Court Opinion

ID: 9838911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 18:00:43.331924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:44.112351
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30408         Document: 00516888297               Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/08/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                     September 8, 2023
                                       No. 22-30408                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                          Clerk

   Don Frank, Individually & as Representative on behalf of Armando
   Frank Estate; Antonio Frank, Sr., Individually & as
   Representative on behalf of Armando Frank Estate,

                                                                     Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                              versus

   Kenneth Parnell; Deputy Alexander; Deputy Spillman;
   City of Marksville; Doug Anderson, in his official capacity, also
   known as Sheriff of Avoyelles Parish,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 1:18-CV-978
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Before the court is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment based on
   qualified immunity for Appellants’ excessive force claim. The district court

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30408

   held that the officers’ use of force, including tasers and chokeholds, was not
   unreasonable under the facts of this case. We VACATE and REMAND.
                               Factual Background
          Armando Frank, a mentally ill, disabled veteran, was a lifelong
   resident of Marksville, Louisiana. In this town of approximately 5,000
   people, Frank was known as “the man on the tractor” because he drove his
   red tractor around town. On October 20, 2017, Frank drove his tractor to
   Walmart for a personal errand. As he sat on the tractor in the parking lot, he
   was approached by Deputies Brandon Spillman and Alexander Daniel of the
   Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s Office, where Marksville is located. They parked
   their vehicles directly in front of Frank’s tractor to prevent the tractor from
   being used as a means of escape or a weapon. Around the same time, Officer
   Kenneth Parnell of the Marksville Police Department arrived at the scene.
   Immediately after arriving, Daniel approached Frank, identified himself as an
   Avoyelles Sherriff’s Office Deputy, and asked for identification from Frank.
   Frank promptly handed Daniel his identification. Spillman and Daniel told
   Frank that they had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and wanted Frank
   to come with them.
          Frank repeatedly asked to see the arrest warrant, and Daniel informed
   him that he could see it at the police station. When Frank asked what the
   charges were, Daniel, Spillman, and Parnell refused to tell him. At this point,
   the encounter became tense. Frank declared that he was not leaving the
   tractor, and Parnell quickly resorted to force, reaching in from the right to
   pull Frank off the tractor. Frank provided some resistance and tried to keep
   Parnell off the tractor.
          Approximately 30 seconds later, Parnell deployed his taser into
   Frank’s chest for a five second cycle. Frank removed one of the taser probes.
   A few seconds later, Spillman jumped onto the tractor and put Frank into a

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   chokehold while screaming “get off the goddamned tractor.” Then, while
   Frank was being choked, Daniel deployed his taser and hit Frank in the leg.
   Shortly after, Parnell performed a drive stun where he physically stunned
   Frank on his leg with the taser for pain compliance. Spillman continued to
   choke Frank while Parnell twisted Frank’s left arm far behind his back.
   Daniel performed two drive stuns with his taser. Parnell then performed two
   more drive stuns with his taser. In total, Frank was tased 7 times in less than
   a minute. Within only minutes of his encounter with the officers, Frank was
   rendered unconscious, and, according to the forensic pathologist, was “for
   all intents and purposes, dead.” Frank was pronounced dead less than an
   hour after the incident began.
                                I. Autopsy report
          On October 23, 2017, the forensic pathologist, Dr. Christopher Tape,
   performed an autopsy on Frank. In addition to physically examining the
   external and internal parts of Frank’s body, Dr. Tape’s autopsy also included
   an examination of the body camera video evidence. In analyzing the video
   evidence, Dr. Tape noted that during the encounter but after the chokehold,
   Frank started breathing heavily and began “cough[ing] . . . “gasp[ing] . . .
   [and] speak[ing] in a deep and strained voice.” According to Dr. Tape, this
   happened because of Spillman’s “carotid sleeper hold evolving into a bar
   hold for approximately 15 seconds with another bar hold for approximately 6
   seconds[,]” combined with Frank’s body being pressed onto the tractor and
   being pulled from the front, which compressed his chest and abdomen and
   reduced his ability to ventilate. After the officers removed Frank from the
   tractor, he was “placed face down with his hands behind his back with
   multiple law enforcement officers partially on his back and neck and lower
   extremities.” For 27 seconds, the officers stayed on Frank’s back while Frank
   was face down on the ground with his hands behind his back. For the next 41
   seconds, the officers tried to lift him with no response, and Parnell declared

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   that Frank was “dead weighting.” While Frank was unconscious, the officers
   dragged him and put him headfirst into a SUV patrol car. Captain Honea of
   the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s Office, who arrived at the scene, noticed
   Frank’s shallow breathing and directed another officer to call paramedics,
   who arrived three minutes later. Frank coded on the stretcher, and
   paramedics attempted to begin chest compressions and to intubate Frank,
   but he never regained a heartbeat. Frank was pronounced dead on October
   20, 2017 at 11:50 a.m., less than an hour after the incident began.
          Dr. Tape listed Frank’s cause of death as “[a]sphyxia due to
   respiratory compromise due to law enforcement arrest with contribution of
   hypertensive atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, obesity (BMI=37), and
   electronic control device shocks.” Dr. Tape detailed a timeline of the
   asphyxiation: in total 6 minutes and 42 seconds of respiratory compromise,
   which included 15 seconds of a carotid sleeper hold and bar hold, 6 seconds
   of bar hold, 165 seconds of compressional asphyxia being pressed against the
   tractor, 27 seconds of compressional asphyxia being face down on the ground
   with his hands on his back, 41 seconds of positional asphyxia while loading,
   as well as 148 seconds of positional asphyxia in the back of the SUV. Frank’s
   physical autopsy also showed injuries “consistent with evidence of a manual
   strangulation.”
          According to Dr. Tape, it is likely that Frank “primarily died as a
   result of respiratory (and possibly some vascular) compromise due to a
   struggle with police, supported by autopsy and video evidence.” Dr. Tape
   determined that the respiratory compromise consisted of “neck holds
   (strangulation), the body being pressed, compromising ventilation
   (compressional asphyxia), the body on the ground with hands behind the
   back and personnel on him (compressional asphyxia and positional asphyxia),
   and the body face down with hands behind the back in the back of an SUV
   (positional asphyxia).” Moreover, the tasers “likely caused respiratory

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   compromise by paralyzing the muscles of ventilation including the chest,
   abdomen and accessory muscles,” and the “addition of the pain of being
   shocked likely stopped effective breathing, at least temporarily.”
          According to Dr. Tape, “it seems that the law enforcement arrest was
   the intervening factor that led to the death,” and for “medicolegal purposes
   such as the death certificate, the manner of death should be classified as a
   homicide.”
                                     Procedural History
          On July 27, 2018, approximately 9-months after the death of Armando
   Frank, Don Frank and Antonio Frank, individually, as the surviving heirs of
   their brother, Armando Frank, and as representatives of Armando Frank’s
   estate, filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the
   Western District of Louisiana.1 The lawsuit named Parnell, Spillman, Daniel,
   and Doug Anderson as Avoyelles Parish Sheriff, and the City of Marksville
   as defendants and alleged causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
   Louisiana state law. On June 10, 2019, the district court granted in part
   Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to replead. On June 25, 2019, Frank
   filed an amended complaint which alleged a Section 1983 excessive force
   claim and claims for excessive force, assault, and battery under Louisiana law,
   seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
          In early November of 2021, all Appellees moved for summary
   judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. On June 13, 2022, the district
   court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and
   dismissed the case.

          _____________________
          1
              For simplicity, the Appellants are referred to as “Frank.”

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                                Standard of Review
          The standard of review on summary judgment is de novo. Davidson v.
   Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). The court should
   grant summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute of material fact
   “and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting
   FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). “[W]e view the facts in the light most favorable to the
   non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Trammell
   v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d
   738, 743 (5th Cir. 2017)). This court “may affirm [summary judgment] on
   any grounds supported by the record.” McGruder v. Will, 204 F.3d 220, 222
   (5th Cir. 2000).
                                     Discussion

                               I. Qualified Immunity
          “Consistent with our standard of review for summary judgments, the
   legal issues underlying the district court’s qualified-immunity ruling is
   reviewed de novo.” Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022). “Once an
   official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must
   rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
   official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law. The
   plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified immunity, but all inferences
   are drawn in his favor.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (internal citations omitted). Qualified immunity shields federal and state
   officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing “(1) that
   the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right
   was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Bey, 53
   F.4th at 857 (internal quotation omitted). A court may rely on either prong
   of the defense in its analysis. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253

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                            1. Constitutional Violation
          When “the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or
   investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one
   invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” Graham v. Connor,
   490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Since an excessive force claim arises out of the
   Fourth Amendment, the test applied is whether the force was reasonable. Id.
   at 396. This reasonableness inquiry is an objective one: “the question is
   whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts
   and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
   intent or motivation.” Id. However, the court “cannot apply this standard
   mechanically.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Excessive
   force claims are “necessarily fact-intensive,” and whether force is excessive
   or unreasonable “depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular
   case.” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (internal quotations omitted).
          “In making this [objective reasonableness] determination, a court
   should consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including the severity of
   the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
   safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. at 728–29 (quoting Graham, 490
   U.S. at 396). These are known as the Graham factors. Additionally, while not
   “exclusive” and outlined “only to illustrate the types of objective
   circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force,”
   the court can also consider “the relationship between the need for the use of
   force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any
   effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the
   severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by
   the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576
   U.S. at 397.

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          The situation before the court is aided by video evidence from
   multiple angles of the interaction. “The reasonableness inquiry is inherently
   factbound, making the video of this . . . event critical.” Harmon v. City of
   Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
   372, 381 (2007) (the court of appeals “should have viewed the facts in the
   light depicted by the videotape”). Therefore, instead of having to take the
   parties’ version of the events as canon, the court “should not . . . rel[y] on
   such visible fiction,” to the extent that there is any. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–
   81.
                                 a. Graham Factors
                                 i. Threat-of-harm
          While all factors are relevant, the “threat-of-harm factor typically
   predominates the analysis when deadly force has been deployed,” so we will
   begin there. Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163. The district court held that this factor
   weighed in favor of Frank “as the tractor, which could have been viewed by
   a reasonable officer on the scene as a threat to safety, was not turned on; was
   blocked by at least one patrol car; and had a farming implement attached to
   the rear.” Frank v. Parnell, No. 18-CV-978, 2022 WL 2125581, at *7 (W.D.
   La. June 13, 2022). We agree. Frank posed no immediate threat to the safety
   of the officers or the public. Frank was clearly unarmed, had no ability to and
   never attempted to flee, and was an obese, disabled veteran.
          Additionally, “this Court considers the speed with which an officer
   resorts to force where officers deliberately, and rapidly, eschew lesser
   responses when such means are plainly available and obviously
   recommended by the situation.” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th 453, 464
   (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1165). It is clear from Daniel’s
   body camera footage that the officers made no attempt to deescalate the
   situation, but rather deliberately and rapidly eschewed lesser responses. It

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   took approximately 80 seconds from when Frank handed his ID to Daniel
   until the officers initiated physical contact with Frank. Parnell fired a taser
   probe into Frank’s chest only 32 seconds later. A mere 8 seconds later,
   Spillman put Frank in a chokehold. Within the next 45 seconds, Frank was
   shot or stunned with a taser six separate times and put in another chokehold.
   A jury could conclude that reasonable officers would have been keenly aware
   that this level of force should not have been used in this situation. The threat-
   of-harm factor favors Frank.
          “While the remaining two factors do not weigh as heavily upon our
   analysis, they yet demand attention.” Crane, 50 F.4th at 465.
                              ii. Severity of the crime
          The district court held that the Graham severity of the crime factor
   “weighs in favor of the officers as they were attempting to execute a felony
   arrest warrant.” Frank, 2022 WL 2125581, at *6. It asserted that since the
   “officers knew there was a felony warrant outstanding and that based upon
   that warrant, they had probable cause to arrest Frank.” Id.
          In the recent case of Crane v. City of Arlington, however, the court did
   not find the fact that the warrant was for “an unconfirmed felony probation
   violation” and multiple confirmed misdemeanor warrants as wholly
   dispositive of this factor. 50 F.4th at 465. Parnell testified that he was advised
   that the open warrant for Frank “was a felony warrant[,]” but that he did not
   recall if he knew what the warrant was about. Neither Daniel nor Spillman
   knew or inquired into the nature of the felony warrant.
          The warrant was for simple criminal trespass and attempted
   unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling. Simple criminal trespass is a
   misdemeanor, and unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling is a felony.

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   LA. STAT. §§ 14:63, 14:62.3.2 Daniel’s incident report does not state that the
   warrant was for a felony or any type of violent crime, but rather says that he
   was aware of “the existence of a warrant . . . .” None of the officers arrived
   at the scene with their weapons drawn or appearing alarmed by the severity
   of the violation. Any felony warrant does not automatically tip the “severity
   of the crime at issue” prong to weigh in the officers’ favor, and, in fact, prior
   case law implicitly recognizes that a felony warrant is not automatically
   dispositive of this factor. Crane, 50 F.4th at 465; Aguirre v. City of San
   Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 408 n.5 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Even if [Frank] were
   suspected of a serious crime, this would not necessarily be dispositive.”).
           None of the officers felt the need to be particularly cautious of Frank
   or take a protective position. The conversation was relaxed and friendly at
   first.3 This factor is, at best, neutral.
       iii. Actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
           “Officers may consider a suspect’s refusal to comply with
   instructions during a traffic stop in assessing whether physical force is needed
   to effectuate the suspect’s compliance.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,
   167 (5th Cir. 2009). “However, officers must assess not only the need for
   force, but also ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force
   used.’” Id. (quoting Gomez v. Chandler, 163 F.3d 921, 923 (5th Cir. 1999)). In
   Deville, the court found that the fact that the officer “engaged in very little,

           _____________________
           2
               An attempt, which is what Frank was charged with, “is a separate but lesser grade
   of the intended crime.” LA. STAT. § 14:27. Nevertheless, it is still a felony.
           3
               For example, soon after the officers arrived, Daniel motioned to Parnell and said
   to Frank that he “understand[s] you’re a veteran. Both of us are too.” The fact that Daniel
   knew Frank was a veteran also lends credence to the allegation that Frank was known to
   the police.

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   if any, negotiation with her—and . . . instead quickly resorted to breaking her
   driver’s side window and dragging her out of the vehicle” was relevant to this
   factor. Id. at 168. Here, there was no attempt at any negotiation. Frank asked
   what the warrant was for or to see the warrant, and the officers only replied
   that he would find out after he was arrested and at the station. In his
   deposition, Daniel agreed that Frank asking why he was being arrested “was
   a reasonable question,” he was “not aware of any downside” to calling the
   station and finding out the nature of the arrest warrant, that he could have
   easily “found out” the reason, and that telling Frank the full information
   about why he was initiating contact with him was a reasonable request. This
   is not to say that the officers were required to show Frank the warrant in this
   situation. They should have, however, engaged in some other de-escalatory
   action before resorting to violence in this circumstance, since such means
   were plainly available given that Frank was sitting unarmed and not able to
   flee on a blocked-in tractor. Deville, 567 F.3d at 168.
          Here, the district court held that it could not say that Frank was only
   passively resisting arrest. Frank, 2022 WL 2125581, at *7 (“Although
   Frank’s initial demeanor was calm, he became increasingly obstinate when
   officers did not do as he requested to present him with a warrant.”). A jury
   could conclude, however, that reasonable officers would have been aware
   that they should not have been repeatedly tasing and choking an unarmed,
   disabled man sitting in a blocked-in tractor. The district court held that
   “Frank reached for the taser. Parnell grabbed his wrist, and Frank pulled his
   arm away.” Id. At *8. From the video evidence, there is, at a minimum, a
   factual dispute about whether Frank was reaching for Parnell’s taser or was
   simply pulling his arm away to avoid being grabbed and tased.
          In Trammell v. Fruge, the court held that there was “a factual dispute
   as to whether Trammel was actively resisting arrest throughout his encounter
   with the police officers.” 868 F.3d at 341. There, the court held that “it

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   appears that Trammel’s only physical resistance prior to being tackled was
   his attempt to pull his arm away.” Id. Additionally, the court noted that the
   officer was not pulled forward. Id. But, the court continued,
                 even if Trammel’s decision to pull his arm away
                 from the officers can be characterized as some
                 degree of resistance that would justify an
                 officer’s use of force, the quickness with which
                 the officers resorted to tackling Trammel to the
                 ground militates against a finding of
                 reasonableness. This Court has several times
                 found that the speed with which an officer
                 resorts to force is relevant in determining
                 whether that force was excessive to the need.

   Id. At 342. This situation is similar to Trammell; “[A] reasonable jury could
   infer that the officers used very little, if any, negotiation before resorting to
   physical violence, and that the officers’ conduct did not constitute the
   required ‘measured and ascending’ actions calibrated to [Frank’s] conduct.”
   Id. (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2012)).
          “Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive[.]” Deville, 567
   F.3d at 167. The Fifth Circuit has held that excessive force existed when an
   officer tased someone who only pulled his arm out of the officer’s grasp.
   Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Trammell, 868
   F.3d at 341–42 (arrestee pulling his arm away from officer’s grasp did not
   alone justify two officers’ tackling him to the ground). Drawing all inferences
   in Frank’s favor, Frank satisfies this factor.

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           Frank has shown that there is a factual dispute about whether the
   officers’ use of force in this situation was unreasonable and violated his
   Fourth Amendment rights.4 We now turn to the clearly established prong.
                                2. Clearly established right
           “Officers’ conduct violates a clearly established right when there is
   ‘controlling authority . . . that defines the contours of the right in question
   with a high degree of particularity.’” Aguirre, 995 F.3d at 415 (quoting
   Linicomn v. Hill, 902 F.3d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 2018)). Clearly established law
   should not be defined at a high level of generality, but “it is not necessary that
   a previous case presenting identical facts exist in order for a right to be clearly
   established.” Id. This is because the central concept is that of fair warning:
   “The law can be clearly established despite notable factual distinctions
   between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long
   as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue
   violated constitutional rights.” Trammell, 868 F.3d at 339 (internal
   quotations omitted).
           “Lawfulness of force, however, does not depend on the precise
   instrument used to apply it.” Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.
   2012). “Qualified immunity will not protect officers who apply excessive and
   unreasonable force merely because their means of applying it are novel.” Id.

           _____________________
           4
               Additionally, “[i]n evaluating excessive force claims, courts may look to the
   seriousness of injury to determine ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have been
   thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified
   infliction as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.’” Deville, 567 F.3d at 168
   (quoting Brown v. Lippard, 472 F.3d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also id. (“[T]he extent
   of [the] injury inflicted may be considered in determining whether the officers used
   excessive force.”) (internal quotations omitted).

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   at 763–64. In Newman, however, the court dealt with a similar situation
   involving the use of a taser. Officers pulled over a vehicle for a traffic stop
   and noticed that a passenger, Mario Cole, had a warrant out for his arrest. Id.
   at 759. Cole got out of the car and began struggling with the police. Id. Against
   police warnings, Newman also exited the vehicle to talk with Cole. Id. Backup
   officers arrived with their tasers out, and instructed Newman to go to the rear
   of the vehicle. Id. at 760. During a search of his person, the police officer
   contended that Newman grabbed his hand and placed it on Newman’s
   privates. Id. The officer pushed Newman towards the car, and another officer
   came to the scene, struck Newman with his baton, and then tased him three
   times. Id.
          The officers argued that “Newman resisted search and arrest, that he
   struggled and was noncompliant, that he reached for his waistband,
   potentially for a weapon, and that their actions were necessary to prevent
   serious injury or death to themselves.” Id. at 762. The court held that no
   reasonable police officer would have found Newman to be armed or trying to
   flee. Id. Therefore, the court held that the police used unconstitutional
   excessive force that violated a clearly established right. Id. At 764. Heeding
   the court’s analysis in Deville, that the degree of force is not justified where
   the officer “engaged in very little, if any, negotiation” with the suspect, the
   Newman court held that it was relevant that the officers “immediately
   resorted to taser and nightstick without attempting to use physical skill,
   negotiation, or even commands.” Id. at 763. Here, the officers used
   commands, but failed to attempt any other action to effectuate compliance
   short of tasing, twisting, and choking Frank. Deville, 567 F.3d at 167 (when
   considering a suspect’s refusal to comply with instructions, “officers must
   assess not only the need for force, but also the relationship between the need
   and the amount of force used.”) (internal quotations omitted).

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          Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that “in an obvious case,” the
   Graham excessive-force factors themselves can “clearly establish” the
   answer, even without a body of relevant case law. Newman, 703 F.3d at 763
   (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)). None of the Graham
   factors justify the officers’ actions against Frank. Even without Newman or
   Deville, a jury could conclude that the officers used excessive force and that
   they had reasonable warning their conduct violated Frank’s clearly
   established Fourth Amendment rights.
          Therefore, the Appellees were not entitled to qualified immunity, and
   the district court erred in granting their motion for summary judgment.
                                 II. State law claims
          “Louisiana’s excessive force tort mirrors its federal constitutional
   counterpart.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 172. “Whether the force used is reasonable
   depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances in each case,” and
   it includes “the known character of the arrestee, the risks and dangers faced
   by the officers, the nature of the offense involved, the chance of the arrestee’s
   escape if the particular means are not employed, the existence of alternative
   methods of arrest, the physical size, strength, and weaponry of the officers as
   compared to the arrestee, and the exigencies of the moment.” Kyle v. City of
   New Orleans, 353 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. 1977). “These considerations are
   sufficiently similar to the Graham factors that our decision on this claim
   mirrors our decision of plaintiffs’ § 1983 excessive force claim . . . .” Deville,
   567 F.3d at 173.
          The federal qualified immunity analysis applies here. There is a
   genuine issue as to whether any of the officers used unreasonable or excessive
   force, so the district court is reversed as to the dismissal of the appealed
   Louisiana state law claims.

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                                    No. 22-30408

                               III. Punitive damages
          “[P]unitive damages may be awarded only when the defendant’s
   conduct is motivated by evil intent or demonstrates reckless or callous
   indifference to a person’s constitutional rights.” Williams v. Kaufman Cnty.,
   352 F.3d 994, 1015 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). “The latter
   standard requires recklessness in its subjective form, i.e. a subjective
   consciousness of a risk of injury or illegality and a criminal indifference to
   civil obligations.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Frank argues that the
   district court abused its discretion by dismissing his punitive damages claim,
   and he contends that there is a triable issue of fact about whether the officers
   demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to his constitutional rights.
          In light of the evidence before it, a jury could reasonably infer that the
   officers’ acts were unjustified and that they acted with callous or reckless
   indifference to Frank’s constitutional rights. Moore v. LaSalle Mgmt. Co., 41
   F.4th 493, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Plaintiffs have therefore met their
   burden to raise a fact dispute over whether each of these Individual
   Defendants demonstrated reckless or callous indifference to [Plaintiffs’]
   constitutional rights. . . . In sum, Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages
   should have survived summary judgment.”).
                              IV. Medical causation
          The district court denied as moot Appellees’ motion for summary
   judgment as to medical causation. This issue is left to the district court after
   remand.
                        V. State law respondent superior
          Frank waived his federal respondeat superior claims against the City of
   Marksville and Doug Anderson as Avoyelles Parish Sheriff. He does,
   however, contend that the City and Anderson are still liable under the state

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                                    No. 22-30408

   tort claims. Unlike federal law, “[m]unicipalities do not enjoy special
   protection from vicarious liability under Louisiana law and are subject to
   respondeat superior like every other employer.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 174; see
   also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320 (“Masters and employers are answerable for the
   damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the
   functions in which they are employed.”). “Although an employment
   relationship may in fact exist, the employer will not be liable for the
   substandard conduct of the employee unless the latter can be fairly said to be
   within the course and scope of the employment with the former.” Brasseaux
   v. Town of Mamou, 752 So. 2d 815, 820 (La. 2000). As the court held in
   Deville,
                 The district court did not reach the question of
                 whether the [municipality] is vicariously liable,
                 concluding that it was entitled to summary
                 judgment because plaintiffs failed to sustain their
                 state-law claims against the individual
                 defendants. Because this conclusion was in error,
                 we reverse. On remand, should the district court
                 reach the issue of the [municipality’s] vicarious
                 liability, it should then consider in the first
                 instance whether [individual defendants] were
                 acting within the scope of their employment such
                 that the [municipality] can be held liable for
                 plaintiffs’ viable state-law claims against the
                 individual defendants.

   567 F.3d at 174.
          Since the district court is reversed as to the state court claims, we
   leave this matter to the district court to decide in accordance with the
   instructions given in Deville, keeping in mind that “the employer of a police
   officer is liable for wrongful injury inflicted while performing his official
   duties.” Bourque v. Lohr, 248 So. 2d 901, 904 (La. Ct. App. 1971); see also

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                                     No. 22-30408

   Buchicchio v. LeBlanc, No. CV 22-00147-BAJ-EWD, 2023 WL 2027809, at
   *10 (M.D. La. Feb. 15, 2023) (“Under Louisiana law, Sheriff Cazes—as
   Chief Juge’s employer—may be liable for Chief Juge’s tortious on-the-job
   conduct.”).
                                     Conclusion

          The judgment of the district court is VACATED as to granting
   summary judgment to Appellees on qualified immunity grounds, the
   dismissal of the parallel Louisiana state tort claims, and the denial of punitive
   damages as a matter of law. On REMAND, the district court can consider
   any challenges to medical causation as well as vicarious liability against the
   City of Marksville and Doug Anderson in accordance with this court’s
   decision.

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