Court Opinion

ID: 9789174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:29:40.31749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.302345
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Agent Pontius’ conduct rendered Morton’s statement involuntary and inadmissible.
I do not disagree that, under the unique facts of this case, the agent’s response to Morton’s question about whether she would need an attorney for the interview was an affirmative misrepresentation about the criminal nature of the interview. I further agree that the agent’s response that the interview was nothing she would need a lawyer for, is to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether Morton’s statement was the *655product of her free and independent will. State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 596, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). What I disagree with is with the majority’s conclusion that, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the agent’s comment rendered Morton’s statements involuntary.
As the majority states, “[a]ll other aspects of the circumstances surrounding this interview indicate that Morton’s statements were voluntarily made.” Specifically, Morton was a 40-year-old, college-educated woman who had been involved in a criminal investigation in this veiy matter. After her calls to her attorney about the agent’s desire to interview her went unanswered, Morton took it upon herself to contact the agent directly. She voluntarily agreed to meet the agent at the police station. There was no undue pressure to participate in the interview. She drove herself to the interview. The interview was held in a break room, not in an interrogation room. It is undisputed that at the start of the interview Morton was told the interview was voluntary, she could refuse to answer questions, and she was free to leave at any time. During the interview, the door to the break room was not locked, nor was Morton handcuffed or restrained in any way. The interview lasted only a little over 2 hours. There is no evidence that during the interview she was denied breaks or contact with the outside world. At the conclusion of the interview she was allowed to leave. Under these circumstances, there was simply nothing that would support a finding that Morton’s statement was involuntaiy.
Notwithstanding all of that, the majority concludes that the agent’s comment, standing alone among this overwhelming abundance of circumstances demonstrating that Morton’s statement was the product of her free and independent will, was sufficient to render her statement involuntary. Although we have not addressed a situation like this one, it is well settled that deceptive interrogation tactics do not, standing alone, establish coercion. See State v. Harris, 279 Kan. 163, 170, 105 P.3d 1258 (2005) (citing State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 127-28, 977 P.2d 941 [1999], for the proposition that deceptive interrogation techniques alone do not establish coercion); see also State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, 32, 37, 106 P.3d 39 (2005) (deceptive police tactics standing alone do *656not render a confession involuntary; instead, such tactics are to be considered as a factor in the totality of the circumstances); State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 127-28 (officers’ conduct in misrepresenting their motivations and lying to the defendant about the evidence against him does not make a confession involuntary as long as the statements are the product of the defendant’s free and independent will).
The majority does not cite, nor is there any case in which we have found deceptive interrogation tactics, standing alone, were sufficient to render an otherwise voluntary confession involuntary. Indeed, we have found confessions voluntary where deceptive police conduct has been part of a totality of circumstances much more coercive than those present in this case. As noted in the majority opinion, in State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, 128 P.3d 382 (2006), we held that the defendant’s confession was not involuntary under a totality of circumstances which included the officers’ misrepresentations of the law concerning the applicability of self-defense and reckless homicide, false statements that there was a surveillance camera recording, there were multiple eyewitnesses, another person was cooperating with police, and forensic analysis of swabs from the defendant’s hands would show whether he had fired or even held a gun in the past 48 hours, as well as appeals to the defendant’s religious beliefs.
For this reason, I dissent.
Davis, J., joins in tire foregoing dissenting opinion.