Court Opinion

ID: 9632050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:00:00.330115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:07.093861
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the plurality that, as a general proposition, the protection afforded by Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures extends beyond its literal terms. However, I also agree with the specially concurring opinion’s criticism of the “analysis” offered by the plurality which, I believe, incorrectly assumes that we are presented with an open slate. Furthermore, I am seriously concerned about the removal of all notions of reasonableness, which has historically been the touchstone of Oregon search and seizure law, from the test to determine whether a search warrant is required to search real property under the circumstances of a particular case. In State v. Walle, 52 Or App 963, 630 P2d 377 (1981), we applied the “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach under circumstances very similar to this case. I would apply the same test here and hold that this record does not provide evidence of an objectively “reasonable expectation of privacy” as to the land on which the marijuana was discovered, even assuming that it is possible to manifest a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an open field.1 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The reasonable expectation of privacy test, as applied in State v. Walle, supra, is derived from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 361, 88 S Ct 507, 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). As he explained it, a “reasonable expectation of privacy” encompasses two elements: (1) a subjective expectation of privacy that (2) is objectively reasonable. In other words, although an individual might have a *32subjective expectation of privacy in real property, that expectation — standing alone — is not enough to establish a constitutionally-protected privacy interest. Additionally, the individual’s expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable if it is to be one that society is willing to recognize.
With respect to real property, it is not, as the plurality holds, sufficient that the land in question is private property. Neither is it sufficient, as the special concurrence would hold, that the area is protected from public view by virtue of its topography or vegetation. In order to establish a constitutionally protected privacy interest, the owner of land must, at the very least, in some way affirmatively demonstrate that the public is not welcome on the land. Commonly employed means of conveying that message include erecting fences2 and posting “No Trespassing” signs. Both actions imply one message: KEEP OUT! Defendants did nothing that would convey the kind of message that would assert a claim to privacy. Surely, “No Hunting” signs, such as they did post, do not say that hikers or other nonhunters are unwelcome. Similarly, making access roads impassable to motor vehicles is not evidence of an intent to deter foot traffic. As one officer testified, he had no intention of trespassing on the Dixson property. Rather, because there were no barriers to his free passage, he reasonably assumed that he was still on the property owned by Rogge Lumber Company.
Therefore, I would hold, under the facts of this case, that these defendants did not objectively manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched, regardless of what might have been going on in their collective heads. It is unnecessary to sail into uncharted waters by formulating a new, untested constitutional analysis, as the' plurality and special concurrence have done. It is also unnecessary to determine, as Judge Van Hoomissen would, whether there is an open fields “exception” to Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, analogous to that under the federal Fourth Amendment.
Deits, J., joins in this dissent.

 It may be that it is impossible to establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field. After all, both the public and the police are free to observe private property from the air. See generally State v. Anspach, 68 Or App 164, 682 P2d 786, reversed on other grounds 298 Or 375, 692 P2d 602 (1984).

 As we said in State v. Walle, supra, 52 Or App at 969: “Fences are not just to keep animals in; they are also a reasonable way of keeping humans out.”