Court Opinion

ID: 9605369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:35:03.550959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:34.238832
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
The sole basis for the judgment of suspension in this case is a claimed knowingly false representation by petitioner to the probate court that he was the husband of Olive Agnes Vickers, deceased, in a proceeding for special letters of administration on her estate. Not only is the result based upon the *257wholly private conduct of petitioner unconnected with his capacity as an attorney of law but the alleged misrepresentation was of a purely technical import and was clearly not intended to cause injury to anyone. Any other conclusion finds no substantial support in the evidence.
The judgment of suspension is based upon the finding that petitioner knowingly misrepresented his marital status to the court in his petition as above mentioned. That alleged falsity must turn upon the assumption that petitioner’s marriage to Olive was invalid, which in turn depends upon the legality of the proceedings for a divorce in Mexico. It should be noted that while no divorce was ever granted by the Mexican court, proceedings therefor were commenced. Whether or not the proceedings there taken, together with all the other circumstances, were sufficient to make petitioner’s claim that he was Olive’s husband, in bad faith, is the question presented. It should first be observed in this connection that the legal question as to the legality of Mexican divorces is difficult and involved. Mexican divorces have been held valid (Commonwealth v. Yarnell, 313 Penn. 244 [169 A. 370]). And also invalid (Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811 [94 S.W.2d 1043, 105 A.L.R. 814]; Garman v. Garman, 102 F.2d 272 [70 App.D.C. 4]; Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524 [192 N.E. 86]; May v. May, 251 App.Div., 63 [295 N.Y.S. 599]; Estate of McNutt, 36 Cal.App.2d 542 [98 P.2d 253]; duQuesnay v. Henderson, 24 Cal.App.2d 11 [74 P.2d 294]; Kegley v. Kegley, 16 Cal.App.2d 216 [60 P.2d 482]; People v. Harlow, 9 Cal.App.2d 643 [50 P.2d 1052]; 105 A.L.R. 817). There may be an estoppel to question the validity of the foreign decree. (Bruguiere v. Bruguiere, 172 Cal. 199 [155 P. 988, Ann.Cas. 1917E, 122]; Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 61 [263 P. 200].) In an article on Mexican marriages and divorces by William B. Stern, Foreign Law Librarian of the Los Angeles County Law Library, appearing in the March-April, 1945, edition of The State Bar Journal, the following statement appears:
“It would be beyond the scope of this article to point out details in which the codes of the several states differ from the Old or the New Federal Civil Codes, or from both of these codes. But I would like to emphasize the need of consulting the codes and laws of each particular state whose law forms the basis of a controversial marriage or divorce. Such a search of the law should not only comprise the *258normative rules of the laws, hut should also embrace statutory provisions by which dispensatory faculties are conferred on judicial and administrative authorities; many marriages and divorces which at first glance seem to be defective, actually derive their validity from dispensations and waivers.”
So far as the record in this case discloses, no judicial tribunal has passed upon the validity of petitioner’s marriage to Olive Agnes Vickers. The petition for revocation of the special letters of administration issued to petitioner alleged that petitioner was not married to Olive, but other grounds were advanced, and it does not appear upon which ground the order of revocation was granted. It is not claimed that the marriage was not legally consummated according to the law of Texas where it was solemnized. The sole claim of invalidity is predicated upon the assumption that petitioner’s marriage to Georgia Vickers had not been dissolved at the time his marriage to Olive was consummated, giving consideration to the point to which the proceedings had developed and the effect thereof. This presented a legal question which could only be determined by a judicial tribunal in an appropriate proceeding after obtaining jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
It clearly appears from the record in this case that the charge against petitioner is based upon the conclusion reached by The State Bar that petitioner was guilty of unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude because he made an alleged misrepresentation relative to his marital status. In my opinion it is not the function of The State Bar to pass upon the validity of the marital status of members of the bar, or predicate a charge of moral turpitude against a member of the bar upon representations made by him in good faith with respect to his marital status, especially in a case such as this where the record shows that the validity of petitioner’s marriage to the deceased was dependent upon the validity of divorce proceedings which petitioner claims he instituted in Mexico where he says he was advised by legal counsel that such decree was valid and legal and resulted in the permanent dissolution of his former marriage. Even conceding that a judicial tribunal might determine such proceedings to be insufficient to sever the bonds of matrimony in an appropriate proceeding to test their validity, it would not necessarily follow that a member *259of the bar would be guilty of moral turpitude in making a representation in good faith that such proceedings were effective before they had been adjudged invalid by a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction to pass upon their validity. Many cases have been decided by the courts of last resort of several of our states and by the Supreme Court of the United States involving questions of this character and we find these courts divided on the question of whether or not divorce proceedings consummated in certain states were effective to dissolve the marriages which were the subject of such proceedings. The following citations reflect the wide divergence of judicial opinion which has existed and apparently still exists on this subject. (Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. —]; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 [68 S.Ct. 1094, 92 L.Ed. —]; Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 [68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed —]; Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 [68 S.Ct. 1221, 92 L.Ed. —]; Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 [65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366]; Esenwein v. Commonwealth (Esenwein v. Esenwein), 325 U.S. 279 [65 S.Ct. 1118, 89 L.Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396]; Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R. 1273]; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 [26 S.Ct. 525, 50 L.Ed. 867]; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 5 to 3 [23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366]; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 [21 S.Ct. 544, 45 L.Ed. 794]; Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 [21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L.Ed. 804]; Olds v. Olds, 219 Iowa 1395 [260 N.W. 1, 5 to 4, 261 N.W. 488]; Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356 [68 P.2d 928, 3 to 2], and 17 Am.Jur., Divorce & Separation, § 747.)
In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Esenwein ease he made the very pertinent observation that “The question of marital capacity will often raise an irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the two States.”
In view of the great conflict of judicial opinion as to the jurisdictional requirements necessary to consummate a valid divorce proceeding it is not possible for me to see how a charge of unprofessional conduct can be predicated upon a representation made in good faith by a member of the bar relative to his marital status where such member of the bar launches proceedings to obtain a divorce in accordance with the law of a state or foreign country before consummating the marriage in question. In other words, in view of the conflict of judicial opinion on the difficult and com*260plex problems involved in the determination of the validity of the marital status, it seems to me that it is expecting too much of a lowly member of the bar to be absolutely certain of his marital status under the circumstances here presented.
It is my understanding that under recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the courts of one state are not required to give full faith and credit to a divorce decree obtained in another state where jurisdictional requirements have not been met (Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 [65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366]; Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279 [65 S.Ct. 1118, 89 L.Ed. 1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396]), and parties who remarry after obtaining such a decree may be adjudged guilty of bigamy. There are no doubt many eases of this character where no prosecution will ever be instituted because of inaction of the prosecuting officials or where both parties to the invalid divorce decree have remarried. Nevertheless, the crime of bigamy has been committed in such cases, and if a lawyer is involved, he is subject to disbarment because the crime of bigamy certainly involves moral turpitude. If the majority opinion in this case is permitted to stand, then The State Bar may successfully proceed with disbarment proceedings against every member of the bar of this state who has remarried after his former marriage was presumably dissolved by a decree of divorce which is subject to a jurisdictional infirmity without a prior determination of its invalidity by a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction. In other words, The State Bar will be permitted to perform the functions of both our criminal and civil courts in addition to its function as an administrative agency. This was never contemplated by even the most ardent supporters of the State Bar Act.
The asserted disability relied upon in order to disqualify Vickers from entering into a marriage with the decedent was that he had not complied with the procedural requirements necessary in order to obtain a divorce in Mexico. To hold that Vickers knew the falsity of the allegation in his petition for special letters of administration that he was the husband of the deceased, and that he made the representation with the intent to deceive, is quite different from a determination as to what his actual marital status may have been after the Mexican divorce proceeding and the Texas marriage ceremony, and is unsupported by any evi*261deuce in the entire record. The majority opinion apparently upholds the finding referred to upon the slim basis of what Cocke, petitioner’s attorney in the Mexican divorce proceedings, said he told petitioner. Plainly petitioner did not understand it in that fashion, otherwise it is not to be supposed that he would have married Olive thereafter and commit the crime of bigamy. On the contrary the presumption is, in accordance with his testimony, that he believed the marriage was severed, that he acted innocently and did not violate the law.
It is well settled in this state that when a marriage has been shown in evidence the law raises a strong presumption of its legality. (In re Pusey, 173 Cal. 141 [159 P. 433]; Hunter v. Hunter, 111 Cal. 261, 267 [43 P. 756, 52 Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411]; Estate of Newman, 34 Cal.App.2d 706, 710 [94 P.2d 356].) There is also a presumption that a person is innocent of crime or wrong. (See, Code Civ. Proe., § 1963(1); Estate of Newman, supra.) (If Vickers did not obtain a divorce in Mexico his marriage to the decedent was bigamous.) It is obvious that these presumptions have not been dispelled in this case. Certainly, it was to Vickers’ advantage to complete the Mexican divorce proceeding as there Would have been no object in going to the trouble and expense of hiring a lawyer and instituting a proceeding if he had no intention of pursuing the matter to completion. The good faith of Vickers in the premises is shown by the fact that he lived with the deceased, outwardly manifesting himself as her husband during the entire remainder of her life. Although she had a mother and brother living, it was he who was endeavoring to make the arrangements for her funeral and burial and see that the expenses thereof were paid. It was for that latter purpose, primarily, that he petitioned for special letters of administration.
The testimony of Vickers cannot be made the basis of an inference that he knew he had not obtained a divorce in Mexico. An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a material fact that may properly be drawn from the existence of certain primary facts. (See, Code Civ. Proc., §yl832, 1958.) Whether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question tif law and depends upon its reasonableness. (See, Code Civ. Proc., § I960.) The majority opinion points to no primary facts *262testified to by Vickers from which it can reasonably be inferred that he knew the Chihuahua court had no jurisdiction to enter or did not enter a divorce decree prior to the marriage ceremony in El Paso. On the other hand, quite to the contrary, Vickers’ testimony reveals the following: His attorney told him that it took six months to get a divorce in the State of Baja California; 30 days in Sonora, and by virtue of -special treaty with the State of Chihuahua, a divorce could be obtained there in one day. When in Juarez, Chihuahua, he appeared in court before a judge and signed an official 11 document roll.” While returning to El Paso his attorney told him it 11 was all over” and that he had a divorce. He was told that it was not essential to the validity of the divorce in Chihuahua that the defendant be notified, because under the laws of Chihuahua the opposing party could not contest the grounds for divorce; that the fact of the filing of a complaint is taken to show dissatisfaction and ineompatability, and the divorce is automatically rendered. He was further informed that notice would be sent to the county of the residence of the defendant for personal service upon her, in accordance with the general practice carried on in order to satisfy the comity requirements of some of the adjoining states. Also, that this notice, when returned, would be filed in the divorce action nunc pro tunc. His testimony further reveals that he informed the court of the residence address where the defendant could be found and served.
Furthermore, under the facts of this ease, Vickers’ state of mind at the time he went through the marriage ceremony in El Paso has no bearing upon what he knew at the time he filed his petition for special letters in the estate of Olive Agnes Vickers. In other words, even if it were possible to infer from Vickers’ testimony concerning the notice or waiver that was to be sent or obtained from his first wife, that he must have known that no divorce decree had been entered prior to the El Paso marriage ceremony, this furnishes no support for the charge in this proceeding that he knew that he was not the husband of the deceased eight months later when he filed his petition in the probate court. This for the reason that Vickers was also told that this waiver or notice would be entered nunc pro tunc. The question is not whether this actually could or could not confer jurisdiction upon the court to render a divorce decree at or *263prior to the time of the marriage ceremony with the deceased (assuming such notice or waiver to be necessary), but whether such fact furnished a reasonable basis for Vickers to believe that it could. In view of the further fact that his wife could not contest the divorce suit, even if she wanted to, it appears to have been most reasonable for him to so believe.
The contention that Vickers knew Mexican legal procedure gains no support from the facts of his education and experience. At the time of the events here concerned he was 33 years of age. His legal experience was quite limited. He had been a member of The State Bar less than four years and had not practiced elsewhere. It need scarcely be said that the modes and methods of civil procedure in Mexico are not matters of common knowledge to the bar of this state. Respondent proved what it claimed to be the law of Chihuahua, Mexico, at the time in question by a member of the bar of that place, qualified as an expert upon divorce law. Moreover, Vickers did not represent himself in the Mexican proceeding, but engaged an attorney licensed to practice in Chihuahua, Mexico.
I further am unable to subscribe to the majority opinion for the reason that it characterizes the acts charged in count one of the order to show cause as “professional misconduct.” Vickers did not appear before the probate court in his capacity as an attorney, but appeared in his personal capacity and so advised the court. He did not even prepare the petition, but another attorney, whose name appears thereon, did so for him. If by the citation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106, the majority mean to imply that Vickers was guilty of “moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption,” then the opinion is further erroneous for the reason that there was no attempt at personal gain. Vickers obtained the appointment as special administrator for legitimate reasons within the purview of the Probate Code provisions for such appointment. He was in need of funds to provide a funeral and decent burial for the one with whom he had been living, ostensibly, and in good faith as his wife. Immediate action was also necessitated in order to consummate a sale of real property that had belonged to the deceased and petitioner before such sale was rendered impossible by virtue of foreclosure proceedings then under way. A special administrator is an emergency officer, appointed *264where necessary, not to conduct administration or distribution of the estate, but solely to conserve the property. (11B Cal.Jur. 864.) He was required to post a $2,000 surety bond as a condition precedent to be appointed special administrator, and it does not appear that any claim has ever been made against the surety on account of maladministration by Vickers nor has it been shown in this proceeding that any detriment was caused to the estate by his appointment.
It appears that the petition for special letters of administration was filed six days after the death of Olive Agnes Vickers, claimed by petitioner to be his wife, and at a time when he had but 25 cents to his name. One’s qualifications to discharge whatever trust may be reposed in him by virtue of his profession or general occupation should not be judged too strictly by what he does at such a dismal hour and under stress of such circumstances. Under any view of the facts in this proceeding nothing is shown that is deserving of any further discipline than that which the petioner is now undergoing.
In conclusion, I deem it appropriate to quote from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal in the case of In re Kling, 44 Cal.App. 267, at page 271 [186 P. 152], where the court speaking through Mr. Justice Victor E. Shaw said: “The record, as we read it fails to disclose any deception on the part of appellant, or that he acted through corrupt motives or otherwise violated the provisions of section 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The oath required by section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure of any attorney is that he will ‘faithfully discharge the duties of an attorney and counselor at law to the best of his knowledge and ability.’ Moral turpitude cannot be predicated upon errors of judgment as to the law. or action had and taken in good faith by an attorney, openly and with notice to the adverse party under an honest assertion of legal right, where there is no deception practiced or unfair advantage sought.” (Italics added.)
In my opinion the proceeding against the petitioner should be dismissed.