Court Opinion

ID: 9583694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:41:15.676767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:36.202126
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES
concurring:
I concur in the result, but write separately because, in my opinion, the PCR judge correctly found that attorney Strickler did not impermissibly comment on petitioner’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. He therefore found that petitioner’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to object. I agree with the PCR judge’s analysis, and agree with the majority that we should affirm.
In State v. Green, 269 S.C. 623, 239 S.E.2d 646 (1977), the Court was faced with the claim that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for a severance. At trial, appellants had sought either a severance, or the right to comment on a codefendant’s refusal to take the stand. The Court held that the trial court committed no error in refusing to permit the appellants to comment on the codefendant’s refusal to take the stand, and cited with approval to a Fifth Circuit decision2 *647which held that a comment on an accused’s silence is improper whether made by a codefendant, by the prosecutor, or by the judge. Id. The Court acknowledged that in situations where an attorney must, in order to fulfill his duty to his client, call attention to a codefendant’s silence, a severance was warranted. In Green, no severance was required because the appellants and the codefendant did not have antagonistic defenses and therefore the appellants were not prejudiced by their inability to comment on the codefendant’s refusal to take the stand.
Viewing Green in context as a severance case, I am not as confident as the majority that it should be read to hold that the same, if not stricter, proscriptions on references to a defendant’s silence apply to codefendants’ attorneys as to judges and prosecutors.3 In my opinion, we should recognize that an attorney, in the course of zealously representing his client, must emphasize the facts that place his client in the best light. I would adopt a test similar to that used in the Eighth Circuit and in the Eleventh Circuit when reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a codefendant’s attorney: whether the attorney manifestly intended to refer to the defendant’s silence or whether the comment was of such a nature that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it as a reference to the defendant’s silence? See e.g., United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213 (8th Cir.1995). In other words, we should ask whether the comments actually or implicitly invited the jury to infer the defendant’s guilt from his silence. See e.g., United States v. Mena, 863 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir.1989).
In the present case petitioner and his codefendant (Kelsey) presented antagonistic defenses in which each blamed the other for killing the victim. Petitioner’s attorney’s (Breibart’s) pretrial motion to sever the cases was denied, as were his repeated requests for a severance and/or a mistrial during the proceedings. During opening statements, Strickler acknowledged Kelsey’s guilt of two of the charges, possession of a pipe bomb and desecration of human remains, but denied that his client had murdered the victim or conspired with *648petitioner to commit the murder. During Breibart’s opening statement, he criticized Strickler’s acknowledgment of Kelsey’s culpability, but told the jury that Kelsey had confessed to all the crimes.
Kelsey testified, and admitted his guilt of the charges other than conspiracy and murder: petitioner did not testify. A third youth involved in the crimes testified for the State; he had initially identified Kelsey as the perpetrator, but in later statements and in his trial testimony he identified petitioner as the responsible individual.
During the closing argument, Strickler said:
So I will talk with you a little bit about what I had to say at the start; and that’s that [Kelsey] would go ahead and confess to what he is guilty of, what he has done. What did Mr. Breibart tell you at the start? That’s [petitioner’s] attorney.
I’ve got to bring that up because yesterday you heard nothing but [Kelsey] because [he] wanted and was willing to sit right up there and look /all in your eyes and tell you the answer to the only questions that matter ...
He talked with you about only the questions that matter in this case, and there has never been anything to say from the moment he sat down and gave his statement to the police which he brought to your attention and which the State makes no claim that he has testified inconsistently with. He has said consistently that [the victim] was killed in the back seat by [petitioner]....
There was no objection to this argument.
At the PCR hearing, petitioner complained that Strickler’s argument referring to Kelsey’s testimony impermissibly singled out petitioner’s failure to testify. When Breibart was asked at the hearing why he did not object, he said that he felt highlighting Kelsey’s trial testimony was favorable to the petitioner since Kelsey had essentially confessed to murder, just as Breibart had predicted in his opening statement. Breibart testified that he felt Strickler’s closing argument was not a comment on petitioner’s silence, but was instead intended to emphasize Kelsey’s self-damaging trial testimony.
The PCR judge held that Breibart was not ineffective in failing to object to Strickler’s closing argument because, viewed in context, the argument was not an improper com*649ment on petitioner’s right to remain silent. We must uphold this finding if supported by any probative evidence in the record. Jackson v. State, Op. No. 25678, 2003 WL 21692966 (S.C. Sup.Ct. filed July 21, 2003). In my opinion, there is evidence to support the finding that Breibart’s strategic decision not to object was reasonable since the argument, viewed in context, was helpful to his client’s position. See e.g. Legare v. State, 333 S.C. 275, 509 S.E.2d 472 (1998) (where counsel articulates valid reason for strategy he is not ineffective). Further, applying the test outlined above, I would not find the comments objectionable as actually or implicitly inviting the jury to infer petitioner’s guilt from his silence, but rather as Strickler’s proper attempt to highlight the consistency of Kelsey’s story. See e.g. United States v. Jackson, supra (attorney may properly argue his testifying client’s credibility in closing); United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.1984) (testifying codefendant’s attorney may properly argue his client’s willingness to face questioning on stand).
For these reasons, I would affirm the PCR court’s order denying petitioner relief. This case highlights one of the problems that arise when codefendants have antagonistic defenses but the State nevertheless insists upon a joint trial. The codefendants in this case were placed in the unenviable position of having to attack each other while the State played a largely passive role. Had the trial court’s decision to deny petitioner’s severance motion been before us, I would have been inclined to find reversible error.4 State v. Green, supra.
BURNETT, J., concurs.

. De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.1962).

. I note that federal circuits appear split whether a Fifth Amendment violation even occurs when the comment is made by a codefendant's attorney. Compare, e.g., United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.1984) (no violation) with United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir.1987).

. Petitioner took no direct appeal.