Court Opinion

ID: 9752449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:09:09.810232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:44.519706
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 24, 2022

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00344-CV
                            ———————————
                     RACHEL LEAL-HUDSON, Appellant
                                         V.
                        JULIE KETTERMAN, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 190th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2022-01417

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Rachel Leal-Hudson challenges the trial court’s judgment ordering,

inter alia, (1) that she was disqualified from being a candidate on the March 1, 2022

Republican Party primary ballot for the office of judge of the 313th District Court

of Harris County, (2) that she was also disqualified from being the Republican Party
candidate for that office on the general election ballot, and (3) that any votes cast for

Leal-Hudson would be void.

      The Supreme Court of Texas, in an original mandamus proceeding filed by

Leal-Hudson, stayed the trial court’s judgment. After winning the primary election,

Leal-Hudson was the Republican Party candidate for the office of judge of the 313th

District Court in the November 8, 2022 general election. However, Leal-Hudson lost

to her opponent in the general election.

      Because the general election has occurred and Leal-Hudson lost, the case has

become moot. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the

case for want of jurisdiction.

                                     Background

      By early 2022, both Leal-Hudson and appellee Julie Ketterman had submitted

applications to be a candidate on the Republican Party primary ballot for the office

of judge of the 313th District Court. As required by the Texas Election Code, Leal-

Hudson submitted a petition containing voter signatures with her application. See

TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.021(e).

      On January 10, 2022, Ketterman filed suit against the Harris County

Republican Party (HCRP) and Cindy Siegel, the party chair. Ketterman’s suit

centered on her allegation that, in at least seven pages of her petition, Leal-Hudson

had signed an affidavit attesting that she had witnessed each signature on that page

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and that she had read a required statement to each signer when she had actually not

done so.

      In addition to a temporary restraining order, Ketterman sought temporary and

permanent injunctive relief. She asked the trial court “[to] restrain[] and enjoin[]

Seigel and the [HCRP] from placing . . . Leal-Hudson on the Republican primary

ballot or certifying her . . . for the general election ballot as the Republican nominee

for the office of Harris County Judge of the 313th Judicial District Court.” Ketterman

had not sued Leal-Hudson, but Leal-Hudson intervened in the suit as a defendant.

      On January 14, 2022, the trial court denied Ketterman’s request for a

temporary injunction. Ketterman filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging

the denial, which this Court denied in a non-substantive opinion. See In re

Ketterman, No. 01-22-00041-CV, 2022 WL 278930, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Jan. 28, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

      The case was tried to a jury in early February 2022. The jury found that Leal-

Hudson had committed 10 separate instances of fraud when she signed certain

affidavits in the petition supporting her application. Based on the jury’s findings, the

trial court rendered a judgment against Leal-Hudson on February 4, 2022.

      The final judgment ordered as follows: (1) Leal-Hudson’s application to be

on the March 1, 2022 Republican Party general primary ballot for the office of judge

of the 313th District Court was “void and invalid”; (2) Cindy Siegel, as HCRP chair,

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was required to reject Leal-Hudson’s application; (3) Leal-Hudson was disqualified

as a candidate for the office of judge of the 313th District Court for the primary

election and for any runoff election; (4) Leal-Hudson was disqualified as the

Republican Party candidate for the office for the general election on November 8,

2022; (5) a permanent injunction be issued enjoining Siegel from canvassing and

counting votes in favor of Leal-Hudson; (6) any votes cast and counted in favor of

Leal-Hudson shall be treated as void, and (7) a permanent injunction be issued

enjoining Siegel from certifying Leal-Hudson’s name for the office of judge of the

313th District Court for the November 8, 2022 general election.

      Leal-Hudson filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of

Texas. On February 10, 2022, the supreme court granted Leal-Hudson’s motion for

emergency relief, staying the trial court’s February 4, 2022 judgment.

      On February 17, 2022, Siegel and HCRP filed a direct appeal in the Supreme

Court of Texas. Leal-Hudson did not file a direct appeal in the supreme court. 1

      On March 1, 2022, Leal-Hudson won the Republican Party primary election

for the office of judge of the 313th District Court.2

1
      Siegel and HCRP also filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court.
      Their mandamus petition and Leal-Hudson’s petition remain pending.
2
      An appellate court may take judicial notice of certain facts outside the appellate
      record, see Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Public Util. Comm’n, 878 S.W.2d 598,
      600 (Tex. 1994), including the results of public elections, see TEX. R. EVID. 201(b);
                                            4
      On April 8, 2022, the supreme court dismissed Siegal’s and HCRP’s direct

appeal. Siegel and HCRP did not file a notice of appeal in this Court.

      Leal-Hudson had filed a timely motion for new trial. After her motion was

overruled by operation of law, she filed a notice of appeal here on May 4, 2022.

      Leal-Hudson requested and received two extensions of time to file her brief,

which was filed on August 29, 2022. Ketterman sought two unopposed extensions

of time before filing her brief on October 31, 2022. Eight days later, after the votes

were counted, Leal-Hudson lost the general election to her opponent.

                             Motion to Dismiss Appeal

      Ketterman has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that Leal-

Hudson’s May 4 notice of appeal for the trial court’s February 4 judgment was

untimely. Generally, a notice of appeal is due within 30 days after the final judgment

is signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. If a party files a timely motion for new trial, then

the notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after the judgment is signed. See

id. Here, Leal-Hudson filed a timely motion for new trial on March 7. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 329b(a); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 4 (extending periods of time that fall on

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday). Thus, under Rule 26.1, Leal-Hudson’s notice of

appeal was due by May 5, 2022. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1).

      City of Edinburg v. Jasso, No. 13-18-00330-CV, 2020 WL 103859, at *1 (Tex.
      App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
                                           5
      In her dismissal motion, Ketterman acknowledged that, under Rule 26.1, Leal-

Hudson’s May 4 notice of appeal was timely. Nonetheless, Ketterman asserts that,

under the circumstances here, Rule 26.1 was “superseded” by Rule of Appellate

Procedure 57.5, which provides:

      If a direct appeal to the Supreme Court is filed, the parties to the appeal
      must not, while that appeal is pending, pursue an appeal to the court of
      appeals. But if the direct appeal is dismissed, any party may pursue any
      other appeal available at the time when the direct appeal was filed. The
      other appeal must be perfected within 15 days after dismissal of the
      direct appeal or the date of the Supreme Court’s ruling on a timely filed
      motion for rehearing.

TEX. R. APP. P. 57.5.

      Ketterman argues that Rule 57.5, not Rule 26.1, established the due date for

Leal-Hudson’s notice of appeal because “[t]he rules of statutory construction dictate

that [a] specific statute (Rule 57.5) controls over a general statute (Rule 26.1).”

Ketterman argues that, because the supreme court dismissed Siegel and HCRP’s

direct appeal on April 8, 2022, and no rehearing motion was filed, Rule 57.5 required

Leal-Hudson to file her notice of appeal within 15 days of the April 8 dismissal, that

is, by April 25, 2023. For that reason, Ketterman asserts Leal-Hudson’s May 4 notice

of appeal was untimely.

      We note, however, that “the specific-controls-over-general maxim applies

only when overlapping statutes cannot be reconciled.” Tex. Indus. Energy

Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 107 (Tex.

                                          6
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we construe Rules 26.1 and 57.5 in

a way that that harmonizes them rather in a manner that causes them to conflict. In

other words, Rules 26.1 and 57.5 can be reconciled. See id.

      Rule 57.5 forbids parties from pursuing an appeal in the court of appeals while

a direct appeal is pending in the supreme court. TEX. R. APP. P. 57.5. This raises the

possibility that Rule 26.1’s deadlines to file a regular appeal could expire while the

direct appeal is pending. To preserve the parties’ rights to appeal, Rule 57.5 permits

the party to file a regular appeal during the 15-day period following the direct

appeal’s dismissal, irrespective of whether Rule 26.1’s deadlines have expired. See

id. In this regard, Rule 57.5 creates, as Leal-Hudson contends, a safe harbor that

preserves the right to file a regular appeal during the post-dismissal period. This

interpretation is consistent with the supreme court’s directive “that appellate courts

should not dismiss an appeal for a procedural defect whenever any arguable

interpretation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure would preserve the appeal.”

Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. 1997).

      Here, Siegel and HCRP, who did not file a post-judgment motion, could have

filed a regular appeal during the 15-day period after their direct appeal was

dismissed, even though the 30-day deadline to file an appeal under Rule 26.1 had

passed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 57.5. On the other hand, Leal-Hudson did not need to

utilize Rule 57.5’s safe harbor provision because she had filed a motion for new trial,

                                          7
extending her deadline to file a regular appeal until 90 days after the judgment was

signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(1). Leal-Hudson timely filed her notice of appeal

within that 90-day period. Reading the rules in this way not only harmonizes Rules

26.1 and 57.5 but also follows the supreme court’s directive to avoid dismissal based

on procedural defects when the rules can be construed in a way to preserve the right

of appeal. See Verburgt, 959 S.W.2d at 616. Accordingly, we deny Ketterman’s

motion to dismiss.

                                      Mootness

      On appeal, Leal-Hudson challenges the trial court’s judgment, which, as

noted, contained provisions preventing Leal-Hudson from being a candidate on the

primary and general election ballots and made any votes cast for Leal-Hudson void.

Because—after the supreme court stayed the trial court’s judgment—Leal-Hudson

lost the general election to her opponent by receiving fewer votes, we must address

the threshold question of mootness.

      “[W]e are obligated to review sua sponte issues affecting jurisdiction.” M.O.

Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004). “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction

is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.” Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34

S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is

a question of law. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004).

                                          8
       This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy. See

State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018). A case becomes moot

when (1) a justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties, (2) the parties

no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the case’s outcome, (3) the court can

no longer grant the requested relief or otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests,

or (4) any decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion. Electric

Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund,

LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 634–35 (Tex. 2021); see Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6 (“Mootness

occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant the relief requested or

[to] otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests.”).

       “A suit may become moot at any time, including on appeal.” In re

Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). As a result, “courts have

an obligation to take into account intervening events that may render a lawsuit

moot.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 166–67 (Tex. 2012). If a

case becomes moot, the court must vacate any order or judgment previously issued

and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 162.

       The overarching controversy in this case was whether Leal-Hudson should be

disqualified from being a candidate on the primary and general election ballots for

the office of judge of the 313th District Court and whether any votes that she

received for that office were void. While the appeal was pending, the general election

                                            9
occurred, the votes were counted, and Leal-Hudson lost to her opponent. Because

any decision by this Court on the controversy cannot have any practical legal effect

on the parties’ rights, the case is now moot. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162 (“[A]

case is moot when the court’s action on the merits cannot affect the parties’ rights or

interests.”); see also In re Uresti, 377 S.W.3d 696, 696 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam)

(“Once an election begins, a challenge to the candidacy of an individual becomes

moot.”). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Leal-Hudson’s challenge to

the trial court’s judgment.3 See Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6.

3
      A notice was sent to the parties informing them that the trial court’s judgment may
      be vacated and the case dismissed unless they responded showing why the case was
      not moot. Neither party responded to the notice.
                                          10
                                    Conclusion

      We vacate the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case for lack of

jurisdiction. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 162; see also Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Inv’rs,

LP, 656 S.W.3d 394, 395 (Tex. 2022) (holding that, after case became moot on

appeal, court of appeals should have vacated trial court’s judgment in addition to

dismissing case); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d

782, 785 (Tex. 2006) (“One purpose of vacating the underlying judgment if a case

becomes moot during appeal is to prevent prejudice to the rights of parties when

appellate review of a judgment on its merits is precluded.”).

                                              Richard Hightower
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

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