Court Opinion

ID: 9546997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:39:30.577115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:08.992664
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(concurring) — A majority of the court are of the opinion that the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2129, preclude the operation of the principle of equitable estoppel in this case and that, therefore, our recent decision in Hutson v. Walker, 37 Wn. (2d) 12, 221 P. (2d) 506, must be overruled. Since I was the writer of the opinion of the court in that case, I deem it appropriate to state my reasons for concurring in the present decision.
In the Hutson case, this court applied the statement found in Frye & Co. v. Boltman, 182 Wash. 447, 47 P. (2d) 839 (italicized below), where this court said with reference to § 2129:
“It is therefore apparent that the legislature of 1854, by one and the same act, defined the obtaining of money or property by falsely personating another as larceny and also provided that property obtained by larceny shall be restored to the owner notwithstanding the fact that it may have passed to an innocent purchaser.
“This subject was considered by this court in the case of Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13, where the act of 1854 was considered at some length and parts here pertinent were quoted. It was there squarely held that what the *318legislature intended to cover by the use of the word ‘larceny’ must be determined from what the law then defined as larceny. Since by the act of 1854 what was here done was defined as larceny and since that act declared that property so obtained must be returned to the owner, notwithstanding a purchase in good faith by one not a party to the wrong doing, we see no escape from the conclusion that appellant is entitled to recover under the statute.
“Of course, one so entitled to recover may, by acts amounting to an equitable estoppel, place himself in a position ■where he cannot enforce his legal title, but we see nothing in the facts of this case which even approaches equitable estoppel.”
In applying the principle of equitable estoppel to the facts of the Hutson case, the court concluded as follows:
“Under the facts as found by the trial court, appellant is estopped by his conduct to question respondent’s title to the car. This case is a proper one in which to apply the rule applied in Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13, and quoted above:
“ ‘It is but the enforcement of the old and familiar rule that, of two innocent persons one of whom must suffer by the fraud of a third person, he who has put it in the power of such third person to commit the fraud must be the sufferer.’
“Our decision is in accord with the rule adopted in similar cases in most jurisdictions, as is shown by the annotation found in 151 A. L. R. 690, 692.
“The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.”
Because § 2129, Rem. Rev. Stat., has been in force since 1854 and has never been amended or repealed, and because the italicized language in the Frye & Co. case was not necessary to the decision in that case, I am impelled to concur in the decision in this case.
Whether the result of the present case be considered equitable or not is a problem for the legislature and not the courts. If equitable considerations are to be accorded weight in such cases, § 2129 must be amended or repealed. Furthermore, in that event, if it be the intent of the legislature that title to motor vehicles may be transferred only on the records of the department of licenses, then Rem. *319Supp. 1947, § 5312-6, should be amended to specifically so provide.
Until the legislature sees fit to make such statutory changes, I am forced to the conclusion that the decision is correct and that the Hutson case must be overruled.
May 8, 1951. Petition for rehearing denied.