Court Opinion

ID: 9524168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:25.804645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:59.448324
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion denying defendant’s motion for a Frye evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence on actuarial instruments used by Buck and Leavitt in assessing defendant’s risk of reoffending. I concurred in the opinion of In re Detention of Bolton, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1223 (2003), which held that “the psychological or psychiatric testimony of an expert predicated upon actuarial instruments is scientific evidence subject to Frye.” Bolton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1228. We concluded that “[tjhere is a danger that actuarial instruments may intrude upon the proper functioning of the jury, that they may instill a false confidence or carry a misleading sense of scientific infallibility.” Bolton, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1228-29. Our decision in Bolton requiring a Frye hearing is consistent with the three reported cases in Illinois discussing admissibility of actuarial tests relied upon by experts testifying on the detention of sexually violent persons: Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d 965, 782 N.E.2d 920, Hargett, 338 Ill. App. 3d 669, 786 N.E.2d 557, and Traynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d 949, 789 N.E.2d 865. The fundamental dispute between this case and Bolton is that the majority in this case views any test used by a psychologist as neither scientific nor novel. In my opinion, the various tests are presented as a scientific principle, technique, or test offered as independent support of the expert’s subjective opinion. In this case, for example, the State’s expert relied on specific numerical results from tests and testified as to the significance of those numbers. The majority concludes this is not scientific. I am confounded that the majority goes to great lengths to establish that these tests are not scientific and, therefore, should be admitted without the scrutiny of the Frye test. A prime example of the important role played by a Frye test is found in People v. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d 1, 526 N.E.2d 525 (1988). There, the trial court admitted testimony from a “shoe[-]print[-] identification” expert who claimed that each person made a unique impression in the wear patterns of the sole of the shoe, which led her to conclude the defendant was responsible for the shoe print left at the crime scene beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court concluded that this testimony failed the Frye test in that the expert’s theory lacked “general acceptance.” Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 9, 526 N.E.2d at 531. Moreover, as in this case, reliance was placed upon decisions from foreign jurisdictions to establish admissibility of the evidence. Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 11, 526 N.E.2d at 532. Finally, despite the fact that the expert in Ferguson was the only known shoe-print expert, the trial court found that her testimony was based upon “ ‘scientific standards of measurement, uniqueness!,] and a relationship between individuals that can be differentiated.’ ” Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 10, 526 N.E.2d at 531. The appellate court, though reversing the trial court’s finding of admissibility, did conclude that Frye analysis looks not just at the results, but the entire theory to determine whether it is a scientific principle, technique, or test of general acceptance. “Frye identifies the ‘thing from which the deduction is made’ as a ‘scientific principle or discovery.’ (Frye, 293 F. at 1014.) We construe the ‘thing from which the deduction is made’ in the instant action as not simply scientific standards of measurement, but rather [the expert’s] theory that shoe wear patterns are unique and an identification can be made by comparing them.” Ferguson, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 11-12, 526 N.E.2d at 532. In this case, that means examination beyond the questions of “Is this an actuarial test?” or “Is the actuarial test being used by many psychologists?” The question becomes the following: “What is the theory upon which the tests base their prediction of future behavior— the method of selecting factors, the determination of the numeric scale, the revision of testing instruments, et cetera?” According to the majority here, these tests are “[actuarial risk-assessment instruments *** developed by observing those sex offenders who reoffend to determine which ‘risk factors’ they have in common.” 344 Ill. App. 3d at 364. Moreover, the dissent in Bolton asserted that these tests were merely “an inference of probability from a sophisticated record-keeping system.” Bolton, slip op. at 16-17 (Appleton, J., dissenting). However, absent a Frye hearing, there is insufficient information in the record of this case to draw such a conclusion. We concluded in People v. Canulli, 341 Ill. App. 3d 361, 369-70, 792 N.E.2d 438, 444 (2003), that an appellate court cannot make such a determination absent a full Frye evidentiary hearing held and recorded by the trial court: “ ‘[T]he proponent *** must prove general acceptance, by surveying scientific publications, judicial decisions, or practical applications, or by presenting testimony from scientists as to the attitudes of their fellow scientists.’ [Citations.] However, ‘[u]nless the question of general acceptance has been thoroughly and thoughtfully litigated in the previous cases, *** reliance on judicial practice is a hollow ritual.’ [Citation.]” None of these tests — the Static-99, the Minnesota Screening Tool— Revised, or the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide — have been specifically examined by the trial court in this case. The majority opinion herein relies upon opinions from other states, while rejecting the opinions in Illinois. But, primarily, I dissent because each of these individual tests, though collectively referred to as “actuarial,” is, in fact an independent evaluative process that should be subject to the scientifically rigorous review that Frye contemplates. While they may have begun as a diagnostic tool for use by psychologists in making a diagnosis, they are, as in this case, being presented in court as independent evidentiary validation of expert opinions. The numerical score and the categorization of the score from each test is presented as a definitive truth that the expert need only recognize and relay to the jury, such as a machine might analyze physical data in an objective and infallible manner. In this sense, they are no different than the plethysmograph test designed to measure changes in the circumference of the penis when exposed to video or audio stimuli (see In re Detention of Hughes, 338 Ill. App. 3d 224, 788 N.E.2d 370 (2003)) to determine whether the respondent was a sexually dangerous person. The court in Hughes concluded that it was error to allow the expert to base his opinion on the results of the plethysmograph, absent a Frye determination and any prior determination in any reported case in Illinois. Hughes, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 241, 788 N.E.2d at 384. In Frye, the court determined that a test described as the “systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.” Frye, 293 E at 1014. One cannot help but conclude that, given the widespread use of lie-detector tests today, such tests would be admitted under the same arguments that the majority uses in this opinion.