Court Opinion

ID: 9593122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:19:54.892459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:16.040859
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh,
C.J. (dissenting). The act, of intentionally burning a business, specifically intending to cause property damage, is not an accident and, therefore, it cannot be an "occurrence” for purposes of this insurance contract. The accidental nature of the fireman’s fall cannot convert the intentional act of the insured into an "accident.” In the plain language of the contract, there is no coverage unless the injury was caused by an "occurrence,” and an "occurrence” must be an accident.
i
As we observed in Allstate Ins Co v Freeman and Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins Co v DiCicco, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), we first determine whether coverage exists.
The policy provides coverage for bodily injury or property damage "caused by an occurrence.” In the definition section the policy defines "occurrence”:
"[0]ccurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage *556neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, for coverage to exist in this instance, the injuries must have been caused by an occurrence.
ii
On remand, the Court of Appeals cited Collins v Nationwide Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 271; 294 NW2d 194 (1980), for the proposition that "if a death results from the voluntary act of the victim, but the result is unexpected, unanticipated, and unforeseen, it is an accidental death within the meaning of an accident insurance policy.” Unpublished opinion per curiam, decided April 5, 1990 (Docket No. 122173), slip op at 3. But Collins is easily distinguishable from this case. The policy in Collins provided coverage for "accidental bodily injuries.” This language focuses upon the resulting injury, not on the act that results in injury. In the present case, the language speaks of "liability . . . caused by an occurrence . . . which results in bodily injury.” Accordingly, to trigger liability coverage, the basis of the injury, the event that caused the injury, must have been an accident resulting in bodily injury or property damage unexpected and unintended by the insured.
The complaint alleges that a fire occurred at the premises of Town & Country Music Center. It further alleges that "Thomas B. Deane, Jr., responded to the alarm to the fire and was injured during the course of battling the fire.” Therefore, the event which forms the "basis for the injury,” the event to be classified as an occurrence, is the fire. The policy defines "occurrence” as "an accident . . . which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended *557from the standpoint of the insured.” An accident is " 'an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated and not naturally to be expected.’ ” Freeman, supra at 670. This fire was not an "accident.” The insured admitted this. He intended to set the fire and intended to burn the contents of the premises. It cannot be said that the fire was " 'an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.’ ” Id. Therefore, this bodily injury was not caused by an occurrence and coverage is precluded. Defining the fireman’s fall as "accidental” cannot convert the fire, the basis of the injury, into an "accident.”
I would hold that where a direct risk of harm is intentionally created, and property damage or personal injury results, there is no liability coverage even if the specific result was unintended. It is irrelevant that the character of the harm that actually results is different from the character of the harm intended by the insured. Freeman, supra at 718. The insured set out intending to cause property damage, his act was not an accident, and the bodily injury was, therefore, not caused by an occurrence.
This interpretation also comports with the different nature of the policy in question, as compared to the policy in Collins. The policy in Collins was an accident policy, intended to insure the injured party against unexpected injury. Here, we are interpreting a liability policy, and the Court should examine the nature of the insured’s actions because it is the function of the policy to provide coverage for liability resulting from negligent acts of the insured.
*558III
Justice Riley has concluded that there was an occurrence because an accident occurred when the fireman fell from the roof. Ante, pp 546-547. She supports her theory by reference to this Court’s opinion in Allstate, supra:
Accordingly, we find that ascertaining the insured’s "intent” may determine whether the insured’s actions constituted an "accident,” but it does not necessarily follow that an insured must act unintentionally for an act to be an "occurrence.” [Id. at 670. Emphasis added.]
I agree that the insured is not required to act unintentionally for the act to be an occurrence;1 however, I find the first portion of the quoted sentence enlightening. Examining the insured’s intent may determine whether the actions constitute an "accident.” A hypothetical example may help to clarify what I believe to be the substance of the quoted language. Suppose the fire had been started by a faulty electric cord on the insured’s coffeemaker. Examining the insured’s act for "intent,” there is no doubt that he purposely plugged in the coffeemaker and turned on the switch. In that sense he acted intentionally. The fire remains an accident and the act constitutes an occurrence, however, because at the time of the insured’s purposeful act he had no intent to cause harm. The act of plugging in the coffeepot is not a sufficiently direct cause of the harm, and the fire in this example is an accident. Mr. Piccard, on the other hand, acted intentionally with the intent to cause property damage and, indirectly, any poten*559tial resulting personal injury; his actions were the direct cause of the condition that resulted in personal injury. His actions cannot constitute an occurrence.
In the motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), Frankenmuth contended that there was no genuine issue regarding any material fact. I agree. Neither party contends that Mr. Piccard did not intend to set fire to his music store. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and direct that summary disposition be entered in favor of the insurer, Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company.
Boyle and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 Almost every event, after all, can be traced back along a line of but-for causation to some intentional act, ultimately, constructing the building or buying the property.