Court Opinion

ID: 9856719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:56:03.192354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:26.573140
License: Public Domain

DeviN, O. J.,
dissenting: In the trial just two questions were presented for determination: (1) Was the game of pool described in the majority opinion a game of chance? (2) If so, did the defendants wager money on the result of this game of chance?
The State’s evidence on both points was unequivocal. It was sufficient to make out a case of gambling under the statute. The jury so found.
The only exception was that the able judge who tried this case in the course of his charge to the jury referred to the object of the statute against gambling as being one to prevent people from getting something for nothing. It is thought by the majority that this was too broad an expression, and that it was prejudicial to these particular defendants, necessitating a new trial. There is some justification for saying that one of the basic impulses that induces adventurers to wager on a game of chance is the hope of gain, of obtaining something of value without the expenditure of services or property. However, if the language objected to be regarded as inappropriate, it will be noted it was used in a preliminary general observation, and the jury was presently instructed pointedly on the evidence in this particular case as to the elements of the offense charged against these defendants.
After stating the evidence and the contentions of the State and the defendants, the court charged the jury as follows:
“The court instructs you if you find, and find beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants engaged in a game of chance betting upon the outcome, money passing upon the result, in which some persons lost *42money and received no benefit or service therefrom, and that others gained money having rendered no service or furnished nothing to the person who gave him the money, I say if you find, and find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants did that, it would be your duty to render a verdict of guilty.”
In this instruction Judge Pless put the matter clearly and correctly to the jury on the determinative questions at issue. There could be no misunderstanding as to what was necessary to constitute gambling under the statute as applied to these defendants under the evidence in this case. The evidence that the defendants had bet money on a game of chance was positive and credible. It would hardly seem probable that an intelligent jury would have been influenced by a general observation, such as that here complained of, rather than by the direct and positive instruction of the Judge on the evidence in this case as to what was necessary to be found before the defendants could be convicted.
Verdicts and judgments are not to be lightly set aside. The rule is that it must be made to appear not only that the matter complained of was erroneous but also that it was material and prejudicial, amounting to a denial of some substantial right. Wilson v. Lumber Co., 186 N.C. 56; Rogers v. Freeman, 211 N.C. 468; Collins v. Lamb, 215 N.C. 719; S. v. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683 (690). An error cannot be regarded as prejudicial unless there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Gall v. Stroud, 232 N.C. 478.
In my opiuion the verdict and judgment should have been upheld.
I am authorized to say that Justice JohNsoN joins in this opinion.