Court Opinion

ID: 9693937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:10:59.812677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:26.314932
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice McBride :
I concur in the reversal of this judgment. I do not, however, believe that the reasons stated touch the heart of the matter. I am left with the unrelievable feeling that it is fundamentally unfair to spread before the jury a defendant’s criminal record while the issue of his guilt has not yet been ascertained by them. I am aware, of course, of the decisions of this Court, which allow such a practice. Some of the justices who wrote those opinions have specifically conceded the unfairness of it. The present Chief Justice, in his dis*167sent in Commonwealth v. DePofi, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A. 2d 649, and Justice Musmanno, in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 389 Pa. 382, 417, 133 A. 2d 207, and Justice Bell in Commonwealth v. Lowry, 374 Pa. 594, 603, 98 A. 2d 733, have placed on the record their views to the same effect. It is clear, therefore, that at least a majority of this Court believes that this procedure is unfair. It is my firm conviction that experience in the application of the rule during the years which have passed since the Act of 1925 has convincingly demonstrated that this unfair rule ought no longer be followed. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who opened his classic Avork on the Common Laiv by telling us: “The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common Law. To accomplish the task, other tools are needed besides logic. It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the hrw has not been logic: it has been experience.”
That statement can have no better application than it has here. Even as a matter of logic the rule has been supported on the grotind that the jury ought to know just Avhat the judge ought to know in pronouncing sentence ; but it must be remembered that upon conviction of murder in the first degree prior to 1925 there was no discretion on the part of a judge to impose a punishment less than death. It did not matter how much or how little he knew of the defendant. Even judges, hearing a plea of guilty, should not know a man’s criminal record until they have first determined the degree of his guilt. Only then, if ever, can that criminal record play its proper part on the question of sentence without the necessarily attendant uncertainty as to whether it plays an improper part on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was tMs Court which created that rule only 34 years ago; it is this Court which should *168now abandon it. Stare decisis is one of tbe great principles of jurisprudence but its. application here would be unjust. I join with Justice Musmanno in Ms concurring opinion.
■ It seems to me that there is an additional reason for reversing the judgment. It was apparently not argued in the court below and was not presented to us; but in my view, it is too fundamental to be disregarded. Commonwealth v. Stowers, 363 Pa. 435, 70 A. 2d 226 (1950).
The Act of June 24, 1939, P. N 872, §701, 18 P.S. §4701,1 is the governing substantive and procedural statute. The respective functions of the court and jury are carefully stated therein. Where the defendant pleads not guilty it becomes the duty of the jury trying the case not only to find the degree of the offense *169but to fix the penalty of life imprisonment or death by its verdict. Where the defendant pleads guilty the court “shall, at its discretion, impose sentence of death or imprisonment for life”. In this case the trial judge correctly charged the jury as follows: “If you conclude that the defendant is guilty of murder of the first degree a further duty rests upon you, and that is of fixing the penalty. You will have to, if you come to such a conclusion, state in your verdict whether he shall suffer death in the manner provided by law or undergo imprisonment for life.”
The record shows that when the jury returned the roll was called and the jurors stated that their foreman would speak for them. The record then states “The foreman of the jury read the verdict of said jury, finding the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree, and recommending the death penalty”. A separate entry says that “Upon request of counsel for defense the jury was polled, and each juror when his or her name was called, stated that he or she had found the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree with the death penalty”. This latter entry, however, does not purport to contain the exact language of the court officer or the response of each member of the jury. We must look at the formal verdict specifically placed of record and signed by its foreman. That is as follows: “And now, to-wit: June 21, 1957¿ we, the Jurors empaneled in the above entitled case, find Robert Tallie Davis guilty of first degree murder and recommend the death penalty. Roy G. Westwood, Foreman”. The court below, in its opinion, reciting the proceedings in the case, says: “Upon trial of the case the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree, with the recommendation of the death penalty.” Upon that “verdict”, after overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, neither of which concerned it*170self with, the present point, the court sentenced the defendant to death.
It is clear, to me at least, that although the trial judge correctly charged the jury as to its duty and responsibility, that body did not, according to this record, meet the responsibility placed upon it. It merely “recommended” the death penalty: it did not fix it. It showed no consciousness that its decision was irrevocable as it is under our law. The statute provides: “The court shall impose the sentence so fixed, as in other cases.” But the trial jury fixed no sentence; it merely recommended it. To whom was this recommendation made? Certainly not the trial judge, because he had no power to act upon a recommendation. His duty as to the imposition of sentence is purely ministerial. Certainly not to this Court, for we have denied to ourselves, mistakenly I think, the right to modify a death penalty fixed by a jury. Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A. 2d 391 (1952); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A. 2d 353 (1949). The recommendation by the jury of a death sentence is a decision completely unknown to our law and should not have been received by the court nor acted upon. The jury did not exercise its sole “discretion”; it passed it on, or at least shared it, with others. If on a plea of guilty the court determined that the homicide was murder of the first degree and entered an order “recommending” the death penalty, surely such a finding could not be accepted by this Court. Nor could the Governor of the Commonwealth accept it as the basis for a warrant of execution. Yet there is no difference between that situation and the present one. It seems to me that a decision which spells the difference between life and death must avoid the least possible uncertainty. I agree that it may reasonably be argued that the jury’s recommendation may *171have been meant by them to be tantamount to a “fixing” of the penalty; but I insist that it may also be argued that the jury was recommending the death penalty in the belief that some power existed elsewhere to accept or refuse such recommendation. The point I make is that the meaning of the jury’s “true deliverance” must not be made the subject of reasonable debate; it must be put beyond differences of opinion.
In Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 338 Pa. 65, 12 A. 2d 317 (1940), the jury recommended the death penalty. We correctly held that this was not the same thing as fixing the death penalty; but in that case we said that the situation was cured by virtue of the fact that the crier, in repeating his understanding of the jury’s verdict, used the word “fix” instead of “recommend” and the jury assented. Believing, as I do, that the trial judge should not have left such an important matter to the crier, I do not agree with the reasoning in that case; but in any event, it is no authority for what was done here.
In Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A. 2d 743 (1953), the reverse of the Petrillo situation appeared. There the jury fixed the penalty but the court clerk recorded the verdict as constituting a recommendation. There we held, rightly I think, that the court could correct the clerical error where there was no doubt that it misrepresented the facts.
I do not insist that in every case the jury need use the word “fix”; it is sufficient if they, by any unmistakable language, demonstrate by their verdict that they have accepted the responsibility of finally imposing the punishment which is to be meted out. In my opinion, this record shows that they did not do that but contented themselves only with the making of a recommendation, to persons unknown, who might or might not have power to accept or reject such recom*172mendation. The general understanding, legal and lay-alike, is that one who merely recommends a decision is not thereby making the decision itself or accepting responsibility for the decision. Juries generally are fully conscious and are sometimes told specifically of their right to make a recommendation of mercy. Nobody pretends that this recommendation is binding except where the statute specifically says so.
It seems to me that the jury’s consciousness of its ultimate responsibility, in this case, was not of that degree required by law and its verdict should not have been received and acted upon. Further deliberation was required.

 The statute reads as follows: “All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or'by lying in wait, or by any' other kind of willful, deliberate and .premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to. perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall, be murder in the first degree. All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree. The jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain in their verdict whether the person is guilty of murder of the first or second degree. If such person is convicted by confession, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and to give sentence accordingly.
“Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the first degree is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to suffer death in the manner provided by law, or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the case, which shall fix the penalty by its verdict. The court shall impose the sentence so fixed, as in other cases. In cases of pleas of guilty, the court, where it determines the crime to be murder of the first degree, shall, at its discretion, impose sentence of death of imprisonment for life.’-’ (Emphasis supplied)