Court Opinion

ID: 9593573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:23:20.778972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:54.027141
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting:
I object strongly to both the Court’s holding that utilization of statutory remedies is not a necessary prerequisite to a suit for wrongful discharge, and its holding that the plaintiff’s implied contract claim is cognizable under West Virginia law.
I.
Allowing disgruntled employees to sue in state court without first pursuing their administrative remedies guts the remedies provided by federal and state legislatures in the mine safety statutes, and burdens the courts of this State with cases that could be more fairly and more efficiently resolved in the administrative systems established expressly for this purpose. It ordinarily is presumed that when a legislature provides a remedial scheme along with its enactment of statutory proscriptions of unjust dismissal, the administrative procedures provided in the statute are sufficient to protect the public policy in issue. See, e.g., Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.1984) (claim for wrongful discharge may be maintained only in the absence of statutory remedy); Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir.1980) (statutory remedies for corporate retaliation against employees exercising rights protected by statute held exclusive); Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 635 F.Supp. 75, 80 (E.D.Pa.1986) (statutory remedy for discharge on account of “whistle-blowing” activities is exclusive and preempts any state court action).
The Supreme Court of Oregon has decided a case virtually identical to this one. In Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977), the plaintiff, like Collins, filed a tort-based cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on a public policy exception similar to that recognized in Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978). Faced with this conflict between the legislatively created administrative remedies, and the *556court-created public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the court in Walsh reasoned:
Although the situation in this case is similar [to the case establishing the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine], there is one decisive difference. It is true, of course, that the community has a strong interest in maintaining safe working conditions. That interest has been expressed in both state and federal statutes (citations omitted). Correspondingly, we would agree that employers should not be allowed to discharge employees solely for complaining about safety problems. However, unlike the situation in [the other case], an employee who is discharged because he complained of a safety violation is provided remedy under existing law for his wrongful discharge.
563 P.2d at 1208.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia has read Harless in a similarly restrictive manner. In Guevara v. K-Mart Corporation, 629 F.Supp. 1189 (S.D.W.Va.1986), Chief Judge Haden held that an alleged victim of national origin discrimination was limited to the exclusive remedies provided by the West Virginia Human Rights Act and that the plaintiff could not prosecute a Harless - type action for abusive discharge and outrageous conduct. Cf. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) (NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over matters which are arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act). In accord with these authorities, I would limit the application of Harless to cases in which there is no existing statutory remedy for the wrong alleged.1
Further, I believe the majority overstates the holding in Wiggins v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 178 W.Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987). Read narrowly, the case merely says that a plaintiff may sue in state court for damages that are not available in an administrative action, such as anguish, stress, degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care. See 178 W.Va. at 66, 357 S.E.2d at 748 (quoting Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984)). No such allegation was made by Mr. Collins. Similarly, the plaintiff in Wiggins had exhausted his federal administrative remedy, and the case did not, therefore, address the issue presented here. The issue in Wiggins was whether requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies would duplicate the federal administrative process.
A holding that the administrative remedies are exclusive would best promote the orderly resolution of retaliatory discharge claims. At a minimum, this Court should require exhaustion of either state or federal remedies prior to institution of suit in state court.
It appears that access to our courts as a parallel forum for enforcing statutory rights can be restricted only by the Legislature, and I urge the Legislature to add such provisions to existing acts, and to include them in future legislation, if it intends an effective administrative forum for resolution of claims.
II.
Finally, the Court's consent to allow Mr. Collins to pursue a claim for breach of an implied contract is nothing short of frightening. If a contract for perpetual employment can be found based on the fact that an employer described the company’s pension benefits to a salaried employee, the doctrine of at-will employment is truly dead. The majority’s reliance on Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 176 W.Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986), is misplaced. There was no employee handbook in this case — only some rather vague references to papers that described *557pension benefits. Also, the Court in Cook made clear that even an employee handbook could only form the basis for a unilateral contract where it includes a definite promise only to discharge employees for certain specified reasons. Id., syl. pt. 6. Accord, Zeedick v. Thomas Memorial Hospital, No. 2:85-01787 (S.D.W.Va. June 5, 1986). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision rejected a claim that a West Virginia employer’s retirement plan and stock participation plan created an implied-in-fact contract of employment. Speelman v. Smith Transfer Corp., 790 F.2d 889 (4th Cir.1986) (table).
Moreover, even if West Virginia recognized implied-in-fact employment contracts, Mr. Collins has only testified that the company would keep him on as long as his performance was satisfactory and competent. Even in states that recognize implied employment contracts, an agreement for “satisfactory performance” is not enforceable because it is a purely subjective term measured by the employer. See, e.g., Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Co., 562 F.Supp. 1286, 1291-92 (N.D.Ill.1983).
For the reasons set out herein, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice NEELY joins in this dissent.

. Although cited by the majority as support for its holding, Price v. Boone County Ambulance Auth., 175 W.Va. 676, 337 S.E.2d 913 (1985), was premised on a finding that the administrative procedures established by statute for redressing human rights claims had proved to be totally inadequate. Id. at 916. Price was never intended to open the floodgates for full-scale circumvention of administrative remedies in general. Significantly, Price explicitly restricted damages awarded in state court to those authorized by statute to be awarded by an administrative tribunal. Id., syl. pt. 2.