Court Opinion

ID: 9637024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:53:35.664177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:23.065050
License: Public Domain

Galway, J.,
dissenting. The defendant argues that Part I, Article 17 of the New Hampshire Constitution grants him the right to be tried in the county in which the alleged crime was committed, and that he could waive that right only by moving the court to transfer the case and by demonstrating that he could not get a fair and impartial trial in that county. Additionally, the defendant contends that principles of double jeopardy prevent him from being tried again should this matter be remanded. The majority’s opinion, however, agrees with the State’s arguments that the defendant waived, or forfeited, his right to trial in the county where the crime was alleged to have occurred by his silence or inaction and that double jeopardy does not bar his retrial. While the majority’s opinion holds some appeal as a matter of public policy, I believe it misinterprets the relevant law, and I, therefore, dissent.
When interpreting a constitutional provision, we look to its purpose and intent, bearing in mind that we will give the words in question the meaning they must be presumed to have had to the electorate when the vote was *168cast. Petition of Below, 151 N.H. 135, 139 (2004). “The language used by the people in the great paramount law which controls the legislature as well as the people, is to be always understood and explained in that sense in which it was used at the time when the constitution and the laws were adopted.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted).
When Part I, Article 17 was originally enacted it read:
In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts in the vicinity where they happen is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no crime or offence ought to be tried in any other county than that in which it is committed; except in the cases of general insurrection in any particular county, when it shall appear to the Judges of the Superior Court, that an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the offence may be committed, and upon their report, the assembly shall think proper to direct the trial in the nearest county in which an impartial trial can be obtained.
The Perpetual Laws of the State of New Hampshire 12 (John Melcher ed. 1789). Other than the minor change from “assembly” to “legislature,” this provision remained unchanged for nearly 200 years. See S. Marshall, The New Hampshire State Constitution A Reference Guide 77 (2004).
In State v. Albee, 61 N.H. 423, 425 (1881), one of the few cases directly interpreting this provision, we recognized that the only exception to the requirement in Part I, Article 17 that venue be placed in the county where the crime was alleged to have occurred was in the case of a “general insurrection.” We held, however, that despite this single exception, a defendant could also waive venue in a particular county when a fair trial could not be had. Id. at 427. This was so, we stated, because the framers of the provision did not intend to destroy a defendant’s common-law right to a change of venue when a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the county where the crime was allegedly committed. Id. Nevertheless, we also held in Albee, that this common-law right, which the framers could not be presumed to have destroyed, could be waived by a defendant’s silence. Id. at 428. The majority concludes that in 1978, Part I, Article 17 was amended, in effect, to codify Albee. I disagree.
Nothing in the record of the constitutional convention at which the amended language of Part I, Article 17 was discussed and adopted indicates that the delegates paid any heed to the ruling in Albee that a defendant could waive proper venue in any case other than a “general insurrection.” According to the committee report on the resolution to amend Part I, Article 17:
*169Article 17 as presently worded provides procedure for change of venue only in cases of general insurrection and refers only to “counties.” Resolution eliminates provision as to “general insurrection,” broadens “counties” to include “judicial districts” and provides for a change of venue on motion of defendant when fair and impartial trial cannot be had.
Journal of the Convention to Revise the Constitution 232 (June 13, 1974) (emphasis added); see also MARSHALL, supra at 77 (“Until 1978, criminal cases had to be tried within the county in which the crime occurred, except in cases of general insurrection.”). Thus, while the effect of the 1978 amendment may be similar to that of Albee, in that it permitted a defendant to waive venue in a particular county, I do not believe there is a basis to conclude that the 1978 amendment, in effect, codified Albee. This is especially true when one considers the effect of the amendment on the method by which a defendant could waive his right to venue in a particular county.
Part I, Article 17, as it currently exists, does that which we said was the intent of the framers in Albee — it protects the right of the defendant to change the venue of prosecution when a fair and impartial trial cannot be had. When Albee was decided, however, the Constitution did not define any method for the defendant to invoke that right regardless of the fairness of a trial, and only permitted changes in the case of a general insurrection. It was in the face of this omission that we held both that a defendant could change venue when a fair trial could not be obtained and that a defendant could waive the right to change venue by silence or inaction. No such infirmity continues to infect Part I, Article 17. Following the 1978 amendment, Part I, Article 17 not only specifically provides a defendant the right to change venue when a fair trial may not be had, but also prescribes the procedure for doing so, by requiring that changes in venue be made “upon motion by the defendant.” Thus, to the extent it protects a defendant’s right to obtain a change in venue when a fair trial cannot be had, Part I, Article 17 has an effect similar to Albee. Because, however, Part I, Article 17 now explicitly provides a particular procedure for obtaining that change, the conclusion in Albee that venue may be waived by silence can no longer be considered the law of this state.
The majority next concludes that Part I, Article 17, as presently written, grants a criminal defendant two rights: the right to be tried where the crime was committed and the right to obtain a change of venue upon proof that he cannot obtain a fair trial there. The majority’s formulation, however, excludes the express language of the provision that a change in venue may be had “upon motion by the defendant, and after a finding by *170the court that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had where the offense may be committed____” (emphasis added). The use of the conjunctive signifies that both the defendant’s motion and a finding by the court are required. Thus, the second right referenced by the majority ought to state that a defendant has the right to obtain a change of venue upon his motion and proof that he cannot obtain a fair trial. To hold otherwise, is to ignore the clear words of the Constitution that a change in venue is to be based upon an affirmative act by the defendant, and not mere silence.
Lastly, the majority notes that courts in the federal system and a majority of the states have held that the right to venue may be waived or forfeited by a defendant’s silence and cites the appealing policy reasons for such conclusion. The Federal Constitution, however, in defining proper venue for prosecutions, does not contain any language explaining how, when, or under what circumstances the right to venue in a particular place may be waived. The federal courts, therefore, have interpreted this right as one that, unlike other enumerated rights, may be waived by silence. See, e.g., United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984). No such omission is at work here. The New Hampshire Constitution specifically provides the procedure for waiving the right to venue in the place where the crime is alleged to have been committed. Thus, the analysis of the federal courts is inapposite. See State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-32 (1983) (“While the role of the Federal Constitution is to provide the minimum level of national protection of fundamental rights, our court has stated that it has the power to interpret the New Hampshire Constitution as more protective of individual rights than the parallel provisions of the United States Constitution.”). Additionally, the majority does not explain how the rules, statutes, cases, or constitutions of any other jurisdiction bear sufficient similarity to Part I, Article 17 such that the analyses and conclusions of those jurisdictions ought to be applied here. Thus, I believe reliance upon the laws and cases of other jurisdictions for the purpose of interpreting the New Hampshire Constitution in this context is inappropriate. We must interpret our Constitution as it is, not as we believe it ought to be, no matter how appealing the reason, or numerous those in disagreement.
Because the New Hampshire Constitution requires a change in venue to be based upon a motion by the defendant and because the defendant made no such motion here, I would conclude that the decision of the superior court to dismiss the matter for improper venue was correct.
After concluding that the respondent had waived his right to contest venue, the majority also concludes that reprosecution of the respondent is not barred by principles of double jeopardy. With this conclusion I also disagree.
*171According to the majority, the trial court did not decide any of the material elements of the crime, but dismissed the charge for lack of venue. The majority reasons that although venue is an element of the crime, it is not a material element, and does not bear upon a defendant’s guilt or innocence. Since venue does not bear upon a defendant’s guilt or innocence and is not a material element, the majority concludes that dismissing the case for lack of proper venue is distinguishable from a verdict of acquittal, which would implicate principles of double jeopardy.
RSA 625:10 (2007) states, in relevant part: “No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) RSA 625:11 (2007) provides, in pertinent part:
III. “Element of an offense” means such conduct, or such attendant circumstances, or such a result of conduct as:
(e) Establishes jurisdiction or venue.
RSA 625:11, IV defines a material element of an offense as “an element that does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unrelated to (1) the harm sought to be prevented by the definition of the offense, or (2) any justification or excuse for the prescribed conduct.”
While I agree with the majority that venue is not a “material element” of an offense, the distinction between “element” and “material element” is irrelevant here. In order that the defendant be convicted, the State must prove each element of an offense and, as the majority and I agree, venue is an element of every offense under the statute. Here, at the conclusion of the trial, the superior court dismissed the case because it determined that the State had not shown that venue was proper in Hillsborough County, and, therefore, had not proven an element of the offense. Thus, irrespective of whether proper venue bears upon the respondent’s guilt or innocence, this case was dismissed because the State did not prove an element of the offense. There is no meaningful distinction between this dismissal and any other judgment of acquittal entered when the State fails to prove an element of the offense. This is simply not a case where the distinction between “element” and “material element” has any bearing on the outcome. Cf. State v. McCabe, 145 N.H. 686, 691 (2001) (m,ens rea need not be proved as to particular element because not a material element). Accordingly, I would conclude that retrial of the defendant is barred by double jeopardy.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.