Court Opinion

ID: 9590567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:56:06.293393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:28.530456
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
If, as former Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court has said, “errors are the insects in the world of law . . .,” where such errors are harmful, appellate courts must be the exterminators. Although it is a bit embarrassing to extinguish a fire of your own making, it is appropriate to do so when one is wiser today than yesterday. Accordingly, we should bid adieu to Staton v. State, 219 Ga. App. 316 (464 SE2d 888) (1995).
After further consideration of Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995), I concur with the majority’s opinion but write separately regarding Division 1 to address the majority’s distinction between premature notices of appeal and late notices of appeal. In my opinion, Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308, 310-311 (1) (215 SE2d 676) (1975), mandates this holding, and, therefore, I concur in the majority’s opinion. However, I am not convinced that Rowland did not implicitly overrule Gillen.
*573Decided May 29, 1996.
Rowland, presented the Supreme Court with only the issue of notices of appeal filed after the expiration of the statutory period. The Supreme Court did not specifically address the issue of premature appeals or mention Gillen. Hence, our use oí Rowland to dismiss the premature appeal in Staton v. State, supra at 317, may itself have been premature. While Rowland did not address the issue before us and did not overrule the line of cases following Gillen, I still believe that the Court’s rationale in Rowland should apply to premature notices of appeal.
In Rowland, the Supreme Court held that our practice of ruling on late-filed appeals, while laudable, “requires the appellate court to ignore jurisdictional and procedural statutes and rules.” 264 Ga. at 874. Its observation surely applies to our granting of appeals that have been filed prematurely. Moreover, whether the appeal is filed prematurely or after the 30-day period for appeal has expired, a criminal appellant still will be entitled to an out-of-time appeal. If the case ultimately is dismissed for failure to file the notice of appeal within the statutory 30-day period, there is no reason a party cannot request an out-of-time appeal even if that party was dismissed because he filed the appeal too early rather than too late. “Since an out-of-time appeal is the remedy for a frustrated right of appeal, we may dismiss an appeal of right for failure to follow appellate procedural prerequisites. [Cit.]” Id. at 875. Thus, to the extent that our consideration of premature notices of appeal has its basis in the due process and fairness concerns which Rowland holds need not be considered, we should reconsider our rulings in this line of cases.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that premature notices of appeal are “not jurisdictionally defective but only procedurally irregular.” If the notice of appeal does not comply with OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), it is defective. Period. It is not the Court’s job to decide that one failure to comply is a defect and another is merely an irregularity. Moreover, if there is to be an exception to the statute, the legislature should create the exception rather than this Court.
Nevertheless, because Rowland did not address the issue of premature appeals and because Rowland did not overrule that line of cases following Gillen, I believe this Court is compelled to follow the rule in Gillen until the Supreme Court has an opportunity to address the issue before us.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this special concurrence.
*574Debra G. Gomez, for appellant (case no. A96A0679).
Janet S. Willy, for appellant (case no. A96A1256).
Charles H. Weston, District Attorney, Robin O. Flanders, Laura D. Hogue, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee (case no. A96A0679).
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, John A. Pursley, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee (case no. A96A1256).