Court Opinion

ID: 9687985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:56:07.139935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:33.896548
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). While I agree with my colleagues on the first issue which may be characterized as the Miranda1 question, I am not in accord with their holding that to allow the blackboard to be taken into the jury room even with the express consent of counsel did not constitute reversible error.
It is too well settled to admit of discussion that: “It is the rule that nothing in the nature of testimony may be taken in the absence of the defendant”. People v. Raider (3931), 256 Mich 131, 138.
It is my precise point that allowing the jury to take the blackboard, unidentified and unadmitted as an exhibit, into the jury room raised it to the level of substantive evidence. Admittedly this was done out of the presence of the accused. This rendered the conviction constitutionally infirm. In the factual context of this case, it was crucial evidence. Distances, measurements and locations all bearing on the question of whether the accused discharged the weapon or whether it was discharged by the deceased were placed on the board by prosecution witnesses. Interlineations, corrections and over-writings were made on it by counsel. The very fact *672the jury called for it establishes the weight they must have accorded it. It might very well have been the conclusive factor in their deliberations. To allow the jury to take it into the jury room whether it stood in the courtroom for several days or not was the same as allowing the officer who designated the spot at which the weapon was found in relation to the body of the deceased to testify again in defendant’s absence.
Only two things could have happened in this case. Either the accused discharged the firearm or the deceased did. The answer to that question should not have been affected by the presence of the unadmitted piece of demonstrative evidence in the jury room during deliberations.
I am not unmindful that this Court has held times without number that certain issues cannot be raised the first time on review. I have signed and indeed authored such opinions. I am aware that trial counsel in this case may well have decided that to consent to taking the blackboard into the jury room was a wise trial tactic, and of benefit to the accused. However, I concur in the holding of this Court in People v. Degraffenreid (1969), 19 Mich App 702, 713. There are certain rights which are so essential to the concept of due process that no lawyer can waive them for a defendant' In my view the right of the defendant to be present when any testimony is taken is in that category. For this reason I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974).