Court Opinion

ID: 9676582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:27:52.521033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.591669
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by:
PAUL W. GREEN, Justice.
I respectfully dissent because the plaintiff, Donna Hall, presented legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Diamond Shamrock Refining Company, L.P. (“Diamond Shamrock”) was grossly negligent.
As pointed out by the majority, the standard for determining gross negligence involves objective and subjective components. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23-24 (Tex.1994). Objectively, the act of negligence must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others. Id. But in addition to that, the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved and proceed nonetheless in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. Id.
In a no evidence review, we consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding. The evidence can be summarized as follows:
• Diamond Shamrock knew that allowing liquid hydrocarbons to leak into the RLE gas compressors could cause an explosion and fire.
• Diamond Shamrock designed the Feed Prep Unit (FPU), which housed the RLE compressors, in a way that allowed liquid hydrocarbons to flow through a portion of the system.
• Diamond Shamrock failed to provide adequate training and procedures for system start-up.
• Diamond Shamrock failed to utilize an existing bleeder valve that could have prevented the explosion and fire.
From this evidence, I agree the jury might reasonably have found that the activity posed an extreme degree of risk, thus satisfying the objective component of the gross negligence standard.
However, the evidence does not support a finding on the subjective component. While it may be true that Diamond Shamrock personnel knew that allowing liquids to leak into the gas compressors could cause an explosion, there is no evidence that anyone within the company had “actual, subjective awareness” the system as designed would permit this to happen and, knowing this, proceeded indifferently in the face of this knowledge.
In discussing the subjective component of the gross negligence standard, the supreme court in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex.1999) explained that “what separates ordinary negligence from gross negligence is the defendant’s state of mind; in other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrate that he did not care.” Id. at 246-47 (citing Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 573 (Tex.1985) and Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex.1981)). The evidence detailed in the majority’s opinion is perhaps sufficient to show Diamond Shamrock committed acts and omissions of ordinary negligence, but it fails to demonstrate these acts displayed a corporate state of mind of indifference to peril that elevates the conduct from negligence to gross negligence.
*26Because the majority fails to render judgment in favor of Diamond Shamrock in light of Hall’s failure to prove gross negligence, I dissent.