defendant to exert or not exert a defense. The State of Maryland was through their Court of Appeals, reversed it and sent it back. They indicated that the Court was obliged under those circumstances because a plea of guilty did not deal with trial strategy. That dealt with the defendant’s right to enter a plea. So any exertion in the defense. So they sent it back and said no, you have to have this hearing, have the hearing, and at that point if you find out that he’s competent and that he has the necessary threshold requirements to tell his counsel what he wants in regard to that plea, then he goes ahead and does it. So they reversed the Court because they didn’t allow it. The trial court. So now I’m dealing *883with not an exertion of the defense, but an opportunity to frame the defenses that are available. Treece also says the defendant ordinarily has the ultimate decision when the issue end involves a choice that will inevitably have important personal consequences for him or her and when the choice is one a competent defendant is capable of making. With these things being placed of record, I am going to sustain the defendant’s right to make an opening statements under these circumstances. Number 1 is before we make the opening statement, he must be given the opportunity to explain this to counsel so that they’re not surprised by developments in the courtroom. The second thing is that if the defendant does not cover items after his opening statement defense counsel has the right to make an additional summary. The third thing is that in regard to security in the courtroom, the Court will adopt the recommendations that the restriction of movements will be at the podium or to the bench and that anything outside of that would result in the Court adjourning briefly and placing the defendant in a stationary position.
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Court: I think at this point, he has counsel present, he has received advice from counsel, he can otherwise capably go forward and if he chooses to reject that, then I think any statements made by him can be used for impeachment purposes or for any other reason appropriate under the circumstances of the case at a later stage in the proceeding. Now let me get down to this closing argument, even before we get to it. Closing argument is a little bit different than opening statement. I am of the opinion that the calling of witnesses as I have indicated, cross-examination of witnesses, trial motions are the exclusive providence [sic] of counsel. Defense counsel continue to be lead counsel but the Court’s going to sustain his right to make an opening statement. This does not mean that he has the latitude to make closing arguments because there we are dealing exclusively with evidence and we’re dealing more with trial strategy based upon the presentation of proof. So I think, the other thing is in an opening statement, no personal opinions and objections will be taken up at the bench with appropriate sheriff present.
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West: Our other position is we would object and we want to make sure that it’s on the record, with regard to the previously stated objections, that we would object to allowing him to make the opening statement and that if the Court is going to allow him to make an opening statement, we would ask to be counsel, not co-counsel, but counsel under Faretta. We would object to being co-counsel in this case or allowing him to make the opening statement as co-counsel. I don’t -
Court: I would agree that he is not making the statement as co-counsel. He’s making the statement as the defendant, in the defendant’s entitlement to make the statement, the only thing the Court can place of record at this point is that it is the defendant’s right to present defenses and participate with counsel in the presentation of those defenses and that’s the only reason that Fm saying that the defendant has the right to do it.
*884Curtain: Judge, I think at this point and time you are absolutely correct. There is no motion made by the defendant before this Court to make him counsel of record and we’ll just leave it at that. We’ll just note our objection for the record.
Appellant later withdrew his request to deliver the opening statement after his trial attorney allowed him to review the opening statement that the attorney had prepared and Appellant verified that “it covers everything that I had written about.”
Subsequently, during the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Appellant became concerned that his attorneys were not asking cross-examination questions -that he considered important. Accordingly, in a hearing held in chambers, Appellant explicitly asked to be made lead counsel for purposes of the remainder of the introduction of evidence and closing argument. The trial court denied Appellant’s request to question witnesses personally, but implied, as it had during the prior discussion of Appellant’s right to give his own opening statement, that Appellant may be entitled to deliver the closing argument for the defense:
Soto: Your honor, there are some questions that need to be asked to Ms. Porter and my attorney doesn’t want to ask those questions. The only thing I could do is assert myself as counsel and my constitutional right to go pro se. That way these questions are asked because I know, I think we discussed it before, the only way this is going to happen for me to ask questions is if I put in a motion for pro se.
Court: There is no question you have the right to pose questions. Questions would be posed for counsel. Participation by the defendant is not unlimited. So you are saying you want to represent yourself at this stage and ask questions of this witness. That’s what you’re asking?
Soto: Yes, your honor. To have John West as stand-by counsel.
Court: And Mr. West?
West: Judge, I’m not sure of the questions he is talking about. He asked the questions that I was going to ask. I showed him the questions that I was going to ask. Bill asked some of the same questions already. Rather than being repetitive, I took some of those questions out. I’m not sure what additional questions there are that Mr. Soto would care to ask.
Curtain: You know Judge, in addition, this is a death penalty case. I mean, we are three quarters of the way through the trial. He doesn’t have any expertise, nor does he have the experience to become legal counsel in this case.
Court: I think that I kind of previously approached this. I think the defendant can control those things for which touch upon his constitutional entitlements, and in particular anything that reflects upon a plea of guilty or the exertion of a defense which means I may be guilty but under these circumstances, he can control those things. In addition to that, he has the constitutional entitlement always to be present and in each and every critical stage of the proceeding we’ve made sure that we’ve done that. So now we’ve reached the stage where in previous pre-trials the Court has ruled that the defendant is capable of *885knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to exert certain defenses. I also indicated that in conformity with law as I understood it, all other tactical and strategic decisions rest with counsel of record. So I have two motions in front of me arising out of that. Tactical and strategic has to do with the calling of witnesses, questioning and cross-examination. So we are down to the stage at this point where the defendant wants to fire his counsel, you don’t want to fire him, you just want to say you want to become counsel from this point forward. Is that correct?
Soto: Yes sir.
Court: So you want to be counsel of record also for closing statements?
Soto: Yes, your honor.
Court: Hmmm. And I think there is sufficient evidence in the record that I had previously indicated that defense counsel continues as lead counsel.... You are going to have to explain to me a little bit more Mr. Soto why half way through a trial there is some compelling reason you want to replace counsel of record.
Soto: Your honor, this has been throughout the whole trial with me and my counsel. About questions that were going to be asked. And I told counsel, last time I told him was this morning, that if he didn’t ask the questions then I would represent myself and he understood that, he said “go ahead, do what you gotta do,” and that’s what I took from there. I think these questions are vital to my defense to witnesses that are hopefully are going to be subpoenaed to testify tomorrow.
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Curtain: Judge, quite honestly [inaudible] gives him the absolute right to represent himself in a case and the Court has already had hearings as to whether or not he’s capable of intelligently and voluntarily making decisions in regards to his defense and I’m not real sure that he understands what he’s getting into. But that’s a decision for the Court to make.
Court: I think just the exertion “they didn’t ask the questions that I want to ask” probably is not sufficient. A couple of reasons for that. Not every question can be asked of every witness. Questioning has to be under the rules of evidence, both as to admissibility, competency and relevancy. First of all, it requires some training and background and working knowledge in regard to the rules. On restricted right to ask questions based upon other than those procedures is improper. So I think that just the exertion of saying “they didn’t ask the questions I liked,” is not sufficient for me to have him step aside as counsel. It’s just insufficient. You do have the right to exert yourself at certain stage of the proceedings and although we are not at closing arguments I am probably preliminarily of the opinion that your right of making the closing statement is unique to give. Same as right to make an opening statement. That’s your constitutional entitlement. You make the closing statement, I realize I am kind of going in reverse order here, if you make the closing statement, then the closing statement has to bear upon the evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence, it’s not a personal opportunity to express opinions though. I *886think based upon the status of the ease probably the Court would say if you want to, if you make the request to make the closing statement, you’re probably entitled to it. And after you make your closing statements, John will have the opportunity to make any additional closing statements to make sure that the case is fully represented in front of the jury.
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Court: But at this point the Court is not inclined to believe that just simply because you have a question you want to ask of this witness that I am going to fire counsel and the Court, I don’t think it arises to the occasion. And quite candidly I’m not sure that I have sufficient information in front of me that you would conform your actions to the requirements of the rules of practicing law. Even if you are pro se you are still bound by the rules. Can the Commonwealth advise me just the criteria, what does the Court look like when I allow a defendant to start practicing his case by himself?
Comm.: Judge, I think two things. First, you run some risks that he will as Elizabeth has alluded to very vividly and discreetly make errors that will be dangerous for him. I think there is a high likelihood in that situation that there will be violations of the rules of evidence and the rules of procedure and from my reading of cases which the Court has [inaudible], there is no question in mind that not only asking questions but the line of questioning and declining to ask a question is a tactical decision that is absolutely best left to experienced trial counsel.
Court: I think what I will probably do at this point is I’ll deny your request to be counsel of record. However, I will allow you the opportunity to ask additional questions through counsel and those questions if they are not asked by counsel can be sealed and made a part of the record for further review. If counsel chooses not to ask the question, there probably should be some brief statement placed in the record that this is either cumulative or whatever it is. But I think he is entitled to say I want this question asked and I think it’s going to have to be in some type of forum that it can be preserved. How that would be, written questions or part of the record, I don’t know.
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Court: I think trial tactics including which witnesses to cross-examine and the cross-examining question is a strategy to be exercised by counsel of record. It is not an unrestricted constitutional right. The right to enter a plea or not to enter a plea or exert a defense is exclusive to the defendant. And I think probably his closing argument probably comes close to that. At this point, what I’m going to do is recess. I will allow you to talk with him.
Curtain: I was talking about his right to be his own counsel. That concerns me a little bit because there is the Wilson case that appeared before the Kentucky Supreme Court and dealt with an issue like this. They never actually had to address that issue because he just only objected to who his counsel was. He never actually asked to proceed pro se. So I need to get a ruling from the Court. Does the Court consider he’s overruling his motion to become his own counsel?
*887Court: I think that I stated as part of the video recorded proceeding that I would deny the request to become pro se counsel at this point and, not to fire counsel, but ask you to step aside.
Finally, during an instruction conference held after all of the evidence had been introduced, Appellant informed the trial court that he wanted to give the closing argument for the defense, and his attorneys again objected. The trial court initially ruled that it was inclined to permit Appellant to present the closing argument for the defense, but later revisited the issue and denied Appellant’s request. At that time, the on-the-record discussion between defense counsel, Appellant, and the trial court once again reveals that, of the parties present, Appellant appeared to have the most accurate conception of the scope of his constitutional right to self-representation. In fact, both the trial court and Appellant’s trial counsel erroneously informed Appellant that the hybrid representation arrangement he desired was impermissible:
Curtain: The first thing I would like to point out to the Court is I don’t believe Mr. Soto is asking that we be relieved of counsel. I think what he is asking this Court is “I want to do the closing argument.” And if that’s the case, he is attempting to practice law without a license and he can’t do that. So what he is attempting to do, and quite honestly I am starting to feel like a yo-yo, you know, we go up, we go down, we go up, we go down, on this issue. And he has yet to approach this Court to ask us to be relieved as his counsel. What he’s asking this Court for is an opportunity to practice law without a license and he is not entitled to do that. You know, he doesn’t get to have his cake and eat it too in this situation. We are either his attorneys and we represent him or we are not his attorneys. But, we have, this is the third time we have come before the Court on this issue and he has yet to make a clear statement to this Court that he wants to relieve us as counsel and he wants to proceed on his own. And quite honestly, at this point and time, Judge, we are at the end of the trial, we are getting ready to enter into, most likely, a very complicated area of mitigation where if he has no counsel, he is going to be in some serious trouble. But he doesn’t get to pick and choose areas where he goes, okay, I want to represent myself in this area, but then, okay, when we are done with that, I want my counsel to come back on. That’s not fair to us, and it’s definitely not fair to him. These types of cases are too complicated and there has been no formal motion by this guy to ask us to be relieved as counsel. And I would ask the Court based upon that that he not be entitled to do a closing argument.
Court: Mr. Soto, I have heard comments here but I don’t know what you want to do.
Soto: Your honor, it is my understanding that, and I am not sure if you told us or told me that before, but my understanding was if I went pro se that I could have the option of keeping counsel as standby. And that is what I am referring to. Now, in this case, if I have to get rid of my attorneys, my counsel, in order for me to do my closing statement, no, I don’t want to do that. I am not an idiot to where I am going to do something like that. So, I want to know what the *888ruling is going to be, what the law states. Am I alloioed to go pro se and allowed to keep my counsel as standby?
Curtain: It’s not standby, it’s whisper counsel. We would sit behind you while you conduct the rest of this trial.
Soto: It’s my understanding, what I have read was standby counsel was making me lead counsel and my attorneys continued their job.
Court: Well, what do you want to do?
Soto: What I want to do was give my closing statement. And allow my attorneys to continue what they have been doing for mitigation purposes, for the sentencing purposes, if I’m convicted. To my understanding, the last thing we have for the guilt and innocence is the closing statement. Is that correct?
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Court: The sequence of closing arguments is first those to defense and then to the Commonwealth at the guilt or innocence stage. If you choose to make your closing statement I think under this one case that I have referred to, the Robards [u Rees, 789 F.2d 379 (6th Cir.1986) ] case from the Sixth Circuit and also another case in regard to self-representation, that there is no just allowing a defendant to handle parts while having counsel handle other parts. So I think in answer to the second part of your question, can you proceed and yet still have counsel? I think you can proceed and still have counsel, but you are the only one at that point who handles the case. Now, probably I didn’t make that clear during earlier parts of the proceedings.
Soto: No, your honor, but I do understand it now though.
In my view, the majority’s attempts to rationalize the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s right to self-representation simply do not hold water. Fust, the majority labels Appellant’s request to act as his own counsel untimely and, in doing so, attempts to apply a convenient bright-line, procedural default rule gleaned from jurisdictions with substantially different conceptions of the constitutional right of self-representation, i.e., jurisdictions that, unlike Kentucky, do not generally authorize a partial waiver of counsel. Of course, the majority’s contention ignores Appellant’s repeated requests to be named lead counsel/co-counsel for purposes of trial, and, as I have observed above, the first of Appellant’s requests came months before the trial commenced. More significantly, however, I would observe that the federal cases relied upon in the majority opinion place emphasis upon the timing of a defendant’s motion to proceed pro se because of the nearly inherent necessity for a continuance of the proceedings to allow for trial preparation when a criminal defendant wishes to discharge counsel completely and represent himself on the eve of or in the midst of trial,11 which would, no doubt, “frustrate the orderly procedures of a *889court in the administration of justice.”12 It is difficult, however, to apply that rule to the case before us — in which there is no claim made, and certainly no evidence to suggest, that granting Appellant’s request would have caused any delay in the proceedings. Appellant’s request and the hearing upon it occurred during a conference regarding the jury instructions that was conducted after the close of evidence and after the jury had been sent home for the day. The closing arguments themselves were not scheduled until the next morning, and defense counsel advised the trial court that, “[i]f this Court is inclined to allow him to do the closing argument, I will work with him tonight” on it. I would further observe that the timing of Appellant’s earlier request to participate personally in the trial proceedings by delivering the opening statement for the defense was apparently a non-factor to the trial court, which granted Appellant’s request although it was not made until after the opening statement for the Commonwealth and the proceedings in connection with Appellant’s request resulted in delaying the proceedings for more than an hour between statements.
The majority opinion’s assertion that Appellant “never specifically asserted his right to self-representation or to proceed pro se ”13 is flatly contradicted by the record, which not only provides the context necessary to properly characterize Appellant’s request, but also demonstrates that Appellant expressly advised the trial court during the colloquy concerning his desire to cross-examine witnesses that he “want[ed] to be counsel of record also for closing statements.” Moreover, I am baffled by the majority opinion’s suggestion that Appellant’s voicing of his desire to make his own closing argument constituted something other than a request to represent himself at this stage of the proceedings. At the very least, Appellant’s statement was “an unequivocal request to limit the role of counsel,” 14 which required the trial court to determine whether Appellant’s waiver was voluntary and intelligent. Of course, if Appellant had asked the trial court for permission to unclog the drains in the Oldham Circuit Courthouse, no one could seriously dispute that Appellant was asking to act as a plumber. Given that “[tjhere can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary fact-finding process in a criminal trial[,]”15 Appellant’s request to deliver the closing argument for the defense, ie., a request to perform a task traditionally performed by defense counsel, necessarily constituted a request to act as co-counsel. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] defendant’s right to self-representation plainly encompasses certain specific rights to have his voice heard ... [including the right] to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial,”16 and has stated that “[t]he[se] specific rights to make his voice heard ... form the core of a defendant’s right of self-representation.” 17
*890Nor does the trial judge’s speculation that Appellant “might use his closing argument to present unsworn testimony,”18 create any justification for prior restraint that would deny Appellant his right to self-representation. First, although the majority opinion describes the trial court’s speculation as a legitimate concern, I would observe that the record suggests otherwise. From all indications, Appellant committed these horrible crimes. During the court proceedings, however, Appellant consistently maintained proper decorum and, even when he vehemently disagreed with his appointed counsel, demonstrated that he was capable of calmly and rationally relating his concerns to the trial court. Further, Appellant himself informed the trial court “I know what I’m not supposed to talk about anything other than evidence that came up in this trial. So it’s not like I’m trying to testify^.]” In addition, both of Appellant’s appointed attorneys indicated that they would be willing to work with Appellant to “make sure no objectionable matter comes into the closing argument.” In any event, however, I would observe that, if an assertion that “the defendant is going to do something wrong” were a basis for denying a defendant’s right of self-representation, virtually no defendant would ever be permitted to participate personally in his or her defense. Accordingly, the law does not recognize the likelihood of a defendant’s incompetent self-representation as a basis for denying the right.19 When delivering the closing argument, however, Appellant would be held to the same standards as a licensed attorney, the Commonwealth would have an opportunity to object to any improper argument or deviations from proper procedure, and the trial court would have been able to rule upon any such objections and grant any relief that it deemed appropriate.20
In my view, the record in this case shows beyond any doubt that Appellant was denied his constitutional right of self-representation. While it is true that a trial court has no obligation to inform a criminal defendant of his right to self-representation sua sponte,21 in the case at bar, the trial court, which was from all indications unaware of Wake v. Barker and the availability of hybrid representation, ignored some of Appellant’s requests to act as co-counsel and denied others after it mischar-acterized the scope of Appellant’s right of self-representation on the record. In addition, although “the public defenders’ obligations to defend the indigent may properly be considered to embrace the duty to *891furnish limited representation!;,]”22 Appellant’s appointed counsel actively objected to any form of hybrid representation that would allow Appellant to act as co-counsel. Although I recognize that a criminal defendant’s direct participation in court proceedings is a deviation from the norm that can be frustrating for appointed defense counsel and can try the patience of a trial court, criminal defendants have a constitutional right to such participation at their criminal trials. In this case, the end result of the confusion regarding the scope of Appellant’s self-representation rights and the nature of his requests was that Appellant’s request to act as co-counsel for purposes of delivering the closing argument was improperly denied. This structural error entitles Appellant to a new trial.
II. OTHER ISSUES
I disagree with the majority’s Part IV(A) analysis because, in my view, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to excuse Juror 42 for cause. The United States Constitution guarantees a capital defendant fair and impartial jurors who can consider any relevant mitigation evidence,23 and Juror 42 unequivocally stated that she could not consider all of the KRS 532.025 statutory mitigating circumstances that were identified for her. As such, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion to strike Juror 42 for cause. For reasons that I have explained in depth on prior occasions, however, I would not reverse Appellant’s convictions on the basis of this error alone because I believe that Appellant’s removal of Juror 42 with a peremptory challenge rendered the trial court’s error harmless.24
As to Part VI(B), I disagree with the majority’s apparent holding that defense counsel may “veto” a defendant’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence during the capital sentencing phase of a trial. Although the majority is correct in its observation that Jacobs v. Commonwealth25 “did not address whether [its] holding extended to a waiver of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial,”26 this Court very recently cited Jacobs for exactly that conclusion when we held that “the defendant is ‘master of his own defense and pilot of the ship[,]’ and thus may elect to ignore the advice of his counsel and to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence.”27 Accordingly, I agree with Appellant’s claim that he was entitled to “call the shots” during the capi*892tal sentencing phase of his trial. Appellant thus had the power to decide whether his trial counsel made inquiries of jurors during voir dire regarding whether they could consider EED as a mitigating circumstance and/or emphasized EED during closing argument in the capital sentencing phase.
Because the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 was Appellant’s certificate of release or discharge from active duty in the U.S. military, ie. a Defense Department (DD) Form 214, the document was properly authenticated under KRE 901(a), which provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”28 Accordingly, I agree with the majority opinion’s Part VII(C)(2) conclusion that “Appellant’s DD Form 214 was properly authenticated despite the fact that it was neither certified nor attested and was not introduced by the custodian of the record.”29 I disagree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that the DD Form 214 “was self-authenticating under KRE 902(4).”30 And, I would observe that the logical path that the majority follows to this conclusion is an unnecessarily circuitous one, and one that I predict this Court may trip upon in the future.
The majority first construes KRE 902(4)’s use of “an official publication” to mean that the original (as distinguished from a copy) of any official record is self-authenticating and then turns to KRE 901(a) and determines that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 was an original official record, ie., Appellant’s original DD Form 214. Of course, if the proof was sufficient to authenticate the document under KRE 901(a), the “genuineness” of the exhibit had been established, and there would be no need to evaluate whether the document might be self-authenticating under KRE 902. More significantly, however I take issue with the majority’s interpretation of KRE 902(4)’s “an official publication” language, which was imported to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence from RCr 9.44 and CR 44.01 (provisions that themselves were taken from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 44(a)). In my view, this language is duplicative of KRE 902(5), which states that extrinsic evidence of authenticity is not required with respect to “official publications.”31 And, an “official publication” is “[a] document which purports to be printed by government authority,”32 e.g., “statutes, court reports, rules and regulations.”33 In other *893words, the KRE utilize “publication” in a manner consistent with its commonly-understood meaning, ie., “[generally, the act of declaring or announcing to the public.” 34 Because Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 was not a published official record within the contemplation of KRE 902(4) or (5), the document was not self-authenticating, and the Commonwealth was required to introduce extrinsic evidence in order to authenticate it.
Because the Commonwealth introduced sufficient extrinsic evidence to do so, however, Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 was properly admitted into evidence. The testimony of Commonwealth’s witness Renae Harrison, Appellant’s ex-wife, supported a finding that the document was, in fact, what it was entitled, ie., a “Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty” that identified Appellant by name, date of birth, and social security number.35 Harrison, who herself had been a member of the United States Army during the time that she and Appellant were married to one another, identified the form as a DD Form 214, explained that standard procedure provided for servicepersons to receive such a form upon discharge, and, after testifying that military procedure requires the person to whom such a form is issued to review and sign it upon receipt, identified Appellant’s signature on the form.36 In addition, I would observe that Appellant’s argument to the contrary is somewhat disingenuous given that, at an ex parte hearing conducted on June 19, 2000 at which the trial court found that Appellant could voluntarily and intelligently decide to fore-go the presentation of a theory of the case that would have emphasized extreme emotional disturbance as a defense, Appellant himself read a list of his military achievements and awards from a copy of a document that he identified as a “release or discharge from active duty form.” Although the document itself was not made a part of the record, Appellant’s own description of it as well as the fact that the awards and achievements that Appellant read from the document are listed in the same sequential order in Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 is persuasive evidence that Appellant was reading from a copy of his DD Form (likely provided via discovery) and that Commonwealth’s Exhibit 104 was, in fact, the original of Appellant’s DD Form 214.
I agree with the majority opinion’s Part VII(B) conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Appellant was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing when he committed these crimes. For the reasons that I have outlined previously,37 however, I cannot agree with the majority’s broad declaration that “[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication does not serve to acquit the defendant, but, if it negates the element of intent, reduces the offense to one having a *894mens rea of wantonness.”38 In my view, an intentional crime does not “somehow sublimate[] into an unintentional crime ... whenever] a defendant is too intoxicated to form the intent to commit the intentional crime.”39 Instead, a lesser-included offense instruction for an offense with a wanton mental state is required only when there is evidence from which a jury could conclude that the defendant acted other than intentionally and that his conduct “objectively and independently of intoxication”40 created a risk contemplated by the lesser-ineluded offense. In any event, the voluntary intoxication analysis is unnecessary to address Appellant’s claim of entitlement to an instruction on Second-Degree Assault because that allegation of error can be dismissed simply by observing that Second-Degree Assault is not a lesser-ineluded offense of Attempted Murder.41
In Part IX(B)(5), the majority opinion cites Foley v. Commonwealth42 for the proposition that “KRS 532.055(2) does not apply in capital cases.”43 Foley, however, predated a significant 1998 amendment to KRS 532.055, which deleted a provision that read: “This section shall not apply to sentencing hearings provided for in KRS 532.025.” And, this Court recently held that, as a result of the amendment, KRS 532.055 is applicable to “all felony cases”44 and that “KRS 532.055 now supplements KRS 532.055 in capital cases.”45 Accordingly, because KRS 532.055(2) provides that “[t]he jury shall recommend whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively[,]”46 the trial court’s capital sentencing phase jury instructions properly required the jury to make a concurrent/consecutive recommendation.
For the reasons that I articulated in my concurring opinion in Caudill v. Commonwealth, 47 I disagree with the majority’s suggestion in Part X that the McClellan v. Commonwealth48 definition of EED “does not apply when EED is used as a mitigating circumstance.”49 I agree, however, that the prosecutor’s characterization of the EED mitigating circumstance was not “so plainly erroneous as to constitute misconduct.” 50
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion as to Part I only.

. 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST, amend. VI.

. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 572.

. Id. See also id, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 573 ("To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists.”).

.Ky., 514 S.W.2d 692 (1974).

. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel ....” KY. CONST. § 11.

. Wake, 514 S.W.2d at 695. See also Hill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 125 S.W.3d 221, 225 (2004) ("[A] defendant also has a state and federal constitutional right to proceed -without a lawyer.” (emphasis in original)).

. Id. at 696 (emphasis added). But see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (stating that Far-etta “does not require a trial judge to permit ‘hybrid’ representation”).

. Ky., 276 Ky. 754, 125 S.W.2d 221 (2004).

. Id. at 229.

. See Robards v. Rees, 789 F.2d 379, 384 (6th Cir.1986) (“This Court also concludes that Robards’ request for self-representation, if honored, would have impermissibly delayed the commencement of the trial.... Had the request been granted, the trial judge would have been obliged to postpone the commencement of the trial for an extended period of time in order to allow Robards a sufficient amount of time to prepare his defense.’’).

. Id. at 383.

. Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 857 (2004).

. Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 426, 430 (1982).

. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2553, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 598 (1975).

. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174, 104 S.Ct. at 949, 79 L.Ed.2d at 131.

. Id., 465 U.S. at 177, 104 S.Ct. at 950, 79 L.Ed.2d at 132.

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 857.

. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 ("It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.... And, although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”); Crawford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1992) ("A defendant has an absolute right to waive counsel and to represent himself and no determination as to the effectiveness of such representation need be made.”); Wake, 514 S.W.2d at 695 ("No one contends that an accused must be capable of adequately representing himself in order to make a valid waiver of counsel.”).

. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 n. 46 ("[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”).

. Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 574 S.W.2d 325 (1978).

. Wake, 514 S.W.2d at 696.

. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951-52, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, 284 (1989) ("In order to ensure 'reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case,' the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant’s background and character or the circumstances of the crime.” (citations omitted)); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2235, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 509 (1992) ("Any juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that jury has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial.”).

. See Gamble v. Commonwealth, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 367, 374-75 (2002) (Keller, J., dissenting); Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 813-18 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting).

. Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994).

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 855.

. St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 560 (2004) (citation omitted).

. KRE 901(a).

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 862.

. Id. at 862.

. See KRE 902(5) ("Official Publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued by public authority.”).

. 7 KURT A. PHILLIPS, JR., KENTUCKY PRACTICE: RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, Rule 44.01, at 122 (5th ed.1995) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1 F.R.D. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y.1939) C[T]he authenticity of an official document is sufficiently established when a copy of it is offered which purports to have been printed by authority of the Government.”).

. Commentary to KRE 902(5), Evidence Rules Study Commission, Final Draft (November 1989). See also United States v. Rainbow Family, 695 F.Supp. 314, 330 n. 5 (E.D.Tex.1988) (portions of United States Army Field Manual found to be self-authenti*893cating under FRE 902(5)); California Ass’n of Bioanalysts v. Rank, 577 F.Supp. 1342, 1355 n. 23 (C.D.Cal.1983) (report of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which bore official seal of that agency on its cover page, found to be self-authenticating under FRE 902(5)).

. See BLACK'S LAW PICTIONARY 1242 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added).

. See KRE 901(b) ("[T]he following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: (1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.”).

. See KRE 901(b)(2).

. Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 275, 286-293 (2000) (Keller, L, dissenting).

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 867.

. Fields, 12 S.W.3d at 293 (Keller, J., dissenting).

. Id. at 292.

. See Holland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 114 S.W.3d 792, 802 n. 6 (2003).

. Ky., 942 S.W.2d 876 (1996).

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 872.

. St. Clair, 140 S.W.3d at 562.

. Id. at 562 n. 5.

. KRS 532.055(2).

. Ky., 120 S.W.3d 635, 682 (2003) (Keller, J., concurring).

. Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464 (1986).

. Soto, 139 S.W.3d at 874 (citing Caudill, 120 S.W.3d at 673-74).

. Id.