Court Opinion

ID: 9384538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 13:07:21.407011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.166197
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-21-00560-CR

                                        Ronald GUILLORY Jr.,
                                               Appellant

                                                   v.

                                         The STATE of Texas,
                                               Appellee

                      From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2019CR13486
                          Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 29, 2023

AFFIRMED

           In a single issue, appellant Ronald Guillory Jr. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to support his conviction for failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102. We affirm.
                                                                                                      04-21-00560-CR

                                                  BACKGROUND

         Guillory was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision after being arrested

and charged with sexually assaulting a child in 1991. This resulted in a reportable conviction or

adjudication that required Guillory to comply with sex offender registration requirements. 1

         In 2019, Detective Harry Gonzales—a detective with the San Antonio Police Department

in the Sex Offender Registration Unit—identified Guillory’s name from a database for failing to

timely register in any jurisdiction. After further investigation, Guillory was arrested and charged

with failure to comply with sex offender registration requirements.

         After a jury trial, Guillory was found guilty of failing to comply with sex offender

registration requirements. Guillory pled true to an enhancement paragraph for a prior conviction.

Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial court sentenced Guillory to two years in prison.

Guillory appeals.

                                                    DISCUSSION

         In his sole issue, Guillory contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction

for failing to comply with sex offender registration requirements. Specifically, Guillory argues

there is insufficient evidence showing he is “the same person required to register [as a sex offender]

because of a previous reportable conviction or adjudication.”

A. Standard of Review

         We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction under the standard set

forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895

1
  A person who receives deferred adjudication community supervision is required to comply with sex offender
registration requirements. See Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“A person is required
to register ‘with the local law enforcement authority in any municipality where he resides or intends to reside for more
than seven days’ if he has a ‘reportable conviction or adjudication.’”) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
62.051(a)); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(5)(A) (defining a “[r]eportable conviction or
adjudication’ [as] a conviction or adjudication, including . . . a deferred adjudication” based on sexual assault of a
child).

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(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under that standard, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict and determine, based on that evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom,

whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Jackson,

443 U.S. at 318–19). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached to the

testimony of the witnesses. Id. In this role, the jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the

testimony presented by the parties. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991). Further, the jury is permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts as

long as each is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360. When the

record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved those conflicts in favor

of the verdict and therefore defer to that determination. Id.

       It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial

evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact

need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence

must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not permitted to use a “divide and conquer”

strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015). Instead, appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.

Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

       We measure the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically

correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

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B. Applicable Law

        A person commits the offense of failure to comply with registration requirements if he is

required to register as a sex offender and fails to comply with any requirement of chapter 62 of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(a); Young v.

State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). As charged in this case, a person fails to

comply with the sex offender registration requirements if (1) he has a reportable conviction or

adjudication, (2) he is required to register, (3) he fails to comply with that requirement, and (4) his

duty to register has not expired. See Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 824–25 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012); Hall v. State, 440 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d); see also

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.001(5)(A), 62.051, 62.102(a). A “[r]eportable conviction or

adjudication” includes “a deferred adjudication, that, regardless of the pendency of an appeal,” is

“based on” the sexual assault of a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(5)(A).

C. Analysis

        Here, Officer Nicholson—an officer with the San Antonio Police Department in the Sex

Offender Registration Unit—testified that Guillory had been placed on deferred adjudication for

sexually assaulting a child in 1991. The State admitted into evidence the 1992 deferred

adjudication order placing Guillory on deferred adjudication in cause number 91-CR-4522 in the

226th District Court, Bexar County, Texas, for sexual assault of a child. Officer Nicholson and

Detective Gonzales testified that Guillory’s sexual offense is one that requires Guillory to register

annually for life. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(6)(A) (defining a “[s]exually

violent offense” as an offense for sexual assault of a child if the offense is “committed by a person

17 years of age or older”); id. art. 62.101(a)(1) (“[T]he duty to register for a person ends when the

person dies if the person has a reportable conviction or adjudication . . . for . . . a sexually violent

offense[.]”); see also McGraw v. C.I., 525 S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet.

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denied) (“[T]he law is clear that current successful completion of deferred adjudication for

particular offenses[, including sexual assault of a child,] does not relieve an offender of a duty to

register under the [Texas sex offender registration program].”). 2 Thus, there was evidence that

Guillory has a reportable conviction or adjudication requiring annual lifetime registration. 3 See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.001(5)(A), 62.051, 62.101 (requiring annual lifetime

registration for reportable convictions or adjudications for sexual assault of a child).

         Officer Nicholson testified generally about the process involved with registering a sex

offender and testified he was the officer who registered Guillory in 2016. Officer Nicholson

identified, and the State admitted into evidence, the following documents utilized in Guillory’s

2016 registration: (1) Pre-Release Notification Form for the Texas Sex Offender Registration

Program; (2) Sex Offender Verification form; and (3) a Sex Offender Registration Receipt.

         The Pre-Release Notification Form identifies Guillory as the person who is subject to

register in the sex offender program. The form lists the registering offense as sexual assault of a

child and notes Guillory is required to register annually for the remainder of his life. Guillory

signed the form and placed his initials next to a list of rules and restrictions associated with his

required annual sex offender registration. Specifically, Guillory wrote his initials next to a

statement on the form acknowledging that he “must personally appear at [his] primary registration

authority and verify [his] registration information annually.”

         The Sex Offender Verification form also informs Guillory of his lifetime duty to report

annually. Above his signature, the form states:

2
  We note the State admitted into evidence an order stating Guillory’s deferred adjudication was unsatisfactorily
terminated.
3
  Guillory asserts he is not responsible for registering as a sex offender while allegedly appealing the underlying sexual
assault of a child offense. However, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifically instructs sex offenders to
register regardless of any pending appeals. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.001(5), 62.002(b)(1).

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                                                                                       04-21-00560-CR

           I HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND UNDERSTAND I HAVE A DUTY TO
           REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER IN TEXAS. FAILURE TO ABIDE BY
           THESE REQUIREMENTS COULD SUBJECT ME TO CRIMINAL
           PROSECUTION, PURSUANT TO TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL
           PROCEDURE, CHAPTER 62.

           Finally, the Sex Offender Registration Receipt contains Guillory’s signature of

acknowledgment indicating his 2016 registration was completed and reminding him he must return

to register by his date of birth annually. 4

           Officer Nicholson identified Guillory in court by describing Guillory’s shirt and stated he

knew who he was because he had seen him several times. We are not persuaded by Guillory’s

assertion on appeal that Officer Nicholson’s identification was invalid because the trial court did

not verbally comment on the State’s notation of the identification for the record. Guillory did not

object to Officer Nicholson’s identification. Therefore, it was the jury’s prerogative to weigh the

evidence when deciding whether, from the totality of the circumstances, it was adequately apprised

that Officer Nicholson was referring to Guillory when he identified Guillory in court. See Rohlfing

v. State, 612 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (“Although at no time did the prosecutor

request that the record be made to reflect that the person referred to in the courtroom was appellant,

we conclude from the totality of the circumstances the jury was adequately apprised that the

witnesses were referring to appellant.”). Officer Nicholson conceded the last time he had seen

Guillory was likely during his 2016 registration; however, it was within the jury’s province—as

the sole judge of the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony—to

consider the effect the passage of time had on Officer Nicholson’s testimony of Guillory’s

identification. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360.

4
    The receipt notified Guillory of his “08/17/2017” “Return Date[.]”

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          Furthermore, the jury heard evidence that Guillory’s fingerprints taken from his arrest in

1991 are located on a document known as a “drop card.” Vincent Villarreal, a fingerprint examiner,

compared Guillory’s fingerprints taken at the trial with the fingerprints taken from the drop card

and concluded the prints belong to the same person. Additionally, the drop card describes

Guillory’s demographics, including physical characteristics, and identifies Guillory as the

defendant who is charged with sexual assault of a child in cause number 91-CR-4522 in the 226th

District Court, Bexar County, Texas. This cause number and offense matched the deferred

adjudication order that initiated Guillory’s obligation to register as a sex offender.

          Notwithstanding this evidence, Guillory argues the evidence is insufficient to show that he

is the same Guillory as listed in the 1991 deferred adjudication order and subject to sex offender

registration. However, identity may be shown by circumstantial evidence and reasonable

inferences derived from the evidence. Adams v. State, 418 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d); Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet.

ref’d).

          Despite Guillory’s contention his fingerprints were not physically on the deferred

adjudication order and noting a difference in the state identification numbers listed on some of the

documents in evidence, we conclude—from the totality of the circumstances—the jury could

reasonably infer Guillory was the offender in the 1991 deferred adjudication order that subjected

him to annual sex offender registration. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Rohlfing, 612 S.W.2d at

601.

          Finally, Gonzales testified he ran a computer query on local, state, and national sex

offender registration databases and determined Guillory had not registered as a sex offender in

other jurisdictions and had not verified his registration as a sex offender in San Antonio in 2019.

Gonzales reviewed Guillory’s file to ensure there were no paper documents regarding Guillory’s

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verification that were inadvertently omitted from the local database. Based on his findings,

Gonzales testified Guillory “was out of compliance” with his obligation to verify his registration

as a sex offender. We hold there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Guillory

failed to follow the sex offender registration requirements in 2019. Crabtree, 389 S.W.3d at 824–

25; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(a).

       Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient

to support the jury’s determination that Guillory failed to comply with registration requirements

of a sex offender under chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Temple, 390

S.W.3d at 360 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

       Accordingly, Guillory’s sole issue is overruled.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                  Irene Rios, Justice

Do not publish

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