Court Opinion

ID: 9386480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 17:02:11.949224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.676160
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 12 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10135

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                1:19-cr-00018-DAD-BAM-1
 v.

KEVIN NEAL CROWNOVER, AKA Kevin MEMORANDUM*
Crownover,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of California
                    Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 10, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Kevin Neal Crownover appeals the district court’s denial of his Rule 29

motion for judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      We review de novo the denial of a Rule 29 motion for a judgment of

acquittal. United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2020). In deciding

a defendant’s Rule 29 motion, the district court “must enter a judgment of acquittal

of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29(a). To decide whether the evidence was insufficient, we consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir.

2010) (en banc).

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Crownover committed the

offense of aggravated identity theft. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence at trial established that: (1) as

treasurer of a local lodge of the International Association of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, Crownover had sole possession of the lodge’s checkbook; (2)

Crownover and lodge president James Hernandez were the only signatories on the

lodge’s bank account and protocol required that they both sign each check; (3) the

sole signature on check #103, which was made out to Crownover, appeared to

include a J and an H; (4) Hernandez did not sign check #103 or any other checks

made out to Crownover; (5) Hernandez did not sign any blank checks; and (6)

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check #103 was deposited into Crownover’s personal account. This evidence was

sufficient for any rational trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

Crownover knowingly used Hernandez’s signature without lawful authority on

check #103. See Gagarin, 950 F.3d at 602; United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882,

887–88 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we do not address Crownover’s argument

that the jury should not have been permitted to make handwriting comparisons

under the circumstances presented here.

      Because we affirm the district court’s denial of Crownover’s Rule 29

motion, we decline to vacate Crownover’s sentence.

      AFFIRMED.

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