Court Opinion

ID: 9954271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 21:03:30.109797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:59.819231
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 Uriarte v. Matrai CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 MICHELE URIARTE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165401
 v.
 GYORGY MATRAI,                                                          (Contra Costa County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. MSD19-02312)

                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Gyorgy Matrai, who is representing himself in a marital dissolution
action with his former spouse, Michele Uriarte, appeals an order entered by
the trial court on June 6, 2022, that (1) denied Matrai’s motion to disqualify
Uriarte’s counsel; (2) denied Matrai’s motion to join Uriarte’s counsel as a
party; (3) granted Uriarte’s motion to declare Matrai a vexatious litigant,
imposed a pre-filing requirement and required an accounting to redact
confidential information that Matrai has publicly filed; and (4) awarded
Uriarte $2,000 in attorneys’ fees under Family Code Section 271.2

         1 We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to the

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
         2 Neither the accounting to redact confidential information nor the fee

award would be independently appealable, but we consider them because
they were part of the resolution of the vexatious litigant and disqualification
motions respectively, both of which are appealable.
                                                               1
      Uriarte did not file a respondent’s brief or any other documents in the
appeal, so we decide the appeal based on Matrai’s opening brief and the
record he supplied. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2) (future
undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court).) We
conclude that Matrai has failed to establish any error in the trial court’s
June 6 order and therefore affirm.
                                DISCUSSION
      This action has been pending since May 2019. In that time, Matrai has
filed multiple appeals challenging various orders issued in the same
underlying action. His appeals for the most part have purported to challenge
non-appealable orders and have been resolved against him by summary
dismissal. (See, e.g., Uriarte v. Matrai (June 1, 2023, A166135, A166232)
[nonpub. opn.] 2023 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 3178; Uriarte v. Matrai (Mar. 29,
2023, A165471) [nonpub. opn.] 2023 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 1899.) Matrai
has been advised previously of the importance of providing an adequate
record. (Uriarte v. Matrai (Mar. 29, 2023, A165471) [nonpub. opn.]
2023 Cal.App. Unpub. Lexis 1899 at *3–*4.) He has also been advised that
the filing of appellate briefs not supported by citations to a proper record and
appropriate authority can result in the imposition of sanctions. (Uriarte v.
Matrai (June 1, 2023, A166135, A166232) [nonpub. opn.] 2023 Cal.App.
Unpub. Lexis 3178 at *4; rule 8.276(a)(1).) As reflected in the discussion
below, Matrai has failed to heed these warnings.
      In the present appeal, Matrai challenges the order issued following a
hearing on May 23, 2022, at which Matrai did not appear. The inadequate
record provided by Matrai and the deficiencies in his opening brief largely
preclude meaningful appellate review. Matrai has submitted an 11-volume,
3,153-page clerk’s transcript, filled almost exclusively with irrelevant

                                       2
materials.3 His opening brief cites several times to the entirety of the clerk’s
transcript but—in violation of the applicable rule—fails to include a single
citation by page to a specific document. (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Matrai’s
assertions of error are for the most part conclusory and not supported with
relevant legal authority. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In our own review of the
record provided, we have found almost none of the documents that would be
necessary for review of his claims. Matrai’s failure to comply with the rules
of court and to provide a record that permits review of the asserted errors
arguably provides grounds for the dismissal of his appeal. (See
In re Marriage of Wilcox (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 492, 498; Del Real v. City of
Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) Nonetheless, we briefly consider
his arguments to the extent possible.
      Matrai contends the order must be reversed because he was not given
notice of the May 23 hearing. The register of actions shows, however, that
Matrai’s ex parte motion to disqualify Uriarte’s attorney was filed February 1
and, at the time of filing, was set for hearing on May 23. With respect to his
joinder motion, the record includes a notice and proof of service showing that
on February 8, Matrai was given notice that the hearing was continued to
May 23. The register of actions shows that Uriarte filed her motion to
declare Matrai a vexatious litigant and for related relief on April 13, 2022,
and the motion was set for hearing on May 23. The register also shows that
several proofs of service were filed at the same time. Because Matrai did not
include any of these documents in the record, he has forfeited any challenge
to the sufficiency of the notice as to these motions. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986)

      3 Multiple volumes contained confidential information in violation of

rules 8.45 and 8.47. We struck those volumes from the record and directed to
Matrai to re-file them after redacting the confidential information.
                                        3
41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [appellant “has the burden of showing reversible error by
an adequate record”].)
      Matrai contends the order denying his motion to disqualify Uriarte’s
counsel must be reversed because the trial court cited to only one of the many
grounds for attorney disqualification listed in his motion and ignored the
others. Having reviewed what we believe is the relevant pleading (an unfiled
document entitled “Emergency Motion and Pleading on Disqualifying
Michael Amthor and East County Family Law Group as Opposing Counsel”),
we find that the trial court adequately responded to each ground for
disqualification raised by Matrai. The trial court’s order found “that
Mr. Matrai failed to meet his burden demonstrating a[n] ethical conflict that
prohibited representation of Petitioner Michelle Gonzaga Uriarte by Michael
Amthor and East County Family Law Group.” The court explained,
“Mr. Matrai has failed to make a showing that either, Mr. Amthor or
someone at East County Family Law Group, ‘possesses confidential attorney-
client information materially related to the proceedings before the court,’ and
so the Court finds that no rebuttable presumption arises. This is also not a
case requiring disqual[ification] of attorneys representing adverse parties in
successive representations. Nor is this a case involving familial relationships
involving Mr. Amthor and any party to this action. Finally, the Court has
nothing to suggest that Mr. Amthor is or would be a percipient witness in
this matter.”
      With respect to the vexatious litigant order, Matrai contends the order
must be vacated because the court failed to consider that he was represented
by counsel for a period of time, that his filings were “initiated only and solely
in response to various court proceedings in defense of himself and his minor
son’s due process right,” and that the court’s findings are generally

                                        4
unsupported and contradictory. In declaring Matrai a vexatious litigant, the
trial court relied on Matrai’s filings in the dissolution action, as well as his
filings in this court, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The court found that Matrai met the definition of a vexatious
litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(3), in that
he is someone who “while acting in propria persona, repeatedly files
unmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessary
discovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay.” The court acknowledged that Matrai had been
previously represented by counsel but carefully detailed all of Matrai’s
frivolous filings while self-represented. Because Matrai did not include any
of Uriarte’s moving papers in the record, even while he submitted several
thousand pages of irrelevant material, Matrai’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence in support of the court’s order has been forfeited.
      Matrai asserts that the court’s order granting Uriarte’s request for an
accounting to redact confidential information is invalid because it fails to list
the records to be redacted. The court found, however, that Matrai had
repeatedly filed documents with unredacted social security numbers and
account numbers and directed him to audit his pleadings and provide the
court with a list of all documents to be redacted from the court’s files. Given
the voluminous nature of the filings by Matrai in this action, the court
reasonably ordered him to determine initially which documents should be
redacted.
      Finally, Matrai contends that the “[o]rder to pay attorney’s fees is
invalid on its face because the payment order was issued with no supporting
documents attached to justify the fees.” He cites “Rule 1.5 of The State Bar of

                                         5
California” in support of his argument that the order was issued without the
“mandatory records and documentation.” The rule cited is not applicable.
Family Code section 271 authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction
where a party’s conduct “frustrates the policy of the law to promote
settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by
encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” The party
requesting an award under this section is not required to demonstrate any
financial need for the award. (Ibid.) Nor is the party seeking sanctions
“required to establish any particular harm as a prerequisite to a sanctions
award under [Family Code] section 271.” (In re Marriage of Corona (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226.) The trial court awarded Uriarte $2000 based
on Matrai’s filing of the motions to disqualify Uriarte’s attorney and to join
her counsel as a party to the proceedings and his failure to appear at the
hearing. Presumably, the request for sanctions was included in Uriarte’s
opposition filed May 10, but this is another document that, so far as we can
tell, Matrai omitted from the needlessly voluminous record he supplied.
Accordingly, we must presume that Matrai received notice as required by
section 271 and that the request was properly supported. Given the
incomplete record before us, Matrai has not established that the trial court
abused its discretion in making the fee award. (In re Marriage of Corona,
supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1225 [“A sanctions order under (Fam. Code)
section 271 is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)

                                        6
                                DISPOSITION

      The June 6 order is affirmed. Uriarte is entitled to recover costs, if any.
                                           GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
SMILEY, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, Alameda County, assigned by the

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
                                       7