Court Opinion

ID: 9947394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 19:02:40.007643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:24.640193
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24 P. v. Haynes CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081708

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. SCD183548)
 CARMELO HAYNES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Howard H. Shore, Judge. Affirmed.
         John Derrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina, Felicity Senoski, and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Carmelo Haynes appeals from an order summarily denying his petition

for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6, in which he sought relief
from a 2005 conviction for attempted murder based on his guilty plea (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a)). We conclude the record of conviction conclusively refutes
Haynes’s eligibility for relief at the prima stage, and we affirm the trial
court’s order.
                                        I.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2004, Haynes was charged as the sole defendant with two counts:
(1) premeditated attempted murder of K.H. (§§ 664; 187, subd. (a); 189); and
(2) assault upon K.H. with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)).
      The victim (K.H.) testified at the July 1, 2004 preliminary hearing, and
we briefly summarize his testimony. On June 15, 2004 at approximately
10:30 p.m., Haynes and two other individuals entered K.H.’s trailer and
demanded he give them a ride. K.H. refused, and seconds after they left,
Haynes returned and again demanded a ride. K.H. again refused, and
Haynes shot him. K.H. saw Haynes’s face when he was pointing the gun at
him and also recognized Haynes’s voice.
      In April of 2005, in exchange for a stipulated sentence of 22 years,
Haynes pled guilty to attempted murder of K.H. without premeditation
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and admitted two enhancement allegations:
(1) personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); and
(2) personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). His initialed and
executed a plea form also included a “[s]tipulation to the preliminary
examination transcript as a factual basis” for the plea. The minutes of the

1    Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
                                        2
change of plea reflect that Haynes was sworn and examined, but the

transcript of the plea colloquy no longer exists.2

      In September 2022, Haynes filed a facially valid petition for

resentencing using a preprinted form citing section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6)3
seeking the appointment of counsel and asserting that: (1) a complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial at
which he could have been convicted of attempted murder pursuant to that
doctrine; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
He also attached the sentencing minutes and the probation department’s
stipulated sentence report reflecting the change of terms as stated on his
executed plea form.
      The People filed an initial response in which they argued that Haynes
was ineligible for relief because he admitted to personally using a firearm
and was therefore the actual perpetrator. Haynes replied through appointed
counsel that his facially valid petition was sufficient to establish a prima
facie case and asked the trial court to issue an order to show cause. He
contends the trial court engaged in impermissible fact-finding when it denied

2     The court reporter’s March 23, 2023 affidavit states the stenographic
notes had been destroyed in accordance with Government Code
section 69955, subdivision (e).

3     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was recodified without
substantive change in section 1172.6, pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 200
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 200). (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) We refer to the current codification throughout this opinion.

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his motion at the prima facie stage following its review of the preliminary
hearing transcript and seeks a “bright line” rule that preliminary hearing
transcripts may not be relied upon in the prima facie determination.
      On January 25, 2023, the matter proceeded to a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner had established a prima facie case for relief.
(§ 1176.2, subd. (c).) Although the parties did not rely on the preliminary
hearing transcript in their written or oral arguments, the court noted the
plea form included a stipulation to the preliminary transcript as a factual

basis and accessed the transcript during the hearing.4

      After taking the matter under submission to review the preliminary
hearing transcript, the court issued an order denying the petition and
providing the following reasoning: “. . . [H]ere, the change of plea reflects
that Petitioner pled guilty to attempted murder and admitted he personally
used a firearm. The plea form includes a stipulation to the preliminary
hearing transcript as the factual basis for the plea. This court has reviewed
that transcript. The evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing establishes
that the petitioner was the sole perpetrator and shooter. Therefore, without
reweighing any evidence, the record reflects that Petitioner has failed to
make a prima facie showing for such relief because, as the direct perpetrator
he is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.”
      Haynes timely appealed.

4     We granted Haynes’s motion to augment the record to include the
July 1, 2004 preliminary hearing transcript.
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                                       II.
                                DISCUSSION
A.    Applicable Legal Standards
      Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which limited accomplice liability under the felony-
murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it
relates to murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on imputing
malice predicated solely on a person’s participation in a crime. (See People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) As amended by Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, the ameliorative
changes to the law were made expressly applicable to attempted murder and
voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859,
865 & fn. 18.) The statute specifies that the only theory of attempted murder
for which a person may seek relief is “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.; see People v. Coley (2022)

77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).)5
      Under section 1172.6, a person serving a sentence for murder,
attempted murder or manslaughter under theories that have since been
eliminated or narrowed may file a petition to have the conviction vacated and
to be resentenced. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) A person may file a petition for
resentencing relief “when all of the following conditions apply:

5     Section 1172.6 allows a petition for resentencing to be filed only by the
following categories of persons: “A person convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), italics
added.)
                                       5
      (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
      (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder.
      (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or
attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
      Under the statutory mechanism established by the Legislature, after
appointing counsel if a petitioner makes such a request (§ 1172.6, subd.
(b)(3)), the first step for a trial court in evaluating the petition is to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, and if so, to
issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “The parties can, and
should, use the record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “While the trial court may look at the record of
conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner
has made a prima facie case . . . , the prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. Like
the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. . . . ‘However, if the record, including

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the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971, citations omitted.)
      The court may appropriately deny a petition at the prima facie stage if
the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450 [the court may dismiss the petition at the prima
facie stage, “ ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition’ ”].) If, on the other hand, petitioner has made a “prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief” (ibid.), “the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (§ 11726, subd. (c).)
      We independently review the trial court’s decision to deny a
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B.    The Record of Conviction Conclusively Establishes Haynes Was
      Ineligible for Relief as the Sole Perpetrator of the Attempted Murder
      To satisfy the first statutory condition for eligibility for resentencing
relief, the information filed against Haynes must have allowed the
prosecution to proceed on the attempted murder charge “under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Haynes cannot
meet this initial eligibility requirement.
      Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine “an accomplice
is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the
target offense), but also of any other offense committed by the direct
perpetrator that was the ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime the
accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).” (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843, italics added (Gentile).) “Unlike direct aiding and
abetting liability, culpability under the natural and probable consequences

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theory does not require an accomplice to share the direct perpetrator’s intent.
Instead, ‘[a]ider and abettor culpability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine is vicarious in nature’ and ‘ “is not premised upon the
intention of the aider and abettor to commit the nontarget offense because
the nontarget offense’ ” may not be intended at all. [Citation.]” (Id. at
p. 844.)
      Haynes was charged and pled guilty as the direct perpetrator, not as an
accomplice or indirect aider and abettor. The single-defendant information in
this case does not identify or charge any codefendants and unequivocally
alleges that Haynes unlawfully attempted to murder K.H. (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), and among other things, that Haynes “personally inflicted great
bodily injury upon [K.H.], not an accomplice to the above offense, within the
meaning of . . . Section 12022.7[, subd.](a)” and that “in the commission” of
the attempted murder, Haynes “personally used a firearm . . . within the
meaning of . . . section 12022.53(b).” In his executed and initialed plea form,
Haynes pled guilty to attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) and admitted
the allegations that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and
personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) “in the
commission” of the attempted murder of K.H.
      We distinguish this case from cases like People v. Eynon (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 967 (Enyon) and People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217
(Rivera), in which the trial court erred in summarily denying the petition for
resentencing because “the generic murder charge” allowed the prosecution to
proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and probable
consequences. (See Enyon, at p. 978; Rivera, at p. 233.) Those cases involved
multiple defendants and charges that permitted the People to proceed on a

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natural and probable consequences theory against the petitioning
defendants, who were not alleged to be the actual killers.
      In Enyon, “[t]he information alleged generically that Eynon and his
codefendant ‘did willfully, unlawfully, and with deliberation, premeditation,
and malice aforethought murder [the victim].’ Eynon was not alleged to be
the actual killer, and the generic murder charge allowed the prosecution to
proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and probable
consequences or felony murder.” (Enyon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 977.)
Similarly in Rivera, “[t]he operative indictment’s only count alleged that
Coneal and Rivera ‘did willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought
murder [the victim] . . . in violation of . . . section 187[, subd.] (a), a felony,’
with accompanying gang and lying-in-wait special circumstances as to both
defendants. The indictment also alleged other gang-related enhancements as
to both defendants, one that the offense was committed to benefit a gang and
the other that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing death during such an offense. Only Coneal, however, was alleged to
have personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death.”
(Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 224–225.)
      Had the information in this case charged multiple defendants, the
prosecution could have conceivably proceeded on an attempted murder
charge against Haynes under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)), but that is not the record we have before us. As the
Supreme Court acknowledged, when two or more persons commit a crime,
“the dividing line between the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor is
often blurred . . . . [B]oth may act in part as the actual perpetrator and in
part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual
perpetrator.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.) Although a

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petitioner’s personal use of a firearm or personal infliction of great bodily
injury in a multiple-defendant case does not necessarily prove that he was
the actual shooter (see People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106, 125), the
facts of a particular case may support only that conclusion. As explained by
our Supreme Court in People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, when the
record shows only one person displayed and used a gun and “[a]ll evidence
points to defendant, not the second robber, as the one with the gun,” the true
finding on a personal use enhancement demonstrates that the defendant was
the actual killer.” (Id. at p. 1120; see also People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1205 [no evidence of anyone else using a gun supported the conclusion
that the jury necessarily found defendant to be the actual killer].)
      Here, Haynes was charged in a single-defendant complaint as the
direct perpetrator, who personally used a firearm and personally inflicting
great bodily injury on K.H. while attempting to murder him. The record
therefore refutes his form petition’s declaration to the contrary that “[an] . . .
information . . . was filed against [him] that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
      Haynes similarly fails to satisfy the third statutory condition for
eligibility—that he “could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) The changes to the law permit
an accomplice convicted of attempted murder to seek resentencing relief
under section 1172.6, but a direct perpetrator of an attempted murder cannot
establish that he was convicted under a now-abrogated accomplice theory of
liability. (Ibid.; see People v. Mares (Feb. 23, 2024, E080611) ___ Cal.App.5th
___, ___[2024 Cal.App. Lexis 114, *32-33 (Mares).)

                                        10
      Haynes’s admittedly hypothetical argument that unspecified additional
evidence may be presented at an evidentiary hearing is purely speculative
and ignores the record of conviction in this case. Even if Haynes wished to
claim he was misidentified and another person committed the crime, such a
defense “was available to him at the time of his plea,” and “[n]ew evidence of
misidentification could support a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but it
would not show that he cannot be convicted ‘because of’ the changes to the
law, as required by section 1172.6.” (Mares, supra, ___ Cal.App.5th ___, *16.)
      We need not address the split of authority on “the import of the
preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a petitioner has made
a prima facie case for resentencing” in this case. (See People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989 (Flores).) The California Supreme Court is poised to
resolve that issue (see People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, review
granted June 28, 2023, S279670 [whether a trial court impermissibly engages
in factfinding by relying on the preliminary transcript to summarily deny a
section 1172.6]), and we decline Haynes’s invitation to establish a “bright-line
rule” in this case.
      Moreover, even if, arguendo, the trial court’s reliance on “the evidence
adduced at the preliminary hearing” as the basis for its conclusion that
“petitioner was the sole perpetrator and shooter” could be considered
impermissible judicial fact-finding (see People v. Drayton (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 965, 982 (Drayton); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974), any
such error would be harmless in light of Haynes’s ineligibility for
resentencing relief given the record of conviction. (See People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [state law harmless error standard; i.e.,
whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the error]; see also Lewis, supra,

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11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–974 [applying Watson standard to prima facie stage of
section 1172.6 petitions].)
      As the record in this case conclusively establishes that Haynes is not
eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, we
affirm the trial court’s order.
                                      III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The order denying Haynes’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                                      IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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