Court Opinion

ID: 9657538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:46.176548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.205347
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.

(dissenting).

I. The Facts.
Sam St. Pierre was part owner of an appliance store in Detroit. Sometime during 1935, plaintiff went to work for him. She was then 17 years old. St. Pierre was about 35 years old. Plaintiff and Sam began going together. About three years later, Sam proposed marriage. Angeline accepted. She made the down payment on a cottage at Briggs lake and furnished it.
Sam and Angeline had heard there was no waiting period for marriage in Ohio. On April 15, 1938, they went to Napoleon, Ohio, and obtained a license to marry. On the application Sam St. Pierre made a sworn statement that he was not previously married, that he had no wife living, and that there *60was no legal impediment to the marriage. The parties then discovered they could not be married that day because of Ohio law, but that they would have to come back later. Angeline returned with Sam to Briggs lake and began living with him as his wife.
In reliance upon Sam’s representation that he was single, plaintiff entered into what she believed was a common-law marriage. Plaintiff knew that common-law marriages were valid in Michigan. Sam was working seven days a week and maintained he could not get away for another trip to Ohio. It became a matter of less and less importance to her that no ceremonial marriage had been performed.
World War II caused such a shortage of the appliances Sam was selling that he went bankrupt. They moved in with Angeline’s mother. Eventm ally Sam St. Pierre had an opportunity to go into the construction business. He thought this was something he would like to do. Angeline borrowed money from her father. The home at Briggs lake was mortgaged to permit Sam to undertake the new venture. Angeline did the bookkeeping, collecting, advertising, picking up of materials, drove truck, and carried on the business except for actual operation of the crane and bulldozer. Throughout her entire supposed married life she actively engaged in all of the business enterprises. She inherited $10,000 which she invested in the business and the development of lands. The business was successful and several parcels of land were subdivided with lots sold by deed and land contracts in which Sam and Angeline held themselves out as husband and wife.
In 1959, Angeline was advised by Sam that he had been previously married and there was “a problem in his background that might involve fur*61ther troubles.” Angeline bad never been permitted by Sam to meet any of his relations — father, brothers and sisters. Throughout this purported marriage, Sam had cut Angeline off entirely. He told her that he was more or less the black sheep of the family, that he had done something bad that his family did not approve of, and that they did not approve of him. Sam had even requested Angeline not to contact his family in the event of his death. At the time of his death on December 27, 1961, she knew only the name and address of one brother. At the time she learned there was a “problem”, Angeline and Sam had two grown and married children. She still believed herself to be the wife of Sam. Angeline’s concluding testimony was:
“I believed I was married to Sam; he was my husband and a previous marriage or a half dozen previous marriages would have made no difference. He was my husband; I was his wife; we had a home; we had children.”
II. The Proceedings.
Angeline filed a bill of complaint to quiet title in which she alleged she was the owner in fee simple of lands by deeds in which the grantees were named as Sam and Angeline, his wife, or Sam and Ange-.. line, husband and wife. llene Timmons, administratrix of the estate of Sam, and Sam’s wife, Irene, and the seven children of Irene and Sam were made. defendants. Angeline pled ownership in the lands by virtue of the death of Sam; that a portion of the lands had been sold under land contracts; that the defendants were claiming some right in the contracts ; that those claims constituted a cloud on her title.
Defendants denied plaintiff’s conclusions as to the ovuiership of the properties and asserted that *62plaintiff was a single woman. llene Timmons, as administratrix, filed a separate cross-bill of complaint asking for partition. Angeline’s answer to the cross-bill pled that llene was estopped to deny that she and Sam were not [sic] husband and wife, and estopped to attack the deeds under which she claimed title, such estoppel being both in pais and by deed.
On August 20, 1962, plaintiff filed a motion for decree on the pleadings. Defendants filed separate amended answers alleging as to Irene and the children, that their claims were by right of inheritance, and, as to llene, as administratrix, that she claimed the same interest in the real property as Sam had owned.
On November 6, 1962, the circuit judge filed a written opinion in which he concluded that Angeline and the estate of Sam were each the owners of an undivided one-half interest in the properties. No relief was granted on the cross-bill for partition, pending proofs to determine whether partition could equitably be ordered or whether a sale would be necessary. Order denying plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed on March 14, 1963.
Plaintiff filed a proposed amended complaint setting forth in more detail a recital of the relationship between herself and Sam. Order permitting the filing of the amended complaint was entered, and answers thereto were filed. The answers are almost entirely a claim of lack of information or knowledge sufficient upon which to form a belief with defendants neither admitting nor denying and leaving plaintiff to her proofs.
The case was tried in July, 1964. Angeline St. Pierre and a Ward Van Blaricum were the only witnesses. Pie testified that Angeline St. Pierre handled the business end of a development under*63taken by Sam and Angeline. On April 12, 1965, the opinion of the circuit judge was filed. He found that the real estate ostensibly owned by Sam and Angeline as tenants by the entireties was, in fact, owned by them as tenants in common, each having an undivided one-half interest. The judgment of the court decreed that Angeline and llene, in her representative capacity, were each the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the property as tenants in common. It was further decreed that the title to all property conveyed by Sam and Angeline prior to Sam’s death should be quieted.in the grantees of such conveyances, free and clear of any claims on behalf of the estate of Sam, llene, Irene, or the children, and that the estate of Sam, llene, Irene, and the children should have no right, title or interest in or to any of the streets in platted subdivisions. Angeline and llene were held entitled each to one half of the proceeds of any land contracts accrued or paid since the date of Sam’s death.
Claim of appeal was filed May 21, 1965. Opinion of the Ccrurt of Appeals was filed April 12, 1966, with a dissent filed April 18, 1966. Rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals on August 5, 1966. (2 Mich App 723.) This Court denied application for leave to appeal by order entered on October 21, 1966. 378 Mich 736. On motion by the plaintiff to reconsider, this Court granted leave to appeal by order entered April 12, 1967. 379 Mich 759.
III. The Law.
Under the deeds conveying the properties to Sam and Angeline, as husband and wife, or to Sam and Angeline, his wife, an apparent paper title in fee simple was established with an estate by the entire-ties created in them as grantees. Defendants insist *64that the paper title is not binding- as to them and undertake to show that throughout the period covered by the deeds of conveyance, Sam had never been divorced from Irene, and, hence, Angeline remained a single woman because it was impossible for her to enter into a lawful marriage with Sam.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that an estate by the entireties cannot be created by deeds designating- the grantees as husband and wife where, at the time, a lawful marriage between the grantees did not exist. Absent estoppel, a challenge to the app'arent paper title has been permitted, there being no reason as between the grantees not to show ■‘•'the true state of affairs. The following cases announce the rule:
Collins v. Norris (1946), 314 Mich 145, a suit to have defendant’s name stricken where the grantees named in the deeds as husband and wife were each ■'at the time married to another;
Cristia v. Cristia (1947), 317 Mich 66, an action for divorce, where the Court in dividing property found the interest of vendees named as husband and wife in a land contract to be as tenants in common, ■ although they subsequently married;
Williams v. Dean (1959), 356 Mich 426, in which the Court rejected appellants’ contention that since they were married after the execution of the land ' contract they thereby became tenants by the entire-ties before the levy of the writs of execution on the interest of the husband; ...
Spence v. Jones (1960), 359 Mich 231, holding in a partition action that the grantees in deed to property, described as husband and wife, took as tenants in common because the male grantee had a wife living- at the time from whom he had not been divorced; '
Daniels v. Daniel (1961), 362 Mich 176, where the plaintiff as administratrix prevailed in establish*65ing an interest for her decedent’s estate as a tenant in common in property conveyed to decedent and defendant as husband and wife when at the time decedent was legally married to another.
In this case, llene, the administratrix, in her separate answer to plaintiff’s amended bill of complaint stated: “This defendant alleges that she is entitled to the same interest in said real estate in her representative capacity as the deceased would have had.” There is no claim by llene, as administratrix, that the lands involved must be sold to pay Sam’s debts. Irene, the lawful wife, and the seven children in their separate answer to the amended bill of complaint alleged: “These defendants further admit that they have been determined to be the heirs of Sam St. Pierre and further state that it is possible that they may inherit from the estate of Sam St. Pierre as his heirs, but make no further claims other than by right of inheritance.”
Thus, defendants, alleging they stand in the shoes of Sam and are entitled to take whatever interest he had in the lands and land contracts at the time of his death, seek to invoke the foregoing rule. They insist that as between Angeline and Sam there never was an estate by the entireties but, instead, the lands ' and land contracts were held as tenants in common, with each one having an undivided one-half interest therein at the -time of Sam’s death.
Plaintiff has met the defendants’ claims by pleading estoppel, estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais or equitable estoppel. In Stone v. Culver (1938), 286 Mich 263, Justice Butzel wrote for a unanimous Court (pp 267, 268): “It is true that title may not be created by estoppel. * * * The purpose of the rule that title may not be created by estoppel is -to prevent the uncertainty of titles which would arise if the statute of frauds could be evaded and parol evidence of an estoppel could he .introduced *66to show that the paper title is not what it appears to be. The rule is not applicable to the instant case in which the estoppel serves to defend and not to destroy the apparent paper title. A party may not be estopped from claiming that the paper title is what it appears to be, but he may be estopped, as in the instant case, from showing by parol evidence that the paper title is not what it appears to be.” In Daniels v. Daniel (1961), 362 Mich 176, it was stated (p 184): “While an estoppel may not create title it may operate to prevent vitiation of a title apparently created.”
Sam had full knowledge of his own marital status during all the years he lived with Angeline. Despite this, he took title to the lands involved by deeds naming himself and Angeline, husband and wife, as grantees. He ratified this relationship and the apparent paper title thus created by subsequently conveying portions of the same land as subdivided lots by deeds which named Sam and Angeline, husband and wife, as grantors. “When a person has so acted as to make it appear from the face of a deed that a certain title has been created, he may be estopped to introduce parol evidence to show that that is not the actual title. Stevens v. DeBar (1924), 229 Mich 251; Colonial Theatrical Enterprises v. Sage (1931), 255 Mich 160; Spitzeley v. Holmes (1932), 256 Mich 559.” Stone v. Culver, supra, at page 267.
Every parcel of land as to which Angeline seeks to quiet her title, and every parcel sold off under land contract, was obtained initially under deeds of conveyance to Sam and Angeline in which they were named as husband and wife, or in which Angeline was designated as the wife of Sam. Defendants now assert their demands by virtue of these same deeds. They would confirm the legal descriptions and the conveyancing to Sam and Angeline, *67but seek to reject that portion of each deed which describes Angeline as the wife of Sam, or describes the two of them as husband and wife.
It has long been settled that a person cannot accept and reject the same instrument. It is, likewise, settled that if a person undertakes to avail himself as to a part of the instrument, he cannot defeat its provisions in any other part as the doctrine of election prevents the assertion of repugnant rights. This equity rule has been said to be an extension of the law of equitable estoppel. Aiken v. Gonser (1955), 342 Mich 29, 35; Porter v. Landis (1950), 329 Mich 76. In Holsbaugh v. Detroit Bank & Trust Company (1963), 371 Mich 432, this Court denied relief to daughters of the testator who for a period of 18 years had accepted specific bequests under their father’s will and the net income from a testamentary trust but who then filed a bill of complaint to have declared void certain charitable provisions in the trust under the will and for an order of distribution of funds and an accounting. Relief was denied on the basis of estoppel to assert repugnant rights under the same instrument. The cases of Aiken v. Gonser, supra; Jacobs v. Miller (1883), 50 Mich 119; Hawley v. Dibble (1915), 184 Mich 298; Young v. Young (1918), 200 Mich 236; and Stone v. Cook (1904), 179 Mo 534 (78 SW 801), were cited as time-honored precedents.
In the case of Hayes v. Livingston (1876), 34 Mich 384, an action of ejectment, Chief Justice Cooley wrote on the application of estoppel in pais. He cautioned that the doctrine of estoppel in pais is not as broadly applicable to cases involving the legal title to real estate as it is in those cases where only personalty is in question, the proviso of the statute of frauds that interests in land shall not be created or transferred otherwise than by deed operating as a limitation upon the doctrine. In *68this case, the rights of third persons are not involved and the provisions of the statute of frauds are inapplicable to the claim of Angeline who is not seeking to create or transfer any interests in lands other than the apparent paper title vested in her upon the death of Sam.
llene, as the personal representative of Sam, has presented no different position or more compelling-case than that of Sam. Estoppel as to Sam becomes estoppel as to llene. Similarly, Irene and the children are in privity with Sam. They do not rely on a title to the lands acquired from sources other than Sam. They say they stand to inherit from Sam. Their rights are to be determined by the acts and conduct of Sam and as his heirs they are es-topped if Sam, their ancestor, would be estopped. 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §§ 119, 120, pp 778-780.
In the case of Stevens v. DeBar, supra, the Court said (p 253):
“In the instant case the vendee, Mrs. DeBar, directed the vendor, Mrs. Hardy, to convey the legal title to herself and her former husband jointly with the right of survivorship; Mrs. Hardy complied with such direction, and as a part of the one transaction Mrs. DeBar in writing ratified it by executing with her former husband a mortgage for the balance of the purchase price. May the plaintiff whose sole rights' are as heir at law of Mrs. DeBar and whose rights can be no greater than Mrs. DeBar’s assail in a court of equity this transaction, this executed contract? We think not. This Court has consistently held that title to real estate may not be created by estoppel, but in numerous cases this Court has also held that a party may estop himself after the arrangements have been fully executed from asserting that the title he by his own acts has created or aided in creating is not the true title.”
*69Sam signified his ratification of the acceptance of title with Angeline in the relationship of husband and wife by restating this relationship in the deeds to the subdivided lots where their names appeared as grantors.
The following cases set forth the general rules of equitable estoppel:
In Dahrooge v. Rochester German Insurance Co. (1913), 177 Mich 442, 452, it was said:
“Estoppel is based on some misleading conduct or language of one person which, being relied on, operates to the prejudice of another, and is applied to the wrongdoer by the court in denial of some right, which otherwise might exist, to prevent a fraud.”
In Kole v. Lampen (1916), 191 Mich 156, involvingassumpsit on a promissory note, this Court said, at page 157:
“It is a familiar rule of law that an estoppel arises when one by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.”
In Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. Auditor General (1884), 53 Mich 79, involving estoppel to dispute the legality of a tax assessment, this Court said at page 86:
“It sometimes becomes an act of simple justice in the law to hold a party to the truth of something he has asserted, and not to suffer him to aver or prove the contrary, because to do so would be to mislead and prejudice some other party who has acted in reliance upon the truth of his assertion. *70The rule under which this is done is. a simple rule of justice.”
The above quotation was approved and applied in the subsequent case of Kittinger v. Kittinger (1947), 319 Mich 145, 151.
In Colonial Theatrical Enterprises v. Sage (1931), 255 Mich 160, 171, 172, this Court said:
“The basis of estoppel is fraud. The doctrine, being equitable, is dependent upon the circumstances, and the relief ranges from mere reimbursement to putting the party entitled to its benefit in the same position as if the thing represented was true.”
It was said in Gard v. Gard (1918), 204 Mich 255, 259:
“This Court has repeatedly held in cases involving fraud that it does not lie with one charged with fraud, who assumes to have knowledge of a subject of which another may well be ignorant, to claim that such other should have used greater diligence to discover the fraud, should have been more vigilant, less credulous.” (Citing. cases.)
In Detroit Savings Bank v. Loveland (1911), 168 Mich 163, an action of assumpsit for labor and materials furnished, this. Court said (p 172):
“Estoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying the truth of a fact which has in contemplation of law become settled by the act of the party himself, express or implied. If one’s conduct, induces another to believe in the existence of certain facts, and the other acts thereon to his prejudice, the former is estopped to deny that the state of facts does in truth exist.”
In Ollig v. Eggles (1956), 347 Mich 49, the plaintiff had built a house on land which he mistakenly *71believed to belong to bis-.wife, not knowing that she bad quit-claimed it to the defendant by a deed never recorded. Defendant, knowing that be bad title, silently watched and even helped plaintiff build the bouse. After the wife’s death, when the bus-band learned the facts, be sued, seeking title or compensation. This Court held the defendant es-topped by bis silence and by his act in helping to build-the bouse from asserting bis-legal defenses.
As between Sam and Angeline, Sam by bis conduct has estopped’himself from claiming bis relationship with Angeline was any other than be held it out to be — husband and wife. The defendants are all in privity with Sam and their claims are subject to the same defenses as would bar a claim by ,Sam. This is not a case of creating a new title to tbé property in Angeline by estoppel. Instead, it is a demand by her of confirmation of the title already vested in her according to the record title.
To summarize: Sam indiiced Angeline to enter into a purported marriage relationship with him, to bear him two children, to live with him through years of adversity that culminated in bankruptcy, to assist him in a new business career with her inheritance and her managerial and business abilities. He isolated her from bis family. Only 20 years later did he intimate to her difficulties in bis past. While be told her that be bad been previously married, according to the record before us, at no time did be tell her that be was still married to Irene. In numerous land contracts and other conveyances be held her out to be bis wife. Even after the admission in 1958 of trouble in bis past, sbe continued to believe sbe was bis wife. These are the equities on the side of Angeline. Defendants have made no showing of any equities on Sam’s side, if any do exist. Since the equities of these defendants are no greater than those of Sam, the *72judgment of the chancellor should have been for Angeline.
The judge also erred in attempting to adjudicate in this case rights of third parties who had not been interpled. Such adjudication, as to title holders and land contract purchasers and as to governmental units to which streets had been dedicated, is unnecessary. Their titles are derived through Angeline and Sam, or through Angeline as the survivor. Since the record title will stand in Angeline upon entry of a new judgment, nothing further need be done to protect their rights.
The Court of Appeals should be reversed. The case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff.
O’Hara, J., concurred with Adams, J.