Court Opinion

ID: 9958624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 18:03:51.87744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:32.305093
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                               DOYLE, P. J.,
                          HODGES and WATKINS, JJ.

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                   days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                      April 9, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0011. NOELLIEN v. THE STATE.

      HODGES, Judge.

      Following a jury trial, the Superior Court of Cobb County entered a judgment

of conviction against Solomon Santana Noellien for one count each of possession of

methamphetamine or amphetamine with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30 (b)),

possession of cocaine (OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)), possession of a controlled substance

(methadone) with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30 (b)), possession of a

Schedule IV controlled substance (alprazolam) (OCGA § 16-13-30 (a)), and

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1)). Noellien

appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial as amended, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.

         Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,1 the evidence adduced at trial

demonstrated that the Marietta Cobb Smyrna Organized Crime Unit received a

complaint concerning suspected human trafficking or prostitution at a residence on

Little Willeo Road in Cobb County in May 2016. Surveillance of the residence

revealed extensive traffic in and out of the residence, with male visitors staying

approximately thirty minutes to one hour. Officers stopped a visitor to the residence,

who confirmed that he had visited the residence to engage in prostitution. Based upon

that information, officers obtained a search warrant for the residence. Officers

executed the warrant and, upon entry to the residence, discovered drugs in plain view.

Officers stopped the search of the residence to obtain a second search warrant for

drugs.

         In the ensuing search, officers discovered a downstairs bedroom. The bedroom,

and an adjacent closet, contained men’s clothing and shoes; no other men’s clothing

was located inside the house. Officers also discovered multiple cell phones, digital

scales, small plastic bags commonly used to distribute drugs, and drugs stashed in a

         1
             See, e.g., Bustos v. State, 365 Ga. App. 433 (878 SE2d 774) (2022).
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Planters peanut container in the downstairs bedroom. Credit cards, mail, and a vehicle

certificate of title located in the bedroom contained Noellien’s name. Noellien was the

only person listed on the lease for the residence.

      In a downstairs bathroom near the bedroom, officers found an open safe under

the sink and shards of methamphetamine in the toilet. And in a closet just outside the

bedroom, officers found a large quantity of marijuana. Altogether, the search of the

downstairs bedroom and adjacent areas yielded quantities of alprazolam, cocaine,

crack cocaine, marijuana, methadone, and methamphetamine, as well as the digital

scales and multiple cell phones. Noellien was present when officers executed the

search warrant, and a search of Noellien’s person yielded a small plastic bag

containing suspected cocaine and $4,128 in cash.

      A Cobb County grand jury indicted Noellien for one count each of trafficking

methamphetamine or amphetamine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,

possession of a controlled substance (methadone) with intent to distribute, possession

of a Schedule IV controlled substance (alprazolam) with intent to distribute, and

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. At trial, a jury found Noellien guilty

of the charges of possession of a controlled substance (methadone) with intent to

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distribute and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and guilty of the lesser

included offenses of possession of methamphetamine or amphetamine with intent to

distribute, possession of cocaine, and possession of a Schedule IV controlled

substance (alprazolam). The trial court denied Noellien’s motion for new trial as

amended, and this appeal follows.

      In a single enumeration of error, Noellien states that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions because “[e]vidence of mere presence at the

scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in the illegal

act, is insufficient to support a conviction.” We do not agree.2

      Georgia law provides that

      2
         A sizeable portion of Noellien’s argument also focuses on the trial court’s jury
instruction for party to a crime in the absence of a co-defendant. Although Noellien’s
counsel objected to the proposed instruction during the charge conference, it is not
enumerated as error and we do not reach this issue. See Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534,
539, n. 6 (523 SE2d 1) (1999) (“[A]n appealing party may not use its brief to expand
its enumeration of errors by arguing the incorrectness of a trial court ruling not
mentioned in the enumeration of the errors.”); Kelly v. State, 364 Ga. App. 556, 566
(6), n. 4 (874 SE2d 442) (2022) (declining to consider defendant’s challenge to trial
court’s jury instructions where defendant attempted to expand enumeration of error).
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      possession can be either actual or constructive. A person has actual
      possession of an object if he knowingly has direct physical control of it
      at a given time. Constructive possession results when a person who,
      though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and
      intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bustos v. State, 365 Ga. App. 433, 435 (1) (878

SE2d 774) (2022). “Constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial

evidence but, as with any charge based on purely circumstantial evidence, in order to

support a conviction, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis, save

that of constructive possession by the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Id. at 435-436 (1). To that end, of course,

      questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be
      decided by the jury which heard the evidence and that finding will not be
      disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is unsupportable as a matter of law.
      In other words, whether the evidence shows something more than mere
      presence or proximity, and whether it excludes every other reasonable
      hypothesis, are questions committed principally to the trier of fact, and
      we should not disturb the decisions of the trier of fact about these things
      unless they cannot be supported as a matter of law.

(Citation omitted.) Id. at 436 (1).

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      It is true, as Noellien contends, that “mere presence at the scene of a crime,

even coupled with knowledge and approval, is insufficient to convict one of being a

party.” (Citation omitted.) Bustos, 365 Ga. App. at 436 (1).

      However, presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the
      offense are circumstances from which one’s participation in the criminal
      intent may be inferred. A person will not be presumed to act with
      criminal intention, but the trier of facts may find such intention upon
      consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other
      circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is
      prosecuted. If the totality of circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
      connect the defendant with the possession of the drugs, the conviction
      will be sustained, even though there is evidence to authorize a contrary
      finding.

(Citation omitted.) Id.

      Here, the evidence at trial revealed that a smorgasbord of drugs and drug-

related items, including digital scales, multiple cell phones, and small plastic bags,

were found in a downstairs bedroom that contained credit cards, mail, and a vehicle

certificate of title, all bearing Noellien’s name. Officers also found cocaine and over

$4,000 in cash on Noellien’s person. Moreover, Noellien was the only person listed

on a lease for the residence. Finally, men’s clothing was found only in the vicinity of

                                          6
the downstairs bedroom and nowhere else in the multi-story residence. The jury was

free to reject as unreasonable Noellien’s theory that he was merely present and that

others in the residence had possession of the drugs and drug-related objects located

in the vicinity of the downstairs bedroom. See, e.g., Lopez-Vasquez v. State, 331 Ga.

App. 570, 573 (1) (771 SE2d 218) (2015). As a result, we conclude that the evidence

was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Noellien guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) (“[I]t is

unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, or have under his or her control any

controlled substance.”), (b) (“[I]t is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver,

distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any

controlled substance.”) (j) (1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to possess, have

under his or her control, manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer,

purchase, sell, or possess with intent to distribute marijuana.”); see also Bustos, 365

Ga. App. at 436 (1) (“If the totality of circumstantial evidence is sufficient to connect

the defendant with the possession of the drugs, the conviction will be sustained, even

though there is evidence to authorize a contrary finding.”) (citation omitted).

      Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.

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