Court Opinion

ID: 2963420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:31.071674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.233835
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          July 5, 1995      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                    
                                  __________________

          No. 94-1950
                                    KARIN CLARKE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                     KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OF CALIFORNIA, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion of  this  Court issued  on  June 14,  1995,  is
          amended as follows:

               Cover sheet, under  listing of  counsel, add:   Nan  Myerson
                                                               ____________
          Evans, Bon Tempo & Evans and David A. Robinson on brief of amicus
          _____  _________________     _________________
          curiae National Employment Lawyers Association.

                    [Appendix not attached.  Please contact Clerk's Office
                  for 
                                   opinion with appendix.]
                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                                         
                                     ____________________

                  No. 94-1950

                                        KARIN CLARKE,

                                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                              v.

                         KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OF CALIFORNIA, INC.,

                                     Defendant, Appellee.

                                                         
                                     ____________________

                         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                                   ___________________

                                                         
                                     ____________________

                                    Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                           _____________

                               Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                         ____________________

                                   and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                            _____________

                                                         
                                     ____________________

                       Kevin G. Powers, with whom Robert S. Mantell and Law
                       _______________            _________________     ___
                  Office of Kevin G. Powers were on brief for appellant.
                  _________________________
                       Jeffrey   G.  Huvelle,   with  whom   Melissa  Cole,
                       _____________________                 _____________
                  Covington  &  Burling,  Terry  Philip  Segal,  Brenda  R.
                  _____________________   ____________________   __________
                  Sharton and Segal & Feinberg were on brief for appellee.
                  _______     ________________
                       Nan Myerson Evans,  Bon Tempo &  Evans and David  A.
                       _________________   __________________     _________
                  Robinson on brief  of amicus  curiae National  Employment
                  ________
                  Lawyers Association.
                                                         
                                     ____________________

                                        June 14, 1995
                                                         
                                     ____________________

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   Plaintiff  Karin Clarke  appeals
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          from a  district court judgment dismissing  her sexual harassment

          claim  against her  former  employer, Kentucky  Fried Chicken  of

          California,  Inc. ("KFC"), for  failure to exhaust administrative

          remedies,  and dismissing  her related  state-law tort  claims on

          preemption grounds.  We affirm the judgment.

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    While employed by defendant  KFC at a fast-food restau-

          rant  in  Saugus,  Massachusetts, Clarke  was  sexually harassed,

          physically assaulted,  and subjected  to attempted rape  by other

          KFC employees.   Clarke quit  her job and  initiated the  present

          lawsuit in Massachusetts Superior Court,  alleging sexual harass-

          ment,  negligent and reckless  infliction of  emotional distress,

          and negligent hiring, retention and supervision.  

                    After removing the case  to federal district court, see
                                                                        ___

          28 U.S.C.    1441, 1446; see also id.   1332 (diversity jurisdic-
                                   ___ ____ ___

          tion), KFC filed a motion to dismiss all claims, see Fed. R. Civ.
                                                           ___

          P. 12(b)(6),  contending that  the sexual harassment  claim under

          Mass.  Gen. L.  Ann. ch.  214,    1C, was  barred for  failure to

          exhaust  mandatory administrative  remedies before  the Massachu-

          setts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"), see Mass.  Gen.
                                                            ___

          L.  ch. 151B,    5 (prescribing  six-month limitation  period for

          MCAD claims),    9 (making section 5  procedure "exclusive"), and

          that Clarke's  common  law  tort  claims were  preempted  by  the

          Massachusetts Workers'  Compensation Act,  see Mass. Gen.  L. ch.
                                                     ___

                                          2

          152,   1 et seq. (Supp. 1994).  The motion to dismiss was granted
                   __ ___

          in its entirety.  Clarke v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of California,
                            ______    _____________________________________

          Inc., No. 94-11101-EFH (D. Mass. Aug. 17, 1994).1  
          ____

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   Sexual Harassment
          A.   Sexual Harassment
               _________________

                    Clarke  first contends that  the district  court should

          not  have  dismissed her  sexual  harassment  claim, because  the

          "jurisdictional" clause  in  Mass. Gen.  L.  Ann. ch.  214,    1C

          (1986) ("The  superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity to
                                       _____ ____ ____________

          enforce  this  right  and to  award  damages.")  evinces a  clear

          legislative intent to except such claims from compliance with the

          otherwise mandatory MCAD exhaustion requirement  imposed on other

          employment-based discrimination claims  under Massachusetts  law.

          In order to place her contention in context, we examine pertinent

          case law and statutes, see infra APPENDIX at pp. (i)-(iii). 
                                 ___ _____

               1.   Fair Employment Practices  Act, Mass. Gen.  L. Ann. ch.
               1.   Fair Employment Practices  Act, Mass. Gen.  L. Ann. ch.
                    _______________________________________________________
               151B
               151B
               ____

                    In 1946 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the  Fair

          Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 151B,  

          1  et seq.,  which  contained a  comprehensive  list of  unlawful
             __ ___

          discriminatory  acts by  covered Massachusetts  employers against

                              
          ____________________

               1We review  Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de  novo, accepting all
                                                    __  ____
          well-pleaded  allegations.   Vartanian v.  Monsanto Co.,  14 F.3d
                                       _________     ____________
          697, 700 (1st Cir. 1994). 

                                          3

          their employees.2   See id.    4; Katz v.  MCAD, 312 N.E.2d  182,
                              ___ ___       ____     ____

          187  (Mass. 1974) (noting that FEPA was enacted "to implement the

          right to  equal  treatment  guaranteed  to all  citizens  by  the

          constitutions  of  the  United  States  and the  Commonwealth").3

          Gender-based  discrimination was  included  in the  section  four

          listing  as an unlawful employment  practice.  See  Mass. Gen. L.
                                                         ___

          Ann. ch.  151B,   4(1); see also College-Town v. MCAD, 508 N.E.2d
                                  ___ ____ ____________    ____

          587 (Mass. 1987) (interpreting FEPA   4(1) as encompassing sexual

          harassment by employers and supervisory employees).

                    FEPA claimants  must file their MCAD  claims within six

          months  after  the alleged  discriminatory  act,  or forfeit  any

          entitlement to judicial review.  See Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 151B,
                                           ___

              5, 9  ("As to  acts declared  unlawful in  section  four, the
                      __ __  ____ ________  ________ __  _______  ____

          procedure provided in [chapter 151B,    5] shall, while  pending,

          be exclusive;  and the final determination  therein shall exclude
             _________

          any  other action, civil or criminal, based on the same grievance

          of the individual concerned.")  (emphasis added); see also Acker-
                                                            ___ ____ ______

          son v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 624 F. Supp. 1148, 1158 (D. Mass. 1986)
          ___    _________________

          (holding that compliance with six-month limitation period becomes

          unwaivable "jurisdictional" prerequisite to civil suit).

                    As  to  section  four administrative  claims  which are

          adjudicated by the  MCAD within ninety  days from filing,  either
          ___________
                              
          ____________________

               2A covered FEPA  "employer" is  one who has  more than  five
                                                                       ____
          employees.  Id.   1(5).
                      ___

               3While FEPA primarily  targets employment-based  discrimina-
                                              __________
          tion,  it  also  proscribes  a variety  of  other  discriminatory
          conduct     in housing, real estate,  credit extension, insurance
          and banking    not directly relevant to the appeal.  

                                          4

          the  claimant  or the  respondent  may obtain  limited  review on
                                                         _______

          petition to the superior court, Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 151B,   6,

          followed  by an  appeal of  right to  the Supreme  Judicial Court

          ("SJC").4   Unless the MCAD  fails to act  within ninety days  or

          grants an express dispensation, the  claimant may not bypass  the

          administrative  claims  process  by  filing a  civil  action  for

          damages or  injunctive relief  directly with either  the superior
                                         ________

          court or the probate court.  Id.   9.
                                       ___

                    In 1986, the Massachusetts Legislature    presaging the

          SJC's College-Town decision, supra     amended FEPA by explicitly
                ____________           _____

          including  "sexual harassment" within  the comprehensive  list of

          employer  acts proscribed under section  4.  See  1986 Mass. Acts
                                                       ___

          588 (codified at Mass. Gen. L. Ann. ch. 151B,   1(18) (definition

          of  "sexual harassment"),     4(16A)).   At  the same  time,  the

          Legislature amended  Chapter 214, a separate  statutory provision

          vesting the  superior court with original  equity jurisdiction as

          follows:  "A person shall  have the right to be free  from sexual

          harassment, as defined  in [FEPA    1(18)].   The superior  court

          shall  have jurisdiction in equity  to enforce this  right and to
          _____  ____ ____________

          award  damages." 1986 Mass. Acts  588 (codified at  Mass. Gen. L.

          Ann. ch. 214,   1C) (emphasis added) [hereinafter: "Section 1C"].

                              
          ____________________

               4The  superior court may set  aside or modify  an MCAD order
          only if it finds,  according "due weight to the  [MCAD's] experi-
          ence, technical competence, and specialized  knowledge," that the
          order was  (1) unconstitutional, (2) beyond  the MCAD's jurisdic-
          tion or statutory authority; (3) based upon an  error of law; (4)
          issued  pursuant to  an  unlawful procedure;  (5) unsupported  by
          substantial evidence; or (6) arbitrary and capricious.  See Mass.
                                                                  ___
          Gen. L. Ann. ch. 30A,   14 (1995).

                                          5

                    2.  The ERA and Charland
                    2.  The ERA and Charland
                        ____________________

                    Enacted in  1989, the  Equal Rights Act  ("ERA"), Mass.

          Gen. L. Ann. ch. 93,    102, 103, proscribes, inter alia, gender-
                                                        _____ ____

          based  discrimination in  connection with  the execution  and en-
                                                                        ___

          forcement of contracts and provides that "[a] person whose rights
          _________ __ _________

          . . . have been violated  may commence a civil action for injunc-

          tive and other appropriate  equitable relief, including the award

          of compensatory and  exemplary damages.  Said civil  action shall

          be instituted . . . in the superior court . . . ."  Id.   102(b).
                                                              ___

                    Later, in Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 631 N.E.2d 555
                              ________    _________________

          (Mass.  1994),  the SJC  held that  ERA  section 102(b)  does not
                                                                        ___

          excuse claimants from compliance with the comprehensive  adminis-
          ______

          trative claims  procedure established  in FEPA section  9, supra.
                                                                     _____

          Rather, in enacting the ERA, the Legislature presumably was aware

          that FEPA section  9 had  long mandated MCAD  exhaustion for  all
                                                                        ___

          employment-based discrimination claims  alleging "unlawful  prac-
                                                            ________  _____

          tice[s]"  listed in FEPA section 4.   Charland, 631 N.E.2d at 558
          _______                               ________

          (noting "legislative intent to subject all  discrimination claims
                                                 ___  ______________ ______

          to administrative  scrutiny") (emphasis added).   And since Char-

          land had alleged a breach of his employment contract, arising out
                                           __________ ________

          of his wrongful  discharge based on age and national origin    an

          employment-based claim  actionable under FEPA, see  Mass. Gen. L.
                                  __________ _____ ____  ___

          Ann. ch. 151B,   4(1) (barring discharge  from employment because

          of  "national origin" or "age")     the SJC  held that Charland's

          superior court action  must be  dismissed for failure  to file  a

          timely  administrative claim with the MCAD.  Charland, 631 N.E.2d
                                                       ________

                                          6

          at 559; see  also Agin v. Federal White  Cement, Inc., 632 N.E.2d
                  ___  ____ ____    ___________________________

          1197, 1199 (Mass. 1994) (same).

               3.  Standard of Review
               3.  Standard of Review
                   __________________

                    Where, as  here, a district court  dismissal turns upon

          an interpretation of state  law, we conduct plenary review.   See
                                                                        ___

          Salve Regina  College v. Russell,  499 U.S. 225,  239-40 (1991).5
          _____________________    _______

          The issue before us on  appeal is whether Section 1C,  unlike ERA

          sections 102 and 103, excepts the instant employment-based sexual

          harassment claim from compliance  with the administrative exhaus-

          tion  requirement in FEPA section 9.  Clarke argues that Charland
                                                                   ________

          is  not controlling,  because  it resolved  only the  legislative
                                                      ____

          correlation  between FEPA  and  the ERA,  which  would mean  that
                                     ___  ___ ___

          Charland's reference  to "the  legislative intent to  subject all
          ________                                                      ___

          discrimination  claims  to  administrative  scrutiny"   was  mere
          ______________  ______

          dictum.  KFC responds  that the Charland rationale likewise  bars
                                          ________ _________

          Clarke's unexhausted  Section 1C claim --  a gender-based employ-

          ment  discrimination  claim  explicitly  listed in  FEPA  section

          4(16A) as an unlawful act.    

               4.  Section 1C
               4.  Section 1C
                   __________

                    Clarke would distinguish  Section 1C from  ERA sections

                              
          ____________________

               5Although Clarke  belatedly urges certification to  the SJC,
          "[w]e  are rarely receptive to  . . .  requests for certification
          newly  asserted on appeal."   See Nieves v.  University of Puerto
                                        ___ ______     ____________________
          Rico, 7  F.3d 270, 278 (1st  Cir. 1993); see also  Fischer v. Bar
          ____                                     ___ ____  _______    ___
          Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 857  F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1988), cert.
          _________________________                                   ____
          denied, 489 U.S.  1018 (1989).  Nor will we  resort to certifica-
          ______
          tion unless  the issue presented is  sufficiently unsettled under
                                                            _________
          state law that we could not essay a "reasonably clear" prediction
          with  adequate confidence.  See Porter v. Nutter, 913 F.2d 37, 41
                                      ___ ______    ______
          n.4 (1st Cir. 1990).

                                          7

          102  and 103 on  the ground that  it evinces a  clear legislative

          intent  to  create two  parallel  remedial  paths for  redressing
                                  ________

          sexual  harassment  claims     one administrative,  one judicial.

          Unlike the ERA,  which became  law some fifty  years after  FEPA,

          Section 1C was enacted  at the same time the  Legislature amended
                                  __ ___ ____ ____

          FEPA section  4 to cover sexual harassment claims.  Consequently,

          Clarke argues, unless Section 1C is interpreted as establishing a

          parallel  judicial path  that  bypasses  the MCAD  administrative

          remedy,  Section 1C becomes surplusage.   See Casa  Loma, Inc. v.
                                                    ___ ________________

          Alcoholic Beverages  Control Comm'n,  385 N.E.2d 976,  978 (Mass.
          ___________________________________

          1979)  ("It is  a common  tenet of  statutory construction  that,
                 

          wherever possible, no provision of a legislative enactment should

          be treated as superfluous.").  We agree with Clarke that Charland
                                                                   ________

          is not directly controlling, since it did not consider the unique

          language and legislative history of Section 1C.

                    Nevertheless, absent  a definitive  SJC ruling,  we may

          look to "analogous decisions, considered  dicta, scholarly works,
                                        __________  _____

          and  any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the

          [SJC] would decide  the issue  at hand, taking  into account  the

          broad policies and  trends so evinced."   Michelin Tires (Canada)
                                                    _______________________

          Ltd. v.  First Nat'l  Bank, 666  F.2d 673,  682  (1st Cir.  1981)
          ___      _________________

          (emphasis  added); see also Gibson  v. City of  Cranston, 37 F.3d
                             ___ ____ ______     _________________

          731,  736 (1st Cir. 1994).6  Charland categorically states that a
                                       ________
                              
          ____________________

               6Clarke  points  to  an unpublished  superior  court opinion
          entered  after oral  argument in  this case,  see Burman  v. Boch
                                                        ___ ______     ____
          Oldsmobile, Inc.,  No. 92-02690 (Mass.  Sup. Ct. Apr.  11, 1995),
          ________________
          which held Charland inapposite to sexual harassment claims.  Even
                     ________
          assuming it were  proper to consider the unreported decision, see
                                                                        ___

                                          8

          claimant alleging  an unlawful discriminatory act  listed in FEPA
                                                             ______

          section  4  must comply  with  the  MCAD administrative  process,
                      ____

          absent  clear evidence that the Legislature  carved out an excep-

          tion.  Moreover, the listing of unlawful acts in section  4 is so

          comprehensive that the SJC has yet to identify an exception.  See
                                                                        ___

          Charland, 631  N.E.2d at 558  (citing with approval  Mouradian v.
          ________                                             _________

          General  Elec. Co., 503 N.E.2d 1318 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (Massa-
          __________________

          chusetts Civil Rights Act claimants must first comply with FEPA's

          MCAD procedure)).  

                    The  language of  1986 Mass. Acts  588     amending the

          FEPA section  4 listing and adding new Section 1C, see supra p. 5
                                                             ___ _____

              does not dictate the interpretation urged by Clarke, since it

          does  not specify  at what  point in  the sexual-harassment-claim

          process original  superior court  jurisdiction vests.   Under the

          Charland  rationale,  once  employment-based   sexual  harassment
          ________

          claims were added  to the FEPA section 4 listing  by the Legisla-
                      _____

          ture,  the MCAD claim-filing procedure mandated by FEPA section 9
                                ______

          presumptively became the exclusive procedural path for initiating
                                   _________                     __________

          all  such claims against "employers."   After the  MCAD renders a

          final decision,  of course,  jurisdiction to review  its decision
                                                       ______

          would lie in  the appropriate superior court.  See supra pp. 4-5.
                                                         ___ _____

          In  some instances,  however,  administrative claims  may not  be

          acted  upon within ninety  days by  the MCAD;  alternatively, the
                              
          ____________________

          U.S. Ct. of  App. 1st Cir. Rule 14, Burman  contains no developed
                                              ______
          analysis and  no discussion of the  relevant statutory provisions
          or legislative history.  See id. slip op. at 8 n.5 ("[T]his Court
                                   ___ ___
          views  the Charland holding as specific, not extending to G.L. c.
                     ________
          214,   1C."). 

                                          9

          MCAD may permit  the claimant  to proceed directly  with a  civil

          action in a judicial forum.  

                    Thus, like its  counterpart provision, FEPA section  9,

          Mass.  Gen. L. Ann. ch. 151B,   9 (vesting superior, probate, and

          housing  courts  with  original  jurisdiction  of  FEPA  claims),

          Section  1C serves  an essential  function     by vesting  in the

          superior  court  (as distinguished  from  the  SJC, for  example)

          exclusive original jurisdiction to entertain such administrative-

          ly exhausted     but unadjudicated     sexual harassment claims.7
             _________         _____________

          Therefore,  much  like  ERA  sections 102(b)  and  103(b),  which

          provide that claimants  "may commence a civil  action for injunc-

          tive and other appropriate equitable relief . . . in the superior

          court"  without indicating when such  a civil action  may be com-
                                     ____

          menced, the  mere  fact that  Section 1C  designates which  court
                                                               _____  _____

          shall have original jurisdiction  over exhausted    but unadjudi-
                                                 _________        _________

          cated    MCAD claims  does not mean that the  designated judicial
          _____

          forum  may assert jurisdiction ab initio, i.e., before (or in the
                                         __ ______  ____  ______
                              
          ____________________

               7Chapter 214,   1, recognizes  that the superior courts  and
          the  SJC are  endowed, concurrently,  with the  requisite general
          power  possessed  by  courts  in equity  to  fashion  appropriate
          remedies in  the exercise  of their traditional  equity jurisdic-
          tion.   Chapter 214,   2, on  the other hand, vests  the SJC with
          "exclusive [original] jurisdiction of  all civil actions in which
          equitable relief  [authorized by statute] is  sought," unless the
                                        __ _______               ______ ___
          statute expressly  provides that another court  shall have exclu-
          _______ _________  ________ ____ _______ _____  _____ ____ ______
          sive  or  concurrent  original  jurisdiction  over  the statutory
          ____  __  __________  ________  ____________  ____  ___ _________
          claims.  Thus, contrary to  Clarke's contention, the bare  refer-
          ______
          ence to superior court "jurisdiction" in Section 1C may have been
          intended merely to overcome  the automatic "default" mechanism in
          Section  2    which would  otherwise vest the  SJC with exclusive
                                                                  _________
          original jurisdiction  over all  Section 1C claims  for equitable
          relief     and  to  designate which  other court  (i.e., superior
                                        _____  _____ _____   ____
          court) possesses  jurisdiction once  the Section 1C  claimant has
          met the MCAD-exhaustion requirements imposed by FEPA section 9.

                                          10

          absence of) a timely MCAD claim.        Neither  party  cites  to

          the legislative history relating to Section 1C, though it appears

          fairly illuminating.  The legislative bill approved by  the House

          Committee on Commerce and Labor (H.5732) represented a compromise

          melded from eight competing Senate and House versions relating to
                      _____

          sexual harassment  in employment  and education.    Two of  these

          predecessor versions provided as  follows:  "A person  shall have

          the right to be free  from sexual harassment. . . .  The superior

          court shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce this right and

          to award damages.  The filing  of a complaint under chapter  151B
                             ___ ______  __ _ _________ _____ _______  ____

          shall  not be  a prerequisite  to filing  a complaint  under this
          _____  ___ __  _ ____________  __ ______  _ _________  _____ ____

          section  in superior court."  H.3136  (sponsor, B. Gray, Framing-
          _______  __ ________ _____

          ham); see also H.488 (Saggese, Winthrop) (emphasis added).  It is
                ___ ____

          noteworthy  that the  only pertinent  deletion before  Section 1C
                                ____

          became law  was the  italicized language  from  H.3136 and  H.488

          quoted supra.  See Russello v.  United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24
                 _____   ___ ________     _____________

          (1983) (noting that deletions of limiting language from predeces-

          sor bills  normally presumed intentional); State  of Rhode Island
                                                     ______________________

          v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 700 (1st Cir.) (same),
             _________________________

          cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298 (1994).  
          ____  ______

                    Clarke argues  that Section  1C is unlike  ERA sections

          102 and 103, which encompass claims for employment-based discrim-
                                                  __________

          ination  listed in FEPA section  4 as well  as sundry non-employ-
                                                                ___________

          ment-based  discrimination claims  which might  not be  listed in
          ____                                            ___

          FEPA.  Thus, the ERA enactment may be seen as serving an indepen-

          dent  function  even after  Charland.   That  is, though  all ERA
                                      ________

                                          11

          employment-based  claims of a type listed in FEPA section 4 would
          __________

          be subject  to FEPA's administrative exhaustion  requirement, see
                                                                        ___

          Charland, 631 N.E.2d  at 558-59, non-employment-based ERA  claims
          ________                         ______________       ___

          not listed in FEPA section 4 (if any) might be initiated directly

          in  the superior  court  without administrative  exhaustion.   By

          contrast,  Section 1C  encompasses only sexual  harassment claims
                                             ____

          which are employment-based, compare Mass. Gen.  L. Ann. ch. 151B,
                    __________        _______

             1(18) (defining  "sexual harassment"  in terms  of "employment

          decisions,"  "work  performance,"  and "work  environment")  with
                                                                       ____

          Mass.  Gen. L.  Ann. ch.  214,    1C (prohibiting  harassment "as

          defined in  chapter  [151B]"), and  all  employment-based  gender
                                                   __________

          discrimination claims  already fall  within FEPA section  4, and,

          consequently, come within the mandatory administrative exhaustion

          provision.  Clarke reasons, therefore, that unless  Section 1C is

          interpreted  as  providing  employment-based   sexual  harassment

          claimants an MCAD bypass  into superior court, its  enactment was

          redundant  and superfluous.  See  Casa Loma, Inc.,  385 N.E.2d at
                                       ___  _______________

          978 (noting  that, where possible,  statutes ought not  be inter-

          preted so as to render any provision superfluous).  But see supra
                                                              ___ ___ _____

          note  7  (investing superior  court  with  jurisdiction over  all

          exhausted Section 1C claims, as opposed to superior, probate, and

          housing courts designated in FEPA section 9).

                    On the other hand,  KFC points out    correctly  in our

          view     that the Legislature may well have intended that Section

          1C  make  all  employment-based  sexual  harassment  unlawful  in
                    ___  __________

          Massachusetts, without regard to  the number of employees working

                                          12

          for the  particular employer, whereas other  forms of employment-
                                                _____  _____ __ ___________

          based discrimination would  be covered by FEPA  only if practiced
          _____ ______________

          by employers who hire more than  five persons.  See supra note 2.
                                                          ___ _____

          This interpretation is  substantiated by the fact that Section 1C

          is not tied  into FEPA's  definition of "employer,"  but only  to
             ___                                                   ____

          FEPA's  definition  of  "sexual  harassment."    Although  Clarke

          counters that the Legislature could have achieved the same result

          simply  by amending the FEPA definition of "employer" to accommo-

          date  this exception,  we are  not persuaded--  nor aware  of any

          authority-- that  the amendatory  technique she suggests  was the

          only one open to the Legislature. 

                    Clarke further contends that it would be incongruous to

          require  only the  employees of  large-scale employers  to comply

          with the MCAD administrative claims process, and not employees of

          small-scale employers, since such an interpretation would contra-

          vene  the Charland  holding  that all  discrimination claims  are
                    ________                ___

          subject  to  the  exhaustion  requirement.   This  contention  is

          demonstrably  flawed as  well.   Charland simply  held that  MCAD
                                           ________

          exhaustion  is  required if  the  claim alleges  an  unlawful act

          listed in FEPA section  4.  And discriminatory conduct  by small-
                                                                     ______

          scale employers  is not  listed in section  4. See Mass.  Gen. L.
          _____               ___                        ___

          Ann. ch. 151B,    4(16A) (unlawful "[f]or an employer, personally
                                                    __ ________

          or  through its agents,  to sexually  harass any  employee"); see
                                                                        ___

          also supra note 2.   Absent ambiguity in the  statutory language,
          ____ _____

          we think it inappropriate to second-guess the Legislature's clear

          language establishing broadened protection for victims of  sexual

                                          13

          harassment.

                     Finally,  Clarke argues  that the  Legislature singled

          out all sexual harassment  claims    from other types  of employ-
                                                    _____

          ment-based discrimination  claims  under FEPA     because  sexual
                     ______________

          harassment normally warrants more  urgent remedial action and, by

          affording sexual harassment victims direct access to the superior

          court, Section  1C would enable more  immediate equitable relief.

          Her contention is unavailing for two reasons.

                    First,  Clarke reserved  this  argument  for her  reply

          brief on  appeal, thereby denying KFC an  opportunity to respond.

          See VanHaaren  v. State Farm Mut.  Auto. Ins. Co., 989  F.2d 1, 7
          ___ _________     _______________________________

          n.6 (1st  Cir. 1993).   Second, even if  it were not  waived, the

          claim is meritless  since FEPA already provides the very remedial

          mechanisms Clarke would have us read into Section  1C.  See Mass.
                                                                  ___

          Gen. L.  Ann. ch. 151B,    5 (MCAD commissioner "may  also file a
                                        ____ ____________

          petition in equity in the superior  court . . . seeking appropri-

          ate injunctive relief against such respondent . . . .");   9 ("An
                                                                         __

          aggrieved person may also seek temporary injunctive relief in the
          _________ ______

          superior . . .  court . .  . at any  time to prevent  irreparable

          injury during  the pendency of or  prior to the filing  of a com-

          plaint with the [MCAD].") (emphasis added).

                    For the foregoing reasons,  therefore, we conclude that

          it  is reasonably likely that  the SJC would  extend its Charland
                                                                   ________

          rationale  to  Section 1C,  thereby preserving  the comprehensive

          procedural  framework  established  by  the  Legislature in  FEPA

          section 9.  Consequently,  the district court judgment dismissing

                                          14

          the sexual harassment claim for failure to exhaust administrative

          remedies under the MCAD must be affirmed.

          B.   Common Law Tort Claims8
          B.   Common Law Tort Claims
               ______________________

                    Clarke contends that the district court erred in ruling

          that the three remaining common law claims    alleging negligence

          in hiring, supervising and  retaining the offending KFC employees

               were  preempted by  the Massachusetts  Workers' Compensation

          Act, Mass. Gen. L.  Ann. ch. 152,   24.   We briefly reprise  the

          legislative history relating to recent amendments to the workers'

          compensation statute. 

                    From the  start, section  24 of the  Massachusetts wor-

          kers'  compensation statute  included a  comprehensive preemption

          provision   precluding  injured  workers  from  instituting  tort

          actions  "in respect  to an  [employment-related] injury  that is
                                                            ______

          compensable  [through the payment  of disability  benefits] under
          ___________

          this  chapter."   Mass.  Gen. L.  Ann. ch.  152,    24  (emphasis

          added).9   Until 1985,  employment-induced emotional disabilities
                                                     _________

                              
          ____________________

               8The  failure to file a claim with  the MCAD did not bar the
          common law claims.  See Felinske v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking
                              ___ ________    _____________________________
          Indus. Pension Fund,  855 F.  Supp. 474 (D.  Mass. 1994)  (citing
          ___________________
          Melley v. Gillette Corp., 475 N.E.2d 252 (Mass. 1985)).  However,
          ______    ______________
          Clarke  has not appealed the  dismissal of the  common law claims
          alleging intentional tortfeasance.

               9Massachusetts workers  may avoid  section 24  preemption by
          expressly  reserving their common law rights at the time they are
          hired.  Id.  Clarke made no such reservation.
                  ___

                                          15

          were considered  fully "compensable" injuries under  the workers'

          compensation statute,  without regard  to whether  the disability

          resulted from employer negligence.  See Foley v.  Polaroid Corp.,
                                              ___ _____     ______________

          413 N.E.2d 711, 714-15 (Mass. 1980).  

                    Clarke  concedes  that   her  negligence-based   claims

          against KFC allege employment-induced emotional injury and, thus,
                                                _________

          would have  been preempted under the  pre-1985 workers' compensa-
                                                ___

          tion  statute.  In 1985,  however, the SJC  held that employment-

          related emotional injuries likewise  were "compensable" under the

          workers' compensation statute,  even though the emotional  injury
                                          ____ ______

          resulted from  such bona fide  employer decisions as  layoffs and

          interdepartmental transfers.  Kelly's  Case, 477 N.E.2d 582, 584-
                                        _____________

          85 (Mass.  1985) (noting that disallowance  of workers' compensa-

          tion for such  emotional injuries  is a policy  decision for  the

          Legislature, not the courts).  

                    The  ensuing uproar  from  the  Massachusetts  business

          community  over the  implications  of Kelly's  Case prompted  the
                                                _____________

          Legislature to amend the  "personal injury" definition in chapter

          152 to read:

                    Personal  injuries  shall  include mental  or
                    emotional disabilities only where the predom-
                    inant contributing cause  of such  disability
                    is an  event  or series  of events  occurring
                    within any employment.  . . .   No mental  or
                                                    __ ______  __
                    emotional disability  arising principally out
                    _________ __________          ___________
                    of a bona fide,  personnel action including a
                         ____ _____  _________ ______ _________
                    transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination
                    except such  action which is  the intentional
                    infliction of emotional harm shall  be deemed
                                                           ______
                    to be a personal injury within the meaning of
                          _ ________ ______
                    this chapter.  

          See  1985 Mass.  Acts 572  ("Workers' Compensation  Reform Act");
          ___

                                          16

          1986 Mass.  Acts 662 (codified at  Mass. Gen. L. Ann.  ch. 152,  

          1(7A)).   Although ostensibly a pro-employer  enactment, serendi-
                                          ____________

          pitously the 1985 amendment  also presented claimants like Clarke

          with a basis  for attempting to  circumvent the broad  preemption

          provision  in section  24 of  the workers'  compensation statute.

          From the  beginning, section  24 had  preempted  tort actions  at

          common  law,  but  only in  respect  to  injuries compensable  by
                                                            ___________

          disability benefits under the workers' compensation statute.  See
                                                                        ___

          Mass. Gen.  Laws Ann. ch. 152,    24.  After  the 1985 amendment,

          however, emotional injuries caused by an employer's "bona fide []

          personnel  action[s]"      [hereinafter  otherwise:   "BFPA"]    

          literally became "noncompensable" under the workers' compensation

          statute.   Consequently, Clarke argues,  if it can be established

          that her emotional injuries  were caused by a good  faith, albeit
                                                        ____  _____

          negligent, personnel decision on the part of KFC    for which she
          _________

          would  not be  entitled to  workers' compensation  benefits under

          chapter 152, amended section 1(7A), see supra p. 16     she would
                                              ___ _____

          be entitled  to redress her  negligence-based tort claims  in the

          courts by virtue of  the "noncompensability" exception to section

          24 preemption.

                    Clarke's argument  cannot succeed, however,  unless she

          can  demonstrate both  that (1)  the decision  not to  screen KFC
                           ____

          hirees, nor alter their working  conditions to minimize the  risk

          that Clarke  be emotionally harmed by  sexual harassment, consti-

          tuted  a  "bona  fide personnel  action"  within  the meaning  of

          amended section 1(7A); and (2) the 1985 Legislature, in rendering
                                 ___

                                          17

          all  BFPA-induced emotional  injuries  noncompensable  under  the

          workers' compensation  statute, intended  to deny  BFPA claimants

          like Clarke the right  to collect workers' compensation benefits,

          and,  as an offsetting form  of relief, to  save their common law

          tort remedies from preemption under  section 24.  Since  Clarke's

          argument plainly  founders on the second prong, we simply assume,

          arguendo, that the  personnel actions at  issue qualify as  BFPAs
          ________

          under amended section 1(7A).

                    Although there  is no  SJC decision directly  in point,

          the interpretation Clarke urges was rejected recently by the Mas-

          sachusetts Appeals Court,  in Catalano v. First  Essex Sav. Bank,
                                        ________    ______________________

          639 N.E.2d 1113 (Mass.  App. Ct.), review denied, 644  N.E.2d 225
                                             ______ ______

          (1994).  The Catalano court noted that the 1985 amendments to the
                       ________

          workers'  compensation  statute were  in  direct  response to  an

          invitation the SJC extended  to the Legislature in Kelly's  Case:
                                                             _____________

          to "determine, as  a matter of public policy, whether  one of the

          costs of doing business in this Commonwealth shall be the compen-

          sation of those few employees  who do suffer emotional disability

          as  a result  of being  laid off  or transferred."   Id.  at 1115
                                                               ___

          (quoting Kelly's Case, 477 N.E.2d at 584-85):
                   ____________

                    It is  obvious that the Legislature wished to
                    protect the employer from liability under the
                    [Workers' Compensation] Act for  claims aris-
                    ing out of bona fide personnel actions unless
                    motivated  by an intent  to inflict emotional
                    distress.  In  those circumstances, it  seems
                    unlikely  that  the  Legislature intended  to
                    preserve a civil action  for claims based  on
                    negligent  infliction  of emotional  distress
                    that arise from a bona fide personnel action.
                    To  do so would negate  . . .  the purpose of
                    relieving employers from  the financial  bur-

                                          18

                    dens of such claims . . . .

          Id. at 1116.
          ___

                    Clarke correctly points out that  the Catalano analysis
                                                          ________

          constitutes dicta because  the court dismissed  the appeal on  an

          alternate ground.  Id.   Nevertheless, persuasive, reasoned dicta
                             ___

          may provide  a valuable guide  to statutory interpretation.   See
                                                                        ___

          Gibson, 37 F.3d at 736 (absent explicit ruling by state's highest
          ______

          court, federal court sitting in diversity may consult "considered

          dicta") (citing Michelin Tires,  666 F.2d at 682); see  also Bank
                          ______________                     ___  ____ ____

          of New England Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 986 F.2d  600, 603 (1st
          _______________________________    _____

          Cir.  1993)  (relying  on  "persuasive" dicta  of  United  States

          Supreme Court);  cf. also Sainz  Gonzalez v. Banco  de Santander-
                           ___ ____ _______________    ____________________

          Puerto Rico, 932  F.2d 999,  1001 (1st Cir.  1991) (declining  to
          ___________

          credit dicta unsupported by  reasoned analysis); United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Rivera,  872 F.2d 507, 509  (1st Cir.) (same),  cert. denied, 493
          ______                                          ____  ______

          U.S. 818 (1989).  Moreover, the Catalano analysis was prompted by
                                          ________

          the  appeals  court's  express  desire to  resolve  "the  alleged

          uncertainty  and  confusion  that  purportedly  exists among  the

          members  of the  [Massachusetts]  bar and  public concerning  the

          initiation of  legal proceedings  involving the claims  raised in

          this appeal," Catalano, 639 N.E.2d at 1115, and the SJC summarily
                        ________

          denied review.  

                    The original workers' compensation  statute effectively

          preempted  a broad  range of  civil actions based  on employment-

          related emotional injury, see  supra p. 15, and one  would expect
                                    ___  _____

          any significant retreat from this longstanding legislative policy

                                          19

          to be heralded with considerably greater clarity than is discern-

          ible in Mass. Gen.  L. Ann. ch. 152,   1(7A).   We agree with the

          appeals  court that it would strain credulity and common sense to

          presume that the Legislature chose to limit employers' collective

          liability under the workers'  compensation scheme, only to expose

          individual employers  to greater  liability in common  law negli-

          gence suits based on bona fide personnel actions.  

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    The grievous sexual harassment claims alleged by appel-

          lant were  entitled to just  adjudication in  the first  instance

          under  the administrative claims process established by Massachu-

          setts  law.   As  the courts  are  powerless to  reinstate  legal

          remedies foreclosed  by failure to comply with a mandatory admin-

          istrative  exhaustion  requirement, the  district  court judgment

          dismissing  the sexual harassment claim must be affirmed.  Final-

          ly, the district court judgment dismissing the related common law

          tort claims must be affirmed on preemption grounds.

                    The district  court judgment is affirmed.   The parties
                    The district  court judgment is affirmed.   The parties
                    ________________________________________    ___________

          shall bear their own costs.
          shall bear their own costs.
          __________________________

                                          20

                                       APPENDIX
                                       APPENDIX

          A.   Equal Rights Act, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93, sec. 102 (1994):
          A.   Equal Rights Act, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93, sec. 102 (1994):
               ________________

               Section 102.  Equal Rights for All  Persons Within Com-
               monwealth;  Enforcement by  Civil Action  for Equitable
               Relief;  Jurisdiction  of  Superior  Court;  Degree  of
               Proof; Damages, Costs and Attorneys' Fees.

                    (a) All  persons within the  commonwealth, regard-
                    less of  sex, race, color, creed  or national ori-
                    gin, shall have, except  as is otherwise  provided
                    or permitted  by law,  the same rights  enjoyed by
                    white male citizens, to make and enforce contracts
                    .  . . and  to the full  and equal  benefit of all
                    laws and  proceedings for the security  of persons
                    and property . . . . 

                    (b) A person whose  rights under the provisions of
                    subsection  (a) have been  violated may commence a
                    civil  action for injunctive and other appropriate
                    equitable relief, including the award of compensa-
                    tory and exemplary damages[] . . . in the superior
                    court . . . . 

          B.   Fair  Employment Practices  Act, Mass.  Ann. Laws  ch. 151B,
          B.   Fair  Employment Practices  Act, Mass.  Ann. Laws  ch. 151B,
               _______________________________
               sec. 1 (1995):
               sec. 1 (1995)

               Section 1. Definitions.

                    As used in this chapter
                         . . . .

                         5. The term "employer" does not include . . .
                    any employer  with fewer  than six persons  in his
                    employ . . . .

                         . . . .

                         18.  The term "sexual  harassment" shall mean
                    sexual advances, requests  for sexual favors,  and
                    other verbal  or physical conduct of  a sexual na-
                    ture . . . (b)  . . . [which] have the  purpose or
                    effect of unreasonably interfering with an indivi-
                    dual's work performance  by creating an intimidat-
                    ing,  hostile,  humiliating or  sexually offensive
                    work environment. Discrimination  on the basis  of
                    sex shall  include, but not be  limited to, sexual
                    harassment.

                                          i

               Section 4.  Unlawful Practices;  Certain Records  to be
               Kept; Employer,  etc., Not Required  to Grant Preferen-
               tial Treatment to Any Individual or Group.   
            
                    It shall be an unlawful practice:  
            
                         1. For an employer,  by himself or his agent,
                    because of  the race, color, religious  creed, na-
                    tional origin,  sex, sexual orientation, .  . . or
                    ancestry of  any individual  to refuse to  hire or
                    employ or  to bar or to  discharge from employment
                    such  individual or  to discriminate  against such
                    individual in compensation or in terms, conditions
                    or  privileges of employment,  unless based upon a
                    bona fide occupational qualification. . . .

                         . . . .
              
                         16A. For an  employer, personally or  through
                    its agents, to sexually harass any employee.  
            
               Section  5.  Complaints Alleging  Unlawful  Practice or
               Violation  of  Certain  Statutes;   Proceedings  Before
               Commission; Injunctive Relief; Award of Damages.

                         Any  person  claiming to  be aggrieved  by an
                    alleged unlawful  practice [listed in section 4] .
                    .  .  may .  .  . make,  sign  and  file with  the
                    commission a verified complaint in writing . . . .

                         . . . .

                         .  . .  Before  or after  a determination  of
                    probable  cause  hereunder  such commissioner  may
                    also  file a  petition in  equity in  the superior
                    court . . . . 

               Section  6. Judicial  Review  of  Order of  Commission;
               Injunctive Relief.

                         Any complainant, respondent  or other  person
                    aggrieved by  such  order of  the  commission  may
                    obtain judicial review  thereof . . . in the supe-
                    rior court . . . .

               Section  9.  Chapter Construed  Liberally; Inconsistent
               Laws;  Procedure Exclusive;  Damages or  Injunctive Re-
               lief.

                         . . . [A]s to acts declared unlawful  by sec-
                    tion four, the procedure provided in this  chapter
                    shall, while pending, be  exclusive; and the final

                                          ii

                    determination  therein  shall  exclude  any  other
                    action, civil or criminal, based on the same grie-
                    vance of the individual concerned.

                         Any  person  claiming to  be  aggrieved  by a
                    practice made unlawful under this chapter or under
                    chapter  one hundred  and fifty-one  C, or  by any
                    other unlawful practice within the jurisdiction of
                    the commission,  may, at the  expiration of ninety
                    days  after the  filing  of a  complaint with  the
                    commission, or sooner if a commissioner assents in
                    writing, but not later  than three years after the
                    alleged  unlawful practice occurred, bring a civil
                    action for damages or injunctive relief or both in
                    the  superior or  probate court  . .  . or  in the
                    housing  court within  whose district  the alleged
                    unlawful practice  occurred if the  unlawful prac-
                    tice involves residential housing. .  . .  An  ag-
                    grieved  person may also seek temporary injunctive
                    relief in the superior,  housing or probate  court
                    within such county at  any time to prevent irrepa-
                    rable injury  during the  pendency of or  prior to
                    the filing of a complaint with the commission. . .
                    .

          C.   Equity Jurisdiction Statute, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214 (1995)
          C.   Equity Jurisdiction Statute, Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214 (1995)
               ___________________________

               Section 1. General Equity Jurisdiction, Concurrent.

                         The  supreme  judicial  and  superior  courts
                    shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction of
                    all cases and  matters of equity cognizable  under
                    the  general  principles  of equity  jurisprudence
                    and,  with reference thereto,  shall be  courts of
                    general equity jurisdiction . . . . 

               Section 1C. Right to be Free From Sexual Harassment.

                         A person shall have the right to be free from
                    sexual harassment,  as defined in chapter one hun-
                    dred and fifty-one B and one hundred and fifty-one
                    C.  The superior court shall have the jurisdiction
                    in equity to enforce this  right and to award dam-
                    ages.

               Section 2. Statutory Equity Jurisdiction.

                         The  supreme judicial court shall have origi-
                    nal and  exclusive jurisdiction  of all  civil ac-
                    tions in which equitable relief is sought cogniza-
                    ble under any statute and not within the jurisdic-

                                         iii

                    tion conferred by section  one, unless a different
                    provision is  made; and the  superior court  shall
                    have like original and exclusive, or like original
                    and concurrent, jurisdiction  only if the  statute
                    so provides.

                                          iv