Court Opinion

ID: 9897812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:25.839944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.652354
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Beales, Causey and Senior Judge Haley

              ABIGAIL LYNN PRUSSIA, A/K/A
               ABIGAIL LYNN O’NEAL
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1093-22-2                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                              FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF KING AND QUEEN COUNTY
                                            B. Elliott Bondurant, Judge

                              (Paul Eric Freeman; Woodmere Law P.L.L.C., on brief), for
                              appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; William K. Hamilton, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Abigail Lynn Prussia appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court of King and Queen

              County revoking a portion of her previously suspended sentences. Prussia contends that “[t]he trial

              court abused its discretion in revoking one and a half years of Prussia’s five-year suspended

              sentence where Prussia was now highly motivated to participate in drug treatment and comply with

              the conditions of her probation.” After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel

              unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have

              been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be

              overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).

              Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                           BACKGROUND

        On appeal, we “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may properly be drawn from it.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274

(2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 318, 329 (2013)).

        On September 23, 2020, Prussia pleaded guilty to possession of a Schedule I or II narcotic.

Pursuant to the terms of her plea agreement, the trial court initially deferred judgment in that case

after finding that Prussia was eligible for first-offender probation. See Code § 18.2-251.

Consequently, the trial court placed Prussia on one year of supervised probation. It ordered her to

complete “a substance abuse assessment,” to “remain drug and alcohol free during the period of

probation,” and to complete 100 hours of community service.

        However, Prussia failed to comply with the terms of her probation. On September 10, 2021,

Prussia’s probation officer filed a report in the Circuit Court of King and Queen County notifying

the court that Prussia had failed to complete any of her required community service hours, that she

had “failed to successfully complete a substance abuse evaluation” despite numerous warnings

“to get the evaluation completed,” and that she had “tested positive for Methamphetamine on

June 3, 2021 and August 12, 2021.” After a hearing in October 2021, the trial court revoked her

“First Offender Status,” found her guilty of the 2020 possession charge, and also found her guilty of

violating the conditions of her probation. The trial court then sentenced her to five years of

incarceration, all suspended, for possession of a Schedule I or II narcotic and to 60 days in jail with

30 days suspended for violating the conditions of her probation. The suspended sentences were

conditioned on five years of good behavior and the completion of supervised probation. The trial

court also ordered that Prussia abstain from illicit drugs and alcohol for five years.

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       On May 27, 2022, Prussia’s probation officer filed a major violation report with the trial

court stating that Prussia had been convicted on a guilty plea of possession of methamphetamine in

a different jurisdiction. In July 2022, Prussia’s probation officer filed an addendum reporting that

Prussia had changed her address without notifying her probation officer and had been discharged

from her substance abuse and mental health treatment program for failure to comply with her

treatment plan.

       At the revocation hearing, Prussia pleaded guilty to violating the terms and conditions of her

previously suspended sentences and acknowledged that she “ha[d] not lived up to the requirements

of the probation order.” Nevertheless, she proffered to the trial court that she had remained drug

and alcohol free and was prepared to provide a urine screen. She also asked the trial court to impose

a sentence below the discretionary sentencing guidelines recommendation.1 The trial court ordered

Prussia to submit to a drug screen before it made any decision in the matter. After a brief recess, her

probation officer reported that Prussia was “unable to provide a urine sample.” Prussia’s counsel

proffered that Prussia would not object to the trial court finding that the urine screen “would have

been dirty.”

       The Commonwealth then argued that the trial court had extended several chances to Prussia

but that she had failed to successfully complete her probation. The Commonwealth emphasized that

Prussia had sustained a new conviction for possession of methamphetamine and that she had not

been compliant with her substance abuse or mental health treatment program. In the

Commonwealth’s view, Prussia was not interested in obtaining treatment for her drug addiction.

       Following Prussia’s inability to provide a urine screen, she amended her previous request

and asked the trial court to sentence her within the sentencing guidelines. In allocution, Prussia

       1
         The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended six months of incarceration to
one year and six months of incarceration.
                                              -3-
stated that she was experiencing a “very rough time in [her] life.” Prussia explained that her mother

“had thrown [her] out” of the residence, which had “played a part” in her failure to complete her

first-offender obligations. Prussia informed the trial court that, before she “fouled up,” she had

attended her mental health and substance abuse treatment appointments and kept her appointments

with her probation officer. Prussia alleged that she had been complying with probation since she

had incurred her new charge. Finally, Prussia acknowledged her mental health issues and informed

the trial court that she would like to continue mental health treatment to resolve her “core issues.”

          The trial court revoked Prussia’s previously suspended sentences and resuspended three

years, six months, and thirty days. Thus, the trial court imposed a total of one year and six months

of incarceration, consistent with Prussia’s request to receive a sentence within the discretionary

sentencing guidelines. Prussia appeals, now arguing that the trial court abused its sentencing

discretion by imposing one year and six months of incarceration because she “was now highly

motivated to participate in drug treatment and comply with the conditions of her probation.”

                                             ANALYSIS

          “Under settled principles, a criminal defendant cannot ‘approbate and reprobate by taking

successive positions in the course of litigation that are either inconsistent with each other or

mutually contradictory. Nor may a party invite error and then attempt to take advantage of the

situation created by his own wrong.’” Alford v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 706, 709 (2010)

(quoting Rowe v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 495, 502 (2009)). “The approbate-reprobate doctrine

is broader and more demanding than Rule 5A:18.” Id. “[T]here is no ‘ends of justice’ exception

to the approbate and reprobate doctrine.” Nelson v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 397, 405

(2020).

          Here, after Prussia was unable to provide a urine sample for the drug test and proffered

that she would not object to the trial court finding that the urine screen “would have been dirty,” she

                                                 -4-
asked the trial court to “sentence her within the guidelines.” The sentencing guidelines

recommended six months of incarceration to one year and six months of incarceration. In this

case, the trial court imposed one year and six months of incarceration. Consequently, the trial

court clearly sentenced Prussia within the sentencing guidelines, which is consistent with her

request. Thus, given that Prussia actually asked the trial court to impose the sentence that it

imposed, Prussia cannot now complain that the sentence represented an abuse of discretion.

                                          CONCLUSION

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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