Court Opinion

ID: 9732018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:05:11.055629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:19.762276
License: Public Domain

*430HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent. First, I cannot agree that the information contained in the affidavit supports a finding of probable cause to search appellant’s home. Specifically, I fail to see how the fact that appellant was seen selling cocaine on the street forms a substantial basis to support the magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause existed to believe that contraband would be found in appellant’s home. See Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 418-19, 555 A.2d 1254, 1261 (1989) (citation omitted). This is not a case where the informant said that he or she had seen contraband in appellant’s home, or appellant had told the informant that he had drugs stored there. Cf Commonwealth v. Frye, 242 Pa.Super. 144, 363 A.2d 1201 (1976) (construing Aguilar-Spinelli two prong analysis of affidavit and holding that facts supported sufficient showing of probable cause to issue search warrant of suspect’s residence). Instead, the informant stated that he or she had seen appellant selling cocaine and had seen him “going to and coming from 408 Pancoast Pl[ace].” Furthermore, the informant saw appellant entering his residence “after he had made some sales or was going in for the night.” Thus, appellant was not seen entering and exiting his home as part of the drug transaction. The majority acknowledges that the facts here present a close case, but maintains that because appellant was seen selling cocaine and “going to and coming from” his home, probable cause existed to search the premises. However, although the affidavit establishes that appellant probably resided at 408 Pancoast Place, I would find that the lack of a substantial nexus between the street crime and the appellant’s residence renders the warrant invalid. See Commonwealth v. Way, 342 Pa.Super. 341, 492 A.2d 1151 (1985). Thus, I would agree with the trial court that the affidavit “failed to give rise to probable cause to believe that drugs would be found at [appellant’s home].” Suppression Court Opinion at 4.
Second, I also agree with the trial court that the evidence should have been suppressed for the alternative reason that *431the police officers’ manner of entry into appellant’s home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. The critical inquiry is whether sufficient time elapsed in which the police could form a reasonable belief that the occupants of the premises did not intend to voluntarily or peaceably surrender the premises. Commonwealth v. Parsons, 391 Pa.Super. 273, 279, 570 A.2d 1328, 1332 (1990) (citation omitted). Here, unlike Parsons, the officers did not testify that they articulated their identity, authority, and purpose to the occupants before they entered the dwelling. Thus, I would find that the officers failed to give adequate notice before opening the door to the premises. See id.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 2007. For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the trial court.