Court Opinion

ID: 9694552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:46:33.440536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:03.292760
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I concur with that part of the majority’s opinion which concludes that the decision of the Commonwealth Court affirming the Board’s order of total loss of retirement benefits to the Appellants herein is an unjustifiable forfeiture of their “deferred compensation”, I must disagree with the result of that holding which allows these jurists to maintain their total retirement benefits up until the effective date of the order of suspension or removal. For the reasons that follow, I would conclude that Article Y, § 16(b) of our Constitution, given its intended effect, allows for the termination of a judge’s prospective pension benefits effective the date, as determined by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, the jurist committed the act of misconduct while in office which was the predicate for removal.
From the beginning of our civilization those who were favored to serve as judges were deemed to be members of society whose integrity could not be questioned and whose *504judgment was accepted as sound and above reproach. The grant of power to a judge recognizes that those who serve in that capacity, although sharing the failings of all humans, were individuals who were expected to withstand the temptations of life and, therefore, could properly judge others who possessed less resolve to meet that standard. This unusually high standard is reflected in our Canons of judicial ethics which demand more of a judge than merely obeying the existing law. The Canons of judicial behavior expressly provide that we avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2, Subd. (B). Those Canons expressly dictate that overt misbehavior may not be condoned.
In each instance before us today, the dereliction has been established and is not being challenged. Those issues have been resolved by our decisions in Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988) and In re: Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988). The situation is further exacerbated as the conduct in question is not related to the personal behavior of the jurist but rather concerns the jurist’s behavior in the performance of his judicial duties. The only issue presented is the appropriate response to that errant behavior. Our response must, therefore, be appropriate to that behavior which caused damage to the integrity of the judicial process and its image. I do not believe that we can ignore the magnitude of the breach nor the irreparable damage it has cast upon the integrity of this system.
For the reasons that follow, I am constrained to conclude that the majority’s result serves to compound the damage caused by the conduct it intends to sanction. The instant situation afforded the opportunity for this Court to reenforce its previously expressed intention to maintain the integrity of the jurists of this Commonwealth. Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988). To the contrary, today’s decision signals to all that our previous posture, enunciated in In re: Glancey, 518 Pa. 276, 542 *505A.2d 1350 (1988), was merely an aberration and business as usual will prevail.
In recognition of the august nature of a jurist’s position in our society, both our Constitution and General Assembly enacted requirements that public officers, including judges, take an oath prior to entering upon the responsibility of office. This required oath of office and an individual’s inclusion in the State Retirement Plan independently operate to create a contractual relationship between the jurist involved and the State. Specifically, Article VI, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that all public officers including members of the judiciary take a designated oath of office. The required oath is as follows:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and that I mil discharge my office with fidelity.”
Pa.Const. Art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added).
The requirement that an oath of office be taken by members of the judiciary was codified by the Legislature pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 3151 which reads as follows: § 3151. Oath of Office
Each judicial officer shall, before entering on the duties of his office, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation before a person authorized to administer oaths:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this Commonwealth and that I will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.”
Any person refusing to take the oath or affirmation shall forfeit his office. A judicial officer shall be sworn upon his appointment or election, and after each retention election, and thereafter need not be sworn in any matter referred to him.
42 Pa.C.S. § 3151 (emphasis added).
As the statute explicitly states, the taking of the oath is an prerequisite to “entering upon the duties” of office. Com*506monwealth ex rel. Kelley v. Keiser, 340 Pa. 59, 69, 16 A.2d 307 (1940). It necessarily follows that the oath of office is also a precondition to receiving any compensation for the performance of those duties, as one clearly may not receive payment for services one has not performed. Thus, it is the very oath of office itself which enables a judge to commence his duties and accordingly earn that compensation due him, including the pension benefits payable to a jurist.
In addition to the statutory requirement imposed upon those assuming the esteemed and powerful position of judge that an oath of office be taken, the oath itself imposes additional obligations upon the jurist. The oath of office required to be taken mandates that a judge “discharge the duties ... of office with fidelity.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 3151. Implicit in this language is the notion that compliance with this pledge is a predicate to receiving the benefits of office and conversely failing to abide by the oath must result in a simultaneous termination of a jurist’s entitlement to the emoluments of office.
The relationship between a public employee and the State Pension Plan is necessarily contractual in nature containing various mutual obligations. “It is well established that retirement benefits are founded upon a contract theory of deferred compensation.” McKenna v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 495 Pa. 324, 334, 433 A.2d 871, 876 (1981) (Nix, J., concurring) (citing Harvey v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 392 Pa. 421, 141 A.2d 197 (1958); Baker v. Retirement Board of Allegheny County, 374 Pa. 165, 97 A.2d 231 (1953); McBride v. Allegheny County Retirement Board, 330 Pa. 402, 199 A. 130 (1938); Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400 (1934)). I agree with Judge Barry of the Commonwealth Court when he so aptly noted:
What Glancey fails to recognize is that Sections 16 and 18 of Article V constitute “terms and conditions” upon which the receipt of retirement pay is premised. Put another way, at the time Glancey joined the system, that system provided that a judge could collect retirement pay unless *507he was removed from office under Section 18 of Article V.
Glancey v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, 126 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 457, 463, 560 A.2d 263, 266 (1989). Accordingly, once the jurist engaged in conduct which was sufficiently violative of his oath of office to warrant suspension or removal, that act of misconduct serves to instantaneously sever the jurist from that very system which provided him a process for entitlements to the emoluments of his office. Accordingly, I would hold that the Board must calculate the loss of the Appellant’s prospective retirement benefits only up until that date determined by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board to be the first instance of misconduct engaged in by each jurist.
While the Order of the Board and its subsequent affirmance by the Commonwealth Court requiring the total loss of all state contributions to the pension funds of Appellants constitute an impermissible forfeiture, calculating the loss of prospective pension benefits from the date of misconduct effectuates the economic consequence of removal or suspension and is undeniably fair.1 Under this analysis there can be no risk of “forfeiture” as the moment the jurist engages in misconduct he simultaneously breaches his contractual obligation with the State and his entitlement to rights and privileges due him terminates instantly. Thus, it is the jurist’s own affirmative conduct which precipitates the breach of contract and termination of his pension benefits, not the Constitution nor this Court. Accordingly, there is no loss or deprivation of any property interest in which the jurist had a reasonable expectation or right to possess. Clearly, once a jurist tarnishes the bench with his betrayal of the public trust, from that moment forward he can no longer realistically expect continued financial support from *508the very system offended by his actions. The jurist’s entitlement to the financial emoluments of office ceased to exist once he engaged in “misconduct”.
This conclusion is predicated upon my belief that the phrase “no compensation” as employed in Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly provides this Court with the authority to terminate the pension benefits of a removed or suspended jurist. Article V, Section 16(b) of the Pennsylvania Constitution states:
Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be retired upon attaining the age of seventy years. Former and retired justices, judges and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as provided by law. No compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this article or under Article VI.
Pa.Const. Art. V, Section 16(b) (emphasis added).
Whenever this Court is called upon to interpret a particular constitutional provision, we are guided by the basic principle that “[constitutional provisions are not to be read in a strained or technical manner. Rather, they must be given the ordinary, natural interpretation the ratifying voter would give them.” Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinski v. Isaac, 483 Pa. 467, 475, 397 A.2d 760, 765, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 2841, 61 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Where more than one interpretation is possible, it is appropriate to “favor a natural reading which avoids contradictions and difficulties in implementation, which completely conforms to the intent of the framers, and which reflects the views of the ratifying voter.” Id., 483 Pa. at 477, 397 A.2d at 766. A constitution reflects the will of the people; thus, the people’s natural understanding of the terms therein must be given full effect. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976); Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976); Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976); Breslow v. School District of Baldwin Township, 408 Pa. 121, 182 A.2d 501 (1962).
*509A natural reading of the last two sentences of this provision would require the word “compensation” to carry the same meaning in both instances. “Compensation” is generally understood to refer not only to salary but also to retirement benefits. See Catania v. Commonwealth, State Employes’ Retirement Board, 498 Pa. 684, 690, 708, 450 A.2d 1342, 1345, 1349 (1982); Bellomini v. Commonwealth, State Employes’ Retirement Board, 498 Pa. 204, 209-10, 445 A.2d 737, 739 (1982). The choice of word “compensation” in this context indicates the framers’ intent to encompass salary and retirement benefits.
While the plain meaning of “compensation” as used in this context suggests the inclusion of retirement and pension benefits in addition to salary, a thorough analysis of Section 16 in its entirety, compels the same conclusion. Section 16(b) also states that “[fjormer and retired justices, judges, and justices of the peace shall receive such compensation as shall be provided by law." Pa. Const. Art. V, § 16(b), (emphasis added). The only compensation to which a former or retired judge is entitled after he or she retires or leaves office is the accrued retirement benefits resulting from service as an active judge. Any additional compensation obtained from service as a senior judge is not included since that retired or former judge does not have a right to serve in senior service, but rather serves only at the pleasure of this Court. Additionally, the compensation received by senior judges does not accrue from service rendered as an active judge, but rather from the services rendered as a senior judge. Section 16(c) allows only former or retired justices or judges to be assigned to “temporary judicial service.” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 16(c). Despite their explicit inclusion in Section 16(b), justices of the peace are not eligible for temporary judicial assignments under Section 16(c). The “compensation” referred to in Section 16(b) for former or retired justices or judges may include remuneration for temporary judicial assignments, but it must also include retirement and pension plans, because justices of the peace are not authorized to perform temporary judicial *510service. Thus, to hold that “compensation” does not include one’s retirement or pension contribution would contradict Section 16(b)’s mandate that former and retired justices of the peace receive “such compensation as shall be provided by law.” Pa. Const. Art. Y, § 16(b) (emphasis added).
While I believe that Section 16 itself operates to define “compensation” to include pension benefits, an analysis of other constitutional provisions also supports such an interpretation. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Constitution grants certain powers and outlines a specified procedure, in general, to deal with the disciplining of judges. First, the Constitution creates a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (J.I.R.B.), Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(a), and empowers it to investigate those jurists who have been charged with misconduct, Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(d). Once the J.I.R.B. investigation warrants an appropriate punishment, the Board is authorized to recommend to this Court “the suspension, removal, discipline, or compulsory retirement of the justice or judge.” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(g). The last remaining phase of the process, is for this Court to implement the recommendations of the J.I.R.B., implement any of the enumerated sanctions that are “just and proper”, or reject the recommendations wholly. Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(h). However, should an order for suspension from office or removal be issued, “the justice or judge shall be suspended or removed from office and his salary shall cease from the date of such order.” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 18(h) (emphasis added).
Today’s holding by the majority, allowing all compensation to survive until the effective date of the order of removal or suspension, clearly disregards the fact that the Legislature chose to employ different terms at different times because they intended those words to convey different definitions. The explicit reference to the term “salary” in Section 18(h) further reassures us that the term “compensation” as used in Section 16(b) was intended to have a separate and distinct meaning. This deliberate reference to the term “salary” in Section 18(h) above, unquestionably *511demonstrates that the drafters of the Constitution were well aware of the differences in meaning between “salary” and “compensation.” Their selective use of the two words thus, was intentional, rather than inadvertent and we are bound to effectuate and oblige such intent. See, Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinski v. Isaac, supra; Commonwealth v. Harmon, supra. Therefore, while the language of Section 18(h) requires the termination of a jurist’s “salary” effective the date of the Order of removal or suspension is issued, it does not prohibit the termination of pension benefits from occurring earlier. Clearly an employee is entitled to collect a wage while continuing employment; however, no entitlement exists on behalf of a removed or suspended jurist to collect pension benefits, an emolument of office provided in exchange for faithful service, once he engages in misconduct. If the term “compensation” in Section 16(b) were intended to refer to salary only, Section 18(h) would be redundant. Clearly, the framers did not intend such a result as they understood that the two terms were not interchangeable.
Next, those who fail to recognize that the concept of “compensation” is a broad classification of which salary is merely a component or subsection are vulnerable to an unintended consequence resulting from their position. Article V, Section 16(a) referring to the “compensation” of judges, states in relevant part: “[Tjheir compensation shall not be diminished during their terms in office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth.” Pa. Const. Art. V, § 16(a). If compensation merely refers to salary, then Section 16(a) solely protects against the diminution of salaries and leaves open the possibility for a future reduction in a jurist’s overall benefits. Such an occurrence could legitimately occur under the latter interpretation.
I disagree and believe it is highly significant that Section 16(a) employs the term “compensation” rather than “salary” to assure that the value of the overall compensation package would not be diminished. This interpretation of *512the word compensation would result in a more legitimate and intended outcome, that protection against erosion extends beyond maintenance of a mere salary level, but rather to the entire compensation package including medical benefits and retirement funds.
Prior to the 1968 Amendments, Section 26 of Article III (formerly Section 11) of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibited the passage of legislation giving “extra compensation” to any public employee after services had been rendered. In Jameson v. City of Pittsburgh, 381 Pa. 366, 113 A.2d 454 (1955), and Koehnlein v. Retirement System for Employees of Allegheny County, 373 Pa. 535, 97 A.2d 88 (1953), this Court construed that language “extra compensation” to be violated by state statutes authorizing increases in retirement allowances to already retired public employees. Thus, it had already been determined and firmly established almost forty years ago by this Court that “compensation” included retirement benefits. At the time of the 1967-68 Constitutional Convention therefore, when the provisions of Section 16 were being drafted, the term “compensation” had previously been employed with reference to retirement benefits. Accordingly, any assertion that the term “compensation”, as intended and employed in Section 16(b), is ambiguous cannot be plausible as it clearly disregards the historical and common understanding and usage of the term.
Thus, pursuant to this analysis, I believe a proper resolution of this matter would necessitate directing the Board to calculate the value of the appellants’ pension plans as follows.2
The retirement benefits of former Judge Glancey who took judicial office in January of 1969, vested in January of *5131979. His misconduct occurred in December of 1985. Accordingly, the State Employes’ Retirement Board would be directed to calculate former Judge Glancey’s benefits up to the date of the misconduct.3
Similarly, former Judge Porter originally took office in December of 1971, so his pension benefits vested as of December 1981. His misconduct, like Glancey’s, occurred in December of 1985, and the S.E.R.B. would be directed to calculate pension benefits up to the date of that misconduct.
Former Judge King was also first appointed to the bench in December of 1971, and his pension rights vested in December of 1981. Former Judge King first breached his oath by committing misconduct in December of 1983. Accordingly, the Board would be directed to compute the value of his retirement benefits as of that date. Such a consequence is required at a minimum and the preservation of judicial integrity in this Commonwealth demands no less.4
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. The effect of the majority’s ruling today renders meaningless any economic distinction between a judge whose emoluments cease effective the date he retires in good standing and the Appellants herein who also receive their emoluments in full until the date of the order of suspension or removal. This is an affront to all jurists who retired after years of faithful and ethical service.

. Former Judge Shiomos lost his pension benefits pursuant to the Public Employees Forfeiture Act, (“Act 140") P.S. 752, No. 140, §§ 1-5, 43 P.S. §§ 1311-15. Judge Shiomos currently has a case pending before this Court challenging the constitutionality of "Act 140”. Shiomos v. State Employes’ Retirement Board, No. 85 E.D. Appeal Docket, 1991. The resolution of this matter has been reserved for the appropriate time.

. As this conclusion indicates, I expressly disagree with the Board’s conclusion that the state’s contribution prior to the misconduct should be disturbed.

. Notwithstanding the majority’s insistence that the course of action suggested in this dissent constitutes a "forfeiture”, we conclude that a jurist’s entitlement to the emoluments of office automatically ceases upon the occurrence of his affirmative act of misconduct that was the predicate for the suspension or the removal. A forfeiture implies the taking of something to which a person was entitled. Once the oath is breached, there is no basis for entitlement.