Court Opinion

ID: 2964078
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:05.631218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.442604
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2200

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   FRANK J. LINDIA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Edward S. MacColl with whom Thompson,  McNaboe, Ashley & Bull  was
            _________________           _________________________________
        on brief for appellant.
            Margaret  D.  McGaughey, Assistant  United  States Attorney,  with
            _______________________
        whom  Jay  P.  McCloskey,  United  States  Attorney,  and Jonathan  R.
              __________________                                  ____________
        Chapman, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
        _______

                                 ____________________

                                    April 18, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Pursuant to a plea agreement
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            with  the  government,  defendant-appellant  Frank  J. Lindia

            pleaded guilty to a  one-count indictment charging that, from

            December 1994  to January 31, 1995, he  and codefendants John

            C. Mosby and  Augustine T. Aguirre conspired  to possess with

            intent  to  distribute  in   excess  of  fifty  kilograms  of

            marijuana,  in violation  of 21  U.S.C.   846,  841(a)(1) and

            (b)(1)(C).  On appeal, Lindia claims that  the district court

            erred by:  including a  negotiated but unconsummated  sale of

            150  pounds   of  marijuana  in   the  sentence  calculation;

            sentencing him as  a career offender; and refusing  to depart

            downward  from the  sentence on  his claim  that the  career-

            offender    criminal     history    category    significantly

            overrepresented his past criminal conduct.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                      Pertinent Background and Prior Proceedings
                      Pertinent Background and Prior Proceedings
                      __________________________________________

            A.  Facts
            _________

                      We accept the facts as set forth in the uncontested

            portions of  the Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") and

            the  sentencing  hearing  transcript, see  United  States  v.
                                                  ___  ______________

            Muniz, 49  F.3d 36, 37  (1st Cir. 1995),  reciting additional
            _____

            facts below as necessary.  

                      In late  1994,  federal and  Maine law  enforcement

            authorities, with the help  of a cooperating individual (CI),

            began  investigating Lindia's  activities.   Soon thereafter,

                                         -2-
                                          2

            the  CI  (who had  been  the "buyer"  in  monitored marijuana

            transactions) introduced to Lindia an "associate," undercover

            DEA  Special Agent  Mike  Cunniff, who  would handle  further

            transactions.  During the ensuing negotiations, Agent Cunniff

            was introduced to Lindia's associates, Aguirre and Mosby.

                      On  January 20,  1995, Agent  Cunniff met  Mosby at

            Mosby's  home   in  Jamestown,  Rhode  Island,   where  Mosby

            delivered  to Cunniff  forty-eight pounds  of marijuana.   On

            January  31, 1995,  Lindia and  Aguirre met Agent  Cunniff in

            Portland, Maine, to receive  payment for the marijuana.   The

            meeting took place in a hotel room that government agents had

            previously  set  up with  videotape  equipment.   During  the

            meeting,  Agent   Cunniff  delivered  $62,400  in   cash  and

            commented  on the failure of Aguirre and Lindia to accept the

            payment  earlier, as they had promised.   Concerned about his

            customer's  unhappiness, Lindia apologized  for the delay and

            indicated that more marijuana was  available.  The three  men

            then planned  for an additional thirty pounds of marijuana to

            be delivered the next day.

                      Also during  the  videotaped meeting,  Lindia  told

            Cunniff, "We have something else .  . . that we would like to

            send up to  you."  Both  Lindia and Aguirre  then spoke of  a

            subsequent shipment  of  marijuana and  indicated  that  they

            could  probably  send  Cunniff  "about" 150  or  200  pounds,

                                         -3-
                                          3

            depending  upon the capacity of the vehicle in which it would

            travel.1   Lindia stated that the lot could be delivered in a

            little over one  week's time.   After counting  out the  cash

            payment for the forty-eight  pound lot and discussing details

            of the  next day's thirty-pound delivery,  Lindia and Aguirre

            left  the hotel  room  and were  promptly  arrested.   Lindia

            eventually   pleaded   guilty   and   cooperated   with   the

            authorities.

            B.  Sentencing
            ______________

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  transcript  of  this  portion  of  the  conversation
            between Lindia, Aguirre and Agent Cunniff reads, in part:

                      Lindia:   And let me ask  you another question.  We
                                have something  else . . .  that we would
                                like  to send  up to  you.   Now this  is
                                going to be
                      Aguirre:  What, the [shipment] that's coming
                      Lindia:   The one that's coming with . . . Chewy
                      Aguirre:  Are  you  talking about  this  one that's
                                already
                      Lindia    Not this  one, the  one that's  behind it
                                from Chewy
                      Aguirre:  Well, we could probably get about
                      Lindia:   We could probably get about
                      Aguirre:  One and one half, or two even
                      Cunniff:  I can handle three, five, or thousand
                      Lindia:   This is contingent upon the  vehicle that
                                we have at this point. . . . So two would
                                probably be the limit.

            After  discussing delivery  matters about this  shipment, the
            discussion continued:

                      Cunniff:  How much are we talking about?
                      Lindia:   Probably one and half to two
                                . . . .
                      Aguirre:  Whatever we can get [in the vehicle].

                                         -4-
                                          4

                      The  district  court sentenced  Lindia as  a career

            offender under  21 U.S.C.   994(h), including  as a predicate

            offense Lindia's Rhode Island conviction on a nolo contendere
                                                          ____ __________

            plea for possession with intent to deliver marijuana.   Under

            the Career  Offender guideline,  U.S.S.G.   4B1.1, the  court

            was required  to determine  the offense statutory  maximum in

            order to ascertain the applicable offense level.  Because the

            court included the negotiated 150-pound lot in  the amount of

            drugs attributable to Lindia,  it found the offense statutory

            maximum  to be  twenty  years' imprisonment  under 21  U.S.C.

              841(b)(1)(C).

                      Pursuant  to  the  Career Offender  guideline,  the

            statutory maximum of twenty years yielded an offense level of

            thirty-two with  a criminal history  category of VI.   Lindia

            asked  the court  to depart  downward on  the basis  that the

            criminal  history  category   overrepresented  his   criminal

            history; but  the court refused, specifically  ruling that it

            did  not have the authority to do so.   The court did grant a

            three-level  downward  adjustment  in the  offense  level for

            acceptance of  responsibility, resulting  in a  total offense

            level of  twenty-nine and  a guideline imprisonment  range of

            151 to 188 months.  On the government's motion under U.S.S.G.

              5K1.1, the court departed downward from the guideline range

            for Lindia's substantial assistance and imposed a sentence of

            108 months' incarceration.

                                         -5-
                                          5

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      We review  the sentencing court's  findings of fact

            for  "clear error"  and  generally defer  to its  credibility

            determinations.   United States v. Muniz, 49 F.3d 36, 41 (1st
                              _____________    _____

            Cir. 1995); United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1304 (1st
                        _____________    _______

            Cir.),  cert. denied, 115 S.  Ct. 378, 498,  499, 532 (1994).
                    _____ ______

            We  review   de  novo  the  court's   interpretation  of  the
                         __  ____

            guidelines and application of law.  Muniz, 49 F.3d at 41.
                                                _____

            A.  Drug Quantity Calculation
            _____________________________

                      The   extent  of  the  penalty  for  a  controlled-

            substance  conviction  is determined  in  large  part by  the

            amount  of  drugs  properly attributable  to  the  defendant.

            United  States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 982 (1st Cir. 1995),
            ______________    ________

            petition for cert. filed,  (Mar. 8, 1996) (No. 95-8348).   On
            ________ ___ _____ _____

            appeal,  Lindia challenges the  district court's inclusion of

            the  negotiated  but  unconsummated  150-pound  lot  in   the

            calculation of his sentence.  Without this quantity, he would

            have received the benefit  of 21 U.S.C.   841(b)(1)(D), which

            provides for a  maximum imprisonment term of only  five years

            "[i]n  the case  of less  than 50  kilograms of  marijuana."2

            Use of  this penalty provision would have  yielded, under the

                                
            ____________________

            2.  1 kilogram is equivalent to approximately 2.2 pounds.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Career Offender guideline, a pre-adjustment  offense level of

            seventeen instead of thirty-two.  See U.S.S.G.   4B1.1.3
                                              ___

                      The  PSR stated  that  Lindia was  responsible  for

            103.5 kilograms of  marijuana, representing a  combination of

            the forty-eight  pound,  thirty-pound, and  150-pound  lots.4

                                
            ____________________

            3.  This  challenge is  somewhat perplexing  in light  of the
            indictment  and  plea  agreement  in the  record  before  us.
            Lindia  informs  this court  that  he pleaded  guilty  to the
            conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana but
            "did  not plead guilty to quantity."  The indictment to which
            he pleaded  guilty, however,  states that the  conspiracy was
            for  "in   excess  of  50  kilograms."    Further,  both  the
            indictment   and   the   plea   agreement   cite  21   U.S.C.
              841(b)(1)(C)  which sets  forth  a maximum  sentence of  20
            years as the applicable penalty provision.  Indeed,  the plea
            agreement  explicitly states  that "[t]he  parties agree  and
            understand that  the maximum  statutory penalty which  may be
            imposed  upon conviction  is  imprisonment of  not more  than
            twenty years."
                      Nonetheless,  Lindia insists that  at the change of
            plea hearing, the court and the parties "understood" that the
            issue  of  drug quantity  would  be  left entirely  open  for
            sentencing  purposes.   Incredibly, Lindia  does not  provide
            this  court with a transcript  of the change  of plea hearing
            for our consideration  of his claimed material change  in the
            indictment and  plea agreement.   And  nothing in the  record
            before us  hints of  a superseding indictment  or information
            eliminating the  quantity specification.  Because  the record
            adequately supports  the court's finding  that, counting  the
            negotiated 150-pound lot, the marijuana quantity attributable
            to Lindia was  in excess of  50 kilograms, we  do not  decide
            whether his plea precluded his challenge to the drug quantity
            finding.

            4.  The government points  out that, with a total quantity of
            103.5 kilograms of marijuana, the five-year mandatory minimum
            and 40-year  maximum in  21 U.S.C.    841(b)(1)(B)(vii) might
            have   applied   rather   than   the   20-year   maximum   in
              841(b)(1)(C).    The  application  of   the  lower  maximum
            sentence  is apparently  based  on the  understanding of  the
            parties  and  court, as  evidenced  in  the indictment,  plea
            agreement, and  PSR, that Lindia  would be responsible  for a
            marijuana  quantity  that  would  trigger no  more  than  the
            penalties set for in   841(b)(1)(C).

                                         -7-
                                          7

            Lindia objected to  this conclusion,  asserting, inter  alia,
                                                             _____  ____

            that the 150-pound lot "never existed" and was not the object

            of  any   conspiracy,  and  that  his   statements  about  it

            constituted  mere  "puffing"  in  an attempt  to  gain  Agent

            Cunniff's business  confidence.   At the sentencing  hearing,

            Lindia  testified  that  the  150-pound lot  had  never  been

            previously discussed or  planned and that  no steps had  been

            taken  to obtain it.  Lindia repeated that the discussion was

            meant to impress Agent Cunniff, and testified that only after

            obtaining payment  for the forty-eight  and thirty-pound lots

            did he intend to  actually seek the additional 150  pounds of

            marijuana.

                      The district court found, under a preponderance-of-

            the-evidence standard, that the  proposed delivery of the 150

            pound lot  had  not  been  discussed or  planned  before  the

            videotaped  meeting.   The  court also  found, however,  that

            based on Lindia's and Aguirre's statements, the 150 pounds of

            marijuana added to, and were part of, the charged conspiracy.

            The court found that  Lindia and Aguirre intended  to produce

            that  marijuana and were  reasonably capable of  doing so and

            thus, the 150  pounds were includable in  the offense conduct

            for the purposes of the statutory maximum and the  Sentencing

            Guidelines.

                      Application note 12 of U.S.S.G.   2D1.1 provides:

                      In  an  offense involving  negotiation to
                      traffic  in  a controlled  substance, the

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      weight    under    negotiation   in    an
                      uncompleted distribution shall be used to
                      calculate    the    applicable    amount.
                      However, where the  court finds that  the
                      defendant did  not intend to  produce and
                      was not reasonably  capable of  producing
                      the  negotiated  amount, the  court shall
                      exclude  from  the guideline  calculation
                      the  amount that  it finds  the defendant
                      did not  intend  to produce  and was  not
                      reasonable capable of producing.

            We  have interpreted  this note  as requiring  the sentencing

            court to include the negotiated  amount in the drug  quantity

            calculation unless it finds  both that the defendant did  not

            have the intent to produce the amount, and that he lacked the

            capacity to deliver  it.   United States v.  Wihbey, 75  F.3d
                                       _____________     ______

            761, 777 (1st Cir. 1996); Muniz, 49 F.3d at  39.  Application
                                      _____

            note  12  applies for  the  purposes of  both  the Sentencing

            Guidelines  and  the  statutory  penalties  under  21  U.S.C.

              841(b).  Muniz, 49 F.3d at 39-40 (indicating that five-year
                       _____

            difference in statutory mandatory minimum was  dependent upon

            drug quantity  calculated under application  note 12); United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Pion,  25 F.3d 18, 25 n.12  (1st Cir.) (noting that
            ______    ____

            drug  quantity  finding  under  note  12  provides  threshold

            calculus for  mandatory minimums),  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.
                                                _____ ______

            326 (1994).

                      Lindia  contends  that  due  process  requires  the

            government to prove drug  quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.

            Drug quantity, however, is  not an element of the  offense of

            conviction, 21 U.S.C.    846  and 841(a)(1), but is typically

                                         -9-
                                          9

            relevant only for  determining the  penalty.   See 21  U.S.C.
                                                           ___

              841(b); United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976, 979-80 (1st
                      _____________    ________

            Cir. 1995) (citing  United States v. Lam  Kwong-Wah, 966 F.2d
                                _____________    ______________

            682,  685 (D.C.  Cir.), cert. denied,  506 U.S.  901 (1992));
                                    _____ ______

            United States  v. Patterson,  38 F.3d  139, 143-44  (4th Cir.
            _____________     _________

            1994), cert. denied, 115  S. Ct. 1968 (1995).  As  such, drug
                   _____ ______

            quantity  for  purposes  of    841(b) is  determined  by  the

            sentencing   court   under  a   preponderance-of-the-evidence

            standard.5   See United States  v. Barnes, 890  F.2d 545, 551
                         ___ _____________     ______

            n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that  court, not jury, determines

            drug quantity  under   841(b)),  cert. denied, 494  U.S. 1019
                                             _____ ______

            (1990); United  States v. Lombard,  72 F.3d 170,  175-76 (1st
                    ______________    _______

            Cir. 1995) (explaining that  "once convicted, a defendant has

            no  right under the Due Process Clause to have his sentencing

            determination be confined to facts proved beyond a reasonable

            doubt,"  rather, applicable standard  is preponderance of the

            evidence);  Whiting, 28  F.3d  at 1304  and n.5  (reaffirming
                        _______

                                
            ____________________

            5.  We note  that, during  the sentencing  proceeding, Lindia
            argued that the government must prove drug quantity beyond  a
            reasonable doubt, and that  he had the right to a "jury trial
            on the question of quantity."  The court told Lindia, "either
            you  get a jury  trial on the offense  or not," remarked that
            this  request  was essentially  an  attempt  to withdraw  the
            guilty  plea, and inquired if he sought to withdraw his plea.
            After consulting with his counsel, Lindia stood by his plea.

                                         -10-
                                          10

            preponderant  evidence  standard);   see  also  McMillan   v.
                                                 ___  ____  ________

            Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93 (1986).6
            ____________

                      Here, to assist in its determination of whether the

            conspiracy included the 150-pound lot, the district court had

                                
            ____________________

            6.  Lindia  cites  McMillan  v.  Pennsylvania,  477  U.S.  79
                               ________      ____________
            (1986), in support of his argument that due  process requires
            proof  of drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.  McMillan,
                                                                ________
            however, expressed a due process concern where a state treats
            an element of a criminal offense as a sentencing factor, thus
            affording it less procedural safeguards.  477  U.S. at 84-88.
            Here,  the quantity of drugs  in this federal  offense is not
                       ________
            one of the elements of the  offense, see supra, but a settled
                                                 ___ _____
            sentencing factor.
                      Moreover,  this  is not  a case  in which  the drug
            quantity  finding  is  "a tail  which  wags  the  dog of  the
            substantive  offense,"  McMillan,  477 U.S.  at  88,  thereby
                                    ________
            possibly  triggering   a  higher  burden  of   proof  on  the
            government.   See United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 369
                          ___ _____________    _______
            (8th Cir. 1991) (suggesting but not deciding that due process
            requires  more than preponderant  standard where inclusion of
            uncharged  drug amounts  produced 18-level  increase in  base
            offense level  and seven-fold increase  in sentencing range);
            United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102 (3d Cir. 1990)
            _____________    ________
            (holding that clear-and-convincing evidence  standard applies
            to justify a twelve-fold, 330-month  departure from guideline
            range median); cf. United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 176
                           ___ _____________    _______
            (1st  Cir. 1995)  (holding that  sentencing court  may depart
            downward  where  uncharged,  enhancing  conduct  of acquitted
            murder  charge increased  sentence  from 262-327  months'  to
            mandatory life term).
                      Without expressing any  opinion as to  the holdings
            of Townley and  Kikumura, we  note that,  unlike those  cases
               _______      ________
            (and  Lombard,  as  well),  this  case  does  not  involve  a
                  _______
            sentencing  enhancement  or  departure  based   on  uncharged
                                                                _________
            conduct.  Here, Lindia pleaded guilty to every element of the
            offense charging a marijuana conspiracy between December 1994
            and January 31, 1995; and the sentence squarely punishes that
            offense  of  conviction.    See United  States  v.  Harrison-
                                        ___ ______________      _________
            Philpot,  978  F.2d  1520,  1524  (9th  Cir.  1992)  (holding
            _______
            inapplicable tail-wagging-dog concerns  where disputed  drug-
            quantity  pertained only to  sentence for convicted conduct),
            cert. denied, 508 U.S. 929 (1993).  In short, this  is simply
            _____ ______
            not a case  in which  due process required  anything more  at
            sentencing.

                                         -11-
                                          11

            the  benefit  of  the  videotape  of the  hotel  meeting  and

            Lindia's  own  testimony  at  the sentencing  hearing.    The

            transcript from  the hotel meeting  clearly reveals  Lindia's

            (and  Aguirre's)  stated  desire  and  agreement  to  provide

            Cunniff  with 150 to 200 pounds of marijuana.  The discussion

            included details such as the identification of the shipment's

            source,  the  capacity  of   the  vehicle  to  transport  the

            marijuana,  and the number of days for delivery.  Thus, there

            was sufficient, reliable evidence  from which the court could

            find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conspiracy

            included the 150-pound lot.

                      To invoke the exception of application note 12, the

            court needed to  be persuaded  that Lindia did  not have  the

            intent  and ability to produce the 150-pound lot.  Wihbey, 75
                                                               ______

            F.3d  at 777.   The  court  was free  to reject,  as it  did,

            Lindia's claim that the discussion of the 150 pounds was mere

            "puffing" to impress the buyer into future negotiations.  See
                                                                      ___

            Whiting,  28 F.3d  at  1305 (refusing  to disturb  sentencing
            _______

            court's rejection of "puffing" claim); see also United States
                                                   ___ ____ _____________

            v.  DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306,  1322 n.18 (1st  Cir. 1994) (noting
                ______

            that sentencing court's  choice between supportable plausible

            inferences cannot  amount to clear error),  cert. denied, 115
                                                        _____ ______

            S. Ct. 947 (1995).  Lindia did not prove to the court that he

            lacked  the  intent and  ability  to  produce the  negotiated

            amount; rather,  based on  the evidence presented,  the court

                                         -12-
                                          12

            affirmatively  found that he had  both.  We  discern no clear

            error in the court's finding that the 150 pounds of marijuana

            were part  of the  conspiracy and,  as such,  were includable

            under U.S.S.G.    2D1.1 to  determine  the offense  statutory

            maximum and Guideline sentencing range.7

            B.  Career Offender Status
            __________________________

                                
            ____________________

            7.  Lindia  cites  Neal  v.  United States,  116  S.  Ct. 763
                               ____      _____________
            (1996), in support of his contention that application note 12
            "is inconsistent with established  law."  In Neal, the  court
                                                         ____
            held  that stare  decisis required  it to  adhere to  a prior
                       _____  _______
            statutory   interpretation   pertaining  to   the  sentencing
            calculation  of  a  certain drug,  in  the  face  of a  newly
            conflicting  methodology set forth in the Guidelines.  116 S.
            Ct. at 768-69.   Here, Lindia cites no controlling sentencing
            precedent with which application note  12 actually conflicts.
            Rather, Lindia  cites cases  affirming the general  principle
            that the object of a conspiracy is an element of  the offense
            and must be  proven beyond  a reasonable doubt.   See  United
                                                              ___  ______
            States  v. Bush, 70 F.3d  557, 561 (10th  Cir. 1995) (holding
            ______     ____
            that in a multiple-object  conspiracy conviction, where it is
            impossible to tell which  controlled substance was the object
            of conviction, defendant must be sentenced based on objective
            yielding lowest offense  level), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 795
                                             _____ ______
            (1996).   Lindia  contends  that because  specific intent  to
            effectuate  the  substantive offense  must  be  proven for  a
            conspiracy  conviction,  application note  12  conflicts with
            "long-established  law  for  identifying   the  object  of  a
            conspiracy" because  it permits inclusion of  a drug quantity
            even if the defendant did not have the intent to produce that
            quantity.
                      Here,  unlike Bush,  the indictment  specifies only
                                    ____
            one controlled-substance object of the conspiracy: possession
            with intent  to distribute  marijuana.  Lindia's  guilty plea
            waived the government's burden to prove that object.  Had the
            case  gone to  trial, the  government would  not have  had to
            prove  any  specific  amount   of  drugs  for  a  conviction.
            Campbell,  61  F.3d at  979.   Thus,  application note  12 is
            ________
            simply   part  of  the  Sentencing  Commission's  permissible
            methodology for  employing the penalty  provisions pertaining
            to  quantity set forth in    841(b); it does  not remove from
            the government's burden an element of the conspiracy offense.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      The  district  court sentenced  Lindia as  a career

            offender  under 21 U.S.C.    994(h) due to  two previous drug

            distribution offenses and the  instant offense.  See U.S.S.G.
                                                             ___

              4B1.1.   Lindia  challenges  this aspect  of his  sentence,

            arguing  first,   that  conspiracy  to  commit  a  controlled

            substance offense should not  trigger career offender status,

            and  second,  that the  court should  not  have counted  as a

            predicate  offense  a Rhode  Island  charge  to which  Lindia

            pleaded nolo contendere.
                    ____ __________

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      1.  Conspiracy As Predicate Offense
                      ___________________________________

                      In 1994, this  court joined a number of  our sister

            circuits  in  holding  that,  in  U.S.S.G.    4B1.2, comment.

            (n.1),  the  Commission  properly  designated  conspiracy  to
                                                           __________

            commit  a  "crime  of  violence  or  a  controlled  substance

            offense"  as a  triggering  or predicate  offense for  career

            offender purposes, even though conspiracy convictions are not

            listed  in  the body  of the  pertinent  guidelines or  in 28

            U.S.C.   994(h).  United  States v. Piper, 35 F.3d  611, 618-
                              ______________    _____

            619  (1st Cir. 1994) (citing cases), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
                                                 _____ ______

            1118  (1995).   On appeal,  Lindia  invites us  to reconsider

            Piper and  join those  circuits holding that  conspiracies to
            _____

            commit  the crimes defined in   994(h) do not fall within its

            purview.   See  e.g., United  States v.  Mendoza-Figueroa, 28
                       ___  ____  ______________     ________________

            F.3d  766 (8th  Cir.  1994), cert.  denied,  116 S.  Ct.  939
                                         _____  ______

            (1996).    We  decline  the  invitation  and  adhere  to  our

            controlling precedent, thus affirming  the use of the instant

            conspiracy   conviction  to   trigger  the   career  offender

            provisions.

                      2.  The Rhode Island Nolo Contendere Plea
                      _________________________________________

                      In 1986, Lindia pleaded  nolo contendere to a Rhode
                                               ____ __________

            Island charge of possession  with intent to deliver marijuana

            ("the  1986 charge").  On this plea, the state court adjudged

            Lindia  "guilty as  charged  and convicted"  and  gave him  a

            deferred sentence.  Lindia argues that the 1986 charge is not

                                         -15-
                                          15

            a "conviction"  under Rhode  Island law and  therefore cannot

            constitute  a  predicate  offense  for  purposes   of  career

            offender status.

                      We have previously  addressed the issue  of whether

            or not a  nolo contendere plea and  subsequent disposition in
                      ____ __________

            Rhode   Island  constitutes   a   "conviction"  for   federal

            sentencing purposes.   See United States v. Patrone, 948 F.2d
                                   ___ _____________    _______

            813, 816-17  (1st  Cir. 1991),  cert.  denied, 504  U.S.  978
                                            _____  ______

            (1992).  Patrone involved sentencing under  the armed-career-
                     _______

            criminal  statute, 18  U.S.C.    924(e),  which  specifically

            provides that  state law  determines whether or  not a  state
                           _____

            disposition constitutes a  "conviction."  Id. at  816; see 18
                                                      ___          ___

            U.S.C.   921(a)(20).  By contrast, for purposes of the career

            offender  provisions,  whether  or not  a  state  disposition

            constitutes  a  "conviction" is  determined  by  reference to

            federal law and the Guidelines.  See United States v. Pierce,
                                             ___ _____________    ______

            60  F.3d  886,  892  (1st Cir.  1995)  (analyzing  Guidelines

            provisions in  concluding  that  state  disposition  on  nolo
                                                                     ____

            contendere plea constituted "conviction"), petition for cert.
            __________                                 ________ ___ _____

            filed, (Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-6474).
            _____

                      After  carefully  analyzing the  Guideline language

            and commentary, we held in Pierce that the guilt-establishing
                                       ______

            event,  such as  a  guilty  plea,  trial,  or  plea  of  nolo
                                                                     ____

            contendere,  "determines whether  and when  there has  been a
            __________

            countable `conviction'" for  purposes of the  Career Offender

                                         -16-
                                          16

            guideline.   60 F.3d at  892.   We concluded  that a  Florida

            offense, to  which the defendant pleaded  nolo contendere and
                                                      ____ __________

            that  resulted in  a  "withheld adjudication,"  constituted a

            countable "conviction" under  the Career Offender  guideline.

            Id.   Similarly,  Lindia's nolo  contendere  plea, subsequent
            ___                        ____  __________

            adjudication,  and   deferred  sentence  also   constitute  a

            "conviction" for  career offender purposes.   See also United
                                                          ___ ____ ______

            States  v.  Cuevas,  75  F.3d  778,  780-83 (1st  Cir.  1996)
            ______      ______

            (holding,   under  federal   standards,  that   Rhode  Island

            disposition  on nolo  contendere plea  is a  "conviction" for
                            ____  __________

            immigration law purposes).

                      Moreover,  there is  little  doubt  that  the  1986

            charge would constitute a  conviction under Rhode Island law.

            In Patrone, we  explained that under R.I.  Gen. Laws   12-18-
               _______

            3(a),  a   nolo  contendere   plea  will  not   constitute  a
                       ____  __________

            "conviction  for  any  purpose"   if  the  court  places  the

            defendant on probation and the defendant completes  probation

            without violating its terms.  948 F.2d at 816, n.1.   Section

            12-18-3(b)  further provides,  however, that  subdivision (a)

            "shall  not apply to  any person who is  sentenced to serve a

            term  in the adult correctional institution or who is given a

            suspended or deferred sentence in addition to probation."  As

            explained  in Patrone,  we interpret  this provision  to mean
                          _______

            that  a nolo contendere plea followed  by a deferred sentence
                    ____ __________

                                         -17-
                                          17

            (or other sentence  described in   12-18-3(b)) constitutes  a

            "conviction" under Rhode Island law.  See id.
                                                  ___ ___

                      Lindia  contends that  our  analysis in  Patrone is
                                                               _______

            inapplicable,  reading much into   12-18-3(b)'s language: "or

            deferred  sentence  in  addition  to   probation."  (emphasis
                                __  ________  __   _________

            added).   Lindia claims that he was not placed on "probation"

            for the 1986 charge,  rather, he "entered probationary status

            based solely on an agreement  with the Rhode Island  Attorney

            General."  The record before this court is less than clear on

            this issue.   It is  apparent, however,  that although  Rhode

            Island law  provides for  a special circumstance  in which  a

            nolo contendere plea and  successful completion of  probation
            ____ __________

            will not constitute a  conviction, that circumstance will not

            apply  where  the  defendant  is also  given  a  sentence  of

            imprisonment, or a suspended or deferred sentence.   See R.I.
                                                                 ___

            Gen. Laws   12-18-3.  Thus, even assuming that Lindia was not

            placed on  probation,  the controlling  fact is  that he  was

            given  a deferred  sentence, thus  rendering the  benefits of

              12-18-3(a)  inapplicable.    Lindia   cites  to  no   other

            applicable Rhode Island  law in which a nolo  contendere plea
                                                    ____  __________

            will not constitute a conviction.8

                                
            ____________________

            8.  R.I. Gen.  Laws   12-19-19 provides, inter  alia, that if
                                                     _____  ____
            the  court  defers sentencing  on a  plea  of guilty  or nolo
                                                                     ____
            contendere, it may  actually impose a sentence  only within a
            __________
            certain  time  period  unless  the  defendant   is  otherwise
            sentenced to  prison during that  period, in  which case  the
            time  for imposing sentence  is extended.   This section says
            nothing about  whether  or  not the  plea,  followed  by  the

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      Under  both  federal and  state law  standards, the

            district  court properly  counted Lindia's  1986 charge  as a

            conviction for purposes of the career offender adjudication.

            C.  Authority to  Depart Downward Based on Overrepresentation
            _____________________________________________________________

            in Career-Offender Criminal History Category
            ____________________________________________

                      Lindia contends that  the criminal history category

            of  VI, calculated  pursuant to  his career  offender status,

            significantly  overrepresents  his  criminal  history.    The

            district court  ruled  that nothing  in  the  career-offender

            statute, 28 U.S.C.   994(h), or in the Guidelines permitted a

            downward departure  on this  basis.9  The  First Circuit  has

            not yet decided the  permissibility of such a departure  in a

            career offender case, see United States v. Morrison, 46  F.3d
                                  ___ _____________    ________

            127,  129  (1st  Cir.  1995), although  many  of  our  sister

            circuits have answered this  question in the affirmative, see
                                                                      ___

            e.g.,  United  States v.  Spencer,  25 F.3d  1105  (D.C. Cir.
            ____   ______________     _______

            1994);  United States v. Rogers, 972 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1992);
                    _____________    ______

            United States  v. Bowser,  941 F.2d  1019  (10th Cir.  1991);
            _____________     ______

            United States v. Lawrence, 916 F.2d 553, 554 (9th Cir. 1990).
            _____________    ________

                      Pursuant  to the  Sentencing  Reform  Act of  1984,

            commencing  at 18  U.S.C.    3551, 28  U.S.C.    991-998  (as

                                
            ____________________

            deferred sentence, constitutes a  "conviction."  Based on the
            structure of    12-18-3, however,  it is apparent  that Rhode
            Island treats nolo contendere pleas as convictions unless the
                          ____ __________                      ______
            defendant meets the provisions of   12-18-3.

            9.  The court did not  indicate in any way whether  or not it
            would depart if it had the authority to do so.

                                         -19-
                                          19

            amended), the United States Sentencing Commission promulgates

            Sentencing Guidelines that  establish presumptive  sentencing

            ranges for  categories of defendants and  offenses.  Williams
                                                                 ________

            v.  United States,  503 U.S.  193, 195-96  (1992).   Under 28
                _____________

            U.S.C.   994(h),

                      The  Commission  shall  assure  that  the
                      guidelines  specify a sentence  to a term
                      of  imprisonment at  or near  the maximum
                      term   authorized   for   categories   of
                      defendants  in  which  the  defendant  is
                      eighteen years old or older and [has been
                      convicted  of a  violent crime  or felony
                      drug  offense and  has a  least two  such
                      prior convictions].

            This  statute  is  meant  to  ensure  that  the  Commission's

            Guidelines  provide  that certain  felony-recidivists receive

            maximum authorized sentences.   See United States v. Labonte,
                                            ___ _____________    _______

            70  F.3d 1396,  1404 (1st  Cir. 1995).   The  Career Offender

            guideline,    U.S.S.G.      4B1.1,   is    the   Commission's

            implementation  of   994(h).   See U.S.S.G.   4B1.1, comment.
                                           ___

            (backg'd);  Labonte, 70  F.3d  at 1400-1401.   The  guideline
                        _______

            establishes the career-offender presumptive  sentencing range

            by  setting  forth  enhanced   total  offense  levels  --  by

            reference  to offense  statutory maximums10  -- and  provides

            that  "[a] career  offender's  criminal  history category  in

                                
            ____________________

            10.  The   First  Circuit   has   upheld   the   Commission's
            interpretation  that  "maximum  term"   in    994(h)  is  the
            applicable  unenhanced  statutory  maximum.    See  generally
                                                           ___  _________
            LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396.
            _______

                                         -20-
                                          20

            every case shall be Category VI," the highest category level.

            U.S.S.G.   4B1.1.

                      The  Sentencing  Reform  Act permits  a  sentencing

            court to  depart from  a  Guidelines' presumptive  sentencing

            range "only when  it finds that `there  exists an aggravating

            or mitigating circumstance  of a  kind, or to  a degree,  not

            adequately  taken  into   consideration  by  the   Sentencing

            Commission in formulating  the guidelines.'"   Williams,  503
                                                           ________

            U.S. at 198 (quoting 18 U.S.C.   3553(b)); see also 28 U.S.C.
                                                       ___ ____

              991(b)(1)(B)  (providing  that  the  Commission's  purposes

            include   "maintaining   sufficient  flexibility   to  permit

            individualized  sentences  when  warranted by  mitigating  or

            aggravating   factors  not   taken   into   account  in   the

            establishment    of    general    sentencing    guidelines").

            Accordingly, the  Guidelines provide that "a  case that falls

            outside the linguistically applicable guideline's `heartland'

            is  a candidate for departure."  United States v. Rivera, 994
                                             _____________    ______

            F.2d  942, 947  (1st  Cir. 1993);  see  U.S.S.G. Ch.I,  Pt.A,
                                               ___

            intro.  comment. (4)(b).   Such  cases are  deemed "unusual,"

            and, by definition, the Commission (with some exceptions) has

            not  "adequately"  considered  them  within  the  meaning  of

              3553(b).    Id.    As  Justice  (then  Chief  Judge) Breyer
                          ___

            thoroughly  explained  in  Rivera,  the  exceptions  to  this
                                       ______

            principle  are  those  several  factors  the  Commission  has

            explicitly  rejected  as permissible  grounds  for departure.

                                         -21-
                                          21

            Id. at 948-949  (also explaining  that encouraged  departures
            ___

            are likely "reasonable" while discouraged  departures require

            "unusual or  special" circumstances); see  also Williams, 503
                                                  ___  ____ ________

            U.S.  at 200  (concluding that  departure based  on expressly

            rejected factorconstitutesincorrect applicationofGuidelines).

                      The  Application  Instructions for  the Guidelines,

            set  forth   in  U.S.S.G.    1B1.1,  explain   that  after  a

            sentencing   court   determines   the   offense   level,  the

            defendant's  criminal history  category,  and the  applicable

            guideline  range, it  then refers  to certain  provisions for

            "Specific  Offender Characteristics and  Departures" and "any

            other policy  statement or commentary in  the guidelines that

            might  warrant  consideration  in   imposing  sentence."    A

            guidelines policy statement,  U.S.S.G.   4A1.3,  specifically

            addresses  the  adequacy  of  a  criminal-history  category's

            reflection of a defendant's past criminal conduct.  See also,
                                                                ___ ____

            U.S.S.G.  Ch.5, Pt.H,  intro.  comment. and    5H1.8 (stating

            that criminal history is  relevant in determining if sentence

            should be outside applicable guideline range).  Section 4A1.3

            explicitly recognizes  that  a defendant's  criminal  history

            category may "significantly over-represent[]  the seriousness

            of a defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that  the

            defendant will  commit  further crimes."   U.S.S.G.    4A1.3,

            (policy statement).  In such cases, the sentencing  court may

            consider a downward departure.  Id.  We agree with our sister
                                            ___

                                         -22-
                                          22

            circuits (that  have considered the issue)  that a sentencing

            court  may invoke   4A1.3 to depart downward from the career-

            offender  category   if  it  concludes   that  the   category

            inaccurately   reflects   the  defendant's   actual  criminal

            history,  within the  meaning of  18 U.S.C.    3553(b).   See
                                                                      ___

            e.g., United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
            ____  _____________    _______

            1994);  United  States v. Rogers, 972 F.2d  489, 494 (2d Cir.
                    ______________    ______

            1992);  United States v.  Bowser, 941  F.2d 1019,  1024 (10th
                    _____________     ______

            Cir. 1991); United States  v. Lawrence, 916 F.2d 553,  554-55
                        _____________     ________

            (9th Cir. 1990).

                      The district court  interpreted Congress's  mandate

            in    994(h) and  the  Commission's implementation,  U.S.S.G.

              4B1.1,   as   precluding   departure  on   the   basis   of

            overrepresentation  in all  cases in  which the  defendant is

            assigned  a criminal history category of  VI under the Career

            Offender guideline.  Section  994(h), however, is directed to

            the Commission's  duty to formulate  guidelines pertaining to

            categories of defendants, not to sentencing courts faced with

            individual defendants.  As  explained above, Congress and the

            Commission   have  rejected   rigid  sentencing   schemes  by

            empowering  the sentencing  court  to  consider factors  that

            might  comprise an  "unusual" case.   The Commission  has not

            designated as a "forbidden departure"  the overrepresentation

            of a criminal history category in career offender  cases, see
                                                                      ___

            Rivera, 994 F.2d at  948-49, and "there is nothing  unique to
            ______

                                         -23-
                                          23

            career offender  status which would strip  a sentencing court

            of its  `sensible  flexibility' in  considering  departures."

            Rogers, 972 F.2d at 493.
            ______

                        A   district   court   that  considers   numerous

            Guidelines cases has a  "special competence" to determine the

            "ordinariness"  or   "unusualness"  of  a   particular  case.

            Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951.  When faced with a departure  motion
            ______

            in  a career-offender case,  as in  other cases,  the court's

            experience and  unique perspective will allow it to decide if

            the case before it falls outside the guideline's "heartland,"

            warranting departure.   See Rivera, 994 F.2d at  952 (holding
                                    ___ ______

            that appellate court reviews "unusualness" determination with

            "respect"  for sentencing  court's "superior  `feel' for  the

            case"  (citation omitted)).   Because  the district  court in

            this case did not consider whether or not the career-offender

            criminal    history    category   overrepresented    Lindia's

            circumstances,  so as to  make his case  "unusual," we remand

            for its determination of this issue.11

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                      For  the  foregoing  reasons, we  affirm  in  part,
                                                        ______

            vacate  in part  and remand  for proceedings  consistent with
            ______               ______

                                
            ____________________

            11.  The government, both in its brief  and at oral argument,
            conceded that the court  had the authority to depart  on this
            basis  and   stated  that,   should  we  agree,   remand  for
            resentencing would be appropriate.

                                         -24-
                                          24

            this opinion.

                                         -25-
                                          25