Court Opinion

ID: 9571143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:20.026589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:47.128115
License: Public Domain

Phipps, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Divisions 2 and 3 of the majority opinion, but dissent to Division 1 and to the majority’s decision to overrule Ayiteyfio v. State.27 Because the trial court erred by granting the State’s McCollum motion, I would reverse.
Our review in this case is limited to the trial court’s step three determination that the State proved purposeful racial discrimination based on Gay’s peremptory strike of Juror No. 25, which determina*642tion was based not on the totality of the circumstances, but on its finding that Juror No. 25 was similarly situated to African-American jurors who were not struck. The trial court’s stated reason for concluding that Gay struck Juror No. 25 because of his race was that several African-American jurors who were seated on the jury collectively satisfied the criteria used to excuse Juror No. 25, although no African-American juror satisfied all three criteria. Although the State may carry its burden of persuasion by showing that similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury,28 “[w]here there are multiple reasons for striking a juror, white or black, it cannot be presumed that a reason applied to one juror, of one race, but not applied to another juror, of another race, is racially motivated.”29 Thus, a trial court cannot presume racial discrimination based on jurors being similarly situated when, in fact, they are not similarly situated. Here, Juror No. 25 was not similarly situated because the multiple reasons for striking him were not all applicable to any African-American juror seated on the jury.30 For that reason, the trial court’s conclusion that Gay engaged in purposeful racial discrimination when he struck Juror No. 25 was clearly erroneous.31 And because the State failed to meet its ultimate burden of persuasion, placing Juror No. 25 on the jury resulted in an illegally constituted jury.32 Thus, Gay is entitled to a new trial.33
In its zeal to affirm the trial court’s decision, regardless of the conclusions reached, the majority misconstrues the Ayiteyfio decision. It does not preclude a trial judge from drawing an inference of discrimination when one is warranted under the totality of the circumstances. Instead, it sets forth a rule to be applied to determine whether a juror who has been struck is similarly situated to a juror of another race who was seated on the jury. This consideration may be crucial when ruling on a McCollum motion, to assist in determining if the State has met its burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.
The rule established in Ayiteyfio was not intended to restrict the trial judge in any manner, but merely to aid the court in its step three analysis by giving some guidance on the definition of the term “similarly situated.” This case presents a perfect example of why the rule will help, not restrict, trial judges. During voir dire, the trial court asked the State for guidance on whether a particular juror is *643“similarly situated” if other jurors collectively satisfy the criteria used to excuse that juror. The State never responded to the court’s request and neither party ever mentioned the rule set forth in Ayiteyfio, which could have resolved the issue without further time or effort by the trial court.
Decided November 27, 2002.
Dennis C. Francis, Jr., for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Nor should Ayiteyfio be overruled based on the majority’s speculation that a defendant may invent additional reasons to strike a juror merely to evade McCollum. This defendant gave three race-neutral reasons, as determined by the trial court, for striking Juror No. 25.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Ruffin, Judge Barnes and Judge Miller join in this dissent.

 254 Ga. App. 1 (561 SE2d 157) (2002).

 See Blair v. State, 267 Ga. 166, 167 (2) (476 SE2d 263) (1996).

 Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 668-669 (1) (c) (437 SE2d 463) (1993).

 Ayiteyfio, 254 Ga. App. at 3.

 See id.

 Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509, 510 (2) (467 SE2d 562) (1996).

 Id.