Court Opinion

ID: 9729631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:45:17.449048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.295691
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: While I concur in the judgment of the majority affirming defendant’s conviction, I do not agree with its reasoning. In my opinion, an incorrect standard of review has been employed by the majority. Accordingly, I specially concur. Even though both the State and the defense cite People v. Martin (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 428, 519 N.E.2d 1085, and this court’s decision in People v. Janecek (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 89, 540 N.E.2d 1139, for the proposition that the fact finder’s resolution of the issue of defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, this standard is no longer valid with regard to insanity cases. Subsection (e) was added to section 6 — 2 of the Code by Public Act 83 — 288, effective January 1, 1984. (Pub. Act 83 — 288, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1984 (1983 Ill. Laws 2035).) The addition of that subsection eliminated the requirement, in cases in which the insanity defense has been raised, that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not insane; instead, subsection (e) now provides that the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty by reason of insanity. The standard of review of a finding that the defendant was not insane, as discussed in Martin and Janecek, is premised upon earlier decisions, which in turn are premised upon section 6 — 2 of the Code prior to its 1984 amendment. For instance, in holding that the fact finder’s resolution regarding defendant’s insanity will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, this court in Janecek cites only Martin in support. (Janecek, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 540 N.E.2d at 1142.) Martin in turn cites People v. Teague (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066, in support of that same standard of review. (Martin, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 433, 519 N.E.2d at 1088.) Teague, however, was a 1982 appellate court opinion arising from a 1977 conviction of various felony counts. At the time Teague was decided, subsection (e) had not yet been added to section 6 — 2 of the Code. The defendant’s burden under subsection (e) of section 6 — 2 of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty by reason of insanity is the burden applicable in civil proceedings; when reviewing determinations by a trier of fact that a defendant who asserted the insanity defense failed to meet that burden of proof, appellate courts should apply the standard of review applicable to civil cases. The Third District Appellate Court correctly stated that civil standard of review as follows: “It is not our position to question the wisdom of a jury’s verdict unless the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. under the Pedrick [v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504] standard.” (Spring v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R. Co. (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 3, 11, 357 N.E.2d 1330, 1336, affd (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 290, 371 N.E.2d 621.) The Third District Appellate Court in Spring also said the following: “Both parties agree that the standard for determining whether a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v. should be given is established in Pedrick [citation]. This oft cited case requires a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. to be entered ‘only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspects most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ (37 Ill. 2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14.)” Spring, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 10, 357 N.E.2d at 1335. The foregoing standard should be applied to the present case as this court considers whether defendant proved by preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. When all the evidence is viewed in its aspect most favorable to the prosecution, I conclude that it cannot be said the evidence so overwhelmingly favors defendant’s argument that he was insane that no contrary verdict based upon this evidence regarding defendant’s insanity could ever stand.