Court Opinion

ID: 9673479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:41.971253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:42.097246
License: Public Domain

ARNOT, Chief Justice,
concurring.

Validity of Indictment

I concur that the members of the grand jury in this case were not disqualified from serving because they were not “complainants” under Article 19.08(8). I write separately to clarify my position.
The Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 8460 Auxiliary and the Comanche County Crime Stoppers, Inc. were two of the complainants named in the indictments. Tupin was foreman of the grand jury which indicted appellant. Tupin was not a member of the Comanche County Crime Stoppers, Inc. while he was on the grand jury but had been the nonprofit corporation’s president at the time of some of the offenses listed in the indictment. Evans was a member of the Comanche County Crime Stoppers, Inc. at the time he served on the grand jury which indicted appellant. Hodges was a member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars but was not a member of the Auxiliary.
Historically, bias or prejudice on the part of a person summoned as a grand juror, his forming an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, or his interest in a prosecution other than a direct pecuniary interest does not disqualify that person from serving on the grand jury. The theory has been that a grand jury is an accusatory not a judicial body. For example see Williams v. State, 167 Tex.Crim. 503, 321 S.W.2d 72 (1958); and Arnold v. State, 148 Tex.Crim. 310, 186 S.W.2d 995 (1945).
Certainly, one can propose different scenarios where a member of the grand jury is or is not qualified to serve. If a member owned insubstantial shares in a publicly traded company, that member of the grand jury would be qualified even though the company was the victim. However, a member or officer might be disqualified from serving as a grand juror if the defendant were being prosecuted for theft from a family business incorporated as a closely held business in which the member was the president. The question is whether the member or officer of the corporation is also the victim.
The more interesting question is whether, after the amendment of Article 19.08(8) in 1989, the purpose of the grand jury has begun to shift from being an accusatory body to becoming a body more similar to a petit jury in which the accused has the protection of an unbiased review. We find no cases addressing this question.
In Arnold, Arnold was convicted of cattle theft. Arnold objected that members of the grand jury were also members of the Texas & Southwestern Cattle Raisers’ Association. One of the purposes of the Association was to help investigate and prosecute cattle thefts. Representatives of the Association had actually initiated the criminal proceedings against Arnold. In Arnold, the court held that members of the Association were not disqualified from serving as grand jurors. In Williams, one grand juror, C.E. Smith, was a peace officer who assisted in the search for Williams and was present when Williams signed a confession. The court held that Smith was not disqualified from serving on the grand jury that indicted Williams. These holdings are consistent with the concept that a grand juror is an accusatory body. Both of these cases were decided before the amend*340ment of Article 19.08(8) became effective on September 1,1989.
In the case before us, the nonprofit corporations were the complainants, not their officers or members. Concerned citizens who donate their time and efforts to a nonprofit corporation for the prevention of crime might well be the same citizens who would be called upon to serve on a grand jury. Tupin, Evans, and Hodges did not sign the complaints in connection with the offenses named in the indictment. It would be unusual for a member of a nonprofit corporation to have a direct pecuniary interest in the corporation. I concur that the first point of error should be overruled and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.