Court Opinion

ID: 9617568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:57:54.82036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:12.076254
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
Because the trial judge’s charge pursuant to Davis adequately covered the substance of the requested charges on self-defense, I respectfully dissent.
First, that the defendant has the right to act on appearances is conveyed by the second and third Davis elements that the defendant believed he was in imminent danger and a reasonable and prudent man would have entertained the same belief. Similarly, the requested charge that words accompanied by hostile acts may establish self-defense is covered by these same Davis elements regarding the defendant’s belief of imminent danger.
That the defendant has no duty to retreat if it would increase his own danger of harm is conveyed in the fourth Davis element that the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger. This fourth element also covers appellant’s requested charge that a defendant is justified in shooting until the danger has ceased.
The majority’s conclusion that the Davis charge was not adequate here places an onerous burden on the trial judge to charge proposed variations on a legal principle merely because the facts may be reviewed as supporting the requested charge. This Court has long held that a jury charge is adequate if it fully and fairly covers the substance of the requested charge. See, e.g., State v. Barwick, 280 S. C. 45, 310 S. E. (2d) 428 (1983). I would adhere to this standard and hold appellant’s exception without merit.
I would dispose of appellant’s remaining exceptions under Supreme Court Rule 23 and affirm his conviction.