Court Opinion

ID: 9372943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:42.578663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.078615
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BEVERLY MARTIN,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          SF-0752-17-0412-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: February 2, 2023
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Beverly Martin, Medford, Oregon, pro se.

           Trever Cox-Neuroth, Landover, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we
     GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant retired from the EAS-25 Human Resources Business Data and
     Systems Analyst position 2 effective May 29, 2015.       Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1.   On July 20, 2015, the appellant filed a formal equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging that her retirement was involuntary. IAF,
     Tab 4 at 21.     On February 23, 2017, the Equal Employment Opportunity
     Commission issued an order dismissing the appellant’s request for a hearing and
     indicating that the agency should process the complaint in accordance with the
     procedures for mixed-case complaints, i.e., complaints involving matters
     appealable to the Board, and should issue a final agency decision (FAD) . IAF,
     Tab 10 at 38-39. There is no evidence that the agency issued a FAD, and, on
     May 3, 2017, the appellant timely filed this appeal because more than 120 days
     had elapsed since she filed her formal EEO compliant without the agency issuing
     a FAD. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 10 at 38-39; see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(d)(1)(i).
¶3        At the Board, the appellant timely initiated discovery, and by the agency’s
     admission, its responses were due on June 8, 2017. IAF, Tab 19 at 4. The agency
     moved for an extension of time to respond to the appellant’s interrogatories and
     requests of production of documents. Id. The administrative judge denied the
     agency’s request, IAF, Tab 20, and, when the agency failed to respond to the
     appellant’s discovery requests, she filed a motion to compel, IAF, Tab 22. The
     agency moved for another extension of time to respond to the appellant ’s
     discovery requests. IAF, Tab 23. The administrative judge granted the agency’s
     2
       The appellant was employed at the Postal Service Headquarters facility in
     Washington, D.C. However, at the time that she retired, the agency was allowing the
     appellant, for her convenience, to reside in Medford, Oregon, while still maintaining
     her status as an employee at the agency’s Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Initial
     Appeal File, Tab 4 at 6.
                                                                                       3

     motion, affording it until July 10, 2017, to respond to the appellant’s discovery
     requests.   IAF, Tab 25.   Notwithstanding this order, the administrative judge
     issued the initial decision dismissing the appellant ’s appeal on June 27, 2017,
     nearly 2 weeks before the agency’s responses to discovery were due.            IAF,
     Tab 27.
¶4        In her petition for review, the appellant states that she consulted the Board’s
     regional office and was left with the understanding that she would have the
     opportunity to complete discovery and to present all of her evidence at a hearing.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 5 at 6.

                                        ANALYSIS
¶5        An administrative judge’s rulings regarding discovery matters are subject to
     an abuse of discretion standard.   Wagner v. Environmental Protection Agency,
     54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 (1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table). The
     rules governing discovery in Board proceedings are set out in the Board ’s
     regulations at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.71-.75.          These regulations require that
     “[d]iscovery must be completed within the time period designated by the
     judge . . . .” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d)(4). Initial discovery requests must be served
     within 30 days of the administrative judge ordering the agency to produce its file
     and response. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d)(1). A party must respond to a discovery
     request within 20 days.    5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d)(2).     Generally, any discovery
     requests following the initial discovery request must be served within 10 days of
     service of the response. Id. If a party serves objections to a discovery request or
     if the responding party does not timely respond to the discovery request, the
     requesting party has 10 days to file a motion to compel discovery.        5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.73(d)(3).
¶6        In the acknowledgment order, the administrative judge set the time frame
     for discovery consistent with the provisions of the Board’s regulations, indicating
     that initial discovery requests must be served within 30 days of May 5, 2017, and
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     the opposing party’s responses to discovery must be served no later than 20 days
     after the date of service of the discovery request. IAF, Tab 2. Here, as noted, the
     discovery period was extended until July 10, 2017, and the administrative judge
     issued the initial decision on June 27, 2017. As the agency’s response to the
     appellant’s discovery request could have been filed on the last day provided for
     such a response, issuing the initial decision prior to the close of discovery
     effectively denied the appellant the opportunity to contest the agency’s
     objections, to follow up with requests for further discoverable material based
     upon the agency’s initial response, or to file a motion to compel. It also denied
     her the opportunity to submit into the record evidence obtained during discovery.
¶7        As the party bearing the burden of proof on the claim that her retirement
     was involuntary, the appellant is entitled to obtain evidence to support her claim.
     See Jenkins v. Environmental Protection Agency, 118 M.S.P.R. 161, ¶ 26 (2012).
     By issuing the initial decision prior to completing discovery, the administrative
     judge deprived the appellant of the opportunity to submit additional relevant
     evidence that she had obtained during the discovery process.         See Lynch v.
     Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 219, ¶ 11 (2010).           Thus, we find it
     necessary to remand the appeal for further adjudication.

                                          ORDER
¶8        Accordingly, we remand this appeal for further adjudication and a new
     initial decision consistent with this Remand Order. In so remanding, we make no
     finding on whether the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that her
     retirement was involuntary, entitling her to a hearing. See Thomas v. Department
     of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 11 (2016) (finding that in a constructive adverse
     action appeal, if an appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation of fact establishing
     Board jurisdiction, she is entitled to a hearing at which she must prove
     jurisdiction by preponderant evidence). Rather, we remand because the appellant
     has not had a full and fair opportunity to obtain evidence in support of her claim
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that the agency forced her retirement.     Based on the record as currently
developed, we cannot say that the appellant’s discovery requests would not have
led to relevant admissible evidence concerning the appellant’s allegations of
involuntary retirement.

FOR THE BOARD:                                 /s/ for
                                       Jennifer Everling
                                       Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.