Court Opinion

ID: 9896014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:04.317174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:46.100119
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2022-CA-1058-MR

MATTHEW M. JACKSON                                                  APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 03-CR-00333

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Matthew M. Jackson appeals from the Warren Circuit

Court’s denial of his postconviction motion brought under Kentucky Rule of

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 and Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR)

60.02. We affirm.

            This case has a tangled procedural history, which we shall greatly

condense. Jackson was indicted on a host of charges in the Warren Circuit Court
related to robberies of video stores. Jackson had previously “pled guilty in the

Robertson Circuit Court in Tennessee to the late-night robbery of a Nashville-area

Blockbuster store after being apprehended at the scene. Jackson also pled guilty to

raping a female employee of that store.” Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-

000777-MR, 2005 WL 2045482, at *1 (Ky. Aug. 25, 2005) (Jackson I). Jackson

also confessed to the Tennessee authorities that he had “robb[ed] several

Nashville-area Blockbuster stores . . . .” Id. Because of their similarities to the

Kentucky offenses, the Warren Circuit Court permitted the Commonwealth to

introduce evidence of the Tennessee robberies as “signature crimes.” Id.

             After trial, a Warren Circuit Court jury acquitted Jackson of some

offenses but found him guilty of three counts of complicity to first-degree robbery

and three counts of complicity to first-degree burglary. Jackson was sentenced to a

total of sixty years’ imprisonment. Our Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal,

rejecting Jackson’s argument that the Warren Circuit Court erred by allowing the

Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the Tennessee crimes. Id. at * 3-5.

             Jackson then began a lengthy quest for postconviction relief from

Tennessee state courts, federal courts, and Kentucky state courts. Jackson’s

federal postconviction petitions have been unsuccessful. Jackson v. Cameron, No.

21-5429, 2022 WL 1279731, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2022) (affirming the denial of

postconviction relief and discussing Jackson’s federal postconviction history).

                                          -2-
             However, as it relates to this case, a Tennessee appellate court ordered

an evidentiary hearing to be held by a Robertson County, Tennessee trial court on

Jackson’s claim that he “did not enter his guilty pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently [to two counts of aggravated rape] because he did not know he would

be subject to the requirement of community supervision for life.” Tennessee v.

Jackson, M2018-01971-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 405474, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Jan. 24, 2020). In 2021, the Robertson County, Tennessee trial court granted

Jackson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he had not been advised of

the lifetime supervision requirement. The limited record before us does not

disclose any subsequent proceedings regarding those charges.

             Meanwhile, Jackson has filed numerous postconviction motions in

Kentucky state courts. We outlined those filings in a previous appeal:

                    On December 4, 2006, Jackson returned to the
             Warren Circuit Court and sought post-conviction relief
             pursuant to RCr 11.42. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 03-
             CR-000333 (Warren Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2006) (motion to
             vacate sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42). The circuit court
             denied that relief on June 15, 2007, so Jackson appealed
             that denial to this Court. Jackson v. Commonwealth, No.
             2007-CA-001396-MR (Ky. App. July 10, 2007) (notice
             of appeal). . . . Jackson filed a motion to dismiss the RCr
             11.42 appeal, which was granted on February 13, 2008.
             Id. (Feb. 13, 2008 orders granting/dismissing).

                    Again, Jackson turned to Warren Circuit Court for
             relief. He filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02 asking the
             circuit court to reconsider the denial of his first request
             for RCr 11.42 relief, but the court denied the motion.

                                         -3-
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 03-CR-000333 (Warren Cir.
Ct. May 12, 2008) (order denying motion to reconsider
RCr 11.42 pursuant to CR 60.02). Jackson did not appeal
that denial to the Court of Appeals.

      He did, however, file a new CR 60.02 motion in
Warren Circuit Court that was denied on November 3,
2008. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-
000329-MR (Ky. App. Nov. 3, 2008) (circuit court
judgment). He appealed that order.

       In his second post-judgment appeal, this time of
the denial of his CR 60.02 motion, Jackson was
represented by the DPA. He did not perfect that appeal
but instead eventually moved to dismiss it. Jackson v.
Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-000329-MR (Ky. App.
Sept. 21, 2009) (motion to dismiss). The Court granted
that motion. Id. (Nov. 20, 2009 order
granting/dismissing).

       Jackson then caused a new file to be opened in the
Court of Appeals by filing a motion for a belated appeal.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2011-CA-002072-MR
(Ky. App. Nov. 14, 2011) (motion for belated appeal).
This motion identified the appealed judgment as the same
November 3, 2008 circuit court order denying CR 60.02
relief. Id. (Nov. 3, 2008 circuit court judgment).
Because the prior appeal was timely, his motion for a
belated appeal was denied. Id. (Apr. 23, 2012) (order
denying belated appeal).

       On June 29, 2015, Jackson filed a motion for relief
pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02, or in the alternative
pursuant to [Kentucky Revised Statute] KRS 419.020 for
a writ of habeas corpus. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 03-
CR-000333 (Warren Cir. Ct. June 29, 2015) (motion).
On April 9, 2018, the Warren Circuit Court denied
Jackson’s motions. Id. (April 9, 2018 order).

                           -4-
Jackson v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-000653-MR, 2019 WL 6998657, at *1-2

(Ky. App. Dec. 20, 2019) (footnote and paragraph break omitted) (Jackson II).

              We affirmed the Warren Circuit Court’s denial of relief in Jackson II,

primarily because Jackson raised arguments which he could have presented in his

previous postconviction motions. Id. at *2-3 (citing, e.g., Cardwell v.

Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Ky. App. 2011)).

              Despite our admonition in Jackson II that successive postconviction

motions are impermissible, Jackson filed the motion at hand in 2021. Although the

motion is hazy at times, we perceive that it again attacks the Warren Circuit

Court’s decision to allow presentation of evidence of the Tennessee crimes at trial

in light of the fact that Jackson’s Robertson County, Tennessee convictions were

vacated in 2021. In a supplement to his motion, Jackson also argues his counsel

was ineffective for not properly informing Jackson of the fact that his offenses

required him to serve 85% of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole and

that “the Commonwealth has forfeited waiver of jurisdiction” by not more quickly

requiring him to be transferred from custody in Tennessee to custody in Kentucky.

The trial court denied the motion as successive. Jackson then filed this appeal.1

1
  Issuance of this Opinion was delayed because we temporarily placed the appeal in abeyance to
allow the trial court to rule on Jackson’s CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate.

                                             -5-
              We begin by noting the limited record before us, which does not

include the record of Jackson’s trial or his previous postconviction motions.

Jackson did not designate further matters to be included with the record in this

appeal, nor did he object to the notice of certification prepared by the circuit clerk

which shows the written record to contain only ninety-eight pages. “Our precedent

is clear. When an appellate court does not have a complete record before it, that

court must assume that the omitted portion supports the trial court’s decision.”

Commonwealth v. Woods, 657 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Ky. 2022). Thus, we must

assume the relevant portions of the record of Jackson’s previous proceedings

support the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.2

              Typically, we would begin by discussing matters like our standards of

review and what a movant must show to demonstrate ineffective assistance of

counsel. However, we need not discuss those matters because this motion is fatally

successive. We repeat what we stressed in Jackson II: Jackson is not entitled to

multiple, successive attempts to gain postconviction relief under either RCr 11.42

2
  We reject Jackson’s argument that this motion is not successive because his previous appeals
were allegedly dismissed on procedural grounds. The reason(s) why Jackson sought to dismiss
his previous appeals from the denials of postconviction relief is irrelevant. The bottom-line
takeaway is that Jackson filed previous postconviction motions and thus cannot raise here issues
which he could, and should, have raised previously. The mere existence of those prior motions
makes this one fatally successive. Accordingly, we shall not order the record to be supplemented
to provide us with the contents of his previous motions.

                                              -6-
or CR 60.02. See, e.g., Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014).

Accordingly, the postconviction motion at hand is fatally successive.

             For example, Jackson argues his trial counsel was ineffective.

Jackson’s trial was roughly twenty years ago and thus he could, and should, have

raised any ineffectiveness arguments previously. The same conclusion applies to

Jackson’s persistent argument that the Warren Circuit Court erred by allowing

signature crime evidence pertaining to his Tennessee offenses. That argument was

rejected by our Supreme Court in Jackson I. Longstanding Kentucky precedent

holds that “[i]t is not the purpose of RCr 11.42 to permit a convicted defendant to

retry issues which could and should have been raised in the original proceeding,

nor those that were raised in the trial court and upon an appeal considered by this

court.” Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ky. 1972).

             The only arguments in Jackson’s motion which are not plainly

doomed as successive are his newly discovered evidence-type arguments

pertaining to the vacation of his Robertson County, Tennessee convictions. CR

60.02(f) permits relief based on newly discovered evidence only if the new

evidence is “of such decisive value or force that it would, with reasonable

certainty, have changed the verdict or that it would probably change the result if a

new trial should be granted.” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 886 (citations omitted).

                                         -7-
             Jackson’s Tennessee convictions were vacated because he was not

properly informed that a rape conviction would result in post-incarceration

supervision. In other words, the Tennessee convictions were vacated on grounds

unrelated to Jackson’s guilt, and he may be convicted afresh of those offenses.

The fact that Jackson was not informed of the post-incarceration supervision

consequences under Tennessee law for rape convictions has nothing to do with the

fairness of his Kentucky trial or the validity of his Kentucky robbery convictions.

             We also reject Jackson’s argument that he is entitled to relief under

CR 60.02(e), which provides in relevant part that a party is entitled to relief from a

final judgment if “a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or

otherwise vacated . . . .” Though he vehemently argues to the contrary, Jackson’s

Kentucky convictions were not based on the Tennessee convictions simply because

evidence of some Tennessee offenses were discussed in his Kentucky trial.

Similarly, as explained by the trial court, Jackson properly remains in custody in

Tennessee awaiting resolution of the charges which were vacated.

             In short, Jackson has presented nothing “of such decisive value or

force that it would, with reasonable certainty, have changed the verdict or that it

would probably change the result if a new trial should be granted.” Foley, 425

S.W.3d at 886 (citations omitted). Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on any

of his “newly discovered evidence” claims stemming from some of his Tennessee

                                         -8-
convictions having been vacated. And the remainder of his claims are fatally

successive. We have considered all the arguments in the parties’ briefs and reject

as irrelevant, redundant, improperly preserved for our review, or otherwise without

merit any arguments contained in the briefs which are not discussed in this

Opinion.

            For the foregoing reasons, the Warren Circuit Court is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Matthew M. Jackson, pro se                Daniel Cameron
Springfield, Tennessee                    Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Stephanie L. McKeehan
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -9-