Court Opinion

ID: 9753617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:20:25.311182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:39.137366
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
FITZGERALD, J.:
I concur only in the result of vacating the order. Initially, I agree with the ma*401jority that the appeal is timely. I also agree that the certified record and docket do not indicate Appellant’s counsel filed any petition to withdraw.1 Thus, the PCRA court’s order granting a nonexistent petition to withdraw is improper. Cf. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 965 A.2d 280, 281 (Pa.Super.2009) (holding “PCRA court erred when it dismissed appointed counsel sua sponte after the evidentiary hearing”). Although the majority offers compelling rationales for its disposition, I view the procedural posture differently and would remand for further proceedings, as set forth below.
I suggest the instant procedural posture is almost identical to that in Commonwealth v. White, 871 A.2d 1291 (Pa.Super.2005). In White, the defendant privately retained counsel, who filed a first PCRA petition on his behalf. Id. at 1292-93. After the PCRA court denied relief, the defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Id. at 1293. The record did not reflect counsel’s withdrawal of appearance, but did reflect the defendant’s request for appellate counsel and in forma pauperis status. Id. The defendant’s counsel neither filed a notice of appeal nor an appearance before this Court. Id.
In resolving this procedural quirk, the White Court expounded:
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and our caselaw make clear that an indigent petitioner is entitled to representation by counsel for a first petition filed under the PCRA. This right to representation exists throughout the post-conviction proceedings, including any appeal from disposition of the petition for post-conviction relief. It is equally clear that once counsel has entered an appearance on a defendant’s behalf he is obligated to continue representation until the case is concluded or he is granted leave by the court to withdraw his appearance.
Commonwealth v. Quail, 729 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa.Super.1999). As stated by the Honorable Justin M. Johnson in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Evans, 866 A.2d 442, 2005 Pa.Super. [PA Super] 9 , Rule 904, formerly Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504, makes the appointment of counsel mandatory in cases in which a defendant has filed a PCRA petition for the first time and is unable to afford counsel or otherwise procure counsel. Unless a record is made which contradicts the averments of [the defendant’s] verified request for the appointment of counsel, he is entitled to representation in this appeal. Inasmuch as [the defendant] has not been afforded counsel, and no reason appears of record to justify the denial of appointed counsel, we are obligated to remand the present case back to the PCRA court so that [the defendant] can have the benefit of a counseled appeal. Upon remand the PCRA court may either direct [the defendant’s] PCRA counsel to resume his stewardship of [the defendant’s] appeal5 or new counsel may be appointed should [the defendant] be adjudged indigent.
Id. at 1293-94 (punctuation and most citations omitted). The White Court ultimately “remanded for provision of counsel and *402filing of an appellate brief’ within ninety days. Id. at 1295. The White Court relied, in part, on this Court’s reasoning in Quail.
In Quail, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent defendant for his first PCRA petition. Quail, 729 A.2d at 572. After a hearing, the PCRA court denied the defendant’s petition. Id. The defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. Id. The defendant’s counsel “neither entered an appearance on [the defendant’s] behalf in this [C]ourt nor was counsel granted leave to withdraw his representation.” Id. at 573. The Quail Court noted:
Inasmuch as appellant has not been afforded counsel in the present appeal yet is entitled to representation we are obligated to remand the present case back to the PCRA court so that appellant can have the benefit of a counseled appeal. Upon remand the PCRA court may either direct [the defendant’s] PCRA counsel to resume his stewardship of [the defendant’s] appeal or new counsel may be appointed.
In the future, when presented with a scenario where an indigent petitioner files a pro se appeal from a first PCRA petition, the PCRA court should take one of two actions: the PCRA court should either promptly notify counsel of record that his client has taken an appeal and that counsel remains obligated to represent him2, or the PCRA court should appoint new counsel to represent the appellant on appeal. This action would alleviate the need of this court to remand cases back to the PCRA court and would further expedite the appeals process.
Quail, 729 A.2d at 573 (footnote omitted).
Because the certified record did not reflect a petition to withdraw, the instant PCRA court “erred when it dismissed appointed counsel sua sponte after the [PCRA] evidentiary hearing.” See Jackson, 965 A.2d at 281. Appellant was therefore represented by PCRA counsel when he filed a pro se notice of appeal, similar to the defendants in White and Quail. See White, 871 A.2d at 1293-94; Quail, 729 A.2d at 573. Appellant’s counsel, similar to the counsel in White and Quail, neither filed an appearance nor a petition to withdraw from representation with this Court. See White, 871 A.2d at 1293-94; Quail, 729 A.2d at 573. Akin to the defendant in White, Appellant also claims his PCRA counsel was ineffective. See White, 871 A.2d at 1294 n. 5.
I would, similar to our reasoning in Quail and White, remand for the PCRA court to either order Appellant’s PCRA counsel to represent Appellant on appeal or appoint new appellate counsel. See White, 871 A.2d at 1293-94; Quail, 729 A.2d at 573.2 I would also order the PCRA court to ascertain whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1021 (Pa.Super.2001) (limiting scope of Pa. R.Crim.P. 121(A) in PCRA proceedings); cf. Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(1)-(2). I suggest a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement may be filed nunc pro tunc. See Jackson, 965 A.2d at 284. Because of the procedural errors *403implicating Appellant’s right to appellate counsel, I believe it is premature to remand for a new PCRA hearing with new PCRA counsel. Accordingly, I concur only in the result of vacating the order below, as I would remand to ensure Appellant has appellate counsel for this appeal or competently waived his right to appellate counsel.

. The certified record includes a document that was neither served on nor filed by the parties. See generally Pa,R.Crim.P. 113 (stating criminal case file shall contain all papers

 It seems unlikely that [defendant’s PCRA counsel] can resume representation of [the defendant] in light of the accusations of ineffectiveness argued by [the defendant] in his pro se appellate brief, however, this is an issue to be resolved by the PCRA court. filed in case). This document is an internal memorandum discussing the merits of Appellant's PCRA petition and addressed to the PCRA judge.

. Similar to White, because Appellant claimed his PCRA counsel was ineffective in his pro se appellate brief, it seems unlikely that PCRA

 Should the PCRA court choose this approach counsel of record would have essentially three options. Counsel could resume his representation and file an advocate’s brief in appellant’s behalf, counsel could resume his representation and file a Turner/Finley brief in this court or counsel could petition the PCRA court for leave to withdraw prior to the filing of a brief with this court. counsel can resume his representation to Appellant. Cf. White, 871 A.2d at 1294 n. 5. I would, however, defer to the PCRA court.