Court Opinion

ID: 9483468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:21:20.803938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:38.702405
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge,
with whom McMILLIAN and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that the majority has improperly usurped the role of the trial court by substituting its own factual “findings” 1 for those of the trial court as to the effect of the newly discovered evidence on the outcome of Mr. Cornell’s trial. The majority chooses to disregard the district court’s finding that “the newly discovered evidence [Cross’s 1989 recantation] bears upon the constitutionality of petitioner’s detention ... [and] the suppressed exculpatory evidence is not only favorable to petitioner, but is material to the issue of guilt.” Most significantly, the majority ignores the district court’s conclusion that “it is reasonably probable that if there is a retrial and all of this evidence is presented to the jury, the petitioner will be found not guilty.”
Instead, the majority concludes that Cornell has not established cause for his procedural default in failing to present the 1989 Cross recantation to the state court. In this conclusion, the majority misconstrues the nature of the Cross recantation. While it is true that Cross originally recanted shortly after Cornell’s trial in 1976, Cross quickly withdrew that recantation, claiming that he had been coerced to recant, and the validity of the recantation was instantly discredited. Because of Cross’s apparent change of heart, defense counsel chose not to further pursue the recantation theory at that time. In 1989, not only did Cross sign a sworn affidavit recanting his trial testimony, but he also provided sworn testimony before the federal district court. This is significant new evidence in light of the fact that allegations of coercion are no longer brought to bear on this latter recantation. Further, the 1989 recantation is not associated with Cross’s heavy drug use which he *385subsequently admitted influenced his testimony at trial.
The majority entirely ignores precedent in our circuit that requires the consideration of newly discovered evidence in a habeas proceeding where it has been determined that the evidence “would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” See Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 823 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 913, 97 S.Ct. 2985, 53 L.Ed.2d 1099 (1977). Although this holding has been called into question by certain members of our court, the en banc court has declined opportunities to overrule this precedent and therefore Mast-rian and its progeny remain valid law, binding upon this court.
The majority would have us believe that the evidence of Mr. Cornell’s guilt was substantial and that, therefore, the suppressed evidence, which was clearly a Brady violation, and the recanted testimony, were not material to the outcome of the trial. However, the procedural history and the facts presented at trial demonstrate the questionable validity of this determination.
First, the jury was deadlocked 7-5 after fifteen hours of actual deliberation and reached a verdict of guilty only after receiving an Allen charge and deliberating nearly six more hours. In 1979, a federal district court granted habeas relief, finding that the Allen charge had served to improperly coerce the guilty verdict. Cornell v. Iowa, No. 78-368-2 (S.D.Iowa 1979). Then, in 1988, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the basis of the material exculpatory evidence suppressed by the State of Iowa, a suppression which a federal district court subsequently found “reprehensible.” Cornell v. Nix, No. 88-1618-B (S.D.Iowa 1990). Finally, the district court in the present case determined that if the recantation evidence and the suppressed exculpatory evidence had been presented to the trial court it would have resulted in a finding of acquittal.
Where the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance becomes significant in the court’s evaluation of newly discovered evidence. The evidence at issue in this case was of more than relatively minor importance. The only inculpatory evidence presented at the trial was that of the two brothers, Albert and Bryce Oliver, and Eric Cross. Cornell’s theory of defense was that Bryce was the one who had killed Crow. Therefore, of those three witnesses, Cross was the only disinterested party and his testimony was crucial in that it served to lend substantial credibility to the testimony of the otherwise self-interested brothers. Obviously, without Cross’s corroborating testimony, the credibility of Albert and Bryce would have been called into serious question.
Mr. Cornell is now serving a life sentence with no further state court proceedings available to present this new evidence, as conceded by the state’s lawyer at oral argument. I consider it to be a fundamental miscarriage of justice to disregard the district court’s finding on remand that, had the evidence been presented, a jury would have acquitted Mr. Cornell. I would direct the trial court to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

. The majority makes no less than seven of its own "findings" throughout its opinion. See ante at pages 380-84.