Court Opinion

ID: 9790687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:57:36.082171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.981742
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Smith was charged with conspiring to intimidate a witness in the discharge of that witness’ duty.1 The district court, in effect, instructed the jury that the State was not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim of the assault was a witness in the discharge of his duty. The State is required to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596 (Wyo.1993); Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 451 (Wyo.1993); and see Blakely v. State, 474 P.2d 127 (Wyo.1970); State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119 (1947). The jury was required to have found, under proper instructions, that the actions of Smith constituted intimidation of a witness in that witness’ discharge of his duties. Unfortunately that is not what the jury was instructed to do.
I agree that Smith’s actions were reprehensible and that he was likely guilty of the crime charged. That, however, is not the test we apply in these circumstances on appeal. Smith was entitled by one of the most fundamental of our constitutional rights to have the jury decide his guilt. Here the jury decided his guilt in part, and the other part was directed by the trial court. I have searched in vain for even the most slender thread of authority which might countenance such an occurrence. I can find none. I, therefore, would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

. Wyoming Statutes 6-l-303(a) and 6-5-305 (1988).