Court Opinion

ID: 9629074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:36:36.953545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:15.248640
License: Public Domain

WARDEN, J.,
specially concurring.
Because I agree with the majority that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed, but for the reason that the state’s appeal was untimely, I concur in the result.
The state appeals pursuant to ORS 138.060, which provides:
“The state may take an appeal from the circuit court or the district court to the Court of Appeals from:
* * * *
“(3) An order made prior to trial suppressing evidence
* * * J5
ORS 18.071 provides:
«* * * [q>]he notice of appeal shall be served and filed * * * not later than 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from was given or made.” (Emphasis supplied:)
The majority, by a process of logical legerdemain that could only fool a lawyer, concludes that “giving or making” an order means stamping it “filed.” The processes are not the same. The order was given or made by the judge as a part of his judicial duties; it was stamped “filed” as the ministerial act of a court clerk.
The majority gives as its reason for equating “given or made” with “stamped ‘filed’ ” that, until the stamping is done, the order “is not yet readily available to the public or to the parties.” What difference does 'it make, if it is indeed a *527fact, that the order is not available to the public, when what is to be determined is the beginning of the time for appeal by one of the parties? I submit that the reason would be makeweight, if it had weight.
I submit, too, that it makes no difference for the purpose of starting the time for appeal running that the order may not be readily available to the parties before it is stamped “filed.” What is significant is that parties know what the court has ordered, in this case suppression of evidence of defendant’s refusal to take field sobriety tests. Here, the parties had knowledge of the court’s decision on November 5,1982, when the court orally announced its ruling on the motion. On December 6, 1982, they were again advised of the court’s ruling when the order was signed and delivered to the clerk’s office and an employe of that office telephoned both attorneys to advise them of those facts. In my view, the order was “given and made” on December 6, and the state was on notice that, if it intended to do so, it had to appeal the order within 30 days. It should not be given additional time because of delays in the clerk’s office.
In State v. Delker, 26 Or App 497, 552 P2d 1313 (1976), the defendant contended that the state’s appeal should be dismissed, because it was not timely. We rejected his argument that the appeal period began to run when the trial judge orally announced his order. Relying on Charco, Inc. v. Cohn, 242 Or 566, 411 P2d 264 (1966), we held that, because the order was not effective until it was filed, the appeal period did not begin running until that time. 26 Or App at 503. Implicit in that holding is that the time for appeal begins to run when an order suppressing evidence is filed. In Charco, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its previous holdings that orders not signed in open court become effective on the date of filing, stating:
“Any other rule would make an order effective, not upon the will of the judge who made the order, but upon the whim of the clerk as to when it should be entered.” 242 Or at 570.
The rule abhorred by the Supreme Court is the one the majority adopts.
“Filing” is the delivery of the order to the clerk of the court with the intent that it be filed. Charco, Inc. v. Cohn, *528supra; Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or 412, 399 P2d 1011, 406 P2d 539 (1965). I would hold that an order is “given or made” when it is filed, i.e., delivered to the clerk for filing. That was done, in this case, on December 6,1982. The state’s notice of appeal, filed January 13, 1983, was not timely. I would affirm the trial court on that basis and would not consider whether evidence of defendant’s refusal to take field sobriety tests should be suppressed as compelled communication. Accordingly, I specially concur.