Court Opinion

ID: 9862155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:02:41.323205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:29.677061
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority, albeit reluctantly. While I concede Beasley is controlling, its holding is in conflict with the well-settled principle that the law favors resolutions on the merits (see Venzor v. Carmen’s Pizza Corp. (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 602 N.E.2d 81, citing Widicus v. Southwestern Electrical Cooperative, Inc. (1960), 26 Ill. App. 2d 102,167 N.E.2d 799; Moss v. Gibbons (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 632, 638, 536 N.E.2d 125, 129), as well as with the principles that a statute giving a right to appeal is to be liberally construed and interpretations resulting in a forfeiture are not favored. See McGaughy v. Human Rights Comm’n (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 751, 755, 612 N.E.2d 964, 967; Moenning v. Commonwealth Edison (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 468, 471, 481 N.E.2d 36, 39. In Luttrell v. Industrial Comm’n (1987), 154 Ill. App. 3d 943, 507 N.E.2d 533, the claimant filed a praecipe and scire facias rather than a request for summons. The court held that there was no significant distinction between a request for summons and the praecipe, and that the failure to file a request for summons did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the crucial point was that the goal or purpose of the statute — notice to the parties — had been satisfied. In reaching its decision, the court noted that the cases wherein our supreme court held that strict compliance with the statutory requirements was necessary to vest the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction all involved failures to perform what the court considered substantive requirements of the statute. In the present case, claimant did not fail to file the required receipt but merely filed it several days late. In Berry v. Industrial Comm’n (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 274, 302 N.E.2d 277, claimant included with his timely filed praecipe a copy of a letter to the Commission indicating that he had mailed a check for costs. Claimant’s attorney informed the clerk that the probable costs had been paid, and the Commission verified this information. The clerk thereupon issued a writ for certiorari without requiring actual exhibition of the receipt for costs. Noting that the purpose of the statute was to coerce payment of the costs, our supreme court held that the letter to the Commission and the Commission’s verification that costs had been paid satisfied the requirement of the statute. Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 278, 302 N.E.2d at 279-80. As in Luttrell and Berry, the goal and purpose of the statute has been fulfilled. To completely deny claimant a right to appeal under these circumstances elevates form over substance and runs counter to the preferred tendency "to prevent technicalities from depriving a party of the right to be heard.” Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 278, 302 N.E.2d at 280, citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 311, 196 N.E.2d 654.