Court Opinion

ID: 9738799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:53.126006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.505375
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE MORAN, concurring in People v. Grizzle and dissenting in People v. Roberts: The majority, sua sponte, relies on the procedural rule of waiver to reverse the appellate court and reinstate defendant Roberts’ conviction for attempted murder. This was done despite the well-established rule that an issue not raised in the court of review is deemed waived. Nowhere in its petition for leave to appeal, its brief, or its reply brief does the State contend that Roberts waived any error by his failure to object to the giving of the instructions in question. Neither party considers waiver to be an issue here, and with good reason, for the question of waiver, in the context of such instructions on attempted murder, was argued and disposed of by this court in People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16. Harris was the consolidation of two cases appealed by the State, the defendants being Harris and Shields. Each involved charges of attempted murder and jury instructions similar to those involved in the instant case. At trial, Harris objected to the giving of the questioned jury instructions but the objection was overruled. He failed to raise the same objection in his post-trial motion. Shields, on the other hand, failed to object to the giving of such instructions at both the trial and his post-trial hearing. The briefs in both cases disclosed that in Harris’ case, as here, the State did not raise the waiver issue, but did so in Shields’ case. In both, this court determined that the instructional errors were so “substantial” that the waiver rule should not bar consideration on the merits. People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, 28. The majority attempts to distinguish Harris on the ground that “we granted leave to appeal in that case [Harris] to resolve the attempted-murder problem resulting from our decisions in People v. Muir and People v. Trinkle, and not to deal with the question of wavier.” (75 Ill. 2d at 15.) This statement is unfounded, since reasons for allowing a petition for leave to appeal are unrecorded. The opinion in Harris evidences that we applied the waiver rule because the instructions on the elements of the offense of attempted murder were so substantially defective that, in the interests of justice, defendant was allowed to raise the issue on appeal. To now deny defendant Roberts the same right — to have his case decided on the merits — especially when the State has not urged us to do so, is not only patently unfair to the defendant but casts doubt on the sincerity of our recent efforts to correct the errors which heretofore prevailed in this area of criminal law. At issue in both People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, and People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, were the proper instructions to be given the jury when the offense is attempted murder. In Trinkle, we held that a conviction cannot stand if the jury was instructed that it could find a defendant guilty of attempted murder “sans specific intent to kill.” (People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, 201.) In Harris, we upset the convictions of both Harris and Shields, and affirmatively resolved, “An instruction must make it clear that to convict for attempted murder nothing less than a criminal intent to kill must be shown.” (People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, 27.) The instructional defect in the cases of Trinkle, Harris and Shields was precisely the same as the defect in the present case. The prejudicial impact of such improper instructions was acknowledged by the holding in Trinkle and Harris. Other than absolute-Hability offenses, every criminal offense requires one of four mental states. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 4—3 through 4—7.) Under sections 9—1 (a)(1) and 9—1 (a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 9—1 (a)(1) and 9—1 (a)(2)), the offense of murder requires either of two mental states — intent or knowledge. On the other hand, only one mental state will suffice for the offense of attempt. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 8—4 (a). Also see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 4—3 (b), and W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law sec. 59, at 428-29 (1972). As noted by the majority, the jury in the case at bar was instructed that, to convict defendant of attempted murder, defendant must have acted with intent to commit the crime of murder. The jury was then given the foHowing instruction defining murder: “A person commits the crime of murder who kills an individual if, in performing the acts which cause the death, (1) he intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual.” Under this instruction, the jury could convict the defendant of attempted murder if it found that defendant intended to do great bodily harm, knew that his acts created a strong probability of death, or knew that his acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm. (As hereafter noted, defendant was not charged in the verbiage of (1) of the instruction.) Under Trinkle and Harris, this instruction was erroneous in that it permitted the jury to convict the defendant upon a finding that he had a mental state other than a specific intent to kill. An indictment and jury instructions must make it clear that the specific intent to kill is a prerequisite to a conviction for attempted murder. Mr. Justice Ryan’s dissent in Harris commences by stating, “Considerable amount of uncertainty seems to prevail in courts and among members of the bar as to what language is permissible or impermissible in charging attempted murder and in instructing the jury on this offense.” (72 Ill. 2d at 29.) To rectify the uncertainty, I believe the body of the indictment and the necessary instructions regarding attempted murder should contain the following: INDICTMENT On or about the____day of______at and within________ County, Illinois,________ committed the offense of ATTEMPT MURDER, in violation of section 8 — 4(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Illinois Revised Statutes 19__, chapter 38, section 8— 4(a)) in that [he] [she] did, with the intent to commit the offense of murder of____[victim]_________ take a substantial step toward the commission of said offense, in that [he] [she] did, without lawful justification, ______________________________ with the intent to kill_____[victim]_______ in violation of section 9 — 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Illinois Revised Statutes 19__, chapter 38, section 9— 1(a)(1)). JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits the crime of murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death, he intends to kill that individual. A person commits the crime of attempted murder if, with intent to commit the crime of murder, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder. The crime attempted need not have been committed. To sustain the charge of attempted murder, the State must prove the following propositions: First: That the defendant performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the crime of murder; and Second: That the defendant did so with the intent to kill_______[victim.]_________ If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. According to the majority, we need not “as a matter of grace” consider the instructional defect, sub judice, to assure the defendant a fair trial. (75 Ill. 2d at 14.) The majority bases this assertion on its conclusion that “the evidence in this case is not ‘closely balanced.’ ” (75 Ill. 2d at 14-15.) Iam convinced that, in reaching this conclusion, the majority considered whether the defendant committed the acts aEeged, but failed to consider the intent which was the subject of the instructional error. The inquiry should have been directed to the defendant’s mental state: Did defendant fire a shot into the adjacent truck with specific intent to kill the driver? The facts pertinent to this question certainly leave considerable doubt as to whether defendant Roberts had the specific intent to kill. The action taken by the grand jury supports this statement. The indictment presented to the grand jury charged Roberts with two counts of attempted murder. Count I stated: “*** the defendant, with the intent to commit the offense of Murder in violation of Section 9 — 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961, did perform a substantial step toward the commission of that offense in that he did, with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to Bemie L. Larson, aimed [«c] a gun and shoot said gun at Bemie L. Larson ***.” Count II stated, “*** the defendant, with the intent to commit the offense of Murder in violation of Section 9 — 1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961, did perform a substantial step toward the commission of that offense in that he aimed and fired a gun at the passenger compartment of a truck occupied and driven by Bernie L. Larson, knowing that such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Bernie L. Larson ***.” Count I charged defendant with the specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm. On this count, the grand jury returned a no bill. Count II charged the defendant with knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, and on this count a true bill was returned under which the defendant was subsequently convicted. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the grand jury specifically found a lack of probable cause that Roberts had acted with intent to kill. There is no doubt that the error in this case, identical to the error in Harris, was “substantial” — the determination also reached in Harris. This, coupled with the grand jury’s finding on count I, leads me to but one conclusion: the interest of justice requires that defendant Roberts’ conviction be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. I would, therefore, affirm that portion of the appellate court judgment which reversed the conviction of Roberts.