Court Opinion

ID: 9560983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:40.723702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:27.744007
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-1861
DAVID HAKIM,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

SAFARILAND, LLC and DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
                                  Defendants-Appellants.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:15-cv-6487 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED OCTOBER 25, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2023
               ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and LEE, Circuit
Judges.
   LEE, Circuit Judge. In 2014, David Hakim, a SWAT oﬃcer
for the DuPage County Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce (“DCSO”), acci-
dentally got shot by a colleague during a training exercise.
The oﬀending projectile was a “breaching” shotgun round
2                                                        No. 22-1861

manufactured by Safariland, LLC. 1 Breaching rounds assist
law enforcement oﬃcers in breaking down doors by disabling
hinges and other attachments on doorframes. When used as
intended, they disintegrate harmlessly on impact with a metal
attachment mechanism. But here, Hakim’s fellow oﬃcer
missed the metal door hinge he was shooting at. The round
struck wood, remained live, and ultimately hit Hakim in the
spine. Hakim’s thirteen-month recovery from his injury re-
quired multiple surgeries, and to this day he experiences pain
so severe that he has trouble sleeping.
    Hakim initiated this diversity action against Safariland
under Illinois’s law of strict products liability. Hakim claimed
that the Safariland round was defective in its manufacture
and design, and that Safariland had failed to provide ade-
quate warning that its rounds do not disintegrate if they strike
wood instead of metal. A jury found for Safariland on the
manufacturing- and design-defect claims, but it awarded Ha-
kim $7.5 million on his failure-to-warn claim. Safariland ﬁled
several motions during and after the trial, challenging the suf-
ﬁciency and weight of Hakim’s evidence as well as the size of
the award. The district court denied all of Safariland’s mo-
tions. Safariland now appeals, and we aﬃrm in all respects.
                       I. BACKGROUND
A. Safariland’s Breaching Rounds and Product Warnings
   Safariland’s breaching rounds are 12-gauge shotgun
rounds made of compressed zinc powder. When an oﬃcer

    1 The defendants, Safariland, LLC and Defense Technology Corpora-
tion of America, merged in 2009. For convenience, we will refer to both
defendants collectively as “Safariland.”
No. 22-1861                                                    3

who needs to enter a room is faced with a locked door, the
oﬃcer ﬁres the round at the metal hardware that attaches the
door to the door frame. When a ﬁred round comes in contact
with the metal attachment, the round disintegrates, and the
force of the blast destroys or disables the attachment. This al-
lows the oﬃcer to enter the room safely without harming an-
yone who may be inside, including any hostages.
    When ﬁred correctly, the rounds are safe. But an errantly
deployed round can be deadly. For instance, if a ﬁred round
impacts wood (rather than metal), it does not disintegrate and
may pierce the wood and remain live, risking harm to anyone
in its path. The question we face is whether Safariland ade-
quately apprised its consumers of this risk.
    Safariland has issued various product descriptions and
warnings describing how to operate the breaching rounds
and the risks associated with their use. But none of these ma-
terials inform consumers, in so many words, that the rounds
do not disintegrate when they hit wood. In fact, the materials
sometimes imply that the opposite is true. For instance, the
product literature states that the rounds disintegrate on con-
tact with a “hard surface.” And Safariland’s product catalog
lists the breaching rounds on a page labeled “less lethal,” and
it states that the rounds “[d]isintegrate[] on contact” and are
“[s]afe to use at close distances.” Indeed, during the trial, one
of Safariland’s expert witnesses admitted that he had never
seen Safariland product literature stating that the rounds
must hit metal to disintegrate.
   On the other hand, the product literature does tell users
how to deploy the rounds safely. It recommends the “45/45”
method of deployment, whereby a round is shot into a door
45 degrees out from the door, and at a 45-degree downward
4                                                 No. 22-1861

or upward trajectory. The literature also states that rounds
should be ﬁred directly at a metal door attachment, rather
than at the area between the attachment and the door. The lat-
ter technique is known as “shearing.” The literature indicates
that a proper ﬁring technique will “minimize the risk of the
projectile causing serious injury or death.”
B. The DCSO Training Exercise
   DCSO purchased some breaching rounds from Safariland;
there is no evidence that any DCSO SWAT oﬃcers, including
Hakim, ever received or read any of Safariland’s product lit-
erature. The SWAT team used the rounds during a shotgun
breaching training exercise conducted at a vacant house in
Hinsdale, Illinois on December 11, 2014.
    Shotgun breaching training normally takes a full day, but
it was rare for the SWAT team to have a vacant house to train
in. So, the team heard a thirty-to-sixty-minute presentation
and proceeded directly to live ﬁring exercises.
    The trainees, including Hakim, split into small groups and
randomly selected three doors in the house as breaching sta-
tions. Two stations were in the basement and one was on the
main ﬂoor. There was no coordination or communication be-
tween the teams, and there were more teams (three) than cer-
tiﬁed shotgun breaching instructors (two).
    Oﬃcer Andrew Alaniz was at one of the basement sta-
tions. He was a crack shot with a riﬂe and a pistol, but he had
no experience in using a breaching round. An instructor told
Alaniz to try to shear the hinge oﬀ the door (contrary to Safa-
riland’s instructions). Alaniz did so, but he missed the hinge
multiple times. His third shot went through the basement’s
No. 22-1861                                                           5

ceiling. Unfortunately, Hakim was standing on the main ﬂoor
of the house in Alaniz’s line of ﬁre.
C. Hakim’s Injury and Recovery
   The round Alaniz had ﬁred deﬂected oﬀ Hakim’s body ar-
mor and hit his lumbar spine. He was rushed to the hospital.
The district court recounts the immediate aftermath:
       Spinal surgery was necessary to remove the
       fragments of the round, and the surgeon was
       only able to remove most of them. Hakim testi-
       ﬁed the projectile had torn through the dura,
       which contains the spinal cord and ﬂuid. Be-
       cause the wound was so large, it could not be
       stitched, and was instead patched. Because of
       the patch, Hakim had to lay motionless on his
       back in the hospital for 48 hours. After he was
       discharged, his wound became infected and he
       had to be debrided. 2
Hakim v. Safariland, LLC, No. 15 C 06487, 2022 WL 1136552, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2022).
    Hakim’s suﬀering did not end there. During his recovery,
he was unable to take the necessary amount of pain medica-
tion because he was born with only one kidney. Id. The inci-
dent left Hakim with various ailments, including headaches,
chronic pain in his lower back, and radicular symptoms and
pain in his lower extremities. To this day, Hakim suﬀers from

   2 Debridement is “the usually surgical removal of lacerated, devital-
ized, or contaminated tissue.” Debridement, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/debridement.
6                                                     No. 22-1861

daily pain so severe that he can only sleep four to ﬁve hours
per night.
    These conditions have impacted Hakim’s personal and
professional life considerably. Although he can walk without
an assistive device, he has had to cut back on chores to pre-
serve his strength, and he suﬀers from a reduced range of mo-
tion. Hakim did not return to full-time duty until thirteen
months after he was shot. As a SWAT oﬃcer, a member of a
task force for the United States Marshals Service, and the
owner of a martial arts academy, Hakim is required to remain
in relatively good physical form. Yet the shooting rendered
him unable to pass the SWAT team’s running agility test, and
he does not believe that he will be able to continue serving on
the SWAT team or task force for “more than a few years.”
While on surveillance assignments, Hakim has to get out of
his car every thirty minutes to prevent stiﬀness.
D. The Proceedings Below
    Hakim brought this diversity action against Safariland un-
der Illinois’s law of products liability, alleging that the breach-
ing rounds were defective in their manufacture and design
and that Safariland had failed to give adequate warning that
the rounds do not disintegrate on contact with wood. Hakim,
2022 WL 1136552, at *2. At trial, Hakim oﬀered Safariland’s
product literature and testimony from his SWAT colleagues,
some of whom indicated that they were unaware that the
rounds had to hit metal to disintegrate. Id. at *4. Two doctors
also testiﬁed about the nature and extent of Hakim’s injuries.
Safariland countered with expert testimony from Kenneth
Hubbs, a master shotgun breaching instructor, and Weinong
Chen, a materials expert, who testiﬁed that the rounds
No. 22-1861                                                   7

operated as intended and described the proper method of de-
ployment of a breaching round.
    Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, Safariland
moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 50(a). The court deferred ruling on the motion
pending the jury’s verdict. Id. at *2. The jury eventually re-
turned a verdict of $7.5 million for Hakim on the failure-to-
warn claim, but it found for Safariland on the manufacturing-
and design-defect claims. Id. Safariland then renewed its mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and
added a motion for a new trial under Rule 59; it also sought
remittitur of the $7.5 million award. Id. The district court de-
nied all of the motions and entered judgment for Hakim. Id.
at *7.
                      II. DISCUSSION
   We ﬁrst address Safariland’s contentions that the district
court erred in failing to grant it judgment as a matter of law
or a new trial. We then discuss the district court’s refusal to
order remittitur of the jury’s $7.5 million award. Ultimately,
we conclude that the jury’s verdict and award should stand in
their entirety.
A. Safariland’s Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law
   and a New Trial
       1. Legal Standard
    A motion for judgment as a matter of law should be
granted under Rule 50 when “a party has been fully heard on
an issue … and … a reasonable jury would not have a legally
suﬃcient evidentiary basis to ﬁnd for the party on that issue.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The court must not “make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence,” and it must view the
8                                                    No. 22-1861

evidence and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor” of the
nonmoving party (here, Hakim). Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). We review the district
court’s denial of Safariland’s Rule 50 motions de novo. 3M v.
Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595 (7th Cir. 2001).
    A new trial may be granted pursuant to Rule 59 “if the
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence.” Whitehead
v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). While a
court adjudicating a motion for a new trial may gauge the
weight of the evidence and assess witness credibility, a jury
verdict should only be overturned if “no rational jury” could
have rendered it. Id. at 928 (cleaned up). A district court’s de-
nial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of dis-
cretion. Id. at 927.
       2. Products Liability in Illinois
   We apply Illinois’s substantive law in this diversity case.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Be-
fore turning to Safariland’s arguments, then, an overview of
products liability law in Illinois is helpful.
    Under Illinois law, a defendant may be held strictly liable
in tort for manufacturing, and placing into the stream of com-
merce, a product “whose defective condition ma[kes] it un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” Mikolajczyk
v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 334 (Ill. 2008). To prove a
claim of strict products liability, a plaintiﬀ must establish that
he suﬀered (1) an injury (2) proximately caused by (3) a “con-
dition of the product” that (4) “made the product unreasona-
bly dangerous” and that (5) “existed at the time the product
left the defendant’s control.” Id. at 345. There are three types
of conditions that may render a product unreasonably
No. 22-1861                                                               9

dangerous: a defect in manufacturing, a defect in design, or
“a failure of the manufacturer to warn of the danger or to in-
struct on the proper use of the product.” Id. at 335. We are
concerned here with the third type of defect: failure to warn
of a product’s dangerous properties.
    A failure-to-warn claim will lie if a product “has a latent
defect or a dangerous propensity of which a user would nor-
mally be unaware,” and the defendant does not provide ade-
quate warning of the defect or dangerous propensity. Baltus
v. Weaver Div. of Kidde & Co., 557 N.E.2d 580, 588 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990). 3 A product warning may be inadequate if, for example,
it does not “specify the risk presented by the product,” it is
“inconsistent with how the product would be used,” it fails to
“provide the reason for the warning,” or it fails to “reach fore-
seeable users.” Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 412 N.E.2d 959,
964 (Ill. 1980). The adequacy of a warning is a question of fact
typically directed to the jury; of course, the mere fact that
warnings were given “is not conclusive [evidence] that the
warnings were adequate.” Collins v. Sunnyside Corp.,
496 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).

    3 We cite decisions from Illinois’s intermediate appellate courts where
appropriate. “Although it is true that only state supreme court cases bind
this court, state appellate court decisions nevertheless provide significant
guidance.” United States v. Glispie, 943 F.3d 358, 367 n.13 (7th Cir. 2019).
10                                                            No. 22-1861

         3. Necessity of Expert Testimony
   In its motions for judgment as a matter of law, Safariland
argued that Hakim’s failure-to-warn claim failed because Ha-
kim did not oﬀer any expert testimony to support it. 4
     Many products liability cases involve complicated, tech-
nical questions about a product’s design or operation. Lay ju-
rors in such cases may have diﬃculty in determining whether
a product has been rendered unreasonably dangerous by an
alleged defect. Illinois courts therefore have determined that
expert testimony is required to support complex products li-
ability claims in some cases. Niehaus v. United Seating & Mo-
bility, Inc., No. 10-160-GPM, 2011 WL 5325652, at *2 (S.D. Ill.
Nov. 3, 2011) (“[G]enerally in product liability and negligence
cases involving specialized products and ‘specialized
knowledge’ expert testimony is required.”) (citing Baltus,
557 N.E.2d at 588–89). 5 Whether expert testimony is necessary
is determined by examining the “speciﬁc facts and issues in-
volved” in the case. See Baltus, 557 N.E.2d at 588–89. So, in

     4 Safariland also argues generally that the district court made a pro-
cedural error when ruling on its motions for judgment as a matter of law.
According to Safariland, the court wrongly considered evidence not intro-
duced during Hakim’s case, but in its own case. But Safariland does not
explain, nor can we discern, how it was harmed by the court’s potentially
erroneous consideration of evidence introduced during the defense case.
If anything, such consideration would have made it more likely that the
court would grant Safariland judgment as a matter of law.
     5 We have debated whether, in diversity cases, the necessity of expert
testimony in a products liability action is determined by reference to state
or federal law. Show v. Ford Motor Co., 659 F.3d 584, 586–88 (7th Cir. 2012).
We need not resolve this issue now, since the parties agree that Illinois law
controls.
No. 22-1861                                                   11

certain failure-to-warn cases, a plaintiﬀ may need an expert to
explain why a particular warning is inadequate. But it bears
repeating that the adequacy of warnings is most often a jury
question. Collins, 496 N.E.2d at 1158.
    Safariland argues that Hakim needed expert testimony
here, because the breaching rounds are specialty products be-
yond the understanding of a typical lay juror. Safariland em-
phasizes that the rounds are complex in design and are used
by trained law enforcement personnel rather than the general
public. It also notes that the rounds have to be ﬁred in the cor-
rect way to be eﬀective, and that an ordinary juror would not
be aware of the proper deployment method.
    But none of these facts are particularly relevant to Hakim’s
failure-to-warn claim. The fact that the rounds might be com-
plex in some respects does not mean that expert testimony is
required for every products liability claim involving the
rounds. For instance, if Hakim’s claim was that the rounds
were designed defectively, testimony from a ballistics expert
or design engineer would probably be necessary. Show,
659 F.3d at 587 (“[D]esign options are the province of engi-
neers[.]”). But the jury found for Safariland on Hakim’s de-
sign-defect claim, and Hakim does not appeal that verdict.
   On the other hand, Hakim’s failure-to-warn claim pre-
sents diﬀerent factual issues, and the question it raises is ra-
ther straightforward: Did Safariland’s product literature ade-
quately apprise consumers of the risk that the breaching
rounds can remain live after striking wood? Answering this
question does not require the application of any specialized,
technical knowledge; all the jury had to do was examine the
warnings and assess whether they were adequate.
12                                                   No. 22-1861

    Thus, the cases Safariland cites requiring expert testimony
for design-defect claims involving complex products are in-
apposite. Show, 659 F.3d at 587–88 (automobile); Henry v.
Panasonic Factory Automation Co., 917 N.E.2d 1086, 1092–93 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2009) (industrial machinery); Cappellano v. Wright
Med. Grp., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830–31 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (hip
prosthesis). An average juror likely does not possess the spe-
cialized knowledge to determine whether a car or medical de-
vice was designed defectively, for example. But where warn-
ings, rather than design choices, are at issue, a jury need only
determine whether there was a known risk and whether it
was suﬃciently disclosed. For this reason, numerous courts
in this circuit applying Illinois law have not required expert
testimony in the context of a failure-to-warn claim. See, e.g.,
Africano v. Atrium Med. Corp., No. 17-cv-7238, 2021 WL
2375994, at *6–12 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2021) (holding plaintiﬀ did
not need expert testimony to support claim that defendant
failed to warn that surgical mesh may not have been sterile,
while suggesting expert testimony might have been required
on manufacturing- and design-defect claims); Lott v. ITW Food
Equip. Grp. LLC, No. 10 CV 1686, 2013 WL 3728581, at *1–2,
*25, *28 (N.D. Ill. July 15, 2013) (holding expert testimony was
not required to support failure-to-warn claim involving food-
waste-disposal machine, while indicating such testimony was
required to support the plaintiﬀ’s design-defect claim).
    Admittedly, not all failure-to-warn claims are so straight-
forward. Some product warnings are communicated exclu-
sively to trained specialists, who possess esoteric knowledge
beyond the experience of the average juror. In such cases, ex-
pert testimony may be necessary for a jury to determine how
a reasonable specialist in the relevant ﬁeld would interpret the
warning. Take, for example, cases involving drugs and
No. 22-1861                                                           13

medical devices, where a lay juror untrained in medicine
would be unable to comprehend the meaning of the warnings
themselves. See, e.g., Sosnowski v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No.
11 C 59, 2012 WL 1030485, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2012) (hold-
ing expert testimony was required on failure-to-warn claim
involving hip prosthesis); N. Tr. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 572 N.E.2d
1030, 1038–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding expert testimony
was required in determining whether warning label on med-
ication adequately disclosed risk of cardiac arrest).
    Safariland urges us to adopt a similar rule here, arguing
that the law enforcement oﬃcers to whom the breaching
rounds are marketed are “specialists.” But it is not the charac-
teristics of the audience to whom the warning is directed that
is dispositive, but whether a lay juror would understand the
nature of the relevant risk and the substance of the warning at
issue absent expert testimony. See Upjohn, 572 N.E.2d at 1036
(indicating that expert testimony is not required where a jury
can “reach an intelligent conclusion about the adequacy of the
warning without the aid of an expert’s specialized
knowledge”). Here, the risk is that the breaching rounds,
when they strike wood, do not disintegrate; this is well within
the comprehension of a layperson. Indeed, as Hakim points
out, there is no evidence that law enforcement personnel are
any more familiar with the physical or kinetic properties of
breaching rounds than an average consumer. 6 In sum,

    6 We note here that Safariland put on its own experts, who testified
about the material composition of the breaching rounds, as well as how to
deploy the rounds. It is not clear to us why Hakim would need to present
more expert testimony covering the same issues to support his case.
14                                                             No. 22-1861

Hakim’s straightforward failure-to-warn claim did not re-
quire expert testimony.
         4. Adequacy of Safariland’s Warnings
   Next, Safariland argues that the district court should have
granted it judgment as a matter of law because its warnings
were adequate. Alternatively, it contends that the jury’s deci-
sion that its warnings were inadequate was against the weight
of the evidence and, therefore, that a new trial was war-
ranted. 7
    Safariland acknowledges that none of its product litera-
ture speciﬁcally warns that breaching rounds that hit wood
do not disintegrate. But it argues that this danger was implied
in its literature. For instance, Safariland notes that the docu-
ments advise shooting the rounds directly at metal attach-
ment mechanisms, rather than attempting to “shear” those
mechanisms oﬀ a door, to “minimize the risk of the projec-
tile[s] causing serious injury or death.” But other statements
in the literature seem to indicate that the rounds will disinte-
grate on contact with wood. For instance, the literature states
that breaching rounds “disintegrate[] into a ﬁne powder”

     7 Safariland also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
rejecting its motion for a new trial because it did not thoroughly weigh the
evidence and did not point out any specific inadequacies in the product
warnings. But the district court clearly articulated its basis for denying Sa-
fariland’s motion for a new trial: “gaps and inconsistencies” in Safari-
land’s product warnings, which could have led a reasonable jury to con-
clude that Safariland had failed to warn of its product’s dangerous pro-
pensity. Hakim, 2022 WL 1136552, at *5. While the district court’s discus-
sion could have been more thorough, this statement is sufficient to sup-
port meaningful appellate review. See United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d
775, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2020).
No. 22-1861                                                               15

upon contact with a “hard surface.” A reasonable consumer
certainly could interpret the term “hard surface” to include
wood.
    Adding to the confusion is Safariland’s product catalog.
The catalog features the breaching rounds on a page labeled
“less lethal” and states that the rounds “[d]isintegrate[] on
contact” and are “[s]afe to use at close distances.” A reasona-
ble jury could interpret these statements as conveying the
false impression that the breaching rounds are not particu-
larly harmful, even when misﬁred. Therefore, the jury reason-
ably could have found Safariland’s warnings inadequate. Sa-
fariland is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new
trial on this basis. 8
        5. Causation
    Finally, Safariland appeals the district court’s denial of its
motion for a new trial on the issue of proximate causation. In
its view, Hakim’s injury was caused solely by the SWAT

    8 Safariland makes some additional arguments here that do not war-
rant significant discussion. First, it argues that the testimony of several
DCSO SWAT officers indicates an understanding among the officers that
breaching rounds must hit metal targets to disintegrate. We struggle to see
how this evidence is legally relevant to Hakim’s failure-to-warn claim,
since Safariland admits that none of the SWAT officers received or read
Safariland’s product literature. In any event, at least one officer testified
that he believed the rounds would disintegrate on striking wood, and the
jury was entitled to credit this testimony. Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc.,
725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013). Second, Safariland asserts that the testi-
mony of its experts was unrebutted, and that the DCSO SWAT team was
shown a video of how to properly deploy breaching rounds. But as the
district court correctly observed, the jury was not “required to draw spe-
cific inferences from the evidence in [Safariland’s] favor and disregard
conflicting evidence.” Hakim, 2022 WL 1136552, at *4.
16                                                    No. 22-1861

team’s sloppily conducted training exercise, and the jury’s
contrary verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
     “Proximate cause encompasses two requirements” under
Illinois law: “cause-in-fact and legal cause.” Malen v. MTD
Prods., Inc., 628 F.3d 296, 309 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Young v.
Bryco Arms, 821 N.E.2d 1078, 1085–86 (Ill. 2004)). A defend-
ant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of a plaintiﬀ’s injury if the con-
duct “was a material element and a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the injury.” Lee v. Chi. Transit Auth., 605 N.E.2d 493,
502 (Ill. 1992). Legal causation, meanwhile, is a question of
foreseeability. Id. at 503. It exists so long as the plaintiﬀ’s in-
jury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s
conduct. Id. Proximate causation is typically a question for the
jury. Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 688 N.E.2d 130, 134 (Ill.
1997); Mack v. Ford Motor Co., 669 N.E.2d 608, 613 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996).
    Here, Safariland spends pages rehashing how, in its view,
the trial evidence suggested that DCSO acted improperly, but
provides virtually no legal analysis to support its position as
to proximate cause. It cites a grand total of two cases, neither
of which provide any help in resolving the issue. Indeed, Sa-
fariland fails to address any number of legal questions rele-
vant to proximate cause. For example, under Illinois law, an
injury may have multiple proximate causes. Mack, 669 N.E.2d
at 613. Here, even assuming Safariland is right that DCSO was
negligent, it is not clear why Safariland’s own failure to warn
would not constitute an additional proximate cause of Hakim’s
injuries, subjecting it to liability. Safariland’s arguments are
wholly lacking, and we have made clear that such “perfunc-
tory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are un-
supported by pertinent authority, are waived.” Crespo v.
No. 22-1861                                                         17

Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)). 9
B. Damages
    Finally, Safariland appeals the district court’s denial of its
motion for remittitur of the $7.5 million award or, in the alter-
native, a new trial. Our review is for abuse of discretion.
Rainey v. Taylor, 941 F.3d 243, 252 (7th Cir. 2019). We apply Il-
linois law in determining whether Hakim’s damages were ex-
cessive. Id. at 253.
     Under Illinois law, an award of damages is excessive only
if it “falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensa-
tion or results from passion or prejudice, or if it is so large that
it shocks the judicial conscience.” Richardson v. Chapman,
676 N.E.2d 621, 628 (Ill. 1997). And a jury’s verdict is accorded
signiﬁcant deference. Id. This is particularly true in personal-
injury cases, where the precise dollar value of a person’s pain
and suﬀering is diﬃcult to measure. Snelson v. Kamm,
787 N.E.2d 796, 816 (Ill. 2003). Nevertheless, Illinois law does
list some factors for us to consider, including the

   9 To the extent that Safariland argues elsewhere that it is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law because neither Hakim nor his
fellow officers read Safariland’s warnings, this is an incorrect state-
ment of law. Where a defendant sells a product to a purchaser, who
then distributes that product to an end user, the defendant may still
be liable in certain circumstances to the end user for failing to pro-
vide adequate warnings to the purchaser, even where the end user
did not read the warnings. See, e.g., Solis v. BASF Corp., 979 N.E.2d
419, 439–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Venus v. O’Hara, 468 N.E.2d 405, 408–
09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
18                                                             No. 22-1861

“permanency of the plaintiﬀ’s condition, the possibility of fu-
ture deterioration, the extent of the plaintiﬀ’s medical ex-
penses, and the restrictions imposed on the plaintiﬀ by the in-
juries.” Richardson, 676 N.E.2d at 628. 10
    Here, the jury’s award was rooted in the substantial evi-
dence of Hakim’s pain and suﬀering. Hakim has been diag-
nosed with various chronic, and seemingly permanent, med-
ical conditions as a result of the shooting, including back pain,
pain in his lower extremities, stiﬀness, an abnormal lumbar
extension, and reﬂex and balance issues. He experiences daily
pain, and he is limited in the pain medications he can safely
take. His pain is often so severe that he can only sleep four to
ﬁve hours a night. Moreover, the evidence indicates that Ha-
kim’s condition may deteriorate in the future: he is at risk for
additional spinal trauma, and he doubts that he will be able
fully to perform his physically demanding law enforcement
jobs “for more than a few years.” And the jury heard that Ha-
kim’s injuries seriously restrict his personal and professional
activities. As a result of the shooting, Hakim is not able to pass
all SWAT performance and agility tests, and he needs to get
out of his car every half-hour while on surveillance assign-
ments so that he does not become stiﬀ. At home, Hakim has

     10 We pause briefly to reject Safariland’s argument that the district
court applied the wrong legal standard to its remittitur motion. The dis-
trict court denied remittitur because the jury’s award was “not irrational.”
Hakim, 2022 WL 1136552, at *6. Safariland replies that the standard for re-
mittitur under Illinois law is excessiveness, not irrationality. See Richard-
son, 676 N.E.2d at 113–14. But any award that falls “outside the range of
fair and reasonable compensation,” results from “passion or prejudice,”
or “shock[s] the judicial conscience,” id., would accurately be described as
irrational. In any case, the district court was clearly aware that Illinois law
governed and applied it correctly. See Hakim, 2022 WL 1136552, at *6–7.
No. 22-1861                                                                 19

diﬃculty walking, and he has had to cut back on chores to
conserve his strength.
    Based on this evidence, the jury’s award of $7.5 million,
while perhaps on the high side, was not unreasonable or un-
fair. 11 The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in denying Safariland’s motion for remittitur or a new trial.
                            III. CONCLUSION
   We have considered Safariland’s remaining arguments,
and none have merit. For the reasons stated above, the judg-
ment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

    11 Safariland also points to certain comments by Hakim’s counsel dur-
ing trial to argue that the award was based on “passion or prejudice,” ra-
ther than evidence. Richardson, 676 N.E.2d at 628. Given our determination
that Hakim’s award was within the range of fair and reasonable compen-
sation for his injuries, however, we have no basis to conclude that the
award was the result of passion or prejudice. Dresser Indus., Waukesha En-
gine Div. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1448–49 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying
Wisconsin law) (noting that “a finding that damages were not mon-
strously excessive or unsupported by the evidence necessarily precludes
a finding of passion and prejudice”). Nor does the fact that the jury
awarded more damages than Hakim’s counsel requested mandate such a
finding. Fedt v. Oak Lawn Lodge, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 469, 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(sustaining jury award of $1 million, even though counsel had requested
$600,000).