Court Opinion

ID: 9723478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:16:57.067831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:48.949980
License: Public Domain

HOPPER, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The observations and advice of the court in Bennett v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 116 [90 Cal.Rptr. 479] (where the appellate court upheld the denial of a claim), is singularly appropriate in this case. The court in Bennett at page 120 said: “In discussing this claim we must be constantly aware of the different functions performed by the superior court and ourselves. Unless, ultimately, each case of this nature is to be decided by the Court of Appeal as if no trial court had ever acted on the petition, we must be careful to preserve the area of the superior court’s discretion and we must do this in fact, as well as in words. It is easy enough to give the appearance that the respective func*36tions of the two courts are being preserved: all we need do is label as an ‘abuse of discretion’ any ruling with which we happen to disagree .... we cannot arbitrarily substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.”
In my opinion the majority has in effect substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The majority contends that Lindbeck did not meet his burden of proof (citing the clearly distinguishable case of El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 57 [159 Cal.Rptr. 267]—a case in which there was apparently no evidence and merely argument of counsel) and argues that Lindbeck’s counsel did not properly investigate the matter here. Whether failure to discover the existence of a possible claim against the city was reasonable and consistent with what a prudent person would have done under the same circumstances is a factual question. By granting the petition in this case the trial court decided the issue in favor of Lindbeck. I submit that there is substantial evidence before the trial court to support the judgment. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the mugging took place in an area of the underground garage “prominently marked as reserved for guests of the Fresno Hilton Hotel” and which is served by an elevator to the Fresno Hilton Hotel. Conceding, arguendo, that it would be reasonable to infer that such signs might trigger an investigation (e.g., the majority says “reserved by whom” for the Fresno Hilton does raise such an inference), it would also be reasonable to infer that the sign had nothing to do with some entity other than Hilton having an interest in the property. Rather, it could be construed as a warning prohibiting persons other than Hilton guests from parking in the particular place. A reasonable conclusion can be (and was) made by the trial court that Lindbeck was lulled into assuming that only Hilton Hotel was involved. Any misconception was reasonable under the circumstances and I cannot say that Lindbeck or his counsel as a matter of law failed to exercise reasonable diligence.
I do not agree that this is a classic case of an attorney merely opening a file initiating suit and closing the file. Under the particular circumstances we should not hold that there was no showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect within the meaning of the statute..
Furthermore, cases such as Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468 [58 Cal.Rptr. 249, 426 P.2d 753], Black v. County of *37Los Angeles (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 670 [91 Cal.Rptr. 104], and Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [76 Cal.Rptr. 80], must be seen each in its proper perspective. In those cases a reasonably prudent investigation of the circumstances of the particular accidents may very well have disclosed a public entity as being involved. Each and all of those cases are distinguishable from this case. First, the claims therein were all denied by the trial court whereas this claim has been granted. Second, each of those cases involved situations where it was obvious that a public entity was involved. In Black there was a defective condition of a public street. In Shaddox there were clearly marked state vehicles. In Tammen the maintenance of a state highway was involved. Here insofar as the evidence before the trial judge is concerned the sign and elevator were clearly marked “Hilton Hotel.” It was certainly not unreasonable to believe the parking and the elevator were the property of Hilton. I am not persuaded that the fact, if it be a fact (since the record does not show anything about this occasion and judicial notice was not taken thereof), that there is access directly into the facility from a major public street is significant. Most places of business and residences also have some sort of direct access from a public street and some stores may even be under public ways.
Absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the trial court’s determination should be affirmed (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 552 [94 Cal.Rptr. 158, 483 P.2d 774]; Viles v. State of California (1967) 66 Cal.2d 24, 28 [56 Cal.Rptr. 666, 423 P.2d 818]; Martin v. City of Madera (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 76, 79 [70 Cal.Rptr. 908]). I cannot conscientiously say that the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. Considering all of the circumstances the court had before it, I cannot in this case substitute my judgment for that of the trial court. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 242, p. 4234; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 162, p. 3735.) The trial court’s exercise of discretion was based on a reasoned judgment and complies with the legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue and therefore such discretion should be upheld (Bullis v. Security Pac. Nat. Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801, 815 [148 Cal.Rptr. 22, 582 P.2d 109]; see also California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board (1977) 70 Cal. App.3d 833, 843 [139 Cal.Rptr. 155]).
The city concedes that there was no prejudice. Our law favors the hearing of cases on the merits and any doubt which may exist should be *38resolved in favor of the petition for relief (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, supra, ibid.; Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 537 [148 Cal.Rptr. 729]).
Rather than frustrate the remedial purpose behind the statute, I would deny the writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 28, 1980. Hopper, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 19, 1980. Bird, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.