Court Opinion

ID: 9625924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:56:12.006236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:13.608843
License: Public Domain

Justice QUINN
dissenting.
Because I view the statement that plaintiff “in the past bullied and physically threatened those who disagreed with him” as defamatory per se and not constitutionally protected, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants.
I am in agreement with the majority’s conclusion in Part I of the opinion that the only reasonable interpretation of the statement is that it imputes criminal conduct of an assaultive or harassing nature to plaintiff and, consequently, is defamatory per se. My disagreement is on the question whether the statement is constitutionally protected.
In resolving the constitutional question, the majority follows the supreme court’s two-part analysis in Keohane v. Stewart, supra, and concludes that the statement is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. With that conclusion, I agree. Where I part company with the majority is in its application of the second part of the Keohane analysis in determining whether a reasonable person would view the statement as one of fact.
The statements in Keohane consisted of two letters written to a local newspaper. The letters were written shortly after the plaintiff, who then was a district judge, found an anesthesiologist not guilty by reason of insanity on the charge of sexually assaulting an anesthetized 16-year-old patient. The letters did not refer to plaintiff by name but generally referred to collusion and payoffs between judges and doctors. The supreme court noted that the letters consisted of speculative commentary on matters of public concern and were replete with the sort of “imaginative expression” and “rhetorical hyperbole” regarded as worthy of constitutional protection. Keohane v. Stewart, supra, 882 P.2d at 1300. The court concluded that the statements, when considered in the social context of their utterance, could not reasonably be interpreted as a statement of fact about the plaintiff-judge.
In contrast to the statements in Keohane, the statement at issue here is clearly a recitation of facts about plaintiff and his past conduct. There is nothing speculative or conjectural about the assertion that plaintiff “in the past bullied and physically threatened those who disagreed with him.” The words “bullied and physically threatened” were italicized so as to emphasize the underlying negative basis in fact for the writer’s assessment of plaintiffs qualifications for public office.
The fact that the statement implies criminal conduct on the part of plaintiff should weigh heavily against consigning the statement to a constitutionally protected status. The additional fact that the defamatory statement was made by political activists in the context of a political campaign should not serve to create some form of constitutionally protected immunity for its makers. Finally, the fact that the postcard may have contained “imaginative expression” or “rhetorical hyperbole” with respect to other candidates does not somehow transform the defamatory factual statement about plaintiff into constitutionally acceptable debate on public issues.
Truth, of course, is a defense to a libel claim. That defense, however, should be a matter for the jury’s determination. I would reverse the summary judgment in favor of defendants and would remand the case for a trial on the merits.