Court Opinion

ID: 9674162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:24:09.298561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.887191
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
In its point No. 4 appellant asserts that the uncontroverted evidence shows that appellant has never violated Art. 787, Penal Code. In its argument under point No. 4 appellant says that Art. 787, Penal Code, applies to trains alone, not to switching operations, classification, interchange of freight cars or passenger cars in the yard of a railroad.
In support of its contention that there is a vast difference between the operation of a train or the movement thereof, and a switching operation in the yards of a railroad, appellant cites United States v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., D.C., 112 F.Supp. 646; United States v. Chicago B. & O. R. Co., 7 Cir., 199 F.2d 223; and United States v. Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 203 F.2d 241. These cases make a distinction between a “train movement” and a “switching operation” in the interpretation of the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16, with reference to the application of the power brakes provision of said Acts. However, their holdings seem to us to give little if any support to appellant’s position in this case.
Appellant has not cited us to a case and we know of none in which the word “train” as used in Art. 787, Penal Code, has been given the restricted meaning for which appellant contends. We do not believe that the Legislature of the State of Texas intended to exempt trains engaged in switching operations from the effect of the statute, or that the Legislature intended indirectly to grant a permit to railroads to block crossings more than five minutes with their switching operations.
The word “train” has a broad meaning. 74 C.J.S., Railroads, § 1, pp. 334-336. We believe that it is in this broader sense that the word is used in Art. 787, Penal Code.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.