Court Opinion

ID: 9594051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:26:39.0122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:51.893096
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL.
I respectfully dissent from Part B of the majority opinion, and would reverse the court of appeals’ decision finding the second and third written statements were inadmissible.
In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), the United States Supreme Court addressed the police practice of conducting a custodial interrogation in which no Miranda warnings were given until the interrogation produced a confession. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604, 124 S.Ct. 2601. The interrogating officers would follow the inadmissible statement with Miranda warnings, and then lead the suspect over the same ground a second time. Id. The Court concluded, “Because this midstream recitation of warn*305ings after interrogation and unwarned confession could not effectively comply with Miranda’s constitutional requirement, we hold that a statement repeated after a warning in such circumstances is inadmissible.” Id. The Seibert Court elaborated:
For unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice, there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.
Id. at 612. In describing why the Miranda warnings were ineffective in Seibert, the Court stated, “[T]he police did not advise that her prior statement could not be used.” Id. at 616. Thus, for Seibert to apply, the first unwarned custodial statement must be inadmissible. This is in part because the Court was concerned that the later interrogation was a mere continuation of the earlier unwarned and inadmissible custodial interrogation. See id. at 616-17.
In this matter, the majority’s reliance on Seibert is misplaced. Seibert applies when, police conduct an initial custodial interrogation without giving Miranda warnings, elicit a confession, and then give Miranda warnings before finally eliciting the same confession a second time. See id. at 604. In such circumstances, the first unwarned statement is inadmissible because it violates Miranda’s warning requirements. See id.
In the present case, I agree with the majority that the first statement was admissible because Respondent was not in custody when it was given. Because there was no custodial interrogation regarding the first statement, there was no need for Miranda warnings. The majority states that the interrogation status changed from noncustodial to custodial when the police asked Respondent how he comforted the child. However, merely asking questions that result in inculpatory responses does not change a noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. If this were so, the nature of police investigation would be forever altered. There is no evidence in the record to suggest the circumstances of questioning changed such that a custodial interrogation resulted *306when the police began to elicit inculpatory information. Hence, because there was no custodial interrogation, Seibert does not apply.
The mere giving of Miranda warnings does not convert an otherwise noncustodial situation into a custodial interrogation. State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704, 708, 258 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1979). In this case, the second and third statements were obtained after Miranda warnings were given. However, giving Miranda warnings did not convert the noncustodial interrogation into a custodial interrogation. Because the second and third statements were obtained in a noncustodial setting, I would hold the second and third statements were admissible. Thus, I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision and hold the trial court correctly allowed all three statements.
KITTREDGE, J., concurs except for the finding that the third statement was obtained in a non-custodial setting.