Court Opinion

ID: 9635732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:01:53.681182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:11.480991
License: Public Domain

Duncan, J.,
dissenting in part: I concur in all of the foregoing *449opinion, except section II thereof. In my judgment the order requiring the defendant to produce the guest registrations should be vacated, and I therefore dissent from section II of the opinion for reasons hereinafter expressed.
As a result of Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497, the investigation authorized by the Legislature of this state is now limited to investigation of the question of “whether subversive persons as defined in said [1951] act are presently located within this state” (Laws 1953, c. 307) and whether “necessary legislation” should on that account be recommended. Id. The right of the committee “to exact testimony and to call for the production of documents must be found in this language.” United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 44. See also, United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791; United States v. Lamont, 236 F. (2d) 312. The inquiry must therefore be pertinent to the issue of whether subversive persons “are presently located within this state” if it is to be permitted.
The committee’s demand for production of the guest registrations was supported by no claim of information in the possession of the committee concerning the guests (other than speakers) ,to indicate that their identification by name might relate to the subj ect matter of the investigation. Cf. Wyman v. Sweezy, 100 N. H. 103, 112. The demand rested only upon the testimony of the witness as to the total number of guests for each season, in the course of which he stated that “very few” of the guests came from the State of New Hampshire.
In Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, it was pointed out that a question may not be sustained as relevant “on a mere possibility that it might lead to later relevant questions” (Id., 106); and that the resolution authorizing the investigation “does not . . . authorize [the Attorney General] to examine private citizens indiscriminately in the mere hope of stumbling upon valuable information.” Id., 110. The information sought by the committee is not limited to the names of guests resident here (Cf. Rumely v. United States, 197 F. (2d) 166, 176) nor is it represented that the names cannot be obtained by less objectionable methods (see Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 542; note, 56 Col. L. Rev. 798, 801), or that production of the registrations may show the activities of the Center to be subversive. The conduct of the guests does not fall within the same category as that of the defendant and speakers at the Center, which has consisted of public endorsement and advocacy *450of ideas; and no suggestion has been made that by mere presence at the Center the guests became members of any organization, or advocated any action, lawful or otherwise. The committee seeks to know “who was there,” in order by further examination to “find out what went on.”
In view of the restricted purpose of the investigation, which is more closely confined than the purposes of the congressional investigations with which the cases relied upon by the majority were concerned, production of the registrations is at best only a diffused and remote approach to the issue of whether subversive persons are “presently located” in New Hampshire, and can of itself become relevant only when coupled with other relevant information concerning the guests which is not shown to be at hand. See United States v. Mathues, 33 F. (2d) 261; United States v. Barry, 29 F. (2d) 817; Bowers v. United States, 202 F. (2d) 447. See also, Watkins v. United States, 233 F. (2d) 681, 694. “It is clear that authority over a subject matter does not import authority over all activities of persons concerned in that subject matter.” Rumely v. United States, 197 F. (2d) 166, 176.
Enforcement of the subpoena goes beyond the inquiry held relevant in Wyman v. Sweezy, supra. It calls for the names of persons largely nonresident who assembled at different times, ostensibly to discuss topics of religious, political, and economic import. The “possible answer” will not of itself be concerned with the “main object of investigation.” (Id., 106).
The order of the Court will operate as a deterrent upon the right of free speech and peaceable assembly guaranteed by the Constitution. Wyman v. Sweezy, supra, 113. See Edgerton, dissenting, Barsky v. United States, 167 F. (2d) 241, 254. Constitutional rights of the guests as well as of the witness are involved, and the Court need not restrict itself to consideration of the rights of the witness alone. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249; Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 187; Comment: Inquiry Into Political Activity, 65 Yale L. J. 1159, 1183-1189. The role of the guests with respect to the subject matter was not essentially different from that of the purchasers of pamphlets pertaining to national issues in the Rumely case supra. “On a record such as this, so slim a semblance of pertinency is not enough to justify inquisition violative of the First Amendment.” Rumely v. United States, 197 F. (2d) 166, 172. See also, United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 46.
*451The record does not disclose such a public necessity for production of the registrations as to warrant abridgment of the privilege of the individuals concerned to exercise their civil liberties free from threatened involvement in the legislative investigation of subversive persons.
I am authorized to state that Goodnow, J., concurs in this dissent.