Court Opinion

ID: 9850167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:57.860602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.709277
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I concur with the reasoning and the conclusion of the majority. I write separately because I believe this court should decide whether petitioner has a “proper interest,” within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 20012, in obtaining confidential accident reports.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that section 20012 does not exclude petitioner from the class of persons with a “proper interest” in the contents of accident reports. On the contrary, that section provides that law enforcement agencies receiving such reports shall disclose their “entire contents ... to any person who may have a proper interest therein, including, but not limited to, the driver or drivers involved . . . .” (Italics added.) The statute clearly contemplates that persons other than those involved in the reported accident may have a “proper interest” in the report.1
The majority correctly analyze the competing interests involved when a litigant seeks to discover confidential accident reports. On the one hand, it is well established that liberality is the rule in civil discovery. (Valley Bank *303of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 655-656 [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977]; Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266]; Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 548, 572 [7 Cal.Rptr. 109, 354 P.2d 637].) This court has recognized that extensive pretrial discovery promotes the “historically important state interest of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings.” (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 432 [85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, 44 A.L.R.3d 1].)
On the other hand, the Legislature appears to have afforded some measure of privacy to persons filing these required accident reports. The purposes behind the confidentiality provision of section 20012 were summarized in State of California ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court (Thomsen) (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 25 [168 Cal.Rptr. 78] (hereinafter Thomsen): “[T]he obvious purpose of section 20012 is ‘to encourage parties and witnesses to report accidents completely and truthfully. ’ [Citation.] ... A further purpose of the statute may well be one of protecting the privacy of persons involved, not merely as an aid to obtaining reports, but also as an end in itself. At least, the section achieves an element of privacy which, since the passage of the statutory scheme, has been recognized in California as a constitutional right (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1) and is cognizable in discovery matters. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 29.)
When the interest of a civil litigant in discovering potentially relevant information intrudes on another person’s claim to privacy, the court must engage in a careful balancing of each interest. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d 657.)
In Morales v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 283 [160 Cal.Rptr. 194], and Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669 [156 Cal.Rptr. 55], the courts have determined that “careful balancing” requires a court to accommodate each interest to the greatest extent possible. When each interest can be protected by allowing limited discovery, ‘“. . . the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.’ [Citation.]” (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 658; see also Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528-533 [174 Cal.Rptr. 160] [plaintiff in defamation action against university is entitled to see the contents of his personnel file, including letters of reference, with appropriate deletions of identification of the sources of these confidential letters].) The court must fashion its order “to accommodate the competing values of the individual right to privacy and ... the ‘important state interest of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in . . . legal proceedings. ’ [Citations.]” (Willis v. Superior Court (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 277, 297 [169 Cal.Rptr. 301].)
*304Where it is not possible to accommodate both interests, courts have carried out their “careful balancing” by requiring a litigant to show a particular need for the information. The showing which a litigant must make varies, depending on the weight accorded the privacy interest. For example, in Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 [143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766], this court held that where a defendant sought discovery which implicated the First Amendment associational rights of a large class of plaintiffs, it was entitled only to such limited information as was “directly relevant” to the cause of action or to a defense. (Id., at pp. 859-862.) In Bodenheimer v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 885 [167 Cal.Rptr. 26], discovery of a defendant’s membership in a political organization was allowed because, in light of a conspiracy allegation, his membership involved “a narrow question having an important connection with the lawsuit.” (Id., at p. 889.) In Fults v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 899, 904-905 [152 Cal.Rptr. 210], the court held that a wife bringing a paternity action could be compelled to disclose her own sexual activities only to the extent justified by a compelling interest. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to discovery of information about her sexual activities at the time conception might have occurred.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, when a litigant’s request for discovery touches another person’s privacy interest, a litigant is not as free to obtain information as he might otherwise be. (See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at pp. 384-386.) A particularized need for the information must be established. How compelling this need must be will depend on the importance of the privacy interest involved.
Applying these principles, it is clear that if petitioner’s needs can be met by discovery of the contents of accident reports—whether as a TASAS printout or in any other form which omits the names and addresses of the reporting parties—a court can and must allow such discovery. Plainly petitioner is entitled, under generally applicable principles of civil discovery, to learn whether other accidents have occurred at the same location and whether the nature of those accidents indicates that they might have been caused by a design defect. Such information is unquestionably “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (b).) Just as plainly, the reporting parties have no countervailing privacy interest in the facts of their accidents—so long as these facts do not reveal their identities.2
*305If a litigant cannot make a particularized showing of a need for the entire report, the court may authorize “ ‘partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.’” (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 658.) Such a litigant has a “proper interest” within the meaning of section 20012 in obtaining the depersonalized information found in the reports.
After reviewing the accident report information obtained through this limited discovery, a litigant may determine that evidence of one or more of these accidents is likely to be admissible in his own case. At this point, he should be permitted to discover the identities of the reporting parties in those accidents. It is true that at this stage the privacy interest of the reporting party is being invaded. However, once a litigant can show that evidence of another accident will likely be admissible in his trial, he demonstrates a sufficiently particularized need for discovery which outweighs the limited statutory privacy of the reporting party. He has met a far more stringent test of “relevance” than is usually required for discovery.3 He has demonstrated that the “historically important state interest of facilitating the *306ascertainment of truth in connection with legal proceedings” (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d 415, 432) demands the discovery he seeks. He is a person with a “proper interest” in obtaining the entire report.
The countervailing privacy interest in this case does not involve constitutionally protected First Amendment activities. (Compare Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844; Church of Hakeem, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 384 [168 Cal.Rptr. 13].) Nor does disclosure invade an established privilege, such as the physician-patient privilege (Britt, supra, at pp. 862-864) or the psychotherapist-patient privilege (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 429-435).
Automobile accidents are generally not a “sensitive area[] of personal information . . . .” (Willis v. Superior Court, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 297; see Fults v. Superior Court, supra, 88 Cal.App.3d at p. 905 [discovery refused where the defendant in a paternity case sought to learn “the most intimate aspects of (the mother’s) sexual life”]; and Morales v. Superior Court, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 283 [disclosure of plaintiff’s extramarital affairs limited to exclude names, addresses, and telephone numbers of nonlitigant paramours].) The fact that a person was involved in an automobile accident cannot compare with the embarrassment suffered as a result of a disclosure of an arrest. (See Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69 [161 Cal.Rptr. 19] [criminal defendant not entitled to learn identities of all persons arrested by officer who arrested him, absent further showing of relevance].) Disclosure of the facts of an automobile accident will generally be less of an intrusion into personal affairs than will disclosure of financial records. (Compare Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 656-657; Cobb v. Superior Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543 [160 Cal.Rptr. 561] [discussing the various protective orders available to narrow discoverable financial information]; see generally Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 238 [118 Cal.Rptr. 166, 529 P.2d 590].)
Allowing a litigant to obtain accident reports, when he can show that evidence of the reported accident is likely to be admissible in his case, represents a fair balancing of the competing interests. A litigant who can make such a showing qualifies as a person with a “proper interest” in the reports under Vehicle Code section 20012.

Although the persons specifically enumerated by section 20012 are those who may be involved in the litigation arising out of the reported accident, the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply here to exclude petitioner from the class of persons with a “proper interest.” The specifically enumerated persons appear to exhaust the class of potential parties to the litigation based on the reported accident. Application of the doctrine would render the words “including but not limited to” mere surplusage. (2A Sutherland on Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) § 47.21.)
Furthermore, the doctrine “is a rule of construction used to carry out, not to defeat, legislative intent.” (County of Placer v. Corin (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 443, 448, fn. 2 [170 Cal.Rptr. 232]; see also American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 603, 608-609 [186 Cal.Rptr. 345, 651 P.2d 1151]; Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 102-103 [154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595].) As discussed below, the legislative objective, consistent with well-established public policy, is to require disclosure of the required accident reports when it is necessary to promote the important state interest in the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings. This objective is just as important when the litigation involves a subsequent accident at the same location.

As Thomsen, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at page 29, and Edgar v. Superior Court (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 430, 435 [148 Cal.Rptr. 687] noted, there is no protected privacy interest in the fact that prior accidents have occurred at a particular location. Those cases explicitly recognize that a litigant is entitled to discovery of the state’s knowledge that accidents have occurred at a location—even though the state’s knowledge is derived from confidential sec*305tion 20012 reports. As the Edgar court held, “The confidential privilege provided is not intended to protect the State from its . . . duty to acknowledge the fact of prior occurrences, but is to protect and keep inviolate the identity of the persons involved in the accident, the witnesses and investigating officers, as well as the details contained in the report.” (Edgar v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at p. 435.)
To the extent Edgar suggests that there is a privacy interest in the “details involved in the report” other than those details which would reveal the identity of the reporting party, it is in error. A reporting party has no interest in keeping secret such facts as the cause of an accident, the exact location and number of cars involved—so long as these facts do not disclose anyone’s identity.

Normally, a party opposing discovery may not object on the ground that the information sought will not be admissible at trial. Discovery is available so long as “the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (b) [depositions]; the same scope of discovery is applicable to interrogatories [Code Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (c)] and to requests for documents [Code Civ. Proc., § 2031, subd. (a)].)
Furthermore, a litigant is entitled to discover “the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (b); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790-792 [183 Cal.Rptr. 810, 647 P.2d 86]; Smith v. Superior Court (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 6, 11-12 [11 Cal.Rptr. 165, 88 A.L.R.2d 650].)
As this court has held, the term “relevant” as used in the discovery statutes, does not require a showing of admissibility. (Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 790; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 174-175 [84 Cal.Rptr. 718, 465 P.2d 854].) “[Admissibility is not a proper test. Relevancy to the subject matter is the sole test for the production of unprivileged matter. [Citing Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 391 (15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266).]” (Filipoff v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 443, 452 [15 Cal.Rptr. 139, 364 P.2d 315].)
Absent the confidentiality provision of Vehicle Code section 20012, it is beyond question that the accident reports—including the names and addresses of the reporting parties—would be relevant and discoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b).