Court Opinion

ID: 9889883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 18:00:46.416459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:49.049103
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10002
                           ____________________

        KARYN D. STANLEY,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CITY OF SANFORD, FLORIDA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00629-WWB-GJK
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10002

        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
               Can a former employee sue under Title I of the Americans
        with Disabilities Act for discrimination in post-employment distri-
        bution of fringe benefits? We answered “no” in Gonzales v. Garner
        Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). Gonzales put us at
        odds with the Second and Third Circuits but in league with the
        Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. In this appeal, we must decide
        whether Gonzales is still good law after (1) the Supreme Court’s de-
        cision about Title VII retaliation in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
        337 (1997), and (2) Congress’s changes to the text of the ADA.
                We believe Gonzales is still good law. We thus reaffirm that
        a Title I plaintiff must “hold[] or desire[]” an employment position
        with the defendant at the time of the defendant’s allegedly wrong-
        ful act. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Because plaintiff Karyn Stanley is suing
        over the termination of retirement benefits when she neither held
        nor desired to hold an employment position with her former em-
        ployer, the City of Sanford, Gonzales bars her claim. We therefore
        affirm the district court.
                                        I.

                Karyn Stanley became a firefighter for the City of Sanford,
        Florida, in 1999. She served the City in that capacity for about fif-
        teen years until she was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016.
        Although she managed to continue working as a firefighter for
        about two more years, her disease and accompanying physical dis-
        abilities eventually left her incapable of performing her job. So, at
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                         3

        the age of 47, Stanley took disability retirement on November 1,
        2018.
                When Stanley retired, she continued to receive free health
        insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Stanley
        first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying
        disability reasons, such as Stanley’s Parkinson’s disease, received
        free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Stan-
        ley, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan,
        disability retirees such as Stanley are entitled to the health insur-
        ance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Stanley
        was thus set to become responsible for her own health insurance
        premiums beginning on December 1, 2020. She filed this suit in
        April 2020, seeking to establish her entitlement to the long-term
        healthcare subsidy.
               Stanley believes the City’s decision to trim the health insur-
        ance subsidy was discriminatory against her as a disabled retiree.
        Her complaint alleged violations of Title I of the Americans with
        Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights
        Act. She also asserted that, by changing the benefits plan, the City
        unconstitutionally discriminated against her in violation of the
        Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally,
        she brought a claim under Florida Statutes section 112.0801, which
        authorizes municipalities to offer employees health insurance.
               The district court entered judgment for the City. On a mo-
        tion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Stanley’s claims
        under the ADA, the Rehab Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10002

        were insufficiently pleaded. Relying on our decision in Gonzales,
        the district court reasoned that Stanley could not state a plausible
        disability discrimination claim because the discriminatory act al-
        leged—the cessation of the health insurance premium payments—
        would occur while Stanley was no longer employed by the City.
        The district court later granted summary judgment to the City on
        Stanley’s claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Florida
        Statutes section 112.0801(1). It reasoned that the City’s decision sat-
        isfied rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause and
        that nothing in the Florida statute prevented the amendment to the
        benefits plan.
               Stanley timely appealed.
                                          II.

                We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim for which
        relief may be granted de novo. United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Hu-
        mana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 809 (11th Cir. 2015). We ask whether the
        complaint alleges “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
        ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
        556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
        544, 570 (2007)). Likewise, we review a grant of summary judg-
        ment de novo. Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc.,
        711 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper
        if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute about any ma-
        terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
        law. Id. We view the summary judgment record in the light most
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                          5

        favorable to the non-moving party, and we draw all reasonable in-
        ferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
                                       III.

                                       A.

               We begin with Stanley’s claims under Title I of the ADA, the
        Rehab Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The parties agree that
        our disposition of Stanley’s Title I claim will control all three stat-
        utory disability discrimination claims. See Boyle v. City of Pell City,
        866 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
        422 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, our analysis
        of Title I and the viability of Stanley’s claim under it applies with
        equal force to her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil
        Rights Act.
                The dispute between the parties turns on the definition sec-
        tion of the ADA. Title I of the ADA, as originally enacted, made it
        unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual with a disa-
        bility because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . .
        employee compensation, . . . and other terms, conditions, and priv-
        ileges of employment.” Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
        Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331–32 (1990). The statute de-
        fined a “qualified individual with a disability” as someone “who,
        with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the es-
        sential functions of the employment position that such individual
        holds or desires.” Id. § 101(8), 104 Stat. 331 (emphasis added).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10002

                We held in Gonzales that a former employee who does not
        hold or desire to hold an employment position cannot sue over dis-
        criminatory post-employment benefits. 89 F.3d 1523, 1531. We rec-
        ognized that the ADA protects against discrimination in fringe ben-
        efits, such as health insurance, because these benefits have always
        been recognized as one example of a term, condition, or privilege
        of employment. See Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(b)(2), 104 Stat. 331; Gon-
        zales, 89 F.3d at 1526 & n.9. But because the ADA prohibits discrim-
        ination only as to those individuals who hold or desire to hold a
        job, we reasoned that a former employee cannot bring suit under
        Title I to remedy discrimination in the provision of post-employ-
        ment fringe benefits. Under the “prior-panel-precedent rule,” we
        are required “to follow the precedent of the first panel to address
        the relevant issue, unless and until the first panel’s holding is over-
        ruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Scott
        v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1257 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation
        marks and citation omitted). And any later en banc or Supreme
        Court decisions must “actually abrogate or directly conflict with,
        as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.”
        United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005).
               Stanley argues that her claim is not barred by Gonzales for
        three reasons. First, she points to a Supreme Court case handed
        down shortly after Gonzales, which she says calls into question our
        reasoning in Gonzales. Second, she points to statutory changes in
        the text of the ADA, which she says undermine the result in Gon-
        zales. Third, she argues that Gonzales is distinguishable. We will
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                         7

        start by unpacking our reasoning in Gonzales, and then address each
        argument in turn.
                                          1.

               Gonzales was the first time we considered a former em-
        ployee’s ability to sue under Title I. Timothy Bourgeois, who suf-
        fered from AIDS, was fired from his job but kept receiving health
        insurance through his former employer. Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1524.
        About six months after the termination, Bourgeois’s former em-
        ployer amended its health insurance plan by capping AIDS-related
        coverage. Id. In the time between that amendment and Bourgeois’s
        death, he incurred significant treatment costs for which he was de-
        nied coverage. Id. at 1525. August Gonzales, the administrator of
        Bourgeois’s estate, sued under Title I, alleging that the insurance
        plan amendment was unlawful disability discrimination. Id. at
        1524.
                Relying on “the plain language of the ADA,” we held that
        Bourgeois (and thus his estate) had no viable Title I claim “because
        he neither held nor desired to hold a position with [his former em-
        ployer] at or subsequent to the time the alleged discriminatory con-
        duct was committed.” Id. at 1526. That conclusion followed from
        the text of Title I’s anti-discrimination provision. It expressly ap-
        plied only to “qualified individual[s] with a disability” who “hold[]”
        or “desire[]” an “employment position.” Pub. L. 101-336, § 101(8),
        104 Stat. 331. We also relied on Title I’s listed examples of discrim-
        ination, which mentioned only “qualified individual[s] with a disa-
        bility,” “applicant[s],” and “employee[s]” as possible victims of
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10002

        disability discrimination. Id. § 102(b)(1), 104 Stat. 332; see Gonzales,
        89 F.3d at 1526–27 & nn. 10–11. We explained that each of these
        terms had an inherent temporal qualification: a qualified individual
        with a disability held or desired to hold a job when the discrimina-
        tion occurred; an employee was “an individual employed by an em-
        ployer” when the discrimination occurred; and an applicant, alt-
        hough not defined by Title I, was necessarily someone who had
        applied for a job when the discrimination occurred. Gonzales, 89
        F.3d at 1526–27 (citation omitted).
                In interpreting the ADA in Gonzales, we recognized that
        other employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the
        Civil Rights Act of 1964, have been construed to protect former
        employees. See id. at 1527–29. We noted, however, that the prece-
        dents adopting that interpretation arose in the context of retalia-
        tion, not discrimination. See id. We found that distinction im-
        portant. As we had previously held, such a construction was “nec-
        essary to provide meaning to anti-retaliation statutory provisions
        and effectuate congressional intent.” Id. at 1529 (citing Bailey v. USX
        Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1998)). That is, by prohibiting
        retaliation, a statute necessarily contemplated that it would apply
        to individuals who accused a former employer of unlawful behav-
        ior. See id. at 1529 n.14 (“[W]e note that many retaliation claims are
        filed by former employees alleging, for example, post-employment
        blacklisting.”). So we endorsed a broad interpretation of anti-retal-
        iation provisions to avoid excluding an especially vulnerable class
        of people from the statute’s protection and thus undermining Con-
        gress’s remedial scheme.
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        22-10002                Opinion of the Court                          9

               We explicitly declined to extend this reasoning to Title I dis-
        crimination claims in Gonzales. Title I’s “qualified individual” defi-
        nition, we said, was dispositive evidence that “Congress intended
        to limit the protection of Title I to either employees performing, or
        job applicants who apply and can perform, the essential functions
        of available jobs which their employers maintain.” Id. at 1527. We
        concluded that the plain language of Title I’s anti-discrimination
        provision did not “frustrate the statute’s central purpose”—i.e.,
        protecting disabled people who can nevertheless perform the es-
        sential functions of a job—the way that a “literal interpretation” of
        other statutes’ anti-retaliation provisions may have threatened to
        do. Id. at 1528–29. Instead, to construe Title I to apply to former
        employees would “essentially render[] the [qualified individual] re-
        quirement . . . meaningless.” Id. at 1529.
                Thus, after Gonzales, the rule in this circuit was settled. To
        fall within Title I’s anti-discrimination provision, a plaintiff’s claim
        must depend on an act committed by the defendant while the
        plaintiff was either working for the defendant or seeking to work
        for the defendant. The result was that a former employee could not
        sue for alleged discrimination in post-employment fringe benefits.
              That settled rule was briefly disturbed five years later when
        a panel of this Court declared Gonzales overruled by intervening
        Supreme Court precedent. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035
        (11th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
        519 U.S. 337 (1997), held that an individual could sue his or her for-
        mer employer under Title VII for a post-employment retaliatory
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-10002

        act. The Johnson majority considered Robinson to be a decision of
        such magnitude that it “mandate[d] the conclusion that Gonzales is
        no longer good law and must be deemed overruled.” Johnson, 273
        F.3d at 1037. The Johnson majority then held that Title I prohibits
        discriminatory acts against current and former employees alike. See
        id.
              But Johnson’s precedential life was short-lived. The opinion
        was vacated when this Court voted to rehear the case en banc. Id.
        at 1070. K Mart later filed for bankruptcy, the parties settled, and
        the appeal was dismissed. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 281 F.3d 1368
        (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Because of the bankruptcy and settle-
        ment, we never issued an en banc opinion in Johnson. But the result
        of our en banc vacatur is that Gonzales regained its status as this
        Court’s governing precedent on Title I’s qualified individual re-
        quirement.
                                         2.

               We now turn to Stanley’s arguments. The centerpiece of
        Stanley’s appeal is her request that we resurrect Johnson, ignore
        Gonzales, and hold that, after Robinson, former employees can sue
        under Title I for post-employment discrimination. But Stanley
        greatly overstates Robinson’s impact. “For a Supreme Court deci-
        sion to undermine panel precedent to the point of abrogation, the
        decision must be clearly on point and clearly contrary to the panel
        precedent.” Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 56 F.4th 951, 965 (11th Cir.
        2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This can happen
        “where the Supreme Court has clearly set forth a new standard to
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                         11

        evaluate” a claim or issue. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
        1352 (11th Cir. 2008). But Robinson did nothing of the sort.
                 The Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson—a Title VII retal-
        iation case—did not even upend our Title VII precedents, much
        less our Title I caselaw. Long before Robinson, we had held that Ti-
        tle VII’s anti-retaliation provision allowed claims for post-employ-
        ment retaliation. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528–29. Robinson adopted
        the same rule. But, in Gonzales, we distinguished Title I discrimina-
        tion claims from our Title VII precedents based on the different
        text of the ADA. Id. Because Robinson’s interpretation of Title VII
        did not change our Title VII caselaw, it is hard to say it overruled
        our Title I caselaw. Judge Carnes said it best in his Johnson dissent:
        “It is a bit audacious . . . to say that a Supreme Court decision whose
        holding was anticipated, acknowledged, and considered by a prior
        panel when deciding a different issue has undermined that prior
        panel’s decision on the different issue to such an extent that it may
        be disregarded.” Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1068 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
               Like its holding, Robinson’s reasoning also does little to un-
        dermine Gonzales. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision at issue in
        Robinson applies to “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Neither
        the statutory definition of “employees” nor the anti-retaliation pro-
        vision’s specific use of that term provides any “temporal qualifier.”
        Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341–42. Looking to the rest of Title VII, the
        Robinson Court found that Title VII regularly “use[s] the term ‘em-
        ployees’ to mean something more inclusive or different than ‘cur-
        rent employees.’” Id. at 342. For example, reinstatement is a Title
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10002

        VII remedy. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1), 2000e-16(b)).
        Because “one does not ‘reinstate’ current employees,” the Robinson
        Court reasoned that Title VII’s remedial provisions’ use of “em-
        ployees” “necessarily refers to former employees.” Id. (brackets
        omitted). The term “employees” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation pro-
        vision was, therefore, ambiguous because it could be “consistent
        with either current or past employment.” Id.
                Title I’s anti-discrimination provision is not afflicted with
        any such ambiguity. There is a clear temporal qualifier in Title I:
        Only someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
        can perform the essential functions of the employment position
        that such individual holds or desires” is protected from disability dis-
        crimination. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) (emphases added), 12112(a); see
        also Slomcenski v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 1271, 1280–81 (11th Cir.
        2005). “Can,” “holds,” and “desires” are in the present tense. So, to
        be a victim of unlawful disability discrimination, the plaintiff must
        desire or already have a job with the defendant at the time the de-
        fendant commits the discriminatory act. See McKnight v. Gen. Motors
        Corp., 550 F.3d 519, 520 (6th Cir. 2008); Weyer v. Twentieth Century
        Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000). And unlike Title
        VII’s varied use of “employees,” Title I consistently uses the term
        “qualified individual” to refer to active employees or current appli-
        cants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)–(b), 12114.
               We acknowledge that the circuits are split. Our reading of
        Robinson aligns us with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Each
        of those courts has held that (1) Robinson does not implicate Title
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                         13

        I’s anti-discrimination provision and (2) Title I does not protect
        people who neither held nor desired a job with the defendant at the
        time of discrimination. See McKnight, 550 F.3d at 522–28; Morgan v.
        Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 457–59 (7th Cir. 2001); Weyer, 198
        F.3d at 1108–13. The Second and Third Circuits have held that Title
        I’s anti-discrimination provision is ambiguous, however, and have
        resolved that purported ambiguity in favor of former employees.
        See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 66–69 (2d Cir. 1998);
        Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604–08 (3d Cir. 1998).
               We are not convinced by Stanley’s argument that we should
        follow the Second and Third Circuits. The question we are answer-
        ing here is whether Robinson is so compelling that it justifies ignor-
        ing a prior precedent. But neither the Second nor Third Circuit an-
        swered that question. Moreover, a review of those courts’ deci-
        sions convinces us that we are on the right side of the split. Neither
        court established that the text of Title I’s anti-discrimination provi-
        sion is ambiguous. Instead, the Second and the Third Circuit ex-
        pressed something between discomfort and disagreement with the
        policy choice underlying the line, drawn by the text of the ADA,
        between disabled individuals who hold or desire to hold a job and
        those who do not. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67–68; Ford, 145 F.3d
        at 605–06. But not “even the most formidable policy arguments”
        empower a court to ignore unambiguous text. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor
        & City Council of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2021) (quotation
        marks and citation omitted). Nothing in Robinson, Castellano, or
        Ford gives us a basis to ignore Gonzales.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10002

                                           3.

                We are also confident that Gonzales survived Congress’s
        amendments to the ADA. Stanley points to two pieces of post-Gon-
        zales legislation—the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-
        325, 122 Stat. 3553, and the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
        Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5—and argues that because both acts
        amended the ADA’s text, we are free to, and should, depart from
        Gonzales’s interpretation of the original text of the ADA. It is of
        course true that when Congress amends a statute, we need not fol-
        low decisions interpreting discarded statutory language. But we
        consider a prior precedent overruled by subsequent legislation only
        if the congressional amendment represents “a clear change in the
        law.” Sassy Doll Creations, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 331 F.3d
        834, 840 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Neither the ADAAA
        nor the Fair Pay Act fits that bill.
                Turning first to the ADAAA, we cannot say that the ADAAA
        upset Gonzales’s interpretation of Title I’s qualified individual defi-
        nition. The ADAAA altered Title I’s anti-discrimination provision.
        Where Title I originally said that employers could not “discrimi-
        nate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
        ability of such individual,” Pub. L. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 331
        (emphasis added), it now prohibits discrimination “against a quali-
        fied individual on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (em-
        phasis added). But the definition of “qualified individual”—some-
        one who, “with or without reasonable accommodation” is able “to
        perform the essential functions of the employment position that
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        22-10002                Opinion of the Court                         15

        such individual holds or desires”—was materially unchanged by
        the ADAAA and remains in effect today. Compare Pub. L. 101-336,
        § 101(8), 104 Stat. 331 with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see Pub. L. 110-325,
        § 5(c), 122 Stat. 3557 (striking “with a disability” but otherwise leav-
        ing section 12111(8) as originally enacted). So the text upon which
        we relied in Gonzales is still the operative text in the statute.
               Stanley contends that the result in Gonzales undermines
        Congress’s purpose in adopting the ADAAA. The purpose of the
        ADAAA, says Stanley, was to broaden the scope of Title I. We have
        no doubt that is true; Congress said as much when passing the
        ADAAA. See Pub. L. 110-325, § 2(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 3553–54. But only
        the rare statute pursues its purpose to the exclusion of everything
        else. The ADAAA expanded Title I’s protections by expanding the
        mental and physical conditions that satisfy the statutory definition
        of “disability.” See id. Nobody disputes that Stanley is disabled. The
        issue here is whether Stanley was a “qualified individual” at the rel-
        evant point in time. And the substance of the qualified individual
        standard, including the temporal qualifications, was unaffected by
        the ADAAA. See Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306–07
        (10th Cir. 2016); Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245–
        47 (5th Cir. 2013).
               So too for the Fair Pay Act. To be sure, the Fair Pay Act ef-
        fected a serious change in employment law. Before the Fair Pay
        Act, discriminatory compensation claims generally accrued at only
        one point in time: when the discriminatory compensation decision
        or practice was made or adopted. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10002

        Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007). That rule posed serious
        statute of limitations problems for potential plaintiffs, who may not
        have even learned of the discriminatory compensation scheme un-
        til well after its initial adoption. See id. at 649–50 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
        senting). The Fair Pay Act reflects Congress’s decision to relax the
        statute of limitations. Pub. L. 111-2. § 2(1)–(2), 123 Stat. 5. Now, a
        claim for discriminatory compensation accrues “when a discrimi-
        natory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when
        an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation
        decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by ap-
        plication of a discriminatory compensation decision or other prac-
        tice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A); see id. § 12117(a); Pub. L.
        111-2, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 6 (stating that the Fair Pay Act “shall apply
        to claims of discrimination brought under title I”).
                 The Fair Pay Act made it easier to sue after discrimination—
        as defined by Title I—occurred. Cf. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S.
        701, 713–16 (2009); McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d
        873, 888 (7th Cir. 2012). But, like the ADAAA, the Fair Pay Act did
        not change the statutory language that we relied on in Gonzales.
        Both before and after the Fair Pay Act, a Title I discrimination claim
        requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was a “qualified individ-
        ual” who was subject to discriminatory terms, conditions, or bene-
        fits of employment. The Fair Pay Act’s relaxed statute of limitations
        helps a plaintiff only if that plaintiff otherwise has a claim for dis-
        crimination. Because nothing in the Fair Pay Act changes Title I’s
        substantive requirements, Gonzales is still binding precedent with
        respect to a former employee’s ability to sue under Title I.
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                       17

                                         4.

               Because we hold that Gonzales is still good law, we must ask
        whether Stanley was a disabled employee or job applicant capable
        of performing the job at the time of the alleged discrimination.
        There are three points in time in which Stanley can theoretically
        root her Title I claim: (1) in October 2003, when the City amended
        the benefits plan; (2) whenever she first became subject to the al-
        legedly discriminatory provisions of the benefits plan as a disabled
        employee; or (3) in December 2020, when she was affected by the
        termination of the health insurance premium payments.
               Neither option 1 nor option 3 works for Stanley. Although
        she was employed by the City in October 2003, she concedes, and
        we agree, that her claim cannot turn on the 2003 amendment to
        the benefits plan because she was not yet disabled at that time. Alt-
        hough she was disabled at the time of the December 2020 termina-
        tion of the health insurance premium payments, that option
        doesn’t work because, by that time, Stanley’s relationship with the
        City was as retiree, not employee. She did not hold or desire to
        hold, nor was she qualified to hold, an “employment position” with
        the City, as required by Title I’s anti-discrimination provision and
        Gonzales.
               In response to this reasoning, Stanley makes an argument
        similar to one advanced by the estate administrator in Gonzales. She
        argues that she was a “qualified individual” in December 2020 and
        remains so today because the “‘employment position’ that [she]
        now holds is that of a retired employee . . . .” But we rejected that
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10002

        argument in Gonzales, refusing to recognize “post-employment
        benefits recipient” as a job. 89 F.3d at 1530. In light of Gonzales, we
        must reject Stanley’s identical argument today.
                The final option is that Stanley suffered discrimination as a
        disabled employee at some unknown point before she retired but
        after she was diagnosed with Parkinson’s. Stanley argued at oral ar-
        gument that, while working for the City in the two years after her
        Parkinson’s diagnosis, the writing was on the wall that she would
        need to take disability retirement. So, the argument goes, the alleg-
        edly discriminatory benefits plan became a finalized term of her
        employment whenever disability retirement became a foregone
        conclusion. The upshot is that a completed claim of disability dis-
        crimination may have accrued while Stanley was a qualified indi-
        vidual performing her duties as a firefighter.
                This argument, if successful, would distinguish Stanley’s
        case from Gonzales, where the alleged discrimination occurred en-
        tirely after the employment relationship had already terminated.
        But it would not distinguish this case from decisions of the Sixth
        and Ninth Circuits. Those circuits have held that a Title I plaintiff
        must be a qualified individual, not only at the time of discrimina-
        tion, but also when the plaintiff files suit. See McKnight, 550 F.3d at
        528; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1108–09. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are
        on our side of the split. So, even though Stanley’s argument is not
        foreclosed by our holding in Gonzales, there is some tension be-
        tween this argument and our reasoning in Gonzales.
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                        19

                We need not resolve this tension today because Stanley
        waited too long to make this argument. In the district court, Stan-
        ley’s sole argument in support of her qualified individual status was
        that the Johnson majority was correct, so the district court should
        ignore Gonzales. But Stanley did not try to distinguish her case from
        Gonzales, essentially conceding that she loses if Gonzales applies.
        Then, in her initial brief on appeal, Stanley affirmatively conceded
        that “[i]n this action, Ms. Stanley does not claim she was impacted
        by the discriminatory 24-month rule during her employment.” The
        first time this argument appeared was in the United States’ brief as
        amicus curiae in this Court. We will not consider arguments raised
        only by amici. Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240,
        1247 (11th Cir. 1991). That rule is particularly appropriate where,
        as here, a party did not make an argument to the district court and
        specifically disclaimed the argument in its own brief.
               Because Stanley cannot establish that the City committed
        any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the es-
        sential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title
        I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab
        Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act.
                                       B.

               Finally, we turn to Stanley’s claims under the Equal Protec-
        tion Clause and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court
        concluded that the City was entitled to summary judgment on
        both claims. We agree.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10002

                The City’s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Pro-
        tection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and gov-
        ernment-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental
        right, so we scrutinize the City’s benefits plan under the lenient
        standard of rational basis review. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
        ing Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445–46 (1985); Morrissey v. United States, 871
        F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 2017). We do not grade the wisdom of
        the City’s decision. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). If
        “there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
        vide a rational basis for the” City’s decision, it will be upheld. Id.
        (citation omitted). The City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate
        governmental purpose of conserving funds. And its chosen
        method—decreasing the number of employees for whom the City
        subsidizes health insurance—is rationally related to that legitimate
        purpose. So there is no equal protection problem here.
               Neither does the City’s benefits plan violate Florida Statutes
        section 112.0801. The statute requires that a “municipality . . . that
        provides . . . health . . . insurance . . . for its officers and employees
        and their dependents upon a group insurance plan or self-insurance
        plan shall allow all [retired] personnel . . . the option of continuing
        to participate in the group insurance plan or self-insurance plan.”
        Fla. Stat. § 112.0801(1). The health insurance must be offered at the
        same “cost applicable to active employees,” but “[f]or retired em-
        ployees . . . , the cost of continued participation may be paid by the
        employer or by the retired employees.” Id. Stanley receives exactly
        what she is owed under the statute: the option to remain on the
        City’s health insurance plan. The statute does not require the City
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        22-10002               Opinion of the Court                       21

        to pay Stanley’s health insurance premiums. To the contrary, the
        statute grants the City discretion over whether to pay retirees’ pre-
        miums. The City cannot violate a statute by exercising the discre-
        tion specifically granted by that statute.
                                       IV.

              The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.