Court Opinion

ID: 6414945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:55:27.666386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:30.594980
License: Public Domain

Chapman, J.
If this action can be maintained, it must be fa. the breach of the contract which the defendants made with the plaintiff. He had purchased a package of tickets entitling him to a passage in their cars for each ticket from Boston to Lynn. This constituted a contract between the parties. Cheney v. Boston & Fall River Railroad, 11 Met. 121. Boston & Lowell Railroad v. Proctor, 1 Allen, 267. Najac v. Boston Lowell Railroad, 7 Allen, 329. The principal question in this case is, what are the terms of the contract? The ticket does not express all of them. A public advertisement of the times when their trains run enters into the contract, and forms a part of it *437Denton v. Great Northern Railway, 5 El. & Bl. 860. It is an offer which, when once publicly made, becomes binding, if accepted before it is retracted. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 227. Advertisements offering rewards are illustrations of this method of making contracts. But it would be unreasonable to hold that advertisements as to the time of running trains, when once made, are irrevocable. Railroad corporations find it necessary to vary the time of running their trains, and they have a right, under reasonable limitations, to make this variation, even as against those who have purchased tickets. This reserved right enters into the contract, and forms a part of it. The defendants had such a right in this case.
But if the time is varied, and the train fails to go at the appointed time, for the mere convenience of the company or a portion of their expected passengers, a person who presents himself at the advertised hour, and demands a passage, is not bound by the change unless he has had reasonable notice of it. The defendants acted upon this view of their duty, and gave certain notices. Their trains had been advertised to go from Boston to Lynn at 9.30 p. m., and the plaintiff presented himself, with his ticket, at the station to take the train; but was there informed that it was postponed to 11.15. The postponement had been made for the accommodation of passengers who desired to remain in Boston to attend places of amusement. Certain notices of the change had been given; but none of them had reached the plaintiff. They were printed handbills posted up in the cars and stations on the day of the change, and also a day or two before. Though he rode in one of the morning cars from Lynn to Boston, he did not see the notice, and no legal presumption of notice to him arises from the fact of its being posted up. Brown v. Eastern Railroad, 11 Cush. 101. Malone v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 12 Gray, 388. The defendants published daily advertisements of their regular trains in the Boston Daily Advertiser, Post and Courier, and the plaintiff had obtained his information as to the time of running from one of these papers. If they had published a notice of the change in those papers, we think he would have been bound bv it. Foi *438as they had a right to make changes, he would be bound to take reasonable pains to inform himself whether or not a change was made. So if in their advertisement they had reserved the right to make occasional changes in the time of running a particular train, he would have been bound by the reservation. It would have bound all passengers who obtained their knowledge of the time-tables from either of these sources. But it would be contrary to the elementary law of contracts to hold that persons who relied upon the advertisements in either of those papers should be bound by a reservation of the offer, which was, without their knowledge, posted up in the cars and stations. If the defendants wished to free themselves from their obligations to the whole public to run a train as advertised, they should publish notice of the change as extensively as they published notice of the regular trains. And as to the plaintiff, he was not bound by a notice published in the cars and stations which he did not see. If it had been published in the newspapers above mentioned, where his information had in fact been obtained, and he had neglected to look for it, the fault would have been his own.
The evidence as to the former usage of the defendants to make occasional changes was immaterial, because the advertisement was an express stipulation which superseded all customs that were inconsistent with it. An express contract cannot be controlled or varied by usage. Ware v. Hayward Rubber Co. 3 Allen, 84.
The court are of opinion that the defendants, by failing to give such notice of the change made by them in the time of running their train on the evening referred to as the plaintiff was entitled to receive, violated their contract with hi.m, and are liable in this action. Judgment for the plaintiff.