Court Opinion

ID: 9522827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:40.366865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:03.736796
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 21. dissenting. I dissent for the simple and obvious reason that this case is plainly controlled by Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, Inc., 2008 VT 15, 183 Vt. 218, 945 A.2d 368, where we held that a similar contractual release was insufficiently clear and unambiguous to insulate the defendant from liability for its own negligence. In holding to the contrary, the majority mistakenly concludes that Thompson was based on slight differences in phrasing between the release at issue there, which waived “any claim,” and the release that we found to be effective in Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 142 Vt. 634, 637, 459 A.2d 97, 98 (1983), which waived “any and all claims, demands, liability, right or causes of action of whatsoever kind.” Although we noted these textual variations in a footnote in Thompson, 2008 VT 15, ¶ 17 n.2, this was not the basis of our holding. Indeed, we acknowledged in our opinion that the release at issue was quite comprehensive and “contained] broad language purporting to release any claim.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 22. The problem with the release in Thompson was not its language, but its context, or as we phrased it there its “organization.” Id. As we explained:
The opening paragraph of the release recites that operating a motorcycle is inherently dangerous and that operation may result in injury. The release then waives “any claim” resulting from the operation. Based on this language, we conclude that the release waived claims for injuries resulting from dangers inherent to riding a motorcycle, not for those resulting from defendant’s negligence.
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we concluded that the release did not bar the plaintiffs negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 1, 20.
¶ 23. In so holding, we relied on a number of cases from other jurisdictions that reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 633, 632 n.26 (Alaska 2001) (release whose “opening sentences refer only to unavoidable and inherent risks of ATV riding” followed by general release “from *484any and all liability, loss, damage claim or cause of action . . . arising out of participation in the ATV RiderCourse” released defendant only from the inherent risks of ATV riding); Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (although release alerted plaintiff “to the dangers inherent in skiing” it did not alert plaintiff that defendant was “released from its own negligence”); O’Connell v. Walt Disney World Co., 413 So. 2d 444, 445 n.2, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (release that purported to assume “risks inherent in horseback riding” followed by waiver of “any claims or causes of action . . . arising out of any injuries [the participant] may sustain as a result of that horseback riding” did not relieve defendant from liability for its own negligence).
¶ 24. Although not cited in Thompson, another instructive decision consistent with its holding is Steele v. Mt. Hood Meadows Oregon, Ltd., 974 P.2d 794 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). There, a ski operator’s form release opened with a provision stating that the ticket purchaser assumed the “inherent risks of skiing” followed by a general release of “any claims for personal injury . . . arising in connection with or resulting from” the use of the facility. Id. at 795. Although the latter provision was seemingly broad and all-encompassing, the Oregon court concluded that the two provisions, read together, were ambiguous, and that a ticket holder “reasonably could have understood that he or she was only releasing any claims for personal injury that resulted from those inherent risks,” not from the ski operator’s negligence. Id. at 798.
¶ 25. The provision in the Race Day Entry Form signed by Mr. Provoncha in this case contains the same basic ambiguity identified in Thompson and the decisions cited above. The first sentence purports to broadly release defendant from “liability, loss, claims, and demands ... in anyway arising while engaged in competition . . . [or] from any cause what so ever.” This is followed immediately — and at least arguably modified by — two additional sentences plainly referring to the risks inherent in the sport, the first acknowledging “the risk and danger to myself . . . [of] participating or assisting in this event” and the second assuming “in reliance upon my own judgment ability” the risk of loss. The ambiguity occasioned by these provisions appearing within the same document was compounded, in this case, by the fact that Mr. Provoncha had already signed another document (a VMA Membership Form) several weeks before the race which *485appeared, at best, to state that he assumed responsibility for the risks inherent in the sport but made no mention of defendants’ own negligence. Indeed, the trial court here found, and defendants have not disputed, that this first form merely “release[d] the Defendants from claims for injuries resulting from dangers inherent to riding a motorcycle” and did “not clearly establish the parties’ intention to release the Defendants from liability arising out of the Defendants’ own negligence.”
¶ 26. As we held in Colgan v. Agway, Inc., 150 Vt. 373, 553 A.2d 143 (1988), and reaffirmed in Thompson, releases of this nature are held to a heightened standard, and must clearly and unambiguously express the parties’ intention to absolve a party from responsibility for its own negligence. See Colgan, 150 Vt. at 375, 553 A.2d at 145 (noting that courts have “traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability, and . . . have applied more exacting judicial scrutiny when interpreting this type of contractual provision”); Thompson, 2008 VT 15, ¶ 19 (observing that “when a party wishes to exculpate itself from negligence liability ‘a greater degree of clarity is necessary to make the exculpatory clause effective’ ”) (quoting Colgan, 150 Vt. at 375, 553 A.2d at 145). Such provisions “must be construed strictly against the parties relying on them.” Colgan, 150 Vt. at 375, 553 A.2d at 145.
¶ 27. Contrary to the majority, I cannot see how the form release at issue here — viewed in its entirety and measured against these exacting standards — can be construed as a clear and unambiguous exculpation of defendants from liability for their own negligence. As in Thompson, I would hold that, at most, the release waived claims for injuries resulting from risks inherent in motocross racing, not those resulting from defendants’ negligence. Accordingly, as in Thompson, I would reverse the judgment, and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the conduct that allegedly resulted in Mr. Provoncha’s injuries represented a risk within the limited scope of the release.