Court Opinion

ID: 9710503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:54.798281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.246337
License: Public Domain

LEADBETTER, Judge,
concurring and' dissenting.
I concur in the decision to order a new trial, and join in all of the majority opinion except that portion holding that the PHRA does not provide the right to a jury trial of suits seeking money damages.1
I fully agree with the majority that neither the Pennsylvania nor United States Constitution requires a jury trial for such actions. Moreover, the majority makes a strong argument that the PHRA’s use of the word “court” suggests an intent that cases be tried to a judge sitting without a jury. Nevertheless, while I find it a very close issue, I must conclude that the legislature intended to incorporate the right to a jury when it included language providing for legal remedies.2
*439As the majority notes, plaintiff here sought damages under the PHRA for discriminatory termination, sexual harassment, and retaliation.3 Although not applicable to the states 4, the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution has long been held to require federal courts to provide a jury trial to determine such “legal” claims, i.e., claims for compensatory or punitive damages. This is so whether those claims arise under common law or by statute, [Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536, 78 S.Ct. 893, 900, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1007, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974)] and whether the cause of action arises under federal or state law. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222, 83 S.Ct. 609, 610, 9 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963). As a result, a long line of cases in the federal courts have found a right to a jury trial for damage claims brought under the PHRA. See, e.g., Reniclc v. Olan Mills, Inc., No. 96-0506, 1996 WL 903711, at *1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21103, at *1 (W.D.Pa. July 29, 1996); Galeone v. American Packaging Corp., 764 F.Supp. 349, 353-54 (E.D.Pa.1991); Lubin v. American Packaging Corp., 760 F.Supp. 450, 452 (E.D.Pa.1991).
Certain of these cases have relied upon the statutory analysis of Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978), to reach the conclusion that the Pennsylvania legislature must have intended to create a jury trial right in enacting the PHRA. In Lorillard, the United States Supreme Court contrasted the remedial provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., with Title VII of the CM Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Title VII, as originally enacted, did not specify whether cases were to be tried to a jury, but since it provided for only equitable relief, it was construed to require bench trials only. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969).5 The Court concluded that since the ADEA provides for legal as well as equitable relief, the ADEA confers on plaintiffs the right to demand a jury trial. 434 U.S. at 584, 98 S.Ct. at 872. The Court reasoned that Congress, aware of the Seventh Amendment significance of providing for legal relief, must have intended to grant the right to a jury trial. Thus, a number of federal decisions have, by analogy to Lorillard, reached the conclusion that our legislature, in providing for legal relief, must have intended to provide for a jury trial. I am not persuaded that Lorillard has such direct application to Pennsylvania legislation. As the majority correctly points out, the only relevant inquiry dictated by Pennsylvania constitutional law is whether the cause of action existed at the time our state constitution was enacted. Since the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states, and the distinction its interpretation has drawn between legal and equitable remedies is therefore irrelevant to Pennsylvania law, I find it difficult to impute to our legislature the same reasoning imputed to Congress in Lorillard.
Nonetheless, I do not believe that our legislature was unmindful of the Seventh Amendment, nor of the significance of the distinction between equitable and legal remedies under federal law. As the Superior Court has noted, the PHRA was patterned largely after Title VII,6 except for the inclusion of legal relief. The legislature surely foresaw that PHRA claims would sometimes be joined with Title VII claims in the federal *440courts and sometimes be tried in combination with other state law claims in our courts. Yet if we adopt the conclusion of the majority, we recognize a system whereby the same cause of action, if tried in state court must be decided by a judge alone, yet in federal court will be heard by a jury upon the demand of either party. This is not an insignificant difference. The high value placed upon the right to trial by jury is rooted in our deepest traditions, and it is difficult to believe that our legislature intended to accord that right to litigants who sought relief in federal courts, but deny it to those who came to our courts of common pleas.
Moreover, such a dichotomy works a particular prejudice on two categories of parties. First, it places a disproportionate burden on plaintiffs from rural areas far from the federal courthouses, who would have to expend significantly more time and money (and, in many cases, seek the assistance of counsel outside their local area) simply in order to obtain a jury trial. Second, this ruling deprives all defendants of any choice in the matter. By selecting the forum in which to bring their claims, plaintiffs will have the absolute power to determine whether the case will be tried to judge or jury.
I simply cannot impute to our legislature the intention to create such an anomalous and inequitable result. For these reasons, I would upon remand direct the court of common pleas to allow a jury trial of this matter.

. We are, of course, not dealing with the equitable remedies which may be sought under the PHRA.

. 43 P.S. § 962(c)(3).

. Such damages are recoverable under the PHRA. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n. v. Zamantakis, 478 Pa. 454, 459, 387 A.2d 70, 73 (1978).

. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D.La.1972), aff'd. sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098, 93 S.Ct. 908, 34 L.Ed.2d 679 (1973) (per curiam) (stating that civil jury trials are "not so fundamental to the American system of justice as to he required of state courts by due process”). See also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 169 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 2448, 2460 n. 4, 37 L.Ed.2d 522 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to provide for bench trials exclusively. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4). Subsequently, in 1991 Congress further amended Title VII to provide for "legal” as well as “equitable" damages and simultaneously granted to plaintiffs the right to demand a jury trial. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(l).

. Murphy v. Cartex, 377 Pa. Superior Ct. 181, 195, 546 A.2d 1217, 1224 (1988).