Court Opinion

ID: 9945720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:04:10.18804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.577940
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 28, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
                             ________________

                             No. 3D22-937
              Lower Tribunal Nos. F09-41142 & F10-10288
                          ________________

                             Michael Johnson,
                                Appellant,

                                     vs.

                           The State of Florida,
                                Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Robert T.
Watson, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Nicholas A. Lynch, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and GORDO, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
      Michael Johnson appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation in

lower tribunal case numbers F09-41142 and F10-10288. In his initial brief,

Johnson raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred by failing to

enter written orders revoking his probation. 1 After Johnson filed his notice of

appeal, but before the appellate record was docketed, the trial court entered

two written orders revoking Johnson’s probation, nunc pro tunc to the date

the court revoked Johnson’s probation and sentenced him. 2 It, therefore,

appears that that the trial court’s entry of these written, probation revocation

orders has mooted Johnson’s only appellate argument.

      The probation revocation orders, though, fail to specify the evidence

relied on by the trial court and the court’s reasons for revoking Johnson’s

probation. This was error. “The probationer it entitled . . . [to] a written

statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for

revoking probation.” McCloud v. State, 653 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA

1995) (quoting Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985)); see King v.

1
  See Ward v. State, 306 So. 3d 1004, 1005 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“When
. . . the trial court has failed to enter any written order of revocation, this Court
has, on plenary appeal, consistently granted relief in the form of a remand
with directions for the trial court to enter a written order of revocation.”).
2
  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.600(a) (providing the trial court with concurrent
jurisdiction to render orders on procedural matters relating to the appeal prior
to the docketing of the appellate record).

                                         2
State, 46 So. 3d 1171, 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“If a trial court revokes a

defendant’s probation, the court is required to render a written order noting

the specific conditions of probation that were violated.”). We, therefore,

reverse the written probation revocation orders, and remand to the trial court

with directions to enter corrected probation revocation orders that contain

the required written statements. Upon entry of the corrected orders, Johnson

– if he so chooses – may appeal the corrected, probation revocation orders.

Id. 3

        Reversed and remanded.

3
  In Thomas v. State, 585 So. 2d 475, 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), this Court
affirmed a similarly deficient, probation revocation order on the Court’s
review of the relevant hearing transcripts, refusing the defendant’s request
that the Court remand for entry of “a written order specifying the reasons for
revocation.” We distinguish Thomas for two reasons. First, Johnson’s
counsel – the Miami-Dade Public Defender’s Office – apparently did not
receive copies of the revocation orders prior to filing Johnson’s initial brief.
Indeed, the probation revocation orders are not in the appellate record
prepared by the lower court clerk. Consequently, unlike in Thomas, Johnson
did not have the appropriate opportunity to challenge the revocation of his
probation in his briefing to this Court. Second, unlike here, “[t]here is no
indication that in Thomas the [written finding] requirements of Black v.
Romano were called to the court’s attention.” McCloud, 653 So. 2d at 455,
n.2. Given the circumstances presented here, we find Thomas inapplicable
to the instant appeal.

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