Court Opinion

ID: 9642602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:04:05.518712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:49.968956
License: Public Domain

Bukliitg, J.
(dissenting). Giving due regard to the opportunity of the hearer of the evidence to judge of the cred-gj ibility of the witnesses, still the result of an independent evaluation of the evidence on this appeal leads me to the conclusion that the claimant has not sustained the burden of proof imposed upon him. Russo v. U. S. Trucking Corp., 26 N. J. 430 (1958); Ricciardi v. Marcalus Manufacturing Company, 26 N. J. 445 (1958). Accordingly, I dissent from the factual determination of my colleagues on the majority.
Petitioner must, of course, establish by a reasonable probability that the incident on October 3, 1952 was causally related to his alleged present condition.
There can be no question that petitioner’s complaint of precordial pain and pain running down his left arm could have been symptomatic of a cardiac condition. And, if a cardiac condition was manifested for the first time imme*514diately following the strain in carrying the stretcher, the sequence of events would establish a reasonable probability of causal relationship.
But the symptoms alone, and without further confirming clinical evidence, do not establish heart disease by a reasonable probability. As stated by Dr. Erank:
“There is no specific site, but we do know that precordial pain, pain over the so-called rheumatoid site of heart disease, is usually not due to heart disease.
When a patient comes to us and says, T have a pain here,’ then we occasionally do find heart disease. It’s more often not present than present.”
There was no substantial disagreement on this score by Dr. Cunnifl, who testified that “many things” can cause precordial pain.
The significant fact in this case is that confirmation of a cardiac condition was not forthcoming.
Petitioner was hospitalized from October 7, 1952 to October 122, 1952. During this period he received three electrocardiograms, his chest, stomach and intestinal tract were X-rayed and other clinical tests including blood counts, a urinalysis and sedimentation rates were performed. All of these were negative as to any condition relative to. his heart. ^It is noteworthy that Dr. Cunnifl who had examined the electrocardiograms previously stated, “I will accept the fact that they are negative.”
Both the majority in the Appellate Division and in this court stress the fact that no such tests were performed after October 22, 1952 and until November 1954 when Dr. Cunnifl performed an electrocardiogram which indicated an “old” myocardial infarction and that tests, if they had -been performed, might have revealed such an infarction. The testimony of Doctors Erank and Cunnifl as to the length of time it might take an injury to the heart to manifest itself on an electrocardiogram was similar. Dr. Erank testified that the reason petitioner was kept in the hospital from October 7 to October 22, 1954 was that an initial electrocardiogram *515may be negative but that sometimes, as long as 10, 15 or 20 days later, it may prove positive. Dr. Cunniff testified that an electrocardiogram may not show positive “for a number of days” “and even several weeks.”
Counting the day of the injury, petitioner was not released from the hospital until 20 days had elapsed. That an electrocardiogram administered after October 22, 1952 might indicate a change to positive would, in my view of the evidence, be a mere possibility and not a reasonable probability. Moreover, petitioner was examined by Dr. Erank on October 27, 1952 and Eebruary 11, 1953 and he found no cardiac condition on both those visitations.
It is equally significant that neither petitioner’s doctor, Dr. Marcus, nor the city’s doctor, Dr. Visconti, at the hearing on the prior compensation award found any evidence of a myocardial infarction of the heart wall. Dr. Marcus testified that petitioner’s injury was orthopedic in nature, although he testified that the petitioner had cardiorespiratory symptoms about two years prior to the accident. It was his conclusion that there might be “a medical disability which is probably cardiorespiratory in nature and which is unrelated.”
Dr. Visconti testified: “There was an old associated cardiorespiratory pathology not related to the trauma in question and which antedated the accident in question.”
While Dr. Cunniff found a myocardial infarction in November 1954 (the date of his first examination) all he could say was that it was more than several months old. Eour doctors (Erank, Costello, Marcus and Visconti) who examined the petitioner prior to November 1954 could find no cardiac condition causally related to the incident of October 3, 1952. Petitioner came under Dr. Prank’s care several days after the injury. Intensive clinical tests, including three electrocardiograms, given up to 20 days following the accident, showed negative. In sum, the inference that one could draw that the myocardial infarction found in November of 1954 resulted from the incident more than two years before, is greatly outweighed by the direct medical evi*516dence negating the existence of any causally related cardiac condition prior to November 1954.
I vote to reverse the judgment appealed from, resulting in the denial of increased compensation.
Mr. Justice Wacheneeld joins in this dissent.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Heher, Erancis and Proctor—4.
For reversal—Justices Wacheneeld and Burling—2.