Court Opinion

ID: 9573740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:58:19.553318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:14.089261
License: Public Domain

Coleman, J.,
concurring.
An en banc hearing was granted in this case because the panel before which this appeal was pending requested pursuant to Code § 17-116.02(D) that the Court convene in order to reconsider the panel’s holding in Williams v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 412, 368 S.E.2d 293 (1988). In Williams, a divided panel of this Court held that an appeal which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial was procedurally barred because defense counsel had not made a motion to strike the evidence or a motion to set aside the verdict. More precisely, the Williams case held that defense counsel’s closing argument that the accused should be found not guilty because the evidence did not prove he intended to distribute the cocaine which he possessed was not the equivalent of a motion to strike. Id. at 414, 368 S.E.2d at 294. Today, the Court sitting en banc reverses Williams and holds that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was preserved for appeal where defense counsel in a bench trial during closing argument stated to the judge that, because the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to prove an intent to distribute, the Commonwealth had not proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In my view, the majority bases its holding on the fact that, because the trial judge in deciding the issue of guilt necessarily had *487to consider the sufficiency of the evidence in order to find that each element of the offense was proved, the sufficiency question was considered by the trial court and was, therefore, preserved for appeal. However, because the sufficiency of the evidence had not been challenged by an appropriate motion or in a manner which made “known to the court the action which he desire [d] the court to take,” Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1991) (quoting Code § 8.01-384), I would dismiss this appeal under Rule 5A:18 rather than affirm the conviction.
In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has applied its counterpart to our Rule 5A:18, Rule 5:25, to nonjury trials as well as to jury trials. In my opinion, for reasons later explained, both the bench and bar will be better served by our applying Rule 5A:18 uniformly to both bench and jury trials.
In this case, the defendant did not preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence by moving to strike the evidence at the conclusion of all the evidence. See generally White v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 231, 348 S.E.2d 866 (1986). He did not make a motion to set aside the verdict on grounds of sufficiency. McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321-22, 357 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1987). He does not present “good cause” for having failed to make those required and necessary motions. Mason v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 339, 345, 373 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1988). Finally, he does not assert a reason why we should waive the contemporaneous objection requirement in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987). In short, he neither properly preserved the issue for appeal nor presented sufficient grounds to waive the requirements of Rule 5A:18.
Although I would dismiss this appeal, I concur with the majority that, on the merits, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. As to the propriety of my joining with the majority in addressing the merits of the sufficiency issue, which I would hold to have been procedurally barred, I have no reservation about the correctness of my doing so because a procedural bar analysis under Rule 5A:18 necessarily requires a sub silentio determination by the Court that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case of guilt. If no crime had been charged or proven, we would be required to address the merits of the issue in order to attain the ends of justice and prevent a miscarriage of justice. See *488Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991) (applying the ends of justice exception to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:25 to prevent a conviction for a “non offense”); Ball v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 754, 758-59, 273 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1981) (ends of justice exception applied because the defendant “has been convicted of a crime of which under the evidence he could not properly be found guilty”); see also Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. at 436, 357 S.E.2d at 744 (“the ‘ends of justice’ provision may be used when the record affirmatively shows that a miscarriage of justice has occurred”). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the ends of justice exception will apply only “in those rare instances when it is necessary” to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Ball, 221 Va. at 758, 273 S.E.2d at 793. Thus, by invoking the procedural bar, as I would do, and by refusing to invoke the ends of justice exception, I necessarily find, without fully addressing the merits of the issue, that the elements of the offense had been charged and proven. Therefore, by invoking the procedural bar, I impliedly affirm the sufficiency of the evidence and expressly state my assent to the sufficiency holding.2
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the motions or proceedings before the trial court raised the question of whether a prima facie case of malicious maiming in violation of Code § 18.2-51 had been established. The majority opinion, as did the panel opinion in Williams, reiterates the clearly defined purposes underlying the contemporaneous objection rules, Rule 5A:18 and Supreme Court Rule 5:25. These rules are designed “to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials by allowing the trial judge to intelligently consider an issue and, if necessary, take corrective action.” The majority argues that the rule should not be applied so strictly as to prevent a merit review of an issue which was raised before the trial judge with sufficient particularity that the judge had the opportunity to consider the question intelligently. The majority holds that it is sufficient if “ ‘at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, [a party] makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to *489take or his objections to the action of the court and his grounds therefor,’ ” citing Code § 8.01-384. See also Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. at _, 402 S.E.2d at _; Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 166.
My basic disagreement with the majority is with its holding that the closing argument of counsel in this bench trial constituted the equivalent of a motion which challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The majority holds that argument to the judge that he should find Campbell “not guilty” because the evidence did not establish the intent necessary to convict him of malicious wounding is the equivalent of a motion to strike the evidence which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. I do not believe that closing “argument,” even that which addresses the issue of whether the Commonwealth met its burden of proof, is an adequate substitute for a motion to strike the evidence.
The majority states that, because the trial court in making its guilt determination must necessarily consider whether the evidence was sufficient, it is a “useless technicality” to hold that the failure to move to strike or to set aside the verdict should bar consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Judge Benton, in his dissent in Williams v. Commonwealth, similarly characterized the distinction between the closing argument in a bench trial and a motion to strike as a “hypertechnical” application of Rule 5A:18.
The requirement of Rule 5A:18 that an objection or motion be made with specificity in order to preserve an issue for appeal is by its very nature a technical requirement. This technical requirement has served and continues to serve useful and meaningful purposes in the trial and appellate courts. While I would preserve the requirement that a motion be made, I would apply the rule liberally and require nothing more than a statement of the relief requested and reason therefor.
For the reasons which I expressed in Williams v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. at 414, 368 S.E.2d at 294, closing argument that asks the trial judge to weigh the evidence, to make credibility determinations, and to find the accused “not guilty” is not an adequate substitute for a motion to strike or a motion to set aside the verdict. Here, counsel argued that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that James Campbell intended to *490maim, disable, disfigure, or kill young Cecil Campbell. No motion to strike the evidence was made. The only “ruling” made by the trial judge was his finding of guilt. No motion to set aside the verdict was made. By its holding, the majority simply assumes the defendant was dissatisfied with the ruling (the finding of guilt) and may appeal, although no “on the record” objection appears with specification as to the basis of the objection.
A motion to strike the evidence serves a totally different function than closing argument as to the weight of the evidence. A motion to strike requires the trial judge to review the sufficiency of the proof as to each element of the crime. Closing argument, on the other hand, may address many issues in the case other than the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt. When the motion to strike has merit, the trial judge is required to strike the evidence and dismiss the charge. As a practical matter, an accused may find it of no great consequence whether he or she be found “not guilty” or whether the charges are “dismissed” because the state has failed in its basic proof that a crime was committed. However, the fact remains that a motion to strike is a well-established and well-defined means of directing a trial judge’s attention to a specific legal issue. Thus, the distinction between “argument” and “motions” serves a meaningful purpose. I would hold that closing argument does not make “known to the court the action [of striking the evidence and dismissing the charge] which [the defendant] desires the court to take . . . and his grounds therefor.” Code § 8.01-384.
I also believe the majority holding does a disservice to the bar, to the trial courts, and to the appellate courts by obfuscating the requirements for preserving for an appeal a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. While no particular litany should be required and a motion could be made during closing argument in a bench trial, at the very least, the trial judge should be clearly informed as to what he or she is being asked to do and the reasons therefor.
The majority holding also does a disservice to the bar by condoning imprecise motion practice. By not requiring defense counsel to define clearly to the trial judge the relief sought, opposing counsel (the Commonwealth’s attorney) may have no opportunity to respond. Both trial and appellate courts will be left to fend for themselves and identify vital issues that affect the lives of persons *491charged with criminal offenses. The holding imposes a new and substantial burden on the trial courts because they now must be alert to decipher the true import of the argument. In the final analysis, almost every closing argument will ask the court for a finding of “not guilty.” Carried to its logical extension, the majority holding will now allow an automatic appeal on the ground of sufficiency of the evidence.
The majority holding also does a disservice to this Court. By permitting issues to be raised on appeal that were mentioned in closing argument, the majority invites confusion. In the absence of a specific motion and ruling, we will be forced in the first instance to sort through the record of closing argument to determine the nature of the argument, diverting limited judicial resources from a determination of the merits of an appeal. Rather than requiring trial judges to divine what “motions” might be cloaked in “argument,” I would invoke the procedural bar of Rule 5A:18 and dismiss this appeal.

 Compare Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 404 S.E.2d 736 (1991) (en banc). I joined Chief Judge Koontz in dissent in Lee in the view that the issues before the trial court in that case had been preserved for appeal because they had been clearly put in issue by the pleadings, the evidence, and the procedure adopted by the court and counsel which specifically identified the issues which the trial judge was called upon to decide.