Court Opinion

ID: 9690929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:52:40.206559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:07.695801
License: Public Domain

FOWLER, Justice,
concurring on motion for rehearing.
This is a frustrating case. It is frustrating because it seems that the law should have had a different response to the case than it did. Our majority opinion detailed the tragic accident befalling young Jonathan Ruvalcaba and his family. In the trial following this accident, the trial court entered an $8,384,657.52 judgment in favor of the Ruvalcabas. However, because we are bound by a rigid premises Lability system that does not provide a readily ascertainable classification for a plaintiff like Jonathan, and because the evidence presented in support of recovery under a premises liability theory was insufficient, we must reverse that judgment, and render one that the Ruvalcabas take nothing on their claim against American Industries Life Insurance Company.
I write separately to address what I think is the inadequacy of our system of establishing landowner liability, and to *145comment on the Ruvalcabas’ claim that the result in this case is unfair.
First, it is clear that the law applicable to the Ruvalcabas’ appeal is that of a strict, unyielding, and rigid premises liability classification system. Under this system, the status of the entrant controls— that classification often matters more than what the land owner or occupier has done or failed to do, and more than the legitimacy of the visit. This system produces results that, at times, can be contrary to common sense.
When a plaintiff is a licensee, as Jonathan arguably is in this case,9 the owner is negligent with respect to the condition of the premises if (1) the defendant has actual knowledge of the condition, (2) the condition is unreasonably dangerous, (3) the plaintiff did not have actual knowledge of the danger, and (4) the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the plaintiff from danger by failing to adequately warn the plaintiff of the condition, and by failing to make the condition reasonably safe. State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Tex.1996) (per curiam). This heavy burden — of proving actual knowledge as opposed to a lesser burden such as constructive knowledge — does not seem to be one that more modern notions of responsibility would place on one who was in a building for a legitimate reason. After all, if Jonathan had been a businessman visiting the premises, American Industries would have been liable if it had possessed constructive knowledge, or should have known, of the dangerous condition. However, because Jonathan was only a child visiting his father who worked in the building, American Industries was liable only if it had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition.
A premises owner or occupier should not be strictly hable for conditions that result in injury, and should not be considered an insurer against ah risk of injuries that others might sustain on its property. However, this case is a good example of the inadequacies in our current system of determining landowner liability. For example, here, the Ruvalcabas argued, and the trial judge agreed, that Jonathan was a business invitee. (The majority has already detailed why Jonathan was not an invitee — to start with, he wasn’t there for a pecuniary visit that was mutually beneficial to him and the landowner.) Yet, I conclude that Jonathan is a licensee, not an invitee, because he was a social guest. And, although I say he is a licensee, I admit he isn’t the typical licensee. Someone else might even argue that Jonathan was a trespasser. This confusion is not unusual. For when litigants test our premises liability system with new issues, the system is not flexible enough to encompass them; unless a person fits precisely under one of its categories, it can be *146difficult to determine the appropriate classification for them.10
This uncertainty as to which classification applies creates problems for litigants and judges. Litigants have difficulty in determining what facts they need to prove to meet their burden. They have to make their best guess and hope they’re right. Judges have trouble determining what classification applies. Consequently, one of several results will often occur: (1) judges can’t agree how the categories should be applied, e.g., Mellon Mortgage Co., 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex.1999), or (2) judges engage in mental acrobatics to fit the litigant into a category, or (3) judges apply the categories rigidly, as here, so that the plaintiff recovers nothing when, arguably, the system ought to impose' a different duty on the land owner or occupier.
The reason this confusion or uncertainty results is that the system is not logic-based. Maybe centuries ago it was logical, because people were not as mobile as they are today, but, in our modern world, it is not logical. One who is looking at an event (other than a slip and fall) cannot determine, by relying on logic and general legal principles, whether liability will be imposed. Instead, one must put on blinders and apply this rigid system. This creates uncertainty in this area of the law; and, one of the responsibilities of the judiciary is to provide order, not uncertainty. This is reason enough to question the eon-tinued usefulness of applying the centuries-old common law premises liability classification system.
This brings me to the next point of discussion, one that formed part of the basis of the Ruvalcabas’ complaint on rehearing — our holding that there was insufficient evidence to support a showing of actual knowledge. Although the Ruvalca-bas complain mightily that they met their burden,11 the evidence did not support a finding of actual knowledge. The building manager testified he was unaware of the danger posed by the stairs. In fact, he affirmatively stated that he did not think the stairs were dangerous. In support of this, he cited to the fact that no prior complaints about the stairs had been made, and no prior injuries had occurred on the stairs. No other evidence was produced to show that a reasonable person in the building manager’s position would have realized that this accident, or some similar accident, was likely to occur. Although he agreed that a reasonable property manager would keep up with the city codes, the building manager testified that he was not familiar with them. Moreover, the record contains no evidence on (1) whether any families had ever visited the building before, (2) whether visitors ever came to the building, (3) whether the building manager ever had any children visit him or whether other children had used the stairs while with him there, or (4) whether the building manager had young children of his own.12 *147There simply is nothing in the record from which we could infer actual knowledge.
For these reasons, I join fully in the majority opinion but also write separately.
EDELMAN, J., concurring and FOWLER, J., dissenting on Second Motion for Rehearing.

. Although the trial court found Jonathan was a business invitee, Jonathan clearly was not visiting his father for a pecuniary purpose, which is required for one to be cloaked with business invitee status. Instead, Jonathan was visiting his father for a social reason — to share some time with him over lunch; regrettably, this reason warrants less protection.
In their motion for rehearing, the Ruvalca-bas contend that Jonathan is treated by our opinion as a trespasser, and that, as a result, all people visiting office workers are treated as trespassers unless they can demonstrate that they had a present business relationship with the building owner. Jonathan is not classified as a trespasser in this opinion. The practical result may be that, as a licensee or trespasser, Jonathan cannot recover. But that in no way relegates social visitors to trespasser status. The proof in this case, as explained herein, cannot support recovery for a licensee-that does not mean that a licensee could never recover in this type of situation, just that Jonathan could not in this particular situation.

. An excellent example of this problem is Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex.1999), which produced three opinions and interpretations of law for the plurality opinion and one dissent. Three of the opinions could not agree how the plaintiff should be classified, and one ignored the classifications altogether, presumably thinking it more logical to approach the case in a different way.

. Of course, the burden the Ruvalcabas argued they needed to meet was a "should have known” standard, not an actual knowledge standard.

.These examples pertain to the likelihood that the building manager might have reason to scrutinize the stairs with the safety of children in mind. The Ruvalcabas may already have known the answers to these questions but did not introduce them because the answers would not have been helpful to their case.