Court Opinion

ID: 9648037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:00:06.868786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:06.058335
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
concurring and dissenting in part.
I agree with the decision to abate and remand for an evidentiary hearing. I dissent from the overruling of appellant’s first point of error; in my opinion, before ruling on the first point of error, we should have the benefit of the record generated by the evidentiary hearing we have ordered upon abatement.
The majority states there is nothing in the record before us to indicate the trial court withdrew appellant’s plea, other than a docket sheet entry, which the majority declines to consider. The majority has chosen to ignore the sworn testimony from the out-of-time motion for new trial hearing, which shows the following:
—Appellant’s trial counsel acted as appellant’s bondsman on the case. On May 21, 1992, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of robbery, pursuant to a plea bargain under which appellant would be sentenced to eight-years confinement. The trial judge deferred finding appellant guilty, resetting the case for formal judgment and sentencing at a later date. Approximately two-weeks later, on June 1, 1992, appellant appeared in court and told the court and his trial counsel that he did not want to plead guilty because he was innocent. The trial court allowed appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty and placed appellant in the holding cell. Appellant’s trial counsel told appellant if he did not plead guilty, his trial counsel would “get off the bond.” The trial court set a new bond for $20,000, revoking the old bond. After further discussion the trial court “allowed the plea to withstand,” and appellant was sentenced to eight years confinement on June 1, 1992. The only *113“Plea of Guilty” and “Admonishments, Statements and Waivers of Defendant” in the file were each signed on May 21, 1992; none were signed on June 1, 1992.
Appellant is asking us to consider the above, and other sworn testimony from the hearing, in connection with matters he could otherwise raise in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding: ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady error,1 and the propriety of a conviction without a plea.2 Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 887, (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (recognizing cognizability of due process claims in habeas corpus proceedings).
The prosecutor was present during the hearing at which the foregoing testimony was adduced, and conducted cross-examination of the witnesses. In my opinion, it is totally appropriate for us to consider this sworn testimony in connection with appellant’s complaints under his point of error one.
In my opinion, in the interest of justice, we should abate this appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for a full evidentiary hearing to determine not only whether appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel, and whether the State committed Brady error, but also to determine whether appellant was convicted without an effective plea to the indictment.

. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1962) (prohibits State suppression of evidence favorable to an accused where evidence is material to guilt or punishment). See Crutcher v. State, 481 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).

. Appellant argues that once his plea was withdrawn, a new plea was required. Appellant cites Lumsden v. State, 384 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1964) for the proposition that the failure of a defendant to enter a plea to an indictment is a jurisdictional defect making the trial a nullity.