Court Opinion

ID: 9790131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:35.517439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.417210
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority begins its opinion by incorrectly stating the issue to be decided by this Court as follows: “Does the accidental death of an employee occurring at an employer-sponsored Christmas party arise out of and in the course of employment for purposes of an award of workmen’s compensation benefits?” Supra at 542. However, the issue to be decided on appeal is not whether Mrs. Grant was injured while in the course and scope of her employment. That was the issue before the factfinder in this case, the Industrial Commission. The issue on appeal is whether there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission’s ultimate finding that “the accident which caused the death of Ruth Grant did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.”
Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a factual issue to be resolved by the Industrial Commission upon the attendant facts and circumstances of each ease. Teffer v. Twin Falls School Dist. No. 411, 102 Idaho 439, 631 P.2d 610 (1981); Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953); Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P.2d 404 (1946). The Idaho Constitution and previous decisions of this Court mandate that on appeal our review of Industrial Commission decisions is limited to questions of law. Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 9. The findings of the Industrial Commission will not be disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Case of Graham, 103 Idaho 824, 654 P.2d 1377 (1982); Bush v. Bonners Ferry School Dist. No. 101, 102 Idaho 620, 636 P.2d 175 (1981); Lampe v. Zamzow’s, Inc., 102 Idaho 126, 626 P.2d 782 (1981). Therefore, however popular the cause or grievous the injury, and regardless of our individual and personal feelings on how a case should have been decided, we are not entitled to weigh the evidence or make findings or substitute our judgment for that of the commission.
In misperceiving the issue to be decided on appeal, the majority, contrary to the constitutional limitations on our review of Industrial Commission findings, usurps the Industrial Commission’s factfinding function and finds that Mrs. Grant’s accident arose out of and in the course and scope of her employment. This is a finding of ultimate fact to be decided by the trier of fact rather than by this Court on appeal.1 Re*552peating, since it bears repeating, the issue for our review is not whether Mrs. Grant’s death arose out of the course and scope of her employment, which requires a finding of ultimate fact, but is whether there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial Commission’s finding that her accident did not arise in the course and scope of her employment.
The majority, having misstated the issue and then assumed the role of factfinder, proceeds to decide the issue in favor of the plaintiff appellant, stating that “the conclusion is inescapable that Mrs. Grant’s fatal accident occurred within the scope and course of her employment.” In an attempt to mask its factfinding, the majority suggests that the Industrial Commission’s referee may have committed an error of law. Specifically, the majority criticizes the referee’s reliance on the so-called “black letter” law appearing as § 22.00 in Larson’s, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, at p. 5-71, as set out at page 456 of the majority opinion.
I.
The majority’s criticism of “black letter” law is erroneous in two respects. First, the majority suggests that there is something sinister about “black letter” law, specifically that law appearing as Section 22.00 in Larson’s, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, at p. 5-71. I find the majority’s criticism of the Industrial Commission for applying “black letter” law somewhat disconcerting. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “black letter law” as “an informal term indicating the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or embodied in the statutes of a particular jurisdiction.” How does a tribunal, such as the Industrial Commission, err by applying “the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts ... ?” When cases are tried before a jury rather than before the Industrial Commission as factfinder, judges instruct juries, at the behest of the counsel, on “the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts,” i.e., “black letter law,” from which the jury then determines the ultimate facts of the case. The majority’s criticism of the Industrial Commission for applying so-called “black letter law,” i.e., “the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts,” is really a prelude and masks the real reason for the majority’s decision. If the majority was reversing the Industrial Commission because it had applied the law erroneously, the proper procedure would be to reverse the commission’s order and remand the matter to the Industrial Commission to redetermine the case after first applying the correct law. This Court recently took that course in Ross v. Fiest, 105 Idaho 119, 666 P.2d 646 (1983). That was also the course taken in Moore’s Case, 330 Mass. 1, 110 N.E.2d 764 (1953), prominently relied on in the majority opinion. However, the Court has not remanded the matter to the Industrial Commission asking it to redetermine the case after applying the correct law following Ross v. Fiest, supra. Rather, after criticizing the Industrial Commission’s use of “black letter” law, the majority then proceeds to decide the factual issue without remanding the matter to the Industrial Commission to redecide the question applying proper law. Obviously, the majority is not reversing the Industrial Commission for applying the wrong law, “black letter” or otherwise, but rather the Court is reversing the Industrial Commission because it views the facts differently than the Industrial Commission did.
II
Aside from the majority’s inappropriate criticism of the Industrial Commission’s use *553of “black letter law,” the majority’s analysis of Section 22.00 in Larson, is erroneous. First, quoting the section’s introductory textual paragraph, ante at 456-457, the majority urges that the rules set out in § 22.00 apply only to recreational, as opposed to social events. This argument is unsupported. Section 22 in Larson is entitled, in bold face print, “Recreational and Social Activities.” Section 22.00 begins, “Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment when ...,” and no distinction in the applicability of the three enumerated sections appears elsewhere on the face of the rule.
The majority’s argument that the “black letter” rules set out at § 22.00 apply only to recreational activities is further negated when one views the complete text of section 22. The introductory phrase pointed to by the majority concludes that “an attempt is made in this section to systematize the developing law on recreational activities.” The analysis which follows in § 22 is not, however, limited to recreational activities but includes an in-depth discussion concerning whether recreational and social activities are to be considered within the course and scope of employment, in light of such factors as whether the injury occurred on the premises, § 22.10; the degree of employer sponsorship of the activity, whether recreational or social, § 22.20; and whether the activity results in benefit to the employer, § 22.30. Thus, the majority’s first premise, i.e., that the general rules stated by Larson at § 22.00 were intended to apply only to recreational activities and events, is erroneous.
The majority, without so holding, also implies that the referee and the Industrial Commission erred in failing to consider the entire text of Section 22, and, specifically, in failing to consider a paragraph contained in Section 22.23, set out at pages 543-44 of the majority opinion, which suggests several pertinent questions to be asked in determining whether an injury is employment related. The majority states that “had the referee gone beyond page 5-71 and asked himself the questions found [in Section 22.23] he not only would have found his task easier, but his result more just and in accordance with the liberality which the legislature declares sets the tone of administering the act.” Ante at 544. It is pure speculation to state that the referee would have arrived at what the majority apparently thinks is a “more just” result had he specifically applied the questions suggested by Larson to the facts of this case. The record neither demonstrates that the referee failed to consider the entire text of Section 22, nor that the referee, had he expressly answered the questions posed, would have reached a different conclusion.
The resolution of factual matters is committed to the expertise of the Industrial Commission, which specializes in hearing industrial accident cases. See Dawson v. Hartwick, 91 Idaho 561, 428 P.2d 480 (1967); Clark v. Brennan Constr. Co., 84 Idaho 384, 372 P.2d 761 (1962); Kernaghen v. Sunshine Mining Co., 73 Idaho 106, 245 P.2d 806 (1952). The expertise acquired by the commission in its day-to-day involvement in and resolution of workmen’s compensation disputes should not be interfered with on appeal, particularly where there is no affirmative showing that the commission or hearing referee failed to apply the law correctly. “The Commission by reason of its makeup and experience is possessed of certain expertise in these matters to which the court should defer.” Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 662, 619 P.2d 1110 (1980) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
Without suggesting that the referee was required to expressly answer each of the questions recommended in Larson, Section 22.23, as contended by the majority, a number of the referee’s findings of fact provide answers to the suggested questions. The referee found: the Christmas party was sponsored by the employer (sponsorship); employees were not compelled or required to attend, and that each was free to attend or not attend as he so desired (voluntariness of attendance); the party was customarily held each year and that this party was held in the evening outside of normal working *554hours and off the business premises2 (degree of encouragement to attend); the party was to be paid entirely by the employer (whether financed by the employer); and, that the employer’s purpose in sponsoring the Christmas party was to promote good will and morale among the employees and that the employer deducted the cost of the parties on its income tax returns (benefit to employer). In light of these findings, which adequately encompass the questions suggested by Larson in Section 22.23, the referee properly applied the law found at Section 22.00, and the Industrial Commission cannot be faulted in its application of the law.
Ill
Finally, the majority’s discussion of relevant case law includes only those cases which affirm the granting of benefits for injuries sustained at recreational or social activities. There is an equally large number of cases in which the denial of workmen’s compensation benefits for accidents occurring at recreational or social activities has been affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., Anderson v. Custom Caterers, Inc., 279 Ala. 360, 185 So.2d 383 (1966); Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 71 So.2d 802 (1954); United Parcel Service v. Industrial Accident Comm., 172 Cal.App.2d 73, 342 P.2d 41 (1959); Courville v. Natl. Food Stores of Louisiana, Inc., 174 So.2d 251 (La.App.1965); Landry’s Case, 346 Mass. 762, 190 N.E.2d 208 (1963); Ethan v. Franklin Mfg. Co., 286 Minn. 371, 176 N.W.2d 72 (1970); Sills v. Wert, 139 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sup.Ct.1955); Tally v. J.J. Newberry Co., 25 N.Y.2d 945, 305 N.Y.S.2d 156, 252 N.E.2d 634(1969); Stojak v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 332, 426 A.2d 229 (1981); Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Civ.App.1964).
However, these cases do not reflect a split of authority. With very few exceptions, both the cases cited in the majority opinion and the cases set out above affirm the factfinder, usually an Industrial Commission, in its determination of whether the accident occurred within the claimant’s employment. While the factual issue is very close, as all of these cases reflect, it is a classic factual issue to be resolved by the finder of fact, and not by an appellate court. Even the most casual reading of the majority opinion, such as the comment on page 544 that “[h]ad the referee gone beyond page 5-71 and asked himself the questions found on page 5-85, ... he not only would have found his task easier, but his result more just ...,” discloses that the majority does not like the result reached by the referee and the Industrial Commission, so they are taking over the factfinding function. While it is easy to sympathize with the claimant’s cause, the bar and the public are entitled to expect this Court to exercise sufficient self discipline not to be led by its sympathies to violate the Industrial Commission’s constitutional fact-finding authority under Art. 5, § 9, Idaho Constitution. See Parker v. St. Maries Plywood Co., 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955 (1980).
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.

. This Court recently has been inclined to usurp the factfinding function of the Industrial Commission, see, e.g., Barker v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 105 Idaho 108, 666 P.2d 635 (Idaho Sup.Ct.1983); Gray v. Brasch & Miller Constr. Co., 102 Idaho 14, 624 P.2d 396 (1981); Bowman v. Twin Falls Constr. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 312, 581 P.2d 770 (1978); Lyons v. Indus*552trial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 P.2d 1360 (1977), always, it seems, in favor of claimants. A generation ago this Court yielded to a similar urge to retry the facts, only then seemingly in favor of employers. See Johns v. S.H. Kress Co., 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1959). That opinion has been severely criticized by the author of today’s majority opinion.
See Woodhams v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 101 Idaho 369, 613 P.2d 380 (1980) (Bistline, J., dissenting); Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie, 101 Idaho 657, 619 P.2d 1110 (1980) (Bistline, J., dissenting). What the Court does today is no different than what it did in Johns v. S.H. Kress Co., supra. In either case, we violate the Idaho' Constitution by retrying the facts.

. In order to counter the effect of this particular finding, which Larson’s treatise lists as one of the important criteria for the factfinder to consider, the majority engages in some fact-finding of its own, finding that “Christmas dinner parties are not ordinarily held during working hours, and it is difficult to conceive that the employer’s traditional Christmas dinner party would be held at his place of business.” Ante at 459. There is nothing in the record to support the majority’s factfinding regarding Christmas parties.