Court Opinion

ID: 9671551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:38:58.00566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:10.695767
License: Public Domain

WARD, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The validity of the exclusion clauses partially depend upon the validity of the unrecorded Fuentes to Charles R. Carter Investment Corporation deed. This deed, by the use of the Roman numeral III, conveyed the west 25 feet of Lot 1, Block 3, of the Kern Place Addition and nothing else. It makes no particular map or plat a portion of the deed. As the *294property in dispute is located in Block One-Hundred-and-Eleven, the mind might assume that whoever typed the deed inadvertently hit the key on his typewriter for the capital letter “I” instead of the key used to indicate the digit one, i. e. “1”. By way of argument to the contrary, in the same deed, the digit one was used at four other locations. There are no words explaining “III” or specifying that it was intended to express the number One-Hundred-Eleven. As a further example, “HI” means three and is so used to identify an uncounted number of paragraphs in the Appellants’ pleadings, in their motion for instructed verdict, in their objections of the charge of the Court, in their motion to disregard issues, in their motion for new trial, and in their brief where they refer to the assignments of error. Where the description in a deed is plain, clear, and unambiguous, parole evidence is inadmissible to show that it was intended by the parties to convey land not described in the deed and the rule announced in Scheller v. Groesbeck, supra, controls. Unless there is a latent ambiguity in the deed, the parties are bound by its recitals. Browne v. Gorman, 208 S.W. 385 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1918, writ ref’d.). Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the words a grantor uses to indicate the land he intended to convey, and it can not be used to show that the deed was intended to describe different land, or land located elsewhere than that described. This is not an action based on fraud or mistake to correct the description. Davis v. George, 104 Tex. 106, 134 S.W. 326 (1911); 19 Tex.Jur.2d Sec. 163, p. 483.
In Browne v. Gorman, supra, the deed description called for Survey 426, when in fact, the grantor meant Survey 425. The Court held that the deed was not ambiguous and that parole evidence, whether brought by parties or strangers, could not make the deed convey land which it does not purport to convey. In Texas Osage Cooperative Royalty Pool v. Colwell, 205 S.W. 2d 93 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio, 1947, writ ref’d, n. r. e.), the deed specified Section 16 in Block P when the grantor allegedly intended to convey Section 16 in Block S, and there was not a Section 16 in Block P. There the grantees in the deed filed suit on three counts to recover what they claimed to be theirs — one in trespass to try title, one that there was a latent ambiguity in the deed and one that a mutual mistake had been made. The count on reformation based on mutual mistake was barred by the statute of limitations and this in turn barred the count on trespass to try title. The Court held there was no latent ambiguity in the deed stating that the description was full, clearly and consistently expressed without any doubt or apparent conflicts and “there appears to be nothing hidden or concealed in the description that would admit extrinsic or parol evidence to explain”.
The stipulation entered into by the parties was for the purpose of agreeing to common source of title and lists the instruments which could be admitted into evidence without proof of execution. The stipulation expressly excludes any admission that any of the parties have a chain of title or title to the property involved and in this light, I would hold that it is immaterial to the point under discussion. Therefore, I would hold that the unrecorded deed conveyed none of the property in dispute.
Looking now to the exceptions contained in the deeds to the Appellees, the one from Lewis to the Appellants reading “excepting, however, that portion of said Lot One heretofore conveyed for the widening of Mesa Avenue” is particularly insufficient standing alone. In Waterhouse v. Gallup, 178 S.W. 773 (Tex.Civ.App. Galveston, 1915, writ ref’d) ; the exception in the general warranty deed provided “save and except one hundred acres previously sold to Joseph Worden” was held to be insufficient as it could not be located with any reasonable certainty. Looking to the Fuentes to Lewis deed either to aid the other deed or to see if a valid exception was made, we see that it provides for the conveyance of the two lots and excepts “25 feet heretofore conveyed to widen Mesa Road”. As seen, nothing has been conveyed to widen Mesa Road. The exception does not specify from *295which of the two lots the twenty-five feet is excepted, or whether it was excepted from both lots. From the map made a part of the deed, it can be logically assumed it is 25 feet somewhere on the western side. It is just as logical to say it is 25 feet in the southwest corner of the property as any other. The direction is not given which would undoubtedly have made it clear. Walters v. Tucker, Mo., 281 S.W.2d 843 (1955). A beginning point is not definitely stated such as was used in Pitts v. Zavala-Dimmit Counties Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, Tex.Civ.App., 81 S.W.2d 801. There, the reservation was of 20 feet from the top bank of the lake and it was held “sufficient to except out of the grant, a strip 20 feet wide measured from the top bank of the lake”. The Appellants have pointed out no case where a description such as before us has been held sufficient. Grants are liberally, exceptions strictly, construed against the grantor. Stroud v. Hunt Oil Co., 147 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland, 1941, no writ). I would hold that the exception falls.
While the submission of the issues has been of no avail to the Appellees, I would affirm the case on the basis that the Ap-pellees have established title to the disputed tract.