Court Opinion

ID: 9448869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:47:20.564812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:35.222006
License: Public Domain

JONES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority would permit an estoppel against the United States because it did not inform the appellant, prior to the time for which the tax was assessed, of its construction of the statute. Estoppel must be based on representation or concealment of facts and not as to matters of law. First National Bank of Montgomery v. United States, D.C.N.D.Ala. 1959, 176 F.Supp. 768, aff. 5 Cir., 285 F.2d 123.
The tax is imposed by the statute. If, under the statute the appellant’s fishing pole is a fishing rod, the lack of a ruling by the Commissioner would not exempt it from the tax. If, under the statute, the appellant’s fishing pole is not a fishing rod, a ruling of the Commissioner would not make it so. In neither case would a tax liability or exemption result from the appellant’s knowledge or lack of knowledge of a Commissioner’s ruling.
The exact question here, as I read the record, decided against the Government was decided against the taxpayer in Commerce-Pacific, Inc. v. United States, 9th Cir. 1960, 278 F.2d 651. In the opinion of the court it was said:
“In our view the district court correctly decided that the jointed bamboo cane poles here in issue are ‘fishing rods’ within the meaning of Section 4161 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. They were there- ■ fore, properly taxable and the judgment of the lower court must be and is affirmed.” 278 F.2d 651, 655.
The majority distinguish the Ninth Circuit case because there each section of the rod, or pole, has string wrapped around the bamboo near the end, and here there is no string wrapping. I hope my *946brothers of the majority will not think me lacking in respect if I suggest that they have a rather tenuous string with which to hang their distinction. I would follow the Commerce-Pacific case. Therefore I DISSENT.