Court Opinion

ID: 9905341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 07:08:20.125148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:01.653555
License: Public Domain

REVERSE;RENDER and REMAND; and Opinion Filed November 27, 2023.

                                    S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00562-CV

   LINA T. RAMEY & ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED, Appellant
                           V.
 JEREMY COMEAUX; DANA WILKIE; SYDNEY BOUNDS; BRANDY
CLARK; TENA MARIE EASON, INDIVIDUALLY, ON BEHALF OF ALL
    WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES, AND AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE MICHAEL EASON;
 AND DEANUS HODGE, AS DEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
         ESTATE OF CHARLES ERIC HARRIS, Appellees

                On Appeal from the 101st Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-14378

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                           Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s partial denial of appellant

Lina T. Ramey & Associates’ (“Ramey & Associates”) motion to dismiss filed

pursuant to chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Chapter

150 requires a plaintiff suing for damages arising out of the provision of professional

services by a licensed or registered professional, to file an affidavit, commonly

referred to as a certificate of merit, with the complaint, and failure to comply with
the provisions of chapter 150 requires dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(a) (e). On appeal, Ramey & Associates

asserts the trial court erred in partially denying its chapter 150 motion to dismiss

because appellees failed to comply with the certificate of merit requirement and

because all of appellees’ claims arose out of its contract with the Texas Department

of Transportation (TxDOT) for professional engineering services in connection with

a construction project on State Highway 121 (SH 121), not just the claims the trial

court dismissed.

      We reverse the trial court’s Order on Ramey & Associates’ First Amended

Chapter 150 Motion to Dismiss excepting from dismissal appellees’ claims against

Ramey & Associate for its alleged negligence in failing to ensure that, as part of the

roadway construction project, the original lane markings were removed instead of

being covered with black paint and render judgment dismissing all of appellees’

asserted claims. We remand the case to the trial court to determine whether dismissal

of the claims regarding a deficiency in the inspection of the roadway and work site

should be with or without prejudice. Because the dispositive issues in this case are

settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                   BACKGROUND

      On or about March 16, 2021, a head-on collision occurred on a part of SH 121

that was under construction when a Ford Expedition traveled into the opposing lane

and collided with a Cadillac SUV. The driver of the Ford was George Eason, and

                                         –2–
the passengers in that vehicle were Charles Harris and Jeremy Comeaux. The driver

of the Cadillac was Brandy Clark, and the passengers in that vehicle were Dana Wilkie

and Sydney Bounds. The collision resulted in the death of Eason and injuries to the

other occupants of the vehicles.

       Appellees sued various parties associated with the highway construction

project, including Ramey & Associates, a civil engineering firm that was involved

in the design and implementation of the traffic control plan utilized for the

construction, asserting negligence and premises liability claims for damages

resulting from the collision.1 Appellees Sydney Bounds and Brandy Clark further

asserted a negligence per se claim. Appellees contend that Ramey & Associates’

flawed traffic control plan caused Eason to veer into oncoming traffic resulting in

the collision. Appellees’ live pleadings at the time the trial court considered Ramey

& Associates’ motion to dismiss alleged that the defendants designed, controlled,

implemented, and maintained the traffic control plan utilized on the section of the

highway where the collision occurred, and that the plan caused Eason to veer into

oncoming traffic resulting in the collision. In addition, appellees claimed Ramey &

Associates:

    Failed to maintain a safe roadway for use of the public;

    Failed to design, control, implement, and maintain a reasonably safe traffic
     control plan;

    Failed to provide adequate warning and signage of changes in traffic patterns;

    Failed to properly maintain and inspect the worksite and roadways;

   1
     Ramey & Associates and TxDOT entered into a contract for engineering services, pursuant to which
Ramey & Associates provided traffic engineering services for roadway construction of a 9.5-mile section
of SH 121 in portions of Collin and Fannin Counties.
                                                 –3–
    Failed to adequately train and supervise personnel;

    Failed to utilize reasonable means of protecting travelers;

    Unreasonably deviated from a reasonably safe traffic control plan;

    Failed to properly supervise those whose work they had a right to control; and

    Failed to meet the standard of care under the Texas Manual on Uniform Traffic
     Control Devices (TxMUTCD).

      Appellee Jeremy Comeaux originally filed suit against Ramey & Associates

on August 18, 2022. Comeaux nonsuited that case when Ramey & Associates filed

a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with chapter 150. Thereafter, on October

14, 2022, Comeaux filed a second suit against Ramey & Associates, with an affidavit

signed by Peter S. Parsonson, Ph.D., P.E., a civil engineer, licensed in several

southeastern states and in California, but not in Texas. Petitions in intervention,

relying on the same affidavit filed by Comeaux, were filed on December 28, 2022,

by appellee Dana Wilkie; on January 20, 2023, by appellee Tena Marie Eason,

individually, on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries, and as personal

representative of the estate of George Eason; and on February 27, 2023, by appellees

Sydney Bounds and Brandy Clark. On March 7, 2023, appellee Deanus Hodge, as

dependent administrator of the estate of Charles Harris, filed his petition in

intervention. His petition did not include a certificate of merit. On March 14, Hodge

filed an amended petition attaching the curriculum vitae of Parsonson, but not the

Parsonson affidavit.

       Ramey & Associates filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with
 the requirements of chapter 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
                                        –4–
 arguing the affidavits attached to the first-filed petitions of Comeaux, Wilkie,
 Eason, Bounds, and Clark failed to meet the requirements of section 150.002

 because they were not rendered by a Texas-licensed professional engineer. See

 CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 150.002(a) (b) (affidavit of a third-party professional

 engineer licensed by this state is required in any action or proceeding for damages
 arising out of the provision of professional services by licensed professional

 engineer). Ramey & Associates similarly moved to dismiss the claims asserted by

 Hodge because a certificate of merit was not filed contemporaneously with his

 first-filed petition. Id. §§ 150.001(1-b); 150.002(a) (affidavit to be filed with
 complaint which, for first time, raises claim against licensed professional for

 damages arising out of provision of professional services of licensed professional).

         Appellees responded to Ramey & Associates’ motion to dismiss, attaching

 a certificate of merit signed by David C. Steitle, P.E., a civil engineer licensed in

 Texas.2 In their response, they argued that the motion should be partially denied

 because they were not required to file a certificate of merit with respect to their

 claim that Ramey & Associates failed to properly inspect the work site and

 roadway to “ensure that the contractor complied with section 6F.77’s of the

 TxMUTCD requirement that the original pavement markings ‘be removed or

 obliterated as soon as practical’” was not an engineering design service. Appellees

 also argued Parsonson’s affidavit was sufficient because he is qualified to testify

   2
      Chapter 150 does not permit amendments or supplemental affidavits to correct a failure to comply
with section 150.002. CIV. PRAC. & REM. §150.001(1-b); Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 384, 394 (Tex. 2014); Pipkins v. Labiche Architectural Grp., Inc., 661 S.W.3d 842, 848 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2022, pet. denied).
                                                 –5–
as an expert and that no certificate of merit should be required because Ramey &

Associates’ alleged negligence in failing to ensure compliance with section 6F.77

of the TxMUTCD was so obvious that expert testimony is not required.

       The trial court partially granted and partially denied Ramey & Associates’

motion to dismiss. The trial court ordered that all of the claims against Ramey &

Associates were dismissed without prejudice, except the claim against it “for its

alleged negligence in failing to ensure that the original lane markings were

removed instead of being covered with black paint.” This interlocutory appeal

followed. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 150.002(f) (order granting or denying a motion

for dismissal is immediately appealable as an interlocutory order).

                                    DISCUSSION

      We review a trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss under section 150.002

of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code for an abuse of discretion. TIC N. Cent.

Dallas, L.L.C. v. Envirobusiness, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014,

pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable and

arbitrary manner, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Samlowski

v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011). A trial court also abuses its discretion

if it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

840 (Tex. 1992).

      We review matters involving statutory construction de novo. Belvedere

Condos. at State Thomas, Inc. v. Meeks Design Grp., Inc., 329 S.W.3d 219, 220

                                        –6–
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Once we construe the statute, we determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the statute to the facts.

Morrison Seifert Murphy, Inc. v. Zion, 384 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2012, no pet.).

        A reviewing court looks to and relies on the plain meaning of a statute’s words

as expressing legislative intent unless a different meaning is supplied, is apparent

from the context, or the plain meaning of the words leads to absurd or nonsensical

results. Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex.

2017); Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384, 389–90 (Tex.

2014). Courts must presume that the legislature chose the statute’s language with

care, including that words were chosen or omitted for a purpose, and must construe

statutes so that no part is surplusage, but so that each word has meaning. Pedernal

Energy, 536 S.W.3d at 491–92; Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Inc. v. Hogue,

271 S.W.3d 238, 256 (Tex. 2008) (“The Court must not interpret the statute in a

manner that renders any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous.”).

        As is relevant here, the statute requiring a certificate of merit requires that in

any action for damages arising out of the provision of professional services by a

licensed professional, a claimant file with the complaint an affidavit of a third-party

professional engineer licensed in this state.3 See CIV. PRAC. & REM. §150.002(a) (b);

    3
      There is an exception to this rule, but no one contends, nor do we conclude, the exception applies
here. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 150.002(c).

                                                 –7–
Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. E. Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., 520 S.W.3d 887, 890

(Tex. 2017) (“The affiant must . . . be licensed or registered in Texas”). The

certificate of merit statute requires that the affidavit be filed with the pleading which,

for the first time, raises a claim against a licensed professional for damages arising

from the provision of professional services by the licensed professional. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. §150.001(1-b).               And “[t]he plaintiff’s failure to file the affidavit in

accordance with [§ 150.002] shall result in dismissal of the complaint against the

defendant[,]” which may be with prejudice. Id. § 150.002(e).

        It is undisputed that Ramey & Associates is a licensed professional

engineering firm, registered with the Texas Board of Professional Engineers and

Land Surveyors. It is also undisputed that TxDOT contracted with Ramey &

Associates to perform the professional engineering service of developing and

designing the traffic control plans for the widening of SH 121. It is further

undisputed that Parsonson is not licensed to practice engineering in the State of

Texas and that appellee Hodge did not file a certificate of merit with his first filed

complaint.

        The parties’ dispute centers on whether appellees’ claims against Ramey &

Associates for the allegedly deficient inspection of the work site and roadway to

    The affidavit shall set forth specifically for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the
negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the licensed or registered professional in providing
the professional service, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar
professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. Id. § 150.002(b).
                                                     –8–
ensure compliance with section 6F.77 of the TxMUTCD arises out of the firm’s

provision of professional services, such that it would require a certificate of merit in

order to survive a chapter 150 motion to dismiss. Ramey & Associates contends

these claims arise out of its provision of professional service; appellees contend they

do not.4

       In determining whether claims arise out of the provision of professional

services, we look to the substance of the plaintiff’s pleadings. Jennings, Hackler &

Partners, Inc. v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 471 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2015, pet. denied). A claim arises out of the provision of professional services if the

substance of the pleadings implicates a professional’s education, training, and

experience in applying special knowledge or judgment. Id.

       When determining whether a plaintiff’s claims arise out of the provision of

professional engineering services within the meaning of section 150.002, we look to

the definition of the practice of engineering in the Texas Occupations Code. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. § 150.001(3); LJA Eng’g Inc. v. Santos, 652 S.W.3d 916, 919 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).                     Section 1001.003 of the Texas

Occupations Code provides the “practice of engineering” means:

       [T]he performance of or an offer or attempt to perform any public or

   4
       More particularly, appellees contend that Ramey & Associates negligently failed to ensure that
Defendants Mario Sinacola & Sons Excavating, Inc. and Striping Technology, L.P. removed the original
pavement markings as required by the governing regulations. Appellees claim this alleged negligent
performance was not an engineering design service but an inspection service that required no specialized
training or education.

                                                 –9–
      private service or creative work, the adequate performance of which
      requires engineering education, training, and experience in applying
      special knowledge or judgment of the mathematical, physical, or
      engineering sciences to that service or creative work.

TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1001.003(b). The statutory definition of the “practice of

engineering” includes specific types of professional services, including the

development or optimization of plans and specifications for engineering works or

systems and engineering for review of the construction or installation of engineered

works to monitor compliance with drawings or specifications; and “any other

professional service necessary for the planning, progress, or completion of an

engineering service.” See id. § 1001.003(c) (9) (12); Whitaker v. R2M Eng’g, LLC,

603 S.W.3d 530, 537 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied) (observing that

“umbrella of practicing engineering casts a large shadow”).

      Here, the record shows TxDOT engaged Ramey & Associates to provide

professional engineering services in connection with roadway improvements to a

portion of SH 121. The services included the design of a traffic control plan. A

traffic control plan is used during the construction to efficiently move the public

through and around the work zone with minimal delay and to minimize potential

hazards to transportation users in the vicinity of the work zone and highway workers.

      In their petitions, appellees alleged Ramey & Associates and other named

defendants, designed, controlled, implemented, and maintained the traffic control

plan utilized on the section of roadway where the accident occurred, and that the

                                       –10–
traffic control plan caused Eason to veer into oncoming traffic resulting in the

collision at issue here. In appellees Bounds and Clark’s petition in intervention, they

further asserted that the named defendants had a duty to follow the rules and

regulations outlined in the TxMUTCD; specifically, section 6F.77 which provides,

“Pavement marking obliteration shall remove the non-applicable pavement marking

material, and obliteration method shall minimize scarring. Painting over existing

pavement markings with black paint or spraying with asphalt shall not be accepted

as a substitute for removal or obliteration.” They also asserted the named defendants

failed to comply with the rules and regulations of TxMUTCD Section 6F.77 in that

they painted over an obsolete longitudinal stripe with black paint and that failure

caused or contributed to the collision.

      Appellees’ complaint about Ramey & Associates’ alleged failure to ensure

that the original lane markings were removed instead of being covered with black

paint, involve the monitoring of compliance with drawings or specifications and

“other professional service necessary for the planning, progress, or completion of an

engineering service.” See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 1001.003(c) (9) (12). And, thus, the

alleged failure directly involves the practice of engineering.

      To the extent an inspection of the work performed on the roadway did not

itself constitute the provision of engineering services, the issue presented is whether

claims concerning same arise out of the provision of professional services. Jennings,

471 S.W.3d at 581. To arise out of the provision of professional services, the alleged

                                          –11–
mal-acts need only originate, stem, or result from the engineer’s supplying services

which utilize his special engineering talents, education, and the like. Whitaker, 603

S.W.3d at 535–36.

         Any inspection performed by Ramey & Associates was necessarily done as a

component part of the necessary steps for implementing the traffic control plan,

which clearly involved the provision of engineering services, and from which

appellees’ claims arose. See, e.g., Tucker Eng’g, Inc. v. Temperley, No. 03-21-

00565-CV, 2022 WL 17684036, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 15, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“even if the inspection itself would not be the provision of engineering

services [it] was a done as a component part of the necessary steps for preparing the

structural inspection report, which was the provision of an engineering service and

for which the [plaintiffs’] claims arose.”). Thus, appellees’ claims regarding an

inspection of the work performed arise from Ramey & Associates’ provision of

professional (engineering) services.

         Based on our examination of the substance of appellees’ factual allegations,

we conclude that their claims regarding an inspection of the roadway and work site

are subject to the requirements set forth in section 150.002. Because appellees failed

to comply with those requirements, the trial court abused its discretion when it

refused to dismiss those claims. Accordingly, we sustain Ramey & Associates’ sole

issue.

                                         –12–
                                  CONCLUSION

      We reverse the trial court’s May 16, 2023, Order on Ramey & Associates’

First Amended Chapter 150 Motion to Dismiss partially denying Ramey &

Associates’ motion to dismiss and render judgment that all of appellees’ asserted

claims are dismissed. We remand the case to the trial court for a determination of

whether the dismissal of the claims regarding a deficiency in the inspection of the

roadway and work site should be with or without prejudice as provided under section

150.002(e). See DLB Architects, P.C. v. Weaver, 305 S.W.3d 407, 411–12 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (remanding case for determination of dismissal

with or without prejudice).

                                          /Nancy Kennedy/
                                          NANCY KENNEDY
                                          JUSTICE
230562F.P05

                                       –13–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

LINA T. RAMEY & ASSOCIATES,                   On Appeal from the 101st Judicial
INCORPORATED, Appellant                       District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. DC-22-14378.
No. 05-23-00562-CV           V.               Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Kennedy. Justices Nowell and Miskel
JEREMY COMEAUX;DANA                           participating.
WILKIE; SYDNEY BOUNDS;
BRANDY CLARK; TENA MARIE
EASON, INDIVIDUALLY, ON
BEHALF OF ALL WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES, AND
THE ESTATE OF GEORGE
MICHAEL EASON, AND DEANUS
HODGE, AS DEPENDANT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE OF CHARLES ERIC
HARRIS, Appellees

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s May 16,
2023 Order on Lina T. Ramey & Associates, Incorporated’s First Amended Chapter
150 Motion to Dismissed is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED that all of
appellees’ asserted claims against Lina T. Ramey & Associates, Incorporated are
dismissed.

      We REMAND the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the
dismissal of the claims regarding a deficiency in the inspection of the roadway and
work site should be with or without prejudice as provided under section 150.002(e).

                                       –14–
    It is ORDERED that appellant LINA T. RAMEY & ASSOCIATES,
INCORPORATED recover its costs of this appeal from appellees JEREMY
COMEAUX; DANA WILKIE; SYDNEY BOUNDS; BRANDY CLARK; TENA
MARIE EASON, INDIVIDUALLY, ON BEHALF OF ALL WRONGFUL
DEATH BENEFICIARIES, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
ESTATE OF GEORGE MICHAEL EASON; AND DEANUS HODGE, AS
DEPENDENT ADMINSTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF CHARLES ERIC
HARRIS.

Judgment entered this 27th day of November 2023.

                                    –15–