Court Opinion

ID: 9658581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:05:09.069187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:56.838605
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This case is a termination case as the facts clearly indicate and the majority concedes (Majority op. at 673). The school district was required, therefore, to follow the procedures mandated by the continuing contract statute, Minn.Stat. § 125.12 (1988) in terminating Dokmo’s employment. Since the school district failed to follow statutory termination procedures, it cannot now argue that Dokmo waived her rights by failing to seek review via writ of certio-rari to the court of appeals. Strand v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 392 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Minn.1986) (propriety of teacher terminations pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 125.17.)1 In effect, the school district argues dichotomous positions: on the one hand, that it did not terminate Dokmo, so it was not required to follow statutory termination procedures, and on the other hand, that it did terminate Dokmo, so she could only challenge its action by writ of certiora-ri. To allow the school district to have it both ways is unfair and not in accordance with law.
It is necessary to expand on the facts presented by the majority to determine the appropriateness of the relief sought in this case. The majority believes the 60-day limitations period began running on April 16,1987, when the school district sent Dok-mo a letter stating the school board had “accepted her resignation” on April 13, 1987. The school district’s course of conduct, however, was arguably equivocal. The school district first asserted, in a March 13, 1987 letter, that Dokmo was ineligible for reinstatement because she had been employed as a “teacher” during her leave. Yet it did not contact the LeSu-eur school district to ascertain whether Dokmo had been employed as a “teacher,” “substitute teacher,” or in any capacity, until March 25, 1987, the same day it informed Dokmo she had been employed as a “teacher.” Moreover, even before obtaining information on Dokmo’s employment status in LeSueur, the district’s personnel department signed Dokmo’s “Resignation Form” on March 17, 1987.
Dokmo and the school district continued to discuss Dokmo’s tenure after the April 16 letter. On July 18, 1987, Dokmo wrote the school district, requesting time to obtain new counsel before meeting with district representatives. Some time in early August 1987, Dokmo and her new attorney met with school district representatives. According to Dokmo, “There was no decision of any kind made at the meeting, however, information was exchanged.” Shortly thereafter, on August 15, 1987, Dokmo received a standard “welcome back” letter from the district for the 1987-88 school year. When Dokmo called the district, it informed her the letter had been sent out in error. Under these facts, a strong argument can be made that even were there a 60-day limitations period, it did not begin running on April 13 or 16, 1987.
Our cases do, indeed, make clear that the preferred and usual method of review of school board actions is by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals. This case illustrates, however, that the school district, in actuality, controls whether certiorari is the proper remedy in any given situation. Where, as here, the school district fails to provide a vehicle by which a proper remedy may be pursued, the school district is es-topped to complain about the remedy chosen by the teacher. Although the majority articulates legitimate concerns for the expeditious review of school board decisions, it fails to acknowledge the school board’s own failure to comply with the law.
*679The majority states that “[t]his court’s longstanding rule and repeated holding has been the proper and only method of appealing school board decisions on teacher related matters is by writ of certiorari.” (Majority op. at 673). In fact, this court has for many years reviewed actions brought by teachers in the form of declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Sherek v. Independent School Dist. No. 699, Gilbert, Minnesota, 449 N.W.2d 434 (Minn.1990) (Brief for Appellant at A-11, C8-88-1284); Berland v. Special School Dist. No. 1, Minneapolis, 314 N.W.2d 809 (Minn.1982); Downing v. Independent School Dist. No. 9, Itasca County, 207 Minn. 292, 291 N.W. 613 (1940). The issue of the appropriate method of review of school board actions was not before this court in Harms v. Independent School Dist. No. 300, La-Crescent, 450 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Minn.1990). The issue was neither raised nor argued by the parties and any comments by this court were dicta.
The issue involved in the case before us presents a question of law, not a question of fact, and was framed as such by Dokmo in her complaint. Dokmo prayed the court “For a declaratory judgment * * * that plaintiff is a substitute teacher within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 125.60, subd. 6a.” (Emphasis supplied.) The term “substitute teacher” is not defined in Chapter 123 or 125 and its meaning is crucial to whether or not Dokmo was entitled to reinstatement under Minn.Stat. § 125.60, subds. 3 & 6a. Minn.Stat. § 555.01 (1988) states, “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is remedial and should be liberally construed and administered. Minn.Stat. § 555.12 (1988). “[A] declaratory judgment action is an appropriate method for obtaining a judicial interpretation of statutes.” In the Matter of the Welfare of K.S., 427 N.W.2d 653, 657-58 (Minn.1988). Dokmo asked the district court to determine whether she had been a substitute teacher within the meaning of the statute. This is precisely the type of issue that was before the court in Welfare of K.S. See 427 N.W.2d at 658. Furthermore, this court has previously reviewed a declaratory judgment action brought by a teacher to determine her status and rights under her contract with the school district after she was terminated. See, e.g., Downing v. Independent School Dist. No. 9, 207 Minn. 292, 291 N.W. 613 (1940). I would hold, therefore, that Dokmo correctly proceeded by bringing a declaratory judgment action in district court and would affirm the court of appeals.
The majority, because of its holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, did not reach the issue of whether Dokmo is entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 125.60, subd. 3. I would reach that issue and hold that Dok-mo is entitled to reinstatement.
Minnesota Statutes §§ 125.60, subdivision 6a, and 123.35, subdivision 5, must be read together to determine whether Dokmo is entitled to reinstatement after her return from the extended leave of absence. Section 125.60, subdivision 6a, creates an exception for substitute teachers, and section 123.35, subdivision 5, recognizes that an individual may be employed as a substitute teacher for longer than one year: Section 126.60, subdivision 6a, provides:
No school board shall be obligated to reinstate a teacher who takes a full-time or part-time position as a teacher in another Minnesota school district while on an extended leave of absence pursuant to this section. This subdivision shall not apply to a teacher who is employed as a substitute teacher.
Minn.Stat. § 123.35, subd. 5, states in part, “The board shall not hire a substitute teacher except: (a) For a duration of time of less than one school year to replace a regular teacher who is absent; or (b) For a duration of time equal to or greater than one school year to replace a regular teacher on a leave of absence.”
Dokmo replaced a teacher on a leave of absence for a duration of time equal to or greater than one school year. Each year for four years, Dokmo signed a one year contract from which the “duration” provi*680sions had been deleted. In addition, the contracts she executed in 1985 and 1986 inserted provisions indicating Dokmo was contracting to serve “as a substitute teacher * * * in a vacancy occurring as a result of an extended maternity leave.” Under these provisions, Dokmo was employed as a substitute teacher and would be entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 125.60.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, it is necessary to resolve the issue of whether a teacher may voluntarily waive continuing contract rights under Minn.Stat. §§ 123.35 and 125.12 in order to preserve a reinstatement right under section 125.60. The school district contends Dokmo could not be considered a substitute teacher after her first year in LeSueur because Minn. Stat. § 123.35, subd. 5 (1988), operated to automatically convert her to “teacher” status.
The predominant purpose of teacher tenure law is to provide “stability, certainty, and permanency of employment on the part of those who [have] shown by educational attainment and probationary trial their fitness for the teaching profession.” Minneapolis Fed’n of Teachers, Local 59 v. Minneapolis Special School Dist. No. 1, 270 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Minn.1978) (citation and emphasis omitted). In light of this legislative policy, the waiver of continuing contract rights should be exercised only with caution and due care. The use of substitute teaching contracts may not be abused to coerce teachers to disclaim the right of tenure long guaranteed by statute. Perry v. Independent School Dist. No. 696, 297 Minn. 197, 201, 210 N.W.2d 283, 286 (1973). If there is no abuse, and I find none in this case, waiver may be validly exercised.
To be valid, “Contractual waiver of statutory tenure rights must be knowing and voluntary * * * and will not be upheld where the teacher had no choice in contract terms.” Rochester Educ. Ass’n v. Independent School Dist. No. 535, 271 N.W.2d 311, 315 n. 6 (Minn.1978); See also State ex rel. Johnson v. Independent School Dist. No. 810, Wabasha County, 260 Minn. 237, 246, 109 N.W.2d 596, 602 (1961). Under the facts of this case, I would uphold respondent’s waiver of her rights under Minn.Stat. §§ 123.35 and 125.12 as clear and voluntary. Dokmo knew she would be replacing a teacher who would be returning for the next school year. Dokmo also knew that she had continuing contract rights in Anoka-Hennepin when waiving eligibility for those rights in LeSueur.
I would therefore affirm the court of appeals and hold that respondent is entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 125.60, subd. 3.

. In Strand the school district followed the notice and hearing requirements of the Teacher Tenure Act. 392 N.W.2d 881, C4-84-1466, App. Brief at 1 and 5.