Court Opinion

ID: 9669836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:51.973464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:28.590444
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of the issues presented in this case. In order to conclude that plaintiff was not a state employee, the majority artificially divides plaintiff’s employment into two not necessarily distinct parts: civilian and military. It then concludes that the plaintiff is exclusively a federal employee when working as a civilian and that his injuries arose out of his civilian employment. Consequently, he is not entitled to state worker’s compensation benefits.
I do not subscribe to the civilian-military dichotomy. I would hold that, although the National Guard Technician Act of 1968 (the Technician Act) conferred nominal federal employment status upon National Guard technicians, such technicians are also state employees for purposes of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. Additionally, I would hold that, applying the economic reality test, an employment *552relationship existed between the state of Michigan and plaintiff for purposes of the worker’s compensation statute. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The National Guard “occupies a distinct role in the federal structure that does not fit neatly within the scope of either state or national concerns.” Knutson v Wisconsin Air Nat’l Guard, 995 F2d 765, 767 (CA 7, 1993). It is a hybrid organization that serves, in times of need, both the federal government and the state within which it is located. “[T]he Guard may serve the state in times of civil strife within its borders while also being available for federal service during national emergencies.” Id.-, see also New Jersey Air Nat’l Guard v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 677 F2d 276, 279 (CA 3, 1982). “Within each state the National Guard is a state agency, under state authority and control. At the same time, the activity, makeup, and function of the Guard is provided for, to a large extent, by federal law.” Bowen v Oistead, 125 F3d 800, 802, n 1 (CA 9, 1997).
The Governor and the Governor’s appointed adjutant general command the guard in each state. 32 USC 314. The federal Defense Department, the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau prescribe regulations and issue orders to organize, discipline, and govern the guard. 32 USC 310. States that fail to comply with federal regulations risk forfeiture of federal funds allocated to organize, equip, and arm state guards. Id., §§ 101, 107, 108, 501; Knutson, 995 F2d 767.
Every member of the state Air National Guard is also enlisted in a federal organization known as the Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS), a *553component of the Ready Reserves of the Armed Forces. The latter is activated when the guard is called into federal service. 10 USC 261, 269, 8079, 8261; 32 USC 101, 301; Perpich v Dep’t of Defense, 496 US 334, 345-346; 110 S Ct 2418; 110 L Ed 2d 312 (1990).
The majority does not explain how or why plaintiffs position as a computer operator was not military-related. It simply assumes that the plaintiffs Michigan National Guard duties on the weekends were military in nature. Whereas, his technician job during the week, when he worked under the control of the state adjutant general, was exclusively civilian, lacking any military qualities or elements. However, in Leistiko v Stone,1 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the capacity of National Guard technicians is “irreducibly military in nature.” On the basis of the record before us, it is reasonable to conclude that plaintiffs job, as a computer operator in the Air National Guard, primarily served the state of Michigan. See Knutson, supra.
Unlike the majority, I find highly persuasive the interpretation of the Technician Act in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2953 v Federal Labor Relations Authority (AFGE), 235 US App DC 104, 113; 730 F2d 1534 (1984). The federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained the purpose of the Technician Act as follows:
The principal purpose of enacting the Technician Act was undoubtedly to provide a retirement and fringe benefit plan for National Guard technicians. Critics of the old sys*554tem complained that the failure of the prior law to provide a comprehensive retirement package acted as a drag on the Guard’s efforts to recruit and retain a first-rate cadre of technicians. By providing nominal federal employment status to the technicians, the Act sought to cement their allegiance to their Guard careers. [Id. at 113.]
The court held that the Technician Act made technicians “nominal federal employees.” Id. at 109. Congress added the federal employment status for the limited purpose of allowing such members to pursue retirement benefits and coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 USC 1346, 2671-2680. The implication, of course, is that such employees were, and still are, primarily employees of their respective states.
“The employment, discipline and discharge of technicians remains completely with the state officials, and their day to day activities on the job are controlled at the state level.” AFGE, supra at 108. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiff always held the position as a state employee, as well as a nominal federal employee.
Likewise, applying the economic reality test, I conclude that plaintiff was primarily employed by the state. The majority correctly recites the appropriate test from Kidder v Miller-Davis Co,2 but erroneously concludes that plaintiff was exclusively a federal employee during the weekdays as a technician.
The Kidder Court held:
[The economic reality test] examines a number of criteria including [1] control, [2] payment of wages, [3] hiring, firing, [and] the maintenance of discipline, and [4] common *555objective. These factors are viewed together in their entirety under a totality of the circumstances test. [Id. at 42.]
The majority states that, because the state adjutant general acted as an agent of the federal government, the first factor compels a finding that plaintiff was a federal employee. In other words, the plaintiff was under the control of a federal agent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the state adjutant general acted as a federal agent.
The majority cites Gilliam v Miller3 and Leistiko v Stone4 to support its assertion that the state adjutant general is an agent of the federal government. I find the majority’s reliance on both cases misplaced, because both are distinguishable from the case at issue. In Gilliam, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals simply stated that the Oregon Adjutant General acts as a federal agency for the limited purpose of determining whether the federal Administrative Procedures Act applies. The Ninth Circuit Court was not presented with the question before us, whether a National Guard technician is a federal or a state employee. Moreover, in Leistiko, there was no discussion about whether a state official acts as a federal agent.
I find compelling the fact that the Michigan Legislature created the office of the adjutant general. MCL 32.700; MSA 4.678(300). In fact, it vested our Governor with the authority to appoint the adjutant general. 5 One of the adjutant general’s duties is to act as *556“liaison in the transaction of official business for the state . . . .” 6Therefore, the Legislature intended the state adjutant general to be a state agent, not a federal agent.
The state adjutant general has the authority to employ, command, and control the day-to-day activities of the technicians. Accordingly, plaintiff was in the control of the state. Likewise, the same analysis would apply to factor three of the test, because the state adjutant general is vested with the authority to hire, fire, and maintain discipline over plaintiff.
As to factor two, wages, it is undisputed that plaintiff received his wages from federal funds. However, in Tulppo v Ontonagon Co,7 the Court of Appeals stated that federal funding is not dispositive as a factor to determine whether an employee is a state or federal employee. Thus, the fact that plaintiff was paid from federal funds does not carry great weight.
Finally, as to factor four, common objective, the majority holds that plaintiffs work as a technician was part of the common objective of the federal government. However, the majority conveniently ignores the fact that a person enlisting in the National Guard takes an oath to defend not only the United States, but also the Constitution of the state of Michigan. MCL 32.625; MSA 4.678(225). This provides further support that plaintiff was both a state and a federal employee.
Factors one, three, and four favor a finding that plaintiff was employed by the state of Michigan. Therefore, I would conclude that plaintiffs employ*557ment was covered under § 161(l)(a). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 134 F3d 817, 820-821 (CA 6, 1998).

 455 Mich 25, 34; 564 NW2d 872 (1997).

 973 F2d 760, 762 (CA 9, 1992).

 Supra at 818.

 MCL 32.702; MSA 4.678(302).

 MCL 32.710; MSA 4.678(310).

 207 Mich App 277, 284; 523 NW2d 883 (1994).