Court Opinion

ID: 9905194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 21:10:35.182702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:34.363399
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. R.S.M., 2023-Ohio-4288.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                                    No. 22AP-323
v.                                                 :              (C.P.C. No. 20CR-2583)

[R.S.M.],                                          :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                                             D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on November 21, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Michael A. Walsh, for appellee.

                 On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Leon J.
                 Sinoff, for appellant.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

LELAND, J.
            {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, R.S.M., appeals from a judgment of conviction and
     sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to a jury trial
     that found him guilty of one count of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and one
     count of domestic violence, a felony of the fourth degree.
I. Facts and Procedural History
            {¶ 2} On June 15, 2020, appellant was indicted on two counts of domestic violence
     in violation of R.C. 2919.25, both charged as felonies of the fourth degree. In Count 1,
     prosecutors indicted appellant for domestic violence involving M.V., his girlfriend at the
     time. Before trial, however, prosecutors agreed to amend Count 1 from domestic violence
     to the lesser-included offense of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree. In Count 2,
     prosecutors indicted appellant for domestic violence involving M.M., appellant’s
No. 22AP-323                                                                                  2

 biological daughter. The record reveals that, on February 19, 2009, the Franklin County
 Municipal Court sentenced appellant to a suspended jail term of 90 days and 2 years of
 community control after he pled guilty to attempted assault pursuant to R.C. 2923.02 and
 2903.13. The parties stipulated to appellant’s prior conviction for attempted assault
 involving a family or household member. The present charges arose from a violent
 dispute in appellant’s home in the early morning hours of May 20, 2020 involving
 appellant, M.V., and M.M. Appellant pled not guilty, and the matter proceeded to trial by
 jury. The following evidence was presented at trial.
        {¶ 3} In May 2020, appellant resided on Vanderberg Avenue in the Hilltop
 neighborhood of Columbus, Ohio.          Appellant shared custody of his two biological
 children, one of which was M.M. M.V. and appellant had been dating for nearly two
 months prior to May 20, 2020, and M.V. was staying over at appellant’s house for the
 night. Five children were present in the house at the time of the domestic violence
 incident: appellant’s two biological children, appellant’s stepdaughter, and M.V.’s two
 children.
        {¶ 4} Appellant learned on May 19, 2020 that his grandmother had passed away.
 Upon learning of her death, appellant was “pretty upset” because he had a “pretty close
 connection with her.” (Tr. Vol. III at 13.) Appellant spent part of that day meeting with
 family to discuss funeral arrangements and other matters pertaining to the death of his
 grandmother. When appellant came home, he and M.V. went to the grocery store to pick
 up supplies to make ice cream sundaes with the children. Appellant also bought a bottle
 of absinthe.
        {¶ 5} At this point, the testimony of M.V. and appellant began to diverge. M.V.
 claimed that upon returning from the grocery store, appellant started “drinking out of the
 bottle” of absinthe, “and he was getting a little drunk.” (Tr. Vol. II at 35.) She testified he
 was “chugging out of the bottle.” (Tr. Vol. II at 35.) M.M. in her testimony corroborated
 M.V.’s claim that appellant was drinking straight from the bottle and was acting “tipsy
 and wobbly.” (Tr. Vol. II at 150.) M.V. recounted appellant then left the home to smoke
 a cigarette and shortly thereafter she heard appellant’s motorcycle start up by the garage
 outside. M.V. described the conditions outside as “all the way dark” and “raining.” (Tr.
 Vol. II at 37.) According to M.V., she had never taken appellant’s motorcycle out before
 because it had “a bunch of things wrong with it.” (Tr. Vol. II at 37.) M.V. did not think it
No. 22AP-323                                                                                3

 was a good idea for appellant to take the motorcycle out because “he was a little bit
 inebriated,” it was raining, and the motorcycle was not in good riding condition. (Tr. Vol.
 II at 38.) Due to her worry that appellant would “hurt[] himself or * * * hurt[] somebody
 else,” M.V. tried to convince appellant to stay home instead, but he was “adamant” and
 went out for a ride. (Tr. Vol. II at 38.)
        {¶ 6} Appellant, on the other hand, claimed M.V. was the first one to take a drink
 after they returned from the grocery store. He testified he poured two shots of absinthe,
 one for M.V. and one for himself. According to appellant, M.V. took the shot, but because
 he “was already upset, emotional,” he “decided not to take the shot and left.” (Tr. Vol. III
 at 14.) Appellant later testified he had actually refilled M.V.’s shot glass with absinthe
 before leaving, so the two shot glasses sat out until he returned from his motorcycle ride.
 In contrast to M.V.’s testimony that it was raining, appellant stated although “it had been
 raining previously, * * * it was not raining.” (Tr. Vol. III at 15.) He also testified, again
 contrary to M.V.’s testimony that it was completely dark outside, “[t]he sun was going
 down. It was starting to get dark out.” (Tr. Vol. III at 15.) From video evidence in the
 record, appellant was outside starting up his motorcycle at approximately 9:01 p.m.
 Appellant claimed M.V. tried to stop him “[m]ultiple times” by getting in his way and
 “blocking the entrance to the hallway to get out.” (Tr. Vol. III at 18.) Appellant “walked
 around” M.V. and went for a ride, returning at approximately 9:28 p.m. (Tr. Vol. III at
 18.)
        {¶ 7} When appellant returned from his motorcycle ride, M.V. claimed “the
 alcohol had fully kicked in” and he was now “drunk.” (Tr. Vol. II at 39.) M.V. recounted
 how appellant tried to use the restroom but instead fell “inside the tub,” prompting her to
 “pick him up out of the tub.” (Tr. Vol. II at 39.) Around the same time, appellant was
 repeatedly “swigging out of the bottle” of absinthe, rebuffing M.V.’s attempts to curb his
 drinking. (Tr. Vol. II at 39.) Although appellant claimed he drank two shots of absinthe
 upon returning from his ride, and that those were the first drinks he had that evening, he
 also admitted the absinthe “was very strong” and “hit [him] pretty fast.” (Tr. Vol. III at
 22-23.)
        {¶ 8} Appellant testified he forgot to close the back gate when he returned home
 and noticed a husky had followed him into the backyard. Appellant said he went outside
 and, confirming the dog was wearing a collar and tag, let the husky into the home.
No. 22AP-323                                                                                  4

 According to M.V., appellant then let his own dog, a “pit mix of some sort,” out of its cage
 over M.V.’s protestations, resulting in a “ruckus” with the two dogs fighting each other.
 (Tr. Vol. II at 40, 41.) After initially moving her children away from the fighting, the dogs
 were separated and M.V. put the husky outside. M.V. stated appellant then began crying
 and yelling about his grandmother and “just going off like that. He was drunk.” (Tr. Vol.
 II at 42.) M.V. claimed appellant, upset about the husky being put outside, ventured
 outside on foot without notifying M.V. or any of the children. Both M.V. and appellant’s
 daughter worried where appellant had gone and attempted to call his cell phone
 numerous times, but he did not answer.
        {¶ 9} When appellant returned to the house, M.V. said he was “super angry,”
 “super drunk,” “stumbling around the house,” and “yelling obscenities.” (Tr. Vol. II at
 43.) M.V. claimed appellant was alternating between yelling at her to leave the house and
 pleading with her to stay. Appellant confirmed in his testimony that at some point, he
 told her to “get out,” and at another other point he told her if she loves him, she could
 come back. (Tr. Vol. III at 32.) At one point, she decided to leave with her two children.
 When she walked out the door, appellant said he “started crying” and “punch[ed] the wall
 as soon as she le[ft],” breaking his hand. (Tr. Vol. III at 26.) M.M. testified that after M.V.
 left, she and her siblings were “scared because [appellant] was drinking.” (Tr. Vol. II at
 154.) M.V. brought her children to the car, but upon reentering to grab her cell phone
 charger, she saw appellant lying face down in the hallway, “sobbing,” with two of his
 children “trying to wipe his face.” (Tr. Vol. II at 47.) M.V. decided against leaving
 appellant’s children alone with him, so she attempted to get appellant and the children to
 bed.
        {¶ 10} M.V. testified that she and appellant walked into the bedroom and
 appellant immediately closed and locked the door, took off all his clothes, and got into
 bed. In contrast, appellant claimed he “think[s]” M.V. locked the door, but he is “not a
 hundred percent sure.” (Tr. Vol. III at 33.) Appellant said he “think[s]” he was lying in
 bed, arguing with M.V., and he could not recall whether he was wearing any underwear.
 (Tr. Vol. III at 34.) He also stated he did not “think [he] had any clothes on.” (Tr. Vol. III
 at 34.) Appellant testified he asked M.V. to leave the bedroom multiple times, but she
 refused and in fact blocked his exit from the bedroom. In M.V.’s telling, appellant began
 violently grabbing M.V. in an effort to initiate sex; he pulled at her, tried to put his hands
No. 22AP-323                                                                                5

 around her throat, spit at her, tried to bite her, pulled at her shirt, and pulled her pants
 around her ankles. She attested that she resisted, which further angered appellant and
 caused him to begin “destroying the room,” including smashing a lamp. (Tr. Vol. II at 51.)
        {¶ 11} In appellant’s telling, M.V. blocked his exit from the bedroom and threw
 him against the wall, causing him to “get upset” and “yell at her to get the f*** out.” (Tr.
 Vol. III at 35.) Appellant admitted he smashed the lamp against the wall because he was
 “frustrated” and “felt like [he] was going to get attacked by [M.V.].” (Tr. Vol. III at 35.)
 He said he “tried to walk out of the bedroom door again,” but M.V. grabbed him and threw
 him down onto the bed, holding him down. (Tr. Vol. III at 35.) Appellant described the
 ensuing struggle as “a wrestling match” in which he tried to get her off him and exit the
 bedroom. (Tr. Vol. III at 36.) Appellant claimed he did not pull M.V.’s pants off, but rather
 that “[s]he pulled her own pants off.” (Tr. Vol. III at 34.) Appellant testified that M.V.
 stuck “her head out the door and talk[ed] to [M.M.] and sa[id] call 911, call 911” after M.M.
 had yelled from outside of the door that she was going to call the police. (Tr. Vol. III at
 36.)
        {¶ 12} M.V. described this moment differently. She heard the children panicking
 outside the bedroom door. The children managed to unlock the bedroom door, cracking
 it open at the same time appellant began “charging” toward the door. (Tr. Vol. II at 53.)
 M.V., worried appellant might injure the children, blocked appellant and tried to “push
 him back against the wall.” (Tr. Vol. II at 53.) M.V. recalled appellant then pushed her
 through the closet door. At this time, M.M. entered the room holding a telephone. As the
 children yelled at the adults to stop, M.V. was able to close the door, leaving only M.M
 still inside the bedroom with M.V. and appellant. M.M. asked whether she should call the
 police, and M.V. responded affirmatively.
        {¶ 13} M.V. next recalled how appellant charged at her again, but this time she was
 able to dodge his advance. She stated appellant crashed into a wall mirror, shattering it
 and falling onto the floor, giving M.M. a chance to escape from the bedroom. Appellant
 claims he was “pushed” and “shoved,” causing him to fall “back into the glass mirror.”
 (Tr. Vol. III at 38.) According to appellant, the children had “already made the
 assumption before they even came in that [appellant] was the aggressor.” (Tr. Vol. III at
 40.)
No. 22AP-323                                                                               6

        {¶ 14} M.M. recounted how, after M.V. and appellant had gone to the bedroom
 together, the children were watching TV in the living room. They heard a loud thump,
 concerning them, and when they heard M.V. scream, all the children “ran back to the back
 bedroom.” (Tr. Vol. II at 155.) While the children knocked and banged on the door, M.V.
 was “screaming for help.” (Tr. Vol. II at 155.) M.M. procured a spare key and successfully
 unlocked the bedroom door, but only she was able to gain entry because appellant was
 “pushing on the door, trying to get [the children] out.” (Tr. Vol. II at 156.) Once M.M.
 was inside the bedroom, she saw M.V. up against a wall with appellant “sort of on top of
 her” and he was “trying to hit” M.V. with his fists. (Tr. Vol. II at 156.) Once M.M. and
 M.V. got the bedroom door open, M.M. escaped and was instructed by M.V. to call 911.
 M.M. then grabbed her phone and called 911 “several times.” (Tr. Vol. II at 157.)
        {¶ 15} Next, appellant testified how he tried to “get [M.M.’s] phone to try to stop
 her from calling.” (Tr. Vol. III at 40.) Appellant said he went searching for M.M. and
 eventually found her in another bedroom. Thinking she “had the phone in her hand,”
 appellant says he attempted to “grab the phone,” but tripped over toys strewn about on
 the ground and fell “on top of [M.M.].” (Tr. Vol. III at 41.) Appellant relays how he was
 “sprawled out,” “laying down on top of [M.M.], on top of the toy box.” (Tr. Vol. III at 42.)
 He described her position as “laying on the toy box, on her back and up to her neck, and
 her head up against the wall.” (Tr. Vol. III at 42.) Appellant recounted how his young
 son jumped on top of his head, “screaming.” (Tr. Vol. III at 42.) He also said he heard
 [M.M.] “screaming” at him to get off her. (Tr. Vol. III at 42.) He then recounted M.V.
 running in, pushing appellant’s son off appellant, and holding appellant to the ground
 while the children ran out of the room. Appellant testified he never had his hands around
 M.M.’s throat. He assumed the scratch on M.M.’s neck came “from the toys when we fell
 into them.” (Tr. Vol. III at 42.)
        {¶ 16} In M.M.’s recollection of this encounter, as she began calling the police,
 appellant looked at M.M., got up off M.V., and “chas[ed] after [M.M.], screaming at [her].”
 (Tr. Vol. II at 157.) M.M. thought appellant “looked very angry.” (Tr. Vol. II at 157.) M.M.
 stated she ran into the office, and, knowing appellant was after the phone, threw the
 phone into a corner of the room. Appellant continued chasing M.M. into the back corner
 of the room, against the wall. M.M. had her back up against toys with her head on the
 wall while appellant “put[] his hands around [her] neck” with a “pretty tight grip” on her
No. 22AP-323                                                                                 7

 neck. (Tr. Vol. II at 159.) M.M. said appellant squeezed her neck “[p]retty hard,” and as
 a result she was “[n]ot really” able to breathe; she felt “nauseous” and “was gasping for
 air.” (Tr. Vol. II at 160.) M.M. believed she “was going to die.” (Tr. Vol. II at 161.)
 Although M.M. said she did not remember what appellant was saying at the time, she
 remembers he was “screaming.” (Tr. Vol. II at 161.) About ten seconds later, M.M.’s
 brother ran in the room and began “hitting [appellant] repeatedly on his back,” causing
 appellant to momentarily loosen his grip on M.M.’s neck and allowing her to “get a little
 bit of air.” (Tr. Vol. II at 159.) Then, M.M. testified that M.V. came in and “jump[ed] on
 [appellant’s] back,” knocking and pinning appellant to the ground. (Tr. Vol. II at 159.) At
 this point, M.M. and the other children ran outside and went to the neighbor’s front door.
 The children waited in the neighbor’s yard until M.V. emerged from the house and put
 them all inside the car to wait for police to arrive.
        {¶ 17} In M.V.’s recounting, appellant chased after M.M. while M.V. stayed behind
 to put her pants back on. After checking on some of the other children who had gathered
 in the kitchen, M.V. searched for appellant and M.M. When M.V. found them in another
 room, she testified she saw appellant had M.M. pinned “against the wall” with both hands
 “on her throat.” (Tr. Vol. II at 55.) M.V. stated M.M. had one hand on appellant’s throat
 while appellant’s son was “hitting him, telling him to stop, that he’s killing her.” (Tr. Vol.
 II at 55.) M.V. stated M.M. at this point was “not speaking a word,” and, with “tears rolling
 down her eyes,” she mouthed the words “help me.” (Tr. Vol. II at 55.) M.V. said appellant
 “was naked on top of [M.M.], choking her out.” (Tr. Vol. II at 56.)
        {¶ 18} After a slight hesitation due to her disbelief at what she was witnessing,
 M.V. said she “charged [appellant] and knocked him onto the floor.” (Tr. Vol. II at 56.)
 She held him to the floor and directed the children to go outside; once they were gone,
 she got off appellant and shut him in the room, where he remained “screaming, crying,
 [and] wailing” to be let out. (Tr. Vol. II at 56.) Once he fell silent, M.V. recounted running
 outside, yelling for the children who had gone to the neighbor’s yard, and locking them in
 her car. M.V. then reentered the house to retrieve her cell phone and car keys, where she
 encountered appellant face down on the bed, “naked, screaming[,] and crying.” (Tr. Vol.
 II at 58.) She then “ran out of the house” and called police again. (Tr. Vol. II at 58.) M.V.
 testified that she and the children waited in the car for police to arrive.   As they waited
No. 22AP-323                                                                               8

 in the car, M.V. observed M.M. had marks on her neck and described her demeanor as
 “really quiet” and “crying.” (Tr. Vol. II at 65-66.)
        {¶ 19} The state also called as a witness Darrel Kerns, a Columbus police officer
 who responded to the 911 calls placed from appellant’s house that night (“Officer Kerns”).
 Officer Kerns was on duty with Officer Lucas Metz. When they arrived, Officer Kerns
 observed M.M. was “visibly upset, shaking, [and] crying” and had “some small scrapes
 and lacerations” on her neck. (Tr. Vol. II at 131.) Upon entering the home, the officers
 found appellant “passed out in the bedroom,” “fully naked.” (Tr. Vol. II at 131, 132.)
 Officer Kerns observed appellant was highly intoxicated based on his inability to wake up,
 his unsteadiness on his feet, and the “[s]trong smell of alcohol.” (Tr. Vol. II at 132.) The
 officers attempted to conduct an interview of appellant, but because of his state of
 intoxication, “the interview just didn’t go anywhere.” (Tr. Vol. II at 134.) The police
 interview of M.V. aligned with the testimony she provided to the trial court.
        {¶ 20} After witness testimony, the attorneys made closing statements and the
 trial court submitted the case to the jury. The jury deliberated and found appellant guilty
 of assault and domestic violence. The jury also found appellant was previously convicted
 of, or pled guilty to, attempted assault involving a family or household member. After a
 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to four to six months in the
 Franklin County Community Based Correctional Facility and four years of community
 control. Appellant timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error
        {¶ 21} Appellant presents the following three assignments of error for our review:

             I. By Failing to Require the Jury to Find Beyond a Reasonable
             Doubt that Defendant’s Prior Conviction for Attempted
             Assault Was an Offense of Violence, the Jury Was Relieved of
             its Duty to Find Every Essential Element of Count Two, in
             Violation of [Appellant’s] Constitutional Rights.

             II. Defense Counsel’s Failure to Properly Cross-Examine
             [M.V.] on her Prior Inconsistent Statement to Detectives,
             Which Supported [Appellant’s] Defense of Accident as to
             Count Two, Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

             III. Appellant’s Convictions Are Against the Manifest Weight
             of the Evidence.
No. 22AP-323                                                                                 9

III. Analysis

   A. First Assignment of Error
        {¶ 22} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in
 failing to instruct the jury to find that his prior conviction for attempted assault was an
 offense of violence.
        {¶ 23} Generally, a criminal defendant “ ‘ “is entitled to have the jury instructed on
 all elements that must be proved to establish the crime with which he is charged.” ’ ” State
 v. D.H., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-501, 2018-Ohio-559, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Jennings, 10th
 Dist. No. 09AP-70, 2009-Ohio-6840, ¶ 98, quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151,
 153 (1980).    “ ‘[T]here is a strong presumption in favor of the propriety of jury
 instructions. Instructions which, in their totality, are sufficiently clear to permit the jury
 to understand the relevant law shall not be the cause of a reversal upon appeal.’ ” State
 v. Calderon, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1151, 2007-Ohio-377, ¶ 54, quoting Arthur Young & Co.
 v. Kelly, 88 Ohio App.3d 343, 350 (10th Dist.1993). “A jury instruction must ‘present a
 correct, pertinent statement of the law that is appropriate to the facts’ of the case.” State
 v. Daniels, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-626, 2019-Ohio-1791, ¶ 4, quoting State v. White, 142
 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, ¶ 46. “ ‘Whether jury instructions correctly state the law
 is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo.’ ” D.H. at ¶ 43, quoting
 Calderon at ¶ 55; see also Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 142 Ohio St.3d
 257, 2015-Ohio-229, ¶ 22 (“The question of whether a jury instruction is legally correct
 and factually warranted is subject to de novo review.”).
        {¶ 24} “On appeal, a party may not assign as error * * * the failure to give any
 instructions unless the party objects before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
 specifically the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” Crim.R. 30(A). An
 appellant that fails to object as required by Crim.R. 30(A) waives the issue on appeal
 absent plain error in the jury instructions. State v. Huish, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-255, 2023-
 Ohio-365, ¶ 55, citing State v. McCown, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-153, 2006-Ohio-6040, ¶ 36.
 “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
 brought to the attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). “Notice of plain error under
 Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances
No. 22AP-323                                                                                10

 and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91,
 97 (1978).
        {¶ 25} The trial court instructed the jury in the present case as follows:
              If the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
              defendant is guilty of Domestic Violence, you must make
              an additional factual finding. You must then separately
              consider whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
              that the defendant was previously convicted of Attempted
              Assault involving a victim who was a family or household
              member, on or about February 19, 2009 in Franklin County
              Municipal Court.

              This evidence was received because a prior conviction is an
              element of the domestic violence offense charged.

 (Emphasis sic.) (Final Jury Instructions at 7-8.) Appellant argues the trial court should
 have further instructed the jury to determine whether appellant’s previous conviction of
 attempted assault was an offense of violence under R.C. 2919.25(D)(3), as that
 determination is a prerequisite to enhancing appellant’s charge from a misdemeanor to a
 felony. See R.C. 2919.25. Appellant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, so we
 review this alleged defect in the trial court’s jury instructions for plain error.
 Crim.R. 52(B). Juries, as factfinders, are responsible for assessing the credibility of
 witnesses and facts presented to them, whereas the trial court in a jury trial is responsible
 for establishing and explaining to the jury the legal parameters in which the case operates.
 R.C. 2945.11. Determining whether a criminal offense is an offense of violence pursuant
 to R.C. 2919.25(D)(3) is a matter of law. See State v. Johnson, 5th Dist. No. CT99-0005
 (Dec. 2, 1999) (“[W]e find felonious assault is an ‘offense of violence’ contemplated by
 R.C. 2923.13. The trial court was entitled to make this determination as a matter of law.”).
 Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the trial court itself rather than the jury to decide
 whether a defendant’s prior conviction was an offense of violence under
 R.C. 2919.25(D)(3).
         {¶ 26} Here, the trial court did not err by omitting this purely legal question from
 the jury instructions. It properly instructed the jury to determine a factual question—
 whether appellant was previously convicted of attempted assault. The jury unanimously
 found appellant was “previously convicted of, or pled guilty to, Attempted Assault
 involving a victim who was a family or household member on or about February 19, 2009
No. 22AP-323                                                                              11

 in Franklin County Municipal Court.” (Apr. 7, 2022 Verdict - 2(B) at 2.) Whether
 appellant’s prior conviction for attempted assault is an offense of violence was a statutory
 question, and the trial court therefore correctly omitted the issue from the jury
 instructions. We thus find no error, let alone plain error, in the trial court’s jury
 instructions regarding appellant’s prior conviction for attempted assault.
         {¶ 27} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
  B. Second Assignment of Error
        {¶ 28} In his second assignment of error, appellant contends he received
 ineffective assistance of counsel when his defense counsel failed to cross-examine M.V.
 on a purported prior inconsistent statement she made to detectives before trial.
        {¶ 29} In order to compel the reversal of his conviction on grounds of ineffective
 assistance of counsel, appellant must affirmatively prove his case satisfies a two-part test
 established by the United States Supreme Court. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
 668, 687-98 (1984). The Supreme Court of Ohio later adopted the Strickland test to
 determine whether an attorney's representation was ineffective. See State v. Bradley, 42
 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989). Only after appellant satisfies both parts of the Strickland test
 may an appellate court resolve whether his conviction “resulted from a breakdown in the
 adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Strickland at 687.
        {¶ 30} The first part of the Strickland test requires appellant to “show that
 counsel's performance was deficient.”       Id. at 687.    Deficient performance means
 representation so “objectively unreasonable” that it “deviat[es] from the acceptable range
 of professionally competent assistance.” Huish at ¶ 92, citing Strickland at 687. “Judicial
 scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland at 689. Due to
 the challenges of reviewing an attorney’s performance at trial, “a court must indulge a
 strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
 professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
 under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial
 strategy.’ ” Id., quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955).
        {¶ 31} The second part of the Strickland test requires appellant to show “the
 deficient performance prejudiced the defense” and deprived appellant of a fair
 trial. Strickland at 687. Appellant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but
 for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
No. 22AP-323                                                                             12

 different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
 the outcome.” Id. at 694.
        {¶ 32} While cross-examining Officer Kerns during trial, appellant’s counsel asked
 about statements purportedly made by M.V. during a police interview. Appellant’s
 counsel asked whether M.V. told Officer Kerns that appellant “had his hands forward and
 did grab [M.M.] by the neck, but he was so inebriated, he stumbled and fell forward on
 top of [M.M.],” to which Officer Kerns responded he did not remember any such
 statement. (Tr. Vol. II at 138.) The prosecution later clarified the statement referenced
 by appellant’s counsel came from a police interview conducted by Detective Anthony
 Monturo, so appellant’s counsel had mistakenly asked Officer Kerns about a conversation
 to which he was not privy. Appellant argues his counsel should have confronted M.V.
 about her statement to Detective Monturo because, in his mind, it corroborated
 appellant’s testimony and could have changed the outcome of the trial. But that brief
 exchange with Officer Kerns was the extent of the evidence adduced at trial regarding
 M.V.’s police interview with Detective Monturo. Appellant’s counsel did not call Detective
 Monturo to testify, nor did she ask M.V. about statements she made during that interview.
        {¶ 33} The only information available in the record about Detective Monturo’s
 interview of M.V. are the questions posed by counsel to Officer Kerns—and such
 questioning merely confirms Detective Monturo interviewed M.V. on May 28, 2020. The
 record is simply not complete enough to verify anything M.V. allegedly told Detective
 Monturo. As such, statements M.V. made could have been either helpful or detrimental
 to appellant’s defense. Without a more complete record, we simply do not know. Viewing
 trial counsel’s conduct in a highly deferential light, we cannot say the conduct at issue
 here was deficient under the Strickland standard. It is entirely possible the decisions not
 to call Detective Monturo to testify and not to cross-examine M.V. about statements she
 made during that interview were strategic decisions intended to prevent prejudicial
 information from reaching the jury. “ ‘Trial counsel need not cross-examine every
 witness. The strategic decision not to cross-examine witnesses is firmly committed to trial
 counsel’s judgment.’ ” State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 216, quoting
 State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 565 (1996). In light of such discretion, “decisions
 regarding cross-examination * * * do not form the basis for a claim of ineffective
 assistance of counsel.” State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-578, 2010-Ohio-1688, ¶ 28,
No. 22AP-323                                                                               13

 citing State v. Flors, 38 Ohio App.3d 133, 139 (8th Dist.1987), and State v. Woods, 4th
 Dist. No. 09CA3090, 2009-Ohio-6169, ¶ 25. Thus, under the first part of the Strickland
 test, appellant’s assertion that his trial counsel’s representation was deficient for failing
 to inquire further into M.V.’s statements made during the May 28, 2020 police interview
 is without merit.
        {¶ 34} Even had the conduct of appellant’s counsel at trial been deficient,
 appellant has not demonstrated how the failure to elicit more evidence from the May 28,
 2020 police interview with M.V. prejudiced him. In the statement at issue, appellant’s
 counsel claimed M.V. stated appellant “had his hands forward and did grab [M.M.] by the
 neck” before allegedly stumbling forward due to his inebriation. (Tr. Vol. II at 138.) For
 the purposes of determining guilt under R.C. 2919.25, it is inapposite whether, after
 appellant grabbed M.M.’s throat, he pinned her against the wall intentionally or via a
 drunken stumble. The act of grabbing his daughter’s throat is sufficient to prove he
 “knowingly cause[d] * * * physical harm to a family or household member,” and M.V.’s
 purported statement to Detective Monturo would readily clear that threshold.
 R.C. 2919.25(A). Even if it had been alleged appellant grabbed his daughter’s throat
 recklessly, rather than knowingly, that too would have been sufficient to support a
 conviction for domestic violence. See R.C. 2919.25(B). Appellant does not adequately
 explain how revealing such information to the jury would have aided in his defense. Thus,
 under the second part of the Strickland test, failure of appellant’s counsel to conduct
 further questioning into the May 28, 2020 police interview did not prejudice appellant.
        {¶ 35} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
  C. Third Assignment of Error
        {¶ 36} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends his convictions are
 against the manifest weight of the evidence.
        {¶ 37} “ ‘[T]he criminal manifest weight of the evidence standard addresses the
 evidence's effect of inducing belief,’ ” requiring this court “to determine whether the
 state's evidence or the defendant's evidence was more persuasive.” State v. Zhu, 10th
 Dist. No. 21AP-10, 2021-Ohio-4577, ¶ 33, quoting State v. Cassell, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-
 1093, 2010-Ohio-1881, ¶ 38. An appellate court in determining whether a conviction is
 against the manifest weight of the evidence reviews the entire record, “ ‘weighs the
 evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
No. 22AP-323                                                                               14

 determines whether[,] in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way
 and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
 and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), quoting
 State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1997). We will reverse a conviction on
 manifest weight grounds only “in the most exceptional case where the evidence weighs
 heavily against the conviction.” Zhu at ¶ 33, citing Cassell at ¶ 40.
        {¶ 38} In conducting a manifest weight review, an appellate court must “ ‘afford
 great deference to the jury’s determination of witness credibility.’ ” Starling v. Ohio Dept.
 of Dev. Disabilities, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-345, 2022-Ohio-2225, ¶ 15, quoting State v.
 Albert, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-30, 2015-Ohio-249, ¶ 14. The trial court as finder of fact,
 whether jury or judge, is indisputably in the best position “ ‘to view the witnesses and
 observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections, and use these observations in
 weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.’ ” State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. No.
 10AP-105, 2010-Ohio-4953, ¶ 6, quoting Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,
 80 (1984). “ ‘Mere disagreement over the credibility of witnesses is not a sufficient reason
 to reverse a judgment on manifest weight grounds.’ ” Zhu at ¶ 34, quoting State v. Harris,
 10th Dist. No. 13AP-770, 2014-Ohio-2501, ¶ 25.
        {¶ 39} In order for appellant to be found guilty of assault against M.V., the state
 had to prove appellant “knowingly cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm” to
 M.V. R.C. 2903.13(A). “[S]erious physical harm” to M.V. caused recklessly is also
 sufficient to justify a conviction for assault. R.C. 2903.13(B). Similarly, in order for
 appellant to be found guilty of domestic violence against M.M., the state had to prove
 appellant “knowingly cause[d] or attempt[ed] to cause physical harm” to M.M.
 R.C. 2919.25(A). “[S]erious physical harm” to M.M. caused recklessly is also sufficient to
 justify a conviction for domestic violence. R.C. 2919.25(B).
        {¶ 40} Appellant contends his convictions for assault and domestic violence are
 against the manifest weight of the evidence. Essentially, appellant asserts the jury should
 have given more weight to his testimony than the testimonies of M.V. and M.M. “A
 conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of fact
 believed the state’s version of events over the appellant’s version.” State v. McCrary, 10th
 Dist. No. 10AP-881, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 16, citing State v. Neff, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-360,
 2009-Ohio-6846, ¶ 18. Simply put, by its decision to convict appellant for assault and
No. 22AP-323                                                                               15

 domestic violence, the jury chose to disbelieve appellant and instead to believe the
 accounts of M.V. and M.M. The record is replete with evidence to support the jury’s
 conclusions, and for that reason, this is certainly not one of those “exceptional case[s]” in
 which “the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Zhu at ¶ 33, citing Cassell at
 ¶ 40. Thus, this court affords great deference to the jury’s credibility determinations and
 concludes appellant’s convictions for assault and domestic violence are not against the
 weight of the evidence.
        {¶ 41} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
        {¶ 42} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s three assignments of
 error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

                           JAMISON and BOGGS, JJ., concur.