Court Opinion

ID: 9392549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 14:05:51.098298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.542505
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0617-MR

DAVID W. MOSLEY                                                                APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE ROBERT V. COSTANZO, JUDGE
   ACTION NOS. 16-CR-00191, 16-CR-00314, 16-CR-00361, 17-CR-00074,
                  18-CR-00447, AND 18-CR-00570

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY1                                                         APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

1
  We note the pro se appellant’s error in naming “Lisa Fugate, Coomonwealth [sic] Atty, Bell
County” as the appellee in the fill-in-the-blank form notice of appeal he used, but we are keeping
the Commonwealth of Kentucky as the named party per Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure
2(A)(2), which directs that “all parties to the proceedings from which the appeal is taken, except
those who have been dismissed in an earlier final and appealable order, shall be parties before
the appellate court.”
ECKERLE, JUDGE: David W. Mosley committed over a dozen crimes, including

assault, escape, and trafficking in controlled substances, on at least six separate

days during a two-year period. For these crimes, he received six separate

indictments with more than a dozen total charges, and, pursuant to negotiated

deals, he ultimately pleaded guilty to charges in each indictment, receiving an

agreed, total, 23-year prison sentence. He now claims his counsel’s assistance was

ineffective because he believes his sentence should have been capped at 20 years.

Because the 23-year sentence does not deviate from the statutory guidelines, and

because Mosley did not prove he would have otherwise rejected the plea offers and

proceeded to trial, we affirm the Trial Court’s Order denying Mosley’s post-

conviction motions.

                                  BACKGROUND

             Mosley was first sentenced to consecutive sentences totaling eight

years from four of the indictments. Almost six months later, he was sentenced to

consecutive sentences totaling 15 years of imprisonment under the remaining two

indictments. The sentences from each indictment were run consecutively to each

other for a total imprisonment sentence of 23 years. The indictments, their

charges, and resulting sentences are detailed below.

                                          -2-
      I.     Sentences entered on August 20, 2018

                On August 20, 2018, Mosley was sentenced on charges arising from

four indictments covering crimes that were committed on four separate days during

2016 and 2017. In the four separate sentences, Mosley received consecutive

sentences totaling eight years of imprisonment.

                In 16-CR-00191, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for a crime occurring on or about February 18, 2016. Mosley pleaded guilty on

September 26, 2017, to one count of possession of a controlled substance, first

degree, first offense (KRS2 218A.1415). On August 20, 2018, Mosley was

sentenced on this charge to imprisonment for one year, such sentence to run

consecutively to sentences imposed in indictment numbers 17-CR-00074, 16-CR-

00361, 16-CR-00314, 06-CR-00032, and 99-CR-00090.

                In 16-CR-00314, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for three crimes occurring on or about April 17, 2016. Mosley pleaded guilty on

September 26, 2017, to one count of possession of a controlled substance, first

degree, first offense (KRS 218A.1415), one count of possession of marijuana

(KRS 218A.1422), and one count of drug paraphernalia – buy/possess (KRS

218A.500). On August 20, 2018, Mosley was sentenced on these charges to a

total, concurrent sentence of imprisonment for one year, said sentence to be served

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         -3-
consecutively to sentences imposed in 17-CR-00074, 16-CR-00361, 16-CR-00191,

06-CR-00032, and 99-CR-00090.

             In 16-CR-00361, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for two crimes occurring on or about October 26, 2015. Mosley pleaded guilty on

September 26, 2017, to two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance, first

degree, second or greater offense (KRS 218A.1412). On August 20, 2018, Mosley

was sentenced on these charges to a total, concurrent sentence of imprisonment for

five years, said sentence to be served consecutively to sentences imposed in 17-

CR-00074, 16-CR-00314, 16-CR-00191, 06-CR-00032, and 99-CR-00090.

             In 17-CR-00074, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for two crimes occurring on or about November 25, 2016. Mosley pleaded guilty

on September 26, 2017, to one count of possession of a controlled substance, first

degree, first offense (KRS 218A.1415), and one count of drug paraphernalia –

buy/possess (KRS 218A.500). On August 20, 2018, Mosley was sentenced on

these charges to a combined, concurrent sentence of imprisonment for one year,

said sentence to be served consecutively to sentences imposed in 16-CR-00361,

16-CR-00314, 16-CR-00191, 06-CR-00032, and 99-CR-00090.

   II.   Sentences entered on February 28, 2019

             On February 28, 2019, Mosley was sentenced on charges arising from

two indictments covering crimes that were committed on two, separate days during

                                         -4-
2018. In the two separate sentences, Mosley received consecutive sentences

totaling 15 years of imprisonment, ten of which were due to an escape charge.

They are detailed below.

             In 18-CR-00447, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for seven crimes occurring on or about May 22, 2018. Mosley pleaded guilty on

February 22, 2019, to the following charges: being a convicted felon in possession

of a firearm (KRS 527.040); receiving stolen property (KRS 514.110); trafficking

in a controlled substance in the first degree, first offense, greater than 2 grams,

methamphetamine (KRS 218A.1412); trafficking in a controlled substance in the

second degree, first offense (KRS 218A.1413); trafficking in a controlled

substance in the third degree, first offense (KRS 218A.1414); trafficking in

marijuana, less than 8 ounces, first offense (KRS 218A.1421); and being a second-

degree persistent felony offender (“PFO”) (KRS 532.080). He was sentenced on

these charges on February 28, 2019, to a total, concurrent sentence of

imprisonment for five years, with all sentences to run consecutively to sentences

imposed in indictment numbers 18-CR-00570, 17-CR-00074, 16-CR-00361, 16-

CR-00314, 16-CR-00191, and 99-CR-00090.

             In 18-CR-00570, Mosley was indicted by the Bell County Grand Jury

for three crimes occurring on or about August 21, 2018. Mosley pleaded guilty on

February 22, 2019, to one count of third-degree assault (KRS 508.025), one count

                                          -5-
of escape in the first degree (KRS 520.020), and one count of being a second-

degree PFO (KRS 532.080). On February 28, 2019, Mosley was sentenced on

these charges to a total, concurrent sentence of imprisonment for ten years, said

sentence to be served consecutively to sentences imposed in 18-CR-00447, 17-CR-

00074, 16-CR-00361, 16-CR-00314, 16-CR-00191, 06-CR-00032, and 99-CR-

00090.

      III.   Post-conviction motion

                Mosley subsequently filed a motion and memorandum pursuant to

RCr3 11.42 in each of the six aforementioned indictments, claiming his counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when recommending Mosley enter guilty pleas in

all six indictments. Mosley claimed the statutory cap on his sentences should have

been 20 years total. Thus, he asserted his counsel’s performance was deficient in

recommending Mosley accept plea deals resulting in a 23-year sentence of

imprisonment.

                On April 20, 2022, the Trial Court entered a consolidated order in all

six indictments denying Mosley’s request for relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. The

Trial Court’s order found and held that “regardless of any potential deficiency on

counsel’s part, [Mosley] has not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to void the plea

or require an evidentiary hearing.” The Trial Court reviewed the guilty plea

3
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -6-
colloquy, the guilty plea documents, and the sentencing and found that nothing

“g[ave] rise to doubt regarding the voluntariness of the plea.” Mosley, pro se,

appealed this decision.

                                    ANALYSIS

              Specifically, Mosley claims that because his crimes were Class C and

D felonies, his total sentence should not have exceeded 20 years pursuant to KRS

532.080(6)(b) and KRS 532.110(1). His prayer for relief on appeal is that we

“correct the aggregated sentence to twenty (20) years[.]”

              The Commonwealth responds with alternative arguments to affirm the

Trial Court’s order. First, the Commonwealth asserts that no ineffective assistance

of counsel occurred because a 23-year sentence is permissible where the sentences

arise from different indictments. Second, the Commonwealth argues that the

aggregate sentence is permissible because some of the crimes, i.e., the actions

occurring while Mosley was awaiting trial and the escape charge, are statutorily

required to run consecutively, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel

occurred.

   I.       Standard of Review

              As Mosley’s claim is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel

in the context of a guilty plea, we evaluate under the standards iterated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984),

                                         -7-
and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 548 S.W.3d 881, 887 (Ky. 2018). Invalidating a

guilty plea based on allegedly deficient performance of defense counsel requires a

movant to prove both prongs of a two-part test: “(1) defense counsel’s

performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance;

and that (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the deficient performance

of counsel, the movant would not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on

going to trial.” Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Ky. 2016). Courts

evaluating these two prongs must “indulge the strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). Additionally, the Trial

Court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty plea,

evaluating whether errors by trial counsel significantly influenced the defendant’s

decision to plead guilty such that the Trial Court should have a reason to doubt the

voluntariness and validity of the plea. Rank, 494 S.W.3d at 481 (citing Bronk v.

Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001)).

   II.   Mosley’s counsel was not ineffective in recommending sentences that
         did not exceed the statutory limits.

             Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we hold that Mosley suffered

neither from deficient performance nor from prejudice because the sentences

imposed did not exceed that permitted by statute. Pursuant to KRS 532.110, a

                                         -8-
Trial Court may generally run multiple sentences for multiple crimes either

concurrently or consecutively, subject to certain exceptions. One of those

exceptions is that an aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms cannot exceed a

certain cap, being the longest extended term authorized by KRS 532.080 for the

highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed. In Mosley’s

case, if all of the indictments were read together, and given the second-degree PFO

and multiple Class D and C felony convictions, KRS 532.080(5) would cap his

imprisonment sentence at no more than 20 years.

             That is not the end of our analysis, though, because Mosley’s

sentences resulted from multiple indictments arising from disparate, criminal acts

occurring on distinct dates. KRS 532.110’s statutory cap from “multiple

sentences” has been held to “not extend to sentences resulting from previous

cases.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Ky. 2018). Where a

sentence “resulted from a previous indictment and trial[,]” KRS 532.110’s

maximum sentence provision does not operate as bar against running a subsequent

sentence consecutively. Johnson, 553 S.W.3d at 220.

             Here, Mosley was facing almost 20 charges stemming from criminal

acts occurring on at least six different days over a period of two years. Those

charges ranged from misdemeanors to Class C felonies and included an assault, an

escape, and multiple narcotics trafficking and possession offenses. Mosley

                                         -9-
accepted separate plea deals and entered guilty pleas in each of the indictments.

He received separate sentencings in each case, and Mosley even brought this post-

conviction claim in each of the six separate indictments. It would appear on the

face of the record that the sentences resulted from previous indictments and guilty

pleas, thus making KRS 532.110’s maximum sentence provision inapplicable.

             Our conclusion is further supported by a recent opinion of this Court

considering the prohibition of KRS 532.110 against running a term of years

sentence consecutively to a life sentence. Meadows v. Commonwealth, 648

S.W.3d 701 (Ky. App. 2022). There, a panel of this Court held that a “judgment

ordering a term of years to run consecutively with a life sentence is not invalid if

rendered in a prior, separate case.” Meadows, 648 S.W.3d at 706 (citing Clay v.

Commonwealth, No. 2009-SC-00012-MR, 2010 WL 2471862 (Ky. Jun. 17,

2010)). The Meadows Court noted that proper, consecutive sentences do not

depend on the order in which the sentences are rendered, “but rather on whether

the sentences are based on convictions arising from the same set of facts or

separate facts.” Id. In other words, provided “the indictments arose from separate

offenses and distinct crimes[,]” KRS 532.110’s maximum sentence provision

would not operate as a bar to aggregate sentences in the separate indictments.

Meadows, 648 S.W.3d at 706.

                                         -10-
             Mosley’s six indictments and resulting sentences fit within the

Meadows framework. Given the length of time between his offenses and the

disparate nature of many of the crimes, Mosley’s indictments arose from separate

offenses and distinct crimes. That Mosley committed separate offenses and

distinct crimes is further evidenced by the fact that it would have been improper

for Mosley to receive one trial for all of the charges. Pursuant to RCr 9.12, “The

court may order two (2) or more indictments or informations or both to be tried

together if the offenses . . . could have been joined in a single indictment or

information.” Joinder requires some nexus of temporal and qualitative

characteristics of the crimes themselves. See, e.g., Cargill v. Commonwealth, 528

S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1975) (“Under the rules the three robbery charges could have

been included in the same trial since they were similar in character and were

closely related in time. There is no connection between the drug charge and the

robbery charges so as to warrant a joinder of offenses.”). See also RCr 6.18

(noting two or more offenses may be charged on the same indictment if the

offenses are “of the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or

transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or

plan”).

             In Mosley’s case, while he had some drug crimes that were of similar

character, they occurred over a two-year time span and included multiple unrelated

                                         -11-
offenses, including an escape and assault. Accordingly, as separate trials were

needed on the various indictments, any resulting sentences could run consecutively

for more than 20 total years. Thus, counsel’s performance was not deficient in

negotiating plea deals that in aggregate exceeded 20 years.

             Moreover, we further hold that counsel’s performance was not

deficient because two other sentencing provisions mandated that 15 years of the

23-year aggregate sentence be served consecutively. First, the five-year sentence

Mosley received in 18-CR-00447 was required to run consecutively to the

aggregate eight-year sentences he received in the 2016- and 2017-issued

indictments. The 18-CR-00447 indictment arose from acts that occurred on May

22, 2018, which would have been after Mosley was indicted in the 2016 and 2017

indictments after Mosley entered guilty pleas in those indictments and before he

was sentenced on those indictments on August 20, 2018. KRS 533.060(3) requires

sentences for crimes committed while “awaiting trial” be imposed consecutively.

That phrase “awaiting trial” has been interpreted to include the period of time

between a guilty plea and final sentencing. Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d

56 (Ky. 2004). Here, Mosley entered his guilty pleas on the 2016 and 2017

indictments on September 26, 2017. He committed the crimes in 18-CR-00447 on

or about May 22, 2018. He was formally sentenced in the 2016 and 2017

indictments on August 20, 2018. Thus, Mosley committed the crimes in 18-CR-

                                        -12-
00446 while “awaiting trial,” and his five-year sentence in 18-CR-00447 must run

consecutively to his sentences in the 2016 and 2017 indictments.

              Additionally, the sentence for escape had to run consecutively to the

other sentences that Mosley was serving. KRS 532.110(3) (“The sentence imposed

upon any person convicted of an escape or attempted escape offense shall run

consecutively with any other sentence which the defendant must serve.”). This

requirement of consecutive sentencing applies “even if it results in an aggregate

sentence of more than twenty years.” King v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 281,

297 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis in original) (referencing the 20-year cap for first-degree

PFO in KRS 532.080(6)(b)).4

              Thus, even if, arguendo, an aggregate, 20-year cap applied to all six

indictments, no deficient performance existed because the sentence for the escape

could not cause Mosley to exceed the statutory cap. Removing the ten-year

sentence for the escape, Mosley received a total imprisonment sentence of 13 years

(8 years for the 2016 and 2017 indictments, and 5 years for the remaining 2018

indictment), some seven years less than the 20-year cap. As Mosley’s sentences

did not in aggregate violate the statutory maximum, Mosley’s counsel’s advice to

accept the plea deals did not constitute deficient performance.

4
  The relevant aggregate sentence caps for a second-degree PFO are 20 years for a Class C
felony, and 10 years for a Class D felony. Compare KRS 532.060(2) and KRS 532.080(5).

                                             -13-
      III.   Mosley has not proven prejudice.

                Though we hold that counsel’s performance was not deficient, we also

agree with the Trial Court that any alleged deficiency did not result in reversible

prejudice. “In the guilty plea context, to establish prejudice the challenger must

‘demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Commonwealth v.

Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Ky. 2012) (some internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 129, 131 S. Ct. 733, 178 L. Ed.

2d 649 (2011), and Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S. Ct. at 370).

                Here, Mosley does not even cite Strickland prejudice on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Indeed, he does not assert that he would

not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. He instead asks

us to “order” the Trial Court to “correct” the aggregate sentence to 20 years instead

of 23. Mosley’s request, then, is that we find the sentence was unlawful and void,

a claim that should be raised separately in a CR5 60.02 motion, see, e.g., Phon v.

Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284, 304 (Ky. 2018) (“It is because these sentences

are void and unlawful that CR 60.02 provides the proper remedy for relief.”), and

Duncan v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 84 (Ky. App. 2021) (CR 60.02(e)), or on

5
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                          -14-
direct appeal, see, e.g., McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky.

2010).

             Moreover, as has been shown, Mosley’s sentence was not unlawful

and void, and thus Mosley was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s

recommendation to enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, Mosley’s RCr 11.42

ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails in toto.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Mosley’s counsel’s performance was not deficient, and Mosley has

not demonstrated any alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice such that he would

not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Having failed

both prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we AFFIRM the Trial

Court’s order denying the RCr 11.42 motion.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 David W. Mosley, pro se                    Daniel Cameron
 Wheelwright, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Christopher Henry
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -15-