Court Opinion

ID: 9473209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:23:01.207672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:23.439166
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that the district court’s award for pain and suffering should be affirmed. I do not agree, however, with the disposition of Mr. Leeper’s claim for lost wages in Part II of the majority opinion. As I have previously stated, I have some doubts about the applicability of the collateral source rule to the type of situation presented in this appeal. See Titchnell v. United States, 681 F.2d 165, 176 n. 9 (3d Cir.1982). Nevertheless, I am bound by the prior decisions of our Court in this regard. See id. at 165; Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.1978).
Even if the collateral source rule is binding on us, however, I do not believe that the majority has applied it properly in this case. Under Pennsylvania law, “the victim of a tort is entitled to the damages caused by the tortfeasor’s negligence regardless of compensation the victim receives from [collateral] sources.” Denardo v. Carne-val, 297 Pa.Super. 484, 444 A.2d 135, 140 (1982). The purpose of the collateral source rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping the full cost of the injury he has caused or from benefitting from protection procured by the victim through his or her own efforts. The rationale is not to provide a windfall to the victim, even though it might appear that in some cases application of the rule has that effect. If a court must choose between giving a potential benefit either to the victim or the tort-feasor, the former should probably receive the benefit. However, if there is an alternative remedy which makes the victim whole without granting an unnecessary windfall to either party, such a remedy should be employed.1 This would seem particularly so when the taxpayers must bear the burden of such a windfall.
Mr. Leeper complains that because of the government’s alleged negligence he was required to utilize eight months of accumulated sick leave that he otherwise would have retained. This expenditure of sick leave potentially prejudiced Mr. Leeper in two ways: (1) it diminished his pension benefits because the lost sick leave otherwise would have been added to his length of service upon retirement; and (2) it curtailed his accumulated sick leave which he might require for a future illness. The district court did provide compensation for the diminution in Mr. Leeper’s pension ben*309efits. Although I have no quarrel with awarding plaintiff some form of compensation for this loss, as will be discussed infra. I believe there is a better way than a present cash award to ensure that Mr. Leeper will receive full credit for his accumulated sick leave.
With regard to the second component of Mr. Leeper’s potential loss — the use of the sick leave in case of future illness — the majority will award plaintiff $13,155.64 for “past lost earnings.” It is true that but for the government’s alleged negligence, Mr. Leeper would have had an additional increment of accumulated sick leave should he need it. But any such loss is speculative. Should Mr. Leeper have no occasion to use the eight months of sick leave in the future — for example if he is not ill or if he leaves the service — he will suffer no harm in this regard.
I believe that it is inappropriate to give Mr. Leeper what may very well be a windfall of over $13,000 — the value of the sick leave utilized — when there is an alternative remedy that would completely compensate plaintiff for his potential loss without giving him a possible bonanza: the government should be required to reinstate Mr. Leeper’s accumulated sick leave hours.2 Thus should Mr. Leeper need the sick leave in the future, it would be available, thereby preventing the government from benefit-ting from its allegedly tortious act. And if Mr. Leeper never needs the sick days, he will not have received a $13,000 gratuitous payment. Reinstating plaintiff’s sick leave hours would also obviate the need to reimburse him at this time for any diminution in pension benefits. Upon retirement, plaintiff would receive full credit in terms of increased length of service for the sick leave hours that were not subsequently utilized. A rule of damages to be effective must give true expression to the realities of the dispute.
Because the majority is awarding a remedy that might very well give plaintiff a windfall whereas there is an alternative remedy that completely compensates him without unduly prejudicing or benefitting either party. I respectfully dissent from this portion of the judgment. Instead, I would vacate and remand with an order to the district court to reinstate Mr. Leeper’s accumulated sick leave in lieu of any present cash award for its loss.3 A court must remain aware of the purpose behind a rule in order to avoid applying it mechanistically and thereby yielding an unintended result. In view of this, I do not believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would approve the remedy fashioned by the majority-

. The majority has not cited, and I have not found, any Pennsylvania case which holds that given the choice between a remedy which makes the plaintiff whole and another remedy which potentially gives the plaintiff more than is necessary to compensate him fully, the latter is preferable.

. I am assuming that the postal service and the federal government are the same entity. See 39 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). If the tortfeasor and the employer were separate entities, the suggested remedy would not be appropriate.

. It is not dispositive that neither party has specifically requested the type remedy that I have suggested. Once a proper request for relief is made, the district court has a duty to grant the relief to which a party is entitled, regardless of whether the party specifically requested the particular type or amount of relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir.1980); Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1293-94 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 679, 62 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); see generally 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2662, 2664 (2d ed. 1983). Moreover, an appellate court has the power to order a district court to grant appropriate relief even if not specifically requested. See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 & n. 5 (3d Cir.1980) (appellate court remanding for district court to conduct an accounting although plaintiff did not request one). A remedy not specifically requested is quite different from deciding an issue not properly before the court. The former is appropriate and, as suggested in Lentino v. Fringe Employee Plans, Inc., 611 F.2d 474, 483 (3d Cir.1979) (Adams, J., concurring), the latter may not be.