Court Opinion

ID: 9377213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 13:03:07.119151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.663445
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
  STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. SHAILA M. CURET
                (SC 20521)
                 Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
                   Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                  Syllabus

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of posses-
   sion of narcotics with intent to sell, the defendant appealed to the
   Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had denied her
   motion to suppress certain evidence seized by the police following
   their warrantless entry into her apartment. Z, a police officer, had been
   dispatched to an apartment building in which the defendant resided in
   response to a 911 call from C, a resident of the building, reporting
   gunshots and an attempted burglary. C reported seeing a man in a
   hooded shirt exit a vehicle outside the building and then hearing an
   altercation and gunshots. C also reported that the man in the hooded
   shirt then exited the building’s front door and fled in the vehicle, that
   a second man exited the building’s back door and fled in a different
   vehicle, and that, after they had left, C found a knife with white paint
   chips on it in the building’s laundry room. When Z arrived, C gave Z
   the knife and recounted the incident. C stated to Z that he had seen the
   man in the hooded shirt enter the building, that he heard loud banging
   on the defendant’s door, and that an altercation then occurred in the
   hallway in front of the defendant’s apartment. According to C, the alterca-
   tion moved into the laundry room, which was a few feet away from the
   defendant’s apartment, before C heard gunshots and saw the man in
   the hooded shirt run out of the front door. Z then proceeded to investigate
   the building and, upon entering the laundry room, found, among other
   things, a spent shell casing, what appeared to be a bullet fragment
   embedded in a wall, a bullet hole in the molding around the laundry
   room’s back door, and a fresh, blood like stain on the wall next to it.
   In the apartment building hallway, Z observed footprints on the wall
   across from the defendant’s apartment, indicative of a struggle, white
   paint chips at the base of the defendant’s door, and fresh pry marks on
   the door and doorframe. C informed Z that two people lived in the
   defendant’s apartment and that he feared that one of them could have
   been involved in the altercation. C confirmed that the defendant’s car
   was in the building’s parking lot and expressed concern to Z that the
   defendant may be inside her apartment suffering from a gunshot or
   stab wound. Z then attempted to look inside the defendant’s apartment
   through a window, but the blinds were drawn, and he received no
   response when he knocked repeatedly on the defendant’s door. Con-
   cerned that someone inside might be injured, Z and his superior officer,
   without first obtaining a warrant, forced their way into the defendant’s
   apartment. Although no one was found in the apartment, Z observed,
   in plain view, various drug paraphernalia. At that point, the search was
   stopped, and the police obtained a search warrant. A subsequent search
   yielded, inter alia, narcotics. After a hearing on the defendant’s motion
   to suppress the narcotics seized from her apartment, the trial court
   denied the motion, concluding that the exigent circumstances and emer-
   gency aid doctrines justified the warrantless entry into the defendant’s
   apartment. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the Appellate
   Court reversed and remanded the case with direction to grant the defen-
   dant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the exigent circumstances
   doctrine was inapplicable because there was no basis on which a reason-
   able police officer would believe that probable cause justified entry into
   the defendant’s apartment and that the emergency aid doctrine was
   inapplicable because a reasonable police officer would not have believed
   that a medical emergency existed inside the apartment. On the granting
   of certification, the state appealed to this court.

Held that, although the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the exigent
   circumstances doctrine did not support the officers’ warrantless entry
   into the defendant’s apartment, it incorrectly concluded that the entry
   was not justified under the emergency aid doctrine, and, accordingly,
   this court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the
   case with direction to affirm the trial court’s judgment:

  The exigent circumstances doctrine applies exclusively to situations in
  which the police, acting in their crime fighting capacity, have probable
  cause to believe that a crime has been or is about to be committed and
  reasonably believe that, in the time it would take for them to obtain a
  warrant, the suspect would be able to destroy evidence, flee, or endanger
  the safety of others, whereas the emergency aid doctrine, which is rooted
  in the police’s community caretaking function, does not require that the
  police have probable cause to enter a home if their purpose in doing
  so is to render emergency assistance, provided there is an objectively
  reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or
  is imminently threatened with serious injury.

  The state did not claim that the police had probable cause to search the
  defendant’s apartment for evidence or to make an arrest but, instead,
  argued on appeal that the warrantless entry was for the purpose of
  rendering medical aid to someone inside the apartment injured in the
  altercation overheard by C, and, accordingly, the warrantless entry was
  not supported by the exigent circumstances doctrine.

  Although the police were acting in their crime control function when
  they arrived at the apartment building, it was apparent that, by the time
  they entered the defendant’s apartment, they were acting pursuant to
  their community caretaking function, as the police were responding to
  reports of gunshots and an attempted burglary, and, in addition to the
  inherent risk of violence that generally accompanies burglaries, there
  were numerous signs of violence, including bullet holes, shell casings,
  and signs of a struggle that would have heightened the officers’ concerns
  that someone may have been injured during the commission of the crimes
  in question, and, given the sequence of events reported by C, it was
  reasonable for the police officers to have believed that the person injured
  in the altercation was someone from the defendant’s apartment who
  either interrupted an attempted burglary, was the intended victim of the
  burglary, or had some other reason to engage in an argument that spilled
  out into the hallway outside of the defendant’s apartment and into the
  laundry room.

  In evaluating the constitutionality of the warrantless entry under the
  emergency aid doctrine, the Appellate Court should have applied the
  reasonable belief standard, which is applied by reference to the circum-
  stances then confronting the officers, including the need for prompt
  assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially
  serious consequences, and which questions whether the officers would
  have been derelict in their duty if they had acted otherwise.

  On the basis of the totality of the facts known to the police officers at
  the time of their entry, including the breaking and entering into the
  apartment building, the damage to and banging on the defendant’s apart-
  ment door, the altercation in the hallway in front of the defendant’s
  apartment, the gunshots, the blood stain, the knife, and the fact that,
  although the defendant’s car was in the parking lot, she did not respond
  to Z’s repeated knocking on her door, it was objectively reasonable for
  the officers to believe that someone inside the defendant’s apartment
  was in need of emergency medical assistance, that immediate entry into
  the apartment was necessary to protect life, and that a failure to take
  such action would constitute a dereliction of duty.
      Argued October 19, 2022—officially released March 7, 2023

                           Procedural History

  Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of possession of more than one-half ounce of cocaine
and operation of a drug factory, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, geographical
area number four, where the court, Cremins, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence;
thereafter, the state filed a substitute information charg-
ing the defendant with the crime of possession of nar-
cotics with intent to sell; subsequently, the defendant
was presented to the court, Fasano, J., on a conditional
plea of nolo contendere to the charge of possession
of narcotics with intent to sell; judgment of guilty in
accordance with the plea, from which the defendant
appealed to the Appellate Court, Devlin and Bear, Js.,
with Prescott, J., dissenting, which reversed the trial
court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction
to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress and to render
judgment dismissing the charge of possession of narcot-
ics with intent to sell, and the state, on the granting of
certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judg-
ment directed.
   Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s
attorney, and Amy Sedensky, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellant (state).
  Emily H. Wagner, assistant public defender, for the
appellee (defendant).
                         Opinion

   ALEXANDER, J. The state appeals1 from the judg-
ment of the Appellate Court reversing the conviction
of the defendant, Shaila M. Curet, following her condi-
tional plea of nolo contendere to the charge of posses-
sion of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 21a-277 (a).2 On appeal,
the state claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly
determined that the defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence seized by the police following a warrantless
entry into her apartment should have been granted. We
agree and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.
   The following facts were either found by the trial
court or are undisputed. On June 22, 2015, at approxi-
mately 3:26 p.m., Anthony Cruz telephoned the Water-
bury police to report gunshots on the first floor of his
apartment building at 130 Woodglen Drive in Water-
bury. Cruz, who lived on the second floor of the build-
ing, told the 911 operator that, just before he heard the
gunshots, he saw a white Kia pull up in front of the
building and a Hispanic male wearing a light blue hoodie
exit the vehicle. Cruz stated that ‘‘there must have been
an altercation because we heard banging and stuff.’’
Cruz further stated that, after the altercation, the man
in the hoodie ran out of the front door of the building
and jumped into the Kia, while a second man ran out
the back door and got into a different vehicle. Both
vehicles then sped away. Cruz told the operator that,
when he and his friend went downstairs to investigate,
they found a knife with white paint on it on the laundry
room floor. They also saw white paint chips on the
hallway floor in front of the defendant’s apartment.
Cruz informed the operator that it appeared that the
man in the hoodie had used the knife to break into
the building and then used it to try to break into the
defendant’s apartment. Specifically, Cruz stated: ‘‘[Y]ou
can see the door that he tried to [enter] because I don’t
think these people are home. And you could see the
door . . . the paint’s all over and the knife’s got white
paint on it.’’3
   Waterbury Police Officer Raim Zulali was dispatched
to the scene at approximately 3:55 p.m. The information
he was provided enroute to the call, which was displayed
on a computer screen in his police vehicle, stated: ‘‘HM
LSW LIGHT BLUE HOODIE TRIED TO BREAK INTO
SOMEONE ELSES HOUSE AND THERE WAS [A LOT]
OF NOISE COMING FROM LAUNDRY ROOM AND AN
ALTERCATION WITH ANOTHER MALE BOTH PAR-
TIES FLED // COMP[LAINANT] FOUNDKNIFE THAT
[HM] GOT INTO THE BLDG WITH.’’
  When Zulali arrived at the scene, Cruz let him into
the building, gave him the knife he had found in the
laundry room, and told him about the man in the blue
hoodie. Cruz informed Zulali that, as the man approached
the building, he pulled his cap down over his eyes and
his hood over his head as if trying to conceal his identity.
After the man entered the building, Cruz heard loud
banging on the door to the defendant’s apartment, after
which an altercation broke out in the hallway in front
of the defendant’s apartment. Cruz informed Zulali that
the altercation then moved into the laundry room,
which was right below Cruz’ apartment and just a few
feet away from the defendant’s apartment. During the
altercation, Cruz heard what he believed to be two
gunshots. Cruz informed Zulali that, after hearing the
gunshots, he saw the man in the hoodie run out of the
front door of the building and drive away in the white
Kia. At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to sup-
press, Cruz clarified that, although he told the 911 opera-
tor that a second man had fled through the back door,
he did not personally see that man. Cruz stated that
someone he was with told him about the second man.4
   While walking through the building, Zulali observed
that the laundry room was in disarray, with the washing
machines and dryers pushed out of place. The laundry
room had two entrances, one facing the front of the
building and one facing the back. On the floor near the
back entrance, Zulali found a spent shell casing and a
single flip-flop. He later found the matching flip-flop
in the parking lot behind the building, near the back
entrance. Zulali also observed a mark on the laundry
room floor and what he believed to be a bullet fragment
embedded in a wall. On the basis of his training and
experience, Zulali believed that a bullet had ricocheted
off the floor and hit the wall. Zulali observed a second
bullet hole in the molding around the back laundry
room door and a fresh, one-half centimeter, blood like
stain on the wall next to it.
  Moving from the laundry room into the back hallway,
Zulali noticed footprints on the wall across from the
defendant’s apartment, suggestive of a struggle, and
white paint chips at the base of the defendant’s door.
He also observed what appeared to be fresh pry marks
on the defendant’s door and in the doorjamb. Cruz
informed Zulali that a man and woman lived in the
defendant’s apartment and that he feared that one of
them could have been involved in the altercation. Zulali
asked Cruz whether the couple’s car was in the parking
lot. Cruz looked outside and saw that it was, at which
point he and Zulali exited the building to look at the car.
While outside, Zulali tried to see inside the defendant’s
apartment, but the blinds were drawn. Because Cruz’
apartment faces the front of the building, he was
unaware when he called 911 that the defendant’s car
was in the parking lot behind the building. Upon seeing
the car and recalling the altercation and gunshots, Cruz
expressed concern to Zulali that the defendant could
be ‘‘laying on her floor in her kitchen’’ suffering from
a gunshot or stab wound.
  At this point, Zulali called for backup. Officer Michael
Gerrity was the first officer to respond to the scene.
At Zulali’s request, Gerrity asked the police dispatcher
to contact area hospitals to determine if anyone had
sought treatment for a gunshot or stab wound. While
Gerrity secured the crime scene, Zulali canvassed the
building to determine if everyone was okay and if any-
one had seen or heard anything. Zulali managed to
speak with all the building’s residents except the occu-
pants of the defendant’s apartment, who did not respond
to his repeated knocking. Most of the people Zulali
spoke with seemed nervous and reluctant to share any
information beyond assuring him that they were fine.
   Concerned that someone inside the defendant’s apart-
ment had been injured in the altercation, Zulali tried
to enter the apartment, but the door was locked. He
then decided to force his way into the apartment. Before
doing so, he called his superior officer, Sergeant Gae-
tano Tiso, to explain the situation to him. Tiso told him
to wait until he got there before entering the apartment.
When Tiso arrived a few minutes later, Zulali once again
apprised him of the situation, the evidence he had dis-
covered in the laundry room, and his concerns about
the couple residing in the defendant’s apartment. The
decision was then made to enter the apartment using
a battering ram that Tiso kept in his police vehicle.
When the door was breached, it triggered the defen-
dant’s security alarm.
   ‘‘After a search of the defendant’s apartment, it was
determined that no one was in the one bedroom apart-
ment. While searching the apartment, Zulali observed
in plain view two scales covered in white residue, clear
plastic bags, and a safe in the closet. At this point, the
search stopped, and a search warrant was sought for
the items that were in plain view.
   ‘‘When the police executed the search warrant, they
seized a total of approximately 186 small plastic bags
containing cocaine weighing 123.5 grams, 2 plastic bags
containing cocaine weighing 43.8 grams, and $41,720
in cash. The defendant was arrested and charged with
possession of more than one-half ounce of cocaine in
violation of General Statutes [Rev. to 2015] § 21a-278
(a) and operation of a drug factory in violation of § 21a-
277 (c).’’ State v. Curet, 200 Conn. App. 13, 20, 244 A.3d
927 (2020).
  The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized from her apartment on the ground that the initial
warrantless entry was not justified by any exception to
the warrant requirement. The state opposed the motion,
arguing that the exigent circumstances and emergency
aid doctrines supported the warrantless entry because
the police had probable cause to believe that someone
inside the defendant’s apartment was involved in a vio-
lent altercation during an attempted burglary. The state
further argued that, given the totality of facts known
to the officers at the time of entry, it was reasonable for
them to believe that a victim was inside the defendant’s
apartment suffering from a stab or gunshot wound.
  The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to sup-
press in an oral decision. The court agreed with the
state that the exigent circumstances and emergency
aid doctrines supported the warrantless entry because,
based on the totality of facts known to the officers at
the time of entry, it was objectively reasonable for them
to believe that someone inside the defendant’s apart-
ment had been shot or stabbed in an attempted burglary
of the defendant’s apartment.
   The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
claiming that the trial court incorrectly had determined
that the exigent circumstances and emergency aid doc-
trines supported the warrantless search of her apart-
ment. Id., 16. In a divided opinion, the Appellate Court
agreed with the defendant and reversed her conviction.
Id. The Appellate Court concluded that the exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine was inapplicable because ‘‘there
was no basis on which a reasonable officer would
believe that probable cause justified entry [into the
defendant’s apartment] in pursuit of a suspect . . . .’’5
Id., 28. It also concluded that the emergency aid doc-
trine was inapplicable because a reasonable officer
would not have believed that a medical emergency
existed inside the apartment. Id., 31. In so concluding,
the Appellate Court examined all the evidence the trial
court had relied on in reaching a contrary conclusion
and determined that none of it supported an objectively
reasonable belief that someone from the defendant’s
apartment was involved in the altercation overheard by
Cruz. See id., 31–32. The Appellate Court reasoned that,
‘‘although Cruz observed [two] individuals enter the
building, there was no witness . . . who observed
either individual enter the defendant’s apartment; nor
did a witness observe anyone emerge from the defen-
dant’s apartment to engage in the altercation. . . .
Moreover, Zulali received information that two individ-
uals had entered the building, engaged in an altercation,
and then fled from the building in separate vehicles.
Zulali was unaware of any evidence that a third party
was involved in the altercation and remained in the
building or was . . . in the defendant’s apartment.’’
Id., 33–34.
    With respect to the blood stain, bullet holes, and shell
casing recovered from the laundry room, the Appellate
Court reasoned that, ‘‘[although] a reasonable officer
. . . might likely conclude that there was an altercation
in the laundry room and someone might have been
injured in the laundry room as a result of the alterca-
tion,’’ there was no evidence that, after the altercation,
‘‘[the] injured person . . . retreated to the defendant’s
apartment’’ in ‘‘a separate area of the building . . . .’’
(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 35. ‘‘The most reasonable inter-
pretation of the facts,’’ the court concluded, ‘‘is that
two men, after entering the building, unsuccessfully
attempted to enter the defendant’s apartment [and then
fled].’’ Id., 40 n.6.
  In reaching its decision, the Appellate Court distin-
guished three cases in which this court upheld a war-
rantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine. Id.,
33–39; see State v. DeMarco, 311 Conn. 510, 538–40, 88
A.3d 491 (2014); State v. Fausel, 295 Conn. 785, 797–802,
993 A.2d 455 (2010); State v. Blades, 225 Conn. 609, 621,
626 A.2d 273 (1993). The Appellate Court interpreted
these cases as requiring ‘‘substantial evidence . . .
clearly demonstrating that someone was in danger of
losing life or limb’’; State v. Curet, supra, 200 Conn.
App. 39; before a warrantless entry may be conducted
pursuant to the emergency aid doctrine—evidence the
Appellate Court found to be lacking in this case. Id., 39–
40.
   Judge Prescott dissented from the Appellate Court’s
opinion. He concluded that the clear and substantial
evidence standard applied by the majority was not the
correct legal standard for evaluating the constitutional-
ity of a warrantless entry under the emergency aid doc-
trine. Id., 53 (Prescott, J., dissenting). Contrary to the
position taken by the majority, Judge Prescott observed,
among other things, that the emergency aid doctrine
does not require that an officer’s belief concerning the
existence of an emergency be the ‘‘most reasonable
interpretation’’ of the evidence, only that it be an objec-
tively reasonable interpretation. (Emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 53 and n.12 (Prescott,
J., dissenting). Applying this standard, Judge Prescott
concluded that Zulali’s belief that someone inside the
defendant’s apartment might have been in need of medi-
cal assistance was as reasonable as the interpretation
advanced by the majority, namely, that two men entered
the building, unsuccessfully attempted to enter the
defendant’s apartment, fought one another in the hall-
way, and then fled in separate vehicles. See id., 49–50
(Prescott, J., dissenting); see also id., 28–29. Judge Pres-
cott noted that ‘‘Cruz was only an earwitness and never
directly observed the altercation. Thus, the mere fact
that, after the altercation ended, he saw two men fleeing
the scene did not necessarily mean that there were only
two persons present during the relevant events. Given
the fact that Cruz heard loud banging on the defendant’s
apartment door immediately preceding the altercation,
it [was] not unreasonable to infer that the altercation
involved someone in the defendant’s apartment who
either interrupted an attempted burglary, was the
intended victim of the burglary, or had some other rea-
son to engage in an argument that spilled out into the
hallway and into the laundry room.’’ Id., 49 (Prescott,
J., dissenting).
   Judge Prescott also disagreed with the majority that
there was insufficient evidence connecting the defen-
dant’s apartment to the altercation in the laundry room.
In his view, the officers reasonably could have con-
cluded that ‘‘any party injured during the altercation
could have fled from the laundry room back into the
defendant’s apartment, locking the door behind him or
her. The pry marks on the doorframe of the defendant’s
apartment door and the paint chips further link the
defendant’s apartment to the altercation, either because
the altercation began as a result of a break-in or an
attempted break-in or because someone attempted to
pursue a fleeing victim. In short, under the totality of
the circumstances, it [was objectively] reasonable for
officers to [believe] that someone shot, stabbed, or oth-
erwise injured during the altercation could have sought
refuge in the defendant’s apartment and might be in
need of medical attention. The fact that no one answered
the door could have meant that the injured party had
lost consciousness, making the need for an emergency
warrantless entry that much more compelling.’’6 Id., 50–51
(Prescott, J., dissenting).
   On appeal, following our grant of certification, the
state challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusion that
the exigent circumstances and emergency aid excep-
tions to the warrant requirement did not support the
warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment. The
state contends that the Appellate Court, in reaching its
conclusion, applied an incorrect legal standard, ignored
the totality of the trial court’s factual findings, and relied
on numerous ‘‘factual inaccuracies . . . .’’ According
to the state, the factual inaccuracies on which the
Appellate Court relied include: (1) ‘‘Zulali received
information that two individuals had entered the build-
ing, engaged in an altercation, and then fled from the
building in separate vehicles’’; State v. Curet, supra, 200
Conn. App. 34; (2) ‘‘Cruz observed [two] individuals
enter the building’’; id., 33; and (3) the defendant’s apart-
ment was in a ‘‘separate area of the building’’ from the
laundry room. Id., 35.
  The defendant disputes the state’s assertion that the
Appellate Court misapplied the law, ignored the trial
court’s factual findings, or based its decision on factual
errors. The defendant argues that the Appellate Court
simply recognized that the trial court’s factual findings
were ‘‘antithetical’’ to its legal determination that the
warrantless entry was justified under the exigent cir-
cumstances and emergency aid doctrines. For the rea-
sons set forth hereinafter, we agree with the Appellate
Court that the exigent circumstances doctrine did not
support the warrantless entry into the defendant’s apart-
ment. We disagree, however, that the entry was not
supported by the emergency aid doctrine.7
   The fourth amendment to the United States constitu-
tion provides that ‘‘[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.’’ U.S. Const., amend. IV.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that
‘‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable.’’ Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639
(1980). It is equally well settled that ‘‘the police may
not enter the home without a warrant or consent, unless
one of the [three] established exceptions to the warrant
requirement is met. Indeed, [p]hysical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth
amendment is directed.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Ryder, 301 Conn. 810, 821, 23 A.3d
694 (2011). ‘‘The exigent circumstances doctrine is one
of [the] three exceptions to the warrant requirement
that are triggered by the need for swift action by the
police. All three exceptions, the exigent circumstances
doctrine, the protective sweep doctrine and the emer-
gency [aid] doctrine, must be supported by a reasonable
belief that immediate action was necessary.’’ State v.
Kendrick, 314 Conn. 212, 225, 100 A.3d 821 (2014).
   The test for determining when exigent circumstances
justify a warrantless search or seizure is ‘‘whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the police had
reasonable grounds to believe that if an immediate
arrest [or entry] were not made, the accused would
be able to destroy evidence, flee or otherwise avoid
capture, or might, during the time necessary to procure
a warrant, endanger the safety or property of others.
This is an objective test; its preeminent criterion is what
a reasonable, [well trained] police officer would believe,
not what the . . . officer actually did believe. . . . Put
simply, given probable cause to arrest or search, exigent
circumstances exist when, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the officer reasonably believed that imme-
diate action was necessary to protect the safety of those
present, or to prevent the flight of a suspect, or the
destruction of evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 227–28.
   By contrast, ‘‘[t]he emergency [aid] exception to the
warrant requirement allows [the] police to enter a home
without a warrant when they have an objectively rea-
sonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously
injured or imminently threatened with such injury. . . .
The need to protect or preserve life or [to] avoid serious
injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal
absent an exigency or emergency. . . . As a result, the
use of the emergency [aid] doctrine evolves outside the
context of a criminal investigation and does not involve
probable cause as a prerequisite for the making of an
arrest or the search for and seizure of evidence. . . .
[United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir.)
([t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an
emergency without the accompanying intent to either
search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their
duties as peace officers, and derives from the common
law), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004, 84 S. Ct. 1940, 12 L.
Ed. 2d 1053 (1964)]. Nevertheless, the emergency [aid]
doctrine does not give the state an unrestricted invita-
tion to enter the home. [G]iven the rationale for this
very limited exception, the state actors making the
search must have reason to believe that life or limb is in
immediate jeopardy and that the intrusion is reasonably
necessary to alleviate the threat. . . . The police, in
order to avail themselves of this exception, must have
valid reasons for the belief that an emergency exists,
a belief that must be grounded in empirical facts rather
than subjective feelings . . . . It is an objective and
not a subjective test. The test is not whether the officers
actually believed that an emergency existed, but whether
a reasonable officer would have believed that such an
emergency existed.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Fausel, supra, 295 Conn.
794–95.
   Any search conducted pursuant to the exigent cir-
cumstances or emergency aid exceptions must be ‘‘strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies’’ that justified it. (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978). The
state bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless
entry falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., State v. Samuolis, 344 Conn. 200,
214, 278 A.3d 1027 (2022).
   Applying these principles, we agree with the Appel-
late Court that the warrantless entry was not supported
by the exigent circumstances doctrine because the police
lacked probable cause to search the defendant’s apart-
ment for evidence or to make an arrest. Probable cause
is required under the exigent circumstances doctrine
because this exception applies exclusively to situations
in which the police, acting in their crime fighting capac-
ity, have probable cause to believe that a crime has
been or is about to be committed and reasonably believe
that, in the time it would take for them to obtain a
warrant, the suspect would be able to destroy evidence,
flee, or endanger the safety of others. See, e.g., State
v. Kendrick, supra, 314 Conn. 227–28. Indeed, the state
does not claim otherwise. Rather, the state consistently
has argued on appeal—first in the Appellate Court and
now before this court—that the warrantless entry in
the present case was justified for purposes of rendering
medical aid to someone inside the defendant’s apart-
ment injured in the altercation overheard by Cruz.8 The
United States Supreme Court has explained that, if the
officers’ purpose in entering a home is to render emer-
gency assistance, then they need not have probable
cause to enter the home. See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher,
558 U.S. 45, 47, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009)
(emergency aid doctrine ‘‘requires only an objectively
reasonable basis for believing . . . that a person within
[the house] is in need of immediate aid’’ (citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted)). This is so
because the ‘‘emergency aid doctrine has its roots in
the police’s caretaking function, as opposed to its law
enforcement function . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) State
v. Samuolis, supra, 344 Conn. 215.
   We recognize that ‘‘it is not always a simple matter
to delineate precisely pursuant to which function [the]
police are acting in carrying out a particular search or
seizure. In fact, we expressly have acknowledged . . .
[that the] [p]olice often operate in the gray area between
their community caretaking function and their function
as criminal investigators. Often there is no bright line
separating the one from the other . . . . In many
instances, however, it is possible to discern whether the
police are acting in their crime control or investigative
functions, or instead are acting pursuant to their com-
munity caretaking function.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendrick, supra, 314
Conn. 233. This is one such instance.
   Although there can be no doubt that the police were
acting in their crime control function when they arrived
at the building, it is equally apparent that, by the time
they entered the defendant’s apartment, they were act-
ing pursuant to their caretaking role. This transition—
from crime solving to caretaking—is a common one and
is to be expected given the myriad situations officers
confront when responding to a call and the ‘‘complex
and multiple tasks’’ they are expected to perform when
they do. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Fausel, supra, 295 Conn. 800–801. Because the police
were acting in their caretaking role, the only issue is
whether it was objectively reasonable for them to
believe that someone inside the apartment was in need
of emergency medical assistance. On the basis of the
totality of facts known to the officers at the time of
entry, we conclude that it was.
   To begin with, the police were responding to reports
of gunshots and an attempted burglary. In Fausel, this
court held that ‘‘there are an infinite variety of situations
in which entry for the purpose of rendering aid is rea-
sonable. Included are those in which entry is made
. . . to seek possible victims of violence in premises
apparently burglarized recently . . . . 3 W. LaFave,
Search and Seizure (4th Ed. 2004) § 6.6 (a), pp. 459–61.
The rationale is that burglary is a crime of violence and
bystanders are likely to be injured by the perpetrator.
See State v. Amado, 254 Conn. 184, 201, 756 A.2d 274
(2000) (crimes against the person like . . . burglary
are, in common experience, likely to involve danger to
life in the event of resistance by the victim . . .).’’
(Emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Fausel, supra, 295 Conn.
798–99; see also United States v. Cooks, 920 F.3d 735,
745 (11th Cir.) (‘‘[i]nherent in a residential burglary is
the risk that the homeowner will catch the perp[etrator]
in the act and wind up a victim’’), cert. denied,         U.S.
     , 140 S. Ct. 218, 205 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2019); Montanez
v. Carvajal, 889 F.3d 1202, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2018)
(‘‘[B]ecause the [f]ourth [a]mendment has to be applied
on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, the object
in implementing its command of reasonableness is to
draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to [apply]
. . . . Our holding—pursuant to which the burglary
itself creates (or more accurately is) the exigency that
justifies a limited warrantless entry to search for . . .
victims—provides [the] police, citizens, and reviewing
courts the sort of readily administrable standard that
the [United States] Supreme Court has deemed essential
in the [f]ourth [a]mendment context.’’ (Citation omitted;
emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.));
Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., 756
F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (for purposes of emer-
gency aid doctrine, ‘‘burglary and attempted burglary
are considered to carry an inherent risk of violence’’),
cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1153, 135 S. Ct. 1401, 191 L. Ed.
2d 360 (2015); United States v. Castillo, 48 Fed. Appx.
611, 613 (9th Cir. 2002) (‘‘[t]he officers’ initial entry into
the apartment and search of the apartment . . . for a
victim . . . were lawful under the emergency [aid]
exception to the warrant requirement because the offi-
cers had received a burglary call, and upon arriving at
the apartment, observed signs of a burglary’’); State v.
Woods, 136 N.C. App. 386, 391, 524 S.E.2d 363 (‘‘[s]tate
and federal courts . . . generally agree that [when] an
officer reasonably believes that a burglary is in progress
or has been recently committed, a warrantless entry of
a private residence to ascertain whether . . . there are
people in need of assistance does not offend the [f]ourth
[a]mendment’’), review denied, 351 N.C. 370, 543 S.E.2d
147 (2000).
   Second, apart from the inherent risk of violence that
accompanies every burglary, in the present case, there
were numerous extrinsic signs of violence—bullet
holes, shell casings, and obvious signs of a struggle in
the hallway. This type of evidence would have only
heightened the officers’ concerns that someone may
have been injured during the commission of the crimes
in question. As Judge Prescott aptly observed, given
the sequence of events reported by Cruz, which began
with banging on the defendant’s door, it was reasonable
for the officers to believe that the person injured in the
altercation was someone from the defendant’s apart-
ment ‘‘who either interrupted an attempted burglary,
was the intended victim of the burglary, or had some
other reason to engage in an argument that spilled out
into the hallway and into the laundry room.’’ State v.
Curet, supra, 200 Conn. App. 49 (Prescott, J., dissenting).
Courts routinely have upheld warrantless entries under
comparable circumstances. See, e.g., United States v.
Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 784–85 (6th Cir. 2006) (officers
responding to reports of gunshots at residence, who
subsequently observed bullet holes in home’s exterior
and received no response after knocking on door, law-
fully entered home under emergency aid doctrine to
ensure nobody inside was injured), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 1299, 127 S. Ct. 1863, 167 L. Ed. 2d 353 (2007);
United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1332–33, 1338
(11th Cir. 2002) (When 911 caller reported gunshots and
loud arguing, and shotgun casings were found outside
home, ‘‘the officers reasonably believed an emergency
situation justified a warrantless search of [the defen-
dant’s] home for victims of gunfire. The possibility of
a gunshot victim lying prostrate in the dwelling created
an exigency necessitating immediate search.’’), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1161, 123 S. Ct. 966, 145 L. Ed. 2d 897
(2003); People v. Lomax, 975 N.E.2d 115, 125 (Ill. App.)
(when police received multiple 911 calls complaining
that gunshots had been fired in apartment and one call
specified that shots had come from first floor rear unit,
‘‘[a]lthough the police had no specific details about the
identity or appearance of either the shooter or any
potential victim, the probability that someone had been
shot was sufficient to create a reasonable belief that
an emergency existed’’), appeal denied, 981 N.E.2d 1001
(Ill. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 935, 133 S. Ct. 1835,
185 L. Ed. 2d 844 (2013).
   In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Appellate
Court reasoned that there was insufficient evidence
connecting the altercation in the laundry room to the
defendant’s apartment, and, therefore, it was not objec-
tively reasonable for the officers to believe that some-
one from the defendant’s apartment was injured in that
altercation. See State v. Curet, supra, 200 Conn. App.
28–29, 35. As the state argues, however, underpinning
the Appellate Court’s analysis were three factual inaccu-
racies: (1) the defendant’s apartment was in a ‘‘separate
area of the building’’ from the laundry room; id., 35; (2)
‘‘Zulali received information that two individuals had
entered the building, engaged in an altercation, and
then fled from the building in separate vehicles’’; id.,
34; and (3) ‘‘Cruz observed [two] individuals enter the
building . . . .’’ Id., 33. On the basis of this information,
the Appellate Court determined that it was unreason-
able for Zulali to believe that anyone other than the
two individuals observed by Cruz were involved in the
altercation. See id., 34–35. The information the Appel-
late Court is referring to is the information Zulali
received from the police dispatcher while en route to
the scene. See id., 34. As the state argues, however, the
dispatcher did not state that two individuals had entered
the building. The dispatcher stated that one individual
had attempted to break into an apartment, that an alter-
cation ensued, and that, afterward, two persons were
seen fleeing the building. Furthermore, at the hearing
on the motion to suppress, the trial court asked Cruz
whether he personally had seen two men entering or
exiting the building. Cruz responded that he had seen
only one man, the man in the Kia, but ‘‘was told by
somebody else’’ that a second man had left following
the gunshots. Thus, contrary to the reasoning of the
Appellate Court, Zulali was not informed that two indi-
viduals had entered the building, engaged in an alterca-
tion, and then fled in separate vehicles; nor did the trial
court make any such findings.9 The trial court found,
rather, that, after the man in the Kia entered the build-
ing, Cruz heard pounding on the defendant’s door fol-
lowed by a fight in the hallway in front of the defendant’s
door. The trial court further found that the fight eventu-
ally spilled over into the laundry room, which, contrary
to the assertion of the Appellate Court, was located
‘‘just a few feet away’’ from the defendant’s apartment,
not in a separate area of the building.10 On the basis of
this and other evidence, the trial court concluded that
it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe
that someone from the defendant’s apartment may have
been injured during the altercation, ‘‘possibl[y] due to
a shooting or a stabbing, and would be in need of imme-
diate . . . medical attention.’’
   Even if there was evidence to support the Appellate
Court’s theory ‘‘that two men, after entering the build-
ing, unsuccessfully attempted to enter the defendant’s
apartment’’; State v. Curet, supra, 200 Conn. App. 40
n.6; it would not change our view of the reasonableness
of the officers’ belief that someone from the defendant’s
apartment was involved in the altercation. This is so
because the Appellate Court’s analysis does not account
for the fact that the altercation was preceded by loud
knocking on the defendant’s door and began in the
hallway in front of the defendant’s apartment. If the two
men who entered the building were acting in concert,
as the Appellate Court’s analysis at times would seem
to suggest, and no one from the defendant’s apartment
was involved in the altercation, then who were the two
men shooting at in the laundry room? We agree with
Judge Prescott that an objectively reasonable interpre-
tation of the evidence is that the two men were fighting
with someone from the defendant’s apartment after the
defendant’s door was opened—either forcibly by the
intruders or voluntarily by someone inside the apart-
ment in response to the loud knocking. See id., 49 (Pres-
cott, J., dissenting). Furthermore, because there was
evidence that the intruders were carrying a firearm and
a knife, it was reasonable for the officers to believe that,
once the door was opened, anyone inside the apartment
was at immediate risk of serious bodily injury.
   We further agree with Judge Prescott that the quan-
tum of evidence the Appellate Court required to justify
a warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine—
namely, ‘‘substantial evidence . . . clearly demonstra-
ting that someone was in danger of losing life or limb’’;
id., 39; or ‘‘clearly demonstrat[ing] that there was a
victim or bystander . . . injured [in the altercation]’’;
id., 34;—is not supported by the case law. See id., 53
and n.11 (Prescott, J., dissenting). If this were the stan-
dard, then the police would never be permitted to enter
a home without a warrant following a burglary. It is
not the standard. ‘‘Officers do not need ironclad proof
of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the
emergency aid exception,’’ they need ‘‘an objectively
reasonable basis for believing’’ that such emergency
assistance is required. (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Michigan v. Fisher, supra, 558 U.S. 49; see also
State v. Fausel, supra, 295 Conn. 800 (‘‘we do not read
[prior case law] to require direct evidence of an emer-
gency situation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The reasonable belief standard ‘‘is a less exacting
standard than probable cause’’;11 United States v. Que-
zada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); and ‘‘must be
applied by reference to the circumstances then con-
fronting the officer, including the need for prompt
assessment of sometimes ambiguous information con-
cerning potentially serious consequences. As one court
usefully put it, the question is whether the officers
would have been derelict in their duty had they acted
otherwise. This means, of course, that it is of no moment
that it turns out there was in fact no emergency. . . .
3 W. LaFave, [Search and Seizure (6th Ed. 2020)] § 6.6
(a), pp. 629–31; see also . . . United States v. Cooks,
[supra, 920 F.3d 743] (we must be mindful that the
police must act quickly, based on hurried and incom-
plete information . . .) . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Samuolis, supra,
344 Conn. 227–28; see id., 227 (‘‘[i]t defies common
sense to conclude that, if there is any plausible, non-
emergency explanation for the facts presented, no entry
can be made until there is definitive proof that a person
is present who is in need of emergency aid’’); see also
Sutterfield v. Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 559 (7th Cir.)
(‘‘[w]hen [the] police are acting in a swiftly developing
situation . . . a court must not indulge in unrealistic
second-guessing’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 574 U.S. 933, 135 S. Ct. 478, 190 L. Ed. 2d
362 (2014); State v. Ortiz, 95 Conn. App. 69, 83, 895
A.2d 834 (‘‘[t]he fact that a person in need of assistance
was not present in the apartment does not in any way
detract from the objectively reasonable interpretation
of the facts that were before the police officers in their
haste to render whatever assistance was necessary’’),
cert. denied, 280 Conn. 903, 907 A.2d 94 (2006).
  Applying this standard, we conclude that the totality
of facts known to the officers supported an objectively
reasonable belief that someone inside the defendant’s
apartment was in need of emergency medical aid. The
facts known to the officers included the breaking and
entering into the building, the damage to the defendant’s
apartment door, the banging on the defendant’s door,
the fight that broke out in front of the defendant’s apart-
ment, the gunshots, the blood stain, the knife, and the
fact that, although the defendant’s car was in the park-
ing lot, she did not respond to the officers’ repeated
knocking on her door. With respect to this final fact,
Cruz testified that, when he realized the defendant’s
car was in the parking lot, he informed Zulali of his
growing concern for the defendant’s welfare. We agree
with the state that Zulali reasonably could have inferred
from this that Cruz, a resident of the building, was suffi-
ciently familiar with the defendant’s comings and goings
to associate the presence of her car with her being at
home, thereby heightening the overall sense of urgency.
In such circumstances, and taking into account all the
other facts known to the officers, it was reasonable for
the officers to believe that immediate entry into the
defendant’s apartment was necessary to protect life and
that a failure to take such action would constitute a
dereliction of duty.12 For all of these reasons, we cannot
agree with the Appellate Court that the emergency aid
doctrine did not support the warrantless entry into the
defendant’s apartment.
   The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court with direction to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the
warrantless entry by the police into the defendant’s apartment was not
justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine or the emergency [aid]
doctrine?’’ State v. Curet, 335 Conn. 969, 240 A.3d 287 (2020).
   2
     Hereinafter, all references to § 21a-277 are to the 2015 revision of the stat-
ute.
   3
     An audio recording of Cruz’ 911 call was entered into evidence at the
hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress and played for the trial court.
A written transcript of the call was also entered into evidence. It provides
in relevant part:
   ‘‘[Cruz]: Hi operator. Operator, I’m up on 130 [Woodglen] Drive, Unit A.
It has nothing to do with me, but we just almost caught someone trying
to break into someone’s apartment. We believe there was an altercation
downstairs in the laundry room. We heard what we thought were shots. I
have a knife here that they tried to work the door with. I have not touched
it. I, you know, it was at the bottom of the door. And I seen this guy come
in . . . a white Kia and, you know, [long sleeve] shirt—
   ‘‘[The Operator]: Black, White or Hispanic?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: I’m sorry, ma’am?
   ‘‘[The Operator]: What race was he?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: Um, Latino.
   ‘‘[The Operator]: Hispanic male. And what did he have on?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: It was like a powder blue, you know, like a light blue, powder
blue hoodie. And it was kind of [silky like] looking—
   ‘‘[The Operator]: So, a light blue hoodie?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: Yes. But he left his hat here, so there must have been an altercation
because we heard banging and stuff. I didn’t know what it was at first. So—
   ‘‘[The Operator]: So, he tried to break in?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: He tried to break into someone else’s house, ma’am. And, you
know, when we went downstairs, we could hear something going on in the
laundry room, then one ran out and jumped in the car, and another one
came out from the back and jumped in another car, and they took off. But
you can see the door that he tried to—because I don’t think these people
are home. And you could see the door there’s been—the paint’s all over,
and the knife’s got white paint on it. So, he holds this knife, this is how he
got into the building. I seen him walk in, but I thought he was with somebody
. . . from the building because we got all kinds of crap going on—
   ‘‘[The Operator]: So, he fled in a white Kia?
   ‘‘[Cruz]: Yes, ma’am. . . .
   ‘‘[The Operator]: All right. We’ll get someone over there.’’
   4
     At the hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court
pressed Cruz on whether he had seen two men exit the building on the day
in question. Cruz responded that he had personally saw only one man, the
man in the white Kia, enter and exit the building. Cruz explained that he
had been told by a person he was with that a second man fled through the
back door after the altercation. Although Cruz did not identify the person
who had told him this, we assume it was the person Cruz referenced in his
911 call, when he told the operator, ‘‘[w]e believe there was an altercation
downstairs in the laundry room. We heard what we thought were shots.’’
(Emphasis added.) See footnote 3 of this opinion.
   5
     The Appellate Court noted that, in evaluating the applicability of the
exigent circumstances doctrine, the trial court had failed to address an
essential component of that doctrine—namely, whether the police had prob-
able cause to search the defendant’s apartment. State v. Curet, supra, 200
Conn. App. 26 n.5; see also State v. Kendrick, 314 Conn. 212, 231, 100 A.3d
821 (2014) (‘‘[a]lthough the exigent circumstances doctrine allows the police
to act [on] their reasonable belief that immediate action is necessary to
protect the safety of those present, or to prevent the flight of a suspect or
the destruction of evidence, the police must have had probable cause for
an arrest or search at the outset’’ (emphasis omitted)).
   6
     Because Judge Prescott concluded that the officers’ warrantless entry
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine, he did not reach the issue
of whether the police had probable cause to enter the apartment under the
exigent circumstances doctrine. See State v. Curet, supra, 200 Conn. App.
40 n.1 (Prescott, J., dissenting).
   7
     ‘‘As a general matter, the standard of review for a motion to suppress
is well settled. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly
erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . .
[W]hen a question of fact is essential to the outcome of a particular legal
determination that implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, [however]
and the credibility of witnesses is not the primary issue, our customary
deference to the trial court’s factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous
examination of the record to ascertain that the trial court’s factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence. . . . [When] the legal conclusions
of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine
whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support
in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . . Accordingly,
the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding the applicability of the exigent
circumstances doctrine is subject to plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kendrick, 314 Conn. 212, 222,
100 A.3d 821 (2014).
   8
     In its brief to the Appellate Court, the state argued that the search was
supported by the exigent circumstances doctrine because it ‘‘pertained to
a risk of danger to human life, not pursuit of a suspect.’’ (Emphasis added.)
State v. Curet, Conn. Appellate Court Briefs & Appendices, March Term,
2020, State’s Brief pp. 18–19.
   9
     In her brief to this court, the defendant insists that the trial court found
that Cruz observed two men enter and leave the building and, further, that
the trial court found that those men were the only individuals Cruz heard
fighting in the laundry room. The defendant bases her argument on certain
statements, taken out of context, that the trial court made during its oral
ruling. In particular, the defendant relies on the trial court’s statement, when
summarizing Cruz’ 911 call, that ‘‘Cruz eventually saw the male and the
second male run out of the building and flee in separate vehicles.’’ As we
indicated, however, the trial court was aware that Cruz did not personally
see two men run from the building. The transcript of the 911 call is ambiguous
on this point, and the court sought clarification of it during the hearing on
the motion to suppress. The defendant’s assertions to the contrary notwith-
standing, we do not read the trial court’s ruling as limiting the number of
individuals involved in the altercation to the two men seen leaving when it
ended. Indeed, the trial court’s ruling belies any such suggestion because
the court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to
believe that someone inside the defendant’s apartment may have been shot
or stabbed during the altercation and may have been in need of emergency
medical assistance.
   10
      Specifically, the trial court found that Cruz told Zulali that, ‘‘[a]fter the
male gained entry into the building, Cruz . . . heard someone knocking
very hard [on] the [defendant’s door]. Cruz was sure the knocking was on
the [defendant’s door]. Cruz then heard an altercation, which started in
front of the hallway of [the defendant’s apartment] and moved over to the
laundry room . . . [which] was just a few feet away . . . .’’
   11
      ‘‘Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reason-
ably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or
conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blades, supra, 225 Conn. 622.
   12
      In the absence of any of the facts known to the officers, our decision
might be different. Such is the nature of the fourth amendment totality
of the circumstances inquiry, in which every factor is integral and often
indispensable to the decision reached concerning the reasonableness of the
challenged conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36, 124
S. Ct. 521, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343 (2003) (reasonableness under fourth amendment
is ‘‘a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to
produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a
given case; it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to
details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating
marginal ones’’).