Court Opinion

ID: 9610470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:41:55.718528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:59.746694
License: Public Domain

Felton, C. J.,
dissenting. My interpretation of the petition in this case, especially in view of the allegations as to damages and the prayer therefor, is that it is an action to recover damages for one single complete damage to the property. See City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724 (28 S. E. 994). My view in such conclusion is fortified by the ruling in Farley v. Gate City Gas Light Co., 105 Ga. 323 (31 S. E. 193). In Division 5 of this case, the Supreme Court ruled on the question whether the trial judge erred in making a certain announcement by request of counsel for both parties. In this announcement the court stated that the diminution in the market value of property would not be an element for recovery in successive suits for a continuing nuisance. See bottom of page 333 and top of page 334. The court held that this announcement was not error. Construing the petition in this case to serve the best interests of the plaintiff in the absence of demurrer raising the particular question (see Harbour v. City of Rome, 54 Ga. App. 97, 187 S. E. 231), it follows that the petition should be construed as not one for damages based on the mere continuance or maintenance of a nuisance. The notice given to the city is notice of the same kind of action *517as the petition contains and since it was not given within six months of the doing of the public work which allegedly caused the damage, the trial judge did not err in sustaining the demurrer and in dismissing the action.
The cases are very confusing on the question when a party must or may sue in one action for all damages and vice versa. I do not know that a definite rule can be gleaned from the decisions. It seems to me that under the facts of this case the court should hold that the public improvement shown in the petition is conclusively a permanent one and that the only remedy the plaintiff has is to sue for all damages in one action. See Bainbridge Power Co. v. Ivey, 41 Ga. App. 193 (1) (152 S. E. 306) for the rule as to when a nuisance is to be treated as permanent. Even if the plaintiff in this case had two remedies and had the right to elect between them, he has done so, in my opinion, and this court has no authority to treat the action as one for only partial damage. If the notice had been given in due time a special demurrer to the measure of damages could not have forced the plaintiff to change his cause of action from one seeking all damages at one time to an action for damages accruing within the four years preceding the filing of the action, assuming the plaintiff could bring either action. If he could only bring an action for full damage at one time, my conclusion is all the more nearly correct.