Court Opinion

ID: 9795214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:22:57.341803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:09.990651
License: Public Domain

WECHSLER, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). {44} When courts construe statutes, they do so for legislative intent. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747. Because I believe that the legislative intent to impose a sentence of consecutive jail time is clear, I would construe Section 66-8-102(F) to require Defendant Calvert to serve a jail term of seventy-two consecutive hours for DWI, second offense, and Defendant Zavala to serve a jail term of not less than 168 consecutive hours for aggravated DWI, second offense. I therefore respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion that holds otherwise. I agree with the majority with regard to Defendant Sanchez-Jacquez’ sentence. {45} Section 66-8-102 requires a consecutive jail term for all offenders. It has language requiring presentence confinement credit for a first offense, but does not have language requiring, or even permitting, presentence confinement credit for second and third offenses. A fourth offense is not at issue because it is a felony subject to Section 31-20-12, which requires presentence confinement credit for felony charges and was in place prior to the consecutive jail term requirement of Section 66-8-102. {46} I believe that the language of Section 66-8-102 expresses the legislative intent. In considering the manner in which the legislature sought to approach the problems of DWI, this Court has recognized that Section 66-8-102 contains progressive punishment provisions designed to deter continued offenses. Hernandez, 2001-NMCA-057, ¶¶ 18-26, 130 N.M. 698, 30 P.3d 387. The consecutive jail terms provisions of Section 66-8-102 are consistent with legislative intent to punish repeat offenders in order to deter recidivism. {47} As written, Section 66-8-102 only allows a court to grant credit for presentence confinement for a first offense. The express statutory language comports with the legislative intent of progressive punishment as recognized in Hernandez. I agree that courts try to construe a statute in its entirety so that each part can be read consistently with the others. See Key, 121 N.M. at 769, 918 P.2d at 355. However, the requirement of consistency is merely an aid in statutory construction that should be applied only when the resulting interpretation would not conflict with the intent of the legislature. El Paso Elec. Co. v. Real Estate Mart, Inc., 92 N.M. 581, 584, 592 P.2d 181, 184 (1979). We cannot lose sight of the paramount purpose of statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent. See State v. Sinyard, 100 N.M. 694, 697, 675 P.2d 426, 429 (Ct.App.1983). Although there may be inconsistencies in the statute at the extremes as the majority points out, I would not allow the effort for consistency to blur the overall legislative intent. {48} I agree with the majority’s resolution of the Miranda issue.