Court Opinion

ID: 9367124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 01:00:25.048359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.911003
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30213        Document: 00516628138             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/30/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                              January 30, 2023
                                       No. 22-30213                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   Carmen McCleery, individually and as executrix of the
   Succession of Donald T. McCleery, Sr.,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Melanie McCleery Speed; Donald Thomas McCleery,
   Jr.; State Farm Insurance Company; Hartford Life &
   Accident Insurance Company,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 1:20-CV-1187

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         This appeal arises from a dispute over the proceeds of three life
   insurance policies purchased by Donald T. McCleery, Sr. (“decedent”).
   Carmen McCleery (“McCleery”), the decedent’s wife, claims that the
   decedent promised her that she would be the sole beneficiary of the policies.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30213        Document: 00516628138              Page: 2      Date Filed: 01/30/2023

                                         No. 22-30213

   Upon discovering that he also named his children from a previous marriage—
   Melanie McCleery Speed (“Speed”) and Donald Thomas McCleery, Jr.
   (“Donald”)—as beneficiaries, she filed suit in federal court. She now
   appeals two rulings by the district court: a partial grant of a motion to dismiss;
   and a grant of a motion for summary judgment for Speed and Donald. For
   the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
                        I.    Factual & Procedural Background
           Before his death, the decedent purchased three life insurance policies:
   one policy with Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company
   (“Hartford”) and two policies with State Farm Insurance Company (“State
   Farm”). Per McCleery, the decedent repeatedly promised her that he would
   make her the sole beneficiary of these policies.
           First, McCleery alleges that, in anticipation of their marriage, the
   decedent promised her the proceeds from the aforementioned policies in
   exchange for her agreement to enter into a separate property agreement.
   McCleery agreed to this exchange. Second, McCleery alleges that during
   their marriage, the decedent again promised her the proceeds from his life
   insurance policies in exchange for financial assistance. McCleery again
   obliged. Consistent with this agreement, she avers she made various loans
   and donations to the decedent over the course of their marriage. 1
           Despite these promises, the decedent redesignated the beneficiaries
   of his life insurance policies several times but never designated McCleery as
   the sole beneficiary. Rather, it is undisputed that at the time of his death, the
   beneficiaries of the policies were as follows: (1) Speed and Donald under one

           1
            For instance, she alleges that she provided loans to the decedent to help him with
   gambling debts and other financial obligations, donated two vehicles to him, and agreed to
   refinance her home to help him secure a loan.

                                               2
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                                          No. 22-30213

   State Farm policy; (2) Speed, Donald, and McCleery under the second State
   Farm policy; and (3) Speed and Donald under the Hartford policy. After the
   decedent passed away in March 2020, State Farm paid the proceeds of its
   two policies consistent with these designations. 2
           McCleery subsequently sued Speed, Donald, State Farm, and
   Hartford in federal court. She submitted claims of detrimental reliance,
   unjust enrichment, undue influence, and fraud.
           Speed and Donald moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion as to McCleery’s
   detrimental reliance claim based on its conclusion that (1) the decedent’s
   estate was an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   19(a); (2) McCleery had failed to join the estate; and (3) joinder of the estate
   would destroy complete diversity. However, the district court denied the
   motion as to McCleery’s unjust enrichment and undue influence claims. 3
           Following discovery, Speed and Donald moved for summary
   judgment. The district court granted their motion and also held, sua sponte,
   that State Farm and Hartford were entitled to summary judgment for the
   same reasons; as a result, the district court dismissed McCleery’s remaining
   claims.     McCleery timely appealed the final judgment and expressly
   referenced the partial grant of the motion to dismiss.

           2
             State Farm did not receive notice regarding a dispute over the proceeds of these
   policies until after it issued payments.
           3
             Separately, the district court granted in part a motion for relief in interpleader
   filed by Hartford, ordering Hartford to deposit the proceeds of the decedent’s Hartford
   policy and applicable claim interest with the Clerk of Court and dismissing Hartford from
   this case. Because McCleery does not appeal Hartford’s dismissal, we do not address it
   here.

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                                    No. 22-30213

                             II.   Standard of Review
          We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
   under Rule 12(b)(6). Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007).
   We accept “the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint” as true and
   draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Causey v. Sewell
   Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004), though “[w]e do
   not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or
   legal conclusions,” Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005).
   To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint “must provide the plaintiff’s
   grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when
   assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”
   Cuvillier, 503 F.3d at 401 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
   555 (2007)). We may affirm “on any grounds raised below and supported by
   the record.” Id.
          We also review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for
   summary judgment. Kerstetter v. Pac. Sci. Co., 210 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir.
   2000). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that
   there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue
   of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
   return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864
   F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). We view the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. “We may affirm
   a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is
   different from that relied on by the district court.” Holtzclaw v. DSC
   Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Separately, we review a district court’s determination that a party is
   indispensable under Rule 19 for abuse of discretion. See Moss v. Princip, 913

                                          4
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                                        No. 22-30213

   F.3d 508, 513–14 (5th Cir. 2019). Whether an entity is an indispensable party
   is “a highly-practical, fact-based endeavor.” Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of
   Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 628 (5th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen an initial appraisal of
   the facts indicates that a possibly necessary party is absent, the burden of
   disputing this initial appraisal falls on the party who opposes joinder.”
   Pulitzer-Polster v. Pulitzer, 784 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1986).
                                 III.      Discussion
   A.     Detrimental Reliance
          McCleery first appeals the dismissal of her detrimental reliance claim.
   The doctrine of detrimental reliance is “designed to prevent injustice by
   barring a party from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions,
   representations, or silence,” and generally applies where there is no written
   or enforceable contract between parties. Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver
   LLC v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 376 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (quotation omitted). To prove detrimental reliance, a party must show “(1) a
   representation by conduct or word, (2) justifiable reliance on the
   representation, and (3) a change in position to the plaintiff’s detriment as a
   result of the reliance.” Id.; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1967. We note that
   “Louisiana does not favor recovery under a detrimental-reliance theory.”
   Koerner v. CMR Constr. & Roofing, L.L.C., 910 F.3d 221, 232 (5th Cir. 2018).
   We, alongside the Louisiana Supreme Court, have also observed that
   detrimental reliance claims are generally limited to situations in which a
   promisor makes a promise to a promisee. See In re Ark-La-Tex Timber Co., Inc.,
   482 F.3d 319, 334 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing the requirements for
   detrimental reliance, including that the representation is made by a promisor
   to a promisee); Suire v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 907 So. 2d 37, 59
   (La. 2005) (same).

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                                     No. 22-30213

          Here, McCleery’s detrimental reliance theory is that the decedent
   promised her that she would be the sole beneficiary of his life insurance
   policies. But notably, McCleery did not name the decedent’s estate as a
   defendant.      McCleery cited Louisiana cases involving third-party
   beneficiaries to support her contention that she did not need to sue the
   promisor (here, because he is a decedent, his estate). See, e.g., McKee v.
   Southfield Sch., 613 So. 2d 659, 662–63 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a
   detrimental reliance claim by a student against a school that implicitly
   promised the student’s father that it would provide the student with credit).
   However, those cases involve suing the promisor, not ignoring him (or it). In
   other words, while McKee demonstrates that a third party can sue for
   detrimental reliance against a promisor that fails to uphold a promise in
   certain situations, these cases do not say the promisor need not be joined. See
   Stokes v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 894 F.2d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining, for
   detrimental reliance purposes, that it is “the defendant [that] ma[kes] a
   representation” upon which the plaintiff relies (emphasis added)).
          As the district court accordingly concluded, and McCleery does not
   dispute, the promisor—the decedent’s estate—was indispensable to
   McCleery’s claim. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion
   in determining that the decedent’s estate is an indispensable party to this
   litigation in light of the nature of McCleery’s claim. Pulitzer-Polster, 784 F.2d
   at 1309. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in
   dismissing McCleery’s detrimental reliance claim.

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                                        No. 22-30213

   B.      Fraud & Undue Influence
           Next, we consider McCleery’s fraud and undue influence claims.
   McCleery asserts that the decedent fraudulently changed the beneficiaries of
   the Hartford and State Farm policies and that Speed and Donald unduly
   influenced him to do so.
           Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1953, to demonstrate fraud,
   plaintiffs must show defendants (1) made a “misrepresentation” or
   “suppress[ed] . . . the truth,” (2) “with the intention either to obtain an
   unjust advantage” or “cause a loss or inconvenience.” Undue influence,
   meanwhile, is found under Louisiana law where a person’s influence so
   greatly affects another person that they effectively substitute their will for
   that of the other person. La. Civ. Code art. 1479; see also Succession of
   Conville v. Bank One, La., N.A., 920 So. 2d 397, 401–02 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
           Additionally, to establish fraud and undue influence as to change of
   beneficiary forms, a plaintiff must submit “specific facts that [the decedent]
   was misled or deceived by [the defendant] about the substance or
   consequences of changing the beneficiary of his policies.” Am. Gen. Life Ins.
   Co. v. Wilkes, 290 F. App’x 688, 691 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); 4 see also
   Colonial Oaks Assisted Living Lafayette, LLC v. Hannie Dev., Inc., 972 F.3d
   684, 689 (5th Cir. 2020).
           But McCleery fails entirely to “set forth any specific facts” that the
   decedent was misled or deceived by either Speed or Donald. See Wilkes, 290
   F. App’x at 691. The majority of her arguments revolve around alleged
   misconduct by the decedent, but, as noted above, the decedent’s estate is not

           4
            Although Wilkes “is not controlling precedent,” it “may be [cited as] persuasive
   authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 5th Cir. R.
   47.5.4).

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                                          No. 22-30213

   a party to this case. Moreover, McCleery’s factual allegations at most
   indicate that (1) Speed and Donald were aware of potential opportunities to
   influence the decedent and had incentive to do so, and (2) the decedent’s
   redesignation of the policies’ beneficiaries and Speed and Donald’s
   inconsistent statements about their communications with the decedent
   together suggest that they influenced him. Of course, Speed and Donald were
   the decedent’s children, so their desire to receive money upon their father’s
   passing is nothing surprising. In any event, McCleery’s claims that the
   decedent’s children hanging around him demonstrates fraud are speculative
   factual allegations that are insufficient. McCleery also failed to submit any
   evidence indicating that Speed or Donald unduly influenced the decedent
   through “[p]hysical coercion[,] . . . duress,” or by “creating resentment
   toward a natural object of [the decedent’s] bounty by false statements.” La.
   Civ. Code art. 1479, cmt. (b). Therefore, we conclude that the district
   court properly granted Speed and Donald’s motion for summary judgment
   as to McCleery’s fraud and undue influence claims.
   C.     Unjust Enrichment
          Finally, we turn to McCleery’s unjust enrichment claim. Under
   Louisiana Civil Code Article 2298, “[a] person who has been enriched
   without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that
   person.”       The term “without cause” “exclude[s] cases in which the
   enrichment results from a valid juridical act or the law.” Id. (emphasis
   added). 5

          5
              There are five required elements for unjust enrichment under Louisiana law:
          (1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there must be an impoverishment, (3) there
          must be a connection between the enrichment and resulting impoverishment,
          (4) there must be an absence of “justification” or “cause” for the enrichment and

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                                         No. 22-30213

            McCleery argues that neither the insurance policies nor the
   beneficiary redesignations could count as valid juridical acts under Article
   2298 because she, Speed, and Donald were not parties to them. However,
   the Louisiana Supreme Court has made clear that “individual policies of
   insurance” are juridical acts, Ross v. Ross, 857 So. 2d 384, 391 (La. 2003), and
   “juridical acts” include both “contract[s]” and “unilateral act[s]” that are
   “intended to have legal consequences,” La. Civ. Code art. 395, cmt. (b).
            McCleery further contends that, regardless, the validity of these
   “juridical acts” is called into question by the decedent’s allegedly fraudulent
   conduct. However, as discussed above, McCleery did not present sufficient
   “specific facts” to establish her fraud or undue influence claims. Wilkes, 290
   F. App’x at 691.
            Therefore, we agree with the district court’s determination that the
   decedent’s change of beneficiary forms constituted valid juridical acts. See
   T. L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 847 (La. 1975) (noting that
   “the proceeds of life insurance, if payable to a named beneficiary other than
   the estate of the insured, . . . pass by virtue of the contractual agreement
   between the insured and the insurer to the named beneficiary”). Because
   “the enrichment” of Speed and Donald “result[ed] from [these] valid
   juridical act[s],” McCleery’s unjust enrichment claim also fails. La. Civ.
   Code art. 2298; see Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver LLC, 376 F.3d at
   407. 6

            impoverishment, and finally (5) the action will only be allowed when there is no
            other remedy at law, i.e., the action is subsidiary or corrective in nature.
   Drs. Bethea, Moustoukas & Weaver LLC, 376 F.3d at 407 (quoting Minyard v. Curtis Prods.,
   Inc., 205 So. 2d 422, 432 (La. 1967)).
            6
            McCleery submitted a new theory of recovery for why the court should reform
   the insurance policies in her response to Speed and Donald’s motion for summary

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                                            No. 22-30213

                                      IV.      Conclusion
           Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM. 7

   judgment. Because this claim was raised in McCleery’s response to Speed and Donald’s
   motion for summary judgment, rather than her own complaint, it is not properly before us,
   and, accordingly, we do not consider it. Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429
   F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005).
           7
              McCleery did not independently appeal anything related to State Farm, so any
   such arguments are forfeited. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 179 (5th Cir. 2000)
   (declining to consider arguments that were not raised in opening briefs). Because the
   district court granted summary judgment to State Farm on the same basis as the individual
   defendants and the individual defendants prevail, State Farm prevails as well.

                                                10