Court Opinion

ID: 9492508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:45.492094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:20.367779
License: Public Domain

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the court’s opinion but write separately to voice reservations concerning the voir dire of prospective jurors. In view of the fact that the charged violations of the Hostage Act required the government to prove that the defendants were not nationals of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(2), (c), the district court was obliged to conduct (or permit) at least some inquiry designed to ferret out potential bias against non-nationals. I view the questions posed as to the jurors’ exposure to citizens of other countries, and their *813ability to be fair to those who are not citizens of this country, as adequate (but barely so) in that regard. I also agree with my colleagues that the circumstances of this particular case did not demand additional inquiry aimed at exposing bias related to the defendants’ race, nationality, and undocumented status. Although the defendants’ illegal presence in this country was disclosed to a limited extent, I am satisfied that neither their status, their nationality, nor their race was so highlighted as to compel additional voir dire along those lines. Further inquiry would have been prudent, a point evidenced by the fact that the government as well as the defense proposed voir dire questions in these areas; but in the final analysis I do not believe that the failure to engage in that inquiry amounts to reversible error.
Were a more searching exploration of bias motivated by race, nationality, or illegal status required, I would be forced to conclude that the voir dire in this case was inadequate. Here, the district court refused to pose any question that would have confronted such prejudices head-on. Like my colleagues, I appreciate the delicate nature of the undertaking and the reluctance to pose questions that inevitably will highlight the very characteristics that may inspire animus in a prospective juror. Ante at 810-11; but see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1636, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality) (“In our judgment, it is usually best to allow the defendant to resolve this conflict by making the determination of whether or not he would prefer to have the inquiry into racial or ethnic prejudice pursued.”). Yet, once the court decides that inquiry is appropriate, it must ask questions that supply the parties and their counsel with meaningful information. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2230, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir.1991). Asking a juror whether she has “any” bias or prejudice that would prevent her from being fair, or whether there is “anything” about the defendants “as you see them” that might cause her to be biased, is simply not enough. See Art Press, Ltd. v. Western Printing Mach. Co., 791 F.2d 616, 618-19 (7th Cir.1986). Members of the venire cannot be expected to divine what attitudes and animosities the court and the parties want to know about. Asked whether she “sees” anything that would cause her to be prejudiced, a prospective juror might focus on the defendant’s clothes, his jewelry, his weight, his apparent comb-over — anything but his race. If voir dire is to yield helpful information, the questions themselves must be framed so as to elicit concrete, candid responses, see United States v. Jones, 188 F.3d 773 (7th Cir.1999), and these were not.