Court Opinion

ID: 9726636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:01:16.180325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:29.377798
License: Public Domain

HOPPER, J., Concurring.
The majority sets out a standard beginning
as follows: “. . . absent a clear showing that the ordinance is being violated . ...” I would emphasize that language because I believe it to be the important part of the holding. The majority opinion then goes on to explain various difficulties with the application of the particular zoning ordinance to the facts of this case. I agree that there are serious questions as to the applicability of the ordinance in question to Synanon.
I also agree with the conclusion of the majority that a preliminary injunction “. . . should not issue in the absence of proof of actual interim harm to the public resulting from the potential violation.” However, in my opinion, a delay in the enforcement of a zoning ordinance results in “actual interim harm to the public” which can and should be weighed against the potential injury to Synanon.1
Zoning ordinances are an integral part of land use regulation; they result from extensive hearings before governmental bodies attempting to balance various competing interests. Just as “no man is an Hand, in tire of it selfe . . .” (John Donne), every part of a planning design is dependent *315upon the remainder and a tear in that design results in damage to the entire fabric. Thus, when a court delays enforcement of even a small part of land use regulation, it interferes with legislative action. The fact that the resulting damage may be difficult to assess does not make it nebulous or nonexistent.
On the present record, in weighing the respective harm on both sides, I agree that the balance must be struck in favor of the appellant.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 9, 1979, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court wás denied March 14, 1979.

The resulting harm is directly related to the length of the delay. Unfortunately, the time between the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction and the final determination of the matter by the granting or denial of a permanent injunction has been greatly extended by reason of the burgeoning case load thrust upon the trial courts in other areas. In this regard the Legislature should consider the granting of priority to the hearing of permanent injunction cases when a public entity is a party, much as is now given to all parties concerned at the preliminary injunction stage.