Court Opinion

ID: 9776968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:50:31.637452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:45.688435
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. I dissent because because I have grave doubts about the soundness of the decision to order Scott, a child himself, to financially support the infant, Keegan, born as a result of an illegal sexual encounter. I take issue with the majority’s reference to Scott as “an underage consenting male victim,” as our law provides that a person under the age of fourteen is incapable of consenting to a sexual act. “Our public policy, as fixed by the General Assembly, is manifest that victims younger than age 14 are beneath the age of consent and cannot be willing accomplices to sexual intercourse.” Miller v. State, 318 Ark. 673, 677, 887 S.W.2d 280, 282 (1994). To require a person under fourteen to be responsible for a child born as the result of a sexual crime seems to thwart that public policy, which is clearly intended to protect young persons who are not capable of protecting themselves or making intelligent decisions about such matters. Although I do not disagree with the majority’s recitation of case law from other jurisdictions or with the principle that the welfare of the infant child is of paramount consideration, I differ with the majority on the issue of who should support the child. Ordering Scott to support this child effectively punishes him for being the victim of a crime. To this end, I believe that this sitúa- . tion could better be handled like those in which the putative father is not known or is deceased. Otherwise, the message such a decision sends is that a victim of crime must pay for the criminal act of the perpetrator. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.