Court Opinion

ID: 9379183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 21:02:29.314374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.835842
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/23 In re A.S. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re A.S, a Person Coming Under                                B316735
 the Juvenile Court Law.
 ______________________________                                  Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP03335
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

 G.S.,

           Respondent;

           v.

 I.S.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Affirmed.
       Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Dawyn Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Adam Baumgarten, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services.
       Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent G.S.
                        ____________________
       I.S. appeals the juvenile court’s termination of its
dependency jurisdiction over his son A.S. We
affirm. Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
       A.S. is a child with high-functioning autism born in 2011.
His parents shared custody of A.S. after their separation and
later divorce. The Department became involved with the family
after A.S. reported the father choked him and held him on the
ground during a June 2020 visit when A.S. threw a tantrum
because he did not want to try on pants with suspenders. The
juvenile court detained A.S. from the father and later sustained
an allegation of failure to protect, finding the father had engaged
in inappropriate physical discipline, and ordered services. The
father appealed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. We
affirmed the orders in In re A.S. (Nov. 4, 2021, B310778) [nonpub.
opn.], p. *3.
       A detailed recitation of the later facts of the case is
unnecessary for our analysis. We provide a brief summary for
context.
       While the first appeal was pending, services for the father
continued. He had monitored visits with A.S. that were

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“inconsistent and destructive.” A.S. continued to show signs of
anxiety before visits with the father. During one visit in April
2021, A.S. had his shoes on the wrong feet. The father was upset
and demanded he switch them. A.S. was distraught and refused,
and the father ended the visit. A social worker noted that the
father’s lack of knowledge and skill in interacting with A.S.
“creates a hostile environment for the child” even with a monitor
present. A.S. began refusing to visit the father. After a
discussion with the judge in chambers, A.S. agreed to try a
conjoint counseling session with his therapist and his father. The
session did not go well. The father did not complete the
individual therapy and parenting classes ordered by the court.
       At a contested section 364 review hearing in October 2021,
counsel for the Department, the mother, and A.S. all asked the
juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction and grant sole physical
and legal custody to the mother. The court did so. The court’s
final order, colloquially referred to as an exit order, specified that
the father would receive monitored visits in a therapeutic setting
once a month after he completed three parenting classes for
children with special needs. Father appeals.
       The father argues it was an abuse of discretion for the court
to terminate jurisdiction. He asserts the court’s supervision was
necessary to ensure the ordered conjoint counseling occurred so
the father and A.S. could mend their relationship, which the
court found would be in A.S.’s best interest.
       The father’s attack, then, is on the juvenile court’s
termination of its dependency jurisdiction rather than the
substance of its exit order.
       With this in mind, we turn to the standard of review. The
parties agree the applicable standard is abuse of discretion.

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Though the father cites cases relating only to challenges to
custody and visitation orders, the Department cites a case
holding that standard applies to a “decision to terminate
dependency jurisdiction.” Though not addressed by either party,
there appears to be a split in authority. Some appellate courts
apply the abuse of discretion standard to decisions to terminate
jurisdiction under section 364, while others apply a substantial
evidence standard of review. (See Bridget A. v. Superior Court
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300 [abuse of discretion standard
applies]; cf. In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 167, 172
[substantial evidence standard applies]; see also In re Aurora P.
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156 [noting a number of reported
decisions reviewed findings pursuant to section 364 for
substantial evidence].)
       We need not enter the fray, however, as the father’s
arguments fail under either standard, if indeed there is a genuine
difference between these deferential standards.
       Section 364 applies when the juvenile court asserts
dependency jurisdiction over a child, but the child remains in the
custody of a custodial parent. (§ 364, subd. (a).) At each hearing,
the juvenile court must determine if the conditions that led to the
detention still exist or are likely to exist if the court ends its
supervision. (§ 364, subd. (c).) If not, the juvenile court must
terminate its jurisdiction. (Ibid.; In re Shannon M. (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 282, 290 [section 364, subdivision c, creates a
“statutory presumption in favor of terminating
jurisdiction”].) When the court terminates its jurisdiction, it may
make appropriate custody and visitation orders, which can
include conditions on such rights, such as counseling. (§ 362.4,
subd. (a); § 362, subd. (c); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196,

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203-204 [statutory authority extends to necessary collateral
orders related to custody and visitation].)
       As discussed, the father claims the juvenile court should
not have terminated jurisdiction. But he does not argue the
conditions that led to the court taking jurisdiction still exist or
would exist if the court terminated its jurisdiction. Nor does he
provide any evidence to show this is the case. Instead, the father
wants the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction to ensure he has
the best chance of mending his relationship with A.S. He argues
that, without court supervision, the conjoint counseling ordered
by the court probably will not occur. While the father’s desire to
rebuild his relationship is commendable, and indeed the court
noted fixing the relationship would be in A.S.’s best interest,
these are not factors under section 364, subdivision (c).
       The juvenile court sought to ensure the father and A.S.
would have the best chance at repairing their relationship by
issuing the exit order it did. As the father acknowledges, if, as he
fears, the order is not followed, his recourse is to go to family law
court to enforce it. He argues proceedings in family law court
would be damaging to A.S. but fails to explain why further
proceedings in the juvenile court would have a different
effect. Regardless, the father’s concern about possible
noncompliance does not constitute a reason to justify extension of
the court’s dependency jurisdiction. (In re Chantal S., supra, 13
Cal.4th at 204 [need to impose conditions relating to visitation
does not justify subjecting child to indefinite dependency
jurisdiction].)
       The father has raised no arguments and pointed to no
evidence relevant to the standard applied by the juvenile court in
terminating its dependency jurisdiction. His challenge fails.

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                        DISPOSITION
     We affirm.

                                      WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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