Court Opinion

ID: 9476783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:05:28.581138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:30.567098
License: Public Domain

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I of the panel’s opinion. For the reasons stated below, I am compelled to dissent from Part II of the opinion.
I agree that we are bound by the state court’s finding that Pinson did not explicitly request his trial attorney to file an appeal. However, the majority’s reliance on this nonexistent request by Pinson to arrive at the conclusion that Pinson did have knowledge of the right to appeal, at 898, is, to me, somewhat incongruous. Nevertheless, Pinson does admit in his brief that he had a generalized knowledge of the appellate process. Thus, one point of departure I have with the panel’s opinion is whether the state has an obligation under the federal Constitution to make explicit to a criminal defendant his appellate rights.
The panel’s opinion summarily and without citation dispatches Pinson’s claim that the federal Constitution requires the state trial court to advise a criminal defendant of his right to appeal. Contrary to the panel’s conclusion, at least three circuits have found such a right to exist when the defendant is indigent, as is Pinson.
[T]he trial judge should ... advise[ ] petitioner of his right to appeal and, as a constitutional corollary, his right to court-appointed counsel on appeal if he is indigent. Failure to give such advice violate[s] petitioner’s right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment and his sixth amendment right to counsel, incorporated through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
United States v. Woods, 440 F.2d 835, 836 (7th Cir.1971); see Lovelace v. Haskins, 474 F.2d 1254, 1255-56 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. McMann, 417 F.2d 648, 654-55 (2d Cir.1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 929, 25 L.Ed.2d 105 (1970). And Missouri has seen fit to hedge against possible claims of ignorance of right to appeal by requiring its trial courts to advise certain convicted defendants of their appellate rights. Mo.R.Crim.P. 29.-07(b)(3).
Yet the district court, in the case at bar, concluded that Pinson must first have advised the trial court of his desire to appeal and his indigent status before the state court would have any obligation to protect his appellate rights. The line of authority relied upon for this proposition, Scarborough v. Wainwright, 404 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.1968), has been called into question. See Martin v. Texas, 694 F.2d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir.1982). Martin at least suggests that the Constitution may impose a duty upon “state trial judges to notify convicted defendants of their right to appeal with court-appointed counsel when indigent.” Id.1
I do not contend that the Woods, Lovelace and McMann position is an unassailable one. I do, however, object to the short shrift Pinson’s argument received, particularly when it appears to be one which has received little, if any, consideration in this Circuit and one which has received acceptance by other circuits.
Moreover, I am unwilling to reach any constitutional issue presented until the district court has had an opportunity to hold further hearings and come to a new judgment in light of a more complete factual and legal presentation. The record reflects that appellant had not one appointed attorney in the trial court, but at least two, was represented by a Special Assistant Public Defender in his state post-conviction proceeding under Rule 27.26 and by still another appointed attorney to handle the present appeal. Available briefs and transcripts clearly reflect not only that the sentencing judge did not comply with Mo.R.Crim.P. 29.07 but also that noncompliance with that *900rule was not even mentioned at the sentence hearing, at the post-conviction proceeding or at the habeas proceeding before the United States magistrate. Indeed, we are assured by appellate counsel on both sides that no Missouri rule or statute required that appellant be advised of his right to appeal. The magistrate so found and evidently came to his factual and legal conclusions utterly unaware of Missouri Rule 29.07(b)(3). See Thompson v. Black, 320 F.Supp. 593, 594-95 (E.D.Ky.1971) (failure to advise a criminal defendant of his right to appeal as mandated by a state rule of criminal procedure may be cause for federal habeas corpus relief).
I would remand for further factual inquiry on a more complete record with new conclusions on relevant issues made in light of Missouri’s rules and a new judgment. In the course of the proceedings on remand I would leave it open to the court to consider as well the question of the legal effectiveness of Pinson’s attempted waiver of his claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the panel’s opinion and from affirmance of the district court’s judgment.

. Martin suggests that the more appropriate ground for habeas relief when an indigent defendant does not receive adequate notice of his appellate rights is ineffective assistance of counsel. Martin, 694 F.2d at 427. Because Pinson failed to exhaust his available state remedies on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pin-son waived that claim in order for his federal habeas petition to proceed.