Court Opinion

ID: 9844066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:57:04.645846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:27.227563
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice.
I dissent. The lease being admitted, the burden was upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence surrender of the premises and cancellation of the lease by mutual agreement. It is easy enough to divine that the defendant both intended and ardently desired that cancellation be effected. But the obstacle which defendant must overcome, is to prove that the plaintiff manifested such intent. It does not appear to me that the evidence will support a finding that he did so.
The prevailing opinion correctly states that “ ‘a surrender [cancellation] will not be implied against the intent of the parties, as manifested by their acts’/’
The facts referred to in the main opinion are the strongest evidence to be found that plaintiff agreed to a cancellation. That evidence not only falls short of affirmatively showing that he agreed to release defendant from their contract, but is entirely consistent with his insistence upon his rights under the lease. It argues only that he wanted to be cooperative in mitigating damages. His response to the statement that defendant wanted to move out: “ 'that was okeh with me, providing they could find someone to take over the place’.” (Emphasis added.) accords with such purpose.
The same can be said of the payment of the November rent, and the giving of the receipt marked “in full”. It was but a strictly proper business transaction; a payment of the rent then due and an acknowledgment that it was paid in full. It is not at all inconsistent with plaintiff’s position that he was entitled to rely on the terms of his lease. No evidence was referred to or offered making any reference to release or cancellation of future rent that might accrue under the lease; nor can any such conclusion be inferred from the receipt itself.
When a sub-tenant was procured which might have reduced plaintiff’s damages, de*254fendant was at least partly responsible for the failure of this arrangement because of his refusal to cooperate in furnishing hot water for the tenant. He knew this was the only possible source of hot water for the lunch counter. Even though there was not a specific covenant that he would so cooperate, it would have been cheaper than to pay the entire rent. This latter matter is not controlling but it bears upon the unreasonableness of the defendant’s position' in refusing to abide by the terms of his lease, and failing to extend reasonable cooperation to the plaintiff in renting the premises to protect the plaintiff from loss.
The burden of proving that the plaintiff agreed to cancellation and release from the terms of the lease cannot be met by simply proving facts equally consistent with continuance of the obligations of the lease. The evidence must be such that reasonable minds could find either directly or from fair inference that its greater weight preponderates toward proving that he so agreed. 1
I cannot agree with the statement that “where a tenant surrenders and the- landlord accepts the premises during the term of the lease, the landlord cannot recover rent not due and payable at the time of the surrender.” This must be coupled with circumstances indicating an intent, on the part of the landlord that he is releasing the obligations under the lease as well as accepting the property; otherwise his acceptance of surrendered premises might simply be in accord with his duty to safeguard the premises and to mitigate damages if possible, as I think the evidence shows here.
I therefore conclude that the judgment should be reversed.

. See Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986.