Court Opinion

ID: 9518060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:42:08.197793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:15.567262
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
Respectfully, I dissent from the decision that this case should proceed when it is evident that the issues are not ripe for review because the Department of Banking has not yet promulgated regulations to implement the Debt Management Services Act, Act of October 9, 2008, No. 117, 63 P.S. §§ 2401-2449 (Act 117). The majority observes that the protection of “economically vulnerable consumers from predatory debt services is a legitimate, even significant state purpose,” op. at 1279. It nevertheless overrules, among others, the Department’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to Petitioners’ claim that Act 117 represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in regard to Debt Settlement Services (DSS) Providers in violation of Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I disagree with the conclusion that Act 117 provides no guidance or imposes no restraints on the Department with regard to regulating DSS Providers.
*1280As the Department emphasizes in its brief, the legislature made the required basic policy choices and provided through the Act adequate standards to guide and to restrain the Department in exercising its delegated functions, citing among other cases Christ the King Manor v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Welfare, 911 A.2d 624 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), for the principle that the Court should examine the underlying purpose of legislation and its reasonable effect in ruling on whether the non-delegation doctrine has been violated.
In Christ the King Manor the Court rejected the petitioners’ Article II, Section 1 non-delegation claim that the legislature failed to make basic policy choices and to establish adequate standards to guide the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) in the exercise of its delegated administrative function. The Court sustained DPW’s demurrer to the petitioners’ amended petition for review challenging the validity of DPW’s amendments to its cost adjustment regulations related to nursing facility payment rates under the state’s medical assistance program. The petitioners sought a declaration that the regulations were invalid due to the alleged unconstitutional delegation of authority. After reviewing the state’s Welfare Code and the federal Medicaid Act, the Court held that adequate legislative standards were provided for DPW to perform its delegated administrative function of setting medical assistance nursing facility payment rates even before as well as after Act 42 (Act of July 7, 2005, P.L. 177), which allowed DPW to amend its rate-setting methodology for facilities participating in the program. The Court noted a basic policy of the Medicaid Act: to ensure continued access to facilities for those who need medical assistance by providing reasonable and adequate payments to economically and efficiently operated facilities. It then held that Act 42 was consistent with the federal act and that DPW adopted the challenged amendments pursuant to Act 42. Accordingly, the standards in the Welfare Code and the federal act were adequate to guide and restrain DPW’s discretion in establishing the payment methodology.
Here, the Department points out the basic policy choices made by the legislature, which are no less adequate than those noted in Christ the King Manor. Act 117 requires licensure for debt management and for debt settlement businesses and provides the information required for licensure and for the revocation of licenses. Act 117 provides reporting requirements for licensed businesses in both categories, and it provides standards regarding conflict of interest and prohibitions against the purchase of consumer debts, distribution of misleading or false information, disclosure of client identity and so forth. Act 117 forbids a licensee from compromising a consumer debt unless the compromise benefits the consumer and has been approved in writing by the consumer. In addition, the Department points out that it is responsible, among other things, for licensing, holding administrative hearings, prohibiting those who violate Act 117 from engaging in activities that are regulated by the Department and ordering Act 117 violators to make restitution to consumers or to make refunds of fees collected. By no means can it be fairly said that these provisions do not represent basic legislative policy choices and provide adequate standards to guide the Department in performing its administrative duty to promulgate regulations to implement Act 117.
There has been no violation of the non-delegation clause of Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, and because the Department has not yet promulgated regulations to implement Act 117 I urge that this matter is not ripe for review and that the Department’s demurrer be sustained and Petitioners’ action be dismissed. In Amer*1281ican Council of Life Ins. v. Foster, 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 634, 580 A.2d 448 (1990), the petitioners challenged an insurance commissioner order denying a petition for investigation and declaratory order related to the commissioner’s elimination of a gender-based classification from life and health lines of insurance. They also filed a declaratory judgment complaint requesting that this Court issue a ruling that the commissioner had no authority to prohibit the insurance industry’s use of gender in underwriting and pricing life and health insurance.
The commissioner filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to the complaint in American Council of Life Ins., contending that this Court lacked jurisdiction because no present case or controversy existed inasmuch as proposed regulations had not been promulgated and the petitioners had to present their concerns through the rulemaking process and then administrative review through the insurance department. The Court sustained the demurrer because the proposed unisex regulations had not been formally promulgated, and therefore an actual controversy did not exist. In short, judicial intervention was premature where the issues involved were to be resolved in the rulemaking process, which would allow the petitioners an opportunity to provide input through written comment and to appear at hearings during the rulemaking process.
The Court noted that the petitioners were not prejudiced because they did not have to rewrite policies or adjust rates until regulations had been formally adopted. It adopted the rationale expressed in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), that administrative agencies should be protected from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in concrete ways. The reasoning in American Council of Life Ins. applies equally here. No regulations exist yet, and because the DSS Providers are not precluded from servicing their existing clients they will not be prejudiced by waiting until an actual case or controversy exists.
The Department’s demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the petition for review filed in this case, and under its present state the Department’s demurrer should be sustained. Christ the King Manor. Act 117 became effective only on February 6, 2009, and until the Department has proceeded through the regulatory process and formally adopted regulations, no case or controversy exists. As a consequence, the Court has no jurisdiction and should proceed no further in this matter.