Court Opinion

ID: 9526586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:20:24.110982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:37.323176
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GEIGER, specially concurring: Although I agree that the decision in the present case is mandated by the holding in People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 302 (1994), I write separately to express my concern with a rule of law that treats the offenses of burglary and residential burglary as mutually exclusive. Such a rule of law overturns the long judicially recognized principle that burglary is a lesser included offense of residential burglary. See People v. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (1993); People v. Johnson, 129 Ill. App. 3d 399, 401 (1984). In People v. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1993), this court carefully analyzed the precise question presented here, namely, whether the State has the discretion to charge and convict a defendant of the less serious offense of burglary, even in those instances where the defendant’s conduct might also constitute the more serious offense of residential burglary. The defendant in Edgeston was charged with and convicted of burglary after he and a friend broke into a private residence and killed the woman who lived there. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 5-6. On appeal, the defendant contended that the State’s evidence showed he committed the crime of residential burglary rather than burglary and that the two offenses were completely separate, distinct, and mutually exclusive. The defendant argued, as does the defendant in the present case, that burglary is not a lesser included offense of residential burglary and that he could not be convicted of burglary when he committed the offense of residential burglary. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 9. This court rejected that argument, ruling that while burglary and residential burglary are distinct and different crimes, the State retains the authority to charge a defendant with burglary even when the alleged conduct also satisfies the elements of residential burglary. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 10. In so ruling, this court examined the language of People v. Bales, 108 Ill. 2d 182 (1985), and noted that under the burglary statute (720 ILCS 5/19 — 1 (West 1994)), a person commits burglary when he unlawfully enters, among other structures, a "building.” This court determined that while a residential home is certainly considered a "dwelling” for purposes of residential burglary, it also fell within the definition of a building under the burglary statute. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 9-10. This court therefore concluded that a defendant who commits residential burglary, necessarily commits burglary, and that it was not the legislature’s intent to prohibit the State from charging a defendant with the lesser offense of burglary, simply because the "building” entered into happened to be a dwelling place. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 11. In Edgeston, this court expressly acknowledged the statutory language within the burglary section stating that burglary shall not include "the offense of residential burglary” as defined in section 19 — 3 (720 ILCS 5/19 — 1 (West 1994)), but concluded that this language did not mean that the State could not, in its discretion, choose to charge a defendant with burglary rather than the more serious offense of residential burglary. Edgeston, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 10. In making this determination, this court relied on the first district case of People v. Johnson, 129 Ill. App. 3d 399, 401 (1984), wherein the court held that such statutory language was meant only to direct the State towards charging the more serious offense of residential burglary when the circumstances permitted, commenting: "[S]uch language seems to indicate no more than an admonition that when a dwelling unit is involved, the appropriate charge is residential burglary.” Johnson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 401. The Johnson court noted that one cannot commit the offense of residential burglary without committing the offense of burglary and that such statutory language was not meant to hinder the State’s discretion in determining whether to charge a defendant with residential burglary or the lesser included offense of burglary. Johnson, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 401. Our supreme court’s holding in People v. Childress, 158 Ill. 2d 275, 302 (1994), clearly overrules these decisions and declares burglary and residential burglary as mutually exclusive offenses: "As the defendant observes, the two offenses [of burglary and residential burglary] are mutually exclusive. Residential burglary can be committed only in dwelling places, while simple burglary cannot occur in a dwelling place. The victim in the present case was attacked and killed in her own home, and thus the defendant could not have been guilty of burglary.” Childress, 158 Ill. 2d at 302. The offense of burglary, therefore, can no longer be charged when the burglary occurs in a residential dwelling. The problem, however, is that the law regarding what constitutes a "dwelling” for purposes of residential burglary is, in many cases, unclear. The present case is an excellent example of this problem: In this district, as well as in the fourth district, a garage attached to a single family home is considered a "dwelling” for purposes of the residential burglary statute. See People v. Cunningham, 265 Ill. App. 3d 3, 9 (1994); People v. Dawson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 672, 675 (1983). However, in the first district, an attached garage is not a "dwelling” for purposes of the residential burglary statute. See People v. Mata, 243 Ill. App. 3d 365, 368 (1993); People v. Smith, 209 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1095 (1991). Therefore, the prosecutor who is faced with charging a defendant is placed in the unenviable position of attempting to ascertain which definition of "dwelling” the trial and appellate courts will use. In the instant case, the State apparently determined that the attached garage was not a "dwelling.” Therefore, the State charged the defendant with the lesser offense of burglary, and the defendant was convicted. However, since this court has determined that an attached garage is considered a dwelling, we are now compelled to overturn the defendant’s conviction. Although the offenses of burglary and residential burglary are distinct, logic would suggest that the former is necessarily a lesser included offense of the latter. The fact that the State chose to pursue the less serious offense should not provide the defendant grounds for reversal.