Court Opinion

ID: 9565723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:26:31.629512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:51.031688
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse this case solely on the basis of an instruction which provided, in essence, that the *53plaintiff (Van Burén) had a duty to drive on the right side of an unmarked road where another driver was “proceeding in the opposite direction.” This instruction was more favorable to Van Burén than the actual state of the law. This is so because, in Virginia, a driver must drive on the right side of the road whether or not another driver is proceeding in the opposite direction. See Code § 46.1-203.
The defendant (Simmons) contended that Van Burén could not recover because Van Burén crossed the half way point of the unmarked road and caused the collision. In asserting this defense, Simmons sought an instruction explaining Van Buren’s duty to drive on the right half of the roadway.
Van Burén, however, proved that Simmons had not fully entered the roadway at the time of the accident. Thus, Van Burén correctly points out that Simmons was not “proceeding in the opposite direction” at the time of the collision. This fact may be conceded, but it has no legitimate bearing on the proper disposition of this appeal.
The actual instruction, as granted, allowed Van Burén to argue that because Simmons was not fully in the road proceeding in the opposite direction, Van Burén was not required to drive to the right side of the road. Under the correct instruction, Van Burén could not have made this argument. Indeed, under the correct instruction Van Burén would have been clearly negligent for failing to drive on her side of the road.
The majority assumes that the jury might somehow have been confused by the instruction. But I submit that the only possible confusion would have favored Van Burén, the plaintiff. Thus, we have a situation where a plaintiff, armed with an instruction more favorable than the law would properly allow, nevertheless lost in a jury trial. This case is a perfect demonstration of the wisdom of Code § 8.01-678, which provides that not every defect in a trial warrants a reversal; the statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
When it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached, no judgment shall be arrested or reversed:
2. For any other defect, imperfection, or omission in the record, or for any error committed on the trial.
*54(Emphasis added.)
In my opinion, to grant a new trial in a case of this kind is a wholesale waste of judicial resources. On the next go round, the plaintiff will no doubt confront a properly drawn instruction which will be less favorable. If she could not prevail under the most favorable conditions, she should not be given a chance to try again under less favorable conditions. Given the fact that the majority correctly rejected plaintiff’s contention that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and given the altogether favorable language of the instruction complained of by plaintiff, I would end this matter here and now by affirming the judgment of the trial court.
RUSSELL, J., joins in dissent.