Court Opinion

ID: 9693883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:06:34.134243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:25.402071
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/25/23 In re K.G. CA4/2
                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re K.G., et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                               E080711

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Super.Ct.No. DPR12200201)

 v.                                                                       OPINION

 J.G.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dorothy McLaughlin,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Shobita Misra, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham Julie K. Jarvi, Deputy

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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       At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court found the Indian

Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) does not apply in this

case. Defendant and appellant J.G. (Mother) contends the juvenile court erred in its

finding because plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social

Services (the Department) failed to ask extended family members about possible Indian

ancestry. We affirm.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On December 21, 2022, with protective custody warrants in hand, the

Department detained K.G. and R.G. (collectively, the children).

                                     DISCUSSION

       When a child welfare agency takes temporary custody of a child in an emergency

situation, without a warrant, then the agency “has a duty to inquire whether that child is

an Indian child.” (§§ 224.2, subd. (b), 306.) That duty includes questioning extended

family members. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(2).)

       In the instant case, the Department did not take the children into temporary

custody without a warrant. Rather, the Department had protective custody warrants

when detaining the children. “That difference matters because the statutory provision

on which Mother relies says that it matters. [Citation.] The inquiry obligation

prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 224.2 was not triggered.” (In re Robert F.

(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500 (Robert F.); contra In re Delila D. (2023) 93

Cal.App.5th 953; and see In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 680.) In other

words, because the Department detained the children via protective custody warrants,

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the Department did not have a duty to question extended family members about their

ancestry. The juvenile court did not err in finding ICWA was inapplicable.

       To avoid this court’s interpretation of section 224.2, subdivision (b), Mother

contends the Department had a duty to inquire of extended relatives under section

224.2, subdivision (a). Section 224.2, subdivision (a), provides, “The court, county

welfare department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing

duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may

be or has been filed, is or may be an Indian child. The duty to inquire begins with the

initial contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or

neglect whether the party has any information that the child may be an Indian child.”

(Italics added.) Other appellate courts have interpreted the “including, but not limited

to” language as imposing an obligation upon child welfare “agencies to ask all relevant

involved individuals whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c);

see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566.)” (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th

275, 290.)

       In Robert F., this court concluded that section 224.2, subdivision (a), by its plain

language “does not require the county welfare department or the court to question

extended family members as part of the initial inquiry in every case. [However,] case-

specific circumstances may require the department to interview extended family

members under [subdivision (a)] . . . . For instance, if the parents deny any Indian

ancestry, but a family member later contacts the social worker and volunteers that the

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family has Indian ancestry, then the department cannot ignore that claim.” (Robert F.,

supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)

      In the instant case, Mother does not assert that ancestral information was

volunteered by the children’s extended family members. Instead, Mother contends

there was “no obligation to volunteer information. [Citations.] The statute imposes on

the agency and the juvenile court, and not the parents, the duty of inquiry.” We follow

Robert F. In the absence of ancestral information volunteered by an extended family

member, the Department did not have a duty to inquire of extended family members

under section 224.2, subdivision (a). (Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)

                                      DISPOSITION

      The disposition order is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                      MILLER
                                                                                          J.

I concur:

CODRINGTON
                                 J.

                                           4
[In re K.G. et al.; E080711]

      McKINSTER, J., Dissenting:

      I respectfully dissent and would follow In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th

953. I would affirm the dispositional orders and findings but remand the case to the

trial court to comply with ICWA inquiry and any notice obligations, if applicable. (In

re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 568.)

                                                            McKINSTER
                                                                            Acting P. J.

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