Court Opinion

ID: 9646571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:03:20.435305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:39.498332
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent. In this appeal by the Commonwealth (Appellant), it continues in its attempt to compel Holly Maguigan, Appellee, to respond to its speculative inquiries concerning the whereabouts of her client who failed to appear for a scheduled trial three years ago.
*135Appellee is an attorney who represented Carlos Aquino on charges of rape, statutory rape, corrupting the morals of a minor, indecent assault, and indecent exposure.
On April 7, 1983, Aquino did not appear for his trial on these charges. Later that day, the Commonwealth filed a Motion to Compel Appellee to disclose the address and telephone number of her client and an on-the-record presentation of that motion was made before Judge Anderson, Program Calendar Judge.
The motion was presented for the Commonwealth by Suzanne McDonough, Esquire, an Assistant District Attorney, who had worked on Mr. Aquino’s prosecution and prepared the case for trial. Appellee appeared for the motion presentation, represented by David J. Rudovsky, Esquire. In explaining the necessity for presenting a Motion to Compel, Ms. McDonough gave the court extensive background information concerning the difficulty in keeping tract of the whereabouts of Mr. Aquino since his last court appearance on January 19, 1983. At that time, he appeared in court for the presentation of a Motion to Compel a Bill of Particulars.
By February 9, 1983, a Federal warrant for arrest had been issued by the Federal District Court because Mr. Aquino could not be located at the address Mr. Aquino had given when his bond was posted. Appellee was notified that a warrant had been obtained against her client and although she stated that she did not know where Mr. Aquino was, she did attempt to locate him through Mr. Gerardo Tempkin, the owner of the property Mr. Aquino was supposed to be living at. This property turned out to be a used car dealership and it was unlikely that Mr. Aquino ever lived there.
Ms. McDonough next apprised Judge Anderson of the F.B.I.’s efforts in intercepting phone calls with Mr. Aquino’s brother which placed his whereabouts at his brother’s home until March 15, 1983, and that Appellee received a phone call on February 23, 1983, from someone who charged the call to Mr. Aquino’s brother’s phone number.
*136Finally, Ms. McDonough advised the trial court of her primary concern:
The problem here is that Ms. Maguigan two weeks ago told me outside the courtroom in City Hall that despite the fact that I had several conversations with her regarding the Defendant’s whereabouts being completely unknown, that she was ready to try the case and the Defendant would be present and when I asked, Where is he; do you know, she said, I can’t tell you that. As a result of that I brought in this little girl who was raped repeatedly when she was ten years old and two little brothers and prepped them for five hours yesterday to have them ready to testify on the representation that she would be ready to go to trial in this case today.
Those kids have gone through living hell. We come in here today and I ask Ms. Maguigan where her client is, if he is going to show up and she said she didn’t know. I asked her if she would let the Court know where he was and she told me she could not tell me and your Honor heard her tell the Court that she refused to tell the Court what information she had on him.
Now, if the bail bond means nothing and an attorney is allowed to hide the Defendant or hide information with regard to a Defendant who has sworn to the Court that he would appear, that he would always give us his address and then hide behind an attorney who knows where he is, then it isn’t a very good system of justice at all and we ask, based on that case which sets out the general law in Pennsylvania that normally if the administration of justice will not be hampered, then an attorney does not have to disclose the whereabouts, the current whereabouts of their client, but when the administration of justice will be hampered, that it's a duty for defense attorney to disclose and I also suggest that in the issue of bail when a Defendant tells the Court in submitting to the Court’s orders that he will always provide his current address, he can’t then say that when he changes his address and communicates it to his attorney that it is *137privileged and the Court should not know about it.1 (pp. 56a-58a).
During the presentation of the motion, Judge Anderson requested Appellee to disclose the requested information (pp. 65-66a of the Record) and following arguments, Judge Anderson gave the Commonwealth and Appellee the right to submit briefs on whether an attorney can be ordered to disclose the address and phone number of a client who does not appear for his criminal trial, in violation of his bail. A second argument was scheduled for April 13,1983. At that argument, the following discussion occurred between the Court and Appellee’s attorney, Mr. Rudovsky:
THE COURT: Counsellor, it seems to me to avoid engaging in a fruitless exercise whether Ms. Maguigan knows the whereabouts of the Defendant—
MR. RUDOVSKY: You have just asked the question of whether Ms. Maguigan knows the whereabouts of the Defendant. This is slightly different than, materially different than the question that was posed at the hearing last week, does she know the address and phone number of Defendant.
THE COURT: Essentially, that’s what I want to know.
MR. RUDOVSKY: I can address that. She does not know the address and phone number of the Defendant.
At a later point, Appellee’s counsel informed the Court:
*138... I can represent to the Court that during the course of what we consider to be an attorney-client conversation, as a result of that conversation, [appellee] has some general information about the possible whereabouts of the Defendant, and I put it that way because there is a difference between that and the address issue.
Based on this representation, the Court ordered Appellee to disclose the whereabouts of her client and when Appellee refused to do so, after already informing the Court that she did not know Mr. Aquino’s address or phone number, the Court found Appellee in contempt, imposing a $100.00 per day fine until Appellee purged herself of the contempt.
Appellee filed an appeal to Superior Court from that order arguing, among other things, that:
1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over her to give testimony concerning her client’s whereabouts;
2) that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege; and
3) any disclosures would not protect her rights of self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
Prior to argument, the Commonwealth petitioned Superi- or Court to remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas for the purpose of granting immunity to Appellee. Judge Spaeth, former President Judge of the Superior Court, granted the Commonwealth’s petition remanding this matter back to the trial court to consider the propriety of using the Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947, et seq.,2 to compel Appellee to disclose information that could be privileged under the attorney-client privilege.
Pursuant to Judge Spaeth’s Order, the trial court held a hearing on June 27, 1983, where it found that immunity was proper in this case and, thereupon, ordered Appellee to divulge her knowledge concerning the whereabouts of her client and how to locate him. Appellee steadfastly continued to refuse to answer the court’s questions, replying that any such information was privileged. The court again *139found Appellee in contempt of its order and again fined her $100.00 per day until she purged herself of the contempt.
Another appeal to Superior Court followed on June 28, 1983, and that Court, by its Opinion and Order of December 30, 1983 (by Judge Spaeth), reversed the order of the trial court, finding that its inquiry of Appellee was too broad, forcing her to divulge protected client information. Superi- or Court did not decide whether the trial court acted properly in granting the immunity petition or whether the use of the Immunity Act was a proper procedure, simply assuming that the trial court had jurisdiction, Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 323 Pa.Superior Ct. 317, at 327, 470 A.2d 611, at 616 (1983). Because this case raised important questions concerning the parameters of the attorney-client privilege and the use of an immunity petition to compel an attorney to testify against her client, allocatur was granted.
Appellant argues that an attorney can be granted immunity to divulge any information as to the whereabouts of a client who does not appear for his criminal trial and that Superior Court erred in concluding that the trial court’s questioning of Appellee was too broad. I disagree with the Commonwealth, the Majority, and with Superior Court’s disposition of this matter.
There is no question that an attorney cannot be forced to divulge information learned from his client while acting as his attorney. The attorney-client privilege is one of the greatest protections known to our legal system and its evolution from the 17th Century bears witness to our continual confidence in the concept that attorney-client communications can be trustworthy and open only when a client is confident that his conversations to his attorney will not be divulged without his knowledge or consent.3
*140Our Legislature has codified the privilege as applied to criminal cases in the Act of July 9, 1976, P.L.1976, 586, No. 142, § 2, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5916, which provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial by the client.
In Estate of Kofsky, 487 Pa. 473, 409 A.2d 1358 (1980), the Court stated that the attorney-client privilege is grounded in a policy entirely extrinsic to protection of the fact-finding process; its purpose is to foster a confidence between client and advocate that will lead to a trusting and open attorney-client dialogue. See also, Alexander v. Queen, 253 Pa. 195, 97 A. 1063 (1916).
As a consequence, damage to the administration of justice occurs when the sanctity of the confidence is violated improvidently, not when the evidence is given substantive consideration, Kofsky.
Furthermore, each attorney is guided by the canons and ethical considerations of the Code of Professional Responsibility when representing his client. Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes an obligation upon an attorney to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client, for reasons explained in ethical consideration 4-1 of the Code, as follows:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ *141him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. Ethical Consideration 4-1, Code of Professional Responsibility.
There is, however, nothing confidential or secretive in the address or phone number of a client. This information is not within the attorney-client privilege, and can be the subject of a court inquiry, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2298 (3rd Ed.) 1940. Disclosure of a client’s address or phone number is severable from other communications to an attorney, which are privileged. Disclosure can be accomplished with a simple question by the Court, “What is your client’s address and phone number?” This question can be directly responded to without the divulging of other communications, which may be confidential.
The majority makes much of the fact that Appellees’ client was in violation of his bail agreement which obligated her client to keep the court informed of his address at all times and imputes this requirement on to Appellee as well. Because I do not find Appellee to act as her client’s surety, I do not believe she should be subjected to a disgruntled District Attorney’s barage of questions that “might” provide a lead as to the client’s whereabouts. The majority’s contrary conclusion does not serve as an aid to find a fugitive from justice. Rather, it only will expose an attorney to vague, speculative inquiries and, in reality, will place the attorney in a position to be harassed by a court and a *142district attorney because his client did not appear at a hearing.
The uselessness of the Majority’s directions is readily apparent by its mandate in this case. The Majority concludes that the trial court’s inquiries were not overbroad and now remands, after a three year hiatus, to subject the attorney to give stale information concerning where her client was three years ago, or in the interim, although I find it highly unlikely that she would have kept tabs on him knowing the consequences.
More basically, I am concerned by the Majority’s analysis of the court’s right to conduct a broad inquiry because it implies that our defense counsel are not truthful when asked direct questions by the court. For our system of justice to function, we must assume that attorneys practicing before us, will answer questions honestly and truthfully. The majority’s analysis seems to operate from a contrary premise and, for that reason, I dissent.
In the case sub judice, the record reveals that the trial court, on April 7,1983, limited its inquiry to the address and phone number of Mr. Aquino. At the April 13, 1983, argument, the inquiry was the same, to which Appellee, through her counsel, stated that she did not know the address or phone number of her client (p. 76a). At this point the inquiry should have ceased for, in my view, any other questions became too broad. Instead, a two year odyssey in creative procedure-making began buffeting Appellee between the trial court and Superior Court with the Commonwealth at the helm, trying to chart a new course in prying information out of attorneys in direct contravention of the time-honored protection granted by the attorney-client privilege. What is more disappointing is that the Majority now puts its imprimatur on the Commonwealth’s tactics and,, from that action, I dissent.
When Appellee was found in contempt of the trial court’s order to divulge information on April 7 and April 13, 1983, an appeal was taken to Superior Court. Instead of reaching the merits of the appeal, Superior Court, per Judge Spaeth, *143vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter back to the trial court to consider the Commonwealth’s immunity petition. This, in my view, was error.
A review of the record would have revealed that Appellee had already answered the only legitimate inquiry concerning Mr. Aquino’s whereabouts (address and phone number). Since Appellee had divulged that she did not know her client’s address or phone number, there was nothing else the court could legitimately ask her without compromising the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, a remand was improper, especially to grant her immunity. Since she had answered the only question she could be asked, what usefulness would there be in granting her immunity? Even clothed with immunity, what else could she answer without violating her client’s right to have privileged information remain unrepeated?
My concern is that no one can test the veracity of her compelled answers. Would the logical answer be to compel Appellee to open her files for inspection by the Court and the District Attorney? Again, no direction is provided by the Majority and I believe a trial court order that seeks to compel more than an address and phone number is inherently overbroad.
Moreover, had Appellee not answered the permissible questions of the trial court, an immunity petition would still not be the proper remedy, since a simple remand with directions to the trial court could have informed all involved as to what information could or could not be divulged.
Under any circumstances, however, in my opinion, an immunity petition was an inappropriate vehicle for the Commonwealth to use or Judge Spaeth to entertain, under these circumstances, and, in this respect, I also dissent from the Majority. The Immunity Act extends to witnesses appearing in proceedings as defined by the Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(a).4 An attorney, in his representative capacity of *144counsel for his client, is not a witness. He is an officer of the court, and as such, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court when he appears for his client before our tribunals. This jurisdiction extends to the court’s right to ask an attorney the address and phone number of his client. It does not extend to broader inquiries concerning a client’s whereabouts because such inquiries may expose information which is privileged. Most importantly, it must be remembered that under these circumstances, an attorney, acting for his client, remains just that, an attorney. The questioning by the court does not transform the attorney into a witness. Accordingly, the Immunity Act is inapplicable in these circumstances since the attorney is not appearing before the court as a witness.
The record reveals that the Commonwealth’s remand and immunity petition request was presented to Judge Spaeth, in camera, and after arguments, was granted by him.5 The trial court’s order of April 13, 1983, was also vacated by Judge Spaeth and the matter remanded to the trial court.
It does not appear that a panel considered the propriety of remanding the matter to the trial court when it was first remanded by Judge Spaeth on May 13, 1983, or in the *145subsequent appeal by Appellee. Additionally, the propriety of the contempt order of April 13, 1983, has never been reviewed by Superior Court which limited its review in the second appeal to the June 27, 1983, immunity hearing. I find this futile procedure totally improper and would conclude that the second contempt to have been a nullity.
From my review of the April 7 and April 13, 1983, hearings and arguments before the trial court, it is clear that Appellee answered that she did not know her client’s address or phone number. In my view, this was all she was required to answer and any other questions were improper intrusions into privileged areas. Consequently, the trial court’s finding of contempt at the conclusion of the April 13, 1983, argument was improper and should be reversed.
The majority stresses that Appellee admitted knowing for one month prior to April 7, 1983, that Aquino would not appear for trial (slip opinion, p. 21) and that her exercise of the attorney-client privilege frustrates the interests of the administration of justice. The Majority finds this to be a sufficient basis upon which to compel Appellee to respond to the general questions regarding her client’s whereabouts.
Unfortunately, this is a misstatement of the facts appearing in the copy of the record furnished me. At page 10, transcript of the proceedings before the Honorable Levy Anderson, April 7, 1983, on the Commonwealth’s Motion to Compel defense counsel to disclose the address and telephone number of the defendant, the following statement of Mr. Rachofsky (sic), Counsel for Appellee, is made in response to a statement made by Suzanne McDonough, Assistant District Attorney:
Without agreeing to the factual representations just made, I was going, at one point, based on what the Court said, to give up this Fifth Amendment argument. I will not give it up now given the representation just made that my client, Ms. Maguigan, has known for a month that her client, Mr. Aquino, would not appear for trial....”
*146Clearly, the assertion of Ms. Maguigan’s purported knowledge for a month before the trial date was made by Ms. McDonough and is not an admission by Ms. Maguigan or her counsel.
Had Ms. Maguigan harbored such knowledge that her client would not show up for trial and still forced the Commonwealth into full preparedness for trial, thus wasting everyone’s time and patience, I, too, would agree that sanctions should be imposed on Ms. Maguigan. But the question of sanctions is not before us. The question of the attorney-client privilege is. To destroy this privilege by reliance upon non-existent facts is unconscionable.
Furthermore, the Majority states at page 24, slip opinion: Although it is possible under a particular situation that information of the whereabouts of a defendant could be so inextricably intertwined with the underlying charges for which representation was sought that a disclosure of that information would be protected by the privilege, the facts of this case do not present such a situation. (Emphasis added.)
How can the Majority possibly know what situation is presented by the facts of this case which are unrevealed and remain within the protection of the attorney-client privilege? The Majority today declares that the fishing expedition by the Commonwealth is now sanctioned, whether the disclosures are made in open court or in camera, and the judge will now decide what is privileged information and what is not. So much for an attorney’s honor and fidelity! Sweet dreams to sanctity of confidences between attorney and client! The uprooting of the most revered of our common law privileges has now begun with tornado force. I view the future of the attorney-client privilege with grim forebodings. Judge Spaeth’s expressed fears are rationally related to the compelled disclosure of all facts within defense counsel’s knowledge which could possibly aid in discovering the “whereabouts” of a missing defendant. What is more natural than the follow-up question: “Give us the names and addresses of all persons within your knowledge *147who might conceivably know of the ‘whereabouts’ of the missing defendant.”
I concur in Judge Montemuro’s finding that the order compelling the disclosure of information leading to the “whereabouts” of the defendant is manifestly and “indisputably” overbroad and sanctions the Commonwealth’s access to information which is absolutely privileged.
I would affirm Superior Court.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this opinion.

. I note that usually transcripts present themselves as cold, lifeless, and sterile versions of what transpires before a trial court and often it is difficult for an appellate tribunal to appreciate the emotionally charged atmosphere which serves as a backdrop for the events which unfold before a trial judge. That is not the case here, however. Ms. McDonough’s impassioned narrative of Mr. Aquino’s elusive actions springs to life from the record and gives the reader a very clear idea that Ms. McDonough had spent a considerable amount of time in preparing this case and in keeping track of him and that his uncooperative elusiveness had worn thin her patience. In short, the Assistant District Attorney's fervor reeked of prosecutorial frustration in bringing this case to trial and in desperation, the prosecutor turned with full force to the only person left, Appellee. In my opinion, the prosecution’s persecution of Appellee for information concerning her client’s whereabouts went far beyond permissible limits.

. Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 10(78), as amended, et. seq.

. The strength and vitality of the privilege in our law is exemplified by the many statutes and judicial decisions throughout our country embracing the privilege. Heister v. Davis, 3 Yeates 4 (1800); Moore v. Bray, 10 Pa. 519 (1849); Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 1972 (1859); Andrews v. Simms, 33 Ark. 771 (1878); Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 11 S.Ct. 350, 34 L.Ed. 954 (1890); Carter v. West, 93 Ky. 211, 19 S.W. 592 (1892); Liggett v. Glenn, 51 Fed. 381, 4 U.S.App. 438 *140(1892); Stone v. Minter, 111 Ga. 45, 36 S.E. 321 (1900); In re: Young’s Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908); Carney v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 205 Mo.App. 495, 226 S.W. 308 (1920); Ex Parte Schneider, 294 S.W. 736 (1927); In re: Heile, 29 N.E.2d 175, 65 Ohio App. 45 (1939); Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942); McCaslin v. Willis, 197 Miss. 366, 19 So.2d 751 (1944); Lietz v. Primock, 84 Ariz. 273, 327 P.2d 288 (1958); Baird v. Koemer, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.1960); N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20, V.A.M.S. § 491.060, 5 Okl.St.Ann § 3, S.D. C.L. 19-13-2, et. seq., T.C.A. 23-3-105.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5947(a) provides:
Immunity orders shall be available under this section in all proceedings before:
*1441) Courts
2) Grand Juries
3) Investigating grand juries
4) The minor judiciary and coroners.

. Text of Record, pp. 86a-87a:
A hearing (sic) was held before Judge Spaeth the following week. At that point, contrary to the position that was taken here today and, in fact, taken on the 13th, the District Attorney conceded that there was a legitimate Fifth Amendment issue. This was after Judge Spaeth said there was substantial merit to all the claims that were raised and that he would issue a stay of the Court’s Order. Because they recognize the validity of the Fifth Amendment claim, that is they, the Commonwealth, petitioned Superior Court for a remand to ask this Court to grant immunity. We argued at that point and we said to Judge Spaeth that there was no jurisdiction in this Court to grant immunity and that’s why Judge Spaeth ordered a hearing on the immunity applications that normally come before your Honor, that is ex parte. We thought that there was significance to the issue of jurisdiction and, therefore, before immunity could be imposed in this case, he thought a hearing was necessary.