Court Opinion

ID: 9669141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:40:39.285922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:52.848168
License: Public Domain

*878STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Opinion of the majority.
I. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY A CHANGE OF VENUE?
In reading the briefs and the appropriate part of the transcript in this case, I felt an overwhelming sense of deja vu. The atmosphere surrounding this case, the action (or lack of it) by the trial judge, the uncontro-verted evidence of the attitude of the community as shown by the poll taken by appellant, to me, all raise the specter of the trial and conviction of Fred Grooms. Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131 (1988).
I dissented in that case, and the reasons set forth, Id. at 142,143, are identical, except for a numerical difference in the poll. I will not overburden this opinion by repeating that verbiage. I will simply refer to it and incorporate it, by reference, in this dissent.
The highly charged atmosphere of the potential jurors in this case is identical to that in Grooms. Ultimate fairness mandates a change of venue in this case as I believed it did in Grooms. On retrial, if the proof is the same, I would order a change of venue.
II. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REFUSE TO GIVE A DEFINITION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE?
A definition of extreme emotional disturbance should have been given to the jury. Repeatedly, this Court has required such a definition.
In McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464 (1986), this Court stated that
[wjithout some standard or definition a jury is left to speculate in a vacuum as to what circumstances might or might not constitute extreme emotional disturbance. Since the General Assembly did not define the term, it becomes necessary for the court to do so.
McClellan at 467. On retrial in McClellan, it was ordered that the jury “be instructed as to the definition of the state of mind which constitutes an extreme emotional disturbance.” Id. at 469.
Three years later in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900, 909 (1989), we stated that “[wjhether extreme emotional disturbance is used as an element of the murder, manslaughter, or mitigating circumstance instructions, the jury should be instructed as to its definition.”
Two years after Dean we reiterated: there should have been a separate instruction on extreme emotional disturbance so that the jury could understand how to apply extreme emotional distress to differentiate the two intentional homicide crimes; intentional murder and manslaughter in the first degree.
Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811, 815 (1991). As in Holbrook, the jury in the ease presently before the Court was entitled to a definition of extreme emotional disturbance so that they could properly differentiate between murder and first degree manslaughter.
For these reasons, on retrial I would require an instruction be given to the jury which defines extreme emotional disturbance.