Court Opinion

ID: 9640577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:08:41.777251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.583477
License: Public Domain

SCOTT BRISTER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the flood waters in this case ran through a gully and a few inches of a man-made trench before entering the Good-mans’ property, the Court holds they could divert them with impunity. Conceding this absurd result is at odds with the express words of the Texas Water Code, the Court holds we are confined by opinions of our sister courts declaring water diverted into a watercourse or touched by mankind no longer “surface water.” I disagree that our sister courts have ever applied such rules to facts like these. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court have adopted a different rule that governs here. Because the Court turns aside from that rule, I respectfully dissent.
Generally, Texas law prohibits a landowner from burdening adjacent lands with water except in the same manner in which it would naturally flow.1 Thus, a lower estate is obliged to receive water in a natural watercourse (such as a stream or creek), even if those waters have been augmented by runoff from an upper estate.2 Similarly, a lower estate is obliged to receive surface waters as they naturally flow from an upper estate,3 but not obliged *423to do so if they have been channeled by the hand of man.4
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court and this Court long ago adopted a modified rule in urban settings, where extensive development makes it difficult or even impossible to establish how water “naturally” flowed.5 As this Court recognized, “surface water” in such areas is not confined to natural (that is, prehistoric) contours:
In an urban environment such as Harris County, the natural flow may have been changed numerous times before there is any litigation on the subject. Thus, to force plaintiffs in such actions to prove the natural flow of surface water “untouched by the hand of man” in an urban setting, would frequently deprive such litigants of an adequate remedy. The Restatement of Torts Section 833, comment a (1939) defines interference with the flow of surface water “as an obstruction, diversion or alteration of what has theretofore been regarded as the natural or normal flow of surface waters in the particular place where the interference occurs.” Thus, it is the normal or natural flow of surface water at the time of diversion that should determine the rights of the parties in an urban area.6
While both courts were addressing common-law negligence actions, the absence of a statutory definition of surface water indicates the common law definition should apply.7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held the statute was intended to eliminate differences between the civil and common law so that “the civil law rule as to surface water would henceforth govern all property.”8
There is no question in this case what that normal flow was — the developer of this subdivision constructed a storm sewer drain (no doubt at considerable expense) to receive runoff from the recreation area and channel it through the drain at the rear of the Goodman’s property. Whoever covered up the drain clearly diverted the normal flow of surface water in a manner that damaged the Dietrichs’ property.9
I do not think the opinions of our sister courts require us to ignore the clear words of this statute and adopt an interpretation the Court admits is absurd. While the cases mentioned unfavorably by the Court cite the human-hands and natural-watercourse exceptions to the category of surface waters, they address very different *424situations than those involved here. Two hold that water in a river or stream is not covered by the statute,10 but neither suggests a gully rises to that level. Even in Texas where creeks can run dry, no one confuses a creek with gully. Two other eases merely hold that upper landowners cannot channel water onto lower ones, or that if they do the lower ones may return the favor by damming the flow to send it back.11 And one of these latter cases recognizes that surface water may remain surface water even after it has been diverted by artificial means.12
Additionally, this case is different from others because it addresses the actions a “middle” landowner may take. Assuming the Goodmans could have diverted the flow of water back to the club area from whence it came, the question here is whether they could instead divert it upon their lower neighbors. Only a divided panel of the Third Court of Appeals appears to have answered this question in the affirmative,13 in an opinion that has been criticized by commentators.14
Here, the jury found the Goodmans were not negligent; but the statute imposes a duty of strict liability.15 There was at least some evidence the Goodmans caused the diversion here (even if in a non-negligent manner) by covering the drain. Thus, the section 11.086 issue should have been submitted to the jury.
“There has been much discussion and even more confusion concerning the rights and duties of adjoining landowners with respect to surface water.”16 By excluding touched-by-human-hands and coming-out-of-a-gully water from the statute, the Court adds to that confusion in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. See Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223, 228-29 (Tex.1978).

. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 86 S.W.3d 693, 711 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. filed).

. See Bily v. Omni Equities, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 606, 611-12 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding lower estate owner liable under 11.086 for raising grade of property so as to reduce natural runoff).

. See Bunch v. Thomas, 121 Tex. 225, 49 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1932) (holding lower property owner was not liable under predecessor statute for building levee blocking water coming from uphill that had been channeled through dip across road); Jefferson County Drainage Dist. No. 6 v. Lower Neches Valley Auth., 876 S.W.2d 940, 950 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (holding lower estate owner not liable under section 11.086 for building canals that blocked water coming from upper land in channelized drainage ditches).

. City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex.1968); Muzquiz v. R.M. Mayfield & Co., 590 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

. Muzquiz, 590 S.W.2d at 743-44 (emphasis added).

. See Parr v. Tagco Indus., 620 S.W.2d 200, 206 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ); see also Robertson County v. Wymola, 17 S.W.3d 334, 343 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (looking to the common law measure of actual damages in the absence of a statutory definition).

. See Kraft, 565 S.W.2d at 229.

. See Tex. Water Code § 11.086(a).

. See Dalon v. City of DeSoto, 852 S.W.2d 530, 539 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied) (holding city not liable under 11.086 for channeling storm sewers into natural creek that allegedly caused erosion of lower owners property because water in creek was not surface water); Stoner v. City of Dallas, 392 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding city not liable under 11.086 for widening creek and thus causing flooding on lower owner’s property).

. See Boatman v. Lites, 970 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, no pet.) (holding upper owner liable under 11.086 because some water diverted by berm was natural runoff); Jefferson County Drainage Dist, No. 6, 876 S.W.2d at 950 (holding lower estate owner not liable under 11.086 for building canals that blocked water draining from upper land in drainage ditches).

. See Dalon, 852 S.W.2d at 539.

. See Mitchell v. Blomdahl, 730 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding lower landowner was not liable to middle landowner for blocking flow of water it was receiving, as water came from storm sewers diverted by upper landowner onto middle owners' property).

. See Douglas G. Caroom and D’Ann Johnson, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Water Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 439, .446 (1988) (finding Mitchell "troublesome,” "inequitable,” and that its use of untouched by hands of man criteria as a judicially created exception to section 11.086 that might "swallow the basic rule” of the statute).

. See Bily, 731 S.W.2d at 611.

. City of Houston v. Renault, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex.1968).