Court Opinion

ID: 9791114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:05:58.129541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.198567
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
I cannot agree with the court’s decision. An analysis Will show with unmistakable clarity that its effect is to turn the defendant’s claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment into a conclusive presumption that he was guilty of gambling, which charge he denied under oath in his affidavit; and that this deprives him of his right of trial of that issue by jury, for which he made a timely demand.1
Summary judgment depriving the defendant of his right to a trial is justified only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to him, shows clearly that even upon a trial, judgment would necessarily go against him. Accordingly we should not treat this case as though there had been a trial and the issues resolved in favor of .the plaintiff as, it seems to me, is done in the main opinions.2 Instead this record should be analyzed in the light most favorable to the defendant to ascertain whether there is any genuine dispute as to a material and controlling issue of fact, and if there is, that issue should be determined upon a trial; and in case of doubt it should be resolved in favor of allowing the party the privilege of a trial.3
The basis of the plaintiff’s asserted right to evict the defendant was that he had permitted gambling on the premises in violation of the terms of the lease and of the law.4 The defendant’s answer denied any violation of either. He asserted that the plaintiff’s real motive for trying to evict him was that the American Oil Company had offered twice the rental he paid, and had in fact advanced $1500 in consideration of her promise to evict the defendant. The plaintiff filed three affidavits relating to alleged payoffs on pinball machines and punchboard games by the defendant. In opposition to them the defendant filed an affidavit stating that he “ * * * does not recall any of the events referred to * * * and therefore denies that he made any of the alleged ‘pay-offs,’ ” and that, “ * * * all of the statements pertaining to pay-offs are false.”
*39It surely cannot be gainsaid that at that point the defendant had denied the critical issue, the charge of gambling. The trial judge himself so concluded and quite properly denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment at that point. The question of concern here has arisen because when the defendant’s deposition was thereafter taken, in response to questions about gambling activities, he claimed privilege against self-incrimination and declined to answer.5 The result of this, the way I see it, was to say in effect: I have told you I have no recollection of any such thing and have denied under oath your claim of gambling. The burden is upon you to prove your own case. To your attempt to prove it by me, I decline to furnish you any information, and stand on the • privilege which is mine under the Constitution.
In order for the trial court to justify rendering judgment against the defendant at this point, it must conclude thht the record compels a finding that the defendant was guilty of gambling. The only possible basis for such a ruling would be to draw a conclusive presumption of that fact from the defendant’s claim of his privilege. This position essayed by the plaintiff, that by claiming his privilege the defendant confessed that he had conducted gambling at the cafe, is unsupportable.
. The United States Supreme. Court is of course the final arbiter of rights assured under the Federal Constitution.6 In numerous cases it has confronted and dealt with the effect of asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. It spoke on the subject with unequivocal certainty in the case of Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York,7 which involved a schoolteacher who had been dismissed because he invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned by a congressional committee. The Board had contended that the teacher was either (a) guilty of crime, or (b) guilty of perjury for falsely invoking the privilege. The court rejected this contention and said:
At the outset we must condenvn the practice of imputing a sinister -meaning to the exercise of a person’s^consliiujional right under the Fifth Amendment. * * In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S.Ct. 497 [100 L.Ed. 511], we scored the assumption that those who claim this privilege are either criminals 'or- perjurers. The privilege against self-inc'rimin-ation would be reduced to a hollow-mockery if its exercise could be taken as equiv*40alent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. As we pointed out in Ullmann, a witness may have a reasonable fear of prosecution and yet be innocent of any wrongdoing. The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.
The problem was dealt with again just this year in another civil proceeding.8 A New York lawyer was disbarred for his refusal to produce records and testify at a judicial proceeding, claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, saying:
* * * the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment * * * should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. * * *
We said in Malloy v. Hoggan:
“The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement — the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty * * * for such silence.” 378 U.S., at 8, 84 S.Ct., at 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d at 659.
In this context “penalty” is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege "costly.”
There are numerous other examples where forcing a party to answer, or forfeit a right or property, has been held to violate the Fifth Amendment. In Boyd v. United States,9 forfeiture of goods. Garrity v. State of New Jersey,10 police officers to be removed from office if they refused to give information about an alleged fixing of traffic tickets. If the cases hereinabove referred to are sound: that property may not be forfeited, a police officer or schoolteacher may not be discharged, or an attorney be disbarred, for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, all in noncriminal proceedings, then how can we justify summarily finding the facts against the defendant here without a trial, and deprive him of his cafe which is his means of livelihood solely because he invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The court's decision cites certain authorities as supporting its conclusion. In *41órder to avoid burdening this opinion and the printed page with a lengthy exposition on each of those authorities, I say this- advisedly and categorically: Those authorities as cited do not deal with the same question involved here, and they do not support the proposition that because defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment he must be presumed guilty of the conduct charged and that consequently there is no longer any dispute on that issue. Upon examination it will be found that insofar as they touch close to the question here involved, they stand for á proposition with which I am in full accord: that in a civil case, where a party invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege, it is a circumstance which, upon a trial, the court or jury may consider in connection with all other evidence, and may draw an inference adverse to that party’s interest if they so desire.11
A reading of a little further into Section 80 of McCormick on Evidence, cited by the majority, and to the cases which are referred to in that text, will show that the question there considered is .not whether the court on summary judgment must find the privilege claimer guilty of misconduct, but whether the court or jury, as fact finder, may draw the adverse inference. But none goes so far as to say that the claiming of the privilege establishes absolutely that the party is guilty of the conduct about which he is questioned. Insofar as we have been able to find by our research, there has never been a case which has sustained a ruling that a party is defeated on summary judgment for claiming the privilege, nor where a court has said that the inference must be made, nor have we even found a case where going to any such extreme has even been urged.12 If there is any such authority, we would be glad to be enlightened by citation to it by the majority in support of their position.
There are other aspects of this case which argue persuasively the propriety of affording the defendant the opportunity of a trial *42rather than to cast him out without a hearing. The affidavits filed by the plaintiff are not to my mind in and of themselves sufficient to compel a finding that defendant was gambling. They relate to certain observations about the playing of a pinball machine and the defendant handing over money at the cash register, plus some hearsay statements overheard by affiants. It is true that if these affidavits stood unassailed, they would permit an inference and thus a finding of the gambling. On the other hand, it is also true that if the inadmissible hearsay recited in the affidavits is disregarded, reasonable minds might well remain 'unconvinced that the defendant was gambling. This is particularly so when it is 'remembered that even in a civil case, where the act necessary to establish a cause of action would amount to a crime, it is usually held that the proof required must be clear and convincing.13
The' other aspect of the case bearing on the conclusion herein advocated is that in the defendant’s answer and in his affidavit denying the alleged payoffs he injected certain other elements touching upon the questionable character, the interest, and the motives of plaintiff’s affiants in an alleged collusion with her to cancel the defendant’s lease, which a jury might regard as casting serious doubt upon their credibility. This also argues cogently against the propriety of ruling that the record compels a finding against the defendant without trial.
Upon the basis of this record as it presently stands, and in the light of the law as discussed herein, it is my opinion that the defendant is entitled to have the trial by jury in accordance with his demand. (All emphasis added.)
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, C. J.

. As to assurance of trial by jury under our law see Art. I, See. 12, Utah Constitution, and U.R.C.P. Rule 83.

. The concurring opinion is incorporated by reference into the main opinion.

. See Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396; Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 385 P.2d 62.

. Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-3 (1953).

. Sec. 12 of Art. I of the Constitution of Utah and Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.

. That the Fifth Amendment is binding on the States, see Malloy v. Hoggan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653.

. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692.

. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967), overruling Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 81 S.Ct. 954, 6 L.Ed.2d 166 (1961).

. 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746.

. 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1967).

. See also In re Ratner, 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 865; Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42, 358 P.2d 155; Bowe v. Palmer, 36 Utah 214, 102 P. 1007; and see 25 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence Sec. 178.

. The closest thing we have found is in cases where a plaintiff has brought an action and then refused discovery on the basis of the Fifth Amendment privilege, and the court has justified sanctions such as striking his pleadings, finding the facts against him, or entering his default. See Abramowitz v. Voletsky, 47 Misc.2d 626, 262 N.Y.S.2d 991; Barbato v. Tuosto, 38 Misc.2d 823, 238 N.Y.S.2d 1000; Levine v. Bornstein, 13 Misc.2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574, affirmed 7 A.2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868, affirmed 6 N.Y.2d 892, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702, 160 N.E.2d 921. These rulings were based on the ground that it wouldn’t be fair to allow him to sue and then refuse to talk. (See Rule 37(b) and (d) U.R.O.P.) But even in those eases from the expression of the judges it will be seen that all agreed that such sanctions could not properly be applied against a defendant who is brought involuntarily into court, because this would place him in the precarious position of either having to confess judgment or give up his privilege.

. See Boyle v. Baggs, 10 Utah 2d 203, 350 P.2d 622; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, Sec. 229; Beagley v. United States Gypsum Co., 116 Utah 337, 209 P.2d 750; Bowler v. Vannoy, 67 Nev. 80, 215 P.2d 248, petition for rehearing denied, 67 Nev. 80, 216 P.2d 274.