Court Opinion

ID: 9731540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:49:25.774754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:19.434601
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). First, it must be stated what the facts of this case do not deal with and that is the termination of Michael’s mother’s parental rights. This case concerns a grandmother, the plaintiff, who is seeking the legal custody of her grandson, Michael.
According to the testimony of Theol A. Barstad, the grandmother, and Wanda K. Frazier, the mother of Michael, the boy was born on November 24, 1973, and has lived outside of the grandmother’s home for only six months, except for the time after birth when he lived with his mother and her father for about two months and with his mother and her brother for less than a month. Michael was approximately eight years of age at the time of the custody hearing on December 21 and 30, 1981, and is now about ten and one-half years. During his eight years he has:
(1) lived outside of the grandmother’s house for approximately six months;
(2) lived in the grandmother’s house with his mother also living there for approximately four and one-half years;
(3) lived in the grandmother’s house while his mother lived elsewhere for close to three years.
He has now lived in his grandmother’s house without his mother living there since April, May or June of 1980.
The parties differed in their testimony as to who was involved in the daily care of Michael while they all lived in the grandmother’s house. However, during that period of time, the mother worked nights and she testified that she saw Michael only for an hour a day in the morning before he went to school and during weekends. The *572grandmother testified that from February, 1974, to February, 1977, she was primarily responsible for meeting Michael’s physical needs and that from August, 1977, to the time of the hearing, she and her husband had been primarily responsible for raising Michael and meeting his physical needs. Michael’s mother admitted to attending only one parent-teacher conference at his school. The grandmother testified that she attended the balance of such meetings.
Footnote 10 in the majority opinion discusses a different conclusion than mine as to what the record bears on the mother’s continuing relationship with Michael. The record on this issue consists of the mother and grandmother’s testimony and in some respects they are at odds with each other. That is a strong reason for affirming the trial court unless the trial judge abused his discretion, which in my opinion he did not do here. The trial judge heard and saw the witnesses and had the opportunity to develop the evidence to a greater degree if he believed he needed more information. As an appellate court we are not in such a favored position to evaluate the testimony since we have only a record which is sometimes short of what we wish as to convincing power.
There is nothing at all in the record of the daily and hourly togetherness of Michael and his mother when they both lived in the grandmother’s house since the only testimony on the mother’s working hours was from the mother and the grandmother as to working nights. If she had other working hours and conditions during that time, she did not testify to them. This again is a strong reason for affirming the trial judge absent an abuse of discretion which is not found here by the majority. The record does not show how many parent-teacher conferences the grandmother attended for Michael but only that she attended all of them except the one attended by his mother.
*573According to the trial court’s findings, the result of having spent all of his life but approximately six months in his grandmother’s house and under her immediate, even though not exclusive, care is that Michael is a happy, bright, friendly, intelligent and well-adjusted boy who is doing well in school and is happy in his present surroundings, his grandmother’s home.
Since this is a custody case and not termination of parental rights case, Stanley v. Illinois, is not relevant. In the portion of that case quoted by the majority (supra at p. 557), the Supreme Court described the child’s father as not only having sired but “raised” the child. We do not have a mother in the instant case who has raised her child.
Quilloin v. Walcott, cited by the majority, arose under a Georgia law which required consent by a parent for adoption of a child born out of wedlock. The Supreme Court, however, denied the father’s attempt to block the adoption. The court stated in Quilloin that since the father had never been a de facto member of his child’s family, he was not denied due process by not allowing him a veto over his child’s adoption. The statements of the Court in Quilloin regarding the rights of parents were directed to a “natural family” and in that situation unfitness of a parent was necessary before breaking up the natural family. In the instant case, Michael has lived with his “natural family,” which is his grandmother, for all but approximately six months of his entire life. The Quilloin case was decided on the rule of the best interest of the child.
In the In Interest of J.L.W. case, termination of parental rights of the mother was at issue. There this court required a finding of unfitness of the mother before her parental rights could be terminated. Again, since that case concerns the termination of parental rights, it is not relevant to the present custody case.
*574Smith v. Organization of Foster Families did not involve the issue of weighing the rights of natural parents as against foster parents, nor did it involve a custody or termination issue. The foster parents organization challenged New York procedures for removal of children who had lived with the foster family for less than 18 months. These foster families claimed a constitutional liberty interest in the integrity of their family unit. It is in that atmosphere that the Supreme Court upheld New York’s procedures and described family values as follows:
“Thus the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘pro-mot [ing] a way of life’ through the instruction of children, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972), as well as from the fact of blood relationship. No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent relationship, between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the absence of blood relationship.” 431 U.S. at 844. (Footnote omitted.)
Regarding In Interest of Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 447-48, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) the majority states: “A biological parent who has never borne any significant responsibility for the child and who has not functioned as a member of the child’s family unit is not entitled to the full constitutional protections.” (Supra at p. 563.) Michael’s mother has not borne a significant responsibility for Michael and has not consistently functioned as a member of the child’s family unit, and yet the majority applies an unfitness of parent test rather than in the best interest of the child test.
The majority states: “The statutory standards for child custody do not establish an absolute right of a fit and able parent to the custody of his or her children in the face of compelling reasons to the contrary.” (Supra at p. 564.) Then the majority cites sec. 767.24 (2), Stats.:
*575“ ‘767.24 Child custody.... (2) In making a custody determination, the court shall consider all facts in the best interest of the child and shall not prefer one potential custodian over the other on the basis of the sex of the custodian. The court shall consider reports of appropriate professionals where admitted into evidence when custody is contested. The court shall consider the following factors in making its determination.’ ” (Supra at p. 564.)
That section states the legislature’s determination that in child custody cases the test is the best interest of the child. Paternity would only be one, but important, fact in applying that test for custody.
The majority ignores the legislative pronouncement in sec. 767.24(1) (c), Stats., which is that the best interest of the child is the appropriate test in a custody award and not the unfitness test. That section states the test as “If the interest of the child demands it,” which is always the paramount test. Section 767.24(1) (c) speaks to applying the best interest of the child test only if both parties in the action are unfit or unable to adequately care for the child before awarding custody to a relative of the child based on the child’s best interest. In that circumstance, there is no alternative but to look to the best interest of the child. However, in the instant case neither party has been found unfit, but that does not eliminate the test of best interest of the child. It is unnecessary and in fact unwise to find the mother unfit and therefore not able to participate in any way with the raising of her son. By awarding custody of the boy to the grandmother, the trial court did not foreclose contact with the mother on a daily or regular basis which a finding of unfitness might have brought about.
In Larson v. Larson, 30 Wis. 2d 291, 299, 140 N.W.2d 230 (1966), we stated:
“A court should not necessarily feel impelled to make a finding of unfitness on the part of the mother when it has *576determined that the best interests of the child demand its custody be placed in the father. ... In many instances the mother can be a fit person to have the custody, but because of other comparative circumstances custody to the father serves the best interest of the child.”
The trial court should not be required to find the parent unfit before considering the best interests of the child since that is not in the child’s best interest. If the parent is found by a court to be unfit, his or her parental rights should be terminated. If the parent is not unfit, he or she still may not be the person to have custody of the child when considering the child’s best interest.
Section 767.24(2), Stats., controls when making a custody determination and the test there is the best interest of the child. That section now sets forth the factors the trial court shall consider in making the determination and they are:
“ (a) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to custody;
“ (am) The wishes of the child as to his or her custody;
“(b) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest ;
“(c) The child’s adjustment to the home, school, religion and community;
“(d) The mental and physical health of the parties, the minor children and other persons living in a proposed custodial household;
“(e) The availability of public or private child care services; and
. “ (f) Such other factors as the court may in each individual ease determine to be relevant.”
Unfitness is not defined in the statutes. In a concurring opinion in LaChapell v. Mawhinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679 at 685-86, Chief Justice Horace Wilkie gave a relevant definition of unfitness in a custody matter. He stated:
*577“Unfitness is more than a matter of ‘morals.’ As a matter of fact, the statute dealing with care and custody of minor children describes unfitness in these terms:
“ ‘247.24 ... if the court finds either that the parents are unable to adequately care for any such child or are not fit and proper persons to have the care and custody thereof, . .
“Fitness then is measured in terms of ability to adequately care for a child.”
“Adequately” is a term that suggests there are relatively different modes of care. Funk & Wagnall’s Desk Standard Dictionary gives “adequate” a range of meaning from “equal to what is required” or “suitable to the case or occasion” or “fully sufficient.” In raising a child, minimal capacity for care and treatment must be examined in light of the best interest of the child if there is superior care and treatment available, especially if the superior care is provided by and available from a custodian who has proven as successful at it as the grandmother has in respect to Michael.
In Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 440, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969), the court discussed unfitness as follows:
“Actually, there is an understandable reluctance of family courts to pronounce a parent to be ‘unfit.’ . . . In jurisdictions where children are still treated as near-chattels in a comparing of respective rights of parents to custody, this distinction between unfitness and inability to adequately provide care may be very important. In this state, where the primary and controlling consideration is what will be best for the child it is not as crucial because in this state the would-be custodian must establish not only fitness and ability to provide adequate care but also that his or her being awarded custody would be in the best interests of the child. This court has held that a mother can be a fit person to have the custody ‘. . . but because of other comparative circumstances custody to the father serves the best interests of the child’ also suggesting that ‘A court should not necessarily feel impelled to make a finding of unfitness on the *578part of the mother when it has determined that the best interests of the child demand its custody be placed in the father.’ Under the ‘comparative circumstances’ test, we deal not in the coin of censure or blame, but in the concentration of concern on what order will best protect and promote the well-being of the child.”
If as between parents, one need not be found unfit before custody is awarded based on the child’s best interest, the same should hold true where as here the grandmother seeks custody. Unfitness conclusively rules out the parent as a custodian but that finding should not be required since it is the child’s best interest that should be controlling.
Again, what the court in this case is not considering must be discussed since the majority’s opinion raises the specter of lifestyle, finances and the omnipresent state. The plaintiff in the present case, the grandmother, receives Aid for Dependent Children to support Michael. Therefore, the majority’s fear of the wealthy prevailing if the best interest of the child test is applied is unfounded in this case. When the situation arises that there is a contest between wealth of a third party and the minimal financial ability of a parent, then the trial court can address it, and it is doubtful whether any trial judge in this state would award custody on the basis of wealth. This mother is supported by her male friend with whom she lives. He has not been employed since August, 1981, and lives on separation funds. This man has no legal obligation to support either Michael or his mother and the relationship can end anytime he chooses. Therefore, the decision of the trial court did not involve financial advantage of minimum economic circumstances.
The only consideration of lifestyle applied by the trial judge in this case concerned the stability of the boy’s environment. For ten years the grandmother has provided a stable home environment on which Michael can *579depend. The mother is now approximately 26 years of age and has not yet demonstrated a continuing stable lifestyle. It is that factor of uncertainty which the trial judge compared to the boys’ present stable environment in determining his best interest. Since leaving her mother’s house in June of 1980, the mother of Michael has lived from June, 1980, to July, 1980, in River Falls, Wisconsin; July, 1980, to February, 1981, in Woodbury, Minnesota; February, 1981, to September, 1981, in Still-water, Minnesota; and September, 1981, to December, 1981, in South Haven, Minnesota.
This is not a case where the state is involved as it would be in a termination of parental rights matter and so discussing the oppressiveness of a “1984”1 style action is not relevant. In termination cases, the statutes and this court have stated fitness is the criterion. Although, in the recent termination case of In Interest of Baby Girl K., this court stated, consistent with the United States Supreme Court cases, that the best interest of the child in a termination case is paramount since in that case the father’s rights were terminated due to his lack of care of the child when the opportunity was available and that was sufficient for an unfitness finding.
The United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, -U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2992 (1983), analyzed many of its previous custody cases. The Lehr decision repeated the language of a concurring opinion in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862, citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) : “ ‘Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.’ 441 U.S., at 397, 99 S. Ct., at 1770.”
In Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2993, the Court discussed Stanley v. Illinois and Quilloin v. Walcott and Caban v. Moham*580med, and what it stated concerning- unwed fathers can be applied generally to biological parents:
“[T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. The actions of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. ‘[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in “promoting] a way of life” through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood relationship.’ ”
The Court was quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844, which quoted Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972).
The Supreme Court in Lehr concluded:
“The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.” 103 S. Ct. at 2293-94.
The same analysis can be applied to the mother of a child even though the U.S. Supreme Court cases have dealt with fathers. The mother of Michael has had ten and one-half years to be involved in the daily raising and care of her son and has not consistently and constantly done so. Therefore, Michael’s excellent attitude toward life and his hope for the future are owed principally to his grandmother’s ten years of caring for him and caring about him. The trial court recognized the stability in Michael’s life and said it should not be foregone for the uncertainty of the next eight years in the custody of his *581mother who still has not developed a stable lifestyle, but rather one subject to constant change.
As the Court stated in Lehr: “The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases.” Id. at 2990. The Court described those appropriate cases to be where the parent has been involved in the daily raising and care of the child, which we do not have in the instant case. That court also considered the age of the child as a factor to be considered since what might be in the best interest of an infant or toddler may not be in the best interests of a ten year old child as is the situation in this case.
Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3d 1187, 1196 (1970), Child Custody — Parent or Grandparent, discusses the two basic principles in determining custody as:
(1) the parental right doctrine and
(2) and the best interests of the child concept.
The article states that:
“The conflict between these two basic theories is more apparent than real, since even those courts which tend to apply the ‘best interests of the child’ doctrine firmly support the proposition that one of the most important factors entering into the determination as to what constitutes the best interest of the child is the general belief that normally it is in the child’s best interest to be in the custody of its parents as distinguished from the custody of a grandparent. Moreover, the two doctrines are not always clearly distinguished in the opinions, and in many instances both doctrines seem to have been utilized by the courts, such interchangeability probably being due to the fact that both doctrines seek the same basic objective from two different approaches.”2
*582The concept of requiring a finding of unfitness of a parent in a custody case before considering the best interest of a child is out of place. “The use of an unfitness standard has not added noticeable clarity or certainty to custody law and carries with it implications of immorality and fault . . . Cooper and Nelson, Adoption and Termination: A Reply, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 641, 667 (1983).
In LaChapell, 66 Wis. 2d at 683, this court discussed Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972) as follows:
“In determining that custody of the two children here should be granted to William Mawhinney, the trial court felt that under Ponsford v. Crute (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5, it had no choice but to award custody to the surviving natural parent unless it could find him to be unfit or unable to care for the children. We do not agree. The conclusion reached by this court in Ponsford should not be interpreted as laying down an inflexible rule, that in every case involving a dispute between the natural father or mother and grandparents for the custody of the children, the doctrine of the best interests of the children cannot prevail. As a general matter, but not invariably, the child’s best interest will be served by living in a parent’s home. However, if circumstances compel a contrary conclusion, the interests of the child, not a supposed right of even a fit parent to have custody, should control. There well may be cases where it would be detrimental to the best interests of the child to award custody to a surviving spouse.” (Emphasis added.)
. In the LaChapell case the children whose custody was under consideration were approximately thirteen and ten years old and they hardly knew their father.
The history in custody case law and the test to be applied has vacillated in Wisconsin as follows:
In Sommers v. Sommers, 33 Wis. 2d 22, 146 N.W.2d 428 (1966), the unfitness standard was applied.
In Dees v. Dees, 41 Wis. 2d 435, 164 N.W.2d 282 (1969), the best interest standard was applied.
*583In Ponsford v. Crute, 56 Wis. 2d 407, 202 N.W.2d 5 (1972), the unfitness standard was applied.
In Kurz v. Kurz, 62 Wis. 2d 677, 215 N.W.2d 555 (1974), this court distinguished between the test of Ponsford and Dees.
In LaChapell v. Mawhinney, 66 Wis. 2d 679, 225 N.W. 2d 501 (1975), the best interest of the child standard was applied.
Now, the majority’s opinion requires an unfitness test prior to best interest consideration. In 1977 in ch. 105, sec. 37, Laws of 1977, the current sec. 767.24(2), Stats., was adopted. This more recent change does not limit the best interest test to a parent/parent dispute and sets forth the guidelines to be followed in applying the best interest standard. Those are the guidelines that are to be used in determining custody with parental relationship being recognized in sub. (a) : “The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to custody; . . . (b) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; (c) The child’s adjustment to the home, school, religion and community; . . . (f) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.” All of the subsections may in fact involve a parental relationship in the custody consideration.
It is not informative, realistic or proper in a custody case to require the trial court to find unfitness of the parent or parents prior to applying the truly pertinent standard of what is in the best interest of the child. Parental relationship will certainly be a heavily weighted factor unless other compelling circumstances as determined by the trial court require custody to be granted to another person or persons as in the best interest of the child.
*584In another law review article, the same conclusion is reached to eliminate presumptions or preferences in custody cases and give “real credence” to the best interest rule. In The Best Interest of the Child Doctrine in Wisconsin Custody Cases, Comment, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 343, 359 (1980), the author wrote:
“By this time, it should be clear that a combination of a doctrine declared to be absolutely governing and a presumption or preference which weakens that doctrine can only lead to a morass of muddled rationalizations. Ironically, all of the decisions reached could have been achieved without the imposition of any presumptions or preferences at all. Given the rhetoric found in each case which praises the best interest doctrine, such could easily have been the sole rule in each case without disturbing the result. Eliminating the presumptions and preferences and giving real credence to the best interest rule may not add to the substance of custody law, but it would serve to rid the law of an unnecessary stumbling block, to promote a clarity of language in both trial court and appellate decisions, and perhaps to foster closer examination of the particular circumstances in any given case; an approach which common sense dictates as the most sound.”
It must be stressed that custody is not the same as termination of parental rights. If the grandmother of Michael were awarded legal custody, the status quo of the last ten years would be maintained. The mother of Michael would be able to be with Michael daily or visit him with regularity or engage in activities with him. These same contacts might not be available if the mother’s rights were terminated but that would depend on the courts’ orders for the best interests of the child.
In footnote 9 of the majority opinion, the court states that if there are compelling reasons warranting an award of custody to a nonparent, then the issue of parental fitness or unfitness does not control. That test still establishes the parental fitness question as the controlling one *585unless there are compelling reasons to go beyond it in the trial court’s consideration. I would find such compelling reasons to be the best interest of the child, as was found by the trial court. Again, the court through this opinion does not give a clear statement of whether the test of fitness must be met before the best interest test is applied.
The trial court found Michael’s mother not unfit; however, that did not resolve the case since the judge believed the best interest of Michael was in the custody of his grandmother. I would affirm the trial court and would not require a finding of unfitness of the parent before awarding custody to the grandmother, which is in Michael’s best interest. By removing this first unrealistic requirement in the proceedings, which the majority opinion requires, responsibility for the awesome decision would then be placed in the trial court where it belongs. As we said in In Matter of Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d 613, 618, 297 N.W.2d 833 (1980), by quoting Adoption of Randolph, 68 Wis. 2d 64, 74-75, 227 N.W.2d 634 (1975) :
“ ‘In questions involving the determination of what is in the best interests of the children, whether in an adoption case or a divorce case, it must be recognized that the trial court has the chance to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses, and its determination of the question of what is in the best interests of the children may not easily be overturned by this court. Thus, in Larson v. Larson, [30 Wis. 2d 291 (1966)] a divorce case, we said:
“ ‘ “This court is firmly committed to the principle that the findings of fact and orders of the trial court concerning the custody of minor children in divorce actions will not be set aside or reversed unless clearly against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, or unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
“ ‘ “Custody matters are highly discretionary and the rule is well established that the trial court’s determination will not be upset in the absence of a cleár abuse of *586discretion.” Belisle v. Belisle (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 317, 321, 322, 134 N.W.2d 491.
“ ‘ “As has been repeatedly held by this court, the matter of the custody of children in divorce actions is a matter peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the trial court, who has seen the parties, had an opportunity to observe their conduct, and is in much better position to determine where the best interests of the child lie than is an appellate court.” Adams v. Adams (1922), 178 Wis. 522, 525, 190 N.W. 359; Hamachek v. Hamachek (1955), 270 Wis. 194, 202, 70 N.W.2d 595.’ ”
If the majority is not giving- primacy to the fitness test, then the opinion does not explain how the trial judge abused his discretion. I read the opinion to hold that the test in a custody case between parent and grandparent to be whether the parent is fit or unfit to give care to the child and if fit, will be awarded custody except for compelling reasons which will be determined on a case by case basis. It would be better to acknowledge the test to be the best interest of the child with the fitness of the parent being a most important factor. This decision does not state the trial judge abused his discretion and therefore it must mean he applied the wrong test, i.e., parental fitness rather than best interest of the child.
By applying the standard I believe proper of what is in Michael’s best interest as a happy, well-adjusted ten year old boy living in a stable environment, I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Michael’s custody to his grandmother. “ ‘ “. . . This court will not find an abuse of discretion if the record shows that discretion was in fact exercised and if the record shows that there is a reasonable basis for the trial court’s determination.” ’ ” In Matter of Adoption of R.P.R., 98 Wis. 2d at 619, quoting Rhodes v. Terry, 91 Wis. 2d 165, 176, 280 N.W.2d 248 (1979). I would find no abuse of discretion in this case and would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS J. CECI joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The book by George Orwell.

 For analysis of the confusion in this court’s decisions as to termination and custody, see: Hayes and Morse, Terminating Parental Bights, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 439 (1983); Cooper and Nelson, Adoption and Termination: A Reply, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 641 (1983).