Court Opinion

ID: 9899460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:47.674091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.471634
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Dashuta v. LA Stainless Kings CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 LEONID DASHUTA,                                              B321121

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                 19SMCV00037)

 LA STAINLESS KINGS, INC.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Offices of Gabor Szabo for Defendant and Appellant.
     Marc J. Gedeon and Halil Hasic for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
               _______________________________
       Defendant LA Stainless Kings, Inc. (LASK) appeals from a
judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Leonid Dashuta after the
trial court denied LASK’s petition to vacate an arbitration award
and granted Dashuta’s petition to confirm the arbitration award.
We affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
I.     The Parties Sign an Agreement
       On or about September 20, 2018, Dashuta and LASK
executed the “Agreement” at issue in this case. The Agreement
provided that LASK, a concession truck designer and
manufacturer, would manufacture a food truck for Dashuta,
doing business as Magnifico Pizzeria; and Dashuta would pay
LASK $95,350 for the materials and labor. LASK was bound
under the Agreement to manufacture the food truck “for the
agreed upon price.”
       Per the terms of the Agreement, Dashuta paid LASK
$10,000 upon the signing of the Agreement. Dashuta’s next
payment of $25,350 was due five weeks later. On October 8,
2018, Dashuta paid $13,350 and agreed to purchase the pizza
oven for the food truck, reducing the amount it owed LASK under
the Agreement by $12,000 (i.e., the cost specified in the
Agreement for purchase of the pizza oven). The balance under
the Agreement was due when the “Health Department approves
the truck at final inspection.”
       The parties disagreed as to who was obligated under the
Agreement to procure the shell vehicle that LASK would use to
manufacture the food truck. The Agreement stated that $13,000
of the price Dashuta would pay LASK for the manufacture of the
food truck was allocated specifically for purchase of a “Used Step
Van 22’ Cargo.” (Agreement, ¶ 7.) The Agreement listed one of

                                2
LASK’s “duties” as: “to assist CUSTOMER [Dashuta] to find and
purchase a vehicle suitable to build the desired concession truck
on.” (Agreement, ¶ 4(ix).) The Agreement listed one of Dashuta’s
duties as: to “give final approval on the truck before purchase and
if ‘LASK’ is unable to find a truck that fits our needs/preferences,
‘CUSTOMER’ has the option to bring their own truck to build.”
(Agreement, ¶ 5(iv).) Finally, the Agreement included a section
(¶ 8) with the heading, “Preliminary Agreement Regarding Used
Truck Purchase (if applicable),” stating in pertinent part, “LASK
offered CUSTOMER the option to purchase a brand new step van
with manufacturer warranty. However, CUSTOMER opted to
[sic] the more economical option of using a USED VEHICLE to
build the food truck on. The parties agreed to the USED TRUCK
purchase with the following condition[s]:
       “8.a. CUSTOMER understands that used vehicle
purchases are AS IS and there is NO WARRANTY on the vehicle.
       “8.b. LASK will make good faith, reasonable efforts to find
a reliable and good general value vehicle for CUSTOMER, as
customer satisfaction is very important for LASK.
       “8.c. LASK will notify CUSTOMER in writing (an
electronic mail or a text message is sufficient to comply with this
requirement) when LASK finds a suitable truck for CUSTOMER.
Thereafter CUSTOMER has three (3) days to contact LASK in
writing (an electronic mail or a text message is sufficient to
comply with this requirement) if CUSTOMER wants to arrange
his/her/its own inspection of the used truck prior to start
manufacturing process on the truck [sic]. If CUSTOMER does
not contact LASK, LASK assumes that the right to inspect the
used vehicle was waived, the CUSTOMER wish[es] to purchase

                                 3
the used truck AS IS, and LASK will proceed with the
manufacturing process. . . .”
       A shell vehicle was not procured and LASK did not
manufacture a food truck for Dashuta. Each blamed the other for
the failure.
       We cannot fashion a summary of the circumstances of the
search for a shell vehicle (and the subsequent breakdown of the
parties’ relationship) because the record before us does not
include a transcript of the arbitration hearing or an enumeration
of the exhibits actually admitted in that hearing.1 Below we
summarize the parties’ positions on the matter and the
arbitrator’s factual findings, which provide context for LASK’s
contentions on appeal.
II.    Dashuta Files a Complaint Against LASK
       On January 4, 2019, Dashuta and Magnifico LLC
(Dashuta’s solely owned company) filed a complaint in this
action, asserting causes of action against LASK and Szabolcs
Apai (an individual who apparently owned LASK) for breach of
the Agreement, violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law

      1 The record on appeal includes Dashuta’s responses to

LASK’s requests for production, attaching the documents
Dashuta produced during discovery in the arbitration
proceedings. LASK represents that these documents include all
of the exhibits Dashuta introduced during the arbitration
hearing. Without a transcript of the arbitration hearing, there is
no foundation for these documents, and we have no witness
testimony providing context for the documents.

                                4
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.), and fraud/fraudulent
misrepresentation.2 Therein, Dashuta alleged, in pertinent part:
       “Several weeks” after the parties executed the Agreement
and Dashuta made the first payment under the Agreement, Lask
(through Apai) informed Dashuta that it “had only been able to
find shell vehicles for $22,000 and $25,000, respectively, which is
almost double the promised price of $13,000.” LASK forwarded
to Dashuta advertisements for the two vehicles. Dashuta asked
LASK “to keep looking” for a vehicle that satisfied the terms of
the Agreement. “After several more weeks,” LASK reiterated
that it could not “locate a suitable shell vehicle for less than
$22,000.” Dashuta conducted “his own Google search” and found
“the very same shell vehicles” on sale for $12,000 and $15,000,
respectively. When Dashuta confronted LASK with this
information, LASK responded that the vehicles Dashuta found
“could not be identical” to the vehicles it had found.
       Dashuta also asserted in the complaint: “After further
back-and-forth, Plaintiff Dashuta concluded that defendants’
modus operandi consisted of bait-and-switch tactics and making
money from customers not just on the agreements but also on
significant markup on parts procured for the customers. [Italics
omitted.] Defendant [Apai] lures potential customers in by
representing that he could procure shell vehicles at low prices;
once a customer signs a contract, Defendant [Apai] informs them
that no suitable shell vehicles are available at the promised price.
At this juncture, the customer has little choice but to pay the

      2 Plaintiff Magnifico LLC and defendant Apai are not

parties to the judgment at issue, and they are not parties to this
appeal.

                                 5
significantly higher price for the shell vehicle. Defendants earn
thousands of dollars through this scheme.”
        As alleged in the complaint, Dashuta concluded defendants
LASK and Apai breached the Agreement by, among other things,
“[f]ailing to find a shell vehicle for Plaintiffs for the agreed-upon
price of $13,000.” Dashuta also “determined that he [could not]
trust defendants to perform their obligations under the
Agreement.” Therefore, he asked them to return the two
payments he had made totaling $23,350, “less [a] reasonable
amount to compensate Defendant LASK for any drawings or
other work it performed pursuant to the Agreement.” According
to the complaint, Apai/LASK then ceased all communications
with Dashuta.
        In his breach of contract cause of action (and in the prayer
for relief), in addition to damages according to proof, Dashuta
sought “rescission of the Agreement based on Defendant [Apai]’s
misrepresentations and fraudulent conduct in connection with
carrying out his obligations under the Agreement.” In the prayer
for relief, Dashuta also sought interest on any monetary relief,
costs and attorney fees, statutory damages (under the Unfair
Competition Law), and punitive damages (on the
fraud/fraudulent misrepresentation cause of action).
III. The Parties Stipulate to Arbitrate the Dispute
        LASK moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration
clause in the Agreement (¶ 15), stating: “Disputes. Shall any
dispute arise concerning this Agreement, prior to initiating a
formal dispute, both parties to this Agreement shall make a good
faith attempt to resolve the dispute informally. If such informal
dispute resolution is unsuccessful, either party may proceed with
Arbitration. All claims and disputes arising under or relating to

                                 6
this Agreement are to be settled by binding arbitration, with the
condition that the arbitrator shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning and the award may be vacated or
corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any
such error, in the state of California. An award of arbitration
may be confirmed in a court of competent jurisdiction. Each
party to bear their own costs and fees. The arbitration fees and
costs should be equally shared by the parties.”
       Dashuta did not oppose the motion to compel arbitration.
Before the date set for the hearing, the parties filed in the trial
court a “Stipulation for Binding Arbitration and Stay of Action.”
The stipulation included the language from the Arbitration
clause quoted above stating that the “arbitrator shall not have
the power to commit errors of law or legal reasoning and the
award may be vacated or corrected on appeal to a court of
competent jurisdiction for any such error.” Pursuant to the
stipulation, the court ordered the parties to “arbitrate any and all
controversies related to this matter,” and the court stayed the
action pending the binding arbitration.
IV. The Arbitration
       A.    Dashuta’s notice of intent to arbitrate/demand
             for arbitration and LASK’s counterclaims
       On or about January 15, 2020, Dashuta (and Magnifico
LLC) filed a notice of intent to arbitrate/demand for arbitration
against LASK (and Apai) before Judicate West under the
Judicate West Commercial Rules. In the section of the form for
claim or relief sought, Dashuta stated, “Actual damages, direct
and consequential, in the amount of at least $23,350; interest at
the legal rate; rescission; statutory damages; costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees; punitive damages. In its “Nature of

                                 7
Dispute” attachment to the notice/demand for arbitration,
Dashuta included the same factual allegations from the
complaint that we summarized above.
      LASK and Apai filed counterclaims against Dashuta.
LASK asserted a breach of contract counterclaim against
Dashuta, alleging LASK fully performed under the Agreement,
but “Dashuta stopped his performance promised in the
[Agreement] by refusing to accept suitable vehicles to use as a
shell-vehicle to start building out the food truck, by attempting to
cancel the contract without justification, [and] by failing to make
progress payments pursuant to the terms of the [Agreement].”
LASK claimed Dashuta’s breach of the Agreement damaged
LASK in an amount in excess of $25,000.
      LASK also asserted a counterclaim against Dashuta for
declaratory relief, seeking a determination (1) that Dashuta
breached the Agreement by failing to perform pursuant to its
terms; (2) that LASK was relieved of its duty to perform under
the Agreement due to Dashuta’s breach; (3) that LASK did not
owe Dashuta anything under the Agreement; and (4) that
Dashuta owed LASK costs under Code of Civil Procedure section
998.
      Apai asserted a counterclaim against Dashuta for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging Dashuta
“threatened Apai with physical harm and serious bodily injuries
if Apai refused to return the money deposited by Dashuta with
LASK under the terms of the [Agreement].” Apai sought mental
and emotional distress damages and punitive damages from
Dashuta.

                                 8
      B.      The Arbitrator excludes LASK’s exhibits for not
              providing them to Dashuta in advance of the
              arbitration hearing
       On February 8, 2021, two days before the date initially
scheduled for the arbitration hearing, Dashuta (and Magnifico
LLC) served a witness list, an exhibit list, and exhibits on LASK
by email. The arbitration hearing was continued at the request
of LASK’s counsel due to personal reasons.
       At the continued arbitration hearing on March 8, 2021,
LASK’s counsel indicated that LASK (and Apai) intended to
introduce exhibits at the hearing. Dashuta’s counsel objected
because he had not seen the exhibits, which were not served in
advance of the hearing. LASK’s counsel emailed the exhibits to
Dashuta’s counsel during the hearing. The arbitrator (Hon.
Joanne B. O’Donnell (Ret.)) reserved her ruling on the objection,
allowing LASK and Apai to present their documentary evidence
at the hearing, and requesting post-hearing briefing by the
parties.
       Because the record before us does not include a transcript
of the arbitration hearing, we cannot provide an account of what
occurred at the arbitration hearing (e.g., who testified, what they
testified to, and which exhibits were introduced or admitted).
       After the arbitration hearing, the parties submitted
briefing on Dashuta’s objection to LASK’s (and Apai’s) exhibits.
Dashuta argued Judicate West Commercial Arbitration Rules
required that exhibits be exchanged prior to the hearing, and
there was no good cause to depart from the rules. LASK argued
it would have provided the documents if Dashuta had
propounded discovery, but Dashuta did not. LASK also argued
there was no prejudice because its exhibits consisted of

                                 9
documents that were equally available to Dashuta. Finally,
LASK argued it was not required to disclose exhibits used for
impeachment during cross-examination.
       On March 31, 2021, the arbitrator held a hearing on the
evidentiary matter and thereafter ruled in favor of Dashuta,
excluding LASK’s (and Apai’s) exhibits.3 In an April 6, 2021
written ruling, the arbitrator concluded Judicate West
Commercial Arbitration Rules required the parties to exchange
all exhibits prior to the hearing, including documents to be used
for impeachment. The arbitrator found no good cause to depart
from the rules.
       Subsequently, in the Arbitration Award, the arbitrator
explained that the evidentiary ruling excluding LASK’s and
Apai’s exhibits “did not exclude testimony by [their] witnesses
discussing those excluded exhibits.” The arbitrator added, “To
the extent that testimony is not incompetent hearsay, the
[a]rbitrator has considered it.”
       C.    Parties’ post-hearing briefing on the merits of
             the dispute
       After the arbitrator issued the written ruling on the
evidentiary matter, the parties submitted post-hearing briefing
on the merits of the dispute. To aid in preparation of the
briefing, LASK’s counsel emailed Judicate West, requesting “the
sound recording of the arbitration hearing,” which had occurred
over Zoom. A case manager from Judicate West responded, in
pertinent part: “It seems there was a miscommunication and no
recording was generated. The [arbitrator] was under the

      3 The record before us does not include a transcript of this

March 13, 2021 hearing.

                                10
impression that counsel was going to record the hearing by their
own means and did not receive any request during the
arbitration hearing itself to employ any recording features.
Based on my own review of the file, I did not find any request
made to Judicate West directly to enable the recording feature in
Zoom.”4
       In his opening brief on the merits, Dashuta argued LASK
breached the Agreement by, among other things, failing to
procure a suitable shell vehicle for $13,000. According to the
brief, Dashuta testified at the arbitration hearing: that he
informed Apai/LASK that the vehicle identification numbers of
the shell vehicles LASK claimed were on sale for $24,500 and
$22,500 matched the vehicle identification numbers of the shell
vehicles Dashuta found on sale for $15,990 and $12,990 through
his Internet search; and Apai responded that those vehicles “were
not ideal anyway” because they had gas engines, and Apai could
find Dashuta a shell vehicle with a diesel engine. According to
Dashuta, Apai/LASK “did not locate and offer a truck to Dashuta
for the agreed-upon price.”5

      4 To the extent LASK challenges the judgment confirming

the arbitration award on the ground there is no recording of the
arbitration hearing, LASK has not established misconduct by the
arbitrator or an error of law or legal reasoning permitting
vacation of the Arbitration Award.
      5 We are not adopting Dashuta’s characterization of

evidence that is not before us. We include this summary of the
factual account in Dashuta’s brief because the parties’ differing
positions on the evidence provide context for LASK’s contentions
on appeal.

                               11
       In the alternative, Dashuta argued the Agreement should
be rescinded based on mutual mistake and no meeting of the
minds, based on the parties’ conflicting testimony regarding who
was obligated under the Agreement to procure the shell vehicle.
According to Dashuta’s brief, “Dashuta testified that he was
always under the impression that LASK would procure a truck
[shell vehicle] for him and manufacture a food truck from it.
[Citation to Dashuta’s testimony, in general.] He testified that
he relied on Mr. Apai’s extensive expertise in finding a suitable
truck. Id. Dashuta further testified that he lacked mechanical
expertise to make a decision on his own as to what would be a
suitable truck. Id. [¶] Mr. Apai, on the other hand, testified that
LASK was not contractually obligated to procure a truck for
Dashuta and that LASK was merely helping Dashuta. [Citation
to Apai’s testimony, in general.] Mr. Apai testified that it was
Dashuta’s sole responsibility to acquire a suitable truck. Id.”6
       In seeking rescission of the Agreement, Dashuta argued
LASK should return the $23,350 Dashuta paid and compensate
Dashuta for other costs he incurred (e.g., costs associated with
the incorporation of Magnifico LLC). Dashuta further argued
that allowing LASK to keep the payments would constitute
unjust enrichment because “LASK has not provided anything of
value to Dashuta in exchange for the $23,350.00.” According to
Dashuta, LASK made one drawing related to the food truck, and

      6 Although Dashuta cited to witness testimony (in general)

in his post-hearing briefing on the merits, the testimony is not
attached to the brief. And, as we stated above, the record before
us does not include a transcript of the witnesses’ testimony (or
any portion of the arbitration hearing). Nor is there a stipulation
between the parties as to any witness’s testimony.

                                12
there was no evidence corroborating Apai’s testimony that LASK
performed other work on the project. Dashuta also asserted that
LASK’s and Apai’s counterclaims lacked merit based on the
evidence presented at the arbitration hearing.
       In response to Dashuta’s opening brief, LASK argued in its
post-hearing brief, in pertinent part, that “the issue of the shell
vehicle was not a material breach but a thinly veiled attempt by
Dashuta to get out of the [Agreement] as his [existing] pizza
trailer business was not doing as well as he hoped,” and “Dashuta
knew that he would not be able to operate a successful pizza
business from the pizza truck either.” According to LASK, the
shell vehicle that Dashuta found on sale for $12,990 was suitable
(regardless of engine type), but Dashuta refused to purchase it,
without explanation. LASK also argued that the Agreement only
“required LASK ‘to assist’ Dashuta to find a suitable vehicle and
not to unilaterally secure a truck for Dashuta.” LASK also
argued there was no fraud “in the inducement nor thereafter”
(although Dashuta did not raise such a claim in his post-hearing
briefing).
       LASK further argued “the parties had a valid contract and
meeting of the minds,” as “Dashuta wanted a custom-made food
truck manufactured by LASK, built out on a used truck, and
LASK agreed to manufacture a custom-made food truck for
Dashuta, built out on a used food truck platform. The fact that
both parties were searching for suitable trucks shows that it was
not material whose duty it was under the [Agreement] to find a
suitable truck.”
       LASK also asserted that the evidence presented at the
arbitration hearing supported LASK’s and Apai’s counterclaims
against Dashuta. According to LASK, Apai testified that LASK’s

                                13
damages were $41,862.10, “which included $6,112.50 in labor
costs, $7,999.60 realized loss on equipment and material ordered,
after deductions of income for selling steel cabinets and shelves
for scrap metal, and returning items in exchange for restocking
fees, lost profit of $14,250.00 and liquidated damages per
contract.”
       In his post-hearing reply brief, Dashuta reiterated the
arguments he made in his opening brief, as summarized above,
including that the Agreement should be rescinded based on no
meeting of the minds. Thereafter, LASK filed a sur-reply brief,
responding to Dashuta’s reply brief, which the arbitrator
considered over Dashuta’s objection.
       D.    Arbitration Award
       On June 30, 2021, the arbitrator issued an eight-page
Arbitration Award. The arbitrator concluded Dashuta was
entitled to rescission of the Agreement “based on no meeting of
the minds and mutual mistake.”
       In the Arbitration Award, the arbitrator referenced specific
provisions of the Agreement (¶¶ 4.ix, 7, 8.b & 8.c summarized
above) under which the arbitrator concluded “LASK expressly
agreed to find a suitable shell vehicle for [Dashuta] for $13,000.”
The arbitrator continued: “Apai testified at the hearing that the
Agreement did not oblige LASK to find a suitable shell vehicle for
[Dashuta] for $13,000. Instead, he claimed that LASK was
merely obligated to help [Dashuta] to find a suitable vehicle. In
support of this position, Mr. Apai relied on the following provision
in the Agreement: ‘LASK to assist CUSTOMER to find and
purchase a vehicle.’ [Citation.] This provision cannot be
reconciled with the provision that LASK was to find a suitable
shell vehicle for [Dashuta] for $13,000.”

                                14
      The arbitrator rejected LASK’s argument that because both
parties were searching for a suitable shell vehicle, it was
immaterial whose duty it was under the Agreement to find such a
vehicle. The Arbitration Award states: “The evidence at the
hearing and the bulk of the parties’ briefing demonstrates that
the entire arbitration turned on whether the Agreement
obligated LASK to find a suitable vehicle for $13,000.
Accordingly, the terms concerning the obligation must be
considered material. Based on the conflicting terms of the
Agreement, and the parties’ conflicting testimony concerning
those provisions, the parties did not have a true meeting of the
minds as to those provisions and there was no mutual consent.”
      “To return the parties to the status quo ante” upon
rescission of the Agreement, the arbitrator awarded Dashuta the
$23,350 he paid LASK and $224 he paid to the California
Secretary of State for incorporating Magnifico LLC, plus interest
on those amounts. The arbitrator ordered LASK (and not Apai)
to pay the award.
      Based on her conclusion that rescission of the Agreement
was the appropriate remedy, the arbitrator rejected Dashuta’s
claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment and LASK’s
counterclaim for breach of contract. The arbitrator stated in the
award that Dahsuta had withdrawn his claim for fraud in the
inducement. The arbitrator also concluded Apai did not prove his
counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.7

     7 The arbitrator dismissed Magnifico LLC as a claimant

based on a motion LASK and Apai made at the conclusion of the
arbitration and their post-hearing briefing on the issue.

                               15
V.     LASK’s Petition to Vacate the Arbitration Award and
       Dashuta’s Petition to Confirm It
       On October 8, 2021, LASK filed a petition to vacate the
Arbitration Award. LASK argued the arbitrator exceeded her
powers and made errors of law and legal reasoning in ruling the
Agreement should be rescinded based on no meeting of the minds
and mutual mistake, and the Arbitration Award cannot be
corrected.8 LASK further argued the arbitrator did not follow
Judicate West Commercial Arbitration Rules in excluding
LASK’s evidence and deciding the matter on a theory—rescission
based on mutual mistake—Dashuta first raised in his post-
hearing briefing. Dashuta filed an opposition to LASK’s petition.
       On December 23, 2021, Dashuta filed a petition to confirm
the Arbitration Award. LASK filed an opposition to Dashuta’s
petition.
       On February 1, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
parties’ petitions.9 The court denied LASK’s petition to vacate
the Arbitration Award and granted Dashuta’s petition to confirm
the Arbitration Award. On April 8, 2022, the court entered
judgment in favor of Dashuta and against LASK in the amount of
$23,574 (the amount awarded by the arbitrator).

      8 As stated above, the arbitration clause at issue here

specifies that “the arbitrator shall not have the power to commit
errors of law or legal reasoning and the award may be vacated or
corrected on appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any
such error.”
      9 There is no reporter’s transcript of this February 1, 2022

hearing in the record on appeal.

                                16
                             DISCUSSION
I.       Legal Principles Regarding Arbitration and Scope of
         Our Review
         LASK moved the trial court to vacate the Arbitration
Award under several of the statutory grounds for doing so set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2,10 namely: (1)
“The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by
misconduct of a neutral arbitrator” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3)); “The
arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the
controversy submitted” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)); and “The rights of
the party were substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the
arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by
other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this
title” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)).
         “California law favors alternate dispute resolution as a
viable means of resolving legal conflicts.” (Richey v. AutoNation,
Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916.) Generally, “an arbitrator’s
decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.”
(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Moncharsh).)
“In cases involving private arbitration, ‘[t]he scope of arbitration
is . . . a matter of agreement between the parties’ [citation], and
‘ “[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by
the agreement or stipulation of submission.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 8-9.)
“[T]o take themselves out of the general rule that the merits of
the [arbitration] award are not subject to judicial review, the
parties must clearly agree that legal errors are an excess of

      10 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of

Civil Procedure.

                                 17
arbitral authority that is reviewable by the courts. Here, the
parties expressly so agreed, depriving the arbitrator[] of the
power to commit legal error. They also specifically provided for
judicial review of such error.” (Cable Connection, Inc. v.
DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1361.) Accordingly,
LASK and Dashuta agree that this court may review “errors of
law or legal reasoning” per the arbitration clause in the
Agreement, but not errors of fact.
II.    The Trial Court Had Authority to Grant Dashuta’s
       Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award
       Under section 1285.4, subdivision (a), a petitioner must
“[s]et forth the substance of or have attached a copy of the
agreement to arbitrate.” LASK contends the trial court had “no
power” to grant Dashuta’s petition to confirm the Arbitration
Award because Dashuta did not comply with section 1285.4,
subdivision (a). LASK is mistaken. A copy of the Agreement
containing the arbitration clause is attached to the declaration of
Dashuta’s counsel in support of Dashuta’s petition to confirm the
Arbitration Award. In support of this argument, however, LASK
points us to a different declaration from Dashuta’s counsel—the
declaration in support of Dashuta’s opposition to LASK’s petition
to vacate the Arbitration Award—to which the Agreement was
not attached (and need not have been attached).
       Alternatively, LASK contends the trial court had no power
to confirm the Arbitration Award because the arbitrator voided
the Agreement ab initio, “based on Dashuta’s challenge to
formation,” so the agreement to arbitrate “no longer existed” and
the arbitrator had no power to enter an award and the court had
no jurisdiction to confirm an award. LASK cites no pertinent
case law for this novel argument that it did not raise in the trial

                                18
court (or before the arbitrator). Rather, LASK relies on
inapposite cases where courts found arbitration clauses
unenforceable post-arbitration because the agreements of which
they were a part were illegal or against public policy. (See
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP v. J-M
Manufacturing Co, Inc. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 59, 68 [“law firm’s
conflict of interest rendered the agreement . . ., including its
arbitration clause, unenforceable as against public policy”];
Loving & Evans v. Blick (1949) 33 Cal.2d 603, 607, 614 [contract
made in violation of contractor’s licensing laws designed to
protect the public is entirely illegal and void].) Here, no one has
argued that the Agreement is illegal or against public policy and
that such illegality or violation of public policy affected the
arbitration clause.
       LASK has never disputed that the parties agreed to
arbitrate all disputes relating to the manufacture of the food
truck. In fact, it was LASK who moved to compel arbitration and
the parties thereafter stipulated to binding arbitration of their
claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in the Agreement. Both
sides asked the arbitrator to interpret the Agreement (in
Dashuta’s claims and in LASK’s counterclaims), and the
arbitrator did, taking evidence in aid of her interpretation.
LASK cites no authority indicating an arbitrator lacks power to
grant rescission of an agreement containing an arbitration clause
based on mutual mistake/no meeting of the minds, and we are
aware of none.

                                19
III.   The Arbitrator Did Not Commit Legal Error in
       Allowing Dashuta to Advance the Theory of Mutual
       Mistake
       LASK contends the trial court erred in denying the petition
to vacate the Arbitration Award, arguing the arbitrator
committed legal error (thereby exceeding her power under the
arbitration clause in the Agreement) by entering an award “[o]n
claims never brought by Dashuta (i.e., mutual mistake and/or
rescission of contract based on mutual mistake, thus LASK did
not introduce[] evidence to counter it).” LASK acknowledges that
Dashuta sought rescission of the Agreement in both his
complaint in the trial court and in his demand for arbitration
before Judicate West. But LASK argues that neither the
complaint nor the demand for arbitration put LASK on notice
that Dashuta would seek rescission based on mutual mistake (as
opposed to rescission based on misrepresentations and fraudulent
conduct, as asserted in the complaint). We reject this contention
of legal error for several reasons.
       First, both in the complaint and in the Nature of Dispute
(attached to the demand for arbitration), Dashuta alleged LASK
breached the Agreement by, among other things, failing to
procure a shell vehicle for the contract price of $13,000. In its
counterclaims in the arbitration, LASK alleged Dashuta breached
the Agreement by, among other things, refusing to accept
suitable vehicles to be used as a shell vehicle. Thus, LASK was
on notice that the arbitrator had to determine the parties’
obligations with respect to the purchase of the shell vehicle in
order to decide the parties’ claims/counterclaims. Whether the
parties in fact agreed to the same terms regarding purchase of
the shell vehicle was part of that determination.

                               20
       Second, we do not know if there was any discussion at the
arbitration hearing regarding rescission of the Agreement and
the basis or bases on which Dashuta sought rescission, because
the record does not include a transcript of the arbitration hearing
(or a settled statement or stipulation as to what occurred). We do
know, before the arbitrator made the award, Dashuta argued for
rescission of the Agreement based on mutual mistake and no
meeting of the minds in two post-hearing arbitration briefs. We
also know LASK responded to these arguments in its own post-
hearing briefing, without objecting that Dashuta had not
properly pleaded his claims, expressing surprise that Dashuta
was raising these issues, or indicating it was prejudiced by the
introduction of new issues. It was incumbent upon LASK to
inform the arbitrator that LASK believed the issue Dashuta
argued in his pre-award briefing was not properly pleaded. “[W]e
cannot permit a party to sit on his rights, content in the
knowledge that should he suffer an adverse decision, he could
then raise the . . . issue in a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s
award. A contrary rule would condone a level of ‘procedural
gamesmanship’ that we have condemned as ‘undermining the
advantages of arbitration.’ ” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p.
30.)
       Finally, even if the record indicated LASK preserved this
contention for our review, we would not conclude in LASK’s favor.
An arbitrator has discretion to determine “what issues are
necessary to the decision” and “discretion to determine the extent
of remedies.” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994)
9 Cal.4th 362, 372, 374.) “Absent an express and unambiguous
limitation in the contract or the submission to arbitration, an
arbitrator has the authority to find the facts, interpret the

                                21
contract, and award any relief rationally related to his or her
factual findings and contractual interpretation.” (Gueyffier v.
Ann Summers, Ltd. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1179, 1182.) Here,
according to the Arbitration Award, based on testimony from
Dashuta and Apai (LASK’s owner), the arbitrator determined
that Dashuta and LASK had differing interpretations of
conflicting provisions of the Agreement concerning the purchase
of the shell vehicle. According to the Arbitration Award,
“evidence at the hearing,” which is not before us, “and the bulk of
the parties’ briefing demonstrates that the entire arbitration
turned on whether the Agreement obligated LASK to find a
suitable vehicle for $13,000.” Based on her interpretation of the
contract and factual findings from the evidence, the arbitrator
concluded “the parties did not have a true meeting of the minds
as to those provisions and there was no mutual consent,” and the
appropriate remedy was rescission. The arbitrator had the power
to determine these issues. Next, we address LASK’s challenges
to the merits of the arbitrator’s determinations.
IV. This Court May Not Review the Arbitrator’s Factual
       Findings On Mutual Mistake and No Meeting of the
       Minds
       LASK contends the trial court erred in denying the petition
to vacate the Arbitration Award, arguing “it was an erroneous
conclusion of law [for the arbitrator] to find that mutual mistake
existed as to a material term of the [Agreement] warranting
rescission.” (Italics added.) LASK asserts the arbitrator’s rulings
on mutual mistake/no meeting of the minds are wholly legal
questions that this court may review on appeal from the
judgment confirming the Arbitration Award. We disagree that
these are strictly legal questions that we may review because the

                                22
arbitration clause allows for judicial review of errors of law and
legal reasoning. As explained more fully below, the arbitrator
concluded that the provisions of the Agreement regarding which
party was obligated to find a suitable shell vehicle are
“conflicting” (i.e., ambiguous), and we agree with this legal
conclusion. Due to the ambiguity of the Agreement, the
arbitrator took evidence and made factual findings in
determining that the parties were operating under a mutual
mistake and that there was no meeting of the minds. We may
not review the arbitrator’s factual findings for error (Moncharsh,
supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11), and we conclude there is no error of
law or legal reasoning appearing on the face of the Arbitration
Award.
       The interpretation of a contract is a question of law, as
pertinent here, “only when it is based on the words of the
instrument alone” or “when there is no conflict in the extrinsic
evidence.” (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech,
Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 395.) “But when, as here, ascertaining
the intent of the parties at the time the contract was executed
depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, that credibility
determination and the interpretation of the contract are
questions of fact . . . .” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘ “ ‘[W]here the existence . . . of a contract or the terms
thereof is the point in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or
admits of more than one inference, it is for the . . . trier of the
facts to determine whether the contract did in fact exist . . . [.]’ ” ’
[Citations.] ‘Mutual assent or consent is necessary to the
formation of a contract’ and ‘[m]utual assent is a question
of fact.’ ” (Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS
Architects, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 763, 771-772.)

                                  23
        There is no mutual consent if both parties are mistaken on
a matter that goes to the very essence of the contract. (See, e.g.,
Balistreri v. Nevada Livestock Production Credit Assn. (1989) 214
Cal.App.3d 635, 641-642 [in “ ‘certain cases where there is a
mutual misunderstanding regarding the identity of the subject
matter of the contract, and either both parties are at fault in
creating the mistake, or neither of the parties is at fault, there is
no meeting of the minds as to a material matter, and no contract
is formed’ ”].) “A party may rescind a contract if his or her
consent was given by mistake.” (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26
Cal.4th 261, 278, citing Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)(1).)
        “In determining whether a mutual mistake has occurred, a
court may consider parol evidence. [Citation.] Such evidence is
admissible to show mutual mistake even if the contracting
parties intended the writing to be a complete statement of their
agreement. [Citation.] ‘It is the rule that, where the writing
itself, through mistake, does not express the intention of the
parties who entered into it . . . and the writing does not therefore
contain the real contract between the parties, the objection as to
parol evidence is without merit.’ [Citation.] Extrinisc evidence is
necessary because the court must divine the true intentions of
the contracting parties and determine whether the written
agreement accurately represents those intentions.” (Hess v. Ford
Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 525.)
        Here, the arbitrator concluded the provisions of the
Agreement regarding which party was obligated to find a suitable
shell vehicle are “conflicting” (i.e., ambiguous). We agree with
this legal conclusion. On the one hand, there are multiple
provisions of the Agreement that support Dashuta’s position that
LASK was obligated to find a suitable shell vehicle for Dashuta.

                                 24
For one, $13,000 of the contract price that Dashuta was to pay to
LASK was earmarked specifically for the shell vehicle, indicating
that LASK would procure the vehicle for Dashuta. (Agreement, ¶
7.) Next, the Agreement states LASK “will make good faith,
reasonable efforts to find a reliable and good general value
vehicle for” Dashuta, and LASK will notify Dashuta in writing
“when LASK finds a suitable truck for” Dashuta. (Agreement, ¶
8.c.) On the other hand, there is a provision of the Agreement
that supports LASK’s position that LASK was to merely assist
Dashuta in finding a suitable vehicle, and the Agreement did not
place the ultimate obligation to find the vehicle on LASK: “LASK
to assist CUSTOMER to find and purchase a vehicle suitable to
build the desired concession truck on.” (Agreement, ¶ 4.ix.)
      The Arbitration Award indicates that due to this ambiguity
in the Agreement, the arbitrator heard testimony from Dashuta
and Apai (LASK’s owner) regarding their understanding of the
terms of the Agreement and the parties’ obligations thereunder.
The testimony is not before us, and even if it were, we could not
review the arbitrator’s factual findings, based on extrinsic
evidence, that due to the parties’ mutual mistake regarding the
parties’ obligations under the Agreement, “the parties did not
have a true meeting of the minds as to those provisions and there
was no mutual consent.”11 The arbitrator further concluded:

     11 LASK relies on Hedging Concepts, Inc. v. First Alliance

Mortgage Company (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1421 for the
proposition that one party’s “subjective misinterpretation of the
contract” does not constitute the “type of ‘mistake’ that will
support rescission.” LASK’s reliance on this case is misplaced.
Here, the arbitrator made a factual finding, based on the
testimony, that each party understood their obligations under the
Agreement differently under the conflicting (ambiguous) terms of

                               25
“The evidence at the hearing and the bulk of the parties’ briefing
demonstrates that the entire arbitration turned on whether the
Agreement obligated LASK to find a suitable vehicle for $13,000.
Accordingly, the terms concerning that obligation must be
considered material.” We have no legal basis to disturb this
finding either.
      LASK contends rescission was not an appropriate remedy
because Dashuta was not harmed under LASK’s interpretation of
the Agreement. Without a record from the arbitration hearing,
we cannot address this contention regarding harm.
V.    This Court May Not Review the Arbitrator’s
      Determination Regarding Monetary Compensation
      Lask contends the trial court erred in denying the petition
to vacate the Arbitration Award, arguing the arbitrator made an
error of legal reasoning because she “did not consider LASK’s
damages in relation to rescission of the contract.” As LASK
indicates, the “purpose of rescission is to restore the parties to the
position they would have been in had they not entered the
contract.” (Akin v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 291, 298.) LASK asserts the arbitrator
“concentrated on Dashuta only and abandoned all rights for
equitable reinstatement of financial conditions to pre-contract
status for LASK.”
      To the extent LASK believed the arbitrator failed to
consider monies LASK expended in performing under the
contract, LASK’s recourse was to request the arbitrator correct
the award under rule 13.B.4 of the Judicate West Commercial

the Agreement. As explained above, we may not review this
factual finding on appeal from a judgment confirming an
arbitration award.

                                 26
Arbitration Rules, which provides in pertinent part: “Within 10
days after service of the award, any party, in accordance with
Rule 3.B may give notice to the arbitrator, the JW arbitration
administrator, and the other parties, and request that the
arbitrator correct any clerical, typographical or computation
errors, or any errors of a similar nature in the award, or make an
additional award as to specific Claims or Counterclaims
presented in the arbitration but not determined in the award.”
(Italics added.) There is no indication in the record that LASK
asked the arbitrator to address this complaint about the
Arbitration Award.
       Moreover, the Arbitration Award expressly states the
arbitrator considered and determined what would return the
parties to their pre-contract positions. In pertinent part, the
award states: “Upon rescission, the ‘parties must be put in the
same position they occupied before the execution of the contract
as far as it is possible to do so.’ [Citation.] ‘When a contract is
rescinded . . . the purpose of damages is to put the parties in the
position they were in before the contract rather than to give
either party the benefit of his bargain.’ ” The arbitrator went on
to make the following finding: “To return the parties to the
status quo ante, Respondent [LASK] must return the amount of
$23,350.00 to Claimant [Dashuta].” We do not have before us
any evidence that was admitted at the arbitration hearing in
support of LASK’s claim for damages (e.g., Apai’s testimony), and
even if we did, we could not review or disturb the arbitrator’s
factual findings as to what would “return the parties to the status
quo ante.”

                                27
VI.     LASK Has Not Established Prejudice From the
        Arbitrator’s Exclusion of Its Documentary Evidence
        LASK contends the arbitrator’s exclusion of its
documentary evidence, including for impeachment purposes,
“resulted in an unfair, unbalanced, biased procedure, prejudicing
LASK” and constituting grounds for vacation of the Arbitration
Award. As set forth above, LASK moved the trial court to vacate
the Arbitration Award on grounds, including (1) that the “rights
of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3)); and (2) the “rights of
the party were substantially prejudiced . . . by the refusal of the
arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by
other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this
title” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)).
        LASK did not exchange its documentary evidence with
Dashuta in advance of the arbitration hearing. Rule 8.A.1 of the
Judicate West Commercial Arbitration Rules provides: “The
parties, in good faith, will exchange all non-privileged documents
and other information (including electronically stored
information) on which they intend to rely in support of their
position in the dispute or claim, including copies of all such
documents and other information in their possession, custody, or
control, and names of individuals whom they may call as
witnesses at the arbitration hearing. The arbitrator may modify
these obligations at the initial or subsequent CMC.” Rule 8.A.2
provides: “As the parties become aware of new documents or
information, all parties will continue to be under an obligation to
supplement the exchange of documents and information
described in Rule 8.A.1. Documents that were not previously
exchanged, and witnesses and experts that were not previously

                                 28
identified, will not be received into evidence at the hearing, unless
agreed upon by the parties or upon a showing of good cause as
determined by the arbitrator.” (Italics added.)
       As discussed above, the arbitrator excluded LASK’s
documentary evidence for violation of these rules, finding no good
cause to depart from the rules. LASK blamed its failure to
exchange its documents on the arbitrator, for not setting a date
for the exchange of documents, and on Dashuta, for not
propounding discovery on LASK.
       Without a transcript of the arbitration hearing, we cannot
determine prejudice, given that the arbitrator allowed LASK to
offer testimony about the excluded documents and “considered”
that testimony “[t]o the extent that testimony is not incompetent
hearsay.” Moreover, we have no way to determine that LASK
had “material” evidence (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)) that could only be
introduced by means of the excluded documents, and not the
witness testimony it presented. Accordingly, because LASK
cannot establish prejudice, we need not decide if the arbitrator
committed any errors of law or legal reasoning in making the
evidentiary rulings.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Each side is to bear its own
costs on appeal per the arbitration clause in the Agreement.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                  CHANEY, J.
We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                    BENDIX, J.

                                 29