Court Opinion

ID: 9909591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 19:00:38.339758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:05.505241
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30047        Document: 00516999558             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/13/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                     ____________                                      Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                      No. 23-30047                           December 13, 2023
                                     ____________                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk
   Daniel Gonzales Llagas,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Sealift Holdings, Incorporated; Sealift, Incorporated;
   Black Eagle Shipping, L.L.C.; Fortune Maritime, L.L.C.;
   Sealift Tankships, L.L.C.; Sagamore Shipping, L.L.C.;
   Remington Shipping, L.L.C.,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:17-CV-472
                     ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Plaintiff appeals the district court’s orders compelling arbitration and
   enforcing an arbitration award.           For the reasons set forth below, we
   AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                            No. 23-30047

                                       I.     Background
      A. Facts
          Daniel Gonzales Llagas is a Philippine citizen who worked as a fitter
   performing steelwork and repairing machinery on several different United-
   States-flagged ships. According to Llagas, the Sealift Defendants 1 are a single
   business enterprise that owns each of the ships on which he worked.
          Rather than directly employing Filipino seamen, like Llagas, the
   Sealift Defendants used Lots International, Inc. to source labor from the
   Philippines via Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (collectively, the
   “Manning Agents”). That is because “[t]he Philippine government requires
   foreign employers or their agents to employ Filipino workers through the
   Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), a department of
   the Ministry of Labor and Employment.”                     Lim v. Offshore Specialty
   Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 2005). According to Llagas,
   Magsaysay “is licensed by [POEA] as a manning agent with authority to
   recruit Filipino seamen for employment on board vessels accredited to it,”
   and the contracts at issue indicate that Magsaysay is an agent of Lots. For
   each stint on the Sealift Defendants’ ships, Llagas signed an employment
   contract with the Manning Agents (the “POEA Contracts”). The Sealift
   Defendants did not have a contract with the Manning Agents but did receive
   monthly invoices from Lots so that Lots could pay Llagas and others for their
   work aboard the Sealift Defendants’ vessels.
          Each POEA Contract establishes the terms of Llagas’s employment,
   including dates of employment, basic wages, hours of work, fixed overtime,
   and leave pay. The contracts also incorporate POEA’s “Standard Terms and

          _____________________
          1
              The term “Sealift Defendants” refers to all the defendants.

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   Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-
   Board Ocean-Going Ships.” One such term is Section 29’s arbitration
   clause, which mandates arbitration for “claims and disputes arising from this
   employment.” Another such term is Section 31’s requirement that “[a]ny
   unresolved dispute, claim or grievance arising out of or in connection with
   this contract . . . shall be governed by the laws of the Republic of the
   Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants to which the
   Philippines is a signatory.”
      B. Procedural History
          Originally, Llagas filed a class action in Louisiana state court against
   the Sealift Defendants. Llagas did not name either of the Manning Agents as
   a defendant. The lawsuit alleges violations of 46 U.S.C. §§ 8106, 8701, and
   10302, and seeks remedies provided by 46 U.S.C. §§ 10313 and 11107. The
   petition also states that “[c]ontrary to United States statutory law, and the
   General Maritime Law . . . the Sealift Defendants failed to make payments of
   the full wages due to Plaintiff and the class he seeks to represent.” The
   Sealift Defendants removed the lawsuit to federal court.
          Shortly thereafter, the Sealift Defendants filed a Motion to Stay
   Litigation and Compel Arbitration based on the arbitration clause
   incorporated into the POEA Contracts. The magistrate judge recommended
   that the court compel arbitration. The magistrate judge concluded that,
   despite the Sealift Defendants not having signed the POEA Contracts, Llagas
   should be compelled to arbitrate based on the equitable-estoppel doctrine set
   out in Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000).
          Llagas filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and
   recommendation, arguing that the magistrate judge mistook his claims as
   seeking wages due under the POEA Contracts (rather than alleging violations
   of statutory law alone) and therefore erroneously applied the doctrine of

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   equitable estoppel. Simultaneously, Llagas filed a stipulation disavowing any
   reliance on the POEA Contracts except to the extent the documents signed
   violated 46 U.S.C. § 11107. In light of Llagas’s stipulation, the district court
   remanded to the magistrate judge the Sealift Defendants’ motion to compel
   arbitration.
          Upon remand, the magistrate judge issued a supplemental report and
   recommendation concluding that Llagas should be compelled to arbitrate
   because his statutory claims were intertwined with his employment
   contracts. The district court agreed and issued a judgment compelling
   arbitration. Llagas filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court
   granted in part by issuing an amended judgment clarifying the reasoning of
   the court but not altering the result. The amended judgment clarified that
   “Plaintiff’s claims in this case ‘rely on the terms of the written agreement’
   (the Employment Contract) because each of his claims ‘makes reference to
   or presumes the existence of the written agreement’ and thus[ ‘]arise out of
   and relate directly to the written agreement.’”
          As a result of the order requiring arbitration, Llagas filed a petition
   with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). However, in
   doing so, he named not just the Sealift Defendants as respondents but also
   Magsaysay and Marlon R. Rono, the President of Magsaysay. He also
   asserted causes of action similar to the same statutory violations as those
   alleged in his original petition. The matter was ultimately transferred to the
   National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On the NLRC’s complaint
   form, Llagas listed Magsaysay in the space for “Name of Respondent
   Agency,”       Marlon   R.    Rono     in   the    space    for   “Name      of
   Owner/Manager/President,” and Sealift Holdings, Inc. in the space for
   “Name of Respondent Principal.” In the causes of action section of the
   form, Llagas checked boxes for: (1) illegal dismissal – others (please specify),
   (2) money claims non-payment, (3) underpayment – salaries/wages, (4)

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   underpayment – overtime pay, and (5) others (please specify). Disregarding
   the form’s instructions, he did not provide any additional information about
   his “other” causes of action in the spaces provided to do so.
           In addition to his NLRC complaint, Llagas also filed a position paper
   with the NLRC. Unlike his NLRC complaint, which did not allege the
   relevant statutory violations, Llagas’s position paper includes causes of
   action for violations of the same United States statutes alleged in his original
   state-court petition.
           The arbitrator rendered a decision against Llagas.                  The Sealift
   Defendants then moved for the district court to recognize and enforce the
   arbitration decision. The district court granted the motion and issued a
   judgment in favor of the Sealift Defendants on all claims, declining to
   reconsider. Llagas timely appealed.
                       II.     Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
       The     district      court   had     federal      question     jurisdiction   under
   28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on Llagas’s statutory claims. 2 The district court also
   had removal jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 205.                    We have jurisdiction
   pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)(1)(D) and (a)(3).
           We “review[] an order compelling arbitration de novo,” Crawford
   Pro. Drugs, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 748 F.3d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (quotation omitted), but review the “use of equitable estoppel to compel
   arbitration for an abuse of discretion.” Id. “To constitute an abuse of
   discretion, the district court’s decision must be either premised on an
   application of the law that is erroneous, or on an assessment of the evidence

           _____________________
           2
              Llagas also contends that the district court had diversity jurisdiction, but the
   notice of removal does not properly plead the citizenship of the parties that are LLCs.

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   that is clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted). We “may affirm the
   district court on any ground supported by the record.” Id. at 256–57
   (quotation omitted).
          We review a district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award de
   novo. YPF S.A. v. Apache Overseas, Inc., 924 F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2019).
   But “[r]eview of the underlying arbitral award is exceedingly deferential.”
   Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc., 966 F.3d 361, 368 (5th Cir.
   2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                                  III.      Discussion
          The two issues before us are (1) whether the district court abused its
   discretion by compelling arbitration based on equitable estoppel, and
   (2) whether the district court erred by enforcing the arbitration award. We
   address each issue in turn.
              A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by compelling
                  arbitration based on equitable estoppel.
          Llagas contends that the district court erroneously compelled
   arbitration because the Sealift Defendants are not signatories to the POEA
   Contracts and equitable estoppel does not apply.
          A non-signatory may compel arbitration based on the equitable-
   estoppel doctrine under the intertwined-claims basis in two independent
   circumstances: (1) when the claims rely on the terms of the contract, or (2)
   when the claims arise out of interdependent and concerted misconduct. See
   Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527 (adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s framework). 3
   When “both independent bases” exist, “equitable estoppel is much more

          _____________________
          3
            Neither party disputes that this body of law governs the equitable-estoppel
   determination.

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   readily applicable.” Id. at 527–28. The Sealift Defendants contend that both
   bases for equitable estoppel exist in the present case. We agree.

                 1. Reliance on the terms of the contract

          The first basis for equitable estoppel under Grigson—reliance on the
   terms of the contract—is the basis on which the district court compelled
   arbitration. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   doing so.
          “[E]quitable estoppel applies when the signatory to a written
   agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of the
   written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.” Grigson,
   210 F.3d at 527 (quotation and italics omitted). In other words, “[w]hen each
   of a signatory’s claims against a nonsignatory makes reference to or presumes
   the existence of the written agreement, the signatory’s claims arise out of and
   relate directly to the written agreement.” Id. (quotation omitted). The
   theory is that a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot
   “have it both ways” by, on the one hand, seeking “to hold the non-signatory
   liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an
   arbitration provision,” while, on the other hand, “deny[ing] arbitration’s
   applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.”          Id. (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Llagas argues that the district court confused reliance on the existence
   of the POEA Contracts with reliance on the terms of the POEA Contracts.
   Llagas contends that the district court’s reasoning is at odds with Hill v. G E
   Power Systems, Inc., 282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002). We disagree.
          In Hill, we held that the plaintiff’s claims for trade-secret
   misappropriation and fraudulent inducement may have “touch[ed] matters”
   covered by a termination agreement that ended a business relationship

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   between the plaintiff and one of the defendants. 282 F.3d at 348–49. But
   because the non-signatory defendant “stop[ped] short of asserting that [the
   plaintiff] relies upon the express terms of the Termination Agreement in
   asserting its claims . . . the first prong of the Grigson test [was] not met.” Id.
   at 349.
             Unlike Hill, the claims at issue in the present case do rely on the
   express terms of the POEA Contracts. It is clear that Llagas would never have
   received this job without the POEA Contract. Further, § 11107, which
   provides the remedy for each of Llagas’s claims, relies on the express terms
   of the POEA Contracts because it looks to “the amount agreed to be given
   the seaman at the time of engagement” as one of two potential remedies
   when a seaman’s employment violates the law. 4 Llagas contends that
   because the alternative remedy under § 11107—“the highest rate of wages at
   the port from which the seaman was engaged”—does not rely on the express
   terms of the contract, § 11107 does not provide a basis for equitable estoppel.
   But even if the port rate, rather than the contractual rate, is the remedy
   awarded, a court still must evaluate “whichever is higher” by comparing the
   express terms of the POEA Contract with the highest rate available at the
   port; that is particularly true here, where Llagas admitted he was paid the

             _____________________
             4
             Moreover, § 11107 is not the only statute at issue that meets Grigson’s first test.
   Under § 8701(b), “[a] person may not engage or employ an individual, and an individual
   may not serve, on board a vessel to which this section applies if the individual does not have
   a merchant mariner’s document.” Further, § 8106(c) sets a maximum limit of 60 days in
   a calendar year “that the owner or operator of a vessel . . . may employ on board riding gang
   members who are neither United States citizens nor aliens lawfully admitted to the United
   States for permanent residence for work on board that vessel.” Finally, § 10302(a) states
   that “[t]he owner, charter, managing operator, master, or individual in charge shall make
   a shipping agreement in writing with each seaman before the seaman commences
   employment.” We agree with the district court that these statutes “presume[] the
   existence of” an employment agreement and therefore “arise out of and relate directly to”
   the employment agreements. Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527.

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   contractual wages. See 46 U.S.C. § 11107. This alone is a sufficient basis for
   equitable estoppel, especially because each of Llagas’s statutory claims relies
   on § 11107 for a remedy.
            Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
   compelling arbitration under Grigson’s first test.

                   2. Interdependent and concerted misconduct

            In addition to the above, the second basis for equitable estoppel also
   applies. Under the second basis, equitable estoppel is appropriate when a
   signatory “raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted
   misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to
   the contract.” Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527 (quotation omitted).
            As stated above, his POEA Contract is what led him down the path at
   issue.    Thus, here, the allegations in Llagas’s complaint implicate the
   Manning Agents as the entities who employed Llagas and facilitated his
   allegedly unlawful engagement with the Sealift Defendants. The statutes on
   which Llagas’s claims rely support this conclusion. First, §§ 8701(b) and
   § 8106(c) prohibit employment of a seaman under certain conditions, which
   directly implicates Llagas’s actual employers (the signatory Manning
   Agents). Second, § 10302 sets requirements that must be met before a
   seaman begins employment. Finally, as discussed above, § 11107, which
   provides a remedy for each of the alleged statutory violations, prohibits “[a]n
   engagement of a seaman contrary to a law of the United States.” We
   therefore hold that the alleged misconduct “raises allegations of substantially
   interdependent and concerted misconduct.”            Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527
   (quotation omitted).
            For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by applying equitable estoppel and compelling arbitration.

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      B. The district court did not violate public policy by enforcing the
          arbitration award.
          We next consider whether the district court properly confirmed the
   arbitration award as requested by the Sealift Defendants. Llagas argues that
   the district court erred because enforcing the award violated public policy.
   We disagree.
          The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
   Arbitral Awards (the “Convention”) “applies when an arbitral award has
   been made in one signatory state and recognition or enforcement is sought in
   another signatory state.” Asignacion v. Rickmers Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft
   mbH & Cie KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing the Convention,
   June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3). The United States and the
   Philippines are both signatories. Asignacion, 783 F.3d at 1015.
          A United States court with jurisdiction “shall confirm” an arbitration
   award governed by the Convention “unless it finds one of the grounds for
   refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specifically
   specified in the said Convention.” 9 U.S.C. § 207. “The Convention
   permits a nonsignatory to refuse to recognize or enforce an award if
   ‘recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
   policy of that country.’” Asignacion, 783 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Convention
   art. V(2)(b)). The “public policy defense is to be construed narrowly to be
   applied only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic
   notions of morality and justice.”          Id. at 1016 (quotation omitted).
   Additionally, the public-policy defense applies only for an “explicit public
   policy” that is “well defined and dominant” and can be “ascertained by
   reference to the laws and legal precedent and not from general considerations
   of supposed public interests.” Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union,
   AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987)). Llagas bears a “heavy

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   burden of proof” to avoid enforcement of the arbitration award on public
   policy grounds. Lim, 404 F.3d at 905 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
   Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972)).
          “A district court’s review of an award is extraordinarily narrow.”
   Asignacion, 783 F.3d at 1015 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   “Similarly, a court reviewing an award under the Convention cannot refuse
   to enforce the award solely on the ground that the arbitrator may have made
   a mistake of law or fact.” Id. (citation omitted).

                 1. Applying foreign law to a United-States-flagged vessel

          First, Llagas contends that it violates public policy for a foreign
   arbitrator to apply foreign law to the internal affairs of a United-States-
   flagged vessel. Llagas relies on a remark from Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
   571 (1953) to support his position. In Lauritzen, the Supreme Court set out a
   seven-factor test to analyze choice-of-law questions in maritime cases and, in
   doing so, stated that “[e]xcept as forbidden by some public policy, the
   tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties
   intended to apply.” 345 U.S. at 588–89. But the Court subsequently
   remarked that “[w]e think a quite different result would follow if the contract
   attempted to avoid applicable law, for example, so as to apply foreign law to
   an American ship.” Id. at 589.
          We previously addressed the Lauritzen exception in Asignacion. 783
   F.3d at 1018–19. Like the present case, Asignacion dealt with a public-policy
   challenge to an arbitration award concerning a Filipino seaman subject to a
   POEA contract. Id. at 1013. The plaintiff in Asignacion argued that the
   arbitration award should not be enforced because the Philippines-based
   arbitrators, applying Philippines law, awarded him far less than he would
   have received under United States maritime law. Id. at 1016–17. To settle
   the choice-of-law issue, we turned to Lauritzen and considered its remark

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   condemning “choice-of-law provision[s] that attempt[] to ‘avoid applicable
   law.’” Id. at 1019. We reasoned that because the terms of the POEA contract
   at issue mandated the application of Philippines law, the plaintiff’s employee
   “did little, if anything, to avoid applicable law through its contract with [the
   plaintiff].” Id. On the other hand, we recognized that “the Philippine
   government has arguably attempted to avoid the application of foreign law to
   its seamen.” Id. Ultimately, we concluded that “it is far from certain that
   the Lauritzen Court condemned such choice-of-law clauses mandated by a
   foreign sovereign rather than a party to the contract.” Id.
          Llagas argues that Asignacion is not dispositive because the vessel at
   issue in that case sailed under the flag of the Marshall Islands rather than the
   United States (even though the Marshall Islands adopts the general maritime
   laws of the United States). But that does not change Asignacion’s conclusion
   that the reach of the Lauritzen exception does not require a different outcome
   here, where the choice-of-law clause is “mandated by a foreign sovereign
   rather than a party to the contract.” Id. at 1019. Also, the public policy at
   issue must be “well defined and dominant” and ascertainable “by reference
   to the laws and legal precedents” to warrant non-enforcement of an
   arbitration award. Id. at 1016 (quoting United Paperworks, 484 U.S. at 43).
   That is not the case here. Accordingly, Llagas has not met his “heavy burden
   of proof” to avoid enforcement on the basis that the arbitrator applied
   Philippines law. Lim, 404 F.3d at 905 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17).
   In any event, as discussed below, the arbitrator did address the U.S. statutes
   in question.

                  2. Effective vindication of statutory remedies

          Llagas also argues that the district court erred by enforcing the
   arbitration award because doing so violated public policy under the effective-
   vindication/prospective-waiver doctrine.

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          The “effective-vindication” or “prospective-waiver” doctrine stems
   from Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
   (1985). In Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme Court noted that “in the event the
   choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a
   prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies for
   antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
   agreement as against public policy.” 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. It added, however,
   that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory
   cause of action in the forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
   remedial and deterrent function.” Id. at 637.
          Because the case at issue in Mitsubishi Motors had not yet been
   arbitrated, the Court concluded that the district court would have the
   opportunity at the “award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate
   interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.” Id. at
   638. The Court also stated that “[w]hile the efficacy of the arbitral process
   requires that substantive review at the award enforcement stage remain
   minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal
   took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.” Id.
          According to Llagas, enforcing the arbitration award in the present
   case would violate public policy because the arbitrator did not take
   cognizance of or actually decide Llagas’s statutory claims beyond holding
   that United States law did not apply. Given that this argument is clearly not
   true, because the arbitrator did address that law as we explain below, he also
   argues that the arbitrator’s labeling that portion of his opinion as ex gratia
   argumenti precludes it from constituting an actual decision on the merits.
   Finally, Llagas contends that even without the ex-gratia-argumenti label, the
   arbitrator’s more substantive conclusions regarding Llagas’s statutory claims
   do not constitute an actual decision on the merits. Llagas concedes that he
   cannot find a standard by which to judge whether an arbitrator took

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   cognizance of and actually decided a claim but submits that we should apply
   the NLRC’s 2011 Rules of Procedure.
          We disagree with Llagas’s contention that the arbitrator did not take
   cognizance of or actually decide Llagas’s claims beyond holding that United
   States law did not apply. Besides rejecting Llagas’s statutory claims on
   choice-of-law grounds, the arbitrator also rejected Llagas’s statutory claims
   on procedural and evidentiary grounds.
          Regarding the procedural grounds, the arbitrator noted that Llagas
   included his statutory claims in his position paper but not in his complaint,
   which only alleged “underpayment of salary/wages and overtime pay.” The
   arbitrator explained that the “NLRC Rules of Procedure provide[] that the
   parties’ position papers, especially that of the claimant, should only cover
   claims and causes of action raised in the complaint.” That procedural ruling
   is sufficient.
          Turning to the evidentiary grounds, the arbitrator stated that “[e]ven
   assuming ex gratia argumenti that the US laws invoked by complainant [are]
   remotely applicable, still, he miserably failed to prove by any slight of
   evidence that he, a Filipino seafarer is in fact considered a ‘gang member’
   under US law.” The arbitrator also noted that “Complainant even failed to
   discuss the requisites and conditions entitling him to benefits under said US
   laws and that he has complied with all the requisites entitling him to the
   benefits under the US laws which he invokes.”
          Llagas is also incorrect that the arbitrator’s labeling of the evidentiary
   ground as ex gratia argumenti precludes us from concluding that the arbitrator
   took cognizance of and actually decided Llagas’s claims. District courts often
   make findings of an affirmative defense but then also “assume arguendo”
   that such a holding is not correct and then resolve the merits. When we
   consider such cases, we can and do look at both. See, e.g., Wion v.

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   Quarterman, 567 F.3d 146, 147–49 (5th Cir. 2009) (addressing district court’s
   conclusions that petition was not time barred and that, even if it was,
   equitable tolling should apply). Unsurprisingly, Llagas fails to identify any
   authority establishing that enforcement of an arbitration award violates
   public policy if the arbitrator reaches the merits of a statutory claim only in
   the alternative. See Lim, 404 F.3d at 905 (explaining that a party seeking to
   avoid enforcement of an arbitration award on public-policy grounds bears a
   “heavy burden” (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 17)). But even “assuming
   arguendo” that is a “failure to consider,” Llagas ignores that the arbitrator
   also concluded—without any such label—that Llagas failed to prove his
   statutory claims in accordance with the NLRC’s rules of evidence by failing
   to plead those claims in his complaint.
          Finally, we are not persuaded by Llagas’s assertion that the
   substantive analysis of his statutory claims does not satisfy the NLRC’s
   decisional requirements, and therefore the district court should not enforce
   the arbitration award. It is clear upon a “minimal” review that does not
   include an “intrusive inquiry” that the arbitrator provided three
   independent bases for denying Llagas’s statutory claims—two of which did
   not rely on the inapplicability of United States law. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473
   U.S. at 637 (providing limits of review). That is sufficient to avoid the
   concern that a contract’s “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
   operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue
   statutory remedies.” Id. at 637 n.19.
          We therefore conclude that the effective-vindication/prospective-
   waiver doctrine is inapplicable to the present case.
                                IV.      Conclusion
          For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders
   compelling arbitration and enforcing the arbitration award.

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