Court Opinion

ID: 9574739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:07:38.79705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:53.769442
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance and generally in the reasoning of the majority, but I think it proper to call attention to the recent decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, in the Estate of Lundell, 95 Cal.App.2d ----, ---- [212 P.2d 914], a hearing in which ease was denied by this court on February 23, 1950, as I think it is clear that the decision in the last mentioned case is in clear conflict with the holding of this court in the case at bar as well as the settled rule in cases of this character.
It has long been the rule in this state that in the allowance of attorneys’ fees, or the determination of the value of legal services rendered by an attorney, the experience of the trial judge furnishes every element necessary to fix the value of services rendered by an attorney in handling a legal problem (Elconin v. Yalen, 208 Cal. 546 [282 P. 791]; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles-Inyo Farms Co., 134 Cal.App. 268 [25 P.2d 224]; Theisen v. Keough, 115 Ca;.App. 353 [1 P.2d 1015]; Moore v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App. 658 [280 P. 1008]; Estate of Schnell, 82 Cal.App.2d 170 [185 P.2d 854]), and it is not necessary that expert evidence as to the value of such services be introduced. (Estate of Straus, 144 Cal. 553 [77 P. 1122]; Kendrick v. Gould, 51 Cal.App. 712 [197 P. 681]; Reid v. Warren Improvement Co., 17 Cal.App. 746 [121 P. 694]; Bowman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 88 Cal.App. 481 [263 P. 826]; Liebenguth v. Priester, 64 Cal.App.2d 343 [148 P.2d 893]; Peebler v. Olds, 71 CaLApp.2d 382 [162 P.2d 953].) It also appears to be the settled rule that even if expert evidence is offered in such a case, it is not conclusive on the trial court. (Zimmer v. Kilborn, 165 Cal. 523 [132 P. 1026, Ann.Cas. 1914D 368]; Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298 [104 P. 320, 20 Ann.Cas. 49]; Lady v. Ruppe, 113 Cal.App. 606 [298 P. 859]; Cullinan v. McColgan, 87 Cal.App. 684 [263 P. 353]; Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501 [261 P. 994]; Nylund v. Madsen, 94 Cal.App. 441 [271 P. 374]; Libby v. Kipp, 87 Cal.App. 538 [262 P. 68]; Estate of Schnell, *84482 Cal.App.2d 170 [185 P.2d 854]; Flynn v. Young, 25 Cal.App.2d 614 [78 P.2d 245]; Mitchell v. Towne, 31 Cal.App.2d 259 [87 P.2d 908].)
In view of the rules of law announced in the authorities above cited, the decision of the District Court of Appeal in the Estate of Lundell, supra, is clearly unsound, and this court should have granted a hearing in that case in order to maintain uniformity in the decisions on this subject.
In my opinion, the respondent’s position in the Estate of Lundell, supra, is much stronger and more in harmony with the authorities on the subject than the position of respondent in the case at bar, and it is impossible for me to reconcile the position of the majority of this court in voting to deny respondent’s petition for a hearing in that case with their position in joining in the opinion which affirms the order of the trial court in the case at bar. The two positions are wholly irreconcilable and the attempt in the majority opinion to distinguish the Estate of Lundell from the ease at bar greatly weakens the position of the majority and adds confusion to the law in this field.