Court Opinion

ID: 9881270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 21:04:11.596119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:11:40.244022
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Fabela CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,                                                  A166534

 v.                                                           (Napa County
 FLORENTINO FABELA,                                           Super. Ct. No. CR160883)
      Defendant and
 Appellant.

          Florentino Fabela appeals from the trial court’s order
terminating his probation as unsuccessful based on his failure to
report to his probation officer upon reentry to the country after
being deported. Fabela argues and the Attorney General
concedes that the trial court erred because there is no evidence in
the record that Fabela reentered the country during his probation
period. Fabela asks us to order the trial court to enter an order
terminating his probation as successful at the end of the
probation period, but we agree with the Attorney General that
the proper remedy is to reverse the judgment and remand to the
trial court.

                                                      1
                         BACKGROUND
      In June 2012, Fabela pled guilty to one count of possession
of a controlled substance for sale, in violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (b). The trial court
suspended imposition of sentence and granted formal probation
for three years. One condition of probation was that Fabela had
to immediately report to his probation officer if he reentered the
country after being deported.
      In January 2013, the Napa County Probation Department
filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging Fabela had begun
the deportation process in July 2012 and had never reported to
the probation officer. The trial court summarily revoked Fabela’s
probation and issued a bench warrant.
      Fabela was arrested on the warrant in September 2022. At
the contested revocation hearing, Fabela’s probation officer
testified that Fabela had never reported to probation prior to his
September 2022 arrest. Fabela told the probation department in
a pre-arraignment interview that he had been deported in
October 2012. Fabela later returned to the United States and
had been living with his family in San Jose at the time of his
arrest.
      The trial court noted there was no testimony as to when
Fabela had reentered the country, but it concluded that Fabela
had committed a “technical violation” by failing to report after
reentering. The trial court then terminated Fabela’s probation
unsuccessfully.

                                 2
                           DISCUSSION
      Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (a) allows a trial
court to summarily revoke a defendant’s probation “if the
interests of justice so require and the court, in its judgment, has
reason to believe from the report of the probation . . . officer or
otherwise that the person has violated any of the conditions of
their supervision, or has subsequently committed other offenses,
regardless of whether the person has been prosecuted for those
offenses.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (a); People v. Leiva (2013)
56 Cal.4th 498, 505 (Leiva).)1 “ ‘Such summary revocation gives
the court jurisdiction over and physical custody of the defendant
and is proper if the defendant is accorded a subsequent formal
hearing in conformance with due process. [Citation.] [¶]
Therefore, after the summary revocation, the defendant is
entitled to formal proceedings for probation revocation. The
purpose of the formal proceedings is not to revoke probation, as
the revocation has occurred as a matter of law; rather, the
purpose is to give the defendant an opportunity to require the
prosecution to prove the alleged violation occurred and justifies
revocation.’ ” (Leiva, at p. 505.)
      “The standard of proof in a probation revocation proceeding
is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.]

      1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

The Legislature amended section 1203.2 in various respects after
Leiva addressed a prior version of the statute, but none of the
changes to the statutory language is relevant here. (See Stats.
2013, ch. 31, § 9; Stats. 2013, ch. 32, § 7; Stats. 2015, ch. 61, § 1;
Stats. 2019, ch. 111, § 1; Stats. 2021, ch. 533, § 1.)
                                     3
‘Probation revocation proceedings are not a part of a criminal
prosecution, and the trial court has broad discretion in
determining whether the probationer has violated probation.’
[Citation.] [¶] We review a probation revocation decision
pursuant to the substantial evidence standard of review
[citation], and great deference is accorded the trial court’s
decision, bearing in mind that ‘[p]robation is not a matter of right
but an act of clemency, the granting and revocation of which are
entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” (People
v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 772–773.)
      Fabela argues and the Attorney General concedes that
Leiva requires reversal of the judgment. In Leiva, a trial court
placed a defendant on probation in April 2000 for three years and
required him to report to his probation officers within one day of
his release from jail. (Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 502.)
However, the defendant was deported the day he was released.
(Ibid.) The trial court summarily revoked probation in
September 2001 and issued a bench warrant. (Ibid.) In
November 2008, the defendant was arrested following a traffic
stop. (Id. at p. 503.) Before the probation violation hearing, a
report indicated that the defendant had been unable to report to
probation because he was deported and had returned to the
country in February 2007. (Ibid.) At the hearing in February
2009, the trial court found the defendant had violated probation
when he returned to the country and did not report to his
probation officer. (Ibid.) The court reinstated and extended the
probation. (Ibid.) The defendant appealed. (Ibid.)

                                  4
      The defendant was deported again a month later. (Leiva,
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 503.) The trial court again summarily
revoked probation. (Id. at p. 504.) At a hearing after the
defendant returned to the country and was arrested, the trial
court ordered that probation remain revoked and sentenced the
defendant to a term in prison. (Ibid.)
      The Supreme Court reversed both orders. (Leiva, supra,
56 Cal.4th at pp. 504, 518.) Section 1203.2, subdivision (a) stated
at the time that the revocation of probation would “ ‘serve to toll
the running of the probationary period.’ ” (Id. at p. 505.) The
Supreme Court held this was intended only to preserve the trial
court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim that the defendant had
violated a condition of probation during the probationary period,
not to extend the period of probation. (Id. at p. 515.) Leiva
declared, “a trial court can find a violation of probation and then
reinstate and extend the terms of probation ‘if, and only if,
probation is reinstated based upon a violation that occurred
during the unextended period of probation.’ ” (Id. at p. 516.)
      The parties are correct that Leiva is controlling here.
Section 1203.2, subdivision (a) currently states that the
revocation of probation, “summary or otherwise, shall serve to
toll the running of the period of supervision.” For present
purposes, this language is identical in substance to the version of
the statute Leiva applied. The trial court terminated Fabela’s
probation because it believed he had violated the conditions of his
probation when he reentered the country. In a colloquy with
Fabela’s counsel, the trial court indicated that it believed the

                                 5
probation period was tolled when it summarily revoked Fabela’s
probation. Leiva rejected this reasoning, holding that a trial
court can only find a probation violation for an action that occurs
during the initial probation period, even if probation was
summarily revoked. (Leiva, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 516.)
Because there is no evidence of when Fabela reentered the
country, the record does not demonstrate that Fabela violated the
requirement that he report upon reentry during the probation
period.2
      Although the Attorney General concedes that the trial
court erred, he argues that we should remand the case for further
proceedings. Fabela argues instead that we should direct the
trial court to enter an order terminating probation as successful
nunc pro tunc to July 11, 2015, when the probation period
expired. He contends that our conclusion that the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate a violation of probation means no
issues remain to be litigated.
      Fabela relies primarily on People v. Quarterman (2012)
202 Cal.App.4th 1280. That court held that issue preclusion
barred the prosecution from initiating a second probation
violation proceeding after failing to carry their burden of proof in

      2 This is true regardless of whether the probation period

was three years, as the trial court originally ordered, or two years
under a retroactive application of the recent statutory
amendment that reduced the maximum duration of probation to
two years. (See People v. Canedos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 469,
473–474, review granted June 29, 2022, briefing deferred
pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).) We express no
opinion regarding the length of Fabela’s probation period.
                                 6
an earlier probation revocation proceeding on the same factual
basis. (Id. at pp. 1285, 1288, 1291.) But the first probation
revocation ruling in that case had issue preclusive effect because
it had become final. (Id. at pp. 1290–1291.) Here, there has been
only one probation revocation proceeding, the outcome of which is
not final because we are considering it in this appeal. (Id. at
pp. 1290–1291 & fn. 12 [judgment is final for issue preclusion
when it is “ ‘free from direct attack’ ”].) Quarterman itself
acknowledged that if the original probation ruling had been
adverse to the defendant, and the defendant successfully
appealed that ruling as unsupported by sufficient evidence, the
“reversal on appeal would have resulted in a new
hearing . . . .” (Id. at p. 1293.) Fabela does not contend that
double jeopardy principles are applicable here. (Id. at p. 1287 &
fn. 9 [“[d]ouble jeopardy principles do not apply in probation
revocation proceedings”].) In the context of a prior strike
allegation, in which double jeopardy likewise does not apply, our
Supreme Court similarly concluded that retrial of the allegation
is permitted after the appellate court reverses the finding for
insufficient evidence. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236,
241–258.)
      We recognize that Fabela’s counsel stated at the
arraignment hearing that Fabela had reentered the country
about five years earlier, after his probation period had already
expired. But statements of counsel are not evidence (People v.
Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 369, fn. 8), and neither the
prosecution nor Fabela introduced any evidence at the revocation

                                  7
hearing to show when Fabela reentered. We shall therefore
reverse and remand for further proceedings. (Leiva, supra,
56 Cal.4th at p. 518 [reversing judgment and remanding for
further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion]; § 1262
[“If a judgment against the defendant is reversed, such reversal
shall be deemed an order for a new trial, unless the appellate
court shall otherwise direct”].)
                             DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
HIRAMOTO, J.

People v. Fabela (A166534)

       
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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