Court Opinion

ID: 9692244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:27.880326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.494949
License: Public Domain

*265CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I agree with the majority that Section 9728(b)(5) of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9728(b), authorizes the Department of Corrections to make deductions from income in an inmate’s personal account to collect court-ordered restitution. I depart, however, from the majority’s decision to sustain Respondents’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer based on the broad holding that the Department may make deductions of 20% from “all funds” in an inmate’s personal account whether derived from institutional earnings or from personal gifts. The majority relies on the exemption from process under Section 8127 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127, for “restitution to crime victims, costs, fines or bail judgments pursuant to an order entered by a court in a criminal proceeding.”
The majority also expresses the view that legitimate penological interests may be advanced in collecting an inmate’s debt from his or her personal inmate account and that an inmate’s ability to pay a debt is determined in the first instance at the time of sentencing. I do not disagree that penological interests should be advanced in this or in any other state, but I do disagree with the notion that the Department can make deductions from personal gifts, or private property, of an inmate when that power is not expressly authorized by statute. Furthermore, no record exists before this Court, or before the agency, as to the nature of the gifts involved or as to the procedures instituted for making deductions from gifts or recording them in inmate accounts. Also statutory authority for making monetary deductions from an inmate’s account is restricted under Section 8127(a)(5) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127(a)(5), to “wages, salaries and commission.” The majority, however, has rewritten this law to support its own interpretation: as rewritten, the statutory authority for making deductions from personal inmate accounts now covers “wages, gifts and government benefits.” Op. at 263.
Act 841 amended Section 8127(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127(a), by adding subsection (a)(5). Section 8127(a)(5) now provides:
(a) General rule and exceptions.— The wages, salaries and commissions of individuals shall while in the hands of the employer be exempt from any attachment, execution or other process except upon an action or proceeding:
(5) For restitution to crime victims, costs, fines or bail judgments pursuant to an order entered by a court in a criminal proceeding. (Emphasis added.)
There is no question that the amendments restrict attachments to “wages, salaries and commissions” in the institution’s hands. Act 84 also amended Section 9728(b) of the Sentencing Code. Section 9728(b)(5) now provides:
(5) The county correctional facility to which the offender has been sentenced or the [DOC] shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other court-ordered obligation. Any amount deducted shall be transmitted by the [DOC] or the county correctional facility to the probation department of the county or other agent designated by the county commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county in which the offender was convicted. The [DOC] shall develop *266guidelines relating to its responsibilities under this paragraph.
DOC developed guidelines and issued its policy statement providing that “the business office will ... [djeduct from the inmate’s account monthly payments for 20% of the preceding month’s income provided the account balance exceeds $10.00.” DC-ADM 005, Part VI(C)(4)(a).
The majority essentially adopts the view that the Department’s policy statement is based upon statutory authority and that it supports the argument that personal gifts from family members or from any other outside source unrelated to an inmate’s institutional earnings and deposited to the inmate’s account are subject to automatic deduction to pay restitution or any other court-ordered obligation.2 However, in Chimenti v. Department of Corrections, 720 A.2d 205, 210 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), aff'd, 559 Pa. 379, 740 A.2d 1139 (1999), the Court indicated that “a statement of policy is a governmental agency’s statutory interpretation, which a court may accept or reject depending upon how accurately the agency’s interpretation effects the meaning of the statute.” (quoting Central Dauphin School District v. Department of Education, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 426, 434, 608 A.2d 576, 581 (1992)). The Department’s policy devolving upon itself the power to automatically deduct 20% from personal gifts to inmates is not statutorily authorized, and, therefore, it is not binding on the Court. Although the Court has upheld the Department’s authority under Act 84 to make deductions from inmate income, it does not follow that corresponding authority exists to make deductions from personal gifts without first affording the inmate some appropriate due process protection. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3d Cir.1997).
In Sweatt v. Department of Corrections, 769 A.2d 574, 576-577 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), the Court reiterated the following principle:
When ruling upon preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the Court, must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as well as all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom. The Court is not required to accept as true any conclusions of law or expressions of opinion. A demurrer, which results in the dismissal of a suit, should be sustained only in cases that are free and clear from doubt and only where it appears with certainty that the law permits no recovery under the allegations pleaded. (Citations omitted.)
Based on its' reasoning, the majority cannot say that the issue in this case is free and clear from doubt and that it appears with certainty that the law would permit no relief or recovery under the allegations pleaded. Accordingly, I dissent from the decision to sustain Respondents’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.
Judge FRIEDMAN joins this dissent.

. Act No. 84 of 1998, Act of June 18, 1998, P.L. 640, effective October 18, 1998.

. Taking the majority’s view to its most logical limits, the policy statement would allow automatic deductions to pay court-ordered child support, judgments for civil damages in suits against the inmate or any other court-ordered liability. Clearly, such automatic deductions are not authorized by Act 84.