Court Opinion

ID: 9898190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:03.315135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:12.600846
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:
                                                         No. 84804-6-I
LORI SUSAN PRICE,
                                                         DIVISION ONE
                         Respondent,
                                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                and

JESSE ELDON PRICE,

                         Appellant.

        HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Jesse Price challenges provisions of a parenting plan

that provide for the care of his daughter. The challenged decisions were within the

trial court’s discretion and there has been no showing that the court abused its

discretion. We affirm.

                                            FACTS

        Jesse Price and Lori Price are the parents of H. 1 In January 2021, Lori

petitioned for legal separation and sought entry of a parenting plan for then 5-year

old, H.     While the petition was pending, the court entered two successive

restraining orders that required Jesse to refrain from interfering with H’s school

        1 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names for

clarity. No disrespect is intended.
No. 84804-6-I/2

attendance and with “reasonable efforts to protect her from COVID-19[2]

transmission.”

        The parties later agreed to convert the petition for legal separation to a

petition for dissolution.         They resolved all property and support issues by

agreement and the issues before the court during the three-day trial in July 2022

only concerned the provisions of a parenting plan.                     Lori was represented by

counsel at trial, while Jesse represented himself.

        After considering the testimony of seven witnesses, including the parties

and a guardian ad litem, as well as over 35 exhibits, the trial court entered a ruling

and expressly found that Jesse has a “long-term emotional or physical impairment

that interferes with the performance of parenting functions.” This finding was

incorporated       into   a    parenting      plan     that   requires     Jesse      to   obtain     a

neuropsychological evaluation and comply with the resulting treatment

recommendations.           The parenting plan also gives Lori sole decision-making

authority with respect to H’s health care. 3 Additionally, the parenting plan sets

forth a residential schedule that establishes that H is to live with Lori the majority

of the time, but provides for residential time with Jesse every other weekend and

two weekday afternoons each week.

        Jesse timely appealed.

        2 2019 novel coronavirus infection disease.
        3  The parenting plan provides for joint decision-making with regard to education and
daycare, subject to the limitation that Jesse may not remove H from school or daycare “without Lori
Price’s prior consent” and may not “interfere with reasonable school-imposed conditions for the
health and safety” of H.
         Lori seeks correction of a typo that appears in the court’s written ruling that sets forth this
limitation, but as the parenting plan incorporates a corrected version of the limitation, it is
unnecessary to remand for correction of the written ruling.

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No. 84804-6-I/3

                                           ANALYSIS

        At the outset, we note that, as he did below, Jesse represents himself on

appeal. Pro se litigants are held to the same standard as attorneys and are bound

by the same rules of procedure and substantive law. In re Marriage of Olson, 69

Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). To comply with the Rules of Appellate

Procedure (RAP), an appellant’s brief must contain “argument in support of the

issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and

references to relevant parts of the record.” RAP 10.3(a)(6).                     Here, with few

exceptions, Jesse’s arguments are unsupported by proper references to the record

on appeal or legal authority. Jesse relies on authorities and articles that were

apparently not presented to the trial court and appear to be outside the appellate

court record, and fails to provide argument in support of each assignment of error.

We decline to consider any arguments or authorities not before the trial court. 4

RAP 2.5(a).       Critically, Jesse fails to apply, much less identify, the relevant

standard of review, and largely fails to address the applicable legal standards.

Notwithstanding these limitations, to the extent we are able to discern Jesse’s

challenges to aspects of the parenting plan, we endeavor to review the merits of

his claims on appeal.

I.      Standard of Review and Legal Principles

        In Washington, “the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which

the court determines and allocates the parties’ parental responsibilities.” RCW

        4 To the extent that Lori also cites authorities in her responsive briefing that    were not
presented at trial and are not a part of the appellate record, we likewise do not consider them.

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No. 84804-6-I/4

26.09.002. In structuring a permanent parenting plan, the court exercises broad

discretion. In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012) (citing

In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993) (discussing

various aspects of RCW 26.09.187)). The court’s discretion is guided by several

specific statutory provisions: RCW 26.09.002, which declares the policy of the

Parenting Act of 1987; RCW 26.09.184, which sets forth the objectives of the

permanent parenting plan and its required provisions; RCW 26.09.187(3), which

enumerates the factors to be considered in making residential provisions in a

parenting plan; and RCW 26.09.191, which sets forth factors that require or permit

limitations on a parent’s involvement with the child. Id. at 35-36.

       We review the parenting plan ultimately adopted by the court for abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

A trial court abuses its discretion when “its decision is manifestly unreasonable or

based on untenable grounds” or reasons. Id. at 46-47.

II.    Residential Schedule

       Jesse claims that the residential schedule, which provides for H to live

primarily with Lori, is contrary to the child’s best interests because of an incident

he characterizes as abuse. To support this allegation, Jesse relies on a hearsay

statement dated April 2023 that he concedes was neither before the trial court

during the proceedings in July 2022, nor does it appear in the appellate court

record. Jesse cannot establish an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, or any basis

for appellate review in the absence of evidence in the record which substantiates

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No. 84804-6-I/5

his claim. See State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 337-38, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)

(appellate court will not consider matters outside the record).

        Jesse also contends that because H spends the majority of time in Lori’s

household under the parenting plan, it ignores the “importance of a father’s role in

a child’s development” and is not in her best interests. In fashioning residential

provisions, the trial court must consider the factors enumerated in RCW

26.09.187(3)(a), including the “relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s

relationship with each parent,” “past and potential for future performance of

parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004(3),” and “the emotional needs

and developmental level of the child.” RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i), (iii), (iv). Here, the

court’s ruling reflects its consideration of each of the statutory factors and its

specific consideration of the importance of each parent’s role in H’s life. The court

expressly found that “each parent brings unique and important influences on their

daughter that are positive and necessary for her successful upbringing.” Jesse’s

assertion that the court disregarded the value of his involvement is not only

unsupported by the record but directly contradicted by it. 5

          5 Jesse also argues that the residential schedule is not in H’s best interest because Lori

lacks suitable housing. He claims that structural defects in decking attached to Lori’s house raise
“serious concerns” about the “stability” of the structure. However, while Jesse admitted below that
he lacked suitable housing for his daughter to reside with him, there was no admissible evidence
before the trial court to suggest that Lori’s housing is inadequate or unsafe.
          Further, Jesse asserts throughout briefing that he “will not abdicate [his] responsibilities for
[his] daughter,” that he will “continue to be her father,” and makes other similar comments regarding
his role as her parent. There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that Lori or any other
party sought to terminate his parental rights and the court issued no such order.
          Finally, throughout his opening and reply briefs, Jesse repeatedly refers to pursuing
additional litigation based on the outcome of this appeal, against the trial and appellate courts and
various other entities. The Rules of Appellate Procedure constrain our review to whether the trial
court abused its discretion in its orders set out in the parenting plan and we decline to consider
other litigation, particularly that which has not yet been initiated.

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No. 84804-6-I/6

III.   Decision-Making Provisions

       Jesse challenges the allocation of decision-making authority with regard to

health care. The parenting plan provides for Lori to have “sole authority to engage

the child with treating doctors as might be necessary at her discretion.”

       Citing RCW 26.09.004(2), which defines “parenting functions” to include

“[e]xercising appropriate judgment regarding the child’s welfare, consistent with

the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic

circumstances,” Jesse claims that health care decision-making should not have

been allocated to Lori because H is “now suffering from poor physical health.” He

points to Lori’s failure to pursue a mask exemption for H and his concerns about

his daughter’s nutrition. But, the issue of whether it was appropriate to comply with

the mask mandate then in effect was fully litigated at trial and Jesse fails to address

our deferential standard of review. And again, his claim is, at least in part, based

on the alleged current conditions rather than evidence that was before the trial

court and is now before us in the appellate record.

       Jesse also appears to appeal the aspect of the decision-making provision

that orders him to “not interfere with the administration of medication” prescribed

for H. Jesse claims that, as a result of this provision, he has no power to protect

his daughter against “very risky and unnecessary” prescribed medication. Jesse

argues the medication at issue has not been subject to appropriate testing, has a

variety of potentially harmful side effects, and that there are safer ways to address

H’s underlying health issues.     But here too, both parties presented evidence

regarding this issue at trial and had the opportunity to fully express their viewpoints

                                         -6-
No. 84804-6-I/7

about the necessity and efficacy of medication prescribed for H. Contrary to

Jesse’s apparent belief, our court does not find facts, resolve conflicts in the

evidence, or reweigh the evidence to determine if we would reach a different

conclusion from the trial court. See In re Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App.

545, 561, 359 P.3d 811 (2015). The trial court was entitled to credit the evidence

presented by Lori.

       Finally, Jesse maintains that, in several instances, he demonstrated that

Lori lied under penalty of perjury. He further argues that the trial court erred by not

imposing sanctions or other consequences on Lori for this conduct and in crafting

provisions consistent with her proposals. But, Jesse does no more than show that

he disagreed with some of the assertions made by Lori’s lawyer and had a basis

to challenge some aspects of Lori’s testimony. He asserts that Lori committed

perjury, but fails to provide any authority which would suggest that this court could

make such a determination, or provide any evidence to establish perjury beyond

his conclusory statements. Moreover, Jesse fails to appreciate that the trial court’s

role in this case was not to mediate factual disputes between the parents. Rather,

the court’s primary purpose and responsibility in establishing a parenting plan, is

to provide for the child’s physical care, ensure the child’s emotional stability, and

further the child’s best interests. See RCW 26.09.184(1)(a), (b), (g).

       We find no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in its allocation of

residential time and decision-making authority in the parenting plan. Lori requests

                                         -7-
No. 84804-6-I/8

an award of costs. Because she substantially prevails on appeal, Lori is entitled

to statutory costs under RAP 14.2. 6

        Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                                   ______________________________

        6 In response to Jesse’s appeal, Lori also requests “protection” from further “frivolous
proceedings.” But, it is unclear exactly what relief Lori seeks and she fails to provide legal authority
that supports her request. Accordingly, it is denied.
        In addition, Lori asks for affirmative relief with respect to several aspects of the parenting
plan. But, because Lori has not filed a cross appeal, we decline to consider her requests for relief.
See RAP 2.4(a) (appellate court will grant affirmative relief to a respondent by modifying the
decision subject to review only if the respondent also files a timely notice of appeal or such relief is
“demanded by the necessities of the case.”).

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