Court Opinion

ID: 9387075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 17:01:14.401014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.201960
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10779    Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 04/14/2023    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                 No. 22-10779
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        ANDRE DELICEANO MILLER,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                          ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A 076-475-973
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10779

        Before JORDAN, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Andre Miller petitions for review of an order from the Board
        of Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of his motion to
        rescind his in absentia order of removal and reopen his
        immigration proceedings. He argues that the Board abused its
        discretion when it determined that he received proper notice. His
        first notice-defect argument is that his notice did not include all the
        consequences of failing to appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5). His
        second notice-defect argument is that his initial notice to appear
        did not specify the date and time of his hearing. After careful
        consideration, we deny his petition.
                                          I.
                Miller is a native and citizen of the Bahamas who entered
        the United States on a six-month tourist visa in September 2004.
        Miller overstayed that visa and remained in the United States for
        another eight years. At that point, the Department of Homeland
        Security served him with a notice to appear charging that he was
        removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). The notice
        ordered Miller to appear before an Immigration Judge at a date and
        time to be set in the future and warned him of the consequences
        for failing to appear at his hearing. Specifically, it warned Miller
        that if he “fail[ed] to attend the hearing at the time and place
        designated on this notice, or any date and time later directed by the
        Immigration Court,” then “a removal order may be made by the
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        22-10779                Opinion of the Court                          3

        immigration judge in [his] absence,” and he could “be arrested and
        detained by the [Department of Homeland Security].”
               Miller received a second notice setting his hearing for May
        6, 2013 in Atlanta, Georgia. He was again warned that failure to
        appear at the hearing could result in an order of removal. On
        Miller’s motion, the hearing was rescheduled and first moved to
        New York, and then to Florida. Eventually—in July 2014—Miller
        attended a master hearing and conceded to removability. The
        Immigration Judge personally served Miller with notice that his
        next hearing would be January 20, 2015, and warned him yet again
        that failure to appear could result in an in absentia removal.
               In October 2014, Miller’s counsel moved to withdraw from
        the proceedings “because of [Miller’s] persistent failure to fulfill his
        obligations.” In doing so, his counsel stated that he informed Miller
        of his January 2015 hearing, delivered a copy of the notice of
        hearing to him by first class mail, and “exhorted him to read this
        Court’s Notice of Hearing reminding him that if he does not appear
        in Court for her [sic] next hearing he may be ordered removed
        from the United States.” The Immigration Judge granted the
        motion to withdraw.
               Despite the repeated warnings, Miller did not attend his
        January 2015 hearing. Because he had already conceded
        removability and was personally served with notice, Miller was
        ordered removed to the Bahamas in absentia. Four more years
        passed before Miller was detained by the Department of Homeland
        Security for execution of the removal order.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10779

               Upon his detention, Miller filed an emergency motion to
        rescind the in absentia removal order and reopen his removal
        proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). He argued that the
        notices that he received were deficient under 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229(a)(1)(G)(ii) and 1229(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under those provisions,
        the notices he received were required to specify the “consequences
        under section 1229a(b)(5) of this title of the failure, except under
        exceptional circumstances, to appear.” Miller argued that the
        notices specified some, but not all, of those consequences.
        Specifically, Miller contended that the notices were required to
        notify him of the provisions of § 1229a(b)(5) concerning rescission
        and judicial review.
               After an Immigration Judge denied the motion, the Board of
        Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. In a supplemental brief
        to the Board following the Supreme Court’s decision in Niz-
        Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), Miller added a new
        argument: that his initial notice to appear was deficient for the
        failure to specify the time and place of his proceedings. The Board
        rejected both arguments. It rejected Miller’s first notice-defect
        argument because the Board has long held that notice of the
        possibility of removal in absentia was sufficient. And it rejected his
        time-and-place argument because that defect was cured by the
        subsequent notice Miller received, which did specify the time and
        place of his hearing.
               Miller now petitions for review of the Board’s decision to
        this Court, and we deny the petition.
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        22-10779               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                         II.
               The Board’s decision does not adopt the reasoning of the
        immigration judge, so we review only the Board’s reasoning.
        Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th
        Cir. 2022). “We review the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen
        for an abuse of discretion, but review any underlying legal
        conclusions de novo.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
        Board misapplies the law. Ferreira v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d
        1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013).
                                         III.
                                         A.
               We start with Miller’s first notice-defect claim—that he was
        not informed of all the consequences of failure to appear. “The
        fundamental principle governing any exercise in statutory
        construction is that we begin where all such inquiries must begin:
        with the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Chinchilla,
        987 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted)
        (alteration adopted). So we begin with an overview of the relevant
        statutory provisions.
               Under § 1229—governing initiation of removal
        proceedings—a notice to appear must specify the “consequences
        under section 1229a(b)(5) of this title of the failure, except under
        exceptional circumstances, to appear.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(ii);
        id. § 1229(a)(2)(A)(ii). Section 1229a(b)(5), in turn, is entitled
        “Consequences of failure to appear.” Id. § 1229a(b)(5). It has five
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-10779

        subsections—A through E. Subsection A, entitled “In General,”
        provides that any noncitizen receiving notice in accordance with
        the statute who does not appear at a hearing will be ordered
        removed in absentia if the government establishes by clear,
        unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is
        removable. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Miller concedes that his notices
        warned him of this possibility.
               The remaining subsections concern subsection A’s
        applicability and the options available for seeking to undo or
        challenge an in absentia removal order. Subsection B provides that
        written notice of the hearing is not required if the noncitizen fails
        to provide an address. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(B). Subsection C says that
        an in absentia removal order may be rescinded only if the
        noncitizen can demonstrate that the failure to appear was because
        of exceptional circumstances or that notice was not received in
        accordance with the statute. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). Subsection D
        allows for judicial review of the grounds upon which an in absentia
        removal order is entered: the validity of the notice received, the
        reason the noncitizen did not attend the proceeding, and whether
        the noncitizen is removable. Id. § 1229a(b)(5)(D). Finally,
        subsection E clarifies that the in absentia removal provisions apply
        to all noncitizens, including those who remain in contiguous
        foreign territory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C).
               The term “consequences” is undefined in the statute, so “we
        look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language
        as it was understood at the time the law was enacted.” Chinchilla,
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        22-10779                Opinion of the Court                         7

        987 F.3d at 1308. A “consequence” is “a natural or necessary
        result.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 482–83
        (1993); see also Consequence, Black’s Law Dictionary 306 (6th ed.
        1990) (defining “consequence” as the “result following in natural
        sequence from an event which is adapted to produce, or to aid in
        producing, such result”). Miller says that the rescission and judicial
        review provisions found in subsections C and D—which were not
        specified in the notices that he had received—are consequences of
        his failure to appear. Therefore, we ask whether the provisions of
        § 1229a(b)(5) relating the rescission of an in absentia removal order
        and judicial review of such order are the natural and necessary
        result from the failure to appear.
                They are not. If a noncitizen fails to appear at a hearing, the
        natural and necessary result is that an in absentia removal order
        will be entered if the government meets its burden that written
        notice was provided and that the noncitizen is removable. 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229a(b)(5)(A). The notices Miller received adequately and
        repeatedly warned him of this possibility. The rescission and
        judicial review provisions, on the other hand, describe how and
        under which circumstances the consequences of the failure to
        appear can be undone—which does not naturally and necessarily
        result from the failure to appear.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10779

               Miller does not cite to a single published decision—in any
        circuit—that has adopted his reading of the statute. 1 Miller
        primarily attempts to recharacterize the recission and review
        provisions as stripping noncitizens of their appellate rights. For
        example, Miller argues that a noncitizen ordered removed in
        absentia who later becomes eligible for adjustment of status is
        barred from moving to reopen the removal proceeding because
        under § 1229a(b)(5)(C) an in absentia removal order may be
        rescinded “only” upon a motion alleging that the failure to appear
        was due to exceptional circumstances or lack of adequate notice.
        Miller’s characterization of these provisions misses the mark. The
        rescission and judicial review provisions stem from being ordered
        removed in absentia, not from the failure to appear itself.
               Miller next argues that the phrase “consequences under
        section 1229a(b)(5)” must include more than just the consequences
        under § 1229a(b)(5)(A). Otherwise, he argues, Congress would
        have more narrowly said “consequences under section
        1229a(b)(5)(A).” But there is no reason to conclude that all the
        consequences under § 1229a(b)(5) could not be found in a single
        subsection. Indeed, there is no dispute that at least some
        subsections of § 1229a(b)(5)—subsections B and E—are not
        consequences that a noncitizen must be informed of. See 8 U.S.C.

        1 In an unpublished decision, we have already once rejected the same
        argument Miller advances today. Lopez-Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 20-
        14380, 2021 WL 5414911, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2021).
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        22-10779                Opinion of the Court                         9

        § 1229a(b)(5)(B), (E). We will not strain the statute to conclude that
        subsections that do not contain consequences of the failure to
        appear in fact do based only upon Congress’s choice to broadly
        reference to § 1229a(b)(5).
               Miller moves next to the section’s headers. Section
        1229a(b)(5) is titled: “Consequences of failure to appear.” He
        argues that the use of the plural form consequences suggests a
        reading of the statute that requires warning of more than only the
        possibility of in absentia removal. And subsection E is titled “Effect
        on judicial review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(E). Miller argues that
        because consequence is sometimes used synonymously with effect,
        the judicial review provision must be a consequence of the failure
        to appear.
               While it is true that the “title of a statute or section can aid
        in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s text,” the title “cannot
        undo or limit that which the text makes plain.” Auriga Polymers
        Inc. v. PMCM2, LLC, 40 F.4th 1273, 1286 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d
        1196, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 2020). Because the plain meaning of
        consequences is clear—and does not include the rescission and
        judicial review provisions—we do not resort to the section’s title
        to manufacture ambiguity.
              We therefore conclude that the plain language of the statute
        requires the noncitizen to be warned of only the possibility of in
        absentia removal. The notices Miller received repeatedly notified
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-10779

        him of that consequence if he failed to appear at his hearing. We
        accordingly deny the petition for review on this ground.
                                         B.
               We also deny Miller’s second deficient-notice claim—that
        the initial notice he received did not state the date and time of his
        hearing. Miller concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our
        precedent in Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Attorney General, 40
        F.4th 1312, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022). And we adhere to our past
        decisions unless a prior panel’s decision has been overruled or
        abrogated by the Supreme Court or by us sitting en banc. United
        States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
                                   *     *      *
              The petition for review is DENIED.