Court Opinion

ID: 9893190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 08:10:25.26762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:14.416737
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                       No. 07-22-00300-CR

                     GERALD ANTHONY MORGAN, APPELLANT

                                               V.

                           THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                          On Appeal from the 78th District Court
                                Wichita County, Texas
        Trial Court No. DC78-CR2020-0381, Honorable Meredith Kennedy, Presiding

                                       October 23, 2023
                               DISSENTING OPINION
                     Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       The elephant in the room is whether a parent can invade the “privacy” of his child.

Minors generally do not have the right to privacy in the home of their parents, and

Candace specifically lacked any such expectation on her phone. The majority holds a

parent can look at his child’s phone, but the instant the parent shares anything on the

child’s phone with himself, a crime has been committed. This is not the law in Texas.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
A. The civil tort of invasion of privacy does not equate with the crime of invasive
visual recording.
        As an initial matter, the majority adopts our sister court’s definition of the civil cause

of action for breach of privacy into the statute at issue here. The majority decides “intent

to invade the privacy of the other person” is “intentionally intruding upon Candace’s

private affairs in a manner ‘which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of

ordinary sensibilities.’” See ante (citing Ex parte Metzger, 610 S.W.3d 86, 102 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d)). This definition has not yet been adopted by the

Second Court of Appeals, from whom this case was transferred, and is a matter of first

impression for the transferring court.

        The majority uses the civil tort of invasion of privacy to support its position, but it

does so without fully developing the case law behind the tort. Even the San Antonio Court

of Appeals requires the intrusion be unreasonable, unjustified, or unwarranted. Polansky

v. Southwest Airlines Co., 75 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.). I

suspect most Texas parents of ordinary sensibilities would stand for the position that full

unfettered access to their child’s phone is reasonable, justified, and warranted.

B. Equating the intent to transmit the photograph alone is not evidence of intent to
invade someone’s privacy.
      The majority adopts the State’s proposition equating the intent to “promote”1 the
image itself is an intent to invade someone’s privacy:

        Appellant’s acts of accessing and viewing the contents of Candace’s phone
        are not prohibited by the statute. Moreover, the evidence indicated that
        Appellant and Mari owned and exercised supervisory authority over
        Candace’s phone; they both had the password to the phone and

        1 The State equates the sending of the image to the defined word “promote” within the statute.      The
word is defined in Texas’s obscenity laws, and it is questionable whether a mere transmission to oneself of
the explicit material “promotes” it under the statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.15(a)(4); 43.21
(“‘Promote’ means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmit, publish,
distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.”).
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        occasionally inspected it. It is not Appellant’s intent in searching Candace’s
        phone that is at issue, but rather his intent in sending a copy of the
        photograph to himself.

Just as the State proposes, the majority’s decision rests on Appellant’s conduct which

invaded Candace’s privacy, not his intent to do so. While the statute is generally drafted

as a “nature of conduct” offense because of its specific prohibitions of the taking or

distribution of an explicit photograph, the qualifying clause that it be “with intent to invade

the privacy of the other person” is result-oriented.2                     Thus, Appellant’s mere act of

transmitting the photograph is not enough—it had to be done with the goal of invading

Candace’s privacy. If mere intent to act were sufficient, this statute would follow the same

fate as its prior version, which was ruled unconstitutional. Ex parte Thompson, 442

S.W.3d 325, 337–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). There has to be specific intent to invade

privacy, not a general intent to commit the act which results in the invasion of privacy.

Otherwise, a host of innocent actions could become prosecutable offenses under the

statute:

        •    a parent who takes an image of his child while bathing forwards the
             image to his spouse;

        •    a father forwards an inappropriate image found on his child’s phone to
             the child’s mother;

        •    a person forwards an explicit image transmitted for harassment to law
             enforcement; or

        •    an investigator who is investigating the transmission of such images
             forwards the image to her work computer to preserve evidence.3

        2 See generally Young v.   State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 423–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing
differences between “result of conduct” and “nature of conduct” offenses).

        3 A statute is likely to be found overbroad if the criminal prohibition it creates is of “alarming breadth.”

Ex parte Thompson, 341 S.W.3d at 350.

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These are all “intentional intrusions” into the “private affairs” of other people, and yet none

would say any of the above acted “with intent to invade the privacy of [another] person.”

The intent element must be specific intent to “invade the privacy of [another] person” to

survive constitutional scrutiny. Because the statute requires specific intent, the cross-

examination testimony to rebut the implied “lascivious” intentions of Appellant were

relevant.

       The only contested issue at trial was the intent of Appellant to “invade the privacy”

of Candace. Under the “result of conduct” definition of “intent,” the State was required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant “act[ed] intentionally, or with intent, with

respect to [] a result of his conduct when it [was] his conscious objective or desire to []

cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). The only evidence of Appellant’s

intent came from Candace’s mother:

       •    when school officials informed the mother of the image found on
            Candace’s email account and she told Appellant about it, he did not
            immediately tell her he was the person responsible; 4

       •    when she told Appellant a week later Candace’s school was conducting
            an investigation into the specific email address the image was sent to,
            he then confessed he forwarded the image to himself and said he
            “wasn’t thinking” and did not want Candace to “get in trouble”; and

       •    Appellant never showed the image to Candace’s mother, did not inform
            her of what he found when he forwarded the image to himself, and
            deleted the image from his own accounts by the time he admitted to her
            he forwarded the image.

       4 It is not apparent from the testimony the initial conversation between Candace’s mother and

Appellant revealed the email address to which the explicit image was sent. The testimony does show once
the email address was revealed, Appellant admitted to Candace’s mother he forwarded the image to
himself.
                                                  4
However, the cross-examination testimony elicited outside the presence of the jury

revealed this was not the whole story:

        •   two weeks before Appellant discovered the image, Candace was
            hospitalized for overdosing on a marijuana vape pen at school;

        •   Candace was suspended from school due to her drug activity;

        •   Candace, while under the influence, stated she was sexually involved
            with several males, including one with whom she had an abusive
            relationship;

        •   despite her mother forbidding her from having it, Candace downloaded
            Snapchat to her phone, a messaging app which deletes all messages
            within twenty-four hours;

        •   Candace called Appellant “dad” and acknowledged him as her parent,
            despite not being his biological daughter; and

        •   Candace claimed she took the explicit selfie to check for “leakage” due
            to her sexual activity and had an infection which needed to be treated.

These facts temper the very controlled narrative of the State. These additional facts are

“of consequence” in determining Appellant’s intent, as the jury could have reasonably

inferred Appellant forwarded the image to himself because Candace was engaging in

dangerous and risky behaviors and was using Snapchat to conceal her conduct.

        Even if the evidence is relevant, however, the trial court could still have properly

excluded it under Rule of Evidence 403 “if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” TEX. R.

EVID. 403.5 Although the State never made an explicit objection under Rule 403, both the

       5 We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct

under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ballard v. State, No. 07-16-00333-CR, 2017 Tex. App.
                                                    5
State and the trial court repeated the cross-examination testimony was a form of “victim

shaming” and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudice. Under Rule 403, the

trial court should weigh the following factors:

       (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered evidence along with
       (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against
       (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis,
       (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the
       main issues,
       (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that
       has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and
       (6) the likelihood presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate
       amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Gigliobianco v. State, 210

S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

       Here, the excluded evidence was probative of Appellant’s intent, it was crucial to

his defense, and the testimony did not consume an inordinate amount or time or repeat

evidence already admitted.         Regarding the risk of confusing the jury, suggesting a

decision on an improper basis, or undue weight by the jury, these factors were mitigated

by the fact Candace did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minors generally

do not have the right to privacy in their parents’ home, and Candace specifically lacked

any such expectation on her phone. Alameda v. State, 235 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007).6 According to Candace, while living with her parents, she was required to

LEXIS 11719, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 15, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Carrasco v. State, 154 S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

       6 Because minors lack capacity, their parents are able to give “vicarious consent” for access to

what would otherwise be the private domains of adults. Alameda, 235 S.W.3d at 222–23; see also
Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Under the State’s theory, we have the strange
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give them full, unfettered access to her phone, including providing them the password.

The taking of the picture, insofar as her parents were concerned, was done without any

expectation of privacy because she lacked a possessory interest in the phone and did not

have the right to exclude her parents from the phone.7 Without Candace having an

expectation of privacy, Appellant was free at all times to examine the contents of

Candace’s phone and do what was necessary to protect her, including preserving

evidence to further investigate her risky behaviors. The probative value of the evidence

of Candace’s “personal struggles” regarding Appellant’s intent far outweighed any danger

of unfair prejudice in a decision by the jury on an improper basis.

        Finally, the exclusion of the evidence was harmful because it affected Appellant’s

substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). Again, the only evidence of intent presented by the State was through

mother’s testimony, stripped of any of Candace’s actions which caused concern and

result that Appellant, as the parent of Candace, could have given a third party, such as law enforcement,
consent to access her phone and the image, but somehow not give himself the same permission.

       7 The following is a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine if someone has a reasonable

expectation of privacy:

        (1)     whether the person had a property or possessory interest in the place invaded;

        (2)     whether she was legitimately in the place invaded;

        (3)     whether she had complete dominion or control and the right to exclude others;

        (4)     whether, before the intrusion, she took normal precautions customarily taken by
                those seeking privacy;

        (5)     whether she put the place to some private use, and

        (6)     whether her claim of privacy was consistent with historical notions of privacy.

Mohammed v. State, No. 02-15-00127-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 7200, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
July 7, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596,
606–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)); Long v. State, 535 S.W.3d 511, 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
                                                     7
motivated Appellant to go through her phone. The State’s presentation of evidence

misled the jury to believe Candace was a generally well-behaved teenager who did not

warrant her stepfather looking at the contents of her phone, let alone forwarding any of

the contents to himself.    This was reinforced by the version of Candace the State

presented to the jury: a dialysis tech who put herself through school and, at the time of

the offense, was a hard-working teenager with a job who only had her phone confiscated

from her when she “talked back.” Based on this “cleaned up” presentation of evidence, it

is understandable the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt Appellant had the intent to

invade Candace’s privacy. Given this was the only evidence the State presented of intent,

the additional testimony from Candace’s mother about her activities immediately prior to

the alleged offense provides context for Appellant’s actions, tends to suggest his intent

was not to invade Candace’s privacy, and more than slightly weakens the State’s case.

In light of the entire record, the exclusion of the evidence had “a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determin[ing] the jury’s verdict,” and requires reversal. Gonzalez,

544 S.W.3d at 373 (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

       The excluded testimony was relevant, should not have been barred based on

unfair prejudice, and its exclusion was harmful to Appellant. Because I would sustain

Appellant’s issue regarding the exclusion of evidence based on relevance, I respectfully

dissent.

                                                         Alex Yarbrough
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.

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