Court Opinion

ID: 9895593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 21:00:19.760004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:36.872663
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 23-1040

                       NANCY DER SARKISIAN,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                    AUSTIN PREPARATORY SCHOOL,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Gelpí, Selya, and Lynch,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Rory FitzPatrick, Kyle W. Cunningham, and Cetrulo LLP on brief
for appellant.
     Jonathan R. Shank and Jackson Lewis P.C. on brief for
appellee.

                         November 7, 2023
             LYNCH, Circuit Judge.          At the beginning of the 2019-2020

school year, Nancy Der Sarkisian, then sixty-nine years old and a

ninth-grade English teacher at Austin Preparatory School ("Austin

Prep"), began what she had told Austin Prep would be a four-week

leave of absence for hip surgery.                When Der Sarkisian experienced

complications that required further surgery -- and which her doctor

anticipated would leave her incapacitated for an additional three

months -- Austin Prep extended her leave of absence. Der Sarkisian

then experienced even more complications that required even more

surgery.     When Der Sarkisian's doctor told the school that she

would be unable to work with or without accommodations for an

additional     three       to   six   months,     Austin    Prep   terminated      her

employment and offered her the opportunity to reapply when she was

cleared to work.

             Instead, Der Sarkisian brought claims for disability

discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (Count I)

and for age discrimination in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B

(Count    II).       The    U.S.      District    Court    for   the    District   of

Massachusetts granted summary judgment for Austin Prep on both

counts.     Der Sarkisian v. Austin Preparatory Sch., 646 F. Supp. 3d

174   (D.    Mass.     2022).          As   to    Der     Sarkisian's    disability

discrimination claims, the district court concluded that she had

failed to carry her burden to make out a prima facie case that she

                                         - 2 -
was a "qualified individual" under the ADA and thus had also failed

to do so under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.                  As to Der Sarkisian's

age discrimination claim, the district court concluded that Der

Sarkisian had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material

fact   as   to       whether    Austin    Prep's    proffered     reason    for   her

termination was pretextual.              Der Sarkisian appeals.        We affirm.

                                           I.

                                           A.

               We recount the facts "in a light as favorable to [Der

Sarkisian] as the record will reasonably allow." Travers v. Flight

Servs. & Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 144, 145 (1st Cir. 2013).

               Austin Prep is a private Catholic school in Reading,

Massachusetts.          The school educates around 750 students a year

enrolled in grades six through twelve.

               Der Sarkisian began working at Austin Prep in 1996 as a

sixth-grade substitute teacher.                 The school offered her a full-

time position as a sixth-grade English teacher later that year.

Der Sarkisian continued to teach English to various grades at

Austin Prep. When the events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred,

Der Sarkisian was assigned to teach ninth-grade English, a class

she had taught for the previous two years, in the fall of 2019.

               For    several    school    years    up   to   and    including    the

2018-2019 school year, Austin Prep employed teaching staff under

the    terms     of    an   agreement     with     the   Austin     Prep   Teachers'

                                          - 3 -
Association (the "APTA Agreement").            The APTA Agreement allowed

teachers to accumulate up to 110 days of unused sick leave and

separately provided for one year of unpaid "[e]xtended [l]eave"

for reasons including "personal health."

           The APTA Agreement expired on August 31, 2019, and the

school adopted new policies in its place.            Under the terms of the

new sick leave policy, employees could accumulate up to sixty-five

days of unused sick leave.         The school also took out a long-term

disability insurance policy on behalf of its employees that paid

sixty   percent   of   the   employee's     salary    during    a    period   of

disability after a ninety-day waiting period.               After the APTA

Agreement ended, Austin Prep no longer had a policy of offering

one year of unpaid extended leave.

           Just   before     the   2019-2020    school   year       began,    Der

Sarkisian learned that she would need hip surgery.              On August 4,

2019, Der Sarkisian emailed Sean Brennan, Assistant Head and Upper

School Head at Austin Prep, to tell him that she had scheduled her

surgery for September 5th, the third day of the 2019-2020 school

year at Austin Prep.       Der Sarkisian stated that her "doctor said

that [she] should figure on being out of school for four weeks."

At the time, Der Sarkisian had accumulated the maximum of sixty-

five unused sick days.

           Austin Prep granted Der Sarkisian a leave of absence

until October 2019 to recover from this surgery.                    Austin Prep

                                    - 4 -
retained Jonathan Bourdeau as a substitute teacher to cover Der

Sarkisian's    ninth-grade   English   classes   during   her   leave   of

absence, which Austin Prep "expected to last for approximately

four weeks."    Bourdeau "was retained on a per-diem basis, and did

not have a contract with Austin Prep for any extended period of

time."   As such, Bourdeau could not count on sustained employment

with Austin Prep, nor could Austin Prep count on Bourdeau's

availability to cover Der Sarkisian's classes indefinitely.

          On October 13, 2019, more than five weeks after her leave

of absence began, Der Sarkisian emailed Brennan and stated that a

complication from her initial surgery meant that "a bone in [her]

hip cracked."   As a result a doctor "did a second surgery . . . to

repair the break and actually had to redo the hip replacement."

She described the experience as "a total nightmare" and stated

that "[t]he recovery [was] going to be much more difficult now

because [she] c[ould]n't put any weight on [her] right foot for 12

weeks." She stated that she was "in a critical care rehabilitation

hospital" where she "ha[d] therapy three times a day," that she

"ha[d] no idea how long [she would] be [t]here," and that she would

"[m]ost likely . . . be out for the first semester."

          Der Sarkisian's doctor completed a Certification of

Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health Condition on

October 28, 2019, in support of her request for further leave.          In

                                 - 5 -
that Certification, Der Sarkisian's doctor stated that she would

be "incapacitated" until January 5, 2020.

          In a November 14, 2019, email, John Weber, Austin Prep's

chief financial officer, told Der Sarkisian that the school had

extended her leave of absence to January 6, 2020, and that she

would need to provide clearance from her doctor to return to work.

Weber also stated that Der Sarkisian would "reach the 90-day wait

period for [long-term disability benefits] on December 2, 2019,"

at which point Der Sarkisian "w[ould] have used 59 of [her] 65

available sick days."    After using her remaining sick days, Der

Sarkisian "w[ould] not receive any pay from Austin Prep until the

first regular payroll date following [her] return to work."    Der

Sarkisian responded on November 23, 2019, that she was "going to

file for [long-term disability benefits] because [she was] going

to be out of school longer than [she] had anticipated because of

the second surgery."    Austin Prep continued to use Boudreau on a

per diem basis to teach Der Sarkisian's five classes.

          Der Sarkisian had a third surgery on November 27, 2019.

On her portion of the long-term disability benefits application

form, which she dated November 26, 2019, Der Sarkisian originally

wrote "January 2020" as her expected return to work date and then

crossed out that date and wrote "unsure after 3rd surgery."    Her

doctor completed his portion of that application on November 27,

                               - 6 -
2019, in which he stated that Der Sarkisian would have a "total

temporary disability" for "3-6 months" as of that date.

          Der   Sarkisian   submitted    her   disability    benefits

application to Austin Prep on December 4, 2019.      In an email to

Weber the following day, Der Sarkisian stated that she would not

be back at Austin Prep in January 2020 because she had needed a

third surgery on November 27, 2019, after her doctor "found an

infection in the area where the hip replacement was done, so [she]

definitely w[ould] be out longer than [she] expected."      She stated

that as part of her recovery she "ha[d] to do an intravenous

injection of antibiotics at home until at least February 7th" and

that she could not "seem to wake up from this 'nightmare.'"

          Austin   Prep     sent   Der   Sarkisian's     doctor    an

"Accommodation Request Inquiry Form" in early December 2019.       In

it, Austin Prep stated that Der Sarkisian had "requested an

accommodation [under the ADA] from [Austin Prep] in order to do

her job" and that the school was requesting information about

"whether there [wa]s a reasonable accommodation that would allow

[Der Sarkisian] to perform the essential functions of her job."

Austin Prep attached Der Sarkisian's job description to the form.

          In his response, dated December 9, 2019, Der Sarkisian's

doctor stated that she was "substantially limited" in her ability

                               - 7 -
to perform several "major life activities"1 and was unable to

"walk[], bend[], [use] stairs, squat[], lift[], [or] driv[e]."         He

stated that this impairment would last "3-6 months."        In response

to the question "What job function(s) is the employee having

trouble performing because of the limitation(s)?" Der Sarkisian's

doctor wrote "All."    In response to the question "Do you have any

suggestions    regarding   possible   accommodations   to   improve   job

performance? If so, what are they?" Der Sarkisian's doctor wrote,

in full, "She should be on total temporary disability."

          Weber called Der Sarkisian on December 26, 2019, and

stated that Austin Prep was terminating her employment effective

immediately.    In a letter dated that day, Weber stated:

          Having reviewed the Accommodation Request
          Inquiry Form dated December 9, 2019[,]
          completed by your medical provider, we
          understand that you are currently unable to
          work in any capacity. As you know, you have
          effectively been out of work since September
          4, 2019. We also understand that you expect
          to continue to be unable to work for at least
          another three to six months.         You have
          exhausted all available leave under the Family
          and Medical Leave Act and all available paid
          time off. The completed paperwork necessary
          to submit a claim for long term disability
          insurance benefits has been submitted on your
          behalf and accepted for review.

     1     Der Sarkisian's doctor stated that Der Sarkisian was
impaired in her ability to perform the following major life
activities: "Caring for Self," "Performing Manual Tasks,"
"Sleeping," "Walking," "Standing," "Working," "Lifting," and
"Bending."

                                 - 8 -
           Unfortunately, [Austin Prep] has a growing
           need to fill your position, and we cannot
           provide an extended and continuing leave of
           absence with no set end date. As we discussed
           today, we are sorry that we are unable to
           continue to reserve your position and are
           severing your employment with Austin Prep
           effective on the date of this letter. When
           you are recovered and released to work, you
           are welcome to apply for any open positions
           for which you are qualified.

Der Sarkisian was sixty-nine years old when Austin Prep terminated

her.

                                  B.

           Der Sarkisian filed a complaint in the Massachusetts

Superior Court for Middlesex County on October 2, 2020, which

Austin Prep removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of

Massachusetts on November 13, 2020.         Count I of Der Sarkisian's

complaint alleged discrimination on the basis of a disability in

violation of Title I of the ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.2

Count II alleged discrimination on the basis of age in violation

of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4.

           After   attempting   mediation    without   resolution,   the

parties did discovery.    Austin Prep moved for summary judgment on

both counts on December 15, 2021.           The district court heard

       2  Count I alleges that Austin Prep's actions were a
"[v]iolation of M.G.L. c. 151B § 1 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101." These
are the definitional provisions of their respective statutes;
neither provision prohibits conduct or establishes a cause of
action. The district court construed Count I as alleging claims
under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(16) and 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

                                 - 9 -
argument on Austin Prep's summary judgment motion on November 30,

2022.

            The district court granted Austin Prep's motion as to

both counts in a Memorandum and Order dated December 6, 2022.                      Der

Sarkisian,    646    F. Supp. 3d     at   178.      As   to     Der    Sarkisian's

disability discrimination claim, the district court held that

"regular    attendance    was   an   'essential     function'         of    Mrs.   Der

Sarkisian's role" at the time she was terminated in December 2019.

Id. at 185.         The court concluded that Der Sarkisian had not

satisfied     her     burden    to    demonstrate        that     a        reasonable

accommodation existed that would have allowed her to perform this

essential function and thus that she could not make out a prima

facie case of discrimination based on a disability.                    Id. at 186-

87.     As to her age discrimination claim, the district court held

that Der Sarkisian had failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether Austin Prep's stated reason for her

termination was pretextual.          Id. at 188-90.

            This timely appeal followed.

                                      II.

            We review the district court's grant of summary judgment

de novo.     Travers, 737 F.3d at 146.           Under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

                                     - 10 -
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."         Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).

                                  A.

            We begin with Der Sarkisian's claims for disability

discrimination under Title I of the ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws ch.

151B, § 4(16).      "The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

[("SJC")] has indicated that federal case law construing the ADA

should be followed in interpreting the Massachusetts disability

law."    Ward v. Mass. Health Rsch. Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 33 n.2

(1st Cir. 2000).   We "analyze claims under the ADA and under [Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 151B] using the same framework." Jones v. Nationwide

Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2012).        Thus, "[a]lthough

we write in terms of the ADA, our comments apply with equal force

to [Der Sarkisian]'s claim under its state-law counterpart, Mass.

Gen. Laws. ch. 151B, § 4."    Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc.,

283 F.3d 11, 20 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002).

            We evaluate Der Sarkisian's disability discrimination

claims    under   McDonnell   Douglas's   three-step    burden-shifting

framework.    Flaherty v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 946 F.3d

41, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2019).      At step one, Der Sarkisian "has the

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that

[s]he (1) was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) was a

'qualified individual,' and (3) was discharged in whole or in part

because of h[er] disability."     Id. at 53.

                                - 11 -
          Der Sarkisian's claims fail at step one because she has

not carried her burden to demonstrate at least a genuine issue of

material fact that she is a qualified individual, and thus we

proceed no further. "In order to be a 'qualified individual' under

the [ADA], the burden is on [Der Sarkisian] to show: first, that

she 'possess[es] "the requisite skill, experience, education and

other job-related requirements" for the position, and second,

[that she is] able to perform the essential functions of the

position with or without reasonable accommodation.'"     García-Ayala

v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646 (1st Cir. 2000)

(third and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted)

(quoting Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir. 1998)).

The parties agree that Der Sarkisian generally possesses the

requisite skills and qualifications; they dispute only whether she

has demonstrated that a reasonable accommodation would allow her

to perform the essential functions of her job.

          The   district   court   found   that   regular,   in-person

attendance was an essential function of Der Sarkisian's job, Der

Sarkisian, 646 F. Supp. 3d at 184-85, and neither party disputes

that finding on appeal.    Der Sarkisian argues she has carried her

burden to demonstrate that her request for a further extension of

her leave of absence would have allowed her to perform this

essential function and was facially reasonable.      We disagree.

                               - 12 -
           First,   Der   Sarkisian   incorrectly   argues   that   the

"[d]istrict [c]ourt concluded, in effect, that the failure of Mrs.

Der Sarkisian and her physician to give a precise date for her

return rendered her accommodation request unreasonable per se."

Our review of the district court's opinion makes clear that the

district court did no such thing.     According to the district court

opinion:

           Mrs. Der Sarkisian correctly notes that
           accommodations in the form of leave requests
           "turn[] on the facts of the case."     García-
           Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d
           638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
           However, in these circumstances, an additional
           extension of leave was not a reasonable
           accommodation. Mrs. Der Sarkisian had not set
           a return date, and "[s]uch an open-ended
           request for additional leave is just the type
           of wait-and-see approach that has been
           rejected as giving rise to a triable issue on
           reasonable accommodation."    Henry v. United
           Bank, 686 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2012).

           I recognize the First Circuit has held that
           some open-ended leave requests might be
           reasonable,    but   it   has    done   so   in
           distinguishable circumstances. García-Ayala,
           212 F.3d at 649-50 (leave extension reasonable
           where employee provided specific return date,
           temporary     workers     filled     employee's
           responsibility, and employer decided to
           terminate employee based purely on company
           policy); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437,
           444   (1st   Cir.   1998)    (leave   extension
           reasonable where evidence showed that "leave
           would be temporary and would allow her
           physician to design an effective treatment
           program," company provided 52 weeks of paid
           disability leave, and company acknowledged
           that allowing the employee to recover was

                                - 13 -
            "more profitable" than hiring and training a
            new employee).

            In the context of teaching and related
            responsibilities   of    a   school,    other
            considerations are in play.      Austin Prep
            wanted to ensure that its students had
            consistency with respect to their educators.
            Moreover, Austin Prep was understandably
            concerned that Mrs. Der Sarkisian's temporary
            replacement, Mr. Bourdeau, who did not have a
            formal contract with the school, would leave
            for a position elsewhere, thus exacerbating
            the burden of an open ended accommodation to
            the school's mission. Accordingly, on these
            facts, an additional period of leave without
            end date was not a reasonable accommodation.

Der   Sarkisian,    646    F. Supp. 3d   at    186    n.9   (alterations   in

original).

            Moreover, the district court correctly concluded that

Der Sarkisian has not carried her burden to demonstrate that her

request for a further leave of absence was facially reasonable.

Der Sarkisian's claims cannot survive summary judgment if she

cannot show, at a minimum, that her proposed accommodation "seems

reasonable on its face," US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S.

391, 401 (2002) (citing Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d

254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001)) -- that is, that it is "feasible for the

employer under the circumstances," Reed, 244 F.3d at 259.

            "Courts confronted with similar requests . . . have

concluded    that   such   requests   are     not    facially   reasonable."

Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceutical LP, 856 F.3d 119, 130

(1st Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).           As the district court found,

                                  - 14 -
we    have   upheld     such   claims    only     under    circumstances         that

demonstrate the facial reasonableness of that request.                   See, e.g.,

García-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 648-50 (leave extension reasonable where

temporary workers were consistently available to fill employee's

responsibility and employer decided to terminate employee based

purely on company policy against leave of that type); Criado, 145

F.3d at 444 (leave extension reasonable where evidence showed that

"leave would be temporary and would allow her physician to design

an effective treatment program," company provided 52 weeks of paid

disability     leave,    and   company   acknowledged       that   allowing       the

employee to recover was "more profitable" than hiring and training

a new employee).        Der Sarkisian does not develop any argument for

why her request for a further extension of her leave was facially

reasonable that considers the school's need to provide continuity

and adequacy of instruction in all five of her English classes.

Nor   does    she   argue   that   the   school    faced    no    risk    from    the

possibility that the substitute teacher who had filled her teaching

role would not continue on a per diem basis and the crisis that

would result if he left.            Nor does she address the school's

legitimate concern with its inability to guarantee its ninth-grade

English      students    high-quality     education        from    a     full-time,

permanent instructor during the 2019-2020 school year as a result

of her leave.

                                    - 15 -
            Der Sarkisian argues that Austin Prep's former policy of

offering 110 sick days and a year-long unpaid leave of absence

demonstrates the facial reasonableness of her request.      Not so.

The record shows that Austin Prep had deliberately removed both

those policies before the school year at issue and instead offered

a disability insurance policy, from which Der Sarkisian received

benefits.    This change -- and Der Sarkisian's assent thereto --

renders her argument meritless.

            Der Sarkisian argues that she and Austin Prep "[1] could

have agreed that Mrs. Der Sarkisian would take an unpaid leave of

absence and return in September; . . . [2] could have agreed to

see where things stood with Mrs. Der Sarkisian's health after three

months, the short end of [her doctor's] estimate; . . . [or]

[3] could have discussed whether other faculty members could cover

her classes pending her return." Der Sarkisian did not raise these

arguments to the district court.    In fact, at least one of these

newly raised proposed accommodations directly contradicts Der

Sarkisian's argument to the district court that "Austin Prep would

not have had to lower any of its employment standards or reallocate

any essential functions of her job to make other workers' jobs

more onerous in order to accommodate Mrs. Der Sarkisian."     These

arguments are waived.    See Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94,

102 (1st Cir. 2006) ("This prophylactic rule requires litigants to

spell out their legal theories face-up and squarely in the trial

                               - 16 -
court; if a claim is 'merely insinuated' rather than 'actually

articulated,' that claim ordinarily is deemed unpreserved for

purposes of appellate review." (quoting McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of

Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991)).

           Even    if   not   waived,    these     newly   raised    proposed

accommodations fail.      Der Sarkisian failed to develop any evidence

in the record that the belatedly argued "accommodations" would

have satisfied the school's need for instruction of her five

classes and its need to afford its students continuity and avoid

the risk of chaotic disruption.         See Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 128

("[W]here a plaintiff fails to show facial reasonableness, summary

judgment for the defendant is appropriate.").          Further, the school

was "not obligated to offer an 'accommodation' to an employee that

is contrary to medical advice."              Jones v. Walgreen Co., 765

F. Supp. 2d 100, 108 n.3 (D. Mass 2011), aff'd, 679 F.3d 9 (1st

Cir. 2012).   And Der Sarkisian's proposal that other faculty --

who were already teaching full course loads and subjects other

than English -- should take on her teaching responsibilities is

unreasonable on its face.      "[T]he law does not require an employer

to   accommodate   a    disability   . . .    by   reallocating     essential

functions to make other workers' jobs more onerous."                Richardson

v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 594 F.3d 69, 81 (1st Cir. 2010)

(alteration in original) (quoting Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d

141, 153 (1st Cir. 2006)).

                                  - 17 -
              Finally,   because    Der    Sarkisian   has   not   carried   her

burden to demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation existed, we

need not address her argument that the school failed to engage in

an interactive process.          Echevarría, 856 F.3d at 133.

              Because Der Sarkisian has not carried her burden to set

out a genuine issue of material fact on an essential element of

her prima facie case of disability discrimination, Austin Prep was

entitled to summary judgment on her ADA and Mass. Gen. Laws

ch. 151B disability discrimination claims.

                                          B.

              Der Sarkisian argues the district court also erred in

granting summary judgment for Austin Prep on her claim of age

discrimination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.               The SJC applies

the       McDonnell    Douglas     burden-shifting      framework     to     age

discrimination claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. See Abramian

v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1084-85

(Mass. 2000).         For the purposes of summary judgment no party

disputes steps one or two of this framework.3           Instead, Austin Prep

      3   At step one, Der Sarkisian "has the burden to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that '(1) [s]he is
a member of a class protected by [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B];
(2) [s]he performed [her] job at an acceptable level; (3) [s]he
was terminated; and (4) [her] employer sought to fill the
plaintiff's   position   by   hiring   another   individual   with
qualifications similar to the plaintiff's." Id. at 1084 (quoting
Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Bos., Inc., 646 N.E.2d 111,
115 (Mass. 1995)).     At step two, Austin Prep "can rebut the
presumption" created by the prima facie case by "articulating 'a

                                     - 18 -
argues that Der Sarkisian cannot carry her step three burden to

"show that the reasons advanced by the employer for making the

adverse    decision    are   not    true"    --   that    is,   that    they    are

pretextual.      Id. at 1085.      The district court concluded that Der

Sarkisian had not demonstrated that a genuine issue of material

fact existed as to pretext.         We agree.

            Der Sarkisian's pretext evidence consisted entirely of

three teacher comparators, all three of which the district court

rejected.     Der Sarkisian, 646 F. Supp. 3d at 189-91.                On appeal,

Der Sarkisian argues only that Austin Prep's "disparate treatment"

of one of these comparators -- Austin Prep science teacher Katy

Haughn -- "proves that Austin Prep discriminated against Mrs. Der

Sarkisian due to her age."

            As   the   district     court   rightly      recognized,     no    such

disparate treatment occurred.         Id. at 189.      The parties agree that

Haughn, who was thirty-eight years old at the time, began a leave

of absence due to a medical condition in the first semester of the

2019-2020 school year.       The parties further agree that when "Ms.

Haughn's    medical    provider    completed      an   Accommodation      Request

Inquiry Form, which indicated that Ms. Haughn was unable to perform

any of the essential functions of her job with or without an

lawful reason or reasons for its employment decision [and]
produc[ing] credible evidence to show that the reason or reasons
advanced were the real ones."       Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Blare, 646 N.E.2d at 115).

                                    - 19 -
accommodation    .    .   .   Austin   Prep      terminated   Ms.    Haughn's

employment."    As the district court stated, "Austin Prep treated

Ms. Haughn and Mrs. Der Sarkisian in exactly the same manner,

despite their differences in age."         Id.

           Der Sarkisian develops no further argument on appeal in

defense of her age discrimination claim.

           Because Der Sarkisian has not demonstrated a genuine

issue of material fact as to pretext, an essential element of her

claim   under   the   SJC's   application     of   the   McDonnell    Douglas

framework, Austin Prep was entitled to summary judgment on her age

discrimination claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B.

                                   III.

           We affirm.

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