Court Opinion

ID: 9832679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:06:11.091665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:50.114767
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] Upon further consideration of this case, upon motion for rehearing, we have concluded that we were in error in holding that the claim for the value of the three bales of cotton marked “DONE” was not barred by the two-year limitation provided in the shipping contract or bill of lading. We do not find it necessary to decide whether the two or four year statute applies to this case, as we have held, correctly we think, in the opinion that the provision in the contract with regard to the time within which such an action should be instituted is valid and enforceable. The decision of the question depends upon when this cause of action accrued. The contract provided for immediate shipment, and the carrier was bound to transport and deliver the property within a reasonable time; no time for such delivery being specified. After the lapse of a reasonable time for such delivery, the property not being delivered, the shipper had a right to treat such breach of contract as a conversion and bring suit for the value of the cotton. If the cotton was tendered to the shipper before the trial, this would have satisfied the demand for its value; and the shipper would then be entitled, upon proper amendment of his petition, to recover damages for the delay. In determining what was a reasonable time for the transportation and delivery of this “DONE” cotton, we think that appellant’s contention must be sustained that the extraordinary condition found to have existed, no notice of which was given to the shipper at the time of shipment, cannot be taken to affect or enlarge the time of delivery, under the contract, beyond the time allowed under usual or ordinary conditions. Texas Central R. R. Co. v. Hannay-Frerichs Co., 142 S. W. 1167; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Stark Grain Co., 103 Tex. 542, 131 S. W. 410; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Felker, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 604, 90 S. W. 531.
[6] The cotton was delivered to the carrier, as shown by the bill of lading No. 75, on October 11, 1906. The trial court finds that the “average time,” by which we understand was meant reasonable time, for delivery of this cotton was from 10 days to 3 weeks. Taking the longest period named, 21 days, this reasonable time for transportation of the three bales from Merkel and delivery at Galveston expired on November 2,-1906. The plaintiff’s cause of action then accrued, and became barred, under the contractual limitation, two years after that date, or November 2, 1908. This action was begun by filing of the original petition on February 11, 1911, two years and three months, and more, after the cause of action accrued.
The trial court further found as a fact that the average or reasonable time for such transportation and delivery during the season of 1906-07, when the extraordinary conditions of congestion of traffic existed, was from 30 to 90 days. Taking the longest time of 90 days from the date of the bill of lading, October 11, 1906, this reasonable time expired January 11, 1907. The plaintiff’s cause of action then accrued, regardless of *1194;the doctrine of Railway -Co. v. Hannay-Fre-¡riehs Co., and other cases, supra, and was barred when this suit was filed, under the contractual limitation provided. The court does add that the last of the lot of cotton of which these three bales was a past was (delivered February 19, 1907; but we cannot (regard this as contradictory of the finding .•as to a reasonable time required for such .carriage and delivery, or that such reason,-able time extended to February 19th. It seems clear to us, under the findings of fact of the court and the law as stated in the Hannay-Frerichs Case, supra, and others ■cited, that the cause of action herein .set up .and adjudicated, as far as concerns the three bales of “DONE” cotton, accrued more ■than two years before the filing of the petition, and was barred; and that the trial ■court should have so held.
[7] The finding of the trial court that this suit “was instituted before the expiration of two years from the date of the breach of said contract of carriage, as stipulated therein,” is, in fact, a conclusion of law, and an ■erroneous conclusion from the facts found, .and ought not to be allowed to control the ■clear and specific findings of fact as to the ■date of the breach of the contract by the -failure to deliver within a reasonable time.
There is nothing in the correspondence alluded to by appellee that would prevent the running of the limitation or relieve him of -the obligation to sue, as herein pointed out.
Our conclusion is that the motion should ’be granted, in so far as concerns the judgment for the value of the three bales of cotton marked “DONE,” and that as to the value of this cotton judgment should be here rendered that plaintiff take nothing; and it -is so ordered. This does not affect the judgment for the value of the other cotton, ship-ped April 24, 1907, which is affirmed.
As to the other questions decided, we adhere to our original opinion. The costs of -this appeal and motion will be adjudged .■against appellee. The judgment for cost of the trial court is not disturbed.