Court Opinion

ID: 9593245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:56.534725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:21.017522
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). In this action for a declaratory judgment, the Court of Appeals concluded that bodily injuries suffered by police officers Don A. Czopek and Herdis B. Petty in an affray with the insured, Arthur A. Smith, either were not the result of an "occurrence” or were "expected or intended” by Smith, and directed entry of summary disposition for Group Insurance Company of Michigan. I would reverse and remand for trial.
I
Smith, who was then eighteen, walked home at 11:30 p.m. from a New Year’s Eve party on December 31, 1983. He was "extremely drunk,” having consumed, in two and one-half hours, eight twelve-ounce beers and a pint of peppermint schnapps — less four shots a friend drank. He was walking down the middle of the road, weaving *616from side to side, staggering and falling, and interfering with the flow of traffic.
Czopek, patrolling in a squad car, observed Smith. Czopek stopped his vehicle on the side of the road and, when Smith walked alongside, told him, "get off the road. You’re going to get hit.”1 Czopek did not identify himself, and Smith did not immediately recognize him, as a police officer. Smith swore at Czopek and kept walking. Czopek again told Smith to get off the road. Smith again swore at Czopek, and kept walking. Czopek called for backup, parked his vehicle, and walked up to Smith, who began screaming that he had to get home or his dad would kill him. Smith then began to run.2 Czopek recognized that Smith was "extremely drunk.”
Czopek and backup officer Petty followed Smith. They caught up with him where he had stopped to rest and was leaning against an automobile. Smith testified that a man jumped on his back. He had not identified himself as a police officer.3 Then another man came up in front of him. By then, Smith recognized the men as police officers.
Czopek and Petty attempted to place Smith in a squad car, but he refused. Smith testified he told *617them that all he wanted to do was go home. He also testified that he knew he was "resisting arrest” by refusing to enter the squad car. Smith further testified that, to prevent the officers from placing him in the vehicle, he braced himself against the car with his feet and hands. Czopek testified that as the officers attempted to handcuff Smith, he fell to the ground and began swinging his arms and kicking his feet so that they could not get near him. .
While Smith was on the ground, Petty grabbed Smith’s left arm, and Czopek grabbed his right arm. When Smith attempted to get up from the ground, Czopek slipped and fell, and Smith jerked his right arm loose from Czopek’s grip. Petty testified that Smith’s arm, when he jerked it free from Czopek’s grasp, struck Petty in the chest with enough force to break his ribs.4
*618After three more officers arrived, the police were able to handcuff Smith and place him in a squad car. Petty sat in the back seat with Smith, and according to Smith Petty put his finger in Smith’s mouth. Smith testified that he believed Petty would "yank the side of [his] face off,” and to prevent that he bit Petty’s hand.
The officers took between thirty and sixty minutes to secure Smith and place him in the squad car. He was transported to jail. He threatened suicide, and was placed in a padded cell and monitored. Czopek observed Smith try to stuff a mattress in his mouth, and threaten to hang himself.
Czopek was later treated for frostbitten fingers and ears. Petty was treated for broken ribs and given a tetanus shot for the bite.
Smith was charged with two counts of assault and battery, disorderly conduct, and interfering with a police officer. He pleaded guilty to and was convicted of reduced charges of disorderly conduct and assault and battery, was fined $250, and was placed on probation.
Czopek and Petty commenced an action against Smith, seeking damages for personal injury. Smith tendered the defense to Group Insurance, his parents’ homeowner insurer.5 Group Insurance commenced this action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a determination that it was not required to defend.
The circuit judge granted Group’s motion for summary disposition regarding the officers’ assault and battery claim, but denied summary disposition *619regarding the negligence claim. The Court of Appeals ordered entry of summary disposition with respect to both claims. This Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Metropolitan Property & Liabilitys Ins Co v DiCicco, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), and directed the Court of Appeals to "discuss whether forcibly resisting arrest is an 'accident’ within the meaning of the insurance policy’s definition of 'occurrence,’ regardless of whether the resultant bodily injury was expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.” The Court of Appeals again found that Group Insurance is not required to defend.6
II
The majority disposes of this case on the ground that there was no "occurrence” as that term is defined in the policy. The majority finds, on the basis of Smith’s admission during deposition that he intended to resist arrest, that "forcibly resisting arrest is not an 'accident’ within the meaning of the insurance policy’s definition of 'occurrence.’ ” The majority concludes that because there was no "occurrence” as that term is defined in the policy, coverage for the officers’ injuries is barred by the policy.7
*620The majority further states, as a matter of public policy, that voluntary intoxication cannot be permitted as a defense to the operative effect of the exclusion.
Three issues are raised under the language of the policy in the circumstances of this case:
—Whether the alleged assault is an "occurrence,” that is, an "accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results ... in bodily injury.”
—If the alleged assault is an occurrence, whether coverage is nonetheless excluded because it resulted in "bodily injury . . . that is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured.”
—Whether the insured’s voluntary intoxication *621may have so diminished his capacity to expect or intend that the exclusion does not apply.
III
In DiCicco, this Court considered an identical homeowner’s policy. The lead, albeit dissenting, opinion in DiCicco concluded that the "proper construction of a contract requires that we first determine whether coverage exists, and then whether an exclusion precludes coverage. . . . Accordingly, we must determine first whether the . . . incident constituted an 'occurrence.’ ” Id. at 668.8
The policy provides coverage for personal injuries caused by an "occurrence,” defined as "an accident . . . which results ... in bodily injury . . . .” This definition does not include the limitation or clarification that the event is to be viewed from the "standpoint of the Insured.”9
In DiCicco, the incident was the stabbing of one *622student by another during a fight. The lead/dissenting opinion declared that "occurrence” "must be broadly construed,” and that "accident,” in the definition of "occurrence,” was not restricted to "unintentional” actions.10 The lead/dissenting opinion characterized that the incident in DiCicco as "not clear cut enough” for the Court to conclude that there was not an "occurrence.”11 The signers of the plurality opinion agreed.12
Consistent with the view of the signers of both the lead/dissenting and the plurality opinions in DiCicco, I would similarly construe "occurrence” and conclude, in the instant case, that the incident was "not clear cut enough” to permit this Court to conclude there was not an occurrence.
IV
The policy excludes from coverage "bodily *623injury . . . which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured.”
In DiCicco, the signers of the plurality opinion ruled that an identical exclusionary clause was unambiguous, and clearly provided that whether an injury was intended or expected was to be determined from the subjective standpoint of the insured.13 The signers of the plurality opinion *624ruled that to apply the exclusion on the facts of that case,14 the Court "need only determine whether [the victim’s] injury was either expected or intended from the standpoint of [the insured].”15
*625V
The majority finds that Smith resisted arrest.16 I agree that there is evidence that would support a finding by the trier of fact that Smith "resisted arrest.”17 I do not agree, however, that such evidence requires a finding, as a matter of law, that Smith intended to injure Czopek or Petty.
Whether Smith subjectively "intended or expected injury” for the purposes of the exclusion *626depends, under the analysis of the plurality opinion in DiCicco,18 on whether his actions are seen as involving an intentional act with unintended results, or as an intended act from which injury must result.
I conclude, in light of the cases cited by the plurality in DiCicco as illustrative of these two kinds of cases,19 and in light of the holding in DiCicco where the insured walked back into a fight "brandishing” an open weapon, that on the record so far made this Court could not appropriately find that Smith intended an act "the result of which injury can only occur” and therefore presume that he intended the injury.
VI
Courts in other jurisdictions construing this clause in the context of bodily injuries caused by an insured’s assault have held that injuries were "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured”20 where the insured intentionally struck *627or punched the victim. These cases illustrate the second category of cases described by the plurality in DiCicco, where the insured’s actions were such that it might be said, "the result of which injury can only occur.”
Where, however, the circumstances are such that, although the insured intended the assault, there is a factual question whether the insured intended the resulting injury, courts have concluded that the question whether the injuries were "expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” must be resolved by the trier of fact.21
*628Smith testified during deposition that he did not intend to injure Czopek or Petty. He said that he did not kick or punch the officers, but was using his hands and feet alternately to brace himself to prevent the officers from pushing him into the squad car, or, when he was on the ground, to keep them from handcuffing him, and to keep them away from him. He said he was unaware of the subfreezing temperatures.
Czopek and Petty both testified during deposition that Smith did not kick or punch them, although Smith swung his arms and kicked his legs in an effort to prevent them from approaching him.
This Court cannot appropriately decide as a matter of law that Smith acted with the intention of injuring Czopek or Petty or that his actions were such that the result must have been injury to them.
VII
The majority further concludes, as a matter of public policy, that 'voluntary intoxication cannot provide a factual basis for denying the operative effect of the exclusionary clause.22
The majority relies on Allstate Ins Co v Sherrill, 566 F Supp 1286 (ED Mich, 1983).23 I have found decisions in two other states that also have con-*629eluded that voluntary intoxication "was of no consequence” and may not preclude, in a particular situation, a finding that the insured did not expect or intend injury.24
The majority of. courts in other jurisdictions, however, have held that voluntary intoxication may provide a factual predicate for a determination that injuries were not expected or intended.
In the specific factual situation here presented, where the insured was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault, most courts have held that intoxication may destroy, for purposes of the exclusion, the capacity to form the requisite intent.25
Thus, in Burd v Sussex Mut Ins Co, 56 NJ 383, 386; 267 A2d 7 (1970), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that where a drunken insured was convicted of "atrocious assault and battery,” coverage for the resulting civil claim was not necessarily barred by the exclusion.26 The court said that *630the insured’s conviction for assault and battery did not collaterally estop him from asserting that his voluntary intoxication was such that he could not form the intent to injure.27
The court said it was the insurer’s burden to establish that the insured, despite his intoxication, formed the requisite intent to injure the victim.
VIII
I conclude that the factual situation in this case is not clear enough to allow this Court to say that there was no occurrence, as that term is defined in the policy. I conclude further that Smith’s actions, even if characterized as resisting arrest, do not require a determination as a matter of law that he intended thereby to injure Czopek and Petty. In light of Smith’s testimony that he did not intend to injure Czopek or Petty, it is a question of fact whether, assessing the extent to which he was intoxicated, he had formed, or was capable of forming, the requisite intent to injure Czopek or Petty.
I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial._

 When asked whether he was going to arrest Smith, Czopek responded:
I don’t know. At this point I didn’t know. I had no idea. I was more or less concerned with his safety. I was trying to find out who he was and where he lived, maybe get him home.

 Smith was asked during deposition whether he "took off running,” and nodded his head affirmatively. He was then asked, "Why did you do that?” to which he responded, " ’Cause I didn’t want to get taken to jail, so I took off running.”
Earlier, Smith had given a statement to an investigator. He was asked, "Did you know that they were police officers?” and responded "Not really.”

 Petty said that he did not identify himself as a police officer and, as far as he was aware, neither did any of the others.

 On deposition, Smith testified as follows:
Q. Do you remember kicking anybody?
A. No.
Q. Did you hit anybody?
A. No.
Q. When you were on the ground trying to prevent them from throwing you into the police car, were you kicking on the ground?
A. No. I was just putting my feet up against the door and not letting them push me in the car.
I didn’t think I did any harm to any of the police officers. The next day, after they told me I did harm to some of the police officers, it was kind of hard to believe that. I didn’t have any intent to do that to any of the police officers.
Q. But you did intend to resist being arrested, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened to you after you got into the police car?
A. Then they handcuffed me finally and they threw me in the car and took me down to the Woodhaven Police Station.
Q. How long would you estimate it took them to get you in the police car?
A. Half an hour, 45 minutes.
Q. You did quite a bit of resisting then if it took them a half an hour, 45 minutes, wouldn’t you say?
*618A. Well, not exactly, because at first it was only two cops, and I was trying to talk to them.

 Smith resided with his parents and was covered by the policy of insurance.

 The Court of Appeals said that injuries suffered in the course of an intoxicated person’s resisting arrest are not the result of an "accident” within the meaning of "occurrence.” Further, the Court of Appeals said that voluntary intoxication that induces violent behavior and results in injury cannot be the basis of a claim that the behavior and resulting harm was accidental.

 The policy provides:
COVERAGE E — PERSONAL LIABILITY
This Company agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage, to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence. This *620Company shall have the right and duty, at its own expense, to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of Such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, but may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. This Company shall not be obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of this Company’s liability has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
5. "occurrence”: means an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property damage.
EXCLUSIONS
This policy does not apply:
1. Under Coverage e — Personal Liability and Coverage f— Medical Payments to Others:
f. to bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured.

 DiCicco was consolidated with Allstate Ins v Freeman. Five opinions were written in the two consolidated cases. The lead opinion, insofar as it concerned DiCicco, was written by Chief Justice Riley and signed by Justice Griffin. The plurality opinion in DiCicco, written by Justice Boyle, was signed by Justice Brickley, with whom Justices Levin, Cavanagh and Archer concurred.

 The term "occurrence” is defined as "an accident” that results "in bodily injury or property damage.” See n 7 for text.
In deciding whether an assault is an occurrence within the terms of the policy, a crucial question is from whose standpoint the assault is to be viewed. From the standpoint of the insured, an assault is an intentional act. But from the standpoint of the injured party, the assault may well be an unforeseen, unexpected and unanticipated event. See 11 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), §§ 44:298, 44:300, pp 465-467, 469-470; anno: 72 ALR3d 1090.
Some courts have ruled that whether an event is an accident is to be determined from the standpoint of the injured party. See Georgia Casualty Co v Alden Mills, 156 Miss 853; 127 So 555 (1930). Other courts have held that the issue is to be determined from the standpoint of the insured. See Sontag v Galer, 279 Mass 309; 181 NE 182 (1932). This split of authority led one commentator to observe that
in response to the conflicting results which may be reached, *622depending upon whether the assault is viewed from the standpoint of the victim or from that of the assailant, recent years have seen the development of a policy form which covers bodily injuries resulting from an "accident” which was "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” [72 ALR3d 1090, 1096.]
Where the policy defines "occurrence” to mean an accident "from the standpoint of the insured,” courts will determine from the standpoint of the insured whether an event is an occurrence. See Briscoe v Travelers Indemnity Co, 18 Wash App 662; 571 P2d 226 (1977).

 The lead opinion summarized events that constitute an "accident”:
"[A]n accident is an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected.” Accordingly, we find that ascertaining the insured’s "intent” may determine whether the insured’s actions constituted an "accident,” but it does not necessarily follow that an insured must act unintentionally for an act to be an "occurrence.” [Id. at 670.]

 Id. at 672.

 Id. at 706.

 The plurality opinion in DiCicco noted that there are two distinguishable classes of cases under the standard exclusion used in DiCicco — identical to the exclusion in the instant case. The first class involves those cases where the insured intended the act, but did not intend the injury. The second class involves those cases where- the insured intended the act, "the result of which injury can only occur.” 432 Mich 719.
In the first class of cases — intended act, but unintended injuries— injury is said to be "caused intentionally” within the meaning of the clause so as to preclude coverage "if the insured intended the act and to cause some kind of bodily injury or damage . . . .” Id. at 718. Asking whether the insured subjectively "expected or intended” the injuries resulting from his intentional acts, courts have found (see DiCicco for case citations) there was coverage where
—the insured intentionally burned his property, but without the intent to cause injury or damage, but in fact caused injury or damage;
—the insureds intentionally pointed their guns, but either the discharge of the gun, or the striking of the injured party was unintentional.
In the second class of cases — intended act of the sort from which injury must result — courts presume or infer from the circumstances that the insured intended the resulting injury or damage. Courts have presumed (see DiCicco for case citations) that the insured intended his intentional act to result in injury where
—the insured placed a loaded gun to the victim’s head and pulled the trigger;
—the insured intended to have sexual intercourse with his minor stepdaughter;
—the insured intended to strike his victim in the face with a closed fist.
In DiCicco, the insured, a college student, scuffled with another student. The fight came to an abrupt end. DiCicco returned to his room, and the other student walked down the hallway. DiCicco came out of his room holding an open hunting knife and called the other student offensive names. The other student returned to the hall, saw *624the knife, and challenged DiCicco to use the knife. DiCicco responded by poking the student in the chest with his empty hand while holding the open knife in his other hand. DiCicco backed the student against the wall. The student reacted, and in the scuffle that followed DiCicco stabbed the student in the stomach.
The trial court found:
"DiCicco denies any intent to use the knife, claiming that he went to get the knife merely to scare away the other persons he considered to be a threat. No one observed him make a gesture of moving the knife as though to stab Gravenmier. The knife was held in his right hand and the poking was done with his left. DiCicco denies knowledge of in fact stabbing. Immediately following the stabbing, DiCicco looked-shocked. Gravenmier obviously did not expect DiCicco would use the knife or he would not have engaged in his act of bravado.” [432 Mich 664, 710.]
Relying on those findings, the plurality found that "[i]t is obvious that these findings will not require the conclusion that DiCicco expected or intended to injure [the other student],” and that it could not be said that "brandishing a knife always results in injury — that DiCicco’s actions preclude coverage as a matter of law.” Id. at 710, 720. The plurality concluded, therefore, that the exclusionary clause was not relevant, and the insurer was bound to provide a defense to DiCicco in the underlying tort claim.
The lead opinion, in dissent, would have held that "if the court determines .that the insured acted intentionally, then the 'expected or intended’ language is satisfied by a finding that injury resulted as the 'natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipated’ consequence of those intentional acts.” Id. at 676. The lead opinion would have found that the facts, as presented in DiCicco, presented "the ideal circumstances in which a trial court should infer the insured’s subjective intentions as a matter of law.” Id. at 679. (Emphasis added.) Further, the lead opinion found that DiCicco’s claim that he did not expect or intend injury to result from his conduct "flies in the face of all reason, common sense and experience.” Id. at 682.

 Seen 13.

 In Allstate v Freeman (DiCicco), supra at 710, the lead opinion, acknowledged in dissent, "[t]here is precedential authority in this jurisdiction which holds that under [the] exclusion ... an insured must subjectively intend both his act and the resulting injury in order to avoid its duty to defend and indemnify.” Id. at 672. See Morrill v Gallagher, 370 Mich 578, 583; 122 NW2d 687 (1963), and Putman v Zeluff, 372 Mich 553; 127 NW2d 374 (1964). The lead opinion rejected this authority.
*625In Morrill, the insured threw a cherry bomb into a co-worker’s office intending to frighten him. The co-worker suffered severe hearing damage and a nervous disorder as a result. The homeowner’s policy excluded coverage for injuries caused intentionally or at the direction of the insured. This Court held:
Some emphasis is placed on exclusion (c) on the ground that in the instant case the firecracker was thrown intentionally. Unquestionably such was the case, but it will be noted that under the language of the excluding clause the injury must be caused "intentionally.” There is nothing in this case to justify a conclusion that [the insured] intended to cause any physical harm to plaintiff. [370 Mich 588.]
In Putman v Zeluff, supra at 555, the insured’s son shot a dog while on an overnight camping trip. The barking dog, a valuable hunting dog, was rushing toward the campfire. The son shot in the dog’s direction, and hit the dog. He intended to shoot, and intended to shoot in the dog’s direction. The insured was covered by a homeowner’s policy containing an exclusion for " 'injuries] . . . caused intentionally by . . . the insured.’ ” This Court, citing Morrill, held that it was a question of fact whether the son — when he shot in the direction of the dog — intended to destroy it. This Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that he did not so intend.

 The majority states:
In his deposition, Mr. Smith admitted that he intended to prevent the arrest. His actions, biting and swinging his arms and legs, were intended to make it impossible for the officers to easily get him into the squad car and on his way to the police station. Because of Arthur Smith’s admission in his deposition, we are unwilling to conclude that his resisting arrest, which resulted in injuries to the policemen, was an "accident.” [Ante, p 598.]

 Smith’s statement that he resisted arrest, a legal conclusion by a layman, is not judicially binding, and may not even be relevant or material except as a layman’s description of his conduct.

 See n 13.

 Id.

 Holman v Alabama Farm Bureau Mut Casualty Ins Co, 476 So 2d 107 (Ala, 1985), where the insured, engaging in armed robbery, forced the victim’s car off the road, repeatedly hit the victim, and set fire to his car; Clark v Allstate Ins Co, 22 Ariz App 601; 529 P2d 1195 (1975), where the insured intentionally struck the victim in the face; Steinmetz v Nat’l American Ins Co, 121 Ariz 268; 589 P2d 911 (1978), where the insured punched the victim in the face; Abbott v Western Nat’l Indemnity Co, 165 Cal App 2d 302; 331 P2d 997 (1958), where the insured brutally beat and kicked the victim even after he lay helpless on the ground; Hartford Fire Ins Co v Spreen, 343 So 2d 649 (Fla App, 1977), where the insured walked over to the victim, swung at him, and struck him in the face; Maxson v Farmers Ins of Idaho, Inc, 107 Idaho 1043; 695 P2d 428 (1985), where the insured punched the victim in the face; Mid America Fire & Marine Ins Co v Smith, 109 Ill App 3d 1121; 441 NE2d 949 (1982), where the insured kicked the victim in the head; Home Ins Co v Neilsen, 165 Ind App 445; 332 NE2d 240 (1975), where the insured struck the victim in the face with a fist; Lawrence v Moore, 362 So 2d 803 (La App, 1978), lv gtd 365 So 2d 230 (La, 1978), dis 368 So 2d 121 (La, 1979), where the insured *627punched the victim twice in the face; Smith v Senst, 313 NW2d 202 (Minn, 1981), the insured struck the victim in the face, fracturing his jaw; Mutual Service Casualty Ins Co v McGehee, 219 Mont 304; 711 P2d 826 (1985), where the insured deliberately punched the victim in the face; Jones v Norval, 203 Neb 549; 279 NW2d 388 (1979), where the insured intentionally hit the victim in the face with his fist and rendered him unconscious; Vittum v New Hampshire Ins Co, 117 NH 1; 369 A2d 184 (1977), where the insured punched the victim and clubbed him with a two-by-four; New York Casualty Ins Co v Ward, 139 AD2d 922; 527 NYS2d 913 (1988), where the insured punched the victim; Wear v Farmers Ins Co of Washington, 49 Wash App 655; 745 P2d 526 (1987), where the insured shoved the victim, then hit him with his fists and knocked him out; Pendergraft v Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co, 342 F2d 427 (CA 10, 1965), where the insured came up behind the victim, spun him around, and punched him.

 See Morrill v Gallagher, n 15 supra; Quincy Mut Fire Ins Co v Abernathy, 393 Mass 81; 469 NE2d 797 (1984) (a factual question with regard to the subjective state of mind was presented where the defendant admitted that he intentionally threw a rock at a moving car, but denied that he intentionally sought to injure anyone; summary judgment in favor of the insurer was reversed); Farmers Ins Exchange v Sipple, 255 NW2d 373 (Minn, 1977), where the insured exchanged heated words with the victim, and then struck him with his fist, injuring him, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly submitted the issue of intent to injure to the jury because assault and battery was not within the exclusion unless a reason for the act is to injure, or the character of the act is such that intent to injure can be inferred; Hartford Fire Ins Co v Blakeney, 340 So 2d 754 (Ala, 1976), where the insured pushed a house guest out a doorway, and he fell backward and sustained serious brain injuries, the court held that it was a question for the jury whether the insured expected or intended injury to result from this intentional act; Rambin v Wood, 355 So 2d 561 (La App, 1978), where the insured came up behind the victim who was riding a small tractor and pushed or struck him from the rear, the victim’s leg was injured when he fell off *628the tractor, affirming the trial court’s ruling that the act was intentional, but that the injury was not; Home Indemnity Co v Politte, 602 SW2d 943 (Mo App, 1980).

 The majority opines "[further, to allow voluntary intoxication as a defense in a civil action is also unjust. ... To allow such a defense would be to create the ability to act unwisely without the requisite financial responsibility.” Ante, p 601.
This analysis ignores that insurance coverage is in general a matter of contract, not public policy, while criminal responsibility is a matter of legislative and, therefore, public policy.

 Ante, p 599.

 See Hanover Ins Co v Newcomer, 585 SW2d 285, 289 (Mo App, 1979); Travelers Ins Co v Cole, 631 SW2d 661, 664 (Mo App, 1982); American Family Mut Ins Co v Peterson, 405 NW2d 418 (Minn, 1987); Economy Fire & Casualty Ins Co v Meyer, 427 NW2d 742 (Minn App, 1988).
See also Allstate Ins Co v Hampton, 173 Mich App 65; 433 NW2d 334 (1988), cited by the majority.

 See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Morgan, 185 Ga App 377; 364 SE2d 62 (1987), aff’d 258 Ga 276; 368 SE2d 509 (1988); NN v Moraine Mut Ins Co, 153 Wis 2d 84; 450 NW2d 445 (1990); Parkinson v Farmers Ins Co, 122 Ariz 343; 594 P2d 1039 (1979); Transamerica Ins Co v Thrift-Mart, Inc, 159 Ga App 874; 285 SE2d 566 (1981); Badger Mut Ins Co v Murry, 54 Ill App 3d 459; 370 NE2d 295 (1977); Burd v Sussex Mut Ins Co, 56 NJ 383; 267 A2d 7 (1970); Garden State Fire & Casualty Co v Keefe, 172 NJ Super 53; 410 A2d 718 (1980); Kenna v Griffin, 4 Wash App 2d 363; 481 P2d 450 (1971); U S F & G Ins Co v Brannan, 22 Wash App 2d 341; 589 P2d 817 (1979); Nettles v Evans, 303 So 2d 306 (La App, 1974); Perilloux v Nelson, 378 So 2d 551 (1979).

 The policy in Burd provided that the company would pay for all bodily injuries for which the insured was legally liable, but under a special exclusion stated that coverage did not apply to " 'bodily injury . . . caused intentionally by . . . the Insured.’ ” Id. at 387.

 This contrasts with the court’s reasoning in Allstate Ins Co v Sherrill, supra, relied on by the majority. There the court held that because Michigan does not permit voluntary intoxication to be interposed as a defense in a criminal case, this Court would not permit the exclusion to be avoided on the basis of voluntary intoxication. The court said that an insured should not be permitted to avail himself of insurance to escape his financial responsibilities.