Court Opinion

ID: 9535335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:08.195985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.272702
License: Public Domain

Concurring in Part, and Dissenting in Part
Achor, J.
— I concur in the opinion of Arterburn, J. insofar as it is based upon the grounds that the petitioner was guilty of laches in the bringing of his action to prohibit the trial court from appointing a receiver without notice, and that the writ did not comply with Rule 2-35 of this court.
I do not concur in the opinion insofar as. it enunciates the following three general propositions of law as governing in. a case of this exceptional character: 1) A writ of prohibition may not be used as a vehicle for testing the sufficiency of a complaint for the appointment of a receiver without notice, which complaint does not state facts sufficient to invest the court with jurisdiction; 2) that even though the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to invest the court with jurisdiction of the case, the court must be given the right to erroneously decide the question of its jurisdiction and that the remedy for such erroneous decision must be had by appeal, or. 3) that, a party whose property is thus wrongfully appropriated has an adequate remedy by appeal.
1. The generally accepted propositions of law, as stated in the majority opinion, cannot be applied without exception in proceedings for the appointment of a receiver without notice. It is one of the most fundamental and basic rules of judicial process that a court acquires no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the cause or of the defendants therein, except and until the defendant has been served with notice of the action filed against him. However, in contravention of- this generally established rule, courts have been authorized *613to appoint receivers without notice and thus usurp by judicial process, without notice, the property of a defendant, provided facts are stated in the complaint which warrant this extraordinary exercise of jurisdiction. The facts • necessary to the exercise of such jurisdiction have been prescribed in the opinions of this court, and must be specifically stated in the complaint seeking such relief. State ex rel. Red Dragon Diner v. Superior Court (1959), 239 Ind. 384, 386-387, 158 N. E. 2d 164, 166.1 The required facts are not stated in the complaint before us.
In the absence of these specifically prescribed allegations of fact, the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver without notice and thus usurp the property of a party-defendant who has not been brought within the judicial arm of the court.
2. Except and unless the complaint asking for the appointment of a receiver without notice contains allegations sufficient to invest the court with jurisdiction to enter such a decree, the court has no authority to erronéoúsly decide that it may exercise such jurisdiction. If a court erroneously assumes jurisdiction of a cause, an original action and prohibition brought to this court is a proper remedy. Acts 1955, ch. 253, §1, p. 647, being §3-2201, Burns’ 1962 Cum. Supp. Rule 2-35.
3. I do not agree that an appeal from an unauthorized appointment of a receiver provides an injured party with an adequate remedy. In order to remove the *614receiver pending appeal, it would be incumbent upon the appellant to post bond sufficient to satisfy the claim of creditors or other parties interested in the litigation. This might impose an impossible burden Upon the business involved, especially if it were already laboring under financial difficulties. On the other hand, if the receiver is permitted to remain in control of the business pending appeal, he would not ordinarily, under present practice, be made responsible for any more than a proper accounting for his transactions as receiver. He could be, but ordinarily is not, made accountable for losses sustained by the business by reason of its usurpation by the receiver, even though it is ultimately determined that there was no cause for such appointment. Furthermore, the period of time required for a determination of the issue on appeal is such that, even though the owner of the business prevailed in his appeal, the business without the owner’s experienced management might well have suffered irreparable loss.
Note. — Reported in 189 N. E. 2d 421.

. —“(1) That an emergency exists which renders interference necessary before there is time to give notice in order to prevent waste, destruction or loss.....(2) That protection cannot be afforded in any other way, as by temporary restraining order. ... (3) That plaintiff could not reasonably have anticipated the injury in time to give notice. . . .” State ex rel. Red Dragon Diner v. Superior Ct. (1959), 239 Ind. 384, 386-387, 158 N. E. 2d 164, 166.