Court Opinion

ID: 9674763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:34:55.485606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.053397
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
The people appeal, by leave granted, from an order of the Cass County Circuit Court affirming an order of the Cass County Probate Court, Juvenile Division, which dismissed a criminal petition filed against defendant.
On February 25, 1977, a home on Diamond Lake Island, Cassopolis, Michigan, was extensively damaged. A juvenile petition was filed against defendant on his 19th birthday, November 27, 1979, for allegedly breaking and entering the home on Diamond Lake Island. Defendant was approximately 16 years, 3 months old at the time the alleged crime occurred. On December 5, 1979, the probate court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Although no authority was cited, the dismissal was apparently based on MCL 712A.5; MSA 27.3178(598.5), which provides in part:
"The juvenile division of the probate court shall not have jurisdiction over a child after he or she attains the age of 18 years, except as provided in section 2a.”
The following day the prosecutor requested a warrant in district court charging defendant with malicious destruction of property over $100. The district court refused to sign the warrant on the *484ground that no jurisdiction attached pursuant to MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3), which states in part:
"If during the pendency of a criminal charge against a person in any other court, it is ascertained that the person was under the age of 17 at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall transfer such case without delay, together with all the papers, documents, and testimony connected therewith, to the juvenile division of the probate court of the county in which such other court is situated or in which the person resides.”
The prosecutor then filed a complaint for superintending control in the circuit court. Following a hearing, the circuit court issued a writ of superintending control directing the district court to issue a warrant for defendant’s arrest and then transfer the case to the probate court pursuant to MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3). Pursuant to the circuit court’s order, defendant was arraigned on March 19, 1980, and the case was then transferred to probate court.
On April 25, 1980, defendant tendered a plea in confession in probate court. The probate judge refused to accept the plea and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The prosecutor filed a claim of appeal in the circuit court which affirmed the probate court’s order of dismissal. We granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal.
The question is whether the court of adult criminal jurisdiction or the juvenile division of the probate court has jurisdiction over a person who allegedly commits a crime prior to his 17th birthday and who obtains the age of 18 prior to the commencement of criminal proceedings against him.
*485Probate court jurisdiction ceases under MCL 712A.5; MSA 27.3178(598.5) at the time the child obtains the age of 18, except as provided in MCL 712A.2a; MSA 27.3178(598.2a).1 On the other hand, MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3) requires the adult criminal court to transfer the case to the probate court if the defendant was under the age of 17 at the time of the commission of the offense, regardless of the defendant’s age at the time the transfer is made. The statutes are in obvious conflict. Under a literal reading, a person who commits a crime prior to his 17th birthday and obtains the age of 18 prior to the institution of criminal proceedings would not be subject to the jurisdiction of either the circuit court or the probate court. We do not believe the Legislature intended to immunize the defendant from criminal prosecution in such cases.
Since there is no Michigan authority pertaining to the interpretation of these conflicting statutes,2 our decision is guided by principles of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544, 562; 78 NW2d 273 (1956). When alternative interpretations are possible, a court must ascribe to the Legislature the most probable and reasonable intention. Oakland Schools Bd of Ed v Superintendent of Public Instruction, 392 Mich 613, 619; 221 NW2d 345 (1974). Legislative enactments must be read as a whole so as to harmonize the meaning of their separate provisions and, if possible, avoid the construction *486of one provision in such a manner as to negate another. Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590, 611; 274 NW2d 392 (1979); Washtenaw County v Saline River Intercounty Drainage Board, 80 Mich App 550, 555; 264 NW2d 53 (1978), lv den 402 Mich 944 (1978). Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. In the Matter of Karen Marable, 90 Mich App 7, 10; 282 NW2d 221 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 871 (1979). A statute specific in language and enacted contemporaneously or subsequent to a general statute covering the same subject matter constitutes an exception to the general statute if there appears to be a conflict between them. People v Joseph, 110 Mich App 465, 471; 313 NW2d 340 (1981).
In the case at bar, MCL 712A.5; MSA 27.3178(598.5) is a general provision requiring the juvenile division of the probate court to relinquish jurisdiction at the time the child attains the age of 18. In contrast, MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3) is a specific statute which applies only in instances in which the accused was under the age of 17 at the time the ofiense occurred. Were we to strictly enforce the age limit provided in MCL 712A.5; MSA 27.3178(598.5), the provision for transfer of jurisdiction in MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3) would be totally negated in cases where the defendant is 18 years of age or older.
Applying the above-stated rules of statutory construction, we hold that where a case is transferred to the probate court pursuant to MCL 712A.3; MSA 27.3178(598.3), the probate court shall have jurisdiction without regard to the defendant’s age at the time of transfer. However, such jurisdiction shall be for the limited purpose of holding a waiver hearing pursuant to MCL 712A.4; MSA *48727.3178(598.4). Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the statute, the probate court may waive jurisdiction to the court having general criminal jurisdiction over the charged offense. If the probate court declines to waive jurisdiction, the case shall be dismissed. We believe this procedure effectuates the legislative intent and, to the extent possible, gives effect to both conflicting statutes.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 MCL 712A.2a; MSA 27.3178(598.2a) is not pertinent to the present case.

 Cf. People v Carlson, 360 Mich 651; 104 NW2d 753 (1960); People v Tillard, 318 Mich 619; 29 NW2d 111 (1947); People v Ross, 235 Mich 433; 209 NW 663 (1926).