Court Opinion

ID: 9477637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:27:55.949238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:58.553620
License: Public Domain

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that Clegg is entitled to assert a mistake of law defense to the charges of exporting firearms without a license. Generally, ignorance of the law or a mistake as to the law’s requirements cannot be a defense in a criminal prosecution. See United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1971). An exception has been created to provide for the legitimate reliance on an official interpretation of law. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 484, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (due process prevents conviction of individual advised by police chief to protest across the street to avoid prosecution under statute prohibiting demonstrations “near” the courthouse); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 425-26, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1259-60, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959) (convictions violate due process where a state investigating commission assured witnesses they could invoke their privilege against self-incrimination but where court later denied them the privilege); United States v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.1987) (due process prohibits defendant’s conviction for activities held to be lawful by court of appeals at least until the Supreme Court has granted certiorari). In each of these examples, it is clear that the actor actually relied on an official statement that certain conduct was not unlawful. Similarly, in United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir.1987), we held that a purchaser of a gun could reasonably rely on the representations of a licensed firearms dealer who declared that the sale was lawful. We concluded that the conviction of someone misled by the affirmative statements of a government agent that certain conduct *1225is lawful violates due process. Id. at 775.
Nothing in my search of the record in this case discloses the requisite reliance on an official interpretation of the law. Even assuming that Clegg dealt with officials possessing the requisite authority1 to suspend the law, Clegg never alleges these officials authorized the unlawful conduct or told him that his activities were lawful. In fact, Clegg admits that he was involved in gun running actitivies before he ever became acquainted with these officials. As the majority notes in its summary of Clegg’s allegations, various officials of the United States may have become aware of Clegg’s activities. Moreover, several officials may have actually helped Clegg in his quest to supply arms to Afghan rebels. Liberally construed, the officials’ conduct may amount to what the majority terms “solicitation, encouragement, and assistance” to Clegg. Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is still lacking any allegation of an official representation that Clegg’s conduct was lawful. Cf. United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir.1987) (denying mistake of law defense to defendant who never testified that he believed government involvement in a crime made the activity lawful). Hence, Clegg may well have had the aid of various United States officials. This does not make his conduct lawful. I would reverse the district court’s ruling that Clegg is entitled to assert the defense.

. The majority does not specifically address the issue of what authority the official must possess. In United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 946-49 (D.C.Cir.1976), Judge Wilkey approved the use of a mistake of law defense for someone who relied on the “apparent authority" of a government official. Other circuits have adopted a stricter standard by requiring that the government official have actual authority. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 84 (2d Cir.1984). In Tallmadge, we seemed to conclude that a licensed firearms dealer is an agent of the United States empowered by statute to interpret the law. See Tallmadge, 829 F.2d at 774. Here, the majority simply notes that Clegg dealt with "officials of the highest rank” but does not decide whether such officials are empowered either to provide Clegg with a license to export arms or to suspend the license requirement.