Court Opinion

ID: 9755132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:26:57.640339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:03.294078
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Bell:
The First Class City Home Rule Act of April 21, 1949, P. L. 665, authorizes cities to frame and adopt or amend their own charters and exercise all powers and authority of local self-government “subject to the limitations hereinafter prescribed”. The limitations hereinafter prescribed are, inter alia:
“Section 18. . . . Notwithstanding the grant of powers contained in this act, no city shall exercise powers contrary to* or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly which are — (a) Applicable to a class or classes of cities on the following subjects: (9) ... (b) Applicable in every part of the Commonwealth, (c) Applicable to all the cities of the Commonwealth.”
It is crystal clear that that Act is directly applicable to and controls the instant case, and invalidates that part of the Charter which is in conflict with the Act of September 29, 1951, P. L. 1654, 53 PS §304.
The Act of September 29, 1951, supra, provides “all decisions of the Civil Service Board or Commission in any city shall be subject to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. . . . The appeal may be taken by any employe aggrieved thereby, . . . .” Could any language be clearer? That Act, by the clear language contained in its title and in its provisions, applies not to some cities, or to all cities except cities of the first class, or except to chartered cities — it applies to all cities.
That Act of the Legislature is by its clear terms and intent of State-wide application to all cities. It *61grants unquestionably to discharged civil service employes a right of appeal to the Courts. This right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure or local concern — it is a matter of substance, a matter of Statewide concern, which the Legislature wisely said in the Act of 1951 applies to all cities. A right of appeal to a Court given to a policeman or other Civil Service employe who is discharged from his job for “just cause”, by a civil service commission, is such a fundamental, substantive, American right that it is of Statewide concern, not only to the Legislature but to all of the people of Pennsylvania! As such, it is paramount to and invalidates any City Ordinance or City Charter which, as here, conflicts therewith.*
The decision of the majority flies directly in the teeth of the clear language of the Act of 1949! The majority relies upon Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A. 2d 834. That case was factually entirely different from the instant case, and as such is clearly distinguishable. If, however, we assume that the language of that opinion is applicable to the instant case, i.e., that subparagraphs (b) and (c) of the Act of 1949 limited the City of Philadelphia to substantive matters of State-wide concern, it does not support the majority opinion but strengthens and confirms this opinion. Moreover, the majority opinion is contrary to and in conflict with Kelly v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A. 2d 238. The Federal and out of state decisions cited in the majority opinion are not only not binding but also they are clearly distinguishable — in those cases there was no statutory or constitutional limitation of the rights of a city to local self-government such as exists in Pennsylvania.
*62The lower Court in discussing the merits, speaking through Judge Davis, said:
“Addison was discharged for purchasing his home entirely with monies furnished him by Leo ‘Olee’ Coleman, the well known numbers banker.
“We have sustained his appeal for failure of proof of the essential element of the specification, viz., that Addison knowingly borrowed money from Leo Coleman, the notorious numbers banker.
“We have difficulty concluding from the record without gross speculation, that Addison received mortgage money from a person personally known to him at all, much less known to him to be a notorious numbers banker.
“The following factors militate against appellant’s knowledge thereof. He pursued normal legitimate channels to purchase and pay for his home. He inquired of the real estate broker, Abe Johnson, whom he had known for years as a neighborhood realtor, as to the value and the amount of mortgage money he might anticipate obtaining. He engaged an attorney who bid, prepared the deed and mortgage, procured the actual funds, and handled the matter for him. Thereafter he paid monthly installments thereon to the agents of the mortgagee and subsequent assignees.
“To purchase the property was his unquestionable right. To mortgage the property likewise was his right. To mortgage the property to a person named Leo Coleman was his right. Only to knowingly do so to Leo ‘Clee’ Coleman, the numbers banker, was not his right:
“There.is no evidence in the record from which any responsible fact finding tribunal can conclude that Addison knew at the time that he executed the mortgage who the actual lender of the money was, much less that he knew him to be Olee Coleman, the numbers *63banker. See Gartland v. City of Philadelphia, 70 D. & C. 161.
“Suspicion was aroused by the fact that the amount of the mortgage equalled the bid to the sheriff. It would have been easy and better to have offered testi mony from a qualified realtor that such a mortgage was inordinately large for the premises in question anc not indicated as being warranted by its market value if that was the case.
“Further suspicion was indulged in from the fact that Addison made only one numbers arrest in the several years while on duty in the area where Clee Coleman lived. How many arrests should he have made? How many arrests did others make? Both facts were susceptible of proof, if relevant, and not proven.
“We had occasion to review the kind of substantial proof necessary in Connolly case, supra. Suspicion is not enough.
“We have reviewed the record carefully and conclude that the Civil Service Commission acted on suspicion and not on substantive proof, for which reason we have sustained the appeal.”
The evidence was sufficient to support the findings of the Court below; there was no error of law; and I cannot say that the trial Judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, and whose findings and conclusions were supported by the Court en banc, committed a manifest abuse of discretion. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court below.
Mr. Justice Musmanno joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 It is' unnecessary to decide whether this provision of the Charter violates the Constitution.