Court Opinion

ID: 9380643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 19:02:19.148477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.915309
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/23 P. v. Hernandez CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
  California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                      or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E078556

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. FSB19001842)

 SAMANTHA LYNETTE HERNANDEZ,                                              OPINION

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Harold T. Wilson,

Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

         Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Laura

Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                              1
       Defendant and appellant Samantha Lynette Hernandez entered a mobile home in

San Bernardino that belonged to Herman Medina and his wife. While defendant was

inside the mobile home, Medina arrived and noticed that a window had been pried open

and one of the doors was ajar. He entered the mobile home and found defendant in a

bedroom, holding a pipe. She warned him that something was in the mobile home. She

left carrying a bag that belonged to Medina’s wife and contained items she took from the

mobile home. Defendant was apprehended down the street by police and was still in

possession of the bag. Defendant was also carrying a backpack, which contained a

magazine loaded with rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition. Defendant was convicted

of first degree burglary and unlawful possession of ammunition along with having

suffered a prior serious and violent felony conviction.

       Defendant claims on appeal that (1) insufficient evidence was presented to support

her conviction of first degree burglary as the People failed to prove that the residence was

inhabited at the time of the burglary; (2) if this court reduces her conviction to second

degree burglary, the five-year term imposed on the prior serious felony conviction found

true under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a),1 must be stricken and, in the

alternative, if his court upholds her conviction of first degree burglary, the trial court

abused its discretion by refusing to strike the section 667, subdivision (a), prior and it

should be dismissed on appeal; her conduct credits should be recalculated if this court

reduces her conviction to second degree burglary; and (4); remand for resentencing is

       1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                               2
required in order for the trial court to consider the sentencing objectives of Senate Bill

No. 567.

                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.     PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459; count 1) along with the

special allegation that it was a serious and violent felony conviction because the

residence was occupied (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c); 462, subd. (a); 667.5, subd. (c).) She was

also found guilty of unlawful possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2.)

In a bifurcated proceeding, after defendant waived her right to a jury trial, the trial court

found the special allegation true for count 1 that she had suffered a prior serious felony

conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a).) In addition, the trial court found true that defendant had

suffered a serious or violent felony conviction on counts 1 and 2 pursuant to sections 667,

subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12, subdivision (a), and had served a prior prison

term within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).

       Defendant was sentenced on February 4, 2022, to the middle term of four years on

count 1 plus a consecutive eight-month term on count 2. Defendant was additionally

sentenced to five years for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), prior serious felony

conviction.2 She received a total sentence of nine years eight months to be served in state

       2 The trial court struck the prior serious and/or violent felony conviction for
purposes of imposing count 1 and not doubling the sentence.

                                              3
prison.3 She was granted 1,139 total credits pursuant to section 2933.1, consisting of 990

actual days and 149 conduct credits.

       B.      FACTUAL HISTORY

               1.      PEOPLE’S CASE-IN-CHIEF

       On May 22, 2019, Herman Medina and his wife, Collette Moore, owned a mobile

home located at 2686 West Mill Street Space 138 in San Bernardino (mobile home). The

mobile home had three bedrooms and two bathrooms. It was furnished and all of the

utilities, including electricity and gas, were turned on. Medina maintained regular trash

service. On May 22, 2019, Medina stated that he and his wife were primarily storing

their items in the house because the floors had been damaged. He stated that they were

gradually moving things from the mobile home to their house in Rialto. His son lived in

the mobile home until November 2018 when the floors were damaged by a pipe that

burst. Medina’s son planned to move into the mobile home once the floors were fixed.

       On May 22, Medina went to the mobile home. He had been to the mobile home

just a few days prior to that day. He had locked all of the doors when he left. During this

time in 2019, he would go to the mobile home about three times each week. He would

check on the mobile home and take the garbage out.

       He arrived at the mobile home between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. He was just going to

pick up the mail when he observed that the side door to the mobile home was ajar. He

went inside and heard a noise coming from one of the bedrooms. When he entered one of

       3   The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior.

                                                4
the bedrooms, he saw defendant holding a 15-inch pipe that he recognized had been in

the house. He said, “Who the ‘F’ are you?” Defendant responded, “There is someone in

here. There’s someone in here.” Medina told her, “Yeah, you.” Defendant told Medina

that someone had invited her to stay in the mobile home.

       Defendant stated that there was “something” in the mobile home. Defendant had a

bag under her arm. The bag had the words Arrowhead Medical Center (AMC) printed on

it. Moore had worked at AMC as a nurse and the bag belonged to her. Defendant walked

past him out of the bedroom. He did not stop her because he was afraid of her strange

behavior. She exited the mobile home by the side door. Medina followed her. He yelled

at her to give back his items or he was going to call the police. Defendant responded that

the items belonged to her.

       Medina followed her down the street. Defendant flagged down a man on a

bicycle. She got on the handlebars and left with him. Police officer Dimola responded to

a 911 call from Medina at around 1:40 p.m. on May 22, 2019. Medina pointed to the

direction that defendant had left on the bicycle. Officer Dimola observed a male

Hispanic riding a bicycle with a female, identified as defendant, on the handlebars.

Officer Dimola followed them. Once defendant got off the bicycle, Officer Dimola

approached defendant. She was wearing black clothing and had both a black backpack

and the AMC bag. Officer Dimola detained defendant. The male with defendant ran off.

Medina identified defendant as the female who had been in his house.

       Officer Prinz was called to Medina’s mobile home at approximately 1:55 p.m. on

May 22, 2019. Officer Prinz observed the window that had been damaged. A person

                                             5
could fit through the window. Officer Dimola brought defendant’s backpack and the

AMC bag back to the house. Inside the backpack was a magazine for a Ruger

semiautomatic firearm that was loaded with 13 rounds of nine-millimeter ammunition.

       Inside the AMC bag was some of Moore’s makeup. In addition, keys to a vintage

motorcycle that had been in one of the kitchen drawers was in the bag. Also in the bag

was a knife shaped like a gun that Moore had given Medina. It had been stored in a

kitchen drawer. Moore had not put these items in the AMC bag.

       Medina also found his wife’s purse, which contained her jewelry, in a recycle bin

outside the home. The holder for the knife found in the AMC bag was inside one of the

purses. In addition, Medina’s wife’s checkbook was in the purse. Moore kept the purses

in her bedroom. Medina did not own any guns or ammunition.

       Medina looked around the mobile home after the police left. It appeared that

someone had used both of the toilets but had not flushed them. He found a bag of female

clothes in the laundry room that did not belong to him or Moore. There were dirty dishes

in the kitchen, which had been left by Medina’s son from November 2018. Medina had

left them in the sink advising his son that he had to clean them.

       Moore had never met defendant and did not give her permission to take any of

Moore’s items. Medina had not given anyone permission to enter his house. He did not

give defendant permission to enter the house or take Moore’s bag. The parties stipulated

that defendant had suffered a prior conviction, which prohibited her from possessing

ammunition.

       Defendant presented no evidence on her behalf.

                                             6
                                       DISCUSSION

       A.     INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF FIRST DEGREE BURGLARY

       Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction of first

degree burglary as it was not proven that the house was inhabited.

       “ ‘A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable

to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of

solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the

conclusion in question. Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is

satisfied. [Citation.] Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence,

the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the

finding.’ ” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 711.)

       Burglary involves the act of unlawful entry accompanied by the specific “intent to

commit grand or petit larceny or any felony.” (§ 459.) First degree burglary requires

entry into an “inhabited” dwelling house. (§ 460, subd (a).)

       Here, the jury was instructed on burglary that it had to find (1) defendant entered a

building/room within a building/structure; and, (2) when she entered a building/room

within the building/structure, she intended to commit theft. They were further instructed,

“Burglary is divided into two degrees. If you conclude that the defendant committed a

burglary, you must then decide the degree. [¶] First degree burglary is burglary of an

inhabited house [or a room within an inhabited house].” [¶] “A house is inhabited if

someone uses it as a dwelling, whether or not someone is inside at the time of the alleged

entry. [¶] A house is inhabited if someone used it as a dwelling and left only because a

                                              7
natural or other disaster caused him or her to leave. [¶] A house is not inhabited if the

former residents have moved out and do not intend to return, even if some personal

property remains inside. [¶] All other burglaries are second degree. [¶] The People

have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the burglary was first degree

burglary. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty

of first degree burglary.”

       Defendant disputes that there was sufficient evidence presented that the mobile

home was inhabited. “ ‘[I]nhabited’ for purposes of section 460 ‘means currently being

used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘It has never been

held that a person loses his residence by reason of a brief absence from the house where

he lives, and without evidence of an intention to depart therefrom and go to live in some

other place.’ [Citation.] ‘Numerous cases . . . have held that a residence is still

“inhabited” for purposes of [section] 460 even though the residents of the house are

temporarily away from the premises, where they have indicated no intention to stop

living there.’ [Citation.] . . . [A] house ‘is “inhabited” if it is currently being used for

residential purposes, even if it is temporarily unoccupied, i.e., no person is currently

present. A formerly inhabited dwelling becomes uninhabited only when its occupants

have moved out permanently and do not intend to return to continue or to resume using

the structure as a dwelling.’ ” (People v. Tessman (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1299-

1300.) Whether a dwelling is inhabited is a question of fact. (People v. Burkett (2013)

220 Cal.App.4th 572, 582.)

                                               8
       In People v. Marquez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 797, 801-802, the defendant entered

the home of the victim through a window and took the victim’s television and stereo. At

the time of the burglary, the owner of the home had been moved into a boarding home

and it was uncertain when she could return to her home. The home was maintained by a

friend. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the house was inhabited

because the owner intended to return and there was no evidence that she vacated or

abandoned the property. (Id. at pp. 799-802.)

       In People v. DeRouen (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 86, the defendant entered several

vacation homes stealing various items from the homes. He was convicted of several

counts of first degree burglary. (Id. at pp. 89-91.) On appeal, the defendant argued that

the vacation homes were not inhabited because they were not the victims’ primary living

quarters. (Id. at pp. 90-91.) The appellate court noted that burglary laws are “ ‘based

primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual

burglary situation—the danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to

perpetrate the intended crime or to escape and the danger that the occupants will in anger

or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby inviting more violence.’ ” (Id. at p. 91.)

It found that, “the societal interests present in one’s second or vacation home are equally

as important as those present in one’s primary residence. Each of the victims testified

they resided in their [vacation] residences sporadically. The potential danger of an

unexpected intruder into these dwellings, surprising the occupants and inciting violence is

the same potential danger a burglar poses to occupants of their primary residence.” (Id.

at p. 92.)

                                              9
       Here, substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the mobile home was

inhabited. Medina stated that at the time they were storing their items in the house and

were moving items to their other home in Rialto. They had not moved all of their

belongings. Medina went to the mobile home three days each week to check on it and get

the mail. Their belongings—including beds and dishes—were still in the home. The

electricity and gas were still turned on. Medina stated that the floors had been damaged

and needed to be fixed. Once they were fixed, his son would move back into the house.

Medina and Moore were still inhabiting the house as they were gradually moving to

Rialto. There was no evidence that they had abandoned or vacated the mobile home.

(People v. Marquez, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at pp. 801-802.) Further, their son was

moving back into the house as soon as the floors were fixed. Substantial evidence

supports the jury’s finding of habitation.

       Defendant contends that Medina was only using the house for storage. However,

Medina still went to the location three times each week. Further, Medina testified they

were gradually moving to Rialto and that they were waiting to repair the floors, which

had been damaged by a pipe that burst, so Medina’s son could move in. Medina insisted

that his son was planning to occupy the mobile home. The evidence supported that

Medina and Moore were still inhabiting the house and that once the floor was repaired,

Medina’s son would move back in.

       Defendant also argues that the mobile home was not inhabited because she

speculates there was no running water. She claims this is evidenced by the dishes still

being in the sink and the toilets not being flushed. However, there was no testimony that

                                             10
the water had been shut off. In fact, Medina testified that he had kept the utilities on,

including electricity and trash service. Medina indicated the sink was full of dishes

because his son had left the dishes and he refused to clean them for his son, not because

the water had been turned off.

       Finally, defendant contends the fact that the floors had not been fixed at the time

of her entry was evidence that Medina viewed the house merely as a place to store his

belongings and had no intention to return to inhabit the house. However, Medina

testified that he planned to fix the floors so his son could move back in. Further, the

utilities were kept on at the house. If Medina viewed the house only as a storage facility,

there would have been no reason to keep electricity or trash service.

       The evidence supports that Medina and his family only vacated the premises

because the floors needed to be repaired. Medina was gradually moving items to their

new home in Rialto and had not abandoned the mobile home. They had every intention

of returning to inhabit the premises once the floors were fixed. Substantial evidence

supports defendant’s conviction of first degree burglary. 4

       B.     SECTION 667, SUBDIVISION (A) PRIOR CONVICTION

       Defendant makes two alternative arguments regarding the section 667, subdivision

(a)(1), serious prior conviction. First, defendant argues that if this court reduces her

conviction in count 1 to second degree burglary, the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), prior

       4 Defendant has contended that if this court reduces her conviction in count 1 to
second degree burglary, her conduct credits should be recalculated pursuant to section
4019 rather than under section 2933.1. Since we have upheld her first degree burglary
conviction, we need not address this claim.

                                             11
no longer applies. As stated ante, the first degree burglary conviction was supported by

substantial evidence. As such, we need not strike the sentence imposed on the section

667, subdivision (a)(1), conviction on this ground. Defendant argues in the alternative

that if this Court upholds her first degree burglary conviction in count 1, then the trial

court abused its discretion by refusing to exercise its discretion to strike the prior

conviction.

              1.      ADDITIONAL FACTUAL HISTORY

       According to the probation report, defendant was 25 years old. On January 30,

2014, she was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to 24 months

in prison. At the same time she was convicted of receiving a stolen vehicle and was

sentenced to 32 months in county jail. She violated her parole for this charge four

separate times, including when she committed the instant offense. On November 29,

2018, she was convicted of grand theft, a misdemeanor, and was placed on probation.

The aggravating factors included for the current crime were that it involved a threat of

bodily harm, the manner in which the crime was committed was carried out with

planning and sophistication, and it involved the taking of property of great monetary

value. As for the aggravating factors for defendant, she was engaged in violent conduct

that was a serious danger to society, the prior convictions were numerous and increasing

in seriousness, she had served prior prison terms, she was on parole at the time of the

offense and her prior performance on parole was unsatisfactory. There were no

mitigating factors found by the probation department. It was recommended that she

receive a sentence of 14 years four months.

                                              12
       Defendant filed a People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

(Romero) motion to strike her prior conviction. She argued that her prior conviction was

suffered just prior to her 18th birthday. Defendant also submitted a biopsychosocial

report to be considered with the Romero motion. Defendant argued the trial court should

consider her unstable childhood in ruling on the Romero motion. Defendant reported that

her parents fought when she was young and that her father would whip her with a belt.

Her parents divorced and she stayed with her mother until she was 12 years old. Her

mother had mental health and substance abuse issues and could not care for her. She

moved in with her father who physically abused her. She was placed in foster care at the

age of 13. She claimed to have been sexually assaulted when she was 14 years old. She

suffered from substance abuse, anxiety, depression, and paranoia. Defense counsel

withdrew the Romero motion after meeting with the prosecutor and the trial court, and

being advised as to the sentence that the trial court intended to impose.

       At the sentencing hearing conducted on February 4, 2022, the trial court noted that

Medina and Moore had indicated they wanted defendant to be punished but not “to the

fullest extent of the law.” The trial court stated on the record the aggravating factors

included that defendant had a prior record, which indicated a pattern of regular and

increasingly serious criminal conduct. She was on parole at the time she committed the

instant offense and her prior performance on parole was unsatisfactory.

       The trial court stated it had considered these factors when deciding whether to

impose or strike the section 667, subdivision (a), prior conviction. The trial court stated it

understood it had discretion to strike the prior but chose not to strike the prior conviction.

                                              13
The trial court noted, “So the record is clear, the Court has read and considered the

sentencing report. After a discussion with both parties, the Court agrees that nine years,

eight months is an appropriate sentence in this case. [¶] The Court did exercise its

discretion pursuant to 1385 with respect to the strike allegation in order to accomplish

that nine years, eight months. [¶] The Court did not exercise, although the Court

understands the Court has discretion under 1385, with respect to 667 (a)(1), a five-year

enhancement.”

              2.      ANALYSIS

       “[S]ection 667, subdivision (a) requires a trial court to impose a five-year

enhancement for each prior serious felony conviction.” (People v. Shaw (2020) 56

Cal.App.5th 582, 585.) On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No.

1393 which amended sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385, subdivision (b) to allow a

court to exercise its discretion to strike or dismiss a prior serious felony conviction for

sentencing purposes. It was effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2.)

The sentencing in this case was conducted in 2022, and the trial court stated that it

understood it had the discretion to strike the serious prior felony conviction.

       As noted in People v. Shaw, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th 582, there are “few published

opinions following the enactment of Senate Bill 1393 that define the scope of a trial

court’s authority to strike a prior serious felony enhancement ‘in the furtherance of

justice’ [citation], or discuss in any detail the standard of appellate review.” (Id. at p.

585.) The court in Shaw first determined that a trial court, in determining whether to

strike a prior serious felony conviction should look to the nature of the offense and the

                                              14
background of the offender as it does in choosing whether to impose or strike other types

of enhancements. (Id. at p. 587.) “No error occurs if the trial court evaluates all relevant

circumstances to ensure that the punishment fits the offense and the offender.” (Ibid.)

Review of “a trial court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement [is

under the] abuse of discretion [standard].” (Id. at p. 585.)

       Here, the trial court considered striking the section 667, subdivision (a),

enhancement despite defendant withdrawing her Romero motion. The trial court

reviewed all of the aggravating and mitigating factors. It found that defendant had a prior

record and had a pattern of increasingly serious felony convictions. Further, defendant

had been on parole at the time that she committed the instant offense. The trial court also

noted that defendant’s prior performance on parole had been unsatisfactory. There were

no mitigating factors. The trial court noted that it was aware it had the discretion to strike

the prior serious felony conviction and that it had looked to all of the aggravating factors

in determining whether to strike the prior conviction. The trial court did not abuse its

discretion, after considering all of the relevant circumstances in deciding not to strike the

section 667, subdivision (a), prior conviction.

       C.     SENATE BILL NO. 567

       Defendant contends that Senate Bill No. 567’s (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 4,

5.15)(SB 567) amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b), requires remand for

resentencing in order for the trial court to reconsider his sentence under the new law. The

People contend defendant forfeited his claim by failing to object to the imposition of the

middle term at sentencing. We agree that defendant has forfeited her claim.

                                             15
       SB 567 amended section 1170, effective January 1, 2022, which was one month

prior to defendant’s sentencing. It provided several changes to the imposition of upper,

middle and lower-term sentences. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides “When a

judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms,

the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the

middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” Subdivision (b)(2)

provides, “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there

are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of

imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances

have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable

doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)

       Further, Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides in pertinent part:

“Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term

would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower

term if any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense:

[¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma,

including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The

person is a youth, or was a youth as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at

the time of the commission of the offense.” Section 1016.7, subdivision (b) provides that

“A ‘youth’ for purposes of this section includes any person under 26 years of age on the

date the offense was committed.”

                                              16
       The ameliorative changes to section 1170 were in effect at the time of defendant’s

sentencing. Defense counsel and the prosecutor apparently spoke with the trial court

about the appropriate sentence in chambers but the trial court did not place the discussion

on the record. Defendant withdrew her Romero motion based on the indicated sentence

discussed in chambers. Defendant was aware that the trial court intended to impose the

middle term on count 1 but did not object on the record or ask the trial court to consider

her age and childhood as a mitigating factor in imposing the middle term.

       Defendant’s failure to raise the applicability of SB 567 after the effective date of

the amendment to section 1170 has forfeited the argument on appeal. (People v. Scott

(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351; People v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 683-684,

review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237; but see People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th

825, 840 [found no forfeiture in a case involving section 1170.91, which provides that the

court shall consider any trauma suffered by the defendant as a member of the United

States military as a factor in mitigation when imposing a sentence].)

       Further, based on the silent record in this case, we must presume the trial court

was aware of the change in the law and properly applied it to defendant’s sentence. “[A]

trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.” (People

v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “These general rules concerning the

presumption of regularity of judicial exercises of discretion apply to sentencing issues.”

(People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 497, 499 [presumed on a silent record that

the trial court was aware of its discretion to strike a prior conviction when sentencing

occurred 53 days after the issuance of the Romero opinion].) We must presume the trial

                                             17
court was aware of its discretion under section 1170, as amended, in imposing the middle

term.

        Even if defendant has not forfeited her claim, and we presume that the trial court

was unaware of its discretion under revised section 1170, remand is unnecessary as the

trial court would not have exercised its discretion to impose the low term. (People v.

Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453, 463 [“ ‘[T]he appropriate remedy is to remand for

resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have

reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ”

citing to People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391; see also People v. Barber

(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 814 [“When a court is unaware of its discretion, the remedy

is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would

have reached the same conclusion if it had been aware of its discretion”].)

        The trial court was well aware of defendant’s childhood and age based on

defendant’s Romero motion to strike the prior serious felony conviction. Defendant

chose to withdraw the Romero motion based on the sentence indicated by the trial court.

All parties appeared to be satisfied that the sentence imposed was fair and just. There is

nothing to support the trial court would have imposed the low term in this case based on

defendant’s childhood and age as it had already stated that the appropriate sentence in the

case was nine years and eight months. The record clearly indicates that the trial court

would conclude that imposing the lower term was contrary to the interests of justice.

(§1170, subd. (b)(6).) “Remand for resentencing would be an idle act.” (People v.

Salazar, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 464, fn. omitted.)

                                             18
                                     DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed in full.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   MILLER
                                                            J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                             P. J.

McKINSTER
                                J.

                                          19