Court Opinion

ID: 9584701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:51:49.643247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.370307
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with the remainder of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent as to Division 2, and I dissent in part to Division 3.
1. I do not agree that the victim in this case was shown to be competent within the meaning of OCGA § 24-9-5 (a). That statute requires “that the witness has sufficient understanding to receive, remember and narrate impressions and is sensible of the obligation to tell the truth. [Cit.]” Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 409 (2) (b) (383 SE2d 555) (1989). See also Dorsey v. State, 206 Ga. App. 709, 713 (3) (426 SE2d 224) (1992) (physical precedent only) (witness competent where he or she understands obligation to tell truth and can give material evidence concerning subject matter at issue).
Although the competency statute contains only minimal requirements concerning whether a witness is competent to testify, those requirements were not met in this case. While the victim indicated to the court that he knew what it meant to tell the truth, nothing in the trial court’s examination of the victim or the record itself shows that the victim understood the difference between truth and falsehood. Compare Vaughn v. State, 226 Ga. App. 318, 319 (1) (486 SE2d 607) *220(1997) (victim demonstrated her understanding of the difference between truth and falsehood and importance of telling the truth). While the victim may well have been capable of meeting the requirements of the statute, his competence was not adequately demonstrated below. Had the trial court simply also asked the victim whether he knew what it meant to tell a lie or to tell a falsehood and the consequence, of not being truthful under oath, I might well be able to agree that his competence was adequately shown.
Decided July 16, 1999.
Cynthia W. Harrison, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Baker, Nathaniel Dobson, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
2.1 agree with the majority that the similar transaction evidence involving the child molestation charge initiated by defendant’s sister after discovering the seven-year-old neighbor girl was properly admitted, as was the evidence concerning the incident with the adult woman. I do not agree, however, that the trial court correctly admitted the similar transaction testimony involving Dumas’s niece. The alleged victim herself, aged 24 at the time of trial, did not testify. Instead, her mother testified as to what the then seven-year-old victim reported to her, and she did so without any showing that the child made the outcry immediately after the alleged sexual assault. It therefore was not shown that the outcry might have been admissible as part of the res gestae. See generally Tucker v. State, 243 Ga. 683, 684 (3) (256 SE2d 365) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in Division 2 of this dissent.