Court Opinion

ID: 9787932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:27:53.082794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:02.623421
License: Public Domain

Steuer, J. (dissenting).
In November, 1957 the plaintiff, Warren Carlie, owned a cabin at Gilbert, Pennsylvania. On November 16 of that year he drove with the deceased, John Alfieri, to Broadheadsville, the nearest town where there were stores. Arriving there in the early afternoon, they stopped at the store of the defendant Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and bought some food and supplies. Among the supplies was a package of charcoal briquets manufactured by Cabot Corporation. These briquets were sold in bags of heavy paper which bore the following legend:
1 £ E-Z Glo Charcoal Briquets
££ Easy to light and quick to give off heat that’s even and long lasting. Ideal for cooking in or out of doors. Excellent for picnics and barbecues and for emergencies.”
The two young men proceeded to the cabin at Gilbert, where they planned to spend the week end. They cooked their dinner out of doors. The cooking was done on a brazier. It is plaintiff’s claim that one of the items of their dinner was corn and that the water in which to cook it had not come to a boil by the time they had finished the rest of their meal. They thereupon took the pot containing the water and the brazier with the burning briquets into the cabin. The water in due course boiled, and the corn was cooked and eaten. This fact is disputed. Photographs taken thereafter show no pot, the Pennsylvania State *463Troopers who investigated found no corn cobs and no pot, and Carlie, in his earlier description of events, omits any mention of corn or cooking in the cabin. However, he so testified at the trial and, as plaintiff’s able counsel points out, the jury could have so found, and I will conclude that this was the fact.
November 16 was a Saturday. On the following Monday morning, Carlie awoke feeling ill. He saw Alfieri still in bed and he left the cabin. He sought medical aid. While he was away, State Troopers stopped in at the cabin and found Alfieri dead. It was soon found that Alfieri had died and Carlie was suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning.
To complete a statement of the facts, the cabin was an unfinished one-room structure. While the walls, roof and floor were complete, they were unlined and not air proof. There was no fireplace or chimney. There were windows but they were not opened on the night in question. The briquets are processed charcoal. They share the qualities of all fuels in that in burning they give off carbon monoxide, the quantity being in relation to the amount burned. A quantity sufficient to cook with, if left to burn in an unventilated room, will produce a percentage in the air that can be lethal.
The court found nothing to base a charge of negligence in the manufacture of these briquets and left the question of liability to the jury on the issue of whether there was a duty to warn purchasers of the danger of using this product, and the related question of whether the legend on the bag would mislead a user to his peril. The jury found that it would. My colleagues hold that this finding is to be sustained against the manufacturer and not against the retailer. I fail to see how one can be liable without the other. The plaintiffs pleaded breach of warranty. While this was stricken by the trial court, the ruling was duly excepted to and the point raised on the appeal. As recovery was had on a basis of express warranty, there is, of necessity, a breach of the implied warranty of fitness.
However, in the view that I take, this determination is not of particular significance. The plaintiffs failed to prove a cause of action against the manufacturer. It is elementary that there is no duty to warn against things that are of common knowledge. Plaintiffs do not dispute this but argue that the amount of carbon monoxide produced by charcoal and the amount that is lethal are not matters generally known. In these contentions they are undoubtedly correct, but that is not the test. The test is whether it is generally known that burning a combustible in an únventilated room will probably cause lethal fumes. This has been *464made a matter of common knowledge and in the past 40 years has been impressed upon the public by the wide publicity given to not infrequent fatalities resulting from the consumption of gasoline by a running motor in a garage. It is common knowledge that fire burns, and that the composition of the surrounding atmosphere undergoes a change that makes it dangerous unless freely replaced. The fact that people are sometimes careless in applying that knowledge does not detract from its being widely and generally known.
The legend on the container must be read in connection with that knowledge. Unless it can be read as stating that some special property in this product reverses the well-known law of nature, it has no special significance. Articles of commerce are to be used as intended. Otherwise there is no limit to the potentiality for injury. Nor can a manufacturer be expected to make his product foolproof. While it is true that increasing mechanization and complexity have put upon the manufacturer an increased burden of care for the protection of his consumers (Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 51), the burden should not go beyond endurable limits. To place the risk on him of the consumer’s misuse by ignoring ordinary principles is to make the manufacturer an insurer who protects his customers against themselves.
The statement that the briquets are ideal for indoor cooking does not imply that they are safe under conditions in which other combustibles, such as wood, coal or any of the liquid fuels, would be unsafe. Danger from contamination from the air is no more ruled out than danger from the flames. It could not be argued that one who burned his hand in the flames had a cause of action because of the legend. No more should it be heard from one who paid no heed to the property of combustibles to poison the air of an enclosed space.
Ordinarily the quantum of damages is not a matter of import in a situation where no damages are in order. Here, however, the award of the jury is of peculiar significance. In the claim for wrongful death the jury award was $180,000, and for conscious pain and suffering $20,000. The trial court reduced these figures to $90,000 and $7,500, respectively. My colleagues have further reduced them to $30,000 and elimination of any recovery for conscious pain and suffering. The last is necessarily correct as there is no proof that the deceased ever regained consciousness or suffered in any degree. It follows that the jury’s verdict on wrongful death alone was excessive by 600%. This is no mere overvaluation. It demonstrates a complete disregard of the court’s instructions and the use of criteria other than those *465given them. It also shows that the verdict is the result of emotion rather than appraisal of the facts, and it casts a cloud upon the verdict as a factual resolution in all respects.
Even the figure of $30,000 cannot be justified. The deceased was unmarried and living with his parents. His father and mother were in the same age group and each had a life expectancy of 20.9 years. The deceased and his father worked for the same concern and the father earned in excess of $10,000 a year, the son about $5,300. It is claimed that he contributed $2,600 a year to his parents. Aside from the fact that this was not a contribution but paid partially for his board and lodging, is it to be contemplated that this young man would never marry and that he would devote his earnings to the support of his parents who made twice what he himself earned? To realize $30,000 it would be required that he contribute his entire earnings for a period of five and a half years without retaining for himself, or his parents spending for him, a single cent for food, lodging, clothing or anything else. Moreover, this is on the assumption that nothing was to be deducted from his earnings for taxes. When these are considered, the utter impossibility that this figure represents an evaluation of his future contributions becomes manifest.
The judgment should be reversed and the complaint dismissed as to both defendants.
Botkin, P. J., Valente and McNally, JJ., concur with Stevens, J.; Steuer, J., dissents and votes to reverse and dismiss the complaint as to both defendants in opinion.
Judgment modified on the law and on the facts to reverse and dismiss the cause of action for conscious pain and suffering as to plaintiff Alfieri, to reverse and dismiss the complaint as to A & P, and the judgment in favor of plaintiff Alfieri for wrongful death reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event, unless plaintiff stipulates to accept $30,000 plus interest from the date of decedent’s death, in which event it is affirmed, as modified, without costs. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs. Settle order on notice.