Court Opinion

ID: 9385394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 16:07:24.330088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.288944
License: Public Domain

J-A28023-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DAVID BARROW                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 685 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0009416-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                               FILED APRIL 06, 2023

       David Barrow appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we

affirm.

       This case stems from events that occurred on August 14-15, 2016 when

Barrow stole Hafiz Bailey’s (victim) .380 Jenkins semiautomatic weapon from

the victim’s home. Following a foot chase, Barrow fired the weapon at the

victim. The shot missed and the victim subsequently called 911.1 Both Barrow

____________________________________________

1 Regarding this incident, Barrow was charged on a separate docket and
acquitted of all charges.
J-A28023-22

and the victim2 were taken into custody and brought to the Philadelphia

County 35th Police District. We adopt the following additional factual history

from Commonwealth v. Barrow, 227 A.3d 446 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Table).

       [Upon being taken to the Philadelphia County 35th Police District
       station and being placed in separate holding cells, Barrow] began
       belligerently yelling out to [the victim], telling him that the
       detective was coming to get [the victim] soon[,] asked [the
       victim] not to say anything about the stolen gun, and told [the
       victim] they needed to be on the same page. [Barrow] proceeded
       to ask [the victim] why he was snitching on [Barrow], to which
       [the victim] responded[,] “just leave it alone.” On August 15,
       2016, [at approximately] 8:15 [p.m.], Police Officer Henry Lewis
       was assigned to escort [defendants, including Barrow and the
       victim,] to the closed[-]circuit television (CCTV) room to
       communicate remotely with the arraignment judge. Once each
       person was arraigned, they [were given the opportunity to make
       a phone call. Barrow was] arraigned prior to [the victim] and was
       already speaking on the pay phone when [the victim] was sent to
       the back of the room to use the pay phone.

       As [the victim] was headed towards the pay phones, he saw
       [Barrow,] who proceeded to ask him what he had said to the
       detectives.     [The victim] responded that he had told [the
       detectives] the truth. During this time, Officer Lewis heard
       unintelligible words coming from the pay phones, banging against
       a trash can, and a phone falling. [] Upon arriving at the pay phone
       area, Officer Lewis saw [Barrow] flip [the victim] onto his back,
       head first, onto the concrete floor and a trash can. Then, [Barrow]
       fell on top of [the victim] and began to choke him by placing his
       arm around [the victim’s] neck. [Barrow stopped choking the
       victim when the police officers separated them. The victim’s]
       head injury required 5 staples [].

Id. at 2-4, quoting Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/19, at 2-4.

____________________________________________

2 The victim had been placed into custody for carrying a firearm without a
permit and, subsequently, found not guilty of that offense. N.T. Jury Trial,
5/9/17, at 6.

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        On August 15, 2016, Barrow was arrested and charged with aggravated

assault,3 simple assault,4 firearms not to be carried without a license,5 carrying

firearms in public in Philadelphia,6 possessing instruments of a crime,7

intimidation of a witness or victim,8 and retaliation against a witness, victim

or party.9 On May 16, 2017, Barrow was convicted by a jury of intimidation

of a witness or victim, retaliation against a witness, victim or party, and simple

assault and acquitted of the remaining offenses. On August 17, 2017, Barrow

made an oral motion for extraordinary relief, which was denied on the record.

On the same day, Barrow was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight to

twenty years’ incarceration followed by six years of probation.          Barrow,

through trial counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration on August 31, 2017,

which was denied as untimely on September 14, 2017. Barrow filed a pro se

notice of appeal September 20, 2017, more than 30 days after he was

sentenced. This Court directed Barrow to show cause as to why his appeal

____________________________________________

3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.

4   Id. at § 2701.

5   Id. at § 6106.

6   Id. at § 6108.

7   Id. at § 907.

8   Id. at § 4952.

9   Id. at § 4953.

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should not be quashed as untimely. Barrow failed to comply with the order

and this Court quashed his appeal on March 29, 2018.

       Barrow subsequently filed a PCRA petition on April 8, 2018, seeking

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, nunc pro tunc, wherein Barrow raised

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for trial counsel failing to file a post-

sentence motion and direct appeal. The PCRA court reinstated Barrow’s direct

appeal rights on May 3, 2018. On May 6, 2018, Barrow filed a post-sentence

motion to vacate the verdict and Barrow’s sentence, which was denied on June

8, 2018. Barrow did not file an appeal. On November 15, 2018, Barrow filed

a PCRA petition requesting reinstatement of his appellate rights, nunc pro

tunc, due to PCRA counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal of the aforementioned

order, which the court granted on November 16, 2018.

       On November 26, 2018, Barrow filed a notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc.

On November 30, 2018, however, Barrow filed a pro se PCRA petition, which

was dismissed on December 12, 2018 due to his pending appeal in this Court.

On February 28, 2020, this Court affirmed Barrow’s judgment of sentence.

See Barrow, supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of

appeal on October 5, 2020.

       Barrow filed a timely pro se PCRA petition10 on November 3, 2020 and

the PCRA court subsequently appointed counsel. Through counsel, Barrow

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10 A PCRA petition filed after the reinstatement of a petitioner’s direct appeal
rights, nunc pro tunc, is considered a first PCRA petition    for     timeliness
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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filed an amended PCRA petition on May 2, 2021, raising ineffective assistance

of counsel claims and requesting a new trial.       The Commonwealth filed a

motion to dismiss and the PCRA court subsequently filed a notice of intent to

dismiss without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Barrow

did not file a response. The court dismissed the petition on February 7, 2022.

Barrow filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2022. Barrow and the PCRA court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Barrow raises the following issues for our

review.

       1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Barrow’s] PCRA
          petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to
          establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
          subpoena and present available exculpatory evidence, and
          failing to file a motion to compel disclosure of the exculpatory
          evidence[?]

       2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Barrow’s] PCRA
          petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to
          establish that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
          raise all appropriate issues and preserve all appropriate claims
          in the statement of matters complained on appeal[?]

       3. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Barrow’s] PCRA
          petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to
          establish violations of [Barrow’s] constitutional rights under the
          United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, including
          ineffective assistance of counsel, multiple instances of
          prosecutorial misconduct, and a conviction based on evidence
          that did not establish [Barrow’s] guilt beyond a reasonable
          doubt[?]

____________________________________________

purposes. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super.
2013) (explaining “when a PCRA petitioner’s direct appeal rights are
reinstated nunc pro tunc in his first PCRA petition, a subsequent PCRA petition
will be considered a first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes” (citations and
footnote omitted)).

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      4. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary
         hearing[?]

Appellant’s Brief, at 9.

      Our scope and standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition are

well-settled:

      [O]ur scope of review is limited by the parameters of the [A]ct.
      Our standard of review permits us to consider only whether the
      PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record
      and whether it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general we
      may affirm the decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any basis
      on the record to support the [PCRA] court’s action; this is so even
      if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(quotations and citations omitted).

      Regarding the denial of an evidentiary hearing, this Court has

determined that

      there is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a [PCRA]
      petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that
      no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not
      necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019); see

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 462 A.2d 772, 773 (Pa. Super. 1938)

(“[U]nless the PCR[A] court is certain of the total lack of merit of an issue

raised in a PCR[A] petition, a hearing should be held on the issue”) (citation

omitted, emphasis in original).

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      In his first two claims, Barrow alleges that trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective in failing to file a motion to compel disclosure of video footage

of the altercation from the 35th Police District and to preserve this claim on

appeal, respectively.   Appellant’s Brief, at 17-19.    Barrow alleges that the

security video shows the victim as the initial aggressor of the altercation that

took place in the pay phone area, and, thus, exonerates Barrow. Barrow is

afforded no relief.

      One avenue of relief under the PCRA is to demonstrate “ineffective

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

Counsel is presumed to be effective, and “the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.”     Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10

A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To satisfy this burden, an appellant must plead and prove by a
      preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his underlying claim is
      of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by
      counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate
      his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness[,] there is
      a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
      proceeding would have been different. Failure to satisfy any prong
      of the test will result in rejection of the appellant’s ineffective
      assistance of counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

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      The PCRA court determined that Barrow failed to satisfy the first prong

of the ineffective assistance of counsel test because Barrow’s assertion that

the exculpatory video exists is speculative. PCRA Court Opinion, at 7.

      Instantly, the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that the

existence of the alleged exculpatory surveillance video of the altercation is

speculative because even if the CCTV footage had been recorded and

preserved, the altercation took place out of view of the cameras. Officer Lewis

testified that on August 15, 2016, he was orchestrating arraignment court

when he, “heard a commotion in the back. And then [he] got up and ran to

the back.” N.T. Jury Trial, 5/11/17, at 157. Officer Lewis testified that the

arraignment area was “about twenty-five feet” away from the pay phone area

and you need to “turn around two corners to get to it.”             Id. at 181.

Additionally, this live feed was for the purpose of carrying out arraignment

court proceedings. Id. at 154 (Officer Lewis testifying that during arraignment

court, “the defendants see the judge on a TV screen and they talk back and

forth”).   Moreover, the Commonwealth stated in its motion to dismiss this

PCRA petition that, “in an abundance of caution, [it] searched all of its records

relating to this case and found no reference to any alleged video recordings

inside the 35th district.”   Commonwealth Motion to Dismiss PCRA Petition,

9/7/21, at 7.

      In light of the foregoing, the PCRA court’s determination that neither

trial nor appellate counsel were ineffective is supported by the record.

Inasmuch as the existence of the alleged exculpatory video of the incident is

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speculative, the trial court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on

this issue. Rivera, supra; Holt, supra.

      Barrow’s   third   issue,   with    three   sub-issues,    alleges   that   his

constitutional rights were violated due to prosecutorial misconduct. Barrow’s

first sub-issue alleges that the Commonwealth violated Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963) in its inadvertent failure to disclose the allegedly

exculpatory video footage. Appellant’s Brief, at 20. Barrow claims the video

is material and favorable because it would provide “irrefutable evidence that

[the victim] was the initial aggressor” during the altercation within in the 35th

Police District or it constitutes impeachment evidence.         Id. at 21. Barrow

concludes there is a reasonable probability the trial would have had a different

outcome had the video been disclosed. Barrow is afforded no relief.

      To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show:                (1) the

Commonwealth suppressed evidence either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the

evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was

material.   Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 887 (Pa. 2002),

citing Brady, supra at 87. Evidence is favorable to the defendant where, “if

disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction

and acquittal.” Chambers, supra at 888. Additionally, “when the reliability

of a witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, non-disclosure of

evidence effecting that witness’ credibility runs afoul of [Brady’s] disclosure

requirement.” See Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1272 (Pa.

1992). In Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme

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Court stated, “The Commonwealth cannot violate Brady by suppressing

evidence that does not exist.” Id. at 891, citing Commonwealth v. Lewis,

743 A.2d 907 (Pa. 2000) (no Brady violation where Commonwealth did not

have information requested).

       As discussed above, Barrow’s claim that video evidence exists is

completely speculative.       The Commonwealth found no video records from

inside the 35th Police District. Additionally, as per Officer Lewis’ testimony,

even if footage of arraignment court was preserved, the altercation took place

out of view of the camera. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in denying

Barrow’s alleged Brady violation without an evidentiary hearing. Heilman,

supra.

       Barrow’s second and third subclaims allege that the Commonwealth

committed prosecutorial misconduct by presenting perjured testimony and

failing to prove his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt, respectively. Upon

a review of the record, we determine that although neither of these claims

were discussed in the trial court opinion, the record is complete and, thus,

there is no need to remand. Commonwealth v. Flemister, 946 MDA 2021

(Pa. Super. filed May 16, 2022).11
____________________________________________

11In Flemister, this Court remanded the record to the PCRA court having sua
sponte raised the possibility that the petitioner was serving an illegal sentence
where the sentencing transcript made no mention of the merger between the
petitioner’s attempted murder and aggravated assault convictions. The Court
remanded to permit the PCRA to determine whether the record explained the
sentence and to answer the merger question and to allow parties to file
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       To be eligible for collateral relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must

demonstrate that his conviction or sentence resulted from one of the

circumstances listed in the eligibility provision, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).

Petitioner must also demonstrate that the issues raised have not been

previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544. An issue is previously

litigated if “the highest court in which the petitioner could have had review as

a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue; or . . . . [the issue] has

been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction

or sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2) and (3). An issue is waived “if the

petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial . . . . on

appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b);

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 74 (Pa. 2014) (“[A]ny claim

deriving from an event at trial could have been challenged at trial and raised

on direct appeal. To the extent such a claim was not raised at trial, it is waived

under the PCRA.”).

       Barrow’s second sub-claim alleges that the Commonwealth committed

prosecutorial misconduct where it permitted perjured testimony. Specifically,

Barrow claims that the Commonwealth was “provided ample evidence [] to

question the validity of all of the [victim’s] statements” because the victim

was proven to be the initial aggressor in the first incident between the two

____________________________________________

supplemental briefs addressing the legality of sentencing issue.           Unlike in
Flemister, the record is complete with regard to these issues.

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men, although the victim’s initial statement to the police indicated otherwise.

Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Barrow’s claim is meritless.

       Barrow cites to Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) for the

proposition that the protection of false testimony extends to witness

credibility. In Napue, the witness, who had been serving a 199-year sentence

for the same murder for which the petitioner had been on trial, falsely testified

that the prosecutor did not offer the witness a reduction in sentence in

exchange for the witness’ testimony. Id. at 265. There, the United States

Supreme Court determined that the failure of a prosecutor to correct the

testimony of the witness which he knew to be false denied the petitioner due

process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States. Id. at 265, 271. Accordingly, this claim is reviewable

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i).12

       However, unlike in Napue, Barrow does not demonstrate why or how

the Commonwealth knows the victim perjured regarding the incident in the

35th Police District. Inasmuch as Barrow relies on the alleged video evidence

of the incident, the Commonwealth searched for the video and did not find it.

Further, even if the victim lied regarding who was the initial aggressor during

____________________________________________

12 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i), a claim is cognizable on collateral
review if the conviction or sentence resulted from “[a] violation of the
Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
could have taken place.”

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the first incident, it has no bearing on whether the Commonwealth knew the

victim’s testimony had been untruthful.

      Moreover, the record shows that the victim conceded that he was the

initial aggressor during the first incident. The victim’s statement to the police,

while in Officer Genio Santiago’s police vehicle on the way to the 35th Police

District, indicated that the victim confronted Barrow.      See N.T. Jury Trial,

5/11/17, at 46 (Officer Genio Santiago of the Philadelphia Police Department

testifying that victim conceded he confronted Barrow regarding victim’s stolen

firearm); id. at 89 (victim testifying he “approached” Barrow outside Barrow’s

home).

      In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not err in dismissing Barrow’s

claim that the Commonwealth permitted the victim’s perjured testimony

without an evidentiary hearing.

      Barrow’s third sub-claim contends that the Commonwealth failed to

prove his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Barrow claims

that the victim’s testimony was unsupported by any factual evidence and

Officer Lewis did not testify as to who initiated the altercation at the police

station. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22. Barrow is afforded no relief.

      Here,   Barrow   appealed    his   witness   intimidation   and   retaliation

convictions on sufficiency and weight of the evidence grounds on direct

appeal, and, thus, these are previously litigated. Barrow, 227 A.3d at 9 (this

Court affirming Barrow’s judgment of sentence); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9544(a)(2). Additionally, although Barrow did not challenge his simple assault

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conviction on direct appeal, he could have, and, thus, it is waived.13 See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b), see also Barrow, 227 A.3d at 4 n.2 (“[Barrow] does

not challenge in any respect his simple assault conviction.”). See Blakeney,

supra.

       In light of the foregoing, the PCRA court’s determination that neither

trial nor appellate counsel were ineffective or that the Commonwealth

committed prosecutorial misconduct is supported by the record. Holt, supra;

Smith, supra.        Additionally, the PCRA court did not err in denying an

evidentiary hearing because, inasmuch as Barrow’s claim that video evidence

exists is completely speculative, there are no genuine issues of material fact

and Barrow’s claim lacks any merit. Maddrey, supra; Bennett, supra.

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2023

____________________________________________

13 Additionally, Barrow does not argue that direct appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge his conviction for simple assault on grounds
of sufficiency.

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