Court Opinion

ID: 9692712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:01:37.864377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:36.320263
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice, CAPPY,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that there is no statutory right for a plaintiff to obtain a trial by jury in an action against an insurer for bad faith brought pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. In reaching its' conclusion, the majority errs in three fundamental and far-reaching respects.
First, the majority mistakenly believes that our decision in Wertz v. Chapman Township, 559 Pa. 630, 741 A.2d 1272 (1999), in which we determined that there was no right to a jury trial in an action brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, is dispositive with respect to section 8371 and gives that decision a breadth and effect that was not intended, is not required and will be problematic in the future. Strict application of Wertz to every statutorily-created cause of action will not only deny the unique nature of the various statutes enacted by the Legislature, but it will severely limit our court’s ability in cases hereafter to properly discern the intent of the Legislature regarding the statutory right to a trial by jury.
Second, and related thereto, the majority’s analysis fails to give full effect to the construct set forth in the Statutory Construction Act.1 Neglecting to follow the step-by-step dictates of that Act in this appeal leads the majority to substitute its view for that of the Legislature and wrongly conclude that there is no right to a jury trial in a claim of bad faith.
Finally, and most importantly,, the conclusion reached by the majority, that it is for a judge, and not a jury, to award punitive damages under section 8371, is sharply at odds with the intent of the Legislature. Simply stated, one hundred and fifty years of law establishes that the award of punitive damages is entrusted to a jury. The majority ignores this elephant in the room and instead, comes to the novel and *285unprecedented conclusion that the Legislature intended for a judge to award punitive damages. Therefore, I dissent. I address each of these points of disagreement below.
In Wertz, our court employed a limited statutory construction analysis when faced with the issue of whether a plaintiff was afforded a right to a jury trial under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 43 P.S. §§ 951-962.2. Our court first noted that the statute was silent as to whether or not a jury trial was available in an action brought under the statute and that the General Assembly was able to expressly provide for the right to a jury trial. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1274. We opined that this lack of an express granting of the right to a jury trial worked as a presumption against the finding of legislative intent to create the right to a jury trial under the Act. Furthermore, we considered that the Legislature used the undefined term “court” with respect to who should determine discriminatory conduct and grant relief and concluded that this was evidence that it was for a judge to make these decisions. Id. We also noted the lack of legislative history regarding the statute. Id. at 1274-75. Ultimately, we concluded that, based upon the above-stated considerations, there existed no statutory right to a jury trial under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Id. at 1275.2
The majority, by finding Wertz to be dispositive with respect to section 8371, misunderstands the import of that case. While the considerations utilized in Wertz were based upon the rules of statutory construction set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, they were a truncated version of the factors set forth in that Act. It was never the intent that the analysis used in Wertz be applied to all statutes or to broadly replace the rules of statutory construction, which must be utilized when interpreting a statutory provision.3 By limiting itself to *286the factors set forth in Wertz, the majority employs a “one-size fits all” approach that fails to take into account differences in statutes and unnecessarily limits the appropriate statutory construction analysis. Even more importantly, adherence to the abbreviated Wertz analysis will handcuff our court with respect to future questions regarding the Legislature’s intent concerning a statutory right to a jury trial, and it virtually eliminates the finding of an implied right to a jury trial.
Contrary to the majority’s approach, the full and proper framework in which to analyze the issue of a statutory right to a jury trial is set forth in the Statutory Construction Act. Proper application of the roadmap set forth in the rules of statutory construction leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended for a right to a trial by jury in a claim brought under section 8371.
The polestar of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the Legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)(court’s sole objective in construing or interpreting a statute remains to “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly”). The right to a jury trial may be expressly set forth in a statute, or it may be implied. Commonwealth v. One 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe, 530 Pa. 523, 610 A.2d 36, 38 (1992)(jury trials are not available in a proceeding created by statute unless the statute expressly or impliedly so provides or proceeding has a common law basis (citing Murphy v. Cartex Corp., 377 Pa.Super. 181, 546 A.2d 1217, 1222 (1988))). In either case, to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, our court first considers the language of the statute itself. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)(“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”).
Section 8371 was enacted into law as part of the Act of February 7,1990, P.L. 11, No. 6, § 3, effective July 1,1990, as a general amendatory act to the Judicial Code. Section 8371 provides:
*287§ 8371. Actions on insurance policies
In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of the following actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8371.
It is apparent that section 8371 neither expressly provides for, nor prohibits, a jury trial in an action brought under this section. Thus, it becomes incumbent to consider whether the statute impliedly provides for a jury trial.
As noted above, the rules of statutory construction set forth that when the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Only if the words of the statute are found not to be explicit, i.e., to be unclear or ambiguous, should a reviewing court further engage in an attempt to ascertain the intent of the Legislature through use of the various tools provided in the Statutory Construction Act.4 A term is not explicit, or is ambiguous, if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. Cf. Murphy v. Duquesne University, 565 Pa. 571, 777 A.2d 418, 430 (2001). Conversely, a term is clear and free from all ambiguity if it is *288reasonably susceptible of only one construction and being capable of being understood in only one sense.
Section 8371 utilizes the term “court” to describe the body that determines whether an insurer acted in bad faith and with respect to possible actions to be taken if such a finding is made. Applying the above-stated concepts, it becomes clear that the term “court,” as used in this statute is not explicit, but is ambiguous and is not reasonably capable of a single construction or being understood in only one sense.
Specifically, section 102 of the Judicial Code provides definitions for usage in the sections found in the Code, including section 8371. The definition ascribed by the Legislature to the term “court” in section 102 is broad and inclusive:
“Court.” Includes any one or more of the judges of the court who are authorized by general rule or rule of court, or by law or usage, to exercise the powers of the court in the name of the court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 102.
The Judicial Code also contains a distinct statutory definition for the term “judge”:
“Judge.” Includes a justice of the Supreme Court. Except with respect to the power to select a president or administrative judge, to appoint and remove the administrative staff of the court and to adopt rules of court and other similar matters, the term includes a senior judge.

Id.

The above provisions make clear that the definition given by the Legislature to the term “court” begins by use of the nonexclusive verbiage, “[i]ncludes,” which suggests that while including a judge or judges, more is contemplated by the definition. Moreover, the definition section of the Judicial Code contains separate and specific definitions for the words “court” and “judge.” As defined, the two terms are not equivalent, and implies that “court” means something in addition to “judge.” Finally, supporting the proposition that the term “court” is capable of more than a single construction is *289that notably absent from the Judicial Code is a separate definition for the term “jury.”
Further confirming the existence of an ambiguity is that in other statutes, the Legislature itself has considered the term “court” to encompass the concept of a jury and has expressly carved out the concept of jury from the meaning of the term “court.” See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 6336 (“Hearings under this chapter [of the Juvenile Act] shall be conducted by the court without a jury.... ” (emphasis supplied)); 23 Pa.C.S. § 1308(b)(“The application for a marriage license shall be . heard by a judge of the court, without a jury, in court or in chambers at the earliest possible time.” (emphasis supplied)).
Additionally, case law supports more than one construction or understanding of the meaning of the term “court.” As far back as the beginning of the last century, courts of this Commonwealth have not considered the term “court” to be exclusively coextensive with the term “judge.” See, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel. The Attorney General v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 A. 961, 976 (1904)(trial court, relying on Anderson’s Law Dictionary, determined that, “[t]he term ‘court’ may mean the ‘judge’ or ‘judges’ of the court, or the judge and the jury, according to the connection and the object of its use.”); The Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, 727 A.2d 1144, 1160 n. 10 (Pa.Super.1999) aff'd 567 Pa. 386, 787 A.2d 376 (2001)(“court” used in a generic sense, “and presumes the assignment of duties to the judge and/or jury in the traditional manner of practice.”); Kehrer v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 25 Pa. D. & C. 4th 1 (CCP Lancaster Co.1995)(“court” has “institutional components of both judge and jury”).
Finally, other authority similarly ascribes a more inclusive meaning to the term “court.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000) offers the definition of “court” as, “A person or body of persons whose task is to hear and submit a decision on cases at law.” Significantly, even United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a strict textualist, finds that the term “court” can include both *290judge and jury.5 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 356, 118 S.Ct. 1279, 140 L.Ed.2d 438 (1998)(Scalia, J. concurring)(“[Court] has a broader meaning, which includes both judge and jury,” (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 318 (5th ed.l979)(“A body organized to administer justice, and including both judge and jury.”))).
Given the differing meanings ascribed to the term, one simply cannot reasonably say that the term “court,” as contained in the Judicial Code, is free from all ambiguity and is subject to only one construction or understanding. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), (c)(emphasis supplied); O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, 566 Pa. 161, 778 A.2d 1194, 1200 (2002).
Rather than acknowledge the ambiguity in the term “court” in this statute and then turn to the other tools of statutory construction set forth in section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act to avoid the ambiguity, the majority commits a second fundamental error by refuting these other reasonable meanings ascribed to the term “court” and simply offering its definition of the term “court.”6 This approach fails to give effect to the Statutory Construction Act. At this juncture, the analysis should consist solely of the determination of whether or not the statute is ambiguous—not what differing interpretation is most persuasive. In sum, the majority foregoes additional tools used to discern the intent of the Legislature, comes to its own conclusion regarding who should hear a claim of bad faith, and in doing so, fails to determine the statute’s meaning as intended by the General Assembly.
Having determined that the term “court” is not explicit, the next step is to turn to the considerations set forth in the Statutory Construction Act to be utilized when the terms of a statute are not clear and free from all ambiguity. 1 Pa.C.S. *291§ 1921(c).7,8 Employment of these tools firmly establishes that the Legislature intended that there be a jury trial available under section 8371.
The occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be obtained are all matters to be considered to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(1), (3), (4). By failing to take into account these considerations, the majority commits its third fundamental error.
When it enacted section 8371, the Legislature provided the primary remedy of punitive damages to punish insurers that engaged in bad faith. Punitive damages are a legal remedy and have traditionally been awarded by juries in courts of law. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), “[u]nder the traditional common-law approach, the amount of punitive damages is initially determined by a jury instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful conduct. The jury’s determination is then reviewed by trial *292and appellate courts to insure that it is reasonable.” This view was recently echoed by the majority of the Court in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). As expressed by Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, “ Tt is the peculiar function of the jury’ to set the amount of punitive damages ----” Id. at 437 n. 11, 121 S.Ct. 1678 (quoting Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565, 6 S.Ct. 501, 29 L.Ed. 729 (1886)). Justice Ginsberg in her dissent acknowledged the same: “At common law, as our longstanding decisions reiterate, the task of determining the amount of punitive damages ‘has [always been] left to the discretion of the jury.’ ” Id., at 445, 121 S.Ct. 1678 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363-371, 371, 14 L.Ed. 181, 185 (1851)). Thus, over one hundred and fifty years of legal tradition establish that punitive damages are to be awarded by a jury.
The tradition of the award of punitive damages being within the province of the jury is unmistakable evidence that the Legislature intended to permit a jury to determine bad faith and to award punitive damages in an action brought pursuant to section 8371. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(5)(General Assembly presumed to know the existing law when enacting a statute). Strikingly, the majority fails to offer a single case in which the award of punitive damages was for a judge in the first instance. The majority’s assertion that a judge may award punitive damages if a jury trial is waived is a weak reed by which to refute this overwhelming evidence of the Legislature’s intent. Of course, a party may waive its right to a jury trial, but this does not logically support the proposition that there is no right to a jury trial in the first instance—in fact, it suggests just the opposite. Yet, even assuming that the award of punitive damages is in some unique instance awarded by a judge rather than a jury, the clear implication of this tradition of a jury determining punitive damages in attempting to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly simply cannot and should not be ignored. It is this departure from longstanding law that exposes most clearly the flaw in the majori*293ty’s approach and leads to frustration of the intent of the Legislature.9
In conclusion, the majority errs in limiting its analysis regarding section 8371 to those factors expressed in Wertz. Rather, it is full utilization of the framework set forth in the Statutory Construction Act that is appropriate. Employing this construct, it becomes evident that the term “court” is not explicit and unambiguous. Applying the tools of statutory construction, and recognizing the longstanding legal tradition of a jury awarding punitive damages, it becomes an inescapable conclusion that the Legislature intended that a jury be permitted to determine the issue of bad faith and punitive damages.10
Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
Justice NEWMAN joins this dissenting opinion.

. Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (“Statutory Construction Act”), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq.

. Finding that there existed no cause of action for discrimination at the time the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted, we also concluded that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not guarantee a plaintiff a right to a jury trial in an action brought under the Pennsylvania Pluman Relations Act. Id. at 1276-77.

. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901 ("In the construction of the statutes of this Commonwealth, the rules set forth in this chapter shall be observed, unless *286the application of such rules would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly.”).

. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)("When the words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, [listing various matters].”); Ramich v. WCAB (Schatz Electric, Inc.), 564 Pa.656, 770 A.2d 318 (2001)(only when the language of the statute is ambiguous does statutory construction become necessary); Coretsky v. Board of Commissioners of Butler Township, 520 Pa. 513, 555 A.2d 72, 74 (1989)("Only if a statute is unclear may a court embark upon the task of ascertaining the intent of the legislature by reviewing the necessity of the act, the object to be attained, circumstances under which it was enacted and the mischief to be remedied.”).

. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Amy Gutmann ed„ 1997).

. Indeed, the majority's approach sharpens the point. The majority recognizes that the statute in defining the term "court'' utilizes the definitional language "includes any one or more judges ” Maj. Opin. at 1156-57. The majority offers that the word " ‘includes’ can signal the beginning of a complete list.” (emphasis applied). Maj. Opin. at 1157. Yet, this only supports the conclusion that the term is ambiguous.

. Statutory construction considerations include:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be obtained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921 (c)(l)-(8).

. The circumstances under which a statute was enacted and legislative history are sometimes used to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(2), (7). Yet, the parties have not offered, and I have not found, any legislative history that would shed light on the availability of a jury trial in an action brought pursuant to section 8371 or evidence of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of section 8371. Therefore, the absence of relevant background as to the passing of section 8371 fails to advance the analysis. Moreover, there is a lack of former law and legislative and administrative interpretations of section 8371. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(5), (8). Thus, these factors do not aid in the determination of the issue before us.

. Finally, while the parties have weighed in on the significance of the General Assembly’s providing for the award of punitive damages, as it relates to the right to a jury trial, neither party has in a meaningful fashion addressed the effect of section 8371’s provision for interest and/or court costs and attorney fees against the insurer. Consistent with the recognition that the term "court” as used in section 8371 is capable of meaning judge or judge and jury, and becatxse a judge has traditionally awarded interest, costs, and fees, Bata v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 448 Pa. 355, 293 A.2d 343, 356 n. 29 (1972), for purposes of section 8371, I would find that the Legislature intended for a judge to determine interest, court costs, and attorney fees. The Birth Center, 727 A.2d at 1160 n. 10; Kehrer, 25 Pa.D. & C. 4th at 6. Construing the statute to provide for a jury trial with respect to an award of punitive damages and to provide for a judge to award interest, costs and fees is not inconsistent, but simply an unremarkable recognition of the legal bodies that historically made such awards.

. As I would conclude that there exists a statutory right to a trial by jury in a proceeding brought pursuant to section 8371, I do not reach the issue of whether there is such a right pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution.