Court Opinion

ID: 9809316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:08:09.327985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:09.896288
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting: — Still adhering to the views' contained in the opinion of the court as delivered by me at its last term, I am compelled to dissent from the present opinion of the court. Here my dissent would end if the present opinion simply expressed its present views, but as it is in greater part a critical review of the former opinion, I deem it proper to say something further. The opinion of the court speaks of the construction “which has been uniformly adopted by this court until this case was decided at the last term.” This alleged uniformity of construction I have been utterly unable to discover. It may exist somewhere, but if so, in a state too intangible for my mental grasp. Perhaps it shares the etherial existence of that quality of exemption which is said to be capable of existing independently of the substance which it qualifies. The case of Thomas v. Fulford, 117 N. C., 667, in which a distinguished member of the Bar wittily said that there were five dissenting opinions, may be cited as an example of uniformity.
*596The court again says that the framers of the Constitution “never intended that this humane and beneficent provision of the organic law should be so interpreted and misunderstood.” Perhaps not. My only way of knowing their thoughts is from their written words.
In the construction of the constitutional provisions creating the homestead, there are two different views, either of which might reasonably be followed; but they are antagonistic. If one is right, the other must be wrong; and it seems to me that the effort to combine these inconsistent principles is the real cause of the confusion that has arisen in the construction of the homestead, and is the vital error in tire present opinion of the court. The homestead must be either a mere quality annexed to land or a particular estate carved out of the fee. The very definition of the one excludes the other. A quality in itself has no- independent existence, but must remain annexed to the subject which it qualifies. The qualities of a horse are generally considered as including strength, speed, indurance, gentleness and intelligence. The owner cannot sell the horse and still keep these qualities for himself. The qualities must go with the horse or cease to- exist. On the contrary, no one would include the mane and tail of a horse among his qualities. They are parts of the horse and can be cut off and separated from the horse. So, if the homestead is a mere quality annexed to land, it must remain with the land; but if it is a particular estate carved out of the fee, it may exist and be conveyed independently of the reversion. We adopted the former view as being more logical, in view of the repeated decisions of this court; but I readily admit that the latter is not unreasonable, provided it is not confused with a lot' of inconsistent qualities.
The logical result of the present opinion of the court is to turn the homestead into an estate or interest in land. Its parts are (1) a particular estate for life to the homesteader, *597(2) a remainder to bis children until they have become 21 years of age, (3) a contingent remainder to bis widow during her widowhood unless she has a homestead of her own, and (4) the ultimate fee or reversion, which may be retained or conveyed by the homesteader. This idea seems to have been running through the minds of the court in one form or another for many years from their frequent use of the terms “homestead estate” and “reversion.” -
The court principally relies upon the case of Jenkins v. Bobbitt, 77 N. C., 385, which it says “is directly in point and has never been overruled or questioned.” Then follows a long extract from that opinion in which occur the following paragraphs: “As the owner of an estate in reversion after a homestead estate had a right to make a voluntary alienation, it follows that his creditors had a right to have it sold under execution.” And again: “A sale by the owner of the homestead of his estate in reversion stands as at common law.” This is a distinct recognition of two different estates carved out of the same fee.
This court in its present opinion uses the following language : “If this is not so, and the land itself or a part of it allotted for the purpose of exemption was in the mind of the legislature as being that thing which constitutes the ‘homestead’, why should it speak of a ‘reversionary interest’, which implies that there is a preceding estate or interest.”
It may be asked why, if I am now willing to call it an estate, I did not SO' call it in writing the former opinion of the court? One sufficient reason was that this court, while frequently using the words “estate” and “reversion” had repeatedly declared in unequivocal terms that the homestead was merely a quality of exemption attached to land, which is utterly inconsistent with the idea of an estate. Now that this court has virtually turned it into an estate by giving it *598all the elements that constitute an estate, I think it should be called by its proper name.
Although feeling compelled to dissent from the opinion of the court, it is proper to say that I shall offer no further opposition to the adoption of the rule. It cannot be said that it is in violation' of any of the constitutional or inherent rights of the citizen; and as the personnel of this court insures the permanency of this opinion for many years to come, I shall not further attempt to weaken what I cannot change. Where no moral question is involved, the mere consistency of individual opinion bears no importance compared to the necessity of establishing settled rules of property.