Court Opinion

ID: 9964702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 17:02:50.607245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:39.379962
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

           IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T., J.T., B.T., and G.T.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0182
                                FILED 4-30-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD507431
                 The Honorable Melody Harmon, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Emily M. Stokes
Counsel for Appellee DCS

Diane Leos, Esq.
By Diane Leos
Counsel for Appellee Children
                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T. et al
                         Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1             P.T. (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s order
adjudicating his children T.T., J.T., B.T., and G.T. (collectively, “the
Children”) dependent as to him. For the reasons below, the superior court’s
ruling is affirmed.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           Father and S.G. (“Mother”) are the parents of the Children.
Mother also has two children not in common with Father, including a minor
daughter, D.G. Father and Mother have been together for over a decade,
and Father has helped raise Mother’s two other children from a “very
young age.”

¶3            In February 2023, D.G. told the Department of Child Services
that Father had been sexually abusing her for the past five years. She
reported that Father started touching her inappropriately at age 9, began
having intercourse with her at age 11, sent her a pornographic video in the
last year, and continued having intercourse with her up until the previous
month. The month D.G. reported the abuse, the department petitioned for
dependency, alleging the Children were dependent as to Father for abuse,
and removed the Children and D.G. from the home.

¶4           At the preliminary protective hearing and initial dependency
hearing in March, the court read the Form 1 notice to Father. That notice
advises parents that they “must appear for every court date,” including the
adjudication hearing dates: “If you don’t show up for a court date and you
don’t have a good reason for not showing up, the court may find you have
waived your rights in this case and you have admitted the allegations in the
dependency petition.” A few days later, Father filed a signed Form 1.

¶5          The superior court held three days of trial from June to
August. Father appeared on the first day along with his attorney. On the

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                   IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T. et al
                          Decision of the Court

second day, Father did not appear. His attorney moved to waive his
appearance, which the court granted after no party objected. The
evidentiary portion of the trial ended after the second day, and a third day
was set for closing arguments. Father again did not show for the third day,
but he was represented by counsel; neither the court nor his counsel
addressed his absence. After the trial, the court found the Children
dependent as to Father because of abuse, “[s]pecifically, Father was openly
sexually abusing [D.G.] within the home for a period of years[,] . . . exposed
his children to pornography,” and other criminal behavior of a sexual
nature. The court also found that “Father failed to appear for the last 2 days
of trial and failed to rebut his sexual abuse in anyway.”

¶6            Father timely appealed after receiving a good cause
extension. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-
120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

                                 DISCUSSION

¶7             Father contends that the superior court violated his due
process protections and prejudiced him by unlawfully finding that Father
failed to appear for part of his dependency trial. He argues that the court
could not lawfully find that he failed to appear because the court never
found that he was absent without good cause. This Court reviews statutory
interpretation, rules interpretation, and constitutional issues de novo. Brenda
D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442, ¶ 15 (2018).

I.     The Superior Court’s Lack of Findings on the Second Day Was Not
       Error Because Father Requested His Presence Be Waived.

¶8             Parents have a right to attend dependency hearings regarding
their children. See Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 14
(App. 2006). This is based on parents’ fundamental right “to the
companionship, care, custody, and management of [their] children.” Id.
(quoting Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 200, ¶ 8 (App.
2002)) (internal quotations omitted). But parents, or their attorneys, may
waive this right to attend. See State v. Kolmann, 239 Ariz. 157, 161, ¶ 12 (2016)
(explaining that defendants’ right to be present “is not absolute and it may
be waived by defendants or their counsel”); see also Rogone v. Correia, 236
Ariz. 43, 52, ¶ 32 (App. 2014) (“Attorneys serve as agents of their clients and
bind them through actions they take within the scope of the
representation.”).

¶9           Here, on the second day, Father’s attorney requested Father’s
presence be waived, and the court explicitly granted the request. Because

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                   IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T. et al
                          Decision of the Court

Father’s actions, through his counsel, successfully sought for the hearing to
continue without him, this Court will not allow him to now claim the court
erred by granting his request. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 566, ¶ 11
(2001) (“The purpose of the [invited error] doctrine is to prevent a party
from injecting error in the record and then profiting from it on appeal.”)
(cleaned up); Sunland Dairy LLC v. Milky Way Dairy LLC, 251 Ariz. 64, 70,
¶ 24 (App. 2021) (“By the rule of invited error, one who deliberately leads
the court to take certain action may not upon appeal assign that action as
error.” (quoting Caruthers v. Underhill, 235 Ariz. 1, 7, ¶ 23 (App. 2014))). This
Court therefore concludes the court did not err in proceeding with the
second day of trial after Father waived his presence.

II.    The Superior Court’s Lack of Findings Regarding Father’s
       Appearance on the Third Day Was Not Fundamental Error.

¶10            On the third day, Father also did not appear. He was again
represented by counsel, but this time his attorney neither sought to waive
his presence nor objected to the hearing proceeding. When a parent fails to
object to an alleged due process violation in the superior court, this Court
reviews for fundamental error. Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 447, ¶ 37; see also Louis
C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 484, 489, ¶ 20 (App. 2015) (finding no
fundamental error after “[a]ssuming, without deciding, that fundamental
review is also available to a parent challenging a dependency
adjudication”). The first step in a fundamental error review is to determine
whether the court erred. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018); see
also Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 429-30, ¶ 38 (citing to criminal cases for
fundamental review analysis when discussing it in a termination case).

¶11            Parents may waive their rights by failing to attend and
consequences may result. When the court sets dependency adjudication
hearings, it must instruct the parents that failing to appear “may result in
an adjudication of dependency.” A.R.S. § 8-826. If parents do not show, then
after the court determines they were given this instruction, the court may
find the parents have waived their legal rights and admitted the allegations.
A.R.S. § 8-844(F). But before the court may continue dependency
adjudications in the parents’ absence, it must find that the parents “failed
to demonstrate good cause for the failure to appear.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
338(e)(3); see also Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 443, 448, ¶¶ 20, 40 (finding this
requirement for termination proceedings, whose statutes have similar
language). The court must also include findings relating to the parents’
absence in its minute entries. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(h)(3).

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                    IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T. et al
                           Decision of the Court

¶12            Again, the court made no findings on the third day about
whether Father’s absence was for good cause. But because the third day of
the trial was for closing arguments without any new evidence presented,
the court was not required to determine whether Father waived his rights
or whether his absence was for good cause. Compare Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at
444, ¶ 24 (stating a termination adjudication hearing is complete “at the
close of evidence, when the matter is submitted for the court’s decision”)
with id. at 448, ¶ 40 (“If a parent never appears at the hearing, then when
the evidence is closed the juvenile court should confirm the absent parent’s
waiver of rights[.]”). Because the court was not required to make these
findings for a day set for closing arguments, then there is no error and the
fundamental error analysis ends.

¶13             But even assuming the superior court erred, Father still would
not be entitled to relief if the error was not fundamental. Escalante, 245 Ariz.
at 142, ¶ 21. A fundamental error is one that either “went to the foundation
of the case, . . . took from the [parent] a right essential to his defense, or . . .
was so egregious that he could not possibly have received a fair trial.” Id. If
a parent proves the egregiousness prong, then prejudice is also established.
Id. Otherwise, the parent must separately show prejudice, meaning that
without the error the trier of fact could have reached a different verdict. Id.
at 142, 144, ¶¶ 21, 29. These are fact-intensive inquiries requiring this Court
to look at the totality of the circumstances. Id.

¶14            Father argues that the court’s error prejudiced him because it
allowed the court to deem that he had admitted the allegations against him
and relieved the State of its burden of proof. See A.R.S. § 8-844(F). But the
court never found that Father admitted the allegations; it found that Father
“failed to rebut his sexual abuse in anyway.” “Failing to rebut” and
“admitting” are not synonymous. The record indicates that the court held
the State to its burden to prove the dependency by a preponderance of the
evidence. A.R.S. § 8-844(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(c)(1). The record is
replete with unrebutted evidence of Father’s heinous acts towards the
Children and D.G., which supports the court’s findings.

¶15           Further, the totality of the circumstances shows no
fundamental error. Father was represented by his counsel each day of the
hearing. See Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 299, 307, ¶ 25
(App. 2007) (“[When] a parent fails to appear but is still represented by
counsel, the court may proceed in that parent’s absence because his or her
rights will be protected by the presence and participation of counsel.”).
Nothing in the record indicates Father wished to attend and testify. The
third day was dedicated to closing arguments, and the parties did not

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                   IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO T.T. et al
                          Decision of the Court

present new evidence. Though the court’s findings were sparse, nothing in
the record demonstrates that Father was deprived of “a right essential to
his defense, or . . . that [Father] could not possibly have received a fair trial.”
Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21. There was no fundamental error.

                                CONCLUSION

¶16          For the reasons above, the superior court’s dependency order
is affirmed.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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