Court Opinion

ID: 9375850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 23:06:08.072957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.319102
License: Public Domain

02/28/2023

                                    DA 22-0267
                                                                                  Case Number: DA 22-0267

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                   2023 MT 35N

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF:

         BARBARA KAY LEWIS,

             Deceased.

APPEAL FROM:        District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
                    In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DG-20-024(B)
                    Honorable Robert B. Allison, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

              For Appellant:

                    Randall A. Snyder, Snyder, Beaudry & Cook, Bigfork, Montana

              For Appellee:

                    Marybeth M. Sampsel, Kelly R. O’Brien, Measure Law, P.C.,
                    Kalispell, Montana

                                             Submitted on Briefs: January 25, 2023

                                                        Decided: February 28, 2023

Filed:
                                ir,-6m---if
                    __________________________________________
                                     Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Edmund Langlois (Langlois) appeals from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law, and Order issued by the Eleventh Judicial District Court on May 3, 2022, requiring

that he reimburse the Estate of Barbara Kay Lewis (Estate) in the amount of $15,111.71

and that he pay his attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

¶3     On May 6, 2020, the District Court issued an order appointing Langlois as guardian

and conservator to Barbara Kay Lewis (Barbara). Barbara passed away on June 26, 2021.

On July 19, 2021, the court issued an order appointing Maranda Johnson (Johnson),

Barbara’s daughter, as personal representative of the Estate.

¶4     On December 6, 2021, Langlois, by and through his counsel, submitted an inventory

of Barbara’s estate. On December 7, 2021, Langlois filed the Final Accounting, Motion to

Approve the Final Accounting, and Motion to Dismiss Guardianship. On February 8, 2022,

Johnson, in her capacity as personal representative, objected to each filing by Langlois.

Johnson specifically objected to Langlois’s failure to comply with the accounting

obligations imposed by § 72-5-424(2), MCA, his use of Barbara’s funds for personal

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benefit, his commingling of Estate funds with his personal funds, and his improper disposal

of Estate property.

¶5     Johnson challenged two aspects of Langlois’s accounting. First, Langlois included

$5,080 for “horse care.” Langlois testified that he had a horse packing business that owned

several horses. He reports that Barbara made donations of hay to the horses during her

lifetime. Langlois admitted to using funds from Barbara’s accounts to purchase hay for

the business’s horses during his time as her guardian and conservator.            He also

acknowledged that Barbara did not own a horse over that same period.

¶6     Second, Langlois included $10,031.71 for reimbursements of expenses incurred in

fulfillment of his duties as Barbara’s guardian and conservator. He testified that he wrote

monthly rent checks to himself for the period Barbara resided with him.           Langlois

acknowledged that he did not track these general expenses nor keep receipts from those

expenses despite reimbursing himself.

¶7     Johnson also objected to Langlois retaining Barbara’s personal property—

including, but not limited to, a desk and leather couches—upon her death and disposing of

such property without notifying Johnson.        Langlois retained but did not dispose of

Barbara’s horse trailer.

¶8     The District Court concluded that Langlois breached his fiduciary duty—detailed in

§§ 72-38-801 through -813, MCA, and made applicable to conservators through

§ 72-5-423, MCA—in three ways: first, he did not take reasonable steps to control and

protect Barbara’s personal property (see § 72-38-809, MCA); second, he failed to keep

adequate records and to refrain from commingling funds (see § 72-38-810, MCA); and,

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third, he did not promptly respond to Johnson’s request for information (see § 72-38-813,

MCA). The court additionally determined that Langlois’s recordkeeping fell short of his

obligation to keep “suitable records.” Section 72-5-424(2), MCA; see § 72-5-438(1), MCA

(requiring a conservator to account to the court or successors of the protected person upon

termination of a conservatorship). The court ordered Langlois to reimburse the Estate for

$15,111.71. The court also declined to grant Langlois’s request for attorney’s fees incurred

in response to Johnson’s objection and the resulting hearing.

¶9     Langlois argues that the District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

were in error and unsupported by evidence. We review a trial court’s findings of fact to

determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous.              In re Guardianship &

Conservatorship of Elizabeth Saylor, 2005 MT 236, ¶ 10, 328 Mont. 415, 121 P.3d 532.

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if substantial evidence does not support it, if the

district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if, after reviewing the record,

this Court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Guardianship

of Saylor, ¶ 10. As applied to accountings submitted for conservatorships, the clearly

erroneous test requires that an accounting must be accurate, complete, and verifiable. In

re Guardianship of Saylor, ¶ 10. This Court reviews a trial court’s determination of law

de novo. In re Guardianship of Saylor, ¶ 10.

¶10    The District Court did not abuse its discretion in setting forth its findings of fact and

in deciding that Langlois’s accounting was not accurate, complete, and verifiable. The

court carefully scrutinized Langlois’s accounting and testimony. The court was under no

obligation to apply a greater weight to Langlois’s summary of his relationship with

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Barbara, his interpretation of her wishes, nor his arguments regarding what constituted

reasonable expenses.     Langlois had the opportunity to provide any and all receipts

accounting for the expenses in question. Instead, he provided a chart of alleged monthly

expenses and reported a lump sum expense for hay for his horses.

¶11    Langlois contends that the court misinterpreted § 72-5-438(3), MCA. However, as

set forth below, we find no error with the court’s determination that the law applied to the

facts of this case authorized the court to order a reimbursement based on Langlois’s breach

of his fiduciary duty. Though the court recited a flawed version of § 72-5-438(3), MCA,

this Court will “affirm the district court when it reaches the right result, even if it reaches

the right result for the wrong reason.” City of Kalispell v. Omyer, 2016 MT 63, ¶ 9, 383

Mont. 19, 368 P.3d 1165. In other words, the court’s misstatement of law was not

dispositive with respect to the correctness of its legal conclusions.

¶12    Langlois asserts that the court erred in ordering Langlois to reimburse the Estate

$15,111.71. He contends that the court was not sitting in equity and, therefore, exceeded

its authority by ordering him to reimburse the Estate, rather than requiring an audit of his

accounting.

¶13    A court of equity has jurisdiction over an alleged breach, abuse, or betrayal of a duty

or obligation arising out of fiduciary relations. In re Guardianship of Saylor, ¶ 32 (internal

citations and quotations omitted). An equity court with jurisdiction over a controversy may

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render final judgment in relation to all matters involved and growing out of that

controversy. In re Guardianship of Saylor, ¶ 33.1

¶14    The District Court after reviewing the record, including Langlois’s accounting and

testimony, concluded that he fell short of his fiduciary duties as guardian and conservator

with respect to documentation of expenses and management of personal property. The

court relied on testimony provided by Langlois, such as that the hay fed horses owned by

his business and that Barbara did not own horses for the duration of the relevant period, to

reach its conclusion that Langlois did not keep suitable records. Additional testimony

heard and documentation received by the court further supported its conclusion. For

example, Langlois did not provide any credit card receipts or statements to evidence his

expenses and he admitted to reimbursing himself for “what [Barbara] had normally paid in

years past” as well as for expenses he perceived Barbara “would have insisted” be

reimbursed. Finally, Langlois acknowledged that he “unilaterally elected to dispose” of

Barbara’s personal property.

¶15    We affirm the District Court’s decision to order a reimbursement.                Though

§ 72-5-438(3), MCA, grants a court the discretionary authority to require an audit, the

provision does not place a mandate on the court to do so nor a bar on the court’s ability to

order reimbursement. The court’s thorough examination of the record indicated that

Langlois breached his fiduciary duty and did not meet his burden of proving the proper

1
 Langlois argues that, because In re Guardianship of Saylor included a vigorous dissent, that the
precedential value of the majority’s opinion is diminished. Dissent, however strong, from
precedential cases does not prevent this Court from relying on that precedent.
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disposition of the property under his control. See In re Estate of Clark, 237 Mont. 179,

183, 772 P.2d 299, 302 (1988). Acting in equity, the court had the authority to grant

complete relief, including reimbursement.

¶16    The District Court directed Langlois to pay his attorney’s fees. Langlois claims he

is entitled to payment by the Estate for those fees. Additionally, he alleges that Johnson

and the court sought to punish him by refusing to award such fees.

¶17    A District Court's grant or denial of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. In re Conservatorship of J.R., 2011 MT 62, ¶ 77, 360 Mont. 30, 252 P.3d 163.

¶18    Montana law expressly allows conservators to hire attorneys to assist them in estate

administration, including defense or prosecution of actions to protect the estate. Section

72-5-427(3)(w), (x), MCA. In limited circumstances, attorneys are entitled to reasonable

compensation from the estate. See § 72-5-432, MCA.

¶19    Langlois cites several cases in which attorney’s fees were granted to support his

contention that such fees should be awarded. However, each of those cases is easily

distinguishable from the facts of this case.

¶20    In In re Guardianship of A.M.M., 2015 MT 250, ¶ 66, 380 Mont. 451, 356 P.3d

474—one of the cases Langlois cites—this Court concluded that “an attorney specifically

appointed as a conservator, rather than one hired by a conservator, is entitled to reasonable

fees for legal work done in administration and/or protection of the estate.” Here, Langlois

is not requesting fees for the legal services he provided the estate nor was the legal work

in question done in administration and/or protection of Barbara’s estate. As summarized

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by the District Court, Langlois’s attorney’s fees were incurred in response to “the objection

and hearing,” both of which pertained to the interests of Langlois, not those of the Estate.

¶21    Another case Langlois cites, Swenson v. Janke, 274 Mont. 354, 361, 908 P.2d 678,

682-83 (1995), dealt with the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees, not whether

such fees should be awarded in the first place, in a landlord-tenant dispute.            The

reasonableness of an award is not at issue in this case and distinct laws govern attorney’s

fees with respect to matters involving conservators.

¶22    Finally, Langlois cites In re J.R. to argue for the award of attorney’s fees. In that

case, this Court upheld a district court’s decision to award attorney’s fees on the basis that

the fees were not used to defend the conservator in their individual capacity, but rather to

explicitly protect the conservatorship. In re J.R., ¶ 68.

¶23    Given our affirmation of the District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law in this case, which suggest this action was meant to defend Langlois rather than the

Estate, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying attorney’s fees

incurred following Johnson’s objection on February 8, 2022. However, the court should

calculate and award Langlois his attorney’s fees resulting from services rendered by his

counsel prior to Johnson’s objection to the extent those services pertained to administration

of the estate, not Langlois’s defense.

¶24    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

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¶25   Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

                                                   /S/ MIKE McGRATH

We Concur:

/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

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