Court Opinion

ID: 9417780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:36:41.478432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:49.706113
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Shiras
dissenting in part, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice McKenna concurred.
In the opinion and judgment of the 'court, in so far as they affirm the decree of the Circuit Court restraining the state officers from seizing property shipped into the State of South Carolina from the State of California by the complainant for residents of South Carolina on their order for their own use, I fully concur. But the reasons which lead me to so concur constrain me to withhold my assent from that portion of said opinion and judgment which reverses the decree below, in respect that it restrained such officers from levying upon and confiscating property of the complainant shipped into the State to agents for the purpose of being stored and sold therein in original packages.
. In the few observations I shall submit it will be assumed, as well settled, that before the passage of the act of August 8, 1890, known as the Wilson Act, it was not within the power of any State to forbid the importation of wines and liquors from foreign countries or other States, nor. their sale in the original packages, nor to subject such sale to discriminatory taxes or regulations. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; Bowman v. Chicago Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, 507; *458Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161.
The case before us, therefore, turns upon the proper construction and application of that statute.
Since its passage it, has been considered by this court in two-cases, and the conclusions therein reached will now be pointed out.
In the case of In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, the question for' ■adjudication was the validity of a constitutional provision of. the State of Kansas; which provided that “ the manufacture- and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes,” and of certain statutes of that State which declared that “ any person or persons who shall manufacture, sell or barter any spirituous, malt, vinous, fermented or other intoxicating liquors shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished as hereinafter provided : Provided, however, That’ such liquors may be^ sold' for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes as provided in this act; ” and it was held that, in the case of a person arrested by the state authorities for selling imported liquor on the 9th.day of August, 1890, contrary to the law of the- State which forbade the sale, the act of Congress which had gone into effect on the 8th day of August, 1890, providing that imported liquors should be subject to the operation and effect of the state laws to the same extent and in the same manner as though the liquors had been produced in the State, justified the imposition of the penalties of the . state law.
It will be perceived that this was a case in which the state laws .wholly prohibited the manufacture, and sale of intoxicating liquors as articles of ordinary consumption and merchandise; and this court said, referring to the Wilson bill, Congress did not use terms of permission to the State to act, but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to' imported- packages in their original condition. . .. It imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but állowed imported property to fall at once upon1 arrival within the local jurisdiction.”
*459In Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, was presented the question of the validity of the act of the general assembly of South Carolina, approved January 2, 1895, generally known' as the State Dispensary Law. That legislation did not forbid the use, manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, but enacted an elaborate system of regulation, whereby no wines or liquors, except domestic wines, should be manufactured or sold except through the agency of a state board of control, a commissioner and certain county dispensers, and after an inspection by a state chemist.
Packages of wines and liquors made in other States and imported by a resident of the State for his own use, and in the possession of railroad companies which, as common carriers, had brought the packages within the State, were seized and confiscated as contraband by constables of the State.
■ This court, after considering certain provisions of the act which relieved the sale of domestic wines from restrictions imposed upon imported wines and also those which created a system of inspection, said —
“This is not a law purporting to forbid the importation, manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating liquors, as articles detrimental to the welfare of the State and to the health of its inhabitants, and hence is not .within the scope and operation of the act of Congress of August 8, 1890. That law was not intended to confer upon any State the power to discriminate injuriously against the products of other States in articles whose manufacture and use are not forbidden, and which are therefore the subjects of legitimate commerce. When that law provided that ‘ all fermented, distilled oe. intoxicating liquors, transported into any State or Territory, remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage therein, should, upon arrival in such State or Territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had-been produced in such State or Territory, and should not; be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages .or otherwise,’ evidently equality or uniform*460ity of treatment under state laws was intended. The question whether a given state law is a lawful exercise of the police power is still open, and must remain open, to this court. Such a law may forbid entirely the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and be valid. Or it may provide equal regulations for the inspection and sale of all domestic and imported liquors and be valid. But the State cannot, -under the Congressional legislation referred to, establish a system .which, in effect, discriminates between interstate and domestic commerce in .commodities to make and use which- are-admitted to be lawful. ■ . ... It is sufficient for the present- casfe to hold, as we do, that when a State recognizes the manufacture, sale and use"of intoxicating liquors as lawful, it cannot discriminate against the bringing of such articles in and importing them from other States; that such legislation is void as a hindrance to Interstate Cominerce and an unjust preference of the products of the enacting State as against similar products of the other States.”
Accordingly the conclusion reached was that, as respected residents • of the State of South Carolina desiring to import foreign wines and liquors for their own use, the act in question in that case was void.
• In the present case, which arose under a later statute, this court follows Scott v. Donald in holding that the act is .invalid as sought to be applied to the importation by residents of the State for their own use, but holds that the residents of other 'States' cannot import wines and liquors and sell them in the original packages, although such articles are recognized by ■ the State as lawful subjects of manufacture, use and sale.
The court concedes that it is not within the power of the .State, even, when reinforced by the act of Congress of August, T890, to deprive a resident of one State of the right to ship liquor into “another State to a resident for his own use, “ because such right is derived from the Constitution of the United States, and does not rest on the grant of the state law,” yet holds that the act of South Carolina can validly declare that all liquors imported from other States, for the purpose of sale •in original packages, can be seized and confiscated, the com*461mon carrier thereof subjected to fine, and the consignee, if he removes the liquors from the depot or pays freight or express charges thereon, subjected to a fine of five hundred dollars, and to an imprisonment of twelve months at hard labor in the state penitentiary.
Such legislation manifestly forbids Interstate Commerce in articles whose manufacture and sale within the State are permitted, and, in view of the previous decisions of this court, can only be defended by invoking the provisions of the act of Congress. This seems to be the theory upon which the opinion of the majority proceeds, as shown, by the following' statement: “ The claim that the state statute is unconstitutional because it deprives of the right to sell imported liquors in the original packages, rests on the assumption that, the state law is a regulation of Interstate Commerce, because it forbids the doing of an act which, in consequence of the permissive grant resulting from the act of Congress, the State had undoubtedly the lawful power to do. Indeed, the entire argument by which it is endeavored to maintain the contention arises from excluding from view the change as to the sale of intoxicating liquors arising from the act of Congress.”
But, if the act of Congress can validly operate to authorize the State to forbid the sale in original packages of imported articles of the same kind with those whose manufacture and sale within the State are permitted and regulated, I am unable to see why it cannot also operate to authorize the State to forbid the importation for use. Once concede that it is competent for Congress to abdicate its control over Interstate Commerce in articles whose manufacture, sale and use are lawful within the State, and to confer upon the State the power to forbid importation of such articles for sale, it must follow that it would equally be competent for Congress to authorize the State to forbid the importation of such articles for use. And, conversely, if it be not competent for Congress to authorize a State to forbid the importation for use of articles whose use in domestic commerce is lawful, so it would not be competent for Congress to authorize a State to forbid the importation-for sale of articles whose sale in domestic commerce is lawful.
*462I am altogether unwilling, to attribute to Congress an indention to abandon the protection of Interstate Commerce in articles of food or drink, whether for personal use or for sale, where similar articles are treated by a State as lawful subjects of domestic commerce. If such were the intention of Congress in the act of August, 1890, I should be compelled to regard such legislation as invalid. The control and regulation of foreign and interstate commerce are among the most important powers possessed by the National legislature, and, as has often been said by this court, were among the most potent causes which led to the establishment of the Constitution. The conceded purpose of protecting commerce from hostile action between the States would be defeated if Congress could withdraw from the exercise of its powers in such matters, and turn them over to the legislatures of the States.
But there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended any such act of abdication in the present instance. Reasonable. meaning and effect can' be given to the act of August 8, 1890, without giving it such a construction as would raise the serious question of its constitutionality.
Its plain meaning is that, if, in the bona fide exercise of its police power, the State finds it necessary to declare that all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquor is of a detrimental character, and that its use and consumption are against the morals, good health and safety of its inhabitants, it may legislate, on that assumption, with equal effect us to such liquor whether imported or of domestic manufacture. Such legislation may take the form of total prohibition, and be valid, as we held in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, under a statute of the State of Kansas. The articles prohibited Ivere thus taken out of the sphere of commerce, whether interstate or domestic, and no discriminations were thereby made or attempted adversely to the persons or property of other States.
Or the legislation may seek to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, and if the regulations are reasonable, in the fair exercise of the police power, applicable alike to articles imported and to those' made in the State, their • validity may well be sustained, without infringing upon the Federal control of Interstate Commerce.-
*463Thus if the State of South Carolina, instead of prohibiting the sale of imported liquors in imported packages altogether and confiscating them to her own use, had seen fit to prescribe reasonable regulations of the sale ■ — • such, for instance, as forbade its taking place on Sunday, or in the night time, or to be drunk on the premises, or to be made'to minors, and if such regulations likewise applied to the sale of domestic liquors — then the case might be deemed to fall within the proper exercise of the police power.
Far different is the nature of the provisions of these acts of South Carolina. They do not pretend to forbid either the use, manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. They do not provide a reasonable system of inspection, calculated to protect the public from imposition. They do not seek to subject the. sale to reasonable regulations, but do contain provisions which, if carried into effect, would wholly prevent the makers and owners of wines and liquors made in. foreign countries or in the other States from exercising the right of free commerce under the-Constitution. ’At the most, it can only be said that such persons can be permitted to send their property into South Carolina for sale if the state authorities think fit to allow them that privilege.
Nor, even if allowed this restricted privilege of importation, are they permitted to sell their property for what it is worth in the market, because they can sell only through a. county dispenser, who is compelled to give a bond in the penal sum of three thousand- dollars, conditioned that he will not 'sell intoxicating liquors at a price other than that fixed by the state board of control. This provision- not merely hampers the citizens of the other States in their exercise of the right of trade and commerce, but deprives the residents of the State of the right to purchase articles of a commercial character at prices regulated by open competition.
It may be said that such a construction of the act' of Congress would deprive it of actual operation — that the power and laws of the States would be left just as they were before its passage. But, not infrequently, courts have said that there are statutes that are merely declaratory of the law as *464it previously existed. And such declaratory statutes are not without value when they serve to elucidate existing law, or to remove uncertainty when decisions or prior enactments are supposed to corifliot. The act in question may well be regarded as a legislative attempt to define the boundaries between Federal and state powers in respect to interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors ; and this court, in the cases of In re Rahrer and of Scott v. Donald, and in the recent case of Rhodes v. Iowa, ante, 412, has so treated it. But it cannot, as I think, be either interpreted or sustained as an effort to transfer the regulative control in matters of Interstate Commerce from the Nation to the States.
The opinion of the majority, as I read it, fails to recognize frequent and well considered decisions of this court, and seems to justify a brief reference to them.
In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, an act of the State of Maryland imposing penalties on all importers of foreign articles or commodities, including wines and spirituous liquors, if they should sell the same wfithout having first procured a license from the state authorities, was held repugnant to the .provision of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that “ no State shall, "without consent of Congress, lay any impost, or duty on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,” and to that which declares that Congress shall have power “ to regulate commerce "with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.” In the course of his reasoning Chief Justice Marshall said: “ The object of the Constitution would be as completely defeated by a power-to tax the article in the hands of the importer the instant it was landed, as by a power to tax it while entering the port. There is no difference, in effect, between a' power to prohibit the sale of an article and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold.”- ■ •
And again : “ If this power to regulate commerce reaches the interior of a State, and may be there exercised, it must *465be capable of authorizing the sale of those articles which' it introduces. Commerce is intercourse; one of. its most ordinary ingredients is traffic. It is inconceivable that the power to authorize this traffic, when given in the most comprehensive terms, with the intent that its efficacy should be complete, should cease at the point when, its continuance is indispensable to its value. To what purpose should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorize a sale of the thing imported ? Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as-a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorize importation, but to authorize the importer to sell. . . . The power claimed by the State is, in its nature, in conflict with that given to Congress; and the greater or less extent in which it may be exercised does not enter into the inquiry concerning its existence.”
Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, was a case wherein was brought into question the validity of a statute of the State of Michigan, which imposed a tax or duty on persons who, not having their principal place of business within the State, engage in the business of selling liquors, to be shipped into the State; and it was held that a discriminating tax imposed by a State, operating to the disadvantage of products of other States when introduced into the first mentioned State, is, in effect, a regulation of commerce between the States, and as such a usurpation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. Replying to the contention on behalf of the statute, that it was passed in the exercise of the police power of the State, Mr. Justice Bradley said: “ This would be a perfect justification of the act if it did not discriminate against the. citizens and products of other States in a matter of commerce between the States, and thus usurp one of the prerogatives of the national legislature. The police power cannot be set up to control the inhibitions of the Fed*466eral Constitution, or the powers of the United States Government created thereby.*’
In Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, it was. held that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all by a State, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the State.
A law.of the State of Iowa forbidding any common carrier from bringing within that State, for any person or corporation, any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory, without a, permit from the state authorities, was held void in the case of Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 125 U. S. 465, and the court, through Mr. Justice Matthews, said : “ Here is the- limit between the sovereign power of the State and the Federal. power. That is to say, that which does not .belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police •power of the State, and that which does belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of the United States. . . . The same process of legislation and reasoning adopted by the State and its courts would bring within the police power any article of consumption that a State might wish to exclude,' whether to' that which was drank or to food and clothing.”
'By- an act passed in 1871, the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia subjected persons selling imported goods without a license to penalties, and this act was held invalid in Stoutenburg v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141; and in disposing of the contention that Congress' must be regarded as having authorized or adopted this legislation, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said: “In our judgment Congress, for the reasons given, could not have delegated the power to enact the third clause of the twenty-first section of the act of assembly, construed to include business agents such as Hennick; and there ,is nothing in this record to justify the assumption that it endeavored to do so, for the powers granted to the District were municipal merely, and although by several acts Congress rej pealed or modified parts of this particular by-law, these parts ’ were separably operative and such as were within the scope of municipal action, so that this Congressional legislation can*467not be resorted to as ratifying tbe objectionable clause, irrespective of the inability to ratify that which could not have been originally authorized.” •
In Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, this court held invalid a statute of the State of Minnesota, which made it a matter of fine or imprisonment for any one to sell any fresh beef, mutton, lamb or pork which had not been inspected in a manner prescribed in the act. Eeferring to the contention, in behalf of the State, that there was no discrimination against the products and business of other States for the reason that the statute requiring an inspection of animals on the hoof, as a condition for the privilege of selling in the State, was applicable alike to all owners of such animals, whether citizens of Minnesota or citizens of other States, this court, through Mr. Justice Harlan, said : “ To this we answer that a statute may, upon its face, apply equally to the people of all the States, and yet be a regulation of Interstate Commerce which a State may not establish. A burden imposed by a State upon Interstate Commerce is not to be sustained simply because the statute imposing it applies alike to the people of all the States, including the people of the State enacting such statute. The people of Minnesota have as much right to protection against the enactments of that State, interfering with the freedom of commerce among the States, as have the people of other States. Although this'statute is not avowedly, or in terms, directed against the bringing into Minnesota of the products of other States, its necessary effect is to burden or affect commerce with other States, as involved in the transportation into that State, for the purposes of sale there, of all fresh beef, veal, mutton or pork, however free from disease may have been the animals from which it was taken.”
We did not find it necessary in Scott v. Donald to pass upon the validity of a scheme whereby...a State should seek to establish itself as a trader in articles of commerce, and to punish as criminals all persons who should attempt to deal in such articles. Nor has the court seen fit to'discuss that question in the present case. ' It may be that, if confined to articles of *468state production, such a scheme might not be open to objections on Federal, grounds. But where a State proposes to create a monopoly in articles which its own legislation recognizes as proper subjects of manufacture, sale and use, and where those'articles are a part of international and Interstate Commerce, it is, I submit, too plain to call for argument that such an attempt does not comport with that freedom of trade and commerce, to preserve which is one of the most important purposes of our Federal system.
If these views are sound, then the acts of South Carolina in question, in so far as they seek to prevent citizens of that State from importing for their own use wines and liquors," and to arbitrarily forbid, and not by reasonable regulations, control sales of such articles when imported, are void as an unconstitutional interference with Interstate Commerce.
-I think the'decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice McKenna concur in the views of this opinion.