Court Opinion

ID: 9718763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:33:21.737039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:02.288817
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 25] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 26] For centuries, our common law tradition has recognized that businesses, professions, and individuals may be held responsible, in damages actions, for acts committed by employees or agents in the course and scope of their employment. See DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 11, 719 A.2d 509, 513; Page v. Boone’s Transp., Ltd., 1998 ME 105, ¶ 15, 710 A.2d 256, 257. This responsibility extends to improper acts by individuals who are apparent agents of a principal, see Steelstone Indus., Inc. v. North Ridge Ltd. P’ship, 1999 ME 132, ¶ 12-13, 735 A.2d 980, 983; Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Me.1995), and, in some circumstances, extends to individuals who are apparently independent contractors, see Legassie v. Bangor Publ’g Co., 1999 ME 180, ¶¶ 18-19, 741 A.2d 442, 447-48.
[¶ 27] Throughout our legal history, and until 2005, while recognizing the responsibility of businesses, professions, and individuals for the acts of their employees and agents, we limited that responsibility to acts done in the course and scope of employment. See, e.g., Mahar v. Stone-Wood Transp., 2003 ME 63, ¶ 17, 823 A.2d 540, 545 (holding that an employer is not responsible for assault and other illegal acts committed by an employee while driving a route for his employer because the illegal acts were outside the scope of employment).
[¶ 28] We had regularly turned aside efforts to extend the responsibility of businesses, professions, and individuals to include improper acts by their employees and agents that occurred outside the course and scope of their employment or agency. See id.; Korhonen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2003 ME 77, ¶ 12 n. 4, 827 A.2d 833, 837; Napieralski v. Unity Church of Greater Portland, 2002 ME 108, ¶¶ 6-11, *318802 A.2d 391, 392-93; Hinkley v. Penobscot Valley Hosp., 2002 ME 70, ¶ 16, 794 A.2d 643, 647; Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 9, 692 A.2d 441, 443-44. This limitation on liability extended even to illegal acts, such as assaults, committed while serving the employer, because we viewed such acts as being outside the scope of the employment relationship. Mahar, 2003 ME 63, ¶¶ 12-17, 823 A.2d at 544-45.
[¶ 29] In 2005 we created a narrow, carefully circumscribed exception to the common law rule, holding that an employer may be liable for the acts of an employee outside the course and scope of the employment, but only if a plaintiff could demonstrate both fiduciary duty and foreseeability. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 31-39, 871 A.2d 1208, 1219-22. That exception to the common law rule could apply only when a plaintiff could demonstrate that: (1) the employer had a fiduciary duty towards the plaintiff, and (2) the employer knew or should have known that the employee might engage in improper acts, outside the course and scope of employment, that could injure the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 38, 871 A.2d at 1222. We premised that holding on the theory of negligent supervision, carefully limited to when there was a fiduciary relationship or responsibility toward the plaintiff in a situation where the employer “knew or should have known of the risk of harm” to the plaintiff. Id. We also emphasized that “we need not and, therefore, do not address in this opinion whether negligent supervision liability may be imposed in other circumstances.” Id. ¶ 39, 871 A.2d at 1222.
[¶ 30] Despite the narrowly circumscribed negligent supervision cause of action adopted in Fortin, I dissented, expressing concern that the reasoning of the opinion would open the door to a wide range of efforts to make businesses, professions, and individuals responsible for employees’ improper acts outside the course and scope of the employment or agency. Id. ¶¶ 77-97, 871 A.2d at 1232-37 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
[¶ 31] Today, the prediction stated in the dissent four years ago comes true. The Court today fundamentally alters and dramatically expands business, professional, and individual responsibility for improper acts of employees and agents occurring outside of the course and scope of the employment or agency. With this opinion, businesses, professions, and individuals are at risk of suit and exposed to damages payments for acts by employees after hours and away from the employer’s premises that have nothing to do with furthering the objectives of the business, professional, or individual employment activity.
[¶ 32] The Court’s opinion concedes that the relationship between Dragomir and the social worker employed by Spring Harbor Hospital did not occur within the course and scope of the social worker’s employment and thus could not create a basis for the hospital’s liability on agency or respondeat superior theories. ¶¶ 13-14. Like Mahar, the social worker’s actions here were illegal acts for which he was subsequently convicted. Unlike ' Mahar, the social worker’s improper acts occurred after hours when he was off duty and away from the employer’s premises.
[¶ 33] To allow the negligent supervision claim, the Court abandons the narrow limits it imposed for consideration of negligent supervision claims in FoHin. The Court expands the criteria prerequisite to a negligent supervision claim from a fiduciary relationship to any “special relationship.” It then interprets “special relationship” expansively to include any plaintiff who alleges that he or she was somehow *319“vulnerable” in the relationship with the defendant institution or its employees.
[¶ 34] Although acknowledging that there is nothing in the present record indicating that the hospital was aware of anything in the social worker’s record that would put it on notice that the social worker had engaged in sexual improprieties with patients and might do so again, the Court allows a remand for trial or other proceedings. The Court holds that the plaintiff should again be allowed the opportunity to develop evidence of foreseeability on the part of the hospital, although the plaintiff has failed to identify such evidence in the eight years since the improprieties by the social worker were disclosed and the hospital terminated the social worker.
[¶35] Thus, with the Court’s opinion today, businesses, professions, and individuals are exposed to suit and potential liability for negligent, improper, or illegal acts by their employees occurring off premises and after hours if the plaintiff alleges that he or she had a special or vulnerable relationship to the employer or the employee. Further, such an action may proceed past the summary judgment or motion to dismiss stage even if there is no evidence, beyond speculation or unsupported allegations, that the after-hours and off-premises improprieties of the employee were in any way foreseeable by the employer.
[¶ 36] This fundamentally changes employers’ responsibility for the off-premises, after-hours actions of their employees. When “vulnerability” is all that must be alleged to “open the courtroom door,” one can easily predict a dramatic expansion of claims based on after-hours employee conduct by (i) patients against healthcare professionals and institutions, (ii) adult and minor students against schools, (iii) clients against attorneys, (iv) church members against clergy, and (v) any others who can allege that as a result of differences in financial, political, psychological, professional, or spiritual power, they are or were “vulnerable” in relation to any institution or individual against whom a negligent supervision claim is asserted.
[¶ 37] I would not so dramatically expand the risks of conducting business in the State of Maine. Businesses, professions, and individuals are responsible under the law for the negligent and/or improper acts of their employees or agents done in the course and scope of their employment. They should not be responsible for every after-hours impropriety and interaction between their employees and someone who may later claim that they were “vulnerable” as a result of their relationship to the business, profession, or individual. I would affirm the good judgment of the Superior Court that refused the plaintiffs invitation to allow this dramatic expansion of business, professional, and individual liability.