Court Opinion

ID: 9897938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:14.123952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.003433
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Detention of
                                                   No. 82912-2-I (consolidated with
 ROBERT EUGENE LOUGH,                              No. 82913-1-I
                                                   No. 82126-1-I)
                      Appellant.
                                                   DIVISION ONE

                                                   PUBLISHED OPINION

       MANN, J. — Robert Lough was civilly committed under the sexually violent

predator act (act), chapter 79.01 RCW, in 2015. Lough was evaluated in 2019 and

2020 by a Department of Social and Health Services (Department) evaluator as

required by RCW 71.09.070. The 2019 evaluator determined that Lough still met the

definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP). Lough then petitioned the trial court for

an unconditional release trial under RCW 71.09.090(2), arguing that his participation in

substance abuse treatment changed his condition. The trial court denied Lough’s

request for an unconditional release trial.

       In 2020, the Department’s same evaluator concluded that Lough no longer met

the definition of an SVP. The Department’s secretary disagreed, and under RCW
No. 82912-2-I/2

71.09.090(1)(a) declined to authorize a petition for unconditional release. The trial court

declined Lough’s second petition for an unconditional release trial.

        Lough appeals both trial court decisions. We granted discretionary review and

consolidated the appeals. 1 We affirm.

                                                  I.

        We begin by summarizing the act. The act governs the civil commitment of

SVPs in Washington. The chapter defines an SVP as “any person who has been

convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental

abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in

predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility.” RCW

71.09.020(19).

        At issue in these consolidated appeals are the Department’s required annual

evaluation under RCW 71.09.070 and the process for the committed person to petition

for an unconditional release trial under RCW 71.09.090(2). Under RCW 71.09.070, a

committed SVP “shall have a current examination of his or her mental condition made

by the department at least once every year.” RCW 71.09.070(1). The report prepared

by the Department’s annual evaluator must consider whether:

        (a) The committed person currently meets the definition of a sexually
            violent predator;

        (b) Conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest
            of the person; and

        (c) Conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the
            community.

        1 Lough’s appeals of the 2019 and 2020 annual review proceedings were consolidated.   See No.
82913-1-I; No. 82126-1-I.

                                              -2-
No. 82912-2-I/3

RCW 71.09.070(2). If the Department’s secretary determines that the person’s

condition “has so changed that the person no longer meets the definitions of [an SVP],”

then the secretary must authorize the person to petition the court for unconditional

discharge or discharge to a less restricted alternative. RCW 71.09.090(1).

       If the Department’s secretary determines that the person’s condition has not “so

changed that the person no longer meets the definition of an [SVP],” then under RCW

71.09.090(2)(a), the committed person may petition the trial court annually for an

unconditional release trial. If a petition is filed, the trial court then sets a show cause

hearing to determine whether probable cause exists for an unconditional release trial.

RCW 71.09.090(2)(a). At the show cause hearing, RCW 71.090(2)(a) establishes two

ways for the trial court to determine that there is probable cause to proceed to an

unconditional release trial: “(1) by deficiency in the proof submitted by the State, or (2)

by sufficiency of proof by the [committed person].” In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d

789, 798, 42 P.3d 952 (2002).

       At the show cause hearing, the State must present prima facie evidence that the

committed person continues to meet the definition of an SVP. RCW

71.09.090(2)(b)(i)(A). If the State fails to meet this burden, the court must order an

unconditional release trial. RCW 71.09.090(2)(c)(i). If, however, the State produces

prima facie evidence that the committed person continues to be an SVP, the State’s

burden is met and “an unconditional release trial may not be ordered unless the

committed person produces evidence satisfying: Subsection (4)(a) of this section; and

subsection (4)(b)(i) or (ii) of this section.” RCW 71.09.090(2)(b)(ii)(A). RCW

                                           -3-
No. 82912-2-I/4

71.09.090(4)(a) and (4)(b) set out the evidence required for the committed person to

establish probable cause for a release trial:

       (4)(a) Probable cause exists to believe that a person’s condition has “so
       changed,” under subsection (2) of this section, only when evidence exists,
       since the person’s last commitment trial, or less restrictive alternative
       revocation proceeding, of a substantial change in the person’s physical or
       mental condition such that the person either no longer meets the definition
       of a sexually violent predator or that a conditional release to a less
       restrictive alternative is in the person's best interest and conditions can be
       imposed to adequately protect the community.

       (b) A new trial proceeding under subsection (3) of this section may be
       ordered, or a trial proceeding may be held, only when there is current
       evidence from a licensed professional of one of the following and the
       evidence presents a change in condition since the person’s last
       commitment trial proceeding:

       (i) An identified physiological change to the person, such as paralysis,
       stroke, or dementia, that renders the committed person unable to commit
       a sexually violent act and this change is permanent; or

       (ii) A change in the person’s mental condition brought about through
       positive response to continuing participation in treatment which indicates
       that the person meets the standard for conditional release to a less
       restrictive alternative or that the person would be safe to be at large if
       unconditionally released from commitment.

       The trial court reviews the evidence presented at the show cause hearing for

probable cause. State v. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d 369, 382, 275 P.3d 1092 (2012).

“While the probable cause standard is not a stringent one, it allows the court to perform

a critical gate-keeping function.” The court “must assume the truth of the evidence

presented” but at the same time “must determine whether the asserted evidence, if

believed, is sufficient to establish the proposition its proponent intends to prove.”

McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 382.

                                           -4-
No. 82912-2-I/5

                                            II.

                                            A.

       At 26 years old, Lough was convicted of attempted murder in the first degree and

rape in the first degree after violently raping and beating a 21-year-old woman he met at

a bar. Lough was sentenced to 30 years in prison. While incarcerated, Lough

demonstrated behavioral problems including threats to kill staff members, sexual

harassment, and assaults on other inmates. Before Lough’s release from prison, the

State petitioned to commit Lough as an SVP. In 2010, while detained at the Special

Commitment Center (SCC) awaiting trial, Lough violently assaulted another resident

after he made Lough angry. Lough pleaded guilty to assault in the third degree with the

aggravating factor of substantial bodily injury to the victim and was sentenced to an

exceptional sentence of 60 months in prison. He was released back to the SCC about

two years later.

       The civil commitment case went to a jury trial in 2015. Psychologist Richard

Packard, Ph.D., testified on behalf of the State. Dr. Packard concluded that Lough

suffered from antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), posttraumatic stress disorder

(PTSD), and multiple substance abuse disorders in a controlled environment, including

cannabis, alcohol, stimulants, and opioids. He concluded that the ASPD, PTSD, and

substance abuse disorders were all linked to Lough’s sexual offending.

       Psychiatrist Michael First, M.D., testified as an expert witness on behalf of Lough.

Dr. First agreed that Lough suffered from ASPD, but not PTSD. He rejected the PTSD

diagnosis because he determined that Lough lacked enough required symptoms. Dr.

First further concluded that diagnosing PTSD “depends entirely on [Lough’s] self-

                                          -5-
No. 82912-2-I/6

report,” therefore, “it’s very easy to malinger it.” Finally, Dr. First noted that PTSD and

ASPD share many symptoms.

       Following a unanimous jury verdict in the State’s favor, the trial court ordered

Lough be committed as an SVP to the Department for control, care, and treatment

under chapter 71.09 RCW.

                                             B.

       Department psychologist Elizabeth Bain, Ph.D., completed the 2019 annual

review evaluation of Lough under RCW 71.09.070. Dr. Bain concluded that Lough

continued to meet the SVP definition. Lough then exercised his right to petition for

release under RCW 71.09.090(2). Lough supported his petition with an SVP evaluation

prepared by Amy Phenix, Ph.D. Dr. Phenix confirmed that since he had been at the

SCC, Lough had not participated in sex offender treatment because “his grievance

thinking interferes with his ability to trust others enough to engage himself in therapeutic

activities.” Dr. Phenix concluded, however, that Lough did not meet the definition of an

SVP because of his age, participation in substance abuse treatment, and because she

did not believe he had a paraphilia.

       Lough argued that Dr. Phenix’s report was enough to show change through

“treatment” because her report showed that Lough made progress in substance abuse

classes at the SCC. Lough claimed that nothing limits “treatment” in the statute to

sexual deviancy treatment. The State conversely argued that the statute defines

“treatment” as sex offender specific treatment. The trial court terminated the annual

review and denied Lough’s petition for an evidentiary hearing. The court determined

that the State established a prima facie case that Lough continues to meet the definition

                                           -6-
No. 82912-2-I/7

of an SVP, and Lough failed to show probable cause to believe that he has “so

changed” in accordance with RCW 71.09.090(4).

       We granted Lough’s petition for discretionary review.

                                            C.

       In the meantime, the Department went forward with Lough’s 2020 review under

RCW 71.09.070. Dr. Bain also conducted Lough’s 2020 annual review evaluation. Dr.

Bain recognized that Lough had still not participated in sex offender specific treatment

and remained at risk for committing future acts of violence. But, Dr. Bain concluded that

Lough’s age had possibly remitted his antisocial thinking and his risk for future violent

acts is likely to continue to decrease with age.

       Dr. Bain’s report was reviewed by the SCC’s senior clinical team under the

Department’s regulations. WAC 388-880-058. The senior clinical team did not agree

with Dr. Bain’s conclusion that Lough no longer met the SVP definition. The

Department secretary considered Dr. Bain’s evaluation and the senior clinical team’s

recommendations and declined to authorize Lough to petition for release under RCW

71.09.090(1). Lough again exercised his right under RCW 71.09.090(2) to petition for

release, over the secretary’s objection. The petition proceeded to a new show cause

hearing before the trial court. RCW 71.09.090(2)(a).

       The State retained clinical psychologist Erik Fox, J.D., Ph.D., to evaluate Lough.

Dr. Fox opined to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Lough met the

definition of an SVP. Relying on Dr. Fox’s report, the State moved for an order

terminating the 2020 annual review proceeding. The State argued that Dr. Fox’s report

provided prima facie evidence to satisfy its burden that Lough continues to meet the

                                          -7-
No. 82912-2-I/8

SVP definition. Lough claimed that denying him an unconditional release trial on these

facts violated procedural and substantive due process.

       The trial court found that the State had met its prima facie burden of establishing

that Lough continued to meet the definition of an SVP, and that a less restrictive

alternative was not in Lough’s best interest. The trial court also found that Lough had

not engaged in sex offender treatment at the SCC and could not put forth qualifying

evidence that he had so changed through treatment. The court terminated the 2020

annual review.

       We granted Lough’s petition for discretionary review and consolidated Lough’s

appeals.

                                            III.

       Lough argues that the court erred in denying his request for an unconditional

release trial during the 2019 review process because: (1) the reports completed by Dr.

Phenix established probable cause that he had changed through treatment by

participating in a substance abuse program, (2) if he cannot satisfy the change through

treatment requirement through participation in substance abuse treatment, the statutory

definition of treatment is unconstitutionally vague and violates his right to procedural

due process as applied, and (3) the SCC’s inability to offer treatment for his PTSD

violates his right to due process.

       We review a trial court’s legal determination of whether evidence meets the

probable cause standard de novo. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 394.

                                          -8-
No. 82912-2-I/9

                                             A.

       Lough first argues that “treatment” under the SVP statute is not limited to sex

offender treatment, but should include substance abuse treatment. We disagree.

       Statutory interpretation is a matter of law we review de novo. State v. Evans,

177 Wn.2d 186, 191, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). The goal of statutory interpretation is to

determine and carry out the legislature’s intent. State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell &

Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). To determine legislative intent, we

first examine the plain language of the statute. No further interpretation is needed when

the language is clear and unambiguous. HomeStreet, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,

166 Wn.2d 444, 451, 210 P.3d 297 (2009). A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to

more than one reasonable interpretation. Homestreet, 166 Wn.2d at 451. Words are

given their ordinary meaning and each word should be given effect so that no portion of

the statute is rendered superfluous. Homestreet, 166 Wn.2d at 451-52. “Where

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a statute’s meaning must be derived from

the wording of the statute itself.” Wash. State Human Rights Comm’n v. Cheney Sch.

Dist. No. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982).

       Change through treatment requires the committed person establish “[a] change

in [their] mental condition brought about through positive response to continuing

participation in treatment which indicates that the person meets the standard for

conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or that the person would be safe to be

at large if unconditionally released from commitment.” RCW 71.09.090(4)(b)(ii). The

change must be “substantial.” RCW 71.09.090(4). The SVP statute defines “treatment”

as “the sex offender specific treatment program at the special commitment center or a

                                          -9-
No. 82912-2-I/10

specific course of sex offender treatment pursuant to RCW 71.09.092(1) and (2).” RCW

71.09.020(21).

        Lough argues that the reasonable interpretation is that the sex offender specific

treatment program at the SCC includes treatment for a mental abnormality that formed

a basis for civil commitment—including substance abuse treatment. But we look to the

plain language. The statute does not state that the treatment only addresses the mental

abnormality for commitment. Rather, it requires “sex offender specific” treatment. 2

        The reasonable interpretation is that Lough must engage in treatment that

addresses being a sex offender—not simply substance abuse treatment where Lough

refuses to discuss his underlying sexual offense. Moreover, the language of the statute

directly narrows the scope of treatment. The legislature was decisive and exclusive by

adding “sex offender specific treatment” as a qualifier. RCW 71.09.020(21). We

interpret the statute to give effect to each word as to render none superfluous.

Homestreet, Inc., 166 Wn.2d at 451-52.

        2 While our holding is supported by the plain language of the statute, we note also that the

legislative history also supports the exclusion of substance abuse treatment from SVP “treatment.” The
definition of “treatment” was added to RCW 71.09.020 in 2015. LAWS OF 2015, ch. 278, § 2. The
legislative history reveals that the amendment was adopted in response to efforts to obtain new trials
based on progress in treatment that is not sex offender specific treatment:

        Each year, SVPs are petitioning courts for new trials because they have expert reports
        that say they have changed due to treatments that are not sex offender specific. Only
        this sex offender treatment will reduce recidivism if they are released into the community.
        Sex offender specific treatment is designed to identify and treat the individual’s dynamic
        risk factors. Those risk factors have been empirically demonstrated to be related to
        sexual and violent recidivism. This treatment is currently offered at the Special
        Commitment Center (SCC). Therapeutic change is not a passive process; it involves
        active engagement of the individual and the treatment team to identify risk factors specific
        to that person in order to bring about change that will decrease risk for re-offense.

S.B. REP. ON H.B. 1059, at 2-3, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).

                                                 -10-
No. 82912-2-I/11

       Lough has not participated in sex offender specific treatment while at the SCC.

In 2016, Lough began attending the substance abuse self-help group, Counselor

Assisted Self Help (CASH). In 2018, he was placed on “maximum benefit status” in

CASH, signifying that substance abuse should no longer be a responsivity issue to sex

offender treatment. 3 Lough, however, refused to participate in sex offender specific

treatment at the SCC. Lough participated in Awareness and Preparation and completed

the required prerequisite to sex offender treatment. He was invited to participate in sex

offender treatment, but he declined. And indeed, Lough later withdrew from CASH over

frustration in the discussion of sexual behavior and note taking explaining, in part: “Not

until I joined your version . . . have I ever seen so many assignments involved, many of

which are clearly directed at involving deviant sexual behavior or in some way,

psychologically deviant thoughts.”

       Even though substance abuse may have been a contributing factor to Lough’s

sexual offending, addressing substance abuse alone does not treat the underlying

ASPD and other reasons for committing such a violent sexual offense. To show that he

has “so changed” through treatment, Lough must complete sexual offender specific

treatment. This treatment likely addresses his dynamic risk factors and underlying

reasons for his difficulty controlling his sexually violent behavior, not just abstaining from

substance use.

        3 As explained by Elena Lopez, Psy.D., the SCC’s Chief of Resident Treatment, “responsivity”

addresses things that impede or facilitate progression, “so what accommodations might be necessary for
someone to participate in any formal treatment process, so essentially meeting someone where they are
at and addressing any sort of deficit and/or accommodation that they may need to be successful.”

                                               -11-
No. 82912-2-I/12

                                              B.

       Lough next argues that if we determine that his participation in substance abuse

treatment alone cannot satisfy the “so changed” requirement, then the meaning of

treatment is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.

       “[T]he due process vagueness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment and

article I, section 3 of the state constitution requires that citizens have fair warning of

proscribed conduct.” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 752, 193 P.3d 678 (2008). “A

vagueness challenge seeks to vindicate two principles of due process: the need to

define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice of what

conduct they must avoid and the need to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law

enforcement.” State v. Fraser, 199 Wn.2d 465, 484, 509 P.3d 282 (2022).

       A statute is vague if either “a reasonable person would not understand what

conduct is prohibited or if it lacks ascertainable standards that prevent arbitrary

enforcement.” In re Det. of Lee, 14 Wn. App. 2d 271, 291, 471 P.3d 915 (2020). To

determine whether fair notice exists, impossible standards of specificity are not required

and we examine the term in the context in which it is used. Lee, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 287;

Fraser, 99 Wn.2d at 484. To determine whether a statute provides adequate standards

for enforcement, the court looks to whether the statute defines conduct through

“inherently subjective terms.” Fraser, 199 Wn.2d at 484. The statute is only vague “if it

invites an inordinate amount of . . . discretion.” Fraser, 199 Wn.2d at 484.

       We presume statutes are constitutional. City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wn.2d 717,

719, 600 P.2d 1268 (1979). The challenging party “carries the heavy burden of

demonstrating the enactment’s invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt.” City of Bellevue,

                                            -12-
No. 82912-2-I/13

92 Wn.2d at 720. We review constitutional questions de novo. Fraser, 199 Wn.2d at

475.

       Lough argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the term “sex

offender specific treatment program” is so unclear as to deprive him of fair notice and

the actions of the trial court and SCC treatment providers amount to arbitrary

enforcement. We disagree.

       Here, an ordinary person could understand what conduct is proscribed. It is

reasonable to assume that the requirement to undergo “the sex offender specific

treatment program” to mean treatment that involves discussion of the person’s sex

offense history and risk factors. It is reasonable for an ordinary person to be on notice

that discussing substance abuse or any other disorder without targeted discussion of

sexual offending would not constitute sex offender treatment. Requiring only treatment

of substance abuse with no discussion of their sexual offense history, cycle, or risk

factors, would defy the purpose of the statute in treating individuals who have been

civilly committed for sexually violent offenses.

       Lough also cannot prove that the “so changed” requirement is arbitrarily enforced

by the SCC or the trial court. The statutory definition of treatment does not invite an

“inordinate amount of discretion.” Fraser, 199 Wn.2d at 484. Lough must establish that

he has “so changed” through sex offender specific treatment. As the trial court found,

“Lough’s participation in substance abuse treatment . . . has not fully addressed the

overall disorder which the substance abuse contributed to. It’s one large ball of wax,

and I can’t peel off one area of participation treatment and say, that’s it, you’ve met

criteria, and you’re sufficiently changed.” The court then concluded that Lough has not

                                          -13-
No. 82912-2-I/14

done what is “necessary for him to begin to show that he has lowered his risk and

addressed the full diagnosis that got him admitted to the [SCC] in the first place as an

SVP, and that is, he has not participated in sex offender treatment, and that’s an

undisputed fact.”

       Lough has not participated in sex offender treatment. The SVP statute entrusts

the SCC as the entity in charge of the “control, care, and treatment” of SVPs. RCW

71.09.060(1). Lough was committed as an SVP, and therefore must participate in sex

offender treatment. The SCC requiring Lough to participate in more than substance

abuse treatment is reasonable enforcement under the statute and does not constitute

arbitrary enforcement.

       The definition of treatment under the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.

                                             C.

       Lough next argues that the “so changed” requirement as applied to him violates

procedural due process under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893,

47 L. Ed. 2d. 18 (1976). We disagree.

       No state may deprive any person of liberty without due process of law. U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. 1, § 3. The procedural component of the due

process clause requires that government action be implemented in a fundamentally fair

manner. State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 332, 358 P.3d 385 (2015). We review

constitutional questions de novo. State v. Derenoff, 182 Wn. App. 458, 465, 332 P.3d

1001 (2014).

       In determining procedural due process protections, we “employ the Mathews

test, which balances: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of erroneous

                                           -14-
No. 82912-2-I/15

deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of

additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the governmental interest, including costs and

administrative burdens of additional procedures.” In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357,

370, 150 P.3d 86 (2007).

        The first Mathews factor weighs in Lough’s favor as involuntary commitment is a

“massive curtailment of liberty.” In re Det. of Johnson, 179 Wn. App. 579, 588, 322

P.3d 22 (2014). The third Mathews factor favors the State because it “has a substantial

interest in encouraging treatment, preventing the premature release of SVPs, and

avoiding the significant administrative and fiscal burdens associated with evidentiary

hearings.” McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 394. Thus, the second factor is determinative

here.

        In McCuistion, our Supreme Court considered the procedural due process

concerns of the SVP statute, and in particular, whether the requirements for establishing

probable cause to gain a full postcommitment hearing satisfy procedural due process.

174 Wn.2d at 393. The court recognized that, given the “extensive procedural

safeguards” in chapter 71.09 RCW, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is low.

McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 393. As for the 2005 amendments to the statute that added

the probable cause requirements in RCW 71.09.090(4), the court explained:

        As noted earlier, the 2005 amendments do not alter the standard for
        continued commitment. The State is still required to evaluate the SVP
        annually to determine whether the person continues to meet the definition
        of an SVP. If not, a person is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing within 45
        days. RCW 71.09.090(1). In addition, an SVP is entitled by statute to a
        show cause hearing where the State is required to present a prima facie
        case that the individual continues to be mentally ill and dangerous, and
        the SVP need only present evidence that refutes the State’s probable

                                           -15-
No. 82912-2-I/16

       cause showing. Assuming—as we must—that the legislature is correct
       that a single demographic is insufficient to demonstrate that the individual
       has “so changed” as to no longer be mentally ill and dangerous and,
       additionally, that change of that nature requires participation in treatment,
       the procedure established by the legislature ensures that individuals who
       remain committed continue to meet the constitutional standard for
       commitment, namely dangerousness and mental abnormality. Thus, it is
       unlikely to result in an erroneous deprivation of liberty.

McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 393-94.

       Lough contends that his circumstances meaningfully differ from McCuistion’s

because, unlike Lough, McCuistion refused treatment and based his petition for release

solely on a change in his age. Thus, Lough contends, the court’s holding in McCuistion

cannot be applied to his case. But the McCuistion court did not rely McCuistion’s lack of

treatment to conclude that the SVP statute satisfied procedural due process. Rather,

the court concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation was minimal as the result of

the annual review process under RCW 71.09.090(1), which is presumed to determine

when someone is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 393-

94. The court reiterated that a person is entitled to a trial when the annual review

evaluation concludes that the person no longer meets SVP definition. McCuistion, 174

Wn.2d at 393-94.

       Lough’s 2019 annual review evaluation concluded that he continued to be

mentally ill and dangerous. The court then concluded that the State satisfied its burden

of proof. Based on McCuistion, Lough’s 2019 annual review process satisfied due

process. 174 Wn.2d at 393-94. The annual review proceeding provides sufficient

procedural protections. Lough’s as applied challenge to procedural due process fails.

                                          -16-
No. 82912-2-I/17

                                            D.

       Continuing his theme of trying to dictate his choice of treatment options, Lough

next argues that the failure to provide PTSD treatment violates due process because

without the opportunity for treatment, he does not have a realistic opportunity to be

cured and released. We disagree.

       Due process “requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some

reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Jackson v.

Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed 2d 435 (1972). The nature and

duration of commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW reflect the dual purposes of

commitment, which are treatment and incapacitation for the mentally ill and dangerous.

In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 27, 857 P.2d 989 (1993). Those subject to

civil commitment have “a constitutional right to receive ‘such individual treatment as will

give each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental

condition.’” In re Det. of D.W., 181 Wn.2d 201, 208, 332 P.3d 423 (2014) (quoting

Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)).

       Due process requires an annual review process that grants a release trial upon a

showing that Lough is no longer mentally ill and dangerous. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at

384, 389. As discussed above, such a change in condition can be shown either by “an

identified physiological change to the person,” or a change brought about “through

positive response to continuing participation in treatment”—specifically sex offender

treatment. RCW 71.09.090(4)(b)(i), (ii); RCW 71.09.020(21). Lough can and should

undergo sexual offender specific treatment which will give him a “realistic opportunity to

be cured or improve” his underlying mental abnormalities contributing to his

                                          -17-
No. 82912-2-I/18

dangerousness. This treatment is readily available at the SCC. But Lough refuses to

participate.

       Our Supreme Court has explained that there is “no talismanic significance to a

particular diagnosis of mental illness.” In re Det. of Thorell, 149 Wn.2d 724, 762, 72

P.3d 708 (2003). “No technical diagnosis of a particular ‘mental abnormality’ definitively

renders an individual either an SVP or not.” Thorell, 149 Wn.2d at 762. It is the

“diagnosis of a mental abnormality, coupled with a history of sexual violence, which

gives rise to a serious lack of control and creates the risk a person will likely commit

acts of predatory sexual violence in the future.” Thorell, 149 Wn.2d at 762. Specific

diagnoses that comprise an individual’s mental abnormality do not form the basis of

commitment. Instead, it is the overarching mental illness, mental abnormality, or

personality disorder coupled with dangerousness that render them appropriate for

commitment.

       Lough is correct that the State’s expert, Dr. Packard, testified during his 2015

commitment trial that Lough suffered from ASPD, PTSD, and multiple forms of

substance abuse and all three were linked to his diagnosis. But Lough ignores that his

expert, Dr. First, disagreed that Lough suffered from PTSD. More importantly, the trial

court’s instructions to the jury and closing arguments by all parties reiterated that a

finding of a specific diagnosis was not required to establish that Lough was an SVP. No

special interrogatory or verdict required the jury to select and declare which diagnosis

they found beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury had to find only that Lough met the

definition of an SVP, that he had been convicted of a crime of sexual violence, suffered

from a mental abnormality causing serious difficulty controlling his sexually violent

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No. 82912-2-I/19

behavior, and that it made him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if

not securely confined. Nothing requires Lough to receive PTSD treatment to have a

realistic opportunity for release. Lough has access to sex offender specific treatment—

he just refuses to participate.

       Finally, Lough asserts that the trial court denied an unconditional release trial

because he had not fully participated in treatment to address all of his diagnosed mental

abnormalities. Lough interprets the trial court’s statement as meaning he must

participate in PTSD treatment. Lough misinterprets the court’s oral ruling. In holding

that Lough had not established probable cause that he had changed through treatment,

the court stated, in part:

       The big problem I’m having here, the overwhelming problem I’m having
       with the presentation here, is that Dr. Phenix agrees, everybody agrees,
       that Mr. Lough has declined to engage in any sexual offender treatment at
       the SCC . . . Mr. Lough hasn’t done what is necessary for him to begin to
       show that he has lowered his risk and addressed the full diagnosis that got
       him admitted to the SCC in the first place as an SVP, and that is, he has
       not participated in sex offender treatment. And that’s an undisputed fact.

Consistent with the statute, the trial court denied Lough an unconditional release trial

based on his failure to participate in sex offender specific treatment and address the

manifestation of his mental disorder—offending sexually. The trial court did not

conclude that Lough must participate in PTSD treatment to establish that he was “so

changed.”

       Lough’s due process interest in receiving an unconditional release trial by

showing that he has changed through treatment was not abrogated. Lough was not

entitled to an unconditional release trial because he failed to participate in the requisite

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No. 82912-2-I/20

sex offender treatment. Lough’s due process claim based on the lack of PTSD

treatment at SCC fails.

                                            IV.

      Lough also challenges the trial court’s decision declining to grant an

unconditional release trial after his 2020 evaluation. Lough argues that because the

Department’s evaluator concluded he no longer met the definition of an SVP, the

Department’s decision to decline authorization for an unconditional release trial violated

substantive and procedural due process.

                                            A.

      Lough first argues that substantive due process requires an unconditional

release trial when the Department’s annual review evaluation concludes the committed

person has changed and is no longer an SVP. We disagree.

      Substantive due process is satisfied where “both initial and continued

confinement are predicated on the individual’s mental abnormality and dangerousness,”

which the State must justify through periodic review. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 387.

Thus, a person “may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no

longer.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77, 112 S. Ct. 1780 118 L. Ed. 2d 437

(1992).

      Our Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the SVP statutory scheme against

substantive due process claims. In Young, the court explained that civil commitment

statutes are constitutional—and will pass strict scrutiny—when they further compelling

state interests and are narrowly drawn to serve those interests. 122 Wn.2d at 26. In

addressing the SVP statute, the court explained that the State has an “irrefutable” and

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No. 82912-2-I/21

compelling interest in treating sex offenders and protecting society from their actions.

Young, 122 Wn.2d at 26. The court concluded that the nature and duration of the

commitment bears a reasonable relation to the statute’s dual purposes of treatment and

incapacitation. Young, 122 Wn.2d at 33-34.

       The Young court also concluded that the SVP statute is narrowly drawn because

it only permits detention of individuals who are both mentally ill and dangerous. Young,

122 Wn.2d at 27-35, 39. The court explained that committed persons have “a full trial

with a complete range of procedural protections” and that “the statute’s release

provisions provide the opportunity for periodic review of the committed individual’s

current mental condition and continuing dangerousness to the community.” Young, 122

Wn.2d at 39.

       And in McCuistion, our Supreme Court upheld statutory amendments that narrow

the scope of evidence a committed person could rely on to establish probable cause for

an unconditional release trial. 174 Wn.2d at 385. The court held that the ability for a

release trial based on the “so changed” provision is a statutory right that “provides

additional safeguards that go beyond the requirements of substantive due process.”

McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 385.

       McCuistion affirmed that substantive due process only requires that the State

conduct periodic review of the person’s suitability for release. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at

385. The court noted that the 2005 amendments changing the requirements necessary

to gain a full evidentiary trial did not alter “the constitutionally critical annual review

scheme.” McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388. It explained that Young upheld the SVP

statute because the statute requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

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No. 82912-2-I/22

the person is mentally ill and dangerous at the initial commitment hearing and to justify

continued detention through the annual review process. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388.

And then, if the individual no longer meets the definition of an SVP, “‘the secretary shall

authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release’ or ‘unconditional

discharge.’” McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 388 (quoting RCW 71.09.090(1)).

       And in In re of Det. of Nelson, 2 Wn. App. 2d 621, 630, 411 P.3d 412 (2018), we

rejected the argument Lough makes here—that allowing the State to present a different

evaluation at the show cause hearing from that of its annual evaluation contradicts

substantive due process. We explained:

       What is critical to the constitutionality of the statute is a “periodic and
       timely evaluation of the sexually violent person’s mental health condition.”
       In re Det. of Rushton, 190 [Wn.] App. 358, 371, 359 P.3d 935 (2015). The
       periodic and timely evaluation is provided for in RCW 71.09.070 by
       making it an obligation of the department. Allowing the prosecuting
       agency to present a different evaluation to make its prima facie case at the
       show cause hearing provided for in RCW 71.09.090(2) does not
       undermine the objectivity of the annual review process and is not
       inconsistent with substantive due process. Cases cited by petitioners do
       not suggest otherwise. The Supreme Court has expressly stated that at a
       probable cause hearing, the trial court “is entitled to consider all of the
       evidence, including evidence submitted by the State.” McCuistion [174
       Wn.2d at 382].

       Contrary to the argument of petitioners, allowing the state to bring in
       expert witnesses other than the department’s evaluator is not an absurd
       result. A party’s discretion to retain and rely on expert witnesses of its
       choosing is a regular component of civil and criminal proceedings.

Nelson, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 630-31.

       Lough’s contention that the annual review consists solely of the individual

Department evaluator’s annual review evaluation conducted under RCW 71.09.070 is

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No. 82912-2-I/23

incorrect. McCuistion, Young, and Nelson support the proposition that the release

procedures in RCW 71.09.090(1), not just the evaluation, provide the constitutionally

required periodic review. McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 385-86; Young, 122 Wn.2d at 39;

Nelson, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 630. The annual review process is not limited to the individual

evaluator’s evaluation, but includes review by the Department’s secretary under RCW

71.09.090(1). McCuistion explained that after the annual review evaluation is

completed under RCW 71.09.070, it is the Department that decides whether a person

no longer meets SVP definition and can petition for release under RCW 71.09.090(1),

not the individual evaluator. 174 Wn.2d at 380. Thus, it is the process, not the

individual evaluator that ensures substantive due process.

      Under RCW 71.09.070 and 71.09.090(1), the Department completed a forensic

evaluation by an evaluator and completed a review by the senior clinical team and the

Department’s secretary. The senior clinical team and ultimately the secretary did not

adopt the conclusion that Lough no longer meets criteria as an SVP, and thus did not

authorize Lough to petition for unconditional release. The secretary considered the

conclusions of the senior clinical team and the individual evaluator in making this

decision.

      The secretary reaching a different conclusion than the individual evaluator does

not mean that the statute “permits the continued involuntary commitment of a person

who is no longer mentally ill and dangerous,” as Lough contends. Instead, it supports

the notion that the SVP statute consists of a rigorous review process that considers

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No. 82912-2-I/24

input from multiple experts and clinicians. An individual evaluator’s report is not a

determinative factor in the Department’s conclusion. 4

        The trial court then reviewed Lough’s petition under RCW 71.09.090(2). At the

annual review proceeding, the State presented prima facie evidence that Lough

continues to meet the definition of an SVP. The State satisfied this burden by

presenting an outside expert evaluation concluding that Lough remains mentally ill and

dangerous, thus justifying his commitment. See RCW 71.09.090(2)(b)(iii). And we

previously held that the State’s reliance on an outside expert at the annual review

proceeding does not violate substantive due process. Nelson, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 630.

        Lough’s substantive due process rights were not violated because the annual

review process as a whole ensures that he has been determined to still be l mentally ill

and dangerous and that his commitment continues to be based on those reasons.

                                                    B.

        Lough next argues that procedural due process requires an unconditional release

trial when the Department evaluator concludes that the committed person no longer

meets the criteria for commitment, even when the conclusion conflicts with the

Department’s final position. We disagree.

        We again employ the Mathews test as discussed above. Stout, 159 Wn.2d at

370; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The second factor remains dispositive. In re Det. of

Hatfield, 191 Wn. App. 378, 397, 362 P.3d 997 (2015).

         4 Lough’s contention that Young held that the Department must authorize a petition if an evaluator

states that he no longer meets the SVP definition is a misstatement. Young stated that “[i]f it appears that
the person is no longer a sexually violent predator then the secretary of DSHS shall authorize the
detainee to petition the court for release [under] RCW 71.09.090.” 122 Wn.2d at 13. This shows that it is
ultimately the decision of the secretary, not the individual evaluators.

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No. 82912-2-I/25

       A “comprehensive set of rights for the SVP detainee already exists” under

chapter 71.09 RCW. Stout, 159 Wn.2d at 370. “The risk of an erroneous deprivation of

liberty under the challenged amendments [2005 treatment-based change amendments]

is low” because of “the extensive procedural safeguards in chapter 71.09 RCW.”

McCuistion, 174 Wn.2d at 393.

       The SVP statute affords a committed person a complete range of procedural

protections. Young, 122 Wn.2d at 39. The State has the burden of showing that the

person meets the definition of an SVP at the probable cause determination and the civil

commitment trial. RCW 71.09.040; 71.09.060. The statute affords the right to a jury

trial, unanimous jury verdict, and appointed counsel. RCW 71.09.050-.060; Young, 122

Wn.2d at 39. To commit, the State carries the highest possible burden of convincing

the jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. RCW 71.09.060(1).

       These comprehensive procedural protections continue throughout commitment,

including annual examinations by a qualified evaluator and the right to obtain their own

qualified expert to conduct an evaluation. RCW 71.09.070. The secretary may

determine the person is entitled to an unconditional release trial, but even if denied, the

committed person may petition over the secretary’s objection for a probable cause

hearing. RCW 71.09.090(1), (2). A committed person may then obtain an unconditional

release trial by presenting probable cause of a change through participation in sex

offender treatment. RCW 71.09.090(4).

       In the face of this “panoply of procedural protections,” the refusal to order an

unconditional release trial when a single Department evaluator concludes that a person

no longer meets SVP definition is of little value or consequence. McCuistion, 174

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No. 82912-2-I/26

Wn.2d at 393. Under the act, the trial court must order an unconditional release trial

when the Department’s secretary authorizes a petition for release. RCW 71.09.090(1).

The secretary’s authorization of a petition for release comes from the secretary’s

decision—the agency’s final determination—that the committed person no longer meets

SVP definition. The decision relies on multiple clinicians and experts, such as

Department evaluators and the senior clinical team.

       The additional measures of seeking outside experts, consulting the senior clinical

team, and the final decision resting with the secretary do not render the Department

evaluator’s reports superfluous. The report has a legal effect as the State uses it to

meet its burden of proof at the annual review proceeding, or it requires the State to

obtain other evidence justifying commitment or concede that an unconditional release

trial is warranted.

       A requirement that the court must issue an unconditional release trial when a

single evaluator determines a person does not meet the SVP definition would contradict

the State’s interest. Here, the Department’s secretary and senior clinical team

concluded that Lough meets the criteria for commitment, the State presented prima

facie evidence in the form of an expert opinion that Lough remains mentally ill and

dangerous, and Lough cannot show a change because of participation in treatment

because he refused sex offender specific treatment. Lough’s failure to obtain an

unconditional release trial through the various provided pathways does not render the

statutory scheme in violation of procedural due process as applied to him.

       Lough also argues that due process requires a neutral fact finder because using

hired experts, such as Dr. Fox, creates bias. But this argument is conjecture. Both

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No. 82912-2-I/27

sides are allowed to obtain outside experts, yet the final decision in the annual review

process is left to the secretary—an agent of the Department itself. As we recognized in

Nelson, the State’s obligation to present evidence at the annual review proceeding is

separate from the Department’s obligation to conduct an annual evaluation, and the

State’s reliance on an outside evaluator at the annual review proceeding does not

undermine the objectivity of the Department’s process. 2 Wn. App. 2d at 630. Lough

provides no basis to support his opinion about Dr. Fox and his argument based on

“hired bias” fails.

       Lough’s procedural due process claims fail.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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