Court Opinion

ID: 9408555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 07:00:23.832073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.887747
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CHRISTOPHER COULTER,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  SF-1221-17-0522-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: July 12, 2023
                         Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Waukeen Q. McCoy, Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the appellant.

           Kathryn Price, El Segundo, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review ,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the Western Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was employed by the
     agency as an Air Traffic Control (ATC) Specialist at Travis Air Force Base
     (TAFB), California. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 41 -45. According to the
     appellant, in March 2013, he began collecting and compiling information related
     to ATC operations at TFAB. IAF, Tab 1 at 25. He alleges that, from 2013 to
     2015, he tracked and recorded “all safety violations, procedural violations,
     non-compliance, errors and mishaps to prevent further mishaps/incidents from
     occurring” in a document called the “Administrative Pro Time Tracker and Daily
     Extraction Notes [E]xcel spreadsheet.” IAF, Tab 6 at 4. The appellant asserts
     that he experienced ongoing retaliatory behavior by his superiors and coworkers
     for tracking incidents and maintaining the spreadsheet. Id. at 5.
¶3        On February 17, 2016, the agency removed the appellant from his position
     based on one charge of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee and one charge
     of failure to follow directives.   IAF, Tab 1 at 7-10.    On August 3, 2016, the
     appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that
     he made several protected disclosures and that the agency took several actions
     against him in retaliation for making those disclosures.        Id. at 20-38.    On
     April 25, 2017, OSC informed the appellant that it had terminated its inquiry into
     his allegations and was closing his case. Id. at 39-42. OSC also advised the
     appellant that he may have a right to seek corrective action before the Board. Id.
¶4        The appellant timely filed an IRA appeal with the Board, IAF, Tab 1, and
     the administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order informing him of what was
     required to establish Board jurisdiction over his claims, IAF, Tab 3. Both parties
     responded to the order, IAF, Tabs 4, 6-14, and the appellant filed a rebuttal to the
     agency’s pleading in which he primarily argued that his overall tracking in his
                                                                                                3

     spreadsheet of alleged safety violations, protocol violations, mishaps, and
     incidents constituted a protected disclosure, IAF, Tab 15 at 7 -9.                     More
     specifically, though, he highlighted six alleged disclosures and five p ersonnel
     actions that he asserts were taken in retaliation for those disclosures. 2                Id.
     at 16-17.
¶5         In particular, the appellant alleged that he tracked and disclosed the
     following: (1) a civilian technician violated agency protocol, which resulted in
     $100,000 worth of damaged equipment; (2) the same civilian technician and two
     coworkers failed to follow protocol in a separate incident, which resulted in
     $29,000 worth of damaged equipment; 3 (3) another coworker failed to properly
     secure modems; (4) in February 2012, there was a mid-air collision between a
     light civilian aircraft and a helicopter, and he tracked the incident and kept notes
     on it in his spreadsheet; (5) in September 2015, the Chief Master Sergeant
     (CMSgt) attempted to decertify his ATC ratings; and (6) “in or about 2015,” his
     supervisor placed him on unauthorized duty restrictions, and he tracked this
     occurrence in his spreadsheet. Id. The appellant claimed that, in retaliation for
     these disclosures, the agency: (1) denied him overtime pay despite the fact that
     he worked overtime hours; (2) denied him a year-end bonus and time-off award in
     2013, 2014, and 2015; (3) changed his job duties by placing unauthorized
     restrictions on his duties and responsibilities; 4 (4) placed workplace restrictions

     2
       In the appellant’s initial response to the jurisdiction order, he listed several additional
     alleged personnel actions. IAF, Tab 6 at 5-7. It appears that, through the course of the
     proceedings below, the appellant narrowed his allegations regarding personnel actions,
     which he more clearly lays out in his rebuttal to the agency’s response to the
     jurisdictional order. IAF, Tab 15 at 9-12. We have relied on the appellant’s rebuttal in
     analyzing the personnel actions at issue in the appeal.
     3
       The appellant treats purported disclosures 1 and 2 as one disclosure, IAF, Tab 15
     at 16; however, we have separated them on review to adequately analyze each one
     individually.
     4
      The appellant broadly alleges that the agency placed unauthorized duty restrictions on
     him in retaliation for his disclosing his tracking spreadsheet. IAF, Tab 15 at 10 -11. He
                                                                                             4

     on him; (5) placed him on administrative leave; and (6) removed him from
     Federal service. IAF, Tab 6 at 7, Tab 15 at 9-12.
¶6         On August 7, 2017, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 20, Initial Decision (ID).
     The administrative judge found that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that
     purported disclosures 1, 2, 3, and 5 were protected; however, she found that the
     appellant failed to exhaust those claims before OSC. ID at 8 -13. She also found
     that the appellant failed to exhaust his remaining disclosures before OSC. ID
     at 4-13.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative
     judge erred in dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, that he made
     nonfrivolous allegations of protected disclosures, and that he exhausted those
     claims with OSC. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6 at 15-18. In an affidavit
     attached to his petition, he alleges an additional 14 claims of either protected
     disclosures or protected activity. 5 Id. at 23-26. For clarity, we have numbered
     the additional allegations raised on review sequentially with the allegations
     presented below and addressed by the administrative judge.
¶8         In allegation 7, the appellant claimed that he conducted “playbacks” almost
     once a week between 2012 and 2015 of ATCs failing to give traffic advisories
     and traffic alerts and that he shared this information with his superiors; in
     allegation 8, he detailed a specific “playback” that he conducted on April 22,
     2014, wherein he alleged that ATCs violated an order and that he recorded it in
     his spreadsheet, which was later sent to his superiors; in allegation 9, he claimed

     also claims as a separate personnel action that agency officials placed unauthorized
     duty restrictions on him in retaliation for a specific incident in August 2015. Id. at 11.
     Because the alleged personnel actions taken by the agency are effectively the same, we
     have combined them.
     5
      In the affidavit, the appellant also repeats three of the alleged disclosures explicitly
     made below. PFR File, Tab 6 at 24-25. Those allegations will not be reiterated here.
                                                                                           5

     that, in April 2013, he filed a grievance against his former supervisor and the
     CMSgt for denying him overtime pay in violation of agency regulations; in
     allegation 10, he claimed that, in April 2013, he filed a grievance against his
     former supervisor for implementing a rotating shift bid process in violation of
     agency regulations; in allegation 11, he claimed that a coworker failed to provide
     ATC automation pre-duty briefings, that he logged these failures in his
     spreadsheet, and that he disclosed this violation to his superiors; in allegation 12,
     he claimed that two other employees committed several security violations, which
     included, but were not limited to, leaving equipment room exit doors open,
     leaving equipment cabinets unlocked, and leaving unsecured laptops unattended
     overnight; and in allegation 13, he claimed that he tracked coworkers’ failure to
     provide air traffic control instructions. 6 Id. at 17, 23-25.
¶9         In allegation 14, the appellant claimed that, in October 2014, he filed a
     grievance against his supervisor for violating the automated time and attendance
     systems by changing his overtime hours to regular hours; in allegation 15, he
     claimed that, in November 2014, he filed another grievance against his supervisor
     for placing unauthorized duty restrictions on him; in allegation 16, he claimed
     that a coworker improperly shared his personal files 7 and information in violation
     of the agency’s Personally Identifiable Information (PII) policy; in allegation 17,
     the appellant claimed that, in September 2015, he filed a grievance regarding the
     CMSgt’s attempt to decertify his ratings; in allegation 18, he claimed that, in
     October 2015, he filed a grievance against his supervisor and the Lieutenant

     6
      Specifically, the appellant alleged that he tracked his coworkers’ failure to provide
     merging target procedures. PFR File, Tab 6 at 17.
     7
       Although the appellant indicates that his “personal files” were shared, he may mean
     that his “personnel files” were shared; however, we have stated his claim as he asserted
     it.
                                                                                          6

      Colonel (Lt. Col.) for denying him his Weingarten rights 8 during an investigatory
      meeting; in allegation 19, the appellant claimed that the CMSgt and the Lt. Col.
      forced him to illegally backdate a controller evaluation, and that he eventually
      filed a grievance on the matter; and in allegation 20, he claimed that between
      January 2014 and December 2015, he filed multiple inspector general (IG)
      complaints against his superiors. Id. at 25-26.
¶10        In his petition for review, the appellant also alleges as an additional
      personnel action that the agency imposed “restrictions” on him, which included
      being told that he was not permitted in the break room and the aut omation office
      and that he could not attend award ceremonies during off -duty hours. Id. at 11.
      He also alleges that he was required to check in with the watch supervisor before
      and after his shift and was told not to park in a certain location. Id. The agency
      has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 8.

                                          ANALYSIS
  ¶11      The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant proves by
      preponderant evidence that he exhausted his administrative remedy before OSC
      and makes nonfrivolous allegations that:       (1) he made a protected disclosure
      described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the protected
      disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
      to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
      Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 8, aff’d, No. 2022-1967,
      2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023); Chambers v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11; Salerno v. Department of the Interior,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). The Board generally treats OSC exhaustion as a

      8
        The U.S. Supreme Court, in National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten, Inc.,
      420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975), recognized that a member of a bargaining unit has a right to
      representation at investigatory interviews.
                                                                                         7

      threshold determination before considering whether the appellant’s claims
      constitute nonfrivolous allegations of protected disclosures or protected
      activities.   See Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446,
      ¶¶ 4-5 (2014) (stating that the first element to Board jurisdiction over an IRA
      appeal is exhaustion by the appellant of his administrative remedies before OSC
      and that the next requirement is that he nonfrivolously allege that he made a
      protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity). Accordingly, our analysis
      will look first to whether the appellant exhausted his administrative remedy with
      OSC and, if that threshold requirement is met, then to whether he nonfrivolously
      alleged that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity
      that was a contributing factor to an agency personnel action.          See Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. In determining if an appellant has made nonfrivolous
      allegations, the Board looks to his allegations rather than the agency’s contrary
      evidence or view of the evidence. Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      979 F.3d 1362, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

      The appellant exhausted 20 claims of alleged protected disclosures or protected
      activities and 6 alleged personnel actions before OSC. 9
¶12        To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant
      must have provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into his
      allegations of whistleblower reprisal. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. Generally,
      exhaustion can be demonstrated through the appellant’s initial OSC complaint,
      evidence the original complaint was amended (including but not limited to OSC’s
      determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended
      allegations), and the appellant’s written responses to OSC referencing the
      amended allegations. Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R.
      135, ¶ 8 (2011).      Alternatively, exhaustion may be proved through other

      9
        The appellant appears to have met the timeliness requirements set forth in 5 U.S.C.
      § 1214(a)(3) for filing an IRA appeal with the Board.
                                                                                           8

      sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the
      appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in his appeal. Chambers,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
¶13         As briefly noted above, in the initial decision, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant failed to prove that he exhausted any of the six alleged
      disclosures before OSC that he raised below.         ID at 10-13.    On review, the
      appellant submits an affidavit reiterating his alleged disclosures and activities
      raised before the administrative judge and, as noted, identifies new disclosures
      and activities. PFR File, Tab 6 at 21-33. In that affidavit, he states that he had
      “multiple conversations with the [OSC] investigator where [he] stated the
      aforementioned disclosures” that he made and “the retaliation” he was receiving.
      Id. at 33. Although the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for
      the first time on review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record
      closed below despite the party’s due diligence, Cleaton v. Department of Justice,
      122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2016), the
      appellant’s affidavit concerns the exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is
      a jurisdictional issue, and jurisdiction is always before the Board, see Lovoy v.
      Department of Health and Human Services, 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 30 (2003).
      Accordingly, we have considered the appellant’s affidavit, and we find that it is
      sufficient to establish by preponderant evidence that he exh austed his
      administrative remedy with OSC regarding the 20 alleged disclosures and
      activities he has raised with the Board. See Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
¶14         The exhaustion requirement for an IRA appeal also precludes the Board
      from considering a personnel action that was not raised before OSC.           Mason,
      116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8. Here, the appellant alleged below that the agency denied
      him overtime pay, denied him year-end bonuses in 2013, 2014, and 2015,
      restricted his duties, placed him on administrative leave, and removed him from
      his position. IAF, Tab 15 at 9-12. On review, he also asserts that the agency
      placed restrictions on him in the workplace.       PFR File, Tab 6 at 11-15.      The
                                                                                       9

      appellant’s OSC complaint makes clear that he exhausted his claims that the
      agency denied him overtime pay and year-end bonuses, IAF, Tab 1 at 25, 35,
      restricted his duties, id. at 30-31, placed him on administrative leave, id. at 30,
      and removed him, id. at 27, 34. Although his OSC complaint does not reference
      the workplace restrictions, his affidavit submitted on review mentions these
      restrictions and asserts that he raised this claim with OSC. PFR File, Tab 6 at 28.
      Thus, between the appellant’s OSC complaint submitted below and his affidavit
      submitted on review, we find that the appellant exhausted his claims that the
      agency took the six personnel actions listed above against him. See Chambers,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11; Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.

      The appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that he made at least one protected
      disclosure or engaged in at least one protected activity.
¶15        As stated above, to establish jurisdiction before the Board in an IRA appeal,
      the appellant must, after exhausting his administrative remedy before OSC, make
      nonfrivolous allegations that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in
      protected activity. Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5. A nonfrivolous allegation of
      a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an allegation of facts that, if proven,
      would show that the appellant disclosed a matter that a reasonable person in his
      position would believe evidenced one of the categories of wrongdoing specified
      in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).    Id., ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative
      whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:
      whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to
      and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the
      actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
      mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
      and specific danger to public health or safety. Id.
                                                                                             10

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected disclosure
            with respect to allegations 2-8, 11-13, and 16.
¶16         As discussed above, in allegations 2-4, 7-8, 11-13, and 16, the appellant
      asserts that he disclosed to his superiors various incidents in which agency
      employees failed to follow protocols, policies, and Joint Orders, which resulted
      in, among other things, damaged equipment, equipment being left unsecured, a
      mid-air collision, and violations of PII.       PFR File, Tab 6 at 17, 21, 23 -26.
      Regardless of the specific laws, rules, or regulations that the appellant believed
      were violated, the gravamen of these allegations is that he disclosed to his
      superiors several instances in which he believed coworkers engaged in conduct
      that violated laws, rules, or regulations. 10 See Hudson v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 104 M.S.P.R. 283, ¶ 11 (2006) (stating that there is no de minimis
      exception to an allegation that an agency violated a law, rule, or regulation).
      Although we have concerns about the degree of detail provided in these
      allegations, as the appellant has not specifically alleged when the disclosures
      were made or, in some instances, specifically to whom, the burden at the
      jurisdictional stage is a low one, and we must resolve any doubt or ambiguity in
      favor of finding jurisdiction. See Usharauli v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 19 (2011) (stating that any doubt or ambiguity as to
      whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous jurisdictional allegation should be
      resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction); Jessup v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10 (2007) (observing that the appellant’s burden of

      10
         Although the appellant has not identified the specific law, rule, or regulation in each
      disclosure that he believes was violated, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
      Circuit has stated that an appellant need not allege a violation of law with precise
      specificity when the “statements and circumstances surrounding the making of those
      statements clearly implicate an identifiable violation of law, rule, or regulation.” See
      Langer v. Department of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Here, in
      light of the low threshold for making a nonfrivolous allegation, the appellant has
      provided sufficient information to implicate an identifiable law, rule, or regulation
      when not otherwise expressly provided.
                                                                                          11

      making a nonfrivolous allegation is low and requires only a minimal sufficient
      showing).   Accordingly, because the appellant provided a brief description of
      wrongdoing related to a violation of law, rule, or regulation as contemplated in
      section 2302(b)(8) and asserted that he disclosed this alleged wrongdoing to his
      superiors, we find that his assertions in this regard constitute nonfrivolous
      allegations that he made protected disclosures.
¶17        In allegation 5, the appellant asserts that he disclosed that the CMSgt
      attempted to decertify his ATC ratings, and in allegation 6, he alleges that he
      disclosed that his supervisor placed him on unauthorized duty restrictions. PFR
      File, Tab 6 at 25-26.      Of the types of wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8), the appellant’s claims in allegations 5 and 6 most closely align with
      allegations of an abuse of authority. An employee discloses an abuse of authority
      when he alleges that a Federal official has arbitrarily or capriciously exercised
      power which has adversely affected the rights of any person or has resulted in
      personal gain or advantage to herself or to preferred other persons.           Webb v.
      Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 10 n.3 (2015).            Here, the
      appellant’s allegations that the CMSgt attempted to decertify his ratings and that
      his supervisor imposed unauthorized duty restrictions on the appellant could both
      result in an adverse effect on the appellant’s rights , as both concern the
      appellant’s performance. Thus, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged
      that he disclosed an abuse of authority with respect to allegations 5 and 6.
¶18        Based on the foregoing, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged
      that he made a protected disclosure with respect to allegations 2 -8, 11-13, and 16.
      We now turn to the appellant’s protected activities.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he engaged in protected activity
            with respect to allegations 9, 14-15, and 20.
¶19        The remainder of the appellant’s allegations are either related to the filing
      of grievances or an IG complaint, both of which are considered protected activity
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). As relevant here, however, protected activity under
                                                                                      12

      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) includes “the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or
      grievance right granted by any law, rule, or regulation . . . with regard to
      remedying a violation of [section 2302(b)(8)]” (emphasis added).        Thus, only
      grievances seeking to remedy whistleblower reprisal are covered under
      section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i).   5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); see Mudd v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013).
¶20          The appellant claims in allegation 9 that he filed a grievance in April 2013
      against his previous supervisor and the CMSgt for denying him overtime pay
      when he worked overtime hours. PFR File, Tab 6 at 23-24. The grievance does
      not appear in the record, but the appellant alleged that he was denied overtime
      pay due to his tracking spreadsheet. Id. at 11. Because the appellant has alleged
      that his tracking spreadsheet included various instances of wrongdoing by
      coworkers or agency officials and that he provided this spreadsheet to his
      superiors, we liberally construe the disclosure of this spreadsheet to constitute
      whistleblowing activity and, therefore, find that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that this grievance sought to remedy reprisal for whistleblowing.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      April 2013 grievance constitutes protected activity. See Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365,
      ¶ 7.
¶21          The grievances referenced in allegation 14 (regarding the claim that the
      appellant’s supervisor improperly logged into the appellant’s timecard and
      changed his time from unscheduled overtime to regular hours) and allegation 15
      (regarding the appellant’s placement on unauthorized duty re strictions by his
      supervisor) both appear in the record. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12, 17-19. The appellant
      filed the grievance detailed in allegation 14 to obtain the appropriate overtime
      pay that he was denied, he claims, as a result of reprisal for maintaining and
      disclosing his tracking spreadsheet, which, as explained above, when liberally
      construed, constitutes whistleblowing activity.      Id. at 11-12.   The grievance
      detailed in allegation 15 sought the rescission of a memorandum that imposed
                                                                                      13

      duty restrictions, according to the appellant, in reprisal for his maintaining and
      disclosing the tracking spreadsheet, which, again, when liberally construed,
      constitutes whistleblowing activity. Id. at 17-19. Because both grievances were
      filed to remedy personnel actions alleged to have been taken in retaliation for
      whistleblowing activity, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the
      grievances described in allegations 14 and 15 constitute protected activity. See
      Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7.
¶22         Finally, the appellant claims in allegation 20 that he filed several IG
      complaints between January 2014 and December 2015, PFR File, Tab 6 at 26.
      Based on our review, no IG complaint is included in the record, but the filing of
      an IG complaint is considered protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C)
      regardless of whether it was filed in connection with remedying a violation of
      section 2302(b)(8).   See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that IG reports that he filed from 2014
      to 2015 constitute a protected activity.
¶23         In sum, we find that the appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that he
      engaged in protected activities in allegations 9, 14-15, and 20. We now address
      the appellant’s allegations that are not protected.
                                                                                             14

            The appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that he made a
            protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity with respect to
            allegations 1, 10, and 17-19. 11
¶24         In allegation 1, the appellant claims that he disclosed to his superiors that a
      coworker violated agency protocols which resulted in $100,000 worth of damaged
      equipment. IAF, Tab 15 at 16; PFR File, Tab 6 at 24. The administrative judge
      found that the appellant’s allegations constituted a nonfrivolous allegation of a
      violation of a law, rule, or procedure. 12 ID at 8. We find, however, that the
      appellant’s allegations are not sufficiently specific or detailed to meet the
      above-referenced standard, as he does not explain, in contrast with the disclosures
      discussed above, the underlying conduct that he believes violated the unspecified
      protocol.   Compare Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 2, 6-7 (finding that an
      appellant’s disclosure to OSC that an agency’s communication security system
      was inadequate was not sufficiently specific or detailed to meet the nonfrivolous
      allegation standard), with Rusin v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298,
      ¶¶ 14-15 (2002) (finding that the appellant’s allegation that his supervisor
      violated a specific and detailed rule from the agency’s Procurement Instruction
      Memorandum constituted a nonfrivolous allegation of a violation of a law, rule,
      or regulation). Thus, we find that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous
      allegation of a protected disclosure.        See Linder v. Department of Justice,
      122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 14 (2014) (stating that disclosures must be specific and

      11
         As explained below, a finding of jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal only
      requires us to find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one
      protected disclosure or engaged in at least one protected activity that was a contributing
      factor in at least one personnel action. See Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 13; see also infra ¶ 30. Although we have found above that the
      appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one protected disclosure or
      engaged in at least one protected activit y, we nonetheless address the remaining alleged
      disclosures and activities in order to simplify the administrative judge’s remaining
      jurisdictional undertaking on remand.
      12
        Nonetheless, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove th at he
      exhausted this claim with OSC. ID at 10.
                                                                                       15

      detailed, and not simply vague allegations of wrongdoing); Keefer v. Department
      of Agriculture, 82 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 10 (1999) (explaining that disclosures must not
      be broad and imprecise and should be “sufficiently clear”).
¶25        In allegation 10, the appellant asserts that he filed a grievance in April 2013
      against his previous supervisor for implementing a rotating shift bid process.
      PFR File, Tab 6 at 24.     In allegation 17, the appellant asserts that he filed a
      grievance regarding the CMSgt’s attempt to decertify his ATC ratings. Id. at 26.
      In allegation 18, he asserts that he filed a grievance against his superior for
      denying him his Weingarten rights. Id. In allegation 19, the appellant alleges
      that he filed a grievance against his superiors because they forced him to illegally
      backdate a controller evaluation containing false information. Id. As explained
      above, only grievances seeking to remedy whistleblower reprisal are covered
      under section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i). 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); see Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R.
      365, ¶¶ 6-7. Based on our review of the record, either the referenced grievances
      do not appear in the record or the appellant has not alleged that they were filed to
      remedy reprisal for whistleblower activity, as he has not claimed that the
      implementation of a rotating shift bid, the decertification of his ATC ratings, the
      denial of his Weingarten rights, or being forced to sign a backdated evaluation
      constituted personnel actions taken against him by the agency in retaliation for
      making a protected disclosure or engaging in a protected activity.       PFR File,
      Tab 6 at 24, 26.    Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the grievances described in allegations 10 and 17-19
      constitute protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9).              See Mudd,
      120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7.
¶26        To reiterate, we find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that
      he made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity with respect to
      allegations 1, 10, and 17-19. However, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that he made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity with
      respect to allegations 2-9, 11-16, and 20.
                                                                                       16

      The appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that the agency took at least one
      personnel action against him.
¶27         As discussed above, the appellant claimed that the agency took six
      personnel actions against him in reprisal for his protected disclosures or
      activities. Specifically, the appellant claimed that the agency: (1) denied him
      overtime pay despite the fact that he worked overtime hours; (2) denied him a
      year-end bonus and time off award in 2013, 2014, and 2015; (3) changed his job
      duties by placing unauthorized restrictions on his duties and responsibilities;
      (4) placed workplace restrictions on him; (5) placed him on administrative leave;
      and (6) removed him from Federal service.         IAF, Tab 6 at 7, Tab 15 at 9-12.
      After careful review of the record, we find that the appellant made nonfrivolous
      allegations that the denials of overtime pay and year-end bonuses constitute
      personnel actions because they both concern pay. 5 U.C.S. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).
      We also find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel
      action regarding the unauthorized duty restrictions because a significant change
      in   duties,   responsibilities    or   working   conditions   is   covered   under
      section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).       Further, the Board has held that placement on
      administrative leave constitutes a personnel action.      Hagen v. Department of
      Transportation, 103 M.S.P.R. 595, ¶ 13 (2006). Finally, a removal is an agency
      action covered under chapter 75.         5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii).   Thus, the
      appellant has made nonfrivolous allegations that these actions constitute
      personnel actions under section 2302(a)(2)(A).
¶28         Regarding the appellant’s allegation that the agency imposed workplace
      restrictions on him, he asserts that he was told by his superiors not to be in the
      break room or the automation office, or to attend award ceremonies during
      off-duty hours. PFR File, Tab 6 at 11. He also claims that he was told not to
      park in a certain location and that he was the only employee who had these
      restrictions placed on him. We find that these assertions do not rise to the level
      of a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency took a personnel action against him
                                                                                        17

      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).         The only category encompassed by the
      appellant’s allegation is a “significant change in duties, responsibilities, or
      working conditions” under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xiii). In interpreting this phase,
      the Board has explained that “only agency actions that, individually or
      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
      found to constitute a personnel action covered by section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).”
      See Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16 (2022). The
      appellant’s allegations that he could not park in a certain location or be present in
      certain rooms do not affect his duties or responsibilities, and the appellant has not
      alleged how these restrictions have a significant effect on his working conditions.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that the
      agency’s imposition of workplace restrictions amounts to a personnel action
      under section 2302(a)(2)(A).

      The appellant made nonfrivolous allegations that at least one protected disclosure
      or activity was a contributing factor to at least one personnel action.
¶29         The next step in the analysis of an IRA appeal is to determine whether the
      appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the above-discussed protected disclosures or
      activities were contributing factors in a personnel action. Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R.
      230, ¶ 5. To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage of
      an IRA appeal, the appellant only need raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      fact of, or the content of, the protected disclosure or protected activity was one
      factor that tended to affect the personnel action in any way. Id., ¶ 13. One way
      to establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under which an employee
      may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
      in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the
      official who took the personnel action knew of the disclosure or activity and that
      the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable
      person could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in
                                                                                       18

      the personnel action. Id. With regard to the knowledge prong of this test, an
      appellant may establish, for jurisdictional purposes, that a disclosure or activity
      was a contributing factor in a personnel action by nonfrivolously alleging that the
      official taking the personnel action had constructive knowledge of the disclosure
      or activity. See Wells v. Department of Homeland Security, 102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 8
      (2006).   Constructive knowledge may be established by demonstrating that an
      individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure or activity influenced the
      official accused of taking the retaliatory action. Id. Regarding the timing prong
      of the test, the relevant inquiry is the time between when the agency official
      taking the action had actual or constructive knowledge of the disclosure or
      activity—not necessarily the date of the disclosure or activity itself—and the time
      that the action was taken. See id.
¶30         Due to the complexity and volume of the appellant’s claims, our discussion
      here is limited to addressing our ultimate inquiry of whether the appellant has
      established jurisdiction over his appeal, to wit, whether he has nonfrivolously
      alleged that at least one protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
      in at least one personnel action. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 13 (explaining
      that, in cases when an appellant has alleged multiple personnel actions, the Board
      has jurisdiction over the appeal when the appellant exhaust s his administrative
      remedy and makes a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one alleged personnel
      action was taken in reprisal for at least one alleged protected disclosures). As
      further discussed below, however, on remand, the administrative judge should
      address each disclosure and personnel action over which the Board has
      jurisdiction, in addition to considering the merits of the appellant’s claims.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one protected disclosure
            or activity was a contributing factor in the denial of overtime pay.
¶31         Regarding the appellant’s first alleged personnel action, the denial of
      overtime pay, it appears that the appellant alleged two different instances for
      when he was not properly compensated for overtime hours; the i nstance that led
                                                                                           19

      to the filing of the April 2013 grievance (the subject of another alleged protected
      activity), for which he does not provide a date, and the instance that occurred in
      September 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12; PFR File, Tab 6 at 23-24. Further, he has
      alleged that the CMSgt, the Major, and his supervisor were the agency officials
      responsible for the denial of overtime pay. PFR File, Tab 6 at 23 -24, 28.
¶32         Because the alleged 2013 denial of overtime pay predates many of the
      appellant’s alleged protected disclosures and protected activities, for the sake of
      efficiency, we consider here the alleged September 2014 denial of overtime pay. 13
      Regarding allegation 9 (concerning the April 2013 grievance related to the initial
      denial of overtime pay), this grievance was filed in April of 2013, which was
      followed within 2 years by the September 2014 denial of overtime pay. Thus, the
      appellant’s   assertions   in   allegation   9   meet   the   timing   prong    of   the
      knowledge/timing test with respect to the 2014 denial of overtime pay.               See
      Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14 (holding that a personnel action taken within
      approximately 1 to 2 years of the protected disclosure or activity satisfies the
      knowledge/timing test). Additionally, the appellant alleges that he logged “this
      information” in his tracking spreadsheet and that he disclosed the spreadsheet to
      his superiors.    Id. at 23-24.      Although the appellant’s reference to “this
      information” and to his “superiors” is not precise, at the jurisdictional stage of the
      proceedings, it is reasonable to construe this assertion as one alleging that he
      disclosed the grievance and the subject matter of the g rievance to a category of
      agency officials that includes, at least, the CMSgt and the appellant’s supervisor.
      See Usharauli, 116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 19; Jessup, 107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10. As such,
      we find that the appellant also nonfrivolously alleged that at least two of the
      agency officials responsible for the November 2014 denial of overtime pay had
      knowledge of the April 2013 grievance detailed in allegation 9.              Thus, the

      13
        On remand, the administrative judge should include in the jurisdictional consideration
      the 2013 denial of overtime pay.
                                                                                        20

      appellant has also met the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one
      protected disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to deny him overtime pay in November 2014. See Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one protected disclosure
            or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to deny him a
            year-end bonus in 2014 and 2015, but failed to nonfrivolously allege the
            same with respect to the 2013 denial of a year-end bonus.
¶33         The appellant has alleged that the agency denied him year-end bonuses in
      2013, 2014, and 2015. PFR File, Tab 6 at 11-12. Although the appellant failed to
      explicitly name the agency official responsible for the denials, the record suggests
      that his direct supervisor denied those year-end bonuses. IAF, Tab 1 at 31, Tab 8
      at 24. Regarding the 2013 denial, the appellant has not asserted when in 2013
      this denial occurred. Because this allegation lacks sufficient specificity to more
      fully assess the appellant’s claim, we only consider allegations of alleged
      protected disclosures and activities that occurred prior to 2013, as those that
      occurred after the 2013 denial of overtime could not have been contributing
      factors to it. See Lu v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 11
      (2015) (explaining that events that preceded an appellant’s disclosures will have
      “little to no relevance”); Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 27 (finding that disclosures
      occurring after the personnel actions at issue could not have been con tributing
      factors in those actions).   The only alleged protected disclosure or protected
      activity that occurred prior to the relevant time period is the appellant’s
      disclosure detailed in allegation 4. In allegation 4, he alleges that he disclosed to
      the Major and flight security officers that a midair collision occurred as a result
      of his coworkers’ failure to provide traffic alerts and traffic advisories in
      violation of an agency Joint Order. PFR File, Tab 6 at 21. However, he has not
      alleged that he made this disclosure to his supervisor, who was responsible for the
      denial of the 2013 year-end bonus, nor has he alleged that the officials to whom
                                                                                       21

      he made the disclosure had any influence on the appellant’s supervisor’s decision.
      Thus, the appellant’s allegations do not meet the knowledge/timing test.
¶34        However, the knowledge-timing test is not the only way for an appellant to
      satisfy the contributing factor element.   See Stiles v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶ 24 (2011).         If the appellant fails to make
      nonfrivolous allegations that satisfy that test, we must consider other factors,
      such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for
      taking the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was p ersonally directed
      at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether those individuals had a desire
      or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Id. Here, the appellant’s challenge to
      the agency’s basis for denying him the year-end bonus is a generic accusation that
      simply repeats his belief of reprisal. PFR File, Tab 6 at 11-12. Further, by the
      appellant’s own admission, his alleged disclosure in allegation 4 did not implicate
      his direct supervisor.   Id. at 9-10.   Based on the foregoing, we find that the
      appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that he made at least one protected
      disclosure or engaged in at least one protected activity that was a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to deny him a year -end bonus in 2013.
¶35        Turning to the appellant’s allegation that the agency also denied him a 2014
      year-end bonus, we again observe that the appellant has not asserted a specific
      date on which this denial occurred. However, it is reasonable to assume that it
      occurred sometime in 2014. In allegation 9, the appellant alleges that he filed a
      grievance regarding the denial of overtime pay in April of 2013, and as discussed
      above, we have found that he nonfrivolously alleged that that grievance was
      protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9).        Because an April 2013 grievance
      occurred within 1-2 years of the 2014 denial of the appellant’s year-end bonus,
      we find that the appellant has met the timing prong of the knowledge /timing test.
      See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14.       Additionally, as discussed above, the
      appellant has alleged that he tracked the information related to the grievance in
      his spreadsheet, and that he shared the spreadsheet with his superiors. Again, at
                                                                                         22

      this stage of the proceedings, we construe this assertion as one alleging that he
      disclosed the information in allegation 9 to at least his direct supervisor, w ho was
      the agency official responsible for the denial of the appellant’s 2014 year -end
      bonus. See supra, ¶ 34; see also Usharauli, 116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 19; Jessup,
      107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10. As such, we find that the appellant also met the knowledge
      prong of the knowledge/timing test.       Accordingly, we find that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one protected disclosure or engaged
      in at least one protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to deny his year-end bonus in 2014.
¶36         Regarding the 2015 denial, the appellant again does not allege specifically
      when in 2015 this denial occurred.       However, in allegation 14, the appellant
      alleged that he filed a grievance in October of 2014, and we have found above
      that he nonfrivolously alleged that that grievance was protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9). Because an alleged protected activity that occurred in October of
      2014 occurred within 1-2 years of any date in 2015, we find that the appellant has
      established the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test.              See Salerno,
      123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14. Additionally, as noted above, the appellant’s supervisor
      was responsible for the 2015 denial of overtime pay, and the record makes clear
      that the October 2014 grievance was sent directly to him. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-13.
      Thus, we find that the appellant’s allegations also meet the knowledge prong of
      the   knowledge/timing    test.     Accordingly,    we   find   that   the   appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one protected disclosure or engaged
      in at least one protected activity that was a contributing factor in the denial of his
      2015 year-end bonus.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one protected disclosure
            or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to impose
            unauthorized duty restrictions on him.
¶37         Regarding the alleged unauthorized duty restrictions, the appellant has
      alleged that his supervisor placed him on unauthorized duty restrictions on
                                                                                       23

      November 13, 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 17-19. As explained above, in allegation 14,
      the appellant alleges that he engaged in protected activity in October 2014 by
      filing a grievance covered under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9).          Again, because a
      protected activity that occurred in October of 2014 proceeded by 1 month the
      November 2014 restriction on his duties, we find that the appellant has
      established the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test with respect to the duty
      restrictions action See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14. Further, because the
      October 2014 grievance described in allegation 14 was sent directly to the
      appellant’s supervisor and that supervisor was responsible for this acti on, we also
      find that the appellant’s allegations meet the knowledge prong of the
      knowledge/timing test. Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that he made at least one protected disclosure or engaged in at least one
      protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to place
      him on unauthorized duty restrictions.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one protected disclosure
            or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to
            place him on administrative leave.
¶38        The appellant alleged that the Lt. Col. placed him on administrative leave in
      October 2015. IAF, Tab 15 at 12. Regarding allegation 16, the appellant alleged
      that he disclosed that a coworker had improperly accessed and shared his personal
      files in violation of the agency’s PII policy to his direct supervisor and the
      Lt. Col. on or around October-November 2014. PFR File, Tab 6 at 26. Because
      the appellant has alleged that the Lt. Col. was responsible for his placement on
      administrative leave and the Lt. Col. had knowledge of the disclosure contained
      in allegation 16, we find that the appellant’s allegations meet the knowledge
      prong of the knowledge/timing test.      Additionally, because the appellant has
      alleged that his placement on administrative leave occurred approximately 1 year
      after the disclosure, we find that his allegations meet the timing prong of the
      knowledge/timing test. See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 14. Accordingly, we
                                                                                       24

      find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one protected
      disclosure or engaged in at least one protected activity that was a contributing
      factor in the agency’s decision to place him on administrative leave.

            The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that at least one protected disclosure
            or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to remove
            him.
¶39        The record shows that the Colonel (Col.) issued the notice removing the
      appellant on February 17, 2016.     IAF, Tab 1 at 7, 10.     Looking again at the
      appellant’s allegation 16, which is discussed directly above, the appellant
      asserted that he made this disclosure sometime in October or November 2014 to
      his direct supervisor and the Lt. Col. PFR File, Tab 6 at 26. Because this time
      period is within 2 years of the date of his removal, we find that the appellant ha s
      met the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test. See Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R.
      230, ¶ 14. Further, although the appellant has not alleged that the Col. himself
      was aware of this disclosure, he has alleged that it was actually the Lt. Col. who
      prompted the removal action and that the Lt. Col. was aware of this disclosure.
      PFR File, Tab 6 at 26. As we explained above, an agency official responsible for
      the action has constructive knowledge of a disclosure if a person with actual
      knowledge influenced the responsible official’s action. See Wells, 102 M.S.P.R.
      36, ¶ 8. Here, because the appellant has alleged that the Lt. Col. influenced the
      ultimate decision to remove him from his position and that he had actual
      knowledge of this disclosure, PFR File, Tab 6 at 26, we find that the appellant has
      alleged that the Col. had constructive knowledge of the disclosure, see Wells,
      102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 8. Thus, the appellant’s allegations also meet the knowledge
      prong of the knowledge/timing test.      Accordingly, we find that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that he made at least one protected disclosure or engaged
      in at least one protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to remove him.
                                                                                      25

                                       CONCLUSION
¶40         Based on the foregoing, we find that the appellant proved by preponderant
      evidence that he exhausted 20 allegations of protected disclosures and activities
      with OSC and made a nonfrivolous allegation that at least one personnel action
      was taken in retaliation for at least one alleged protected disclosure or protected
      activity.   See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 13.       Specifically, we find that the
      appellant nonfrivolously alleged that (1) his April 2013 grievance, as discussed in
      allegation 9, was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to deny him
      overtime pay in November of 2014 and a year-end bonus in 2014; (2) his October
      2014 grievance, as discussed in allegation 14, was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to deny him a year-end bonus in 2015; (3) his October 2014
      grievance, as discussed in allegation 14, was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to place him on duty restrictions in November of 2014; and (4) his
      disclosure regarding a coworker’s improper access and sharing of per sonal files
      in violation of the agency’s PII policy, as detailed in allegation 16, was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to place him on administrative leave
      and to remove him. Although we have not considered here whether the appellant
      has nonfrivolously alleged that all of his alleged protected disclosures and
      protected activities were contributing factors to the personnel actions set forth
      above, we find that the appellant established Board jurisdiction over his IRA
      appeal. See id.
¶41         Because we have not fully resolved the Board’s jurisdiction with respect to
      each of the appellant’s individual claims, we remand the appeal to the
      administrative judge for a full and complete discussion of whether the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that the remainder of his alleged protected disclosures and
      protected activities were contributing factors in the personnel actions discussed
      above. Thereafter, the administrative judge should hold a hearing on the merits
      where the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that he made a
      protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity that was a contributing
                                                                                           26

      factor in a personnel action. 14 If the appellant makes such a showing, the agency
      shall have the opportunity to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the personnel action even in the absence of the appellant’s
      protected disclosure or protected activity. 15       See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e); Lu,
      122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 11.

                                             ORDER
¶42         For the reasons discussed above, we grant the appellant’s petition for
      review, reverse the initial decision, find that the Board has jurisdiction over his
      appeal, and remand this case to the Western Regional Office for further
      adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      14
        The merits hearing should be limited only to the claims over which the administrat ive
      judge finds jurisdiction and the claims over which we have found jurisdiction here.
      15
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.