Court Opinion

ID: 9793037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:41:07.109487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:07.365124
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Groves
specially concurring:
I concur in the opinion, but wish to make a statement concerning two possible inferences which might be drawn from that portion of the opinion under point 5 — alleged improper remarks made by the district attorney during *478closing argument.
The determination in this respect could have been predicated merely upon the failure of defendant’s counsel to give any indication in advance of the testimony of the defendant that he wished that testimony to be for a limited purpose. An inference might be drawn from the opinion that, if the defendant may take the stand for a limited purpose, the court’s permission must first be obtained. Such a conclusion may or may not be sound. It is conceivable that we might rule someday that a defendant has. a constitutional right in this respect. See Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 59 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909, 89 S.Ct. 1752, 23 L.Ed.2d 222, (1969). At the moment I lean the other way, but I think we should leave the door open in this connection.
The second possible inference is that, if a defendant is permitted to take the stand for a limited purpose, his testimony must be only as to collateral matters not bearing on the merits of the accusation against him. The question of voluntariness of a confession is submitted to a jury as one of the elements to be considered by it in reaching a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” I am inclined to think that the testimony as to voluntariness, when presented in the trial itself before the jury, may not be a collateral matter. However, it is conceivable that sometime we might rule that the defendant may take the stand to testify only as to voluntariness of confession, irrespective of whether this is a collateral matter, under the following reasoning: In the in camera hearing required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the defendant is permitted to testify on the limited subject. Downey v. People, 121 Colo. 307, 215 P.2d 892 (1950). Someday we might rule that, simply because the defendant can testify solely as to voluntariness at the in camera hearing, Ire has the same right before the jury. Again, it is not intimated that we shall so hold, but the avenue toward this ruling should not be closed at this time.