Court Opinion

ID: 9793715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:51:50.031449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:41.432615
License: Public Domain

SWANSTROM, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I of the lead opinion. I also agree with the holding in Part II that the crime of robbery in this state *534embraces the common-law crime of larceny. The elements of the crime of robbery necessarily include all the elements of larceny as that crime was formerly defined in this state. One of the elements common to the crimes of larceny and robbery is the “specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.” State v. Jesser, 95 Idaho 43, 501 P.2d 727 (1972); State v. Hurst, 36 Idaho 156, 209 P. 724 (1922).
Thus, I agree there was error in the instructions given. However, I also believe the error can be classified as harmless in this case. Therefore, I will briefly explain where I disagree with Part III of the lead opinion. Jury instruction No. 26, stating what requisite specific intent must be found, admittedly does not contain the historically accepted language used in Jesser. The instruction was deficient, in one respect discussed later. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that there was any absence of instruction on the element of specific intent. As the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Walters discloses, several instructions required the jury to consider this element. It is my belief that this is not a case where there was a failure to instruct on one of the necessary elements of the crime. The error in this case, rather, is similar to those which the United States Supreme Court said in Rose v. Clark, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), might be considered harmless.
As I read it, Rose would allow and even encourage the harmless error analysis to be made here. In this analysis we are permitted to determine what the probable effect of the instructional error may have been. Let us compare the instruction given:
In the crime of Robbery there must exist in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to take personal property in the possession of another from his person or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear. Unless such intent so exists that crime is not committed.
with the instruction requested by Olin:
In the crime of robbery of which the defendant is accused, a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of the specific intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.
When viewed against the undisputed evidence in this case, there is no significant difference between the phrase:
[T]he specific intent to take personal property in the possession of another ... against his will, by means of force or fear,
and the phrase:
[T]he specific intent to ... deprive the owner of his property.
For all practicable purposes the specific intent expressed in the first phrase embraces the specific intent spelled out in the second phrase.
In this instance at least, “deprive” is not a word of art requiring a special definition. “To deprive” means simply “to take away” from another. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 606 (1976). “It connotes want of consent.” People v. Banks, 75 Ill.2d 383, 27 Ill.Dec. 195, 388 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (1979) quoted in Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 634 P.2d 1226, 1228 (1981). See opinion of Walters, C.J., supra. In the present case, if the state has proven a “specific intent to take personal property in the possession of another ... against his will, by means of force or fear,” then surely it has proven also “the specific intent to deprive.” What, then, is missing from the court’s instruction No. 26? It is the word “permanently.”
To “deprive permanently” means to: (a) Take from the owner the possession, use or benefit of his property, without an intent to restore the same; or (b) Retain property without intent to restore the same or with intent to restore it to the owner only if the owner purchases or leases it back, or pays a reward or other compensation for its return; or (c) Sell, give, pledge or otherwise dispose of any interest in property or subject it to the claim of a person other than the owner.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Did the absence of this word *535affect the outcome of the trial? I think it did not. Here, the compelling evidence presented by the state established Olin’s specific intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. The evidence strongly suggests there was no intent on Olin’s part when the crime was committed “to restore” the property taken at some future time. There can be no serious question that the state’s proof convincingly established the requisite specific intent. Indeed, this is one of those situations where the defendant can hardly be heard to say otherwise, or, if he says it, his statements will fall on disbelieving ears.
Here, there is no need to pause over the distinctions between intending to take from the owner and intending to take from another person who is merely in possession. The state has never been required to prove that the robber knew who the owner of the property was. In this regard, it is sufficient for the state to prove the defendant was not the owner of the property or entitled to possession. The undisputed evidence showed that Olin had no possessory or ownership right to or interest in the property taken.
The only evidence which was offered to show the absence of the requisite specific intent was the evidence of Olin’s intoxication. The jury was fully instructed on that defense. No error is alleged in those instructions. The jury obviously rejected the argument that Olin’s intoxication prevented him from forming the specific intent to deprive the owner of his property. The ultimate question is: Would the jury have reached the same conclusion if they had been told the state needed to prove Olin intended to permanently deprive the owner of his property? Olin’s alleged intoxication does not help him here. The jury found Olin had the ability to form, and did form, the intent to deprive. No reason is shown in the evidence or by the arguments why Olin would have had any less ability to form the intent to deprive the owner of his property “permanently.”
Aside from intoxication, there was no explanation given why Olin was acting like a robber and talking like a robber. Without some suggestion in the record indicating why a juror might believe reasonably that Olin intended to deprive the owner of his property only temporarily, I believe the instructional error was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I vote to affirm.