Court Opinion

ID: 9460043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:38:53.672339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:26.804561
License: Public Domain

KOELSCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The district court determined that, under Hawaiian law, the doctrine of imputed negligence would apply in a joint venture having as its sole object the mutual pleasure of the venturers. This court disagrees on the ground that the doctrine is limited to joint ventures for pecuniary profit.
True, there is a line of authority reflected in some cases and texts cited by the majority which supports the view of *963the law adopted by this court, but that view is by no means universally held, nor is the underlying rationale irrefutable. To the contrary, many jurisdictions make no such distinction. They recognize the rule applied by the district court in this case; and the logic they employ is highly persuasive. Thus the fundamental concern of the courts which espouse the doctrine is not with the nature of the undertaking, but with the question whether the particular person who is prosecuting a claim, or against whom a claim is prosecuted, had a voice in the undertaking. In short, they look to see whether he shared a right to control the undertaking. Given “the essential element of joint control” [Dias v. Kamalani, 39 Haw. 474, 478 (1952)] these courts uniformly recognize that the doctrine of imputed negligence applies without regard to the nature of the venture. Dias v. Kamalani (supra); Wong v. McCandless, 31 Haw. 750 (1931); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968); Bagley v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 102 (La.App.1968); Hamilton v. Slover, 440 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.1969); Lollar v. Dewitt, 255 S.C. 452, 179 S.E.2d 607 (1971); McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Co., 356 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962); Wentworth v. Town of Waterbury, 90 Vt. 60, 96 A. 334 (1916). Their reasoning is based upon a fundamental principle of agency, applicable to the members of such ventures and reflected in the maxim “qui facit per alium facit per se.” 1
This court, until now, has consistently taken the position that, in diversity cases such as this, “The district court’s considered view as to the law of the state in which it sits is entitled to great weight, and will be accepted on review unless shown to be clearly wrong.” Bigjoe v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 28, 29, 30 (9th Cir. 1971); Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1969); Owens v. White, 380 F.2d 310, 313, 315 (9th Cir. 1967); Insurance Co. of North America v. Thompson, 381 F.2d 677, 681, 25 A.L.R.3d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1967); Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 377 F. 2d 525 (9th Cir. 1967); Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1965); see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 93 L.Ed. 1480 (1949). Being firmly convinced that the validity of the local district court’s ruling on this question of state law is, at the very least, fairly arguable, I defer to its determination and decline to join the majority in reversing the judgment for the golf course defendants.
The judgment should be affirmed in all respects.

. Of course the nature of the enterprise is important where the issue of control is factual, for as the Supreme Court of Hawaii pointed out in Dias v. Kamalani, supra at 478 of 39 Haw. “ . . . joint control in such cases is more readily inferable where the trip is for a business venture than wliere it is for a pleasure venture, since in the latter situation it is more difficult to raise a relationship higher than one of host and guest.” However, no such factual issue is presented here; the evidence showed plaintiffs’ right of control as a matter of law.