Court Opinion

ID: 9554532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:00:34.774091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:29.364695
License: Public Domain

20-1348
    Ghale v. Garland
                                                                                    BIA
                                                                               Barcus, IJ
                                                                            A205 897 882

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day of August, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                       RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                       STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                       SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    RAJENDRA GHALE,
            Petitioner,

                       v.                                         20-1348
                                                                  NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                      Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq., New York,
                                         NY.
FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                    General; Stephen J. Flynn, Senior Litigation
                                    Counsel; Lindsay Marshall, Trial Attorney,
                                    Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                    States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                    D.C.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioner Rajendra Ghale, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a

March 25, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a June 6, 2018 decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).             In re

Rajendra Ghale, No. A 205 897 882 (B.I.A. Mar. 25, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 897 882

(Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 6, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented and modified by the

BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005); Xue Hong Yang v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). “[A]dministrative findings of

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). “Accordingly, we review
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the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and must defer to the factfinder’s

findings based on such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. . . . By contrast, we review legal conclusions de

novo.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

      To establish eligibility for asylum, Ghale had to show that he suffered past

persecution or that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution “on account

of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i).

      “[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of

treatment our society regards as offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64,

72 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).          A valid claim of past

persecution may “encompass[] a variety of forms of adverse treatment, including

non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,” but the harm must be

sufficiently severe, rising above “mere harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of

Just., 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted).    “[W]hile the difference between harassment and persecution is

necessarily one of degree, the degree must be assessed with regard to the context

                                           3
in which the mistreatment occurs.” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       The agency did not err in concluding that Ghale failed to establish harm

rising to the level of persecution. 1              Ghale testified that, over a period of

approximately five years, he had a series of encounters with Maoists who

demanded that he support their party, came to his home on multiple occasions,

once threatened to kill him if they lost an election, and once forced him from his

home and hit him in the head with an unidentified object, leaving him unconscious

and requiring two days’ medical treatment. But his sparse testimony did not

otherwise “refer[] to specific facts” showing the severity of his injuries from this

assault or showing that the assault rose to the level of persecution in the context in

which it occurred. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d

820, 822 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a beating may constitute persecution but does

not “constitute[] persecution per se”); Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226 (holding that

“minor” beatings are more likely to constitute persecution if they occur in the

1We do not understand the agency’s decisions to rely on an adverse credibility determination.
See Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. 1669, 1680 (2021) (“In order for an alien’s testimony to carry the
day on its own, the statute requires the alien to satisfy the trier of fact on all three counts—
showing his ‘testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.’”) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
                                                  4
context of arrest or detention on account of a protected ground). The record is

silent as to the nature of the treatment Ghale received while hospitalized and any

other lasting effects from the assault.     Although Ghale also received threats,

apparently triggered by periodic elections, these were mostly separated by years

both from each other and from this one instance of physical harm. See Gui Ci Pan

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that “unfulfilled threats”

generally do not constitute past persecution).

      Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum

by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution, “which requires that

the alien present credible testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and

establish that his fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357

F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2) (2018). 2 “In cases in

which the applicant has not established past persecution, the applicant shall bear

the burden of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to

relocate, unless the persecution is by a government or is government-sponsored.”

8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i) (2018).

2Citations to regulations refer to the version in effect at the time of the agency’s
decision.
                                         5
      The agency did not err in concluding that Ghale failed to satisfy that burden.

As the agency noted, Ghale’s interactions with the Maoists occurred in his home

village, and Ghale asserted that he did not have problems with Maoists during

two periods in which he lived outside the village: between 2006 and 2008, and for

more than two months immediately before leaving Nepal in 2012. He did not

claim that he was in hiding during the first of these periods, and while he asserted

that he was in hiding during the second, his testimony was vague as to why this

was necessary. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)

(“In the absence of solid support in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is

speculative at best.”).   Moreover, the agency reasonably relied on Ghale’s

testimony that his parents have relocated to Kathmandu without further problems

with the Maoists in finding that he, too, could safely relocate within Nepal. See

Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that evidence of

similarly situated family members being able to “live . . . without harm” in the

applicant’s home country “cuts against [the] argument that [the applicant] has a

well-founded fear of persecution”).     Other than the potential risks posed by

Maoists, Ghale does not claim that there was any factor that would make it

unreasonable for him to move to another area of Nepal. See Singh, 11 F.4th at 117

                                         6
(“Under the regulations in place at the time . . . the agency determined the

reasonableness of internal relocation by considering ‘whether the applicant would

face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil

strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure;

geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender,

health, and social and familial ties.’”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (2017)).

      In sum, Ghale did not meet his burden for asylum because he did not

demonstrate sufficiently severe past harm or that he could not reasonably avoid

future persecution by relocating within Nepal.           See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),

1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i) (2018); Mei Fun Wong, 633 F.3d at 72;

Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178.      Because Ghale failed to meet his burden for

asylum, he “necessarily” failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of

removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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