Court Opinion

ID: 9475472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:28:16.426337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.154300
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The Supreme Court of California has stated:
... the uniform California rule is that a limitations period dependent on discovery of the cause of action begins to run no later than the time the plaintiff learns, or should have learned, the facts essential to his claim. Gutierrez v. Mofid, 218 Cal.Rptr. 313 at 316, 39 Cal.3d 892, at 897, 705 P.2d 886, at 889 (1985) (italics in original).
After citing earlier cases to the same effect, the Supreme Court of California states:
It is irrelevant that plaintiff is ignorant of his legal remedy or the legal theories underlying his cause of action. Id. at 316; 39 Cal.3d at 898; 705 P.2d at 889.
*523In the present case Robert F. Timmel was treated in 1982 by Dr. Joseph Tarantolo of the Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C. In March of 1982 Dr. Tarantolo diagnosed his condition as tardive dyskinesia and its cause as probably the long term use of Trilafon. On November 16, 1982 Timmel told Tarantolo that he was considering legal action against his prior psychiatrists due to his belief that they had negligently failed to inform him that tar-dive dyskinesia was a risk of the extended use of Trilafon. Tarantolo advised him to consult a lawyer. At this point Timmel learned “or should have learned” the facts essential to his claim.
In Gutierrez the plaintiff suspected that the surgeon had “done something wrong” when she left the hospital in December 1978. One doctor in January 1979 advised her to sue, and another in February told her she had had “too much surgery.” At that point she was on constructive notice and had, as the statute itself prescribes, “a duty of diligent inquiry.” Id. at 316; 39 Cal.3d at 897; 705 P.2d at 889. In our case after Dr. Tarantolo had told Timmel his problem and its cause and Timmel had recognized that negligence was involved, Timmel was under a similar duty of diligent inquiry. I am unable to see any significant difference between Tarantolo’s advice and the advice given by the physician in Gutierrez to sue, advice which even the dissent in Gutierrez thought was enough to start the running of the Statute if an attorney had not then advised against suit. Id. at 321; 39 Cal.3d at 905; 705 P.2d at 894 (per Bird, C.J.).
By November 16, 1983, Timmel not only had knowledge of the facts; he was aware that to make his knowledge effective he would need legal assistance. As the Supreme Court of California put it, the Statute begins to run when “one has suffered appreciable harm and knows or suspects that professional blundering is its cause ____” Id. at 316 (italics supplied); 39 Cal.3d at 905; 705 P.2d at 894. The opinion of the court acknowledges that Tarantolo told Timmel “many times” on November 16, 1982 that his earlier psychiatrists should have warned him about the dangers of the drug they had prescribed. If such warning did not make Timmel suspect he had a case, what would have done the job? Not, however, until January 24, 1984 was Timmel’s suit brought. By that date the Statute had run. The period in which to bring suit had “inexorably” expired. Id. at 319; 39 Cal.3d at 902; 705 P.2d at 892.
If this court were free to determine the Statute of Limitations as a matter of social policy, there are those who would think it enlightened to have a longer statute than one year. There are many others who would see nothing enlightened in leaving conscientious physicians and psychiatrists vulnerable for a long period to the dissatisfied complaints of those they had tried to help. But this court is not free to make up its own period of limitations. We are bound by California law. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). The court disregards the controlling statute and the controlling California cases.