Court Opinion

ID: 9705948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:27:09.516479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:23.130051
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Being unable to agree with the reasoning or result reached in Divisions I and II of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.
Trial court’s post-submission interrogation of the jury and giving of the so-called Allen charge, all over repeated timely objections, constituted prejudicial error, regardless of time, sequence, or circumstances.
I. At the outset, this statement in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 135-136, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), manifest a constitutionally based condemnation of any post-submission interrogation as to numerical standing of the jury:
*22“We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to. reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious, although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned.” (emphasis added).
Further in this vein, one basic precept of the Fifth Amendment is that due process requires an accused be accorded a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). And judicial conduct which tends to coerce “minority view” jurors into acquiescence effectively prevents a fair trial by depriving an accused his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Cf. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 1060, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965). Brasfield’s characterization of post-submission interrogation was inherently coercive and its attendant reference to fair trial, suffices to place its rationale within constitutional parameters. See Jones v. Norvell, 472 F.2d 1185, 1186 (6th Cir. 1973); People v. Sellars, 76 Cal.App.3d 265, 271 n. 4, 141 Cal.Rptr. 294, 297 (1977); Smoot v. State, 31 Md.App. 138, 355 A.2d 495, 502-503 (1976), citing Taylor v. State, 17 Md.App. 41, 299 A.2d 841, 845 & n. 8 (1973); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M. 91, 547 P.2d 574, 580 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206, 549 P.2d 284 (1976). This conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s reversal in Brasfield notwithstanding absence of timely exception at trial. 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 136.
But even if Brasfield be deemed not binding upon us as a state court it still remains an accused’s fair trial right dictates we adopt its teaching. See, e. g., People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn.1975); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 769, 777-780.
Furthermore, this court cited Brasfield with approval in State v. Robinette, 216 N.W.2d 317, 318 (Iowa 1974), wherein error had not been preserved.
In brief, I find no reason to abandon that stance by purporting to examine circumstances which, as Brasfield aptly notes, cannot be reviewed properly by the courts.
II. Noticeably, the foregoing initial error was only compounded by trial court’s subsequent Allen charge. Sellars, 76 Cal.App.3d at 271 n. 4, 141 Cal.Rptr. at 297; Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 141. In support of my disagreement with the majority’s Allen charge approval, see the dissent in State v. Kelley, 161 N.W.2d 123, 127-128 (Iowa 1968). See also United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 776 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 419-420 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88 (1969); Redeford v. State, 572 P.2d 219, 220-221 (Nev.1977).
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.