Court Opinion

ID: 9846468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:41:48.35832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:33.224429
License: Public Domain

Barrow, J.,
joined by Baker, J., and Cole, J., dissenting.
The majority places a new and insurmountable burden on the Commonwealth to prove juror impartiality. Previously, the rule applied by the majority was applicable only to communications to jurors during trial. In addition to unnecessarily expanding application of the rule, by doing so in this case, the majority effectively establishes an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.
Unquestionably, the defendant has a right to trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). To preserve this right, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice attaches to an impermissible communication during “the deliberative process of the jury.” Stockton, 852 F.2d at 744.
This rule applies, however, only to communications made after the jury has been sworn. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954); Stockton, 852 F.2d at 744; Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 n.5 (4th Cir. 1986); Annotation, Communication Between Court Officials or Attendants and Jurors in Criminal Trial as ground for Mistrial or Reversal — Post Parker Cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 890, 898 (1985). Extra-judicial communications made before a jury is sworn has, until now, been treated differently. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); Stockton, 852 F.2d at 744; Haley, 802 F.2d at 1535 n.5. Voir dire and the court’s instructions protect a defendant from jury partiality acquired before a jury is sworn. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217. “Voir dire has long been recognized as an effective method of rooting out such bias, especially when conducted in a careful and thoroughgoing manner.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.13 (1984). After a jury has been sworn, on the other *524hand, “long-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987). Because of these concerns, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice necessarily arises from communications made after a jury has been sworn. See Stockton, 852 F.2d at 744.
Before a jury is sworn, however, a venireman is presumed impartial unless actual prejudice is demonstrated during voir dire. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). Even where, as a result of pre-trial publicity, all of the chosen jurors knew that the defendant was a convicted felon and some even knew the details of the pending charges, this presumption was not rebutted without demonstration during voir dire of a hostile opinion on the part of the venire. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975).
The jurors’ oath distinctly and rationally separates the application of these two conflicting presumptions. To blur this distinction by excepting “extraneous communication” ignores the reality that a venireman’s predisposition is made up of a lifetime of “extraneous communications.”
This is not to suggest that the jury’s verdict was beyond reproach. However, “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added). The defendant had this opportunity. The trial court conducted a post-trial hearing at which three jurors testified for the defendant. Each of them testified that they heard the jury orientation officer’s statements. Each, however, testified unequivocally that the statements did not affect their verdict in any way.
There was no evidence that any jurors, other than the three who testified, overheard the jury officer’s remarks. The defendant did not attempt to prove that other jurors had heard the statement of the jury orientation officer. He did not call other jurors to testify, nor did he ask those that he did call whether any other jurors had been present when the statement was made. There was no evidence that the other jurors attended the same orientation as the three who testified. We cannot determine from this record whether the jury orientation officer’s remarks were made during a formal presentation to all of the assembled veniremen or were made to only a few under less formal circumstances.
*525Since evidence supported the trial judge’s finding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the officer’s statement and there was no evidence that the other jurors heard it, the majority opinion effectively creates an irrebuttable presumption. There is no contention that the remarks, which did not relate to the defendant’s trial or to the defendant personally, were so inflammatory that their effect could not be overcome. Similarly, there is no evidence that the comments were a product of a continuous effort to contaminate or influence juries amounting to official misconduct or that the manner of examining the three jurors at the hearing was done in a manner that tended to unduly influence their responses. Even if the burden was on the Commonwealth to prove lack of prejudice, the testimony of the three jurors was sufficient to do so.
The effect of the majority opinion, however, is to create an insurmountable burden. Here, the majority infers that the officer’s remarks were made to all of the jurors on the panel while assembled together. Apparently, therefore, the Commonwealth could rebut the presumption only by calling all of the jurors to testify as to the impact of the remarks on their verdict — a procedure in conflict with the common law rule against admitting a juror’s testimony regarding the motives and influences affecting jury deliberations. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892). This rule applies to all cases except those where external influences during a jury’s deliberations are alleged to have affected the verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. at 117.
Expansion of this rule will also affect defendants. The majority’s opinion implicitly counsels defendants during voir dire to avoid inquiry concerning pre-trial communications to the jury. In the event of an adverse verdict, a defendant can now challenge pretrial communications armed with a presumption of prejudice, an advantage he would not have during voir dire.
The jury officer’s remarks are indefensible; however, they must be judged for their effect on the jury’s verdict. This effect should be measured by content of the remarks, the context in which they were made and their influence on the jury, not simply by the officer’s official capacity. A hallmark of our system of criminal justice is its reliance on lay juries. We trust in jurors’ deliberations, in their attention to the evidence and to the trial court’s instructions. We value the finality of their decisions. We should not dis*526card a jury verdict without first concluding that it is tainted by partiality.
The trial court found that the defendant failed to prove that the jurors were partial. Evidence supported this decision, and I would affirm the judgment of conviction.