Court Opinion

ID: 9736012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:39:57.39746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.332819
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
Because my review of the constitutional question raised by Appellant demands the conclusion that Section 9781(b) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A., contravenes the right of appeal guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I am compelled to write this dissent.
Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, provides.
*511§ 9 Right of appeal
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
In construing this provision the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that, “an accused has an absolute right to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980).
Section 9781(b), which allows for the “grant” of an allowance of appeal at the appellate court’s discretion where a substantial question exists concerning the appropriateness of the sentence which was imposed, curtails a defendant’s absolute right to appeal. As our supreme court recognized in Commonwealth v. Jones, 523 Pa. 138, 142-143, 565 A.2d 732, 734 (1989), “Section 9781(b) provides the defendant or the Commonwealth with only a limited appeal in an attack upon the discretionary aspects of a legal sentence____” It has also been noted that in accordance with Section 9781(b) “[t]he appearance of a substantial question determines whether this court may grant allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of sentence, while the sound discretion of the court determines whether the court will grant review.” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 393 Pa.Super. 277, 292, 574 A.2d 610, 618 (1990). The limitation this section plays upon a defendant’s appellate rights was noted in Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, supra. Commenting on this court’s prior practice of reviewing the argument on the merits of a sentencing issue without making a prior determination of whether a substantial question was raised so as to “allow the appeal,” the court stated: “If this determination is not made prior to examination of and ruling on the merits of the issue of the appropriateness of the sentence, the [Appellant] has in effect obtained an appeal as of right from the discretionary aspects of sentencing.” Tuladziecki, supra., 513 Pa. at 513, 522 A.2d at 19-20.
*512An appeal as of right is, however, what our constitution guarantees. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides an accused such as Appellant with a right to appeal even if the only matter sought to be reviewed is the discretionary aspects of the defendant’s sentence. The Constitution does not limit this right, therefore, it cannot be limited by any provision of the Sentencing Code.
The Majority concedes that the right to appeal has been construed as absolute, and it suggests that Section 9781(b) acts only as a constitutionally valid limitation on that right. (Majority opinion at 735.) Although it has been stated that “this constitutional right to appellate review is a personal right which may be relinquished only through a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver,” Commonwealth v. Passaro, 504 Pa. 611, 476 A.2d 346 (1984), Section 9781(b) does not concern waiver by an appellant. The constitution provides a defendant in a criminal proceeding with a right to have all matters reviewed which have been properly preserved at the trial court level. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 388 Pa.Super. 327, 333, 565 A.2d 777, 780 (1989) (Del Sole, J., concurring). Unlike established rules concerning the methods and manner for perfecting an appeal which a defendant can chose to obey or ignore jeopardizing his or her appellate rights, Section 9781(b) grants the appellate court the authority to determine whether a particular sentencing matter is worthy of an appeal regardless of the action or inaction taken by the defendant. A defendant who deliberately chooses to bypass the orderly procedures for challenging the court’s judgment which are afforded to a person convicted of a crime, and thereby fails to properly preserve a matter for appeal, will have voluntarily relinquished or waived the right to appeal. Nevertheless, it remains the appellant’s choice whether to relinquish or waive that right. Section 9781(b) acts as a barrier preventing appellants from exercising that right. Instead it places upon the appellate court the ability to accept or reject an appeal which is timely filed raising issues concerning sen-*513tenting which have been properly preserved at both the trial and appellate levels.
The superior court’s decision to dismiss such an appeal leaves an appellant without recourse. An appeal to the supreme court from such a decision is not allowed, leaving the superior court’s decision unchecked. This limitation on review is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(f). It provides:
Limitation on additional appellate review.—No appeal of the discretionary aspects of the sentence shall be permitted beyond the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(f)
Accordingly, the superior court’s discretionary decision to disallow an appeal can not be reviewed, and an abuse of that discretion cannot be remedied.
' The removal of the “right” to ensure that a defendant’s sentence is reviewable is particularly disturbing when one examines the decisions of this court which have determined whether to allow an appeal. Widely divergent and inconsistent views of what constitutes a substantial question have arisen resulting in nonuniform treatment of a defendant’s ability to appeal a sentencing matter. See Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 379 Pa.Super. 515, 550 A.2d 567 (1988) (appellant must include in his Rule 2119(f) statement the crime for which he was convicted); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 368 Pa.Super. 341, 534 A.2d 114 (1987) (an appellant must include in his Rule 2119(f) statement the crime for which he was convicted and the length of the sentence imposed in order to warrant our review of the discretionary aspects of sentencing). Also compare Commonwealth v. Ousley, 392 Pa.Super. 549, 573 A.2d 599 (1990) (claim that sentence exceeded guideline recommended aggravated sentence did not raise a substantial question) with Commonwealth v. Burdge, 386 Pa.Super. 194, 562 A.2d 864 (1989) (claim that sentence considerably exceeded recommended aggravated sentence raised a substantial question). As an examination of the caselaw will indicate the practical application of the requirements of Section *5149781(b) and Pa.R.App.P. 2119(f) has led to the creation of dubious standards, and allowed for inconsistent results. It also has unnecessarily burdened this court as noted by Judge Popovich in his Concurring Opinion in Commonwealth v. Chilcote, 396 Pa.Super. 106, 578 A.2d 429 (1990):
I am ... convinced that the compliance with the requirements of ... [Rule 2119(f) ] ... wastes valuable judicial resources by adding an additional tier to our analysis of a defendant’s attack on the discretionary aspects of his sentence, (footnote omitted)
396 Pa.Super. at 131, 578 A.2d at 441.
To uphold the validity of this provision of the Sentencing Code and disregard the mandates of our Constitution will complicate the appellate process and, more importantly, potentially provide unfair treatment to those seeking review of their sentences.
The constitution guarantee of review is particularly vital with regard to sentencing matters.
A defendant’s ability to have his or her sentence reviewed by an appellate court operates as a necessary check to ensure that an appropriate punishment has been issued.
Barnes, supra, 388 Pa.Superior Ct. 333, 565 A.2d at 780. (Del Sole, J. concurring).
Pennsylvania’s procedure of indeterminate sentencing, “necessitates the granting of broad discretion to the trial judge, who must determine, among the sentencing alternatives and the range of permissible penalties, the proper sentence to be imposed.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 130, 351 A.2d 650 (1976). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that the importance of this discretionary power cannot be overemphasized, and has examined its role and its potential for abuse in Martin, supra. In this regard the supreme court has stated:
[M]any commentators argue that it is one of the most important, and most easily abused powers vested in the trial court today. In United States v. Waters, [citation omitted], Judge Wilkey, speaking for the court, stated:
What happens to an offender after conviction is the least understood, the most fraught with irrational dis*515crepancies, and the most in need of improvement of any phase in our criminal justice system.
It is true that the sentence imposed is normally left undisturbed on appeal because the trial court is in a far better position to weigh the factors involved in such a determination. However, we have held that the court’s discretion must be exercised within certain procedural limits, including the consideration of sufficient and accurate information.
466 Pa. at 131-132, 351 A.2d at 657 (footnotes omitted.)
Thus, the important power held by those who impose a discretionary sentence is a pow"er which must be exercised within limits. As a check on those limits the citizens of this Commonwealth have been provided with the constitutional provision found in Article V, Section 9, which ensures that a defendant has a right to appeal. Section 9781(b) of the Sentencing Code eliminates that right, and instead gives the reviewing court the power to “grant” or “allow” appeal, in its discretion, when the discretionary aspects of a sentence are challenged.
Footnote four of the Majority Opinion clearly illustrates how the Majority misses the point of the argument in this case. The question is not whether trial courts will or will not abuse their discretion. We assume members of the bench of this Commonwealth will exercise their duty in accordance with the high standards for which they are known, however we must recognize that mistakes do occur and appellate courts exist to remedy such situations. The real issue is the legislative attempt to permit our court to exercise our discretion to limit review. This discretionary action, which is not subject to review, prohibits what our own constitution guarantees—the right to appeal.
The Commonwealth argues that the decision of the Supreme Court in Tuladziecki, supra, impliedly upheld the constitutionality of Section 9781(b). I do not agree; rather, that issue was never presented to the Court. The Petition for Allowance of Appeal before the supreme court raised two questions:
*516I. Did the Superior Court err in entertaining the Commonwealth’s appeal where the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a substantial question concerning the propriety of the sentence imposed?
II. Did the Superior court err in reversing the Judgement of sentence of the Trial Court upon determining that the sentence imposed was unreasonable?
650 W.D. Allocatur Docket, 1985.
Allocatur was granted solely to determine these questions. At no time was the constitutionality of Section 9781(b) raised or considered: The supreme court has identified as a “well-settled principle” that it “should not decide a constitutional question unless absolutely required to do so.” Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 503 Pa. 373, 381, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (1983). The constitutional question was not raised and not preserved for review in Tuladziecki and was not necessary to the court’s decision. Because constitutional questions are not to be anticipated, I have no hesitancy in rejecting the view that the issue has been decided by implication.
By my decision I would expressly overrule two prior decisions of this court, Commonwealth v. Smith, 394 Pa. Super. 164, 575 A.2d 150 (1990) and Commonwealth v. Chilcote, 396 Pa.Super. 106, 578 A.2d 429 (1990). In these cases the panels held that the limitation placed on appellate review of sentencing by Section 9781(b) is de minimis and that a threshold burden requiring this Court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to review a discretionary sentencing question is constitutionally acceptable. As I have stated, I do not agree that this or any limitation placed on a person’s right to appeal can withstand analysis under Article V, Section 9. While I agree that a person may waive their right to appeal by their own action, I reject the concept that the right may be eliminated by statute. Instead I agree with our distinguished colleague, Judge Zoran Popovich, who stated in his concurring opinion in Chilcote, “§ 9781(b) violates the absolute right of a defendant to appeal his sentence.” Commonwealth v. Chilcote, supra 396 Pa.Super. at 130, 578 A.2d at 441.
*517Although I would hold that Section 9781(b) violates the Pennsylvania Constitution, and would therefore necessarily review Appellant’s claim, I would ultimately conclude, after a review of the record, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.
WIEAND and BECK, JJ., join.
McEWEN, J., concurs in the result.