Court Opinion

ID: 9701016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:59:12.696732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:17.238671
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I am not so wedded to the rule of stare decisis that I would join in the application of an archaic rule and thus reach an inequitable conclusion.1
The immunity of charitable institutions from liability for the negligence of their employes is corvrt-made law based upon erroneous, illogical and indefensible principles. The theory has been denounced in legal journals and criticized in earlier opinions of this Court. Even the majority does not support the doctrine on its merits.
The general dissatisfaction with the theory of charitable immunity has led courts which earlier adopted *95the doctrine to abandon it. In fact, the very court which created the theory has repudiated it. Since the date of lower court’s decision in this case the Court of Appeals of New York has deserted the doctrine and held hospitals liable for damage caused by the negligence of their employes.
The present majority of this Court refuse to discard the rule, and instead suggest that any repeal be made by the legislature so as to be prospective in effect. They fear that severe financial injury will be done to charitable institutions which relying on our previous decisions, have not thought it necessary to insure against liability for negligent injuries. I believe this position to be incorrect.
Experiential data in support of the majority’s predictions are conspicuously missing from its opinion. The majority has pointed to no examples of serious injuries to charities in jurisdictions in which the rule of immunity has been judicially abrogated. In any event, the Statute of Limitations which bars recovery for negligent injuries occurring more than two years prior to the institution of suit will effectively serve to check a flood of litigation. Furthermore, practitioners know that many charities have voluntarily undertaken to purchase liability insurance in which the insurer agrees not to plead the defense of charitable immunity. Other charities have taken out insurance against liability without such agreement in anticipation of a change in the law. These practices would greatly reduce the adverse financial impact on charities which might result from a reversal of our position. They also indicate to me that charitable institutions recognize their responsibility to the public, even if this Court does not.
Assuming arguendo that charities will suffer grave financial hardship if we do repudiate the doctrine of *96immunity, I am persuaded that they should bear such loss. In choosing the party to suffer the pecuniary distress which results from negligent injuries — charitable institutions which are not insured against legal liability or individuals who are not insured against financial loss — -I believe we are compelled to decide against the charities by a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence — the party whose blameworthy conduct has caused injury to another must compensate the innocent and injured party therefor. By deciding to await possible legislative change so as to avoid imposing liability on charities for negligence which has occurred in the past two years, the majority continue to permit unprotected individuals to suffer undeserved financial loss for the indefinite future.

 “It is a maxim among lawyers, that whatever hath been done before may legally be done again: and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of directing accordingly.” Jonathan Swift in Gulliver’s Travels. (Modern Library Edition).