Court Opinion

ID: 9645558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:28:23.560018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:27.905873
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
Defendant, Ottavio Novembrino, was indicted for possession of controlled dangerous substances and possession of controlled *160dangerous substances with intent to distribute. He filed a motion to suppress evidence and, as noted in the majority opinion, the suppression hearing resulted in sharply conflicting accounts of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s arrest and the subsequent search of his service station. The trial court, however, credited the State’s evidence, as did the Appellate Division, and, now, this Court. In spite of the fact that every judge who reviewed the issuance of the search warrant and examined the evidence surrounding the search and seizure in this case accepted the State’s version, each reached the same conclusion — that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
I concur in the unanimous determination that there was no probable cause in this case. Further, I join the majority in its conclusion that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant issued without probable cause must be excluded notwithstanding the executing officer’s subjective good faith in relying upon the warrant; in a case such as this, the judicially-devised exclusionary rule must be applied to vindicate the underlying constitutional interest. However, I break rank with the Court when it expresses an additional reason for reaching this result, namely, that the exclusionary rule itself is a constitutional right directly protected under the State Constitution.
I.
Before explaining my reasons for disagreeing with the majority as to the conceptual basis for applying the exclusionary rule, some observations concerning the antecedent issues in this case are pertinent. These relate to both the non-controverted question of probable cause and the highly-controverted issue of the relevance of the executing officer’s subjective good faith.
As to probable cause, in view of the unanimity of opinion, I see no necessity for the Court’s extensive exposition of this issue. I would be content in this case simply to adopt the sound position of the Appellate Division that the affidavit and circum*161stances surrounding the issuance of the search warrant failed to demonstrate adequate probable cause:
The affidavit here involved simply revealed that a police informant concluded for unknown reasons that defendant was a drug dealer, that a person previously arrested for possession of cocaine was seen at defendant’s gas station engaged in some unspecified activities which caused a detective, whose education, training and experiences are unknown, to conclude that criminal activities in the form of violations of Title 24 were taking place at the gas station. The totality of the circumstances spelled out in the affidavit failed to contain a single objective fact tending to engender a “well grounded suspicion” that a crime was being committed. * * * We conclude, therefore, that probable cause was not established. [State v. Novembrino, 200 N.J.Super. 229, 236 (1985) (citations omitted).]
This is so particularly in light of the Court’s ruling that a totality-of-the-circumstances formula analogous to that set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), is now to be used to assess the validity of search warrants under the probable cause standard set forth in Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. Ante at 122.
With respect to the relevance of the executing police officer’s subjective good faith, the Court rejects the proposition that if probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is lacking, seized evidence should nevertheless be admissible on the basis of the good-faith exception recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). I concur in this determination.
I agree with the majority that the good-faith test effectively dilutes probable cause — the indispensable constitutional foundation for a reasonable search and seizure — by eliminating the necessity for demonstrating reasonable grounds to make a search before evidence obtained therefrom will be admissible in evidence. This conclusion is based on the fact that operation of the exclusionary rule serves to deter not only intentional official misconduct but also mistaken official misdeeds.
In addition, the test proffered under Leon is not simply subjective good faith as such. Rather, the test is objective-subjective good faith: whether the actual, “subjective” good faith of the executing police officer itself can be considered “objec*162tively” reasonable as a basis for undertaking — and validating — a search in reliance upon the warrant. We have generally eschewed the relevance or significance of the actual state of mind of the executing officer. In recent cases we have been emphatic and consistent in our adherence to the proposition that probable cause must be demonstrated by reference to objective circumstances — what an informed, trained and reasonably experienced police officer under all of the circumstances would have understood in terms of whether there is probable cause. See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210 (1983) (police officer’s search and seizure would be considered reasonable only if it conformed to objectively reasonable police standards); see also State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152 (1983) (“if the validity of a search can be sustained independently on objective grounds demonstrating reasonableness, the existence of other defects that do not derogate from the overall objective reasonableness of the search or impugn the integrity of the judicial process should not be relied upon to invalidate the search.”) (emphasis added); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25, 71 (1979) (dissenting opinion).
The problem is that the objective-subjective good faith test of Leon is inconsistent with the requirement of objective probable cause. As put by Justice Brennan dissenting in United States v. Leon:
it is virtually inconceivable that a reviewing court, when faced with a defendant’s motion to suppress, could first find that a warrant was invalid, under the new [Illinois v.] Gates standard, but then, at the same time, find that a police officer’s reliance on such an invalid warrant was nevertheless “objectively reasonable” under the [Leon] test. Because the two standards overlap so completely, it is unlikely that a warrant could be found invalid under Gates and yet the police reliance upon it could be seen as objectively reasonable; otherwise, we would have to entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant.” (citing Kamisar, supra, note 5, at 588-89; Wasserstrom, “The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment,” 21 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 257 (1984); LaFave, "The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing ‘Bright Lines’ and ‘Good Faith,’ ” 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 307, 333-59 (1982). [468 U.S. at 958-59, 104 S.Ct. at 3445-46, 82 L.Ed.2d at 721-22.]
Justice Brennan concluded that the subjective good-faith test would virtually eviscerate the constitutional requirement of *163probable cause. I could not agree more, and on this point I am confident that the majority of this Court concurs, particularly in view of its extended emphasis upon the paramountcy of probable cause as the quintessential basis for a reasonable search and seizure and its rejection of the objective-subjective good faith test of Leon. Ante at 157.
II.
My major difference from the Court has not to do with its test of probable cause or its rejection of the good-faith exception. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, I agree with the Court’s application of the exclusionary rule. The effect of our judgment in this case is to sanction the exclusion of evidence derived from a search and seizure based upon a warrant that was not supported by probable cause — on objective grounds — notwithstanding the subjective good faith of the executing officer in relying upon the search warrant.
My departure from the Court is occasioned by its characterization of the exclusionary rule as it is applied in this case. The majority has decided that the exclusionary rule — the exclusion of evidence derived from an objectively unreasonable search and seizure — itself is a constitutional right. I do not believe that it is a constitutional right as such. Rather, it is a remedial rule that is ancillary or incidental to the central constitutional right of the citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. That the exclusionary rule is a remedial rule ancillary to the constitutional right in no way denigrates the singular importance of the rule or detracts from its legal potency. See State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 290 (1986) (concurring opinion). I am satisfied that the exclusionary rule is vitally necessary to protect the underlying constitutional right on the part of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and should be continued as a court-created remedy as a matter of our state common law. While this conceptual disagreement has no practical consequences in this case, it may have enormous ramifications in other situations.
*164I am constrained to state my difference from the Court because I cannot subscribe to its analysis or reasoning concerning the constitutional basis of the exclusionary rule. The Court’s determination is borne out neither by the decisional law that has served to explicate our legal traditions relative to the exclusionary rule, nor by state constitutional history relevant to the exclusionary rule, nor by considerations of a sound public policy — factors that we generally consider in expounding and interpreting our state constitution. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986); State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39 (1983); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338 (1982) (concurring opinion).
A.
A review of our decisional law shows that, even after Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), in which the exclusionary rule was first applied under the fourth amendment, New Jersey did not apply the exclusionary rule. Rather, this state adhered to the rule that “competent proof shall be available for the prosecution of the offense notwithstanding illegality in the seizure.” Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 509-10 (1958); see State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 594 (1951), cert, denied, 343 U.S. 908, 72 S.Ct. 636, 96 L.Ed. 1326 (1952); State v. Guida, 119 N.J.L. 464 (E. & A.1938); State v. Merra, 103 N.J.L. 361 (E. & A.1927); State v. Cortese, 104 N.J.L. 447 (E. & A.1927), aff’g 4 N.J.Misc. 683 (Sup.Ct.1926); State v. Lyons, 99 N.J.L. 301 (E. & A.1923); State v. MacQueen, 69 N.J.L. 522, 528 (1903).
In 1958, we had an opportunity to re-examine the constitutional significance of this settled rule. In Eleuteri v. Richman, supra, 26 N.J. 506, search warrants were invalidated because the issuing magistrate was without power to authorize a search beyond the territorial limits of his court. Id. at 508. The issue was whether the fruit of that unlawful search was nevertheless admissible in evidence. The Court observed that:
The exclusionary rule rests upon two propositions. The first is that government should not stoop to the “dirty business” of a criminal in order to catch *165him. The second is that civil and criminal remedies against the offending officer are as a practical matter ineffective, and hence the rule of exclusion is the only available remedy to protect society from the excesses which led to the constitutional right. Id. at 512.
And further:
the exclusionary rule has the role of a deterrent — a device to compel respect for the [constitutional] guarantee by removing an incentive to disregard it. It is calculated to prevent; not to repair. The postulate is an enforcement official indifferent to basic rights. Id. at 513, 141 A.2d 46 (emphasis added).
Even after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), by which the federal adoption of the exclusionary rule as a remedial device to vindicate the fourth amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches became applicable to states under the fourteenth amendment, we consistently recognized that the exclusionary rule served the primary purpose of deterrence. Moreover, we initially held that the rule should be applied only to redress culpable police misconduct. See State v. Gerardo, 53 N.J. 261, 267 (1969) (holding that exclusion of evidence is not mandated by the fourth amendment, since “important as it is in our society, [it] does not call for imposition of judicial sanctions where enforcing officers have followed the law with such punctilious regard as they have here”); State v. Zito, 54 N.J. 206, 211 (1969) (holding that “the product of a search should not be suppressed when a search is made in good faith upon the strength of a statute later declared unconstitutional); State v. Bisaccia, 58 N.J. 586, 589-91 (1971). (“It is puzzling that the suppression rule was not anchored to the reason for its creation. The evil sought to be ended was insolence in office.”)
The majority here asserts that at least since the decision in State v. Valentin, 36 N.J. 41 (1961), “the exclusionary rule has become imbedded in our jurisprudence.” Ante at 148. It states that the exclusionary rule has consistently been applied to exclude from the State’s case-in-chief evidence illegally obtained through warrantless searches or in reliance upon defective warrants. The cases it cites all reflect a judicial concern with, and reaction to, evidence that was seized in violation of *166standards and rules designed to assure the reasonableness of the search and seizure. E.g. State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 141 (1983) (evidence obtained as a result of telephone-authorized search would be suppressed where State failed to prove minimal procedural requirements to assure reliability); State v. Fariello, 71 N.J. 552 (1976) (requiring suppression of evidence of narcotics possession where affidavit was insufficient to show probable cause and issuing judge made no transcription or summary of officer’s testimony); State v. Moriarity, 39 N.J. 502 (1963) (evidence that defendant conducted bookmaking and lottery was suppressed where affidavit did not show probable cause and, officer’s testimony to issuing judge not given under oath); State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 265-66 (1963) (mandating suppression of illegally seized evidence of bookmaking activities and rejecting State’s argument in support of a good faith exception).
It may not be amiss to characterize these decisions as “embeddpng]” the exclusionary rule in our jurisprudence. Their significance, however, is not so much a consistent reliance upon the exclusionary rule but a judicial expansion of the scope of the rule. In effect, these decisions extend the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule to encompass cases of unreasonable official misconduct that was simply misguided or mistaken, as well as intentional or malicious. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that this Court, in extending and applying the exclusionary rule, has consistently and unfailingly stressed its deterrent purpose and its origins as a court-created remedy designed to discourage improper police conduct.1 E.g., State v. *167Gerardo, supra, 53 N.J. at 267 (“The doctrine of suppression is judge-made, a device adopted upon the belief that there was no effective remedy for a violation of [the fourth amendment]. Suppression is ordered, not to rectify a wrong already done, but to deter future violations.”). The Court has not given similar weight to the notion that the rule is designed to make the frequently-guilty defendant constitutionally “whole” by negating the use of the fruit of an unreasonable search. Thus, while the rule is part of our “jurisprudence,” it is the Court’s unswerving endorsement of its deterrent purpose that accounts for this. It is therefore an exaggeration to say that the rule, though markedly broadened, has acquired constitutional stature.
It might be argued (though not by the majority) that the exclusionary rule is constitutional because it is directly related to “judicial integrity.” We, however, have not subscribed to the view that “judicial integrity” is the purpose served by the exclusionary rule, although in particular cases “judicial integrity” may be threatened by certain kinds of police misconduct and itself would justify application of the rule. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563 (1979) (holding that the fourth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed an opportunity to challenge the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant). Just last term we reiterated the position that the function of the exclusionary rule is deterrence. In Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Com’n., 100 N.J. 79 (1985), we held that “[d]eterrence of future unlawful police conduct is the ‘prime purpose’ of the exclusionary rule, ‘if not the sole one.’ ” Id. at 85 (citations omitted). We rejected the argument that “judicial integrity” mandates that the courts exclude all *168evidence that has been unlawfully seized. The Court held that in most suppression cases
the evidence is unquestionably accurate and the wrong is complete by the time the evidence reaches the court. Therefore, the analysis is narrowed to the question of whether admitting the evidence would encourage future improper law enforcement actions____ [T]his inquiry is substantially the same as the question of whether exclusion would serve a deterrent purpose. [Id. at 89 (citations omitted).]
In sum, the exclusionary rule as developed and applied in this jurisdiction has evolved from one focusing essentially on callous, willful or insolent police misbehavior to one that encompasses official misconduct reflecting no more than ignorance, mistake, or inexperience. In either of these situations, the result to the victim is the same — an objectively unreasonable search and seizure. And, therefore, the application of the rule is the same — to exclude ill-found evidence in order to discourage the offending officials. Thus, it is the judicial understanding of what is “improper” police misconduct that has changed over the years, not the purpose of the rule. The genetic thread that connects our decisions is the central design of the exclusionary rule to deter improper official conduct. To reiterate, the purpose is not solely or primarily to punish the offending police officer or to compensate the defendant or even to assure judicial integrity. Consequently, this stream of decisional law erodes rather than supports the foundation upon which the Court now raises the exclusionary rule to a constitutional right.
B.
The decisional law does not clearly reflect strong legal traditions that suggest the exclusionary rule is itself of constitutional stature. Hence, our decisions do not provide the basis from which to reason that the exclusionary rule has now evolved into a constitutional doctrine. Moreover, the relevant and express constitutional history in this area militates against the conclusion that the exclusionary rule itself has acquired the status of *169a constitutional right. On this point I agree with the analysis of the dissenting opinion. Post at 168.
As noted, the early prevailing rule in our jurisdiction allowed into evidence the fruits of an illegal search and seizure. Supra at 164. This rule of admissibility was firmly in place when the delegates to New Jersey’s Constitutional Convention assembled in the summer of 1947. The constitutional provision guaranteeing the citizens’ right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, like its federal fourth amendment counterpart, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized. [N.J. Const. (1947) art. I, para. 7.] 2
An amendment proposed at the Convention would have added the following sentence to Article I, paragraph 7: “Nothing obtained in violation hereof shall be received into evidence.” In effect, it was proposed that the exclusionary rule be made an express constitutional right. The delegates defeated the proposed amendment by a final vote of 46 to 25. See 1 Convention Proceedings Record 598-608 (August 19, 1947).
The debate leading to the defeat of the amendment included discussion of both the merits of the federal exclusionary rule and the propriety of incorporating such a rule into the constitutional guarantee. The Court in Eleuteri v. Rickman, supra, summarized the Convention proceedings:
The issue was debated, with specific reference to the merits of the federal rule. One delegate added that in any event he questioned the advisability of incorporating an answer either way in organic law. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 46 to 25. 1 Convention Proceedings Record, 598, 608. We do not infer that the delegates intended thereby to embed our case law, but it is equally clear the the rule of exclusion is not the unmistakable wake of the constitutional provision. [26 N.J. at 511]
*170It may be, as the Court in Eleuteri acknowledged, that the defeat of the exclusionary-rule amendment at the Constitutional Convention left the rule amenable to judicial treatment and development, perhaps even to the point of someday recognizing it as a standard of constitutional dimension. It seems equally clear, however, that our case-law has not brought us to this point. The rule remains, as it has always been, a judicial remedy. Though the rule has achieved broadened scope and application, it is designed to protect the central constitutional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by deterring unlawful official conduct that otherwise undermines this constitutional right. It is thus fair to conclude that (1) the exclusionary rule is expressly not a part of the New Jersey Constitution and (2) the decisional law does not by express holdings or clear implication furnish a basis for determining that the exclusionary rule has become an integral part of the State Constitution.3
C.
The Court offers no reason why the judicially-fashioned exclusionary rule cannot satisfactorily be regarded as a common-law principle and remain fully efficacious in vindicating the underlying constitutional right. Indeed, rights and interests that are vital to the individual have been anchored firmly in our common law. E.g. State v. Hartley, supra, 103 N.J. 252 (privilege against self-incrimination). It therefore seems to me unwise — because unnecessary — for this Court to metamorphose an ancillary rule such as the exclusionary rule from a common-law doctrine into a constitutional right. To do so forever blocks *171any future development of the rule and effectively forecloses the possibility of alternative approaches that might serve to enforce the basic constitutional right.4
Moreover, permitting the exclusionary rule to be incorporated into our Constitution effectively prevents the other branches of government from exercising their own responsibility to protect a citizen’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For at least a generation we have, until today, expressed confidence in the role of the other branches of government with respect to the citizen’s constitutional right to be secure against unlawful searches and seizures. Compare Eleuteri v. Rickman, supra, 26 N.J. at 514-16 (“The judiciary, of course, is not the sole guardian of the Constitution. The executive branch is equally sworn to uphold it.”) with Delguidice v. New Jersey Racing Com’n, supra, 100 N.J. at 92 (“There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly the duty of executive and legislative branches. We find ourselves at that point in this case.”) We would be remiss if we failed to comprehend that the other branches of government have direct responsibilities with respect to the effective enforce*172ment of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The majority itself stresses the constructive measures taken by the Attorney General and other law enforcement authorities to adopt procedures to assure the reasonableness of searches and seizures. Ante at 150-151. It also quite aptly acknowledges the Legislature, which specifically incorporated the exclusionary rule into its enactment of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-1 to -26.5 In providing for a statutory rule of exclusion, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21, the Legislature specifically recognized the availability of supplementary forms of relief and, significantly, provided that an officer’s good faith reliance on a court order authorizing the interception constitutes a defense to any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding instituted against the officer, N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-25, but does not avoid the suppression of evidence derived from an improper interception. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21. In State v. Molinaro, 117 N.J.Super. 276 (Essex Cty.Ct.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 122 N.J.Super. 181 (App.Div.1973), the court noted that: “In the adoption of the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, the New Jersey Legislature attempted to be scrupulous about the protections which it fashioned for individual privacy.” Id. at 287. The court then held:
Where evidence has been seized unlawfully, suppression of that evidence at trial ordinarily follows. This doctrine of suppression is a court-authored remedy. Where, however, evidence stems from an unlawful wiretap, suppression of such evidence is the remedy selected specifically by the Legislature. Id. at 294. (citations omitted).
The court also stated:
Arguably, the judiciary in a different setting could abandon or modify the exclusionary doctrine since this rule originated with the courts. It has been *173suggested, however, that it is also within the power of a legislative body to adopt or negate a rule of suppression. With respect to evidence derived from an unlawful electronic surveillance, the New Jersey Legislature by N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21 has instituted such a rule. Id. at 295, 284 A.2d 385. (citations omitted).6
The Wiretapping Act instructs us that when a threatened privacy interest is deemed sufficiently important, the Legislature will not hesitate to devise effective remedies, including the exclusionary rule, to protect this interest.
The “bottom line” for the majority seems to be its despair that there can ever be any effective alternative to the exclusionary rule and, therefore, we might as well give it permanency. It is certainly fair to observe that existing alternatives to the exclusionary rule are largely inadequate. Eg. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (An individual whose fourth amendment rights have been violated by a state law enforcement official has a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (A cause of action for damages arises under the fourth amendment itself when its provisions are violated by federal officials). Nevertheless, this Court need not, and should not, itself end the search for effective solutions. The debate over possible alternatives to the exclusionary rule has gone on for a long time, and has taken on an increased vigor since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. Chief Justice Burger has suggested a comprehensive remedy in his dissent in Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 422-23, 91 S.Ct. at 2017-18, 29 L.Ed. at 642. This proposal is similar to those that have been suggested from time to time by legal commentators. See, e.g., Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: *174A Case Study in Judicial Usurpation, 34 Drake L.Rev. 33 (1984-85);7 Berner, Fourth-Amendment Enforcement Models: Analysis and Proposal, 16 Val.U.L.Rev. 215 (1981); Wilkey, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment by Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 95 F.R.D. 211 (1982). I would leave to the sound judgment of the Legislature and the Executive whether there can be developed other ways to preserve the constitutional right of citizens to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. Of course, this Court reserves the power to pass upon the constitutionality of any action undertaken by the other branches of government. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Tp. in Somerset Cty., 103 N.J. 1 (1986). In the meantime, I continue to believe strongly in the significance of the exclusionary rule in serving the constitutional right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and would not hesitate to recognize and apply the exclusionary rule to this end as a matter of state common law.
IY.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

 it is noteworthy that, in terms of the fourth amendment, since Mapp the scope of the exclusionary rule has steadily shrunk. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75, 89 S.Ct. 961, 967, 22 L.Ed.2d 176, 187 (1969) (defendants whose fourth-amendment rights had not been violated did not have standing to object to evidence obtained in violation of the rights of others; application of the exclusionary rule should depend on a cost-benefit analysis); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351, 94 S.Ct. 613, 621, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 573 (1984) (grand-jury witness could not invoke the rule to refuse to answer *167questions based on evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant; the purpose of the rule "is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim [but rather] to deter future unlawful police conduct.”).

 The text of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution are nearly identical. Neither contains any reference to the exclusionary rule.

 We can appropriately consider the exclusionary rule to have become a part of what one commentator labels the "constitutional common law,” “a substructure of substantive, procedural and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions [, rules that are] ... subject to amendment, modification or even reversal by [the legislature].” Monaghan, "Forward: Constitutional Common Law,” 89 Harv.L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1975).

 Paradoxically, the majority professes a willingness to "evaluate carefully” any legislative attempt to develop remedies to preserve the constitutional right. This may imply that if the Legislature ultimately develops a suitable and effective alternative to the exclusionary rule, then this Court has the power to modify or even abandon the rule that it now claims is "constitutional.” Ante at 157, n. 39. This proposition undermines, if it does not directly contradict, the view that the exclusionary rule has attained the permanence of a constitutional right. The majority, in effect, recognizes the intrinsic nature of the exclusionary rule as a court-crafted remedy designed to deter improper official conduct, and impliedly acknowledges that the remedy can expand or contract in light of changing perceptions of the kind of conduct to which it should be applied. These considerations, I suggest, support the proposition that the exclusionary rule, while it serves a constitutional right, itself is not a constitutional right, but a common-law doctrine, which is always amenable to change and subject to legislative and executive attention.

 That statute expressly provides for suppression of evidence derived from any intercepted wire or oral communication if the interception was unauthorized or inconsistent with the statute, or if the order of authorization was insufficient. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-21.

 This position was substantially affirmed in State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418 (1981), in which the Court stressed that the Legislature has enacted a strict remedy for failure on the part of police officers to minimize the scope of a wiretap — the exclusionary rule. Catania further overruled the earlier case of State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518 (1972), which had determined that the legislative exclusionary rule should be given a narrow rather than broad interpretation.

 The common thread supporting these proposals is that "[t]he task of overseeing and remedying Bill of Rights violations ultimately is a legislative one, and no legal obstacle exists today to prevent the rule’s legislative repeal or modification.” Gangi, The Exclusionary Rule: A Case Study in Judicial Usurpation, supra, 34 Drake L.Rev. at 35.