Court Opinion

ID: 9575029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:46.067566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:49.954690
License: Public Domain

Bell, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to this Court’s reversal of the judgment in Case No. S91A1191, because I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that “the parol evidence admitted demonstrates that the alleged illegal activity was at most incidental to the contract rather than required by it,” 262 Ga. at 123.
There was undisputed testimony from Crooke that before and at the time the contract was signed, Crooke intended to engage in the alleged illegal activity with Gilden, and that but for the parol understanding that they were to engage in the alleged illegal activity Crooke would not have allowed Gilden to engage in other activity pursuant to the contract. Crooke further testified that Gilden insisted that Crooke had to sign the contract if their alleged illegal activity were to go forward. Crooke testified, moreover, that in executing the contract the parties envisioned the alleged illegal activity.
Gilden introduced no evidence to rebut the foregoing testimony, and on appeal did not dispute its accuracy. Instead, Gilden argued that the trial court was not authorized to consider parol evidence to show that the contract violated OCGA § 13-8-1. The majority opinion appears to disallow Gilden’s argument, as the majority seems to acknowledge that parol evidence is admissible to show that a contract is void under § 13-8-1. However, the majority then reaches a conclusion that even Gilden did not urge, which is that Crooke’s testimony at most demonstrated that the alleged illegal activity was merely incidental to the contract. I cannot accept this conclusion, as it is inconsistent with Crooke’s testimony. The proper conclusion is that the contract was founded upon or grew immediately out of the alleged illegal activity, and therefore was void under § 13-8-1. Liles v. Still, *124176 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (335 SE2d 168) (1985).1
Decided March 19, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 2, 1992.
Weinstein, Rosenthal, Tobin & Caldwell, Michael S. Rosenthal, R. Scott Tobin, for appellant.
Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David Flint, Debra A. Wilson, for appellee.
Mary P. Schildemeyer, Julie I. Edelson, Sandra E. Lundy, Paula L. Ettelbrick, Maria Gil de Lamadrid, Ruth E. Harlow, William B. Rubenstein, amici curiae.

 I note that the majority, in finding that the alleged illegal activity was at most incidental, relies exclusively upon Shannondoah, Inc. v. Smith, 140 Ga. App. 200 (230 SE2d 351) (1976). However, Shannondoah is distinguishable on its facts, as in that case there was no evidence that the contract grew immediately out of and was connected with illegality.