Court Opinion

ID: 9776335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:51.975402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.380726
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, its reasoning and holding, but I write to point out the vagaries of the present “docket equalization” system by which various courts of appeals are required to accept transfer cases from other courts.2 In this case, the El Paso court of appeals has been called upon to interpret the statute granting law-enforcement authority to the Metropolitan Transit Authority serving the citizens and taxpayers of Harris County. We have done so relying upon authority, not from one of the two appellate courts sitting in Houston, but from the Waco court of appeals. It seems to me that the people of Harris County, who elect judges to the First and Fourteenth District Courts of Appeals, might not have anticipated, and might not appreciate, that the appellate judges west of El Paso and Waco are deciding a question of statutory interpretation peculiar to metropolitan Houston.
I also note that the First District Court of Appeals, sitting in Houston, has belatedly had the opportunity to rule upon this issue, and has concluded, as we do here, that:
[T]he legislature intended Metro police officers to have broad jurisdiction to enforce the laws and such jurisdiction is not limited merely to offenses causing injury or detriment to, or occurring on, Metro property. Vickio v. State, 902 S.W.2d 523, (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.).
See also Lundy v. State, 891 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (Metro officers authority not restricted to times during which Metro service runs). It seems appropriate that we at least consider the reasoning of this “home court” in reaching our own conclusions. Because all courts writing upon this subject have reached the same conclusion, we need not confront today the thorny question of which authority we should follow, were we assigned a case where the “home court” had held one way, and our *657own court, or another court of appeals, had published authority to the contrary.
The present system of transferring cases between courts of appeals has created numerous questions: to which court of appeals must trial judges look in making their rulings? If their home court of appeals holds one way, but another court of appeals to which cases are frequently transferred holds another, what result? Must trial judges resign themselves to potential reversal even where they follow the established authority of their jurisdiction? Similarly, where is counsel to look in seeking authority to support argument in a transferred case? These are questions which remain unanswered; they are questions highlighted by this case of uniquely local impact.

. From time to time, the Texas Supreme Court enters an order transferring cases from the most populous appellate districts in the state to those less populous. This case was transferred from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston to the Eighth Court of Appeals in El Paso by order dated June 23, 1993. That single order transferred a total of 800 cases from the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Courts to the Eleventh (East-land), Seventh (Amarillo), Tenth (Waco), Thirteenth (Corpus Christi), Sixth (Texarkana), and Eighth (El Paso) courts.