Court Opinion

ID: 9516624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:47:23.442498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:28.692618
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: The majority has departed from the principles regarding negotiated guilty pleas that this court has set forth in prior decisions. I therefore respectfully dissent. This court in People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), interpreted Supreme Court Rule 604(d), which provides that a defendant may not appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty unless the defendant timely “files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). This court held that the motion-for-sentence-reconsideration provisions of Rule 604(d) apply only to “open,” as opposed to “negotiated,” guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 331-32. We defined an open guilty plea as one in which a defendant pleads guilty “without receiving any promises from the State in return.” (Emphasis added.) Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Accordingly, we concluded that, following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea, a defendant must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment, even if the defendant wants to challenge only his sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 332. Evans explained that allowing a defendant to challenge only his sentence following the entry of judgment on a negotiated guilty plea would violate basic contract law principles. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327. In such a circumstance, the defendant is attempting to hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally reneging on or modifying the terms that the defendant had previously agreed to accept. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 327-28. For example, the defendants in Evans agreed to plead guilty and, in exchange, the State promised to dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333. The circuit court accepted the plea agreements in both cases and entered judgments in accordance with the terms of the plea agreements. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333. Thus, the defendants could not seek to reduce their sentences to which they agreed without first moving to vacate their guilty pleas. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 333-34. Accord People v. Clark, 183 Ill. 2d 261, 266-68 (1998) (holding that Evans applied where the defendant pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, yet the parties did not agree on whether that sentence would be served consecutively or concurrently with a sentence imposed by another state, but where the applicable statute mandated consecutive sentences). Subsequently, in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 74 (1999) , this court determined that the holding in Evans applies to plea agreements in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the State’s promises to dismiss other charges and to recommend a cap on the length of the defendant’s sentence. We reasoned that, by agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for the sentencing cap, the defendant is effectively agreeing not to challenge a sentence imposed below the cap. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Although the defendant “may not like the sentencing court’s ultimate disposition, that is a risk he assumes as part of his bargain. A defendant who is unwilling to accept that risk should not agree to a cap rather than a fixed term.” Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 74. Therefore, in Linder, this court once again applied basic contract principles to the plea agreement and refused to allow a defendant to renege on his part of the bargain. In this case, defendant was charged with robbery, a Class 2 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/18 — 1 (West 1998)), and aggravated battery, a Class 3 felony (see 720 ILCS 5/12 — 4 (West 1998)). At a hearing, the circuit court advised defendant of the charges against him and that he faced possible prison sentences of three to seven years for the robbery, and two to five years for the aggravated battery. The circuit court further advised defendant that he could receive extended prison terms and therefore be sentenced to prison terms of 14 and 10 years, respectively. Defendant and the State ultimately reached a plea agreement. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to robbery in exchange for the State’s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge against defendant. The parties presented the plea agreement to the circuit court. The circuit court again advised defendant that he could be sentenced to a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment for the robbery. The circuit court accepted the plea agreement and, following defendant’s guilty plea to robbery, sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. Defendant’s plea agreement is negotiated within the meaning of Evans. Defendant pled guilty in exchange for the State’s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge against him. Because defendant obtained the State’s promise to dismiss this charge, the prison sentence that defendant could have expected to receive was reduced from 12 years to 7 years if extended sentences were not imposed, and from 24 years to 14 years if extended sentences were imposed. The plea agreement that the parties negotiated, therefore, provided defendant the valuable benefit of a less severe sentence than he could have received had he been convicted of both robbery and aggravated battery. Moreover, by pleading guilty to robbery in exchange for the State’s promise to dismiss the aggravated battery charge, defendant, in effect, agreed that a sentence within the statutory range for robbery was appropriate. Defendant was in fact sentenced to seven years in prison for the robbery — a sentence within the statutory range. Allowing defendant to challenge the length of his sentence in this circumstance without also requiring him to move to withdraw his guilty plea unfairly binds the State to its part of the plea bargain, i.e., the dismissal of the aggravated battery charge, while allowing defendant the opportunity to renege on or modify the terms to which he had previously agreed. Such a result is not proper under this court’s holding in Evans. Allowing defendant to modify unilaterally this plea agreement while holding the State to the terms of the agreement will discourage prosecutors from entering into plea agreements. This result will “not advance our policy of encouraging properly administered plea bargains.” See Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 328. For the foregoing reasons, defendant was required to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in order to challenge his sentence. Because he did not do so, defendant’s appeal should be dismissed. I therefore respectfully dissent.