Court Opinion

ID: 9556484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 15:07:20.940289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:28.137722
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                       CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                             AUGUST 17, 2023
                                                                        STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT
                 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 156

Mari Emilie Sayler,                                     Plaintiff and Appellee
     v.
Jason Paul Sayler,                                  Defendant and Appellant

                               No. 20230004

Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Anthony S. Benson, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.

Opinion of the Court by Bahr, Justice.

Joshua Nyberg, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Jacey L. Johnston (argued) and Cassidy A. Violet (on brief), Grand Forks, ND,
for defendant and appellant.
                               Sayler v. Sayler
                                No. 20230004

Bahr, Justice.

[¶1] Jason Sayler appeals from an amended judgment entered after a bench
trial on the issue of parental responsibility. He argues the district court’s
award of primary residential responsibility to Mari Sayler in Minnesota was
procedurally improper because she did not make a motion to relocate the
children to Minnesota, the court erred by failing to apply the Stout-Hawkinson
factors, and the court erred by considering circumstances created by the
interim order. He further argues the court’s findings on the best interest
factors and decision-making authority are clearly erroneous. Finally, he argues
the court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees. We affirm the
amended judgment in part and reverse in part.

                                       I

[¶2] The parties married in June 2013 and had two children. The parties
separated on October 21, 2021 when Mari Sayler left with the children for
Austin, Minnesota.

[¶3] Mari Sayler filed a summons and complaint in November 2021 initiating
divorce and custody proceedings. The complaint specifically alleged Mari
Sayler “resides in Austin, Minnesota” and Jason Sayler “resides in Devils Lake,
North Dakota.” Mari Sayler simultaneously filed an application for ex parte
interim order and a motion for interim order. In her application and motion,
Mari Sayler requested temporary primary residential responsibility of the
children. The motion requested “Mari’s parent’s home in Austin, Minnesota
(where Mari is currently residing) shall be considered the legal residence of the
child[ren].” Mari Sayler further alleged in her declaration she and the children
reside with her parents in Austin, Minnesota, and addressed the best interest
factors based on her Minnesota residence.

[¶4] The district court found a threat of imminent danger to both Mari Sayler
and the children and other circumstances indicating an ex parte interim order
is necessary because Mari Sayler’s “declaration and exhibits demonstrate that

                                       1
Jason is threatening self-harm and that there are serious concerns about his
anger and mental health.” The court awarded Mari Sayler temporary primary
residential responsibility of the children and Jason Sayler no parenting time
until further hearing.

[¶5] Jason Sayler filed an answer and counterclaim, a countermotion for
interim order, and a declaration. The answer and counterclaim acknowledged
Mari Sayler resides in Austin, Minnesota. The countermotion for interim order
requested the district court order Mari Sayler to return the children to Devils
Lake, North Dakota. Jason Sayler’s declaration addressed the best interest
factors based on the children’s current residence in Austin, Minnesota.

[¶6] After a hearing, the district court issued an interim order assessing the
best interest factors, noting most of the factors favored neither party but some
favored Mari Sayler due to Jason Sayler’s mental health issues, domestic
violence issues, and the safety of his home. The interim order found Mari
Sayler currently lives “with her parents in Austin, MN, along with the parties’
two children[.]” The court further explained while her move from Devils Lake,
North Dakota to Austin, Minnesota obviously “changed the location and
environment of the children” and “certainly upset that continuity[,]” “there
were valid reasons Mari chose to leave the marital home with the children and
establish residence elsewhere.” The court concluded it was in the best interests
of the children that Mari Sayler be awarded temporary primary residential
responsibility, subject to Jason Sayler’s reasonable parenting time, and joint
decision-making responsibility.

[¶7] The parties entered a stipulation for partial judgment regarding division
of assets, debts, and spousal support. The stipulation identified Mari Sayler’s
residence as Austin, Minnesota, and stipulated she currently resides in
Minnesota. A two-day trial was held on the remaining child-related issues. The
district court entered amended findings and an amended judgment. The court
concluded the best interest factors favored Mari Sayler and awarded her
primary residential responsibility, in Minnesota, and final decision-making
authority regarding medical issues. Jason Sayler appeals.

                                       2
                                       II

[¶8] Jason Sayler argues Mari Sayler did not specifically plead for relocation
of the children, he did not receive notice of Mari Sayler’s intent to move with
the children, and the district court erred in failing to make findings under the
Stout–Hawkinson relocation factors. See Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶¶ 34-37,
560 N.W.2d 903; Hawkinson v. Hawkinson, 1999 ND 58, ¶ 9, 591 N.W.2d 144.

[¶9] Jason Sayler raises these issues as matters of law. This Court reviews
questions of law de novo. State v. K.J.A., 2023 ND 56, ¶ 3, 988 N.W.2d 595;
Twete v. Mullin, 2020 ND 264, ¶ 3, 952 N.W.2d 91.

[¶10] Jason Sayler argues the award of primary residential responsibility to
Mari Sayler in Minnesota was procedurally improper because Mari Sayler
failed to make the necessary motion to relocate the children to Minnesota.

[¶11] Section 14-09-07, N.D.C.C., governs relocation of the residence of a child
after a district court has entered an order establishing residential
responsibility. “The purpose of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07 is to protect the
noncustodial parent’s visitation rights if the custodial parent seeks to move out
of state.” Jelsing v. Peterson, 2007 ND 41, ¶ 7, 729 N.W.2d 157.

[¶12] Section 14-09-07(3), N.D.C.C., does not apply to this case.1 Section 14-
09-07(1) and (2), N.D.C.C., provides:

      1. A parent with primary residential responsibility for a child may
      not change the primary residence of the child to another state

1 Section 14-09-07(3), N.D.C.C., provides:

      A court order is not required if the other parent:
           a. Has not exercised parenting time for a period of one year; or
           b. Has moved to another state and is more than fifty miles [80.47
               kilometers] from the residence of the parent with primary
               residential responsibility.

                                       3
      except upon order of the court or with the consent of the other
      parent, if the other parent has been given parenting time by the
      decree.

      2. A parent with equal residential responsibility for a child may
      not change the residence of the child to another state except with
      consent of the other parent or order of the court allowing the move
      and awarding that parent primary residential responsibility.

Neither party alleges Mari Sayler had Jason Sayler’s consent to move the
children to Minnesota. Thus, the issue is whether she was required to obtain a
court order under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07.

[¶13] Section 14-09-07(1) and (2) prohibit a parent from changing a child’s
primary residence without a court order when an order granting primary or
equal residential responsibility exists. See Maynard v. McNett, 2006 ND 36,
¶ 21, 710 N.W.2d 369 (holding “a parent with joint legal and physical custody
may not be granted permission to move with the parties’ child, unless the
district court first determines the best interests of the child require a change
in primary custody to that parent” (emphasis added)); Paulson v. Bauske, 1998
ND 17, ¶ 6, 574 N.W.2d 801 (“A custodial parent must get judicial permission
to move with her child to another state if the noncustodial parent does not
consent to the move.” (emphasis added)). Mari Sayler moved to Minnesota
before initiating these proceedings. An order establishing residential
responsibility did not exist when she moved the children to Minnesota.
Therefore, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07(1) and (2) do not apply in this case.

[¶14] Jason Sayler does not provide authority for his position a parent, who
has not been awarded primary or equal residential responsibility, and who
relocates before initiating proceedings, must obtain permission from the
district court to remain at the parent’s present residence. Under the facts of
this case, we conclude Mari Sayler was not required to obtain the court’s
permission under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07 to relocate to—or more accurately,
remain in—Austin, Minnesota with the children.

                                       4
[¶15] Jason Sayler also argues the lack of pleading to relocate resulted in lack
of proper notice Mari Sayler intended to remain in Austin, Minnesota.

[¶16] Contrary to Jason Sayler’s assertion, both parties’ pleadings presume
Mari Sayler resides in Minnesota. As previously noted, Mari Sayler’s
complaint specifically alleged Mari Sayler “resides in Austin, Minnesota,” and
her motion for interim order requested “Mari’s parent’s home in Austin,
Minnesota (where Mari is currently residing)” be considered the legal
residence of the children. Her declaration stated she and the children now
reside with her parents in Austin, Minnesota and she therein addressed the
best interest factors based on her Minnesota residence. Mari Sayler’s pleadings
gave Jason Sayler notice Mari Sayler intended to reside in Minnesota. This is
in part evidenced by Jason Sayler’s answer, which acknowledged Mari Sayler
resides in Minnesota, and his declaration, which addressed the best interest
factors based on the children’s current residence in Minnesota. The parties also
stipulated Mari Sayler resides in Minnesota.

[¶17] After a hearing on the interim motions, the district court considered the
evidence and arguments and entered a detailed interim order. The interim
order found Mari Sayler currently lives “with her parents in Austin, MN, along
with the parties’ two children.” The court further found her move from Devils
Lake, North Dakota to Austin, Minnesota “changed the location and
environment of the children[,]” and “certainly upset that continuity[,]” but
“there were valid reasons Mari chose to leave the marital home with the
children and establish residence elsewhere.” After weighing the best interest
factors, including Mari Sayler’s move to Minnesota and the reasons for it, the
court determined it is in the best interests of the children Mari be awarded
primary residential responsibility, subject to Jason Sayler’s right to reasonable
parenting time.

[¶18] We conclude the pleadings and interim order provided Jason Sayler
notice the district court would determine residential responsibility based on
Mari Sayler residing in Minnesota and Jason Sayler residing in North Dakota.

                                       5
                                         C

[¶19] Jason Sayler argues the district court erred in failing to provide analysis
or findings under the Stout–Hawkinson relocation factors or failing to make a
specific finding it would be in the children’s best interests to relocate to another
state.

[¶20] Relying on Seay v. Seay, 2012 ND 179, 820 N.W.2d 705, and Pember v.
Shapiro, 2011 ND 31, 794 N.W.2d 435, Jason Sayler argues the Stout-
Hawkinson factors must be analyzed when the initial determination of
residential responsibility and motion for relocation are raised in the same
proceeding. In Stout we noted the inevitability of cases in which an initial
primary residential responsibility determination would necessarily have to be
made before ruling on a parent’s request to relocate. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 54
n. 7. Seay and Pember stand for the now well-established principle that when
the initial determination of residential responsibility and a request to relocate
are raised in the same proceeding, generally a district court must first
determine primary residential responsibility by applying the best interest
factors before addressing the relocation request by applying the Stout-
Hawkinson factors. Seay, at ¶¶ 15-16 (explaining the court should first
determine primary residential responsibility by applying the best interest
factors and then relocation by applying the Stout-Hawkinson factors); Pember,
at ¶¶ 22-28 (concluding “[t]he district court acted properly by considering
Shapiro’s relocation request after it had awarded sole physical custody of the
children to her using the best interest factors”).

[¶21] Seay and Pember are distinguishable from this case because in neither
Seay nor Pember had the parent moved before initiating proceedings to
establish residential responsibility. The parties do not cite, nor have we found,
a case addressing whether a district court must apply the Stout-Hawkinson
factors in a case where a party moves before requesting an order establishing
primary residential responsibility.

[¶22] This Court has explained the “distinction between an original award of
custody and a decision to modify custody.” Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301,

                                         6
303 (N.D. 1988). “For an original placement of the custody of a child, when
parents divorce, the trial court needs to determine only the best interests and
welfare of the child. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.1. For a motion to modify an original
custodial placement, the trial court needs to make a two-step analysis.” Gould
v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 42, 43 (N.D. 1992). The two issues, in chronological order,
are: “(a) whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since
the original divorce decree and custody award; and if so (b) whether those
changes are such that the best interests of the child would be served by a
change in custody.” Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303. We have emphasized, “[t]he
original custody award revolves solely around the best interests of the
children.” Id. This case involves an original award of (custody) parental
responsibility.

[¶23] Mari Sayler’s residence was known to the parties and the district court
at the time the decree was entered. Thus, in this case, the award of primary
residential responsibility and the children’s place of residence revolved solely
around the best interests of the children. Mari Sayler was not requesting
permission to relocate; she was requesting primary residential responsibility
based on her current residence. The court weighed the best interest factors,
assessing primary residential responsibility with Mari Sayler in Minnesota
against Jason Sayler in North Dakota. In weighing the best interest factors,
the court addressed Mari Sayler’s prior relocation under multiple factors.
Among other things, the court found “Mari had good cause to leave the home
with the children” and did not move “from Devils Lake with the intent to
frustrate Jason’s contact with the children.” Based on its weighing of all of the
best interest factors, the court determined it is in the best interests of the
children that Mari Sayler be awarded primary residential responsibility.

[¶24] As already concluded, because residential responsibility had not
previously been established, a motion to relocate was not necessary. Similarly,
consideration of the Stout-Hawkinson factors was not necessary. “The Stout-
Hawkinson factors are designed to address the best interests of the child for
cases in which a primary custodian has already been designated and the
custodial parent wishes to move.” Maynard, 2006 ND 36, ¶ 21; see also
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07 (statute governing motions for relocation applies when

                                       7
primary residential responsibility or equal residential responsibility has been
established). Generally, the Stout-Hawkinson factors need not be considered
at the initial residential responsibility decision absent a request to relocate.
See Asiama v. Asumeng, 2023 ND 114, ¶ 17, 992 N.W.2d 543 (“The Stout-
Hawkinson factors are considered when a custodial parent requests to change
the residence of a child to another state under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-07.”).

[¶25] The issue before the district court was whether it was in the best
interests of the children to live with Jason Sayler in North Dakota or Mari
Sayler in Minnesota. Marsden v. Koop, 2010 ND 196, ¶ 9, 789 N.W.2d 531 (“An
initial custody determination requires that the district court award primary
residential responsibility of children to the parent who will better promote the
best interests and welfare of the children.”); Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303 (“[An]
original custody award revolves solely around the best interests of the
children.”). The court was required to make that determination by analyzing
the best interest factors. N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1); Marsden, at ¶ 59 (Maring,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating “it would be appropriate
to consider the parent’s new location and home under the best interest factors”
if the parent “has already relocated”). The court was not called upon to
determine whether Mari Sayler could move to Minnesota; she was already
living in Minnesota—a fact the court considered when it addressed the best
interest factors.

[¶26] We conclude the district court did not err by determining residential
responsibility under the best interest factors without making separate findings
under the Stout–Hawkinson relocation factors.

[¶27] We are cognizant a party may try to abuse this precedent by unilaterally
moving with the child prior to initiating proceedings. However, we have
explained a “district court may consider the intention of the parent [moving]
with the child in judging the child’s best interests under [N.D.C.C.] § 14-09-
06.2.” Maynard, 2006 ND 36, ¶ 21; see also N.D.C.C. § 14-09-6.2(1)(m) (under
the best interest factors a court considers “[a]ny other factors considered by the
court to be relevant to a particular parental rights and responsibilities
dispute”). Courts should consider a parent’s unilateral move when they

                                        8
consider “all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child.”
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1); see also Schneider v. Lascher, 899 N.Y.S.2d 479, 481
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (explaining mother’s prior relocation “is a very important
factor among the constellation of factors to be considered in arriving at a best
interests determination” in initial custody determination) (quotation omitted)).
The purpose or motive for a unilateral move is one of the many factors courts
should consider and weigh when addressing the factually complex, and
extremely important, determination of parental responsibility.

                                         D

[¶28] Jason Sayler argues the district court’s reliance on the conditions created
by the interim order was improper because it “used the no[n]-appealable
temporary order to determine the children were established in a new
community and that remaining in that community would be in their best
interest.”

[¶29] In Odegard v. Odegard, 259 N.W.2d 484, 485 (N.D. 1977), we recognized
“temporary-custody orders have a tendency to become permanent-custody
orders[.]” This is partly due to “concern for the physical and psychological
stability of the child. One parent’s custody of the child while the divorce is
pending may result in the creation of emotional bonds and security in one’s
surroundings which are desirable to perpetuate in the permanent custody
order.” Catlin v. Catlin, 494 N.W.2d 581, 585 (N.D. 1992). However, we have
also stated, “Although stability is one of the best-interest factors, it is only one
of the factors.” Schlieve v. Schlieve, 2014 ND 107, ¶ 22, 846 N.W.2d 733
(rejecting argument it was not in the children’s best interests to disrupt the
stability established by the interim order). The best interest factors balance
these, at times, conflicting concerns.

[¶30] “[W]e have stated that relying on a parent’s primary caretaking
pursuant to an interim order might be improper.” Peek v. Berning, 2001 ND
34, ¶ 10, 622 N.W.2d 186. However, we have declined to decide this issue. See
id.; see also Kjelland v. Kjelland, 2000 ND 86, ¶ 10, 609 N.W.2d 100 (explaining
reliance on parent serving as primary caretaker pursuant to an interim order

                                         9
may be improper but “we need not decide that issue because the trial court did
not rely on [father] serving as the primary caretaker since the interim order”).

[¶31] Jason Sayler argues the district court prejudicially relied upon the
interim order when it found “Mari [continues] to provide for the children,
having taken them to Austin, Minnesota to move in with her parents.” He
argues Mari Sayler unilaterally moved the children to Minnesota and he “was
not able to provide for his children in the normal fashion[.]” However, the court
found “Mari had been the parent staying at home with the children and
providing for their needs, with Jason providing caretaking duties when
possible. Mari is continuing to provide for the children, having taken them to
Austin, Minnesota to move in with her parents.” The court ultimately found
this factor favored neither party. Thus, in determining primary residential
responsibility, the court did not improperly rely on Mari Sayler serving as the
primary caretaker during the interim period.

[¶32] To the extent Jason Sayler argues it is improper to use a non-appealable
“temporary order to determine the children were established in a new
community and that remaining in that community would be in their best
interest,” we have previously relied upon the forward-looking and backward-
looking best interest factors. We have explained:

      When analyzing factor (e), the court must examine “[t]he
      permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
      home.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(e). “Although overlap exists
      between factors (d) and (e), factor (e) uses a forward-looking
      approach to the stability of the family unit, its interrelations and
      environment, versus the backward-looking factor (d).” Eifert [v.
      Eifert], 2006 ND 240, ¶ 11, 724 N.W.2d 109. Factor (e) focuses on
      the children’s future prospects for a stable family environment. Id.
      Interaction and interrelationships with parents and relatives are
      also considered under factor (e). Id.

Lindberg v. Lindberg, 2009 ND 136, ¶ 13, 770 N.W.2d 252; see also Jelsing,
2007 ND 41, ¶ 14 (“Although factor (d) uses an approach looking at the past,
there is an overlap between factors (d) and (e), the permanence of the existing
or proposed custodial home.”).

                                       10
[¶33] When considering the best interest factors, the district court considered
events that occurred before and after the interim order, including that Mari
Sayler moved the children from North Dakota to Minnesota, the move
“changed the location and environment of the children” and “upset” the
children’s continuity, and the reasons she moved. These, and other factors
considered by the court, were relevant to the best interest factors under
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). We conclude the court did not err by improperly
relying on the interim period when analyzing the best interest factors.

                                        III

[¶34] Jason Sayler argues the district court’s findings on the best interest
factors and decision-making authority are clearly erroneous.

[¶35] “A district court’s primary residential responsibility decision is a finding
of fact that we analyze under the clearly erroneous standard of review.”
Kershaw v. Finnson, 2022 ND 165, ¶ 9, 980 N.W.2d 40. “A district court’s ruling
on decisionmaking is also a finding of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous
standard.” Taylor v. Taylor, 2022 ND 39, ¶ 20, 970 N.W.2d 209.

[¶36] “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view
of the law, if no evidence supports it, or if this Court, on the entire record, is
left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Kershaw,
2022 ND 165, ¶ 9 (quoting Vetter v. Vetter, 2020 ND 40, ¶ 8, 938 N.W.2d 417).
“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, and the
district court’s factual findings are presumptively correct.” Berdahl v. Berdahl,
2022 ND 136, ¶ 6, 977 N.W.2d 294 (quoting Holm v. Holm, 2017 ND 96, ¶ 4,
893 N.W.2d 492). “A choice between two permissible views of the evidence is
not clearly erroneous if the district court’s findings are based either on physical
or documentary evidence, or inferences from other facts, or on credibility
determinations.” Id. (quoting Holm, at ¶ 4). “Under the clearly erroneous
standard, we do not reweigh the evidence nor reassess the credibility of
witnesses, and we will not retry a custody case or substitute our judgment for
a district court’s initial primary residential responsibility decision merely
because we might have reached a different result.” Kershaw, at ¶ 9 (quoting
Vetter, at ¶ 8).

                                        11
                                          A

[¶37] Jason Sayler argues the district court erred in weighing best interest
factors (d), (e), (f), and (h). The court found factors (d), (e), and (h) favored
neither party and factor (f) favored Mari Sayler.

[¶38] Based on our review of the record, we conclude sufficient evidence in the
record supports the district court’s findings. Jason Sayler asks this Court to
reweigh the evidence. “This Court will not reweigh the evidence or reassess
credibility when there is evidence to support the district court’s findings, and
we will not reverse the decision merely because we might have reached a
different conclusion.” Porter v. Porter, 2006 ND 123, ¶ 5, 714 N.W.2d 865. The
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.

                                          B

[¶39] Jason Sayler argues the district court erred in awarding final decision-
making authority to Mari Sayler.

[¶40] “A parenting plan must include a provision relating to decisionmaking
responsibility, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-30(2)(a), and that responsibility must be
allocated in the best interests of the child, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-31(2).” Dick v.
Erman, 2019 ND 54, ¶ 14, 923 N.W.2d 137 (citation omitted). “With two
parents, there is always a potential for the parties to reach a point of impasse
when it comes to decisions about their child.” Id. at ¶ 15 (holding “[e]ventually
a decision must be made, and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
a mistake was made regarding the district court’s determination of decision-
making responsibility”).

[¶41] Here, the district court ordered:

      The parties will make non-emergency health care decisions for the
      children jointly. . . . In the event of a dispute, the parties will work
      with a qualified third party appropriate . . . to reach resolution. If
      there is still disagreement as to non-emergency health care
      decisions, Mari will have the final decision making authority, but
      only after good faith efforts by the parties to make a joint decision
      and work with a qualified third party.

                                        12
[¶42] After reviewing the record, and considering the district court awarded
Mari Sayler primary residential responsibility, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction a mistake has been made. The court’s award of final
decision-making authority to Mari Sayler is not clearly erroneous.

                                       IV

[¶43] Jason Sayler argues the district court abused its discretion by awarding
attorney’s fees to Mari Sayler. He argues the court’s findings are inadequate
to support the award of attorney’s fees. We agree.

[¶44] “Under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23, a district court has broad discretion to
award attorney’s fees in a divorce action.” Friesner v. Friesner, 2019 ND 30,
¶ 20, 921 N.W.2d 898. In exercising its discretion whether to award attorney’s
fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23, “the court must balance one party’s needs
against the other party’s ability to pay.” Harvey v. Harvey, 2016 ND 251, ¶ 7,
888 N.W.2d 543. “In balancing the parties’ needs and ability to pay, the district
court should consider the property owned by each party, their relative incomes,
whether property is liquid or fixed assets, and whether the action of either
party unreasonably increased the time spent on the case.” Id. (cleaned up).

[¶45] “An award of attorney’s fees requires specific findings supported by
evidence of the parties’ financial conditions and needs.” Harvey, 2016 ND 251,
¶ 7; see also Martinson v. Martinson, 2010 ND 110, ¶ 14, 783 N.W.2d 633 (“A
court must make specific findings supported by evidence of the parties’
financial needs and conditions to award attorney fees.”); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke,
538 N.W.2d 197, 203 (N.D. 1995) (“The awarding of attorney’s fees must be
supported by evidence setting forth information regarding the parties’
financial conditions and needs.”). “An award will not be reversed on appeal
unless the court abuses its discretion.” Harvey, at ¶ 7. “A court abuses its
discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable
manner, it misinterprets or misapplies the law, or its decision is not the
product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination.” Id.

[¶46] The district court awarded Mari Sayler an additional $5,000 in
attorney’s fees, finding:

                                       13
      [Mari Sayler] was a stay-at-home mother for a majority of the
      marriage, and has only recently reentered the work force. Jason
      has been employed as an attorney, and was the sole economic
      provider for the family up until the separation. Mari has argued
      that Jason’s decision and behavior refusing to correspond with
      Mari during the pendency of this divorce has unreasonably and
      unnecessarily increase[d] the attorney’s fees incurred by both
      parties.

      Because Jason’s income is currently over three times that of
      Mari’s, and because Mari has demonstrated her need for
      assistance with attorney’s fees and Jason’s ability to pay part of
      her attorney’s fees, the Court will award Mari an additional
      amount for her attorney’s fees of $5,000 from Jason . . . . The Court
      is awarding this reduced amount, as compared to the amount
      requested by Mari, because the Court is aware that Jason is also
      responsible for payment of his own attorney’s fees as well.

[¶47] The district court summarily addressed the appropriate factors,
concluding, “Mari has demonstrated her need for assistance with attorney’s
fees and Jason’s ability to pay part of her attorney’s fees[.]” However, the court
did not make specific findings regarding Mari Sayler’s income and expenses to
support its conclusion she needed assistance in paying her attorney’s fees.
Similarly, the court found Jason Sayler had a net monthly income of $5,646,
but did not address his claimed monthly expenses of $6,272 when concluding
he had the ability to pay part of Mari Sayler’s attorney’s fees. The court noted
the parties’ relative income in general terms, stating “Jason’s income is
currently over three times that of Mari’s,” but made no findings regarding how
their relative incomes impacted Mari Sayler’s needs or Jason Sayler’s ability
to pay. The court also noted Mari Sayler argued Jason Sayler’s actions
unnecessarily increased both party’s attorney’s fees. However, the court made
no finding whether Jason Sayler’s actions unnecessarily increased the party’s
attorney’s fees.

[¶48] “A district court has discretion to award attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C.
§ 14-05-23 based on the parties’ relative abilities to pay, but it must make
specific findings regarding the nonmoving party’s ability to pay and the moving
party’s need.” O’Keeffe v. O’Keeffe, 2020 ND 201, ¶ 22, 948 N.W.2d 848.

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“Implied findings are insufficient for an award of attorney’s fees[.]”
Nieuwenhuis v. Nieuwenhuis, 2014 ND 145, ¶ 31, 851 N.W.2d 130. When the
court does not provide sufficient findings, “[w]e are left to speculate whether
factors were properly considered and the law was properly applied, leaving us
unable to perform our appellate function.” Deyle v. Deyle, 2012 ND 248, ¶ 23,
825 N.W.2d 245. “Without the necessary findings, the award of attorney’s fees
must be reversed and remanded.” Nieuwenhuis, at ¶ 31 (reversed and
remanded because the court “failed to provide an explanation or findings to
support its award of attorney’s fees”); see also Harvey, 2016 ND 251, ¶ 9
(reversing and remanding because the court “did not provide the required
analysis for attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23”); Datz v. Dosch, 2014
ND 102, ¶ 23, 846 N.W.2d 724 (holding the court abused its discretion because
it only made findings on one party’s ability to pay without balancing the other
party’s need); Deyle, at ¶ 23 (remanding for reconsideration and a “reasoned
explanation” after concluding the court did not adequately explain its decision).

[¶49] Because the district court did not make sufficient findings to support its
award of attorney’s fees, we reverse the court’s award of attorney’s fees and
remand for the court to make further findings on its award of attorney’s fees.

                                       V

[¶50] We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude they
are either without merit or not necessary to our decision. We affirm the parts
of the amended judgment awarding primary responsibility and decision-
making authority and reverse the part awarding attorney’s fees.

[¶51] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

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