Court Opinion

ID: 9846801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:48:36.159929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.188267
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding in Division 2.
The question presented here is whether appellee/condemnee’s expert witness’ testimony that he was formerly employed by the State Department of Transportation (appellant/condemnor) should be excluded as prejudicial to appellant. The majority opinion, relying on DeKalb County v. Queen, 135 Ga. App. 307 (3) (217 SE2d 624) (1975), concludes that such evidence is not objectionable and is admissible. I do not agree and would overrule Queen. I would not overrule Dept. of Transportation v. English, 135 Ga. App. 425 (218 SE2d 134) (1975), and would extend Logan v. Chatham County, 113 Ga. App. 491 (148 SE2d 471) (1966).
A witness may qualify as an expert by stating, inter alia, his education, training, and the extent and length of his experience. It is permissible, but not necessarily required, that an expert witness relate his particular employers or clients in stating his qualifications. While the jury, hearing such evidence as to qualifications may consider it with regard to the credibility of the witness, the question of whether a witness is qualified to give his opinion as an expert is one for the court. Dept. of Transp. v. Great Southern, 137 Ga. App. 710, 712 (225 SE2d 80) (1976).
Here, the appellant/condemnor properly filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence in qualifying the experts in the case that appraisers for either appellant or appellee had worked for the other party. The trial judge denied the motion based on Queen. When qualifying his experts, condemnee asked for whom each expert had done appraisals. Both experts listed the Georgia Department of Transportation (State Highway Department) among their former employers. In each instance, counsel for appellee/condemnee asked additional specific questions with regard to the expert appraiser’s work for DOT, emphasizing this employment.
Under the circumstances, where the jury has heard the *588qualifying testimony, in my opinion it was prejudicial for appellee/condemnee’s expert to be permitted to testify that he had formerly been employed by appellant/condemnor. The jury could construe his opinion testimony as an appraiser as having the implied approval of appellant/condemnor, his former employer. To exclude the expert’s testimony regarding his former employment by an opposite party in the proceedings would not necessarily affect his qualification as an expert. I see no reason for appellee/condemnee to insist on such testimony except to prejudice the jury.