Court Opinion

ID: 9957833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 15:00:35.226132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:51.076716
License: Public Domain

22-6457
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Poczter, IJ
                                                                           A208 797 307

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 4   four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                      JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 8                      RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 9                      EUNICE C. LEE,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   PARDEEP SINGH,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                       22-6457
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
1    FOR PETITIONER:                      Richard W. Chen, New York, NY.
2
3    FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
4                                         Attorney General; Sarah A. Byrd, Senior
5                                         Litigation Counsel; Brandon T. Callahan,
6                                         Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
7                                         Litigation, United States Department of
8                                         Justice, Washington, DC.

 9            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

11   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12            Petitioner Pardeep Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of an

13   August 22, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming a June 3, 2019, decision of an

14   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

15   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Pardeep

16   Singh, No. A208 797 307 (B.I.A. Aug. 22, 2022), aff’g No. A208 797 307 (Immig. Ct.

17   N.Y. City June 3, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

18   facts and procedural history.

19            Under the circumstances, we have considered “the IJ’s decision as modified

20   by the BIA’s decision,” that is, minus the IJ’s determination that the asylum claim

21   was time-barred. Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.

22   2005).     We review an adverse credibility determination “under the substantial
                                               2
 1   evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and

 2   “the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

 3   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 4   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 5         The governing credibility standard provides as follows:

 6         Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,
 7         a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
 8         candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . . . the
 9         consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
10         statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and
11         considering the circumstances under which the statements were
12         made), the internal consistency of each such statement, the
13         consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , and
14         any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to
15         whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart
16         of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.

17   Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,

18   from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

19   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d

20   162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

21         We find that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility

22   determination.     The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies among two

23   versions of Singh’s asylum application, his testimony, and his documentary

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1    evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

2          Singh alleged that he was physically attacked by members of the Congress

3    Party because of his and his family’s support for the Mann Party. However,

4    Singh’s first asylum application did not disclose that he was physically attacked

 5   and stated only that Congress Party members “bullied” him. It was not until his

 6   second application and his hearing testimony that he claimed that in December

 7   2004, Congress Party members beat him until he was unconscious and had to be

 8   taken to a hospital. The agency reasonably relied on his total omission of this

 9   attack, which was the basis of his claim of past persecution. See Hong Fei Gao, 891

10   F.3d at 78–79 (“[I]n assessing the probative value of the omission of certain facts,

11   an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible petitioner would

12   reasonably have been expected to disclose under the relevant circumstances.”).

13   When asked to explain why the original version of the application omitted that he

14   was physically harmed, Singh was unresponsive, answering: “No. They came

15   there. We were attacked.” When informed that he had to provide “responsive

16   answers,” Singh paused, then stated, “I gave the statement, whatever my

17   statement was.”     Neither response resolved the inconsistency between the

18   applications. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner

                                              4
 1   must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

 2   secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

 3   to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

 4         Further, Singh’s second application also omitted information about the 2004

 5   attack and included details that were inconsistent with his testimony.         In the

 6   application, Singh wrote that “[t]hree people on a bike came up to me and attacked

 7   me with hockey sticks and rods. I was badly injured and became unconscious”;

 8   he did not mention the attackers’ political affiliation. However, at his June 2019

 9   hearing, Singh testified that “four to five individuals” attacked him, and the

10   attackers were Congress Party members who were aware that Singh supported

11   another party. When asked to explain why his written statement did not identify

12   who attacked him Singh simply responded, contrary to the record, that the written

13   statement identified his attackers.

14         The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by Singh’s lack of

15   responsiveness    when    questioned    about    these   issues.     See   8   U.S.C.

16   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We give “particular deference” to an IJ’s demeanor finding

17   because the IJ is “in the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems in

18   the . . . testimony suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an

                                              5
 1   innocent cause such as difficulty understanding the question.” Li Hua Lin v. U.S.

 2   Dep’t of Just., 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 3         The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s lack of reliable corroboration.

 4   See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure

 5   to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

 6   corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that

 7   has already been called into question.”). Singh provided a letter from a Mann

 8   Party official, which stated that Singh and his family “had a problem with local

 9   administration and other political groups.” However, when questioned, Singh

10   stated that he had no problems with the local administration, and he never testified

11   to harassment from any political group other than the Congress Party. When

12   pressed to explain this inconsistency, Singh unresponsively replied, “[b]ecause

13   they were all supporting Mann Party.” Singh also provided a letter from the

14   individual who allegedly found him after the 2004 attack, which stated that this

15   individual took Singh home and then transported him to the hospital. However,

16   Singh testified during the hearing that he was taken directly to the hospital after

17   he was attacked. When asked to explain this discrepancy, Singh stated that he

18   was unconscious at the time.        The agency was not required to credit this

                                               6
1    explanation because Singh testified that when he regained consciousness, he was

2    told what had happened. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.

3          In sum, substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination

4    given Singh’s inconsistent statements and lack of reliable corroboration.         See

5    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

6    (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

7    was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude

 8   even more forcefully.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.

 9   The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

10   removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief were based on the same

11   factual predicate.    See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76 (“Where the same factual

12   predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and

13   protection under the CAT, an adverse credibility determination forecloses all three

14   forms of relief.”).

15         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

16   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

17                                          FOR THE COURT:
18                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
19                                          Clerk of Court

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