Court Opinion

ID: 9608498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:13:53.154418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:31.945754
License: Public Domain

*333EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The lead opinion holds that opinion evidence of the “shy distance,” the general tendency of drivers to move away from a barrier on their right under certain conditions, is “too remote to be relevant.” 118 Or App at 325. Weaver, an expert witness, testified that there is a general tendency of motorists when rounding a curve to move away from objects on the right side, in this case, a bridge barrier. He said:
“It’s called a ‘shy distance.’ It’s an unwillingness of people to test those limits and so I think it is more likely that when confronted with a solid object on one side and the center of the road on the other, that a person is likely to move away from that solid object.”
“Relevant evidence” is evidence that has a tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. OEC 401. The issue is whether plaintiff crossed the center line of the highway when she went around the corner. All relevant evidence on that issue is admissible unless it conflicts with a statutory, constitutional or decisional rule of evidence. “Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” OEC 402. Thus, the inquiry is whether evidence of the general tendency of drivers to move away from a barrier on their right while going around a corner makes it more likely than not that plaintiff crossed the center line. In the light of OEC 402, we turn to decisional rules of evidence arising from cases in which general tendencies or propensities have been held admissible or inadmissible.
In Chance v. Ringling Bros., 257 Or 319, 478 P2d 613 (1970), the court held that expert testimony concerning the characteristics and propensities of a certain breed of dog was admissible, because jurors might not be familiar with the propensities of that particular breed. The evidence was deemed probative, because the jury could have concluded that the circus, knowing of the propensity of the breed, was negligent in keeping the dogs in a certain area. In Carlson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 57 Or App 695, 646 P2d 43, rev den 293 Or 801 (1982), we held that the propensity of inexperienced pilots to become disoriented in clouds was probative of what caused the plaintiffs decedent’s airplane to break v. in midair.
*334In contrast to the admission of evidence of a “propensity” or the natural inclination to react in a particular manner under certain circumstances, The Supreme Court has held that evidence that drivers customarily obey or disobey a traffic sign offered to prove what a party did at the time in question is not admissible. See Savage, Adm’x v. Palmer et al, 204 Or 257, 272, 280 P2d 982 (1955); Frame v. Arrow Towing Service, 155 Or 522, 64 P2d 1312 (1937); Fromme v. Lang & Co., 131 Or 501, 281 P 120 (1929); Myrtle Point Trans. Co. v. Port of Coquille River, 86 Or 311, 168 P 625 (1917). However, in James v. Carnation Co., 278 Or 65, 562 P2d 1192 (1977), the court distinguished the holding in Savage. It said that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of “custom and usage” as to how other drivers used an auxiliary lane to the right of the fog line where the plaintiff was parked, because the evidence was probative of the issue of comparative negligence.
In summary, the rule is that evidence of others’ negligence is generally not admissible to prove the negligence of a party. However, evidence of others’ negligence is often admissible on other relevant issues, such as causation, a dangerous condition or knowledge. In this case, a pivotal issue is whether defendants’ trailer crossed the center line into plaintiffs lane or whether plaintiff crossed the line. The witness was asked whether “traffic that proceeds southbound coming across the bridge has any tendency * * * due to the design of the highway at that point [to cut across the curve in highway]?” He answered affirmatively. That evidence is not direct evidence that, on other occasions, drivers crossed the center line and, therefore, it follows that, on this occasion, that is what plaintiff did. Rather, it is evidence of a general tendency of drivers to drive in a particular manner because of a curve in the highway. Admittedly, the evidence gives rise to an inference that plaintiff was negligent, but so too did the evidence offered in Carlson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., supra, and in Chance v. Ringling Bros., supra.1 The evidence is relevant and thus admissible, because it makes a fact in issue, whether *335plaintiff crossed the center line, more probable than it would be without the evidence.
The lead opinion holds that Weaver’s testimony lacked a proper foundation. As authority, it relies on State v. Baker, 87 Or App 285, 742 P2d 633, rev den 304 Or 405 (1987). That reliance is misplaced. In that case, we held that the trial court “acted within its discretion in excluding the offered testimony [as speculative].” 87 Or App at 291. Just as it was within the range of the trial judge’s discretion in Baker to exclude the evidence, here, it was within the discretion of the court to admit the evidence. There was a sufficient basis in the record on which the expert could give an opinion because of the expert’s awareness of the design of the highway, the location of the bridge and his understanding of how the “shy distance” tendency affects motorists.
Also, I disagree with the concurring opinion that an OEC 403 objection was preserved. The fact that plaintiffs counsel included the word “prejudicial” in his objection to testimony about Weaver’s observation of the traffic flow at the accident scene does not preserve an objection to Weaver’s testimony that, in his opinion, drivers when rounding a curve have a tendency to move away from objects on the right side of the highway. The purpose of requiring an appellant to preserve an assignment of error by making a specific objection to the trial court is to provide the court an opportunity to correct its ruling. An objection on a specific ground as to specific testimony does not put the court on notice as to the parties position regarding different testimony. OEC 103(1)(a); ORAP 5.45(2); Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77, 559 P2d 1275 (1977). Moreover, an objection on the basis of OEC 401 does not preserve an objection under OEC 403. See State v. Isom, 313 Or 391, 406, 837 P2d 491 (1992); State v. Odoms, 313 Or 76, 84, 829 P2d 690 (1992); Wallender v. Michas, 256 Or 587, 591,475 P2d 72 (1970). In sum, I would hold that the trial court did not err when it admitted the evidence under OEC 402.
I dissent.

 In addition, the lead opinion draws a distinction between voluntary and involuntary reactions. When the dog lunged at the plaintiff in Chance, that act was a voluntary reaction and therefore, the majority’s distinction is not supported by the decisional law.