Court Opinion

ID: 9767717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:24:04.804907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.587966
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
*363The trial court did not err in permitting Doris Sayles to testify that she was a notary public in and for McCulloch County, Texas.
Woodson v. State, 24 Texas Cr. Rep. 153, 6 S.W. 184, cited by the state, is direct authority for holding that her testimony was not inadmissible under the best evidence rule, there being no issue between her and the public as to her status as a notary public.
Doris Sayles testified upon an issue between appellant and the State and freely admitted that she made the false certificate as a notary public.
It is true that this was an essential element of the offense charged against appellant and a material issue between the state and appellant, but it was not an issue between the accomplice witness and the public.
Upon the issue between the state and appellant, raised by the indictment and plea of not guilty, appellant did not see fit to resort to the records or otherwise challenge Doris Sayles’ status as a notary public, as was done in Faubion v. State, 104 Texas Cr. Rep. 78, 282 S.W. 597, cited by appellant.
There is much evidence, some of which was offered by appellant to show that Doris Sayles was acting as a notary public in and for McCulloch County, Texas, and there is no evidence which shows or tends to show that she was not a regularly appointed and qualified notary public in and for said county.
We were also in error in holding that because the state failed to produce proof other than that of Doris Sayles to establish the fact that she was a notary public in and for McCulloch County, Texas, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction under the rule requiring corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice.
Art. 718 V.A.C.C.P. provides that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice “unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.”
This statute further provides “and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”
*364It would seem clear that further and additional proof as to Doris Sayles’ status as a notary public could under no circumstance tend to connect appellant with the offense charged and thus satisfy the provision of Art. 718 V.A.C.C.P.
The recognized test to determine the sufficiency of evidence to corroborate an accomplice witness is to exclude the testimony of the accomplice or accomplices from consideration and determine whether there is other inculpatory evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the offense charged, Alexander v. State, 160 Texas Cr. Rep. 460, 274 S.W. 2d 81.
If there be such other evidence which tends to connect the accused with the offense charged this satisfies Art. 718 V.A.C. C.P. and if the evidence as a whole is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, and the jury so finds, this court’s duty is to hold the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The holding on original submission was based upon what I believe to be an erroneous construction of the holding of this court in cases such as Almazan v. State, 140 Texas Cr. Rep. 432, 145 S.W. 2d 576, where it was said: “Every essential fact testified to by the accomplice alone must be corroborated by non-accomplice testimony tending to connect appellant with the commission of the offense charged.”
If this may be interpreted as requiring proof from sources other than Doris Sayles as to her status as a notary public, then it is wrong and is contrary to the rule recognized elsewhere in the same opinion and in other opinions of this court.
It is not necessary that the corroborating evidence support that of the accomplice as to each incriminative fact, but is sufficient if the corroborating evidence tends to connect the accused with the offense charged. Contreras v. State, 144 Texas Cr. Rep. 285, 162 S.W. 2d 716.
Every constituent element of the offense as testified to by the accomplice need not be corroborated. Williams v. State, 59 Texas Cr. Rep. 347, 128 S.W. 1120.
It is not necessary to corroborate an accomplice’s entire narrative nor all of his testimony. Middleton v. State, 86 Texas Cr. Rep. 307, 217 S.W. 1046.
*365The error shown in the remark of the trial judge was made before any evidence was introduced. It was not objected to at the time and there was no motion to have the jury instructed to disregard it. In the light of these facts, it is not such error as would justify reversal.
I do not find in Art. 1010 P.C., cited in the majority opinion on rehearing, where “it requires first that an offense be shown.”
I do find where it provides that in prosecutions for offenses such as that of the making and uttering of a false and forged certificate it shall be no defense “that the matter, act, deed, instrument or thing was in law, either in substance or form, void.”
While I do not base my dissent upon Art. 1010 P.C. and express no opinion as to its validity, it seems clear that if it is not material that the false certificate be void in substance or in form, it must follow that no defect in the appointment or qualification of the notary public who forged the void instrument would be fatal to the conviction of the person who passed or uttered it.