Court Opinion

ID: 9915989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:07:49.328073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:19.453716
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3143-20

DONNA MACRI FATOVIC,

          Plaintiff-Respondent/
          Cross-Appellant,

v.

DAMIR FATOVIC,

     Defendant-Appellant/
     Cross-Respondent.
________________________

                   Argued December 19, 2023 – Decided January 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
                   Docket No. FM-02-1782-18.

                   Robert A. Skoblar argued the cause for appellant/cross-
                   respondent (Skoblar Law, PC, attorneys; Robert A.
                   Skoblar, on the briefs).

                   Bonnie C. Frost argued the cause for respondent/cross-
                   appellant (Einhorn, Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick,
                   attorneys; Bonnie C. Frost, Matheu D. Nunn and Jessie
                   M. Mills, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM

      In this highly contentious divorce case, defendant Damir Fatovic appeals

from a March 10, 2021 judgment of divorce (JOD) and a June 11, 2021 amended

JOD (AJOD). Plaintiff Donna Macri Fatovic cross-appeals from an October 29,

2021 order granting her a $25,000 counsel fee award, arguing the award is

inadequate. We affirm the challenged judgments and order, substantially for the

reasons set forth by Judge Darren T. DiBiasi in his well-reasoned oral opinions.

                                             I.

      Because we write for the parties, we need only summarize the relevant

factual and procedural history of this matter. In June 1998, two days before the

parties wed, they entered into a prenuptial agreement (PNA). The PNA stated,

in part:

                   It is the intention of the parties in entering into
            this Agreement that in the event of an end to the[ir]
            marriage[,] . . . their rights shall be fixed in
            advance . . . . It is their intention to avoid litigation and
            intrusion into their professional and personal lives,
            which would perhaps otherwise occur if this Agreement
            had not been entered into. . . .

                   It is the intention of the parties to create limited
            joint property during the marriage. The joint property
            to be created shall be confined to any joint checking
            account maintained by the parties and gifts given to the
            parties jointly. With the exception of these assets, all
            other property acquired by either party shall be

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                                         2
            considered their sole and separate property unless title
            is placed in joint names.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      The parties also agreed under the PNA:          (1) each party's premarital

property would "remain the separate property of the respective parties"; (2) each

party's earned income during the marriage would be "joint marital property," but

plaintiff was entitled to retain "income realized by [her] from gifted, inherited[,]

or premarital assets"; and (3) if the marriage ended, defendant waived any right

to alimony, but plaintiff could receive alimony if she was the "primary

caretaker" for any children born of the marriage, and "the parties mutually . . .

agree[d] that [she] should discontinue her employment."

      The parties remained married for almost twenty years and had two

children together, a daughter, born in 2001, and a son, born in 2008.            On

February 11, 2018, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)

against defendant. Defendant obtained a TRO against plaintiff two days later.

Within a week, the parties dismissed the TROs and entered into a consent order

providing for mutual civil restraints. Also in February 2018, plaintiff filed a

complaint for divorce.

      In November 2018, the parties and their counsel executed a confidentiality

agreement (CA). The CA limited the ability of defendant and his attorney to

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                                         3
review certain financial and private information plaintiff deemed confidential,

including information:

            [R]elating to and/or involving [her] non-marital/gifted/
            inherited/entities in Trust (specifically the Donna Macri
            Fatovic Trust and the Macri Complete Trust) and any
            and all financial holdings non-marital and of any Trust,
            including but not limited to accounts, financial
            statements, real property, investments and the like.

      Two months later, the parties signed another agreement entitled,

"Agreement Regarding Certain Issues."        Under this agreement, defendant

withdrew "any claim he ha[d] to review and/or obtain information about the

Macri Complete Trust," and both parties agreed not to "seek alimony or any

other form of spousal support from [each] other." Contemporaneously, the

parties executed a Custody and Parenting Agreement (CPA). The CPA provided

they would have joint legal custody of the children and "share physical custody"

based on "a flexible parenting time schedule for the children's benefit," without

designating either party as the parent of primary residence.

      Although the parties successfully resolved many of their matrimonial

issues, they continually argued over discovery matters. In July 2019, the judge

then assigned to the parties' case entered an order denying plaintiff's motion to

quash various subpoenas issued by defendant's counsel. But the judge also

directed that documents submitted in response to defendant's subpoenas would

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                                       4
be held by his attorney "to ensure . . . no discovery [wa]s provided to [d]efendant

that the parties agree[d wa]s not discoverable" "or that [wa]s subject to [the

CA]," including the Macri Complete Trust. Additionally, the judge granted

defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to "file a complete updated Case

Information Statement [(CIS)], with all required attachments, disclosing any and

all accounts she h[eld] . . . exclusive of the Macri Complete Trust." Further, the

judge directed defendant to file an updated CIS and that both parties "answer

any discovery deficiencies."

      Months later, during intensive settlement conferences (ISCs) on October

29, and November 14, 2019, the parties resolved additional financial issues. On

October 29, 2019, they agreed to divide proceeds from the sale of the former

marital home, with defendant receiving fifty-six percent of the proceeds and

plaintiff receiving forty-four percent of the proceeds, after the parties deposited

$40,000 from the sale proceeds into their son's 529 account. Counsel for the

parties also stated during the October 29 ISC that both parties agreed to waive

"all credits" each claimed against the other, except for an "ALCA account,"1

which remained in dispute. During questioning by Judge DiBiasi, the parties

1
  The ALCA account also is referenced in the record as the "ALKA" or "Alka
account."
                                                                             A-3143-20
                                        5
represented to the judge they: understood the oral agreement; were voluntarily

entering into it; had enough time to consider its terms; were satisfied with their

attorney's services; and understood that "by committing to the[] terms [of the

agreement]," they were "waiving [their] right to have a trial on th[o]se issues."

      During the November 14, 2019 ISC, with the assistance of counsel and

the court, the parties orally agreed to equally divide the ALCA account, which

was worth less than $3,000. They also agreed to share responsibility for marital

tax debts and certain expenses associated with the former marital residence.

Before the ISC concluded, the parties confirmed to Judge DiBiasi that they

entered into the oral agreement voluntarily; they were not "under the influence

of any substances" that would affect their ability "to think clearly"; they had

sufficient time to consult with their attorneys about the agreement; and were

satisfied with their attorneys' services. The judge then directed "counsel to draft

a [marital] settlement agreement [(MSA)] incorporating all of the[] terms"

agreed upon between the parties to date and ordered the parties to return to court

the following month.

      The parties never signed an MSA following the November 2019 ISC. In

March 2020, defendant's fourth attorney moved to be relieved as counsel over

defendant's objection. Judge DiBiasi granted counsel's application immediately

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                                        6
following argument on May 22, 2020, finding defendant not only breached his

retainer agreement, but his relationship with his attorney was "broken."

However, the judge also informed defendant "if [he] wish[ed] to retain an

attorney, [he] ha[d] time" to do so prior to trial.

      Considering the parties' inability to agree on the form and entry of an

MSA, Judge DiBiasi entered an order on June 5, 2020, setting forth the terms of

the parties' oral agreements from the October and November 2019 ISCs. The

judge's order also gave the parties ten days to submit a list of the remaining

issues they believed had to be tried.

      Less than two weeks later, the parties virtually appeared for a pretrial

conference. At the hearing, Judge DiBiasi acknowledged receiving the parties'

lists of trial issues and noted defendant's list was fifteen pages long, "single-

space[d and in] small font." Judge DiBiasi told defendant he was "a little

overwhelmed" by defendant's list, and "having a tough time reconciling

[defendant's stated] objective to . . . avoid a trial," considering defendant's

lengthy "list of requests." Before concluding the hearing, the judge encouraged

the parties to continue trying to resolve their outstanding issues.

      The parties virtually appeared in court again in June 2020, after defendant

submitted a pared-down list of trial issues to Judge DiBiasi. At the hearing,

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                                         7
defendant disputed that he waived certain credits during the October and

November ISCs. Accordingly, the judge took a brief recess to review the record

from the ISC hearings. Following his review, the judge confirmed to the parties

that during the October and November 2019 ISCs, plaintiff's attorney "state[d]

on the record that part of the settlement was the waiver of all credits. And

[defendant's attorney] echoed that understanding, and added some important

language that it was not just [defendant] who was waiving credits . . . . It was a

mutual waiver of credits." Therefore, the judge instructed the matter would

proceed to trial on July 6, 2020, and if defendant "attempt[ed] . . . to bring up

the credits again" at trial, the judge was "going to remind [him] that the credits

[we]re waived."

        On June 22, 2020, the judge issued a case management order (CMO),

scheduling the trial for July 6 and 9, 2020. The CMO also provided: "the parties

mutually waived their rights to request credits from the other party during the

October 29 . . . and November 13, 2019 settlement conferences. The court will

not hear testimony as to this issue."

        Three days after the judge entered the CMO, and less than two weeks

before the trial was scheduled to commence, Robert Skoblar, Esq. 2 wrote to

2
    Skoblar represents defendant on this appeal.
                                                                            A-3143-20
                                        8
Judge DiBiasi, seeking to adjourn the trial "for at least four weeks" to allow

Skoblar to represent defendant.          Skoblar stated he had "many prior

commitments" and could "only agree to become involved" on defendant's behalf

if the judge granted the adjournment. Judge DiBiasi denied the adjournment

request.

      When the parties virtually appeared for trial on July 6, defendant argued

plaintiff's July 5, 2020 CIS was incomplete because she listed the values of

certain assets on her CIS as "TBD," meaning the value had yet "to be

determined." Defendant asked the judge, "should I be including my personal

accounts [on my CIS] if she's not?" Plaintiff's counsel responded that defendant

"ha[d] received voluminous . . . documents with regard to the[] accounts in

question.   So therefore, if [defendant] want[ed] to know what the account

balances were, he certainly c[ould] go look them up himself."           The judge

interjected that he understood there was "a stipulation [the parties would]

divide . . . marital accounts [equally]."    He later explained, "I would have

intervened earlier about some of the confusion regarding the TBD [references

in plaintiff's CIS]. But . . . the focus is . . . regarding marital accounts. That's

what need[s] to be divided, not exempt accounts."

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                                         9
      Following this discussion, defendant placed a global settlement offer on

the record to resolve the parties' remaining financial issues. Judge DiBiasi

acknowledged it "was a good-faith settlement offer." However, plaintiff did not

accept or reject the offer. Instead, she asked for additional time to consider it.

      With Judge DiBiasi's assistance, the parties continued their virtual

settlement discussions on July 9, and July 27, 2020, and reached a resolution on

a myriad of issues, including an agreement to waive child support payments

from each other. After eliciting testimony from the parties, the judge found the

parties: understood the terms of this most recent agreement; entered into it

voluntarily; and understood they were waiving their right to a trial on any issues

resolved under the July 2020 agreement.

      On August 12, 2020, Judge DiBiasi executed another CMO. The CMO

stated, "[t]he parties . . . substantially resolved all outstanding issues. The

[c]ourt [will be] incorporating the settlement terms into a [JOD]." Additionally,

the CMO stated the trial would begin on September 8, 2020, and Judge DiBiasi

would "hear limited testimony" on four remaining equitable distribution issues:

(1) whether plaintiff's TD Bank ITF checking account was a marital asset subject

to equitable distribution; (2) how to equitably distribute airline miles and credit

card points acquired during the marriage; (3) whether plaintiff's 2017 and 2018

                                                                             A-3143-20
                                       10
restricted cash units (RCUs) were subject to equitable distribution; and (4)

whether certain retirement accounts held by defendant were subject to equitable

distribution.

      Five days prior to the September 8 trial date, rather than file a formal

motion, defendant sent a four-page email to Judge DiBiasi, seeking relief on

various issues. For example, he requested time to serve subpoenas on plaintiff's

employer and TD Bank, and an adjournment of the trial so defendant could

"gather the missing information." He also asked Judge DiBiasi to order plaintiff

"to provide an accurate and complete CIS," alleging she "answer[ed] 'TBD'

down the line to the questions" on her CIS and "le[ft] out accounts and assets."

      The trial proceeded as scheduled on September 8, 2020. It continued over

several days but did not conclude until January 2021, even though the parties

were the only witnesses to testify. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at trial;

defendant was self-represented.

      During plaintiff's testimony, she provided documentation for, and testified

about, her TD Bank ITF account. She also testified regarding accrued points on

various credit cards, identifying how many points were awarded premaritally,

and the conditions attendant to using the points. Further, she testified about the

RCUs she received from her then employer, Avis Budget Group (ABG), when

                                                                            A-3143-20
                                       11
the RCUs vested, and the terms under which she was entitled to receive the

RCUs in her position as real estate counsel staff attorney for ABG. Following

plaintiff's testimony about her TD Bank ITF account, defendant conceded this

account was exempt from equitable distribution.

      Defendant's testimony centered around claims his Vanguard Roth and

Vanguard Traditional IRAs were premarital and thus, exempt from equitable

distribution. However, shortly before the trial concluded, defendant advised

plaintiff and Judge DiBiasi that defendant "was mistaken and had misidentified

his account numbers."          Defendant explained "he confused [a] previously

stipulated marital retirement account . . . with [his] Vanguard Roth IRA . . . .

[and now] concede[d] that the Vanguard Roth IRA ending in 940 [wa]s . . . a

marital account . . . subject to equitable distribution." This concession left Judge

DiBiasi to determine whether defendant's "Vanguard Roth IRA ending in 322

and Vanguard Traditional IRA ending in 4939" were subject to equitable

distribution.

      On March 10, 2021, Judge DiBiasi placed his decision on the record

regarding the parties' four trial issues.       He prefaced his decision with the

following remarks:

                      This case has a long and tortured history.
                Litigation . . . lasted three years. The parties conducted

                                                                              A-3143-20
                                           12
             extensive discovery, engaged in . . . voluminous motion
             practice, attended approximately ten mediation
             sessions, participated in multiple and partially
             successful [ISCs], and ultimately tried several issues to
             conclusion. Civility does not exist between the parties.
             The record is replete with venom, insults[,] and
             contempt. Their anger permeated the courtroom[] and
             penetrated the [Z]oom screen. It was palpable and self-
             destructive.    They have an unhealthy and toxic
             relationship. The fractured procedural history reflects
             this toxicity.

      After recounting the litigation's procedural history and the parties' pretrial

agreements, the judge stated that their agreements and a decision he rendered on

"a midtrial motion" would be incorporated into the JOD, so the parties would

"have one document to which [they could] refer" in the future. The judge also

addressed defendant's claim that defendant's limited "ability to access certain

discovery as a self-[]represented litigant prevented him from effectively

representing himself." Judge DiBiasi emphasized he had discussed this very

"argument on the record multiple times, but it b[ore] repeating." The judge then

stated he was "confident . . . defendant had access to all the necessary

information and documents he needed to adequately represent himself on the

four limited trial issues."

      Turning to his decision on the four trial issues, the judge found: (1)

plaintiff proved her ITF checking account was premarital and thus, exempt from

                                                                              A-3143-20
                                       13
equitable distribution; (2) plaintiff owed defendant $1,145.50, plus an additional

$250 for his share of her marital credit card points and airline miles,

respectively; (3) plaintiff owed defendant $1,6663 for his one-half share of the

marital portion of her 2017 RCUs; and (4) because defendant failed to show his

retirement accounts ending in 332 and 4939 were not commingled during the

marriage or were otherwise exempt, the marital portion of those accounts were

to be equally divided between the parties.

      The judge further observed defendant's testimony about his retirement

accounts was "confusing and unpersuasive." Additionally, the judge stated he

"was surprised that [defendant] didn't better understand his own account history"

because "[t]hese were his accounts[ and defendant] was in the best position to

explain the account history to the court." The judge entered a conforming JOD

that day, and incorporated the parties' prior oral and written agreements into the

judgment as he stated he would.

3
   This amount was subsequently adjusted in the JOD and AJOD to reflect
plaintiff owed defendant $2,111.76 for his share of this asset.

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                                       14
      The parties subsequently moved for clarification or modification of the

JOD. Judge DiBiasi granted in part, and denied, in part, their applications in an

order dated June 11, 2021, and then entered the AJOD the same day.4

      Three months later, each party moved for an award of counsel fees from

the other party. Defendant sought fees totaling $174,689.68; plaintiff requested

$480,000 in counsel fees. Following argument on October 29, 2021, during

which both parties were represented by counsel, Judge DiBiasi orally granted

plaintiff $25,000 in counsel fees, and declined to award defendant any counsel

fees. In explaining his decision on the record, the judge stated:

                   Now, this is a matter with a [PNA] that addressed
            alimony, a negotiated [fifty/fifty] parenting plan, no
            child support, and relatively straight[]forward equitable
            distribution     [issues].       Nevertheless,    closure
            required . . . ten mediation sessions, five [ISCs] with
            the court, [several] days of trial, and many, many
            formal applications. [Litigation] lasted over a thousand
            days. . . .

                  The parties have incurred nearly [one] million
            [dollars] in legal fees—let me repeat, [one] million
            [dollars]. It's an incomprehensible amount of money.
            The parties are successful but they're not necessarily
            wealthy.

4
   Because the clarifications and modifications set forth in the AJOD do not
affect our decision, we do not address them.
                                                                           A-3143-20
                                      15
                  . . . The court relentlessly tried to stop this
            madness. It failed. . . . Even [c]ounsel tried to stop t[he
            parties]. They also failed.

                  The parties' decisions have consequences. In this
            case, the consequences add up to hundreds and
            hundreds of thousands of dollars . . . . They must own
            that. No motion can repair what the parties have
            broken. This is quite simply the worst case with the
            worst behaved litigants over which I have presided in
            my nearly five years in the Family Division, and it was
            all completely avoidable.

      Next, the judge acknowledged he was authorized to award counsel fees

pursuant to Rules 4:42-9 and 5:3-5, and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. After finding the

hourly rates of counsel were reasonable, the judge referenced the factors set

forth under Rule 5:3-5(c), and stated:

            [B]oth parties are earning approximately similar
            level[s] of incomes, although their income[s have]
            fluctuated recently. They each received about . . .
            $100,000 or so[] from the sale of the marital residence.
            They each have retirement accounts. Plaintiff is the
            beneficiary of [a] Trust. I'm not precisely sure the
            extent to which she receives distributions from that
            Trust[,] but the court is aware that there are
            distributions that exist and that does put her in a
            stronger financial position than [defendant].

                   . . . The parties are both successful professionals.
            They each have the ability to afford reasonable attorney
            fees in connection with common sense matrimonial
            litigation, but that's not what happened here. The
            parties spent an unhealthy amount of their income and
            assets on this litigation.

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                                         16
      So, while each party is able to perhaps contribute
to the other party's fees, neither party is in a position
certainly to pay all of those fees. They're just too high.
They're too high.

      ....

      Now, here, to be perfectly clear, both parties
contributed to this toxic litigation. Neither party has
clean hands. I am confident of that finding. Their
behavior more often than not was shocking and
embarrassing. . . . They were just as disrespectful in
the courtroom as they were over Zoom. Grievances
consume them.

       . . . The court has never experienced anything
quite like them. The economic issues [we]re relatively
straight forward but resentment and anger prevented the
parties from quickly striking common-sense
solutions. . . .

       The spirit and intent of the settlement
conferences was to end the litigation [and] to obtain
closure, but that never happened[,] and the court finds
that the defendant is primarily responsible for this
outcome. He tried to renegotiate the settlement. He
made it impossible to finalize the [MSA]. Defendant
tried to reneg[e] and presented a [fifteen]-page, single-
spaced list of outstanding issues. The court finds that
to be in bad faith.

       Defendant then demanded trials on issues that he
primarily lost on. Plaintiff is not perfect. Both parties
were disrespectful to the court, to counsel, and to each
other but plaintiff is not primarily responsible for how
the litigation ended.

      ....

                                                             A-3143-20
                           17
                   . . . Here, plaintiff has indicated [she] . . . paid
            over $480,000 in counsel fees. Defendant . . . paid
            nearly $200,000 but has a substantial balance that he
            owes of another $200,000. That balance will linger
            with him for some time. It's a significant obligation that
            is outstanding.

                  With respect to the results obtained, plaintiff
            primarily succeeded on the issues that the parties
            decided to try to conclusion. And the degree to which
            [fees] were incurred to enforce existing orders or to
            compel discovery, there was voluminous prejudgment
            motion practice in this case by both parties.

                   So, . . . in light of the court's analysis of the
            factors set forth in . . . Rule 5:3-5[(c)], the court
            finds . . . defendant shall pay plaintiff counsel fees in
            the amount of $25,000 and shall pay those fees within
            [thirty] days.

                  [(Emphasis added).]

                                        II.

      On appeal, defendant argues Judge DiBiasi erred in:             (1) denying

"defendant's application to retain counsel for the trial"; (2) failing to compel

plaintiff "to serve a meaningful [CIS]"; (3) "limit[ing] the issues to be tried on

the basis of a partial settlement which did not exist"; and (4) "awarding

[plaintiff] counsel fees[,] given her lack of good faith throughout the

proceedings." Additionally, defendant contends for the first time on appeal the

                                                                            A-3143-20
                                       18
judge "demonstrated a general bias against [him] which resulted in an unjust

judgment."

      Plaintiff disagrees with defendant's contentions and argues he "is

procedurally barred from appealing an[y] issue upon which he previously

agreed . . . [because] he does not allege unconscionability, fraud, or

overreaching." She also argues on cross-appeal that Judge DiBiasi "abused [his]

discretion and failed to consider the extent of defendant's bad faith when [the

judge] limited plaintiff's counsel fee award to only $25,000 out of the $480,000

she incurred."

      The parties' arguments lack merit.     R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).    We add the

following comments.

      Our review of a Family Part order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Appellate courts "review [a] Family Part judge's findings

in accordance with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's

'special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters.'"    Thieme v. Aucoin-

Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). Such

deference is particularly proper "when the evidence is largely testimonial and

involves questions of credibility." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting In re Return

of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).

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                                      19
      "Thus, 'findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" Thieme, 227 N.J. at 283 (quoting

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). "Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly

mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should we interfere." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.

414, 428 (2015) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88,

104 (2008)). However, we review legal issues de novo. Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J.

Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017).

      Appellate review is not limitless. "The jurisdiction of appellate courts

rightly is bounded by the proofs and objections critically explored on the record

before the trial court by the parties themselves." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1,

19 (2009); see also Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). Accordingly,

we need not consider arguments which were not raised in the trial court.

Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012); Nieder v. Royal

Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).

      Similarly, we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply

briefs. Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Eng'rs, 337 N.J. Super. 590,

596 (App. Div. 2001). Also, "claims not addressed in [a party's] merits brief

[are] deemed abandoned." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.

5 on R. 2:6-2 (2023) (citing Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't. of Law

                                                                            A-3143-20
                                       20
& Pub. Safety, 421 N.J. Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011)). Moreover, to the

extent we review an argument raised for the first time on appeal, we do so under

a plain error standard, meaning we disregard such errors unless "clearly capable

of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

      Regarding defendant's first argument—which is mistakenly framed as a

denial of counsel issue rather than denial of his belated request for an

adjournment days before the divorce trial was due to begin—it is well settled

that a "trial court's decision to grant or deny an adjournment is reviewed under

an abuse of discretion standard." State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v. Shalom

Money St., LLC, 432 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2013). Thus, we will not

reverse the denial of an adjournment request to allow a party to retain counsel

of their choosing "absent a showing of an abuse of discretion which caused [the

party] a 'manifest wrong or injury.'" State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 537 (2011)

(quoting State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 259 (App. Div. 1998)). In

deciding whether to grant a request for an adjournment to enable a party to retain

successor counsel, "the trial court must strike a balance between its inherent and

necessary right to control its own calendar and the public's interest in the orderly

administration of justice, on the one hand," and a party's right to have sufficient

                                                                              A-3143-20
                                        21
time to retain that party's choice of counsel.      Id. at 538 (quoting State v.

Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 402 (App. Div. 1985)).

      Here, we are satisfied the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying

defendant's June 25, 2020 adjournment request. As noted, defendant made this

request days before the trial was to commence on July 6, 2020, despite the fact

he had sufficient time to retain counsel after Judge DiBiasi granted his trial

attorney's motion to withdraw from the case in May 2020. Moreover, defendant

fails to explain why he could not have retained counsel between May 2020 and

September 8, 2020, the date the trial began.

      Turning to defendant's second argument, we generally "accord substantial

deference to a trial court's disposition of a discovery dispute" and "will not

ordinarily reverse" those decisions "absent an abuse of discretion or a judge's

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law." Brugaletta v. Garcia, 234 N.J.

225, 240 (2018) (quoting Cap. Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon Healthcare Servs.,

Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 79-80, 165 (2017)).         Although our discovery rules are

"construed liberally in favor of broad pretrial discovery," Payton v. N.J. Tpk.

Auth., 148 N.J. 524, 535 (1997), a party's right to discovery is "not unlimited,"

Trenton Renewable Power, LLC v. Denali Water Sols., LLC, 470 N.J. Super.

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218, 226 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Piniero v. N.J. Div. of State Police, 404 N.J.

Super. 194, 204 (App. Div. 2008)).

      Further, pertinent to defendant's discovery argument, Rule 5:5-2(a)

provides, in part, "[t]he case information statement required by this rule shall be

filed and served in all contested family actions . . . in which there is any issue

as to custody, support, alimony[,] or equitable distribution."       Additionally,

pursuant to Rule 5:5-2(c), parties maintain a continuing obligation to inform the

court of any "material changes in the information supplied on the [CIS]," and

"[a]ll amendments to the [CIS] shall be filed with the court no later than [twenty]

days before the final hearing."

      Here, neither party timely filed an amended CIS before the scheduled trial

date of July 6, 2020. Also, both parties were ordered during the pendency of

this matter to cure "discovery deficiencies." However, because the parties

exchanged voluminous discovery prior to trial and resolved numerous issues

pendente lite, leaving Judge DiBiasi to rule on only four discrete issues, we

decline to find the judge erred in failing to order plaintiff to update her July 5,

2020 CIS.

      Regarding defendant's contention that Judge DiBiasi erred in "limit[ing]

the issues to be tried," we are mindful New Jersey has a "strong public policy in

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favor of the settlement of litigation." Gere v. Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012)

(citing Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008)). "This policy

rests on the recognition that 'parties to a dispute are in the best position to

determine how to resolve a contested matter in a way which is least

disadvantageous to everyone.'" Ibid. (quoting Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes,

396 N.J. Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2007)).

      "In furtherance of this policy, our courts 'strain to give effect to the terms

of a settlement wherever possible.'" Brundage, 195 N.J. at 601 (quoting Dep't

of Pub. Advoc. v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.

1985)).   "In general, settlement agreements will be honored 'absent a

demonstration of fraud or other compelling circumstances.'" Nolan v. Lee Ho,

120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 125

(App. Div. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      We also recognize "[a] Family Part judge has broad discretion in . . .

allocating assets subject to equitable distribution," Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J.

Super. 61, 71 (App. Div. 2012), and in determining the manner of distribution,

Steneken v. Steneken, 367 N.J. Super. 427, 435 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd in part,

modified in part on other grounds, 183 N.J. 290 (2005). An appellate court will

affirm an award of equitable distribution provided "the trial court could

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reasonably have reached its result from the evidence presented, and the award

is not distorted by legal or factual mistake." La Sala v. La Sala, 335 N.J. Super.

1, 6 (App. Div. 2000).

      We also note that typically, "[a]ny property owned by a husband or wife

at the time of marriage will remain the separate property of such spouse and in

the event of divorce will be considered an immune asset and not eligible for

distribution." Valentino v. Valentino, 309 N.J. Super. 334, 338 (App. Div. 1998)

(citation omitted). The burden of establishing that an asset or any portion

thereof is immune from distribution rests on the party claiming its immunity.

Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 269 (2007).

      Here, the record well supports Judge DiBiasi's determination that the

parties reached numerous agreements prior to trial, including agreements

reached during lengthy ISCs, with the benefit of counsel and the judge's

assistance. The record also supports the judge's findings that plaintiff met her

burden in demonstrating certain property was immune from equitable

distribution, whereas defendant failed to satisfy his burden in that regard.

Accordingly, defendant's arguments that the judge erred in concluding the

parties left only four discrete issues for trial, and that the judge abused his

discretion in deciding those four issues, fail.

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      Turning to defendant's newly raised bias argument, we recognize "judges

must refrain . . . from sitting in any causes where their objectivity and

impartiality may fairly be brought into question." State v. Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190,

206 (1961). "Any questions concerning that impartiality threatens the integrity

of our judicial process." State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div.

1993).

      Concerns pertaining to a judge's partiality are generally considered in the

context of whether the judge should be recused from the case. But the decision

about whether recusal is warranted is a matter within the sound discretion of the

judge. State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010); State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super.

108, 129 (App. Div. 2002). Importantly, a judge cannot be considered partial or

biased merely because of rulings that are unfavorable toward the party seeking

recusal. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 186-87 (1997).

      Where a litigant fails to file a motion for recusal in the trial court, we

assess the issue under the plain error standard. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. at 129

(citing Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J. Super. 57, 63 (App. Div. 1990)). As discussed,

under this standard, "[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the

appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Here, because defendant's claims of bias

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are not supported by the record, Judge DiBiasi committed no error, let alone

plain error, in failing to recuse himself in this matter.

      Finally, regarding the parties' counsel fee arguments, we observe that an

"award of counsel fees and costs in a matrimonial action, rests in the [sound]

discretion of the trial court." Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 544-

45 (App. Div. 1992) (citing Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div.

1990)). Therefore, we will not disturb a counsel fee decision in a matrimonial

matter "absent a showing of an abuse of discretion involving a clear error in

judgment." Tannen v. Tannen, 416 N.J. Super. 248, 285 (App. Div. 2010).

      "An allowance for counsel fees is permitted to any party in a divorce

action, R[ule] 5:3-5(c), subject to the provisions of Rule 4:42-9." Slutsky v.

Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 366 (App. Div. 2017). Additionally, "where a

party acts in bad faith[,] the purpose of the counsel fee award is to protect the

innocent party from [the] unnecessary costs and to punish the guilty party."

Welch v. Welch, 401 N.J. Super. 438, 448 (Ch. Div. 2008) (citing Yueh v. Yueh,

329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000)).

      Per Rule 5:3-5(c), family courts must consider the following nine factors

when deciding attorney fee applications:

             (1)   the financial circumstances of the parties;

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            (2)   the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or
                  to contribute to the fees of the other party;

            (3)   the reasonableness and good faith of the positions
                  advanced by the parties both during and prior to
                  trial;

            (4)   the extent of the fees incurred by both parties;

            (5)   any fees previously awarded;

            (6)   the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by
                  each party;

            (7)   the results obtained;

            (8)   the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce
                  existing orders or to compel discovery; and

            (9)   any other factor bearing on the fairness of an
                  award.

      In Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94-95 (2005), the Supreme Court

summarized the attorney fee inquiry as follows:

                   In a nutshell, in awarding counsel fees, the court
            must consider whether the party requesting the fees is
            in financial need; whether the party against whom the
            fees are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad
            faith of either party in pursuing or defending the action;
            the nature and extent of the services rendered; and the
            reasonableness of the fees.

            [Ibid. (citing Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233
            (1971)).]

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      "In fashioning an attorney fee award, the judge must determine the

'lodestar,' which equals the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by

a reasonable hourly rate." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 493 (App. Div.

2012) (quoting Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. at 464). The court must exclude any hours

billed that are "not reasonably expended" and calculate the reasonable hourly

rate as per community standards. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. at 465 (quoting Rendine

v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 335 (1995)).

      Governed by these standards, we discern no reason to disturb the

challenged judgments, nor the October 29, 2021 order granting plaintiff a

$25,000 counsel fee award. In reaching this conclusion, we do not condone

plaintiff's inexplicable omissions, nor her use of "TBD" in multiple places in her

July 5, 2020 CIS, rather than monetary figures, including her use of "TBD" for

her personal and total monthly budget. Similarly, we do not sanction her

attorney's pre-trial proposal that because the parties exchanged discovery, if

defendant wanted to know the balances of plaintiff's accounts, "he certainly

c[ould] go look them up himself." Still, considering the parties exchanged

significant discovery prior to trial and resolved all but four equitable distribution

issues, we agree with Judge DiBiasi that "defendant had access to all the

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necessary information and documents he needed to adequately represent himself

on the four limited trial issues."

      Likewise, the record well supports the judge's findings that: (1) defendant

acted in bad faith and "made it impossible to finalize the [MSA]"; (2) both

parties "contributed to this toxic litigation"; (3) "neither party ha[d] clean

hands"; and (4) "[t]he economic issues" in this matter were "relatively straight

forward but resentment and anger prevented the parties from quickly striking

common-sense solutions." Accordingly, we affirm the JOD, AJOD, and October

29, 2021 order substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge DiBiasi's

thoughtful and comprehensive oral opinions.

      Affirmed.

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