Court Opinion

ID: 9573073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:47:36.738227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:50.095776
License: Public Domain

Royse, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully disagree. I believe the majority has incorrectly decided to address the merits of Saucedo’s appeal.
*269Numerous appellate decisions make clear that “it is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles which cannot affect the matter in issue before the court.” Thompson v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 208 Kan. 869, 871, 494 P.2d 1092, cert. denied 409 U.S. 944 (1972). In a case recently issued, the Supreme Court stated:
“[I]t is the function of a judicial tribunal to determine real controversies relative to the legal rights of persons and properties which are actually involved in the particular case properly brought before it and to adjudicate those rights in such manner that the determination will be operative, final, and conclusive.” Board of Johnson County Comm’rs v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, Syl. ¶ 1, 912 P.2d 716 (1996).
The requirement of a real controversy presupposes that “there must be at least two parties who can assert rights which have developed or will arise against each other.” Johnson County Sports Authority v. Shanahan, 210 Kan. 253, 259, 499 P.2d 1090 (1972).
In my view, this case fails the criteria described in Duffy: (1) This case does not present a controversy relative to the legal rights of the parties actually involved in the case; and (2) the majority opinion does not adjudicate those rights in a manner that is operative, final, and conclusive.
With regard to the first criteria, the only parties to this case are Saucedo and Winger. Winger has never filed any motion to bring Medpro into this action. Saucedo did not appear in this appeal.
Winger asserts the only issue before this court is whether Med-pro has the right to settle Saucedo’s claim without Winger s approval. Medpro is not a party to this action. Winger has not asserted that Saucedo must return the money paid to her, a fact which likely explains Saucedo’s decision not to file a brief in this appeal. While there may be a dispute about rights in this case, there is no dispute presented in this appeal about the rights of the parties involved in this particular case.
Perhaps even more telling is the fact that the majority opinion does not adjudicate the rights of the parties in a manner that is operative, final, and conclusive. First, the majority opinion simply directs the district court to vacate the order approving settlement. *270There is no suggestion that Saucedo must return the money to Medpro (which has not asked that its money be returned).
Second, Winger asserts, without citation to the record, that the settlement has damaged him because it has been reported to a national data bank. Winger asserts this report to the data bank will cause him monetary loss and harm his reputation. The majority opinion does nothing about that entry in the data bank. The majority opinion does not and'cannot order Medpro — a non-party to this case — to delete the alleged entry in the data bank.
Finally, the majority opinion leaves the district court with a real puzzle. After it deletes the order approving settlement, as directed by the majority opinion, what is the district court to do? Winger claims in his brief that he wants his day in court on the merits. Must the district court schedule a trial that Saucedo does not want so that Winger can “vindicate himself”? The majority opinion simply leaves the district court case file in limbo. It does not produce an operative, final, or conclusive result.
Winger asserts this court should address the merits of his appeal because interpretation of the policy language is an “area of continuing public interest.” Before any policy language is interpreted, it would seem reasonable that the policy be admitted into evidence in the case. The policy supposedly at issue here has not been admitted into evidence. It is supported in the record only by an assertion of counsel in his brief to the district court. Assertions of counsel before the trial court, appellaté court, or in an appellate brief are not evidence. In re Estate of Murdock, 20 Kan. App. 2d 170, Syl. ¶ 5, 884 P.2d 749 (1994). Even more important, this court should decide issues of public interest after hearing both sides of a dispute, not on the basis of the brief from only one side.