Court Opinion

ID: 9960754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 21:19:42.253592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:50.610444
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                          Washington State
                                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Division Two

                                                                                            April 16, 2024

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                            DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                              No. 57153-6-II

                                  Respondent,

           v.                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

    BRITTNEY CAROL GUSTAITIS,

                                  Appellant.

          CHE, J. ⎯ Brittney Gustaitis appeals her convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle

and attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, arguing the trial court erred by admitting

hearsay under the business records exception,1 declining to give a limiting instruction on the

hearsay, and failing to conduct a CrR 3.5 hearing, and that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a CrR 3.5 hearing, and that cumulative error deprived her of a fair trial.

          In the late evening of February 21, 2021, police were involved in a high-speed chase of

two trucks driving in tandem—a white Ford F-250 that had been reported as stolen and a maroon

Ford F-350—in Shelton, Washington. Police successfully utilized stop sticks,2 which brought

the white truck to a stop in a ditch. Its driver entered the front passenger side of the maroon

truck before the maroon truck escaped. Shortly thereafter, the maroon truck was located in front

1
    RCW 5.45.020.
2
    A device that deflates tires in a safe manner.
No. 57153-6-II

of a residence with a motorhome in the driveway area. Police found Gustaitis and a male suspect

in the motorhome. Police read Gustaitis Miranda3 rights at the jail, which she acknowledged.

         The State charged Gustaitis with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (i.e., the maroon

truck), attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, and other crimes.4 Gustaitis waived her

right to a CrR 3.5 hearing. The trial court denied Gustaitis’s motion to exclude hearsay

testimony based on a police database search indicating that the maroon truck was stolen, and the

trial court denied giving a limiting instruction regarding the police database testimony. No

records custodian or owner of the maroon truck testified. A jury convicted Gustaitis of

possession of a stolen vehicle and attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.

         We hold that (1) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony, (2) the error was not

harmless, (3) Gustaitis waived her right to a CrR 3.5 hearing, (4) Gustaitis’s counsel was not

ineffective for waiving the CrR 3.5 hearing, and (5) cumulative error did not deprive Gustaitis of

her right to a fair trial. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle

and remand to the trial court to dismiss the possession of a stolen vehicle count but otherwise

affirm the conviction for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.

                                               FACTS

         On the rainy night of February 21, 2021, Mason County Sheriff’s Office Detective Dylan

Helser—while in his uniform with a badge, fully-marked patrol vehicle with lights, siren, push

bumper, and Mason County Sheriff Office decal—received a report of the theft of a white 2005

Ford F-250. Helser then received an additional report that the stolen white truck was at a local

3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
4
    The jury acquitted Gustaitis of the other two charges.

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No. 57153-6-II

gas station and accompanied by a maroon Ford F-350. Later, Squaxin Island Police Officer

Blaylock observed the trucks pull into a second local gas station. Blaylock—while in his marked

police vehicle with lights, siren, push bumper, and Squaxin Island Police Department decal—

attempted to initiate a stop of the trucks, but terminated his pursuit due to road conditions and the

trucks fleeing at excessive speed with no headlights activated.

       Helser later saw the trucks traveling at a high rate of speed and attempted to initiate a

stop in the heavy rain. Helser turned on his overhead lights and siren. Helser paced the trucks

traveling at 85 mph in a 65-mph zone. The trucks turned onto a very narrow road with just a

yellow centerline. The trucks utilized the entire roadway to negotiate turns at times, forced an

oncoming car out of the way, and “bl[e]w through” a stop sign. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 133-34.

       An off-duty deputy deployed stop sticks, but the trucks continued at a high rate of speed

after running over the stop sticks. This caused the white truck to run into a ditch, while the

maroon truck pulled beside it in the middle of the road. Helser used his patrol vehicle to pin5 the

rear tire of the maroon truck and another deputy used their vehicle to pinned the rear of the

maroon truck to prevent it from leaving. Helser exited and proceeded to the driver’s side of the

maroon truck and gave verbal commands for the driver to exit.

       Helser did not see the face of the maroon truck driver straight on, but he observed the

driver’s left shoulder. He observed what appeared to be a dark or black hood over the head, long

brown hair draped over the shoulder, and a multi-colored sweatshirt in the area of the shoulder

and sleeve. Helser also observed that the driver appeared to be short because the driver was

5
 This is a technique where the police vehicle positions itself in a specific way against the target
vehicle to keep that vehicle in place.

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No. 57153-6-II

sitting close to the steering wheel so as to reach the pedals. Based on these observations, Helser

concluded that the driver appeared to be a female. The maroon truck was able to break free of

the pin and other police officers in marked cars pursued the maroon truck.

       Later, Helser heard that the maroon truck struck two patrol vehicles and was returning in

his direction. Helser investigated fresh tire tracks leading into the driveway of a residence.

Helser found the maroon truck with no occupants parked in front of the residence. Officers

contacted the residence’s occupants.

       Helser then noticed the windows of the motorhome parked on the property were fogged

up. Helser gave verbal commands to the occupants of the motorhome and did not receive any

response. The homeowners consented to a search of the motorhome and gave Helser a key to the

motorhome. Police gave further verbal instructions to the motorhome occupants. Gustaitis and a

male suspect exited the motorhome. Helser observed three wet jackets laying on a table in the

motorhome. A multi-colored sweatshirt matched the sweatshirt Helser saw on the driver of the

maroon truck.

       The maroon truck did not have license plates affixed to its front or rear. Police searched

the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the maroon truck in a police database that registers

data from three systems—the Washington State Department of Licensing, Washington Crime

Information Center, and National Crime Information Center. The search returned that the

maroon truck was reported as stolen. Helser also observed that the driver door of the maroon

truck had a “punched lock.” RP at 181-82. Helser testified that this would typically suggest that

the vehicle was stolen.

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No. 57153-6-II

       Later, Helser contacted Gustaitis in the jail and read Miranda rights to her. Gustaitis

stated she understood her rights. At one point, Helser recounted the entire incident and

commented on the dangers of the car chase. Gustaitis began to cry, lowered her head, did not

look at Helser, and stated, “I know.” RP at 184-85. Gustaitis then “perked up and wiped the

tears from her face and stated that she hadn’t been in the vehicle at all.” RP at 185-86.

       Prior to trial, Gustaitis twice stipulated to the admission of her custodial statements and

waived her right to a CrR 3.5 hearing in signed forms that stated:

       [x] Custodial Statements by Defendant.
           [x] Defendant’s statements may be admitted into evidence without hearing by
               stipulation of the parties. Subject to relevance, foundation, etc.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 141-42, 145-46.

       In Gustaitis’s motion in limine, she addressed her custodial statements made to Helser of

“I know” and her exculpatory statement denying being in the maroon truck. RP at 7-8. Gustaitis

argued, and the State agreed, that Gustaitis’s entire statement to Helser should be admitted if her

“I know” statement was elicited. The court accepted the parties’ agreement regarding the scope

of Gustaitis’s admissible custodial statements made to Helser. At jury trial, Helser testified to

Gustaitis’s statements and Gustaitis did not object to Helser’s testimony.

       Additionally, in her motion in limine, Gustaitis moved to exclude police testimony—that

any vehicles involved in the case were stolen—from evidence on the basis of hearsay. The court

ruled it admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Gustaitis requested

an instruction limiting the evidence that the vehicles had been reported stolen to explain the

police’s actions in pursuing the vehicles and not for it to be considered as proof that any vehicle

was actually stolen. The trial court declined to give the limiting instruction.

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No. 57153-6-II

       At jury trial, Gustaitis raised a hearsay objection when Helser testified that he received a

stolen vehicle sighting report and that a maroon Ford truck accompanied the stolen white truck.

The State argued that the testimony was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but

instead offered to explain the officers’ response. The court overruled Gustaitis’s objection.

       The trial court also overruled Gustaitis’s second hearsay objection to Helser’s testimony

that when someone reports stolen vehicles, it is registered in multiple police databases and that a

police database check of the maroon truck returned a status of stolen. Later, outside the presence

of the jury, Gustaitis renewed her hearsay objection to Helser’s testimony, arguing that any

evidence suggesting the maroon truck was stolen would be hearsay, which again was overruled.

Neither the owner of the maroon truck nor a records custodian for the police’s stolen vehicle

database testified.

       Following trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts for possession of a stolen vehicle and

attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.

       Gustaitis appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

                             I. ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE

       Gustaitis argues the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony contained in the

police stolen car database that identified the maroon truck as being stolen. Gustaitis further

argues this evidentiary error was not harmless and thus, materially affected the outcome of trial

and requires reversal of her conviction. We agree the trial court erred in admitting hearsay

testimony from the stolen vehicle database to the extent that the evidentiary error requires

reversal of Gustaitis’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle.

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No. 57153-6-II

A.      Standard of Review

        Generally, a decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467, 473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012). There is an abuse of discretion when

the trial court adopts a view that a reasonable person would not take, its decision is based on

facts unsupported in the record, or its decision was reached by applying an incorrect legal

standard. State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).

        If a trial court abuses its discretion, we then review the error for prejudice to determine

whether it was reasonably probable, absent the error, that the outcome of the trial would have

been materially affected. State v. Barry, 183 Wn.2d 297, 303, 352 P.3d 161 (2015).

B.      Deputy Helser’s Testimony Does Not Fall Within the Business Records Exception to

Hearsay

        1. RCW 5.45.020 – Business Records as Evidence

        “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted. ER 801(c). Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under an exception. ER 802.

One such exception is records of regularly conducted activity. ER 803(a)(6). To be admissible

under the business records exception, a business record must (1) be in record form, (2) be of an

act, condition or event, (3) be made in the regular course of business, (4) be made at or near the

time of the act, condition or event, and (5) the court must be satisfied that the sources of

information, method, and time of preparation justify the admittance of the evidence. State v.

Ziegler, 114 Wn.2d 533, 538, 789 P.2d 79 (1990) (citing RCW 5.45.020). Business records are

presumptively reliable if made in the regular course of business and without any apparent motive

to falsify. Id.

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No. 57153-6-II

       In order to lay a foundation for admission, appropriate testimony by a custodian or other

qualified witness is required to establish the record’s identity and mode of preparation. State v.

Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 397, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979) (police database record must be shown to be

admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, RCW 5.45). The statutory

terms “custodian” and “other qualified witness” are broadly interpreted by reviewing courts.

State v. Quincy, 122 Wn. App. 395, 399, 95 P.3d 353 (2004). The record, however, does not

need to be identified by the very person who made it. Id. The testimony of one who, as a regular

part of his work, has custody of the record or supervises its creation will suffice. Id.

       When discussing the application of the business records exception to Helser’s testimony

during motions in limine, the trial court stated

       Business records rule . . . the records of law enforcement, indicating when somebody said
       this vehicle is reported stolen, that is something that’s kept in the normal course of business
       of law enforcement. It’s admissible.

RP at 21-22.

       Here, the State failed to establish the foundational requirements to admit Helser’s

testimony under the business records exception. Helser is not a records custodian or other

qualified witness. No testimony was presented that Helser made the report in the police stolen

vehicle database nor supervised the creation of the report. He accessed the database information

as part of his work, but he did not have custody of the record. Even if we were to assume Helser

is a qualified witness, he did not testify to the report’s identity, mode of preparation, whether it

was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the maroon truck being stolen,

nor when stolen vehicle information is updated or removed from the databases.

                                                   8
No. 57153-6-II

       Furthermore, the database appears to store data from multiple databases, which presents

additional hearsay issues. Helser’s testimony alone does not reliably establish that the maroon

truck was stolen when Gustaitis possessed it. In this instance, without the testimony of the

maroon truck owner, a records custodian, or other qualified witness, we hold the admission of

Helser’s testimony on the status of the maroon truck based on the database constituted

impermissible hearsay, that the trial court’s ruling rests on untenable grounds, and therefore the

trial court abused its discretion in admitting Helser’s testimony under the business record

exception.

C.     Trial Court’s Error in Admitting Deputy Helser’s Testimony Was Not Harmless

       To prove possession of a stolen vehicle, the State was required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Gustaitis “knowingly received, retained, possessed, concealed, or disposed

of a stolen motor vehicle.” CP at 96. The trial court instructed the jury that “stolen” meant

“obtained by theft, robbery or extortion.” CP at 100. The remaining evidence that pointed to the

maroon truck being stolen was the truck had a punched door lock, it was being driven at high

rates of speed, the driver failed to stop the truck despite multiple police-initiated stops, and it was

being driven in tandem with a reported stolen white truck. But, Helser’s hearsay testimony about

the status of the maroon truck was the only evidence that the maroon truck was actually stolen at

the time.

       Here, without the truck owner or a properly laid foundation to admit the contested

evidence under the business records exception, the jury was permitted to rely on inadmissible

hearsay evidence as proof of the maroon truck being stolen. Considering the remaining evidence

for Gustaitis’s possession of a stolen vehicle count, it is reasonably probable, absent the

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No. 57153-6-II

admission of the impermissible hearsay, that the outcome of the trial on this count would have

differed if the hearsay statements by Helser had been excluded. We hold that the erroneous

admission of Helser’s statements was not harmless and was prejudicial to Gustaitis on her

possession of a stolen vehicle count.6

                             II. CUSTODIAL STATEMENT – CRR 3.5 HEARING

       Gustaitis argues the trial court erred by failing to conduct a CrR 3.5 statement hearing

before her custodial statement, “I know,” could be admitted. Br. of Appellant at 32-33. She

argues her statement was not voluntary due to her extremely emotional state during Helser’s

accusatory questioning in the jail. We disagree because Gustaitis expressly waived her right to a

CrR 3.5 hearing.

       The purpose of a CrR 3.5 hearing, Washington’s confession procedure, is to determine

the voluntariness of custodial statements. State v. Cherry, 191 Wn. App. 456, 469, 362 P.3d 313

(2015). The rule is mandatory, but a defendant may waive their right to a CrR 3.5 hearing. State

v. Myers, 86 Wn.2d 419, 425-26, 545 P.2d 538 (1976). “[A]n attorney is impliedly authorized to

stipulate to and to waive procedural matters, such as those obviating the need for certain proof.”

State v. Fanger, 34 Wn. App. 635, 637, 663 P.2d 120 (1983). When counsel waives the CrR 3.5

hearing, counsel may not assail the trial court’s failure to conduct one. State v. Ralph, 41 Wn.

App. 770, 776, 706 P.2d 641 (1985). Moreover, failure to hold a CrR 3.5 hearing does not

render a statement inadmissible if the record shows the statement was voluntary, and the

6
  Because we reverse the conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, we do not address
Gustaitis’s remaining argument that the trial court erred in declining to give a limiting instruction
regarding the police database information.

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No. 57153-6-II

defendant was advised of his or her constitutional rights. State v. Williams, 137 Wn.2d 746, 754,

975 P.2d 963 (1999).

       Here, Gustaitis twice waived her right to a pretrial confession hearing. Gustaitis’s

counsel signed two documents expressly waiving the CrR 3.5 hearing and filed the documents

with the court. Like in Ralph, when counsel waives the CrR 3.5 hearing, Gustaitis may not now

attack the trial court’s failure to conduct one. 41 Wn. App. at 776. Therefore, we hold the trial

court did not err as Gustaitis waived her right to a CrR 3.5 hearing.

                            III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Gustaitis argues her counsel’s failure to move to suppress her “I know” statement in a

CrR 3.5 hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because it prejudiced her and

denied her a fair trial. She argues it is possible she involuntarily made her statement because of

her extremely emotional state. We disagree.

       “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make two showings:

(1) defense counsel’s representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances; and (2) defense counsel’s

deficient representation prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that,

except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). Legitimate trial

strategies or tactics do not constitute deficient performance. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33,

246 P.3d 1260 (2011).

       The failure to demonstrate either prong of this test ends the court’s inquiry. State v.

Johnson, 12 Wn. App. 2d 201, 210, 460 P.3d 1091 (2020), aff’d, 197 Wn.2d 740 (2021). Courts

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No. 57153-6-II

strongly presume that the counsel was effective. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. The burden is

on the defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel to show deficient representation

based on the record. Id.

       Here, in Gustaitis’s motion in limine, defense counsel successfully argued that if

Gustaitis’s statement, “I know,” were to come into evidence, then the rest of her statement in

which she made an exculpatory claim that she had not been in the maroon truck at all, should

also be admitted. Defense counsel clearly leveraged the introduction of this ambiguous

“admission” in order to have admitted Gustaitis’s unequivocal exculpatory statement she made

immediately afterwards. In fact, defense counsel emphasized Gustaitis’s statement twice at

closing and stated, “[Gustaitis] asserted she was not in the truck . . .” and “[Gustaitis] said very

clearly I was not in the truck.” RP at 315. Given that Gustaitis did not testify at trial, admission

of her exculpatory claim that she was not in the maroon truck was certainly a legitimate trial

tactic that helped her defense. See Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33. Additionally, Gustaitis twice

stipulated to the admission of her custodial statements and waived her right to a CrR 3.5 hearing

in signed documents filed with the court, which further support that her defense counsel

employed legitimate trial strategies or tactics. Therefore, Gustaitis fails to demonstrate the first

prong of the applicable test.

       Even if we presume that defense counsel’s representation is deficient, Gustaitis cannot

show the second prong of the test—that the result of her proceeding would have been different

absent the suppression of her statement. Had the jury not heard her “I know” statement, there

was still overwhelming evidence for the jury to convict Gustaitis of the attempting to elude a

pursuing police vehicle charge. Gustaitis was identified as the driver of the maroon truck, she

                                                  12
No. 57153-6-II

drove at excessive speeds, without headlights, in heavy rain at times, while failing to yield to

several marked, pursuing police vehicles with lights and sirens activated. Thus, Gustaitis cannot

show prejudice. We hold that Gustaitis’s counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a CrR

3.5 hearing.

                                IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE

       Gustaitis argues the cumulative effect of the errors she asserts above was to undermine

her right to a fair trial, requiring reversal of her convictions and a new trial. We disagree.

       The cumulative error doctrine applies when a combination of trial errors denies the

defendant a fair trial, even if any individual error may not justify reversal. State v. Restvedt,

26 Wn. App. 2d 102, 127, 527 P.3d 171 (2023). Where the errors are few and have little to no

effect on the outcome of the trial, the doctrine does not apply. State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252,

279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006). The only error raised here is the admission of hearsay evidence

regarding the status of the stolen maroon truck, which speaks to Gustaitis’s conviction for

possession of a stolen vehicle. Gustaitis’s other arguments raised did not constitute error. We

hold that Gustaitis’s claims of error do not rise to the level of cumulative error requiring reversal

of her conviction for attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle.

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No. 57153-6-II

                                          CONCLUSION

        We reverse Gustaitis’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle but otherwise affirm

Gustaitis’s conviction for attempting to elude a pursing police vehicle. We remand to the trial

court to dismiss Gustaitis’s count for possession of a stolen vehicle.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                      Che, J.
 We concur:

 Veljacic, A.C.J.

 Price, J.

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