Court Opinion

ID: 9475460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:00.027871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:43.843762
License: Public Domain

EDITH HOLLAN JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s position on the issue of liability. I disagree, however, and therefore dissent from my colleagues’ decision to affirm the quantum of damages assessed by the jury. The jury returned a lump sum award of $95,000.1 Out of this lump sum, it is estimated that $79,193 was allocated to compensate the plaintiff for her general damages — i.e., those damages resulting from her past and future physical and mental pain, and for physical impairment. Given the nature of the injuries sustained by Mrs. Zeno when she fell, a general damages award of more than $79,-000 is clearly outside the realm of reasonableness. Mrs. Zeno injured a knee and her right arm when she fell. Any damages attributed to the knee injury must be minimal, however, as Mrs. Zeno sought treatment for it only on the date of the accident.
With respect to her elbow, however, the record reflects continued complaints of pain and a 10% physical impairment. Despite the pain, Mrs. Zeno’s attending physician discharged her from his care in 1984. She waited one year to return to her doctor, and this final visit was prompted by an ailment unrelated to her slip and fall accident, Mrs. Zeno has never been hospitalized for care or management of her injuries. No surgery has ever been performed on the arm, and her doctor testified that it was unlikely that she would require surgery in the future. Any continued pain she may suffer does not appear to be severe. There are no life expectancy figures in the record, but she was 65 years old at the date *183of the accident. For all these reasons it appears that the general damages rendered by the jury were “entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained”2 and the court therefore abused its discretion in failing to condition the judgment for Mrs. Zeno on acceptance of a remittitur.
To support their affirmation of the jury’s award, the majority cites three cases where the general damages awarded were greater than those awarded here, and cites to one case where the general damages were approximately $17,000 less than those rendered in this case. Those cases are not comparable for purposes of gauging a reasonable jury verdict, and their dissimilarity proves the excessiveness of this award. In Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,3 a 49 year-old plaintiff was awarded $100,000 general damages for injuries she sustained to her back, hip, right knee, and both ankles. This plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a ruptured disc, and she was hospitalized no less than five times after the disc surgery because of continued pain.4 General damages totalling $100,000 were awarded to the plaintiff in Dunaway v. Rester Refrigeration Service, Inc.5 In that case, the plaintiff’s injuries resulted in his having to undergo surgery twice. In addition, he developed degenerative arthritis in the injured arm area. Continued pain was anticipated during the remainder of his life which was expected to last another 16.05 years.6
The majority notes that the plaintiff in Samanie v. Bourg7 was awarded $62,-500.00 in total damages for a “mere” knee injury. The majority fails to point out, however, that as a result of this injury, it was “more probable than not that” the plaintiff would require surgery to repair a ligament and a meniscectomy. The injury was held to be one “of a serious nature, resulting in instability of the left knee and an expected degree of permanent disability [from 5% to 25%].”8 Finally, the majority cites to London v. Bell,9 another case where the plaintiff recovered $100,000 for a knee injury. This knee injury, however, resulted in the plaintiff’s suffering excruciating pain. The pain was so severe, the plaintiff “constantly cried while in the hospital” and required palliative morphine and codeine.10 Not only had this plaintiff sustained 20% disability to the knee, she would also require surgery in the future. None of the cases discussed by the majority involves injuries similar to those sustained by Mrs. Zeno, and the plaintiffs in these cases had either undergone surgery, or were expected to undergo surgery in the future.
Turning to those cases where the injuries are in fact similar to those sustained by Mrs. Zeno, we find awards ranging from $7,500 to $23,000. For example, $23,000 was awarded to a 66 year-old woman who, like Mrs. Zeno, slipped and fell in a grocery store. The plaintiff in that case continued to have pain in the foot she fractured and in the knee she injured. The $23,000 was held to be “very generous” but not excessive. Edmond v. Market Basket Stores, Inc., 479 So.2d 1020, 1023-24 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). In another case, the plaintiff’s slip and fall accident resulted in injury similar to that sustained by Mrs. Zeno (a fracture of the right radial head of her elbow). Even with complaints of continued pain and limitation of movement, she was awarded only $7,500. Yoder v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., Inc., 407 So.2d 449, 450 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981). In still another *184grocery store slip and fall case, a general damage award of $16,917 was sustained for an elbow injury. Unlike Mrs. Zeno, this plaintiffs injuries resulted in a 50% loss of use in her injured arm. Peralta v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermkts., Inc., 406 So.2d 720, 722-23 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981), writ denied, 410 So.2d 762 (La.1982).
Mrs. Zeno should not benefit from a windfall that yields damages quite disproportionate to her injury and to the injuries of people comparably situated. Our jury system relies on the common sense and perception of jurors to adjust damages according to differing fact patterns, and thus we may expect differences in the awards among cases. However, when damages assessed in behalf of a plaintiff such as Mrs. Zeno are three to four times the “very generous” recovery in comparable cases, the adversarial system has not yielded a defensible result. It is true that defense counsel did not pursue the excessiveness of the award with zeal in the trial court or in this court. His reluctance is probably attributable to a sense that to do so would be futile in light of the traditional reluctance of appellate courts to disturb jury awards. We should shy from encroaching on the jury’s function in the usual case, but we would ignore our mandate by declining to scrutinize the amount of an award of intangible damages simply because a jury arrived at it. When the standard of similar awards in comparable cases is totally at odds with the jury’s conclusion, as it is here, we should not strain to approve it, as the majority has done.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Since the jury found Mrs. Zeno 12% contributorily negligent, the sum she was actually awarded amounted to $83,600.

. Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.1983).

. 448 So.2d 829 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984).

. Id at 833.

. 428 So.2d 1064 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 433 So.2d 1056 and 433 So.2d 1057 (La.1983).

. Id at 1069-70.

. 434 So.2d 149, amended to St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bourg, 434 So.2d 157 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 435 So.2d 445 (La.1983).

. Id at 152-54.

. 422 So.2d 260 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).

. Id at 262.