Court Opinion

ID: 9496753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:34:44.739614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:46.995121
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Daniel P. Kiely is not estopped by his allegedly inconsistent positions from pursuing his disability-discrimination claim. But I disagree with the majority’s decision not to undertake an evaluation of the record to determine whether this case presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding Kiely’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of his job.
Based upon the record before us, I am convinced that we would have vacated the grant of summary judgment even if the district court had ruled against Kiely on the merits. Heartland, after all, was aware of Kiely’s statutory blindness at the time of his hire and considered him qualified. Furthermore, the four formal evaluations of Kiely’s job performance covering the duration of his employment at Heartland rated him as either “average” or “definitely above average.” Finally, Kiely testified in his deposition that he had no difficulty transporting patients within the facility, that he was able to treat patients in their rooms, that he had no trouble negotiating hallways, and that he would not need any additional accommodations if he were to be reinstated at Heartland. This evidence seems more than sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Griffith, v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 383-84 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact was created by the plaintiffs “proof that he had performed the sales associate job for approximately two years and had received favorable evaluations”).
Permitting the district court to entertain a second motion for summary judgment under these circumstances will serve only to delay the trial that this case ultimately merits. See Salazar-Paucar v. I.N.S., 281 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir.2002) (“[W]e generally do not remand when on the record before us, it is clear that we would be compelled to reverse [the BIA’s] decision if it had decided the matter against the applicant.”) (quotation marks omitted). So although I would normally agree with the majority’s proposition that we should give the district court the first crack at evaluating the underlying merits of a claim, I believe that to do so here would be counterproductive in light of a record clearly showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Kiely’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of his job.
*392■ I would therefore vacate the order granting Heartland’s motion for summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.