Court Opinion

ID: 9668600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:19:04.601225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.414670
License: Public Domain

Carr, J.
(concurring). The defendants in these cases insist that the trial judge was correct in entering judgments on motions notwithstanding the verdicts of the jury, on the ground that plaintiffs could not establish their alleged causes of action without expert testimony and that there was no proof of negligence on the part of defendant Bat-tersby unless it is inferred from the mere fact that plaintiff Sandra Higdon sustained an injury. With such claims we are unable to agree. It is doubtless, true that in the majority of malpractice eases expert testimony is essential to enable the triers of the facts *378to reach correct conclusions. Such is the situation where questions of treatment are involved, or other matters with reference to which laymen, as a general rule, are not informed. The value of the opinions of those who are skilled in such matters is obvious whenever expert testimony is necessary to establish pertinent and material facts in the trial of cases.
In the cases at bar, however, we are not concerned with matters of treatment by defendant dentists but, rather, with the use of a mechanical appliance. Obviously it was the duty of defendant Battersby in the use of the so-called separating disk to observe a degree of care commensurate with the possible results that might ensue from inattention to the work or otherwise negligent handling of the equipment employed. The question at issue is whether there was in fact negligence constituting the proximate cause of the injury. Bearing in mind the nature of the question, we think the cases fairly fall within the line of decisions in this State in which it has been recognized that expert testimony is not essential to the establishing of a cause of action for damages resulting from negligence in cases of the character here involved. Among such decisions are: Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich 39; Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich 383 (57 ALR 262); LeFaive v. Asselin, 262 Mich 443; and Winchester v. Chabut, 321 Mich 114.
This Court has never approved the res ipsa loqui-tur rule. It has been repeatedly said that the mere fact that an accident, or an injury, has occurred is not proof of negligence. It is equally well established that permissible inferences may be drawn from facts. In Burghardt v. Detroit United Railway, 206 Mich 545 (5 ALR 1333), it was said by Mr. Justice Fellows, who wrote the opinion of the Court I (pp 546-548):
*379“This Court has not adopted the rule res ipsa loquitur; we have uniformly held that the happening of the accident alone is not evidence of negligence; and we have as uniformly held that negligence may he established by circumstantial evidence, and that where the circumstances are such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and within the field of legitimate inferences from established facts that at least a prima facie case is made. Alpern v. Churchill, 53 Mich 607; Barnowsky v. Kelson, 89 Mich 523 (15 LRA 33); LaFernier v. Soo River Lighter & Wrecking Co., 129 Mich 596; Stowell v. Standard Oil Co., 139 Mich 18; Elsey v. J. L. Hudson Co., 189 Mich 135 (LRA 1916B, 1284); O’Donnell v. Lange, 162 Mich 654; Karris v. Royal Oak Savings Bank, 187 Mich 407; Sewell v. Detroit United Railway, 158 Mich 407; Gerstler v. Weinberg, 160 Mich 267; Congdon v. Detroit, Jackson & Chicago R. Co., 179 Mich 175; Bayer v. Grocholski, 196 Mich 325.
“In Barnowsky v. Kelson, supra, it was said (pp 524-527):
“ ‘In this case the falling of the roof was in and of itself some evidence that the work of raising it was not being done with the ordinary care and skill. It is true that the mere fact of any injury does not impute negligence on the part of any one, but where a thing happens which would not ordinarily have occurred if due care had been used, the fact of such happening raises a presumption of negligence in some one. * * *
“ ‘This roof not properly supported would fall as a natural result of the laws of gravitation, but if properly braced there would be no reason for its' falling from that cause, and it would not fall from any other cause without the interposition of the elements or some human agency. Therefore, without any other showing than that it suddenly gave way, slipped or tipped to one side, and fell, the presumption is almost conclusive that it fell because it was not sufficiently braced or stayed.’
*380“In Sewell v. Detroit United Railway, supra, Mr. Justice Montgomery, speaking for the Court, said (pp 409,- 410) :
“ ‘It is the settled rule of this State that negligence of the defendant must be proved, and that an inference of negligence is not to be drawn from the mere fact of an accident. But it has also been held in numerous cases that the circumstances attending an injury may be such as to justify an inference of negligence. As in the present ease, if all that appeared had been that the plaintiff was riding in a car of the defendant under' the control of its servants, and the car in which plaintiff was riding continued its course until it collided with another car ahead of it standing still, with sufficient force to push the. still car ahead 75 feet, the inference that some one had blundered prima facie would be the most natural one to be drawn, and. that inference is so clear that it would not require further proof of negligence on the part of the defendant.’ ”
The rule, as above stated, has been repeatedly referred. to with approval in subsequent decisions, among which are: Fish v. Grand Trunk Western Railway, 275 Mich 718; Macros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 290 Mich 567; Pattinson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Port Huron, 333 Mich 253; and Crase v. City of Detroit, 341 Mich 132. An interesting comment on the Michigan rule will be found in 65 CJS, Negligence, § 220(2), pp 991, 992..
In the case at bar the testimony of plaintiff Sandra Higdon is in conflict with that of defendant Bat-tersby. The latter insisted that the cause of the injury was a movement on Sandra’s part,, which resulted in bringing the disk in contact with her tongue. He further claimed that he ceased operating the disc at once following the contact. It was the claim of Sandra that she did not move, and that the disk was not removed “right away” after it contacted her tongue. Under the accepted, rule in this. State the *381testimony must be construed as strongly as possible in favor of the plaintiffs. Grover v. Simons, 342 Mich 480, and prior decisions there cited.
It may be assumed from the verdicts returned that the jury determined the facts in accordance with the proofs introduced by plaintiffs. Obviously such proofs negative the explanation of defendants as to how the injury occurred. Under the rule recognized in the Burghardt Case, supra, and other decisions of like character, it was within the province of the jury to draw inferences from established facts, subject to the limitation that negligence could not be inferred from the mere occurrence of the accident and injury. It was within the province of the jury to accept the testimony of plaintiff Sandra, and to give such weight thereto as was deemed proper.
Defendants direct attention to Vale v. Noe, 172 Wis 421 (179 NW 572), in which a judgment for the plaintiff, in a case somewhat similar to those now at bar, was reversed. The opinion indicates, however, that the appellate court concluded that freedom from negligence on the part of the defendant was shown by undisputed testimony. Be that as it may, we do not regard thé decision as controlling here. Each case of this nature must necessarily rest on its own facts. We think that plaintiffs were entitled to have the issues involved submitted to the jury, that the verdicts returned were supported by sufficient evidence, and that judgments notwithstanding the verdicts should not have been entered. ■, •
Remanded with directions to set aside the judgments and to enter judgments in accordance with the verdicts returned by the jury.
Dethmers, C. J., and Sharpe- and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Carr, J.