Court Opinion

ID: 9750232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:38:30.111315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:04.817590
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, Chief District Judge
(concurring).
Section 146.30(3) (c) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides for the withdrawal from a nursing home of any patient who receives county support when “an emergency exists which places the patient’s health, safety or welfare in jeopardy.” The part of the statute that is at issue is not the withdrawal of the patients but the determination that the nursing home is unsafe or unhealthy. The plaintiffs are entitled to a hearing on the issue of their respective homes being a healthful and safe place because their liberty is put in jeopardy in that their “standing and associations in [the] community” may be seriously damaged by an adverse determination of this issue. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). A determination by the Government that a nursing home is unsafe or unhealthy not only damages its standing in the community but also prejudices its ability to attract and retain private patients and thus puts its very existence in jeopardy. Under these circumstances the due process clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits the state from damaging plaintiffs’ reputation by making this adverse determination even if county patients are not withdrawn. Such a determination or finding cannot be made without providing some procedural safeguards. Roth, supra; see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). The Roth court while upholding the right of a state university to refuse to renew a nontenured teacher’s contract without a hearing stressed that the teacher’s reputation was not damaged nor was he denied access to other teaching jobs. Although the nursing homes here have no “tenured” status, they do have their reputation at stake, and the Government’s act of finding them unsafe and unhealthy seriously damages their reputation and ability to function. Such decisions on the part of Government cannot be done arbitrarily.
In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961), it is pointed out that a “consideration of what procedures due process may require under any giv*574en set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Here the precise governmental function that is under consideration is the determination or finding that the nursing homes are unhealthy and unsafe, and the private interest involved is the reputation of the nursing homes.
As I will point out later, I do not believe that the function of the Government as a purchaser of services or of the nursing homes as a seller of services is what is involved. If the Government decides not to purchase these services for any other reason, such as excessive charges, I do not think it would be contended that a due process hearing would be required.
Therefore, I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority but for different reasons.
In particular, I am troubled by the implications of the majority opinion which could be read to say that the state may not discontinue purchasing services from private vendors who have become dependent on it for a large share of their income without giving the vendors the right to a due process hearing. This is a far reaching concept — a concept which -imposes many procedures on the purchasing policies of the state which, on this record, I do not think we are justified in imposing upon the state. Of course, if the majority’s finding on page 572 — “that the interest of the plaintiffs in retaining public assistance patients and receiving the public funds flowing therefrom is within the fourteenth amendment’s protection of ‘property’ ” —is correct, then the conclusion reached by the majority is correct. Therefore, one must analyze the nature of the interest that the plaintiffs have, other than the interest in their reputation, to determine whether or not it is the type of property interest that is entitled to the protection of the 14th Amendment.
The plaintiffs do have a private financial interest in selling their services to the state, but this financial interest is unilateral on their part and in no way obligates the state to do more than pay for services rendered to patients. When the relationship between the government and a private individual is that of purchaser and seller, then the terms of the relationship are generally controlled by contractual agreements and not by the United States Constitution. On this record, the plaintiffs have not established that there is something so unique in their relationship, such as something approaching the tenure relationship of teachers, which would bring their interest to the level of property interest under Roth in retaining the public assistance patients in their homes. I can conceive of situations where this might be the ease- — for instance, if private interests built nursing homes with the understanding by the public officials that the nursing homes would receive a certain amount of business from the state — but there is nothing in this record that such a commitment was ever made or implied formally or informally by the state.
According to Roth, an individual must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement to” a benefit if his interest is to merit the protection of procedural due process. 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The majority opinion herein feels that the plaintiffs are entitled to the receipts that they receive, and will receive in the future, for taking care of indigent patients for the same reason that welfare recipients are entitled to benefits as provided for by law — that is, nursing homes have “[a] claim of entitlement * * * grounded in the statute defining eligibility,” Roth, supra at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, explaining Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). The logic of Goldberg is inap*575plicable to this case. In Goldberg, “eligibility” and “entitlement” were synonymous. If an individual met the statutory criteria for eligibility, he was entitled to the benefits. The statute and the regulations under challenge in this case define eligibility to retain patients under a county plan. The statute does not, however, entitle any particular home to have such patients. The statute imposes no affirmative duty to place patients in any nursing home.
In summation, when determining whether a particular private interest merits the protection of procedural due process, the Supreme Court has very deliberately examined the precise nature of the private interest and that of the Government plus the nature of the relationship between the parties. See, e. g., Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Goldberg, supra; and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, supra. This examination has always been in light of the particular factual context of each case. Roth appears to have established a dichotomy of interests — those interests in one’s “liberty” and those in one’s “property.” A withdrawal of county supported patients after a finding that a home is unsafe or unhealthy without a hearing on the issue of whether it is unsafe or unhealthy infringes upon a nursing home’s “liberty” interest in its reputation. I am not able to find a protectable “property” interest in the retention of these patients. At this stage of the proceedings, the relationship between the Government and the plaintiffs appears to be that of purchaser and sellers (they are not acting in their capacities as licensor/licensee), and the plaintiffs have not established any unique factual situation which would justify treating them different from other vendors.
I therefore concur in the result for the above reasons.