Court Opinion

ID: 9390574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 20:01:18.210178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.277608
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11231    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 04/27/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11231
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       KAREN C. YEH HO,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A.,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:15-cv-81522-KAM
                          ____________________
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       2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-11231

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Karen Yeh Ho, proceeding pro se, appeals following the
       judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
       (“Wells Fargo”) as to her claims arising from the foreclosure pro-
       ceedings of her home, and the loan modification activities during
       the foreclosure proceedings. First, she argues that the district court
       erred in granting summary judgment to Wells Fargo as to her dis-
       crimination claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
       (“ECOA”) and as to her claim under the Real Estate Settlement
       Procedures Act (“RESPA”). 1 Second, she argues that the district
       court erred in entering judgment after a bench trial on her ECOA
       notice claim. Third, Yeh Ho contends that the district court erred
       in striking her demand for a jury trial. 2 Fourth, she asserts that she
       is entitled to punitive damages.
                                                   I.

       1 We summarily reject Yeh Ho’s RESPA claim. She failed to address this claim
       in her initial brief on appeal and she cannot adopt her brief in a case not con-
       solidated with this case.
       2 We also summarily reject this claim. Yeh Ho has abandoned this claim by
       failing to sufficiently address the issue in her brief on appeal. In any event, the
       district court did not abuse its discretion in striking her demand for a jury trial
       because Yeh Ho failed to respond to Wells Fargo’s motion in the district court.
       See S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1) (stating that failure to respond to an opposing
       party’s motion may be deemed sufficient cause for granting the motion).
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       22-11231                Opinion of the Court                         3

              We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, apply-
       ing the same legal standards as the district court. Yarbrough v. De-
       catur Hous. Auth., 941 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2019).
               On appeal from a judgment in a bench trial, we review a dis-
       trict court’s conclusions of law and the application of law to the
       facts de novo, but review the district court’s factual findings for
       clear error. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. S. Tr.
       Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018). A district court’s
       findings of fact will not be reversed unless we are left “with the
       definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”
       after reviewing the record. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
               “When considering a motion for summary judg-
       ment, . . . courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences in
       the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when con-
       flicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must]
       credit the nonmoving party’s version.” Feliciano v. City of Miami
       Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omit-
       ted, second alteration in original) (concluding that the district court
       erred in improperly discounting the plaintiff’s sworn statements
       and accepting the officers’ assertions as uncontroverted). “Even if
       a district court believes that the evidence presented by one side is
       of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment
       on the basis of credibility choices.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       However, the factual dispute must be genuine, “that is, if the evi-
       dence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
       nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11231

       248 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
       of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence
       on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at
       252.
               “[I]ssues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are
       deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
       Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Campbell,
       26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that issues not
       properly presented on appeal are deemed forfeited and will not be
       addressed absent extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied, 143 S.
       Ct. 95 (2022). “We have long held that an appellant abandons a
       claim when [s]he either makes only passing references to it or raises
       it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au-
       thority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681
       (11th Cir. 2014). Likewise, “[t]his Court has repeatedly held that
       an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time
       in an appeal will not be considered by this [C]ourt.” Access Now,
       Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (quo-
       tation marks omitted)).
               Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
       that, “[i]n a case involving more than one appellant or appellee, in-
       cluding consolidated cases, any number of appellants or appellees
       may join in a brief, and any party may adopt by reference a part of
       another’s brief.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(i). Our local rules explain that,
       in order to adopt another party’s brief, the appellant must “include
       a statement describing in detail which briefs and which portions of
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       22-11231               Opinion of the Court                         5

       those briefs are adopted.” 11th Cir. R. 28-1(f). Federal Rule of Ap-
       pellate Procedure 28(i) does not allow parties in non-consoli-
       dated appeals to automatically adopt and rely on briefs of another
       case unless they separately move for adoption and the motion is
       granted. United States v. Bichsel, 156 F.3d 1148, 1150 n.1 (11th Cir.
       1998).
              The ECOA provides that it shall be unlawful for any creditor
       to discriminate against any applicant on the basis of marital status.
       15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). Regulation B was promulgated to enforce
       the ECOA. Regions Banks v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184,
       1190 (11th Cir. 2019); see 12 C.F.R. § 202 et seq. Both the ECOA
       and Regulation B carve out exceptions for actions that are not con-
       sidered discrimination, including when a creditor may require a
       spouse’s signature. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(a); 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d).
       Under the ECOA, a creditor does not engage in discriminatory con-
       duct when making “[a] request for the signature of both parties to
       a marriage for the purpose of creating a valid lien, passing clear ti-
       tle, waiving inchoate rights to property, or assigning earnings.” 15
       U.S.C. § 1691d(a). Likewise, Regulation B provides that a creditor
       may require a spouse’s signature upon an applicant’s request for
       secured credit if the creditor reasonably believes it necessary “un-
       der applicable state law to make the property being offered as se-
       curity available to satisfy the debt in the event of default.” 12
       C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4).
             Additionally, both the ECOA and Regulation B include ex-
       ceptions to creditor conduct constituting “adverse action.” 15
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11231

       U.S.C. § 1961(d)(6) (stating that the term “does not include a refusal
       to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement
       where the applicant is delinquent or otherwise in default”); 12
       C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(2)(ii) (explaining that any action or forbearance
       taken with respect to an account that is delinquent or in default is
       not adverse action).
               The ECOA and Regulation B also impose certain notifica-
       tion requirements for creditors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d); 12 C.F.R.
       § 202.9. The ECOA requires creditors to provide applicants against
       whom adverse action is taken with a statement of reasons regard-
       ing the action. 15 U.S.C. § 1961(d)(2). If an application is incom-
       plete, the creditor must, within 30 days of receiving the incomplete
       application, send the applicant a written notice “specifying the in-
       formation needed, designating a reasonable period of time for the
       applicant to provide the information, and informing the applicant
       that failure to provide the information requested will result in no
       further consideration being given to the application.” 12 C.F.R.
       § 202.9(c)(1)-(2). If the applicant fails to provide the requested in-
       formation within the designated time period, the creditor is re-
       lieved of other notification requirements. Id. § 202.9(c)(2). A cred-
       itor may orally inform an applicant of the need for additional infor-
       mation, but if the applicant does not supply the information, the
       creditor must send the written notice. Id. § 202.9(c)(3).
              The Florida Constitution states that “[t]he owner of home-
       stead real estate, joined by the spouse if married, may alienate the
       homestead by mortgage, sale or gift.” Fla. Const. art. X, § 4.
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       22-11231               Opinion of the Court                        7

       “Florida courts have consistently interpreted this . . . provision as
       requiring spousal joinder in the execution of a mortgage on home-
       stead property in order for the mortgage to encumber the property
       and be enforceable in foreclosure, even where only the signatory
       spouse is an owner of record on the property’s deed.” Crawford v.
       Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 266 So. 3d 1274, 1277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
       2019).
              The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
       Wells Fargo on Yeh Ho’s ECOA discrimination claim but denied
       summary judgment on her ECOA notice claim. In the subsequent
       bench trial on the ECOA notification claim, the district court cor-
       rectly concluded that Wells Fargo had satisfied applicable notice
       requirements.
              We first address Yeh Ho’s argument that the district court
       erred in granting summary judgment for Wells Fargo on her
       ECOA discrimination claim. We conclude that the district court
       did not err. Because Yeh Ho had defaulted on the loan at the time
       Wells Fargo offered the loan modification, the anti-discrimination
       provision of the ECOA and Regulation B did not apply to her. 15
       U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6); 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(c)(2)(ii). On appeal, Yeh Ho
       does not dispute that the loan was in default. Moreover, even as-
       suming the relevant anti-discrimination provisions did apply to her,
       the district court correctly concluded that it was reasonable for
       Wells Fargo to require either Wing’s signature or a divorce decree
       in light of Florida’s homestead laws. See Crawford, 266 So. 3d at
       1277; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691d(a), 1691(b)(1). The ECOA expressly
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11231

       provides that such a requirement does not constitute discrimina-
       tion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691d(a), 1691(b)(1).
               Turning to Yeh Ho’s argument that the district court erred
       in entering judgment in favor of Wells Fargo after the bench trial
       on her ECOA notice claim, we also conclude that the district court
       did not err. We conclude that Wells Fargo satisfied the notice re-
       quirements with respect to the deficiencies in Yeh Ho’s application
       for loan modification. The evidence presented at the bench trial
       demonstrates that, within 30 days after receiving Yeh Ho’s final
       trial payment (deemed by the district court to constitute an appli-
       cation for loan modification), Wells Fargo sent Yeh Ho the Novem-
       ber 25, 2013, letter regarding the information it needed to complete
       the application, which Yeh Ho concedes that she received. This
       letter satisfied 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(2)’s requirements, because it: (1)
       specified the information needed, including her and Wing’s signa-
       tures, or documents indicating why he should not have to sign; (2)
       designated a reasonable time period of 14 days to provide the in-
       formation; and (3) informed her that failure to provide the required
       information would result in Wells Fargo cancelling the modifica-
       tion. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(c)(2). Moreover, although Yeh Ho’s failure
       to supply the required information relieved Wells Fargo of any
       other notification requirements, Wells Fargo subsequently in-
       formed Yeh Ho of the application’s incompleteness again via
       phone call on January 2, 2014, and then notified her that it could
       not finalize the agreement on January 13, 2014. 12 C.F.R. §
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       22-11231                  Opinion of the Court                               9

       202.9(a)(1)(ii), (c)(2), (c)(3). The district court thus did not err in
       concluding that Wells Fargo provided the requisite notice.
             Because all of her claims have failed, 3 Yeh Ho is not entitled
       to punitive damages.
              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is
              AFFIRMED.

       3 Although Yeh Ho also asserts breach of contract claims on appeal, she did
       not raise such claims in the district court. Thus, such claims are not properly
       before us.