Court Opinion

ID: 2964471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:11.647163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:33.812961
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-1777

               SARGENT D. NICHOLS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HE IS TRUSTEE OF

                        ANDOVER NORTHWAY REALTY TRUST, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                    THE CADLE CO.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Gilbert R. Hoy, Jr. for appellants.
               ___________________
               Alvin  S. Nathanson,  with whom  Shannon M.  Fitzpatrick and
               ___________________              _______________________
          Nathanson & Goldberg, PC were on brief, for appellee.
          ________________________

                              _________________________

                                  December 19, 1996

                              _________________________

                    Per Curiam.   This  appeal illustrates once  again that
                    Per Curiam.
                    __________

          the  overly generous  use of  Fed. R.  Civ. P.  54(b) by  a well-

          intentioned district  judge can create a  minefield for litigants

          and  appellate courts alike.  Though the appeal itself amounts to

          an exercise in futility, see infra, it should serve as a reminder
                                   ___ _____

          that haste  makes waste.   There are often  untoward consequences

          when  judges  too readily  acquiesce  in the  suggested  entry of

          "partial" final judgments.

                    The  basic  procedural  facts   are  undisputed.    The

          plaintiffs  owned  valuable  commercial  real estate  located  in

          Peabody,  Massachusetts.  After  their original  lender plummeted

          into receivership,  the defendant Cadle Co.  (Cadle) acquired the

          mortgage  on  the property  from  the  Federal Deposit  Insurance

          Corporation.  Inasmuch as the mortgage note was in arrears, Cadle

          foreclosed on the property and took possession of it.

                    The plaintiffs  sued, claiming inter alia  breach of an
                                                   _____ ____

          agreement  to  forbear  (count  1),  wrongful  interference  with

          economic  relationships (count  2), fraud  (count 3),  and unfair

          trade  practices in  violation of  Mass. Gen.  L. ch.  93A,    11

          (count 5).   The plaintiffs  also sought specific  performance of

          the  supposed  forbearance  agreement (count  4)  and declaratory

          relief (count 6).   All six counts implicated the  mortgage note,

          the foreclosure, and Cadle's conduct  in respect thereto.   Cadle

          denied the plaintiffs' allegations, pointed to the relatively low

          price   that   the  property   had   brought   at  auction,   and

          counterclaimed  for the deficiency that it thought was due on the

                                          2

          mortgage note.

                    After discovery had been  conducted, the district court

          granted  partial summary judgment in Cadle's  favor.  This ruling

          dispatched counts  1, 2, 3,  4, and 6  of the complaint,  leaving

          count  5  and  Cadle's   counterclaims  unaffected.    The  court

          thereafter  certified the  judgment as  final under  Rule 54(b).1

          Although the  court made a rote recitation that there was no just

          reason  to delay the entry of judgment, it failed to substantiate

          that  conclusion.     Using  the  district   court's  Rule  54(b)

          certificate  as  a springboard,  the  plaintiffs  prosecuted this

          appeal.

                    It is trite, but  true, that piecemeal appellate review

          invites  mischief.   Because  the    practice  poses  a  host  of

          potential problems  we  have warned,  time and  again, that  Rule

          54(b)  should be  used sparingly.   See, e.g.,  Consolidated Rail
                                              ___  ____   _________________

          Corp.  v. Fore River Ry. Co., 861  F.2d 322, 325 (1st Cir. 1988);
          _____     __________________

          Spiegel v.  Trustees of Tufts  Coll., 843 F.2d  38, 43  (1st Cir.
          _______     ________________________

          1988);  Santa Maria v. Owens-Ill.,  Inc., 808 F.2d  848, 854 (1st
                  ___________    _________________

          Cir. 1986).  We have also admonished that a district court intent
                              
          ____________________

               1Ordinarily,  a  judgment is  final  (and,  thus, appealable
          under  28 U.S.C.   1291)  only if it  conclusively determines all
          claims of  all parties to  the action.   See generally  Catlin v.
                                                   ___ _________  ______
          United States, 324  U.S. 229,  233 (1945) (stating  that a  final
          _____________
          decision  generally is  one  which "ends  the  litigation on  the
          merits  and leaves nothing  for the court  to do but  execute the
          judgment").  Rule 54(b) limns an exception to this principle.  It
          provides in relevant part:   "When more than one claim for relief
          is presented in an action . . . the court may direct the entry of
          a final  judgment as to  one or  more but fewer  than all of  the
          claims or parties . . . upon an express determination  that there
          is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
          entry of [such a] judgment. . . ."

                                          3

          upon setting the stage for the fragmentation of appellate  review

          must explain the need for entering an earlier-than-usual judgment

            at least in cases where the explanation is not obvious from the

          record.  See Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 39
                   ___ _________    ______________________

          (1st  Cir. 1991);  Spiegel,  843 F.2d  at 43  &  n.4; Pahlavi  v.
                             _______                            _______

          Palandjian, 744 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1984).
          __________

                    In  this  instance  the district  court  volunteered no

          meaningful  explanation for  its  determination  that a  judgment

          should  enter even though a substantial part of the case remained

          untried,2 and  no good reason for the  certification is apparent.

          The  claims adjudicated  on  summary judgment  and certified  for

          appeal are inextricably intertwined  with the claims left pending

          in the district court, and the parties to both sets of claims are

          precisely the  same.  As we predicted in Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 44,
                                                   _______

          "[i]t will be a  rare case where Rule 54(b)  can appropriately be

          applied when  the contestants  on appeal  remain, simultaneously,

          contestants below."   This  case falls within  the generality  of

          that  prediction,  not within  the  long-odds  exception to  it.3
                              
          ____________________

               2The district court did note in its certificate that all the
          counts  on  which  it   granted  summary  judgment  involved  the
          propriety of the foreclosure.   But that tells us  very little as
          the  claims that remained likewise involved  the propriety of the
          foreclosure.     The  court   also  noted  the   desirability  of
          discharging the lis  pendens that the  plaintiffs had filed,  but
                          ___  _______
          gave no  reason to suspect  that any particular  urgency attended
          this discharge.

               3This case offers a testimonial to the wisdom that underlies
          the Spiegel doctrine.   After the appeal had been  fully briefed,
              _______
          the  district court conducted a trial on the remaining claims and
          counterclaims.   Cadle prevailed  across the board.   Immediately
          thereafter  it  moved to  dismiss the  appeal  on grounds  of res
          judicata and collateral  estoppel.   We do not  reach the  issues

                                          4

          Finally,  the   record  reflects  no  special   circumstances  or

          overriding equities that might counsel  in favor of permitting an

          immediate appeal from a plainly interlocutory order.

                    We   need  go  no  further.     Since  the  Rule  54(b)

          certificate  in  this case  was  improvidently  granted, we  lack

          appellate jurisdiction.   See Consolidated Rail, 861 F.2d at 326;
                                    ___ _________________

          Spiegel, 843 F.2d at 46.
          _______

                    The appeal  is dismissed without prejudice  for want of
                    _______________________________________________________

          appellate jurisdiction.  All parties shall bear their own costs.
          ______________________   ______________________________________

                              
          ____________________

          raised  in the motion to dismiss, but its content illuminates the
          Serbonian  bog into  which  appellate courts  can  be plunged  by
          relaxed  application of the  rigorous standards that  ought to be
          associated with Rule 54(b) certifications.

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