Court Opinion

ID: 9571479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:05.283167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:28.285578
License: Public Domain

*174HOWELL, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I fully concur in all parts of the majority opinion except the portion of the opinion involving the type of objectively verifiable evidence necessary to corroborate a repressed memory case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to section 11(B) of the majority opinion.
As the majority recognizes, statutes of limitations are necessary to protect against stale and fraudulent claims. See Santee Portland Cement Co. v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 299 S.C. 269, 271, 384 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1989) (“One policy behind the statute of limitations is the protection of a defendant from false or fraudulent claims that might be difficult to disprove if not brought until after relevant evidence has been lost or destroyed and witnesses have become unavailable.”), overruled on other grounds by Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat’l Vendors Division of Unidynamics Corp., 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d 858 (1995). In addition, by establishing an outside time limit for the filing of actions, statutes of limitations allow businesses to make at least rough assessments of their potential liability, and allow insurers to set premiums in accordance with their potential exposure. Of course, given the operation of the discovery rule, statutes of limitations do not allow for absolute certainty when determining potential liability, nor do they offer complete protection against fraudulent claims. Nonetheless, any further erosion of the important protections offered by statutes of limitations must be carefully considered and must strike a fair balance between the interests of plaintiffs and the interests of defendants.
Accordingly, I believe the majority quite correctly requires plaintiffs in repressed memory cases to corroborate their claims through independent, verifiable, objective evidence. “While it may well be that some plaintiffs with valid claims will not be able to satisfy this requirement, I strongly believe the requirement is necessary to protect defendants against claims that may be so old that no evidence (other than the defendant’s often unpersuasive denial) is available to refute the claim.
I likewise agree with the majority’s determination that this corroboration requirement can be satisfied by evidence of an *175admission of the abuser, medical confirmation of childhood sexual abuse, and other similar evidence. My sole concern with the majority’s opinion is the final type of evidence the opinion suggests will satisfy the corroboration requirement.
The majority opinion states that the requirement of objectively verifiable corroborative evidence may be satisfied by “proof of a chain of facts and circumstances having sufficient probative force to produce a reasonable and probable conclusion that sexual abuse occurred.” This is simply a statement of the definition of circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., State v. Grippon, 327 S.C. 79, 83-84, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464 (1997) (“Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating the existence of a fact.”). Thus, the majority concludes that “objectively verifiable corroboration” can be established through circumstantial evidence. In my view, only some form of direct evidence can satisfy the requirement of objectively verifiable corroboration of the sexual abuse. I simply cannot envision how circumstantial evidence of the sexual abuse could in any way be considered “objectively verifiable” evidence of the sexual abuse. Stated another way, any objective, verifiable evidence of sexual abuse would, by its very nature, be direct evidence of the abuse.1
The majority opinion clearly imposes an additional burden on plaintiffs in repressed memory cases by requiring expert testimony to establish the fact of the plaintiffs repressed memory. However, if circumstantial evidence is sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement, the requirement becomes meaningless. Plaintiffs will simply present circumstantial evidence supporting the claims of their own abuse, such as evidence of behavioral changes or unexplained fears. While this type of evidence may inferentially establish that something happened to the plaintiff, it cannot be considered objective, verifiable evidence that the plaintiff or anyone else was sexually abused. Thus, by allowing plaintiffs in repressed memory cases to corroborate their claims through circumstantial evidence, I believe the majority opinion eviscerates the very corroboration requirement it seeks to impose.
*176Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. I would hold that circumstantial evidence cannot satisfy the requirement of objectively verifiable corroboration of the plaintiffs claims in a repressed memory case.

. Of course, direct evidence that the defendant abused others might amount to circumstantial evidence that the defendant abused the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the objectively verifiable corroboration requirement would be satisfied by the direct evidence of the abuse of others.