Court Opinion

ID: 9386952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 06:00:19.408224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.003220
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KEITH GUTHRIE, SR.,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        CH-0752-16-0212-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 13, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jill C. Beck, Kansas City, Missouri, for the appellant.

           Michael E. Anfang, Kansas City, Missouri, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                          2

     following circumstances:     the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).              After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to find that the appellant failed to meet his burden to pr ove that
     race was a motivating factor in his removal, we AFFIRM the initial decision..
¶2         As further detailed in the initial decision, the appellant most recently held a
     Motor Vehicle Operator position.           Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 27,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2. The agency proposed his removal based on a single
     charge of inappropriate conduct, with six accompanying specifications.             ID
     at 2-3; IAF, Tab 4 at 72-73. In short, those specifications alleged that, between
     August and October of 2015, the appellant (a) drove recklessly and too fast with a
     veteran passenger on two occasions, (b) struck another vehicle while driving a
     veteran and failed to check on the other vehicle’s passengers , (c) struck a stop
     sign and failed to check for damage or report the incident, (d) struck a tree branch
     and damaged a vehicle’s mirror, (e) put gasoline in a diesel vehicle, and (f) drove
     on a suspended license on one date.       IAF, Tab 4 at 72.      After the appellant
     responded to the proposal, the deciding official upheld the removal, effective
     January 8, 2016. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 4 at 86-90.
¶3         The appellant challenged his removal in the instant appeal, raising race and
     age discrimination affirmative defenses.     IAF, Tabs 1, 21.      After holding the
                                                                                         3

     requested hearing, the administrative judge found that the agency met its burden
     of proving specifications (a)-(e) 3 and the inappropriate conduct charge, generally.
     ID at 4-11. She also found that the agency met its burden of establishing nexus
     and the reasonableness of the penalty. ID at 11-14. Finally, the administrative
     judge found that the appellant did not prove either of his affirmative defenses. ID
     at 14-18.     Accordingly, the administrative judge sustained the appellant’s
     removal. ID at 18. The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response , and the appellant has
     replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.
¶4         On review, the appellant first challenges the administrative judge’s findings
     concerning specification (c), that he struck a stop sign on October 22, 2015, and
     failed to check for damage or report the incident. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. To find
     that the agency met its burden of proving this specification, the administrative
     judge relied on the testimony of another motor vehicle operator who witnessed
     the incident and her contemporaneous report on the matter. ID at 7-8. However,
     as the appellant rightly notes, the administrative judge referred to the wrong
     report.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; ID at 7-8 (citing IAF, Tab 4 at 32-33).           The
     administrative judge mistakenly referred to a police report pertaining to a
     different accident and specification, rather than the witness report concerning the
     appellant’s striking a stop sign. Compare IAF, Tab 4 at 32-33, with id. at 39-40.
     Nevertheless, we find the error harmless. See Panter v. Department of the Air
     Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is
     not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversing an
     initial decision).
¶5         Despite the administrative judge’s reference to the wrong piece of evidence,
     the record does contain a contemporaneous witness report pertaining to

     3
       The administrative judge did not sustain specification (f), concerning the appellant
     driving on a suspended license, because the appellant was initially unaware of the
     suspension and acted appropriately after learning of it. ID at 10.
                                                                                          4

     specification (c), signed by both the witness and a police officer, corroborating
     the allegation that the appellant hit a stop sign on the date in question. IAF,
     Tab 4 at 39-40.    The statement the witness provided in that contemporaneous
     report is consistent with her testimony at the hearing. Id.; IAF, Tab 26, Hearing
     Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the motor vehicle operator). Although the
     appellant disputes that witness’ testimony, he has failed to provide sufficiently
     sound reasons for us to overturn the administrative judge’s conclusion that her
     testimony was more credible than the appellant’s.          ID at 7 -8; see Haebe v.
     Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the
     Board must give credibility-based determinations deference and may only
     overturn an administrative judge’s explicit or implicit demeanor -based credibility
     findings when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so). Accordingly, we
     discern no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s findings concerning
     proof of this specification, the others she sustained, or the charge, generally. 4
¶6         The appellant next references and attaches various provisions of 5 U.S.C.
     chapter 43, arguing that the agency committed a number of errors in addressing
     his conduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-13. For example, the appellant asserts that the
     agency previously rated him as “fully successful” and failed to give him an
     opportunity to correct his performance after notifying him of the specifications.
     Id. at 4-5. He also asserts that the agency neglected to list the critical elements
     he failed to meet. Id. at 5. These arguments are unavailing. They mistakenly
     conflate the appellant’s chapter 75 removal with a performance -based action
     under chapter 43. Compare Hall v. Department of Defense, 117 M.S.P.R. 687,
     ¶ 6 (2012) (explaining the elements of a chapter 75 adverse action appeal,
     including proof of an agency’s charges, nexus, and the reasonableness of its
     penalty), with Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5

     4
       Although the appellant disputes specification (c), he admits to the pertinent facts
     underlying specifications (b), (d), and (e) and provides no substantive arguments
     concerning specification (a) on review. E.g., PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.
                                                                                               5

     (2010) (explaining the elements of a chapter 43 performance-based action,
     including the requirements that an agency communicate to the appellant the
     critical elements of his position, warn him of his performance inadequacies, and
     provide a reasonable opportunity to improve).          Even if the agency could have
     pursued a performance-based action under chapter 43, it was not required to do
     so.   Lovshin v. Department of the Navy, 767 F.2d 826, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
     (recognizing that an agency may rely on either chapter 75 or chapter 43 to take a
     performance-based action).
¶7         Mixed with his arguments that mistakenly implicate the requirements of
     chapter 43, the appellant references provisions of an alleged “Master Agreement”
     and agency handbook.        PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6.         In doing so, he appears to
     implicate an affirmative defense of harmful error. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A)
     (providing that an adverse action may not be sustained if the employee “shows
     harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such
     decision”). However, it appears that the appellant failed to clearly articulate any
     such claim below. IAF, Tab 21 at 4. Therefore, to the extent that he is now
     asserting harmful error, we will not address it for the first time on review. See
     Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (recognizing
     that the Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in
     a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material
     evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence).
¶8         In his petition, the appellant also reasserts that he suffered age
     discrimination, one of the affirmative defenses he did raise below. 5 PFR File,

     5
       The appellant does not re-raise his race discrimination claim. We agree with the
     administrative judge’s well-reasoned conclusion that the appellant failed to present any
     evidence to support this claim. ID at 14-17. To the extent that she stated that the
     appellant did not prove a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination, ID at 17, we modif y
     the initial decision to find that the appellant failed to meet his burden to prove that race
     was a motivating factor in his removal, Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶¶ 28-31 (2016) (explaining that the previously used phrase
     “convincing mosaic” was not meant to impose a new, separate legal requirement, but
                                                                                         6

     Tab 1 at 7; IAF, Tab 21 at 4. The administrative judge found that, although the
     appellant alleged that he was treated differently on the basis of his age, he failed
     to present any supportive evidence. ID at 17-18. On review, the appellant alleges
     that he “suffered age discrimination for the mere fact th at he was terminated
     before he turned 65 when he would be eligible for an unreduced retirement.”
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.        He further asserts that “[i]n this situation, age
     discrimination is about the appellant wanting and deserving to be fully vested at
     age 65, it’s not about his age being compared to a colleague.”            Id.   These
     assertions do not warrant a different result. The appellant has failed to meet his
     burden of proving that his age was a motivating factor in his removal.            See
     Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1173-76 (2020) (interpreting
     29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) as expressly imposing liability if the appellant shows that age
     discrimination played a part in the agency’s action); Gardner v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶¶ 28-30 (2016) (explaining that an
     affirmative defense of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 requires that an
     appellant first show by preponderant evidence that the prohibited consideration
     was a motivating factor in the contested personnel action), clarified by Pridgen v.
     Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24. 6
¶9        The appellant lastly suggests that removal was not a reasonable penalty for
     his conduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. He points to “the absence of intentionality and
     malicious intent, as well as a lack of extensive damage.” Id. We find no merit to
     the argument.

     finding that despite an administrative judge’s use of this phrase, she properly
     considered the evidence as a whole in finding that the appellant failed to prove her
     Title VII affirmative defenses), clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and
     Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24.
     6
      Because the appellant failed to meet his initial burden to prove that his race or age
     was a motivating factor in the agency’s decision, we need not reach the question of
     whether discrimination was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s decision. See Pridgen,
     2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22.
                                                                                        7

¶10        When, as here, all of the agency’s charges are sustained, but one of the
      underlying specifications is not, the agency’s penalty determination is entitled to
      deference and should be reviewed only to determine whether it is within the
      parameters of reasonableness. Parker v. U.S. Postal Service, 111 M.S.P.R. 510,
      ¶ 8, aff’d, 355 F. App’x 410 (Fed. Cir. 2009).     In applying this standard, the
      Board must take into consideration the failure of the agency to sustain all of its
      supporting specifications. Id. Even when conducting such review, the Board’s
      function is not to displace management’s responsibility or to decide what penalty
      it would impose but to assure that management’s judgment has been properly
      exercised and that the penalty does not exceed the bounds of reasonableness. Id.,
      ¶ 9. Thus, the Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that the agency
      failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the agency imposed clearly
      exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. Id.
¶11        As the administrative judge recognized, the agency properly considered the
      relevant factors when determining that removal was appropriate. ID at 11 -14;
      HCD (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 4 at 72-76, 86-87. Among
      other things, the agency noted that, even though the appellant had not acted with
      malice, he had exhibited an increasing pattern of unsafe driving, with a lack of
      regard for the well-being of veterans the agency served. HCD (testimony of the
      deciding official); IAF, Tab 4 at 72-76, 86-87. As a result, the agency concluded
      that he could not be depended on to perform his duties conscientiously or safely.
      HCD (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 4 at 72-76, 86-87. Like the
      administrative judge, we find no basis for disturbing the agency’s chosen penalty;
      it does not exceed the tolerable limits of reasonableness, even when considering
      the appellant’s arguments concerning the lack of malice and extent of damage.
      ID at 11-14.
                                                                                      8

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your cas e, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         9

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                10

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     11

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice descri bed in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           12

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.