Court Opinion

ID: 9587983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:28:35.106374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:56.688577
License: Public Domain

*243KAUS, J.
I concur on my understanding that part II of the court’s opinion does not intend to transplant the philosophy of Hocharian v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 714 [170 Cal.Rptr. 790, 621 P.2d 829] from section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure—its former habitat—to subdivision (b) of section 583. Hocharian, of course, is generally understood to mean that in cases involving mandatory dismissals for failure to prosecute, the key issue is the plaintiff’s diligence, rather than the existence of a specific judicially developed exception or exceptions. As far as section 581a is concerned, the Legislature quickly amended that statute by adding subdivision (f) to nullify Hocharian (Stats. 1982, ch. 600, § 1, p. 2575).1 The exceptions allowed by that amendment are, of course, those which have long been judicially recognized as qualifying section 583, subdivision (b). The 1982 legislation is therefore not merely a repudiation of Hocharian, but an affirmation of preHocharian law with respect to section 583, subdivision (b).
While certain passages of part II of the court’s opinion are reminiscent of Hocharian, they are not necessarily at odds with the 1982 legislation. The opinion does rely on Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 95, 105 [191 Cal.Rptr. 549], where there the Court of Appeal held: “[W]e believe reasonable diligence constitutes a guideline by which to assess the existing exceptions of impossibility, impracticability or futility. ” (My italics.) No one can quarrel with that formulation.
The facts depicted in the court’s opinion persuade me that under all the circumstances it was impracticable for plaintiff to bring the case to trial within the statutory period and that she was not guilty of such a lack of diligence as would estop her from claiming that the impracticability exception applies to her.
Grodin, J., concurred.

 “(f) Except as provided in this section, the provisions of this section are mandatory and are not excusable, and the times within which acts are to be done are jurisdictional. Compliance may be excused only for either of the following reasons: [¶] (1) Where the defendant or cross-defendant is estopped to complain, [¶] (2) Where it would be impossible, impracticable, or futile to comply due to causes beyond a party’s control. However, failure to discover relevant facts or evidence shall not excuse compliance.”