Court Opinion

ID: 9836999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:55.61025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.720432
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree with the majority’s reliance on waiver. This Court has interpreted the waiver provisions of RCM 920(f) as applying only to the instructions mentioned in RCM 920(e)(7), but not to “required instructions.” United States v. Taylor, 26 MJ 127, 128 (CMA 1988). An instruction on lesser-included offenses is one of the “required instructions” when raised by the evidence. RCM 920(e)(2). We have permitted defense counsel to affirmatively waive an instruction on lesser-included offenses to present an “all or nothing” defense, but only in those rare cases of “an affirmative, calculated, and designed course of action by a defense counsel.” See United States v. Moore, 12 USCMA 696, 700, 31 CMR 282, 286 (1962); see also United States v. Pasha, 24 MJ 87, 91 (CMA 1987); United States v. Snyder, 6 USCMA 692, 21 *458CMR 14 (1956); United States v. Bowers, 3 USCMA 615, 14 CMR 33 (1954).
In my view, the record does not show “an affirmative, calculated, and designed course of action” in this case. To the contrary, the defense position was that only three offenses were committed, that appellant had already admitted committing them, and that he had pled guilty to them. Defense counsel asked the military judge to tell the members that indecent acts are a lesser-included offense of rape and sodomy. After the military judge outlined her intended instructions, defense counsel responded that the instruction was “not exactly what I wanted, but it’s close,” suggesting that the instruction was not completely satisfactory. The subsequent comment by defense counsel, ‘Yes ma’am, I agree,” does not establish a waiver, as asserted by the majority. It is an ambiguous response, equally susceptible of interpretation as agreement with the military judge’s observation that indecent acts are a lesser-included offense of rape and sodomy. In my view, this dialog does not reflect a tactical decision to pursue an “all or nothing” defense. At best, it shows something between confusion and reluctant acquiescence.
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that the error was harmless because the evidence was overwhelming. Although appellant admitted digital penetration, he denied penile penetration. The prosecution relied heavily on medical evidence to support the allegations of rape and sodomy. Defense counsel established during cross-examination of the Government’s medical expert that the condition of the victim’s anus was not consistent with penile penetration, that there was no evidence of abrasions, tears, or scar tissue in the victim’s vagina, and that the condition of her hymenal tissue and vagina was consistent with repeated digital penetration. The defense argued that the medical evidence was consistent with penetration by appellant’s thumb or more than one finger.
Trial counsel argued that appellant committed many more offenses than the three he admitted. The military judge’s instruction gave no guidance on the number of offenses at issue. The military judge told the members that they were permitted to consider appellant’s guilty plea “to the extent that [it] admits an element of that offense which also establishes an element of [rape] or [sodomy] directly or by implication.” The military judge further instructed the members that, “[t]o the extent that an element of [indecent acts] is also an element of [rape] or [sodomy], the accused’s plea of guilty establishes that element without the necessity of further proof.” Thus, the instructions permitted the members to use appellant’s guilty plea against him on the rape and sodomy charges, but did not permit the members to use it in his favor by finding him guilty only of the lesser-included offense to which he had pleaded guilty. These instructions gave the members an “all or nothing” choice, thereby undercutting the defense theory that appellant was guilty only of the indecent acts, including the digital penetration that he had admitted in his guilty plea.
Finally, because of the defective instructions, we cannot ascertain from the record whether the members intended to convict appellant of three offenses or five offenses. If they believed that on two of the three occasions covered by appellant’s guilty plea, he did more than he admitted, then appellant stands convicted of the greater offenses, rape and sodomy, as well as the lesser-included offenses of indecent acts, for the same acts. Because of the ambiguity caused by the instructions, this Court cannot determine if appellant was convicted of both the greater and lesser-included offenses for the same acts.
For the above reasons, I would set aside the convictions of rape and sodomy and authorize a rehearing where appellant’s guilt or innocence can be determined in a correct legal framework.