Court Opinion

ID: 9519454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:16:46.810359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:23.350640
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant Cassel-man was charged and convicted of resisting a law enforcement officer pursuant to IND.CODE § 35-44-3-3, sections (a)(1) and (a)(2). Those sections appear as follows:
"Sec. 8. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:
(1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties as an officer; (2) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the authorized service or execution of a civil or criminal process or order of a court;
# # * # * a
commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor."
The process that was served by Officer Wofford upon Casselman is civil in nature.1 As such, the manner of service must comply with the provisions of IND.CODE § 34-1-6-1 through 14, respecting civil arrests.2 If the arrest order appears to have been properly procured and is valid on its face, the officer ordered to serve it may act in reliance upon it. Stine v. Shuttle et al. (1962), 134 Ind.App. 67, 186 N.E.2d 168.
The law enforcement officer in Stine was sued by a citizen falsely arrested for non-payment of a traffic fine. The Court therein stated:
"It is ... a general rule of law that a process or warrant not void on its face issued by a tribunal having general jurisdiction of the subject matter is a protection to the officer executing it, and the officer is not required to look beyond the process or warrant or determine the va*1319lidity or regularity of the proceedings on which it is founded, or to exercise his judgment touching its validity in a point of law .... Even though a process may have been issued irregularly by a party who might be liable, it is nevertheless a protection to the officer executing it. See Vol. 35, C.J.S., pp. 539-540. (It is only where a process is void on its face that the arresting officer is not protected. Vol. 85, C.J.S., p. 541." 134 Ind. App. at 74, 186 N.E.2d at 172.
The writ of attachment herein was issued by the Elkhart County Court after Cassel-man twice failed to appear for proceedings supplemental to a judgment entered against him. The arrest order commanded Casselman to appear before the court and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to appear at the two prior hearings. The court issuing the arrest order was wholly without notice of a pending bankruptcy proceeding involving Casselman.
By executing the writ, as directed, Wof-ford was properly fulfilling his official duties, acting upon an arrest order valid on its face. Law enforcement officers must not be required to discern and decide all issues of law before attempting to serve an arrest order which in all respects appears to be valid. Casselman makes no showing that the process issued was improperly obtained or invalid on its face and admits that the issuing court was given no notice of the bankruptcy proceeding until after the writ was executed. To allow a debtor to assert bankruptcy each time a process server attempts service of a civil process would significantly undermine the purpose of proceedings supplemental.
The majority herein seeks to preserve the common-law right of a citizen to resist an unlawful arrest and likewise concludes that the arrest of Casselman was unlawful. The statute in question here was enacted to enable law enforcement officers to carry out their official duties in a safe and orderly manner. The result reached by the majority would allow citizens to avoid civil arrest merely by closing the door to their homes. To allow a citizen to resist any form of civil arrest in this way would effectively eliminate all such arrests.
It is clear that the use of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer making a civil arrest cannot be justified. City of Indianapolis v. Ervin (1980), Ind. App., 405 N.E.2d 55. However, the actions of Officer Wofford in making the arrest herein were not at all improper. Wofford was acting upon an arrest order proper in all appearances. Casselman was fully informed of Wofford's official status and purpose. When the reading of the writ was interrupted, Wofford asked that Cas-selman allow him to complete the reading of the writ and they would then discuss the matter. Casselman responded by yelling at Wofford and proceeding to close the door. As Wofford reached forward to hold the door open, he was pushed backward. It was after Casselman had physically pushed Wofford away from the door that Wofford was compelled to react with force. In order to detain and subdue Casselman, Wofford was ultimately foreed to enter Casselman's home and draw his service revolver.
The "resisting" prohibited by statute occurred while Wofford was outside the Cas-selman residence, before any force whatsoever was exhibited by Wofford. The actions thereafter taken by Wofford were in no way unnecessary or excessive but were a reasonable response to Casselman's resisting the arrest. _
Recent cases have held that a citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by a person who he knows or has reason to know is a police officer performing his duties, regardless of whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful.
City of Indianapolis v. Ervin, supra; Fields v. State (1978), 178 Ind.App. 350, 382 N.E.2d 972;
Williams v. State (1974), 160 Ind.App. 294, 311 N.E.2d 619.
As the Fields Court recognizes, the common-law right of forceful resistance to unlawful arrests serves only to promote violence. That right is outmoded in modern *1320society. Fields, supra, 382 N.E.2d at 975. Quoting Miller v. State (1969), Alaska, 462 P.2d 421, at 426-427, the Fields Court states:
" 'We feel that the legality of a peaceful arrest should be determined by courts of law and not through a trial by battle in the streets. It is not too much to ask that one believing himself unlawfully ar rested should submit to the officer and thereafter seek his legal remedies in court. Such a rule helps to relieve the threat of physical harm to officers who in good faith but mistakenly perform an arrest, as well as to minimize harm to innocent bystanders. The old common law rule has little utility to recommend it under our conditions of life today.'"
Fields, supra, 178 Ind.App. at 356-357, 382 N.E.2d at 976.
If the issuance of the arrest order herein was in any way improper, Casselman's remedy should not lie at the seene of confrontation but should instead be determined in a court of law.3 The evidence presented is sufficient to support Cassel-man's conviction for resisting a law enforcement officer under sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of IND.CODE § 85-44-8-8. His conViction should be affirmed.

. IND.CODE § 34-4-11-4, IND.CODE § 34-1-41-10.

. Those sections require that an order for arrest be made by the court or its clerk upon the affidavit of the plaintiff. The arrest order is thereafter delivered to and executed by the sheriff.

. See, IND.CODE § 34-4-11-3.