Court Opinion

ID: 9821110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:49:31.037297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:48.058399
License: Public Domain

JUDGE HAWTHORNE,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the court gbused its discretion by finding that all of the student loans incurred after the parties' separation were separate debt. I also agree that the trial court erred in determining the award of maintenance before fully dividing the parties' marital and separate property, And I agree with the majority's analysis of the trial and appellate attorney fees issues.
However, I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of what should be considered "financial resources," given the common *806usage of this term. And to the extent the majority found no reported case addressing this issue, this fact does not weigh in favor of the majority or the dissent.
When determining the amount and duration of a maintenance award that the court deems just, Ch. 151, sec. 1, § 14-10-114(4), 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 484, requires a district court to consider all relevant factors. These factors include "[the financial resources" of the spouse seeking maintenance and that spouse's ability to meet his or her needs independently. § 14-10-114(4)(a), 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws at 484. >
We read a statute's words and phrases in context and construe them according to their common usage. § 2-4-101, C.R. $.2015.. "(It is not the role of the courts to rewrite or eliminate clear and unambiguous statutes merely because they do not believe the General Assembly would have intended the éon-sequences of its enactments." People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 360 (Colo.2001) (Coats, J., dissenting). R
The term "financial resources" is not defined in the statute, so it is proper for us to consult definitions in rétognizéd dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of this term words. See Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 9 (Colo.2001). One such dictionary provides three definitions that inform our decision. "Financial" is defined as "relating to finance," and "finances" are defined as "the pecuniary affairs or resources of a state, company, or individual." Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 851 (2002). In addition, "resources" are defined as "immediate and possible sources of revenue," "something to which one has recourse in difficulty," and "means of resort in exigency." Id. at 1984. Reading the term "financial resources" in its statutory context, its common meaning is: in the pecuniary affairs of the spouse seeking maintenance, those possible sources of reyenue to 'which that spouse has recourse and to which he or she may resort to meet his or her needs independently. Student loans are one such possible source of revenue to wife.
Indeed, wife states in her opening brief that "[student] loans were incurred during the marriage that provided both a subsidy for living expenses and [her] school expenses." ' It is undisputed that during the marriage, the parties jointly used portions of student loans as sources of revenue for living expenses. So, under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion when it considered wife's receipt of $38,000 in student loans a part of her financial resources.
The trial court considered wife's student loans "income for [wlife to live off of," The court's analysis in arriving at its maintenance award appears to have been focused primarily on the income or income-like nature of those loans and wife's ability to use them to meet her needs. While the student loans might help wife pay for some of her living expenses, I agree with the majority that the loans are nevertheless generally a debt wife will most likely have to repay, When considering the loans as a "financial resource" for maintenance purposes, the court should also have considered the liability 'created by the loans.1 Cf. In re Marriage of Hill, 166 P.3d 269, 272 (Colo.App.2007) (noting that the parties' "financial resources" for purposes of attorney fees include their incomes, assets, and liabilities). -
I reject Wlfes related assertlon that the sonogram school loans were not going to be used to pay for living expenses and should therefore. not be considered in deciding her malntenance request. Wife testified that her loans were historically used ,to pay for both school expenses and hvmg expenses, The court had discretion to infer from this evidence that wife would llkevmse use the sonogram loans for those purposes. See In re Marriage of Foottit, 903 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Colo.App.1995) (statmg that inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the evidence are matters within the chstnct court's sole d1scret1on)
*807The majority concludes that construing "financial resources" as I do poses the potential for "serious injustice" because courts would be permitted to consider a party's potential ability to obtain any type of loan as a financial resource.2 But I would not adopt such a broad rule and, therefore, I only address the student loans actually obtained in this case. Rather than looking at a party's ability. to obtain all types of loans, courts may consider whether the party obtained student loans, as the court did here. I would consider student loans a financial resource when a party has actually obtained the loans and used a portion of the loans for living expenses,. thus lowering the party's reasonable needs. § 14-10-114(8)(a)(D)(D), C.R.8.2015. When a party, as here, previously used student loans to subsidize living expenses, courts may consider student loans obtained by a party a financial resource when they find that the loans are covering living expenses. Thus, my interpretation would not result in a serious injustice as applied.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

. I note that the new maintenance statute specifically dlsungulshes a party's "meome from his or her "financial resources," supporting a con- ~ clusion that a party's "financial resources" includes more than just income or income-like property. See § 14-10-1140G)@(0(W), (C), C.R.S.2015. *

. I do not address the majorltys "parade of horribles" that might lead to "serious injustice" because the issue of credit worthiness for other types of loans and circumstances surrounding those potential loan; are not before us. See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist, 2015 CO 50, ©29 n. 15, 351 P.3d 461.