Court Opinion

ID: 9487743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:25:09.239571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:27.546712
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the trial judge’s improper conduct in the present case constituted plain error, I respectfully dissent. The trial judge’s handling of the dismissal of the lone African-American juror was reprehensible, and more than a nicely-worded reprimand is required to remedy the judicial misconduct in this matter.1 Appellant, Timothy Rush, was denied the fundamentally fair trial that due process guarantees. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant Rush’s motion for a new trial. I would reverse and remand this case for the new trial that Rush deserves.
Rush, who is African-American, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that two police officers used excessive force against him. Resolution of this matter required the jury to choose from two conflicting accounts of what happened during the early morning hours of January 1, 1990. Rush claimed that around the time of the incident, 12:37 a.m., he was in his home with his grandmother and his cousin. Meanwhile a friend, Michael Mayhorn, was in Rush’s backyard, celebrating the New Year by firing a shotgun into the air. Rush’s grandmother asked Rush to tell Mayhorn to stop firing the shotgun and to come inside. Rush approached the kitchen door, wearing only pajama bottoms, to ask Mayhorn to cease firing the shotgun. Rush testified that while standing sideways bent over between the storm door and the wooden door and looking into the backyard, he was shot in the abdomen by one of the police officers. Immediately after being shot, Rush made his way to a telephone in the hallway of his home and called 911 for assistance. The testimony of Rush’s grandmother and his cousin corroborated Rush’s version of the facts.
The two police officers told a different story. They were dispatched to Rush’s neighborhood in response to a report that shots had been fired. They claim that they were fired upon by a shotgun as they approached Rush’s backyard. They saw two men standing below the rear steps of the entrance of the home. At trial, neither officer could identify Rush as having been one of the two men. Both officers did testify that the man firing the shotgun was wearing pants and a shirt. Officer Smith claimed that 25-31 shotgun blasts were fired at them and that the officers returned 13-16 shots before notifying the dispatcher of the situation. Smith testified that after he fired two shots, his first target slumped over, handed the shotgun to the other man, and entered the house through the rear steps.
Rush was indicted in connection with this incident on state charges of first degree assault, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon. However, these charged were later dropped. Robert Craddiek, an assistant circuit attorney for the city, testified that he explained to Smith that the pattern of the bullet holes (i.e. holes made by shots fired by the police officers) and other physical evidence revealed inconsistencies in his version of the incident. Upon hearing this explanation of the weaknesses in the case, Smith offered to change his account and even admitted that Rush could have been inside the house when shot. After the memo *1205of nolle “prosequi was submitted on all charges, Smith tried to get Craddiek to reinstate the charges because he feared that he would be sued if Rush was not prosecuted.
Even this brief review of the record clearly demonstrates the critical importance of the jury’s assessment of witness credibility. “A trial judge must be especially cautious and circumspect in language and conduct during a jury trial. The judge must be fair to all parties and not do or say anything that might prejudice either litigant in the eyes of the jury.” Coast-to-Coast Stores v. Womack-Bowers, 818 F.2d 1398, 1401 (8th Cir.1987). Every person who has the high honor to serve as a member of the judiciary must fervently adhere to the fundamental principles of judicial conduct because, as the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]t is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his [or her] lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.” Starr v. United States, 158 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S.Ct. 919, 923-24, 38 L.Ed. 841 (1894); accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 416 F.2d 362, 364 (5th Cir.1969) (“By reason of his role, quickly observed by jurors, the judge is a figure of over-powering influence, whose every change in facial expression is noted, and whose every word is received attentively and acted upon with alacrity and without question.”). When viewed against the exacting requirements for proper judicial behavior, the trial judge’s conduct in the present case falls far short of our standards.
While I am most concerned with the comments made by the trial judge in the presence of the jury, I will also discuss certain comments made by the trial judge to Rush’s counsel outside of the hearing of the jury because it is important to understand the context in which the improper remarks were made to the jury in order to appreciate the gravity of the trial judge’s misconduct. Moreover, it is appropriate to consider the record as a whole when conducting a review under the plain error standard. United States v. Solomonson, 908 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir.1990).
The majority opinion explains that the trial judge denied the request of Rush’s counsel to send a taxicab for Dorothy Bluett, the absent juror, because of a concern over delay and “because the court did not find it appropriate for a party to provide transportation services to a juror.” These reasons were in fact proffered by the trial judge in the post-trial order denying Rush’s motion for a new trial. Rush v. Smith, No. 91-1430C(2), slip op. at 4 (E.D.Mo. June 1, 1993) (Memorandum and Order). However, on the day of the trial in question, the trial judge held a different view. Speaking with counsel about his refusal to send a United States marshal to pick up Bluett, the trial judge said:
You’ll have to get your own jurors, it’s ten o'clock, you’ve known about this situation since nine o’clock. If you felt like you wanted to do it yourself or get a cab or something like that and get her in, I would have no problem "with that as long as there was no conversation with her on the way, but as it stands now, I intend to proceed with what jurors I have as long as I have six.
Joint Appendix at 156. In my view, it was wholly unreasonable to expect Rush’s counsel to make any sort of contact with a juror outside the courtroom without first seeking permission of the court. For the trial judge to base his refusal on counsel’s one-hour delay while waiting for the trial judge to arrive, is, to my mind, arbitrary and unfair.2
After the trial judge made these statements, Rush’s counsel asked to make a statement on the record with regard to the dismissal of the juror. His remarks, in part, were as follows:
Mr. Singer [Rush’s counsel]: We have the Marshal here, had agreed and was beginning on his way to pick up this juror when the Court informed and indicated to him not to. We were then told that the Court would address this matter when the Judge arrived. We were here for the scheduled motions at a quarter to nine this morning *1206and the Court has just arrived here. We do not know our juror lists have been taken, we don’t know where she lives. We would be in a position of picking up a juror in this ease, which would make a contact with the Plaintiff. Judge, this is a very serious matter. She was left on the jury with deference to [a Batson3 motion] and she’s an elderly woman and she informed the Court that her only transportation here was public transportation. It’s — that is a very' serious prejudice to our client’s ease....
Joint Appendix at 156-57.
Rush’s counsel then emphasized the hardship caused by the inclement weather4, and stated that it was his understanding that the other divisions of the courthouse were not meeting that day, and that the courthouse had in fact been closed by the Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Missouri. The trial judge then told counsel that his information was not correct regarding the status of courthouse activity and admonished counsel that “you better get your facts straight.” The following exchange occurred immediately thereafter:
Mr. Singer: Well, Judge the information I had received was from your staff.
The Court: Okay. Well, that’s not true. You get information from me if you will, and I’ve tried to give you accurate information.
Mr. Singer: They were here.
The Court: Well, now you got that dig in twice. I’m an old man. I’m seventy-six years old, I’ve got a wife that’s in charge of [a local hospital department], she got into a ditch this morning. I went out, put a chain on my car, pulled her out of the ditch. I’ve done all the things that I can do to preserve my family and to maintain this trial and I don’t need any snide remarks about the time of my arrival.
Joint Appendix 158-59. I have included this excerpt from the trial transcript because it clearly demonstrates the trial judge’s inappropriate demeanor. When a judge dons the robe, he or she must put aside all personal preoccupations, no matter how troubling they may be. In the present case, the trial judge let his personal life affect his judicial temperament, and as a result, he exhibited undue hostility toward Rush’s counsel, who was only acting in the best interests of his client.
In concluding that there was no plain error in the present case, the majority opinion fails to consider the hostility, as evidenced by this exchange, the trial judge exhibited toward plaintiffs counsel immediately prior to the trial judge’s improper comments about racial solidarity to the jury. A review of the transcript and the context surrounding the trial judge’s improper comments demonstrates that, under the circumstances, the restrained and somewhat awkward attempt by Rush’s counsel to suggest corrective action to the trial judge was an understandable approach. See op. at 1199. In light of the events of the day in question, I would deem the attempt on the part of Rush’s counsel to point out the trial judge’s error without further provocation to be sufficient to qualify as a contemporaneous objection. From my perspective, however, whether counsel lodged a contemporaneous objection is of no great consequence because, as I have indicated, it is my opinion that the trial judge’s improper comments constituted plain error.
Shortly after the exchange between Rush’s counsel and the trial judge, the jury was called into the courtroom, and the trial judge made the following opening remarks:
Your eyeballs will indicate that your Juror Number Two is absent and we’ve previously discussed that, so we’re going to proceed without her. Something just occurred to me, though, when I was being mildly scolded by the Plaintiffs attorneys for starting court late, that it was this Court’s insistence or relative insistence that we have a black juror in this case, that put the black juror to the missing juror, Dorothy Mae Bluett in the box. I told all of you and I’m going to say this in front of the jury, it doesn’t make any difference. It’s a truth and I’m not afraid of the truth, but I was sincerely afraid of striking the only two blacks that were on that jury, that the Courts of Appeals would look askance at anybody being able to single out a particu*1207lar race and eliminating them from consideration of this jury, so I, and I’m gonna take credit for this, I’m sorry. I’ve got to, I’ve got to preserve the justice and pursuit of justice by this Court, prevailed upon the City to put at least one of those black ladies on this panel so that Mr. Rush would be at least represented ethnic-wise or race-wise. I just, I’m not a damn fool. I haven’t been around here for seventy-six years and not found out that the races have a tendency to stick together and that may be good or bad, but whatever it is, it exists.
Joint Appendix 160-61. I cannot overstate the injudiciousness of these remarks. In a situation where all the court had to do was tell the jury that a juror was unable to attend and that an alternate would take her place, the trial judge recklessly launched into this improper commentary. His remarks would be shocking even if made in chambers, but before a jury, they are unfathomable.
Before addressing the impropriety of the trial judge’s comments, I first note that the trial judge should not have told the jury that Rush’s attorney “scolded” him for being late. The transcript reveals that Rush’s counsel did nothing of the sort. Moreover, even if Rush’s counsel had scolded him, the trial judge should have refrained from making such a reference because of the danger that such characterization might unfairly disparage Rush and Rush’s counsel in the jury’s eyes. However, this indiscretion pales in comparison to the comments which followed.
Most importantly, the trial judge committed plain error by telling the jury that the races have a tendency to stick together. The irreparable damage caused by the utterance of this polarizing remark to an all-white jury hearing a civil rights ease brought by an African-American whose corroborating witnesses were also African-American is self-evident. Such insidious notions have no place in our society, let alone our courtrooms. While I remain optimistic that some day such thinking will be uniformly greeted with incredulity and contempt, we have not progressed so far that I can rest assured the trial judge’s comments fell upon deaf ears. Whether intentional or not, the trial judge’s remarks infected the courtroom and plainly deprived Rush of a fair trial.
While the trial judge’s improper comments were not directed at the merits of Rush’s case, I am gravely concerned they might have effectively undermined the credibility of his witnesses. A similar case was considered by a New York state appeals court over thirty years ago in People v. Burris, 19 A.D.2d 557, 241 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1963). That court’s appreciation of the inequity of weighing testimony on the basis of racial similarity is instructive:
In our opinion, the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Both the court and the assistant district attorney suggested to the jury that the identification of the defendant by the complaining witness should be weighed in the light of the fact that both defendant and the witness were negroes. We have firmly rejected the weighing of testimony on the basis of racial similarity or dissimilarity of witnesses. As identification here turned on the testimony of a single witness, a new trial is necessary to correct the possible effect on the jury of an argument which should be eschewed as false in its premise and divisive in its result.
Id. (citation omitted). The wisdom of that court’s decision is compelling. While the trial judge in the present case did not expressly state that Rush’s witnesses should be discredited, I believe that the danger of his implication demands a new trial as well. Even an inadvertent and indirect suggestion that Rush and his corroborating witnesses gave a consistent account of the events because of racial solidarity, and not because of their sworn duty to tell the truth, is completely intolerable.5 Moreover, because of the impracticality of determining what effect the racial remark had on the jury, I believe that the requirement of a showing of actual prejudice is inappropriate. Again, I point to the result in Burris. In that case, the court realized the importance of witness credibility and therefore determined that the “possible *1208effect” on the jury was sufficient to merit a new trial. I believe that on the particular facts of this case, the potential for prejudice in the minds of the jurors was so great that no actual prejudice need be shown.
Because I am firmly convinced that the trial judge’s error in this case substantially affected the constitutional rights of Timothy Rush by destroying the fundamental fairness of the entire proceeding, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Of course, I am in full agreement with the majority opinion's strong reprimand.

. I see no reason why the trial judge could not have allowed Rush’s counsel to send a cab to pick up the juror, provided that defendants had no objection and that the juror did not know who paid for the transportation.

. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1985).

. The record provides that St. Louis received between 10 to 14 inches of snow.

. In addition, I believe the majority opinion may have relied upon a misreading of our precedent. The majority opinion states that “we do not reverse the trial court for misconduct 'unless it appears that the conduct complained of was intended or calculated to disparage the [plaintiff! in the eyes of the jury and to prevent the jury from exercising an impartial judgment upon the *1208merits.’ " Maj. op. at 1202, citing Harris v. Steelweld Equip. Co., 869 F.2d 396, 400 (8th Cir.) (Harris), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817, 110 S.Ct. 70, 107 L.Ed.2d 37 (1989). This statement appears to indicate that we will only reverse for intentional judicial misconduct. However, the portion of the majority opinion’s statement which quotes Harris is derived originally from Goldstein v. United States, 63 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.1933) (Goldstein). The quoted excerpt appearing in the majority opinion omitted the following introductory clause: "An appellate court should be slow to reverse a case for the alleged misconduct of the trial court, unless....” Id. at 613. The omitted section, however, is crucial to a proper understanding of the precedent. The Goldstein court did not say that we will not reverse for judicial misconduct which is unintentional. Rather, it wisely provided that in the absence of intentional misconduct, the court should be "slow” to reverse for alleged misconduct of the trial court. This language was quoted in its entirety in La Barge Water Well Supply Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 798 (8th Cir.1963). However, in Harris, the case relied upon by the majority opinion, the opinion did not include the first clause of the sentence and employed the altered version. Common sense tells me that there may be instances, though rare, where a court's misconduct may be plain error and yet unintentional. The desire to preserve this possibility accounts for the approach of the Goldstein court to the question of judicial misconduct.