Court Opinion

ID: 9737045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:52.789318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.126860
License: Public Domain

ZAZZALI, J.,
dissenting.
The State may not subject a citizen to criminal punishment unless it affords that citizen a trial by jury in which guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because I believe that the majority has denied that right in this appeal, I respectfully dissent.
Today, one year after the Appellate Division vacated defendant’s parole disqualifier, the Court orders her back to prison to serve a twenty-six month term of incarceration. That term represents the balance of the three-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed as a result of the trial court’s determination that defendant was intoxicated when she committed vehicular homicide. Because a jury did not make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt, I believe that defendant’s imminent re-incarceration violates the jury trial protections of our State Constitution.
Consistent with the sentiments expressed by this Court in State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523, 766 A.2d 1126 (2001), as well as the *105broader protections we traditionally have afforded defendants under article 1, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the New Jersey Constitution, I would hold that when the finding of any fact triggers imposition of a minimum period of imprisonment a jury must find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would hold unconstitutional on its face N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-5b(2), the statutory provision that sets forth the procedures by which the three-year mandatory minimum term at issue is imposed.
I
The right to trial by jury is “one of the most cherished rights in the long history of our Anglo-American jurisprudence.” State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 210, 432 A.2d 912 (1981). It encompasses fundamental principles of fairness and due process that circumscribe a state’s power to punish criminal conduct. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which he is charged”); State v. Anderson, 127 N.J. 191, 200, 603 A.2d 928 (1992)(noting that jury trial right is intertwined with right to due process of law); Ingenito, supra, 87 N.J. at 216 n. 5, 432 A.2d 912 (stating that “many of the concerns we have expressed in the jury context implicate broader due process concerns”). More specifically, it grants the criminally accused the right to have a jury determine whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the facts to which criminal liability attaches. Anderson, supra, 127 N.J. at 200-01, 603 A.2d 928; Ingenito, supra, 87 N.J. at 213, 432 A.2d 912. Because the jury trial right is the paramount restraint on the government’s broad power to punish, we long have held that the severity of the punishment authorized by law is the “only reliable test” for determining when that right attaches.2 State v. Owens, 54 N.J. *106153, 160, 254 A.2d 97 (1969), cert. denied, Owens v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 593, 24 L.Ed.2d 514 (1970). See Anderson, supra, 127 N.J. at 205-06, 603 A.2d 928; State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109,112, 577 A.2d 1259 (1990), cert. denied, Hamm v. New Jersey, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1413, 113 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991); Ingenito, supra, 87 N.J. 204, 213-14, 432 A.2d 912 (1981); In re Buehrer, 50 N.J. 501, 517-18, 236 A.2d 592 (1967).
We recently emphasized the constitutional significance of punishment in Johnson. In that case, we suggested that the proper benchmark for ascertaining whether a defendant’s jury trial right attaches is the length of the prison term, or “real time,” imposed pursuant to a mandatory minimum sentence. Johnson, supra, 166 N.J. at 541-42, 766 A.2d 1126. By adopting the reasoning of Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), however, the majority has abandoned this Court’s focus on a defendant’s “real time.”
The majority bases its denial of the jury trial right in part on its classification of intoxication as a sentencing factor rather than as an element of an offense. Ante at 97-98, 820 A.2d at 650. Similarly, the majority endorses the Harris plurality’s distinction between factual findings that increase a defendant’s maximum possible punishment, as in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), from those that trigger a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, ■ as in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). Ante at 95-97, 820 A.2d at 649-650. Because the severity of the punishment imposed is the proper measure of whether the jury *107trial right attaches, I find no principled basis for such distinctions. See Johnson, supra, 166 N.J. at 541-42, 766 A.2d 1126.
In Harris, a majority of the Supreme Court consisting of Justice Breyer and four dissenting Justices expressly rejected the view that a mandatory minimum term triggers any less constitutional scrutiny than an enhanced maximum term in respect of the right to a jury trial. Although Justice Breyer concurred in the Harris Court’s judgment that a fact that triggers a mandatory minimum generally does not need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, his concurrence was consistent with his dissenting opinion in Apprendi. In that dissent, he argued that jury trial protections should not necessarily attach to proof of facts that extend a defendant’s permissible sentencing range. See Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 561, 120 S.Ct. at 2400, 147 L.Ed.2d at 498 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Breyer would withhold the protection of a jury trial irrespective of whether a mandatory minimum or an extended maximum term is implicated. Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 567-68, 122 S.Ct. at 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d at 544 (“I cannot agree with the plurality’s opinion insofar as it finds such a distinction [between Apprendi and Harris ].”)(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Apprendi supra, 530 U.S. at 563-64, 120 S.Ct. at 2401, 147 L.Ed.2d at 500 (“I do not understand why, when a legislature authorizes a judge to impose a higher penalty ... a new crime is born; but where the legislature requires a judge to impose a higher penalty than he otherwise would (within a preexisting statutory range) based on similar criteria, it is not.”)(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, joined in dissent in Harris by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, also rejected the plurality’s distinction between those factual predicates that extend the outer limit of a sentence and those that trigger a mandatory minimum prison term. Harris, supra, 536 U.S. at 574, 122 S.Ct. at 2423, 153 L.Ed.2d at 549. (“[Sjuch fine distinctions with regard to vital constitutional liberties cannot withstand close scrutiny.”)(Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, in contrast to the majority in this appeal, a majority of the Harris Court would decline to condition the right to a jury trial on *108whether a criminal statute provides for a mandatory minimum or an extended .maximum term.
II
On more than one occasion, this Court has demonstrated its willingness to extend the jury trial right to resolve uncertainties and to mitigate limitations created by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. In State v. Gilmore, for example, we held that the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury prohibited the prosecutor from using his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. 103 N.J. 508, 528-29, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986). We looked to our State Constitution because the Supreme Court expressly declined to consider whether such a practice violated the defendant’s federal right to a jury trial. Id. at 522, 511 A.2d 1150. In so doing, we noted that recourse to the State Constitution’s jury trial provisions was justified in part because the scope of federal constitutional protections under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was uncertain. Ibid. In Anderson, supra, we overturned a criminal perjury conviction as a violation of the defendant’s state constitutional right to trial by jury. 127 N.J. 191, 603 A.2d 928. In the face of well-settled federal law that suggested a contrary result, we held that the practice of allowing the trial court, rather than the jury, to determine the materiality of perjured testimony violated our State Constitution. Id. at 204-05, 603 A.2d 928. In reaching that conclusion we noted that a majority of federal courts had not set forth adequate rationales for their contrary holdings. Ibid.
When, as in this appeal, the basis for the applicable federal law is both uncertain and unpersuasive we should not hesitate to reach an independent conclusion under our State Constitution. As Justice Pashman stated, “[t]he simplest but perhaps most compelling reason for extending state constitutional rights beyond their federal counterparts is that it strengthens the constitutional safeguards of fundamental liberties.” State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 355, 450 A.2d. 952 (1982) (Pashman, J., concurring). In the absence of *109a principled justification, I would not permit the Legislature to exempt select facts from jury scrutiny when the finding of those facts results in a significant term of imprisonment. Accordingly, I would hold that once the Legislature determines that a single fact triggers a specific amount of punishment that fact must be charged to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ill
The State argues that the rule I propose could be read to entitle defendants to a jury trial on all factors that affect the length of a sentence. I note, however, that a mandatory minimum term, such as that imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C: 11 — 5b(1)—(2), differs significantly, for example, from a sentence adjusted pursuant to the guidelines set forth in our Criminal Code. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, a trial court that considers aggravating and mitigating circumstances at sentencing examines and balances numerous factors to make a cumulative assessment that results in a sentence within a prescribed statutory range. See State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 359-60, 471 A.2d 370 (1984). In that process, no single factor unconditionally alters the range of punishment to which the defendant is exposed. Similarly, a factual finding leading to the imposition of a mandatory minimum differs significantly from a trial court’s decision whether to impose a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5a. Pursuant to that statute, the trial court must focus on the nature and circumstances of multiple convictions based on the guidelines established by this Court in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985), cert. denied, Yarbough v. New Jersey, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1193, 89 L.Ed.2d 308 (1986). Under Yarbough, the trial court grounds its determination in the relationship between the various offenses, rather than any particular species of implicated conduct. See id. at 642-45, 498 A.2d 1239.
Finally, my proposed holding would not preclude the Legislature from creating future mandatory minimum penalties. It simply would require juries, rather than judges, to make the *110requisite factual findings that trigger the imposition of mandatory mínimums. Such a rule would hamper neither the Legislature’s prerogative to define crimes nor its capacity to impose punishment.
IV
In conclusion, because federal law in this area is uncertain and unpersuasive, I would hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-5b(2) violates our State Constitution. I would extend the jury trial right to require that any fact that results in imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The right- to trial by jury should not depend on whether the Legislature has declared that a finding of a particular fact will result in an enhanced maximum sentence, rather than in a mandatory minimum. Nor should it turn on an equally arbitrary distinction between sentencing factors and elements. As a matter of state constitutional law, our analysis must begin and end with the degree of punishment that the Legislature conditions on a specific factual determination. I therefore would affirm the Appellate Division on state constitutional grounds in accordance with the sentiments expressed by this Court in Johnson.
For the reasons I have expressed, I therefore dissent, joining my colleagues Long and Albin.
Justices LONG and ALBIN join in this opinion.

 Under the New Jersey Constitution the accused is entitled to a jury trial whenever the legislatively prescribed punishment exceeds a six-month term of *106incarceration. State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109, 112, 577 A.2d 1259 (1990), cert. denied, Hamm v. New Jersey, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1413, 113 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991); State v. Owens, 54 N.J. 153, 162, 254 A.2d 97 (1969), cert. denied, Owens v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 593, 24 L.Ed.2d 514 (1970). Thus, a mandatory minimum prison term of six months or less would not implicate a defendant's right to trial by jury.