Court Opinion

ID: 9390683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 07:11:22.457358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.136316
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                ________________
                                NO. 09-22-00147-CR
                                ________________

                           EX PARTE DENNIS MUNZY

________________________________________________________________________

                     On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
                              Liberty County, Texas
                        Trial Cause No. 22DC-WR-00431
________________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Dennis Munzy appeals the denial of his Application for Writ of Habeas

Corpus after being charged with failure to comply with Sex Offender Requirement

Registration. On appeal, Munzy raises one ground for relief. He challenges the

constitutionality of the trial court’s decision to deny his bail, arguing the trial court

acted without authority to deny bail pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Texas

Constitution. Munzy requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s denial of his

writ and remand this case. In response, the State agrees, stating the trial court abused

its discretion and acted without authority under the Texas Constitution to hold

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Munzy without bail. The State also requests this Court to reverse the trial court’s

denial of his writ and remand this case.

                       Review of the Trial Court’s Setting of Bail

      We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court’s merit-based denial of

habeas proceedings. See Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 868-69 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991). We review the denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus under

an abuse of discretion standard. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006); Ex parte Klem, 269 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet.

ref’d). We consider the entire record and review the facts in the light most favorable

to the trial court’s ruling. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718. We

afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on the application of the law

to fact questions when the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of

credibility and demeanor. Klem, 269 S.W.3d at 718. If the trial court’s resolution of

the ultimate issues turns on an application of legal standards, we review the

determination de novo. Id.

      Similarly, we review a trial court’s ruling on the setting of bail under an abuse

of discretion standard of review. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15

(affording a trial court discretion to set bail); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed if it is within

the zone of reasonable disagreement. Clemons v. State, 220 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex.

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App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)).

      An appearance bond secures the presence of a defendant in court for trial. Ex

parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The United States

and Texas Constitutions prohibit excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV;

Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11, 13; Ex parte Sabur-Smith, 73 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (The right to reasonable bail is protected by the

United States and Texas Constitutions.). The trial court should set bail sufficient to

provide reasonable assurance the defendant will appear at trial, but not so high as to

be oppressive. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(1), (2); Ex parte Ivey,

594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Bail is excessive if it is “set in an amount

greater than [what] is reasonably necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate

interests.” Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d)

(citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753-54 (1987)). When setting the

amount of bail, the trial court weighs the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s

appearance at trial against the defendant’s presumption of innocence. Id. The amount

of bail may be deemed oppressive when the trial court sets the bail at an amount “for

the express purpose of forcing [a defendant] to remain incarcerated[.]” Ex parte

Harris, 733 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.).

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      Viewing the entire record in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we hold that the

trial court abused its discretion by not setting bail in this case. Ex parte Gill, 413

S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. 2013); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. Accordingly,

we sustain Munzy’s sole issue, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand the case

for immediate further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                                              ________________________________
                                                      JAY WRIGHT
                                                         Justice

Submitted on December 6, 2022
Opinion Delivered April 26, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

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