Court Opinion

ID: 9557627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:53:39.307947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:06.565433
License: Public Domain

*974BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s cavalier usurpation of the district court’s authority to make evidentiary findings on contested issues of fact. Barnum specifically argued to the district court that there was no probable cause for his traffic stop because his center taillight was functioning properly, and Officer Hatler knew it was working properly yet stopped him anyway in the hope of uncovering criminal activity. The district court concluded as a matter of law that “[subsequent events demonstrate that the issues in this case do not depend in any way upon the finding of probable cause to stop the vehicle.” Thus, the district court found it unnecessary to make any factual findings concerning the disputed portions of the stop. As explained below, this conclusion of law is incorrect. Instead of correcting the district court’s erroneous legal conclusion, the majority— apparently recognizing it does in fact matter whether Officer Hatler purposely fabricated a reason for stopping Barnum — determines that, if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, it was only because Officer Hatler made a reasonable mistake of fact. By doing so, the majority assesses the record, assumes the district court implicitly made a factual finding that it expressly stated it was not making, and makes factual determinations that should have been made by, and are solely within the province of, the district court.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Barnum’s consent was voluntary. Finding Barnum’s consent was voluntary, however, “is not the end of our inquiry.” United States v. Esquivel, 507 F.3d 1154, 1160 (8th Cir.2007). “Because voluntary consent to search, which was preceded by an illegal police action, does not automatically purge the taint of an illegal detention, we must next determine if the voluntary consent was an independent, lawful cause of the discovery of the [incriminating evidence].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal detention, we consider: “(1) the temporal proximity of his consent and the prior Fourth Amendment violation; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir.2003). Of these, “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is ‘the most important factor because it is directly tied to the purpose of the exclusionary rule-deterring police misconduct.’ ” United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1111 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir.2006)).
We have “found purposeful and flagrant conduct where: (1) the impropriety of the official’s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up.” Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir.2006). The majority correctly notes that we must presume Barnum’s center taillight was functioning properly. If we assume the taillight was working, there are two possible scenarios concerning the traffic stop: either Officer Hatler mistakenly concluded the taillight was malfunctioning, or he in fact knew it was working properly. I agree with the majority that if it is the former, then Officer Hatler’s unreasonable mistake of fact “does not constitute the type of blatantly unconstitutional or flagrant behavior condemned in Brown” Ante at 973.11
*975If, however, Officer Hatler was aware the taillight was functioning properly (or never bothered to look at the taillight) before stopping Barnum, then this is precisely the type of purposeful and flagrant misconduct that taints Barnum’s subsequent consent to search. If Officer Hatler simply fabricated a reason for stopping Barnum, then the impropriety of his misconduct would have been obvious, and he would have known such conduct was unconstitutional. Moreover, there would have been no purpose for fabricating a reason to stop Barnum other than to hope something might turn up. To rule otherwise would allow police officers to fabricate reasons for stopping motorists so long as the officers inform the suspects that the fabricated purpose of the stop is complete before obtaining their consent. If police officers stop motorists for reasons they know to be false, then those officers are engaging in conduct they know to be unconstitutional. Such a blatant disregard of constitutional rights taints any subsequent consent to search the officers may receive.
Therefore, the district court incorrectly concluded as a matter of law that the circumstances of the stop were immaterial to Barnum’s motion to suppress. To the contrary, the circumstances of the stop were critical to ruling on the motion to suppress. Instead of correcting the legal error, recognizing the need for further findings of fact, and remanding to the district court, the majority engages in its own assessment of the evidence based upon a “reasonable view of Officer Hatler’s testimony.” Ante at 973. Even more remarkable, the majority — in a footnote — constructs an entirely new and legally unsupported rule in holding that our assumptions “are limited to those necessary to establish a Fourth Amendment violation” such that we “need not and do not assume that Officer Hatler acted purposefully and flagrantly — that he knew the taillight was working or that he had any improper motive or malicious intent in initiating the traffic stop without probable cause.” Ante at 973 n. 9. The majority claims that, when a district court presumes a Fourth Amendment violation but fails to make any findings concerning the nature of the violation, this Court — if the specifics surrounding the violation are in fact relevant — -will simply assume the least culpable conduct possible of violating the constitution.
If the majority is relying on our statement in United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), that we will affirm in the absence of express factual findings so long as “any reasonable view of the evidence supports the district court’s decision,” our subsequent cases have rejected the majority’s application of this principle to the present case. The principle enunciated in Bloomfield generally applies when a district court correctly articulates the law and reaches a result such that certain factual findings are implicit in the lower court’s holding.12 For example, when the district court correctly articulates that the legal principle govern*976ing a motion to suppress is the existence of probable cause, and denies the motion to suppress without making factual findings, we can conclude the district court implicitly found probable cause, and we need not remand for express factual findings so long as any reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding of probable cause.
If, however, the district court reaches an erroneous legal conclusion that it believes obviates the need for relevant factual determinations, we must correct the legal error and remand for further proceedings. In such cases, the “absence of an explicit factual finding ... precludes us from resolving the appeal at this juncture.” United States v. Khabeer, 410 F.3d 477, 483 (8th Cir.2005). The majority avoids this logic by stating it is simply “reviewing the record to determine whether the district court’s legal conclusion-that Barnum’s consent purged the taint of any alleged Fourth Amendment violation-is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.” Ante at 972 n. 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The majority, however, makes no mention of the district court’s preceding legal conclusion that “[sjubsequent events demonstrate that the issues in this case do not depend in any way upon the finding of probable cause to stop the vehicle.” 13 As discussed, this legal conclusion is incorrect. The majority ignores this erroneous statement of the law, and instead presumes that the unmade necessary factual findings — those the district court expressly stated it was not making — were implicitly determined in favor of the government. In doing so, the majority fails to heed the Supreme Court’s admonition that “it is the function of the District Court rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 543, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988).
Because the district court’s result was premised solely on an erroneous legal conclusion, we should not scour an undeveloped record for any reasonable view of the evidence to support the district court’s result. Bloomfield is meant to apply when “the trial court omits a finding apparent on the face of the record, or when, under any possible view of the record, the district court could have reached but one result.” Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 914 (quoting United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287, 1290-91 (D.C.Cir.1991)). Had the district court correctly recognized that Barnum’s motion to suppress should be granted if Officer Hatler fabricated a reason for initiating the traffic stop, but denied his motion to suppress without making any findings concerning the stop, then we could presume the court implicitly determined the facts in favor of the government.
In this case, however, the district court’s erroneous legal conclusion precludes application of Bloomfield and requires a remand to the district court. It defies logic for the majority to assume the district court implicitly made a specific factual finding concerning Officer Hatler’s observations when the district court expressly stated' — because of an incorrect legal conclusion — that it was not making any findings in that regard. It is one thing to apply Bloomfield to facts the court must have implicitly made, it is another thing entirely to apply Bloomfield to facts the court expressly declined to make. While *977doing so is a convenient method of pretending the district court’s erroneous legal conclusion had no effect on the outcome, convenience is no substitute for rigorous analysis and a just result.
Moreover, the majority, in assessing the evidence, incorrectly implies Barnum’s theory lacks support in the record. Barnum presented maintenance records reflecting no reported problems with the taillight either before or after the traffic stop in question. In addition, employees of the service center testified it is common practice to check the taillight and to note any malfunction or necessary repairs on the service records for that vehicle. Furthermore, Officer Hatler had already come across Barnum’s vehicle in the parking lot of a hotel known as a frequent site of criminal activity, thereby increasing his motivation for stopping Barnum in the hope of uncovering criminal activity. In contrast, the only evidence the taillight was malfunctioning at the time of the stop was Officer Hatler’s testimony. In light of this evidence, the district court could conclude the taillight was working properly at the time of the stop. If it determines the light was working properly, the district court could also conclude Officer Hatler never believed the taillight was malfunctioning. Officer Hatler followed directly behind Barnum’s vehicle for twenty seconds, and it is hard to see how Officer Hatler could have mistakenly believed the taillight was not working properly. While the majority may have such faith in the sanctity of police officers to find such a scenario impossible as a matter of law, I believe the district court should resolve this contested factual issue. It is not our responsibility to determine which interpretation of the evidence is more reasonable. Rather, the district court should make its own factual findings relevant to Barnum’s motion to suppress, which we can then review for clear error.
I also disagree with the majority’s assessment of the temporal proximity factor. The majority states that Barnum gave his consent to search twelve to fifteen minutes after the allegedly illegal traffic stop. In doing so, the majority is calculating the time between when Officer Hatler first initiated the traffic stop and when Barnum gave his consent. This fails to recognize, however, that, if the traffic stop was unconstitutional, then the Fourth Amendment violation continued until the non-consensual portion of the encounter ended, i.e., when Officer Hatler returned Barnum’s paperwork and informed him that the purpose of the stop was complete. If we are assessing the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation, logic dictates that we should consider the time period between when the Fourth Amendment violation ends and when the consent to search is given. By concluding otherwise, courts reward officers for prolonging unconstitutional conduct. Therefore, in assessing the temporal proximity between the Fourth Amendment violation and the consent to search, I believe we should consider the time period from the end of the constitutional violation, not the beginning.14
Accordingly, I dissent.

. It is worth noting there is no evidence to explain how, if the taillight was functioning *975properly, Officer Hatler could have mistakenly concluded it was broke during the twenty seconds in which he was following directly behind Barnum's vehicle.

. Notably, the district court in Bloomfield made some factual findings in favor of the government based on the police officer’s testimony, which indicated the court treated the officer's testimony as credible. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 915. In this case, the district court did not make any factual findings from which we can presume the court found any portion of Officer’s Hatler’s testimony to be credible. It is entirely possible the court found Officer Hatler’s testimony to be false, but still denied the motion based on its determination that the circumstances of the stop were irrelevant; as previously explained, such an interpretation of the law would be wrong.

. The majority claims this statement simply means the district court correctly concluded that a finding of probable cause was unnecessary if Barnum's consent purged the taint of any Fourth Amendment violation. Ante at 971 n. 6. Of course, this ignores the fact that whether Barnum’s consent purged the taint of the violation was dependent upon the finding of probable cause; if Officer Flatler knew there was no probable cause, then Barnum’s consent could not have purged the constitutional violation.

. To the extent our precedent states otherwise, ante at 972, I believe such a rule is illogical, unsound, and should be reconsidered.