Court Opinion

ID: 9875439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:33:47.838673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:00.973500
License: Public Domain

Crothers, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 38] The majority reaches a conclusion plausibly supported by breadcrumbs from the United States Supreme Court’s cases regarding alcohol-impaired transportation operators. But, even if the majority opinion is plausible and understandable, I respectfully dissent because I think an incorrect conclusion has been reached.
[¶ 39] My view of the correct answer in this case has a simple but incomplete explanation, and a long, complex and somewhat meandering explanation. I will attempt to articulate both. What I will not articulate is the approach suggested by the special concurrence, which was neither briefed nor argued by the parties.
The Short Answer
[¶ 40] The short, albeit incomplete, answer is that the onsite screening is an unlawful search without a warrant or the application of a recognized warrant exception. The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed that “our cases establish that the taking of a blood sample or the administration of a breath test is a search.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2173, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616-617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966)). The Court in Birch-field also held “the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving.” Id. at 2184. The Court specifically focused on searches incident to arrest and did not hold that warrantless breath tests could be constitutionally obtained under any other exception.
[¶41] For post-arrest chemical testing, North Dakota used the Intoxilyzer 8000 breath testing device during events pertinent to this case. See North Dakota Attorney General, Breath Alcohol Approved Chemical Testing Devices (July 1, 2014), https://attomeygeneral.nd.gov/sites/ag/ *899files/documents/Crlme-Labl/2-BreathAlco holProgram/ApprovedDevices/20U/07-01-lJhpdf. By statute, the use of Intoxilyzer machines for blood-alcohol level analysis is limited to post-arrest searches. N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(2) (“The test or tests must be administered at the direction of law enforcement officer only after placing the individual ... under arrest”). Of course, “[a]n arrest must be supported by probable cause.” City of Devils Lake v. Grove, 2008 ND 155, ¶ 11, 755 N.W.2d 485.
[¶42] For pre-arrest onsite screening testing, North Dakota used the Intoxilyzer S-D5 and Alco-Sensor breath testing devices during events pertinent to this case. See North Dakota Attorney General, Approved Method for Operating the Intoxi-lyzer S-D5 (July 1, 2008), https://atto meygeneral.nd.gov/sites/aglfilesld ocuments/Crime-Labl/2-BreathAlcohol Program/ApprovedMethods/IntoxS-D5/0 7-01-08.pdf and Approved Method for Operating the Alco-Sensor FST (Oct. 1, 2012), https://attorney general, nd.gov/sites/ ag/flles/documents/Crime-Labl/2-Breath AlcoholProgram/ApprovedMethods/Alco-SensorFSTApprovedMethod/10-01-12.pdf.
[¶43] Here, Barrios-Flores refused to take an onsite screening test which, like the Intoxilyzer, measures blood alcohol levels from a breath sample. See N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1). But unlike the Intoxilyzer, the onsite screening test is administered only before arrest and only to obtain probable cause to arrest or decide if additional tests should be requested. Id.; Fossum v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 2014 ND 47, ¶ 19, 843 N.W.2d 282 (“On-site screening tests are not admissible to establish blood alcohol content for purposes beyond probable cause to arrest and require further testing.”). Also significant is that the onsite screening test can be administered by law enforcement on less than probable cause. North Dakota law allows law enforcement to demand an onsite screening test if they have reason to believe the driver committed a traffic violation or had a vehicular accident, and the officer has formulated an opinion that the driver’s body contains alcohol. Our cases describe this level of proof as reasonable suspicion. State v. Baxter, 2015 ND 107, ¶10, 863 N.W.2d 208. Of course, reasonable suspicion requires a lesser quantum of evidence than probable cause. We have explained the difference as follows:
“Probable cause to arrest is different from reasonable suspicion to stop. An officer has ‘reasonable suspicion’ to stop a motor vehicle if the officer can point to ‘some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’ Salter [v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp.], 505 N.W.2d [111] at 114 [N.D.1993]. Probable cause to arrest, however, requires more: it exists when ‘the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.’ ”
Moran v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 767, 770 (ND 1996).
[¶ 44] Under the United States Supreme Court analysis in Birchfleld, I believe reasonable suspicion is an impermissibly low bar to conduct any warrantless search of a driver’s breath. This conclusion is especially true since the virtually identical intrusion of a post-arrest Intoxilyzer test was justified in Birchfleld as a search incident to arrest. As a result of Birchfleld, I would overrule State v. Baxter, 2015 ND 107, 863 N.W.2d 208, State v. Baxter, 2016 ND 181, 885 N.W.2d 64, and hold the onsite screening test cannot be demanded under *900N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, absent probable cause or a DUI-related arrest.2
The Long Answer
[¶ 45] The United States Supreme Court’s holdings in DUI enforcement cases are inconsistent and unclear. Its decades of inconsistent legal theories and unclear direction have made state conformance with its constitutional rulings impossible. The pending case irrefutably makes my point.
[IT 46] A few important concepts are clear and have been consistently applied. Courts long have recognized that a search occurs when the state administers blood or breath tests to determine blood alcohol concentrations. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (“It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent does not, argue, that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of ‘persons,’ and depend anteced-ently upon seizures of ‘persons,’ within the meaning of that Amendment.”). Also well established is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted).
[¶47] Examination of Supreme Court opinions from 1966 to 2016 shows that continuity of DUI cases largely ended with these bedrock pronouncements. Schmerber was arrested for driving under the influence. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758, 86 S.Ct. 1826. His blood was drawn at the direction of a police officer while at a hospital where Schmerber was being treated for injuries from an automobile accident. Id. One of the questions in Schmerber was whether a warrant was required to involuntarily draw and test blood from a seemingly intoxicated driver. Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. In the Schmerber Court’s words, “The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed, that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’ ” 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation omitted). The Schmerber decision long was read as standing for the proposition ■ that DUI blood and breath tests were exempt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement due to the exigency of alcohol being naturally eliminated from the body after a driver stopped drinking. See State v. Morales, 2015 ND 230, ¶12, 869 N.W.2d 417 (Schmerber permitted warrantless blood draw as justified by exigent circumstances). Schmerber also was read to permit law enforcement to involuntarily secure evidence of blood-alcohol content as á search incident to arrest. See State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601, 604 (N.D. 1985) (“A sample of Kimball’s blood could properly be taken as a search incident to his arrest, notwithstanding his lack of consent or objection, if two conditions set forth in *901Schmerber v. California, supra were met.”).
[¶ 48] These readings of law enforcement’s authority under Schmerber were not limited to state courts; the United States Supreme Court itself joined in the view. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 and 563, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (“Schmerber, then, clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test” and “respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the [blood alcohol] test”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 625, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (in Schmerber “we held that a State could direct that a blood sample be withdrawn from a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated, despite his refusal to consent to the intrusion.”). Yet, without reversing or modifying its own interpretations of Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court retreated from the position (and chastised the Missouri courts for following their earlier descriptions of Schmerber’s scope). See Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1568, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (“Here and in its own courts the State based its case on an insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect.”). McNeely will be considered more deeply below.
[¶ 49] After Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court held in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18-19, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), that due process was not violated when a state enforced its implied consent law by summarily suspending a driver’s license for refusal to take a breath analysis test. The Court reached its ruling after noting the state’s “interest in public safety is substantially served by the summary suspension of those who. refuse in several ways to take a breath-analysis test, upon arrest.” Id. at 18, 99 S.Ct. 2612. The Court further noted:
“A state plainly has the right to offer incentives for taking a test that provides the most reliable form of' evidence of intoxication for use in subsequent proceedings. Indeed, in many cases, the test results could lead to. prompt release of the driver with no charge being made on the ‘drunken driving’ issue. And, in exercising its police powers, the Commonwealth is not required by the Due Process Clause to adopt an ‘all or nothing’ approach to the acute safety hazards posed by drunken drivers.”
Id. at 19, 99 S.Ct. 2612. The Court concluded, “the compelling interest in highway safety justifies [Massachusetts] in making a summary suspension effective pending the outcome of the prompt postsuspension hearing available.” Id.
[¶ 50] In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Court heard a challenge to the evidentiary use of .a driver’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test for which he had impliedly consented. Id. at 554, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Neville case involved a driver claiming both-Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment due process violations.
[¶ 51] The Fifth Amendment question was whether admission of a driver’s refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court held that the privilege was not violated, reasoning “the values behind the Fifth Amendment are .not hindered when the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the blood-alcohol test or having his refusal used against him.” Id. at *902563, 103 S.Ct. 916. As justification for the holding, the Court recognized that states were combating the “carnage caused by drunk drivers” by enacting implied consent laws for chemical testing. Id. at 558, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Court recognized that part of the states’ arsenal being used to stop drinkers from driving was enactment of implied consent laws declaring that by operating a vehicle drivers have “deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving while intoxicated.” Id. at 559, 103 S.Ct. 916.
[¶ 52] The driver in Neville also claimed his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by admission into evidence of his refusal to take the blood-alcohol test because he was not warned of the consequences of refusal. Id. at 564-65, 103 S.Ct. 916. Relying on its then-current reading of Schmerber that “the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test.” Id. at 563, 103 S.Ct. 916. The Court held that a South Dakota driver’s “right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota legislature.” Id. at 565, 103 S.Ct. 916. As a result, the Court held it was not “fundamentally unfair for South Dakota to use the refusal to take the test as evidence of guilt, even though respondent was not specifically warned that his refusal could be used against him at trial.” Id.
[¶ 53] In another 1983 decision the United States Supreme Court upheld Illinois’ implied consent law procedure for drivers license suspensions. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77 L.Ed.2d 1267 (1983). The Court held, “the Constitution does not require arresting officers in Illinois, in enforcing that state’s implied consent statute, to recite in an affidavit the specific and concrete evidentiary matters constituting ‘the underlying circumstances which provided him with a reasonable belief that the arrested person was driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.’ ” Id. at 1119, 103 S.Ct. 3513 (citation omitted). Reaching this conclusion, the Court cited Neville and Mackey regarding -the state’s interest in using implied consent and drivers license revocation as a means of reducing “carnage” caused by intoxicated drivers. Id. at 1118, 103 S.Ct. 3513.
[¶ 54] In 1987 the Court held that chemical testing of railroad operators presented a “special need” allowing warrant-less chemical testing for alcohol outside of the normal Fourth Amendment requirement. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 620, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). The Court previously recognized a Fourth Amendment exception based on the special needs in probation searches, searches of highly-regulated businesses, work-related searches of employees’ desks and offices, search of student property by school officials and searches of prison inmates. Id. at 619-20, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
[¶ 55] The laws challenged in Skinner were federal regulations rather than state implied consent laws for motorists. In Skinner the regulations required blood and urine testing of railroad crew members after most injury or property damage incidents, and permitted crew breath and urine testing when railroads suspected an employee was impaired. Id. at 609-611, 109 S.Ct. 1402. Despite the difference in legal origin, the Court reaffirmed “that the collection and subsequent analysis of the requisite biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches.” Id. at 618, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The Court noted, “[t]he Government’s interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety ... presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify *903departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements.” Id. at 620, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 56] The Court in Skinner next examined “whether the Government’s need to monitor compliance with these restrictions justifies the privacy intrusions at issue absent a warrant or individualized suspicion.” Id. at 621, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The Court answered the question in the shadow of Schmerber, stating “alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate ... and blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.” Id. at 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402. From this, the Court concluded:
“In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. We believe this is true of the intrusions in question here.”
Id. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The Court concluded by stating “that the compelling Government interests served by the FRA’s regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment before testing a given employee.” Id. at 633, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
[¶ 57] This history shows the Court was actively deciding blood alcohol testing and implied consent cases between Schmerber in 1966 and Skinner in 1989. Then all was quiet in this field at the United States Supreme Court until 2013. Since 2013, the Court generally has focused on the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test in DUI and implied consent cases. Although language in several opinions appear to hint the Court was considering expanding Skinner to exempt DUI blood-alcohol testing under the special needs exception to the warrant requirement, none have done so. Instead, the Court has parsed both the implied consent laws and the various chemical tests used to measure blood-alcohol levels to recognize differing Fourth Amendment protections based on differing privacy expectations.
[¶ 58] Starting in 2013 the Court signaled a departure from the common interpretation of Schmerber and ignited the current round of litigation in DUI cases. In Missouri v. McNeely, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), the Court explained the issue as follows:
“The question presented here is whether the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases.”
Id. at 1556. The Court answered the question by rejecting a categorical conclusion that the natural dissipation of alcohol in human blood presented an exigent circumstance allowing warrantless blood testing of DUI suspects. Id.
[¶ 59] The Justices in McNeely also touched on the role of implied consent laws in fighting driving while intoxicated matters. Justice Sotomayor wrote for herself and three others as follows:
“As an initial matter, States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking war-rantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to *904BAG testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”
Id. at 1566. Justice Kennedy did not join this portion of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion so it was not part of the plurality writing that became the Court’s opinion. Id. at 1568. The plurality in McNeely did not further discuss the perceived role of implied consent laws or opine whether a motor vehicle operator’s implied consent permitted warrantless chemical testing of blood alcohol levels.
[¶ 60] The Birchfield, Beylund and Bernard cases from North Dakota and Minnesota were the latest in the United States Supreme Court’s foray into this quagmire. Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016). Substantively, the Court held “a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving.” Id. at 2185. Because the Court found warrantless blood tests constitutionally impermissible searches, the Court examined implied consent, stating “we must address respondents’ alternative argument that such tests are justified based on the driver’s legally implied consent to submit to them.” Id.
[¶ 61] The Court first noted:
“Our prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply. See, e.g., McNeely, supra, at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1565-1566 (plurality opinion); Neville, supra, at 560, 103 S.Ct. 916.”
Id. However, as noted above, the portion of McNeely cited by the Birchfield majority was not part of the plurality opinion. Part III of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Kagan. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556. While Justice Kennedy joined the other portions of the opinion, he did not join Part III. Id. at 1568.
[¶ 62] The Birchfield majority continued by stating, “Petitioners do not question the constitutionality of [implied consent] laws, and nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on them.” 136 S.Ct. at 2185. The Court also stated, “It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to such a test. There must be a limit to the consequences to which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision to drive on public roads.” Id. Clearly, these two positions conflict. Regarding blood tests, the Birch-field Court did more than “cast doubt” on implied consent. The Court held implied consent was constitutionally ineffective.
[¶ 63] 'But the Court was far less clear about the. utility of implied consent for breath tests. Because the Court in Birch-field held that breath testing was constitutionally permissible as a search incident to arrest, it did not decide the constitutionality of criminalizing the refusal to take a pre-arrest onsite screening test or a post-arrest breath test. See N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 and 39-20-01 respectively.
[¶ 64] Here, the majority, acknowledges these holdings in Birchfield and concludes the pre-arrest onsite screening test can be demanded by the state on penalty of loss of driving privileges based on no more than reasonable suspicion. Majority opinion ¶ 17. Doing so, the majority pins its holding on this Court’s pre-Birchfield holding in State v. Baxter, 2015 ND 107, ¶ 16, 863 N.W.2d 208. Majority opinion ¶ 17. (“We conclude Birchfield v. North Dakota, does not change our analysis in Baxter for pre-arrest onsite screening tests of an individual’s breath for purposes of administrative license proceedings.”). The majority goes on to hold, “a pre-*905arrest warrantless onsite screening test of an individual’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the individual was driving while impaired does not violate the Fourth Amendment or N.D. Const. art. I, § 8.” Id.
[¶ 65] I do not agree with the majority that we should parse the constitutionality of demanding an onsite screening test based on whether the case will become a criminal proceeding or an administrative license proceeding. I do agree the remedies available for an unconstitutional search differs in each proceeding because the exclusionary rule applies to the criminal proceeding, State v. Birchfield, 2016 ND 182, ¶ 3, 885 N.W.2d 62, but exclusion does not apply to administrative proceedings. Beylund v. Levi, 2017 ND 30, ¶ 28, 889 N.W.2d 907. However, that the exclusionary rule is not an available remedy for an unconstitutional search should not be the guiding principle upon which we decide whether the search is constitutional in the first instance. More importantly, when law enforcement requests, that a driver perform the pre-arrest onsite screening test, a driver simultaneously is subject to the administrative loss of driving privileges, and to criminal prosecution for refusing to take the breath test and for driving under the influence. See N.D.C.C. §§ 39-20-14 and 39-20-01. Therefore, the constitutionality of requiring an onsite screening test based solely on implied consent should be examined under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, rather than the type of proceeding in which the fruits of the search, might be used. See Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2173.
[¶ 66] Traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis “assess[es], on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Riley v. California, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (citation omitted). The onsite screening and the Intoxilyzer tests operate similarly by determining blood alcohol levels from a driver’s breath sample. The Supreme Court concluded the Intoxilyzer “breath test does not ‘implicate] significant privacy concerns.’ ” Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2178 (citation omitted). The Court in Birchfield also concluded the governmental interest in curbing drunk driving is high, and “requiring the police to obtain a warrant in every case would impose a substantial burden but no commensurate benefit.” Id. at 2181-82.
[¶67] From this analysis the United States Supreme Court did not conclude breath tests were free from Fourth Amendment constraints. Rather, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment balance of privacy and governmental need could be struck by treating the warrant-less search as reasonable when performed incident to arrest.
[¶ 68] From the Birchfield Court’s holding and reasoning, no apparent reason exists to conclude the onsite screening test and the Intoxilyzer chemical test can, or should be, subject to different constitutional analysis. Arrests must be made on no less than probable cause. Subjecting the two breath tests to the-same analysis requires that both would- be- unreasonable searches unless supported by probable cause or performed incident to arrest. Because the majority fails to reach this conclusion,- and instead .permits the state to demand an onsite- screening test on no more than reasonable suspicion, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 69] Daniel J. Crothers

. I realize that requiring probable cause or a DUI arrest based on probable cause eliminates virtually all utility of the onsite screening test under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1) as currently written, Whether the statute can be amended to permit admission of the onsite screening test obtained upon probable cause or incident to lawful arrest is a question for another day. I also acknowledge that the ruling I suggest effectively declares’ unconstitutional that part of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1) permitting the onsite screening test based on reasonable suspicion. Article VI, section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution requires thé agreement of at least four members of this Court to declare a statute unconstitutional.