Court Opinion

ID: 9790285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:50:04.582832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.948057
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I recognize that this father’s situation places him in a sympathetic light, I cannot join with the majority’s creation of a rule allowing a credit against unpaid child support payments. First, I am not convinced that adopting any inroad into our previously absolute rule against retroactive modification would be wise, even in a proper case. Second, this is not a proper case for adopting such an exception. Additionally, I am afraid that this decision does not provide adequate guidelines and standards for its implementation for trial judges, attorneys, and divorced parties.
It is true that some states have allowed credit against unpaid support. Those decisions, however, are based on one of two initial criteria: either the custodial parent has agreed, explicitly or implicitly, to payment in a mode other thank that provided in the decree1; or a “compulsion of circum*361stances” has been found to justify an alternate mode of payment which substantially complied with the spirit and intent of the decree.2
Neither prerequisite is present in this case. There was no compulsion of circumstances here, nor is anything before us which affirmatively shows that the mother consented, either expressly or implicitly, to-the custodial or support changes.
The majority hinges its finding of the mother’s implied consent to failure to pay support, solely upon the period of time which elapsed before she filed this action for contempt. This is not an acceptable basis for a finding of consent to an antecedent failure to pay support in general,3 nor is it even an accurate reflection of the facts in this case as the mother contends that she relied on father’s repeated assurances that he would pay.
It is a settled rule in Oklahoma that an action for the recovery of unpaid installments for child support is one for a debt created at law and evidenced of record.4
I believe that most problems inherent in a system which allows a party under a court order to decide for himself whether he will comply with the terms of that decree, are obvious. This process is complicated even more by the fact that the courts which will review his decision to disobey, will assess the situation on equitable considerations.
Equity, after all, is in the eye of the beholder. For that reason I urge attorneys to advise their clients to proceed cautiously in matters concerning custody and support. The majority’s exception to the rule against retroactive modification is not fully developed; it will be refined and altered through the coming years. The grist for that refinement process will be those who do not seek a prospective judicial modification of their decrees, and instead simply do not comply with them.
Those who might be tempted to rely on this decision to excuse their' non-compliance and hope to receive retroactive “credit” for expenditures other than those allowed in this precise factual situation, must understand that if their idea of equity is not shared by the Court, they may be risking more than the ultimate responsibility for unpaid installments or a finding of contempt. We have a statute, 10 O.S.Supp. 1980, § 60.6, which provides that where a parent has wilfully failed, refused, or neglected to contribute to the support of his child “as provided in the decree of divorce” for one year, it is not necessary to terminate his parental rights prior to the adoption of his child. This statute has been very strictly applied by this Court.5
In conclusion, I am persuaded by the following from Bradley v. Fowler, 30 Wash.2d 609, 192 P.2d 969 (1948):
“We appreciate that it might be argued that it is not equitable to require respondent to pay support money to appellant for the time the children were in his custody, and that, this proceeding being one of an equitable nature, the court was justified in allowing to respondent a credit of one hundred twenty-five dollars against the amount he was required to pay. However, we are of the opinion that even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity, cannot disregard the provisions of a lawful decree, nor is such a *362court justified in offsetting against payments required to be made under such a decree voluntary payments made for medical attention and clothing furnished children, as was done in this case. If, under such a decree as we have here before us, the father could refuse to make the payments required of him, and in an attempt to justify such refusal show that he had expended certain sums of money on his children while they were with him, it is evident there would be continuous trouble and turmoil. If a party to such a decree is not satisfied with its provisions relative to the custody of the children, or payments required to be made for their support, such party may always come into court and ask for a modification of the decree.”
I believe that the only proper “equitable” determination in this matter has already been made and decided correctly by the trial court; that under these facts, the father was not in contempt of court.

. Headley v. Headley, Ala., 172 So.2d 29 (1964); Gould v. Awapara, Tex.Civ.App., 365 S.W.2d 671 (1963); Frazier v. Rainey, 227 Ga. 350, 180 S.E.2d 725 (1971).

. Jackson v. Jackson, 306 Ky. 715, 209 S.W.2d 79 (1948); Schlom v. Schlom, 149 Miss. 111, 115 So. 197 (1928).
There is some danger that the majority’s statement concerning allowance of credit against arrearages if equity would so dictate provided it “would not do an injustice to the mother” may be misinterpreted. That is not a separate criterion independent of consent or a compulsion of circumstances as discussed above, and none of the authorities cited in the majority’s n.2 so indicate. Injustice to the mother is instead an additional factor to consider after a finding of consent or compulsion of circumstances.

. See, e.g., Baures v. Baures, 13 Ariz.App. 515, 478 P.2d 130, 47 A.L.R.3d 1024 (1971); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 192 Okl. 564, 137 P.2d 914 (1943).

. Wade v. Wade, Okl., 570 P.2d 337 (1977); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 192 Okl. 564, 137 P.2d 914 (1943).

. Matter of Adoption of E.S.P., Okl., 584 P.2d 209 (1978).