Court Opinion

ID: 9670915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:28:16.142674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.249479
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority holding is a rejection of the definition of “item” which we established in State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n., 186 N.W.2d 141, 150-52 (Iowa 1971), and a far-flung expansion of our majority holding in Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975). The result at once deprives the executive branch of a proper item veto and the right to veto legislation that repeals the operation of an existing statute. I respectfully dissent.
As the majority points out, there is no provision in the federal constitution for an item veto. We hence turn to state authorities for guidance. They disclose that our definition in Turner is no aberration. Agreeing with most definitions of “item” we said the term includes more than mere line subjects and dollar amounts. 186 N.W.2d at 149-52.
The experience in other states shows that, at best, there tends to be a blurred line between an “item” (which can be vetoed from an appropriation bill) and a proviso or condition on how the funds are to be spent (which cannot). It does however seem clear that the line, no matter how blurred, is crossed when legislation (even if labeled a proviso or condition) is appended to an appropriation bill in violation of the single subject provision of a state constitution.
The cases recognize a difficulty faced by governors when presented with appropriation bills which have been infused with legislation, going beyond the appropriation, which impacts either on existing statutes or upon purely executive functions. Some governors are unprotected even by a single-subject constitutional provision. See State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 314, 260 N.W. 486, 492 (1935). It is quite common to find provisions such as Art III, § 29 of the Iowa Constitution which provide that “every act shall embrace but one subject_” Single subject provisions offer some protection but it is limited. If a provision is attached to an appropriation bill in violation of the single-subject provision the whole act could be challenged as void. See Green v. City of Cascade, 231 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1975). But a governor is usually in a poor position to ask for an appropriation bill to be declared void. This would be the case when the government could not continue to function without the funds from the appropriation. Legislation attached by means of proviso or condition labels to crucial appropriation bills might thus become impervious to veto. The upshot was a liberal definition of an item, mentioned by the majority, which we adopted in Turner. We said: “... should the ... [legislature attempt to coerce the [gjovernor into approving a lump sum appropriation by combining purposes and amount the court [will] interpret the term ‘item’ liberally to preserve the purpose of the item veto amendment.” 186 N.W.2d at 152 (quoting Note, Item Veto Amendment to the Iowa Constitution, 18 Drake L.Rev. 245, 250 (1969)).
*485Moreover, in Welden, this court stated what it would do when faced with a legislative appropriation unneeded for the specific enactment; we said we would apply the “scar tissue” test:
We would have a different case if the clauses involved here came under the rule relating to separate, severable provisions under which appropriations were not dependent for passage by the legislature.
Welden, 229 N.W.2d at 714 (citing Turner ).1 The scar tissue test certainly did not originate in our Turner opinion. Again, it is a well established response by the courts to a legislature’s temptation to append controversial bills to appropriation measures.
Plaintiffs no doubt think the scar tissue rule is an unwarranted expansion of the originally intended scope of an item veto, which they see as the mere authority to strike individual dollar amounts. But courts elsewhere commonly apply it. In addition to Turner and Welden, see Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654, 664-68 (Fla.1980); Henry v. Edwards, 346 So.2d 153, 158 (La.1977); Attorney General v. Administrative Justice, 384 Mass. 511, 515-18, 427 N.E.2d 735, 738 (1981); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 364-65, 524 P.2d 975, 985-86 (1974); State ex rel. Link v. Olson, 286 N.W.2d 262, 270-71 (N.D.1979); State ex rel. Brown v. Ferguson, 32 Ohio St.2d 245, 249-52, 291 N.E.2d 434, 438-39 (1972); Elmhurst Convalescent Center Inc. v. Bates, 46 Ohio App.2d 206, 209, 348 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1975); Brault v. Holleman, 217 Va. 441, 446-50, 230 S.E.2d 238, 243-44 (1976); Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 289-310, 11 S.E.2d 120, 123-32 (1940); Fain v. Chapman, 94 Wash.2d 684, 687-88, 619 P.2d 353, 355-56 (1980); State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis.2d 679, 705-08, 264 N.W.2d 539, 550 (1978); State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis.2d 118, 128-34, 237 N.W.2d 910, 917-18 (1976).
The majority recites, and seems to acknowledge the validity of, the “scar-tissue test”, but does not follow it. Under the test the provisions in question here were proper subjects of item vetos. Each appropriation was earmarked to a department of government which could use the funds only for the purpose specified by the legislature. The vetoes here in no way modified the legislative plan of how the department could use the funds. The vetoed provisions related only to funds which might remain unused. The power of the governor to transfer unused funds under section 8.39, acting after notice to and “review and comment by” appropriate legislative chairpersons, has been statutorily provided for more than forty years. See Iowa Acts (49 G.A.) ch. 62, § 5 (1941). All branches of Iowa government have become quite used to it. It is, to put it in simple terms, the way our state government works.
If the legislature were to pass an act calling for the repeal or suspension of section 8.39 the act would be subject to an executive veto. Under the scar tissue rule the governor should not be robbed of this veto power by the simple process of attaching the repeal or suspension of this existing statute to an appropriation bill. This is a textbook example of why we and states elsewhere adopted the scar tissue rule. The trial court should be affirmed.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McGIVERIN, J., join this dissent.

. In Turner we said an item was “something that may be taken out of a bill without affecting its other purposes and provisions. It is something which can be lifted bodily from it rather than cut out. No damage can be done to the surrounding legislative tissue, nor should any scar tissue result therefrom.” 186 N.W.2d at 151 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 290, 11 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1940)).