Court Opinion

ID: 9723284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:10:07.707713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:16.100196
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I concur in part and dissent in part. With respect to the temporary restraining order, I dissent from that portion of the decision which affirms contempt against the union (Molders) as to counts 40 and 41 (treated as a single violation). In other respects I concur. With respect to the preliminary injunction, I concur in vacating the contempt order as to Antonio Barba, count 16. However, I dissent from that portion which affirms the contempt order against Tony Hinojosa, count 43; Charles *414Johnson, count 29; and Donato Zavala, count 21. I further dissent from the finding of contempt against Molders in counts 21 and 43 (inasmuch as those counts are based on the acts of Zavala and Hinojosa). In other respects, I concur.
We deal with the typical pressures which arise in an area of economic warfare we call strikes. Ground rules have been established, particularly by the federal government, as to how those wars are to be waged. The record indicates that issues from this strike were taken into the federal courts, into the local police headquarters and into the state superior court. We specifically deal with (1) contempt proceedings against Molders arising out of a temporary restraining order and (2) contempt proceedings against Molders and six individuals arising out of a preliminary injunction.
I
Temporary Restraining Order
The majority view that the temporary restraining order did not violate Code of Civil Procedure section 527.3 is correct. A trial court has authority to limit the number of pickets at the entrances after evidence of interference with ingress and egress has been presented. Such a declaration was before the court.
The argument that the temporary restraining order expired before the hearing when counsel had stipulated to the continuance is difficult to accept. I agree that the limitation of dates is for the protection of defendant .and is not jurisdictional. Accordingly, the time may be knowingly waived.
The dual objections that the declarations initiating the contempt proceedings gave inadequate notice to Molders and that there was not substantial evidence to support the contempt order are more troublesome.
In a heated strike situation, particularly when new employees are hired (called “scabs” or “strike breakers” by union people), feelings will run high. Words and tones of voice not acceptable at the local YWCA or YMCA are commonplace. Angry looks from striking employees are not unexpected. While pickets are exercising théir statutory and First Amendment rights at a strike site, a new employee will naturally feel *415some intimidation. It is with that in mind that the contempt orders are reviewed.
The issue of adequate notice, while close, must be resolved against the union. It is true that the employer’s declarations took a scatter-gun approach hitting multiple incidents from persons standing still to overt acts of violence. Further, it is true that no facts were included to show agency or any other connection between the actors and the union. However, hearings were conducted in such a way that the union had an adequate opportunity to rebut after the employer presented its evidence. Thus, there was notice and an opportunity to defend.
The substantial evidence issue is more difficult.
I would vacate the finding of guilt as to counts 40 and 41 (treated as a single violation). Count 40 alleges interference with movement of a vehicle driven by an employee. The testimony of the employee, however, was as follows:
“A. I drove into the driveway and there were six pickets in the drive. They was just standing there for a while; I pulled up and stopped, and then they slowly walked to one side. One of the, you know, kind of split one way and one went one way and the others went the other way.
“Q. How long did that take?
“A. Oh, I’d say maybe ten seconds.”
And count 41 alleges that the same employee was threatened by Cantu, a striker. The testimony is as follows:
“Q. What exactly did Horace Cantu say to you?
“A. He said, ‘I’ll be off watch in ten minutes. I’ll meet you out back.’ ”
In the context of a heated strike, the actions appear to be that of pussy cats. The testimony is insufficient to show interference with the vehicle or threats of violence to the employee.
As to the remaining findings of contempt, I would affirm. While the evidence of agency is weak, I believe that the union, by taking no steps to discipline or otherwise show disapproval, has ratified the acts.
*416Counts 47 and 53 relate to the scattering of nails in the company parking lot on the mornings of May 24 and 25. An employee testified that nails were scattered on May 20 and again on May 24 and 25. He testified that he was the first employee to arrive on those days, that on each occasion union pickets were present when he arrived, and the nails had already been scattered, so that he did not actually see anyone scattering nails.
Petitioner argues that this circumstantial evidence is insufficient to support the contempt findings against the union, suggesting that inasmuch as there were guards at the plant all night who were not called to testify, one could just as easily conclude that the company itself scattered the nails. It is true that there was no direct evidence as to who scattered the nails. Nor was there evidence that whoever scattered the nails did so on behest of the union. However, the combination of motive and opportunity are sufficient to support the finding of the court that the union was responsible. The court’s determination was buttressed by the pattern of harassment by the union members during the strike as well as the failure on the part of the union to demonstrate any disapproval.
The last finding of contempt, count 59, concerned a threat by Donato Zavala against employee Gary Vierra on the morning of May 27. Vierra testified to a continuing stream of intimidating conduct beginning the day he was hired ón May 19. On that date as he walked to the company office to go to work, four or five pickets, including Zavala yelled unfriendly invectives which would make even a sailor wince. Vierra was advised that he was “not going to make it home tonight.”
The following night Vierra left with one of the plant supervisors, and this time three carloads of pickets followed them. They drove around for about 20 to 25 minutes until they lost the pickets, and Vierra went home. Vierra called the plant the next morning, Friday, and reported that he was too scared to come to work.
When Vierra went to work the following week, the verbal threats (you are “really going to get it now”) and invectives continued.
The intensity of attention given Vierra, no doubt because he was viewed as a “scab” and “strike breaker,” clearly went beyond the acceptable levels of roughness even in a strike situation. Vierra was threatened with violence. The union at no time showed disapproval of *417this extensive and long-lasting campaign against Vierra. Accordingly, it ratified those acts.
II
The Preliminary Injunction
Six individuals were found in contempt. The judgment of contempt should be vacated as to the four individuals against whom there is no proof of actual knowledge. I concur that the contempt order, count 16, as to Antonio Barba be vacated. However, the contempt order should also be vacated as to Tony Hinojosa, count 43; Donato Zavala, count 21; and Charles Johnson, count 29. The record shows that they were not served; neither was there any showing of knowledge on their part. The testimony was that a pile of about 30 copies of the order was placed on a chair next to a pickup that served as headquarters for the picketers. I consider this “service,” or notice, inadequate. Criminal contempt proceedings are of a very serious nature. Its basis in terms of notice must be more solid than shown in this record.
Accordingly, I concur and dissent as set forth above.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 29, 1977. Reynoso, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 29, 1977. Bird, C. J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.