Court Opinion

ID: 9745463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:59:20.451406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:24.508931
License: Public Domain

PERLUSS, P. J., Dissenting.
Because the Bell Gardens police officers’ discovery of a valid outstanding arrest warrant for Guillermo Rodriguez during the course of their arguably unlawful traffic stop so attenuates the connection between the stop itself and the evidence discovered during their *1150properly limited search incident to arrest that any taint from the primary illegality has been purged (see People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 448, 450 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581] (Boyer)), I would affirm the trial court’s order denying Rodriguez’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Evidence need not be suppressed as “ ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ ” even if the evidence would not have come to light but for an infringement of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.1 (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448; Hudson v. Michigan (2006) 547 U.S._,_ [165 L.Ed.2d 56, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164] (Hudson).) “ ‘The question is whether the evidence was obtained by the government’s exploitation of the illegality or whether the illegality has become attenuated so as to dissipate the taint. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” {Boyer, at p. 448.) “Attenuation can occur, of course, when the causal connection is remote. [Citation.] Attenuation also occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” (Hudson, at p._[126 S.Ct. at p. 2164.].)
As the majority explains, three factors are typically examined to determine whether the causal chain has been sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal conduct; the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; the presence of intervening circumstances; and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. (See Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448; Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603-604 [45 L.Ed.2d 416, 95 S.Ct. 2254].) But the fundamental question remains whether the evidence came from the “ ‘exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” (Wong Sun v. Untied States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 488 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407]; see United States v. Crews (1980) 445 U.S. 463, 471 [63 L.Ed.2d 537, 100 S.Ct. 1244] [“In the typical ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ case, however, the challenged evidence was acquired by the police after some initial Fourth Amendment violation, and the question before the court is whether the chain of causation proceeding from the unlawful conduct has become so attenuated or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance so as to remove the ‘taint’ imposed upon that evidence by the original illegality.”]; Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 448.) In my view, the majority gives far too little significance *1151to the fact the intervening circumstance in this case was the discovery of a valid, outstanding arrest warrant.
The evidence at issue in this case—a baggie containing methamphetamine—was discovered in the automobile driven by Rodriguez during what the majority correctly describes as “a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest based upon an outstanding warrant.” The starting point for analyzing Rodriguez’s suppression motion, therefore—a point conceded by Rodriguez’s counsel at oral argument and not disputed by my colleagues in the majority—is that the Bell Gardens police officers who detained Rodriguez could lawfully arrest him based on that warrant, regardless of the validity of the traffic stop itself. (E.g., U.S. v. Green (7th Cir. 1997) 111 F.3d 515, 521 [“It would be startling to suggest that because the police illegally stopped an automobile, they cannot arrest an occupant who is found to be wanted on a warrant—in a sense requiring an official call of ‘Oily, Oily, Oxen Free.’ ”]; U.S. v. Hudson (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 425, 439-440; see People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 583 [159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207] [arrest on warrant discovered as result of improperly prolonged traffic stop does not bar prosecution for underlying offense].)
Once it is agreed the officers could lawfully arrest Rodriguez on the outstanding warrant, it necessarily follows the officers were entitled to conduct a properly limited search incident to that arrest, which includes a search of the passenger compartment of Rodriguez’s automobile: A lawful arrest in which the defendant is taken into custody gives the arresting officers the right to search the defendant for weapons or evidence at the scene (Gustafson v. Florida (1973) 414 U.S. 260, 263-266 [38 L.Ed.2d 456, 94 S.Ct. 488]; United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 225-236 [38 L.Ed.2d 427, 94 S.Ct. 467]), as' well as to search the area within the lunging distance of the arrestee—that is, “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” (Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 763 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034].) When the arrestee was the occupant of a car, the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest includes the passenger compartment of the car even if the arrestee has been removed and no longer has access to the vehicle. (New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460-461 [69 L.Ed.2d 768, 101 S.Ct. 2860] [when police officer makes lawful custodial arrest of automobile’s occupant, Fourth Amendment allows officer to search vehicle’s passenger compartment as contemporaneous incident of arrest]; Thornton v. United States (2004) 541 U.S. 615, 617, 622-624 [158 L.Ed.2d 905, 124 S.Ct. 2127].)
If the Bell Gardens police officers were authorized to search the passenger compartment of Rodriguez’s automobile, at least in part to protect themselves *1152from the possibility he could grab a weapon hidden within his reach, what possible interest is served by holding that contraband discovered as a result of that lawful search incident to a lawful arrest should be suppressed? This is not a situation in which the arrest itself is a direct product of the allegedly unlawful traffic stop, as would be the case, for example, when officers arrest a motorist after observing a firearm or illegal drugs in plain view following the stop. (See, e.g., People v. Parnell (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 862, 874-875 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 302] [gun discovered in plain view following traffic stop].) In those instances it may well be proper to conclude the officers exploited the unlawful traffic stop to search the arrestee’s automobile. But here, the outstanding warrant was a judicial order directing the arrest of Rodriguez whenever and wherever he was located. The officers had a right to arrest Rodriguez and a right to search him and the car once he was arrested. In short, the search in this case was the result of the continuing requirement that the arrest warrant be enforced, not the traffic stop itself, even though that stop was the “but for” cause for the timing of his arrest. (See Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._[126 S.Ct. at p. 2164] [“Our cases show that but-for causality is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for suppression.”].)2
Whether or not the traffic stop itself was proper, the evidence was discovered as a direct consequence of a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant, not through exploitation of the initial detention. As we have said in a related context, “It would defy common sense to hold seizure of the [contraband] under these circumstances was unreasonable.” (People v. Parnell, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.)3
*1153Although by no means binding, a number of state supreme courts and federal circuit courts of appeals have reached similar conclusions in similar circumstances. For example, earlier this year in State v. Frierson (Fla. 2006) 926 So.2d 1139, 1144, the Florida Supreme Court held, “The brief amount of time that elapsed between the illegal stop and the arrest of respondent weighs against finding the search attenuated, but this factor is not dispositive. In turning to the next factor, the outstanding arrest warrant was an intervening circumstance that weighs in favor of the firearm found in a search incident to the outstanding arrest warrant being sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal stop to be purged of the ‘primary taint’ of the illegal stop. Crucially, the search was incident to the outstanding warrant and not incident to the illegal stop. The outstanding arrest warrant was a judicial order directing the arrest of respondent whenever the respondent was located. As Judge Gross noted [in the concurring opinion in the intermediate appellate court], ‘A warrant indicates the existence of criminal conduct separate from the conduct that occurred at the time of the illegal traffic stop.’ [Citation.] The illegality of the stop does not affect the continuing required enforcement of the court’s order that respondent be arrested.”
Similarly, in State v. Page (2004) 140 Idaho 841 [103 P.3d 454, 455] the Supreme Court of Idaho concluded, “[Discovery of an outstanding warrant *1154for [the defendant’s] arrest constituted an intervening event, dissipating any possible taint of unlawful law enforcement conduct.” (Accord, State v. Hill (La. 1998) 725 So.2d 1282, 1286 [“the discovery of the existence of outstanding arrest warrants gives an officer probable cause to arrest, and may constitute an intervening circumstance within the meaning of Brown, which may dissipate the taint caused by prior police misconduct”]; State v. Jones (2001) 270 Kan. 526 [17 P.3d 359, 361] [once the officer “learned of the outstanding warrant, he had a right and duty to arrest [the defendant]. Subsequent to the arrest, [the officer] had the right to search [the defendant].”]; U.S. v. Green, supra, 111 F.3d at pp. 521, 522 [“The lawful arrest of Avery constituted an intervening circumstance sufficient to dissipate any taint caused by the illegal automobile stop.” “Where a lawful arrest pursuant to a warrant constitutes the ‘intervening circumstance’ (as in this case), it is an even more compelling case for the conclusion that the taint of the original illegality is dissipated.”]; U.S. v. Simpson (8th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 490, 495 [same].)
One additional point troubles me about my colleagues’ analysis. The majority holds, as I understand it, if the traffic stop was unlawful, then the evidence discovered during the search incident to Rodriguez’s otherwise lawful arrest must be suppressed. Why? Because in the view of the majority, if the brake light was not in fact broken at the time of the traffic stop and the Bell Garden police officers cannot adequately explain an objectively reasonable basis for their belief it was (see, e.g., People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1136 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 136 P.3d 859] [“The question for us, though, is not whether Ingram’s vehicle was in fact in full compliance with the law at the time of the stop, but whether Officer Womack had ‘ “articulable suspicion” ’ it was not.”]; see generally Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 184 [111 L.Ed.2d 148, 110 S.Ct. 2793] [“ ‘reasonableness,’ with respect to this necessary element, does not demand that the government be factually correct in its assessment”]), then the officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing must be perjury. Yet, even if the officers were mistaken about the operating condition of the right brake light and the trial court concludes their actions were not objectively reasonable (see Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 397 [104 L.Ed.2d 443, 109 S.Ct. 1865] [“the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. ... An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable [action]; nor will an *1155officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable [act] constitutional”]), it does not necessarily follow the officers’ testimony at the initial suppression hearing constituted perjury. Honest mistakes happen, even when police officers are involved. Accordingly, I believe it is premature to conclude, as does the majority, if the traffic stop was improper, the officers involved in stopping Rodriguez necessarily engaged in flagrant misconduct that requires suppression of the methamphetamine discovered in his car. (See Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 449 [issues of attenuation properly resolved on appeal only if their factual bases are fully set forth in the record]; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311] [same].)
For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 Whether relevant evidence obtained by assertedly unlawful means must be excluded is determined exclusively by deciding whether its suppression is mandated by the federal Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 561-562 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 28 P.3d 239]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].)

 In Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. _ [126 S.Ct. 2159], the United States Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in a search of the defendant’s home pursuant to a validly issued search warrant notwithstanding the officers’ violation of the knock-and-announce rule. The question in Hudson, as it is in this case, where the search also took place pursuant to a valid, judicially issued warrant, was not whether the search would take place, but rather when it would occur. (See id. at p._[126 S.Ct. at p. 2165] [“What the knock-and-announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant. Since the interests that were violated in this case have nothing to do with the seizure of the evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”].)

 In People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577, the Supreme Court held a police officer who stops a motorist for a traffic violation may detain the motorist for as long as is reasonably necessary for the officer to perform the duties required by the stop. (Id. at p. 584.) Investigative activities beyond the original purpose of a traffic stop are permissible so long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time it would otherwise take. (Ibid.; see People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 498 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 793].) Accordingly, “[i]f a warrant check can be completed within the same period, no reason appears to hold it improper: because it would not add to the delay already lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his violation, it would not represent any further intrusion on his rights.” (McGaughran, at p. 584.) In explaining what was not involved in the case before it, the McGaughran court in dicta *1153suggested, when an arrest on an outstanding warrant discovered during an unlawful detention results in the seizure and use of incriminating evidence against the arrestee, the defendant may invoke the exclusionary rule. (Id. at p. 583.)
I respect the advice of Justice Kaus, offered in People v. Trice (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 984, 986-987 [143 Cal.Rptr. 730], while he was still a member of this court, and would normally follow dicta from the California Supreme Court. (See ibid. [“Whether the Supreme Court’s obvious awareness of the consequences of its statement elevates the dictum to a holding or whether it is a dictum that we must follow, does not make much difference. We follow.”].) In this instance, however, only three other justices concurred in Justice Mosk’s opinion for the court in McGaughran, including the dicta regarding discovery of evidence during a search incident to an arrest pursuant to a warrant discovered during an unlawful traffic stop; and Justice Newman’s concurrence was based solely on the California Constitution (see McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 595 (cone. opn. of Newman, J.)), which, prior to the adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d), by Proposition 8 on the June 1982 California primary election ballot, imposed an independent and less exacting standard for the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence than does the federal Constitution. (See generally In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 885-890 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court made plain in Hudson, there has been a considerable narrowing in the application of the federal exclusionary rule since the 1970’s when McGaughran was decided. (See Hudson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._[126 S.Ct. at pp. 2163-2164] [“ ‘Subsequent case law has rejected this reflexive application of the exclusionary rule.’ [Citation.]”].) Accordingly, I do not believe exclusion of the evidence found in Rodriguez’s car is required under the doctrine of stare decisis. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)