Court Opinion

ID: 9856033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:36:47.329359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:55.738761
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
Prom judgments of guilty of violating section 337a, subdivision 3 of the Penal Code, after trial before the court without a jury, defendant appeals. There is also an appeal from the order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The evidence being viewed in the light most favorable to the People (respondent), the essential facts are:
*586On May 18, 1942, Officer Boswell of the Los Angeles Police Department saw defendant enter a drug store at 300 South Hill Street. Officer Boswell walked to the doorway of the drug store and saw defendant standing before a counter, on the other side of which was the druggist, Max Fisher. The officer saw Mr. Fisher hand defendant some currency and a yellow slip of paper. The currency defendant placed in the right pocket of his shirt and, as the officer walked into the store and defendant saw him, he started to tear up the yellow sheet of paper. Then he handed it to the officer who placed him under arrest. Sixty-two dollars was found in defendant’s right shirt pocket.
After qualifying as an expert upon bookmaking activities in the city of Los Angeles, Officer Boswell, identified the yellow slip of paper as a “betting marker” used by bookmakers in the city of Los Angeles. He further testified that, names on the betting marker such' as “Red Weatherly,” “The “Finest,” and “Saving Grace” were names of horses that were racing on various tracks in the United States on the day defendant was arrested. He also testified that the characters “5-b,” “P,” and “1-10” appearing below the words “The Finest” indicated that the horse named “The Finest” was to run in the first race at the Belmont race track, and that the amount of the bet was a one dollar insured place wager. He also testified that a horse named “The Finest” was in fact running in the first race at the Belmont Park race track on May 18, 1942.
On the way to the police station Mr. Fisher was shown the betting marker he had handed to defendant and in the presence of defendant was asked what the notations indicated, to which he replied that they indicated horses and races. He was also asked how long he had been placing bets with defendant, to which he replied, “Several days.”
Defendant was then asked by the police officer what his employer who owned the parking lot where defendant was employed would do if he knew defendant was out taking bets, to which defendant replied, “He would probably ‘can’ me.”
Defendant urges reversal of the judgment on two propositions which will be stated and answered hereunder seriatim.

First: Independent of the inferences to be drawn from defendant’s conduct when confronted with accusatory statements of the police officer on the way to the police sta
*587
tion, there is no substantial evidence to prove the corpus delicti of the crimes of which defendant was convicted.

This proposition is untenable, in view of the decisions in People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778] ; People v. Kahn, 27 Cal.App.2d 645 [81 P.2d 632]; People v. Miropol, 33 Cal.App.2d 297, 298 [91 P.2d 230]; and People v. Abraham, 53 Cal.App.2d 564 [128 P.2d 39]. In the cases cited the evidence was no stronger than in the instant case. Nevertheless, the convictions were sustained in the first case by our Supreme Court and in the others by this court.
From the record it appears that defendant received from Mr. Fisher money and a piece of paper commonly denominated a “betting marker,” frequently used by those engaged in “bookmaking” activities in the county of Los Angeles. From this evidence the trial judge under the decisions above cited was justified in drawing the inference that the essential elements were present to constitute a violation of section 337a, subdivisions 1 and 3 of the Penal Code.

Second: The trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting Officer Boswell to testify that the yellow slip of paper defendant received from Mr. Fisher was a betting marker, and as to the significance of the letters and figures appearing thereon.

This proposition is untenable. The law is established in California that the testimony of a duly qualified expert, such as Officer Boswell, is admissible to explain the significance of cryptic letters and figures which appear upon papers, books, and paraphernalia customarily used by bookmakers (People v. Hinkle, 64 Cal.App. 375, 378 [221 P. 693]; see also People v. Pruitt, (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 272, 277 [130 P.2d 767]).
In view of the fact that our Supreme Court has denied a hearing in the last cited case any statements contained in People v. Davis, (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 331, 334 [117 P.2d 917], contrary to the rule of law above stated must be deemed to have been overruled.  It is an established rule of law that a later decision overrules prior decisions which conflict with it, whether such prior decisions are mentioned and commented upon or not (Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129, 131 [9 S.Ct. 1, 32 L.Ed. 368]; Kenney v. Antioch L. O. School Dist., 18 Cal. App.2d, 226, 231 [63 P.2d 1143] ; Outer Harbor D. & W. Co. v. Los Angeles, 49 Cal.App. 120, 124 [193 P. 137] ; Palvutzian v. Terkanian, 47 Cal.App. 47, 52 [190 P. 503]).
*588For the foregoing reasons the judgment and order are and each is affirmed.