Court Opinion

ID: 9625003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:24:38.470248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:58.827234
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants Kluger, Warner and Kestenberg assert for the first time on motion for rehearing that even assuming service of process to be governed by Title 36-6A, *596it was not proper since Code Ann. § 36-610a requires nonresident service by registered mail and they were served by certified mail. They cite Johnson v. Johnson, 218 Ga. 28, 30 (5) (126 SE2d 229) (1962), wherein Chief Justice Duckworth stated by way of obiter dictum that a statute requiring registered mail should be strictly construed. They reiterate their argument that they should have been made parties defendant before any service could properly be made upon them.
We decline to reverse the trial court upon these grounds at this time. "Condemnation is a special statutory procedure and Code Ann. § 36-605a provides that upon petition, the superior court shall make an order requiring all persons concerned to appear before a special master, between 10 and 15 days from service, to make known all matters material to their rights. The petition and order serve as all necessary process. The court may also order a continuance for good cause. Code Ann. § 36-611a.
"We believe this sets up a specific rule of practice and procedure, especially in view of the stated purpose of the chapter, i.e., 'to provide a simpler and more effective method of condemnation’ where there is a 'necessity for a quick determination’ or where, for several reasons, a judicial supervision is desirable. Code Ann. § 36-602a. It is well established that all legal issues relating to the condemnation may be raised and determined in the special master proceeding. If no exceptions are taken to the master’s findings or no regular appeal taken from the judgment based on his award, the only issue remaining is that of value. [Cits.]
"It seems clear that where there has been a final adjudication in a proceeding designed to be expeditious, a party may not later tender an answer to the petition under general rules of civil practice. The time for the filing of defensive pleadings (as opposed to their sufficiency) is governed by the duration of the special statutory procedure.” Nodvin v. Ga. Power Co., 125 Ga. App. 821, 822 (2) (189 SE2d 118) (1972).
"All the more is it true that one who fails to file a proper claim or make a timely protest to the judgment may not, after many terms of court have intervened, open *597up the case on the sole ground that he is entitled to a portion of the proceeds.” Roberts v. Wise, 140 Ga. App. 1, 3, supra.
The condemnation petition here was filed against, among others, the limited partnership Southeastern Industries, specifically designating and serving the three general partners Kestenberg, Warner and Kluger by sending each of them a copy of the complaint by certified mail. No motions for insufficiency of process were filed. A condemnation hearing was held at which the partnership and the other fee simple interest holders were represented by counsel. Atlanta Warehouses, West End Warehouses, Irving Trust Company and Southeastern Industries by and through Kestenberg, Warner and Kluger, each of whom signed a document entitled "Agreement as to Disbursement of Condemnation Proceeds,” agreed how they would draw the funds once the award was entered and paid into court. This document was filed, and it was not filed in the nature of a special appearance. Pursuant thereto, upon payment into the registry of the court of the award of $4,360,000, an order was obtained disbursing the funds with Kestenberg receiving $100,000. Not until after the appeal, and trial of the case in which the jury returned a verdict of $4,100,000 and the court subsequently awarded attorney fees and expenses to the condemnees did these appellants allege lack of service in their motion to set aside the judgment.
It is clear that here, as in Taylor v. Taylor County, 231 Ga. 209, 210 (200 SE2d 887) (1973), "the condemnees had adequate notice of the special master hearing, they filed defenses that were considered and ruled on by the special master, and after the special master’s award they filed an appeal to a jury in the superior court. Under these circumstances, the rights of the appellants were adequately protected even if they had no service at all prior to the special master hearing.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, we do not reach the question of whether service by certified mail was improper, for under the interpretation of the condemnation statute set forth in the Taylor, Nodvin and Roberts decisions quoted above the issue was not timely raised and must be deemed waived. See also in this connection Code Ann. §§ 81A-112 (b) (4), (5), 81A-112 (h), *5986-810. Remaining grounds of the motion for rehearing having been considered and rejected on appeal, it must therefore be denied.