Court Opinion

ID: 9451566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:19:51.361267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:48.221488
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the opinions of Judge Waterman and Judge Tyler except that portion of Judge Waterman’s opinion which refers to applicable New York tort law and that a “damage factor” (not yet developed by any supporting proof) is present here. Until proof is developed on a trial, I am unwilling to speculate in advance whether it is here or not. Nor do I agree that the Grayson case (supra) is applicable. It may well be that future earnings in a field of employment, at most only in a planning stage, would be too speculative under New York law as a foundation for damages. However, there will be ample opportunity for counsel to argue the applicable New York law upon such trial as may take place. There is no present need for pre-judgment.
TYLER, District Judge
(concurring);
I concur in the majority view that this matter should be remanded for further proceedings. Indeed, I go further and observe that the majority opinion is one of the clearest discussions to date of the difficult problems inherent in administration of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Nevertheless, I would like to record my view that the disposition of this court should not necessarily deter the trial court upon remand in reaching the same result as that here appealed from. There is room to surmise that upon a more complete record it may turn out that the trial court was correct in dismissing this action for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
In Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842, 2 Cir. 1965 and in the majority opinion here, this court has unmistakably charted the rock and the whirlpool between which a trial judge must steer in reaching a pre-trial determination of whether or not the jurisdictional limit has been met. After two decades or more of development of liberal and full pre-trial procedures, including depositions, interrogatories, pre-trial conferences and the like, however, this is a poor time to conclude that Section 1332(a) is largely unworkable. I am sure that my colleagues do not disagree. But only by encouraging examination into the jurisdictional situation will the statute acquire and maintain significant practical value as intended by Congress. See Arnold v. Troc-coli, supra, p. 845.
A cynic might be tempted to say that what we do here today tends to indicate *102that Section 1332(a) has no particular practical value in the exigencies of usual trial practice. Yet there have been several recent instances of diligent investigation at the pre-trial stage which sufficiently illustrate that the problem can be met and solved. See Olster v. Kiamesha Concord, Inc., 232 F.Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Arnold v. Troccoli, supra. In Olster, for example, the trial judge, by ordering a further medical examination of plaintiff, was able to ascertain with legal certainty that the personal injury claim of plaintiff could not possibly meet the “claim in controversy” minimum amount. In Troccoli, searching inquiries in pre-trial developed not only the existence of another suit upon the same facts in the City Court of New York with a jurisdictional maximum of $6,000 but also findings establishing that plaintiff’s physical condition had markedly improved and thus negating her claim of aggravated injuries.
It is neither necessary nor desirable to discuss here all the potentially available techniques for searching out whether a plaintiff can possibly sustain his burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. The record, however, does suggest some considerations in this case which, if developed further, may be important. For example, plaintiff in her answers to interrogatories has given incomplete and imprecise answers to relevant questions about loss of earnings and other special damages. The medical report of February 19,1962, approximately 90 days after the alleged accident, contains little or nothing to negate the probability of a relatively quick and complete recovery. It is not inconceivable that full and early recovery would necessarily be conceded by the treating doctor; such a circumstance, in my opinion, would preclude plaintiff's claim that “she was compelled to abandon her plans to become a beautician.” Thus, I would not think it unreasonable to require plaintiff to furnish the omitted information and to submit, at her own expense, to another physical examination. In addition, if defendant is represented by an insurance company, the latter may have in its files information in the form of a frank evaluation of this claim by plaintiff and her representatives. Without further elaboration, the point is clear that further investigation here may establish that plaintiff cannot maintain her burden of proving federal jurisdiction.
Two other points deserve comment. First, if the majority opinion is to be understood to declare that the filing of another suit for the same relief in the state court, where the matter in controversy is alleged to exceed $10,000, is totally irrelevant, I would respectfully disagree. I believe that a trial judge has the right and the duty to inquire into the circumstances and good faith of filing two separate suits for the same relief, one in the state court and one in the federal court, even though, as Judge Waterman properly points out, the law theoretically permits this to be done. But inquiry into another suit filed on the basis of the same or similar allegations in a state court might reveal information adduced during the course of that other suit which would cast light upon the federal jurisdictional question. Moreover, where, as here, plaintiff’s counsel has effectively conceded that the state court suit was filed only because he had serious doubts about the existence of federal jurisdiction, I would go further and suggest that this could be considered as one circumstance tending to show that the federal action is colorable, even though I would necessarily agree that this concession standing alone is insufficient to support the ultimate conclusion. Still further, although I do not suggest that plaintiff’s counsel here contemplated such a technique, the trial court should have the right to inquire whether or not the federal suit has been filed primarily as a device to obtain more liberal discovery, the fruits of which to be used at a state court trial.
Second, although the majority opinion may not have so intended, I would not wish its discussion of those cases suggesting that the Seventh Amendment requires submission of such claims to a *103federal petit jury construed as approval thereof. In short, there would not appear to be even a threshold problem of constitutional dimensions for the simple reason that a plaintiff, as, for example, Mrs. Deutseh, clearly has a right to a jury trial in a state court of proper jurisdiction.
In sum, even though today this court firmly adopts the approach laid down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (1959), nothing in that rule is at odds with the plain duty of the federal trial courts to winnow out the flagrant and colorable cases, and though the record before us does not certainly establish this case as such, I would not want to see the issue foreclosed upon remand.