Court Opinion

ID: 9901281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 16:16:06.702057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:29.942834
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges O’Brien, AtLee and Malveaux
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              MISHON MICHAEL TARPLEY
                                                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1364-22-1                                 JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
                                                                              NOVEMBER 21, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                           FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
                                          Matthew W. Hoffman, Judge

                             Richard G. Hallenback, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                             Suzanne Seidel Richmond, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                             Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following conditional guilty pleas, the circuit court convicted Mishon Michael Tarpley of

              possessing a controlled substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-250, and possessing a firearm

              simultaneously with a controlled substance, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(B). Tarpley’s

              guilty pleas were conditioned on his right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to suppress

              evidence obtained after a traffic stop, which he claims violated the Fourth Amendment.1 Finding

              no error, we affirm the convictions.

                                                      BACKGROUND

                     “On review of the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most

              favorable to the Commonwealth.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 737, 741 (2006).

              “[W]hen a defendant challenges the denial of a motion to suppress, he has the burden to show

                     * This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       Judge Gary A. Mills presided at the hearing on Tarpley’s motion to suppress and
              entered the order denying the motion.
that the trial court’s ruling constituted reversible error.” Id. at 745. “Since the constitutionality

of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment involves questions of law and fact, we give

deference to the factual findings of the trial court but independently decide whether, under the

applicable law, the manner in which the challenged evidence was obtained satisfies

constitutional requirements.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672 (2004).

       While on patrol the night of March 9, 2020, Officer Andrew Gohn of the Newport News

police observed a Mercedes sedan being operated with rear and rear side windows that appeared

to be tinted “darker than legal” and with a license plate holder that obscured the top portion of

the word “Virginia” on the license plate.2 Based on these observations, Officer Gohn stopped

the vehicle; Tarpley was the driver. When Officer Gohn approached, he noticed a strong odor of

marijuana coming from the vehicle. After another officer arrived, Officer Gohn ordered Tarpley

out of the vehicle and advised that the officers were detaining him for a narcotics investigation.

Tarpley responded that he had “a little bit of weed” in his pocket but no narcotics. The officer

placed Tarpley in handcuffs and informed him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436 (1966). When searching Tarpley, the police found marijuana and cocaine. The police

discovered more marijuana and cocaine, a digital scale, and a firearm in the car.

       Officer Gohn tested the rear side windows of Tarpley’s car and found that the tinting was

within legal limits. In addition, the rear window was obscured by a sunshade, which made the

window appear darker than it actually was.

       The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Officer Gohn was justified in

stopping Tarpley’s car based on his observations of possible illegal tint to the car’s windows and

       2
         At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth introduced photographs of the license
plate and the holder that surrounded it.
                                             -2-
the license plate holder that partially obscured the license plate. The court subsequently accepted

Tarpley’s conditional guilty pleas and convicted him of the two offenses now on appeal.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Tarpley argues the court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the traffic stop

violated the Fourth Amendment. He claims that Officer Gohn’s reasons for making the stop—

the perceived illegal window tint and partially obscured license plate—did not amount to a

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.3

       The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“A traffic stop is a ‘“seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted in

accordance with the Fourth Amendment.’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 375, 380

(2019) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)). “To justify the traffic stop, an

officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped committed a crime or traffic

violation.” Id.; see McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553 (2008). Reasonable suspicion

requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000). “Reasonableness

is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of

split-second decisions and without regard to the officer’s intent or motivation.” Thompson v.

Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727

(1995)).

       “To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some

mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in

       3
         Tarpley does not contend that any of the police officers’ actions after the stop violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, we limit our consideration to the lawfulness of the stop
itself.
                                               -3-
the community’s protection.’” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60-61 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338

U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). “[R]easonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken understanding of the

scope of a legal prohibition.” Id. at 60. “[T]hose mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be

objectively reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer

involved.” Id. at 66. “In determining whether a police officer had a particularized and objective

basis for suspecting that a person stopped may be involved in criminal activity, a court must

consider the totality of circumstances.” Parker v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 96, 104 (1998).

       Code § 46.2-716(B) makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle with the license plate

hidden or obscured. Specifically, the statute prohibits any bracket, frame, or holder for the

license plate that “in any way alters or obscures . . . the name or abbreviated name of the state

wherein the vehicle is registered.” Code § 46.2-716(B)(iii). Code § 46.2-1052(B) prohibits

operating a motor vehicle with any “tinted film, sun-shading material, or other colored material”

on the rear or rear side windows in excess of that permitted by statute.4

       The court determined that the traffic stop was justified by reasonable, articulable

suspicion of criminal activity. The record supports this determination. Officer Gohn testified

that he observed Tarpley’s vehicle with rear and rear side window tinting that appeared “darker

than legal” and a license plate border obstructing the word “Virginia.” Photographic evidence

confirmed that the license plate frame partially obstructed the word “Virginia” on the plate. The

degree of obstruction is not relevant here, as the statute prohibits driving with a license plate

frame that “in any way alters or obscures” a state’s name on the license plate, Code

       4
         Code § 46.2-1052 was subsequently amended to prohibit traffic stops based on a
suspected window tint violation and to preclude admission of evidence obtained during such a
stop. See 2020 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I ch. 45. The court rejected Tarpley’s argument that the
amended version of the statute applied retroactively, and he does not challenge that ruling on
appeal.
                                               -4-
§ 46.2-716(B) (emphasis added), and “reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken understanding

of the scope of a legal prohibition,” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60.

       Similarly, the fact that Tarpley’s windows did not violate the tinting statute does not

negate the court’s finding that the stop was objectively reasonable. Code § 46.2-1052 regulates

window tinting according to percentages of “light transmittance.” It would be unreasonable to

require police to determine the tinting percentage of a window before stopping a vehicle to

investigate a violation—especially when, as here, the traffic stop occurred at night and one

window was obscured by a sunshade. See Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 371 (2016)

(holding that a police officer’s observation of a parking pass hanging from a rear-view mirror

produced reasonable suspicion of violating an obstruction-of-view statute and noting the “virtual

impossibility of determining” a violation while the car is in motion); see also Prunty v.

Commonwealth, No. 2074-00-1, slip op. at 9, 2001 WL 747731, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. July 3,

2001) (holding that reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to know “the precise amount

of [window] tinting allowable by law” before making a traffic stop to investigate a possible

violation).5 Here, the record reflects that Officer Gohn’s observations produced more than a

“hunch” that Tarpley’s car had illegal window tinting. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

       Based on the objective facts and circumstances presented by the Commonwealth, it was

reasonable for an officer in Officer Gohn’s position to suspect that Tarpley was operating a

vehicle with equipment violations; thus the officer was justified in stopping Tarpley. Because

the police did not seize Tarpley in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, the circuit court did

not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

       5
          “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
their persuasive value.” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012); see Rule
5A:1(f).
                                              -5-