Court Opinion

ID: 9383577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 18:03:15.065799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.296336
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23 In re Julian V. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re JULIAN V. et al., Persons Coming Under
    the Juvenile Court Law.

    STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY                                                              F085111
    SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                          (Super. Ct. Nos. JVDP-21-000164,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   JVDP-21-000165, JVDP-21-000166)

                    v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    A.M.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
            APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ann Q.
Ameral, Judge.
            David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
            Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Lindy Giacopuzzirotz, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*           Before Peña, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and DeSantos, J.
       A.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental
rights to her now four-year-old sons, Julian V. and Jackson V. (collectively, the twins),
and 18-month-old son, Matthew V. (collectively, the children), pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 The sole issue on appeal is whether the Stanislaus
County Community Services Agency (agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply
with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) and related California law because extended family members were not asked
about the children’s possible Indian2 ancestry. The agency concedes that its investigation
under ICWA was deficient. The parties filed a joint stipulation seeking a conditional
reversal and limited remand to the juvenile court for ICWA compliance.
       For the reasons discussed herein, we accept the agency’s concession. Consistent
with our recent decision in In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566 (K.H.), we conclude
“the error is prejudicial because neither the agency nor the court gathered information
sufficient to ensure a reliable finding that ICWA does not apply and remanding for an
adequate inquiry in the first instance is the only meaningful way to safeguard the rights at
issue.” (K.H., at p. 591.) Accordingly, we accept the stipulation, conditionally reverse
the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remand with directions.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The agency took the children into protective custody in August 2021 after
Matthew was born prematurely and tested positive for methadone, methamphetamine,
THC and opiates. Mother was married to Ronnie T. However, her boyfriend,
Jonathan V., was named as the father on the twins’ birth certificates and he held the

1      Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2      “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1
(Benjamin M.).)

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children out as his own. He and mother were substance abusers with a significant
criminal history, including drug-related charges. The children were placed together in
foster care in November 2021.
       On August 13, 2021, Jonathan signed a “PARENTAL NOTIFICATION OF
INDIAN STATUS” (ICWA-020) form, indicating he may have Indian ancestry through
his great-grandmother but he could not identify a tribe. An ICWA-020 form signed by
social worker Carmen Hernandez was submitted for mother indicating she had no Indian
ancestry. Hernandez also completed an ICWA-020 form for Ronnie stating he did not
have any Indian heritage.
       The agency filed a dependency petition, alleging the children came within the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and
(j) (abuse of sibling) because of the parents’ substance abuse. Ronnie was identified as
the presumed father of all three children because of the marital presumption. Jonathan
was identified as the presumed father of the twins.
       The presumed fathers appeared at the detention hearing on August 13, 2021.
Mother was incarcerated and did not attend the hearing. Jonathan told the juvenile court
he possibly had a relative who was a member of a federally recognized tribe but he could
not identify a specific tribe. The court directed him to inquire of his relatives. The court
ordered Ronnie to undergo paternity testing as to all three children, ordered the children
temporarily detained and continued the hearing to August 17, 2021, to give Jonathan time
to hire private counsel.
       On August 17, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the children detained and again
asked Jonathan if he had any Indian ancestry. He said it was “unlikely” but had not asked
his family. The court found it had no reason to believe ICWA applied, however, ordered
Jonathan to make further inquiries. Diane V., Jonathan’s mother, reported possible
Cherokee ancestry.

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       Hernandez gathered information from Jonathan and Diane as well as from the
Youth Connections database for purposes of completing the “NOTICE OF CHILD
CUSTODY PROCEEDING FOR INDIAN CHILD” (ICWA-030) form. The Youth
Connections database produced a printout, which included the names of 25 maternal
relatives, their relationship to the children, birth date, date of death if applicable, age, and
address. Twelve of the maternal relatives are deceased, including the maternal
grandmother. The agency sent letters to 13 maternal relatives, including the maternal
grandfather, a maternal uncle, various “great” and “great-great” relatives and several first
cousins once removed, and on September 14, 2021, filed an ICWA-030 form, which it
sent to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
Sacramento Regional Office.
       On September 28, 2021, the juvenile court convened the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing and found Jonathan qualified as the twins’ presumed father. The
court continued the hearing to October 15, 2021, at which time the court adjudged the
children dependents as alleged in the petition, ordered reunification services for mother
and Ronnie as to all three children and for Jonathan as to the twins. Ronnie and Jonathan
were ordered to submit to paternity testing, which subsequently established Jonathan’s
biological paternity and excluded Ronnie. Ronnie was dismissed from the case.
       The BIA Sacramento responded on September 29, 2021, acknowledging the child
custody proceedings and the agency’s request for assistance in identifying the children’s
possible tribal affiliation. It also acknowledged that the agency notified the Cherokee
tribes based on its inquiry with the family and directed the agency to follow up with the
tribes if they did not respond. In letters dated in October and November 2021, the
Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of

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Cherokee Indians informed the agency the children were not Indian children based on the
information provided.
       On November 12, 2021, Diane filed a modification petition (§ 388) asking the
juvenile court to enforce its order granting her monthly visitation. The court granted the
petition at a hearing on December 8, 2021, and found ICWA did not apply.
       In its report for the six-month review hearing, the agency recommended the
juvenile court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing to
consider a permanent plan of adoption. The children were well-loved and cared for by
their foster parents and mother and Jonathan were not complying with their court-ordered
services. Mother and Jonathan were not drug testing and had felony charges for failure to
appear in court, bringing a controlled substance into prison, possession of drugs in
prison/jail, grand theft, burglary and possession of a controlled substance.
       On May 19, 2022, at a contested six-month review hearing, the juvenile court
found ICWA did not apply, terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing for September 15, 2022. Neither mother nor Jonathan challenged the setting
hearing by extraordinary writ petition.
       In its report for the section 366.26 hearing, the agency recommended the juvenile
court terminate parental rights. The agency reported ICWA did not apply, citing the
juvenile court’s prior finding.
       On September 15, 2022, the juvenile court convened the section 366.26 hearing
and found ICWA did not apply. The court set a contested hearing on October 6, 2022.
At the contested hearing, the court found the children were likely to be adopted and
terminated parental rights.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Mother contends the agency discussed placement with multiple maternal family
members, including a “maternal great grandmother, maternal great grandfather, maternal

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grandfather, and maternal first cousin,” but neglected to ask these family members
whether the children had Indian ancestry. Therefore, she argues, the agency failed to
fulfill its duty of initial inquiry under ICWA and the juvenile court erred in finding
ICWA did not apply. We concur.
A.     ICWA Inquiry Duties, Generally
       Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation of Indian
children from their tribes through adoption of foster care placement with non-Indian
families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Under California law adopted pursuant
to ICWA, the juvenile court and the agency have an “affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire” whether a child “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) An
“ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined in the same manner as under federal law, i.e., as “any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe
or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
member of an Indian tribe[.]” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); accord , § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting
the federal definition].)
       “Because it typically is not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child, both
federal and state law mandate certain inquiries to be made in each case. These
requirements are sometimes collectively referred to as the duty of initial inquiry.”
(Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741.)
       Federal regulations implementing ICWA require courts to ask participants in a
dependency case whether they know or have reason to know the child is an Indian child
and to instruct the parties to inform the court “ ‘if they subsequently receive information
that provides reason to know the child is an Indian child.’ ” (Benjamin M., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 741.)
       California law, however, “more broadly imposes on [the agency] and [the]
juvenile court[] (but not parents) an ‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire’ whether

                                              6
a child in the dependency proceeding ‘is or may be an Indian child.’ ” (Benjamin M.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 741–742, quoting § 224.2, subd. (a).) That duty to inquire
“begins with [the] initial contact … and obligates the juvenile court and [the agency] to
ask all relevant involved individuals whether the child may be an Indian child.” (In re
T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 290, citing § 224.2, subds. (a)–(c).)
       Under the statute, when the agency takes a child into its temporary custody, its
duty of initial inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child ….” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) ICWA defines “ ‘extended family member’ ” by
“the law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe” or, absent such law or custom, as “a person
who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child ’s grandparent, aunt or
uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c) [extended family
member “defined as provided in [§] 1903” of ICWA.)
       The juvenile court, in turn, at a party’s first appearance, must ask “each participant
present in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child
is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (c)) and require each party to complete an ICWA-020
form (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)(C)). 3 “The parties are instructed to inform the
court ‘if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is
an Indian child.’ (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2020); § 224.2, subd. (c).)” (In re D.F. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)
       If that initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or agency a “reason to believe that an
Indian child is involved,” then their duty to “make further inquiry regarding the possible

3      All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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Indian status of the child” is triggered. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) If that further inquiry results
in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal requirements of
section 224.2 apply. (§§ 224.2, subd. (f) & 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
       Additionally, the agency is required by the rules to document its inquiries.
Rule 5.481(a)(5) provides, “The petitioner must on an ongoing basis include in its filings
a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all
information received pertaining to the child’s Indian status, as well as evidence of how
and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new
information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.”
       The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a child’s proceeding if it
finds the agency’s duty of inquiry has been satisfied and there is no reason to know that
child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) The juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA does not apply thus “ ‘ “implies that … social workers and the court
did not know or have a reason to know the children were Indian children and that social
workers had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.” [Citations.]’ ” (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
       Social workers have no duty under federal law to ask extended family members
about possible tribal membership. (In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069.) The
error, if any, is an error of state law. (Ibid.)
B.     Standard of Review
       We review a juvenile court’s ICWA findings under a hybrid substantial
evidence/abuse of discretion standard, reviewing for substantial evidence whether there is
reason to know a child is an Indian child, and for abuse of discretion a juvenile court’s
finding that an agency exercised due diligence and conducted a “proper and adequate”
ICWA inquiry. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)

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       Where, as here, the issue on appeal concerns the agency’s due diligence in
conducting an adequate inquiry under ICWA, we review the juvenile court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence and its ultimate determination whether ICWA applies
under the abuse of discretion standard. (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601.)
C.     The Agency and the Juvenile Court’s Inquiry
       Pursuant to its duty under section 224.2, the juvenile court had mother complete
an ICWA-020 form for the purpose of determining whether she had any Indian heritage.
She indicated that she did not and there is no evidence the agency asked her about any
relatives that it could ask. However, the agency did identify maternal relatives in its
effort to place the children. Some of those relatives, notably the maternal grandfather and
a maternal uncle, qualify as extended family members under ICWA. However, there is
no evidence the agency attempted to contact them. In addition, there are other maternal
relatives mother claims were in contact with the agency regarding placement and are
extended family members but were not interviewed regarding Indian ancestry. She refers
specifically to a maternal great-grandmother, maternal great-grandfather, maternal
grandfather and maternal first cousin. We find no reference to these relatives on the
pages mother cites and only the maternal grandfather and first cousin would qualify as
extended family members for ICWA purposes. In any event, there were extended family
members (i.e., the maternal grandfather and maternal uncle) the agency could have
contacted to fulfill its initial inquiry obligations. Since it did not, substantial evidence
does not support a finding the agency conducted an adequate inquiry under ICWA.
Therefore, the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding ICWA did not apply.
D.     Prejudice
       We further conclude that the inquiry error was prejudicial. Therefore, we
conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order and remand the matter for the limited
purpose of compliance with ICWA.

                                               9
       Because the failure in this case concerned the agency’s duty of initial inquiry, only
state law is involved. Therefore, we may not reverse unless the error was prejudicial
under state law. “(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [‘No judgment shall be set aside … unless,
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice’].)”
(Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
       Here, the miscarriage of justice lies in the agency’s failure to satisfy its inquiry
duties under ICWA. As we explained in K.H., “[t]he relevant rights under ICWA belong
to Indian tribes and they have a statutory right to receive notice where an Indian child
may be involved so that they may make that determination. It necessarily follows that the
prejudice to those rights lies in the failure to gather and record the very information the
juvenile court needs to ensure accuracy in determining whether further inquiry or notice
is required, and whether ICWA does or does not apply.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 591.)
       The extent of the agency’s inquiry was confined to asking mother if she had any
Indian ancestry and recording her negative response. However, in the process of
attempting to locate relatives for placement, the agency identified maternal relatives who
fall within ICWA’s definition of an extended relative. The record is silent, however, as
to what efforts if any were made to contact those relatives in an effort to comply with
ICWA. “Where a record is silent or nearly silent with respect to an ICWA inquiry at the
first step, a finding of harmlessness necessarily rests on speculation” and “is at odds with
the statutory protections that ICWA and California law intend to afford Indian children
and Indian tribes.” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.) Therefore, the error in this
case is prejudicial.4

4       Although we conclude prejudicial error occurred in this case, we stress that it
is not because an inadequate inquiry renders the juvenile court’s ICWA finding reversible
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       Before reversing or vacating a judgment based upon a stipulation of the parties, an
appellate court must find “both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable
possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the
reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion
of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the
availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).) Because this case would be subject to reversal to permit
compliance with ICWA and corresponding California statutes and rules absent the
parties’ stipulation, a stipulated remand advances the interests identified by Code of Civil
procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
376, 379–382.)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply is conditionally reversed,
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order the agency to
comply with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2,
subdivision (b) and rule 5.481(a)(5). If, after determining that an adequate inquiry was
made consistent with the reasoning in this opinion, the court finds that ICWA applies, the
court shall vacate its existing orders and proceed in compliance with ICWA and related
California law. If the court instead finds that ICWA does not apply, its ICWA finding
shall be reinstated. In all other respects, the court’s orders terminating parental rights are
affirmed.

per se. Rather, it is because the record is “so undeveloped that the inadequacy of the
inquiry is readily apparent and there simply is no basis on which to find substantial
evidence would support a contrary conclusion. Consequently, there also is no basis on
which the court could exercise discretion to approve the patently inadequate inquiry and
record. Under these circumstances, it is perhaps fair to say that the error and need for
reversal are ‘clear.’ ” (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 618.)

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