Court Opinion

ID: 9864942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:17:32.739566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:46.215601
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bock
dissenting.
I dissent, for two reasons: First, the conduct of Hamilton does not constitute a violation of the ordinance involved; second, the ordinance, if construed to apply to such conduct, is unconstitutional and void, in that it abridges the exercise of freedom of speech and religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.
The legislative intent, as disclosed by the ordinance, was to regulate the sale and advertising of commodities, not to regulate the exercise of freedom of speech or religion. The only language which, if we ignore this legislative intent, may have any application to the facts before us is as follows: “No person shall in the City of Montrose, use any * * * sounding instrument or employ any loud or offensive device * * * as a means of * * * attracting a crowd * * The exercise of freedom of speech or religion naturally and impliedly includes the attraction of a crowd. A speech is delivered to an audience, not in a vacuum. The record is silent on whether Hamilton succeeded in attracting a crowd. The following language of the ordinance, which clearly relates to hawking any article or goods, has no application whatever to Hamilton’s conduct: “No person shall * * * cry or hawk any article or goods in such a manner as to attract any crowd or as to disturb or annoy any person.” That eliminates any disturbance and annoyance features from this case. There is no contention that Hamilton did not have a right to be where he was when he was preaching and making announcements of religious services. He was exercising a constitutional right, both as to freedom of speech and religion. “Wher*239ever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.” Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1023. See, also, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 Sup. Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155. Using a loud-speaker to attract a crowd would be the only possible dereliction under the ordinance. In my .opinion, the facts disclosed by the record do not constitute a violation of this ordinance. City of Gaffney v. Putnam, 197 S.C. 237, 15 S.E. (2d) 130.
The constitutional questions raised are of more importance. Within the last decade the Supreme Court of the United States; under the able leadership of the then Chief Justice, Charles Evan Hughes, showed in an affirmative way, how the civil liberties of the individual may be vindicated and preserved. Practically all of the cases cited in the majority opinion indicate this definite trend. What freedom of speech, the press, and exercise of religion actually mean can be determined only when these principles are tested in specific instances. The tendency now is not to widen the conflict between liberty and authority, but to reconcile the competitive relationship between these governmental principles. Would a statute or ordinance which absolutely prohibits the use of any loud-speaking device under any circumstances be an abridgment of free speech? I say it certainly would. Just as the right of free press includes the right to “distribute,” so freedom of speech includes the right to be “heard.” The use of a loud-speaker, under the circumstances, is not a nuisance per se. The right to its use, however, is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable legislative regulations,- without an invasion of the constitutional guarantees. A loud-speaking device is a *240great convenience to those who desire to hear and be heard, and bears a necessary relationship to freedom of speech. Its use may reasonably be regulated as to time, place and manner. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct., 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213. The vice of the ordinance before us is that, when applied to the facts at bar, it absolutely prohibits the use of a loud-speaker at any time, in any manner, anywhere. People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093. Such an abridgment of the right of free speech or exercise of religion cannot be left to a gentlemen’s agreement with a chief of police. Concepts of civil liberty, such as freedom of speech and the press, are relative and not absolute, and vary with time and circumstances; and. so, amplification devices which, in recent years, have come largely into use, have their necessary place in the exercise of these constitutional rights. That a city may regulate the use of such sounding devices and protect itself “from concentrated and continuous cacophony” already has been indicated above. The v inertia which sometimes exists in municipalities in protecting individual liberty must be overcome by affirmative action in the enactment of laws that will not abridge, but reconcile, the exercise of free speech and religion, with the authority to reasonably regulate it in the interest of the public safety, health, welfare or convenience, and not leave this problem to the arbitrary action of a chief of police.
An ordinance regulating commercial solicitation and canvassing is one thing, but the application of such ordinance to conduct such as that of defendant in the instant case, thereby interfering with his exercise of a constitutional right, is another. There is a difference in degree, which emphasizes the importance of protecting the individual from an invasion of his constitutional liberties as distinguished from regulating the use of sounding instruments in the sale or solicitation of commodities. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 Sup. *241Ct. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155. Under the language of the ordinance in question, which is controlling, Hamilton’s conduct cannot involve a breach of the peace, commission of - a nuisance, disturbance or impeding traffic. There may be such ordinances in force in Montrose, and perhaps Hamilton’s conduct was within their prohibition. Our concern here must solely be with the ordinance under which he was prosecuted. The utterances of defendant over the loud-speaker are not asserted to have been abusive, subversive or in any other respect unlawful.
In the Cantwell case, in the fifth count of the information, under which a conviction was obtained, defendants were charged with the common-law offense of inciting a breach of the peace. Notwithstanding defendants did something to arouse animosity, the court, in view of the invasion of the constitutional guarantees, denied liability thereunder. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts on that phase of the case, said (page 311): “Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the petitioner’s communication, considered in the light of the constitutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the common-law offense in question.”
In the Schneider case the Los Angeles, Milwaukee and Worcester ordinances under review absolutely prohibited the distribution of pamphlets in the streets, and one of them in other public places. In that case the court held that the purpose of the ordinances, to keep the streets clean and of good appearance, was insufficient to justify the exertion of the police power to invade the constitutional guarantees.
*242The majority of the court here relies upon the case of Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, to justify its opinion. In that case “the sole charge against appellants was that they were ‘taking part in a parade or procession’ on public streets without a permit as the statute required.” In referring to that case, in Trujillo v. Walsenburg, 108 Colo. 427, 118 P. (2d) 1081, we said that it contained an excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of public streets. In the Cox case, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, quoting from the opinion of the lower court, said: “The defendants * * * ‘had a right, under the act, to a license to march when, where and as they did, if after a required investigation it was found that the convenience of the public in the use of the streets would not thereby be unduly disturbed, upon such conditions or changes in the time, place and manner as would avoid disturbance.’ ” In that case, unlike the present one, there was a state statute conferring regulatory power as to time, place and manner of the exercise of a constitutional right. It is clear that the Cox case is in no way analogous in fact or law to the case at bar.
In my opinion, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded, with directions to dismiss the complaint.