Court Opinion

ID: 9410448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:05:44.297216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.005358
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           TO BE PUBLISHED

            ORDERED PUBLISHED: JULY 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2021-CA-0692-DG

JOHN EDWARD ANDERSON                                                  APPELLANT

               ON REVIEW FROM HICKMAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-XX-00003

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                             OPINION AND ORDER
                                 DISMISSING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: John Edward Anderson is before the Court on discretionary

review from the Hickman Circuit Court’s order affirming his conviction of theft by

failure to make required disposition of property. After careful review of the briefs,

record, and law, we dismiss this action pursuant to the Fugitive Disentitlement

Doctrine (FDD).
            BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               After a bench trial, Anderson was found guilty of theft by failure to

make required disposition of property1 and was subsequently sentenced by the

Hickman District Court on August 17, 2020, to 180 days, 60 days to serve and the

balance conditionally discharged for two years. Anderson was ordered to report to

jail by September 14, 2020, to begin service on his conviction. He failed to

comply, and a bench warrant was issued on September 16, 2020. Despite having

absconded, Anderson, through counsel, timely appealed his conviction, and the

Hickman Circuit Court affirmed by a May 18, 2021, opinion.

               Thereafter, Anderson sought discretionary review from this Court.

On September 13, 2021, the Commonwealth sought dismissal of this action under

the FDD based on Anderson’s ongoing fugitive status. Anderson subsequently

surrendered himself to the jail and implored this Court to grant discretionary

review. On November 30, 2021, a panel of this Court denied the Commonwealth’s

motion, and discretionary review was ultimately granted.

                                   LEGAL ANALYSIS

               In its brief, the Commonwealth renews its contention that this action

should be dismissed under the FDD. In response, Anderson argues the issue was

waived by the Commonwealth’s failure to file a motion to reconsider the order

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.070.

                                               -2-
denying relief, pursuant to RAP2 43(D).3 We, however, disagree. Though

Anderson is correct that this rule permits the filing of reconsideration motions,

neither the RAP nor the prior rule mandate that the failure to do so constitutes a

waiver. Further, as the Commonwealth notes, it has long been recognized that

“[t]his Court retains authority to review decisions on motion panel that do not

finally dispose of the case[.]” Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co. v. Young, 361

S.W.3d 344, 350 (Ky. App. 2012); see also Knott v. Crown Colony Farm, Inc., 865

S.W.2d 326, 329 (Ky. 1993). Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of the

Commonwealth’s claim.

                “The [FDD] recognizes the principle that when a criminal defendant

absconds and remains a fugitive during his or her appellate process, dismissal of

the appeal is an appropriate sanction.” Commonwealth v. Hess, 628 S.W.3d 56, 57

(Ky. 2021). In our interlocutory order declining to apply the FDD, we reasoned:

                This case is distinguishable from Hess because
                [Anderson] has not remained a fugitive. He has
                surrendered at this point. The Supreme Court of the
                United States stated that it could not accept an expansion
                of the FDD “that would allow an appellate court to
                sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited
                disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system, even
                where such conduct has no connection to the course of

2
    Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3
  This action was briefed prior to the January 1, 2023, adoption of the RAP. However, as the
prior rule, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 76.38, was substantially similar, we have elected to
reference the RAP in the interest of clarity.

                                               -3-
              the appellant proceedings.” Ortega-Rodriguez v. U.S.,
              507 U.S. 234, 246 (1993).

              In response, the Commonwealth asserts Ortega-Rodriguez is

distinguishable, the defendant in that case having been returned to custody prior to

his appeal, and the interlocutory order is otherwise inconsistent with our holding in

Collins v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2017-CA-2022-MR & 2017-CA-2044-MR, 2021

WL 4024429 (Sep. 3, 2021).4 In that case, Collins twice absconded from

supervision while his appeal contesting the revocation of his probation was

pending; though, like Anderson, Collins was apprehended prior to the resolution of

his appeal. Id. at *1. Applying Hess, 628 S.W.3d 56, the Court concluded that

since Collins had largely absented himself from the appellate process, the FDD

applied, and the appeal was dismissed. Collins, 2021 WL 4024429, at *2. Hence,

the Commonwealth reasons that dismissal is likewise appropriate herein.

              Not disputing the Commonwealth’s claims, Anderson nevertheless

maintains that the FDD is not applicable under these facts because, unlike Hess

and Collins which involved appeals secured only by statute, the appeal of his

conviction is guaranteed by Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution. Because

the characterization of Anderson’s appeal as constitutional is incorrect, we

disagree.

4
  Though Collins was rendered prior to the November 30, 2021, order at issue herein, the
opinion did not become final until December 21, 2021.

                                              -4-
                As recognized by the Court in Hess, Section 115 of the Kentucky

Constitution5 “confers to a defendant a single, direct appeal as a matter of right.”

628 S.W.3d at 59-60 (citing Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Ky.

2010) (single appeal as a matter of right) and Moore v. Commonwealth, 199

S.W.3d 132, 137 (Ky. 2006) (first appeal is a matter of constitutional right)). In

satisfaction of this right, Anderson exercised without infringement a direct appeal

to the Hickman Circuit Court of his Hickman District Court conviction. At issue

herein is Anderson’s entitlement to discretionary review which, as indicated by the

name, is not a right secured by the Constitution but is instead granted solely as a

matter of judicial discretion pursuant to RAP 44.6 See Beard v. Com. ex rel. Shaw,

891 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1994). Thus, Anderson’s claim that the FDD is not

applicable is unavailing.

                The FDD is an acknowledgment of the court’s discretion to dismiss

non-constitutional appeals in order to prevent a defendant from realizing a reward

under the rules of the legal system from which he has simultaneously absented

himself. Hess, 628 S.W.3d at 61. We agree with the Commonwealth that our

interlocutory order disregarded the fact that Anderson sought the benefit of

5
  “In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal
to another court[.]” (Emphasis added.)
6
    Formerly codified at CR 76.20.

                                                 -5-
discretionary review while a fugitive from the legal system. Consequently, the

FDD applies and dismissal is within our discretion. We further conclude that

dismissal is appropriate given Anderson’s evasion of the underlying sentence for

approximately one year and the reasonable inference that his surrender was

motivated entirely by his desire to escape the repercussions of that decision.

Echoing the Court in Hess, this action “is a perfect example of when the FDD

should be applied since it is fundamentally offensive that a person who has

removed [him]self from the justice system should potentially reap its benefits

should the appellate process decide in [his] favor. [Anderson’s] actions are exactly

what the FDD intended to prevent.” Id at 59.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that

this appeal be, and it hereby is, DISMISSED.

             ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: __May 19, 2023___
                                               JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

                                         -6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Adam Meyer               Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Brian D. Morrow
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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