Court Opinion

ID: 9691775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 08:09:57.304349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:12.204184
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-21-00286-CV
                              __________________

                   IN THE INTEREST OF L.J.L.
__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 317th District Court
                      Jefferson County, Texas
                    Trial Cause No. F-213,651-E
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This is an appeal of a SAPCR (“Suit Affecting Parent-Child Relationship”).

After a bench trial, Mother appeals a modification order entered by the trial court

concerning her daughter, L.J.L.1 The modification order granted Father the exclusive

right to designate L.J.L.’s primary residence. In two issues, Mother complains the

trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody because there was insufficient

evidence supporting the trial court’s implied findings that a material change of

circumstances had occurred and that the modification was in L.J.L.’s best interest.

      1To protect the privacy of the parties, we use the child’s initials and refer to

certain other individuals by their relationship to the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 109.002(d).
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As discussed herein, we affirm the trial court’s Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship.

                                 BACKGROUND

      Mother filed a Petition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship seeking to

modify the 2012 Order Establishing Parent-Child Relationship (“2012 Order”).

Mother alleged that the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party

affected by the 2012 Order had materially and substantially changed since the date

of rendition and that modification was in L.J.L.’s best interest. Mother requested that

Father’s access and possession be restricted to supervised possession. Father filed

an Original Answer denying Mother’s allegations the same day the trial court signed

an Order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child Relationship finding that Father failed to

appear and wholly made default. Father filed a Motion for New Trial and to Set

Aside Default Judgment, in which he argued that Mother failed to properly serve

him and that he had a meritorious defense because L.J.L. had made an outcry

claiming sexual abuse had occurred at Mother’s home. Father alleged that L.J.L. had

been interviewed at the Houston Children’s Assessment Center, and based on the

interview, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) had created a safety plan and did not

want L.J.L. returned to Mother’s home until they completed the investigation. Father

included his Affidavit, in which he averred that sending L.J.L. back to Mother’s

home would jeopardize L.J.L.’s mental, physical, and emotional health because

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L.J.L. had reported that her sister (“Sister”) was sexually abusing her. The trial court

set aside the default judgment and granted Father a new trial.

      Father filed a Counterpetition to Modify Parent-Child Relationship alleging

that the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the 2012

Order had materially and substantially changed since the date of rendition and

requesting that he be appointed as the person who has the right to designate the

child’s primary residence. Father alleged that Mother had a history or pattern of

family violence and child neglect, CPS found that physical and sexual abuse may

have occurred in Mother’s home, and that a safety plan required him to keep L.J.L.

Father requested that the trial court limit Mother’s access and possession to

supervised visitation or to unsupervised daytime visits outside Mother’s home and

pleaded that such modification was in L.J.L.’s best interest. Father attached his

Affidavit, in which he averred that L.J.L. had alleged that Sister sexually abused her

at Mother’s home, and Mother had slapped and threatened to choke L.J.L. At

Father’s request, the trial court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem for L.J.L.

      The trial court conducted a bench trial. Mother testified that she was L.J.L.’s

primary conservator, who was nine years old, and that L.J.L. had thrived under her

care. When the trial occurred, Mother lived in Houston, and she explained that L.J.L.

would be attending fifth grade in Alief Independent School District. Mother testified

that she has three children, and she currently resides in her home with L.J.L. and her

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son, who is twelve. Mother told the trial court that L.J.L., while living with Mother,

had made allegations of sexual abuse against Mother’s fourteen-year-old daughter,

Sister, who had been living with an aunt for over a year. Mother explained that under

the court’s orders, Sister could not be around L.J.L. unsupervised, and she had

complied with that order. Mother testified that L.J.L. outcried to Father, and Mother

suspected that Father had coerced L.J.L. to make the outcry.

      Mother also told the trial court why she filed a suit to modify the trial court’s

2012 Order. According to Mother, she wanted the order modified because she

wanted the trial court to reduce Father’s visitation with L.J.L. Father responded to

the suit, by accusing Mother of abusing and neglecting L.J.L. and keeping her in an

unsafe environment. Mother denied all of Father’s allegations and explained that

CPS never found she had abused L.J.L., nor had CPS removed L.J.L. from Mother’s

care. Mother explained that pending the results of the current investigation, CPS had

issued a safety plan to Father, and Father was supposed to return L.J.L. to her. Father

had, however, failed to do so and kept L.J.L. for six months. Mother testified that

she kept sister and L.J.L. separated, cooperated with the investigation, allowed CPS

to visit her home, and that CPS had ruled out the allegations against her. Mother also

testified that neither she, nor Sister were charged with any criminal activity, and

L.J.L. had not made any further outcries. Mother explained that if the court allowed

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her to maintain custody of L.J.L., she would continue to abide by the court’s

requirements regarding arrangements for Sister and L.J.L.

      Mother testified that while in her care, L.J.L. attended school virtually the past

school year, because Mother was concerned about COVID, and she understood that

was one of Father’s concerns. Mother explained that she had enrolled L.J.L. in

school for the upcoming school year and that there were no issues with L.J.L. moving

to the fifth grade. Mother also explained that the previous summer both she and

Father submitted to drug testing, and she tested positive for marijuana. Mother

testified that while on vacation without L.J.L., Mother said she tried THC candy,

which she legally purchased in California, and she claimed she did not regularly use

marijuana. Mother further testified that she believed drug use was not a concern

because the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) had

not requested drug testing in over a year.

      Mother believed it was in L.J.L.’s best interest for her to remain the primary

conservator with the exclusive right to designate L.J.L.’s primary residence and for

Father to have supervised possession and access because of his negative influence.

Mother was aware that L.J.L. had informed the Guardian Ad Litem that she preferred

to live with Father, but she felt Father had influenced that decision. Mother denied

telling L.J.L. not to discuss what occurred in Mother’s home, and she explained that

CPS found her home was appropriate. Mother testified it would be detrimental to

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uproot L.J.L. from her Houston home, school, and friends. She also admitted that

Father did not approve of her moving to Houston, but the 2012 Order did not include

a geographical restriction. Mother explained that due to her work schedule, L.J.L.

walked to and from school with her siblings and other neighborhood friends, and

Mother added that a family member met L.J.L. when she got home. Mother also

testified that L.J.L. saw a counselor concerning her outcry of sexual abuse, but

Mother did not believe that Sister had sexually assaulted L.J.L. as L.J.L. had

claimed. Mother further testified that L.J.L. claimed that something occurred at

Father’s home and told her she did not want to stay there. Mother explained that she

was currently employed, had health insurance for her children, and had almost

completed her psychology degree online.

      Father testified that he had lived in Beaumont for over twenty years with his

mother and stepfather. Father explained that L.J.L. has her own room and attends

Beaumont Independent School District. Father testified that he always wanted joint

custody of L.J.L. and to share 50% of the responsibilities and time, and he was

concerned that Mother spent L.J.L.’s child support on her other children, who did

not receive any child support. Father testified that after Mother moved to Houston,

L.J.L. was dirty and smelly 50% of the time he picked her up, and he would “wipe

her down right quick.” Father testified that he complained to Mother but “tried to

work things out” outside of court, and he explained he did not have money to hire

                                         6
an attorney. Father explained that he called CPS twice in 2013 or 2014 to complain

about L.J.L.’s condition when he picked her up, which also included her having bite

marks and scratches. CPS, however, had ruled out his complaints.

      Father testified that when L.J.L. was three or four, he had just returned from

picking L.J.L. up from Mother when he found L.J.L. on top of his girlfriend’s child

“humping and kissing on him.” Father testified that when L.J.L. told him where she

learned it from, he believed that Sister might have been sexually inappropriate with

L.J.L. When he called Mother to discuss what he had seen, she told him “it was

denied on her end.” Father did not report the incident to CPS because he was “trying

to co-parent[]” and thought Mother would “eradicate whatever might have been

transpiring.” Father also testified he called CPS when L.J.L. was six, because she

told him that Mother had slapped her and threatened to choke her until she passed

out if she continued to ask to live with Father. Father also complained that Mother

had denied him access to L.J.L., but he admitted that he never filed any enforcement

actions against Mother.

      Father testified that after L.J.L. outcried, he kept L.J.L. from Mother for

approximately six months without court authorization, because he was trying to

protect L.J.L., who begged him to keep her. Father also testified that after he tried to

talk to Mother about L.J.L.’s allegations of physical and sexual abuse, L.J.L. told

him that Mother whipped her and yelled. Father explained that he was seeking a

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modification because L.J.L. made an outcry. Father testified that after L.J.L. made

an outcry to her teacher at school, he took her to the Children’s Assessment Center.

Father explained that Mother did not believe that Sister assaulted L.J.L., that Mother

was more concerned about getting L.J.L. back than solving the problem, and that

Mother did not remove Sister from her home until the court ordered her to do so.

      Father testified that he is currently employed, works four day shifts per week

and has flexibility as a supervisor. Father also explained that L.J.L. has family and

church support in Beaumont and is making “all A’s” in school. Father testified that

the CPS investigation was pending when Mother filed her motion to modify, and

that he filed his modification because he was concerned for L.J.L.’s safety. Father

explained that CPS had ruled out any allegations against him. Father believed that

appointing him as the primary conservator with the exclusive right to determine

L.J.L.’s primary residence was in L.J.L.’s best interest. Father did not request

supervised visitation with Mother, but he did request that the court order include

L.J.L. being separated from Sister when L.J.L. is with her Mother.

      The trial court took judicial notice of all pleadings on file as well as the

Guardian Ad Litem’s report. The trial court also considered the findings of the CPS

investigation, which, among other findings, ruled out allegations of neglectful

supervision and physical abuse against Mother. That said, the CPS investigation

found “reason to believe” as to the allegations of sexual abuse against L.J.L.’s sister.

                                           8
After considering the evidence, the trial court signed an Order in Suit to Modify

Parent-Child Relationship, found the material allegations in Father’s Counterpetition

to Modify true and correct, and ruled that the requested modification would be in

L.J.L.’s best interest. The trial court appointed the parents as joint managing

conservators, granted Father the exclusive right to designate L.J.L.’s primary

residence, and ordered Mother to supervise L.J.L.’s contact with Sister. Mother

appealed.

                                   ANALYSIS

      In two issues, Mother complains the trial court abused its discretion by

modifying custody because there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

implied findings of a material change of circumstances and to support the finding

that modifying the order is in L.J.L.’s best interest.

      We review a trial court’s modification order under an abuse of discretion

standard. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982). A trial court

abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or when it

acts without reference to any guiding principles. See In re A.E.M., No. 09-18-00288-

CV, 2020 WL 826715, at *9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Under an abuse of discretion standard, the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence are not independent grounds of error but merely factors in assessing

whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re A.E.D., No. 09-13-00555-CV,

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2014 WL 4363445, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 4, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). “This standard has been distilled into a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the trial

court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2)

whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion.” In re M.A.M., 346

S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied) (citations omitted); see In re

E.R.A., No. 09-20-00042-CV, 2021 WL 1031142, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). “‘The traditional sufficiency review

comes into play with regard to the first question. With regard to the second question,

we determine, based on the elicited evidence, whether the trial court made a

reasonable decision.’” In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2010, no pet.) (quoting In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2005, no pet.)); see In re E.R.A., 2021 WL 1031142, at *4.

      Since trial courts have wide discretion to determine the child’s best interest in

resolving issues of custody and visitation, “‘[t]he trial court does not abuse its

discretion if its order is supported by some evidence of a substantial and probative

character.’” In re B.C.C., No. 09-21-00001-CV, 2022 WL 17350920, at *9 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Dec. 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re A.E.D., 2014 WL

4363445, at *3). We review the entire record in determining whether the trial court’s

decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. (citation omitted). The trial court does

not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence, so long as

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some evidence supports its decision. Id. (citing In re H.M.W., No. 09-21-00047-CV,

2022 WL 710059, at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

      The factfinder “‘is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and

demeanor,’” and our review must defer to the trial court’s factual determinations.

See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009)). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in

favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and we disregard all

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been

not credible. Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2022)). When, as in

this case, the trial court does not issue separate findings of fact, we presume the trial

court made all findings necessary to support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801

S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).

      A court that has continuing exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that

provides for the conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child. Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 155.003(a). Section 156.101 of the Family Code sets out the

grounds for modifying a conservatorship order:

   (a) The court may modify an order that provides for the appointment of a
       conservator of a child, that provides the terms and conditions of
       conservatorship, or that provides for the possession of or access to a
       child if modification would be in the best interest of the child and:

      (1) the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected
          by the order have materially and substantially changed since the
          earlier of:
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         (A) the date of the rendition of the order, or

         (B) The date of the signing of a mediated or collaborative law
            settlement agreement on which the order is based[.]

Id. § 156.101(a)(1); In re A.E.M., 2020 WL 826715, at *10. “‘The change-in-

circumstances requirement is a threshold issue for the trial court and is based on a

policy of preventing constant re-litigation with respect to children.’” In re A.E.M.,

2020 WL 826715, at *10 (quoting Smith v. Karanja, 546 S.W.3d 734, 738 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.)) (other citation omitted). Unlike

termination of parental rights cases in which the statutory grounds for termination

must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the standard of proof for a

conservatorship decision is preponderance of the evidence. See In re J.A.J., 243

S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007).

      The child’s best interest is the trial court’s primary concern in determining

issues of conservatorship, possession, and access. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.002.

We assess the trial court’s best-interest finding by using the Holley factors. See

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). The Holley factors include

(1) the child’s desires; (2) the child’s current and future physical and emotional

needs; (3) any physical or emotional danger to the child now or in the future; (4) the

parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to

those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; (6) the plans for the child by

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these individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) acts or omissions by a parent

tending to show that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. Id.

      The trial court heard conflicting evidence regarding the Holley factors with

respect to conservatorship, possession, and access. See id. After hearing all the

evidence and observing the witnesses, the trial court found that it was in L.J.L.’s best

interest that the parents remain as joint managing conservators and that Father have

the exclusive right to designate L.J.L.’s residence. Based on the evidence concerning

all relevant factors when the trial occurred, we conclude that some evidence of

substantive and probative character supports the trial court’s decision. See In re

B.C.C., 2022 WL 17350920, at *9. We further conclude that the trial court made a

reasonable decision considering the evidence presented. See In re E.R.A, 2021 WL

1031142, at *4; In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d at 849. Accordingly, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying its order. See Gillespie, 644

S.W.2d at 451. We overrule Mother’s issues and affirm the trial court’s Order in Suit

to Modify Parent-Child Relationship.

      AFFIRMED.
                                                      _________________________
                                                         W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                              Chief Justice

Submitted on March 8, 2023
Opinion Delivered August 24, 2023
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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