Court Opinion

ID: 9961718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 16:12:43.23999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:24.891941
License: Public Domain

J-A07021-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: K.T., A MINOR :              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :                   PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
  APPEAL OF: J.T., MOTHER           :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :
                                    :              No. 1351 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-21-DP-0000101-2022

  IN RE: K.T., A MINOR                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.T., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1353 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered September 13, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
                   Orphans' Court at No(s): 023-ADOPT-2023

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED: APRIL 19, 2024

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A07021-24

       J.T. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree terminating her parental rights

to her daughter, K.T. (“Child”), born in July 2022.1 Mother also appeals from

the order changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

Upon review, we affirm the termination decree and dismiss the appeal from

the goal change order as moot.

       The trial court detailed the factual and procedural history of this matter,

as follows:

             [In July 2022], the same day that Child was born,
       Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (henceforth
       “CCCYS”), received a referral regarding [Child] and her Mother
       due to concerns that Mother’s intellectual and developmental
       disabilities as well as housing instability impacted her ability to
       safely care for [C]hild. . . . [The trial court] provided a verbal
       order for CCCYS to receive emergency protective custody of
       [Child] for placement into the [care] of [kinship parents].[2]

              As a result of the verbal emergency protective custody order
       . . . [,] a shelter care hearing was held . . . and it was ordered
       that [Child] remain in the legal and physical custody of CCCYS for
       continued placement with [kinship parents]. Mother appeared for
       the shelter care hearing and evidence presented included that
       Mother’s parental rights were involuntarily terminated by
       Lancaster County . . . regarding [Child’s older sibling]. Mother’s
       housing was historically unstable as she had been moving
       between Lancaster, Dauphin, and Cumberland counties. Since
       July [] 202[2], she had provided CCCYS three different addresses
       for where she was supposedly living and as a result, her current
____________________________________________

1 By separate decree of the same date, the trial court additionally terminated

the parental rights of any unknown father. No unknown father filed an appeal
or participated in the instant appeals.

2 Child’s older sibling was also placed with those “kinship parents,” so
designated because both children were placed with them. Kinship parents
adopted Child’s older sibling in August 2022. See N.T., 9/12/23, at 6-7, 89.

                                           -2-
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       residence had not been viewed by CCCYS. The hospital staff
       where [Child] was born reported Mother needed to be supervised
       with [Child] as, although she demonstrated love and care towards
       her newborn, Mother was not capable of caring for [Child] safely
       and effectively without supervision. Lancaster County’s child
       welfare agency had performed a parenting assessment of Mother
       that concluded she required supervision to properly care for a
       child[,] with that conclusion rooted in assessments of Mother’s
       limited cognitive abilities. [The hearing officer] determined [the
       order] for emergency protective custody should be ratified[,] and
       directed [Child] to remain in the legal and physical custody of
       CCCYS for continued placement in the kinship home of her
       sibling’s pre[-]adoptive parents. . . . CCCYS [then] filed a
       dependency petition alleging that [Child] was without proper
       parental care, control[,] and supervision placing her health,
       safety[,] and welfare at risk[,] as well as having been born to a
       parent whose parental rights to another child had been
       involuntarily terminated within the last three years.          The
       allegations of lack of proper parental care and supervision
       involved Mother’s ongoing homelessness and housing instability
       since at least 2020.

             An adjudicatory hearing was held [i]n August [] 2022 . . . .
       Mother had moved yet again since the shelter care hearing . . ..
       Following an adjudicatory hearing, it was determined that [Child]
       was a dependent child based upon clear and convincing evidence
       and she was to remain placed in the legal and physical custody of
       CCCYS in her kinship home with her sibling.[3]

             A permanency plan was developed for Mother . . . and
       subsequently revised. . . . Mother was ordered to develop and
       maintain appropriate and effective communication with service
       providers, obtain and maintain stable housing, meet and provide
       for [Child]’s physical, emotional[,] and developmental needs,
       address mental health and IDD [(“intellectual and developmental
       disability”)] needs and improve parenting skills.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/23, at 1-3 (unpaginated) (footnotes omitted).

____________________________________________

3 The court additionally established a permanency goal of reunification and a

concurrent goal of adoption.

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       Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

regular permanency review hearings after which it maintained Child’s

commitment and          placement.       Although   the   court found   aggravated

circumstances existed as to Mother because her parental rights to Child’s older

sibling had been involuntarily terminated, it did not excuse CCCYS from the

requirement it provide reasonable efforts toward reunification.

       From August 2022 to August 2023, Mother engaged in guided visitation

at Alternative Behavior Consultants (“ABC”), participating in 22 of 42 visits.4

See N.T., 9/12/23, at 14, 17-18, 26-27; see also CYS Exhibit 4 JUV.             In

August 2023, Mother transitioned to ABC’s Skills program, and participated

in four sessions. ABC terminated Mother from the program two weeks prior to

the subject hearing because it received reports people unknown to ABC were

living in Mother’s home. See id. at 19-20, 99-100; see also CYS Exhibit 4

JUV.

       Against the advice of service providers, Mother moved to Perry County

in January 2023. See N.T., 9/12/23, at 58, 94. She

       moved in with a female roommate who had an open case with
       Perry County [CYS].       In or around May 2023, the female
       roommate [and her two children] moved out [after a volatile
       relationship with Mother,] and [Mother and her boyfriend assumed
       the lease]. Service providers . . . reported there [we]re other
       adults residing in the apartment. Mother admitted that two weeks
       prior to the hearing, two adult friends had just moved into the

____________________________________________

4 Notably, Mother’s visitation reverted to [CCCYS] from March 2023 through

May 2023 due to her inconsistency. See N.T., 9/12/23, at 14, 92-93.

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       apartment. She had only known the one adult for approximately
       two weeks.[5]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/23, at 10 (unpaginated), Findings of Fact ¶ 5,

subparagraph m.

       In June 2023, CCCYS filed a petition to change Child’s permanency goal

from reunification to adoption and a petition to involuntarily terminate

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b).    The trial court held an evidentiary hearing.   Child, then almost

fourteen months old, was represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”)

and legal counsel. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).6 Mother was present and

represented by counsel.

       The court heard substantial testimony regarding Mother’s continued

unstable housing situation. Both CCCYS caseworker, Whitney Taylor, (“Ms.

Taylor”) and Jessica Hoffman (“Ms. Hoffman”), senior human services case

manager for MH/IDD, testified they discouraged Mother from moving to Perry

County because of its distance away and because it would result in less

____________________________________________

5 Immediately prior to the move to Perry County, Mother was in and out of

shelters, motels, and friends’ homes in Cumberland County. While she was
placed on an assisted housing list, she rejected such housing options on two
occasions, most recently just prior to moving to Perry County. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/16/23, at 9 (unpaginated).

6 Both the GAL and legal counsel argued in favor of termination and goal
change at the conclusion of the subject hearing. See N.T., 9/13/23, at 141-
143. Neither submitted briefs to this Court.

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services being available to Mother.      See N.T., 9/13/23, at 58, 58, 95.

Moreover, both Ms. Taylor and Ms. Hoffman expressed serious concerns about

Mother’s housing situation in Perry County. See id. at 59, 94-95. Ms. Taylor

noted problems with Mother’s female roommate who not only had “an open

case” with Perry County CYS, but two autistic, nonverbal and physically

aggressive children who posed a threat to another child’s safety. Ms. Taylor

told Mother those conditions were a bar to reunification. See id. at 59, 95.

     Following an unspecified period in a motel, Mother and her boyfriend

assumed the lease for the Perry County home and have occupied it since

sometime in May 2023, when the roommate left with her children. See id. at

58-59, 97. Ms. Taylor stated that Mother could not afford the rent without

her boyfriend. Id. at 115. Ms. Taylor and Ms. Hoffman also testified other

people lived in the apartment and Mother attempted to conceal that fact from

them. See id. at 61, 98-100, 115. Ms. Taylor further explained, “It was also

reported that the parent educator was not supposed to let me know about

these people, that it’s none of my business.     So[,] I felt that there was

manipulation going on there where [Mother] purposely wasn’t being truthful

about people in her home.” Id. at 116.

     Mother testified, at the time of the hearing, she and her boyfriend

resided with a couple whom she described as their “best friends.” However,

Mother then testified that she had known at least one of them for only two

weeks prior to their moving into her home. Id. at 123, 134-35. Mother did

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not know and had not asked, if either person had a criminal record. See id.

at 136. She admitted her boyfriend’s niece and her children resided with them

previously in the home. See id. at 124. Mother also acknowledged she did

not tell CCCYS about the people residing with her and did not understand the

importance of being honest with her caseworker. See id. at 124-25.

      The testimony at the hearing demonstrated Mother’s mental health

treatment was inconsistent, and it was unclear whether she was taking her

medication regularly and as directed. See id. at 32-33, 37-38, 102-03, 118-

19. Both Ms. Hoffman and Ms. Taylor acknowledged that Mother had been

treating at Sadler Health and had made efforts to assist Mother in securing

alternative treatment. See id. at 61-62; 102-03. Mother conceded she was

not currently receiving mental health treatment.     See id. at 125-26. She

indicated plans to start treatment with a new provider via telehealth. See id.

at 125-26, 140.    While Mother testified she consistently takes her mental

health medication, her primary care provider, Ms. Spiese, disagreed. See id.

at 37-38; 125-26; see also id. at 118-19.

      Mother also exhibited persistent problems including a lack of retention,

relaying unreliable information, and failing to appreciate the impact of her

behaviors on Child’s safety. See id. at 17-18, 40-41, 64-65, 93-94, 104-09,

117. Ms. Spiese expressed, “[Mother] is not consistent with her presentation

of facts . . . . [Y]ou don’t know what’s happening in [Mother]’s life because it

could really be anything.”    Id. at 40-41.    Ms. Spiese and others related

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Mother’s false statements regarding issues as significant as pregnancy and

her father’s death. See id. at 40-41, 64-65, 93-94. Ms. Taylor expressed

concern about Mother’s failure to address her mental health, and her lack of

understanding of how that affected Child’s safety. Although Ms. Taylor had

discussed the matter weekly with Mother for one year, Mother failed to

understand the concern and challenged its validity. See id. at 109.

       Ms. Taylor additionally testified Mother lied about Child’s condition,

including that she was having seizures, which falsity created concern for

Child’s safety. See id. at 104-07. Kinship Mother and Child’s initial primary

care provider echoed these concerns.7 See id. at 87-88, 44, 48.

       By decree, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental

rights to Child. By separate order dated and entered the same day, the court

also changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

       Mother, through court-appointed counsel, filed separate, timely notices

of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated Mother’s

appeals sua sponte. The trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
       discretion when it found that Mother’s parental rights should be
       terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(8) as [CCCYS]
____________________________________________

7 Kinship Mother testified Mother’s false reports of Child’s medical problems

resulted in a recommendation that Child obtain a different medical provider.
See N.T., 9/13/23, at 87-88.

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     did not provide sufficient evidence at the hearing on [its] petition
     for termination of Mother’s parental rights to establish that the
     conditions which led to the removal of [Child] from Mother’s care
     and placement of Child in foster care continue to exist and
     termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
     welfare of [Child]?

     2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
     discretion when it found that [Child’s] permanency goal of
     reunification was neither appropriate no[r] feasible, and ordered
     a goal change to adoption, thus contravening 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
     6351(f)?

     3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
     discretion in changing the goal from reunification to adoption
     when the conditions which led to removal/placement of [Child] no
     longer existed or were substantially eliminated, thus contravening
     42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)?

     4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its
     discretion determining the best interests of [Child] would be
     served by changing the goal to adoption when [Mother] had met
     or was meeting all her permanency plan goals, and was ready,
     willing, and able to parent [Child] and provide for her needs, thus
     contravening 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)?

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (issue reordered, unnecessary capitalization eliminated,

spacing corrected).

     Our standard of review is as follows:

     [I]n cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights[,
     our review] is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
     determination is supported by competent evidence.               When
     applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept
     the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
     if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial
     court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
     appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
     has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of
     discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest
     unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.         It
     matters not that an appellate court might have reached a

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      different conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an
      abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary
      support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (internal

citations omitted; emphasis added).

      Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination

of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Subsection

2511(a) provides grounds for the involuntary termination of parental rights.

If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence supporting the existence

of one of the grounds for termination set forth in subsection (a), the court

must then consider whether termination would best serve the child under

subsection (b). See id. § 2511(b). This Court need only agree with one of

the grounds set forth in subsection (a) to affirm, provided subsection (b) is

also satisfied. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).       Mother has failed to

preserve and thus waived any challenge related to section 2511(a)(1), (2),

and (5). See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted) (explaining this Court will not review an appellant’s claim

unless it is included in the statement of questions involved, developed in the

argument, and supported by citation to relevant legal authority).

      We review Mother’s challenges to termination pursuant to subsections

(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

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     (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
     may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                                     ...

        (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
        by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
        agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
        removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
        removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
        termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
        and welfare of the child.

                                  *****

     (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

     To satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) the child

has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Section 2511(a)(8) does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the

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child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). Rather, our

inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions” have been

“remedied” such that “reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time

of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009). This Court has

acknowledged:

      [T]he application of [s]ection (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
      parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems
      that had led to removal of her children.            By allowing for
      termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to
      exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s
      life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to
      perform     the   actions    necessary    to    assume     parenting
      responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
      indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
      parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
      work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a short
      period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to complete the
      process of either reunification or adoption for a child who has been
      placed in foster care.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

      Finally, this Court has also explained that,

      while both section 2511(a)(8) and section 2511(b) direct us to
      evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to
      resolve the analysis relative to section 2511(a)(8), prior to
      addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed
      by section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
      address section 2511(a) before reaching section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

      In the instants matter, the trial court explained:

             Mother has not shown an ability to provide safe and stable
      care for [Child]. Since her birth, [Child’s] day to day needs and
      individual care have been provided by her kinship care parents.
      Mother has not been able to demonstrate an ability to provide

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      [Child] with safe or stable housing or that she can exercise safe
      parenting skills. Mother has a documented history of exercising
      poor insight and judgment into identifying what is safe housing
      and which individuals are safe to live with or invite to one’s home.
      Despite various service providers attempting to assist in this area,
      Mother has not consistently received mental health counseling and
      services. Mother’s lack of consistent visitation with [Child] during
      [Child’s] first fifteen months of life has resulted in Mother’s
      inability to meet [Child’s] physical comfort needs and
      strengthen[ed Child’s] close connection to her kinship family.
      Despite . . . efforts to reunify Mother and [Child] following a
      finding of aggravated circumstances due to a prior involuntary
      termination of parental rights regarding an older child, Mother was
      unable to complete any of her permanency goals essential to
      ensure a safe return of [Child] to her physical care. It has been
      over fifteen months since [Child’s] birth and placement in the
      kinship home yet Mother is not any closer to providing [Child]
      permanency by way of reunification than she was at the time of
      placement.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/23, at 12-13.

      Initially, it is undisputed that Child had been removed from Mother’s

care for over twelve months. At the time of the subject hearing, Child had

been placed since July 2022, almost fourteen months. See N.T., 9/12/23, at

6, 8. Consequently, the evidence met the first prong of section 2511(a)(8).

      Mother assails the second statutory prong, i.e., whether the conditions

which led to Child’s removal or placement still exist. To the extent Mother

asserts the reasons for Child’s placement were “substantially alleviated,” she

has stable housing, mental health treatment, and responded to prompts

during her guided visitation, defeating the sufficiency of proof of section

(a)(8), see id. at 22-23, we disagree.

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      Ample evidence supports the trial court’s finding “[M]other has been

unable to remedy the significant concerns regarding her housing, parenting

skills and mental health resulting in the need for ongoing placement . . ..

[Child] has been in the custody of CCCYS for more than [twelve] months with

the conditions which led to her removal continuing to exist.”        Trial Court

Opinion, 11/16/23, at 13 (unpaginated).

      Child was placed due to concerns for parental care and control related

to Mother’s mental health and intellectual functioning, and homelessness.

See N.T., 9/12/23, at 6.      As discussed above, the record reveals these

concerns remained. Accordingly, the evidence proved the second prong of

section (a)(8).

      Likewise, the record also supports the court’s determination regarding

the third and final prong of section 2511(a)(8), i.e., that termination will best

serve the needs and welfare of Child. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/23, at

12-13 (unpaginated).     Specifically, the certified record indicates CCCYS’s

concerns regarding Child’s safety while in Mother’s care persisted at the time

of the hearing because Mother consistently made poor decisions, including the

choice to have virtual strangers reside in her home. See N.T., 9/12/23, at

71-72, 107-08.

      For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in

concluding the termination of Mother’s parental rights will best serve Child’s

needs and welfare pursuant to section 2511(a)(8).

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      Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section

2511(a)(8), we must next determine whether termination was proper under

section 2511(b).    Section 2511(b) affords primary consideration to the

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Regarding the section 2511(b)

best interest analysis, this Court has explained:

             While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
      major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
      is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
      court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
      The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
      termination of parental rights. Rather, the [trial] court must
      examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
      termination would destroy an existing, necessary[,] and beneficial
      relationship. . ..

             In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally . . . the
      trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
      relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
      severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations,

quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted).

      The evaluation of a child’s respective bonds is not always an easy task.

“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond

analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.”   In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

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omitted). When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

well.    Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations omitted).

        Furthermore, “[c]ommon       sense      dictates that courts   considering

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive

home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 268.      In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to section

2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id.

at 269. Children “are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . .

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

        As our Supreme Court recently explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d

1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023),

        a court conducting a [s]ection 2511(b) analysis must consider
        more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
        severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the
        parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b)
        analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is
        necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the
        bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
        needs and welfare.

In addition, the K.T. Court explained that the inquiry must consider and weigh

certain evidence if it is present in the record, including, but not limited to, the

child’s “need for permanency and length of time in foster care . . .; whether

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the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety,

and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted).

       The record supports the trial court’s determination that termination

served Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

pursuant to section 2511(b). The court reasoned:

       [Child] is residing in the same home as her sibling who was
       previously adopted by the kinship parents. The kinship mother
       identified a close and healthy sibling relationship between [Child]
       and this sibling. [Child] has been residing in this kinship home
       her entire life as she was placed there from the hospital. She is
       closely connected to her kinship parents and older sibling. She is
       now over fifteen months old and has had all of her physical,
       social[,] and developmental needs met by the kinship parents.
       This home is a safe and stable environment with dependable
       caregivers capable of providing her with love and care she needs
       to promote her health[y] development.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/23, at 13 (unpaginated). We agree.

       As indicated, Mother participated in guided visitation through ABC from

August 2022 to August 2023.8 This visitation was inconsistent, and Child was

often upset and crying, and Mother’s attendance at visits remained

____________________________________________

8 As ABC’s visitation supervisor, Linda Mapes (“Ms. Mapes), explained, “Guided

visitation has more prompts, more assistance, helping wherever it needs.
More parent education than our regular Steps program, which basically
provides for the safety of the children. Safety is also included with guided but
it’s more educational, more assistance.” N.T., 9/12/23, at 13.

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inconsistent from August 2022 to August 2023. See N.T., 9/12/23, at 14, 17-

18, 26-27, 79.

      Despite acknowledging some positive visits, in response to whether she

observed any bond between Mother and Child, Ms. Mapes stated Mother,

“[t]ried really, really hard.   [Mother] would console her or try to console

[Child]. [Child] oftentimes would start to cry as soon as we got in the room.

We did have several visits towards the end of visitation where [Child] was

happy and played, and then [Mother] would miss a visit and getting restarted

was always hard for [Child].” Id. at 26; see also id. at 26-27, 79 (recounting

kinship mother’s impression of Child after visits).

      Mother’s visitation remained guided until August 2023, when the Agency

made a referral to Skills (a home-based, hands-on parenting skills program)

through ABC. Id. at 19-20, 99. Mother participated in four sessions with the

Skills program but was terminated from the program two weeks prior to the

subject hearing due to reports of other people in the home, which she denied.

See id. at 99-100, 111. Mother had not visited with Child since that time.

Id. at 100.

      Further, Child has resided in her current kinship home her entire life.

She is bonded with her kinship family, which includes her older sibling, and

doing well.    Ms. Taylor testified, “she always seeks comfort from [kinship

mother].      She seeks comfort from her [sibling].   She seems to be very

comfortable within the home. . . . [S]he’s usually a very happy baby/toddler.

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Id. at 109-10.     Because of this, Ms. Taylor, as well as Child’s GAL, testified

adoption would be in her best interests. See id. at 110, 142-43.

        As the trial court’s findings pursuant to section 2511(b) are supported

by the certified record, and free from legal error, we will not disturb them.

Mother and Child do not share a necessary and beneficial relationship pursuant

to section 2511(b). See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Indeed, the record reveals

no parent-child bond exists between Mother and Child. Rather, Child shares

a parent-child bond and beneficial relationship with her kinship family, whom

she has resided with her entire life.

        Given our disposition concerning termination, Mother’s challenge to the

goal change order, reflected by issues two through four, are moot.

See Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding

issues regarding goal change are moot once parental rights are terminated).

        Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating

Mother’s parental rights and dismiss the appeal of the goal change order as

moot.

        Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/19/2024

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