Court Opinion

ID: 9387098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 18:05:30.993974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.767025
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Palmer, 2023-Ohio-1232.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        CLARK COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 2022-CA-65
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 21-CR-0267
                                                   :
 THOMAS E. PALMER                                  :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                       Rendered on April 14, 2023

                                              ...........

ANDREW PICKERING, Attorney for Appellee

GARY C. SCHAENGOLD & GHASSAN J. DEEK, Attorneys for Appellant

                                             .............

HUFFMAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Thomas E. Palmer appeals from his convictions, following pleas of guilty, to

vehicular assault, a felony of the fourth degree; possession of cocaine, a felony of the fifth

degree; and operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (“OVI”), a

misdemeanor of the first degree. The court imposed consecutive prison sentences for

the felonies and a consecutive jail term for the misdemeanor. Palmer argues that the court
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erred in sentencing him to consecutive maximum sentences.

       {¶ 2} We conclude that the trial court made the findings necessary under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) in imposing consecutive sentences for vehicular assault and possession

of cocaine.        We cannot conclude that the court’s finding pursuant to R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c), namely that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct demonstrated that

consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him,

was not supported by the record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). However, the trial court erred in concluding that Palmer’s six-month

jail sentence for OVI was required to be served consecutively to the prison sentence for

vehicular assault and also in ordering Palmer to serve his jail term prior to his consecutive

prison terms. The trial court also erred in failing to properly impose jail-time credit.

Accordingly, Palmer’s convictions are affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

resentencing.

              I.      Factual and Procedural History

       {¶ 3} On April 27, 2021, Palmer was indicted for aggravated vehicular assault, a

felony of the second degree, with a specification for driving while under suspension, and

for OVI and possession of cocaine.       On July 25, 2022, Palmer entered into a plea

agreement with the State. The aggravated vehicular assault was amended to vehicular

assault, the specification was dismissed, and Palmer pled guilty to vehicular assault, a

fourth-degree felony; he also pled guilty to possession and OVI. The court ordered a

presentence investigation report (“PSI”).     On August 18, 2022, the court sentenced

Palmer to prison terms of 18 months for vehicular assault and 12 months for possession,
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and it sentenced him to 6 months in jail for OVI, all of which it ordered to be served

consecutively. The court ordered that Palmer serve the jail sentence prior to serving the

prison terms. The court also imposed a fine of $1,075 and suspended Palmer’s driver’s

license.

               II.    Arguments and Analysis

         {¶ 4} Palmer asserts the following assignment of error:

               THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO

         CONSECUTIVE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SENTENCES UPON THE THREE

         CHARGES TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY.

         {¶ 5} Palmer argues that the court erred in the following three ways: 1) in finding

that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct supported consecutive sentences; 2) in holding

that it was required to impose the OVI sentence consecutively to the vehicular assault

sentence; and 3) in ordering Palmer to serve his misdemeanor jail term prior to his felony

terms.

         {¶ 6} The State responds that the “serious physical harm to the victim and

[Palmer’s] repeated OVIs” supported the imposition of consecutive sentences and that

the consecutive sentences should not be disturbed on appeal. The State concedes that

Palmer’s OVI sentence must be served after his prison terms.

         {¶ 7} We note that in imposing sentence, it was significant to the court that the

facts of the case were egregious.        The court noted that Palmer was “traveling at

excessive speeds, running other vehicles off the roadway, and swerving all over the road,”

and that he “crashed into the rear of the victim’s pickup truck so hard that the rear axle
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was displaced from the vehicle.” The court indicated the victim’s back was broken. It

was also significant to the court that Palmer had two prior OVI convictions, and that he

was driving under suspension and in possession of cocaine.          The court noted that

Palmer was originally indicted for a second-degree felony with a maximum penalty of 8

to 12 years in prison.

       {¶ 8} At the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry, the court stated that it

was mandatory that the OVI sentence be served consecutively to the sentence for

vehicular assault. The court found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect

the public from future crime and punish Palmer. It found that consecutive sentences were

not disproportionate to the seriousness of Palmer’s conduct and to the danger that he

posed to the public, and that his history of criminal conduct demonstrated that consecutive

sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. The court

noted that Palmer lacked a felony record, and that his only convictions were for traffic

offenses and two prior OVI convictions, but due to the nature of the instant OVI offense,

it gave “great weight” to the prior OVIs. The court found that Palmer’s criminal history

“calls for consecutive sentences.” In its judgment entry, the court found it had discretion

to impose a prison term for the possession offense, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(ii),

because Palmer had caused serious physical harm to the victim. The court advised

Palmer that he would receive credit for time spent in the Clark County Jail but did not

specify an amount.

       {¶ 9} The judgment entry provided: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the OVI

offense, the defendant serve six (6) months in the Clark County Jail prior to serving the
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prison terms with jail-time credit from November 23, 2021 to December 16, 2021.” The

court “remanded [Palmer] to the custody of the Clark County Sheriff’s Office” and ordered

that he be “conveyed to ODRC, c/o Orient Correctional Facility, Orient, Ohio after serving

the six (6) month jail sentence.”

      {¶ 10} We initially note:

             We have said that “a trial court may rely on ‘a broad range of

      information’ at sentencing.” State v. Bodkins, 2d Dist. Clark No. 10-CA-38,

      2011-Ohio-1274, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Bowser, 186 Ohio App.3d 162,

      2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “The evidence the court

      may consider is not confined to the evidence that strictly relates to the

      conviction offense because the court is no longer concerned * * * with the

      narrow issue of guilt.” (Citation omitted.) Bowser at ¶ 14. “Among other

      things, a court may consider hearsay evidence, prior arrests, facts

      supporting a charge that resulted in an acquittal, and facts related to a

      charge that was dismissed under a plea agreement.” (Citation omitted.)

      Bodkins at ¶ 43. Even “ ‘[u]nindicted acts * * * can be considered in

      sentencing without resulting in error when they are not the sole basis for the

      sentence.’ ” State v. Cook, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87265, 2007-Ohio-625,

      ¶ 69, quoting State v. Bundy, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02 CA 211, 2005-

      Ohio-3310, ¶ 86.

State v. McNichols, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2021-CA-52, 2022-Ohio-3076, ¶ 10.

      {¶ 11} The Ohio Supreme Court recently discussed consecutive felony sentencing
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at length in State v. Gwynne, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607, __ N.E.3d __, noting

that “[w]hen a person is sentenced for having committed multiple offenses, the

presumption is that those sentences will be imposed concurrently, not consecutively.

See R.C. 2929.41(A),” but that there are exceptions. Id. at ¶ 10. “For the exception

under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to apply and before the court imposes consecutive sentences,

it must make specific findings which are delineated in the statute.” Id. The trial court

must find that “the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime

or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.”

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Finally, the court must find at least one of the following: “* * * (c)

The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are

necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.” Id. Gwynne noted

that defendants may appeal consecutive sentences, and that “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)

states that an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or

that it may vacate the sentence and remand the case for resentencing when it clearly and

convincingly finds that the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Id. at ¶ 11.

       {¶ 12} Gwynne set forth “practical guidance” for consecutive-sentence review,

noting that the first step “is to ensure that the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) have

been made” as to “necessity and proportionality, as well as the third required finding under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c).” Id. at ¶ 25. In the absence of these findings, “the

appellate court must hold that the order of consecutive sentences is contrary to law and
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either modify the sentence or vacate it and remand the case for resentencing. * * *.” Id.

If the court determines that the necessary consecutive-sentence findings were made, it

“may then determine whether the record clearly and convincingly supports those findings.

* * *.” Id. at ¶ 26. If “one of the consecutive-sentence findings is found not to be

supported by the record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by R.C.

2953.08(G)(2), then the trial court's order of consecutive sentences must be either

modified or vacated by the appellate court. See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” Id.

       {¶ 13} According to Gwynne, an appellate court’s review of the findings and record

“is de novo with the ultimate inquiry being whether it clearly and convincingly finds—in

other words, has a firm conviction or belief—that the evidence in the record does not

support the consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.” Id. at ¶ 27. The

court noted that “the first core requirement is that there be some evidentiary support in

the record for the consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.” Id. at ¶ 28.

“The second requirement is that whatever evidentiary basis there is, that it be adequate

to fully support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings.         This requires the

appellate court to focus on both the quantity and quality of the evidence in the record that

either supports or contradicts the consecutive-sentence findings.” Id. at ¶ 29. Under

the de novo standard, an appellate court is “authorized to substitute its judgment for the

trial court's judgment if the appellate court has a firm conviction or belief, after reviewing

the entire record, that the evidence does not support the specific findings made by the

trial court to impose consecutive sentences.” Id.

       {¶ 14} The Supreme Court concluded that “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires trial courts
                                                                                        -8-

to consider the overall number of consecutive sentences and the aggregate sentence to

be imposed when making the necessity and proportionality findings required for the

imposition of consecutive sentences.” Id. at ¶ 31. Finally, Gwynne held that “appellate

review of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not require deference

to the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).” Id.

       {¶ 15} Pursuant to our de novo review of Palmer’s sentences for the felonies, we

conclude that the trial court made the necessary consecutive-sentence findings under

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). We cannot conclude that the record clearly and convincingly does

not support the findings as they pertain to the court’s order on each count. There was

evidentiary support for the court’s finding that Palmer’s history of criminal conduct

demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from

future crime by him. As the trial court noted, and as reflected in the PSI, Palmer had two

prior OVI convictions, one in 2018 and one in 1999. The PSI stated that he also had

almost 20 prior traffic convictions, including speeding, driving under suspension, and

assured clear distance.

       {¶ 16} Further, Palmer was initially charged with a felony of the second degree,

with a specification for driving under suspension. The PSI stated that the victim’s back

was “broken in several different places,” that Palmer reported abusing alcohol, marijuana,

and cocaine, and that he had last used those substances on January 23, 2022, the date

of the collision. The PSI stated that at the time of the collision, Palmer and the victim

were both northbound on State Route 571, and Palmer “drove directly into the rear of the

other vehicle” at high rate of speed, displacing the axle.     The PSI listed additional
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offenses for which Palmer had been cited, including test refusal with prior OVI, driving

without a valid license, driving under a 12-point license suspension, and assured clear

distance. After reviewing the entire record, and in the absence of a firm conviction or

belief that the evidence did not support the court’s specific finding, pursuant to R.C.

2929.14(C)(4)(c), to impose consecutive sentences, we agree with the State that the

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences for the felonies was appropriate.               The

sentences were also within the statutory range.

       {¶ 17} Regarding Palmer’s six-month consecutive sentence for OVI, we note that

R.C. 2929.24 governs misdemeanor jail terms and provides that “the court shall impose

a definite jail term that shall be one of the following: (1) For a misdemeanor of the first

degree, not more than one hundred eighty days.”

       {¶ 18} R.C. 2929.41 governs multiple sentences. It provides:

       (A) * * * Except as provided in division (B)(3) of this section, a jail term or

       sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently

       with a prison term or sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state

       or federal correctional institution.

       (B) * * *

       ***

       (3) A jail term or sentence of imprisonment imposed for a misdemeanor

       violation of section * * * 4511.19 of the Revised Code shall be served

       consecutively to a prison term that is imposed for a felony violation of

       section * * * 2903.08 * * * when the trial court specifies that it is to be served
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       consecutively.

              When consecutive jail terms or sentences of imprisonment and

       prison terms are imposed for one or more misdemeanors and one or more

       felonies under this division, the term to be served is the aggregate of the

       consecutive terms imposed, and the offender shall serve all terms imposed

       for a felony before serving any term imposed for a misdemeanor.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 19} In State v. Schidecker, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26334, 2015-Ohio-1400,

¶ 46, this Court found that the statute “gives the trial court discretion to determine whether

the misdemeanor term should be served consecutively,” and that R.C. 2929.41(B)(3)

“permits, but does not require the trial court to impose consecutive sentences.” Id.

       {¶ 20} We conclude that the trial court erred in ordering Palmer to serve his jail

term prior to his felony sentences and also in determining, pursuant to R.C.

2929.41(B)(3), that it was required to impose the OVI sentence consecutively to the

vehicular assault sentence. The trial court must reconsider whether the misdemeanor

sentence should run concurrently or consecutively, exercising its discretion in making this

determination.

       {¶ 21} Although not raised by the parties, we further note that the trial court failed

to “specify the total number of days” of jail time credit awarded to Palmer, and he was not

given the opportunity to be heard on the issue of jail-time credit. R.C. 2949.08(B); R.C.

2967.191; Ohio Adm.Code 5120-2-04.            The court is ordered to give Palmer an

opportunity to be heard on this issue and to file a new judgment entry properly imposing
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the number of days of jail-time credit.

               III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 22} Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part,

reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. With respect to the OVI, the trial court

is ordered to determine whether the jail sentence for that offense should be served

concurrently with or consecutively to the prison sentences imposed on the other offenses.

The trial court is also instructed to give Palmer an opportunity to be heard on the issue of

jail-time credit and to file a judgment entry that reflects the correct number of days of jail

time credit.

                                      .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.