Court Opinion

ID: 9566783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:43:04.062479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:52.980947
License: Public Domain

M. J. Shamo, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial on the ground of a witness’ reference to a letter describing defendant as a "dope dealer.” .1 would reverse and remand for a new trial.
The question presented is whether a witness’ improper comment which was unresponsive to the question posed by the examining attorney was so prejudicial that defendant was denied a fair trial. The proper resolution of this question is controlled by the two-pronged test set forth in People v Stegall, 102 Mich App 147, 151-152; 301 NW2d 473 (1980), lv den 412 Mich 877 (1981):
If such a prejudicial response could reasonably have been anticipated by defense counsel, we would tend to agree with the defendant that a mistrial was required and that the defendant’s delayed motion for a new trial should have been granted. . . . However, the witness’s prejudicial *309response was clearly unanticipated. A nonrespon-sive volunteered answer to a proper question is not cause for granting a mistrial.
Nevertheless, this Court must decide whether the prejudicial effect of the incompetent testimony has resulted in manifest injustice . . . and whether the prejudicial effect of the incompetent testimony could have been cured by a cautionary instruction by the trial judge.
In the instant case, reversal is required under either prong. First, although I do not mean to suggest that the prosecutor was guilty of any deliberate misconduct, I do conclude that the prejudicial remark volunteered during prosecutorial questioning "could reasonably have been anticipated.” Unlike in Stegall, the party conducting the examination presumably had unrestrained pretrial access to the police witness. Even though the prosecutor is the defendant’s adversary at trial, the prosecutor has a duty "to see that the defendant has a fair trial and to protect the interest of the people, who are as concerned with protecting the innocent as they are with convicting the guilty.” People v Williams, 114 Mich App 186, 198; 318 NW2d 671 (1982), lv den 422 Mich 909 (1985). The prosecutor may not close his eyes to the possibility that one of his witnesses will inject prejudicial matter into evidence.
Second, the nature of the volunteered reference was manifestly prejudicial. The characterization of defendant as a dope dealer by defendant’s wife could have left a powerful impression on the jury. It was highly, albeit improperly, probative of defendant’s familiarity with drugs, which could have influenced the jury to conclude that the drugs found in defendant’s home were subject to his possession. Most of the cases relied upon by the *310majority were decided in the context of references by witnesses to the defendant’s prior incarcerations for undisclosed reasons. People v Yarbrough (On Remand) (On Rehearing), 86 Mich App 105; 272 NW2d 345 (1978); People v McQueen, 85 Mich App 348; 271 NW2d 231 (1978); People v Histed, 56 Mich App 630, 634-635; 224 NW2d 721 (1974). Unlike those cases, the witness’ reference in the instant case had a direct bearing on the issues of guilt and innocence. I conclude that a curative instruction would have been wholly inadequate to alleviate the prejudice incurred by defendant. Cf., People v Alexander, 118 Mich App 112, 114-115; 324 NW2d 550 (1982).
The trial court abused its discretion in its denial of a mistrial. Defendant was deprived of a fair trial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.