Court Opinion

ID: 9380568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 16:07:15.236449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.249836
License: Public Domain

J-A19023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    PAMELA D. SHIFFLETT                        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    JOAN K. MENGEL                             :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :      No. 1517 MDA 2021

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 23, 2021
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 2018-01553

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                 FILED MARCH 20, 2023

        Appellant, Pamela D. Shifflett, appeals from the judgment entered in

the Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Appellee, Joan K.

Mengel, following a jury trial. We affirm.

        The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

           On September 26, 2016, a collision occurred between
           vehicles operated by [Appellant] and [Appellee]. As a result
           of that collision, [Appellant’s] vehicle was “spun around”
           with its front tires in the road and its rear tires in the grass
           adjacent to the road. (N.T. Trial, 8/9/21, at 7). [Appellant]
           was not injured while she remained inside the vehicle. (Id.
           at 36). [Appellant] was able to leave the vehicle and walk
           on her own. After walking on or toward the roadway,
           [Appellant] returned to her vehicle to get her phone in order
           to dial 911. (Id. at 9, 36). At some point after she called
           911, [Appellant] walked into a culvert and twisted her ankle.
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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       (Id.)

       On October 19, 2018, [Appellant] initiated a Civil Complaint
       against [Appellee]. At a pre-trial conference that occurred
       on July 13, 2021, [Appellee] acknowledged negligence, but
       not causation. In other words, [Appellee] acknowledged
       that the collision between her car and the one driven by
       [Appellant] was her fault. However, [Appellee] did not
       acknowledge that the accident caused any harm to
       [Appellant].

       Both [Appellant] and [Appellee] produced medical experts
       to provide testimony to the jury via videotaped deposition.
       [Appellee’s] expert, Dr. Daniel C. Farber, provided
       testimony about the seriousness of the injury claimed by
       [Appellant]. On cross-examination, [Appellant’s] counsel
       endeavored to get Dr. Farber to testify that [Appellant]
       suffered some injury as a result of [Appellee’s] negligence.
       Dr. Farber would not specifically provide such [testimony].
       Rather, Dr. Farber acknowledged that [Appellant] suffered
       what he described as a “minor ankle sprain” “at the accident
       scene.” Dr. Farber did not—nor could he—render an opinion
       about whether the negligence of [Appellee] was a cause of
       harm suffered by [Appellant].

       At trial, there was significant discussion about the issue of
       causation. [Appellant] submitted a request for a directed
       verdict on the issue of causation. According to [Appellant’s]
       counsel, Dr. Farber’s testimony constituted a binding legal
       admission that [Appellant] should be entitled to at least
       some damages. (See Motion for Directed Verdict, 8/10/21;
       N.T. Trial, 8/9/21, at 43-46; N.T. Trial, 8/10/21, at 4). [The
       trial c]ourt consistently denied [Appellant’s] request for a
       directed verdict on the issue of causation. However, [it]
       agreed with [Appellant] that if the jury found even a minor
       injury resulted from the accident, then the jury’s verdict
       could not be zero dollars. (N.T. Trial, 8/10/21, at 6).

       At trial, [the c]ourt provided both counsel with a complete
       copy of everything it planned to communicate to the jury
       during its Closing Instructions. (Id. at 4). [Appellant’s]
       counsel objected to the [c]ourt’s use of the phrase “a
       substantial factor[” in defining causation.] (Id. at 5).
       [Specifically, in response to the court’s question as to

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          whether there were any comments or objections,
          Appellant’s counsel stated “I just want to renew my
          objection with regards to the use of the old language, a
          substantial factor, for purposes of preserving that. Other
          than that, I have no problem.” (Id.)] … [N]o other
          objection was proffered when the instructions were provided
          in advance to both counsel. [The trial c]ourt rejected
          [Appellant’s] counsel’s challenge to the words “a substantial
          factor.” …

(Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/21, at 1-3).1

       On August 10, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee.

Although the jury found Appellee was negligent by agreement of the parties,

it decided “[Appellee’s] negligence was not a factual cause of any harm to

[Appellant.]” (Id. at 31).

       Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief on August 17, 2021,

requesting a new trial or entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(“JNOV”). In her post-trial motion, Appellant first claimed the court erred in

not entering a directed verdict as to causation. Second, Appellant asserted

that the court’s jury instruction erroneously included the language “substantial

factor” and “caused by the accident.” (Post-Trial Motion, filed 8/17/21, at 4).

       After receiving briefs from the parties, the court entered an order on

____________________________________________

1 After the court issued its closing instructions to the jury, Appellant’s counsel
requested “some form of clarification that when [the court] referenced
accident, [it was] referring to negligence as well…. I am simply saying that
the repetitive use of the word ‘accident’ could distract them from that reality.”
(N.T. Trial, 8/10/21, at 28-29). The court responded: “I think we are talking
semantics,” to which Appellant’s counsel then stated: “We can deal with it
later if you don’t want to deal with it now.” (Id. at 29). Thereafter, the court
did not provide any correction or clarification to its instructions.

                                           -3-
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November 3, 2021, denying post-trial relief. Appellant filed a praecipe to enter

judgment, and judgment was entered on November 23, 2021. Appellant filed

a notice of appeal,2 and on November 26, 2021, the court ordered her to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Appellant timely complied.

       Appellant raises the following four issues for our review:

       A. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Appellant’s]
          motion for a directed verdict on question 2 (causation) when
          the trial court told the jury at the start of trial that [Appellee]
          conceded [Appellant] suffered injuries as a result of
          [Appellee’s] negligence?

       B. Where [Appellee] conceded [Appellant] suffered some
          injuries as a result of [Appellee’s] negligence, whether the
          trial court erred by not granting [JNOV]?

       C. Where both [Appellant] and [Appellee] requested the simple
          and accurate “factual cause” instruction set forth in Pa. SSJI
          § 13.20, whether the trial court erred by adding more than
          either party requested and including the words “substantial
          factor” to the jury instructions such that the jury heard
          confusing instructions as to causation[?]

       D. Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that
          [Appellant] must prove harm caused “by the accident”
          instead     of    harm     caused      “by     [Appellee’s]
____________________________________________

2 Appellant purported to appeal from the trial court’s order denying her post-
trial motion. An order denying post-trial motions is interlocutory and generally
not appealable. See Levitt v. Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 584 n.2 (Pa.Super.
2009) (stating that appeal properly lies from entry of judgment, not from
order denying post-trial motions). However, because judgment was entered
on November 23, 2021, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of
judgment. See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657
A.2d 511, 514-15 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en banc) (stating that appellate courts
may “regard as done that which ought to have been done”) (citations
omitted). We have amended the caption accordingly.

                                           -4-
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         negligence/conduct” when [Appellant’s] ankle injury
         occurred moments after the accident because [Appellant]
         was forced to walk in a dangerous place due to where her
         vehicle was pushed by the accident?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4) (questions reordered for purposes of disposition).

      In her first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied

her motion for a directed verdict.    Appellant claims she was entitled to a

directed verdict as to causation because Appellee’s expert conceded that

Appellant suffered an ankle injury as a result of Appellee’s negligence. (Id.

at 13-19). Based on this concession, Appellant insists the court was required

to enter a directed verdict on the issue of causation, relying on Mano v.

Madden, 738 A.2d 493 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc), and Andrews v.

Jackson, 800 A.2d 959 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 572 Pa. 694, 813

A.2d 835 (2002). We disagree.

      Our standard and scope of review are as follows:

         Our standard[s] of review when considering motions for a
         directed verdict and [JNOV] are identical. We will reverse a
         trial court’s grant or denial of a [JNOV] only when we find
         an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the
         outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an
         appellate court is the same as that for a trial court.

         There are two bases upon which a [JNOV] can be entered;
         one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
         and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable
         minds could disagree that the outcome should have been
         rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court
         reviews the record and concludes that, even with all factual
         inferences decided adverse to the movant, the law
         nonetheless requires a verdict in [her] favor. Whereas with
         the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and
         concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the

                                     -5-
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        movant was beyond peradventure.

Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2010), aff’d, 618 Pa.

228, 55 A.3d 1088 (2012) (quoting Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915

A.2d 117, 119 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

     “To prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the

defendant had a duty to conform to a certain standard of conduct, that the

defendant breached that duty, that such breach caused the injury in question,

and actual loss or damage.” Barton v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 124

A.3d 349, 359 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

        [T]he determination of whether the defendant’s conduct
        was a substantial cause of the injuries complained of should
        not be taken from the jury if the jury may reasonably differ
        as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a
        substantial factor in causing the harm.          See also
        Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434. If issues are raised
        on which a jury may not reasonably differ, it is proper for
        the trial court to decide them. If, on the other hand, a
        jury may reasonably differ on whether the
        defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in
        causing the injury, generally, the case must go to the
        jury on those issues.

Straw v. Fair, 187 A.3d 966, 993 (Pa.Super. 2018) (emphasis added), appeal

denied, 651 Pa. 27, 202 A.3d 49 (2019) (quoting Vattimo v. Lower Bucks

Hosp., Inc., 502 Pa. 241, 247, 465 A.2d 1231, 1233-34 (1983) (plurality)).

     In Mano, surpa, this Court held that it was “impermissible for a jury…to

disregard the uncontroverted testimony from experts from both parties that

the plaintiff suffered some injury as a result of the accident in question.”

Mano, supra at 497.     Similarly, in Andrews, supra, this Court held that

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“[w]here there is no dispute that the defendant is negligent and both parties’

medical experts agree the accident caused some injury to the plaintiff, the

jury may not find the defendant’s negligence was not a substantial factor in

bringing about at least some of plaintiff’s injuries.” Andrews, supra at 962

(emphasis omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court explained:

         [The court] listened to the entirety of Dr. Farber’s[, the
         defense expert’s,] videotaped testimony in [c]ourt.
         Nowhere did Dr. Farber link the motor vehicle accident that
         [Appellee] admitted causing to the ankle injury suffered by
         [Appellant.] Dr. Farber acknowledged that the ankle injury
         occurred “at the accident scene,” but he carefully avoided
         the semantic trap that [Appellant’s] counsel attempted to
         set. Based upon the totality of Dr. Farber’s testimony, we
         cannot agree with [Appellant’s] assertion that Dr. Farber’s
         testimony required us to remove the issue of causation from
         the jury’s hands.

(Trial Court Opinion at 5). The trial court further stated:

         To be sure, [Appellee] acknowledged that her negligence
         caused her vehicle to collide with the one operated by
         [Appellant]. However, at no time did [Appellee] concede
         the issue of causation. To argue that [the trial court] should
         have taken the issue of causation from the jury based upon
         obtuse language from a medical expert who was dealing
         primarily with the seriousness of [Appellant’s] injury would
         have been profoundly unfair. Causation in this case was
         very much a jury issue.

(Id. at 7).

      Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s reliance on Andrews, supra

and Mano, supra is misplaced. Whereas in those cases, experts for both

parties agreed that there was injury caused by the accident, there was no

                                      -7-
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such agreement between the parties’ experts in the case before us. Thus, the

cases on which Appellant relies are distinguishable, and the court properly

submitted the issue of causation to the jury. See Straw, supra. Appellant’s

first issue affords her no relief.

      In her second issue, Appellant again insists that Appellee’s expert

conceded      that   Appellant’s   sprained   ankle   was   caused   by   Appellee’s

negligence.     Based on this assertion, Appellant contends the jury was not

permitted to render a verdict in favor of Appellee on the issue of causation.

Alternatively, Appellant claims that the evidence established she suffered

some “neck, shoulder, and abdomen injuries” in the car crash.             Appellant

concludes the jury’s verdict was flawed and against the weight of the evidence,

and the trial court should have granted her motion for JNOV or granted a new

trial. (Appellant’s Brief at 30-31). We disagree.

      Regarding a motion for JNOV:

         The trial court may award a [JNOV] or a new trial only when
         the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
         one’s sense of justice. In determining whether this standard
         has been met, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
         judge’s discretion was properly exercised, and relief will only
         be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose
         a palpable abuse of discretion. When a fact finder’s verdict
         is so opposed to the demonstrative facts that looking at the
         verdict, the mind stands baffled, the intellect searches in
         vain for cause and effect, and reason rebels against the
         bizarre and erratic conclusion, it can be said that the verdict
         is shocking.

Haan v. Wells, 103 A.3d 60, 70 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

                                        -8-
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       Here, Appellant testified that she suffered pain in her right ankle about

a week after the accident.         (N.T. Trial, 8/9/21, at 12-13).   Appellant also

introduced into evidence videotaped deposition testimony from her expert, Dr.

Paul J. Juliano, who treated her for an ankle injury.3 Dr. Juliano opined that

Appellant’s ankle injuries were caused by the accident. (Juliano Dep. at 9).

       Appellee introduced into evidence videotaped deposition testimony from

her expert, Dr. Farber. Dr. Farber testified that after “reviewing [Appellant’s]

records and her exam and her story, it appeared that she had some minor

ankle strain at the accident scene.”             (Farber Dep. at 21).   On cross-

examination the following exchange occurred:

          Q. Now, you indicated that you believed [Appellant] suffered
          a minor ankle sprain in her right ankle as a result of the
          defendant’s negligence; is that correct?

          A. Well, at the accident scene she had that injury. I can’t
          tell you where it comes from, but...

          Q. Well, [Appellant]–

____________________________________________

3 We note that it is Appellant’s responsibility to supply a complete record for
our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). The certified record in this matter
contains only a limited excerpt of the trial transcript related to causation.
Appellant did not ensure that the certified record contained the full trial
transcript. Nor did she supply this Court with the official transcripts of
deposition testimony. Cade v. McDanel, 679 A.2d 1266, 1268-69 (Pa.Super.
1996) (stating appellant has duty to supply this Court with official transcripts
of deposition testimony; failure to confirm that original certified record for
appeal contains sufficient information to conduct proper review constitutes
waiver of issues sought to be examined). Although we could deem Appellant’s
issues waived on this ground, Appellant included complete copies of the
experts’ depositions in her reproduced record (the veracity of which Appellee
does not dispute) upon which we can conduct our review. See id.

                                           -9-
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       A. –the car and turning her ankle so that’s–

       Q. Understand.

       A. I’m not a lawyer to tell you that—the—who’s responsible
       for it.

                               *     *      *

       A. I certainly won’t dispute those details. But if you ask me
       to describe who’s responsible for the injury, that’s not—I
       don’t look at that as my job. My job is to look at her injury
       and—and tell you what I think, you know, happened and
       what the treatment was, whether the treatment was
       appropriate, that sort of thing. That’s all I can—

       Q. Well, you did — you did opine that she suffered a minor
       ankle sprain?

       A. Correct.

       Q. Right. And we can agree that she suffered an ankle injury
       when she stepped out of the vehicle on the grass after being
       pushed into the grass by the defendant’s vehicle? Can we
       agree on that?

       A. Again, I don’t know—I can’t speak to the—I have not
       studied nor remember the details of her accident. But as
       she described to me getting out of the car and turning her
       ankle when she stepped into the ditch, that would appear to
       be the time which she suffered her injury from her
       description.

       Q. Okay. And do you have any information that would
       suggest that she suffered this ankle sprain that you say she
       suffered at any time other than when she’s been pushed into
       the grass alongside the road at nighttime?

       A. No.

       Q. So we can agree that the reason she has a sprained ankle
       is because she’s in the dark, on the grass, getting out of a
       vehicle that’s been pushed off the roadway?

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       A. We can—we can agree that she stepped out of the car
       and turned her ankle and suffered an injury.

       Q. Okay. And that she didn’t voluntarily walk into that
       grassy area at nighttime?

       A. No. But, again, that’s not—that’s not my area of
       expertise to look at the forensics of the accident—it’s the—

                                *     *      *

       Q. …My question. Doctor, was really this: That when you
       did the—when you did the defense medical exam, you knew
       that the parties would be looking at your report to see what
       you said about what injuries were suffered as a result of
       [Appellee’s] negligence; is that fair?

       A. Sure, yes.

       Q. And that what you found was that—was that she did, in
       fact, suffer an injury. You just characterize it as a minor
       sprain; is that fair?

       A. True.

                                *     *      *

       Q. You wrote a report that indicated that [Appellant] did, in
       fact, suffer an injury as a result of being pushed into the
       grass. And you are here to tell the jury that she did, in fact,
       suffer an injury as a result of that incident; is that fair?

       A. I mean, I’m here to present the report of my questioning
       and exam and review of the records.

       Q. Correct. And your—your report indicated that she did, in
       fact, suffer a sprain to her right ankle as a result of being
       pushed off the road into the grass—

       A. Correct.

       Q. Correct? So we can agree on that?

       A. Okay.

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(Id. at 31-34, 51-53).

       The trial court found that Appellee’s expert did not concede that the

accident was the cause of Appellant’s ankle injury. Our review of the prior

exchange leads us to agree.            While Dr. Farber conceded that Appellant

suffered an ankle injury at the accident scene and following the accident,

he did not concede that the accident caused Appellant’s injury. Therefore,

the question of causation was properly left to the jury, and Appellant was not

entitled to JNOV. Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Appellee, as verdict winner, Appellant has not established that the “evidence

was such that a verdict [in her favor] was beyond peradventure.”        Reott,

supra at 835. Therefore, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.4 Reott,

supra; Haan, supra.

       Appellant’s third and fourth issues are related, and we address them

together. Appellant argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury that

it must find Appellee’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in bringing about

Appellant’s injury to render a verdict in favor of Appellant.         Appellant

emphasizes that both parties proposed the court use the same instruction

____________________________________________

4 Regarding Appellant’s alternative argument that she suffered some “neck,
shoulder, and abdomen injuries” in the car crash, our review of the certified
record does not reveal any testimony or evidence to support this claim, other
than Appellant briefly describing some “upper torso” pain that she suffered
the day after the accident. (N.T. Trial, 8/9/21, at 10-11). Accordingly, this
alternative argument does not afford Appellant any relief.

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regarding causation, the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instruction

(SSJI) § 13.20 (Factual Cause).           Appellant contends that this instruction

replaced the previously used terms “substantial factor” and “legal cause.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 22). Appellant concludes the trial court erred and abused

its discretion when it gave its own instruction, rather than the SSJI instruction,

ultimately confusing the jury and warranting a new trial.5 We disagree.

       Our standard of review when considering the adequacy of jury

instructions in a civil case is to determine whether the trial court committed a

clear abuse of discretion or error of law controlling the outcome of the case.

Pringle v. Rapaport, 980 A.2d 159, 165 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

          “It is only when the charge as a whole is inadequate or not
          clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse[,] rather than
          clarify a material issue[,] that error in a charge will be found
          to be a sufficient basis for the award of a new trial.” Id.
          (quotation and citation omitted); Commonwealth v.
          Chambers, 602 Pa. 224, 980 A.2d 35, 49-50 (2009) (“[a]
          charge will be found adequate unless the issues are not
          made clear, the jury was misled by the instructions, or there
          was an omission from the charge amounting to a
          fundamental error”). Further:
____________________________________________

5  Appellant claims the trial court further confused the jury during its
instructions by stating that Appellant’s injuries must have been caused “by
the accident” rather than using the phrase “by the defendant’s negligence.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 27). Nevertheless, Appellant has failed to develop this
argument adequately on appeal. (Id. at 27-28). Consequently, we deem this
particular claim waived. See Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080 (Pa.Super.
2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 719, 110 A.3d 998 (2014) (explaining
arguments that are not appropriately developed on appeal are waived;
arguments not appropriately developed include those where party has failed
to cite any authority in support of contention). Because Appellant waived this
argument by failing to develop it in her brief, we need not consider whether
she properly preserved this challenge before the trial court.

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            [i]n reviewing a trial judge’s charge, the proper test is
            not whether certain portions taken out of context
            appear erroneous. We look to the charge in its
            entirety, against the background of the evidence in
            the particular case, to determine whether or not error
            was committed and whether that error was prejudicial
            to the complaining party.

         Reilly by Reilly v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204,
         [231,] 489 A.2d 1291, 1305 (1985).

Salsgiver Commc’ns, Inc. v. Consol. Commc’ns Holdings, Inc., 150 A.3d

957, 962-63 (Pa.Super. 2016).

      Jury instructions must contain correct definitions of legal terms.

Gorman v. Costello, 929 A.2d 1208, 1213 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation

omitted). Although “the SSJI are not binding on trial courts, the SSJI are

nonetheless instructive.” Id. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court “has never

adopted the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions, which exist

only as a reference material available to assist the trial judge and trial counsel

in preparing a proper charge.” Jeter v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,

716 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.Super. 1998) (internal citation omitted). Thus, a trial

judge has wide latitude in his choice of language when charging a jury,

provided that the court fully and adequately conveys the applicable law.

Hatwood v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 55 A.3d 1229,

1235 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 723, 65 A.3d 414 (2013).

      In Gorman, supra, this Court considered a court’s instruction to the

jury concerning causation in a negligence case. Similar to the case here, the

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appellant was injured after her vehicle was struck by the appellee’s vehicle.

At trial, the court instructed the jury by reading a portion of the Pennsylvania

Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions. The jury later returned a verdict

finding that the appellee was negligent, but the negligence was not a factual

cause of the appellant’s injuries.

      On appeal, the appellant argued the court erred by reading only a

portion of the suggested instruction on factual causation. This Court agreed,

stating the trial court had failed to provide a complete definition of factual

cause, such that the jury lacked “an essential tool needed to make an informed

decision based on correct and complete legal principles relevant to its verdict

on the issue of damages.” Id. at 1213 (internal citations omitted).

      Instantly, the SSJI 13.20 regarding Factual Cause that the parties asked

the court to read states:

         In order for [name of plaintiff] to recover in this case, [name
         of defendant]’s [negligent] [grossly negligent] [reckless]
         conduct must have been a factual cause in bringing about
         harm. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm
         would not have occurred absent the conduct. To be a factual
         cause, the conduct must have been an actual, real factor in
         causing the harm, even if the result is unusual or
         unexpected. A factual cause cannot be an imaginary or
         fanciful factor having no connection or only an insignificant
         connection with the harm.

         To be a factual cause, [name of defendant]’s conduct need
         not be the only factual cause. The fact that some other
         causes concur with [name of defendant]’s negligence in
         producing an injury does not relieve [name of defendant]
         from liability as long as [his] [her] [their] own negligence is
         a factual cause of the injury.

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Pa.SSJI (Civ) § 13.20.

     During its instructions, the court charged the jury as follows:

        There are two general issues that you will have to address:
        Causation and damages. Let me describe those to you in
        more detail. As I indicated to you at the outset, the first
        issue you will have to decide is whether [Appellee’s] conduct
        was a factual cause of harm to [Appellant].

        This is, again, a different concept than the question of who
        caused the accident. [Appellee] admits that she caused the
        accident. However, the question is whether the accident
        caused some, all or part or none of [Appellant’s] harm. That
        is the question that you must answer.

        [Appellant] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
        that [Appellee’s] conduct was a factual cause of her harm.
        To be a factual cause an event must have been a substantial
        factor in bringing about the harm. Notice, that I have been
        very careful to use the word “a” instead of the word “[the]”.
        There can be more than one cause of a plaintiff’s harm.

        The concept of factual cause does not mean that an accident
        has to be the only cause, a primary cause, or even the most
        important factor in causing an injury. However, in order for
        a plaintiff to recover, the accident must be a substantial
        factor in bringing about harm to the plaintiff.

        A substantial factor is defined as an actual factor, a real
        factor. It is not imaginary. It is not one having only an
        insignificant connection to the accident. An accident may
        be found to be a factual cause so long as it contributes to a
        plaintiff’s harm in any way that you find to be substantial.

        Now, as you assess damages you will be required to decide
        what damages actually resulted from the accident as
        opposed to some other factor. It is at that point that you
        will assess the degree to which [Appellant] suffered harm
        only as a result of the accident. To reiterate, at this point
        as you are answering the question regarding causation you
        must only decide whether this accident was a factual cause,
        a substantial factor in bringing about some harm to
        [Appellant.]

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         It is not necessary at this point for you to conduct a
         qualitative analysis of all of the different things that may
         have come into play to create harm to [Appellant.] That
         analysis will occur when you assess damages.

         Let me summarize with respect to causation: Number one,
         in order to recover a plaintiff must prove by a
         preponderance of evidence that the accident was a factual
         cause of the harm of which [Appellant] now complains.

         Two, an accident will be deemed a factual cause if it is a
         substantial factor in bringing about [Appellant’s] harm.

         Three, the accident can be a substantial factor even if other
         factors also contributed to [Appellant’s] harm. With respect
         to causation you do not need to engage in a qualitative
         analysis of how all of the many factors related to the
         accident and not related to the accident may have combined
         to create a plaintiff’s condition.

         You only need to decide if the accident was a substantial
         factor in bringing about any harm. …

(N.T. Trial, 8/10/21, at 11-14).

      Here, Appellant takes issue with the court’s use of the words “substantial

factor” in defining causation, as SSJI 13.20 does not use that verbiage.

Nevertheless, the court fully defined the principle of causation using language

that has been widely used in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Straw, supra at 993

(defining causation as established when “conduct was a substantial factor in

bringing about the harm inflicted upon a plaintiff”). See also Rost v. Ford

Motor Co., 637 Pa. 625, 654, 151 A.3d 1032, 1049 (2016) (“To establish

proximate causation, a plaintiff must adduce evidence to show that the

defendant’s act was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s

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J-A19023-22

harm”). Although the court’s language did not mirror that set forth in SSJI §

13.20, the suggested standard jury instructions are not mandatory.6         See

Jeter, supra. Further, this case is distinguishable from the fundamental error

at issue in Gorman because it does not involve a situation where the court

provided an incomplete definition for a relevant legal principle. Thus, the trial

court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for a new trial, and Appellant’s

final two issues merit no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Judgment affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 The Subcommittee Note for SSJI 13.20 explains that “[c]onfusion has been
generated, compounded, and perpetuated by various attempts to make clear
to the jury the ramifications of the distinction between a factual cause of an
accident and a legal cause of an accident.”            Pa.SSJI (Civ) § 13.20,
Subcommittee Note. The Note goes on to state that the term “substantial”
means only “significant” and does not require any particular quantification.
Id. Because “proximate cause” is “a term that attempts to give substance to
the distinction between factual cause and legal cause but means nothing to
an ordinary juror,” that term has been omitted from the SSJI, as well as
language such as “substantial factor.”         Id.   Thus, “the subcommittee
recommends that the emphasis be on cause and that the definition of factual
cause be so stated as to emphasize that it need not be so considerable or
large as to be confused with the plaintiff’s burden of proof, which is
considerably higher.” Id. Accordingly, “[i]t is the committee’s belief that the
substitution of ‘factual cause’ for ‘substantial factor’ and ‘legal cause’ would
not change an essential element in the burden of proof charge or create a
prejudice to any party.” Id.

We reiterate that the SSJI are not mandatory, but as the name makes clear,
suggested jury instructions. See Jeter, supra. Thus, the fact that the SSJI
omits the words “substantial factor” does not mean that inclusion of those
words is necessarily erroneous. Our review of the jury instruction in its
entirety makes clear that the court accurately recited the law pertaining to
causation such that a new trial is not warranted under these circumstances.
See Pringle, supra.

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     President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins this memorandum.

     Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/20/2023

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