Court Opinion

ID: 9430224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:16.56169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:23.767034
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117 (1980), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that permitted Government appeals from certain sentences. Today, the Court summarily reverses because it finds that the “Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rationale is inconsistent with the rationale of the holding of this Court in DiFran-cesco.” Ante, at 29.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion does not mention DiFrancesco. The appellate briefs before the Pennsylvania court did consider that case, however.1 Indeed, Mr. Gold-hammer argued that DiFrancesco did not govern precisely because no Pennsylvania statute authorized government appeals of sentences at the time of his conviction and sentencing.2 Mr. Goldhammer has raised the same argument *32before this Court in his response to the Commonwealth’s petition.3 Moreover, it should be noted that, unlike the situation in DiFrancesco, the Pennsylvania prosecutor made no attempt to take an appeal from the sentences imposed by the trial court. The Commonwealth, in its petition and in its reply, has not adequately addressed these points.
The majority recognizes that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment may ultimately be supported by state-law grounds. See ante, at 30-31. In view of that uncertainty, and in view of the Commonwealth’s failure to address this important issue, I would simply deny certiorari.4 I would presume that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that DiFrancesco did not govern for the plausible state-law reason that had been argued to it.
Three factors support this presumption. First, Pennsylvania’s current statutory framework for permitting government appeals from sentences was not in place at the time of Mr. Goldhammer’s conviction and sentencing.5 Second, Pennsylvania courts are now. applying the new statutory framework,6 with full knowledge of DiFrancesco.7 Third, *33and perhaps most importantly, we should assume that a State Supreme Court is familiar with this Court’s precedents and with its own State’s law. Because the majority’s summary reversal reflects a contrary assumption, I respectfully dissent.

 See Brief for Appellant in No. CR 84-1852, p. 13, n. 3; Brief for Appel-lee in No. CR 84-1852, pp. 13-15.

 See id., at 14 (“At the time the instant case arose in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth did not have the right to appeal from a sentence. That right did not exist until the sentencing guidelines were approved in July, 1982. See 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 9781”).

 See Brief in Opposition 9, n. 6 (“At the time of the trial and sentence here, there was no statutory provision in Pennsylvania for appeal of sentences”).

 See this Court’s Rule 21.5 (“The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying his petition”).

 See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9781 (1982); 204 Pa. Code §303.1 et seq. (1982), reproduced following Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 42, § 9721 (Purdon 1982).

 See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Dixon, 344 Pa. Super. 293, 496 A. 2d 802 (1985); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 343 Pa. Super. 596, 495 A. 2d 956 (1985); Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, 341 Pa. Super. 468, 491 A. 2d 1352 (1985).

 See Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, supra, at 477, n. 2, 491 A. 2d, at 1356, n. 2 (“Appellee also suggests that to grant the relief sought by the Commonwealth ‘would appear to be a violation of the Fifth Amendment Constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.’ This argument has *33been resolved contrary to appellee’s claim. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U. S. 117 . . .”).