Court Opinion

ID: 9458890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:04:34.427434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:55.865682
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
dissenting-
I agree with that large part of the Court’s opinion which, sets out in descriptive fashion the wisdom of having the trial judge make the bail determination in the first instance, the necessity that the trial judge set out his reasons for denying bail pending appeal, and the deference due those reasons when adequately stated. I also share the view that the statement of reasons in this case is little more than a parroting of the statute and insufficient to satisfy the demands of Fed.R.App.P. 9(b) and our case law. My disagreement goes only to the issue of the proper disposition in this court. I believe that the letter and spirit of the governing rules require both that we reach the substantive issues in this motion now and that we order Stanley released, subject to conditions, pending determination of his appeal.
I
The majority justifies its remand of this record by invoking Fed.R.App.P. 9(b) in support of its assertion that “appraisal of the intangibles which ultimately make or break the case for bail” 1 can best be performed by the District Court. In my opinion the Court misconceives the thrust of both the rule and our decisions construing it.
The overriding purpose of the procedural requirements of the rule is expedition — even at some expense to the “traditional” role of the trial court. The Advisory Committee’s Notes make clear that the provision for trial court determination in the first instance was in no way intended to discourage appellate courts from acting: “[Sjpeedy determination [of the motion is necessary] if relief is to be effective.” 2 To this end the rule provides that if the District Court refuses release or imposes conditions, it must state its reasons, and the appellant may then move the Court of Appeals to order his release or lift conditions. If read without reference to the narrow exception added by our case law, the rule then commands us to determine that motion, not hold it while we engage in forays for more evidence. Indeed, it goes on to specify that the evi-dentiary basis of our decision is to be “such papers, affidavits, and portions of the record as the parties shall present”; 3 thus leaving to the parties the decision whether to put the trial court’s opinion and underlying record into evidence. And not only does the rule contemplate that we will act without interposing the trial court, but it also explicitly empowers us to order the movant’s release pending our determination of the motion.4
*590The majority, however, today chooses to invoke the judicially created exception and ignore the urgency permeating the rule itself. This choice leads the Court to hold the motion, remand the record to the District Court, and let Stanley continue to suffer his second year of post-trial incarceration.5 In this I think it goes too far. Our decision in Weaver v. United States6 did, it is true, require that the District Court state its reasons for attaching conditions to release altogether. But the basis for that holding was a belief that requiring such a statement in all subsequent cases would facilitate an expeditious determination of subsequent motions addressed to this Court. Weaver should not be read, particularly in light of our later experience, as an announcement that we will remand the record whenever a District Court judge has failed adequately to state reasons. Every additional proceeding required in these cases imposes an additional denial of liberty on the moving appellant.7 Consequently, to remand is to punish the movant solely because the trial court denied him his clear statutory right — a statement of reasons. The emasculation of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 that the Court fears, if not already a fact, will come through the application of logic like this rather than through any abandonment of the trial court. The Weaver remand, as an exception necessary to correct trial court errors, cannot be made the general rule.
II
The Court acknowledges that “remands necessitated by [trial court] failures to observe the commands of Rule 9(b) may occasion some encroachment on the accused’s right to a speedy resolution on bail.”8 It justifies giving short shrift to the rule’s contrary command by observing, first, that the trial judge has viewed the demeanor of the movant at trial, and, second, that there may be some “remarkable indicia of nonreleasibility ... in circumstances we do not know.”9 Again, I think that Rule 9(b) itself strikes the balance between the advantages of testimonial inferences and the necessity of a speedy determination, and strikes it wisely at least as regards the two classes of inference hypothesized by the Court here.
The value of predictions of future conduct based on observations of a defendant’s behavior during the extraordinary stress of trial has itself been severely questioned by insightful trial judges.10 Here even less is possible, for a remand will not produce the unrecorded observations of a prescient witness; but only the faded recollections of a busy judge. I cannot countenance, nor believe that the rule permits, the saeri-*591fice of what may be months of freedom to the pursuit of such chimera.
I similarly reject the Court’s speculation that the trial judge may have been possessed of some “remarkable indicia of nonreleasibility” that were not only outside the record, but that the trial judge thought unnecessary even to mention in his statement of reasons. I cannot take account of such a remote and improper possibility.11
Ill
Since I conclude that we have no justification for returning the record to the District Court, I turn to the merits of this motion. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 requires that a convicted offender be released pending appeal unless the court finds that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay, or unless no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.12 Since no one asserts that Stanley’s appeal is frivolous, our concern is with the likelihood of flight and danger to the community.
Movant's showing on the question of flight is, as the majority concedes, “impressive.” Stanley has close ties to the community. His wife and children, parents, three brothers, six sisters, seven aunts and uncles, and wife’s parents reside in the area. The pre-sentence report includes Stanley’s wife’s characterization of their marriage as “solid,”13 and Stanley has been assured work in his father-in-law’s business if released. Moreover, while at liberty prior to and during trial, Stanley has always appeared when required to do so. The sole factor which points to the possibility of flight is that he is facing a five-year sentence. While relevant, it does not outweigh the overwhelming factors supporting release on strict conditions, and it is doubtful it would outweigh release on lesser ones.
Nor can the record support a finding that Stanley will pose a danger to the community if released. Only two facts in the record give any indication of dangerousness — Stanley’s current conviction and his admission that he used narcotics while he was employed as a police officer.
Certainly the act for which a person seeking release stands convicted is relevant in assessing whether the community’s safety would be imperiled by release. Here, however, the substantial issues Stanley raises on appeal directly concern whether or not he committed the offense for which he was convicted. In such cases, unlike appeals where the fact of the offense is unchallenged, the inference to be drawn from the guilty verdict is more questionable.14 And, in Stanley’s case, the inference is further attenuated by the almost total absence of prior criminal activity. His only other involvement with the law was a disorderly conduct charge in 1965 which resulted in a ten dollar fine.
The remaining factor concerns Stanley’s admission of past drug usage, but not addiction. Stanley claims that he stopped using drugs in December, 1970, and it is uncontested that he is not addicted at this time. Further, it appears from the pre-sentence report that Stan*592ley sought help in stopping his drug usage when arrested for the present crime. Finally, Stanley has been promised work in his father-in-law’s business if released and his father-in-law would be in a position to see that Stanley conducts himself properly during the working day.
In sum, Stanley would have a supervised job; he has no prior convictions or even arrests, save a ten dollar fine of some vintage, and he is apparently not addicted to drugs. On the identical record that was before the trial court, I think the conclusion inescapable that Stanley can be released without an unreasonable risk of flight or danger to the community under the conditions or release of the sort set forth in the form order appended to this opinion. I believe we are obligated to do so, and therefore dissent from the remand of this record.
ORDER
Ordered by the court that Thomas E. Stanley, Jr., shall be released on his personal recognizance on the following conditions: (1) Upon the representation of counsel that Stanley has obtained regular employment within the Washington Metropolitan Area, he shall be released. (2) His employer shall report immediately to - upon Stanley’s failure to present himself for work at the proper time, and - shall report that failure to .counsel for the United States, counsel for Stanley, and the Criminal Clerk’s Office of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (3) Stanley shall reside with his wife and children and not leave the Washington Metropolitan area without permission of the District Court. Stanley’s wife is to report immediately to - upon Stanley’s overnight absence from their residence. (4) Stanley shall report to the D. C. Bail Agency weekly on - in person. (5) Stanley shall not use any narcotic drug and shall report weekly (or as otherwise may be reasonably required) to the D. C. Bail Agency for testing to determine whether he has used any narcotic drug. (6) Stanley, his wife, and his employer shall sign a statement indicating their understanding of the conditions set forth above and promising compliance with them.

. Majority opinion at 582.

. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Advisory Committee’s Note, Rule 9(b), reprinted at 43 F.R.D. 132 (1968). The full quotation is more specific, asserting that the procedure should be as speedy as the pretrial review the Committee describes in its Note to Rule 9(a) in these words:
The purpose of [this] subdivision is to insure the expeditious determination of appeals respecting release orders, an expedition commanded by 18 U.S.C. § 3147 [of the Bail Reform Act] and by the Court in Stack v. Boyle, [342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951)].

. Fed.R.App.P. 9(b).

. Id. The Court’s remand of the record in this case appears to call for an explicit determination whether to invoke our discretion under this provision.
Indeed, the very existence of this provision indicates that release is appropriate in at least some cases both prior to any determination of the motion and despite a District Court’s contrary conclusion. Where, as here, the evidence sought by the Court would support denial of release, the Court shows itself unable to conclude that release subject to conditions is insufficient to guarantee the safety of the community and availability of the mov-ant. This inability appears to require movant’s release pending determination of the motion, even though the remand *590may produce evidence supporting denial of release pending determination of the appeal. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-48 (1970), requiring release unless the requisite determination has been made.

. The trial judge ordered Stanley held commencing May 21, 1971, the day on which lie was convicted.

. 131 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 405 F.2d 353 (1968).

. In Banks v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 414 F.2d 1150 (1969), for example, five full months elapsed from entry of our per euriam order remanding the record until we finally determined the motion.

. Majority opinion at 587.

. Id. at 587.

. The use of demeanor in a decision such as release pending trial or appeal, or the determination of a proper sentence, is troublesome even when the delay required to obtain it is ignored. According to an eminent trial judge:
The trial judge’s observation of the defendant ... is often a minor and fleeting factor. It is, in the folklore of our judicial system, overdrawn and overweighed.
Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin.L.Rev. 1, 27 (1972). See Statement of Judge Stanley A. IVeigel, Appellate Review of Sentences, Hearings on S. 2722 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1966).

. In the rare case in which the trial judge did have such remarkable information, it could be put upon the record before this Court on the Government’s motion to ■ revoke bail.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1970). This provision governs precisely because this request is a de novo motion rather than an appeal. Thus the proviso in § 3148 does not apply.

. The only countervailing suggestion is an assertion contained in the Government’s opposition to the motion for release, that a cousin reported that Stanley was having marital difficulties and had argued with other members of his family. This assertion has no support in the record and, indeed, is in direct contradiction to Stanley’s wife’s appraisal.

. Cf. Banks v. United States, supra note 7, 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 259, 414 F.2d at 1155 (1969) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).