Court Opinion

ID: 9947987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 01:00:37.951091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:49.520347
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30230           Document: 103-1           Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/05/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                   ____________                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                    FILED
                                    No. 23-30230                                March 5, 2024
                                   ____________
                                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                    Clerk
Anthony Monroe,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

Terry Conner, in his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer with
Louisiana State Police; Richard Matthews, in his individual capacity as
a law enforcement officer with the Louisiana State Police; Lamar Davis, in
his official capacity as the Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police;
Chavez Cammon, in his official capacity as records custodian,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 5:21-CV-4063
                   ______________________________

Before Jones, Dennis, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       In Owens v. Okure, the Supreme Court held that a forum state’s
general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims applies to
claims brought under § 1983. 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989). Appellant

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30230             Document: 103-1           Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/05/2024

                                          No. 23-30230

Anthony Monroe challenges the application of Louisiana’s one-year residual
prescriptive period to his police brutality claims found in Article 3492 of the
Louisiana Civil Code. 1 The district court concluded that Monroe’s claims,
filed one year and eleven months after the conduct giving rise to his federal
claims, was time-barred. Because we are bound by precedent, we AFFIRM.
                                                I
        This case involves a routine traffic stop that allegedly ended in
violence after three Louisiana State Police Troopers (collectively
“Defendants”) physically attacked Monroe in Bossier Parish, Louisiana.
According to Monroe’s amended complaint, this brutality caused Monroe to
suffer a heart attack and other severe life-threatening injuries.
        Monroe filed suit one year and eleven months 2 after the incident,
bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. He asserted violations of
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, for excessive force and
conspiracy.        He also brought Monell 3 claims for failure to supervise,
investigate, and decertify officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; aggravated assault
in violation of La. Rev. Stat. § 14:37; aggravated battery in violation of La.
Rev. Stat. § 14:34; and violations of the Louisiana Constitution and the
Records Law, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44.31, for refusal to comply with
document requests.

        _____________________
        1
            In Louisiana, the state legislature sets “prescriptive periods” rather than
“statutes of limitations.” La. Civ. Code art. 3492 (2024) (“Delictual actions are subject
to a liberative prescription of one year.”).
        2
       The attack occurred on November 29, 2019. Monroe filed his complaint
November 24, 2021.
        3
            Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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Case: 23-30230           Document: 103-1          Page: 3       Date Filed: 03/05/2024

                                       No. 23-30230

        Defendants separately moved to dismiss Monroe’s federal claims as
time barred under Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period. In March 2023,
the district court granted the motions to dismiss, dismissing his federal claims
with prejudice and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Monroe’s state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. Monroe
timely filed a notice of appeal on April 10, 2023. We review the district
court’s dismissal de novo. United States v. Irby, 703 F.3d 280, 283-84 (5th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
                                             II
        On appeal, Monroe argues that Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive
period is inapplicable under Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 (1984),
because it undermines § 1983’s federal interests. Specifically, he argues that
(1) Louisiana law discriminates against § 1983 claimants because it time-bars
federal claims one year earlier than equivalent state claims involving crimes
of violence; (2) the Louisiana legislature consciously seeks to prevent
plaintiffs from bringing police brutality claims; and (3) Louisiana’s residual
limitations period does not account for the practicalities of litigating police
brutality claims. Additionally, Monroe argues that Louisiana Civil Code
Article 3493.10, 4 a prescriptive period that applies to crimes of violence,
provides an appropriate analogue to apply to police brutality claims. Finally,
he argues that the four-year statute of limitations supplied by 28 U.S.C. §
1658 could also apply.
        Recently, a panel of our court considered identical arguments in
Brown v. Pouncy, -- F.4th --, 2024 WL 667692 (5th Cir. 2024). In that case,

        _____________________
        4
           La. Civ. Code art. 3493.10 (2024) (“Delictual actions which arise due to
damages sustained as a result of an act defined as a crime of violence . . . are subject to a
liberative prescription of two years.”).

                                             3
Case: 23-30230       Document: 103-1       Page: 4   Date Filed: 03/05/2024

                                 No. 23-30230

Brown argued that Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period should not apply
to police brutality claims brought under § 1983 because the period
“impermissibly discriminates against Section 1983 police brutality claims
and practically frustrates litigants’ ability to bring such claims,” both of
which contravene the federal interests behind § 1983. Id. at *1, *3. There,
the panel held that “Supreme Court precedent, and our cases applying that
precedent, [] forcelose[d] Brown’s position.” Id. at *3. The panel noted that
our precedent “consistently applied shorter, general limitations periods
instead of longer ones governing analogous state law claims,” and has
“repeatedly applied Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period” to claims
brought under § 1983. Id. at *4, *6. It explicitly stated that “[o]nly the
Supreme Court, having already solved the problem of uncertainty in the
absence of a federal limitations period for Section 1983 claims, can clarify
how lower courts should evaluate practical frustration without undermining
that solution.” Id. at *7. Although we are sympathetic to Monroe’s plight,
we are bound by Brown under our rule of orderliness. Edmiston v. Borrego, 75
F.4th 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Def. Distrib. v. Platkin, 55 F.4th 486,
495 n.10 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The rule of orderliness means that one panel of
our court may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening
change in law, such as by statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or
our en banc court.”).
                                     III
       Accordingly, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                      4