Court Opinion

ID: 9661890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:54:02.917403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.896983
License: Public Domain

*69OPINION
ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge.
The appellant claims that our original opinion was mistaken in stating that two photographs were introduced in evidence. We have read the parts of the transcript to which the appellant points. Despite his argument, it is clear to us that the trial court overruled his objections to the admission of the photographs. Then the State asked the court “to consider the description [of the appellant] along with the photo.” The appellant asked, “Has that been admitted?” The trial court replied, “No, sir,” and made remarks to the effect that “it” had not been offered. Our understanding of this passage is that it was the “description,” not the photographs, which were excluded from evidence. The trial court’s order expressly states that the State introduced a photograph. The panel’s opinion was correct, and the evidence of identity was sufficient.
The appellant now raises, for the first time, two constitutional claims. The first is that the application of Illinois’ murder statute would constitute an ex post facto law. This claim evidently is based on one of the supporting papers which is attached to the governor’s warrant, in which the State’s Attorney of Cook County, Illinois, set out the text of the murder statute. That instrument concludes, “Amended by P.A. 77-2638, Par. 1, eff. Jan. 1,1973.” The offense in question was alleged to have occurred on or about July 29, 1972. But a 1973 amendment to part of the statute does not mean that every application of the statute is an ex post facto law. In fact, Public Act 77-2638 amended only the penalty provision of the murder statute; the substantive offense was not affected. See 1972 Illinois Laws 1717, 1719 (P.A. 77—2638, section 1). The papers “substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that State,” as required by V.A.C.C.P., Article 51.13, Section 3. The citation to a change in the penalty provisions does not show an ex post facto application of the law.
The second constitutional claim is that the Illinois “statute which forms the basis of this charge has been ruled unconstitutional” in People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 Ill.2d 353, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975). The claim is simply wrong. That opinion held that a related statute, which established procedures for assessing the death penalty, was unconstitutional. The respondents were held to be liable to terms of imprisonment for murder. The statute defining murder was not affected. There is no showing that the statute which the appellant is alleged to have violated is unconstitutional.
Finally, the appellant reurges his contention that the trial court erred in denying bail without a hearing. He argues that the issue is not moot, for his argument applies to other persons similarly situated.
We agree that the trial court could not have found that this was a capital case where the proof was evident. It was error to deny bail without a hearing. See Ex parte Quinn, 549 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.1977); V.A.C.C.P., Article 44.35. But this failure does not call for reversal. Ex parte Quinn, supra. No relief accrues to the appellant. *
The motion for rehearing is denied.

 It will be noticed that this is an appeal. The appellant did not invoke this Court’s original powers to order the trial court to hold a hearing or to set reasonable bail.