Court Opinion

ID: 9889230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 23:03:12.906054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:13.039770
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 In re M.B. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.B., a Person Coming                                       B322471
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
________________________________                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                21CCJP01737)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

MAURICE B.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Maurice B.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                      _____________________________

                         INTRODUCTION

       Maurice B., the father of 15-year-old Malaysia B.,
challenges the custody and visitation order the juvenile court
issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 362.4,
subdivision (a),1 when the court terminated its jurisdiction.
Maurice contends the court abused its discretion in granting
Malaysia’s mother sole legal and physical custody of Malaysia.
He also contends the court abused its discretion by ordering
monitored visitation, failing to specify the duration of visits, and
improperly delegating authority for visitation to a therapist. We
agree with one of Maurice’s contentions: The juvenile court erred
in failing to specify the duration of visits. Therefore, we reverse
the custody and visitation order for the juvenile court to correct
this deficiency.

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

                                  2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Department Files a Petition Under Section 300;
             the Juvenile Court Detains Malaysia
      We described much of the factual and procedural
background of these proceedings in Maurice’s prior appeal, which
was from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition
orders. (See In re M.B. (July 13, 2023, B318130) [nonpub. opn.]
(Maurice B. I).) In February 2021 Malaysia called law
enforcement because she became scared after a fight between her
mother, Michelle, and her stepfather, Brandon W. Michelle told
sheriff’s deputies that Brandon pushed her into her bedroom and
grabbed her by the neck and that Malaysia’s then-seven-year-old
stepbrother, Zion, witnessed the incident. Brandon admitted to
the social worker that he choked and “body-slammed” Michelle,
but said that he later calmed down and walked away. He said
the incident was a “misunderstanding.” (Maurice B. I.)
      Malaysia told the social worker that her mother and
Brandon fought often, that Brandon was violent, and that she
and Zion feared Brandon. Zion said that Brandon was mean to
Michelle and yelled at her and that it scared him when Brandon
banged on their door loudly at night. Zion said Brandon once
threatened Michelle with one of his guns. (Maurice B. I, supra,
B318130.)
      In April 2021 the Department filed a petition under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), on behalf of Malaysia and
Zion, alleging that Michelle and Brandon had “a history of
engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence” and
that their violent conduct “endangers the children’s physical
health and safety and places the children at risk of serious

                                 3
physical harm, damage, and danger.”2 (Maurice B. I, supra,
B318130.) The juvenile court detained Malaysia from Michelle
and Maurice, placed her with a maternal aunt, and ordered
monitored visitation for both parents. The court also issued a
temporary restraining order against Brandon and ordered him
not to have any contact with Malaysia. (Maurice B. I, supra.)

     B.      The Juvenile Court Sustains an Amended Petition
             and Places Malaysia with Maurice
       In May 2021 the Department filed a first amended petition
under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), adding allegations
Michelle and Brandon physically abused Malaysia by hitting her
with a belt. The Department then filed a second amended
petition adding allegations that Michelle and Maurice had a
history of domestic violence and that Michelle obtained a
temporary restraining order against Maurice in 2015.
(Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)
       At the jurisdiction hearing the juvenile court found
Malaysia was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (b). The court sustained counts a-1 and b-1 (domestic
violence between Michelle and Brandon) and a-3 and b-3
(physical abuse by Brandon). The court also sustained counts a-2
and b-2 (physical abuse by Michelle), but struck the allegation
Michelle hit Malaysia with a belt because the court found
Michelle had stopped doing that. The court dismissed counts a-4
and b-4 (domestic violence between Michelle and Maurice).
(Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)

2    The juvenile court’s orders regarding Zion and his father,
Brandon, are not at issue in this appeal.

                                4
       At the disposition hearing counsel for Malaysia expressed
concern about Maurice’s unresolved “anger management issues”
and said Maurice called the maternal aunt a “bitch” in front of
Malaysia. Counsel stated Malaysia wanted to visit Maurice but
did not want to live with him yet. The juvenile court declared
Malaysia a dependent child of the court. The court removed
Malaysia from Michelle and placed her with Maurice on the
conditions that (1) Maurice “comply with parenting and anger
management in therapy”; (2) Maurice not discuss the case or
make negative remarks around Malaysia about her parents; and
(3) the Department make a plan for Malaysia to transition to
Maurice’s home. Among other things, the court ordered Maurice
to participate in individual counseling to address anger
management, domestic violence, and parenting issues and to
participate in conjoint counseling with Malaysia if her therapist
recommended it. The court also ordered Michelle to participate
in a support group for victims of domestic violence, parenting
classes, and individual counseling, and to have monitored
visitation with Malaysia. (Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)

      C.     The Juvenile Court Sustains a Supplemental Petition,
             Removes Malaysia from Maurice, and Returns Her to
             Michelle
      Michelle complied with her case plan; Maurice did not.
Among other things, Maurice never provided proof he had
enrolled in counseling, and he made negative comments to
Malaysia. The maternal aunt told the social worker that Maurice
called Malaysia, read her case reports about Brandon’s alleged
abuse, and said to Malaysia, “You disgust me,” which made
Malaysia cry. When the social worker spoke with Maurice about

                                5
his comments to Malaysia, Maurice denied he made them and
complained the Department was not treating him fairly as a man
and a father. The social worker invited him to attend the
Department’s support group for fathers, and Maurice said he
would speak with the social worker who led the group.
(Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)
       Malaysia later told the social worker that Maurice
complained about the maternal relatives during visits, and the
social worker told Maurice that talking about the case or saying
negative things about the maternal relatives made Malaysia cry
or feel angry. Maurice denied saying those things and accused
the maternal relatives of lying. A few weeks later Malaysia again
told the social worker that she wanted Maurice to stop talking
about Michelle and the maternal aunts. Malaysia said that her
father needed “counseling” and “anger management,” that she no
longer wanted to have overnight visits with him, and that, when
he talked about the case or spoke negatively about the maternal
relatives, Malaysia thought about “hurting others.” (Maurice B.
I, supra, B318130.)
       In October 2021 the Department reported to the juvenile
court that Maurice’s “negative berating comments” endangered
Malaysia’s physical and emotional well-being. At the
Department’s request, the juvenile court issued an order
removing Malaysia from Maurice. When the social worker told
Maurice about the court’s order, he accused the social worker and
the maternal relatives of lying and told the social worker she was
a “dumb racist bitch” and was going to lose her job. (Maurice B.
I, supra, B318130.)
       On October 20, 2021 the Department filed a subsequent
petition under section 342 alleging Maurice emotionally abused

                                6
Malaysia by making disparaging comments about her, Michelle,
and Michelle’s family. The Department also filed a supplemental
petition under section 387 seeking to remove Malaysia from
Maurice. The Department alleged Maurice did not participate in
the court-ordered parenting and anger management classes and
continued to discuss the case with Malaysia and make negative
remarks about Michelle, all of which endangered Malaysia’s
physical health and safety and put her at risk of serious physical
harm. When the social worker told Maurice about the
allegations, he denied them and said it was Malaysia who
initiated discussion about the case and the maternal relatives.
Maurice said, “What was I supposed to do, tell her to shut up?”
(Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)
       At the detention hearing on the subsequent and
supplemental petitions, the court removed Malaysia from
Maurice and ordered monitored visitation and phone calls. The
court ordered the Department to assess whether Michelle could
have unmonitored and overnight visits.
       At the January 18, 2022 combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing the court sustained the supplemental petition
under section 387 and dismissed without prejudice the
subsequent petition under section 342 for emotional abuse. The
court found Maurice’s derogatory statements about Malaysia,
Michelle, and Michelle’s relatives violated the court’s conditions
for releasing Malaysia to Maurice. The court also found Maurice
was not complying with his case plan because he was not
“addressing parenting and anger management in his individual
counseling.” The court also stated “the persistent nature and
extent of his negative comments shows he is not working on the
issues at all.” The court found Michelle, in contrast, had made

                                7
substantial progress in her case plan. The court removed
Malaysia from Maurice and placed her with Michelle on the
condition Michelle comply with family preservation services.
(Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)
       The court ordered Maurice to participate in parenting and
anger management classes and individual counseling to address
age-appropriate discipline for children and anger management
and domestic violence issues. The court ordered monitored
visitation for Maurice. Maurice appealed from the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings on the sustained supplemental
petition under section 387 and the court’s disposition orders. We
affirmed. (Maurice B. I, supra, B318130.)

      D.      The Juvenile Court Terminates Jurisdiction, Grants
              Michelle Sole Custody, and Orders Monitored
              Visitation for Maurice
       In its status report for the review hearing under
section 364, the Department reported Michelle had provided
Malaysia a “safe, stable, and loving environment.” Michelle fully
complied with her case plan by completing parenting and
domestic violence classes and participating in individual
counseling. Michelle’s therapist reported that Michelle had
“grown tremendously,” that she “continues to grow in her
parental role and is a wonderful advocate for her children,” and
that she had “successfully completed her individual counseling.”
       Maurice refused to provide the Department with
verification he was complying with his case plan, including
documentation he had enrolled in counseling and parenting
classes. The Department wrote Maurice monthly, but Maurice
did not contact the Department to schedule visits with Malaysia.

                                8
Maurice also did not make himself available for assessment by
Malaysia’s therapist for conjoint counseling.
       In April 2022 Maurice called Malaysia, yelled at her, and
called her a liar. Malaysia hung up. She told the Department
she did not want to talk to Maurice again “because he does not
know how to talk to people.”
       At the July 22, 2022 review hearing under section 364, the
juvenile court awarded Michelle sole legal and physical custody of
Malaysia. The court ordered monitored visitation in a
therapeutic setting for Maurice. On July 26, 2022, after receiving
and signing custody and visitation orders, the court terminated
its jurisdiction over Malaysia. Maurice timely appealed from the
court’s custody and visitation order. (Maurice B. I, supra,
B318130.)
                          DISCUSSION

       A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Section 362.4 “authorizes the juvenile court, when
terminating jurisdiction over a dependent child, to issue a
custody and visitation order that will become part of the parents’
family law file.” (In re Anna T. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 870, 871;
see § 362.4, subd. (a); In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196,
203.) The court’s custody and visitation order under
section 362.4, commonly referred to as an “exit order” (In re T.S.
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513), “may not be modified by the
family court ‘unless the court finds that there has been a
significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court
issued the order and modification of the order is in the best
interests of the child.’” (Anna T., at pp. 871-872; see § 302,
subd. (d).) “When making a custody determination under

                                9
section 362.4, ‘the court’s focus and primary consideration must
always be the best interests of the child.’” (T.S., at p. 513; see
In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 112 [“The court must be
guided by the totality of the circumstances and issue orders that
are in the child’s best interests.”].)
       “‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody
[and visitation] orders when it terminates jurisdiction in a
dependency case.’” (In re J.M., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 112;
see In re N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094.) “We review the
juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of that discretion.” (J.M.,
at p. 113; see In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 863.) “‘When
applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, “the trial
court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the
law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”’”
(In re Maya L. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.) “‘When two or
more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’” (N.M., at p. 1094.)

      B.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
             Awarding Michelle Sole Legal and Physical Custody
       Maurice argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in
awarding Michelle sole legal and physical custody of Malaysia
because Michelle “had a long history of domestic violence
relationships,” and although she had “received services for
domestic violence, only a short period of time had passed since
her last domestic violence relationship.” Maurice asserts he, “on
the other hand, was able to properly care for the child.”
       It was well within the court’s discretion to conclude
granting custody to Michelle was in Malaysia’s best interest.

                                 10
Although the juvenile court initially found jurisdiction based on
domestic violence between Brandon (Malaysia’s stepfather) and
Michelle, in the intervening 16 months Michelle fully complied
with her case plan, which was designed to reduce the risk of
future domestic violence. She completed a support group for
victims of domestic violence, a parenting class, and individual
therapy. Michelle’s therapist reported that Michelle “has
resolved her concerns that brought her to the attention of the
Department” and that she “thinks more about her children than
herself and no longer has interest in participating in unhealthy
relationships.” Michelle’s therapist also stated that, although the
therapist was leaving the agency where she worked, she did not
think it was clinically necessary for Michelle to transfer to
another therapist because she was “very confident” Michelle
could “successfully advocate for herself and for her children going
forward should any issue arise.”
       In July 2022, six months after the court returned Malaysia
to Michelle, the Department found “no safety threats with the
family” and recommended granting Michelle full physical
custody. The Department reported Malaysia had “stability,
structure, love, [and] guidance” in Michelle’s care. Michelle told
the social worker she had ended her relationship with Brandon
and had “moved past having unhealthy relationships for the sake
of dating.” The social worker said that Michelle understood “the
importance of not allowing her children to continue to be in or
witness a cycle of violence” and that she was “able to keep them
safe.”
       In contrast, there was considerable evidence that awarding
custody to Maurice was not in Malaysia’s best interest. Maurice
consistently disparaged Michelle and her family and discussed

                                11
the dependency case with Malaysia, in violation of the juvenile
court’s order releasing Malaysia to Maurice. Maurice’s
disparaging comments made Malaysia think of hurting other
people. Maurice’s behavior did not improve after the juvenile
court removed Malaysia from him in January 2022. In
April 2022 Malaysia told the social worker that Maurice had
called her and “immediately started yelling at her, calling her a
liar and talking negatively about her maternal family.” Malaysia
told the social worker that she did not want to talk to Maurice,
and at the section 364 hearing in July 2022, counsel for Malaysia
told the juvenile court Malaysia did not want her father to visit.
       Despite Maurice’s assertion he “made efforts to attend
therapy . . . to address his anger,” he did not provide the
Department or the juvenile court with any evidence he was
complying with the court’s orders aimed at protecting Malaysia.
Maurice submitted no evidence he was attending parenting
classes or addressing parenting or anger management issues in
his online counseling. He did not make himself available to
Malaysia’s therapist to be assessed for conjoint counseling. In
addition, he did not visit Malaysia in the six months before the
section 364 hearing. The juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Michelle sole legal and physical custody.3

3      The Department recommended giving Michelle and
Maurice joint legal custody, but the juvenile court awarded sole
legal custody to Michelle so that Michelle would not have to deal
with Maurice’s harassment, “especially since [Maurice]
essentially refused to do services in this case to address the
issues.” That decision was also within the court’s discretion.

                                12
      C.     The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
             Ordering Monitored Visitation in a Therapeutic
             Setting, But It Did Err in Failing To Specify a
             Minimum Duration for Visits
       The juvenile court ordered that Maurice could visit
Malaysia “at a minimum of one time per month” and that “either
a therapist must be present or somebody that the therapist
recommends.” The court also ruled that, if the parents could not
agree on the therapeutic monitor, Maurice would “have to pay for
a professional monitor that meets the standard of what a
therapist thinks is needed.” Maurice argues the court abused its
discretion in issuing that order. Maurice has half a point (or at
least one-third of one).
       Maurice argues the juvenile court erred in requiring his
visits to be monitored because Malaysia “was not at any risk of
harm from unmonitored visits.” The court previously ordered, at
the January 2022 disposition hearing, Maurice’s visits with
Malaysia to be monitored “given the extraordinary nature” of
Maurice’s negative statements to Malaysia. We affirmed that
order. (See In re M.B., supra, B318130.)
       As discussed, Maurice did nothing after the January 2022
hearing to reduce the risk of harm to Malaysia. He did not
comply with his case plan and did not visit Malaysia. When he
called Malaysia, he yelled at her. At the July 2022 section 364
hearing, counsel for Malaysia told the court that Malaysia did not
want her father to visit her and that, if the court ordered visits,
she wanted “them to be monitored in a therapeutic setting.” The
court stated Malaysia was “old enough to know what situation
she needs to feel safe with [Maurice], so those visits must be
therapeutic, meaning either a therapist must be present or

                                13
somebody that the therapist recommends be present for the
visits.” The court ordered monitored visitation for Maurice
because of his previous inappropriate behavior around Malaysia
“and because he hasn’t completed the parenting class or the
anger management.” That order was well within the court’s
discretion. (See § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B) [“No visitation order shall
jeopardize the safety of the child.”]; In re D.P. (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071 [“juvenile court reasonably exercised
its discretion to limit mother to monitored visits”].)
       Maurice also argues the court impermissibly delegated
authority over visitation to the therapist. He contends the court
“placed sole discretion as to whether any visits would occur in the
hands of the therapist” and “effectively granted the therapist
absolute veto power over visits.” “[T]he power to decide whether
any visitation occurs belongs to the court alone.” (In re S.H.
(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317; see In re C.S. (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 631, 639 [“it is impermissible for the court to
authorize a third person, whether social worker, therapist or the
child, to determine whether any visitation will occur”].) However,
a “‘visitation order may delegate to a third party the
responsibility for managing the details of visits, including their
time, place and manner.’” (In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
511, 517; see In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 439.)
       In In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th 196 the Supreme
Court held the juvenile court did not err in giving a parent’s
therapist discretion to determine when the parent had made
“satisfactory progress” so that visitation could begin. (Id., at
pp. 213-214; see In re C.S., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 640-641
[“order granting . . . visitation rights and expressly stating the
frequency and duration of visits, while requiring [child’s]

                                 14
therapist to approve the start of those visits, did not constitute an
unlawful delegation of judicial authority”]; cf. In re Nicholas B.
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138 [order stating visitation “shall
not occur until the minor’s therapist expresses support for such
visitation” gave too much discretion to the therapist].) The
juvenile court here delegated an appropriate level of
responsibility to the therapist. Contrary to Maurice’s assertion,
the court did not give the therapist sole discretion to decide
whether visits would occur. The visitation order stated: “Father
may have monitored therapeutic visits with a therapist or
someone recommended by therapist present, at a minimum of
1 time per month. If parents cannot agree upon a monitor, father
to pay for a professional monitor that meets the standard of what
therapist recommends.” The therapist’s only role was to monitor
the visits or approve someone else to serve as the monitor. That
was not an unlawful delegation of judicial authority. (See In re
C.S., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 640 [juvenile court properly
gave the therapist discretion to decide when visits could safely
begin].)
       Finally, Maurice argues the court erred in failing to specify
the minimum duration of visits. He’s right about that. The
visitation order specified the minimum frequency of visits, but
was silent on the duration of each visit. The court’s failure to set
a minimum duration allowed for the possibility Michelle or the
monitor could limit the length of visits to prevent any meaningful
visitation. If that were to occur, Maurice’s only remedy would be
to seek modification of the visitation order in family court, which
would require him to show a “significant change of
circumstances.” (§ 302, subd. (d).) The juvenile court erred in
failing to specify a minimum duration for the visits. (See

                                 15
In re Grace C. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478 [“Where a
juvenile court orders visitation, the court shall specify the
frequency and duration of visits.”]; In re Rebecca S. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314 [“leaving the frequency and duration
of visits within the legal guardian’s discretion allows the
guardian to decide whether visitation actually will occur”];
In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274 [juvenile court erred
in failing to specify frequency and duration of visits].)

                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s custody and visitation order is
reversed. The juvenile court is directed to vacate its order
terminating jurisdiction, issue a new custody and visitation order
based on current circumstances that specifies the frequency and
duration of the visits, and if appropriate, enter a new order
terminating jurisdiction.

                                     SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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