Court Opinion

ID: 9898361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:11.751608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:04.436030
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 AMINA J. CONDEL,                            No. 84310-9-I

                         Respondent,         DIVISION ONE
               v.

 FRANK GARRETT CONDEL,                       UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                         Appellant.

       SMITH, C.J. — Amina and Frank Garrett Condel1 married in 1999 and have

four children together. After enduring years of abuse, Amina petitioned for a

domestic violence protection order (DVPO) for herself and their children. After a

contested hearing, a court commissioner granted her petition, entered a DVPO,

and ordered Garrett to surrender any weapons and attend a domestic violence

treatment program. The commissioner denied Garrett’s motion for

reconsideration and a judge denied his motion for revision. On appeal, Garrett

raises a number of challenges, both procedural and substantive. Finding no

merit in his contentions, we affirm.

                                       FACTS

       Amina and Garrett Condel married in 1999 and have four children

together: B.C., G.C., J.C., and L.C. Three of the children are minors and L.C. is

an adult with autism, dependent on her parents for care.

       1 For clarity, we refer to the parties by their preferred first names—in

Mr. Condel’s case, his middle name—because they share a last name.
No. 84310-9-I/2

       Soon after the parties married, Garrett became physically and

psychologically abusive toward Amina. His behavior escalated over the years to

eventually involve the parties’ children. Garrett’s aggressive behavior caused

Amina to “live in extreme fear for [her] life and [the] children’s lives.” Amina’s

situation only worsened with the onset of the COVID-192 pandemic. Forced to

remain at home with Garrett, his controlling and abusive behavior became

unbearable.

       In March 2022, Amina petitioned for a domestic violence protection order

(DVPO) for herself and the children. Amina’s declaration in support of the DVPO

detailed years of abuse directed at her and the children. She stated that Garrett

first became aggressive during their first year of marriage and that when Garrett

got upset, “he would often wrap his arms around [Amina] and physically hold

[her] against her will . . . so that [she] could not move or escape.” She described

that over the years, Garrett habitually abused her, calling her crude names and

being generally demeaning. She also alleged that Garrett used “threatening

body language to intimidate [her],” including charging after her and putting his

face aggressively close to hers.

       On July 17, 2019, in what Amina described as “[o]ne of the scariest

incidents,” Garrett “slapped [her] hand with so much force that his finger jabbed

into [Amina’s] eye and [her] head slammed backwards and struck the frame of

[her] bedroom door.” Amina experienced eye pain “non-stop” for a month and

       2 COVID-19 is the World Health Organization’s official name for

“coronavirus disease 2019,” a severe, highly contagious respiratory illness that
quickly spread throughout the world after being discovered in December 2019.

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No. 84310-9-I/3

received medical care for her eye and head injuries.

       Amina recounted several incidents of violence against her witnessed by

the children. For example, in November 2019, when Amina asked G.C. to leave

the garage to go to bed, Garrett “came charging toward the door and slammed

the door on [Amina’s] right arm and side.” And in March 2020, during an

argument about finances, Garrett suddenly “sprung up from his chair and the

chair slammed down hard on [Amina’s] foot.” Amina cried out in pain and the

children “ran to [her] to see if [she] was ok, and [Amina] cried for several

minutes.”

       Amina’s declaration also contained several examples of violence directed

towards the parties’ children. For instance, in March 2018, Garrett “got physically

aggressive with GC by slapping his leg.” A few days later, “Garrett became

physically aggressive with LC by slapping, grabbing and being rough with her

and scaring her to the point where she was shaking and crying.” In total, Amina’s

declaration contained more than 20 accounts of violence towards her or the

children.

       Garrett denied committing any acts of violence towards Amina or the

children and claimed that “notwithstanding her hyperbolic melodrama, Amina has

never been frightened of [him] in any way whatsoever.” Garrett noted that while

he had been raised “in a loving family with no exposure to domestic violence,”

Amina was “raised by a single mother” and “had been the victim of multiple

childhood traumatic events.” Garrett stated that he believed “these unfortunate

childhood experiences have had a detrimental impact on [Amina’s] personality,

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her perceptions, and her views about parenting.” In support of his position,

Garrett provided excerpts from his daily journal, which he said he “felt compelled

to start keeping . . . to protect [himself] from [Amina’s] fabrications.”

       At the DVPO hearing before a court commissioner, the court concluded

that Amina met her burden of proving Garrett had perpetrated acts of domestic

violence. The court specially highlighted the July 17 eye injury incident as

supporting a DVPO’s entry and noted that it found Amina’s version of events to

be more credible than Garrett’s. The court found that the children were present

for many of the incidents alleged in Amina’s petition, including the one on

July 17, and that this exposure constituted domestic violence against the

children. The court noted that an incident on December 15, 2019—in which

Garrett was alleged to have grabbed J.C. around the neck—warranted including

the children in the DVPO. The court concluded that Garrett presented a credible

threat to Amina and granted her petition. It also ordered Garrett to surrender any

weapons in his possession and attend a domestic violence treatment program.

Finally, the court stated that the DVPO was subject to any visitation rights

granted in the parties’ ongoing dissolution proceeding.

       Garrett moved for reconsideration, which the commissioner denied. He

then moved for revision, which a superior court judge denied.

                                      ANALYSIS
                                 Standard of Review

       A court commissioner’s decision is subject to revision by the superior

court. RCW 2.24.050. On a motion to revise, the superior court reviews the

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commissioner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo based on the

evidence and issues presented to the commissioner. In re Marriage of Moody,

137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240 (1999). “A revision denial constitutes an

adoption of the commissioner’s decision, and the court is not required to enter

separate findings and conclusions.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App.

779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). On appeal, we review the superior court’s ruling,

not that of the commissioner. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. at 789, 791.

       We review the superior court’s decision to grant a domestic violence

protection order for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Stewart, 133 Wn.

App. 545, 550, 137 P.3d 25 (2006). The court abuses its discretion if its decision

is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.

In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). Where,

as here, the court weighed contradictory evidence, “[w]e review the superior

court’s findings for substantial evidence,” and defer to the trier of fact on

questions of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of the

evidence. In re Vulnerable Adult Petition for Knight, 178 Wn. App. 929, 936-37,

317 P.3d 1068 (2014). Evidence is “substantial” when it is sufficient to persuade

a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted. In re Marriage of Black,

188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017).

                                  Motions to Refer

       Garrett argues the court abused its discretion by refusing to rule on his

motions to file a report with law enforcement or the Department of Social and

Health Services (DSHS) or to refer the case to Family Court Services (FCS). We

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No. 84310-9-I/6

disagree. The court effectively denied Garrett’s motions by granting the DVPO

petition.

       RCW 26.12.170 provides that the court “may” file a report with law

enforcement or DSHS if it has reasonable cause to believe that a child of the

parties has suffered abuse or neglect. It also provides that the court “may” order

or recommend Family Court Services. RCW 26.12.170. The statute grants the

court the ability to make a referral. Therefore, we review the court’s

determination for an abuse of discretion. See In re Guardianship of Johnson,

112 Wn. App. 384, 387-88, 48 P.3d 1029 (2002).

       Here, the court did not file a report with law enforcement or DSHS and did

not refer the parties to FCS for an assessment. Instead, after finding that Garrett

committed domestic violence against both Amina and their children, the court

granted Amina’s petition for a DVPO. By granting Amina’s petition, the court

effectively denied Garrett’s requests for referrals. That denial was not an abuse

of discretion.3

                             Garrett’s Video Exhibits

       Garrett asserts that the court erred by refusing to admit or consider video

exhibits that he wished to submit as evidence. However, because the court was

unable to play them, Garrett chose to proceed with the hearing without the

exhibits rather than postponing the hearing. We conclude that in doing so, he

       3 Garrett also claims that both parties moved the court to refer them to

FCS. But Amina only requested the court refer the parties to FCS if it was not
inclined to grant her a protection order.

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No. 84310-9-I/7

waived this issue.

       Under RAP 2.5(a), we may refuse to hear any claim of error not raised

before the trial court. Waiver requires both knowledge and intent; it is the

intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right, or conduct that infers

relinquishment of such right. Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 669, 269 P.2d

960 (1954). “It is a voluntary act which implies a choice, by the party, to dispense

with something of value or to forego some advantage.” Bowman, 44 Wn.2d at

669. The ability of an attorney to waive a right on their client’s behalf depends on

the nature of the right, but statutory and procedural rights are typically waivable

without the client’s express permission on the record. See, e.g., State v. Israel,

19 Wn. App. 773, 779, 577 P.2d 631 (1978) (attorney’s waiver of statutory right

to examination by two experts in competency hearing); In re Adoption of M.S.M.-

P., 184 Wn.2d 496, 500, 358 P.3d 1163 (2015) (attorney’s waiver of

constitutional right to public proceedings).

       At the April 20 hearing, the court informed the parties that it had not been

able to review the video exhibits submitted by Garrett’s counsel. The court noted

that it did not have access to the exhibits and that it was unsure how to view the

exhibits—it suggested that counsel might need to appear and play the exhibits in

open court. The court stated that the parties could proceed that day without the

exhibits or the hearing could be continued to allow the court time to view the

exhibits.4 Garrett’s counsel opted to proceed: “I think my client would prefer to go

       4 The court offered to grant a shorter than usual continuance: “[I]f it’s

important that the Court review this prior to . . . a hearing or . . . issuing a

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No. 84310-9-I/8

forward.” The court then reiterated that it “ha[d] not reviewed any video evidence

that was submitted, and that [the video exhibits were] not going to be considered

as part of the Court’s decision.” Garrett’s counsel did not object further.

       In response to Amina’s waiver argument, Garrett urges this court to look to

the superior court’s ruling on his motion for revision, in which it concluded that it

was “unclear from the audio recording of the April 20th hearing” if Garrett waived

viewing of the video exhibits by agreeing to go forward. The superior court also

determined that, regardless of waiver, it could not review the exhibits because

Amina did not consent to being recorded and “it is illegal to record a

communication without consent from all parties involved.” See RCW

9.73.030(1)(b). Garrett argues that exceptions to the Washington Privacy Act,

chapter 9.73 RCW, apply and that the superior court erred in not admitting his

exhibits.

       Because we conclude that Garrett’s actions at the hearing constituted a

waiver, we decline to reach whether the exhibits violated the Privacy Act. The

record before us clearly demonstrates that Garrett was fully aware of his right to

present the video evidence and knowingly and voluntarily chose to relinquish it.5

                        Domestic Violence Protection Order

       Garrett maintains that the court abused its discretion by granting Amina’s

petition for a DVPO because she failed to meet her burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence occurred. He specifically

decision . . . then the best thing I can suggest is . . . a short continuance, like,
less than the standard two weeks.”
       5 We reviewed a transcript of the hearing, rather than an audio recording.

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No. 84310-9-I/9

takes issue with the two incidents the court outlined as examples for the bases

for the protection order and claims they were not domestic violence as defined by

statute. We disagree and conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s

finding that Garrett committed acts of domestic violence.

       At the time Amina filed her petition, the Domestic Violence Prevention Act

(DVPA), former chapter 26.50 RCW (2019), governed civil domestic violence

protection order proceedings.6 A party seeking a protection order must allege

the existence of domestic violence and must be accompanied by an affidavit

made under oath stating the specific facts and circumstances from which relief is

sought. Former RCW 26.50.030(1) (2005). Domestic violence is “[p]hysical

harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm”

between intimate partners or between family or household members. Former

RCW 26.50.010(3) (2019). Evidence demonstrating a present fear based on

past violence is a sufficient basis for granting a DVPO. Muma v. Muma, 115 Wn.

App. 1, 6-7, 60 P.3d 592 (2002). A person may also petition for protection on

behalf of minor household members, regardless of whether those minors

witnessed acts of domestic violence or were themselves victims. Former RCW

26.50.020(1)(a) (2019); Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 592-93, 598-99,

398 P.3d 1071 (2017). The petitioner must prove each element of former

RCW 26.50.030 by a preponderance of the evidence. See Reese v. Stroh, 128

Wn.2d 300, 312, 907 P.2d 282 (1995) (setting out burden of proof in civil cases).

       6 The DVPA was repealed by 2021 ch. 215 § 170, effective July 1, 2022.

Its provisions are now codified under Civil Protection Orders, ch. 7.105 RCW.

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No. 84310-9-I/10

To meet this standard, the court must find that it was more likely than not that

domestic violence occurred. See In re Marriage of Freeman, 169 Wn.2d 664,

672-73, 239 P.3d 557 (2010).

       Here, Amina’s declaration alleged that she was “increasingly afraid of

Garrett,” that “[m]ost of the incidents of violence occur in front of the children or

involve them,” and that at times, she lived “in extreme fear for [her] life.” Her

declaration detailed more than 20 episodes of violence toward her and the

children. In one of the worst incidents, Garrett slapped Amina’s hand with such

force that his finger jabbed into her eye and her head slammed backwards,

striking a doorframe. A few minutes later, Garrett started filming Amina holding

J.C., and told her, “Don’t hit me.” Amina responded: “You just assaulted me, you

went into my eye and my head hit the wall.” B.C. also witnessed Garrett

recording Amina and appeared “very confused” about what was happening.

After that incident, Amina said she “experienced eye pain non-stop for a month

and received medical care for [her] eye and head.” Attached to her declaration

are photos from almost every incident, either of Amina or the children. The

photos show red marks, bruises, and scratches consistent with Amina’s

recounting of the incidents. She also noted that Garrett owns several guns,

many of which are stored inside the couple’s house, and that she was unsure if

the guns were locked or loaded.

       After considering the evidence presented by the parties, the court

concluded that Amina’s version of events was “more credible” than Garrett’s.

The court found that the parties’ children “were present for many of the incidents

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No. 84310-9-I/11

alleged in the petition,” including the July 17, 2019 incident where Garrett injured

Amina’s eye. The court also noted that the December 15, 2019 incident—in

which Amina alleged that Garrett grabbed J.C. by the neck—supported including

the children in the DVPO. Though Garrett denied this allegation, the court again

found Amina’s account “more credible.”

       Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and conclusion that

Garrett perpetrated domestic violence against Amina and their children. Amina

provided detailed a recounting of incidents that resulted in bodily harm, physical

injury, and fear of imminent physical harm. And because the parties’ children

were present for and involved in certain instances of domestic violence, it was

appropriate for the court to include them in the DVPO. Rodriguez, 188 Wn.2d at

595-98 (children’s exposure to domestic violence constitutes domestic violence).

       Garrett contends that the two incidents the court mentioned at the hearing

do not constitute domestic violence as a matter of law.7 We disagree.

       First, Garrett asserts that the court wrongly concluded he did not act in

self-defense during the July 17 incident in which Amina suffered an eye injury.

       7 Garrett also implies that the two incidents discussed by the court were

the only instances of domestic violence the court identified. But Garrett grossly
misinterprets the record. The court merely highlighted these two incidents as
examples of bases for the DVPO—it did not indicate that these were the only
incidents of domestic violence. The court told Garrett’s counsel as much after
counsel tried to limit the court’s ruling:
           MR. BERRY: And, again, if I may, Your Honor, just so I’m clear
       on the incidence of domestic violence, the one on July 17th . . .
       that’s the assault that the Court is relying upon?
           THE COURT: That is the—that’s the explicit one the Court
       discussed during its ruling, yes.

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No. 84310-9-I/12

Whether he acted in self-defense is fundamentally a question of fact, susceptible

to the court’s determination after hearing evidence. See State v. Hatt, 11 Wn.

App. 2d 113, 134-35, 452 P.3d 577 (2019) (whether defendant acted in self-

defense is a question for the fact-finder). The parties agree that during that

incident, Amina held her hand up in front of Garrett and that Garrett hit Amina’s

hand out of the way. Amina argues that she held her hand up to communicate

“stop” and that Garrett responded with violence. Garrett contends that he

interpreted Amina’s raised hand as an act of aggression and responded by

slapping her hand to protect himself. The trial court determined that Amina’s

story was more credible and Garrett cannot attack the court’s credibility

determination on appeal. Knight, 178 Wn. App. at 937 (“We defer to the trier of

fact on the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting

testimony.”).

       Second, Garrett claims the court erred by concluding the December 15

incident—in which Amina alleges Garrett grabbed J.C. by the neck—did not

constitute “reasonable physical discipline,” because it based its conclusion

“solely on speculation.” The court did not err in determining that Garrett’s actions

were not reasonable physical discipline.

       RCW 9A.16.100 allows parents to use moderate and reasonable physical

discipline for purposes of restraining or correcting their children. The statute

provides a nonexclusive list of unreasonable physical disciplinary actions

including:
       (1) Throwing, kicking, burning, or cutting a child; (2) striking a child

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No. 84310-9-I/13

       with a closed fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering
       with a child’s breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly
       weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and which
       does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor
       temporary marks.

RCW 9A.16.100.

       In determining whether physical discipline is reasonable, the fact finder

should consider the age, size, and condition of the child, the location of the injury,

the nature of the misconduct, and the child’s developmental level. RCW

9A.16.100; WAC XXX-XX-XXXX.

       Amina alleged that on December 15, 2019, “Garrett became physically

aggressive with JC and lashed out at him by grabbing him around his neck.” In

support of this allegation, she provided photos of J.C. after the incident with red

marks on his neck. The red marks on J.C.’s neck resemble finger marks,

consistent with her story. The court noted that “[Garrett] denie[d] the incident

took place and thus [did] not seem to be arguing that this was discipline per

RCW 9A.16.100,” but that “even if he had made such an argument . . . this

conduct is beyond what is reasonable per that statute.” The court concluded that

“[g]rabbing a child’s neck would interfere with a child’s breathing and is explicitly

stated within the statute as per se unreasonable.”

       The court did not err in concluding that Garrett’s actions were likely to

interfere with J.C.’s breathing, and therefore, not reasonable physical discipline

under the statute. Contrary to Garrett’s assertion, it is not speculative to

conclude that grabbing a child by the neck hard enough to leave finger marks

would interfere with their breathing. The photos provided by Amina show clear

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No. 84310-9-I/14

red marks on J.C.’s neck, consistent with Amina’s version of the events. The

court did not abuse its discretion in granting the DVPO.

                          Challenges to Findings of Fact

      Garrett challenges two of the court’s findings of fact as not being

supported by substantial evidence: (1) that he presented a credible threat to

Amina, and (2) that the couple’s children were exposed to domestic violence.

We conclude that both findings were supported by substantial evidence.

      Evidence is “substantial” when it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded

person of the truth of the matter asserted. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127.

      1. Garrett Presents a Credible Threat

      The many episodes of abuse detailed in Amina’s declaration demonstrate

that Garrett perpetrated acts of domestic violence against her. Amina’s

description of these incidents, along with the supporting documentation and

photos she provided, constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding that

Garrett presented a credible threat to Amina.

      Garrett attempts to contrast this case with In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193

Wn. App. 1, 367 P.3d 607 (2016). In T.W.J., this court upheld a finding that

respondent represented a credible threat based on an e-mail from respondent’s

counsel to petitioner, in which counsel warned petitioner of respondent’s threat to

kill her. 193 Wn. App. at 6-7. Garrett asserts that there “is no such evidence

here” and that Amina “has never alleged that [Garrett] has ever threatened to

physically harm her or their children.” But this argument misses the mark.

Domestic violence is not confined to threats of physical violence. And Amina has

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No. 84310-9-I/15

alleged that she felt threatened by Garrett on several occasions. Faced with

overwhelming evidence, which it determined credible, and evidence that

corroborated Amina’s assertions that Garrett habitually committed acts of

domestic violence, the trial court did not err in finding that Garrett presented a

credible threat to Amina.

       2. Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence

       The December 15, 2019 incident, in which Garrett is alleged to have

grabbed J.C. by the neck constitutes substantial evidence supporting a finding

that the children were exposed to domestic violence. The incidents described in

the section of Amina’s declaration entitled “Past Violence Toward Children,” also

supports a finding that the children were exposed.

       In an attempt to cabin the court’s finding that the children were exposed to

domestic violence, Garrett asserts that “there is no evidence that any of the

parties’ children, with the exception of [J.C.], were present at either of the two

incidents which the court concluded constituted domestic violence.” But the

court’s finding was not confined to the July 17 and December 15 incidents. The

court clarified that those incidents were “the explicit one[s] the Court discussed

during its ruling” and did not state that those were the only incidents supporting

its findings. And contrary to Garrett’s assertion, the record demonstrates that

J.C. was not the only child present during the alleged incidents. For example, in

March 2018, Amina alleges that Garrett “got physically aggressive with GC by

slapping his leg.” A few days later, Amina states that Garrett “became physically

aggressive with LC by slapping, grabbing and being rough with her and scaring

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No. 84310-9-I/16

her to the point where she was shaking and crying.” Amina recalls Garrett

“yelling, being aggressive, domineering, and threatening to LC.” Photos of L.C.

from after the incident corroborate Amina’s story.

       We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the

couple’s children were exposed to domestic violence.

                              Constitutional Challenges

       Garrett raises a series of constitutional challenges on appeal. He asserts

the court erred in (1) not considering whether Garrett’s constitutional right to

parent was affected by the DVPO, (2) not conducting a strict scrutiny analysis,

and (3) restricting Garrett’s contact with his children. We do not find his

arguments persuasive. Washington courts have already determined that the

DVPA—and protection orders authorized by it—do not interfere with the

constitutional right to parent.

       “[P]arents have a fundamental right to autonomy in child rearing

decisions.” In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 13, 969 P.2d 21 (1998).

Where a fundamental right is involved we apply the “strict scrutiny” test, which

holds that the State may only interfere if it can show that it has a compelling

interest and its interference is narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest.

Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 15. This test is satisfied when the State, exercising its

parens patriae power, interferes in a parental relationship in which a child has

been harmed or there is a credible threat of harm to the child. Stewart, 133 Wn.

App. at 555; Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 16. We review constitutional challenges de

novo. Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 501, 387 P.3d 680 (2017).

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No. 84310-9-I/17

       Here, the court found that Garrett represented a credible threat to the

physical safety of Amina and their children. The court also concluded that

Garrett had harmed at least one of the children. Therefore, State interference in

the form of a DVPO is justified to protect the children and does not violate

Garrett’s fundamental right to parent his children. Moreover, there was no error

in the court not explicitly considering this right; it had no obligation to rehash

settled case law when it granted the DVPO.

       Garrett’s arguments to the contrary are vague and unavailing. While he

recognizes the State may interfere in a parental relationship when a child has

been harmed or if there is a credible threat of harm, he maintains that the

incidents the court relied on do not provide substantial evidence that any of the

children were harmed. Relying on In re Marriage of C.M.C., Garrett claims that

the incidents the court relied on are “de minimus” and that there is no compelling

State interest where there are only “isolated, de minimus incidents which could

technically be defined as domestic violence.” 87 Wn. App. 84, 88, 940 P.2d 669

(1997). In C.M.C., this court, in dicta, noted that the commentary to the proposed

Parenting Act of 1987 stated that the term “history of domestic violence” was

intended to exclude “isolated, de minimus incidents which could technically be

defined as domestic violence.” 87 Wn. App. at 88 (quoting 1987 PROPOSED

PARENTING ACT: REPLACING THE CONCEPT OF CHILD CUSTODY: COMMENTARY AND

TEXT 29 (undated)). But that statute was later amended and is not at issue in the

present case. Moreover, regardless of the precedential value of C.M.C., the

incidents alleged here are certainly not de minimus or isolated. Rather, the

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No. 84310-9-I/18

record demonstrates a history of domestic violence spanning several years. As

previously discussed, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that

Garrett posed a credible threat to the children.8

       Relying next on State v. Ancira, Garrett asserts that any restriction of his

contact with his children must be “reasonably necessary” and that limiting his

contact to one hour a week over FaceTime or Zoom was not reasonably

necessary. 107 Wn. App. 650, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001). But Ancira is

distinguishable. Ancira involved a sentencing condition in a criminal case that

prohibited the defendant from having contact with his children for five years. 107

Wn. App. at 652-53. On appeal, this court concluded that the evidence was

insufficient to support such a severe prohibition against contact. Ancira, 107 Wn.

App. at 654. Here, the evidence amply supported restricting contact and the

DVPO is subject to residential provisions granted in the parties’ ongoing

dissolution proceeding. We conclude that the DVPO does not infringe upon

Garrett’s constitutional rights.

                            Domestic Violence Treatment

       Garrett contends that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to

participate in domestic violence treatment and the DV Dads program because

       8 After argument, Garrett filed a Supplemental Memorandum Clarifying

Responses to Questions Raised During Oral Argument and a related motion for
leave to file that memorandum. He cites RAP 18.8(a) as authority allowing us to
consider his arguments even though they are made outside of the normal briefing
and argument process. RAP 18.8(a) allows us to waive the requirements of the
rules of appellate procedure where we find it appropriate. We decline to exercise
our discretionary powers under RAP 18.8(a) and do not consider his
supplemental briefing.

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No. 84310-9-I/19

such programs lack proof of efficacy. He also claims that ordering him to partake

in treatment violates his constitutional rights. Both assertions are incorrect.

       The DVPA authorizes courts to “[o]rder the respondent to participate in a

domestic violence perpetrator treatment program approved under RCW

26.50.150.”9 Former RCW 26.50.060(1)(e) (2020).

       Garrett asserts that the court violated his constitutional rights by ordering

him to participate in a treatment program lacking proof of efficacy. He insists that

“[n]o state interest is furthered by ordering a parent to complete a domestic

violence treatment program which lacks evidence of efficacy.” In support of his

argument, Garrett relies on a 2013 report from the Washington State Institute for

Public Policy.10 But that report was disapproved of by Washington’s Domestic

Violence (DV) Manual for Judges as mischaracterizing the Domestic Violence

Perpetrator Treatment Program, ch. 388-60B WAC, and using generally flawed

research methodology. See GENDER & JUST. COMM’N, W ASH. STATE SUP. CT.,

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MANUAL FOR JUDGES app. B (2016) (APPENDIX B),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/manuals/domViol/appendixB.pdf

[https://perma.cc/C89R-RNEB].11

       9 Former RCW 26.50.150 (2019) has been recodified as RCW

43.20A.735.
        10 M. MILLER, ET AL., W ASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (WSIPP), W HAT

WORKS TO REDUCE RECIDIVISM BY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS? (2013),
https://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1119/Wsipp_What-Works-to-Reduce-
Recidivism-by-Domestic-Violence-Offenders_Full-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DKL-XKM2].
        11 For example, the DV Manual notes that the studies underlying the 2013

WSIPP report have been “extensively critiqued in multiple peer journals.”
APPENDIX B at 3 n.10. The DV Manual also states that WSIPP’s conclusions “are

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       But Garrett fails to acknowledge that in 2018, the WAC chapter governing

domestic violence treatment programming was repealed and replaced by WAC

388-60B. The updated WACs require an initial assessment to determine the

“level of risk, needs, and responsivity for the participant” and the “level of

treatment the program will require for the participant.” WAC 388-60B-0400(2)(a)-

(b). The purpose of this assessment is to provide “[b]ehaviorally focused

individualized treatment goals or objectives for an initial treatment plan.”

WAC 388-60B-0400(2)(c). After the assessment, the program is required to write

a summary including its findings, recommendation, and rationale for the level of

treatment prescribed. WAC 388-60B-0400(19). And as part of this process,

assessors are authorized to recommend no domestic violence intervention

treatment where appropriate. WAC 388-60B-0400(10) and (19)(f). These

procedures minimize the risk that Garrett will receive treatment that is

unnecessary or unhelpful. The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering him

to participate in treatment.

                            Best Interests of the Children

       Garrett argues that the court erred in granting the DVPO without

considering the best interests of the children. We conclude that the court

considered the best interest of the children by granting the DVPO.

       The Parenting Act of 1987, chapters 26.09, 26.10 RCW, requires the court

to consider the best interests of the children when entering a parenting plan.

not only inaccurate but simply cannot be supported either by the authors own
meta-analysis or by a comprehensive review of the literature.” APPENDIX B at 3
n.10.

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RCW 26.09.184(1)(g); RCW 26.09.002. Former RCW 26.50.060(1)(d) provides

that “[o]n the same basis as is provided in chapter 26.09 RCW, the court shall

make residential provision with regard to minor children of the parties.” However,

the court is not required to “incorporate the full panoply of procedures and

decision factors from the Parenting Act into the protection order proceeding”

because that proceeding is intended to be “a rapid and efficient process.”

Stewart, 133 Wn. App. at 552. And the court does not need to make formal

findings or follow formal proceedings as it would when entering a parenting plan.

Stewart, 133 Wn. App. at 553. Rather, it only needs to consider the same factors

in making its temporary orders. Stewart, 133 Wn. App. at 553.

       Here, the court considered the best interests of the children by granting

the DVPO after finding that Garrett presented a credible threat to the children.

Garrett’s assertion that “the lower court never even considered the best interests

of these children” is not only unsupported by the record but directly contradicted

by it. The court found that the children “were present for many of the incidents

alleged in the petition” and that “exposure to domestic violence is domestic

violence to the children and is sufficient to support a domestic violence protection

order that protects the children as well.” A denial of the DVPO petition, or

ignoring its existence when entering residential provisions, would have been a

failure to consider the best interests of the children. The court did not err.

                                        Fees

       Amina requests attorney fees on appeal under former RCW 26.50.060

and RAP 18.1. Garrett contends that because Amina did not request fees before

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the trial court, she cannot request them on appeal. He also asserts that Amina

cannot recoup fees under former RCW 26.50.060 because it has been repealed

and is no longer an “applicable law” as required by RAP 18.1. We award Amina

her reasonable attorney fees.

      When Amina filed her petition, former chapter 26.50 RCW governed civil

DVPO proceedings. That chapter still governs this proceeding. Under former

RCW 26.50.060(1)(g), the court has discretion to require a respondent in a

DVPO proceeding to pay petitioner’s reasonable attorney fees. RAP 18.1

provides that the prevailing party on appeal may recover fees where fees are

permitted at the trial court level. Because Amina is the prevailing party on

appeal, she is entitled to her reasonable attorney fees.

      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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