Court Opinion

ID: 9769143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:35:58.460863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:34.303090
License: Public Domain

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge. Ozzie Atkins was convicted by a jury of residential burglary and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Atkins argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence of his intent to commit an act punishable by imprisonment. We hold that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent, and affirm. At 11:30 a.m. on March 13, 1997, Gene Jackson, an evening shift dispatcher for the local sheriff, was home alone watching television in a bedroom when he saw Atkins enter his home unannounced. Jackson did not know Atkins and did not authorize him to enter his home. Although the front door was left slightly open, the storm door was closed. Jackson testified that he heard the door open and observed Atkins walking toward his stereo, located in a corner of his living room. Jackson stated that Atkins fled the moment they made eye contact with one another. Jackson then sent his Rottweiler, who was lying at his feet, after the intruder, and Jackson also gave chase. He caught up with Atkins as he was trying to jump a fence across the street from Jackson’s home. Jackson testified that when he asked the intruder why he was in his home and to identify himself, Atkins responded that he wanted to ask if he could rake his leaves, and said that his name was “June Bug.” Because there were no leaves on the ground, Jackson returned home and called the police. The police apprehended Atkins a few blocks from Jackson’s home. Atkins again identified himself to the police as “June Bug,” but gave his real name when asked. He was later identified by Jackson as the intruder. After the State rested, Atkins moved for directed verdict and argued that the State had failed to present sufficient evidence that he entered an occupiable structure with the purpose of committing an unlawful act. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Atkins of residential burglary. On appeal, Atkins contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he had the requisite intent to support a conviction for burglary. He argues that there is no evidence of his intent to commit a felony after his unlawful entry, and that he could well have entered to seek employment, such as raking leaves, and could have simply been admiring Jackson’s furnishings. He further claims that he fled because Jackson’s dog was intimidating and gave chase after him. In response, the State contends that his felonious intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances — the illegal entry, movement toward the stereo equipment, fleeing from the house, use of a false name, and giving an implausible reason for the entry. We agree that these factors constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence of Atkins’s intent, and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict.  The offense of residential burglary requires proof: (1) that the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in an occupiable structure of another person and (2) that he did so with the purpose of committing an offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-201 (R.epl. 1993 ). It is well settled that the State is required to prove each and every element of the offense. Oliver v. State, 14 Ark. App. 240, 687 S.W.2d 850 (1985). Specific intent cannot be inferred solely from proof of an illegal entry. Forgy v. State, 302 Ark. 435, 790 S.W.2d 173 (1990); see also Oliver v. State, supra. The State cannot shift to the defendant the burden of explaining his unlawful entry, but must also establish the defendant’s intent. Norton v. State, 271 Ark. 451, 609 S.W.2d 1 (1980). However, intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, so long as such evidence is consistent with the guilt of the defendant and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Rudd v. State, 308 Ark. 401, 825 S.W.2d 565 (1992) (citing Cassell v. State, 273 Ark. 59, 616 S.W.2d 485 (1981)).  It is well settled that the flight of an accused to avoid arrest is evidence of his felonious intent. Cristee v. State, 25 Ark. App. 303, 757 S.W.2d 565 (1988); Oliver v. State, supra. In Cristee, supra, a finding of intent for a conviction of burglary was upheld where, although nothing was stolen, the appellant was seen running, with a crowbar, from the scene of a break-in after the alarm went off. In Oliver, supra, although nothing was stolen, a finding of criminal intent for a conviction of burglary was upheld where the appellant was seen running from an illegally entered structure; the alarm triggered by the entry summoned the police. In Forgy, supra, a burglary conviction was affirmed because intent could be inferred from the illegal entry, fresh scrape marks around a television, and the fact that other valuables had been prepared for removal. In Rudd v. State supra, a conviction of burglary was upheld where the appellant was found hovering around computer equipment with gloves on; appellant’s seven prior burglary convictions were also introduced into evidence.  The existence of criminal intent or purpose is a question of fact for the jury when the evidence shows facts from which it may be reasonably inferred. Cristee, supra. Furthermore, a jury may consider and give weight to any false, improbable, and contradictory statements made by an accused explaining suspicious circumstances. Walker v. State, 313 Ark. 478, 855 S.W.2d 932 (1993). Here, the evidence shows that Atkins unlawfully entered Jackson’s residence; Jackson testified that he observed Atkins walking toward his stereo equipment; upon being discovered, Atkins immediately ran; Jackson gave chase and caught Atkins while he was trying to jump a fence in front of Jackson’s residence; upon capture, Atkins provided a false name and an implausible reason for the entry. We note that the dissenting judges point out that this case is similar to Wortham v. State, 5 Ark. App. 161, 634 S.W.2d 141 (1982), in which a burglary conviction was reversed because there was insufficient evidence of Wortham’s felonious intent. In both cases there was no forced entry and no property was taken or even touched. However, there are several crucial differences between the two cases. Wortham was merely observed standing inside the open front doorway of the house he had entered. He ran away when a girl inside screamed. The two girls in the house knew Wortham and he had asked them to be his girlfriends. These circumstances are clearly a far cry from an illegal entry by a complete stranger who then brazenly walks across a room towards the owner’s stereo equipment. While it is true that the State may not shift to Atkins the burden of explaining his unlawful entry, here, he did explain and gave an implausible and even ludicrous excuse for his entry into Jackson’s home — that he wanted to rake Jackson’s leaves in the middle of spring, when there were no leaves on the ground. By doing so, he provided an additional factor from which the jury could infer his felonious intent.  Although none of the factors, standing alone, would sustain the conviction, together they provide sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that Atkins had the intent to commit a theft. Affirmed. Robbins, C.J., and Bird and Meads, JJ., agree. Stroud and Jennings, JJ., dissent.