Court Opinion

ID: 9491254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:08:19.176004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:36.836706
License: Public Domain

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur with that part of the majority opinion that affirms the district court’s imposition of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1.
I must respectfully dissent, however, from that part of the majority opinion that affirms the district court’s imposition of a one-level departure, which was also imposed for obstruction of justice. I agree with the majority that Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137-38, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991), requires a sentencing court to provide advance notice, specifically identifying the particular ground upon which it may grant an upward departure. I likewise agree with the majoi-ity’s conclusion that the district court’s notice in this case fell short of the requirements imposed by Bums.
I do not agree, however, with the majority’s plain error analysis which sweeps the Bums defect under the rug. The govern*423ment never raised Milton’s failure to object as a ground justifying a heightened standard of review in this case. Thus, the majority is raising Milton’s failure to object sua sponte, and then finding the sentencing court’s unfortunate, but nonetheless plain, failure to adhere to the dictates of Bums excusable. Similarly, I cannot agree that the government adequately established any concealment on Milton’s behalf. The Porsche relied upon by the government had apparently been seized prior to the time that Milton was interviewed by the probation officer. The balance of the government’s evidence relies upon speculation concerning the status of purported gifts and the fact that Milton, at one time or another, had considerable assets.
For the foregoing reasons, I would require that Milton’s sentence be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.