Court Opinion

ID: 9919454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:03:51.75394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:44.389594
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

 NIKKI ALVAREZ-SOWLES, as Clerk and Comptroller of Pasco County,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

           PASCO COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision,

                                Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-305

                            January 17, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Emily A. Peacock,
Associate Judge.

David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte, Gilbert, McNamara & Caldevilla, P.A.,
Tampa; and Dennis J. Alfonso of McClain & Alfonso, P.A., Dade City
(withdrew after briefing); Nancy McClain Alfonso of Alfonso Hersch, P.A.,
Dade City (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.

Nichole "Nikki" Alvarez-Sowles, pro se.

Gregory T. Stewart, Kirsten H. Mood, and Matthew R. Shaud of Nabors,
Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.
     This appeal concerns the obligations of Pasco County under article
V, section 14, of the Florida Constitution and section 29.008, Florida
Statutes, to "fund the cost of . . . existing multiagency criminal justice
information systems"1 and to "pay reasonable and necessary salaries,
costs, and expenses of the state courts system to meet local
requirements as determined by general law." For the reasons stated
below, we reverse in part and affirm in part the final summary judgment
entered in favor of Pasco County.
     In 2020, after the office of the Pasco County clerk and comptroller
experienced a significant reduction in revenues, Nichole "Nikki" Alvarez-
Sowles, in her capacity as the clerk and comptroller of Pasco County (the
Clerk), initiated an investigation to determine if additional financial
resources were available to her office. At the conclusion of the
investigation, the Clerk determined that Pasco County is obligated to
provide funding for the multiagency criminal justice information system
and for the courthouse annex located in New Port Richey because it
constitutes a local requirement.2 Thereafter, in April 2021, the Clerk
submitted her budget request to Pasco County's Board of County
Commissioners (the BOCC) for the 2021-2022 fiscal year. See §
218.35(2), Fla. Stat. (2020). The budget request was significantly greater
than the requests made by the Clerk's predecessor and included a
request for funds to pay for the expenses incurred by the Clerk to operate
and maintain the multiagency criminal justice information system and
the expenses incurred by the Clerk related to the courthouse annex. The

     1 We note that while "multiagency" is hyphenated in the Florida

Constitution, it is not hyphenated in section 29.008.

     2 There is a courthouse located in Dade City, Pasco County's

county seat, as required by statute. See § 138.09, Fla. Stat. There is
also a second courthouse, referred to as the courthouse annex, in New
Port Richey.

                                      2
BOCC agreed to provide funds for the multiagency criminal justice
information system but declared that it would phase in the funding
request over a period of three years; the BOCC denied the request for
funding related to the courthouse annex.
     On November 12, 2021, the Clerk filed a three-count declaratory
relief action against Pasco County. Count I of the petition sought a
declaration of the parties' obligations with regard to the funding for the
multiagency criminal justice information system, count II sought a
declaration of the parties' obligations with regard to the funding for the
courthouse annex, and count III sought supplemental relief with respect
to counts I and II. The Clerk moved for summary judgment on count I,
and Pasco County moved for summary judgment on all counts. Despite
the fact that the BOCC had agreed to provide funding for the multiagency
criminal justice information system, Pasco County contended that it was
not legally obligated to do so. Following a hearing, the trial court entered
final summary judgment in favor of Pasco County. The trial court
determined that since the
     Multiagency [criminal justice information system] in existence
     today is not the same Multiagency [criminal justice
     information system] as was in existence when [the pertinent
     constitutional provision] or section 29.008, were
     adopted[,] . . . under the express language of the
     constitutional provision and section 29.008, Florida Statutes,
     [Pasco] County may provide funding for the subsequently
     acquired Multiagency [criminal justice information system],
     but its mandatory obligation extends only to the existing
     system that was operating at the time of the adoption of the
     various provisions.
The trial court further found that since the BOCC has the authority to
review and make modifications to budget requests of the various
constitutional officers, including the Clerk, it necessarily has the

                                     3
authority to provide funding in phases. With respect to count II, the trial
court determined as a matter of law that the courthouse annex was not
established pursuant to either subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 or subsection
29.008(2)(a)2 and therefore that it did not constitute a local requirement.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that it was appropriate
to find in favor of Pasco County on the Clerk's claim for supplemental
relief. This appeal followed.3
        We review the trial court's final summary judgment de novo. Cole
v. Plantation Palms Homeowners Ass'n, 371 So. 3d 413, 416 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023) (citing Pio v. Simon Cap. GP, 366 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023)). "Under the new [2021 amendment] summary judgment
standard, summary judgment is warranted 'if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Pio, 366 So. 3d at 1203). Issues involving constitutional and
statutory interpretation are likewise reviewed de novo. Fla. Hosp.
Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 485 (Fla. 2008).
   I.    Multiagency criminal justice information system
        The Clerk argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion
for summary judgment and in granting Pasco County's competing motion
for summary judgment with respect to count I. The Clerk contends that
a reading of the plain language of article V, section 14(c), of the Florida
Constitution and subsection 29.008(1)(h), Florida Statutes, dictates that
Pasco County's obligation to fund the multiagency criminal justice
information system did not cease when hardware and software that had

        3 Though the Clerk sought a declaration of the parties' obligations

with respect to the funding at issue, the trial court only expressly
addressed Pasco County's obligations or lack thereof.

                                       4
comprised the system at the time of the amendment and enactment of
the constitutional provision and statute, respectively, were replaced and
that Pasco County is prohibited by article XII, section 25, of the Florida
Constitution from providing the funding in phases over a period of years.
We agree.4
     a.   Obligation to fund
     Pasco County's obligation to fund the multiagency criminal justice
information system turns on the interpretation of article V, section 14(c),
and subsection 29.008(1)(h).
           After the adoption of the Constitution's article V in
     1972, funding of the third branch of state government—the
     judicial branch—was largely borne by local government. The
     State had only a small share, section 14 of article V then
     providing only that compensation for judges would be the
     responsibility of the state by general law. In 1998, however, a
     new provision (known as Revision 7) was submitted to the
     electorate by the Constitution Revision Commission
     substantially and significantly revising judicial branch
     funding. The new plan for funding the judicial system
     primarily placed the burden on the state, with the share of
     the counties greatly reduced. The principal source of funding
     was to be general revenues and user fees and costs. It was
     adopted by the electorate in 1998 and became fully
     effectuated by 2004.

     4 Pasco County argues on appeal, just as it did below, that while it

may provide funding for the multiagency criminal justice information
system it is not obligated to do so. Because the determination as to
whether Pasco County can provide that funding in phases depends on
whether a legal obligation to provide funding exists in the first instance,
the Clerk properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to declare
whether Pasco County has a legal obligation to fund the multiagency
criminal justice information system. See Ranucci v. City of Palmetto, 317
So. 3d 270, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (quoting Harris v. Aberdeen Prop.
Owners Ass'n, 135 So. 3d 365, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)).

                                     5
City of Fort Lauderdale v. Crowder, 983 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008). There are exceptions to the state's funding obligations, including
those found in subdivision (c), which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
      Counties shall be required to fund the cost of communications
      services, existing radio systems, existing multi-agency criminal
      justice information systems, and the cost of construction or
      lease, maintenance, utilities, and security of facilities for the
      trial courts, public defenders' offices, state attorneys' offices,
      and the offices of the clerks of the circuit and county courts
      performing court-related functions.
Art. V, § 14(c), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Statutes were enacted to
implement the new requirements of Revision 7, including section 29.008,
which was enacted in 2000. See ch. 2000-237, § 8, Laws of Fla. Section
29.008 provides in pertinent part as follows:
      (1) Counties are required by s. 14, Art. V of the State
      Constitution to fund the cost of communications services,
      existing radio systems, existing multiagency criminal justice
      information systems, and the cost of construction or lease,
      maintenance, utilities, and security of facilities for the circuit
      and county courts, public defenders' offices, state attorneys'
      offices, guardian ad litem offices, and the offices of the clerks
      of the circuit and county courts performing court-related
      functions. . . . For purposes of implementing these
      requirements, the term:
            ....
      (h) "Existing multiagency criminal justice information systems"
      includes, but is not limited to, those components of the
      multiagency criminal justice information system as defined in
      s. 943.045, supporting the offices of the circuit or county
      courts, the public defenders' offices, the state attorneys'
      offices, or those portions of the offices of the clerks of the
      circuit and county courts performing court-related functions
      that are used to carry out the court-related activities of those
      entities. This includes upgrades and maintenance of the
      current equipment, maintenance and upgrades of supporting

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      technology infrastructure and associated staff, and services
      and expenses to assure continued information sharing and
      reporting of information to the state. The counties shall also
      provide additional information technology services, hardware,
      and software as needed for new judges and staff of the state
      courts system, state attorneys' offices, public defenders'
      offices, guardian ad litem offices, and the offices of the clerks
      of the circuit and county courts performing court-related
      functions.
§ 29.008(1)(h) (emphasis added). A "[c]riminal justice information
system" is "a system, including the equipment, facilities, procedures,
agreements, and organizations thereof, for the collection, processing,
preservation, or dissemination of criminal justice information."
§ 943.045(13), Fla. Stat. Article XII, section 12(b), provides that "the
amendment to Section 14 shall be fully effectuated by July 1, 2004."
      In the late 1970s software was acquired for the purpose of
implementing and developing a multiagency criminal justice information
system in Pasco County. At that time and for several decades thereafter,
the system's software applications and data were stored on Pasco
County's IBM mainframe. The IBM mainframe not only hosted the
software applications that permitted various agencies to access the
criminal justice information but was also used by several other entities
for the purpose of data storage and retrieval. The IBM mainframe
eventually became so antiquated that it was difficult to operate,
maintain, and repair. So Pasco County decided to replace the IBM
mainframe with Microsoft Windows servers; the IBM mainframe was
officially retired in 2019.
      Meanwhile, the Clerk's predecessor decided to replace the software
that had been used by her office to interface with the multiagency
criminal justice information system, which had also become antiquated.

                                      7
The Clerk's predecessor chose a Microsoft Windows based platform called
CLERICUS, which became operational in 2016. CLERICUS is hosted on
the Clerk's servers. It is undisputed that CLERICUS is used for the
collection, processing, preservation, and dissemination of criminal justice
information and that various criminal justice agencies interface with it.
     In finding in favor of Pasco County on the parties' competing
motions for summary judgment with respect to count I, the trial court
determined that because both the constitutional and statutory provisions
expressly refer to "existing" multiagency criminal justice information
systems and because the hardware and software components of the
current Pasco County multiagency criminal justice information system
did not exist at the time the funding obligation was initially imposed,
Pasco County is no longer obligated to fund the system. In other words,
the trial court determined that Pasco County's funding obligation
extended only to the multiagency criminal justice information system as
it existed at the time of the constitutional amendment and enactment of
the statute. But this narrow reading fails to give effect to subsection
29.008(1)(h) as a whole.
     When construing a statute, we must give effect to the legislative
intent. Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (citing Bautista v.
State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003)). "To discern legislative intent,
a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the
statute." Id. (citing Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1185); accord Leftwich v. Fla.
Dep't of Corr., 148 So. 3d 79, 87 (Fla. 2014) ("The plain language of a
statute is the primary method through which legislative intent may be
discovered."); see also Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc., 984 So. 2d at 485
("[T]he principles governing constitutional interpretation largely parallel
those of statutory interpretation." (citing Zingdale v. Powell, 885 So. 2d

                                     8
277, 280 (Fla. 2004))). While the trial court considered the use of the
word "existing" in both the constitution and statute, it failed to recognize
that section 29.008 must "be interpretated to give effect to every clause
in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts." See
Larimore, 2 So. 3d at 106 (quoting Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793
So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 2001)). After all, "significance and effect must
be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if
possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere
surplusage." Id. (quoting Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay
Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006)).
     As set forth above, "[e]xisting multiagency criminal justice
information systems" is defined in subsection 29.008(1)(h) to include
"upgrades and maintenance of the current equipment, maintenance and
upgrades of supporting technology infrastructure and associated staff,
and services and expenses to assure continued information sharing and
reporting of information to the state." Turning to the first two clauses,
we note that the term upgrades is not defined in the statute. However,
when the legislature does not define a term, we may derive its meaning
from dictionaries. Somers v. United States, 355 So. 3d 887, 891-92 (Fla.
2022) (quoting Debaun v. State, 213 So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla. 2017)).
Neither upgrades nor upgrade is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, but
elsewhere upgrade is defined as follows: "to replace something (such as
software or an electronic device) with a more useful version or
alternative." See Upgrade, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upgrade (last visited Nov.
16, 2023); see also Upgrade, Dictionary.com,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/upgrade (last visited Nov. 16, 2023)
(defining upgrade in part as "a new version, improved model, etc.");

                                     9
Upgrade, Britannica.com,
https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/upgrade (last visited Nov. 16,
2023) (defining upgrade—and its plural form upgrades—in part as "an
occurrence in which one thing is replaced by something better, newer,
more valuable, etc."). From these dictionary definitions we derive the
meaning of upgrades to include replacements such that subsection
29.008(1)(h) contemplates the replacement of equipment and supporting
technology infrastructure.
     Moreover, as to the third clause, the services and expenses
pertaining to CLERICUS are clearly necessary to "assure continued
information sharing and reporting of information to the state." See §
29.008(1)(h). Reading all these clauses together, as we must, leads to
the inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended the counties'
funding obligations pertaining to multiagency criminal justice
information systems to continue even after replacement of the equipment
and supporting technology comprising the system, including hardware
and software. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Pasco
County is no longer obligated to fund the multiagency criminal justice
information system and in granting summary judgment as a matter of
law on that basis.
     b.   Phased funding
     Having determined that Pasco County's obligation to fund the
multiagency criminal justice information system has not ceased, we next
consider whether Pasco County can phase in that funding over time. The
answer lies in the Florida Constitution.
     Article XII, section 25, provides as follows:
     (a) Commencing with fiscal year 2000-2001, the legislature
     shall appropriate funds to pay for the salaries, costs, and

                                    10
      expenses set forth in the amendment to Section 14 of Article
      V pursuant to a phase-in schedule established by general
      law.
      (b) Unless otherwise provided herein, the amendment to
      Section 14 shall be fully effectuated by July 1, 2004.
No exception to the funding deadline for multiagency criminal justice
information systems has been provided, and as such a plain reading of
this constitutional provision dictates that the funding obligation for those
systems imposed by the amendment to article V, section 14(c), must be
fully effectuated by July 1, 2004. Since that deadline has long passed,
Pasco County is foreclosed from complying with its mandatory obligation
to fund the multiagency criminal justice information system by providing
that funding in phases over a period of years.
      Sheppard & White, P.A. v. City of Jacksonville, 827 So. 2d 925 (Fla.
2002), further supports our reading of the constitutional provision. In
that case, the supreme court considered the appropriate hourly rate for
the services of appointed counsel, the funding obligation for which was to
be borne by the state. As part of the supreme court's analysis, it stated
the following:
      We must express our serious concerns as to how the system
      for compensating conflict counsel may develop in the very
      near future. Florida is coming to a crossroad regarding its
      system for the representation of indigents in capital cases.
      By constitutional amendment, the State will probably soon
      assume the full responsibility of funding for conflict counsel no
      later than 2004.
Id. at 932 (emphasis added) (citing art. V, § 14; art. XII, § 25, Fla.
Const.). Relying on the same two articles of the constitution that are at
issue in our case, the supreme court surmised that the funding
obligation imposed by constitutional amendment (referred to as Revision
7) would become the full responsibility of the state no later than 2004.

                                      11
We in turn believe that it is appropriate to interpret those constitutional
provisions, for purposes of this case, to require Pasco County to have
assumed full responsibility for funding of the multiagency criminal
justice information system no later than July 1, 2004, such that phased-
in funding is not permitted.
        The trial court therefore erred in failing to enter summary judgment
in favor of the Clerk on count I and in granting summary judgment in
favor of Pasco County on count I.
  II.    Courthouse annex
        In count II of the petition, the Clerk sought a declaration of the
parties' respective rights and obligations with regard to the funding of the
Clerk's court-related functions at the courthouse annex in New Port
Richey. The Clerk argues that the trial court erred in determining that
the courthouse annex does not constitute a local requirement as
contemplated by article V, section 14(c), and subsection 29.008(2). We
disagree.
        Article V, section 14(c), provides in pertinent part that "[c]ounties
shall also pay reasonable and necessary salaries, costs, and expenses of
the state courts system to meet local requirements as determined by
general law." When section 29.008 was enacted in 2000, it did not define
local requirements and merely reiterated the language of the
constitutional amendment. See § 29.008(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). But that
changed in 2003 when the legislature amended section 29.008. See ch.
2003-402, Laws of Fla. And since that amendment went into effect in
2004, section 29.008 has provided in part as follows:
        (2) Counties shall pay reasonable and necessary salaries,
        costs, and expenses of the state courts system, including
        associated staff and expenses, to meet local requirements.

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     (a) Local requirements are those specialized programs,
     nonjudicial staff, and other expenses associated with
     specialized court programs, specialized prosecution needs,
     specialized defense needs, or resources required of a local
     jurisdiction as a result of special factors or circumstances.
     Local requirements exist:
     1. When imposed pursuant to an express statutory directive,
     based on such factors as provided in paragraph (b); or
     2. When:
     a. The county has enacted an ordinance, adopted a local
     program, or funded activities with a financial or operational
     impact on the circuit or a county within the circuit; or
     b. Circumstances in a given circuit or county result in or
     necessitate implementation of specialized programs, the
     provision of nonjudicial staff and expenses to specialized
     court programs, special prosecution needs, specialized
     defense needs, or the commitment of resources to the court's
     jurisdiction.
     (b) Factors and circumstances resulting in the establishment
     of a local requirement include, but are not limited to:
     1. Geographic factors;
     2. Demographic factors;
     3. Labor market forces;
     4. The number and location of court facilities; or
     5. The volume, severity, complexity, or mix of court cases.
Subsection 29.008(2)(a) instructs that a local requirement exists either
when it is "imposed pursuant to an express statutory directive, based on
such factors as provided in paragraph (b)," see § 29.008(2)(a)1, or when
the circumstances set forth in subsection (2)(a)2 are met.
     With respect to an "express statutory directive," the legislature has
provided that
     [t]he following shall be considered a local requirement
     pursuant to subparagraph (2)(a)1.:

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     (a) Legal aid programs, which shall be funded at a level equal
     to or greater than the amount provided from filing fees and
     surcharges to legal aid programs from October 1, 2002, to
     September 30, 2003.
     (b) Alternative sanctions coordinators pursuant to ss. 984.09
     and 985.037.
§ 29.008(3). The Clerk has failed to point to an express statutory
directive indicating that a secondary courthouse facility, such as the
courthouse annex, shall be considered a local requirement for purposes
of the constitution and section 29.008, and we have found none. We are
therefore left to consider subsection 29.008(2)(a)2.
     Subsection 29.008(2)(a)2 describes alternative circumstances
under which a local requirement may come to exist. However, local
requirements under this subsection "must be determined by the . . .
method" prescribed by subsection 29.008(2)(c). But it is undisputed that
subsection 29.008(2)(c) has no applicability to this case. Therefore the
trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that the courthouse
annex does not constitute a local requirement as contemplated by article
V, section 14(c), and section 29.008. Entry of summary judgment on
count II in favor of Pasco County was therefore proper.5

     5 In addition to determining that the courthouse annex was not

established pursuant to either subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 or subsection
29.008(2)(a)2 and therefore that it did not constitute a local requirement
under the constitution or statute, the trial court made an alternative
finding that the courthouse annex was not a local requirement as
contemplated by the statute based on facts for which there was no
evidentiary basis. But because the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Pasco County on count II for the independent
reason that the circumstances set forth in subsection 29.008(2)(a)1 and
subsection 29.008(2)(a)2 had not been met, it is proper to affirm the final
summary judgment with respect to this count.

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  III. Supplemental relief
     In count III of its petition the Clerk also sought supplemental relief.
See § 86.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2021) ("Any person seeking a declaratory
judgment may also demand additional, alternative, coercive, subsequent,
or supplemental relief in the same action.").6 The Clerk's request for
supplemental relief is dependent upon the outcome of her claims in
counts I and II. See City of Newberry v. Alachua County, 366 So. 3d
1176, 1179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (explaining that supplemental relief "is
ancillary to and dependent upon the existence of a declaratory
judgment"). Once a declaratory judgment is entered in favor of the party
seeking declaratory relief, that party's request for supplemental relief
becomes ripe for determination. See McAllister v. Breakers Seville Ass'n,
41 So. 3d 405, 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Because the trial court erred in

     6 We note that section 86.061 directs that "[t]he application [for

further relief based on a declaratory judgment] shall be by motion to the
court having jurisdiction to grant relief." Here, the Clerk did not seek
supplemental relief by motion but rather included a claim for
supplemental relief in her petition for declaratory relief. On appeal,
Pasco County does not contend that the Clerk erred in seeking
supplemental relief by petition rather than by motion, nor do we believe
that she did. See, e.g., Mac Assocs. v. LaMontagne, 556 So. 2d 460, 461
(Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (relying on the 1987 version of section 86.061, which
mirrors the 2021 version of the statute, when stating that supplemental
relief should be sought by petition). We understand that under certain
circumstances when a statute (or rule) requires that relief be sought in a
pleading, a motion will not suffice. See, e.g., Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.
2d 835, 837-38 (Fla. 1991). But that is generally due to concerns about
proper notice. And we do not believe any shortcomings with respect to
notice exist here where the inverse has occurred—seeking relief in a
pleading when the statute calls for a motion. By including a claim for
supplemental relief in the petition for declaratory relief, the Clerk
afforded Pasco County more notice than would have been afforded by a
motion filed after the initiation of the declaratory relief action.

                                     15
failing to grant summary judgment in favor of the Clerk on count I, it
likewise erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Pasco County
on count III to the extent that count III sought supplemental relief related
to count I.
   IV.     Conclusion
         We affirm the final summary judgment with respect to count II.
However, we reverse the final summary judgment to the extent the trial
court found in favor of Pasco County on count I and remand for entry of
final summary judgment in favor of the Clerk on count I. We also reverse
the final summary judgment to the extent the trial court found in favor of
Pasco County on the Clerk's claim for supplemental relief related to
count I and remand for further proceedings.
         Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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