Court Opinion

ID: 9826105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:22:06.044101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:50.910121
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Fraser:
I concur with the Chief Justice in confirming the conviction.
I. I think the refusal of the motion ff> change the venue was proper. Florence is in the Twelfth circuit. One of the reasons for the change of venue is that Dr. Bigham, a brother of the defendant, had been convicted in Georgetown county of killing his wife, and is now a fugitive from justice, and that the odium of his brother’s conduct attached to the defendant in Florence county. Georgetown and Florence are in the same circuit, and no reason is stated *399for concluding that the same prejudice does not extend to Marion or Horry counties, the only other counties in that circuit. So far as this point is concerned, a change would not have Ijelped the defendant.
Again, another ground for the motion was that another brother, Smiley Bigham, had been tried for murder in Florence county; that, while Smiley was acquitted, the murder was of a “peculiarly revolting nature” and great prejudice existed on account of it, notwithstanding the' verdict of acquittal. There was a further showing that Smiley was threatened with prosecution for mutilation of the public records of Florence county; that prejudice existed against the defendant on account of the crimes of Smiley. The defendant was charged with killing Smiley. The defendant’s defense was that the other killings were done not by himself, but by Smiley. The defendant said Smiley did all the killing- and there was a conviction on the minds of the jury that Smiley was fully capable of doing murder. The refusal of the motion to change the venue was not only an abuse of discretion, but a wise exercise of it. By the trial in Florence county the defendant got the advantage of the prejudice against Smiley.
II. As to the motion for continuance, one of the attorneys for the defendant said he had spent 30 days or more on the case. The case shows no demand for the testimony taken before the coroner, or any effort to get it. There was no error here.
III. The following charge is complained of :
“So that if a killing is shown to have been done, if, as in this case, the defendant is shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have killed Smiley Bigham with malice aforethought, expressed or implied, he is guilty of murder; otherwise not.’’
The appellant complains that the words “as in this case” makes the charge a charge on the facts. This is untenable. *400The charge means (after stating the general rule), if the defendant killed Smiley Bigham with malice aforethought, he is guilty of murder; otherwise, he is not guilty. The charge was entirely proper. t
IV. The next assignment of error is in this charge:
“Now, the defendant claims in this case, not only that he is not guilty of this offense, but that the death of Smiley Bigham was the result of an act of his own; that he committed suicide. Now, is there a' reasonable doubt upon that point? If you find that there is a reasonable doubt as to whether Smiley Bigham killed himself — took his own life —then you cannot convict this defendant in this case, because it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Smiley Bigham did not commit suicide and that this defendant did kill him, before you can bring in a verdict against him.”
While this portion is somewhat involved, it is not lacking in clearness. It means, if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to suicide, acquit the defendant, because it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed him. That is the law of the case. There is nothing in this to throw the burden on the defendant.
The following paragraphs made it still clearer.
V. As to the statements made by the deceased:
A witness was permitted to say the deceased said:
“He is kind of cutting up some with us; he has had his share, but I am going to give him a piece of the land if he will behave himself. He is talking about killing us all, but I am not afraid of him.”
Ordinarily that is incompetent, clearly so. Much depends on the surroundings. The theory of the defendant was that Smiley was a crazy man. The only way ordinary people can judge of a man’s sanity is from what he says and does. The defendant, on the cross-examination, had been allowed to prove Smiley’s actings *401and sayings, and I cannot say it was reversible error to allow .the state to follow the defendant’s lead on the redirect examination.
VI. The most serious question in the case is that the presiding Judge did not, in so many words, charge the jury that the defendant was clothed with a presumption of innocence. I think, however, that the omission was cured for all effective purposes when he did charge:
“Now the whole case, as you have heard it argued, is upon the basis of circumstantial evidence. You must be able to say, in order to bring in a verdict of guilty, not only may this be the man that did the killing of Smiley Bigham; not only is it possible that he might have done it; but you must be able to point to him and say, ‘Thou 'art the man, beyond a reasonable doubt.’ This is all the law requires. It is to show beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant is- the one that killed Smiley Bigham.”
VII. As to the remarks of the Judge to appellant’s counsel, I would say the language used by the attorney was not Court language. I can well understand how, under the circumstances, counsel might have used language such as he would not have used, would not have used or approved of, in his calmer moments. So much depends on the circumstances and the manner of saying, that it is impossible for us to condemn the remarks of the presiding Judge. The time to prevent a personal difficulty is at the very beginning. The presiding officer who hesitates is lost. He may lose control of his Court in half a minute. We cannot say therefore that his Honor committed reversible error in making the statements shown by the record.
For these reasons I concur in affirming the judgment.