Court Opinion

ID: 9861063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:40:18.84983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:09.581885
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COUSINS, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the part of the majority opinion holding that the equitable lien claim set forth in appellant’s complaint was properly dismissed by the trial court. (See Pruitt Office Machines, Inc. v. Liberty National Bank (1950), 341 Ill. App. 146,149, 93 N.E.2d 104; Oppenheimer v. Szulerecki (1921), 297 Ill. 81, 87,130 N.E. 325.) However, in my opinion the majority errs in holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the mechanic’s lien claim set forth in count I of appellant’s complaint. As the appellant, Leveyfilm, Inc., sets forth in its complaint, this case arises out of a leasehold interest held by Leveyfilm in a portion of the premises in question. The defendant was at all relevant times the owner and lessor of the subject property. In paragraph 11 of count I, Leveyfilm alleges that "Lessor *** at various times specifically requested that *** lessee contribute to provide services, labor and expenditures in connection with the lessor’s and beneficial owner’s efforts to maintain and improve the real estate.” Leveyfilm also alleges in paragraph 12 of count I that "[tjhere existed *** a contract or contracts partly expressed and partly implied, with respect to the repair and improvement by Leveyfilm of the real estate.” The salient issue in the instant appeal is whether a lessee who performs work in leased premises may assert a lien as a "contractor” under the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act (Act). (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 1992).) The majority’s expression is that "[t]he precise issue in the present case is whether an owner may authorize a tenant to perform repairs and improvements himself, and then claim that the Act does not apply merely because the tenant directly provided the labor and services rather than contract with a third party.” (274 Ill. App. 3d at 353.) The majority then opines "[a]s a matter of first impression, we hold that he may not.” (274 Ill. App. 3d at 353.) I believe that the majority’s impression is mistaken. Recognizing the lack of authority for its impression, the majority writes: "The only case in Illinois which even remotely involves a tenant claiming a mechanic’s lien for his own repairs and improvements upon lessor’s property is Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Hedstrom [citation] ***.” (274 Ill. App. 3d at 353 n.3.) Actually, there are absolutely no precedents to support the majority’s impression in the instant case. The majority’s statement that "any person who makes an improvement to land under a contract with the owner can claim a mechanic’s lien” (274 Ill. App. 3d at 352) has limitations. Although the Act begins with the words "any person,” lessees are clearly excluded because of the extensive specification of the kinds of work, service, and occupations (including architects and mechanics) and the designation of the persons specified as contractors. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides guidance for interpreting the Act in the instant case. Under this rule, when an act lists things to which it refers, the court may infer that any omissions were intended as exclusions, even if there are no negative words prohibiting it. See Villegas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1994), 266 Ill. App. 3d 202, 211, 639 N.E.2d 966; La Salle National Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners Association (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 654, 670, 440 N.E.2d 1073. I disagree with the majority’s view that the landmark cases of Carey-Lombard Co. v. Jones (1900), 187 Ill. 203, 58 N.E. 347, and Boyer v. Keller (1913), 258 Ill. 106, 101 N.E. 237, are inapposite. In Carey-Lombard, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that a tenant who performs repairs or other work with respect to leased premises is not the type of person intended to be protected by the Mechanics Lien Act and has no right to assert a lien under the Act. The Illinois Supreme Court wrote: "It cannot be seriously claimed that under the [lease] agreement the lessees contracted with [the lessor] to furnish materials or perform any of the labor or services named in the foregoing section of the [mechanics lien] statute, by the doing of which they would, by that section, be known as 'a contractor.’ [(Emphasis omitted.)] The statute is, as its title indicates, for the security of mechanics and those who furnish material for buildings, etc., therein named. Agreements made under its provisions are known in the law as building contracts, sometimes termed ’working contracts.’ *** *** [W]e assume that no one would contend that [the lessees], under their contract with the [lessor], could have enforced a lien against the leased property for any improvements placed upon it by them under this agreement.” (Emphasis added.) (Carey-Lombard, 187 Ill. at 208-09.) Also, in Boyer, the court wrote: "[I]t is insisted that the lessee, Keller, occupies the position of original or principal contractor, and that as these lien claimants were all subcontractors, they are bound by the terms of the contract between the principal contractor, Keller, and the owners ***. This same contention was made in Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Jones [(1900)], 187 Ill. 203, where a similar contract was before us for consideration and was decided adversely to the contention of appellees.” Boyer, 258 Ill. at 113. Finally, the majority writes that "[i]t is clear that the Illinois legislature has chosen to write the Act broadly so as to include 'any person’ who satisfies the requirements of a lien.” (274 Ill. App. 3d at 352.) However, the clear intent of the Act is to protect mechanics and other persons who are contractors for improvements made to the property of others. A lessee with knowledge of the owner may contract with contractors who may have lien rights. However, a lessee has an interest in the land and is not a contractor under the Act. (Carey-Lombard, 187 Ill. at 208.) Thus, a lessee is not the subject of the operation of the Mechanics Lien Act. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subject to their operation, and courts will read nothing into such statutes by intendment or implication. (See O’Neill v. Brown (1993), 242 Ill. App. 3d 334, 339, 609 N.E.2d 835.) The Mechanics Lien Act is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly rather than broadly construed. (Delaney v. Schiessle (1992), 235 Ill. App. 3d 258, 265, 601 N.E.2d 978.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the mechanic’s lien claim in the instant case.