Court Opinion

ID: 9819200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:06.81555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:22.288137
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCUSKEY, dissenting: I disagree with both the majority’s reasoning and conclusion. Therefore, after a careful review of the record, I respectfully dissent. The resolution of this case requires more facts than those provided by the majority. On July 13, 1993, the victim was shot and killed near the Arsenal Courts housing project in Rock Island, IIlinois. There were two eyewitnesses to the shooting. At trial, Gary Davis identified the defendant as the murderer. He testified that he saw the defendant shoot the victim. A second witness, Steve Fuhlman, was interviewed by Officer Mark Nenninger on the day of the murder pursuant to a "neighborhood canvas” in search of witnesses to the murder. Fuhlman told the officers that he was outside on the street working on his car when he saw one black man chasing another black man. On July 15, 1993, Fuhlman picked the defendant out of a photographic lineup. At trial, Fuhlman identified the defendant as the shooter. On cross-examination, defense counsel engaged in the following exchange: "Q. [D]id the State provide assistance to you or to [sic] the State’s Attorney’s Office provide assistance to you in moving away from the Arsenal Courts area? A. Some. Q. So they provided some money for you for moving? A. No. They supplied a truck. Q. So you didn’t have to rent a truck to move. Is that correct? A. Well I’m not totally moved. I still have belongings in the house. Q. Have they provided other financial assistance to you? A. Motel room for some place to stay. Q. Is it your intention to permanently move from the Arsenal Courts area? A. Yes. Q. And, you do not want to reside there. Is that correct? A. I feel unsafe there. Q. And, isn’t it also true that you did not want to reside there at the time that this shooting occurred? A. I wanted to reside there ever since I bought the house. Q. Well, weren’t you looking for a reason to get out of the Arsenal Courts area? A. No I wasn’t. I wouldn’t have been putting money in the house. Q. Well weren’t you behind on your obligations regarding that house financially? A. Taxes. Q. You hadn’t paid the taxes for about two years on it?” With this question, the trial court stopped the cross-examination. The trial court found the question concerning property taxes to be collateral. Outside the presence of the jury, the judge allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof and continue questioning Fuhlman regarding the issue of unpaid taxes. During this examination, Fuhlman admitted being behind on his taxes. However, he also said that the State had not paid the taxes for him. Defense counsel argued that he was attempting to show the witness’ bias through this line of questioning. According to the defendant, Fuhlman’s testimony was his "ticket out” of a bad neighborhood and an attempt to obtain financial assistance by the State. The trial court was not convinced by the defendant’s analysis. The court noted that, one week before the trial, the State had made a motion to withhold its witness list. The court ruled that it had to be turned over to the defense. Subsequently, Fuhlman’s home was riddled with bullets while he, his wife, and two young daughters were present. The court, on its own initiative, ordered Fuhlman be taken into protective custody and further ordered that the State share the costs with Fuhlman. Accordingly, the court noted that any financial assistance Fuhlman was receiving from the State was pursuant to the court order. Furthermore, the court noted that the State did not pay Fuhlman’s real estate taxes or pay for his new home. Based on these facts, the trial court found the question regarding property taxes to be collateral. The majority is indeed correct that a defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness for the purpose of showing the witness’ interest, bias or motive to testify falsely. People v. Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d 129, 145, 638 N.E.2d 282, 294 (1994). As Britt further notes, however, "a defendant does not possess the unbridled authority to question a witness.” Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 294. Indeed, a defendant should have the "opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Emphasis in original.) Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 145, 638 N.E.2d at 294. Accordingly, "the trial court enjoys wide latitude in limiting the cross-examination of a witness to prevent repetitive or minimally relevant questioning, harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.” Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 638 N.E.2d at 294. Thus, when a defendant claims that his cross-examination of a witness was unduly restricted, "we look to the testimony allowed rather than that prohibited.” (Emphasis in original.) Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 638 N.E.2d at 294. In the instant case, the trial court allowed the defendant to examine Fuhlman regarding the question of bias. As the above-recited testimony shows, the defense was allowed to fully explore the amount of financial aid that Fuhlman received from the State. The only question the trial court excluded in cross-examination was the question concerning property taxes. Even here, however, the trial court allowed the defense to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. During that examination, it became eminently clear that the State in no way assisted Fuhlman in the payment of his property taxes. Thus, continued questioning by the defense counsel on this matter was clearly collateral. Consequently, looking to what cross-examination was allowed by the trial court versus the single question disallowed by the court, it is clear that the judge allowed the jury to hear sufficient testimony to determine Fuhlman’s credibility. See Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 146, 638 N.E.2d at 294. Based on my review, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the question to be collateral. Moreover, the defense "ticket out” theory was patently without merit. Contrary to the majority’s statement that Fuhlman "wanted to leave the neighborhood for many years” (293 Ill. App. 3d at 864), Fuhlman testified that he did not desire to move from his home prior to the murder. Rather, it was only after the murder that he felt "unsafe.” The trial court made it very clear that Fuhlman’s insecurity about his safety stemmed from his home being shot up a week before trial. In order for Fuhlman to have used his testimony as a "ticket out,” he would have had to know in advance that (1) his home would be shot up; (2) the trial court on its own motion would place him into protective custody; and (3) the State would be ordered to share his costs. Given the near impossibility of this theory, I find the trial court was correct in not allowing the defense to pursue further examination on this issue. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.