Court Opinion

ID: 9561145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:04:21.830104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:39.145179
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23 P. v. Harris CA1/3
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                           DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
  Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        A164007

v.

NOAH MICHAEL HARRIS,                                               (Contra Costa County
  Defendant and Appellant.                                         Super. Ct. No. 1196158 )

          Defendant Noah Michael Harris was convicted by a jury of
attempted murder (Pen. Code1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 664)(count 1); elder
abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1))(count 2); assault with a deadly or dangerous
weapon (§ 245, subd.(a)(1))(count 3); dissuading a witness from
reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4); and making criminal
threats (§ 422, subd. (a)) (count 5). The jury also found true allegations
that Harris used a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd.
(b)(1))(count 1) and inflicted great bodily injury on a person 70 years of
age or older (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)) (counts 1 and 3). He was sentenced to
an aggregate term of 9 years in state prison.

1
          All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                           1
      The convictions arose from an incident during which the victim,
71 years old at the time, was driving in a public park roadway when
Harris threw a rock toward the back of his car. Harris and the victim
then engaged in a heated verbal altercation before the victim began
driving away. While there appeared no obstacle to the victim
continuing to drive away, he instead backed up his car (with Harris
also backing up on foot) and then drove toward Harris. Within seconds,
the victim stopped his vehicle and Harris cut the side of the victim’s
neck, resulting in an injury requiring numerous stitches. The victim
then drove forward a short distance and called 911. Harris contends
the victim tried to hit him with his car and he was acting in the heat of
passion when he cut the victim’s neck. The prosecution argued the
victim was simply trying to scare Harris off though the victim told
police after the incident that he accelerated to try to kill him.
      On appeal, Harris challenges only the attempted murder
conviction based on the argument (among others) that the trial court
committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the
lesser offense of a heat of passion theory of attempted voluntary
manslaughter. We agree the trial court prejudicially erred and,
accordingly, shall reverse the conviction for attempted murder.2 While
the trial court’s failure to properly instruct requires the attempted
murder conviction be reversed, the People shall have the option of

2     Given this determination, we do not address the arguments that
the attempted murder conviction cannot stand because of the
admission of prior offense evidence to prove Harris’s intent to kill the
victim, the exclusion of evidence of Harris’s 2015 auto accident to
support his claim that he acted in unreasonable self-defense, and the
use of CALCRIM No. 600 (elements of attempted murder). In addition,
the sentencing issues raised on appeal are rendered moot.
                                     2
accepting a modification of judgment to reflect a conviction of
attempted voluntary manslaughter.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The charges against Harris arose from his encounter with the 71-
year-old victim on May 27, 2021. The trial took place over three days in
September 2021, during which the prosecution presented four
witnesses and introduced into evidence three one-minute video clips
taken from the victim’s car dashboard camera. Harris did not testify or
present any witnesses.
Video Evidence
      The video evidence included both video and audio. The jurors
were given transcripts (not marked as exhibits) and were instructed as
follows: “The transcripts are not evidence. They won’t be going with
you in the jury room. The evidence are the discs.”
      The video introduced as People’s Exhibit 1 was played in open
court. It begins with the victim’s car waiting at a red light at an
intersection for approximately 25 seconds before driving straight ahead
and then taking a left to enter the road inside a park. Immediately
upon entering the park area, there are approximately 15 diagonal
parking spaces to the left that are partially occupied. Harris and an
apparent companion (with a shopping cart) can be seen crossing the
road from the right to the left side of the road a couple of cars ahead of
the victim and stopping in an empty parking space. A few seconds
before the video ends, Harris can be seen turning toward the victim’s
car as the victim passes them. Within a second, the victim stops his car
and exclaims “What the fuck is your problem.”

                                     3
      The beginning of the video introduced as People’s Exhibit 2,
which was also played in open court, appears to pick up around the
time the first video stops. Someone [Harris or his companion] states “I
don’t know what you are looking at me for” and the victim responds
“You threw something at my car” – this is followed by someone
appearing to say “I didn’t throw shit at your car” although what is said
is difficult to hear over the victim’s dog barking. The victim states “get
the fuck out of here” followed by someone (Harris or his companion)
saying words to the effect of “you want to die today.” Harris and the
victim continue to exchange words (including the victim calling Harris
“a piece of shit” and telling him “you’re so fucked up”) as Harris’s
companion walks away with the shopping cart. At around the 29-
second mark, the victim slowly drives forward a very short distance
before backing up around the 33-second mark (the beeping of the car
going into reverse is readily audible). While not everything the victim
mutters during this time can be heard, the victim can be heard
muttering to himself between seconds 34 and 37, “I’m going to fucking
run into you – I’m going to run into you” as he is backing up multiple
car lengths. It does not appear Harris can hear these mutterings
although whether he can hear is not completely clear from the video.
      The victim then stops and immediately starts going forward – it
is open to debate and interpretation whether the victim was aiming his
car at Harris or the parking spot. Harris jumps away and across the
front of the victim’s car into a parking space and the victim stops before
fully entering that space. After the victim stops his car, Harris
proceeds around the front of car and disappears from the camera’s
view. The car then goes briefly into reverse and then forward down the

                                     4
roadway for a few feet. At this point the video ends. As described
below, it is alleged that Harris cut the victim’s throat when the victim
was stopped near the parking stall but that is not discernible on the
video (either by sounds or by the victim exclaiming as much).
        A third video, introduced into evidence as People’s Exhibit 3 but
not played in open court, is of the victim driving a bit further forward,
stopping his car, and calling 911. The victim states to the 911 operator
that a “guy” cut his throat and that the person was still there “standing
right next” to him. Nothing can be heard from Harris or any
individuals other than the victim and 911 operator. Harris cannot be
seen at any point during this video though at the very end of the video
Harris’ companion can be viewed on the left walking with the shopping
cart.
Victim’s Testimony
        On the day in question, the victim drove his car to a park to take
his dog for a walk. As he entered the park, he saw two men in the
roadway move to the left so cars could pass them. As he drove past the
men, Harris threw a rock at the left rear of the victim’s car. The victim
stopped his car, with his foot on the brake, opened the driver’s side
door, and yelled at Harris, “ ‘What the fuck are you doing?’ ” In
response, Harris walked toward the victim; Harris “seemed to be
gleeful about the whole thing in that kind of an odd, grinning smile.”
        The victim was “terrified” and tried to close and lock his car door.
There was a “tussle” with the car door: the victim (sitting in the driver’s
seat) pulled at the car door to close it, and Harris grabbed at the
window frame, pulling it back toward him. There was no physical
contact between the men. The “tussle” lasted “seconds;” at some point

                                      5
Harris told the victim, three times, “ ‘You’re gonna die,’ ” in an angry,
aggressive, voice.3 The victim felt threatened, like he was going to die,
and “[a]bsolutely” believed Harris might carry out his threats.
Speaking in a very aggressive voice, Harris also told the victim not to
call the cops and if he did so he was going to die. The victim felt very
threatened and was concerned for his safety. On cross-examination the
victim confirmed he did not believe Harris would cause him significant
harm if he called 911 but the victim was scared as he did not know
what harm would come his way. Additionally, while the victim did not
really believe Harris would kill him if he called the police as the victim
did not know how Harris would kill him “other than sort of slitting my
throat, which was as close to death I think as I’ve been.”
      After a few seconds, the victim was able to get his car door closed.
Harris did not say anything further to the victim.4 Harris then moved
“around to the right side of [the victim’s] car. [The victim thought] he
did. He was on the right side. [The victim] wanted to pull into the
parking place.” The victim later testified that at some point after he
had closed his car door, he began to drive away from where Harris was
because he “just wanted to get away to lessen the fear of the threat.”
When asked at what point he began driving his car toward Harris, the
victim said after the tussle with the car door frame and Harris made
“the threat of death” and “the threat about [the victim] reporting a
crime.” At some point the victim started to drive his car toward Harris

3     The victim testified that before Harris threatened him, he had
never threatened Harris and had not said he was going to physically
harm Harris in any way.
4     When asked if at this time in the interaction Harris said, “ ‘Okay.
The fight’s over. I’m done,’ ” the victim replied: “No. There was no
closure in the interaction.”
                                     6
with the goal of pulling into a parking space. When asked if he
intended to hit Harris, the victim said he did not know, he could not
imagine thinking or being able to do so, and he may have been trying to
frighten Harris as the victim did not have “a lot of ammo in my
arsenal.”
      When asked “at the point where you accelerated or started
driving in the direction of the Harris, why didn’t you just leave instead
of doing that?,” the victim replied that he did not know and could not
say “because the confrontation was ongoing. There was a conclusion to
it, not that I was looking for any, but I don’t know. I wasn’t trying to
win.” At the time the victim drove toward Harris, the victim felt Harris
was still a threat to his life “[b]ecause of the conversation that he had
with me and the words he said” and the victim had no idea what Harris
could do.
      The victim also testified that as he “was pulling forward” toward
Harris, Harris “was dancing around” or “hopped around” from the right
side of the car to directly in front of the car; the victim braked his car
because he did not want to hit Harris. Harris then ran “around the
front” of the car to the driver’s side; he “was gleeful again; that happy,
crazy look in his face.” Harris’s expression terrified the victim. Harris
reached into the rear window of the driver’s side (the victim did not
know the window was down) and Harris cut the victim on his neck.
The victim initially did not feel any pain and believed Harris had
scratched his neck with a sharp fingernail. The victim later realized he
was bleeding from a cut on his neck; there was blood everywhere, on his
shirt, pants, and shoes.

                                     7
      After People’s Exhibit 2 (second video) was played, the prosecutor
asked the victim a series of questions, eliciting what the victim heard
and saw as the prosecutor replayed and stopped the video at certain
second marks. The victim was asked if he heard on a portion of the
video when “you say something about hitting Harris with this car?,” the
victim replied: “I said to myself, ‘I’m going to run into him.’ ” The
victim testified he did not believe Harris heard him make that
statement because the stereo was playing and the car windows were up
except for the back rear window – the video supports this recounting.
The victim testified that 46 seconds into the video clip was the point
when he got cut and had put his car “in reverse . . . [and] was getting
ready to back out and go down the street.” The victim confirmed that
“from this video it looks like [he] had braked [his] vehicle, reversed, and
six seconds later is when [he] would have been slashed.”
      Harris withdrew his hand from inside the car and followed the
victim as the victim drove his car forward four or five feet while calling
the police. The recording of the 911 call was played for the jury. When
sirens could be heard in the distance, Harris walked out of the park. In
response to the 911 call, emergency services transported the victim to a
hospital where he received over 20 stitches to close a four-inch cut on
his neck. The wound healed but left a scar.
      On cross-examination, the victim was asked if it was his
“testimony today that you did not try to hit Mr. Harris with your car?”
The victim responded, “I didn’t try to hit him with my car. I drove
towards him, yes.” Defense counsel then asked, “So when you said
something in your car, ‘I’m going to run him over,’ you did not mean
that?” and the victim responded, “That was my only – I said that

                                     8
because it was my only personal defense, and by that time I was
enraged.”
      After being shown a video of statements he made to the police at
the hospital, the victim confirmed he had told the police that he had
“accelerated to try and kill him;” that he was “going to run him down
with my car next time I see him;” that he was “going to accidentally hit
the accelerator instead of the brakes;” that he felt some type of fear
when Harris said something about the victim dying; and that Harris
had said, “ ‘If you call the police, I will kill you,’ ” so the victim
immediately called the police. The victim did not recall making his
statements; he was shocked at what he said, and he attributed his
statements to being on Fentanyl for pain and recalled feeling “high”
when he spoke with the officer. The victim also recalled testifying that
he intended to frighten Harris when he moved his car toward him and
that he could have instead driven forward and left the park. The victim
also testified that he had told the prosecutor that he was trying to scare
Harris.
Additional Testimony
      A bystander witness saw Harris as he left the park after the
incident. He described Harris as “aggressive but happy at the same
time,” and as Harris walked past the bystander, the bystander heard
Harris say, “ ‘I like competition.’ ”
      Shortly after the incident, a police officer was dispatched to a gas
station (about two miles from the park) in response to a report that
Harris was in front of a gas station challenging other individuals to a
fight. The officer saw Harris in front of the gas station and asked him
if he had a weapon. Harris removed from his pocket an X-ACTO box

                                        9
cutter and placed it on the ground. The box cutter did not have a blade,
but it was covered with dried blood where the blade would have been
inserted into the box cutter handle.
Prior Offense Evidence
        A BART peace officer testified about an altercation or
disagreement at a BART station that occurred the evening of
December 28, 2020. The officer and his partner found Harris “very
agitated and confrontational, very verbally aggressive.” After Harris
was arrested for resisting arrest and placed in a patrol car, he told one
officer that the officer was going to die, Harris was going to kill him,
and the officer was lucky Harris did not kill him at that point in time.
Harris’s voice tone was very loud, and he was agitated, frustrated, and
angry. On several occasions throughout Harris’s contact initially with
the officers and after Harris was placed in the patrol car, Harris asked
one or the other officer to fight him.
                                DISCUSSION
        The trial court did not give an instruction allowing the jury to
consider convicting Harris of attempted voluntary manslaughter based
on heat of passion, a lesser included offense of attempted murder. It
refused the proposed instruction on the basis there was “no evidence of
heat of passion.” We agree with Harris that the failure to provide the
instruction was prejudicial error.
   I.      Heat of Passion Theory of Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter
        Harris was charged with attempted murder, which requires “the
specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act
toward accomplishing the intended killing. [Citation.] Attempted
murder requires express malice, that is, the assailant either desires the

                                     10
victim’s death, or knows to a substantial certainty that the victim’s
death will occur.” (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 177–178.)
      However, an attempt to kill while acting “in the heat of passion –
even if exercising a sufficient ‘measure of thought . . . to form . . . an
intent to kill’ – [results in] ‘a mental state that precludes the formation
of malice.’ ” (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1136–
1137 (Millbrook), quoting People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 942
(Beltran); see § 192, subd. (a) [“[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of
a human being without malice;” “[i]t is of three kinds: (a) Voluntary –
upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion”].) Simply put, heat of
passion reduces “ ‘an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to
voluntary manslaughter “by negating the element of malice that
otherwise adheres in such a homicide.” ’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) __
Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 4520 at p.*21] (Schuller), quoting People v.
Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461, quoting People v. Breverman (1998) 19
Cal.4th 142, 154 (Breverman)5; see People v Van Ronk (1985) 171
Cal.App.3d 818, 824–825 (Van Ronk) [“[t]here is nothing illogical or
absurd in a finding that a person who unsuccessfully attempted to kill
another did so with the intent to kill which was formed in a heat of
passion;” “[u]nder those circumstances, the less culpable person is
guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter rather than attempted
murder”].)
      Heat of passion is “a state of mind caused by legally sufficient
provocation that causes a person to act, not out of rational thought but
out of unconsidered reaction to the provocation.” (Beltran, supra, 56

5    Breverman was disapproved on another ground in Schuller,
supra, __ Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 4520 at p.*36, fn. 7].
                                     11
Cal.4th at p. 942.) This theory of manslaughter has both an objective
and a subjective component. To satisfy the objective, also known as
“reasonable person,” element, heat of passion must be due to verbal or
physical provocation that would cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection. To
satisfy the subjective element, the defendant must have acted under
the actual influence of the provocation. “ ‘ “However, if sufficient time
has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to
subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary
manslaughter.” ’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 549–550
(Moye).)
      “[O]n appeal we employ a de novo standard of review and
independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included
offense of [attempted voluntary manslaughter based on the heat of
passion theory] should have been given.” (People v. Manriquez (2005)
37 Cal.4th 547, 584.) In so doing, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the defendant, we do not evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses, and we may find substantial evidence “even in the face
of inconsistencies presented by the defense itself.” (Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at pp. 162–163; see People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186,
196 (Barton) [a “jury’s truth-ascertainment function” is impaired unless
it is given “the opportunity to decide whether the defendant is guilty of
a lesser included offense established by the evidence”]; id. at p. 203
[“ ‘[t]he jury should not be constrained by the fact that the prosecution
and defense have chosen to focus on certain theories;’ ” “[t]he trial court
must instruct on lesser included offenses when there is substantial

                                    12
evidence to support the instruction, regardless of the theories of the
case proffered by the parties”].)
   II.      Verdict is not Inconsistent with Heat of Passion Jury
            Instruction
         Despite the Attorney General’s contentions to the contrary, there
is nothing in the jury verdict inconsistent with an instruction based on
heat of passion. Although the jury must have found Harris intended to
kill (a prerequisite for a conviction of attempted murder), that finding
does not rule out the possibility that he acted in the heat of passion.
(See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 942; see Von Ronk, supra, 171
Cal.App.3d at pp. 824–825 [nothing illogical or absurd in a finding that
a person who unsuccessfully attempted to kill another did so with the
intent to kill which was formed in a heat of passion].)
         This possibility was also not ruled out by the jury’s rejection of
the two self-defense theories, reasonable or imperfect self-defense, upon
which it was instructed. Indeed, “ ‘in the usual case,’ ” a heat-of-
passion instruction “ ‘supplements the self-defense instruction,’ ” in
that “ ‘even though the defense of self-defense fails, as it might for
excessive retaliation by the defendant, the jury might still find the
original [provocation] sufficient to constitute [heat of passion], which
would preclude a finding of malice aforethought and reduce the crime
to manslaughter.’ ” (People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 530–531;
see Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 148, 162–164 [trial court erred
in not giving heat-of-passion instruction where jury was instructed on
both theories of self-defense]; Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 202–203
[sufficient evidence supported giving both heat-of-passion and
imperfect self-defense instructions]; People v. Thomas (2013) 218

                                       13
Cal.App.4th 630, 634-635, 639, 645 (Thomas) [while evidence might fit
better with imperfect self-defense, trial court erred by not giving heat-
of-passion instruction where defendant had a heated argument with
victim and victim’s friends, one of the friends punched defendant,
defendant went to his car to retrieve a gun, defendant’s father tried to
calm him down, and when victim then approached defendant,
defendant shot victim believing victim was trying to get the rifle].)
   III.   Heat of Passion Instruction was Warranted
      An instruction on heat of passion is warranted where there is
substantial evidence to support the requisite objective and subjective
components: (1) the defendant’s passion was due to a legally sufficient
provocation by the victim that would cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and
reflection; and (2) the defendant acted while under the actual influence
of a strong passion induced by adequate provocation. (See Millbrook,
supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.) “No specific type of provocation is
required, and ‘the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can
be any “ ‘ “[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion” ’ ”
[citations] other than revenge.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th
101, 108.) “ ‘However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the
provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to
return, the [attempted] killing is not [attempted] voluntary
manslaughter.’ ” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163; see People v.
Gingell (1931) 211 Cal. 532, 545 [“the ‘cooling time’ to be considered [i]s
the time within which an ordinarily reasonable [person] would cool
under like circumstances”].)

                                    14
      We find there was substantial evidence to support the
instruction’s objective component – a legally sufficient provocative act.
The evidence shows that immediately before Harris cut the victim’s
neck the victim had backed up and then nearly hit Harris with his car.
The victim had no barrier to simply continuing to drive away (rather
than backing up) and his testimony of being “terrified” is belied by the
decision not to drive away. A jury might not have ultimately been
convinced that Harris acted in the heat of passion, but the evidence
would allow it to find that after the initial encounter it was the victim
who provoked Harris by backing up his car and driving it toward
Harris.
      We find unavailing the Attorney General’s argument that the
victim’s act of driving his car toward Harris at most arose to the level of
“simple assault” and hence was not sufficient to arouse the passions of
an ordinarily reasonable person to cause an attempt at the victim’s life.
“[T]here is no way that driving a car toward a person can constitute
simple assault but not assault with a deadly weapon or force likely to
cause great bodily injury.” (People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101,
117.) Further, the Attorney General’s argument – which is focused on
whether an ordinary person of average disposition would be moved to
attempt to kill the victim “focuses on the wrong thing. The proper focus
is placed on [Harris’s] state of mind, not on his particular act. To be
adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an emotion so
intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without
reflection. . . . [T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the
defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought process to such an extent
that judgment could not and did not intervene. Framed another way,

                                    15
provocation is not evaluated by whether the average person would act
in a certain way: to kill. Instead, the question is whether the average
person would react in a certain way: with his reason and judgment
obscured.” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 949.)
      We also find there was substantial evidence to support the
instruction’s subjective component – that Harris acted under heat of
passion caused by the victim’s provocative act. “As . . . explained in
People v. Jones (1911) 160 Cal. 358, 368 . . ., ‘it is not a matter of law
but a matter of fact for the jury in each case to determine under the
circumstances of the case whether the assault or whether the blow, or
whether the indignity or whether the affront, or whatever the act may
be, was such as is naturally calculated to arouse the passions and so
lessen the degree of the offense by relieving it from the element of
malice.’ ” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 950–951.) While the jury
concluded Harris did not have an actual fear that he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury, under proper instructions it
could have found Harris acted rashly and without reflection in reaction
to the victim’s driving his car at him, which was preceded by an
exchange of aggressive words between Harris and the victim. (See
Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 645 [although facts might fit
more precisely with a homicide mitigated by imperfect self-defense, a
heat of passion instruction was appropriate where evidence supported
that defendant shot the victim when his passion was aroused and his
reason was obscured due to a sudden quarrel].)
      Moreover, the Attorney General does not address whether
sufficient time elapsed for a reasonable person’s passion to “ ‘cool off’ ”
and for reason or judgment to be restored. (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th

                                     16
at p. 951.) It cannot be said as a matter of law that a few seconds (the
time between the car going toward Harris and the criminal act) was a
sufficient cooling off period for a reasonably ordinary person’s passion
to subside and reason or judgment restored. While Harris’s facial
appearance and statement after the incident is circumstantial evidence
of his earlier state of mind it does not refute as a matter of law a claim
that he was acting under a heat of passion. A rational jury could find
that under the circumstances faced by Harris, a reasonable person’s
“intense and high-wrought emotions aroused by the initial threat” of
the victim’s conduct had not had time to cool or subside before acting
rashly and without reflection. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 164.)
   IV.   Failure to Instruct was Prejudicial Error
      We conclude the trial court’s refusal to instruct on heat of passion
was not harmless under the standard set forth in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). (See Schuller, supra, ___
Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 4520 at p.*36, fn. 7] [when the record
contains substantial evidence of heat of passion, the failure to instruct
on that theory is subject to review under the Chapman standard].) As
the court explained in Schuller, “ ‘[a] jury misinstruction that relieves
the prosecution of its burden to prove an element of the crime – by
either misdescribing the element or omitting it entirely – violates [the
federal Constitution].’ [Citations.] When [heat of passion] is at issue,
the malice element of murder requires the People to show the absence
of that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Thus,
when there is substantial evidence to support the theory, the failure to
instruct on [heat of passion] amounts to an incomplete element of
murder, namely malice. In the absence of such an instruction, jurors

                                    17
would have no reason to conclude they cannot find malice (and thus
cannot return a verdict of murder) if they harbor a reasonable doubt as
to whether the defendant [acted in heat of passion]. Because this form
of misinstruction precludes the jury from making a finding on a factual
issue that is necessary to establish the element of malice, it qualifies as
federal error.” (Schuller, supra, __ Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal. Lexis 4520 at
pp.**3-4].)
      Having found the trial court here erred in refusing to instruct the
jury on heat of passion, under Chapman, we make “ ‘a thorough
examination of the record.’ ” (Schuller, supra, __ Cal.5th __ [2023 Cal.
Lexis 4520 at p.*39], quoting Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1,
19 (Neder).) “Unless, based on this examination, we conclude ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained,’ we reverse the conviction.” (People v. Brown (2023)
14 Cal.5th 453, 473, quoting Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, and
citing Neder, at p. 15.)
      Here, our examination of the record shows sufficient (but not
overwhelming) evidence to support the attempted murder charge, but,
as we have also determined, there was sufficient evidence to support an
instruction on heat of passion. Because, as discussed at length ante, a
reasonable jury could have concluded Harris acted pursuant to heat of
passion and therefore lacked the requisite malice for an attempted
murder conviction, we cannot conclude “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.’ ” (Brown, at p. 473; see Schuller, supra, __ Cal.5th ___ [2023
Cal. Lexis 4520 at pp.*42-43] [if the appellate court believes an
instruction on imperfect self-defense was warranted because there was

                                    18
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in
defendant’s favor on question of imperfect self-defense, “the court could
not then, consistent with Chapman, go on to find that the error was
nevertheless harmless simply because the evidence against imperfect
self-defense was so overwhelming that no reasonable jury could have
possibly found in [defendant’s] favor on that issue”].)
      The Attorney General’s reliance on Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th 537,
to argue harmless error is misplaced as the Supreme Court’s decision is
premised on the facts before it in that case, facts that do not align with
those in the case before us. In Moye, “[o]nce the jury rejected
defendant’s claims of reasonable and imperfect self-defense, there was
little if any independent evidence remaining to support [the
defendant’s] further claim that he killed in the heat of passion, and no
direct testimonial evidence from defendant himself to support an
inference that he subjectively harbored such strong passion, or acted
rashly or impulsively while under its influence for reasons unrelated to
his perceived need for self-defense.” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 557.)
The court in Millbrook explained as follows: “The only evidence
supporting a heat-of-passion instruction in Moye was the defendant’s
own testimony that he acted in self-defense. Thus, in rejecting the self-
defense argument, the jury in Moye necessarily rejected the only
evidence that would have supported a heat-of-passion instruction. . . .
Moye does not hold that a failure to instruct on heat of passion can
never be prejudicial when a jury rejects a finding of self-defense, and
neither will we.” (Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1148.)
      As always, we must analyze the facts in the case before us.
Unlike in Moye, the jury here did not necessarily reject all evidence

                                    19
supporting a heat of passion instruction by refusing to find that Harris
acted in unreasonable self-defense. The standard for unreasonable self-
defense is whether the defendant had an honest but unreasonable
belief that they were in “imminent danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury” (CALCRIM No. 571), not whether their reason was
obscured by passion that negated malice. While the evidence
concerning Harris’s state of mind was relevant to both unreasonable
self-defense and heat of passion, the jury might well have concluded
that while Harris was not in fear of his life or suffering great bodily
injury, nonetheless he acted in a heat of passion when he cut the
victim’s neck. Harris was entitled to have the jury “ ‘consider the full
range of possible verdicts’ included in the charge. . . . [E]very lesser
included offense, or theory thereof, which is supported by the evidence
must be presented to the jury.” (Breverman, supra,19 Cal.4th at p. 155;
italics omitted.) Even though the jury was allowed to consider whether
Harris acted in imperfect self-defense, “nothing in the court’s
instructions advised the jury it could consider whether [Harris’s]
passion was aroused or his reason obscured on account of” the victim’s
conduct in driving his car toward Harris. (Thomas, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 646.)
      In sum, for the reasons stated, the conviction for attempted
murder cannot stand as we cannot say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the omission of a heat-of-passion instruction did not affect the jury’s
verdict.6

6
      We recognize that in their briefs, filed before our Supreme
Court’s opinion in Schuller, the parties agreed the proper standard of
review was under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).
Given the Schuller opinion, we do not employ the Watson standard of
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   V.      Remedy
        “ ‘An appellate court is not restricted to the remedies of affirming
or reversing a judgment. Where the prejudicial error goes only to the
degree of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, the
appellate court may reduce the conviction to a lesser degree and affirm
the judgment as modified, thereby obviating the necessity for a
retrial.’ ” (People v. Edwards (1985) 39 Cal.3d 107, 118 (Edwards).)
        Harris does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s implicit finding that he harbored the intent to kill
the victim, and concedes the People are entitled to retry him on that
charge should they so choose. Harris asks us to offer the People the
alternative option of accepting a modification to the judgment to reflect
Harris’s conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, thereby
obviating the need for a retrial. The People have not responded to this
request in their brief.
        The People are entitled to retry Harris, or they may be satisfied
with a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter. Because we do
not know whether the People would prefer to retry Harris or would be
satisfied with a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter, our

review. We note that if Watson were applicable, we would conclude
reversal was required because there is “ ‘ “a reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility” ’ ” that the jury would have come to a
different verdict had the court given a heat-of-passion instruction.
(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050; see
Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146–1147 [defendant shot a
fellow guest at a house party during a heated exchange; the court found
prejudicial error under Watson in failing to give a heat of passion
instruction where evidence conflicted as to what prompted the
defendant to shoot the victim and as to the defendant’s state of mind
when he fired the shot].)
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disposition preserves both opinions. (See Edwards, supra, 39 Cal.3d at
p. 118.)
                              DISPOSITION
       Harris’s convictions for elder abuse, assault with a deadly or
dangerous weapon (and related enhancement), dissuasion of a witness,
and criminal threats are affirmed.
       The conviction for attempted murder is reversed. The People
shall have 60 days from issuance of the remittitur to refile an
attempted murder charge. If the People do not do so, the trial court
shall proceed as if the remittitur constituted a modification of the
judgment to reflect a conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter
and shall resentence Harris accordingly. At any resentencing hearing
for attempted voluntary manslaughter on the modified judgment, the
trial court shall consider the enhancements for personal use of a deadly
or dangerous weapon and personal infliction of great bodily injury on a
person 70 years of age or older as alleged in the information and proven
at trial.

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                                 _________________________
                                 Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A164007/People v. Harris

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