Court Opinion

ID: 9893268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:05:55.487345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:48.167101
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                Docket No. 50143

ROGER COOK and SHELLEY COOK, )
husband and wife,                        )
                                         )
   Plaintiffs-Respondents,               )
                                         )
v.                                       )
                                         )
JAY VAN ORDEN and SHELLI VAN )
ORDEN, husband and wife; DEXTER VAN )
ORDEN, an individual,                    )
                                         )
   Defendants-Appellants,                )
                                         )
and                                      )
                                         )
LAVAR        GROVER        and JEANETTE )
GROVER, husband and wife; MERRILL )
HANNY and BETHEA HANNY, husband and )
                                                   Pocatello, August 2023 Term
wife; DONALD G. ALLEN and KATHY )
ALLEN, husband and wife; BARRY COX and )
                                                   Opinion Filed: October 26, 2023
LINDA COX, husband and wife, and DOES I- )
V,                                       )
                                                   Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
                                         )
   Defendants.                           )
_________________________________        )
LAVAR        GROVER        and JEANETTE )
GROVER, husband and wife,                )
                                         )
   Counterclaimants-Cross Claimants,     )
                                         )
v.                                       )
                                         )
ROGER COOK and SHELLEY COOK, )
husband and wife,                        )
                                         )
   Counterdefendants-Respondents,        )
                                         )
and                                      )
                                         )
                                         )
                                      1
 JAY VAN ORDEN and SHELLI VAN )
 ORDEN, husband and wife; DEXTER VAN )
 ORDEN, an individual,                   )
                                         )
    Cross Defendants-Appellants,         )
                                         )
 and                                     )
                                         )
 MERRILL HANNY and BETHEA HANNY, )
 husband and wife; DONALD G. ALLEN and )
 KATHY ALLEN, husband and wife; BARRY )
 COX and LINDA COX, husband and wife,    )
                                         )
   Cross Defendants.                     )
 _______________________________________ )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
       Bingham County, Darren B. Simpson, District Judge.

       The order of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

       Cooper & Larsen, Pocatello, for Appellants. J. D. Oborn argued.

       Parsons Behle & Latimer, Idaho Falls, for Respondents. Jon Stenquist argued.
                                     _____________________

BRODY, Justice.
       This is the second appeal of this matter, which concerns the existence of a prescriptive
easement and the presumption of permissive use. Shelley and Roger Cook own a parcel of land
(the “Cook Property”) located in Bingham County, Idaho. The Cook Property was originally
owned by Shelley’s grandfather, John Harker Sr., and has stayed in the Harker family ever since.
The Cooks filed suit against Jay and Shelli Van Orden alleging they had a prescriptive easement
across the Van Ordens’ land (the “Van Orden Property”) via a road the parties call “Tower Road.”
Tower Road connects the Cooks’ property to a county road and has been used by the Cooks and
their predecessors in interest since the Cook Property was homesteaded in 1908. The district court
initially entered judgment in favor of the Van Ordens after it determined the Cooks had failed to
prove the necessary element of adverse use for a prescriptive easement. The Cooks appealed, and
this Court reversed the district court’s decision. This Court explained that it was necessary for the
district court to determine the statutory period of adverse use because “there were potentially

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periods of adverse use” that could satisfy “either the five-year or twenty-year period for
establishing a prescriptive easement.” Cook v. Van Orden, 170 Idaho 46, 53, 507 P.3d 119, 126
(2022) (“Cook I”). The case was remanded to the district court to determine the statutory period
and analyze whether the Harkers’ or Cooks’ (collectively “Harkers/Cooks”) use of Tower Road
was adverse during that time.
       On remand, the district court determined that the use of Tower Road by the Harkers was
presumptively permissive prior to 1910 and that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that Harkers’
or Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the
district court identified a statutory period from 1962 to 2006, and granted the Cooks’ prescriptive
easement claim by concluding the period of statutory use was sufficiently adverse due to the
common belief of the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons—the Van Ordens’ predecessors in
interest—that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use Tower Road. In other words, the adverse use
was established based on a claim of right regardless of the preceding permissive use. The Van
Ordens appealed to this Court, contending that the district court erred in granting the Cooks a
prescriptive easement. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision and
remand for entry of judgment in favor of the Van Ordens.
                 I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A.      The Cook Property
       The Cook Property is a 160-acre parcel of land located in Bingham County. Shelley Cook’s
grandfather, John Ray Harker (“John Harker Sr.”), homesteaded the land in 1908. John Harker
Sr.’s widow, Sarah M. Clark (formerly Sarah M. Harker), was granted title to the land under the
Homestead Act in 1922. Over the following years, the Cook property was conveyed to various
family members. Their son, John Harker Jr., obtained ownership of the land in 1967. John Harker
Jr.’s daughter, Shelley Cook, and her husband, Roger Cook, were deeded the land in 2018.
Currently, Shelley and Roger Cook are the titled owners of the Cook Property.
       Before John Harker Jr. obtained ownership, the Cook Property was leased to Allen
Thompson in 1962. For roughly twenty years, he and his son, Ted Thompson, dry-farmed the land
until the late-1980s. At that point, Ted placed the property into the government’s Conservation
Reserve Program (“CRP”) and continued to lease the land and reseed it in accordance with the
CRP requirements until 2015.

                                                3
       B.      The Van Orden Property
       In 1910, George Thompson purchased a large parcel of land in Bingham County that
included what is now the Van Orden Property. Upon his passing in 1968, George’s daughter, Gwen
Wilts, inherited the portion of the land that now constitutes the Van Orden Property. The Van
Orden Property comprises approximately 2,000 acres. Wilts appointed her brother, Allen
Thompson, and later his son, Ted Thompson, to act as her agents over the Van Orden Property.
Allen and Ted dry-farmed the property until 1993. Then, like the Cook Property, Ted placed the
land into the CRP until 2014. Roughly one year later, the Longhursts purchased the Van Orden
Property. In late 2016 or early 2017, the Longhursts sold the property to the Van Ordens.
       C.      Tower Road
       Tower Road takes its name from radio towers, which were built on land that was once part
of the Van Orden Property. Tower Road connects the Cook Property to County Road 129 South
10th East in Bonneville County, Idaho. Tower Road runs through several properties, including the
Van Orden Property. In the mid-1980s, Ted Thompson created a side road off Tower Road known
as the “Cut Out Road.”
       Since at least the 1960s, there has been a gate on the Van Orden Property near the
intersection of Tower Road and County Road 129 South 10th East. Prior to the mid-1980s, it was
a simple wire gate with a chain and occasionally a lock (referred to as the “farmer’s gate”).
According to the testimony of Matthew Thompson (the son of Ted Thompson) the Harkers
probably had keys to the lock or put their own lock on the farmer’s gate.
       In the 1980s, at the request of power companies with property in the area, the Thompsons
replaced the farmer’s gate with a metal gate, which the parties refer to as the “heavy gate.” The
heavy gate was originally locked with a combination lock, then a single lock and key system was
used. The Thompsons provided the Harkers/Cooks with a key to the heavy gate. In the 1990s, the
lock and key system was replaced by personal locks on the gate in a daisy-chain series. Vehicles
could drive around the heavy gate. During the years that the Thompsons owned the Van Orden
Property, the public drove motorcycles, cars, pickups, four-wheelers, all-terrain vehicles, horses,
and station wagons on the property.
       The following figure shows Tower Road and the properties at issue:

                                                4
                        Figure 1. Map of Tower Road and Adjacent Properties

       D.      Accessing the Cook Property
       John Harker Sr. accessed the Cook Property primarily by taking Tower Road. Between
1962 and 1967, John Harker Jr. also used Tower Road to access the Cook Property. In addition,
Harker Jr. used the Cut Out Road to haul grain and to take boy scouts camping on the Cook
Property. While Allen and Ted Thompson were leasing the Cook Property from the early 1960s to
1993, they accessed the Cook Property via Tower Road. The Cooks would use Tower Road to
access their property an average of ten times per year to check that the property complied with the
CRP requirements. When the Cooks forgot their key to the heavy gate, they would drive around
the heavy gate or take a road by the Idaho Falls Country Club that connected to Tower Road.

                                                5
       When the Longhursts owned the Van Orden Property between 2015 and 2016, the Cooks
would access Tower Road through Country Club Road. In the fall of 2016, Mr. Cook called Mr.
Longhurst to speak with him about the Cooks getting a lock placed on the gate so they could access
Tower Road. Mr. Longhurst was unavailable to speak with him at that time. Mr. Cook called Mr.
Longhurst again several months later to make the request but, by then, the Longhursts had sold the
land to the Van Ordens.
       When the Van Ordens purchased the property, it was only partially enclosed. In the summer
of 2017, the Van Ordens completely enclosed the property with a fence and gated the access points
to Tower Road. The fence and gates contain the Van Ordens’ cattle. Strangers, including Mr. Cook,
would leave gates open, letting cattle out, or close gates that were intentionally left open by the
Van Ordens to herd cattle through. To avoid this and to keep trespassers out, the Van Ordens
placed locks on their gates. During this time, Mr. Van Orden told Mr. Cook that they would allow
the Cooks to use Tower Road if the Cooks called and asked for permission first. Mr. Cook,
however, expressed that he did not want to have to ask for permission.
       E.      Procedure
       On July 17, 2017, the Cooks filed suit against the Van Ordens, asserting a prescriptive
easement over Tower Road. During a bench trial in October 2020, multiple witnesses, including
members of the Cook and Thompson families, testified that the Harkers/Cooks had a right to use
Tower Road. The district court held that the Cooks’ use of Tower Road was open and notorious,
“continuous and uninterrupted from the early 1960s (if not before) until 2017,” and with the actual
or imputed knowledge of the Thompson family who possessed the land on behalf of the owner of
the servient tenement. However, the district court also found that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of
Tower Road was not adverse. Based on this conclusion, the district court determined that it did not
need to calculate the applicable statutory period for the prescriptive easement claim because it
became irrelevant. Following the bench trial, the title to Tower Road was quieted in favor of the
Van Ordens.
       The Cooks appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court had erred in determining
their use had not been adverse and by not assigning a statutory period. In Cook I, we held that the
district court erred by not assigning a statutory period to its analysis because there was “evidence
suggesting that there may have been periods when the use was adverse.” 170 Idaho 46, 53, 507
P.3d 119, 126 (2022). Without first knowing the relevant statutory period, the Court was unable to
                                               6
determine whether the Harkers’/Cooks’ use was adverse. Id. Thus, we reversed the district court’s
decision and remanded the case for the district court to identify the relevant statutory period and
then determine whether the use had been adverse during that period.
       On remand, the district court determined the Cooks established the necessary elements of
a prescriptive easement for the five-year statutory period, continually, from 1962 to 2006. The
district court determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of Tower Road was by permission from
1908 to 1962 but was “under a claim of right” from 1962 to 2015. The district court explained that,
other than the “adverse and under a claim of right” element, all other elements for a prescriptive
easement for Tower Road had been met between 1908 and 2015. Notably, the district court found
that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that the Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of the Tower
Road, established prior to 1910, ever changed into an adverse use.” The district court determined
that, under prescriptive easement case law decided prior to this Court’s decision in Cook I, it
“would find that the Cooks failed to show adverse use and would deny the prescriptive easement.”
Nevertheless, the district court interpreted Cook I to suggest that the presumption of permissive
use from 1908 to 1962 must be disregarded, and that the “Cooks’ and Thompsons’ common belief
in the Harkers’ right to use the Tower Road and the Cut Out Road equates to an adverse use under
a claim of right.” From this, the district court concluded that it was obligated to find that the
Harkers’/Cooks’ use had been adverse and granted the Cooks a prescriptive easement.
       The Van Ordens timely appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred in
granting the Cooks an easement by prescription after finding that the Cooks had not established
adverse use of Tower Road.
                             II.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
       “This Court’s ‘review of a trial court’s conclusions following a bench trial is limited to
determining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law.’” Chester v. Wild Idaho Adventures RV Park, LLC, 171 Idaho 212,
519 P.3d 1152, 1161 (2022) (quoting Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton Cnty., 168 Idaho 442, 456, 483
P.3d 985, 999 (2020)). “A district court’s determination that a claimant has or has not established
a private prescriptive easement involves entwined questions of law and fact.” Cook I, 170 Idaho
at 51–52, 507 P.3d at 124–25 (quoting Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228
(2006)).

                                                7
        “[W]hen reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact in a case in which the facts must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, the job of the reviewing court is simply to determine
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to sustain the finding.” Latvala v. Green
Enters., Inc., 168 Idaho 686, 695, 485 P.3d 1129, 1138 (2021) (quoting Sowards v. Rathbun, 134
Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000)). Evidence is substantial and competent if a reasonable
trier of fact could accept and rely upon it in making the factual finding challenged on appeal. Id.
“However, “[t]he substantial evidence standard for appellate review requires a greater quantum of
evidence when the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, than
when mere preponderance is required.” Id. “[T]his Court exercises free review over a trial court’s
conclusions of law, including the question ‘of whether the facts found, or stipulated to, are
sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement or a
prescriptive easement.’” Id. (quoting Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79
(2009)).
                                       III.   ANALYSIS
        “An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not
inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner.” Capstar Radio Operating Co. v.
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 420, 283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012) (quoting Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480, 129
P.3d at 1229). To establish a prescriptive easement, the party claiming the easement must provide
clear and convincing evidence that their use of the subject property was (1) open and notorious,
(2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or
imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, (5) for the statutory period. Cook, 170
Idaho at 52, 507 P.3d at 125. “Idaho law disfavors private prescriptive easements.” H.F.L.P., LLC
v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 679, 339 P.3d 557, 564 (2014). Because prescription acts as
a penalty against the burdened landowner, “courts should closely scrutinize and limit rights
obtained through prescription. . . .” Id.
        The district court determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of Tower Road was
presumptively permissive because the Van Orden Property was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved
when the Harkers initially began using the property in 1908. Despite concluding this permissive
use never changed into adverse use, the district court further determined that it was obligated to
find that the Cooks established the “adverse and under a claim of right” element under its
interpretation of Cook I. Each conclusion is addressed in turn.
                                                8
       A.      The district court did not err when it determined that the Harkers’ use of
               Tower Road was presumptively permissive because the Van Orden Property
               was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved.
        “The question whether a use was adverse, made pursuant to an implied servitude, or
permissive, in the inception is often difficult to answer, particularly in cases of long-established
uses where the original parties are not available to describe the circumstances of the initial use.”
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.16 cmt. g (2000). To help determine whether a use
was permissive or prescriptive, “[c]ourts have developed a series of presumptions . . . .” Id. In
Idaho, “[t]he general rule is that proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the
presumption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right.” Lemhi Cnty. v. Moulton, 163
Idaho 404, 409, 414 P.3d 226, 231 (2018) (quoting West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d
1326, 1333 (1973)). “Proof of all of these elements shifts the burden to the owner of the servient
estate, who must demonstrate that the claimant’s use was permissive.” Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho
675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997).
       However, “[t]he presumption of adverse use is inapplicable and rather permissive use is
presumed” if the servient estate is wild, unenclosed, and unimproved. Cook I, 170 Idaho at 54–55,
507 P.3d at 127–28. “[I]f the presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the
presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested and ‘brought home’ to
the servient property owner.” Id. (quoting H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566). As
this Court has stated,
       [t]he reason for the rule that a passageway over unenclosed and unimproved land
       is deemed to be permissive is sound and also easily understandable . . . . It assumes
       that the owner of such land in many instances will not be in position to readily
       detect or prevent others from crossing over his land, and, even if he did, he might
       not enter any objection because of a desire to accommodate others and because
       such usage resulted in no immediate damage to him. Also[,] in such instances the
       landowner would probably have no reason to think the users of the passageway
       were attempting to acquire any adverse rights. On the other hand[,] there would be
       no reason or basis for such inference of permission on the part of the landowner if
       someone tore down his fence or destroyed his crops by reason of such usage. These
       acts alone would be calculated to put the landowner on notice that others were using
       his land adversely to his own interest and right of occupation.
H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681–82, 339 P.3d at 566–67 (2014) (quoting Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho
513, 522, 373 P.2d 929, 934 (1962)).
                                                 9
       “This Court has cautioned against becoming overly focused on discussions of shifting
presumptions in prescriptive easement cases.” Cook I, 170 Idaho at 53, 507 P.3d at 126 (citing
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230). Instead, we encourage courts to focus “on whether
the five prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them.”
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230. However, since Hughes, this Court has explained: “it
is not error for the court to use such rules as ‘an approach to determining whether the claimant had
met the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence.’” Backman, 147
Idaho at 399, 210 P.3d at 84 (quoting Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 64, 190 P.3d 876, 883
(2008)). Presumptions may be permitted if each of the five elements for a prescriptive easement
are adequately analyzed. Id. In this case, the district court was permitted to apply presumptions
because it adequately analyzed each of the five elements for a prescriptive easement claim, “as
this Court expressed a desire for in Hughes and Beckstead.” Id. Moreover, this case provides an
instance where the application of presumptions is appropriate to determine whether use during the
statutory period was adverse or permissive because Harker Sr. is not available to describe the initial
use of Tower Road.
       A grant of permission can be express or can be implied by law when the servient estate
was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved when the use began. See Cook I, 170 Idaho at 54–55, 507
P.3d at 127–28; see also Hughes, 142 Idaho at 480–81, 129 P.3d at 1229–30. In Cook I, this Court
stated that “[a]dverse use may be established if the users can demonstrate that their use was not
based on a grant of permission, but rather consisted of assertive conduct founded in common belief
that they had a right to use the road without seeking permission.” 170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at
129-30 (emphasis added). As such, it is crucial to understand whether the Harker/Cook families’
use of Tower Road was based on permission, either express or implied.
       The Harkers began using Tower Road when John Harker Sr. homesteaded the Cook
Property in 1908. The individuals who were present when the use began and would have personal
knowledge regarding whether the Thompsons granted John Harker Sr. permission to use the road
have all passed away. Evidence regarding whether John Harker Sr. had express permission to use
Tower Road was limited to Shelley Cook’s testimony that there was no indication in her family
history that permission had been sought. As that testimony does not conclusively settle whether
explicit permission had been granted, the question becomes whether the Harkers’ use of Tower

                                                 10
Road was implicitly and presumptively permissive—an issue that must be analyzed under the
applicable presumption for use across wild, unenclosed, and unimproved land.
       The testimony presented at trial provides substantial and competent evidence to support
the district court’s conclusion that the Van Orden Property was wild, unenclosed, and unimproved
when the Harkers’ use of Tower Road began. The unfarmed portion of the land consists of
sagebrush, quaking aspen, and juniper trees, or rocks, and Mrs. Cook testified that fields were
planted on the property in the 1960s. The Thompsons never built corrals, buildings, or other
improvements on the property. Therefore, the district court reasonably inferred that the land was
both wild and unimproved before the fields were planted in the 1960s. In addition, the Van Orden
Property was unenclosed when the Van Ordens purchased it in 2016 or 2017. Because substantial
and competent evidence supports the conclusion that the Van Orden Property was wild,
unenclosed, and unimproved prior to the 1960s, the district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’
initial use of Tower Road was presumptively permissive is affirmed.
       B.      The district court erred when it determined that the Harkers’/Cooks’ use of
               Tower Road became adverse in 1962 to establish a prescriptive easement.
       As noted above, the district court determined that the presumption of permissive use
applied to the Harkers’ initial use of Tower Road. “[I]f the presumption of permissive use applied
when the use began, the presumption continues until a hostile and adverse use is clearly manifested
and ‘brought home’ to the servient property owner.” H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at
566. “[T]he nature of the use is adverse if ‘it runs contrary to the servient owner’s claims to the
property.’” Backman, 147 Idaho at 397, 210 P.3d at 82 (quoting Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc.,
142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005)). For a hostile and adverse use to be clearly manifest,
“a user must make some new and independent act that would put the owner of the servient property
on notice that the use was no longer permissive.” Id. at 398, 210 P.3d at 83.
                   1. The district court was not obligated to find adverse use under Cook I.
       The district court stated that “nothing in the evidence [implies] that the Harkers’ or Cooks’
permissive use of Tower Road . . . ever changed into an adverse use. Based upon these facts, it is
difficult to conclude that the Harker family demonstrated an ‘adverse use of the Tower Road.’”
The district court noted that, ordinarily, it would find that the Cooks failed to establish a
prescriptive easement under Fuquay v. Low, 162 Idaho 373, 397 P.3d 1132 (2017), H.F.L.P., LLC,
157 Idaho 672, 339 P.3d 557, and Backman, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75. However, the district
                                                11
court determined that the Cooks established adverse use due to its interpretation of our holding in
Cook I. A portion of the district court’s decision centered on the following statement in Cook I:
       It is not necessary to show a history of contentious or aggressive behavior to satisfy
       the “adverse use” element of a prescriptive easement—although, unfortunately, that
       is often the case. Adverse use may be established if the users can demonstrate that
       their use was not based on a grant of permission, but rather consisted of assertive
       conduct founded in common belief that they had a right to use the road without
       seeking permission. Here, Shelley Cook, Matthew Thompson, and Shirley
       Thompson all testified that the Harkers’ and Cooks’ adverse use of the road over
       the servient estate was predicated on the understanding that the Harkers had a right
       to use the road and did not need permission.
Cook I, 170 Idaho at 56–57, 507 P.3d at 129–30. The district court stated that this “holding appears
to signal that a common belief of a claimant’s right to use the contested property satisfies both the
‘adverse’ and ‘as a matter of right’ prongs of the third prescriptive easement element.” Under this
interpretation, the district court determined that it “was obligated to find that the Cooks [had]
established adverse use” based on “the Cooks’ and Thompsons’ common belief in the Harkers’
right to use the Tower Road and the Cut Out Road.” This interpretation would also suggest that
the Court’s statement in Cook I provided a new or different legal standard for prescriptive
easements than the Court’s decisions in Fuquay, H.F.L.P., LLC, and Backman. That is not the case.
       In Cook I, we reaffirmed the well-established principle that adverse use cannot be
established if the use is based on permission. 170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at 129–30; see Fuquay,
162 Idaho at 377, 397 P.3d at 1136; see also H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339 P.3d at 566;
Backman, 147 Idaho at 397–-98, 210 P.3d at 82–83. We further noted that assertive conduct paired
with a common belief that there was a right to use the road could constitute adverse use under a
claim of right. 170 Idaho at 56–57, 507 P.3d at 129–30; see H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 681, 339
P.3d at 566; see Backman, 147 Idaho at 398, 210 P.3d at 83. Thus, the quoted statement from Cook
I above simply restates existing principles of adverse use for prescriptive easements. See Cook I,
170 Idaho at 56-57, 507 P.3d at 129–30. We did not eliminate the presumption of permissive use,
nor did we eliminate the need for specific conduct to overcome the presumption of permission to
establish use that is adverse. Our restatement of settled principles in Cook I was not intended to
compel the district court to decide the prescriptive easement issue a specific way. Instead, we held
that without knowing the statutory period, this Court could not determine whether the district court
erred when it determined the Cooks’ use of Tower Road was not adverse. Id. at 53–57, 507 P.3d

                                                 12
at 126–30. We also noted that testimony indicating the Harkers had a right to use the road “could
have established adverse use.” Id. at 57, 507 P.3d at 130 (emphasis added). However, this merely
indicated that there were “potentially periods of adverse use,” which made it necessary to
determine the time parameters the district court considered. Id. at 53, 507 P.3d at 126 (emphasis
added). In short, the district court was not obligated to find that the Cooks had established “adverse
use and under a claim of right” under our decision in Cook I.
                    2. The Cooks did not establish that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of
                       Tower Road changed into an adverse use.
        On remand from Cook I, the district court found that “nothing in the evidence [implies]
that the Harkers’ or Cooks’ permissive use of the Tower Road, established prior to 1910, ever
changed into an adverse use.” Nevertheless, the district court determined the Cooks established
adverse use for a five-year statutory period, continually, from 1962 to 2006. Because the
presumption of permissiveness applied when the use began, the Cooks needed to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that “some new and independent act” occurred between 1962 to 2006
“that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive.”
Backman, 147 Idaho at 398, 210 P.3d at 83. The Cooks failed to do so.
        In the early 1900s, John Harker Sr. began using Tower Road to access the Cook Property. By
the 1960s, the Harker family continued using the road in a similar manner, by driving on Tower Road
to access the property. Testimony at trial establishes that the Harkers/Cooks and the Thompsons held
a common belief that the Harker family had a right to use Tower Road and that the Harkers/Cooks did
not seek permission to use Tower Road. However, once permissive use was established, the mere
subjective belief that one has a right to use the road in question is not sufficient to establish adverse
use. See Backman, 147 Idaho at 397–98, 210 P.3d at 82–83; see also H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at
682, 339 P.3d at 567. Nor would permissive use change to adverse use merely because permission
was not continually sought. See Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 704, 963 P.2d 383, 387 (1998)
(“[P]ermissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement.”).
        Rather, the Cooks needed to put forth evidence to show that a hostile and adverse use was
“clearly manifested and ‘brought home’ to the servient property owner.” H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho
at 681, 339 P.3d at 566 (citation omitted); see also Fuquay, 162 Idaho at 379, 397 P.3d at 1138
(citation omitted). “[T]he rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen
into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of

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the owner.” Fuquay, 162 Idaho at 379, 397 P.3d at 1138. In this case, the record supports the
district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’/Cooks’ permissive use of Tower Road never changed
into an adverse use.
       At trial, the Cooks argued that they asserted their right to Tower Road in the 1980s by
occasionally driving around the heavy gate to access Tower Road. However, as the district court
noted, the public also drove around the heavy gate. When a claimed easement is used
“indiscriminately by the general public,” a prescriptive easement generally cannot be established.
Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230 (quoting Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112–13, 697
P.2d 451, 452–53 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 116
Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414 (1989)). Therefore, the district court did not err when it concluded that
the Cooks’ occasional circumvention of the heavy gate was not a sufficiently adverse act to
overcome the established permissive use. Furthermore, the Cooks only needed to drive around the
heavy gate if they forgot their key, which was given to the Harkers by Ted Thompson. As the
district court correctly noted: “a lock and key system, whereby the dominant estate owner is given
a key, is [a factor] which supports a finding of permissive, rather than adverse, use.” See, e.g.,
H.F.L.P., LLC, 157 Idaho at 682, 339 P.3d at 567; Christle v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829, 718 P.2d 1267
(Ct. App. 1986). Thus, the district court’s finding that the Cooks’ use remained permissive is
supported by additional facts in the record.
       For these reasons, the district court’s conclusion that the Harkers’ and Cooks’ use of Tower
Road remained permissive is supported by substantial and competent evidence. As such, the Cooks
failed to prove all the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence, and
the district court erred in granting the Cooks a prescriptive easement.
       C.      Attorney Fees and Costs
       The Cooks assert that they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-
121. Idaho Code section 12-121 provides that a “judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to
the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.” Inasmuch as the Cooks have not prevailed on
appeal, they are not entitled to attorney fees.
                                     IV.    CONCLUSION
       For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court’s decision granting the Cooks
a prescriptive easement and remand with instructions that the district court enter judgment in favor
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of the Van Ordens. The Cooks are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Costs are awarded to the
Van Ordens as a matter of course pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a).
       Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.

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