Court Opinion

ID: 9897893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:50.300537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:47.334031
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                    No. 84755-4-I

 In the Matter of the Guardianship of               DIVISION ONE
 L.C.
                                                   ORDER DENYING MOTION
                                                   FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
                                                   WITHDRAWING AND
                                                   SUBSTITUTING OPINION

       Appellant father M.M. filed a motion to reconsider a portion of the opinion

filed on October 2, 2023, in the above case. The panel has determined that the

motion for reconsideration should be denied. The panel has also determined that

the opinion in the above-entitled case filed on October 2, 2023, should be

withdrawn and a substitute published opinion be filed.

       Now, therefore, it is hereby

       ORDERED that the opinion filed on October 2, 2023, is withdrawn and a

substitute published opinion shall be filed.

              FOR THE COURT:
No. 84755-4-I/2

                  2
        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                            No. 84755-4-I

 In the Matter of the Guardianship of
                                                            DIVISION ONE
 L.C.

                                                            PUBLISHED OPINION

        CHUNG, J. — H.C. (mother) and M.M. (father) appeal from a trial court’s

order appointing the mother’s cousins Jordan and Courtney Hacker as limited

guardians over their minor daughter L.C. The parents assert that, although it was

appropriate for the court to appoint a guardian for L.C., the trial court should not

have appointed the Hackers and instead should have appointed their chosen

nominee. RCW 11.130.215 requires the trial court to appoint the parents’

guardian of choice unless it finds that doing so would be contrary to the best

interest of the child. Because the trial court made no such finding here, we agree

with the parents and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                             FACTS

        On March 10, 2021, Jordan and Courtney Hacker filed an emergency

minor guardianship petition for L.C. 1 At the time, L.C. was already residing with

        1 Initially, the petition named only the mother as a respondent. The Hackers’ petition was

later amended after the father was added to L.C.’s birth certificate.
No. 84755-4-I /2

the Hackers, as her mother was incarcerated and her initial caregiver, Hailie

Hotchkiss, could no longer care for her. The trial court granted the petition and

entered an emergency guardianship order appointing the Hackers as L.C.’s

temporary limited guardians. The court also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL)

for L.C.

          Both parents objected to the Hackers acting as guardians for L.C. Initially,

the mother requested that the child be placed with the father. In July 2021, both

parents requested that Christi Compton, 2 the mother’s sister, be appointed as

L.C.’s guardian.

          On May 20, 2022, less than two months before trial, the father filed an

amended objection to minor guardianship, naming his adult daughter Jasmine

Mulliken as his preferred guardian for L.C. The father also suggested his mother,

Cherilynn Bradford, as an alternative placement for L.C. This was the first time

either name had been brought to the trial court’s attention. The mother

subsequently filed an amended objection making the same suggestions as the

father.

          The GAL spoke to Mulliken, who was then residing in Alaska with her son.

Mulliken indicated that she was in the process of undergoing an Interstate

Compact placement study so that she could serve as guardian for L.C.’s younger

sister, who was then the subject of a dependency action. The GAL obtained

          2 Ms. Compton’s first name is alternatively spelled Christi and Kristi. We utilize the

spelling used by the mother.

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No. 84755-4-I /3

Bradford’s contact information from Mulliken; however, Bradford did not respond

to the GAL’s attempts to speak with her.

       The court held a trial on the petition on July 11 and 12, 2022. At trial, the

court heard testimony from the father, Courtney Hacker, Hotchkiss, the GAL,

Mulliken, and Bradford. The court also admitted into evidence three exhibits: the

GAL’s initial report, the GAL’s amended report, and the GAL’s summary of

reports from the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF).

       Following trial, the court issued its written findings and conclusions. The

trial court found that all of the witnesses were credible, but that Courtney Hacker

and the GAL were the most knowledgeable about the circumstances that led to

L.C. residing with the Hackers. The court further found that “[n]either parent has

substantially performed basic parenting functions for L.C. since her birth,” as the

mother was intermittently incarcerated, the father had been an absentee parent,

and both had ongoing substance abuse issues and refused to adhere to the

terms of a no-contact order prohibiting the mother from contacting the father. As

to the Hackers, the trial court found that they “have been providing a safe, stable

and loving home for L.C. for well over a year.” As to Mulliken and Bradford, the

court found only that they had not “been appropriately vetted and seem to be

late-coming suggestions for guardians.” The trial court additionally found that

there was no reason to believe that L.C. was of Native American ancestry.

       The trial court stated that it “adopts [the GAL’s] recommendations, both as

to who should serve as guardian(s), the Hackers, as well as all of her other

recommendations, including regarding ongoing contact with the parents and

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No. 84755-4-I /4

pace and process of visitation.” The trial court thus ordered that L.C. should be

appointed a guardian based on need and that the Hackers should be appointed

as limited guardians.

       The parents both appeal.

                                     ANALYSIS

I.     Choice of Guardian

       The parents argue that the trial court erred by appointing the Hackers as

guardians for L.C. instead of their chosen designee, Mulliken, or their chosen

alternative, Bradford. The Hackers, on the other hand, contend that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in designating them as guardians because placement

with Mulliken or Bradford was contrary to L.C.’s best interest.

       In 2019, the legislature adopted the Uniform Guardianship,

Conservatorship, and Other Protective Arrangements Act, ch. 11.130 RCW,

completely overhauling the statutory framework for guardianships in the state of

Washington. As part of the act, the legislature enacted RCW 11.130.215, which

outlines the requirements for the appointment of a guardian for a minor child.

This statute states, in relevant part:

       In appointing a guardian under subsection (1) of this section, the
       following rules apply:

              (a) The court shall appoint a person nominated as guardian
       by a parent of the minor in a probated will or other record unless
       the court finds the appointment is contrary to the best interest of the
       minor. Any “other record” must be a declaration or other sworn
       document and may include a power of attorney or other sworn
       statement as to the care, custody, or control of the minor child.

RCW 11.130.215(2).

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No. 84755-4-I /5

       As an initial matter, the statute does not delineate a standard of review for

the trial court’s decision on whom to appoint as the child’s guardian. The mother

and the Hackers suggest that the standard of review should be abuse of

discretion. 3 An abuse of discretion standard is usually appropriate in cases where

       (1) the trial court is generally in a better position than the appellate
       court to make a given determination, (2) a determination is fact
       intensive and involves numerous factors to be weighed on a case-
       by-case basis, (3) the trial court has more experience making a
       given type of determination and a greater understanding of the
       issues involved, (4) the determination is one for which “no rule of
       general applicability could be effectively constructed,” and/or (5)
       there is a strong interest in finality and avoiding appeals.

State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 621, 290 P.3d 942 (2012) (citations omitted)

(quoting In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 127, 65 P.3d 664 (2003)).

       Determining who should be appointed as a child’s guardian is a fact-

intensive inquiry that trial courts are necessarily in a better position than the

appellate courts to decide. See, e.g., In re Dependency of G.C.B., No. 84772-4-I,

slip op. at 17 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2023) (listing factors courts should

consider in determining whether guardianship is an appropriate course of action

in termination cases and noting that “[t]he 2022 amendment to RCW

13.34.180(1)(f) does not change this analysis”),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/847724.pdf. Additionally, there is a strong

interest in the finality of cases involving the custody of a child, as disruption to the

child’s life can result in harm to the child. See In re Custody of S.R., 183 Wn.

       3 The father did not address the standard of review in his briefing.

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No. 84755-4-I /6

App. 803, 813, 334 P.3d 1190 (2014) (legislative policy favors finality of custody

decisions to avoid disruption to children). We agree with the parties that abuse of

discretion is the appropriate standard of review.

       “Under an abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court will find error

only when the trial court’s decision (1) adopts a view that no reasonable person

would take and is thus ‘manifestly unreasonable,’ (2) rests on facts unsupported

in the record and is thus based on ‘untenable grounds,’ or (3) was reached by

applying the wrong legal standard and is thus made ‘for untenable reasons.’ ”

Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).

       The parents assert that the trial court abused its discretion by not

appointing Mulliken or Bradford as the child’s guardian because it did not make a

finding that the appointment of Mulliken or Bradford as guardian would be

contrary to the best interest of L.C. As noted above, RCW 11.130.215(2)(a)

states that “[t]he court shall appoint a person nominated as guardian by a parent

of the minor in a probated will or other record unless the court finds the

appointment is contrary to the best interest of the minor.” (Emphasis added.) As

a general rule, “the word ‘shall’ is presumptively imperative and operates to

create a duty rather than conferring discretion.” State v. Bartholomew, 104 Wn.2d

844, 848, 710 P.2d 196 (1985). Thus, if the court finds a guardian should be

appointed, it is required to appoint the parent-nominated person, and it may

deviate from this requirement only if it “finds” the appointment is contrary to the

child’s best interest.

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No. 84755-4-I /7

       Our Supreme Court has previously outlined what a written order must

contain when a statute has mandated factual findings:

               Generally, where findings are required, they must be
       sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. State v. Holland,
       98 Wn.2d 507, 517, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983). While the degree of
       particularity required in findings of fact depends on the
       circumstances of the particular case, they should at least be
       sufficient to indicate the factual bases for the ultimate conclusions.
       Groff v. Department of Labor & Indus., 65 Wn.2d 35, 40, 395 P.2d
       633 (1964); State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966).

In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). When the

written findings are not sufficient on their face, they “may be supplemented by the

trial court’s oral decision or statements in the record.” Id. at 219 (citing Holland,

98 Wn.2d at 518; Todd v. Superior Ct., 68 Wn.2d 587, 414 P.2d 605 (1966)).

When the trial court has not entered the required findings and the order cannot

be supplemented by the court’s oral statements, the trial court may not enter the

relief afforded by the statute. See In re Marriage of Katare, 125 Wn. App. 813,

826, 105 P.3d 44 (2004) (court cannot impose restrictions on a parent in the

absence of findings under RCW 26.09.191).

       Here, the trial court’s only finding concerning Mulliken and the parents’

alternative nominee, Bradford, was that they had not “been appropriately vetted

and seem to be late-coming suggestions for guardians.” Nowhere in its findings

of fact and conclusions of law or its order appointing a limited guardian did the

trial court find that placement with Mulliken or Bradford would be contrary to

L.C.’s best interest.

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No. 84755-4-I /8

       While the Hackers concede that the trial court made no explicit finding that

placement with Mulliken or Bradford would be contrary to L.C.’s best interest,

they nevertheless assert that the trial court implicitly made this finding when its

order adopted the GAL’s “recommendations, both as to who should serve as

guardian(s), . . . as well as all of her other recommendations, including regarding

ongoing contact with the parents and the pace and process of visitation.” We

disagree.

       In her amended report, admitted as an exhibit during trial, under a section

entitled “Investigation,” the GAL states that “to disrupt the attachment and

security [L.C.] enjoys at the Hackers would be detrimental to her sense of

stability and security and could lead to significant attachment issues.” It is this

sentence that the Hackers contend was incorporated into the trial court’s findings

of fact. However, the GAL’s report contains a separate section entitled

“Recommendations.” This section reads as follows:

       1. Petitioners should be the guardians of the minor child.
       2. Visits between the child and her parents should begin with cards
          and letters, progress to video chats and, if the visitations are
          consistent and positive, move to in-person visits – taking into
          consideration the travel time and toll on the child. Visits need to
          be graduating in contact and length and divided into tiers. Only
          consistent visitation in a tier should allow progress to the next
          tier.
       3. All visits between the child and her parents should be
          supervised by a professional supervisor, at the parents’
          expense.

In stating that it was adopting the GAL’s “recommendations, both as to who

should serve as guardian(s), . . . as well as all of her other recommendations,”

the trial court made it clear that it was adopting this particular section of the

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No. 84755-4-I /9

GAL’s amended report into its findings and conclusions. Had the trial court

intended to adopt the remainder of the GAL’s amended report, it would have said

so. 4

        In the alternative, the Hackers assert that specific findings of fact are not

required where the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that

appointment of the parents’ nominated guardian would be contrary to the best

interest of the child. For this proposition, the Hackers rely on In re Marriage of

Croley, 91 Wn.2d 288, 588 P.2d 738 (1978) and In re Marriage of Shui, 132 Wn.

App. 568, 125 P.3d 180 (2005). Croley and Shui are both dissolution matters in

which the trial court was tasked with determining a residential schedule for the

couple’s children. RCW 26.09.187(3) and its predecessor, former RCW

26.09.190 (1973), listed a number of factors that the trial court must consider

before ordering a residential schedule for the children. However, neither RCW

26.09.187(3) nor former RCW 26.09.190 (1973) specifically required the trial

court to make findings as to every factor. By contrast, RCW 11.130.215(2)

requires the trial court to make a specific factual finding before it may appoint a

guardian other than the person nominated by the child’s parents. Croley and Shui

are therefore inapposite.

          4 Not only did the GAL not make a recommendation in her report that placement with

Mulliken or Bradford would be contrary to L.C.’s best interest, but at trial, when asked whether
“[b]ased on your call that you had with Jasmine Mulliken are you in any position to recommend
that it be in the child’s best interest to be placed in her care?” the GAL responded, “No. I can’t
form an opinion on that. I don’t know enough.”

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No. 84755-4-I /10

       Because the trial court was required to make a specific factual finding and

did not do so in its written order, we can affirm the decision of the trial court only

if the court’s order can be supplemented by the trial court’s oral statements on

the record. We cannot do so because the trial court never made any oral

statements on the record concerning its factual findings. To the contrary, the trial

court explicitly decided not to issue an oral ruling in order to prevent the need for

additional court appearances.

       Because the trial court’s decision is contrary to the plain language of RCW

11.130.215(2), it abused its discretion by appointing the Hackers as guardians

without entering a finding that placement with Mulliken or Bradford would be

contrary to L.C.’s best interest. “We do not make findings of fact, and where the

superior court failed to enter sufficient findings, remand is the proper remedy.”

State v. P.M.P., 7 Wn. App. 2d 633, 645, 434 P.3d 1083 (2019); see also In re

Dependency of K.W., 199 Wn.2d 131, 161-62, 504 P.3d 207 (2022) (reversing

and remanding after determining trial court abused its discretion by failing to give

meaningful preference to relative placements requested by child, as required by

RCW 13.34.130(3)). Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and

remand this matter for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II.    Applicability of ICWA and WICWA

       The father asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the trial court

erred by not adhering to the dictates of the Indian Child Welfare Act of

1978 (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act

(WICWA). He contends that the trial court had reason to know L.C. was an

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No. 84755-4-I /11

Indian child because the records reviewed by the GAL referred to the

father having “Apache ancestry on his mother’s side.”

       ICWA and WICWA apply to all involuntary custody proceedings

“where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is

involved.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); see also RCW 13.38.070(1) (“In any

involuntary child custody proceeding seeking the foster care placement of,

or the termination of parental rights to, a child in which the petitioning party

or the court knows, or has reason to know, that the child is or may be an

Indian child as defined in this chapter . . . .”). “[A] court has a ‘reason to

know’ that a child is an Indian child when any participant in the proceeding

indicates that the child has tribal heritage.” In re Dependency of Z.J.G.,

196 Wn.2d 152, 175, 471 P.3d 853 (2020).

       From the time that the petition for guardianship was filed in March

2021 until July 2022, none of the parties to the proceeding ever mentioned

L.C. having tribal heritage. It was only on July 6, 2022—five days before

trial—when the GAL filed copies of reports from DCYF that there was

anything on record indicating that L.C. had tribal heritage. The DCYF

reports were not admitted as substantive evidence during the trial, and

there is no indication in the record that anyone called the reports to the

trial court’s attention. Furthermore, none of the witnesses, including the

father, testified during the trial that L.C. had tribal heritage. Because no

participant to the proceeding indicated that L.C. has tribal heritage, the

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No. 84755-4-I /12

trial court did not have reason to know that L.C. was an Indian child

subject to ICWA and WICWA based on the trial evidence.

       The father nevertheless asserts that the trial court violated its duty

to inquire about whether L.C. was an Indian child. The record is

insufficient for us to review this claim of error. 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a)

dictates that the trial court in a child custody proceeding must ask all

participants whether they know or have reason to know that the child is an

Indian child. This inquiry is to be “made at the commencement of the

proceeding and all responses should be on the record.” 25 C.F.R.

§ 23.107(a).

       After the Hackers filed a petition for an emergency guardianship

over L.C., the trial court conducted a hearing in which the Hackers and

Hotchkiss testified. While proceedings were ongoing, the Hackers filed for

multiple extensions of the emergency order, on which the court also

conducted hearings. The parents testified on the record at some of these

hearings. The parties did not provide this court with transcripts of any of

the pretrial hearings. Without those records, we cannot review the father’s

claim of error. See Bulzomi v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 72 Wn. App. 522,

525, 864 P.2d 996 (1994) (“An insufficient record on appeal precludes

review of the alleged errors.”).

                               CONCLUSION

       As to whether the trial court violated a duty to inquire whether L.C.

was an Indian child under ICWA and WICWA, we cannot review the

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No. 84755-4-I /13

father’s claim of error based on the designated record. 5 However, the trial

court abused its discretion by appointing the Hackers as guardians for

L.C. without making a finding that placement with either of the parents’

nominees for guardian, Mulliken or Bradford, would be contrary to L.C.’s

best interest. We therefore remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

 WE CONCUR:

       5 The father may re-raise the issue before the trial court on remand.

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