Court Opinion

ID: 9950789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:11:26.765666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:42.952221
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Deese, 2024-Ohio-936.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                                   No. 23AP-418
v.                                               :             (C.P.C. No. 21CR-3546)

Michael B. Deese,                                :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on March 14, 2024

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Kimberly Bond, for appellee.

                 On brief: Michael B. Deese, pro se.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

DORRIAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael B. Deese, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for jail-time credit. Because
we conclude Deese is not entitled to jail-time credit for his period of pre-trial house arrest,
we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On April 19, 2022, Deese pled guilty to one fifth-degree felony count of
possession of heroin and one fifth-degree felony count of possession of cocaine in Franklin
C.P. case No. 21CR-3546. That same day, Deese pled guilty to charges in three other
criminal cases: one fourth-degree felony count of possession of cocaine in case No. 19CR-
5422, one third-degree felony count of possession of cocaine in case No. 19CR-5423, and
one third-degree felony count of having a weapon under disability and one fourth-degree
No. 23AP-418                                                                              2

felony count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound in case No. 19CR-6119. On
April 26, 2022, the trial court sentenced Deese to 9 months of imprisonment on each charge
in the four cases, all to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of 54 months of
imprisonment. Plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, and the defense stipulated to the amount
of jail-time credit Deese had in each case: 182 days in case No. 19CR-5422, 193 days in case
No. 19CR-5423, 174 days in case No. 19CR-6119, and 3 days in case No. 21CR-3546.
       {¶ 3} Deese filed a motion for jail-time credit in case No. 21CR-3546 on
December 19, 2022, asserting he was entitled to 368 days of jail-time credit for the period
he spent on house arrest from April 23, 2021 until his sentencing on April 26, 2022. The
trial court denied Deese’s motion, finding that he had stipulated to the amount of jail-time
credit at sentencing and he was not entitled to jail-time credit for time spent on house
arrest. Deese failed to timely appeal the judgment denying his motion for jail-time credit
but moved this court for leave to file a delayed appeal. We granted Deese’s motion, and the
matter is now before us on Deese’s delayed appeal. State v. Deese, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-418
(Sept. 21, 2023) (memorandum decision).
II. Assignment of Error
       {¶ 4} Deese assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
              THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
              DENYING THE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL JAIL-TIME
              CREDIT, FOR TIME SO SPENT UNDER COURT-ORDERED
              HOUSE     ARREST,    WHERE      IT    DISREGARDED
              LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN R.C. §2929.01(P).

III. Discussion
       {¶ 5} We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct jail-time credit for
abuse of discretion. State v. Dean, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-173, 2014-Ohio-4361, ¶ 5. An abuse
of discretion occurs when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable;
however, no court has authority to commit an error of law when exercising its discretion.
State v. Spirnak, 10th Dist. No. 19AP-261, 2020-Ohio-6838, ¶ 16.
       {¶ 6} At a sentencing hearing, a trial court is required to “[d]etermine, notify the
offender of, and include in the sentencing entry the total number of days * * * that the
offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the offender
is being sentenced.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i). The sentencing court “retains continuing
No. 23AP-418                                                                                                 3

jurisdiction to correct any error not previously raised at sentencing” in making that
determination. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii). The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction is required to “reduce the prison term of a prisoner, as described in [R.C.
2967.191(B)], by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason
arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including
confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial.” R.C. 2967.191(A).
        {¶ 7} Under R.C. 2929.01(P), “[h]ouse arrest” is defined as “a period of
confinement of an offender that is in the offender’s home or in other premises specified by
the sentencing court” and during which certain conditions apply.
        {¶ 8} Deese argues his period of pre-trial house arrest satisfied the conditions set
forth in R.C. 2929.01(P), and therefore should have been treated as a period of confinement
for which he was entitled to jail-time credit under R.C. 2967.191(A).1 In support of his
argument, Deese cites a portion of State v. Reed, 162 Ohio St.3d 554, 2020-Ohio-4255.
        {¶ 9} Prior to Reed, this court held that “time served under electronically
monitored house arrest as a condition of bail does not constitute confinement for purposes
of the jail-time credit statute.” State v. D.H., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-525, 2015-Ohio-5281,
¶ 16, citing State v. Blankenship, 192 Ohio App.3d 639, 2011-Ohio-1601, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).
Other Ohio appellate courts had similarly held that pre-trial house arrest was not
confinement for purposes of determining jail-time credit. State v. Curry, 8th Dist. No.
105203, 2018-Ohio-4771, ¶ 64 (“The imposition of house arrest with electronic monitoring
does not constitute a term of imprisonment under the statute.”); State v. Johnson, 2d Dist.
No. 27937, 2018-Ohio-4142, ¶ 21 (“[T]rial courts may not treat a defendant’s electronically-
monitored home confinement, imposed as a condition of bail, as here, as tantamount to
being held in jail in lieu of bail for purposes of allocating jail-time credit.”); State v. Porter,
12th Dist. No. CA2017-07-101, 2018-Ohio-3852, ¶ 7 (“[A]n individual subjected to house
arrest may not be awarded jail-time credit for time spent while exercising the freedoms of
house arrest. This is because an individual’s liberties, freedom of choices, and movement

1 The trial court imposed house arrest as a condition of a recognizance bond in case No. 19CR-6112 on April 23,

2021. Deese was indicted in case No. 21CR-3546 on August 27, 2021, and he appears to concede that the full
period of house arrest for which he seeks jail-time credit would not apply to case No. 21CR-3546. Deese argues,
however, that judicial economy justifies issuance of a single order applying all the requested time to one case
because his sentences were imposed consecutively.
No. 23AP-418                                                                                    4

are not restrained to an extent reasonably associated with being ‘confined’ in a facility.”);
State v. Osborne, 5th Dist. No. 11 CA 14, 2011-Ohio-2363, ¶ 26 (“Appellant’s house arrest
does not constitute confinement and therefore Appellant is not entitled to jail time credit
for the time served on house arrest.”).
       {¶ 10} In Reed, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered whether a defendant was
entitled to jail-time credit for time spent on postconviction house arrest. Reed at ¶ 2. A
majority of the court concluded “[t]he legislature has expressed its intent that jail-time
credit is to be given only for the time the defendant is confined in a public or private facility”
and that “[c]onfinement in a personal residence” did not qualify for jail-time credit. Id. at
¶ 16. The court rejected the argument that Reed was entitled to jail-time credit for his time
on postconviction house arrest:
               R.C. 2967.191(A) is plain and unambiguous and limits a jail-
               time credit to specific types of confinement, those in which the
               defendant is confined in a public or private facility. The statute
               does not provide for a reduction in sentence for a term of
               postconviction house arrest or electronic monitoring imposed
               for violating community-control sanctions.

Id. at ¶ 19. The portion of Reed that Deese cites in his brief on appeal is from a dissenting
opinion authored by Justice Donnelly and joined only by Justice Stewart. Therefore, it is
not binding on our decision in this appeal.
       {¶ 11} Since the Reed decision was issued, Ohio appellate courts have applied its
reasoning to hold that pre-trial house arrest does not qualify for jail-time credit. State v.
Brown, 8th Dist. No. 110192, 2021-Ohio-3348, ¶ 30 (“Although the Ohio Supreme Court’s
holding [in Reed] applied specifically to postconviction house arrest, its reasoning that only
confinement in a public or private facility counts for the calculation of jail-time credit
likewise extends to time spent on house arrest before conviction.”); State v. Nichols, 2d
Dist. No. 2020-CA-2, 2020-Ohio-4596, ¶ 16 (applying Reed and the Second District’s prior
cases to hold that pre-trial electronically monitored house arrest was not confinement for
purposes of determining jail-time credit).
       {¶ 12} Consistent with our prior decision in D.H. and the reasoning in the Supreme
Court’s Reed decision, we conclude that Deese’s period of pre-trial house arrest did not
constitute confinement for purposes of R.C. 2967.191(A) and he was not entitled to jail-time
No. 23AP-418                                                                           5

credit for the time spent on house arrest. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Deese’s motion for jail-time credit.
       {¶ 13} Accordingly, we overrule Deese’s sole assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Deese’s sole assignment of error and
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                     Judgment affirmed.
                     BEATTY BLUNT and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.