Court Opinion

ID: 9963918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 15:13:06.094756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:04.235113
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

George B. Thomas,                               :
                              Petitioner        :
                                                :
                       v.                       :    No. 899 C.D. 2022
                                                :    Submitted: April 6, 2023
Sysco Foods (Workers’                           :
Compensation Appeal Board),                     :
                      Respondent                :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge1
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                               FILED: April 26, 2024

      George B. Thomas (Claimant) petitions for review of an Order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), affirming a Decision of a Workers’
Compensation Judge (WCJ), that granted a Termination Petition filed by Sysco
Foods (Employer). Claimant argues Employer should be barred from utilizing an
independent medical examination (IME) of Claimant because Employer did not
notify Claimant’s workers’ compensation (WC) counsel in advance of the requested
IME. Alternatively, Claimant argues the IME physician’s opinion was equivocal,
and, therefore, the Termination Petition should have been denied. Upon review, we
affirm.

      1
          This matter was reassigned to the author on February 13, 2024.
       I.      BACKGROUND
       On July 1, 2016, Claimant suffered a work injury, which, by stipulation of the
parties, was described as a lower left leg amputation and an adjustment disorder with
mixed anxiety and depressed mood. A WCJ approved the stipulation by decision
dated September 17, 2018. On April 28, 2020, Employer filed the Termination
Petition, asserting Claimant fully recovered from any psychological injuries as of
February 10, 2020, the date of Gladys Fenichel, M.D.’s most recent IME.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 6a.) Claimant filed an answer denying the same. (Id.
at 8a.) Proceedings were held before a WCJ. At a May 14, 2020 telephonic hearing,2
Employer moved for admission of Dr. Fenichel’s IME report, to which Claimant
objected. (Id. at 98a-100a.) One basis for Claimant’s objection was the lack of
notice to Claimant’s WC counsel of the IME. (Id. at 101a.) Claimant’s WC counsel
explained he was surprised when he received Dr. Fenichel’s report, originally
thinking it was based on one of her prior examinations, only to discover it was a new
IME. (Id.) Given the lack of notice to Claimant’s WC counsel, Claimant sought to
exclude the use of any evidence from Dr. Fenichel. (Id. at 101a-03a.) Employer’s
counsel responded that they were also unaware of the IME notice, which was sent
by a third-party vendor, until Dr. Fenichel’s report was received. (Id. at 104a.)
Employer’s counsel acknowledged counsel in the WC matter was not copied; rather,
counsel in third-party litigation was. (Id.) Counsel for Employer argued Claimant
was not prejudiced as he did receive notice and went to the IME, and Claimant could
have asked his attorney about the notice and IME if he had questions. (Id. at 105a.)

       2
         The May 14, 2020 telephonic hearing involved both the instant Termination Petition, as
well as a modification petition filed by Employer, which is the subject of a separate appeal before
this Court at docket number 1414 C.D. 2021.

                                                2
      The WCJ offered Claimant’s WC counsel two options: (1) to reschedule the
IME with Dr. Fenichel and proceed under a new petition to terminate, or (2) since
counsel received the report, proceed with the litigation of the existing Termination
Petition. (Id. at 105a-06a.) Claimant’s WC counsel responded he would have
objected to the IME had he been aware in advance, and that the issuance of the report
two months later prevented him from having his expert, Kenneth Weiss, M.D.,
review it and respond. (Id. at 106a-07a.) Claimant’s WC counsel also denied that
Claimant’s counsel in the third-party litigation received notice of the IME, despite
being allegedly copied on the notice. (Id. at 108a.) The WCJ explained that because
the Termination Petition is a new proceeding, separate from the litigation of a
modification petition, the record of which was closed earlier in the hearing, he was
going to have Employer “move forward with Dr. Fenichel’s deposition testimony
and [Claimant would] have plenty of time to talk to Dr. Weiss and have him discuss
Dr. Fenichel’s opinions of full recovery.” (Id. at 108a-09a.) The WCJ continued:

      I do know that the IME in the [modification petition] litigation that
      served as support for the doctor’s deposition was done in February of
      2019.

      The new IME was done a year later.

      So had you objected to it, more than likely I would have overruled your
      objection and permitted the IME to go forward anyhow.

(Id. at 109a.)
      Claimant’s WC counsel responded he understood the WCJ’s rulings, and he
preserved his objections for the record. (Id. at 110a.) The WCJ then explained:
“[L]et’s assume that I would say that the IME was not proper and needed to be
rescheduled. You would get notice of a new IME and we would be back here again,”

                                         3
which Claimant’s WC counsel confirmed was correct.                        (Id. at 110a-11a.)
Accordingly, the WCJ explained:

       So let’s move forward just to get some – I’m going to give you plenty
       of time. You’ll have an opportunity to talk to your client about the
       content of the IME since you were not present or notified about the
       IME.

       So what I’m going to do is I’m going to order that [Employer] must
       move forward with the deposition of Dr. Fenichel within 120 days.

       . . . [T]hat should give you enough time to talk to your client in that
       period of time, send the report to Dr. Weiss and get whatever opinions
       you want from Dr. Weiss.

       And then you will have 90 days after the date of the next hearing, which
       will be scheduled in 120 days. [You] will have 90 days after that date
       to complete any psychiatric evidence on behalf of [] Claimant.
(Id. at 111a.)
       At the next scheduled hearing on December 11, 2020, Employer moved for
admission of Dr. Fenichel’s deposition transcript and related exhibits, to which
Claimant did not object. (Id. at 120a-21a.) Therein, Dr. Fenichel, a board-certified
psychiatrist, testified as follows.3 Dr. Fenichel previously conducted her first
examination of Claimant in January 2018, at which time she opined Claimant could
return to work from a psychiatric perspective. (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact
(FOF) ¶ 1(b).)        Dr. Fenichel performed a second evaluation of Claimant
approximately one year later, and her opinion remained unchanged. (Id. ¶ 1(c).) Dr.
Fenichel performed a third evaluation, which is the basis for Employer’s
Termination Petition, on February 10, 2020.4 (Id. ¶ 1(f).) Dr. Fenichel noted normal

       3
         Dr. Fenichel’s deposition testimony can be found in the Reproduced Record at 260a
through 329a and is summarized by the WCJ in Finding of Fact 1.
       4
         The WCJ’s Decision appears to contain a typographical error as Dr. Fenichel testified it
occurred on February 10, 2020, not January 10, 2020. (R.R. at 269a-70a.)

                                               4
mental status findings during her examination. (Id. ¶ 1(o)-(p).) She opined Claimant
fully recovered from the adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed
mood and imposed no restrictions from a psychiatric perspective. (Id. ¶ 1(q).) Nor
did Dr. Fenichel believe Claimant required further psychiatric or psychological
treatment. (Id.) Following her examination of Claimant, Dr. Fenichel reviewed a
report from Dr. Barbara Watson dated February 20, 2020. (Id. ¶ 1(r).) Dr. Watson’s
report indicated Claimant resumed treatment secondary to a decline in mood and
behavior and Claimant presented with euthymic mood and full affective range. (Id.
¶ 1(g).) Claimant had not treated with Dr. Watson since March 5, 2020. (Id. ¶ 1(f),
(h).) Claimant’s March 19, 2020 appointment with Dr. Watson was canceled due to
the pandemic; telehealth network appointments were available and offered to
Claimant during the pandemic, but Claimant did not attend such appointments. (Id.
¶ 1(f), (h)-(j).)
       Dr. Weiss, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, testified as follows.5 Dr.
Weiss evaluated Claimant a second time at the request of Claimant’s counsel in
December 2020. (Id. ¶ 2(b), (o).) Claimant had no signs of physical or mental
distress but, according to Dr. Weiss, Claimant’s emotional expression was restricted,
which Dr. Weiss testified was consistent with depression. (Id. ¶ 2(c).) Claimant
admitted to not following through with psychotherapy or other rehabilitative
activities, the importance of which Dr. Weiss explained. (Id. ¶ 2(c), (o).) Claimant
acknowledged he had not been seeing Dr. Watson regularly and had not returned to
Dr. Watson “for a while.” (Id. ¶ 2(e).) Claimant told Dr. Weiss he is apprehensive
as to how others view him due to his prosthesis and became a “recluse” since the
pandemic. (Id. ¶ 2(d)-(e).) Claimant told Dr. Weiss he is constantly sad and

       5
        Dr. Weiss’s deposition testimony can be found in the Reproduced Record at 176a through
226a and is summarized by the WCJ in Finding of Fact 2.

                                              5
reminded of the incident and injury. (Id. ¶ 2(g).) In Dr. Weiss’s opinion, Claimant’s
depressed mood increased since his first examination of Claimant in 2018 and his
post-traumatic symptoms decreased. (Id. ¶ 2(h).) Dr. Weiss’s diagnosis was
“Dysthymic Disorder (chronic depression) along with mild residuals of post-
traumatic stress disorder.” (Id. ¶ 2(j), (n).) Dr. Weiss believed Claimant should
continue with psychotherapy and possibly antidepressant medicines. (Id. ¶ 2(l), (o).)
Dr. Weiss disagreed with Dr. Fenichel about Claimant having no psychiatric
disability. (Id. ¶ 2(j).) Dr. Weiss believed returning to Employer would create
anxiety, and Claimant’s self-consciousness, avoidant behavior, and poor self-esteem
renders him “unable to perform the requisite functions to work productively” in a
vocational setting. (Id. ¶ 2(f), (k)-(l).) The WCJ noted Dr. Weiss previously opined
that it would be beneficial for Claimant to return to work, which is inconsistent with
Dr. Weiss’s testimony now. (Id. ¶ 2(k).) The WCJ also noted that both times Dr.
Weiss evaluated Claimant was at his counsel’s request. (Id. ¶ 2(m).)
      Claimant testified as follows.6 Claimant appeared for an examination before
Dr. Fenichel at which he complained of severe depression, anxiety, and feeling
downtrodden, sad, and unhappy. (Id. ¶ 3(a).) Claimant told Dr. Fenichel he has
neither adjusted to the injury nor accepted he had been injured. (Id. ¶ 3(b).) He did
not recall whether Dr. Fenichel inquired about having flashbacks, nightmares, or
dreams, but he would have responded he does experience flashbacks. (Id. ¶ 3(c).)
He also dreams about being able to run and having full athletic ability of all his limbs
and constantly thinks about being “normal” again.             (Id. ¶ 3(e), (g).)    He is
uncomfortable speaking about the workplace accident. (Id. ¶ 3(d).) Claimant told
Dr. Fenichel “he cut himself off from friends and family,” as well as his attorneys,

      6
        Claimant’s testimony can be found in the Reproduced Record at 131a through 153a and
is summarized by the WCJ in Finding of Fact 3.

                                            6
resulting in his mother intervening. (Id. ¶ 3(f).) He described his depression as
“crippling.” (Id. ¶ 3(h).) He had sought help from Dr. Watson in February 2020 but
stopped in March 2020 because of his worsening depression. (Id. ¶ 3(i).) In August
2020, Claimant saw Dr. Watson again. (Id. ¶ 3(j).) Despite the availability of
telehealth visits, Claimant did not schedule any further appointments with Dr.
Watson until January 2021, attributing the same to his depression and avoidant
behavior. (Id. ¶ 3(i)-(j).) Since January 2021, Claimant has seen Dr. Watson weekly
and was referred to a psychiatrist for antidepressants. (Id. ¶ 3(k).) A week before
the March 2021 hearing, Claimant tried to schedule a psychiatry appointment. (Id.
¶ 3(l).) Although Claimant’s symptoms continue, he believes Dr. Watson is helping
him overcome his depression, though he does not believe he could return to work at
Employer given his flashbacks and anxiety. (Id. ¶ 3(j)-(l).7)
       The WCJ rejected Claimant’s testimony as to ongoing disability. (Id. ¶ 4.) In
doing so, the WCJ explained, “Claimant’s credibility is impacted negatively by
infrequent psychological treatment visits,” specifically noting the complete lack of
treatment for a period of 11 months and the proximity of his resuming treatment to
his IME with Dr. Fenichel. (Id. ¶ 4(a)-(b).) The WCJ credited the testimony of Dr.
Fenichel, stating she evaluated Claimant three times and her opinions were well
reasoned, logical, and supported by the evaluations. (Id. ¶ 5.) The WCJ rejected Dr.
Weiss’s testimony to the extent it contradicted Dr. Fenichel’s, citing, in part, Dr.
Weiss’s changing diagnoses between evaluations. (Id. ¶ 6(a).) The WCJ further
explained that Dr. Weiss’s opinions were not well reasoned or logical, were largely
based on symptoms reported by Claimant, whom the WCJ did not credit, and were
inconsistent with Dr. Fenichel’s. (Id. ¶ 6(b)-(d).) Based on the above findings, the

       7
          There are two paragraphs designated as 3(j), (k), and (l) in the WCJ’s Decision. These
refer to the second.

                                               7
WCJ concluded Employer sustained its burden of showing Claimant fully recovered
from the psychological work-related injury as of January 10, 2020, and granted the
Termination Petition. (WCJ’s Decision, Conclusion of Law ¶ 2, Order.)
       Claimant appealed to the Board. (R.R. at 9a-17a.) Before the Board, Claimant
argued the WCJ erred because Employer engaged in ex parte communications with
Claimant by scheduling the examination with Dr. Fenichel without the knowledge
of Claimant’s counsel. The Board concluded Claimant’s reliance on Pennsylvania
State University v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Sox), 83 A.3d 1081 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013), was misplaced as it involved the interplay of attorney-client
privilege between counsel for an employer and physicians employed by the
employer/client and doctor-patient privilege between the same physicians and their
patient, who was also the claimant. (Board Opinion (Op.) at 2.) Rather, the Board
concluded this situation involved a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(Board Op. at 2-3.) The Board explained that here, Dr. Fenichel performed three
independent examinations of Claimant. (Id. at 2.) It continued:

       While we certainly do not condone [Employer]’s actions of contacting
       Claimant without the benefit of his counsel’s foreknowledge, we do not
       believe that this situation rises to the level that a remand is required
       given the multiple examinations. Purportedly, Claimant had the benefit
       of his counsel’s advice in two of the three examinations.

(Id.) Citing Keppol v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Acme Markets, Inc.)
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 996 C.D. 2011, filed February 10, 2012),8 the Board stated a
remand was not warranted as the conduct was “not relevant to the issues before the
WCJ and on appeal.” (Board Op. at 3.)

       8
         Unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive value pursuant
to Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P 126(b), and Section
414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                8
       The Board also rejected Claimant’s argument that the WCJ erred in
concluding Employer met its burden of proof on the Termination Petition.
Recapping the evidence presented and based upon the credibility determinations of
the WCJ, by which the Board was bound, the Board determined there was substantial
evidence to support the WCJ’s findings that Employer satisfied its burden. (Id. at 7-
8.)
       Claimant timely petitioned this Court for review of the Board’s Order.9

II.    PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
       Claimant argues that while Section 314 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 651,10 permits an
employer to request a claimant to undergo a physical examination and for the
examination to occur outside of the presence of claimant’s counsel, advance notice
must still be provided to counsel so that a claimant can be advised of their rights.
Claimant points to Section 131.11 of the Special Rules of Administrative Practice
and Procedure before WCJs (Special Rules), 34 Pa. Code § 131.11, and Section
31.26 of the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure (GRAPP), 1
Pa. Code § 31.26, as requiring notice be served on counsel. Claimant asserts this
Court has also required an employer to show notice was provided before a WCJ may
order the claimant to attend an IME. (Claimant’s Brief (Br.) at 11 (citing Cataldi v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Lane Co., Inc.), 738 A.2d 1074 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999),
and Maranc v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bienenfeld), 628 A.2d 522 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1993)).) Claimant asserts the Board’s reliance on the Rules of Professional

       9
          Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether
errors of law were committed, or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence. Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Minteer), 762 A.2d 328, 331
n.2 (Pa. 2000).
        10
           Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended.

                                                9
Conduct is misplaced because it was not Employer’s counsel but Employer, via an
agent, who communicated directly with Claimant. Comparing this situation to
spoliation of evidence, Claimant contends that the appropriate sanction is to bar use
of the IME. In so contending, Claimant argues fault lies entirely with Employer and
its agent, Claimant was prejudiced as a result because his benefits were terminated,
and there are no lesser sanctions available. Moreover, Claimant argues that allowing
Employer to utilize the IME sets a bad example from which other employers,
insurers, and IME agencies will follow. Accordingly, Claimant requests that this
Court reverse the Board’s Order and bar the use of Dr. Fenichel’s report and
testimony.
       In a footnote, Claimant alternatively asserts Dr. Fenichel’s opinion is legally
insufficient because her opinions are inconsistent. Specifically, Claimant argues Dr.
Fenichel opined Claimant was fully recovered as of March 7, 2019, but “‘continued’
to agree” with Dr. Watson’s opinion that Claimant suffered from adjustment disorder
with mixed anxiety and depressed mood as of February 10, 2020. (Claimant’s Br.
at 9 n.1.)
       Arguing that an issue is waived unless it is preserved at every stage of the
litigation, Employer responds Claimant waived his argument about counsel not
receiving notice of the examination because he did not properly raise and preserve
his arguments throughout the litigation. (Employer’s Br. at 19 (citing Wheeler v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr.), 829 A.2d 730, 735 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003)).) While Claimant objected to the use of Dr. Fenichel’s report at the
May 14, 2020 hearing, Employer argues that is all Claimant did. According to
Employer, Claimant did not present any evidence that the examination was improper
or the result of ex parte communications, never raised or preserved the objection at

                                         10
Dr. Fenichel’s deposition; never objected to the admission of Dr. Fenichel’s
deposition, and never argued or preserved his objection in his post-hearing
submission to the WCJ. Employer agrees with Claimant that the Board’s reliance
on the Rules of Professional Conduct is misplaced because it was a third-party
vendor that sent the letter directly to Claimant and not his attorney. Because
Claimant had notice of the examination and actively participated, Employer argues
the Board’s Order should be affirmed.
       In response to Claimant’s second argument, Employer argues the WCJ’s
findings that Claimant is fully recovered from the psychological injuries are
supported by substantial evidence and this Court cannot overturn the WCJ’s
credibility determinations.

III.   DISCUSSION
       A.    Notice to WC Counsel
       We first address Claimant’s argument that any evidence from Dr. Fenichel’s
IME should be excluded from evidence because Claimant’s WC counsel was not
given notice of the scheduled IME since, without this evidence, Employer cannot
meet its burden of proof on the Termination Petition. Employer argues Claimant
waived this issue by failing to raise it throughout the litigation before the WCJ.
       In Wheeler, we explained:

       It is well established that an issue is waived unless it is preserved at
       every stage of the proceeding. . . . The strict doctrine of waiver applies
       to a [WC] proceeding. . . . The purpose of the waiver doctrine is to
       ensure that the WCJ is presented with all cognizable issues so that the
       integrity, efficiency, and orderly administration of the [WC] scheme of
       redress for work-related injury is preserved.

                                          11
829 A.2d at 734 (internal citations and quotations omitted). There, we held that a
claimant who voluntarily attended a vocational interview without objecting that the
vocational expert was not approved by the Department of Labor and Industry to
conduct such interviews did not preserve the issue and the fact that the claimant was
proceeding pro se did not excuse his failure to object. Id.
      While our caselaw requires an issue to be raised at “every stage of the
proceeding” in order to be preserved, id. (emphasis added), Employer would have
us interpret this as requiring a party raise an objection at every opportunity in order
to preserve it. Employer acknowledges Claimant objected at the May 14, 2020
hearing, but asserts Claimant also had to object again at Dr. Fenichel’s deposition,
at the December 20, 2020 hearing when Dr. Fenichel’s deposition was admitted into
evidence, and in post-hearing submissions. (Employer’s Br. at 20-21.)
      Although Employer cites no support for this proposition, we note that Section
131.66(b) of the Special Rules provides, at least in relation to depositions, that

      [o]bjections shall be made and the basis for the objections stated at the
      time of the taking of the depositions. Only objections which are
      identified in a separate writing, introduced prior to the close of the
      evidentiary record, as close of the record is specified in [Section]
      131.101(c)-(e) (relating to briefs, findings of fact and close of record),
      and stating the specific nature of the objections and the pages where
      they appear in the deposition or the exhibits to which they refer will be
      preserved for ruling. Objections not so preserved are waived.

34 Pa. Code § 131.66(b). On a number of occasions, this Court has found that
noncompliance with either or both requirements in Section 131.66(b) resulted in
waiver of an issue. See, e.g., Costello v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.)
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1230 C.D. 2014, filed April 21, 2015), slip op. at 21 (failure to
object to the timeliness of an examination at the time of the expert’s deposition);

                                          12
Privette-James v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Univ. of Pa.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1906
C.D. 2013, filed June 5, 2014), slip op. at 37-38 (failure to object to the spoliation
of evidence at the IME physician’s deposition); Alessandro v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (Precision Metal Crafters, LLC), 972 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009) (objecting at deposition but not preserving that objection in writing as
required); Degraw v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Redner’s Warehouse Mkts., Inc.),
926 A.2d 997, 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (“[E]ven if [the c]laimant’s counsel
objected on the basis of lack of foundation when [the physician] was being
questioned on the nature of [the c]laimant’s injuries, those objections would be
waived” as there was no evidence of record that they were preserved in writing.).
      However, there is no indication the objecting party in those cases raised the
very same objection at a hearing before the WCJ, prior to the deposition, and that
the WCJ overruled that objection. That is what occurred here. At the May 14, 2020
hearing, upon Employer moving for admission of Dr. Fenichel’s IME report,
Claimant objected to any and all evidence originating from Dr. Fenichel’s third IME
of Claimant on the basis that Claimant’s WC counsel was not provided notice of the
IME. (R.R. at 98a-103a.) After some back and forth between Claimant’s WC
counsel and the WCJ, the WCJ essentially overruled the objection, stating
Claimant’s counsel would be provided ample time to consult with his client, prepare
for Dr. Fenichel’s deposition, and have Dr. Weiss review and respond to Dr.
Fenichel’s report and testimony. (Id. at 108a-11a.)
      Because Claimant already objected to any evidence from Dr. Fenichel, there
was nothing to be gained from objecting again since the WCJ already essentially
overruled the same objection at the hearing. The purpose of preserving objections
is to enable the WCJ to address “all cognizable issues so that the ‘integrity,

                                         13
efficiency, and orderly administration of the [WC] scheme of redress for [the] work-
related injury’ is preserved.” Wheeler, 829 A.2d at 734. That purpose is fulfilled
under the factual scenario presented here. Requiring Claimant to restate the same
exact objection upon which the WCJ already ruled at (1) Dr. Fenichel’s deposition;
(2) the December 20, 2020 hearing at which Dr. Fenichel’s deposition was admitted
into evidence; and (3) in Claimant’s post-hearing submissions does nothing to
further this purpose.11
       Having concluded Claimant did not waive the issue, we turn to its merits.
Claimant maintains that administrative regulations require service also be made
upon a party’s counsel. For support, Claimant cites both Section 31.26 of GRAPP
and Section 131.11(c) of the Special Rules.
       Section 31.26 of GRAPP, provides:

       In a proceeding where an attorney has filed a submittal on behalf of a
       client or has filed an appearance under [Section] 31.24(b) (relating to
       notice of appearance), a notice or other written communication required
       to be served upon or furnished to the client shall also be served upon or
       furnished to the attorney (or one of the attorneys if the client is
       represented by more than one attorney) in the same manner as
       prescribed for his client, notwithstanding the fact that the
       communication may be furnished directly to the client.

1 Pa. Code § 31.26. However, the Special Rules supersede GRAPP. Section 111.2
of the Special Rules, 34 Pa. Code § 111.2. See also Stech v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeal Bd. (MJS Equip. Co.), 678 A.2d 1243, 1244 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (“[The

       11
          Moreover, rather than at every opportunity, as Employer posits, it appears the reference
to “every stage” in Wheeler means that the issue must be raised before the WCJ and the Board in
order for it to be preserved for appellate review. See, e.g., Privette-James, slip op. at 14-15
(concluding the claimant’s argument was waived for not raising it to the Board); GMS Mine Repair
& Maint., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Way), 29 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)
(concluding the employer’s argument was waived for not raising it before the Board).

                                               14
employer] properly notes that WCJ proceedings are governed by the Special Rules .
. . , which supersede [GRAPP].”)           Therefore, Section 31.26 of GRAPP is
inapplicable.
      Section 131.11(c) of the Special Rules provides that “[a]ny notice or other
written communication required to be served upon or furnished to a party shall also
be served upon or furnished to the party’s attorney in the same manner as it is served
upon the party.” 34 Pa. Code § 131.11(c). While it applies to WC matters, as the
parties noted, there are no reported appellate cases directly on point. However, there
are cases that help shed light on the consequences of noncompliance with Section
131.11(c).
      First, it is important to understand the role, if any, counsel plays in an IME.
The Court first examined this issue in Maranc v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal
Board (Bienenfeld), 628 A.2d 522, 524 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). There, a claimant
refused to attend an IME without having his counsel present. The claimant asserted
he had a constitutional right to have counsel present during the IME. We rejected
that argument, reasoning that a referee, now called a WCJ, is the factfinder and, as
such, can accept or reject the IME physician’s testimony. Id. at 525. Further, the
Court reasoned that

      counsel can adequately protect [the claimant’s] interest by deposing
      [the IME physician] regarding his conclusions. [] [C]ounsel has the
      right to cross-examine [the IME physician] during any hearing or
      deposition in order to challenge his findings, should they be contrary to
      [the claimant]. [The claimant] is also entitled to produce his own
      physician to rebut any conclusions formulated by [the IME physician].

Id. Thus, there are safeguards in place.
      Second, albeit in a different context, we required a claimant to demonstrate
actual prejudice or adverse impact when the claimant’s counsel did not receive a

                                           15
copy of a notice of ability to return to work. Hale v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.
(Fleming Cos.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1803 C.D. 2011, filed June 4, 2012), slip op. at
27.
       Here, the WCJ postponed proceedings for several months to allow Claimant’s
WC counsel ample time to confer with his client. Claimant’s WC counsel also had
the opportunity to participate in Dr. Fenichel’s subsequently scheduled deposition
and cross-examine her to challenge Dr. Fenichel’s findings from the IME. In
addition, the WCJ provided Claimant time to have Dr. Weiss review Dr. Fenichel’s
report and deposition and provide his own report and testimony. In other words,
Claimant received all of the safeguards under Maranc and did not establish any
actual prejudice or adverse impact from the lack of notice to Claimant’s WC counsel
under Hale, particularly given this was Claimant’s third IME with Dr. Fenichel.
       Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude the WCJ committed an
error of law or abused her discretion in allowing the litigation of the Termination
Petition to proceed as it did.

       B.     Termination Petition
       Alternatively, Claimant asserts Dr. Fenichel’s opinions were equivocal and,
thus, insufficient to carry Employer’s burden of proof on the Termination Petition.12

       12
          We note that Claimant’s argument on this issue does not conform to Rule 2119(a) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), as it does not contain caselaw,
relevant legal authority, or meaningfully discuss precedent. Instead, the entirety of Claimant’s
argument is contained in a footnote in the Summary of Argument section of Claimant’s Brief.
Although there are shortcomings in Claimant’s brief, Employer was able to address Claimant’s
argument, and we will also address the merits of this issue. See Richardson v. Pa. Ins. Dep’t, 54
A.3d 420, 426 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (providing that we may review the cognizable arguments we
can glean from an appellate brief, despite a noncompliance with the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure, even if those violations are “egregious,” if they do not preclude meaningful
appellate review).

                                               16
       To obtain a termination of benefits, an employer bears the burden to prove
“that the claimant fully recovered from his work injury and has no remaining
disability, or that any remaining disability is no longer related to the work injury.”13
Ingrassia v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Universal Health Servs., Inc.), 126 A.3d
394, 402 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). An employer meets this burden when its medical
expert unequivocally testifies that “it is [the expert’s] opinion, within a reasonable
degree of medical certainty, that the claimant is fully recovered, can return to work
without restrictions and that there are no objective medical findings which either
substantiate the claims of pain or connect them to the work injury.” Udvari v.
Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (USAir, Inc.), 705 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Pa. 1997).
       Medical testimony is “equivocal if it is based only upon possibilities, is vague,
and leaves doubt.” Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Conagra Foods), 37
A.3d 72, 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quotation omitted).                The medical expert’s
testimony must be reviewed “as a whole[,] and [we] may not base our analysis on a
few words taken out of context.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]here are no magic words that
a doctor must recite to establish causation.” Campbell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Pittsburgh Post Gazette), 954 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “There is no
requirement that every utterance that escapes the lips of a medical witness . . . must
be certain, positive, and without reservation, exception, or paradventure of a doubt
in order to be considered unequivocal.” Id. “[I]f a medical expert testifie[d], after
providing a foundation for the testimony, that, in [the expert’s] professional opinion,
[the expert] believes or thinks a fact exists,” the testimony is unequivocal. O’Neill
v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (News Corp., Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2011). The “mere offering of alternative analyses with respect to a work-related

       13
         Employer here only proceeded with the Termination Petition with regard to Claimant’s
psychological injuries, not his physical ones.

                                             17
injury does not render the expert’s testimony equivocal.” Manitowoc Co., Inc. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cowan), 74 A.3d 1137,1142 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Nor
is an expert required to “rule out with absolute certainty other factors that may have
caused or contributed to a condition.” Campbell, 954 A.2d at 730.
        Claimant asserts Dr. Fenichel’s opinion was equivocal because her opinions
were inconsistent, opining on the one hand that Claimant had fully recovered as of
March 7, 2019, but opining on the other hand that, as of February 2020, Dr. Fenichel
“‘continued’ to agree” with Dr. Watson’s opinion that Claimant still suffered from
adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood. (Claimant’s Br. at 9
n.1.)
        Preliminarily, it is unclear where Dr. Fenichel allegedly deemed Claimant
fully recovered as of March 7, 2019, which predated the filing of the Termination
Petition. Claimant does not provide a citation for this assertion, and the Court’s
review of the record only shows March 7, 2019, as being a date for which Claimant
had last seen Dr. Watson before resuming treatment after the IME in 2020, (R.R. at
142a), and as the date of Employer’s filing of a separate petition to modify, (id. at
89a).
        A review of Dr. Fenichel’s February 10, 2020 IME report does show where
Dr. Fenichel states she “continue[s] to agree with the diagnosis as noted by Dr.
Watson of an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood,” as
Claimant points out.14 (Certified Record Item 26 at 8.) At her deposition, though,
Dr. Fenichel repeatedly testified that she felt Claimant was fully recovered from a

        14
         Claimant cites page 351a of the Reproduced Record for support that Dr. Fenichel agreed
with Dr. Watson’s diagnoses of adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood.
(Claimant’s Br. at 9 n.1.) However, the Reproduced Record filed by Claimant skips from page
331a to 352a. It appears Claimant is referring to a statement on page 8 of Dr. Fenichel’s February
10, 2020 report, which is in the Certified Record at Item 26.

                                               18
psychological standpoint. (R.R. at 278a.) She explained the basis for this opinion
as follows:

      This opinion was based on the opportunity to meet with [Claimant]
      three times, the opportunity to review records that were over the course
      of a number of years -- the first time again was in January [2018] when
      I first met [Claimant] -- the fact that [Claimant]’s main problems were
      not in any way related to what happened to him in his work injury but
      what he described for himself as a problem getting his own motivation
      going, the fact was that in my opinion [Claimant] was recovered from
      the adjustment disorder that was diagnosed by Dr. Watson, and the fact
      is that [Claimant] was provided with lots of opportunities to engage in
      psychological treatment and lots of opportunities to pursue other types
      of work, lots of opportunities even to go back to [Employer] and it was
      not any type of psychiatric disorder that prevented him from doing so.

(Id. at 279a.) Dr. Fenichel’s review of Dr. Watson’s records also, in her opinion,
supported her “ultimate conclusion” that Claimant did not need any additional
psychological treatment for his work injury. (Id. at 286a, 288a.) Upon review of
Claimant’s updated medical records, Dr. Fenichel testified that her opinion
remained, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Claimant was fully
recovered from a psychological standpoint as of the date of her IME on February 10,
2020. (Id. at 291a.)
      Taken as a whole, Dr. Fenichel testified unequivocally that Claimant is fully
recovered from the accepted psychological work injuries and explained why she felt
this way. Amandeo, 37 A.3d at 80. The WCJ, as fact finder, was then free to review
that testimony and make determinations as to weight and credibility. Miller v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Millard Refrigerated Servs. and Sentry Claims Serv.),
47 A.3d 206, 209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). “A WCJ may accept or reject the testimony
of any witness in whole or in part.” Id. Here, the WCJ credited the testimony of Dr.
Fenichel over the testimony of Dr. Weiss and Claimant. “[T]he appellate role is not

                                        19
to reweigh the evidence or to review the credibility of the witnesses.” Bethenergy
Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Skirpan), 612 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa.
1992). As Dr. Fenichel’s testimony was sufficient to carry Employer’s burden on
the Termination Petition, we discern no error. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                     RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                       20
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

George B. Thomas,                      :
                       Petitioner      :
                                       :
                 v.                    :   No. 899 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Sysco Foods (Workers’                  :
Compensation Appeal Board),            :
                      Respondent       :

                                    ORDER

     NOW, April 26, 2024, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board, dated July 21, 2022, is AFFIRMED.

                                     RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge