Court Opinion

ID: 9951409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-16 00:00:34.600093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:02.183148
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40273            Document: 61-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/15/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                            FILED
                                    No. 23-40273
                                                                      March 15, 2024
                                  Summary Calendar
                                  ____________                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk
United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Jake Delahney Taylor,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 3:19-CR-23-1
                   ______________________________

Before Barksdale, Graves, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, Jake Delahney Taylor was
convicted of, inter alia: sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a), (e); and distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B), (b)(1). (He pleaded guilty to two other related counts, but
does not contest those convictions.)

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40273         Document: 61-1       Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/15/2024

                                   No. 23-40273

       First, Taylor renews his assertion made in district court that there was
insufficient evidence to support the two convictions at issue because the
surreptitiously recorded videos and images did not involve “lascivious
exhibition” amounting to “sexually explicit conduct”, as required by the
statutes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (defining “sexually explicit conduct”).
In that regard, he contends our court’s test for “lascivious exhibition”—
weighing the Dost factors—is overly expansive, and the D.C. Circuit’s test is
more in line with the statute. See United States v. Hillie, 39 F.4th 674, 684–
90 (D.C. Cir. 2022). He correctly concedes his contention is foreclosed by
our precedent but raises the issue to preserve it for possible further review.
See United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 826–28 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying
Dost factors); United States v. McCall, 833 F.3d 560, 563–64 (5th Cir. 2016)
(concluding surreptitious recording of minor satisfied “lascivious
exhibition” element).
       Next, Taylor relatedly contends our court’s Dost test for “lascivious
exhibition” renders the statutes of conviction overbroad under the First
Amendment because it allows for convictions based on images not depicting
minors in a sex act. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982)
(requiring visual depiction of sexual conduct); United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (explaining “‘[s]exually explicit conduct’ connotes
actual depiction of the sex act rather than merely the suggestion that it is
occurring” (emphasis in original)). Review of his preserved as-applied and
facial constitutional challenges is de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur, 51
F.4th 560, 568 (5th Cir. 2022). Our court, however, has previously rejected
this contention. E.g., United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 263–67 (5th Cir.
2020) (refusing to limit First Amendment’s categorical exclusion of child
pornography to images depicting minors’ criminal abuse); United States v.
Traweek, 707 F. App’x 213, 215 n.2 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Steen, 634 F.3d at

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                                  No. 23-40273

826–28) (rejecting assertion that Ferber requires “minor affirmatively
commit a sexual act or be sexually abused”).
       Last, Taylor challenges, for the first time on appeal, two special
conditions of his 10-year supervised release. The special conditions require
him to, inter alia: “not possess and/or use computers or other electronic
communications or data storage devices or media, without the prior approval
of the probation officer”; and “not . . . access any Internet service during the
length of [his] supervision, unless approved in advance in writing by the
United States Probation Officer”. He contends: the conditions, read
literally, require him to obtain permission before each computer or Internet
use for the term of his supervised release; and, therefore, the conditions are
unreasonably restrictive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (requiring “no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary”).
       Because Taylor did not raise this issue in district court, review is only
for plain error. E.g., United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.
2012). Under that standard, Taylor must show a forfeited plain error (clear-
or-obvious error, rather than one subject to reasonable dispute) that affected
his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If
he makes that showing, we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain
error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. (citation omitted).
       Our court has held special conditions requiring a defendant to obtain
prior approval for each use of an electronic device to access the internet are
“unreasonably restrictive”. United States v. Naidoo, 995 F.3d 367, 384 (5th
Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Sealed Juv., 781 F.3d 747, 756–57 (5th Cir.
2015). Pursuant to our precedent, and in the light of other unchallenged,
imposed special conditions relating to the two at issue, we affirm Taylor’s
two special conditions, but subject to the interpretation that individual

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                                No. 23-40273

approval is not required for each instance of usage under the two conditions.
See Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 384 (affirming condition subject to similar
construction); Sealed Juv., 781 F.3d at 756–57 (same).
      AFFIRMED.

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