Court Opinion

ID: 9850878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:56.284179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.966548
License: Public Domain

Phipps, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
To establish constructive knowledge, an invitee must present evidence that either: (1) an employee of the owner or occupier “was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition and could have easily seen the substance and removed the hazard,” or (2) the owner/occupier failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and keeping the premises in safe condition.2 Constructive knowledge may also be *805inferred from evidence that the owner or occupier lacked a reasonable inspection procedure or failed to follow a reasonable inspection procedure at the time of the incident.3 But if there is no evidence that following such a reasonable inspection and cleaning procedure would have resulted in the discovery and removal of a foreign substance, there logically can be no inference that the defendant had constructive knowledge of its existence.4 “Conversely, where the evidence raises the inference that the foreign substance was discoverable pursuant to a reasonable inspection, a jury issue arises as to whether the defendant had constructive knowledge of what [a] reasonable inspection would have revealed.”5
The majority concludes that summary judgment was proper because “by the Chastains’ own admission, [the water was] so difficult to detect.”6 As support for this conclusion, the majority quotes Lindsey v. Ga. Bldg. Auth.,7 which cites Rodriquez v: City of Augusta,8 for the proposition that “[c]onstructive knowledge can only be inferred with proof that the proprietor or its agent could have easily discovered and corrected the alleged hazard.”9 However, that principle is not applicable here, where there is no evidence that an employee of the defendants was in the immediate vicinity of the dangerous condition.10 Lindsey is inapposite. It involved not a transient foreign substance, as was the water in this case, but a permanent static condition. The Lindsey plaintiffs claimed and the evidence showed that the defendant’s employees regularly had been in the immediate area of the allegedly dangerous static condition,11 thus invoking the question of whether one of the defendant’s employees could have “easily discovered” and corrected the alleged hazard. And although Rodriquez concerned a transient foreign substance, that case is also inapposite. There, the plaintiff claimed and the evidence showed that the defendant’s employees had been in the immediate vicinity of the alleged hazard just before the plaintiff fell. Thus, that *806method of proving constructive notice by showing that an employee of the owner/occupier could have “easily discovered” and corrected the alleged hazard was invoked and dispositive in Rodriquez.
But the issue of whether the owner/occupier could have “easily discovered” and removed the water is not dispositive in this case, where the Chastains do not allege nor does the evidence show that an employee was in the immediate vicinity of the water on the floor. The Chastains did not seek to establish constructive knowledge by alleging that an employee of the owner or occupier was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition and could have “easily discovered” and removed the water. Instead, they sought to establish constructive knowledge by showing that the owner/occupier or agent thereof failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the premises and by showing that the defendants failed to follow a reasonable inspection procedure at the time of the incident.12
Considering what the Chastains saw and determining that the water was not easily discoverable, the majority reaches the conclusion that there was no evidence that a reasonable inspection would have revealed and removed the water. But the evidence presented by the Chastains regarding the amount of water on the floor was sufficient to call into question whether a reasonable inspection would have discovered it. There was sufficient water on the floor to cause Chastain’s fall, dampen his pants leg, and still span an area of two to three feet.13 A shine on the floor’s surface may have made the water less visible, but a reasonable inspection would have taken the floor’s shine into account. Although the majority focuses on what was seen by Chastain and his wife, ages 78 and 71, respectively, and how they were able to see it, a reasonable inspection by the owner/occupier or agent thereof may have detected what was not readily noticeable to casual mall shoppers. It is important to remember that the duty to inspect lay not with the Chastains, but with the defendants’ employees or agents, who would be more familiar with the mall’s shiny flooring material and how to detect foreign substances thereon. Further, the record shows that the substance on the floor in this case was simply water, which would have required no special cleaning process.
The Chastains presented evidence, which when viewed in a light to favor them, raised an inference that the water was discoverable pursuant to a reasonable inspection. And although there was evi*807dence presented of a continuous inspection policy whereby mall workers would patrol the mall looking for hazards, as the majority states, there was no evidence in the record from an employee who could state specifically that he or she had actually done so during the period of time in question. Thus, a jury issue arises whether the defendants had constructive knowledge of what a reasonable inspection would have revealed.
Decided July 16, 2002
Reconsideration denied July 30, 2002.
Mitchell & Shapiro, Richard C. Mitchell, for appellants.
Hawkins & Parnell, Matthew F. Barr, Christine A. Sullivan, Thomas R. Mock, Jr., Gorby, Reeves, Peters & Burns, Michael S. Reeves, Christine A. Carson, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Blackburn and Judge Miller join in this dissent.

 (Punctuation omitted.) Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622-623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980); Hardee’s Food Systems v. Green, 232 Ga. App. 864, 866 (2) (502 SE2d 738) (1998).

 Kauffman v. Eastern Food & Gas, 246 Ga. App. 103, 104-105 (2) (539 SE2d 599) (2000).

 See Blake v. Kroger Co., 224 Ga. App. 140, 142 (1) (480 SE2d 199) (1996), disapproved on other grounds, Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 747 (493 SE2d 403) (1997). Further, “Robinson focused on the issue of plaintiff’s knowledge of the foreign substance, not the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge.” Lovins v. Kroger Co., 236 Ga. App. 585, 587 (1) (b) (ii) (512 SE2d 2) (1999). See also Kroger Co. v. Brooks, 231 Ga. App. 650, 655 (1) (b) (500 SE2d 391) (1998).

 Brooks, supra.

 (Punctuation omitted.)

 235 Ga. App. 718 (509 SE2d 749) (1998).

 222 Ga. App. 383 (474 SE2d 278) (1996).

 Lindsey, supra at 720; Rodriquez, supra at 384.

 See Alterman Foods, supra at 622-623; Rodriquez, supra.

 Lindsey, supra at 720.

 See text accompanying footnotes 2 and 3 of the dissent, supra.

 Compare Hardee’s Food, supra at 867 (2) (b) (grease on floor was invisible and would not have been discovered through a reasonable visual inspection or cleaned through reasonable procedure); Blake, supra at 144 (the evidence failed to show that a grocery store’s supposed failure to inspect and clean caused its failure to discover an alleged wet spot, where the spot was barely visible, if at all, to those who crawled on the floor looking for it and it could not have been speculated that sweeping would have removed the hazard).