Court Opinion

ID: 9775498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:00:52.714407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:58.212110
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. “Waiver of the right to counsel shall be accepted only upon a finding by the court from clear and convincing evidence, after questioning the juvenile, that . . . [t]he parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney agreed with the juvenile’s decision to waive the right to counsel.” Thus provides Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-317(a)(3) (Repl. 1991). Although that Statute is part of the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989 and is included among sections dealing with proceedings to be conducted by the juvenile divisions of chancery courts, it contains no limitation requiring its use only in such proceedings. One of the goals of the Juvenile Code is, To protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution, recognizing that the application of sanctions which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases. [Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-302(3) (Repl. 1991).] This decision will guarantee that the purpose of, and the flexibility envisioned by, the statutory language will not be achieved in cases like this one. If the Court’s opinion is correct, when a juvenile like Boyd waives the right to counsel without the required guidance and confesses, the prosecutor choosing whether to charge the juvenile in a juvenile court or in a circuit court must file felony charges in a circuit court or risk suppression of the confession for noncompliance with § 9-27-317. A Statute designed to protect juveniles thus will result in their being subjected to greater punishment, and the rehabilitation goals of the Juvenile Code will be subverted. A juvenile accused of a felony, and thus facing the possibility of being prosecuted as an adult, obviously has more need for parental guidance than one facing delinquency proceedings. Surely the General Assembly did not intend the Statute to result in curtailment of a protection the juvenile would otherwise have. We have often rejected statutory interpretations resulting in absurdity or injustice or which defeat the plain purpose of the law. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 311 Ark. 641, 846 S.W.2d 639 (1993); Ragland v. Allen Transformer Co., 293 Ark. 601, 740 S.W.2d 133 (1987); Ragland v. Alpha Aviation, Inc., 285 Ark. 182, 686 S.W.2d 391 (1985). We should do so in this case and hold that, although the Statute is part of the Juvenile Code, it applies at least to a juvenile who, while being interrogated and before being charged or made the subject of a delinquency proceeding, waives the right to counsel. I respectfully dissent.