Court Opinion

ID: 9942567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:04:52.062146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:15.131107
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2022-1820
                 _____________________________

JUAN RAMON NAVA,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Liberty County.
James C. Hankinson, Judge.

                       February 21, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

     Juan Ramon Nava appeals his conviction for failure of a
sexual offender to report a change in information. We affirm the
judgment and sentence in all respects, but write to address Nava’s
claim that the jury instructions in his case were fundamentally
erroneous.

                                I

     The State filed a one-count information against Nava. The
title of the count read as follows: FAILURE OF SEXUAL
OFFENDER TO REPORT A CHANGE IN INFORMATION. The
body of the charge read in full as follows:
         On or about December 9, 2021 [Nava] did unlawfully
    as a “sexual offender” per Section 943.0435(4) (fail to
    report a change in the information required to be
    provided pursuant to Section 943.0435(4)(b)(l), to wit:
    Failed to Update Address, within 48 hours as required as
    follows:

         To the Department of Law Enforcement through
    their online system; in person at the Liberty County
    Sheriff’s Office; in person at the Department of
    Corrections, or in person at the Department of Juvenile
    Justice, contrary to Sections 943.0435(9) & (14)(c),
    Florida Statutes.

     Section 943.0435, Florida Statutes, is entitled “Sexual
offenders required to register with the department; penalty.”
Subsection (9)(a) states that a violation of this section constitutes
a third-degree felony.

     Subsection (4), which sets forth requirements for change of
residence for sexual offenders, identifies several ways that a
sexual offender may violate section 943.0435. The following table
compares the two of those requirements:

         943.0435(4)(a)                           943.0435(4)(b)1.
“within 48 hours after any                “A sexual offender who vacates
change in the offender’s                  a permanent, temporary, or
permanent, temporary, or                  transient residence and fails to
transient residence . . . , the           establish or maintain another
offender shall report in person           permanent, temporary, or
to a driver license office . . . .”       transient     residence     shall,
                                          within     48      hours     after
                                          vacating . . . , report in person
                                          to the sheriff’s office of the
                                          county in which he or she is
                                          located.”

The information in this case charged a violation of section
943.0435(9), Florida Statutes, referring to the requirements of
section 943.0435(4).

                                      2
     It is unclear whether the State alleged a specific violation of
paragraph (4)(a) or subparagraph (4)(b)1. On the one hand, the
information explicitly mentions section 943.0435(4)(b)1., which
generally applies to “homeless sexual offenders.” See State v.
Cutwright, 41 So. 3d 389, 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (noting that
section 943.0435(4)(b) “provides for the registration of a transient
residence for homeless sexual offenders”); see also Peterson v.
State, 198 So. 3d 1064, 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“[Section
943.0435(4)(b) requires] that homeless sexual offenders tell the
sheriff’s office where they can be found.”).

     On the other hand, the information mentions a failure to
update an address—which suggests a violation of section
943.0435(4)(a). See generally Griffin v. State, 969 So. 2d 1161, 1162
(Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“Section 943.0435(4)(a) requires a sex
offender to report to the Department of Motor Vehicles, in person,
within 48 hours after a permanent or temporary address change
to renew his ‘driver’s license or identification card.”).

     Nava never addressed this discrepancy at trial. Instead, both
Nava and the State treated the case as if the information charged
Nava with failing to report a change of address, required by section
943.0435(4)(a). The State claimed that Nava had either moved
from one place to another or had established a second, unreported
residence. Nava argued that he had not moved at all, he had just
moved one of his trailers to the second property.

     A single, standard instruction addresses subsection
943.0435(4), Florida Statutes. The instruction provides trial courts
with specific options for violation of subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b)1.
In this case, however, the trial court did not instruct the jury based
on either of those options. Instead, the trial court created a unique,
non-standard instruction. The following table compares the
standard instruction options with the actual instruction provided
to the jury in this case:

                                  3
  § 943.0435(4)(a)      § 943.0435(4)(b)(1)       This case
Defendant is a         Defendant is a        Juan Nava has
sexual offender.       sexual offender.      agreed or
                                             stipulated that he
                                             has been convicted
                                             as a sexual
                                             offender...
Defendant             Defendant              Juan Nava
[established]         [established]          established or
[maintained] a        [maintained] a         maintained a
permanent,            permanent,             permanent,
temporary, or         temporary, or          temporary, or
transient residence transient residence      transient
in (name of county) in (name of county)      residence in
County, Florida.      County, Florida.       Liberty County,
                                             Florida.
Defendant             Defendant knowingly Juan Nava
knowingly failed to failed to report in      knowingly failed
report in person to   person to an office of to report a change
a driver’s license    the sheriff of (name   of his address in
office of the         of county) County,     person at an office
Department of         within 48 hours of     of the sheriff of
Highway Safety        vacating [his] [her]   Liberty County or
and Motor Vehicles permanent residence the Department of
. . . within 48 hours and failing to         Corrections within
after any change in [establish]              48 hours after the
[his] [her]           [maintain] another     change.
permanent,            [permanent]
temporary, or         [temporary]
transient residence. [transient] residence.

See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.14(d). The third element of the
jury instruction actually provided in this case combines parts of
subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b)1. As to (4)(a), the instruction stated
that “Juan Nava knowingly failed to report a change of his
address.” This suggests that Nava moved to another, physical
location. With regard to (4)(b)1., however, the instruction stated
that Nava failed to report to “the sheriff of Liberty County or the
Department of Corrections.” This suggests that Nava became
homeless—as sexual offenders with a new address report to the
                                 4
Department of Highway Safety and Motor vehicles whereas sexual
offenders with no new address report to the local sheriff’s office.

     Nava acknowledges that he failed to object to the jury
instructions, but he claims that the discrepancy between the
elements charged in the information and the elements set forth in
the instructions constitutes fundamental error, for which he is
entitled to reversal even without a proper objection. We disagree.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, the inconsistency
between the information and the instructions does not render
Nava’s conviction fundamentally erroneous.

                                  II

     Jury instructions “are subject to the contemporaneous
objection rule, and absent an objection at trial, can be raised on
appeal only if fundamental error occurred.” Reed v. State, 837 So.
2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644
(Fla. 1991)).

     Because Nava did not object to the jury instruction in this
case, his claim of error may only be reviewed for fundamental
error. See Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695, 722 (Fla. 2021) (reviewing
error from omitted instruction for fundamental error because the
defendant did not object to the omission); see also Knight v. State,
286 So. 3d 147, 151 (Fla. 2019) (“In the absence of a
contemporaneous objection at trial, a jury instruction error is only
subject to relief in the event of fundamental error.”).

     To qualify as fundamental and therefore “justify not imposing
the contemporaneous objection rule, ‘the error must reach down
into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of
guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the
alleged error.’” Delva, 575 So. 2d at 644–45 (quoting Brown v.
State, 124 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1960)).

     With regard to an omitted element in a jury instruction,
“fundamental error occurs only when the omission is pertinent or
material to what the jury must consider in order to convict.” Delva,
575 So. 2d at 645 (quoting Steward v. State, 420 So. 2d 862, 863
(Fla. 1982)). Hence, “[f]ailing to instruct on an element of the crime

                                  5
over which the record reflects there was no dispute is not
fundamental error . . . .” Id. For example, if the instruction fails to
inform the jury that the defendant must have actual knowledge of
contraband, but if the defendant solely argues that he did not
possess the contraband, then no fundamental error occurs. Id.

    As to a misstated element in a jury instruction, the same
principle applies. If the jury instruction incorrectly defines an
element in a manner that makes it easier for the State to obtain a
conviction, no fundamental error occurs if the defendant does not
dispute that element at trial. See Reed, 837 So. 2d at 370.

     Applying this standard to Nava’s trial, no fundamental error
occurred. First, the entire case proceeded on the premise that the
requirement of section 943.0435(4)(a) (failure to report a change in
residence) was the one that Nava violated. The evidence
established such a violation. Just as important, Nava himself
defended the case as if change of address had been charged. Nava
claimed in his opening statement that he “didn’t change his
address.” He moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground that
the State failed to prove that he “changed his address and did not
update that address within 48 hours.” He argued in closing that he
did not “change his address.” In fact, the crime argued at trial, by
the State and by Nava, was consistent with the jury instructions.
Even though these instructions were not consistent with the
specific subparagraph charged in the information, they did
accurately set forth the elements of the crime the parties argued
at trial.

     Moreover, Nava’s theory at trial was that he never changed
his residence at all. This defense would have applied whether Nava
had been charged with failing to report a change in residence or
with failing to report after vacating and not establishing a new
one. The fact that his defense would not have changed if either
offense had been charged shows a lack of prejudice from the
instruction error.

     Second, Nava only disputed whether he was required to
report—he never disputed where he was required to report.
Therefore, the reporting location is immaterial for the purposes of
our fundamental error review. Cf. Battle v. State, 911 So. 2d 85, 89

                                  6
(Fla. 2005) (“[A] dispute does not arise when mistaken identity is
the sole defense and the facts of the crime are conceded by the
defendant.” (citing Delva, 575 So. 2d at 645)).

     We note that, had Nava objected to the language of the
charging document, the State could have amended the
information, even midtrial, without prejudicing Nava’s ability to
mount his defense in this case—that is, he never left the original
residence. See Thach v. State, 342 So. 3d 620, 623–24 (Fla. 2022)
(holding that the State can amend the information during trial
unless the defendant makes an individualized showing of prejudice
to his substantial rights). To find fundamental error in such a
scenario would only encourage “hip pocket appeals.” See DeFreitas
v. State, 701 So. 2d 593, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (Gunther, J.,
concurring in result only):

         To allow broad direct review of a criminal trial on the
    basis of fundamental error supplies no motivation
    whatsoever to a defense attorney to object when various
    errors occur throughout a trial. To the contrary, a defense
    attorney might well be motivated to not object to the
    errors as they occur and then if the verdict is not to his or
    her client's favor, he has a “hip-pocket” appeal because
    the defense attorney can argue that so many unobjected-
    to errors occurred during trial that the errors magically
    transformed into fundamental error on direct appeal.

                                 III

     Appellate courts should find fundamental error in only the
rarest of cases. See Figueroa-Sanabria v. State, 366 So. 3d 1035,
1055 (Fla. 2023) (“Fundamental errors are few and rare.” (citing
Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988))); see also Sheppard
v. State, 151 So. 3d 1154, 1166 (Fla. 2014) (“The principle [of
fundamental error] is applied only in rare cases[.]”); F.B. v. State,
852 So. 2d 226, 229–30 (Fla. 2003) (“[R]arely will an error be
deemed fundamental . . . .”). This is not one of them. The evidence
established a violation of section 943.0435(4), the jury was
instructed on the elements of a violation of section 943.0435(4),
and Nava argued the case as if section 943.0435(4)(a) had been
charged. Moreover, to the extent that the instructions indicated a

                                 7
different reporting location than set forth in section 943.0435(4)(a),
Nava did not dispute below the erroneous or omitted element.
Accordingly, we affirm.

    AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS and LONG, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Tyler Kemper Payne,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody Attorney General, and Virginia Harris, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                                  8