Court Opinion

ID: 9927081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 06:04:55.256166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:47.097720
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   January 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 360581
                                                                   St. Clair Circuit Court
MICHAEL CALVIN KNOL,                                               LC No. 21-000088-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant, Michael Knol, appeals as of right his sentences relating to two counts of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual contact with a
person under 13 years of age).1 Knol was sentenced to 43 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for
each count. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

                                       I. BASIC FACTS

        Knol, who was in a dating relationship with the victim’s mother at all relevant times,
sexually assaulted the victim when she was less than 13 years of age. The victim testified that in
2007, when she was six years old, Knol entered her bedroom at night and put his hands on her
thighs, arms, and “butt area.” In 2009, when she was eight years old, she woke up with Knol
touching her groin and the insides of her thighs with his hands. She recalled that he would also
crawl into her bed, remove her pants and underwear, and touch her “groin area” with his hands.
He would also rub his penis against her back. Following a jury trial, Knol was convicted of two
counts of CSC II. Because of his convictions, Knol is required to register as a sex offender under
the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., MCL 28.725(1); MCL
28.725(13); and submit to electronic monitoring once released from prison, MCL 750.520c(2)(b).

1
  Knol was acquitted of three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL
750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a person under 13 years of age).

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                            II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Knol argues that SORA’s requirement of lifetime registration constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment as prohibited by US Const, Am VIII, and cruel or unusual punishment as prohibited
by Const 1963, art 1, § 16. He also contends that MCL 750.520c(2)(b)’s requirement that he be
subjected to lifetime electronic monitoring after he is released from prison violates US Const, Am
VIII, and Const 1963, art 1, § 16, and amounts to an unreasonable search under US Const, Am IV,
and Const 1963, art 1, § 11. “Questions relating to statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.”
People v Malone, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 331903); slip op
at 4. We also review de novo constitutional questions. Id. “When interpreting a statute, the court’s
overriding goal is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent by examining the plainly expressed
language.” Id. “A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and courts will construe a statute as
constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is plainly apparent. The party challenging the statute’s
constitutionality has the burden of proving its invalidity.” Id. (citations omitted).

        A constitutional challenge to a statute “can be brought in one of two ways: by either a facial
challenge or an as-applied challenge.” People v Jarrell, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2023) (Docket No. 356070); slip op at 9. A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is
“a claim that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional on its face, in that there is no set of
circumstances under which the enactment is constitutionally valid.” People v Wilder, 307 Mich
App 546, 556; 861 NW2d 645 (2014). An as-applied challenge “alleges a present infringement or
denial of a specific right[,] or of a particular injury in process of actual execution of government
action.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                          B. ANALYSIS

                        1. MANDATORY LIFETIME REGISTRATION

        Knol’s CSC II convictions, which involved a victim less than 13 years of age, are Tier III
offenses. See MCL 28.722(v)(v). As a result, Knol is subject to the requirements of SORA,
including lifetime registration. MCL 28.725(1); MCL 28.725(13). On appeal, Knol argues that
the 2021 SORA’s requirements are unconstitutional both facially and as applied under the United
States Constitution, which forbids cruel and unusual punishment, US Const, Am VIII; and the
Michigan Constitution, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment, Const 1963, art 1, § 16. “As
a threshold matter, the constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment requires that
there first be a punishment imposed.” Jarrell, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 9 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). In People v Lymon, 342 Mich App 46, 78; 993 NW2d 24 (2022), this Court
concluded that the 2021 amendments to SORA promoted the traditional aim of punishment. The
Lymon Court did not address whether mandatory lifetime registration under SORA constituted
cruel or unusual punishment, but instead addressed whether the registration requirement was cruel
or unusual punishment when imposed for a crime that lacked a sexual component and was not
sexual in nature. Id. at 82. In light of the determination in Lymon that the 2021 SORA amendments
constitute punishment, Knol argues the lifetime registration requirement violates the Michigan
Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment.

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              To determine whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, courts assess
       whether it is “unjustifiably disproportionate” to the offense committed by
       considering four factors: (1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity
       of the offense, (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties
       imposed for other offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in
       Michigan compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and
       (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. [Id.]

“[T]he dominant test is the proportionality question, which is whether the punishment is so
excessive that it is completely unsuitable to the crime.” People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555; 873
NW2d 811 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted), rev’d in part on other grounds 499 Mich
879 (2016). “Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively
valid. In order to overcome the presumption that the sentence is proportionate, a defendant must
present unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate sentence
disproportionate.” People v Burkett, 337 Mich App 631, 637; 976 NW2d 864 (2021) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        Knol’s convictions stemmed from his relationship with the victim, who was less than 13
years of age at the time of the assaults. Knol, who was in a relationship with the victim’s mother
and lived in the same home as the victim, cultivated a relationship with the victim and acted as a
parental or authority figure. As noted above, the victim testified that Knol entered her bedroom at
night and had sexual contact with her intimate parts. The victim, who was frightened of Knol, did
not oppose him. It also took a number of years before she reported the assaults.

       The Legislature has determined CSC II warrants a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison.
MCL 750.520c. Under SORA, Knol is required, as a result of the offenses, to register as a sex
offender. Although potentially longer in duration than the maximum term of imprisonment, and
although imposing serious restrictions on where Knol can live or work, sex offender registration
imposes significantly less loss of liberty than confinement in prison. Lifetime registration,
however harsh it might be, is not unduly harsh considering the gravity of Knol’s sexual crimes
against a victim who is less than 13 years of age. In light of the gravity of Knol’s offenses,
mandatory lifetime registration is a proportionate punishment.

        Next, comparing Knol’s mandatory registration and monitoring under SORA to the
penalties for other offenses in Michigan, SORA registration is not the only mandatory penalty in
Michigan law. As noted in Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6:

               Mandatory lifetime imprisonment is the penalty imposed for first-degree
       murder, MCL 750.316(2). Two years’ imprisonment is the mandatory punishment
       for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
       750.227b(1). A second conviction results in the mandatory punishment of five
       years’ imprisonment, and a third conviction is subject to a mandatory 10-year
       period. Id. Additionally, certain CSC-I convictions may impose a mandatory 25-
       year minimum sentence, MCL 750.520b(2)(b), or a mandatory life sentence, MCL
       750.520b(2)(c).

                                                -3-
Furthermore, the unique circumstances surrounding the CSC II offenses justify the uniqueness of
a defendant’s lifetime registration requirement. Victims of CSC II who are less than 13 years of
age tend to be more vulnerable victims, especially when they are targeted by adults who are using
a position of trust within a household. See People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 158-159; 749 NW2d
257 (2008) (listing factors demonstrating vulnerability in the context of OV 10, including the
victim’s youth, the existence of a domestic relationship, whether the offender abused his or her
authority status, and whether the offender exploited a victim by his or her difference in size or
strength or both). Additionally, the lifetime registration requirement is mandated under SORA.
“Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively valid, and a
proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual.” Jarrell, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 11
(quotation marks and citations omitted). On this record, Knol has failed to show the punishment
is disproportionately harsh compared to other penalties imposed in Michigan.

         Further, Knol’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration is not an unduly harsh
punishment when compared to punishments for similar offenses in other states, and thus not
unique. “Many states have a tiered system for sex offender registration, with lifetime registration
reserved for the most heinous perpetrators of sexual assault.” Id. Consequently, SORA’s
registration requirement is not materially different from sex offender registries in other states, and
it is not unduly harsh.

        With respect to the goal of rehabilitation, “the lifetime registration under SORA does not
advance the goal of rehabilitation. . . .” Id. Regardless, given the strength of the other three
factors, we conclude that the punishment of lifetime registration is not cruel or unusual as applied
to Knol’s CSC II convictions. See id. (“[W]hile lifetime registration under SORA does not
advance the goal of rehabilitation, the other three factors strongly support that such a punishment
is neither cruel nor unusual as applied to Jarrell’s CSC-I convictions.”). Consequently, on this
record, Knol has not established constitutional error in his as-applied challenge that mandatory
lifetime registration under SORA violates Michigan’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment.

        With respect to Knol’s facial challenge, we conclude that he cannot meet the standard of
proving SORA’s mandatory lifetime registration requirement is facially cruel or unusual under the
Michigan Constitution. Knol argues that, because the trial court had no discretion to fit the term
of registration to the facts of his case, the mandatory penalty violates Michigan’s established
principle of individualized sentencing and constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. However,
registration is statutorily mandated for individuals convicted of the offenses that Knol was
convicted of—it is not a discretionary provision under the sentencing guidelines. Yet, if a statute
“is valid under the facts applicable to defendant then it is certainly capable of being upheld against
a facial challenge.” Hallak, 310 Mich App at 569. Because Knol’s sentence was constitutional as
applied to him, SORA’s mandatory lifetime registration requirement is valid on its face.
Moreover, because the requirement passes muster under the state constitution, Knol cannot prevail
on his argument that SORA violates US Const, Am VIII. See People v Benton, 294 Mich App
191, 204; 817 NW2d 599 (2011) (“If a punishment passes muster under the state constitution, then
it necessarily passes muster under the federal constitution.”) (Quotation marks and citation
omitted.).

                                                 -4-
                 2. MANDATORY LIFETIME ELECTRONIC MONITORING

         MCL 750.520c(2)(b) requires a trial court to sentence a defendant who is convicted of CSC
II “to lifetime electronic monitoring . . . if the violation involved sexual contact committed by an
individual 17 years of age or older against an individual less than 13 years of age.” Knol argues
the lifetime monitoring requirement is cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by US Const,
Am VIII, and cruel or unusual punishment as prohibited by Const 1963, art 1, § 16. He also asserts
that lifetime electronic monitoring violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, US Const, Am IV, or the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 11, which
guarantee every person’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

        Our Supreme Court has held lifetime electronic monitoring constitutes “punishment,” and
is subject to the constitutional limitations against cruel or unusual punishments. People v Cole,
491 Mich 325, 335-336; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). In Hallak, 310 Mich App at 577, this Court
addressed the constitutionality of lifetime electronic monitoring and held such punishment “does
not violate [a] defendant’s state or federal rights against cruel and/or unusual punishment” facially
or as applied. Further, the Hallak Court held that the use of an electronic monitoring device to
monitor the movements of the defendant, who had been convicted of CSC II, constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment, but such a search of a defendant 17 years or older convicted of CSC
II against a person under the age of 13 was not unreasonable. Id. at 579. Given that this Court has
already held that lifetime electronic monitoring is not cruel or unusual or an unreasonable search
under the circumstances present in this case, Knol is not entitled to relief.2

                                   III. OFFENSE VARIABLES

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Knol argues the trial court improperly assessed 15 points each for offense variables (OVs)
8 and 10. He further argues his due-process rights were violated because he was sentenced on the
basis of inaccurate information. We review constitutional issues, such as due process challenges,
de novo. Benton, 294 Mich App at 203. Likewise, we review de novo whether a trial court
properly interpreted and applied the sentencing guidelines. People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 123;
771 NW2d 655 (2009). “Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court's factual determinations
are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People
v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Clear error exists when the reviewing court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Blevins, 314 Mich
App 339, 348-349; 886 NW2d 456 (2016).

2
  Although Knol heavily relies on State v Grady, 372 NC 509; 831 SE2d 542 (2019), and Park v
State, 305 Ga 348; 825 SE2d 147 (2019), those opinions are not binding. See People v Campbell,
289 Mich App 533, 535; 798 NW2d 514 (2010). In contrast, we are bound to follow the decision
in Hallak. MCR 7.215(C)(2).

                                                -5-
                                          B. ANALYSIS

        “A defendant is entitled to be sentenced by a trial court on the basis of accurate
information.” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). “It is well settled that
the use of inaccurate information at sentencing may violate [a] defendant’s constitutional right to
due process.” People v Hoyt, 185 Mich App 531, 533; 462 NW2d 793 (1990). “[D]ue process is
satisfied as long as the sentence is based on accurate information and the defendant has a
reasonable opportunity at sentencing to challenge that information.” People v Williams, 215 Mich
App 234, 236; 544 NW2d 480 (1996).

        Knol contends that the trial court erred by assessing 15 points for OV 8. The trial court
must score OV 8 at 15 points if “[a] victim is asported to another place of greater danger or to a
situation of greater danger . . . .” MCL 777.38(1)(a) (alteration in original). “[M]ovement of a
victim that is incidental to the commission of a crime . . . qualifies as asportation under OV 8.”
People v Barrera, 500 Mich 14, 22; 892 NW2d 789 (2017). Knol argues that there was no
evidence presented at trial establishing that he moved the victim before or while he assaulted her.
However, the presentence information report (PSIR) reflects that the victim reported “she was
often asleep when the defendant would come wake her up and take her into another room to assault
her.” (Emphasis added). Knol expressly did not challenge the accuracy of any of the factual
statements included in the report. “A presentence report is presumed to be accurate and may be
relied on by the trial court unless effectively challenged by the defendant.” People v Callon, 256
Mich. App. 312, 334; 662 N.W.2d 501 (2003). Because the presentence report indicates that the
victim was asported from one room to another, OV 8 was properly assessed at 15 points. See
Barrera, 500 Mich at 21-22 (concluding the trial court properly assessed OV 8 at 15 points because
the “defendant took the victim from the living room into his bedroom in order to sexually assault
her”).

        Next, Knol argues that the trial court erred by assessing 15 points for OV 10. A trial court
must assess 15 points when predatory conduct is involved. MCL 777.40(1)(a). “ ‘Predatory
conduct’ means preoffense conduct directed at a victim . . . for the primary purpose of
victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). “ ‘Victimize’ ” is defined as “to make a victim of.” Cannon,
481 Mich at 161. “ ‘[V]ictim’ is defined as ‘1. a person who suffers from a destructive or injurious
action or agency 2. a person who is deceived or cheated[.]’ ” Id. (alterations omitted). “[P]oints
should be assessed under OV 10 only when it is readily apparent that a victim was ‘vulnerable,’
i.e., was susceptible to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation.” Id. at 158 (citation
omitted).

       Factors to be considered in deciding whether a victim was vulnerable include (1)
       the victim’s physical disability, (2) the victim’s mental disability, (3) the victim’s
       youth or agedness, (4) the existence of a domestic relationship, (5) whether the
       offender abused his or her authority status, (6) whether the offender exploited a
       victim by his or her difference in size or strength or both, (7) whether the victim
       was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, or (8) whether the victim was
       asleep or unconscious. The mere existence of one of these factors does not
       automatically render the victim vulnerable. [Id. at 158-159.]

                                                -6-
In Cannon, our Supreme Court stated that a court may assess 15 points for OV 10 if it can answer
the following questions in the affirmative:

              (1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the
       offense?

              (2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who suffered
       from a readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or
       temptation?

              (3) Was victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging in the
       preoffense conduct? [Id. at 161-162.]

Moreover, “the sentencing judge must determine if there was preoffense conduct directed at a
victim for the primary purpose of victimization.” Id. at 159 (quotation marks omitted).
Regardless:

       “predatory conduct” . . . does not encompass any “preoffense conduct,” but rather
       only those forms of “preoffense conduct” that are commonly understood as being
       “predatory” in nature, e.g., lying in wait and stalking, as opposed to purely
       opportunistic criminal conduct or “preoffense conduct involving nothing more than
       run-of-the-mill planning to effect a crime or subsequent escape without detection.
       [People v Huston, 489 Mich 451, 462; 802 NW2d 261 (2011).]

         In this case, the victim was vulnerable. She was less than 13 years of age when Knol
perpetrated the crimes. Knol, who lived in the same home as the victim, was more than 17 years
of age at all relevant times and was an authority figure. Further, Knol engaged in preoffense
conduct. Knol, who was in a relationship with the victim’s mother, waited until others in the home
were asleep before entering the victim’s bedroom and perpetrating the assaults. The victim
testified that she was typically asleep when Knol began to touch her intimate parts. She did not
oppose Knol or initially report the assaults because she feared Knol, who would excessively punish
her for even minor infractions. Given the record in this case, OV 10 was properly assessed 15
points. Because Knol was sentenced on the basis of accurate information, his due-process rights
were not violated. Knol is not entitled to resentencing.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                            /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                            /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

                                               -7-