Court Opinion

ID: 9684105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:46:42.049277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.830152
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction concluding that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s *445pretrial plea in bar of prosecution based on a statutory claim of former jeopardy under TEX.PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 30(c) (Vernon Supp.1973) as amended (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1484, ch. 544, Sec. 2, effective September 1, 1973). Miller v. State, 640 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1982). On original submission this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment.
Although the reasoning and holding of the Court of Appeals is correct, a brief review of their analysis is helpful here. On April 19, 1974, the State filed an original petition in the juvenile court alleging that appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct. The petition alleged, inter alia, that on April 8, 1974, appellant had “... intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Leonard G. Sella, by shooting the said Leonard G. Sella with a pistol_”
On May 6, 1974, the State filed a motion in the same cause seeking an order from the juvenile court certifying and transferring appellant to the district court for prosecution as an adult. After several attempts the certification and transfer was accomplished and an indictment was returned alleging the same offense as that alleged in the original petition for adjudication as a delinquent. Pursuant to that indictment appellant was tried and convicted of the offense in the instant case.
Appellant filed two pleas of former jeopardy in the trial court, both of which were overruled. Appellant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in overruling his plea of former jeopardy because, under the provisions of former TEX.PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 30(c) (Vernon Supp.1973), the State was prohibited from subsequently prosecuting him for any offense previously alleged in the adjudication petition filed in juvenile court. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed appellant’s conviction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on the legislative history of several articles.
In 1967, 60th TEX.PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 30, Sec. 3 (Vernon 1925) was amended to read as follows:
No •person who has been adjudged a delinquent child may be convicted of any offense alleged in the petition to adjudge him a delinquent child or any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile judge as evidenced by anything in the records of the juvenile proceeding.
Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1086, ch. 475, Sec. 7 (emphasis added).
In 1973, TEX.PENAL CODE ANN., Art. 30, Sec. 3 (Vernon 1925) was replaced by the conforming amendment to Penal Code, Art. 30(c) passed along with Title III of the Family Code. The conforming amendment to Penal Code, Art. 30 reads in part:
(c) A person who has been alleged in a petition for an adjudication hearing to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense alleged in the juvenile court petition or any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile court judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the juvenile court proceedings.
Acts 1973, 63 Leg., p. 1484, ch. 544, Sec. 2, effective September 1, 1973 (emphasis added).
During the same session of the Legislature a new Penal Code was enacted. Section 8.07(d) of the new Penal Code replaced Art. 30 and it reflects the language of Art. 30 as it read after the 1967 amendment. Section 8.07(d) reads:
No person who has been adjudged a delinquent child may be convicted of any offense alleged in the petition to adjudge him a delinquent child or any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the juvenile proceedings. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, sec. 8.07(d) (Vernon 1974).
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out:
... there were three different double jeopardy standards regarding juveniles in the period between 1967 and January 1, 1974. The 1967 enactment barred prosecution of a juvenile as an adult if the child previously had been adjudi*446cated as a delinquent for the same misconduct,.... The 1973 Family Code Amendment to Art. 30 changed the law, to bar adult prosecution if there had merely been a previous allegation in juvenile court of the same misconduct. The same Legislature, in enacting See. 8.07 of the new Penal Code, then reverted to the 1967 standard of prior adjudication as barring adult prosecution.
Miller, supra, at 407.
Thus, an inconsistency existed between Art. 30(c), the conforming amendment, to the old Penal Code, and Sec. 8.07(d) of the new Penal Code. The issue in the instant case is which law controls.
The Court of Appeals based its determination that Art. 30 controls in the instant case on TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. Art. 5429b-2, Texas Code Construction Act, Sec. 3.11(c) which reads,
The repeal of a statute by a code does not affect an amendment, revision, or reenactment of the statute by the same Legislature which enacted the code. The amendment, revision, or reenactment is preserved and given effect as part of the code provision which revised the statute so amended, revised or reenacted.
We believe that Sec. 3.11(d) of the Code Construction Act also supports the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Sec. 3.11(d) reads:
If any provision of a code conflicts with a statute enacted by the same Legislature which enacted the code, the statute controls.
Both rules of construction were implicated when the 63rd Legislature amended Art. 30 of the old Penal Code and also enacted a new Penal Code which omitted the amendment. In such a situation both rules suggest, as the Court of Appeals held, that the amendment to Art. 30 controls.
Further, the Practice Commentary to V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 8.07 (1974) also concluded that in light of Sec. 3.11(c) of the Code Construction Act the Family Code Amendment to Art. 30 controls over Sec. 8.07. The same conclusion was drawn by the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals in R.E.M. v. State, 532 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Civ.App.1975) (opinion on rehearing).
We cannot agree, as the dissenting opinion on original submission suggests, that statutes which implicate such important matters as whether or not a person can be prosecuted in a particular case is purely procedural such that the state of the law at the time of trial controls.
After reviewing the State’s contention on rehearing we conclude that our opinion on original submission was correct. We are constrained to so hold by the legislative problems arising in 1973 and discussed above. Accordingly, the State’s Motion for Rehearing is denied.
ONION, P.J., and TOM. G. DAVIS and McCORMICK, JJ., dissent.
WHITE, J., not participating.