Court Opinion

ID: 9752364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:01:11.244983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:08.575204
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11335
                           ____________________

        DEIRDRE BAKER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        JEA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00889-HES-PDB
                           ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                         22-11335

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SMITH, District              ∗

        Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               Deirdre Baker, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit
        alleging that her former employer, JEA (the Jacksonville Electric
        Authority), discriminated against her on the basis of her race.
        Baker, who is black, claimed that she was wrongfully terminated
        on account of her race and was retaliated against because of her
        complaints of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the
        Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a).
        Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
        entered judgment in favor of JEA. Baker—still proceeding pro se—
        appealed. After careful review, and with the beneﬁt of oral
        argument, we aﬃrm.
                                       I.       Background 1
              JEA, a water, and sewer utility company located in
        Jacksonville, Florida, employs both appointed and civil service
        employees. 2 Civil service employees are subject to the City of

        ∗
         Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge for the Southern
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
        1 We review de novo a district court’s rulings on cross-motions for summary

        judgment, and we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
        party on each motion. James River Ins. Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects Inc., 22 F.4th
        1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022).
        2 The City of Jacksonville Charter defines JEA as an “independent agenc[y]” of

        the City. Jacksonville, Fla., Charter § 18.07(d). The Florida legislature
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        22-11335                   Opinion of the Court                                  3

        Jacksonville’s Civil Service Rules and Regulations and are entitled
        to certain employment protections, while appointed employees are
        essentially at-will employees who do not enjoy the same
        protections as civil service employees. Those appointed employees
        who previously served in civil service positions are permitted to
        revert to their civil service positions in lieu of termination in the
        event of performance issues. Baker held various civil service
        positions at JEA until she ﬁlled the appointed position of Financial
        Analyst Water/Wastewater (“W/WW”) Operations in August
        2015. In this new position, Baker was supervised by Melinda Ruiz-
        Adams, the Manager of Business Operations, who was in turn
        supervised by Carole Smith, the director of W/WW Asset
        Management and Performance.
               In October 2018, JEA began its annual process of goal
        setting, requiring all employees, including Baker, to submit
        personal goals and objectives (also called “job factors”) for the
        upcoming year. Those goals and objectives were used to set criteria
        by which the employees would be evaluated by their supervisors.
        Ruiz-Adams reviewed Baker’s initial submission of her job factors

        “created and established” the JEA by statute as a “body politic and corporate”
        to exercise “all powers with respect to electric, water, sewer, natural gas and
        such other utilities which are now, in future could be, or could have been but
        for this Article, exercised by the City of Jacksonville.” Id. § 21.01 (citing
        statutes creating the JEA). Thus, JEA is a governmental entity created by the
        Florida legislature, and it acts primarily as the City’s agent in providing utility
        services. We take judicial notice of the Charter and ordinances of the City of
        Jacksonville as they are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid.
        201(b).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11335

        and determined that the goals Baker submitted were so easily
        achievable that they amounted to the bare minimum required
        under Baker’s job description. Accordingly, Ruiz-Adams rejected
        Baker’s job factors and initiated a series of discussions regarding
        what acceptable goals and objectives would look like. Ruiz-Adams
        also sent Baker a draft of acceptable job factors for Baker to use as
        a guide. Baker, however, did not adjust her job factors properly and
        failed to comply with Ruiz-Adams’s directions.
              Baker then met with Robert Mack, the Director of
        Organizational Eﬀectiveness and Payroll, to discuss the goal-setting
        process, but she still refused to input appropriate job factors
        following that meeting. Eventually, Ruiz-Adams sent an email to
        Baker instructing her to submit the job factors provided by
        management and informing her that any refusal to do so would be
        considered insubordination. Baker responded two days later and
        informed Ruiz-Adams that she refused to follow the instructions.
               Throughout the goal-setting process and consultation with
        Ruiz-Adams, Baker made two complaints to JEA management.
        First, during her initial meeting with Ruiz-Adams, Baker
        complained about an alleged pay disparity between herself and
        Ruth Remsen (a white employee who was paid more than Baker).
        In response, JEA Human Resources conducted a formal job audit
        to determine whether Baker and Remsen were performing the
        same tasks and whether Baker was compensated according to the
        correct pay grade. The results of the audit showed that, while
        Baker’s assigned duties “overlap[ped]” with Remsen’s, Remsen’s
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        22-11335                 Opinion of the Court                              5

        role had a “broader scope of duties” and “higher experience
        requirements.” 3 Ultimately, the audit results demonstrated that
        Baker did not perform the same tasks as Remsen and that Baker
        was properly compensated.
               Meanwhile, Baker was placed on a Manager Support
        Program (“MSP”), which was a performance improvement plan
        giving her notice of unacceptable performance. Under the MSP, if
        Baker did not “make the required changes, termination from
        employment [would] follow due to the serious nature and
        consequences of [her] non-compliance.”
                Second, approximately 11 days after lodging her ﬁrst
        complaint, Baker ﬁled a complaint with JEA’s Labor Relations
        Department, alleging that Ruiz-Adams and Smith were
        discriminating against her and harassing her by not accepting her
        goals and objectives. Baker presented information purportedly
        showing “ongoing attacks, threats[,] and bullying tactics”
        stemming from the goal-setting process. After interviewing Baker,
        Ruiz-Adams, Smith, and another individual supervised by Ruiz-
        Adams, Labor Relations’s “investigation revealed . . . no evidence
        to support a claim of bullying or discrimination,” and oﬀered Baker
        feedback that she “need[ed] to be more open to constructive
        criticism and work to establish eﬀective and productive working
        relationships with peers and upper level management.”

        3 At the time of the audit, Baker had 17 years’ experience at JEA compared to

        Remsen’s 30 years’ experience.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11335

                Baker eventually entered her job factors as required by the
        MSP but, according to Smith, “the issues of [Baker’s]
        insubordination and [her] challenging interactions with others
        continued.” These issues culminated in Baker’s dismissal in June
        2019. A new vice president of W/WW had requested certain
        information (unrelated to Baker’s job factors) be provided to him
        in a speciﬁcally formatted spreadsheet, and Baker was responsible
        for collecting and entering this information. However, according
        to Smith, Baker “refused to comply with the new directions from
        management,” having been asked multiple times to ensure
        compliance with the spreadsheet and failing to do so “despite . . .
        counseling and direct instruction.”
                On June 7, 2019, several minutes before a meeting with the
        vice president, Smith approached Baker about the spreadsheet.
        According to Smith, Baker had been told “several times” that the
        spreadsheet she prepared was not properly formatted and that
        Baker was “continually challenging and diﬃcult when asked to
        change how things were done or [how to] perform certain tasks.”
        Baker, for her part, recounted her exchange with Smith somewhat
        diﬀerently. Baker testiﬁed that Smith was “close to [Baker’s] face,”
        told Baker that she wanted the speciﬁc spreadsheet, “ﬂung the
        paper in [Baker’s] face[,] . . . turned around, . . . slung her hair and
        . . . walked out.” Following that meeting, Baker sent an email on
        June 18, 2019, to Smith, copying Human Resources and Labor
        Relations. She stated that she wished to address Smith’s “abrupt
        and very abrasive visit to [Baker’s] oﬃce,” and expressed that she
        would not “be threatened, intimidated or harassed.” She also
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        22-11335                 Opinion of the Court                              7

        questioned why Smith acted with “hostility” despite Baker’s work
        product “serv[ing] the purpose/person in which it was intended.”
               On June 27, 2019, Ruiz-Adams met with Baker and, because
        Baker’s conduct and performance had not improved following the
        implementation of the MSP, Ruiz-Adams oﬀered Baker the option
        of “revert[ing] back to her previous civil service position.” She also
        informed Baker that if she chose not to revert, she would be
        terminated. The following day, Baker sent an email to the director
        of JEA’s Labor Relations Department and Human Resources
        informing them that she chose not to revert and claiming that she
        had been harassed and retaliated against by Smith and Ruiz-Adams,
        alleging that they had “conspired and consulted against [her] with
        conﬂicting/contradicting directives to threaten [her] with
        insubordination.” Baker was terminated several hours later.
               Baker sued JEA on August 7, 2020, asserting causes of action
        for employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
        environment under Title VII. She amended her complaint twice,
        ﬁling the operative complaint on February 5, 2021. During
        discovery, on September 28, 2021, Baker ﬁled a motion for
        summary judgment. In response, JEA then moved for summary
        judgment and responded to Baker’s motion for summary
        judgment.4 Following full brieﬁng, the district court granted JEA’s
        motion and denied Baker’s.

        4 Before filing its motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge granted

        JEA’s motion for an extension of time to file a response to Baker’s motion,
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11335

               The district court ﬁrst addressed Baker’s race discrimination
        claim, which centered on her allegation that Remsen, a white
        employee, was paid more than Baker despite performing identical
        work. Using the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
        Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the district court determined that
        Baker could not make a prima facie case of discrimination because
        Remsen was not an adequate comparator: Pursuant to the job
        audit conducted following Baker’s claim of pay disparity, Remsen
        and Baker did not perform identical work and thus they were not
        similarly situated for purposes of Title VII. The district court noted
        that even if Baker had made out a prima facie case, she had not
        pointed to any record evidence that JEA’s reasons for terminating
        her were pretextual.
               With respect to Baker’s retaliation claim, the district court
        concluded that it failed as a matter of law because the purportedly
        protected activities—Baker’s two complaints of pay disparity and
        hostile work environment made in December 2018—were not
        temporally proximate to Baker’s termination in June 2019. But
        “[e]ven if there were a connection between” those complaints and
        Baker’s termination, the district court concluded that Baker’s
        “intervening misconduct” “severed” that connection. The district
        court in a footnote also discussed Baker’s complaint sent via email
        on June 28, 2019, (the same day as her termination), noting that by
        that point it was already determined Baker would be ﬁred if she

        over Baker’s objection. Baker filed a motion for relief from the magistrate
        judge’s order granting JEA an extension, which the magistrate judge denied.
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        22-11335                   Opinion of the Court                                  9

        chose not to revert and thus her termination “could not have [been]
        in retaliation for the complaint.” But the district court did not
        discuss Baker’s other complaints made in February 2019 or on June
        18, 2019.
               Lastly, regarding Baker’s hostile work environment claim,
        the district court determined that the actions taken by JEA over a
        period of six months were not suﬃciently severe or pervasive to
        constitute a hostile work environment.
              Baker ﬁled a motion for relief from the district court’s
        summary judgment order, which the district court denied. Baker
        timely appealed.
                                        II.     Discussion
                Baker raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the
        district court misapplied the burden-shifting standard set forth in
        McDonnell Douglas. Second, she argues that she established a prima
        facie case of a racially hostile work environment. Third, she argues
        that she established a prima facie case of retaliation.5 We address
        each in turn.

        5 Baker also challenges several rulings granting JEA extensions of time by the

        magistrate judge during summary judgment briefing. However, we lack
        jurisdiction to review these rulings because Baker did not appeal them to the
        district court. United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
        that “[a]ppeals from the magistrate’s ruling must be to the district court,” and
        that we lack jurisdiction to hear appeals “directly from federal magistrates”);
        United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1359-62 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Renfro
        where a magistrate judge issued an order on a non-dispositive issue, a party
        failed to object to the order, and the same party subsequently appealed from
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                         22-11335

                    A. Race discrimination
                First, Baker takes issue with the district court’s application
        of the McDonnell Douglas framework in assessing her Title VII race
        discrimination claim. She contends that she was not required to
        satisfy that framework, but that, in any event, she did so by putting
        forth sufficient evidence to prove a Title VII violation. However,
        Baker has waived her challenge on this issue because she failed to
        raise it below in response to JEA’s motion for summary judgment
        and, on appeal, she has failed to challenge the district court’s
        determination that JEA put forth a non-pretextual reason for
        Baker’s termination.
               This Court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of
        summary judgment. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253,
        1263 (11th Cir. 2010). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a),
        a district court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant
        shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
        the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In
        determining whether the movant has met this burden, courts must
        view all the evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor
        of the nonmoving party. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023
        (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

        the final judgment). As for Baker’s challenges to the district court’s discovery
        extensions, a broad grant of authority is given to district courts in managing
        their dockets, especially with respect to pre-trial activities. See, e.g., Smith v.
        Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014). We see nothing that
        suggests the district court abused its discretion with these extensions.
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        22-11335                Opinion of the Court                         11

                Moreover, to obtain reversal of a district court judgment
        that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must
        convince this Court that every stated ground for the judgment
        against her is incorrect. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739
        F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). An appellant’s failure to challenge
        one of the grounds on which the district court based its judgment
        deems the challenge abandoned on appeal, “and it follows that the
        judgment is due to be affirmed.” Id. We may also decline to
        consider challenges that were not raised by an appellant in
        opposition to a motion for summary judgment to the district court
        below. See, e.g., Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265,
        1274 (11th Cir. 2021) (declining to consider an appellant’s Title VII
        disparate treatment claim because he did not raise it in his
        summary judgment briefing in the district court).
               Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an
        employee “because of” her race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Where a
        plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence to make out a Title VII
        discrimination claim, we utilize the burden-shifting framework
        established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. Chapter 7
        Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2012).
        Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to
        establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas,
        411 U.S. at 802. To do so, “a plaintiff must show (1) she belongs to
        a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she was
        subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) her employer
        treated similarly situated employees outside her class more
        favorably.” Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11335

        “[A] plaintiff must show that she and her comparator[] are similarly
        situated in all material respects” for purposes of the fourth
        McDonnell Douglas step. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213,
        1224 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
               If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
        and the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
        reason for its action, the employee then bears the burden to show
        that the employer’s reason is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411
        U.S. at 802–04.
               In opposition to JEA’s motion for summary judgment, Baker
        did not challenge the application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-
        shifting framework, despite JEA’s reliance upon it. Additionally,
        on appeal, Baker does not challenge another independent ground
        for the district court’s summary judgment ruling: that she failed to
        put forth any evidence that JEA’s justification for her termination
        was pretextual. Therefore, we conclude that Baker has waived her
        challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
        favor of JEA on Baker’s Title VII race discrimination claim and we
        thus affirm.
               However, even if she did not waive her challenge, her claim
        for race discrimination would fail on the merits because Baker has
        not identiﬁed a valid comparator. Remsen, to whom Baker points
        as a possible comparator, worked at JEA for thirteen more years
        than Baker and had diﬀerent duties than Baker (despite sharing
        some work responsibilities with Baker). Remsen is therefore not a
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        22-11335               Opinion of the Court                         13

        comparator for purposes of Baker’s prima facie case of race
        discrimination.
                   B. Hostile work environment
               Baker argues that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion,
        she established a prima facie case of a hostile work environment.
        She contends that she was subject to harassment and a hostile work
        environment from October 2018 through June 2019, that Ruiz-
        Adams provided her with “discriminatory job factors” during the
        goal-setting process, and that she experienced work interferences
        and “[w]ork related threat[s].” However, she does not make any
        specific argument that the district court erred in concluding that
        Baker failed to show that the purported harassment was sufficiently
        severe or pervasive or interfered with Baker’s ability to perform her
        job.
                Title VII prohibits employers from subjecting employees to
        harassment, or a hostile work environment. “When the workplace
        is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
        that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
        [plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working
        environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
        U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted).
               To make out a prima facie case of a hostile work
        environment based on racial harassment, the plaintiff must
        establish that: (1) she belonged to a protected group; (2) she was
        subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based
        on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment was sufficiently
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11335

        “severe or pervasive” to alter the terms and conditions of her
        employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5) a
        basis exists for holding the employer liable. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs.
        Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2016).
               The “severe or pervasive” requirement “contains both an
        objective and a subjective component.” Miller v. Kenworth of
        Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). In evaluating the
        objective severity of the harassment, a court considers, among
        other things, the severity of the conduct and whether it
        unreasonably interfered with the employee’s job performance. Id.
        Isolated incidents that are not extremely serious are not sufficiently
        severe or pervasive. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
        788 (1998); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1303–04 (11th
        Cir. 2012) (finding that seven racist acts over the course of one year
        was sufficient to preclude summary judgment); but see McCann v.
        Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1378–79 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that
        instances of racially derogatory language over a period of more
        than two years were too isolated to be “severe or pervasive”).
               Pro se filings are held to a less stringent standard than those
        drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed. Stephens v.
        DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1319 n.16 (11th Cir. 2017). However,
        where a pro se litigant fails to raise a legal claim on appeal, she
        abandons that claim, and we will not review it. Timson v. Sampson,
        518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Where an appellant makes only
        passing reference to an issue or raises it in a perfunctory manner,
        without providing supporting arguments or authority, that claim
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        22-11335               Opinion of the Court                     15

        is considered abandoned and need not be addressed on appeal.
        Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.
               Here, the district court held that Baker had not
        demonstrated that the purported hostile actions—“which occurred
        over [the course of] more than six months”—were severe or
        pervasive, nor did she demonstrate that the actions interfered with
        her ability to do her job. Baker, however, makes no argument
        addressing the specific holding below and has thus abandoned any
        challenge thereof on appeal. Id. And even if she had not
        abandoned this challenge, it would fail on the merits. JEA’s
        conduct by and through its employees occurred over a period of
        six months and consisted largely of supervisors’ and management’s
        attempts to urge Baker to fulfill her employment obligations.
        Baker has not pointed to any instance of harassment or hostile
        action—much less a cumulation of instances to create a hostile
        work environment—by any individual at JEA that unreasonably
        interfered with Baker’s ability to do her job; much less any action
        that was motivated by her race in any way whatsoever. We
        therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
        JEA on Baker’s hostile work environment claim.
                   C. Retaliation
               Lastly, Baker argues that she has established a prima facie
        case of retaliation, faulting the district court for acknowledging
        only two of eight instances in which Baker claims she engaged in a
        protected activity that was followed by purported adverse action.
        Specifically, Baker lists the following instances of protected
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-11335

        expression: (1) she made a complaint of racial pay disparity in
        October 2018; (2) she discussed her job factors and her
        compensation complaint with an unspecified individual in
        December 2018; (3) she made a complaint to the Director of
        Organizational Effectiveness and Payroll regarding her goals and
        objectives in December 2018; (4) she made a harassment complaint
        in December 2018; (5) she made a formal complaint in December
        2018 to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; (6) she
        made a compensation complaint and a complaint regarding her
        MSP in February 2019; (7) she made a hostile work environment
        complaint to human resources and management in June 2019; and
        (8) she made a workplace retaliation complaint to senior
        management in June 2019, hours before her termination.
                The district court focused on the purportedly protected
        activities in which Baker engaged in December 2018, but Baker
        argues that the district court should have also considered the
        activities from June 2019. Specifically, Baker argues that her
        complaint on June 18, 2019, via email to an allegedly harassing
        supervisor constituted protected expression and her demotion ten
        days later constituted retaliation.
                Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
        employee for, inter alia, opposing “any practice” made unlawful by
        Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of
        retaliation, a plaintiff may show that: (1) she engaged in a
        statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse
        action; and (3) she established a causal link between the protected
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        22-11335                Opinion of the Court                          17

        activity and the adverse action. Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d
        1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
               To establish statutorily protected conduct, a plaintiff must
        show that she had a reasonable, good-faith belief that her employer
        was engaged in unlawful employment practices. Id. The plaintiff
        must prove that she subjectively held such a belief and that the
        belief was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances. Id.
        A grievance alleging unfair treatment, absent any indication of
        discrimination based on the plaintiff’s protected status, is not
        protected under Title VII. Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
        Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995).
               As for the materially adverse action prong, warnings that a
        plaintiff’s job is in jeopardy do not constitute materially adverse
        actions. Howard, 605 F.3d at 1245.
                With respect to causation, a plaintiff must show that the
        protected activity and the adverse employment action are not
        completely unrelated. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d
        1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001). “Close temporal proximity between
        protected conduct and an adverse employment action is generally
        sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of
        material fact of a causal connection,” so long as the proximity is
        very close. Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286,
        1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted); Thomas v. Cooper
        Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). For instance, a
        three-to-four-month “disparity between the statutorily protected
        [action] and the adverse employment action is not enough.”
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                     22-11335

        Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364. Absent “other evidence tending to show
        causation, if there is a substantial delay between the protected
        expression and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails
        as a matter of law.” Id.
                In a retaliation case, when an employer contemplates taking
        a materially adverse action before an employee engages in
        protected activity, “temporal proximity between the protected
        activity and the subsequent adverse . . . action does not suffice to
        show causation.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2006). Moreover, superseding, intervening acts may be sufficient
        to break a causal chain. See, e.g., Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid
        Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that “a
        culmination of problems growing out of appellant’s manner of
        handling his job, his lack of cooperation within his office, his
        mismanagement of his staff, his refusal to comply with the terms
        of his job description, and his refusal to follow instructions from his
        supervisor” were sufficient to break the causal chain between
        protected activity and adverse action). 6 Finally, the employee
        must ultimately prove that “the desire to retaliate” was the “but-
        for” cause of a challenged action. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
        Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).
             The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        to JEA on Baker’s retaliation claim because Baker has not

        6 All published cases of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of

        business on September 30, 1981, are precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v.
        City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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        22-11335               Opinion of the Court                         19

        established a prima facie case of retaliation. First, assuming that her
        complaints in December 2018 are protected activity, they are not
        temporally proximate to her termination in June 2019. As for her
        complaint in February 2019, the time between February and
        termination in June 2019 is likewise not temporally proximate to
        her termination. Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (explaining that our
        caselaw requires a “very close” temporal relationship between
        protected activity and adverse action and that a three-to-four-
        month “disparity between the statutorily protected [action] and the
        adverse employment action is not enough”).
                With respect to her complaint made on June 18, 2019, in
        which Baker expressed that she felt “threatened, intimidated, and
        harassed” following her encounter with Smith, even assuming that
        this email constitutes protected conduct, there is nothing in the
        email that ties Baker’s complaints of harassment or intimidation to
        her race. Rather, JEA has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
        reason for terminating Baker and Baker has done nothing to
        demonstrate pretext. Lastly, as to Baker’s complaint made on June
        28, 2019 (the same day as her termination), we agree with the
        district court that because JEA had already determined that Baker
        would be terminated if she chose not to revert, Baker’s termination
        could not have been in retaliation for that email. See e.g., Alvarez,
        610 F.3d at 1270 (“Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions do not
        allow employees who are already on thin ice to insulate themselves
        against termination or discipline by preemptively making a
        discrimination complaint.”). We therefore affirm the district
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        court’s grant of summary judgment to JEA on Baker’s retaliation
        claim.
                                   III.   Conclusion
               Because Baker has waived her challenge to the application
        of the McDonnell Douglas framework and to the district court’s
        conclusions regarding pretext, JEA is entitled to summary
        judgment on Baker’s race discrimination claim. Even if Baker did
        not abandon her challenge to the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment to JEA on her hostile work environment claim—which
        we conclude that she did—her hostile work environment claim
        would still fail on the merits. Lastly, because Baker cannot
        establish a prima facie case of retaliation, JEA is entitled to summary
        judgment on that claim as well.
               AFFIRMED.