Court Opinion

ID: 9570002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:19:16.888626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:36.261731
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I join the majority’s affirmance of Ricketts’s conviction for the murder of his wife, but write separately because the jury instruction on adultery in murder cases needs to be replaced.
1. I cannot join the majority’s approval of the following jury charge:
... I charge you to kill either a spouse or a spouse’s lover for past acts of adultery or to prevent the apparent commission or the completion of an act of adultery in progress between them, nothing else appearing, is murder.9
This statement fails to fully apprise the jury of the law of this State that adulterous conduct can serve as sufficient provocation to reduce homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter.10 This jury charge relies upon a vague statement “nothing else appearing” to substitute for the principle that a jury may convict on the lesser offense of manslaughter if it finds that the defendant acted solely as the result of a serious provocation that excites a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion.11
This charge also reveals the dangers of lifting jury instructions from appellate opinions.12 This charge comes from this Court’s decision in Burger v. State,13 in which we stated,
the idea that a spouse is ever justified in taking the life of another ... to prevent adultery is uncivilized. This is murder; and henceforth, nothing more appearing, an instruction *476on justifiable homicide may not be given.14
The Court’s primary emphasis in Burger was to address and overturn prior law that held that killing a spouse’s lover to prevent adultery constituted justifiable homicide. Thus, the Court advised judges and attorneys not to use a justifiable homicide defense in these circumstances.15 The Court did not intend to foreclose a jury’s consideration of the contention that finding one’s spouse in an adulterous situation created provocation within the meaning of the voluntary manslaughter statute. The Court specifically stated,
Our ruling should not, however, be read to mean that the peculiar facts of a given case may never suggest “passion” and “provocation” within the meaning of the voluntary manslaughter statute.16
In future prosecutions involving a defense of voluntary manslaughter because of adulterous conduct, I would urge trial courts not to give the above-quoted portion of charge 4 (B) (3). Instead, a clearer statement of the law would be to first define voluntary manslaughter, and then to charge as follows:
A spouse’s adulterous conduct may serve as serious provocation sufficient to cause a person to act as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion. What circumstances will present a situation so as to excite such passion and exclude all idea of deliberation or malice is a matter for the jury to determine. If the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing was done by the defendant without malice, and without a spirit of revenge, but under a violent, sudden impulse of passion, then you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
Nevertheless, I conclude that no reversible error occurred under the unique facts of this case.
2. Additionally, I cannot join Division 4 of the majority opinion. The defendant did not object at trial to the time limitation imposed on closing arguments and did not request additional time. The majority, however, ignores the defendant’s failure to preserve this error for appeal. In the two leading cases dealing with this issue, the defend*477ants objected to the time limitation on closing argument.17 By addressing the merits of the issue on appeal, the majority fails to employ the time-honored rule that a failure to object at trial waives the issue on appeal.18 This Court has routinely applied this rule to a wide variety of alleged errors,19 including the failure to allow the defendant his right under OCGA § 17-8-71 to the opening and closing arguments.20 The Court has relaxed the rule only in cases involving the death penalty.21 I would hold, consistent with our prior cases, that because Ricketts failed to raise at trial any objection to the time limitation, he has waived the issue on appeal.
Decided March 24, 2003
Reconsideration denied April 11,2003.
Brian Steel, for appellant.
Philip C. Smith, District Attorney, Penny A. Penn, Assistant District Attorney, Thurhert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jennifer S. Gill, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears joins in this special concurrence and Justice Carley joins in Division 1 of this special concurrence.

 Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal Cases (2nd ed.), Charge 4 (B) (3).

 Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700 (523 SE2d 868) (1999); Strickland v. State, 257 Ga. 230, 231 (357 SE2d 85) (1987).

 OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).

 See Stull v. State, 230 Ga. 99, 104 (196 SE2d 7) (1973) (“Even though language used by the appellate courts in a decision may embody sound law, it is not always appropriate to employ such language in instructing the jury.”).

 238 Ga. 171, 172 (231 SE2d 769) (1977).

 Id.

 See also Gibbs v. State, 174 Ga. App. 19 (329 SE2d 224) (1985) (Carley, J.) (criticizing use of other language from Burger as a jury charge).

 Burger, 238 Ga. at 172.

 Monroe v. State, 272 Ga. 201 (2) (528 SE2d 504) (2000); Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809 (493 SE2d 169) (1997).

 State v. Larocque, 268 Ga. 352, 353 (489 SE2d 806) (1997) (“State has long followed the contemporaneous objection rule, which provides that counsel must make a proper objection on the record at the earliest possible time to preserve for review the point of error.”); Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 495 (422 SE2d 188) (1992) (alleged errors not raised at trial will not be heard on appeal).

 See, e.g., Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 50 (572 SE2d 583) (2002) (failed to object to presence of court personnel in courtroom during ex parte hearings); Sedlak v. State, 275 Ga. 746, 754 (571 SE2d 721) (2002) (failure to object to question rephrased after initial objection); Acliese v. State, 274 Ga. 19, 20 (549 SE2d 78) (2001) (failure to object to admission of exhibit); Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 380 (552 SE2d 855) (2001) (failure to object to trial court’s excusal of juror); Massey v. State, 272 Ga. 50, 52 (525 SE2d 694) (2000) (failure to object to trial court’s admonishment to defense counsel not to read the law); Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 641 (522 SE2d 225) (1999) (failure to object to improper responses by a prospective juror); Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 238 (517 SE2d 502) (1999) (failure to object to judge’s lack of impartiality); Miller v. State, 267 Ga. 92 (475 SE2d 610) (1996) (failure to object to improper comments made in closing argument); Hood v. State, 266 Ga. 662, 663 (470 SE2d 235) (1996) (failure to object to witness testifying after violating rule of sequestration); McIntyre v. State, 266 Ga. 7, 20, n. 36 (463 SE2d 476) (1995) (failure to object to substitution of judge); Lee v. State, 265 Ga. 112, 114 (454 SE2d 761) (1995) (failure to object to form of verdict).

 Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233, 234-235 (253 SE2d 698) (1979) (construing former Code Ann. § 27-2201).

 Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 713 (532 SE2d 677) (2000) (failure to make objection waives issue of improper argument at guilt-innocence phase of death penalty trial).