Court Opinion

ID: 9928358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:01:13.791504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:00.163601
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1356     Document: 010110992816         Date Filed: 01/31/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            January 31, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  CHRISTOPHER A. PEREA,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 23-1356
                                                       (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00410-RM)
  MRS. BURTLOW, Fremont Correctional                             (D. Colo.)
  Facility Prison Warden; PHILIP J.
  WEISER, Attorney General of the State
  of Colorado,

        Respondents - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, KELLY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Christopher Perea, proceeding pro se,1 seeks a certificate of appealability (COA)

 to appeal from the district court’s decision construing his motion under Rule 60(b) of the

 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C.

 § 2254 habeas application that it lacked jurisdiction to consider. We deny a COA and

 dismiss this matter.

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        1
          Because Mr. Perea appears pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. Hall
 v. Scott, 292 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
Appellate Case: 23-1356      Document: 010110992816          Date Filed: 01/31/2024      Page: 2

        I. Background

        A Colorado jury found Mr. Perea guilty of felony murder, second degree-murder,

 and second-degree kidnapping for the murder of his wife. The trial court sentenced him

 to life in prison without parole.

        In 2022, Mr. Perea filed his first § 2554 habeas application. The district court

 denied habeas relief. Mr. Perea then filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to

 Rule 60(b). The district court determined that the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as

 a second or successive habeas application. Because Mr. Perea had not obtained

 authorization from this court to file a second or successive application, the district court

 concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider the application on the merits. Mr. Perea now

 seeks a COA to appeal from the district court’s ruling.

        II. Discussion

        To obtain a COA to challenge the district court’s procedural ruling, Mr. Perea

 must show both “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states

 a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it

 debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.

 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We need not address the constitutional question if

 we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s resolution of the

 procedural one. Id. at 485.

        In his initial habeas application, Mr. Perea asserted four claims. He alleged

 his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (1) failing to hire a forensic

 expert to test the DNA under the victim’s fingernails; (2) failing to work with

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Appellate Case: 23-1356     Document: 010110992816          Date Filed: 01/31/2024     Page: 3

 forensic experts to independently test a cinderblock, jacket, car curtains, and

 fingerprints for DNA; (3) laboring under a conflict of interest; and (4) failing to

 impeach a neighbor’s testimony. The district court denied all the claims on the

 merits.

        Mr. Perea then filed a post-judgment motion purportedly seeking relief under

 Rule 60(b). The district court construed Mr. Perea’s Rule 60(b) motion as a second or

 successive § 2254 habeas application because the arguments in the motion “assert[ed] or

 reassert[ed] federal bases for relief from [Mr. Perea’s] underlying state court

 convictions.” R. vol. 3 at 215.

        The Supreme Court has “recognized that a Rule 60(b) motion may be subject

 to the requirements for second or successive applications if it asserts, or reasserts, a

 ‘claim,’ that is, ‘an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of

 conviction.’” In re Lindsey, 582 F.3d 1173, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gonzalez

 v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530 (2005)). A Rule 60(b) motion is not a successive

 habeas application “if it either (1) challenges only a procedural ruling of the habeas

 court which precluded a merits determination of the habeas application; or

 (2) challenges a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceeding.” Spitznas v.

 Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

        In his Rule 60(b) motion, Mr. Perea did not challenge any procedural rulings

 that precluded a merits determination, nor did he argue there was a defect in the

 integrity of his federal habeas proceedings. Instead, he reasserted the same four

 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from his initial habeas application.

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Appellate Case: 23-1356      Document: 010110992816         Date Filed: 01/31/2024      Page: 4

        In his COA application, Mr. Perea does not dispute that he was reasserting his

 habeas claims. He contends he made mistakes in his initial habeas application, and

 he was attempting to correct those mistakes in his Rule 60(b) motion by putting forth

 evidence to add to his original arguments.

        Given these circumstances, the arguments in Mr. Perea’s Rule 60(b) motion

 were “effectively indistinguishable from alleging that [he] is, under the substantive

 provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532. He

 has therefore failed to show that reasonable jurists would find debatable the district

 court’s decision to construe his Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive § 2254

 habeas application.

        A state prisoner, like Mr. Perea, may not file a second or successive § 2254 habeas

 application unless he first obtains an order from the appropriate court of appeals

 authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

 Absent such authorization, a district court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of a

 second or successive § 2254 habeas application. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251

 (10th Cir. 2008).

        III. Conclusion

        Because Mr. Perea’s Rule 60(b) motion reasserted claims raising federal

 challenges to his state convictions without receiving authorization from this court, the

 district court properly treated the motion as an unauthorized second or successive § 2254

 habeas application over which it lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, we deny a COA and

 dismiss this matter because reasonable jurists would not find debatable the district court’s

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Appellate Case: 23-1356   Document: 010110992816        Date Filed: 01/31/2024   Page: 5

 procedural ruling. We grant Mr. Perea’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment

 of costs or fees.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

                                           5