Court Opinion

ID: 9765444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:03:02.286534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.012376
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice. The jury returned a defendant’s verdict in this case involving a car wreck at an intersection. The trial court granted the plaintiffs motion for a new trial. We reverse and dismiss.  In 1982, we amended ARCP Rule 59(a)(6) to state that a trial judge can set aside a jury verdict only when it is “clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. . . .” Clayton v. Wagnon, 276 Ark. 124, 633 S.W,2d 19 (1982). The trial judge cannot substitute his view of the evidence for that of the jury. Bryant v. Sorrells, 293 Ark. 276, 737 S.W.2d 450 (1987). If the trial judge denies the motion for a new trial, we will affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict. If he grants the motion for a new trial, we will affirm if he did not abuse his discretion in finding that the verdict was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. Wilson, 282 Ark. 450,669 S.W.2d 6 (1984). In this case the trial judge abused his discretion because the jury’s verdict was not clearly against the evidence. Appellant Scott Schrader, a sixteen-year-old high school student who had gone home for lunch, got into his father’s Chevrolet Malibu to drive back to school. He had not driven that particular car in four weeks, but when he last drove it, the brakes worked satisfactorily. According to appellant, he left home and started down a rather long hill at about 30 or 35 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone. The road curved, and he began to apply his service brakes. They worked satisfactorily, and he was unaware they might later fail. He continued to slow down because there was a stop sign at the intersection at the bottom of the hill. When he was 10 to 15 feet from the stop sign, and going 10 to 15 miles per hour, he began to apply more pressure to the brake pedal. He had both feet on the brake pedal. Suddenly, and without warning, the pedal went to the floor, and the service brakes failed. Appellant, headed in an easterly direction, ran past the stop sign and into the intersection. He testified that, as he entered the intersection, he took evasive action by swerving to the right, but could not keep from running into appellee’s pick-up truck. He stated that his testimony was substantiated by the physical evidence which does show that the far left part of appellant’s front bumper struck appellee’s right door. Appellee was driving his pickup truck in a southerly direction on the intersecting road. He testified that his speed was about 35 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone. He stated that as he approached the intersection he noticed that appellant, who was going 15 to 20 miles per hour, was excited and trying to do something like apply the brakes, but it was obvious appellant’s car was going to ram appellee’s truck. Appellee swerved into the left lane, and appellant’s car hit the right side of his truck. Appellee did not state whether appellant attempted to swerve his car or take any other evasive action to avoid the wreck. He was asked a question which was designed to elicit such testimony, but it did not do so. The question and answer were: Q. Did you see the defendant [appellant] do anything to try to avoid this wreck? A. Er — he appeared to be doing something in the car, I’m not sure if he was — er—if he — if he was just excited or scared or what, but he appeared to be applying the brake. Appellant put on evidence by an expert mechanic witness who testified that he examined the service brakes on appellant’s car after the accident and found that the master cylinder had blown out the seals on both ends. He stated that on rare occasions a master cylinder without separate pistons, like the one on appellant’s car, can blow out both seals and, when that happens, the service brakes can go out without warning. Further, there would be no leakage or puddling on the surface under the car to warn a driver who is about to enter the car because the leakage is internal. Also, the hydraulic braking system is a pressure system and when the seals are out there is no pressure resistance. It is like “pushing a pencil through a glass of water — there wouldn’t be any resistance there.” Additionally, the appellee did not request an instruction on the duty to maintain brakes in good working order, Ark. Code Ann. § 27-37-501 (1987), or on the speed limit applicable to appellant’s car. The jury heard the above evidence and the instructions by the trial court and determined that the appellant was not negligent. The trial court granted a new trial because he felt the appellant (1) failed to operate his vehicle in a proper manner, (2) failed to maintain proper control, (3) failed to take evasive action, and (4) failed to react in a1 proper manner. In so ruling, the trial court abused its discretion.  There was no showing that the accident was caused by appellant’s failure to operate his vehicle in a proper manner. Appellant testified that at the top of the hill he was driving 35 miles per hour, and another time he said he was driving 30 miles per hour at that point. The speed limit there was 30 miles per hour. However, he stated he had reduced his speed halfway down the hill to 10 to 20 miles per hour. Appellee stated that appellant was only going 15 to 20 miles per hour, so speed was not a factor which contributed to the accident. There was no suggestion that appellant was out of his lane or violating any of the rules of the road immediately before his brakes failed. There was no instruction on failure to maintain brakes. There was no showing that appellant was at fault in failing to anticipate an abrupt breakdown in his service brake. There was no showing that appellant failed to swerve or take other evasive action. The appellant only attempted to use his service brakes; he did not attempt to use his emergency brake. At first blush this might seem negligent. However, appellant’s service brake failed when he was 10 to 15 feet from the intersection, and he was traveling at a speed of 10 to 20 miles per hour. At 20 miles per hour, he would be traveling 29.33 feet per second, and at 10 miles per hour 14.67 feet per second. Thus, from the time his service brakes failed and he was applying pressure with both of his feet on the brake pedal, he had less than a second to realize what had happened, react, take his left foot off the service brake pedal, get his left foot on the emergency brake pedal, and apply pressure.  Under these circumstances, the trial judge abused his discretion in holding that the jury verdict was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Appellee asks us to affirm the trial judge’s ruling by applying the standard of strict liability. See Stevens v. Wood Sawmill, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 13 (S.D. 1988). We do not address the argument. Appellee is asking for affirmative relief, as he is asking for a finding of liability against appellant based on strict liability. He did not make such a request at trial. He did not cross-appeal. The jury was instructed, without objection, that a finding of negligence was necessary. Accordingly, we do not consider applying the standard of strict liability in this case. Reversed and dismissed. Purtle, J., dissents in part and concurs in part.