Court Opinion

ID: 9410913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 07:00:14.134712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.859112
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ANTHONY GOMEZ,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          NY-1221-17-0105-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 24, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Alan E. Wolin, Esquire, Jericho, New York, for the appellant.

           Michael J. Berger, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the field office
     for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant most recently held the position of Deputy Facility Telehealth
     Coordinator. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 41 at 4, Tab 42 at 4. In or around
     June 2016, he filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC),
     alleging that the agency had engaged in a number of improprieties in retaliation
     for protected whistleblowing activity. IAF, Tab 12 at 16-32. OSC closed the
     complaint in January 2017, and this IRA appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 12
     at 33-46. The administrative judge found that the appellant met his jurisdictional
     burden, then developed the record and held a hearing, but denied the appellant ’s
     request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 58, Initial Decision (ID). She found that
     the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving that he made protected
     disclosures or otherwise engaged in protected activity. ID at 6 -11. The appellant
     has filed a petition for review.   Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.       The
     agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.
¶3        Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the
     Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if, after the appellant has e xhausted his
     administrative remedies before OSC, he makes nonfrivolous allegations that:
     (1) he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
     engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
     (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor
     in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R.
     230, ¶ 5 (2016). Once an appellant establishes jurisdiction over his IRA appeal,
     he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim, which he must prove by
     preponderant evidence. Id. If the appellant proves that his protected disclosure
     or activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him, the
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     agency is given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it
     would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected
     disclosure or activity. Id.

     The appellant failed to prove that he made a protected disclosure concerning the
     hiring of an Administrative Officer.
¶4         The appellant alleged that he made a protected disclosure in a series of
     meetings by expressing concerns to two individuals, the Associate Chief of Staff
     of Ambulatory Care (ACSAC) and the Deputy Facility Telehealth Coordinator
     (DFTC), about their plan for filling a position.      E.g., IAF, Tab 12 at 5-8.
     Specifically, he reportedly disclosed that they were improperl y trying to subvert
     veteran hiring preferences in order to place the DFTC in an Administrative
     Officer position. Id.
¶5         The administrative judge recognized that both of the alleged recipients
     denied having any knowledge of the disclosure, denied that the mee tings ever
     occurred, and denied that they concocted the plan described by the appellant. ID
     at 7-8 (citing IAF, Tab 50, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD1) (testimony of the
     DFTC), Tab 51, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD2) (testimony of the ACSAC)). She
     also recognized that while the appellant presented contrary testimony, there was
     no documentation or other corroborating evidence for either the disclosure or the
     meetings he described. ID at 6-8.
¶6         Faced with the conflicting testimony, the administrative judge properly
     analyzed witness credibility. ID at 8-9; see Hillen v. Department of the Army,
     35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (describing how an administrative judge must
     analyze witness credibility and providing a number of factors that may be
     relevant in doing so).    Most notably, the administrative judge found that the
     DFTC and the ACSAC both testified in a straightforward, unequivocal, and
     consistent manner, while the appellant’s testimony was vague, nonspecific, and
     speculative. ID at 8. Based on factors that included demeanor, the administrative
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     judge found the DFTC and the ACSAC credible, but found the appellant lacking
     credibility. ID at 8-9.
¶7         On review, the appellant reiterates his allegations about meetings with the
     ACSAC and the DFTC, their plan to subvert veteran hiring preferences, and his
     disclosure about the same. For the most part, his arguments on this matter mirror
     the ones he made below, without specifically addressing the administrative
     judge’s findings. Compare PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-11, with IAF, Tab 12 at 5-8,
     Tab 56 at 10-13.          Those that remain amount to disagreement with the
     administrative judge’s credibility determinations. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-29. For
     example, while the administrative judge found the appellant’s testimony about
     this alleged disclosure vague and nonspecific, the appellant asserts that he and his
     disclosure “were sufficiently specific and detailed.” Compare ID at 7, with PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 25. We are not persuaded. The appellant has not identified any
     substantive evidence in support of this alleged disclosure, nor has he presented
     any basis for overturning the administrative judge’s well-reasoned credibility
     findings regarding the same. See Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R.
     129, 133-34 (1980) (finding that mere disagreement with the administrative
     judge’s findings and credibility determinations does not warrant full review of the
     record by the Board), review denied, 669 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam);
     see also Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
     (recognizing that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
     findings if they are based on a witness’ demeanor and may only overturn them for
     “sufficiently sound” reasons).    The appellant has not presented, for example,
     documentary evidence showing that he made this disclosure and the contrary
     testimony of the DFTC and the ACSAC about the same was incorrect.

     The appellant failed to prove that his grievance is activity protected and within
     the purview of this IRA appeal.
¶8         Aside from the disclosure described above, the appellant asserted that there
     was a time during which he was temporarily detailed to the Lead Facility
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      Telehealth Coordinator (FTC) position and, as a result, he filed a grievance
      regarding his pay during that temporary detail. E.g., IAF, Tab 12 at 8-9. That
      grievance alleged that the agency violated a particular union contract provision by
      failing to pay him at a higher rate during the detail assignment. IAF, Tab 11,
      Subtab 4 at 30-31. The grievance was ultimately denied by an arbitrator.         Id.
      at 1-18.
¶9          While the appellant presented his grievance as additional protected act ivity,
      the administrative judge concluded that it fell outside the Board’s purview in this
      IRA appeal. ID at 9-10. She correctly recognized that the WPEA extended the
      Board’s jurisdiction over IRA appeals to claims of reprisal for filing a grievance
      only if that grievance sought to remedy whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8). Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7
      (2013). In other words, the administrative judge correctly determined that the
      Board cannot address allegations that the agency retaliated against the appellant
      for his grievance in this IRA appeal because that grievance did not seek to
      remedy whistleblower reprisal.
¶10         On review, the appellant reasserts that he filed the aforementioned
      grievance, and he summarily argues that both the grievance and his associated
      testimony were protected activity. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12, 27. However, he
      has not presented any basis for us to reach a conclusion different from the
      administrative judge. He has not shown that his grievance sought to remedy a
      violation of section 2302(b)(8), so he has not shown that it falls within the
      Board’s jurisdiction over IRA appeals.

      Remand is required for the administrative judge to address another alleged
      disclosure.
¶11         Below, the administrative judge issued an order explaining the Board’s
      limited jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 3. That detailed order directed the appellant to file
      a statement, accompanied by evidence, listing the following: (1) his protected
      disclosures or activities; (2) the dates he made the disclosures or engaged in the
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      activities; (3) the individuals to whom he made any disclosures; (4) why his belief
      in the truth of any disclosures was reasonable; (5) the actions the agency took or
      failed to take, or threatened to take or fail to take, against him because of his
      disclosures or activities; (6) why he believes a disclosure or activity, or a
      perception of such a disclosure or activity, was a contributing factor to the
      actions; and (7) the date of his complaint to OSC and the date that it notified him
      it was terminating its investigation of his complaint, or if he had not received
      such notice, evidence that 120 days have passed since he filed his complaint with
      OSC. Id. at 7.
¶12         Rather than clearly listing the requested information, the a ppellant’s
      representative responded with a narrative that is somewhat difficult to follow.
      IAF, Tab 12 at 4-13.        Nevertheless, within both that narrative and the
      accompanying OSC correspondence, there is an allegation that the appellant had
      discussions with the ACSAC and the Deputy Chief of Ambulatory Services about
      his temporary detail to the Lead FTC position. Id. at 9-10, 30-31. According to
      the appellant, he “was very vocal in claiming that management was acting
      improperly by continuing the Lead FTC position as a Title 38 position and in
      refusing to convert it to a Title 5 position, at [his] great disadvantage.”     Id.
      at 9-10, 30.     Concerning this matter, the appellant further alleged that he
      “certainly opined that management was acting in violation of regulation and
      policy and were abusing their authority and engaging in mismanagement.”         Id.
      at 10, 30.
¶13         It appears that neither the agency nor the administrative judge recognized
      this allegation as another potential disclosure. See, e.g., IAF, Tabs 14-15, 57.
      The confusion is understandable, because the appellant seems to have
      simultaneously alleged that the agency’s actions surrounding the Lead FTC
      position amounted to reprisal for the alleged disclosures and activities discussed
      above, and that it was the basis of an additional disclosure. Nevertheless, the
      appellant did continue to pursue the matter, as demonstrated by his reiterating the
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      same alleged disclosure in his prehearing submission and post -hearing
      summation. IAF, Tab 42 at 6-7, Tab 56 at 14-15. The appellant has raised the
      matter again on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-13, 27-28.
¶14        An initial decision must identify all material issues of fact and law,
      summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
      administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests.       Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980). Because the administrative judge did
      not address this additional alleged disclosure, we find it appropriate to remand the
      appeal for further adjudication. 2      See Mastrullo v. Department of Labor,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 14 (2015) (remanding an IRA appeal for further adjudication
      when the initial decision failed to address each of the disclosures exhausted
      before OSC).
¶15        On remand, the administrative judge should permit the parties to submit
      additional argument and determine whether the submission of additional evidence
      (including additional hearing testimony) is necessary. See Ryan v. Department of
      the Air Force, 117 M.S.P.R. 362, ¶¶ 9-10, 15 (2012) (instructing an
      administrative judge to determine whether the submission of ad ditional evidence,
      such as hearing testimony, was necessary on remand after he failed to adjudicate
      all of the alleged personnel actions).       In her remand initial decision, the
      administrative judge may incorporate her prior findings concerning the
      Administrative Officer disclosure and grievance activity. See supra ¶¶ 4-10. The
      remand initial decision must, however, also address the alleged Lead FTC
      disclosure. See supra ¶¶ 12-13.

      2
        In light of our findings, it would be premature for us to consider the appellant’s
      arguments concerning the contributing factor requirement or the agency’s burden, if he
      were to present a prima facie case of reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-20, 29.
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                                            ORDER
¶16        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 3

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      3
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.