Court Opinion

ID: 9642911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:12:10.353883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:54.271106
License: Public Domain

*694MORTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting.)
It seems to me that the opinion in the Nardone Case, Nardone v. U. S., 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. -, December 20, 1937, especially when read in connection with the dissent, indicates clearly that on questions of wire tapping the views of the Supreme Court are now in accordance with those expressed in the dissenting opinions in the Olmstead Case, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376. My associates, I understand, feel that, as the Olmstead Case was not explicitly overruled, we are still bound by it. I had not supposed the requirement to be so rigid, especially on matters of this character where the law rests on ethical considerations. The Nardone Case, passing by the constitutional question, holds in substance that conduct which is regarded by the public as so unethical that it is by statute specifically forbidden to persons generally is also forbidden to officers of the law, and that evidence obtained by officers in violation of such statutes will not be admitted in the federal courts. This principle is equally applicable whether the statute involved is federal or state; and I do not think there is occasion to resort to nicety of construction in dealing with such statutes in order to avoid this salutary rule. Official lawlessness seems to me quite as serious as private lawlessness because if it is condoned individuals are left helpless against official abuse — not a negligible danger in view of the rapidly extending powers of federal and state bureaucracies.