Court Opinion

ID: 9930643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 15:03:22.519019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:55.754113
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 7, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-757
                        Lower Tribunal No. 18-166
                          ________________

                 Mishelle Addys Perdomo Vindel,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          Scott Aron Stewart,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria Elena
Verde, Judge.

     Lisa A. Baird, P.A., and Lisa A. Baird, for appellant.

     Sandy T. Fox, P.A., and Sandy T. Fox, for appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     EMAS, J.
      INTRODUCTION

      Mishelle Addys Perdomo, the Former Wife, appeals the trial court’s

final judgment, contending the trial court erred in (1) permitting the

introduction of Honduran bank account records because they were not

properly authenticated by the bank’s records custodian; (2) relying on such

bank records to conclude that the funds in those accounts constituted marital

assets subject to equitable distribution; (3) denying the Former Wife’s

request for prejudgment interest on the equitable distribution of funds owed

to the Former Wife from the date of filing in 2018 to the date the funds were

actually paid in 2021 and 2022; and (4) denying the Former Wife’s request

for attorney’s fees and costs without making findings regarding the parties’

need and ability to pay.

      Because the trial court erred in admitting the Honduran bank account

records into evidence without proper authentication, and in relying upon

those records in making its equitable distribution determinations, we reverse.

We further reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest, given the

stated basis for that denial, and, finally, we hold the trial court erred in

denying attorney’s fees and costs to the Former Wife without making the

requisite findings under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2021). We remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      2
      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Mishelle Addys Perdomo (Former Wife) and Scott Aron Stewart

(Former Husband) were married in 2012. They had no children. The Former

Husband filed for dissolution of marriage in January 2018 and the parties

were divorced by a bifurcated final judgment in September 2018. That

judgment dissolved the marriage, awarded the Former Wife an advance

equitable distribution of $47,500, and retained jurisdiction over all remaining

financial issues, including equitable distribution, alimony, attorney’s fees,

and costs.

      In 2021, the case proceeded to trial on the issue of equitable

distribution. One of the central questions was whether the Former Wife hid

marital assets in Banco Ficohsa Honduras, a bank located in Honduras.

Banco Ficohsa Honduras has an International Representative Office in Coral

Gables.

      Significant to the action below (and on appeal) was whether that local

office could serve as a proper custodian for account records located in

Honduras. In January 2020, the Former Husband served a subpoena duces

tecum on the International Representative’s Office in Coral Gables, seeking

to obtain bank records for the Honduran bank accounts in the name of the

Former Wife and the Former Wife’s sister, Evelyn Perdomo.

                                      3
      Within a month, the general manager of the local office replied that the

Coral Gables office was “an international representative office serving as

liaison” between Banco Ficohsa Honduras and its customers in the United

States; and that it submitted the Former Husband’s request to the “Head

Office in Honduras” which confirmed that the Former Wife and her sister do

hold personal bank accounts with Banco Ficohsa Honduras. Attached to

that reply was what purported to be the subject bank records, the local office

indicating that these were “authentic copies of both Ms. Mishelle’s and Ms.

Evelyn’s accounts . . . .”

      Equitable Distribution of the Former Husband’s Marital Assets

      The trial commenced on February 1, 2021. The day before trial, the

Former Husband filed 35 exhibits generally associated with the Former

Wife’s bank records from Banco Ficohsa Honduras. The Former Wife moved

to strike all exhibits provided and witnesses listed because they violated the

pretrial order and applicable rules. On the first day of trial, the trial court

heard argument on the Former Wife’s motion to strike, and generally agreed

with the Former Wife regarding the Former Husband’s last-minute attempt to

introduce and rely upon the bank records.

      Following a break to discuss the matter, the parties agreed to defer to

a future date that portion of the case relating to the Former Wife’s Honduran

                                      4
bank records and the funds in those accounts, and to proceed with trial on

the remaining issues relating to the Former Husband’s purported marital

assets. Upon conclusion of that portion of the trial, the trial court ordered the

Former Husband to disburse the Former Wife’s share of cash and funds in

an Ameriprise investment account, but to withhold the remaining assets of

$102,865 (held in a Capital One account) pending the outcome of the still-

pending equitable distribution of the Former Wife’s alleged Honduran bank

accounts, which purported to total approximately $100,000. The trial court

further reserved ruling on the Former Wife’s entitlement to prejudgment

interest.

      Equitable Distribution of Funds in the Former Wife’s Honduran
      Bank Accounts

      The trial court reset the remaining portion of the trial (on equitable

distribution of funds in the Former Wife’s Honduran bank accounts) to

commence four months later, on June 7, 2021. A month before that trial

date, the Former Husband issued a trial subpoena duces tecum to the

International Representative Office located in Coral Gables, in an attempt to

secure the appearance at trial of the “records custodian” to authenticate the

previously obtained bank records. The Former Husband also filed an

addendum to his pretrial catalog and witness list, disclosing this newly-

subpoenaed witness.

                                       5
      Thereafter, non-party Banco Ficohsa Honduras moved to quash the

subpoena on the ground that there is no records custodian at the

International Representative Office in Coral Gables; rather, the records

custodian is located in Honduras, where the bank itself, and the bank

records, are located.

      On the June 7 trial date, the trial court granted Banco Ficohsa

Honduras’ motion to quash the subpoena, determining the subpoena was

“unnecessary” given the supposed “authentication” and referencing the letter

from the local office stating that the attached records were “authentic”:

      If you have the documents and you have the certification of
      authenticity, then the gentleman doesn't have to appear in Court,
      because you have a certificate of authenticity. It's a moot issue.

      ...

      The documents are in fact -- that you have a certificate of
      authenticity from a records custodian, then they're coming in as
      business records. Okay. Okay, so your Motion is granted, and
      you may go.

      The trial court advised the Former Wife she could renew any objection

to the introduction of the bank records when the Former Husband sought

their admission at trial. At trial, when the Former Wife renewed her objection,

the trial court heard argument from the parties, overruled the objection, and

admitted the documents as business records:

                                      6
     Let me look at them. It says, “We hereby present you with
     copies of Ms. Mishelle’s and Ms. Evelyn’s accounts with
     transactional records pertaining to the requested dates in
     the subpoenas, as well as a print screen of our database
     search” – it doesn’t say the key language that these records are
     made and kept in the regular course of their business. I am going
     to be honest with you, Ms. Baird. The way I read the letter is that
     these are authentic copies of business records. That’s how I read
     it, because it doesn’t have to say business records. It says they
     are authentic copies of transactional records. A transactional
     record is a business record of the Bank, so I am going to allow
     the documents to come in. The documents have been properly
     translated.

(Emphasis added).

     Relevant to the issues presented, the Former Wife testified and denied

having any substantial assets in Honduras. However, she acknowledged that

Hands in Service—a non-profit organization based in Michigan with which

she used to be affiliated—utilized her Honduran bank accounts to receive

and distribute funds donated to specific Honduran charities. She maintained

that, while the account was in her name, the funds that had been in that

account (approximately $100,000) were not her funds. The Former Wife

further explained that any withdrawals from the account were made by her

sister to distribute to the intended charities in Honduras, as instructed by

Wayne Merz, the CEO of Hands in Service.

     Wayne Merz also testified, and his testimony was consistent with the

Former Wife’s testimony: Merz would wire transfer funds to the Former

                                     7
Wife’s Honduran bank account, and those funds would be used to pay for

Hands in Service projects.      The Former Wife or her sister would then

withdraw that money to distribute to local Honduran charities. Merz further

testified that the Former Wife and her sister were both volunteers, and

neither was paid for their work. Once the Former Wife married in 2012, she

no longer deposited or withdrew funds from the Honduran bank account

utilized by Hands In Service. Instead, her sister, who had signatory authority

on the account, took over this duty following the Former Wife’s marriage.

Mertz also identified which one of the Honduran bank accounts Hands In

Service utilized to send funds from the United States to Honduras. 1

      The Former Wife provided a proffer regarding what Evelyn Perdomo

(the Former Wife’s sister) would have testified to if present. The proffer was

consistent with the testimony of the Former Wife and Merz.

      At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court announced its finding that

the money in three of the four Honduran bank accounts were marital assets

the Former Wife sought to conceal from the Former Husband.

      The Former Wife moved to reopen the trial, again challenging the

introduction of the bank records due to the failure to provide a records

1
 The trial court, in its oral pronouncement and in the order on appeal, found
Merz’s testimony credible.

                                       8
custodian to properly authenticate them. She requested that the trial court

reopen the trial to hear from an actual records custodian who would explain

that “the same bank accounts have different account numbers due to

changes in the banking system utilized by Banco Ficohsa in Honduras; and

that the same sums were moved from one account to another but ultimately

withdrawn by the Former Wife’s sister, Evelyn.”        The Former Husband

objected, and the trial court denied the Former Wife’s motion.

      The trial court entered a supplemental final judgment of dissolution of

marriage, noting it admitted the Honduran bank records over the Former

Wife’s objection. It further found that there were four different bank accounts

in the Former Wife’s name at Banco Ficohsa Honduras existing on the date

the petition for dissolution was filed (January 3, 2018). Of those four

accounts, the following contained marital assets “not originating from Hands

In Service”: “$65,963.99 in account xx86 . . .; $40,978.09 in account [xx91] .

. .; and $1,028.32 in xx83.” It thus found that a total of $107,970.40 in the

wife’s Honduran bank accounts were marital assets subject to equitable

distribution.

      The trial court denied the Former Wife’s request for prejudgment

interest, finding that “it would be inequitable to charge the Former Husband

for delays largely occasioned by the pandemic.” The trial court also denied

                                      9
both parties’ request for attorney’s fees without making any finding on the

parties’ relative need and ability to pay.

      Based on these findings, the trial court ordered the Former Husband

to retain the funds in the Capital One account ($103,865) and the Former

Wife to retain the funds in the bank accounts at Banco Ficohsa Honduras

($107,970.40).

      This appeal followed.

      ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

      1. It was error to admit the records of Banco Ficohsa Honduras
         because they were not properly authenticated.

      “Evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Garcia, 254 So. 3d 565,

567 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). However, to the extent that such ruling is based

upon construction of a statute or rule, this court applies a de novo standard

of review. Id.

      The trial court found: “The Court reviewed a letter dated February 14,

2020, signed by the General Manager of the International Representative

Office in Coral Gables, and attached to the records and found it to be in

substantially similar form to a Records Custodian Affidavit.”

      The Former Wife contends that, instead of obtaining the bank records

from the bank’s records custodian in Honduras, the Former Husband

                                       10
obtained the records (and a letter stating the records were authentic copies)

from its International Representative (a non-records custodian) in Coral

Gables, Florida. While the Former Husband did subpoena Banco Ficohsa

Honduras, the Bank moved to quash that subpoena, asserting that the Coral

Gables office is not a proper custodian of the Bank’s records, and that these

records were the only evidence introduced in an effort to establish that

marital assets existed in Honduras.

      We conclude that the Former Wife’s contention has merit.

      We begin with an unremarkable proposition:

      Authentication or identification of evidence is required as a
      condition precedent to its admissibility. The requirements of this
      section are satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
      that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

§ 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2021).

      The trial court admitted the bank records under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule, section 90.803(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2021).

Under that rule, a party intending to offer such evidence may do so through

witness testimony from a records custodian or through a written certification

of authenticity:

      (a) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
      form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at
      or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person
      with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
      business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business

                                       11
        activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data
        compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
        other qualified witness, or as shown by a certification or
        declaration that complies with paragraph (c)[2] and s. 90.902(11),
        unless the sources of information or other circumstances show
        lack of trustworthiness.

§ 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2021).

        In the instant case, the Former Husband sought admission of the

foreign bank account records of Banco Ficohsa Honduras through a

certification of authenticity. Such certification must satisfy the requirements

set forth in section 90.902(11), Florida Statutes (2021), which generally

incorporates the evidentiary foundation for admission of business records

under section 90.803(6). Section 90.902(11) provides:

        Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to
        admissibility is not required for:
              …

        (11) An original or a duplicate of evidence that would be
        admissible under s. 90.803(6), which is maintained in a foreign
        country or domestic location and is accompanied by a
        certification or declaration from the custodian of the records or
        another qualified person certifying or declaring that the record:

2
    Section 90.803(6)(c) provides in pertinent part:

        A party intending to offer evidence under paragraph (a) by means
        of a certification or declaration shall serve reasonable written
        notice of that intention upon every other party and shall make the
        evidence available for inspection sufficiently in advance of its
        offer in evidence to provide to any other party a fair opportunity
        to challenge the admissibility of the evidence.

                                        12
      (a) Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters
      set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person having
      knowledge of those matters;

      (b) Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity;
      and

      (c) Was made as a regular practice in the course of the regularly
      conducted activity.

      Here, the manager for the International Representative Office in Coral

Gables provided the records, together with an introductory letter; it is this

letter which the trial court relied upon as the certification of authenticity

required under section 90.902(11). That letter provided, in its entirety:

      Reference is made to the Subpoena Duces Tecum Without
      Disposition dated on January 27th of the present year. In that
      regard, please observe the following statement:

      1. Banco Ficohsa International Representative Office, also
      known as Banco Ficohsa Corp., is licensed under the laws of the
      state of Florida to operate as an international representative
      office serving as liaison between Banco Financiera Comercial
      Hondurena, S.A. (Banco Ficohsa Honduras), a banking
      Institution organized according to the laws of Honduras, and its
      existing and prospective customers in the United States. As a
      representative office, Banco Ficohsa Corp. DOES NOT have
      permission to receive deposits of deposit-type liabilities in the
      United States or in any other U.S. territory.

      2. Banco Ficohsa Corp. is also NOT ALLOWED to engage in any
      activities relating to securities trading, foreign exchange, or
      money transmission services

      3. Considering the above, Banco Ficohsa Corp. submitted your
      request to its Head Office in Honduras and it has been confirmed

                                      13
     to us that Ms. Mishelle Addys Perdomo Vindel and Ms. Evelyn
     Waleska Perdomo Vindel DO HOLD personal [sic] with Banco
     Ficohsa Honduras, unlike Elusions Corporacion, legal entity who
     DOES NOT appear in our records.

     We hereby present you with authentic copies of both Ms.
     Mishelle’s and Ms. Evelyn’s accounts with transactional records
     pertaining to the requested dates in the subpoena, as well as a
     print screen of our database search for Elusions Corporacion in
     which you can observe the message “Query caused no records
     to be retrieved”.

(Emphasis added).

     While the letter purported to “authenticate” the records, it also (a)

acknowledged that the office is an International Representative Office of

Banco Ficohsa Honduras, without permission “to receive deposits or deposit-

type liabilities in the United States . . . .” and (b) explained that the Head

Office in Honduras confirmed that the wife and sister held personal accounts

in the Honduran bank. Moreover, the letter fails to:

     - certify or declare that the records “were made at or near the time of

        the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information

        transmitted by, a person having knowledge of those matters” (§

        90.902(11)(a));

     - certify or declare that the records were “kept in the course of the

        regularly conducted activity” of the foreign bank (§ 90.902(11)(b));

        or

                                     14
          - certify or declare that the records were “made as a regular

              practice in the course of the regularly conducted activity” of the

              bank (§ 90.902(11)(c)).

It is self-evident that this letter fails to meet the foundational requirements for

authentication of these foreign bank records.

       And given the similarity in the requirements contained in sections

90.902(11) and 90.803(6) (together with section 90.902’s incorporation of the

material requirements of 90.803(6)), decisions construing and applying

90.803(6) provide helpful guidance. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 211

So. 3d 87, 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding bank records were hearsay and

trial court erred in admitting them in absence of required certification or

declaration under section 90.803(6): “That section requires the certification

or declaration to state that the record sought to be admitted was made at or

near the time of the occurrence or from information transmitted by a person

with knowledge, was kept in the course of regularly conducted activity, and

was made as a regular practice in the course of the regularly conducted

activity.”)

       In the instant case, the letter not only fails to provide the requisite

certification or declaration, it indicates that the records were made and kept

by another office located in another country:

                                        15
      Considering the above, Banco Ficohsa Corp. submitted your
      request to its Head Office in Honduras and it has been confirmed
      to us that Ms. Mishelle Addys Perdomo Vindel and Ms. Evelyn
      Waleska Perdomo Vindel DO HOLD personal [sic] with Banco
      Ficohsa Honduras, unlike Elusions Corporacion, legal entities
      who DOES NOT appear in our records.

(Emphasis added).

      Banco Ficohsa Honduras reiterated this point in its motion to quash,

where it argued that its records custodian is located in Honduras, and that

there is no records custodian located in Coral Gables. In support of its

position, Banco Ficohsa Honduras relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s

decision in Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 2013). In Ulloa, the Court

considered (in the context of a criminal case) whether a party could compel

a nonparty foreign corporation to produce documents by serving the

corporation's registered agent in Florida. The Court concluded that “the

provisions of chapter 607 governing registered agents cannot be invoked to

obtain documents from a nonparty corporation, where the corporation and

the requested documents or materials are located out-of-state.” Id. at 925.

See also Kinsale Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 285 So. 3d 411, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA

2019) (“A Florida subpoena has no force outside the state, absent

compliance with another state's requirements for service of process. §

48.011, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“Summons, subpoenas, and other process in civil

actions run throughout the state; Quest Diagnostics Inc. v. Swaters, 94 So.

                                      16
3d 635, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding party seeking to serve subpoena

on nonparty in civil case required to comply with requirements for service of

process in state where no party was located).” Ulloa further supports the

Former Wife’s position that the trial court erred in allowing the bank records

into evidence.

      Because we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the bank records,

we also hold that this error requires reversal of the trial court’s determination

that the accounts in the Former Wife’s name at Banco Ficohsa Honduras

contained marital assets subject to equitable distribution, as there is no

competent substantial evidence to support such a determination. 3

      2. The trial court erred in declining to grant the Former Wife
         prejudgment interest in the equitable distribution award on the
         stated basis.

      Because we are reversing and remanding for further proceedings on

the question of equitable distribution of the Former Wife’s marital assets, we

also address the trial court’s order denying (or declining to award)

3
   Given our determination that the trial court erroneously admitted the bank
records, we do not reach the Former Wife’s alternative argument that, even
if the records were properly admitted, the trial court erred in concluding the
funds in those accounts were marital assets and that the records do not
support the trial court’s findings as to what amounts in each account
constituted marital funds.

                                       17
prejudgment interest to the Former Wife. The following timeline is relevant

to this issue:

         • In January 2018 the Former Husband filed for divorce.

         • In September 2018, the Former Wife received $47,500 in

            temporary attorney’s fees.

         • In February 2021, the Former Wife received $208,742.30 in

            equitable distribution.

         • In April 2022, the Former Wife received the balance of

            $57,922.70 in equitable distribution.

      The Former Wife posits that she had no access to a substantial portion

of her share of the marital assets for more than three years (January 2018

to February 2021) following the Former Husband’s filing of the petition for

dissolution in January 2018, and that the trial court should have granted her

request for prejudgment interest during this time.

      In denying the Former Wife’s request for prejudgment interest, the trial

court found “it would be inequitable to charge the Former Husband for delays

largely occasioned by the pandemic.” The Former Wife contends this stated

reason for denying prejudgment interest was erroneous, both factually and

legally. As to the factual error, the Former Wife argues that at least two of

the three years of “delay” (i.e., the period between January 2018 and March

                                      18
of 2020) could not have been occasioned by the pandemic, since the

shutdown resulting from the pandemic did not occur until March of 2020.

      As to the legal error, the Former Wife contends that the “cause” of the

delay is not relevant in determining whether to award prejudgment interest

in the context of equitable distribution of marital assets. We note, as a

general proposition, that the primary purpose of awarding prejudgment

interest is not to punish the Former Husband, but to compensate the Former

Wife for the loss of the use of funds during a time period in which she was

entitled to those funds. In Catalfumo v. Catalfumo, 704 So. 2d 1095 (Fla.

4th DCA 1997), the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s denial of

prejudgment interest on an equitable distribution award of over a million

dollars. In doing so, our sister court noted:

      The purpose of requiring payment of prejudgment interest is “to
      insure that equity be done between the parties.” Cotton v. Cotton,
      439 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d
      886 (Fla.1984).

      ...

      We agree with the reasoning expressed in Morris v. Morris, 724
      P.2d 527 (Alaska 1986), that awarding prejudgment interest “is
      not to penalize the losing party, but rather to compensate the
      successful claimant for losing the use of the money between the
      date he or she was entitled to it and the date of judgment. A
      corollary purpose is to prevent the judgment debtor from being
      unjustly enriched by the use of that money.” Id. at 529; see also
      Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212, 215
      (Fla.1985).

                                       19
     The record supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Catalfumo
     had the benefit and use of Mrs. Catalfumo's share of the assets
     for more than seven years. Under the facts of this case and the
     findings of the trial court, it would be inequitable for Mrs.
     Catalfumo to be denied prejudgment interest. We therefore hold
     that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to award
     prejudgment interest from the date of filing of the petition for
     dissolution.

Id. at 1099-1100.

     This court, in an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage

involving an equitable distribution award, relied upon this specific reasoning

in Catalfulmo. See Schuenzel v. Schuenzel, 320 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2021) (“The purpose of prejudgment interest is to make the plaintiff

whole from the date of the loss, to compensate him for losing the use of his

money during that period. Catalfumo, 704 So. 2d at 1100”).

     In the instant case, because the trial court’s stated reason for denying

the Former Wife’s motion for prejudgment interest (concluding “it would be

inequitable to charge the Former Husband for delays largely occasioned by

the pandemic”) is not supported by the competent substantial evidence and

fails to consider the primary purpose of an award of prejudgment interest, we

reverse and remand for the court to reconsider the Former Wife’s motion,

consistent with this opinion, and in light of our reversal of a portion of the

equitable distribution award.

                                     20
        In doing so, we caution however, that “[a] party in a divorce proceeding

is not ‘entitled’ to such interest in every case, because the trial court must

have broad discretion to determine the most equitable distribution of marital

property under the particular circumstances.” Mathers v. Brown, 21 So. 3d

834, 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (finding the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in awarding prejudgment interest) (quoting Morris, 724 P.2d at

529). See also 26 Fla. Jur 2d Family Law § 1198 (“A decision to award

prejudgment interest in a dissolution action is within the trial court's discretion

and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of such discretion.”) (citing

Mathers, 21 So. 3d 834).

        We also acknowledge that the First District recently held that a trial

court does not have the authority to award prejudgment interest as part of an

equitable distribution of marital assets because section 61.075, Florida

Statutes (governing the equitable distribution of marital assets in Florida)

“does not authorize prejudgment, or retroactive, interest.” Iarussi v. Iarussi,

353 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). 4

4
    Our sister court further observed:

        Though prejudgment interest is not mentioned in the statute,
        some Florida courts have read it in. The only court to discuss it
        in depth is the Fourth District, first in Catalfumo v. Catalfumo, 704
        So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

                                         21
      Because we are reversing the trial court’s order denying the Former

Wife’s request for prejudgment interest and remanding for further

proceedings (which will include the trial court’s reconsideration of the issue),

we need not formally address the apparent conflict between the decisions of

this court and our sister court in Iarussi. To the extent that our remand for

reconsideration is an implicit determination that the trial court has the

authority to award prejudgment interest in the first instance, we note conflict

with Iarussi. 5

      ...

      The purpose of equitable distribution is to distribute marital
      assets equitably, and does not deal in prior loss, entitlement, or
      unjust enrichment. There is no statutory authority to add
      prejudgment interest to an equitable distribution. The separation
      of married persons inevitably causes temporary distance
      between people and their property. But marital property, which is
      all that we deal with when discussing an equitable distribution, is
      owned by both parties. Carroll v. Carroll, 471 So. 2d 1358, 1361
      (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“Assets which are acquired during marriage
      are to be deemed as jointly owned assets and are to be equitably
      distributed.”); § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. Because they both jointly
      owned all of the marital assets subject to distribution, it
      necessarily follows that neither could have suffered a deprivation
      of property warranting prejudgment interest prior to entry of final
      judgment.

Iarussi v. Iarussi, 353 So. 3d 75, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)
5
  We further observe that the equitable distribution statute expressly
authorizes the trial court “to do equity” in determining the equitable
distribution of marital assets. § 61.075, Fla. Stat. (“In a proceeding for

                                      22
        3. The trial court erred in denying the Former Wife’s motion for
        attorney’s fees and costs without making the requisite findings.

        Throughout the proceedings, the Former Wife consistently sought

attorney’s fees based on the Former Husband’s greater ability to pay.

Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2022), requires that the trial court take

into consideration the parties' ability to pay when awarding attorney's fees

and costs. 6 Troike v. Troike, 271 So. 3d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

dissolution of marriage, . . . the court shall set apart to each spouse that
spouse's nonmarital assets and liabilities, and in distributing the marital
assets and liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the
premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification
for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors, including . . . [a]ny
other factors necessary to do equity and justice between the parties”); see,
e.g., Carollo v. Carollo, 920 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (“The trial court
possesses broad discretionary authority to do equity between the parties
when making financial awards in dissolution proceedings. Canakaris v.
Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)”). This authority would appear to
include—at the very least—the authority under appropriate circumstances to
award prejudgment interest where necessary to do equity. And the reason
offered by Iarussi for not permitting prejudgment interest—“Because they
both jointly owned all of the marital assets subject to distribution, it
necessarily follows that neither could have suffered a deprivation of property
warranting prejudgment interest prior to entry of final judgment,” see Iarussi,
353 So. 3d at 80—would appear to overlook the fact that, even if jointly
owned, it may well be that one spouse had taken steps to secure sole access
to and use of those marital assets, to the exclusion of the other spouse. The
fact that the asset may be jointly owned does not mean there could not be—
as a practical matter—a deprivation of access to and use of a marital asset,
thus warranting consideration of an award of prejudgment interest.
6
    Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2021) provides in relevant part:

        The court may from time to time, after considering the financial

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However, the trial court denied each parties’ request for attorney’s fees

without making any finding regarding their respective need and ability to pay.

The final judgment merely provides:

      Both parties' requests for an award of attorney's fees from the
      other are DENIED. Each party shall bear its own attorney's fees
      and costs.

      The trial court’s summary denial of the Former Wife’s motion for

attorney’s fees, without making any findings regarding the parties’ need and

ability to pay, is reversible error. Gudur v. Gudur, 277 So. 3d 687, 693 (Fla.

2d DCA 2019) (“As to attorney’s fees, the trial court ordered that ‘[e]ach party

shall pay his/her own attorney’s fees.’ The trial court cannot deny a request

for attorney’s fees under section 61.16 without making findings as to one

party’s ability to pay an award of fees and the other party’s need for the

payment of fees.”); Rawson v. Rawson, 264 So. 3d 325, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA

2019) (“Without making any findings as to the former wife’s need for fees

and the former husband’s ability to pay them, the trial court ruled only that

both parties were responsible for their own attorney’s fees. In simply denying

      resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable
      amount for attorney's fees, suit money, and the cost to the other
      party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this
      chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings
      and appeals.

                                      24
fees without further explanation, the trial court erred.”); Gaetani-Slade v.

Slade, 852 So. 2d 343, 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“[A] trial court cannot decide

the issue of attorney's fees without findings as to one spouse's ability to pay

fees and the other spouse's need to have fees paid.”) (quotation omitted);

Fulmer v. Fulmer, 961 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (reversing the

trial court's order denying request for attorney's fees and remanding case for

trial court to make findings in support of its decision because “the absence

of findings of fact regarding the parties' needs and ability to pay renders a

trial court's decision regarding attorneys' fees impossible to review”). 7 We

7
  We note that the Florida Supreme Court recently amended Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.530(a) and corresponding Florida Family Law Rule
12.530(a), adding a preservation requirement for a claim that the trial court
failed to include requisite findings in a final judgment. The amendatory
language of each rule now provides:

      To preserve for appeal a challenge to the sufficiency of a trial
      court's findings in the final judgment, a party must raise that issue
      in a motion for rehearing under this rule.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a); Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(a). However, the effective
date of this amendment was August 25, 2022. See In re Amendments to
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530 and Florida Family Law Rule of
Procedure 12.530, 346 So. 3d 1161 (Fla. 2022), and therefore did not apply
to the instant case, since the final judgment was filed April 4, 2022, and a
timely motion for rehearing would have been filed well before the effective
date of this amendment. See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(b) (providing that a
motion for rehearing “must be served not later than 15 days after . . . the date
of filing of the judgment in a non-jury action.”)

                                       25
therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the Former Wife’s

motion for attorney’s fees and costs.

      CONCLUSION

      Because the bank records of Banco Ficohsa Honduras were

unauthenticated and improperly introduced into evidence, we reverse that

portion of the final judgment regarding equitable distribution and remand for

a redetermination of equitable distribution without consideration of, or

reliance upon, those bank records. 8 We also reverse, for the reasons stated,

the trial court’s denial of the Former Wife’s request for prejudgment interest,

and the denial of the Former Wife’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs, and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

8
 See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Candelaria, 339 So. 3d 463,
471 n.9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[W]here the reversal is the result not of trial
court error, but a party's failure to meet its evidentiary burden, a remand to
allow for a “second bite of the apple” is generally not permitted; Levy v. Ben
Shmuel, 255 So. 3d 493, 497 n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (en banc) (noting that,
as a general rule, a party's failure to meet its evidentiary burden will not be
afforded a ‘second bite of the apple’ on remand following appeal, and
recognizing an exception where the party's failure to meet its burden was the
result of judicial error)”).

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