Court Opinion

ID: 9691258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:19:06.058399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:14.165600
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Opinion By
Justice MOSELEY.
We deny the motions for rehearing filed by appellants South West Property Trust, Inc. and SWP Properties I, L.P. (“South West”) and appellee Dallas County Flood Control District No. 1 (“the District”).
In its motion for rehearing, South West argues our opinion improperly ignores the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Thomas v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 261 U.S. 481, 43 S.Ct. 440, 67 L.Ed. 758 (1923), and that we misconstrued Hydrocarbon Production Co. v. Valley Acres Water District, 204 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.1953). South West’s motion conflates the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. We address South West’s motion to clarify the bases for our decision.
The taxpayer in Thomas challenged the government’s property tax scheme based on the apportionment of the tax among the taxpayers in a special purpose district. The Supreme Court held the tax was levied in a “grossly discriminatory” manner and, as a result, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Thomas, 261 U.S. at 485, 43 S.Ct. 440. Thus, Thomas was decided on equal protection grounds, not due process grounds.
South West’s motion also argues the Court’s opinion misconstrued Hydrocarbon, and that language from that opinion actually supports South West’s position. South West’s motion specifically refers the Court to the following language from Hydrocarbon:
That the Legislature of the State of Texas has complete and perfect Constitutional power to create the reclamation and conservation district in question may not be questioned. It is equally established, however, that if the consequence and effect of the provisions by which such exercise of the legislative power is effectuated at [sic] unconstitutional and invalid when applied to a complainant the Court should so declare and award relief accordingly.
See Hydrocarbon, 204 F.2d at 217 (emphasis added by South West). On the basis of the above language, South West asserts that the “inclusion” of the property in the District is not the critical issue because “it is the resultant action that determines whether South West’s constitutional rights have been violated.” South West’s motion argues it is the “ ‘consequence’ and ‘effect’ of this legislation and the manner in which the legislative power is ‘effectuated’ which may be challenged by a taxpayer and that is precisely what South West has done in this controversy.”
In Hydrocarbon, the landowner-prospective taxpayer sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prohibit a governmental district (similar to the one in this case) from issuing bonds and levying ad valorem taxes. Hydrocarbon, 204 F.2d *15at 215. Although the state legislature had found that all the land to be included in the district would benefit thereby (as did the legislature in this case), the landowner contended that finding was, as to its property: “palpably wrong, eonstitut[ed] a gross abuse of discretion and [was] void....” Id. The landowner also contended its property within the district (and thus subject to the district’s tax) “will not be benefited by the issuance of bonds or the expenditure of the proceeds and, as applied to [the landowner’s] property, the same is confiscatory and void and, in the alternative, that plaintiff is entitled to a hearing on the question of benefits.” Id. at 215-16.
The trial court dismissed the landowner’s complaint, and the landowner appealed, arguing the legislature’s finding of benefits was “contrary to the facts, ... palpably arbitrary, ... and if permitted would constitute taking appellant’s property without due process of law and deny it the equal protection of the law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 216.
The Fifth Circuit ruled against the landowner, affirming the judgment of the district court. Id. at 219. The court stated the creation of such districts was authorized by the Texas Constitution, and that Texas law authorized such districts to raise funds “either by means of ad valo-rem taxation on all property in the district, or by means of a special assessment, where the tax is levied in proportion to benefits.” Id. at 217 (citations omitted). It held that the choice between imposing the tax on an ad valorem basis or according to benefits conferred “are matters which rest in the discretion of the state, and are not controlled by either the due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 218 (internal quotation omitted). Further, because the legislature had the right to authorize the district to tax property ad valo-rem, and thus without regard to benefit, the landowner had no constitutional right to a hearing on the question of benefits. Id. at 219.
Thus, Hydrocarbon should be read as rejecting the landowner’s substantive and procedural due process and equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent those claims were before the court. However, Hydrocarbon concluded by noting the landowner’s complaint
really attacks only the right and power of the District to tax appellant’s property at all. It does not provide a predicate for determination of any question of discrimination or illegality in the actual assessment and collection of taxes but only a claimed apprehension that inequality and discrimination will follow. We therefore do not now pass upon this feature of the claim and in no wise attempt to adjudicate it.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Hydrocarbon court expressly abstained from reaching and deciding any federal equal protection claims arising from the actual assessment and collection of taxes. It is in this context that the underlined language from Hydrocarbon, quoted by South West in its motion for rehearing, must be read.
South West did not cite Thomas in its briefing before the court.1 Indeed, the following quotation constitutes South West’s entire argument in its presubmission brief regarding its federal equal protection claim:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that *16no state may “deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal. protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST, amend XIV, § 1. The taxing of Plaintiffs’ property by the District even though the property received no benefit, while property owned by others received the benefit, constitutes a denial of equal protection.
Apart from this conclusory assertion, South West’s presubmission briefing sets forth no argument or authority to support this contention. It is not the function of this Court to conduct an independent research of applicable law to determine whether an issue presents reversible error. Because South West failed to provide the argument and authority necessary to make this appellate complaint viable, our opinion held South West’s brief waived any federal equal protection arguments, and presented nothing for our review. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Kang v. Hyundai Corp., 992 S.W.2d 499, 503 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
In essence, South West’s contentions based on Thomas and Hydrocarbon in its motion for rehearing are equal protection arguments under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether the District’s ad valorem tax is “grossly discriminatory” and viola-tive of the Fourteenth Amendment, as was the ad valorem tax in Thomas, is an equal protection issue. Whether the “consequences and effect” of the legislation setting up the District (which was “effectuated” by levying and collecting taxes) is so discriminatory and unequal as to constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is an equal protection issue — one not decided by Hydrocarbon or presented by South West’s presubmission brief to this Court. Having waived such arguments by its presubmission briefing, South West may not resurrect them via a motion for rehearing. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h).
We have also reviewed the remaining arguments in South West’s motion for rehearing and find them without merit. Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ motion for rehearing.
Justice O’NEILL dissents without further opinion.

. We also note South West’s presubmission briefing to this Court omits any reference to Hydrocarbon. (The District cited Hydrocarbon in its brief passim.)