Court Opinion

ID: 9393500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 15:04:55.357009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.641339
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 22-1447
                                  Filed May 10, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMES PAUL SMITH,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Kirk Daily, District

Associate Judge.

       A defendant appeals his convictions following guilty pleas.       APPEAL

DISMISSED.

       Ryan J. Mitchell of Orsborn, Mitchell, Goedken & Larson, P.C., Ottumwa,

for appellant.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

       Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
                                         2

BADDING, Judge.

       In November 2021, James Smith tendered written guilty pleas in separate

criminal cases to felony charges of second-degree theft and felon in possession of

a firearm.1 Both pleas were signed by Smith and acknowledged his right to file a

motion in arrest of judgment in order to challenge his guilty pleas. See Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.24(3)(b).    After a continuance, Smith’s failure to appear at the

rescheduled date, and his later apprehension, an unreported sentencing hearing

was held in both cases on September 1, 2022. The court entered sentencing

orders imposing concurrent terms of imprisonment not to exceed five years on

each charge. In separate orders, the court noted that Smith made an oral motion

in arrest of judgment at the time of sentencing, which the court denied as untimely.

The record does not disclose the grounds for Smith’s untimely motion in arrest of

judgment.

       Smith now appeals. First, he claims his “counsel was ineffective in failing

to adequately advise [him] of the obligation to file a motion in arrest of judgment

and the consequences of not filing.” As the State points out, we are without

authority to consider this claim on direct appeal, so we decline to do so. See Iowa

Code § 814.7 (2022); State v. Tucker, 982 N.W.2d 645, 653 (Iowa 2022).

1 At the time, written guilty pleas to felony charges were authorized by order of the
supreme court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a procedure Smith does
not challenge. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Ongoing
Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court Services (Nov. 24, 2020)
(“Through June 30, 2021, district courts may accept written guilty pleas in felony
cases in the same manner as in serious and aggravated misdemeanor cases. See
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b) (last paragraph).”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Supervisory Order, In
the Matter of Ongoing COVID-19 Iowa Judicial Branch Court Services and
Processes Continued to January 1, 2022 (June 21, 2021) (extending November
24, 2020 order through January 1, 2022).
                                            3

       Second, Smith claims the “plea proceedings were defective due to [him] not

being fully and properly informed of his right to file [a] motion in arrest of judgment

and the consequences of not filing.” Smith acknowledges that his oral motion in

arrest of judgment—the denial of which he does not challenge on appeal—was not

timely, and his failure to otherwise move in arrest of judgment precludes relief on

appeal. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). But he submits that he falls under one

of the “two recognized exceptions to the prohibition on obtaining appellate relief

following a guilty plea when no motion in arrest of judgment is filed,” that being

“when the defendant is not adequately advised of the obligation to file the motion

and the consequences of not filing.” Accord State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 109

(Iowa 2021).2

       But Smith’s claim on this point is still only that trial counsel failed to properly

inform him of the consequences of failing to file his motion in arrest of judgment.

Specifically, he incorporates the arguments he made under his first claim and

reiterates: “Trial counsel failed to properly and adequately inform [him] of any and

all issues surrounding the motion in arrest of judgment.” While Smith tries to

present this claim as a challenge to his guilty pleas on the merits, it is just a

repackaging of his ineffective-assistance claim and does not present any

substantive grounds for relief.3       See State v. Vennink, No. 20-1629, 2021

2 The other historical exception “allowed a defendant to indirectly challenge his
guilty plea on appeal despite not filing a motion in arrest of judgment ‘if the failure
to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted from ineffective assistance of
counsel.’” Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (citation omitted). That “exception no
longer provides an avenue for relief on direct appeal.” Id.
3 Smith’s brief makes a passing reference to his innocence, but that is not the type

of claim for which we could provide relief on appeal because it is unsupported by
evidence, affidavits, or authority. See State v. Kudron, No. 17-0614, 2018
                                        4

WL 3378547, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2021) (“[F]ailure to inform a

defendant about a motion in arrest of judgment implicates error-preservation

issues; it is not a substantive ground for relief.”).   Since Smith confines his

complaints to “his lawyer, he makes a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

that he can only pursue in postconviction proceedings.” State v. Basquin, 970

N.W.2d 643, 660 (Iowa 2022).

      Because Smith only forwards ineffective-assistance claims upon which we

cannot provide relief on direct appeal, he does not have good cause to appeal

following his guilty pleas. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3); Treptow, 960 N.W.2d

at 109–10; State v. Altimus, No. 19-1609, 2021 WL 5918310, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Dec. 15, 2021). As a result, we dismiss the appeal.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

WL 2722784, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018) (declining to address a “bare
allegation” of innocence on direct appeal from a guilty plea); see also Kellar v.
Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 352 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (“We do not
consider such an ‘argument’ which here consists of nothing more than a bald
assertion without any elaboration.”).