Court Opinion

ID: 9561148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:04:22.40332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:39.010573
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority relies on workers’ compensation law to interpret a commercial liability insurance contract, I dissent.
At issue in this case is the meaning of exclusion 16 in the umbrella liability insurance policy Hartford Casualty Insurance Company issued to Sunrise Carpet Industries, Inc. The use of workers’ compensation law to guide the interpretation of a contract not involving workers’ compensation is inappropriate. Workers’ compensation is a state-imposed and regulated system that provides limited benefits to employees who suffer injuries on the job without regard to the traditional principles of tort law. Public policy concerns have led the legislature to mandate that courts interpret the workers’ compensation act liberally in order to bring both employers and employees within its coverage,3 but these concerns have no place in interpreting private contracts. Additionally, the umbrella policy contains a specific exclusion for claims covered by workers’ compensation, and it is therefore illogical and redundant to incorporate workers’ compensation law into exclusion 16 4
Exclusion 16 provides that the policy does not apply to coverage afforded for personal injuries “to other employees arising out of and in the course of their employment.” Thus, the focus is on whether the claim arises out of and in the course of a plaintiff’s employment, and not whether sexual harassment is within the scope of an employee’s duties. According to the allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint in the underlying suit, a supervisor made the plaintiffs’ submission to his sexual advances an express condition of employment, and Sunrise discriminated against the plaintiffs in retaliation for reporting the offensive conduct. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim clearly arose out of and in the course of their employment. This conclusion is consistent with the decisions of a majority of other courts interpreting similar policy exclusions.5 Therefore, I would conclude that an employee’s sexual *296harassment of another employee triggers exclusion 16.
Decided February 28, 2000
Reconsideration denied April 11, 2000.
Hine & Niedrach, Edward Hine, Jr., Erin M. Richardson, for appellant.
Lokey & Smith, Malcolm P. Smith, for appellees.
Anderson, Kill & Olick, Eugene R. Anderson, Richard P. Lewis, Amy Bach, amici curiae.

 OCGA § 34-9-23.

 See McCleod v. Tecorp Int'l Ltd., 865 P.2d 1283, 1286-1288 (Or. 1993).

 See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 713 A.2d 1007, 1011 (N.J. 1998) (“the clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions . . . favors enforcement of the *296employee exclusion to bar coverage for [discrimination] claims”); Meadowbrook, Inc. v. Tower Ins. Co., 559 N.W.2d 411, 419-420 (Minn. 1997) (“It is incongruous to hold that [plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim against employer] can arise anywhere but in the course and scope of a plaintiff’s employment.”); Board of Education v. Continental Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (1993) (sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge action arose out of employment and thus employee exclusion applied to bar coverage); McCleod, 865 P.2d at 1287-1288 (employee’s sexual harassment claim not covered when policy excludes claim “arising out of and in course of employment”); David v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (exclusion for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment bars coverage for emotional distress caused by sexual harassment by another employee); Aberdeen Ins. Co. v. Bovee, 777 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (employee’s sexual harassment claim not covered when policy excludes claim “arising out of and in course of employment”).