Court Opinion

ID: 7810263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:12:03.109467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:27.102140
License: Public Domain

Hart, J. (after stating the facts). The decree of the chancellor was correct. That one who is already in possession of land as tenant and continues such possession after the making of a parol contract for the purchase thereof from his landlord does not thereby take the contract out of the statute of frauds. This court has held that possession to have the effect to take the case out of the statute must be exclusive, evincing the birth of a new estate, and distinguished from the continuation of an old one; and must not be referable to an antecedent right. McNeil v. Jones, 21 Ark. 277; Haines v. McGlone et al., 44 Ark. 79; Moore v. Gordon, 44 Ark. 334, and Ashcraft v. Tucker, 136 Ark. 447, and cases cited. These authorities also support the rule that an independent ground for specific performance for a parol contract for the purchase of land is that the purchaser has made permanent and valuable improvements under claim of ownership of the land. According to this test Vaughan was entitled to a decree of specific performance. According to Ms own testimony and that of one of the witnesses for the defendants, he cleared seven acres of land which was worth $15 per acre. He also, as he expressed it, finished building a house which had been started by Rugen during the period of his tenancy. Another witness testified that the work Vaughan did on the house was to cover it. Rugen testified himself that Vaughan did some work on the house. He, also, paid $20 of the purchase money at the time the contract was made. The contract price of the land was $500. The value of the improvements and the part of the purchase money paid amounted to at least $125. These improvements were permanent in their nature, and it can not be said that they were of so little value as to be considered as compensated for by the temporary enjoyment of the land. The evidence shows that Turner lived in the neighborhood and knew of Vaughan’s claim to the land at the time he purchased it from Rugen. The chancellor found the issues in favor of the plaintiff. Under the circumstances we think that the part payment of the purchase money and the improvements made by the purchaser were of a permanent nature and of such a substantial character, when compared with the value of the land, that it would be inadequate to refuse the plaintiff the relief prayed for in his complaint. It follows that the decree must be affirmed.