Court Opinion

ID: 9948084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 15:08:44.966072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:04.626471
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0117-22

KENNETH POLI,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PORT AUTHORITY OF
NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_____________________________

                   Argued January 29, 2024 – Decided March 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Sabatino, Mawla, and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-0192-21.

                   Theodore B. Campbell argued the cause for appellant.

                   Kyle J. Costa argued the cause for respondent, (Port
                   Authority Law Department, attorneys; Kyle J. Costa, on
                   the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Appellant Kenneth Poli appeals from the March 18, 2022 order denying

his motion to enforce litigant's rights, and August 5, 2022 order granting

summary judgment in favor of defendant Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey ("PANYNJ") for failure to serve a notice of claim as required by N.J.S.A.

32:1-163. Based on our review of the record and the applicable principles of

law, we affirm.

      In April 2014, Poli was hired by PANYNJ. He received annual job

performance reviews conducted by his manager, Philip Finamore. Prior to 2018,

Poli's annual job performance was rated as having "met or exceeded

expectations" with corresponding numerical ratings of at least three out of a

possible five. In his annual performance review for 2018, Poli received a

numerical rating of two out of five, categorized as "below expectations." Poli

complained about his performance rating but was told the review could not be

changed.

      On July 25, 2019, counsel for Poli, Theodore Campbell, Esq., sent a letter

to the PANYNJ Director of Security Operations, Michael DeGidio, Executive

Advisor to the General Counsel, Caroline Ioannou, and Chief of Human Capital,

Marylee Hannell. Campbell wrote that he was retained "to address Poli's 2018

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performance review, after he was informed . . . that there is no current policy in

place for him to dispute the performance review rating."

      The letter explained "Poli . . . believe[d] his relationship with . . .

Finamore . . . may have suffered in part due to [Poli's] report to the appropriate

authority about some irregularities for [a construction project at JFK

International Airport] in July of 2017, which was subsequently investigated and

substantiated by the [PANYNJ Office of Inspector General ("OIG")] . . . ." The

letter continued, "[i]f [Poli's] reporting to the [O]IG in any way impacted his

performance review . . . [Poli's] requested transfer to a different [d]epartment

merits consideration." The letter specifically requested consideration of Poli's

"request for a review and an adjustment of his 2018 evaluation, along with [his]

request for a transfer to a different [d]epartment."

      The OIG commenced an investigation of the issues raised in Campbell's

letter. On August 27, 2019, Ioannou sent an email to OIG investigative counsel

Inna Spector, and senior counsel Dyana Lee, with the subject line "Privileged &

Confidential – Litigation Hold Process – Anticipated Litigation by [Poli]." In

September 2019, Poli and Campbell met with Spector and Lee to discuss Poli's

allegations.

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      On January 10, 2020, the Inspector General sent Campbell a letter

advising him the OIG investigation was complete and the OIG "determined . . .

Poli's 2018 [e]valuation was sufficiently supported by documented evidence of

his work performance and completely unrelated to his limited involvement with

the 2017 OIG investigation." The OIG "confirmed that . . . Poli was neither the

complainant in the 2017 OIG[] [i]nvestigation nor a source of any confidential

or protected information." The OIG dismissed the complaint and terminated the

investigation.

      In February or March 2020, Poli was advised in his annual performance

review for 2019 he received a numerical rating of three out of five, categorized

as "met expectations."

      On March 25, 2020, Poli received a copy of an August 8, 2018

memorandum summarizing the findings and conclusions of the 2017 OIG

investigation. The memorandum did not mention Poli by name, title, or other

description. The report identified PANYNJ fire chief, Thomas Wieczerak, as

the individual who requested the OIG conduct the investigation.

      On November 5, 2020, Campbell sent a letter to OIG Acting Inspector

General, Michael Farbiarz, disputing the OIG's determination that Poli was not

"involve[d] as a whistleblower" in the 2017 OIG investigation because he

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provided Wieczerak with underlying information relating to one of the issues

included in the investigation. The letter requested a meeting "to discuss this

apparent contradiction in light of New Jersey's Rule[] of Professional Conduct

(3.3[]) regarding a lawyer's obligation for candor to a tribunal along with the

OIG's perspective in response to [Campbell's] observations." On November 16,

2020, Campbell sent another letter to Farbiarz reiterating his request for a

meeting. The letter closed, "[i]f you elect not to meet with us . . . I will advise

my client accordingly."

      Poli contends that in December 2020, Campbell sent a letter, incorrectly

dated July 9, 2020, to the Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, Debra Torres,

in which he summarized Poli's claim that he was a whistleblower because he

provided information to Wieczerak, who then reported the information to the

OIG. Campbell wrote, "[s]ince [I] . . . raised concerns about [the OIG's]

investigative findings and candor relative to . . . Poli's status in this matter, [he]

would like [Torres's] [d]epartment to investigate and address this issue . . . ."

The letter concluded Poli "would like an in-house resolution before resorting to

an outside [a]dministrative [j]udicial remedy."

      On December 22, 2020, Campbell wrote to Hannell requesting she "clarify

immediately[] the pending nature of [Poli's] 2018 performance evaluation to a

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definitive grade pursuant to your policies.        We have requested, and now

reiterate, a rating of [three] is warranted, which is in line with [Poli's] prior and

subsequent performance ratings."        The letter requested Hannell's "prompt

response."

       On January 13, 2021, Poli filed his complaint in this action. On March

26, 2021, he filed an amended complaint.          Poli asserted causes based on

violation of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -

14 ("CEPA"), violation of the Pierce1 doctrine, violation of contract (Woolley2

doctrine), interference with economic advantage, the New Jersey Law Against

Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50 ("NJLAD"), fraud, and defamation. Poli

demanded "compensatory damages, including lost wages, punitive damages,

[and] benefits, together with interest."

       On May 14, 2021, PANYNJ filed an answer to the amended complaint.

PANYNJ asserted failure to state a claim as an affirmative defense but did not

assert an affirmative defense based on failure to serve a notice of claim.

1
    Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980).
2
  Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, modified, 101 N.J. 10,
(1985).
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      During discovery, Poli filed a motion to compel discovery, including

production of the OIG investigation file relating to Poli's allegations, and

defendant filed a cross motion for a protective order. On October 29, 2021, the

court entered an order granting in part and denying in part both motions. The

court did not rule on defendant's privilege claims, but ruled the OIG

investigation file would be "produced with appropriate redactions per . . .

Campbell's representations today. So that would be names and identifiers and

then if there's other follow-up discovery request[s] based on that, then I'll leave

that to another day."

      A dispute arose over defendant's redactions of the OIG file and Poli filed

a motion to enforce the October 29, 2021 order. On March 18, 2022, the court

denied Poli's motion because the court did not previously order disclosure of the

unredacted OIG file, as Poli alleged, and because Poli did not demonstrate

defendant's assertions of privilege lacked merit.

      On June 21, 2022, defendant moved for summary judgment arguing Poli

failed to serve a notice of claim as required by N.J.S.A. 32:1-163, and Poli's

causes of action based on CEPA, NJLAD, and the Pierce doctrine could not be

asserted against defendant. Poli opposed the motion, arguing he substantially

complied with the notice of claim requirement. On August 5, 2022, the court

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heard oral argument. The same day, the court entered an order granting the

motion supported by a written opinion. On August 9, 2022, the court issued an

amended written opinion.

      The court rejected Poli's argument that he substantially complied with the

notice of claim requirement. 3 Applying the standard for substantial compliance

set forth in Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 (2001), the court found

Poli failed to demonstrate he "alert[ed] [d]efendant to any of the claims filed in

[his] amended complaint." The court also found Poli did not establish he took

a series of steps to comply with the statute, generally complied with the purpose

of the statute, or had a reasonable explanation why he did not strictly comply

with the statute. As to the fraud claim, the court additionally determined the

alleged notice was not served at least sixty days before Poli filed suit.

      On appeal, Poli argues: (1) the court erred by rejecting his claim of

substantial compliance as to his "whistleblower" and "fraud" claims; (2) the

court erred by failing to consider and apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to

3
    Because Poli only addressed his CEPA, NJLAD, and fraud claims in
opposition to the motion, the court deemed the motion unopposed as to all other
claims. The court, however, noted Poli's "Wool[l]ey doctrine" claim also failed
on the merits for failure to serve a notice of claim.

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                                        8
preclude defendant from raising the notice of claim defense; and (3) the court

erred by failing to enforce the October 29, 2021 discovery order. 4

      Appellate courts review the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for

summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court.

Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73 (2022); Stewart v. N.J. Tpk. Auth./Garden State

Parkway, 249 N.J. 642, 655 (2022). The court must "consider whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder

to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

      Pursuant to these principles and having considered the arguments raised

on appeal, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's thorough

and well-reasoned March 18, 2022, and August 9, 2022 written opinions. We

add the following comments.

4
   Poli does not address his causes of action based on the Pierce doctrine,
violation of contract (Woolley Doctrine), interference with economic advantage,
NJLAD, or defamation. Therefore, they are waived. Miller v. Reis, 189 N.J.
Super. 437, 441 (App. Div. 1983) (holding issues not briefed beyond conclusory
statements need not be addressed). Those claims, however, also fail on the
merits as discussed herein.

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      The court correctly analyzed and applied the doctrine of substantial

compliance. To demonstrate substantial compliance a litigant must establish:

            the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series
            of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3)
            a general compliance with the purpose of the statute;
            (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim[;] and (5) a
            reasonable explanation why there was not a strict
            compliance with the statute.

            [Galik, 167 N.J. at 353.]

      "Establishing th[e]se elements is a heavy burden." Id. at 357. "The

substantial compliance doctrine 'operates "to prevent barring legitimate claims

due to technical defects."'" H.C. Equities, LP v. Cty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366,

386 (2021) (quoting Cnty. of Hudson v. Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21 (2011)).

      N.J.S.A. 32:1-163 requires:

            any suit, action or proceeding prosecuted or maintained
            under this act shall be commenced within one year after
            the cause of action therefor shall have accrued, and
            upon the further condition that in the case of any suit,
            action or proceeding for the recovery or payment of
            money, prosecuted or maintained under this act, a
            notice of claim shall have been served upon the Port
            Authority by or on behalf of the plaintiff or plaintiffs at
            least sixty days before such suit, action or proceeding
            is commenced.

      The notice of claim must provide:

            (1) the name and post-office address of each claimant
            and of [their] attorney, if any, (2) the nature of the

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                                        10
              claim, (3) the time when, the place where and the
              manner in which the claim arose, and (4) the items of
              damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained so
              far as then practicable.

              [N.J.S.A. 32:1-164.]

      The purpose of the statute is to provide "adequate time for investigation,

reasonable opportunity for the preparation of its defense, and reasonable

opportunity to effect a settlement before the institution of suit." Zamel v. Port

of N.Y. Auth., 56 N.J. 1, 7 (1970). In the context of a similar notice of claim

requirement under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to -12.3,

our Supreme Court held the

              Legislature clearly envisioned that a claimant would
              disclose to a public entity its tort causes of action in a
              single document that provides clear notice of its claim,
              not in a series of incomplete communications that must
              be considered together in order to infer that a claim may
              be filed.

              [H.C. Equities, LP, 247 N.J. at 387-88.]

"[T]he public entity [cannot be] required to analyze multiple communications

and determine whether, viewed in the aggregate, they reveal an intent to sue."

Id. at 387.

      The record in this case does not demonstrate a lack of prejudice to

defendant, a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved, general

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compliance with the purpose of the statute, or reasonable notice of petitioner's

claim, as required by Galik. 167 N.J. at 353. Poli's numerous communications

with different individuals at different times are inadequate to establish

substantial compliance. The relevant statutes require "a notice of claim" and

refer to "the notice of claim." N.J.S.A. 32:1-163, 164. As the Supreme Court

held in H.C. Equities, LP, the Legislature clearly intended the notice would be

communicated in a single comprehensive document, not in a series of

incomplete communications. 247 N.J. at 387-88.

      Nowhere in any of the letters did Poli notify defendant of his intention to

file a lawsuit. Rather, the letters requested meetings to resolve his complaints

"in-house." Moreover, Poli's letters did not alert defendant to any of the claims

asserted in the amended complaint. The July 25, 2019 letter sought only "to

address Poli's 2018 performance review" and his "request for a transfer to a

different [d]epartment."   The November 5, 2020 letter disputed the OIG's

determination that he was not a whistleblower and requested a meeting "to

discuss [that finding] in light of [RPC 3.3] regarding a lawyer's obligation for

candor to a tribunal along with the OIG's perspective in response to [counsel's]

observations."

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                                      12
      The November 16, 2020 letter reiterated Poli's request for a meeting and

stated "[i]f you elect not to meet with us . . . I will advise my client accordingly."

The first letter sent in December 2020 reiterated Poli's claim that he should be

deemed a whistleblower and stated Poli "would like an in-house resolution

before resorting to an outside [a]dministrative [j]udicial remedy."              The

December 22, 2020 letter related only to Poli's request for a revision to his 2018

performance evaluation and requested a "prompt response."

      These letters do not demonstrate Poli advised defendant that he intended

to assert claims based on CEPA, NJLAD, breach or violation of contract,

interference with economic advantage, the Pierce doctrine, fraud, or defamation.

In addition, the letters did not reference any of the damages sought in the

lawsuit, including compensatory damages, lost wages, lost benefits, or punitive

damages.5 In fact, the only demands addressed in his letters—revision of his

2018 performance evaluation and transfer to a different department—are not

even included as demands in the amended complaint.

      Finally, Poli failed to provide a reasonable explanation why there was not

a strict compliance with the statute as required by Galik. 167 N.J. at 353. Poli

5
 During argument before us, counsel stated Poli is not making a claim for lost
wages. That claim is, however, asserted in the amended complaint.
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essentially contends he did not strictly comply with the statute because he was

not aware of the notice requirement. Generally, "ignorance of the law . . . will

not excuse failure to meet the filing deadline . . . ." Hyman Zamft & Manard,

LLC v. Cornell, 309 N.J. Super. 586, 593 (App. Div. 1998). If an attorney's

negligence "is the sole basis for the late notice, the claim against the public

entity will be lost." Bayer v. Twp. of Union, 414 N.J. Super. 238, 259 (App.

Div. 2010).

      Poli's reliance on the August 27, 2019 email Ioannou sent to Spector and

Lee, with the subject line "Privileged & Confidential—Litigation Hold

Process—Anticipated Litigation by [Poli]," does not lead us to a different result.

As we have discussed at length, the record does not support Poli's substantial

compliance argument. The fact that defendant initiated a litigation hold process

after receiving Poli's July 25, 2019, letter does not establish Poli substantially

complied with the notice of claim requirement. The doctrine of substantial

compliance requires much more than merely raising the possibility of some

unspecified future litigation. We are satisfied the court determined correctly

Poli failed to meet the heavy burden of establishing substantial compliance with

the notice of claim requirement.

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                                       14
      Poli's argument that defendant waived the notice of claim defense by

failing to assert it as an affirmative defense lacks merit. While it might be a

preferable practice to assert failure to serve a notice of claim as an affirmative

defense in cases such as this, omitting it will not result in waiver. In Port Auth.

of New York & New Jersey v. Airport Auto Services, Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 427,

430 (2007), we held that "failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement

[set forth in N.J.S.A. 32:1-163] withdraws the consent to suit, and thus, deprives

the court of subject matter jurisdiction." (internal quotation omitted) (quoting

Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. v. Barry, 833 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (N.Y. Sup. App.

Term 2007)). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised at any time,"

and cannot be waived. Lall v. Shivani, 448 N.J. Super. 38, 48 (App. Div. 2016).

Because failure to serve a notice of claim deprives the court of subject matter

jurisdiction, defendant did not waive the defense by failing to assert it as an

affirmative defense.

      Poli's argument that defendant is equitably estopped from asserting the

notice of claim defense is not persuasive. The doctrine of "[e]quitable estoppel

is 'rarely invoked against a governmental entity.'" Meyers v. State Health

Benefits Comm'n, 256 N.J. 94, 100 (2023) (quoting Middletown Twp.

Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n Local No. 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 162 N.J.

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361, 367 (2000)). However, "the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked against a

municipality to prevent manifest wrong and injustice." Ibid. (quoting Gruber

v. Mayor & Twp. Comm. of Raritan Twp., 39 N.J. 1, 14 (1962)).

      Poli contends defendant should be estopped from asserting the notice of

claim defense because defendant did not alert him to the notice requirement by

asserting it as an affirmative defense, and affirmatively concealed the

requirement by not placing it on its website. As discussed previously, defendant

was not required to assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction as an affirmative

defense. Poli's claim that defendant concealed the requirements of the statutes

by not placing the statutes on its website is entirely without merit. Statutes are

publicly available and cannot be concealed.       Poli failed to demonstrate a

manifest wrong or injustice that must be prevented. The doctrine of equitable

estoppel, therefore, is inapplicable.

      We are not convinced the court erred by failing to compel the production

of documents in response to Poli's motion to enforce litigant's rights.        We

"generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the

court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken

understanding of the applicable law." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019)

(quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).

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      Here, Poli moved to enforce the court's October 29, 2021 order and

compel the production of certain documents deemed privileged or otherwise

protected from discovery by defendant. On March 18, 2022, in a comprehensive

written opinion, the court found Poli misconstrued its October 29, 2021 order,

and determined Poli failed to show the information withheld from production

should be produced. We discern no reason to conclude the court abused its

discretion by denying Poli's motion and will not disturb the March 18, 2022

order on appeal.

      To the extent we have not otherwise addressed appellant's arguments, they

are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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