Court Opinion

ID: 9769457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:51:19.538463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:03.958454
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
In my view the holding of the majority effectively nullifies the clear provisions of *208RCr 9.64. For whatever purpose RCr 9.64 was adopted, it is there and requires the approval of the trial court before dismissal of an indictment. I am not aware of any authority in this jurisdiction that requires the trial court to give reasons for the exercise of discretion in refusing to dismiss an indictment, nor does the majority opinion supply any such authority. Rader and Kidd, cited in the majority opinion, do not support such a proposition. Butler, the Florida Court of Appeals’ opinion, is so different in its factual situation it could not be applicable here. There, the trial court approved the written agreement to dismiss the indictment if the results of the polygraph test showed the defendant was telling the truth. The agreement further provided that if the results of the test inculpated the defendant such evidence could be admitted at trial. Further, Florida apparently does not have a rule comparable to RCr 9.64.
Here, the appellant does not make a showing of any prejudice to him in the trial of the case as a result of taking the polygraph test, and I can find no rational basis for forcing the trial court to accept an agreement such as was apparently made here.
I can agree with the statements about “fair play” and the Commonwealth keeping a promise. If the trial court had participated in the agreement, I would be the first to say it should be kept. However, I would hold appellant to the knowledge that the permission of the trial court was necessary before the indictment could be dismissed.
In keeping RCr 9.64 as a viable rule and in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the appellant, I would affirm the judgment.
Accordingly, I dissent.