Court Opinion

ID: 9964476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 11:10:18.981533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:31.675203
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                             ON RECONSIDERATION EN BANC

                                      NO. 03-22-00697-CR

                                   Michael Tucker, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                  The State of Texas, Appellee

               FROM THE 390TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
    NO. D-1-DC-21-904045, THE HONORABLE JULIE H. KOCUREK, JUDGE PRESIDING

                                          OPINION

               This Court sitting en banc has voted to reconsider this case1 to establish this Court’s

precedent about whether subsection (f)(1) of Penal Code section 22.021 (Subsection (f)(1)) defines

an element of an offense of aggravated sexual assault. We thus also are deciding whether a trial

court’s felony judgment that lacks a reference in the judgment’s “Statute for Offense” section to

Subsection (f)(1) must be modified to include such a reference when a defendant has been

sentenced in accordance with Subsection (f)(1)’s prescribed minimum sentence. We withdraw our

opinion and judgment of October 5, 2023, and substitute today’s opinion and judgment in their

       1
          See Tex. R. App. P. 41.2(c). Justice Theofanis is recused from this case and has not
participated in the case or in the en banc vote.
place. Our disposition of the appeal remains the same, and we dismiss the State’s motion for

rehearing as moot.

               Appellant2 was convicted after a bench trial for the second-degree felony of

indecency with a child by sexual contact, see Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), (d), which was

Count IV in the indictment, as well as other offenses involving the same child victim, including

Count I for aggravated sexual assault, see id. § 22.021. The trial court assessed punishment at

15 years in prison for Count IV and 25 years for Count I. In a sole appellate issue, Tucker

maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support the elements of the offense for Count IV

that Tucker “caused [the child victim] to touch appellant’s sexual organ” and that Tucker “acted

with the intent to arouse and gratify her own sexual desire.” Separately, the State requests that we

modify the judgment for Count I to add in its “Statute for Offense” field a reference to

Subsection (f)(1). We reject both sides’ positions and affirm.

                                        BACKGROUND

               Tucker used to manage a group home where several people or families would rent

individual rooms. Tucker would collect the rent for the homeowner. Tucker’s bedroom was

upstairs in the home, and Leslie Cunningham once rented another upstairs room. She stayed there

with her five-year-old daughter, A.R.

               A.R. told her mother about concerning things that Tucker had done to the child, so

Cunningham called the police. An investigation ensued, A.R. went through a forensic interview,

and Tucker was twice interviewed by a detective. Daisy Sycks, another tenant in the group home,

       2
          Tucker’s appellate brief says: “The appellant, Michael Tucker, is transgendered and thus
will be referred to in the brief by feminine pronouns. During these proceedings she referred to
herself as Jacqueline Michelle Tucker.” We refer to Tucker using her chosen pronouns.

                                                 2
had a minor daughter who also made outcries against Tucker. Tucker was ultimately indicted for

several sex offenses, variously involving A.R. and Sycks’s daughter.3 Count I against Tucker was

for aggravated sexual assault involving A.R., and Count IV was for indecency with A.R. by sexual

contact. There were other counts involving A.R. that we need not mention further. After a bench

trial, the court convicted Tucker of Count I and Count IV and entered separate written judgments

on those two counts. Tucker now appeals, challenging only the judgment for Count IV. The

State’s request for judgment modification concerns only the judgment for Count I.

                                  EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY

               Tucker argues in her sole appellate issue that the evidence was insufficient to

support the elements of the offense that she “caused A.R. to touch appellant’s sexual organ”

and that she “acted with the intent to arouse and gratify her own sexual desire.” The standards

for evidence-sufficiency reviews after bench trials are generally the same as those for

evidence-sufficiency reviews after jury trials. See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172–73

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In such a review, we must consider all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, which requires resolving any ambiguities in the evidence in the State’s favor.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 634 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021); Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). And we

must consider the combined and cumulative force of all admitted evidence and the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from any or all of the evidence. See Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d

320, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

       3
         A separate appeal before this Court—cause number 03-22-00698-CR—concerns
Tucker’s conviction for offenses against Sycks’s daughter.

                                                  3
               We presume that the factfinder resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the

evidence, and drew reasonable inferences all in a manner that supports the conviction. See

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The

factfinder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence and could have believed

some, all, or none of any given witness’s testimony. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Schneider v. State, 440 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet.

ref’d). We must defer to the factfinder on all these determinations. See Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733;

Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Schneider, 440 S.W.3d at 841.

The factfinder also “may use common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and

experience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences from the evidence.” Acosta v. State,

429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If any rational factfinder could have drawn the

inferences necessary to support proof of an element, then the State has carried its burden on that

element. See Brooks, 634 S.W.3d at 748. As for those elements here, to have proven Tucker’s

offense of indecency with A.R. by sexual contact as alleged in the indictment, the State must have

proven that Tucker caused A.R. to touch Tucker’s sexual organ and that Tucker did so with the

intent to arouse or gratify Tucker’s own sexual desire. See Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(2).

               First, the evidence supports the element that Tucker caused A.R. to touch Tucker’s

penis. In her interviews with detectives, Tucker admitted to an incident that involved Tucker’s

penis’s going in A.R.’s mouth. Tucker described the incident during the later interview with

the detective: Tucker had just masturbated in her bed; A.R. knocked on her mother’s bedroom’s

door; Tucker woke up; A.R. went in Tucker’s room, went to where Tucker was on her bed, and

asked to get under the covers; Tucker let A.R. under the covers and felt something wet on her

penis, which was A.R.’s mouth; and Tucker never told Cunningham that this had happened.

                                                4
Tucker’s explanation for the incident was that the five-year-old child had “raped” her. But the

trial court as factfinder was permitted to use its common sense to reject Tucker’s explanation for

why A.R.’s mouth had touched Tucker’s sexual organ, see Acosta, 429 S.W.3d at 625, and could

rationally infer instead that it had to have been the large adult, who is about 6′5″ or 6′6″ tall, who

caused the young child to do what the child did. Plus, Tucker’s admission that she did not tell the

child’s mother about what had happened supports a rational inference of consciousness of guilt,

which is highly probative evidence of guilt, see Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 299 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1994); Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no pet.). There was

other evidence of Tucker’s consciousness of guilt: Tucker admitted lying to the detective during

their first interview about the incident and in the later interview told the detective that Tucker

would apologize to A.R. about the incident if they had the chance to speak again. The evidence

thus supported the necessary inferences on the element of the offense that Tucker caused A.R. to

touch Tucker’s sexual organ.

               As for the element of the intent to arouse or gratify Tucker’s sexual desire, “the

requisite specific intent . . . can be inferred from” the defendant’s conduct and remarks and all the

surrounding circumstances. See McKenzie v. State, 617 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).

Relevant circumstances for inferring such an intent include other similar instances of the

defendant’s illegal sexual contact with children. See Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985).

               The record here included, in addition to the evidence recounted above, plenty of

evidence about similar instances of Tucker’s illegal sexual contact with children and about a link

between children and Tucker’s arousing or gratifying her sexual desires:

                                                  5
           ▪   Tucker admitted to an instance involving a third person’s perceiving that
               Tucker was masturbating to thoughts of children. At the time of the
               incident, A.R. had been in Tucker’s room with her but then left. Tucker
               started masturbating. A neighbor saw Tucker doing it through a window
               and called out that Tucker was “a sicko or something,” which Tucker
               believes was the neighbor’s “perceiv[ing] that [Tucker] was jacking off to
               thoughts of” A.R.

           ▪   Tucker admitted that she “lusts for the body of children, especially female
               children,” expressing that “children are born with bodies that [Tucker]
               wishes [s]he was born with.” The detective interpreted the subtext of
               Tucker’s statements as sexual. Tucker also described children’s bodies,
               including when nude, as works of art.

           ▪   Tucker admitted that she herself is “not a safe person to watch children,” at
               least in part because she is “a monster” for having touched the children
               inappropriately.

           ▪   Tucker admitted that there could have been times when she masturbated
               under her blanket while a child was in the room with her.

           ▪   Sycks’s daughter reported that Tucker had inappropriately touched her,
               including once when Tucker pulled the child’s pants down while in the
               bathroom and touched the child’s vagina with Tucker’s hand or finger.

           ▪   Tucker admitted to instances of touching Sycks’s daughter. One such
               instance involved giving the child a “horsey ride” though the child was
               naked, and Tucker admitted both that the child’s “vagina probably rubbed
               against [Tucker’s] legs while that was happening” and that it was possible
               that Tucker’s fingers or hand touched the child’s vagina. In another
               instance, Tucker said that she saw Sycks’s daughter belly-dancing while
               wearing an outfit like the one worn by the Jasmine character in the
               “Aladdin” movie. The child, Tucker believes, “ran across the room, leapt
               on [Tucker], forcing h[er] body backwards and then hump[ed] [Tucker],
               with [the child’s] pelvis slamming into [Tucker’s] pelvis,” and it took
               Tucker “about thirty seconds for [Tucker] to recover h[er]self and get the
               small child off of” Tucker’s body. Tucker thought that the child’s mother
               was prostituting the child to Tucker and maintained that the three-year-old
               held Tucker (who is 6′5″ or 6′6″ tall) down on the bed for about 30 seconds.

Because of all this evidence, the trial court rationally could have inferred the necessary specific

intent, including because Tucker’s explanations for prior sexual contact with children were

                                                 6
implausible and because of the admissions about incidents that connect the arousal or gratification

of Tucker’s sexual desires with children. See id.; McKenzie, 617 S.W.2d at 216. We hold that the

evidence was sufficient to support the elements of the offense of indecency with a child by contact

that Tucker challenges and overrule her sole appellate issue.

                    STATE’S REQUEST FOR MODIFIED JUDGMENT

               The State requests that we modify the judgment for the Count I aggravated sexual

assault to reflect that the “Statute for Offense” includes Subsection (f)(1)—the subsection of

the statute that requires that the minimum term of imprisonment for Tucker’s Count I offense

be 25 years because the child victim was younger than six years old at the time the offense

was committed. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(f)(1). The judgment for this count reflects the

“Statute for Offense” as Penal Code section 22.021(a)(2)(B), but the State argues that omitting

Subsection (f)(1) from the “Statute for Offense” field is a clerical error or misrecital requiring

modification even though the judgment elsewhere—under a heading titled “Furthermore, the

following special findings or orders apply:”—reflects the trial court’s finding against Tucker under

Subsection (f)(1) “that the victim or intended victim was younger than 6 years of age at the time

of the offense.” (Formatting altered.) We deny the State’s request for the following reasons.

               First, we set forth the relevant limits on our judgment-modification authority. We

have the authority to “modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified.” Tex. R. App.

P. 43.2(b). This authority to modify, however, does not extend to non-errors in a trial court’s

judgment. The authority has been described in different ways, including that it is used “to make

the record speak the truth when the matter has been called to [our] attention by any source,” see

French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); “to reform incorrect judgments,”

                                                 7
see Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc); see also

French, 830 S.W.2d at 609 (“adopt[ing] the reasoning set forth in Asberry”); “to reform whatever

the trial court could have corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to

correct the judgment appears in the record,” see Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 530; to delete improper

findings or add proper findings, see Van Flowers v. State, 629 S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Asberry, 813 S.W.2d at 530; and to resolve “conflict[s]”

between an oral pronouncement of sentence and a competing sentence as reflected in the written

judgment, see Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The modification

authority extends to at least some kinds of judicial errors as well as to mere clerical errors. See

Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). But in all events, the modification

authority deals with ascertainable errors. See Briceno v. State, 675 S.W.3d 87, 100 & n.3 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2023, no pet.) (describing authority to modify judgments as part of court of appeals’

“broad, remedial powers to correct errors in the record” (emphasis added)); Shumate v. State,

649 S.W.3d 240, 243 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.) (referring, in appeal involving issue

about reforming or modifying judgment, to statements by Court of Criminal Appeals noting that

“‘[r]eform means to correct; to make new, to rectify’ and h[olding] that ‘the judgment of the court

below should be reformed and corrected, so as to make it read, in connection with the judgment as

entered” (quoting McCorquodale v. State, 98 S.W. 879, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1905) (op. on

reh’g))); Van Flowers, 629 S.W.3d at 712 (“[T]he record must supply us with the information

necessary to show both that a modification is warranted and the particular modification that is

warranted. If the record does not do both, we cannot modify the trial court’s judgment.” (internal

citation omitted)); see also Van Flowers, 629 S.W.3d at 715 (refusing to modify sentence that fell

within statutory permissible range). The State cites us no authority, and we have found none, that

                                                8
empowers us to modify a judgment to change something that is not an error in the judgment. Thus,

if what the State requests here in its request to modify the judgment would not address an error,

then we may not make the requested modification.

               Turning next to the relevant requirements of a judgment, we begin with the relevant

statute. The trial court’s judgment of conviction

       shall reflect:

                ....

               The offense or offenses for which the defendant was convicted;

                ....

               The date of the offense or offenses and degree of offense for which the
               defendant was convicted; [and]

                ....

               In the event of conviction of an offense for which registration as a sex
               offender is required under Chapter 62, . . . a statement of the age of the
               victim of the offense.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 1(13), (14), (27). To effectuate these requirements, “[t]he

Office of Court Administration . . . shall promulgate a standardized felony judgment form that

conforms to the requirements of Section 1 of this article,” and a “court entering a felony judgment

shall use the form promulgated under this section.” Id. § 4.

               Pursuant to these directives, there is a form for judgments of felony convictions,

and the trial court here used the form. The form includes a field titled “Statute for Offense,” in

which trial courts frequently insert statutory references. The references to be inserted in the

“Statute for Offense” field should be those that define the elements of the offense that the defendant

                                                  9
committed. See McDade v. State, 613 S.W.3d 349, 358 & n.12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.);

Bledsoe v. State, 479 S.W.3d 491, 497–98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d).

               The State here argues that Subsection (f)(1) should be added to the judgment’s

“Statute for Offense” field because it is an element of the Section 22.021 offense that Tucker

committed. Whether we may grant the State’s requested modification turns on whether the

“Statute for Offense” field’s lack of a reference to Subsection (f)(1) is an error, and that issue turns

on whether Subsection (f)(1) defines an element of Tucker’s Section 22.021 offense.

               Neither the Court of Criminal Appeals nor our Court has resolved whether

Subsection (f)(1) defines an element of an offense under Section 22.021. With no precedent

deciding the issue, we thus resort to first principles for deciding what is and is not an element of a

particular offense.4

               The Legislature has instructed that “‘[e]lement of offense’ means: (A) the

forbidden conduct; (B) the required culpability; (C) any required result; and (D) the negation of

any exception to the offense.” Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(22). The “Legislature has considerable

discretion in defining crimes and the manner in which those crimes can be committed,” “limited

only by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution and the Due Course of Law provision

of the Texas Constitution.” O’Brien v. State, 544 S.W.3d 376, 383 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

       4
          In nonprecedential Hernandez v. State, see Tex. R. App. P. 47.7(a), we modified a
judgment to add Subsection (f)(1) to the judgment’s “Statute for Offense” field after the State in
its appellee’s brief requested the modification, relying on authority from our sister court treating
Subsection (f)(1) as an element. See Nos. 03-22-00288-CR, 03-22-00289-CR, 2023 WL 4748842,
at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Bledsoe v. State, 479 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref’d)). The appellant
had not responded on the issue in his reply brief, and after our opinion and judgment issued, the
appellant did not move for rehearing or en banc reconsideration or seek discretionary review in the
Court of Criminal Appeals.

                                                  10
The Court of Criminal Appeals has added, “An ‘element’ is a fact that is legally required for a fact

finder to convict a person of a substantive offense.” Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014).

               To “determine the elements of an offense,” the Court of Criminal Appeals has

applied what it calls “the eighth-grade-grammar test.” O’Brien, 544 S.W.3d at 386. That test is

applied “to the text of the statute describing the offense in the context of the entire statutory scheme

to attempt to discern the Legislature’s intent in passing the statute.” Id. at 387. The test involves

“focus[ing] on the statutory verb and its direct object defining the criminal act.” Id. at 386; accord

Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 718–19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

               The test fits within Texas courts’ overall approach to statutory interpretation when

determining the elements of an offense. “Whether a particular statutory aggravating fact creates

an element of a new offense or simply constitutes a punishment issue is a matter of statutory

construction.” Holoman v. State, 620 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). When interpreting

statutory provisions for these purposes, “we give effect to the plain meaning of the text, unless

the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not

have possibly intended.” Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “Statutory

language is ambiguous if it ‘may be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two

or more different senses.’” Id. (quoting State v. Schunior, 506 S.W.3d 29, 34–35 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016)).

               Aside from creating elements of offenses, statutory provisions also may create

punishment “enhancements.” See id. at 527 (distinguishing elements of offenses from punishment

enhancements). An enhancement in this sense is a fact that increases the punishment range for an

                                                  11
offense to a certain range above that ordinarily prescribed for the offense.5 See Calton v. State,

176 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Castellanos v. State, 533 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, pet. ref’d); Navarro v. State, 469 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

               We now turn to whether Subsection (f)(1) is an element of Tucker’s Count I offense

under Section 22.021. The statutory provisions relevant to Tucker’s offense state:

       (a) A person commits an offense:

               (1) if the person:

                         ....

                         (B) regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at
                         the time of the offense, intentionally or knowingly:

                                (i) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a
                                child by any means; [and]

                                 ....

               (2) if:

                         ....

                         (B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether
                         the person knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense.

                         ....

       (f) The minimum term of imprisonment for an offense under this section is
       increased to 25 years if:

       5
          In a different context from that presented by this case, enhancements can be elements
of offenses when the enhancement raises a misdemeanor to a felony and thus invokes the
subject-matter jurisdiction of a different level of court. See Holoman v. State, 620 S.W.3d 141,
143, 145–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This situation is not presented here because
Subsection (f)(1) does not make a jurisdictional difference to Section 22.021 offenses, which
already are felonies. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(e).

                                                  12
               (1) the victim of the offense is younger than six years of age at the time the
               offense is committed.

Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B), (f)(1).

               Applying the Legislature’s and Court of Criminal Appeals’ tests to these statutory

provisions leads us to conclude that Subsection (f)(1) is not an element of Tucker’s offense under

Section 22.021. The fact that a victim’s age was less than six years at the time of the offense is

not an instance of forbidden conduct, required culpability, a required result, or a negation of an

exception to the offense. See id. § 1.07(a)(22). Tucker could have been found guilty under

Section 22.021 without proof that the victim’s age was under six years; therefore, proof of that

fact was not “required for [the] fact finder to convict [Tucker] of [the] substantive offense.” See

Schmutz, 440 S.W.3d at 34. And applying “the eighth-grade-grammar test” shows that the relevant

verb and direct object defining the offense here are, respectively, “causes” and “penetration,”

coupled with an article “the” and prepositional phrases “of the anus . . . of a child.” See Tex.

Penal Code § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i).      The plain meaning of the relevant statutory language is

unambiguous—age less than six years under Subsection (f)(1) is not an element defining a

Section 22.021 offense. The Subsection (f)(1) fact is instead a punishment enhancement because

it is a fact that increases the punishment range for the offense above that ordinarily prescribed for

the offense. See Calton, 176 S.W.3d at 233; Castellanos, 533 S.W.3d at 418; Navarro, 469 S.W.3d

at 696. It is like other statutory provisions that have been treated as non-element enhancements.

See, e.g., Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d

748, 750, 753–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

               Were matters different—if a fact that when proved merely imposes a higher

sentence were for that reason necessarily an element of the offense as well—then the enhancement

                                                 13
of a misdemeanor DWI sentence by proof of only a single prior offense could not be a mere

enhancement but would necessarily be an element as well. Yet the Court of Criminal Appeals has

held exactly the opposite. Proof of a single prior offense is merely a DWI punishment issue and

is not an element of the offense. See Oliva, 548 S.W.3d at 519–20, 533–34.

               We thus conclude that Section 22.021 unambiguously requires that Subsection (f)(1)

not be an element of a Section 22.021 offense. Even if the statute were ambiguous, we would still

conclude that Subsection (f)(1) is not an element. The relevant statutory provisions bear some of

the hallmarks identified by the Court of Criminal Appeals as signaling non-element status. For

example, Subsection (f)(1) is not framed using the phrase “a person commits an offense if.”

See id. at 523. Subsection (f)(1) is a subsection of the statute different from “the main part of

the statute prescribing the offense,” “separated from provisions that more obviously prescribe

elements of an offense.” See id. at 531. And Subsection (f)(1) refers to a specific punishment

range.6 See id. at 531–32.

               The State’s arguments in support of the requested modification do not persuade us.

It argues that adding Subsection (f)(1) to the “Statute for Offense” field is “necessary . . . because

it signifie[s] that appellant [i]s not eligible for parole” and that without it “the judgment [i]s

       6
          We recognize that our conclusion is at odds with the one in our unpublished Hernandez
and disavow it only to the extent that it is inconsistent with this en banc opinion. And although
Tucker agrees with the State that Hernandez treated Subsection (f)(1) as an element, we are not
bound by the parties’ agreement on the legal issue of the proper interpretation of Section 22.021
to determine whether Subsection (f)(1) is an element. See Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d 518, 520
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“[T]he parties agree that the existence of a prior conviction is an element
of the offense. We, of course, are not bound by any agreement or concessions by the parties on an
issue of law.”); see also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[T]he
proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.”
(quoting Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002))); Van Flowers v. State,
629 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing same principle from
Estrada when considering issue about requested modification of judgment).

                                                 14
incomplete and should be modified to accurately reflect the statutes of conviction and sentence.”

But the finding that Subsection (f)(1) calls for is expressly stated in the judgment here. In its field

for “special findings or orders [that] apply,” the judgment says, “The Court enters an affirmative

finding that the victim or intended victim was younger than 6 years of age at the time of the

offense.” The State makes no showing for why stating the Subsection (f)(1) finding like this is

insufficient, and we have found no precedential authority besides Bledsoe indicating that such a

statement is insufficient. From Bledsoe, we are more persuaded by the reasoning in Justice

Dauphinot’s dissent, see 479 S.W.3d at 499–500—reasoning that is consistent with what we have

laid out above.

                  The State goes on to argue from Bledsoe that without the modification to add

Subsection (f)(1) to the “Statute for Offense” field, “the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

could erroneously, yet understandably, conclude that [Tucker] is eligible for release on parole.”

See id. at 498. We trust the abilities of Department officials to read what Tucker’s Count I

judgment already says and correctly carry out the officials’ duty to determine parole ineligibility

under this statute: “An inmate is not eligible for release on parole if the inmate is . . . serving a

sentence for any of the following offenses under the Penal Code: . . . (3) Section 22.021, if the

offense is punishable under Subsection (f) of that section.”7 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 508.145(a)(3).

The judgment here expressly provides the finding that activates Subsection (f)(1) and thus also

Government Code section 508.145(a)(3). The State has not shown that more is needed in the

       7
          Notably, this statute’s use of the phrase “is punishable under” for Subsection (f)(1) is yet
another sign that the Legislature views Subsection (f)(1) not as an element of the offense but as a
mere punishment enhancement. See Oliva, 548 S.W.3d at 532.

                                                  15
“Statute for Offense” field or that a phone call to the Department could not fix any error in

determining Tucker’s parole ineligibility.

               In all, we must deny the State’s requested modification because the lack of

Subsection (f)(1) in the “Statute for Offense” field is not an error.

                                          CONCLUSION

               We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               __________________________________________
                                               Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker, Triana, Kelly, and Smith
 Justice Theofanis not participating

Affirmed on En Banc Reconsideration

Filed: April 25, 2024

Publish

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