Court Opinion

ID: 9753195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:03:07.364506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:31.997958
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy:
I concur with the judgment of the Court that this case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to *224determine whether or not appellant has waived his right to appeal from his 1962 conviction. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 442 Pa. 339, 275 A. 2d 293 (1971).
I cannot agree, however, that an appellant, represented at trial by privately retained counsel, should be afforded the protections of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) on the mere allegation in his Post Conviction Hearing Act petition that he was indigent at the conclusion of his trial.1 In the situation where appellant was represented at trial by court-appointed counsel, there has been a court determination that he was too impoverished to afford private counsel; however, when a defendant is represented at trial by private counsel, as was the appellant here, no such determination has been made, and I believe it is a mistake for this Court or any court to assume post-trial indigency as to such a defendant.
As 1 understand the decision in Douglas v. California, supra, it extends rights only to a defendant who is indigent at the conclusion of his trial; the rights so extended are that if a defendant is indigent and desires to take an appeal, he is entitled to the free assistance of counsel on appeal and, as an obvious corollary, is entitled to be so advised. This holding of Douglas, coupled with the standards concerning the waiver of federal constitutional rights, see Carnley v. *225Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70 (1962) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938), is the reason that, in cases where an indigent alleges a denial of his “appellate rights” and the record is “silent” on this point, the Commonwealth must prove that the petitioner knowingly waived his right to free counsel on appeal. While the record in the present case may be “silent”, it does not indicate indigency.
There is nothing in the Douglas holding, as I read it, which places the burden of proof upon the prosecution to show that an appellant not shown to be indigent knowingly waived his right to counsel on appeal.2 See United States ex rel. O’Brien v. Maroney, 423 F. 2d 865 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Pate v. Holman, 341 F. 2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965). Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, before appellant is afforded the benefit of Douglas protection, I believe he should first be required to satisfy the post-conviction hearing court that his indigent status at the conclusion of his trial was the reason for his failure to file a timely appeal. When, but not until, the defendant has done that, the burden is on the Commonwealth to show a knowing waiver of defendant’s “Douglas rights”.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that appellant’s indigent status was the reason he did not file a timely ap*226peal, the hearing on remand in the present case should consist of more than just the Commonwealth’s evidence to rebut the allegation in appellant’s PCHA petition of a denial of the right to appeal. Whether by means of his own testimony or that of another, a defendant who alleges that he has been denied his appellate rights should be obliged to present at least a prima facie case before the Commonwealth should be obliged to respond by producing countervailing evidence. I know of no situation in our practice where a mere averment in a petition or complaint is taken as the equivalent of evidence, so as to put the opposing party to his proof. There is no justification that I can see for doing so even in a situation involving an indigent defendant.
I would remand to the post-conviction hearing court for proceedings consistent with this dissenting opinion.

 Appellant’s Post Conviction Hearing Act petition, filed November 1, 1968, alleges: “It was . . . shown that applicant himself was without funds, and that it was his family which retained counsel. Moreover, it is undisputed that neither court or counsel advised applicant that he had an absolute right to direct appeal regardless of whether he had sufficient funds.” This recitation of the facts is somewhat inconsistent with that contained in appellant’s brief in this Court. In his brief, appellant nowhere refers to any condition of indigency, but simply states that: “The appellant requested his attorney to file post trial motions and appeal, but no such action was ever taken:”

 Following the decision in Douglas v. California, supra, this Court adopted the prophylactic rule that all defendants should be informed of their appellate rights on the record. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A. 2d 760 (1968). This is a very slight administrative burden for the Commonwealth and I agree that in post-Douglas trials, where the record does not show an explanation of appellate rights, the Commonwealth must bear the burden of showing a knowing waiver of these rights at a collateral proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Ezell, 431 Pa. 101, 244 A. 2d 646 (1968). I do not believe, however, that this prophylactic rule is constitutionally mandated and I would not apply it to those cases in which the trial was concluded prior to the decision of Douglas v. California, supra.