Court Opinion

ID: 9444464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:01:50.88896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:52.868832
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I find myself in substantial agreement with the views of the majority on the effect of the State Statutes of Limitation and with the general discussion of the principles of res judicata as the majority opinion states them. I find myself in agreement, too, with the view of the majority that, as to actions for monthly benefit installments accruing after the institution of the first action, the judgment in that action furnishes no defense, and if I could agree that the action in this case was an action for such monthly benefits, I could agree with the conclusion of the majority that the judgment in the first action was not res judi-cata.
With the premise on which the conclusion of the majority rests, I cannot, however, agree. For I think it quite plain that while the complaint does recite that under the terms of the policy there is now due and owing to him the sum of $14,200, it does not sue, nor ask judgment, for this sum. On the contrary, this complaint, as the complaint in the former action did, alleges and sues for an anticipatory breach of the policy and a lump sum of $53,920.00 due for the whole period of his life, based on his expectancy. Moreover, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not urge or claim, he does not in his specifications of error or in his brief urge or even claim, what the majority opinion holds, that he was entitled to recover the accrued installments.
*300The record standing thus, I cannot agree with the view of the majority that this court should or can treat the suit as one for the recovery of accrued installments instead of, as plaintiff has all along in both suits declared it to be, one for the recovery of a lump sum due for the anticipatory breach of the policy.
It is not exactly clear to me from the opinion of the majority what part in the result arrived at is played by the fact that plaintiff got a verdict on special issues for, though the verdict is set out in full and afterward referred to, it is not claimed, as it could not be,1 that the verdict itself has survived the judgment for any purpose as evidence, or estoppel, or otherwise.
I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the judgment.

. 30 Am.Jur., p. 938, “Judgments”, Sec. 196; Smith V. Smith, 235 Minn. 412, 51 N.W.2d 276, 32 A.L.R.2d 1135; Smith v. McCool, 16 Wall. 560, at page 561, 21 L.Ed. 324, where it is said:
“A verdict without a judgment in a case like this is of no validity, either as an es-toppel or as evidence. To give efficacy to a verdict, general or special, it must be followed by a judgment, and when offered to establish any fact, such fact must have constituted, in whole or in part, the foundation of the judgment which was rendered. Greenleaf says: ‘It is only where the point in issue has been determined that the judgment is a bar. If the suit has been discontinued, or the plaintiff becomes nonsuit, or for any other reason there has been no judgment of the court upon the matter in issue, the proceedings are not conclusive.’ The matter must have become res judicata.”