Court Opinion

ID: 9528745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:33.854928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:17.287556
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J. Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent it would strike the special circumstances finding under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). I dissent, however, to reversing the separate special circumstances finding under subdivision (a) (10). In my view, the jury’s finding that such special circumstance existed here should be upheld.
Subdivision (a) (10) applies to a murder committed to prevent testimony in a “criminal proceeding.” The majority, in reversing the jury’s finding under that subdivision, reasons that it would be inapplicable here if defendant murdered to prevent juvenile court testimony implicating him in a burglary. I suggest that such a result is intolerable—this defendant intended to kill, and brutally did kill, witness Morganti to prevent his future “court” testimony. Defendant should not be permitted to evade a special circumstance finding merely because the record is unclear whether he believed Morganti’s testimony would have been elicited in a juvenile delinquency proceeding rather than adult court. Indeed, I find two independent grounds for sustaining the jury’s finding under subdivision (a)(10).
Facts
In June 1980, Doctor David Edwards discovered that his office had been burglarized. Edwards suspected defendant, a 17‘A-year-old minor employed by Edwards’ janitorial service. Edwards confronted and accused defendant on several occasions, finally informing him that defendant’s coemployee Morganti was an eyewitness to the burglary. Defendant responded by saying “Nobody is going to believe that idiot in Court .... I’ll see to it that they don’t.”
In November 1980, defendant approached another minor, John A., and told him that defendant wanted Morganti killed to prevent his testimony. Soon thereafter, John lured Morganti from his apartment and escorted him to a nearby parking lot where defendant joined them. Defendant pulled a *857knife from his pocket and ordered Morganti into defendant’s truck. After stopping once to enable defendant to wire Morganti’s hands behind his back, the trio drove to an isolated mountain area. Defendant grabbed his shovel and ordered Morganti to start digging. After the hole was dug, defendant made Morganti lie in it and, thereupon, began to strike him in the head with a baseball bat. Defendant passed the bat to John, who (at defendant’s request) hit Morganti and then backed away. Defendant asked for John’s knife and, as John turned away once more, he heard Morganti scream.
The assailants buried their victim in the shallow grave but, as defendant was walking across it, Morganti’s hand emerged and grabbed defendant’s leg. After Morganti’s head emerged from the dirt, defendant wrapped a piece of wire around Morganti’s neck and attempted to strangle him into submission. Finally, after Morganti’s struggles ceased, defendant hit him in the groin area with the baseball bat and, observing no response, reburied him and left the area. The evidence indicated that Morganti died of suffocation. No formal proceedings with respect to the Edwards burglary had been initiated at the time of Morganti’s death.
Discussion
Subdivision (a)(10) of section 190.2 provides that a special circumstance exists if “The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding . . . .” The majority concludes that defendant’s killing of Morganti might not have been aimed at preventing testimony in a “criminal proceeding,” because defendant was a minor when he committed the Edwards burglary and, accordingly, he would have faced only a juvenile delinquency hearing pursuant to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The majority relies primarily upon the language of section 203 of the Welfare and Institutions Code that a wardship order “shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.” For two separate reasons, the majority’s analysis is erroneous.
1. Potential for Adult Proceedings
First, as defendant was approximately 17 Vi years old at the time of the burglary, he was potentially subject to adult criminal proceedings in the event he was found unfit to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 603, 604, 707; Rucker v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [141 Cal.Rptr. 900].) Thus, although the initial petition would have been filed in juvenile court, defendant was charged with knowledge that Morganti’s testimony ultimately could have *858been elicited in an adult criminal proceeding. Accordingly, it is entirely reasonable to hold that defendant’s announced general intention to “see to it” that Morganti never testified “in Court” constituted substantial evidence of an intent to kill his victim to prevent his testimony “in any criminal proceeding.” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10).)
It is true, of course, that we cannot know with certainty whether defendant’s burglary case would have been tried in adult or juvenile court; key witness Morganti’s death mooted the issue prior to the initiation of any proceedings. Yet defendant is hardly in a position to complain. Just as one accused of killing his parents cannot be heard to plead for mercy on the ground that he is an orphan, defendant’s intentional murder of Morganti should estop him from complaining about any resultant uncertainty regarding the status of the burglary case.
2. Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Are “Criminal Proceedings”
In any event, I think the majority’s distinction between adult and juvenile proceedings in the present context is too artificial, producing anomalous results far beyond the probable contemplation of the framers of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(10). We must keep in mind that this provision was adopted by the people in November 1978 as part of an initiative measure designed to expand the list of special circumstances for which death or life imprisonment without parole may be imposed. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) p. 32.)
In construing initiative measures, we have indicated that they “must receive a liberal, practical commonsense construction which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people. [Citations.] . . . The literal language of enactments may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the apparent intent of the framers. [Citations.]” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281], italics added.) In addition, as we have recently observed, when faced with serious constitutional questions involving the rationality of a death penalty statute, we should “endeavor to construe the statute in a manner which avoids any doubt concerning its validity. [Citations]” (Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 147 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], fn. omitted, italics in original.)
In my view, the only “practical commonsense construction” of the 1978 initiative provision at issue here, and the only interpretation which avoids an irrational, and possibly unconstitutional classification, is that the provision applies to all defendants who intentionally kill their victims to prevent *859them from testifying in any proceeding aimed at establishing whether the defendant has committed a crime.1 In this sense, a juvenile court delinquency hearing reasonably may be characterized as a “criminal proceeding.” (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 707.) It would be anomalous to hold that the mere nature of the anticipated testimonial forum determines whether or not the case is a capital one. Intentional murder of a juvenile court witness is no less heinous or deserving of capital punishment than the slaying of his counterpart in adult court. Many cases have noted the practical equivalence of adult and juvenile court delinquency proceedings. (E.g., In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 8, and fn. 4 [201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917]; In re Mikkelsen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 467, 471 [38 Cal.Rptr. 106].) In addition to the “quasi-criminal” nature of juvenile court delinquency proceedings (Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 801 [91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26]), and the “widely held belief” that they are “in reality criminal proceedings” (In re Jerald C., supra, 36 Cal.3d p. 8, fn. 4), it cannot be denied that both adult and juvenile proceedings are designed, at least in part, to protect the public from the consequences of criminal activity. (See id., pp. 7-8; Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (b).) The intentional killing of a witness to prevent his testimony regarding the defendant’s crimes poses identical threats to the public safety, and to the administration of justice, whether that testimony was to be elicited in adult or juvenile court.
For all the foregoing reasons, it is highly unlikely that the electors who adopted the 1978 death penalty initiative assumed that the phrase “criminal proceeding” would exclude a juvenile court delinquency proceeding based on acts constituting a crime if committed by an adult. Indeed, a more recent initiative measure which also involved criminal procedure and punishment employed the phrase “criminal proceeding” in its broader sense. The measure added article I, section 28, subdivision (f), to the state Constitution, providing that an accused’s prior felony convictions “in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile ” (italics added) shall be admissible at his trial. Thus, the words of our state Constitution presently confirm that “criminal proceedings” may, under certain circumstances, include juvenile court proceedings.
The majority relies heavily upon Welfare and Institutions Code section 203, which by its terms precludes a juvenile court proceeding from being deemed a criminal proceeding. Taken literally, and without considering the purposes underlying section 203, its language might limit the reach of the *860special circumstance provision at issue. Yet as we previously indicated, we may disregard the literal language of enactments to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the framers’ apparent intent. Section 203 (formerly § 503) reflects one major purpose of the Juvenile Court Law, namely, to protect minors from “the stigma of criminality often attached to adult penal proceedings . . . .” (T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767, 775 [94 Cal.Rptr. 813, 484 P.2d 981].) Yet no such stigma can possibly attach if we construe the special circumstance provision at issue as including juvenile delinquency proceedings. Indeed, the salutary purposes of the Juvenile Court Law would be promoted, not hampered, by holding that the murder of a witness in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is an aggravated crime which merits the most severe punishment.
The majority also relies upon the general rule that when a penal statute is reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, we ordinarily will adopt the one favorable to the defendant. (E.g., People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186], and cases cited.) We have indicated that this general rule is founded upon the due process principle that a defendant is entitled to “fair warning” that his act is punishable as a crime. (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420].)
For two reasons, I reject application of this principle here. First, we have never indicated that the foregoing general rule must always override other interpretive principles such as the necessity to avoid absurd or anomalous results, or the obligation to construe statutes in such a manner as to uphold their constitutionality. Indeed, in Davis, supra, 29 Cal.3d 814, we cited and applied all of the foregoing interpretive principles in reaching our decision. As I have previously indicated, the adoption of defendant’s proposed construction of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(10), would lead to anomalous, and perhaps unconstitutionally arbitrary, results. Accordingly, that construction should be rejected as one to which the provision is not “reasonably susceptible.” (Davis, at p. 828.)
Second, defendant was not constitutionally entitled to know with absolute certainty that his brutal murder would invoke a “special circumstances” provision. Due process may require fair notice that one’s conduct is punishable as a crime (Keeler, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 631), and defendant certainly must have realized that his actions were subject to severe punishment. Any imprecision in defining the exact nature or degree of that punishment should not be deemed constitutionally significant.
*861I would conclude that the second of the two special circumstance findings was supported by the evidence and should be sustained.
Mosk, J., concurred.

In this regard, the provision would not apply to other juvenile proceedings, such as truancy or disobedience proceedings not arising under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.