Court Opinion

ID: 9650116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:25:21.144173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:18.505694
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion offered by the majority, with one exception. I must disassociate myself from that portion of the opinion which approved of the Commonwealth’s expert witness offering his personal opinion as to whether or not the semen samples discovered at the crime scene were “probably” those of the defendant, (slip opinion).
In order to illustrate the precise nature of my objection I will briefly discuss the section of the majority opinion dealing with the admissibility of expert testimony on DNA analysis.
The majority concludes that DNA testing is generally accepted in the scientific community and a proper prosecutorial tool. I agree. The majority further concludes that, although the testing procedures have been generally accepted in the scientific community, there is considerable dissension within that community as to interpretation of the results. Everyone can agree on the interpretation of the scientific evidence of exclusion, i.e., which samples do not match. The problem occurs when the samples being examined do match at certain significant markers generally referred to as loci. Therefore, the majority concludes that because there is no general acceptance in the scientific community as to interpreting the results where certain DNA markers match, the trial court properly excluded the proffered testimony of the expert utilizing the statistical evaluation of matching loci under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.,1923). I agree.1
It is with the majority’s final conclusion that I take issue and disassociate myself. Having concluded that a statistical analysis was inadmissible as not having been agreed upon in the general scientific community, the majority goes on to *534analyze the testimony of the expert on the basis of relevancy.2 The majority concludes that the trial court did not err in permitting the expert to testify that a match was more likely than not under the facts and circumstances of this case. I cannot accept the rationale offered by the majority, nor can I condone the circumvention of Frye utilized by the majority. Although the majority found the expert testimony, as to the statistical probability of inclusion, inadmissable under Frye, they nevertheless went on to find the testimony admissible under a relevancy, standard.
In my view Frye requires, as a condition precedent to the admissability of expert testimony, that the scientific basis from which the testimony stems be accepted in the general scientific community. My independent search of the record reveals nothing to indicate that the expert testimony here would have been generally accepted in the scientific community. Equally important, the testimony offered, although couched in verbiage rather than statistics, is nothing more than a casual recitation of a statistical likelihood. In my mind, “more likely than not” means, at minimum, that it is 51 percent likely that there is a match.
Accordingly, the Commonwealth failed to lay a proper foundation with regard to the testimony as admitted into evidence against the defendant. There was no demonstration, as required by Frye, that the expert’s opinion, that it was more likely than not a match, has gained acceptance in the general scientific community. Lacking that condition precedent this testimony should have been excluded and, therefore, I disassociate myself from the rationale adopted by the majority opinion on this point.
A further review of the record, however, demonstrates that although the admission of this evidence was clearly error, it was harmless error. In light of the overwhelming evidence of *535guilt, I am not convinced that the admission of this testimony requires a new trial. Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978).
Thus, I join in all other facets of the majority’s opinion as well as the result and write only to address specifically the conclusion reached by the majority regarding the application of Frye to the facts of this case.

. For more detailed information regarding the admissibility of DNA testimony see, Judicature, Vol 76 No. 5, 1993 "DNA evidence: how reliable?”

. The specific testimony by the expert was that since the semen samples found at the crime scene matched the defendant’s semen sample at three out of four loci, it was his personal opinion that the sperm at the crime scene was "more probable than not that of the defendant.” (Majority opinion at p. 523).