Court Opinion

ID: 9683994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:42:38.597306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.755804
License: Public Domain

JULIAN, Senior District Judge
(dissenting on motion to stay).
This action was brought as a class action to enjoin as unconstitutional on its face the enforcement of Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P. On April 28, 1975, this Court, in a divided decision, declared unconstitutional the parental consent requirement to a minor’s abortion and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the statute. Subsequently, on July 1, 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of this Court, holding “that the District Court should have certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the meaning of § 12P and the procedure it imposes.” Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 844, 858 (1976). On July 30, 1976, the Honorable William J. Brennan, acting as Circuit Justice, issued an order temporarily restraining enforcement of the statute pending a final decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. On January 25, 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court rendered an opinion which comprehensively answered each of the nine questions certified by this Court. In its opinion the Supreme Judicial Court stated that it would wait twenty days before certifying an attested copy of its decision to this Court. Thus the stay previously granted by Justice Brennan was dissolved on February 14, 1977, when the certified opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court was received by the clerk of this Court.
*858A preliminary injunction will issue only upon a showing that the plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of prevailing ultimately on the merits and that, absent the preliminary injunctive relief, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm. The plaintiffs have the burden of proving the existence of both these facts. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113 (1 Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 1807, 20 L.Ed.2d 653 (1968). The majority, however, shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that a preliminary injunction should not issue. By stating that it refuses to “assume the point in issue,” (p. 855 of majority opinion), namely, the constitutionality of the statute, the majority has in fact assumed that the statute is unconstitutional. The presumption of constitutionality of statutes (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 99) applies to Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P. The United States Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976) has vacated this Court’s ruling that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The burden of proving that the statute as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court is unconstitutional rests upon the plaintiffs.
The majority relies on three arguments to justify staying the enforcement of Mass. G.L. c. 112, § 12P. First, it contends that the statute is silent regarding the standard to be used by parents in determining whether or not to consent and that Massachusetts parents may be unaware of the Supreme Judicial Court’s construction of the statute. This contention is clearly without merit. It is an established rule of law that a state court’s interpretation of its own state statutes is binding on the federal courts. See Hortonville Joint School Dish No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass., 426 U.S. 482, 487, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 2312, 49 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1976); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); Kingsley Picture Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688, 79 S.Ct. 1362, 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 (1959). The majority opinion points out that “a statute may be construed to render it constitutional only when it is ‘susceptible’ to that construction.” (P. 857 of majority opinion.) This Court, however, is precluded from holding that Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P, is not susceptible to a constitutional construction, because the United States Supreme Court itself, in Bellotti v. Baird, supra, expressly found that the statute is susceptible to a constitutional interpretation:
“It is sufficient that the statute is susceptible to the interpretation offered by appellants; and we so find . . ..”
Id., 428 U.S. at 148, 96 S.Ct. at 2866, 49 L.Ed.2d at 856 (emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court’s holding is binding upon this Court.
Furthermore, a state court’s construction of its own state statutes is deemed to be notice to all concerned of what the statute provides. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (by implication). It is not essential to the statute’s validity or binding force that the standard be spelled out in the text of the statute itself. It is legally sufficient if it is articulated in the opinion of the state’s highest court which construes the statute. It is quite clear from the Supreme Judicial Court’s answer to question 1 (Baird v. Attorney General, Mass., 360 N.E.2d 288, at 292 n. 4), which was certified by this Court, that the parent when considering whether or not to grant consent is to consider exclusively what will serve the child’s best interest.
Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court enjoins upon the judges of the Superior Court (Baird v. Attorney General, Mass., 360 N.E.2d 288, page 293) that they must “disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what would serve the minor’s best interests.” Id., at 293. There is no reason to suppose that the Superior Court judges of this Commonwealth would be unaware of the proper standard by which to review a minor’s petition under Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P.
*859A second reason relied upon by the majority for granting the stay is that by imposing a mandatory requirement of consultation between the minor and her parents, the Supreme Judicial Court has “ . diminished the only feature of the statute that could save it from the Court’s ruling in Danforth.” (P. 856 of majority opinion.) The majority misreads Danforth. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), the United States Supreme Court struck down the parental consent provision of a Missouri statute because it purported to delegate an absolute veto power to the parents. The Massachusetts statute as construed does not create any such absolute power. Therefore, it is most unlikely that the Massachusetts statute would be declared unconstitutional for the reasons which invalidated the Missouri statute.
The majority (on pp. 856-857, majority opinion) purports to give a third reason for granting the stay. After several readings of the opinion, however, it is still unclear to me what that third reason might be.
Finally, without considering any of the defendant’s contentions that the stay might cause irreparable harm to Massachusetts minors, the majority reaches a finding that absent the preliminary injunctive relief, the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm. I fail to see how the enforcement of Mass. G.L. c. 112, § 12P, could conceivably result in any harm or injury — irreparable or otherwise — to any of the plaintiffs.
Where is the harm to members of the plaintiff class of Massachusetts minors? If the parents consent to an abortion, as well they might, then no harm would inure to the minor desiring to terminate her pregnancy. If the parents withhold consent but a Superior Court judge determines that an abortion would be in the minor’s best interest, then she may have an abortion, and she would suffer no harm. Surely, requiring the minor to comply with minimal legal procedures, though perhaps inconvenient, or even unpleasant, does not constitute irreparable harm or injury to the minor. Only in the instance where the minor’s parents arid a state judge concur that an abortion would not be in the best interest of the adolescent girl would she be precluded from having an abortion. Certainly enforcement of a state statute which prevents a minor from undergoing a surgical procedure which is found by both her parents and the Court to be contrary to her own best interests, cannot sensibly be said to cause her irreparable harm.
Where is the harm to Baird or to Dr. Zupnick? Baird’s only conceivable harm is a possible diminution of income which might result from the loss of business of some minors who forego having abortions, or who decide under parental guidance to have the operation at a facility other than Baird’s. The only harm which can . possibly inure to Dr. Zupnick would similarly entail only a loss of income. These financial losses, which would certainly not be ruinous to Baird’s business or to Dr. Zupnick’s professional career, cannot be considered irreparable.
On the contrary, the harm that is inflicted on the minor and her parents by staying the enforcement of Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P, is permanent and grave. A pregnant unmarried minor is likely to be in an emotional turmoil:
“All experts agreed that pregnancy in an unmarried minor is a period of great emotional stress; . .
Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.Supp. 847, 853 (D.Mass.1975) (Aldrich, J.). She may well be confused and unable to decide what to do.
“We find quite credible defendants’ expert who testified that at certain periods of their lives adolescents might react maturely one day and immaturely the next.”
Id., at 854, n. 9.
It is undisputed that she would profit from parental support and guidance at this critical juncture in her life.
“All experts agreed that . . . support is needed, and that parental support, if forthcoming, is most desirable. Probably most parents are supportive.”
*860Id., at 853.
Yet, by staying the enforcement of this statute, a Massachusetts minor who has an abortion without consulting with her parents will be deprived of the counsel, guidance and support which her parents could have provided for her at a critical period in her life and to which she is entitled as a matter of state law. She may be left without guidance to choose among a variety of abortion facilities, unregulated and unsupervised by public or other independent authority.
“The greatest divergence in the testimony related to the capacity of minors to given [sic] an informed consent. At one extreme, Baird testified that in his many years experience he had never met a minor who was incapable, a conclusion supportable only on a hypothesis, which we reject, that an abortion, if not medically contra-indicated, is always the best solution, so that a minor who wants one must be presumed capable.”
Id., at 854. (Footnotes omitted.)
Corresponding to the child’s need for parental protection and guidance, the parents have a legal1 and moral obligation to provide for and protect their child. As the majority finds in their earlier opinion, most parents would wish to know of their child’s condition, so that they could discharge their parental obligations.
“. . . From the standpoint of parents, we believe that most would wish to know of their daughter’s pregnancy, and we may assume that most would seek to be supportive.”
Id., at 853.
Yet, by staying the enforcement of this statute, information of their child’s condition may be kept from them, and they may be deprived permanently of the opportunity of fulfilling, for the benefit of their minor daughter, the parental obligations which they owe her.
The action of this Court staying the enforcement of Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P, re.moves for an indefinite period the only legal barrier in this state against the exploitation of pregnant adolescents by operators of unregulated and unsupervised abortion facilities who may be motivated by concerns which are far removed from the minor’s own best interest. The stay granted by the majority is legally unjustified and does not serve the best interest of either the minor or the public.
I respectfully dissent.

. See laws both decisional and statutory cited in fn. 17, Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F.Supp. 847, 864 (dissenting opinion).