Court Opinion

ID: 9902205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:26.137358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.574677
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2021-CA-1163-MR

WILLIAM RICHARDSON;
CANDACE RICHARDSON; SHAWN
TURNER; KERRI TURNER; JAMES
CLOUGH; CHESTER KIEHL; SUSAN
JACKSON; WARD SIMMONS;
CATHERINE SNOW; AND WILSON
SIMMONS                                             APPELLANTS

            APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.      HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL MATTOX, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 16-CI-00146

GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION; MARK
SULSKI, JEFF CALDWELL, BYRON
MORAN, JOHN SHIRLEY, ROB
JONES, FRANK WISEMAN, REGINA
MIZELL, STEVE SMITH, AND
JANET HOLLAND, IN THEIR
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; GENE L.
BUTCHER, JR.; SKYWAY TOWERS,
LLC; AND CELLCO PARTNERSHIP
D/B/A VERIZON WIRELESS                               APPELLEES

                         OPINION
                        AFFIRMING

                       ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: This is an appeal by landowners seeking review of the

approval of an application for the construction of a new cellular antenna tower

filed by Skyway Towers, LLC, and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless

(collectively, Verizon) pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 100.985 et

seq. The Scott Circuit Court affirmed that decision in a KRS 100.347 statutory

appeal, which we also affirm.

            The underlying action began on January 4, 2016, when Verizon filed a

Uniform Application (File No. PDP-2016-05) with the Georgetown-Scott County

Planning Commission (the Planning Commission), seeking permission to construct

a 199’ wireless communications tower with a lightning arrestor on the property of

Gene L. Butcher, Jr., on Stamping Ground Road between Viley Lane and Lloyd

Road in Georgetown, Kentucky. The project name was Lloyd Road – Wireless

Communications Facility, and the application included several attachments

pursuant to the statutory requirements in KRS 100.987 and KRS 100.9865. Notice

of the upcoming public hearing was provided by posting a sign and by mailing

notification letters and delivering legal notice to the Georgetown News Graphic.

            The Planning Commission held a public hearing on the application on

February 11, 2016, during which Megan Chan reviewed the Staff Report. The

report included a review of Verizon’s application, which met the requirements of

                                        -2-
the Zoning Ordinance, Georgetown, Scott County, Kentucky Section 2.55(F) and

(J). The report noted that “[t]he most significant benefit to the community would

be increased service, while the offsets have not been demonstrated by the

application or raised by neighboring property owners or members of the general

public.” Because the application complied with the Comprehensive Plan, Zoning

Ordinance, and Subdivision and Development Regulations, the report

recommended that the Planning Commission approve the application with several

conditions, including addressing site drainage. After discussing the report and

other issues, Ms. Chan recommended approval of the application along with the

conditions noted in the report. David Pike, Verizon’s counsel, called his witnesses

and stated that all of the requirements had been addressed and met.

                 The meeting minutes include issues raised by Dr. William

Richardson, a local ophthalmologist:

                        Chip Richardson, Stamping Ground Road property
                 owner, stated that he and his wife purchased 1581 acres to
                 the west of the proposed tower. He stated that directly
                 across from him is what has been called the most
                 historically rich area in Scott County. It was the
                 homestead of the ninth Vice President of the United
                 States, Richard Johnson. The Choctaw Academy is there
                 in a state of disrepair, and he has made a commitment to
                 help restore it. He is in negotiations with the Heritage
                 Council to place an easement for the dormitory of the
                 Academy.

1
    The transcript of the hearing shows that they purchased 168 acres of land.

                                                 -3-
                      Dr. Richardson also stated that he would like to
               construct a grass landing strip for his own sport aviation
               use.[2] A 200’ tower in his path is not conducive to this
               use. He expressed concern about whether the tower is
               actually needed, doubting the applicant’s statement that
               there is a critical need for the area. He felt there are
               reasons to consider postponing the application to look at
               another site within the radio frequency service area.

                      Commissioner Wiseman felt that the tower would
               not affect the historic integrity of the Choctaw Academy.
               Dr. Richardson stated that this commercial operation is
               directly across the road from an historic resource that will
               hopefully attract tourists to Stamping Ground once it is
               restored.

               ....

                     Dr. Richardson felt that there are inadequate
               studies that show the opportunity to co-locate.[3]

                       Mr. Perkins stated that the required scientific
               evidence has been submitted that legally overrides the
               other concerns that have been expressed. Dr. Richardson
               felt that that does not preclude the Commission requiring
               a second, independent study to verify the biased studies
               commissioned by the applicant. Mr. Perkins stated that
               that is not feasible due to time constraints, budget, and
               the fact that the applicant provided studies certified by
               experts.

               ....

2
  Richardson stated during the hearing, “[T]he tower is directly in a glide path that I want to
install on my farm.”
3
  KRS 100.985(3) defines “co-location” as “locating two (2) or more transmission antennas or
related equipment on the same cellular antenna tower[.]”

                                                -4-
                   Dr. Richardson stated that this is the first
             opportunity for public comment. There is no point in
             having a meeting if the Commission simply checks off
             items on a checklist. Notice requirements were
             discussed. Dr. Richardson felt the time period between
             being noticed and the public hearing was too short.

At the end of the hearing, the Planning Commission voted to approve the

preliminary development plan, subject to the listed conditions, by a vote of 6-2 (the

two who voted to deny the application wanted to give Richardson the opportunity

to do additional studies).

             On March 13, 2016, Richardson and other individuals who own

property on Stamping Ground Road within 1000 feet of the proposed tower

(collectively, Richardson) filed a statutory KRS 100.347 appeal against the

Planning Commission, the commissioners in their official capacities (collectively,

the Planning Commission), Butcher, and Verizon (collectively, the Private Party

Appellees), seeking review of the Planning Commission’s approval of Verizon’s

Uniform Application. Richardson alleged that he (along with the other property

owners) was denied his due process rights and lost the quiet enjoyment and value

of his property. He asserted that Verizon failed to include in the Uniform

Application the location of all cellular antenna towers and all proposed

construction sites for cellular antenna towers on its tower grid map pursuant to

KRS 100.987(2)(a). Such information was not included in Verizon’s Radio

Frequency Report, Search Area Map, or Alternate Site Analysis, meaning that the

                                         -5-
Planning Commission approved the application without all of the required

information, making the decision arbitrary and violating his due process rights. In

addition, the Planning Commission did not provide any findings of fact to support

its approval. The case was assigned to Division 2, Judge Paul F. Isaacs.

             In their answer, the Private Party Appellees asserted several defenses,

including that Richardson had improperly included documents outside of the

administrative record with his complaint (Exhibits A, B, C, and D); that

Richardson waived any claims he did not assert at the public hearing; and that the

Planning Commission’s decision to approve the Uniform Application was based

upon substantial evidence and was in compliance with the protections afforded by

the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. The Planning Commission also

disputed Richardson’s complaint and sought dismissal in its answer.

             In a separate motion, the Private Party Appellees sought direction

about the filing of the administrative record and the briefing schedule, and they

asserted that the matter should proceed as an “on the record” KRS 100.347

statutory appeal rather than a regular civil action that would permit discovery.

Richardson objected to the motion, noting that the request that the case be heard

“on the record” was in response to the inclusion of exhibits indicating the existence

of already constructed or proposed cellular tower sites that were not included in the

Uniform Application and, therefore, were not available to the Planning

                                         -6-
Commission. Richardson claimed these omissions called into question the validity

of assertions in the application. He argued that while, generally, judicial review of

zoning decisions is limited to determining whether the decision was arbitrary, a

court may consider additional evidence regarding claims of bad faith, misconduct,

or fraud. Richardson alleged in his complaint that the Private Party Appellees had

acted in bad faith by misrepresenting both to the Planning Commission and to him

that the Uniform Application complied with KRS 100.987 as the exhibits attached

to his complaint showed additional sites that had not been included in the

submitted tower grid map. Therefore, Richardson argued that additional discovery

was warranted to determine why the sites were omitted and what impact it would

have on the merits of the application. In reply, the Private Party Appellees argued

that Richardson waived his argument related to the County Tower Map as he did

not raise it at the public hearing; that Richardson failed to show the referenced

towers were in the relevant search area for the new tower; and that Richardson

failed to plead bad faith, misconduct, or fraud with particularity, which precluded

discovery.

             In October 2016, the circuit court entered an agreed order related to

the filing of the administrative record and briefing of the KRS 100.347 statutory

appeal claims. The court ordered the Planning Commission to file the

administrative record for this case in fourteen days and stated that “[t]here shall be

                                          -7-
no further discovery, proof, or evidence taken on the Appellants’ claims in this ‘on

the record’ KRS 100.347 proceeding in the absence of further order of this Court.”

The court would consider the discovery issue once it had the opportunity to review

the administrative record and briefs. “If the Circuit Court ultimately rules it will

not allow discovery or submission of documents outside the administrative record,

then the case shall proceed before the Circuit Court to final judgment on any

claims made upon authority of KRS 100.347 in this action.” The parties filed

briefs in accordance with this order, and the appellees all sought a judgment in

their favor.

               In April 2017, the Private Party Appellees moved the court for a status

conference and/or oral argument on the pending motions for summary judgment,

as they were ripe for a decision. The court held a hearing on the pending motions

on June 8, 2017, although the recording of this hearing is not in the certified

record. In September, the appellees filed joint proposed findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and summary judgment affirming the Planning Commission’s

decision. The matter was submitted for a decision as of September 18, 2017.

               In May 2018, the appellees jointly moved the court to hold a status

conference as the motions for summary judgment had not yet been ruled on. After

hearing oral argument the previous June, a new judge was appointed (Judge Brian

Privett). The appellees sought to discuss whether further briefing or argument

                                          -8-
would be necessary. In September 2018, the Private Party Appellees filed a similar

motion as no ruling had been entered. And the same appellees filed another similar

motion in April 2019. In March 2020, the Planning Commission filed an AOC-

280 notice of submission of case for final adjudication.

             In August 2020, the Private Party Appellees filed a motion for

judgment based upon the increased public need for wireless service during the

COVID-19 pandemic, requesting that the court rule on the motions for summary

judgment that had been pending for more than three years. After hearing argument

from counsel, the court indicated that it would enter a ruling as soon as possible.

             On December 29, 2020, the circuit court entered an opinion and order

on the motions for summary judgment, affirming the Planning Commission’s

decision to grant the Uniform Application. The court first ruled that Verizon’s

filing into the court record of maps of other cell towers that had not been tendered

to the Planning Commission in its application must be excluded from the record;

the court would review the record that the commissioners had at the time of the

hearing. After setting forth its standard of review (“an administrative decision may

be arbitrary if it was: ‘1) action in excess of granted power, 2) lack of procedural

due process, and 3) lack of substantial evidentiary support’”) and citing to

American Beauty Homes Corporation v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning

                                         -9-
and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456-57 (Ky. 1964), the court found that

the Planning Commission’s decision was not arbitrary:

                   At the outset, there are probably very few issues
            taken out of the hands of local planning commissions and
            citizens than the location of cell towers. Federal and
            state law allow review basically only on two grounds:
            the ability of the applicant to co-locate on existing towers
            (which is always supported with testimony and affidavit
            of an expert engineer stating that co-location was
            considered and is appropriate), that the tower comply
            with local land use (subject to limitations in the U.S.
            Code and KRS which basically take away any real local
            land use control over location, especially in rural areas).
            Once this information is submitted, and testimony
            presented at Planning Commission hearing, unless
            something incredibly unusual happens, the local unit has
            no choice but to approve. That is the same with the
            reviewing court on appeal of an administrative action
            granting cell tower applications.

                   As to the American Beauty Homes factors, there is
            no evidence of, and none has been tendered, that the
            action in the current matter was granted in excess of
            granted powers of the Planning Commission. The
            Planning Commission is specifically granted the power to
            grant cell tower applications under KRS 100.987.

                   Based on a review of the record and the state of the
            federal and state laws concerning what must be presented
            to the local unit, and the limited amount of review a local
            unit has to determine such applications, there was
            substantial evidence to support the Planning
            Commission’s granting the application. Such evidence
            essentially only consists of evidence of co-location
            considerations, and compliance with land use subject to
            limitations on the land use ordinances.

                                       -10-
       The prong of the review that receives the most
attention in Plaintiffs’ brief and filings concerns the lack
of substantive due process in the hearing, under two
grounds: the lack of specific findings of fact, and the
omission of cell towers from the application map that
were later filed with this Court, but not with the Planning
Commission.

       First, Defendants are correct that there is no
requirement as to specific findings of fact in cell tower
applications. What is at concern is whether the due
process right of the Plaintiffs have been infringed by the
lack of the findings of fact so that this Court could not
have the opportunity to review the approval of the
Planning Commission. Due Process is concerned with
substantive rights, or “the idea that some rights are so
fundamental that the government must have an
exceedingly important reason to regulate them,” and
procedural rights “which requires the government to
follow known and established procedures.” Hampson v.
Boone County Planning Com’n, 460 S.W.3d 912, 917
(Ky. App. 2014), quoting Miller v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392, 397 (Ky. 2009). In this action, the
lack of findings of fact goes more toward whether there
was substantive evidence to support the administrative
decision and not toward due process. While the
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process in terms of the
protection of their property rights is sacred, the Planning
Commission followed the substantive law as it stands so
that Plaintiffs were given the substantive process that is
due. As to procedural due process, the Planning
Commission followed all the procedures required by law,
and the Plaintiffs were given notice and an opportunity to
be heard and meaningfully participate in the hearing.
This Court has serious concerns about what it continues
to see as the lack of formal practices and procedures,
though not required, but most likely a best practice, from
the Planning Commission in this matter and in others that
have been reviewed by this Court. Some day the lack of
those practices will be enough for an appellant to show

                            -11-
             that due process was not given. This, however, is not
             that case.

                    Second, the Plaintiffs argue that the filing of the
             maps in this action with additional tower locations that
             were not submitted as required to the Planning
             Commission violated their due process as it could have
             allowed for further questioning on co-location or other
             matters at the hearing. The Court, however, again, sees
             that while Defendant Verizon obviously, assuming
             through negligence, did not strictly comply with the
             application requirement in submitting an incorrect map,
             the addition of other towers on the late-filed map
             substantively complied with the application process so
             that due process rights of the Plaintiffs were not
             implicated. Again, the record from the hearing is more
             than substantial enough to show that Defendant Verizon
             was entitled to the grant of the application under the
             current laws which allow them so much deference in
             location.

The conclusion of the order indicated that the court had considered the motions,

responses, briefs, and arguments of the parties in making its decision.

             In January 2021, Richardson moved the court to alter, amend, or

vacate its opinion and order pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)

59, arguing that the court should hear oral arguments on the merits, rule concerning

the tendered maps and exhibits that had not been before the Planning Commission,

and remand the matter to the Planning Commission for Verizon to start over with a

correct and complete application that would be available to the public with

sufficient notice and the opportunity to prepare for the public hearing. Richardson

specifically argued that the court had improperly concluded that the consideration

                                        -12-
of a cell tower application was a ministerial action by the Planning Commission

rather than discretionary, that the court improperly affirmed the Planning

Commission’s decision when it (the Planning Commission) failed to make any

findings of fact, that the court failed to address the denial of Richardson’s right to

cross-examination at the public hearing, and that the court must address the issues

that Verizon failed to meet the statutory requirements in its application and that the

Planning Commission acted in excess of its powers.

              In response, the Private Party Appellees disputed Richardson’s

arguments and asserted that the decision was proper as there was overwhelming

evidence to support the granting of the Uniform Application. They also indicated

that Richardson had raised new issues in this motion that had not been preserved in

the Planning Commission proceedings, which should be rejected, and that the court

ruled against further discovery in the opinion and order when it found that judicial

review of administrative matters was limited to only the record before the

commission.

              In March 2021, the second circuit judge recused, and the case was

transferred from Division 2 to Division 1, with Judge Jeremy Mattox being the

third judge assigned to the matter.

                                         -13-
               On March 26, 2021, Richardson filed a motion for leave to file a first

amended complaint and a petition for declaration of rights.4 The Private Party

Appellees objected, stating that a declaration of rights claim could not be permitted

as a separate claim from the statutory appeal. The record does not contain a

separate ruling on this motion.

               On September 3, 2021, the court entered an order denying

Richardson’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate. The court addressed and rejected

Richardson’s arguments as to holding oral arguments, the application of

controlling law as to the Planning Commission’s role in cellular tower hearings,

the lack of factual findings, cross-examination at the public hearing, and the failure

to address his arguments related to Verizon’s failure to meet the statutory

requirements and that the Planning Commission acted in excess of its powers.

This appeal now follows.5

               On appeal, Richardson raises issues related to due process, whether a

hearing was required, the circuit court’s finding that the Planning Commission’s

action was discretionary, deficiencies in the Uniform Application, and the

4
  In the tendered complaint, Richardson stated he had obtained a conditional approval from the
Federal Aviation Administration to construct a private use heliport and airport on January 4,
2017. He alleged that the proposed Lloyd Road tower would constitute a nuisance and deny him
the property right he had to operate a private use heliport and airport on his property adjacent to
the site of the proposed tower.
5
  There are several other appeals pending related to the constitutionality of KRS 100.3471
(appeal bonds) that are proceeding separately from this appeal.

                                               -14-
exclusion of evidence of proposed cellular towers not included in the grid map

filed with the Planning Commission. The Private Party Appellees dispute these

arguments and assert that the Planning Commission’s approval was supported by

substantial evidence, complied with applicable law, was consistent with the Staff

Report, was not arbitrary, and was therefore properly affirmed by the circuit court.6

                 Before we reach the merits of the appeal, we must address the Private

Party Appellees’ discussion of Richardson’s compliance issues related to the

citation of unpublished opinions on several pages of his brief. We note that the

Private Party Appellees cited to the prior rule found in CR 76.28(4)(c), as they

filed their brief prior to the effective date of the Kentucky Rules of Appellate

Procedure (RAP). RAP 41 now provides:

                 (A) Kentucky Opinions. “Not To Be Published”
                 opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
                 are not binding precedent and citation of these opinions is
                 disfavored. A party may cite to and rely on a “Not To Be
                 Published” opinion for consideration if:

                        (1) it was rendered after January 1, 2003,

                        (2) it is final under RAP 40(G),

                        (3) there is no published opinion of the
                        Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals that
                        would adequately address the point of law
                        argued by the party, and

6
    The Planning Commission adopted the brief filed by the Private Party Appellees.

                                               -15-
                    (4) the party clearly states that the opinion is
                    not binding authority.

             (B) Unpublished Opinions from Other Jurisdictions.
             Unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions are not
             binding precedent and citation of these opinions is
             disfavored.

             (C) Citation and Copies.

                    (1) When citing a “Not To Be Published”
                    opinion of the Kentucky appellate courts,
                    the party must provide the style, date, and
                    case number of the opinion: e.g. Doe v.
                    Roe, 2019-SC-1234 (Ky. Feb. 20, 2020), or
                    Smith v. Jones, 2019-CA-1999 (Ky. App.
                    Dec. 4, 2020).

                    (2) When citing an unpublished opinion
                    from another state, the party must either
                    provide a URL or other identifier that will
                    permit easy access to the opinion on a
                    publicly available electronic database or
                    include a copy of the entire opinion in the
                    appendix to the party’s brief[.]

The new rule is very similar to the prior rule, with the exception that a party is no

longer required to provide copies of all cited, unpublished opinions with the brief

but, rather, must comply with RAP 41(C)(2) as to unpublished opinions from

another state. In addition, RAP 40(H) provides that “[n]on-final opinions, orders,

or opinions and orders may not be cited as binding precedent in any court of this

state and may not be cited without indicating the non-final status.”

                                          -16-
               We agree with the Private Party Appellees that Richardson failed to

comply with either rule in his citation of unpublished (and non-final) opinions. On

page 8 of his brief, Richardson failed to provide a copy of the unpublished federal

district court’s opinion; on page 13, he cited to a Kentucky Court of Appeals

opinion that was ordered depublished by the Supreme Court; on page 14, he cited

to an unpublished, non-final opinion that was reversed by the Supreme Court; and

on page 15, he cited to an unpublished Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion that

was rendered before January 1, 2003. As these violate RAP 41, we shall ignore

any citations to these opinions, and related argument, in our review.

               We also agree with the Private Party Appellees that only the evidence

presented to the Planning Commission is appropriate to consider. See Smith v.

O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Ky. App. 1997) (quoting Florida Power & Light

Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743, 105 S. Ct. 1598, 1607, 84 L. Ed. 2d 643 (1985)

(“The focal point for [this] judicial review should be the administrative record

already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”)).

While there was some discussion about permitting additional evidence before the

circuit court and a pending motion to amend the complaint by Richardson, the

court effectively denied both when it entered the judgment. We shall not disturb

that ruling.

                                         -17-
            Turning to the merits of Richardson’s appeal, we shall first address

the applicable standard of review. We agree with the Private Party Appellees that

our review of land use decisions is based upon whether the decision was arbitrary.

This standard is set forth in this Court’s decision in Hampson v. Boone County

Planning Commission, 460 S.W.3d 912 (Ky. App. 2014), a case in which this

Court also reviewed the approval of a cellular antenna tower:

                  Concerning judicial review of an administrative
            action, the court in American Beauty Homes Corp. v.
            Louisville & Jefferson County Planning & Zoning
            Comm’n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964) held:

                   Basically, judicial review of administrative
                   action is concerned with the question of
                   arbitrariness . . . . The above three grounds
                   of judicial review, (1) action in excess of
                   granted powers, (2) lack of procedural due
                   process, and (3) lack of substantial
                   evidentiary support, effectually delineate its
                   necessary and permissible scope . . . . In the
                   final analysis all of these issues may be
                   reduced to the ultimate question of whether
                   the action taken by the administrative
                   agency was arbitrary.

            American Beauty Homes Corp. at 456-57 (internal
            citations omitted). Recently, the Kentucky Supreme
            Court succinctly explained the parameters of whether a
            decision was arbitrary:

                   Judicial review of an agency decision is
                   limited to the determination of whether the
                   decision was arbitrary, i.e., whether the
                   action was taken in excess of granted
                   powers, whether affected parties were

                                        -18-
                    afforded procedural due process, and
                    whether decisions were supported by
                    substantial evidence. Issues of law
                    involving an administrative agency decision
                    will be reviewed on a de novo basis.

             Louisville Metro Health Dep’t v. Highview Manor Ass’n,
             LLC, 319 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Ky. 2010) (quoting
             Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette
             Urban County Gov’t, 265 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Ky. 2008)).

Hampson, 460 S.W.3d at 916. And substantial evidence is defined as, “evidence

of substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in

the minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976

S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998).

             The regulation of cellular antenna towers is set forth in KRS 100.985

through KRS 100.987. KRS 100.987 permits a local government to plan for and

regulate the siting of cellular antenna towers. The statute provides for the filing of

an application to construct such a tower as well as the review process by the

Planning Commission. KRS 100.9865 sets forth the contents of a uniform

application, which includes various reports, the lease or sale agreement for the

property, a site development plan or survey, a map identifying every structure and

every owner of real estate within 500 feet of the proposed tower, a statement

regarding the consideration of likely effects the installation will have on nearby

land uses and values, and a statement of written notice.

                                         -19-
            For his first argument, Richardson contends that he was denied his

due process rights in the administrative process for several reasons. The Hampson

Court described due process rights:

                   As to the Appellants’ claims of a violation of due
            process we note that due process has two meanings in our
            jurisprudence:

                   (1) substantive due process, which is based
                   on the idea that some rights are so
                   fundamental that the government must have
                   an exceedingly important reason to regulate
                   them, if at all, such as the right to free
                   speech or to vote; and (2) procedural due
                   process, which requires the government to
                   follow known and established procedures,
                   and not to act arbitrarily or unfairly in
                   regulating life, liberty or property.

            Miller v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 296 S.W.3d 392, 397
            (Ky. 2009).

                   Regarding procedural due process, it has oft been
            said, “[o]rdinarily, notice and an opportunity to be heard
            are the basic requirements of due process.” Storm v.
            Mullins, 199 S.W.3d 156, 162 (Ky. 2006).

Hampson, 460 S.W.3d at 916-17. Richardson’s due process arguments in this

appeal address procedural due process. After careful review, we reject each

argument and hold that Richardson was afforded sufficient procedural due process.

            Richardson first argues that the public notice contained the wrong

address for the proposed cellular tower site. As the Private Party Appellees point

out, the Uniform Application contained the correct address for the proposed site on

                                       -20-
Stamping Ground Road. The tower itself was named Lloyd Road after a road in

the vicinity of the site. Richardson clearly had actual notice of the public notice as

he appeared at the Planning Commission’s review proceeding. We decline

Richardson’s request to revisit Judge Caperton’s dissent in Hampson.

               Second, Richardson argues he was denied due process when he was

prevented from cross-examination. He relies upon the Supreme Court of

Kentucky’s opinion of Kaelin v. City of Louisville, 643 S.W.2d 590 (Ky. 1982), to

argue that the Planning Commission should have held an adjudicatory, trial-type

hearing. But as the Private Party Appellees argue, Kaelin addressed an appeal in a

zoning map amendment case. Here, KRS 100.987(4)(a) only provides for a review

of the Uniform Application, not a trial-type hearing.7 In addition, the Planning

Commission provided Richardson with the opportunity to speak and to conduct

cross-examination at the public hearing when appropriate, although he did not take

advantage of that opportunity in rebuttal as he was told he could do. And

Richardson could not have cross-examined David Pike, an attorney representing

Verizon, not a witness subject to cross-examination.

7
  “After an applicant’s submission of the uniform application to construct a cellular antenna
tower, the planning commission shall: (a) Review the uniform application in light of its
agreement with the comprehensive plan and locally adopted zoning regulations[.]”

                                              -21-
             Third, Richardson contends that the Planning Commission’s failure to

make express findings of fact denied him his due process rights. KRS 100.987

does not require the Planning Commission to make findings of fact when an

application is approved:

             (4) After an applicant’s submission of the uniform
             application to construct a cellular antenna tower, the
             planning commission shall:

                   (a) Review the uniform application in light
                   of its agreement with the comprehensive
                   plan and locally adopted zoning regulations;

                   (b) Make its final decision to approve or
                   disapprove the uniform application; and

                   (c) Advise the applicant in writing of its
                   final decision within sixty (60) days
                   commencing from the date that the uniform
                   application is submitted to the planning
                   commission or within a date certain
                   specified in a written agreement between the
                   local planning commission and the
                   applicant. If the planning commission fails
                   to issue a final decision within sixty (60)
                   days and if there is no written agreement
                   between the local planning commission and
                   the applicant to a specific date for the
                   planning commission to issue a decision, the
                   uniform application shall be deemed
                   approved.

The Planning Commission is only required to make written findings of fact if the

application is denied, as set forth in KRS 100.987(5):

                                        -22-
             If the planning commission disapproves of the proposed
             construction, it shall state the reasons for disapproval in
             its written decision and may make suggestions which, in
             its opinion, better accomplish the objectives of the
             comprehensive plan and the locally adopted zoning
             regulations. . . .

Because the Planning Commission granted Verizon’s Uniform Application, the

Planning Commission did not have to issue any findings of fact.

             Accordingly, we reject Richardson’s procedural due process

arguments as they lack merit.

             Next, Richardson argues that the circuit court erred when it stated that

a public hearing is not required when a planning commission considers a cellular

antenna tower application. In the September 3, 2021, order, the circuit court did

not state that a public hearing was not required. Rather, it correctly stated that “not

all land use proceedings pursuant to KRS Chapter 100 involve full trial-type

hearings” and that the review of a cellular tower application did not “require the

formal hearing that [Richardson argues he was] wrongfully deprived of[,]” citing

to Danville-Boyle County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Prall, 840 S.W.2d

205, 208 (Ky. 1992) (stating that the review of a planning commission’s approval

of an amendment to a Development Plan for a Planned Unit Development was

“less than a full type trial hearing”). Accordingly, we find no merit in this

argument.

                                         -23-
               Next, Richardson argues that the circuit court erred in characterizing

the Planning Commission’s action as ministerial. We disagree that the circuit court

mischaracterized this action as ministerial rather than discretionary, but, rather, it

appropriately reviewed the Planning Commission’s granting of the Uniform

Application.

               Next, Richardson contends that the circuit court erred in affirming the

Uniform Application because it was deficient. He states, first, that Verizon did not

strictly comply with KRS 100.987 and, second, that the circuit court’s finding that

the noncompliance was negligent was not supported by evidence. Specifically,

Richardson argues that Verizon did not comply with KRS 100.987(2)(a) by

including

               a grid map that shows the location of all existing cellular
               antenna towers and that indicates the general position of
               proposed construction sites for new cellular antenna
               towers within an area that includes:

                     1. All of the planning unit's jurisdiction; and

                     2. A one-half (1/2) mile area outside of the
                     boundaries of the planning unit’s
                     jurisdiction, if that area contains either
                     existing or proposed construction sites for
                     cellular antenna towers[.]

Richardson claims that Verizon failed to include at least three sites for existing

and/or proposed construction sites for new cellular antenna sites in its Uniform

Application.

                                          -24-
              We agree with the Private Party Appellees that there is no merit in

Richardson’s argument because he failed to introduce evidence into the

administrative record identifying these locations as possible alternative locations

for the cellular tower at issue, that these locations were in Verizon’s search area, or

any information about when they would be constructed or whether they would

meet the height requirement for Verizon to use. And he did not raise this argument

before the Planning Commission, meaning that this argument is not preserved for

our review.

              In conclusion, we hold that Richardson has failed to establish that the

Planning Commission’s approval of Verizon’s Uniform Application was arbitrary.

The Planning Commission did not act in excess of its granted powers, Richardson

was afforded procedural due process in that he received notice and was able to

express his objections to the Planning Commission at the public hearing, and the

Planning Commission’s decision to grant the Uniform Application was supported

by substantial evidence as presented in the Uniform Application and at the public

hearing. See Hampson, 460 S.W.3d at 916. Therefore, we find no error in the

Planning Commission’s action or in the circuit court’s decision to uphold the

granting of the Uniform Application.

              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Scott Circuit Court is

affirmed.

                                         -25-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES SKYWAY
                           TOWERS, LLC; CELLCO
W. Henry Graddy, IV        PARTNERSHIP, D/B/A VERIZON
Dorothy T. Rush            WIRELESS; AND GENE L.
Versailles, Kentucky       BUTCHER:

                           David A. Pike
                           F. Keith Brown
                           Shepherdsville, Kentucky

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                           GEORGETOWN-SCOTT COUNTY
                           PLANNING COMMISSION; MARK
                           SULSKI; JEFF CALDWELL;
                           BYRON MORAN; JOHN SHIRLEY;
                           ROB JONES; FRANK WISEMAN;
                           REGINA MIZELL; STEVE SMITH;
                           AND JANET HOLLAND:

                           Thomas R. Nienaber
                           Florence, Kentucky

                         -26-