Court Opinion

ID: 9950964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 14:02:43.910358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:40.393653
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                          TIMOTHY GIBSON,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                 STAR COLLISION AND TOWING, LLC,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-1332

                              March 15, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the County Court for
Hillsborough County; James S. Giardina, Judge.

Jacquelyn M. Codd and Ramil A. Kaminsky of RAK Law, PLLC, Lakeland,
for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

     Timothy Gibson challenges the county court's order granting Star
Collision and Towing's Motion to Vacate Final Default Judgment and
Quash Service. As discussed below, we find error in the court's order
and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
     In June 2021, Gibson's vehicle was towed by Star Collision without
his consent. Gibson paid $215 to regain possession of his vehicle from
Star Collision's storage lot. The following August, Gibson filed a
complaint seeking to recover the cost expended to regain possession of
his vehicle, including court costs and attorney's fees. He alleged that
Star Collision was not authorized to remove his vehicle from the property
and was therefore not permitted to charge him a fee to regain possession.
After Star Collision failed to file any paper to appear in the matter,
default was entered. And on March 8, 2022, the court entered a final
default judgment awarding Gibson $215 in damages, $165 in costs, and
reasonable attorney's fees. The court conducted a separate hearing to
determine reasonable attorney's fees and subsequently entered its March
25, 2022 judgment for $9,485.00 in attorney's fees and costs against
Star Collision. In December of the same year, Star Collision filed a
motion to quash service and to vacate the final default judgment and the
final judgment awarding attorney's fees. Star Collision alleged that it
was never served with the summons, complaint, or any filed documents
in the matter.
     After our review of the issues on appeal, it is evident the return of
service is at the center of this matter. The return of service indicated
that the summons and complaint were received by the process server,
Jamie Henderson, on August 24, 2021, and served to "William Kleet" on
August 26, 2021 at 8:19 a.m. at Star Collision's corporate office.
Additional comments by Mr. Henderson estimated Mr. Kleet's age and
weight, indicated that he had brown hair, and identified him as the
owner of Star Collision. Prior to the hearing on the motion to vacate,
however, Paige Kasmin filed an affidavit in support of Star Collision's
motion. Ms. Kasmin indicated that she was an authorized member of

                                      2
Star Collision but denied receiving service. She further indicated that
"William Kleet" was not a member, owner, or employee of Star Collision.
She instead identified "William Klee" as an authorized member and the
registered agent of Star Collision but stated that he was not present at
the office on the date of service and that the description of the individual
served did not match Mr. Klee. Mr. Klee also filed an affidavit in support
of Star Collision's motion. His affidavit similarly indicated that he was
an authorized member of Star Collision but denied receiving service. He
pointed to the misspelling of his last name and the description of the
individual served and stated that he was not at Star Collision's office
during the time of service. The court heard similar testimony from Mr.
Klee and Ms. Kasmin at the January 13, 2023, hearing.1 The court also
heard testimony from Mr. Henderson, who stated that the individual in
the courtroom, Mr. Klee, was the person he served but that he may have
made a spelling error on the return of service. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court made no findings and instead reserved ruling.
     Several months later, the court issued an order granting Star
Collision's motion to vacate and to quash service. The court reasoned
that because the return of service indicated the named party served as
"William Kleet," the service did not include the name of the person served
or the name of a person authorized to accept service on behalf of Star
Collision. The court concluded that the return of service was facially
invalid and thus, the service was invalid. Service was quashed, the final

     1 Ms. Kasmin and Mr. Klee mainly contended that Mr. Klee was

bald and weighed more than as described in the return of service. Mr.
Henderson testified that while he observed that Mr. Klee was bald on the
top of his head, there was hair on the sides which he believed was brown
at the time of service.
                                     3
judgments dated March 8, 2022, and March 25, 2022, were set aside,
and the writ of garnishment was dissolved.2
      "A trial court's ruling on a motion to quash service of process, to
the extent it involves questions of law, is subject to de novo review."
Robles-Martinez v. Diaz, Reus & Targ, LLP, 88 So. 3d 177, 179 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2011). "The return of service is the instrument a court relies on to
determine whether jurisdiction over an individual has been established."
Koster v. Sullivan, 160 So. 3d 385, 388 (Fla. 2015). If a return is regular
on its face, the service of process is presumed valid, and the party
challenging service must then overcome that presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. Id. at 389. The burden to demonstrate that the
return of service is facially valid is on the party who seeks to invoke the
court's jurisdiction. Id. And "[a] return of service that is [facially valid]
must include the statutory factors contained in section 48.21." Id.
Section 48.21(1), Florida Statutes (2021), provides that a return of
service shall note (1) the date and time that the pleading comes to hand
or is received by the process server, (2) the date and time that process is
served, (3) the manner of service, and (4) the name of the person served
and, if the person is served in a representative capacity, the position
occupied by the person.
      Failure to include the statutorily required information invalidates
service unless the return is amended.3 See § 48.21(2) ("[T]he return is
amendable to state the facts . . . at any time on application to the court

      2 After Star Collision filed its motion to vacate and quash service,

but before the hearing on the same, Gibson obtained a writ of
garnishment against Star Collision's bank accounts.
      3 The record on appeal indicates that two attempts were made to

amend the return of service to fix the spelling error, but neither
application to amend was ruled upon by the court.
                                       4
from which the process issued. On amendment, service is as effective as
if the return had originally stated the omitted facts . . . ."). If the return
of service is defective and not sufficiently amended to correct the defect,
the party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction retains their burden
of proof to demonstrate valid service despite the facially invalid return.
See Rodriguez v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. as Tr. for Deutsche Alt-A Sec. Inc.,
Mortg. Pass Through Certificates Series 2006-AR2, 352 So. 3d 8, 13 (Fla.
4th DCA 2022) ("If the return of service is defective on its face, however,
it cannot be relied on as evidence that service was valid, and the party
seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction retains the burden of proving
valid service and must prove valid service by other means.").
      We note that in support of its conclusion, the court relied on
several cases which found the return of service facially invalid due to the
failure to include the name of the individual served. See Vives v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 128 So. 3d 9, 11, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (concluding
that the return of service was facially invalid because it did not state the
name of the person service was made to, rather it stated that it was
served on an "unnamed individual"); see also Carus v. Cove at Isles at
Bayshore Homeowners Ass'n, 354 So. 3d 1111, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022)
(concluding that a return of service stating that documents were served
on "Jane Doe as sister/co-tenant" failed to name the person served and
was therefore invalid); Murphy v. Cach, LLC, 230 So. 3d 599, 601 (Fla.
5th DCA 2017) (holding that a return of service which lists the person
served as "John Doe" is facially deficient under section 48.21 because it
does not contain the name of the person served). Unlike those cases,
however, the return of service in the instant case names the person
served. While Star Collision may challenge the validity of service based
on an added "t" or the description of the individual served, those

                                       5
arguments go toward the veracity of the information in the return of
service and should be raised once the burden has shifted.
      Finally, we recognize that a party challenging service may present a
prima facie case demonstrating that the return of service is defective,
shifting the burden back to the party seeking the court's jurisdiction.
See Robles-Martinez, 88 So. 3d at 180. However, the affidavits submitted
by Mr. Klee and Ms. Kasmin do not challenge the facial validity of the
return of service, but the validity of service itself. See id. ("There is a
significant difference between a facially defective return of service (for
example, a return which, on its face, fails to contain the information
required by statute) and an invalid service of process (for example, a
claim that the residence where service was effectuated was not the
defendant's usual place of abode)." (footnotes omitted)).
      Therefore, after review of the four corners of the return of service,
we conclude that it contained all the elements required by section
48.21(1). As such, Gibson met his initial burden of establishing the
validity of service. The burden to prove improper service by clear and
convincing evidence was then required to shift to Star Collision prior to
quashing service and vacating the judgments. Although the court
conducted a hearing, the court made no findings regarding whether Star
Collision presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumptively valid service or whether the witnesses were credible.
      Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting Star
Collision's Motion to Vacate Default Judgment and Quash Service.
Further, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,
including a new evidentiary hearing, following which the appropriate
findings may be made by the trial court.
      Reversed and remanded.

                                       6
KHOUZAM and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

                                      7