Court Opinion

ID: 9740875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:43:48.270471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.220562
License: Public Domain

TRAPP, J., dissenting: In the adopted opinion the contract is construed to require that defendant arbitrate the issue as to whether the person for whom claim is made was an insured person under the definition contained therein. There appear to be inherent contradictions in the opinion which states both, (1) that the single issue before the trial court is whether or not there is an arbitration agreement, and, (2) that while the contract could have limited the issues to the liability of the hit-and-run driver, it failed so to do. Both of the two paragraphs in the contract in which there is reference to arbitration clearly define and limit the issues to be arbitrated in the following language: (a) A paragraph which the opinion quotes as providing “coverage” in which defendant agrees: “To pay all sums which the Insured or his legal representatives shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an Uninsured Vehicle because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called ‘bodily injury,’ sustained by the Insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such Uninsured Vehicle; provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether the Insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such damages, and if so the amount thereof shall be made by agreement between the Insured or such representative and the Company or, if they fail to agree and the Insured or the Company so demands, by arbitration.” (Emphasis supplied.) In this clause, the adjective “such” is employed to modify “damages,” thus achieving the specificity required by the opinion as to other “matters.” (b) A paragraph providing “Arbitration” is in the following language: “If any person making claim hereunder and the Company do not agree that such person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an Uninsured Vehicle because of bodily injury to the Insured, or do not agree as to< the amount of payment which may be owing under this Section, then, upon written demand of such person or upon written demand of the Company, the matter or matters upon which such person and the Company do not agree shall be settled by arbitration . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Grammatically, in the phrase, “the matter or matters,” the word “the” is used as a function word to indicate that the following noun refers to something previously mentioned or clearly understood from the context. It likewise achieves a high quantum of specificity. As stated in the opinion, Section II does define “Insured,” “Vehicle,” “Uninsured Vehicle” and similar terms. These matters are in separate paragraphs and no reference to arbitration is made concerning any of them. It is apparent that the language of the policy in the paragraph stating when payment is to be made to the insured, and in the paragraph specifically and solely prescribing arbitration, limits the arbitration procedure to the determination of specific factual issues, i. e., (1) whether claimant is “legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an Uninsured Vehicle . . . ,” and, (2) if he is so entitled, the amount to be recovered. In the statutory provision, chapter 73, § 755 (a) (Ill Rev Stats 1965), relating to “uninsured” or “hit-and-run motor vehicle coverage,” there is no language referring to arbitration of disputes in this form of insurance. The Uniform Arbitration Act, section 1. (C 10, § 101 Ill Rev Stats 1965) authorizes an agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration, and further provides that there may be: “. . . a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising “ The term “any” is, of course, distinguishable from the term “all,” as the former means one or more chosen from an undetermined number. The use of arbitration, therefore, is a matter of contract between the parties and it seems axiomatic that parties may contractually designate specific matters without assuming an obligation to arbitrate all matters of a dispute. The Uniform Arbitration Act, § 2(a) provides that if a party claims an agreement to arbitrate, but the other party denies the existence of an agreement, the court shall determine summarily the issues so raised, and, in § 2(b), on a party’s application, the court may stay arbitration proceedings commenced or threatened upon a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. If such issue is properly in dispute, the court shall summarily dispose of it. Defendant’s motion in the trial court for the stay of arbitration proceedings presents an issue not specified as a matter for arbitration, and it is precisely an issue for summary disposition by the trial court under § 2(b) of the Uniform Arbitration Act. The conclusion set out in the opinion that provision for “any” arbitration requires arbitration of “all” controversies under the contract predictably will reduce the use of arbitration procedures, through contract or agreement, to those instances where arbitrable issues can be strictly “all or none.” This determination, in fact, makes § 2 (a) and § 2 (b) of the Uniform Arbitration Act without meaning or application, except in the unlikely event that a party demands arbitration as to a contract which contains no reference whatsoever to arbitration. The opinion has noted authorities consistent with the view expressed in this dissent.