Court Opinion

ID: 9397090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:05:44.20829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.352262
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 21-1854
                               Filed May 24, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAYME POWELL,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Roger L. Sailer,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals his convictions, alleging his attorney had a conflict of

interest and challenging the denial of a motion for mistrial. AFFIRMED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., Badding, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                         2

BADDING, Judge.

       In a diatribe against the compensation paid to court-appointed attorneys,

Jayme Powell’s trial counsel moved for a mistrial outside the presence of the jury.

He argued that it was fundamentally unfair to have “somebody being paid at the

courthouse janitor level to defend [Powell] on something that’s going to take his

freedom away for the rest of his life.” The district court disagreed and denied the

motion, which counsel renewed as the trial progressed, at one point claiming he

was “ineffective to help this man.”

       The jury found Powell guilty of attempted murder and related charges.

Powell appeals, claiming (1) “defense counsel had a conflict of interest between

being paid for his services and his effective representation”; and (2) the court

abused its discretion in denying a mistrial after counsel “clearly informed the court

he was providing ineffective representation to his client.” We affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       The day after Christmas in 2020, Powell got into an argument with his

roommate, Richard. That argument led to a shooting on the interstate, during

which at least two gunshots were fired at a truck being driven by Richard’s

girlfriend. Richard was following behind the truck on his motorcycle. One shot

shattered the back driver’s side window, where Richard’s two-year-old daughter

was sitting in her car seat, and the other went into the passenger side door. The

girlfriend said these shots were fired by Powell from his truck.

       When Richard raced forward on his motorcycle to help, Powell ran into him

with his truck. Powell then fled on foot to a nearby farm and took a truck sitting

outside. After driving that truck through a fence, Powell abandoned it and took
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another truck from a neighboring farm. He drove to a friend’s house, where he

was apprehended by the police. Richard was severely injured in the motorcycle

crash but survived, as did his girlfriend and child.

       The State filed a trial information charging Powell with two counts of

attempted murder, two counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent

as a habitual offender, two counts of theft in the second degree, and possession

of a firearm by a felon as a habitual offender. Powell’s first two court-appointed

attorneys withdrew before a third attorney was appointed to represent him in April

2021. The case against Powell proceeded to trial in October where the theme of

the case—outside the jury’s presence—was defense counsel’s ire over the amount

he is paid through his contract with the State Public Defender’s office.

       That theme began on the first day of trial when, after the jury was selected,

defense counsel challenged the jury pool because only “20 of the 70 were male.”

Counsel prefaced that argument “with the fact that I’m court-appointed” and paid

at “$68 an hour, which is fundamentally unfair to defendants to adequately

maintain an office and sufficiently prepare to compete against better-funded

prosecution.” The district court denied the request “to disqualify the pool and call

another pool of jurors,” and trial started.

       Counsel continued with his theme the next day of trial when he renewed the

challenge to the jury pool:

             So I’m asking this Court to kick this jury out simply because
       the pool is unfair.
             With that, I will finish here with the fundamental fairness in
       terms of this public appointment for me because I do not have a
       paralegal, and then I have to pay an assistant out of my court-
       appointed funds if I wanted one. So I’m not going to be able to do
                                         4

       the statistics or have somebody go back and work yesterday to
       develop that jury pool question for the Court.
               ....
               My position is the State of Iowa is just downgrading this court
       appointment process. . . . Clearly, I can come to the Court, and I
       have to ask for funds, and the Court has given me extra funds . . .
       and I haven’t asked for, you know, beyond that at this point because
       I’ve never really had any luck with it very much. . . .
               Well, right now I would like somebody to come in or the Court
       to appoint somebody to do this jury investigation and come up with
       statistics and arguments and proof that the defendant isn’t getting a
       fair jury pool here.

The court stated it would “give it another look” and make “a renewed ruling on that

sometime prior to the end of trial,” though no further ruling was made on that issue.

       The third day of trial began with defense counsel moving for a mistrial

because he learned the State had charged Richard “with extortion for threatening

the prosecution that he wasn’t going to testify.” The State offered to make Richard,

who had already testified for the prosecution, available if counsel wanted to call

him as a witness. After the court denied the motion, defense counsel asked

       for another mistrial and/or an order from the Court as I [thought]
       about fundamental fairness about the whole system of the public
       defense.
               The State is getting paid. Their witnesses are all being paid.
       They get their money. The Court knows I did a trial a couple weeks
       ago. In the best case, I’m not going to be paid until March of next
       year. . . .
               ....
               So I can go through this whole trial now and get ready for
       cases, and the public defender—and of course I understand that I’m
       on the contract, but I won’t know for months whether or not the public
       defender is going to pay me. Okay? Which in the back of my mind
       it’s there.
               I’m completely honest with my client in this public support
       system. And he has me, and he knows the situation. It’s not affecting
       my . . . it’s not impacting me in terms of being here and doing what
       I’m doing.
               So I’m asking this Court to give an order that the State Public
       Defender’s Office pay me at the end of this trial when it goes to jury.
       Otherwise I will have to wait months to be paid.
                                           5

               Now, to lay it out a little more, the State is paid weekly. The
       prosecution. And I’m sure the Court is as well. The only one that
       doesn’t get paid weekly or has to worry about getting paid is me.
               And I have to stand here and represent this man, and I will
       argue that that is not only unfair and it raises to the level of a mistrial
       at this point because of . . . this immunity thing and forcing a witness
       to testify. . . . [T]he State has an office right over here with their own
       staff that gets paid. And I brought it up yesterday. I get paid $68 an
       hour. I have to maintain a secretary. $18 living wage. That give[s]
       me[] $50. I have to maintain my office, pay for my computers, all of
       my equipment, and do everything else . . . which brings me less than
       the courthouse janitor.
               So you have somebody being paid at the courthouse janitor
       level to defend him on something that’s going to take his freedom
       away for the rest of his life. And I get thrown hardballs and hardballs.
       And it’s just me. [The prosecutor] has the whole system behind him.
               . . . . And if that’s the way the State wants to play this game
       of defense work, it just [is] fundamentally unfair.
               . . . . I’m asking for a mistrial, but I’m also asking the Court
       order the State to pay me so that at least . . . I’m not sitting here and
       having to worry about my bills and living my life and at the same time
       defending this guy because I have to invest my time and food and
       motels and getting here and then still worry about getting paid. The
       last time I did a trial over here the State wouldn’t even pay me for
       staying here.

Though the court said that it was “not without sympathy” for defense counsel, it

denied the motion for mistrial and request for an order requiring payment.

       Later on that day, defense counsel again decried his lack of resources while

challenging an exhibit the State offered that was “a summary of data information

received from Verizon.” The court overruled the objection, noting the State had

put all the data into the record as an exhibit. Yet counsel argued: “I don’t have the

resources to have this—these specialized programs and licenses to go back

through and analyze and look at and contribute to how this data works.” So he

again “urge[d] the Court just to throw it all out and start this whole thing over and

then give the defense the resources necessary to defend this man.” Once more,

the court denied the motion.
                                           6

       On the last day of trial, defense counsel closed his theme with a final appeal

to the court for a mistrial:

               Yesterday the prosecution argued that I had the evidence,
       that I could have analyzed it, that I could have done depositions.
       He’s sitting here with state investigators in the courtroom that can
       help him. He’s got all of his office. And the fundamental fairness of
       this is my client is indicating to me stuff that I should have done and
       could have done which makes me ineffective because I didn’t have
       the time.
               . . . . [O]ver the years you just get into this process of give
       reasonable representation but don’t—you know, you just can’t do too
       much; otherwise, we are not going to pay you. So that makes me
       ineffective to help this man. So we are moving for a mistrial.

Noting that it had considered the same arguments previously, the court again

denied the motion.

       The jury ultimately found Powell guilty of two counts of attempted murder;

two counts of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent; possession of a

firearm by a felon; and the lesser-included offenses of operating a motor vehicle

without owner’s consent. Powell stipulated to prior felony convictions for the

habitual offender enhancements and was sentenced to a total indeterminate

sentence of fifty-four years in prison. He appeals.

II.    Conflict of Interest

       Citing his “Sixth Amendment right to counsel,”1 Powell first claims that his

attorney’s statements about his compensation from the State Public Defender’s

1 While “[c]onflict-of-interest claims are typically raised in ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims,” Powell has not made that specific claim under his first issue
heading. See State v. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Iowa 2007). Instead,
he frames the issue as a “generic conflict-of-interest claim.” Id. As a result, we do
not find any impediment to our authority to consider the claim on direct appeal. Cf.
Iowa Code § 814.7 (2020) (limiting the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to
resolve ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal).
                                           7

office “should have alerted the district court to a possible conflict of interest, thus

giving rise to the court’s obligation [to] inquire further to determine if an actual

conflict existed.” Because the court knew or should have known of the conflict,

Powell argues “reversal is required” under State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233, 238

(Iowa 2000). We review this claim de novo. See Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 345.

       Powell is correct that the court in Watson held “that where the trial court

knew or should have known of a particular conflict, reversal is required without a

showing that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance, even though

no objection is made at trial.” 620 N.W.2d at 238. But in cases since Watson, our

supreme court has adopted the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Mickens

v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). See State v. Vaughan, 859 N.W.2d 492, 500

(Iowa 2015). The court in Vaughan explained that following Mickens,

       automatic reversal is required under the Sixth Amendment only when
       the trial court refuses to inquire into a conflict of interest over
       defendant’s or counsel’s objection. When neither the defendant nor
       his or her attorney raises the conflict of interest, the defendant is
       required to show an adverse effect on counsel’s performance to
       warrant reversal, even if the trial court should have known about the
       conflict and failed to inquire.

Id. (internal citations omitted); accord Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 347 (“[W]hen

the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry (or even if it did conduct an inquiry), the

Supreme Court required the defendant to show his counsel’s performance was

adversely affected by the conflict of interest before it would presume prejudice and

find a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal.”).

       While Powell’s attorney extensively discussed his payment issues at trial—

mostly to advance other arguments he was making, like the jury pool issue—

Powell concedes on appeal that neither he nor his attorney raised the potential
                                            8

conflict-of-interest issue before the court. So, under Vaughan and Smitherman,

Powell must show the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance.

Because he advocates for automatic reversal, Powell has not made that showing.

We accordingly reject his claim.        See State v. Kramer, No. 16-2048, 2018

WL 346454, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2018); Kensett v. State,

No. 17-1702, 2018 WL 6715484, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2018).

       In doing so, we note that while defense counsel tied his compensation to

Powell’s ability to receive a fair trial, he specifically stated, “[I]t’s not impacting me

in terms of being here and doing what I’m doing.”            That was apparent from

counsel’s performance at trial, where he cross-examined witnesses, presented

defense witnesses, and moved for a mistrial multiple times. Further, as the State

points out, Powell cites no authority holding “that this type of claim about contract

rates or reimbursement timetables for appointed counsel can establish an actual

or potential conflict of interest.” Cf. United States v. O’Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 71 (2d

Cir. 1997) (rejecting an argument “that failure to pay fees or an attorney’s motion

to withdraw for his client’s failure to pay, without more, gives rise to a conflict of

interest”); accord United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952, 957 (1st Cir. 1978). For

these reasons, we deny Powell’s conflict-of-interest claim.

III.   Mistrial for Ineffective Assistance

       Powell next claims “the district court abused its discretion when it denied

the motion for a mistrial after the defense counsel clearly informed the court he

was providing ineffective representation to his client.” The parties agree that we

should review this claim for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Newell, 710

N.W.2d 6, 32 (Iowa 2006).
                                           9

       We first observe that, like with his last claim, Powell does not cite any

authority supporting his claim that a mistrial can be granted because of ineffective

assistance of counsel.      Nor have we been able to find any.            Cf. State v.

Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998) (“For a judge, sua sponte, to declare

a mistrial because of perceived inadequacy of defense counsel is—and certainly

should be—a rare event.”).

       In any event, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of this claim.

Iowa Code section 814.7 states that “[a]n ineffective assistance of counsel claim

in a criminal case shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction

relief pursuant to chapter 822.” In interpreting a prior version of section 814.7

(2018), our supreme court held that the district court did not err in refusing to

consider ineffective-assistance claims that a defendant raised in a motion for new

trial because, at the time, such claims could be raised only in postconviction relief

and direct appeal.2 See State v. Trane, 934 N.W.2d 447, 464 (Iowa 2019). We

reach the same conclusion here.

       AFFIRMED.

2 As noted in the preceding footnote, section 814.7 has since been amended to
remove our authority to resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct
appeal. See State v. Jacobs, 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021).