Court Opinion

ID: 9577041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:06.747773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:52.237308
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion creates a substantial change in Georgia law by holding that the trial court was required to grant a motion for mistrial simply because the prosecutor did not volunteer an explanation for failing to prove a certain portion of his opening statement and because the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard that particular portion. I submit that the trial court was well within its discretion in denying Alexander’s motion for mistrial and the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Historically, this Court has not even considered the question of good faith in the prosecutor’s opening statement, where the trial court instructs the jury to disregard what the prosecutor says he hopes or expects to prove, but does not prove. Sterling v. State, 89 Ga. *352807 (1) (15 SE 743) (1892). Eventually, good faith was acknowledged as the general test in passing upon the prosecutor’s opening statement. Daniels v. State, 58 Ga. App. 599, 605 (3) (199 SE 572) (1938). However, contrary to the assertion of the majority, no Georgia appellate court has ever held that, where the trial court instructs that opening statements are not evidence and have no probative value, “a conviction will not be reversed if the prosecutor acted in good faith. . . .” Instead, this Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently held that, where there is such an instruction, “no error is committed where it does not appear that the remarks of the prosecutor were otherwise than in good faith.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 636 (21) (a) (340 SE2d 891) (1986). See also Jordan v. State, 78 Ga. App. 879, 883 (6) (52 SE2d 505) (1949); Daniels v. State, supra at 600 (3). In other words, there must be some showing that the prosecutor’s remarks were in bad faith. Due to the limited effect of an opening statement, an “accused who asserts it as misconduct must prove more than the mere failure to adduce the testimony described in it, he must also prove bad faith in the introduction of such statement.” 23A CJS, Criminal Law, § 1242, p. 131. See also Walden v. State, 170 Ga. App. 880, 881 (3) (318 SE2d 676) (1984).
The majority’s reliance on Thompson v. State, 265 Ga. 677, 678-679 (2) (461 SE2d 528) (1995) is misplaced. The majority opinion itself shows that Thompson involves cross-examination at the evidentiary stage regarding the defendant’s prior criminal offenses. In such cases, there is a unique potential for prejudice, and “ ‘the district attorney is required to demonstrate that his questions were asked in good faith, and based on reliable information that can be supported by admissible evidence.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Medlock v. State, 263 Ga. 246, 247 (2) (430 SE2d 754) (1993). Such language has never been used in the “opening statement” cases. Even if the issue here had arisen during cross-examination regarding prior criminal offenses, this Court would not reverse the judgment but would, at most, remand the case for the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor could make the required showing. Medlock v. State, supra at 247-248 (2); Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 91 (8) (c) (402 SE2d 41) (1991). However, because this case does not involve the evidentiary stage, neither reversal nor remand is proper.
Indeed, the reversal of the judgment in this case is especially inappropriate. It appears that nothing in the record indicates that the crimes were not gang-related or that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. To the contrary, the prosecutor attempted to question an eyewitness about the gang of which Alexander was a member, and presented evidence that one participant in the shooting was a gang member and that the murder occurred by means of a drive-by shooting after a confrontation between two groúps, which is classic gang *353activity. Thus, the gang-related nature of the crime is a reasonable inference from the evidence. Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137 (4) (485 SE2d 783) (1997); Freeman v. State, 130 Ga. App. 718, 720 (1) (204 SE2d 445) (1974). In the absence of a showing of bad faith, the granting of a mistrial is a drastic remedy for a prosecutor’s mention, in opening statement, of certain details which are not later proved, but which would constitute merely additional support for a reasonable inference from the admissible evidence.
Decided December 4, 1998 —
Reconsideration denied December 17,1998.
Reginald L. Bellury, for appellant.
Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Stephen A. Bradley, Assis*354tant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Angelica M. Woo, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*353The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that, “[e]ven if an opening [statement] is somehow improper, relief will be granted only where the unavoidable effect is to so prejudice the finders of fact as to render them incapable of objective judgment. [Cits.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 711 A2d 444, 456 (Pa. 1998). The trial court here avoided any prejudicial effect on the jury in the manner long set forth in Georgia law, by instructing the jury that opening statements are not evidence. This instruction was given both before opening statements and during the final charge. No Georgia case has ever required an instruction to specify which portion of the opening statement the jury should disregard. See Cargill v. State, supra at 636 (21) (a); Sterling v. State, supra, 807 at (1); Jordan v. State, supra at 883 (6); Daniels v. State, supra at 600 (3). The majority erroneously declares that this Court did not state what curative instruction was given in Cargill. Actually, no curative instruction was given in Cargill, but this Court did approve of an instruction “that the remarks of counsel in opening [statement] are of no probative value. . . .” Cargill v. State, supra at 636 (21) (a).
The trial court gave substantially the same general instruction which was approved in Cargill. It does not appear that the prosecutor’s remarks were made in bad faith and, in my opinion, the record reveals that those remarks were made in good faith. Thus, I believe that Cargill and other relevant cases, far from supporting the majority’s conclusion, demand the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment. Under the majority opinion, any failure of the prosecutor to prove any portion of his opening statement will always be reversible error unless he successfully and affirmatively demonstrates his good faith. This is an unwarranted departure from previous Georgia law and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this dissent.