Court Opinion

ID: 9771161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:35:08.97226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:11.901252
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons here discussed, I respectfully dissent.
In this action for mandamus and prohibition originally brought in the Court of Appeals, Southern District, that Court issued its preliminary rule in prohibition and alternative writ of mandamus and on final determination quashed the writs. We consider the case as an original proceeding.
In the underlying cause the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission *359seeks to condemn the private lands of two owners for use in a highway project utilizing federal funds. Drawing upon the well reasoned opinion of Titus, P.J., by which the Southern District quashed its preliminary rule and alternative writ the question, aptly put by relator is: Whether “the owners [of property to be condemned in a suit involving federal highway aid funds] are entitled to discover, by means of Subpoena Duces Tecum the reports, notes, memoran-da, summaries or written documents, made or used by Messrs. Sage and Bennett [relator’s appraisers], in appraising the owners [sic] land at the hearing for the appointment of Commissioners.”
The propriety of discovery is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we should not disturb its ruling except for abuse of that discretion. State ex rel. Kuehl v. Baker, 663 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Mo.App.1983). However, prohibition and mandamus may sparingly be employed to review a trial court’s overruling of objections to discovery on grounds that the matters sought are privileged or constitute work product, if it can be seen that the refusal to forbid discovery exceeds the trial court’s jurisdiction or constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. St. Louis Little Rock Hosp., Inc. v. Gaertner, 682 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Mo.App.1984).
In this proceeding to prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its order authorizing issuance of a subpoena duces tecum allowing the condemnees to obtain the records of relator’s appraisers, relator has the burden of demonstrating that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the order. State ex rel. Eggers v. Enright, 609 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. banc 1980); State ex rel. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of Kansas City v. Southern, 284 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo.App.1955). There is, of course, a presumption that the trial court has acted within its jurisdiction, State ex rel. Martin v. Peters, 649 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Mo.App.1983); State ex rel. City of Maplewood v. Crandall, 569 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo.App.1978) and it is important that we not substitute our discretion for that of the trial court exercised within the legitimate boundaries of its jurisdiction. Crackereck Country Club, Inc. v. Sprinkle, 485 S.W.2d 652, 655 (Mo.App.1972). Further, we should be mindful that prohibition issues with great caution and only in cases where the judicial usurpation of jurisdiction or act in excess of the same is clearly evident. State ex rel. Eggers, 609 S.W.2d at 382; State ex rel. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gaertner, 601 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo.App.1980); State ex rel. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Meyer, 449 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Mo.App.1970). This is especially true in preliminary stages of proceedings involving trial courts’ rulings on discovery questions. We have in such eases steadfastly refused to interfere except in those rare instances where the trial court has stepped openly beyond the limits of its authority.
Relator urges that in condemnation proceedings the ordinary rules of civil procedure do not apply prior to the filing of exceptions. It argues instead that the statutes and special rules on condemnation govern such proceedings, citing State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Green, 305 S.W.2d 688 (Mo.1957), and State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. James, 115 S.W.2d 225 (Mo.App.1938). However, these cases do not support relator’s assertion as they merely state that after exceptions are filed, condemnation proceedings are to be governed by the rules of civil procedure. Green, 305 S.W.2d at 694; James, 115 S.W.2d at 226. There is no indication from these cases which rules of procedure govern prior to the filing of exceptions and relator suggests no other authority on the subject. Further, the cited cases were decided long before State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising Company, Inc. v. Conley, 527 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. banc 1975).
In Weatherby, we held that the allegation and proof that condemnor and property owners had been unable to agree on compensation to be paid for property being taken is jurisdictional, id. at 336, and that the legislature through § 226.150, RSMo *36019691 instructed the Highway Commission as to appraisal, negotiation and settlement offers and directed that it comply with the requirements spelled out in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651, 4652 and 4655,2 in those instances where, as here, federal highway aid is involved. Weatherby, 527 S.W.2d at 341. Meeting the criteria of these sections is a jurisdictional prerequisite for the appointment of commissioners or for the court to proceed further until the condemnor complies therewith and amends its petition to include the proper allegations. Id. at 341-42.
Relator argues that though the Court has held the requirements of Weatherby must be pleaded and proved, it has not required that discovery may be had concerning these jurisdictional requirements. Relator contends:
In a condemnation suit where the requirements of Weatherby are to be imposed, the hearing for the appointment of commissioners is the appropriate time to raise the issues imposed by Weather-by. The requirements of Weatherby in this case have been pleaded, and relator now merely asks the opportunity to offer proof on them. If given the opportunity to offer proof, relator is confident the Respondent will find compliance, and determine it has jurisdiction to appoint the commissioners.
While I agree that the appropriate time to finally determine the jurisdictional prerequisites of Weatherby is at the hearing to appoint commissioners, the error in the remainder of relator’s argument is manifest.
The condemnation hearing is an eviden-tiary proceeding in which the right of the condemnor to condemn the property in question is finally adjudicated, the order of taking is entered and the substantive rights of the parties regarding the ownership of the property are determined. Washington University Medical Center Redevelopment Corp. v. Komen, 637 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo.App.1982). In addition, it has been stated that in this portion of the proceedings:
[T]he court must determine whether the condemnation is authorized by law — i.e.: is there jurisdiction over the condemnation proceeding. This determination may involve one or more of several requirements — is there constitutional, statutory or ordinance authority for the exercise of eminent domain (citation omitted); is the taking for a public use (citations omitted); has the condemning authority complied with the conditions precedent to bringing the action. (Citation omitted.) The trial court’s determination on these issues, favorable to the plaintiff is not appealable. (Citation omitted.)
State ex rel. Devanssay v. McGuire, 622 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo.App.1981).
While this first segment of a condemnation proceeding does not determine the extent of compensation due, Washington University, 637 S.W.2d at 53-54, it is not a perfunctory proceeding for as noted above, in this vital stage of the case, the order of *361taking is entered and the substantive rights of the condemnee are adjudicated. Yet relator urges that it be allowed to proceed without permitting the landowners the right of discovery to challenge the Highway Commission’s pleadings or proof. In effect relator demands and the majority today condone an unfettered power in the condemning agency to avoid discovery and conceal facts in its control bearing on the central statutory issue in question. By any standard of fairness, the owners of the property soon to be condemned are entitled to question the court’s jurisdiction to proceed by contesting whether relator has complied with the previously discussed conditions precedent imposed by the law.3 These prerequisites to jurisdiction become a hollow sham absent the right of the con-demnee to discover by lawful means the necessary information to challenge the con-demnor’s assertion that they have been met.
Relator further argues that Weatherby is not involved because the principles announced there apply only in cases where there has been no appraisals of the property and the condemnor has made no allegations that such has been done. I cannot agree, as the plain language of Weatherby states that these are conditions precedent to the court's proceeding further with a condemnation suit “until the Commission complies therewith.” 527 S.W.2d at 341-42. Such rationale is not confined to the limited factual situations relator suggests.
Examining now the discoverable nature of the documents sought by duces tecum, in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Jensen, 362 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Mo. banc 1962) it was held that letters, memo-randa or notes prepared by appraisers for the highway department were exempt from discovery as work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. A decade later we reexpressed the view that the opinion of appraisers as to damages in condemnation suits were to be considered work product and not subject to discovery in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Kalivas, 484 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Mo.1972). Relator now argues that the documents sought (of the same type as those sought in Jensen) are the work product of relator and under the teachings of that case are not discoverable. However, relator fails to take into account that since Jensen the work product *362privilege has been substantially modified by Rule 56.01(b)(3), which provides that “upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means” he may obtain discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation. It is this new rule and its qualifying provisions that must be examined in determining whether the so called “work product” is discoverable. Porter v. Gottschall, 615 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Mo. banc 1981). Rule 56.01(b)(4)(b)4 did not change the status of the documents sought in this case from work product, but provides a method by which, under circumstance such as those present here, such information may be subject to discovery. Carthen v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 694 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Mo.App.1985); Willis v. Brot, 652 S.W.2d 738, 739-40 (Mo.App.1983). Our rule reflects a. new openness, which follows the trend to remove secrecy and eliminate the “dog eat dog” aspect of litigation from our system of justice.
To demonstrate that a “substantial need” exists, the party seeking discovery must show: 1) the importance of the materials to be discovered; 2) an inadequate alternative means of discovery; and 3) a lack of the substantial equivalent. 23 Am.Jur.2d Depositions and Discovery § 66 (1983).
The elements of prejudice, hardship, or injustice contemplated by this exception to the rule exist where the party seeking discovery is, with due diligence, unable to obtain evidence of some material facts, events, conditions, and circumstances which the discovery will probably reveal, and where, because of this situation, the party is unable to prepare the case adequately for trial.
27 C.J.S. Discovery § 72 (1959). Thus a substantial need has been found and discovery allowed where: it will give a clue to relevant facts that cannot otherwise be found; the party seeking discovery can prove its case only by using information in the other party’s possession; and where a deponent is an employee of an adverse party and a hostile or evasive witness so that his prior statement is needed for impeachment purposes to prevent undue hardship. 23 Am.Jur.2d, supra; 27 C.J.S., supra.
Without question the evidence necessary to demonstrate whether the requirements of Weatherby have been met is solely in the hands of the condemnor. In addition condemnor’s appraisers typically (if not invariably) are prone to support condemnor and thus the opportunity for impeachment is an indispensable ingredient to provide fairness in these proceedings. If discovery were not allowed, relevant facts as to jurisdictional prerequisites could go undisclosed and the condemnee would be helpless to challenge the condemnor’s bald assertion that it had complied with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
It has been well stated that:
[I]n nearly all condemnation cases good cause could justifiably and with reason be argued. The obligation in all condemnation cases is to render fairness to both the public and the condemnee; a con-demnee is being dispossessed against his will; he merely seeks just compensation; to in any way limit the means that he might use to combat a condemnor’s strength would seem unacceptable.
7 P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Nichols On Eminent Domain § 7.03[2][c] (1987). In addition, a Florida court has stated:
Unlike litigation between private parties condemnation by any governmental authority should not be a matter of “dog eat dog” or “win at any cost”.
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*363Considering the nature of the condemnation proceedings, we hold that there is no violation of the essential requirements of law in compelling the [condemnor] to produce in advance of trial information bearing on the issue of “just” compensation.
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We do not believe this procedure will place the [condemnor] at a disadvantage in trying its case. We can envisage no “unfairness” to [the] governmental agency. If the governmental unit or agency is seeking to effectuate the “summum bonum”, as it should in every condemnation suit, there is no justification for cutting corners or being secretive to the possible detriment of the individual land owner whose property is being taken from him against his will.
It may be that the condemnor will derive an advantage by disclosing these pertinent matters prior to trial. It might develop that the condemnee, after learning the basis for the evaluation of his property, will decide to settle the issues without going to trial, thereby resulting in a “speedy and inexpensive determination” of the case.
Shell v. State Road Department, 135 So.2d 857, 861 (Fla.1961). This follows an apparent trend of the states to permit, for various reasons, discovery of this sort of information. See, e.g., Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 123 N.W.2d 424 (1963); State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Grudnik, 90 S.D. 571, 243 N.W.2d 796 (1976); Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1977); Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481 (Utah 1979).
In Missouri, the purposes of discovery are to eliminate concealment and surprise, aid litigants in determining the facts prior to trial, and to provide the parties with access to information necessary to develop their contentions and to present their respective sides of the issues framed by the pleadings. State ex rel. Anheuser v. Nolan, 692 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo.App.1985). In this connection we have stated that “[impediments to the discovery of truth are afforded validity in relatively few instances in the common law,” and claims of privilege are to be carefully scrutinized. State ex rel. Chandra v. Sprinkle, 678 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. banc 1984). Relator has failed to demonstrate how the trial court erred or to show how else the owners are to question whether the negotiations were in good faith, if they are not entitled to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence at the hearing at which such matters are to be litigated and the question of court’s jurisdiction to further proceed is to be decided. I do not believe relator has met its burden of clearly evidencing the usurpation of jurisdiction or act in excess of the same. State ex rel. Tarrasch v. Crow, 622 S.W.2d 928, 937 (Mo. banc 1981).
Finally, the majority’s flouting of the crystal clear legislative intent contained in § 226.150, which mandates compliance with the relevant federal statutes, is especially distressing. We noted in Weatherby and there is no reasonable way to avoid the unambiguous statutory language that § 226.150 “very specifically states that the Commission shall comply with acts of congress or rules or conditions of agencies such as the Federal Highway Administra-tion_” Weatherby, 527 S.W.2d at 341. (Emphasis added.) In overruling Weather-by, the majority misses the mark when it blithely and quite irrelevantly asserts it has found no evidence that Congress intended compliance with federal statutes be a condition precedent to condemnation in state courts.5 Ante, at 357. The focal point of our inquiry should and must be whether *364our legislature intended compliance with 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651, 4652, and 4655 be a condition precedent to condemnation in Missouri courts. Clearly, the language “[t]he commission is hereby directed to comply with the provisions of any act of Congress,” contained in § 226.150, makes conformance with federal regulations a prerequisite to condemnation in our State. The majority in its zeal to abandon the holding in Weatherby erroneously disregards the plain language of the statute and substitutes the preference of this Court for the intention of the Missouri Legislature. Such is not a proper exercise of the judicial function.
I would order that the preliminary rule and alternative writ be quashed.

. Section 226.150, RSMo 1986, unchanged in pertinent part states:
The commission is hereby directed to comply with the provisions of any act of Congress providing for the distribution and expenditure of funds of the United States appropriated by Congress for highway construction, and to comply with any of the rules or conditions made by the Bureau of Public Roads of the Department of Agriculture, or other branch of the United States government, acting under the provisions of federal law in order to secure to the state of Missouri funds allotted to this state by the United States government for highway construction. (Emphasis added.)

. These requirements were found to and continue to include:
(1) appraisal of the property before negotiation, with an opportunity for the owner to accompany the appraiser, (2) determination of the sum by which buildings, structures or other improvements which belong to tenants contribute to the fair market value of the real property to be acquired and, in the alternative, the fair market value of the structure for removal, (3) establishment of just compensation for the property to be acquired, which shall be no less than the approved appraisal,
(4) furnishing the owner with a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount established as just compensation, and
(5) making an offer of the just compensation so established to the owner.
State ex rel. Weatherby Advertising Company, Inc. v. Conley, 527 S.W.2d 334, 341 (Mo. banc 1975).

. Besides complying with the federal prerequisites contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651, 4652 and 4655, the condemning authority has always been required by this Court to engage in good faith negotiations aimed at settling and avoiding condemnation. Weatherby, 527 S.W.2d at 341. See also Note, Preliminary Requirements For Condemnation In Missouri: Necessity, Public Use, And Good Faith Negotiations, 44 Mo.L.Rev. 503, 509 (1979) (hereinafter Preliminary Requirements For Condemnation). Following a brief discussion of several cases, the majority somehow concludes that those cases stand for the proposition that the amount offered by a condemning authority "is not of material significance in determining the existence of the good faith negotiations required_" Ante, at 7. Initially, the condemnor has the burden of proving good faith, however, once that burden is satisfied the condemnee must demonstrate a lack of good faith. See Preliminary Requirements For Condemnation, 44 Mo.L.Rev. at 509. All of the cases cited by the majority hold merely that a substantial disparity between the appraised value and the actual award by itself does not satisfy a condemnee’s burden. See Shelby County R-IV School District v. Herman, 392 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Mo. banc 1965) ("no evidence of bad faith ... and therefore good faith [of the condemning authority] is not a subject for our consideration.") (emphasis added); School District of Clayton v. Kelsey, 196 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo.1946) (“there is nothing in the record [other than the disparity] that would justify overturning the ruling on the theory that the condemnation was not in good faith_”); City of Blue Springs v. Central Development Association, 684 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Mo.App.1984) (“if the $132,200 offer, which was based on an appraisal, turns out to be only half or one-fifth the value finally awarded, that by itself is no indication of bad faith.") (emphasis added); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Cady, 400 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Mo.App.1965), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 204, 87 S.Ct. 407, 17 L.Ed.2d 300 (1966) (evidence of an attempt to negotiate held sufficient to satisfy condemnor’s burden of acting in good faith). Certainly, a substantial variance between the appraised value and the actual award can be evidence of a lack of good faith which can be weighed with all of the other events surrounding a taking of a private owner’s land but such variance is not the sole evidentia-ry fact relevant to the question of “good faith." The cited cases cannot be reasonably construed to preclude other pertinent factors which are legitimate subjects for proof and accordingly are legitimate subjects for discovery on the issue of “good faith.”

. Rule 56.01(b)(4)(b) states: "A party may discover by deposition the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify.” Rule 56.01(b)(3) begins with the language that “Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this Rule_" While in light of Carthen v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 694 S.W.2d 787 (Mo.App.1985) and Willis v. Brot, 652 S.W.2d 738 (Mo.App.1983), it appears that the documents sought here may be described as work product, under our new rule it no longer means that the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction in ordering their discovery. See e.g., State ex rel. Eggers v. Enright, 609 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Mo. banc 1980); State ex ret. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gaertner, 601 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo.App.1980).

. The majority attaches substantial weight to the fact that they are unable "to locate [any] case in these United States where a condemnee failed to collect a condemnation award by reason of withdrawal of federal funds.” Ante, at 357. While there may in fact be no reported case in which federal funds have been withdrawn such an absence does not conclusively establish such a sanction has never been employed. It certainly is in the best interest of the Highway Commission to comply with the pertinent federal regulations in order to avoid risking the loss of federal monies. But more than that, the legislature has by statute specifically provided for compliance with federal guidelines.