Court Opinion

ID: 9363359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 22:07:12.995675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.466412
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Galloway v. Galloway, 2023-Ohio-29.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ERIE COUNTY

Jennifer L. Galloway                                Court of Appeals No. E-21-043

        Appellant                                   Trial Court No. 2020 DR 0004

v.

Kyle L. Galloway                                    DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                    Decided: January 6, 2023

                                                *****

        Leslie O. Murray, for appellant.

        Gina M. McNea, for appellee.

                                                *****

        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Jennifer L. Galloway, appeals the October 1, 2021

judgment of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,

granting her a divorce from defendant-appellee, Kyle L. Galloway, and entering orders

relating to spousal support and the division of marital assets. For the following reasons,

we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the trial court judgment.
                                   I.     Background

       {¶ 2} Jennifer Galloway and Kyle Galloway married on October 20, 1990. On

January 8, 2020, Jennifer filed a complaint for divorce; Kyle counterclaimed. The matter

proceeded to trial on October 6, 2020, after the parties could not agree on spousal support

and the division and value of certain property. The magistrate issued findings of fact and

conclusions of law, and Jennifer filed objections. In a judgment journalized on

October 1, 2021, the trial court implicitly overruled Jennifer’s objections and adopted the

magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Jennifer appealed and assigns seven

errors for our review:

              FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED RELEVANT

       EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE

       LOCATED AT 6903 PORTLAND ROAD, SANDUSKY, OH 44870.

              SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED ESTABLISHED

       LAW THAT A MERE SIGNATURE ON A DOCUMENT DOES NOT

       CONSTITUTE A RELEASE OF DOWER RIGHTS.

              THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD, DESPITE TOTAL LACK

       OF EVIDENCE, THAT THE PARCELS LOCATED AT 1812 STATE

2.
       ROUTE 13, GREENWICH, OH 44837 WERE SEPARATE PROPERTY

       OF THE APPELLEE.

              FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE

       RELEVANT FACTORS OF O.R.C. 3105.18 AND DID NOT AWARD

       THE APPELLANT WITH SPOUSAL SUPPORT.

              FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       INCORRECTLY QUALIFIED A PORTION OF THE HELOC DEBT AS

       PERSONAL, WHEN IT WAS ACQUIRED PRIOR TO THE PARTIES[’]

       SEPARATION, AND IS THEREFORE MARITAL DEBT.

              SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       IMPOSED AN UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE

       PARTIES’ ACCOUNTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.

              SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: THE TRIAL COURT

       ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO RETURN

       APPELLANT TO HER FORMER MAIDEN NAME.

                                 II.    Law and Analysis

       {¶ 3} Jennifer’s seven assignments of error challenge several aspects of the trial

court’s judgment entry of divorce, including (1) its rejection of her expert’s opinion

concerning the value of the marital residence; (2) its rejection of her claim that she did

3.
not intend to release her dower rights as to real property Kyle sold to his father; (3) its

conclusion that real property gifted to Kyle by his parents was his separate property; (4)

its refusal to award spousal support to Jennifer; (5) its allocation of $15,000 as debt

attributable to only Jennifer; (6) its valuation and division of certain marital assets; and

(7) its failure to restore Jennifer to her maiden name.

       {¶ 4} We address each of Jennifer’s assignments of error in turn.

             A. Opinions Concerning the Value of the Marital Residence

       {¶ 5} Jennifer and Kyle both presented expert testimony concerning the value of

the marital home. Jennifer presented the testimony of Christopher Wechter, a broker,

who provided a broker price opinion in October of 2020, and estimated the value of the

home at $375,000.00. Kyle presented the testimony of Donald Leto, an appraiser, who

appraised the property as of October 22, 2019, and who estimated the value at $280,000.

Jennifer claims that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting her expert’s opinion

concerning the home’s value.

       {¶ 6} Jennifer argues that (1) the value of the home greatly increased between the

time Leto appraised it in October of 2019, and Wechter valued it in October of 2020; (2)

Leto failed to consider features that increased the value of the property including trees

and woods, a building, the school district, proximity to shopping, and updates Kyle made

to the house after the appraisal; and (3) Leto valued the home against comparables that

were located outside the school district and further away from shopping and industry

4.
instead of comparing it against comparables in the vicinity of the home. Jennifer insists

that Wechter provided a line-by-line explanation of items missing from Leto’s appraisal

and fully explained the deficiencies in Leto’s appraisal, but the trial court failed to

consider Wechter’s opinions and incorrectly adopted Leto’s valuation.

       {¶ 7} Kyle responds that Leto inspected both the interior and exterior of the home,

while Wechter viewed only the exterior. He claims that several factors affected Leto’s

valuation, including the fact that (1) the home is heated by wood only; (2) the home has

no air conditioning; (3) the home has no water source—water must be hauled to the

property; (4) the home had previously been used as a pole barn and was converted into a

house; and (5) the home has no basement. Kyle emphasizes that Wechter acknowledged

that he was unaware that the home had previously been used as a pole barn, a factor that

could affect its value, and Wechter valued a barn on the property at $100,000 even

though he never went into it. He points out that Leto explained that the higher-value

comparables Wechter used to value the home had important differences, including the

quality of the exterior construction and interior finishes, heat and air conditioning, square

footage, and the existence of basements.

       {¶ 8} The valuation of marital assets is typically an issue of fact for the trial court.

Ruetz v. Ruetz, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1037, 2003-Ohio-4091, ¶ 41, citing Hacker v.

Hacker, 5 Ohio App.3d 46, 47, 448 N.E.2d 831 (5th Dist.1981). In determining a value,

the trial court is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of

5.
the witnesses. Wideman v. Wideman, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-030, 2003-Ohio-1858,

¶ 21. It may “accept or reject either party’s opinion as to the value of the marital home,

so long as its decision is support by evidence in the record.” Id., citing Murray v.

Marina, Inc. v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio App.3d 166, 173, 703 N.E.2d 846

(6th Dist.1997). To that end, we review a trial court’s valuation of marital property using

the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Jackson v. Jackson, 6th Dist. Fulton No.

F-12-013, 2014-Ohio-1145, ¶ 17, citing Schuller v. Schuller, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-96-

012, 1997 WL 51223, * 2 (Feb. 7, 1997). This means that we will affirm the trial court’s

valuation determination if it is supported by competent and credible testimony. Smith v.

Smith, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-89-3, 1990 WL 1357, *6 (Jan. 12, 1990).

       {¶ 9} Here, Wechter’s valuation was performed more recently than Leto’s,

however, Leto testified that the average sales prices had not changed since the time he

performed the appraisal—it had just become easier to sell houses. More importantly, the

trial court judgment specifically observed that Leto inspected both the exterior and

interior of the house, while Wechter performed a drive-by inspection of only the exterior.

This was clearly important to the trial court’s decision. The trial court was free to make

credibility determinations and weigh the evidence as it deemed appropriate. This means

it was free to reject Jennifer’s expert’s opinion concerning the value of the home. See,

e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 147 Ohio App.3d 513, 526, 771 N.E.2d 303 (7th Dist.2002)

6.
(“The court did not give much weight to the appraisal submitted by Garner because it

appeared that he did not actually visit the site.”).

       {¶ 10} Accordingly, we find that the court’s decision declining to accept Jennifer’s

expert’s valuation was supported by competent, credible evidence. We find Jennifer’s

first assignment of error not well-taken.

                                B. Release of Dower Rights

       {¶ 11} In January of 2014, Kyle sold ten acres of property—acquired during the

marriage, but titled only to him—to his father, Dennis Galloway, for $36,000. In

connection with that transfer of property, Jennifer signed a quitclaim deed, releasing her

dower rights. The trial court concluded that the divorce proceedings were not the proper

forum—and it refused—to “unravel” this transaction that had occurred six years earlier.

It noted that Jennifer had benefitted from receipt of the proceeds of that sale. In her

second assignment of error, Jennifer challenges the trial court’s conclusion. She claims

that her signature on that document did not effectively release her dower rights because

she was misled into signing and did not intend to convey the property.

       {¶ 12} Jennifer argues that under Ohio case law, when a party to a marriage does

not understand what “dower rights” means and believes that a document is being signed

for the tax benefit of the marriage, the mere signature on the document signing away

dower rights is not enough to accomplish release of those rights. She claims that she was

asked to sign the deed to reach a beneficial tax result—not to convey property—and she

7.
relied on Kyle to act in her best interest. Jennifer maintains that the ownership of that

property was an essential part of the marital estate and part of the parties’ retirement plan.

She insists that while Dennis bought the property, he holds it in trust and intends for it to

revert to Kyle when Dennis dies. Jennifer contends that Kyle should not be gifted

property that was supposed to be a marital asset.

       {¶ 13} Kyle responds that (1) Jennifer has failed to meet her burden of

demonstrating a lack of intent to transfer the property; (2) the sale of this property

occurred six years before the trial of the divorce, yet Jennifer is only now complaining;

(3) Kyle and Jennifer had originally bought 60 acres and at the time of the 2014

transaction, they had “systematically sold” all but ten to 12 acres of it, so Jennifer would

have executed similar deeds for the other transfers; (4) proceeds from the sale were used

to pay down the mortgage on the marital home, pay marital bills, and make payment

towards the home of the parties’ daughter in Cincinnati, thus Jennifer benefitted from the

proceeds of that sale; and (5) Jennifer executed the deed in front of an attorney—Kyle’s

uncle—and she could have asked what dower rights were.

       {¶ 14} Jennifer relies on Partridge v. Partridge, 2d Dist. Greene No. 98 CA 38,

1999 WL 945046, *9 (Aug. 27, 1999), in support of her position that her signature on the

warranty deed transferring the ten acres to Dennis did not effectively release her dower

rights because she signed that deed for “tax reasons” and not because she intended to

release her dower rights. In Partridge, the husband obtained a bank loan for the marital

8.
residence acquired during the course of the marriage, but given wife’s poor credit history,

the bank advised that he would not be approved for the loan if wife were on the

mortgage. Accordingly, wife signed a document releasing her dower rights so that the

mortgage could be obtained.

       {¶ 15} The Second District Court of Appeals explained that the burden of

challenging the effectiveness of a deed executed in accordance with statutory

requirements rests with the person making the challenge. Id., citing Pettry v. Pettry, 81

Ohio App.3d 30, 34, 610 N.E.2d 443 (10th Dist.1991). He or she must “demonstrate that

the deed was not intended as an outright complete transfer of all of [his or her] interest in

the property” to his or her spouse despite the express terms of the deed. Id., quoting id.

       {¶ 16} In Partridge, the court found that there had been ample evidence presented

that the house was purchased as marital property and remained marital property. It

concluded that husband failed to demonstrate that wife intended to transfer to him

outright her interest in the property or to convey her interest in the residence to him as

separate property. To the contrary, the evidence at trial showed that wife left all financial

decisions to husband, her name was not on the mortgage because of her credit problems,

she did not know what “dower rights” meant, she was not aware of signing away any

quitclaim of dower rights, and it was not her intent to release her dower rights. The court

held that the marital residence was properly determined to be marital property subject to

division.

9.
        {¶ 17} Kyle responds that Partridge is distinguishable because the court was

determining the division of the equity of the divorcing parties’ marital home and there

was never a signing of any document for the release. He emphasizes that Partridge

makes clear that the burden rests with the person challenging the effectiveness of the

deed.

        {¶ 18} We agree with Kyle that Partridge is of no assistance here. The court in

Partridge was charged with dividing the parties’ interests in the marital home, where the

parties had resided together until they separated and where husband continued to reside.

The property at issue here involved approximately ten acres of investment property that

was part of a larger, 60-acre parcel, the majority of which the parties had sold to third-

party purchasers. This ten-acre parcel was sold to Dennis six years before the divorce—

long before divorce was even being contemplated—for $36,000, and the proceeds were

used for the benefit of both Kyle and Jennifer. They used the proceeds to pay down their

own mortgage—increasing their equity—pay the mortgage on their daughter’s home

(which Kyle and Jennifer owned together), and pay household expenses. Both parties

benefitted.

        {¶ 19} Jennifer has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that her signature

on the deed was not intended as an outright, complete transfer of all of her interest in the

property. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to “unravel” this 2014

10.
transaction. Its decision is supported by competent, credible evidence. We find

Jennifer’s second assignment of error not well-taken.

                         C. Determination of Separate Property

       {¶ 20} In 2014, Kyle’s parents transferred two parcels of land to Kyle, located in

Greenwich, Ohio. It is deeded in only Kyle’s name. Jennifer argued that because this

land was acquired by Kyle during his marriage to her, it must be treated as marital

property unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was intended as a gift solely

to one party to the marriage. The trial court determined that it had been gifted only to

Kyle and constitutes his separate property. In her third assignment of error, Jennifer

argues that this was error.

       {¶ 21} In divorce proceedings, the domestic relations court must determine what

constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. R.C. 3105.171(B).

“This determination involves mixed questions of law and fact, and is therefore not a

discretionary matter.” (Citations omitted.) Dayal v. Lakshmipathy, 2020-Ohio-5441, 163

N.E.3d 683, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.), appeal not allowed, 161 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2021-Ohio-717,

164 N.E.3d 480. “We review the domestic relations court’s characterization of property

under the manifest weight of the evidence standard.” Id. We will not reverse a judgment

as against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is supported by some competent,

credible evidence. Blake Homes, Ltd. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 173 Ohio App.3d 230, 2007-

11.
Ohio-4606, 877 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.), citing C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr.

Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978).

       {¶ 22} R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a)(i) defines “marital property” to include “[a]ll real

and personal property that currently is owned by either or both of the spouses * * * and

that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage * * *.” R.C.

3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii) defines “separate property” to include “[a]ny gift of any real or

personal property * * * that is made after the date of the marriage and that is proven by

clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse.” Clear and

convincing evidence is “[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.

It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such

certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean

clear and unequivocal.” In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 104, 495 N.E.2d 23

(1986).

       It is generally presumed that property acquired during a marriage is “marital

property” unless it can be shown to be separate. Daval at ¶ 28, citing Johnson v. Mills,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102241, 2015-Ohio-4273, 18. The burden of demonstrating that

property is separate property lies with the party seeking such classification. Id., citing

Tincher v. Tincher, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2019 CA 00028, 2020-Ohio-3352, ¶ 64,

citing Passyalia v. Moneir, 2017-Ohio-7033, 95 N.E.3d 723, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.).

12.
       {¶ 23} It is undisputed that the property in Greenwich is titled in only Kyle’s

name. Kyle argues that it was intended to be separate property because (1) his parents

had a practice of gifting real estate to Kyle and his siblings; (2) Kyle used the land for

hunting and offered to buy the land from his parents, but they preferred to gift him the

property; (3) Dennis sought legal advice on how best to transfer the property and, in a

letter from his attorney, repeated reference is made to gifting the property to Kyle—

Jennifer is not mentioned in the letter.

       {¶ 24} Jennifer responds that the letter from counsel does not suggest that she was

intended to be excluded from the gift. She claims that it was her in-laws’ practice to

write annual Christmas checks to Kyle that were “always seen as a gift to both of them.”

       {¶ 25} Unlike some of the other properties acquired during the marriage, the

property in Greenwich was deeded only to Kyle. At trial, Dennis testified that he

intended the land as a gift to Kyle, just as he had gifted houses to both of his daughters.

The letter from Dennis’s attorney references Dennis’s intent to gift the property to

Kyle—it never mentions Jennifer.

       {¶ 26} Jennifer testified that marital funds were used to build a cabin on the

property, but Dennis testified that he built the cabin with the help of his friend Bill, and

Kyle helped him (to the extent he was able, due to back problems), just as Dennis had

helped Kyle build his house. Dennis acknowledged that Kyle and Jennifer paid to run

electricity to the cabin, however, Kyle testified that other than installing electric for

13.
$5,600, he had put no money into the cabin and had used only salvaged materials. His

sister recently gave him her old kitchen cabinets to put in the cabin, but the cabin has no

running water or useable indoor bathroom. Jennifer testified that when their adult

children were little, they used to go camping on the property, however, she did not

specify whether that was before or after Dennis transferred the property to Kyle. She

acknowledged that Kyle mainly used the property for hunting.

       {¶ 27} We find that this evidence was sufficient for the trial court to form a firm

belief or conviction that the property in Greenwich was gifted only to Kyle and

constituted separate property. There is competent, credible evidence in the record to

support that conclusion. We find Jennifer’s third assignment of error not well-taken.

                                   D. Spousal Support

       {¶ 28} In her fourth assignment of error, Jennifer argues that the trial court erred

in failing to award her spousal support. R.C. 3105.18(B) provides that “[i]n divorce and

legal separation proceedings, upon the request of either party and after the court

determines the division or disbursement of property under section 3105.171 of the

Revised Code, the court of common pleas may award reasonable spousal support to either

party.” R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) sets forth the factors that must be considered “in determining

whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature,

amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support.” Those factors are:

14.
             (a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not

      limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed

      under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code;

             (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

             (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the

      parties;

             (d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

             (e) The duration of the marriage;

             (f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because

      that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek

      employment outside the home;

             (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the

      marriage;

             (h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

             (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not

      limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;

             (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning

      ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s

      contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;

15.
              (k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking

       spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the

       spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the

       education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;

              (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal

       support;

              (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted

       from that party’s marital responsibilities;

              (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and

       equitable.

       {¶ 29} While the trial court is required to consider each of these statutory factors,

it need not comment on each of them; “rather, the record must only show that the court

considered the statutory factors when making its award.” Choi v. Choi, 2018-Ohio-725,

106 N.E.3d 908, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). An award of spousal support is generally within the trial

court’s discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Newcomer

v. Newcomer, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1183, 2013-Ohio-5627, ¶ 22. An abuse of

discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983). An unreasonable decision is one that lacks sound reasoning to support the

decision. Hageman v. Bryan City Schools, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-742, 2019-

16.
Ohio-223, ¶ 13. “An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate determining principle

and is not governed by any fixed rules or standard.” Id. quoting Porter, Wright, Morris

& Arthur, LLP v. Frutta del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-

3567, 2008 WL 2779511, ¶ 11. And an unconscionable decision is one “that affronts the

sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Id.

       {¶ 30} We review the parties’ arguments and the trial court’s findings with respect

to the R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors.

                  1. Parties’ Income and Relative Earning Abilities

       {¶ 31} Kyle’s 2019 W-2 wages exceeded Jennifer’s by approximately $20,000.

Jennifer claims, however, that Kyle is highly skilled in performing residential home

improvement projects and over the years has relied on these skills to supplement his

income from his full-time job at NASA. She estimates that with these “side jobs” that he

performs, Kyle’s total annual income is closer to $40,000 more than hers. Jennifer insists

that despite his claims to the contrary, Kyle continues to perform residential home

improvement projects for which he is paid, and the trial court abused its discretion in

accepting his testimony that he no longer performs these projects.

       {¶ 32} Kyle responds that he and Jennifer’s incomes are close. He maintains that

Jennifer presented no evidence of his income from side jobs and the only examples of

side jobs that she could point to were projects he completed years ago for family

17.
members and close friends. Kyle testified that he stopped performing side jobs because

of the physical strain on his body.

          {¶ 33} The trial court found that both Jennifer and Kyle have stable employment

with future income growth potential. It recognized that Kyle earned $11,642.37 more

than Jennifer. It found that Jennifer failed to establish any additional income attributable

to Kyle for side jobs. It found no evidence to support her contention that Kyle earned

$20,000 per year from side jobs.

                         2. The Parties’ Ages and Physical, Mental,
                                 and Emotional Conditions

          {¶ 34} The parties are both in their early 50s. Jennifer concedes that Kyle has had

some back issues over the years, but claims they are both in good health now. There was

testimony that Kyle was unable to work for a period of time because of back issues. He

also testified that he got out of the construction business (which was his occupation from

2000 until he began working for NASA in 2017) because he was worn out and was

experiencing knee, shoulder, and back problems. But Kyle agrees that both parties are

relatively young and healthy and still in their working years.

          {¶ 35} The trial court found that both parties are relatively young and in good

health.

18.
                          3. The Parties’ Retirement Benefits

       {¶ 36} Jennifer maintains that the parties’ retirement benefits were equalized

during the divorce process. Kyle responds that Jennifer glosses over the fact that his

retained retirement assets were significantly less than hers.

       {¶ 37} The trial court found that Jennifer’s retirement benefits are nearly double

Kyle’s.

                            4. The Duration of the Marriage

       {¶ 38} The parties were married for almost 30 years. Jennifer argues that the trial

court discounted this fact in its decision denying spousal support. She claims that she

organized her life around the parties’ marriage and their eventual retirement together.

She insists that she chose to take a lower-paying job to be on the same schedule as their

children, depended on the parties’ accumulation of property as a retirement source, and

became accustomed to a certain standard of living that she is now being denied.

       {¶ 39} The trial court found that the duration of the marriage was the only factor

that favors an award of spousal support.

                           5. Consideration of Care of Minors

       {¶ 40} The parties’ children are now grown, however, Jennifer maintains that the

parties decided together that she would take a lower-paying job so that she would have

the same schedule as the children when they were school-aged. She insists that because

19.
of this decision, she makes less money than she may have, and at this point—after 22

years as a school secretary—she could not easily switch jobs.

                            6. The Parties’ Standard of Living
                             Established During the Marriage

       {¶ 41} Jennifer argues that she is not able to maintain the same standard of living

that was established during her marriage. Her condo is half the size of the home she

shared with Kyle and a loan she took out in connection with the purchase of the condo

went toward the actual purchase price and realtor fees and toward flooring, furniture, and

appliances. She explains that she and Kyle used to take lavish vacations to places like

Punta Cana. She acknowledges that she has taken three trips during the pendency of the

divorce—one to Chicago, which her daughter paid for, so that Jennifer could care for her

granddaughter while her daughter attended a work seminar; one to her sister’s wedding;

and one to the home of a friend, who allowed her to stay there for free. Meanwhile, she

claims, Kyle’s standard of living has not suffered. Finally, Jennifer maintains that while

Kyle paints her out to have a history of imprudent spending, she explains that the parties

used credit cards to pay household expenses, to entertain, and to pay for the expenses of

their daughter’s wedding.

       {¶ 42} Kyle emphasizes that Jennifer received temporary spousal support while

this case was pending, which allowed her to secure her own housing and adjust to life

with her own income. He also points out that he gave her $145,000 so she could buy her

$169,500 condo. He maintains that Jennifer chose to take out an additional $60,000 loan

20.
for upgrades, new furnishings, matching appliances, and the extras she desired, when the

parties could have divided up their personal property and household furnishings. Kyle

insists that Jennifer chose to incur these additional expenses, and instead of living within

her means, racked up additional debt.

       {¶ 43} The trial court found that Jennifer lives beyond her means and expects Kyle

to pay for it.

                      7. The Parties’ Relative Extent of Education

       {¶ 44} Jennifer acknowledges that the parties are equally educated and close to

retirement, and that it is unreasonable to expect either of them to change careers at this

stage in life.

                     8. The Parties’ Relative Assets and Liabilities

       {¶ 45} Jennifer claims that Kyle has many assets—he owns properties and is the

beneficiary of a family trust. He also has a fiancée who assists with food and furniture

expenses, and his parents routinely gift him money or property.

       {¶ 46} The trial court found that Kyle obtained a loan for $145,000 so that

Jennifer could secure her own housing. It observed that Jennifer purchased a $169,500

condo with this $145,000—her share of the equity in the marital residence—but chose to

borrow an additional $60,000 (instead of the $25,400 shortfall) for extras such as paint,

furnishings, and appliances. It noted that Jennifer took only one couch and bedroom set

from the marital home instead of utilizing items from the marital residence. It

21.
characterized Jennifer as having chosen to financially encumber herself unnecessarily. It

also emphasized that $35,000 had been used from a home equity line of credit to pay

Jennifer’s credit card debt, and despite the account being frozen, she took out an

additional $15,000, which she used toward her attorney fees and a new car. Finally, the

court found that Jennifer had incurred another $10,000 in credit card debt.

                          9. The Contribution of Each Party to the
                               Other’s Education or Training

       {¶ 47} Jennifer argues that she took a lower-paying job so that she could be

available to the parties’ minor children and so that Kyle “could hone his skills in the

construction industry.”

             10. The Time and Expense Necessary to Acquire Additional
                  Education or Training and the Tax Consequences
                          of an Award of Spousal Support

       {¶ 48} Jennifer concedes that these factors are inapplicable.

                    11. Lost Income Production Capacity Resulting
                             from Marital Responsibilities

       {¶ 49} Jennifer claims that she and Kyle made the joint decision that she would

quit her job at National City Bank—where she was being prepared to become a loan

officer—so she could care for their children, then she took a job at their school so she

could have the same schedule as the children. She insists that she is now locked into a

lower-paying job when she could be making significantly more money.

22.
                    12. Any Other Factor that the Court Expressly
                            Finds Relevant and Equitable

       {¶ 50} Jennifer argues that due to the parties’ long-term marriage, Kyle’s ability to

make more money than Jennifer, and the parties’ decision that Jennifer would maintain a

lower-paying job to care for their children, and in order for Jennifer to maintain a similar

standard of living post-divorce, she should be awarded spousal support. She insists that

Kyle distracted the court by pointing out one-time expenses associated with moving to

imply that Jennifer lives beyond her means. She complains that the trial court gave

improper weight to personal perspective and value judgments and adopted Kyle’s gender-

based arguments (e.g., “a woman who has too many credit cards and gets her nails done

too often”). She maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in not utilizing R.C.

3105.18(C)(1).

       {¶ 51} Under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), the trial court must determine whether spousal

support is “appropriate and reasonable.” Morse v. Morse, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-16-

023, 2017-Ohio-5690, ¶ 18, citing Basista v. Basista, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-076,

2016-Ohio-146, ¶ 28. The factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) guide the court in

making this determination. Id. A trial court must not base its determination upon any

one factor taken in isolation. Organ v. Organ, 2014-Ohio-3474, 17 N.E.3d 1192, ¶ 15

(9th Dist.), citing Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988),

paragraph one of the syllabus. “[A]ll of the statutory factors must be considered, with the

goal of reaching an equitable result.” Pearson v. Pearson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-

23.
066, 2022-Ohio-642, ¶ 12, citing King v. King, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-17-072, 2019-Ohio-

1561, ¶ 8-9.

       {¶ 52} Here, our review of the trial court judgment confirms that the court

thoroughly considered each of the relevant factors under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), and applied

those factors in light of the facts presented at trial. Certainly, the parties were married for

a very long time—one factor weighing in favor of an award of spousal support.

However, while Kyle earned more than Jennifer, the income disparity was not so

significant as to afford one party a significantly more comfortable lifestyle than the other.

Moreover, Jennifer exited the marriage with greater retirement assets and relatively little

debt. Although Jennifer sought to impute additional income to Kyle, she did not present

sufficient evidence of the income he earned from this additional work or the regularity of

these side jobs. Finally, although Jennifer asserted that she made career decisions for her

family that foreclosed the possibility of a higher-paying job, this argument was not well-

developed. She testified simply that she was a secretary for a loan officer, that she was

being prepped “to do loans,” and that she “could have moved up the ladder” if she would

have stayed at the bank.

       {¶ 53} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to award

spousal support here. We find Jennifer’s fourth assignment of error not well-taken.

24.
                                     E. HELOC Debt

         {¶ 54} In May of 2019, Jennifer and Kyle secured a $50,000 home equity line of

credit (“HELOC”). The parties used $35,000 to pay down credit card debt then froze the

account. Jennifer unfroze the account and withdrew the remaining $15,000 in August of

2019, to pay counsel fees and living expenses. The court found that Jennifer used $3,500

to pay attorney fees and $4,000 for her new car, and placed the remainder in her savings

account. It, therefore, determined that this $15,000 was separate debt for which Jennifer

was solely responsible. In her fifth assignment of error, Jennifer argues that this was

error.

         {¶ 55} Jennifer claims that she and Kyle did not separate until November of 2019,

when she moved out of the marital residence, and the entirety of the loan was utilized

before their separation. She emphasizes that most of the line of credit was used to pay

credit card debt incurred by the parties during their marriage. She maintains that by

allocating the $15,000 liability only to her, the trial court punished her for seeking the

legal representation to which she was entitled. Jennifer insists that all $50,000 should be

treated as marital debt.

         {¶ 56} Kyle responds that until Jennifer unilaterally borrowed the $15,000 against

the HELOC, all that was owed on the marital residence was the $35,000, which they used

to pay down credit card debt. He insists that Jennifer used that $15,000 for attorney fees

and personal expenses, including the purchase of a new vehicle, while the parties were in

25.
the process of disentangling themselves from one another. As such, he claims, he “never

saw a dime” of that money, and the trial court properly determined it to be separate debt

attributable only to Jennifer.

       {¶ 57} “The property to be divided in a divorce proceeding includes not only the

assets owned by the parties, but also any debts incurred by the parties.” (Internal

citations and quotations omitted.) Baum v. Perry-Baum, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-

085, 2019-Ohio-3923, ¶ 22. Where the amount of debt is undisputed and the issue is one

of property division, the trial court is vested with broad discretion to divide that property

as it deems equitable. Id. at ¶ 23. “An equitable distribution * * * does not always mean

an equal distribution.” Id., citing Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355, 421 N.E.2d

1293 (1981).

       {¶ 58} This court has thoroughly considered the entire record of proceedings in the

trial court and we find that the trial court's allocation of this $15,000 debt to Jennifer was

not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable, and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion.1

We find Jennifer’s fifth assignment of error not well-taken.

1
 Jennifer argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allocating the $15,000 debt to
her. Even applying a more stringent standard, we would still find no error in the trial
court’s allocation to Jennifer of the $15,000 HELOC debt. The evidence at trial makes
clear that Jennifer unilaterally withdrew that money and used it solely for her own benefit
while the parties were in the process of seeking an end to their marriage, but while she
was still living in the marital home. Jennifer agreed on cross-examination that “Kyle
didn’t see that money.”

26.
                                 F. Division of Accounts

       {¶ 59} After valuing the marital residence, the court calculated its available equity

by subtracting the $50,000 HELOC. Dividing that amount in two, it found that Jennifer

and Kyle each had equity of $119,365. Kyle had already paid $145,000 to Jennifer so

that she could buy a condominium. Thus, the court found that Jennifer had been overpaid

by $25,635. After making this determination, the court valued and divided other of the

parties’ property and either credited it or debited it from Jennifer’s overpayment. In her

sixth assignment of error, Jennifer argues that the trial court erred by incorrectly valuing

and inequitably dividing certain of the parties’ accounts and personal property.

       {¶ 60} Specifically, Jennifer takes issue with the following valuations:

          • A 1994 Skid Steer and 2002 Bobcat. Jennifer claims that Kyle sold these

              items to a friend at a price ($4,000) well below market value, yet Kyle

              continues to have access to this equipment, essentially retaining its benefit;

          • The Silverado. Jennifer claims that the court should not have accepted the

              Kelley Blue Book value—$9,108—for Kyle’s 2007 Chevy Silverado

              because Kyle testified he would never sell it for that low an amount;

          • Kyle’s tools. Jennifer claims that the trial court ignored credible testimony

              that Kyle owns numerous tools (saws, air compressors, drills, a grinder, a

              weed whip, gas cans, mowers, a ladder, a socket set, a shop vac, a sawzall),

              which she testified are worth $20,000;

27.
           • Kyle’s guns. Jennifer claims that the court failed to account for the value

              of 13 of Kyle’s guns, which Jennifer contends have a value of $2,600

              (average of $200 per gun); and

           • A 2006 Mule. Jennifer claims that the trial court failed to account for the

              value of a 2006 Mule that she says is worth $7,000.

       {¶ 61} Jennifer also thinks the trial court should have recognized the following in

its property distribution:

           • Kyle owes Jennifer $17,500 for the marital residence;

           • Jennifer owes Kyle $15,760 because her bank accounts plus retirement

              accounts total $88,660, and Kyle’s retirement accounts plus a life insurance

              policy total only $72,900;

           • Kyle owes half of Jennifer’s credit card debt of $11,700;

           • Kyle owes Jennifer $279,911 for her interest in real property;

           • Kyle owes Jennifer half of the value of his “vehicle, personal property,

              guns, and tools,” which she estimates at $87,900; and

           • Kyle owes Jennifer half of a $100,000 “brick of cash” that he kept in a safe

              in their home.

       {¶ 62} Kyle responds that Jennifer was already awarded half of the money he

received as payment for the Skid Steer and Bobcat. He contends that Jennifer offered no

qualified opinions of their worth, nor did she offer qualified opinions of the worth of

28.
other personal property such as his guns or tools. Kyle insists that Jennifer was credited

for her share of the Silverado and provided no evidence of its value. He acknowledges

that a brick of cash once existed, but he maintains that his trial testimony made clear that

this money was spent during the marriage for the parties’ joint expenses, including the

costs of their daughter’s wedding.

       {¶ 63} As previously discussed, the valuation of marital assets is an issue of fact

for the trial court. Ruetz, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-02-1037, 2003-Ohio-4091, at ¶ 41. In

determining a value, the trial court is charged with weighing the evidence and

determining the credibility of the witnesses. Wideman, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-030,

2003-Ohio-1858, at ¶ 21. It may accept or reject a party’s opinion as to value, so long as

its decision is support by evidence in the record. Id. We review a trial court’s valuation

of marital property using the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Jackson, 6th

Dist. Fulton No. F-12-013, 2014-Ohio-1145, at ¶ 17, citing Schuller, 6th Dist. Fulton No.

F-96–012, 1997 WL 51223, at * 2. We will not disturb the trial court’s judgment unless

it is not supported by competent and credible testimony. Smith, 6th Dist. Sandusky No.

S-89-3, 1990 WL 1357, at *6.

                                      1. The Vehicle

       {¶ 64} With respect to Kyle’s vehicle, Jennifer testified that she believed his

vehicle—a 2007 Silverado with over 100,000 miles—was worth $20,000. The Kelley

Blue Book estimates a value of only $9,108. The trial court accepted the Blue Book

29.
value, credited Jennifer with half of that amount, $4,554, and ordered that it be deducted

from the overpayment she received for her half of the equity in the marital residence.

Jennifer complains that this was error because Kyle said he would never accept this low

of an amount for the vehicle.

       {¶ 65} Ohio courts routinely rely on Kelley’s Blue Book in valuing automobiles.

See Collins v. Collins, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-11-32, 2012-Ohio-749, ¶ 15 (“David also

supported his testimony with a Blue Book website printout, admitted as Defendant’s

Exhibit 7.”); Deemer v. Deemer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-05-06, 2006-Ohio-1658, ¶ 7

(accepting husband’s evidence of vehicle’s value where he attached a valuation from

Kelley’s Blue Book and wife presented no evidence “beyond unsupported pretrial

statement”); Bostick v. Bostick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90711, 2008-Ohio-5119, ¶ 27

(“[W]ith respect to the cars, the trial court accepted Husband’s valuations as

demonstrated by the Kelley Blue Book, an accepted guide to used car pricing.”); King v.

King, 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA7, 2014-Ohio-5836, ¶ 3; (finding no competent,

credible evidence to support the court’s value of $8,750 where husband provided three

Kelley Blue Book values that were all higher than $9,500). What’s more, Kyle testified

that he would never accept the Kelly Blue Book value not because it was an incorrect

estimation of the vehicle’s worth, but because he cannot afford to replace the vehicle.

We find that the trial court’s valuation of the Silverado at $9,108 was supported by

30.
competent, credible evidence and the trial court properly credited Jennifer for half its

value.

                2. The Guns, Mule, Mower, Tools, Skid Steer, and Bobcat

         {¶ 66} With respect to Kyle’s guns, Jennifer testified that she was not sure how

many guns Kyle has and did not know their exact values. Kyle testified that he paid $240

for one of his hunting rifles and his other guns cost somewhere between $125 to $250

each. The trial court accepted that Kyle owns approximately 13 guns (that were not gifts)

with values ranging from $240 to $380 each. (At an average of $310 per gun, this would

equal $4,030.)

         {¶ 67} With respect to the 2006 Mule—bought new for $7,000—and the riding

lawn mower—bought after the parties separated for $3,000—the court found that no

evidence had been presented as to the current value of those items.

         {¶ 68} With respect to Kyle’s tools, Jennifer claimed that they had a total value of

$20,000. Kyle testified that he offered to give Jennifer half of the tools and she declined

them. The trial court did not specifically dispose of them in its judgment.

         {¶ 69} And with respect to the Skid Steer and Bobcat, Jennifer testified that her

Internet search showed that the Skid Steer was worth $12,000—Kyle testified that he

purchased the Skid Steer in 1996, but he could not remember what he paid for it. He

purchased the Bobcat used three years ago for $9,000. Kyle testified that he sold the Skid

Steer and Bobcat together to a friend for $4,000—he acknowledged that this was below

31.
fair market value and that he retains use of the items. The proceeds of the sale were in

his attorney’s IOLTA account and the court ordered that half the proceeds be released to

Jennifer.

       {¶ 70} Despite the lack of specific evidence concerning the current value of many

of these items, the court “[a]s and for equitable division” of those personal items, allowed

Jennifer to retain the remaining amount of the overpayment for her portion of the equity

in the marital residence—$7,466.

       {¶ 71} “It is expected that the court will ‘place a value on the major assets owned

by the parties.’” Kiernan v. Ward, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29994, 2022-Ohio-1303, ¶ 8,

quoting Zona v. Zona, 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0007-M, 2005-Ohio-5194, ¶ 5. But

“[a] trial court ‘cannot be expected to value every piece of furniture, lawn equipment, and

other personal property accumulated during a marriage * * *.’” Id., quoting Kohler v.

Kohler, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 96CA006313, 1996 WL 455850, *3 (Aug. 14, 1996).

“[T]he overarching goal is to create an equitable distribution” of marital property,” and

the court has discretion in fashioning that distribution. Id., citing Hunt v. Hunt, 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 21CA011720, 2022-Ohio-412, ¶ 8. Consequently, an appellate court “will

not overturn those discretionary determinations absent an abuse of discretion.” Kiernan

at ¶ 8, citing Hunt at ¶ 8; Fetzer v. Fetzer, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0036, 2014-Ohio-

747, ¶ 34.

32.
       {¶ 72} Moreover, a trial court does not err in failing to perform valuations of

marital property where the parties have not provided sufficient, credible evidence for the

court’s consideration. Roberts v. Roberts, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-27, 2008-Ohio-

6121, ¶ 24. In that situation, the court must make a division as it deems equitable. Id.

       {¶ 73} In Roberts, the trial court found—and the appellate court agreed—that the

parties had failed to present convincing evidence of the value of several household items.

Id. at ¶ 21. There, husband and wife stated “the original cost of a few of the items.” Id.

The court observed that “these figures were of little help in determining their present

values[,] * * * [t]hus, both parties’ testimony on this issue was severely lacking.” Id.

The court explained that “when a party fails to present evidence as to the value of an

item, it is akin to an invited error and that party has waived the right to appeal in regard to

that asset.” Id.

       {¶ 74} Here, in the absence of competent, credible evidence as to the current value

of these items of personal property, the court devised an equitable division to the best of

its ability given the information provided to it. We find no abuse of discretion in its

division of this marital property.

                                     3. The Brick of Cash

       {¶ 75} The parties agreed that at one point, Kyle had a “brick of cash” that totaled

$100,000—cash he had been saving his whole life. Jennifer testified that she had last

seen the “brick of money” three or four years earlier. Kyle testified that the cash had

33.
been depleted because he had paid cash for several high-priced marital expenditures,

including their daughter’s wedding--$10,000; the purchase of one of the parties’

properties in Fitchville--$22,500; the purchase of property in Cincinnati--$15,500; trips to

Punta Cana; and living expenses for two months of time he spent rehabbing their

daughter’s house, during which he was not getting paid. Kyle also testified that he paid

for his 2007 Harley with that money, and Jennifer had taken $15,000.

       {¶ 76} The trial court accepted that the brick of cash had been depleted. We find

that there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.

       {¶ 77} Finally, there are no details in the record concerning Jennifer’s $11,700

credit card debt. We have addressed all remaining aspects of Jennifer’s challenge to the

property distribution in other sections of this decision.

       {¶ 78} We find Jennifer’s sixth assignment of error not well-taken.

                               G. Return to Maiden Name

       {¶ 79} In her seventh assignment of error, Jennifer argues that the trial court erred

when it failed to restore her to her maiden name. She claims that she raised the issue of

being returned to her maiden name in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law, and again in her objection to the magistrate’s decision. Kyle responds that a nunc

pro tunc entry could have been utilized to effect Jennifer’s name change or she can apply

to the probate court for a name change.

34.
       {¶ 80} Under R.C. 3105.16, “[w]hen a divorce is granted the court of common

pleas shall, if the person so desires, restore any name that the person had before the

marriage.” Use of the word “shall” demonstrates that this duty is mandatory. Brown v.

Brown, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2008-08-021, 2009-Ohio-2204, ¶ 82.

       {¶ 81} In Brown, wife failed to request in her complaint that she be restored to her

maiden name, but made an oral request during the final hearing before the magistrate,

made a request in writing through her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,

and raised the issue in her objections to the magistrate’s decision. The appellate court

found that consistent with R.C. 3105.16, the trial court erred when it failed to restore her

former name. See also Collins v. Collins, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-53, 2011-Ohio-2339,

¶ 8 (finding that trial court was required to restore wife to her former name where wife

made request in her prayer for relief in her divorce complaint). See also Havrilla v.

Havrilla, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27064, 2014-Ohio-2747, ¶ 6 (concluding that trial court

erred in failing to return wife to maiden name where divorce decree was silent on the

issue); Reisz v. Tusing, 9th Dist. Lorain No. C.A. 3884, 1986 WL 2476 (Feb. 19, 1986),

*2 (sustaining wife’s assignment of error where domestic relations court approved

husband’s proposed journal entry of divorce in its entirety, neglecting wife’s request for

restoration of her maiden name); Hunt v. Hunt, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 87-B-46, 1988 WL

37972, *1 (Apr. 8, 1988), (“[A] court coming on to grant a final divorce must react to the

35.
desire of a person requesting restoration of her name that she had previous to the

marriage.”).

       {¶ 82} Here, Jennifer did not make a request to restore her maiden name in her

complaint. We have reviewed the transcript of the trial and see no request for a name

change in those proceedings. Jennifer’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law,

however, do reflect a request that she be returned to her maiden name, and the proposed

judgment entry that she attached to her objections to the magistrate’s report contains

reference to her desire to have her maiden name restored. The better practice would have

been for Jennifer to have explicitly requested the name change in her complaint, at trial,

in the proposed findings of fact, and in her objections to the magistrate’s report.

However, because a request was made (albeit not very prominently), the statute mandates

that such a request be granted, and the magistrate and the trial court appear to have

overlooked the request entirely, we find that the request should have been addressed and

granted.

       {¶ 83} Kyle incorrectly suggests that this matter could have been resolved via a

nunc pro tunc entry. “A nunc pro tunc entry is properly used to correct clerical errors,

and not to make substantive changes to a judgment.” (Citations omitted.) Watkins v.

Allstate Vehicle & Property Ins. Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1235, 2020-Ohio-3397, ¶

49, appeal not allowed, 160 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2020-Ohio-4574, 153 N.E.3d 113. The

trial court’s failure to return Jennifer to her maiden name was not a mere clerical error.

36.
       Accordingly, we find Jennifer’s seventh assignment of error well-taken. We

remand this matter to the trial court so that it can modify the judgment to restore Jennifer

to her former name of Jennifer Ott.

       {¶ 84} Finally, although not raised by any party, we observe that the trial court

judgment recites an incorrect date of marriage. Specifically, at paragraph 2(b) of the

findings of fact, the date of marriage is listed as October 20, 2009, when it should be

October 20, 1990. We sua sponte remand this matter to the trial court so that it can

modify its judgment to reflect the parties’ correct date of marriage—October 20, 1990.

                                      III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 85} We reverse, in part, and affirm, in part, the October 1, 2021 judgment of

the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division.

       {¶ 86} With respect to Jennifer’s first assignment of error, we conclude that the

trial court’s decision declining to accept Jennifer’s expert’s opinion concerning the value

of the marital residence was supported by competent, credible evidence. We find her first

assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 87} With respect to Jennifer’s second assignment of error, we find no error in

the trial court’s rejection of Jennifer’s claim that she did not intend to release her dower

rights as to real property Kyle sold to his father. We find her second assignment of error

not well-taken.

37.
       {¶ 88} With respect to Jennifer’s third assignment of error, we find that the

evidence was sufficient for the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that real

property gifted to Kyle by his parents was his separate property. We find her third

assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 89} With respect to Jennifer’s fourth assignment of error, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s decision not to award spousal support here. We find her

fourth assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 90} With respect to Jennifer’s fifth assignment of error, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s decision to allocate $15,000 of debt to only Jennifer. We

find her fifth assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 91} With respect to Jennifer’s sixth assignment of error, we find that the trial

court’s valuation determinations are supported by competent, credible evidence, and the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in its division of certain of the parties’ accounts and

personal property. We find her sixth assignment of error not well-taken.

       {¶ 92} With respect to Jennifer’s seventh assignment of error, we find that the trial

court erred in failing to restore Jennifer to her maiden name. We find her seventh

assignment of error well-taken and remand this matter to the trial court so that it can

modify its judgment to reflect that Jennifer Lynn Galloway is restored to her maiden

name, Jennifer Lynn Ott.

38.
       {¶ 93} We also find, sua sponte, that the trial court judgment recites an incorrect

date of marriage. On remand, the trial court shall amend its judgment to reflect that the

parties’ date of marriage was October 20, 1990—not October 20, 2009.

       {¶ 94} The parties are ordered to share in the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.

                                                                Judgment reversed, in part,
                                                                     and affirmed, in part.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                        ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
                                                ____________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

39.