Court Opinion

ID: 9705413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:05:13.358646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.899149
License: Public Domain

J. HARVEY HUDSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I join the majority in its disposition of appellant’s first four issues. In his fifth issue, however, appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in limiting closing argument to twenty minutes. Because I agree with appellant, I respectfully dissent.
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const, amend. VI. “The Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his *192right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor.” Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879, 881 (1962); see also Arnold v. State, 68 S.W.3d 93, 102 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. ref'd) (holding that denial of jury argument may constitute a denial of the right to counsel). Thus, the “argument of a cause is as much a part of the trial as the hearing of evidence.” Meredeth v. People, 84 Ill. 479, 481 (1877). Yet, over the last century there has been a steady progression in the jurisprudence of this state and others to tolerate ever more restrictive limitations on the length of closing argument.
Arguments of several hours were once common and considered a matter of right.1 Today, limiting argument to ten or fifteen minutes per side is routinely approved by appellate courts.2 In fact, the majority cite a number of decisions upholding restrictions imposed on argument similar to the one found here. The rule seems to be that if counsel is completely denied an opportunity to present argument, reversible error results from an undeniable infringement of the Sixth amendment.3 However, if the trial court, in its discretion, simply limits the time permitted for argument, appellate courts generally approve the limitation. How far does this logic extend? Is a five minute limitation permissible under the Sixth Amendment? How about a one minute limitation? The trend toward ever shrinking time limits on closing argument cannot continue indefinitely without extinguishing any meaningful right to argue.4 At some point, appel*193late courts must decide whether the Sixth Amendment is to be fully observed or not.
Everyone concedes that the accused must be permitted a full hearing where, if he chooses, he may present all relevant evidence in his defense. In this endeavor he is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Moreover, the right to be represented by counsel includes the right to fully argue the merits of his defense. How a lawyer chooses to argue may vary. Counsel may argue the case with great aplomb and skill, or he may deliver a mediocre presentation utterly lacking in logic and persuasive impact. Counsel may be a gifted orator, or he may be shy and awkward; he may speak loudly or softly; he may be animated, or he may be cold and stiff. Whatever method counsel adopts, the trial judge must sit silently, for the accused has placed his defense in the hands of his counsel, not the judge.
If, due to time limitations, counsel is constrained to leave off some point of fact, some logical syllogism, some emotional plea — has the defendant been afforded a full or partial hearing? If counsel must hurry his remarks and speak in an unnatural manner to meet the time restrictions, has not the judge dictated both the content of the argument and the manner of its delivery? In other words, has not the court infringed upon the defendant’s right to be fully represented by counsel? 5 The right to counsel was “secured to the people of England, from whence we [borrowed it], by long and persistent efforts.” Dille v. State, 34 Ohio St. 617, 619 (Ohio 1878). By what authority do courts infringe upon it today? The fact that we came into possession of this liberty as a conceded right, ought not to cause us to underate or forget its importance. Id. While the people have it within their authority to repeal the Sixth Amendment, the judiciary (even by incremental progression) do not.
*194Even before the advent of the Sixth Amendment, argument was a fundamental component of a fair trial. In the “16th and 17th centuries, when notions of compulsory process, confrontation, and counsel were [still] in their infancy, the essence of the English criminal trial was argument between the defendant and counsel for the Crown.6 Whatever other procedural protections may have been lacking, there was no absence of debate on the factual and legal issues raised in a criminal case.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 860, 95 5.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975).
While procedural protections are much more extensive today, than in the 16th century, this fact does not diminish the importance of closing argument. The right to fully argue a case “is of inestimable value, not only to the accused, but to the administration of public justice.” Wingo v. State, 62 Miss. 311, 1884 WL 3462, at *3 (Miss. Oct. 1884). For example, while jurors generally do a good job of determining the facts, studies abound “demonstrating the extent to which jurors misapprehend the relevant law.”7 “The problem is especially severe when the law is set forth in pattern instructions that — because they are designed without the facts of any particular case in mind — tend to be abstract, general, and technical.” Christopher May, 18 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. at 872. “In one experiment, mock juries made numerous mistakes concerning the law — mistakes that were not corrected in the later deliberations. This failure to apply the law correctly was by no means a failure to take the law seriously. Discussions of the law took up one-fifth of the deliberation time and were carried out with great intensity, frequently with an apparent sense of frustration.” Id. “Every law professor knows this to be a serious problem for law students who, while they may have mastered the black-letter law, cannot apply it to a set of facts even after a semester or more of study. Students can usually grasp the facts and recite the law, but they are commonly unable to build a bridge between the two.” Id.
“Also telling are studies showing that jurors frequently cannot answer simple true-false questions concerning statements of law taken from instructions they were given in court. Their understanding is often little better than that of persons who never heard the instructions at all.” Id. A lawyer, however, can do what the trial judge is not permitted to do — explain the court’s charge in simple, everyday language and apply it to specific evidence. Without the benefit of argument, juries are often hopelessly confused. On appeal, we presume the jury understood and followed the court’s charge, but “often the judge must state those rules to the jury with such niceties that many lawyers do not comprehend them, and it is impossible that the jury can.” Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir.1948). In short, “juries have the disadvantage ... of being treated like children while the testimony is going on, but then being doused with a kettleful of law during the charge that would make a third-year law-student blanch.” Id. (quoting CuRTis Bok, I Too, Nicodemus 261-62 (1946)).
*195In addition to explaining the charge, counsel may draw reasonable conclusions from the evidence which the jury never considered. In fact, the “primary purpose of direct and cross examination of witnesses ... ‘is to create the record upon which summation will be based.’ ” State v. Washington, 614 So.2d 711, 713 (La.1993) (quoting 6 A.P. ORDoveR, Criminal Law Advocacy, § 1.01 (1990)). Sometimes facts are developed so subtly and skillfully on cross-examination, the defense is not immediately obvious even to the prosecutor. Id. On these occasions the accused’s defensive theory is not apparent until closing argument. Consider, for example, Abraham Lincoln’s first defense of a client charged with murder. He engaged in no cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses save for the state’s sole eye-witness. Of this witness, Lincoln asked only fourteen questions, and these inquiries seemed to have no particular relevance to the case. Only thereafter did Lincoln show by irrefutable logic that the witness was none other than the murderer himself. The court ordered the witness arrested, and he promptly confessed. Franois L. Wellman, The Art of CROSS-Examination 56-58 (1904).
“[TJhere will be cases where closing argument may correct a premature misjudgment and avoid an otherwise erroneous verdict. And there is no certain way for a trial judge to identify accurately which cases these will be, until the judge has heard the closing summation of counsel.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 863, 95 S.Ct. 2550. If counsel is not afforded the opportunity to fully argue the case, the brilliance of his cross-examination and the significance of critical testimony, carefully cultivated during trial, may never be revealed. Thus, when a trial judge imposes restrictive time limits, he always runs the danger of inadvertently depriving the defendant of the full (and sometimes the best) representation of counsel because he simply does not know what counsel is about to say. Accordingly, when “time for the argument ... is restricted by the court, it should be very clear that the right of the accused to be heard has not been essentially impaired, and that an opportunity for making full and complete defense on the whole case has not been denied.” Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 676 (Miss.1991), overruled on other grounds by King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 889 (Miss.2001).
In addition to the power of cold logic, it is counsel’s privilege to argue the case in the manner he deems best. Counsel may indulge in “flights of oratory.” He may, in fact, make a naked appeal to the juror’s emotions. If the Sixth Amendment is to have any application to modern trials, the speed, volume, timing, and strategy employed by counsel in his final argument must be determined by counsel, not the court. Counsel must not be constrained by court imposed restrictions to make “such a luke-warm and sterile argument that the jury is unable to determine which side of the case he is on.” Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Fisher, 559 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref. n.r.e.).
When Captain Thomas Preston and eight British soldiers under his command were tried for murder in 1770, they were defended by a future President of the United States, John Adams. The defendants were accused of the “bloody butchery” acclaimed at the time as the “Boston Massacre.” In asserting his clients’ claim of self-defense, Adams faced the daunting task of persuading an American jury to see the incident through the eyes of British soldiers occupying the city.
Adams’ closing argument in the Preston case was hailed as a “virtuoso performance,” and Preston was acquitted. *196David McCullough, John Adams 65-68 (2001). Thereafter, Adams defended the eight enlisted men who fired into the crowd. His closing argument, which lasted two days, was described as “electrical.” Id. Persuaded by Adams’ logic and oratory, the jury acquitted six of the eight soldiers. Could Adams have achieved the same result in twenty minutes? If the difference between an acquittal and a conviction is determined by whether counsel is permitted to fully argue the case, how can we say the imposition of overly restrictive time limits does not infringe upon the Sixth Amendment?
“It is very difficult for a judge to determine what effect a given line of argument may have upon a jury, or some one of them, or what period may be necessary to enable counsel to present, in the aspect deemed by them important, the case of their client. The minds of men are so differently constituted that an advocate may require much more for the statement and elaboration of his view than another.” People v. Keenan, 13 Cal. 581, 584 (1859).
Nevertheless, I recognize that if trial courts could not restrict the length of argument, some attorneys would be tempted to filibuster. In fact, “intolerable evils might result and the very purposes for which courts of justice were instituted might be defeated if no limitation could be imposed on the freedom of speech in this behalf.” Wingo, 62 Miss. 311, 1884 WL 3462, at *4. Thus, the trial judge may “restrain what has been termed ... an ‘abuse’ of [the right to argue],” which simply means “that counsel may be restricted to a discussion of matters relevant to the case, and restrained from wasting the time of the court by useless repetition.” People v. Green, 99 Cal. 564, 34 P. 231, 232 (1893).
For example, if, during argument, a lawyer begins reading from a phone book, the trial court may cut him off because the “argument” has absolutely no relevance to the case or the issues to be determined by the jury. Likewise, if a lawyer, having completely exhausted his arguments, begins repeating himself, the court may impose restrictions to keep from wasting time. Apart from these two considerations, however, I cannot conceive of any other valid restraint upon closing argument. So while the trial court is vested with discretion in regulating the duration of argument, such discretion is not unlimited.8
Here, the record demonstrates appellant’s counsel was engaged in a legitimate, purposeful, non-repetitive argument when he was abruptly silenced by the trial court. For what purpose was counsel cut short? Not to quell improper argument, nor silence useless repetition. The argument appears to have been limited solely for the convenience of the court. In fact, the majority contend the trial court has the prerogative of limiting argument in order to move the docket more expeditiously. This is not, in my opinion, a valid reason for limiting argument.9
*197Admittedly, trial courts are “under extreme pressures to move cases and keep their dockets current, but those admirable goals should not be accomplished at the expense of fairness to the litigants and without consideration for the jurors who could be greatly assisted in rendering their verdict by the attorneys’ closing arguments.” Bell v. Harland Rayvals Tramp., Ltd., 501 So.2d 1821, 1823 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986). “While time is important to the court it is also important to the accused, whose life or liberty hangs in the balance.” Yopps, 178 A.2d at 882. In other words, “the need for expedition can never justify a denial of a reasonable opportunity to present the defendant’s case.” Comi v. State, 202 Md. 472, 97 A.2d 129, 132 (1953). Thus, while the trial judge may, in his discretion, limit the length of argument, this “power ... is qualified by the competing right of the defendant, which has constitutional stature, to be heard either by himself or by counsel.” 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL Procedure § 449 (13th ed.1991).
When deciding what time limitations should be imposed upon counsel, a trial court should consider not simply the press of time, but the length of the trial, the number of witnesses, the amount of evidence, the importance of the case, and the number and complexity of issues. Bell, 501 So.2d at 1323.
Here, appellant was tried for capital murder and, therefore, subject to the most severe penalty our law permits against a juvenile offender-confinement in the penitentiary for life. Considering the enormity of the crime, few cases could arguably be more important to society and the accused, than the one presented here.10
During the course of appellant’s trial, which lasted two days, the jury heard testimony from eleven witnesses. One factor in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting argument is to consider the number of witnesses called at trial versus the amount of time to analyze their testimony.11 Here, if counsel had *198devoted his entire argument to simply analyzing the testimony of the witnesses, he would have had only 1 minute and 49 seconds to review, examine, and comment on the testimony of each witness. Again, this seems to be an unreasonable restriction.
In addition to reviewing the evidence, the record demonstrates that counsel attempted to explain the court’s charge to the jury. The issues before the jury were both numerous and complex. In the limited time available to him, counsel hurriedly tried to set forth the three offenses for which appellant could be convicted. He then attempted, within the context of the court’s charge, to show why there might be a reasonable doubt regarding proof of at least one of the elements of capital murder, ie., intent to rob. Counsel endeavored to explain the concept of conspiracy and the law of parties to the jury and to show why the evidence could not reasonably support a guilty verdict under either theory. In fact, the majority observe that appellant’s counsel did address many of the topics articulated in his objection to the trial court’s imposition of a twenty-minute time limit. However, the majority also recognizes that counsel addressed these points in a hurried and cursory fashion. A cursory argument mandated by overly restrictive time limitations does not satisfy the constitutional guarantee of full representation by counsel.
“The crucial question in reviewing the trial court’s time limitations is whether [appellant’s] counsel [was] permitted to advocate effectively for [his client]. One factor [to] consider in making this determination is whether the court’s restrictions hamper the jury’s ability to understand the information and issues at trial.” United States v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1246, 117 S.Ct. 1856, 137 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1997). “In all events, the time must be reasonable and should permit counsel an adequate opportunity to relate the factual argument to the governing principles of law.” Strong, 495 So.2d at 1240. “Unless one takes the view that counsel’s final argument should be nothing more than a bird’s-eye surface review of the case” with no in-depth analysis of the evidence, “a rushed, scatter-gun presentation” with no real coherence cannot be fairly deemed as a legitimate opportunity to argue the case to the jury. Maleh, 491 So.2d at 292.
In attempting to comply with the trial court’s time limits, counsel was frustrated by the length of the charge and the complexity of the legal issues. Counsel’s request for additional time to explain and refute each of the nine possible factual scenarios that might authorize a guilty verdict was denied. Yet the record reflects it took the trial judge 21 minutes to read the 13 page charge to the jury, while counsel was afforded only 20 minutes for closing argument. Thus, appellant’s counsel was somehow expected to explain, apply, and argue the charge in less time than that required to simply read the charge without the benefit of explanation, applica*199tion, or argument. Simple logic compels the conclusion that this was an impossible task.
Though I believe the trial court abused its discretion in limiting argument to twenty minutes, I am also of the opinion that a criminal conviction must not be reversed lightly. A criminal trial should be a decisive and portentous event, and if a defendant is guilty, he should look upon the courtroom with an apprehension and foreboding of judgment.
A defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and this is the time and place set for him to be tried by a jury of his peers and found either guilty or not guilty by that jury. To the greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge should be determined in this proceeding: the accused is in the court-room, the jury is in the box, the judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly sworn, await their turn to testify. Society’s resources have been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). But while finality and justice are important considerations, the people of this nation, and of this state, have established constitutional guarantees for the accused that the judiciary are sworn to uphold, and if the court imposes an arbitrary limitation of time upon counsel, against his consent, this must be done at the risk of a new trial. Green, 34 P. at 233.
While the evidence presented by the State against appellant was substantial, I do not believe he was afforded a fair trial. “The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.” Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550. “There is no judge, however able and learned, and no jury, however intelligent, but may be benefitted, and receive valuable assistance in reaching a correct conclusion, from the argument of counsel.” Walker, 22 S.W. at 686. “[T]o limit the argument of counsel for the defense in a criminal prosecution is a matter of great delicacy, and should be done with the utmost prudence and caution.” Willie, 585 So.2d at 676.
The issue presented here, as the majority recognizes, is a close one in which there may be legitimate differences of opinion. For the defense, however, closing argument is the last clear chance to persuade the jury that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550. By severely limiting the time for argument, the trial court deprived appellant of the whole and full representation of counsel. Because I believe appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel was infringed, and I have grave doubts that the limitation of argument did not affect the outcome of the trial, I cannot, in good conscience, affirm the conviction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. See People v. Young, 136 Cal.App. 699, 29 P.2d 440, 444 (1934) (upholding a limitation of 3 hours per side in an assault case); People v. Phillips, 120 Cal.App. 644, 8 P.2d 228, 233 (1932) (approving a restriction of 2½ hours in a murder case); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 531 (1880) (approving a 4 hour limitation in a homicide case); Lindsay v. State, 138 Ga. 818, 76 S.E. 369, 370 (1912) (affirming a 2½ hour limit in a murder case); State v. Riddle, 20 Kan. 711, 714 (1878) (upholding a time limitation of 4 ½ hours in a murder case); Smith v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 133, 37 S.W. 586, 587 (1896) (finding no abuse of discretion in limiting argument to 4 hours per side in a murder case); Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 584, 585 (1874) (finding trial court did not abuse its discretion to limiting argument to 5 hours per side after a two day trial for attempted murder); Bradley v. State, 60 Tex.Crim. 398, 132 S.W. 484, 487 (App.1910) (affirming a 3 hour limit in a manslaughter trial); State v. Shores, 31 W.Va. 491, 7 S.E. 413, 418 (1888) (approving a 4 hour limitation in a burglary case).

. See Bowman v. State, 331 So.2d 775, 776 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 331 So.2d 777 (Ala.1976) (affirming a 15 minute limit in a drug case); Dawes v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Ky.1961) (finding no abuse of discretion in limiting argument to 15 minutes in a possession of stolen property case); Decker v. State, 734 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd) (holding limitation of 15 minutes proper in aggravated robbery trial); Esterline v. State, 707 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref'd) (approving limitation of 10 minutes per side in a delivery of marijuana case); Moya v. State, 691 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no pet.) (upholding a limitation of 10 minutes per side in a drug case).

. State v. Davis, 822 So.2d 161, 165 (La.Ct.App.2002) (holding trial court erred in denying counsel an opportunity to present closing arguments in an armed robbery case); State v. Moorcraft, 319 So.2d 386, 391 (La.1975) (holding trial court erred in denying argument in a traffic violation case); Yopps, 178 A.2d at 882 (Md.1962) (holding trial court abused its discretion in a burglary case where it denied argument in a bench trial).

. The tendency toward ever shrinking limitations on closing argument has been resisted in some states. For example, in Foster v. State, the court announced: "[W]ide latitude must be given counsel in arguing his case to the jury and ordinarily arguments restricted to thirty minutes or less are considered suspect.” 464 So.2d 1214, 1215 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985).
*193In several states, the erosion of a party's right to present argument has been halted by statute. The North Carolina legislature, for example, has mandated that closing argument to a jury may be limited “to not less than one hour on each side in misdemeanors and appeals from justices of the peace; to not less than two hours on each side in all other ... felonies less than capital; [and] in capital felonies, the time of argument of counsel may not be limited otherwise than by consent.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A-97 (1995).
The Supreme Court of Georgia has removed all discretion from trial judges to set time limits for closing argument in felony cases by interpreting Section 17-8-73 of the Georgia Code to be a legislative expression of the maximum and minimum time limits for argument in felony cases, i.e., two hours for capital felonies and one hour for non-capital felonies. See Chapman v. State, 273 Ga. 865, 548 S.E.2d 278, 282 (2001) (holding a trial court has no discretion to impose any further limit on the time for closing argument than that provided by statute, and failure to afford the parties two hours for argument in a capital case, even if the death penalty was not sought, is error as a matter of law). See also Monroe v. State, 272 Ga. 201, 528 S.E.2d 504, 506 (2000) (holding that defendant in trial for malice murder entitled by statute to two hours for closing argument); Massey v. State, 270 Ga. 76, 508 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1998) (same).
Also, the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[n]ot more than two counsel shall address the jury on behalf of the plaintiff or defendant; the whole time occupied on behalf of either shall not be limited to less than two hours.” ORCP 58 B(7). Moreover, this rule is made applicable to criminal cases by Section 136.330 of the Oregon Revised Statutes. State v. Doem, 156 Or.App. 566, 967 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1998, pet.denied) (holding trial court in a felony assault case erred in limiting argument to 20 minutes in violation of ORCP 58 B(7)).

. This argument was eloquently made in 1893 by W.W. Hair before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in defense of a client who had been convicted of theft after the trial court restricted the time for argument to twenty minutes. See Walker v. State, 32 Tex.Crim. 175, 22 S.W. 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 1893).

. In fact, Lord Coke was of the opinion that no man, even "with all his true and uttermost labors,” could hope to achieve a proper disposition in a difficult case "without solemn argument, where I am persuaded, Almighty God openeth and enlargeth the understanding of those desirous of justice and right.” John F. Dillon, The Laws and Jurisprudence of England and America 191 (1894).

. Christopher N. May, The Sound of the Gavel: Perspectives on Judicial Speech: "What Do We Do Now?”: Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 869, 872 (1995).

. See, for example, Huntly v. State, 34 S.W. 923, 924 (Tex.Crim.App.1896) (holding that time limit of 15 minutes per side for argument in case that took four hours to try was improper, but not reversible because counsel failed to make sufficient bill of exceptions); Walker v. State, 32 Tex.Crim. 175, 22 S.W. 685, 686 (Tex.Crim.App.1893) (holding trial judge erred in limiting argument to 45 minutes per side in a theft case supported largely by circumstantial evidence — noting that “while time is precious to the court, it is infinitely more so to him for whom counsel is pleading, and whose life, liberty, and happiness is resting in the balances of Justice.'').

. See State v. Kay, 12 Ohio App.2d 38, 230 N.E.2d 652, 660-62 (1967) (holding trial judge erred in limiting argument in bribery case to 45 minutes when the judge stated he was limiting argument because (1) he wanted to get the case to the jury by 4 o’clock in the *197afternoon, (2) he had another case scheduled for trial the next business day, and (3) he wanted to spare the jury the inconvenience of returning after the weekend).

. For other murder cases in which the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the time for argument, see Keenan, 13 Cal. 581 (1859) (holding limitation of 3 hours was an abuse of discretion in a murder case); Stockton v. State, 544 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Fla.1989) (finding trial court erred in limiting argument to 30 minutes in a murder trial that lasted two days and in which 15 witnesses testified); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 1058, 1059-60 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (finding trial court abused its discretion in limiting argument to 25 minutes in a second-degree murder case); Fugate v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 663, 72 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1934) (finding 25 minutes was insufficient time to fully argue a murder case); Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 676 (Miss.1991) (holding trial court erred in limiting punishment argument to 15 minutes in a capital murder trial); State v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 P. 3, 9 (1903), overruled, on other grounds by State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 P. 981 (1907) (finding error to restrict argument to 1 hour and 45 minutes in a capital murder case); Collier v. State, 101 Nev. 473, 705 P.2d 1126, 1131-32 (1985) (holding a 1 hour argument in murder case insufficient because it permitted counsel less than 2 minutes per witness to review their testimony); State v. Cash, 138 S.C. 167, 136 S.E. 222 (1927) (holding that one hour was not sufficient time for argument in a murder case); State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323, 331-32 (1955) (holding 40 minutes for argument in capital murder case was an abuse of discretion); State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251, 254 (1906) (holding a limitation of 1 hour and 30 minutes per side too restrictive in a capital murder case).

. The trial court was held to have abused its discretion in limiting argument in the following cases in part, at least, because the testimony of the witnesses could not be adequately reviewed in the time allotted for argument: Rossi v. United States, 9 F.2d 362, 368 (8th *198Cir.1925) (1 minute and 9 seconds per witness); People v. Green, 99 Cal. 564, 34 P. 231, 232 (1893) (2 minutes and 30 seconds per witness); Munez v. State, 643 So.2d 82, 83 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (4 minutes per witness); Knapp v. Shores, 550 So.2d 1155, 1156 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (1 minute and 45 seconds per witness); Strong v. Mt. Dora Growers Co-op., 495 So.2d 1238, 1240 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (1 minute and 32 seconds per witness); Maleh v. Florida East Coast Prop., Inc., 491 So.2d 290, 292 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986) (56 seconds per witness); Woodham v. Roy, 471 So.2d 132 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (4 minutes per witness); Washington, 614 So.2d at 713 (1993) (2 minutes and 9 seconds per witness); Huntly, 34 S.W. at 923 (1 minute and 22 seconds per witness); Jones v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 63, 12 S.E. 226, 228 (1890) (1 minute and 46 seconds per witness).