Court Opinion

ID: 9390753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 15:07:22.953927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.494945
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Nesbitt, 2023-Ohio-1276.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ROSS COUNTY

State of Ohio,                                :   Case No. 22CA20

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                  DECISION AND
        v.                                    :   JUDGMENT ENTRY

Deshawn Nesbitt,                              :
                                                  RELEASED 4/18/2023
        Defendant-Appellant.                  :

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

Cassandra S. Goodpaster, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public
Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross County
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     Deshawn Nesbitt appeals from a judgment of the Ross County Court of

Common Pleas convicting him of felonious assault with a firearm specification and having

weapons while under disability. Nesbitt presents four assignments of error in which he

contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on negligent assault as a

lesser included offense of felonious assault, that his conviction was against the manifest

weight of the evidence, that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional, and that the

having weapons while under disability statute is unconstitutional. However, the record

reflects that Nesbitt was originally indicted on two counts of felonious assault and then

indicted again under the same case number on two counts of felonious assault with

firearm specifications and one count of having weapons while under disability. He was
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                     2

tried before a jury on the counts in the second indictment and acquitted of one count and

convicted of the other two counts and a firearm specification. However, the trial court did

not dispose of the counts in the first indictment via journal entry. Because of these

“hanging charges,” the entry from which Nesbitt appeals is not a final appealable order.

Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of his appeal and dismiss it.

                              I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2}   On August 6, 2021, an indictment was filed charging Nesbitt with two counts

of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, second-degree felonies. Both counts

alleged that on or about July 17, 2021, Nesbitt “did knowingly cause or attempt to cause

physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon.” On August 9, 2021, the trial

court conducted an arraignment hearing at which Nesbitt pleaded not guilty.

       {¶3}   On August 27, 2021, a second indictment was filed under the same case

number charging Nesbitt with three counts: (1) Count One, felonious assault in violation

of R.C. 2903.11, a second-degree felony; (2) Count Two, felonious assault in violation of

R.C. 2903.11, a second-degree felony; and (3) Count Three, having weapons while under

disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a third-degree felony. As in the first indictment,

both counts of felonious assault in the second indictment alleged that on or about July 17,

2021, Nesbitt “did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by

means of a deadly weapon.” However, each felonious assault count in the second

indictment also included a firearm specification. On August 30, 2021, the trial court

conducted a second arraignment hearing at which Nesbitt pleaded not guilty to the

second indictment.
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                        3

       {¶4}   At the jury trial, the trial court and parties proceeded as if the second

indictment was the only indictment, and the jury considered only the charges and

specifications set forth in it, i.e., two felonious assault counts with firearm specifications

and the having weapons while under disability count. The jury found Nesbitt guilty of

Count One and the accompanying firearm specification, not guilty of Count Two, and

guilty of Count Three.

       {¶5}   On June 6, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry regarding the

verdict. The entry stated that on August 9, 2021, Nesbitt pleaded “not guilty to the charges

contained in the indictment, to wit: Felonious Assault, ORC Section 2903.11, a second

degree felony, Felonious Assault, ORC Section 2903.11, a second degree felony, and

Having Weapons While Under Disability, ORC Section 2923.13, a third degree felony.”

The entry stated that the jury found him “Guilty on Count One, Felonious Assault, Not

Guilty on Count Two, Felonious Assault, and Guilty on Count Three, Having Weapons

While Under Disability.” The entry did not mention the fact that there were two indictments

and that the jury considered only the charges and specifications set forth in the second

indictment. The entry also incorrectly indicated that Nesbitt pleaded not guilty to the

charges in the second indictment on August 9, 2021, when that was the date he pleaded

not guilty to the charges in the first indictment.

       {¶6}   On June 13, 2022, the trial court issued a judgment entry of sentence in

which it stated that Nesbitt had been found guilty of Count One, felonious assault, with a

firearm specification, and Count Three, having weapons while under disability. The court

imposed an aggregate sentence of 13.5 to 17.5 years in prison. Nesbitt filed a notice of

appeal from this entry.
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                        4

                              II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶7}   Nesbitt presents four assignments of error:

       ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred in refusing to
       instruct the jury on negligent assault when the evidence showed that the
       defendant, at most, acted recklessly when handling the firearm, but not
       knowingly, and recklessness is sufficient culpability for negligent assault but
       not for felonious assault.

       ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: Nesbitt’s conviction was against the
       manifest weight of the evidence as the jury clearly lost its way in rendering
       a guilty verdict.

       ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3: R.C. 2967.271, the Reagan Tokes Law,
       violates Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution and the Sixth and
       Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

       ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4: R.C. 2923.13, the weapons-under-
       disability statute that allows a juvenile adjudication to serve as a predicate
       offense for an adult felony conviction, violates Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio
       Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to [the] Constitution of the United
       States.

                             III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       {¶8}   Before we address the merits of the appeal, we must determine whether we

have jurisdiction to do so. Appellate courts “have such jurisdiction as may be provided

by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of

record inferior to the court of appeals within the district * * *.” Ohio Constitution, Article

IV, Section 3(B)(2). “If a court’s order is not final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction

to review the matter and must dismiss the appeal.” Clifton v. Johnson, 4th Dist. Pickaway

No. 14CA22, 2015-Ohio-4246, ¶ 8.          “In the event that the parties do not raise the

jurisdictional issue, we must raise it sua sponte.” Id. Our review of the record in this case

revealed a jurisdictional issue which prevents us from reaching the merits of the appeal.
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                      5

       {¶9}   “The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2505.02 to specify which orders are

final.” State v. Cutright, 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3718, 2021-Ohio-1582, ¶ 6, citing Smith

v. Chen, 142 Ohio St.3d 411, 2015-Ohio-1480, 31 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 8. “A judgment of

conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the

fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp

indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.” State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303,

2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, paragraph one of the syllabus. “The Supreme Court

of Ohio has * * * held that in a criminal case involving multiple counts, a final order need

not contain a reiteration of those counts that were resolved on the record in other ways,

such as dismissal, nolled counts, or not guilty findings.” Cutright at ¶ 7, citing State ex

rel. Rose v. McGinty, 128 Ohio St.3d 371, 2011-Ohio-761, 944 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 3. “But

unless the charges that do not result in conviction have been terminated by a journal

entry, the hanging charges prevent the conviction from being a final order under R.C.

2505.02(B) because it does not determine the action by resolving the entire case.”

(Emphasis added) Id., and cases cited therein.

       {¶10} In this case, Nesbitt was charged in two indictments filed under the same

case number.     Although the trial court and parties appear to have treated the first

indictment as if it had been dismissed and replaced by the second indictment, “ ‘ “[i]t is

axiomatic that a court speaks only through its journal entries.” ’ ” State v. Richards, 4th

Dist. Washington No. 20CA12, 2021-Ohio-389, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Payton, 4th Dist.

Scioto No. 14CA3628, 2015-Ohio-1796, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. Collier v. Farley, 4th

Dist. Lawrence No. 05CA4, 2005-Ohio-4204, ¶ 18. The trial court did not dispose of the

counts in the first indictment via journal entry. As a result, the two counts in the first
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                   6

indictment constitute “hanging charges” which prevent the trial court’s judgment entry of

sentence from being a final appealable order. See State v. Kuntz, 4th Dist. Ross No.

21CA3759, 2023-Ohio-669, ¶ 4, 7 (although trial court orally granted state’s motion to

dismiss two counts in first indictment, court failed to formally dismiss those counts via

journal entry, so judgment entry of sentence regarding counts in second indictment was

not a final appealable order). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of

Nesbitt’s appeal and dismiss it.

                                                                  APPEAL DISMISSED.
Ross App. No. 22CA20                                                                      7

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

         It is ordered that the APPEAL IS DISMISSED and that appellant shall pay the
costs.

         The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.