Court Opinion

ID: 9939650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 10:10:57.444271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:41.925620
License: Public Domain

In the
         Court of Appeals
 Second Appellate District of Texas
          at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-23-00077-CR
      ___________________________

MARVIN EDWARD ROBINSON, JR., Appellant

                      V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
            Wichita County, Texas
     Trial Court No. CCL1-CR2022-1040

   Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
          Opinion by Justice Wallach
                                      OPINION

      A jury convicted Marvin Edward Robinson, Jr. of failure to identify and assessed

punishment at 180 days’ confinement in the county jail and a $2,000 fine. See Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 38.02. The trial court sentenced Robinson accordingly, and he now

appeals. In one issue, Robinson argues that the prosecutor “lessened the requisite

burden of proof by impermissibly defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt as ‘not far

from’ preponderance of the evidence, therefore denying [Robinson] of his due process

right to be tried at the requisite burden of proof for a criminal proceeding.” Because

Robinson did not preserve his appellate complaint, we will affirm.

                                     Background

      On the evening of July 3, 2022, Wichita County Deputy Sheriff Robert LaMel

stopped Robinson’s car because the car’s rear license plate was not illuminated. See Tex.

Transp. Code Ann. § 547.322(f). As seen in a video from LaMel’s dashcam, LaMel

repeatedly explained why he had stopped Robinson and asked Robinson to provide his

license, or, if not his license, at least his name and date of birth. LaMel then had

Robinson walk to back of the car and showed Robinson that his car’s license plate was

not illuminated. LaMel explained that a rear license plate must be illuminated under the

Texas Transportation Code and again asked for Robinson’s name. Robinson finally told

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LaMel his birthdate and said that his name was “Marvin Bey.” 1 Once someone from

the county’s dispatch informed LaMel that “Marvin Bey” was an alias, LaMel arrested

Robinson. Robinson was subsequently charged by information with giving the officer

a false name.

      At voir dire, in explaining the State’s burden, the prosecutor first told the jury

that the State would have to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt

and that it was not permitted to define “reasonable doubt” for the jury. The prosecutor

then explained that reasonable doubt was not “beyond all doubt” and that unless a

potential juror had witnessed the offense, the potential juror could not know beyond

all doubt what had occurred:

      [PROSECUTOR]: I can tell you what [beyond a reasonable doubt] isn’t.
      It is not beyond all doubt, right. Let me ask you this. [Venireperson],
      what’s a way that you would have no doubt that something happened?

      VENIREPERSON: . . . . No doubt that something happened? If I was a
      witness to it.

      [PROSECUTOR]: Exactly. That is the best answer ever. That’s the
      answer we are all looking for. And if you were a witness in this case, would
      you be sitting out here? You couldn’t be a witness and a juror, right? So
      that’s why the standard is not beyond all doubt. The only way you’d know
      for sure is if you’re a witness to something, right?

      1
        Robinson’s use of “Bey” as an alias, as well as some of his statements to the
officer and in the trial proceedings, indicate that he has sovereign-citizen beliefs. See
Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v. New Jersey, 790 F. Supp. 2d 241, 242–45, 269,
272 (D.N.J. 2011); El-Bey v. United States, No. 1:08CV151, 2009 WL 1019999, at
*1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2009, order).

                                           3
              It’s not beyond a shadow of a doubt. It’s not absolute[ ] certainty.
      And it only applies to the elements of the offense, those elements that we
      talked about. On this day in Wichita County, Mr. Robinson gave a false or
      fictitious name to a guy he knew was a peace officer who had lawfully
      detained him. So if there’s testimony of, oh, it was raining; it wasn’t
      raining, do we have to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt? That it was
      raining? It’s not an element. It doesn’t really matter.

      The prosecutor then used a visual aid—apparently a picture of a puzzle with

some pieces missing—to further explain the concept of reasonable doubt:

      [PROSECUTOR]: Can you help us all out? What is this a picture of?

               VENIREPERSON: A gun.

               [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Are you sure?

               VENIREPERSON: Looks like a gun to me.

            [PROSECUTOR]: All right. Do you believe beyond a reasonable
      doubt this is a picture of a gun?

               VENIREPERSON: Yeah.

               [PROSECUTOR]: Even though we’re missing some pieces here,
      right?

               VENIREPERSON: Yeah.

               [PROSECUTOR]: We can still tell it’s a gun, right?

               VENIREPERSON: Yep.

            [PROSECUTOR]: So we believe—do you believe beyond a
      reasonable doubt that’s a picture of a gun?

               VENIREPERSON: That’s a picture of a gun.

              [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Well, what about this puzzle piece over
      here, this piece of this leaf missing? Does that change your mind? Do you
      still believe beyond a reasonable doubt that’s a picture of a gun?

                                           4
               VENIREPERSON: That’s a picture of a gun.

             [PROSECUTOR]: So that’s a poignant illustration that’s used in
      every courtroom in Texas every week. We get that.

      The prosecutor then asked the jury if anyone would hold the State to a higher

burden than beyond a reasonable doubt or if anyone would hold the State to a lesser

burden. It was at this point that the prosecutor made the comments to which Robinson

now objects.

      [PROSECUTOR:] Anybody who would hold the State to a lower
      standard? We have all sorts of legal standards of proof. Like
      preponderance of the evidence, has anybody ever heard that term? No?
      So it’s like a civil case, right? Like traffic accidents, if we had a hundred
      sheets of paper here, two stacks, a hundred sheets here, a hundred sheets
      here, it’s just evidence that slightly tips the scale. So if I took one piece of
      paper from the 100 and 100 and turned it into 101 and 99, that would be
      a preponderance of the evidence, right? Or if we had a scale and I put it
      on the scale and tipped it down, that would be preponderance of the
      evidence. But that is not far from what we’re dealing with here. Does everybody
      understand that and is good with that? [Emphasis added.]

Robinson represented himself at trial, and he did not object to the prosecutor’s

statement.

                                       Discussion

      In his sole issue, Robinson argues that “[t]he State impermissibly commented on

the burden of proof during voir dire by stating that the requisite burden of proof is ‘not

far from’ a preponderance standard” and that “[b]ecause the prosecutor’s comment—

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and the trial’s court failure to correct [it][2]—resulted in the jury receiving wrongful

information as to the correct burden of proof, Mr. Robinson was deprived of a right . . .

fundamental to the proper functioning of the judicial system.” Citing Tuazon v. State,

661 S.W.3d 178, 194 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.), he argues that he was not

required to object to preserve his argument for appeal because it involves a waivable-

only right and that the error3 resulted in egregious harm.

       In Tuazon, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the defendant, Tuazon, had a

“waivable-only . . . due process right not to have the trial court define reasonable doubt

in a manner that shifted the State’s burden of proof.” Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (citing

Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), and that case’s discussion

of rights that may be waived but may not be forfeited by failing to object). The court

then held that Tuazon’s due process right had been violated because the trial court had

defined the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt by stating that, if compared to a

football field, the State was “not expected to have to take it all the way down to the

       2
        To the extent that Robinson’s inclusion of this clause was intended to argue the
trial court had a duty to sua sponte correct the prosecutor’s statement, it is the only part
of his brief in which he raises the argument, and he does not support the argument with
further analysis or any citations to authority. The argument is thus inadequately briefed,
and we will not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1; Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166,
179–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
       3
         Although Robinson uses the word “error” to describe the prosecutor’s action,
in appellate practice, the word is ordinarily used to refer to trial court mistakes. Johnson
v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 229 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

                                             6
endzone, spike the football, and convince everybody beyond any shadow of a doubt,

no possibility, . . . [i]t’s just that little, tiny bit over the 50-yard line.” Id. at 186. The

appellate court held that the trial court’s football field comparison had “effectively

equat[ed] the beyond a reasonable doubt standard with the preponderance of the

evidence standard.” Id. at 194. Robinson argues that we should likewise hold that the

prosecutor in this case equated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard with the

preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and that he was not required to object to the

prosecutor’s argument to preserve his complaint for appeal.

       In Marin, the Court of Criminal Appeals described three categories of rights and

each category’s preservation requirement: (1) “absolute requirements and prohibitions,”

like jurisdiction, which may not be waived or forfeited through failing to object;

(2) rights that may be plainly, freely, and intelligently waived but not forfeited, like the

right to assistance of counsel and the right to a trial by jury; and (3) rights that may be

forfeited. Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 278–79; see Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). Most errors fall into the third category.

       The Marin error-preservation categories are not based on the particular

circumstances of the claim or the harm that the alleged error caused. Proenza,

541 S.W.3d at 795–96. Rather, a determination of whether a claim may be forfeited is

based solely on the nature of the error. Id. at 796 (quoting Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d

736, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Thus, for claims based on comments made at trial, it

                                              7
does not matter to a preservation analysis that some comments are worse than others.

Id.

      The nature of the error here is a prosecutor’s alleged misstatement of the beyond-

a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. Even assuming that in this case the prosecutor’s

statement in context was as unambiguously incorrect as the one at issue in Tuazon, this

case differs from Tuazon because in Tuazon, it was the trial court who made the

challenged statement.

      Notably, most of the cases on which Robinson relies for his argument involved

voir dire comments by the trial court regarding the burden of proof. 4 Robinson cites

one case, from the First Court of Appeals, for the proposition that a prosecutor’s

unobjected-to voir dire statements regarding the burden of proof could constitute

fundamental error. See Meadows v. State, Nos. 01-09-00443-CR, 01-09-00444-CR,

2010 WL 2874199, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 22, 2010, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Meadows, however, skipped any analysis of

whether a prosecutor’s comments could rise to the level of fundamental error and went

      4
        He cites one case that, in addition to addressing the trial court’s comments
regarding the burden of proof, also addressed the appellant’s complaint about the
prosecutor’s voir dire comments about the appellant’s guilt and his criminal history. See
Hamson v. State, No. 01-97-01408-CR, 1999 WL 312300, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] May 13, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication). However, in that
case, the prosecutor’s challenged comments were not related to the burden of proof,
and the appellate court disposed of the argument in a single sentence, holding that the
appellant had forfeited his complaint by not objecting. Id. at *3.

                                           8
straight to deciding whether the comments did so in that case and holding that they did

not. Id. It thus does not provide us with any guidance on the issue, and it does not

persuade us to depart from the line of case law, cited below, that addresses comments

by prosecutors.5

       5
         Additionally, Meadows pre-dated the Proenza opinion, which provided needed
clarity regarding Marin’s error-preservation standards. See Meadows, 2010 WL 2874199,
at *6 (citing the pre-Proenza plurality opinion in Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000) (plurality op.)). In some more recent post-Proenza cases, other appellate
courts have considered whether a prosecutor’s statements in voir dire rose to the level
of fundamental error. See Green v. State, No. 14-21-00316-CR, 2023 WL 2585935, at
*6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 21, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.); Dixon v.
State, No. 07-16-00058-CR, 2022 WL 124568, at *13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 13,
2022) (mem. op., not designated for publication), opinion corrected on denial of reh’g, No. 07-
16-00058-CR, 2022 WL 1234096 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 25, 2022, no pet.) (order
on reh’g), and cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2458 (2023); Holland v. State, No. 05-18-01419-CR,
2019 WL 6799755, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication). However, none of these cases persuade us that
Robinson’s issue should be sustained. In each case, the appellate court held that the
prosecutor’s voir dire comments at issue did not rise to the level of fundamental error.
Green, 2023 WL 2585935, at *6; Dixon, 2022 WL 124568, at *13; Holland,
2019 WL 6799755, at *5. Before reaching that conclusion, like the Meadows court, each
court appeared to simply assume that such comments could be fundamental error.
Green, 2023 WL 2585935, at *6; Dixon, 2022 WL 124568, at *13; Holland,
2019 WL 6799755, at *4. Accordingly, those opinions provide us with no persuasive
analysis regarding whether a complaint about a prosecutor’s voir dire comments can
give rise to fundamental error.

      Additionally, both Dixon and Holland stated that other comments or actions by
the prosecutor mitigated the harm from the challenged comments. See Dixon,
2022 WL 124568, at *13; Holland, 2019 WL 6799755, at *4. While comments may be
considered in context to determine whether a complained-of comment was actually
improper or misstated the law, appellate courts may not consider the harm from a
prosecutor’s comments to determine whether a complaint about the comments was

                                              9
       On the other hand, in Johnson v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals has provided

us with guidance about when a prosecutor’s act can result in reversal despite no error

by the trial court. Although Johnson did not address preservation requirements, it pointed

out the difference between the actions of the trial court and those of prosecutors:

“[o]rdinarily, a conviction is not overturned unless the trial court makes a mistake,” and

“[t]here are just a few situations in which a conviction can be overturned even though

the trial court has done nothing wrong.” 169 S.W.3d at 228–29 (emphasis added). The

few situations are generally those over which “neither the trial court nor the defendant

has any control.” Id. at 229; see Darcy v. State, 488 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016). For example, if a prosecutor suppresses exculpatory evidence or knowingly uses

forfeited. See Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 791, 795–96 (stressing the importance of keeping
questions of preservation and harm distinct from one another).

        Further, in Holland, it is not entirely clear what standard the court applied in its
analysis. See Holland, 2019 WL 6799755, at *4 (first citing Texas Rule of Evidence
103(d), which applies to evidentiary rulings and does not establish a freestanding
fundamental-error standard separate from the one articulated in Marin, and then citing
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), which sets out the
appropriate harmless-error review standard for jury charge error and does not apply
outside the context of charge error); see also Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 795 (discussing Rule
103(d) and stating that it does not create a “freestanding, harm-based doctrine of error
preservation”); Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (setting out jury-charge harm standard); cf.
Prevost v. State, No. AP-77,039, 2016 WL 748465, at *1 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 24,
2016) (not designated for publication) (noting that Almanza standard does not apply to
complaints that do not concern jury-charge error). The year after Holland was decided,
the same court decided Davis v. State, which, as noted below, took a different approach
in reviewing a prosecutor’s voir dire comments. No. 05-19-00508-CR,
2020 WL 3396440, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).

                                            10
perjured testimony, neither the trial court nor the defendant is in a position to know

about the wrongdoing when it occurs, and the trial court therefore cannot correct it.

Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 229.

      Here, if Robinson had objected, the trial court could have provided any

clarification or correction that was needed. See, e.g., Compton v. State, 666 S.W.3d 685,

714 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (stating that the prosecutor’s comments about which the

appellant complained “could have been cured by a timely objection and instruction

from the trial judge if the trial court had been placed on notice of the issue”); Jones v.

State, No. 05-22-00555-CR, 2023 WL 7144643, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 31, 2023,

no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that if the appellant had

objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire comment, “the trial court could have issued a

curative instruction, and prospective jurors could have been questioned about how the

statement might affect their deliberations”). Thus, we are not persuaded that we should

treat the prosecutor’s statement in this case the same way that we would address a trial

court’s misstatement of the burden of proof.

      The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a complaint about a prosecutor’s voir

dire comments in Davis v. State. 2020 WL 3396440, at *4–5. In that case, the appellant

complained that, during voir dire, the prosecutor had “grossly misstated the law

governing the presumption of innocence.” Id. The appellate court noted that the

appellant had cited no cases “holding that a prosecutor’s statements about the

                                           11
presumption of innocence during voir dire can rise to the level of fundamental error,” 6

and the appellate court had not found any such cases, either. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).

The court then held that “if the prosecutor in this case misstated the law during voir

dire, then we view those statements to be akin to an improper jury argument, which is

forfeited if it is not preserved with an objection.” Id.

       We agree with that approach. This court and others have repeatedly held that

complaints about a prosecutor’s comments must be preserved by objection. See Carson

v. State, Nos. 2-07-158-CR, 2-07-159-CR, 2008 WL 1867148, at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 24, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that

by not pursuing his complaint to an adverse ruling, appellant had forfeited his complaint

that during closing argument, prosecutor made up a definition of reasonable doubt and

asserted that it was the legal definition); see also Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996) (noting that “a defendant’s ‘right’ not to be subjected to incurable

erroneous jury arguments is one of those rights that is forfeited by a failure to insist

upon it”); Davis, 2020 WL 3396440, at *5; Calhoun v. State, No. 02-15-00323-CR,

2016 WL 3452915, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (noting that “[t]o preserve error regarding improper voir

dire questions or statements, a party must make a specific and timely objection”);

       6
         For purposes of this appeal, the phrase “fundamental error” refers to claims that
fall into Marin’s first two categories, i.e., claims that we may “reach[ ] on appeal whether
they were preserved at trial or not.” Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 794.

                                              12
Babineaux v. State, Nos. 01-06-00608-CR, 01-06-00609-CR, 2007 WL 1953693, at

*8(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 6, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (holding that the appellant had failed to preserve his complaint that the

prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument); Barnes v. State, No. 14-00-01444-

CR, 2002 WL 373061, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 7, 2002, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that the appellant had not preserved

his complaint that the definition of reasonable doubt given by the prosecutor during

closing argument confused the jury and undermined the burden of proof); Jenkins v.

State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (stating

that the appellant had not preserved his complaint that during voir dire the prosecutor

misstated the law regarding the burden of proof). By not objecting, Robinson failed to

preserve his complaint.

      If the prosecutor misstated the law regarding the burden of proof, Robinson was

required to object to preserve his complaint. Because he did not object, he forfeited his

complaint. We overrule his sole issue.

                                      Conclusion

      Having overruled Robinson’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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                                   /s/ Mike Wallach
                                   Mike Wallach
                                   Justice

Publish

Delivered: February 8, 2024

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