Court Opinion

ID: 9544562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:04.984258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:13.909762
License: Public Domain

HENDLEY, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in Points I, II and IV of Judge Hernandez’ opinion. I disagree with Point III for the following reasons.  It is well recognized that in attempting to determine the plain meaning of a statute, it is often necessary to consider the punctuation used by the Legislature. Moore v. Magor Car Corp., 27 N.J. 82, 141 A.2d 536 (1958). See also City of Indianapolis v. Ingram, 377 N.E.2d 877 (Ind.App. 1978); Hayes v. State, 247 A.2d 101 (Me. 1968); and General Motors Corp. v. Erves, 399 Mich. 241, 249 N.W.2d 41 (1976). A grammatical analysis is particularly appropriate where the core of the ambiguity revolves around punctuation. Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. State Dept. of Agriculture, 244 Or. 15, 415 P.2d 740 (1966). It is well established that where the Legislature uses commas, it seeks to create separate and independent parts. Curly’s Dairy, supra. In Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564 (Me. 1979), the Supreme Court of Maine stated: “A comma is generally used to indicate the separation of words, phrases, or clauses from others not closely connected in the structure of the sentence.” In the instant case, if the Legislature had intended the words “used for irrigation or stockwatering purposes” to modify all eight preceding parts of the sentence and thereby create an independent clause, it would have used a semicolon and not a comma to punctuate that section. See Drinkwater v. State, 69 Wis.2d 60, 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975). Therefore, a grammatical analysis, which both sides recognize as being dispositive, clearly warrants a finding in favor of the taxpayers. This view is supported by New Mexico’s long established rule that the meaning or area of application of a statute may be gleaned from its title. City of Las Cruces v. Davis, 87 N.M. 425, 535 P.2d 68 (Ct.App. 1975); Harriett v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958). The section in question is found under the following title: “Methods of valuation for property taxation purposes; general provisions.” If that section was to be limited to the two agricultural purposes discussed above, it would have more properly been placed within § 7-36-20, N.M.S.A. 1978, which is titled: “Special method of valuation; land used primarily for agricultural purposes.” By incorporating subsection C under the general provisions section, as opposed to the more specific agricultural purposes section, it is apparent that the terms listed in § 7-36-15(C) were intended to be given a broader application than given to them in Judge Hernandez’ opinion. This conclusion gains additional support by the fact that both §§ 7-36-15 and 7-36-20 were enacted by the Legislature the same day, as part of the same bill. See Laws of 1975, ch. 165, §§ 2 and 3.  A final reason is the long standing rule that any ambiguity in determining the appropriate means of valuating property for tax purposes is to be strictly construed against the state and resolved in favor of the taxpayer. See Westland Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 83 N.M. 29, 487 P.2d 1099 (Ct.App.1971); and Field Enterprises Educational Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 82 N.M. 24, 474 P.2d 510 (Ct.App.1970). Accordingly, the decision of the Director is reversed. IT IS SO ORDERED. ANDREWS, J., concurs.