Court Opinion

ID: 9740383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:34:13.661825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.004249
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: While I agree with the plurality’s determination that the meaning of the phrase “defendants sued by the plaintiff’ is unclear, I disagree with its conclusion that an examination of the statute as a whole fails to clarify that meaning. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the plurality opinion. As this court recently noted in People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007): “The principles guiding our analysis are well established. Our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, the surest and most reliable indicator of which is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” See also Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Nonetheless, “ ‘[w]e do not view words and phrases in isolation but consider them in light of other relevant provisions of the statute.’ ” People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008), quoting People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 252-53 (2005). See also Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007). Here, an examination of the statute as a whole aids in the construction of the critical statutory phrase. The first sentence of section 2 — 1117 provides: “Except as provided in Section 2 — 1118, in actions on account of bodily injury or death or physical damage to property, based on negligence, or product liability based on strict tort liability, all defendants found liable are jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs past and future medical and medically related expenses.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1117. In this sentence, the legislature limits the statute’s scope to specific categories of tort actions. Only those “defendants found liable” “in” the specified actions are implicated. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1117. The legislature’s decision to limit section 2 — 1117’s application only to defendants in the specified categories of actions strongly suggests that the statute was intended to include only those defendants who remained “in” the action when liability was determined. Under the express language of the first sentence of section 2 — 1117, former defendants who are not parties in the specified tort action when liability is determined are not subject to joint and several liability for a plaintiffs medical expenses. The reach of the second and third sentences of section 2 — 1117 is similarly limited to the types of actions noted in the first sentence. Therefore, the same limitation on the procedural status of the defendants subject to liability also applies to the final two sentences in the statute. In other words, those two sentences apply only in the same type of actions listed in the first sentence. They do not apply to other categories of legal actions. A comparison of words used in all three sentences in section 2 — 1117 is instructive. The second and third sentences state: “Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is less than 25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally liable for all other damages. Any defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1117. A comparison with the first sentence reveals that the legislature repeats the word “defendants” throughout the provision. Nothing in the statute indicates that the legislature intended the word “defendants” to have a different meaning in the second and third sentences than it has in the first sentence. Accordingly, the language chosen by the legislature in all three sentences appears to include in the allocation of fault for liability purposes only those “defendants” who remain “in” the tort action until verdict. This interpretation also comports with the ordinary meaning of the word “defendant.” In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, a “defendant” is defined as “a person required to make answer in an action or suit in law or equity or in a criminal action.” (Emphasis added.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 591 (1981).3 Under this definition, a “defendant” must answer and defend against claims made in a legal action and must, therefore, be a party in the lawsuit. Thus, under this definition, the need for opposition “in an action or suit in law or equity” establishes the adversarial nature of the relationship required between the plaintiff and any defendant in the action who is included in the apportionment of fault. This same adversarial relationship is expressly required by the first sentence of section 2 — 1117, where all defendants found liable “in” the specified tort actions are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s medical expenses. Additionally, construction of section 2 — 1117 comports with the use of the word “defendant” as a legal term of art. In Black’s Law Dictionary, a “defendant” is defined as “[t]he person defending or denying; the party against whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit or the accused in a criminal case.” (Emphases added.) Black’s Law Dictionary 377 (5th ed. 1979). Applying this definition, a settled tortfeasor who has been dismissed from the lawsuit is no longer “defending or denying” and is no longer a “party against whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit.” (Emphasis added.) Notably, the legislature chose to limit the allocation of fault to only three types of parties: “the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1117. By expressly creating three categories for the allocation of fault within the specified tort actions, the legislature signaled that fault should be apportioned only among those parties. The legislature did not choose to create a fourth category for “former defendants” or “settled defendants.” Under the plain meaning of the relevant words, the absence of that express category signals the legislature’s intent to exclude persons or entities no longer engaged in an active plaintiff-defendant relationship at the time of fault allocation. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 151-52 (1997) (“Where a statute lists the things to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions should be understood as exclusions”). Therefore, I wholeheartedly agree with the plurality’s conclusion that section 2 — 1117 does not permit the allocation of fault to settling defendants that have been dismissed from the lawsuit. This conclusion is consistent with our statements in Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64 (2002), even though that case is not directly on point. In Unzicker, this court determined that the language of section 2 — 1117 demonstrated the legislature’s intent to determine tort liability by dividing responsibility among “those people in the suit *** who might have been responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Emphasis added.) Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 78-79, 80. Although Unzicker was superceded by statute, the 2003 amendments did not affect the statutory language at issue in this case, and Unzicker is still applicable to the 1986 version of section 2 — 1117. The statutory analysis in Unzicker is instructive here. In Unzicker, we noted that in enacting the 1986 version of section 2 — 1117, “the legislature referred to a division of fault among the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third-party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff.” Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 77. As this court recognized in Unzicker, in apportioning responsibility under section 2 — 1117, “the legislature looked to those people in the suit.” (Emphasis added.) Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 78. Unzicker explained that “the party must already have been brought into the case by a defendant for that party to be included in the division of fault.” Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 78. Our decision in Unzicker, therefore, is consistent with the plurality’s current, de novo, interpretation of section 2 — 1117, holding that the legislature intended to divide responsibility only among those parties in the suit, not among those that have been dismissed. For the reasons stated, I specially concur in the plurality’s decision.  When citing dictionary definitions, I use the edition in effect at the time the statute was enacted to reflect most accurately the intent of the legislature.