Court Opinion

ID: 9594513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:30:40.059001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:23.801579
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but not in all that is said therein. The majority implies that it was possible for appellee-Wife to have included a claim for revival of the dormant judgment in her application for a contempt citation against appellant-Husband. In my opinion, this is erroneous.
“[T]he filing of a contempt action is not tantamount to filing a complaint. [Cits.]” Baer v. Baer, 263 Ga. 574, 575 (1) (436 SE2d 6) (1993). An application for a contempt citation is an ancillary motion in the divorce action itself. Phillips v. Brown, 263 Ga. 50, 51 (1) (426 SE2d 866) (1993). Since an application for a contempt citation is merely an ancillary motion in the divorce action and not a complaint whereby any new claim for relief is initiated, those provisions of the Civil Practice Act relating to the latter pleading would not be applicable. It follows that Wife could not rely upon OCGA § 9-11-18 as authority for including a claim for revival of the dormant judgment in her application or upon OCGA § 9-11-15 as authority for amending her application to add such a claim.
In order to revive the dormant judgment, Wife had only two options. She could have filed a separate timely revival action, which proceeding would be controlled by the Civil Practice Act. Kight v. Behringer, 192 Ga. App. 62 (383 SE2d 624) (1989); Watkins v. C & S Nat. Bank, 163 Ga. App. 468 (294 SE2d 703) (1982). In the alternative, she could have filed a separate timely application for a writ of scire facias, which proceeding would be controlled by OCGA § 9-12-62 et seq. Wannamaker v. Carr, 257 Ga. 634 (362 SE2d 53) (1987). Wife did neither and, in the context of the instant contempt proceeding, Husband was erroneously found to be in contempt for failing to make such payments under the divorce decree as Wife had allowed to become dormant. Zerblis v. Zerblis, 239 Ga. 715 (238 SE2d 381) (1977). Wife was entitled to enforcement of the divorce decree only to the extent of such unpaid payments as had become due within seven years of the filing of her application for a contempt citation. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of reversal and would expressly direct that the trial court enter a new judgment which does not predicate Husband’s contempt upon his failure to make payments which had become due more than seven years prior to the filing of Wife’s application.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins in this special concurrence.
*239Decided March 6, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 30, 1995.
Cunningham & Mullinax, W. David Cunningham, for appellant.
Hatch, Johnson & Meaney, James A. Meaney III, for appellee.