Court Opinion

ID: 9782402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:29:24.651379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:59.221059
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(dissenting in the result):
¶ 24 I write separately to dissent not from the principles outlined by the majority, nor their application to this case, but because I believe that a threshold matter should be resolved before these principles are addressed. The question is whether Jordanelle waived the right to further object to defects in the service of process after representing to the trial court that no prejudice would result to Stichting if the court were to quash the summons?
¶ 25 I would answer this question in the affirmative. Judicial estoppel is a court ere-ated doctrine that "focuses on the relationship between [a] litigant and the judicial *91system." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 85 (2000). "This doctrine prevents parties from 'playing "fast and loose" with the court or blowing "hot and cold" during the course of litigation.'" Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawai'i 91, 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 (1998) (citation omitted). Further, judicial estoppel "seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position [that is] inconsistent, conflicts with, or is contrary to one that [he orl she has previously asserted in the same or in a previous proceeding." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 74; see also Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996) ("'[A] person may not, to the prejudice of another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same person ... involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully maintained'" (Citation omitted.)).
¶ 26 Jordanelle, in its written motion, initially asked the court to quash the service and dismiss the case. However, during the subsequent motion hearing, Jordanelle represented to the trial court that,
The rights and duties of Mr. Smay and his client [are] to properly serve the summons and comply with the rule. The law is that if they don't do that it's to be rendered fatal and defective.
It doesn't mean that Mr. Smay can't re[-]serve the summons.
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We're not saying that Mr. Smay's claims still won't be heard. They may be heard, but he has to follow procedure.
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If he wants, he can come out and serve Jordanelle once again. He still is even within the 120 days. Nothing has been harmed by it, but we ought to be entitled to, and he ought to be required to follow the rules.
¶ 27 Through this representation, Jorda-nelle's attorney, either knowingly or mistakenly, lulled the trial judge into viewing the matter as a minor procedural wrinkle that could be resolved with a simple instruction to re-serve. This representation is, I believe, the equivalent of a waiver of all procedural defects regarding the service of process in this case. After such a representation has been made, a trial court should be entitled to rely upon counsel's representation and resolve what was represented to be a minor procedural matter by quashing service and instructing Stichting to re-serve the process, as agreed by counsel on the record.
¶ 28 Had Jordanelle's attorney instead, clearly represented to the court that granting the motion to quash would be determinative, the trial court would have had a reason to treat the matter differently. Instead of resolving the matter quickly, upon what is best termed an agreement by counsel to reserve the complaint, the trial court might well have inquired into the substance of the issue, including asking whether the problem could have been remedied by a motion to amend the service,1 or whether Jordanelle waived any procedural defects. The court would also have had the opportunity to consider other arguments that might have been raised by opposing counsel.2 However, in reliance upon Jordanelle's representation, the trial court ordered the summons quashed and instructed Stichting to serve a properly drafted summons upon Jordanelle.
¶ 29 Then, in the following round of motions, Jordanelle adopted a position wholly inconsistent with its prior position, arguing that, as a result of the summons being quashed, Stichting had failed to timely serve the summons and was now barred. Jorda-nelle's adoption of these contrary positions is clearly inapposite and constitutes Jordanelle playing " 'fast and loose' with the court." Marcos, 969 P.2d at 1242.
*92¶ 30 I believe that it is inadvisable for this court to countenance Jordanelle's misleading behavior.3 I also believe that our decision may have untoward consequences impacting the future utilization of judicial resources. Following this decision, trial judges may become reluctant to rely upon trial counsel's representations. Instead, trial courts may be forced to serutinize every representation of counsel for any possible unforeseen consequence, regardless of assurances to the contrary made by counsel, thereby unnecessarily expending both judicial and litigant resources searching for hidden consequences to virtually every action in court. This consequence can be avoided if we simply require counsel to either stand behind their representations to the court, or, in the event of a mistake, notify opposing counsel and the court so that the matter might be revisited.
¶ 31 For these reasons, I would conclude that Jordanelle waived any objection to the procedural defect contained in Stichting's summons, and reverse Judge Davis's dismissal with prejudice.

. As suggested by the majority opinion.

. Given the workload of district judges, it would be very unusual for a trial judge to permit argument about a procedural matter that is easily remedied. Knowing the propensity of most trial judges to want to spend time on substantive disagreements between counsel, and not become mired in technical irregularities, opposing counsel may have been unwilling to force the issue when opposing counsel has represented in open court that the matter is both minor and inconsequential.

. I view with some interest the fact that Jorda-nelle argued to Judge Harding, Sr. that no prejudice would result from quashing the summons, and then argued to Judge Lynn Davis, who did not have knowledge of Judge Harding's intent, that because the summons had been quashed, Stichting failed to serve the summons within the statutory period; therefore, Stichting's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.