Court Opinion

ID: 9855805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:31:23.762464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:04.745513
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent, believing the main opinion misconceives the function of process, confuses the matter of jurisdiction over persons and subject matter and cites but one case which is no authority under the facts of this case.
The opinion asserts that an assault and battery action was commenced. Nothing was commenced. The purported process was no process at all since it purported to be that of someone sui juris, whereas plaintiff clearly was non sui juris,3 having no capacity whatever to have process issued in his name. The main opinion concedes this by admitting the process was vulnerable to attack by motion to quash, and it correctly recognizes that a minor has no capacity to sue or have process issued, by quoting Rule 17(b) to the effect that when an infant is a party he must appear by guardian.
It is admitted that if a minor files a complaint in his own name, that although such filing does not commence an action, the infirmity of incapacity may be eliminated by the appointment of a guardian ad litem, it being the court’s duty to effect such appointment upon discovery of the infancy.4 But that does not make void process valid, and it is a far cry from saying that process purportedly served beforehand, which was *313void and could not have given the court jurisdiction over defendants, suddenly can become validated by the appointment of a guardian ad litem and an amendment. I am aware of no cases, save where a general appearance has been made or a waiver accomplished, where any procedure entertained after filing of a complaint will breathe life into any previous void process. In those cases involving general appearance and waiver of defective process, courts invariably have said that but for the appearance or the waiver, no jurisdiction over the person purportedly served would attach.
Rule 4(h), quoted in the main opinion, is no help, since it applies only to errors having nothing to do with the basic question of conferring jurisdiction of the person by means of service of process, and it in no sense applies to void process. Otherwise any process, in any form, served in any way, good or bad, could, by amendment, confer jurisdiction over the person. Recently we rejected an effort to gain jurisdiction by ignoring and discounting process which purportedly had been served but where the process server neglected merely to date it.5 If, as the main opinion contends, amendments should be allowed freely, it would have been an easy matter in that case simply to amend the process by dating it, but when it. comes to a question of acquiring jurisdiction by service of process, courts require statutory requirements to be followed strictly.
The only case cited in support of the main opinion is not only worlds apart factually from the instant case, but actually seems to support this dissent. In the Canterbury case, there was no question as to service of process whatever, as is the case here. Hence there was no question of lack of jurisdiction over the person because of defective process, and it is difficult for me to understand how the main opinion can construe that case to include one like this which involves jurisdiction over the person by service of process. Process intended to acquire jurisdiction over the person is either good or bad and if it does not confer jurisdiction at the outset amendment will not cure it. The Canterbury case concedes that the timely assertion of the defense of lack of capacity is effective when it says that “where an infant sues in his own name, and no attack for lack of capacity has been made * * * the lack of capacity is deemed waived6 * *
The judgment should be affirmed.

. See Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 1945, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885, 889, where it was said that “generally speaking a minor is not sui juris, and could not, in his own name and right exercise options, make binding contracts or maintain or prosecute a claim or action for. wages or injuries.” 27 Am.Jur. 836, Sec. 116; Buie 17(b), Utah Buies of Civil Procedure.

.27 Am.Jur. 833, Sec. 113 et seq.

. Rees v. Scott, 1958, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877.

. By pointing to the Canterbury case, this writer simply points out that lack of capacity was recognized as a defense, but does not concede that such lack of capacity can be waived by the defendant, contending that appointment of a guardian alone can cure such incapacity.