Court Opinion

ID: 9895573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 19:08:33.4256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:34.965925
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. S.D.D., 2023-Ohio-4040.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                                   No. 23AP-171
v.                                                 :             (C.P.C. No. 23CR-420)

[S.D.D.],                                          :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                             D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on November 7, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Paula M. Sawyers, for appellee. Argued: Paula M. Sawyers.

                 On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E.
                 Pierce, for appellant. Argued: Timothy E. Pierce.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, S.D.D., appeals from an order of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas denying her oral motion for pre-trial release on bail and granting
the motion of plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, to hold her without bail. For the following
reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On January 11, 2023, appellant was charged in the Franklin County
Municipal Court for one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), arising from the
death of her 8-month-old son, M.S. At appellant’s initial appearance on January 17, 2023,
the municipal court set bail at $1.5 million, with additional conditions of no possession of
firearms, no future acts or threats of violence, and no contact with all minor children. Upon
motion of the prosecutor, the municipal court dismissed the case on January 26, 2023
No. 23AP-171                                                                                           2

because appellant had been indicted by the Franklin County Grand Jury on January 25,
2023. State v. Dawson, Franklin M.C. No. 23CRA-484.1
        {¶ 3} The indictment alleged that on January 9, 2023, appellant committed
involuntary manslaughter, in violation of R.C. 2903.04, a first-degree felony, in causing the
death of M.S. as the proximate result of committing or attempting to commit the offense of
child endangering. The indictment also charged appellant with three counts of child
endangering, in violation of R.C. 2919.22, with two counts charged as felonies of the third
degree and one count charged as a felony of the second degree. The second-degree felony
count and one of the third-degree felony counts alleged that the child endangering was
committed as part of a course of criminal conduct occurring in Perry and Franklin Counties
from November 9, 2022 to January 8, 2023. The indictment also charged co-defendant
K.L.M., appellant’s live-in boyfriend, with the same offenses.
        {¶ 4} On January 27, 2023, the state filed a motion, pursuant to R.C. 2937.222,
seeking an order denying appellant and K.L.M. bail or bond. The trial court held a hearing
on the motion on February 2, 2023. At the outset of the hearing, the state represented that
the parties had agreed to a joint hearing for appellant and K.L.M.; the trial court confirmed
that agreement on the record. Appellant and K.L.M. were represented by separate counsel
at the hearing. The state presented testimony from Columbus Division of Police (“CPD”)
Detective Darren Egelhoff, the lead investigator in the case. The state presented no
additional witnesses or evidence. Neither appellant nor K.L.M. testified or presented other
witness testimony or evidence.
        {¶ 5} Detective Egelhoff offered the following testimony. On January 9, 2023, CPD
was summoned by the Franklin County Coroner’s Office to the home shared by appellant
and K.L.M. on Hiawatha Street. Detective Egelhoff was advised that appellant had called
911 at 6:30 p.m. to report that M.S. was not breathing and M.S. was transported to
Nationwide Children’s Hospital. Testing and x-rays revealed M.S. had at least 12 “healing
fractures,” several “acute injuries,” and exhibited physical signs of shaken baby syndrome.
(Tr. at 6-8.) Medical personnel opined that the “healing fractures” were likely inflicted two
to four weeks prior to January 9, 2023 and had never been treated; the “acute injuries” were

1 By journal entry filed June 26, 2023, this court granted appellant’s motion to supplement the appellate

record with the record from Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2023CRA-484.
No. 23AP-171                                                                                 3

likely inflicted on January 9, 2023. (Tr. at 9-10.) M.S. succumbed to his injuries and was
thereafter taken to the coroner’s office. Preliminary results of the coroner’s autopsy
revealed the cause of M.S.’s death as blunt force trauma to the head. The autopsy further
revealed that M.S. suffered a subdural hemorrhage (brain bleed), bruising to the scalp and
head area, and a laceration to the stomach. (Tr. at 8.) The coroner ruled M.S.’s death a
homicide.
        {¶ 6} Appellant and K.L.M. were transported to CPD headquarters for questioning
on January 9, 2023; neither were arrested at that time. Both voluntarily submitted to
interviews and surrendered their cell phones. Detective Egelhoff told the couple he would
try to return their cell phones the next day. At the conclusion of the interviews, CPD officers
returned appellant and K.L.M. to their home.
        {¶ 7} Detective Egelhoff’s investigation into M.S.’s death revealed that appellant
was M.S.’s biological mother and K.L.M. was appellant’s live-in boyfriend. The couple
moved into the Hiawatha residence approximately two weeks prior to the incident on
January 9, 2023. For several months prior to their move to Franklin County, they resided
with appellant’s father in Perry County. At the time of M.S.’s death, appellant’s other two
children, ages two and three, and K.L.M.’s three-year-old child, lived in the home; no other
adults resided there. Neither appellant nor K.L.M. have any family in Franklin County.
Appellant’s father and grandmother live in Perry County; K.L.M. has no familial ties to
Ohio.
        {¶ 8} Detective Egelhoff’s investigation further revealed that appellant’s children,
including M.S., were in Georgia visiting their biological father from August 4 until
November 9, 2022, at which point they were returned to appellant in Perry County. During
the course of its investigation into M.S.’s death, Franklin County Children Services
(“FCCS”) received medical records from a Georgia pediatrician indicating that all three
children had been examined on October 27, 2022; none exhibited any medical problems.
        {¶ 9} Forensic examination of appellant’s and K.L.M.’s cell phones revealed that in
text messages sent from November 9, 2022 to January 9, 2023, appellant and K.L.M.
discussed “beating the kids’ asses [and] beating them with belts.” (Tr. at 11.) In one of the
text messages, appellant stated that “her hand was so red from smacking one of the
children.” (Tr. at 12.) In another text message on December 1, 2022, appellant told K.L.M.
No. 23AP-171                                                                               4

to “[t]ear [S’s] ass up again when you get here.” (Tr. at 27.) The forensic examination of
the cell phones further revealed that appellant was home on January 9, 2023 and that
K.L.M. had searched the internet between 10:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. that morning using
phrases such as “what to do if a baby’s not breathing,” “baby’s not eating,” “[w]hat does it
mean if nine month old is breathing regular but won’t wake up,” “[w]hat does it mean nine
month old eyes are watery but not opening and drooling,” and “[e]ight month old eyes shut,
not moving when trying to open.” (Tr. at 13, 25-26.)
       {¶ 10} Following completion of the cell phone forensic examination, CPD Detective
Lemmon, along with an FCCS employee, went to the Hiawatha address to return the cell
phones, deliver FCCS paperwork, and speak with appellant and K.L.M.; however, no one
was at home when Detective Lemmon arrived. Neighbors reported they had not seen
appellant or K.L.M. following their return from the police interview on January 9, 2023.
Appellant and K.L.M. were eventually located at appellant’s father’s home in Perry County
on January 13, 2023; they were arrested and returned to Franklin County.
       {¶ 11} Following M.S.’s death, K.L.M.’s son went to live with his biological mother
in Michigan; appellant’s other two children were placed in emergency custody with
appellant’s grandmother in Perry County.
       {¶ 12} Detective Egelhoff was cross-examined by both defense counsel. During
cross-examination, Detective Egelhoff provided more detail regarding the circumstances
leading to the arrest of appellant and K.L.M. In that regard, Detective Egelhoff testified
that an arrest warrant was issued for appellant and K.L.M. on January 11, 2023. Detective
Egelhoff was unaware of the couple’s whereabouts after they were returned to their home
on January 9 until January 13, 2023. That morning, he and other CPD officers traveled to
appellant’s father’s home in Perry County to question him about appellant and K.L.M.
relevant to the time they resided with him. Appellant’s father initially declined to speak to
officers. Approximately 20 minutes later, the officers went to the home of appellant’s
grandmother. Shortly thereafter, the grandmother received a FaceTime message from
appellant’s father indicating that appellant and K.L.M. were at his home and were prepared
to surrender to law enforcement. Appellant and K.L.M. were taken into custody that day.
       {¶ 13} Detective Egelhoff also testified during cross-examination that on January 9,
2023, both appellant and K.L.M. were employed at a company that provided “babysitting”
No. 23AP-171                                                                                5

services for developmentally disabled individuals; Detective Egelhoff noted that no
complaints of abuse had been reported against either appellant or K.L.M. in connection
with this work. Detective Egelhoff further testified that the other three children who lived
in the Hiawatha home were examined after M.S.’s death; no injuries or signs of abuse were
reported. Detective Egelhoff also averred that he was unaware of any FCCS cases or filings
involving any of the children; he had not yet received any information from Perry County
Children Services.
       {¶ 14} Following Detective Egelhoff’s testimony, the trial court permitted counsel
for the parties to present oral argument. To that end, the state noted the requirements set
forth in R.C. 2937.222 regarding the denial of bail and the testimony provided by Detective
Egelhoff relevant to those statutory requirements. In addition to recounting Detective
Egelhoff’s testimony, the state noted that a records search revealed appellant had no prior
criminal history; K.L.M. had a misdemeanor weapons conviction in Michigan. Noting the
serious nature of the charges, the potential prison term of 25 to 30.5 years, and the lack of
ties to Franklin County, the state urged the trial court to deny appellant and K.L.M. bail
pending trial. Alternatively, the state requested the trial court set bond in excess of $1
million.
       {¶ 15} Also noting the requirements regarding the denial of bail set forth in R.C.
2937.222, counsel for K.L.M. and appellant each pointed to the portions of Detective
Egelhoff’s testimony favorable to their client in arguing that the trial court should deny the
state’s motion and set a reasonable bond. In addition, counsel for appellant noted that
because appellant was currently six months pregnant, holding her in jail pending trial was
unnecessary.
       {¶ 16} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
               Well, I appreciate all of the arguments today and the
               testimony. And based upon the testimony that I’ve heard and
               the nature of the charges and the potential sentences in this
               case, I think there is clear and convincing evidence that there
               is just cause to hold these defendants without bond at this
               time. So I’m going to order that, and I am noting that this is
               an offense of violence with a very substantial sentence. So
               we’ll hold them with no bond for the time being at least.
(Tr. at 51.)
No. 23AP-171                                                                                6

        {¶ 17} On February 28, 2023, the trial court issued the following order in appellant’s
case:
               The matter is before the Court on [appellant’s] oral motion for
               bond, heard on February 2, 2023. [Appellant’s] motion is
               hereby DENIED.

(Emphasis sic.) (Order at 1.)
II. Assignments of Error
        {¶ 18} Appellant timely appeals and assigns the following two assignments of error
for our review:
               [I.] The lower court erred by granting the prosecution’s
               motion that Appellant be held without bail when the court
               failed to make all necessary findings required by R.C.
               2937.222(B) and when it failed to consider all the factors
               found in R.C. 2937.222(C). The denial of bail under these
               circumstances violated Appellant’s rights under the Fifth,
               Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
               Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 9, and 16 of the Ohio
               Constitution, R.C. 2937.222, R.C. 2937.23, R.C. 2937.32, and
               Crim.R. 46.

               [II.] The lower court erred by granting the State’s motion that
               Appellant be held without bail when its ruling was not
               supported by the sufficiency of the evidence and ran against
               the manifest weight of the evidence which violated Appellant’s
               rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
               of the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 9, and
               16 of the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 2937.222, R.C. 2937.23, R.C.
               2937.32, and Crim.R. 46.

III. Analysis
        {¶ 19} “A trial court’s order denying bail is a final appealable order under R.C.
2937.222(D)(1) and it is considered by this court on an expedited basis pursuant to R.C.
2937.222(D)(1)(a) through (d).” State v. Burney, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-354, 2014-Ohio-
2622, ¶ 6, citing State v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-523, 2008-Ohio-3525, ¶ 6. An order
denying bail pursuant to R.C. 2937.222 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Justice, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-234, 2023-Ohio-435, ¶ 11, citing State v. De La Cruz, 10th Dist.
No. 21AP-516, 2022-Ohio-4293, ¶ 10, citing Foster. See also State v. Henderson, 10th Dist.
No. 16AP-870, 2017-Ohio-2678, ¶ 5; Burney at ¶ 6. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
No. 23AP-171                                                                                              7

trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. De La Cruz at ¶ 10,
citing Henderson at ¶ 5, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
        {¶ 20} “The Ohio Constitution provides that ‘ “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties * * * except for a person who is charged with a felony where the proof is
evident or the presumption great and where the person poses a substantial risk of serious
physical harm to any person or to the community.” ’ ” Justice at ¶ 14, quoting De La Cruz
at ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9. “The [Ohio] Constitution requires
the General Assembly to set standards by law to ‘ “determine whether a person who is
charged with a felony where the proof is evident or the presumption great poses a
substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 14,
quoting De La Cruz at ¶ 12, quoting Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9. In accordance
with this constitutional mandate, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2937.222.
        {¶ 21} R.C. 2937.222(A) provides that on motion of the prosecuting attorney or on
the judge’s own motion, the judge shall hold a hearing to determine whether an accused
charged with certain offenses, including first- and second-degree felonies, shall be denied
bail. “[T]he state has the burden of proving that the proof is evident or the presumption
great that the accused committed the offense with which the accused is charged, of proving
that the accused poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the
community, and of proving that no release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of
that person and the community.” R.C. 2937.222(A).
        {¶ 22} R.C. 2937.222(B) further provides that no accused person shall be denied bail
unless the judge “finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the
presumption great that the accused committed the offense described in [R.C. 2937.222(A)]
with which the accused is charged, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community, and
finds by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions will reasonably assure the
safety of that person and the community.”2 “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence is that “which
will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought

2 At the time of the proceedings in this case, Crim.R. 46(A) provided that “[a] defendant may be detained

pretrial, pursuant to a motion by the prosecutor or the court’s own motion, in accordance with the standards
and procedures set forth in the Revised Code.”
No. 23AP-171                                                                               8

to be established.” ’ ” De La Cruz at ¶ 15, quoting Foster at ¶ 6, quoting Cross v. Ledford,
161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
       {¶ 23} R.C. 2937.222(C) provides that in determining whether an accused person
poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the community and
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the safety of that person
and the community, the judge “shall consider all available information regarding all of the
following”:
               (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
               including whether the offense is an offense of violence or
               involves alcohol or a drug of abuse;

               (2) The weight of the evidence against the accused;

               (3) The history and characteristics of the accused, including,
               but not limited to, both of the following:

               (a) The character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
               employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
               community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to
               drug or alcohol abuse, and criminal history of the accused;

               (b) Whether, at the time of the current alleged offense or at
               the time of the arrest of the accused, the accused was on
               probation, parole, post-release control, or other release
               pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence
               for the commission of an offense under the laws of this state,
               another state, or the United States or under a municipal
               ordinance.

               (4) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
               the community that would be posed by the person’s release.

       {¶ 24} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her bail because the trial court failed to make the necessary findings
by clear and convincing evidence as required under R.C. 2937.222(B) and failed to consider
the factors set forth in R.C. 2937.222(C). The state responds that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion because the trial court “[a]fter considering the evidence, * * *
considered all factors required from R.C. 2937.222 and the evidence clearly and
convincingly supports the trial court’s finding that the Appellant should be held without
bail.” (Appellee’s Brief at 15.)
No. 23AP-171                                                                                 9

       {¶ 25} We cannot glean from either the trial court’s statement made on the record
at the conclusion of the February 2, 2023 hearing or the order issued by the trial court on
February 28, 2023 that it complied with the requirements of R.C. 2937.222 in denying
appellant bail. The trial court has not provided sufficient detail to enable meaningful
appellate review.
       {¶ 26} We first note the trial court referenced none of the criteria required by R.C.
2937.222(B) either on the record at the hearing or in its order. This court’s decisions
support a conclusion that in order to deny bail to an accused, a trial judge must make the
findings set forth in R.C. 2937.222(B). Justice at ¶ 17, 19 (referring to the “required”
findings set forth in R.C. 2937.222(B)); De La Cruz at ¶ 17, 18 (denoting the R.C.
2937.222(B) factors that “must be established” or are “required” for denial of bail); Foster
at ¶ 9, 16 (referencing the factors “to be considered” under R.C. 2937.222); Burney at ¶ 29
(stating that the trial court “made all of the required findings”).
       {¶ 27} Further, in its oral pronouncement, the trial court indicated that it based its
denial of bail on the nature of the charges, that the offense was one of violence, and that
appellant was potentially facing a very substantial sentence. While the nature of the
offense, including whether it is an offense of violence, is one of the R.C. 2937.222(C) factors
a trial court must consider in making the second and third findings under R.C. 2937.222(B),
we reiterate that the trial court referenced none of the three criteria required by R.C.
2937.222(B). Further, the nature of the offense is only one of the R.C. 2937.222(C) factors
the trial court must consider. There is no indication in the record that the trial court
considered any of the other factors set forth in R.C. 2937.222(C). In addition, the potential
sentence an accused faces is not one of the findings required under R.C. 2937.222(B) or one
of the factors to be considered under R.C. 2937.222(C). Finally, we note that the court’s
reference to “just cause” to hold appellant without bail is without statutory derivative.
       {¶ 28} Consequently, we sustain appellant’s first assignment of error to the extent
we remand this case to the trial court with instruction to make findings required, pursuant
to R.C. 2937.222(B), after considering all the available information presented regarding the
factors outlined in R.C. 2937.222(C) so as to allow meaningful appellate review.
       {¶ 29} Based on our disposition of appellant’s first assignment of error, appellant’s
second assignment of error is rendered moot.
No. 23AP-171                                                                             10

IV. Conclusion
       {¶ 30} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is sustained and her second
assignment of error is rendered moot, the judgment of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with law and this decision.
                                                                      Judgment reversed,
                                                                     and cause remanded.
                    BEATTY BLUNT, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur.