Court Opinion

ID: 9950178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:05:34.201968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:04.945799
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                            CARY PORTNER,
                               Appellant,

                                    v.

               GIL KOPPEL and ALEKSANDRA KOPPEL,
                            Appellees.

                            No. 4D2023-1017

                            [March 13, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Maxine Cheesman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2021-CA-
013227-XXXX-MB.

  Nicole Nicolette Mace and Curt Sanchez of the Law Offices of Curt
Sanchez, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Mark R. Osherow and Kenyetta N. Alexander of Osherow, PLLC, Boca
Raton, for appellees.

LEVINE, J.

    Appellant, Cary Portner, appeals a final order enforcing a settlement
agreement between appellant and Gil and Aleksandra Koppel, appellees.
The parties negotiated the settlement agreement as a result of injuries
appellant sustained while at appellees’ home. Appellant claimed that there
was not, in fact, a settlement agreement since he wanted a “net” settlement
of $100,000 instead of the gross settlement of $100,000 negotiated by
appellant’s former counsel. The trial court granted appellees’ motion to
enforce the settlement agreement, finding that all the essential terms of
the settlement were fully negotiated and agreed to by the parties. We find
competent substantial evidence that appellant clearly and unequivocally
granted his former counsel authority to settle appellant’s claim. Thus, we
affirm.

   Appellant filed a personal injury action against appellees for injuries
sustained while he was at their residence to perform tree trimming
services. According to the complaint, appellees’ two dogs charged at
appellant, causing him to fall and shatter his wrist.
   Several months after the filing of the complaint, appellees moved to
enforce a settlement agreement, claiming the parties had settled the
lawsuit but that appellant had refused to execute the settlement
agreement. The matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, where
appellees presented testimony from their counsel and appellant’s former
counsel and also introduced multiple exhibits. Appellant presented his
own testimony in defense.

    Appellees’ counsel testified regarding text messages and emails
exchanged between himself and appellant’s former counsel.               The
correspondence, which was introduced into evidence, showed that
appellees’ counsel stated he was authorized to settle for $100,000 and
provided appellant’s former counsel with a draft settlement agreement,
which appellant’s former counsel then revised.          Appellees’ counsel
accepted the revisions and forwarded the final settlement agreement to
appellant’s former counsel. The terms of the settlement included payment
of $100,000 from appellees to appellant, a release by appellant, and
dismissal of the lawsuit after receipt of payment. Appellees signed a check
for $100,000 and executed the settlement agreement.

    Appellant testified that he told his former counsel’s associate that he
would settle for a net amount of $100,000. When the associate informed
appellant of a $100,000 offer, appellant testified he was not “clear if it was
net.” Appellant claimed he did not receive a breakdown until two weeks
later. Appellant testified he did not accept the $100,000 gross settlement
offer because it came to $45,000 or $55,000 net.

   Appellant’s former counsel then testified that appellant gave his office
authority to settle the case for $100,000. Former counsel further testified:
“[Appellant] was aware that the gross settlement was $100,000. We had
handled a case for him in the past, and he understands how it works. And
specifically discussed gross versus net settlement in a 45-plus minute
discussion, giving me authority to resolve the case for $100,000.”

    Former counsel testified that appellant unambiguously authorized him
to settle for $100,000. Former counsel told appellant he was not certain
if that would happen because appellees had no insurance and would be
paying out of their own funds. Former counsel discussed that appellant
would receive an approximate net of $40,000 to $60,000 after attorney’s
fees and medical bills. Appellant agreed, and former counsel went forward
with the settlement.

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   According to former counsel, appellant fully understood all the facts
and gave former counsel’s office authority to settle. After the settlement,
appellant asked his former counsel to reduce his attorney’s fees. When
former counsel refused, appellant became irate and took the position that
he did not settle the case.

    Former counsel thought it was in appellant’s best interest to settle the
case for $100,000. There were unclear issues in the case, and appellees
did not have insurance. Former counsel explained the situation to
appellant and why the settlement amount was a good result. Former
counsel believed the case was settled. He had no reason to believe
appellant did not understand the terms of the settlement. Appellant had
full knowledge of all facts relevant to the settlement and did not object
until over a month later, after asking former counsel to reduce his
attorney’s fees.

    The trial court entered an order granting the motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. The trial court summarized the evidence and found
that the documents entered into evidence and the attorneys’ testimony
demonstrated that the parties agreed to the settlement. Additionally, the
trial court found appellant’s former counsel’s testimony credible. The trial
court found that the settlement was both oral and conveyed through
written correspondence between the parties’ attorneys. The trial court
further concluded that the parties negotiated, agreed, and intended to be
bound by the settlement agreement, regardless of whether appellant had
formally executed the settlement agreement. All essential terms were fully
negotiated and agreed to by the parties. The trial court directed appellant
to execute the settlement agreement and to dismiss the case with prejudice
after receipt of the settlement funds. From this order, appellant appeals.

   Settlement agreements are reviewed under the principles of contract
law. Choate v. RySurg, LLC, 330 So. 3d 936, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
Issues of contract interpretation and formation are reviewed de novo, while
factual findings are reviewed for competent substantial evidence. Id.
“Accordingly, the issue of whether there was mutual assent is reviewed for
competent, substantial evidence, but the overall question of whether there
was an enforceable settlement agreement is reviewed de novo.” Evans v.
Diaz, 365 So. 3d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023).

   The “party seeking to enforce a settlement agreement bears the burden
of showing that the attorney proposing the settlement had the clear and
unequivocal authority from his client to do so.” Hamilton v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 48 So. 3d 170, 171-72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Further, “[t]he trial
court’s factual findings that there was a clear and unequivocal grant of

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authority must be supported by competent, substantial evidence in order
to be upheld on appeal.” Id. at 172. When the trial court is the finder of
fact, “the trial judge’s findings of fact are clothed with a presumption of
correctness on appeal, and these findings will not be disturbed unless the
appellant can demonstrate that they are clearly erroneous.” Bd. of Trs. of
Internal Improvement Tr. Fund of State of Fla. v. Waterfront ICW Props., LLC,
310 So. 3d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (citation omitted). Findings of
fact are reviewed “for competent substantial evidence.” Id.

   Competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
appellant’s former counsel had clear and unequivocal authority from
appellant to settle the case for the gross amount of $100,000. The
competent substantial evidence included testimony from the former
counsel who stated that appellant gave authority to settle the case for
$100,000, and appellant was aware that the $100,000 was the gross
amount. Appellant and former counsel discussed the difference between
a gross settlement and a net settlement during a forty-five-minute
conversation. The former counsel discussed with appellant that appellant
would receive an approximate net of $40,000 to $60,000 after paying
outstanding medical bills and the former counsel’s attorney’s fees. After
the settlement, appellant asked the former counsel to lower his attorney’s
fees, which the former counsel declined to do. Only then did appellant
take the position that when he agreed to settle for $100,000, it was a net
settlement and the entire $100,000 would be remitted to appellant.

   The trial court weighed the conflicting testimony and specifically found
the former counsel’s testimony to be credible. The trial court “is in the
best position ‘to evaluate and weigh the testimony and evidence based
upon its observation of the bearing, demeanor and credibility of the
witnesses.’” Hamilton, 48 So. 3d at 172 (quoting Acoustic Innovations, Inc.
v. Schafer, 976 So. 2d 1139, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)). Although
appellant points to his testimony that he told the former counsel’s
associate that he wanted $100,000 net as evidence that the trial court
erred, appellant is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence. See id.
This we cannot do.

    Further, appellant’s testimony belies credibility. Appellant’s testimony
that he only agreed to settle for $100,000 net would essentially mean that
the outstanding medical bills and attorney’s fees would either go unpaid
or that all professionals were working without compensation. In order for
appellant’s testimony that he only agreed to a $100,000 net settlement to
be plausible, then the gross amount of settlement would have had to have
been higher than $100,000, the only settlement number in the record.

                                     4
   Appellant also argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden
of proof to appellant to prove that he did not accept the settlement. In
support, he points to the portion of the trial court’s order noting the
respective evidence presented by the parties. Contrary to appellant’s
contention, the trial court’s finding that appellant did not present any
evidence other than his own testimony does not demonstrate that the trial
court improperly shifted the burden of proof. Rather, it was simply a
recitation of fact. At trial, appellant presented only his own testimony,
whereas appellees presented testimony from their attorney and appellant’s
former attorney and also introduced documentary evidence, including text
messages and emails.

    Appellant next asserts that the trial court erred in finding the parties
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement because the
communications between the parties did not establish a meeting of the
minds. Settlement agreements are favored by the law and will be enforced
whenever possible. DeJour v. Coral Springs KGB, Inc., 293 So. 3d 502, 504
(Fla. 4th DCA 2020). “A trial court’s finding that there was a meeting of
the minds must be supported by competent substantial evidence.” Id.
(citation omitted).

    “To be enforceable, an agreement must be sufficiently specific, and
reflect assent by the parties to all essential terms. . . . Where essential
terms of an agreement remain open, subject to future negotiation, there
can be no enforceable contract.” Bergman v. DeIulio, 826 So. 2d 500, 503
(Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted). Emails between attorneys can
constitute an enforceable settlement agreement. See Warrior Creek Dev.,
Inc. v. Cummings, 56 So. 3d 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

   Competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings that
the parties agreed to all essential terms and that those terms were
incorporated into a final settlement agreement. The correspondence
between the parties’ attorneys showed that appellees’ counsel stated that
he was authorized to settle for $100,000 and provided appellant’s former
counsel with a draft settlement agreement, which former counsel revised.
Appellees’ counsel accepted the revisions and forwarded the final version
to appellant’s former counsel. The terms of the settlement included
payment of $100,000 from appellees to appellant, a release by appellant,
and dismissal of the lawsuit after receipt of payment. No essential terms
remained open, subject to future negotiation. At the hearing, both
attorneys testified regarding the communications between them and
further testified that the case was settled.

                                     5
    The fact that appellant did not sign the settlement agreement is not
dispositive in this case. “A settlement agreement does not have to be in
writing . . . .” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. InterAmerican Car Rental,
Inc., 781 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Additionally, a settlement
agreement does not need to be signed to be enforceable. See Boyko v.
Ilardi, 613 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“[T]he execution of the
settlement documents was not a condition precedent to the settlement
agreement, but rather a mere procedural formality which both parties to
the settlement agreement were obliged to perform.”); Patrick v. Christian
Radio, 745 So. 2d 578, 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (stating that whether a
valid settlement has been reached is not dependent on signing of
documents).

    Finally, appellant claims that the trial court erred in allowing his former
counsel to testify since appellant objected to this waiver of his attorney-
client privilege. Appellant acknowledges and admits that the trial court
did not issue a ruling before appellant and the former counsel testified. It
is clear that “a party must object and obtain a ruling from the trial court
in order to preserve an issue for appellate review.” MacDonald v. Dep’t of
Child. & Fams., 855 So. 2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Since
appellant did not obtain a ruling, this issue is waived for purposes of
appeal.

   Further, the trial court would not have abused its discretion in
permitting the testimony. Section 90.507, Florida Statutes (2022), states:

      A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a
      confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if
      the person . . . voluntarily discloses or makes the
      communication when he or she does not have a reasonable
      expectation of privacy, or consents to disclosure of, any
      significant part of the matter or communication. . . .

   In the present case, appellant testified before his former counsel. As a
result of appellant’s testimony, in which confidential communications
were discussed, appellant waived his attorney-client privilege. See id.;
Hamilton v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA
1982) (“[O]nce the privilege is waived, and the horse out of the barn, it
cannot be reinvoked.”).

   Additionally, appellant would have waived his attorney-client privilege
by claiming that his former counsel lacked authority to settle the case on
appellant’s behalf. “[W]aiver occurs when a party ‘raises a claim that will
necessarily require proof by way of a privileged communication.’” Coates

                                      6
v. Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., 940 So. 2d 504, 508 (Fla. 2d DCA
2006) (citation and emphasis omitted). Significantly, the attorney-client
privilege is waived where the issue is whether the lawyer had the authority
to enter into a settlement. Hamilton, 409 So. 2d at 1114. “No court should
countenance an announced settlement between counsel followed by
escape therefrom, if one side arbitrarily reneges and then seals his
counsel’s lips by invoking the attorney-client privilege.” Id.; see also
Marrero v. Rea, 312 So. 3d 1041, 1050-51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) (finding
waiver of privilege where issue was whether attorney had authority to
settle); Lender Processing Servs., Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 183 So. 3d 1052,
1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (finding waiver of attorney-client privilege where
party asserted counsel lacked authority to settle); Est. of Tobias v.
Barnaby, 804 So. 2d 553, 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (A party “waive[s] the
privilege as a matter of law by making the assertion that [his] counsel had
settled the case without authority.”); Charles W. Ehrhardt, 1 Fla. Prac.,
Evidence § 502.8 (2023 ed.) (“Waiver may also be found when issues are
injected into the litigation by a party who then seeks to shield material
information by asserting the attorney-client privilege.”).

    In summary, we find the trial court did not err in enforcing the
settlement agreement. The record is replete with competent substantial
evidence that appellant’s former counsel had clear and unequivocal
authority to settle the case. Further, the settlement agreement was
enforceable, and the trial court did not err in allowing the former counsel
to testify about the authority he received from appellant to settle. As such,
we affirm.

   Affirmed.

WARNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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