Court Opinion

ID: 9594192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:52.061102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:28.530562
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion in parts I, n, m, and rv. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in part v regarding the remedy it contends is authorized by the Michigan Constitution under art 9, § 32. Although I appreciate the appeal of awarding financial relief to the school districts for the amount of the state’s shortfall from fiscal years 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94, I do not believe that we have the power to create this solution under art 9, § 32.1 would apply the provision as written and order the state of Michigan henceforth to meet its financial obligations under art 9, § 29 by paying its proportionate share of the cost for special edu*222cation and for the state lunch program. This Court does not have authority to order monetary damages for a violation of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment because § 32, the enforcement provision, only gives the courts authority to order declaratory relief.
ANALYSIS
I. REMEDY FOR A VIOLATION OF ART 9, § 29
The people enacted art 9, § 29 to forestall any attempt by the Legislature to shift financial responsibility for services to the local government once the state’s revenues were limited by other provisions of the Headlee Amendment. Durant v State Bd of Ed, 424 Mich 364, 379; 381 NW2d 662 (1985). Section 29 provides in full:
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18.
Examined by itself, this section only describes the obligations of the state for financing new and existing services that it mandates. There is no description in § 29 of a remedy for a violation of these obligations.
The purposes of this section are vindicated by the general enforcement provision, art 9, § 32, which provides a general statement regarding the implementation of the different sections of the Headlee Amend*223ment, §§25 through 31. Section 32 of art 9 states in full:
Any taxpayer of the state shall have standing to bring suit in the Michigan State Court of Appeals to enforce the provisions of Sections 25 through 31, inclusive, of this Article and, if the suit is sustained, shall receive from the applicable unit of government his costs incurred in maintaining such suit.
Section 32 does not anticipate that the Court will order the state, under art 9, § 29, to pay a school district, or the taxpayers of that school district, the cost of complying with a state mandate from past years. Rather, the provision only appears to contemplate the fact that the Court will issue an order directing the state to pay its proportionate share of the necessary costs of the state-mandated activity.
This conclusion is not only supported by the language of the amendment, but also by the fact that the people expressly included a financial remedy in a different provision, § 26. Section 26 creates a ceiling for the level of taxes the state may impose by limiting the total revenue the state may generate. In § 26, the people established a refund in the event that the state exceeded its revenue limit by more than one percent:
For any fiscal year in the event that Total State Revenues exceed the revenue limit established in this section by 1% or more, the excess revenues shall be refunded pro rata based on the liability reported on the Michigan income tax and single business tax (or its successor tax or taxes) annual returns filed following the close of such fiscal year. If the excess is less than 1%, this excess may be transferred to the State Budget Stabilization Fund. [Emphasis added.]
*224Similarly, § 29 could have included a guarantee for monetary relief for the taxpayer if the state failed to pay for its mandated services. There is a maxim of construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or, in other words, the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of similar things. Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994). The fact that the people included a revenue refund for a violation of § 26, but not for § 29, indicates that the people did not envision monetary relief for a violation of § 29.
This conclusion is further supported by the analysis of the Missouri Supreme Court in addressing the same issue under its constitutional amendments. See Fort Zumwalt School Dist v Missouri, 896 SW2d 918 (Mo, 1995). The state of Missouri adopted the virtually identical reform of its tax system in its constitution in 1980 on the basis of Michigan’s Headlee Amendment. We directed the parties in our June 10, 1997, order to provide further briefing on the issue of remedy, including the issue whether declaratory relief was the appropriate relief as in Fort Zumwalt. The Missouri Supreme Court examined a case in which the state of Missouri had failed to provide funding for special education services (a state-mandated service) and concluded that the state was protected by sovereign immunity because its enforcement provision, art X, § 23 (the parallel to Michigan’s art 9, § 32), did not authorize money damages:
Article X, Section 23, authorizes taxpayer suits to enforce the provisions of Section 21 [parallel to Michigan’s art 9, § 29] without saying what remedies are available other than attorneys fees and costs. If Section 23 is a consent by the state to be sued for general money damages to enforce Sec*225tion 21, the consent exists by way of inference or implication. This Court will not infer or imply that a waiver of sovereign immunity extends to remedies that are not essential to enforce the right in question.
Other equally effective but less onerous remedies than permitting a money judgment against the state are available to enforce a taxpayer’s interests under Section 21. Specifically, a declaratory judgment relieving a local government of the duty to perform an inadequately funded required service or activity is an adequate remedy. [Fort Zumwalt, supra at 923.]
I agree with the basic point. There are other less onerous remedies available to the plaintiff school districts. We should not conclude that there is a grant of authority to bring an action for monetary damages against the state of Michigan without an express statement by the people or Legislature.
n. THE MAJORITY’S DECISION
The majority has drawn a different conclusion in the instant case, reasoning that an ordinary person would understand § 32’s directive to enforce § 29 as giving the Court “the duty and authority to enforce § 29 in the way that would most effectuate the balances struck by the people in the Headlee Amendment.” Ante, p 205. I disagree with this basic point because it is unclear what the majority’s interpretation of “enforce” means. Through this vague understanding of “enforce,” the majority has created a license to fashion any remedy that it deems fit. I am convinced that the ordinary person would understand § 32 to only confer authority on the courts to provide declaratory relief for a violation of § 29.
The people ratifying these amendments, in my opinion, likely believed that it would be easy to identify *226when the state either (1) enacted a new program but failed to provide for the funding or (2) reduced funding for an existing state-mandated service, and that the courts would then expeditiously order the end of the violation. Hence, with this understanding, there would be no reason to provide for monetary damages because there would not be a situation in which the state had failed to comply in past years. The drafters of the Headlee Amendment, and the people ratifying it, did not likely anticipate that it would take seventeen years for this Court to issue a definitive ruling on the amendment’s application.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority has not attempted to root its pragmatic decision in the amendment. The majority has limited the relief to three years, 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94. The Court awards a money judgment to the school districts to use for refunds to the taxpayers, tax relief, or other public purposes. This effectively gives the school districts complete discretion in deciding how to use the funds.1 This Court has not been empowered, in my *227opinion, to create this novel solution. By virtue of the fact that the majority apparently only intends to apply this ruling to plaintiffs in this controversy, the majority reveals the idiosyncratic nature of its decision. The majority has improperly arrogated to itself the power to fashion what it believes to be a fair remedy.
Moreover, I am not persuaded that the result is consistent with the basic point of the Headlee Amendment, which is to provide relief for taxpayers. See Durant, supra at 378. The majority has indicated that it anticipates that this monetary relief “typically will not be necessary in future § 29 cases.” See ante, p 204. In other words, these eighty-four school districts will receive the benefit of a monetary damage award for the underfunding for these three years but no other school districts will. This relief will come from the state, and, thereby, it will come from all the taxpayers of the state. In other words, the practical effect of this relief is to give these school districts relief at the expense of the taxpayers of the rest of the state.
The majority’s decision to only give tax relief to these taxpayers suggests to me that the majority is really punishing the state of Michigan for its dereliction in failing to meet its obligations. See ante, p 204. 2 *228Although I believe that the state must meet its constitutional duties, if there is a fear that the state may fail to comply in the future because we are only able to give declaratory relief, I believe that the appropriate response is political, not judicial.
The sad irony of this final chapter in the Durant saga is that the result of the “taxpayers revolt” — the 1978 Headlee Amendment — is an award of damages against the taxpayers of Michigan. Whether the Court awards damages to the school districts, local taxpayers, or both, state taxpayers will ultimately foot the bill. The magnitude of the Court’s judgment is staggering. The Court awards $211 million to the plaintiff school districts. And yet, not even a single child has claimed to have been denied special education services during the pendency of this lawsuit.
Although I acknowledge the state’s “prolonged recalcitrance” in resolving this matter, it hardly justifies foisting what may be the largest damage award in state history upon the very parties — taxpayers—that the Headlee Amendment was intended to protect.
The Court’s award of damages rests uneasily on the following two arguments. The first is that
[t]o deny taxpayers relief would be to deny the reality that they have suffered real dollar losses throughout this protracted litigation. [Ante, p 212 (emphasis added).]
With the best of intentions, the Court aspires to give relief to taxpayers for their “real dollar losses.” However, this justification overlooks one simple fact: local *229taxpayers are state taxpayers. A damage award against the state is a damage award against the state taxpayer. Contrary to the majority’s apparent belief, taxpayers cannot be compensated by making them pay money to themselves.
The same principle that explains why a damage award against the state cannot give taxpayer relief— local taxpayers are state taxpayers — also suggests another fact. State taxpayers benefited from the state’s ability to shift special education expenses to the local level. In other words, even though a taxpayer’s local millage may have risen, that taxpayer was also enjoying the benefits of reduced state spending, which resulted in a lower state tax burden. Thus, as the local tax burden rose, the corresponding state tax burden fell. Therefore, it would appear that the net effect of declining state special education funding on taxpayers was neutral. Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on the “real dollar losses” of local taxpayers is misplaced.
The majority’s second reason for requiring the taxpayers to, in effect, pay for special education twice is that
[t]o deny monetary relief here might provide incentive for protracted litigation in the future. [Ante, p 210.]
This argument assumes that it is the Court’s role to remove “incentives” for protracted litigation on the part of the state. The Court’s place is to interpret the law, not to guide, control, or direct the activities of the other branches of government. We must presume that the other branches of government, once informed of their constitutional duties, will execute *230them to the letter and spirit of the law. In the unfortunate event that they choose to diverge from their explicit constitutional obligations, the remedy must be political, not judicial.
Further, in its attempt to exact a penalty from the state for its transgressions, the Court inadvertently punishes the taxpayer, the party who will ultimately pay the bill in this case.
The school districts’ claim to damages is unconvincing because the school districts exist in a representative capacity, acting on behalf of local taxpayers and students. Because a school district stands in relation to the state as does a subsidiary to its parent corporation, it does not have an inherent right to damages. Its claim to damages can only be as worthy as that of whom it represents, the students and the taxpayers. For divergent reasons, neither of these groups warrants financial relief.
The students can be organized into two groups on the basis of the educational services they received— special education and general education. Special education students were not affected by reduced state funding because each of the school districts made accommodations in other areas to ensure that special education programs met state requirements. For example, the school districts may have increased local millages or cut other programs.
General education programs, on the other hand, may have suffered cutbacks resulting from the shifting of resources from general education to special education. In such cases, however, it is impossible to unring the bell, given the passage of time. Those general education students who were affected have moved ahead to the next grade, and many have been *231graduated. Indeed, many of these new graduates will be helping to pay for the state’s “prolonged recalcitrance.” Notwithstanding the folly of trying to estimate the value of such damages, retroactive damages simply cannot replace a missed educational opportunity.
Thus, the school districts can have no claim to damages through the taxpayers they represent. Although taxpayers may have had their millages increased at a local level, all Michigan taxpayers benefited from lower state taxes made possible, in part, by the state’s declining responsibility for special education costs. Consequently, as discussed above, taxpayers did not necessarily suffer “real dollar losses.”
Michigan voters, through their elected representatives, have chosen to maintain a system of special education that is a model for the rest of the country. By deciding to have such an exemplary program, the citizens of this state also agreed to pay for it. That the money for special education came from the average citizen’s “property tax pocket,” as opposed to his “state income tax pocket,” makes little difference to his net worth. The reality is that the programs were paid for once, albeit not at the constitutionally prescribed level of government.
It is undisputed that those programs were maintained during the pendency of this lawsuit. Local taxpayers paid for them, either through higher local taxes or reduced regular education programs. Awarding damages to the school districts asks the taxpayers to pay for those programs a second time.
Even though local taxpayers may receive token payments from their school districts, everyone knows where the funds for those payments come from: the *232State Treasury, which is funded by tax dollars. The state taxpayer will also be funding the administrative costs to distribute this “relief.”
In my view, the taxpayer can do without this kind of relief. Most likely, the local taxpayer would not want this kind of relief, especially when that “relief” comes out of his own pocket — deducting, of course, administrative expenses. The sure, simple, and most direct way in which to give the taxpayers relief is to award a declaratory judgment. This acknowledges the state’s future obligations under the Headlee Amendment. It also recognizes that this lawsuit is simply not susceptible to damages. And, it avoids a misguided, cumbersome award of damages that confers no net benefit on the taxpayers. Instead, the majority’s remedy will punish the Michigan taxpayers whom the Headlee Amendment was intended to protect, by requiring an increase in state taxes, cuts in state programs, or both.
Accordingly, this Court should limit the scope of its relief to a declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs.3
Riley and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

 The majority provides the boards of education of the school districts the discretion on how to spend this award and relies on the democratic process to safeguard that they shall do so wisely:
We conclude that any award of damages should be distributed to the plaintiff school districts and apportioned to taxpayers within each district, if appropriate. [Ante, p 214 (emphasis added).]
* ** *
[W]e [authorize distribution of money damages] to the plaintiff school districts with the expectation that the democratic process will inform and shape distribution of the award. In so doing, each board of education will exercise its discretion to determine and tailor its award in a manner that best fits the needs of its constituents. Appropriate remedies include, but are not limited to, distributing the award to taxpayers in relation to the amount of increased taxes they paid during 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94 as a result of *227the increase in millage over base year 1978-79, due to underfunding, distributing the award to all property-owning taxpayers, to all local taxpayers, or use of the award by the district for other public purposes. We have full confidence that the checks and balances of democratic decision making in each local unit of government will effectively assess the harm to be redressed and the method of addressing it. [Ante, p 215 (emphasis added).]

 In fact, the majority almost expressly stated this point:
While we anticipate that monetary relief typically will not be necessary in future § 29 cases, defendants’ prolonged recalcitrance in *228this case necessitates a substantial recovery aimed primarily at providing a remedy for the harm caused by underfunding. [Ante, p 204 (emphasis added).]

 Fort Zumwalt, supra.