Court Opinion

ID: 9472350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:57:53.619577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:53.432953
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the district court, since the Secretary has a duty to implement 7 U.S.C. § 1981a. I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the Secretary has no duty to notify farmers of the deferral statute. In my view, the majority has misconstrued the legislative intent behind § 1981a.
The legislative intent as evidenced by Congress’ knowledge of existing law on the subject and the plain meaning of § 1981a reveals that personal notice is required. For example, as was noted in Curry v. Block, 541 F.Supp. 506, 523 (S.D.Ga.1982) it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended § 1981a to provide covered borrowers with personal notice, since “Congress knew that in enacting § 1981a it was using ‘comparable language’ to that found in the Rural Housing Act,” id. (citation omitted), which provides for personal notice. Consequently, in using such comparable language Congress provided for personal notice under § 1981a.
Congressional knowledge of the Rural Housing Act aside, it is clear from § 1981a’s plain meaning that Congress intended to provide personal notice. For example,
[T]he language of the statute expressly provides that the deferral mechanism is triggered “at the request of the borrower.” Further, no deferral relief will be forthcoming absent “a showing by the borrower that due to circumstances beyond the borrower’s control, the borrower is temporarily unable to continue making payments of such principal and interest when due without unduly impairing the standard of living of the borrower.” 7 U.S.C. § 1981a (emphasis added). Logically, the borrower is unable to request the deferral relief and show his eligibility to receive the same unless he has notice of the contents of § 1981a and an opportunity to be heard.
Id. at 522.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the Secretary has no duty to personally notify farmers under 7 U.S.C. § 1981a.