Court Opinion

ID: 9403421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 06:09:51.468598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.763615
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 14, 2023

                                      S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   No. 05-21-00668-CR

                 JEFFERY MICHAEL WINEBERG, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
                             Collin County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 366-83346-2020

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Smith, and Justice Breedlove
                            Opinion by Justice Smith

      A jury convicted appellant Jeffery Michael Wineberg of continuous sexual

abuse of a child, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b), (h).

The trial court assessed his punishment at life imprisonment in the Institutional

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. For the reasons discussed

below, we overrule appellant’s eight issues challenging his conviction, sustain the

State’s cross-issue regarding modification of the judgment, and affirm as modified

the judgment of the trial court.
                                    Background

      Appellant was the stepfather of the victim, E.N. Appellant began dating the

victim’s mother in 2017. Because E.N.’s mother worked during the day and

appellant mainly worked from home, E.N. was often home alone with appellant. The

first time E.N. remembered appellant sexually abusing her was in the summer

between fifth and sixth grade. She was eleven years old at the time. The abuse

continued until she was thirteen. One night, after appellant told her he was going to

visit her the next morning, E.N. set up her iPad to record the sexual abuse. She

played the audio recording for her stepsister a few days later, and then played it for

her mother. Shortly after E.N. played the recording for her mother, she told

appellant’s father that appellant was sexually abusing her. Appellant’s father called

the police and an investigation ensued.

      E.N. and her stepsister were transported to the Children’s Advocacy Center

where they were forensically interviewed. E.N. subsequently underwent a medical

examination that showed there was physical evidence, consistent with a penetrating

event. Appellant was arrested and convicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child.

This appeal followed.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      We will first address appellant’s eighth issue in which he argues that the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a

child under the age of fourteen. We address this issue first because, if meritorious,

                                          –2–
it would provide appellant with the greatest relief—an acquittal. See Chaney v.

State, 314 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d).

      In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Isassi v. State, 330

S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The sufficiency of the evidence is

measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury

charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the trier of fact to

resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Merritt

v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638.

When conducting a legal sufficiency review, we consider all evidence in the record

regardless of whether it was properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235

S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A criminal conviction may be supported

by both direct and circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from the evidence. Id. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as

direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence

alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007).

                                          –3–
      A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if the

person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, during a period that is thirty or

more days in duration, against a child victim that is younger than fourteen years of

age. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b). The indictment in this case included the

following acts of sexual abuse as authorized by section 21.02(c)(4) of the penal code,

see also id. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i, iii–iv), (a)(2)(B): aggravated sexual assault of a

child under fourteen years of age by intentionally and knowingly (1) causing the

female sexual organ of E.N. to contact the male sexual organ of the defendant, (2)

causing the anus of E.N. to contact the male sexual organ of the defendant, or (3)

causing the penetration of the female sexual organ of E.N. by defendant’s finger. It

is well established that a child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.07; Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).

      E.N. was the final witness called by the State. She testified that the first time

she remembered appellant doing something to her that made her feel uncomfortable

was when he asked her if they could snuggle in his room. It was summer and E.N.

had just completed fifth grade. They had snuggled before, but this time was

different. E.N. told him yes, and he took her to his bed. They lay there for a few

minutes, they were on their sides with appellant lying behind her, and then he asked

her to roll over on her back. Once she rolled over, he got on top of her. E.N. asked

him what he was doing, and he said “snuggling.” Appellant began to rub his penis

                                         –4–
on her vagina; it was uncomfortable. They were wearing clothes and he moved up

and down over her body.

         Another time, before they went to a college football game, appellant tried to

penetrate her vagina with his penis. Similar incidents would occur frequently and

when she was home alone with appellant. On another occasion, appellant tried to

penetrate her anus with his penis.

         One night, appellant told her he would visit her the next day. He had never

told her that before, but she knew it meant that he was going to abuse her. Before

she went to sleep, she set up her iPad to record and hid it in a cubby in her room.

The next morning, he came into the bedroom and asked her to take off her clothes.

He then rubbed his penis on her vagina. She was lying on her back with her feet

dangling off the bed, and he was standing next to the bed. Her legs were on his

shoulders or she was holding them. She was also holding a cat stuffed animal. After

“he was finished,” he went to Wal-Mart to get a pill. When he came back, he said

the pill would not work unless “a second sperm got in,” so he sexually abused her

again.

         A.W., E.N.’s stepsister, testified that E.N. came into her room and told her

something about appellant and E.N. that made her concerned. Appellant was A.W.’s

biological father. At first, A.W. thought it was a prank or a joke because she did not

think her father would do such a thing. She realized it was not a joke when E.N.

played her a voice recording of something that happened the week prior. The

                                          –5–
recording was on E.N.’s iPad. A.W. let E.N. sleep in her room that night and hid

E.N.’s iPad under her pillow to keep it safe. The next morning, they played the

recording for E.N.’s mother. About halfway through, appellant walked in and asked

what was going on. When he heard the recording, he took the iPad and said, “This

is ridiculous.” He deleted the recording and told E.N.’s mother they would talk

about it later.

       Police recovered the deleted recording, and it was played for the jury. In the

recording, E.N. can be heard crying; saying, “It hurts,” on multiple occasions; and

asking him to stop. Appellant tells her repeatedly to “relax.” Approximately fifteen

minutes of the recording clearly depicts forcible sexual contact by appellant.

       In referring to the recording, when asked by the State what the “rhythmic

creaking” sound was, E.N. testified, “From the bed.” When asked what the “skin

slapping” sound was, she answered, “[W]hen he is in.” She also testified that he hit

her more than once during the incident.

       During appellant’s interview with police, appellant admitted that he had

touched E.N.’s “girly parts” because she had a lice problem and he was helping

remove the lice. He explained the recording was of him tickling or wrestling with

E.N. and that he accidentally deleted it when he took the iPad away from E.N.’s

mother. A search of appellant’s phone also revealed incriminating internet searches

relating to pregnancy and Plan B.

                                          –6–
      Rachel McConnell, the forensic interviewer that spoke with E.N. at the

Children’s Advocacy Center, testified as an outcry witness.           According to

McConnell, E.N. reported that the abuse started when she was eleven or twelve years

old during the summer between fifth and sixth grade and ended when she was

thirteen years old. E.N. described multiple incidents of abuse to McConnell, which

McConnell detailed to the jury. These included appellant using his fingers and his

penis to touch her vagina, appellant penetrating her vagina with his penis, and

appellant touching her anus with his penis.

      Sandra Onyinanya, a Pediatric Nurse Practitioner in the Referral and

Evaluation of At Risk Children (REACH) Clinic at Children’s Medical Center of

Dallas, testified that she completed a physical examination of E.N. In her training

and experience, it was common for a child alleging sexual abuse to present with no

type of injury or trauma because the tissue that is in the genital area heals very

quickly. In this case, however, E.N. presented with a healed transection in a

particular area of her hymen, meaning that there had been a complete loss of tissue

to the hymen in that area, which was consistent with a prior penetrating event.

      Defense counsel questioned Onyinanya and E.N. about whether the loss of

tissue to the hymen could have been from hitting her private area on her bike seat or

handlebars in a crash, but E.N. did not remember what she injured in the crash and

Onyinanya explained that was only possible if something on the bike penetrated the

hymen. Defense counsel also questioned E.N. about a number of internet searches

                                        –7–
linked to her Yahoo and Google account, as well as two chat conversations with

other account holders on Movie Star Planet, that indicated E.N. may have lied about

the allegations. E.N. denied having the conversations on her Movie Star Planet

account and denied making any of the internet searches. However, E.N. did admit

that several months after her outcry she told the school counselor that the abuse did

not happen because she thought her mother was going to get in trouble, even

arrested. When asked on cross-examination why she went to the counselor, she

responded, “I didn’t know who else to go to.” The counselor testified that E.N. came

to see her and asked the counselor if she knew what happened to her. E.N. then told

the counselor that she made the whole thing up. After E.N.’s recantation, McConnell

conducted a second forensic interview. McConnell testified that E.N. did not recant

during the second forensic interview.

      Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a

conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child because there was evidence that

E.N.’s allegations were false, that she tried to take the allegations back, that she

reported she was chaste during her Church of Latter-Day Saints temple

recommendation interview, and that he denied the abuse. However, each of these

challenges to the evidence attack the jury’s credibility determinations, which we

must defer to on appeal as the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses

and the weight of their testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any part of any witness’s

                                          –8–
testimony. Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “When the

record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the

conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.”

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

      Although appellant raised questions to E.N.’s credibility at trial, the jury was

free to believe her allegations of abuse. The evidence showed that the abuse started

when E.N. was eleven and ended when she was thirteen. E.N. described multiple

instances throughout the two-year period in which appellant caused her sexual organ

and her anus to contact his sexual organ. Furthermore, the jury was able to hear

firsthand one incident of abuse through the iPad recording. Having reviewed the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that any

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against E.N. during a period that was

thirty or more days in duration. We overrule appellant’s eighth issue.

                 Exclusion of Extrinsic Impeachment Evidence

      In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by refusing to admit

Defendant’s Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10, which were printouts of two chat conversations

in E.N.’s Movie Star Planet account with other account holders. Appellant contends

that these represent prior inconsistent statements and show that E.N.’s allegations

against appellant were false.

                                        –9–
      The State responds that appellant failed to authenticate Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10

through E.N.’s testimony because she testified that her accounts had been hacked

before, there was a similar fabrication incident on one of her accounts, and she did

not send the messages; thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them.

      In his second issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by refusing to admit

Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5, which was a printout of internet searches on E.N.’s

Google account related to lying to the police. Appellant argues that, although E.N.

denied performing the internet searches, she confirmed the printout contained her

web search history thus authenticating the printout. Additionally, the State informed

the trial court that it had no objection to the admission of the printout and simply

requested a limiting instruction for impeachment purposes. Therefore, appellant

argues, the trial court erred in refusing its admission.

      As to Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5, the State responds that appellant did not

obtain a ruling on its admissibility and, instead, asked if he could “publish” the

exhibit before it was admitted. The State further argues that appellant also failed to

authenticate Exhibit No. 5 because E.N. denied making the searches.

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse

of discretion standard. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991) (op. on reh’g). We reverse a trial court’s ruling only if it is outside the “zone

of reasonable disagreement.” Id. If a trial court’s decision is correct under any

                                         –10–
theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold it. De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      The trial court first considered Defendant’s Exhibit Nos. 5, 9, and 10 at a

pretrial hearing in which the trial court considered multiple exhibits appellant sought

to admit at trial. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court noted, “I am not

certain about the authentication of these exhibits, and so my current focus is not on

whether or not the Court believes that these exhibits are admissible or will be

admitted as evidence. The question before the Court today at this pre-trial hearing

is whether or not the Court will allow them for impeachment purposes.” E.N.

confirmed that the email address associated with the searches in Exhibit No. 5 was

her Gmail account, but she denied doing any of the Google searches listed or any

searches about accusations in this case. She also testified that she had six or seven

Movie Star Planet accounts between 2017 and 2021. When presented with Exhibit

Nos. 9 and 10—screenshots of chat messages from one of her Movie Star Planet

accounts—E.N. testified that she did not remember whether she had any

conversations with the username shown in Exhibit No. 9 or the username shown in

Exhibit No. 10. Neither conversation was familiar to her, and she testified that those

were not her messages even though the chat dialogue was from her account.

      The evidence further showed that, at one point, appellant knew some of E.N.’s

passwords, but E.N. had changed them since he was arrested. E.N.’s mother also

knew her passwords to her email account, but E.N. denied that her mother knew her

                                        –11–
password to her Movie Star Planet account. The trial court asked E.N. how the

searches got on her account if it was not her. She responded that “[s]omeone had

access to it.” When asked who else had access to the account, she said, “No one.

Just me. But I don’t know how other people got to them.” E.N.’s mother denied

conducting any of the searches.

      As to her Movie Star Planet accounts specifically, E.N. testified that one of

her Movie Star Planet accounts got hacked in 2018 or 2019, and she was locked out

of the account. Appellant had to call and reset it. E.N. also hacked someone else’s

Movie Star Planet account. E.N.’s mother testified that E.N. told her one of her

Movie Star Planet accounts had been hacked and showed her a chat in which E.N.’s

username was claiming that she lied about being “violated” by appellant. E.N. was

consistent that she did not have that conversation on Movie Star Planet. E.N.’s

mother also testified that E.N.’s school contacted her about how someone had gone

into E.N.’s school account and changed things around regarding her class schedule.

      At the close of the hearing, the trial court ruled that it would allow defense

counsel to use this evidence for impeachment purposes at trial in a similar fashion

as it had been presented at the pretrial hearing, i.e. in question and answer format.

The trial court commented that the jury would be in the best position to determine

the credibility of the witnesses.

      At trial, A.W. testified that she also had Movie Star Planet accounts and that

she and E.N. chatted on there quite often. She denied that either of the accounts in

                                       –12–
question on Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10 were hers. She also acknowledged that she had

hacked other people’s accounts for fun. When asked if hacking other people’s

accounts was easy to do, she responded, “Oh, my gosh, all you had to do was talk,”

meaning chat about exchanging things through the accounts, which resulted in the

other person providing their username and password. She and E.N. never talked

about what happened with appellant on Movie Star Planet.

      When E.N. testified, the trial court allowed defense counsel to question E.N.

about the internet searches and the messages on her Movie Star Planet account. E.N.

confirmed that each of the accounts in question were hers and that the passwords

were changed after appellant was arrested, preventing him from having access at the

time of the searches and messages. Defense counsel asked her whether she had ever

searched for the following, to which E.N. answered, “No” to each question:

          How to testify in front of a jury

          Can kids get in trouble for lying to the police*

          Practicing lying so a jury believes you

          What does perjury mean

          How to make a lie sound convincing*

          Making others believe when you lie*

          Lying to the police to get someone in trouble*

          How to get out of testifying because I lied to the police*

          If I lied to the police because I felt pressure*
                                       –13–
           Can I refuse to appear in court if I lied on a witness statement*

           If I don’t want to testify against a person, can the law make me*

           What should I do because I don’t want to go to court to testify*

           Can I be forced to testify as a witness in court*

           Tips for testifying in court*

           I don’t want to testify, do I have to*

           Will a jury believe me because I’m a child*

      After E.N. denied searching any of these phrases, defense counsel showed her

Exhibit No. 5, which showed searches for or visits to pages containing the starred

phrases listed above, as well as other exhibits not at issue on appeal. Defense counsel

then moved to admit the exhibits, including Exhibit No. 5. When the court asked

whether there was an objection, the prosecutor responded, “The State would just ask

for the limiting instruction that this only be used for impeachment purposes only.”

The trial court then summoned the attorneys for an off-the-record discussion but

made no ruling on the record as to the admission of the exhibits. Defense counsel

then confirmed with E.N. the substance of each exhibit he had offered and asked to

publish. The trial court responded, “No.” At that point, the trial court had not

admitted any of the exhibits appellant sought to publish, and defense counsel made

no further attempts to admit them.

      Because appellant never obtained a ruling from the trial court on the record

regarding the admission of Exhibit No. 5, appellant has not preserved his challenge
                                        –14–
to the trial court’s exclusion of Exhibit No. 5 for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(2). Therefore, we overrule appellant’s second issue.

      After denying appellant’s request to publish certain exhibits, defense counsel

questioned E.N. about her Movie Star Planet accounts. He showed her Defense

Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10, which portrayed chat messages with two other account

holders. E.N. confirmed that the sender’s account name and avatar shown on the

printout of the messages were hers. As with the search history, defense counsel was

allowed to question E.N. on whether she sent the following messages:

          I would lie to make my stepdad go away

          I lied to the police, he never did anything to me

          He went to jail and now I got my mom back

          I feel bad but I don’t feel bad

          I made them think that he did bad things to me so he never comes back

          I lied to my mom, too, so she would believe me

          I lied to CPS too

          They all believe me even though he never did anything bad to me

          I had my sister lie too

          I told the counselor at school he didn’t do it but the State lady was called
           and she said I was lying so I got scared

          I didn’t know why they wouldn’t believe me so I decided to keep my
           same story

                                        –15–
       E.N. denied sending each message. Defense counsel then moved to admit

Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10, and the State objected. The trial court sustained the State’s

objection.

      The rules of evidence permit questioning a witness about alleged prior

inconsistent statements if certain requirements are met. TEX. R. EVID. 613(a). First,

the party must tell the witness the contents of the statement, the place and time of

the statement, and the person to whom the witness made the statement. TEX. R.

EVID. 613(a)(1). Then the witness must be given an opportunity to explain or deny

the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 613(a)(3). If the witness fails to unequivocally admit

making the statement, extrinsic evidence of the witness’s prior inconsistent

statement is admissible. TEX. R. EVID. 613(a)(4). However, if the extrinsic evidence

cannot be authenticated as the witness’s statement, it has no relevance and, thus, is

inadmissible. Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

      “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of

evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the item is what the proponent claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). When it comes

to electronic writings, the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the writing

may be authenticated by presenting evidence sufficiently linking the writing to the

purported author. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 639. This can be accomplished in a number

of different ways such as by the sender admitting authorship, a witness to its

composition, evidence that the message originated with the purported sender’s

                                       –16–
electronic device, or by the communication itself in that it contains information that

only the purported sender would know. Id. at 639–41. The Court of Criminal

Appeals has also recognized that “the provenance of such electronic writings can

sometimes be open to question—computers can be hacked, protected passwords can

be compromised, and cell phones can be purloined.” Id. at 641. Therefore, the Court

explained:

      That an email on its face purports to come from a certain person’s email
      address, that the respondent in an internet chat room dialogue purports
      to identify himself, or that a text message emanates from a cell phone
      number assigned to the purported author—none of these circumstances,
      without more, has typically been regarded as sufficient to support a
      finding of authenticity.

Id. at 641–42.

      In this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

sustaining the State’s objection to the admission of Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10. Although

E.N. confirmed that the account in which the messages appeared was hers, she

denied sending any of the messages and did not recognize the usernames of the other

people in the chat. Additionally, there was evidence that E.N.’s Movie Star Planet

account had been hacked before, as well as her school account, and that she had

hacked other people’s accounts. According to her stepsister, hacking an account was

easy to do. Appellant offered no other evidence to authenticate the messages such

as evidence that the messages originated on one of E.N.’s devices or a comparison

of language used in other message E.N. admitted to sending showing that the author

                                        –17–
was the same person. We recognize that the subject matter of the messages

themselves could be sufficient to authenticate the communication; however, these

messages do not contain specific details about the abuse that only E.N. would know.

By this time, multiple people knew that E.N. accused her stepfather of doing bad

things to her, that the police were involved, and that she tried to tell the counselor

that it was not true. Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court could have

concluded that appellant failed to authenticate the messages as prior inconsistent

statements made by E.N. See, e.g., Walcott v. State, No. 03-20-00124-CR, 2021 WL

2021139, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Austin May 21, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (concluding it was not outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement for the trial court to exclude a Facebook message as a prior inconsistent

statement because the defendant failed to sufficiently authenticate the message when

there was evidence the purported author’s Facebook account had been hacked and

shutdown, the message contained information describing the crime that would have

been known to others by that time, and there were no speech or writing patterns that

were unique to, or similar messages sent by, the purported author). Therefore, we

overrule appellant’s first issue.

                           Admission of Audio Recording

      Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting the audio recording of appellant sexually abusing E.N. because the State

                                        –18–
failed to establish the proper predicate foundation for admitting a digitally enhanced

recording. We disagree.

      Appellant relies on Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)

as authority for the admissibility requirements of a digitally enhanced recording. In

Angleton, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that the authentication question

for the enhanced audio recording offered for admission had three parts: (1) whether

the “enhanced” copy accurately depicted the contents of the original recording; (2)

whether the voices on the tape are those who the proponent said they were; and (3)

“whether the depiction of the conversation on the tape as a continuous conversation

between the participants is accurate (i.e. the conversation on the tape is not the result

of splicing or some other alteration).” 971 S.W.2d at 67.

      Appellant argues that the State could not prove prong one or three because the

original recording was not available due to E.N. editing the recording. However, the

Court in Angleton made clear that it was not setting out a three-part test but was

“merely observ[ing] that the authentication question in the present case appears to

implicate three of the examples of authentication at three different levels.” Id. at 67

n.3. The Court cautioned, “Nothing in this opinion should be construed as limiting

the ability of the parties to establish authentication in accordance with the plain

language of Rule 901.” Id.

      In this case, E.N. testified that one night, after appellant told her he would visit

her the next day, she set up her iPad to record because she knew this meant he was

                                         –19–
going to sexually abuse her again. She started the recording and hid the iPad in a

cubby in her room. She went to sleep while the iPad was recording. The next

morning, appellant came into her room and sexually assaulted her. A few days later,

E.N. played the recording for her stepsister and then her mother. At trial, the

recording offered into evidence was twenty-nine minutes long.           The original

recording, which was seven or eight hours long, was no longer available. It is not

clear from the record when E.N. condensed the original recording to the twenty-

nine-minute recording. However, when asked if she made any changes to the

recording aside from shortening its length, E.N. responded, “No.” Additionally,

A.W. testified that the other parts of the recording were just “blank sound.”

      The evidence also showed that when appellant heard E.N. playing the

recording for her mother, he grabbed the iPad and tried to delete it. Police were

subsequently able to recover it. Investigator Chris Meehan with the Collin County

District Attorney’s Office testified he obtained a warrant to search the iPad. He took

the iPad to the Allen Police Department where he watched Detective Compton make

an image of the iPad with a program called GrayKey. The program is able to get a

full file system image that can then be opened with Cellebrite, a software program

that allows you to search the contents of the device. Investigator Meehan found an

audio file titled “new recording.m4a” that was twenty-nine minutes and ten seconds

in length. He testified that deleted items may be overwritten and that he did not find

                                        –20–
the remainder of the recording. His understanding was E.N. condensed it in some

way because most of the time she was sleeping.

        Mark Porter, a forensic video analyst for the Tarrant County District

Attorney’s Office, testified that he was contacted to assist in enhancing the audio on

the recording. He used a program called iZotope (a cyber-repair software) to adjust

the volume of certain portions of the recording so that the audio of the voices was

clearer. He did not delete anything off the recording itself. Porter also testified that

the recording was twenty-nine minutes when he received it.             In his opinion,

eliminating some of the frequencies did not affect the overall veracity of the

evidence. “It just allows the audio to be heard more clearly . . . . You don’t have to

strain to understand what is being said.”

        E.N. identified both her and appellant’s voice on the two recordings before

the court. According to E.N., the only difference between the recordings was that

one was louder than the other; nothing sounded altered from the recording that she

made.

        Based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the recording. E.N. and A.W. sufficiently explained

why the recording was only twenty-nine minutes, instead of seven or eight hours.

Investigator Meehan and Porter explained the programs they used to recover and

enhance the audio and that neither changed the substance of the recording. See TEX.

R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (providing that “[e]vidence describing a process or system and

                                         –21–
showing that it produces an accurate result” can satisfy the authentication

requirement). And, E.N. authenticated the recording by testifying that she made it,

that nothing had been altered since Porter enhanced it, and that she recognized her

and appellant’s voices. See TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (5) (providing that “[t]estimony

that an item is what it is claimed to be” or “[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice-

-whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or

recording--based on hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect

it with the alleged speaker” can satisfy the authentication requirement). The non-

enhanced recording was also admitted into evidence. Moreover, there is no evidence

suggesting that the twenty-nine minute audio was itself spliced or altered in any

substantive way. Any argument that the audio was not a complete recording of the

incident goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See, e.g., Manis v.

State, No. 05-08-00459-CR, 2009 WL 1815468, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26,

2009, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“appellant’s complaint that the

surveillance recordings are ‘not an accurate and complete video of the surveillance

. . .’ goes to the weight of the evidence only and not to its admissibility”).

Appellant’s third issue is overruled.

       Motion to Suppress Evidence Recovered from Appellant’s Phone

      In his fourth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his illegally seized cell phone. The State

offers no explanation for the seizure and, instead, proceeds to a harm analysis.

                                         –22–
        Therefore, assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in denying

appellant’s motion to suppress and in admitting information from the contents of his

illegally seized phone,1 we turn to whether such constitutional error was harmful.

See Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“the harm

analysis for the erroneous admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment must be Rule 44.2(a)’s constitutional standard”). Unless we determine

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction, we

must reverse the judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). “If there is a reasonable

likelihood that the error materially affected the jury’s deliberations, then the error

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103,

119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We focus on the error’s probable impact in light of the

other evidence presented at trial and ask whether there is “a reasonable possibility

that the error, either alone or in context, moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion

to one of persuasion as to the issue in question.” Id.

         We first begin with the evidence admitted from appellant’s phone. The

extraction from appellant’s phone revealed a search on YouTube for “how sperm

travels to the egg,” as well as two videos titled, “Sperm Journey To Ovum

Fertilization / Sperm And Egg Fertilization Video / Parents” and “Intrauterine

    1
     See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963) (evidence seized during an unlawful
search, as well as the fruits of the illegally seized evidence, may not be used against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure in a criminal proceeding).

                                                     –23–
Device (IUD).”     The extraction also showed the following Google searches:

“planned parenthood confidentiality,” “Can Planned Parenthood tell your parents?”

and “does planned parenthood do iuds.” Each of these searches was made within a

few days of the last incident of sexual abuse reported by E.N. On June 21, 2019,

approximately two-and-one-half hours after E.N. played the recording for her

mother and two hours before the case was reported, there was a Google search for

“Southwest Airlines,” which resulted in a visit to the “bookings” page of

Southwest’s website. There were also Google searches on June 21 for “losing

hymen bike seat,” “plan b and blood work,” “plan b and drug test,” “plan b trace in

blood urine analysis,” “how long does plan b stay in your body,” “what can blood

work tell you,” “collin county police reports,” and “Crime reports for Collin County,

TX.”

       On cross-examination, Detective Shoemake conceded that the searches could

have been made by E.N., not appellant, and that appellant’s father could have been

looking to change his flight or book a flight after he learned about the recording.

       The State contends that appellant’s conviction was supported by such

overwhelming evidence that any error in the admission of appellant’s web search

history was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

       There is no question that the internet searches on appellant’s phone are

incriminating, especially in light of their proximity to the last incident of abuse and

E.N.’s outcry. And, the State highlighted the incriminating nature of the searches to

                                        –24–
the jury in its closing argument and encouraged the jury to go back and look at the

dates of the searches. The State argued that the searches showed appellant “was

trying to see how much evidence could be found.”

      In a typical “he said, she said” sexual abuse case we could likely not conclude

that the error of including this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

But this was not a typical case relying solely on the credibility of the victim to prove

the State’s allegations. In addition to E.N.’s testimony, the jury was able to hear

firsthand an incident of sexual abuse. For twenty-nine minutes, the jury listened to

appellant forcing E.N. to have sex with him. And the jury heard that E.N. suffered

loss of tissue to an area of her hymen that was consistent with a penetrating event.

      We include the following portion of what appellant can be heard saying on

the iPad recording to show the overwhelming nature of the evidence presented. It is

explicit and cannot be mistaken for anything but sexual assault.

           “Relax, stop pushing on me.”

           “You’re getting antsy and you’re pushing on me and it’s really irritating
            me.”

           “I’m already in. I’m already in. I’m already in.”

           “Hey just try to relax and get through this first part. Please. Hold on
            to your friend. Just relax and stop kicking me back. The less you do
            . . . make it to where I can’t concentrate. Thank you. Just relax.”

           “Move your hands because every time I do this you’re using it as a
            brace. I gotta see what I’m doing.”

                                         –25–
 “I need you back where I had you. Please. And just relax now. Relax
  your legs. Relax them. Back and forth. Relax them. See you’re
  pushing on me and you’re going to irritate me and that’s when I get
  upset. And you know better than to do that because you know it’s not
  good when I get upset. So relax.

 “It doesn’t hurt at this point.” (yelling)

 “If I’m having to force, then you’re forcing back. I’ve asked you
  several times to relax. Relax.” (yelling)

 “Then try harder. Move your hand. It will help. Move your hand. That
  will help. Put your hands together.”

 “Almost, almost, almost there. Almost there.”

 “Your legs, your hips are locked. Relax your hips. Relax them. I want
  to be able to go back and forth. Relax.

 “Now move your hips down. Move your hips down or you’re going to
  knock me out and it’s going to start all over.” (yelling)

 “Move your hips down toward your chest. Move your hips toward your
  chest. Move your hips toward your chest.” Thank you. One more
  time.” (yelling)

 “Stop crying and relax.”

 “Let me just finish. Let me get done. Stop crying.”

 “Relax. It shouldn’t take this hard for me to get in every time. Now
  stop. I’m gonna just move you back.”

 “Put your hands down.”

 “Relax, baby.”

 “You don’t want me to come out.”

 “Be quiet and we get done.”

                               –26–
           “Just relax. We’ll be done in a minute.”

      Based on the unique and overwhelming evidence in this case against

appellant, we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s

admission of appellant’s internet searches did not move the jury from a state of

nonpersuasion to one of persuasion as to whether appellant sexually abused E.N. on

two or more occasions during a period that was thirty days or more in duration and,

thus, was harmless. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

                                  Cumulative Error

      Appellant argues in his fifth issue that the trial court’s errors cumulatively

denied him a fair trial. He focuses on the jury’s inability to determine the credibility

of E.N.’s testimony and her outcry because the jury was unable to see E.N.’s prior

inconsistent statements or the internet searches she conducted regarding lying to the

police. He again argues that he was not able to meaningfully cross-examine E.N.

because the trial court excluded the evidence that could have impeached her.

Appellant also reiterates that he was confronted with a manipulated recording and

evidence from his phone that had been illegally obtained. He concludes that, even

if each individual error were harmless, the cumulative effect was harmful because it

denied him his constitutional right to a fair trial.

      As discussed in detail above, we have not found error in the trial court’s

decision to exclude a copy of the chat messages from E.N.’s Movie Star Planet

                                          –27–
account, to exclude a copy of internet searches linked to E.N.’s Google account, or

to admit the audio recording of sexual abuse.2 And, while we did find error in the

trial court’s decision to admit evidence found on appellant’s phone, we have

conducted a constitutional harm analysis as is required. Because we have not

concluded that the trial court committed more than one error, there is nothing for us

to cumulate. See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

(“[W]e are aware of no authority holding that non-errors may in their cumulative

effect cause error.”).

        Appellant’s fifth issue is overruled.

                                            Outcry Witness

        In his sixth and seventh issues, appellant asserts the trial court erred in

overruling his objection to the court’s determination that McConnell (the forensic

interviewer) was the proper outcry witness and, as a result, allowed inadmissible

hearsay. Appellant contends the proper outcry witness was E.N.’s mother, at least

to the first incident of sexual abuse, and appellant’s father, as to the last incident.

Appellant further argues that the State failed to prove appellant’s father was

unavailable as an outcry witness because it did not attempt an out-of-state subpoena.

    2
      Appellant does not include issues six and seven, which challenge the admissibility of the outcry
witness’s testimony in this issue. Even if appellant had included those alleged errors in his argument that
the cumulative effect of the errors at trial denied him a fair trial, our result would be the same based on our
disposition of issues six and seven discussed below.
                                                    –28–
       Article 38.072 provides an exception to the rule against hearsay in that it

allows the admission of outcry statements if certain requirements are met. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072. One such requirement is that the designated outcry

witness must be the first person eighteen years of age or older that the child victim

told about the abuse. Id. art. 38.072, § 2(a)(3). To be considered the first outcry, the

victim’s statements must be more than a “general allusion of sexual abuse” and must

describe the alleged offense in some “discernible manner.” Garcia v. State, 792

S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We review the trial court’s determination

as to who is the proper outcry witness for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 92.

       At the hearing, McConnell testified that, as far as she knew, she was the first

adult to whom E.N. provided details of specific offenses. E.N. told her about the

first time and last time it happened and included sensory details in her account.

McConnell also testifed that E.N. told her mother about the first incident in the

hallway where appellant tried to put his penis “in the hole” but then later told her

mother it was a dream. E.N. also told McConnell that she talked to her grandfather

(appellant’s father) about the abuse but did not go into detail about what she told

him.

       E.N.’s mother testified that, in the fifth grade, E.N. disclosed sexual abuse by

appellant. E.N. told her that appellant had “sexted her,” which she thought meant

that E.N. “felt like she was raped.” When E.N.’s mother explained that would “really

hurt” and that if he did that he was violating her, E.N. confirmed that is what

                                         –29–
happened. E.N. did not share any other details and later said she must have been

dreaming. Although E.N. played the recording for her mother, she never told her

any further details of the sexual abuse.

      E.N.’s mother also testified that she knew E.N. told appellant’s father details

about certain acts because he told her, but she was not asked to disclose those details

to the court. Nor did defense counsel elicit testimony from E.N. or the police as to

what E.N. may have described to appellant’s father before he reported the abuse.

      At the hearing, defense counsel asked the trial court to take judicial notice of

the State’s article 38.072 notice in which the State listed appellant’s father as one of

the outcry witnesses. As to appellant’s father, the notice provides: E.N. told

appellant’s father that appellant “penetrated her vagina with his penis. She told

[appellant’s father] that [appellant] came inside of her or finished inside of her and

that [appellant] has made unknown sexual contact with her prior to this incident.”

The notice provides no other details as to when or where this incident occurred and

implies that E.N. did not tell him any details about any other acts of abuse.

Therefore, although E.N. told both her mother and appellant’s father that appellant

sexually abused her, “it was not until [s]he spoke to the forensic interviewer that

[s]he made all of [her] allegations and it became clear the sexual abuse involved

multiple incidents for a period of thirty days or more.” Rodgers v. State, 442 S.W.3d

547, 552 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. ref’d).

                                           –30–
      Furthermore, the State explained that appellant’s father was unavailable and

uncooperative after he went back to Florida. One prosecutor represented, “We have

made several attempts. I can’t tell you exactly, but we have called several times. I

know that [the other prosecutor] has called, actually spoken to him and has been

blown off every single time saying that he doesn’t have time to talk, which is not

unexpected.” The other prosecutor testified that appellant’s father lived in Florida,

and he wanted to talk to him to see if he was coming to trial because he would likely

not be able to subpoena him. “Every time I would speak to him, he would tell me

that he was busy and that he would call me back.” The prosecutor tried four or five

times to contact appellant’s father in 2020, but he was not aware of any attempts his

office made to serve a subpoena in Florida.

      In reviewing a trial court’s decision that the child’s counselor was the proper

outcry witness where the first people the child told about the abuse testified that they

did not remember the child telling them anything, the Austin Court of Appeals

explained, “We interpret the statute to mean that the ‘first person’ refers to the first

adult who can remember and relate at trial the child’s statement that in some

discernible manner describes the alleged offense.” Foreman v. State, 995 S.W.2d

854, 859 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d); see also Creech v. State, Nos. 05-09-

00762-CR, 05-09-00763-CR, 2011 WL 1663040, at *2, 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May

4, 2011, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (relying on Foreman and

concluding child psychiatrist was not proper outcry witness when she testified that

                                         –31–
child did not make an outcry to her, she did not remember child making an outcry,

and she had no notes of child making outcry). Thus, several courts have explained

that an adult who refuses to cooperate with the prosecution cannot be the outcry

witness. Petty v. State, No. 02-21-00130-CR, 2022 WL 4545532, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(citing opinions of sister courts).     Here, the evidence supports a finding that

appellant’s father was uncooperative.

      Based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

determining that McConnell was the proper outcry witness under article 38.072. The

State laid the proper predicate and appellant failed to offer any evidence to the

contrary. See Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91–92; see also In re Z.L.B., 102 S.W.3d 120,

120, 122–23 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam) (relying on Garcia and holding in a juvenile

trial that, “once the prosecution has laid the initial predicate to establish an outcry

witness, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the child made an earlier

statement to another individual” that was more than just a general allusion to abuse).

Appellant’s sixth and seventh issues are overruled.

                             Modification of Judgment

      In a single cross-point, the State contends that the judgment of conviction

should be modified to reflect that E.N. was thirteen years old at the time of the

offense, not fourteen. We agree.

                                         –32–
      This Court has the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we

have the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State,

865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,

529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). The evidence showed that E.N.

was thirteen years old at the time of the last incident of sexual abuse. Therefore, we

delete “FOURTEEN (14) years” from the section of the judgment that provides,

“The age of the victim at the time of the offense was . . .” and replace it with

“THIRTEEN (13) years.”

      Our review of the record also shows that the judgment is lacking one of the

prosecutor’s names. Therefore, in the section titled, “Attorney for State,” we add

the name, “Geeta Singletary” before “Justin Dotzel.”

                                    Conclusion

      As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                           /Craig Smith/
                                           CRAIG SMITH
                                           JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
210668F.U05

                                        –33–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

JEFFREY MICHAEL WINEBERG,                    On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. 366-83346-
No. 05-21-00668-CR          V.               2020.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Chief Justice Burns and Justice
                                             Breedlove participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      to delete “FOURTEEN (14) years” and replace with “THIRTEEN (13)
      years” from the end of the sentence in the judgment that provides, “The
      age of the victim at the time of the offense was . . . .”; and

      to add “Geeta Singletary” before “Justin Dotzel” in the section titled,
      “Attorney for State.”

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 14th day of June 2023.

                                      –34–