Court Opinion

ID: 9534248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:53.125818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:53.253425
License: Public Domain

NOBLE, Justice (concurring specially in the result). The petitioner, convicted of murder, has attacked the judgment and sentence by a Rule 93 motion, asserting that confessions unconstitutionally obtained during custodial interrogation were improperly admitted in evidence. This is, of course, a collateral attack upon a criminal conviction because of the asserted error in the admission of evidence. Whether a collateral attack is permissible in a Rule 93 proceeding depends upon the nature of the constitutional claim and the effectiveness of direct remedies. Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 368 F.2d 822 (1966). Our Rule 93 was copied from 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 and, therefore, the interpretation placed on the federal statute by the federal courts is persuasive of the rights cognizable under our identical rule. State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420, 423 P.2d 611; Lopez v. Singh, 53 N.M. 245, 205 P.2d 492. Matters which could have been raised upon direct appeal furnish no basis for the post-conviction motion. Gallarelli v. United States, 260 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1958); McCreary v. United States, 249 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1957). The motion may not be used in lieu of an appeal to correct errors committed in the course of a trial even though such errors relate to constitutional rights. Barkan v. United States, 362 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Trumblay, 234 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1956). The leading case on availability of § 2255 to correct a claimed erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is that of Smith v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 187 F.2d 192 (1950), where Judge Fahy said that the admission alone of evidence claimed to infringe a right protected by the Constitution does not result in the denial of a constitutional guaranty so long as the error is subject to correction by appeal and there is no indication of any deterrent to appeal. See also Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455. These decisions thus held that in the circumstances presented by the post-conviction motion in the instant case, the attack must be direct, not collateral, otherwise the post-conviction remedy would become a substitute for appeal. It is true that Smith was prior to Escobedo, but it has consistently been followed by an unbroken line of federal circuit decisions to and including De Welles v. United States, 372 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1967). Thornton v. United States, supra, fully reviewed the question in the light of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933, where the Smith reasoning was reaffirmed. As late as De Welles v. United States, supra, the court agreed with and reaffirmed the following from Thornton: “[W]here effective procedures are available in the direct proceeding [to correct trial errors, even as to constitutional claims], there is no imperative to provide an additional, collateral review, leaving no stone unturned, when exploration of all avenues of justice at the behest of individual petitioners may impair judicial administration of the federal courts, as by making criminal litigation interminable, and diverting resources of the federal judiciary.” If we are required to permit collateral review, where effective procedures are available for a direct attack, paraphrasing Thornton, we permit interminable proceedings in the lower courts and, consequently, appeals to appellate courts which may impair judicial administration of our courts. I, therefore, concur with the majority that the order appealed from denying the post-conviction relief sought should be affirmed, but I do so upon the ground that the collateral attack by this proceeding is improper.