Court Opinion

ID: 9613918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:54.039205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:33.092554
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Justice.
This is an appeal from a ten year sentence for first degree burglary. Johannes Wolfe pleaded guilty to the crime (I.C. § 18-1401) on July 28, 1976 and a presentence report was ordered. After this report was received by the district court, Wolfe was given a ten year sentence, the court retaining jurisdiction for 120 days pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601.
Wolfe was then sent to the North Idaho Correctional Institution (hereinafter NICI) at Cottonwood in accord with the recommendation of the presentence report.
At the end of the 120 day period, the faculty at NICI recommended that Wolfe remain there for another 60 days for further observation. A report to this effect was sent to the sentencing judge. Wolfe had been working on a logging crew at NICI, but had received mixed reviews concerning his potential for rehabilitation. The court did extend its retained jurisdiction for another 60 days, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601.
During the second retained period, Wolfe was the subject of a disciplinary proceeding because he was caught in the female barracks. Based on this proceeding, the classification committee recommended to the sentencing judge that the retained jurisdiction be allowed to expire.
Upon receiving this report from NICI, the trial court did allow the retained jurisdiction to expire and Wolfe was sent to the state penitentiary to complete his sentence.
Wolfe appeals this sentence, challenging both the length of the sentence and the procedures used.
I.
We first address the length of the sentence, which is ten years at the state *384penitentiary. This Court has stated the four objectives of criminal punishment as: (1)protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing. State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1957).
The ten year sentence was well within the fifteen year statutory maximum. I.C. § 18-1403. Therefore the sentence was not illegal.
Several factors are to be considered during the sentencing process.1 Appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141 (1973). Wolfe contends that ten years is an excessive sentence and therefore an abuse of discretion given the facts of the case. Wolfe raises issues which must be considered in reviewing this sentence.
“The authority of the reviewing court with respect to the sentence should specifically extend to review of: (i) the excessiveness of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. . . ABA Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 11 (Approved Draft 1968).
This Court has long reviewed sentences, looking carefully at the record before the sentencing judge. Idaho judicial history is replete with examples of modified sentences. State v. Adams, 99 Idaho 75, 577 P.2d 1123, Released March 31,1978 (see dissenting opinion of Bistline, J.). This history is in conformance with the purpose of appellate review:
The general objectives of sentence review are:
' (i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.
ABA Standards, id. at 7.
In light of this important duty, a review of the record is appropriate. Wolfe did have a criminal record, consisting of a conviction for possession of heroin in West Germany. In fact, Wolfe was expelled from West Germany because of his heroin addiction. Wolfe fled to West Germany while charges were pending against him in Coeur d’Alene concerning a barroom incident.
*385Wolfe was 25 years old at the time of the sentencing. The presentence report reflects a poor upbringing from a broken home. The prosecuting attorney also felt that Wolfe was not being fully cooperative in apprehending others involved in the burglary here. (Much of the stolen property was never recovered.)
In mitigation of this picture is Wolfe’s explanations. He became addicted to heroin while he was in the Army in Vietnam. This is Wolfe’s first felony offense in the United States. The record also indicates that Wolfe may have been under the influence of drugs and alcohol when he committed the burglary.
The prosecuting attorney opposed sending Wolfe to Cottonwood (NICI) and recommended a five year prison sentence. The sentencing judge imposed a ten year sentence, but left open the option of modifying that sentence. The general nature of the presentence report reflected a concern about Wolfe’s attitude toward crime. The report characterized Wolfe as highly intelligent, but with serious motivational problems. This is reflected by his continuing drug addition.
In order to properly execute his judicial function as to the length and type of sentence, it was necessary for the sentencing judge to have more information about Wolfe’s potential for rehabilitation. He chose to obtain this information by retaining jurisdiction over Wolfe and having him evaluated at NICI. Depending on the results of Wolfe’s performance at NICI, the judge could well have put Wolfe on probation. The reasons why he did not are discussed in Part II of this opinion.
Given a review of the record and considering the facts the judge had before him, we cannot say the sentence imposed was excessive or an abuse of discretion.
II.
Wolfe argues that the procedures used in sentencing him violated his rights under the due process clause. Idaho Const, art. 1, § 13; U.S.Const, amend. XIV.
Idaho Code § 19-2601 allows jurisdiction to be retained after the sentence is imposed. State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 567 P.2d 17 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1284, 55 L.Ed.2d 793 (1978). This procedure is available to the sentencing judge for up to 180 days while the defendant is evaluated at NICI. This time period gives the defendant a chance to demonstrate his rehabilitation potential and gives trained correction officers a lengthy period in which to evaluate this potential. With the benefit of a report from NICI, the sentencing judge can modify the sentence imposed if the situation merits.
The importance of a comprehensive report from NICI is best understood given the uses for that report. A good report indicating rehabilitative potential may very well result in a suspended sentence and probation. This information is essential for the sentencing judge to fashion a proper sentence.
The basic idea underlying a sentence to probation is very simple. Sentencing is in large part concerned with avoiding future crimes by helping the defendant learn to live productively in the community which he has offended against. Probation proceeds on the theory that the best way to pursue this goal is to orient the criminal sanction toward the community setting in those cases where it is compatible with the other objectives of sentencing. Other things being equal, the odds are that a given defendant will learn how to live successfully in the general community if he is dealt with in that community rather than shipped off to the artificial and atypical environment of an institution of confinement.
ABA Standards Relating to Probation at 1. (Approved Draft, 1970).
While providing an obvious advantage at rehabilitation, probation has other favorable benefits. “Among the arguments in favor of probation is the fact that the cost of supervising one person on probation or parole is approximately 86$ per day, or $313.90 per year. The cost of holding one inmate in the State Correctional Complex is *386$18.84 per day or $6,876.60 per year.” Idaho Judges Sentencing Manual at 7.7-2.
“To the direct cost of maintaining a convict in prison must be added the indirect cost of welfare aid to support his family and the amount of lost tax revenue resulting in keeping him economically unproductive.” Institute on Sentencing, 35 F.R.D. 487, 489.
This cost consideration has been shown a real factor in Idaho.
A further measure of value in working with offenders in the community rather than confining them is the amount of taxable income they earn, thus contributing to the community tax structure. Records indicate that the taxable income of all probationers and parolees being supervised by the Department of Probation and Parole totals $4,560,234 annually-
Idaho Law Enforcement Planning Commission, Comprehensive Plan for Criminal Justice, C-37 (1974).
The importance to the state of the decision whether to grant probation is shown by the above factors. Prisons are as notorious for breeding criminals as they are known for their rehabilitative benefits, “Too often a sentencing judge is faced with the Hobson’s choice of a sentence to an overcrowded prison that is almost a guarantee that the defendant will emerge a more dangerous man than when he entered. . .”
ABA Standards Relating to Probation, supra at 2. See generally, D. Fogel, We Are the Living Proof (1975). Probation is a valuable tool to be used by the state in a battle against recidivism.
Probation is not only important to the state, it is also a coveted goal of the convicted. Probation can be an initial sign that society has not given up on an individual and that a criminal is still a member of that society.
Probation is a desirable position in appropriate cases because:
(i)it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law;
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing normal community contacts;
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the offender into the community;
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial cost to the public treasury of an effective correctional system;
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of the offender.
ABA Standards Relating to Probation, supra at 27.
To be sure, probation is not the same free status that non-criminals enjoy. Probation is allowed only under strict conditions and is closely supervised. In this case, had the hearing and recommendations at NICI found Wolfe a good candidate for probation, it is very conceivable that he would have been placed on probation.
The threshold question to be addressed is whether a sufficient interest exists in the procedure at NICI to warrant the application of procedural due process. Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions require due process before any deprivation’ of life, liberty, or property. Idaho Const, art. 1, § 13; U.S.Const. amend. XIV.
The number of due process decisions coming out of the federal courts has drastically increased in recent years. Since the landmark case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), federal courts have extensively addressed what situations constitute a deprivation of liberty. Morrissey was a situation in which a prisoner out on parole had his parole revoked without a hearing. The court held that this was a deprivation of liberty to start the due process wheels rolling. Similarly, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), found probation revocation a situation deserving of some procedures. Both Morrissey and Gagnon, as elements of due process, re*387quired preliminary and final revocation hearings, notice to the parolee or probationer of any alleged violations, the opportunity to appear at these hearings and present evidence in his behalf, and a limited right to confront adverse witnesses.
Another milestone was reached by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In holding that a loss of “good time” in the Nebraska penal system is a sufficient deprivation of liberty to invoke due process, the Court laid out many guidelines. “We think a person’s liberty is equally protected, even where the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the state. The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government . . .Id. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2976.
Equally enlightening is Childs v. United States Board of Parole, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 511 F.2d 1270 (1974), which discusses this question.
The Board holds the key to the lock of the prison. It possesses the power to grant or deny conditional liberty. In the exercise of its broad discretion it makes judgments concerning the readiness of an inmate to conduct himself in a manner compatible with well-being of the community and himself. If the Board’s decision is negative, the prisoner is deprived of conditional liberty. His interest accordingly is substantial.
Id. at 76, 511 F.2d at 1278.
The above language applies to what happens in Idaho. The sentencing judge in seeking more information as to how to best deal with the criminal, sentenced him to the Board of Correction to be studied and evaluated. The officials there hold a hearing and compile their recommendations into a report to be forwarded to the sentencing judge.
The judge is in a position of placing a great deal of trust in this report and the recommendations contained therein. In this case, the judge followed the report’s recommendations both times; first to extend the retained jurisdiction and then to let it expire without a modification of the sentence.
We hold that a prisoner, as well as the state, does have a substantial interest in the fairness of the due process used to determine his status. We address the procedures used also because the fairness here is extremely important to the effective functioning of the judiciary in the correctional process. The sentencing judge, as well as the convict, needs the full benefit of a procedure designed to paint an accurate rehabilitation picture.
“That the revocation of parole be justified and based on an accurate assessment of the facts is a critical matter to the State as well as the parolee . . ..” Wolff v. McDonnell, supra 418 U.S. at 561, 94 S.Ct. at 2977.
In holding some form of due process does apply to these proceedings, we are continuing a trend of parallel Idaho and United States Supreme Court cases. Following the Wolff opinion came Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402, 545 P.2d 1008 (1976). In that case, this Court applied due process safeguards to prison disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the procedures required in the confinement of inmates in maximum security units for “administrative” reasons. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 1223, 55 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978). That case, extensively citing Wolff, found the state had created a “liberty interest which is protected by due process.” (Opinion of the three judge district court, 462 F.Supp. 397, at 402.) Like the Supreme Court in Wright, we distinguish the instant case from Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976).
Meachum held that inter-prison transfers do not require procedural due process. This is because the state has not created an interest in the prisoner being assigned to one prison as opposed to another. “Confinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limit or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Id. at 225, *38896 S.Ct. at 2538. The instant case presents a much different situation. A hearing held at NICI is done for the benefit of the sentencing judge and not for the correctional officers at Cottonwood. As shown before, both the state and the prisoner have an interest in that report being accurate and fair.
Several Idaho cases point out this Court’s concern with a fair and effective sentencing procedure. In State v. Cornwall, 95 Idaho 680, 518 P.2d 863 (1974), we explained the importance of a hearing on an application for probation.
Before passing judgment, the trial court must grant an applicant for probation a hearing, if he desires one, at which time the applicant must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence which supports his version of the facts, which shows that he is a proper subject for probation, and which rebuts any adverse evidence before the court.
Id. at 682-83, 518 P.2d at 865-66. Similarly, State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 454 P.2d 51 (1969) addressed the value of a complete set of facts before the sentencing judge.
“[Njamely, the desire to acquire all relevant information about a particular defendant so that probation may be granted or that the punishment will fit the man and the crime and the desire to maintain standards of fairness in sentencing procedures.” Id. at 16, 454 P.2d at 53.
“[T]his Court has insisted that certain procedures be followed in probation proceedings in order to insure the reliability and fairness of the conclusions drawn about the defendant’s personality.” Id. at 17, 454 P.2d at 54.
In an extensive dissertation on the importance of probation revocation hearings, State v. Edelblute, 91 Idaho 469, 424 P.2d 739 (1967) sheds light on the issue of fairness and the need for all the facts.
This statutory policy demanding equitable judicial administration of probation becomes more evident upon review of the cases in which this court has resolved problems raised by hearing procedure concerning application for probation and its revocation.
Whenever it has considered procedural standards in hearings regarding applications to withhold judgment and place a defendant on probation, this court has decided, or said, that the applicant must have an opportunity to present his version of probative facts and to contest forcefully the validity of adverse evidence. Finding that a proper hearing had not been accorded a probation applicant, this court has remanded the following cases to the trial court with instructions to grant a significant hearing: State v. Gish, 87 Idaho 341, 393 P.2d 342 (1964); State v. Freeman, 85 Idaho 339, 379 P.2d 632 (1963); State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 289 P.2d 315 (1955); State v. Yockey, 57 Idaho 497, 66 P.2d 111 (1937). Although finding it unnecessary to remand because of an insufficient hearing, the requirements of an adequate probation application hearing were discussed also in the following cases: (the hearing was found adequate in) State v. Gish, 89 Idaho 334, 404 P.2d 595 (1965) and State v. Ellis, 70 Idaho 417, 219 P.2d 953 (1950); (due to the determination of other issues, it became unnecessary to rule on the hearing’s adequacy in) State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 404 P.2d 347 (1965); Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 392 P.2d 552 (1964); State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 304 P.2d 1101 (1957); State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203 (1953); State v. O’Dell, 71 Idaho 64, 225 P.2d 1020 (1950).
Id. at 476, 424 P.2d at 746.
The Court continued on:
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that a hearing regarding an application for probation must be conducted in a judicial manner. It is imperative that the hearing process “affords the defendants full opportunity to present evidence in their behalf.” Otherwise, the trial judge might not be sufficiently informed to fulfill the obligation that he “must exercise this judicial discretion [to grant or refuse a probation application] in a lawful and legal manner . . . and grant or deny the same [the application] *389in the exercise of a sound, legal discretion.”
Id. at 477, 424 P.2d at 747.
In addition to Childs, several of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have found a liberty interest protected by due process in the denial of parole or probation. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman, New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom, Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015, 95 S.Ct. 488, 42 L.Ed.2d 289 (1974); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914, 96 S.Ct. 1511, 47 L.Ed.2d 764 (1976).
Many opinions and law review articles have struggled to define exactly what process is due. This question is important to this Court because of the value of the retained jurisdiction to the entire judicial process in Idaho and because this method of retaining jurisdiction has not been addressed by other courts. The Idaho process most closely resembles the determination of a board to grant or deny parole.
Wolfe urges that the procedures required for a denial of probation should accrue here. State v. Edelblute, supra. The state responds that we have previously ruled that due process does not apply in the instant case. State v. Ditmars, supra. The state’s position misreads the application of Ditmars. This Court there held that when the sentencing judge issues an order relinquishing retained jurisdiction, a hearing is not required, nor is the defendant entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage of the proceedings.
When the judge initially imposes a sentence, all of the constitutionally guaranteed rights accrue. State v. Carver, 94 Idaho 677, 496 P.2d 676 (1972); Thomas v. Hunter, 153 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1946). Thereafter, if the judge sentences the defendant to the custody of the State Board of Correction, he may retain jurisdiction, and ask for an evaluation of the prisoner by the Board of Correction so he can reconsider probation or parole, if the facts warrant it. I.C. § 19-2601. To ensure the fairness and completeness of the procedure, unique to Idaho,2 some safeguards are necessary.
Before a report is sent back to the sentencing judge (pursuant to the retained jurisdiction of I.C. § 19-2601), certain procedures must be followed. The prisoner must be given adequate notice before the hearing, including notice of the substance of all matters that will be considered. The prisoner must be given an opportunity to explain or rebut any testimony or recommendations. In addition, the prisoner must be free to call witnesses in his behalf from among the employees and other prisoners at NICI. This information should be included in the report sent back to the sentencing judge.
These minimal procedures will help ensure the report is as complete as possible and guarantee a basic fairness for both the prisoner and the sentencing judge. “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, 63 S.Ct. 608, 616, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943).
*390From the record we have before us, it is unclear if these procedures were denied. Because this is an appeal from the sentence imposed, we have only the record the sentencing judge had, including a summary of the recommendations made by the NICI faculty. On appeal, error will not be presumed and the burden of proving error is on the appellant. Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 501 P.2d 1383 (1972); Weaver v. Sibbett, 87 Idaho 387, 393 P.2d 601 (1964). Since there is no showing that due process was violated, the sentence is affirmed.
If Wolfe wishes to bring out additional facts, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (I.C. § 19-4901 et seq.) is available. Under this statute, affidavits and other records can be made available so that Wolfe’s claims can be properly considered in light of the foregoing discussion.
Affirmed.
SHEPARD, C. J., and McFADDEN, J., concur.

. “The Supreme Court has stated that in fixing punishment for crime ‘the law recognizes that the previous character, good or bad, of one convicted should be considered in fixing the punishment.’ State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97 (1954). On other occasions the Supreme Court has indicated that evidence concerning the perpetration of the crime and the age and background of the defendant should be considered. E.g., State v. Powell, 71 Idaho 131, 227 P.2d 582 (1951). Other considerations which the Supreme Court has indicated should be taken into account before sentencing and in determining whether to grant probation or not are as follows:
‘(1) all the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense of which the defendant is convicted;
(2)whether the defendant is a first offender;
(3) the previous actions and character of the defendant;
(4) whether the defendant might reasonably be expected to be rehabilitated;
(5) whether it reasonably appears that the defendant will abide by the terms of the probation; and
(6) the interests of society in being protected from possible future criminal conduct of the defendant. State v. Ogata, 95 Idaho 309, 508 P.2d 141 (1973); State v. Kauffman, 94 Idaho 20, 480 P.2d 614 (1971); State v. Gish, 89 Idaho 334, 404 P.2d 595 (1965); State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 289 P.2d 315 (1955).’ State v. Trowbridge, 95 Idaho 640, 516 P.2d 362 (1973).” State v. Mansfield, 97 Idaho 138, 540 P.2d 800, fn. 1 (1975).

. A somewhat similar procedure is available to the federal courts under 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976). Under that statute a federal court can commit a defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a prescribed “study.” Although the federal procedure is different than Idaho’s, the purpose is the same, to use a flexible sentencing statute as a means of compiling an accurate basis for sentencing. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted that statute as requiring a hearing, with counsel, before the judge finally sets sentence after receiving the report from the Bureau of Prisons. United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 84 S.Ct. 295, 11 L.Ed.2d 234 (1963). “It is plain that as far as the sentence is concerned the original order entered under § 4208(b) is wholly tentative. That section merely provides that commitment of a defendant to the custody of the Attorney General ‘shall be deemed to be for the maximum sentence,’ but does not make that the final sentence.” Id. at 164, 165, 84 S.Ct. at 296. Our opinion today adopts a similar due process idea, but applies it at a different time and place because under Ditmars, in Idaho, sentence is imposed initially and not when the retained jurisdiction expires.