Court Opinion

ID: 9482294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:45:51.165051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:53.374823
License: Public Domain

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This case raises two important questions regarding pleading requirements. The first involves the particularity with which facts must be alleged to establish personal jurisdiction under the “conspiracy theory.” I concur in large part with the majority’s treatment of this issue but dissent from its conclusion as to appellees Popkin and Spitz because I think the district court was well within its discretion in refusing to reconsider its dismissal of those two appellees, despite the late submission of the Serian Affidavit.
The second question relates to the responsibility of litigants to bring their legal theories before the district court in their pleadings on a motion for summary judgment. I agree with the majority that appellants John Edmond and Pamela Lyles properly presented their Sixth Amendment claim, their Perjurer’s Liability Fourth Amendment claim, and what I will call their Unlawful Booking Fourth Amendment claim to the district court in opposition to summary judgment, and I agree that the district court wrongly decided those claims. I do not believe, however, that Edmond and Lyles properly raised the Detour-and-Delay Fourth Amendment theory before the district court, and I think that precedent and respect for the district court require us to hold that they therefore abandoned that claim.
In short, I concur in my colleagues’ reversal of the district court’s errors, but I disagree with their willingness to overlook appellants’ mistakes.
I.
Whatever the statutory1 and constitu*428tional2 limits of the “conspiracy theory” of personal jurisdiction under section 13-423(a)(3) of the D.C. long-arm statute, D.C.Code Ann. § 13-423(a)(3), our cases clearly require unusually particularized pleading of each of the three elements of the theory identified by the majority: the existence of a conspiracy, the nonresident’s participation in the conspiracy, and the injury-causing act in the District in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Maj.Op. at 425. Our leading case, Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C.Cir.1983), rejected “bald speculation” and “con-clusionary statement^]” of conspiracy and stated that “ ‘a plaintiff must allege specific facts connecting [the] defendant with the forum.’” Id. at 787-88 (quoting Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204, 1208 n. 5 (9th Cir.1980) (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2399, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984); see also First Chicago Int’l v. United Exchange Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C.Cir.1988) (rejecting jurisdiction when there was “no concrete evidence in the record indicating that there was a common plan ... to [commit the alleged tort] and [that the defendants] conspired and acted to further that plan” (emphasis added)); Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1050 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting jurisdiction when plaintiff had “not alleged a specific tortious act in the District by any of the alleged co-conspirators” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, in every one of the conspiracy theory cases in this circuit since Naartex, the district court has found the pleadings insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. See, e.g., McManus v. Washington Gas Light Co., No. 90-3169, 1991 WL 222345, at *2-*3, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 14539, at *4-*8 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1991); Hasenfus v. Corporate Air Servs., 700 F.Supp. 58, 62 (D.D.C.1988). But cf. Mandelkom v. Patrick, 359 F.Supp. 692, 695-97 & n. 5 (D.D.C.1973) (pre-Naartex case allowing jurisdiction based on “general” allegations of conspiracy where those allegations were uncontroverted and thus could be assumed true). And we are not much, if any, more lenient when deciding whether a district court properly denied plaintiffs’ request for discovery to flesh out their allegations. We review the district court’s decision, after all, only for abuse of discretion. See Naartex, 722 F.2d at 788 (affirming a denial of discovery when “the pleadings contained no allegations of specific facts that could establish the requisite contacts with the District”).
Our standard is stringent for good reason. Although we recognize that it is often difficult to plead conspiracy in specific, non-conclusory terms because rarely is there (especially before discovery) hard evidence of conspiratorial agreement between the defendants, see Mandelkorn, 359 F.Supp. at 696, we cannot allow plaintiffs to subvert the important constitutional principles of sovereignty and due process that underlie personal jurisdiction limitations with mere “unspecified and unsubstantiated claims” that multifarious defendants were part of a broad conspiracy and that one of them committed some tort in the plaintiffs’ desired forum. Hasenfus, 700 F.Supp. at 62. Criminal investigations in particular inevitably involve concerted efforts to enforce the law, and sometimes one or more individuals involved in those efforts may commit a tort against the targets. We certainly cannot permit the targets, properly suing the perpetrators of the alleged tort, to drag everyone else involved in the investigation — every prosecutor, investigator, lawyer, and witness — into the forum where the alleged tort occurred simply by pleading their involvement in the investigation. See Althouse, supra, at 253 n. 113 (“The transactions underlying a claim based on conspiracy may be the conduct ... of law enforcement that will ulti*429mately be vindicated at trial.”).3 That is, apparently, what Edmond and Lyles have tried to do in this case.
I agree with my colleagues that Edmond and Lyles specifically alleged (in their complaint) an overt act in the District that caused injury in the District: their post-arrest incarceration and supposed mistreatment at the Postal Service Office by, as Lyles so colorfully put it at oral argument, “the postal inspectors from hell.” I pay little heed, however, to appellants’ bald and general allegation of “conspir[acy]” against “the defendants, and each of them,” Complaint ¶ 4, or their prefacing of numerous allegations with “[i]n furtherance of said conspiracy,” e.g., id. ¶¶ 7-11. On the other hand, as the majority points out, the Serian Affidavit does provide a specific and fairly concrete basis for believing that there was a conspiracy, involving Postal Inspector Green et al., to procure a grand jury indictment unlawfully and to make an unlawful arrest based upon it, and the complaint adds specific allegations of numerous acts directly relating to that illegal plan by appellee Arnell. See Maj. Op. at 425-26. This is enough, I conclude — although with considerably more hesitation than my colleagues — at least to allow additional discovery as to personal jurisdiction over Arnell. I note, however, that the district judge is free to control that discovery closely, especially in light of Arnell’s claims of official immunity (which may of course provide an alternative ground for dismissal on remand), and to grant a reinstituted motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction if that discovery does not reveal concrete evidence of Arnell’s participation in an unlawful scheme. I also concur with the majority opinion regarding appellee Wolf, whose alleged actions, although related to the multi-front investigation of Edmond and Lyles, were not shown to be specifically connected to the indictment and subsequent arrest.
As for Popkin and Spitz, I might agree with my colleagues if we could properly consider the allegations in the Serian Affidavit against those two appellees. But I do not see how we can. The district court dismissed Spitz and Popkin from the case on April 6, 1988, and denied appellants’ motion to reconsider that decision on September 30, 1988. Not until April 19, 1989 — over six months later — did Edmond and Lyles submit the Serian Affidavit and move to rejoin Spitz and Popkin as “persons needed for a just adjudication.”4 The majority does not contend that the district court acted at all incorrectly when it issued its two 1988 orders but notes that the district court “had the authority” to reverse those orders and then concludes, without any explanation, that “its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.” Maj.Op. at 425. The motion to rejoin Spitz and Pop-kin, however, was apparently never even served on them,5 see Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a), and thus was never acted on by the district court; it surely cannot be an abuse of discretion for the district court not to have reversed itself sua sponte. And even if Edmond and Lyles had properly requested the court to reconsider its earlier orders, I think it indisputable that they never made the convincing showing necessary to establish an abuse of discretion, because they provided no explanation at all for failing to obtain the Affidavit earlier. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115, 105 S.Ct. 2357, 86 L.Ed.2d 258 (1985). Looking therefore only to the complaint, which constitutes the relevant record before the district court at the time of its 1988 orders, I find all of the allegations involving Spitz and Popkin to be like those regarding Wolf — connected solely to a vague and entirely speculative “con*430spiracy” encompassing all activities against appellants and not to the specific conspiracy involving Green (and perhaps Arnell) that included the alleged tort in the District.
II.
Our opinion on the scope of the conspiracy theory under the D.C. long-arm statute can be corrected, if necessary, by the D.C. Court of Appeals. The precedent my colleagues set on the question of the scope of appellate review of summary judgments is, I believe, far more troubling, because it has direct and unfortunate implications for practice in the district courts. This conclusion follows from my understanding of the procedural history of this case.
The federal appellees moved for summary judgment on all issues in March 1989. Realizing that it was practically impossible to respond specifically to each of the more than 50 violations of the Constitution, federal statutes, and state law alleged in the 18 “cause[s] of action” in appellants’ prolix complaint and amended complaint (as it was appellees’ motion exceeded forty pages), appellees quite properly attempted to winnow the controversy down to a handful of basic legal theories and then to argue that, in regard to those theories, there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This effort clearly satisfied appel-lees’ burden under Rule 56. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion____” (emphasis added)).
The burden then shifted to Edmond and Lyles, who had at least three opportunities over the next nine months to explain to the district court why summary judgment was inappropriate — to isolate disputed factual issues or argue that the law was on their side regarding the legal theories on which the appellees focused or any other legal theory. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). They accordingly filed a 38-page opposition to summary judgment, then a nine-page supplemental opposition, and finally a six-page motion to amend the summary judgment order.
I agree with the majority that appellants adequately presented their Perjurer’s Liability and Sixth Amendment claims to the district court during this process. They also raised and preserved on appeal their theory that the postal inspectors’ fingerprinting and photographing them during the stop in the District violated the Fourth Amendment — what I would call their “Unlawful Booking" claim.6 The presentation was awkward, and the citations offered in support often unhelpful, but it is undeniable that the parties and the district court understood, or should have understood, the basis of the legal theories asserted, not because those theories were “surely an obvious reading of [the] case,” Maj.Op. at 421, nor because they were “so plainly springing from [the] complaint,” id. at 422, but because appellants’ summary judgment memoranda repeatedly stated the relevant facts and argued the relevant law. I also agree with my colleagues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Perjurer’s Liability theory by deciding that as a matter of law a facially valid grand jury indictment cures any misconduct involved in procuring or acting upon *431it, a theory the district judge also evidently, but again erroneously, believed resolved the Unlawful Booking claim (which his opinion did not mention). Finally, I agree that the district court should not have summarily rejected appellants’ Sixth Amendment claim, although I doubt that Edmond will be able to prove that the government’s supposed “interference” with his attorney-client relationship with Lyles caused him any cognizable harm, even assuming it was unconstitutional and not covered by official immunity.
I part with my colleagues, however, on their conclusion that Edmond and Lyles properly raised the Detour-and-Delay Fourth Amendment claim below. To be sure, their complaint alleged facts necessary to state such a claim — facts admitted in part by the federal appellees — and incorporated them into a cause of action averring an unspecified Fourth Amendment violation. And, as the majority opinion indicates, those basic facts reappeared in appellants’ opposition and supplemental opposition to summary judgment and various attachments thereto. But nowhere in those pleadings did appellants tie those facts even tangentially to a Detour-and-Delay theory of Fourth Amendment violation. The majority argues that Edmond and Lyles “pursued” the Detour-and-Delay “theor[y] of liability” before the district court, Maj.Op. at 419, but the only “pursuit” that the majority points to is the statement in appellants’ opposition to summary judgment that Edmond and Lyles “ ‘were effectually kidnapped and taken from the State of Maryland into the District of Columbia’ ” for the improper purpose of obtaining their fingerprints and mug shots. Id. at 421 (quoting Opposition to Dismissal at 16). That statement, however, came in the context of explaining “ ‘[t]he injury which [appellants] sustained as a result of defendants’ wrongful conduct,’ ” id. — and the only theories of “wrongful conduct” alleged were Perjurer’s Liability and Unlawful Booking.
If we had before us a grant of a motion for dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we would have a duty to examine appellants’ complaint independently to determine if the factual allegations therein could provide for relief under any viable legal theory, even one not mentioned therein. See, e.g., Wells v. United States, 851 F.2d 1471, 1473 (D.C.Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 336-37 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]. Thus, if the district court had granted the federal appellees’ May 1988 motion for dismissal in toto, we would be entirely justified in considering arguments that appellants briefed for the first time on appeal— or indeed in rooting through the complaint ourselves in search of some valid legal theory.
But we are not in this posture because the district court properly looked to the complaint and in its September 1988 order declined to dismiss “the numerous claims by [appellant] arising directly under the Constitution.” Instead, we are reviewing the district court’s decision on the federal appellees’ March 1989 motion, which was titled a “Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative[,] for Summary Judgment,” but which, once affidavits and other “matters outside the pleadings” were allowed into the record, was converted into (and was treated by the district judge as) a pure Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
Our review is, accordingly, strictly limited to the issues and legal theories that were presented to the trial court in the summary judgment pleadings (and then preserved on appeal). A party may not resurrect on appeal a theory encompassed by its complaint but unmentioned and thus evidently abandoned during the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.7 See Savers Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Reetz, 888 F.2d 1497, 1501 (5th Cir.1989); Kensington Rock Island Ltd. Partnership v. American Eagle Historic Partners, 921 *432F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir.1990) (“ ‘[A] party opposing a summary judgment motion must inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should not be entered. If it does not do so, and loses the motion, it cannot raise such reasons on appeal.’ ” (quoting Liberies v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1983)); see also 10 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2716, at 650-54 (“[On appeal t]he parties cannot add exhibits, depositions, or affidavits to support their position nor can they advance new legal theories or raise new issues in order to secure a reversal of the lower court’s [summary judgment] determination.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); Kriegesmann v. Barry-Wehmiller Co., 739 F.2d 357, 358 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (“Appellant did not present this theory to the trial court, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036, 105 S.Ct. 512, 83 L.Ed.2d 402 (1984).
In a case in which the appellant attempted to raise a Fourth Amendment theory not presented in his opposition to summary judgment below, we explained the fundamental policies on which this rule is founded:
Clearly, oral argument on appeal is not the proper time to advance new arguments or legal theories in opposition to a motion for summary judgment [citing Wright & Miller, supra ]. Appellant did not articulate this argument before the District Court, let alone present evidence to support it. Understandably, then, the District Court never addressed the argument in disposing of the motion for summary judgment____ [Ejven if we found ourselves in agreement with appellant, to reverse the District Court[ ] ... on the basis of a new argument ... would undeniably undermine the integrity of the adversarial process and the authority of the District Court to fairly and effectively control the litigation before it. We decline to do so.
Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 7 n. 17 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Edwards, J.);8 see also Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1537 & n. 160 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (“Ordinarily, in reviewing motions for summary judgment, the appellate court considers only those matters presented to the district court, disregarding additional allegations raised for the first time on appeal.” (citing Tarpley)), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 2353, 86 L.Ed.2d 255 (1985).9
The majority opinion relies on “ ‘the general rule ... that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed on below.’ ” Maj.Op. at 420 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)). It contends that “the District Court never even purported to address” the Perjurer’s Liability and the Detour-and-Delay claims, so “it cannot be asserted that the trial court somehow granted ‘summary judgment’ against appellants on the substance of those theories,” and so, the argument goes, we cannot affirm the summary judgment. Id. at 420; see also id. at 421-22. My colleagues, however, stand the Singleton principle on its head. In truth the district court’s order resolved the entire case (with the single exception of a statutory claim *433against Green), granting summary judgment on “all the constitutional tort claims,” Maj.Op. at 418 (emphasis added); see also Edmond v. USPS, 727 F.Supp. 7, 12 (D.D.C.1989) {Mem.Op.). The only real question, then, is whether the court was required to address with specificity the particular theories appellants raise before us. Singleton, like Tarpley, is designed to spare district courts from the needless chore of addressing and resolving every issue potentially involved in a case — even those not raised by the litigants — before we can affirm the dismissal of the entire case; under any other rule, complicated cases might never conclude. Thus, Singleton simply warns us not to reach out to reverse a district court on a ground that it had no obligation to engage. Unfortunately, that is precisely what the majority does here on appellants’ Detour-and-Delay claim.
The district judge did “totally ignore[ ]” that claim in his orders granting summary judgment and refusing to amend that judgment. Id. at 419. But he did so, I believe, for good reason; he did not, as my colleagues contend, “incorrectly characterize” appellants’ case. Id. at 422. Instead of picking through the complaint to address whatever he felt were meritorious issues, he relied, quite properly, on the adversaries to bring some order to this confused controversy in their summary judgment pleadings by presenting the facts and law that remained in dispute. Indeed, his opinion expressly relied on (and cited) appellants’ opposition memoranda to organize the legal theories remaining in the case. See Mem.Op. at 10 & nn. 8-11. Edmond and Lyles simply failed to fulfill their obligation as litigants — even on their third try, in their motion to amend judgment, after they had seen exactly how the court addressed their claims. But cf. Savers Federal, 888 F.2d at 1501 (plaintiffs who fail to present legal theory in opposition to summary judgment cannot “save the day” by reviving the theory in a motion to reconsider).
We cannot reasonably expect, nor does any precedent require, district judges to comb through the complaint, the remainder of the record, and the multitude of facts and potential violations of law that are alleged therein in search of a legal theory or a genuine factual dispute by which plaintiffs can avoid summary judgment. It is quite unfair to ask them to resolve every single legal theory mentioned by any party at any point in the litigation prior to the summary judgment pleadings. In short, we cannot reverse the district court on a ground never properly presented to it by the adversaries despite their ample opportunities to do so.
That is not all. My colleagues unfortunately go even further in resurrecting appellants’ case. Not only do they allow Edmond and Lyles to raise on appeal the Detour-and-Delay Fourth Amendment claim that was never adequately articulated before the district court (but was at least fleshed out in appellants’ briefs on appeal), they decide to offer some unsolicited (though obviously valuable) legal advice, recommending that appellants restyle their claim as a Fifth Amendment violation (a provision never mentioned in Edmond and Lyles’ appellate briefs). The district court is then told it must address that entirely new theory on remand. See Maj. Op. at 423 & n. 16. Given the gratuitous assistance provided by this court, do appellants need the additional counsel10 that the majority recommends?
Because it “undeniably undermine[s] the integrity of the adversarial process and the authority of the District Court to fairly and effectively control the litigation before it,” Tarpley, 684 F.2d at 7 n. 17, I dissent from the Detour-and-Delay portion of the majority opinion.

. We have not yet been told by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals — whose interpretations of the D.C. long-arm statute are of course binding — whether § 13-423(a)(3) encompasses the conspiracy theory or even whether that provision extends to the limits of due process. See Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 991 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (per curiam) (expressly reserving the latter question), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006, 102 S.Ct. 1643, 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982). Nor have the Maryland or Virginia courts addressed the conspiracy theory under those states’ long-arm statutes, see, e.g., Poole & Kent Co. v. Equilease Assocs. I, 71 Md. App. 9, 18, 523 A.2d 1018, 1023 (1987) (reserving the question), which are analogous to the District’s, see Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1215-16, 1220-21 (D.C.Cir.1973) (looking to Maryland and Virginia decisions when no D.C. decisions were available).

. We have also never examined the theory’s due process limits, despite increasing concern by judges and commentators about its constitutionality. See generally Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 Fordham L.Rev. 234, 255-56 (1983) (criticizing mechanical application of the theory without determining whether “each defendant, through his own actions, purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state” (emphasis added)); Note, The Long Arm and Multiple Defendants: The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 506, 510, 521 (1984) (same).

. Our heightened pleading standard for damage actions against government officials, see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 257 (D.C.Cir.1987), further supports this conclusion.

. The district court did not finally dismiss Ar-nell for lack of jurisdiction until November 14, 1989, which is why the Serian Affidavit is properly part of the record regarding her.

.The certificate of service indicates that the motion was served only on the federal appellees’ attorney. The addresses of Spitz and of Pop-kin’s attorneys were typed in but then whited out.

. Appellants base this theory on cases such as Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397-98, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1968), which held that detention without probable cause for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints can violate the Fourth Amendment. It is important to recognize that while appellants' various Fourth Amendment claims share a common antecedent (that is, lack of probable cause because of perjury), the consequent constitutional violations are clearly distinct: the arrest itself (Perjurer’s Liability), the transportation to and delay in the District (Detour-and-Delay), and the booking activities (Unlawful Booking). The same would be true of other Fourth Amendment theories encompassed by the allegations in the complaint and related to the "manner in which [the] arrest was accomplished," Maj.Op. at 419 (emphasis omitted), such as an “Unreasonable Force” or a "Failure to Present a Warrant” argument. Under the majority opinion, I do not see why these additional claims could not be raised on remand.

. A party may, however, raise a legal argument in its summary judgment pleadings that was not included in its complaint; the pleading is treated as initiating an amendment of the complaint. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Costle, 629 F.2d 118, 133 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.1980).

. The majority contends that Tarpley limits appellate review only of " ‘theories] vaguely raised for the first time at oral argument.’” Maj.Op. at 422 n. 13 (quoting Tarpley, 684 F.2d at 7 n. 17). But while the appellant's position in Tarpley was more egregious than that of appellants in this case — who at least raised the Detour-and-Delay theory in their appellate briefs— there is absolutely nothing in Tarpley that indicates its holding and policy concerns are limited to the “oral argument” situation (for which citation to Fed.R.App.P. 28 and cases on waiver through failure to brief would have sufficed) rather than extending to all cases in which "new arguments or legal theories” were not "articulate[d] ... before the District Court.”

. Our divided panel opinion in Semaan v. Mumford, 335 F.2d 704, 706 & n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1964), has been superseded by Tarpley and similar cases, as well as by recent Supreme Court decisions regarding summary judgment, see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment is “properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure]”). Semaan applied a standard essentially equivalent to that properly used in reviewing a dismissal. See supra page 420.

. Lyles is, I note, a member of the D.C. Bar and the D.C. District Court Bar.