Court Opinion

ID: 9772602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:36.654767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.071160
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant was indicted for murder. A jury subsequently convicted appellant of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter on August 26, 1992. The jury assessed punishment at sixteen years confinement. On September 3,1992, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order adding a deadly weapon affirmative finding to the judgment. The Second Court of Appeals affirmed. Davis v. State, 880 S.W.2d 870 (TexApp. — Fort Worth 1994). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review, which claimed that the trial court erred in entering the nunc pro tunc order making a deadly weapon affirmative finding. This Court subsequently held that the trial court did err. For the reasons below, I respectfully dissent.
In Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr. App.1985), this Court set out three instances when, in a jury trial, the court may properly enter in the judgment that the jury made an affirmative finding that a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense:
(1) Where the indictment specifically alleges the words “deadly weapon” describing the weapon used and the verdict reads “guilty as charged in the indictment”;
(2) Where the indictment names a weapon which is per se a deadly weapon and the verdict reads “guilty as charged in the indictment”; and
(3) Where a special issue is submitted to the trier of fact and is answered affirmatively. Polk at 396.
In the present case, the indictment charging appellant with murder states, in part: “... intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Leonard Lockhart, by shooting him with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm ...” At appellant’s request, the trial court included an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in its charge to the jury. The relevant portion of the charge reads as follows:
... namely, shoot Leonard Lockhart with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, which caused the death of Leonard Lockhart, but you further find and believe from all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case that the Defendant, in killing the deceased, if he did, acted under the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, or if you have a reasonable doubt as to whether Defendant so acted under the immediate influence of a sudden passion arising from an adequate cause, then you will find the Defendant guilty of the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Defendant was not found guilty as charged in the indictment, so the present case does not fit exactly the first two categories described in Polk. As no special issue was submitted to the jury concerning a finding of use of a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, the third category described in Polk is also not met here.
As the Court of Appeals states, however, the charge to the jury contains explicit wording that made it possible for the jury to find appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter only if it found he used “a deadly weapon, to *795wit: a firearm” during the commission of the offense. Since these words are part of the jury charge in the present case, I do not agree that there was only an “implied” deadly weapon finding in the jury’s verdict. I conclude that the jury’s verdict includes a specific finding of use of a deadly weapon in the present case no different than a verdict that reads “guilty as charged in the indictment” includes a finding of use of a deadly weapon when the indictment specifically pleads use of “a deadly weapon.”
The majority cites Easterling v. State, 710 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and Ex parte Flannery, 736 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), in support of its opinion that, because the present case does not square precisely with the three categories in Polk, the trial judge’s nunc pro tunc order making a deadly weapon affirmative finding was improper. Those cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case, however. In Easterling, the indictment (charging attempted murder) did not include the language “deadly weapon.” It did allege the use of a gun, but this Court has long held that a gun is not a deadly weapon per se. Boyett v. State, 692 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). The jury charge under which Easterling was convicted (attempted voluntary manslaughter) did contain language relating to use of “a firearm to wit, a gun.” Easterling at 581. The abstract portion of the jury charge describes “deadly weapon” as including a firearm.
In Ex parte Flannery, the indictment charged Flannery with murder by shooting the decedent with a shotgun. A shotgun at that time was not legally defined as a deadly weapon per se and since the jury charge failed to instruct the jury to make a determination whether the defendant’s use of the shotgun in causing decedent’s death made it a deadly weapon by a manner of its use, there was no deadly weapon finding possible based on the indictment or the jury charge.1
The circumstances present in Flannery and Easterling (lack of proper language alleging use of a deadly weapon in the indictment, the jury charge, or in both) do not exist here. Furthermore, Flannery may have little precedential value today given Narron and Franklin.
In the present case, both the indictment and the jury charge contain legally sufficient language relating to use of a deadly weapon: “... deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm.” As the language is identical in both instances, it is reasonable to conclude that the language on use of a deadly weapon in the jury charge on voluntary manslaughter does refer back to the deadly weapon allegation charged in the indictment.
Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I respectfully dissent.

. In two cases decided by this Court subsequent to Ex Parte Flannery, we have held that a shotgun is a deadly weapon per se. Ex Parte Franklin, 757 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) at 783. Narron v. State, 835 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992).