Court Opinion

ID: 9745823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:33:07.989014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.816959
License: Public Domain

ENGLISH, PJ, dissenting: On the question of liability plaintiff’s brief and the majority opinion rely on the testimony of the witness Gentry to establish the fact that the cherries were delivered to the carrier in good condition. While conceding that “there were some discrepancies in his testimony” the majority find this evidence sufficient. I do not. Gentry was the inspector and buyer for plaintiff at the Stubbs warehouse in Yakima. He testified that his only interest there at that time was to inspect the cherries as they moved into the freight car in question. In so doing he did not look at the cherries in the car itself, but at a distance of 15 or 20 feet as they were loaded by means of a conveyor belt. There were 18 to 20 cars loaded at the Stubbs place between June 28 and July 5, but he was interested in only the one car. He testified further that he had first inspected cherries being loaded onto this car on June 28. He saw more cherries put into the car on June 29. He saw more on June 30 and more on July 1, and didn’t know when the loading of the car was completed. He did not know the number of the car in question, but he did know that from June 28 to July 5 he was watching only one particular car being loaded. He also said that the cherries were in good condition. I am unable to give this testimony any credence or weight whatsoever, let alone permit it to support an essential element of plaintiff’s case. I say this because the uncontroverted documentary evidence shows that the Stubbs Company did not place its order with the Union Pacific Eailroad for the car in question until 5 p. m. on July 3, and at that time directed that the car be ready for loading with cherries on the morning of July 5. The record further shows that car PFE-10128 was supplied to satisfy the Stubbs order; that this car was placed in position for loading at the Stubbs Company track at 7 a. m. on July 5, 1957; and that it was released with bill of lading signed at 6 p. m. on the same day, loaded with 1715 boxes of cherries. Whether Gentry was merely mistaken and had watched the loading of some other car during the week commencing June 28, or whether his entire testimony was a fabrication, is of no consequence here. In any event, it is insufficient to prove delivery of cherries in good condition to the car in question. I also find myself in agreement with defendant’s contention that in cases involving inherently perishable commodities plaintiff has the burden of proving not only that the produce was delivered to the carrier in good condition as of the moment of loading, but also in condition suitable to withstand the contemplated transportation. Plaintiff stipulated that cherries are a perishable commodity. An inspector for the Bailroad Perishable Inspection Agency testified that under proper refrigeration cherries must be marketed within two weeks after picking whether they are loaded onto a refrigerator car the day after picking or eight days after picking. No witness testified that any longer period could be counted on. One witness for plaintiff said that the time was variable; “four or five or fifteen days, you wouldn’t know; . . . When you ship a load, you just start to pray.” It appears affirmatively that 275 boxes in the carload were picked prior to July 1, but there is no evidence as to the date of picking for the remainder. The majority would relieve plaintiff of the burden of proof in this regard, and transfer it to defendant. Under all the circumstances I consider that to be both unfair and unreasonable. I should think, rather, that plaintiff’s recognized obligation to prove the good condition of his shipment at the time of loading, would be meaningless in reference to the issues here unless that “good condition” were considered to connote a condition good enough to withstand the contemplated transportation. On the question of damages, I accept the statement in the majority opinion to the effect that “it is the burden of plaintiff to prove the amount of his loss” and that the “measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the property in the condition in which it should have arrived at the place of destination and its market value in the condition which, by reason of the fault of the carrier, it did arrive.” I further agree that “[t]his rule requires proof of fair cash value at the place and on the date of the contemplated sale.” I cannot, however, accept the majority’s departure from the stated rule. For surely it is a departure when they substitute as the measure of damages in this case the difference between plaintiff’s purchase and sale prices. This error is accentuated, in my opinion, when they shift the burden of proof to defendant by concluding that “the burden of proving that the lesser amount realized in the auction sale was due to a condition other than the deteriorated condition of the cherries was on defendant.” The majority opinion seeks to justify this conclusion, admittedly at variance with the accepted rule of damages, by stating that “plaintiff was unable to produce any direct evidence as to the fair cash market value of Bing cherries or of Lambert cherries in Cincinnati, Ohio on July 15, 1957 in the ‘condition’ in which they ‘should have arrived’ at the place of destination.” (Emphasis supplied.) While it is clear that plaintiff did not produce such evidence, I find nothing in the record to indicate that he was unable to produce it. On the contrary, the fact (formally admitted by plaintiff) was that a great abundance of cherries were marketed in Cincinnati during the week ending July 20, 1957 — twice as many as during any other week in July of that year.* From this it appears that it would have been impossible for plaintiff to establish that he was “unable” to submit proof of Cincinnati market value, even if he had tried to do so. And he made no such effort. The effect of the damage formula which the majority have improvised for this case is to place upon the carrier the entire risk of variations in market price of the commodity shipped. From the footnote above it appears likely that plaintiff made an error in market judgment when he diverted the cherries in question from Chicago so that they would arrive in Cincinnati during a week of market glut. We know that, ordinarily, the free market price of any commodity is bound to decline when there is an increase in the quantity of goods to be sold to the same number of prospective buyers. Whether the market rose or fell, however, is not, and should not be made, the business risk of the railroad. Yet that is precisely what we do in this case when we excuse plaintiff from presenting evidence of the market value of cherries in good condition at Cincinnati on July 15, 1957. By the simple expedient of allowing as damages the difference between the Cincinnati auction proceeds and the plaintiff’s cost of the cherries, the majority have required defendant to guarantee to the plaintiff a stability of market price not otherwise available in the marketing of perishable commodities. As to both liability and damages I believe there has been a failure of proof, and I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Municipal Court.   In evidence, and undisputed, is the Season Summary of the United States Department of Agriculture and the Washington State Department of Agriculture, cooperating, which reflected that carloads of cherries were delivered to Cincinnati as follows during the weeks ending on the dates set forth: June 22,1957 -1 June 29,1957 -2 July 6,1957 -1 July 13,1957 -2 July 20,1957 -4 July 27,1957 -1 August 3,1957 -0 August 10, 1957 -3