Court Opinion

ID: 9727887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:52:06.859268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.132052
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring:
Appellants raise objections to, among other things, the trial court’s instructions on assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. It is well settled that appellants bear the burden of affirmatively establishing prejudicial error. Goldstein v. Kennedy, 134 A.2d 580, 581 (D.C.1957); D.C.Code § 11-721(e) (1981). In this case, however, the Sinais are unable to demonstrate prejudice, assuming error, as the jury returned a general verdict. Despite this, the majority assumes the jury did reach the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. It then goes to great lengths in discussing these issues.1 But where, as here, there was a genuine question regarding primary negligence, it is entirely possible that the jury never even reached the issues presented by the instructions. Instead, the jury may simply have found that the defendants were not negligent.
The general verdict shrouded the decision of the jury in darkness. Appellants “might have dissipated that darkness by asking [pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 49(b) ], for a general verdict accompanied by the jury’s answers to interrogatories.” Foster v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 131 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 762, 63 S.Ct. 560, 87 L.Ed. 1134 (1943). Had interrogatories been used, we would know specifically what the jury found and whether they even considered the defenses asserted by appellees. See American Oil Co. v. Hart, 356 F.2d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1966). The use of interrogatories is warranted precisely because they do help to focus the relevant issues for an appeal. See E.L. Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir.1965) (“everything was wrapped in the enigma of a general verdict. ...”).
Super.Ct.Civ.R. 51 places the burden on counsel to propose desired jury instructions to the trial judge. Here trial counsel failed to request that special interrogatories be submitted to the jury. While it is true that the trial court might have rejected counsel’s proposed queries, appellants would then have been able to preserve an objection to the failure to direct answer to specific questions. See, e.g., Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt & Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 528 (8th Cir.1980). Rule 51 is quite applicable to Rule 49(b) verdicts. Jonnel Enterpris*534es, Inc. v. Dollar Savings Bank of New York, 624 F.2d 398, 402-03 (2d Cir.1980).
I believe it is time that busy appellate courts place responsibility for litigation where it belongs — with counsel. It is they who should, to coin a phrase, “lawyer their cases.” Neither trial nor appellate judges should have to assume that responsibility. For a long time appellate courts have, in the interest of justice, excused or ignored failure of counsel to be precise in objections, legal and constitutional arguments, jury instruction proposals and objections, and verdict forms.2 In so doing, appellate courts have assumed that issues have been preserved when the precise point was not raised at trial. They also are, as we have been in this case, willing to decide complex questions on an unproved assumption of prejudice when none may exist. The rules of procedure provide tools to the lawyer so that only cases requiring decision need be confronted. By decisions like this one we discourage use of those rules and add intolerable delay to the decision of cases squarely presenting issues requiring decision. In the interest of justice we are now obliged to require greater precision to reduce backlog.
We have recently held, in the context of a motion for relief from judgment, that this court will not leniently indulge legal mistakes of counsel. We said, and it should serve as a reminder to us and the bar,
However sympathetic we may be to the circumstances of this appeal, the imputation of acts and omissions of counsel to the client “is necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation.” Railway Express Agency [v. Hill, 250 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1969)]. To give a party in appellant’s position a second chance would increase the burden on other litigants in the system, as well as on our already overtaxed courts. As the court stated in Ohliger v. United States, 308 F.2d 667, 667-68 (2d Cir.1962): “Counsel’s carelessness cannot be excused by this Court if it is to perform its obligation to other litigants whose cases are necessarily delayed by such conduct.” In short, as a general proposition, the client, not the adversary or the court, must bear responsibility for retaining counsel who failed to understand the rules of court. The client’s relief, if any is due, must come from the attorney.
Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc., 491 A.2d 515, 520 (D.C.1985).
Appellants are unable to demonstrate prejudice and it is inefficient and wrong for this court to presume prejudice. See Barrett v. Adkins Furniture Co., 43 A.2d 44, 45 (1945). Accordingly, I concur in the result only.

. This case is distinguishable from Lewis v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 463 A.2d 666 (D.C.1983), which involved a complete failure to instruct, rather than an erroneous instruction, on a certain issue. We seem to read the court’s holding there to mean that where there is a general verdict, this court may, but is not required to, presume prejudice in the event of an instructional error.

. We have been particularly indulgent with failure to properly plead in opposition to summary judgment. This also adds gratuitously to the delay in both the trial and this court.