Court Opinion

ID: 9569602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:15:29.820828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:34.833839
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, J.,
specially concurring.
Having joined the well-written opinion of Justice Donaldson, I write only to mention an oversight in not discussing that which I thought to have been the point most strongly argued by the solicitor-general in connection with a defendant’s right of automatic disqualification. The contention advanced in the state’s brief, and again at oral argument, is that under and by virtue of the Idaho Constitution, art. V, §§ 2 and 13, and the 1975 repeal of former I.C. § 1-1801:1
Although it was obviously intended that the statute would be replaced with a rule, the constitutional provision requiring legislatively determined procedures is a mandatory provision leaving no discretion to either the legislature or to the court to alter its requirements. The word “shall” appears in both article V, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution, requiring the legislature to prescribe the jurisdiction of inferior courts and in article V, § 13, which requires the legislature to provide “the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the supreme court.” Judicial disqualification quite clearly involves a “method of proceeding” in the exercise of the power of an inferior court. Respondent’s Brief, p. 11.
Accordingly, the repeal of the disqualification statute wiped away the right to disqualification because only the legislature has the constitutional authority to provide for such a right. Id. at p. 13.
It would seem that the office of the attorney general is entitled to a response to its contention — which is not made lightly — and the response should come from the Court as a collegiate body, and not from just one member thereof. That a response is in order is further evidenced by the fact that counsel for the Schaffers has adequately addressed the solicitor-general’s contention in the reply brief:
The State further argues that the repeal of the disqualification statute (I.C. § 1-1801) wiped away the right to disqualification. While I.C. 1-1801 was re*1031pealed by 1975 Idaho Sess. laws, ch. 242, p. 651, it should be noted that the enactment repealing that provision stated that its purpose was, “To repeal procedural statutes in conflict with or covered by rules adopted by the Idaho Supreme court on procedural matters.” See State vs. Knee [101 Idaho 484, 616 P.2d 263 (1980) ] supra. Obviously, the legislature recognized that in repealing I.C. § 1-1801 that it was procedural in nature and that the Supreme Court had the authority to promulgate a rule to replace the repealed statute. Thus, the legislature itself provides statutory authority for the Court to provide for automatic disqualification, as provided for in Idaho Criminal Rule 25, and the State’s argument to the contrary has no merit. Appellant’s Reply Brief, p. 3.
Moreover, the state’s heavy constitutional argument is hardly persuasive in this particular instance where Judge Prather assumed jurisdiction of this criminal action only after the state had first utilized the disqualification rule to remove Judge Cogs-well from the case — which most practitioners in North Idaho would view with a jaundiced eye.
Mention might also be made that there is a move afoot, apparently supported by some trial court administrators, that has for its purpose to do away with or greatly restrict the procedural rule allowing for one automatic disqualification. So the argument goes, at least as I understand it from what little has reached my ears, that it interferes with the administrative practice of requiring that cases at issue be double-set and triple-set — said to be a matter of expedition and hence of foremost importance in our judicial system. The judicial production line, i.e., disposition or plain disposal of cases on a rapid basis seems to be replacing the goal of cases being determined on a just basis.
Mention might also be made in connection with the concerns of the solicitor-general that a far more important issue to be addressed is Rule 1102 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence whereby the Supreme Court, by divine right, has ruled of “no force or effect” statutory provisions as to admissibility of evidence which are conflicting with the Court’s rules, irrespective of whether the statutes are past, in praesenti, or in future, and irrespective of such statutes being wholly or largely of a substantive nature, for example, witness privilege. Now, there is a concern which has huge statewide ramifications, and far more deserving of the attention of the office of the attorney general than the contention addressed today. I do not gainsay, however, that the right to disqualify a judge is a substantive right, and only the manner of exercising that substantive right is procedural. But as pointed out two or three hundred opinions ago, an acquiescing legislature has complacently abandoned the field to the Supreme Court, as pointed out by the Schaffers’ reply brief, set out supra.
The right of one automatic disqualification in my view has served a good purpose and its destruction should be carefully guarded against.

. Idaho Const., art. V, § 2 reads:
The judicial power of the state shall he vested in a court for the trial of impeachments, a supreme court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as established by the legislature. The courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for administration and supervision by the supreme court. The jurisdiction of such inferior courts shall be as prescribed by the legislature____
Idaho Const., art. V, § 13 reads:
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the supreme court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this constitution. I.R.C.P. 40(D)(1), which replaced I.C. 1-1801,
reads:
In any action in the district court or the magistrate's division thereof, any party may disqualify one (1) judge, without cause, by filing a motion of disqualification which shall not state any grounds therefor other than this rule of automatic disqualification. Such motion must be made not later than five days after service of a notice setting the action for trial, pre-trial, or hearing on the first contested motion, and must be made before any contested proceeding in such action has been submitted for decision to the judge; provided, where a new trial has been ordered by the trial court or any appellate court on appeal any party may make such motion not later than five days after service of an order setting the action for retrial. In the event there are multiple parties plaintiff, defendant or otherwise, the trial court shall determine whether such coparties have an interest in common in the action so as to be required to join in a disqualification without cause, or that such coparties have an adverse interest in the action so that each adverse coparty will have the right to file one disqualification without cause.