Court Opinion

ID: 2963523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:27.470491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:42.536300
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1810

                                    SUSAN R. BYRD,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               JOHN T. RONAYNE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Norman Jackman,  with whom Martha  M. Wishart and Jackman  & Roth
             ______________             __________________     _______________
        were on brief for appellant.
             David  A. Bunis,  with  whom Dwyer  & Collora  was  on brief  for
             _______________              ________________
        appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                    August 9, 1995
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff  Susan R. Byrd, a former
                    CYR, Circuit Judge.
                         _____________

          associate in the  defendant law firm of Harrison  & Maguire, P.C.

          ("H & M"), sued H & M and various individual partners and associ-

          ates for alleged sexual discrimination, unequal pay, and retalia-

          tory discharge.   The district court granted summary judgment for

          defendants on all claims, and Byrd appealed.  As summary judgment

          was proper, we affirm.

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    Byrd joined H & M as an  associate on June 5, 1989, one

          month  after graduation from Boston University Law School with an

          LL.M. in banking law.  Prior to attending Boston University, Byrd

          had  been a  vice-president and  general  counsel for  Commercial

          National Bank,  Kansas City,  Kansas.   Previously, she  had been

          employed for  six months as  an associate counsel by  an Oklahoma

          City bank; a  trial attorney with  the Federal Deposit  Insurance

          Corporation  for one year; and a self-employed private practitio-

          ner in Wichita Falls, Texas,  for two years following her gradua-

          tion from Oklahoma City  University Law School.   Before entering

          law school, Byrd had earned  an M.B.A. from Central State Univer-

          sity.

                    Prior to joining H &  M, Byrd inquired whether the firm

          had a  "set partnership  track" for  associates.   Defendant John
                              
          ____________________

               1All evidence  in  genuine dispute  is  related in  a  light
          favorable to  Byrd, the  party resisting  summary judgment.   See
                                                                        ___
          Velez-Gomez v. SMA  Life Assur. Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874-75 (1st Cir.
          ___________    ____________________
          1993).

                                          2

          Ronayne, president of  H & M, advised  her that there was  no set

          track to partnership but that Byrd likely would be considered for

          partnership within  two  to  three years  provided  she  met  the

          performance standards.  Another partner,  defendant Alex MacDona-

          ld, told her that she "would  be the first female partner in  the

          law firm." 

                    When Byrd began with  H & M, she  was its highest  paid

          associate, at $62,500  and benefits.  During  her two-year tenure

          she was  responsible for generating almost $100,000  in fees from

          several new  clients she developed while  with the firm.   At the

          outset,  her areas  of  practice  with H  &  M were  concentrated

          principally  in  commercial  loan  workouts  and federal  banking

          regulation.   By the  fall of 1989  her responsibilities included

          all H & M  bankruptcy cases as well.2  A major client during this

          period was Boston Five  Cents Savings Bank, FSB  ("Boston Five"),

          which looked to Byrd for both its bankruptcy law and bank regula-

          tion services.  

                    During  the  latter  part of  1989,  John  Battaglia, a

          Boston Five vice-president, advised defendant Matthew  Kameron, a

          member  of the H & M management committee, that Byrd had prepared

          a legal memorandum which did not  address the question put to her

          and  that Battaglia's department had "lost confidence" and tended

          to "work  around" Byrd rather than  rely on her  advice.  Kameron

                              
          ____________________

               2Although  Byrd came  to H &  M with  what she  describes as
          "considerable experience" in bankruptcy law, the record indicates
          only that during her four years with Commercial National Bank she
          handled some bankruptcy matters.  See infra note 10. 
                                            ___ _____

                                          3

          discussed Battaglia's concerns with  Byrd, then communicated  the

          complaint to  Ronayne.   Ronayne and  Kameron subsequently  spoke

          with  Byrd about her performance and her problematic relationship

          with Boston Five.   Nevertheless, in January 1990  she received a

          $1,500  bonus and a  highly complimentary  performance evaluation

          praising her  professional competence, writing  skills, and atti-

          tude.  

                    During early  1990, Susan  Monahan, vice-president  for

          asset management at Boston Five, told Ronayne that she and others

          in her department were dissatisfied  with Byrd's work and doubted

          that she had the bankruptcy law knowledge she claimed.  According

          to  Monahan, Byrd  frequently gave  legal advice  "off  the cuff"

          which  later proved incorrect.   Monahan  reported that  Byrd had

          delayed  filing judicial  pleadings she  had  been instructed  to

          file,  and that  on at  least  one occasion  she had  represented

          having filed a motion  for relief from stay which had  never been

          filed.   Finally, Monahan informed  Ronayne that Boston  Five did

          not have  confidence in Byrd's  advice or work product.   Ronayne

          relayed these  complaints to Byrd  and encouraged her  to improve

          her relationship with Monahan and Boston Five.   Shortly thereaf-

          ter, Byrd wrote  Monahan and suggested a meeting  "to resolve any

          difficulties and improve upon our working relationship."  

                    Monahan  again complained  to Ronayne  in August  1990,

          stating that she would transfer Boston Five's bankruptcy law work

          to another firm unless H & M reassigned it to someone  other than

                                          4

          Byrd.3  At  around the same time,  Wayne Ferguson, vice-president

          for lending at  Boston Five, complained to Ronayne  that Byrd was

          slow to respond to inquiries and her court cases were  taking far

          too long.4

                    Byrd nonetheless received a $3,000 bonus in the fall of

          1990,  notwithstanding  "mixed"  evaluations   from  Ronayne  and

          Kameron.  Ronayne wrote:  "You seem to have gotten a good grip on

          the bank regulatory work over the past year and to have developed

          your bankruptcy skills."  He continued:  "In general, you seem to

          have  done a  good job  on client  relations although  there have

          obviously  been some issues  with the Boston  Five relationship."

          Ronayne candidly  noted as  well that  supervision of Byrd  might

          entail a "problem" for the  firm since her areas of concentration

          were "not something with which the other lawyers in the firm have

          more than a general knowledge."5  
                              
          ____________________

               3The  record  would  permit an  inference  that  Monahan was
          "demanding" and complained  about other H & M  attorneys as well,
          which resulted in a male associate, Clive  Martin, being relieved
          of  responsibility  for matters  involving  Monahan's department.
          See also infra pp. 13-15. 
          ___ ____ _____

               4Although Byrd  contends that these complaints  pertained to
          bankruptcy matters entrusted to other attorneys, she has included
          no evidentiary support in the appellate record.  See Fed. R. App.
                                                           ___
          P. 11(a) (appellant bears burden of including materials essential
          to her claim); Silva v. Witschen,  19 F.3d 725, 728 n.4, 731  n.9
                         _____    ________
          (1st Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
                           ___ ____

               5Summarizing, Ronayne noted: 

                    I think you are well motivated and very quick
                    on your feet . .  . and have shown a commend-
                    able  willingness to  accept tasks  which are
                    assigned to you. . . .  On the weakness side,
                    I  have sometimes had  the sense that  you do
                    not  have the  backup for  answers which  are

                                          5

                    Similarly,  the  1990  review from  Kameron  was mixed.

          Noting that  Byrd had improved  her ability  to communicate  with

          clients but  still needed  to be "more  sensitive to  damage con-

          trol," Kameron observed:   "She has had  a difficult time  with a

          major client  and although the  difficulties may have  been unre-

          solvable, I  think more  effort could have  been made  before the

          situation deteriorated."6  

                    In the fall of 1990,  Byrd responded as follows to H  &

          M's standardized self-evaluation form:  

                    Being an attorney for  ten years my strengths
                    and  weaknesses are  pretty much set  in con-
                    crete.   What they  are is  what most  likely
                    they will remain.  Boredom has always been my
                    biggest  weakness,  causing  procrastination,
                              
          ____________________

                    given with apparent certainty.  This is obvi-
                    ously an  ambiguous area since  you certainly
                    want  to give  the appearance  of confidence,
                    especially  to clients,  but you  want  to be
                    careful about trying to give an impression of
                    certainty  when you  are not  really sure  or
                    can't immediately  back up the  position.  It
                    is  acceptable from time to time to admit you
                    don't know something and will have to look it
                    up  and it is helpful when someone else (i.e.
                    a regulator or another  lawyer) gives you  an
                    answer to a question to understand the ratio-
                    nale for the answer.

               6Kameron summarized:

                    Hopefully,  Susan  can put  some of  the more
                    negative aspects  of 1990 behind her and con-
                    centrate  on  the  positive  and continue  to
                    expand  in those  areas  where  she has  been
                    successful  and to  continue  to serve  those
                    clients who  are very  happy with  her in  an
                    expanded capacity.  However, I reiterate what
                    I  think must change and that is Susan has to
                    be willing to admit that asking questions and
                    researching  issues are part  of being a good
                    lawyer.

                                          6

                    etc.  My strengths  have never been  utilized
                    in this firm but include management and busi-
                    ness.

                    In November 1990, John Davis became "of counsel" to H &

          M  after  five  years'  specialization  in  bankruptcy  practice,

          bringing  with him  clients  from whom  the  firm generated  fees

          approximating  $200,000  in  a single  year.    Davis started  at

          $70,000 and benefits, plus 15% of the fees generated in cases for

          which he  was responsible.   He  assumed client  responsibilities

          apart from those assigned to Byrd.  

                    On  April 2, 1991, defendant Ronayne and Denis Maguire,

          another H & M attorney,  met with representatives of the Campane-

          lli Companies ("Campanelli"), one of H & M's largest clients, who

          inquired  about supervision in  H & M's  "bankruptcy department,"

          expressed concerns as  to whether Byrd "really knew  what she was

          doing," complained  that Campanelli's  legal work  was not  being

          handled in a timely fashion by Byrd, and that the fees Campanelli

          was charged for her services were too high.  Ronayne and  Maguire

          concluded that there  were serious problems  with the quality  of

          Byrd's performance  for Campanelli and  that H & M  risked losing

          Campanelli altogether unless it took immediate action.  

                    Later  that day, Ronayne and  Maguire met with Byrd and

          informed  her  that  the  firm had  decided  that  the Campanelli

          account should be  reassigned to Davis, with Byrd  to continue   

          at the same salary    handling  Boston Five's consumer bankruptcy

          work and  regulatory matters, as well as  her other clients.  Two

          days later,  Byrd filed a  Title VII sexual  discrimination claim

                                          7

          with  the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and so

          informed H & M, which promptly retained outside counsel. 

                    In late April  1991, Katherine Hinderhoffer,  executive

          vice-president  for Boston Five,  contacted Ronayne.   She stated

          that Byrd did not  have sufficient knowledge of the law  and that

          Boston Five lacked  confidence in  Byrd's legal  advice and  work

          product.  Finally,  in early May 1991, Wayne  Ferguson once again

          contacted  the firm  to  complain that  Byrd  was not  submitting

          timely and  accurate status reports and that  her cases continued

          to proceed too slowly. 

                    At their June  1991 meeting, the H &  M partners deter-

          mined that Byrd's professional judgment and client-communications

          skills  were not in  keeping with  the firm's  professional stan-

          dards.    After  consulting with  outside  counsel,  the partners

          unanimously  voted  to  terminate Byrd's  employment.   Defendant

          Ronayne so informed Byrd on July 11, 1991.  

                    Byrd  brought  suit   against  defendants-appellees  in

          Massachusetts  Superior  Court,  asserting  various claims  under

          state law, Title VII sexual discrimination and retaliation claims

          under  42 U.S.C.     2000e et  seq., and  an Equal Pay  Act claim
                                     __  ___

          under  29 U.S.C.    206(d)(1).   Following  removal,  the federal

          district court granted summary judgment for all defendants on all

          federal claims, and dismissed the state-law claims pursuant to 28

          U.S.C.   1367(c)(3).  Byrd appealed.

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                                          8

                    We  examine  the  grant of  summary  judgment  de novo,
                                                                   __ ____

          viewing all competent evidence in genuine dispute, and reasonable

          infer-ences therefrom,  in a light  more favorable to Byrd.   See
                                                                        ___

          O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d  905, 907 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
          ________    _______                                 _____ ______

          114 S. Ct. 634 (1993).   Summary judgment is inappropriate unless

          "the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to interrogatories,  and

          admissions  on file, together  with the affidavits,  if any, show

          that there is no genuine issue  as to any material fact and  that

          the moving party is  entitled to a judgment as a  matter of law."

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143,
                                 ___________________    _____

          144 (1st Cir. 1994).  Nevertheless, even in  discrimination cases

          "summary judgment may  be appropriate" where the  party resisting

          judgment relies  "upon conclusory allegations,  improbable infer-

          ences, and unsupported  speculation" as to any  essential element

          in her claim.  See Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896
                         ___ ____________    _________________________

          F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).

          A.   Employment Discrimination Claim 
          A.   Employment Discrimination Claim
               _______________________________

               1.   The McDonnell Douglas Framework
               1.   The McDonnell Douglas Framework
                    _______________________________

                    The three-stage, burden-shifting framework announced in

          McDonnell Douglas  Corp. v.  Green, 411 U.S.  792, 802-04  (1973)
          ________________________     _____

          ["McDonnell Douglas"], serves  to allocate burdens of  production
            _________________

          and  order the  presentation of evidence  in Title  VII disparate

          treatment  cases,  thus  "progressively .  .  .  sharpen[ing] the

          inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrim-

          ination."  Texas Dep't of  Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
                     _________________________________    _______

          248, 255 n.8 (1981).  See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,  113 S.
                                ___ _____________________    _____

                                          9

          Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).

                    At the first  stage, Byrd was required to  make a prima

          facie showing  that (1) she  "was within a protected  class," (2)

          possessed  the  necessary  qualifications  for,  "and  adequately

          performed,  her job," (3)  but "was nevertheless  dismissed," and

          (4) her "employer  sought someone of roughly  equivalent qualifi-

          cations to  perform substantially  the same work."   Cumpiano  v.
                                                               ________

          Banco Santander Puerto  Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 153  (1st Cir. 1990).
          ____________________________

          A prima  facie case gives  rise to a rebuttable  presumption that

          the  employer  unlawfully  discriminated against  the  Title  VII

          plaintiff.  Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d  11, 15 (1st
                      _____    ______________________

          Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1958 (1995).
                      _____ ______

                    At the second  stage, the employer must  produce suffi-

          cient competent evidence, "taken  as true," to permit a  rational
                                     _____  __ ____      ______

          factfinder  to  conclude  that  there  was  a  "nondiscriminatory

          reason" for the challenged  employment action, thereby displacing

          the presumption  of intentional  discrimination generated  by the

          prima facie  case.  Woodman  v. Haemonetics Corp., 51  F.3d 1087,
                              _______     _________________

          1091 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748).  
                                       _____

                    At  the third and final stage  in the McDonnell Douglas
                                                          _________________

          analysis, the Title VII plaintiff, "with whom the ultimate burden

          of  persuasion  remains  throughout,"  must  proffer  "sufficient
              __________

          admissible evidence,  if believed, to prove by a preponderance of

          the evidence  each essential  element in a  prima facie  case and
                                                      _____ _____

          that the employer's  justification for the challenged  employment

          action was merely  a pretext for impermissible .  . . discrimina-

                                          10

          tion."   Id. at 1092.  "Where the  elements of a sufficient prima
                   ___

          facie case combine with the factfinder's belief that the ostensi-

          ble basis for  dismissing the employee was  pretextual, `particu-

          larly  if .  . .  accompanied by  a suspicion of  mendacity,' the

          factfinder is permitted to infer  the intentional . . . discrimi-
                        _________

          nation  required to enable  the plaintiff-employee to  prevail on

          the merits."  Id. (quoting Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749). 
                        ___          _____

                    a)   Prima Facie Case
                    a)   Prima Facie Case
                         ________________

                    Although  "the  required  prima facie  showing  is  not

          especially onerous," id.  at 1091, the district  court ruled that
                               ___

          Byrd had not established the second essential element    that she

          possessed  the  requisite  qualifications   for,  and  adequately

          performed, the  legal services  assigned to  her by  H &  M.   We

          believe  it advisable, nonetheless,  to assume that  Byrd managed

          her prima facie case, see, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6
                                ___  ____  _______    __________________

          F.3d 836, 843-44 (1st  Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.  Ct. 1398
                                             _____ ______

          (1994),  and to proceed further into the burden-shifting analysis

          where the shortcomings in her claim are more clear. 

                    b)   Defendants' Burden of Production
                    b)   Defendants' Burden of Production
                         ________________________________

                    As  nondiscriminatory  grounds   for  their  challenged

          actions, defendants  proffered competent  evidence of  continuing

          client  complaints  relating  to  the  timeliness,  quality,  and

          reliability  of  Byrd's  legal  services.    Whether  "ultimately

          persuasive or  not," Hicks,  113 S. Ct.  at 2748,  their proffers
                               _____

          rebutted  any  presumption of  unlawful sexual  discrimination in

          employment  generated by  the prima  facie  showing attempted  by

                                          11

          Byrd, see  Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1092, and it became incumbent upon
                ___  _______

          her  to produce  competent  evidence  that the  nondiscriminatory

          reasons proffered by  defendants were a mere pretext for unlawful

          discrimination.  Id.  
                           ___

                    Byrd  has never  denied that  two large  H &  M clients

          lodged serious complaints concerning  her professional competence

          and performance.   Indeed, the self-evaluation form  submitted by

          Byrd conceded not  only that boredom was  her "biggest weakness,"

          and that it caused her to "procrastinat[e]," but that her profes-

          sional weaknesses were "pretty much  set in concrete[]" and "most

          likely .  . . will  remain."  These admissions  are buttressed by

          the  uncontroverted evidence  that H  & M,  despite  its numerous

          appeals to  Byrd, continued  to receive  similar complaints  from

          clients relating to  the untimeliness and  unsatisfactory quality

          of her legal services.   Moreover, the record is unequivocal that

          despite its numerous  unsuccessful attempts to encourage  Byrd to

          be more responsive to these client concerns, H & M refrained from

          any  adverse  employment  action  until  Campanelli's  complaints
          ___

          raised  serious concerns  that the  firm  would lose  one of  its

          largest clients unless  Byrd were replaced.  Even then, H & M did

          not terminate Byrd.  It was  not until the complaints from Boston

          Five resumed  several weeks later  that the firm decided  to dis-
               _______

          charge her for failing to meet its professional standards.7  
                              
          ____________________

               7There is  no evidentiary basis  for inferring that H  & M's
          professional standards  were  met by  Byrd,  nor that  any  other
          associate remained with the  firm notwithstanding such  deficien-
          cies in performance.   And though it is undisputed that no female
          associate  had ever  been considered  for  partnership at  H &  M

                                          12

                    Byrd relies on the favorable performance evaluation she

          received from  the firm  in January  1990, approximately  fifteen

          months  before her client responsibilities were realigned, and on

          the  mixed  performance  evaluations  received from  Ronayne  and

          Kameron in late 1990,  as evidence that the principal  defendants

          were "happy with her work  and her ability to generate business."

          She  points as  well  to  the undisputed  evidence  that she  was

          rewarded with two bonuses in 1990.  

                    We think these proffers fall well short of generating a

          trialworthy dispute  as to whether the  nondiscriminatory reasons

          articulated by H  & M constituted a pretext  for intentional sex-

          based  discrimination in employment.   For one thing, the January

          1990  evaluation was  the  only  altogether  favorable  one  Byrd
                                     ____

          received.  More importantly, however, the "mixed" evaluations she

          received  in  late  1990 presaged  the  declining  trajectory her

          professional  performance  thereafter  reflected as  reported  by
                                                           __  ________  __

                              
          ____________________

          before  Byrd's termination,  Byrd has  not shown  that any  other
                                                                 ___  _____
          associate    male  or female     who failed to  conform with  the
          _________    ____  __ ______
          firm's  professional  standards,  had  ever  been  considered for
          partnership.  See  Stratus, 40 F.3d at  17 ("[F]or us  to compare
                        ___  _______
          [female plaintiff's] treatment with that of . . . male executives
          in a meaningful way, [plaintiff] would have  to show that she was
          similarly situated to those men in terms of performance, qualifi-
          cations and conduct, 'without such differentiating  or mitigating
          circumstances that would distinguish' their situations.")  (cita-
          tion omitted);  cf. LeBlanc, 6  F.3d at 348 (statistical  data on
                          __  _______
          general hiring  patterns, though  relevant, carry  less probative
          weight  in disparate  treatment cases  than  in disparate  impact
          cases: "[A] company's  overall employment statistics will,  in at
          least  many cases,  have little  direct bearing  on  the specific
          intentions of the employer when dismissing a particular individu-
          al."). 

                                          13

          clients and projected in Byrd's self-evaluation.8
          _______ ___ _________ __ ______ _______________

                    Byrd  further  notes  that  Monahan  complained   about

          another H  & M  attorney, Clive Martin,  who was  not terminated.
                                                            ___

          The  record likewise makes clear, though, that Byrd's termination
                                                         ______

          was not  based on  Monahan's complaints  but  on subsequent  com-
              ___

          plaints from Campanelli  and renewed complaints from  Boston Five

          representatives  other than  Monahan.   In  fact, throughout  her
                           _____ ____  _______              __________  ___

          tenure with H & M, Byrd continued to  perform bank regulation and
          ______

          consumer bankruptcy services  for Boston Five.  It  was not until

          Boston  Five  executive   vice-president  Katherine  Hinderhoffer

          complained  for the  first  time, and  Wayne Ferguson  again com-

          plained    following  the Campanelli complaint     that Byrd  was

          terminated.

                    A  disparate  treatment claimant  bears  the burden  of

          proving  that she  was  subjected  to  different  treatment  than

          persons similarly situated "`in all relevant aspects.'"  Stratus,
                  _________ ________   __ ___ ________ _______     _______

          40 F.3d at 17 (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889
                                 ________________    _________________

          F.2d 13, 19  (1st Cir. 1989)) (alteration in  original).  Accord-

          ingly, Byrd  would have  had to demonstrate  that she  and Martin

          were similarly situated "in terms of performance,  qualifications

          and  conduct, `without such differentiating or mitigating circum-

          stances  that would distinguish'  their situations."   Id.  at 17
                                                                 ___
                              
          ____________________

               8Although  Byrd  proffered   undisputed  evidence  that  her
          efforts in a complex commercial  loan workout had won high praise
          from Michelle Dowd, head of Boston Five's loan review department,
          and  that Dowd was especially impressed with Byrd's background in
          commercial  lending, the Dowd affidavit  in no sense gainsays the
          numerous  complaints relating to  Byrd's other professional legal
                                                                      _____
          services.

                                          14

          (quoting Mitchell  v. Toledo Hosp.,  964 F.2d 577, 583  (6th Cir.
                   ________     ____________

          1992)).  She proffered no such evidence.  

                    Although there is competent evidence that Susan Monahan

          complained against Clive Martin as well, yet he was not terminat-

          ed, the only record  evidence relating to Martin, even  conceding
                  ____

          its competence, is a statement  in Byrd's affidavit    that based

          on  her "conversations  . . .  with  Martin,  Susan  Monahan  had

          [Martin] removed from her cases."   There is no evidence relating

          to  Martin's responsibilities  in  behalf  of  Boston  Five,  his

          professional experience and expertise, his  seniority with H & M,

          nor even the nature and number of complaints against him.  Nor is

          there  evidence  that Martin  had  been the  subject  of repeated
                                                                   ________

          complaints  by Monahan or continuous complaints from other Boston
                                                               _____

          Five executives,  and from another major H  & M client.  Finally,

          there is no evidence that Martin was retained by the firm despite

          repeated  lapses  in   professional  performance  after  numerous

          appeals to improve his performance. 

                    In  sum, there  is no competent  evidence from  which a

          rational factfinder reasonably could infer  that H & M's explana-

          tion for its adverse employment action was a pretext for unlawful

          employment discrimination.  See id. at 16.
                                      ___ ___

          B.   Retaliation Claim
          B.   Retaliation Claim
               _________________

                    Byrd asserts that the summary judgment order dismissing

          her retaliatory discharge claim must be vacated because  a ratio-

          nal  factfinder reasonably  could  conclude  that  she  had  been

          discharged for filing a discrimination  claim with the EEOC.  See
                                                                        ___

                                          15

          Greenberg  v. Union  Camp Corp., 48  F.3d 22, 29  (1st Cir. 1995)
          _________     _________________

          (plaintiff  must  show  that articulated  reason  for  employer's

          action  was a pretext for  retaliation); Mesnick v. General Elec.
                                                   _______    _____________

          Co., 950 F.2d  816, 827 (1st Cir.  1991), cert. denied,  504 U.S.
          ___                                       _____ ______

          985 (1992).   For the most part, her  retaliatory discharge claim

          rests on the identical inferences of pretext found wanting above.

          See supra pp. 13-15.
          ___ _____

                    The only  other evidentiary support for her retaliation

          claim is a  passage in the Ronayne deposition,  which she charac-

          terizes as "an admission that  [her] filing of the discrimination

          claim was a  factor in her discharge."  She adverts to a portion:

          "I don't  think the  filing of a  discrimination charge  with the

          EEOC significantly affected [Byrd]."  But she disregards language

          which  provides  critically  important context.    The  full text

          reflects that  Ronayne stated:   "The same thing would  have hap-
                                            ___ ____ _____ _____  ____ ____

          pened if [Byrd]  hadn't filed a complaint.   I'm not saying  that
          _____ __         ______ _____ _ _________

          people weren't annoyed by [her EEOC complaint], but I don't think

          it significantly affected her." (emphasis added).  Given Ronayne-

          's  flat denial  in the  opening sentence,  his statement  cannot

          reasonably be  considered an admission  that the firm  harbored a

          retaliatory motive for  Byrd's termination.  Thus,  summary judg-

          ment on the retaliation claim was proper as well. 

          C.   Equal Pay Act Claim
          C.   Equal Pay Act Claim
               ___________________

                    The  Equal Pay  Act prohibits wage  discrimination "be-

          tween employees on the basis of sex . . . for equal  work on jobs

          the  performance of  which  requires  equal  skill,  effort,  and

                                          16

          responsibility,  and which  are performed  under  similar working

          conditions."  29 U.S.C.   206(d)(1).   An Equal Pay Act plaintiff

          must make a prima facie  showing that the employer paid different

          wages to an employee of  the opposite sex for substantially equal

          work.  See  Corning Glass  Works v.  Brennan, 417  U.S. 188,  195
                 ___  ____________________     _______

          (1974); see also Marcoux v. Maine, 797 F.2d 1100, 1106 (1st  Cir.
                  ___ ____ _______    _____

          1986).   At that point, the defendant-employer must establish one

          of  the following  affirmative defenses:    the wage  discrepancy

          resulted from (i) a seniority  system, (ii) a merit system, (iii)

          a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production,

          or  (iv) a  differential based on  a factor  other than sex.   29
          __

          U.S.C.   206(d)(1); Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196.
                              ___________________

                    Byrd claims that  H & M violated the Equal  Pay Act, in

          that  her starting  salary  was $62,500,  augmented  only by  two

          modest bonuses, compared with John Davis's $70,000 salary and 15%

          of  generated fees, even though her senior associate position was

          substantially equivalent  to the  "of counsel"  position held  by

          Davis.   Byrd attempts to make her  prima facie case by comparing

          Davis's professional experience with her  own.9  She asserts that

          Davis had less bankruptcy law experience when he came to H & M   
                    ____

          five years', by her calculation    than her six years'.  The only
                              
          ____________________

               9For  present  purposes,  we  simply  assume  arguendo  that
                                                             ________
          competent evidence of comparable  bankruptcy law experience might
          provide indirect support for Byrd's  claim that the two positions
                  ________                                        _________
          required substantially equal  skills.  We note,  nonetheless, the
          agency  position that  skill "must  be measured  in terms  of the
          performance  requirements of  the job. .  . ."   Possession  of a
          skill  not needed  to  meet  requirements of  the  job cannot  be
          considered  in  making  a  determination  regarding  equality  of
          skill."  29 C.F.R.   1620.15(a).

                                          17

          competent record evidence, however, is  the affidavit of a former

          executive vice-president of Commercial  National Bank, who merely

          states  that one of the  responsibilities assigned to Byrd during
                       ___

          her two-year tenure was to "handle[]" "many"  chapter 12 (family-

          farm debtor) matters    doubtless not a relevant qualification at

          H & M    and "some" chapter 11 and chapter 7 cases.10  

                    For  additional  support, Byrd  points  to the  Ronayne

          deposition, which she characterizes as  an admission that she and

          Davis  performed "parallel functions" at H & M.  On the contrary,

          the Ronayne  deposition evinces no  more than that Davis  did not

          supervise Byrd, an undisputed fact which plainly affords insuffi-
          _________

          cient support  for  a  reasonable inference  that  the  two  held

          positions  requiring  substantially   equal  skill,  effort,  and

          responsibility.   See Soble v.  University of Md., 778  F.2d 164,
                            ___ _____     _________________

          167  (4th Cir. 1985)  (finding no actionable  wage discrimination

          where female professor was paid less than male professors of same

          academic rank who performed work requiring greater skill, effort,

          or  responsibility).   Thus,  the  lack  of evidence  that  their

          respective professional  responsibilities  with H  &  M  required

          substantially equal skill, effort and responsibility,  foredoomed

          Byrd's Equal Pay Act claim.  

                    Finally, on a more conclusive note, the record includes

                              
          ____________________

               10Byrd  simply  concludes  that she  "had  a  great deal  of
          bankruptcy experience" at  the time Davis came  to H & M.   More-
          over, though surely in a  position to provide greater detail, she
          has provided no evidentiary support for the claim that she had as
                                                                         __
          much bankruptcy law  experience when she joined  H & M,  as Davis
          ____
          had when he came to the firm. 

                                          18

          undisputed evidence that Davis came  to H & M with  clients whose

          aggregate  annual billings  approached $200,000.   These  clients

          paid H & M $180,000 in fees during 1990.  On the other hand, Byrd

          brought no clients with her  when she joined H & M.   The clients

          for whom she  rendered legal services while  with H & M  paid the

          firm no more  than $100,000  during her  entire two-year  tenure.

          Thus,  the substantially greater revenues Davis generated for the

          firm  afforded defendants an affirmative defense, under 29 U.S.C.

             206(d)(1)(iv) (differences in  compensation based on  a factor

          other than sex), to Byrd's prima facie wage discrimination claim.

          See Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13 F.3d  1313, 1322-23 (9th
          ___ _______    _____________________

          Cir. 1994)  (gender-neutral differences  between responsibilities

          incumbent  upon coaches  of men's  and  women's basketball  teams

          included  the more  substantial public relations  and promotional

          duties  of  men's coach,  whose team  generated revenue  90 times

          greater than women's team).

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    As  defendants were entitled  to summary judgment  as a

          matter  of law  on all  claims,  the district  court judgment  is

          affirmed.
          ________

                                          19