Court Opinion

ID: 9955934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:01:07.400347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:40.941371
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BELINDA STALLINGS-FIELDS,

              Plaintiff,

      v.                                              Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00846 (CJN)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

              Defendants.

                                             ORDER

       Plaintiff Lieutenant Colonel Belinda Stallings-Fields’ amended complaint alleges that her

employer, the United States Army, retaliated against her for raising concerns about security issues

and legal violations. She seeks two forms of relief but has not established entitlement to either.

The Court accordingly dismisses the case without prejudice.

       First, Stallings-Fields seeks “[a] writ of mandate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 . . . ordering

the Defendants to set aside and hold as unlawful the Defendant’s retaliatory and adverse

administrative action taken against Plaintiff,” which means ordering the Army to “set aside and

hold unlawful” previous evaluations, revocation of a certification, referral of Stallings-Fields for

mental health evaluations, investigative findings, and a report of Stallings-Fields going AWOL.

Am. Compl. at 10, ECF No. 10. The problem here is that courts can only grant mandamus to

require a government official to take an action if that official is under a “clear and indisputable”

legal duty to do so. Illinois v. Ferriero, 60 F.4th 704, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Even assuming that

Stallings-Fields has established some legal violation by the Army, she has not pointed to any law

that clearly requires the Army to take the remedial measures she requests as a result of the alleged

violation. Thus, the Court will not compel such action. That should ultimately come as no
surprise, given that “mandamus is a drastic remedy, only available in extraordinary situations, and

thus is hardly ever granted.” Id. at 714 (cleaned up).

        Second, Stallings-Fields seeks “[a] writ of mandate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1361 . . . ordering the Defendant to cease any further retaliatory action against Plaintiff as the

result of her protected communications.” Am. Compl. at 10. The problem here is that Stallings-

Fields has not pleaded any facts to establish that further retaliatory action is imminent—to the

extent she pleads when an act of retaliation occurred, each happened in 2019 or earlier, more than

three years before she filed her amended complaint. The Court thus cannot conclude that Stallings-

Fields faces an imminent injury, as opposed to one “contingent [on] future events that may not

occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” meaning the court cannot grant her requested

prospective relief. See In re Al-Nashiri, 47 F.4th 820, 826-27 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). 1

        Because the Court cannot grant Stallings-Fields the relief she seeks in her amended

complaint, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ [11] motion to dismiss the amended complaint and

DENIES as moot the superseded [9] motion to dismiss the complaint. It is further ORDERED that

the case is DISMISSED without prejudice. If Stallings-Fields wishes to attempt to cure these

deficiencies by filing a second amended complaint, she must do so within 30 days of the issuance

of this order.

DATE: March 29, 2024
                                                             CARL J. NICHOLS
                                                             United States District Judge

1
  The closest Stallings-Fields comes is her allegation that she faces “threats of continued adverse
action through Officer Grade Determination Boards, investigations, and other administrative
abuse.” Am. Compl. at 7. Without further detail or factual allegations, this “mere conclusory
statement[]” does not make it plausible that injury is imminent. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).