Court Opinion

ID: 9727786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:22.869776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.853707
License: Public Domain

Weaver, P.J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority and would affirm the decision of the trial court on both issues.
Although the majority is correct in holding that the amendment of 26 USC 152(e) by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 divested state courts of jurisdiction to award federal income tax exemptions in their discretion, I believe that the majority has wrongly decided the second question.
The majority opinion leaves the impression that the question of which parent receives the tax deduction is a predominant factor in determining whether to modify the level of child support. Yet Michigan law establishes that the welfare of the child within the means and ability of the parent to pay is’ the paramount concern of child-support modification. MCL 552.17; MSA 25.97. Rutledge v Rutledge, 96 Mich App 621, 624; 293 NW2d 651 (1980).
The majority asserts as a basis for remand the trial court’s alleged failure to clearly recognize its discretion to modify the support order "due to plaintiff’s changed financial status.” In my view, this position is incorrect.
Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction in their discretion to modify child-support payments upon a showing of changed circumstances. MCL 552.17; MSA 25.97 and MCL 722.27(c); MSA 25.312(7)(c). So basic is this well-established tenet of the law in Michigan that I fail to see how a trial judge, *64before whom such cases frequently come, could escape awareness of it. See, e.g., Adamczyk v Adamczyk, 155 Mich App 326, 328; 399 NW2d 508 (1986).
The only discretion which the trial court questioned was its discretion to decide which parent could claim the children as dependents for federal tax purposes. Even so, in order to facilitate review of the case, the trial court assumed such discretion and still chose not to order defendant to surrender the tax deduction to plaintiff.
In my view the trial court’s opinion does not indicate any failure by the court to recognize its discretion with regard to the alternative question of support modification in general. In order to prevail on this question, plaintiff needed to show a change in circumstances, i.e., proof of change in earning capacity. Westerhof v Westerhof, 137 Mich App 97, 106-107; 357 NW2d 820 (1984). There was no evidence before the trial court, nor is it alleged on appeal, that plaintiff cannot pay the amount ordered or that plaintiff’s earnings decreased following the order of March, 1985, when plaintiff was made to elevate his support payments from the pitifully inadequate sum of $12.50 per week per child (or the approximate total of $100 per month) to a more appropriate level.
The majority quotes Wells v Wells, 144 Mich App 722, 733; 375 NW2d 800 (1985), to state: "A trial court has the power to modify child support orders if the petitioning party is able to show changed circumstances sufficient to justify the modification.” I believe that the above analysis amply demonstrates that: (1) the trial court correctly applied the law as to the federal deduction; and (2) the trial court kept in mind the need to provide for the welfare of the children within the *65means and ability of the parent to pay and, in declining to modify the support order, recognized its discretion and did not abuse that discretion, let alone commit a clear abuse of discretion by failing to recognize "changed circumstances sufficient to justify the modification.” Id. at 733-734.
I therefore dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s decision and not remand.