Court Opinion

ID: 9797771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:28:59.580561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:19.240155
License: Public Domain

PICKARD, Judge, (dissenting). {21} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the increased sentences enacted by the Legislature in HB 117, which was passed as an emergency measure to address a problem that has plagued New Mexico over the years, were repealed or amended by the later-enacted HB 278, which addressed a relatively less important issue concerning intergovernmental agreements. In my view, more accurate indicators of legislative intent mandate that all three DWI bills passed by the Legislature in 2003 should be given effect. {22} First, I believe that we should bear in mind the backdrop against which the Legislature enacts DWI legislation and the courts interpret it. Numerous cases have recognized the severity of New Mexico’s DWI problem. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. One (1) 1984 White Chevy Ut, 2002-NMSC-014, ¶ 18, 132 N.M. 187, 46 P.3d 94 (“In New Mexico, the elimination of driving while intoxicated and its related offenses is a matter of grave concern to society in general, and to our courts and Legislature in particular.”); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 624, 904 P.2d 1044, 1049 (1995) (“New Mexico has a serious problem with drunk drivers, with one of the highest rates in the nation of DWI-related fatalities. Our citizens are obviously concerned by this dangerous situation!}]”). {23} Second, in my view, the majority’s reliance on Section 12-2A-10(C) begs the question. That statute applies only when there has been an “amendment” to a statute. The issue before the Court in these cases is whether there has been such an amendment. {24} Third, the way to determine that issue is not by an examination of how laws are supposed to be compiled, but instead by an effort to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. See Quintana, 100 N.M. at 226, 668 P.2d at 1103 (indicating, after reciting the laws on compilation, that “[a]ll rules of statutory construction are but aids in arriving at the true legislative intent”). Moreover, the statute governing compilation, § 12-1-8, creates only a presumption that the last act signed by the Governor is the law and expressly requires the compiler to set forth the history and full text of any conflicting enactments in an annotation, thereby indicating a legislative intent to provide easy access to all enactments for the obvious purpose of facilitating a court interpretation of what is the applicable statute. Finally, on this issue, the statute on construction of apparently conflicting statutes, § 12-2A-10(A), instructs that effect should be given to each if possible. {25} The leading case on legislative intent in a situation such as confronts the Court in these cases is State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352 (1994). In that case, as in these cases, the Court was presented with facts indicating the possibility of a legislative mistake: in Helman, the potential mistake was in referring to a particular fiscal year in the legislation concerning purchase of retirement service credit, id. at 353-55, 871 P.2d at 1359-61; in these cases, the potential mistake was in passing several amendments to the same statute in the same year in bills that mostly repeated the original statutory language for the parts that were not amended in the individual bills. Both this Court in Helman, see id. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359, and the majority herein, at ¶ 16, were concerned with issues of separation of powers and intruding on legislative prerogatives. The Supreme Court’s response to this view in Helman and my response to the majority in this case are the same: “we believe it to be the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate and promote the legislature’s accomplishment of its purpose}.]” Id. at 353, 871 P.2d at 1359. Thus, it is imperative to look to see what the Legislature was trying to accomplish in its passage of the three bills at issue here. {26} The majority deems it “critical” that HB 278 restated all of the pre-existing language from the DWI sentencing law as it existed prior to the HB 117 amendment. Yet this fact is entirely unremarkable. Restating the whole statute that is proposed to be amended is required by Article IV, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution as part of its prohibition against so-called “blind legislation,” that is, legislation passed in such a way that the legislators might be unaware of the existing provisions of the statutes they are amending. See, e.g., Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 628, 286 P. 970, 977 (1929). Article IV, Section 18 states, “No law shall be revised or amended ... by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as revised [or] amended ... shall be set out in full.” N.M. Const, art. IV, § 18. Thus, the existence of pre-HB 117 language in amendments to Section 66-8-102 says little about any legislative intent to return the law to its pre-HB 117 status. {27} In addition, the amendments to Section 66-8-102 enacted by HB 117 were not expressly repealed by HB 278. Thus, the repeal would of necessity be by implication. Repeals by implication are not favored. Hall v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 106 N.M. 167, 168, 740 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1987). {28} What does speak volumes about the Legislature’s intent are the facts that the first two bills were passed as emergency measures, the content of all three bills for the most part address different issues, and the third bill signed by the Governor on which the majority relies was the least important bill and was not passed as an emergency measure. In short, the bills are not irreconcilable or in conflict once all of these facts, together with the constitutional requirement of setting out in full the entirety of the section that is proposed to be amended, are considered. {29} The majority characterizes HB 250 (Chapter 51) by its short title, the New Mexico Commercial Driver’s License Act, but otherwise does not describe it or its impact on Section 66-8-102, except to say that it did not change the penalty provisions. In fact, HB 250, as evidenced by its title, was enacted for the purpose of complying with federal law on grade crossing violations and blood or breath alcohol concentrations for commercial drivers. See State ex rel. Sedillo v. Sargent, 24 N.M. 333, 337, 171 P. 790, 792 (1918) (indicating that title of statute may be used to construe statute’s meaning); see also 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 31102, 31310(a), 31311(a) (1997) and 49 C.F.R. § 384.203 (2002) (indicating that federal monies will be withheld from states that do not enact legislation concerning grade crossing violations and prohibiting commercial drivers from driving with a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .04 or greater). Thus, much of HB 250, given Article IV, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, is devoted to commercial licenses in general and grade crossings, but for purposes of this case, an important change to Section 66-8-102 was the change in Subsection (C), which lowered the legal limit to .04 for commercial drivers. This act was passed and signed as an emergency measure, no doubt due to the federal consequences of not so acting. {30} The second bill signed by the Governor (HB 117 or Chapter 90) is the one that primarily concerns us in this case. By its title, its purpose was to increase penalties and require treatment for DWI, but it was also passed for the purpose of complying with federal law regarding blood or breath alcohol concentrations for commercial drivers, and it retains the .04 limit in Section 66-8-102(C). It was also passed as an emergency measure. {31} The third bill, HB 278 or Chapter 164, was enacted, according to its title, to authorize intergovernmental agreements for the exchange of motor vehicle offense information between Indian tribes and the state. The relevant change to Section 66-8-102 was to include tribes in the listing of jurisdictions having DWI offenses that may be used for purposes of determining whether a conviction is a second or subsequent offense. As the majority points out, the penalties stated in HB 278 were the same as what existed prior to HB 117. Importantly, too, for my views, the compliance with federal law was also removed, as Section 66-8-102(0) reverted to its pre-HB 250 state and did not include the .04 level for commercial drivers. This enactment was not subject to any emergency clause and became law according to its terms on July 1, 2003. {32} This specific history indicates that each bill has a different purpose. But for the restatement of earlier law required by the Constitution, each bill could be reconciled one with the other as enacting a law limited to the actual changes it makes to pre 2003 law in accordance with its title. When read against New Mexico’s legislative backdrop of contiixuing concenx for the DWI problem, it is inconceivable to me that the Legislature was engaged in “backing-off.” The majority’s construction nullifies the fact that HB 117 was passed as an emergency measure, as was HB 250. The majority’s construction puts the state at jeopardy for receiving federal funding. The Legislature and public might find it absurd that, by enacting a provision in the ordinary course of dealing with intergovernmental agreements regarding DWI, the Legislature intended to repeal two emergency measures, one critical to the state’s finances and the other intended to do somethixxg about one of the state’s most intractable problems. {33} The majority believing otherwise, I respectfully dissent. I would uphold Defendants’ sentences and instruct the compiler to compile all three laws as a synthesized whole in accordance with what was obviously the Legislature’s intent.