Court Opinion

ID: 9584944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:08.854716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:47.729411
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in the majority opinion *704with respect to Divisions 1, 2, 5 and 6. I must respectfully dissent as to Divisions 3 and 4, and the conclusion reached in Division 7.
1. With respect to Division 3, the trial judge gave the following charge to the jury: "Under the law one of the duties owed by an owner of land is to refrain from maintaining any perils in the nature of pitfalls or mantraps. In contemplation of law, such a situation may result from the knowledge on the part of the owner of the existence of a dangerous or hazardous condition coupled with a conscious indifference to the consequences so that a deliberate intent to inflict injury is inferable, or a dangerous condition hidden with sufficient cover to obscure it or to render it unobservable to one who approaches it in which the hazard is laid or concealed. In other words, a pitfall or mantrap may consist of any hazardous or dangerous condition which is known to the owner and which is so located that he should reasonably anticipate that others might be injured by it.
"If the jury should find in this case that the situation constituted a hidden peril which amounted to in your opinion a pitfall or mantrap within the meaning of the rules of law given you in this charge and that such was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, then he would be entitled to recover provided he is not precluded from recovery by some other rule of law given or to be given you in this charge.”
The evidence showed that the plaintiff fell into a "feeder hopper” located under and on both sides of a railroad sidetrack on the defendant’s premises; the "feeder hopper” was approximately 4 feet wide, 12 feet long and varied in depth from 13 inches to 26 inches; it was a necessary, normal, routine piece of equipment used in defendant’s business and was of proper design.
While the plaintiff alleged that "a make-shift cover had been placed over it,” there was no evidence to substantiate this allegation. The "feeder hopper” was designed to facilitate the unloading of railroad cars delivering materials to the defendant’s plant.
For an excellent discussion of the law relating to pitfalls *705and mantraps, together with many citations giving most pertinent illustrations thereof, see: Crosby v. Savannah Electric &c. Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 198 (150 SE2d 563), where it was said in part: "The doctrine of mantrap and pitfall is rested on the theory that the owner is expecting a trespasser or a licensee and has prepared the premises to do him injury [cit.]. A typical example is the setting of a spring or trap gun to stop or prevent depredations by animals or humans, as in Wilder v. Gardner, 39 Ga. App. 608 (147 SE 911). In that situation the owner expects that a trespasser [someone] will come, and deliberately sets a trap designed to do injury. [Emphasis supplied.] It may result from the knowledge on the part of the owner of the existence of a dangerous or hazardous condition coupled with a conscious indifference to the consequences, so that a deliberate intent to inflict injury is inferable [cit.]; or from a dangerous condition hidden with sufficient cover to obscure it or to render it unobservable to one who approaches it. [Cits.]. The hazard is latent or concealed.”
It cannot be said that the evidence showing that it was dark when the plaintiff’s injury occurred, satisfies the requirements regarding pitfalls and mantraps. See Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 609 (162 SE 394); Baxley v. Williams Construction Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 669 (106 SE2d 799).
Since there was no evidence to support the allegations of the complaint regarding a pitfall or mantrap, the court erred in giving the charge above quoted. Owens v. White, 103 Ga. App. 459 (1) (119 SE2d 581).
2. With respect to Division 4, the judge charged the jury: "Now a servant or contractor assumes the ordinary risk of his employment and is bound to exercise his own skill and diligence to protect himself and in cases of injury it must appear that the servant or contractor did not know of the danger and did not have equal means of knowing such fact and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof. If the danger is obvious and as easily known to the plaintiff as to the defendant, the latter would not be liable *706for failing to warn him of it. If the plaintiff had equal means with the defendant of discovering the danger, any injury resulting to him would be the result of his own fault. Now in connection with the doctrine of the assumption of risk which I have just read to you, I charge you that before this doctrine can be applied in this case, there must first be a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must have a knowledge and appreciation of the hazard. And third, there must have been acquiescence or willingness on the part of the plaintiff to proceed in the face of the danger.”
Under the charge there were three elements under which the jury would be authorized to find assumption of risk: (1) a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the plaintiff, (2) a knowledge or appreciation of the hazard by the plaintiff, and (3) an acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. Thus, under the charge the jury would have had to find that the plaintiff had to have actual knowledge of the condition before the doctrine of assumption of risk would be applicable. "When the judge undertakes to charge the law upon a particular subject, he should charge all [the law] on the subject that is material and applicable to the case.” Tucker v. Talmadge, 186 Ga. 798, 800 (198 SE 726). In this case there was evidence that the plaintiff had worked as a night watchman on the defendant’s premises for over three months; that he made regular rounds over said premises and walked near the "feeder hopper” regularly while at work; that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff had a lighted flashlight and was directing its beam upward as he walked and fell into the "feeder hopper.” Under the evidence it was incumbent upon the trial judge to add a fourth element to his charge on assumption of risk, to the effect that such would exist if the jury should find that the plaintiff could have discovered the danger through the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety. See Gray v. Garrison, 49 Ga. App. 472, 480 (176 SE 412).
3. For the reasons set out above, the judgment of the trial court overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial *707was erroneous, and should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell, and Presiding Judges Hall and Eberhardt concur in this dissent.