Court Opinion

ID: 9552029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:03:45.498431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:27.561137
License: Public Domain

Utter, C.J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — The record does not indicate that a factual basis existed for the plea of guilty to the forgery in count 1.1 therefore concur in the majority's vacation of count 1; however, I would also vacate counts 2 and 3, and therefore dissent. The record does not show petitioner made a knowing and voluntary plea.
Petitioner Keene pleaded guilty and signed a typewritten statement based on CrR 4.2(g) prepared by his attorney. He responded affirmatively when the trial judge asked whether he had read and signed the statement. The following colloquy then occurred:
The Court: And Mr. Keene, you realize, of course, you have a right to be tried by a jury of twelve people if you wish and to confront witnesses?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you have any questions regarding your constitutional rights that you would like to ask either Mr. Ellis or myself at this time?
The Defendant: Not really. The only thing I would like to say, it would be practically impossible for me to prove otherwise. That is why I have agreed to enter a plea of guilty.
The Court: On this statement of defendant on plea of guilty, have you read that through thoroughly?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
*214The Court: Is that true and correct?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The trial judge then entered a plea of guilty.
In the majority's view, the trial judge was justified in relying on the plea statement to determine that the plea was valid. I disagree. In my opinion, petitioner's comment that it "would be practically impossible" for him "to prove otherwise" revealed that he did not have a "full understanding of what the plea connote [d] and of its consequence." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). Petitioner's comment indicated his plea was equivocal, and since the trial judge did not attempt to ensure petitioner's understanding, the plea is invalid.
A defendant who enters a guilty plea waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right to confront witnesses. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969). Thus, before a guilty plea is accepted as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant must be apprised of the nature of the offense and the consequences of the plea. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 153, 607 P.2d 845 (1980); see Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
Boykin does not require as a matter of due process that the trial judge specifically enumerate defendant's constitutional rights, Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 508, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976), although this is certainly the better practice. It is sufficient that the record indicate the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, with knowledge of its consequences. In re Vensel, 88 Wn.2d 552, 554, 564 P.2d 326 (1977); Wood, at 508. When a defendant attempts to make a plea and also makes a comment indicating a misunderstanding, however, the court should make further inquiries, and refuse to accept the plea until the equivocation has *215been eliminated. See State v. Krois, 74 Wn.2d 404, 445 P.2d 24 (1968); State v. Mullin, 66 Wn.2d 65, 400 P.2d 770 (1965).
In this case, because of the circumstances surrounding the plea and- petitioner's comment, the judge's oral inquiries were insufficient. Petitioner's comment, indicating that he was pleading guilty because it would be "practically impossible" for him "to prove otherwise”, revealed that he may have misunderstood that the State has the burden of proof, and that he need not "prove” anything. See McCarthy, at 466. Petitioner's comment, coupled with the fact that the typewritten statement was signed at the last minute, should have put the court on notice that petitioner might not understand his rights, despite the fact that the statement indicated the court had told him that the charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Petitioner's comment also indicated that he may have thought he had to take the stand in his defense. The typewritten statement did not include the right to remain silent,3 and the trial judge only mentioned the right to jury tried and the right to confront witnesses. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge should have conducted a more thorough inquiry.
*216I would hold that the plea should be vacated as to all three counts.
Horowitz, J., concurs with Utter, C.J.
Reconsideration denied April 9, 1981.

In fairness to the trial judge it should be pointed out that the guilty plea statement form utilized by Keene is identical in all important respects to the one set out in CrR 4.2(g). A proposed amendment to the model statement of defendant on plea of guilty set out in CrR 4.2(g) provides in part:
5.1 have been informed that:
(c) I have the right to remain silent before and during trial, and I need not testify against myself.
92 Wn.2d advance sheet No. 5 (June 29, 1979). The existing and proposed rules require only that the written statement be filed "in substantially the form set forth."
Because the petitioner's oral comments required the trial judge to take steps to ensure the petitioner understood his rights, this case presents a somewhat unique factual situation.