Court Opinion

ID: 9647754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:49:36.059205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:53.125979
License: Public Domain

MELINSON, Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion of our distinguished colleague, Judge Hester. I take this opportunity solely to note my opinion that Sections 203 and 302 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act have outlived their usefulness. Section 203 states as follows:
An employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of the employer’s regular business entrusted to such employe or contractor, shall be liable to such laborer or assistant in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employe.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, art. II, § 203, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 520, § 1 et seq., 77 Pa.Stat. Ann. § 52. From this parcel of legislative enactment sprung the case law that the majority was constrained to follow in rendering its decision at bar. See McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287, 153 A. 424 (1930); O’Boyle v. J.C.A. Corporation, 372 Pa.Super. 1, 538 A.2d 915 (1988); Majority Memorandum at 7-12.
Section 302 was recently amended in 1974. Subsection (a) of this section, in pertinent part, states as follows:
A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his insurer shall be liable for the payment of compensation to the employes of the subcontractors unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of such compensation has secured its payment as pro*73vided for in this act. Any contractor or his insurer who shall become liable hereunder for such compensation may recover the amount thereof paid and any necessary expenses from the subcontractor primarily liable therefor.
77 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 461 (emphasis added).
Subsection (b) of Section 302 states:
Any employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employe or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of such employer’s regular business entrusted to that employe or contractor, shall be liable for the payment of compensation to such laborer or assistant unless the hiring employe or contractor, if primarily for the payment of such compensation, has secured the payment thereof as provided for in this act. Any employer or his insurer who shall become liable hereunder for such compensation may recover the amount thereof paid and any necessary expenses from another person if the latter is primarily liable thereof.
77 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 462 (emphasis added).
While Section 302 is substantially similar to Section 203, there is no mention whatsoever in Section 302 that it is replacing or amending the provisions of Section 203. Accordingly, ambivalence has resulted in appellate decisions. This court has both utilized Section 203 exclusively and has given effect to both Sections 203 and 302 in interpreting statutory employer immunity. See and compare O’Boyle v. J.C.A. Corporation, 372 Pa.Super. 1, 538 A.2d 915 (1988), with Cranshaw Construction Inc. v. Ghrist, 290 Pa.Super. 286, 434 A.2d 756 (1981). In contrast, our Commonwealth Court has recently cited Section 302 as the amendment to Section 203, employing the language of 302 solely to decide the same issue. Ace Tire Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 101 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 515 A.2d 1020 (1986). Clearly, confusion abounds as to which legislative enactment represents the Commonwealth’s position on *74statutory employer immunity. Under the standards of both sections, however, I believe that the statutory employer immunity doctrine articulated is contrary to basic tenets of American law.
Under these sections, general contractors are completely insulated from tort liability for negligent or grossly negligent acts. Furthermore, as is clear from their language, these sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act “operate to relieve [the general contractor] from payment of [workmen’s] compensation by placing that responsibility upon the subcontractor.” Capazzoli v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation, 352 Pa. 183, 188, 42 A.2d 524, 526 (1945); see also Cranshaw, 290 Pa.Super. 286, 434 A.2d 756. As stated by Arthur Larson, James B. Duke Professor of Law at the Duke University School of Law, “in the increasingly common situation displaying a hierarchy of principal contractors upon subcontractors upon subcontractors, if an employee of the lowest subcontractor on the totem pole is injured, there is no practical reason for reaching up the hierarchy any further than the first insured contractor.” Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 49.14.
Thus, the effect of these abhorrent legislative pronouncements is to absolve a general contractor of any and all responsibility for negligent or grossly negligent conduct without even imposing upon that contractor the corresponding duty to compensate an injured employee under Workers’ Compensation. Our judicial system is based upon the concept that individuals and corporations alike will be held accountable for their mistakes and indiscretions. To allow general contractors to escape from any sort of liability for injuries to the employees of their subcontractors, without any examination of the circumstances of the injury, clearly runs counter to this fundamental concept.