Court Opinion

ID: 9370112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 20:02:37.831743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.463927
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/10/23 Curamus Management v. Swiech CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 CURAMUS MANAGEMENT, INC.,                                            D079075
 et al.,

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
           v.                                                         00032690-CU-DF-CTL)

 EUGENE SWIECH,

           Defendant and Appellant;

 CHRISTINA M. DENNING et al.,

           Objectors and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.
         G10 Law and Daniel T. Watts for Defendant and Appellant.
         Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur for Plaintiffs and Respondents
Aaron Levine and Curamus Management, Inc.
         Denning Moores, Christina M. Denning and Brian M. Cook for
Objectors and Respondents Denning Moores, APC and Christina M. Denning.
         Turnbow Law Firm and Christopher William Turnbow, for Objector
and Respondent Christopher William Turnbow.
         This lawsuit originated because a homeowners association did not trim
certain trees to Eugene Swiech’s satisfaction despite Swiech not being a
member of that association. Nonetheless, incensed because his ocean view
was obstructed, Swiech created a website wherein he repeatedly criticized the
company that managed the homeowners association, Curamus Management,
Inc. (Curamus), as well as Curamus’s owner, Aaron Levine. Curamus and
Levine (together Plaintiffs) then sued Swiech. After retaining new counsel
and filing an amended complaint, Plaintiffs eventually dismissed their
lawsuit against Swiech, and the superior court entered judgment in Swiech’s
favor.
         However, during the course of litigation, Swiech filed three motions for

sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure 1 sections 128.5 and 128.7. The
superior court denied all three motions.
         After final judgment was entered in his favor, Swiech filed this appeal,
challenging the superior court’s denial of his three motions for sanctions,
arguing the court abused its discretion. We disagree and affirm the
judgment.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         On July 2, 2018, Plaintiffs filed suit against Swiech, alleging causes of
action for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and
intentional interference with economic advantage. At that time, Denning

1     Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise specified.

                                          2
Moores, APC and Christina Denning represented Plaintiffs.2 The relevant

allegations in the initial complaint were as follows:3
         Levine is the owner of Curamus, which manages small homeowners
associations in San Diego. Stratford Woods Homeowners Association
(Association) is one of Curamus’s clients. The Association is located near the
coast in Del Mar. Swiech lives in Del Mar “up the hill from the Stratford
Woods community,” which is run by the Association. Swiech does not live in
the Stratford Woods community and is not a member of the Association.
         For several months, Swiech asked the Association to trim trees that
were blocking his view. The Association did not trim the trees to his
satisfaction. After Swiech learned that Curamus managed the Association,
Swiech retaliated against the Association, Curamus, and Levine. Swiech
contacted Plaintiffs on numerous occasions demanding the trees be trimmed
and threatening legal action and negative Yelp reviews. Neither Curamus
nor Levine had the authority to order the Association to trim the subject
trees.
         Swiech began an online campaign against Curamus and Levine. He
created a “fake website pretending to be Curamus . . . on which he . . . made
and continues to make false and misleading statements.” The website,
curamus-management.com, includes an image of Levine drinking wine as
well as Curamus’s logo, which has been “doctored to read ‘We Mess Up

2     We refer to Denning Moores, APC as “Denning,” which includes the
attorneys belonging to that firm. When necessary, we will refer to individual
attorneys at Denning, and thus, we will use the attorneys’ last names. To
avoid confusion, we will refer to Christina Denning by her first name.

3      We take our summary of the allegations from Swiech’s previous appeal.
(See Curamus Management, Inc. v. Swiech (Oct. 9, 2019, D074990) [nonpub.
opn.].)
                                         3
Curamus Management.’ ” The website also includes the following statements
about Curamus: “We Mess Up,” “Did not do a good job with East Bluff,” “Not
doing a good job with Stratford Woods,” “No respect for the community,”
“Does not take time to work with people,” “Not good with costal [sic]
properties,” and “Does not control costs well.”
      Swiech also expressed his displeasure with the Association’s refusal to
trim the trees to his liking through numerous e-mails to Levine. Swiech’s
language is harsh and, at times, threatening. For example, his e-mails have
included the following: “You and Stratford Woods are the laughing stock of
Del Mar”; “Trees are ready to fall”; “Time to Yep [sic]”; “Website getting
hundreds of hits”; “LEAVE DEL MAR !!!”; “Can you say search engine
optimization”; “Stratford Woods HOA Del Mar now 1st or 2nd hit”; “The story
will be told!!”; “I will update the [sic] both websites with more information
including my opinions”; “You and Ben [The Association’s president] are what
we don’t want in Del Mar”; “Left a message. You guys WILL NOT BLOCK
MY VIEW. The issue WILL NOT GO AWAY !!”; “The issue regarding the
trees will escalate next year. Please inform Ben that legal action is likely to
protect our interests. After researching HOA finances it is easy to conclude
the HOA is broke and defuncted [sic]. Going directly after the 18 people that
live there is not out of the question”; “Based on your reserves you cannot
afford litigation”; and “Tell Ben to go FUCK himself . . . .”
      Swiech also used his Facebook page to complain about Curamus,
Levine, and the Association. For example, he posted, “Trim the trees” and
“These people suck.”
      Plaintiffs sent a cease and desist letter to Swiech demanding that he
take down the website and stop defaming them. Swiech refused to comply
with the demand; therefore, Plaintiffs brought suit against Swiech.

                                        4
      After answering the complaint, Swiech filed a motion to strike the
complaint under section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against
public participation) statute. The superior court denied the motion. On
appeal, we affirmed the order, agreeing with the superior court that Swiech’s
posts on his website did not concern a matter of public interest. (See
Curamus Management, Inc. v. Swiech, supra, D074990.)
      A remittitur was issued on December 12, 2019. Eight days later,
Swiech filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was set to be

heard on April 10, 2020.4 While that motion was pending, Swiech filed a
motion under section 128.7 wherein he sought sanctions in the amount of
$30,363.22 in attorney fees and $1,225.55 in costs. The motion was directed
at Curamus, Levine, and Denning.
      In the motion for sanctions, filed February 14, 2020, Swiech argued
sanctions were warranted because: (1) the lawsuit lacked an “arguable basis
in fact or law”; (2) the claims were “objectively frivolous”; (3) the claims were
based on Swiech’s opinions that are constitutionally protected speech; (4) the
complaint was filed for an improper purpose; and (5) Plaintiffs refused to
dismiss the meritless lawsuit.
      About a month after the sanctions motion was filed, Turnbow Law
Firm and C. William Turnbow (together Turnbow) substituted into the case
as counsel of record for Plaintiffs. Curamus and Levine then filed a motion
for leave to file an amended complaint, an opposition to the motion for
sanctions, and an opposition to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

4     The hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings was
continued to July 31, 2020.

                                        5
Although counsel of record for Plaintiffs when Swiech’s motion for sanctions
was filed, Denning did not file any pleading in response to the motion for
sanctions.
      On July 31, 2020, the court issued a tentative ruling granting the

motion for sanctions as well as the motion for judgment on the pleadings.5
In that tentative ruling, regarding the defamation cause of action, the court
faulted Plaintiffs for failing “to address the case law as to opinions being
protected or explaining how any reasonable attorney could believe the
statements [were] representations of provable facts rather than opinions.”
As to the IIED claim, the court noted that Plaintiffs relied on Swiech’s “non-
actionable ‘derogatory website’ ” as well as harassment of Levine, which
included “ ‘threatening legal action and negative Yelp reviews’ ” and the
posting of “ ‘negative comments about Curamus on Yelp under a fake
account.’ ” The court tentatively found “[n]o reasonable attorney would
believe these facts are sufficient to support a claim for IIED.” Finally,
concerning the claim for intentional interference with economic advantage,
the court tentatively stated: “No reasonable attorney would believe the
opinions expressed were actionable. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to
rely upon such alleged interference to support a claim for intentional

interference with economic advantage.”6

5      The tentative ruling also addressed Swiech’s motion to strike or tax
costs. Because that motion plays no role in the issues before us, we eschew
any further discussion of it.

6      We provide some of the substance of the superior court’s tentative
ruling on Swiech’s first motion for sanctions not because of its legal
significance on the appeal before us but simply to provide context for the
supplemental pleadings filed by Plaintiffs and Denning after the hearing on
that sanctions motion.
                                        6
      At the hearing on Swiech’s motions, Christina appeared along with
Turnbow and counsel for Swiech. The court continued the hearing on the
motions until September 4, 2020 and allowed the parties to submit
supplemental declarations.
      Levine filed a supplemental declaration in support of the oppositions to
the motion for judgment on the pleadings and the sanctions motion. In that
declaration, Levine detailed three “provably false” statements that Swiech
allegedly made and included exhibits in support of the assertions.
      Brian Cook, an attorney with Denning, also submitted a declaration
after the hearing on Swiech’s motion for sanctions. Cook appeared at the
hearing on Swiech’s anti-SLAPP motion. He noted that after the court
denied the anti-SLAPP motion, Cook communicated with Swiech’s attorney,
Cynthia Marks of Slattery, Sobel & Decamp, on “several occasions” to try to
resolve the dispute. Those efforts were not successful.
      Cook stated that Swiech changed counsel and was represented by Ryan
Darby in mid-October 2018. After Darby substituted in as counsel of record
for Swiech, Denning reissued subpoenas to Yelp.com and GoDaddy.com to
establish that “Swiech was the author of a defamatory Yelp posting against
Curamus.” Denning withdrew the subpoenas after Darby informed Cook that
Swiech was appealing the superior court’s order denying his anti-SLAPP
motion. Cook pointed out that Darby never discussed any motion for
sanctions although Darby represented Swiech for over a year.
      After this court affirmed the superior court’s order denying the anti-
SLAPP motion, Swiech replaced Darby with Daniel Watts. Cook talked with
Watts on November 6, 2019, two days before a status conference. During
that call, Watts informed Cook that Swiech would be filing a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Cook responded that Plaintiffs would again

                                       7
reissue subpoenas to Yelp.com and GoDaddy.com and intended to amend the
complaint. Cook and Watts also discussed potential ways to settle the
dispute. Cook explained that the case would only get more expensive for
Swiech because he had lost his appeal of the order denying his anti-SLAPP
motion and could not recover his attorney fees. Cook “then offhandedly made
a comment about the only other way for [Swiech] to recover money would be
from a [section] 128.7 motion.” However, Cook declared that he did not
believe “such a motion was viable given the circumstances of the case and
how egregious Mr. Swiech’s behavior had been throughout the case.” Cook
stated he was joking and that for the year and half the case had been
litigated, no attorney had ever raised the specter of a sanctions motion.
      Over a month later, on December 23, 2019, Watts’s office e-mailed Cook
a copy of Swiech’s motion for sanctions. Nevertheless, Cook talked to Watts
“at least a couple times to further discuss how to resolve the case short of
protracted litigation” and e-mailed a settlement proposal before the
January 10, 2020 status conference. At the status conference, Cook and
Watts told the court that a settlement demand had been made and suggested
the court continue the status conference to allow settlement discussions to
continue. The court agreed.
      However, according to Cook, Watts did not timely respond to the
settlement demand. Instead, Cook e-mailed Watts multiple times asking for
a status update. Finally, on February 7, 2020, Watts informed Cook that
Swiech had rejected the settlement proposal. Facing two upcoming trials,
Cook told Levine that Denning could no longer represent Plaintiffs and
assisted Plaintiffs in finding new counsel.
      Christina Denning also submitted a declaration after the initial
hearing on Swiech’s motion for sanctions. In her declaration, Christina

                                       8
correctly identified the elements for the causes of action of defamation, 7

IIED,8 and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 9
Christina then explained why she believed each cause of action was
warranted by the facts known to her at the time Denning filed the complaint
on behalf of Plaintiffs.
      For example, regarding the defamation claim, Christina identified the
following statements as actionable: “ ‘Did not do a good job with East
Bluff’ ” and “ ‘[a] simple construction project at [S]tratford [W]oods has taken
over a month because the contractors aren’t getting paid.’ ” She
explained that Curamus never worked on or for East Bluff, and Curamus
always paid its contractors. As to the IIED claim, Christina argued that

7      A defamation action based on libel as alleged in the instant matter
includes the following elements: “ ‘[A] false and unprivileged publication by
writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed representation to the eye,
which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injury him
in his occupation.’ ” (Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 515, 527, quoting Civ. Code, § 45.)

8      “The elements of the tort of [IIED] are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering
severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation
of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .” ’ ”
(Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)

9      “Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has five
elements: (1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an
economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit
to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship;
(3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual
disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by
the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt
South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512.)
                                        9
Swiech’s creation of a fake website, on which he purported to be Plaintiffs
and published defamatory statements intended to injure Levine and
Curamus, was outrageous conduct “undoubtedly beyond all bounds of decency
tolerated by society.” And, concerning the claim for intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage, Christina emphasized that Plaintiffs
had an economic relationship with the Association that created the
probability of a future economic relationship and Swiech engaged in conduct
to disrupt that relationship as well as other relationships Plaintiffs had with
various homeowners’ associations.
      In addition, Christina declared that Swiech also started to harass
Denning by posting negative reviews about Denning.
      Swiech filed objections to Cook’s and Christina’s declarations to which
Denning field a response.
      The continued hearing on Swiech’s motion for sanctions and motion for

judgment on the pleadings occurred on September 4, 2020. 10 The court took
the matter under submission and issued a minute order four days later. In
that order, the court denied Swiech’s motion for sanctions. The court
explained:
         “Notwithstanding the above analysis [explaining why the
         court believed Plaintiffs’ causes of action lacked merit],
         Plaintiffs’ former attorneys have submitted declarations to
         explain certain facts that satisfy the Court that their
         actions should not be sanctioned. Plaintiffs’ former
         attorneys had reason to believe that Swiech had posted a
         negative Yelp review which did make factual
         representations about Curamus—that it does not care
         about the people in Del Mar and that it had not paid the
         contractors who work for it. Further, while the statement
         that Curamus ‘did not do a good job with East Bluff’

10    It does not appear that a transcript of the September 4, 2020 hearing is
in the record.
                                      10
         appears to be an opinion, Plaintiff Levine never worked at
         East Bluff, which could make the statement a
         misrepresentation. Further, the website’s inclusion of the
         ‘copyright’ at the end of the page in the name of Eugene
         Swiech was added after Plaintiffs’ cease and desist letter.
         Finally, Swiech made the following statements to Plaintiffs:
         ‘You and Stratford Woods are the laughing stock of Del
         Mar,’ ‘Website getting hundreds of views’ when Plaintiff
         Levine relied almost exclusively on SEO [search engine
         optimization] and positive reviews for marketing, ‘LEAVE
         DEL MAR,’ ‘Tell Ben to go FUCK himself,’ and ‘[y]ou guys
         WILL NOT BLOCK MY VIEW. The issue WILL NOT GO
         AWAY!!’ These statements, coupled with the fact Swiech
         created a fake website and used SEO to bolster visits to the
         website, indicate Swiech was intentionally trying to harm
         Plaintiff Levine and his business. Plaintiffs’ former
         attorneys represent that Swiech’s actions actually
         interfered with Plaintiff Curamus’s relationship with
         Stratford Woods. At a minimum, Plaintiffs’ former
         attorneys had reason to believe they could amend the
         complaint.”

      The court also granted Swiech’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
but gave Plaintiffs ten days to file an amended complaint.
      However, five days before the court ruled on Swiech’s motion for
sanctions, Swiech filed a second motion for sanctions aimed at Plaintiffs and
their new counsel, Turnbow. In that motion, Swiech asked for sanctions in
the amount of $50,343.22 in attorney fees and $1,225.55 in costs. Swiech
claimed sanctions were warranted because Plaintiffs and Turnbow: (1) filed
and prosecuted a frivolous complaint; (2) refused to withdraw the complaint;
(3) filed frivolous court filings (oppositions to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and the first sanctions motion); (4) made an “objectively
unreasonable” demand for $5,000 in their opposition to the first motion for
sanctions; and (5) filed an “objectively unreasonable motion for leave to file
an amended complaint.”

                                       11
      On September 18, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint,
consisting of causes of action for intentional interference with contractual
relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations,
negligent interference with prospective economic relations, and injunctive
relief. Plaintiffs based their causes of action on Swiech’s “conduct, including
without limitation: creating and publishing the Fake Website; enabling
search engine optimization for the Fake Website; publishing provably false
and misleading misrepresentations; and harassing and threatening
Plaintiffs.”
      Almost two months later, Swiech filed his third motion for sanctions.
This final sanctions motions was based on Plaintiffs filing a first amended

complaint.11 Plaintiffs filed a combined opposition to Swiech’s second and
third motions for sanctions.
      Before the hearing on Swiech’s second and third motions for sanctions,
the court issued a tentative ruling denying both motions. At the hearing on
the motions, Swiech’s counsel focused on Plaintiffs’ reliance on the fake
website and the postings on that website as the basis for their causes of
action. Indeed, counsel emphasized that the motions for sanctions were
“directed solely to the fake website, not the Yelp allegations[.]” Further,
Swiech’s counsel pointed out that the court could grant the motions for
sanctions and simply strike the allegations about the fake website from the
first amended complaint and not award any money sanctions. Plaintiffs
submitted on the tentative, and the court took the matter under submission.

11    Swiech also filed an anti-SLAPP motion in response to the first
amended complaint. The court denied that motion. Swiech did not appeal
the court’s order. As such, we do not discuss the anti-SLAPP motion any
further.
                                       12
     On March 22, 2021, the court issued a minute order denying the second
and third motions for sanctions. The court stated:
         “On September 8, 2020, this Court denied Defendant’s
         motion for sanctions. On September 8, 2020, this Court
         granted Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
         as to all causes of action, but granted 10 days leave to
         amend. This Court found the allegations as to the fake
         Curamus website could not be the basis for liability because
         it expressed opinions, not representations of provable facts.
         For essentially the same reasons this Court denied
         Defendant’s motion for sanctions on September 8, 2020, the
         Court denies Defendant’s motion filed on September 3,
         2020 (this Court had not yet [granted] Defendant’s Motion
         for Judgment on the Pleadings). Plaintiffs’ counsel had
         reason to believe that Swiech had posted a negative Yelp
         review which did make factual representations about
         Curamus.”

     The court also addressed Swiech’s argument regarding Plaintiffs
reliance on the fake website and Swiech’s postings on that website. The court
explained:
         “The Court finds that any claims based solely on
         allegations as to the fake website, consistent with its prior
         ruling, are not warranted by existing law. This Court
         already found the allegations as to the fake website do not
         establish any legal liability. None of the allegations
         present any representation of provable fact, but are
         opinions or parody of Curamus.

         “Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiffs have continued to
         include allegations in the FAC regarding the fake website.
         While the allegations regarding the fake website may not
         be stricken by the anti-SLAPP statute, they do not form
         liability for the causes of action on their own. It appears to
         be for this reason that Plaintiffs included the allegations
         with other allegations to support their interference causes
         of action and request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs
         continue to assert, notwithstanding this Court’s express
         finding, that the fake website makes provable statements of

                                       13
         fact. The website includes the following statements: 1. ‘We
         Mess Up,’ 2. ‘Did not do a good job with East Bluff,’ 3. ‘Not
         doing a good job with Stratford Woods,’ 4. ‘No respect for
         the community,’ 5. ‘Does not take the time to work with
         people,’ 6. ‘Not good with costal [sic] properties,’ 7. ‘Does not
         control costs well,’ and 8. The image of Curamus’s logo,
         altered to include the text ‘We Mess Up-Curamu
         Management.’ While the Court continues to find that these
         statements on the fake website are not provable statements
         of fact, the Court does not believe ‘any reasonable attorney
         would agree’ that the statements are not provable
         statements of fact. There is some room for disagreement.
         To the extent this contradicts this Court’s prior findings,
         the Court notes it has the ‘inherent authority to change its
         decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment,’ and it
         may do so sua sponte. (Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt (1999)
         75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156 [(Kritt)].) This Court has not yet
         considered whether the allegations in the FAC, which
         include allegations of false statements in Yelp reviews, are
         frivolous.

         “Notwithstanding the above, the Court believes that no
         reasonable attorney would believe claims based solely on
         the fake website have any merit after contemplating this
         Court’s rulings to date—Plaintiffs should remove any ‘legal
         contentions’ that the fake website forms any basis for
         liability. If Plaintiffs do not voluntarily remove such
         allegations going forward, the Court will strongly consider,
         and most likely will, sanction Plaintiffs.”

      Swiech subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Three days later, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of
the entire action. On May 7, 2021, the court entered judgment of dismissal
wherein it determined that Swiech was the prevailing party under section
1032 and awarded Swiech reasonable costs incurred in the action.
      Swiech timely appealed, challenging the superior court’s orders
denying the three motions for sanctions.

                                        14
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
                         MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS
                            A. Swiech’s Contentions
      Swiech argues the superior court abused its discretion in denying the
motions for sanctions under sections 128.5 and 128.7. We disagree.
                  B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
      Under section 128.7, when a party presents a document to the court,
the party implicitly certifies that (1) the document is not being presented
primarily for an improper purpose, (2) the legal contentions in the document
are nonfrivolous, and (3) the allegations or denials of fact in the document are
warranted by the evidence. (Id., subd. (b).) Section 128.7 authorizes the
court to impose sanctions, including attorney fees, for violating those implied
certifications. (Id., subds. (c), (d); see Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 428, 440.) To obtain sanctions, the movant must show that the
opposing party’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. (Peak, at p. 440.) “A
claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that
[it] is totally and completely without merit.’ ” (Ibid.).) Section 128.5
authorizes the court to impose sanctions, including attorney fees, for bad
faith actions or tactics “that are frivolous or solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay.” (Id., subd. (a).)
      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions for abuse of
discretion. (Primo Hospitality Group, Inc. v. Haney (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
165, 174 [sanctions motion under § 128.7]; Wallis v. PHL Associates, Inc.
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 882, 893 [sanctions motion under § 128.5].) We
presume the trial court’s order is correct and do not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court. (Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage & Investment Corp.

                                        15
(2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1345.) To be entitled to relief on appeal, the
court’s action must be sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage
of justice. (Kurinij v. Hanna & Morton (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 853, 867
(Kurinij); see Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712
[“The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the
facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”].)
                                    C. Analysis
      Swiech challenges two different orders: a minute order dated
September 8, 2020, wherein the superior court denied the first sanctions
motion; and a minute order dated March 22, 2021, in which the court denied
the second and third motions for sanctions. Although Swiech makes specific
arguments in his challenge to each of the orders, at a more foundational
level, he insists the denials of his motions for sanctions are inconsistent with
two tentative rulings. The first tentative ruling was issued on September 7,
2018, regarding Swiech’s anti-SLAPP motion. In that tentative ruling, the
court tentatively granted the motion. The second tentative ruling on which
Swiech relies is dated July 31, 2020, wherein the court tentatively granted
Swiech’s first sanctions motion. Swiech’s reliance on these tentative rulings
is misplaced.
      The court never adopted the tentative ruling on the anti-SLAP motion.
Instead, the court took the matter under submission and requested further
briefing from the parties. The court then issued a minute order on
September 26, 2018, denying Swiech’s anti-SLAPP motion. In that order, the
court did not reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims against Swiech. Rather,
the court found that Swiech did not show that his actions fell under the
protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirmed the court’s order on

                                         16
appeal. (See Curamus Management, Inc. v. Swiech, supra, D074990.)
Consequently, the September 7, 2018 tentative ruling is of no legal

significance here.12
      Similarly, the other tentative ruling on which Swiech relies offers him
no help here as well. The court issued that tentative ruling granting the first
motion for sanctions on July 31, 2020. However, at the July 31 hearing, the
court continued the hearing on the sanctions motion until September 4, 2020,
and allowed the parties to submit supplemental declarations. The court did
not adopt the July 31 tentative ruling as the order of the court.
      On September 4, 2020, after considering the supplemental pleadings
filed and entertaining argument from the parties, the court took the matter
under submission. Four days later, it issued a minute order, denying the
first sanctions motion. In the September 8 minute order, the court did not
adopt its July 31 tentative ruling. As such, that tentative ruling is of no legal
significance here. It never became the order of the court. At most, the
tentative ruling provided insight as to what the court was thinking on July
31, 2020. Further, the tentative ruling offers context as to why Levine, Cook,
and Christina filed supplemental declarations. But the tentative ruling,
which the court never adopted as its final ruling, does not provide any

12    We found one possible reference to the tentative ruling on the anti-
SLAPP motion in a subsequently issued minute order. In the September 8,
2020 minute order, while discussing the first sanctions motion, the superior
court faulted Plaintiffs for not addressing the case law holding that opinions
are protected under the First Amendment. To emphasize this point, the
court added: “As this Court already found when considering the merits of
Plaintiffs’ allegations on Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, ‘Plaintiffs have not
shown the claims are legally sufficient - the statements are opinions.’ ” This
possible brief reference to the court’s anti-SLAPP analysis is not the talisman
that transforms the September 7, 2018 tentative ruling to a final order of the
superior court or that otherwise requires us to consider that tentative ruling.
                                       17
support for Swiech’s arguments here. To the extent he relies on the
September 7, 2018 tentative ruling or the July 31, 2020 tentative ruling to

support his contentions on appeal, we summarily reject those arguments.13
      In denying the first motion for sanctions, the superior court provided a
detailed explanation why it believed sanctions were not warranted. In doing
so, the court referenced Cook’s and Christina’s respective declarations. It
noted that the attorneys had reason to believe that Swiech posted a negative
Yelp review that involved factual representations about Curamus. The court
pointed to actions that Swiech took in response to Plaintiffs’ cease and desist
letter. In addition, the court noted that Swiech’s statements to Plaintiffs
coupled with Swiech’s creation of the fake website and search optimization
activities “indicate[d] Swiech was intentionally trying to harm” Plaintiffs.
Finally, the court determined, “[a]t a minimum, Plaintiffs’ former attorneys
had reason to believe they could amend the complaint.”
      Here, Swiech ignores most of the court’s findings and does not argue

that those findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 14 Rather, he
focuses on Christina’s declaration, arguing the court should have disregarded

13    Moreover, Swiech’s quoting from the September 8, 2018 and July 31,
2020 tentative rulings and acting as if the court somehow adopted the
reasoning of those tentative rulings borders on misrepresentation.
Throughout his opening brief, he treats these rulings as containing findings
the court never made. He compounds this distortion by claiming, without
support, that the “court retained all of its findings from its earlier orders” to
imply the appealed minute orders are similar in content to the tentative
rulings. Such an assertion is patently false.

14    Swiech does argue that the court’s order denying the first sanctions
motion was inconsistent with prior tentative rulings. As discussed ante, the
two tentative rulings on which Swiech relies were never adopted by the court
as final orders and cannot be used to establish that the court abused its
discretion in denying the first motion for sanctions.
                                        18
that declaration as inadmissible legal argument and opinion by a non-expert.
To this end, Swiech notes that he “filed evidentiary objections to Denning’s
declarations, which the trial court did not rule on.” He then claims to raise
“the objections again here by this reference.” That is the extent of Swiech’s
reference to and argument regarding the superior court’s alleged failure to
rule on his objections in his opening brief. He offers neither a discussion of
those objections nor any case law to support his contention that his objections
should have been sustained. This is not sufficient to properly raise the issue
on appeal. (Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 232, 251, fn. 17; Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226

Cal.App.4th 830, 854.) Thus, we deem this argument waived.15
      Next, Swiech argues that even if the superior court properly considered
Christina’s declaration, it should have granted the sanctions motion because
Christina conceded that the lawsuit was filed for an improper purpose,
namely Christina found Swiech “ ‘obnoxious’ ” for writing “ ‘offensive’ ”
comments on Denning’s Facebook page. We do not share Swiech’s reading of
Christina’s declaration. Nowhere in the declaration does Christina state that
she filed the lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiffs because she found Swiech
obnoxious for writing offensive comments on Denning’s Facebook page.
Indeed, the initial complaint was filed on July 2, 2018, and Christina noted

15     In the reply brief, Swiech discusses in detail the objections and argues
why we should exclude certain portions of Christina’s declaration as well as
Cook’s declaration. By waiting to discuss the objections in depth until the
reply brief, Swiech has deprived Plaintiffs, Denning, and Turnbow the
opportunity to respond to such arguments. Accordingly, Swiech’s failure to
substantively discuss his objections to the subject declarations until his reply
brief waives this argument. (See American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453; Varjabedian v. City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d
285, 295, fn. 11.)
                                       19
that Swiech posted “insulting” and “offensive” reviews of Denning on
November 4 and December 14, 2018. Thus, Swiech’s derogatory statements
about Denning could not have been the impetus for the filing of the
complaint, which occurred months earlier.
      In short, the court made certain factual findings based on Cook’s and
Christina’s declarations in opposition to the first motion for sanctions.
Swiech largely does not address the court’s findings or the evidence on which
it relied. Instead, Swiech asks us to consider the superior court’s tentative
rulings while he ascribes untoward (but unfounded) motivations to the filing
of the initial complaint. On this record, we cannot say the court’s order
denying the first motion for sanctions constituted a manifest miscarriage of
justice. (Kurinij, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 867.) Consequently, the court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the first motion for sanctions.
      Swiech’s arguments challenging the March 22, 2021 minute order are
no more persuasive. For example, Swiech contends that his second sanctions
motion was aimed at Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a first amended

complaint.16 And Swiech asserts that the proposed amended complaint was
based on the fake website, which the superior “court had said was
constitutionally protected speech in September 2018 . . . and July 2020[.]”
However, Swiech again refers to the tentative rulings. The superior court
never adopted those rulings; thus, those tentative rulings cannot support

16    As set forth ante, Swiech claimed the second sanctions motion was
aimed at five separate acts of Plaintiffs and Turnbow. In his opening brief,
he focuses on Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint. He
neglects to discuss the other alleged justifications for sanctions. Thus, he has
waived any arguments related to those justifications on appeal. (See Jones v.
Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 92, 96.)
                                       20
Swiech’s argument that Plaintiffs and Turnbow should have been sanctioned
for filing a motion for leave to amend the complaint.
      In addition, Swiech faults Plaintiffs and Turnbow for failing to
withdraw the motion for leave to amend after the court issued the
September 8, 2020 minute order. Swiech insists the superior court “made yet
another finding that those claims [based on the fake website] were frivolous.”
Yet, nowhere in the September 8 minute order did the court find that the
claims were frivolous. Swiech cites to four pages of the minute order, but
does not point to any specific sentence in which the court used the word
“frivolous” to describe the causes of action in the original complaint.
      Further, in the September 8 minute order, the court granted Swiech’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, noting that “[t]he allegations are
insufficient to support the causes of action included in the operative
complaint.” Belying Swiech’s argument here, the court also addressed
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The court observed:
         “Plaintiffs are incorrect that the filing of a motion for leave
         to amend moots this motion. ‘Unless the complaint shows
         on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of
         leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion [ . . . ]
         Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule . . . .’
         (McDonald v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 297,
         303-304.) However, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving a
         reasonable possibility of amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan
         (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Plaintiffs have not indicated
         how [they] could amend, but the motion for leave to file an
         amended complaint indicates Plaintiffs may be able to
         amend the complaint. Plaintiffs are granted 10 days leave
         to amend.”

      Therefore, the court explicitly stated that, based on Plaintiffs’ motion
for leave to amend, Plaintiffs had 10 days to file an amended complaint. Yet,
despite the clear dictates of the court, Swiech now argues Plaintiffs and

                                       21
Turnbow should have been sanctioned for failing to withdraw their motion to
amend after the court specifically granted them 10 days to file an amended
complaint. Such an argument rings nonsensical.
      Further, Swiech fails to address the court’s explanation as to why it
denied the second sanctions motion: “For essentially the same reasons this
Court denied Defendant’s motion for sanctions on September 8, 2020, the
Court denies Defendant’s motion filed on September 3, 2020 (this Court had
not yet [granted] Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings).
Plaintiffs’ counsel had reason to believe that Swiech had posted a negative
Yelp review which did make factual representations about Curamus”
Essentially, Swiech just ignores the court’s reasoning and attempts to focus
us on tentative rulings and specific portions of the record devoid of context.
Such a strategy does not carry the day here. Therefore, on this record,
Swiech has failed to show the court abused its discretion in denying his

second motion for sanctions.17
      Much like his arguments challenging the March 22, 2021 order as it
relates to the second motion for sanctions, Swiech’s contentions that the court
abused its discretion in denying the third sanctions motion rest on tentative
rulings and a selective reading of the record before us. For example, the
following is Swiech’s initial paragraph arguing the superior court abused its
discretion denying the third motion for sanctions:

17     Swiech also argues, without citation to the record, that by the time he
filed the second sanctions motion, the court had dismissed the website claims
with prejudice after issuing multiple warnings that the claims were
“ ‘objectively unreasonable.’ ” Again, this assertion is not supported by the
record. In fact, there is no order dismissing “the website claims with
prejudice” as Swiech claims.
                                       22
         “The court’s order on Sanctions Motion #3 incorporated all
         the findings of the previous orders on Sanctions Motion #1,
         Sanctions Motion #2, the anti-SLAPP tentative, and the
         motion for judgment on the pleadings. Two years of orders
         had now found the claims about the parody website to be
         frivolous. The court had dismissed the website claims with
         prejudice. The court had told Respondents in minute
         orders and tentative rulings that the website claims had no
         merit, and that ‘no reasonable attorney’ would keep
         pursuing them. There was no excuse at this point.”

      The first sentence of the above paragraph is both inaccurate and
unhelpful to Swiech’s position here. The March 22 minute order did state
that it previously (1) granted Swiech’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
but granted leave to amend and (2) denied Swiech’s first sanctions motion. It
did so in the context of explaining why it was denying the second sanctions
motion. Except for stating that it was denying the second sanctions motion
for similar reasons as it denied the first sanctions motion, the court did not
adopt the findings of the September 8, 2020 order. Also, the March 22
minute order did not “incorporate all the findings” of the anti-SLAPP
tentative ruling, and it is a blatant misrepresentation of the record to claim
that it did so. In fact, we note the Swiech does not point to any portion of
March 22 order that incorporates any portion of the anti-SLAPP tentative
ruling whatsoever.
      The second sentence of Swiech’s paragraph also is not supported by the
record. If the record contains two years of orders finding the claims based on
the fake website frivolous as Swiech represents, we would expect Swiech to
cite to these various orders. Yet, he does not cite to a single minute order
declaring Plaintiffs’ claims to be frivolous. Likewise, he does not provide any
citation to the record to support his third sentence that the court dismissed

                                       23
the website claims with prejudice.18 Indeed, our independent review of the
record uncovered no order dismissing any of Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.
      Swiech reiterates the points of his first three sentences in his
penultimate sentence wherein he emphasizes that Plaintiffs were on notice
that the “website claims had no merit” and “ ‘no reasonable attorney’ ” would
keep pursuing them. He thus concludes Plaintiffs and their attorney had “no
excuse at [that] point” to continue with the first amended complaint.
      Swiech next quotes from the September 8, 2020 minute order,
repeating statements that the court directed toward the three causes of
action in the original complaint. Based on that language, he argues that the
first amended complaint violated the court’s previous orders. The record,
however, does not support that contention. Moreover, Swiech appears to
gloss over the court’s explanation regarding why it did not grant the third
sanctions motion. The court explained:
         “Plaintiffs have continued to include allegations in the FAC
         regarding the fake website. . . . It appears to be for this
         reason that Plaintiffs included the allegations with other
         allegations to support their interference causes of action
         and request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs continue to
         assert, notwithstanding this Court’s express finding, that
         the fake website makes provable statements of fact. The
         website includes the following statements: 1. ‘We Mess
         Up,’ 2. ‘Did not do a good job with East Bluff,’ 3. ‘Not doing
         a good job with Stratford Woods,’ 4. ‘No respect for the
         community,’ 5. ‘Does not take the time to work with

18     We acknowledge that in denying the first sanctions motion, the court
found that the allegations in the original complaint were “objectively
insufficient for a defamation claim,” did “not arise to the level of being
outrageous as a matter of law,” and, regarding the claim of interference with
prospective economic advantage, “were not wrongful by any legal measure.”
However, these findings related to the allegations and causes of action in the
original complaint, not the allegations in the first amended complaint, which
was the subject of the third sanctions motion.
                                       24
         people,’ 6. ‘Not good with costal [sic] properties,’ 7. ‘Does
         not control costs well,’ and 8. The image of Curamus’s logo,
         altered to include the text ‘We Mess Up-Curamu
         Management.’ While the Court continues to find that these
         statements on the fake website are not provable statements
         of fact, the Court does not believe ‘any reasonable attorney
         would agree’ that the statements are not provable statements
         of fact. There is some room for disagreement. To the extent
         this contradicts this Court’s prior findings, the Court notes
         it has the ‘inherent authority to change its decision at any
         time prior to the entry of judgment,’ and it may do so sua
         sponte. [Citation.]” (Italics added.)

      Thus, the court expressly stated that it found that reasonable minds
could disagree regarding whether the posts on the fake website were
actionable. More importantly, the court cautioned that if its finding
contradicted any of its prior findings, it had changed its mind. And the court
was permitted to do so. (See Kritt, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.) As
such, Swiech’s attempt to use language from prior rulings as a justification
for its claim that the court abused its discretion in denying the third
sanctions motion necessarily fails.
      In addition, much like he did not do in challenging the September 8,
2020 minute order, Swiech does not address the court’s specific reasoning in
denying the third sanctions motion. In fact, Swiech spends several pages of
the opening brief arguing that the posts on the fake website were
nonactionable opinions. Although the superior court ultimately agreed with
this point, Swiech’s argument ignores the court’s finding that it did not
“believe ‘any reasonable attorney would agree’ that the [posts] are not
provable statements of fact” and that “[t]here is some room for
disagreement.” And the court’s finding is not arbitrary or capricious and does
not exceed the bounds of reason. (See Link v. Cater (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th
1315, 1321 [a court abuses its discretion when its actions are arbitrary or

                                       25
capricious, or exceed the bounds of reason].) For example, Plaintiffs and their
attorneys represented that Plaintiffs never worked at East Bluff. Yet, the
post “Did not do a good job at East Bluff” implies that Plaintiffs did work at
East Bluff and did not do a good job. That statement could be construed as a
misrepresentation of fact.
      Perhaps, Swiech was confused by the court’s paragraph following its
explanation that reasonable minds could differ when it stated:
         “Notwithstanding the above, the Court believes that no
         reasonable attorney would believe the claims based solely
         on the fake website have any merit after contemplating this
         Court’s rulings to date- Plaintiffs should remove any ‘legal
         contentions’ that the fake website forms any basis of
         liability.”

The court was explaining that, although it was not sanctionable conduct to
file the first amended complaint wherein the causes of action were based, at
least in part, on the fake website, going forward, considering the context of
the litigation and the court’s prior rulings, the complaint should not include
any allegations that the fake website is the basis of a cause of action. In
other words, the court understood why Plaintiffs included the allegations
based on the fake website but also cautioned Plaintiffs they could not proceed
on any legal theories of liability solely based the fake website. In light of the
evidence and argument before the court, such an approach (denying sanctions
but admonishing Plaintiffs to remove certain allegations from the first
amended complaint going forward) appears eminently reasonable. As such,
we conclude the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
third motion for sanctions.

                                       26
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs, Denning, and Turnbow are
entitled to their costs on appeal.

                                                            HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

                                     27