Court Opinion

ID: 9852821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:37:22.059863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:35.103058
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
In this case, the trial court held that the City’s moratorium on the implementation of its then-existing sign ordinance was a “zoning decision” within the meaning of OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) and, thus, was subject to the requirements of the Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL), OCGA § 36-66-1 et seq. The majority reverses, but, in my opinion, the trial court was correct. Therefore, I dissent.
The express purpose of the ZPL is “to establish as state policy” minimum procedural safeguards “to assure that due process is afforded to the general public when local governments regulate the uses of property through the exercise of the zoning power.” OCGA § 36-66-2 (a). In furtherance of this goal of insuring protection of the constitutional rights of private property owners, the ZPL adopted the following definition of “zoning”:
the power of local governments to provide within their respective territorial boundaries for the zoning or districting of property for various uses and the prohibition of other or different uses within such zones or districts and for the regulation of development and the improvement of real estate within such zones or districts in accordance with the uses of property for which such zones or districts were established.
OCGA § 36-66-3 (3). Clearly, this is an inclusive definition, and certainly broad enough to encompass the power of a local government to enact a comprehensive ordinance which regulates the right of owners to use their property for the purpose of erecting and maintaining signs.
Although the City’s sign ordinance is itself a “zoning ordinance” within the meaning of OCGA § 36-66-3 (5) because it regulates the use to which the owner of property within the municipal territorial boundaries may put his or her property, the question presented in this case is whether the enactment of a moratorium on the continued implementation of that ordinance is a “zoning decision” within the *136meaning of OCGA § 36-66-3 (4). The majority concludes that the moratorium is not within that definition because it did not constitute “final legislative action” as provided in OCGA § 36-66-3 (4). However, the fallacy in this reasoning is apparent. The moratorium was undeniably “final” insofar as the enforceability of the City’s then-existing sign ordinance was concerned. I submit that an enactment which terminates a property owner’s right to pursue a particular use is certainly a procedural device which serves to regulate that use and, consequently, would be a “zoning ordinance” as defined by OCGA § 36-66-3 (5). See Atlanta Bio-Med v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga. 594, 596 (2) (408 SE2d 100) (1991) (rescission of a zoning ordinance is a “zoning decision”). If the moratorium is a “zoning ordinance,” then its adoption by the City is a “zoning decision” as defined by OCGA § 36-66-3 (4) (A). If the promulgation of the moratorium is a “zoning decision,” then the City, in order to provide minimum due process to the property owners within its territorial boundaries, must comply with the procedural requirements of OCGA § 36-66-4. It is undisputed that the City did not do so, but summarily refused to enforce Outdoor Systems’ rights as a property owner under the then-existing municipal sign ordinance.
Decided July 2, 2001
Reconsideration denied July 26, 2001.
Carothers & Mitchell, Richard A. Carothers, William M. Coolidge III, for appellants.
Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David H. Flint, Mark W. Forsling, for appellee.
Bovis, Kyle & Burch, John V. Burch, Susan M. Pruett, James F Grubiak, Ted C. Baggett, Kelly J. Pridgen, Phears & Moldovan, H. Wayne Phears, amici curiae.
In my opinion, the trial court correctly concluded that the failure to comply with the mandatory procedural requirements of the ZPL compelled the City to consider Outdoor Systems’ rights in accordance with the law in effect prior to the enactment of the void moratorium. The majority takes the contrary position that a local government can control, and even prohibit, a property owner’s use of his or her own property without satisfying the minimum due process requirements mandated under the ZPL. Thus, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s proper disposition of this case.