Court Opinion

ID: 9486669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:55:47.873008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:51.743372
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES,
dissenting.
The majority today finds that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) limits Wright’s recovery to $1000 per proceeding as opposed to per violation. Because I continue to adhere to my original reading of the statute, see Wright v. Finance Service of Norwalk, 996 F.2d 820 (6th Cir.1993), vacated on grant of rehearing, 996 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.1993), I respectfully dissent.
The FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) states: (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchap-ter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to [actual damages; and]
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, [damages for named plaintiffs as in (A); and damages for other class members up to a prescribed limit.]
The majority reads this “in the case of any action” language of ,§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) to impose a per proceeding, and not a per violation, limit. It finds that the language of the statute and the legislative history support this conclusion. I disagree.
When attempting to divine the true meaning of a statute, it is well settled that the statutory language must be read in context and not in isolation. Oates v. Oates, 866 F.2d 203, 206 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1109, 109 S.Ct. 3163, 104 L.Ed.2d 1025 *653(1989). Thus, the language of § 1692k(a)(2)(A) must be read in accord with the language of the entire section. In context, the phrase “in the case of any action,” which the majority finds to apply a per proceeding limitation on liability, is actually nothing more than a distinguishing clause meant to set off individual actions from class actions. Section 1692k(a) addresses civil liability in the context of two distinct types of suits. Specifically, § 1692k(a)(2)(A) deals with individual actions, while § 1692k(a)(2)(B) confronts liability in class actions.
Given that the phrase, “in the ease of any action by an individual,” serves only to differentiate between the statute’s treatment of class actions and individual actions, I find that one must then return to the introductory language of § 1692k(a) to ascertain the object of the $1000 limitation, which is enunciated in § 1692k(a)(2)(A). This introductory language imposes liability on a collector for violations of the Act. Thus, violations are the object to which the $1000 limitation must attach.
Both the legislative history and the articulated purpose of the FDCPA support the conclusion that the $1000 limit applies per violation. The purpose of the FDCPA is
to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The legislative history reveals a similarly broad desire to remedy debt collection abuse, which is a “widespread and serious national problem.” S.Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696. Reading the statutory language to apply a per violation limit of $1000 would best serve these broad goals. However, the majority’s holding today will likely achieve an opposite result.
Because Congress has designated consumers as the primary watchdogs over FDCPA violations, a per proceeding limit of $1000 unwisely frustrates the FDCPA’s broadly stated goals. The meager financial benefit for bringing suits that the majority’s holding imposes will discourage consumers from expending the energy necessary to pursue FDCPA claims.
Moreover, the majority’s holding in the instant case invites an even greater harm. The majority’s refusal to apply the $1000 limit to each violation illogically rewards unscrupulous collectors who, having engaged in an initial violation during attempts to collect on a particular debt, continue with their abusive practices. Applying a flat $1000 ceiling to any one proceeding, regardless of the number of violations involved, means that as the number of violations increases the cost per violation to the collector decreases. I cannot agree that this is a correct result; accordingly, I respectfully dissent.