Court Opinion

ID: 9754958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:19:34.635074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.043479
License: Public Domain

KELLER, P.J.,
dissenting in which WOMACK, KEASLER, and HERVEY, JJ., joined.
I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to show “serious bodily injury.” Serious bodily injury includes, among other things, “any impairment of a physical condition1 ... that creates a substantial risk of death.”2 Appellant restrained the three-year-old *721victim by duct-taping him to a toilet seat. As a result of this restraint, the victim suffered from “moderate to severe” constipation, causing his abdomen to become distended and hard. The pediatrician who treated the victim at the hospital testified that he suffered “serious bodily injury” from an injury that created a substantial risk of death. She further testified that the child was just lucky that his liver and spleen had remained undamaged. Had the spleen been injured, the child could have died very quickly. This evidence alone was sufficient to support a jury finding that appellant inflicted serious bodily injury.
In holding to the contrary, the Court cites the pediatrician’s admission that, at the time she treated the child, the child was not in danger of dying. But that does not mean the child had suffered no risk of death in the meantime. At the time the child’s intestinal system was impaired, there existed a substantial risk that the spleen or the liver could become damaged, which could in turn cause death. As it turned out, the child was fortunate: the constipation had not yet produced the injuries that could have occurred, and his body happened to be in good enough shape that it could probably have avoided those injuries for another twenty-four to forty-eight hours. But the child’s good fortune simply means that the substantial risk of death was not realized. Moreover, the doctor emphasized that her assessment was based on the fact that “there was intervention.” In the context of impairment, we have held that “[t]he relevant issue was the disfiguring and impairing quality of the bodily injury as it was inflicted, not after the effects had been ameliorated or exacerbated by other actions such as medical treatment.” 3 The pediatrician testified that if the child’s condition were left untreated, he could have died in two days. The child was removed from danger because he was treated, and his bowels were evacuated, relieving the constipation.
I also disagree with the Court’s conclusion that appellant was harmed by the alleged violation of jury unanimity. Aside from the fact that evidence was sufficient to show “serious bodily injury,” I believe appellant was not harmed because the evidence of “serious mental ... injury”4 was virtually conclusive. There was evidence that it was the trauma from being taped to the toilet for long periods of time that caused the child’s constipation in the first place. And common sense suggests that any three-year-old child undergoing the experience that occurred here would be additionally traumatized by having to remain on the toilet while suffering from constipation. A therapist testified that the trauma of the experience caused the victim to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Although the child had previously been happy and toilet trained, after the incident he had nightmares, developed a problem with stuttering, suffered periods of uncontrolled defecation, reverted to wearing diapers, hoarded food, and was afraid of bathrooms. Given the overwhelming nature of the mental injury evidence, including the traumatic nature of the crime itself and the vulnerable age of the victim, I conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that any juror who found appellant guilty would find, at the very least, that “serious mental injury” was inflicted.
I respectfully dissent.

. Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(8)(definition of “bodily injury”)

. Tex. Pen.Code § 1.07(a)(46)(definition of "serious bodily injury,” which incorporates "bodily injury”).

. Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (broken nose that was reset).

. Tex. Pen.Code § 22.04(a)(2). The term is not defined in the Penal Code.