Court Opinion

ID: 9880838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 20:03:50.148498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:51.923316
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 P. v. McCalipp CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B319589

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. LA092439)
           v.

 LONTTAEVEON JAYVON
 MCCALIPP,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Martin Larry Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
      Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ______________________________
       In January 2020, Lonttaeveon Jayvon McCalipp (McCalipp)
fatally shot Jonathan McLinn (McLinn) outside the Red Tie
gentlemen’s club in Van Nuys, California. A jury convicted
McCalipp of first degree murder and possession of a firearm by
a felon. The jury also found true the special allegation that
McCalipp had “personally and intentionally discharge[d] a firearm”
in committing the murder, within the meaning of Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivision (d).1 The trial court sentenced
McCalipp to 50 years to life in prison.
       McCalipp now asks us to reverse his convictions, advancing
four arguments. First, his trial attorney rendered ineffective
assistance by withdrawing a motion to suppress certain of his
statements allegedly obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Second, the trial court abused
its discretion in permitting the prosecution to present at trial a
14-second video posted on McCalipp’s Instagram account depicting
him with a gun on his lap nine days prior to the murder. Third,
the cumulative prejudice resulting from his attorney’s allegedly
ineffective assistance and the court’s purported error in admitting
the Instagram video mandates reversal. Fourth, and finally, under
New York Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. __ [142
S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387] (Bruen), his conviction for possession
of a firearm by a felon violates his rights under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments.
       We are not persuaded by McCalipp’s arguments challenging
his convictions. McCalipp fails to demonstrate any prejudice
resulting from his ineffective assistance claim or from the court’s
ruling admitting the Instagram video—whether considered

      1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

                                    2
individually or cumulatively. Nor are we persuaded that we
should part company with the post-Bruen decisions confirming
the constitutionality of California’s prohibition on the possession
of firearms by convicted felons.
       Alternatively, McCalipp contends that—even if we do not
reverse his convictions—we still must remand his case for
resentencing because the trial court committed three sentencing
errors: (1) the court erred by failing to apply section 654 to
stay punishment on McCalipp’s felon-in-possession conviction;
(2) the court abused its discretion by relying on improper factors in
denying the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement; and (3) the court erred by
failing to dismiss the firearm enhancement sua sponte pursuant
to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), which provides that the court
“shall” dismiss an enhancement that “could result in a sentence of
over 20 years.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C).)
       We conclude that section 654 does not require a stay of
punishment on McCalipp’s felon-in-possession conviction because
substantial evidence supports that McCalipp possessed the firearm
at issue prior to the shooting. We conclude further that the trial
court properly relied on permissible factors—including the nature
and circumstances of the offense—in denying the prosecution’s
motion to dismiss the firearm enhancement. And we agree with
our Division Seven colleagues, as well as with the First and Fourth
Districts, that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not require
a trial court to dismiss an enhancement where the court determines
that doing so would endanger public safety.
       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

                                     3
    FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
      A.    The Shooting
       In the early morning hours of January 31, 2020, McLinn
and two friends, Andy Solarzno and Andrew Mayfield attempted
to enter the Red Tie club. Because McLinn was heavily intoxicated,
Arootin Mahmudi, one of the club’s two security guards, would not
permit him entry. Mahmudi told McLinn to “hang up for a little
bit” outside, and that once he “fel[t] a little b[e]tter,” he could enter
the club.
       At approximately 2:44 a.m.—while McLinn was waiting
outside the club—Mahmudi and the other on-duty security
guard, Armen Tomanian, heard six gunshots from approximately
100 feet away. Mahmudi saw McLinn on the ground and another
man standing on top of him. Tomanian saw McLinn fall down
as if he had been shot and another person who appeared to be
the shooter. Tomanian then saw the shooter move towards
McLinn’s head and shoot him three more times.
       Mahmudi ran toward McLinn and demanded that the
shooter drop his weapon. The shooter failed to do so, and—fearing
for his life and the lives of others on the street—Mahmudi fired
nine .40 caliber rounds at the shooter. Tomanian, also using
.40 caliber bullets, fired four rounds at the shooter. The shooter
then entered a four-door sedan. Two other people entered the
sedan, and the car drove away from the scene.
       Mahmudi and Tomanian then approached McLinn, and
Mahmudi observed multiple gunshot wounds in McLinn’s chest
and head areas. Neither Mahmudi nor Tomanian saw weapons of
any kind near McLinn’s body. Detectives recovered only .40-caliber

      2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

                                       4
shell casings at the scene. A subsequent autopsy confirmed that
McLinn had suffered nine gunshot wounds, several of which—
including a gunshot to the back of his head—were fatal.

      B.    The Charges and Pretrial Litigation
            1.    The Information
      The District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging
McCalipp with one count of first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
189, subd. (a)) (count 1) and one count of possession of a firearm by
a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 3).3
      The information alleged further that McCalipp “personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm” in the commission of
the murder, “within the meaning of . . . [s]ection 12022.53[,
subdivision] (d).”4

      3 No “count 2” appears in the information.

      4 Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) provides:
“Notwithstanding any other law, a person who, in the commission
of a felony specified in [enumerated statutes] personally and
intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great
bodily injury, as defined in [s]ection 12022.7, or death, to a person
other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to
life.” (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).)
      The information also alleged firearm use enhancements
pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 12022.53, as well
as a criminal street gang enhancement pursuant to section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1)(C). Because the trial court subsequently struck
or dismissed each of these additional enhancements, we do not
discuss them further in our analysis.

                                     5
            2.    Prosecution’s Motion To Dismiss the
                  Firearm Enhancement Pursuant to
                  Special Directives 20-08, 20.08.1, and 20-14
       In advance of McCalipp’s preliminary hearing, the deputy
district attorney moved to dismiss the firearm use enhancement,
citing section 13855 and three special directives—Special
Directives 20-08, 20.08.1, and 20-14—issued by then-newly elected
Los Angeles County District Attorney George Gascón.
       Special Directive 20-08 “instructed deputy district attorneys
in pending cases to move to dismiss or withdraw sentence
enhancement allegations.” (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 478, 486 (Nazir).) Special Directives 20.08.1 and 20-14,
in turn, clarified the specific language deputy district attorneys
should use in such motions to dismiss.
       The motion filed in McCalipp’s case complied with the letter
of the special directives; however, the deputy district attorney also
stated in the motion that she “[could not] reconcile” the policies
established by the special directives with certain Penal Code
provisions, portions of the California Rules of Professional Conduct
and Rules of Court, and “decades of decisional law and professional
practice.”
       At McCalipp’s preliminary hearing, the deputy district
attorney reiterated that she “[did] not feel that based on the facts
and [her] view of [the] case, that it would be in the interest of

      5 Section 1385 provides, in relevant part, “[t]he judge
or magistrate may, either on motion of the court or upon the
application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance
of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (a).)
The section “applies to a motion to dismiss ‘the entire action or,
as here, only an enhancement allegation.’ [Citations.]” (Nazir,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 490–491.)

                                      6
justice to dismiss [the] special allegation[ ].” The court then denied
the motion.

            3.    Defense Motion To Exclude Any Statements
                  Obtained in Violation of Miranda
      McCalipp filed several pretrial motions in limine, including a
motion “to exclude any statements allegedly made by . . . McCalipp
pursuant to his Miranda rights being violated, or in the alternative,
hold [an Evidence Code section] 402 hearing to determine the
admissibility of said statements.” (Boldface & capitalization
omitted.)
      At the pretrial hearing, however, McCalipp’s counsel
withdrew the motion, explaining that she “[did not] believe there
[were] any issues with” McCalipp’s rights pursuant to Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. 436.

      C.    The Trial
       The prosecution presented several categories of trial evidence
rebutting McCalipp’s contention that detectives had misidentified
him as the shooter, including: (1) witness testimony, (2) a video
recording of portions of McCalipp’s postarrest interview with
detectives, (3) surveillance and body camera footage of the shooting,
(4) materials from McCalipp’s Instagram account, and (5) cell phone
location data.

            1.    Witness Testimony Identifying McCalipp
                  as the Shooter
     Jerrick Henry (Henry), McLinn’s uncle, testified that he
showed Mayfield—who had accompanied McLinn to the Red Tie
the morning of the shooting—two photographs of McCalipp that
McLinn’s mother obtained from Instagram following the shooting.

                                      7
Henry stated Mayfield confirmed that the person in the
photographs shot and killed McLinn.6

            2.    McCalipp’s Postarrest Statements
       Law enforcement arrested McCalipp on March 26, 2020.
Detective Eloy Navarro, the lead detective on the case, testified
that McCalipp used his left hand to complete paperwork during
the booking process. Detectives then interviewed McCalipp for
approximately an hour and a half. The prosecution played excerpts
of this interview for the jury at trial.
       At the outset of the interview, detectives advised McCalipp of
his rights pursuant to Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, including that
he had the right to remain silent and the right to consult with an
attorney. McCalipp acknowledged his Miranda rights and then told
detectives that he had been drinking at the El Tejano restaurant
in North Hollywood, California, during the hours immediately prior
to the shooting. He repeatedly denied, however, that he ever had
visited—or even knew the location of—the Red Tie.
       Nearly halfway through the interview—in response to
detectives’ continued insistence that he had visited the Red Tie—
McCalipp stated:

      6 The prosecution called Mayfield, who was in custody on
unrelated charges, to testify at trial. He denied ever having
identified McCalipp as the shooter and claimed to have only a
limited memory of the morning of the shooting. He also testified
that if others perceived him to be a “snitch,” he and his family could
face retaliation.

                                     8
       “You said why did you go. On PDL7 I didn’t go. So why do
you guys keep saying this? On Bloods, on PDL I don’t wanna talk
to y’all no more.”
       Detectives continued questioning McCalipp after he made
this statement, and McCalipp continued answering the detectives’
questions. He persisted for the remainder of the interview in
denying ever having visited the Red Tie or otherwise being involved
in McLinn’s shooting.

            3.    Surveillance and Body Camera Footage
       The prosecution introduced video footage from surveillance
cameras covering the El Tejano restaurant’s parking lot and front
sidewalk during the approximately two hours prior to the shooting.
The footage captures a man wearing a long-sleeved red shirt or
sweatshirt, jeans, and a black-and-gold bandanna getting in and
out of a blue, four-door sedan. The sedan has a visible sticker in
the lower left corner of its back window. Detective Navarro testified
that, based on the vehicle’s body style, the sedan appeared to be an
Audi.
       The prosecution also played video from security cameras
covering the Red Tie’s parking lot and from the body camera worn
by one of the club’s on-duty security guards. The footage depicts—
from a significant distance—what appears to be a male individual
in a long-sleeved red shirt or sweatshirt, jeans, and bandanna exit a
dark-colored, four-door sedan with a sticker in the lower left corner
of its back window. The footage then shows the individual in the
red shirt shoot McLinn nine times, using his left hand to fire the
gun.

      7 McCalipp admitted to detectives during the interview that
he belonged to the “PDL” gang, which other materials in the record
suggest refers to the “Pasadena Denver Lanes Blood” gang.

                                    9
       The prosecution argued in closing that the combination of
the El Tejano and Red Tie video footage confirmed that detectives
correctly had identified McCalipp as the shooter:
       “[Deputy District Attorney]: But when it comes down to,
in this case, is you have a video. You have a video, and the video
alone shows you [an individual with the] same buil[d as McCalipp],
same clothes, same pattern on the distress[ed] jeans, same left-
hand[edness], same body type, and the same car with the same
decal with the same driver, with the same sunroof.”

           4.    Materials from McCalipp’s Instagram
                 Account
       The trial court permitted the prosecution to present to
the jury several brief videos obtained from McCalipp’s Instagram
account, as well as a number of messages sent to and from the
account.
       McCalipp’s face clearly is visible in each of the videos,
and his counsel acknowledged that McCalipp himself posted the
videos. One such video—posted the day before the murder—depicts
McCalipp in a long-sleeved red shirt or sweatshirt and a black-and-
gold bandanna. Another video, lasting 14 seconds and posted nine
days prior to the murder, depicts McCalipp with a firearm in his
lap, again wearing a long-sleeved red shirt and a black-and-gold
bandanna.
       In addition, the prosecution introduced a messaging
conversation between McCalipp’s Instagram account and another
Instagram user dated 12 days prior to the murder. In the
conversation thread, the other user writes to McCalipp’s account,
“I’m at red tide strip club.” McCalipp’s account responds, “Send
me . . . [t]his addy,” and the other user responds with the address

                                   10
of the Red Tie.8 The messaging record indicates that the
conversation culminated in a video call between McCalipp’s
account and the other Instagram user.
       The prosecution also presented a messaging conversation
from McCalipp’s Instagram account from the night after the
shooting. The conversation contains an embedded photograph
of McLinn’s face. The conversation begins with the following
message sent from McCalipp’s account: “Wasn’t bl.” Another
Instagram user responds, “Nah he didn’t bang. . . . His brother[’s]
from 60s tho[ugh].” McCalipp’s account then responds, “Damn,
that’s brazy.” Another message sent from McCalipp’s account that
same day—also accompanied by a photograph of McLinn—states,
“Jon [i.e., the victim’s first name] a legend, but we ain’t no ordinary
people!!”

            5.    Cell Phone Location Data
      Finally, the prosecution introduced cell phone location data
demonstrating that McCalipp had been traveling in the general
direction of the Red Tie prior to the shooting.

      D.    Verdicts and Sentencing
      The jury found McCalipp guilty of first degree murder
(count 1) and possession of a firearm by a felon (count 3).
The jury also found true the special allegation that McCalipp
“personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, . . . within the

      8 The user appears to have inverted the last two numbers
in the Red Tie club’s address, directing McCalipp to 15823 Stagg
Street, rather than 15832 Stagg Street. McCalipp, however, did not
object to Detective Navarro’s testimony that the address provided
in the messaging conversation was “the same address of the Red Tie
gentlemen’s club . . . where Mr. McLinn was shot.”

                                     11
meaning of . . . [section] 12022.53, subdivision (d)” in committing
the murder.
       The trial court sentenced McCalipp to 50 years to life
on count 1, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder charge
and another consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm use
enhancement.
       The court explained that—although it was aware of
its discretion to strike the firearm use enhancement under
section 1385—it declined to do so because the circumstances of
the murder demonstrated that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety:
       “[T]he real reason why the defendant poses a danger, and
there is a likelihood that he would hurt or kill someone in the
future, is the mere manner in which this crime was committed.
It was basically an execution in the style of a hit man. I mean,
shooting someone at close range in the body, having them fall
to the ground, stepping closer to them and delivering three
bullets to the head, something you only see in the Godfather
or Goodfell[as]. You don’t see murders like that every day that
are so cold and callous[, with] use of a firearm in the fashion
that the defendant did in this case. So I have no doubt given the
opportunity, that the defendant would kill again and is extremely
dangerous to public safety.”
       With respect to count 3, the court imposed a midterm
sentence of two years to run concurrently with the sentence on
count 1.
       McCalipp timely appealed.

                                    12
                            DISCUSSION
      A.    Challenges to Convictions
       McCalipp mounts four challenges to his convictions, arguing:
(1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by withdrawing
a motion to suppress certain of his postarrest statements; (2) the
trial court erred in admitting the Instagram video depicting him
with a gun on his lap nine days prior to the murder; (3) the
cumulative prejudice resulting from his counsel’s purported
ineffective assistance and the trial court’s admission of the video
mandates reversal; and (4) his conviction for possession of a firearm
by a felon violates his rights under the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments.

            1.     McCalipp Fails To Demonstrate Prejudice
                   From His Trial Counsel’s Decision To
                   Withdraw the Suppression Motion
       First, McCalipp contends that we must reverse his convictions
because his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by withdrawing a motion to suppress statements he made
to detectives after he had purportedly invoked his rights under
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436. McCalipp, however, has failed to
demonstrate any resulting prejudice.
       “In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it
is not necessary to determine ‘ “whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant
as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be
followed.” ’ [Citations.] It is not sufficient to show the alleged
errors may have had some conceivable effect on the trial’s outcome;
the defendant must demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that

                                      13
absent the errors the result would have been different. [Citations.]”
(People v. Mesa (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008 (Mesa).)
       McCalipp urges that by telling the detectives, “I don’t
wanna talk to y’all no more,” he invoked his Miranda rights. As
a result, he argues, his counsel should have moved to suppress
all statements he made to detectives following that invocation.
McCalipp contends further that his counsel’s failure to do so
prejudiced him because, after invoking Miranda, he responded
to detectives’ questions with statements that “wreaked of falsity”—
including denying that he had ever visited the Red Tie, denying
that he had gotten out of the blue Audi at the El Tejano restaurant,
and denying that he had access to his Instagram account. He
insists that “[t]he jury reasonably inferred from these statements
that [he] had been dishonest with the detectives because he was
conscious that he was guilty of McLinn’s murder.”
       McCalipp ignores, however, that he represented repeatedly
to the interviewing detectives that he had never visited the Red
Tie before he purportedly invoked his right to remain silent.
McCalipp thus made substantially similar denials in response to
detectives’ inquiries both before and after his purported invocation
of Miranda.
       Moreover, the remaining trial evidence presented against
McCalipp—including the surveillance camera footage, the
Instagram messages directly linking McCalipp to the Red Tie
and the victim, and the cell phone location data—was extremely
inculpatory. We therefore are not persuaded that there is a
“reasonable probability” that suppression of the statements at
issue would have changed the outcome of his trial. (Mesa, supra,
144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008; see Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 688, 694–695.)

                                    14
      Nor are we persuaded by McCalipp’s contention that “the
failure of [his] trial attorney to make a [suppression] motion was
prejudicial even if the motion would have been denied because,”
in that circumstance, the “standard of prejudice [on appeal] would
have been whether the evidence . . . was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt” under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24 (Chapman). Even assuming that Chapman rather than
Strickland applies, the strength of the trial evidence against
McCalipp demonstrates that admission of the postarrest statements
of which he complains was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Accordingly, we conclude that any error by McCalipp’s trial
counsel in withdrawing the motion to suppress was harmless.9

            2.     Any Error by the Trial Court in Admitting
                   the Instagram Video Was Harmless
       Next, McCalipp contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by admitting a 14-second video he posted to his
Instagram account nine days before the murder, depicting him
with a gun in his lap.10 (People v. Byers (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th
447, 453 (Byers), review den. May 12, 2021, S267918 [“[w]e review
a trial court’s ruling admitting evidence for abuse of discretion”].)
We disagree.

      9 In light of our conclusion, we need not resolve whether
McCalipp’s statement that he “[did not] wanna talk to [the
detectives] no more” constituted an unambiguous assertion of
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, or whether—as the
Attorney General contends—the statement constituted merely
an “ ‘expression of frustration with the investigators’ repeated
refusal to accept his’ earlier denial[s]” of culpability insufficient
to invoke that right.
      10 In his reply brief, McCalipp describes the Instagram video
as a “photograph.” We assume this is a typographical error.

                                      15
       McCalipp first insists that the gun in the video was irrelevant
because the prosecution argued at trial that McLinn’s shooter used
a .40 caliber gun, but failed to introduce any evidence that the
handgun in the Instagram video was a .40 caliber weapon. The
video, however, clearly showed McCalipp’s face and depicted him
wearing clothing similar to that worn by the shooter. Thus, even
if the gun was irrelevant, the video as a whole was relevant to
establishing McCalipp’s identity as the perpetrator. (See Evid.
Code, § 210.)
       McCalipp’s next argument—that the presence of the gun
rendered the video unduly prejudicial—presents a closer question.
The Attorney General does not dispute that the prosecution failed
to present any evidence that the gun was, in fact, the murder
weapon. Moreover, other Instagram videos admitted at trial that
did not contain images of a gun depicted McCalipp wearing the
clothing matching that worn by the shooter. These facts diminish
the unique probative value of the Instagram video and arguably
render it unduly prejudicial.
       But even if the trial court erred in admitting the video,
we are not persuaded that “it is reasonably probable the verdict
would have been more favorable to [McCalipp] absent the error.”
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [absent fundamental
unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to
the traditional “reasonable probability” test set forth in People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818].) McCalipp complains that the
video unfairly painted him as a “gun-toting gang member who is
a menace to society,” but he freely admitted his gang membership
to detectives during his postarrest interview (prior to his alleged
invocation of his right to remain silent). Moreover, as set forth,
ante, the other trial evidence offered against McCalipp was very
damaging. We therefore conclude that any error by the trial court

                                     16
in admitting the disputed Instagram video was harmless. (See
Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
       Finally, we are unpersuaded by McCalipp’s argument that
admission of the video violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.11 “To prove a deprivation of federal
due process rights, [McCalipp] must satisfy a high constitutional
standard to show that the erroneous admission of evidence resulted
in an unfair trial. ‘Only if there are no permissible inferences the
jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due
process. Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as
necessarily prevents a fair trial.” [Citations.] Only under such
circumstances can it be inferred that the jury must have used the
evidence for an improper purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘The dispositive
issue is . . . whether the trial court committed an error which
rendered the trial “so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it
violated federal due process.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 229-230.)
       The Instagram video at issue supported the permissible
inferences by the jury that (1) McCalipp possessed and wore
clothes similar to those worn by the shooter, and (2) detectives
thus correctly identified McCalipp as the shooter. Therefore,
“[t]his is not ‘one of those rare and unusual occasions where the
admission of evidence has violated federal due process and rendered
the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ [Citations.]” (Byers,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.)

     11 We therefore necessarily reject McCalipp’s contention that,
because admission of the Instagram video violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process, we should apply the “harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman, supra,
386 U.S. 18, 24 in assessing whether admission of the video
resulted in prejudice.

                                   17
            3.    McCalipp’s Cumulative Error Argument
                  Fails
       McCalipp urges that, even if insufficient to establish prejudice
in isolation, the combined effect of (1) the trial court’s purported
error in admitting the Instagram video, and (2) his counsel’s alleged
error in failing to move to suppress his statements to detectives
requires that we reverse his convictions. But the remaining trial
evidence was so damaging that we find the cumulative effect of any
such errors “too slight to warrant reversing” McCalipp’s convictions.
(People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326.)

            4.    McCalipp’s Conviction for Possession
                  of a Firearm by a Felon Does Not Violate
                  the Second or Fourteenth Amendments
       Finally—relying on Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct.
2111]—McCalipp argues that we must reverse his conviction under
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) for possession of a firearm by a
felon because the statute impermissibly infringes upon his rights
under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. Like other
courts to have considered similar claims, we reject McCalipp’s
facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1). (See, e.g., People v. Ceja (Aug. 30, 2023,
G061609) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 WL 5602746]; People v. Odell
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 307 (Odell); People v. Alexander (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 469 (Alexander).)
       “ ‘On a facial challenge, we will not invalidate a statute
unless it “pose[s] a present total and fatal conflict with applicable
constitutional prohibitions.” ’ [Citation.]” (Alexander, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) Section 29800, subdivision (a)(1) does not
present such a “ ‘ “fatal conflict.” ’ ” (Alexander, supra, at p. 474.)
       “All constitutional rights have limits,” and “[t]he Second
Amendment right [to keep and bear arms] is ‘ “not a right to keep

                                     18
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and
for whatever purpose.” ’ ” (Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 316,
quoting Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2128].)
The prohibition against felons possessing firearms is “one boundary
on this right” (ibid.), and nothing in Bruen calls into question that
boundary. Bruen held that “New York’s concealed carry licensing
regime, which required applicants to demonstrate proper cause to
get a license, was unconstitutional ‘in that it prevents law-abiding
citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their
right to keep and bear arms.’ [Citation.]” (Alexander, supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 474, italics added, quoting Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
at p. ___ [142 S.Ct. at p. 2156].) Indeed, “[i]t was no accident the
Bruen majority repeated the qualifier ‘law-abiding’ some 13 times.
[Citation.] People who have been convicted of a felony are not
‘law-abiding.’ ” (Odell, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)
       Accordingly, we conclude that section 29800,
subdivision (a)(1)’s prohibition on the possession of firearms
by felons is facially constitutional.

      B.    Purported Sentencing Errors
       Having rejected McCalipp’s various challenges to his
convictions, we turn next to the arguments he raises concerning
three purported sentencing errors. Because we disagree that
the trial court made any such errors, we affirm the judgment.

            1.    The Trial Court Did Not Err by Declining
                  To Stay Punishment on Count 3 Under
                  Section 654
      McCalipp first contends that, because “[t]here [was] no
substantial evidence that [he] possessed [the] firearm [used in the
shooting] before the murder,” section 654 required the trial court

                                    19
to stay the prison term for his possession of a firearm conviction
(count 3). We disagree.
       Section 654 provides, in relevant part: “An act or omission
that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of
law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no
case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under any one
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.”
(§ 654, subd. (a).)
       “Section 654 therefore ‘ “precludes multiple punishment
for a single act or for a course of conduct comprising indivisible
acts.” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143
(Jones).) Whether possession of a firearm “ ‘ “constitutes a divisible
transaction from the offense in which [a defendant] employs the
weapon depends upon the facts and evidence of each individual
case.” ’ ” (Ibid.) When the evidence “ ‘demonstrates at most that
fortuitous circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand
only at the instant of committing another offense’ ”—such as when
a defendant shoots an officer with a gun he wrested from him—
section 654 bars a separate punishment for the possession of the
weapon. (Jones, supra, at p. 1144.) On the other hand, “section 654
is inapplicable when the evidence shows that the defendant arrived
at the scene of his or her primary crime already in possession of the
firearm.” (Jones, supra, at p. 1145.)
       Whether “section 654 applies in a given case is a question
of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in
making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be
reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. [Citations.] We review the trial court’s determination in the
light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence

                                     20
of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.)
       McCalipp urges that, because “the Red Tie surveillance video
shows the shooter standing with McLinn and another individual
at the open trunk of a blue car immediately before the shooting
occurs[,] . . . [¶] . . . if [McCalipp] was in fact the shooter, he could
have obtained the firearm that he used to shoot McLinn from the
open trunk of the car immediately before he fired the gun.” But
the evidence obtained from McCalipp’s Instagram account strongly
suggests that he planned McLinn’s murder in advance, supporting
the inferences that (1) he obtained the firearm he used to kill
McLinn in advance of the shooting, and (2) he “arrived at the scene
of [the] primary crime already in possession of [that] firearm.”
(Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
       Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s decision not to apply section 654 to stay
punishment on McCalipp’s count 3 conviction.

             2.    The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion
                   in Denying the Motion To Dismiss the
                   Firearm Enhancement
       Next, McCalipp argues that “the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied the prosecution’s motion [under
section 1385] to dismiss the [firearm use] enhancement . . . [¶] . . .
[b]ecause the trial court merely deferred to the filing deputy district
attorney’s opinion—which was contrary to the official position of
the District Attorney’s Office.” (Boldface omitted & capitalization
added & omitted.) We disagree.
       McCalipp does not dispute that, notwithstanding any special
directives issued by the District Attorney’s Office, the trial court
retained discretion to deny the motion. (See Nazir, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at 499 [“[c]ontrary to the position of the district

                                       21
attorney . . . a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss an enhancement
under section 1385 is not ‘a constitutionally protected exercise
of prosecutorial discretion,’ and the trial court may deny such a
motion”].) And the record does not support McCalipp’s contention
that the court improperly deferred to the deputy district attorney
or failed to consider the special directives. To the contrary, the
transcript of the hearing on the motion reflects that the court
considered permissible factors—including the circumstances of
the offense and the special directives—in reaching its ruling:
        “The Court: [Deputy district attorney], if I’m reading your
motion correctly, it appears that you do not feel that based on
the facts and the view of your case, that it would be in the interest
of justice to dismiss [the] special allegation[ ], and for that reason,
the motion to dismiss any special allegations is denied. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . Just in relation to the motion, I did read the motion. The
court listened to both arguments. The court’s feeling, with the
different policies and positions and based on all of these factors,
I am not granting the dismissal of the special allegation[ ].”
        The court thus expressly clarified that it had not based its
ruling on the personal feelings of the individual deputy district
attorney. Instead, it relied on “the motion” (which set forth
relevant legal authorities and the circumstances of the offense),
“both arguments [for and against dismissing the enhancement],”
and “the different policies and positions” (i.e., the special
directives)—all of which it was proper for the court to consider.
(See Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 495–497.)
        Accordingly, we find unconvincing McCalipp’s arguments that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the prosecution’s
motion to dismiss the firearm enhancement.

                                     22
            3.    Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)(C)
                  Does Not Mandate Dismissal of the
                  Firearm Enhancement
       Finally, McCalipp contends that—irrespective of any
motion by the prosecution—the plain language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) mandates dismissal of the enhancement.
McCalipp concedes that he failed to raise this issue before the
trial court. He urges, however, that, by failing to strike the
enhancement sua sponte, the court imposed an unauthorized
sentence that we have the power to reverse on appeal. (See
People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239, fn. 7 (Anderson),
review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786.) We are not persuaded
that the court imposed an unauthorized sentence on McCalipp by
declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement.
       Section 1385 provides, in relevant part:
       “(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except
if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative
statute.
       “(2) In exercising its discretion [to dismiss an enhancement]
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that
the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury
or other serious danger to others.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]

                                    23
      “(C) The application of an enhancement could result in
a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2)(C).)
      Pointing to the word “shall” in the last sentence of
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C), McCalipp argues that a trial
court must dismiss a sentencing enhancement where, as here,
imposition of the enhancement could result in a sentence greater
than 20 years.
      We agree that, in isolation, the subdivision’s language could
support McCalipp’s contention. But “[w]e do not ‘consider the
statutory language “in isolation.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294 (Mendoza), review den. Apr. 26,
2023, S279144.) “ ‘Rather, we look to “the entire substance of
the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of
the provision . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘That is, we construe the words
in question “ ‘in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious
purpose of the statute . . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
      Like our colleagues in Division Seven and the First and
Fourth Districts, we therefore conclude that—considered in its
broader statutory context—section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)
does not compel a trial court to dismiss all sentencing
enhancements that might result in a sentence of over 20 years.
(See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 291 [“[w]e conclude that
section 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2)(C) does not mandate dismissal
of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would
endanger public safety”]; Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 241,
review granted; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18,
review den. Mar. 22, 2023, S278429; see also People v. Walker
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396, review granted Mar. 22, 2023,

                                   24
S27830912 [“[i]n our view, the text and purpose of section 1385 in
general, and Senate Bill No. 81 in particular, as well as the canons
of statutory construction, counsel in favor of concluding that the
phrase ‘all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed’ in subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not obligate trial courts
to automatically dismiss all but one enhancement whenever a
jury finds multiple enhancements to be true”]; but see People v.
Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1097, fn. 6, review granted
Apr. 12, 2023, S278894 [noting in dicta that “the Legislature has
unambiguously provided that the . . . enhancement(s) [described
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C)] ‘shall be dismissed’ ”].)
       In particular, we find persuasive the following analysis by
the Fourth District in Mendoza:
       “Section 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2) provides that in
determining whether to dismiss an enhancement ‘under this
subdivision,’ the court must consider nine listed mitigating
circumstances if proven by the defendant [citation], ‘unless the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety’ [citation]. That provision means that if the court
finds that dismissal of an enhancement ‘would endanger public
safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed mitigating
circumstances. [Citation.] The ‘shall be dismissed’ language
in section 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2)(C), like the language of all
of the listed mitigating circumstances, applies only if the court

      12 The Supreme Court granted review concerning only
whether “the amendment to . . . section 1385, subdivision (c)
that requires trial courts to ‘afford great weight’ to enumerated
mitigated circumstances [citation] create[s] a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement unless
the trial court finds dismissal would endanger public safety.”
(People v. Walker, S278309, Supreme Ct. Mins., Mar. 22, 2023.)

                                    25
does not find that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. That interpretation gives meaning to the language
in section 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2) requiring the court to consider
whether dismissal ‘would endanger public safety,’ and it
consequently avoids rendering that language surplusage.
       “In contrast, [defendant’s] interpretation gives no effect to
the clause ‘unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.’ [Citation.] That is, Mendoza’s
interpretation would require a court to dismiss any enhancement
when application of the enhancement could result in a sentence
greater than 20 years regardless of whether dismissal would
endanger public safety. We avoid interpretations that render
statutory language surplusage. [Citation.] We also must avoid
interpretations that lead to absurd results. [Citation.] . . . On
[defendant’s] interpretation, dismissal of his firearm enhancement
was statutorily required even though (1) the statute expressly
invites consideration of whether dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety, and (2) the court found that it
would. That is, according to [defendant’s] interpretation, the
statute required the sentencing court to endanger public safety.
That cannot be what the Legislature intended.” (Mendoza, supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 296, fn. & italics omitted.)
       We therefore conclude that a trial court need not dismiss
an enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) where it
determines that doing so would endanger public safety. Here, the
trial court made precisely such a finding, and McCalipp does not
challenge that determination on appeal. Accordingly, we reject his
contention that section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) requires that we
reverse the judgment and remand for resentencing.

                                    26
                        DISPOSITION
     The April 4, 2022 judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                CHANEY, J.

                BENDIX, J.

                                  27