Court Opinion

ID: 9950153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:04:04.964457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:03.946880
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2023-0905
                  _____________________________

KEVIN LAMAR FOUNTAIN,

    Appellant,

    v.

RICKY D. DIXON Secretary
Department of Corrections,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.
James Scott Duncan, Judge.

                          March 13, 2024
PER CURIAM.

     Kevin Lamar Fountain, whose judgment and sentence became
final in 2007, appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Fountain sought to collaterally
attack his conviction for two counts of second-degree murder and
two counts of attempted second-degree murder. Fountain alleges a
defect in his indictment as the basis for his petition.

     Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm. See Baker v.
State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a trial
court may dismiss, rather than transfer, a habeas petition when
the petitioner seeks relief that “(1) would be untimely if considered
as a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise
claims that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved,
on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be
considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that
either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief that were
known or should have been known at the time the first motion was
filed”); Zuluaga v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 32 So. 3d 674, 677 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2010).

     This is the third time Fountain has sought to collaterally
attack his nearly twenty-year-old judgment and sentence in this
court. See Fountain v. State, 966 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
(denying habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel);
Fountain v. State, 16 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (affirming an
order denying a rule 3.850 motion).

     The court finds that this appeal is frivolous and refers
Fountain to the Department of Corrections for sanctions. See
§ 944.279, Fla. Stat. (2023) (providing that “[a] prisoner who is
found by a court to have brought a frivolous or malicious suit,
action, claim, proceeding, or appeal . . . is subject to disciplinary
procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of
Corrections”); Ponton v. Willis, 172 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA
2015) (explaining that a Spencer order is not required before a
court may refer an inmate for disciplinary action under the statute
based on a frivolous filing).

    Fountain is warned that any future filings that this court
determines to be frivolous or malicious may result in the
imposition of further sanctions, including a prohibition against
any future pro se filings in this court.

    AFFIRMED.

ROWE and BILBREY, JJ., concur; B.L. THOMAS, J., concurs in
result.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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Kevin Lamar Fountain, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina Piotrowski,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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