Court Opinion

ID: 9517249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:11:18.160028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.814826
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE DIXON, dissenting: Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act provides that relief may be obtained from final judgments after 30 days from their entry by means of a petition filed not later than two years after the date of judgment. The section abolishes former procedures for attacking final judgments and since 1955 is a codification of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Ellman v. De Ruiter, 412 Ill. 285, where the court held that a petition under section 72 is addressed to the equitable powers of the court and that such powers should be used to prevent injustice. See Joint Committee Comments and Historical and Practice Notes, Ill. Arm. Stats., ch. 110, §72 (1968). Section 72 contains no specific requirement that the neglect of a defaulted defendant or his attorney be excusable. Corum Nobis did require there be no negligence on the part of the defendant. (Jacobson v. Ashkinaze, 337 Ill. 141, 146.) As a general rule, a bill of review, or a bill in the nature thereof will not lie on the ground of counsel’s absence, negligence, mistake, or unfaithfulness, but in exceptional cases the court may entertain a bill on such grounds. (30A C.J.S. Equity §643, at 782.) In Elfman v. Evanston Bus Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 469, 476, the appellate court after agreeing with the trial court finding of negligence by defendants’ attorney went on to affirm the propositions that section 72 was “not intended to relieve a party from the consequences of his own mistake or negligence” and it “is clearly established that negligence of an attorney will be imputed to his client.” The appellate court was reversed. 27 Ill. 2d 609. In reversing the Supreme Court did not discuss the negligence of defendants’ attorney and did not comment on the finding of the appellate court that he was in fact negligent. The court stated, “Since our decision in Ellman v. De Ruiter, 412 Ill. 285, subsequently adopted by the legislature (Laws of 1955, p. 2270,) it has become certain that a petition filed under section 72, such as we have here, invokes the equitable powers of the court, as justice and fairness require, to the end that one may not enforce a default judgment attended by unfair, unjust or unconscionable circumstances.” Elfman v. Evanston Bus Co., 27 Ill. 2d 609, 613. The trend of the courts is to subordinate the existence of excusable neglect to the primary goal of assuring that justice be served by affording the defaulted party his day in court. (See 52 Ill. B.J. 820 (1964).) If, under the circumstance of the case, “substantial justice” dictates that the judgment be set aside, then under Ellman it seems the court has the power to do so. (55 Ill. B. J. 820, 830 (1967).) “In short, as did the court in Stehman v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 2d 40, 206 N.E.2d 299, we interpret the Elfman and Ellman decisions to mean that even though there may have been a lack of due diligence in presenting a defense, a default judgment may nonetheless be set aside if justice and good conscience require it.” Cf. Burkitt v. Downey, 102 Ill. App. 2d 373, 377, 379; Hall v. Hall, 15 Ill. App. 3d 599, 602, 603; George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 19 Ill. App. 3d 973, 979. The court in Stehman, page 48, seized upon the fact that the defendant therein, as herein, was not given notice of the final judgment until more than 30 days after the rendition of judgment. That factor also appeared in Ellman, page 292, Elfman, page 613, and in Jansma Transport, Inc., v. Torino Baking Co., 27 Ill. App. 2d 347, 355; Dann v. Gumbiner, 29 Ill. App. 2d 374, 382; Park Avenue Lumber & Supply Co. v. Nils A. Hofverberg, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 334, 348; Gary Acceptance Corp v. Napilillo, 86 Ill. App. 2d 257, 263; Boughton v. Jones, 98 Ill. App. 2d 396, 400; George F. Mueller & Sons, Inc. v. Morris, 128 Ill. App. 2d 454, 458. There is an anomaly in this matter of negligence of a party or his attorney. Conduct which is excusable under section 50(5) of the Civil Practice Act up until 30 days after judgment1 thereafter becomes negligence sufficient to bar relief unless the defendant is not given notice of the final judgment until more than 30 days after the rendition of judgment in which case the conduct again becomes excusable. In the instant case defendants had paid over *8000 on an *11049.30 obligation.2 The notice of intent to declare a forfeiture was served pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act and so stated. Section 13 of that Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 57, par. 13) allows the court to give the buyer a grace period before the writ of restitution issues and reinstates the contract if full payment is made during the grace period. This is a summary method of setting aside a forfeiture. Had plaintiff brought a forcible entry and detainer action as its notice of intent to declare a forfeiture stated, the trial court might have been obliged to give the defendant a grace period pursuant to section 13.1 do not believe that the declaratory judgment statute was intended as the agency to deprive a defendant of such a valuable right. (Cf. Goldberg v. Valve Corporation of America, 89 Ill. App. 2d 383, 392, but see 666 North Orleans, Inc. v. Kors, 11 Ill. App. 3d 676.) Otherwise stated, declaratory judgment remedies are cumulative and should not be construed as restricting any remedy provided by law for the benefit of any party to the action. If the law provides a grace period a declaratory judgment should apply equitable principles and follow the law. Further, the notice of intent to declare a forfeiture, herein, states, “You and each of you are further notified that unless the following defaults are cured by you after thirty (30) days from the date of this notice, * * (Emphasis supplied.) The rule was evolved by the equity courts that a buyer must be given a reasonable warning of the sellers intention to declare a forfeiture and we have at least one case holding that a month’s warning will suffice. (Chrisman v. Miller, 21 Ill. 227, 237; 53 Ill. R.J. 188, 193 (1964).) At the conclusion of the time specified in a proper notice of intention to declare a forfeiture, the purchaser’s interest in the contract may be terminated. (Forest Preserve Real Estate Improvement Corp. v. Miller, 379 Ill. 375.) Where the vendor has once waived strict compliance with the terms of the contract as to the time of payments, but wishes to avail himself of the right to forfeiture as to subsequent payments, he must give a reasonable, definite, and specific notice that he wifi insist on prompt payment in the future, and must permit the purchaser a reasonable time thereafter to perform. 35 Ill. L. & Pr. Vendor and Purchaser §68, at 494. Does the above language give a definite and specific warning? The usual language is “on or before_(date)” (53 Ill. B.J. 188, 193, 194 (1964).) In order to be effectual, notice should be so fuU and clear as to disclose to persons of ordinary intelligence what is proposed. (Department of Revenue v. Jamb Discount, 13 Ill. App. 3d 430, 435.) A notice must be clear, definite and explicit and not ambiguous. The notice is not clear unless its meaning can be apprehended without explanation or argument. 66 C.J.S. Notice §16, at 654 (1950). In the light of all the circumstances, and in view of the fact that defendant had a meritorious defense and that a petition under section 72 invokes the equitable powers of the court “as justice and fairness require” I am compelled to conclude that the petition to vacate should have been allowed. A denial of the petition could result in the enforcement of a default judgment attended by unfair and unjust circumstances. Elfman. I would reverse and remand the cause with directions to vacate the default of the defendants to permit the defendants to proceed.   See Widicus v. Southwestern Electric Cooperative, 26 Ill. App. 2d 102; Becker v. Pescaglia, 24 Ill. App. 3d 410, for examples.    Counsel for the plaintiffs admitted in open court that the lot in question was worth *21,000 on June 6, 1974.