Court Opinion

ID: 9706679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:49:19.430353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.352767
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in the result). I agree with Justice Brickley’s analysis and conclusion that an unconditional guilty plea waives a claim of violation of the federal and Michigan constitutional right to a speedy trial, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
I also concur in Justice Levin’s conclusion that People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130; 323 NW2d 923 (1982), was incorrectly decided and that the statutory 180-day rule, MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. does not apply to this case. However, I write separately to express my view that, assuming the applicability of the rule, a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea will waive any claim of error based on its violation. The 180-day rule requires:
Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the *720inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. [MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).]
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) requires dismissal with prejudice where an action is not commenced within the 180-day time limit set forth in the act:
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
When the statute is applicable as a threshold matter, an unconditional guilty plea waives the right to assert a violation of the 180-day rule;
It is generally stated that a guilty plea "waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.” People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 440; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), cert den sub nom Michigan v Johnson, 429 US 951 (1976). In People v New, 427 Mich 482; 398 NW2d 358 (1986), we elaborated on the meaning of this statement, drawing from the United States Supreme Court cases of Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258; 93 S Ct 1602; 36 L Ed 2d 235 (1973), and Menna v New York, 423 US 61, 62, n 2; 96 S Ct 241; 46 L Ed 2d 195 (1975). The Court quoted from Menna as follows:
"Neither Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258 (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady v United States, 397 US 742 [90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d 747] (1970), and McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759 [90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763] (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guilty *721pleas inevitably 'waive’ all antecedent constitutional violations. If they did so hold, the New York Court of Appeals might be correct. However, in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 US 266. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State’s imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established.” [New, supra, pp 487-488.]
The Court in New held that a defendant could raise only such rights and defenses as "would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant.” Id. at 491. The New Court reasoned:
Such rights and defenses "reach beyond the factual determination of defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial . . . .” [People v] White, 411 Mich [366] 398 [308 NW2d 128 (1981)] (Moody, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part). In such cases, the state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt, it is subsumed by defendant’s guilty plea. [Id. at 491.]
Thus, the shorthand question whether violation of the 180-day rule is a "jurisdictional defect” which cannot be waived, may be rephrased as whether the statutory 180-day rule implicates the *722very authority of the state to bring defendant to trial.
This requires examination of the object of the statute and the harm it is designed to remedy. The title of the act indicates that its purpose is "to dispose of untried warrants, indictments, informations or complaints against inmates of penal institutions of this state.” We stated in People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 282; 262 NW2d 641 (1978), that "[a] defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is legislatively observed in . . . the 180-day statute, which specifically addressed speedy trial rights of those already incarcerated in state prison . ...” I find these purposes wholly consistent with one another. The disposition of untried warrants against prisoners, obviously a desirable aim, has the further purpose of protecting the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Neither of these interests concerns the very authority of the state to prosecute. The speedy trial right primarily seeks to protect the integrity of the factual determination of guilt or innocence, a question definitively settled by a counseled and voluntary plea of guilty. Especially in view of the clear rule that the constitutional speedy trial right is waived by a valid plea of guilty, Tiemens v United States, 724 F2d 928 (CA 11, 1984), cert den 469 US 837 (1984), it would be anomalous to hold that the statutory right could never be waived. The state’s interest in the expeditious disposition of untried warrants against prisoners, while important, does not implicate the very authority of the state to proceed. This case contrasts with Menna v New York, supra, where the United States Supreme Court held that a claim of a double jeopardy violation survived a guilty plea because the constitutional provision would have precluded the state "from haling a defendant into court on a charge . . . .” *723423 US 62. Other state policies which are furthered by the statutory 180-day rule include policies of rehabilitation and of concurrent sentencing. See People v Woodruff, supra at 137.1 These interests simply have nothing to do with the state’s ability to proceed against defendant in the first place; they do not implicate " 'the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial ....’” New, supra at 491.
Because the interests implicated in the 180-day rule do not relate to the very authority of the state to prosecute, the relevant question becomes whether the statutory remedy of dismissal with prejudice may be relinquished by a valid and unconditional plea of guilty. This is nothing more than a question of statutory interpretation: Did the Legislature in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) intend to remove the state’s authority to prosecute the defendant?
*724I do not agree that MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) unambiguously refers to the very power of the state to prosecute the defendant. The statute indeed uses the term "jurisdiction,” but that phrase is susceptible of various meanings within the realm of criminal procedure. Jurisdiction may refer to the authority of the court to try an offense of a certain kind, or it may concern whether a particular court has authority to try a particular person. 1 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 16.2(a), p 342. The former, subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court "' "to exercise judicial power over a. class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending . . . .” ’ ” People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98, 106, n 7; 398 NW2d 219 (1986), quoting Joy v Two-Bit Corp, 287 Mich 244, 253; 283 NW 45 (1938). Personal jurisdiction deals with the authority of the court over particular persons. See Johnson, supra at 106, n 7. It is a fundamental principle that defects in personal jurisdiction may be waived, whereas subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived and may be raised at any time.
Justice Brickley opines that the language of the statute is so clear that "[t]he traditional personal versus subject-matter jurisdiction distinction is not pertinent . . . .” Post, p 741. I disagree. The statute does indeed decree that when an action is not timely commenced as required by the statutory 180-day rule, "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3). Obviously, the statute contemplates a remedy of dismissal with prejudice and termination of "jurisdiction.” But that observation does not go far in *725answering whether the remedy may be waived by a guilty plea. The statute is silent regarding the effect of a guilty plea on its guarantees. Thus we must apply the appropriate principles of statutory construction and of law to determine whether the statutory remedy may be waived by plea. In determining whether the statutory right is capable of waiver, the traditional distinction between personal and subject-matter jurisdiction becomes crucial.
Given the distinct meanings of the word "jurisdiction,” the term, as employed in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3), cannot be said to unambiguously refer to the power of the court to entertain a class of cases, i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction. Rather, the statute represents a limitation on the power to prosecute in specified circumstances, viz., where an existing warrant, information or charge against a prisoner is not disposed of in a timely manner as provided in MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). The interpretation of the word "jurisdiction” as used in MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) to mean subject-matter jurisdiction reads too much into the statute. The statute does not dictate the class or kind of cases a court can hear; it does not refer to subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the statute decrees that a court loses its power over a particular matter in specified circumstances. Violation of the statute is therefore a "nonjurisdictional” defect, and a claim of error based on noncompliance with the statute does not survive an unconditional guilty plea. Alvin Johnson, supra at 440.
A review of the law in other jurisdictions further reinforces the conclusion that a claim of error based upon violation of the 180-day rule is subsumed by an unconditional guilty plea. It is the general rule throughout the various states that a guilty plea waives a violation of a statutory speedy *726trial right.2 The federal courts also hold that a claim of error based upon violation of the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC 3161 et seq., is nonjuris-dictional and therefore waived by a guilty plea that does not expressly reserve the issue. Lebowitz v United States, 877 F2d 207, 209 (CA 2, 1989); United States v LoFranco, 818 F2d 276, 277 (CA 2, 1987).3
Of particular interest is a Connecticut case, Craig v Bronson, 202 Conn 93; 520 A2d 155 (1987), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted a provision of its own intrastate detainer act, which is nearly identical to MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3), and concluded that the statute did "not decree a loss of jurisdiction of the subject matter of a criminal action as a sanction for noncompliance with the time limitation of [the applicable Connecticut statutory provision], but only a loss of jurisdiction over the person of the *727prisoner . . . Id. at 105. Thus, the court found that error premised on violation of the statute could be waived, and had been waived when the defendant withdrew his motion to dismiss the information as part of a plea bargain. Id. at 100-101.
The Connecticut Supreme Court found no clear answer in the statutory language to the question whether the statute decreed a loss of subject matter rather than personal jurisdiction. Thus, the court sought other indications of legislative intent. The court analogized the provisions of its own intrastate detainer act to those of the interstate agreement on detainers (iad), which provides a sanction of dismissal with prejudice when trial is not brought within the time limits set by statute. Similar to both the Connecticut and our own intrastate detainer acts, the iad provides:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment . . ., such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice[4] [Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation Program for 1957, p 83.]
The court in Craig noted that its own intrastate detainer act was modeled after a proposal of the Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation in its 1957 program. Id. at 104. The committee report noted that the purpose of the proposed intrastate provision was the same as that intended by the iad, of which the committee also advocated adoption. Council of State Governments, *728supra at 78.5 Thus, the Craig court concluded, the Connecticut detainer provision should be interpreted consistent with the iad.
As the court in Craig observed, a guilty plea is held to waive violation of the time limits set forth in the iad. Kowalak v United States, 645 F2d 534 (CA 6, 1981).6 The Craig court concluded that its own intrastate provision should be similarly interpreted.
While the legislative history of MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. does not positively reveal that our intrastate detainer act was modeled after the 1957 proposed legislation, I find the analysis contained in Craig persuasive.7 Like the *729Connecticut Supreme Court, I believe it is appropriate to interpret our own intrastate detainer act consistently with the federal courts’ interpretation of the iad. Because violation of the time limits set forth in the iad is waived by an unconditional guilty plea, I would hold analogously that violation of Michigan’s statutory 180-day rule is also waived by an unconditional guilty plea.
In conclusion, it is my view that where the statutory 180-day rule is applicable, a defendant waives any error based on violation of the rule by unconditionally pleading guilty. To state otherwise is to ascribe to the Legislature an intent to preclude a counseled defendant from voluntarily relinquishing the protection of the statute, and would separate Michigan from the great weight of authority holding that an unconditional guilty plea waives noncompliance with statutory provisions for speedy trial. I concur in the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Riley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.

 The Report of the Council for State Governments on 1957 Suggested State Legislation contains intrastate detainer provisions substantially similar to those contained in MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. According to the report, the legislation was intended to address concerns relating to rehabilitation as well as sentencing:
The prison administrator is thwarted in his efforts toward rehabilitation [by the existence of a warrant against a person already in custody]. The inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must be kept in close custody, which bars him from treatment such as trustyships, moderations of custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps. . . .
The sentencing judge is likewise often thwarted by the de-tainer system. . . . The judge is at a loss when faced with detainers already filed, and with the possibility of other detain-ers. A rather long sentence may be indicated, but the judge hesitates to give such a sentence if the offender is going to serve subsequent sentences, or if he stands to lose the privilege of parole because of a detainer. The incidental first offender may, and sometimes does, serve years in prison because he has violated the law in several jurisdictions, although only a short sentence or probation would accomplish the necessary rehabilitation. [Id. at 74.]

 See Kennedy v State, 297 Ark 488; 763 SW2d 648 (1987) (a plea of guilty waived the right to a speedy trial contained in state rules of criminal procedure); People v Tomasello, 98 Ill App 3d 688; 424 NE2d 786 (1981) (the defendant waived her statutory speedy trial right by pleading guilty); Wright v Indiana, 496 NE2d 60 (Ind, 1986) (the right to a speedy trial contained in a state court rule and a statute was waived by a guilty plea); State v Kitt, 232 Neb 237; 440 NW2d 234 (1989) (a defendant who fails to move for dismissal prior to pleading guilty waives the statutory speedy trial right; a guilty plea constitutes waiver of every defense, procedural, statutory, or constitutional, except the defense that the information or complaint is insufficient to charge a criminal offense); People v O’Brien, 56 NY2d 1009; 439 NE2d 356 (1982) (a statutory speedy trial right was forfeited by a guilty plea); State v Kelley, 57 Ohio St 3d 127; 566 NE2d 658 (1991) (a guilty plea waives the defendant’s right to challenge a conviction on statutory speedy trial grounds); State v Anderson, 417 NW2d 403 (SD, 1988) (noncompliance with a 180-day rule created by court rule was a nonjurisdictional defect and was waived by a guilty plea).

 The federal rule of waiver by guilty plea is codified in 18 USC 3162(a)(2), which provides that "[failure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal Federal case law establishes further that even where a motion for dismissal is made, a subsequent plea waives a claim of error premised on violation of the Speedy Trial Act. Lebowitz, supra.

 The iad was enacted into Michigan law and appears at MCL 780.601 et seq.; MSA 4.147(1) et seq.

 The concerns sought to be addressed by the proposed intrastate detainer act related to rehabilitation of prisoners and sentencing. See n 1. The committee stated that "[t]he [Interstate] Agreement on Detainers applies the same principles embodied in the intrastate act to the interstate field.” Council of State Governments, supra at 78.

 See also United States v Palmer, 574 F2d 164 (CA 3, 1978), cert den 437 US 907 (1978) (the iad constitutes a set of procedural rules; violation is waived by a guilty plea); Camp v United States, 587 F2d 397 (CA 8, 1978) (violation of the iad is nonjurisdictional error, waivable by a criminal defendant); Beachem v Missouri Attorney General, 808 F2d 1303 (CA 8, 1987) (the defendant waived any iad violations when he pleaded guilty).
Our Court of Appeals in People v Office, 126 Mich App 597; 337 NW2d 592 (1983), stated, with citation of People v Johnson, 396 Mich 424; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), and without further analysis, that a guilty plea did not waive the right to assert a violation of the iad. However, because the iad is a congressionally sanctioned compact, its construction presents a federal question. People v McLemore, 411 Mich 691, 693-694; 311 NW2d 720 (1981). Thus, we accord greater authority to the federal courts’ interpretation of the iad than to that of the Court of Appeals.

 MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) is virtually identical to the suggested legislation, reproduced below:
In the event that the action is not brought to trial within the period of time as herein provided, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried [indictment, information or complaint] be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [Council of State Governments, supra at 78.]
*729Like the Connecticut statute, which was modeled after the suggested legislation, MCL 780.131 et seq.; MSA 28.969(1) et seq. was enacted in 1957. 1957 PA 177. The comparable provision of the Michigan act provides:
In the event that, within the time limitation set forth in section 1 of this act, action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3).]