Court Opinion

ID: 9557708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:55:41.078396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.337792
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice,
with whom KEE-TON, Chief Justice, concurs (dissenting).
A review of the record discloses the findings of fact entered by the trial court in some instances are not warranted by inferences of the evidence. It must be pointed out that insofar as the Boise Payette company is concerned — the only principal defendant insofar as this Court is concerned — there is no contract of employment in the record upon which a judgment can be sustained. That is to say, no knowledge of the contract of employment between the respondents and the owners of the premises can be imputed to the Boise Payette corporation, as the record explicitly eliminates that testimony from having any force and effect on that company:
“Q. Mr. Manley, at the time that you went to work there, did you have any arrangement with Mr. MacFarland as to being paid? A. Yes, Mr. MacFarland said, T want you to work on the house, I want you to work on my house’, and he said, T have arranged’—
“Mr. J. L. Eberle: We object to any statement Mr. MacFarland made as being binding on us.
“Mr. Kibler: We consent it would-n’t be binding on Boise-Payette.
“Mr. J. L. Eberle: No contract is pleaded.
“The Court: It would not be binding on the defendant Boise-Payette Lumber Company. You are asking judgment against MacFarland, are you not?
“Mr. Kibler: Yes.
“The Court: I will let him answer. The objection is overruled.”
The apparent authority theory upon which the majority opinion is based resorts to the same type of thinking as is expressed in the findings of fact, in that there was certain evidence introduced pertaining to work performed by B. M. Norrell for the purpose of giving a foundation to the idea that Norrell had the apparent authority not only to employ the respondents, but to waive lien priority of the appellant corporation. The record does not support this conclusion, because nowhere do the respondents testify they knew of such course of conduct and use of authority on the part of Norrell, nor do they testify that they in fact relied on such apparent authority to their injury. Likewise, there is no testimony in the record as to common *325usage of such authority in the construction industry upon which they could have placed reliance.
The very best the record can disclose is that Norrell contracted for the employment of the respondents to finish the carpenter work upon the premises. In proceeding upon this assumption, the respondents’ action must then be based upon contract with the Boise Payette corporation.
There should be no interference with lien rights, inasmuch as they are statutory in nature and have been clearly interpreted by this Court. The rule at common law, and that applicable to equitable liens, is identical to that laid down in Bunt v. Roberts, 76 Idaho 158, 279 P.2d 629, 630, which requires the work done or materials furnished to be requested or authorized by or through the one who is seised of an interest in the res:
“A tenant or lessee is not generally considered the agent of the lessor within the interpretation of the mechanics’ lien law merely by virtue of the relationship of landlord and tenant, and a tenant or lessee cannot subject the interest of his landlord to a mechanic’s lien by reason of the tenant’s contract with a materialman or laborer, unless the owner does some act in ratification of, or consent to the work done and the furnishing of the material or labor. 36 Am.Jur. 73, Secs. 93 to 95; Rio Grande Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Buergo, 41 N.M. 624, 73 P.2d 312, 123 A.L.R. 1; Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 36 Idaho 788, 213 P. 1119.
“The estate or property of a lessor is not subject to a mechanic’s lien for improvements contracted for by his lessee unless the lessor has made him his agent or otherwise conferred the requisite authority on him, or ratified his acts, or is estopped to deny the validity of the lien. 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’
Liens § 65, p. 559; Mundet Cork Corp. v. Three Flowers Ice Cream Co., Mo. App., 146 S.W.2d 678; Masterson v. Roberts, 336 Mo. 158, 78 S.W.2d 856, 97 A.L.R. 862.”
In the case at hand, the Boise Payette corporation is at best a materialman, and not seised of an interest in the property. The corporation has a mortgage on the premises, but this does not give rise to a legal right on its part to alienate the fee or any part thereof as against the owner. It is elementary in lien law that one who does not possess seisin cannot invoke the right of a mechanic’s or a materialman’s lien. Therefore, there is no authority, in law or in equity, by which a lien could be imposed upon the res of this controversy.
Insofar as this record is concerned, the appellant has no knowledge of the agree*326ment between respondents and the owner-builder MacFarland. There is no evidence upon which it can be said that MacFarland ratified the acts of the respondents and thereby complied with the requirements as discussed in Bunt v. Roberts, supra.
It is the conclusion of this dissenting opinion that the judgment should be reversed.