Court Opinion

ID: 9906767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 12:23:08.429943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:16.554596
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-23-00461-CV

                                         W. B., Appellant

                                                 v.

               Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

                 FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
        NO. 321796, THE HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellant W.B. (Father) appeals from the district court’s final order, following a

de novo hearing, terminating his parental rights to his two-year-old son, A.W. (Charlie). 1 In four

issues on appeal, Father contends that (1) this Court cannot presume that the record of the

hearing before the associate judge, which preceded the de novo hearing but has not been

included in the appellate record, supports the decision terminating his parental rights; (2) the

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that Father placed Charlie in an

endangering environment; (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that

Father engaged in endangering conduct; and (4) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to prove that termination of Father’s parental rights was in Charlie’s best interest. We will

affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights.

       1
          For the child’s privacy, we refer to him using a pseudonym and to his parents and other
relatives by their familial relationships to each other, and we refer to the child’s approximate age
at the time of trial. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
                                         BACKGROUND

               The case began in late December 2020, when the Texas Department of Family

and Protective Services (the Department) received a report alleging neglectful supervision of

Charlie by Charlie’s mother, K.W. (Mother), and Father. In the Department’s removal affidavit,

a copy of which was admitted into evidence at the de novo hearing, CPS investigator Catina Bett

averred that Mother had given birth to Charlie following the relinquishment of her parental rights

to three other children, “Tammy,” “Zachary,” and “Lisa” (all pseudonyms), who had been

removed from her care after Lisa had been born with marijuana in her system and after Mother

had attempted to commit suicide. The Department also expressed concerns about Father, who

was in a relationship with Mother but who was not the biological father of her other children.

According to Bett, Father had picked up Mother’s children from school while he was

smoking marijuana.

               The Department also received a report alleging “sexual abuse of all the children”

by Father.     Zachary had exhibited behaviors “indicative of sexual abuse,” including

“attempt[ing] to put his mouth on another child’s penis.” The Department was concerned that

“without legal intervention, [Mother] will allow [Father] to have contact with [Charlie], placing

the child in a dangerous situation that can affect his wellbeing and life,” that Mother “was not

able to provide a safe environment for the child as she continues to engage in sexual intercourse

and be in a relationship with [Father,] who sexually abused her children,” and that Mother

“relinquished her rights to her other children and failed to disclose her involvement with the

Department to the hospital to allow [Father] to have ongoing access to [Charlie].” Based on

these concerns, the Department sought and obtained emergency removal of Charlie from

Mother’s and Father’s care and filed a petition to terminate their parental rights to Charlie.

                                                  2
                In January 2021, while the case was ongoing, Father was indicted on three counts

of aggravated sexual assault of a child, Tammy, who was six or seven years old at the time of the

alleged offenses. The indictment, a copy of which was admitted into evidence at the de novo

hearing, alleged that Father intentionally and knowingly caused the penetration of Tammy’s

mouth with his sexual organ, intentionally and knowingly caused the penetration of Tammy’s

sexual organ with his finger, and intentionally and knowingly caused the penetration of Tammy’s

anus with his sexual organ. In the probable-cause affidavit for Father’s arrest, a copy of which

was admitted into evidence at the de novo hearing, the arresting officer averred the following:

        I WOULD ADVISE THAT ON JULY 9, 2020, A CPS WORKER REPORTED
        AT THE KILLEEN POLICE DEPARTMENT THAT AN ALLEGATION OF
        AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT OF A CHILD HAD SURFACED
        DURING HER INVESTIGATION. I WAS ASSIGNED THE CASE. I WOULD
        ADVISE THAT I REVIEWED THE VIDEO FROM WHEN THE VICTIM,
        [TAMMY,] WAS INTERVIEWED BY A FORENSIC INTERVIEWER AT THE
        CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY CENTER [CAC] IN TEMPLE, TEXAS, AND
        REPORTED THAT SHE HAD SEXUAL CONTACT WITH THE SUSPECT
        [FATHER] AND THAT THE LOCATION OF THE ASSAULT WAS THE
        SUSPECT’S HOUSE IN KILLEEN, BELL COUNTY, TEXAS WHEN SHE
        WOULD VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. THE ASSAULTS OCCURRED
        MULTIPLE TIMES DURING THE TIMEFRAME OF JUNE 2019 THROUGH
        JULY 2020. I WOULD ADVISE THAT THE VICTIM FURTHER REPORTED
        THAT SHE WAS 6 AND 7 YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE
        ASSAULTS . . . .

                In December 2021, Charlie’s foster parents filed a petition to intervene in the

termination suit, seeking to adopt Charlie if Mother’s and Father’s parental rights were

terminated. A second couple, who had adopted Mother’s other children in November 2021, also

filed a petition in intervention seeking to adopt Charlie.     Meanwhile, Mother executed an

affidavit of relinquishment of her parental rights to Charlie. Father opposed the termination of

his parental rights.

                                                3
               The case proceeded to a four-day bench trial before an associate judge, after

which the associate judge signed a decree terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to

Charlie, naming the Department as Charlie’s managing conservator, and continuing Charlie’s

current placement with the foster parents. Regarding termination, the associate judge found that

Mother had executed an irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of her parental rights, see Tex.

Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(K), and that Father had endangered Charlie’s physical and emotional

well-being, see id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The associate judge further found that termination of

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Charlie’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

               Father filed a request for a de novo hearing on the issues of termination and

placement. At that hearing, several witnesses testified, including the Department caseworkers

assigned to the case, two of Charlie’s guardians ad litem, Father, Foster Mother, one of the

adoptive parents of Charlie’s three siblings, the case manager for the adoption agency that

licensed the siblings’ adoptive parents, and a child psychologist. Exhibits admitted into evidence

at the de novo hearing included the removal affidavit, Father’s family service plan, the final

permanency report, documents related to Father’s pending criminal charges, Mother’s affidavit

of relinquishment, and a recording of Tammy’s forensic interview with the CAC.              At the

hearing’s conclusion, the district court announced that it could not conclude that the associate

judge was incorrect in its ruling or that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings,

and it adopted the associate judge’s order as its own. The district court subsequently signed its

final order “affirm[ing] the ruling of the associate judge.” This appeal followed.

                                                4
                                          DISCUSSION

“Absent record” presumption

               Contemporaneous with the filing of his notice of appeal, Father filed a request for

preparation of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record, including “[a] full transcript of the final

hearing conducted” before the associate judge. However, the district court provided only the

transcript of the de novo hearing.2

               In his first issue, Father asserts that this Court “should limit its [sufficiency]

review to the de novo hearing in the district court and disregard the final hearing” held before the

associate judge by not indulging the “absent record” presumption. See In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d

288, 300 (Tex. 2021) (“In the absence of a record, we presume the evidence was sufficient to

support the trial court’s findings.”).     Father contends that “[i]ndulging the absent-record

presumption in this case would violate [his] constitutional right to meaningful review.” He

argues that because he is indigent, he is entitled upon request to have the county pay for the

transcript of the hearing before the associate judge. In Father’s view, because he requested the

transcript but the district court refused to pay for it, “hold[ing] the absence of that part of the

record against [Father] by indulging the absent-record presumption . . . . would impose an

unreasonable impediment to [Father’s] appellate rights, and thereby violate due process.” 3

       2
          In an email from the court reporter to Father’s counsel that Father attached to his brief
but is not included in the clerk’s record, the court reporter wrote, “Judge Jones has let me know
that he is not going to approve payment for the Final Hearing held before Judge Sims [the
associate judge] on this appeal, and you’ll only have the De Novo record to appeal.” No further
explanation was provided in the email. The record contains no response from Father’s counsel to
this email, and the clerk’s record does not include any documents either denying counsel’s
request for the transcript or explaining the court’s reasoning for not providing it.
       3
           We note that the Department in its brief does not address the merits of this issue but
asserts instead that Father inadequately briefed it. We disagree. Father presented a “clear and
                                                 5
                Father acknowledges that “[t]his Court can, however, avoid this constitutional

issue by declining to consider the hearing [before the associate judge] or indulge any

presumptions about what may or may not have been presented there.” Thus, Father asks this

Court to “either disregard any evidence that may have been presented at the final hearing [before

the associate judge] or else remand to the trial court for supplementation of the record.”

                For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that it is not

appropriate to indulge the absent-record presumption here. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; see also

In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 349 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that courts are to avoid deciding

constitutional questions when possible); T.L. v. Cook Child.’s Med. Ctr., 607 S.W.3d 9, 35 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2020, pet. denied) (explaining that principle of judicial restraint requires

courts to refrain from deciding constitutional issues “unless it is necessary to do so”).

Accordingly, we sustain Father’s first issue to the extent that we will limit our sufficiency review

to the evidence presented at the de novo hearing.

Evidentiary sufficiency

                In his second and third issues, Father asserts that the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to prove that he endangered Charlie. In his fourth issue, Father asserts that

the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove that termination of his parental rights is

in Charlie’s best interest.

concise argument” for this contention, “with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record.” See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for
the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”); see also
Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 2004) (explaining
that appellate rules are to be construed reasonably yet liberally to avoid briefing waiver
when possible).
                                                  6
       Standard of review

               “Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code requires two findings to support

termination of a parent’s legal rights: (1) the parent’s acts or omissions must satisfy an

enumerated statutory ground for termination; and (2) termination must be in the child’s best

interest.” In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021); see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232

(Tex. 2019) (per curiam); A.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 577 S.W.3d 689, 697

(Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied). “Proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship

implicate rights of constitutional magnitude that qualify for heightened judicial protection.”

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Tex. 2018).           Parental rights have been characterized as

“essential,” “a basic civil right of man,” and “far more precious than property rights.” Holick

v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).

They are “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” protected by the United States

Constitution. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); E.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., 598 S.W.3d 389, 396 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.). “When the State

initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental

liberty interest, but to end it.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982). “Consequently,

termination proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are

strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. “Because termination of

parental rights ‘is complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time’ the natural and legal rights

between parent and child,” a trial court “cannot involuntarily sever that relationship absent

evidence sufficient to ‘produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630 (quoting Tex.

                                                  7
Fam. Code § 101.007; Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20). “This heightened proof standard carries the

weight and gravity due process requires to protect the fundamental rights at stake.” Id.

                 “A correspondingly searching standard of appellate review is an essential

procedural adjunct.” Id. “The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent

to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. “Evidence is legally

sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and

considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or

conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631. “Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires

weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding.”

Id. “In a factual-sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence

is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id.

“Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the

factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id.

                 However, “an appellate court’s review must not be so rigorous that the only fact

findings that could withstand review are those established beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). “While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are

not absolute.”     Id.   “Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional

underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical

interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.” Id.

                                                  8
       Evidence presented

               Department caseworker Melissa Macias was assigned to the case at the time of

the hearing before the associate judge. She was the fourth caseworker assigned to the case and

had been the caseworker for approximately four to five months. Macias testified that when the

Department took custody of Charlie, the Department’s concern for Charlie’s safety was based on

“the outcry of sexual abuse” made against Father by Charlie’s older siblings, combined with the

fact that Mother and Father “were still together residing in the same household” when Charlie

was born.

               Father’s family plan of service included parenting classes, a psychological

evaluation, individual counseling, and random drug tests on a weekly basis. Macias believed

that Father “may have been working services” before her involvement with the case but that

when she received the case, Father “was no longer working services,” including drug testing.

Macias also testified that when she received the case, Father never allowed her to visit his home

and that she “was never able to assess [the] safety” of Father as a placement. She tried to engage

with Father through “a combination of calls, text messages, unannounced visits to the home,

announced visits to the home,” and even a letter that was mailed to his address. Although Father

responded to one text message and Macias spoke to him on one occasion, Father “was unwilling

to meet with” Macias.

               Regarding the allegations of sexual abuse against Father, Macias acknowledged

that the allegations had been made by one of Charlie’s siblings and that the criminal case was

still pending. However, she testified that the outcry had never changed, and “[t]hat’s concerning

because if [Charlie] were to be placed in the same home, that could potentially happen to him as

well.” Father had no visitation with Charlie because of the pending sexual-assault charges.

                                                9
               Macias testified that at the time of the hearing before the associate judge, the

Department was recommending termination of Father’s parental rights because Father “wasn’t

involved in any of his services,” Father “wasn’t making contact with the Department,” and

Charlie had “a very strong bond with his current foster family,” who was “willing to adopt him.”

               Macias had visited Charlie at the foster parents’ home “at least once a month” and

“[s]omewhere between four and seven” times. Macias testified that Charlie “has an incredibly

strong bond with the [foster] family, including their biological children,” who Charlie considered

to be “his brothers and sisters.” She described their home as “very, very loving” and “safe,” with

“appropriate play equipment for the children.”          Macias had no concerns about the foster

placement. She explained, “They’re engaged all of the time that I’m there. They are able to

meet all of his needs as well as their own biological children’s needs as well.” Additionally,

Charlie had been placed with the foster family since the case began, when he was either four or

five days old. At the time of the de novo hearing, Charlie had been in the foster placement for

over two years. Macias further testified that when Charlie visited the home of his biological

siblings, he was “hesitant” to engage with them and their adoptive parents, who were “kind” but

“also a little hesitant” to engage with Charlie.

               Department caseworker Kirby Rubin, the current caseworker assigned to the case,

testified briefly that the Department’s policy was to try to keep siblings together but that this was

not always possible. He testified that he had not visited and was not familiar with the adoptive

parents of the siblings.

               Michael Lockett, the previous guardian ad litem for Charlie at the time of the

hearing before the associate judge, testified that his recommendation at the time of that hearing

was that Mother’s parental rights be terminated because of the relinquishment, that Father’s

                                                   10
parental rights be terminated because of the outcry of sexual abuse and Tammy’s CAC

interview, and that Charlie remain with the foster parents because “that’s the only home that he’s

known.” Lockett had visited the foster home “half a dozen or so” times, and during those visits,

Charlie appeared to be bonded with the foster parents. Lockett had also observed a visit between

Charlie and his biological siblings, and he described this visit as “awkward. Not necessarily

because anybody made it awkward, but just awkward given the reality of the case and what’s

going on.” Although Lockett had earlier in the case recommended that Charlie be placed with

his siblings, that recommendation changed “the longer the case went on” and Charlie became

“more and more bonded to his current placement.”

               Lockett testified that there was “no doubt” in his mind that Father’s parental

rights should be terminated. When asked why he had no doubt, Lockett explained, “I watched

the outcry of [Tammy], and I watched it twice. And I believe what she was saying. And I

believed the abuse that she suffered. And I think that would make it dangerous for [Charlie] to

be with his dad.” Nothing had happened during the case that would change Lockett’s mind

about terminating Father’s parental rights.

               Melat Mekonnen, Charlie’s current guardian ad litem, testified that she

recommended termination of Father’s parental rights and that Charlie remain in his current

placement. She had visited the placement twice and had witnessed a close bond between Charlie

and the foster parents’ biological children. It was a happy home, suitable for children, and the

foster parents were “the only parents that he knows.” She believed that “any placement change

for [Charlie] would cause a detriment to his emotional health” because “[h]e’s been in the home

since he’s been five days old.”

                                               11
               Father testified that he was engaged to Mother, they still lived together, and there

had never been a time when they were separated. Father explained that he had three jobs since

2021: he worked part-time at a food care center, cut lawns, and chopped wood. Father further

testified that he had completed his services, including a psychological evaluation, individual

counseling, and drug testing, although he could not recall the last time that he had taken a drug

test for the Department. Father acknowledged that he had not communicated with Department

caseworkers Macias and Rubin. He claimed this was because they had “terminated” his services

after he had completed them.

               Father recounted that he had engaged in individual therapy for “[r]oughly eight,

nine months” and that he had been successfully discharged from therapy. Father testified that he

had completed therapy because he wanted to be reunited with Charlie, who he had not seen in

person since Charlie’s removal in December 2020. If Father could not have custody of Charlie,

he preferred that he be placed with Charlie’s siblings because Father was “once in CPS” and his

“brother and sister were tor[n] apart,” so he did not want something similar to happen to Charlie.

               Father acknowledged that his criminal case was “still ongoing” at the time of the

de novo hearing and testified, “I have to plead the Fifth on that, because it hasn’t—nothing’s

progressed yet, and I have no answers for that yet. So I’d like to just plead my Fifth on that. No

further questions.” Father also testified that he had “no idea” as to the nature of the specific

allegations against him, although he knew that he was being charged with aggravated sexual

assault.   Father called Tammy’s allegations “false” and invoked the Fifth Amendment in

response to specific questions regarding whether he had vaginally penetrated her, anally

penetrated her, and orally penetrated her. Regarding a separate outcry by Zachary that Father

                                                12
had put him “in an uncomfortable position,” Father testified, “I haven’t seen the child for so

many years, and anything he could have [] said in the investigator room, I have no idea.”

               Foster Mother testified that she had four other children in her home in addition to

Charlie, ages twelve, ten, five, and one-and-a-half. They live in a five-bedroom house, and

Charlie has his own bedroom. Foster Mother works at home, raising the children. Her husband

works “in tech” for IBM, and he is Charlie’s “favorite person in the universe.” Foster Mother

testified that Charlie is also “super attached” to her other children and described in detail their

interactions playing together. Foster Mother homeschools her older children and had already

started to educate Charlie with flash cards, sounds, shapes, and colors.            Regarding their

socialization of Charlie, Foster Mother testified that they had “an amazing neighborhood” where

the children were all close and that Charlie had “little buddies in Sunday School” at their church.

The foster parents also initiated visits with Charlie’s siblings. Foster Mother testified that they

have “never missed an opportunity of trying to get those kids together” and that the visits “go

really well in general.” Foster Mother added that if they adopted Charlie, they intended to

continue the sibling visits.

               “James” (a pseudonym), one of the adoptive parents of Charlie’s three siblings,

testified that he and his husband had five children, the three siblings that had been removed from

Mother and two others. James explained that the three siblings originally had been placed with

another family but were removed from that home after allegations of abuse arose. They were

then placed with James and his husband. After they learned that Charlie was available for

placement, they expressed a willingness to have him live with them. Charlie was placed with the

foster parents instead. James testified that Charlie’s visits with his siblings “were fine,” although

he thought that the foster parents could sometimes be “hovering” and “overbearing” during the

                                                 13
visits. James believed that it was important for Charlie to be placed with his siblings and that he

and his husband had significant support from their friends and family to help them raise Charlie.

               Regarding Tammy’s outcry against Father, James testified that the allegations

were sexual abuse, specifically penetration, when Tammy was seven years old. He recounted

that Tammy was “doing amazing” right now but that she had required “extensive, multiple types

of therapy sessions to help with the trauma of sexual abuse.” James testified that he had

conversations with Tammy about what had happened to her and that he believed what she had

told him. She had identified Father as the person who had abused her, and she had never

changed her position about what he had done to her. James had never found Tammy to be a liar

and had no reason to disbelieve her account of the abuse. James would not trust any of his

children to be alone with Father, and he believed it was in Charlie’s best interest for Father’s

parental rights to be terminated.

               Stephanie Pino, the case manager for the adoption agency that licensed James and

his husband, testified that she had been involved in placing the siblings in their home. According

to Pino, James and his husband had never “wavered in their desire for [Charlie] to be in their

home” and wanted all four siblings to live together. Pino also testified that there were no safety

concerns with their home, that it was suitable for a sixth child in addition to the five they already

had, and that they had received extensive training through the agency regarding caregiving for

children. Pino had “no concerns whatsoever” that they would be able to meet Charlie’s needs.

               Dr. Scott Hammel, a child psychologist, testified about childhood attachment and

bonding to caregivers. Dr. Hammel briefly observed Charlie with the foster parents but did not

evaluate them or anyone else involved in the case.         Based on his limited observations, he

                                                 14
believed there was “some sort of attachment” between Charlie and the foster parents, although he

could not specify the degree of attachment.

       Endangerment

               Endangerment means exposing a child to loss or injury or jeopardizing a child’s

emotional or physical well-being. See Texas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533

(Tex. 1987); A.C., 577 S.W.3d at 698-99. A finding of endangerment requires more than the threat

of metaphysical injury or possible ill effects from a less-than-ideal family environment, but the

Department does not have to prove that the conduct was directed at the child or that the child

suffered an actual injury. See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012); A.C., 577 S.W.3d at

699. Subsection (D) “focuses on the child’s environment and may be utilized as a ground for

termination when the parent has ‘knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child.’” In re

J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D)). Subsection

(E) focuses on a parent’s conduct and “allows for termination of parental rights if clear and

convincing evidence supports that the parent ‘engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with

persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

child.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234 (quoting Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E)).

               In this case, we will focus our analysis on (E). “Under subsection (E), the cause of

the danger to the child must be the parent’s conduct alone, as evidenced not only by the parent’s

actions but also by the parent’s omission or failure to act.” C.B. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., 458 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied). “Additionally, termination

under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission; a voluntary, deliberate,

and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.” Id.

                                                 15
               “The conduct to be examined includes what the parents did both before and after the

child was born.” Id. Because “endangering conduct is not limited to actions directed towards the

child,” it “may include the parent’s actions before the child’s birth, while the parent had custody of

older children . . . .” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at

533). “Sexual abuse is conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re

G.M., 649 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.); see also In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769,

775 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (“It is beyond question that sexual abuse is conduct

that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being.”).         Moreover, evidence of abuse

committed against one child can support a finding of endangerment against other children who might

later discover the abuse or be abused themselves, even if the other children were not yet born at the

time of the abuse. See In re T.L.E., 579 S.W.3d 616, 625 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,

pet. denied); In re E.A.G., 373 S.W.3d 129, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied); In re

R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 742 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); see also In re L.J.H.,

No. 05-21-00183-CV, 2021 WL 4260769, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“[P]redatory or harmful conduct directed at one child will support termination of parental rights

as to a different child, because all children at risk for the same conduct by the same predator

are endangered.”).

               Here, the Department presented evidence that Father sexually assaulted his

stepdaughter Tammy vaginally, anally, and orally, when she was six or seven years old. Copies of

the probable-cause affidavit, the indictment, and Tammy’s CAC interview were all admitted into

evidence at the de novo hearing. One of Charlie’s guardians ad litem testified that he watched

Tammy’s interview twice, “believed what she was saying,” “believed the abuse that she suffered,”

and thought that the abuse “would make it dangerous for [Charlie] to be with his dad.” One of

Tammy’s adopted parents, James, testified that he had conversations with Tammy about what had

                                                  16
happened to her, that he believed what she had told him, that she had identified Father as the person

who had abused her, and that she had never changed her position about what Father had done to her.

James had never found Tammy to be a liar, had no reason to disbelieve her account of the abuse, and

would not trust any of his children to be alone with Father. Additionally, one of the Department

caseworkers testified that Tammy’s outcry had never changed and that the outcry was concerning to

her “because if [Charlie] were to be placed in the same home, that could potentially happen to him

as well.”

               Father argues that the evidence is insufficient because he testified that the allegations

were false, no other witness had “personal knowledge” of the allegations, and although the

indictment “sets forth some detail, [] it is merely a pleading and only evidence that allegations were

made, not that they were true.” However, the district court could have reasonably inferred that the

indictment, when combined with the other evidence summarized above, including Tammy’s CAC

interview, supported a finding that Father had sexually assaulted Tammy as alleged. See In re

K.A.R., No. 07-22-00157-CV, 2022 WL 3684643, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 25, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that although indictments do not establish guilt, they “issue upon a

grand jury finding probable cause to believe a crime occurred” and that “[p]robable cause reflects the

presence of evidence indicating a fair probability about the occurrence of the act in question”).

Moreover, when asked about each specific allegation in the indictment, Father invoked his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In a civil case, a factfinder may draw an adverse

inference against a party who invokes the Fifth Amendment. In re C.J.F., 134 S.W.3d 343, 352

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet. denied). Thus, the district court as factfinder was permitted to

disbelieve Father’s claim that the allegations were false and to infer that he committed the offenses

against Tammy as alleged and that Charlie was endangered by Father’s abusive conduct. See Murray

v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 294 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.).

                                                  17
                We conclude that the above evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the

trial court’s findings that Father engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct

that endangered Charlie’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

Because Section 161.001 requires proof of only one statutory predicate ground to support

termination, see In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003), we need not consider whether the

evidence is sufficient to prove statutory ground (D), see Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                We overrule Father’s second and third issues.

        Best interest

                We review a factfinder’s best-interest finding in light of the non-exhaustive list of

considerations set out in Holley v. Adams, which include the child’s wishes, the child’s emotional

and physical needs now and in the future, emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the

future, the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody, programs available to help those parties,

plans for the child by the parties seeking custody, the stability of the proposed placement, the

parent’s acts or omissions indicating that the parent-child relationship is improper, and any excuses

for the parent’s conduct. 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); see A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631; In re

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. The Holley factors are not exhaustive, not all

factors must be proved, and a lack of evidence about some of the factors does not “preclude a

factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best

interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the

safety of the child.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. “We must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances in

light of the Holley factors’ to determine whether sufficient evidence supports” the best-interest

finding. In re J.M.G., 608 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. denied) (quoting In re

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B.F., No. 02-07-00334-CV, 2008 WL 902790, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 3, 2008, no pet.)

(mem. op.)).

                In this case, some evidence was contrary to the district court’s finding that

termination of Father’s parental rights was in Charlie’s best interest, including evidence that Father

loved Charlie, wanted Charlie to have a relationship with his siblings, and had engaged in some

court-ordered services in an effort to be reunited with Charlie. However, most of the evidence in the

record supports the district court’s finding. In addition to the evidence that Father sexually assaulted

Charlie’s sister, discussed above, there was also evidence presented that Charlie had been placed

with his foster parents his entire life, that they loved and intended to adopt him, and that their home

was the only home Charlie had ever known; that Charlie was bonded to his foster parents and their

biological children and that because of this bond, it would be detrimental to his emotional well-being

to remove him from their care; and that the foster parents had strong social support from their family

and their community. The Department also presented evidence that Father had refused to allow the

Department to assess the safety of his home, to meet with the two most recent caseworkers, and to

submit to all the drug tests required by the Department; that Father had no role at all in Charlie’s life

during the entirety of the case due to the allegations against him; and that Father had an uncertain

future because of those allegations, including the possibility of incarceration, if convicted.

                Viewing the totality of the above evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s finding, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that

termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Charlie. Accordingly, the evidence

is legally sufficient to support the best-interest finding. Similarly, we are unable to say that the

evidence contrary to the finding is “so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm

belief or conviction” that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of Charlie.

Accordingly, the evidence is also factually sufficient to support the finding.

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              We overrule Father’s fourth issue.

                                        CONCLUSION

              We affirm the district court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: November 30, 2023

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