Court Opinion

ID: 9494904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:49:36.992248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:41.560266
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Instead of deciding this appeal on the basis on which it reaches us — that is, whether to sustain the jury verdict that stainless steel and aluminum are equivalent substrates for copper foil laminates— my colleagues launch yet another assault on the doctrine of equivalents. The court today holds that there is no access to equivalency for any subject matter that is disclosed in a patent specification but not claimed. Thus the court establishes a new absolute bar to equivalency, a bar that applies when there is no prosecution history estoppel, no prior art, no disclaimer, no abandonment.
The court overrules not only its own decisions but also those of the Supreme Court, and reaches out to create a new, unnecessary and often unjust, per se rule. This decision jettisons even the possibility of relief when relief is warranted, and further distorts the long-established balance of policies that undergird patent-supported industrial innovation. It is self-evident that the placement of an increasing number of pitfalls in the path of patentees serves only as a deterrent to innovation. Before taking so deliberate a step, the court should at least consider the consequences. For example, the adverse effect on the disclosure of information in patents — an immediate and foreseeable result of this ruling — has not been recognized by any of my colleagues, despite the fervid warnings of the bar.
Even were this court expert in its understanding of technology policy and innovation economics, we have no authority to change the precedent that binds us. This en banc court has placed itself in egregious conflict with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097, 85 USPQ 328 (1950) and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146, 41 USPQ2d 1865 (1997). The Federal Circuit is no less subject to stare decisis than is any other court of appeals. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (the courts of appeals should “leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”). Shrugging off this obligation, my intrepid colleagues adopt the position of the dissenters in Graver Tank. I must, respectfully, dissent.

Stare Decisis and Supreme Court Precedent

In Graver Tank the Court considered the doctrine of equivalents and reiterated its century-old holding that “the essence of the doctrine of equivalents is that one may not practice a fraud on the patent.” 339 U.S. at 608, 70 S.Ct. 854. The Court reviewed the history of the doctrine starting with Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 14 L.Ed. 717 (1853), as well as the function-way-result criteria established in Union Paper-Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 120, 125, 24 L.Ed. 935 (1877) and reiterated in Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 50 S.Ct. 9, 74 L.Ed. 147 (1929) (“generally speaking, one device is an infringement of another ‘if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result’ ”). The Graver Tank Court observed that the doctrine of equivalents “has been consistently applied by this Court and the lower federal courts, and continues today ready and available for utilization when the proper circumstances for its application arise,” id. at 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, and expressed concern *1065lest “the protection of the patent grant [be converted] into a hollow and useless thing.” Id. at 607, 70 S.Ct. 854.
The Court held in Graver Tank that equivalency was available as to the accused manganese silicate welding flux, which was disclosed in the specification but not claimed, and had been found by the district court to be equivalent in fact. The two dissenters took the position that because the manganese silicate flux was disclosed but not claimed it was dedicated to the public and not reachable under the doctrine of equivalents. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, wrote in dissent that “the function of claims under R.S. § 4888, as we have frequently reiterated, is to exclude from the patent monopoly field all that is not specifically claimed, whatever may appear in the specifications. See, e.g., Marconi Wireless Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 23, 63 S.Ct. 1393, 87 L.Ed. 1731, and cases there cited. Today the Court tacitly rejects those cases.” Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 614, 70 S.Ct. 854 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent, stating that the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter was public property: “Manganese silicate, the flux which is held to infringe, is not an alkaline earth metal silicate. It was disclosed in the application and then excluded from the claims. It therefore became public property.” Id. at 618, 70 S.Ct. 854 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Graver Tank Court, rejecting the dissenters’ position, held that the question of equivalency is to be decided “against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case,” 339 U.S. at 609, 70 S.Ct. 854, and stated that equivalency “in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula.” Id. The Court sustained the availability of equivalency of the manganese silicate flux, over the dissenters’ protestations that it was disclosed and not claimed and therefore public property.
The Court in Warner-Jenkinson reaffirmed Graver Tank, summarizing that “we considered the application of the doctrine of equivalents to an accused chemical composition for use in welding that differed from the patented welding material by the substitution of one chemical element.” 520 U.S. at 24, 117 S.Ct. 1040. The Warner-Jenkinson Court made clear that the Graver Tank Court had declined to adopt the arguments of the dissent. Id. at 26 and n. 3, 117 S.Ct. 1040. Perhaps recognizing that Graver Tank is a powerful obstacle to this court’s new per se rule, my colleagues propose various gambits to distinguish Graver Tank. The per curiam opinion proposes that the inclusion of manganese silicate in invalid claims was critical to the decision in Graver Tank, although neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions mentioned it. My colleagues thus take the curious position that the inclusion of disclosed subject matter in invalid claims renders that subject matter available for equivalency, but that otherwise the subject matter is barred from equivalency. That is not, of course, the holding of Graver Tank.
This court’s new rule contravenes not only Graver Tank but also Warner-Jenkinson. The Court in Warner-Jenkinson was presented with the defendant’s argument that access to the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to subject matter that is actually disclosed in the patent. The Court held that “rejecting the [argument that equivalency is limited to known equivalents] necessarily rejects the more severe proposition that equivalents must not only be known, but must also be actually disclosed in the patent in order for such equivalents to infringe upon the patent.” 520 U.S. at 37, 117 S.Ct. 1040. Thus the Court explicitly recognized that *1066equivalents that are actually disclosed in the patent can infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. The obligation of the lower courts is to adhere to the law as it is announced by the Supreme Court, and in keeping with the Court’s stated purposes. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that this court is “strictly bound” to adhere to Supreme Court precedent); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (“any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification”).
The facts of the Johnston patent here in suit do not differ from those of Graver Tank in any discernible way. The nature of the disclosure of manganese silicate in the patent in Graver Tank is not distinguishable from the nature of the disclosure of stainless steel in the Johnston patent. In the patent in Graver Tank the manganese silicate was disclosed in the specification as follows:
We have used calcium silicate and silicates of sodium, barium, iron, manganese, cobalt, magnesium, nickel and aluminum, both in binary and tertiary combinations, in various proportions. We have also used calcium titanate and various titano-silieates, these being used when it is desirable to introduce titanium into the weld metal. While a number of these conductive welding compositions are more or less efficacious in our process, we prefer to use silicates of the alkaline earth metals, such as calcium silicate, ...
Linde Air Products Patent No. 2,043,960, col. 3, lines 62-73. The only claims before the Court were for the silicates of the alkaline earth metals. There was no claim for manganese silicate; manganese is not an alkaline earth metal. The Court held that infringement by manganese silicate could be reached under the doctrine of equivalents, subject to findings of the trier of fact as to equivalency.
In the Johnston patent the stainless steel substrate was disclosed in the specification as follows:
While aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys may be used. In some instances, such as in laminating plastic credit cards, polypropylene can be used.
Johnston Patent No. 5,153,050, col. 5, lines 5-9. The only claims before the court were for the aluminum metal substrate. There was no claim for the stainless steel substrate. The district court held that infringement by the stainless steel substrate could be reached under the doctrine of equivalents, subject to findings of the trier of fact as to equivalency.
Graver Tank states that equivalency “must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case.” 339 U.S. at 609, 70 S.Ct. 854. Binding precedent thus excludes a per se bar to equivalency simply because stainless steel was disclosed in the specification. Our obligation is to apply the Court’s precedent, and to do so with fidelity to the Court’s meaning. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (per curiam) (“But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”). This court’s adoption of the position of the dissents in Graver Tank is, simply, improper.
*1067The court states that “the patentee’s subjective intent is irrelevant in determining whether unclaimed subject matter has been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public.” Per curiam op. n. 1. I agree that subjective intent is not relevant to what is actually disclosed. However, objective evidence of intent to dedicate is relevant to the question of dedication. It is not disputed that Johnston filed two continuing applications with claims to the stainless steel substrate. Johnston’s U.S. Patent No. 5,725,937 claims the stainless steel explicitly;1 for example:
1. A component for use in manufacturing articles such as printed circuit boards comprising:
a laminate constructed of a sheet of copper foil which, in a finished printed board, constitutes a functional element and a sheet of stainless steel which constitutes a discardable element; ...
This alone defeats an absolute bar that is based on a theory of dedication, for precedent holds that claiming of subject matter in a continuing application rebuts any inference that the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter was abandoned. In re Gibbs, 58 C.C.P.A. 901, 437 F.2d 486, 494, 168 USPQ 578, 582 (CCPA 1971). This aspect of the court’s decision appears to raise a further conflict with precedent.

Federal Circuit Cases Contrary to Today’s Decision

In addition to denying the precedent of the Supreme Court, this court en banc impeaches several of its own prior decisions, for equivalency has routinely been deemed applicable to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter. To reach this policy-driven result the court juxtaposes two extreme factual situations of disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, exemplified by Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 USPQ2d 1001 (Fed.Cir.1996) and YBM Magnex Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 145 F.3d 1317, 46 USPQ2d 1843 (Fed.Cir.1998), and holds that the facts are irrelevant and equivalency is never available. Thus the court holds that despite the extreme diversity of factual situations that arise in technical disclosures and in claiming practices, access to equivalency will always be barred for disclosed subject matter. Such a heavy-handed approach removes from the courts and parties the opportunity and right to review of the merits of individual cases in dispute.
Per se legal rules are appropriate only when the policy is so clear and the outcome so inevitable that a blanket rule is a reasonable shortcut. See Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977) (per se rules require “broad generalizations” and reflect the judgment that while some situations may fall outside the generalization they “are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them”). Today’s per se rule is not of that class. It simply avoids the court’s obligation to reach considered decisions on the merits, by holding that equivalency is unavailable whatever the facts. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999) (stating that “[tjhese variables are not the stuff of a per se rule” in declining to classify disease as a per se disability due to the potential for differing fact scenarios). Similarly, the diversity of technological situations in patents requires a more sensitive legal framework than the bludgeon of a per se rule.
*1068Absent a per se rule, the facts of Maxwell v. Baker and YBM Magnex could indeed be resolved to reach divergent results under the existing law. In Maxwell v. Baker the patentee had fully described and enabled two distinct methods of attaching a pair of shoes. Only one method was claimed; the accused infringer used the other. This court held that equivalency was not available to reach the unclaimed method, reasoning that a patentee can not choose to claim only one of two distinct and fully disclosed inventions, thereby avoiding examination of the other, and then later grasp the unclaimed invention as an equivalent of the first. The court held that the patentee had dedicated the unclaimed method to the public, and could not resort to the doctrine of equivalents. On the facts of that case, this was a reasonable decision.
In contrast, in YBM Magnex the unclaimed magnet compositions differed from those that were claimed solely by the amount of one of the components of the composition. The specification described iron-neodymium-boron magnetic alloys containing oxygen, illustrated the effect of oxygen on magnet stability, and claimed the alloys with the optimum oxygen range. The accused magnets were made of the same alloys but the amount of oxygen was below the optimum range. The amount of oxygen was the only difference between the claimed and the accused magnets. The court held that access to the doctrine of equivalents was not barred, distinguishing Maxwell v. Baker as directed to a different kind of factual situation, and explaining that Supreme Court precedent “does not permit the blanket rule that everything disclosed but not claimed is barred from access to the doctrine of equivalents, whatever the facts, circumstances, and evidence.” YBM Magnex, 145 F.3d at 1320, 46 USPQ2d at 1846. The en banc court today replaces this holding with a per se bar to equivalency, eliminating the opportunity for consideration of the facts, circumstances, and evidence.2
Application to the facts of YBM Magnex illustrates the court’s new rule. The claimed and unclaimed subject matter appear in the following Figure from the patent in suit. The Figure is a graph showing the effect of variation in the oxygen content on the stability of the iron-neodymium-boron magnets:
*1069[[Image here]]
The patentee claimed the range of oxygen content represented in the segment of the graph designated “Excellent Resistance” at the top of the curve; the claims are for an oxygen content of 0.6 to 3.6 weight percent (claimed as 6,000 to 35,000 ppm). The accused iron-neodymium-boron magnets contained the claimed proportions of the same metallic elements, but they had oxygen contents ranging from 0.545 to 0.6 weight percent. The oxygen content of the accused magnets was within or very close to the “excellent resistance” part of the curve, although those below 0.6 weight percent were outside of the literal scope of the claims. Today’s per se rule would preclude the assertion of equivalency against the magnets with an oxygen content below 0.6 weight percent, solely because such content was disclosed in the specification. Issues of estoppel, prior art, dedication, or abandonment, have become irrelevant; disclosure alone is an absolute bar to access to the doctrine of equivalents.
Patentees often must draw lines in order to claim their invention with specificity. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (the claims must “particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”) The establishment of a per se rule so heavily weighted against disclosure is not only inappropriately simplistic, but is contrary to the policy of the patent law. It may be that the data for magnetic alloy oxygen contents outside of the optimum range is only of scientific interest. I do not know its scientific value to students of magnetism, but I can think of no value whatsoever of designing a patent law that fosters its withholding.
There is extensive Federal Circuit precedent where the accused infringing device *1070or composition was within the disclosure. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540, 1544, 19 USPQ2d 1432, 1436 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“the patent specification teaches that a device otherwise satisfying the claim limitations works in the same manner, but not as efficiently, if it is of a different height or positioned differently”); Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 877, 27 USPQ2d 1123, 1128 (Fed.Cir.1993) (use of a separate cabinet was disclosed although the claims were limited to a single cabinet; equivalency was available); Pall Corporation v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220, 36 USPQ2d 1225, 1231 (Fed.Cir.1995) (the asserted equivalent polyamide resin was disclosed but not claimed); Modine Mfg. Co. v. International Trade Commission, 75 F.3d 1545, 37 USPQ2d 1609, 1615-16 (Fed.Cir.1996) (the asserted equivalent range was disclosed in the specification but not literally included in the claim). Heretofore, the breadth of the technical content in the specification did not entail legal consequences that would be unknowable until after examination and definition of the claimed invention.
In ostensible support of its position the per curiam opinion offers several citations to authority. However, most of the cases cited do not concern the doctrine of equivalents, but simply state that the claims establish the scope of the patented invention. That has always been the law, a law that has coexisted with the doctrine of equivalents. E.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 12 S.Ct 76, 35 L.Ed. 800 (1891) (no issue of equivalency; at issue were literal infringement and novelty); Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 62 S.Ct. 969, 86 L.Ed. 1332 (1942) (no issue of equivalency; invalidity due to improper addition of new claim elements); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 81 S.Ct. 599, 5 L.Ed.2d 592 (1961) (no issue of equivalency; question of contributory infringement); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1299, 24 USPQ2d 1138 (Fed.Cir.1992) (no issue of equivalency).
Of the two cited cases that do relate to the doctrine of equivalents, neither case supports a diselosed-but-not-claimed theory. In Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415, 28 S.Ct. 748, 52 L.Ed. 1122 (1908) the Court affirmed infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, stating that “the range of equivalents depends upon and varies with the degree of invention.” In SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123, 227 USPQ 577, 587 (Fed.Cir.1985) this court stated that “the law acknowledges that one may appropriate another’s patented contribution not only with a product precisely described in a patent claim (literal infringement) but also with a product that is not quite so described ... (doctrine of equivalents).” These cases provide no support for the per se rule now adopted.
The per curiam opinion’s only citations relating to disclosed but unclaimed subject matter, Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 26 L.Ed. 783 (1881) and Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 5 S.Ct. 174, 28 L.Ed. 665 (1884), concern reissue patent entitlement, not equivalency. Both cases relate to the availability of a broadening reissue after a prolonged period, sixteen years in Miller, four years in Mahn. In both cases the Court invoked laches, not dedication, to invalidate the reissue. Rulings on reissue laches are not authority for this court’s adoption of the Graver Tank dissent.
The new challenges and new burdens of today’s ruling are as unnecessary as they are ill-conceived. I take note that a colleague writes separately to propose that *1071today’s en banc rule is no more than resolution of a perceived conflict between two Federal Circuit opinions and the court’s preference for the earlier (Maxwell) over the later (YBM Magnex). However, no pre-Maxtvell case adopted a per se rule barring equivalency for all unclaimed disclosures, and Maxwell itself violated our rule of precedence. However, my concern is not with whether this court has authority to resolve perceived conflict among our own cases, for of course we can do so. My concern is that if this case is indeed viewed by my colleagues as no more than a quibble between two recent holdings, it shows the court’s lack of comprehension of the significance of its action.3
The public interest in fostering innovation and technological advance is not served by a judicial decision that imposes legal obstacles to the disclosure of scientific and technologic information. Information dissemination is a critical purpose of the patent system. By penalizing the inclusion of information in the specification the patent becomes less useful as a source of knowledge, and more a guarded legal contract.
No patentee deliberately chooses the doctrine of equivalents to protect commercial investment. Yet every patentee must guard against infringement at the edges of the invention. After today, whenever a patentee draws a line in a disclosed continuum, the copier who simply crosses the line can avoid even the charge of equivalency; a safe and cheap way to garner the successes of another. Each new pitfall for inventors simply diminishes the value of the patent incentive, and ultimately inhibits technological innovation. Concern for the effectiveness of the patent, system has always been a factor in innovation activity. A study by Wesley M. Cohen et al, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appro-priability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not), Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 7552, at 14 (2000), reported that in a 1994 survey of R & D managers 65% of the respondents cited the ease of avoiding patent claims as the main deterrent to patent-based investment in technology, and 47% also cited concern for disclosing technical information without adequate protection.
Discovery of and commercialization of new things is notoriously risk-laden, yet it is the inventor and the innovator, those whose ingenuity and ambition create new things while taking the risk of loss, who provide the basis of industrial advance and economic growth. See, e.g., Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer, International Finance Corp., Discussion Paper No. 19 (The World Bank, 1997) at 1 (80% of industry members surveyed considered patent strength a major consideration in allocating global research and development dollars); Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, /mo-*1072vation and Commercialization of Emerging Technology, 20-96 (1995) (discussing costs borne by the innovator).
The role of patent systems in the allocation of commercial resources is of ever-increasing economic importance, as technology dominates the economy. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Studies 247 (1994) (analyzing how creation of property rights in technology encourages investment in innovation); Symposium on Patents and Technology Licensing, 21 Rand J. Econ. 103 (1990) (investigating link between patent law, innovation, and economic development); see generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 Minn. L.Rev. 697, 699 (2001) (discussing relationships between patent systems and economic growth; collecting authorities).
A judicial change in the balance between innovator and imitator should not be made in disregard of the consequences. The neatness of a per se rule is not necessarily sound legal or economic policy. Nor is it sound judicial policy, for in addition to issues of commerce and technology-based industry, this case raises questions of fundamental fairness as to disputes that will now be excluded from judicial review. Fairness is the foundation of due process; it is superior to, not subordinate to, per se rules.

Decision of this Case

This appeal can be decided on the present law. It is unnecessary to create a new, absolute, and unchallengeable dedication of everything in the specification that is not included in the claims.
The Johnston specification states that the substrate serves as a disposable carrier for the copper foil, that aluminum is preferred, and that steel can be used. The specification also states that the nature of the substrate is not material to the invention. The factual question of equivalency was tried to a jury. On appellate review in accordance with the rules for review of jury verdicts, there was substantial evidence in support of the jury verdict. That is all that was appropriate to decision of this appeal.

. Johnston’s patents in which stainless steel is claimed had not issued during the pendency of most of this litigation.

. The court stresses that an advantage of its new rule is that the courts need not consider the equivalency of "more than that properly examined by the PTO.” Per curiam op. at 1055. The idea that the patentee can choose to avoid examination by refraining from claiming disclosed equivalent subject matter is contrary to the rules of patent examination. MPEP § 904.01(b) states:
All subject matter that is the patentable equivalent of the subject matter as defined in the claim even though specifically different from the definition in the claim, must be considered.
Disclosing without claiming simply enlarges the field of the examiner's search and citation of prior art, enlarging the prosecution history. It thus serves to generate estoppels, not to provide an opportunity to avoid examination.

. The amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law Association and American Bar Association state in strong terms their concern that inventors will restrict the technical content of patent specifications. Of course, avoiding the pitfalls of today’s per se rule will not be easy in view of the vicissitudes of patent examination — further illustrating the burden of this change in the law.
By resolution of the House of Delegates, the American Bar Association adopted the Section’s position that "a per se rule in this situation would be ill advised and would unnecessarily eliminate a scope of protection to which many patentees should be entitled. The preclusion of the doctrine of equivalents should be limited to those situations in which the patentee's failure to claim disclosed subject matter would indicate to the public that such subject matter was disclaimed or dedicated to the public.”