Court Opinion

ID: 9700504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:33:15.136758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:09.966143
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from division III of the majority decision regarding the naming of the parents’ child. The significance of this decision as a legal precedent is immense.
The importance of names in society is of ancient origin. Emperor Fuxi of China decreed the use of family names or surnames about 2852 b.c. Family names came into use in Roman times and again in Northern Italy in the 900s a.d. The Romans used three names, a given name, a clan name, and a family name {e.g., Gaius Julius Caesar). The crusaders carried the custom of family names from Italy to other countries of Western Europe. 14 The World Book Encyclopedia 6 (1992).
The most important regulation regarding family names was made at the Council of Trent (1563). It decreed that every parish must keep complete registers of baptisms, with the names of the child and those of his or her parents and grandparents. There is not much early legislation thereafter because two basic assumptions were taken for granted: that the bride will accept the bridegroom’s family name by marriage and that their children will automatically have the family name of the parents. 12 The Encyclopaedia Britannica 817 (15th ed. 1979).
Elsdon C. Smith in The Story of Our Names (1930) observed that except to the most intimate friends a person’s name is the most prominent feature. It is also the most vulnerable point. An old Roman maxim runs, “Sine nomine homo non est” (without a name a person is nothing). One’s name is a signboard to the world. It is one of the most permanent of possessions; it remains when everything else is lost; it is owned by those who possess nothing else. A name is the only efficient means to describe someone to contemporaries and to posterity. When one dies it is the only part that lives on in the world. Id.
Our common law and statutory law have long recognized the need for a stable system through which people are known. Chapter 144, Vital Statistics, sets out the requirements for registering births. If the mother was married, either at the time of conception or birth, the name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of the child. Iowa Code § 144.-13. Our legislature has also provided the law for changing names. Iowa Code ch. 674. The change of a minor’s name may not be made unless the requirements of section 674.6 on notice and consent by the parents are met. If one of the parents objects to the proposed name change, a court may waive the requirement of both parents consenting, if it finds the noncon-senting parent has abandoned the child or has been ordered to support or financially aid the child and has failed to do so without good cause. See Gail v. Winemiller, 464 N.W.2d 697 (Iowa App.1990). No such finding has been made in this case nor has *731any such allegations been made that Ronald has been guilty of any misconduct.
This is not a change of name case; rather, it is a name case ab initio. Neither is this a Lucy Stone type case, yet, an implication is there. As a nineteenth century suffragist, she was the first American woman to establish her right to use her maiden name publicly after she had been married. Now, that right is acknowledged generally. See Annotation, Right of Married Woman to Use Maiden Surname, 67 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1975).
The instant case is not about women’s rights; it is about equal rights. It does not affect or question, nor do I, a woman’s right to choose a different name for herself in a divorce proceeding. Although the case does not involve the right of Rhonda to change her name from Gulsvig (her third husband’s) to Acosta (her second husband’s), she cites that as an important reason for not wanting her son to be named Gulsvig. In essence, she wants to project and expand her right to select a new name for herself after divorce, so as to consume her son’s right to a true parental name, and totally exclude the child’s father from any recognition. I believe that acceding to this claim is without legal support and is abrasively disruptive of family relationships.
I recognize that a child’s mother has a right equal to that of its father to choose its name. But I do not believe a father’s rights are forfeited by the mother’s act of naming the child on the birth certificate without the father’s knowledge or consent. A child’s name should not be determined by the winner of a race to fill out the birth certificate.
Rhonda unilaterally named the child Acosta when her legal name was Gulsvig, the child’s father indisputably was Ronald Gulsvig, and a pending divorce action had not been concluded. The trial court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the parties in the divorce action under chapter 598 to determine the legal name for the child.
Courts that have considered issues of name change for minors even when authorized by statute have exercised restraint. In Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 36, 223 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1974), the Minnesota Supreme Court said: “[Jjudicial discretion in ordering a change of a minor’s surname against the objection of one parent should be exercised with great caution and only where the evidence is clear and compelling that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates such change.” The Minnesota court reviewed that statement in 1981 and approved it again as a guideline. In re the Application of Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Minn.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Saxton v. Dennis, 455 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 1737, 72 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982). In Saxton, the court held that the children’s best interests were served by keeping their given surname. In Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn.1981), the court held that neither parent has a superior right to determine the initial surname of their child so that the child’s best interests must govern in resolving the quarrel between them as to the initial surname. In 1976, the Nebraska legislature enacted a statute restricting the naming of a newborn infant to the father’s surname, mother’s surname, mother’s maiden surname or a hyphenated surname of both parents. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 71-640.01 (Cum.Sup.1980). In applying that statute, the Nebraska court said:
Society has a strong interest in the preservation of the parental relationship. Even though a divorce decree may terminate a marriage, courts have traditionally tried to maintain and encourage continuing parental relationships. The link between a father and child in circumstances such as these is uncertain at best, and a change of name could further weaken, if not sever, such a bond.... The question of whether the name of a minor child should be changed is to be determined by what is in the best interests of the child. The cases which have considered this question have granted a change of name only when the substantial welfare of the child requires that the name be changed. See Annotation, 53 A.L.R.2d 914. Generally, where the father has supported the children and exercised his visitation rights relief has been denied. A change of name has been granted where the father’s name was *732positively deleterious to the child because of the father’s misconduct and notoriety. Generally, minor embarrassment or emotional upset has been held not sufficient to require that a change of name be granted.
Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 857-58, 317 N.W.2d 381, 383 (1982). See also Spatz v. Spatz, 199 Neb. 332, 258 N.W.2d 814 (1977) (court rejected mother’s attempt to change three children’s names from their father’s name of Spatz to her name of Laflan). Recently, the Nebraska statute was challenged as unconstitutional because it prevented giving a child a surname at birth with which the child had no legally established parental connection. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the statute did not unconstitutionally infringe a parent’s right. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1032, 111 S.Ct. 692, 112 L.Ed.2d 682 (1991).
In Henne, a mother sought to name her daughter McKenzie simply because she liked the name. Her daughter and two other children whom she had named McKenzie for the same reason had no connection with anyone by that name. In finding that there is no fundamental right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment protecting this desire the court said: “[W]e can find no American tradition to support the extension of the right of privacy to cover the right of a parent to give a child a surname with which that child has no legally recognized parental connection.” Id. at 1215. One reason given by the circuit court for the legislation in Nebraska is that “[T]he legislature could reasonably perceive that in the absence of a law such as section 71-640.01, the name of a non-parent could be improperly appropriated to achieve a deliberately misleading purpose, such as the creation of a false implication of paternity.” Id.
Courts have generally recognized that the father, who is ordinarily the objecting party, has a protectable interest in having his child bear the paternal surname in accordance with the usual custom, even though the mother may have been awarded custody of the child. A majority of courts have deemed that the noncustodial father’s interest in having the minor child bear the paternal surname is entitled to “significant consideration.” See Annotation, Rights and Remedies of Parents Inter Se with respect to the Names of Their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d 1091 § 7 (1979). These courts have stressed that the father’s desire to maintain a bond with the child is entitled to significant consideration. Id. at 1105-06.
In In re Shipley, 26 Misc.2d 204, 205 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1960), the court said that the possible adverse affect on the relationship between a natural father and his children is a valid ground of his objecting to a change in the children’s surname where the father has evidenced a sustained interest in the children by continuing support payments and visitation and does not unreasonably delay in objecting to the change. In Flowers v. Cain, 218 Va. 234, 237 S.E.2d 111 (1977), the court observed that where a divorce occurs and the mother is awarded custody, usually it is in the child’s best interests to maintain and encourage, rather than weaken, the relationship between the father and the child. Hence, a court is reluctant to change a child’s name over the objection of a devoted father, for fear that the change would damage further the already strained father-child relationship.
In In re Lone, 134 N.J.Super. 213, 221, 338 A.2d 883, 887-88 (1975), the court said:
The realities are that the child’s present name represents his identity, his paternity and a remaining bond with his father. ... A change of name imposed on a child could represent to him a rejection by his father; or evidence that his father is deserving of rejection or contempt; or an attempt by his mother to deceive him as to his true identity.
Moreover, potential embarrassment, harassment, and the obscure possibility of confusion is not enough to change a child’s name from its father’s surname. Robinson, 302 Minn. at 37, 223 N.W.2d at 141.
In the case at bar, Rhonda has made no assertion that Ronald is an unfit father. Quite to the contrary, she and her mother testified in support of Ronald’s successful attempt to obtain custody of his daughter, Jessica Gulsvig, born of a prior marriage. He has supported his children and given primary care to his daughter. He asserted *733his right to visit his son from the date of his birth. There is no evidence of opprobrium that would make it inappropriate for his son to bear his name. In short, the record shows no fault by Ronald in any attribute that would weaken his right to have his child bear his name.
By contrast, applying the standards and reasons thought important by the majority of courts in the United States, Rhonda’s claim shows no valid reason for rejecting the name of the child’s father. Her claim to name the child a name of her own choosing is based on no more weighty factors than personal pique at Ronald and her conception of appearances. Before her divorce proceeding was commenced against Ronald she was going to register her daughter Amanda Acosta at school as Amanda Gul-svig. She testified that after her divorce from Ronald she would prefer her birth name “Even” for herself, surnaming Jamie “Acosta” because that was her daughter’s surname. Rhonda has changed her name six times in the last six years. She says she will retain the name Acosta if she marries again in order to retain the appearance of a family unit. No indication is given whether subsequent children of Rhonda’s would be named “Acosta,” no matter who the father is, for the same reason she presents here. In this day of frequent divorce and multiple families, the importance of appearance is more myth than substance.
Rhonda allowed Ronald one visit from the date of their son’s birth to the date of the divorce decree, a period of three and a half months. Her matriarchal attitude was fully displayed when she told Ronald she did not want him to have anything to do with her son.
The legal standard that should be applied in this case of determining the child’s name at birth should be more stringent than what is applied by the majority of courts in applications to change a name. In name change cases involving minors, the noncustodial father’s name is entitled to be given significant consideration and a change is not warranted unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best interests to change its name. Even by this standard, Rhonda’s evidence in support of her actions is grossly inadequate to meet these requirements of proof.
No name change case has been cited and I have found none in the United States that has sanctioned the stripping of a father’s name from his child when he is without fault and the placing of another man’s name on the child with whom the child has no biological or legal relationship. I do not believe a divorced father, who is without fault, should have to face the distinct possibility of losing not only the custody of his children but of having his name forever excised from their being. To approve Rhonda’s unilateral and deceitful act on the principle of promoting family unity is not an affirmation of the equality of women, which I support, but an assault on the dignity of man. The noncustodial father's role is reduced to that of an anonymous sperm donor, finance provider and unwelcome visitor. At once, history is ignored, custom rejected and geneology abjured.
I would reverse the trial court on this issue and remand with instructions to order a correction of the birth certificate to show the child’s birth surname as Gulsvig, pursuant to the court’s authority under chapter 598.