Court Opinion

ID: 9793064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:41:42.819871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:12.767141
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J., Dissenting.
I concur in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shenk but feel that the problem involved deserves further discussion.
Even assuming that instructing the jury on the presumption of due care was error in this case, it was clearly not prejudicial.
The challenged instruction reads: “At the outset of this trial, each party was entitled to the presumption of law that every person takes ordinary care of his own concerns and that he obeys the law. These presumptions are a form of prima facie evidence and will support findings in accordance therewith, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. When there is other evidence that conflicts with such a presumption, it is the jury’s duty to weigh that evidence against the presumption and any evidence that may support the presumption, to determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations, of course, shall be related to, and in accordance with, my instructions on the burden of proof.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority holds that this instruction resulted in prejudice to defendant on the ground that since the evidence on the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence is susceptible to an inference either way, the presumption has the effect of “overemphasizing” plaintiff’s case in the minds of the jury, and thus it might have tipped the scales in plaintiff’s favor. To support its position that overemphasis is a ground for reversable error the majority relies on Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652 [320 P.2d 500]. It is submitted that this decision will not support this interpretation.
*224In Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d at 661, it was held that an instruction on unavoidable accident in a close case was prejudicial error, not because defendant’s case was overemphasized, but because the instruction was confusing and misled the jury. It is only the probable confusion of the jury which was affirmatively demonstrated that justified our reversal. Of course, an instruction can overemphasize a party’s case, but if the jury has been otherwise properly instructed, and there is no apparent conflict, then the error appears cured. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Shenlc, the instructions taken as a whole were correct, and since the majority does not claim confusion as a basis for reversal, one is hard pressed to find any prejudice.
However, a majority of this court is of the opinion that improper “overemphasis” of a case, without more, is grounds for reversal whether or not the instructions are confusing or misleading. But even accepting this proposition it can be affirmatively shown that the jury probably did not use the presumption of due care to overemphasize plaintiff’s case. Thus, a result more favorable to the appealing party would not have been reached. Under these circumstances the application of the provisions of article VI, section 4%, of the Constitution precludes reversal. (See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].)
In establishing that the jury probably was not improperly influenced one must consider the instruction on burden of proof, the application of the presumption of due care to both parties, and the findings for the plaintiff on both issues of negligence and contributory negligence. Of major significance is this court's conclusion that the state of the evidence is in near equilibrium, and that excluding the presumption, this evidence is susceptible to inferences either way. Attention is also directed to what I consider the key factor: The finding of the jury that defendant was negligent.
The burden of proving defendant’s negligence was on the plaintiff. Defendant, in this situation, had the benefit of the presumption of due care. Adopting the majority’s reasoning, plaintiff was thereby forced to overcome by a preponderance of the evidence, not only defendant’s ease that it was free from negligence, but also the presumption that it was acting with due care. However, in the face of the burden of proof and the presumption, the jury found on evidence in near equilibrium, that defendant was negligent. From this finding it is reasonable to infer that if the jury considered the pre*225sumption at all in regard to defendant, its effect was negligible compared to the weight the jury gave to the testimonial, circumstantial and real evidence. If the jury had viewed the presumption as significant, then based on the state of the evidence it would have found for defendant. The final inference being' that the presumption probably had no effect upon the jury’s determination regarding defendant’s negligence.
Since it can be inferred that the jury did not consider the presumption of due care in favor of defendant when considering the question of defendant’s negligence, it is unreasonable to assume that the jury acted any differently in its notion of the presumption when considering the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, where the state of the evidence on this issue was, as on the issue of negligence, in near equilibrium. One is obliged to conclude, on the assumption that a jury will probably act consistently in the same case, that the presumption played little or no part in the jury’s determination of plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
Unless this court is prepared to say without any affirmative showing, and contrary to reasonable inferences, that the jury probably acted inconsistently, it is difficult to perceive, based on the evidence herein, precisely how the presumption of due care affected the result, so that without the instruction, the result would have been altered. Indeed, where the reasonable inference is that the jury has given little or no effect to an erroneous instruction in considering the question of negligence, and their subsequent determination of the question of contributory negligence is consistent with this previous inference, a proper conclusion is that the instruction did not result in prejudice.
It is obvious that as requisites to such a conclusion the reviewing court must determine the state of the evidence on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence, as well as ascertain how the jury utilized the presumption in regard to defendant’s negligence.
For example, defendant appeals from a judgment for plaintiff, contending that it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care. The reviewing court determines that the state of the evidence on the issue of negligence was in near equilibrium but on the issue of contributory negligence it was clear and convincing. Examining the jury’s *226actions the reviewing court can infer that on the question of negligence the jury probably disregarded the presumption of due care since on evidence in near equilibrium plaintiff had to carry the burden of proof and overcome the presumption in defendant’s favor, which worked to defendant’s advantage in this instance. However, on the question of contributory negligence, the jury probably relied on the presumption in favor of plaintiff since this could form the only real basis for a finding for plaintiff in the face of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. It may be reasonably inferred, then, that the jury’s actions in handling the presumption were inconsistent and resulted in prejudice.
Thus, it is the affirmative showing of the jury’s inconsistency that establishes prejudice when defendant appeals. Without such a showing there is no reason to believe the error was probably prejudicial.
In cases where plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendant on the ground that prejudicial error resulted from instructing the jury on the presumption of due care, it is impossible to tell how the jury utilized the presumption. The jury might have found the defendant nonnegligent, or the plaintiff contributively negligent. Under these conditions error is usually found on the ground that the instructions tended to confuse or mislead the jury. (See Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850] ; Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491 [274 P.2d 194].) Por this reason the eases cited by the majority for the proposition that instructing the jury on the presumption of due care constitutes prejudicial error are not in point. In Rozzen v. Blumenfeld, supra, 117 Cal.App.2d 285, and Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., supra, 127 Cal.App.2d 491, plaintiff was appealing from a judgment for defendant. The jury could have found for defendant on the alternative grounds of nonnegligence or plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Thus, it is impossible to draw any inference from the jury’s determination of the vital issues since we cannot be certain on which ground the jury found for defendant.
The case of Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App. 2d 442 [272 P.2d 855], involved an appeal by defendant after a judgment for plaintiff. An attack on the instruction containing the presumption of due care was upheld. The case is distinguishable on the ground that there, prejudice was predicated, not on the presumption of due care alone, but was the net result of a series of erroneous instructions, of which the
*227■ presumption of due care was only one. (Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., supra, 126 Cal.App.2d at 445-447.)
There are many cases holding that the giving of an instruction on the presumption of due care in favor of one party and not the other, while erroneous, was not prejudicial. (Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co., 212 Cal. 36 [297 P. 884] ; Paulsen v. McDuffie, 4 Cal.2d 111, 119 [47 P.2d 709] ; Tuttle v. Crawford, 8 Cal.2d 126, 133 [63 P.2d 1128] ; Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal.2d 585 [128 P.2d 16]; Scott v. Sheedy, 39 Cal.App.2d 96,102 [102 P.2d 575]; see Medeiros v. Soares, 17 Cal.2d 176, 179 [61 P.2d 501] ; Stroh v. Bauman, 37 Cal.App.2d 241, 245 [99 P.2d 337] ; Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App.2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; Martindale v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48].)
Generally, it has been held to be prejudicial error for a trial court to refuse to give such an instruction in a ease where, because of death or unconsciousness, the party requesting the instruction was unable to produce evidence as to the happening of the accident and the issue of due care was presented. (Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540 [299 P. 529] ; Downing v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Cal.App.2d 246 [59 P.2d 578] ; Jones v. Heinrich, 49 Cal.App.2d 702, 706 [122 P.2d 304] ; Maaskant v. Matsui, 50 Cal.App.2d 819, 823-825 [123 P.2d 853] ; Russell v. Andersen, 101 Cal.App.2d 684, 697-698 [226 P.2d 350] ; see Ellison v. Lang Transportation Co., 12 Cal.2d 355 [84 P.2d 510]; Westberg v. Willde, 14 Cal. 2d 360 [94 P.2d 590]; Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313]; Gigliotti v. Nunes, 45 Cal.2d 85 [286 P.2d 809] ; Anderson v. County of San Joaquin, 110 Cal.App.2d 703, 716 [244 P.2d 75].) The holding in these cases is understandable when we consider the inability of the party involved to produce any evidence whatsoever as to the conduct of the party in whose favor the presumption is invoked. This is not such a case.
As pointed out hereinabove the instruction held by the majority here to be prejudicially erroneous made the presumption of due care equally applicable to both plaintiff and defendant. It should be worthy of note that this court has never before held the giving of such an instruction to be prejudicial error under any circumstances. However, the District Courts of Appeal have ruled both ways on the subject. An instruction on the presumption of due care identical to the one here was given and found not to be prejudicial error in Medeiros v. Soares, 17 Cal.App.2d 176, 179 [61 P.2d . 501]; Stroh v. Bauman, 37 Cal.App.2d 241, 244-245 [99 P.2d
*228337]; Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal.App. 2d 192, 198 [160 P.2d 554] ; and Martindale v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 89 Cal.App.2d 400, 413 [201 P.2d 48], but a contrary result was reached in Rozzen v. Blumenf eld, 117 Cal. App.2d 285, 287-290 [255 P.2d 850] ; Verhaegen v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 442, 444-447 [272 P.2d 855] ; Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 127 Cal.App.2d 491, 496-497 [274 P.2d 194] ; Nunnemaker v. Headlee, 140 Cal. App.2d 666, 676 [295 P.2d 438] ; and Hughes v. City & County of San Francisco, 158 Cal.App.2d 419, 422-424 [322 P.2d 623] (see Burns v. Churchill, 152 Cal.App.2d 491, 495-496 [313 P.2d 575]).
Originally the rule appeared to be that such an instruction was not prejudicial error because in most cases there was evidence contrary to the presumption and the courts reasoned that the jury would disregard the presumption in the face of the contrary evidence. (Medeiros v. Soares, supra, 17 Cal. App.2d at 178-179.) Other eases appear to have discarded this rationale and replaced it with the rule that whether such instruction is prejudicial depends upon the facts of the particular case. This ad hoe method of deciding prejudice paved the way for the theory adopted by the majority here. (See Ford v. Chesley Transportation Co., 101 Cal.App.2d 548, 553 [225 P.2d 997] ; Rozzen v. Blumenf eld, supra, 117 Cal. App.2d at 288; Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., supra, 127 Cal.App.2d at 497-498; Nunnemaker v. Headlee, supra, 140 Cal.App.2d at 676.) I would disapprove the last cited cases and hold the instruction here not prejudicial.
For the foregoing reasons it seems clear that no prejudice resulted to defendant here and the judgment should be affirmed.