Court Opinion

ID: 9918555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-15 11:09:21.344129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.938676
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00098-CV
     ___________________________

   HOWARD ROSENSTEIN, Appellant

                    V.

    PATRICIA CONDRON, Appellee

  On Appeal from the 271st District Court
           Wise County, Texas
      Trial Court No. CV21-07-515

   Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Howard Rosenstein appeals from the trial court’s final judgment for

Appellee Patricia Condron, which ordered that title to certain real property located in

Wise County had vested in Patricia. Rosenstein claimed that he had been deeded the

property by Patricia’s now-deceased husband, Jimmy Condron, in exchange for

Rosenstein’s representing Jimmy in a criminal matter in 2009. After a bench trial, the

trial court found, among other things, that the deed was intended as a security

instrument used to secure Jimmy’s payment for those legal services rather than as a

conveyance to Rosenstein. Rosenstein raises four issues on appeal: (1) the evidence

was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the deed was intended to be a

security instrument, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the attorney’s-fee

award, (3) the trial court erred when it concluded that Patricia’s claims were not

barred by the statute of limitations, and (4) the trial court erred when it concluded that

Patricia had standing to bring her suit to quiet title. We will reverse the trial court’s

award of attorney’s fees, remand on that issue only, and affirm the remainder of the

trial court’s judgment.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

                             A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      In 2009, Jimmy hired Rosenstein to represent him in a felony sexual assault

case. In the engagement contract (Contract), Jimmy agreed to pay Rosenstein a

minimum $22,500 nonrefundable retainer for pretrial representation.              But the

                                            2
Contract also provided that, “[d]ue to the fact that [Jimmy did] not have money for a

retainer, the fee for such representation and retainer [was] agreed to consist of a

transfer of [Jimmy’s] property,” described as 4.5 acres in Wise County (Property).1

The Contract continued:

       By virtue of this contract for legal services and property transfer, client
       hereby (Jimmy Condron) conveys to Howard Rosenstein all of his
       interest in the [Property] for consideration of attorney representation as
       of 8/25/09 on Jimmy Condron’s sexual assault case.

       ....

       [Jimmy] acknowledges he has carefully read this agreement and property
       transfer and fully agrees to abide by it and fully agrees to sign any
       additional documents to effectuate the transfer. [Jimmy] agrees to let
       attorney sign client’s name to any document to effectuate the transfer of
       the [Property]. For the pendency of the case, [Rosenstein] agrees to let
       [Jimmy] continue to live in his mobile home and pay on the [P]roperty
       the monthly mortgage.

       The Contract further provided that “this representation and agreement for cash

and/or property” did not include any expenses (e.g. for travel, court costs, experts) or

any trial or posttrial representation. Jimmy would be responsible for paying such

expenses as they were incurred and for paying an additional $30,000 for Rosenstein to

represent him at a trial.

       Jimmy’s felony case was dismissed on September 21, 2009, four weeks after he

hired Rosenstein, though Rosenstein did not inform Jimmy that the case had been

       Jimmy had bought the Property in 2003 for $60,000 using a loan serviced at all
       1

relevant times by Wells Fargo.

                                           3
dismissed until October 2. On September 30, 2009, Jimmy signed a special warranty

deed granting the Property to Rosenstein (Deed). That same day, Jimmy (as lessee)

and Rosenstein (as lessor) also entered into a five-year lease agreement for the

Property (Lease). The Lease automatically renewed each year for a new one-year term

if not terminated by either party. Jimmy agreed to pay Rosenstein $643.63 per month,

which could be adjusted “from time-to-time to ensure that the rent payable by [Jimmy

was] sufficient to fully service the loan owed” by Jimmy on the Property. The Deed

was not recorded at that time.

      Jimmy met Patricia in 2010, and they married in 2015. Jimmy and Patricia

claimed the Property as their homestead and shared expenses associated with the

Property, and Jimmy made the mortgage payments directly to Wells Fargo. However,

Jimmy also—at least during the years of 2009 and 2010—reported to Rosenstein that

the mortgage payments had been made by mailing Rosenstein copies of the mortgage

checks Jimmy had paid to Wells Fargo and copies of his monthly mortgage statements

from the bank.

      Jimmy died in June 2020 and his will was admitted to probate as a muniment of

title, with Patricia as his sole beneficiary.2 Patricia then paid off the remaining $40,000

on the Wells Fargo loan and obtained a release of that lien. She also had the

manufactured home on the Property titled in her name and declared as real property.

      2
        Jimmy’s will provided that Patricia would receive his entire estate upon his
death, to include all of his “real, personal[,] or mixed” property.

                                            4
      On April 15, 2021, Rosenstein finally recorded the Deed.

      At trial, Patricia testified that she did not know that Rosenstein existed or about

his claim to the Property until he recorded the Deed in 2021. She explained that, after

learning of Rosenstein’s claim to the Property, she searched through Jimmy’s personal

records but did not find any evidence of the Deed, Lease, or any other agreement

between Rosenstein and Jimmy.

      According to Rosenstein, his legal services arrangement with Jimmy was

premised on the understanding that Jimmy’s 2009 felony case would be Rosenstein’s

highest priority to ensure its speedy resolution. Rosenstein testified that, after the

Deed and Lease were signed in 2009, he had never been to the Property or performed

any actions in his role as purported landlord under the Lease. He admitted that he

had never paid ad valorem taxes or obtained insurance for the Property and had never

reported any rental income or otherwise claimed the Property for tax purposes. It

was not until after Jimmy died that Rosenstein learned that Jimmy and Patricia had

married.   Rosenstein asserted that Jimmy had not paid “a dime” for his legal

representation and that he had never advanced Jimmy money, agreed to give the

property back to Jimmy, or given Jimmy a repurchase option. He explained that

Jimmy had asked him not to record the Deed in 2009 because doing so might have

“mess[ed] up [Jimmy’s] mortgage veteran VA thing that [he] got with Wells Fargo or

whatever the name of that company is.”

                                           5
                          B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Patricia sued Rosenstein for declaratory judgment and asserted causes of action

for pretended sale of a homestead, violation of the TDTPA, innocent grantee for

value without notice, unjust enrichment, and estoppel. She requested the trial court to

quiet title in her name and to declare the Deed void. Rosenstein answered, raising

affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, laches, and lack of standing. He did not

file a counterclaim.

       After a bench trial, the trial court declared that the Deed was “a security

instrument securing payment for” Rosenstein’s legal services rather than a conveyance

and that the Property was vested in fee simple absolute in Patricia, and the trial court

awarded her $20,000 in attorney’s fees. Rosenstein filed a motion for new trial (which

was overruled by operation of law) and requested findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

       The trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which

included the following:

Findings of Fact

   • Patricia lived at the Property at all times after she married Jimmy in 2015, and
     she and Jimmy treated it as their homestead;

   • “During their marriage, Patricia and Jimmy paid the mortgage, ad valorem
     taxes, and insurance on the Property” and “made valuable improvements to the
     Property”;

                                           6
  • “Record title to the Property remained in Jimmy’s name at the time of his
    death”;

  • “In or about September 2020, Patricia paid $39,997.14 to pay off and discharge
    the mortgage on the Property”;

  • “Patricia was the sole beneficiary and devisee named” in Jimmy’s will;

  • “Patricia paid off the mortgage on the Property in reliance on the fact [that
    Jimmy’s will] had been admitted to probate and on a title search . . . confirming
    no cloud on her title existed of record”;

  • “Patricia had no knowledge of Rosenstein’s involvement with Jimmy until the
    recorded Deed came to her attention”;

  • Rosenstein “exhibited no indicia of ownership of the Property” such as paying
    ad valorem taxes or complying with landlord requirements under the Texas
    Property Code;

  • If the Deed had served as a conveyance, Rosenstein would have been unjustly
    enriched by Patricia’s mortgage payoff;

  • “It would be unconscionable for Rosenstein to receive the Property as a fee for
    the legal services he provided Jimmy”;

  • The Deed was intended to be a security instrument to secure payment for
    Rosenstein’s legal services;

  • “The Deed was intended to be a mortgage not a conveyance”; and

  • The attorney’s fees awarded to Patricia are reasonable and necessary pursuant
    to Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Conclusions of Law

  • “Upon probate of [Jimmy’s will], title to the Property vested in Patricia in fee
    simply absolute”;

                                         7
   • Patricia’s causes of action accrued on April 15, 2021, and her claims were not
     barred by limitations;

   • Patricia had standing to assert her claims; and

   • Patricia is not Jimmy’s heir under Section 13.001(b) of the Property Code.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

           A. LEGAL AND FACTUAL EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY ISSUES

      In his first two issues, Rosenstein argues that the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that (1) the Deed was

intended to be a security instrument and (2) Patricia’s attorney’s fees were reasonable

and necessary.

                               1. Standards of Review

      A trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s

answers to jury questions. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.

1991). As with jury findings, a trial court’s fact-findings on disputed issues are not

conclusive, and when—as here—the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, an

appellant may challenge those findings for evidentiary sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel,

881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994); Super Ventures, Inc. v. Chaudhry, 501 S.W.3d 121, 126

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.). We review the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting challenged findings using the same standards that we apply to jury

findings. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297.

                                           8
       We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence

challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of

law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to

prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Shields

Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017); see also Ford Motor Co. v.

Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Tex. 2014) (op. on reh’g); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v.

Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998) (op. on reh’g). In determining whether

legally sufficient evidence supports the finding under review, we must consider

evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could and must disregard

contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete

Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

807, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the

evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658

(Tex. 2018).

       When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all

the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,

                                             9
715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176

(Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

      Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be used to establish any material

fact. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). A fact is established

by circumstantial evidence when it can be fairly and reasonably inferred from other

facts proved in the case. Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929, 933 (Tex. 1993). When

conducting a factual-sufficiency review, a court of appeals must not merely substitute

its judgment for that of the factfinder. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d

757, 761 (Tex. 2003). The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and

the weight to be given to their testimony. Id.

      Further, if the evidence is factually sufficient, then it is necessarily legally

sufficient and we need not also analyze for legal sufficiency. Citizens Nat'l Bank v.

Allen Rae Invs, Inc., 142 S.W.3d 459, 485 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see

Kadow v. MAA, Watermark, No. 02-22-00038-CV, 2022 WL 17841131, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

         2. Trial Court’s Finding That Deed Was a Security Instrument

      Rosenstein first argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that the Deed was intended to be a security

instrument to secure payment for Rosenstein’s legal services rather than a conveyance

of the Property to him. We disagree.

                                           10
      First, Rosenstein did not challenge every ground and finding upon which the

judgment could stand.        “[I]f an independent ground may fully support the

complained-of ruling or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that

independent ground, then we ‘must accept the validity of that unchallenged

independent ground and thus any error in the grounds challenged on appeal is

harmless because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports the

complained-of ruling or judgment.’” S.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Arlington Ind. Sch. Dist., 435

S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, no pet.) (cleaned up) (quoting Britton

v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002,

no pet.). “When findings of fact are sent by the trial court they must form the basis

of the judgment upon all grounds of recovery and of defense embraced therein.”

Tex. R. Civ. P. 299. “[I]f the trial court’s findings of fact are not challenged by a point

of error on appeal, they are binding upon the appellate court.” Trammell v. Trammell,

485 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

      Apart from her claim that the Deed was intended as a security instrument

rather than a conveyance, Patricia pleaded various alternative grounds upon which she

argued that the Deed was void and title to the Property belonged in her name. These

grounds included that (1) she was an innocent grantee for value without notice

pursuant to Section 13.001 of the Texas Property Code; (2) it would be unjust

enrichment for Rosenstein to receive the property in exchange for the limited legal

services he provided; and (3) he was estopped from claiming ownership of the

                                            11
Property because such would be unconscionable considering that he concealed the

Deed and Patricia paid off the mortgage and obtained title to the Property without

notice of the Deed. And the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law

supporting each of these alternative grounds. However, Rosenstein does not assign

error to any of these alternative grounds or findings, complaining only that the trial

court erred in finding that the Deed was a security instrument. Because Rosenstein

has not complained on appeal of the alternative grounds and findings that could

support the judgment, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment.3 See id.

      Further, even if this issue had been adequately raised by Rosenstein, the

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the Deed was a security

instrument.

      “A transfer of title that is absolute on its face may nonetheless be shown to

have been intended as a mortgage given to secure a debt.” Alvarado v. Alvarado,

No. 13-00-690-CV, 2002 WL 1072067, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

      3
         Rosenstein makes a cursory and implicit argument—without any legal
support—that, because the trial court’s written judgment referenced only Patricia’s
pretended sale claim, that her alternative grounds could not support the judgment
because she “did not file a cross-appeal challenging these issues.” This argument fails
because findings made within the judgment are supplanted by any written findings of
fact filed separately by the trial court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 299a (“Findings of fact must not
be recited in a judgment. If there is a conflict between findings of fact recited in a
judgment in violation of this rule and findings of fact made pursuant to Rules 297 and
298, the latter findings will control for appellate purposes.”); see Land v. Land,
561 S.W.3d 624, 632 n. 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). Thus,
here we must look to the trial court’s separately-filed findings of fact—which do
address Patricia’s alternative grounds—in making our decision.

                                           12
May 30, 2002, pet. denied) (citing Bantuelle v. Williams, 667 S.W.2d 810, 815–16 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Johnson v. Cherry, 726 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex. 1987)

(“When there is a finding supported by some probative evidence that a disputed

transaction, although written as a deed, is actually a mortgage, the law will impute the

existence of an enforceable debt, thereby creating the debtor/creditor relationship

necessary to every mortgage.”) (emphasis added). “The circumstances preceding,

surrounding, and subsequent to the transaction may all be viewed in determining

whether a transaction was truly intended as a fee simple transfer, or merely as a loan

or a mortgage.”     RBS Mortg., LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 04-11-00681-CV, 2013 WL

749730, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); see

Bantuelle, 667 S.W.2d at 816. The issue of whether an instrument was intended to be a

deed or a mortgage is a question of fact. Johnson, 726 S.W.2d at 6.

      Here, the Contract provided that Jimmy would pay a nonrefundable $22,500

retainer for Rosenstein’s pretrial representation, which—because Jimmy did not then

have the cash to pay the retainer—would “consist of” a transfer of the Property from

Jimmy to Rosenstein. This fee did not cover any expenses or trial representation, the

latter of which would have required Jimmy to front at least another $30,000. Though

Jimmy executed the Deed and the Lease, Jimmy never paid any rent directly to

Rosenstein. Then, for more than a decade, Rosenstein did nothing to indicate that the

Property had been conveyed to him. He did not record the Deed, visit the Property,

pay the taxes, insure the property in his name, perform his landlord duties, or claim

                                          13
the Property or rental income therefrom for tax purposes. Instead, it was Jimmy and

Patricia who acted as the owners of the Property. They lived on the Property, paid

the taxes, paid the mortgage and other expenses, improved it, insured it, and claimed

it as their homestead.

      From this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably found that the parties

did not intend for Jimmy to use his homestead as payment for $22,500 worth of

(exclusively pretrial) legal services but that they instead intended for the Deed to

secure payment for those services. In other words, this finding was supported by

some probative evidence that was not so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming

weight of all the evidence. Johnson, 726 S.W.2d at 7; Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635.

      For these reasons, we overrule Rosenstein’s first issue.

                     3. Trial Court’s Award of Attorney’s Fees

      In his second issue, Rosenstein argues that the evidence was legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s award of Patricia’s attorney’s fees.

Specifically, he argues that Patricia did not present sufficient evidence of her

attorney’s hourly rate, the total time spent on the case, and the specific services

rendered, and that she did not appropriately segregate her fees between those that

were recoverable and nonrecoverable.         We agree that Patricia’s attorney’s-fees

evidence was insufficient.

      The only evidence submitted to the trial court on the issue of Patricia’s

attorney’s fees came from her attorney’s oral testimony—he did not supply a written

                                           14
affidavit or billing records. He testified as to his qualifications and experience as an

attorney and stated that he charges $300 per hour for his services. As to the particular

services performed and hours expended, Patricia’s attorney testified as follows:

      I had to interview the case. I had to brief out the law that was relevant
      to it. I had to prepare the Plaintiff’s pleadings in this case. I think we’re
      up to our second amended original petition.

      I’ve conducted discovery in this case. I have represented her in the
      eviction suit that was filed and then dismissed. I represented her in a
      91a motion in this case, which was denied. And I represented her --
      prepared a response and represented her in a -- in the Defendant’s
      motion for summary judgment which was also denied.

      I have taken time to prepare for the trial of this case. I’ve arranged for
      the various exhibits, and I have expended numerous – a number of
      hours. I’m – right now I’ve had 20 – approximately 21.5 hours not
      counting today and if we go on until tomorrow. But as of the 22nd of
      September, my fees were a little over $16,000, and depending on how
      this trial goes, my fees will probably exceed $20,000.

      “When a claimant wishes to obtain attorney’s fees from the opposing party, the

claimant must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable and necessary.”

Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex. 2019).

Both the reasonableness and the necessity of a fee are fact questions. Id.

      The lodestar method of fee calculation applies “to any situation in which an

objective calculation of reasonable hours worked times a reasonable rate can be

employed.” Id. at 498. With the lodestar method, “the fact finder’s starting point for

calculating an attorney’s fee award is determining the reasonable hours worked

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, and the fee claimant bears the burden of

                                           15
providing sufficient evidence on both counts.” Id. Sufficient evidence of a reasonable

and necessary fee “includes, at a minimum, evidence of (1) particular services

performed, (2) who performed those services, (3) approximately when the services

were performed, (4) the reasonable amount of time required to perform the services,

and (5) the reasonable hourly rate for each person performing such services.” Id.

Contemporaneous billing records are not strictly required to prove the reasonableness

and necessity of requested fees but are strongly encouraged. Id. at 502. Generalities

about tasks performed do not provide sufficient information for the fact finder “to

meaningfully review whether the tasks and hours were reasonable and necessary under

the lodestar method.” Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2014); see City of

Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736–37 (Tex. 2013) (reversing attorney’s-fees

award when the attorney testified to the time expended and the hourly rate but failed

to provide evidence of the time devoted to specific tasks). When the evidence is not

sufficient to make a lodestar calculation, we must reverse and remand for the trial

court to determine the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees. El Apple I, Ltd. v.

Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. 2012).

      Patricia’s attorney offered only generalities as to broad categories of tasks that

he performed and provided almost no explanation as to the amount of time spent on

each of those tasks. See Long, 442 S.W.3d at 255 (reversing attorney’s-fees award

when the attorney’s affidavit spoke generally about the tasks performed and the

number of hours spent on those tasks). The only indication given as to the specific

                                           16
time spent on Patricia’s case was that he had expended 21.5 hours preparing for and

presenting her case at trial. No evidence was supplied concerning time expended on

the other pretrial tasks that he testified to.

       For these reasons, we sustain Rosenstein’s second issue.

                              B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

       In his third issue, Rosenstein contends that the trial court erred in concluding

that Patricia’s pretended-sale claim was not barred by the applicable statute of

limitations. He argues that the law is clear that “a party to a deed has four years from

the date of execution of the deed to seek to cancel it as an improper or pretended sale

of a homestead.” Thus, in Rosenstein’s view, the statute of limitations governing

Patricia’s claim that the Deed was intended as a security instrument began to run in

2009 when Jimmy executed the Deed, thus barring Patricia from bringing her action

in 2021. We disagree because (1) a purported deed that is found to be a mortgage is

void and thus not subject to a statute of limitations, and (2) even if the statute of

limitations was four years, it did not begin to run against Patricia until an actual

controversy existed between her and Rosenstein.

       A deed that is found to be intended as a security instrument is void. Johnson,

726 S.W.2d at 7 (holding that deed imputed as a mortgage was “null and void”); Wood

v. De Winter, 280 S.W. 303, 307 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1926, no writ) (“If the

instrument was at the time of its execution intended by the parties thereto as a

mortgage and security for a loan, it was a void instrument as such . . . .”); see Tex.

                                                 17
Const. art. XVI, § 50(c) (“All pretended sales of the homestead involving any

condition of defeasance shall be void.”); Sudderth v. Howard, 560 S.W.2d 511, 516–17

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“What the constitution declares void

cannot be made valid by an agreement between the primary parties . . . .”). “[A]n

equitable action to remove cloud on title is not subject to limitations if a deed is void

or has expired by its own terms.” Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618

(Tex. 2007); Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet.

denied).

      Accordingly, because the Deed here was void, no statute of limitations applied

to Patricia’s quiet title action and her pretended-sale claim was not thus barred. See

Ford, 235 S.W.3d at 618.

      But even if a four-year limitations period applied here, it would not have barred

Patricia’s claims. “As a general rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of

limitations begins to run when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek

a judicial remedy.” Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex.

2003); see Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 13.002 (“An instrument that is properly recorded in

the proper county is . . . notice to all persons of the existence of the instrument.”); see

also Poag, 317 S.W.3d at 827 (explaining that the recording of a deed charged appellant

with notice and commenced the statute of limitations related to his claims to set aside

the deed). More specifically, a declaratory judgment action—like the one brought by

Patricia—does not accrue “until there is an actual controversy between the parties.”

                                            18
In re Estate of Denman, 362 S.W.3d 134, 144 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.);

see Vann v. Homeowner’s Ass’n for Woodland Park of Georgetown, Inc., No. 03-18-00201-CV,

2018 WL 4140443, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(collecting cases); cf. Evans v. Graves, 166 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1942,

writ ref’d w.o.m.) (“Though appellant[] might have been able to maintain a suit during

the life estate to quiet title, yet she was not compelled to do so until a right of

possession accrued.”).

      At the very earliest, a legal controversy arose between Patricia and Rosenstein

on July 13, 2020, when she first took purported title to the Property via Jimmy’s

probated will. Before that date, she had no legal right to the property and, necessarily,

no right to seek any related legal remedy. Accordingly, even if a four-year statute of

limitations applied to Patricia’s claims, she would have been required to file suit only

before July 14, 2024—which she did.

      For these reasons, we overrule Rosenstein’s third issue.

                                     C. STANDING

      In his fourth issue, Rosenstein argues that the trial court erred in concluding

that Patricia had standing to bring her suit. He contends that, because he was granted

title to the Property in 2009 via the Deed, the Property was not part of Jimmy’s estate

and could not have been devised to Patricia through Jimmy’s will.            Thus, says

Rosenstein, Patricia did not have a justiciable interest in the Property. Again, we

disagree.

                                           19
        A void deed cannot pass title. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Tex. Bank,

889 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); see Slaughter

v. Qualls, 162 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Tex. 1942) (“The rule has long been established in this

State that where a deed is absolutely void, a suit at law in trespass to try title may be

maintained to recover the land without setting the deed aside . . . .”). Further, a

beneficiary who has interest in estate property under a probated will has standing to

sue to enforce that interest. Houston v. Ludwick, No. 14-09-00600-CV, 2010 WL

4132215, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 21, 2010, pet. denied) (mem.

op.).

        As we explained above, the Deed was void and, thus, never passed title in the

Property to Rosenstein. Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf, 889 S.W.2d at 601. Instead, title

passed from Jimmy’s estate to his sole beneficiary, Patricia, when his will was

probated as a muniment of title, giving Patricia standing to bring her quiet-title claim.

Id.

        For these reasons, we overrule Rosenstein’s fourth issue.

                                 III. CONCLUSION

        Having sustained Rosenstein’s second issue that the evidence was insufficient

to support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees, we reverse that award and remand

this case for a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. See El

Apple I, Ltd., 370 S.W.3d at 764. Having overruled issues one, three, and four, we

affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

                                           20
                                   /s/ Brian Walker

                                   Brian Walker
                                   Justice

Delivered: January 11, 2024

                              21