Court Opinion

ID: 9632524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:17:58.169511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:07.513295
License: Public Domain

Reed, J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent because the trial judge's refusal to suppress can be sustained on another theory,—albeit one unarticulated by the State. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of an automobile and any containers found therein was held valid under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as a contemporaneous incident of a lawful custodial arrest of the vehicle's occupants. The term "containers" was held to include, inter alia, "luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4. In essence, in the context of automobile interior searches, the Belton Court extended the "leap and lunge" *172area of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969).
Here, based upon reliable information from an informant, and bolstered by direct observation of corroborative activity, the police had probable cause to arrest Grinier for possession of marijuana, i.e., the contents of the suitcase. Had he been placed under arrest, the search then could have been conducted as being incident thereto. State v. Helfrich, 33 Wn. App. 338, 656 P.2d 506 (1982). Although the search took place prior to the arrest, the two events were sufficiently contemporaneous to fall within the Belton rule. A search incident to an arrest may occur prior to the arrest, so long as sufficient and independent grounds for the arrest exist before the search and seizure is commenced. State v. Ward, 24 Wn. App. 761, 603 P.2d 857 (1979); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.4(a) (1978).
It may be argued that, because the officers did not intend to arrest Grinier, their only purpose being to seize and open the suitcase in order to establish the presence of marijuana in the house, that a different or contrary result is dictated. I do not think so. Because there were sufficient and independent grounds for Grinier's arrest prior to the search, the motives or intentions of the officers are not relevant to the issue of whether there has been a constitutional violation.
[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.
(Italics mine.) Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 56 L. Ed. 2d 168, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 n.22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), which also emphasizes the objective standard for determining the reasonableness of a search or seizure.
Finally, it should be noticed that neither United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977) nor Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979), requires suppression of Grinier's *173contraband. In Chadwick, the search of the footlocker was not conducted until long after defendants had been taken into custody and so could not be said to be "incident to the arrest." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462. In Sanders, the theory of search incident to arrest was not considered, the Court noting it probably would not have been applicable because " [I]t appears that the bag was not within his 'immediate control' [in trunk of taxi] at the time of the search." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763 n.11.
I cannot accept the thesis that, merely because the officers—having ample probable cause to do so—did not immediately advise him that he was under arrest, Grinier's constitutional rights were violated by a search of his suitcase.
I would affirm.