Court Opinion

ID: 9700735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:47:22.520532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:23.579155
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I would affirm the trial court’s order suppressing evidence.
Conceding that this case, unlike State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555 (N.D.1993), does not provide a direct link between the stolen property found in the community dumpster and the defendant’s apartment, the majority nonetheless validates the search warrant issued for defendant’s apartment. It seems to me, given the careful rationalization, we engaged in to find probable cause in Erickson, that Erickson should be viewed as providing the minimum requirements for probable cause to search a residence based on evidence found in a community dumpster, and not, as the majority demonstrates, the upper limits.
In Erickson, the defendant’s name and address, found on two separate items in the dumpster behind the defendant’s residence, were essential components to this court’s finding of a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s residence and the evidence sought under the warrant. Id. at 559. In State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224, 228 (N.D.1985), we found a sufficient nexus between evidence of illegal drugs and the defendant’s residence where police found evidence of marijuana in a trash bag, which reportedly had been dragged by a dog from the defendant’s yard. Here, the nexus between the rifle and the defendant’s apartment simply does not meet the standard implied in Erickson and Ronngren. The majority admits as much: “Unlike Erickson, ... this case does not involve a direct link to Frohlich’s residence. However, ... [w]e believe that, in this case, a chain of circumstantial links supplied the connection between the stolen property and [Frohlich’s apartment].” Ante at 733-734. The majority’s “chain of circumstantial links” consists, apparently, of stolen property found in a dumpster used by at least two apartments and several nearby businesses, reports by citizen informants of their personal observations of completely legal activities outside the defendant’s apartment, and the sighting of two men carrying a large green trash bag containing a rifle-like object out of the defendant’s apartment building. Each of the so-called “links” has such an attenuated and speculative connection with either the defendant or his apartment that the chain forged is not one I’d wrap around anything, let alone allow to create probable cause to enter one’s place of residence. Despite the majority’s ostensible misconstruction, see ante at 733, the issue in this case is not whether sufficient eircum-*736stantial evidence exists to establish probable cause. Rather, the issue is whether “a chain of circumstantial links” satisfies the implied “direct link” requirement of Erickson and Ronngren. I would not stretch our holdings in Erickson and Ronngren to include this ephemeral “chain of circumstantial links.”
Our decision in State v. Metzner, 338 N.W.2d 799 (N.D.1983), was a particular application of the nexus requirement. In Metzner, we found a sufficient nexus where probable cause that the defendant had committed a crime existed and evidence of the crime was likely in the defendant’s residence: “For instance, evidence that a defendant has stolen material which one normally would expect him to hide at his residence will support a search of his residence.” Id. at 805 [quoting United States v. Maestas, 546 F.2d 1177, 1180 (5th Cir.1977)]. While we stated in Metzner that one “could logically conclude that a person would keep a rifle in his house,” id., a sufficient nexus exists only if there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime. Here, the stolen property in the community dumpster and the garbage bag containing a rifle-like object do not amount to probable cause to believe that either Frohlich or Schmidt had stolen the rifle. Furthermore, Metzner, a convicted felon, purchased a rifle and placed it in his vehicle, creating probable cause to believe he removed the rifle from his vehicle to his home because one “could logically conclude that a person would keep a rifle in his house.” Metzner did not remove a rifle from his home and place it in a vehicle. If he had, there would have been probable cause only to search the vehicle, because the rifle was no longer in the residence. Therefore, Metzner does not apply.
This case is terribly disconcerting. Too many people used or had access to the dumpster and too many people are in comparable positions in our society. Too little evidence, indeed none at all, links the stolen property in the dumpster to the defendant in his apartment, unless probable cause is to be diluted, as it was in this case, in all cases involving young people who “sleep all day” and have friends over in the evenings.
I believe that until now we had established a safety zone against unreasonable intrusions into our privacy by carefully requiring probable cause to be a real prerequisite for search warrants and not an ethereal formality that one easily may avoid. E.g., State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1989); State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830 (N.D.1989). The majority’s decision puts the sanctity of the home and the protection afforded it by the requirement of probable cause at risk by relying on suspicion, speculation and conjecture to establish probable cause and achieve a desired result.
I respectfully dissent.