Court Opinion

ID: 9748491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:03:17.036429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:35.960083
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that Appellant was entitled to an insanity instruction due to his mental condition resulting from the chronic abuse of methamphetamine.
In Commonwealth v. Tate, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 368, 369 (1995), this Court held that drug addiction, by itself, did not constitute a mental illness for the purpose of pleading an insanity defense pursuant to KRS 504.020. Tate dealt with a defendant who committed robbery in order to obtain money for drugs so as to avoid the pain of withdrawal symptoms. The Tate court did not hold that the mental effects of prolonged and severe drug abuse could never form the basis of an insanity defense. The Court merely held that Tate did not introduce enough additional evidence of a mental condition that would cause his behavior to be substantially impaired. Id. at 372-373. The Court specifically stated that “[i]n order for addiction to relieve an accused of criminal responsibility it must be proved that his addiction amounted to or caused mental illness or retardation.” Id. at 372.
While not every drug addict would be entitled to an insanity instruction, Appellant presented two expert witnesses whose testimony effectively amounted to evidence that Appellant lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the law. Dr. Shilling testified that Appellant suffered from paranoid and delusional thinking resulting from the extended use of amphetamines and that “his mental condition was so severe at one point that he felt that his life and his wife and his children were really threatened, that they could be killed and that he lacked what we call the capacity to control his behavior.” Dr. Allen also testified that Appellant suffered from paranoid delusions and hallucinations, and that his behavior was likely affected by such symptoms, which were consistent with the chronic use of amphetamines. There was also other evidence depicting Appellant’s bizarre behavior resulting from such delusional thoughts and hallucinations. The majority erroneously believes that this evidence is so scant that there “was no possibility that the jury could infer a ‘reasonable probability’ that the condition of insanity existed.” Op., p. 68. I disagree. It is well settled that “the court is required to instruct on every state of the case reasonably deducible from the evidence.” Ragland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 79, 81 (1967). There was substantial evidence of Appellant’s physiological and psychological abnormalities at the time of the crime to support an instruction on insanity, regardless of the cause of those infirmities.
This is not a novel concept. Many jurisdictions have long recognized that an ac-*73eused may be absolved of criminal responsibility if found to be suffering from a mental illness caused by the long-term use of intoxicants (sometimes referred to as “settled insanity”). See 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law, § 54 (2003); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, §§ 112-113 (1989). I believe that Tate, swpra, does not preclude such a finding in the case at bar, and therefore, would reverse Appellant’s conviction for failure to instruct the jury on the defense of insanity.
Additionally, the absence of an erroneous-belief-qualified self-protection instruction raises additional doubts in my mind about the reliability of the jury’s Murder verdict. Despite having requested the instruction at trial, the issue was not briefed for the Court. Accordingly, I have some unresolved questions about it, e.g., whether in the context of this case, Appellant would have been an “initial aggressor” for whom the self-protection justification would be unavailable, KRS 503.060(3), and/or whether Appellant’s fears addressed themselves to his belief in a sufficiently imminent threat from the victim. See KRS 503.050(1). In order to resolve those questions and to determine whether the trial court’s failure to give the requested instruction was error, we require a more thorough inquiry than the cursory one that occurred at oral argument in this case. Thus, instead of rendering an opinion that simply ignores the belatedly-raised allegation of error, the Court should delay rendition of this opinion and direct both parties to file simultaneously, within a short period of time, e.g. twenty (20) days, supplemental briefs of nor more than fifteen (15) pages addressing Appellant’s tardily-presented claim. And then, after the supplemental briefs are filed, the Court should address the merits of the claim. Although the content of these supplemental briefs would not alter my bottom-line vote to reverse both of Appellant’s convictions because the trial court erred in failing to instruct upon insanity, I would not be at all surprised to see a majority of the Court reverse Appellant’s Murder conviction if we considered the merits of Appellant’s self-protection claim.
LAMBERT, C.J., and KELLER, J., join this dissent.