Court Opinion

ID: 9855551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:27:12.039841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:12.012889
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
1. Other jurisdictions have long recognized that a lawyer’s credibility may be challenged on cross-examination by asking him if he has ever been suspended or disbarred.1 Because a lawyer’s suspension for knowingly making false statements in the representation of clients certainly would tend to discredit the veracity of his testimony at trial,2 I would follow the majority rule and permit the impeachment of a lawyer in this circumstance.
2. Additionally, I would hold that the argument that Threlkeld was a member of the bar for 20 years was improper in light of the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of his suspension. This Court and the Court of Appeals have previously considered an objection to closing argument waived only if not made “during or after” the argument.3 This rule recognizes the difficulty of objecting during closing argument and still permits the trial court to take remedial action through appropriate corrective instructions to the jury.4 Furthermore, the Unified Appeal Procedure adopted by this Court provides that in both phases of death penalty cases, the trial court must advise defense counsel that any objections to the State’s closing arguments must be made “as soon as grounds for such objection arise, unless explicit permission is granted to reserve objection until the conclusion of argument.” If the general rule were as the majority holds, there would have been no need to specify a different rule in death penalty cases.5
Recently this Court did state in Butler v. State6 that an objection *369made at the conclusion of the argument was untimely. However, the statement was cursorily made and failed to recognize, distinguish, or overrule our prior cases. The primary case cited in Butler involved a failure to make any objection, and thus, the timeliness of the objection was not in issue.7 The other case cited in Butler involved the issue of a continuing objection to testimony,8 and thus, is inapposite.
Decided October 1, 2001
Reconsideration denied October 22, 2001.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, James M. Poe, Lisa S. Higgins, for appellant.
Leonard Danley, for appellee.
Because Butler failed to address the conflicting case law or the policy justifications for either rule, the reliance on stare decisis to refuse to consider the issue thoroughly does a disservice to the bench, bar and integrity of this Court. Butler itself represents a stark abandonment of stare decisis. The Court should not subscribe to the view that a cursory statement in a more recent case merits the application of stare decisis to avoid a thorough analysis of this state’s law.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.

 In re Thorman, 144 N.W. 7, 9 (Iowa 1913); State v. Pearson, 120 A.2d 468, 473 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956); Hyman v. Dworsky, 267 N.Y.S. 539, 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (“general rule” permits impeachment by proof of suspension or disbarment); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915, 919 (2d Cir. 1945) (“plainly proper” to impeach with proof of suspension or disbarment); see also John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 42 (5th ed. 1999).

 See In re Threlkeld, 262 Ga. 282 (417 SE2d 319) (1992) (In complaints brought by two separate clients, Threlkeld admitted violating Standard 45 (b), which, at the time of the disciplinary proceeding, stated that a lawyer in the representation of a client shall not “knowingly make a false statement of law or fact”).

 Miller v. State, 267 Ga. 92 (2) (475 SE2d 610) (1996); Isaac v. State, 263 Ga. 872, 874 (4) (a) (440 SE2d 175) (1994); Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 161 n. 20 (545 SE2d 312) (2001); Robbins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 21, 24 (532 SE2d 127) (2000).

 See Moore v. State, 242 Ga. App. 249, 251-252 (529 SE2d 381) (2000) (noting that attorney properly objected following arguments and trial court gave curative instructions).

 UAP Rule III A (2) (d), B (2) (d).

 273 Ga. 380, 384 (8) (541 SE2d 653) (2001).

 Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450 (511 SE2d 165) (1999).

 Larocque v. State, 268 Ga. 352, 353 (489 SE2d 806) (1997).