Court Opinion

ID: 9567231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:04.780136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:27.208264
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams,
formerly concurring, now dissents.
*27Upon a reconsideration, of this matter in connection with the plaintiff in error’s petition for • rehearing, I have changed my mind and now I would not only grant the petition for rehearing, but I dissent from the majority opinion.
In my dissent I am only concerned with that portion of the majority opinion which approves the ruling of the trial court that as a matter of law Benallo was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the unfortunate accident wherein the minor child, James Bare, was struck by the vehicle driven by Benallo.
The majority opinion concerns itself almost exclusively with the rather interesting question as to whether a 6 year old child under any circumstance could be guilty of contributory negligence. Accordingly there is virtually no discussion in the majority opinion of the equally important issue as to whether the trial court was correct in its determination that as a matter of law Benallo was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the child’s injuries. In this regard the only reference in the majority opinion to this important issue is as follows: “We agree with the trial court that, as a matter of law, Benallo himself was guilty of negligence when his vehicle struck James.”
With the forgoing conclusion, I am very definitely not in accord. On the contrary, I am of the firm view that the issue as to whether Benallo was negligent and—■ if negligent — whether his negligence was a proximate cause of Bare’s injuries was a disputed issue of fact to be resolved by the jury.
At this stage of the proceedings the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Benallo. It was Benallo’s general theory of the case that he was driving his vehicle in a reasonably careful manner and within the lawful speed limit when the Bare child ran into the street in the middle of the block, and that it was for this reason that he was unable to stop his vehicle before *28striking the child. And I find evidence in the record which supports this theory.
The injured child did not testify. Benallo testified that he was proceeding in a northerly direction on Monaco at approximately 25-30 miles per hour; that as he entered the 5800 block he saw a child standing off the street by a mailbox on the west side of Monaco; that he then took his foot off the accelerator and thereafter kept his eyes on the boy “all the time”; that he saw the boy look to the north and then directly towards the approaching vehicle being driven by Benallo; and that “all of a sudden” the boy was directly in front of his car.
Benallo called as his witness one Shirley Martin, who was driving a vehicle some 2 or 3 car lengths behind Benallo’s car. She testified that she saw the boy leave the mailbox and proceed into the street in the middle of the block at what she described as either a “slow run” or “fast walk.”
True, there is some evidence which would tend to support the plaintiff’s contention that the accident was solely caused by Benallo’s negligence, and did not result from any act, be it negligent or not, on the part of the minor child. Though the .facts and circumstances surrounding this accident may not be in great dispute, certainly reasonable minds might well differ as to the proper inferences to be drawn from those facts and circumstances. For example, though the injured child for some reason did not testify, his mother did. She stated that she did not see the accident, though she “heard” it. On direct examination she testified that her child had never gone across the street in front of their home to the mailbox, as she would not even allow her children outside the yard. Yet a disinterested witness called by the defendant testified that minutes after the accident she heard the mother say to her injured child, and I quote: “you little s.o.b., how many times have I told you to stay out of the street.....I told you one of these times you were going to get it!”
*29Without going into any more detail, in my mind all of this adds up to a controverted issue of fact, which under established rules is to be resolved by the trier of the facts. As to the issue of negligence and proximate cause, this was not an open and shut case as the majority of this court now hold. And under the circumstances the matter should not have been resolved as a matter of law by the trial court. It is only in the clearest of cases where the facts are not only undisputed but, in addition, reasonable minds could draw but one inference thereupon that the question of what constitutes reasonable care is one of law. Lasnetske v. Parres, 148 Colo. 71, 365 P. 2d 250. In my mind this is not such a “clear” case as to justify the drastic action taken by the trial court.
Finally, it is perhaps of interest to note that at the conclusion of the plaintiffs case the defendant did himself move for a directed verdict in his favor on the ground, among others, that the plaintiff had failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. The trial court denied this motion, and said the issue was a “jury question.” It was only at the conclusion of the case that the trial court apparently changed its mind and directed a verdict on the issue of liability against the defendant. I am of the view that the trial court was correct in its first ruling when it stated, in effect, that the issue of negligence and proximate cause posed a “jury question.” It is for this reason that I now dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Moore has authorized me to state he joins in the foregoing dissent.