Court Opinion

ID: 9543213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:43:13.937628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:58.371425
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by the Majority that Richard Gutman may not gain access to State Police departmental regulations, directives, and general and special orders concerning sobriety and drug checkpoints and interdiction programs, and intelligence gathering related to political and subversive activity and terrorism for the reason that Gutman has failed to demonstrate that these documents are subject to disclosure under the Act of June 21, 1957, P.L. 390, as amended, 65 P.S. §§ 66.1-66.4, commonly referred to as the Pennsylvania Right-to-Know Act (Act). I dissent, however, from the Majority’s determination that all other records requested by Gutman concerning statements of the responsibilities of various bureaus and divisions within the State Police *574and use of deadly force constitute public records subject to disclosure.
A document must pass a two-part analysis to constitute a public record subject to disclosure. The Majority opinion, however, totally avoids this analysis in leaping to its generalization that the permitted documents are public records and should be disclosed to Gutman. A document must fall within the general statutory definition of a public record set forth in Section 1(2) of the Act, 65 P.S. § 66.1(2), and once determined to be a public record, an examination must be made as to whether the document falls within one of the enumerated exceptions to the statutory definition. Pastore v. Insurance Department, 125 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 611, 558 A.2d 909 (1989). If included in one of the exceptions, the information is exempt from disclosure even though it may constitute a minute, order or decision fixing, among other things, personal or property rights or duties or obligations of any person or group of persons. Id.
Gutman contends that the requested documents represent rules of general applicability and statements of general policy which not only affect State Police personnel but also involve standards for intervention into the lives of private citizens. The State Police, to the contrary, contends that the requested documents are not “minutes, orders or decisions” by the agency which fix any rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations of any persons although they may do so at some future time, and that this conclusion is consistent with this Court’s broad construction of what constitutes a public record and the fixing of rights or duties, citing Marvel v. Dalrymple, 38 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 67, 393 A.2d 494 (1978) and Lamolinara v. Barger, 30 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 307, 373 A.2d 788 (1977).
In Marvel, this Court stated that in determining the right to examine and inspect records under the Act, “[a] broad construction adheres, therefore, to an initial determination that a document is a ‘public record’, to be tempered as an opposing party brings into play the enumerated exceptions.” Id., 38 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 72, 393 A.2d at 497. Added to this *575consideration is the construction given by this Court in Lamolinara of the term “fixing” of rights or duties as constituting some action which affects rather than creates rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations of any person or group of persons. Further, the term public record includes decisions which also “establish, alter, abolish or deny rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations.” Id., 30 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 309, 373 A.2d at 790.
Moreover, this Court observed in West Shore School Dist. v. Homick, 23 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 615, 353 A.2d 93 (1976), that the words used in the statutory definition of a public record are used in the present tense and not in the speculativeness of some future occurrence and that a decision fixing rights or duties is not the same as developing information which may or may not be utilized at a future date to reach a decision affecting rights or duties.1 See City of Chester v. Getek, 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 394, 572 A.2d 1319 (1990) (documents found to constitute public records where they formed the basis for an agency decision). A fundamental step, therefore, in assessing Gutman’s request for disclosure is whether he has shown that the requested documents played an integral part in formulating any particular decision by the State Police fixing rights, duties or obligations, a process completely overlooked by the Majority.
In Consumer Education & Protective Ass’n v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., 125 Pa.Commonwealth *576Ct. 143, 557 A.2d 1123 (1989), a transportation fare setting case, this Court stated that “if a report or document constitutes an essential component of an agency decision, it falls within the Act’s definition of an agency decision and is, therefore, a public record.” Id., 125 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 153, 557 Á.2d at 1127. CEPA was given access to documents that contained information relating to reports, studies or memoranda, which included actual data and calculations in making SEPTA’s expense projections, as this information was an essential component of SEPTA’s budget decisions for fiscal year 1987 on which public hearings were held to consider SEPTA’s proposed operating budget and increase in fares. However, it was held that “CEPA would not be entitled to inspect internal memoranda or reports unless CEPA can demonstrate that such information was integral in formulating SEPTA’s budget proposal.” Id., 125 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 154, 557 A.2d at 1127. CEPA was denied access to all internal memoranda establishing policy or practice for the settlement of claims, litigation, or confidential information prepared for litigation or negotiations to which SEPTA was a party or may become a party.
Nothing in the record in the case sub judice demonstrates that, on their face, State Police departmental regulations, directives, general orders and special orders concerning general responsibilities of the various bureaus and divisions or the use of deadly force may be categorized as a present “decision” by the State Police “fixing the personal or property rights, ... duties or obligations of any person or group of persons” in which those rights, duties or obligations were in some present sense “affected” rather than “created.” The Majority simply views the requested documents as decisions of the agency which fixes duties and obligations of the State Police without any consideration given to this Court’s prior construction of the term “fixing.” See Lamolinara. Similarly, Gutman’s request does not indicate entry of an “order” by the State Police “fixing” among other things rights or duties of any person or group of persons. West Shore. (There is no dispute that none of the requested documents constitute a “minute” of any meeting where official action was taken by the *577State Police.) Significantly, Gutman has never asserted in this record that any of the documents sought represented orders or decisions which affected his or any other persons’ rights or duties.
Consistent with Consumer Education, disclosure should be prohibited where the documents do not meet the statutory definition of a public record, giving due regard to the broadest construction of that term. Hence, unless Gutman can demonstrate, which he has failed to do, that the documents allowed by the Majority were integral in formulating some decision by the State Police which affects Gutman or any other person or group of persons, they do not constitute “public records” subject to his examination and inspection. That is not to say that Gutman could not at some future time gain access to State Police documents, including some or all of those denied by the Majority, upon a showing that they meet the statutory definition for public record and subject to disclosure.
In Vartan v. Department of General Services, 121 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 470, 477, 550 A.2d 1375, 1378 (1988), this Court stated that the broad construction accorded the term public record is not without limitation and “we do not believe that a requestor need merely allege the possibility that information had some impact on an agency decision.” Accordingly, since this Court’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the State Police had just and proper cause to deny Gutman’s request for information, Aamodt v. Department of Health, 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 54, 502 A.2d 776 (1986), the denial should be affirmed as it is apparent that the State Police’s decision was for just and proper cause.
PELLEGRINI, J., joins in this dissent.

. In West Shore, a school teacher requested to inspect his personnel file and did not "assert that any of his property rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations [had] been affected by the contents of his personnel file.” Id., 23 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 619, 353 A.2d at 95. His concern was that the contents of the file could be used in some future proceeding or decision that may affect his rights or duties. This Court stated that the definition of public record must be considered in the present tense and that speculation about future action was insufficient to render the personnel file a public record. Further, the contents of a teacher's personnel file do not constitute a minute, order or decision of the board or fix rights, privileges, immunities, duties or obligations of the teacher.
Also see Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 229, 348 A.2d 910 (1975) (disclosure of voluntarily submitted financial statements by certain government personnel pursuant to executive order denied as such statements did not meet definition of public record).