Court Opinion

ID: 9834132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:19:25.443101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.893066
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
' In his motion for rehearing appellant urges that we erred in stating that the judgment in favor of Graves against Teel was by default. This statement was predicated upon the testimony of Herbert Oliver, one of the attorneys for Graves. When the suit of Graves against Teel was called for trial in the District Court of Karnes County, said attorney was advised that the Teel served with citation was not the Teel who was insured. He then testified as follows: “Being so advised by Mr. Chapman I did not urge the judgment, * * * I believe there was a default judgment taken, and I asked the court to set it aside, and caused citation to be issued and served it upon Robert Teel, Sr.; and at the term of court to which that citation was returnable. I tried the case,, resulting in a judgment for thirty-five' thousand dollars, out of which this garnishment arose.”
The judgment rendered in that case, however, recites: “and came the defendant (Teel), after having been duly served, with citation herein for the length of time, and in the manner provided by law for personal service citation, by his attorney of record herein, and announced ready for trial.”
This judgment recital negatives ^ our statement in the original opinion that the-judgment was by default, and we correct it accordingly.
It was not shown by appellant, however,-■ who was Teel’s attorney in that case; or that he was employed by, or had any connection with, the appellee insurance company, or that he defended that suit in its' behalf. On the contrary, it was shown' that appellant, in his negotiations and efforts to compromise with the insurer dealt with and recognized John F. Battaile of Houston as the attorney for appellee in connection with the matter; and so far as the record shows, Battaile was the only attorney for appellee. Battaile testified on the trial of this suit that he had never represented Teel as his attorney. Consequently proof in the instant case that the insurer took charge of and defended Teel in the suit against him by Graves was wholly lacking.
In view, therefore, of the terms of the policy and the non-waiver provision, in' order to bring the instant case within the holding in the Fellbaum case, it was ini cumbent upon appellant to bring his case within the rule laid down in that case. This he failed to do.
Appellant’s motion is granted to the extent above indicated-; in all other respects it is overruled. ;
Granted in Part and in Part Overruled.'