Court Opinion

ID: 9703336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:52:35.022275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:09.415332
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). This case presents two issues on review; the majority decided only one issue, and I think the majority decided the lesser important issue.
The issues are: (1) Whether the defendant’s prior convictions were admissible to prove intent and (2) whether the defendant waived his right to challenge the admissibility of the convictions because he introduced the evidence of the convictions on direct examination after the trial court held that it would allow the state to introduce the evidence on cross-examination. *93The majority decided the first issue. This court has decided numerous cases involving admissibility of prior crimes evidence. The rule is clear; it is the application of the rule to each particular fact situation which is troublesome.
It is the second issue, however, which is the more important one for this court to decide if it is to serve its review function. It is this question, rather than the question of the admissibility of conviction evidence, which is a “novel one, the resolution of which will have state-wide impact.” In re Standards to Review Petitions to Appeal, 85 Wis.2d xiii (1978).
I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the first issue. Prior crime evidence is admissible if it is relevant to the issue of intent, and in the instant case, to the issue of “intent to use such device or instrumentality to break into a depository, building, or room, and to steal therefrom” (sec. 943.12, Stats. 1975). I do not think that on this record we can say that the two prior convictions of burglary are relevant to the issue of intent.
This court has repeatedly said that the admissibility of the prior conduct evidence depends “upon its probative value which depends in part upon its nearness in time, place and circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought to be proved.” Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 294, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 959. As I noted in Peasley v. State, 83 Wis.2d 224, 238, 265 N.W.2d 506 (1978) (Abrahamson, J. dissenting), it is this very requirement of similarity which leaves so much room for difference of opinion and accounts for the variances in the decisions on the issue of admissibility of evidence of prior conduct to prove an element of the crime charged.
The prior convictions in this case are not as close in time to the offense charged in this case as the majority opinion indicates. The prior crimes evidence admitted *94here consisted of two convictions for two burglaries; one burglary was committed in September 1974 (two years, six months before this charge), the other in January 1975 (two years, two months before this charge).
The record is silent on the nature of the prior burglaries, and we cannot evaluate the similarities of circumstances between those burglaries and the offense charged to determine if the prior burglaries are relevant to the issue of intent. The majority opinion holds the prior convictions relevant, reasoning that “because the defendant had previously been convicted of burglary, he had knowledge of what tools were necessary or could be used in a burglary.” Knowledge of what tools are useful for burglary is not the equivalent of intent to burglarize. I know what tools could be used in a burglary from reading the Wisconsin Reports. In any event the majority’s reasoning rests on the unstated assumption that the defendant had used burglarious tools to commit the prior burglary. Such an assumption is not valid. Not every burglary involves an actual breaking. To prove burglary, the state need prove only an unlawful entry; it need not prove a breaking. Sec. 943.-10, Stats. 1975, provides:
“(1) Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony therein may be imprisoned not more than 10 years:
“ (a) Any building or dwelling; or
“(b) An enclosed railroad car; or
“(c) An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or
“(d) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or
“(e) A room within any of the above.
“(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) under any of the following circumstances may be imprisoned not more than 20 years:
“(a) While armed with a dangerous weapon; or
*95“(b) While unarmed, but arms himself with a dangerous weapon while still in the burglarized enclosure; or
“(c) While in the burglarized enclosure opens, or attempts to open, any depository by use of an explosive; or
“(d) While in the burglarized enclosure commits a battery upon a person lawfully therein.
“(3) For the purpose of this section, entry into a place during the time when it is open to the general public is with consent.”
In Gilbertson v. State, 69 Wis.2d 587, 595, 230 N.W.2d 874 (1975), we said that “it is not necessary to prove the defendant had to or did break and enter the generating room; it includes the nonbreaking, unlawful entry, which was the case here.” Because we do not know if the defendant in his prior burglaries used tools to break into a building, the prior convictions are not relevant in the instant case to prove the defendant intended to use the tools to break into a building.
The majority’s opinion also rests on the unstated assumption that the defendant’s prior convictions for burglary show defendant’s intent to steal. Such an assumption is not valid. Not every burglary involves an intent to steal. In the crime of burglary the specific intent that must be proved by the state is either the intent to steal or the intent to commit a felony.
The defendant’s prior convictions for burglary could have been premised on an unlawful entry (but not a breaking) with the intent to commit a felony other than stealing. I do not think a conviction of burglary based on such facts would be relevant to the crime charged in the instant case which is intent to use tools to break into a building to steal. Thus, in order for the trial court or this court to conclude that the prior convictions were admissible, because they were relevant to the issue of intent to use tools to break into the building *96and steal, the state had to show more than the bare fact of a conviction for burglary. The state had to show that the prior convictions were probative because of their “nearness in time, place and circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought to be proved.” Whitty v. State, supra 34 Wis.2d at 294.
I am persuaded, as was the court of appeals, that the use of the evidence of prior convictions in the case at bar tended to prove character, not intent. And even if the evidence might be considered relevant to the issue of intent, in the circumstances of this case its probative value was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” and should have been excluded. Sec. 904.03, Stats.
In State v. Young, 425 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. 1968), which the majority cites as authority for its position, the Missouri court reversed the conviction, because the only evidence in the case was defendant’s possession of tools and his previous convictions. The Missouri court said that it “found no case which upholds conviction of possession of burglar’s tools on mere possession of tools of such equivocal nature . . . without more on which to base possession with a burglarious intent than appears here.” 425 S.W.2d at 182. The court in Young described the prejudice that could result to a defendant under the holding adopted by the majority of this court, namely that a person previously convicted of burglary stands a high risk of conviction on possession of ordinary tools. I find the reasoning of the Missouri court persuasive to overturn the conviction in the instant case:
“Furthermore, if a conviction can stand merely on a showing of possession of tools which can be used for legitimate purposes as well as for burglary, together with proof of a prior conviction, no released convict could ever safely be in possession of working tools no matter how honest his actual intentions might be.” Id. at pp. 182, 183.
*97In the other cases from four states cited by the majority on page 88 of its opinion as allowing evidence of prior conviction, the convictions were based on more evidence than the possession of tools and a prior conviction. In most of the cases, either the defendant was connected with a robbery or burglary which occurred shortly before his arrest on the charge of possession of burglarious tools or the defendant had in his possession recently stolen goods.
In the case at bar, there is no such “other evidence.” There was no reported burglary in the vicinity in which the defendants were arrested. The defendants were not found under circumstances that made it appear that they were about to break into a building. The testimony of the police was that they were called to the scene not to investigate a possible burglary or other similar suspicious circumstances but to investigate the source of loud noises. A police officer testified that it was highly unusual for a burglar to make loud noises before committing the crime. When the defendant and his companion were stopped by the police, they did not attempt to resist arrest, or flee from the scene; they answered the officer’s questions, although apparently not always truthfully. Although a fact-finder might have reached a guilty verdict on the basis of these circumstances (compare Hansen v. State, 64 Wis.2d 541, 219 N.W.2d 246 (1974)) the admission of the evidence of the prior convictions tainted the trial and was prejudicial error. Hart v. State, 75 Wis.2d 371, 395, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1976).
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals for the reasons stated herein.
I am authorized to state that Justice Heffernan joins in this dissent.