Court Opinion

ID: 9790117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:21.244313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.335891
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion, but dissent to Part II which remands the case for resentencing and entry of more specific findings to explain the basis for the sentence imposed.
As in all cases dealing with disputed issues, in imposing a sentence a trial judge must make findings that are sufficiently explicit to inform the appellate court of its reasons for arriving at a result. In People v. Watkins, 200 Colo. 163, 613 P.2d 633 (1980), it was stated, “the sentencing judge *1345[must] state on the record the basic reasons for imposing the sentence.” In my view, the court did so.
I do not read People v. Watkins, supra, as requiring a sentencing judge to place on the record the inner workings of his mind showing how he balanced mitigating factors against aggravating ones. Thus, I believe the majority errs in requiring a ritualistic, Rule 11-type, recitation of all factors to be considered in sentencing. Rather, it is enough if, as here, the judge informs the appellate court of the reason he sentenced as he did.
The reasons the trial judge imposed this sentence are stated in the majority opinion. To me, imposition of this sentence was justified by the trial court’s finding that, “the child had been sexually assaulted by the defendant not once, but on an average of once every two or three days for approximately four months.” This extended course of criminal conduct directed at the same child victim is an adequate basis for a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances justifying a sentence beyond the presumptive range, § 18-1-105(6), C.R.S. 1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.) and also meets the requirements of People v. Watkins, supra.
Moreover, the nature and variety of the sexual practices to which the child victim was subjected amply support the trial court’s conclusion that the victim had been “robbed” of her childhood. The devastating impact of the defendant’s conduct upon the child’s normal sexual maturation process also constitutes an extraordinary aggravating circumstance.
In my view, no purpose is served by remanding the case for the trial court to state the obvious, that the nature of the offense was such as to outweigh the mitigating factors presented. Therefore, I would affirm the conviction and the sentence.