Court Opinion

ID: 9940358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 01:02:03.6023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:48.008566
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Lopez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050284
                                                                    (Monterey County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. SS091855B)

             v.

 RAUL LOPEZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Defendant Raul Lopez appeals from the denial of a petition for resentencing under
former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). (All subsequent undesignated
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The trial court determined that Lopez failed
to make a prima facie case for relief based upon the preliminary hearing transcript in the
underlying criminal prosecution. Lopez argues that the trial court erred in considering
the preliminary hearing transcript and in concluding based on that transcript that he failed
to make a prima facie case for relief. The Attorney General concedes that the trial court
erred in concluding that Lopez failed to make out a prima facie case, and we accept that
concession.

         We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of
         1

Judicial Administration, section 8.1 (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847, 853-855.)
       In November 2009, Lopez and his codefendant Jorge Luis Meza Ruiz were
charged with a murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang. In February 2013,
pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecution amended the information to add counts of
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and street terrorism (§186.22, subd. (a)). With
respect to the voluntary manslaughter count, the amended information alleged gang and
firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12021.5, subd. (b)). Lopez pleaded guilty
to the voluntary manslaughter and street terrorism charges as well as admitting the gang
and firearm enhancements. The trial court imposed a stipulated sentence of 25 years on
the voluntary manslaughter count with a three-year sentence on the street terrorism stayed
pursuant to section 654. In March 2022, Lopez petitioned for resentencing under Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-1018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) on the ground that he was not the actual
killer and did not have an intent kill, and he had been charged with murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory.
       Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 amended the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequence doctrine “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) In addition to amending two homicide
statutes (id., §§ 2-3 [amending sections 188 and 189]), SB 1437 added what is now
section 1172.6, which allows convicted murderers to obtain retroactive relief based on SB
1437’s restrictions on murder convictions. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959
(Lewis).) In 2021, the Legislature amended this provision, “[c]larif[ying] that persons
who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony
murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same
relief as those persons convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
551, § 1, subd. (a).)

                                               2
       Under section 1172.6, a person convicted of manslaughter may petition to vacate
his or her conviction and to be resentenced if three conditions are satisfied: (1) the
complaint, information, or indictment filed against the petitioner “allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine”; (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder or
manslaughter at trial or “accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial in which the petitioner could
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder”; and (3) the petitioner “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189” made in SB 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petition contains adequate
information (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)), the trial court will hold a hearing to determine
“whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6. subd. (c).) If
the petitioner does so, the trial court will issue a show cause order and conduct a hearing
to determine whether to vacate the conviction in question and resentence the petitioner on
the remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d).)
       In determining whether a prima facie case for relief has been made, trial courts
may examine the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Because the
purpose of the prima facie inquiry is “to distinguish petitions with potential merit from
those that are clearly meritless,” the showing needed to satisfy prima facie requirement is
“ ‘very low.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971-972.) Trial courts may find that a petitioner failed to make
out a prima facie case for relief if the record of conviction shows that the jury was not
asked to convict the petitioner under a theory barred by SB 1437 (see, e.g., People v.
Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677, review granted February 24, 2021, S266366,
review dismissed December 1, 2021) or that the jury necessarily found the petitioner
guilty on a theory that remains viable under SB 1437. (See, e.g., People v. Medrano
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 182-184; People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 956-
957.) However, in determining whether a conviction was based on a theory barred by SB
1437 at the prima facie stage, trial courts may not engage in factfinding; instead, they
                                               3
must assume that the petitioner’s factual allegations are correct and determine “ ‘
“whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       Lopez satisfied this standard. As noted above, the petition alleges that Lopez was
not the actual killer, that he did not have an intent to kill, and that he was charged with
murder under a natural and possible consequences theory. These allegations satisfy the
requirements for relief under section 1172.6. They allege that (1) Lopez was charged
with “murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)); (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial in which he “could have been
convicted of murder” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) he “could not presently be
convicted of murder” after SB 1473 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).
       Nor does the record of conviction refute the petition’s allegations. There does not
appear to be any transcript of the plea colloquy and thus no evidence that Lopez
conceded to being the actual killer or having the intent now required under SB 1473 for
murder. In addition, even if the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing may be
considered part of the record of conviction—an issue that the Supreme Court is currently
considering in People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review granted
June 28, 2023, S279670)—it does not preclude the possibility that Lopez was prosecuted
under a natural and probable consequences theory. The testimony at the preliminary
hearing identified Ruiz, not Lopez, as the person who shot the victim. In addition, while
other evidence showed that Lopez and Ruiz were gang members, that Lopez took his
brother’s truck to drive with Ruiz the night of the murder, and that the person shot was
wearing colors associated with a rival gang, the record from the preliminary hearing does
not conclusively establish that Lopez intended to kill the victim or knew that Ruiz would
do so. Consequently, it is quite plausible that the prosecution sought to prove Lopez
guilty of murder on the then-permissible ground that he intended to aid and abet Ruiz in
assaulting the victim and the natural and probable consequences of that assault was the
                                              4
victim’s death. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 262.) Indeed, in
opposing a motion to dismiss, the prosecution invoked the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, noting that “[a]n aider and abettor is guilty of both the intended
crime and the natural and probable consequence of the crime,” and asserting that “[e]ven
if Lopez did not know the full extent of Ruiz[’s] intentions, he is liable for the natural and
possible consequences of what he thought Ruiz’s action were to be[,] whether assault or
simple confrontation.”
       The trial court appears to have been unaware that the prosecution invoked a
natural probable consequences theory. In concluding that Lopez failed to make out a
prima facie case, the court stated that “[t]here was no testimony, no argument, no
evidence that the People were proceeding under a natural and probable consequence
theory . . . .” This mistake is understandable. In opposing Lopez’s petition for
resentencing, the prosecution stated that “within the prosecution’s closing comments [at
the preliminary hearing] there is no mention made of felony murder or of the doctrine of
natural and probable consequences” without acknowledging that the prosecution invoked
the doctrine in briefing three months after the preliminary hearing. Indeed, in direct
contradiction to that briefing, the prosecution represented that there was “no ‘target
offense’ for which felony murder or murder by natural and probable consequences can
attach.” Now, however, the Attorney General has conceded that defendant “has made a
prima facie showing of eligibility, and he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded with directions to issue an
order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). We express no opinion as to how the sentencing court should rule
upon conducting the evidentiary hearing.

                                              5
                                       ____________________________
                                       BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

____________________________________
DANNER, J.

People v. Lopez
H050284