Court Opinion

ID: 9565255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:17:30.364021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:29.971538
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
dissenting.
Upon the facts presented I would hold that “excusable neglect” has been shown under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Dennis Dial acted with reasonable prudence by furnishing his attorney the complaint served upon him. He did not exhibit indifference to the lawsuit, nor does it appear that he sought to delay an eventual decision in the case. His “neglect” consisted of placing excessive reliance upon an attorney who disserved him. I would deem such “neglect” to be “excusable.”
At one time, I.C. § 5-905 mandated default judgments to be set aside for attorney neglect; and it authorized the imposition of sanctions against counsel. Following repeal of the statute in 1975, no consistent judicial policy evolved on relieving clients from the consequences of attorney neglect. Absent such a policy, I believe we should take our bearings from the general principle that “in doubtful cases, relief should be granted to reach a judgment on the merits.” Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 326, 658 P.2d 992, 997 (Ct.App.1983). See also, e.g., Stoner v. Turner, 73 Idaho 117, 247 P.2d 469 (1952); Orange Transportation Company, Inc. v. Taylor, 71 Idaho 275, 230 P.2d 689 (1951).
We recently had occasion to note that a request for relief from a default judgment “puts squarely in conflict the goals of [judicial] efficiency and substantive justice.” Stirm v. Puckett, 107 Idaho 1046, 1048, 695 P.2d 431, 433 (Ct.App.1985). However, “[e]ven in this day of burgeoning case loads, we have not compromised Idaho’s commitment to deciding cases on their merits.” Id. at 1050, 695 P.2d at 435. I would adhere to that commitment today.