Court Opinion

ID: 9675934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:10:20.163272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:41.474435
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
I respectfully dissent.
We have been asked to determine whether a person apprehended with a stolen firearm may be charged and convicted of both receiving or concealing a stolen firearm and felony-firearm. The defendant in this *699case was initially charged with three crimes.1 He was bound over on receiving or concealing a stolen firearm2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.3 The receiving offense was used as the predicate felony for the felony-firearm charge.
In resolving the issue before us, the appropriate analysis begins with an inquiry into the intent of the Legislature. The object is to determine whether punishment under the two statutes in question for defendant’s single act of possession violates the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 486; 355 NW2d 592 (1984).
We examine the subject, language, and history of the statutes. Id. at 486. We are mindful that the Legislature is free to determine what constitutes a criminal offense and, if it specifically intends, may authorize several penalties for a single criminal act. People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 111; 341 NW2d 68 (1983).
I believe that the majority in this case has glossed over an important principle used in construing legislative intent: Where two statutes prohibit violation of a single social norm, albeit in somewhat different manners, the Legislature is normally deemed not to have intended multiple punishments. Robideau, supra at 487.
The two statutes under scrutiny in this case are MCL 750.535b; MSA 28.803(2) and MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The former concerns stolen firearms and ammunition, and punishes those who receive, *700conceal, store, barter, sell, dispose of, pledge, or accept as security for a loan either one. The latter creates a separate felony for those who possess a firearm while committing a felony. The felony-firearm statute expressly excludes violation of four felonies: (1) unlawful sale of a firearm, MCL 750.223; MSA 28.420, (2) carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, (3) unlawful possession of a firearm by a licensee, MCL 750.227a; MSA 28.424(1), and (4) alteration of identifying marks on a firearm, MCL 750.230; MSA 28.427.
Both statutes prohibit violation of the same social norm: deterrence of the unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. Therefore, it should not be readily assumed that the Legislature intended multiple punishments for one act violating both statutes.
The majority concludes that the Legislature intended the felony-firearm statute to provide an additional sentence for anyone possessing a firearm who commits a felony other than those four explicitly enumerated. Ante at 698. It cites language from People v Sturgis4 for support. However, Sturgis can be distinguished from the case at hand and, in fact, bolsters defendant’s position. In Sturgis, the defendant was convicted of felonious assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and carrying a concealed weapon. This Court held:
We conclude that the history, language, and structure of the statutes indicate that felony-firearm and concealed weapon offenses are distinct offenses which may be separately punished in a single trial when the concealed weapon *701offense is not the predicate of the felony-firearm offense. [Id. at 410.]
The rationale in Sturgis is consistent with that in Wayne Co Prosecutor v Recorder’s Court Judge.5 There, it was found appropriate to convict the defendant of both second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The Court ruled that the two crimes were separate: murder does not require the use of a firearm and felony-firearm does not require the predicate felony of murder.6
The majority overrules People v Walker, 167 Mich App 377; 422 NW2d 8 (1988). That case is distinguishable from the present case, also. In Walker, the Court of Appeals held that assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder was sufficient to serve as the underlying felony for the felony-firearm conviction. Thus, in Sturgis, Wayne Co Prosecutor, and Walker, the underlying felony involved an act separate from possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.
The same rationale has been applied by the United States Supreme Court. In Ball v United States,7 the defendant was convicted of receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Predicated upon a review of the intent of *702Congress,8 the Court concluded that a defendant should not be subjected to two convictions for the same criminal act. It stated that Congress surely recognized that a felon who receives a firearm must also possess it. Id. at 862. Ball sets forth a constitutional baseline that this Court should not ignore. Yet, the majority makes no mention of it.
Against this backdrop of case law, it is implausible to conclude that the Michigan Legislature intended a defendant be punished twice for a single instance of possession of a single gun. We have before us a case in which the intent of the Legislature is so apparent that it overrides the literalness of the “except” clause relied on by the majority. It is noteworthy that the felonies listed in the “except” clause of the felony-firearm statute all involve possession of a firearm. It follows that the Legislature did not intend to impose duplicate punishment when the predicate felony involves the possession of a weapon, as contrasted with the use of a weapon.
Past decisions of this Court suggest that the intent of the Legislature is not that a possession-based firearm offense should become the predicate for a felony-firearm charge. Certainly, a contrary intent is not inevitable from a common-sense reading of the statute and its legislative history.
Any lingering uncertainty or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. As this Court stated in Robideau, “If no conclusive evidence of legislative intent can be discerned, the rule of lenity requires the *703conclusion that separate punishments were not intended.” Id. at 488.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 A charge of carrying a concealed weapon was dismissed.

 MCL 750.535b; MSA 28.803(2).

 MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

 427 Mich 392; 397 NW2d 783 (1986).

 406 Mich 374; 280 NW2d 793 (1979).

 Although the Court in Wayne Co Prosecutor applied the Blockburger test, it recognized that issues challenging multiple punishment are to be decided by determining legislative intent. Wayne Co Prosecutor, supra at 389. Blockburger v United, States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932).

 470 US 856; 105 S Ct 1668; 84 L Ed 2d 740 (1985).

 Although the Court utilized the Blockburger test to determine legislative intent, I believe that a Robideau analysis would yield the identical result.