Court Opinion

ID: 8754989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 11:42:44.900496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:11.859581
License: Public Domain

THAYER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). The important question in this case is whether an innkeeper is exempt from liability to one oi his guests who is injured within the hotel by an act of gross negligence on the part of a servant of the innkeeper, because the servant, at the time he committed the negligent act, was not engaged in rendering any service for his master, but was momentarily off duty and awaiting orders. The majority of the court decide that question in the affirmative, holding, as I understand, that, if the proprietor of a hotel exercises ordinary care in the selection of his servants, he is not -responsible to his guests for any of their acts committed, even within the hotel, no matter how rash, negligent, or brutal they may be, nor how seriously a guest may be injured, provided the servant was not at the moment engaged in some work for and in behalf oi the master. I am unable to assent to this doctrine.
The relation existing between a carrier and a passenger has on numerous occasions been likened to that existing between an innkeeper and his guest. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Power et al., 7 Metc. 596, 601, 41 Am. Dec. 465, Chief Justice Shaw said:
“An owner of a steamboat or railroad in this respect is in a condition somewhat similar to that of an innkeeper whose premises are open to all quests. Yet he is not only empowered, but he is bound, to so regulate his liotise, as well with regard to the peace and comfort of his guests who there seek repose as to the peace and quiet of the vicinity, as to repress and prohibit all disorderly conduct therein; and, of course, he has a right and is bound to exclude from his premises all disorderly persons and all persons not conforming to regulations necessary and proper to secure such quiet and good order.”
This remark was quoted with approval by Ryan, C. J., in Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 450, 459, 17 Am. Rep. 495.
Also in Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. 221, 226, Fed. Cas. No. 7,258, Mr. Justice Story compared the rights and duties of a carrier with those of an innkeeper, upon the evident assumption that the relation of an innkeeper to his guest was practically like that of a carrier to a passenger!
In Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163, 169, the Supreme Court of *172that state remarked, when considering an innkeeper’s liability for the property of his guest, that:
“Innkeepers are under the same liability as common carriers.”
And in the case of Dickson et al. v. Waldron, 34 N. E. 506, 510, 24 L. R. A. 483, 41 Am. St. Rep. 440, the Supreme Court of Indiana remarked :
“But common carriers, innkeepers, merchants, managers of theaters, and others who invite the liuhlic to become their patrons and guests, and thus submit personal safety and comfort to their keeping, owe a more special duty to those who may accept such invitation. Such patrons and guests have a right to ask that they shall be protected from injury while present on such invitation, and particularly that they shall not suffer wrong from the agents and servants of those who have invited them.”
Also, in the case of Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557, 585, 91 Am. Dec. 657, it was held that the liability of innkeepers and of common carriers is founded upon the same considerations of public policy in the one case as in the other.
In the absence of express authority on this point, I should be of opinion that an innkeeper is under the same obligation to protect his guests against the wrongful and discourteous acts of his servants, committed within or upon his premises, as a carrier to protect its passengers against like acts of its employés. A guest comes to a hotel on the invitation of the proprietor, and for the latter’s profit and advantage, and upon the implied understanding that while on the premises as a guest he shall receive courteous and considerate treatment from the proprietor and all persons who are his servants, or, at least, upon the implied understanding that while beneath his roof the life of the guest shall not be imperiled by the rash, inconsiderate, or wrongful acts of those who are his servants. The general law of hospitality would seem to impose such an obligation upon an innkeeper. He promises suitable entertainment to all his guests, as well as respectful, considerate, and proper treatment on the part of all of his servants. If a servant of a hotel, when off duty, should meet a guest outside of the hotel, and not on the premises, and there assault him, it is doubtless true — although the case at bar requires no decision on that point — that the innkeeper could not be charged with responsibility for the servant’s conduct; and it is probably true that the innkeeper would not be responsible for an assault committed on one of his guests within the hotel by a stranger, provided he has taken all reasonable precautions to prevent such occurrences by excluding disorderly persons from his premises. But in my opinion the law casts on the innkeeper an obligation to see to it that his guest is not injured, while within the hotel, by the wrongful, inconsiderate, or negligent acts of those who are his servants.
It is said in the opinion of the majority that an innkeeper is not an insurer of the safety of the person of his guest while within the hotel. The same may be said of carriers. They do not insure the personal safety of passengers, but only to exercise a very high degree of care, or, as it is sometimes said, “the utmost care,” for their protection. Yet it is now well settled that this duty is so comprehensive that it renders the carrier responsible for injuries inflicted on passengers so *173long as the relation of carrier and passenger exists, not only by the negligent acts of its servants done while in the performance of some duty, but also by their willful and wrongful acts, such as assaults committed on passengers or indignities offered to them. The obligation also rests on the carrier to protect its passengers while in transit, not only against the willful and wrongful acts of its own servants, but so far as practicable from acts of violence committed by strangers and co^passengers. It makes no difference, as it seems, what motive may have actuated a servant of the carrier in committing the wrongful act complained of, or whether it was done in conformity with the carrier’s orders, or in express violation thereof and on the sole responsibility of the servant; for, if it was done while the relation of carrier and passenger existed, the carrier is responsible, and it cannot defend on the ground that the act of its servant was done without its sanction and at a moment when he was not rendering any special service to the carrier. A different rule obtains, of course, as respects willful and wrongful acts done by employés to those to whom the carrier at the time owed no other or greater duty of protection than it owed to every other person in the community; but, when the peculiar relation of carrier and passenger exists, the modern rule appears to be that the carrier is under an obligation to see to it that a passenger suffers no harm on account of the wrongful and willful acts of its servants, and that every practicable precaution is taken to protect him against the wrongful acts of strangers and co-passengers. Stewart v. Brooklyn & Crosstown Railroad Co., 90 N. Y. 588, 43 Am. Rep. 185; Dwinelle v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 117, 125, 24 N. E. 319, 8 L. R. A. 224, 17 Am. St. Rep. 611; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 213, 2 Am. Rep. 39, and cases there cited; Bryant v. Rich, 106 Mass. 188, 8 Am. Rep. 311; Spohn v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 74, 80; Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 17 Am. Rep. 504; Pendleton v. Kinsley, 3 Cliff. 416, 427, Fed. Cas. No. 10,922; Chicago & Eastern R. R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546, 42 Am. Rep. 33; Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. R. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19.
Now, it is true that a hotel is an immovable structure and does not run on wheels like a train of cars; but in all other respects the relation existing between an innkeeper and his guest is like that existing between a carrier and passenger, and this fact has always been recognized, as shown by the cases above cited. An innkeeper, like a carrier, is engaged in a quasi public service. When he embarks in the business of keeping a hotel, he is bound to provide entertainment for all travelers who seek a place of rest and refreshment, provided they come to him in a fit condition to be entertained as guests, and are able to pay the customary charges. Unless relieved of the obligation by an express statute, the innkeeper, like the carrier, is an insurer of his guests’ baggage against loss occasioned otherwise than by an act of God or the public enemy. American & English Ency. of Daw (2d Ed.) vol. 16, p. 528, and cases there cited. Besides, an innkeeper is vested with the same power of control over his premises which the carrier exercises over such means of public conveyance as he provides. An innkeeper has the right to exclude from his premises all *174'disorderly persons, and to suppress all disturbances therein that tend to disturb his guests or imperil their safety, and according to the decision of Chief Justice Shaw in the case above cited (7 Metc. 596, 601) it is his common-law duty to exercise this power. Aside from these considerations, the innkeeper, like the carrier, has the exclusive right to select all of the persons who are to aid him in the discharge of his quasi public functions. I have been unable, therefore, to discover any sufficient reason why he should not be held responsible to his guests for the consequences of any willful and wrongful acts of his servants, committed within the hotel, to the same extent that the carrier is responsible to his passengers for like wrongful acts of its servants; and within the authorities above cited a carrier would be clearly responsible to one of its passengers for an injury inflicted by one of its employés under such circumstances as those disclosed in the present case.
Relative to the authorities cited in the majority opinion and not already referred to, this may be said:
Calye’s Case, 4 Coke’s Rep. 63, 66, contains the single detached statement that, “if the guest be beaten in the inn, the innkeeper shall not answer for it.” But it does not say by whom beaten, whether by a servant of the innkeeper or by a stranger. This, however, is a very old case, decided in 1584, and the statement quoted is purely dicta, since the case involved no question respecting the liability of an innkeeper for an assault committed upon a guest within the hotel. Moreover, as the learned editor of the American & English Ency. of Law remarks, in substance (vide vol. 16 [2d Ed.] p. 545), it may well be doubted whether the statement above quoted would be accepted at the present day as authority for the doctrine which it enunJ ciates, since the modern authorities are opposed to the view that an innkeeper cannot be held responsible for an assault committed upon one of his guests within the hotel by a servant, or even by a stranger when the innkeeper has not taken proper care to exclude disorderly persons from his premises.
Curtis v. Dinneen (Dak.) 30 N. W. 148, was a case in which a guest of a hotel kept by a married woman sought to hold her responsible for an assault and battery committed by her husband without her consent or ratification. The husband was living with the wife in the hotel, as he had a right to do, and was assisting her to operate it, so that the case was embarrassed by the existence of the marital relation ; the court holding that under the circumstances the wife could not be held responsible for the tort of the husband.
The other cases that are referred to are without exception cases where it was sought to hold the innkeeper responsible for some defect in the hotel premises, and in one of them (Sandys v. Florence, 47 L. J. 598, 600) it was remarked arguendo, in discussing a demurrer to the complaint, that an innkeeper’s duty “is not to insure his guests, but to see only that they did not suffer from want of reasonable and proper’ care on his part.” None of the cases, however, discuss the particular question which is presented in the case at bar, whether an innkeeper is liable to his guest for the reckless conduct of one. of his servants committed upon the hotel premises, whereby the life of the *175guest is jeopardized. In my judgment an innkeeper ought to be held liable for an act of that nature, and as respects that question I concur in the view which was expressed by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Clancy v. Barker, 98 N. W. 440, that was decided upon the same state of facts which this record discloses.
I think the judgment below should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.