Court Opinion

ID: 9954474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:15:58.354499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:25.319136
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Chaney, Callins and White
              Argued by videoconference

              DOROTEO DIAZ MARTINEZ
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0591-22-4                                 JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                                MARCH 26, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                                John M. Tran, Judge

                              George L. Freeman, IV (The Law Offices of George L. Freeman, IV,
                              PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

                              Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a jury trial, Doroteo Diaz Martinez (“Diaz Martinez”) was convicted of first-

              degree murder and criminal street gang participation. On appeal, Diaz Martinez argues that

              (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first-degree murder as a principal in the

              second degree, (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of criminal street gang

              participation, and (3) the trial court erred in denying his proposed cautionary jury instruction

              regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s

              judgment.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     On appeal and in accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, we recite the

              facts “in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v.

              Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
(2016)). Therefore, we will “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and

all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       On April 22, 2019, Diaz Martinez, Armando Dagoberto Reyes Reyes (“Reyes Reyes”),

Julieth Ford Ortega (“Julieth”), and Byron Estupinian (“Estupinian”) abducted and murdered

16-year-old Richard Hernandez Cruz (“Richard”) in the wooded area near Bryant Alternative

High School in Fairfax County. Diaz Martinez, Reyes Reyes, and Estupinian were all associated

with the criminal street gang MS-13, with Reyes Reyes being a high-ranking “homeboy” who

could give orders to other members and Diaz Martinez being a lower-ranking member of the

MS-13 “Chilanguera” clique. Reyes Reyes was known by the gang nickname “Sobietikho,” and

Diaz Martinez’s gang nickname was “Nadie.” Prior to the murder, Reyes Reyes and Julieth had

been in an on-again-off-again relationship for around eight months, but they were not in a

romantic relationship in April 2019. Julieth also dated Richard from December 2018 to April

2019, but they broke up before Richard’s death.

       At around 7:00 p.m. on April 22, 2019, Julieth went to Bryant Alternative High School to

meet with Reyes Reyes in response to a text message from Reyes Reyes directing her to meet

him there. Julieth sent a text message back to Reyes Reyes, telling him that she no longer

wished to hang out with him, and Reyes Reyes responded that she had to travel to the school to

be “jumped out” if she no longer wished to hang out. When Julieth arrived, Reyes Reyes,

Estupinian, and a male named Enrique were present. Rather than trying to “jump out” Julieth,

Reyes Reyes showed her text messages from a third party stating that Richard was “trying to kill

her” with “brujeria,” i.e., black magic. Reyes Reyes then told Julieth to call Richard and

threatened to harm Julieth and her mother if she refused.

                                               -2-
          At around 11:00 p.m., Julieth called Richard and bought him an Uber ride to an

apartment complex near the school using a prepaid Uber card that Julieth and Reyes Reyes had

purchased at a nearby CVS. Meanwhile, Reyes Reyes told Estupinian to get baseball bats from

the wooded area near the apartment complex. By then, Enrique had left the group and went

home.

          After Richard arrived at the apartment complex, Julieth and Richard walked towards the

back of the apartment complex to the wooded area where Reyes Reyes and Estupinian were

hiding. Reyes Reyes and Estupinian, who were carrying a bat and a machete, respectively, then

grabbed Richard and forced him to keep walking into the woods. After about one minute of

walking, Diaz Martinez suddenly appeared and struck Richard with a blow as he joined the

group. The group kept walking deeper into the woods for about three minutes and then stopped.

Reyes Reyes then asked Julieth to confront Richard about Richard’s alleged use of black magic

on her.

          After Richard responded to Julieth’s questions, the other group members immediately

started punching and kicking Richard. Julieth testified that, because Reyes Reyes asked her to

turn away and not to look, she only heard the sound of the beating without knowing who was

doing what. Julieth also testified that it was dark and that she only knew that Diaz Martinez,

Reyes Reyes, and Estupinian were surrounding Richard when the blows landed on Richard. The

Commonwealth entered into evidence a drawing made by Julieth depicting Diaz Martinez’s,

Reyes Reyes’s, and Estupianian’s positions surrounding Richard during the beating. After the

attacks finally stopped, Reyes Reyes said, “I think we went overboard.” Richard was dead.

Reyes Reyes also stated, “The Beast took him.”

                                                -3-
         The following day, Diaz Martinez returned to the area where Richard was murdered to

assist Julieth, Reyes Reyes, and others in burying Richard’s body. Diaz Martinez did not need

instructions on finding the location of Richard’s body.

         During a subsequent police interview, Diaz Martinez stated that, prior to the murder,

Reyes Reyes had informed him about his plan to conduct a “birthday party” and that Julieth was

going to lead a person into the woods for the “birthday party.” Diaz Martinez explained that a

“birthday party” is an MS-13 term for the gang’s version of court. At a “birthday party” the

gang imposes discipline, usually in the form of a beating, on a person who has committed a

violation or an infraction. At trial, Detective Ray E. Betts was qualified as an expert witness on

the MS-13 gang. Detective Betts explained that a “birthday party” entails “[a] violent attack,

physical attack and . . . often times . . . they’re planning to kill the individual.” Diaz Martinez

finally told the detectives that he went to Bryant Alternative High School on the night of the

murder and met with Reyes Reyes, but that he left at around 11:00 p.m. before Richard arrived

and that he was with his girlfriend Lincy Velasquez Flores (“Lincy”) for the remainder of the

night.

         Lincy testified that, on the night of the murder, Reyes Reyes came to the apartment she

shared with Diaz Martinez looking for Diaz Martinez. Lincy told Diaz Martinez, “Don’t go,” but

Diaz Martinez left with Reyes Reyes. After the Commonwealth refreshed Lincy’s recollection

with records of her cell-phone calls, Lincy testified that, at around 1:00 a.m. on the morning after

the murder, she called Julieth and Reyes Reyes multiple times to locate Diaz Martinez. Lincy

testified that Diaz Martinez did not come home until after she called Julieth and Reyes Reyes at

around 1:00 a.m.

         At trial, crime analyst Jennifer Harrington testified as an expert in historical cell-site

location and cell-tower analysis. Harrington testified that Lincy called Reyes Reyes at 1:07 and

                                                  -4-
1:09 a.m. and called Julieth at 1:08 and 1:10 a.m. on April 23, 2019. Harrington also testified

that Reyes Reyes’s and Julieth’s cell-phone records showed that they were in the area of Bryant

Alternative High School during the time of the murder.

       Prior to the trial verdict, the trial court denied Diaz Martinez’s proposed cautionary jury

instruction regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony, finding that Julieth’s testimony was

corroborated by other evidence. The proposed cautionary jury instruction provided:

               Julieth Ford Ortega has testified that she was an accomplice in the
               commission of the crimes charged in the indictment. While you
               may find your verdict upon h[er] uncorroborated testimony, you
               should consider such testimony with great care and you are
               cautioned as to the danger of convicting the defendant upon the
               uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Nevertheless, if you
               are satisfied from the evidence of the guilt of the defendant beyond
               a reasonable doubt, the defendant may be convicted upon the
               uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice.

       The jury ultimately found Diaz Martinez guilty of first-degree murder and criminal street

gang participation. The trial court imposed a sentence of 20 years for the first-degree murder

charge and 2 years for the criminal street gang participation charge. This appeal followed.

                                           ANALYSIS

                                  I. Cautionary Jury Instruction

       Diaz Martinez argues that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed cautionary jury

instruction regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Diaz Martinez asserts that Julieth

was an accomplice to the murder and that no evidence corroborated her testimony that he was

present when the murder occurred. Thus, Diaz Martinez maintains, the trial court should have

permitted his proposed cautionary jury instruction because Julieth’s testimony as an accomplice

was uncorroborated.

       “The trial court has ‘broad discretion in giving or denying instructions requested,’ and we

review those decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Barney v. Commonwealth, 69

                                               -5-
Va. App. 604, 609 (2019) (quoting Gaines v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 562, 568 (2003) (en

banc)). Yet, it is well established that where the Commonwealth advances accomplice testimony

in support of her case, the trial court has a “duty . . . to warn the jury against the danger of

convicting upon such uncorroborated testimony.” Dillard v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 820, 821

(1976). If an accomplice’s testimony is uncorroborated, it is error for a trial court to refuse the

cautionary instruction. Id. Thus, “[t]he test . . . in determining whether a cautionary instruction

should be granted becomes this: is corroborative evidence lacking?” Id. at 822. If no evidence

exists to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, a trial court must grant a cautionary accomplice

instruction; if evidence exists to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, a trial court properly

refuses the same. Id.

        As to the quantity and quality of corroborative evidence necessary to justify a trial court’s

refusal of a cautionary accomplice instruction, “[t]he corroborative evidence, standing alone,

need not be sufficient either to support a conviction or to establish all the essential elements of an

offense.” Id. at 823. But, “[w]here . . . the testimony of an accomplice is corroborated in

material facts which tend to connect the accused with the crime, sufficient to warrant the jury in

crediting the truth of the accomplice’s testimony, it is not error to refuse a cautionary

instruction.” Id. The sufficiency of the corroboration is a question of law that we review de

novo. Holmes v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 34, 56 (2022).

        In considering whether the trial court abused its discretion, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to Diaz Martinez, the proponent of the jury instruction. Holloman v.

Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 147, 174 (2015). Even so, here we hold that the trial court did not

err in refusing Diaz Martinez’s proposed cautionary jury instruction, as other evidence

corroborated Julieth’s accomplice testimony that Diaz Martinez was present during Richard’s

murder. First, during his police interview, Diaz Martinez admitted he knew that a “birthday

                                                 -6-
party” was an MS-13 euphemism for gang discipline in the form of a beating, that Reyes Reyes

told Diaz Martinez his plan to give a “birthday party,” and that Julieth was going to lead a person

into the woods for the “birthday party.” Diaz Martinez also admitted to going to Bryant

Alternative High School on the night of the murder to meet with Reyes Reyes. Second, Lincy’s

testimony confirmed that, after the meeting at Bryant Alternative High School, Reyes Reyes

came “closer to nighttime” to the home she shared with Diaz Martinez and “told [them] to go to

a party” and that Diaz Martinez left the home shortly after Reyes Reyes’s visit. Lincy also

testified that she called Julieth to ask where Diaz Martinez had been after he left the home

because “I knew they were together . . . they were always together” and that “Julieth was always

with [Reyes Reyes] and so she must know where they were.”1 Finally, Reyes Reyes’s cell-phone

       1
         Lincy testified that she called Reyes Reyes and Julieth to determine Diaz Martinez’s
whereabouts on the evening of Richard’s murder because she “knew they were together.” On
direct examination, she testified that after she called Reyes Reyes and Julieth at “1:00” the
morning of Richard’s murder, Diaz Martinez came home, “but it wasn’t so late.” On cross-
examination, Lincy testified that she called them to “find out where [Diaz Martinez] was or
maybe where he had been” because “he didn’t have his line turned on at that time.” Finally,
Lincy summarized the evening’s events to defense counsel as follows:
               A Okay. So I can say exactly -- okay. So the day that that kid
               died, all I can say is that I had gone back to Bryant [Alternative
               High School] with [Diaz Martinez].

               Q That’s all you can say?

               A And just that after we went back home and after that [Reyes
               Reyes] came and he told us to go to a party.

                  After that we were home, and then I went inside the house and
               went to the bathroom, and [Diaz Martinez] went outside to smoke
               a cigarette. And after that I didn’t see him again.

               Q Then he came back later, he looked normal, he went to bed?

               A Yeah. He looked normal. And I started calling other people
               because [Diaz Martinez] and I were angry and I wanted to know
               where he was.

                                               -7-
data evidence showed that Reyes Reyes—whom Diaz Martinez admitted he had met up with on

the night of the murder and whom Lincy testified was “always” with Julieth, who in turn was

“always” with Diaz Martinez—was in the area of Bryant Alternative High School throughout the

time of the murder.

       This evidence represents material facts that connect Diaz Martinez to Richard’s murder

and corroborate “the occasion and opportunity for the crime” and thus, Julieth’s accomplice

testimony. See Holmes, 76 Va. App. at 57 (quotations omitted); see also Dillard, 216 Va. at 823

(quoting Crosby v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 518, 520 (1922)). Diaz Martinez knew Reyes Reyes

planned a “birthday party” and that he intended Julieth’s participation in it. See Clark v.

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 237, 243 (1978) (holding that an accused’s own admissions may

corroborate accomplice testimony). Lincy’s testimony confirms that Diaz Martinez left his home

in response to Reyes Reyes’s invitation to “go to a party” and, coupled with Reyes Reyes’s cell-

phone data, supports the inference that he was with Reyes Reyes and Julieth at the time of

Richard’s murder. Although these facts, standing alone, are insufficient to support a conviction,

they are sufficient to corroborate Julieth’s accomplice testimony that Diaz Martinez was present

during Richard’s murder. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing the cautionary jury

instruction.

        Lincy’s testimony corroborates Julieth’s testimony that Diaz Martinez was with Julieth
and others at the time of the murder. Our dissenting colleague insists we must “disregard[]
[Lincy]’s conflicting testimony that she called [Julieth] that night looking for” Diaz Martinez.
This suggests an invocation of the appellate review principle that we “discard the evidence of the
[Commonwealth] in conflict with that of the [accused],” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Perkins,
295 Va. at 324). But Lincy’s testimony presents no evidentiary conflict. Even in the light most
favorable to Diaz Martinez, Lincy’s testimony supports the inference that Diaz Martinez was
with Reyes Reyes and Julieth—and not with Lincy—during the relevant period. To the extent
favoring the jury instruction proponent requires discarding conflicting evidence, it does not
compel disregarding evidence merely unhelpful to the proponent’s position. Nonetheless, and
for the reasons discussed above, there is sufficient corroboration of Julieth’s testimony even
without Lincy’s testimony that she called that night looking for Diaz Martinez.
                                                -8-
                                  II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, “[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial

established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)

(quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is

whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction,

‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might

differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at

521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

   A. First-Degree Murder

       Diaz Martinez argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he committed first-

degree murder under Code § 18.2-32 because he neither committed the acts resulting in

Richard’s death nor acted as a principal in the second degree. According to Diaz Martinez, the

evidence was insufficient to prove that he was either present or engaged in any conduct that

would make him an accomplice in the attack. Diaz Martinez stresses that Julieth’s testimony did

not confirm his precise role in the attacks and that no evidence proved that he participated in the

attacks because Julieth’s testimony did not attribute any conduct to him at all. Diaz Martinez

also asserts that even if the evidence was sufficient to establish his presence at the scene of the

crime, mere presence would not make him an accomplice to the crime.

                                                -9-
               1. Presence

       Despite a defendant’s statements regarding his whereabouts at the time a crime occurred,

“[t]he fact finder need not believe the accused’s explanation and may infer that he is trying to

conceal his guilt.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532 (1982) (quoting Black v.

Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842 (1981)). This is true even if the evidence establishing the

accused’s presence is circumstantial, for “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as competent and is

entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude

every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53

(1983). Additionally, “[s]ince the fact finder had the opportunity of hearing and observing the

witnesses, its findings are entitled to great weight.” Carter, 223 Va. at 532.

       Here, Julieth testified unequivocally that Diaz Martinez was present during Richard’s

murder, and, as explained in Section I, supra, Julieth’s accomplice testimony was sufficiently

corroborated by other evidence. In particular, the jury was entitled to weigh Lincy’s testimony

regarding Diaz Martinez’s whereabouts on the night of the murder against Diaz Martinez’s own

explanation of his whereabouts and conclude that Diaz Martinez had lied to conceal his guilt.

Considering Lincy’s testimony that Diaz Martinez left his apartment with Reyes Reyes on the

night of the murder and did not return home until after 1:00 a.m. the next morning, the jury could

reasonably infer that Diaz Martinez’s self-serving statement that he returned home at around

11:00 p.m. before Richard arrived was incredible. Moreover, considering Reyes Reyes’s cell-

phone data evidence—which showed that he was in the area of Bryant Alternative High School

throughout the relevant time when the murder occurred—the jury could reasonably conclude that

Diaz Martinez—who had initially joined up with Reyes Reyes to conduct the “birthday party”—

was likewise with Reyes Reyes in the area of Bryant Alternative High School when the murder

occurred.

                                               - 10 -
       In all, the jury could reasonably conclude that Diaz Martinez’s explanation of his

whereabouts at the time of Richard’s murder was incredible and conflicted with the other

evidence in the case. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Diaz Martinez was

present during the commission of the murder.

               2. Principal in the Second Degree

       Under Virginia law, a principal in the second degree is “equally answerable and bound by

the acts of every other person connected with the consummation of [a] . . . crime.” Winston v.

Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 602 (2004). A principal in the second degree “is one who is

present, actually or constructively, assisting the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.”

Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 482 (2005) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 208

Va. 370, 372 (1967)). “[A] defendant is guilty as a principal in the second degree if he is guilty

of some overt act done knowingly in furtherance of the commission of the crime, or if he shared

in the criminal intent of the principal committing the crime.” McMorris v. Commonwealth, 276

Va. 500, 505 (2008). For a defendant to be liable as a principal in the second degree, “actual

participation in the commission of the crime is not necessary.” Muhammad, 269 Va. at 482

(quoting Jones, 208 Va. at 372).

       Generally, “[m]ere presence during the commission of a crime is not sufficient to render

one criminally liable.” Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 542 (1991). However,

“accompanying a person with full knowledge that the person intends to commit a crime and

doing nothing to discourage it bolsters the perpetrator’s resolve, lends countenance to the

perpetrator’s criminal intentions, and thereby aids and abets the actual perpetrator in the

commission of the crime.” Pugliese v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 94 (1993). Hence, a

person’s presence during the commission of a crime without disapproving or opposing it is

“evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is competent for the jury to

                                               - 11 -
infer that he assented thereto, lent to it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding and

abetting the same.” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 644, 648-49 (2000) (quoting

Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 100 (1942)).

       We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Diaz Martinez

participated in Richard’s murder as a principal in the second degree. First, Julieth’s testimony

established that Diaz Martinez committed an overt act in furtherance of Reyes Reyes’s “birthday

party” plan when Diaz Martinez initially joined the group in the woods and struck Richard with a

blow. Julieth’s testimony also established that, after hitting Richard, Diaz Martinez

accompanied the group deeper into the woods, surrounded Richard along with Reyes Reyes and

Estupinian as Richard was beaten to death, and took no actions to discourage or stop the other

group members from carrying out the beating.

       Additionally, “‘other circumstances’ were present in this case in addition to appellant’s

failure to disapprove or oppose the actions of the perpetrator[s].” Hampton, 32 Va. App. at 649.

The evidence established that Diaz Martinez and Reyes Reyes convened prior to the murder to

discuss Reyes Reyes’s plan to conduct a “birthday party” and that Diaz Martinez knew that a

“birthday party” consisted of the imposition of gang discipline on a person in the form of a

beating. Expert testimony from Detective Betts also confirmed that a “birthday party” can be a

planned attack to kill the target person. Therefore, the jury could find that Diaz Martinez knew

beforehand of Reyes Reyes’s criminal intent and shared Reyes Reyes’s criminal intent by

deliberately joining Reyes Reyes in the woods where the murder occurred.

       Moreover, even if Diaz Martinez did not have the specific criminal intent to kill, “[t]he

one exception [to the general requirement of shared criminal intent] exists when there was

concert of action and the resulting crime, whether such crime was originally contemplated or not,

is a natural and probable consequence of the intended wrongful act.” McMorris, 276 Va. at 506.

                                              - 12 -
Here, Diaz Martinez—with full knowledge of what a “birthday party” consists of and at the

request of a high-ranking MS-13 member, Reyes Reyes—acted in concert of action with Reyes

Reyes and the other group members by intentionally joining the group in the woods, initially

striking Richard with a blow, accompanying the group deeper into the woods, and surrounding

Richard with Reyes Reyes and Estupinian as Richard was beaten to death. And since Richard’s

death was a natural and probable consequence of the severe beating, Diaz Martinez is criminally

responsible for Richard’s murder as a principal in the second degree, regardless of whether he

intended the murder or not.

   B. Criminal Street Gang Participation

       Diaz Martinez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

criminal street gang participation under Code § 18.2-46.2 because Richard’s murder was not

gang-related. Diaz Martinez asserts that the conflict between Reyes Reyes and Richard was

based on Reyes Reyes’s jealousy of Richard’s relationship with Julieth and that Richard’s

murder was not carried out in furtherance of any MS-13 gang activity.

       “The offense of participating in a criminal street gang contains three elements that the

Commonwealth must prove to sustain a conviction under [Code § 18.2-46.2].” Hamilton v.

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 94, 108 (2010). “First, a person must actively participate in or be a

member of a criminal street gang. Second, the person must knowingly and willfully participate

in a predicate criminal act. Third, the act must be committed for the benefit of, at the direction

of, or in association with the gang.” Id.

       On brief, Diaz Martinez does not dispute the first element that he actively participated in

or was a member of MS-13. Diaz Martinez argues only that the second element was not

established because he did not commit the predicate criminal act of first-degree murder and that

the third element was not established because Richard’s murder was not gang-related. Diaz

                                               - 13 -
Martinez’s argument as to the second element fails because, as explained in Section II.A, supra,

the evidence was sufficient to establish that he committed first-degree murder as a principal in

the second degree. Thus, this assignment of error concerns only the third element of criminal

street gang participation.

       As to the third element, Code § 18.2-46.2(A) requires that the predicate criminal act be

committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang.”

Code § 18.2-46.2(A)’s “use of the disjunctive word ‘or,’ rather than the conjunctive ‘and,’

signifies the availability of alternative choices.” Morris v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 744, 749

(2011) (quoting Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 442 (1983)). Therefore, the

Commonwealth can satisfy the third element solely by proving that a defendant committed a

predicate criminal act “in association with” a criminal street gang. Id. at 749-50.

       Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Diaz Martinez’s participation in

Richard’s murder was done “in association with” the criminal street gang MS-13 because Diaz

Martinez participated at the request of a high-ranking MS-13 member, Reyes Reyes, and the

murder was carried out by MS-13 members in the form of a “birthday party,” which is a type of

MS-13 gang attack carried out on another person to impose discipline. Even if, as Diaz Martinez

argues, the murder was not carried out for the benefit of MS-13 as a gang, that is of no moment.

Code § 18.2-46.2(A)’s use of the disjunctive “or” for the third element of criminal street gang

participation entails that the predicate criminal act need not necessarily have been done “for the

benefit” of a criminal street gang, so long as the predicate criminal act was done “in association

with” a criminal street gang. Regardless of whether Richard’s murder was carried out “for the

benefit” of MS-13, the evidence sufficiently established that the murder was carried out “in

association with” MS-13. Therefore, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Diaz

Martinez of criminal street gang participation.

                                               - 14 -
                                          CONCLUSION

       The evidence was sufficient to establish that Diaz Martinez committed first-degree

murder as a principal in the second degree, and the evidence was also sufficient to establish that

Diaz Martinez participated in a criminal street gang. Additionally, the trial court did not err in

denying Diaz Martinez’s proposed cautionary jury instruction. Accordingly, the trial court’s

judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

                                               - 15 -
Chaney, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgment.

       I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. However,

under the applicable standard of review—considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

the proponent of a refused jury instruction—I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the defendant’s proposed cautionary instruction

regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the

majority’s judgment affirming the convictions.

       The murder case against Diaz Martinez (defendant) is based on the testimony of Julieth

Ortega, an accomplice in the murder who had already pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

Ortega’s plea agreement required her to testify against her alleged accomplices in the murder

case. Ortega testified that she was “trying to earn good favor and receive a suspended sentence

or a time-served sentence.”

       The defendant asked the trial court to give the jury the following cautionary instruction:

               Julieth Ford Ortega has testified that she was an accomplice in the
               commission of the crimes charged in the indictment. While you
               may find your verdict upon [her] uncorroborated testimony, you
               should consider such testimony with great care and you are
               cautioned as to the danger of convicting the defendant upon the
               uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Nevertheless, if you
               are satisfied from the evidence of the guilt of the defendant beyond
               a reasonable doubt, the defendant may be convicted upon the
               uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice.

This instruction is identical to Virginia’s Criminal Model Jury Instruction 3.400, and the

Commonwealth conceded that it is a correct statement of law. See Via v. Commonwealth, 288

Va. 114, 115 (2014) (recognizing that a near-identical jury instruction correctly stated the law

regarding uncorroborated accomplice testimony).

       “[I]f an accomplice’s testimony is uncorroborated, it is error for a trial court to refuse the

cautionary instruction.” Holmes v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 34, 55 (2022). “Whether the

                                                - 16 -
accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated is a question of law . . . reviewed de novo on

appeal.” Id. at 56. “[I]n deciding whether a particular instruction is appropriate, we view the

facts in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” Id. at 53 (quoting Cooper v.

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381 (2009)).

        Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant as the proponent of the

jury instruction, Ortega’s testimony that the defendant was present participating in the murder

was uncorroborated.

        Defendant’s Statements to Police

        Considering the defendant’s police interview in the light most favorable to the defendant,

his statements to the police do not corroborate Ortega’s testimony implicating him in the murder.

Initially, the defendant claimed he had no information about the murder case and then stated that

he didn’t want to provide information and be considered “a rat” by other people. Subsequently,

the defendant told police that Reyes Reyes told him about the plan to lure the victim into the

woods and attack him. The defendant said he told Reyes Reyes that he could not stay because

his girlfriend would be angry that he went out without her. Then, around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m., he

returned to the apartment he shared with Lincy Flores and remained at home with her for the rest

of the night.

        The defendant stated that Reyes Reyes called him the next day and asked for his help.

Subsequently, he met Reyes Reyes in the woods and helped him and two others dig a hole.

Initially, the defendant denied seeing or touching the decedent. But he later admitted that he

helped move the body into the hole. The defendant explicitly denied participating in the murder.

        Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, as required, the

evidence does not support the trial court’s inference that the defendant did not need instructions

to the place where he admittedly assisted in burying the victim’s body. This inference is based

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on facts not in evidence. The record is silent on what, if anything, the defendant was told about

the intended burial location before the defendant went there the day after the murder. And

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, he knew about the murder

because Reyes Reyes told him about it, not because the defendant participated in the murder.

       Lincy Flores’s Trial Testimony and Phone Records

       Contrary to the majority’s contention, Lincy Flores’s trial testimony and phone records—

considered in the light most favorable to the defendant—do not corroborate Ortega’s testimony

that the defendant was present during the murder. Flores’s trial testimony includes conflicting

statements about the defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the murder. Flores testified that she

called Ortega around 1:00 a.m. looking for the defendant. According to this testimony, Flores

did not know the defendant’s whereabouts around the time of the murder, which occurred

between 11:26 p.m. and 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. However, Flores also testified that the defendant left

their apartment earlier that night and “it wasn’t so late” when he returned. Flores further testified

that after the defendant had returned to their apartment and “looked normal,” she “started calling

other people because [she and the defendant] were angry and [she] wanted to know where he

was” when he went out earlier without her. When Flores’s testimony is thus understood in the

light most favorable to the defendant—disregarding Flores’s conflicting testimony that she called

Ortega that night looking for the defendant—the cell phone records showing that Flores called

Ortega and Reyes Reyes after 1:00 a.m. do not corroborate Ortega’s testimony that the defendant

was with Ortega and Reyes Reyes at the time of the murder. The majority reaches the contrary

conclusion without considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant,

contrary to the applicable standard of review.

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                                         CONCLUSION

       Because Ortega’s testimony implicating the defendant in the murder—considered in the

light most favorable to the defendant—was uncorroborated, the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to give the jury the proposed cautionary instruction regarding uncorroborated

accomplice testimony. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate the

convictions, and remand for retrial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the judgment

affirming the defendant’s convictions.

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