Court Opinion

ID: 9479950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:33:33.638071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:23.237216
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my day, tap dancing was an art form. Much to my chagrin, however, the border patrol agent’s tapping in this ease is not as edifying. By constitutionalizing this activity, the majority has, in effect, chosen to tap dance over fourth amendment concerns. Yet even the most reluctant ears would agree that the constitution’s tintinnabulations invite a different step. Dutiful to this harmony, I respectfully dissent.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a search occurs when the state infringes upon an expectation of privacy that society considers reasonable.1 The government infringes upon expectations of privacy when its actions might reveal information about an item other than the presence of contraband, even though the appearance of the item itself does not suggest contraband, despite exigent circumstances. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983).
In Place, the Court held that exposure of luggage to a trained canine to determine whether the luggage contained contraband did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment.2 In reaching this holding, the Court stated that:
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents of luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the information obtained is limited.3
In Jacobsen, employees of a private shipping company accidently broke open a *1442package.4 Noticing a white powdery substance, they called a federal agent who removed a trace of the powder and determined that it was cocaine.5 In holding that the agent’s examination of the powder was not a search, the Court commented on the above quoted passage from Place.
Respondents attempt to distinguish Place, arguing that it involved no physical invasion of Place’s effects, unlike the conduct at issue here. However, as the quotation makes clear, the reason this did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about the noncontraband items. That rationale is fully applicable here.6
Place and Jacobsen thus stand for the proposition that a search takes place when governmental action might reveal information about a noncontraband item even though the appearance of the item itself does not suggest the presence of contraband. Hicks further developed this idea.
In Hicks, the police searched the defendant’s apartment after learning that a bullet had been shot through the floor.7 The officers searched for suspects, victims, and weapons.8 Suspicious that the defendant had stolen the stereo in his apartment, one of the officers recorded the stereo’s serial numbers.9 The officer found the numbers by moving the equipment.10 The serial numbers proved that the equipment was stolen and the defendant was consequently indicted for robbery.11
The state argued that the officer’s actions did not constitute a search. The Supreme Court disagreed reasoning that:
[ojfficer Nelson’s moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a “search” separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victim, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that come into view during the latter search would not have constituted an independent search, because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent’s privacy interest_ But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.... It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to the respondent. ... A search is a search, even if it discloses nothing but the bottom of a turntable.12
Hicks reflects the importance of the information revealed by the item searched. The luggage in Place and the powder in Jacob-sen each suggested the presence of contraband. Unlike the homogeneous powder in Jacobsen, or the smell emanating from the marijuana in Place, however, the contents of the stereo in Hicks, its serial number for example, could not be determined from its appearance.13 And, perhaps more impor*1443tantly, Hicks instructs that even in the face of exigent circumstances, the state may not further invade privacy interests. Thus according to this trilogy of cases, the state infringes upon expectations of privacy when its actions might reveal information about an item other than the presence of contraband, even though the item itself does not appear to contain contraband, despite face of exigent circumstances.
Under this trilogy, the agent searched Melchor’s tank when he tapped it. The majority states that the “purpose of Gutierrez’s [the agents] tapping on the side of the tank was to determine the structural integrity of its exterior — i.e., whether the tank’s exterior had been penetrated in some manner.” Yet it is difficult to understand the agent’s concern with the tank’s exterior unless the agent desired information about the tank’s contents. The echo of the tap could reveal the presence of items other than contraband. If Melchor had “penetrated” the exterior of the tank, he could have hidden numerous non-contraband item from public view. Acquiring information about noncontraband items contravenes both Place where the Court stated that the sniff could only disclose the presence of contraband14 and Jacobsen where “the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about the noncontraband items.” 15 Under the language of Hicks, moreover, not only was the tapping “unrelated to the objective of authorized intrusion” 16 i.e. the border search, but also the appearance of the tank, like the turntable’s in Hicks, did not suggest the presence of contraband. The agent’s tap thus constituted a search under the fourth amendment because it might have revealed the presence of non-contraband items and the exterior of the tank did not itself suggest the existence of contraband.
The majority also argues that there are relatively diminished expectations of privacy in automobiles. At 1435, citing United States v. Chadwick, Cardwell v. Lewis, and South Dakota v. Opperman.17 Based on these cases, the majority then concludes that the threshold of what constitutes a search is relatively lower for automobiles than in other places. This conclusion is a non sequitur. In Chadwick and Lewis, the government had probable cause to conduct a search.18 In Opperman, the police searched a car under an inventory proce*1444dure after they impounded it.19 I address the significance of each of these points in turn.
Concerning probable cause, in United States v. Ross20 the Court held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” In reaching this holding, the Court discussed its decision in Carroll v. United States.21 The Carroll Court held that a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment.22 Regarding Carroll, the Court in Ross stated:
[sjince its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contraband goods. It is this impracticability, viewed in historical perspective, that provided the basis of the Carroll decision. Given the nature of the automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.... In short, the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll —the scope of which we consider in this case — applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause. In this class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.... Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a variety of factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730] ... Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 [93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706] ... South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 [96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000]_ Many of these searches do not require a showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.23
Ross demonstrates that the mobility of automobiles was significant in creating an exception to the warrant requirement. Mobility, however, becomes a concern only when the government first has probable cause to suspect the presence of contraband. Without probable cause, the loss of the contraband through the movement of the automobile is not an issue. There is nothing to suspect. Automobile search cases predicated on probable cause are thus irrelevant to the analysis of the present case. In the present case, the inquiry is whether there was a search which in turn could create an interest that the automobile might vanish with contraband. Consequently, Chadwick and Lewis, cited by the majority, do not advance the analysis of whether there should be a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles which would lower the threshold of what constitutes a search.
The majority’s use of Opperman, a ease involving a search after the police impounded a car, is similarly misplaced. The Op-perman Court stated that the mobility of automobiles was not the only reason why it permitted the warrantless searches of automobiles in some circumstances.24 The Court explained that:
*1445[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office. In discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring the public safety, law enforcement officials are necessarily brought in frequent contact with automobiles.... Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements.25
This rationale for diminishing expectations of privacy in an automobile is also inapplicable to the present case. The agents stopped Melchor purportedly to protect the government’s interest in preventing illegal immigration. The government created the border checkpoint where the agents stopped Melchor to guard this very interest. However “when the only government interest asserted is illegal immigration, the scope of border area searches must be limited to compartments large enough to secure a person.” 26 Yet no reasonable person could believe that any human being would be lodged in a propane tank. Perhaps my knowledge of anatomy and the characteristics of propane tanks are foreign, but from my experience, I cannot believe that anyone would seek human breath in the echos of a tap. Our court is not concerned with the immigration of lilliputians. And fourth amendment safeguards should not be mini-turized because of the drug problems in this country.27

. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2579, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In Rakas, the Court stated that:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the fourth amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others ... and one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the fourth amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest_ But by focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in fourth amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of privacy interests protected by that Amendment.

Id.

. Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644.

. Id.

. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111, 104 S.Ct. at 1655.

. Id.

. Id. 466 U.S. at 124 n. 24, 104 S.Ct. at 1662 n. 24 (emphasis added).

. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1152.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593 n. 13, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (emphasis added):
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the fourth amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant.... There will be difficulties in determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and which do not. Our decision in this case means only that a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to which the fourth amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at *1443all whether they are seized from an automobile.
Of course, this rationale explains the result in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986). In Class, the Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle inspection numbers. In arriving at this holding, the Court reasoned that vehicle inspection numbers play an important role in government regulation and that federal law required them to be visible to an observer outside of the car. Id at 114, 106 S.Ct. at 966. "The exterior of a car, of course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it does not constitute a "search.” Id at 114, 106 S.Ct. at 966. To state this point in the terms of the language of Sanders, everything ascertainable from a vehicle inspection number can be gleaned from its appearance. Class thus does not resolve the present case where the contents of a propane tank are hidden from public view. See also United States v. Sylvester, 848 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1988) ("[A] container cannot be opened unless its contents are in plain view or they can be inferred from the container’s outward appearance_ A photographer’s camera bag often contains items associated with taking pictures: film, lens cloth, extra lenses, collapsible tripod, etc. One could not say, however, that because items found in the bag usually are not of an especially private type, the owner of the bag has no expectation of privacy in it. One simply cannot infer what is in the camera bag from its outward appearance." As such, the panel held that the owner had a reasonable expectation of privacy implicating fourth amendment protection.).

. Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644.

. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111, 104 S.Ct. at 1655.

. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. at 1152.

. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974); 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 3, 97 S.Ct. at 2479 (“whether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker which they have lawfully seized at the time of the arrest of its owners, when there is probable cause to believe the footlocker contains contraband’’); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 592, 94 S.Ct. at 2470 (“Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of the car is not unreasonable ...”).

. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097 ("When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of securing and inventorying the automobiles’ contents.”).

. 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

. 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

. Ross, 456 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 2159.

. Id. at 806-809, 102 S.Ct. at 2163-2164. In Cooper v. California, the police searched a car after they impounded it under the direction of a state statute. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 60, 87 S.Ct. at 790. Similarly in Cady, the police searched a car after it had been in an accident and was abandoned by its driver. Cady, 413 U.S. at 436, 93 S.Ct. at 2525.

. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 3096; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) ("There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between automobiles and other private property. *1445First, as the Court repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant.... In addition the configuration, use and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated property.”)

. Id. 428 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. at 3097.

. United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 865 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc).

.The majority also cites United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir.1985) for the proposition that "the law does not require the police to ignore evidence of other crimes in conducting legitimate roadblocks....” The problem, however, is that the border agents in this case were not aware of any "other crimes" until after they made the initial search. But the constitutionality of this search is the issue to be decided. The majority has thus placed the cart before the horse in attempting to justify the search by the contraband that it revealed.