Court Opinion

ID: 9475947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:43:17.60026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:02.292319
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority takes the extraordinary step of granting a writ of mandamus on a discovery matter because it considers the plaintiffs’ citizenship status “completely irrelevant to the case.” Cf. In re Sessions, 672 F.2d 564 (5th Cir.1982); Kerr v. U.S. District Court, 511 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.1975), affirmed, 426 U.S. 394, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976) (refusing to issue mandamus on discovery matters). Mandamus should issue only “to compel the performance of a legal duty which is free of doubt.” Winningham v. HUD, 512 F.2d 617, 620 (5th Cir.1975). Because I disagree that such information is without a shred of relevancy and that the district judge manifestly was without jurisdiction to permit the discovery, I respectfully dissent.
First, a matter with which I have no quarrel. The majority accurately reject the district court’s justification of this discovery insofar as it relates to the authority of the Texas Rural Legal Aid Association to represent undocumented aliens. Although employees of the Legal Services Corporation are prohibited from representing undocumented aliens, 45 C.F.R. § 1626 (1986), the Legal Services Corporation Act does not permit inquiry for this purpose. It should be noted, however, that the defendants have never sought to justify their discovery request on that basis.
Assuming plaintiffs may sue under the AWPA, the nature of their AWPA action makes their immigration status relevant. Plaintiffs allege that they are migrant farm workers, as opposed to seasonal farm workers. The key distinction between the AWPA definitions of migrant and seasonal farm workers is that migrant workers are those who are required to be absent overnight from their permanent place of residence. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(A). The plaintiffs’ permanent place of residence is thus a material issue in this case. The plaintiffs’ immigration and residency status, while not dispositive, clearly could lead to the discovery of relevant evidence in this area. It is not uncommon for Mexican citizens to have their permanent residence South of the Border, but to live with relatives or for short periods of time in the U.S. while work is available. Plaintiffs who live thus would not be “migrant” workers under the AWPA, because they would not be away overnight from their permanent residence in Mexico, but only from their temporary quarters.
I also take issue with the majority’s conclusion that the AWPA and the Fair Labor Standards Act do not distinguish between citizens and illegal alien employees. Previously, no court has explicitly permitted an undocumented alien to recover the damages and penalties provided for in those statutes. Moreover, the AWPA specifically prohibits the employment of undocumented aliens by farmers and farm labor contractors. 29 U.S.C. § 1816. The entire thrust of the AWPA is to enhance and *172create minimum standards for the working conditions of American and a very limited class of documented foreign workers employed in domestic agriculture. To the extent the statute’s prohibition on hiring undocumented aliens is intended to discourage illegal migration of farm workers from other countries, that purpose is undercut by allowing those farm workers to sue and recover benefits on a par with legally employed workers. The impact of the alien hiring prohibition has not been definitively briefed by either party at any time, and the district court afforded discovery of plaintiffs’ immigration status precisely because he felt the issue to be open. So do I. At a time when the problem of illegal immigration into this country is so severe, the competition for entry-level employment along the south Texas border fierce, and the economic pressures on the agriculture industry stringent, I believe we should not rush to broaden farmers’ liability in the context of a factually- and legally-undeveloped mandamus proceeding. At the very least, it is imprudent to mandamus the district court in an area of “doubtful law.” See In re Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 791 F.2d 353, 365 (5th Cir.1986) (mandamus proper only where there is a “clear and indisputable abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power”); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed.2d 230 (1986) (mandamus available only where there is a “clear error of law”); United States v. Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 770 (9th Cir.1980) (mandamus inappropriate in case involving a statute devoid of precedent and subject to differing interpretations).
Finally, I am not unsympathetic to the claim that revelations of immigration status may be harmful to plaintiffs even if it is material to the defense. Such an evaluation is, however, within the district court’s discretion in the first instance. Any extremely severe collateral consequences of the disclosures might be remedied by a protective order. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 26(c).
As the information requested is relevant to material issues in the case, the district court cannot be said to have been acting beyond its lawful authority in compelling its production. The extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus is thus not justified.
I DISSENT.