Court Opinion

ID: 9609257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:24:35.092273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:49.878074
License: Public Domain

ALMON H. MAUS, Senior Judge,
concurring in principal opinion and in concurring opinion of Judge PARRISH.
I also concur in the part of the principal opinion that reverses the trial court’s denial of Charlotte Newton’s and David Newton’s cross petition to set aside the quitclaim deed they executed in connection with the proposed sale of the real estate in question by the Estate of Bess Masters, Incompetent.
As outlined in the principal opinion, the judgment of the trial court, which was not premised upon any findings of fact, purports to grant specific performance of a contract stemming from the Respondent’s offer of January 13, 1984, to purchase real estate owned by Bess Masters, in which the Respondent states she will “put the offer in a formal letter that can be taken to the Judge.” It clearly is an offer to purchase directed to the guardians of the estate.
This action sought specific performance against the Appellants Edwin J. Masters and Jackie Masters and Charlotte M. Newton and David Newton, in their individual capacities. The Appellants deny the existence of a contract imposing upon them an obligation to sell the real property in question. They also assert a number of affirmative defenses. These defenses include the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Limitations.
The general rule is that a court will not grant specific performance of a contract unless it is so certain and definite in its terms as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the intent of the parties. Community Land Corp. v. Stuenkel, 436 S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo.1968); Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir.1953). The alleged contract upon which the court granted specific performance for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion of Judge Parrish is far from meeting this standard. For that reason, I concur in that opinion.
However, the judgment of the trial court is being reviewed under the “plain error doctrine.” That being the case, if by some legal machination one might find that Respondent’s letter of January 13, 1984 and the subsequent proceedings resulted in a contract, it is appropriate to consider the affirmative defenses asserted by the Appellants. The parties extensively briefed the issue of whether or not the enforcement of the contract alleged by the Respondent is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The principal opinion finds that it is. I concur in that conclusion.
Further, according to the Statute of Frauds, § 432.010, any contract for the sale of land must be in writing and contain *834all essential terms of a contract and be signed by the parties to be charged. Rone v. Reeves, 20 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Mo.App. S.D.2000); Vess Beverages, Inc. v. Paddington Corp., 941 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir.1991). There is nothing in the record to meet this required standard.
Clearly, in view of the absence of a definitive contract and considering just two of the affirmative defenses relied upon, the judgment for the Respondent is “plain error.” I agree that the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the trial court should enter judgment upon Count I for the Appellants.