Court Opinion

ID: 9928351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:00:46.582471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:08.825769
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SAYALI KULKARNI,                                DOCKET NUMBER
             Appellant,                         DE-1221-19-0157-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: January 30, 2024
  AFFAIRS,
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Abhijit Kulkarni , Salt Lake City, Utah, for the appellant.

      Johnston B. Walker , Jackson, Mississippi, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. For the reasons set forth below, we
DISMISS as settled all but one of the appellant’s claims on petition for review.
As it concerns the appellant’s remaining claim regarding the determination that
she belonged on Pay Table 1, we AFFIRM the initial decision except as expressly
MODIFIED to address the appellant’s claim that her disclosures evidenced a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

                                 BACKGROUND
      During the time period relevant to this appeal, the agency employed the
appellant and her husband, Abhijit Kulkarni, as Physicians in the Compensation
and Pension (C&P) section at the Veterans Health Administration in Salt Lake
City, Utah. 2 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 7, Tab 11 at 53, Tab 13 at 9.
In this role, they provided medical opinions used to assess veterans’ claims for
disability benefits. IAF, Tab 9 at 34-36, Tab 13 at 4, 9; see U.S. Department of
Veterans       Affairs,       VA        Claim        Exam         (C&P        Exam),
https://www.va.gov/disability/va-claim-exam/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2024). After

2
  The appellant’s husband also filed an IRA appeal based on many of the same claims as
the instant appeal. See Kulkarni v. Department of Veterans Affairs , MSPB Docket No.
DE-1221-19-0158-W-1.
                                                                                       3

receiving a February 28, 2019 closure letter from the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC), the appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal. 3 IAF, Tab 1 at 31-32.
      In response to the administrative judge’s order on jurisdiction, the
appellant alleged that, in retaliation for disclosing violations of laws, rules, and
regulations, an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, and a substantial and
specific danger to public health and safety, the agency admonished her, gave her
a “pay table demotion,” and subjected her to a hostile work environment. IAF,
Tab 7 at 10-15. In particular, the appellant identified the following disclosures:
(1) in or around November 2013, she informed the Chief of Administrative
Medicine (CoAM) that the agency is required to have a “sympathetic
pro-claimant and non-adversarial approach” in assessing veterans claims for
disability benefits and that, contrary to his stated belief that most veterans
seeking   compensation      for   post-traumatic    stress   disorder   (PTSD)     were
malingerers, the best practices guidelines state that veterans may over-report
psychiatric symptoms because they are suffering from chronic PTSD difficulties
and comorbid affective disorders, id. at 10, 27; (2) in an April 7, 2014 email to
the CoAM, she requested that a particular doctor no longer be allowed to peer
review her work because he evidenced “gross medico-legal incompetence” and
“grossly abused the peer review process by harassing [her] and inappropriately
pressuring [her] to overturn a disability related PTSD diagnosis in a veteran,” id.
at 11, 30-33; (3) in April and May 2014, she informed the Chief of Staff that the
CoAM was incompetent, was abusing the peer review process, suffered from
narcissistic personality disorder, was “pressuring [her] to overturn a well
3
   When a veteran applies for disability benefits, the agency may order a C&P
examination to gather evidence regarding service connection and the severity of the
claimed disability. See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Claim Exam (C&P
Exam), https://www.va.gov/disability/va-claim-exam/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2024).
If one is ordered, the doctors within the C&P section review the veteran’s file, see the
veteran for an appointment, and write a report containing an assessment regarding the
veteran’s diagnosis, the severity of the diagnosis, and whether the disability is service
connected. Id. The report is then submitted to the agency claims processor to make a
decision on the veteran’s claim for benefits. Id.
                                                                                 4

substantiated PTSD diagnosis,” and was “grossly mismanaging the administrative
medicine service because he fails to take a sympathetic approach towards
veterans claiming disabilities,” id. at 11, 34-37; (4) in her April 2015 testimony
before a grievance examiner, she alleged that the CoAM was training providers in
the C&P section to look for “superficial inconsistencies” as evidence of
malingering in order to minimize and deny veterans benefits, that this approach
was contrary to the pro-claimant, sympathetic approach mandated by laws, rules,
and regulations, and was causing a reduction in the award of veterans benefits, an
increase in appeals, and was “extremely likely” to cause a veteran to commit an
act of violence, id. at 11, 65-75; and (5) in May 2015 emails, the appellant and
her husband informed the Acting Director that, contrary to statute and agency
best practices, the CoAM discouraged doctors from diagnosing PTSD in most
cases and found fault in the appellant’s husband’s clinical cases by “falsifying
records or violating VA statutes governing Veterans’ disability benefits,” and
they further identified a number of PTSD clinical team examiners and C&P
examiners who improperly did not diagnose a veteran with PTSD or attempted to
overturn prior PTSD diagnoses, id. at 11, 48-53. The appellant also alleged that
the agency perceived her as a whistleblower based on her husband’s
whistleblowing, which similarly pertained to the C&P section’s failure to
properly evaluate veterans’ disabilities in connection with their claims for
benefits and the CoAM’s incompetence, bias against veterans claiming disability
benefits for PTSD, and narcissistic personality disorder. Id. at 10-13.
      Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure. IAF, Tab 22, Initial
Decision (ID).    The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial
                                                                                    5

decision, and the agency has responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1,
3. 4

                                    ANALYSIS
       During the pendency of the petition for review, the parties submitted a
document entitled “SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT” signed and dated by the
appellant on May 7, 2020, and by the agency on May 8, 2020. PFR File, Tab 4.
The document provides, among other things, that the instant appeal will be
dismissed as withdrawn, except for “specific claims related to the determination
that [the appellant] belongs on Pay Table 1.” Id. at 4-5.
       Before dismissing a matter as settled, the Board must decide whether the
parties have entered into a settlement agreement, whether they understand its
terms, and whether they intend to have the agreement entered into the record for
enforcement by the Board. See Mahoney v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 146,
149 (1988). In addition, before accepting a settlement agreement into the record
for enforcement purposes, the Board must determine whether the agreement is
lawful on its face and whether the parties freely entered into it. See Massey v.
Office of Personnel Management, 91 M.S.P.R. 289, ¶ 4 (2002), overruled on
other grounds by Delorme v. Department of the Interior , 124 M.S.P.R. 123,
¶¶ 11-21 (2017) (holding that the Board may enforce settlement agreements that
have been entered into the record, independent of any prior finding of Board
jurisdiction over the underlying matter being settled).
       Here, we find that the parties have entered into a settlement agreement,
understand its terms, and do not intend for the agreement to be entered into the
record for enforcement by the Board. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. As the parties do not
4
  The appellant has submitted with her petition for review a number of exhibits
regarding PTSD and military sexual trauma, news articles about suicide and acts of
violence by veterans, printouts of regulations, and copies of emails from 2014 through
2016. PFR File, Tab 1 at 33-67. The appellant has not alleged or shown that these
documents were unavailable below despite her due diligence, and we therefore do not
consider them for the first time on review. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service,
3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).
                                                                                         6

intend for the Board to enforce the settlement agreement, we do not address the
additional considerations regarding enforcement and do not enter the settlement
agreement into the record for enforcement by the Board.
      Accordingly, we find that dismissing all claims except those relating to Pay
Table 1 “with prejudice to refiling” (i.e., the parties normally may not refile this
appeal) is appropriate under these circumstances.
      We turn now to the appellant’s remaining claim.                  The Board has
jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has exhausted her administrative
remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations of the following:
(1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D);
and (2) the protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a
personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 5 Salerno v. Department of the
Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(e)(1), 2302(b)(8). 6
      A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an
allegation of fact that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a matter
that a reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced one of the
categories of wrongdoing specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).                     Salerno,
123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative whistleblower
has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:                whether a
disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily
ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the actions of the
agency    evidenced    a   violation   of   any   law,   rule,   or   regulation,   gross
5
 In the initial decision, the administrative judge found, and we agree, that the appellant
exhausted the claims raised in this appeal before OSC. ID at 2-3; IAF, Tab 1 at 31-32,
Tabs 14-18.
6
  We have reviewed the relevant legislation amending the whistleblower protection
statutory scheme that was enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have
concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal, nor does it affect the
relevant holdings of the case law cited in this Final Order.
                                                                                      7

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). An
appellant must make specific and detailed allegations; vague, conclusory, or
unsupported allegations, such as one that essentially repeats the legal standard,
without more, are pro forma and insufficient to meet the nonfrivolous standard.
Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶¶ 6, 8 (2016), aff’d per curiam,
679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by Cronin v.
U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n.11. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held, “the question of whether the appellant has
non-frivolously alleged protected disclosures that contributed in a personnel
action must be determined based on whether [she] alleged sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Hessami v.
Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020).                In
addition, “the Board may not deny jurisdiction by crediting the agency’s
interpretation of the evidence as to whether the alleged disclosures fell within the
protected categories or whether the disclosures were a contributing factor in an
adverse personnel action.” 7 Id.
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
disclosures regarding “violations of VA statutes governing Veterans’ disability
benefits, abuse of authority to enforce those violations, and ultimately gross
mismanagement of the Compensation & Pension Service” and the CoAM finding
“fault in a series of [the appellant’s husband’s] clinical cases, by either falsifying
records or violating VA statutes governing Veterans’ disability benefits” were pro
forma    and did    not amount      to a    nonfrivolous    allegation   of   protected
whistleblowing. ID at 6. He further found that the appellant’s disclosure that the

7
  The administrative judge did not have the benefit of Hessami at the time he issued his
initial decision. However, we find that the administrative judge’s analysis was
consistent with Hessami because he did not consider the agency’s evidence or
arguments in finding that the appellant failed to make the requisite nonfrivolous
allegations. ID at 5-10.
                                                                                     8

CoAM was incompetent or a narcissist could not be a protected disclosure,
despite the “disorder” label and her assertion that she was a certified psychiatrist.
ID at 6-7. Regarding the appellant’s disclosures that the CoAM and other doctors
failed to take a sufficiently pro-claimant approach and underdiagnosed, or
pressured others not to diagnose, PTSD, the administrative judge found no
nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure because these disclosures
represented a policy disagreement that did not otherwise evidence one of the
categories of wrongdoing specified in section 2302(b)(8). ID at 7-10.
      On review, the appellant reiterates her claim that her disclosures evidence a
violation of the “strongly and uniquely pro claimant” laws and regulations
governing veterans’ disability claims and specifies, for the first time, that the
CoAM and others violated 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, which requires the agency to
resolve reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran seeking benefits.         PFR File,
Tab 1 at 4-26. She also argues again that her disclosures of an abuse of authority,
gross mismanagement, and a substantial and specific danger to public health and
safety were protected. 8 Id.
      Even under the expanded protections afforded to whistleblowers under the
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), general philosophical or
policy disagreements with agency decisions that “lawfully exercise discretionary
authority” are not protected unless the appellant has a reasonable belief that the
disclosed information separately evidences one of the categories of wrongdoing
listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A).         Webb v. Department of the Interior,
122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶¶ 8-9, 12 n.6 (2015); see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D).
      Here, the appellant’s disclosures pertain to perceived errors in their
interpretation and application of the reasonable doubt regulation and the resulting
diagnoses. We agree with the administrative judge that these disclosures amount

8
  The appellant has not challenged on review, and we discern no reason to disturb, the
administrative judge’s determination that her pro forma allegation that the CoAM
falsified records was insufficient to meet the nonfrivolous standard. PFR File, Tab 1;
ID at 6.
                                                                                    9

to disagreement over a lawful exercise of discretionary authority. ID at 9-10; see
5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D); Webb, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶¶ 2, 10 (finding that the
appellant’s position paper advocating for a different organizational restructuring
was a policy disagreement with the agency’s lawful decision to restructure a
division pursuant to the Secretary of the Interior’s directive). In addition, for the
reasons discussed below, we find that these policy disagreements do not
separately evidence a reasonable belief in one of the categories of wrongdoing
specified in section 2302(b)(8).
      As discussed in the initial decision, erroneous rulings by the agency do not
constitute a “violation of law,” and an employee’s disagreement with an agency
ruling or adjudication does not constitute a protected disclosure even if that ruling
was legally incorrect. O’Donnell v. Department of Agriculture, 120 M.S.P.R. 94,
¶ 15 (2013), aff’d, 561 F. App’x 926 (Fed. Cir. 2014), clarified on other grounds
by Webb, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 9. Such erroneous rulings are corrected through
the appeals process—not through insubordination and policy battles between
employees and their supervisors.       Id.      There are a large number of Federal
agencies that rule on citizens’ applications for benefits or redress every day, and
the orderly administration of these agencies requires that, for better or for worse,
supervisors and managers have the final say in such rulings. Id. A subordinate’s
refusal to abide by her supervisor’s instructions in this regard supplants the
orderly   appeals   process    with   chaotic     agency   in-fighting.   Id.   Such
insubordination is not protected by the WPEA. Id., ¶ 15 & n.5.
      In O’Donnell, the Board found that a soil conservationist’s memorandum
stating his disagreement with his supervisor’s determination that a landowner was
not eligible for enrollment in the agency’s Conservation Reserve Program was not
a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure, even though he believed his
supervisor’s determination was contrary to agency policy.                  O’Donnell,
120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 15.        In addition, the Federal Circuit has found that an
administrative judge with the Department of the Interior’s Office of Hearing and
                                                                                  10

Appeals did not nonfrivolously allege that he made a protected disclosure when
he disagreed with the findings in a prior case. Meuwissen v. Department of the
Interior, 234 F.3d 9, 13-14 (Fed. Cir. 2000), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in O’Donnell, 120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 15 n.5.                Here, the
administrative judge found that the appellant’s disclosures that the CoAM and
others were prejudiced against certain types of veterans’ benefits claims and
failed to take a sympathetic approach in assessing their claimed disabilities were
analogous to the disclosure rejected as failing to meet the nonfrivolous standard
in O’Donnell. ID at 7-10. We agree.
      As noted above, when a veteran applies for disability benefits, the agency
may order a C&P examination to gather evidence regarding service connection
and the severity of the claimed disability.     See U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, VA Claim Exam (C&P Exam), https://www.va.gov/disability/va-claim-
exam/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2024). The providers within the C&P section are
responsible for providing a report containing this information to the agency
claims processor, who makes a determination on the veteran’s claim. Id. If a
veteran disagrees with the agency’s decision, he or she is entitled to request a
higher-level review or file an appeal with the Board of Veterans Appeals.
38 C.F.R. § 3.2500. Accordingly, as in O’Donnell and Meuwissen, any erroneous
decision may be corrected through the appeals process, and the appellant’s
disagreement with the C&P section’s approach and assessment of the veterans’
medical conditions does not constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of a violation of
law, rule, or regulation, even if the resulting disability benefits decisions were
incorrect. See O’Donnell, 120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 15; see also Meuwissen, 234 F.3d
at 13-14.
      We find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her
disclosures evidence a reasonable belief that the CoAM’s conduct constituted
gross mismanagement. Gross mismanagement is a management action or inaction
that creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability
                                                                                    11

to accomplish its mission.        Swanson v. General Services Administration ,
110 M.S.P.R. 278, ¶ 11 (2008). Here, the appellant argues that her disclosure
regarding the CoAM’s “confrontational approach to C&P constituted gross
mismanagement because it was a management action which created a substantial
risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency’s ability to accomplish its
mission” and that, because of his gross mismanagement, “our service line of
administrative medicine did fall apart just like we predicted.” PFR File, Tab 1
at 10, 18. She also notes, as she did below, that the Office of Accountability
Review (OAR) and Administrative Investigation Board (AIB) substantiated her
disclosure of mismanagement when it found that the CoAM failed to provide
appropriate management of the C&P programs. Id. at 19-21; IAF, Tab 7 at 29,
Tab 8 at 33-34. We agree with the administrative judge that these pro forma
allegations of gross mismanagement, which recite the legal standard but fail to
identify any specific risk to the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission, are
insufficient to meet the nonfrivolous standard.       See Clark, 123 M.S.P.R. 466,
¶¶ 6, 8; ID at 6.      In addition, the appellant’s argument that the OAR/AIB
substantiated her belief in the reasonableness of her gross mismanagement
disclosure is unavailing because the misconduct identified by the OAR/AIB—
namely, issues with pay for poor performers, untimely exams, and too much time
allotted   for   administrative   time   and   examinations—is     not   the   alleged
mismanagement she disclosed. 9 IAF, Tab 8 at 33-34.
      We find that the appellant’s disclosures amounted to disagreement with the
CoAM’s lawful exercise of discretionary authority rather than a protected
disclosure of an abuse of authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(D); O’Donnell,
120 M.S.P.R. 94, ¶ 15.       An abuse of authority is defined as an arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power by a Federal official or employee that adversely

9
  Regarding the alleged harm actually disclosed by the appellant, the OAR/AIB found
that, while the CoAM’s negative comments relating to veterans seeking disability
benefits were “prevalent and consistent,” it could not substantiate allegations that he
imposed a higher burden of proof for approving veterans’ claims. IAF, Tab 8 at 33-34.
                                                                               12

affects the rights of any person or that results in personal gain or advantage to
himself or to preferred other persons. Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 22 (2013). The appellant argues that her disclosures that the
CoAM used the peer review process to “deprive Veterans of their right to receive
benefits” and “to enforce illegal orders to illegally deny Veterans benefits”
evidence an abuse of authority because they show an “arbitrary or capricious
exercise of power by a federal official or employee that adversely affects the
rights of any person.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 12-13, 20. Because these arguments
are vague and conclusory, making unsupported assertions and repeating the legal
standard, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure of an abuse of
authority. See Clark, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶¶ 6, 8.
      The appellant also argued below that her disclosure of an “illegal reduction
of Veterans’ disability benefits” evidenced a substantial and specific danger to
public health and safety because a veteran who has been denied benefits may
become violent or commit suicide. IAF, Tab 7 at 11, Tab 9 at 70. In support, she
provided news articles and agency notices regarding a number of incidents in
which a veteran with PTSD committed suicide or an act of violence, including
several where the veteran took these actions after the agency denied him benefits
or treatment. IAF, Tab 8 at 22-27. The administrative judge did not specifically
address this claim, which the appellant raises again on review. PFR File, Tab 1
at 11-15.     Because disclosures of dangers to public health or safety must be
considered separately from other types of disclosures, and “the fact that a
particular health or safety statement involves a policy decision or disagreement
does not deprive it of protection,” we modify the initial decision to address this
claim. See Chambers v. Department of the Interior , 602 F.3d 1370, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
      In determining whether a disclosed danger is sufficiently substantial and
specific to warrant protection under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), the
                                                                                  13

Board considers the following factors: (1) the likelihood of harm resulting from
the danger; (2) when the alleged harm may occur; and (3) the nature of the harm,
i.e., the potential consequences.    Id.   The Federal Circuit has explained that,
“[c]onsistent with these factors, the outcomes of past cases . . . have depended
upon whether a substantial, specific harm was identified, and whether the
allegations or evidence supported a finding that the harm had already been
realized or was likely to result in the reasonably foreseeable future.”           Id.
Revelation of a negligible, remote, or ill-defined peril that does not involve any
particular person, place, or thing, however, is not protected.           Sazinski v.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 73 M.S.P.R. 682, 686 (1997).
In addition, the disclosure of a danger only potentially arising in the future is not
a protected disclosure. Herman v. Department of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Yunus v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1372 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
       We agree with the appellant that the potential consequences of a veteran
with mental health issues becoming violent or suicidal are substantial, and it is
undisputed that such incidents have occurred all too frequently in the past.
However, her allegation that such harm may occur at some point in the future
because of an insufficiently sympathetic C&P examination or the denial of a
disability benefits claim is too remote and speculative to be protected under the
WPA.     See id. at 1378-80 (finding that a psychologist did not disclose a
substantial and specific danger to public safety under the WPA when he
speculated that the prison camp’s failure to have a suicide watch room on the
premises was potentially dangerous for suicidal inmates); Mogyorossy v.
Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 652, ¶¶ 16-17 (2004) (finding that a
security guard’s disclosure that he was permitted only to load three of four
possible shells into his shotgun evidenced merely a speculative danger that might
occur at some point in the future); see also S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 21 (1978), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2743 (explaining that “general criticism by
                                                                                     14

an employee of the Environmental Protection Agency that the Agency is not
doing enough to protect the environment would not be protected under this
subsection”).     Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not made a
nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure of a substantial and specific
danger to public health or safety. 10
      Finally, the appellant argued below that she made a protected disclosure
when she informed agency management of the CoAM’s incompetence and
narcissistic personality disorder.      IAF, Tab 7 at 10-13.      She explained that,
because of this disorder, the CoAM required “automatic compliance with his
illegal orders to enforce an illegal adversarial approach to Veterans’ disability
claims,” which resulted in “illegal reduction of Veterans’ disability benefits” and
was likely to cause “substantial danger in the immediate or near future.” Id. In
the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s accusation
that her supervisor was incompetent or a narcissist could not be a protected
disclosure, despite the “disorder” label and her assertion that she was a certified
psychiatrist. ID at 6-7.
      On review, the appellant argues that she disclosed that the CoAM was an
impaired physician, that she had a duty to report it, and that the diagnosis was
based on the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders and was “objectively reasonable enough to warrant OAR AIB
Investigation.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-23. Although the Board has previously
found an impaired provider disclosure to be protected, the disclosure in that case
concerned an allegedly cognitively impaired physician who exhibited unusual
behavior and deficient patient care. Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 2, 13 n.3. The Board explained that the disclosed danger in
10
   In Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1370, the court found that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
allegation that she reasonably believed that her disclosures concerning patient care
evidenced a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. In contrast, the
disclosures in the instant appeal do not pertain to harm that might arise directly from
patient care practices; they are speculative conjectures of harm that might arise
indirectly from disability evaluation decisions.
                                                                                     15

that case could undoubtedly lead to immediate and serious harm to patients. Id.,
¶ 13 n.3. Here, on the other hand, the appellant has not alleged, and there is no
indication, that the CoAM treated patients or that he posed a direct threat to
himself or others.     In addition, for the reasons the appellant’s disclosures
regarding the C&P section’s adversarial approach and underdiagnosis of PTSD
are not protected, her disclosures that the CoAM’s incompetence and narcissistic
personality disorder caused the adversarial approach and underdiagnosis of PTSD
are not protected. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative
judge’s determination that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her
disclosures regarding the CoAM’s incompetence and personality disorder were
protected.
      In light of the foregoing, we find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
allege that she made any protected disclosures.        Therefore, the administrative
judge properly dismissed this IRA appeal, including the pay table claim, for lack
of jurisdiction.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

11
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      16

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 17

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     18

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 12   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                19

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.