Court Opinion

ID: 9642220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:52:30.18903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:44.697948
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which awards Chil-dress attorneys’ fees under Art. 2226.
I cannot agree with the majority reasoning that a contractual relationship existed between Dairyland and Childress because Art. 6701h intended to make all potential accident claimants third-party beneficiaries to all automobile liability insurance policies. Nor does the authority relied on in the opinion support this conclusion, as those cases involve contracts which were expressly made for the benefit of the party seeking to recover fees.
Statutes authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees are penal in nature and therefore must be strictly construed; consequently, these fees are not recoverable unless such right is provided for by statute or by a contract between the parties. Knebel v. Capital Nat’l Bank in Austin, 518 S.W.2d 795 (Tex.1974); Equitable Trust Co. v. Lyle, 627 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Jay Fikes and Associates v. Walton, 578 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Here, Childress is simply a judgment creditor of Dairyland, and as such does not come under the purview of Art. 2226. While it may be true that the underlying suit was “founded” on a contract, that contract was strictly between Booth and Dairy-land; Childress had no cause of action against Dairyland absent a judgment against Booth.
I would reverse that part of the judgment of the court of appeals awarding attorneys’ fees and affirm the remainder of the judgment.
BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.