Court Opinion

ID: 9899205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 15:07:47.718496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:57.868007
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-528

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                               TIBERIAS ALBERT.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of six

 counts, including armed assault with intent to murder,

 aggravated assault and battery, and four firearms offenses.1                In

 this consolidated appeal from his convictions and the denial of

 his motion for a new trial, the defendant argues that he should

 have been allowed more extensive cross-examination of one of the

 Commonwealth's witnesses, and that his trial counsel provided

 ineffective assistance in various respects.            The defendant also

 asserts that Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, S.C., 493

 Mass. 1 (2023), requires that we vacate the convictions on the

 1 Specifically, the firearm convictions were for: two counts of
 possessing a large capacity firearm in violation of G. L.
 c. 269, § 10 (m), one count of unlawfully possessing a loaded
 firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), and one count of
 unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license in violation of
 G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).
fifth and sixth charges because the Commonwealth did not present

any evidence as to his lack of a firearm license.      We agree that

those two convictions must be vacated but otherwise affirm.

    Background.      1.   The Commonwealth's case.   There was no

evidence that the victim knew the shooter.      The Commonwealth's

theory was that on the afternoon of February 24, 2014, the

defendant and the victim had a brief chance encounter outside

the victim's home.    As a result of this interaction, the

defendant -- for reasons not clear -- became enraged and shot

the victim.

    One of the Commonwealth's two key witnesses was Brittany

Aguiar, who had given the defendant a ride to the residential

area where the shooting took place.      Aguiar knew the defendant

and was dating his much older half-brother, Ronald Alston, whom

she later married.    Aguiar testified that on February 24, 2014,

the defendant flagged her down for a ride and then requested

that she stop on a particular street.      According to Aguiar, the

defendant "didn't really explain why" he had her stop.       She

testified that she observed him go up to the victim's door,

where she saw him speak with the victim for "a few seconds, a

few -- a few minutes at most, not even."      When the defendant

returned to the vehicle, he appeared "definitely angry" and

"frustrated."   She testified that she then observed him go into

the back seat, remove an item from his "stuff," and walk towards

                                   2
the victim with what "obviously was a gun" in his hand.

According to Aguiar, she did not see the shooting, but heard a

gunshot as she drove off, leaving the defendant behind.

     The Commonwealth's other key witness was the victim, whose

testimony was largely consistent with that of Aguiar.     According

to victim, he returned home that afternoon to find a "young kid"

whom he did not recognize at his door.   He testified that the

man was "kind of Dominican looking, light skinned, not real

dark," "maybe about 5'5, 5'6," and about sixteen or seventeen

years old, "like, young."   Although the victim did not identify

the defendant as that man, and although when shown a photograph

array months later he told the police he was fifty percent sure

that the shooter was another man, his description of the shooter

in large part matched Aguiar's description of the defendant.2

     The victim testified that after he and the man exchanged

words, the man went to a vehicle parked in front of the victim's

house, where a woman matching Aguiar's description stood.

According to the victim, shortly thereafter, the man returned

2 According to Aguiar, the defendant was about her height (5'3"
or 5'4") and 160 to 180 pounds. She identified him from his
booking photograph for the police, and that photograph was
admitted in evidence. The defendant was twenty-one years old at
the time of the shooting.

                                3
and shot him.   The victim testified that the man then ran

towards the vehicle before the woman drove away.3

     The Commonwealth also called other eyewitnesses who

corroborated many of the details of Aguiar's account of the

incident.   For instance, a neighbor testified that she heard a

gunshot just after 5 P.M. that evening, and when she looked

outside, saw a man running down the victim's driveway.     Beyond

eyewitness testimony, a critical component of the Commonwealth's

case was forensic evidence linking a firearm found at the

location where the defendant was arrested to the shooting.

Specifically, the Commonwealth called a ballistics expert who

testified that in his opinion, the spent projectile found

outside the victim's home after the shooting came from the

recovered firearm.   The caliber and manufacturer of the spent

projectile matched those of ammunition found in a shoebox in

Aguiar's vehicle, which she attributed to the defendant.     The

police recovered the shoebox and other possessions of the

defendant from the vehicle, including his photograph

identification and Social Security card.

3 The defendant tries to make much of the fact that the victim's
testimony regarding when Aguiar drove off was inconsistent with
Aguiar's testimony on this issue, and he even suggests that the
victim observed the shooter get into the vehicle and drive away
with Aguiar. However, a close reading demonstrates that the
victim did not testify that he observed the shooter get back
into the vehicle after the shooting, but only run towards it.

                                4
    2.   The defense.    The defendant mounted a vigorous multi-

pronged defense.   First, he highlighted inconsistencies in the

eyewitness accounts, and underscored that the victim identified

someone other than the defendant as the shooter.    Second, the

defendant suggested that the spent projectile was planted at the

scene because it was "unbelievable" that this evidence was

passed over in the initial investigation only to be found by an

officer "casually looking down" months later.    Third, he

portrayed Aguiar as a biased witness attempting to curry favor

with the Commonwealth because she had been facing an open

criminal charge at the time of the shooting.     Fourth, he sought

to raise doubt in the jurors' minds about whether Alston, the

defendant's half-brother and Aguiar's boyfriend (and later

husband), was the actual shooter.     Because this appeal primarily

relates to these last two defenses, we turn to the relevant

facts in some detail.

    a.   Pending charge.    Prior to trial, the defendant filed a

motion seeking to cross-examine Aguiar as to incentives she may

have received in her criminal case in exchange for testifying

against the defendant.     That case (where Aguiar was charged with

sexual conduct for a fee) was pending at the time of the

shooting, but was dismissed at the recommendation of probation

                                  5
upon payment of court costs in March 2014.4    The judge largely

ruled in the defendant's favor, allowing him to cross-examine

Aguiar as to the "existence and pendency" of the charge on the

dates of the shooting, her interview with police, and her grand

jury testimony.5    Over his objection, the judge precluded the

defendant from inquiring about the underlying details of the

case, finding that this question went "way beyond" his motion,

which "deal[t] with the issue of a pending case."

     Aguiar testified that she had an open criminal matter when

she first met with the police and testified before the grand

jury.     She further testified that she did not seek to curry

favor with the district attorney's office at that time, and that

at no point did she receive any sort of written agreement from

the district attorney.

     b.    Third-party culprit defense.   Although the defendant

made some efforts to implicate Alston in the shooting, the state

of the evidence placed significant limitations on his ability to

4 As the defendant acknowledged at the hearing before us, this is
not an unusual disposition for this type of case.

5 Alston was charged in Aguiar's case with deriving support from
prostitution. It is clear that the defendant considered having
Alston testify because his motion to cross-examine Aguiar also
included a request to cross-examine Alston. However, neither
side called Alston as a witness. As to the charge against
Alston, the docket from that case appears to suggest that on
August 27, 2014, Aguiar appeared at a pretrial hearing and
asserted her spousal privilege.

                                   6
develop this defense.    For instance, contrary to the various

descriptions of the shooter and the defendant, Alston was

described as six feet tall, around 200 pounds, and in his late

thirties or early forties at the time of the shooting.     A

photograph of Alston was also admitted in evidence.    Moreover,

no witness observed a second man with the victim, let alone one

matching Alston's description.

    The only testimony that placed Alston at the scene was that

of the defendant's girlfriend, Kristen Silvia.    Specifically,

Silvia testified that she was on the phone with the defendant

around the time of the shooting and that she heard Aguiar and

Alston speaking in the background.    She claimed that she heard

"high levels of arguing" and then a voice that she "distinctly"

recognized as Aguiar's saying "let's get out of here," before a

vehicle door closed.

    Given the limited nature of any evidence implicating

Alston, the defendant sought to emphasize the closeness of

Aguiar's and Alston's relationship to develop her motive to lie

to protect Alston.     On cross-examination, Aguiar admitted that

she and Alston were moving in together at the time of the

shooting, that she had Alston listed as the "love of her life"

and his mother listed as "mother-in-law" in her phone contacts

                                  7
at that time, and that they were married in August 2014, shortly

after Aguiar spoke with the police.6

       3.   Subsequent proceedings.    In 2019, the defendant filed a

timely motion for a new trial alleging that trial counsel was

ineffective in five discrete respects, for:       (1) failing to

request a spousal privilege instruction; (2) failing to object

to the use of an outdated reasonable doubt instruction;

(3) failing to request an eyewitness identification instruction;

(4) failing to introduce Aguiar's phone records; and (5) failing

to impeach Aguiar with available video evidence.7      He further

suggested, without explanation, that the "cumulative prejudice

from above failures of trial counsel neutered the third party

culprit defense."     Trial counsel submitted an affidavit and

testified at the evidentiary hearing on the motion before a

judge different from the trial judge (the trial judge having

retired).    In 2021, the defendant's motion was denied.

6 As discussed infra, the defendant now claims that trial counsel
should have requested a jury instruction as to the spousal
privilege that would have allowed Aguiar to avoid testifying
against Alston should he have been charged with the shooting.
It appears that the only time this instruction was discussed at
trial was when the defendant sought to admit details as to
Aguiar's understanding of the spousal privilege through the
testimony of Alston's mother (who also was the defendant's
mother). The judge found that she was not an appropriate
witness through which to do so, but left open the possibility
that the relevance of the spousal privilege could come in
through another witness.

7   The video evidence issue was not raised on appeal.

                                   8
    Discussion.    1.   Limitation on cross-examination.   "The

judge has broad discretion to determine the scope and extent of

cross-examination" of a "prosecution witness[] for bias or

prejudice."   Commonwealth v. Chicas, 481 Mass. 316, 320 (2019).

While a "judge may not bar all inquiry into the subject if the

defendant demonstrates a possibility of bias, [t]he right to

cross-examination . . . is not without limits, and it must be

accommodated to other legitimate interests" (citations and

quotations omitted).    Id.   "We review the judge's decision to

limit the defendant's cross-examination [of a witness] for an

abuse of discretion."   Id. at 319.

    As an initial matter, we reiterate that the defendant was

allowed to and did in fact cross-examine Aguiar as to the

existence of her criminal charge and whether she received any

favors in that case (which she denied).     The defendant now

raises two issues with the judge's limiting further inquiry into

Aguiar's charge:   (1) that the timing of the dismissal could

indicate Aguiar attempted to curry favor in exchange for her

testimony incriminating him, and (2) that the underlying details

about the charge and what they would have revealed about

Aguiar's and Alston's relationship would have supported the

third-party culprit defense.

    In considering the defendant's claims of error, it is

important to keep in focus what was being argued to the trial

                                  9
judge at the time he made his rulings.       In his motion, the

defendant requested only that he be allowed to cross-examine

Aguiar as to her case "pending at the time that the incident in

the instant case occurred . . . because [the charge] may form

the basis of bias and motive to lie, in an attempt to curry

favor with the same District Attorney's Office that is

prosecuting the defendant in the instant case."       However, when

the judge heard from both parties on the motion, the defendant

shifted his focus also to seek to elicit certain details about

that case, including that the police report revealed that Alston

had served as Aguiar's pimp.   According to the defendant,

Alston's "involve[ment] . . . ma[de] a great deal of difference"

because, despite the evidence that Aguiar "knew [Alston]

intimately in [sic] many different levels," she initially told

the police she did not know him.       The judge was understandably

and justifiably concerned that the nature of the charge had the

potential to "impugn Ms. Aguiar."      Counsel was unable to

articulate how the nature of the underlying charge was relevant

to Aguiar's bias or any other defense.

    Notably, the defendant was not arguing at this time that

the evidence that Alston was Aguiar's pimp somehow bore on

whether Alston was the shooter.     Based on what was presented to

him, the judge concluded that he "[didn't] see a basis for the

admissibility of this Alston testimony" as "this [was] all

                                  10
speculation."    The judge therefore precluded any inquiry into

the underlying details of the charge.      Especially where the

defendant had not connected the dots as to how the charge that

Aguiar faced might be relevant to the third-party culprit

defense, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's

prohibition about the specific nature of the charge that Aguiar

faced.8

     Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion in the judge's

limiting the cross-examination about the open charge to the

period that included Aguiar's initial police interview and her

testimony to the grand jury.     See Commonwealth v. Woollam, 478

Mass. 493, 504 (2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1579 (2018)

(cross-examination properly limited where no "quid pro quo

agreement involving open cases").      Indeed, this was the very

time frame that the defendant had specified in his motion.         The

defendant now claims that he should have been allowed to inquire

about the later disposition of the charge (which occurred after

Aguiar already had testified to the grand jury and long before

the trial).     Even putting aside that the defendant received what

he requested as to the time period in question, he is unable to

articulate how being able to ask Aguiar about the disposition of

8 We separately address below whether trial counsel's failure to
better formulate the third-party culprit defense could amount to
ineffective assistance.

                                  11
the charge she had faced would have provided him appreciable

value as to demonstrating her potential bias.     See Commonwealth

v. Rodwell, 394 Mass. 694, 700 (1985) ("We have suggested that

bias because of gratitude for past benefits from the

Commonwealth might be relevant, but, at the same time, we

indicated that the pendency of criminal charges is a much

stronger source of human motivation").

    2.   Ineffective assistance of counsel.     "Where a motion for

a new trial is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant must show that (1) the 'behavior of counsel [fell]

measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary

fallible lawyer' and (2) such failing 'likely deprived the

defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of

defence.'"   Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 362, 365 (2023),

quoting Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).      We

address first the defendant's discrete claims of ineffective

assistance that were the subject of his motion for new trial.

    Two of the issues the defendant raises plainly amounted to

reasonable tactical decisions.    Trial counsel offered sound

reasons for why he decided not to request the model eyewitness

instruction, which would have undercut the strongest evidence in

the defendant's favor:   the fact that the victim identified

someone else as the shooter.     With respect to his decision not

to introduce Aguiar's phone records, trial counsel stated that

                                  12
these records would have corroborated much of her testimony.

Trial counsel's decisions in this regard were not "manifestly

unreasonable."   See Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 482 Mass. 664,

678 (2019) (because the "ineffective assistance of counsel claim

is based on a tactical or strategic decision, the test is

whether the decision was 'manifestly unreasonable' when made"

[citation omitted]).

    As to the remaining discrete arguments, trial counsel

acknowledged that it would have been better practice to request

the spousal privilege instruction and to object to the use of

the outdated reasonable doubt instruction.    The actual spousal

privilege instruction had no direct application where Alston was

not the defendant.     See G. L. c. 233, § 20 par. second ("neither

[spouse] shall be compelled to testify in . . . [a] criminal

proceeding against the other").    While the judge presumably had

the authority to have instructed the jury on the privilege as a

matter of potentially relevant background law -- see, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Grant, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 450, 464

(2010) -- whether to exercise such authority would have lain

within the judge's discretion.    See Commonwealth v. Phong Thu

Ly, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 902 (1984) ("A judge need not give

instructions on every subsidiary fact and possible inference").

We do not view counsel's failure to request such an instruction

as falling measurable below that of ordinary fallible counsel.

                                  13
See Tavares, 491 Mass. at 365.     Neither does the failure to

object to the outdated reasonable doubt instruction constitute

ineffective assistance.    See Commonwealth v. Whitson, 97 Mass.

App. Ct. 798, 801-803 (2020).     Moreover, given the limited

utility of the third-party culprit defense here, any such error

would not have "likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise

available, substantial ground of defence [quotation omitted]."

Tavares, supra.

    Having addressed the discrete issues that were the subject

of the defendant's motion for new trial, we now turn to the

defendant's suggestion -- raised for the first time in this

appeal -- that his trial counsel was ineffective based on his

failure to better articulate how the nature of Aguiar's

prostitution charge may have borne on the third-party defense

that Alston was the actual shooter.     Because this issue was not

raised as part of the motion for new trial, the factual basis of

it must appear "indisputably" on the record for this argument to

succeed.    See Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 223 (2019).

    As noted, the only direct evidence that placed Alston at

the scene was Silvia's unverified and arguably biased testimony.

That testimony presented a double-edged sword:     while, if

credited, it served to place Alston at the scene of the

shooting, it did so at the expense of also placing the defendant

there.     In addition, it bears mentioning that while trial

                                  14
counsel initially planned to have Alston testify, he ultimately

did not call him as a witness.    We do not know why counsel did

not do so, and it would obviously be inappropriate to speculate

about the reasoning behind this choice.    See Commonwealth v.

Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 602 (2001) ("Whether to call a witness is

a strategic decision").    For present purposes, it suffices to

note that the third-party culprit defense was hardly as robust

as the defendant now suggests and that, based on the current

state of the record, we cannot fault counsel for not pressing it

further at trial.9

     Conclusion.     As the Commonwealth has acknowledged, in light

of Guardado, 493 Mass. at 1-2, we vacate the defendant's

convictions of unlawfully possessing a loaded firearm in

violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (n), and of unlawfully carrying

9 We do not mean to suggest that had trial counsel better
articulated how the nature of the charge that Aguiar faced might
have borne on the third-party culprit defense, he would have
been entitled to cross-examine her about that charge. The judge
would have retained significant discretion about whether to
allow such cross-examination, especially in light of the
potential for the nature of the charge to unfairly impugn
Aguiar's credibility. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444
Mass. 563, 571-572 & n.6 (2005) (limiting cross-examination on
racial animus motive that would have supported third-party
culprit defense where asserted motive grounded in speculation
and defendant was allowed to question witnesses on the existence
of their criminal records). See also Chicas, 481 Mass. at 321
("judge was permitted to limit the defendant's cross-examination
of the witnesses to prevent embarrassment and harassment"
[citation omitted]).

                                  15
a firearm without a license in violation of G. L. c. 269,

§ 10 (a), and the verdicts are set aside.      We affirm the

remaining judgments.    We also affirm the denial of the

defendant's motion for new trial.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Milkey, Walsh &
                                         Smyth, JJ.10),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    November 16, 2023.

10   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  16