Court Opinion

ID: 9579070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:11.837735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:15.403408
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would uphold the jury’s verdict because there was evidence from which the jury was authorized to conclude appellant had not proved either that appellee was negligent or that any negligence of appellee proximately caused the collision. Compare Glaze v. Bailey, 130 Ga. App. 189-190 (2) (202 SE2d 708) (1973). “There was proof of the accident and of how it occurred, and the proof may be sufficient to raise an inference of negligence on the part of the [appellee]. But the [appellee] offered an explanation of her *229conduct which the jury may very well have concluded was sufficient to take her conduct out of the realm of negligence. . . .” Simpson v. Brand, 108 Ga. App. 393, 397 (133 SE2d 393) (1963). Appellee testified that “I put on my brakes, I began to skid and I tried to veer off to the right-hand side of the road, hoping to miss [appellant’s] car.” Although appellee testified that she briefly looked down to adjust her air-conditioner, there was no evidence that action either precluded her from stopping as quickly as she otherwise could have or caused her to collide with appellant. Similarly, appellee’s failure to wear her glasses was not shown to be the proximate cause of her failure to stop in time. Further, Lt. Morris’s testimony was sufficient to create an inference that appellee operated her car with ordinary prudence under the circumstances. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I find this evidence did raise a question as to whether the collision “resulted from an unforeseen or unexplained cause,” Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 87 (2) (318 SE2d 700) (1984), rather than any negligence of appellee, and thus presented á question for resolution by the jury. See Simpson, supra.
Decided March 16, 1990
Rehearing denied March 29, 1990
David G. Kopp, for appellant.
Chambers, Mabry, McClelland & Brooks, V. Jane Reed, Jack G. Slover, Jr., for appellee.
“We will not weigh the evidence, and in fact are precluded from doing so. [Cits.] In the absence of legal error, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to interfere with a verdict supported by some evidence even where the verdict may be against the preponderance of the evidence. [Cits.] We will not speculate as to what evidence the jury chose to believe or disbelieve; on appeal, this court is bound to construe the evidence with every inference and presumption being in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, and after the verdict is approved by the trial judge, the evidence must be construed so as to uphold the verdict even where there are discrepancies. [Cits.]” Williams v. Stankowitz, 149 Ga. App. 865, 866 (256 SE2d 147) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.