Court Opinion

ID: 9561570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:12:12.247617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:57.232324
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the lower court, and would hold that the possession of alcoholic *73liquors by the husband of the respondent in the parking lot of the restaurant was illegal.
Under the view I take, Act 398 of the Acts of 1967, now codified as Section 4-29, did not repeal, expressly or by implication, any part of Section 4-95. The two sections are capable of reasonable reconcilement. They are not plainly repugnant. It was not the intent of the legislature to legalize the possession of alcoholic liquors by employees of restaurant operators who have procured a possession and consumption license. On the other hand it was clearly the intention of the legislature to so amend the law that only customers at a licensed restaurant may possess and drink alcoholic beverages on the premises incident to serving of meals.
In order to determine the true intent of the legislature it is necessary to view the law (1) as it was prior to the amendment, (2) to consider those statutes expressly repealed, (3) to consider those existing statutes intentionally retained, and (4) to consider the possession and consumption amendment itself. The obvious overall purpose of the amendment should be considered.
In City of Spartanburg v. Leonard, 180 S. C. 491, 186 S. E. 395 (1936), this court said:
“In ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, the court is not to be governed by the apparent meaning of words found in one clause, sentence, or part of the act, but by a consideration of the whole act, read in the light of conditions and circumstances as they appeared to the Legislature, and the purpose sought to be accomplished.”
The emphasis which the majority opinion places on “notwithstanding any other provision of law” and “any person” is not warranted when one considers the purpose which the amendment seeks to accomplish. These words must be interpreted in the light of the fact that Section 4-95 was not repealed.
*74Section 4-95 (retained by legislature) reads in part as follows:
• “Unlawful possession. — It shall be unlawful for any person to store or have in possession any alcoholic liquors in his place of business other than a licensed liquor store. A place of business shall include:
“(1) any place where goods, wares or merchandise are sold, offered for sale or distributed, and also places of amusement; * * *.”
This section was obviously originally enacted and has been intentionally retained by the legislature in order to prohibit the owner of an establishment from keeping in possession liquor in “his place of business.” It is directed toward all business establishments except liquor stores. The purpose is to aid in law enforcement, to limit sales of liquor to liquor stores, and prohibit bootlegging. If owners and all employees of licensed restaurants are permitted to possess liquor in the restaurant and in the parking lot, a near hopeless law enforcement problem is created and it is reasonable to assume that such was not intended. The legislature appreciated the fact that it was not necessary to repeal Section 4-95 in order to permit customers at a restaurant to drink legally. If it had been the intent of the legislature to legalize possession and consumption by the operator and employees of a licensed restaurant this section would have been repealed or amended. It was retained so as to exempt owners and employees from the new law. This section is directed to a specific class of individuals, namely, operators of business houses. It has a purpose different from Section 4-29.
Section 4-96 (expressly repealed) read as follows:
“Liquor not to be kept in certain places. — It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession for any purpose any quantity of such liquors in any room in which or in connection with which there is maintained or conducted any place of amusement, clubhouse, fraternity house, lodge or meeting place, cafe, rest room, store, office, shop or *75factory and no such place shall be considered a residence within the meaning of this section.”
This section was directed to “any person” and it is this section which (prior to the amendment) made it unlawful to possess and drink alcoholic liquors in a restaurant. It was repealed because repeal was necessary to accomplish the purpose of the possession and consumption amendment.
Section 4-402 (expressly repealed) read in part as follows :
“Resorts for drinking declared nuisance. — All places where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking alcoholic liquors or beverages are hereby declared nuisances * * *.”
This section was also repealed because repeal was necessary in order to accomplish the purpose of the possession and consumption amendment.
The conflict in the law arises because Section 4-95 prohibits Mrs. Gaddy and her employees from having in possession liquor at the restaurant, whereas Section 4-29 permits any person to possess liquor at her licensed eating place. The first statute is directed to a specific class, and the second statute is a generalization. The first was retained to limit the second.
It would seem apparent that the purpose of the amendment was solely to legalize the consumption of alcoholic liquor in licensed restaurants by patrons. Possession of the liquor and transportation of it to and from the restaurant is expressly permitted because transportation to and from and possession at a restaurant are essenital to consumption.
The legislature repealed Sections 4-96 and 4-402 because these sections were inconsistent with patrons drinking on the premises of a licensed restaurant, and that is what the legislature intended to legalize. Simultaneously, the legislature retained Section 4-95 intact because it is not inconsistent with patrons drinking at a licensed restaurant. It is *76inescapable that the legislature intended that it continue to be unlawful for owners of places of business, including licensed restaurants, to possess legal liquor.
It was held in State v. Hood, 181 S. C. 488, 188 S. E. 134 (1936):
“It is presumed that the Legislature was familiar with prior legislation, and that if it intended to repeal existing laws it would have expressly done so; hence, if by any fair or liberal construction two acts may be made to harmonize, no court is justified in deciding that the last repealed the first.”
Repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. Courts should be slow to hold that a statute has been repealed by implication and should avoid so. holding if it can be done on any reasonable hypothesis and can arrive at another result by any construction which is fair and reasonable.
“Where a statute expressly repeals specific acts, there is a presumption that it was not intended to repeal others not specified. In such case there is an implied approval of the statutes not specified, as well as evidence of an intention to leave them undisturbed, and the doctrine of implied repeal does not apply.” 82 C. J. S. Statutes § 289 (1953).
The two statutes can be reconciled and are susceptible of a construction which will render both operative without doing violence to either. It is the duty of the court to so construe them.
“Legislative Intent as Controlling Factor. — The question whether a new act works an implied repeal of an existing statute is one of legislative intention in the enactment of the alleged repealing act. When such intention of the legislature can be ascertained, it is the duty of the courts to give it force and effect, since the intent of the law is its vital force, and the province of the courts is to ascertain and effectuate the valid legislative intent. Indeed, one statute will not be held to repeal another by implication unless it appears, *77from the terms and provisions of the later act, that it was the inention of the legislature to enact a new law in place of the old. Moreover, a repeal by implication will be carried no further than is required to gratify the legislative intent manifested in the later act. It should not be so extended as to include cases not within the intention of the legislature.” 50 Am. Jur. Statuses § 535 (1944).
In Stone & Clamp v. Holmes, 217 S. C. 203, 60 S. E. (2d) 231 (1950), this court said:
“It is a well settled principle of law that where two statutes are in apparent conflict, they should be so construed, if reasonably possible, as to allow both to stand and to give force and effect to each. The primary endeavor is to ascertain and give effect to the manifest indention of the legislature.”
The majority opinion holds that the language of the amendment makes it plain and clear that the legislature intended to allow the possession and consumption of alcoholic liquors by the operators and employees of a licensed restaurant. The effect of this is to say that there is no conflict requiring an interpretation by this court. I disagree. There is nothing in either the old law or the new to indicate that the legislature sought to liberalize the liquor law so as to permit restaurant owners and employees to possess liquor and drink on the premises. I am convinced that there is a conflict and that a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers require a contra ruling.