Court Opinion

ID: 9389304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 15:01:05.817394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.525043
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2017   Document: 29     Page: 1   Filed: 04/25/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  BYUNGMIN CHAE,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

       JANET YELLEN, SECRETARY OF THE
       TREASURY, ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
      SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
        DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
                UNITED STATES,
               Defendants-Appellees
              ______________________

                       2022-2017
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in No. 1:20-cv-00316-TMR, Judge Timothy M. Reif.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 25, 2023
                 ______________________

    BYUNGMIN CHAE, Elkhorn, NE, pro se.

     MARCELLA POWELL, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New
 York, NY, for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
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 2                                             CHAE   v. YELLEN

 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, AIMEE LEE, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
 JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; MATHIAS RABINOVITCH, Office of
 Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation,
 United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
 New York, NY.
                 ______________________

     Before NEWMAN, PROST, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
      Appellant Byungmin Chae appeals the decision of the
 United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”), which
 sustained the denial of Mr. Chae’s application for a cus-
 toms broker license. 1 The CIT affirmed the ruling of United
 States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs” or
 “CBP”) that Mr. Chae did not achieve the required passing
 grade of at least 75 percent on the Customs Broker License
 Examination (“CBLE”), which Mr. Chae sat for in April
 2018. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2) (stating that the Secretary
 of the Treasury “may conduct an examination to determine
 the applicant’s knowledge of customs and related laws, reg-
 ulations and procedures, bookkeeping, accounting, and all
 other appropriate matters”); 19 C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4) (es-
 tablishing “75 percent or higher” as the passing grade on
 the CBLE). On appellate review, we affirm the decision of
 the CIT denying Mr. Chae’s customs broker license appli-
 cation. 2

      1  Chae v. Yellen, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (Ct. Int’l Trade
 2022) (“CIT Op.”).
     2   The CBLE is administered twice a year. 19 C.F.R.
 § 111.13(b). “Applicants who fail the examination and do
 not receive a passing score can retake the exam without
 penalty.” Sec’y Br. 4 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(e)). The rec-
 ord before us does not state whether Mr. Chae has retaken
 the exam.
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                               3

                            BACKGROUND
     The CBLE is an 80-question, multiple-choice examina-
 tion administered by Customs. The directions for the exam
 state that “[e]ach question has a single best answer.”
 J.A. 413 (Apr. 25, 2018 CBLE, Directions) (emphasis in
 original). It is an open book examination, and applicants
 are “responsible for having the following references:”
       Harmonized       Tariff   Schedule   of   the   United
       States . . .
       Title 19, Code of Federal Regulations . . .
       Instructions for Preparation of CBP Form 7501 . . .
       Right to Make Entry Directive 3530-002A
 Id.
      The examination is initially scored by Customs. After
 this initial scoring, 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f) and 19 U.S.C.
 § 1641(e) provide a multitiered system of administrative
 and judicial review. If the passing grade of 75% is not at-
 tained, the applicant may request an initial administrative
 review by the Broker Management Branch of CBP’s Office
 of Trade. See 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f). If the applicant’s score
 remains below 75% after this initial review, the applicant
 may request a second round of administrative review by
 the “appropriate Executive Director” of CBP’s Office of
 Trade. Id. If an applicant’s score remains below 75% after
 exhausting these two levels of administrative review, the
 decision to deny a customs broker license may be judicially
 appealed to the CIT. See 19 U.S.C. § 1641(e)(1). If the ap-
 plicant’s requested relief is still not granted, another level
 of judicial review is available, by appeal to the Court of Ap-
 peals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
     Mr. Chae initially received a score of 65% on the April
 2018 CBLE. J.A. 330. After being notified of this result,
 he appealed to CBP’s Office of Trade’s Broker Management
 Branch, requesting review of thirteen questions. J.A. 333.
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 4                                            CHAE   v. YELLEN

 The Broker Management Branch awarded Mr. Chae credit
 for two additional answers, raising his score to 67.5%. J.A.
 351.
     Mr. Chae then appealed the Broker Management
 Branch’s decision to the Executive Assistant Commissioner
 of CBP’s Office of Trade, requesting review of the remain-
 ing eleven questions for which Mr. Chae was denied credit
 in his initial administrative appeal. J.A. 354. The Execu-
 tive Assistant Commissioner awarded Mr. Chae credit for
 three more of his answers, raising his score to 71.25%. J.A.
 398.
     Mr. Chae then judicially appealed to the CIT, seeking
 review of five of the remaining questions for which he had
 not received credit. 3 CIT Op. at 1348. The CIT granted Mr.
 Chae credit for one question, raising his score to 72.5%.
 CIT Op. at 1353. However, his score remained below 75%.
     Mr. Chae appeals to our court. He focuses on three of
 the remaining questions for which he was denied credit,
 pointing out that a decision in his favor on two of these
 questions will raise his score to the passing grade 75%.
 Chae Br. 3. At issue are Questions 5, 27, and 33 of the
 April 2018 CBLE.
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
     In assessing CBP’s ultimate licensing decision, “[c]on-
 sistent with the broad powers vested in the Secretary [of
 the Treasury] for licensing customs brokers under
 19 U.S.C. § 1641, the denial of a license can be overturned
 only if the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

     3   Mr. Chae initially appealed the Executive Assis-
 tant Commissioner’s decision to the CIT requesting review
 of seven of the remaining questions for which he had not
 received credit. J.A. 296. However, Mr. Chae withdrew his
 challenges to two of those questions. CIT Op. at 1348 n.3.
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                               5

 discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
 Kenny v. Snow, 401 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
 5 U.S.C. § 706).
     Within that framework, decisions as to individual
 CBLE questions are reviewed for support by substantial
 evidence, as detailed in Kenny:
     Underpinning a decision to deny a license arising
     from an applicant’s failure to pass the licensing ex-
     amination are factual determinations grounded in
     examination administration issues—[including]
     the allowance of credit for answers other than the
     official answer—which are subject to limited judi-
     cial review because “[t]he findings of the Secretary
     [of the Treasury] as to the facts, if supported by
     substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”
 401 F.3d at 1361 (quoting 19 U.S.C § 1641(e)(3)). In Kenny,
 we also wrote that “[o]n questions of substantial evidence,
 we review the decisions of the Court of International Trade
 ‘by stepping into [its] shoes . . . and duplicating its review.’”
 Id. (quoting Taiwan Semiconductor Indus. Ass’n v. Micron
 Tech., Inc., 266 F.3d 1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
     The CIT has granted examinees credit on appeal when:
     (1) the omission of relevant statutory or regulatory
     language would result in the question falsely char-
     acterizing the applicable provision, (2) the inclu-
     sion or omission of language would result in “the
     question’s incorrect use of” a relevant term, or (3)
     the inclusion or omission of language would result
     in the question “not contain[ing] sufficient infor-
     mation [for an applicant] to choose an answer.”
 CIT Op. at 1353 (first citing Harak v. United States, 30 Ct.
 Int’l Trade 908, 928 (2006); and then quoting O’Quinn v.
 United States, 24 Ct. Int’l Trade 324, 328, 100 F. Supp. 2d
 1136, 1140 (2000)).
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 6                                              CHAE   v. YELLEN

                          DISCUSSION
     To achieve a passing score of at least 75%, Mr. Chae
 must obtain credit for at least two of the three questions
 discussed in this appeal. Mr. Chae argues that there is
 more than one correct answer among the multiple choices
 for Question 5, that Question 27 was not sufficiently clear,
 and that Question 33 does not provide sufficient infor-
 mation to reach the answer selected by Customs. See Chae
 Br. 1–2. Conversely, the appellees maintain that there is
 a single “best answer” to each question. Sec’y Br. 13, 15,
 19.
                               I.
                          Question 5
     Question 5 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
     5. Which of the following customs transactions is
     NOT required to be performed by a licensed cus-
     toms broker?
     A. Temporary Importation under Bond
     B. Transportation in bond
     C. Permanent Exhibition Bond
     D. Trade Fair Entry
     E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry
 J.A. 417 (emphasis in original).
                    1. Parties’ Arguments
     Mr. Chae selected choice E. Customs designated choice
 B as the correct answer.
     Mr. Chae does not dispute that choice B is a correct an-
 swer; he argues that choice E is also correct. He argues
 that “E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry” is correct because
 “there is no ‘foreign trade zone entry’ term itself in the reg-
 ulation,” and therefore “there is no reason to believe the
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                                7

 entry here is the type of port of entry as claimed by CBP.”
 Chae Br. 1. Mr. Chae asserts that, because the term does
 not exist within Title 19 of the C.F.R., examinees who are
 new to the industry will interpret the term to mean “the
 act of bringing [goods] to the U.S. territory,” also noting
 that “some shipments can be cleared if you claim your own
 goods” under 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(2)(i). Chae Br. 1.
     At the CIT, Mr. Chae argued that the “common under-
 standing” of the term “entry” could reasonably refer to the
 process of “admission” set forth in 19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1).
 See CIT Op. at 1354–55.
     The appellees argue that 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a) supports
 their position. See Sec’y Br. 13–14. Section 111.2(a)(1) re-
 cites a general requirement for a person to obtain a cus-
 toms broker license to transact customs business:
     General. Except as otherwise provided in para-
     graph (a)(2) of this section, a person must obtain
     the license provided for in this part in order to
     transact customs business as a broker.
 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(1). To support CBP’s selected answer,
 appellees point to § 111.2(a)(2), which lists “[t]ransactions
 for which license is not required” as follows:
     (i) For one’s own account. . . .
     (ii) As [an] employee of [a] broker . . . .
     (iii) Marine transactions. . . .
     (iv) Transportation in bond. . . .
     (v) Noncommercial shipments. . . .
     (vi) Foreign trade zone activities. . . .
 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(2).
    To rebut Mr. Chae’s contentions, the appellees point to
 19 C.F.R. § 146.62, titled “Entry” within Part 146 of Title
 19 governing “Foreign-Trade Zones,” and argue that a
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 8                                             CHAE   v. YELLEN

 “question or answer choice need not reflect the precise
 wording of the regulation in order to be valid.” Sec’y Br. 13–
 14 (quoting Harak, 30 Ct. Int’l Tr. at 922). The appellees
 assert that “E. Foreign Trade Zone Entry” reasonably re-
 fers to making entry of merchandise from a foreign trade
 zone as governed by § 146.62, and that this type of entry is
 not exempted from the license requirement set forth in
 19 C.F.R. § 111.2(a)(1).
                          2. Analysis
     Mr. Chae argued to the CIT that “E. Foreign Trade
 Zone Entry” in Question 5 does not reasonably clarify
 whether it is referring to entry into a foreign trade zone as
 governed by 19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1) or entry from a foreign
 trade zone as governed by 19 C.F.R. § 146.62. Because the
 parties “agree[d] that the process of admission set forth in
 [19 C.F.R. § 146.32(a)(1)] does not constitute ‘customs busi-
 ness’ that is required to be performed by a licensed customs
 broker,” CIT Op. at 1354, we find that CBP’s decision to
 deny Mr. Chae credit for Question 5 is not supported by
 substantial evidence.
    However, granting Mr. Chae credit for his answer to
 Question 5 does not, in and of itself, provide the requisite
 passing score on the CBLE.
                              II.
                         Question 27
     Question 27 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
     27. Which of the following mail articles are not
     subject to examination or inspection by Customs?
     A. Bona-fide gifts with an aggregate fair retail
     value not exceeding $800 in the country of ship-
     ment
     B. Mail packages addressed to officials of the U.S.
     Government containing merchandise
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                             9

     C. Diplomatic pouches bearing the official seal of
     France and certified as only containing documents
     D. Personal and household effects of military and
     civilian personnel returning to the United States
     upon the completion of extended duty abroad
     E. Plant material imported by mail for purposes of
     immediate exportation by mail
 J.A. 425.
                     1. Parties’ Arguments
     Mr. Chae selected choice B. Customs designated choice
 C as the correct answer.
     Mr. Chae argues that Question 27 was not sufficiently
 clear. He states that “cbp can not [sic] assume all packages
 quoted in the exam are all international,” so “[a package’s
 origin] is not clear if it was not provided.” Chae Br. 2. Mr.
 Chae argues that a person taking the examination could
 reasonably infer that answer B is referring to packages of
 domestic origin. Mr. Chae further argues that “some mer-
 chandises are allowed to pass free of duty without issuing
 an entry which is not subject to examination or inspection
 by CBP” under 19 C.F.R. § 145.37, noting that “without is-
 suing an entry cbp can still inspect” is not in Title 19 of the
 C.F.R. Chae Br. 2.
     Section 145.37 specifies three classes of merchandise
 that “shall be passed free of duty without issuing an entry”:
     (a) Mail articles for copyright. Mail articles
     marked for copyright which are addressed to the
     Library of Congress, to the U.S. Copyright Office,
     or to the office of the Register of Copyrights, Wash-
     ington, DC . . .
     (b) Books, engravings, and other articles. [Cer-
     tain books, engravings, etchings, and other arti-
     cles] when they are addressed to the Library of
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 10                                             CHAE   v. YELLEN

      Congress or any department or agency of the U.S.
      Government.
      (c) Official government documents. Other mail
      articles addressed to offices or officials of the U.S.
      Government, believed to contain only official docu-
      ments, [though] [s]uch mail articles, when believed
      to contain merchandise, shall be treated in the
      same manner as other mail articles of merchandise
      so addressed.
 19 C.F.R. § 145.37.
      The appellees argue that CBP’s designated best answer
 is supported by other portions of 19 C.F.R. § 145, including:
      § 145.2(b) Generally. All mail arriving from out-
      side the Customs territory of the United States
      which is to be delivered within the Customs terri-
      tory of the United States . . . is subject to Customs
      examination . . .
      § 145.38 Mail articles bearing the official seal of a
      foreign government with which the United States
      has diplomatic relations, accompanied by certifi-
      cates bearing such seal to the effect that they con-
      tain only official communications or documents,
      shall be admitted free of duty without Customs ex-
      amination.
     The appellees argue that it is unreasonable for an ex-
 aminee to argue that the examination question could relate
 to domestic shipments, for the purpose of the exam is “to
 determine the applicant’s knowledge of customs and re-
 lated laws, regulations and procedures, bookkeeping, ac-
 counting, and all other appropriate matters.” Rudloff v.
 United States, 19 Ct. Int’l Tr. 1245, 1246–47 (1995) (quot-
 ing 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2)). The appellees state that “[a]
 reasonable examinee would presume that all answer
 choices concerned an importation of mail articles into the
 United States.” Sec’y Br. 16.
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                             11

      The appellees then argue that Mr. Chae’s reliance on
 19 C.F.R. § 145.37 is “misplaced,” as section 145.37(c) “dis-
 tinguishes between mail articles that contain only official
 documents and mail articles that contain merchandise.”
 Sec’y Br. 16. The appellees point out that, under section
 145.37(c), mail articles containing only official documents
 are passed free of duty without issuing an entry, while ar-
 ticles containing merchandise shall be treated in the same
 manner as other mail articles of merchandise so addressed.
 See 19 C.F.R. § 145.37(c) supra. Thus the packages con-
 taining merchandise mentioned in choice B are subject to
 Customs examination in accordance with 19 C.F.R.
 § 145.2(b).
      The appellees also argue that section 145.37(c) is not
 responsive to Question 27, asserting that section 145.37(c)
 “does not address whether certain mail articles are subject
 to ‘examination’ by CBP, but rather concerns how the arti-
 cles should be treated for entry and duty purposes.” Sec’y.
 Br. 17.
                           2. Analysis
     The CIT concluded that “Customs’ decision to deny
 [Mr. Chae] credit for Question 27 was supported by sub-
 stantial evidence.” CIT Op. at 1361. The CIT determined
 that “Customs determined reasonably that Question 27
 presumes that the mail articles described in the question
 are imported into the United States” based on the purpose
 of the CBLE as recited in 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2) and the
 references recommended to the examinees in the CBLE’s
 directions. Id. at 1360. The CIT also determined that
 19 C.F.R. § 145.37(c) distinguishes mail articles that con-
 tain official documents from those that contain merchan-
 dise. Id. at 1361. The CIT further held that:
     19 C.F.R. § 145.37 . . . is not responsive to question
     27, which instructs the applicant to determine
     “[w]hich of the following mail articles are not sub-
     ject to examination or inspection by Customs.”
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 12                                              CHAE   v. YELLEN

      19 C.F.R. § 145.37 does not address whether cer-
      tain mail articles are subject to “examination” or
      “inspection” by Customs. Rather, this provision ad-
      dresses whether the articles “shall be passed free
      of duty without issuing an entry.” Whether an arti-
      cle “shall be passed free of duty” is a distinct ques-
      tion from whether an article “shall be subject to
      examination or inspection by Customs.” On this ba-
      sis, 19 C.F.R. § 145.37 does not support plaintiff's
      selection of answer choice (B).
 CIT Op. at 1361 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
      We agree with the CIT that the regulations are suffi-
 ciently clear, and that choice B is not a reasonable selection
 in light of 19 C.F.R. §§ 145.2(b), 145.37(c), and 145.38. Sec-
 tion 145.2(b) states that “[a]ll mail arriving from outside
 the Customs territory of the United States which is to be
 delivered within the Customs territory of the United
 States . . . is subject to Customs examination.” Under
 § 145.37(c), “mail articles [addressed to offices or officials
 of the U.S. Government], when believed to contain mer-
 chandise, shall be treated in the same manner as other
 mail articles of merchandise so addressed.” Thus the pack-
 ages in choice B cannot be exempted by section 145.37(c) as
 Mr. Chae argues, and must be subject to Customs exami-
 nation under section 145.2(b), regardless of any difference
 in meaning between “shall be passed free of duty” and “ex-
 amination or inspection by Customs.” Section 145.38 di-
 rectly supports answer choice C.
     Mr. Chae’s additional arguments do not negate the con-
 clusion that choice C is the best answer. CBP’s decision to
 deny Mr. Chae credit for his answer to Question 27 is sup-
 ported by substantial evidence, and thus the CIT’s decision
 as to this question is affirmed.
                               III.
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                           13

                          Question 33
     Question 33 of the April 2018 CBLE asks:
     33. What is the CLASSIFICATION of current-
     production wall art depicting abstract flowers and
     birds that is mechanically printed, via lithography,
     onto sheets of paper, the paper measuring .35 mm
     in thickness that have been permanently mounted
     onto a backing of .50 mm thick paperboard?
     A. 4911.91.2040
     B. 4911.91.3000
     C. 4911.99.6000
     D. 9701.10.0000
     E. 9702.00.0000
 J.A. 426 (emphasis in original).
                      1. Parties’ Arguments
     Mr. Chae selected choice E. Customs designated choice
 B as the correct answer.
     Mr. Chae argues that the wording of Question 33 does
 not provide sufficient information to identify the correct
 answer. Chae Br. 2 (pointing to ambiguity in Question 33,
 stating that “no further detail is identified”). Mr. Chae fo-
 cuses on the term “current-production,” arguing that the
 term should be construed as describing a “process which
 was not discontinued” and that Question 33 identifies “no
 further detail on this shipment.” Chae Br. 2. Accordingly,
 he asserts that the production date of the lithograph in
 Question 33 is ambiguous. The classification that Mr.
 Chae selected, 9702.00.0000, covers “[o]riginal engravings,
 prints and lithographs, framed or not framed,” with no
 mention of the age of the products. Harmonized Tariff
 Schedule of the United States (2017) Basic Edition
 (“HTSUS”), Chapter 97, p. 97-2.
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 14                                            CHAE   v. YELLEN

     The appellees describe this question as “evaluat[ing]
 the ability of an applicant to interpret and apply the
 HTSUS” and its General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”).
 Sec’y Br. 18 (quoting CIT Op. at 1363). The GRIs are prin-
 ciples that govern the classification of goods under the
 HTSUS and must be applied in numerical order. See BASF
 Corp. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1324, 1325–26. GRI 1
 states that “classification [of goods] shall be determined ac-
 cording to the terms of the headings and any relative sec-
 tion or chapter notes.” HTSUS, GRIs, GN p.1.
 Furthermore, we have written that “[s]ection and chapter
 notes ‘are not optional interpretive rules, but are statutory
 law, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1202.’” Aves. in Leather, Inc. v.
 United States, 423 F.3d 1326, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quot-
 ing Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States, 347 F.3d 922, 927
 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
     The appellees support CBP’s designation of choice B as
 the best answer by citing HTSUS 4911.91.3000, which co-
 vers:
      Other printed matter, including printed pictures
      and photographs: Other: Pictures, designs and pho-
      tographs: Printed not over 20 years at time of im-
      portation: Other: Lithographs on paper or
      paperboard: Over 0.51 mm in thickness.
 HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-4.
     The appellees note that the lithograph in Question 33
 is described as wall art mechanically printed onto sheets of
 “paper measuring .35 mm in thickness that have been per-
 manently mounted onto a backing of .50 mm thick paper-
 board.” J.A. 426; see also Sec’y Br. 18. Thus “the combined
 thickness of the lithograph and its mounting is 0.85 mm,”
 Sec’y Br. 19, which is the thickness that should be used for
 classification purposes, as explained in HTSUS Chapter
 49, Additional U.S. Note 1:
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 CHAE   v. YELLEN                                            15

     1. For the purposes of determining the classifica-
     tion of printed matter produced in whole or in part
     by a lithographic process, the thickness of such
     printed matter is that of the thinnest paper con-
     tained therein, except that the thickness of a per-
     manently mounted lithograph is the combined
     thickness of the lithograph and its mounting.
 HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-1. Thus the appellees argue that
 the wall art in Question 33 is a lithograph “[o]ver 0.51 mm
 in thickness.” Id. at p. 49-4; see also Sec’y Br. 19.
     To rebut Mr. Chae’s contentions, the appellees argue
 that “the term ‘current production’ refers to the time in
 which the merchandise was printed, and, thus, reasonably
 means that the printed lithography is not over 20 years
 old.” Sec’y Br. 19–20. The appellees state that “[t]he ques-
 tion does not contain the phrase ‘current production pro-
 cess’ and ‘[e]xaminees cannot be permitted to reach
 conclusions by taking a portion of the question and formu-
 lating their own factual scenarios.’” Id. at 20 (quoting
 Dunn-Heiser v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Tr. 552, 559–60
 (2005)). Appellees also note that “[e]xaminees . . . are not
 permitted to ‘unilaterally rewrite the question.’” Id. (quot-
 ing Dunn-Heiser, 29 Ct. Int’l Tr. at 560).
    The appellees also argue Mr. Chae’s answer, choice E,
 cannot be correct considering HTSUS Chapter 97, Note 2:
     2. For the purposes of heading 9702, the expression
     “original engravings, prints and lithographs”
     means impressions produced directly, in black and
     white or in color, of one or of several plates wholly
     executed by hand by the artist, irrespective of the
     process or of the material employed by him, but not
     including any mechanical or photomechanical pro-
     cess.
 HTSUS, Chapter 97, p. 97-1 (emphasis in original).
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 16                                            CHAE   v. YELLEN

                         2. Analysis
      HTSUS Chapter 97, Note 2 explicitly excludes litho-
 graphs produced by “any mechanical or photomechanical
 process” from heading 9702. Id. Although the description
 of “current-production” strains the application of “[p]rinted
 not over 20 years at time of importation,” it is not incon-
 sistent. J.A. 426; HTSUS, Chapter 49, p. 49-4. We agree
 with the CIT “that Customs’ decision to deny [Mr. Chae]
 credit for [Q]uestion 33 was supported by substantial evi-
 dence.” CIT. Op. at 1364.
     We conclude that CBP’s decision to deny Mr. Chae
 credit for his answer to Question 33 is supported by sub-
 stantial evidence, and thus the CIT’s decision as to this
 question is affirmed.
                        CONCLUSION
     We affirm the CIT’s decision on Questions 27 and 33.
 Thus even though we find CBP’s denial of credit for Ques-
 tion 5 unsupported by substantial evidence, Mr. Chae can-
 not attain a passing grade of at least 75%. Absence of a
 passing grade on the CBLE constitutes lawful grounds for
 denial of Mr. Chae’s application for a customs broker li-
 cense. See Kenny, 401 F.3d at 1361 (“Among the lawful
 grounds for denying a license is the failure to pass the li-
 censing examination.” (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1641(b)(2); 19
 C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4); 19 C.F.R. § 111.16(b)(2))). CBP’s de-
 nial of Mr. Chae’s application is not arbitrary, capricious,
 an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
 law. The CIT’s decision is affirmed.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 Each party shall bear its costs.