Court Opinion

ID: 9725407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:46:00.916004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:14.958201
License: Public Domain

*286Wennerstrum, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion in my judgment does not give consideration to certain fundamental principles that have been applied in cases of the character here under consideration, and because of that fact I feel under obligation to respectfully dissent.
It should be kept in mind the material allegations relative to the liabilities of the City of Des Moines as set out in the plaintiff’s petition are limited to the following:
“A. In failing to maintain a barrier or railing at the point where said decedent fell to his death in the above described pit.
“B. In failing to maintain a street light at the place where said decedent fell to his death into said pit.
“C. In failing to erect and maintain a sign or other warning apprising pedestrians using the cinder path above described of the presence of the pit located immediately below said path.”
The statutory liability of the City of Des Moines must be based upon the provisions of section 389.12, 1950 Code, which is as follows: “Duty to supervise. They shall have the care, supervision, and control of all public highways, streets, avenues, alleys, public squares, and commons within the city, and shall cause the same to be kept open and in repair and free from nuisances.”
There is no allegation in plaintiff’s petition of any defect or obstruction in the street or cinder path. However, it appears to me if any liability on the part of the municipality is to be placed in the instant case, it must be by reason of negligence of the municipality in its failure to properly maintain its streets. This court in the case of McCormick v. Sioux City, 243 Iowa 35, 37, 38, 50 N.W.2d 564, 566, speaking through Justice Hays, stated:
“The liability of a municipal corporation for injuries due to defects or obstructions in its streets is for negligence only, the duty of the city being only to maintain them (the streets) in a reasonably safe condition, with no liability for consequences which could or would not be reasonably foreseen. Where reasonable minds might differ as to whether an accident could or should have been reasonably anticipated from the existence of the alleged defect or obstruction (of the street) the question as to the negligence of the city becomes a question for the jury.” (Words in parantheses and italics supplied.)
*287A sidewalk constitutes a part of the street. Central Life Assurance Society v. City of Des Moines, 185 Iowa 573, 577, 171 N.W. 31, citing Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31. The majority opinion suggests the photographs in evidence show the cinder path was rough and irregular. It also states the pit was in line with the cinder path before the path turned south and toward the bridge. And it continues and states in substance that the pit or ditch would be in line with the street but outside the traveled portion thereof. However, as previously stated, there is no allegation in the petition or any of the amendments thereto which alleges there was any defect in either the street proper or the cinder path, that the hole or ground where it is located is any part of the street or that the claimed place of danger was in line with the street. Consequently unless it is shown the pit here involved was %o immediately adjacent to the cinder path that the possible danger of falling into it could or should have been reasonably anticipated, the City should not be held liable and the question of the claimed negligence for failure to place barriers around the pit should not be submitted to a jury.
There is some variance in the testimony of the several witnesses for the plaintiff. We shall not set out the testimony to disclose this fact inasmuch as it is the obligation of this court to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in passing on a motion for a directed verdict. Although there is some testimony which might be interpreted to the effect the distance from the cinder path to the hole was twenty-eight feet, yet for the purpose of this dissent and the arguments hereinafter set forth we can consider as substantially correct the statement in the majority opinion that, “The evidence indicates the curve in the cinder path was about twelve to sixteen feet west of the pit. * *
It was apparently the theory of the plaintiff and is the theory expressed in the majority opinion that the decedent walked east as the cinder path started to curve and continued on twelve to sixteen feet and fell into the pit or hole. It is maintained there was no barrier to prevent a person from doing so. It is here submitted the evidence justifies the interpretation that as the cinder walk proceeded east toward the railing and bridge referred to in the majority opinion the distance from the path to the hole or pit *288decreased. However, that fact is not of particular importance in the light of the theories expressed by the plaintiff and as set out in the majority opinion.
The basis for this dissent can be summarized by stating it is my conclusion under the rules of law heretofore announced by this court and other authorities the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case do not justify their submission to a jury for its determination.
I. - In 25 Am. Jur., Highways, section 531, page 814, the general rule relative to the liability of a municipality for failure to place barriers or railings where dangerous places or hazards are substantially adjacent to a walk or street is set forth: “Proximity as Affecting Liability. — As a general rule, the duty of a municipal or quasi-municipal corporation or of a private individual to guard excavations or other dangerous places or hazards and the resulting liability for failure to do so exist only when such places are substantially adjoining the way, or in such close proximity thereto as to be dangerous, under ordinary circumstances, to travelers thereon who are using ordinary care, or, as it is sometimes stated, where they are so located that a person walking on the highway might, by making a false step or movement, or upon being affected with a> sudden giddiness, or by other accident, come in contact therewith. No definite rule can be laid down as to how far a dangerous place must be from the highway in order to cease to be in close proximity to it, but the question is a practical one, to be determined with regard to the circumstances of the particular case. In the determination of the question whether a defect or hazard is in such close proximity to the highway as to render traveling upon it unsafe, that proximity must be considered with reference to the highway ‘as traveled and used for the public travel,’ rather than as located, and the proper test for determining the necessity for a barrier, or liability for injury, is whether the way would be dangerous to a traveler so using it, rather than the distance from it of the dangerous object or place.”
And in 25 Am. Jur., Highways, section 532, pages 817, 818, it is further stated that except under certain circumstances “* * * the public authority is ordinarily under no obligation to put up *289railings or barriers to prevent travelers from leaving the traveled portion of the highway or from leaving the highway and running into dangers on adjoining property where the way itself is safe, and is not liable to a person who so leaves the highway and is injured, notwithstanding there is nothing to mark the boundary line of the highway. In other words, barriers are intended to make the highway safe, and not to mark or define its limits so as to warn travelers not to go outside them.”
In 40 C. J. S., Highways, section 262, pages 307, 308, it is stated: “The duty of maintaining barriers, railings, or other guards or signs, and the consequent liability for a failure to do so, may arise where such duty is imposed by statute, and to the extent, or under the conditions, prescribed by the statute. In the absence of such a statute, or under conditions to which the statute does not apply, the duty and liability arise only where the situation is inherently dangerous, or of such an unusual character as to mislead a traveler exercising reasonable care, and the aceident must, in order to be actionable, have been such that the presence of the guard or signal would have prevented its occurrence. There is no duty to fence a road or to provide barriers merely to prevent travelers from straying off the highway.”
In Village of Mineral City v. Gilbow, 81 Ohio St. 263, 276, 277, 90 N.E. 800, 802, 25 L. R. A., N. S., 627, 630, 631, it is stated: “There was no obligation resting upon the village to prevent her from going outside of the street, the dangerous place being outside of the street and not so near as to endanger those using it in the ordinary and proper way. Its obligation is to- keep the streets open and in repair and free from nuisance; and its liability extends no farther than the neglect of such duty. Furthermore, the owner of adjacent property, unless expressly so required by statute, is not bound to keep the street or sidewalk in repair and safe for travel, except as to defects created by himself; nor is he under any legal obligation to erect and maintain barriers to protect travelers on or along the street from a dangerous place which is entirely on his own premises, unless the place is so near the street as to render the street, or sidewalk thereon, itself dangerous for travel. In the latter case it is the duty not only of the abutting owner, but of the municipality also, to see that travelers *290on the street are warned or protected. These propositions are generally recognized as sound law, and the authorities are so numerous and so readily accessible that it is not thought to be necessary to cite them here. But in determining whether it is necessary, in a particular case, that a barrier should be erected in order to make the highway safe for travelers thereon, the true Lest is not the distance from the highway of the dangerous object or place, whether it be much or little; but whether a traveler in passing along the highway and, exercising ordinary care would be subjected to such imminent danger that it would require a barrier to make the highway safe. Kelley v. City of Columbus, 41 Ohio St. 263, 268; Alger v. City of Lowell, 3 Allen (85 Mass.) 402, 405; City of Norwich v. Breed, 30 Conn. 544, 545.” (Italics supplied.)
In the case of McHugh v. City of St. Paul, 67 Minn. 441, 443, 70 N.W. 5, it is stated: “Nor are towns necessarily bound to .fence, or erect barriers, to prevent travelers from getting outside of the road or way. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) §1005. The reason for the rule is well stated, in cases of this kind, in Spar-hawk v. City of Salem, 1 Allen, 30, as follows: ‘It appears that the highway in question was safe and convenient for travelers throughout its entire width, and the land adjoining it was also safe and convenient to travel upon. After getting entirely outside the highway in safety, the traveler must proceed still further in order to reach a dangerous place. If he reached that place, and was injured, the want of a railing was remotely, and not immediately, connected with the injury. If cities and towns are bound to protect travelers against such dangers, by erecting railings to prevent them from straying out of the highway, it is difficult to see the limit of thevr liability. * * ” (Italics supplied.)
And in Barnes v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 138 Mass. 67, 68, 52 Am. Rep. 259, 260, the rule relative to liability of a municipality with circumstances similar to the instant case is stated to be as follows: “To entitle the plaintiffs to recover, they must show that the defect in the highway ‘which caused the injury existed .either in the highway, or so immediately contiguous to it as to make it daAigerous to travel on the highway• itself.’ Sparhawk v. Salem, 1 Allen, 30. The test is ‘whether there is such a risk of a *291traveller, using ordinary care, in passing along the street, being thrown or falling into the dangerous place, that a railing is requisite to make the way itself safe and convenient.’ Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 402. Adams v. Natick, 13 Allen, 429. A town is therefore ‘bound to erect barriers or railings where a dangerous place is in such close proximity to the highway as to make travelling on the highway unsafe. But it is not bound to do so to prevent travellers from straying from the highway, although there is a dangerous place at some distance from the highway which they may reach by so straying.’ Puffer v. Orange, 122 Mass. 389; s. c., 23 Am. Rep. 368, and authorities there cited.” (Italics supplied.)
See also Briglia v. City of St. Paul, 134 Minn. 97, 158 N.W. 794, L. R. A. 1916F 1216; Flansburg v. Town of Elbridge, 205 N. Y. 423, 98 N.E. 750, 41 L. R. A., N. S., 546; Shea v. Town of Whitman, 197 Mass. 374, 83 N.E. 1096, 20 L. R. A., N. S., 980; annotations 20 L. R. A., N. S., 595; Sparks v. Kansas City, 236 Mo. App. 710, 160 S.W.2d 819.
Although the statement might be termed dictum and not determinative of the case, Justice Mulroney in Cox v. City of Des Moines, 235 Iowa 178, 181, 184, 16 N.W.2d 234, 236, states:
“We learn from the testimony that there was a shoulder that was nearly level having a drop of 4.8 inches from the level of the walk to a point four feet south, before the abrupt decline started, and that the grass was dry. # * *
“We are not referred to any ease where the failure to erect a barrier four feet from a sidewalk where there is a steep decline has been held negligence.”
In the latter case the claimed defect was in a city park.
II. Some of the Iowa cases cited in the majority opinion justify comment. The facts in the case of Bixby v. City of Sioux City, 184 Iowa 89, 96, 164 N.W. 641, 644, disclose the plaintiff’s decedent was injured in driving through a barrier at a “T” intersection. The barrier had been placed at the end of the street as a guard from a cliff that was adjacent to and apparently parallel to the street into which the decedent drove. The statement quoted by the majority does not seem applicable to the instant case inasmuch as the pit or ditch here involved is not so immediately adja*292cent to the cinder path and is not of such close proximity “* •* * over which a traveler using such street is liable to fall.”
The majority also refers to the case of Manderschid v. City of Dubuque, 29 Iowa 73, 78, 4 Am. Rep. 196. The quoted portion from the cited case was in no way determinative of the case. A good portion of the cited opinion deals with the question whether there had been a dedication of a highway. The nature of the questions involved is stated in the first paragraph of the opinion:
“The questions, both of law and fact, arising in this case, relate to the character of the Sixth Street extension; whether in contemplation of law it was, at the time of the injury complained of, a highway. It is not denied, that, if it in fact was a highway, defendant is liable in this action, and that the verdict and judgment should be sustained. To these questions alone is our attention directed by the argument of the counsel of the parties, and nó others will be considered.”
A review of this case shows the action was the result of injuries to a horse owned by the plaintiff and sustained on a claimed defective bridge. The fact the bridge was a quarter of a mile from another street was not an issue in the case as noted by the previous statement.
The case of Hall v. Town of Manson, 99 Iowa 698, 68 N.W. 922, 34 L. R. A. 207, mentioned in the majority opinion, involves a situation where the plaintiff in using a crosswalk over a street fell into an excavation made in the street for laying water mains. The claimed defect was not outside of the street or its parallel walk line and the statement quoted in the majority opinion has no application to the present case.
In the case of Parker v. City of Bedford, 139 Iowa 545, 117 N.W. 955, it is shown the ditch, the claimed defect, was in the parking which is a part of the street. The quoted portion from the opinion has application to the facts there involved but is not applicable to a situation outside of the street or walk line.
The majority quotes from the case of Whitlatch v. City of Iowa Falls, 199 Iowa 73, 76, 201 N.W. 83, 85. In this case the opinion also states: “We are of the opinion that the elevation and narrowness of the grade, together with the manner in which *293the south side was constructed, raised a question of fact, for the jury to determine: that is, whether it was the duty of the city, in the exercise of the care imposed upon it by the statute, to erect barriers or guardrails on the south side of the grade.”
It will be observed because of the nature of the elevation and the narrowness of the grade and the manner in which the side of it was constructed a fact question was raised whether barriers or guardrails should have been erected. The fact the claimed defect was in part in the street and in part immediately adjacent to the street does not make the situation similar to the instant case, and the portion of the opinion quoted by the majority, in my opinion, has no application to the situation here under consideration.
The case of Lawrence v. City of Sioux City, 172 Iowa 320, 154 N.W. 494, is quoted from in the.majority opinion. Most of the quotation is taken from the statement of facts. This citation is apparently set forth because the automobile was driven off the street at a curve. Under the facts as shown by that particular case it was held the finding that the city was negligent was not questioned. However, it does not necessarily follow that the cited case is here controlling.
III. The evidence of the plaintiff, interpreted most favorably to her and in keeping with her apparent theory of the case, disclosed decedent walked directly east at the bend of the cinder path. From this point in the path to the ditch the distance to the ditch is at least twelve to sixteen feet — perhaps twenty-eight feet. If at points closer to the bridge he walked off the path it was not because of the bend in the walk. The distance to the ditch at various points nearer the bridge is shown to be from fifteen to five or six feet. And at none of these points is there shown to be any defect in the walk or street. Then, too, the hole was outside of the walk or street line and not immediately adjacent to the cinder path.
Under the evidence presented by the plaintiff and the authorities heretofore cited and commented upon, I would affirm the trial court.
Hays, C, J.; and Smith, J., join in this dissent.