Court Opinion

ID: 9836974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:46.97658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.631559
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
As recently as United States v. Wheelus, 49 MJ 283, 288 (1998), we held that we would not grant relief for post-trial errors unless an appellant alleges an “error at the Court of Criminal Appeals,” establishes “prejudice as a result of the error,” and demonstrates what steps he would have taken to remedy the error given the opportunity to do so. Clearly, prejudice cannot be established in this case.
Pursuant to a pretrial agreement, appellant was convicted of a 14-day unauthorized absence, introduction of marijuana onto a military installation with intent to distribute, and 2 specifications of distribution of marijuana, in violation of Articles 86 and 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 886 and 912a, respectively. The pretrial agreement also provided for dismissal of one specification of possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of a lawful general regulation and placed a limitation on the sentence by providing for suspending all confinement in excess of 60 days for 6 months from the date of trial.
The first staff judge advocate’s recommendation (SJAR) was served on appellant’s trial defense counsel on June 10, 1994. At that time, he acknowledged receipt of the SJAR and had no comments or post-trial submissions for the convening authority. Appellant’s trial defense counsel left active duty in September 1994, but remains in the reserves. The record of trial was returned by the Court of Criminal Appeals for certain corrections, and trial defense counsel received a certificate of correction on April 29, 1997. He signed his review and receipt as a reservist. A second SJAR was served on the same defense counsel on October 15, 1997. Again, that same defense counsel acknowledged receipt and had no comments or submissions.
The majority poses the critical decision in this ease in its decretal paragraph by stating that the court below “may either meaningfully reassess the sentence or order a new SJA’s recommendation and convening authority’s action.” 51 MJ at 230.
I must ask whether, based on this appellant’s record, there is any practical chance that with this record he would receive a different result either from the court below or a new convening authority action? A review of that record reveals that not 4 months after enlisting, appellant was given an Article 15 on June 15, 1992. A second Article 15 was imposed on August 6,1992, for failure to comply with a lawful general regulation. A third Article 15 was imposed on December 23, 1992, for drunk and disorderly conduct. A fourth Article 15 was imposed on November 11, 1993, for drunk and disorderly conduct, incapacitation for duty, and disrespect toward a superior noncommissioned officer. Additionally, the punishment imposed as a result of the fourth Article 15 was vacated on February 3, 1994, at which time a fifth Article 15 was imposed on appellant. Lastly, appellant, while on active duty, entered a plea of nolo contendere to a misdemeanor drug offense in state court. Not only has appellant not established prejudice in this case, but also it is hard to imagine that any convening authority would want to retain appellant in the Navy. Surely a convening authority would prefer a new recruit to an individual with appellant’s abysmal record.
Certainly it would have been preferable to detail an active-duty attorney to review the certificate of correction and second SJA’s recommendation. But a competent reservist attorney who was fully familiar with appel*231lant and his case made that review. The course of action he chose the second time around was just as legitimate as it was for the first clemency petition. Letters from appellant’s family, pastor, and acquaintances were undoubtedly no match for the offense-ridden record presented to the convening authority. This is hardly the factual circumstance to address a reservist’s competence for the post-trial review stage.
As I stated in my dissent in United States v. Johnson-Saunders, 48 MJ 74, 76 (1998):
During this “downsizing climate,” this Court has returned numerous cases for new staff judge advocate (SJA) recommendations and actions, see, e.g., United States v. Camley, 46 MJ 401 (1997); United States v. Parks, 46 MJ 114 (1996); and United States v. Dresen, 43 MJ 372 (1995); or for resolution of questions concerning post-trial representation by counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Tise, 43 MJ 446 (1995); United States v. Dickey, 43 MJ 170 (1995); and United States v. Williams, 43 MJ 149 (1995), but no favorable convening authority actions have been taken.
See also United States v. Catalans 46 MJ 325 (1997); United States v. Edwards, 45 MJ 114 (1996).
However, I agree with the majority that the Judge Advocates General or their equivalent should be aware of the numerous cases that are coming before this Court due to sloppy staff work and inattention to detail. See 51 MJ at 229.