Court Opinion

ID: 9409856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 18:04:24.303099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.955487
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/19/23 P. v. Servin CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B319745

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. VA077024)
         v.

RUBEN SERVIN et al.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.

      John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________
     Defendant and appellant, Ruben Servin (defendant),
appeals from the order denying his petition for resentencing,
pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.95, now section
1172.6.1 The order followed an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d) and found the prosecution had met
its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
not entitled to resentencing. Defendant contends the order was
not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed.
We find no merit to that contention and affirm the order.

                          BACKGROUND2
       In 2004, the jury convicted defendant of multiple crimes
related to the robbery, torture, and murder of Miguel Trejo
(Trejo), as well as the robbery, burglary, and witness dissuasion
of Alfonso Gomez (Gomez). Codefendants, Jesus Cisneros
(Cisneros), Eric Fernandez (Fernandez), Alberto Hernandez
(Hernandez), and Armando Salmon (Salmon), were also convicted
of various charges related to the crimes.
       Specifically, defendant was convicted of the following: first
degree murder of Trejo (§ 187, subd. (a)); torture of Trejo (§ 206);
second degree robbery of Trejo (§ 211); first degree robbery of

1     Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the section by its new numbering
only.
      All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2     We draw some of the following facts from our prior opinion
where we affirmed the modified judgment in People v. Cisneros
(June 29, 2006, B179596) [nonpub. opn.].

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Gomez (§ 211); first degree burglary of Gomez (§ 459); and
dissuading a witness, Gomez, from reporting a crime (§ 136.1,
subd. (b)(1)).
       As to first degree murder, the jury found true the special
circumstance allegations of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), that
the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery,
and of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), that the murder involved
the infliction of torture. The jury also made the special findings
that a principal was armed with a handgun during the
commission of the crimes (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)); that defendants
inflicted great bodily injury during the robbery of Trejo
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); that Salmon used and discharged a
handgun in the crimes against Trejo (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1),
12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)); and Fernandez and Salmon used a
handgun in the crimes against Gomez (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1),
12022.53, subd. (b)).
       Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole plus 11 years. Our previous decision on
June 29, 2006, in People v. Cisneros, supra, B179596, affirmed
the judgment on direct appeal.
Relevant trial evidence
       Trejo was murdered on June 8, 2003. The night before,
Gerardo Altamirano (Altamirano) and Cisneros picked up
Hernandez and Trejo. They drove to defendant’s house around
11:00 p.m., where Salmon, Fernandez, and three other men were
present. Trejo and the men entered a shed in defendant’s
backyard. Altamirano heard sounds of violence, including
punches, screams, someone being knocked down, moaning, and
duct tape being unrolled. Hernandez asked Trejo about the
whereabouts of stolen marijuana. Altamirano then heard a

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gunshot, and Salmon emerged from the shed, handing a gun to
Altamirano.
       Fernandez and Cisneros went in and out of the shed
several times. During this time, Cisneros informed Altamirano
that Trejo was being beaten because he was a “jacker,” who had
stolen marijuana. Altamirano declined Cisneros’s offer to
participate in the beating. Altamirano estimated the beating and
questioning lasted about two hours before Trejo disclosed that the
marijuana was at Gomez’s apartment. Defendant also testified
he heard gunshots, scuffling, and moaning coming from the shed.
       Defendant’s neighbor, whose bedroom window was about
five or six feet from the shed, testified she was awakened at
2:30 a.m. by a voice begging for water, help, and forgiveness. She
also heard the speaker providing directions to a location in
Alhambra and asking that his handcuffs be removed.
       Defendant remained with Trejo while Salmon, Altamirano,
and the remaining men drove to Gomez’s apartment, which was
also Trejo’s residence. Salmon distributed guns, and everyone
except Altamirano entered the apartment.
       Gomez testified that Fernandez entered his bedroom in the
early morning hours, pointed a gun at his head, and cursed.
Fernandez then covered Gomez’s head with a blanket, which
Gomez removed. Salmon then aimed his gun at Gomez’s head
and pulled the trigger, producing a clicking sound. Following
that, Salmon placed a plastic bag over Gomez’s head, handcuffed
him, and tied his feet while demanding pills. Gomez could hear
the voices of two or three other individuals, apart from Salmon
and Fernandez. The men took Gomez’s wallet containing $100,
as well as his briefcase. Salmon warned Gomez that they would
kill him if he called the police.

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      Forty-five minutes after they entered the Gomez
apartment, the men returned to the car, carrying luggage that
smelled of marijuana. Hernandez said they had tied up Gomez,
put a plastic bag over his head, and taken his money. Upon
reaching Salmon’s apartment, Hernandez and Salmon unloaded
the luggage, briefcase, and guns.
      Back in the car, Hernandez called defendant and asked if
Trejo was still alive, expressing his intention to finish him off.
Defendant testified he had multiple telephone conversations with
Hernandez after Hernandez left the shed to go to Gomez’s
apartment.
      Defendant’s neighbor awakened again to the sound of
moaning and someone being kicked. She looked out the window
and saw men cleaning out a car trunk. At 6:00 a.m., the neighbor
called the police.
      Altamirano testified that when they returned to
defendant’s house, Fernandez backed up his car to the shed.
Defendant cleaned out the trunk, while Altamirano looked in the
shed and saw Trejo lying motionless on the floor, leading him to
believe Trejo was dead. Hernandez kicked Trejo in the head,
commenting “that’s what happens to jackers.” Hernandez and
Fernandez wrapped Trejo’s body in a blanket and carried it to the
car trunk. Altamirano then left.
      Sheriff’s deputies arrived at the residence shortly after
6:00 a.m., where they saw Cisneros, Fernandez, Hernandez, and
defendant gathered around a car. The deputies apprehended the
men as they fled in different directions. Upon returning to the
residence, the deputies discovered Trejo’s body wrapped in a
blanket. Deputies found tape, handcuffs, a gun, and an electrical
cord on defendant’s property. Trejo’s blood, as well as the paint

                                5
smeared on his body, matched the blood and paint found in
Hernandez’s, Cisneros’, and defendant’s vehicle.
       The medical examiner testified Trejo had been strangled to
death. Ligature marks on his neck indicated the use of an
extension cord, requiring sustained compression for several
minutes to cause death. Trejo’s knee was fractured by a gunshot
wound, and his swollen face and body had numerous cuts and
bruises. He had sustained these injuries because he had been
beaten with a blunt instrument in the face and head. Wrist
injuries were consistent with handcuffing.
Petition for resentencing
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended the
laws pertaining to felony murder and murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant
in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The
Legislature also added section 1172.6, which provides a
procedure for persons convicted of murder to seek retroactive
relief if they could not be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as
amended effective January 1, 2019. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957.)
       Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition on July 8, 2019,
alleging he had been convicted of murder under the felony
murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine
and he was not the actual killer. The prosecutor filed a response
in opposition to the petition.
       The trial court reviewed the documents submitted by the
parties, the reporter’s transcript of the jury trial, and the record

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of conviction. After hearing the argument of counsel, the court
denied the petition on April 6, 2022, finding the evidence showed
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant aided and abetted in
the murder with the intent to kill and that defendant was a
major participant in the murder.
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of
his petition for resentencing on April 8, 2022.

                 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
       Defendant contends the trial court’s denial of his petition
for resentencing should be reversed because there was not
substantial evidence demonstrating he was a major participant in
the torture and murder of Trejo. However, as discussed below,
our review shows that there was substantial evidence he was a
major participant and that he aided and abetted the torture and
murder of Trejo.
       In response the People argue the trial court should not
have held a hearing on defendant’s petition because the jury
found defendant had the intent to kill in the special circumstance
finding. Since we affirm the trial court order, we need not resolve
this issue.

                           DISCUSSION
      At appointed counsel’s request we have taken judicial
notice of the appellate record in People v. Cisneros, supra,
B179596, and we have reviewed the verdicts rendered against
defendant, the jury instructions, and the procedural history.
I.    Standard of Review
      Section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3), provides that at the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the

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prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder.” The superior court acts as an
independent fact finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v.
Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
       “We review the trial court’s fact finding for substantial
evidence.” (People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087.)
“We ‘must review “the whole record in the light most favorable to
the judgment” and decide “whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1087.)
“[W]e look to whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient
evidence of ‘ “ ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ” ’ to
‘support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt’ that [petitioner]
had the requisite mental state.” (People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522, 618.)
II.    Defendant did not show error regarding the aiding
       and abetting finding
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition on two, separate
grounds: he had aided and abetted the murder of Trejo and he
was a major participant in the murder of Trejo. Defendant’s
opening brief addresses only the finding that he was a major
participant. “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts
it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived.” (Benach v. County of
Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) Since he failed to
address the aiding and abetting ground for denying his petition,
defendant has waived any challenge to this finding.

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       A person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is
culpable as a principal in that crime. (§ 31.) Aiding and abetting
is not a separate offense but a form of derivative liability for the
underlying crime. (People v. Francisco (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th
1180, 1190.) Under direct aiding and abetting principles, an
accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another if the
accomplice aids the commission of that offense with “knowledge
of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to
assist in achieving those unlawful ends.” (People v. Perez (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.)
       The trial court made detailed findings in support of the
conclusion defendant aided and abetted the murder of Trejo,
including defendant made his residence available for the murder
when he met Hernandez, Altamirano and Trejo at the gate and
allowed them to enter his backyard. Additionally, defendant was
aware of the demands on Trejo for the stolen marijuana, the
torture of Trejo to obtain the location of the marijuana, and the
gunshots that injured Trejo. Plus, defendant was left to guard
Trejo in the shed when the others left to retrieve the drugs.
Further, defendant knew the others planned to kill Trejo because
he was called by Hernandez and advised of the intent to kill
Trejo. Defendant was also present when the car was brought to
the shed for the purpose of transporting Trejo’s body. Based on
these findings, the trial court concluded “Mr. Servin clearly aided
and abetted this murder” and the evidence showed “he had intent
to kill” Trejo beyond a reasonable doubt because he knew the
others had the unlawful intent to murder Trejo and he had the
intent to assist them in achieving their unlawful ends.
       The finding that defendant aided and abetted the murder of
Trejo was grounds to deny his petition because a direct aider and

                                 9
abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought. (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848.) By failing to raise and
address this finding with reasoned arguments and legal citations,
defendant has waived the opportunity for review.
       This alone provides sufficient ground to affirm the denial of
defendant’s petition.
III. Defendant was a major participant in the murder of
       Trejo
       The trial court also concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant was a major participant in the murder of Trejo
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. As
interpreted and clarified by the Supreme Court in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and then in People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the determination whether a
defendant is a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life for the purpose of criminal liability
requires a careful review of the case-specific facts, analyzed
against a nonexclusive list of factors. These include: (1) the
defendant’s role in planning the crime; (2) his role in supplying or
using lethal weapons; (3) his awareness of the “particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants”; (4) his presence
at the scene of the killing and thus whether he was “in a position
to facilitate or prevent the actual murder”; and (5) his actions
after the use of lethal force. (Banks, at p. 803; see Clark, at
p. 611.)
       Reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or
to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the
defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Reckless

                                10
indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective
element. (Ibid.) As to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in
which the particular offense is committed,” and he or she must
consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or her
actions create.” (Banks, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 801; see Clark, at
p. 617.) As to the objective element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to
him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in
the actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, at p. 617, quoting Model Pen.
Code, § 2.02, subd. (2)(c).)
       Here, the trial court conducted a thorough analysis of the
evidence before reaching its conclusion that defendant was a
major participant, acting with a reckless indifference for life.
First, the court found defendant played a role in planning the
crime by allowing the others to use his property and shed for the
torture and murder of Trejo. Moreover, defendant was aware of
the dangers posed by the severe beatings and gunshots inflicted
during the torture. Defendant was present at the location of the
torture and murder on his property and did not act to prevent the
crimes. Additionally, he was in a position to either facilitate or
prevent the murder when he ensured Trejo remained a captive
while the others were retrieving drugs from the location they
obtained by torturing Trejo. Defendant was also aware that
holding Trejo captive would result in Trejo’s murder because
Hernandez had informed him of his intention to kill Trejo when
he returned. Finally, defendant aided in the concealment of the
crimes by assisting with the vehicle intended to transport Trejo’s

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body away from his property. These findings provide substantial
evidence in support of the conclusion that, beyond a reasonable
doubt, defendant was a major participant in the torture and
murder of Trejo.
      Further the trial court found defendant was aware of and
willingly involved in the torture and murder of Trejo because he
made his property and shed available for those crimes. Since
Hernandez advised defendant he would kill Trejo, defendant was
consciously disregarding the significant risk of death created by
ensuring Trejo did not escape while the others left to recover the
drugs.
      Substantial evidence supports the finding that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, defendant acted with a reckless indifference for
life.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    ________________________
                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

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