Court Opinion

ID: 9954827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 06:13:53.649237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.531529
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed March 20, 2024

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00355-CV

          JAMES CLIFTON “CLIFF” JONES, Appellant
                          V.
   TRANSPORTATION & PARKING CONSULTANTS, LLC D/B/A MR.
                VALET OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Court
                          Rockwall County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-1259

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Smith
                             Opinion by Justice Nowell
      Transportation & Parking Consultants, LLC d/b/a Mr. Valet of Texas

damaged a Lamborghini owned by James Clifton Jones. Mr. Valet stipulated to

liability, and the case proceeded to a bench trial to determine the issue of damages.

The trial court’s judgment awards $21,000 in loss-of-use damages to Jones and no

damages for diminution in the car’s value. In two issues, Jones argues the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s damages valuations.1 We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                       STANDARD OF REVIEW
        When no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed or timely requested

after a nonjury trial, we presume the trial court made all the necessary fact findings

to support the judgment, and we affirm the judgment if it can be upheld on any legal

theory finding support in the evidence. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d

471, 480 (Tex. 2017). The trial court’s implied findings of fact have the same weight

as a jury verdict. Wyde v. Francesconi, 566 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2018, no pet.). Implied findings may be challenged on legal insufficiency grounds

in the same manner as jury findings or a trial court’s express findings of fact if the

reporter’s record is filed on appeal, as it was here. Shields Ltd. P’ship, 526 S.W.3d

at 480.

        When reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge to the evidence, we credit

evidence that supports the verdict if a reasonable factfinder could have done so and

disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Akin, Gump,

Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. & Rsch. Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 115

    1
      Jones phrases his issues as follows: “Was the trial court’s judgment for 14 days of loss of use damages
proper when the sole and uncontroverted testimony was that Plaintiff was deprived of the use of his vehicle
for 180 days?” and “Was the trial court’s judgment denying diminution in value damages proper where the
competent and uncontroverted testimony was that the vehicle lost $55,000 – $60,000 in value due to the
wreck and subsequent repairs?” Jones’s brief does not provide a standard of review. Based on the arguments
presented in his brief, we interpret Jones’s two issues to challenge the legal sufficiency of the damages
evidence.
                                                    –2–
(Tex. 2009). When, as here, a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding

on an issue on which he had the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that

the evidence establishes all vital facts in support of the issue as a matter of law. Dow

Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). When

reviewing such a “matter of law” challenge, we first examine the record for evidence

that supports the finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary. Id. Anything

more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Formosa

Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.

1998). If there is no evidence to support the finding, we then examine the entire

record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law; the

point of error will be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively

established. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 241. The ultimate test for legal

sufficiency is whether the evidence presented would enable a reasonable and fair-

minded factfinder to reach the verdict under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168

S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005).

                                        FACTS

      A negligent act by one of Mr. Valet’s employees caused damage to the front

of Jones’s 2018 Lamborghini. Mr. Valet accepted responsibility for the damage and

paid for the repairs.

      Jones purchased the Lamborghini in August 2019 for approximately

$205,000. He drove the car daily and accumulated approximately 7,000 miles before

                                          –3–
the accident on March 14, 2020. Jones testified he “believe[d] [the Lamborghini]

was worth approximately $190,000” at the time of the accident. When asked the

basis for his belief, he responded: “On research. You know, I only owned the car

approximately six months, seven months, roughly. So I had done a [sic] research

before I bought the car, and talked to a lot of dealerships and a lot of internet

research.”

      After the car was repaired, Jones estimated the Lamborghini was worth

“[s]omewhere in the 130 - - $135,000 range.” Jones testified he based that opinion

on conversations with “dealers who buy and sell these kind of cars . . . and who has

[sic] bought and sold for me.” Jones also conducted internet research to find “the

value of a car of this magnitude once its [sic] been wrecked and fixed.” When asked

for more information about his internet research on the car’s valuation after the

repair, Jones testified: “You can look all over the internet. There’s [sic] internet sites

for all those cars out there.” When asked what “are the facts, core facts, that

support[ed]” his opinion that the car was worth $130,000 to $135,000 after it was

repaired, Jones replied: “Just the people who sell these cars.”

      The shop that Jones chose to repair the Lamborghini needed 180 days to repair

the car. Jones acknowledged “there was an issue” obtaining parts for the

Lamborghini because the COVID-19 pandemic caused shutdowns, particularly in

Italy where the parts for the car are manufactured. He agreed the COVID–associated

shutdowns were not foreseeable.

                                          –4–
      At the time of the accident, Jones owned several other cars, and he drove those

cars while the Lamborghini was being repaired. Additionally, in May 2020, Jones

purchased another Lamborghini. Although Jones did not rent a car to drive while the

Lamborghini was being repaired, he investigated the cost to rent a Lamborghini and

learned the rental rates ranged from $1,500 to $1,700 plus taxes per day.

      After the trial concluded, the judge sent a letter to the parties stating:

            After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the Court makes the
      following ruling:

      Mr. Clifton [sic] is entitled to a $21,000 loss of use claim which was
      calculated at $1,500.00 a day for 14 days. Mr. Clifton [sic] tried to give
      testimony for a diminution in value claim but couldn’t explain how that
      loss was calculated or a basis for it. The Court does not find a
      diminution in value damage.

The court later entered a judgment awarding $21,000 in actual damages to Jones; the

judgment states the $21,000 reflects $1,500 per day for 14 days and states no

damages were awarded for diminution in value.

                                      ANALYSIS
      In his first issue, Jones asserts the trial court’s judgment awarding damages

for fourteen days of loss of use “was arbitrary and capricious” because the

uncontroverted testimony showed Jones was without his Lamborghini for 180 days.

Jones argues the trial court should have awarded $270,000, representing $1,500 per

day for 180 days, for loss-of-use damages.

      “Compensation is the chief purpose of damages awards in tort cases.” J & D

Towing, LLC v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp., 478 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. 2016). The supreme
                                       –5–
court explained the “basic reason underlying rules for the ascertainment of damages

for any tortious act is a fair, reasonable, and proper compensation for the injury

inflicted as a proximate result of the wrongful act complained of.” Id. That

reasonable and proper compensation “must be neither meager nor excessive,” and it

must place the plaintiff in the position he would have occupied absent the tortious

act. Id. Loss-of-use damages must be foreseeable and directly traceable to the

tortious act. Id. at 677.

       Loss-of use damages compensate a property owner for damages resulting

from a “reasonable period of lost use” of the property. Id. at 655. The amount of

damages may be measured according to the particular loss experienced, such as the

cost of renting substitute chattel. Id. However, damages “may not be awarded for an

unreasonably long period of lost use. Whether framed as a duty of mitigation or a

doctrine of avoidable consequences, the principle is the same: A plaintiff may not

recover loss-of-use damages for a period longer than that reasonably needed to

replace the personal property.” Id. The award is not intended to be a financial

windfall for either party, and it cannot overcompensate or undercompensate the

plaintiff for its injury. Violet Rose Holdings, Ltd. v. Spinning Star Energy, LLC, No.

01-17-00022-CV, 2018 WL 1526169, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

       To prove loss-of-use damages, the plaintiff is not required to actually rent a

replacement automobile or show he expended money for alternative transportation.

                                         –6–
Luna v. N. Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. 1984). The time period

of compensatory loss of use is the period of deprivation of the loss of use of the

automobile, and the actual measure “may be a reasonable rental value by the day,

week, or month.” Id. at 119. That measure is not “rigid and unbending,” and it must

“vary with the character of the property, and somewhat with the peculiar

circumstances of the case.” Id. The supreme court stated that, above all, “[t]he thing

to be kept in view is that the party shall be compensated for the injury done.” Id.

      Given the particular circumstances of this case — Jones had several other cars

to drive, he purchased another Lamborghini shortly after the accident, and the

unforeseeable impact of the COVID-19 pandemic — the trial court could have

determined that fourteen days, at a rate of $1500 per day, was a reasonable period of

time on which to award loss-of-use damages. Jones’s request for $270,000,

comprising of 180 days of loss-of-use damages, would result in the court awarding

loss-of-use damages for an unreasonably long period of lost use. Additionally,

$270,000 is more than the value of the vehicle when Jones purchased it, which would

constitute a windfall and excessive compensation for the injury done. Jones did not

establish that 180 days is the proper time period that must be used in light of the

particular circumstances of this case, and thus he has not established all vital facts

in support of his first issue as a matter of law. We conclude the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the trial court’s award of $21,000 for loss-of-use damages. We

overrule Jones’s first issue.

                                         –7–
      In his second issue, Jones argues the trial court should have awarded $55,000

in damages for diminution in value to the Lamborghini based on his uncontroverted

testimony. Jones, as the owner of the Lamborghini, testified about its value. See Nat.

Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2012) (Property

Owner Rule establishes that an owner is qualified to testify to property value). When

testifying as a property owner, the owner’s testimony must meet the same

requirements as any other opinion evidence. Id. at 156. Opinion testimony “that is

conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make

the existence of a material fact more probable or less probable.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). In Justiss, the Texas Supreme Court elaborated:

      Because property owner testimony is the functional equivalent of
      expert testimony, it must be judged by the same standards. Thus, as
      with expert testimony, property valuations may not be based solely on
      a property owner’s ipse dixit. An owner may not simply echo the phrase
      “market value” and state a number to substantiate his diminished value
      claim; he must provide the factual basis on which his opinion rests. This
      burden is not onerous, particularly in light of the resources available
      today. Evidence of price paid, nearby sales, tax valuations, appraisals,
      online resources, and any other relevant factors may be offered to
      support the claim. But the valuation must be substantiated; a naked
      assertion of “market value” is not enough. . . . But even if unchallenged,
      the testimony must support a verdict, and conclusory or speculative
      statements do not.

Id. at 159.

      Jones failed to provide any factual basis on which his valuation opinions

rested. While Jones testified about how much he paid for the car seven months before

the accident, he provided no factual basis to support his speculation about the value

                                         –8–
of the car at the time of the accident or after it was repaired. The basis for Jones’s

opinions were conversations with people who sell “these cars” and “internet sites for

all those cars out there.”

      Jones’s naked assertions that the car was worth “approximately $190,000”

before the accident and $130,000 to $135,000 after the accident are mere ipse dixit

and are insufficient to support his request for damages for diminution in value.

Jones’s conclusory testimony about diminution in value is not relevant evidence, and

Jones presented no other evidence of diminution in value damages. Accordingly,

Jones has not established all vital facts in support of his second issue as a matter of

law, and we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment

awarding no damages for diminution in value. We overrule Jones’s second issue.

                                    CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

230355f.p05                                 /Erin A. Nowell//
                                            ERIN A. NOWELL
                                            JUSTICE

                                         –9–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

JAMES CLIFTON “CLIFF” JONES,                   On Appeal from the 439th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Rockwall County,
                                               Texas
No. 05-23-00355-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. 1-20-1259.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
TRANSPORTATION & PARKING                       Justices Partida-Kipness and Smith
CONSULTANTS, LLC D/B/A MR.                     participating.
VALET OF TEXAS, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee Transportation & Parking Consultants, LLC
d/b/a Mr. Valet of Texas recover its costs of this appeal from appellant James
Clifton “Cliff” Jones.

Judgment entered this 20th day of March, 2024.

                                        –10–