Court Opinion

ID: 9943121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:12:23.032557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.039047
License: Public Domain

No. 114             February 22, 2024                  91

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

             STATE ex rel ELITEXTRX, LLC,
            an Oregon limited liability company,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
                              v.
                      Scot SIEGEL,
          Planning Director of Multnomah County,
              and MULTNOMAH COUNTY,
                 Defendants-Respondents.
             Multnomah County Circuit Court
                   22CV15736; A179527

  Stephen K. Bushong, Judge.
  Argued and submitted October 23, 2023.
   Kevin J. Jacoby argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the brief were Brittany Adikes and Green Light Law Group.
   Katherine Thomas argued the cause for respondents.
Also on the brief were Jenny M. Madkour.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  POWERS, J.
  Affirmed.
92                               State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

           POWERS, J.
          This is an appeal from a circuit court’s dismissal of a
mandamus action brought by plaintiff Elitextrx, LLC against
the planning director for Multnomah County and Multnomah
County (collectively, the county). The circuit court dismissed
the action, agreeing with the county’s position that, under
ORS 475C.053, it was not yet required to issue the Land Use
Compatibility Statement (LUCS) that plaintiff requested in
connection with obtaining a license to relocate its marijuana
production facility. Construing ORS 475C.053(2), we conclude
that whether a land use is “outright permitted” or “condi-
tional,” as those terms are used in the statute, depends on
whether the proposed use requires discretionary local per-
mit approval “within the given zoning designation where the
land is located.” Here, the county zoning designation requires
such discretionary approval and, thus, the county was not
required to issue the LUCS before plaintiff obtained that dis-
cretionary approval. Accordingly, we affirm.
          We start with a brief overview of the governing
statutes and county ordinances. To obtain a marijuana
production license from the Oregon Liquor and Cannabis
Commission (OLCC), ORS 475C.065, an applicant must
request a LUCS from the city or county that authorizes the
land use, ORS 475C.053.1 See also, e.g., OAR 845-025-1090
    1
      ORS 475C.053 was amended in 2023 after the circuit court’s decision in
this case. Or Laws 2023, ch 519, § 10. Because that amendment did not change
any operative text in the statute, we cite to the current version. ORS 475C.053
provides, in full:
         “(1) Prior to receiving a license under ORS 475C.065, 475C.085, 475C.093,
    475C.097 or 475C.548, an applicant shall request a land use compatibility
    statement from the city or county that authorizes the land use. The land
    use compatibility statement must demonstrate that the requested license is
    for a land use that is allowable as a permitted or conditional use within the
    given zoning designation where the land is located. The Oregon Liquor and
    Cannabis Commission may not issue a license if the land use compatibility
    statement shows that the proposed land use is prohibited in the applicable
    zone.
         “(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, a city or county
    that receives a request for a land use compatibility statement under this sec-
    tion must act on that request within 21 days of:
         “(a) Receipt of the request, if the land use is allowable as an outright
    permitted use; or
         “(b) Final local permit approval, if the land use is allowable as a condi-
    tional use.
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                                                93

(2)(a) (providing that OLCC “[m]ust receive a land use com-
patibility statement from the city or county that authorizes
land use in the city or county in which the applicant’s pro-
posed premises is located prior to acting on an application
* * *”); OAR 845-025-1180(2)(b) (similarly requiring a LUCS
for an application for a change of location “for the new pro-
posed location from the city or county that authorizes land
use for that location”). The LUCS “must demonstrate that
the requested license is for a land use that is allowable as a
permitted or conditional use within the given zoning desig-
nation where the land is located.” ORS 475C.053(1). OLCC
cannot issue a license if the LUCS “shows that the proposed
land use is prohibited in the applicable zone.” Id. The city
or county is required to act on a request for a LUCS within
21 days of either “[r]eceipt of the request, if the land use
is allowable as an outright permitted use,” or “[f]inal local
permit approval, if the land use is allowable as a conditional
use.” ORS 475C.053(2). It is that timing difference—within
21 days of the receipt of the request or after the final local
permit approval—that forms the underlying dispute.
         In this case, the property at issue is in an exclu-
sive farm use (EFU) zone in the jurisdiction of Multnomah
County. Chapter 39 of the Multnomah County Code (MCC)
is the Zoning Code of Multnomah County. MCC 39.1000. In
that chapter, a “permitted use” is defined as “[a] use permit-
ted in a base zone without the need for special administra-
tive review and approval, upon satisfaction of the standards
and requirements of this Chapter.” MCC 39.2000 (defining
“Permitted Use”). The MCC further provides that “Farm
use, as defined in ORS 215.203” is an “allowed use” in an
EFU zone “subject to all applicable supplementary regu-
lations contained in MCC Chapter 39.” MCC 39.4220(A).
Under state law, marijuana is “[a] crop for the purposes
of ‘farm use’ as defined in ORS 215.230” and “[a] crop for

       “(3) A city or county that receives a request for a land use compatibility
   statement under this section is not required to act on that request during the
   period that the commission discontinues licensing those premises pursuant
   to ORS 475C.950(4)(b).
       “(4) A city or county action concerning a land use compatibility state-
   ment under this section is not a land use decision for purposes of ORS chapter
   195, 196, 197, 197A, 215 or 227.”
94                              State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

purposes of a ‘farm’ and ‘farming practice,’ both as defined
in ORS 30.930.” ORS 475C.489(1)(a), (b).
         Under ORS 475C.449(2), a city or county can adopt
“reasonable regulations” on the operation of marijuana
businesses, including marijuana production.2 Under that
authority, the county has adopted regulations as part of
its zoning code that apply to marijuana businesses. That
section, MCC 39.8500 is included in the zoning code under
Part 8.D., which is titled “Special Permits and Applications.”
MCC 39.8500(D) provides, in part:
         “A proposal for establishing, altering, expanding or
     replacing a Marijuana Business will be reviewed as speci-
     fied in Table A below and is subject to the specified criteria
     therein as well as the criteria set forth in paragraph E of
     this section. * * * Where no review process for a particular
     Marijuana Business in a particular base zone is specified
     in Table A, the Marijuana Business may not operate in that
     base zone.”
Where the proposed use is for outdoor marijuana produc-
tion in an EFU zone, the proposal must comply with MCC
39.4220(A) (allowing “farm use”, subject to all applicable
supplemental regulations in MCC chapter 39), and MCC
39.8500(E), which includes additional requirements related
to siting relative to schools; setbacks for buildings and struc-
tures; limitations and required equipment related to noise,
light, and barriers; and limiting a lot of record to only one of
each of the listed types of marijuana businesses.
         With that legal background in mind, we briefly
relate the undisputed factual and procedural history of
this case. Plaintiff, who owns and operates a licensed recre-
ational marijuana production facility in Portland, planned
to relocate its facility to property located within the plan-
ning jurisdiction of Multnomah County on property zoned
EFU. In September 2021, plaintiff submitted an application
to the county for a LUCS, as required by ORS 475C.053.
    2
      As relevant to marijuana production, “reasonable regulations” include, “[r]
easonable conditions on the manner in which a marijuana producer * * * may pro-
duce marijuana”; “[r]easonable limitations on the hours during which [the busi-
ness] may operate”; “[r]easonable requirements related to the public’s access to
[the business’s] premises * * *”; and “[r]easonable limitations on where [the busi-
ness’s] premises * * * may be located.” ORS 475C.449(1)(a), (e), (f), (g).
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                                    95

The county issued a LUCS that checked the box on the form
providing that plaintiff’s proposed use “is prohibited.” The
county also included comments in the LUCS that provided:
      “MCC 39.4215 Uses specifies that no building, structure
   or land shall be used unless the use will occur on a Lot
   of Record. At present, no final land use decision has been
   made that tax lot 2N1W21-01100 is a Lot of Record.
      “The applicant, Elitextrx, LLC has not obtained approval
   of a Marijuana Business Registration from Multnomah
   County Land Use Planning. The [c]ounty’s ordinance is to
   protect and preserve the public health, safety and general
   welfare of the community by establishing restrictions on
   the siting and operation of Marijuana Businesses. [MCC
   39.8500]”
(Brackets in original.)
         Plaintiff then filed a petition for writ of review with
the circuit court. The court issued a writ, and the county
in response filed a motion seeking an order from the court
to withdraw the LUCS and revise it to comply with Scott,
Inc. v. City of Ontario, 316 Or App 633, 503 P3d 502 (2021).
The court granted the county’s motion in part, directing the
county to withdraw the LUCS and consider the application
anew using the effective date of the withdrawal as the date
the county received the LUCS application. The court further
directed the county to comply with ORS 475C.053 and Scott.
Finally, the court noted that it “has not decided the issue of
whether the request for a [LUCS] should be processed under
ORS 475C.053(2)(a) or (b).”
         Effective March 31, 2022, the county withdrew the
LUCS. On May 12, 2022, plaintiff filed a petition for an alter-
native writ of mandamus, requesting that the circuit court
direct the county to issue a LUCS because the proposed
use is “outright permitted” and not a “conditional use.” The
court issued the alternative writ. The county responded and
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff’s proposed
use was not “outright permitted,” which would be processed
under ORS 475C.053(2)(a). Instead, the county asserted that
the proposed use was subject to conditions that require local
permit approval that plaintiff had not yet obtained, which
is processed under ORS 475C.053(2)(b), and thus the county
96                      State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

was not yet required to issue the LUCS. After briefing and
argument, the court granted the county’s motion to dismiss
concluding that the LUCS was required under the timelines
set out in ORS 475C.053(2)(b) because it was not an outright
permitted use within the meaning of the statute.
         On appeal from the resulting judgment, plain-
tiff asserts that this is a case of statutory construction.
Specifically, plaintiff requests that we construe what “out-
right permitted use” and “conditional use” mean as used in
ORS 475C.053(2). Based on the text and context of the stat-
ute, plaintiff asserts that whether a use is “outright permit-
ted” or “conditional” is determined by the base zone where
the property is located. Because plaintiff’s proposed use—
marijuana production—is a “farm use” that is listed as an
“allowed” use in the county’s EFU zone, plaintiff contends
that the use is “outright permitted” and, thus, the county
had to issue a LUCS within 21 days of March 31, 2022.
         The county responds that a land use “is ‘outright
permitted’ for purposes of ORS 475C.053(2)(a) only if it is
allowed without conditions, whereas a use is ‘conditional’
for purposes of ORS 475C.053(2)(b) if it is allowed subject
to conditions met through final local permit approval.” The
county asserts that the plain text of ORS 475C.053(2) cre-
ates a dichotomy between uses that do and do not require
local permit approval and links the timing of the issuance
of the LUCS to a time when the local government knows
whether the proposed use is prohibited or allowable in the
zone. The county further argues that the statutory context
and legislative history supports its reading of ORS 475C.053.
The county also contends that plaintiff’s proposed use is not
“outright permitted” because it is subject to conditions in
the county zoning code that plaintiff must meet through
local permit approval.
         As framed by the parties’ arguments, we must
construe ORS 475C.053(2), focusing on what “outright per-
mitted use” and “conditional use” mean as those terms are
used in the LUCS statutory framework. As with any stat-
utory interpretation question, we seek to determine the
intent of the legislature by applying our usual methodology
of examining the statutory text, in context, along with any
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                                                 97

legislative history that is helpful to our analysis. State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009).
         We start with the text of ORS 475C.053(1), because
it sets out the purpose of the LUCS, viz., to inform OLCC
whether the requested license “is for a land use that is allow-
able as a permitted or conditional use within the given zon-
ing designation where the land is located.” ORS 475C.053(1).
If the land use “is prohibited in the applicable zone,” OLCC
may not issue the requested license. Id. Thus, under that
section, land uses fall into either the “allowable” or “prohib-
ited” category, and within the allowable category, the land
use is either “permitted” or “conditional.”
        The statute then sets out the timing for a city or
county to issue a requested LUCS:
        “(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this sec-
    tion, a city or county that receives a request for a land use
    compatibility statement under this section must act on that
    request within 21 days of:

       “(a) Receipt of the request, if the land use is allowable
    as an outright permitted use; or

        “(b) Final local permit approval, if the land use is
    allowable as a conditional use.”

ORS 475C.053(2).3 Paragraph (2) echoes the text from para-
graph (1) by providing two tracks for the issuance of the
LUCS for an allowable use, depending on if the allowable
use is “outright permitted” or “conditional.” However, ORS
475C.053(2)(b) also gives further context as to what the
legislature intended by its use of the term “conditional,” by
indicating it is a use that requires “local permit approval.”
        The terms “outright permitted” or “conditional”
are not defined within ORS chapter 475C. In the land use
context, however, we are not operating from a blank slate,
particularly when those terms are used in the two-cate-
gory fashion. We must presume that the legislature knew
     3
       We note that ORS 475C.053 does not explicitly provide when a city or county
is required to issue the LUCS if the proposed use is prohibited or if the city or
county ultimately does not grant final local permit approval.
98                                State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

what it was doing when it used those terms in the man-
ner that it did in the land use context. See Marshall v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 371 Or 536, 541, 539 P3d 766
(2023) (explaining that “if the context or legislative history
of a statute indicate that the legislature intended a term
to have a meaning ‘drawn from a specialized trade or field,’
so-called ‘terms of art,’ we consider ‘the meaning and usage
of those terms in the discipline from which the legislature
borrowed them’ ” (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356
Or 282, 296, 337 P3d 768 (2014))). Those terms historically
have been used in Oregon land use to distinguish between
two types of allowed uses. An outright permitted use is one
that can be done “without seeking or obtaining any further
discretionary permission from planning or zoning officials,”
whereas a “conditional use” is one that cannot be made
without obtaining a permit based on a discretionary deci-
sion. Anderson v. Peden, 30 Or App 1063, 1068, 569 P2d 633
(1977), aff’d, 284 Or 313, 587 P2d 59 (1978); see also, e.g.,
Brentmar v. Jackson County, 321 Or 481, 496, 900 P2d 1030
(1995) (discussing the legislative history of ORS 215.213 and
its origins of dividing allowed uses into two categories—
those permitted “as of right” or “uses that a local governing
body could not prevent” and those that are conditional or
“uses that were ‘subject to approval of the governing body
of the county’ ”). The usage of those terms by the legislature
here does not suggest that the legislature intended some-
thing different than that well-understood meaning.4
         In construing those terms, we reject plaintiff’s sug-
gestion that a “conditional use” can only be one that requires
a “conditional use permit.” A conditional use without further
explication is not so narrow. Although it could require a “con-
ditional use permit,” it can also encompass uses that require
some other form of local discretionary review. That inter-
pretation is confirmed by the words used by the legislature.
     4
       We note that the technical meaning of those terms does not differ substan-
tively from the common usage of those terms as reflected in the relevant dictionary
definitions. Rather, the technical meaning ties those common understandings to
the specific processes that make up land-use decisions. See Webster’s Third New
Int’l Dictionary 1683 (unabridged ed 2002) (“permit” as a verb means “to consent
to expressly or formally : grant leave for or the privilege of : allow, tolerate”); id.
at 1603 (“outright” as an adjective means “going or carried to the full extent : not
limited or qualified” or “given without reservation”); id. at 473 (“conditional” as an
adjective means “containing, implying, subject to, or depending on a condition”).
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                                                 99

The legislature did not use the term “conditional use per-
mit” in ORS 475C.053. Instead, it referred to a “local permit
approval” being required for a conditional use in the con-
text of ORS 475C.053. Additionally, the legislature used the
term “conditional use” deliberately to encompass all “allow-
able” uses that are not “outright permitted,” which concep-
tually includes a broader category of uses than one requir-
ing a “conditional use permit.” Cf. Anderson v. Peden, 284
Or 313, 316, 587 P2d 59 (1978); Auckland v. Bd. of Comm.
Mult. Co., 21 Or App 596, 601, 536 P2d 444 (1975).5 We thus
reject plaintiff’s contention that a “conditional use,” as used
in ORS 475C.053, is one that requires a “conditional use per-
mit.”6 If we were to read the statute as plaintiff’s argument
suggests, it would leave out allowable uses that are neither
“outright permitted” nor require a “conditional use permit.”
We agree with the county’s assertion that, using the words
that it did, the legislature deliberately created a dichotomy

    5
      The Supreme Court aptly pointed out in Anderson that, standing alone, the
term conditional use tells us little:
         “Standing alone, the term ‘conditional use’ can convey quite different
    meanings. It could mean that the specified use is a permitted use whenever
    certain conditions exist or are satisfied. Or, second, it may mean that the
    use will be permitted subject to special conditions attached to the individual
    permit. Third, ‘conditional use’ historically has often been employed simply
    as a device to permit discretionary decisions on certain uses, without much
    attention to the meaning of ‘conditional.’ * * * Rather than assuming that the
    term is a known word of art, it would be helpful if draftsmen would spell out
    what ‘conditions’ are meant[.]”
284 Or at 316.
    In Auckland, this court observed that a use that requires discretionary gov-
ernmental approval are quasi-judicial decisions, regardless of the label used:
    “Whenever one seeks to use property in a manner that is not an outright per-
    mitted use, and must therefore obtain governmental approval, the necessary
    governmental proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature within the meaning of
    Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973). This is true
    whether the other-than-permitted-use is sought by way of a zone change,
    comprehensive plan change, conditional use permit, variance, or as in this
    case, ‘a reclassification.’ The labels are not controlling. Instead, Fasano is
    applicable when land-use decisions affect specific individuals and involve
    application of general rules to individual interests. 264 Or at 579-81.”
21 Or App at 601 (footnote omitted).
    6
      We also reject plaintiff’s assertion that we said in Scott that “conditional
use” was only in reference to when a “conditional use permit” is required. We did
not make any such holding in Scott; rather, we merely recognized that, under the
facts of that case, the plaintiff was required to obtain a conditional use permit
because the proposed use required one in the designated zone. 316 Or App at 637.
100                              State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

of allowable uses, viz., those that are “outright permitted”
and those that are “conditional.”
         Further, taking into account that a conditional use
under ORS 475C.053(2) is one that requires “local permit
approval,” there is further contextual guidance in the zon-
ing statutes of the legislature’s likely intent. Although the
legislature has not made the definition of “permit” in the
zoning statutes apply directly to ORS 475C.053, that defi-
nition provides context as to what the legislature likely
intended with the term “local permit approval,” because
the definition of “permit” does otherwise apply to a county’s
approval of a proposed land use. In ORS 215.402(4), “permit”
is defined as “discretionary approval of a proposed develop-
ment of land under ORS 215.010 to 215.311, 215.317, 215.327
and 215.402 to 215.438 and 215.700 to 215.780 or county leg-
islation or regulation adopted pursuant thereto.”7 See also
ORS 227.160(2) (using the same definition as applied to cit-
ies, except referring to the statutes that apply to cities).
         Our interpretation is further supported by the stat-
utory context in ORS 475C.449, which was adopted at the
same time as ORS 475C.053, and, as set out above, allows
local governments to adopt reasonable regulations that
apply to marijuana business, including specifically reason-
able regulations on the location of such businesses. See ORS
475C.449(1)(g) (“ ‘[R]easonable regulations’ includes * * *
[r]easonable limitations on where a premises for which a
license or certificate may be issued under ORS 475C.005 to
475C.525 may be located.”). The legislature expressly allows
    7
      The definition of “permit” further provides that “ ‘[p]ermit’ does not include:
        “(a) A limited land use decision as defined in ORS 197.015;
        “(b) A decision which determines the appropriate zoning classification
    for a particular use by applying criteria or performance standards defining
    the uses permitted within the zone, and the determination applies only to
    land within an urban growth boundary;
        “(c) A decision which determines final engineering design, construction,
    operation, maintenance, repair or preservation of a transportation facility
    which is otherwise authorized by and consistent with the comprehensive plan
    and land use regulations; or
        “(d) An expedited land division, as described in ORS 197.360.”
ORS 215.402(4). Under ORS 197.015(12), a “limited land use decision” is a deci-
sion on matters not at issue in this case with respect to sites within an urban
growth boundary.
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                               101

local governments to apply those regulations to marijuana
production, which is an allowed “farm use,” and provides
that those regulations can be imposed notwithstanding the
statutes that otherwise restrict a local government’s abil-
ity to regulate farm use in an EFU zone. ORS 475C.449(2)
(“Notwithstanding ORS 30.935, 215.253(1) or 633.738, the
governing body of a city or county may adopt ordinances
that impose reasonable regulations * * *”). The existence of
that statute indicates that the legislature contemplated that
local governments would be able to impose those regulations
through local permit approval, including on marijuana pro-
duction in EFU zones.
         From the foregoing text, in context, we conclude
that whether a use is outright permitted or conditional, as
provided in ORS 475C.053, depends on whether the proposed
use requires discretionary local permit approval “within the
given zoning designation where the land is located.” See also
Scott, 316 Or App at 638-39 (emphasizing that the purpose
of a LUCS under ORS 475C.053 is to inform OLCC whether
the use is allowable “within the given zoning designation
where the land use is located”).
         After reviewing the legislative history for ORS
475C.053, we conclude that, although it provides little help
in discerning the legislature’s intent on the issue here, it
does not suggest that the legislature intended something
different from what we have discerned from the text and
context. The legislature enacted ORS 475C.053 as part of
House Bill 3400 (2015), which was a comprehensive bill that
enacted, added to, and amended Ballot Measure 91 that had
just been adopted by the voters in the 2014 general election.
Or Laws 2015, ch 1; Or Laws 2015, ch 614, § 34(4). As orig-
inally drafted, HB 3400 did not include a section similar to
ORS 475C.053. That section was added to HB 3400, along
with many other additions and amendments to the bill,
with the -1 amendments. HB 3400 (2015), -1 amendments
(May 18, 2015). The -1 amendments added a section, which
provided:
      “Prior to the issuance of any license under section 19,
   20, 21 or 22, chapter 1, Oregon Laws 2015, the Oregon
   Liquor Control Commission [now known as the Oregon
102                      State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

   Liquor and Cannabis Commission] shall request a land
   use compatibility statement from the city or county that
   authorizes the land use. The land use compatibility state-
   ment must demonstrate that the requested license is for
   a land use that is allowable as a permitted or conditional
   use within the given zoning designation where the land is
   located. The commission may not issue a license if the land
   use compatibility statement shows that the proposed land
   use is prohibited in the applicable zone.”
Id. § 35(5).
          There was limited public discussion or testimony
related to the land use section of the -1 amendments that
are at issue in this case. MaryAnne Nash of the Oregon
Farm Bureau touched on the land use section more gener-
ally, testifying that in EFU zones there are outright permit-
ted uses and conditional uses that require local governing
body review and expressing concern that it was not clear
from the bill when a county can impose land use condi-
tions. Video Recording, Joint Committee on Implementing
Measure 91, HB 3400, May 20, 2015, at 4:35 (statement
of MaryAnne Nash), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov
(accessed Feb 13, 2024). The only discussion of the LUCS
section came from Katherine Daniels from the Department
of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD). Daniels
briefly expressed the concern that the section required the
LUCS only to show when the proposed use was allowable and
would not inform OLCC if the use would be approved. She
testified that it would be preferrable if the LUCS addressed
whether the proposed use was approved, because otherwise
an applicant could spend time and money to get a license
from OLCC and not end up with land use approval. Video
Recording, Joint Committee on Implementing Measure 91,
HB 3400, May 27, 2015, at 28:45 (statement of Katherine
Daniels, DLCD), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed
Feb 13, 2024). As part of several suggested changes to HB
3400, DLCD suggested that the LUCS provision be amended
to provide that the LUCS “must demonstrate that the
requested license is for a land use that has been approved
within the given zoning designation where the land is
located” and that OLCC could not issue a license where the
land use “has not been approved in the applicable zone.”
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                              103

Testimony, Joint Committee on Implementing Measure 91,
HB 3400, May 27, 2015, Ex 3 (statement of Michael Morrissey
and Katherine Daniels, DLCD) (boldface in original).
         Later, in the -9 amendments—which again con-
tained many revisions to the overall bill—the LUCS pro-
vision in HB 3400 was amended to add the language that
became ORS 475C.053(2). HB 3400 (2015), -9 amendments,
(June 8, 2015). There was no discussion at any public hear-
ings on the amendment to the LUCS provision.
         From that scant legislative history, we take away
two observations. First, there was a general understand-
ing that there are two categories of allowable uses in EFU
zones—those that are permitted outright and those that are
conditional. Second, although there was no public discus-
sion, the fact of the -9 amendment to the LUCS section sug-
gests that the legislature was responding to the DLCD con-
cern that the OLCC could issue a license based on the LUCS
demonstrating the use was allowable, even though the land
use might not be approved by the local government. Those
two observations comport with our construction of the stat-
ute, discussed above, which focuses on the text and context.
        Having properly construed ORS 475C.053, we turn
to what the county code requires with respect to plaintiff’s
proposed use and whether the county is required to issue
the LUCS because it is an outright permitted use.
          Plaintiff asserts that its proposed use is an outright
permitted use under the county code because the code pro-
vides that “farm use” is an “allowed” use in the EFU zone,
MCC 39.4220(A), and that marijuana production in an EFU
zone is reviewed as a farm use, MCC 39.8500(D), Table A.
Plaintiff argues that its proposed use is not a conditional use
under the county code because MCC 39.4230 sets forth a list
of “conditional uses” in the EFU zone and marijuana pro-
duction is not listed there. Plaintiff also points to the coun-
ty’s comprehensive plan, which provides that each zoning
district “specify what uses are allowed outright or condition-
ally in each zone” and, thus, surmises that “allowed” uses in
the EFU zone must be those that are “allowed outright.”
104                             State ex rel Elitextrx, LLC v. Siegel

         The county remonstrates that state law allows it
to regulate marijuana production in its EFU zone, ORS
475C.449, and that it has done so through MCC 39.8500(D)
and (E). The county further asserts that, because plaintiff’s
proposed use is subject to the conditions in MCC 39.8500
that must be met through the local permit approval process
under MCC 39.1105, the use is not an outright permitted
use. We agree with the county’s arguments.
         Plaintiff’s proposed use of outdoor marijuana pro-
duction in an EFU zone is not an outright permitted use
“within the given zoning designation where the land is
located,” ORS 475C.053(1), because it is a use that requires
discretionary local permit approval under the county’s zon-
ing designation. Although “farm use” is an allowed use in
the EFU zone and would not ordinarily require a discretion-
ary permit approval, plaintiff’s proposed farm use requires
discretionary approval as provided in MCC 39.1105.
         The county’s zoning code defines “permitted use” as
“[a] use permitted in a base zone without the need for spe-
cial administrative review and approval, upon satisfaction
of the standards and requirements of this Chapter.” MCC
39.2000 (defining “Permitted Use”). However, the marijuana
business regulations appear in part 8.D. of the code, which
is titled “Special Permits and Applications,” indicating
that a special administrative review applies. Under MCC
39.8500(D), Table A, marijuana production in an EFU zone
is subject to MCC 39.4220(A) and is also subject to MCC
39.8500(E). MCC 39.4220(A) also provides that “[f]arm use,
as defined in ORS 215.203” is an “allowed use” in the EFU
zone “subject to all applicable supplementary regulations
contained in MCC Chapter 39.” Farm use for outdoor mari-
juana production is subject to supplementary regulations,
under MCC 39.8500(E), which are the type of regulations
that require discretionary review for approval, based on
the descriptions of those types of decision in MCC 39.1105.8
    8
      We note that MCC 39.8500(E) regulations appear to require a Type II deci-
sion under MCC 39.1105 based on the descriptions in the code of what a Type II
decision covers. We need not address that issue, however, because it is not raised
in this appeal. Although plaintiff argued before the circuit court and on appeal
that the county did not demonstrate that a permit was required for its proposed
land use, plaintiff has not addressed this issue, having focused solely on farm
use being listed as an “allowed use” and that MCC 39.8500(E) does not explicitly
Cite as 331 Or App 107 (2024)                                               105

Because plaintiff’s proposed use requires discretionary
local approval within the given zoning designation for the
land use, it is not an outright permitted use as that term is
used in ORS 475C.053(2), and, as a result, the county was
not required to issue a LUCS to plaintiff within 21 days of
March 31, 2022. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the circuit
court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s alternative writ of
mandamus.
           Affirmed.

provide that a permit is required. As explained above, we reject plaintiff’s argu-
ments on those points.