Court Opinion

ID: 9564727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:54.321691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.430082
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
dissenting in part.
As the majority correctly indicates, the use of peremptory challenges for racially discriminatory reasons violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). The North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 26, also prohibits the exercise of peremptory strikes solely on the basis of race. State v. Ross, 338 N.C. 280, 284, 449 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1994). Unfortunately, the trial court’s handling of defendant’s Batson challenges in this case circumvented the procedures established by the United States *332Supreme Court and this Court to avoid racial discrimination in the selection of a jury.
The Supreme Court enunciated the procedure that a trial court must utilize when a defendant objects to a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors of the defendant’s race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88. This Court has frequently reiterated this procedure. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489,. 497, 391 S.E.2d 144, 150 (1990). First, a defendant must make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which he may do by showing:
(1) he is a member of a cognizable racial minority, (2) members of his racial group have been peremptorily excused, and (3) racial discrimination appears to have been the motivation for the challenges.
Id. But see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1991) (modifying Batson by holding that a defendant has standing to object to racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges even if there is not racial identity between defendant and the excused juror); State v. Beach, 333 N.C. 733, 430 S.E.2d 248 (1993). If the defendant succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a race-neutral reason for each challenged peremptory strike. State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991). The rebuttal must be clear, reasonably specific, and related to the particular case to be tried. Id. at 17, 409 S.E.2d at 297. The defendant also “has a right of surrebuttal to show that the prosecutor’s explanations are a pretext.” Porter, 326 N.C. at 497, 391 S.E.2d at 150. Finally, “[o]nce the State gives an explanation for its peremptory challenges, the trial court then determines ‘whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.’ ” State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 20-21, 478 S.E.2d 163, 173 (1996) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)), cert, denied, - U.S. —•, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997). The procedure used by the trial court in this case cut short the inquiry required to establish whether the State’s given reasons were nondiscriminatory.
The majority concludes that the trial court correctly determined that defendant had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the peremptory challenges of two black prospective jurors, Mrs. Hudson and Mr. Watkins. I disagree.
*333At the time of the peremptory challenges of Mrs. Hudson and Mr. Watkins, the State had already peremptorily challenged two of three black venire members from the first panel of prospective jurors. The prosecutor exercised his first two peremptory challenges against two black prospective jurors, Mr. Greene and Mr. McKinney. Defendant objected. The trial court conducted a Batson hearing and found, inter alia, that defendant is a black man, that the victim was a white female, and that the venire contained “very few blacks.” Concluding that defendant had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of the State’s peremptory challenges, the trial court required the State to come forward with race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The trial court concluded that the reasons given to challenge Mr. Greene were race-neutral and sufficient to justify the peremptory challenge. However, as to Mr. McKinney, the trial court concluded that the proffered reason for the strike was not race-neutral and appeared to be pretextual. The trial court concluded that the entire jury panel should be discarded to remedy the discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. The State chose to withdraw its challenge of juror McKinney-rather than discard the entire jury panel.
Following the State’s peremptory challenge of the next black prospective juror, Mrs. Hudson, defendant again objected. After noting that a Batson hearing had previously been conducted, the trial court stated:
At this point the prosecution has accepted two black jurors, has excused one; if Mrs. Hudson is excused, that will be two out of four. I do not find that this raises the presumption required to make the prosecution state its reasons. There are sufficient black jurors remaining on the panel.
(Emphasis added.) The trial court declined to find that defendant had made a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the State’s peremptory challenge of Mrs. Hudson.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was correct in this ruling. The trial court found that the prosecutor had “accepted” the seating of two black jurors and had excused one; however, the State “accepted” juror McKinney only after the court decided to remedy the racial discrimination by dismissing the entire jury panel.
Likewise, when Mr. Watkins was subsequently peremptorily challenged, the State had exercised peremptory challenges against four of *334five black jurors, even though it ultimately “accepted” two of five. In response to defendant’s Batson objection, the trial court again noted that two black jurors in the pool had been seated. The trial court then stated that while it was “a little bit troublesome” that three out of five black jurors would have been excused by the State, it would not find that defendant had made out a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson.
I believe that the trial court erred in both instances by ignoring the State’s prior attempt to exercise a peremptory challenge in a racially discriminatory manner and focusing instead on the number of black jurors seated. This evidence of purposeful discrimination is especially significant in light of the circumstances of this case, where defendant is a black man charged with the murder of an elderly white woman. Such circumstances make this a case especially “susceptible to racially discriminatory jury selection.” State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423, 431, 407 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1991).
The majority finds it unnecessary to address defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to make findings under the third step of the Batson analysis because of its conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding no prima facie case of discrimination. However, I believe that defendant sufficiently raised “an inference of purposeful discrimination,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, such that the trial court should have proceeded to conduct a further inquiry. The trial court should have made findings and conclusions as to whether the State’s reasons were legitimate and race-neutral or pretextual and discriminatory. In this case, the trial court failed to “rule[] on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred by concluding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination as to the peremptory challenges of prospective jurors Hudson and Watkins. I would therefore remand this case to the trial court for a hearing on the Batson issue. If the State’s articulated reasons for the challenges are determined to be race-neutral, defendant is entitled to produce evidence to rebut the State’s reasons and prove that the State engaged in purposeful racial discrimination. If defendant can meet this burden, then he must be awarded a new trial.
Justice Whichard joins in this dissenting opinion.