Court Opinion

ID: 9548941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:10:54.487877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:39.433962
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice
(concurring separately)-
I agree with the majority opinion, but wish to add some observations about judicial method in resolving conflicts between state statutes and municipal ordinances. More particularly I wish to discuss the “local activities rule”, and the place it has in the process of determining the validity of ordinances of a home rule municipality.
*45There is no question that we must adhere to the policy expressed in the constitution which requires that we give a broad reading to the powers of home rule cities and boroughs. That in itself poses no difficulty. This general policy, however, will not solve the real problem, which lies in the inherent potentiality of conflict between statutory law enacted by the legislature and local ordinances.
One possible solution is to hold that only where the legislature has expressly dé-clared its intention to prohibit the exercise of municipal powers should we declare municipal ordinances void. Such an approach would have the advantage of simplicity. Unfortunately, such a mechanical jurisprudential technique is so simple that it would not serve the needs of the public. In extreme cases it probably would not survive constitutional attack.1
The state legislature has expressly prohibited the exercise of total local power in such areas as taxation, AS 29.73.040, AS 29.53.3S0, AS 29.53.400; utilities regulation, AS 29.48.040-29.48.100; security for bonds, AS 29.58.180(b); municipal elections, AS 29.28.010, AS 29.28.020 (b)-29.-28.030; and other matters of general state concern. See, AS 29.13.100. It is naive, however, to expect that these prohibitions contemplate each and every matter in which the legislature would properly wish to restrict local power. A home rule concept which relies only on express prohibition to define the scope of local power presupposes a degree of legislative foresight and draftsmanship ability which is completely unrealistic. See Duvall, Delineation of the Powers of the Alaska Home Rule City: The Need for a Beginning, 8 Alaska Law Journal 232, 239 (1970).
For example, the Uniform Commercial Code, AS 45.05.002 et seq., and the Insur-anee Code, AS 21.03.010 et seq., enacted by the legislature, no doubt were meant to operate upon a statewide basis, though nothing in those codes expressly prohibits municipal legislation in the field of commercial law or insurance law. Yet to say that a home rule city could alter the operation of such comprehensive statutory systems would be intolerable. Transactions whose reliability is vital to a functioning economy would become unsettled, to the detriment of the business community and the citizenry of the state. A conflict between the city and the state could not be ignored in this type of situation, despite the absence of an express prohibition.
In such instances the courts must resolve the conflict. There is no escape from our duty to adjudicate legal claims which arise from two constitutional provisions of equal dignity, i. e., the grants of power to both the legislature and to home rule cities.
The question, then, is not the propriety of judicial action or abstention. Rather, the problem is what methods should be employed by courts when presented with those conflicts between municipal ordinances and state statutes which will inevitably occur. As with many questions of public law, the answer is to be found through an analysis and weighing of the various social and governmental interests which bear upon such a conflict.
One test we have used in determining whether the ordinance or the statute must yield, is the “local activities rule.” This test, as applied in Chugach Electric Association v. City of Anchorage, 476 P.2d 115 (Alaska 1970), and Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971), should not be regarded, as it has been by one commentator,2 as the rule the framers of the constitution rejected in establishing a broad home rule policy. Rather, it should *46be recognized as a realistic tool by which to interpret this policy. The “local activities rule” requires the court to focus upon whether the particular subject under consideration is of such statewide concern that the exercise of municipal power is inconsistent with the effectuation of statewide policy, as expressed by statute. Some matters are obviously of statewide concern, some less so. Some matters are so traditionally and readily classified as matters of local government that there will be no difficulty in finding that they are within municipal competence. Here, too, the municipal code adopted by the legislature is of great help in delineating the areas of permissible local action.
Inevitably, there will be cases which fall within a gray area. As to those the courts must attempt to balance competing interests, bearing in mind the constitutionally stated policy of permitting maximum home rule and yet preventing the chaotic state of affairs which would result if each home rule municipality were allowed to legislate as though it were a feudal city-state. When dealing with cases in the gray area, the courts must strike a balance as best they can, after careful consideration of the competing interests and public policies which bear upon the outcome. Thus in Chugach Electric Association, supra, 476 P.2d at 123, we spoke of balancing “the needs of the entire state against the desirable autonomy which only home rule can provide.” The ultimate question, of course, is whether, from an examination of the statutes, a prohibition against home rule powers can be discerned, either expressly or by implication. Fortunately, if the judicial decision in such cases is unacceptable, relief may still be sought from the legislature, which can, if it chooses, alter the determination. A judicial decision of such a question is not, therefore, the end of the controversy.
Those who advocate that the conflict between statutes and ordinances should be resolved by simply holding in favor of home rule in all instances where the legislature has not stated an express prohibition are seeking an illusionary, unworkable solution to a problem which is quite complex and which is, like many things in modern life, not susceptible to decision by mere slogans or mechanical formulae. “The price of certainty is too high when it involves a failure to face the real policy questions involved.” 3
I favor the “local activities rule” applied in Macauley and Chugach, for the rule is, in my opinion, a useful one in resolving the conflict between statute and ordinance.

. Examples are Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879 (Nev.1973), and Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). These eases concern municipal ordinances barring suit by tort claimants unless notice is given within a certain period of time following tire injury. Because the time periods provided by ordinance were shorter than the statutory period of limitation ap-licable to claimants against private persons, the ordinances were in these cases held unconstitutional as denying to tort claimants the equal protection of the laws.

. See, Sharp, Home Rule in Alaska: A Clash Between the Constitution and the Court, 3 UCLA Alaska Law Review 1, 53 (1973).

. Calif. Governor’s Comm’n on the Law of (1967), cited in Duvall, supra, at 244. Preemption, Report and Recommendations, 6