Court Opinion

ID: 9491459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:14:47.663834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:45.424294
License: Public Domain

MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Circuit courts in Indiana are established by the Indiana Constitution. Indiana Const. art. VII, § 7 (“[A]nd a judge for each .circuit shall be elected by the voters thereof.”). The legislature has created in many counties superior courts which hold the same jurisdiction as circuit courts. ■ All circuit court judges are chosen in partisan elections. In most counties superior court judges are also elected'. However, several.of the most populous counties which have a number of superi- or courts, including Lake County, follow some version of the “Missouri Plan” which requires nomination of candidates by a committee followed by the appointment of one of the nominees by the Governor. When each ■judicial term expires the sitting judge who desires to remain on the bench is placed on the ballot in the general election for “retention,” a “yes” or “no” vote.
I am not persuaded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial retention votes, in principle or otherwise. Under the “Missouri Plan” for judicial appointments, the voters never “elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). Rather, the Governor always selects who will actually fill the vacancies on the Lake County Superior Court. The most the voters can say is “Pick another candidate;” they can never say (through the ballot box) “Pick this candidate.” This explains why a state “could, of course, exclude its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by changing to a system in which judges are appointed....” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). Although a retention vote may not enable “judges to be indifferent to popular opinion,” id., Missouri Plan judicial appointment schemes appear to fall outside of the plain language of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act which assumes a voter choice.
The inapplicability of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act can also be seen when examining the remedy. Proof of a proper remedy is part of the plaintiffs’ prima facie case. Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1419 (11th Cir.1998). Even if the plaintiffs could demonstrate racially polarized voting and other relevant factors to a finding of liability under the Voting Rights Act, no remedy exists which the federal court could provide. A federal court may not “abolish a particular form of govern*712ment and ... use its imagination to fashion a new system. Nothing in the Voting Rights Act suggests an intent on the part of Congress to permit the federal judiciary to force on the states a new model of government; moreover, from a pragmatic standpoint, federal courts simply lack legal standards for choosing among alternatives.” Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (plurality). We have no power to order Indiana to elect its judges. Moreover, federal courts cannot change the size of the governmental body at issue. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994) (plurality). Lake County’s superior court judges serve the entire county, and Indiana has a substantial state interest in maintaining retention elections which mirror the jurisdiction of the circuit judges. This also weighs against any alternate court-imposed remedy. In short, the federal courts cannot provide a remedy for a § 2 violation without either changing the appointment process or ordering the Lake County courts to reconstitute themselves. As neither are proper remedies under the Voting Rights Act, I would conclude that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to judicial retention votes such as in Lake County. In all other respects, I concur in the Court’s opinion and concur in the result.