Court Opinion

ID: 9374457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 22:03:40.00968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.750183
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210365-U

                                 Order filed February 22, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                   2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )      of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )      Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )      Appeal No. 3-21-0365
             v.                                       )      Circuit No. 17-CF-2451
                                                      )
      DUSTIN J. GREINER,                              )      Honorable
                                                      )      David M. Carlson,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court erred when it considered the difference in age between
                  defendant’s daughter and the victim in determining defendant’s sentence.

¶2          Defendant, Dustin J. Greiner, pled guilty to one count of aggravated driving while under

     the influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(1)(F), (d)(2)(G) (West 2016)) and was sentenced to

     seven years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the Will County circuit

     court improperly considered: (1) the age difference between defendant’s daughter and the victim,
     and (2) in aggravation, numerous inadmissible victim impact statements. We vacate defendant’s

     sentence and remand for resentencing.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The State charged defendant by indictment with two counts of aggravated driving while

     under the influence (id. § 11-501(a)(4), (a)(6)). The offenses were charged as Class 2 felonies as

     they both alleged that defendant, while under the influence of any drug or combination of drugs

     to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving, drove a vehicle and got into a motor

     vehicle accident that resulted in the death of another person.

¶5          Defendant entered an open plea to count I, and the State dismissed the remaining count.

     The factual basis for the plea established that defendant rear-ended a vehicle, pushing it into

     oncoming traffic. The vehicle was struck by another vehicle, and a 16-year-old passenger died as

     a result of the accident. Defendant’s urinalysis indicated a positive result for cocaine. The court

     accepted the plea and the cause proceeded to a sentencing hearing.

¶6          Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) revealed that he had no prior felony

     convictions but had 5 misdemeanor convictions and 15 traffic offenses. The PSI stated that

     defendant had three children, a 17-year-old son, a 9-year-old daughter, and a 4-year-old son.

¶7          At the sentencing hearing, the State presented victim impact statements from the victim’s

     mother, father, grandfather, two aunts, cousin, boyfriend, boyfriend’s mother, friend, friend’s

     mother, a friend of her father, and a family friend. Defendant’s pastor testified on his behalf,

     stating that he saw growth in defendant after the accident and believed that he could continue to

     grow if he was not imprisoned. Defendant also gave a statement apologizing for his actions.

¶8          The court took the matter under advisement and continued the hearing. Before

     pronouncing the sentence, the State requested to reopen proofs to introduce into evidence that

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       defendant committed a new driving while license suspended offense. The parties stipulated

       witnesses observed defendant drive from the courthouse after the last hearing date and that he

       had a suspended driver’s license. Defendant admitted to the offense. Because of the new driving

       offense, the State requested that defendant be sentenced at the higher end of the 3- to 14-year

       sentencing range.

¶9             The court found in mitigation that defendant accepted responsibility for the accident;

       would be separated from his children if imprisoned, something that the court said “breaks [its]

       heart”; and had no prior felony convictions. In aggravation, the court found that defendant had a

       lengthy history of driving violations and had committed another violation after the prior hearing

       date.

¶ 10           The court sentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. The court stated:

               “I’m going to sentence you to seven years in the Illinois Department of Corrections

               because you will not be free until [defendant’s daughter] is the same age [as the victim].

               The years that [the victim’s family] will never get back, you are not going to get either. I

               don’t know of any other way. I don’t know of any other rhyme or reason or anything that

               would make sense to anybody.”

¶ 11           Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court denied. On direct

       appeal, we remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).

       People v. Greiner, No. 3-19-0748 (2020) (unpublished minute order). On remand, defendant

       filed another motion to reconsider, arguing that his sentence was excessive. The court denied the

       motion, and defendant appeals.

¶ 12                                             II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 13           Defendant contends he was denied a fair sentencing hearing where the circuit court

       considered: (1) the difference between the age of defendant’s daughter and the victim in

       determining defendant’s sentence, and (2) in aggravation, several victim impact statements from

       those who were not considered representatives of the victim under the Rights of Crime Victims

       and Witnesses Act (Act) (725 ILCS 120/6 (West 2018)). The State argues that defendant

       forfeited both of these issues because trial counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection

       and did not raise the issue in the motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant responds that if this

       court finds his sentencing issues forfeited, both are subject to reversal under the second prong of

       the plain error rule.

¶ 14           The plain error rule provides a limited exception to forfeiture. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill.

       2d 539, 545 (2010). The first step of plain error review is to determine if a clear or obvious error

       occurred. Id. “In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence

       at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so serious as to deny the

       defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Id. Defendant bears the burden of persuasion under either

       prong. Id.

¶ 15           The Illinois Constitution requires that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according

       to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful

       citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A sentencing judge must balance “the retributive and

       rehabilitative purposes of punishment, and the process requires careful consideration of all

       factors in aggravation and mitigation.” People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26. For a

       sentence to be reasonable, a “sentence must be based on the particular circumstances of [the]

       case.” Id. The most important factor a judge must consider in sentencing is the seriousness of the

       crime. People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 28. A judge may not employ personal

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       policy in sentencing. People v. Miller, 2014 IL App (2d) 120873, ¶ 36. Consideration of an

       improper sentencing factor only requires remandment when a reviewing court cannot determine

       from the record that the weight placed on the improper factor was so insignificant that it did not

       lead to a greater sentence. Id. ¶ 37.

¶ 16          A court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence. People v. Patterson, 347 Ill. App. 3d

       1044, 1056 (2004). We will not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion.

       People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). Moreover, a sentence within the applicable

       range is presumptively valid, and defendant bears the burden to rebut this presumption. Busse,

       2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27. However, “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when, among

       other things, it fashions a sentence based on the court’s personal beliefs or arbitrary reasons.”

       Miller, 2014 IL App (2d) 120873, ¶ 36.

¶ 17          Defendant’s seven-year sentence falls within the 3- to 14-year sentencing range that

       accompanies a Class 2 felony conviction. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(2)(G) (West 2016);

       730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016). However, it derives completely from the court’s

       consideration of its own personal belief that a seven-year sentence was warranted by the

       difference in age between the victim and defendant’s daughter. The court’s commentary was

       entirely arbitrary, and in essence, contorted the factor in mitigation that “imprisonment of the

       defendant would entail excessive hardship to his dependents,” into a factor in aggravation. 730

       ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2018). This finding is at odds with the court’s prior finding, in

       mitigation, that the separation of defendant from his children “breaks [its] heart.” Additionally,

       the victim’s age is irrelevant to the sentence imposed on defendant. See People v. Joe, 207 Ill.

       App. 3d 1079, 1087 (1991) (consideration of the victim’s profession and standing in the

       community was “clearly inappropriate”).

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¶ 18           The State, after acknowledging that the court’s sentencing rationale was “unusual and

       perhaps even inappropriate,” argues “it is clear from the record” that defendant’s sentence was

       proper because the court based its decision on the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s

       criminal record, and the fact that defendant drove on a suspended driver’s license following the

       first sentencing hearing. However, what is actually clear from the record is that the court based

       its sentencing decision exclusively on the improper age-difference factor. After setting forth this

       rationale, the court stated, “I don’t know of any other way. I don’t know of any other rhyme or

       reason or anything that would make sense to anybody.” (Emphasis added.) This nullified the

       court’s prior discussion of the factors in aggravation and mitigation and conclusively established

       that the improper age-difference factor was the sole rationale for defendant’s seven-year prison

       sentence.

¶ 19           The court’s exclusive consideration of this improper sentencing factor requires reversal

       under the second prong of the plain error rule. Our supreme court has held that a sentencing

       court’s erroneous consideration of a factor inherent in the offense warrants reversal under the

       second prong of the plain error rule. See People v. Martin, 119 Ill. 2d 453, 458 (1988) (“The trial

       judge’s consideration of the fact that the defendant’s conduct caused serious harm to [the

       victim], resulting in his death, as a factor in aggravation in sentencing clearly affected the

       defendant’s fundamental right to liberty [citation] and impinged on her right not to be sentenced

       based on improper factors.”). The error at issue here presents the same fundamental right to

       liberty concern. Accordingly, this plain error requires reversal under the second prong of the

       plain error rule.

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¶ 20          Our resolution of the above issue has rendered analysis of the remaining victim impact

       statement issue unnecessary. Nevertheless, we have authority to address this claim as it is likely

       to recur on remand. People v. Walker, 211 Ill. 2d 317, 343 (2004).

¶ 21          Both the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(a)(5)) and the Act (725

       ILCS 120/6 (West 2018)) prescribe numerous rights for crime victims, including the right to be

       heard at sentencing. Section 6(a-1) of the Act specifically states:

              “In any case where a defendant has been convicted of a violation of any statute, ***

              relating to the operation or use of motor vehicles, *** if the violation resulted in great

              bodily harm or death, the person who suffered great bodily harm, the injured person’s

              representative, or the representative of a deceased person shall be entitled to notice of the

              sentencing hearing. ‘Representative’ includes the spouse, guardian, grandparent, or other

              immediate family or household member of an injured or deceased person. The injured

              person or his or her representative and a representative of the deceased person shall have

              the right to address the court regarding the impact that the defendant’s criminal conduct

              has had upon them. If more than one representative of an injured or deceased person is

              present in the courtroom at the time of sentencing, the court has discretion to permit one

              or more of the representatives to present an oral impact statement.” Id. § 6(a-1).

       This court observed, in People v. Larson, 2022 IL App (3d) 190482, ¶ 37,

                      “The plain language of the statute thus contemplates impact statements limited in

              number (the victim or, in the event of a death, ‘a’ representative of the deceased person);

              source (a ‘representative’ of the deceased person); and content (impact ‘upon them’ of

              the defendant’s criminal conduct) *** The statute does not serve as an invitation to rail

              against the defendant or to recommend a certain sentence to the court.”

                                                         7
       We found that the circuit court did not have discretion to allow nonrepresentatives to make

       victim impact statements, and the court was “obligated to bar any statements by

       nonrepresentatives, to exercise discretion with respect to any additional victim impact statements

       beyond those specifically provided as a right under the Act. Id. ¶ 40.

¶ 22          Here, the court erroneously considered victim impact statements from numerous

       individuals who did not meet the “representative” definition set forth in section 6(a-1) of the Act.

       Therefore, “we remind the trial courts of their obligation to comply with the statute” (People v.

       Somers, 2013 IL 114054, ¶ 18) and specifically only consider those victim impacts statements

       allowed under the Act on remand.

¶ 23                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated and remanded with directions

       to resentence defendant without considering arbitrary factors and improper victim impact

       statements.

¶ 25          Judgment vacated.

¶ 26          Cause remanded with directions.

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