Court Opinion

ID: 9759480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:18:00.827818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.256463
License: Public Domain

Schreiber, J.,
dissenting. The criminal discovery rules, notably B. 3:11 (Notice of Alibi; Particulars), B. 3:12 (Notice of Defense of Insanity), and B. 3:13 (Pretrial; Depositions; Discovery) were designed1 principally for the purpose of presenting at trial all relevant and material evidence to assist the fact finder in the search for the truth.2 To that end neither party, prosecution nor defense, may validly deny, in the words of Chief Justice Traynor, “access to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case.” Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880, 372 P. 2d 919, 920 (1962).
In State v. Montague, 55 N. J. 387 (1970), Justice Jacobs, vigorously affirming these principles, traced the development of our discovery rules and in that case broadened discovery to include the prosecutor’s right to inspect the prior statement of a witness for the defense. He commented that:
*483This step will be fully compatible with the trend of our pretrial discovery rules which, as we have already indicated, are significantly geared towards broader mutual discovery within constitutional limits. [Id. at 401]
B. 3:13-3 (Discovery and Inspection) reflected until today the continuing effort of this Court to fulfill the philosophy of broad discovery as an aid to truth and justice. This particular discovery rule does not come into play until and unless the defendant decides that it should. Thus, it is only after the defendant seeks discovery under the rules,3 including disclosure of the
names and addresses of any persons whom the prosecuting attorney knows to have relevant evidence or information including a designation by the prosecuting attorney as to which of those persons he may call as witnesses [12. 3 :13-3 (a) (7) ],
that the defendant must permit the State to inspect
written statements, if any, including any memoranda reporting or summarizing the oral statements, made by any witnesses whom the State may call as a witness at trial. [12. 3 :13-3(b) (4)]
Note that the defendant need disclose statements only of witnesses the State may call at trial, not of all persons whom he knows to have relevant information.
*484The material which the prosecution, sought here, the memoranda reporting the victim’s oral statements given to defense counsel, fell squarely within B. 3:13-3(b) (4). Defendant had triggered the discovery mechanism by demanding that the prosecutor notify him of the names and addresses of those whom the State might call as witnesses. The State furnished the name and address of the victim; thereafter, the defendant’s counsel and investigator interrogated the victim on two occasions and prepared memoranda reporting the oral statements made. The rule clearly and unambiguously required that these memoranda be disclosed to the State.
Compliance with the rule furthered its spirit and purpose. Furnishing such information advanced the process of presenting all material and relevant data to the jury and judge. Permitting one party to frustrate that goal because the information is adverse to his position conflicts with the hitherto well established end of pretrial discovery.
The only limitations, other than those expressed in the rules, which we have placed on diseover-y of this nature have been those mandated by the constitution. In State v. Mingo, 77 N. J. 576 (1978), we refused to permit the State to obtain and use the opinion of the defendant’s expert. We predicated that result on the constitutional right of effective assistance of counsel implicit in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, par. 10 of the New Jersey Constitution, relying on the theory expressed in United States v. Alvarez, 519 F. 2d 1036 (3 Cir. 1975), that “[t]he attorney must be free to make an informed judgment with respect to the best course for the defense without the inhibition of creating a potential government witness.” Id. at 1047. Here that potential did not exist. The State had previously designated the victim as a proposed witness.
Nor can it justifiably be argued that enforcement of B. 3: 13-3 (b)(4) is unconstitutional because it would make defense counsel hesitate before interrogating a State’s witness. Experienced members of the trial bar consistently demand *485that they be advised of what every witness will likely testify to at the trial. Good lawyering calls for no less.4 Purthermore, since the witness could properly testify at the trial with respect to defense counsel’s interview, as the majority concedes,5 the pretrial disclosure would not have a significant effect on counsel’s decision to question the witness. Counsel have cited no case and our research has disclosed none which has upheld the contention that requiring disclosure of a witness’s statement, the name having been given in the first instance by the State, has risen to an infringement of a defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. But cf. In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (suggesting that requiring defense counsel to answer questions before the grand jury concerning a meeting he had attended with his client and a prospective government witness during the preparatory stages of a case might infringe upon the client’s Sixth Amendment rights). *486Eor a discussion of the relationship between effective assistance of counsel and disclosure by defendant in a slightly different context, see Pulaski, “Extending the Disclosure Requirements of the Jeneks Act to Defendants: Constitutional and Nonconstitutional Considerations,” 64 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 26-39 (1978).
The most commonly asserted constitutional protection invoked by defendants in this area has been the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 95 S. Ct. 2160, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975), has held that privilege to be inapplicable to statements obtained from witnesses. Even requiring a defendant to provide various types of evidence personal to himself has withstood constitutional attack. E. g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (blood sample taken from defendant) ; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973) (defendant forced to give voice exemplars) ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 (1967) (defendant can be compelled to give handwriting samples); State v. Macuk, 57 N. J. 1 (1970) (defendant forced to submit to chemical test to determine level of alcohol in blood). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961), for an extensive list of non-testimonial compulsions directed to the defendant which are not violative of the privilege against self-incrimination. The majority does not rely upon the Fifth Amendment and I advert to it because the case law does support the notion that a defendant may be compelled to disclose to the State inculpatory evidence which the State may use in its direct case.
Lastly, if there were error, which I do not concede, it was at most harmless. The victim, a 48-year-old widow, owned and operated an Army and Navy store in a business section of Elizabeth. While alone in the store in the early afternoon, a man entered and asked to see a snorkel jacket. Sensing trouble, she replied she had none inside the store but perhaps there was one in the window. As she neared the front door, *487he, displaying a knife in one hand, said this was a holdup and demanded her money. She said, “I’ll give you the money but don’t hurt me.” She then opened the cash register and gave him its contents of about $60.
The robber then directed her to the back of the store. She thought he was going to lock her up in the bathroom, but when they were halfway to the back he directed her to lie down. Rearing for her life, she fell to her knees, and started to pray the Our Rather. He stabbed her on the neck. She pleaded, “I don’t have a husband, I have five youngsters, business is bad, I’m trying to make a living for them. Don’t kill me.” Her assailant then stabbed her in four places in her chest and on her left arm. He ran out of the store and she struggled to reach the next door store and collapsed. Help was called and she was taken to the hospital where she remained for three to four weeks. This was followed by a lengthy post-operative therapy at a nursing home.
The crime occurred on March 22, 1976. While being treated in the hospital emergency room, she described her assailant as best she could to a detective. Efforts to identify her assailant by looking through police photographs while at the hospital proved fruitless. Shortly after the police obtained a confession from defendant in May, a detective visited her at the nursing home. On that occasion she was shown a series of photographs, including one of defendant. She was unable to identify him, but at the time was under medication and in severe pain.
Subsequently, the defense attorney and an investigator visited the victim on two occasions. On the first, May 25, 1976, they showed her one picture, which was not that of defendant. She said the photo was “very similar” to her assailant and “could be him, the more I look at it.” When they returned on June 17, 1976 with three photographs, the defendant’s and his two brothers’, she identified the defendant. (It is the disclosure of the reports of these two meetings and the photographs which is at issue.)
*488At the trial she had no difficulty in identifying defendant, for when she saw him in court his eyes brought everything back to her. When asked on cross-examination to explain what it was about defendant’s eyes which impressed her, she replied :
I said his eyes, I can’t find the words, but they are like deep and quiet, subtle. I don’t know what words to use. As I said, they are not big. Some people have big eyes. I can’t explain, but it’s just when I saw him it rang a bell, his eyes are what recalled it to me then, “This is the one.”
The trial court charged the jury that
unless the in-court identification resulted from the observations or perceptions of the defendant by [the victim] which she made during the commission of the crime rather than being the product of an impression gained at the out-of-court identification procedure, it should be afforded no weight.
The victim’s in-court identification evidence coupled with the trial court’s charge, the admittedly proper testimony of the victim to the interview with the defense counsel, and defendant’s confession constitute such overwhelming proof of guilt that any error concerning the discovery of defendant’s photograph and the statement obtained by defense counsel and his investigator was harmless.
I would reverse and reinstate the judgment of conviction.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clieeoed and Handles —6.
For reversal and reinstatement — Justice Scheeibek — 1.

Authority for promulgating discovery rules in the criminal area stems from the Court’s inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires, State v. Hunt, 25 N. J. 514, 530-531 (1958), and the Court’s rule making power.

Prevention of surprise, elimination of gamesmanship, and affording a party an opportunity to obtain evidence and research law in anticipation of the trial are other objectives of adequate pretrial discovery.

The defendant is, of course, entitled to certain limited information exclusive of the operation of 12. 3:13-3. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) ; State v. Carter, 69 N. J. 420 (1976). Due process requires the State to disclose “evidence that affirmatively tends to establish a defendant’s innocence” and evidence impeaching the credibility of a State’s witness. State v. Carter, 69 N. J. at 433. See 8 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 16.08[2], at 122 (2d ed. 1978), suggesting that under the federal rules regarding reciprocal discovery, Fed. B. Crim. P. 16 (b)(1), the government’s right of discovery is not triggered if defendant requests only information to which he is constitutionally entitled.

This point has been well stated in the commentary to the ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (Approved Draft, 1970) :
Generally, an attorney can be effective in a trial only to the extent that be has the information necessary to. plan effectively. Quick wits may be the mark of the trial lawyer, but they are not always sufficient for the orderly exposition and testing of evidence, wbicb is the purpose of a trial. Where planning is foreclosed by lack of information, as has long been the custom in much of criminal litigation, surprise and gamesmanship usually govern the conduct of the proceedings. The result is too often a general obfuscation of the issues. In spite of its obvious entertainment qualities, trial gamesmanship by way of obfuscatory tactics is generally offensive to the dignity of the court as an institution and destructive of respect for legal processes. Where life, liberty and protection of communities from crime are the stakes, gamesmanship is out of place. [Id., § 1.1, comment c at 31]

As distinguished from State v. Mingo, supra, in which none of the expert’s testimony was admissible. 77 N. J. at 586-587.