Court Opinion

ID: 9760602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:03:51.360965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:14.437907
License: Public Domain

Justice McCAFFERY,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I believe (1) the majority’s conclusion that the Philadelphia Parking Authority *290(“PPA”) is a statewide agency is unsupportable; and, more importantly, (2) the statutes addressing (a) parking authorities 1 and (b) taxicabs and limousines in first class cities2 signal the legislature’s intent that the PPA is to be treated as a local authority for purposes of original jurisdiction over many if not most civil actions brought against it, including the underlying dispute in this case.
The Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions brought against or by the “Commonwealth government.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761. Specifically exempted from the definition of “Commonwealth government” are, among other things, “local authorities].” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102. The legislative intent behind placing original jurisdiction over civil actions against local authorities in the courts of common pleas as opposed to the Commonwealth Court, despite that court’s expertise in matters of administrative agency law, has been well explained by this Court:
The Commonwealth Court [in its original jurisdiction] is intended to provide a judicial forum for the uniform and consistent resolution of questions of statewide impact In accordance with this principle, ... for example, an action against the Department of Environmental Resources (“DER”) must be brought in the Commonwealth Court, rather than in the trial court, because otherwise DER would be severely handicapped whenever trial courts reached different resolutions regarding its powers and duties. In contrast, ... there is no particular need for such uniform statewide resolution of issues involving the powers and duties of local authorities which operate within a single county, city or other municipality of the State ... as housing authorities do.
*291To reach any other conclusion than that the authority is a local agency which may be sued in the local court of common pleas rather than in the Commonwealth Court would lead to the absurd and unreasonable result that a citizen would be required to pursue his [or her] remedy in Harrisburg even though the records were located in the community and the agency involved had been created by an individual city or county and the issues involved were matters strictly within the concern of a particular locality rather than a concern of the Commonwealth generally. The General Assembly, of course, could not have intended such a result.
James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 579 Pa. 26, 855 A.2d 669, 675 (2004) (quoting T & R Painting Co. v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 466 Pa. 493, 353 A.2d 800, 802 (1976)) (emphasis added; citations, footnote, and most quotation marks omitted).
The confusion that for years has arisen over the issue of original jurisdiction in civil actions against local authorities stems from language in the governing legislation creating such authorities, wherein the authorities are described as agencies of the Commonwealth.3 As the Commonwealth Court has explained, in an analysis cited with approval by this Court:4
The difficulty in determining the status of ... any authority, is directly related to the reasons behind their creation and authorization by the General Assembly. Although authorities owe their existence to the various units of government and their governing boards are appointed by those entities, they are not considered part of the normal governmental structure. Unlike municipal corporations that have “governmental” and “proprietary” functions, authorities en*292gage only in the latter. Authorities are “public corporations, being corporate agencies engaged in the administration of civil government.” Lighton v. Abington Township, 336 Pa. 345, 353, 9 A.2d 609, 613 (1939). Generally, authorities are established for the purpose of financing and managing various revenue producing projects of a public nature or other activities that are not considered to be part of core governmental activities; they are a governmental business venture, a form of quasi-privatization. The circumstances prompting their creations are usually for one or more of the following reasons:
• the need for an administrative agency to manage public enterprises which, in certain case, have commercial characteristics, e.g., Metropolitan Transportation Authorities (SEPTA); Parking Authorities;
• the need for an agency which can cross governmental boundary lines for the effective handling of intercommunity problems, e.g., SEPTA;
• the need for a method to carry out activities that are constitutionally or statutorily proscribed such as the need to finance public improvements without running afoul of the constitutional limits on debt[,] (see Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 A. 839 (1912))[,] and more recently, to give or lend federal funds given to local governments for community development that otherwise would be constitutionally proscribed by Article 9, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
While the first two reasons for the creation are very similar to reasons why a private corporation would create a subsidiary to carry out an enterprise or would enter into joint venture with another company, the last reason, the need to avoid constitutional impediments, is the one that causes the confusion as to whether authorities are part of the Commonwealth and, if so, for what purposes. Because of the need to get around these constitutional impediments, the legislation authorizing the creation of authorities contains language that the authority is not an agency of the governmental unit(s) that creates it and appoints its board members, *293but is considered an agency of the Commonwealth. Typical of the language contained in most acts is the language [now] contained in ... 74 [Pa.C.S. § 1711(a)], which states that:
An authority shall in no way be deemed to be the instrumentality of any city or county or other municipality or engaged in the performance of a municipal function, but shall exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency and instrumentality thereof.
Even when the authorizing legislation is silent, because of the reason behind the creation of authorities to avoid restrictions on local governments, those authorities are still considered an instrumentality of the Commonwealth. See Application of the Municipal Authority of The Township of Upper St. Clair, 408 Pa. 464, 184 A.2d 695 (1962).
SEPTA v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 161 Pa.Cmwlth. 400, 637 A.2d 662, 664-66 (1994) (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
Consequently, this Court and the Commonwealth Court have long held that “Commonwealth government” for purposes of determining whether the Commonwealth Court or the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction in a case is not the equivalent of “Commonwealth party” for purposes of determining whether the defense of sovereign immunity or local governmental immunity applies. See Gory, supra at 677-79 (holding that although entitled to sovereign immunity as a Commonwealth party, the Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”)was a local agency for purposes of jurisdiction, and therefore original jurisdiction of the underlying contract action rested in the court of common pleas); see also Fraternal Order of Transit Police v. SEPTA, 668 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (stating that “whether an entity is the ‘Commonwealth government’ for purposes of jurisdiction or whether it is a ‘Commonwealth agency’ for purposes of immunity from suit are two distinct issues.”); Quinn v. SEPTA 659 A.2d 613, 616 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995) (holding that for purposes of jurisdiction, SEPTA is, and has always been, treated as a local agency and not an agency of the Commonwealth); Union Switch & Signal, supra at 666 (recognizing that the fact that *294an authority may be considered “an instrumentality of the Commonwealth,” does not make the authority “the Commonwealth” for all purposes; rather, the intent of the General Assembly must be gleaned from the relevant legislation in order to ascertain the authority’s status).5
Thus, for purposes of determining which court has original jurisdiction in the present case, it is of little or no moment that a local parking authority is described in the Parking Authorities Law as “a public body corporate and politic, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency of the Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(a)(1). Rather, the entirety of the governing legislation must be examined to determine whether the legislature intended the authority to be a local authority or the Commonwealth government for purposes of jurisdiction in civil suits brought against it. Gory, supra at 673, 678 (holding that the statutory designation of the PHA as an agency of the Commonwealth must be read with the other provisions of the statute, and, once read, establishes the inescapable conclusion that the PHA is a local authority for purposes of determining the issue of which court has original jurisdiction).
My review of the Parking Authorities Law and the First-Class City Taxicab Law compels me to conclude that the Philadelphia Parking Authority, like other local parking authorities, is indeed, by its nature and function, a local authority. This review leads me to conclude further that the legislature did not intend to alter the longstanding law in this Commonwealth that original jurisdiction over actions against local authorities, including the PPA, lies in the courts of common pleas, except for certain specific controversies involving the PPA where the legislature has specifically provided *295that original jurisdiction lies in the Commonwealth Court. See discussion infra.
There is no need to list the many provisions in the Parking Authorities Law that evidence the fact that parking authorities, including the PPA, whose duties are principally devoted to managing on- and off-street parking facilities and charging and collecting rates at these facilities solely within their localities, are indeed local authorities and lack a statewide reach. Suffice it to say, they are legion. See, e.g., 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (concerning the purposes and powers of parking authorities, including the PPA). The PPA, like all local parking authorities, was created by ordinance of the local municipality, here the City of Philadelphia, in 1950. See City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 79 (2004). Despite changes to the Parking Authorities Law that shifted the political control of the PPA from the City to the Commonwealth,6 the PPA’s functions — and its geographical impact— have essentially remained the same. The significant addition to the PPA’s duties was its assumption of regulation of local taxicabs and limousines. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(d)(23) (granting the PPA the authority to “act as an independent administrative commission for the regulation of taxicabs and limousine service”); and the First-Class City Taxicab Law generally. However, as I shall discuss in more detail infra, these additional local duties do not make the PPA the Commonwealth government.
Moreover, as we are asked here to determine an issue of original jurisdiction, I believe it behooves this Court to examine, as the majority has failed to do, how' the legislature actually addresses the issue of jurisdiction in the Parking Authorities Law itself,7 as this examination would surely be instructive. The Parking Authorities Law specifically provides that certain civil actions brought against the PPA are to be brought in the court of common pleas, and that other *296certain civil actions against PPA are to be brought in the Commonwealth Court.8
In Section 5505 of the Parking Authorities Law, the same section that describes a parking authority as “an agency of the Commonwealth,” one subsection is devoted to the power of a parking authority to “fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges for its facilities at reasonable rates” as determined exclusively by the parking authority. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(d)(9). This subsection further provides:
Any person questioning the reasonableness of rates fixed by the authority may bring suit against the authority in the court of common pleas of the judicial district where the project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the rates and other charges. This paragraph supersedes a contrary provision in any home rule charter, ordinance or resolution.
Id. (emphasis added).
Notably, no exception is made for a city of the first class. Indeed, the subsection’s reference to “home rule charter” indicates a legislative intent to include a city of the first class. Moreover, it would be difficult to argue with the wisdom of consigning to the courts of common pleas original jurisdiction over disputes concerning the reasonableness of local rates and charges imposed by the PPA, as this is surely not an issue of statewide importance.
Section 5508.1 of the Parking Authorities Law is entitled “Special provisions for authorities in cities of the first class.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1. Notably, there is not a special provision that places original jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court over all actions against an authority of the city of the first class (the PPA), despite the legislature’s presumed knowledge *297of the wealth of case law holding that original jurisdiction for actions against local authorities, including the PPA, lies in the courts of common pleas. See, e.g., E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 91 Pa.Cmwlth. 600, 498 A.2d 1364 (1985), aff'd., 509 Pa. 496, 503 A.2d 931 (1986) (holding that the PPA is a local agency or authority and not a part of Commonwealth government).
However, a subsection of Section 5508.1 devoted to the enforcement and administration of on-street parking in a city of the first class, and directing the distribution of revenue from the PPA to the city and the city’s school district, specifically provides:
If a dispute arises between the city and the authority concerning the administration of the system of on-street parking regulation as provided for in this subsection or in the event of a breach or threatened breach of the provisions of this subsection, either the city or the authority may, in the Commonwealth Court, by mandamus or other proceeding at law or in equity:
(i) enforce the proper manner of administration of the system of on-street parking regulation as provided for in this subsection;
(ii) compel the other party and the officers, employees and agents thereof to carry out the provisions of this subsection; or
(iii) require the other party to account, as if it were the trustee of an express trust for the other party, for any revenues received that are required to be paid to the other party.
53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(q.1)(5) (emphasis added).9
Therefore, the Parking Authorities Law specifically provides that for certain actions against the PPA, the courts of *298common pleas shall have original jurisdiction, and in other actions (where there is a dispute between the city and the PPA over one of the PPA’s most significant functions and responsibilities) the Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction. I believe that one should not conclude that because the Parking Authorities Law mentions that in one instance, concerning a specific type of controversy, original jurisdiction lies in the Commonwealth Court, the legislature thus intended to make the PPA part of the Commonwealth government. In addition to actions against or by the Commonwealth government, the Commonwealth Court also has original jurisdiction where “vested in the Commonwealth Court by any statute hereafter enacted.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(4). Section 5508.1(q.l)(5) of the Parking Authorities Law is one such “statute hereafter enacted.”
One of the principal arguments made in this case for asserting that the Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction are the fundamental changes made specifically to the PPA by Act 22 of 2001 (“Act 22”)10 and Act 94 of 2004 (“Act 94”).11 Act 22 unmistakably shifted power from the City of Philadelphia to the Commonwealth with respect to fundamental aspects of PPA governance and revenue direction,12 and Act 94 effectively transferred the regulation of the local Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industry from the Public Utility Commission (“PUC”) to the PPA.13 However dramatic these *299changes were, there was no specific statutory change signaling that for purposes of the question of original jurisdiction, the PPA was to be now considered the Commonwealth government. As seems clear from the above-cited statutory provisions of the Parking Authorities Law, the conclusion would appear to be the opposite. Section 5505(d)(9) specifically places jurisdiction over disputes against the PPA concerning the reasonableness of rates and charges in the courts of common pleas. Section 5508.1(q.1)(5) specifically places jurisdiction over disputes between the PPA and the City of Philadelphia concerning the administration of on-street parking and the direction of the PPA’s revenues in the Commonwealth Court. If the PPA were now the Commonwealth government as a result of Act 22 and/or Act 94, original jurisdiction in the courts of common pleas would not lie, and the Parking Authorities Law would not have to specifically state that the Commonwealth Court had original jurisdiction over specific, narrowly described legal disputes. Had the legislature, in all of its sweeping changes to the PPA in Acts 22 and 94, intended that the PPA be the Commonwealth government and that all civil actions against it accordingly now be tried in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, as opposed to former practice, it could have so stated. It did not. For purposes of original jurisdiction, except for certain specifically identified instances, it left the Philadelphia Parking Authority to be what it most certainly is — a local parking authority.
Further, and contrary to the majority opinion’s conclusions, I conclude that Act 94, which shifted regulatory responsibility of taxicabs and limousines with a Philadelphia nexus from the PUC to the PPA, evidenced a legislative intent to shift original jurisdiction for disputes over such matters from the Commonwealth Court to the courts of common pleas, not to corral the PPA into the orbit of the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. Section 7 of Act 94, setting forth the legislative findings, specifically provides:
*300Due to the size, total population, population density and volume of both tourism and commerce of a city of the first class, it may be more efficient to regulate the taxicab and limousine industries through an agency of the Commonwealth with local focus than an agency with diverse Statewide regulatory duties. Well-regulated local focus on improving those industries can be an important factor in the continual encouragement, development, attraction, stimulation, growth and expansion of business, industry, commerce and tourism within a city of the first class, the surrounding counties and this Commonwealth as a whole.
53 Pa.C.S. § 5701.1(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, the legislature specifically found that the regulation of the Philadelphia area taxicab and limousine industry, with its specific concerns, is best achieved by a local authority with a local focus. Indeed, it had made little sense for specific Philadelphia taxicab and limousine issues, which include Philadelphia’s unique certificate of convenience and medallion system,14 to continue to be regulated by a statewide agency and, correspondingly, that actions against the PUC concerning matters unique to Philadelphia be tried in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.
The local flavor of the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industry is distinctly defined in the First-Class Taxicab Law and ably summarized by the Commonwealth Court in the opinion below, as follows:
In general, for a taxicab or limousine to operate in Philadelphia, it must have a certificate of public convenience issued by PPA. 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5714(a), 5741(a).
A taxicab or limousine authorized by a certificate of public convenience issued by PPA may transport persons: 1) between points in Philadelphia; 2) from any point in Philadelphia to any point in the Commonwealth; 3) from any point in the Commonwealth to any point in Philadelphia if the request for service for such transportation is received by *301call to its centralized dispatch system; and 4) from any point in Philadelphia to any point outside the Commonwealth as part of a continuous trip. 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5714(c), 5741(a.l). Meanwhile, taxicabs which are not authorized by a certificate of public convenience issued by PPA to provide services in Philadelphia, but which hold a certificate of public convenience from the PUC, may still transport persons to Philadelphia and may transport persons from any point in Philadelphia to any point in the Commonwealth beyond Philadelphia if the request for service for such transportation is received by call to its radio dispatch service, without being subject to the regulatory authority of PPA. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5714(d)(1). Similarly, limousines which are not authorized by a certificate of public convenience issued by PPA to provide services in Philadelphia, but which hold a certificate of public convenience from the commission authorizing limousine service elsewhere in the Commonwealth, may still transport persons to Philadelphia and from any point in Philadelphia to any point in the Commonwealth beyond Philadelphia, excluding service from any airport, railroad station and hotel located in whole or in part in Philadelphia, without being subject to the regulatory authority of PPA. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5741(a.3).
Blount v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 920 A.2d 215, 220-21 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) (en banc) (emphasis added).
As can be seen, the authority of the PPA extends to only those taxicabs and limousines with a Philadelphia nexus, and its regulatory authority, and that of the PUC, do not overlap in any significant manner, as one might interpret the majority opinion to read.15 Further, it is a grotesquely distorted *302interpretation of the above provisions of the First-Class City Taxicab Law to conclude that they evidence a statewide reach of the PPA’s powers, authorities, and duties. The majority emphasizes certain language set forth at 53 Pa.C.S. § 5714(c) concerning service from, e.g., the City of Philadelphia “to any point in this Commonwealth.” Majority op. at 285, 965 A.2d at 232 (quoting 53 Pa.C.S. § 5714(c)(2)). However, the provisions of 53 Pa.C.S. § 5714(c) apply only to those vehicles issued a certificate of convenience by the PPA, and thus apply only to vehicles “with citywide call or demand rights in cities of the first class.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5714(a) (emphasis added). In other words, these provisions describe the geographic areas within which the PPA taxicabs and limousines may operate. They do not require PPA certification for all taxicabs or limousines operating within these areas. See also 53 Pa.C.S. § 5741 generally, which tracks similar language pertaining to limousines that operate “within a city of the first class.”
We need to ground ourselves in reality. The Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industry operates in the Philadelphia area with strict ties to Philadelphia. Only the Philadelphia taxicab and limousine industry falls under the jurisdiction of the PPA, an authority with a local reach, and except for regulating taxicabs and limousines that sometimes operate beyond the borders of Philadelphia, functions solely within the City of Philadelphia. Essentially, the PPA’s extra-City taxicab and limousine jurisdiction involves vehicles shuttling suburbanites to and from the Philadelphia International Airport or transporting patients to and from hospitals or other medical facilities that lie within or just without the border of the City. Philadelphia taxicabs and limousines are not fanning out across the state to its far-flung boundaries. There is no PPA statewide impact in the governing statutes or in reality. Indeed, by essentially holding that the PPA is the Common*303wealth government with respect to its regulation of Philadelphia based taxicabs and limousines, the majority actually seems to derail the stated legislative intent of Act 94, which was to transfer regulation of these local vehicles from a statewide agency (the PUC) to a local authority with a “local focus.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5701.1(3).
Further, although the PPA’s jurisdiction lies beyond the borders of Philadelphia with respect to taxicabs and limousines “with citywide call or demand rights,” I do not conclude that this makes the PPA any less of a local authority for purposes of determining issues of original jurisdiction than the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, which operates in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, and which has consistently been held to be a local agency for purposes of jurisdiction. Fraternal Order of Transit Police, swpra; Quinn, supra; Union Switch & Signal, supra.16
Because I agree with the decision of the Commonwealth Court below that Acts 22 and 94 did not change the PPA’s status as a local authority for purposes of original jurisdiction, except where specifically provided in the Parking Authorities Law, and because the PPA’s duties with respect to its regulation of local taxicabs and limousines has only a local focus without any genuine statewide reach, I would affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court transferring the underly*304ing dispute in this case to the court of common pleas. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Act of June 19, 2001, P.L. 287, as amended, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5501-5517 (hereinafter "the Parking Authorities Law”).

. Act of December 30, 2002, P.L. 2001, reenacted and amended by the Act of July 16, 2004, P.L. 758, No. 94, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-5745 (hereinafter the "First-Class City Taxicab Law”).

. See, e.g., 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(a)(1) (describing a parking authority as "a public body corporate and politic, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency of the Commonwealth"); 35 P.S. § 1550 (describing a housing authority as "a public body, corporate and politic, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency thereof”).

. See City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 78-79 (2004).

. See also G. Ronald Darlington, et ai, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice § 40:308 (2008-2009 ed.), stating that: "[Local] authorities are ... not the Commonwealth for purposes of the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would expand [that] court’s trial duties to include resolution of disputes that do not require consistent statewide results and expand the number of cases that could be appealed as of right to the Supreme Court.”

. See Schweiker, supra at 80.

. The legislature did not craft a specific provision concerning the court of original jurisdiction for the issue before us, which involves a challenge to the PPA’s taxicab and limousine regulations. As I discuss infra, I believe that the Parking Authorities Law and the First-Class City Taxicab Law make plain that the PPA is a local authority for this action, and therefore original jurisdiction lies in the court of common pleas.

. The issue of jurisdiction is not directly addressed in the First-Class City Taxicab Law.

. Further, Section 5508.3 of the Parking Authorities Law specifically provides that a first-class city authority (the PPA) "shall be subject to and treated as a Commonwealth agency for purposes of the act ... referred to as the Right-to-Know Law,” which shall apply to such authority. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). Additionally, Section 5508.3 provides that PPA employees shall be treated as Commonwealth employees, and PPA officers and board members shall be *298regarded as public officials of the Commonwealth, in the mandatory application of ethics, disclosure, and conflicts laws that are, by this section, made applicable to the authority. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.3(a)(1). Although Section 5508.3 does not specifically mention jurisdiction, its provisions undoubtedly will have an impact in determining any question of jurisdiction in actions against the PPA or its employees, officers, or board members, arising from the laws made applicable to the PPA by this section.

. Act of June 19, 2001, P.L. 287.

. Act of July 16, 2004, P.L. 758.

. See City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 568 Pa. 430, 798 A.2d 161 (2002) (Castille, J. concurring).

. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(d)(23) (granting the PPA the authority to "act as an independent administrative commission for the regulation of *299taxicabs and limousine service”); and the First-Class City Taxicab Law generally.

. See 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5712, 5714(a) and 66 Pa.C.S. § 2401-2416 (repealed).

. See op. at 285, 965 A.2d at 232, wherein the majority states: "Moreover, the PPA shares the responsibility for regulating taxicab operations in the Commonwealth with the PUC.” The majority then cites to 53 Pa.C.S. § 5722, which pertains solely to the power of the PPA to issue rules and regulations pertaining to taxicabs. (A similar provision pertaining to limousines is set forth at 53 Pa.C.S. § 5742). A Jurisdictional Agreement between the PUC and the PPA, authorized by Act 94, sets forth in detail the shifting of regulatory authority from the PUC to the PPA for all affected taxicabs and limousines. Only for limousine carriers that will hold dual authority from the PUC and the *302PPA will there be dual PUC and PPA jurisdiction for trips to and from Philadelphia, with the exception of trips from an airport, railroad station, or hotel located, in whole or in part, in Philadelphia. In the latter case, the PPA has sole regulatory jurisdiction. 35 Pa.B. 1737.

. I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s overly-broad contention that "the SEPTA enabling statute is substantially different from the Parking Authorit[ies] Law” (op. at 232 n. 12). As the majority notes, the Commonwealth has a statutory role in the creation and governance of metropolitan transportation authorities, including SEPTA. Further, the Commonwealth must receive a yearly financial report from such authorities, contrary to the majority’s assertions of purely local oversight of the authorities’ budgets. See 74 Pa.C.S. § 1752. By contrast, the PPA is an entirely local creation of the City of Philadelphia (see majority op. at 227-28), and while its board members are appointed by the Commonwealth, all board members must be Philadelphia residents. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(d). Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that for purposes of the jurisdiction question before us, the legislation creating metropolitan transportation authorities is "substantially” different from those provisions of the Parking Authorities Law that concern the PPA.