Court Opinion

ID: 9914481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 15:00:52.968533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:15.688208
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12269    Document: 35-1     Date Filed: 01/02/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12269
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       IRAN DWAYNE KETCHUP,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:94-cr-00025-CDL-MSH-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12269         Document: 35-1        Date Filed: 01/02/2024         Page: 2 of 4

       2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12269

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               In 1998, Iran Ketchup, a pro se federal prisoner, filed a 28
       U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentences. The district court
       denied his motion in 2001. Then, almost 20 years later, Ketchup
       moved for relief from that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
       Procedure 60. The district court denied that motion as well.
       Ketchup subsequently moved for disqualification of the district
       court judge who denied his Rule 60 motion. 1 He argued that the
       judge should have disqualified himself because: (1) he could not be
       impartial to the case because granting Ketchup’s motion would
       have potentially disgraced another judge’s career; (2) he had ex-
       pressed positive personal feelings towards the judge who presided
       over Ketchup’s original trial at the former judge’s portrait unveil-
       ing; (3) he was unwilling to review Ketchup’s prior cases; (4) he had
       previously erroneously rejected Ketchup’s claims; and (5) a mate-
       rial witness in his case was within a “third degree of relationship”
       with the district court judge. Again, the district court denied the
       motion. Ketchup’s appeal followed.

       1 Ketchup also moved to file out-of-time objections and to strike the govern-

       ment’s response to his Rule 60 motion, which the district court also denied.
       However, we will not review the denial of those motions because Ketchup
       failed to plainly and prominently raise those issues in his appellate brief. See
       Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that issues not
       briefed by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned).
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       22-12269                Opinion of the Court                           3

               We review de novo whether a case is moot. Christian Coal. of
       Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011). Issues
       are “moot when [they] no longer present[] a live controversy with
       respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Id. at 1189
       (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Friends of Everglades v.
       S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009)). We
       have no authority to rule on moot issues. Id.
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judicial
       disqualification for abuse of discretion. Giles v. Garwood, 853 F.2d
       876, 878 (11th Cir. 1988). A judge should disqualify himself from
       any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
       tioned “or if he has a personal bias against a party.” Id.; see also 28
       U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). When reviewing for impropriety, the alle-
       gations must be reviewed to determine whether an objective, dis-
       interested layperson, who is fully informed of all the facts underly-
       ing the allegations, “would entertain a significant doubt about the
       judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1371, 1321
       (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Parker
       v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)). When
       reviewing for bias, “[t]he bias must arise from an extrajudicial
       source, except in the rare case where pervasive bias and prejudice
       is shown by otherwise judicial conduct.” Giles, 853 F.2d at 878 (in-
       ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. Bd. of Sch.
       Comm’rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)).
             A judge is not required to “recuse himself based on unsup-
       ported, irrational, or tenuous allegations.” Id. If a judge fails to
USCA11 Case: 22-12269      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12269

       disqualify himself from a case where disqualification is warranted,
       vacatur of the judgment is a possible remedy. See Liljeberg v. Health
       Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988) (vacating a dis-
       trict court decision when the district court judge failed to disqualify
       himself under § 455(a)).
              On appeal, Ketchup contends the district court abused its
       discretion when it denied his motion to disqualify, relying on the
       reasons he stated in the original motion. In response, the govern-
       ment argues that this case is moot and, alternatively, that Ketchup’s
       contention is meritless.
              As a preliminary matter, the current case is not moot. If we
       were to hold that the district court judge should have disqualified
       himself from the case, a possible remedy would be to vacate the
       denial of Ketchup’s Rule 60 motion, id., which would represent
       meaningful relief to him, Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1189.
               Nevertheless, we affirm the district court’s denial of
       Ketchup’s motion to disqualify because the district court did not
       abuse its discretion. Ketchup’s accusations amounted to unsup-
       ported and tenuous allegations, and they did not support the con-
       clusion that the district court judge should have recused himself.
       Giles, 853 F.2d at 878. The district court judge’s impartiality cannot
       be reasonably questioned, nor do the allegations support a finding
       that the judge held a personal bias against Ketchup. Id. Thus, we
       AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Ketchup’s motion to disqual-
       ify.