Court Opinion

ID: 9424051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:10:04.12227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:47.809650
License: Public Domain

Mb. Justice White,
concurring in the result.
The Court’s opinion, as I understand it, does not dispense with the necessity of presenting an issue under the draft laws to the registrant’s local board for consideration in the first instance. Petitioner did exactly this, and by its decision, the Court provides no avenue for totally bypassing the Selective Service System and using the courts as an alternative to the local draft boards. Any decision to the contrary would be inconsistent with the well-established principle that the responsible admin*205istrative agency must be given “an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.” Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 155 (1946). See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §20.06 (1958). But presentation of the issue to the agency for consideration in the first instance does not complete the litigant’s task under the exhaustion doctrine if he would seek resolution of that same issue in the courts. On the contrary, he must resort to appellate remedies available within the agency, and only after those remedies have been exhausted can he turn to the courts for review. See, e. g., United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567, 575 (1928).
It is petitioner’s failure to exhaust appellate remedies available within the Selective Service System which presents the obstacle to the challenge of his classification in the courts. And while this facet of the exhaustion doctrine, like its other facets, admits of exceptions when special circumstances warrant, see, e. g., Donato v. United States, 302 F. 2d 468 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962), I cannot agree with the Court’s apparent conclusion that petitioner’s failure to exhaust appellate remedies within the System can be disregarded on the broader ground that only a question of law is involved. Questions of law have not, in the past, been thought to be immune from exhaustion requirements. See, e. g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938). Indeed, this Court has often emphasized that the expertise of the responsible agency is entitled to great deference in matters of statutory construction,1 see, e. g., Udall v. Tallman, *206380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965), thus refuting any contention that questions of law are somehow beyond the expertise of the agency and do not give rise to the considerations which underlie the exhaustion doctrine.
Although I would stop far short of the broad strokes used by the Court in this respect, I do agree that petitioner’s failure to exhaust appellate remedies does not bar review of his classification on the facts of this case. Undoubtedly, Congress could require such exhaustion as a prerequisite to judicial review, see, e. g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), but Congress has not chosen to do so.2 In the absence of any such requirement, I do *207not think review of petitioner’s classification is an impermissible encroachment upon the bailiwick of the Selective Service System. We are not faced with a situation in which consideration of the issue involved has stopped at the first level of the administrative machinery. Rather, petitioner’s case and the scope of the § 6 (o) exemption for sole surviving sons have received the attention of both the State and the National Directors of the Selective Service System. Petitioner has not exhausted the channels for formal appellate review within the System, but the informal review given petitioner’s case and the ratification by the State and National Directors of the position taken by petitioner’s local board are sufficient justification to permit the courts to entertain petitioner’s defense that his classification is improper under § 6 (o).

 The fact that the relevant statute is ambiguous or uncertain, e. g., Logan v. Davis, 233 U. S. 613, 627 (1914), or that the agency’s interpretation of a statute comes while its interrelationship with the other parts of the regulatory scheme is as yet “untried and *206new,” Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933), may accord the agency interpretation of the statute additional significance. And since the construction of the sole surviving son exemption is “essentially a question of first impression,” ante, at 190, the importance of exhaustion — or of a failure to exhaust — is, perhaps, accentuated in this case. Any ambiguity in the language and legislative history of the statute, or any question as to the role which § 6 (o) must play in the statutory scheme would be well suited to resolution by the Selective Service System in the first instance. Exhaustion of appellate remedies within the System would have afforded that agency full opportunity to apply its expertise to these and other questions, thereby facilitating the disclosure of factors which, although germane, are not highly visible to tribunals less familiar with the regulatory scheme.

 Compare Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944). Section 10 (b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 104, prescribes the timing of judicial review — “after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction” — but does not speak to the exhaustion question.
It should be noted that where agency orders are not suspended during the pendency of an administrative appeal, Congress has seen fit to permit judicial review without exhaustion of appellate remedies. Administrative Procedure Act § 10 (c), 5 U. S. C. §704 (1964 ed., Supp. Ill). Under that section, however, if the agency action is inoperative during administrative review, the agency may require exhaustion by its own rules. Since induction may not be ordered during a registrant's appeal, 32 CFR, §§1626.41, 1627.8 (1969), the *207Selective Service System could require exhaustion even if subject to § 10 (c) of the APA. The administration of the draft laws, however, is not covered by the APA, and the necessity for exhausting appellate remedies would seem to rest on the general doctrine developed by the courts.