Court Opinion

ID: 9849626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:22.770389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.334314
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice.
This case is an appeal by the brothers Zamora from a judgment of conviction of unlawful possession of narcotics. Felipe and Ricardo Zamora were jointly tried before a jury, found guilty as charged and sentenced by the trial judge to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed ten years. They have appealed from that judgment assigning error in the admission of certain evidence obtained as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure.
We affirm the judgment of conviction. The present state of the law requires a judicial examination into the reasonableness of the search which turns upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. We therefore are required to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search which produced the evidence, the admission of which is complained of in the case at bar.
In the early evening on June 29, 1968, the Zamoras were apprehended and arrested following a high speed chase of Richardo Zamora’s automobile during which Felipe Zamora was observed throwing a tobacco can and other items from the automobile. The Zamora vehicle was overtaken and stopped and the three men taken into custody. The officers immediately retraced the course of travel and, among other items, recovered the tobacco can, which contained 17 grams of marijuana.
An officer drove the Zamora vehicle to the Canyon County sheriff’s office where the Zamoras and Garza were booked for narcotics possession. While the booking was taking place the interior of the Zamora automobile was searched. No warrant for the search was obtained, the Zamoras were not present at the search and their consent had not been given. Therein were found two paper sacks, one of which contained an additional 10 grams of marijuana and the other of which contained only a trace of marijuana. One sack was not clearly visible from outside the car since it was hidden on top of the glove compartment within the dashboard. During the booking procedure the contents of Garza’s pockets were taken and subsequently analyzed. The pocket residue was found to be lint, fuzz, straw and a trace of marijuana. At trial the tobacco can, the two paper sacks and the residue from the pockets of Garza were all admitted into evidence over defendant’s objections. For the reasons set out below, it is our opinion that the admission of the sacks and tobacco can was correct. Garza did not appear at trial, the residue from his pockets containing a trace of marijuana was not shown to be material to the charge of possession of narcotics by the Zamoras and therefore the admission of such evidence was error, but harmless error not requiring reversal.
We point out initially that prior to the search the law enforcement officers had recovered the tobacco can thrown from the car which contained 17 grams of marijuana. The officers therefore had knowledge that the defendants were in possession of and transporting narcotics in the automobile immediately prior to their apprehension and arrest. We believe this brings the facts in the case at bar substantially within the rule of law set out in cases where the fruits of the crime were in plain sight within the automobile and a warrantless search was therefore justified. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).
Appellants contend that the case at bar is controlled by the decision of Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). That opinion in*627validated a warrantless search by law enforcement officers of defendant’s automobile. Preston, while sitting in his automobile, was arrested on a charge of vagrancy. Thereafter, in the absence of the defendant, a warrantless search was conducted of his automobile and items were found in the trunk thereon which in part resulted in a different criminal charge being lodged against the defendant and said items were admitted into evidence at the trial. In Preston no claim was made that there was any nexus between the reason for which the defendant was arrested and the reason for the search of the automobile. The Court stated, however, in Preston:
“Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar.”
The Court in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967), reiterated certain language from Preston stating:
“We made it clear in Preston that whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and pointed out, in particular, that searches of cars that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property.”
In Cooper the United States Supreme Court distinguished the set of facts in that case from Preston and found the warrant-less search in Cooper reasonable and therefore constitutional.
We hold that Cooper controls the result in this case. Like Cooper, the defendants herein were held on charges closely related to the reason for which the search was conducted. Furthermore, the search was substantially contemporaneous with the-arrest. Under these circumstances, the-conviction must be affirmed and the warrantless search of defendant’s vehicle held constitutional as did the courts in similar-factual situations in the following cases: Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1969); People v. Jones, 38 Ill.2d 427, 231 N.E.2d 580 (1967); People v. Nugara, 39 Ill.2d 482, 236 N.E.2d 693 (1968); People v. Brown, 38 Ill.2d 353, 231 N.E.2d 577 (1967); State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 257 A.2d 699 (1969); United States v. Dento, 382 F.2d 361 (3rd Cir. 1967).
Appellants contend that Cooper is not applicable to the case at bar. They suggest that the warrantless search in Cooper was. inextricably interwoven with and justified by the California statute which allows the impounding of a motor vehicle used to transport narcotics and they therefore reason that the Cooper rationale is only applicable in cases involving an automobile impounding statute such as California. We believe such is an artificial and unduly restrictive reading of Cooper. The same contention has been made and rejected in the following cases: Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, supra; People v. Jones, supra; People v. Nugara, supra; People v. Brown, supra; State v. Hock, supra; and United States v. Dentó, supra. Further, the Court in Cooper based its holding on the federal constitutional rule and could not have based it on the California statute since in fact the California courts have held that the statute does not authorize a search. See 81 Harvard L.Rev. 112; 51 Minnesota L. Rev. 533; 1968 University of Illinois Law Forum 401.
We recognize that the United States Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Wood v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1969), does not agree with the result enunciated herein. However, we believe the previously cited cases from other Circuit Courts and other State Supreme Courts are the better reasoned opinions. *628The Court in United States v. Dentó, supra, stated the matter as follows:
“Under the facts before us Preston v. United States, supra, does not control and we are satisfied that the search before us was reasonable. There are two basic points of departure separating the Preston decision from this appeal. First, unlike Preston the instant search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest (the entire arrest and search procedure was completed within twenty minutes). Secondly, there was a reasonable nexus between the offense the defendant was arrested for and the search of his automobile, where as in Preston the search was entirely unrelated to the arrest on the charge of vagrancy. In distinguishing Preston we do not overlook the statement made by the Supreme Court that ‘[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.’ 376 U.S. 364 at 367, 84 S.Ct. 881 at 883. However, no situations are identical and a judicial examination into the reasonableness of a search depends a great deal upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Cf. United States ex. rel. Murphy v. State of New Jersey, 260 F.Supp. 987 (D.N.J.1965), aff’d, 369 F.2d 698 (3 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 965, 87 S.Ct. 1044, 18 L.Ed.2d 114 (1967). Explaining Preston, the Supreme Court stated in Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 790, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967):
‘We made it clear in Preston that whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and pointed out, in particular, that searches of cars that are constantly movable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although the result might be the opposite in a search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property.’
“Thus, in the ambiance which marked the search of the defendant’s car the officers were justified in taking reasonable safety precautions, necessitating the removal of the cars from the highway, and seeing to it that those precautions should not invalidate a search otherwise incidental and reasonable. Therefore, since there was no violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, the evidence seized by the New Jersey State Police was properly introduced at trial.”
We particularly note herein that we are not informed nor does the record disclose the charge for which the defendants herein were initially arrested when their car was stopped by the law enforcement officers. The record does reveal, however, that when the defendants were taken to the sheriff’s office they were there booked for possession of narcotics.
We further point out that the recent case of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), enunciates a somewhat new and different standard for warrantless seaches incident to an arrest. However, Chimel involved the search of the home of the petitioner therein and the cases are clear that a different standard prevails regarding the warrantless search of a motor vehicle and Chimel is therefore distinguishable from the case at bar. In any event, Chimel v. California, supra, is prospective in its application and has no bearing on the outcome of the case at bar. United States v. Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113 (2nd Cir. 1969); People v. Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal.Rptr. 633 (Cal.1969); New York ex rel. Muhammad v. Mancusi, 301 F.Supp. 1100 (S.D. N.Y.1969).
We believe it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not preclude all warrant-less searches. ' It merely precludes “unreasonable” searches made without a warrant. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Cooper v. California, supra. In the case at bar, the totality of the circumstances indicates that the search was incident to and closely re*629lated to the arrest and charging of the defendants. It was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and charging of the defendants. On these and the further basis that the officers had knowledge prior to the search that the defendants had been in possession of narcotics while riding in the automobile, we hold that the search herein was reasonable and not precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment merely because it was warrantless.
Our attention is called to the Idaho cases of State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968) ; State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 435 P.2d 797 (1967); State v. Haggard, 89 Idaho 217, 404 P.2d 580 (1965); State v. Bitz, 89 Idaho 181, 404 P.2d 628 (1965), and State v. Peterson, 81 Idaho 233, 340 P.2d 444 (1959). While all of these cases involved warrantless searches of automobiles, with the exception of Bits, they turned upon consent having been given to the search or objects which were seized because they were in plain sight. In Bits evidence was obtained from a warrantless search of the defendant’s automobile. The defendant therein was apprehended hiding on top of a building which had been burglarized and thereafter informed officers of the location of his automobile. Five or six hours thereafter the automobile was located and searched. Articles obtained during the search of the automobile were later admitted in evidence over the objection of the defendant. It was held in Bits that the admission of such evidence was error. The search of the automobile was neither incident to nor closely related to the activities or arrest of the defendant. It was not substantially contemporaneous with'the arrest of the defendant. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the search in Bits indicates that the warrantless search was unreasonable and that case is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
We finally hold that the pocket residue taken from Garza was of minimal character compared to the overwhelming quantity of correctly admitted evidence. It could not reasonably have been significant in contributing to the conviction and the admission of such pocket residue as evidence was harmless error. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed. 2d 171 (1963). The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
McFADDEN, C. J., and DONALDSON and SPEAR, JJ., concur.