Court Opinion

ID: 9524113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:05.884261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:52.552595
License: Public Domain

MAY, Judge,
concurring with opinion.
Because the procedure followed by the State in this case indicates there was time to request a warrant, I am compelled to concur with the majority opinion. However, I write separately to stress that were the facts even slightly different, I would affirm the trial court's partial denial of the Weises' motion to suppress.
The evidence at issue in this appeal is what the caseworker and police officer saw after the front door of the Weises' home swung open. The uncontested evidence is that no one turned the knob, but the door swung open as Sulawske knocked repeatedly. Sulawske then stepped a foot or two inside the door to yell for any occupant who might be home. From that vantage point, she could see that the house was filthy and in disarray. When Officer Leister heard Michael Weis coming down the stairs, he stepped into the house to keep the peace and saw the house was a mess.
As a general matter, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the State 4 from entering a private home without a warrant.5 Howeyver, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. One is "when the facts suggest a reasonable belief that a person within the premises is in need of aid." Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind.1997) (quoting Geimer v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1016, 1019 (Ind.1992)).
*216Hertel testified the television and the lights in the living room were on when she arrived alone at the Weises' house that morning, but no one answered the front door despite her repeated knocking and yelling. Had Hertel called 911 and had an officer immediately sent to the house to assist her in checking to ensure the occupants of the home were safe, the State's argument that it acted to ensure the safety of the Weises would be more compelling. See, e.g., Stewart, 688 N.E.2d at 1257 (holding police properly entered hotel room without a warrant to aid occupants when maid knew defendant was in room but knocking and repeated calls to the room went unanswered). However, Hertel did not call for immediate police assistance; rather, she met Sulawske and Officer Leister at city hall before returning to the Weises' home. As the majority notes, "lilt is patently obvious that the timing was such as to allow for presentation of the facts to an independent magistrate in order to request a warrant." Op. at 215.
In addition, I note that these circumstances come very close to not being a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. The State is permitted to seize evidence under the plain view doctrine 6 if the initial entry is permissible under the Fourth Amendment and if the incriminating nature of the evidence is immediately apparent. Id. Under the first part of the analysis, the Fourth Amendment permits the State, when conducting an investigation, to enter a citizen's land, approach the front door, and knock on that door without requesting a search warrant, because when engaging in those acts, police do "not stray from places that visitors to the property could be expected to go when they park[ ] in [a] driveway and approach[ l[al residence." VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied 774 N.E.2d 516 (Ind.2002). See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, .... no search in the constitutional sense has pecurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 1226, 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986).
Sulawske, Officer Leister, and Hertel were not violating the Fourth Amendment or conducting a search when they approached and knocked on the Weises' door. See Sayre, 471 N.E.2d at 712. Anything they saw while approaching the door or standing at the door would have been admissible. Because the uncontested evidence indicated the front door opened after repeated knocking, without anyone turning the handle, I would have held no search occurred had the State seen incriminating evidence when the door initially swung open to whatever extent caused by the knocking.7 However, Officer Leister and Sulawske both indicated Sulawske pushed the door open wider and they stepped into the Weises' residence before they saw the incriminating evidence. Because they erossed the threshold of the Weises' home without permission, they were no longer where "visitors to the property could be expected to go." VanWinkle, 764 N.E.2d at 264. Accordingly, a search occurred.8
*217I therefore reluctantly concur in the majority opinion.

. As the Weises argue, "[wlhile not expressly given law enforcement status, the level of cooperation between the Department of Public Welfare in a CHINS proceeding and the police and prosecutor's office in a related criminal proceeding is such that any effort to deny a caseworker's status as an agent of the state in these cases would be ludicrous." Hastings v. State, 560 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied.

. Because the parties make no separate argument under the Indiana Constitution, we address only the validity of this search under the federal constitution. See Stewart v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ind.1997).

. On other occasions, this doctrine has been referred to as the "open view doctrine." See Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct. App.1984).

. Sulawske testified the door opened an inch or two, while Officer Leister testified the door opened about a foot.

. The State appropriately so conceded.