Court Opinion

ID: 9566865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:06.367453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:56.101763
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in Judge Pannell’s dissent. It was undisputed that the car in question was a family purpose automobile, which means it was furnished to the owner’s family for their pleasure and convenience. Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275 (1) (87 SE 10). The mother directed a third person to drive the automobile on an errand for the mother’s pleasure and convenience, thus relieving the mother of having to attend to this chore herself. The wreck occurred while the third person was driving the car, accompanied by another member of the family of the owner. The majority opinion makes much of the fact, as it contends, that the evidence failed to show the family member was supervising or directing the way and manner the car was being driven. Judge Pannell’s dissent correctly points out that the family member was present in the car and could have governed the way the car was driven had she desired. But that is not where the pressure of the case lies. There is no decision by the courts of Georgia, so far as I can discover by diligent search, which holds that a family member must be present in the car at the time of the collision in order for the automobile to come within the purview of the family purpose doctrine.
In Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8 (153 SE2d 639), this question is discussed, and a finding made against the owner’s responsibility. But in addition to failing to discuss implied authority an express authority from the owner to the effect that his family member may authorize another to drive the car, this meaningful language is used near bottom of page 9, to wit: "In no case in Georgia has it been held that the parent is liable when the son or family member was not in the automobile and directing its use, or when it was not being used for a family purpose. ’’(Emphasis supplied.) This language is clear and concise and can have no meaning except that the parent (owner of the automobile) is liable: 1. When a family member is in the automobile and directing its use; 2. Or, when the car is being used for a family purpose. In the case sub judice, it is as clear as can be that the car was at the time of the collision being used for a family purpose, that is, for the pleasure and convenience of the wife of the owner, in that she had sent a nonmember of the family on an errand in the car. That there *732are authorities which hold that where a family member is present in the car, this is enough to prove family purpose doctrine (see Pritchett v. Williams, 115 Ga. App. 8, 9, supra; Myrick v. Sievers, 104 Ga. App. 95 (121 SE2d 185)), is not equivalent to holding that unless a family member is present, the family purpose doctrine does not apply. In the case sub judice, the mother’s pleasure and convenience could best be served by sending a third person on an errand for the mother, in which the use of the family purpose car was necessary. To limit the mother in such use would effectively deprive her of "pleasure and convenience” in the use of the car, which is an inherent part of the family purpose doctrine.
Of course, the owner of an automobile may place a limitation on its use by instructing the members of his family that no other person is to be allowed to drive the car under any circumstances. And if the uncontradicted evidence at the trial shows the imposition of such limitation, then the driving of the car by one not a member of the family would conclusively be outside the family purpose doctrine. But here it is not even contended that any such limitation was imposed. That means the father meant for his family to use the car in serving their pleasure and convenience without limitation. That is exactly what the mother did here; she needed an errand performed in her behalf which it was not convenient for her to perform; and as no other adult member of the family with a driver’s license was present, she instructed a nonfamily member, with a driver’s license, to drive the car for the mother’s pleasure and convenience. Surely this was within the family purpose doctrine and within the reasons for which the father furnished the car to his family.