Court Opinion

ID: 9547203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:43:42.272874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:27.709636
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The cases cited by the majority to support its conclusions deal with civil rather than criminal issues and do not discuss the question of specific intent prerequisite to criminal liability. The State assumed the burden of establishing the defendants’ specific intent to defraud by the language of the information. The issue, therefore, is not whether there were misstatements of material facts as required by RCW 21.20.010, but whether the defendants “wilfully” made misstatements of material facts as required by RCW 21.20.400. The proof of a market value unknown to the defendants may be relevant to the issue of whether they made misstatements of a material fact. This, however, was not the offense charged. The charge was that they intentionally misstated the value of the stock.
Intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Ladley v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 73 Wn.2d 928, 934, 442 P.2d 983 (1968). It is still necessary, however, that the evidence, to be relevant, must show by reasonable inference that the defendants had personal knowledge of the values quoted in the Twin Falls paper. State v. Brache, 63 Wash. 396, 115 P. 853 (1911); Keisel v. Bredick, 192 Wash. 665, 74 P.2d 473 (1937); State v. Wilson, 38 Wn.2d 593, 231 P.2d 288 (1951); Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959). The evidence regarding value as reflected in the quotes of Mr. Alex Sinclair, a Twin Falls broker, was not relevant to the crime charged and was improperly admitted. This evidence failed to show, even inferentially, that the defendants had the requisite personal knowledge of these quotes. There is other evidence in the record which would support the additional factual allegations sustaining the charges against the defendants. But the record does not *666conclusively show::.-the defendants would have been convicted without the testimony of Mr. .Sinclair. Portions of the testimony of Mr. Frazier, the owner of the company, raise at least a jury question about the accuracy of other testimony regarding the value of the stock at the time of the alleged criminal offense. On cross-examination,.-Mr. Frazier testified as follows: “Q. In your opinion, Mr. Frazier, was the stock quoted by him [Sinclair] being under-priced? A. Well, yes sir, in my opinion, but so is most all the other stock in the nation today. Q. In particular,-with your knowledge about the prospects of the company and the plans and objectives, would you have sold your personal stock at [the prices quoted by Sinclair] had you been able to? A. No sir.” Mr. Frazier also testified that he “couldn’t say that I knew what the fair market trading price of that stock should be at any time [during the year the sale took place].”.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed as to both defendants and remanded for new trial inasmuch as this court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R. 3d 1065 (1967); State v. Britton, 27 Wn.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947); State v. Mack, 80 Wn.2d 19, 21-22, 490 P.2d 1303 (1971).
Rosellini, Stafford, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied January 13, 1975.