Court Opinion

ID: 9908288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:24.775284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.193928
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1188-MR

JOANNE ERWIN                                                          APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM ELLIOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 14-CI-00084

CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC;
CORRECT CARE-INTEGRATED
HEALTH, INC.; KENTUCKY
ATTORNEY GENERAL; KENTUCKY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
LITTLE SANDY CORRECTIONAL
COMPLEX; LADONNA H.
THOMPSON, COMMISSIONER; AND
WARDEN JOSEPH MEKO, OFFICIAL
AND PERSONAL CAPACITIES                                               APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Joanne Irwin (“Appellant”) appeals from the final

judgment of the Elliott Circuit Court dismissing her claims arising from the loss of
her security clearance as a nurse at a state prison facility and subsequent

termination from employment by her civilian employer. She argues that the circuit

court erred in dismissing her claims against her former employers, Correct Care-

Integrated Health, Inc. (“CCIH”) and Correct Care Solutions, LLC (“CCS”), as

well as those against the Kentucky Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and

Warden Joseph Meko. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the

judgment on appeal.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              CCIH, and its successor entity, CCS, had contracts with the DOC to

provide medical staff and healthcare to inmates at several correctional institutions

in the Commonwealth, including Little Sandy Correctional Complex (“LSCC”).

Meko was the Warden at LSCC at all relevant times. Appellant was a licensed

practical nurse employed by CCIH, and later CCS, who was assigned to work at

LSCC.1

              According to Appellant, Warden Meko approached her at LSCC in

February 2014, and struck up a brief conversation. She claims that he asked her

how things were going in the medical department and if she needed anything.

According to Appellant, Warden Meko then asked her if she would go out with

1
 CCIH’s contract with the DOC terminated in February, 2014, at which time CCS contracted
with the DOC to provide medical personnel and services. Appellant was employed first by
CCIH, then CCS after the transition.

                                            -2-
him after work for a drink some time. She claims that she replied, “no, thank you.”

Warden Meko denies that the conversation ever took place.

              After the alleged conversation, Appellant continued to work

uneventfully at LSCC for about two months. On April 16, 2014, Warden Meko

terminated Appellant’s security clearance based on three security infractions

Appellant committed in the workplace. These infractions included giving a “honey

bun” pastry to an inmate in October 2013; giving ChapStick2 to an inmate the

following month; and sometime thereafter, allowing an inmate to braid her hair.

Appellant does not dispute that these incidents occurred, and that she met with

Warden Meko in late 2013 to discuss them.

              Appellant’s clearance was required for the performance of her job

duties at LSCC. Appellant perceived that the termination of her clearance by

Warden Meko was retaliation for her declining to have a drink with him after work

some two months earlier. She would later claim that immediately after the

termination of her security clearance, she attempted to contact prison officials and

her employer, but that both declined to take her calls. Appellant’s employment

with CCS was subsequently terminated as she was unable to perform her job

2
 For purposes of this appeal, the commercial name “ChapStick” is used to describe the lip balm
Appellant gave to an inmate, which may not have been the ChapStick brand.

                                             -3-
requirements without the security clearance.3

                Thereafter, Appellant filed the instant action in Elliott Circuit Court

setting forth claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment; retaliation

(KRS4 344.280); intentional infliction of emotional distress; age discrimination;

conspiracy; and tortious interference with contract. She asserted that CCS and the

DOC were her joint employers, thus making CCS liable for the alleged wrongful

acts of Warden Meko.

                The matter proceeded in Elliott Circuit Court, resulting in protracted

litigation spanning several years. After discovery, the court determined that CCIH

was not Appellant’s employer at the time of her termination; that no proof was

adduced that CCS knew or should have known of Warden Meko’s alleged sexual

harassment; and that, without such knowledge, CCS could not be liable for such

misconduct or any retaliation based thereon. Accordingly, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of CCIH and CCS.

                In August 2021, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor

of Warden Meko on the claims of retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress/outrage. It reserved for later adjudication Appellant’s claim of tortious

3
  The February 2014 conversation occurred while Appellant was employed by CCIH. The
termination of her security clearance happened while she was employed by CCS.
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -4-
interference. In November 2021, it granted summary judgment in favor of Warden

Meko on the tortious interference claim. Finally, in August 2022, the circuit court

entered a final judgment dismissing all remaining claims and making final the

summary judgment in favor of CCS.

             As a basis for the interim and final judgments, the circuit court’s

analysis centered largely on the ChapStick, honey bun, and hair braiding incidents.

The court noted that after the ChapStick and honey bun incidents, LSCC Internal

Affairs investigated the matters and reported its findings to Warden Meko.

Thereafter, Warden Meko met with Appellant on or about November 22, 2013, to

discuss the matter. Warden Meko would later testify that he could have terminated

Appellant’s security clearance at any time based on the incidents, but chose not to

do so because he thought the matter had been resolved. It was and remains the

position of Warden Meko and the DOC that strict compliance is required regarding

the rules addressing employee contact with inmates, because even minor rules

violations can open the door to inmates gaining improper influence over staff

members.

             In its final judgment, the circuit court determined that the three

incidents did occur, and that Appellant admitted their occurrence. It also found

that the hair braiding incident occurred about one week prior to Appellant’s second

meeting with Warden Meko, at which time Appellant’s security clearance was

                                         -5-
terminated. The court concluded that these incidents formed a sufficient factual

basis for rebutting Appellant’s claim that the termination of her security clearance

was retaliatory. This appeal followed.

                          ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

              The Elliott Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of CCIH

based on its finding that CCIH was not Appellant’s employer at the time of her

termination from employment. The court also dismissed CCS from the proceeding

after concluding that CCS played no role in the sexual harassment, retaliation, and

other torts allegedly committed by Warden Meko and the DOC. Appellant now

argues that these rulings constitute reversible error. In support of this argument,

Appellant contends that because she performed the same or similar services for

each of the Appellees, she was a “joint employee” of CCIH, CCS, Warden Meko,

and the DOC from the time Warden Meko asked her out for drinks until her

termination from employment. The focus of her argument on this issue appears to

be that since Appellees effectively acted in concert at all relevant times, they are

jointly culpable for the civil wrongs she endured.

              Appellant directs our attention to two unpublished Kentucky

opinions,5 which she argues stand for the proposition that two employers may be

5
 Kentucky Integrated Electrical and Datacom v. Hussey, No. 2008-SC-000031-WC, 2008 WL
5051632 (Ky. Nov. 26, 2008), and Justice Cabinet, Department of Corrections v. Perkinson, No.
2020-CA-1023-MR, 2022 WL 16703114 (Ky. App. Nov. 4, 2022).

                                             -6-
liable for an injury to an individual who is under a contract with both employers,

and under their simultaneous control. In Hussey, the Kentucky Supreme Court

stated that,

               joint employment occurs when an employee is under
               contract to two employers, under their simultaneous
               control, and performing the same or closely-related
               services simultaneously for both. In such a case, both
               employers are liable for an injury that results from the
               employment. Dual employment occurs when an
               employee is under contract to two employers, under the
               separate control of each, performing largely unrelated
               services for each employer separately. In such a case, the
               employers are liable separately if the employee’s activity
               at the time of the injury is severable but liable jointly if
               the activity is not severable.

Hussey, 2008 WL 5051632, at *3.

               Appellant acknowledges that this issue is not preserved for appellate

review, as her trial counsel focused solely on the employer at the time of her

discharge from employment, i.e., CCS. Accordingly, she seeks a palpable error

review.

               Appellant’s argument centers on her contention that she was jointly

employed by CCIH, CCS, Warden Meko, and the DOC at all relevant times, and

that this joint employment brings with it joint culpability for the various torts

alleged. We have closely examined the record and the law on this issue, and are

not persuaded that Appellant was a “joint employee” per Hussey, supra.

                                           -7-
             The record demonstrates that Appellant’s employment with CCIH

began in 2012, at which time CCIH was under contract with the DOC to provide

medical services and personnel to various prison facilities in the Commonwealth.

CCIH’s contract lapsed on February 28, 2014, and CCS entered into a new contract

with the DOC the following day to provide the same or similar medical services

and personnel. Appellant began her employment with CCS when CCS contracted

with the DOC. Warden Meko allegedly asked Appellant to have a drink with him

some time in February, 2014, which was during Appellant’s employment with

CCIH.

             The Elliott Circuit Court found that Appellant was employed by CCIH

until the end of February, 2014, and then employed by CCS beginning March 1,

2014. We find no error in this conclusion. Nothing in the record demonstrates that

Appellant was “jointly employed” concurrently by CCIH, CCS, Warden Meko,

and the DOC. The record does not support a conclusion that Appellant was

employed under two or more simultaneous contracts with multiple employers.

Rather, all of the evidence demonstrates that Appellant was employed by CCIH

and then CCS during the terms of their respective contracts with the DOC.

             Further, Hussey and Perkinson are distinguishable from the instant

facts. In Hussey, a workers’ compensation case, the Kentucky Supreme Court

applied the joint employment doctrine to find joint liability where the plaintiff was

                                         -8-
under contract simultaneous with two employers. Appellant herein was never

employed simultaneously by CCIH and CCS, and was never employed at any time

by Warden Meko or the DOC.

             Perkinson is also distinguishable. In Perkinson, the plaintiff alleged

that the plaintiff’s employer, “CCS/Wellpath,” conspired with the DOC to create a

hostile and retaliatory work environment. On interlocutory appeal, the Kentucky

Supreme Court determined that the circuit court properly denied the DOC’s motion

to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim of retaliatory discharge based on sovereign

immunity. In the matter before us, nothing in the record shows a conspiracy

between CCIH and/or CCS and the DOC, and there are no immunity issues.

             We find no manifest injustice on this issue, and thus no palpable error.

See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 61.02; Fraley v. Rice-Fraley, 313

S.W.3d 635, 641 (Ky. App. 2010).

             Appellant’s second argument is that the Elliott Circuit Court erred in

dismissing the DOC and Warden Meko from the case based on the court’s finding

that neither the DOC nor Warden Meko were Appellant’s employers. This

argument largely mirrors Appellant’s first argument asserting joint employment

liability. In this second argument, however, Appellant seeks to establish employer

liability as to the DOC and Warden Meko in the context of her intentional

infliction of emotional distress, interference with contract, and retaliation claims.

                                          -9-
As noted above, however, the two unpublished Kentucky opinions relied on by

Appellant do not support her claim that the DOC and Warden Meko were her joint

employers for purposes of establishing employment liability. Nothing in the

record can reasonably be construed as demonstrating that the DOC and Warden

Meko were Appellant’s employers.

               Lastly, we will examine the Elliott Circuit Court’s disposition of

Appellant’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with

contract, and retaliation.6 On the intention infliction of emotional distress claim,

the court cited Osborne v Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 913-14 (Ky. 2000), which

provides that the wrongdoer’s conduct must be intentional or reckless; the conduct

must be so outrageous and intolerable that it offends general standards of decency

and morality; causation; and, resultant severe emotional distress. The Elliott

Circuit Court determined that Warden Meko asking Appellant out for a drink, if it

in fact occurred, was not so outrageous and intolerable as to cause severe

emotional distress. Similarly, the court determined that Warden Meko’s act of

terminating Appellant’s security clearance also did not offend general standards of

decency and morality so as to cause severe emotional distress. These conclusions

are supported by the record.

6
  The circuit court disposed of Appellant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and
retaliation claim by way of a summary judgment order rendered on August 31, 2021, which was
incorporated into the August 30, 2022 final judgment.

                                               -10-
             As to Appellant’s claim of tortious interference with contract,

in order to maintain a tortious interference with contract claim, a plaintiff must

prove the following elements:

             (1) the existence of a contract; (2) [the defendant’s]
             knowledge of the contract; (3) that [the defendant]
             intended to cause a breach of that contract; (4) that [the
             defendant’s] actions did indeed cause a breach; (5) that
             damages resulted to [the plaintiff], and (6) that [the
             defendant] had no privilege or justification to excuse its
             conduct.

Snow Pallet, Inc. v. Monticello Banking Co., 367 S.W.3d 1, 5-6 (Ky. App. 2012)

(citation omitted).

             In considering this issue, the circuit court examined the three separate

incidents which occurred prior to the revocation of Appellant’s security clearance:

the giving of ChapStick to an inmate; the purchase of a honey bun for an inmate;

and allowing an inmate to braid Appellant’s hair. Though Appellant sought to

characterize these incidents as either necessary or harmless, she did not dispute that

they occurred. It is further undisputed that these incidents violated various

provisions of the Corrections Policies and Procedures manual, which bar prison

personnel from receiving or giving a gift to an offender, or from touching an

offender outside the scope of what is reasonably necessary for the performance of

one’s duties. Further, former DOC Commissioner LaDonna Thompson testified as

                                         -11-
to the necessity of these rules, which are aimed in part at preventing inmates from

forming improper relationships with prison staff.

             Based on the totality of the record, including Appellant’s

acknowledgement that each incident occurred, we conclude that the Elliott Circuit

Court properly determined that the claim of tortious interference with contract

could not prevail if the matter proceeded to trial. Appellant could not prove every

element of Snow Pallet, Inc., supra, particularly the last element requiring proof

that Warden Meko was not justified in terminating Appellant’s security clearance.

             Lastly, Appellant argues that she was entitled to move forward on her

claim of retaliation brought pursuant to KRS 344.280. To establish a prima facie

case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must show that 1) she engaged in an

activity protected by KRS Chapter 344; 2) that the exercise of her civil rights was

known by the defendant; 3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse

to the plaintiff; and 4) that there was a causal connection between the protected

activity and the adverse employment action. Lindsey v. Board of Trustees of

University of Kentucky, 552 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Ky. App. 2018).

             The Elliott Circuit Court first noted that, while KRS Chapter 344 does

not expressly require proof that the alleged wrongdoer was a supervisor or

employer, this requirement is implicit in the myriad of cases that the circuit court

examined because only supervisors or employers can take adverse employment

                                         -12-
action. Further, the circuit court found that even if KRS Chapter 344 applied to

Warden Meko, Appellant could not prove that she engaged in a protected activity

per the statute; that Warden Meko engaged in an adverse employment action; nor,

that there was any causal connection between a protected activity and an adverse

employment action.

             Appellant seeks palpable error review on these issues. Again, we find

no manifest injustice on these issues and thus no palpable error. CR 61.02;

Fraley, supra. We also agree with the circuit court that even if KRS Chapter 344

applied to the DOC or Warden Meko, Appellant could not prove every element of

the statute if the matter proceeded to trial. Accordingly, we find no error.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the August 30, 2022 judgment of

the Elliott Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -13-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                          DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Paul Croushore            AND JOSEPH MEKO:
Cincinnati, Ohio
                          Edward A. Baylous II
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CORRECT
                          CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC:

                          Kathleen B. Wright
                          Griffin Terry Sumner
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                          CORRECTCARE-INTEGRATED
                          HEALTH, INC.:

                          Kristeena L. Johnson
                          Lexington, Kentucky

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