Court Opinion

ID: 9851937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:21:52.604126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:19.850778
License: Public Domain

STEELMAN, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision affirming the portion of the Commission’s Opinion and Award concluding Dodson’s injury and death arose out of and in the course of his *10employment and awarding death benefits to plaintiff. Although I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Dubose’s argument under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12(3) (2001) must fail, I do so on different grounds. The facts in this case are not in dispute; however, I recite additional facts to clarify and support my decision on this matter.
On 27 September 1999, John Dodson (“Dodson”) was transporting a load of steel to Virginia for his employer, defendant Dubose Steel, Inc. (“Dubose”). While Dodson was driving in the right lane of a divided highway having two lanes of traffic in each direction, Troy Campbell (“Campbell”) was driving in the same direction in the left lane. The two drivers encountered a disabled recreational vehicle partially blocking the right lane and causing the two lanes of traffic to merge left into a single lane. Dodson moved his truck into the left lane and forced Campbell into a left-turn lane as Campbell blew his horn several times. Dodson returned to the right lane after passing the disabled vehicle.
Campbell pulled up beside Dodson’s truck, looked over at him, motioned back and said “you almost hit me back there.” Campbell made gestures toward Dodson, who responded by shaking his finger at Campbell. Campbell then moved forward in the left lane to where the vehicles ahead of him were stopped at the traffic signal. While the two vehicles were stopped for the traffic signal, Dodson got out of his truck and walked around the front of Campbell’s vehicle, striking the hood with his fist and signaling Campbell to get out of his vehicle. Campbell and other witnesses were under the impression that Dodson was angry as he approached Campbell’s vehicle.
When Dodson reached the left front headlight of Campbell’s vehicle, Campbell turned the wheels to the left and accelerated in an attempt to move into the left-turn lane. Campbell’s vehicle struck Dodson, causing him to fall and to suffer significant head injuries which ultimately resulted in his death on 4 October 1999.
On 25 October 1999, defendant American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance (“American Mutual”) denied the workers’ compensation claim filed by plaintiff, finding that “there was no causal relationship of the employee’s injuries to his employment.” Plaintiff requested a hearing before the North Carolina Industrial Commission regarding the denial of the workers’ compensation claim to determine whether Dodson was acting in the course and scope of employment at the time of his injury.
*11On 30 November 2000, the Deputy Commissioner filed an Opinion and Award concluding that Dodson’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment and ordering defendants to pay death benefits to plaintiff. Both Dubose and American Mutual appealed the Deputy Commissioner’s Opinion and Award.
On 18 January 2002, the Full Commission (“Commission”) affirmed the Deputy Commissioner’s Opinion and Award. The Commission found facts as detailed above and made additional findings of fact and conclusions of law as set out in the majority opinion. Dubose appealed the Commission’s Opinion and Award. American Mutual did not participate in this appeal.
The issue presented in Dubose’s appeal to this Court is whether the death of an employee who was engaged in an act of “road rage” at the time of his injury resulting in his death suffered an injury com-pensable under N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 97. In the event that there are procedural inadequacies in Dubose’s appeal, I would exercise this Court’s authority under N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2003) to suspend the rules and address Dubose’s arguments in their entirety.
I.
Dubose first contends the Commission erred in awarding death benefits to plaintiff because the event causing Dodson’s injury and resulting death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment with Dubose.
Whether an employee’s injury arises out of and in the course of his employment is a mixed question of law and fact. Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick & Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982). This Court’s review of the Commission’s Opinion and Award is limited to whether its factual findings are supported by any competent evidence and whether its conclusions are adequately supported by its findings. Allen v. Roberts Elec. Contractors, 143 N.C. App. 55, 546 S.E.2d 133 (2001). If the findings of fact compel a conclusion opposite of that reached by the Commission, it is the duty of this Court to reverse the Commission. Warren v. City of Wilmington, 43 N.C. App. 748, 259 S.E.2d 786 (1979).
A. Background Law
The North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-1, et seq. (hereinafter “the Act”), defines a compensable, accidental injury under the Act as one “arising out of and in the course of *12employment....” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (2001). The phrase “arising out of’ relates to the origin of the accident and generally requires a causal connection between the nature of the employment and the injury. Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972). “In the course of employment” refers to the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the injury. Pittman v. Twin City Laundry & Cleaners, 61 N.C. App. 468, 300 S.E.2d 899 (1983). Although these elements are interrelated, the claimant has the burden of establishing both to receive compensation. Pickrell v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 368 S.E.2d 582 (1988); Hoyle, 306 N.C. at 251, 293 S.E.2d at 198.
B. Arising Out of the Employment
There are two lines of North Carolina cases decided under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) which potentially are controlling in our determination as to whether Dodson’s injuries arose out of his employment. The first line of cases, relied upon by the majority and the Commission, deals with injuries caused by assaults occurring in the workplace or assaults by co-workers. The second line of cases, relied upon by Dubose, addresses injuries to employees occurring when the employee interrupts his business for his employer to engage in personal conduct unrelated to his employer’s business.
1. Assaults in the Workplace
The Commission expressly relied on one of the workplace cases, Hegler v. Cannon Mills Co., 224 N.C. 669, 31 S.E.2d 918 (1944), in finding that Dodson’s injuries and death were “rooted in” his employment. In Hegler, tensions between two co-workers, Hegler and Smith, developed over the course of a year and culminated in Hegler’s complaint to his employer about the quality of Smith’s work. Id. at 670, 31 S.E.2d at 919. Two days after the complaint, Smith assaulted and killed Hegler at their workplace. Id.
Our Supreme Court found that the tension between the two coworkers “had its origin in the employment.” Id. at 671, 31 S.E.2d at 919. The Hegler Court also found that the assault was “directly connected with” and “was rooted in and grew out of the employment.” Id. at 670-71, 31 S.E.2d at 919. Hegler affirmed the Commission’s findings and conclusions that the death had occurred in the course of and arose out of the employment. Id.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Pittman v. Twin City Laundry, 61 N.C. App. 468, 300 S.E.2d 899 (1983). In Pittman, aquar-*13rel between two employees of the laundry service ended in one employee shooting and killing the other at the workplace. Id. at 470, 300 S.E.2d at 901. This Court held that the death “had its origin in a risk connected with [Pittman’s] employment and that his death was in direct consequence of that risk.” Id. at 474, 300 S.E.2d at 903. Thus, the Pittman Court, citing Hegler, found the shooting was causally connected to and arose out of the decedent’s employment. Id.
Pittman expressly distinguished those cases where the claimant is injured at the workplace by a non-employee assailant who committed the assaults for reasons unrelated to the employer’s business. In such cases, our courts have held “that an injury is not compensable when it is inflicted in an assault upon an employee by an outsider as a result of a personal relationship between them, and the attack was not created by and not reasonably related to the employment.” Hemric v. Manufacturing Co., 54 N.C. App. 314, 318, 283 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (1981); see also, Gallimore v. Marilyn’s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977) (holding that the employee’s death did not arise out of her employment where there was no evidence that the assault was motivated by her employment or that her employment affected her risk of being assaulted); Robbins, swpra, (holding that the assault and killing of an employee at her workplace did not arise out of her employment since the risk of assault by her estranged husband was personal and not incidental to her employment); Dildy v. MBW Invs., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 65, 566 S.E.2d 759 (2002) (holding that claimant’s injury at the store where she worked did not arise out of her employment because the risk that her boyfriend would carry out previous threats was based in a personal relationship independent of her employment).
In the present case, the incident giving rise to Dodson’s injury and death was not an assault by a co-worker occurring at the workplace. Therefore, I would hold that this case is not controlled by the decisions concerning assaults in the workplace or assaults by co-workers.
2. Increased Risk Analysis
The facts and issues presented here are more analogous to the cases where an employee interrupts his work for his employer to engage in personal conduct unrelated to the employer’s business, such as rendering assistance to a third person. In those cases, our courts primarily have relied on an increased risk analysis to determine whether injuries arose out of the claimant’s employment.
*14The increased risk analysis requires a finding that the employee’s injury was caused by an increased risk incidental to the employment. The key determination is whether the injury was “a natural and probable consequence of the nature of the employment.” Gallimore, 292 N.C. at 404, 233 S.E.2d at 532-33. A contributing proximate cause of the injury must be a risk unique to the nature of the employment and not a risk to which any member of the public would be equally exposed apart from the employment. Id. at 404, 233 S.E.2d at 533; see also Roberts v. Burlington Indust., 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417 (1988). This risk also must be one “which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person... as incidental to the service when he entered the employment.” Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 284 N.C. 230, 233, 200 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1973).
In adopting the increased risk approach, our Supreme Court expressly rejected the “positional risk” doctrine, where an injury arises out of the employment if it “ ‘has its source in circumstances in which the employee’s employment placed him.’ ” Roberts, 321 N.C. at 359, 364 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Bartlett, 284 N.C. at 235, 200 S.E.2d at 196). Thus, even when employment provides “a convenient opportunity” for injury, it is not necessarily the contributing proximate cause. Robbins, 281 N.C. at 240, 188 S.E.2d at 354.
Our Supreme Court applied the increased risk analysis in Roberts, supra, where the decedent-employee worked as a furniture designer and often traveled to visit retail stores selling his employer’s furniture. Id. at 351, 364 S.E.2d at 418. While he was returning home from a business trip, Roberts was struck and killed by a vehicle as he attempted to help an injured pedestrian who had no connection to his duties with his employer or his employer’s business. Id. at 351, 364 S.E.2d at 419. The Roberts Court concluded that Roberts’ employment did not increase the risk of being struck while assisting a pedestrian on the roadside and that “[t]he risk was common to the neighborhood, not peculiar to the work.” Id. at 358, 364 S.E.2d at 423. The Court further held that although his employment may have placed him in the position to rescue the injured pedestrian, Roberts’ own “decision to render aid created the danger,” not the nature of his employment. Id. at 359, 364 S.E.2d at 423. Because it concluded Roberts’ injury did not arise out of his employment, the Court ordered the reinstatement of the Commission’s Opinion and Award denying compensation. Id. at 360, 364 S.E.2d at 424.
Here, the Commission found that the “root cause” of the confrontation occurred when Dodson merged into Campbell’s lane while *15he was driving in the course of his business for Dubose as part of the “basic nature of his work as a truck driver.” By finding that Dodson’s employment was the “root cause” of his confrontation, the Commission tacitly acknowledged that his employment was merely a remote cause, and not a direct or proximate cause, of his injury.
The Commission also concluded that Dodson’s “employment as a long distance truck driver caused him to spend the majority of his working hours traveling on highways and streets.” For this reason, the Commission concluded, “the risk of driver error causing tempers to flare among strangers on busy highways was increased.” This conclusion is based upon a positional risk analysis, wherein Dodson’s employment as a truck driver placed him on the highway more frequently than other drivers and, therefore, increased his risk of confrontations with other drivers. However, our Supreme Court expressly rejected the positional risk doctrine in favor of the increased risk approach.
The Commission further concluded that “[a] truck driver’s risk of being struck by a vehicle is a risk greater than that of the general public.” While a truck driver may experience an increased risk of being in a collision or accident involving his truck, his employment cannot reasonably be seen as increasing the risk of the driver himself being struck by a vehicle after exiting his truck to confront another driver on the roadside. The risk of confrontations while driving, commonly referred to as “road rage,” is not unique to employment as a truck driver. It is something that can occur at anytime to any member of the general public in the normal course of operating a motor vehicle. The mere fact that Dodson drove on the highway more often as a result of his employment may have provided “a convenient opportunity” for exposure to “road rage,” but as our Supreme Court held in Roberts and Robbins, supra, demonstrating positional risk does not establish a compensable injury.
Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that Dodson’s injury was not the natural and probable consequence of his employment. The initial contact between Dodson and Campbell occurred when Dodson merged into Campbell’s lane, forcing him into the turn lane. After passing the disabled vehicle, Campbell shouted to Dodson then continued forward to meet the traffic in front of him. At this point, the incident effectively had come to an end. However, Dodson personally chose to renew the confrontation by getting out of his truck to confront Campbell without any additional provocation or contact between the two men or any contact between their vehicles. Once *16Dodson exited his truck to confront Campbell, his conduct was no longer related to his employment. As in Roberts, it was Dodson’s independent and voluntary act of getting out of his truck to confront Campbell which created the risk that he could be struck by another vehicle. The risk of injury was not created by the nature of his employment.
The facts as found by the Commission compel the conclusions that the proximate cause of Dodson’s injury was his decision to exit his vehicle to confront Campbell in an act of “road rage” and that the risk of such an act is not incidental or unique to nature of his employment as a truck driver but is a risk to which every member of the general public is equally exposed. Therefore, I would hold the Commission’s findings do not support the conclusion that Dodson’s injuries arose out of his employment with Dubose.
C. In the Course of the Employment
“In the course of employment” refers to the time, place and circumstances giving rise to the injury.
With respect to time, the course of employment begins a reasonable time before work begins and continues for a reasonable time after work ends. The place of employment includes the premises of the employer. Where the employee is engaged in activities that he is authorized to undertake and that are calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the employer’s business, the circumstances are such as to be within the course of the employment.
Pittman, 61 N.C. App. at 472, 300 S.E.2d at 901-02 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The circumstances element is fulfilled when “ ‘the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time to do that thing.’ ” Harless v. Fynn, 1 N.C. App. 448, 456, 162 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1968) (citations omitted).
In this case, there was no finding that Dodson’s actions occurred at the time or place of his employment. Further, the incident does not meet the circumstances element. Dodson was not authorized to exit his truck to confront other drivers, and he was not engaged in any activity in furtherance of Dubose’s business when he got out to confront Campbell. Dodson was not doing what a truck driver reasonably would do at the time and place of his employment when the injury *17occurred. Therefore, I would hold the Commission’s findings do not support its conclusion that Dodson’s injuries occurred in the course of his employment.
II.
In its second argument, Dubose contends the Commission erred pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12(3) in awarding death benefits to Dodson where his death was proximately caused by his own willful intent to injure or kill himself or another. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12(3) provides that “[n]o compensation shall be payable if the injury or death to the employee was proximately caused by: . . . (3) [h]is willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.” The employee must intentionally and purposefully intend to injure another. “Neither acts by the claimant, nor mere words spoken by the claimant and unaccompanied by any overt act, will be a sufficient bar to compensation unless the willful intent to injure is apparent from the context and nature of the physical or verbal assault.” Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 710, 295 S.E.2d 458, 461 (1982). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12(3) provides an affirmative defense for which Dubose has the burden of proof. Id. at 709, 295 S.E.2d at 460.
Based on statements by Campbell and other witnesses, the Commission found that Dodson struck Campbell’s vehicle with his fists, pointed at Campbell and generally seemed angry. The Commission did not find that Dodson verbally threatened Campbell or that any physical assault on Campbell occurred. The context of this incident does not make apparent the fact that Dodson willfully intended to injure Campbell, only that he intended to confront him. I would hold that Dodson is not precluded from receiving compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12(3).
In summary, because the Commission’s findings do not support its conclusions that Dodson’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, I would hold the Commission erred in concluding that Dodson suffered a compensable injury under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) and in awarding death benefits.