Court Opinion

ID: 9379388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 15:11:46.044162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.854247
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 23

                                                                OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2022

                                                                              March 15, 2023

  IN THE MATTER OF THE
  TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
  RIGHTS TO: LCB, minor child,

  SHEENA MARIE GIPSON,

  Appellant
  (Respondent),
                                                                    S-22-0212
  v.

  STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel.
  DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

  Appellee
  (Petitioner).

                     Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County
                       The Honorable Suzannah G. Robinson, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Robert Piper* and Erik Oblasser, Corthell and King Law Office, P.C., Laramie,
      Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Christina F. McCabe, Senior Assistant
      Attorney General.

Office of the Guardian ad Litem:
       Joseph R. Belcher, Director; Kimberly Skoutary Johnson, Chief Trial and Appellate
       Counsel.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

* An Order Allowing Withdrawal of Counsel was entered on December 20, 2022.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] The Department of Family Services (DFS) brought an action to terminate the
parental rights of Sheena Marie Gipson (Mother) to her son. After failing to make a timely
demand for a jury trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 38 (Rule 38), Mother requested that the district
court exercise its discretion and grant a jury trial pursuant to W.R.C.P. 39(b) (Rule 39).
The district court denied her request. Following a bench trial, Mother’s parental rights
were terminated. Mother appeals the district court’s decision denying her motion for a jury
trial arguing that it was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

                                             ISSUES

[¶2]   The issues are:

               1.      Was the district court’s denial of Mother’s motion for a
                       jury trial an appealable order?

               2.      Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied
                       Mother’s motion for a jury trial under Rule 39?

                                              FACTS

[¶3] Mother gave birth to LCB in March 2019. Immediately following his birth, LCB
tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. 1 Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and THC. Shortly thereafter, LCB was placed into protective custody
and a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed.

[¶4] In December 2020, DFS filed a petition to terminate parental rights. In January
2021, Mother filed a pro se answer and requested counsel. On April 12, 2021, Mother’s
Affidavit of Indigency and Request for Court Appointed Counsel and an order appointing
counsel were filed. Two days later, the district court held a scheduling conference, where
Mother and her counsel appeared. Mother did not request a jury trial at the scheduling
conference and a bench trial was set for November 2021.

[¶5] On June 9, 2021, Mother filed a Motion for Leave to File Jury Demand pursuant to
Rule 39. In her motion, Mother acknowledges that she did not file a timely jury demand
pursuant to Rule 38. The motion explains that Mother was not represented when she filed
her answer in January, she remained unrepresented until April, after the time to request a
jury under Rule 38 had lapsed, and she did not knowingly waive her right to a jury trial.

1
 Tetrahydrocannabinol is the major psychoactive component in marijuana and is commonly referred to as
THC. Terence Ng & Vikas Gupta, Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), National Library of Medicine,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK563174/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2023).

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The motion also recites that Mother and her counsel had discussed the possibility of
requesting a jury trial on May 4, 2021, and Mother had decided against making a jury
demand at that time. On June 7, 2021, Mother determined that she did want a jury trial.
The district court held a hearing on Mother’s Rule 39 Motion for Leave to File Jury
Demand and a few weeks later denied her motion in an oral ruling.

[¶6] In the ruling, the district court recognized that, while Mother failed to meet the time
requirements of Rule 38, the court had the discretionary authority to grant Mother’s motion
for a jury trial under Rule 39. The district court found that if a jury trial were granted, there
would be a significant delay in bringing the matter to trial due to the COVID-19 protocols
and such delay would prejudice the State of Wyoming and DFS. The court also considered
Mother’s argument that she was not represented when she filed her answer. It identified
two opportunities where Mother could have requested a jury trial after she was appointed
counsel. The first was the April 14, 2021 scheduling conference. The second, and
according to the district court, more significant opportunity was on May 4, when Mother
discussed this issue with her counsel and rejected the idea of a jury trial. The district court
found that Mother “essentially changed her mind” by waiting until June 9 to request a jury
trial and that a change of mind “is not a good enough reason for the [c]ourt to grant a jury
trial.” The district court entered an order denying Mother’s motion for jury trial on October
5, 2021.

[¶7] The district court held a bench trial in November 2021, and in January 2022, the
judge entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights. 2 Mother appealed. Mother’s
only issue on appeal is her claim that the denial of her request for a jury trial was an abuse
of discretion.

                                              DISCUSSION

I.        The order denying Mother’s Rule 39 motion was not a final appealable order.

[¶8] As a preliminary matter, the GAL argues that Mother’s appeal of the denial of her
Rule 39 motion is untimely. “The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional.” Golden v. Guion, 2016 WY 54, ¶ 11, 375 P.3d 719, 722 (Wyo. 2016)
(citing W.R.A.P. 1.03). W.R.A.P. 2.01(a) provides that an appeal must be filed within
thirty days from the entry of an appealable order. The district court entered its order
denying the Rule 39 motion on October 5, 2021. Mother’s appeals only that order, and she
did not file her notice of appeal until January 28, 2022. The GAL’s argument turns on
whether the order denying a jury trial was an appealable order.

[¶9] We review jurisdictional matters de novo. Golden, ¶ 11, 375 P.3d at 722. The GAL
relies on the definition of an “appealable order” as “[a]n order affecting a substantial right

2
    Father’s parental rights were terminated by default judgment. He did not appeal.

                                                      2
made in a special proceeding[.]” W.R.A.P. 1.05(b). “[S]pecial proceedings are those
which were not actions in law or suits in equity under common law and which may be
commenced by motion or petition upon notice for the purpose of obtaining relief of a
special or distinct type.” In re Est. of Hibsman, 2012 WY 139, ¶ 15, 287 P.3d 757, 760–
61 (Wyo. 2012) (citations omitted). There is no question that the termination of parental
rights is a special proceeding. Id. ¶ 17, 287 P.3d at 761. 3

[¶10] The more rigorous limitation of Rule 1.05 is the requirement that the order affect a
“substantial right.” Denial of a Rule 39 motion for a jury trial in parental-termination
actions does not deprive that party of an opportunity to defend in the courts. Matter of GP,
679 P.2d 976, 988 (Wyo. 1984). “[T]he right to a jury trial in a parental-termination action
cannot be characterized as fundamental.” Id. Neither the federal nor the state constitutions
secure the right to a jury trial in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Id. The right
to a jury trial in these actions is, instead, provided by statute in conjunction with the
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312. 4 The district court’s
order denying a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39 did not affect Mother’s parental rights or
deprive her of due process and cannot be construed to have affected a substantial right. It
affects only her statutory and waivable right to a jury trial. See In re KRA, 2004 WY 18,
¶ 10, 85 P.3d 432, 436 (Wyo. 2004). The order denying a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39 is
not an appealable order and is “reviewable in an appeal from a final, appealable order.” In
Int. of FP, 2021 WY 77, ¶ 17, 488 P.3d 943, 947–48 (Wyo. 2021) (“appeal from a final
judgment supports review of all earlier interlocutory orders” (citing State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 820 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 16A Wright, Miller & Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3949.4, at 72 (3d ed. 1999)))). Mother
filed a timely appeal.

3
  “A petition to terminate parental rights must be brought pursuant to Wyoming’s Termination of Parental
Rights Act, which is found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-2-308 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007).” In re MN, 2007
WY 189, ¶ 3, 171 P.3d 1077, 1079 (Wyo. 2007). Actions to terminate parental rights are special
proceedings, as such actions were not known at common law. See Int. of RR, 2021 WY 85, ¶ 64, 492 P.3d
246, 263 (Wyo. 2021) (proceedings seeking changes in permanency plans are special proceedings); FML
v. TW, 2007 WY 73, ¶ 6, 157 P.3d 455, 459 (Wyo. 2007) (special proceedings are distinguished from other
civil actions by the manner of pleading, practice, and procedure prescribed by law); Cook v. Swires, 2009
WY 21, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 397, 400 (Wyo. 2009) (“a petition for injunctive relief invokes a ‘special
proceeding’”); Inman v. Williams, 2008 WY 81, ¶ 10, 187 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2008) (“a hearing on one
parent’s motion to modify custody and show cause in which the other parent appeared and defended was a
special proceeding under W.R.A.P. 1.05(b)”); Badley v. City of Sheridan, 440 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1968)
(contempt proceedings are special proceedings); Riffle v. Sioux City & Rock Springs Coal Mining Co., 20
Wyo. 442, 124 P. 508, 510 (1912) (the appointment of a receiver is a special proceeding).
4
  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 provides: “The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, including the right of a
parent, child or interested person to demand a jury trial, are applicable in actions brought under this act.”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-312 (LexisNexis 2021).

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II.     The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s request for a
        jury trial.

[¶11] Mother concedes she failed to timely demand a jury trial under Rule 38, which
provides that the failure to request a trial by jury within fourteen days after the service of
the last pleading directed to such issue constitutes a waiver of trial by jury. Rule 39
provides another opportunity to obtain a trial by jury. It states, “Issues on which a jury trial
is not properly demanded are to be tried by the court. But the court may, on motion, order
a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded.” W.R.C.P. 39.

[¶12] Mother contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 39
motion for a jury trial. 5

[¶13] We conduct our review for an abuse of discretion. “In determining whether there
has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could
reasonably conclude as it did.” Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d 371, 377–78 (Wyo.
1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 988 (Wyo.
1986)). “A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the
bounds of reason under the circumstances.” BGH, 930 P.2d at 377 (quoting GSD, 716 P.2d
at 988); In Int. of SO, 2016 WY 99, ¶ 11, 382 P.3d 51, 54 (Wyo. 2016); see also Stroup v.
Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 127 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶14] Mother acknowledges our precedent holding the district court does not abuse its
discretion by denying a request for a jury trial pursuant to Rule 39 when the only reason
for the untimely request was that the party was unfamiliar with the requirements of Rule
38. Armstrong v. Pickett, 865 P.2d 49, 50 (Wyo. 1993); GP, 679 P.2d at 985. Mother
submits that her case is distinguishable because she is not a pro se litigant who was advised
of her right to a jury yet failed to assert such right. She argues the district court failed to
appoint counsel to represent her until after the Rule 38 fourteen-day time limit had expired
and that this failure nullifies a knowing or voluntary waiver. Mother had opportunities to
make a Rule 39 motion after counsel was appointed. She discussed the issue with her
attorney and chose not to request a jury trial. She later changed her mind. Even if we
accept Mother’s argument that her situation is distinguishable from Armstrong, and she did
not make a knowing or voluntary waiver because she was not advised of her right to a jury
trial and did not receive court appointed counsel until after the Rule 38 fourteen-day time
limit had lapsed, we cannot ignore her decision not to make a jury demand after discussing

5
 In her appellate brief, Mother states the district court’s decision violates due process but fails to make any
citation or further argument addressing due process. “[W]e do not ordinarily consider issues which are not
supported by proper citation of authority and cogent argument.” Matter of TJH, 2021 WY 56, ¶ 32, 485
P.3d 408, 418 (Wyo. 2021). In any event, as discussed supra ¶ 10, denying Mother a jury trial did not deny
Mother a right to be heard and did not deprive Mother of due process.

                                                      4
it with her counsel on May 4, 2021. See supra ¶ 5. Mother made a voluntary and knowing
waiver.

[¶15] Mother also argues that when fundamental rights are affected, the court should
change its approach to Rule 39 jury demands.

[¶16] Mother points us to Green Constr. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., where the
Tenth Circuit Court said, even when a jury request is not made pursuant to Rule 38, “a jury
trial should be granted [under Rule 39] in the absence of ‘strong and compelling reasons to
the contrary.’” Green Constr. Co. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th
Cir. 1993) (quoting AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Cunningham, 352 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir.
1965)). 6 Since 1993 when Green was decided, we have directly addressed Rule 39 requests
for jury trials on two occasions. See Stroup, 995 P.2d at 128–29; Armstrong, 865 P.2d at
50 (When unfamiliarity with Rule 38 requirements is the only reason for the untimely
request, denial is not an abuse of discretion.). In Stroup, we held the appellant did not
establish the district court abused its discretion when it denied her Rule 39 motion for jury
trial because she failed to bring a complete record to us on appeal. Stroup, 995 P.2d at 129.
We noted that “the ‘Federal courts have been extremely reluctant to use their discretionary
power under Rule 39(b), often pointing out that discretion should be exercised only under
an extraordinary showing.’” Id. (quoting Patterson v. Maher, 450 P.2d 1005, 1008 n.2
(Wyo. 1969)). We decline Mother’s invitation to change our approach to Rule 39 jury
demands in a termination of parental rights proceeding. We continue to hold that the failure
to meet the requirements of Rule 38 constitutes a waiver whether that failure is “inadvertent
or intentional.” Patterson, 450 P.2d at 1008 (citations omitted). And when a Rule 38
waiver occurs and a Rule 39 motion is denied, it is the appellant’s burden to establish the
denial was an abuse of discretion. Stroup, 995 P.2d at 129.

[¶17] Here, the record demonstrates that Mother’s delay in requesting a jury trial was not
“mere inadvertence,” but a conscious decision made after consultation with counsel. It is
apparent that the district court’s denial was based on careful consideration leading to “a
sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances.” Stroup,
995 P.2d at 128 (quoting Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 161 (Wyo. 1998)).

[¶18] Affirmed.

6
 In Nissan Motor Corp. v. Burciaga, decided a year before Green, the 10th Circuit also acknowledged the
1965 language quoted in Green, but held that, consistent with granting a jury trial absent strong and
compelling reasons to the contrary, “it would not be an abuse of discretion to deny relief pursuant to Rule
39(b) when the failure to make a timely jury demand results from nothing more than the mere inadvertence
of the moving party.” Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. v. Burciaga, 982 F.2d 408, 409 (10th Cir. 1992).

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