Court Opinion

ID: 9793237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:52.212391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:08.698943
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring in result.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed plaintiff's [Grider’s] RICO1 and federal anti-trust2 counts3 and his pendent4 state-law claims.5 Grider appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit solely from the RICO claims’ dismissal.6 He later sought certiorari from *788the U.S. Supreme Court. Unsuccessful in his federal reviews, he refiled his state-law claims within one year of certiorari’s denial. The court holds broadly today that timely-filed pendent jurisdiction claims, dismissed on grounds other than the merits by a federal court sitting in Oklahoma, may be refiled in a state court within one year7 from the time “federal reviews”8 of the U.S. district court’s dismissal have been exhausted.
I write separately to counsel that the pendency of federal reviews should not extend the one-year limit for refiling the dismissed claims in a state court unless the pendent claims’ dismissal had been urged as error on reviews, or unless the plaintiff makes a convincing record-supported showing that mid-appeal dichotomizing of his complaint into separate federal- and state-law claims (by pressing the latter in a state court) would have harmed the prosecution of federal litigation,9 Because the course I would take is more restrictive than that charted by the court, and the rule I would announce is new to our jurisprudence, I would give purely prospective application to the procedural innovation I propose to engraft for the court’s adoption.10 I hence concur only in the result the court reaches today. Under the procedural standards I espouse, a plaintiffs state-law claims should be regarded as having failed otherwise than on the merits when they are dismissed by the federal district court. Were it not for the purely prospective application of the rule I counsel, I would hold, on this record, that the one-year limit of § 100 was triggered by the U.S. district court dismissal.
I
THE PRE-STATUTORY DOCTRINE OF “PENDENT” JURISDICTION GOVERNS THE FEDERAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF GRIDER’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS
A case-law doctrine known as “pendent” jurisdiction,11 which was later carried into *789federal legislation,12 governs Grider’s inclusion of state-law claims in his federal action.13 Federal trial courts have discretion to hear state claims together with federal claims when both arise out of the same facts, if judicial efficiency, convenience and fairness would be served.14 Federal courts routinely decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction when the underlying federal causes of action are dismissed before trial;15 the state-law claims are then dismissed without prejudice and “left for resolution to state tribunals. ”16 This no doubt happened to Grider’s pendent claims.17
The court’s explanation for allowing Gri-der to delay bringing a state suit for one year beyond the end of federal reviews is far too open-ended to be workable as a sound rule of our jurisprudence. Although pendent claims are often used as alternative grounds of recovery to federal claims, they are not ipso facto incapable of independent prosecution in a state court.18 Today’s all-inclusive and undifferentiated protection for every dismissal peripherally placed in the pending federal judicial process invites plaintiffs to postpone state-court refilings for the full length of federal reviews. This is so because the court *790makes no exception for reviews utterly unrelated to pendent claims’ dismissal, nor for those instances where it is clear that an independent, mid-appeal state suit’s commencement would not harm, the plaintiff’s prosecution of federal claims.19
II
THE SAVINGS PERIOD PROVIDED IN § 100 FOR RECOMMENCEMENT OF STATE-LAW CLAIMS THAT FAIL DEHORS THE MERITS IS ORDINARILY TRIGGERED BY THEIR FEDERAL TRIAI^COURT DISMISSAL, WHICH FREES THEM FOR RESOLUTION BY A STATE TRIBUNAL
Although limitation periods are statutory, common law governs their construction.20 Our jurisprudence teaches that limitations begin to run when the plaintiff could first bring the action.21 Since pendent claims may be brought in a state court the moment a federal trial court refuses to exercise jurisdiction over them, the savings statute’s time limit must ordinarily be counted from the claims’ dismissal. Only if the record demonstrates that error in the pendent claims’ dismissal was urged in the federal reviews, or that the plaintiff’s immediate commencement of a state action might have harmed the federal litigation22 should the state-law claims be deemed to have failed later than at their dismissal by the federal trial judge.
Ill
ASSESSMENT OF THE RECORD IN THIS CAUSE
The record before us is incomplete; the parties incorporated for our guidance neither the federal district court’s judgment roll nor the briefs submitted at various stages of federal reviews.23 I would conclude, on this record’s assessment, that (1) the state-law claims’ dismissal was not urged as error in the federal reviews24 and (2) neither the record nor the briefs before us shed any light on the critical issue of whether a mid-appeal refiling of the state claims in a state court would have hobbled Grider's posture in his federal litigation.25 In short, the record plaintiff tenders for our review reveals no more than that the refiled state-law claims failed otherwise than on the merits when they were dismissed in the federal trial court. Were it not for a total absence of extant authority on the controlling issue before us today,261 *791would conclude that Grider’s action was time-barred when he commenced it below more than one year after the federal district court’s dismissal of his pendent claims.
SUMMARY
In sum, I would 'pronounce today that the §100 savings period may be triggered by the end of federal reviews either when (1) the pendent claims’ dismissal is challenged as error both on appeal and on certiorari, or (2) if error in that dismissal is not urged in federal reviews, when a convincing record-supported showing is made that a mid-appeal commencement of a state-court action would have adversely affected the prosecution of federal claims. Because the course 1 would chart for Oklahoma jurisprudence today is new to the body of our decisional law, I would give the pronouncement a purely prospective application from the date mandate issues herein.27

. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) [RICO].

. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1982).

. The federal trial court dismissed Grider's federal counts for failure to state a claim. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

. For the explanation of “pendent" claims, see infra Part I.

. The federal trial court dismissed Grider's pendent claims for "lack of jurisdiction." These claims included, inter alia, violation of state antitrust law, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and conversion.

. According to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, "Grider [whose sole challenge was to the RICO claims' dismissal] does not contend on appeal that the court erred in dismissing the antitrust claims, nor does he argue that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the pendent claims." [Emphasis supplied.] Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1148 n. 1 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 76, 107 L.Ed.2d 43 (1989).

. 12 O.S.1981 § 100. Section 100’s savings provision is available only to those pendent claims that had become barred during an action’s pen-dency. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Bond, Okl., 301 P.2d 361, 363 (1956). The pertinent terms of § 100 are:
"If any action is commenced within due time, and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff ... may commence a new action within one (1) year after the reversal or failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall have expired before the new action is filed.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Edmison v. Crutsinger, 165 Okl. 252, 25 P.2d 1103, 1109 (1933); Smith v. Ogle, 196 Okl. 295, 164 P.2d 992, 995 (1946). But see Morris v. Wise, Okl., 293 P.2d 547, 550 (1956), a case that relies on Herron v. Miller, 96 Okl. 59, 220 P. 36 (1923). Morris holds § 100 uninvocable to save an action which was originally brought in a federal district court in Texas and was later recommenced in an Oklahoma state court. The teaching of Morris came under severe criticism in Bockweg v. Anderson, 328 N.C. 436, 402 S.E.2d 627, 633 (1991), reh’g denied 329 N.C. 277, 406 S.E.2d 599 (1991), for affording out-of-state federal-court dismissals dehors the merits a different treatment from that which is accorded in-state federal-court dismissals.

. "Federal reviews” include both appeal and cer-tiorari process.

. It is the duty of the appealing party to procure a record that is sufficient to obtain the corrective relief sought. Chamberlin, infra note 23 at 724. Plaintiff has the burden to show that § 100 tolled the time bar of limitations. Owens v. Clark, 154 Okl. 108, 6 P.2d 755, 758 (1932).

. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company, Okl., 394 P.2d 515, 520 (1964). See Hale v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs. of Seminole Cty., Okl., 603 P.2d 761, 764 (1979); Isbell v. State Etc., Okl., 603 P.2d 758, 760 (1979) (Opala, J., concurring). For recent examples of purely prospective application given new rules of appellate practice, which are divined from obscurely articulated statutes, see Jaco Production Company v. Luca, Okl., 823 P.2d 364, 364-365 (1992), and Heimbach v. Guiney, Okl., 827 P.2d 170 (1992).

. Pendent jurisdiction of federal courts over state-law claims, even in the absence of diversity, is rested on U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. Whenever a claim arises "under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under their Authority * 4 *” and the court can conclude from the relationship between that claim and the state-law claim that the entire action forms but one constitutional “case,” a federal court may exercise its power to decide the claims together. United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 723-724, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1137-1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (superseded by statute).

. 28 U.S.C. § 1367, eff. December 1, 1990. Its pertinent terms are:
"(a) ... in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." [Emphasis supplied.]

. Grider’s federal court complaint was filed Sept. 29, 1986. Congress’ codification of pendent jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 applies to civil actions commenced on or after December 1, 1990. See supra note 12.

. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.

. See Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3567.1, 133 (1984), citing the rule in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, for the statement that state-law claims should be dismissed if the underlying federal claims or questions are dismissed before trial. Later jurisprudence recognizes that this rule is discretionary. See Annotation, Discretionary Exercise op pendent jurisdiction of federal court over state claim when joined with claim arising under LAWS, TREATIES, OR CONSTITUTION OF UNITED STATES, 76 ALR Fed 46 (1986).

. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. When Congress codified pendent jurisdiction, it enacted a federal "savings” clause. The pertinent terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (1990) are:
"The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a)[’s] [supplemental jurisdiction] ... shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless state law provides a longer tolling period." [Emphasis supplied.]
A commentator upon § 1367(d) strongly suggests that litigants measure its savings time from the district court dismissal and not from the end of federal reviews. See D. Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990) at p. 236, which states in pertinent part:
"The dismissal moment [for purposes of § 1367(d) ] should be taken to be the moment of dismissal in the district court. Even if an appeal is taken to a court of appeals from the district court dismissal, the party whose claim has been dismissed under § 1367 does best to commence the state action within the prescribed time measured from the district court dismissal, and not from some later appellate affirmance of it. Perhaps, after commencing the state court action in such a situation, the plaintiff can ask the state court to stay the action — now timely commenced and pending — while the federal appeal proceeds. This seems to be the safest course until there is a definitive federal ruling about whether the 30-day period may be measured from an appellate determination. The matter is not addressed by § 1367(d) and anything connected with the statute of limitations must be handled conservatively_” [Emphasis supplied.]
Under § 100, a time-barred claim that is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits may not be refiled more than once. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Swyden, 175 Okl. 475, 53 P.2d 284, 288 (1936).

. The 1990 codification of pendent jurisdiction in § 1367 leaves undisturbed the federal trial courts’ discretion to dismiss pendent claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (1990).

. Where the federal trial-court dismissal of pendent claims is not challenged in federal reviews, allowing § 100 to extend the time bar past the very end of the review process would be entirely inappropriate if the federal court had declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction because (1) the state-law claims substantially predominate over federal claims either in terms of proof, of the range of issues raised or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, (2) state claims tender issues of unsettled state-law dimensions or (3) trying the federal and state claims together would tend to confuse the jury.

. An open-ended extension of § 100’s one-year limit past the full length of federal reviews is the inevitable consequence of today’s pronouncement which puts a premium on delay.

. Reynolds v. Porter, Okl., 760 P.2d 816, 819 n. 6 (1988); Lake v. Lietch, Okl., 550 P.2d 935, 937 (1976). See Pryse Monument Co. v. District Court Etc., Okl, 595 P.2d 435, 438 n. 14 (1979).

. MBA Commercial Const, v. Roy J. Hannaford, Okl., 818 P.2d 469, 473 (1991).

. State-court recommencement of pendent claims during federal reviews might be prejudicial to the prosecution of federal claims if, for example, the state-law claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that another pending action would make the federal litigation dismissible, or if the federal reviews were to include questions of federal pre-emption of state-law claims.

. Although Grider tried to supplement the record on this appeal by incorporation of materials from the federal-court litigation which were not timely tendered below, his attempt to cure the deficient record came too late. Material that was not before the trial court at the time of its adjudication may not be considered on appeal. Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, Okl., 720 P.2d 721, 723 (1986); Frey v. Independence Fire and Casualty Co., Okl., 698 P.2d 17, 20 (1985); Eckel v. Adair, Okl., 698 P.2d 921, 925 (1985).

. See supra note 6.

. While Grider argues that judicial economy strongly favored keeping the federal- and state-law claims together until federal reviews stood completed, he neither suggests nor offers to demonstrate that their separation would have harmed his federal litigation.

. The text of § 100 gives us no clear guidance as to when its savings period begins to run in those instances where another forum’s dismissal dehors the merits is challenged on review. Extant jurisprudence of this court and that from other states fails to provide a definitive solution. Purely prospective application should hence be given the rule I counsel the court to adopt today. See Poafpybitty and its progeny, supra note 10.

. Poajpybitty, and its progeny, supra note 10.