Court Opinion

ID: 9709687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:04.385482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.891946
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. On the facts of this case, counsel could have had no reasonable basis for failing to request a charge on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. From the post-trial judge’s specific findings on counsel’s strategy, it is manifestly apparent that appellee’s trial counsel engaged in a course of action that was both contradictory and defeatist and that could in no way have served the best interests of his client.
*199As the majority notes, the only issue at trial was appellee’s sanity at the time he attacked the victim. Thus, the only verdict logically available to the jury aside from guilty was that of not guilty by reason of insanity. Having chosen to defend at trial solely on the basis of appellee’s insanity, appellee’s counsel had presented a chilling picture of appellee’s history of mental disturbance and bizarre acts of sexual sadism. This picture was supplemented by the Commonwealth’s own psychiatric expert, who, although disputing appellee’s legal insanity at the time of the offense, testified that appellee’s disorder “ma[de] him extremely dangerous to society” and “a highly dangerous person for the indefinite future.”
As the trial court noted, if appellee’s counsel had requested an instruction on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the instruction given would likely have been that prescribed by the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, § 5.01A, which appears in substantially abridged form at footnote 6 of the majority’s opinion. That instruction provides, in relevant part: “[WJhen a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he may be the subject of an immediate court proceeding to commit him to a mental treatment facility and if committed his commitment will continue until he is no longer dangerous to others or to himself ” (emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, in the face of undisputed testimony concerning the danger presented by appellee and the existence of a standard jury charge stating that commitment would last until appellee was “no longer dangerous to others,” counsel chose not to request such an instruction. According to the findings of the post-trial court,
“(8) Defendant’s counsel’s tactical decision was based on the reasoning that if requested the point would probably be granted, that defendant had already been released from Warren State Hospital, that by the testimony of the psychiatrist of Warren State Hospital the defendant was a very dangerous person, that the jury should not be informed of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by *200reason of insanity due to the ability of such a person to be legally released after a relatively short term from treatment. In addition, trial counsel was concerned the District Attorney would request and receive an additional charge that defendant could be released in a year.
(9) The defendant’s counsel was of the belief that the Court could not commit the defendant in a mental institution for a period to exceed one (1) year without review.”
The majority endorses counsel’s “tactical decision” because “defense counsel was correct in concluding that commitment was not mandatory following a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity,” and, “[m]ore importantly, we find as reasonable trial counsel’s decision not to ask for the instruction in light of the opportunity it would have presented the prosecutor to argue to the jury that the procedures provided in the Mental Health Procedures Act would permit the defendant to be released within a relatively short period of time.” (at 129-130; footnote omitted).
From these findings and conclusions, it should be obvious that both trial counsel’s strategy and the majority’s approval of it are based upon a purely theoretical analysis utterly removed from the facts of this case, focusing myopically on the abstract fact that commitment is, by statute, discretionary and subject to review, and ignoring the absolute inevitability of appellee’s commitment on this record. Following a full and fair jury charge on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, could any juror, after hearing the testimony of both prosecution and defense experts concerning appellee’s history of dangerous mental illness, have reasonably believed that the Commonwealth would abandon its duty to its citizens and fail to seek appellee’s immediate commitment following such a verdict? Would the prosecution even dare to argue such a possibility? Could any juror, having been presented with a vivid picture of appellee’s violent behavior and poor prognosis, have rationally believed that appellee would not in fact be promptly committed to a mental institution? Could any juror, having heard the Commonwealth’s expert state that appellee was a “highly dangerous person for the indefinite *201future,” have reasonably believed that appellee would be released in a year, or even several years, simply because of the existence of a yearly review procedure? Yet, instead of relying on his own skills as an advocate, the impartiality of the trial judge, and the jury’s common sense, trial counsel chose to leave the jury to reach its own speculative conclusion as to the consequences of the only verdict it could possibly render aside from guilty. See Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 276, 380 A.2d 349, 352 (1977) (instruction “reduce[s] the possibility of compromise verdicts of guilty occasioned by a jury’s misapprehension of ‘acquitting’ a defendant by reason of insanity”).
The issue in this case is not whether a jury charge on the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity must always be given, or whether situations may exist where the failure to request such a charge could constitute sound trial strategy. Rather, the issue is simply whether, on the facts of this case, appellee’s counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity could result in the commitment of his undisputedly disturbed and dangerous client to a mental institution until he was “no longer dangerous to others or to himself.” Manifestly, the order of the Superior Court remanding this case for a new trial should be affirmed.