Court Opinion

ID: 9858665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:38.242634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:26.694057
License: Public Domain

HUMPHREYS, Justice
(dissenting on rehearing).
While maintaining my dissent, I agree, as insisted by the petition to rehear filed by the Attorney General, that there is now nothing to bar the implementation of the Plan to fill the existing vacancy on this Court. My mind is satisfied that the Plan is unconstitutional, but, if we are to operate under it, the vacancy on the Court must be filled under it.
During the argument of this case at Knoxville, and in conference, I expressed the opinion that if neither Mr. Turley nor Mr. Taylor was entitled to the office, and if the Plan was to be upheld, it would be necessary to proceed anew under the Plan, the principle of functus officio so requiring. I am still of that opinion.
Turning to Mr. Turley’s petition to rehear : It makes the point that, inasmuch as his appointive term did not commence until September 1, 1972, it could not have expired on August 31, 1972. And, as there is nothing in § 17-712(2) T.C.A., nor in any other provision of the Plan to prohibit the making of the appointment after that date, his appointment is valid. Mr. Turley argues further that if the Plan is valid, so that the whole subject matter is subject to control by the legislature, then his appointment on September 1, 1972 was valid.
Assuming the validity of the Plan, Mr. Turley is, of course, correct. The majority in its original opinion said Mr. Turley’s appointment was invalid, because, “by the express terms of § 17-712(2) the period to which the Governor could appoint him (Mr. Turley) already had expired before his attempted appointment became effective.”
It is perfectly clear from the statute that, instead of expressly applying to cut off the appointing power on August 31, it expressly applies only to judges already appointed and serving terms of office, and Mr. Turley was not in this category. The statute reads as follows:
“17-712(2). The terms of all justices or judges appointed under this act shall expire August 31 following the next August biennial general election recurring more than thirty (30) days after the vacancy.”
How this language affects the power to appoint after September 1, I shall never understand. Proof that it does not is to be found in the majority’s rehear opinion, holding that now an appointment can be made.
I concurred in the result reached by the majority that Mr. Turley’s appointment was void on the ground that this was required by that part of Article 7, § 5 of the Constitution which provides, “and such vacancy shall be filled at the next Biennial election recurring more than thirty days after the vacancy occurs.”, not the statute.
I am compelled to concede, however, that if the clear mandate of our Constitution that Supreme Court Judges shall “be elected by the qualified voters”, can be read as authorizing a plan under which the qualified voters never get to elect a Supreme Court Judge, then there is no reason at all not to read § 17-712(2) T.C.A. any way that gets the desired result.
Judge Taylor’s original and supplemental petitions to rehear consist largely of rear-gument of the grounds on which he originally relied. I could not agree with them then, and I cannot agree with them now.
Judge Taylor has, however, placed before the Court portions of the Constitutional Convention of 1870, which make it perfectly clear that before the resolution of the question, whether the Supreme Court should be elected by the qualified voters of the State or be appointed as are federal judges, there was much debate, and that it was finally decided that Supreme Court *497judges should be elected by the qualified voters. All of this discussion was summarized in Article 6, § 3 of the Constitution, where it declares “The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State.” This declaration of the manner of choosing Supreme Court Judges is so plain and clear that it does not require support by historical references, as relevant as these references are. If the plain command is going to be ignored, there is no reason to hope the discussion giving rise to the command will be noticed.
Hopeless, though the offering of the history was, I thank Mr. Taylor for placing it before the Court.