Court Opinion

ID: 9555297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 16:10:09.372988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:13.457151
License: Public Domain

J-S19033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
    J.O.M.T.W., A MINOR                        :
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: T.W., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 136 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
                       Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-762

    IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
    E.L.M.T.W., A MINOR                        :
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: T.W., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 137 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
                       Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-758

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 11, 2023

       T.W. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating his

parental rights to his daughters, J.O.M.T.W., born in August 2017, and

E.L.M.T.W., born in September 2021.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 The court additionally involuntarily terminated the parental rights of any
unknown father of E.L.M.T.W. No unknown father filed a separate appeal.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S19033-23

       The family first became known to Lebanon County Children and Youth

Services (“CYS”) in August 2020 due to reports alleging substance abuse and

physical abuse. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 8-9. Specifically, CYS received reports

relaying concerns, inter alia, that Mother and Father were “smoking marijuana

while driving with J.O.M.T.W. in the car . . ..” Id. J.O.M.T.W. was adjudicated

dependent in November 2020, but not placed. See id. at 12-13. Following

an incident in June 2021 where Mother fled with the Children, as well as

allegations of physical abuse related to another of Mother’s children, CYS

obtained emergency protective custody for J.O.M.T.W. and her siblings, all of

whom were placed in June 2021. See id. at 15-17. The female siblings were

placed together in a foster home, and the male siblings were placed together

in a separate foster home. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 52. In August 2021, the

court established permanency goals of return to parent or guardian with

concurrent goals of adoption. See N.T., 9/26/22, at Ex. 7 at 6.

       CYS received reports thereafter about domestic violence between

Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”), who were expecting another child:

       . . . [Mother] had reported an incident to [CYS] where [Father]
       had choked her, cocked a gun and shot it towards her. She also
       had . . . marks and bruising on her belly while she was pregnant
       with [E.L.M.T.W.,] and she admitted they were from [Father].
       [Mother] [got] a [Protection From Abuse Act order] against
       [Father], but then dropped it to talk with him about the baby.
____________________________________________

Lastly, the trial court also issued decrees terminating the parental rights of
S.L.T. (“Mother”) to several of her children. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 150-51. We
address S.L.T.’s appeals separately at Nos. 233-36 MDA 2023, 244 MDA 2023.

                                           -2-
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N.T., 9/26/22, at 18. In October 2021, CYS obtained emergency custody of

E.L.M.T.W., approximately one month after her birth, and placed her with her

older sisters. See id. at 21-23, 25.2 Father was incarcerated at the time.

See id. at 20-21, 24, 82.3 The court adjudicated E.L.M.T.W. dependent in

November 2021, and established a permanency goal of return to parent or

guardian and a concurrent goal of adoption. See N.T., 9/26/22, at Ex. 11 at

7.

       In furtherance of the permanency goals of reunification, CYS established

goals for Parents, including, inter alia:        meet and cooperate with the CYS

caseworker and follow all recommendations; maintain involvement with the

Children’s placement programming and follow all recommendations; meet and

cooperate with service providers regarding the Children’s wellbeing and

development and follow all recommendations; cooperate and follow all

recommendations of approved in-home service providers; maintain a safe and

clean home; obtain mental health, anger management, and drug and alcohol

____________________________________________

2 Mother failed to notify CYS of E.M.L.T.W.’s birth, and CYS had difficulty
locating the child thereafter. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 21.
3 Father has an extensive criminal history, including convictions for, inter alia,

simple assault, accidents involving death or personal injury, defiant trespass,
summary harassment, and fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. See,
e.g., N.T., 9/26/22, Ex. 5. Notably, he was incarcerated from August 30,
2021, until October 22, 2021. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 20-21. He was again
incarcerated from March 16-21, 2022 on charges of simple assault, which
remained outstanding at the time of the subject proceedings. See id. at 26.

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evaluations and follow recommendations; complete random drug screenings;

complete an age-appropriate parenting course and follow recommendations;

and obtain counseling services “to address emotional needs and ability to cope

with anxiety[,] aggression[,] frustration[,] depression[,] etc[.], and follow

recommendations of provider.” N.T., 1/9/23, Ex. 14 at 14-15.

       On September 6, 2022, CYS filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of Parents’ parental rights.         The trial court held bifurcated

evidentiary hearings on September 26, 2022, and January 9, 2023. By the

September hearing date, J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W. were five years’ old, and

one year old, respectively. Parents were present and represented by counsel.

J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W. (collectively, “the Children”) were represented by

a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel.4 At the conclusion of the first

termination hearing, the court continued the matter “to allow . . . [P]arents to

further prove that they can complete all necessary goals.” Id. at 233. While

transition to partially unsupervised visitation occurred in December 2022,

visitation returned to fully supervised shortly thereafter. See N.T., 1/9/23, at

7, 22, 25-26, 29-30.

       At the second termination hearing, on January 9, 2023, CYS presented

the testimony of Barry Stewart, a family therapist with Pressley Ridge, as well

____________________________________________

4 At the September 2022 hearing, CYS presented the testimony of CYS foster

care caseworker, Ashley Weaber, and Liz Rojas-Gomez and Scott Birchman of
Youth Advocate Programs Incorporated, who supervised visits between
Parents and the Children. Parents each testified on their own behalf.

                                           -4-
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as foster care supervisor, Angelica Farrisi.     Parents again each testified on

their own behalf. Ms. Farrisi testified that Parents had made no progress since

the prior hearing. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 50. While Parents had completed

some goals, Ms. Farrisi noted that multiple goals still remained outstanding or

incomplete. Father, among other things, had failed to complete the following:

meet and cooperate with CYS and follow all recommendations; maintain active

involvement in the Children’s placement programming; attend medical

appointments; cooperate with counseling; and complete anger management

treatment. See id. at 73. Parents failed to complete their goal regarding

housing: they failed to have the appropriate separation and/or partition

between their bed in the living room and the Children’s bedrooms, and to have

appropriate mattresses and clean sheets for the Children. Id. at 48, 63, 65.

Ms. Farrisi further noted that the Children were not being fed the appropriate

foods. See id. at 65-67. She stated, “Nearly every visit they’re given an

extreme amount of sugar and sweets and high-sugared juices, despite

recommendations against that.” Id. at 66.5

       Ms. Farrisi further testified that she had been the intake worker when

concerns about J.O.M.T.W. first came in, which was approximately two-and-

____________________________________________

5 Ms. Farrisi described Parents smelling strongly of marijuana at recent visits.

See N.T., 1/9/23, at 45-46, 56-58. She testified that Father uses marijuana
“freely” and is “very open about his marijuana use during the times that he’s
cared for the kids.” Id. at 57-58.

                                           -5-
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a-half years before the January 2023 hearing, and throughout the pendency

of the case, and she stated her observations of Parents’ cooperativeness as

follows:

      I would say throughout this case since I’ve had it, there have been
      times where they’ve been humble and [they’re] willing and
      receptive. [However,] recently it’s been indicative of their initial
      behavior. They’re refusing to follow recommendations, fighting all
      of the recommendations, accusing CYS of a number of
      maltreatment concerns. And the same sort of step-forward
      posturing, staring up and down behavior [Father] exhibits is
      something that he did from the beginning of the case.

Id. at 42.     Ms. Farrisi further described Parents as “combative” and

unreceptive to suggestions at a December 2022 meeting. Id. at 33.

      Mr. Stewart, the family therapist, testified that he commenced in-home

services, which included a domestic violence curriculum, with the family in

August 2022. See id. at 6. He explained, “We had started that with a power

and control wheel that talks about dynamics between a couple and what that

looks like and areas that need to be addressed in terms of control, things like

that . . ..” Id. at 8. However, Mr. Stewart testified that he ceased his services

in December 2022 after a session at Parents’ home during which he learned

that Parents were videotaping the meeting, and Father exhibited behavior

which Mr. Stewart viewed as attempting to intimidate him. See id. at 9-10,

132, 137. A subsequent meeting including Parents, Mr. Stewart, and CYS

“didn’t go well,” and Mr. Stewart did not resume services. Id. at 11. Mr.

Stewart explained, “[W]e tried to talk about some things we needed to see in

terms of just what respect looks like.      [Father] was escalated.    That was

                                      -6-
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pointed out several times. He continued to talk over people and was not really

-- I didn’t feel he was able to listen to the feedback that we had and what we

needed.”     Id.    Mr. Stewart indicated that he observed this “controlling”

behavior directed toward providers or “authority figures.” Id. at 16, 18. As

a result, for the first time in twenty-five years, Mr. Stewart required a behavior

contract in order to continue services with Parents. See id. at 12-13, 20,

132.6

        Additionally, although Parents indicated that they were receiving

counseling through their church, Ms. Farrisi noted their resistance to

counseling and refusal to provide any information. See id. at 34. Mother had

difficulty recalling the name of the church and pastor.       See id. at 88-89.

Father provided the name of the pastor but also had difficulty recalling the

name of the church. See id. at 122. He testified that he and Mother had not

participated in a session since November 2022. See id. at 140.7 While Father

recently completed anger management group sessions, Ms. Farrisi testified

that CYS also required individual sessions. See id. at 37, 45.

____________________________________________

6 As to the behavior contract, Mr. Stewart testified, “I need things to be very

clear about what’s expected and about what won't be tolerated, including
videotaping.” N.T., 1/9/23, at 12. Ms. Farrisi’s observations confirmed the
conflict between Parents and Pressley Ridge. Id. at 69.

7 While he stated that he would be willing for CYS to speak with the pastor,

Father affirmed that previously he would not sign a release until he spoke to
the pastor, whom he did not call, despite having his telephone number, as the
pastor was on holiday. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 123-24, 126-28.

                                           -7-
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       At the conclusion of the subject proceedings, J.O.M.T.W. had been

placed for over year and a half, and E.L.M.T.W. for over a year, in pre-adoptive

foster homes. See id. at 53; see also N.T., 9/26/22, at 17-18. Ms. Farrisi

testified that the Children were happy to see Parents, whom they referred to

as “Mom” and “Big Wolf,” respectively. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 53-54, 102;

see also N.T., 1/9/23, at 16-18, 22 (Mr. Stewart testifying to his observations

of Parents’ affection toward the Children, and recollecting that “one of the

younger[]” Children was sad or upset to have to leave Parents).8 Further, Ms.

Farrisi, as well as Liz Rojas-Gomez of Youth Advocate Programs Incorporated,

acknowledged expressions or inquiries by the Children related to returning

home.     See N.T., 1/9/23, at 53-54; see also N.T., 9/26/22, at 106-07.

However, Ms. Weaber opined that foster parents provide the Children “stability

and permanence” and “ensur[e they] get their necessary services or

evaluations.” N.T., 9/26/22, at 61. Ms. Farrisi further stated that, following

visitation with Parents, the Children are happy to see their foster parents. See

N.T., 1/9/23, at 53-54.        Ms. Rojas-Gomez observed similarly.   See N.T.,

9/26/22, at 106. (“They did not seem sad [to leave their parents’ home].

They would be happy when they’d see the foster parents and hug the foster

____________________________________________

8 Father “prefers to be called Big Wolf.He considers the [C]hildren his pack
and calls them cubs.” N.T., 9/26/22, at 108. While the Children who could
speak, including J.O.M.T.W. referred to their foster parents by their first
names, they occasionally slipped and called their foster mothers “Mom,” or
Mother and Father by their first names. See id. at 76, 102.

                                           -8-
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parents[] and hug . . . [P]arents goodbye.”). Further, the Children are in close

proximity and see each other frequently. As Ms. Farrisi explained, “They are

friends, the foster parents, so they do see the children outside of visits, at

least two to three times a week outside of the visits.” N.T., 1/9/23, at 52-53.

Ms. Farrisi ultimately opined that it was in the Children’s best interests to

terminate parental rights:

      Q. And based on your entire experience with [the Children’s
         parents], and everything you have seen, at this point do you
         think it’s in the [C]hildren’s best interest to move forward with
         the termination?

      A. I think they deserve permanency. I think the back and forth is
         really hard for them. And at this time, I don’t think the parents
         have shown that they can comply with what needs to be
         complied with. Given that, I would say yes.

Id. at 53.

      By decrees issued January 9, 2023, the trial court involuntarily

terminated Parents’ parental rights to J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W. Thereafter,

on January 17, 2023, Father, through appointed counsel, filed timely notices

of appeal from the orders terminating his parental rights, along with concise

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

                                     -9-
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1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).9          The trial court likewise complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.10

        Father raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Did the trial court commit error when it involuntarily
           terminated Father’s parental rights for E.L.M.T.W.?

        2. Did the trial court commit error when it involuntarily
           terminated Father’s parental rights?

        3. Did the trial court commit error when it adjudicated the child
           dependent for E.L.M.T.W.?

Father’s Brief at 2-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; issues reordered for

ease of disposition).11

____________________________________________

9 Father’s appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte on February 3,

2023.

10 We note with disapproval that neither the GAL nor legal counsel filed a brief

with this Court. However, at the conclusion of the subject proceedings, the
GAL recommended that the court grant CYS’s petitions with respect to
Parents. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 144-46. The Children’s legal counsel was
unable to ascertain a preference. See id. at 146-47. However, presently, the
Children’s legal counsel, while declining to file a brief, has opined that the
Children would concur with Father’s assertions of error. See Letter, 4/10/23.

11 The trial court concluded that Father’s third issue, in which he challenges

the adjudication of E.L.M.T.W. dependent, is untimely because he did not
appeal within thirty days of that order. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at
21-22. The trial court was correct. A dependency adjudication is a final order
for purposes of appeal. See In re E.B., 898 A.2d 1108, 1112 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2006). Thus, Father was required to file a notice of appeal within thirty days
of that determination. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Contra Father’s Brief at 23-25
(citing Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650-55 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding
that only certain orders in dependency matters which constitute “certain
crucial points of finality” are final for purposes of appeal)). Father failed to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Our standard of review is as follows:

       [I]n cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights[,
       our review] is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
       determination is supported by competent evidence.               When
       applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept
       the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
       if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial
       court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
       appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
       has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of
       discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters
       not that an appellate court might have reached a different
       conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of
       discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for
       the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations

omitted).

       In his preserved issues, Father challenges the termination of his

parental rights. Father’s Brief at 2-3. Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”)

____________________________________________

file his notice of appeal within thirty days, and therefore, his appeal from the
dependency adjudication is untimely.

We further observe that Father’s above-captioned appeal as to E.L.M.T.W. lies
solely from the trial court’s January 9, 2023 termination decree. See Notice
of Appeal at No. 2022-758. CYS’s petition for termination of Father’s parental
rights to E.L.M.T.W. has the dependency petition attached. See Petition for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 9/6/22, at Ex. E . The dependency
docket is CP-38-DP-65-2021. See id. Father did not include the docket
number for the dependency case on his notice of appeal and, critically, Father
did not file a separate notice of appeal with respect to the November 29, 2021
order of adjudication and disposition. See Interest of S.S., 252 A.3d 681,
688 (Pa. Super. 2021) (recognizing that dependency proceedings and
termination proceedings are two separate, distinct proceedings “with their
own docket numbers, records, and divisions within the Court of Common
Pleas”).

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governs involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings.         See 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.       Subsection 2511(a) provides grounds for the

involuntary termination of parental rights. If the trial court finds clear and

convincing evidence supporting the existence of one of the grounds for

termination set forth in subsection (a), the court must then consider whether

termination would best serve the child under subsection (b).         See id. §

2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of the grounds set forth in

subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is also satisfied. See In re

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Here, the trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights to

the Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See Trial

Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 23. As we need only agree with the trial court’s

determination as to any one section of 2511(a), we limit our discussion to

sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                    ****

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
         for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
         or will not be remedied by the parent.

                                    ****

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      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2)

due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those

grounds may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental

duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated

on other grounds by In re K.T., --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 4092986 at *16 n.23

(Pa. 2023). Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future

need for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his

physical or mental well-being,” especially “where disruption of the family has

already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citation and emphasis

omitted). We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent

efforts   towards   the   reasonably    prompt   assumption   of   full   parental

responsibilities.   See In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017). At a termination hearing, the trial court may properly reject as

untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow through on necessary

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services when the parent failed to cooperate with the agency or take

advantage of available services during the dependency proceedings. See In

re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105. In In re Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court

addressed the relevance of incarceration in termination decisions under

section 2511(a)(2), holding,

      incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor,
      in a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination exist under
      [section] 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity
      of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without
      essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes
      of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012).

      We note, initially, that despite the trial court finding grounds for

termination pursuant to several subsections—which the court noted in its Rule

1925(a) opinion which preceded Father’s brief—Father, in his argument,

focuses only on section 2511(a)(1) and (a)(5). See Father’s Brief at 17-23,

30-32.   We therefore conclude that any assertion of error as to section

2511(a)(2) is waived for failure to address this issue in a meaningful way with

citation to pertinent legal authorities in his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see

also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that where

an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to

relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion

capable of review, that claim is waived); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163

A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining this Court will not review an

appellant’s claim unless it is included in both the concise statement of errors

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complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved, and developed

in his or her argument and supported by citation to relevant legal authority).

      Even if not waived, Father would be due no relief for the following

reasons. In concluding that CYS satisfied the statutory grounds to terminate

Father’s parental rights pursuant to, inter alia, Section 2511(a)(2), the trial

court found as follows:

      . . . [W]hile [Parents] completed some of their goals such as being
      employed and Father completing a parenting class, [Parents]
      failed to follow recommendations, failed to complete many
      important goals, and were unwilling to complete them. [Parents]
      were not sufficiently involved in the placements. [Parents] were
      not setting a good example for behavior. [Parents] did not feed
      the [] Children appropriately. While [Parents] made significant
      progress on their housing situation, the goal remained
      uncompleted. Father has a concerning anger issue that has not
      been resolved. . . . [CYS] was concerned about the severity of
      Father’s usage of marijuana. There are concerns of possible
      domestic violence and dishonesty in these cases. Lastly, [Parents]
      were resistant to couples counseling. Again, th[e c]ourt notes that
      [Parents’] overall unsatisfactory conduct persisted over the whole
      history of these cases; at least thirteen months had passed since
      E.L.M.T.W. was adjudicated dependent and twenty-six months
      had passed since the rest of the [] Children were adjudicated
      dependent.

                                     ****

      . . . [A]ll of the . . . Children have . . . been waiting in the legal
      and physical custody of [CYS] for at least thirteen months by the
      January 9, 2023[] hearing. [Parents] did not make much progress
      regarding [CYS’s] overall main concerns for [them] when
      considering the totality of the record. Additionally, no goals had
      been completed since September [] 2022[,] when [the c]court
      gave [Parents] additional time to try to improve the situation.
      [Parents’] resistance to making improvements that [CYS]
      recommended troubled th[e c]ourt. [Parents] . . . could have . .
      replaced the . . . Children’s sheets and mattresses, signed the
      behavioral contract to resume [Mr.] Stewart’s services, and signed

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      the release for the alleged pastor to speak with [CYS] about these
      cases. However, [Parents] chose to not comply with any of these
      recommendations . . ..

                                      ****

             Th[e c]ourt notes that [Parents] did make progress on some
      of their goals[,] and th[e c]ourt considered their progress. This
      [c]ourt was pleased that [Parents] were both employed, that
      Father completed a parenting class, that [Parents] almost had a
      sufficient home, and that [Parents] had a bond with the []
      Children. [. . .] However, [Parents] did not make much progress
      on important goals that mattered and failed to follow
      recommendations; the overall major concerns of [Parents] not
      following recommendations, being dishonest, and possibly
      violent[,] remained.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 24-25, 29-30 (citations to the record

omitted).

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court

in concluding that grounds existed for termination of Father’s parental rights

pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). Father, inter alia, did not complete his anger

management treatment; demonstrated aggression and non-compliance with

the   family’s    counselor,   Mr.   Stewart;   and   failed   to   follow   agency

recommendations, including, for example, obtaining appropriate bedding and

food for the Children. The record thus demonstrates that Father’s repeated

and continued incapacity, neglect or refusal to comply with their permanency

plan reunification goals has caused the Children to be without essential

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental

well-being.      Further, despite the trial court continuing the matter from

September 2022 to January 2023, no additional goals were completed, which

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demonstrates that the conditions and causes of this refusal cannot or will not

be remedied.      See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.

Super. 2003). As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume

parenting responsibilities.        The court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of

progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,

513 (Pa. Super. 2006).12

       Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section

2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

section 2511(b).      Regarding the section 2511(b) best interest analysis, this

Court has explained:

              While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
       major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
       is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
       court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
       The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
       termination of parental rights. Rather, the [trial] court must
       examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
       termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
       relationship. . . ..

____________________________________________

12 While we affirm under subsection (a)(2), we note that the trial court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights as to E.L.M.T.W. was not proper under
section 2511(a)(5), because Father was incarcerated at the time of her
removal. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating
that section 2511(a)(5) and (8) do not provide a basis for terminating the
father’s parental rights when he was incarcerated at the time of the child’s
removal from the mother’s care).

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             In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
      trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
      relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
      severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations,

quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted). Furthermore, our Supreme

Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). In weighing the bond considerations pursuant

to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in

mind.” Id. at 269. Children “are young for a scant number of years, and we

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

As our Supreme Court recently explained in K.T.,

      a court conducting a [s]ection 2511(b) analysis must consider
      more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
      severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the
      parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b)
      analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is
      necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the
      bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
      needs and welfare.

2023 WL 4092986 at *18 (emphasis added).             In addition, the K.T. Court

explained that the inquiry must consider and weigh certain evidence if it is

present in the record, including, but not limited to, the child’s “need for

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permanency and length of time in foster care . . .; whether the child is in a

preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster

home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id.

(footnote omitted).

      Preliminarily, we observe that Father fails to address subsection (b) with

respect to J.O.M.T.W. See Father’s Brief at 30-32. As such, we conclude that

Father waived any challenge to this subsection as related to her. See In re

W.H., 25 A.3d at 339 n.3; see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 465-66.

Nevertheless, we proceed with our review of subsection (b) vis-à-vis

E.L.M.T.W. See Father’s Brief at 22-23 (briefly discussing the section 2511(b)

factors pertaining to E.L.M.T.W.).

      Father relies solely on his bond with E.L.M.T.W. in support of his

assertion of error under section 2511(b). See Father’s Brief at 23. Father

maintains the trial court “did not adequately address the bonds of [E.L.M.T.W.]

with her parents.” Id.

      In concluding that termination of Parents’ parental rights best serves

the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court stated:

      This [c]ourt notes that [Parents] do share a bond with the []
      Children, but th[e c]ourt does not find that this bond is necessary
      or beneficial. Th[e c]ourt . . . notes that the [] Children are happy
      to see [Parents]. However, this [c]ourt found that the termination
      of [Parents’] parental rights would best serve the needs and
      welfare of the [] Children because of the following[:] The []

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      Children are also happy to see the foster parents. [. . .] The
      current foster parents are adoptive resources. While the boys are
      in one home and the girls are in another, the foster parents of
      both homes are friends, so the [] Children see each other many
      times each week. The caseworker who worked on the case for
      approximately two-and-one-half years testified that it is in the []
      Children’s best interest to terminate the parental rights. The []
      Children deserve permanency, and moving back and forth is really
      difficult for them. Lastly, [Parents] have not shown that they can
      comply with [CYS’s] require[ments]. . . . [Parents’] parental
      rights to the custody and rearing of the [] Children were
      converted, upon the failure to fulfill their parental duties,
      [considering] the [] Children’s rights to have proper parenting and
      fulfillment of their potential in a permanent, healthy, and safe
      environment. E.L.M.T.W. had been involved with [CYS] for at
      least thirteen months by the January 9, 2023, hearing, and
      [J.O.M.T.W. was] involved with [CYS] for at least twenty-six
      months by that date. The developmental, physical, and emotional
      needs as well as the welfare of the [] Children are all being
      addressed better by the foster parents.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 28-29 (citations omitted).

      Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

As CYS foster care supervisor Ms. Farrisi testified to, while Children have a

bond with Parents, they are also bonded to their preadoptive foster parents,

who are better able to provide for the Children’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs, whereas Father has, despite ample opportunity, failed to

show he can provide the requisite stability. As the record supports the court’s

determination that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best

interests of J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W., Father is due no relief.

      As Father has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in

finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2) and that

termination   of   Father’s   parental   rights   best   serves   the   Children’s

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developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to section

2511(b), he is due no relief.   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

termination decrees.

     Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/11/2023

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