Court Opinion

ID: 9667891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:57:17.61691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.319489
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice.
This case involves an appeal from a temporary injunction.1 The Houston Federation of Teachers and several individual teachers filed suit to enjoin Houston Independent School District from implementing a plan that would allow for extension of the school day in high schools. Based upon a finding that extension of the school day would cause irreparable harm to the teachers, the trial court granted a temporary injunction. The court of appeals dissolved the temporary injunction and dismissed the suit, holding that the teachers should have first pursued their claim through the administrative process before resorting to the courts. 715 S.W.2d 369. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court.
In January 1986, HISD adopted a plan for providing tutorial services to high school students during the regular school day.2 The school principals were given some discretion as to how to implement the plan but were expressly told that they could extend the school day by up to thirty minutes if necessary to fit in the tutorials.
Prior to HISD’s adoption of this plan for tutorials, it had an existing policy limiting the “instructional day” to 7V2 hours. At the same time it adopted the plan for tutorials, HISD interpreted the term “instructional day” in its prior policy to mean a 7 ¥2 hour day exclusive of the teachers’ lunch periods. Thus, teachers could work an eight-hour day with the lunch period included.
The teachers filed suit alleging that HISD’s plan for extending the school day violated their contractual rights. They sought temporary and permanent injunc-tive relief. During the hearing on the temporary injunction, the teachers testified that the school district’s implementation of an extended day would affect their child *646care arrangements, transportation arrangements, and second jobs. Finding that the teachers would suffer severe, immediate and irreparable harm if HISD’s plan were implemented, the trial judge issued a temporary injunction. This finding of irreparable harm has not been disturbed on appeal because the court of appeals dismissed the suit without ever addressing the merits of the temporary injunction.
In light of the trial court’s undisturbed finding of irreparable harm, we conclude that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the suit. See Foree v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.1968); Public Utility Commission of Texas v. Pedernales Electric Cooperative, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 214, 220 (Tex.App.—Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). It should have first considered the merits of the temporary injunction.
By its very definition, irreparable harm means that an award of damages months later will not provide adequate compensation. The Commissioner of Education is not authorized to order immediate injunc-tive relief. See Pasadena Ind. School District v. Emmons, 586 S.W.2d 151,152 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ dism’d). Therefore, if the teachers will suffer irreparable harm and if they are required to go through the administrative process before obtaining injunctive relief, they will have no possibility of an adequate remedy; any irreparable harm will already be suffered by the time relief can be obtained.
Parties are not required to pursue the administrative process regardless of the price. If irreparable harm will be suffered and if the agency is unable to provide relief, the courts may properly exercise their jurisdiction in order to provide an adequate remedy. See Emmons, 586 S.W.2d at 152; Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Walgreen Texas Co., 520 S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26.15 (2nd ed. 1983). Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court for it to decide whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.1978).
MAUZY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
KILGARLIN, J., filed a concurring opinion joined by WALLACE, J.
HILL, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion joined by GONZALEZ, J.

. Absent a dissent in the court of appeals or a conflict, this court does not ordinarily have jurisdiction to review a temporary injunction. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(6). However, this court does have jurisdiction to review the decision of a court of appeals on a jurisdictional question. See Baker v. Hansen, 679 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.1984); McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957).

. School districts are required to provide tutorial services pursuant to legislation adopted in 1984. TEX.EDUC.CODE ANN. § 21.103. During the 1984-85 school year, HISD had provided the tutorial services after regular school hours and teachers were paid extra for teaching the tutorial classes. For the 1985-86 school year, HISD first tried to incorporate the tutorials into the regular school day by cutting the length of all class periods from fifty-five to fifty minutes; however the Commissioner of Education refused to allow HISD to shorten the regular class periods. HISD next adopted the plan from which this controversy arose.