Court Opinion

ID: 9929951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 20:02:39.551556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:01:44.573710
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 P. v. Gonzales CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B313468

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. KA113372-01)
           v.

 JUAN CARLOS GONZALES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with direction.
      Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ___________________________
       A jury found Juan Carlos Gonzales guilty of the murder of
Nicholas Pletcher with true findings as to gang and firearm
enhancement allegations. Gonzales, who was 16 years old when
he fatally shot Pletcher, was tried as an adult after the juvenile
court found he was unfit for juvenile proceedings under Welfare
& Institutions Code former section 707.1 In Gonzales’s direct
appeal, we reversed the gang enhancement finding and
remanded for correction of the abstract of judgment but otherwise
affirmed the judgment.
       The California Supreme Court granted review. It
transferred the matter to this court and directed us to vacate our
previous opinion and consider the impact on Gonzales’s case of
Assembly Bill (AB) 2361. During the pendency of Gonzales’s
appeal, AB 2361 amended the requirements under section 707 for
transfer of a matter from juvenile court to criminal court. (Stats.
2022, ch. 330, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2023, section 707
required the juvenile court to find by clear and convincing
evidence (rather than by a preponderance of the evidence) that
the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court before it may transfer the case.
(In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.)
       The parties agree AB 2361 applies retroactively to
Gonzales’s case because the case is not yet final. (See People v.
Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 303; In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.) We conditionally reverse the judgment
and remand the matter for the juvenile court to conduct a new
fitness hearing pursuant to the most current section 707

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare &
Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

                                2
requirements for transfer of a case from juvenile court to criminal
court. If, after the new fitness hearing, the juvenile court decides
to retransfer the matter to criminal court, we give directions to
the criminal court concerning further proceedings.
       As to the other issues considered in our original opinion, we
again reverse the gang enhancement and remand for correction of
the abstract of judgment. Unlike our original opinion, we do not
address appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim which
he raised on appeal. The Supreme Court also granted review of
our order denying appellant’s habeas petition based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the high court’s order, we
issued an order to show cause, returnable before the Los Angeles
County Superior Court on that issue. The ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is currently pending in that court. Accordingly,
for purposes of the present appeal only, appellant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is moot.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On August 21, 2016, Gonzales fatally shot the victim four
times in an alley in Pomona. The District Attorney charged
Gonzales with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) It was
further alleged that Gonzales personally used and discharged a
handgun (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)), that the
offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang,
and that Gonzales was an active participant in the gang (Pen.
Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) and 190.2, subd. (a)(22)).
       Gonzales argued at trial that he acted in self-defense
because the victim had previously threatened him and held a gun
to his head twice. The prosecution’s theory at trial was that
Gonzales, a member of the 18th Street gang, shot the victim
because the 18th Street gang wanted to control the sale of

                                 3
narcotics in that area of Pomona. The victim was a member of a
tagging crew called HA or “High Artists,” which claimed that
territory and sold marijuana there. The mother of the victim’s
children testified the victim appeared nervous and scared in the
month before his death.
        The People presented the following evidence:
1.      Gonzales’s Confession
        On August 25, 2016, Gonzales was arrested and
interviewed by police.2 After initially denying any involvement in
the shooting, Gonzales confessed: “I got popped out twice by him
. . . . With a gun. On my faith . . . he took my shit twice, mister.
Uh, this how it went down. I pass through the park. I was
walking and then, all of a sudden, I go — I go through this, and I
see him. And he starts banging on me, like, ‘Oh, you ain’t from
nowhere. You’re a little bitch.’ This and this. And I was mad,
mister. I did have the burner. I was mad. Just — I couldn’t do
nothing about it. [¶] And then I was posted right there in the
alley, and he comes up to me, like, ‘Oh, you’re a bitch. What’s up?
Give me — start giving me all your shit.’ Like, he tried to tax me,
and I got scared of him, you know. Straight up. I got scared.
Pulled it out, mister. Started popping. Straight up.”
        Gonzales explained the victim had twice previously put a
gun to his head and he did not want to go through that again. On
the day of the shooting, Gonzales believed the victim was
reaching for a gun because he saw the victim reaching in his

2     Portions of the recorded interview were played to the jury,
and a transcript of it was admitted into evidence.

                                 4
pocket.3 When the victim walked up close to Gonzales, Gonzales
“just got scared and just popped it out.” He admitted he shot the
victim three or four times. He also stated “Richard” was with
him.
2.     Richard Guerrero’s Testimony
       Richard Guerrero had known Gonzales since middle school
and knew Gonzales’s street name was Polar. Guerrero testified
that Gonzales told him he did not like the victim. On the day of
the shooting, Guerrero was smoking marijuana with a friend in a
park when the two of them heard the sound of gunfire. Guerrero
and his friend immediately got up. Guerrero was curious to see
what happened, so he ran towards the sound while his friend left
the park.4
       Guerrero came upon Gonzales and the victim in a nearby
alley. Guerrero heard the victim say to someone on the phone,
“Danny, come as quick as possible and bring the burner.”
Guerrero understood “burner” to mean a gun. Guerrero then saw
Gonzales shoot the victim twice a few seconds after that phone
call. The victim screamed and fell to the ground. The gun then

3     No guns were recovered from the alley or from the victim’s
body. A can of spray paint was found in the victim’s right front
pocket and a bottle of cologne in his right back pocket.

4      Guerrero’s trial testimony differed somewhat from what he
told the police shortly after the shooting. In the police interview,
he stated he walked to the alley, not with a “friend,” but with
Gonzales. Guerrero neither mentioned the park nor his friend.
The prosecutor refreshed his recollection at trial with his
statements to the police, which Guerrero then adopted as his
testimony. Guerrero also admitted he first heard a gunshot when
he was near the alley, not while he was at the park.

                                 5
appeared to jam. Gonzales kicked the victim. After fixing the
gun, Gonzales approached within inches of the victim and shot
him in the head. Afterwards, Gonzales said to the victim, “18,
bitch.”
       Surveillance video showed Gonzales and Guerrero walking
away from the alley shortly after the shooting. They hid in a
vacant house for a few minutes when they thought a white van
was following them. Gonzales asked Guerrero to hold and hide
the gun for him, but Guerrero refused. They ended up at
Gonzales’s house, where they smoked marijuana for two hours.
Gonzales told Guerrero he shot the victim because “it was
business.” When pressed by the prosecutor about what that
meant, Guerrero said, “Just business. Personal business.” The
prosecutor then asked, “Gang business?” And Guerrero replied,
“that’s what I thought.”
       Guerrero explained that he sometimes bought marijuana
from Gonzales. Although he did not know Gonzales sold drugs
for the 18th Street gang, he knew Gonzales associated with them.
He also knew the 18th Street gang wanted to control drug sales
in that area of Pomona.
3.     Ballistics Evidence
       The medical examiner testified the victim had four gunshot
wounds: one to the back of his head, which was fatal; a second to
the right side of his abdomen, which was also fatal; a third to his
left hip region, which was potentially fatal; and a fourth to the
area near his torso, abdomen, neck, and right arm, which caused
superficial non-fatal injuries.
       Police found seven .380-caliber cartridge casings; four were
recovered near the victim’s body and three were located further
away, near the mouth of the alley. Three bullets or bullet

                                 6
fragments were also recovered at the scene of the crime. In a
search of Gonzales’s home four days after the killing, police
recovered inside a dresser drawer a .380 semi-automatic handgun
manufactured by Lorcin, and an empty magazine underneath the
mattress. The firearms expert stated that four of the seven
cartridge casings she examined from the crime scene were fired
from the Lorcin .380 handgun.
4.     Facebook Evidence
       Police obtained a search warrant to access Gonzales’s
Facebook account. They recovered a photograph, “authored” by
Gonzales, of a face with the number “18” under the left eye. In a
Facebook message dated August 22, 2016, someone with the
username “Tony Montana” messaged Gonzales, “LOL, finally
Dazer [victim Fletcher] is dead.” Gonzales replied, “Ha, ha, ha,
ha.” Later, Gonzales messaged Montana, “Have you heard?”
Montana responded, “Yep. I heard. So who is next target to get
smoke?”5 Gonzales responded, “IDK.”6 The next day, Montana
messaged, “Yo. Someone snitching on you guys. Keep low key.”
To this, Gonzales stated, “What did we do?” and “I want to know
who smoked Dazer.”
5.     Gang Evidence
       Los Angeles Police Department Detective Arthur Castro
testified he was assigned to the FBI gang task force to monitor
the 18th Street gang. Castro provided a summary of the 18th
Street gang’s history, its territory, and its cliques and subsets.

5     The homicide detective investigating the case testified “who
is next to get smoke” means who is next to be shot or killed.

6     The homicide detective who testified about the message
stated that “IDK” means “I don’t know.”

                                7
He described the gang tattoos as including an “18,” a big “E,” and
“13.” He identified the 18th Street hand sign as an “E” and the
primary colors as navy or dark blue. Detective Castro listed the
primary activities of 18th Street as murder, violent acts,
shootings, robberies, burglaries, narcotics sales, and extortion.
He said 18th Street was involved in everything from selling
narcotics to vandalism. He also described the hierarchy of gangs
and the 18th Street gang’s allegiance to the Mexican Mafia and
what that entailed, including paying rent to the shot caller.
       Castro testified he had conducted two or three
investigations involving violent crimes committed by 18th Street
gang members against a tagging crew or low-level drug dealer to
take control of an area. He stated the 18th Street gang
sometimes absorbed the crew into its organization.
       Although Detective Castro had no prior personal contact
with Gonzales, he confirmed Gonzales’s tattoos showed allegiance
to the Mexican Mafia and included 18th Street gang symbols. It
was Castro’s opinion that Gonzales murdered the victim to
benefit the 18th Street gang. Pomona Police Department
Detective Richard Machado and LAPD Officer Daniel Garcia
testified to predicate cases involving 18th Street gang members
to prove the gang enhancement. We discuss their testimony in
detail below.
6.     Expert Reports
       In 2017, Dr. Ronald Markman evaluated Gonzales and
prepared a report that concluded: “Minor appears to have acted
impulsively, in a highly emotional state, without any thoughtful
consideration, feeling threatened by someone who had previously
been aggressive towards him, and fearing for his life. However,
he was capable of forming the intent to kill, distinguishing

                                8
between right and wrong and premeditating, but his emotional
state likely precluded an ability to deliberate, leading to this
tragic event.” Dr. Markman noted testing revealed an
“individual with a suspicious, impulsive and emotional potential
to act out thoughtlessly.”
       In 2021, Dr. Francesca Lehman evaluated Gonzales. Dr.
Lehman agreed with Dr. Markman that Gonzales “acted
impulsively, in a highly emotional state, without any thoughtful
consideration in the instant offense.” Dr. Lehman further
described the continuing brain development in youths which
result in youthful impetuosity.
       On October 21, 2020, the court held a pretrial hearing
during which the prosecutor moved to exclude any mention of
Gonzales’s age (he was 16 years old at the time of the shooting) at
trial. The prosecutor argued his age was irrelevant to the
proceedings. The prosecutor noted that Gonzales was initially
charged as an adult but the matter was transferred to juvenile
court after the passage of Proposition 57.7 The juvenile court
found Gonzales unfit for juvenile proceedings and the matter was
transferred back to criminal court. Gonzales was 20 years old at
the time of trial.
       Gonzales’s trial attorney initially opposed the motion to
exclude: “I do think it’s very relevant. Developmental stages of
teens [are] different than the mindset and the development of an
adult. And I think it’s important that a jury knows the age of my

7     Proposition 57 required prosecutors to commence all cases
involving a minor in juvenile court but allowed prosecutors to
transfer a minor 16 years or older who is charged with a listed
offense to adult criminal court. (O.G. v. Superior Court (2021)
11 Cal.5th 82, 87; see former § 707, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)

                                9
client at the time of the crimes in order to take that into
consideration when determining any type of mindset needed as
an element of the crime.”
       The prosecutor countered that “unless the defense is going
to call experts to opine or testify that the minor’s age and brain
development at the time weighed on his ability to form the
necessary specific intent to commit murder, I would make the
same objection, that any of that testimony is irrelevant. [¶]
Nothing in the elements of the charged account require us to
prove that a minor had any different specific intent than an adult
would in this particular crime.”
       When the court asked whether defense counsel intended to
call any experts to testify to that effect, she responded, “No, I’m
not. Perhaps for sentencing, but not for the case in chief.” The
court then granted the prosecution’s motion that Gonzales’s age
not be mentioned at trial.
7.     The Verdict and Sentence
       The jury found Gonzales guilty of first degree murder and
found each of the firearm and gang enhancements true. The trial
court sentenced Gonzales to 50 years to life, comprised of a 25-
years-to-life term for the murder conviction plus another 25-
years-to-life term for the firearm enhancement under subdivision
(d) of Penal Code section 12022.53. The remaining sentence
enhancements were stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
Gonzales appealed.
8.     The Direct Appeal
       We reversed the gang enhancement finding and remanded
the matter for further proceedings if the prosecution were to
decide to retry Gonzales on the gang allegations, observing that
the sentence on the gang enhancement had been stayed pursuant

                                10
to section 654. We also directed the trial court to correct an error
in the abstract of judgment. We otherwise affirmed the
judgment.
       Gonzales filed a petition for rehearing which raised a new
issue: the impact on his case of AB 2361, which sets standards
for whether a juvenile should be tried in juvenile or adult
criminal court. Gonzales explained his appellate counsel failed to
raise the issue because the amendments to section 707 made by
AB 2361 were not in effect at the time of briefing. In the interim,
the new law went into effect. We summarily denied Gonzales’s
petition for rehearing, and Gonzales sought review from the
California Supreme Court. On September 20, 2023, the high
court granted the petition for review and transferred the matter
to this court “with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider
the cause in light of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (Stats. 2022, ch. 330).
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528 (d).)”
       The parties filed supplemental briefing pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b). They agree AB 2361
applies retroactively to Gonzales’s case. The People argue there
is no need for remand for a new section 707 hearing because it is
not reasonably probable a juvenile court would deny transfer
under the new standard of proof. The People rely on the
harmless error analysis articulated in People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). Gonzales counters that there is no
“error” to correct. Rather, the juvenile court must be given the
opportunity to make its ruling based on the higher burden of
proof under the new law, and “neither respondent nor this Court
hav[e] the prescience to predict how the Juvenile Court will rule
when applying a new standard.”

                                11
                            DISCUSSION
       We first address the Supreme Court’s order to reconsider
the cause in light of AB 2361. Because the Supreme Court
additionally directed that our previous decision be vacated, we
then repeat our analysis and conclusions regarding the gang
enhancement issue and error in the abstract of judgment.
1.     The Matter is Remanded for the Juvenile Court to
       Conduct a Fitness Hearing Pursuant to Amended
       Section 707
       A.     Applicable Law
       Effective January 1, 2023, section 707, subdivision (a)(3),
provides that to “find that the minor should be transferred to a
court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and
convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
In making its decision, the court shall consider the following five
criteria: (A) “The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor,” (B) “Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,” (C) “The
minor’s previous delinquent history,” (D) “Success of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor,” and
(E) “The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)–(E).)
       “If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall
recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the
minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)

                                  12
       In In re T.A. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 347, 352–356, review
granted July 26, 2023, S279635, the court considered the same
issue presented here.8 There, the defendant minor was tried and
convicted as an adult for murder. The Court of Appeal
conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded for a transfer
hearing in light of Proposition 57, the previous amendment to
section 707. On remand, the juvenile court granted the People’s
motion to transfer the defendant back to criminal court and
reinstate the judgment. Seven months later, during the
defendant’s second appeal, AB 2361 went into effect, further
amending section 707. (In re T.A., at p. 45.) The Court of Appeal
applied the Watson harmless error test to find it was not
reasonably probable the juvenile court would have reached a
different decision under the then-applicable clear and convincing
standard of proof. (Id. at p. 48.) The defendant sought review in
the Supreme Court.
       The Supreme Court granted review and then re-transferred
the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its
decision and “reconsider the cause in light of In re F.M. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 701, 712–716 [307 Cal.Rptr.3d 589, 528 P.3d 19] and
In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416 [305 Cal.Rptr.3d 838]
[‘under the previous version whether the minor is amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court

8      Although the Court of Appeal opinion in In re T.A. was
initially published, the Supreme Court ordered the opinion
depublished when it granted review and ordered the matter
transferred back to the Court of Appeal. (In re T.A. (July 26,
2023, S279635) 532 P.3d 732.) We do not cite In re T.A., supra,
307 Cal.Rptr.3d for precedential effect but only to provide context
for the Supreme Court’s transfer order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(e).)

                                13
was one of five factors for the court to consider in determining
whether the case should be transferred to criminal court. The
amendment states it as the ultimate question for the court to
decide’]. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).)” (In re T.A., supra,
532 P.3d 732, 733.)
       In the In re T.A. transfer order, the Supreme Court directed
the Court of Appeal to specific pages of its prior In re F.M.
opinion. At those pages, the Supreme Court determined that
remand was necessary for a juvenile court to exercise its
discretion “unless the record as a whole establishes that the
juvenile court ‘was aware of, and exercised its discretion . . . .”
(In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 712.)9 The court rejected the
People’s position that the harmless error standard under Watson
applied, concluding the standard “does not address the risk of
courts misapprehending the extent of their lawful authority in
this particular context.” (Id. at p. 716.) The court reasoned,
“where the concern is that no discretionary decision was made,
attempting to discern the likelihood of a ‘more favorable’ decision
is a more speculative inquiry. Instead of hypothesizing what
decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood
the extent of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have
consistently held that remand is appropriate in these
circumstances.” (Ibid.)

9      The issue before the Supreme Court in In re F.M. had
nothing to do with whether a juvenile should or should not be
tried in adult criminal court. Instead, it dealt with the juvenile
court’s failure to comply with section 702, which requires the trial
court upon adjudication to declare whether a sustained wobbler
offense is a felony or a misdemeanor. Unless the court had
exercised its discretion, remand to the juvenile court was
necessary. (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 712.)

                                14
       In In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at page 416, the second
case cited by the Supreme Court in its In re T.A. transfer order,
the Court of Appeal remanded the matter for a new fitness
hearing under amended section 707. In re E.P. identified the
three differences between the previous and amended versions of
section 707: “First, in the previous version of section 707, the
prosecution’s burden was by a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the amendment the prosecution’s burden is increased to
clear and convincing evidence.
       “Second, under the previous version whether the minor is
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court was one of five factors for the court to consider in
determining whether the case should be transferred to criminal
court. The amendment states it as the ultimate question for the
court to decide. Nevertheless, in deciding that question, the
amendment requires the court to consider the same five factors
listed in the previous version.
       “Finally, the previous version required that if the juvenile
court orders a transfer, it shall recite the basis for its decision in
the order. The amended statute requires the court to not only
recite the basis for its decision, but also the reasons supporting
the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
(In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
       The In re E.P. court concluded remand was necessary for
the juvenile court to consider all five factors together to make the
ultimate determination as to whether the minor was amenable to
rehabilitation. (In re E.P., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 417.)

                                 15
      B.     Analysis
      Applying In re F.M. and In re E.P., we remand the matter
for the juvenile court to conduct a new fitness hearing under
section 707. At the time of the initial Proposition 57 fitness
hearing, the juvenile court was not aware of the obligation to
consider whether clear and convincing evidence showed that
Gonzales was not amenable to rehabilitation. Nor was the
juvenile court aware that the ultimate question for it to decide
was whether the juvenile was amenable to rehabilitation; in the
previous version of section 707, whether a minor was amenable to
rehabilitation was only one factor to consider. Finally, the prior
statute did not require the juvenile court to state “the reasons
supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation,” which was added in the amended statute.10
      As the court did in In re F.M., we reject the People’s
argument that we should apply a harmless error analysis to
determine whether it is reasonably probable the juvenile court
would have reached a different decision. It is clear the juvenile
court did not exercise its discretion under a clear and convincing
standard nor could it have been aware that amenability to
rehabilitation was the ultimate fact for the court to decide, not
one of several factors. The remedy in our Supreme Court’s words
is that: “Instead of hypothesizing what decision the juvenile
court would have made if it had understood the extent of its

10    Section 707 was again amended effective January 1, 2024.
(Sen. Bill No. 545 (2023-2024 1st Ex. Sess.) § 1.) On remand, the
juvenile court must comply with the most current version of
section 707. However, the 2024 amendments do not affect our
analysis in this opinion.

                               16
lawful authority,” (In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 716), we
hold that “remand is appropriate in these circumstances.” (Ibid.)
2.     The Gang Finding Under Penal Code Former Section
       186.22 is Supported by Substantial Evidence but That
       Evidence Does Not Meet the Requirements Under the
       Amended Statute; Remand is Necessary
       On direct appeal, Gonzales argued the evidence was
insufficient to support a true finding as to the gang allegation
under Penal Code former section 186.22 as Penal Code section
186.22 is amended by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 699) (AB 333).11 We found substantial
evidence supported the jury’s gang finding under the statute in
effect at the time of the trial. We concluded reversal of the gang
finding was nevertheless necessary because of the changes made
by AB 333.12

11     Gonzales also contends his trial counsel was deficient
because she failed to argue to the jury that there was insufficient
evidence to support the gang enhancement. Given the ample
evidence submitted by the People to prove the gang
enhancement, as a matter of trial strategy, defense counsel could
reasonably have decided instead to focus her closing argument on
self-defense. (See People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211
[“A reviewing court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s
performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.”].)

12    We observe that a reversal of the gang enhancement does
not reduce the sentence Gonzales is currently serving. The trial
court sentenced Gonzales to 50 years to life, comprised of a 25-
years-to-life term for the murder conviction plus another 25-

                                17
       The standard of appellate review for determining the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting an enhancement is the
same as that applied to a conviction—that is, we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the People and
determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806; People v. Mejia
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 614.) Given this standard of review,
we begin by setting out the evidence presented by the prosecution
in support of the gang allegation.
       A.    Gang and Predicate Offense Testimony
       As we have discussed, Detective Castro testified to the
primary activities, common name, and common identifying signs
and symbols of the 18th Street gang. He also identified Gonzales
as a member of the 18th Street gang from his tattoos and social
media.
       Detective Machado testified to arresting Steven Ray Palma,
known as “G Money” and a self-identified member of the 18th
Street gang, for being a felon in possession of firearms on
June 19, 2013.
       Officer Garcia testified to his background, training,
education, and experience as it related to criminal street gangs,
specifically the 18th Street gang. Officer Garcia had previously

years-to-life term for the firearm enhancement under subdivision
(d) of section 12022.53. The trial court imposed and stayed the
gang enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 654. Gonzales
thus must still serve a 50-years-to-life term even if the gang
enhancement were stricken. Although a reversal has no practical
effect on Gonzales’s current sentence, we nevertheless address
his argument because the sentence on the gang enhancement was
imposed (although stayed).

                               18
testified as the gang expert in two cases involving 18th Street
gang members: Jose Luis Munoz, an 18th Street gang member
known as “Diablo,” was convicted of an August 12, 2011 murder
and 18th Street gang members Roberto Epifanio Sanchez, Carlos
Numberto Morales, Philip Joseph Jojola, and Arthur John
Quesada were convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and
attempted murder occurring on July 7, 2012. Garcia also
testified as the gang expert in a case involving Clique 54
members, which he identified as a subset of the 18th Street gang.
In that case, Julio Cesar Reyes, Daniel Alonzo Martinez, and Eric
Sailor were convicted of a June 20, 2014 murder.
       B.     The Evidence Was Sufficient to Establish the Gang
              Enhancement in Effect Prior to the AB 333
              Amendments
       We first discuss Gonzales’s sufficiency of the evidence
argument because if the evidence was insufficient to meet the
requirements of the statute at the time of trial, there can be no
retrial. (People v. Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1033.) An
error based solely on AB 333 permits a retrial if the prosecution
so chooses.
       At the time Gonzales was tried, the prosecution was
required to prove the defendant committed the offense “for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang” in order to establish the gang enhancement. (Pen.
Code, former § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) A “criminal street gang” was
defined as an ongoing association or group of three or more
persons, having as one of its primary activities the commission of
certain criminal acts, “having a common name or common
identifying sign or symbol,” and whose members have engaged in
a “pattern of criminal gang activity.” (Pen. Code, former

                               19
§ 186.22, subd. (f).) A “pattern of criminal gang activity” in turn,
meant the commission of “two or more” statutorily listed offenses.
(Pen. Code, former § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
       Here, the prosecution presented evidence that Gonzales
portrayed himself as an 18th Street gang member on social media
and had tattoos indicating his allegiance to the 18th Street gang.
Guerrero testified Gonzales associated with the 18th Street gang
and said, “18, bitch” immediately after shooting the victim.
Gonzales later told Guerrero he shot the victim because “it was
business.” Gonzales and Detective Castro testified to the 18th
Street gang’s intention to control the sale of narcotics in areas of
Pomona. Based on his experience and a hypothetical mirroring
the facts of this case, Castro testified that in his opinion the
victim’s murder was committed to benefit the 18th Street gang.
       As to whether the 18th Street gang was a criminal street
gang engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, Detective
Castro testified to the primary activities, common name, and
common identifying signs and symbols of the 18th Street gang.
Officer Garcia described the predicate offenses that had been
committed by members of the 18th Street gang, including a 2011
murder by an 18th Street gang member and a 2012 conspiracy to
commit murder and attempted murder by four 18th Street gang
members. At the time of the trial, there were no temporal limits
on the date on which a predicate offense occurred. (This changed
under the AB 333 amendments.) This is sufficient to support a
true finding on the gang enhancement under the former statute.
       C.     The People Failed to Produce Sufficient Evidence of a
              Gang Enhancement Under AB 333
       During the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature
enacted AB 333, which took effect on January 1, 2022. The

                                20
parties agree AB 333 applies retroactively to Gonzales’s case.
The Supreme Court confirmed the parties’ position. (People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207.) Gonzales contends the
People failed to present evidence to meet the new requirements
under AB 333 for predicate offenses. Although the Attorney
General does not counter Gonzales’s argument, he nevertheless
asks us to affirm the judgment without explaining why
affirmance is appropriate under these circumstances. As we
discuss next, we conclude reversal and remand for further
proceedings is proper.
             (1)    AB 333
       Both before and after its amendment by AB 333, Penal
Code section 186.22 applied only to a defendant who committed a
felony “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with
a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in” criminal conduct by gang members. (Pen.
Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) AB 333 added a new definition,
explaining, “to benefit, promote, further, or assist means to
provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the
common benefit is more than reputational. Examples of a
common benefit that are more than reputational may include, but
are not limited to, financial gain or motivation, retaliation,
targeting a perceived or actual gang rival, or intimidation or
silencing of a potential current or previous witness or informant.”
(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (g).)
       AB 333 also changed the requirements for predicate
offenses. AB 333 amended section 186.22’s definition of “criminal
street gang” to require that members collectively (no longer
individually or collectively) engage in a pattern of criminal gang
activity. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (f).) Now, to establish a

                                  21
“pattern of criminal activity,” the prosecution must show the
commission of two or more enumerated offenses, “provided at
least one of these offenses occurred after the effective date of this
chapter, and the last of those offenses occurred within three years
of the prior offense and within three years of the date the current
offense is alleged to have been committed, the offenses were
committed on separate occasions or by two or more members, the
offenses commonly benefited a criminal street gang, and the
common benefit of the offense is more than reputational.”13 (Pen.
Code, § 186.22, subd. (e)(1).)
             (2)    Analysis
       Gonzales contends the People failed to prove the elements
of the amended statute. The Attorney General does not dispute
the lack of evidence.
       At trial, the People presented evidence of four predicate
offenses: (1) a 2011 murder by an 18th Street gang member
known as Diablo, (2) a 2012 conspiracy to commit murder and
attempted murder by four 18th Street gang members, (3) a 2013
arrest of an 18th Street gang member known as G-Money for

13    We observe that Gonzales misreads the amended statute;
he asserts “the predicate offenses could not have occurred prior to
August 21, 2013,” which is three years before the current offense.
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (e)(1) specifies that only
one of the predicate offenses need occur within three years of the
current offense and the second, earlier predicate offense must
occur within three years of the later predicate offense (not within
three years of the current offense).

                                 22
being a felon in possession of a firearm, and (4) a 2014 murder
committed by members of Clique 54.14
       The 2011, 2012 and 2013 crimes. The evidence presented
to the jury did not demonstrate the predicate offenses “commonly
benefited a criminal street gang” where the “common benefit . . .
is more than reputational.” (Pen. Code, former § 186.22, subd.
(e)(1).) In the 2011 offense, the 18th Street gang member shot a
motorist who he believed was following him after a fight. There
is no indication that the shooting or the initial fight was gang
related, much less that it benefited the 18th Street gang. In the
2013 offense for being a felon in possession of two firearms, there
was no testimony that G Money possessed the firearms for gang-
related activities rather than for personal protection.
       The evidence concerning the 2012 crime also did not
demonstrate a common benefit to the 18th Street gang. Officer
Garcia summarized the 2012 offense as follows: “[The defendant
gang members] meet a victim. The victim tells them where to
buy narcotics. So the victim takes them there. They end up
being stopped, all of them. So they blamed — these four blamed
the victim for taking them to a hot place, which is raided by
police. [¶] So from there, they take him to a house in Baldwin
Park. They held the victim hostage, asked the girlfriend to get
some money, like a ransom. [¶] The girlfriend doesn’t come up
with the ransom. Mr. Carlos Morales takes him to San Dimas,
shoots him, but the victim survives.” There is nothing in the

14    In addition to the officers’ testimony regarding the
predicate offenses, the People admitted into evidence the minute
orders in each of the cases. The minute orders do not disclose
any further information pertinent to the gang enhancement
inquiry beyond the testimony.

                                23
summary that indicates the attempted murder was connected to
the 18th Street gang, aside from the fact that the defendants
were members of the gang. Garcia did not testify the four were
looking to acquire drugs for the gang rather than for personal
use.
       The 2014 crime. Although the parties do not argue the
point, it appears the evidence is also insufficient to support a
finding that the 2014 offense was committed to benefit the 18th
Street gang rather than only Clique 54. In People v. Prunty
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 67 (Prunty), the Supreme Court held, “when
the prosecution seeks to prove the street gang enhancement by
showing a defendant committed a felony to benefit a given gang,
but establishes the commission of the required predicate offenses
with evidence of crimes committed by members of the gang’s
alleged subsets, it must prove a connection between the gang and
the subsets.” Neither party cites to or addresses Prunty, much
less discusses whether the evidence presented at trial proved a
connection between the 18th Street gang and Clique 54 beyond
the bare conclusion that one was a subset of the other. Prunty
tells us that is not enough to satisfy Penal Code section 186.22’s
definition of a “criminal street gang.” (Ibid.) Even if we assume
the 2014 offense meets the AB 333 requirements — it occurred
within three years of the current offense, it involved collective
action, and the common benefit was more than reputational in
that the perpetrators killed a gang rival — one predicate offense
is not sufficient to establish a pattern of criminal activity under
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivisions (e) & (f).

                                24
       Given the state of the evidence of the four predicate crimes,
we reverse the gang enhancement.15 The prosecution may elect
to retry the enhancement if it chooses.
3.     The Abstract of Judgment Must be Corrected
       Gonzales points out the abstract of judgment incorrectly
lists the applicable code section for his murder conviction as
Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The murder
conviction was pursuant to Penal Code section 187, subdivision
(a), not section 245, which describes the crime of assault with a
deadly weapon. On remand the trial court shall correct the
abstract.
                           DISPOSITION
       The matter is conditionally reversed and remanded to the
juvenile court with directions to conduct a fitness hearing
pursuant to the version of section 707 currently in effect. If the
juvenile court determines that transfer to adult criminal court is
not appropriate under the amended law, the court shall conduct
further proceedings in juvenile court. If the juvenile court
determines that transfer to criminal court is appropriate under
the amended law, the juvenile court shall retransfer the matter
to criminal court, where the prosecution shall elect whether to
retry defendant on the gang enhancement allegations. If the
prosecution chooses not to retry the gang enhancement, the court
shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment correcting the

15   Because we find the common benefit requirement under AB
333 has not been met, we need not address whether the predicate
crimes involved collective action. (People v. Delgado (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1088–1089; People v. Lopez (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344–345; contra, People v. Clark (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 133, 145, review granted Oct. 19, 2022, S275746.)

                                 25
citation to the murder conviction to Penal Code section 187,
subdivision (a) and striking the imposition of a 25-years-to-life
sentence for the gang enhancement (which is presently stayed
pursuant to section 654). The trial court is directed to forward a
certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                     RUBIN, P. J.
I CONCUR:

                        MOOR, J.

                                26
The People v. Juan Carlos Gonzales
B313468

BAKER, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

       I join the holdings in Parts 2 and 3 of the Discussion
section of the opinion for the court, which I previously joined
before our Supreme Court directed us to vacate our prior opinion
and reconsider the cause in light of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 2361).
       I do not join, however, Part 1 of the Discussion section,
which analyzes the AB 2361 issue. That is because we have no
record of what transpired at the Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707 hearing that led to defendant and appellant Juan
Gonzales’s (defendant’s) transfer to a court of criminal
jurisdiction. Trial and juvenile court judges sometimes make
remarks concerning the strength of the evidence presented on one
point or another, and it is possible the court here made comments
that we might find prescient concerning the change in law that
would later be worked by AB 2361 (e.g., “Given the strength of
the evidence, I would transfer this defendant to a court of
criminal jurisdiction even if the standard were beyond a
reasonable doubt”). If the transferring judge made a comment
along these lines, I think the answer to the question of whether
harmless error review is appropriate in this case might be quite
different than the one given by the majority.
      I would therefore order the record augmented with the
reporter’s transcript of the transfer hearing on our own motion
before resolving this appeal. We cannot responsibly decide the
AB 2361 issue without it.

                           BAKER, J.

                                2