Court Opinion

ID: 9613785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:19:59.285276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:31.863902
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice.
Rissler & McMurry Company, a road-building contractor, filed a claim with the Wyoming State Highway Department in compliance with that agency’s published claims procedure. The petitioner maintained that additional money under a highway construction contract was due. Its theory was that after the letting, the State changed the contract conditions so materially that they could no longer be performed as the parties contemplated, with the result that the claimant suffered a $43,518.86 loss.
Negotiations ensued, culminating in a hearing before the Commission, which resulted in an adverse decision, whereupon Rissler & McMurry appealed to the district court. The appeal was dismissed upon the motion of the Highway Department grounded in the concept that the appellant’s claim was not timely made under § 9-2-332, W.S.1977 [§ 9-71, W.S.1957].1
*584Rissler & McMurry’s responsive position was that it had in the past followed the claim-making regulation of the State Highway Department and did so on this occasion—that a claim upon a highway contract was not required to be filed with the State Auditor and, in any event, the statute had in fact been substantially complied with.
On appeal, the district court found, without benefit of any facts except an affidavit of the State Auditor to the effect that no claim had been filed by appellant in his office:
“1. That the decision of the Highway Commission (rejecting Rissler & McMur-ry’s claim) was not without or in excess of the powers of the State Highway Commission of Wyoming; [parenthetical matter ours]
“2. That said decision was not procured by fraud;
“3. That said decision is in conformity with law;
“4. That the Court presumes that said decision was supported by substantial evidence;
“5. That said decision was not arbitrary or capricious and was not characterized by an abuse of discretion;
“6. That Petitioner’s claim is barred by the provisions of W.S. 9-71 for the reason that a certified statement of said claim was not filed in the office of the State Auditor within one (1) year from the date said claim accrued.”
The only issue with which this court will concern itself is—as identified by the appellant:
“Whether claims under contracts with the Department for highway construction must be filed with the State Auditor or whether a filing with the Commission, the Director of the Department and/or the Department Auditor is sufficient in view of the constitution and the statutes of the State of Wyoming.”
Our overriding concern is whether or not the court erred in holding the appellant’s claim was barred by the provisions of § 9-2-332, W.S.1977 [§ 9-71, W.S.1957]. We will reverse the trial court on this issue.

(a) Claims must be filed in contract disputes.

We have addressed the problem of whether or not § 9-2-332, supra, is applicable to actions on a contract in Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951 (1933), and the recent decision of Wyoming State Highway Department v. Frank D. Napolitano and Norma Napolitano, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1342.
In Utah Construction Co., supra, we said:
“. . . The statute giving the right to sue the state highway commission on its contracts cannot be given a meaning that would permit an invasion of the mandatory constitutional provision (article 16, § 7) that prohibits the audit, allowance, or payment of a claim until it has been filed with the auditing officer. The statute authorizing suit does not purport to repeal or modify section 109-305, supra, requiring claims to be exhibited to the auditor within one year after they accrue ‘and not afterward.’ . . .” 19 P.2d, at 953.
We concluded in Utah Construction Co., supra, 19 P.2d, at 955, by saying:
“We are of opinion, therefore, that the filing of the plaintiff’s claim with the auditing officer was a condition precedent that could not be waived, and, as the petition does not show that the condition had been performed, the demurrer was properly sustained.”
The same rule prevails in tort actions. See Price v. State Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309, 312. We reaffirmed the rule of Utah Construction Co. and Price in Awe v. University of Wyoming, Wyo., 534 P.2d 97, 102. We reaffirmed all of them in Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, supra.
Yet, the appellant urges that this appeal should be distinguished from the rule of Utah Construction Co., Price, Awe, and Wyoming State Highway Department v. Na*585politano. The finer questions here, then, are—Is there a distinction? If so, is it viable?—Should we adopt it if there is?
It is first the appellant’s position that the State Auditor is not the only officer who may receive and lawfully process a claim against the Wyoming State Highway Department. Secondly, if it is the State Auditor with whom the claim must be filed, under the law and facts here, appellant argues that the claim was constructively filed with the State Auditor through compliance with the procedural rules of the State Highway Department2, and, therefore, there was substantial compliance with § 9-2-332, W.S.1977.

(b) Is the State Auditor the only officer with whom the claim can be filed against the Wyoming State Highway Department?

The appellant argues that Article 16, § 7, of the Wyoming Constitution permits the filing with officers, other than the State Auditor.3 It is urged that § 9-2-331(a)(i), W.S.1977, [§ 9-69 (First), W.S. 1957]4, the implementing statute, contemplates an audit by other than the State Auditor in certain instances. This being so, reasons the appellant, there is no statute which makes the filing of the claim with the Auditor a condition precedent to recovery. We said as much in Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, when we said, at 534 P.2d. 102:
. . We recognize that the requirement as interpreted in those cases (Utah Construction Co., supra, and Price, supra) was judicially created because no statute specifies that the claim is a condition precedent to suit, . . [Emphasis and parenthetical matter supplied]
We went on to say, however, that, even so, we would reaffirm the holdings of Utah Construction Co. and Price—which, as we have said, held that the State Auditor was *586the only officer with whom claims against the State could be filed. See, also, Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, supra.
It must be concluded, then, that, even though the rule is not statutory, it is judicial and the claims against the State must be filed according to provisions and requirements of § 9-2-332, W.S.1977. Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission; Price v. State Highway Commission; Awe v. University of Wyoming; and Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, supra.

(c) Was there substantial compliance with § 9-2-332, W.S.1977 [§ 9-71, W.S.1957]?

We assume, as under the condition of the record we believe we have a right to do, a formal claim was presented and processed in accord with the requirements promulgated by the Wyoming State Highway Department, as contained in that department’s Rule 105.17, entitled, “Claims for Adjustments and Disputes,” and implementing directives. [See, fn. 2]
In this case, Rissler & McMurry submitted the claim within the time and in the manner specified by Rule 105.17 of the Wyoming Highway Department’s 1974 Specification Book, as it had done on other occasions without objection or indication «that, so far as the Highway Department was concerned, this was anything but the proper procedure. The claim was submitted well within the period contemplated by § 9-2-332, supra. The parties negotiated beyond the one-year period within which appellant could file with the State Auditor’s office— after which the Highway Commission denied the claim and raised § 9-2-332 as grounds for its motion to dismiss in the district court.
The Department and its Highway Commission cannot play these kinds of games to defeat the good-faith claims of contractors with whom they do business in circumstances such as these. Justice would not be served were we to condone a procedure whereby contractors are required to follow the claim procedure established under the rule-making or contracting authority of the Highway Department and then hold that contractors are denied access to the courts for having followed it.
None of the cases cited above, which are prominent with respect to § 9-2-332, supra, indicate the filing of any claim whatsoever with the Highway Department, except Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, and we held that even if the claim therein had met the requisite formalities, it would have been untimely. As we observed in Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, at 534 P.2d 100:
“In a lawsuit involving neglect to file a claim before initiating the case, this court held in Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission, 1933, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, that the failure of plaintiffs to present a claim to the state auditor or to the state highway superintendent was fatally defective. The court did not discuss the problem that might be raised as to whether or not the claim should be filed with the superintendent of the Wyoming state highway department or with the state auditor in the light of a statute requiring claims to be approved by the state highway superintendent and closed the subject by saying, ‘ * * * The point is probably immaterial, as the petition fails to show that the claim was presented to either the state auditor or the highway superintendent.’ (Pp. 417-418 of the Wyoming Reports and p. 952 of the Pacific Second Reporter.) The situation is the same here. No formal claim fitting the requirements of Art. XVI, § 7, of the Wyoming Constitution, or § 9-71 has been filed with either the state auditor or the appropriate University of Wyoming official.” [Footnote omitted]
None of the cases, therefore, furnish authority for our use in contemplating the substantial-compliance question. In deciding whether there has been substantial compliance with the notice statute, we must first inquire concerning the purpose of the statute. We have had something to say about that in the past.
*587In Awe v. University of Wyoming, supra, quoting from Dias v. Eden Township Hospital District, 1962, 57 Cal.2d 502, 20 Cal.Rptr. 630, 370 P.2d 334, 335, we said:
“ ‘ * * * The principal purpose of such statutes is to give a public entity timely notice of the nature of claims against it so that it may investigate and settle those of merit without litigation.
We went on to say, quoting from Lunday v. Vogelmann, Iowa 1973, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907:
“ ‘The fundamental motivation attributed to legislatures which have enacted such notice requirements is that where a governmental subdivision is involved the public has an interest it does not have as to claims against private persons in seeing prompt and thorough investigation of claims is made. This protects the public treasury from stale claims. [Citing case.] It permits prompt settlement of meritorious claims and facilitates planning of municipal budgets. [Citing case.] The notice requirement also ensures that notices reach the public officers with responsibility to deal with them and in many instances should enable such officers to remedy defects in far-flung municipal property before other persons are injured.’ ”
We recognized the purpose of such notice statutes in 1923 when, in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 30 Wyo. 238, 219 P. 561, 573, aff’d 268 U.S. 276, 45 S.Ct. 491, 69 L.Ed. 953, we identified the purpose of a statute which established a date past which claims for damages could not be filed with a board of county commissioners. In that case we said:
“ . . . [T]he board is entitled to know the amount of the claims made for and on account thereof, so that it may determine whether or not to make the expense of establishment of a road a burden upon the tax payers of the county,
The stated purposes of the claims statute have been served under the facts of this case. The filing of the claim under the claims procedures established by the State Highway Department opened the way for prompt and efficient settlement negotiations. There is no charge here that the State was prejudiced by an inability to timely investigate the claim. On the contrary, settlement negotiations occurred and a hearing before the Highway Commission was held in accordance with the state agency’s own procedures. In addition, the Highway Department’s 1974 Specifications (fn. 2, supra) indicate that the justification for payment of a claim may be based on an audit carried on by the Department. Whether such a departmental audit would be binding on the State Auditor is a question which admits of some doubt, given the dicta contained in Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission, supra, at 952, citing State ex rel. Suter v. Wilder, 196 Mo. 418, 95 S.W. 396; 7 Ann.Cas. 158; and State ex rel. Nolen v. Hackmann, 276 Mo. 173, 207 S.W. 494. Regardless of the answer to that question, it is apparent that the State—at least insofar as the Highway Department is concerned—has operated under a procedure whereby contract claims against the Highway Department have been fully investigated by the Highway Department. According to the disclosures made in argument before this court, it appeared that whenever the Department reached a settlement or agreement with a contractor, the settlement figure would be certified to the State Auditor for payment. Although the State Auditor retains the authority to carry on an independent investigation of the facts, pursuant to § 9-2-334, W.S.1977 [§ 9-73, W.S.1957],5 the Highway Department has been initially and primarily *588responsible in this area. In the normal course of business, it would appear that when a claim is approved by the Highway Department and forwarded to the State Auditor for payment, there is no question with respect to compliance with the claims statute—although compliance with that statute cannot be waived by the Highway Department. Utah Construction Co. v. State Highway Commission, supra, at 955. By its own actions, then, we conclude that the filing of a claim by the contractor in compliance with the Department’s published procedures has the effect of substantially complying with the claims statute.
Such a conclusion is consistent with the applicable law on the subject. Where the purpose of a claims-notice statute has been satisfied, through investigation and attempted settlement of a claim, then there is no need to adopt a policy which would render the statute a trap for the unwary. City of Indianapolis v. Satz, Ind.App., 361 N.E.2d 1227; and Croft v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., 12 Or.App. 507, 506 P.2d 541. Service of notice of a claim on the wrong entity is not always fatal. See, Elias v. County of San Bernardino, 68 Cal.App.3d 70, 135 Cal.Rptr. 621; and Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225. Although the facts of the last-mentioned cases are distinguishable, we find the underlying principles equally applicable to a situation where a state agency has established procedures whereby the proper public entity does or should become adequately apprised of the claim asserted against it.
We hold, therefore, that, while the claim must be submitted as required by our interpretation of the requirements of § 9-2-332 in Utah Construction Co., Price, Awe, and Wyoming State Highway Department v. Napolitano, under the facts of this appeal the statute was substantially complied with.
We say, parenthetically, that even though the district court made some findings about fraud, presumption of substantial evidence, and whether or not the agency decision was arbitrary or capricious— there was no justification for such findings. This case was before the district court on the Highway Department’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for failure to file a claim with the State Auditor. That was the only issue before the court and the only issue to which the court could properly address its attention.
Reversed and remanded for trial upon the issues.

. Section 9-2-332, W.S.1977 [§ 9-71, W.S. 1957], provides:
“Persons having claims against the state shall exhibit the same, with the evidence in support thereof, to the auditor, to be audited, settled and allowed, within one (1) year after such claim shall accrue, and not afterward.”

.It is conceded that at all times relevant to this appeal, the Wyoming State Highway Department’s 1974 Specification Book provided:
“105.17 CLAIMS FOR ADJUSTMENTS AND DISPUTES. If in any case the Contractor deems that additional compensation is due him for work or material not clearly covered in the contract or not ordered as extra work as defined herein, or that contract time be extended, the Contractor shall notify the Engineer in writing within a reasonable time of his intention to make claim for such additional compensation or extended time. This notification should also specify the basis for the claim. The Engineer will acknowledge receipt of said intention and advise the Contractor that consideration will be given the claim when it is submitted in a formal manner with complete and thorough justification for every item.
“Within sixty (60) days from the date of the Contractor’s formal claim, the Department will render to the Contractor a judgment in writing. This judgment shall be final and binding upon both parties to the contract unless the Contractor files within thirty (30) days of the date of said judgment a written notice of appeal with the Secretary of the Highway Commission. Subsequent to the filing of the notice of appeal, the claim will be pursued according to the Contractor’s Claim Procedure adopted by the Highway Commission.
“Under no circumstances will a claim be considered if submitted later than sixty (60) days after publication of first notice of advertisement that work has been accepted as complete.
“If the claim is found to be just, it will be paid on the basis of actual costs to which no percentage will be added. The justification for payment may be based upon an audit by the Department of the Contractor’s project records and cost accounting system. Nothing in this subsection should be construed as establishing any claim contrary to the terms of subsection 104.02.”

. Article 16, § 7, of the Constitution of Wyoming, provides:
“No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or demands against the state, or any county or political sub-division, shall be audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit the same." [Emphasis supplied]

. Section 9-2-331(a)(i), W.S.1977 [§ 9-69 (First), W.S.1957], provides, with respect to the powers of the Auditor, that he shall
“(i) Audit and settle all claims against the state payable out of the treasury, except only such claims as may be expressly required by law to be audited and settled by other officers and persons;”

. Section 9-2-334, W.S.1977 [§ 9-73, W.S. 1957], provides:
“The auditor, whenever he may think it necessary, to the proper settlement of any account, may examine the parties, witnesses or others, on oath or affirmation, touching any matters material to be known in the settlement of such accounts, and for that purpose may issue subpoenas, and compel witnesses to attend before him, and give evidence in the same manner and by the same means allowed by law to courts of record.”