Court Opinion

ID: 9477290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:19:23.948707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:47.889090
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially in which Godbold, Senior Circuit Judge, joins:
I.
I agree with the result reached in Judge Johnson's opinion for the plurality — i.e., that Burch has sufficiently stated a claim of a procedural due process violation — but I cannot join Judge Johnson’s reasoning as to why Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), does not apply to bar the instant case. Instead, I rely upon the reasoning set out in Part II. On the substantive constitutional issue, I agree with the result reached in Judge Tjoflat’s opinion — i.e., that Burch has neither alleged a substantive constitutional violation nor intended to do so — but I cannot join all of Judge Tjoflat’s reasoning. Instead, I rely upon the reasoning set out in Part III.
II.
In my judgment, the reason that Parratt does not apply is that Burch has sufficiently alleged a deprivation pursuant to an established state procedure. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). Burch alleged that each defendant “took part in admitting plaintiff ... as a ‘voluntary’ patient,” that at the time of admission plaintiff was “disoriented, semi-mute, confused and bizarre in appearance and thought,” that defendant’s actions were taken “under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs or usages of the State of Florida” and that each of the defendants “knew or should have known that plaintiff was incapable of voluntary, knowing, understanding and informed consent to admission.” Burch attached to the complaint Exhibit G, a letter from the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, which provided: “This matter was discussed at the Human Rights Advocacy Committee for Florida State Hospital Meeting on August 4, 1983, and hospital administration was made aware that they were very likely asking medicated patients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent.”
In the current Rule 12(b)(6) posture of this case, the test of course is whether it is beyond doubt that Burch can prove no set of facts which would establish a procedural due process violation. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). One such possible set of facts, as gleaned from Burch’s allegations, is that at the two hospitals involved in this case there was an established custom or practice of obtaining voluntary consent forms when the patient was clearly not competent to consent.1 Far from being “beyond doubt,” *809such a practice is entirely conceivable, and perhaps all too tempting.
It is clear that such an established practice can constitute the kind of established state procedure contemplated in Logan, removing the element of randomness which is required for the application of the Par-ratt bar. In Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964 (11th Cir.1986), a state prisoner asserted that he was deprived of property when prison officials confiscated and destroyed some of his legal materials during a search of his cell. He asserted that similar confiscations had taken place in the past, in the face of court orders to the contrary and despite notice to the warden. This court concluded that “it could be inferred that searches and consequent confiscations unaccompanied by procedural safeguards are the sanctioned standard operating procedure at the [prison].” Id. at 967. The court held that Wright had sufficiently alleged that the deprivation of his property was pursuant to an established state procedure and thus that Parratt was not applicable. Accord Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir.1985) (in banc) (where prison officials miscalculated by five years prisoner’s incarceration terms by employing formulae in a manner consistent with standard operating procedures, Logan rather than Parratt applies; “[w]here the injury is the product of the operation of state law, regulation, or institutionalized practice, it is neither random nor unauthorized, but wholly predictable, authorized, and within the power of the state to control”); Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.1984) (if plaintiff could establish that police had official policy of arresting and detaining suspects without probable cause and of confiscating suspects’ property, then police actions constitute established state procedure and Logan applies).
Accordingly, I conclude that Burch has adequately alleged a claim of a procedural due process violation.
III.
I am not persuaded that Burch has alleged a substantive constitutional violation, or that he has intended to do so.
At oral argument to the in banc court, Burch candidly acknowledged that he had made no such claim.
Even liberally construed, a fair reading of the complaint alleges no substantive due process violation. The allegations of the complaint make it clear that Burch was seriously mentally ill. The law is clear that the State can confine such mentally ill persons, if appropriate procedural due process is afforded. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).
Thus, I conclude that Burch has alleged only a procedural due process claim, not a substantive due process claim. There is no suggestion in the complaint that Burch was *810confined for political or other malevolent reasons or that there was other such abuse of state power that would “shock the conscience.” Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (11th Cir.1985) (in banc) (quoting from Bochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-10, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).

. Not only was this theory adequately alleged, it was also fairly presented to the district court. The applicability of Parratt was the major focus of the litigation at this early stage in the district court proceedings. Moreover, the "established state procedure” issue was specifically addressed. Burch’s April 8, 1985, memorandum in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss mentioned the established procedure theory several times. Record on Appeal, Document 16. In response, one of the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum arguing: "However, the post-deprivation remedies provided by Florida law are sufficient because the complaint does not allege a deprivation 'pursuant to some established state procedure.’ Parratt, 451 U.S. at 537 [101 S.Ct. at 1913-14].” Record on Appeal, Document 21 at 2. In response thereto, Burch filed a memorandum arguing:
Defendant ACMHS argues there is no policy under which its employees functioned with respect to admissions procedures. Yet the policy under which plaintiff was admitted to both ACMHS and FSH was not only acknowl*809edged by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the overseer of both entities, but eschewed. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit G attached to the Complaint with a copy attached hereto)....
Now, defendant ACMHS asks this court to accept the proposition that irrespective of the fact that it regularly accepts persons as voluntary and involuntary admissions and regularly employs the above-referenced policy, it has no policy with respect to such admission procedures. Defendant ACMHS cannot claim the protection of established procedures for one purpose and deny the existence of those procedures for another.
Record on Appeal, Document 20. The memorandum again attached Exhibit G which indicated that the hospital was "very likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent.”
The issue was fairly on Burch argued to the original panel that the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services had “conceded that the established procedure being used to admit medicated and disoriented patients ... by using involuntary admission and treatment forms was inappropriate and in violation of patient’s rights.” Brief at 9. See also Reply Brief at 5 (“ACMHS had an established custom of admitting and transferring incompetent patients on the basis of voluntary admission forms,” citing Exhibit G that the hospitals "were very likely asking medicated clients to make decisions at a time when they were not mentally competent.”). Similarly, in his brief to the in banc court, Burch argued “that the defendants were acting pursuant to an institutionalized practice in their reliance on consent to commitment and treatment forms signed by persons who did not possess the capacity to give knowing and informed consent. ... Such an institutionalized practice by defendants would also take Burch’s claim outside the scope of Parratt." Brief at 12.