Court Opinion

ID: 9661502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:26.438072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.242348
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Justice
(dissenting).
Upon further study of the record pertinent thereto, I conclude that the motion of appellees seeking dismissal of cause for want of jurisdiction should be sustained.
Rule 354, T.C.P., “Cost Bond,” relative to perfecting appeal, provides in part: “* * * or in lieu of a bond, appellant may deposit with the clerk cash equal to the estimated costs, less such sums as have been paid to the clerk by appellant on the costs, and in that event the clerk shall file among the papers his certificate showing that the deposit has been made and copy same in the transcript, and this shall have the force and effect of an appeal bond.” Rule 355, under which appellants sought to appeal, headed “Party Unable to Give Cost Bond”, provides: “(a) When the appellant is unable to pay the costs of appeal or give security therefor, he shall be entitled to prosecute an appeal by filing with the clerk his affidavit stating that he is unable to pay the costs of appeal or any part thereof, or to give security therefor, (b) The clerk shall forthwith give notice of the filing of such affidavit to the opposing party or his attorney, (c) Any interested officer of the court or party to the suit, may, by sworn pleading, contest the affidavit within ten days after the giving of such notice whereupon the court trying the case (if in session) or (if not in session) the judge of the court or county -judge of the county in which the case is pending shall set the contest for hearing, and the clerk shall give the respective parties notice of such setting, (d) Upon such hearing the burden of proof shall rest upon the appellant to sustain the allegations of his affidavit, (e) Where no contest is filed in the allotted time the allegations of the affidavit shall be taken as true, (f) Where the appellant is able to pay or give security for a part of the costs *612of appeal he shall he required to make such payment or give such security (one or both) to the extent of his ability. As amended by order of Oct. 10, 1945, effective Feb. 1, 1946.” And Rule 363 states that “The appeal is perfected -when the notice of appeal is given and the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has been filed, or if affidavit is contested, when the contest is overruled. * * * ”
Final order of the District Court herein and basis of appeal was dated March 3, 1953; and steps taken pursuant to the foregoing Rules were as follows: Affidavit of inability to pay costs of appeal filed March 13; contests by the District Clerk and others, on March 20th; Judge Peurifoy fixing a hearing thereon for March 27. In the meantime, appellant’s attorney advised the court that because of another matter in conflict, he desired a postponement of the proceeding until April 3, at which time the contest was actually heard; the order sustaining same reading in part: “The court further finds that the plaintiff is not unable to pay the costs of appeal or any part thereof, or to give security therefor. On the contrary the court is of the opinion and finds that the plaintiff is able to pay or give security for a part, to-wit: $250 of the cost of appeal and plaintiff should be required to make such payment or give security to the extent of his ability. The plaintiff, in open court, requested that he be permitted to make payment of said $250 instead of giving security therefor.”
It will be noted that the 30 day period within which to file cost bond on appeal expired on April 2; the instant hearing on appellant’s own request being had on the 31st day. Also to be observed, is the fact that one attempting to appeal on affidavit is required to file the paper not more than 20 days from date of “such final judgment or order”; the additional 10 days being obviously , the time set apart for contest, if any. The only exception to this time schedule relates to circumstances beyond control of the parties; as illustrated in Smirl v. Globe Laboratories, 144 Tex. 41, 188 S.W. 2d 676, where Rule 434 was made applicable, same providing in part“* * * that if the erroneous action or failure or refusal of the trial judge to act shall prevent the proper presentation of a cause to the Court of Civil Appeals, and be such as may be corrected by the judge of the trial court, then the judgment shall not be reversed for such error, but the appellate court shall direct the said judge to correct the error, and thereafter the Court of Civil Appeals shall proceed as if such erroneous action or failure to act had not occurred.”
Here appellant not only caused the contest to be set for hearing after expiration of the thirty-day period, but suffered an adverse ruling, i.e., compliance with Rule 355 (f) was required. A situation quite analogous was presented in Brandon v. Tartt, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 672; the court there holding: “We are convinced that the appellant has failed in his efforts in perfecting an appeal to this court. It was said by the court in Maples v. Service Mutual Insurance Company of Texas, Tex.Civ. App., 169 S.W.2d 500 that an appeal bond or affidavit is a prerequisite to the perfection of the appeal and is therefore made jurisdictional and that the time for filing the bond is fixed absolutely without power in any court to extend it. * * * When appellee filed his affidavit controverting the affidavit of appellant of his inability to pay the cost of the appeal or give security therefor the burden rested upon appellant to establish his right to appeal under the affidavit filed by him and is governed by the rule announced in Hugle v. Fritz Motor Co., 117 Tex. 411, 6 S.W.2d 84, 85, wherein it is announced that ‘action by a trial court in hearing an appellant’s or plaintiff in error’s proof under this statute is unauthorized unless that action be properly invoked by such appellant or plaintiff in error prior to the expiration of the period of time allowed by law for the filing of his appeal bond, or writ of error bond, as the case may be.’ The appellant relied upon his affidavit of his inability to pay the cost of appeal or to give security therefor until the time for filing an appeal bond had elapsed. Upon the hearing the trial court denied the appellant the right to appeal upon such affidavit. The filing of an *613appeal bond by appellant thereafter, which was more than 30 days after the overruling of his motion for new trial, does not confer jurisdiction upon this court to pass upon the merits of the appeal.” (Emphasis mine.)
The wording of Rule 363 is that “appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is given and the bond or affidavit in lieu thereof has been filed, or if affidavit is contested, when the contest is overruled”; and in view of the language quoted, it is the position of appellant, in effect, that the mandamus proceedings (as a result of which Judge Peurifoy on August 3, 1953 was directed by this Court to set aside his order of April 3 and overrule the contest) were in substitution for the judgment that the trial court should have rendered on April 3, 1953, and sufficient under Rule 363 for purpose of jurisdiction.
The writer, although a member of the Court then entertaining said proceedings in mandamus, now concludes that our favorable action thereon had no more validity than the ruling of Judge Peurifoy which it intended to replace. For on that date (April 3) the trial court had lost jurisdiction to hold a hearing or make any order at all. However, as pointed out by defense counsel, “appellant did not lose his right of appeal by any erroneous judgment of the trial court in appraising his evidence. He lost it by lapse of time.”
But even assuming validity of the April 3 procedure, in my opinion, this Court invaded the province of respondent court as a trier of the facts and judge of the weight and credibility of interested testimony, when it directed him to reverse his action sustaining the contest. Such trial court order was not appealable; the alternative remedy of mandamus not being available unless the truth of affiant’s inability to pay costs be established beyond dispute. Burleson v. Rawlins, Tex.Civ.App., 174 S.W.2d 979. After careful consideration of the testimony had on hearing of contest, I conclude that contrary inferences may be drawn from the testimony of E. Roy Wright (earning at the time from $300 to $350 per month), and that the action of Judge Peur-ifoy adverse to appellant, cannot be characterized as an abuse of discretion; especially so, where, as here, plaintiff had requested in open court for permission “to make payment of said $250 instead of giving security therefor.” The San Antonio Court’s holding in Schnitzer v. Richardson, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 958, is likewise controlling of the considered action of respondent trial judge; with result that relief by way of mandamus ought to have been denied. Says that Court: “On the other hand, the question of relator’s inability to pay or secure all or a part of the costs of appeal is primarily one of fact to be determined by the trial judge from evidence adduced upon the hearing of a contested affidavit of inability. Ón the hearing in this instance relator testified at length upon that issue. If full favorable effect be given his testimony and all deducible inferences therefrom, he would be entitled to the right of appeal under the statute. But it is obvious that the trial judge did not give full credence to all relator’s testimony, but, on the contrary, fowid as a fact therefrom that relator was able to pay or secure at least a part of the costs of appeal. Looking at the record as presented, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the trial judge (presumably acquainted with the parties and their situations, and seeing and hearing the witnesses testify upon the issue) abused his discretion in holding that the evidence showed relator is able to pay or secure a part of the costs of appeal. This being so, this Court is without authority to require the officers of the trial court to furnish a free record to relator to enable him to prosecute an appeal in the case.” (Emphasis mine.)