Court Opinion

ID: 9883536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:46:24.323573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:25.021729
License: Public Domain

KENNETH M. ROMINES, Judge.

CONCURRING

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I depart, however, from the analysis contained in footnote 3: “... We agree with the dissent’s position, that the trial court had the authority after the trial but before sentencing to reconsider its ruling on the motion to suppress ...”. Likewise the dissent seems to base its analysis on the power of the trial court to “reconsider” the ruling on the motion to suppress.
I believe that a motion to suppress, though with Constitutional implications, is no more nor no less than a motion in limine. The ruling of the trial court is interlocutory. If the trial court grants the motion the state can appeal, or seek introduction at trial. If the trial court overrules the motion the defendant can none the less seek to suppress when the evidence is offered — indeed our cases make clear that the ruling vis-a-vis introduction must be objected to or a waiver is accomplished. Once ruled, it is not interlocutory, but an evidentiary matter.
I am persuaded, by the analysis of Judge Satz in State v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.App.1991), that the trial court at the time of the Motion for New Trial reviews all the evidence, not just that offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and as such the trial court uses the principals and standards for new trial as opposed to the “preponderance of the evidence” standard for suppression.
Additionally, the only things I believe inevitable are death and taxes.