Court Opinion

ID: 9380126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 14:04:17.025498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.796742
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0470-MR

HELEN LAND                                                              APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-00815

BRYAN ZACHARY LAND; CHERYL
L. LAND; KATHERINE Y. SHORT;
AND UNKNOWN SPOUSE OF
KATHERINE Y. SHORT                                                      APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: JONES, KAREM, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Helen Land appeals from the Scott Circuit Court’s order

dismissing her quiet title action for failure to state a claim. Finding no error, we

affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             This case involves a dispute between siblings over real property

owned by their parents. George Land, Jr. and Dorothy C. Land were married and

had two children – Helen and Bryan Land. On March 2, 1959, George and

Dorothy Land purchased property at 566 Crumbaugh Road in Georgetown,

Kentucky (the “Property”) in fee simple and with the right of survivorship.

             In 1968, George and Dorothy executed a Joint Will (the “Joint Will”).

The pertinent terms of the Joint Will are as follows:

                    It is the will of each of us that on the death of
             either of us, all of the property of the deceased party,
             whether real or personal, and wheresoever situate, shall
             descend to and become the sole property of the surviving
             party.

             ...

                    In the event we should die in a common disaster,
             or from a common cause, we give, bequeath and devise
             all of our estate, real and personal, of every kind and
             description, wheresoever situate, to the surviving
             children born of our marriage, absolutely and in equal
             shares and in fee simple.

             ...

                    This Joint Will is made in performance of a written
             contract entered into simultaneously with the execution
             of this Will and by the terms of which each of us
             contracted with the other to execute this Will; and by the
             further term of which we, and each of us, contracted that
             we should not revoke this Will in whole or in part, or
             attempt to do so.

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George and Dorothy also executed a separate agreement on the same day (the

“Agreement”). The Agreement was recorded with the Joint Will and stated in

pertinent part:

             1. That each party shall devise and bequeath to the other
                all of his or her estate, real and personal property,
                wheresoever situate, to be the surviving party’s
                property absolutely and in fee simple.

             2. That in the event the parties hereto shall die in a
                common disaster, then and in that event, said Last
                Will and Testament shall provide that all the property
                of the parties hereto, real and personal, wheresoever
                situate, shall be the property of the surviving children
                born of the marriage of the parties hereto, to be theirs
                absolutely and in equal shares and in fee simple.

                  ....

              6. Said Will shall further provide that neither party shall
                 revoke said Will in whole, or in part, nor attempt to
                 do so, except with the written permission of both
                 parties.

While George passed away in 1986, Dorothy lived for approximately thirty more

years, passing away on August 26, 2016.

             Beginning in 1999 and continuing until 2011, Dorothy divided the

Property into separate lots. She transferred ownership of all the parcels to herself,

Bryan, and Bryan’s wife, Cheryl, in fee simple with the right of survivorship.

Additionally, Bryan and Cheryl sold a portion of the Property to Katherine Short in

fee simple in 2017 after Dorothy’s death.

                                         -3-
             On December 29, 2020, Helen filed a complaint requesting, among

other relief, that the circuit court enter an order quieting title to the property and

determining that she had an ownership interest in the property under the Joint Will.

Bryan, Cheryl, and Katherine filed motions to dismiss, and the circuit court held a

hearing on March 4, 2021. Thereafter, the circuit court entered an order

concluding that Helen’s complaint against Bryan, Cheryl, and Katherine had failed

to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief related to any interest she

may have in the Property. Thus, the circuit court dismissed Helen’s quiet title

claims with prejudice.

             Helen filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court

denied on March 28, 2022. This appeal followed.

                                      ANALYSIS

             a. Standard of Review

             An appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim de novo. Barnett v. Central Kentucky Hauling, LLC, 617 S.W.3d 339, 341

(Ky. 2021). Moreover, like the trial court, it must take the material, factual

allegations in the complaint as true. Id. Indeed, “[i]n ruling on a motion to

dismiss, the pleadings should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff[.]” Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. 2009) (citation

omitted). Thus, a court properly dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim

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where the plaintiff “appears not to be entitled to relief under any set of facts which

could be proven in support of his claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

             b. Discussion

             In Kentucky, “a plaintiff seeking to establish title must sustain his

claim either by record title or adverse possession; he must recover on the strength

of his title and not upon the weakness of his adversary’s title[.]” Gabbard v.

Lunsford, 308 Ky. 836, 215 S.W.2d 985, 986 (1948).

             Thus, we must first determine whether the circuit court correctly

dismissed Helen’s complaint for failing to allege facts sufficient to establish a

claim of title to the Property under the Joint Will. In construing the pleadings in

favor of Helen, we will assume that, upon George’s death, the Joint Will became

irrevocable, and Dorothy could not dispose of the Property in a manner other than

under the terms of the Joint Will.

             Therefore, we must examine the language of the Joint Will to

determine how the parties intended to dispose of the Property under the Joint Will.

“[T]he intention of a testator, as gathered from the four corners of the will, is the

one to be adopted and enforced by the court” and “in applying that rule, the

language that the testator used, and not the language he might have used, controls.”

Underwood v. Underwood, 273 Ky. 654, 117 S.W.2d 596, 598 (1938).

                                          -5-
             In this case, the Joint Will’s language, whether it is read

independently or together with the Agreement, is unambiguous: George and

Dorothy intended that the surviving spouse receive the entire estate if the spouses

did not pass away “in a common disaster” or “from a common cause.” While the

Joint Will did not use the words “in fee simple,” that was clearly what was

intended by the phrase “become the sole property of the surviving party.”

             Moreover, the Joint Will contained no language of intention that the

surviving spouse was only to have a life estate in the Property. See Smith v.

Newton, 308 Ky. 136, 213 S.W.2d 1002 (1948) (the Court found no indication that

the parties intended a devise to a married brother to be a life estate based on the

clear testamentary language in the joint will). Here, the parties used no language

in the Joint Will to designate how the parties intended the remainder of the

surviving spouse’s property to be distributed. Instead, it is clear from the

documents that George and Dorothy meant for the survivor to have full ownership

of the Property and to inherit their estates solely, absolutely, and in fee simple. It

was only in the event of the spouse’s joint death from a “common disaster,” or a

“common cause” should the children of their marriage share equally in their

estates.

             Thus, upon George’s death thirty years after executing the Joint Will,

Dorothy became the owner of his entire estate, including the Property, in fee

                                          -6-
simple. The fact that the deed to the Property was held by the spouses jointly with

right of survivorship further attests to their intentions regarding their estate plan.

             In sum, Helen “appears not to be entitled to relief under any set of

facts which could be proven in support” of her claim, and the circuit court properly

granted the motion to dismiss her complaint. Morgan, 289 S.W.3d at 226 (citation

omitted).

                                   CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Scott Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

 Jason M. Obermeyer                          Meredith Schuh Fannin
 Georgetown, Kentucky                        John P. Watz
                                             G. Edward Henry, II
                                             Lexington, Kentucky

                                             D. Barry Stilz
                                             Lexington, Kentucky

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