Court Opinion

ID: 9883859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:23:22.399912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.457659
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I join the opinion of the court in its application of Blakely v. Washington to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. When the district court may unilaterally find facts that increase the defendant’s sentence beyond what would otherwise be legally permissible based on the jury verdict or guilty plea alone, the jury does not “stand between the individual and the power of the government.” United States v. Booker, — U.S.—,—, 125 S.Ct. 738, 752, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). But because I conclude the majority’s remedy for the Blakely violation does not comply with our severability jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent.
Any discussion of a remedy for Blakely-related problems must begin by addressing severability issues. Severability is an analytical tool designed to protect the separation of powers by preventing the court from substitution of its judgment for the judgment of the elected representatives of the people. See Regan v. Time Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652-53, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984). Traditional severability analysis begins with an unconstitutional portion of an act and asks if it may properly be severed in light of the intent of the legislature as to the act as it was passed. The court may not craft its own remedy by adding to an act or excising portions of its choosing. See id.; McGuire v. C & L Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 614 (Minn.1984).
Minnesota Statutes § 645.20 (2004) lays out the statutory standard for severability:
Unless there is a provision in the law that the provisions shall not be severa-ble, the provisions of all laws shall be severable. If any provision of a law is found unconstitutional and void, the re*149maining provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds the valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume the legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.
There is a presumption of severability. Chapman v. Commissioner of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825, 835 (Minn.2002). Analysis of whether a statute’s void provisions are severable centers on legislative intent, see, e.g., City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533 (Minn.1979) (holding that unconstitutional provision exempting certain groups from ambit of an obscenity ordinance may be properly severed because doing so did not alter the intended effect of the ordinance, and the constitutionally void portion was “superfluous”). But because our goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature had it known that a part of the bill was unconstitutional, the attention given to legislative intent is in the form of a specific question. See Johnson Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 402 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn.1987). We must center only on the specific unconstitutional provision, and then ask whether the legislature would have passed the constitutional provisions of the statute independently of the provision declared unconstitutional — here, whether the legislature would have passed a system where presumptive sentences are applied regardless of any aggravating factors. See Regan v. Time Inc., 468 U.S. at 653, 104 S.Ct. 3262; Sarette, 283 N.W.2d at 537. See also State v. Dilts, 337 Or. 645, 103 P.3d 95 (2004) (holding that the court considers “whether a part of a statute should be severed only when part of a statute is held to be unconstitutional and the court therefore must determine whether that part of the statute can be severed and the remaining parts of the statute saved” (emphasis in original)). If the answer is no, the provision is not severable and the entire regime must be declared unconstitutional.
In the present case, we should ask the traditional severability question this way: Would the legislature in 1978 have passed the remaining provisions that constitute the sentencing guidelines regime without the unconstitutional provision for departures from presumptive sentences? In asking this question, it is important to note that the legislature cannot intend something unconstitutional. Thus, the fact that the legislature did pass the guidelines system is irrelevant to the severability question, as is the majority’s observation that failing to sever would return the state to indeterminate sentencing and allow broad judicial discretion in sentencing.1 The court must not merely ask which possible remedy seems to conform best to the intent of the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.20. Ad hoc analysis of what remedy the legislature would likely prefer enables the judiciary to take on the legislative *150mantle too easily. Instead, upon a determination that the legislature would not have passed the remainder of the guidelines regime without a provision for upward departures, the court should strike down the entire regime and return the state to indeterminate sentencing. That system at least has the approval of an earlier body of the people’s representatives, whereas the system the court today creates only has the approval of this court.
By examining the legislative history of the original sentencing guidelines legislation, we can answer the severability question definitively, and the answer is no. The guidelines would never have become law but for the provision for upward departures.
In 1975, State Senator William McCut-cheon introduced a determinate sentencing bill that made imprisonment mandatory for all felonies, eliminated “good time” and abolished the parole board.2 Research Project: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 5 Hamline L.Rev. 292, 301 (1982) (hereinafter “Research Project”). The bill, perceived as a “get tough on criminals” bill because it would send all felons to prison, was less a serious proposal than a means to stimulate consideration of sentencing reform ideas. Id. at 302. After extensive hearings prior to the 1976 legislative session, the bill was completely rewritten. Id. Included in the new bill was a presumptive sentence of 40% of the statutory maximum in the 1963 criminal code and a provision allowing courts to deviate from the presumptive sentence within a range of 15%. Id. After passage in the Senate, the bill moved to the House Committee on Crime Prevention and Corrections. There, committee chairman Donald Moe opposed the bill because he believed that imposing identical sentences on all persons convicted of the same offense would ignore large differences in conduct leading to those convictions. Id. at 303 n. 11. Moe believed that supporters of the bill were not eliminating discretion in sentencing, but merely moving it from the parole board into the hands of judges and prosecutors, a group less transparent and accountable to the public than the parole board. Id.
But this determinate sentencing bill never became law. Governor Wendell Anderson vetoed the bill on April 13, 1976, expressing concerns along the lines of Rep. Moe. In particular, the Governor disagreed with the omission of a clear provision for longer sentences for the most serious offenders. Id at 304 (citing Veto Message, 4 Journal of House 6640 (1976)). The majority notes that Governor Anderson vetoed the bill because its provision for extended terms for chronic and dangerous offenders did not define the penalty for such terms. But this observation only underscores the Governor’s concern for proportionality in sentencing and public safety. Governor Anderson’s objection to the bill was not as narrow as the majority contends. The Governor worried that dangerous offenders would not receive sufficiently lengthy sentences under the new law — that rationality and proportionality might be sacrificed in light of the bill’s lack of guidance on the issue of extended terms. He wrote, “[m]y major concern is that [the bill] simply deals inadequately with chronic dangerous offenders.” Id. at 6640. The Governor feared the bill would “result in non-use of extended terms; the basic determinate sentences in the bill *151would then result in sentences that are too short for chronic dangerous offender convicted of first and second degree murder and aggravated rape.” Id. at 6641. Thus, we need not wonder whether determinate sentencing would have become law absent a clear procedure for upward departures; we know that such a proposal was expressly rejected based on concern for proportionality and public safety.
But the legislative history does not end with the Governor’s veto. The bill was reintroduced in 1977, and was drastically altered in the House to include the concept of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 305. The bill passed both legislative bodies, and in conference committee, the debate centered on the scope of discretion in sentencing as well as the location of that discretion. Id. at 805-06. Negotiators agreed upon a compromise that incorporated determinate sentencing with legislative and judicial guidelines. Id. at 306. While sentence ranges were narrow and sentences were determinate, judges were allowed to depart from the presumptive sentence. Governor Rudy Perpich signed the bill into law on April 5,1978.
Thus, after determinate sentencing was rejected by Governor Anderson specifically because it would lead to disproportionate sentencing for the worst offenders, the legislature reached a very delicate compromise creating the determinate guidelines but allowing judges to increase sentences based on factual findings. The final debate in conference committee focused on discretion in sentencing and a provision for extended sentences for the worst offenders was a key part of the compromise that ultimately emerged. The historical record is overwhelming that legislators would not have moved forward with the bill but for the provision for upward departures from presumptive sentences based on judicial discretion. So, from the history of the bill alone, we can answer the severability question in the negative.
The text of the legislation itself lends further support to the proposition that the guidelines bill would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional provisions. The purpose of the legislation is explicitly detailed in the statutes promulgating the guidelines regime. Section 244.09, subdivision 5, although added to the guidelines statute in 1997, states that the guidelines are “a procedure based on state public policy to maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing.” Act of May 6, 1997, ch. 96, § 1, 1997 Minn. Laws 694, 695. The guidelines themselves state a purpose to “establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure * * * proportionality.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines I. This court has stated its belief that the “overriding principle in all sentencing is rationality, predictability, and consistency * * *.” State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn.2002); see also id. at 68 (“[T]he sentencing guidelines were created to assure uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability in sentencing”); Hutchinson v. State, 679 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Minn.2004). Further, public safety is a paramount concern of the Guidelines Commission when establishing arid modifying the sentencing guidelines. Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004). The majority focuses on the goal of uniformity, and, citing our decision in State v. Misqua-dace, notes that the guidelines themselves, by providing a wide diversity of presumptive sentences based on both offense severity and criminal history, serve the goal of proportionality. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 68. We explained in Misquadace that in order “[t]o maintain consistency, departures from the guidelines are discouraged.” Id. at 68; Minn. Sent. Guidelines I. But we went on to note that “any rational system of sentencing must allow for *152different sentences to be imposed when substantial and compelling circumstances warrant different treatment.” Id. at 69 (emphasis added). Thus, while the majority is correct that the guidelines themselves lead to proportionate sentencing in the majority of cases, it is equally true that the guidelines cannot embrace every possible case, and thus proportionality and rationality demand that the worst offenders be dealt with outside the guidelines. Today’s decision, stripping the Minnesota sentencing system of upward durational departures, requires imposition on remand of presumptive guidelines sentences for the very worst offenders, imposing an irrational sentencing system on the state.3
The majority attempts to play down the irrationality of the system it creates, arguing that the number of upward departures, 7.3% of felony sentences in 2003, is modest. Minn. Sent. Guidelines Comm’n, The Impact of Blakely v. Washington on Sentencing in Minnesota: Long Term Recommendations 8 (Sept. 30, 2004). The majority suggests by implication that taking the wheels off of upward departures is of little practical significance. The reverse is true; the modest number of upward departures reflects first, a well-designed system of presumptive sentences addressing the goal of uniformity, while preserving upward departures for the worst offenders. Upward departures in a large number of cases would make presumptive sentences meaningless.
But the actual number of upward departures is not constitutionally significant. What is significant is the fact that no sentencing system can be rational and proportional without a mechanism for departures. See Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d at 69. Upward departures and guidelines sentencing are so inextricably bound together in the pursuit of uniform and proportional sentencing that, under our severability jurisprudence, the one cannot be separated from the other. Today’s decision guts rational, proportionate sentencing and conflicts with the statutory command to consider public safety first. See Minn.Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2004) (stating that the “primary consideration of the [sentencing guidelines] commission shall be public safety”).
It is also worth mentioning that the legislature has taken action to address the Blakely problem. See Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 16, §§ 3-6, 2005 Minn. Laws —, —. The legislature continues to be committed to proportionality and tough penalties for the worst offenders, and to this end has increased the ceiling on presumptive sentencing ranges from 15% to 20% above the fixed presumptive sentence. Id., § 1. Further, the legislature remains committed to upward durational departures from the presumptive sentence, opting for jury determination of facts which support such departures. Id., § 4. These provisions are a temporary fix, sunsetting on February 1, 2007. Id. But the legislature’s decision to preserve upward departures underscores the conflict between our action today and the will of the people’s representatives.4
*153In light of the foregoing, we should have little problem answering the severability question in the negative — the legislature would never have passed the guidelines bill without provision for upward departures. Having found the guidelines non-severable, our precedents direct us to end our analysis of legislative intent. We should strike down the entire sentencing guidelines regime as unconstitutional and non-severable, and remand for resentencing under the statutory range for the offense committed.5 This would allow district courts to exercise discretion to impose sentences up to the statutory maximum and provide the legislature a clean slate from which to begin sentencing reform anew.6 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The Supreme Court in Blakely expressly approved of judicial discretion in sentencing and indeterminate sentencing. The issue is one of legal expectation. A defendant convicted or pleading guilty under a system of mandatory presumptive sentences has an expectation of a specific sentence. But under a system of indeterminate sentencing, potential criminals are on notice that their behavior risks a broad range of possible punishment. Nothing about judicial discretion in sentencing offends the Sixth Amendment unless it pushes an offender’s penalty above the presumptive punishment the law provides. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2540; Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002).

. Prior to the sentencing reforms of the late seventies, the district court sentenced felons to a maximum term of years within the statutory range for the offense committed, and the parole board determined the actual release date. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.10; 609.12 (1978).

. It is, of course, true that an indeterminate sentencing regime, as urged by the dissent, may adversely complicate the legislative goal of uniformity. But while that development is speculative, proportionality is a guaranteed casualty of the majority decision.

. Neither the majority’s remedy nor the legislature’s reforms resolve one potential problem lurking beneath the surface of Blakely: The United States Supreme Court has flirted with holding outright that all facts that increase the ceiling in possible punishment beyond what is allowed by the jury verdict or defendant's admissions alone must be treated as elements of the offense. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 478, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (majority opinion) (“Any *153possible distinction between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of criminal indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by the court as it existed during the years surrounding our Nation’s founding.”); id. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (majority opinion) ("[W]hen the term 'sentencing enhancement’ is used to describe an increase beyond the authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict.”); id. at 521, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (Thomas, J., concurring) (exhaustively detailing the common law history of the understanding that "if a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment * * * it is an element” of the crime being punished); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (”[A]11 facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives — whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane — must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 565, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("[Tjhose facts that determine the maximum sentence the law allows, then, are necessarily elements of the crime.”) (citations omitted). Elements of a crime must not only be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but must also be included in the initial charging instrument. See id. at 557, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (holding that the legislature "may not manipulate the definition of a crime in a way that relieves the Government of its constitutional obligations to charge each element in the indictment, submit each element to the jury, and prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt”). Striking the Minnesota guidelines regime in its entirety and remanding for imposition of a sentence under the statutory range would prospectively eliminate this issue because aggravating sentencing factors would be folded into the judge’s discretion and would not affect the presumptive range of punishment. See supra, n. 1.

. There are no perfect choices here. Under the dissent's proposed remedy, the district court sets fixed-length sentences within the statutory range for the offense committed, or if no range is fixed by statute, to a fixed term within the default range for a felony. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.03; 609.10 (2004). The majority correctly points out that the former parole board, which determined actual release dates for inmates, no longer exists, and that the legislature never intended judges to have unfettered discretion in sentencing. But neither did the legislature intend to entirely eliminate discretion in sentencing, as the majority does today. The 1978 legislature merely relocated discretion from the parole board to judges and prosecutors. Research Project, 5 Ham-line L.Rev. at 303 n. 11. The compromise which emerged in 1978 embraced judicial discretion to serve the goal of proportionality by allowing judges to depart from the guidelines, although in a manner that offended the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 306. While we cannot resurrect the parole board, the dissent's position would retain that judicial discretion in a way that does not run afoul of the constitution and respects the intentions of the 1978 legislature. The majority's wholesale elimination of all discretion in sentencing is the more significant change, not envisioned by any body of the people's representatives.

. In the present case, remanding for resen-tencing under the statutory range for the of*154fense committed would give the district court discretion to sentence Shattuck to a term of up to 360 months in prison — the very sentence he received by virtue of the district court's upward durational departure under Minn.Stat. § 609.109, subd. 4(a) (2004). Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(a) (2004).