Court Opinion

ID: 9352346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 20:01:31.038218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:14.904579
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/23 P. v. Stepp CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F080237
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. VCF273216A)
                    v.

    JOSHUA CALAB STEPP,                                                                   OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Kathryn T.
Montejano, Judge.
         Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D.
Cary and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
       Defendant Joshua Calab Stepp’s appeal challenges only certain aspects of his
sentencing. No issues related to the verdicts reached by two separate juries are raised
here. Following our review of the record, we conclude a remand is necessary to allow the
trial court to reconsider whether an aggravated term is warranted for defendant’s
conviction for arson of property. Defendant is also entitled to a Franklin proceeding.1
                                     BACKGROUND
       The facts underlying this appeal occurred in September 2012 when defendant was
23 years old. Defendant, a former gang member, was involved in causing the death, by
stabbing, of another former gang member, whose body was then taken to and left in an
orchard.2 Defendant eventually returned to the orchard with a codefendant and his
mother, who he had asked to bring a gas can. When defendant and his codefendant
reached where they had left the body, they poured gasoline on the victim and a car that
had been used in the crime and lit them on fire. The partially burned body and the car
were found by a farmworker soon thereafter.
       Although this case was first charged in 2012, it was not until October 2017 when a
first amended information was filed, charging defendant with conspiracy (Pen. Code,
§ 182, subd. (a)(1),3 a felony; count 1), murder (§ 187, subd. (a), a felony; count 2),
dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1), a felony; count 3), conspiracy to dissuade a
witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(2), a felony; count 4), and arson (§ 451, subd. (d), a felony;
count 5). The first amended information also alleged as to counts 1 through 4, that each
offense was committed for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4) & (5)),
as to counts 1 through 3, defendant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), as to

1      People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
2      A codefendant who is not part of this appeal was involved in the commission of
these crimes. This codefendant entered into an immunity agreement and testified during
defendant’s trial.
3      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise specified.

                                             2.
count 2, gang and felony-murder kidnapping special circumstances (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17) & (22)), and as to counts 3 and 4, defendant inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Additionally, it was alleged that defendant suffered a prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), had a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
       In December 2017, a jury found defendant not guilty of counts 1, 3, and 4.
Defendant was, however, found guilty of count 5 (arson of property). With respect to
count 2, murder, the jury was unable to reach a verdict. A minute order indicated the
People intended to retry defendant for the allegations contained in count 2, and that
sentencing for count 5 would trail until after that second trial.
       At the end of the second trial on June 18, 2019, the jury found defendant not guilty
of murder in the first degree, but guilty of murder in the second degree. The jury also
found not true the allegation defendant committed the crime for the benefit of a street
gang but found true the allegation defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon, a knife. After the jury was released, the court conducted a bifurcated proceeding
and found true the allegations defendant had a prior strike conviction, a prior serious
felony conviction, and served a prior prison term. During this proceeding, the court
acknowledged receiving a certified record of conviction related to a plea entered by
defendant in 2008 for the crimes of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215), and burglary of a
vehicle in the second degree (§ 459). Defendant received a total sentence for these
two prior convictions of two years six months.
       On October 25, 2019, defendant was finally sentenced in this matter. For the
count 5 conviction for arson of property, defendant received a consecutive determinate
term of 11 years (the upper term of three years doubled), plus five years for the
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement. For the count 2 second degree murder
conviction, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 30 years to life (15 years

                                              3.
doubled for the strike), one year for the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement,
and five years for the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement. This appeal followed.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Our task in this appeal is to consider only the two issues raised by defendant; both
issues are related to sentencing.
I.     Defendant is Entitled to a Franklin Proceeding
       A.     The Controlling Legal Standard
       A youth offender parole hearing (YOPH) is a hearing conducted by the Board of
Parole Hearings to review “the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age
or younger … at the time of the controlling offense.” (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he
board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole … shall give great weight to the
diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth,
and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with
relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd. (c).)

       “[A]ssembling such information [is] ‘typically a task more easily done at or
       near the time of the juvenile’s offense’ [citation], [and thus the defendant
       should have the opportunity] to ‘put on the record the kinds of information
       that sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a [YOPH]’ [citation]. [T]he
       trial court [may] receive ‘any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject
       to cross-examination) that may be relevant at [the defendant’s] eventual
       [YOPH].’ ” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446.)
The underlying goal is to provide a meaningful baseline of information about a
defendant’s characteristics and circumstances so that a parole board can someday judge
the extent the defendant has matured and become rehabilitated while in custody. (People
v. Delgado (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 95, 104 (Delgado).) However, section 3051 does not
apply and a YOPH is not available, “if the defendant was convicted under the
Three Strikes law (pertaining to repeat offenders) or the ‘One Strike’ law (pertaining to
certain sexual offenders), or if he was sentenced to [life without the possibility of parole]
for an offense committed after he reached the age of 18.” (Delgado, at p. 100, citing

                                              4.
section 3051, subd. (h).) The Delgado court further stated the treatment of youth
offenders sentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Law for purposes of a YOPH does not
violate equal protection, as it constitutes a rational approach to addressing the problem of
recidivism. (Id. at p. 102.)
       Yet, case law has held that if a defendant is ineligible for a YOPH under
section 3051, another type of proceeding may still be available. In Franklin, the
defendant was 16 years old when he committed murder, and the trial court was statutorily
required to sentence him to two consecutive sentences of 25 years to life. (Franklin,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 268.) The Franklin court concluded it was unclear whether the
defendant had a sufficient opportunity at sentencing to “make an accurate record of [his
youth-related] characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense” to enable the
board to “properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related
factors.” (Id. at p. 284.) The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the defendant had an opportunity to make this record. (Id. at pp. 286−287.) This
is commonly referred to as a “Franklin proceeding.”
       The Delgado court recently held:

       “[T]here is another legal basis for granting … a Franklin proceeding.
       [T]hat entitlement lies in subdivision (c) of section 4801, which was
       enacted in conjunction with [section] 3051. [¶] Like section 3051,
       section 4801, subdivision (c) was enacted in 2014 as part of the
       Legislature’s effort to bring California law into conformity with
       Supreme Court precedent respecting juvenile sentencing. (Franklin, supra,
       63 Cal.4th at pp. 268, 276.)” (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 103.)
       The Delgado court explained the reference in section 4801, subdivision (c) to
section 3041.5 indicated the Legislature’s intent that the criteria set forth in section 4801,
subdivision (c) apply broadly to all parole hearings, not just YOPHs. (Delgado, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 103.) Consequently, even though a defendant is not entitled to a
YOPH, the parole board will have to consider his diminished capacity and subsequent
maturation in assessing his suitability for parole at some point in the future. (Ibid.)

                                              5.
“[B]ecause section 4801, subdivision (c) requires the parole board to consider
youth-related factors during parole hearings for youthful offenders, Franklin proceedings
should be provided to … all … defendants who are statutorily ineligible for a YOPH
under section 3051.” (Delgado, at pp. 103–104.)
       Based on this discussion, we reach three conclusions in this case. First, as
expressly stated by section 3051, subdivision (h), defendant is ineligible for a YOPH
because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Second, section 3051’s exclusion
of defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes law does not violate equal protection.
(Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 101–103; People v. Wilkes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
1159, 1167; People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 864.) And third, as the parties
agree, defendant should receive a Franklin proceeding even though he is ineligible for a
YOPH because evidence related to his youth will be relevant at an eventual parole
hearing. (Delgado, at pp. 103–104.) Thus, we remand this case for a Franklin
proceeding.
II.    Resentencing is Required Under Section 1170
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.; stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3) (Senate Bill 567) and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5) amended section 1170 in two respects that are relevant here.
First, a court must impose the middle term, unless certain narrow circumstances exist.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) An upper term may be imposed when it can be justified by
aggravating circumstances supported by facts that have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true by a jury or the judge in a court trial. (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
However, “the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).)

                                               6.
       What we must now consider is whether the trial court “set forth on the record the
facts and reasons” for imposing the upper term.4 (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5).) If the court
failed to articulate its reasons as is now required by section 1170, this court must consider
whether the failure requires remanding the case for resentencing, or if it can be upheld
because the error could be viewed as harmless. This court recently articulated its
standard for harmless error in the Senate Bill 567 context. (People v. Dunn (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 394, 405–410, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn).)
Specifically:

       “The reviewing court determines (1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether
       the jury would have found one aggravating circumstance true beyond a
       reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a reasonable probability that
       the jury would have found any remaining aggravating circumstance(s) true
       beyond a reasonable doubt. If all aggravating circumstances relied upon by
       the trial court would have been proved to the respective standards, any error
       was harmless. If not, the reviewing court moves to the second step …,
       (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have
       imposed a sentence other than the upper term in light of the aggravating
       circumstances provable from the record as determined in the prior steps. If
       the answer is no, the error was harmless. If the answer is yes, the reviewing
       court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing consistent with
       section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–
       410, fn. omitted.)
       A.       Was There Error, and If So, Was It Harmless?
       Sentencing in this case occurred at the end of a lengthy hearing during which the
court considered various redactions and modifications to the probation report, the
calculation of credit days, a Romero motion brought on behalf of defendant, and
testimony from the victim’s brother and mother addressing the impact of the victim’s

4      Because this case is not yet final on appeal, defendant is entitled to the benefit of
section 1170, as amended, pursuant to the principles of retroactivity set forth in In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.

                                              7.
death on the family. When finally moving on to sentencing defendant, the trial court
started by addressing the sentence for count 5, the arson conviction:

              “In Count 5, the defendant’s gonna be committed to state prison for
       the aggravated term of six years pursuant to 1170.12(c)(1) plus an
       additional and consecutive five years pursuant to 667(a)(1) for a total of
       11 years .…”
The citations to the Penal Code highlight the fact defendant received the aggravated term
of three years for the conviction of arson to property alleged in count 5. (§ 451,
subd. (d).) This three-year term was then doubled to six years due to a prior conviction
that qualified as a strike. Another five years was added pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), for a prior serious felony conviction, which requires that the
enhancement run consecutively. No statement was made at any time during sentencing
while on the record about the reasons for choosing the aggravated term, as is required by
section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) [“The court shall set forth on the record the facts and
reasons for choosing the sentence imposed.”].
       The People contend that the failure to specify reasons for choosing the aggravated
term can be considered harmless. They specifically cite section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)
to argue that a certified record of a defendant’s prior conviction can be used to justify an
aggravated sentence without submitting the question to a jury. While this might be true,
and we might guess that this was something the trial court considered, there was no
statement “on the record” actually supporting this conclusion, as is required under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(5). We acknowledge there is evidence in the record that a
certified record of conviction was provided to the court as an exhibit at the end of the jury
trial. However, no reference was made to the certified record of conviction during
sentencing, or at any time during the hearing before sentencing occurred.
       While it would be tempting to conclude the jury would have found beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of a prior conviction based on the certified record, we are
not confident this court can also conclude, as is required by Dunn, that it is reasonably

                                             8.
probable the jury would have found other aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.) Defendant was charged with murder in
count 2. Two verdict forms were provided to the jury at the end of the trial, and the jury
found defendant guilty of second degree murder. The jury also rejected the special
allegation that the act was committed to benefit a street gang, but did find true defendant
used a knife, a deadly or dangerous weapon.
       First degree murder requires a finding the defendant committed the act by “lying
in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.”
(§ 189, subd. (a).) “All other kinds of murders are of the second degree.” (§ 189,
subd. (b).)
       The conclusion reached by the jury that defendant was guilty of second degree
murder and not first degree murder could be viewed as going against conclusions stated
in the probation report, which we are aware was before the trial court during the same
hearing when sentencing occurred.5 Specifically, the probation report lists the
“aggravation factors” as follows:

              “The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, the threat of
       great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
       viciousness, or callousness. [Citation.]

              “The manner in which the crime was carried out indicates planning,
       sophistication or professionalism in that the defendant told the co-defendant
       he was going to ‘get’ the victim prior to the incident.”
These statements lean toward a conviction for first degree murder rather than
second degree murder. Yet the jury rejected first degree murder and convicted defendant
of second degree murder.
        Again, the trial court provided no reasons on the record for choosing the
aggravated term. Section 1170, subdivision (b) now requires “that every factor on which

5     In fact, the trial court stated its concern that the probation report seemed to contain
many inaccuracies which could have long term impacts for defendant.

                                              9.
a court intends to rely in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related to
a defendant’s prior conviction(s), [must be] admitted by the defendant or proven to a
jury.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465–466.) “It would be entirely
speculative for us to presume, based on a record that does not directly address the
aggravating factors, what a jury would have found true .…” (Id. at p. 466.) We,
therefore, must remand this case for resentencing consistent with the requirements of
section 1170, subdivision (b). (See Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       This case is remanded so that defendant may be afforded a Franklin proceeding.
The sentence is vacated. On remand, the trial court is directed to pronounce judgment in
accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b), consistent with this opinion. Following
resentencing, the trial court shall forward an amended abstract of judgment to the
appropriate authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

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