Court Opinion

ID: 2964155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:27.008988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:51.799929
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2234

                                   ALEXANDER KATZ,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 CITY METAL CO.,INC.,
                                VERDIG DEUTCHE NICKLE,
                            AMERICA, INC., MILTON WILCOX,
                                   AND PETER BRUNO,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge. 
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Robert E. Savage for appellant.
            ________________
            Michael P.  DeFanti, with  whom Hinckley,  Allen &  Snyder was  on
            ___________________             __________________________
        brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     July 2, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.   Plaintiff/Appellant
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            Alexander   Katz   ("Katz")   sued   his   former   employer,

            Defendant/Appellee  City   Metal  Co.  ("City   Metal"),  its

            President  Milton Wilcox  ("Wilcox") and its  Chief Executive

            Officer  Peter Bruno  ("Bruno"),  under  the  Americans  with

            Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.    12101 et seq.  (1995) ("ADA"),
                                                 __ ____

            and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen.

            Laws     28-5-1  et seq.  (1995),  claiming that  City  Metal
                             __ ____

            unlawfully  discriminated  against  him  by  discharging  him

            because of a disability.  See 42 U.S.C.   12112(a); R.I. Gen.
                                      ___

            Laws     28-5-6,  5-7.   At  the close  of  Katz's case,  the

            district court granted City Metal's  motion for judgment as a

            matter of law pursuant  to Fed. R. Civ. P.  50(a)(1), finding

            that Katz had not presented  evidence sufficient to show that

            he  had a  "disability"  as defined  under  the ADA.1    Katz

            appeals.  We reverse and remand for a new trial.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      City  Metal is  a corporation  that buys  and sells

            scrap metal, employing more than fifteen employees.  Katz was

            hired by City Metal on July  1, 1991.  On September 27, 1992,

            he  suffered  a  heart  attack.    Five  weeks  later, Wilcox

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Because  the  definition  of "handicap"  under  the Rhode
            Island law is substantially identical to the ADA's definition
            of "disability," we will not separately address the state law
            claim.  Compare 42 U.S.C.   12102(2) with R.I. Gen. Law   28-
                    _______                      ____
            5-6(9).

                                         -2-
                                          2

            telephoned Katz  and told him his  employment was terminated.

            This  lawsuit followed, and ended at the close of Katz's case

            in a judgment as a matter of law for City Metal.

                      "We  review the  grant of a  Rule 50(a)  motion for

            judgment as a matter of law de novo, under the same standards
                                        __ ____

            as the district court."  Andrade v. Jamestown  Housing Auth.,
                                     ___________________________________

            82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir. 1996).  Accordingly, we "examine

            the  evidence  and  all  fair inferences  in  the  light most

            favorable  to  the  plaintiff  [and]  may  not  consider  the

            credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony,  or

            evaluate the weight  of the evidence."  Richmond  Steel, Inc.
                                                    _____________________

            v. Puerto Rican American Ins. Co., 954 F.2d 19,  22 (1st Cir.
            _________________________________

            1992) (internal  quotation marks and citations  omitted).  To

            warrant submission  of an  issue to  the jury,  the plaintiff

            must present "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence and may

            not  rely on conjecture or speculation.  Id.  "[T]he evidence
                                                     ___

            offered  must make the existence  of the fact  to be inferred

            more  probable than  its nonexistence."   Resare  v. Raytheon
                                                      ___________________

            Co.,  981  F.2d 32,  34 (1st  Cir. 1992)  (internal quotation
            ___

            marks  and citations omitted).   To affirm  the withdrawal of

            any claim  from the jury, we  must find that, as  a matter of

            law,  the record would permit a reasonable jury to reach only

            one conclusion as to that issue.  Richmond Steel, 954 F.2d at
                                              ______________

            22.  

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      With this standard in mind we rehearse the evidence

            adduced by Katz.  

                                 The Trial Testimony
                                 The Trial Testimony
                                 ___________________

                      Katz testified as follows.  City Metal hired him in

            July of 1991 as a scrap  metal salesman because of his  prior

            experience in the field.  He was assigned various territories

            which he serviced by traveling in a company car.   At the end

            of  1991,  Bruno asked  Katz to  take  an inside  position in

            customer relations as a  liaison between the company and  its

            customers.   Katz  accepted  and continued  in that  position

            until July  of 1992.   During that  time Katz also  helped to

            train  Wilcox, who was new to the business, and trained other

            salesmen.  In July of 1992, Katz, at his request, returned to

            being a salesman.  Up until  the time he was discharged, Katz

            did not  receive any negative  reports or comments  about the

            quality  of his performance and was not informed that his job

            was in jeopardy.

                      On Sunday,  September 27,  1992, while Katz  was in

            Cleveland  visiting his family, he had a heart attack and was

            taken by  ambulance  to the  Cleveland  Clinic.   During  his

            seven-day   stay  there,   Katz  underwent   two  angioplasty

            procedures  and  some  testing,   and  was  kept  in  cardiac

            intensive  care.   He  was discharged  from  the hospital  on

            Saturday,  October  3, 1991,  and  telephoned  Wilcox on  the

            following Monday to  explain the situation.  Wilcox then sent

                                         -4-
                                          4

            Katz  Rhode  Island temporary  disability  application forms.

            Katz submitted them and  received disability payments for six

            months, the maximum payable under Rhode Island law.

                      After his  discharge from  the  hospital, Katz  had

            great difficulty breathing, even  while sitting down, and was

            extremely limited in his ability to walk.  After a few steps,

            he became short  of breath and experienced chest pains, broke

            into  sweats and became nauseous.   It was  necessary that he

            keep stress to a minimum.  

                      Katz  went to  the company  office on  the Thursday

            afternoon following his hospital discharge for the purpose of

            discussing his  return to work.   Due to  the effects  of his

            heart attack, Katz was unable to walk to the company's office

            on  the second floor.   Wilcox therefore came  down to Katz's

            car, where the two had a conversation.  Katz asked  about his

            customers and told Wilcox he wanted to return to work as soon

            as  possible, even if it was initially in a limited capacity.

            Wilcox  told him not to  worry about his  customers, and that

            the main thing was for Katz to get well.

                      Katz  stayed in Rhode Island for about a week after

            his  conversation with  Wilcox.   The cold  weather, however,

            restricted his  breathing which,  in turn, made  walking even

            more difficult.   Since Wilcox  had told him  that his  first

            objective  should be to get well,  Katz decided to recuperate

            at his family's apartment in Miami, Florida.

                                         -5-
                                          5

                      On Friday, the last  working day of October, Wilcox

            telephoned  Katz and told him  that he was  discharged.  Katz

            called Wilcox the  following Monday and offered  to return to

            work on  a part-time basis with a  reduction in salary and to

            accept whatever accommodations the company would make.

                      At the time of  the trial in October of  1995, Katz

            still  had  some trouble  breathing  and  walking.    He  was

            working,  having obtained a job on February 17, 1995 (after a

            lengthy search  beginning in January of  1993), selling bonds

            for the State of Israel.

                      Katz also called Wilcox as a witness.  He testified

            that Katz's brother called to tell him about the heart attack

            two days after it occurred, and that he never questioned that

            Katz had a heart attack.  He testified that Katz looked tired

            when he  met him in  the parking lot,  and that he  told Katz

            that  his  main objective  should  be  to  recover.    Wilcox

            testified, however,  that  he had  decided  to fire  Katz  on

            September 4, 1992 (prior to the heart attack), for failing to

            submit  a weekly travel schedule as required, and that he had

            merely waited until  the end  of October to  so inform  Katz.

            Katz  also called Bruno as  a witness, who  testified that he

            was instrumental in  hiring Katz, but  was not familiar  with

            the circumstances of his termination.

                           The Judgment As A Matter Of Law
                           The Judgment As A Matter Of Law
                           _______________________________

                                         -6-
                                          6

                      After Katz, Wilcox, and Bruno had testified, Katz's

            attorney informed the court  that he had one more  witness --

            Katz's  treating physician  in Rhode  Island --  whom he  had

            subpoenaed for  the following day.  The  court recessed until

            the following  day, when  Katz's attorney informed  the court

            that the doctor had declined to appear in court until Friday,

            three  days  hence, and  requested  that he  be  permitted to

            present  the  doctor's   testimony  in  rebuttal  after   the

            defendants' case.  The  court stated that it would  deal with

            the  issue  when  it arose  and  was  not  sure the  doctor's

            testimony was "vital to the essence of your claim."  

                      When  asked to  state its  position on  the matter,

            City Metal stated that it had received Katz's medical records

            and that it did not dispute that Katz suffered a heart attack

            or that it  perceived that  he suffered a  heart attack,  but

            that it did  contest that Katz  was actually disabled  within

            the meaning of the ADA.  At that point, the court stated that

            Katz  could not  prove  that  he  was  disabled  without  the

            testimony of his  doctor, and Katz  again requested either  a

            continuance or  that the  doctor be permitted  to testify  in

            rebuttal.  The court denied those requests and Katz rested.

                      City Metal  then moved for judgment as  a matter of

            law,  arguing that in order  to prove a  disability under the

            ADA and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices  Act, Katz

            was  required  to  show   that  the  heart  attack  "severely

                                         -7-
                                          7

            restricted  a   basic  life  activity  on   a  permanent  and

            continuing  basis," and that he  had failed to  do so because

            there had been no medical testimony that Katz was permanently

            impaired  in a major life activity.  In response, Katz argued

            that his testimony established that the heart attack resulted

            in  hospitalization, and  impaired  his  ability to  breathe,

            walk, perform manual  tasks, care for  himself and work,  and

            that the evidence therefore met each of the three alternative

            definitions of the term "disability" under the ADA -- that he

            had a  physical impairment that substantially  limited one or

            more major life  activities, that he had a record  of such an

            impairment, and that  City Metal regarded him  as having such

            an impairment.  See 42 U.S.C.   12102(2).
                            ___

                      The district court ruled as follows:

                      The  question is  whether  it produced  a
                      permanent   disability   that  he   can't
                      perform  his work.   It's obvious  he's a
                      salesman, and  he's still selling. .  . .
                      In order for the Plaintiff to recover  in
                      this  case, the  Plaintiff  must  make  a
                      showing   that  he   has  some   type  of
                      permanent impairment, physical impairment
                      in   one  or   more   of   life's   major
                      activities.   There's been no  showing of
                      that in this case.

                      The  only  evidence  is  that  he  has  a
                      blocked  artery  that  was  opened  up by
                      balloon  angioplasty.  That does not show
                      that  he has  a  permanent disability  or
                      heart disease.  I know.  I've been there.
                      I had a heart attack.

                      People recover from heart attacks  and go
                      on with life's  functions.  I  know, I've
                      done  it, and  I had  an artery  that was

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      completely  blocked   and  not  reopened.
                      Because  I went  through a  rehab program
                      where I developed the collateral arteries
                      to take over the function of that artery,
                      now I  can perform.   I'm playing tennis.
                      I'm doing aerobic  exercises every  other
                      day.   I can  perform fully in  my life's
                      functions as a Judge, where there's a lot
                      more  stress  than some  other vocations.
                      So  I have  personal experience  in this.
                      Now a judge can't  put aside his personal
                      experiences in life in deciding cases.  

                      I  have decided it as a matter of law.  I
                      have  decided  the  Plaintiff  failed  to
                      prove  that he had a permanent disability
                      resulting from his heart attack.

                                         II.
                                         II.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                      The district  court erred in ruling  that there was

            insufficient evidence of disability within the meaning of the

            ADA.   We start with the words of the statute.  The Americans

            with  Disabilities Act  is  a federal  civil rights  statute,

            enacted  "to  provide  a  clear  and  comprehensive  national

            mandate   for  the  elimination   of  discrimination  against

            individuals with  disabilities."   42  U.S.C.    12101(b)(1).

            See also Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 671
            ___ ____ __________________________________

            (1st  Cir.  1995).    In  the  employment  context,  the  ADA

            prohibits a "covered entity" (defined as "a person engaged in

            an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees")

            from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual  with a

            disability because  of the  disability of such  individual in

            regard   to   job   application   procedures,   the   hiring,

                                         -9-
                                          9

            advancement,    or    discharge   of    employees,   employee

            compensation, job training, and other terms,  conditions, and

            privileges  of employment."  42 U.S.C.   12112(a).  To obtain

            relief under the  Act, a plaintiff  must prove three  things.

            First,  that he was disabled  within the meaning  of the Act.

            Second, that with or  without reasonable accommodation he was

            able  to perform  the essential  functions of  his job.   And

            third, that the employer  discharged him in whole or  in part

            because of his disability.2  

                      In light  of the district court's  ruling, we focus

            on the first  element --  "disability" -- as  defined in  the

            ADA:

                      The term "disability" means, with respect
                      to an individual -- 

                      (A)  a physical or mental impairment that
                      substantially limits  one or more  of the
                      major life activities of such individual;

                      (B) a record of such an impairment; or 

                      (C)  being  regarded  as having  such  an
                      impairment.

                                
            ____________________

            2.  A   plaintiff   may   indirectly   prove   that  he   was
            discriminated against  because of  a disability by  using the
            prima facie case and  burden shifting methods that originated
            _____ _____
            in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and
               ________________________________
            were  refined  and  sharpened  in Texas  Dep't  of  Community
                                              ___________________________
            Affairs  v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor
            ___________________                          ________________
            Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502  (1993).  See Benson v. Northeast
            _____________                         ___ ___________________
            Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995); DeLuca v.
            ______________                                      _________
            Winer  Indus., Inc.,  53  F.3d 793,  797-98 (7th  Cir. 1995);
            ___________________
            White v. York  Int'l Corp.,  45 F.3d 357,  360-61 (10th  Cir.
            __________________________
            1995).

                                         -10-
                                          10

            42 U.S.C.   12102(2).

                      A  "physical  impairment"  is "[a]ny  physiological

            disorder, or condition  . . . or  anatomical loss affecting,"

            inter alia, the "cardiovascular" system.  29 C.F.R.    1630.2
            _____ ____

            (h)(1)  (1995).    "Major  life activities"  are  defined  as

            "functions  such as  caring  for  oneself, performing  manual

            tasks,   walking,   seeing,  hearing,   speaking,  breathing,

            learning,   and   working."      29   C.F.R.       1630.2(i).

            "Substantially limited" is defined as:

                           (i) Unable to  perform a major  life
                      activity that  the average person  in the
                      general population can perform; or

                           (ii) Significantly  restricted as to
                      the condition, manner  or duration  under
                      which   an   individual  can   perform  a
                      particular   major   life   activity   as
                      compared  to  the  condition,  manner  or
                      duration under which  the average  person
                      in  the  general  population can  perform
                      that same major life activity.

            29  C.F.R.    1630.2(j)(1).    Factors  to be  considered  in

            assessing whether an individual is substantially limited in a

            major life activity are:

                           (i) The  nature and severity  of the
                      impairment;

                           (ii)   The   duration  or   expected
                      duration of the impairment; and 

                           (iii)  The  permanent  or long  term
                      impact, or the expected permanent or long
                      term  impact of  or  resulting  from  the
                      impairment.

                                         -11-
                                          11

            29  C.F.R.      1630.2(j)(2).3     According  to   the  Equal

            Employment 

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The   regulations  set   forth   a  more   particularized
            definition of what it means  to be "substantially limited  in
            the  major  life  activity of  working."    See  29 C.F.R.   
                                                        ___
            1630(j)(3).   We need not  consider the permutations  of that
            definition,   however,   because   if   an    individual   is
            substantially  limited in  a major  life activity  other than
            working, or is so regarded, "no determination should  be made
            as  to whether  the  individual is  substantially limited  in
            working."  29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App., at 403.

                                         -12-
                                          12

            Opportunity Commission's Compliance Manual:

                      Although       short-term,      temporary
                      restrictions     generally     are    not
                      substantially  limiting,   an  impairment
                      does not necessarily have to be permanent
                      to rise  to the  level  of a  disability.
                      Some  conditions  may  be   long-term  or
                      potentially  long-term,   in  that  their
                      duration is indefinite and  unknowable or
                      is  expected  to   be  at  least  several
                      months.  Such conditions, if  severe, may
                      constitute disabilities.

            2 EEOC  Compliance Manual,  Interpretations (CCH)    902.4,  

            6884,  p. 5319  (1995).   Examples  of  impairments that  are

            "usually  not disabilities"  because  they  are  "temporary,"

            "non-chronic," and "of short duration, with little or no long

            term  or  permanent  impact,"  are  "broken  limbs,  sprained

            joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza."  29 C.F.R.

            Pt. 1630, App. at 402.    

                      Especially given that City Metal has never disputed

            that  Katz  had a  heart  attack,  we have  no  doubt that  a

            rational  jury could  conclude,  even without  expert medical

            testimony,  that   Katz  had   a   condition  affecting   the

            cardiovascular system  and therefore  that he had  a physical

            impairment  under the ADA.4   29 C.F.R.    1630.2 (h)(1).  We

                                
            ____________________

            4.  In Cook  v. State of  Rhode Island, Department  of Mental
                   ______________________________________________________
            Health,  Retardation, and  Hospitals,  10 F.3d  17 (1st  Cir.
            ____________________________________
            1993),  a case under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
            1973 (which is  interpreted substantially identically to  the
            ADA, 42  U.S.C.     12117(b), 12201(a)),  we upheld  the jury
            verdict  in  favor  of  plaintiff,  in   part  based  on  her
            presentation  of   expert  medical  testimony   that  "morbid
            obesity"  was  a  physiological  disorder  that  affected the
            musculoskeletal,  respiratory,  and  cardiovascular  systems.

                                         -13-
                                          13

            think, however, that it is a very close question whether Katz

            offered sufficient  evidence  to prove  that that  impairment

            "substantially limited" his major life activities within  the

            meaning  of the  ADA,  his scheduled  expert medical  witness

            having proved unavailable.  

                      As  might reasonably  be expected  after any  major

            trauma  and resultant  medical procedure  or surgery,  Katz's

            ability to  breathe, walk and work  was substantially limited

            in  the period  immediately  following the  heart attack  and

            angioplasty procedures.  This does not, however,  necessarily

            lead  to  the conclusion  that Katz  had  a disability.   See
                                                                      ___

            McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,  62 F.3d 92, 96 (3d
            ________________________________________

            Cir.  1995)  (inability  to  work for  two  months  following

            surgery  not  a  disability).   We  think  that  it would  be

            difficult for a  lay jury  to conclude, based  solely on  the

            immediate effects of a heart attack and angioplasty procedure

            on Katz,  that those limitations were  permanent or persisted

            on a long-term basis,  or that their duration was  indefinite

            and unknowable or  expected to  be at  least several  months.

            Katz was apparently prepared  to present medical testimony to

            this effect  but, as  already noted,  his medical  expert was

            unavailable and the court declined to delay the trial.

                                
            ____________________

            Id. at 23.  In a case like Cook, where it is not obvious to a
            __                         ____
            lay jury that the condition affects one of the bodily systems
            listed  in the regulations, expert testimony that it does may
            well be necessary to avoid a judgment as a matter of law.  

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      There  is  certainly no  general rule  that medical

            testimony is always necessary  to establish disability.  Some

            long-term impairments would be obvious to a lay jury (e.g., a
                                                                  ____

            missing  arm)  and  it  is  certainly  within  the  realm  of

            possibility that  a plaintiff himself in  a disabilities case

            might  offer a description of treatments  and symptoms over a

            substantial  period that  would put  the jury  in  a position

            where it could determine that he did suffer from a disability

            within the meaning  of the ADA.  On this  record, we think it

            is a much closer  case whether Katz put such  evidence before

            the jury.

                      The  bulk  of the  evidence  as  to Katz's  medical

            condition  related primarily  to  his  situation  immediately

            after the  operation, including his initial  effort to return

            to work  in which he was  so stricken that he  could not even

            leave the car and climb up a flight of stairs  to the office.

            Katz did testify that even  three years after the  operation,

            he still felt in  poor condition; but that testimony  was far

            more  general  and  far  less  specific  than  his  testimony

            regarding the impact of the  heart attack in the month or  so

            immediately following its occurrence. 

                      We think it  was unwise for  the district court  to

            invoke   its  own  medical   experience  in   explaining  its

            determination that Katz's evidence was inadequate, since  the

                                         -15-
                                          15

            determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a

                                         -16-
                                          16

            major activity must be made on an individual basis:  

                      The    determination   of    whether   an
                      individual  has a  disability  is  . .  .
                      based  .  .  .  on  the  effect  of  that
                      impairment on the life of the individual.
                      Some  impairments  may  be disabling  for
                      particular   individuals   but  not   for
                      others.

            29 C.F.R. Pt.  1630, App. at 402.  See  also Chandler v. City
                                               ___  ____ ________________

            of Dallas,  2 F.3d  1385, 1396  (5th Cir. 1993)  (recognizing
            _________

            that "the effect of a given type of impairment . . . can vary

            widely from individual to  individual"), cert. denied, 114 S.
                                                     ____  ______

            Ct  1386 (1994).   Nonetheless,  it is  at least  a debatable

            question whether,  based on Katz's testimony,  the jury could

            conclude  that   he  suffered   from  a  continuing   medical

            condition, persisting beyond the period immediately after the

            operation,  that substantially  limited  one or  more of  his

            major life activities.  

                      We  need  not  definitively  resolve  the issue  of

            whether expert  medical testimony was necessary  for the case

            to go forward on a theory of actual disability in this  case,

            because we think  that the evidence  permitted Katz to  reach

            the  jury  under  one   of  the  alternative  definitions  of

            disability, that  City Metal "regarded [Katz]  as having such

            an  impairment."    41  U.S.C.     12102(2)(C).    Under  the

            regulations an individual  who has an impairment  that is not

            substantially  limiting  (or has  no  impairment  at all)  is

            nevertheless  "disabled" if he is  treated by the employer as

                                         -17-
                                          17

            having an impairment that does substantially limit major life

            activities.  29 C.F.R.    1630.2(l)(1).  An example  given is

            an employee  whose controlled  high blood  pressure is  not a

            disability  but  is reassigned  because  the employer  fears,

            wrongly, that the  employee may have a heart attack.  Id. Pt.
                                                                  ___

            1630, App.  See also Cook, 10 F.3d at 20-21, 23, 25 (employer
                        ___ ____ ____

            treated  employee as  handicapped by  refusing to  rehire her

            based on its belief that her morbid  obesity would compromise

            her ability to  do her job and put her  at risk of developing

            serious ailments).

                      In this case, Katz alleged in his complaint that he

            was  not only  actually disabled  but also  perceived by  his

            employer to  be disabled, and was  fired because of  it.  The

            dramatic encounter at the office, in which Katz was unable to

            climb the stairs and Wilcox observed his fatigue, is only one

            piece  of evidence; others  included the employer's knowledge

            of    the   heart    attack,   angioplasty    procedure   and

            hospitalization, and yet another was Katz's own statements to

            his employer that when  he returned to work it would at least

            initially  have to be  in a  limited capacity.   Cf.  Hamm v.
                                                             __   _______

            Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 724-26 (7th Cir. 1995) (employer did not
            ______

            "regard"  employee as  disabled where  there was  no evidence

            that the  person who made  the decision to fire  him was even

            told about the employee's arthritis; employee told his direct

            supervisor  that  it  was  "nothing"  and  "would  pass"  and

                                         -18-
                                          18

            continued to  do all of the  functions of his job).   Even if

            medical  expert testimony  were required  here to  permit the

            jury  to  find that  Katz  was  suffering from  a  continuing

            serious  heart condition,  the  jury certainly  did not  need

            medical testimony in making  its own judgment as to  what the

            employer may have perceived, rightly or wrongly, about Katz's

            condition.

                      When the district  court proposed  to withdraw  the

            case from the jury and  direct a verdict, Katz argued to  the

            court  that regardless  of actual  medical condition,  he had

            provided a basis for  the jury to conclude that  the employer

            perceived him to  be disabled.   The judge  did not  directly

            respond  to this assertion.   Katz has renewed  it on appeal,

            but City Metal's brief also fails  to respond in any depth to

            the perception argument.  At least on this record, we have to

            conclude  that Katz did provide  enough evidence to reach the

            jury on the issue of perception which, as already noted, does

            constitute disability within the meaning of the Act.

                      Congress, when it provided for perception to be the

            basis of disability status,  probably had principally in mind

            the  more usual  case in  which a  plaintiff has  a long-term

            medical condition of some  kind, and the employer exaggerates

            its   significance   by   failing   to   make  a   reasonable

            accommodation.   But  both  the language  and  policy of  the

            statute seem to us to offer protection as well to  one who is

                                         -19-
                                          19

            not substantially disabled  or even  disabled at  all but  is

            wrongly perceived to be so.   And, of course, it may  well be

            that Katz was both actually disabled and perceived to be so.

                      The second  element of proof is  ability to perform

            the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable

            accommodation.   See 42 U.S.C.    12111(8).   Katz  testified
                             ___

            that  five days  after his  discharge from  the  hospital and

            again  two  days  after he  was  fired,  he  asked Wilcox  to

            accommodate him by allowing him to return to  work on a part-

            time  basis.    On  the  latter occasion,  Katz  suggested  a

            reduction  in  salary  and  said  he  would  accept  whatever

            accommodations the  company would make  in order to  keep his

            job.   Reasonable  accommodations include,  inter alia,  "job
                                                        _____ ____

            restructuring  [and] part-time  or modified  work schedules."

            42 U.S.C.    12111(9).  As  we noted in  Grenier v.  Cyanamid
                                                     ____________________

            Plastics, Inc.:
            ______________

                      With   respect  to   known  disabilities,
                      however, the emphasis  is on  encouraging
                      the employer to "engage in an interactive
                      process with the individual  to determine
                      an  effective  reasonable accommodation."
                      Guidance   IV.B.6b  (citing H.R. Rep. No.
                      ________
                      485   (Pt.   2),    supra,   at    65-66,
                                          _____
                      U.S.C.C.A.N. at 347-48).

            70  F.3d at  677.   Katz's suggestions  were rejected  out of

            hand.  The district judge did not say that Katz had failed to

            show  that   he  could   perform  his  job   with  reasonable

                                         -20-
                                          20

            accommodations, nor does City Metal offer  any argument as to

            this element on appeal.5  

                      The third  element of plaintiff's  case, that  Katz

            was fired because of a disability, or that his disability was

            a motivating  factor in  City Metal's  decision to  fire him,

            Pedigo v.  P.A.M. Transport, Inc.,  60 F.3d  1300, 1301  (8th
            ________________________________

            Cir. 1995),  also was a question  of fact for the  jury.  The

            timing  of Katz's firing,  one month after  his heart attack,

            was circumstantial  evidence from  which the jury  could find

            that Katz's disability  triggered, in whole  or in part,  his

            firing by City Metal.

                      We rule  that the court erred  in granting judgment

            as a matter of law for City Metal, because the evidence would

            permit the  conclusion that Katz established  that City Metal

            regarded  him  as   having  an   impairment  constituting   a

            disability under section  12102(2)(C) of the  Act.  Thus,  he

            proved a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA and
                     _____ _____

            the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act. 

                      Where  there must be a  remand for a  new trial, we

            have broad authority to draft a remand order that is fair and

            just.  28  U.S.C.   2106.  In this  instance, given that Katz

            was  deprived  of  his  medical  testimony  more  or  less by

            accident, we  see no reason  why on retrial he  should not be

                                
            ____________________

            5.  City Metal was free,  of course, to attempt to  show that
            accommodating  Katz  would  have  imposed  on  it  an  "undue
            hardship."  42 U.S.C.   12111(10).

                                         -21-
                                          21

            allowed to present  expert testimony in  a timely fashion  in

            order to show an actual disability under the statute.  

                      Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial,
                                      _______     ______

            leaving it open to Katz to retry the case under any or all of

            the three theories of disability available under the statute.

                      Costs on appeal awarded to appellant.

                                         -22-
                                          22