Court Opinion

ID: 9785264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:13:07.719404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:13.965321
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
President Judge LEADBETTER.
While I agree with much of the majority’s analysis, I must respectfully dissent because I would affirm the order of the Board of Appeals (Board) on alternate grounds.1
Section 202(a) of the Tax Reform Code *458of 19712 (Code) makes taxable “each separate sale at retail of tangible personal property or services.” 72 P.S. § 7202(a). The majority, as well as the Board and the parties, characterize the transactions in this case as involving the sale of air. I, however, believe that the transactions at issue are better characterized as the rental of air pumps. As I believe it is indisputable that air pumps are tangible personal property, this view of the case simplifies the matter considerably.
The stipulated facts in this case make clear that the activity at issue is not the sale of air, but rather the payment for the use of the equipment that can be used to pump am into a tire. Specifically, Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation of Facts states that:
[Air-Serv Group (ASG) ] charges a fee for the right to use the air vending machine for a specific number of minutes ... The charge does not vary by the amount of the air placed into a tire or tires or the time during which the pump is operated. The charge relates to the time the air vending machine is available to perform as stated above.
If ASG were selling air, one would expect the amount charged to vary with the amount of air sold. However, that is not the case, as ASG is not selling air, it is selling the right to use equipment which can be used to pump air into a tire or tires. The fee is flat because it pays for the use of the equipment for a set period of time.
It is well established that the grant of a right to use personal property in exchange for payment is subject to tax. Section 201(k)(l) of the Code, 72 P.S. § 7201(k)(l), defines “sale at retail” as:
Any transfer, for a consideration, of the ownership, custody or possession of tangible personal property, including the grant of a license to use or consume whether such transfer be absolute or conditional and by whatsoever means the same shall have been effected.
61 Pa. Code § 31.4(a) makes clear that:
Transfers of possession or of custody of tangible personal property for consideration, by whatever means effected and irrespective of the terms employed by the parties to describe the transaction, are taxable. The rental, lease or license to use or consume tangible personal property is subject to tax. For example, when a machine shop grants to another the right to use its machinery on weekends for a fee, the transaction is taxable. Similarly, the grant of a right to use an electronic computer for a fee is subject to tax ...
(emphasis added). The right conveyed in this case is obviously quite short term and subject to a number of conditions (for example, the removal of the equipment from the premises would likely be frowned upon), so perhaps it is be better characterized as a license to use than a rental. Regardless of the precise characterization, however, I can see no difference between the grant of a right to use an air pump for a fee and the example of the “the grant of a right to use an electronic computer for a fee” given by the Code. 61 Pa.Code § 31.4(a).
Because I believe that the transactions at issue are taxable, I respectfully dissent.

. It is well settled that this Court may affirm for any reason and is not limited to grounds raised by the parties. McAdoo Borough v. Pa. Labor Relations Ed., 506 Pa. 422, 485 A.2d 761 (1984), citing Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A.2d 517 (1980); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975); Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974); Prynn’s Estate, 455 Pa. 192, 315 A.2d 265 (1974); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).

. Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended.