Court Opinion

ID: 9874440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:08:01.11079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:48.871348
License: Public Domain

Moskowitz, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: I agree with the majority that plaintiff failed to address defendants’ prima facie showing that there was no departure from good and accepted medical practice. I also agree with the majority that the IAS court should have granted the branch of defendants’ motion that sought to dismiss the informed consent cause of action. I disagree with the majority, however, on the issues of whether the IAS court properly granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the bill of particulars and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim. Accordingly, because I agree with the IAS court’s decision in that regard, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, defendants met their prima facie burden with plaintiff’s medical records, and the opinions of Dr. Behrman and two experts, who addressed all theories of negligence alleged in the bill of particulars. In opposition, plaintiff failed to address defendants’ prima facie showing that *566the result from the double jaw surgery was anything but a reasonable result.
In general, a plaintiff cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by asserting a new theory of liability for the first time in opposition papers (see Abalola v Flower Hosp., 44 AD3d 522, 522 [1st Dept 2007]). However, plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend the bill of particulars to encompass this additional theory of departure and causation, and the IAS court properly granted the motion, accurately noting that the allegations of malpractice in the expert affidavit fell within the scope of plaintiff’s original allegations. Indeed, defendants had notice in their own records of plaintiff’s condition, even though no deposition testimony referred to that condition (cf. Farris v Dupret, 138 AD3d 565, 566 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 912 [2016]).
Furthermore, although plaintiff filed a note of issue, the IAS court had not yet set a date for trial. As a result, I do not believe that there would be significant prejudice to defendants as a result of the delay in amending the bill of particulars (see Cherebin v Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d 364, 365 [1st Dept 2007]; see also Lara v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2000 NY Slip Op 50887[U] [Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 26, 2000], affd 305 AD2d 106 [1st Dept 2003] [Frye hearing held where new theory was introduced during opening statements to the jury]). Of course, were we to permit plaintiff to amend her bill of particulars, as I believe we should, defendants would be allowed further reasonable discovery on the new theory of liability (see Cherebin, 43 AD3d at 365; see also Abdelnabi v New York City Tr. Auth., 273 AD2d 114, 115 [1st Dept 2000]). So that further discovery could proceed, I would also strike the note of issue.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion otherwise, there is nothing unduly speculative about the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert otolaryngologist. The expert noted that plaintiff’s medical chart clearly called attention to her primary immune deficiency, and that the condition would make plaintiff susceptible to periop-erative infection, especially with surgery involving hardware and the oral cavity.
Thus, the expert concluded, it was a departure for Dr. Behrman to have failed to account for plaintiff’s condition in the surgical planning and to discuss the surgery with plaintiff’s immunologist. The expert further opined that plaintiff’s infection resulted directly from Dr. Behrman’s failure to incorporate plaintiff’s suppressed immune condition into his surgical planning. Specifically, the expert noted that the infection had likely *567spread to the mastoid cavity and inner ear, and that acute infection and inflammation is known to adversely affect the inner ear. Thus, the expert concluded, the infection had caused sensory deficit. Similarly, the expert noted that the infection and associated inflammation caused direct injury to neurologic anatomy, thus causing the numbness of plaintiff’s lip, chin, and lower facial area. The expert therefore drew a direct causal connection between the infection and plaintiffs injuries. These assertions by plaintiff’s expert are sufficient, at this stage of the litigation, to support an amended bill of particulars (see Carnovali v Sher, 121 AD3d 552 [1st Dept 2014]; cf. Katechis v Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 36 AD3d 514, 516 [1st Dept 2007]).