Court Opinion

ID: 9733933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:20:45.791288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.576066
License: Public Domain

Annaabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. The majority’s decision that Knight suffered a specific-incident compensable injury stands in stark contrast to our prior case law on the subject. By concluding that Knight’s onset of pain, which was not accompanied by an identifiable accident, was an incident-specific injury, the majority ignores the statutory distinction between incident-specific injuries and gradual onset injuries. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (Repl. 2002). Moreover, the majority’s futile attempt to distinguish our case law is not persuasive. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent. Arkansas Code Annotated § ll-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2002) defines a “compensable injury” as, An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, including eyeglasses, contact lenses, or hearing aides, arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury is ",accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in accordance with the plain language of the statutory provision, this court and the court of appeals have concluded that an injury is “accidental” only ifit is caused by a specific incident of trauma. See, e.g., Kimbell v. Assoc. of Rehab Indus. & Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., 366 Ark. 297, 235 S.W.3d 499 (2006) (claimant fell from a porch while talking to a client of the center); Swaim v. Wal-Mart Assoc., Inc., 91 Ark. App. 120, 208 S.W.3d 837 (2005) (claimant felt a pop in his foot while he was pulling a heavily loaded pallet); Crawford v. Single Source Transp., 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004) (claimant experienced a flexion of his knee while he was descending from his truck). In subsection (ii) of section ll-9-102(4)(A), the Arkansas General Assembly expressly designates as compensable certain types of injuries not caused by a specific incident, or not identifiable by time and place of occurrence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A) (Repl. 2002). Such gradual onset injuries are compensable only if the injury is (a) caused by rapid repetitive motion, (b) a back or neck injury, or (c) hearing loss. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii). Again, there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. The only injuries that have been defined as compensable by the legislature are as follows: accidental injuries, gradual injuries of three specific types, mental illness, cardiovascular disease, hernias, and adverse reactions experienced by certain employees to vaccinations for smallpox. See generally Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (Repl. 2002). While there may be a category of injury which has not been included in the statutory definition of compensability, such as a nonback, nonhearing-loss, nonrepetitive-motion injury that is not caused by a specific incident but that is otherwise identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the Commission and the courts are mandated to construe the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act strictly. Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2002). Moreover, the legislature has expressly declared that: [T]he extent to which any physical condition, injury or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage ... shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers’ Compensation Commission, or the courts. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001 (Repl. 2002). By construing the statute strictly it is clear that the legislature intended to differentiate between accidental injuries, which involve a specific incident, and gradual onset injuries that are compensable even though “not caused by a specific incident” or “not identifiable by time and place of occurrence.” See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b)&(c). This distinction was illustrated by our court’s decision in Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing, 342 Ark. 11, 26 S.W.3d 777 (2000). The claimant in that case was an assembly-line worker who suffered from a herniated disc in her cervical spine that she claimed was an incident-specific, workplace injury. Id. The claimant’s job required her to attach metal plates to air conditioning units, and she testified that she had to bend her neck six times with each unit, resulting in her bending almost 1,800 times during a shift. Id. The claimant alleged that while she was performing her job duties, she began to feel pain in her neck and right arm, but she was able to complete her shift. Id. The pain progressively worsened and the claimant sought medical treatment. Id. Although the claimant contended that her injury was the result of a specific incident at work, she admitted that she did not know how she was injured and she did not recall anything specific happening. Id. Accordingly, we held that the claimant’s own words belied her argument that the injury was caused by a specific, identifiable incident. Id. Likewise, in the recent case of Weaver v. Nabors Drilling USA, 98 Ark. App. 161, 253 S.W.3d 30 (2007), the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of workers’ compensation benefits when the claimant asserted that his spinal injury was linked to his work. Id. In that case, the claimant began complaining of pain in his hands while he was “mixing mud” at work but was unable to define a specific incident that caused his condition. See id. In doing so, the appellate court specifically rejected the claimant’s argument that while he could not prove a specific incident, his work was the only logical cause of his injury. See id. Again, as in Hapney, the court concluded that the claimant had only proven that he felt pain while at work but had not shown evidence of a specific incident that occurred at work and resulted in his injury.1 Id. Despite the majority’s statement to the contrary, the instant case is indistinguishable from Hapney and Weaver. Here, Knight testified that he began feeling pain while he was descending the stairs as part of his job duties. He was able to continue working, but his pain gradually increased until he felt unable to work and sought medical attention. Like the claimants in Hapney and Weaver, Knight admitted in his own testimony before the ALJ that he did not know the cause of his injury, and he could not identify a specific incident that resulted in his injury. Although, as the majority points out, Knight gave a specific description of his activities at the time he felt pain in his knee, namely he was walking up and down stairs at work, he could not specify an incident that occurred while he was descending the stairs that day. Specifically, he admitted that he neither tripped or fell preceding the pain, nor did he feel a pop or flexion in his knee, or anything else identifiably related to the onset of his pain. The majority also relies upon our past holding that unexplained injuries are compensable. As a general principle, this proposition is correct, but the majority’s reasoning in applying it to the instant case is flawed. What the majority fails to recognize is that the “unexplained” injuries in those cases had an unexplainable root cause, but the claimants in those cases still experienced specific, identifiable incidents that occurred at work and ultimately resulted in their injuries. See, e.g., Kimbell v. Assoc. of Rehab Indus. & Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., supra (claimant fell from porch due to unexplained dizziness); Little Rock Convention & Visitors Ctr. v. Pack, 60 Ark. App. 82, 959 S.W.2d 415 (1997) (claimant fell while caulking a walkway); Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 22 Ark. App. 21, 732 S.W.2d 496 (1987) (claimant fell and blacked out after stepping off a forklift). In the instant case, however, Knight did not experience an “unexplained” injury that resulted from a specific incident; rather, he simply experienced an onset of pain while at work and did not offer any proof that it was related to a specific incident. Moreover, the majority contends that Crawford v. Single Source Transportation, 87 Ark. App. 216, 189 S.W.3d 507 (2004), controls the outcome of this case. I disagree. In that case, the claimant described an incident where he stepped from his truck, his knee buckled, he fell to the ground, and then he felt pain in his knee. See id. The only similarity between Crawford and the instant case is that the Crawford claimant was descending from his truck and Knight was descending the stairs immediately preceding the onset of pain. See id. While the claimant in Crawford was able to identify a specific incident that led to his injury, namely, his knee buckled as he stepped from the truck, the claimant here failed to identify any specific incident that caused his injury. Actually, the outcome of this case should be governed by Whitten v. Edward Trucking/Corp. Solutions, 87 Ark. App. 112, 189 S.W.3d 82 (2004), a case in which the court of appeals held the claimant’s injury to be idiopathic. The claimant in Whitten suddenly felt a pain in his back as he was ascending the stairs to his supervisor’s office. Id. As the court of appeals stated, “[h]e neither tripped or stumbled, nor was he carrying anything heavy at the time of the fall.” Id. at 115, 189 S.W.3d at 84. A medical examination of the claimant revealed that he suffered from three preexisting injuries, which could have caused his pain. Id. Accordingly, the Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that his injury was idiopathic in nature. Id. Here, Knight was descending the stairs when he felt pain in his knee, and like the claimant in Whitten, he did not trip or stumble, and he was not carrying anything heavy. Also like the claimant in Whitten, Knight had suffered a previous injury to his knee; whereas the claimant in Crawford had not sustained any prior injuries. I simply cannot accept the majority’s strained attempt to distinguish our case law, when Knight wholly failed to prove that his injury resulted from a specific incident. The majority’s decision today jettisons strict construction as mandated by the legislature and completely ignores the statutory provision that “[a]n injury is ‘accidental’ only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and space of occurrence.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added). For the first time, this court holds that the onset of pain is a specific-incident injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102. For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.   The majority tries to distinguish Weaver by pointing out that the Commission denied benefits to the claimant in Weaver, and, thus, the appellate court simply had to affirm the Commission’s findings under our deferential standard of review. While the Commission may be insulated to a certain degree, it may not arbitrarily disregard evidence that supports the denial of a claim. See Kimbell v. Assoc. of Rehab Indus. & Bus. Companion Prop. & Cas., supra.