Court Opinion

ID: 9519900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:27:05.721139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:17.997887
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, J.
(dissenting). Viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the applicant widow, it would seem that this is a case where the commission might draw different inferences from evidentiary facts, and that the finding of the commission based upon an inference that is reasonably supported by the evidence cannot be disturbed by the courts on review.
In Ebner v. Industrial Comm. (1948), 252 Wis. 199, 201, 31 N. W. (2d) 172, this court stated:
“And if the facts are not in dispute, but permit of drawing a different inference therefrom, a question of fact and not a question of law is presented and the commission’s finding thereon will be sustained. Eckhardt v. Industrial Comm. 242 Wis. 325, 329, 7 N. W. (2d) 841; Green Valley Co-op Dairy Co. v. Industrial Comm. 250 Wis. 502, 27 N. W. (2d) 454.”
It has been repeatedly held that the burden of proof is on the compensation claimant. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1936), 222 Wis. 111, 114, 267 N. W. 62; Bowen v. Industrial Comm. (1941), 239 Wis. 306, 311, 1 N. W. (2d) 77; Skelly v. Industrial Comm. (1949), 254 Wis. 315, 319, 36 N. W. (2d) 58; McCune v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 260 Wis. 499, 504, 50 N. W. (2d) 683.
The presumption which the majority credit with a dominant influence is not fixed and final. There is evidence which destroys its effectiveness and puts upon the claimant the necessity of producing evidence to support her claim. The *245length of time during which Andreski was completely disassociated with any service connected with his official capacity has probative value to show that he was indulging in his “day off” habit at the place where it was his custom to indulge in private unofficial relaxation. The facts showing a plan, intention, and purpose to entertain himself, using his private car and visiting with friends are set forth in the opinion of the trial judge and the findings of the commission. The undisputed facts which would support an inference, which inference in turn would support a finding by the commission that Andreski was not performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment at the time of his injury are:
(1) That several times prior to Saturday, November 28, 1948, Andreski had visited the France tavern for purposes of personal recreation.
(2) That there is no evidence that Andreski, when he left his office late in the morning of November 28th, started out on a trip incidental to the performance of his duties of sheriff.
(3) The long interval of time (six hours) that elapsed during which Andreski was at the France tavern.
(4) That after leaving the France tavern Andreski proceeded to Antigo which is located in Langlade county, although his jurisdiction as sheriff extended only to the limits of Marathon county.
The facts were considered as proof and as showing a basis for a proper inference, and it seems to me there is no question about the relevancy and materiality of such evidence. The course of conduct of the deceased is certainly of probative value. The showing made points to the existence in the mind of the sheriff of a deliberate purpose to conduct himself unofficially in a manner satisfactory to him. The commission correctly found in its decision that it is common knowledge that sheriffs often leave their offices for personal reasons, *246such as for eating, going home, and doing personal errands. The conduct of Andreski was proved to be of an unofficial nature, and such proof leads to and warrants the inferences drawn by the commission and by the circuit court.
The majority opinion cites the decision of Hansen v. Industrial Comm. (1951), 258 Wis. 623, 46 N. W. (2d) 754, involving the fatal injuries of a traveling salesman occurring near a restaurant where he had gone for supper, in which the court based its decision on sec. 102.03 (1) (f), Stats., which provides:
“Every employee whose employment requires him to travel shall be deemed to be performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment at all times while on a trip, except when engaged in a deviation for a private or personal purpose. Acts reasonably necessary for living or incidental thereto shall not be regarded as such a deviation. Any accident or disease arising out of a hazard of such service shall be deemed to arise out of his employment.”
We fail to see where such statute has any application to the present case. In Hansen v. Industrial Comm., supra, said section is referred to as “the traveling salesmen’s provision of the statutes,” and it does not apply to all employees required to perform some services outside of an office, store, or factory. Even if Andreski’s duties required him to travel about the county, it was not the sort of travel that comes within the purview of the “traveling salesmen’s provision” of the statutes, a section obviously limited to cases of employees temporarily “living away from home.” Hansen v. Industrial Comm., supra, at page 627. Moreover, even if this “traveling salesmen’s provision” could be construed as applicable to a person whose work might entail the occasional use of an automobile, it obviously would have no application to an employee while on a personal errand. In the present case, since it was not established that Andreski was *247injured while on a business trip for his employer, the section could have no possible application.
Where sec. 102.03 (1) (f), Stats., applies, the burden is on the employee to show that he was “performing service growing out of and incidental to hjs employment.” The presumption of this section, that the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is overpowered by the evidence.
For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court affirming the order of the commission dismissing plaintiff’s application for compensation should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Fritz and Mr. Justice Currie join in this dissent.