Court Opinion

ID: 9573526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:26.310254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:32.434572
License: Public Domain

Justice MEYER
concurring.
While I concur in the final result that the majority has reached, I disagree with the majority’s ruling that the admission of the *124prior conviction, though harmless, was error. I conclude that there was no error at all in the admission of the prior conviction.
I conclude that the trial court did not err in finding, pursuant to Rule 609(b), that the probative value in the admission of the prior conviction outweighed any prejudicial effect and in waiving the ten-year rule.
Rule 609(b) is limited to a consideration of the admission of evidence for the purpose of impeachment. The use of evidence of a criminal conviction is only admissible under this rule for casting doubt upon defendant’s credibility or truthfulness. Admission of convictions older than ten years is permitted only when “the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b) (1988).
The district attorney prepared and served a written “Notice of Intent to Use Evidence of Conviction of Crimes More Than Ten Years Old” eleven days prior to the scheduled start of trial on 13 March 1989. The notice recited that it was made pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 609(b), and it “begins with his conviction in Danville, Virginia 18th May, 1970.” Defendant responded with a written “Motion to Prohibit Use of Evidence of Convictions of Crimes More Than Ten Years Old.”
On the first day of trial, immediately before jury selection started, the presiding judge heard a series of motions. The final hearing pertained to the written motion to compel full discovery of all material about prior convictions in the possession of the district attorney. As the hearing progressed, it turned to inquiry as to which prior convictions could be mentioned during jury selection and which would be admissible into evidence for purposes of cross-examination at trial. Counsel for defendant objected to the use of a 1970 Virginia conviction.
Evidence was taken at the motions hearing. The first item presented was a certified copy of a document or documents from a Virginia court dated 18 May 1970. Subsequently, defendant was sworn and testified that he had been convicted in Virginia on 18 May 1970, while represented by counsel, of a felony of crime against nature by kidnapping a male child eleven years of age and forcing the child to take defendant’s penis into his mouth. Defendant fur*125ther testified that the presiding judge in Virginia imposed judgment, put him under six years’ probation, and ordered certain conditions as a condition of the probation.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Sitton entered the following order in pertinent part:
Let the record show that the Court finds that the defendant was convicted on May 18, 1970 with the benefit of his privately retained counsel, Mr. Kushner, in the State of Virginia, that that being a felonious conviction, the Court finds that there is probative value and that in the interests of justice the ten-year rule is hereby waived and the Court would so order and allows the State to question the defendant in regard thereto.
Defendant testified at trial before the jury. During direct examination, the following colloquy took place:
Q Jim, did you have a conviction for any crime in the State of Virginia?
A Yes, sir, I did.
Q What was that for?
A I don’t remember the exact wording of the charge, but the circumstances were that I had given a boy a ride, and I believe he was eleven years old then. He appeared to me to be at the time to be older. I was sixteen at the time this happened. And I offered him money to give me oral sex, which he did.
And some months later I was arrested and charged, I think, with abducting him and forcing him to perform oral sex on me.
Q And you were convicted of that?
A I plead [sic] guilty to that charge; yes, sir.
Q You were sixteen years old?
A I was sixteen when this happened. I was actually seventeen when I was charged and convicted of it.
Q And what was the sentence, Jim?
*126A I think there was six years probation and I was under Court Order to get some psychiatric counseling.
The district attorney cross-examined defendant about the conviction at some length.
At the conclusion of defendant’s trial, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. The trial judge found as aggravating factors that defendant had been convicted of a felony in Virginia. The felony conviction was the Virginia felony of crime against nature described above.
The prosecution offered as evidence a certified copy of the record of conviction in Virginia and the earlier sworn testimony of defendant acknowledging that he had been convicted of and received a sentence for the crime described in the Virginia papers. Specific details of the Virginia incident were developed throiigh sworn testimony. Evidence was presented to establish that defendant was seventeen years old when charged, eighteen years old when convicted, and that his file was sealed.
At the conclusion of sentencing, the trial judge entered the following order:
Let the record show that . . . the Court having heard the evidence . . . makes the following findings of fact:
That the defendant was born in the month of March, 1952;
That he was charged with the offense of sodomy in the State of Virginia, an offense which was alleged to have occurred on June 20th, 1969 when the defendant was seventeen years of age;
That a trial was conducted on the 18th day of May, 1970 in the Circuit Court of the State of Virginia;
That the defendant having been tried by a jury and although having been seventeen years of age, that he thereby waived his rights as a juvenile and was tried in the Circuit Court as an adult and was sentenced in the Circuit Court as an adult pursuant to 16.1-272 of the Code of the State of Virginia;
That the North Carolina Statutes; particularly Statute 15-A-1340(40) reads in part as follows concerning aggravating factors:
*127“The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than sixty days confinement; such convictions include those occurring in North Carolina Courts and Courts of other States, the District of Columbia and the United States, provided that any crime for which the defendant was convicted in a jurisdiction other than North Carolina would have been a crime if committed in this State.”
That the Court, having considered the decision of State versus Bill [sic] in the Supreme Court of this State, ruled that the offering of an offense from the State of Alabama was not admissible because the individual was treated as a juvenile.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Court concludes as a matter of law that this case differs from that of State versus Bill [sic] and the Court finds that the defendant in this case was treated as an adult, was sentenced as an adult and therefore does not merit the protection of secrecy and privacy as a juvenile in the State of Virginia or in North Carolina.
Although the trial judge did not specifically set out the facts and circumstances in support of the probative value of the prior conviction, this alone does not make it error. It is only when the facts and circumstances supporting the probative value of the evidence are not “apparent from the record” that its admission is error. State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 307, 384 S.E.2d 470, 486 (1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, — U.S. —, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). Here, the record is replete with facts and circumstances showing the probative value of the evidence, including defendant’s own testimony on direct examination that he pled guilty to the offense in 1970. Because of the particular nature and circumstances of the prior conviction, it is clear to me that its probative value far outweighs its prejudicial effect. It is up to the jury to decide how much weight to give defendant’s testimony. Of course, the evidence is prejudicial — all impeachment is prejudicial. The incident in 1970 reflects upon the character of defendant and in doing so raises doubt as to the defendant’s credibility. In the prior case, defendant was convicted of a felony involving a sexual offense with a male child eleven years old in that he forced the child to perform fellatio. In the case sub judice, defendant admitted to having a consensual homosexual relationship with one of the *128boys that he murdered. Due to the similar sexual nature of the two cases, the jury could infer that defendant was not telling the truth regarding his alleged self-defense in the present incident and give less weight to his testimony.
I would affirm the trial court’s holding that the prior conviction’s probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.
In addition, I find the majority’s lengthy treatment of the question of whether defendant was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the prior crime and whether he “waived” his rights as a juvenile to be completely unnecessary and unwise. As the majority points out, the defendant admitted in his own sworn testimony that he had pled guilty to a felony violation of the laws of Virginia and that judgment had been imposed on him in 1970. As the majority also points out, under the laws of that state, a juvenile could be tried as an adult for the offense in question. Defendant’s testimony is all that is necessary to support a finding that the 1970 conviction was not a juvenile adjudication. State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 307 S.E.2d 156 (1983) (a defendant’s own statement that he had been convicted of a prior crime punishable by more than sixty days is a sufficient method of proof).
In conclusion, while agreeing with the majority’s final result, I cannot agree that the admission of defendant’s prior conviction was error.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this concurring opinion.