Court Opinion

ID: 9715856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:16:52.814746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:45.282615
License: Public Domain

HESTER, Judge,
dissenting:
This is a suit instituted by the estate of an 11-year old boy, killed in a sled riding accident, to collect “Work Loss Benefits” from his father’s No-Fault Insurance Carrier. “Work Loss Benefits” can be collected only by those individuals included in the definition of survivors in the No-Fault Act.
As our Supreme Court recently stated in Allstate v. Heffner, 491 Pa. 447 at 450, 421 A.2d 629 at 631 (1980):
“This Court must start from the position that its duty ‘is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly,’ so that full effect is given to every position of a statute, if possible. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a)(1980-81 pamphlet).
In enacting the No-Fault Act, the General Assembly expressly declared that “the maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents on Commonwealth highways, ... is essential to the humane and purposeful functioning of commerce.” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(a)(3) (emphasis added). Furthermore, ‘it is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish ... a statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims’ 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b) (emphasis added). The legislature has provided definitions for the terms with which we must interpret the No-Fault Act. The following definitions contained in Article I are required in order to resolve the issue presently before us: (Emphasis added).
And on 491 Pa. 452, 421 A.2d at 632:
“Survivors” means: (A) spouse; or (B) child, parent, brother, sister or relative dependent upon the deceased for support.”
*357Clearly, to recover Work Loss Benefits, the claimant must be a survivor as defined by the Act. The Estate of the 11 year old deceased victim is certainly not a “Survivor” as defined by the No-Fault Act. Therefore, the Estate is not entitled to receive Work Loss Benefits.
The majority contends that this case is controlled by our Opinion in Heffner v. Allstate Insurance Company, 265 Pa.Super. 181, 401 A.2d 1160 (1978). I do not agree. There, the appellant-plaintiff was the surviving widow, the spouse of the decedent. She clearly qualified as a “Survivor” under the No-Fault Act. In the case at bar the appellant is the Estate of the decedent, and does not qualify as a “Survivor”. John G. Freeze, Jr., as father of the deceased victim, is not to be confused with John G. Freeze, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of the deceased victim, the within appellant-plaintiff. The Estate is a separate and distinct entity.
In Heffner v. Allstate, supra, the trial court held that the surviving widow-appellant was entitled to recover the “Survivors Loss” benefits but not the “Work Loss” benefits her husband indisputably would have received had he been permanently injured, rather than killed in the accident. Our Court reversed, holding “that appellant is entitled to recover work loss benefits as the survivor of a deceased victim”, 265 Pa.Superior Ct. 188, 401 A.2d at 1163 (emphasis added).
The only issue in Heffner v. Allstate was whether the spouse of decedent could collect in her own right, both “Survivors Loss” benefits and “Work Loss” benefits under the No-Fault Act. Our Opinion concluded with the following:
“.. . We conclude that appellant is entitled to recover work loss benefits as the survivor of a deceased victim under the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act and, consequently, under the contract of insurance with Allstate”. 265 Pa.Superior Ct. 193, 401 A.2d at 1166 (Emphasis added).
Our holding in Heffner v. Allstate, is restricted to awarding Work Loss Benefits to Survivors of deceased victims as enumerated in the Act. It cannot be here broadened to *358include the estates of deceased victims. That argument, or interpretation, was never advanced or asserted in Heffner v. Allstate. We were there concerned only with the effort of the spouse of the deceased victim to collect Work Loss benefits. His estate was not a party. I joined in that Opinion. I continue to believe it to be a correct interpretation of the Act. It permitted recovery by one included in the Legislative Enumeration of Survivors.
As asserted by the majority, the Supreme Court, in Allstate v. Heffner and Pontius v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 491 Pa. 447, 421 A.2d 629 (1980), affirmed our Opinion in Heffner v. Allstate. The opinion of the Supreme Court concerns itself only with the fact situation in Heffner and the right of Survivors to collect both Survivors Loss and Work Loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. Pontius is mentioned but once in the Opinion.
As Justice Nix states of 491 Pa. at 453, 421 A.2d at 632-33:
“The crux of the issue presented to us is whether the legislature intended ‘victims’ of motor vehicle accidents to be accorded differing basic loss benefits from those accorded survivors of ‘deceased victims.’ Appellants, Allstate and USF&G, contend that the legislature did intend such a distinction. On the one hand, appellants assert that ‘victims’ are entitled to the following basic loss benefits: allowable expense, work loss, and replacement services loss. On the other hand, appellants maintain survivors of ‘deceased victims’ are only entitled to: allowable expense (funeral expenses) and survivor’s loss. This view has been adopted by four different courts of common pleas but was rejected by the Superior Court in the two cases presently before us.” (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court discussed only the issues involved in the Heffner appeal and restricted its discussion to the rights of “Survivors” as defined in the No-Fault Act. The term “Survivors” is used throughout the Opinion. The facts of the Pontius appeal were never discussed.
The major thrust of the Supreme Court’s Opinion in Allstate was to rebut the allegation that the No-Fault Act *359did not permit the recovery of both “Survivors Loss Benefits” and “Work Loss Benefits” by survivors of deceased victims. Double recovery was the major issue in Allstate. In disposing of that issue the Supreme Court stated at, 491 Pa. 459, 421 A.2d 636:
“Even assuming such potential for double recovery, this fact, in and of itself, does not necessarily evidence a legislative intention to deny “work loss” benefits to survivors. As appellee Pontius points out in his brief, the legislature has allowed double recovery of other benefits under the Act. For example, Section 203 of the Act concerning Collateral Benefits permits victims to recover their medical expenses from Blue Cross and Blue Shield and then recover the same expenses a second time from the no-fault carrier. It is apparent that the “vice” of double recovery was not foremost in the minds of the legislators when the No-Fault Act was enacted. Consequently, the mere possibility of a double recovery by granting “work loss” benefits to survivors of deceased victims, does not seem contrary to either the express or implied intention of the legislature.
However, we believe that in practice, recovery of survivors loss and work loss benefits by survivors of deceased victims, will no more constitute double recovery under the Act than does recovery under analogous wrongful death and survival actions in tort law. See Pezzulli v. D’Ambrosia, 344 Pa. 643, 26 A.2d 659 (1942); First National Bank of Meadville, Pa. v. Magra Therapy Mfg. Corp., 229 F.Supp. 460 (W.D.Pa.1964); and Hochrein v. United States, 238 F.Supp. 317 (E.D.Pa.1965). As we view the Act, the decedent’s contribution of income under surviv- or’s loss recovery shall be excluded from the amount recovered under work loss. In this manner, both basic loss benefits will compliment, rather than duplicate each other. It must be kept in mind that the Act sets monetary limits of $15,000 for recovery of work loss benefits and $5,000 for survivor’s loss benefits. If actual losses do not reach or exceed these limits, the full amounts of these basic loss benefits need not be paid. (Emphasis added).
*360In the concluding paragraph of its Opinion in Allstate, the Supreme Court embraced the position adopted by this Court in Heffner. See 491 Pa. 460, 421 A.2d 636:
The position taken by the Superior Court in Heffner is the most cogent approach to the No-Fault Act. The recovery of work loss benefits by survivors of deceased victims best fulfills the legislature’s express intention to provide “compensation of the economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents” by providing “adequate basic loss benefits [to] . . . the survivors of deceased victims.” (Emphasis added).
Note the constant use of the word “Survivors”.
The intent of the Legislature in enacting No-Fault was to provide “the maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the economic losses of the ‘survivors’ of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents on Commonwealth highways .... ” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(a)(3) (emphasis added). Furthermore, it provided that, “it is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly to establish ... a statewide system of prompt and adequate loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the ‘survivors’ of deceased victims,” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b) (emphasis added).
The definition of the term “survivor” in the Act does not include the Estate of a deceased victim. We are bound by that definition.
I am of the opinion that the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to an interpretation of that statutory language. By expressly naming the parties that were to be considered as “Survivors” under the No-Fault Act, the Legislature intended to exclude all parties and/or entities not included in their definition.
In retrospect, an estate of an individual could not possibly be considered a survivor. The estate does not exist prior to the death of the testator. Not having existed prior to the death of the individual, the estate cannot be a survivor. The Estate of John Goss Freeze did not come into existence until *361some time following his death. His Estate cannot be considered as one of his survivors.
The majority would have us expand the legislative definitions of “survivor” to include the estate of a deceased victim. In so doing the majority is once again moving out of the area usually inhabited by the Judiciary and into the habitat of the Legislature. This is not unique. This inclination has been common to the Bench since “the time the memory of man runneth not to the contrary.” While asserting the power of judicial review, Chief Justice John Marshall carefully elaborated this view: “Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.” Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheaton 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824).
We are often inclined to become “robed legislators”. In the instant case, there is no cause to inject the court into the role of the Legislature. The definition of “survivor” in the statute is clear and precise.
“When the words of the statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
1 Pa.Con.Stat.Ann. § 1921(b).
In construing the provisions of the No-Fault Act, we must be mindful of our obligation to follow established rules of statutory construction under which we are not permitted to disregard the clear and unambiguous language of the Act on the pretext that its literal interpretation will frustrate its spirit.
The Act clearly restricts recovery of work loss benefits to “survivors” as defined in the Act. The estate of the deceased victim is not included in that definition. No where in the Act is there a provision that would permit an estate to recover the basic loss benefits created by the Act. It is clear *362that an estate, therefore, cannot recover those basic loss benefits.
The result, which I urge, is compelled by a valid and unambiguous statute with which courts may not palter under the pretext of construction or interpretation. 1 Pa.C. S.A. 1921(b). The result urged by appellant can be achieved only through Legislation.
The majority finds that the “sub silentio” affirmance by the Supreme Court of Judge Wieand’s order of July 3, 1979, remanding Pontius v. U.S.F. & G., supra, to the court below, is sufficient to support a conclusion that the estate of a deceased victim is entitled to work loss benefits under the No-Fault Act.
I do not agree.
The Supreme Court has at no time, either directly or indirectly, ever addressed the question as to whether the estate of a deceased victim may recover work loss benefits. The most that the Supreme Court has done is affirm Judge Wieand’s order in Pontius, supra. That order did no more than reverse and remand without prejudice. No opinion or memorandum was filed. That, I submit, was not a “decision” of the Superior Court. This, in my judgment, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that the estate of a deceased victim can collect No-Fault benefits, particularly in view of the wording of the Act.
The majority further states that: “From the tenor of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Allstate Insurance Company v. Heffner, supra, and from its affirmance sub silentio in that case of our decision in Pontius that a deceased victim’s estate may recover under the Act, we conclude that what was dictum in our earlier opinion must properly be applied to this case and become our holding.” Slip Opinion, page 1004.
My reading of the Supreme Court opinion in Allstate v. Heffner, supra, leads me to the opposite conclusion. In that opinion that court states that one of the purposes of the Act *363was to provide maximum feasible restoration of all individuals injured and compensation of the economic losses of the survivors of all individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents. The court further stated: “The legislature has provided definitions for the terms with which we must interpret the No-Fault Act. The following definitions contained in Article I are required in order to resolve the issue presently before us.”
“Survivor” means:
(A) spouse; or
(B) child, parent, brother, sister or relative dependent upon the deceased for support.
The Supreme Court specifically listed that definition of “survivors” in its opinion.
The tenor of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Allstate v. Heffner, is that work loss benefits could be recovered by survivors of deceased victims and that the recovery of both work loss and survivors loss benefits by survivors of deceased victims was permitted. The opinion refers to survivors throughout. Recovery is strictly limited to survivors as defined in the Act.
There is absolutely nothing in the tenor of the Supreme Court’s opinion that would substantiate the conclusion that the estate of a deceased victim could collect work loss benefits. The opposite is true. The opinion rigidly confines itself to survivors as defined by the Act. The plaintiff-appellee was the spouse of the deceased victim. She was covered by the definition of survivors in the Act, and she was permitted to recover. Her husband’s estate was not a party. This is the only valid conclusion that can be drawn from that opinion.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Allstate does not hold that the estate of a deceased victim is entitled to work loss benefits. The No-Fault Act makes no such provision.
I therefore dissent.