Court Opinion

ID: 9543419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:29.334361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:19.743645
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
Appellant Robert L. Holbrook was arrested and charged with the murder of Elsie Olmeda and numerous other offenses in connection with her death. Holbrook waived trial and entered a plea of guilty to murder and conspiracy generally and a degree-of-guilt hearing was scheduled. Following the degree-of-guilt hearing, Holbrook was found guilty of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, robbery, burglary, and possessing an instrument of crime, generally. Holbrook received a sentence of life imprisonment on the murder conviction, concurrent terms of five to ten years for the conspiracy conviction, and ten to twenty years on the robbery conviction. The remaining sentences for the burglary and possession convictions were suspended. Holbrook now brings this direct appeal. We are asked to consider the following issues:
1. Did the trial court err in finding Holbrook guilty of first-degree murder at the degree-of-guilt hearing?
2. Did the trial court err in denying Holbrook’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and/or further err in denying Holbrook’s motion for a new degree-of-guilt hearing based upon his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness?
A review of the record reveals that the evidence presented before the trial court was sufficient to sustain a finding of murder in the first degree. The test to be conducted in response to a claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict is well established:
The test for the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether the evidence is sufficient to prove every *391element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder properly could have based its verdict.
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 430, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989) (citations omitted). The mens rea required for first-degree murder is specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Cain, 349 Pa.Super. 500, 503 A.2d 959 (1986). The specific intent to kill may be established solely from circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Jones, 391 Pa.Super. 292, 570 A.2d 1338 (1990), alloc. denied, 528 Pa. 608, 596 A.2d 155 (1991). A conviction for conspiracy to commit a crime may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiratorial activity, and from the relationship, conduct and overt acts of the parties. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 381 Pa.Super. 1, 552 A.2d 1064 (1988), alloc. denied, 524 Pa. 616, 571 A.2d 379 (1989).
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, the record establishes the following: Holbrook, 16 years old at the time the incident occurred, had been selling drugs for co-conspirator George Padilla for about three months. Holbrook feared Padilla and was aware of Padilla’s reputation as a “hitman.” On the night of Ms. Olmeda’s murder, Holbrook met up with the other co-conspirators outside of Padilla’s home. Padilla was a relative of Olmeda’s. They agreed that they would rob Ms. Olmeda as her husband was incarcerated and she would be home alone with her children. The defendants drove together to Olmeda’s home and forced their way into the residence by pushing Olmeda onto the floor. Once inside, the co-conspirators dragged Olmeda up her hall stairs to the second floor. The co-conspirators immediately began to beat Olmeda and demanded that she give them money. While the co-conspirators were beating Olmeda on the second floor, Holbrook was told to stay downstairs and guard Olmeda’s sleeping child on the couch. *392Olmeda’s other child was locked in a closet. After finding the money, the co-conspirators set out to kill Olmeda to prevent her from identifying her perpetrators. The co-conspirators tried strangling and stabbing Olmeda. One of the co-conspirators came down to the first floor and got a knife from the kitchen. Later, Holbrook went to the kitchen and retrieved an extension cord and threw it up to the co-conspirators on the second floor. This cord was one of the objects used to kill Olmeda. The co-conspirators hogtied Olmeda’s hands and feet, tied her to the banister and then repeatedly strangled and stabbed her. During this murderous episode, Holbrook listened to the “noises” and maintained his position as guard over the child who awoke during the commotion.
Suddenly, all the noises stopped and the co-conspirators began to descend from the second floor. One co-conspirator had blood on his sleeve. Holbrook admits at that point he thought that Olmeda had been killed. Olmeda was found with a telephone cord wrapped around her neck, multiple stab wounds and the knife lodged in her throat. She was unable to be resuscitated and died on the way to the hospital. An autopsy revealed that she had died from strangulation and multiple stab wounds.
While Holbrook’s actions were significantly less horrendous than those of his cohorts, he nonetheless participated in the murder and his conduct rose to the level of first-degree murder. Holbrook admits that he knew they were going to Olmeda’s home to rob her and he participated in gaining entry into Olmeda’s house. He further aided in the conspiracy by watching over Olmeda’s sleeping child on the first floor couch. As this conspiracy took a dreadful turn to include the murder of Olmeda, Holbrook continued his duty as watchman, and retrieved' an extension cord for use by his cohorts during which time Olmeda was being excruciatingly beaten and was screaming out. Holbrook remained silent and took no action even after seeing Olmeda’s blood on another co-conspirator’s sleeve.
We find no significance in either the fact that Holbrook may have been ignorant/unaware of the intended use of the exten*393sion cord he supplied, or, that the reason for his cohort’s trip to the kitchen was to obtain a knife. The attack on Olmeda was brutal and quite prolonged and occurred inside of a small, two story rowhouse. This house was only thirty feet, nine inches long, and fifteen feet, nine inches wide. The trial court was presented with testimony that other persons could easily be heard inside of the house. The trial court’s determination, as factfinder, that Holbrook knew that the victim was being brutally murdered during the time that he maintained his duty as guard, and in obtaining one of his cohort’s weapons of choice, is sufficiently established in the record. When coupled with the fact that Holbrook listened to Olmeda’s prolonged screams and the contemporaneous commotion surrounding her death and his knowledge of Padilla’s reputation as a hitman, the record evidences that the Commonwealth established that Holbrook willingly participated in the conspiracy to commit robbery and remained loyal to his cohorts when this conspiracy transformed into murder. Accordingly, we find Holbrook’s first issue meritless and we affirm the trial court’s finding that Holbrook harbored a specific intent to kill Ms. Olmeda.
Holbrook next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Holbrook alleges his decision to waive trial and plead guilty was not knowing and intelligent, and instead, that he was coerced by his attorney to plead after his attorney promised him a conviction of only third-degree murder. Holbrook also contends that as a result of his trial counsel’s promise of a conviction of only third-degree murder he was wrongfully advised not to testify at the degree-of-guilt hearing. Intertwined in both allegations is Holbrook’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Our standard of review when evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is well-settled, presumes that counsel is effective, and places on the defendant the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa. 218, 230, 570 A.2d 75, 81 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 415 Pa.Super. 65, 71, 608 A.2d 528, 531 (1992). We are first required to determine whether the issue underlying the claim is of arguable merit. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 527 Pa. 118, *394122, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1991). If the claim is without merit, our inquiry ends because counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. Id. Even if the underlying claim has merit, the appellant still must establish that the course of action chosen by his counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate the client’s interest and that the ineffectiveness prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Id; Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).
An attempt to withdraw a plea of guilty after sentencing will only be granted where the defendant is able to show that his plea was the result of manifest injustice. Pa. R.Crim.P. 321; Commonwealth v. Refile, 353 Pa.Super. 190, 509 A.2d 400 (1986), alloc. denied, 518 Pa. 655, 544 A.2d 1342 (1988). To establish manifest injustice, Holbrook must show that his plea was involuntary or was given without knowledge of the charge. Commonwealth v. Fenton, 388 Pa.Super. 538, 566 A.2d 260 (1989). A review of the record establishes the following. In response to Holbrook’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court conducted a hearing during which time Holbrook’s counsel testified in great detail his efforts on Holbrook’s behalf. Trial counsel testified that anything discussed with Holbrook was first discussed with his family including decisions concerning a jury trial, the possibility of a guilty plea, and although there was no guarantee, the hope of a conviction of a lesser degree then first-degree murder. Further, before accepting Holbrook’s guilty plea, the trial court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Holbrook as is required to ascertain if Holbrook’s plea was voluntarily and understandingly tendered. Pa.R.Crim.P. 319; Commonwealth v. Braxton, 410 Pa.Super. 391, 600 A.2d 198 (1991). A review of the colloquy establishes that Holbrook and his father fully understood that Holbrook could ultimately be found guilty of first-degree murder and receive a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court found that trial counsel was thoroughly prepared for trial, that Holbrook and his family were advised of the progression of events, and that counsel was effective in representing Holbrook. This court is bound by the factual findings and credibility determinations made by the trial court. Commonwealth v. May, 485 Pa. 371, 402 A.2d *3951008 (1979). Based on Holbrook’s trial counsel’s testimony, and the lengthy colloquy conducted by the trial court, the trial court found that Holbrook failed to show his plea was the result of manifest injustice. After reviewing the record, we conclude, as did the trial court, that Holbrook’s plea was knowing and voluntary and that Holbrook has failed to establish that it resulted from manifest injustice. Refile, supra. As a result, Holbrook’s claim for ineffectiveness must also fail. Pierce, supra.
Additionally, Holbrook alleges that he was wrongfully advised by his trial counsel not to testify at the degree-of-guilt hearing. Holbrook contends that such testimony would provided substantial evidence likely to reduce his conviction to third-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. As such, Holbrook contends that his trial counsel was ineffective and further, that a new degree-of-guilt hearing should be held. We disagree. Prior to Holbrook’s arrest, he dictated a statement to his sister which detailed his version of the events that took place on the night of Olmeda’s murder. Holbrook, along with his trial counsel, went and surrendered to the police. Holbrook gave the police a statement which was essentially the same as the statement dictated earlier to his sister. The substance of these two statements represented the only version of the events ever related to trial counsel. Holbrook’s trial counsel testified during the hearing on Holbrook’s motion to withdraw his plea that since Holbrook could not add to anything more than what was offered in the statements, that it was trial counsel’s decision that it would not be prudent to subject Holbrook to cross-examination by the prosecutor. Holbrook never repudiated the contents of his statements and in fact had stated that he would not have added anything else. At the hearing, the trial court specifically questioned Holbrook as to those factors which determined Holbrook’s level of guilt. Holbrook’s claim that he be given a new degree-of-guilt hearing is meritless and as a result, Holbrook’s claim of ineffective assistance also fails. Pierce, supra.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
KELLY, J., files a concurring and dissenting Opinion.