Court Opinion

ID: 9766681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:56:35.715714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:24.605648
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Our original opinion carefully reviewed the law of self-defense. We emphasized, in considering whether a jury charge on self-defense is required, the importance of the defendant’s “reasonable belief” that he is in danger of an unlawful attack. We used the definition of self-defense provided in Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974) to decide what we considered the fundamental question in appellant’s ground of error regarding his requested charge on the right to defend himself against multiple assailants: Was the evidence to be viewed “in the light most favorable to the defendant” or was it to be viewed “from the defendant’s standpoint”? A related question also suggested itself: Is there a difference? Implicit in our ruling on appellant’s ground of error was a determination that, at least in the peculiar facts of this case, there is a difference between the two — and the correct way to view the evidence is from the standpoint of the defendant. See Frank v. State, 688 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). This method of review focuses more on the reasonable belief of the accused, as prescribed by statute, than on inferences drawn from the testimony of third persons.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing contends that this Court ignored evidence supporting the requested charge, or else sat as a jury and discounted that evidence. We did not. We considered all the evidence and decided that, although evidence was received which, taken by itself, would support an inference of perceived threat from Thomas Maldonado sufficient to require the requested charge, appellant’s direct evidence of his state of mind (standpoint) took away any possibility of an inference that appellant reasonably believed himself to be in danger from an attack by Maldonado. Evidence that Maldonado stabbed appellant near the time that appellant shot Ricky Morin is not evidence that appellant feared Maldonado. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Tulos v. State, 698 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d). Though Maldonado’s testimony that he stabbed appellant could lead to an inference that appellant knew Maldonado was there, continued to be a threat, and reasonably feared an attack, appellant directly said that he did not.
A new question is suggested by appellant’s motion for rehearing: Does direct testimony of a defendant regarding his reasonable beliefs “trump” testimony which would support an inference of his reasonable belief? Because we view the evidence from the standpoint of the defendant, and not in the light most favorable to the defendant, it does. Appellant is the only one who can testify to his subjective belief.
Consider for a moment the following hypothetical situation. A jury has heard from several eyewitnesses that a defendant walked into a room where the deceased was sitting. The deceased pulled out a gun, cocked it, and fired it at the defendant. The defendant ducked behind a chair, pulled out his own gun and killed the deceased. After several witnesses have testified to this version if the facts, the defendant takes the stand and says, “Yes, I was afraid of the deceased; however, I entered the room with the sole purpose of shooting the deceased. Even if he had no gun, I would still have killed him.” From a practical standpoint, if a defendant takes the stand and testifies that he did not fire his gun in self-defense, all of the eyewitness accounts in the world will not require a charge on self-defense. As we stated in our opinion in original submission, appellant’s testimony that he did not know *415where Maldonado was, and that he neither saw nor heard him, amounts to a judicial confession that he was not defending himself against an attack by Maldonado.
It is true that the jury may believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness’ testimony. Williams v. State, 692 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Westfall v. State, 663 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, pet. ref’d.). However, evidence is not to be plucked out of context and examined in a vacuum to determine if a requested charge is required. Godsey v. State, No. 843-82, 719 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Crim.App., 1986).
Viewing the evidence of Maldonado’s presence near appellant in the context of appellant’s testimony that he was unaware of Maldonado’s presence, we do not find that appellant’s requested charge on the right to defend against multiple assailants was warranted in this case. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.