Court Opinion

ID: 9709327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:58.60012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.727430
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
I would reverse the trial court and order a new trial. The giving of the defendant’s instruction no. 2 was error. The instruction reads as follows:
I instruct you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that a storekeeper must use ordinary care to keep premises in a reasonably safe condition for the customers. Ordinary care, as applied to storekeepers, is that degree of care usually exercised by ordinary prudent persons engaged in the same line of business.
The instruction tells the jury that so long as the storekeeper behaved as other storekeepers did, he was exercising ordinary care. This is not true. What “usually” is done may or may not constitute ordinary or reasonable care under the circumstances. It implies that a standard of conduct in a given trade or job determines whether a storekeeper was negligent. Whether such a standard applies depends upon the jury’s determination of its reasonableness. Because everyone behaves in a certain manner does not make such behavior not negligent.
The majority recognize that the standard set by an industry is not the definition of reasonable care and cite Gilbert v. Stone City Construction Co., Inc., (1976) Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d 738, 745 and see also P-M Gas & Wash. Co., Inc. v. Smith, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 357, 358; see also Walters v. Kellam & Foley, (1977) Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 199, 214. They go on to say “[t]he word ‘usually’, however, is undoubtedly incorrect. The standard is what a reasonably prudent person would have done. See P-M Gas, supra.” The majority then finds that against“'the background of the other instructions, the giving of the above instruction is not reversible error.
I cannot agree. A bad instruction is not cured by the giving of a correct instruction on the same subject. The trial court may not by giving contradictory instructions leave the jury with the task of deciding what rule of law to apply. Deckard v. Adams, (1965) 246 Ind. 123, 203 N.E.2d 303; Hainey v. Zink, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 238, 242.
The trial judge also erred in refusing to permit testimony from a medical expert regarding his opinion of the degree of permanent impairment suffered by the plaintiff. Since damages were sought for permanent and impairing injuries by plaintiff’s complaint, that fact was in issue and any evidence probative of that issue was admissible. This is particularly true of the denied testimony. Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, (1938) 214 Ind. 394, 14 N.E.2d 561. The majority recognize that the exclusion was error but excuse it by finding it was not vital to plaintiff’s case citing Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahern, (1976) Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 774 and referring to “other evidence introduced that suggested to the jury the amount of impairment ... In practical terms.” No evidence is recited which performs this function of proof.1
I believe such evidence was vital to plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff’s offer to prove showed the degree of impairment at twenty-five percent. An expert is able to express opinions and draw inferences a jury is incompetent to draw. Davis v. Schneider, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 283. The inferences of the degree of impairment drawn by the medical expert would not be possible *601by the jury on the basis of the isolated examples of impairment. Therefore, I believe such evidence was vital to the plaintiff’s case.
For these reasons I dissent. I would reverse and grant a new trial.

. I assume the majority refer to the statement of the medical expert that she could not lift heavy objects (furniture and patients) or go bowling. Also plaintiff testified about some of her limitations after her fall.