Court Opinion

ID: 9399787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 14:13:36.05522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:38.424013
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Friedman
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

            COLTON ALLEN KING
                                                                                  OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0397-22-1                                    JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN
                                                                                  JUNE 6, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                           FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                           John W. Brown, Judge

                           Michelle C.F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent
                           Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                           Suzanne Seidel Richmond, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                           Miyares, Attorney General; Robin M. Nagel, Assistant Attorney
                           General, on brief), for appellee.

                   In Miller v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 727, 732 (1997), this Court established a due

            process defense for an individual “who takes measures to learn what conduct the government has

            proscribed, but is misadvised by the government itself.” Colton Allen King now argues that

            Miller’s due process defense applies to bar a conviction for possession of a firearm in Virginia

            where King relied upon advice from his Pennsylvania probation officer regarding King’s right to

            possess and use firearms in Pennsylvania. We find that Miller does not apply to such a situation.

            We decline King’s invitation to extend the parameters of Miller, and we affirm his conviction.

                   Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Chesapeake convicted King of

            possessing a firearm after an adjudication of delinquency as a juvenile in violation of Code

            § 18.2-308.2(A)(iii).1 King’s prior adjudication of delinquency occurred in Pennsylvania. The

                   1
                     Code § 18.2-308.2(A)(iii) provides that it is unlawful for a person “to knowingly and
            intentionally possess or transport any firearm” if that person is “under the age of 29” and “was
Virginia trial court sentenced King to three years and nine months of imprisonment with three years

suspended for the illegal firearm possession.

        King first argues that his conviction is fundamentally unfair and is prohibited by Miller’s

due process exception because, during his residence in Pennsylvania, his Pennsylvania probation

officer allegedly made clear that “any loss of rights would be fully restored under Pennsylvania law

upon his release from juvenile probation.” King further argues that, if Miller’s due process

exception does not apply to this set of facts, Miller should be extended to include “situations where

a person is permitted to possess a firearm in the state in which they are convicted[.]”

        King also asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to a

portion of defense counsel’s closing argument relating to King’s Pennsylvania probation officer’s

alleged statements to him. Finally, King contends that the trial court erred in refusing to take

judicial notice of a Pennsylvania statute governing persons who are prohibited from possessing a

firearm as a result of a prior criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication.

        We find no trial court error and affirm the judgment.

                                           BACKGROUND

        “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v.

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381

(2016)). In doing so, we discard any of King’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true all

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be

drawn from that evidence. Id. at 473.

adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile 14 years of age or older at the time of the offense of a
delinquent act which would be a felony if committed by an adult, . . . whether such conviction or
adjudication occurred under the laws of the Commonwealth, or any other state.”
                                               -2-
       While responding to a call regarding possible drunk and disorderly behavior at

Chesapeake Pawn on May 7, 2021, Chesapeake Police Officer Tibbetts encountered King and a

female in the area of the store where gun holsters were displayed. King was “sluggish” and

“slightly unsteady on his feet.” A Glock pistol with an extended magazine was visible in King’s

right pants pocket. Officer Tibbetts retrieved the firearm with King’s permission. The officer

determined the gun was stolen and arrested King. King’s date of birth was April 19, 1993,

making him twenty-eight years old when Officer Tibbetts arrested him.

       King was adjudicated delinquent in Pennsylvania on May 6, 2010, when he was

seventeen years old, for receiving stolen property. The adjudicatory order describes this charge

as “a felony of the third degree” under Pennsylvania law. The Pennsylvania court imposed a

two-year period of probation subject to various conditions, including that King would “not be

permitted to hunt without the prior approval of the probation department and the court, subject to

a further prohibition that may apply in this case under the federal statutes.” King told Officer

Tibbetts after his 2021 arrest that he believed it was legal for him to possess the firearm.

       Testifying on his own behalf, King acknowledged his juvenile delinquency adjudication

in Pennsylvania in 2010. He stated, “My probation officer, when I was on probation for that

charge, told me that I could possess my guns. I couldn’t use them until I got off probation

because it was a stipulation, not the law.” According to King, the probation officer visited

King’s home, where firearms were openly displayed. King acknowledged that he was not

allowed to hunt without prior permission as a condition of his probation, but claimed that he

thought or assumed that he did not lose his “rights to bear arms” because he was a juvenile at the

time of the offense. At the time of King’s trial for the instant offense, his right to possess a

firearm had not been restored in Virginia. King also had accumulated three convictions

involving stealing.

                                                 -3-
       During closing argument, the trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to a

reference to evidence not in the record regarding King’s probation officer’s statements. The

defense suggests that this ruling foreclosed the court from considering the central thrust of

King’s “due process” argument that King reasonably relied on the Pennsylvania probation

officer’s statement and believed he could legally possess a gun in Virginia. Following the

disputed ruling, however, the trial court permitted defense counsel to argue that King relied on

“the content of the relationship with his probation officer and her visiting his home” to conclude

“that he could possess a firearm lawfully.” Based on this premise, defense counsel further

asserted that the “due process” exception recognized in Miller was applicable to excuse King’s

conduct.2

       Defense counsel also urged the trial court to take judicial notice of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 6105, which governs persons who were prohibited in that state from possessing a firearm due

to a prior criminal conviction or juvenile adjudication. The Commonwealth opposed the motion,

arguing that it was irrelevant whether Pennsylvania law permitted King to possess a firearm in

that state because Virginia law governed his conduct in Chesapeake in 2021. The

Commonwealth further argued that King’s possession of a firearm violated the terms of Code

§ 18.2-308.2(A)(iii).

       The trial court did not take judicial notice of the Pennsylvania code section, reasoning

that the statute did not govern King’s behavior in Virginia. The trial court rejected King’s

contention that a due process exception applied to excuse his conduct. The court found him

guilty, and this appeal followed.

       2
         In Miller, 25 Va. App. at 735, the Court recognized the “due process defense” that may
apply where “a defendant has reasonably relied upon affirmative assurances that certain conduct
is lawful, when those assurances are given by a public officer or body charged by law with
responsibility for defining permissible conduct with respect to the offense at issue.”
                                               -4-
                                           ANALYSIS

                                    I. The Due Process Claim

       In his first assignment of error, King claims that his conviction was unfair and violated

due process because “his probation officer made clear [that] any loss of rights would be fully

restored under Pennsylvania law upon his release from juvenile probation.”3 Such a due process

defense presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review on appeal. See

Miller, 25 Va. App. at 737 n.5 (noting that “‘reasonableness’ can be determined only after a

finding that the content and source of the information are legally sufficient to invoke due process

concerns”); see also McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490 (2001) (noting that when

faced with a mixed question of law and fact, the appellate court must defer to the trial court’s

factual findings but “determine independently” whether constitutional mandates have been met).

       In support of this argument, King relies on his own testimony that his Pennsylvania

probation officer informed him that he could possess his guns but could not “use them” until

King finished his probationary period. King asserts that he reasonably believed, based on the

Pennsylvania probation officer’s statements and conduct, that any loss of rights he suffered

would be fully restored following his release from juvenile probation.4 King then relies upon

Miller, in arguing that his due process rights were violated in Virginia when he was convicted of

       3
         King also notes on appeal that the General Assembly amended Code § 18.2-308.2 in
2015 to provide a procedure for recognition in Virginia of another jurisdiction’s restoration of a
defendant’s right to possess a firearm, and he argues that this amendment should apply here.
King did not raise this argument in the trial court, so it is procedurally barred. See Rule 5A:18.
However, we note that according to King’s own testimony, King’s right to possess firearms was
never restricted in Pennsylvania. A right that was never lost cannot be restored; therefore, the
2015 amendment to Code § 18.2-308.2 would be inapplicable here under King’s theory, even if
the issue were preserved. See 2015 Va. Acts ch. 767.
       4
        King did not argue below, nor does he argue on appeal, that he did not know that he had
been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile of an offense that would be a felony if committed by an
adult. He also does not argue that Code § 18.2-308.2 requires a showing of such knowledge.
                                               -5-
possession of a firearm by a felon after relying on this advice from his Pennsylvania probation

officer.

           In Miller, the defendant knew that his felony conviction meant he could not possess

firearms. He sold his hunting guns and hunted with a bow and arrow following his conviction;

however, he eventually decided he wanted to hunt with a muzzle-loading rifle. Miller, 25

Va. App. at 730. Miller contacted representatives from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco

and Firearms and from the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries; they advised that

he could possess a muzzleloader. Id. He also asked his Virginia probation officer, who gave

him the same advice. Id. Miller then purchased and hunted with a muzzle-loading rifle. He

eventually was charged with and convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon for that rifle.

On appeal, Miller argued that he had relied in good faith on the advice he had been given, and

that due process precluded his conviction under those circumstances. Id. at 731.

           Miller “addresses the legal consequences of a violation of the criminal law by an

individual who takes measures to learn what conduct the government has proscribed, but is

misadvised by the government itself.” Id. at 732. A due process defense exists “where a

defendant has reasonably relied upon affirmative assurances that certain conduct is lawful, when

those assurances are given by a public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for

defining permissible conduct with respect to the offense at issue.” Id. at 735. “The ultimate due

process inquiry is whether a defendant’s conviction, for reasonably and in good faith doing that

which he was told he could do, is fundamentally unfair in light of the content of the information

he received and its source.” Id. at 737.

           This due process defense involves two steps. First, “the defendant must establish, as a

threshold matter, the legal sufficiency of the content and source of the information received.” Id.

                  With respect to content, the defense is available only where the
                  information upon which the defendant has relied is an affirmative
                                                  -6-
               assurance that the conduct giving rise to the conviction is lawful.
               In the absence of such an affirmative assurance, the due process
               concerns that the defense is designed to protect are not implicated,
               and the defense fails.

Id. at 738. “As to the source of the information, it must be established that the information was

received from a ‘government official.’” Id. It is not enough to prove that the source was a state

actor; the defendant must show that the source was “a public officer or body charged by law with

responsibility for defining permissible conduct with respect to the offense at issue.” Id. at 739.

       Second, the trial court must make “a factual determination whether the defendant’s

reliance upon the information received was reasonable and in good faith.” Id. at 737. This due

process defense is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing it.

Id.

       King’s argument fails under Miller in multiple ways. First, he failed to show “the legal

sufficiency of the content and source of the information received.” See id. “[T]he defense is

available only where the information upon which the defendant has relied is an affirmative

assurance that the conduct giving rise to the conviction is lawful.” Id. at 738. Here, King

testified that his Pennsylvania probation officer indicated that he could continue to possess

firearms. However, he did not testify that his probation officer told him that he could possess

firearms in Virginia. Nor has he shown that a Pennsylvania probation officer is “charged by law

with responsibility for defining permissible conduct with respect to” possession of firearms in

Virginia. See id. at 739. Further, King failed to demonstrate that his reliance on his probation

officer’s advice was reasonable and in good faith. This requirement is not met by simply

assuming advice given regarding gun possession in Pennsylvania would apply to gun possession

in Virginia or any other state.5

       5
         We also note that there is no evidence that King was “misadvised” by a state actor.
Miller, 25 Va. App. at 732. King’s Pennsylvania probation officer appears to have given him
                                               -7-
          Miller, which dealt with a Virginia probation officer advising his probationer on a

question of Virginia law, explicitly limits its holding to advice received from Virginia state

actors.6 The Miller Court specifically declined to extend its holding to advice from out-of-state

actors:

                 Many cases involve a defendant who seeks to invoke the defense
                 as a bar to prosecution by one sovereign for advice received from
                 an official of another sovereign. The defense has been nearly
                 universally rejected in this dual-sovereign context. The only
                 exceptions are cases where a defendant has relied on the advice of
                 a state judge with respect to federal law.

Id. at 740 (citation omitted). Thus, Miller specifically distinguished its holding from the present

situation, where King seeks to rely on a Pennsylvania probation officer advising King on a

question of Pennsylvania law. In fact, King takes that reliance one step further, seeking to

extend his probation officer’s advice to apply to Virginia as well, even though there is no

evidence that his probation officer ever advised him that he could legally possess a firearm in

Virginia.

          Because the present situation clearly does not fall within the parameters of Miller, we

find that King’s due process rights were not violated.

                                 II. King’s Attempt to Expand Miller

          In his second assignment of error, King states: “If the due process exception in Miller v.

Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 727 (1997), does not include situations where a person is permitted

to possess a firearm in the state in which they are convicted, it should be modified.” King asks

accurate advice about the law in Pennsylvania at the time. There is no evidence that his
probation officer ever gave him advice, accurate or otherwise, about the law in Virginia (or any
other jurisdiction).
          6
         The Miller Court found that the agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms and from the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries were not “charged
by law with responsibility for defining permissible conduct under Code § 18.2-308.2,” but that
Miller’s probation officer did fall within the due process defense. Miller, 25 Va. App. at 742-43.
                                                 -8-
us to reach beyond our authority, as “[a] holding by one panel of the Court of Appeals of

Virginia ‘bind[s] all other three-judge panels under the interpanel accord doctrine.’” White v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 599, 612 n.7 (2017) (quoting Startin v. Commonwealth, 56

Va. App. 26, 39 n.3 (2010) (en banc)). “A decision of one panel protected by the interpanel

accord doctrine ‘cannot be overruled except by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the

Virginia Supreme Court.’” Id. (quoting Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 265 (2003)). In

accord with these principles, we decline King’s invitation to expand Miller.

                                III. The Closing Argument Dispute

       King argues that a dispute regarding closing argument resulted in the trial court

foreclosing consideration of his Miller due process argument. “The decision regarding the

appropriateness of a closing argument is committed to the discretion of the trial court.” Canipe

v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 639 (1997). “This [C]ourt will not interfere with the

exercise of this broad discretion unless it affirmatively appears that such discretion has been

abused and that the rights of the complaining litigant have been prejudiced.” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Cohen v. Power, 183 Va. 258, 262 (1944)).

       Here, the following exchange occurred during closing argument:

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Here, Mr. King testified that at
               sentencing he was advised that he was not allowed to hunt. And
               actually the reason I took so long with the sentencing order earlier
               is because I was flipping through to see if there was any mention
               of possessing a firearm in there. There is not but there is a
               paragraph on maybe the fourth page stating that Mr. King was not
               allowed to hunt while he was on probation, consistent with his
               testimony today. And, Your Honor, he testified that his probation
               officer -- and needless to say but he did testify to it earlier that his
               probation officer told him that he could.

               [COMMONWEALTH]: Objection. . . . It’s not evidence in the
               record. It’s not evidence before the court. It’s not appropriate to
               incorporate items into argument that were excluded from evidence.

               THE COURT: I’m going to sustain that objection.
                                                 -9-
       The trial judge sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to this vague statement by

King’s attorney regarding King’s permission to hunt while on probation; counsel stated that

King’s probation officer “told him that he could,” but the evidence actually suggested he could

not hunt without prior permission. The defense now asserts that limiting counsel’s reference to

the phrase “his probation officer told him that he could” related to firearm possession rather than

hunting—and that, based on the ruling, the trial court may have inappropriately failed to consider

this central aspect of his claim. The record, however, does not support King’s reading of the

proceedings.7 In any event, immediately after this ruling, the trial court clearly permitted

defense counsel to raise the argument that King had inferred from the Pennsylvania probation

officer’s statements that King “could possess a firearm lawfully.” This argument ultimately did

not succeed—but King certainly was not prevented from making the claim.8

       Contrary to King’s assertion on appeal, the record does not reflect that, in sustaining the

Commonwealth’s objection during closing argument, the trial court refused to consider King’s

       7
         The trial transcript indicates that the prosecution’s objection was that King could not
hunt without prior permission; there was no evidence to the contrary. Any suggestion that King
could hunt without permission while on probation was outside the record.
       8
         After the initial ruling, and without objection, defense counsel was permitted to
rephrase her position and argue as follows:

                       Your Honor, he testified that his probation officer came to
               his house all the time, that he has had guns on display in the home,
               and he also -- the first police officer, Officer Tibbetts who testified
               today said that Mr. King told him that he believed that he could
               possess a firearm at the time of his arrest. That, coupled with the
               certified conviction offered by the prosecution showing that he was
               only prohibited from hunting, as well as Mr. King’s testimony
               about his probation officer coming to the house and seeing guns in
               his house every time she came to visit, Your Honor, I believe allow
               him to successfully argue this due process defense, which is he
               reasonably relied on the certified conviction order, on the
               statements of his probation officer -- I’m sorry. On the content of
               the relationship with his probation officer and her visiting his
               home, he believed that he could possess a firearm lawfully.
                                                 - 10 -
position that his probation officer told him that he could possess firearms—even if he could not

use them. Nor did the court prevent King from relying on Miller. Rather, the trial court ruled

that King’s legal status vis-a-vis possession of firearms in Pennsylvania during his probation was

irrelevant to whether he could lawfully possess a firearm in Virginia in 2021. The court found

that King’s rights in Virginia were governed by Code § 18.2-308.2 and that the Miller rationale

did not apply.

       “A trial court has broad discretion in the supervision of opening statements and closing

argument.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 70, 92 (2019) (quoting O’Dell v.

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 703 (1988)). “[An appellate] court will not interfere with the

exercise of this broad discretion unless it affirmatively appears that such discretion has been

abused and that the rights of the complaining litigant have been prejudiced.” Walls v.

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 273, 280 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen, 183 Va. at

262). King has demonstrated no prejudice or abuse of discretion by the trial court in sustaining

the Commonwealth’s objection during argument. King’s closing argument was not improperly

restricted in any way. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

                                  IV. The Judicial Notice Question

       Finally, King asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of 18 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 6105, which governs possessing a firearm after conviction of certain offenses or

juvenile adjudications in Pennsylvania. Virginia does permit a trial court to take judicial notice

of statutes from other jurisdictions in proper cases. Under Code § 19.2-265.2(A),

                 [w]henever, in any criminal case it becomes necessary to ascertain
                 what the law, statutory or otherwise, of this Commonwealth, of
                 another state, of the United States, of another country, or of any
                 political subdivision or agency of the same is, or was, at any time,
                 the court shall take judicial notice thereof whether specially
                 pleaded or not.

                                                - 11 -
See also Va. R. Evid. 2:202(a) (stating that a trial court “may” take judicial notice of another

state’s laws). Nonetheless, “the most elementary first step is that ‘[e]vidence must be relevant to

be admissible. It is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”’” Ragland v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 519, 535 (2017) (quoting Payne v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App.

194, 217 (2015)). “[E]very fact, ‘however remote or insignificant, that tends to establish the

probability or improbability of a fact in issue is relevant.’” Id. at 535-36 (alteration in original)

(quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, adopted upon reh’g en banc, 45

Va. App. 811 (2005)). “Put another way, evidence has relevance if it tends to cast any light on

any material point.” Id. at 536 (quoting Thomas, 44 Va. App. at 753).

       Here, the Pennsylvania statute was not relevant, nor was it necessary for the trial court to

ascertain Pennsylvania law. As the trial judge reasoned, the Pennsylvania statute is not

controlling in Virginia, making it both irrelevant and unnecessary to the trial court. King’s

conduct in Virginia is governed by the Virginia Code. By its express terms, Code

§ 18.2-308.2(A)(iii) prohibits possession of a firearm by a person who is under the age of

twenty-nine and who was adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile fourteen years of age or older at

the time of the felonious delinquent act “under the laws of the Commonwealth, or any other state

. . . .” Cartagena v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 202, 209 (2017); see also supra note 1. The

evidence was undisputed that King was seventeen years old when he was adjudicated delinquent

for a felonious act in Pennsylvania, and he was twenty-eight when Officer Tibbetts arrested him

in Chesapeake. Pennsylvania law regarding whether King was permitted to possess a firearm in

Pennsylvania following his juvenile adjudication was irrelevant to his guilt or innocence of

violating Code § 18.2-308.2(A)(iii) in Virginia. See Cartagena, 68 Va. App. at 209. Nor, under

the circumstances of this case, was it necessary for the trial court to ascertain the law of

                                                - 12 -
Pennsylvania in order to determine King’s guilt or innocence on this charge. The trial court did

not err in refusing to take judicial notice of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105.

                                              CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment.

                                                                                  Affirmed.

                                                - 13 -