Court Opinion

ID: 9492221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:35:12.429389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:10.988233
License: Public Domain

DIANE P. WOOD,
with whom ROVNER and EVANS, Circuit Judges,
join, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc.
In my view, this case presents two distinct issues that are worthy of the en banc *1027court’s attention. The first is the panel’s choice of mandamus as the procedural vehicle with which to address the state’s contention that the district court was not authorized to entertain Johnny Neal, Jr.’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that it was a “second or successive” petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). The second concerns the methodology by which we decide whether a petition that nominally appears to be second or successive requires permission from the court of appeals before it can be filed.
Regardless of whether the panel has come to the correct decision on the second of these two points in this particular case, it is beyond debate that the system inaugurated three years ago by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) is a complex one. District and appellate judges alike across the country have grappled with such questions as: When has a first petition been dismissed for purely technical reasons, such that it can be disregarded for purposes of § 2244(b)(3), and when has it not? See, e.g., Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628 (9th Cir.1997) (discussing the effect on the renewed presentation of a Ford claim of its prior dismissal in an initial petition on ripeness grounds), aff'd. 523 U.S. 637, -, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 1622, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162 (7th Cir.1996) (discussing the impact of failing to pay the $5 filing fee for the first petition on a second one). When does a failure to exhaust excuse a first petition from “counting,” and when not? See, e.g., Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3d Cir.1997); Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44 (2d Cir.1996). And when should a “second” petition be considered as a first one, because the subject matter of the two cases is distinct (as, for example, when two different prison disciplinary proceedings are implicated), and when not? See, e.g., Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that prior approval requirements do not apply to proper petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); In re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185 (4th Cir.1999) (finding a second petition challenging a resentencing proceeding not to be successive when the first petition challenged the original sentencing proceeding); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234 (5th Cir.1998) (finding two petitions not to be successive when they challenged two different actions by a prison board).
When the law is so unsettled and complicated, it seems to me inappropriate to use the heavy hand of a writ of mandamus to correct a perceived jurisdictional error on the part of the district court. The mere fact, as the supplemental opinion of the panel notes, that mandamus can lie for .the correction of jurisdictional errors does not mean that it is the preferred remedy for such issues. Quite the contrary is true: in the overwhelming majority of cases, this court and all others require parties to save their jurisdictional objections — even those that relate to something as fundamental as subject matter jurisdiction — for an appeal in the ordinary course of events unless there is a compelling reason why appeal would be an inadequate remedy. E.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260, 67 S.Ct. 1558, 91 L.Ed. 2041 (1947); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 32, 63 S.Ct. 938, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943). Unless the lack of jurisdiction is absolutely clear and irreparable harm would result from the delay attendant to taking an appeal, sound principles of judicial administration counsel in favor of waiting for the appeal to correct a jurisdictional error.
Under the current state of AEDPA law, it is especially appropriate to allow the district court to complete its consideration of the case and to make a full record for appeal. Such a record will often throw light on the district court’s reasons for holding that a particular petition was not one subject to the § 2244 procedures. If the court of appeals agrees, then the appeal on the merits can proceed. If the court of appeals disagrees, it has effective procedures at its disposal for correcting the district court’s jurisdictional error. If *1028the district court mischaraeterized a petition as one not requiring leave to file from the court of appeals or failed altogether to see the problem, the usual and appropriate response from the court of appeals is to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction when the petitioner appeals and to direct his or her attention to the requirements of § 2244(b)(3). Alternatively, if a district court has doubts about whether it faces a “first” or a “second” petition within the meaning of AEDPA, it can transfer the case to the court of appeals and invoke the gatekeeping function. See Mancuso v. Herbert, 166 F.3d 97, 99 (2d Cir.1999). Errors can occur in the other direction as well and are equally correctable through ordinary procedures. Sometimes applicants contemplating a nominally second petition file first for permission from the court of appeals, only to be told that they have really filed a “first” petition. In those cases, transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 to the district court may be both possible and desirable, especially in light of the strict statute of limitations that applies tó collateral proceedings.
Perhaps at some point the rules for distinguishing second or successive petitions from initial ones will become so blindingly clear that a district judge who disregards them should be corrected immediately through a writ of mandamus. I respectfully suggest that we have not yet reached that point. Furthermore, the fact that this court has needed more than three months to consider the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc in this case, the fact that a significant number of judges on this court thought that rehearing en banc was warranted, and the fact that the panel has responded with a more complete explanation of its reasoning all suggest that the-choice of mandamus was an unfortunate one here. Last, it is regrettable, particularly given the flood of petitions under § 2254 that reach us, that the full court does not consider it worth its time to give a more complete elaboration of the standards it will follow in the future •for deciding which cases must pass through the § 2244 gate and which fall within the district court’s jurisdiction. For these reasons, I dissent from the decision not to rehear this case en banc.