Court Opinion

ID: 9477843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:32:55.404671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:05.072600
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
with whom BRORBY, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting.
The majority holds that a premature notice of appeal is effective if a subsequent Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) certification is obtained or if a final adjudication of the matter occurs before the court considers the merits of the appeal. I respectfully disagree with this procedure for two reasons. First, I do not think that the court of appeals has the power to expand appellate jurisdiction through reinterpretation of settled law. Second, even assuming the new procedure is more efficient, I question the need to provide a failsafe system for preserving a civil appeal due to the ease of compliance with the established rules.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides that “The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” In the situation before us, there is little mystery as to what constitutes a final decision. A final decision under § 1291 is one which “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute on the judgment.’ ” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 1136, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945)). In the absence of a final judgment on all claims or a final judgment on part of the claims, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) makes it clear that 1) there can be no final decision which terminates the action, and 2) any previous decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of a final judgment adjudicating all claims.1 Although the collateral-order doctrine provides an exception to the final-decision rule contained in § 1291, the doctrine is without application in this case. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (collateral-order doctrine stated); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (requirements for application of collateral-order doctrine). Instead, we are presented with a notice of appeal filed before the district court adjudicated all the claims in the action and before a Rule 54(b) certification was obtained.
Under our prior decisions, this appeal would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction would be determined as of the date the notice of appeal was filed (January 16, 1987), and a later Rule 54(b) certification by the district court would be ineffective. Lamp v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1981); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consol., Ltd., 647 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir.1981). Although summary judgment in favor of defendants was entered on the main claim on December 18, 1986, that judgment failed to adjudicate all the claims of the parties. It was not a final judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The next order entered on December 31, 1987, the administrative closing order staying the de*647fendant’s counterclaim, left defendant Goodrich the option of reopening the action within sixty days. The administrative closing order indicates that the district court never intended its summary judgment order to be a final order. The counterclaim was pending at the time the notice of appeal was filed, January 16, 1987, and the summary judgment entered by the district court could have been revised. Golden Villa Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 549 F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir.1977); Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b). Accordingly, the notice of appeal was premature and ineffective.
The majority concludes that the premature notice of appeal became effective when the administrative closing order “matured into a dismissal of the counterclaim with prejudice” and thereby created an ap-pealable final judgment. Majority Opinion at 643. The majority claims to find support for its new rule in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2), which provides:
Except as provided in (a)(4) of this Rule 4, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4), referred to in Rule 4(a)(2), clarifies that a notice of appeal filed prior to the disposition of a post-trial motion is ineffective and that a new notice of appeal must be filed after the disposition of the motion. By its terms, Rule 4(a)(2) applies when a party appeals “after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry of the judgment or order.” “It applies, therefore, only to a decision that will be final on its entry. It does not make appealable an order that is not appealable under § 1291 or § 1292(a).” 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 11204.14 (1987). Thus, Rule 4(a)(2) hardly applies in these circumstances because the original summary judgment was not an appealable order. Moreover, the appellate rules are not to be construed so as to expand the court’s jurisdiction. Fed.R. App.P. 1(b).
The majority also relies on other cases which have reached a similar result. The most persuasive reason advanced for this result is that the Supreme Court has indicated that there must be a practical rather than technical approach to finality under § 1291, one which balances the harms of piecemeal review against justice denied by delay. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 311, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225. I cannot agree, however, that “[i]n analagous situations, the Supreme Court has allowed subsequent events to validate prematurely filed appeals. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82, 83 S.Ct. 227, 229-30, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Lemke v. United States, 346 U.S. 325, 326, 74 S.Ct. 1, 98 L.Ed. 3 (1953) (criminal appeal).” Majority Opinion at 645.2 These brief cases simply do not turn on an attempt to appeal solely from a judgment which could not be final upon entry. Because I view the majority’s decision as conflicting with Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), I am not persuaded that the general Supreme Court authority mentioned by the majority is adequate support for the result achieved here.
There is another reason why I cannot agree with the new procedure announced by the majority. Perfecting an appeal is not a difficult task and it should be entrusted to those appearing before the court rather than to the court itself. The following best expresses this sentiment:
The rules of appellate practice in hand are simple and plain. They fill no office of mere red tape, or as a show of surface routine. To the contrary, they have substance, and carry on their face the obvious purpose to aid appellate courts in getting at the right of a cause. Hence, apparently, they bespeak the dignity arising from obedience. If they are not to be obeyed, they should be done away with once and for all. A just rule, fairly interpreted and enforced, wrongs no man. Ostensibly enforced, but not, it *648necessarily wrongs some men viz., those who labor to obey it — the very ones it should not injure.
Sullivan v. Holbrook, 109 S.W. 668, 670 (Mo.1908) (Lamm, J.). After our initial reminder that the appeal was jurisdictionally defective, appellants obtained a Rule 54(b) certification from the district court but did not file another notice of appeal. In light of what was settled Tenth Circuit law at the time, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was hardly prudent. In the long run, and in fairness to those who do follow the simple appellate rules, the court’s time is better spent resolving correctly filed appeals rather than shepherding stray appeals back into the flock.
I would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 provides:
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims'or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express ditection for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of the parties.

. See also Anderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir.1980) (“Analogously, subsequent events can validate a prematurely filed appeal.”). This proposition is also supported by citations to Foman and Lemke.