Court Opinion

ID: 9419481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:49:43.252563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:18.514277
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Eeankfuetee,
dissenting in part:
Those dealing with the Government must no doubt turn square corners. While agents for private principals may waive or modify provisions in contracts which circumstances have rendered harsh, provisions in government contracts cannot be so alleviated. But in order to enforce the terms of a government contract courts must first construe them. And there is neither law nor policy that requires that courts in construing the terms of a government contract should turn squarer corners than if the same terms were contained in a contract between private parties. “A Government contract should be interpreted as are contracts between individuals, with a view to ascertaining the intention of the parties and to give it effect accordingly, if that can be done consistently with the terms of the instrument.” Hollerbach v. United States, 233 U. S. 165, 171-172. Like all other writings that do not have the precision of mathematical terms, government contracts have interstices that secrete relevant implications. Neither a statute which provides that contracts shall be reduced to writing, nor the parol evidence rule “precludes reliance upon a warranty implied by law.” United States v. Spearin, 248 U. S. 132, 138. Unless the terms of a contract are so explicit as to preclude it, the presupposition of fair dealing surely must underlie a government as well as a private contract. Ripley v. United *739States, 223 U. S. 695, 701-702; United States v. Smith, 256 U. S. 11, 16.
Accordingly, provisions in a government contract defining methods for settling controversies by appeal to the contracting branch of the Government presuppose effective resort to such methods of settling questions that arise in carrying out a contract—they presuppose that administrative remedies as a condition to judicial relief are not rendered futile and nugatory. This does not of course question the good faith of the head of the Veterans’ Administration. But where the man on the spot, in his daily relations with the contractor, shows the kind of arbitrary attitude found by the Court of Claims, he cannot be effectively supervised by the head of a department. In any event, the burden of incurring the subordinate’s future hostility by appeals to the head of a department should not be cast on the contractor. The findings of the Court of Claims in this case can only mean that it would have been wholly futile, and worse than futile, to invoke the explicit provisions of the contract for resort to administrative relief. Therefore, as a reciprocal duty of the Government, the contract brings into operation the implied warranty that those who have in effective keeping the administrative machinery for settling controversies will not prevent its utilization for all practical purposes.
The Court of Claims awarded respondent $79,661.56 to compensate for losses and increased costs resulting from the unreasonable and improper requirements imposed upon the contractor by the Government’s superintendent of construction and his assistant. The circumstances surrounding the various items which go to make up this sum differ in details, but the basis on which the Court of Claims found for the contractor is the same.
The findings of fact of the court below tell a story of arbitrary impositions. Erom the outset, the superintend*740ing government officers required the contractor “to do things admittedly not required of him under the contract on threat of reprisals for refusal.” These were not empty threats. The evidence shows that an unauthorized and unreasonable order to erect outside scaffolding for laying bricks was enforced by rejecting brickwork which was not precisely uniform to a maximum of one-sixteenth of an inch by measurement, and exacting of plaintiff mortar joints that did not vary more than one-eighth of an inch by measurement. That these rejections and exactions were wilful and oppressive became clear when all objections ceased as soon as the contractor decided to comply and erect the outside scaffolds. This is but one illustration of what was apparently a systematic practice of unjustified demands and vexations.
The Court of Claims found that the superintendent and his assistant “resented plaintiff’s making protest to the contracting officer, thereby rendering it impossible for plaintiff effectively to protest in writing in each instance to the contracting officer through the defendant’s officer at the site of the work..... The contracting officer in those cases involving unreasonable and arbitrary acts and instructions of the officers at the site of the work stated to plaintiff that he understood and appreciated the troubles and difficulties under which plaintiff was having to perform the work, but there was practically nothing he could do about it and that plaintiff should keep him informed but that plaintiff 'would just have to do the best he could to get along’ with the officers and inspectors at the site of the work, to the end that the work be completed as soon as possible.” If there is substantial evidence supporting these findings, this Court’s power of review is confined to questions of law. 53 Stat. 752, 28 U. S. C. §288.
For all but one item, there can be no doubt that the evidence is adequate and the award in accordance with *741law. The contractor was awarded $107.50 for the extra cost of temperature steel used by order of the superintendent of construction in slabs reinforced with two-way rods. The record makes clear that the contract specifications supported this order of the superintendent, in that no distinction was made as to whether the slabs were reinforced by one-way or two-way rods, and the fact that the contracting officer subsequently relieved the contractor of this requirement as to two-way rods does not justify the award. In view of what I deem to be legal principles governing the construction of contracts, I should therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims for damages resulting from the acts of the superintending officers after deducting $107.50.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this opinion.