Court Opinion

ID: 9726000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:26:22.40453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:37.472516
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The officers’ conduct did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights. Like Gonzalez, the officer asked defendant for his identification during a valid, ongoing traffic stop. The simple request for identification was facially innocuous and did not prolong defendant’s detention or fundamentally change the nature of the stop. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236, 789 N.E.2d at 270. When defendant responded he did not have any identification on him, the officer requested his name and birth date. That question is also facially innocuous and did not fundamentally change the nature of the stop. Defendant replied with false information, which yielded a “no record on file” result. Based on defendant having provided false information, the officers continued to question defendant to obtain his true identity. If defendant had provided the correct information, the questioning would not have exceeded the length of the valid traffic stop as in Cox. See 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. Thus, the extended nature of this stop is attributable to defendant’s providing false information, not the officers’ conduct. Additionally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity once the warrant check yielded the “no record on file” result. See 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. The “no record on file” indicated defendant had lied about his identity and gave the officers reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had obstructed justice. Regardless of whether the officers violated defendant’s fourth amendment rights, the exclusionary rule of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not extend to suppress defendant’s conduct that formed the basis of his obstructing-justice charge. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the constitutional violation is considered the “poisonous tree” and any evidence that the State obtains by exploiting that constitutional violation is subject to suppression as the “fruit” of that poisonous tree. People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 448, 645 N.E.2d 923, 940 (1994). However, our supreme court has declined to extend the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of crimes that arise from and are in reaction to an illegal search or seizure. People v. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d 446, 455-57, 271 N.E.2d 37, 43-44 (1971). Thus, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not require the suppression of evidence of a defendant’s own unlawful conduct in response to police conduct that was in violation of the fourth amendment. See People v. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d 265, 270, 459 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1984). This case is similar to Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 266, 459 N.E.2d at 656, where the defendant sought to quash his arrest and suppress evidence of his actions that formed the basis of his resisting-a-peace-officer (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 31—1) and battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 12—3) charges. There, the defendant spit in a police officer’s face and engaged in a scuffle with the same officer after several officers had entered the defendant’s apartment even though he had denied them access. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 266-67, 459 N.E.2d at 656-57. The court held that even if the officers’ entry was unlawful, the evidence of defendant’s conduct that formed the basis of his resisting-a-peace-officer and battery charges should not have been suppressed because the exclusionary rule did not extend to cause suppression of the defendant’s unlawful actions that were in response to unlawful police conduct. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 270, 459 N.E.2d at 659; see also People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 378-79, 604 N.E.2d 923, 928 (1992) (refusing to extend the doctrine to exclude evidence of the defendants’ actions directed against the police officers after they entered defendants’ home, regardless of the illegality of that entry). For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress.