Court Opinion

ID: 9620999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:50:22.42634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:56.828476
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
1. In its order of August 31,1987, the trial court delayed enforcement of the “in-custody” portion of the appellant’s sentence, so that the appellant could “put his affairs in order and also to raise any proper legal challenges and have them heard prior to serving the sentence.” One most reasonably would understand from that language that the appellant was required to raise any challenges timely from the date of that order, and not from the future date scheduled for serving the “in-custody” portion of the sentence.
However, the appellant’s motion to set aside the order of August *86531, 1987, was not filed until January 11, 1988, almost four and one-half months after the order. “A motion to set aside a . . . judgment is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case. [Cits.] A motion in arrest of judgment must be filed at the term when the verdict and judgment are rendered, as the trial court has no power over the judgment after the term in which it was rendered has passed. [Cits.] The appellant’s motion was not filed within the time provided by law to be considered as a motion for new trial. [Cits.] Finally, the motion does not contain the necessary allegations to receive consideration as an extraordinary motion for new trial. [Cits.] Therefore, the motion was not timely filed and the judgment overruling it, being treated as a dismissal [cit.], the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.” McRae v. State, 116 Ga. App. 407, 408 (157 SE2d 646) (1967). See also Palmer v. State, 144 Ga. App. 480 (241 SE2d 597) (1978).
The State Court of Cobb County has two-month terms. Ga. L. 1979, pp. 3481, 3483. The appellant’s motion to set aside, construed as an appropriate motion in arrest of judgment, was not filed within the same term as that in which the challenged order was entered. Thus, as in McRae, we should treat the trial court’s judgment overruling the motion as a dismissal, and that judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
2. Nevertheless, even if the appellant’s challenge to the order of August 31, 1987, was timely, I believe that the trial court’s denial of that motion should be affirmed. “A sentence is not voided because of the state’s delay in attempting to enforce it. Etheridge v. Poston, 176 Ga. 388 (168 SE 25) (1933). This appears to be a prevalent rule. E.g., Ex parte Grouch, 29 Okla. Crim. 343 (233 P 780) (1925); Miller v. Evans, 115 Iowa 101 (88 NW 198) (1901). Of course, there is some point at which a state’s unreasonable delay will be deemed to prevent later enforcement of the sentence. E.g., Yates v. Buchanan, 170 S2d 72 (Fla. App. 1965). Where the state makes no move to initiate the sentence, the defendant must offer himself up if he wishes the term to begin to run. Moreover, an offer which is premature because the sentence may not yet be put into effect is ineffective and may not be deemed continuing. E.g., Dixon v. Beaty, supra, 188 Ga. at 690-691. The defendant’s offer must come at a time when the sentence may lawfully be put into effect. See Crosby v. Courson, 181 Ga. 475 (182 SE 590) (1935); Etheridge v. Poston, supra. See generally Annot., Effect of Delay in Taking Defendant into Custody after Conviction and Sentence, 98 ALR2d 687 (1964).” Huff v. McLarty, 241 Ga. 442, 446 (246 SE2d 302) (1978).
In Huff v. McLarty, where the defendant offered himself up to begin serving his sentence of probation, but both the solicitor and the trial judge erroneously told him that it was premature to begin serving the sentence, the Supreme Court found that the defendant’s sen*866tence had begun to run when the defendant offered himself up. Maxwell contends that as in Huff v. McLarty, his sentence began to run when he presented himself to the sheriffs department on March 31, 1986, and thus his jail term has been served. The trial court actually found that Maxwell’s sentence began to run on March 27, 1986, but considered only the probation part to have been served by Maxwell.
Decided October 19, 1988.
Jack J. Menendez, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, Solicitor, Melodie H. Clayton, Victoria S. Aronow, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.
In Huff v. McLarty, the State erroneously prevented the defendant from serving any of his sentence; in the instant case, the State erroneously declined to incarcerate Maxwell on March 31, 1986, but it is uncontroverted that the probation part of the sentence was formally implemented promptly thereafter. In short, the State’s action in this case merely rearranged the order in which Maxwell was to complete the sentence. As found by the trial court, Maxwell still owes the State 3 months in jail, a debt that Maxwell actually negotiated for prior to pleading guilty, and that debt must be paid. I concur with that conclusion.
For the above reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this dissent as to Division 1.