Court Opinion

ID: 9575809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:17:28.392218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:08.671439
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.
I concur in the conclusion and, generally, in the discussion by Mr. Justice Carter but do not agree that the property settlement agreement was, or could be, effectively incorporated in the decree by a mere reference. (See my concurring opinion in Flynn v. Flynn (1954), 42 Cal.2d 55, 61-62 [265 P.2d 865], and my dissenting opinion in Messenger v. Messenger (1956), 46 Cal.2d 619, 637 [297 P.2d 988].)
In addition to Justice Carter’s discussion it may be pointed out that the provisions of the document entitled “Property Settlement Agreement,” whether considered alone or together with the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint for divorce and the terms of the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce, appear to preclude the construction placed upon the agreement by the trial court and the majority of this court. Rather, in my view, the agreement, the complaint for divorce, the divorce decrees, and the conduct of plaintiff and her former husband combine to demonstrate that the monthly payments were intended to be for alimony to the wife and support of the child, and the contrary determination of the trial court herein as to the alimony payments is untenable.
The complaint for divorce alleged “That there is no community property the result of said marriage of the parties hereto, a property settlement agreement having been entered into . . . That plaintiff does not have sufficient money, means or property with which to support and maintain herself and the minor child of the parties hereto, and that . . . $60.00 per month is a reasonable and necessary sum . . . for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and said minor child.” (Italics added.) The complaint prayed for “$60.00, per month, for the support and maintenance of plaintiff and said minor child.” (Italics added.) This is far from being a prayer for an order directing specific performance of a property settlement agreement, and following such prayer, the interlocutory decree ordered the husband to pay $60 a month “for the support and maintenance of said plaintiff and the minor child,” not as specific performance of a property settlement agreement. (Italics added.)
The above quoted allegations of the complaint for divorce *289and the order of the interlocutory decree are in accord with the provision of the agreement (paragraph 16) that “Subject to the approval by any Court of competent jurisdiction, Husband agrees to pay to Wife . . . [$60] per month as and for the support and maintenance of Wife and the minor child.” (Italics added.) The general provisions of paragraphs 1, 5, and 18, quoted in the majority opinion (pp. 278, 279, do not overcome the specific provision of paragraph 16 as to support.
Plaintiff’s allegations in the divorce action that “there is no community property . . ., a property settlement agreement having been entered into,” and that “plaintiff does not have sufficient money, means or property with which to support . . . herself . . .,” are highly persuasive that what plaintiff sought for herself in the divorce action was alimony, as such, not specific enforcement of a property settlement agreement, as to which no issue was raised. If plaintiff were in fact seeking a decree ordering performance of a property settlement agreement she could and should have sought its approval and a decree literally incorporating it in the judgment and ordering defendant to perform its covenants.
The conduct of plaintiff in praying in the divorce action for support for herself and the child is consistent only with the view that the payments provided by paragraph 16 of the agreement were, as to plaintiff, for support, that is, alimony. Furthermore, plaintiff’s subsequent conduct in “stipulating” to and accepting a reduction in the amount of the payments, although the agreement contained no provision particularly directed to a change of such amount, indicates that plaintiff as well as the former husband considered and treated the payments as alimony and support, subject to court order and not as a part of the division of property.
In these circumstances the rule quoted in the majority opinion (p. 279) from Messenger v. Messenger (1956), supra, 46 Cal.2d 619, 628, can have no application. Plaintiff wife did not treat the support provision of the agreement here as an “integral and inseparable part” of the property settlement portions of the agreement; she treated it, her former husband treated it, and in accord with their position the trial court in the divorce proceeding treated it, as an agreement for support and alimony in addition to, not as an integral part of, the settlement of their property rights.
From the foregoing conclusion that the payments decreed *290to the wife are alimony and child support, it follows that the obligation to make such payments terminated with the death of the former husband insofar as such payments are alimony (Miller v. Superior Court (1937), 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868]; Parker v. Parker (1924), 193 Cal. 478, 481 [225 P. 447] ; Hamilton v. Hamilton (1949), 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 298 [210 P.2d 750] ; Roberts v. Higgins (1932), 122 Cal.App. 170, 171 [9 P.2d 517]), although the obligation survives during the child’s minority insofar as the payments are child support (Taylor v. George (1949), 34 Cal.2d 552, 556 [212 P.2d 505] ; Newman v. Burwell (1932), 216 Cal. 608, 612 [15 P.2d 511]).
I would reverse the judgment with directions consistent with the foregoing views.
Shenk, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 12, 1956. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.