Court Opinion

ID: 9714151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:32:13.115825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.931310
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Cheep Justice Bell :
I very strongly dissent. In the field of criminal law, we are constantly confronted with the question: “Is there no limit in time or in number or in final disposition of a criminal’s alleged or claimed rights?”
Defendant-appellant, wMle represented by an attorney, pleaded guilty in 1958 to eleven armed robberies. Cox’s many attempts to secure a new trial are stated *71in the Opinion of Mr. Justice Jones. However, that Opinion inadvertently overlooked the crucial fact that in the habeas corpus proceeding held in the Federal Courts on June 7, 1966, during which both Cox and his original counsel testified about the trial and the sentencing proceedings, Cox was represented by an attorney in that habeas corpus proceeding, and his counsel raised and a/rgued the very issues he is raising herein. Chief Judge John W. Lord, Jr., specifically held—and with this holding I agree—that there was no conflict of interest. See United States ex rel. Cox v. Myers, United States District Court, Miscellaneous No. 3196 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
Had the aforesaid habeas corpus proceeding been held in the Courts of this Commonwealth, petitioner would be deemed to have finally litigated or waived this issue* and I can see no reason or justification for ignoring Judge Lord’s able decision. Furthermore, I believe that in the Opinion of Mr. Justice Jones, one can find a realistic conflict of interest only by a Procrustean stretch. One of the main reasons for the terrific Court backlog is a lack of Public Defenders. Every time two or more defendants are tried together and there is a difference in their past record which might result not in different verdicts but in different sentences, each man (according to the Opinion of Mr. Justice Jones) has to be represented by a different attorney. Where is the Court going to find a sufficient number of lawyers, and where will they get the money to pay for them? For each of these reasons, I find no merit whatsoever in this appeal.
Equally important, I would dismiss the appeal for the following reasons: One of the major reasons for the stupendous workload and the tremendous backlogs in *72the Courts today is the number of repetitious appeals and post-conviction hearing petitions which are allowed by the Courts and relief of some kind often granted to a convicted criminal based upon (1) stretched technicalities, and/or (2) his false or highly imaginary alleged facts or (3) novel theories or farfetched deductions set forth by able criminal lawyers and swallowed by the Courts. The time has come, and indeed is long since past, where because of the above mentioned Judicial situation and the protection and safety of the law-abiding public, a convicted criminal who has been represented by a lawyer should, in the absence of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, be allowed one, and only one, counseled appeal which must be taken within thirty days from the entry of the judgment of sentence,* and one, and only one (counseled) habeas corpus or post-conviction hearing** which must be taken within two years.

 See Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §4, 19 P.S. §1180-4 (1970 Supp.). See also, Commonwealth v. Black, 433 Pa. 150, 249 A. 2d 561 (1969).

 This is confirmed by the Act of December 2, 1968, P. L. , No. 351, §1, 12 P.S. §1111.1 (1970 Supp.), and the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, P. L. , Article V, Section 502(a), effective September 11, 1970.

 This is confirmed by the Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, supra. See also, Commonwealth v. Black, 433 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 431 Pa. 522, 246 A. 2d 345. In the trial and sentencing and in the appeal and in the post-conviction hearing, petitioner is, of course, entitled to be represented by an attorney.