Court Opinion

ID: 9719774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:03:13.553128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.956399
License: Public Domain

Quirico, J.,
dissenting (with whom Reardon, J., joins). Qn September 1, 1976, a judge of the Superior Court entered a judgment ordering the defendant Secretary of the Commonwealth (Secretary) to place the names of Me*687Carthy and Stouffer (plaintiffs) “on the ballots being prepared for the November 2, 1976 elections as candidate [s] for the offices, respectively of President and Vice-President of the United States.” On September 14, 1976, the Chief Justice of the Appeals Court, sitting as a single justice, allowed the motion of the Secretary to stay that judgment pending final disposition of his appeal therefrom. On September 28, 1976, this court entered an order which (a) allowed the joint application of the parties for direct appellate review of the Secretary’s appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court, and (b) vacated the order of the Appeals Court staying the judgment of the Superior Court. Justice Reardon and I dissented from the order of this court.
The facts agreed on by the parties are set forth in detail in the court’s opinion in these cases. A skeletal outline of them sufficient for the purpose of this dissent follows. The plaintiffs desired to have their names appear on the ballot as independent candidates for the offices of President and Vice President in the 1976 general election. To qualify for a place on the ballot they were required by statute (G. L. c. 53, § 6) to file with the Secretary, on or before July 6, 1976, nomination papers bearing no less than 37,096 signatures of qualified voters certified by the registrars of voters of municipalities in the Commonwealth (G. L. c. 53, § 7). On July 6, 1976, they filed with the Secretary about 8,000 nomination papers bearing about 50,000 signatures but only 34,934 of which were certified by the registrars. Because the number of certified signatures on the nomination papers was 2,162 below the number required, the Secretary informed the plaintiffs on July 9, 1976, that their names would not be included on the ballot. Notwithstanding that deficiency in certified signatures, a judge of the Superior Court entered a judgment ordering the Secretary to include the names of the plaintiffs on the ballot. This court, by its order of September 28, 1976, in effect affirmed that judgment, and it has today issued an opinion “to explain the reasoning which led to [the] order and to answer the serious questions raised by [the plaintiffs] with respect *688to ballot access by independent candidates.” The purpose of my separate opinion is to state the reasons for my dissent from the order when it was entered.
It is my opinion that in all respects material to these cases the Legislature has mandated in detail, by clear and unambiguous language, the various steps and procedures to be followed by persons aspiring to have their names appear on the general ballot as independent candidates for the offices of President or Vice President of the United States, and the duties and responsibilities of the aspirants and of the various public officials in relation thereto. The Secretary is responsible for the first step which is to make nomination papers available to the aspirants. The aspirants are responsible for the next step which is to obtain signatures of voters on the nomination papers and to submit those papers to city or town registrars of voters for certification. The registrars are then responsible for certifying the signatures thereon. After such certification, the aspirants are responsible for the next step which is to file with the Secretary nomination papers containing the statutorily mandated minimum number (in this case 37,096) of certified signatures. The Secretary is responsible for the next step which is to place on the ballot for the general election the names of those aspirants who have filed nomination papers bearing the required number of certified signatures.
It is stipulated that the plaintiffs failed to fulfil their statutory responsibility to file with the Secretary a minimum of 37,096 certified signatures. This court seems to have concluded that the plaintiffs should be relieved of the fatal consequence flowing from that failure on the reasoning that it was due solely to the prior failure, neglect or refusal (herein referred to collectively as “failure”) of unidentified registrars of voters to certify many names appearing on nomination papers filed with them by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs named as defendants only the Secretary and one election official of the city of Boston, alleging that the latter was fairly representative of the class of registrars and clerks of all cities and towns in the *689Commonwealth. A motion for the certification of such a class was denied. With that single exception, no judicial proceedings have been brought against any registrars who allegedly failed to certify names on nomination papers.
The court has rescued the plaintiffs from their own failure to file the required number of certified signatures by reading into the election statutes something which is nowhere found therein or intended by the Legislature, i.e., a responsibility on the Secretary to review those signatures which were not certified by the registrars and, if they appear to be signatures of voters “substantially as registered,”1 then to include them in the number of certified signatures, unless the Secretary, as a defendant in an action brought against him but not against the registrars, can sustain the burden of proving that the registrars lawfully failed or refused to certify them. In thus construing *690the present statutes, the court has relieved the plaintiffs of the burden of proving irregularities which they allege were committed by local registrars of voters, and it has imposed the almost impossible burden of proving the contrary on the Secretary who had no part in committing the irregularities and has no responsibility for reviewing the acts of the registrars. I do not question the power of the Legislature to enact a statute to that effect, but I cannot agree that it has done so or that it intended to do so by any statute now in effect. I further do not agree that this court can or should bring about that result by judicial interpretation of the existing statutes.
I agree with the implicit holding by the court that alleged unlawful failure of local registrars of voters to certify proper voters’ signatures on nomination papers is judicially reviewable, and that an action under G. L. c. 56, § 59, is an appropriate proceeding by which to obtain such review notwithstanding the fact that historically such relief has commonly been sought by petitions for writs of mandamus or for writs of certiorari (see cases cited in n.10 of the court’s opinion in these cases).
However, I am not able to agree with the statement by the court that in a case such as this “[t]he only relief available ... is an order to the Secretary ... to place the candidate’s name on the ballot if his petitions were in fact in compliance with statutory requirements” even though lacking the required number of certified signatures. Neither am I able to agree with the further statement of the court that in a case such as this “the proper defendant... is the Secretary... and that the local registrars are not necessary parties.”
In short, today’s opinion would appear not only to constitute an unwarranted reading of our election laws, but also to place on the Secretary of the Commonwealth a legislatively unintended and unmanageable burden.

 The statement of agreed facts includes the following: “13. The plaintiffs have examined approximately sixty per cent of the non-certified signatures submitted on their petitions and none of those which were certified. They submit that... (2,547) signatures are certifiable but were not certified in the first instance. The defendants ... have examined the same documents and stipulate that... (2,470) signatures are substantially as registered, but not necessarily certifiable.” Those two figures were specifically agreed to relate to ten cities and towns other than Boston. In the judge’s purported “Findings of Facts, Rulings of Law and Order for Judgment,” he included verbatim the first sentence quoted in this footnote from the statement of agreed facts, but not the next two sentences. In lieu of those two sentences, he said: “At least 2,470 signatures of those examined are substantially as registered, and were certifiable in the first instance” (emphasis supplied).
It is open to serious doubt whether the judge had anything before him which permitted the conversion of the clear and unresolved disagreement of the parties on the question whether the uncertified signatures were certifiable into a purported express finding that the signatures in question were certifiable in the first instance. This doubt is of even greater dimensions by reason of the fact that the judge made no reference whatever in his decision to the following portion of the agreement of the parties: “14. In the City of Boston, plaintiffs examined ... (4,809) non-certified signatures and claim... (1,135) of those signatures were certifiable in the first instance.... The defendants concede that... (1,107) of those signatures are substantially as registered, but not necessarily certifiable.”
The situation described above raises grave doubts whether the plaintiffs would be entitled to any relief even if they had joined all of the registrars of voters as defendants, but that is not the primary basis of this dissent.