Court Opinion

ID: 9963489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:08:53.27142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:51.678679
License: Public Domain

[J-59-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                WESTERN DISTRICT

    EARL JOHN DWYER AND CHRISTINE                 :   No. 2 WAP 2023
    DWYER, HUSBAND AND WIFE,                      :
                                                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                      Appellants                  :   Superior Court entered July 8, 2022
                                                  :   at No. 519 WDA 2021, affirming the
                                                  :   Judgment of the Court of Common
               v.                                 :   Pleas of Allegheny County entered
                                                  :   April 26, 2021 at No. GD01-006612.
                                                  :
    AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL, INC.,                   :   ARGUED: October 18, 2023
    AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL SERVICES,                :
    INC., RIVERSOURCE LIFE INSURANCE              :
    COMPANY, JAMES E. ANDERSON, JR.,              :
    AND DUANE DANIELS,                            :
                                                  :
                      Appellees                   :

                      CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE BROBSON                                                DECIDED: APRIL 25, 2024
        The Majority makes four related holdings: (1) trial courts do not enjoy absolute

discretion in deciding whether to award a plaintiff up to three times the plaintiff’s actual

damages (augmented damages) pursuant to Section 9.2(a) of Pennsylvania’s Unfair

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL),1 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a);2 (2) in

1 Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, added by the Act of
November 24, 1976, P.L. 1166.
2 Section 9.2(a) of the CPL, entitled private actions, provides:

       Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
       personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any
       ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the
       use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared
       unlawful by section 3 of this act, may bring a private action to recover actual
(continued…)
determining whether to increase a plaintiff’s damages pursuant to Section 9.2(a), a trial

court’s discretion is constrained by the legislative objectives underlying Section 9.2(a); (3)

the award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to the CPL is irrelevant in assessing whether a

plaintiff is entitled to augmented damages pursuant to Section 9.2(a); and (4) when

examining whether to increase a plaintiff’s damages under Section 9.2(a), trial courts are

precluded from considering that a jury awarded the plaintiff common law punitive

damages. I agree with the first three holdings. Moreover, because the trial court in this

matter committed reversible error by violating these legal principles when it denied Earl

John Dwyer and Christine Dwyer (Dwyers) augmented damages under Section 9.2(a), I,

like the Majority, would remand the matter to the trial court with instruction.

       I part ways with the Majority regarding whether a trial court can consider that a jury

awarded punitive damages to a plaintiff when analyzing whether the plaintiff should

receive augmented damages under Section 9.2(a) of the CPL. To be sure, a trial court

cannot treat punitive damages as interchangeable with augmented damages under the

CPL, as the trial court did in this matter. In my view, however, a trial court is not required

to ignore the award of punitive damages in performing an augmented damage

assessment under Section 9.2(a). Indeed, for the reasons that follow, I conclude that an

award of punitive damages may be relevant in informing, in part, a court’s decision

whether to increase a plaintiff’s damages under Section 9.2(a). Thus, unlike the Majority,

my remand instructions to the trial court would not include a directive that the trial court

       damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater. The court
       may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages
       sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide
       such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. The court may
       award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs
       and reasonable attorney fees.

73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a)

                               [J-59-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
is barred from considering the fact that the jury awarded punitive damages to the Dwyers

when it reassesses whether the Dwyers should receive augmented damages pursuant to

Section 9.2(a). Consequently, on that point, I respectfully dissent.

       I begin by outlining where I agree with the Majority. As the Majority persuasively

develops, the CPL does not provide trial courts with unfettered discretion to determine

whether (up to) treble damages are proper pursuant to Section 9.2(a) of the CPL.

(Majority Opinion at 11-12.) Indeed, I fully concur with the Majority that a court’s discretion

in this regard is cabined by the legislative intent of Section 9.2(a), specifically, and the

CPL, generally.     Investigating that intent reveals three objectives that animate the

augmented damages clause of Section 9.2(a): “to incentivize private actions for unfair

and deceptive trade practices, to compensate plaintiffs, and to deter wrongful conduct.”

(Id. at 14.) A trial court’s decision regarding the award of augmented damages pursuant

to Section 9.2(a) must comport with these legislative goals. Lastly, the Majority correctly

concludes that the CPL plainly provides that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under

that statute are “in addition to other relief” provided in Section 9.2(a), including the

availability of augmented damages. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a); (Majority Opinion at 19.) Thus,

an award of attorneys’ fees under the statute has no bearing on a court’s augmented

damages assessment.

       Here, the trial court misunderstood the boundaries of its discretion in assessing

whether to award the Dwyers augmented damages under Section 9.2(a) of the CPL. The

trial court’s error in this regard is made clear in the opinion that it authored pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). ln that opinion, the trial court rejected

the Dwyers’ contention that it erred by refusing to award them augmented damages

pursuant to Section 9.2(a) by simply stating that “the jury had already awarded punitive

damages” and that the trial court enjoyed “absolute discretion” in deciding whether the

                              [J-59-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3
Dwyers should receive augmented damages under Section 9.2(a).3 (Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

Opinion, 8/25/2021, at 4 (emphasis omitted).) The trial court’s reasoning demonstrates

that its decision was untethered from the legislative objectives of Section 9.2(a).

Accordingly, I am aligned with the Majority’s decision to remand this matter to the trial

court with instruction to reassess whether the Dwyers should receive augmented

damages pursuant to Section 9.2(a).

       Turning to my disagreement with the Majority, while the trial court in this matter

erroneously treated punitive damages and CPL augmented damages as one in the same,

the CPL does not contain any language that compels a trial court to ignore entirely the

fact that a jury awarded punitive damages to a plaintiff when the trial court is asked to

determine whether the plaintiff should receive augmented damages under the CPL.

Moreover, as noted above, one of the three legislative objectives that a trial court must

consider in making a Section 9.2(a) assessment is whether the damages awarded deter

the wrongful conduct of the defendant and other sellers of goods and services. (See

Majority Opinion at 13 (explaining that “the availability of enhanced damages under the

CPL serves to deter wrongful conduct”)); (id. at 14 (“[I]t is not solely the defendant whose

wrongful conduct is being deterred. The availability of enhanced damages under the CPL

also serves to deter the same kind of wrongful conduct by other sellers of goods and

services in the marketplace, thereby protecting the public at large.”).) Importantly, this

Court has held that the deterrence aspect of Section 9.2(a) contains a punitive element.

See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 93 A.3d 806, 815 (Pa. 2014) (explaining that

Section 9.2(a)’s augmented damages clause, “although designed, in part, for other more

remedial purposes, do[es] contain a deterrent, punitive element”); Schwartz v.

3 In this opinion, the trial court did not mention that its decision to deny the Dwyers

augmented damages pursuant to Section 9.2(a) was based upon the fact that they also
received attorneys’ fees. The Majority, however, accurately highlights that the trial court
did make such a statement in its December 18, 2019 order. (Majority Opinion at 3.)

                             [J-59-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4
Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 897 (Pa. 2007) (expressing that “the trebling of damages

[pursuant to the CPL] obviously has a strong punitive dynamic”).

       It is well settled that common law punitive damages are utilized to punish a

defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2023)

(describing punitive damages as “private fines intended to punish the defendant and to

deter future wrongdoing”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In my view, the

shared features of punitive damages and the deterrence aspect of the augmented

damages clause of Section 9.2(a) are obvious—they both are aimed, at least in part, at

punishing a defendant and deterring future misconduct. Consequently, where, as here,

a successful CPL plaintiff is also successful on common law claims based on the same

wrongful conduct and secures a punitive damages award, the trial court should be

permitted to consider that award in assessing, “in its discretion,” whether augmented

damages under Section 9.2(a) of the CPL are “necessary or proper.” Section 9.2(a) of

the CPL. That consideration, however, should be limited to informing, in part, the trial

court’s conclusion as to whether augmented CPL damages are “necessary or proper” to

deter future wrongdoing. Nothing in the text, structure, or purpose of the CPL convinces

me otherwise.4

4 I do not share the Majority’s concern that a trial court’s consideration of a punitive

damages award in denying augmented CPL damages could work to a successful
plaintiff’s prejudice if an appellate court later reverses the punitive damages award. In
such a scenario, the courts and litigants would be on notice of this Court’s decision on
this question and would be guided accordingly should any party appeal the punitive
damages award. Moreover, where the reversal of a punitive damages award calls into
question other aspects of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff, I discern no
reason why the appellate court could not remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider
those aspects in light of the appellate court’s disposition. See Section 706 of the Judicial
Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 706 (“An appellate court may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse any order brought before it for review, and may remand the matter and direct the
entry of such appropriate order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be
just under the circumstances.”).

                             [J-59-2023] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5
       For the reasons stated above, I would vacate the judgments of the Superior Court

and trial court. In addition, I would remand the matter to the trial court with direction to

reassess whether the Dwyers should receive augmented damages under the CPL in a

manner that is consistent with this Opinion.

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