Court Opinion

ID: 9470549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:08:52.352828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:57.844831
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but feel the need to express my opinion regarding the majority’s application of the remittitur doctrine.
When a federal court concludes that a damage award is excessive, it may use a remittitur as an alternative to ordering a new trial. Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 303 F.2d 39, 47 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 891, 83 S.Ct. 186, 9 L.Ed.2d 125 (1962). When properly applied, the remittitur doctrine can aid in the conservation of judicial resources and the reduction of legal costs for the parties. Accordingly, the remittitur doctrine has been used when the evidence in the record does not support a particular damage award, Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (2d Cir.1982); Carlton v. H.C. Price Co., 640 F,2d 573, 582 (5th Cir.1981); Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 303 F.2d at 46-47, or when the jury’s “error or oversight is patent and the correction mechanical.” Shingleton v. Armour Velvet Corp., 621 F.2d 180, 182 (5th Cir.1980).
In this case, the majority orders “a remand to the district court for entry of judgment in the amount of $60,000 unless the plaintiff files with the district court a notice that she rejects the judgment in her favor in the amount of $60,000 and demands a new trial.” The majority does not, however, arrive at this decision by carefully examining the evidence and concluding that the jury’s punitive damage award is excessive. Indeed, a properly-charged jury has never decided the issue of punitive damages. Nevertheless, the majority justifies the remittitur on the basis of: (1) a statement attributed to plaintiff’s counsel in which he “indicated a willingness” to accept the remittitur, and (2) an observation that the $60,000 actual damage award is “fair compensation” for plaintiff’s injuries. That the majority may have correctly assessed the fair amount of compensation in this case does not legitimize its attempt to use the remittitur doctrine to further its own conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages. This is an issue which a properly-charged jury should resolve.
*184I also believe that the majority’s application of the remittitur doctrine is completely unnecessary in this case. The majority has purportedly given the plaintiff the “option” of accepting the remittitur. The plaintiff, however, already has the option of walking away with her compensatory damage award and thus not pursuing her punitive damage claim at a second trial. Indeed, by correctly limiting the new trial to the issue of punitive damages, Devine v. Patteson, 242 F.2d 828, 832-33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821, 78 S.Ct. 27, 2 L.Ed.2d 36 (1957), the majority has eliminated any risk to the plaintiff should she refuse to accept the remittitur. In my view, the case should simply be remanded to the district court for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and the remittitur doctrine should not be involved.