Court Opinion

ID: 9494005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:26:14.038508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:09.734902
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that, despite the violation of Juan Manuel Muro-Incían’s (“Muro”) due process rights in five underlying deportation proceedings, his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 must be affirmed because he has failed to demonstrate prejudice. The majority has misconstrued our case law as to what showing is required to demonstrate prejudice.
Muro arrived in the United States as an infant in 1965; grew up here with his parents, who are lawful permanent residents; married a U.S. citizen in 1984 at the age of 20; and has three children, all of whom were born in this country. His due process rights were repeatedly violated because the record from his various deportation proceedings clearly raised the inference that he was eligible for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), but he was never so advised. In order to demonstrate prejudice from these due process violations, Muro need not establish that he would actually have been granted a § 212(h) waiver; rather, “he must only show that he had a ‘plausible’ ground for relief from deportation.” United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir.2000). The evidence in the record certainly is sufficient to satisfy this minimal threshold.
To show that he had a plausible ground for relief, Muro submitted the declaration of his wife, Linda Muro, who stated:
It is important that our children have a father. They love their father and need *1187him in their lives. I also need help in raising the children and providing for them. I can not provide everything they need without their father’s help. It is a significant hardship on the family not to have Juan in the country to help with the children.
Linda Muro thus indicates that the children’s love for their father and her need for his help in “raising” them-in addition to his help in “providing” for them-contribute to the significant hardship that would result from Muro’s deportation. This evidence thus goes beyond the simple matter of the hardship posed by deportation of a family’s primary bread-winner. See Gutierrez-Centeno v. INS, 99 F.3d 1529, 1533 (9th Cir.1996) (family separation is a factor “which warrants considerable, if not predominant, weight”); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 712 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1983) (“We have held that ‘[t]he most important single [hardship] factor may be the separation of the alien from family living in the United States.’ ” (citation omitted and alterations in original)).
Thus, the majority’s reliance on United States v. Arce-Hernandez, 163 F.3d 559 (9th Cir.1998), in concluding that this evidence is insufficient to show plausibility is misplaced. “Arce-Hemandez simply stands for the proposition that economic hardship caused by deportation of the family’s primary bread winner, combined with relocating, do not, standing alone, constitute the extreme hardship necessary to justify relief.” Arrieta, 224 F.3d at 1082.1
Muro also submitted the declaration of Matthew Millen, an immigration law expert with 24 year's’ experience in the field. After reviewing Muro’s immigration file, hearing transcripts, attorney notes, criminal history, and wife’s declaration, Millen gave his expert opinion that there is a “reasonable possibility” that Muro would have been granted a § 212(h) waiver. The sufficiency of this showing of prejudice is directly supported by our case law. See Arrieta, 224 F.3d at 1083 (stating that a showing of prejudice is made by “testimony from an expert witness, ... that there was ‘a reasonable possibility’ ” that a petitioner would have been granted a waiver if one had been sought).
In concluding that this showing is insufficient, the majority misreads Arrieta. It asserts that “[ujnlike Arrieta, Muro-Inclan has not provided that ‘something more’ required by Arce-Hernandez to ‘remove [his] case from the “typical” hardship category.’” Maj. op. at 1186. But Arrieta expressly holds that credible expert testimony, such as that given here, “provides additional support for the proposition that it would be ‘plausible’ that Mr. Arrieta would have received a § 212(h) waiver. Because it is plausible that Mr. Arrieta would have received a waiver, we hold that he was prejudiced by the government’s due process violation.” Arrieta, 224 F.3d at 1083. And such a showing of “plausibility” or a “reasonable possibility” that such a showing of extreme hardship can be made is all that is required. See id.; United States v. Jimenez-Marmolejo, 104 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.1996).
Because I conclude that Muro has made a plausible showing of available relief under § 212(h), as required by our case law, I would reverse his conviction.

. In addition, we have also considered it significant that "deportation will ... not only sever close family ties, but return [the petitioner] to a country in which she has no real ties. This is not the type of hardship experienced by most aliens who have spent time abroad.” Gutierrez-Centeno, 99 F.3d at 1533 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Muro has spent his entire life in this country after arriving here as an infant.