Court Opinion

ID: 9659348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:41:32.829023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:06.737513
License: Public Domain

*799SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice
¶ 37. (dissenting). I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517, of even date.
¶ 38. The majority opinion in Ward holds that evidence seized in an unconstitutional no-knock search may be admitted only when an officer relies in objective good faith on a pronouncement of this court. Thus a mere pronouncement of this court validating a no-knock search apparently is not adequate to admit the evidence. An officer's subjective good faith reliance on this court's pronouncement is not sufficient to admit the evidence. An officer's reliance in objective good faith on this court's pronouncement is needed to admit the evidence.
¶ 39. An issue the majority opinion does not address in this case or in State v. Ward is what constitutes an officer's reliance in objective good faith on a pronouncement of this court.
¶ 40. Can an officer rely in objective good faith on a pronouncement of this court when the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review this court's pronouncement and numerous state and federal courts have disagreed with this court's pronouncement? In February 1997 when the officers executed the unconstitutional no-knock entry into Ms. Orta's residence, the U.S. Supreme Court had already agreed to review this court's decision in State v. Richards.1 Richards is the case that, according to the majority opinion, the officers had to rely upon in objective good faith.2 Numerous federal and state decisions disagreed with this court's pronouncement in Richards. See State v. Richards, 201 *800Wis. 2d at 871 n.6 (Abrahamson, J., concurring)(cases described).
¶ 41. The majority does not apply the "rely in objective good faith" standard. Why not? Is the standard meaningless?
¶ 42. I cannot join Justice Prosser's ruling on the exigency exception to the rule of announcement in this case without asking the parties to brief and argue this issue. The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for a new suppression hearing to determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances existed to justify dispensing with the rule of announcement. Nevertheless, I agree with his analysis of this state's exclusionary rule set forth in State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). I join that part of Justice Prosser's concurrence relating to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
¶ 43. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 See Richards v. Wisconsin, certiorari accepted January 3, 1997, 519 U.S. 1052 (1997).

 State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996).