Court Opinion

ID: 9826760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:34:20.781946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:14.231307
License: Public Domain

On Petition To Rehear.
The petition to rehear is grounded on Rule 11, Section 4, of this Court, which is in the following language: “No assignment of error in any case brought to this court for review can be predicated upon any alleged error of the trial court consisting of an omission or affirmative action in the organization of the court or jury, or for any defect in the pleadings, or for any mistake, irregularity or error in the conduct of the case, unless it affirmatively appears in the record that the omission, action, defect, or error was reasonably called to the attention of the trial judge and ruled on adversely to the party complaining, otherwise same will be treated as having been waived, or cured in the trial court. ’ ’
There are several reasons why this rule has no application to this case. We are not dealing with an assignment of error. The defendant assigned no errors. The Chancellor decided the entire case in his favor, holding that the complainants were entitled to no relief and dismissing the bill. The complainants were granted a broad appeal. The defendant was satisfied with the Chancellor’s action. The case was triable de novo in this court, with a prima facie presumption that the decree was correct.
The ultimate question for decision here was whether the action of the Chancellor in dismissing the bill was *363erroneous. The burden was on the complainants to show that it was and that upon the evidence in the record they were entitled to the relief sought.
 The case was tried according to the forms of the chancery court. A motion for a new trial was not a prerequisite to a review by this court of questions of fact arising upon the record. The applicable rule, as stated by Judge Williams in his annotations of Code Section 9036, is as follows: “The broad appeal in a matter of equity tried according to the forms of the chancery court, whether from the circuit or chancery court, opens the whole case for hearing before the appellate court, and gives a trial de novo, upon the pleadings and evidence, regardless of the decree below, that is, in the same manner as it was triable before the inferior court.”
Many cases are cited to support this statement of the rule. So far as we know, it has never been questioned. The only change was brought about by Code Section 10622, which does no more than to provide a prima facie presumption of correctness with respect' to the Chancellor’s decree. McCalla v. Rogers, 173 Tenn. 239, 116 S. W. (2d) 1022.
 We held, among other things, that there was no evidence in the record to justify us in granting relief to the complainants on the theory that the defendant had enticed away the complainants’ employees. The fact that the Chancellor also denied this relief, but upon another ground which we did not reach, is immaterial in a case of this kind. The case of Oppenheimer v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank, 97 Tenn. 19, 23, 36 S. W. 705, 33 L. R. A. 767, 56 Am. St. Rep. 778, cited in the original opinion, which counsel doubtless overlooked, expressly so holds. See also Chambers v. Chambers, 92 *364Tenn. 707, 23 S. W. 67; Sheafer v. Mitchell, 109 Tenn. 181, 71 S. W. 86; Hobson v. Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S. W. (2d) 659; Chicago Bldg. & Mfg. Co. v. Barry, Tenn. Ch. App., 52 S. W. 451; Cannon v. Hickman, 4 Tenn. App. 588, and Cf. Barretsville Bank & Trust Co. v. Balton, 182 Tenn. 364, 377, 187 S. W. (2d) 306. Even in a case tried according to the forms of law where the trial is before the judge without a jury, a correct judgment will be affirmed if sufficient reasons for the conclusion reached appear in the record, notwithstanding that the trial judge may have given insufficient grounds for his decision. Little Rock & Memphis R. Co. v. Wilson, 90 Tenn. 271, 16 S. W. 613, 13 L. R. A. 364, 25 Am. St. Rep. 693; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. McDonough, 97 Tenn. 255, 37 S. W. 15; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 89 Tenn. 311, 312, 15 S. W. 652; Weinstein v. Barrasso, 139 Tenn. 593, 202 S. W. 920, L. R. A. 1918D, 1174; Red Top Cab Co. v. Rosenblum, 3 Tenn. App. 454; Ankenbauer v. Ankenbauer, 6 Tenn. App. 221.
However, it is insisted that the defendant did not except to the finding of the Chancellor which was adverse to him. This contention is also based upon a misconception of the practice. It overlooks the distinction between cases tried according to the forms of law and those tried according to the forms of equity. Carter v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, 166 Tenn. 200, 207, 60 S. W. (2d) 421; Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 655, 266 S. W. 313.
Finally, it may be observed that if Rule 11, Section 4, were applicable to the situation before us, the complainants themselves would be in a rather bad plight; for so far as the record discloses, they did not attempt to comply with that rule as a preliminary to assigning errors *365iii this court. It is likely that in the circumstances of the particular case it did not occur to them that the rule was applicable to the questions to be presented upon appeal by the assignments of error. As already indicated, we think the rule was not applicable.
The petition to rehear is denied at the cost of the complainants.