Court Opinion

ID: 9484127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:41:33.267559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:02.359997
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, with whom RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge and BOWMAN, MAGILL, and MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, join.
I would reverse the district court and remand this case for further proceedings. Subject to the requirements of the panel opinion, In re Motion to Unseal Electronic Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.1992), now vacated by the court en banc, I would unseal the electronic surveillance evidence and make it available to Smith. My reasons are set forth in the panel opinion which is incorporated in this dissent by reference.
The court’s opinion introduces to this circuit a new concept of legislative interpretation: look not to the statutory language, look instead to the rest of the title into which the words are placed and, remarkably, look to “ ‘the legislative struggle leading to its enactment.’ ” Court’s Opinion, supra at 1017 (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir.1984) (NBC)). I suggest that this approach has permitted the court to base its opinion not on the language of the law or on commonly accepted principles of statutory construction, but on the court’s own notion of acceptable public policy.1 Whether or not one agrees *1021with the philosophies expressed by the majority is unimportant. What is important is that the opinion implements policy decisions not within the powers delegated to this court.
In analyzing the court’s approach, I examine the general rules of law dealing with evidentiary exclusions. I also look to accepted tools of statutory construction ordinarily employed by the federal courts.
There is no argument that the wiretaps at issue very likely contain information that may lead to evidence relevant to this civil RICO dispute. Thus, any construction of section 2517(3) and Title III that serves to obscure facts or hinder their discovery is contrary to long accepted policy formulations. The Supreme Court stated in Trammel v. United States, that:
[testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that “the public ... has a right to every man’s evidence.” United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331[, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884] (1950). As such, they must be strictly construed and accepted “only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1454, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 912, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980).
The Supreme Court also looked at limitations on evidence gathering in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), and concluded that “[w]hatever their origins [constitutional, statutory, or common law], these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.” Id. at 710, 94 S.Ct. at 3108.
Perhaps more to the point in light of the court’s discussion of the legislative findings of Title III is the idea that federal courts will not create an evidentiary roadblock where Congress has debated the issue but failed to specifically provide one itself. In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990), the Court stated that “[w]e are especially reluctant to recognize a[n] [evidentiary] privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.” Id. at 189, 110 S.Ct. at 582. “The balancing of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a legislative function.” Id. The Court refused to create a privilege to protect from discovery the peer review process of universities. The Court relied on the fact that the exemption for educational institutions’ employment decisions contained in Title VII when originally enacted in 1964 was eliminated by section 3 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The Court found that section 3 evidenced Congress’ considered judgment after debating the issues and that the Court should not suggest that Congress was oblivious to concerns of academic autonomy when it abandoned the exemption. Id. at 190, 110 S.Ct. at 582. A similar situation exists in this case with amended language of Title III having been adopted in conjunction with new RICO enactments. The proper analysis and interplay of these amendments was discussed in the panel opinion.
With a wave of its judicial wand, the court makes this well established policy disappear. This action seems to be based upon the notion that the court must protect “conversational privacy.” . Pronouncements that create “a sweeping exclusionary rule,” Court’s Opinion, supra at 1018, and require *1022“greater clarity on the part of Congress,” id., before wiretap materials may be unsealed for private use are not, however, supported by the language or the history of the wiretap act
The court contends that section 2515 changes the usual axiom that evidence is available unless specifically protected by a rule of exclusion to a contrary rule that states that wiretap material is not available unless its use is explicitly and specifically authorized by section 2517. This analysis not only misreads section 2515 but also ignores, as I will later show, more important policy decisions underlying the Act. Once you have moved past the exclusionary rule in section 2515 to the “disclosure and use” rules of section 2517, there is no reason not to apply the teachings of Trammel, Nixon, and EEOC.
In addition to casting a blind eye toward this policy, the court has ignored the usual tools of statutory construction. Of the argument that the words of section 2517(3) provide for the requested disclosure, the court says: “this ‘argument based on the language of section 2517(3) has a surface plausibility, but only if one concentrates on the language alone and ignores the rest of Title III and the legislative struggle leading to its enactment.’ ” Court’s Opinion, supra at 1017 (quoting NBC, 735 F.2d at 53). Of course, our cases require concentration on the language of a statute. This circuit has said that “the language of the statute itself must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, when we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.” In re Erickson Partnership, 856 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.1988) (citations omitted).
I concede that ascertainment of the plain meaning of the statute may require a look at the particular language at issue, here section 2517(3), in conjunction with the language and design of the statute as a whole. See Bethesda Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403-05, 108 S.Ct. 1255, 1258-59, 99 L.Ed.2d 460 (1988). Even taking the court’s look at the “rest of Title III,” it is difficult to see the need to go beyond the words of the subsection. Assuming, however, for the purpose of fair consideration of the court’s position that there is statutory ambiguity, the interpretation still fails.
The court contends that the language of the statute as a whole leads to the conclusion that section 2517(3) precludes the discovery sought by Smith. It relies upon irrelevant portions of Title III as a basis for this argument. It cites Justice Bran-déis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States for the proposition that Title III was enacted to protect privacy in the use of telephone lines:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of one man’s telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76, 48 S.Ct. 564, 571, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). The court then cites a purported finding of Congress as follows:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and supervision of the authorizing court. Interception of wire and oral communications should further be limited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories of crime with assurances that the interception is justified and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused.
Title III — Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance: Findings, Pub.L. 90-351, § 801(d), 82 Stat. 211, 211.(1968).
While these findings may underscore the need for the wiretap procedures required by Title III, they have little to do with this case. Congress was more concerned in 1968 about who was engaging in wiretaps *1023than about the fruits of lawfully conducted interceptions. See S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2154. Individuals have an important privacy interest in not being the subject of a wiretap investigation at all unless certain requirements are met. Congress provided strict up-front protections against unwarranted or improper wiretaps.2 After an individual’s original privacy interest has been overridden and a wiretap has been conducted pursuant to the requirements of Title III, the individual’s interest in preventing use of the wiretap in civil litigation is less compelling. Congress intended to protect the innocent, not to place privacy concerns above the search for truth. That explains why in section 2517 Congress permitted use of wiretap evidence through testimony given under oath in a “proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdivision,” subsection (3), after approval of its use “by a judge of competent jurisdiction,” subsection (5).
There is no dispute about the propriety of the wiretaps involving Lipton and the Webbes. They were fully within the requirements of Title III. See Court’s Opinion, supra at 1016 n. 1. The court so far misplaces Congress’ concerns about individual privacy that its decision does violence to the language of the statute.
Another shortcoming in the court’s use of Title III findings is dramatized by our holding in In re Prines, 867 F.2d 478 (8th Cir.1989). In Prines, preamble language inconsistent with amended language of the Act was disregarded because, as here, the preamble dealt with an earlier version of the law. The congressional findings the court relies on to support its inference that privacy interests confine wiretap evidence to use by the government in civil actions were made two years before Congress enacted the public law which both amended section 2517(3) to delete “any criminal proceeding” and provided for private civil RICO remedies. In 1970, Congress was concerned with giving private litigants who were injured by RICO violations the necessary tools to recompense their injuries. Congress directed the courts that RICO “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” Pub.L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). The Supreme Court has recognized that “if Congress’ liberal-construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964 [the private attorneys general provision], where RICO’s remedial purposes are most evident.”3 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 492 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3283 n. 10, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). It is clearly inappropriate to import general expressions of legislative intent in 1968 into an analysis of the amended language of section 2517(3) contained in the 1970 public law that created RICO.
When amended section 2517 is properly analyzed in conjunction with contemporary RICO legislation, as was done in the panel opinion, it is clear that “giving testimony ... in any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdivision,” section 2517(3), includes giving testimony at a deposition proceeding in a private civil RICO case in federal or state court, especially if a witness appears before the designated officer pursuant to subpoena and the wiretap material is produced through a subpoena duc-es tecum. The court grudgingly concedes the possibility that subsection (3) requirements may be met through testimony in open court, but never in a pretrial proceeding. Words in support of such an analysis simply cannot be found in the Act or in its legislative history.4
*1024What the court omits in its discussion is that even in 1968, before Title III was amended, the Senate made it clear that “[t]he major purpose of Title III [was] to combat organized crime.” S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), reprinted, in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157.
Congress expanded on this theme when it authorized private civil RICO actions as a way to combat organized crime. The court attempts to blur this issue by reading into section 2517(3) limitations contained only within 2517(5). The court simply misstates Smith’s argument when it contends that Smith relies on subsection (5) and thus carries into subsection (3) a use limited to criminal offenses. Court’s Opinion, supra at 1017. It cannot be rationally argued that the amended language of the Act limits subsection (3) evidence to criminal proceedings.
After making this narrowing inference, the court then backs away and concedes that wiretap evidence may be used in civil proceedings — but only in very limited instances. Court’s Opinion, supra at 1017. The court's interpretation restricts the use of wiretap evidence in civil cases, if it can be used at all, to only those actions in which the federal government, a state, or a political subdivision of the state is a party. The language and the legislative history of the Act, as amended, contain no such qualification. Indeed, the words used by Congress are designed to make certain that all civil RICO actions are included.
Civil RICO complaints, including private complaints, find venue in both federal and state courts. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990). Accordingly, subsection (3) speaks to “any proceeding held under the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdivision.” 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (emphasis added). This language is modified by the need for approval for use by “a judge of competent jurisdiction.” Subsection (5). Obviously, under the law, even a state court judge to whom a private civil RICO case has been assigned may authorize the use of wiretap materials in “any proceeding” held under the authority of the laws of his or her state. Had Congress intended to limit the use to a “trial” or a “hearing” or a “proceeding” involving only a governmental party, it could have used such limiting words. The court seeks to put in place, erroneously, an evidentiary roadblock that is not warranted by the language or structure of the statute.
At oral argument en banc, Smith reemphasized that the Justice Department and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Missouri have both “stated that they have no objection to the release of the requested portions of the tapes.” Appellant’s Supp. Brief at 4. The court neatly overstates Smith’s argument and then knocks down the overblown proposition. Properly analyzed, the claim, while not dis-positive of the issues in this case, is helpful to a fair interpretation of the statute.
As authorized by statute, the Department of Justice has promulgated rules with regard to production or disclosure of material contained in the files of the Department. 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.21-16.29. There is no dispute that the wiretap materials at issue are in Department files. Under 28 C.F.R. § 16.26, the appropriate Department official and United States Attorney are required, in deciding to approve disclosure, to evaluate “[w]hether disclosure is appropriate under the relevant substantive law concerning privilege.” Obviously, the Department has interpreted section 2517 and Title III as permitting disclosure of the Lipton-Webbe tapes to private litigants and has given its approval. The court, without addressing this departmental interpretation, simply finds “that Title III does not grant the government ... authority [under section 2517(3) ]” to determine whether private litigants may have access to this kind of file material. Court’s Opinion, supra at 8. Of course it doesn’t. A court will ultimately make that decision. But the Justice Department’s interpretation of its own reg-*1025illations and the statute it administers must be accepted unless it is plainly unreasonable. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). To apply its particular gloss to the statute, the court has already had to find section 2517(3) ambiguous. Thus, under Chevron, the Court has limited authority to superimpose its own construction of section 2517(3) (precluding release of the tapes to a private litigant) on the Department if the Department’s construction (permitting release to private litigants) is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court points to nothing except its own perception of a socially correct public policy in finding the Justice Department interpretation unreasonable. Let it be understood, however, that the Department does not, alone, make the decision to release the material. As earlier noted, section 2517 clearly makes use of subsection (3) evidence contingent upon approval “by a judge of competent jurisdiction.” Section 2517(5).
Finally, I have searched in vain for reasoned precedent holding that legislative construction should be bottomed upon “the legislative struggle leading to its enactment.” NBC, 735 F.2d at 53. Such information is simply irrelevant unless it appears in genuine legislative history looked to for resolution of an ambiguity in a statute. There is often fierce debate over the wisdom of controversial policy ideas. When legislation is adopted, the fight is over and the memory of these battles adds little to statutory interpretation. In any event, the legislative struggle referred to in NBC and mentioned in the court’s opinion refers to “a long battle between those who would have altogether prohibited wiretaps and the material obtained thereby and those who wanted to allow the government to use wiretap material in criminal prosecutions.” Id. The “altogether prohibit[ors]” lost and Congress, of course, adopted legislation permitting wiretaps. Then, in 1970, Congress broadened the use of wiretap materials to include civil litigation. Thus, the “legislative struggle” referred to by the court adds nothing to our interpretive task in this case.
The court reaches the wrong result. The district court should be reversed and the case remanded for consideration of those matters required by the vacated panel opinion.

. The court also cites a portion of NBC, 735 F.2d at 54, to infer that, under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), a limited construction of Title III may be necessary to avoid a constitutional issue. Court's Opinion, supra at 1019. If NBC can be *1021read for the proposition that Katz requires a limiting interpretation of Title III, it is wrong. The NBC panel says, "[w]e start from the proposition that use of evidence obtained by wiretapping was broadly banned by Katz." NBC, 735 F.2d at 53. No such proposition appears in Katz, The case applied Fourth Amendment protections to electronic eavesdropping. This resulted in the enactment of Title III. Likewise, nothing in Katz prohibits the fruits of a lawful Fourth Amendment search and seizure from being used in civil litigation and it is not evident that any such prohibition exists in the Fourth Amendment or in federal law.

. The procedures for conducting authorized wiretaps are found in 18 U.S.C. § 2518.

. The author of the court’s opinion cites these concepts with approval in his recent dissent in Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir., 1993).

. The language of section 2515 destroys the court’s contention that “a proceeding held under the authority of the United States or [a] State” does not include pretrial discovery proceedings. Section 2515, as adopted in 1968, refers to receiving evidence "in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court.” 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (emphasis added). This wording better supports the court’s argument with regard to proceedings in “open court” being contemplated by the Act. It is wrong to assume, however, that *1024Congress wished to impose or to continue an “in or before" posture through amended section 2517(3) when it purposely used much broader language in its 1970 amendment to the subsection.