Court Opinion

ID: 9536769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:06:52.058165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:14.130682
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I think the trial court was disqualified, and that McGee’s second point on appeal, that:
The trial judge should have disqualified himself on the basis of having been the presiding magistrate at the preliminary hearing and that appellant did not agree as to his sitting as pro tempore judge,
is well taken, since Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution, specifically and unequivocally says that:
Any cause in the district court may be tried by a judge pro tempore * * * agreed upon by the parties, or their attorneys of record.
Concededly this never was done in the instant case.
The judge here also was the city judge that held the preliminary hearing in this case. It was he who bound the defendant over to the District Court for trial. That trial is the same trial at which this selfsame city court judge presided as a District Court judge, although neither the defend*403ant nor his attorney consented to such unorthodox procedure, and although they had objected to his Honor (or Honors) on the basis of bias and prejudice. After this city judge bound defendant over to the District Court for trial (which was later presided over by the same erstwhile city judge), appellant fired his appointed counsel because he believed there was a conflict of interest. Present counsel, Mr. Florence, was then appointed to represent defendant. Stating that previous counsel’s notes were illegible and that he could not properly defend McGee, he asked the judge of the District Court to order another preliminary hearing. Whether he was entitled to another such hearing is somewhat debatable, but immaterial, since the fact is that the District Court judge ordered another preliminary hearing. The same city judge flouted such order and refused to comply with it. Counsel for defendant pressed the matter of bias and prejudice before the District Court. His objection detoured and came before another District Judge, who, with a sweep of an albino brush, countermanded the order of his robed colleague. In any league, it would seem to this writer, the city judge voluntarily should have disqualified himself from umpiring in any future innings of the present juridical ball game.
Under such circumstances one at least may wonder about constitutional guarantees of due process in proceeding afresh before the same judge. Guilty or not guilty, an accused, under such circumstances, might feel legally denuded or disrobed before the same re-robed jurist, sitting not behind the same, but a different bench, beyond his former bailiwick.
The main opinion justifies all this and completely ignores Point No. 2 mentioned above, by gratuitously raising a brand new point that neither side considered pertinent, —an issue based on a statute never mentioned anywhere by anyone, in the briefs on appeal, or in the record (Title 78-3-20, 21 U.C.A.1953, as amended Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1969).
The only statutory issue in this case relating to the qualification of the trial court had to do with Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution. Appellant said this constitutional provision was violated since defendant obviously did not consent to the city judge sitting in judgment over defendant as District Court judge. As to such lack of consent, defendant is dead right, and the State does not deny that he is dead right, — neither in the record nor in its brief. The whole thrust of the State’s answer to McGee’s contention is that the city court judge actually was a qualified judge pro tempore, because McGee “acquiesced in Judge Mecham’s sitting as pro tempore judge.” The State pulls that one out of the fire by the novel argument that after defendant screamed that Judge Mecham was biased and prejudiced, and was given *404the paint treatment mentioned above, he did no more objecting, — and bingo, thus acquiesced. Nowhere can the main opinion point to any contention by the State or anyone else, except that urged by the unsolicited, unwarranted and unsanctioned issue raised for the first time on appeal by this court itself.
The defendant has had absolutely no opportunity intelligently to meet this new point raised by this court, except in the middle of counsel’s oral argument to the court, when one of the justices inquired as to its applicability here.
What this court unfortunately is doing in this case is issuing a declaratory judgment, not initiated properly under the provisions of our declaratory judgment act, not a true adversary proceeding, without any opportunity on the part of anyone to research and brief the matter, — in effect, declaring that the appointment of a city judge to be a district judge under 78-3-20, U.C.A.19S3, is compatible with the constitutional sanctions pertaining to judges pro tempore. Mr. Florence, counsel for defendant, was a member of the legislature that passed the act. In open court he emphatically announced that the legislature had no intention of concluding as does the main opinion here.
I think there are many besides this writer who would question the constitutionality of that statute, what with the possibility that incursions into the area of constitutionally created courts well might be extended by future legislatures to include those presiding over ecclesiastic courts, town court judges, judges of election or beauty contests, as being qualified to sit in judgment over accused persons, million dollar trusts, wills and succession matters and the like.
One might say that surely the legislature would not expand such legislation. It is interesting to note that the original legislation, Chapter 222, Laws of Utah 1967, allowing assignment only of district judges, quickly was amended by Chapter 253, Laws of Utah 1969, to include city judges. At this pace, the complete breakdown of a substantial, responsible judicial system easily can be seen legislatively written on the red sails in the sunset.
The appellant should have a new trial 1) because the procedure in this case lacked the essentials of due process, and 2) the trial court was not invested with any authority as a judge pro tempore under the constitution and/or its implementing judge pro tempore statute (78-3-15, 16, U. C.A.1953).