Court Opinion

ID: 9774653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:28:35.170019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:12.488615
License: Public Domain

DALTON, Judge
(dissenting).
I find it necessary to dissent because I believe that the court in reversing the judgment in this case and remanding the case for a new trial has given the defendant-appellant much more consideration than he is entitled to receive under the facts shown by the record and the law as previously declared by this court. The conviction is reversed on the sole basis of the police officer’s answer to the last question asked at the close of all of the evidence, as follows:
“MR. KOSTER: Did he give you an answer, Officer?
“A. He refused to make a statement.”
It will be noted that the defendant interposed no objection to the question, but waited until the question had been answered and then moved to strike out the answer. There is no suggestion in the record that counsel did not have time to object to the question before it was answered if he had desired to do so. The motion came too late to prevent the jury from hearing the answer and the motion to strike would have amounted to very little. Further, I believe that this evidence was clearly admissible in contradiction of defendant’s testimony that the police officer did not ask him why he carried either gun. It tended to contradict defendant’s testimony and to impeach his credibility as a witness. A refusal implies a request and absent a request there could have been no refusal.
Section 546.260 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf “and shall be liable to cross-examination, as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief, and may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness in the case" (Italics ours.) State v. Beishir, Mo.Sup., 332 S.W.2d 898, 901 [1] ; State v. Swisher, 364 Mo. 157, 260 S. W.2d 6, 10 [1-5] and State v. Woods, 346 *428Mo. 538, 142 S.W.2d 87, 90 [7], Under this statute much evidence that would definitely be inadmissible in the State’s case in chief may become admissible in rebuttal of defendant’s testimony or evidence. State v. King, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277, 283 [11,12] ; State v. Griffin, Mo.Sup., 336 S. W.2d 364, 368 [7].
Any competent testimony that tends to explain, counteract, repel or disprove evidence offered by defendant may be offered in rebuttal of the defendant’s testimony or evidence. State v. Foster, 355 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313, 324 [23 to 27 inc’l]; State v. Beishir, supra, 332 S.W.2d 898, 903 [6, 7]; State v. Woods, supra, 346 Mo. 538, 142 S.W.2d 87, 90 [7]; 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1050, p. 1208. And it is immaterial that such defendant’s evidence may have appeared in the State’s cross-examination of the defendant himself. State v. Foster, supra, 355 Mo. 577, 197 S.W.2d 313, 324 [23 to 27 inc’l]; State v. King, supra, 342 Mo. 975, 119 S.W.2d 277, 284 [12],
Even implied adverse inferences may be rebutted by competent rebuttal testimony. State v. Humphries, 350 Mo. 938, 169 S.W. 2d 350, 353 [8]; State v. Hadley, Mo.Sup., 249 S.W.2d 857, 860 [2], Further, the admission or exclusion of rebuttal testimony and the scope of such testimony, if not clearly admissible as a matter of law and right, rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, and this discretion extends even to the matter of determination of the admission of evidence which may not be strictly rebuttal evidence and an appellate court will reverse only for a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Smith, Mo.Sup., 261 S.W.2d 50, 55 [2] and [3] and cases cited; State v. Smith, 354 Mo. 1088, 193 S. W.2d 499, 503 [14-15]; State v. Dees, Mo. Sup., 276 S.W.2d 201, 206 [10-11]; State v. Payne, Mo.Sup., 342 S.W.2d 950, 954 [4-7]; State v. Mason, 322 Mo. 194, 14 S. W.2d 611, 615 [9-11]; State v. Higginbotham, 335 Mo. 102, 72 S.W.2d 65, 68 [2] ; West’s Missouri Digest, Criminal Law, Key a s I u có Ü CO CM CO CO a VO r~~i O CO 609
A further applicable rule is that evidence which is competent for one purpose, but incompetent for another, must be received and the adverse party then has the right to an instruction, if he requests it, limiting the purpose for which the jury may consider such evidence. Johnson v. Minihan, 355 Mo. 1208, 200 S.W.2d 334, 337 [5]; Hammond v. Schuermann Bldg. & Realty Co., 352 Mo. 418, 177 S.W.2d 618, 620 [4]; State v. Beishir, supra, 332 S.W.2d 898, 902 [3,4], The officer’s final statement was properly admitted under the statute, even though it was not proper evidence to prove the guilt of the defendant of the charge against him. Further, after the close of all the evidence the defendant did not present any instruction limiting the effect of this rebuttal evidence, nor did defendent request the court to advise the jury that this evidence was competent only on the issue of defendant’s credibility as a witness. See State v. Warren, 326 Mo. 843, 33 S.W.2d 125, 127 [1,2]; Scott v. Missouri Ins. Co., Mo.Sup., 233 S.W.2d 660, 665 [9] ; State v. Preslar, 318 Mo. 679, 300 S.W. 687, 690 [2], No such instruction was requested, or given, and none was required unless requested. State v. Preslar, supra; State v. Scown, Mo.Sup., 312 S.W.2d 782, 788 [6-8],
There is a further reason that this case should not be reversed and remanded because of the admission into evidence of the officer’s answer to the last question and the court’s failure to strike it out and that is because under the facts in this case the defendant was not prejudiced by the answer in question in view of his own testimony.
Defendant, testifying in his own behalf, admitted that he had the .25 caliber Colt automatic pistol in his car on the date of his arrest; that he had put the pistol on the front floor of his car; that he made no attempt to conceal it; that he had the pistol with him because he had to go back into the neighborhood where he was afraid and where he previously had been followed; *429that he wanted to have some protection; that he took the gun with him to protect himself because he was afraid for his life; and that he had the .22 caliber pistol, which was locked in the glove compartment, because he used it for target practice. He did not deny that the .25 caliber automatic was, in fact, concealed on or about his person under the front seat of the car, or that both pistols were loaded. He further testified that he did not tell the officer, and the officer did not ask him why he was carrying either gun.
The record further shows he testified as follows:
“Q. Both of these guns are your guns, is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now, are you saying that this gun was not under the front seat? A. No, sir.

“Q. Was the officer correct when he said that he found the gun about eight inches or so underneath the front seat on the passenger’s side?
“A. He could have, sir, I did not place it there.
“Q. You did not see — did you see anybody else place it there?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You did not see where the officer got the gun?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You are not saying he is incorrect when he said he got it from underneath the seat?
“A. No.
"Q. You didn’t put the gun underneath the seat?
“A. No.”
There are other reasons why the answer •of the police officer to the last question was not prejudicial and that is because it was little more than repetition of the officer’s prior testimony that he did ask the defendant why he was carrying State’s Exhibit 1, a .25 caliber Colt automatic pistol. His further testimony that defendant refused to make a statement in answer was but a different way of testifying to the same fact previously testified to, to wit: that a request as to why he was carrying the gun was, in fact, made otherwise there could have been no refusal.
While a careful reading of the entire record in this case convinces us that the questioned evidence was, in fact, admissible to impeach and discredit the defendant as a witness in his own behalf, nevertheless this court in the case of State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 617, 29 S.W. 700, 702, has previously held that proof of defendant’s silence in a case where such evidence was not even offered in contradiction and impeachment of defendants testimony was, in fact, not prejudicial error justifying a reversal where the State otherwise had made out a strong case against the defendant. The court in that case said: “The circumstance that the accused is in custody, while entitled to weight, will not, of itself, exclude the statement, if the circumstances otherwise properly called for a reply or denial by him. * * * We do not think the circumstances detailed by Officer Freese were such as called for a statement by defendant. He must have felt the restraint of his surroundings, and his silence under such circumstances would constitute the very slightest, if any, evidence of his guilt. But, notwithstanding we hold the proof of defendant’s silence was erroneous, we are also clear that under the facts of this case this alone ought not to cause a reversal of this judgment. Error is presumed prejudicial, and it devolves upon the state, when it is shown, to demonstrate that it wrought no harm to defendant. Upon this record, we think this is shown. * * *” (Italics ours.)
On the record presented in the present case I do not find the error, if any, suffi*430ciently prejudicial to justify the reversal of the judgment and, since we believe the evidence properly admissible to affect defendant’s credibility as a witness, we find no error in the record. I think the court might have far better disposed of this case by applying the Latin maxim, De minimis non curat lex, and affirming the judgment since, in view of the defendant’s own testimony before the jury, the officer’s answer to the last question probably had no more to do with the conviction of defendant than the omission of the word “the” in the indictment in the case of State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 224, 228, 109 S.W. 706, 712, for which error this court at one time reversed a judgment of conviction.
I would affirm the judgmént.