Court Opinion

ID: 9839419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 06:09:24.994795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:59.289443
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed September 5, 2023

                                                 In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                           Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                       No. 05-22-00061-CV

                 LAUREN NOVAK AND JUSTIN BEISH, Appellants
                                  V.
                      STATE FARM LLOYDS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 471st Judicial District Court
                                 Collin County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 471-06291-2020

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Miskel
                                Opinion by Justice Molberg
        Lauren Novak and Justin Beish bring this restricted appeal of the trial court’s

August 30, 2021, order dismissing their case for want of prosecution and January 6,

2022, denial of their motion to reinstate.1 We affirm.

    1
      Appellants’ original notice of appeal challenged the denial of their motion to reinstate, which is not
independently appealable. See Weik v. Second Baptist Church of Houston, 988 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). The notice was untimely as to the original dismissal but was
filed within six months of that date, so a restricted appeal was possible. At our direction, they filed an
amended and rule-compliant notice of restricted appeal of the original dismissal order. See TEX. R. APP. P.
30 (restricted appeals).
      To sustain a restricted appeal, appellants must show that (1) the notice of

restricted appeal was filed within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) they

were parties to the underlying lawsuit; (3) they did not participate in the hearing that

resulted in the judgment complained of, and did not timely file any post-judgment

motions or requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is

apparent on the face of the record. Pike-Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex.

2014) (per curiam). The first three requirements are jurisdictional; the fourth is

merits-based, and therefore, is not jurisdictional. See Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d

486, 497 (Tex. 2020).

      Though appellants attempted to invoke the civil procedure rule 306a(4) and

(5) procedure to have the trial court determine the date they received notice of the

dismissal as October 11, 2021, such that their motion to reinstate was timely and

properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction, they did not request the trial court to issue

a ruling to that effect, and the trial court did not do so in any order. “Without a

finding of the date notice was actually received,” and a written order to that effect,

the motion to reinstate was untimely. See Nedd-Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

338 S.W.3d 612, 612 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(c).

Thus, the face of the record of this restricted appeal indicates that the motion to

reinstate was untimely, and we disagree with appellants’ argument to the contrary,

which would deprive this Court of restricted appeal jurisdiction. See Pike-Grant,

447 S.W.3d at 886. And, because the motion to reinstate was untimely, the trial

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court could not grant it because the court had lost plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV.

P. 165a(3), 306a(4)–(5); see also In re Dansby, 583 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding). In any event, we have restricted appeal jurisdiction

because appellants timely filed a notice of appeal and meet the jurisdictional

requirements. See TEX. R. APP. P. 30.

       We review a dismissal for want of prosecution for an abuse of discretion, see

MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997), and because this is a restricted

appeal, we are confined to the face of the record in our review. See Gen. Elec. Co.

v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1991). This

means we review “the papers on file with the trial court when it rendered judgment.”

See id.

       Appellants filed their original petition on December 1, 2020, and appellee

answered December 31, 2020. The next document in the clerk’s record is a notice

of hearing for August 27, 2021, at 10:00 a.m. in the 471st District Court for

“Dismissal for Want of Prosecution” that says “THIS HEARING IS BY

SUBMISSION ONLY. DO NOT APPEAR FOR THE ABOVE SETTING. Instead,

follow the below instructions.”2 Those instructions were that the case would be

dismissed for want of prosecution unless, at least 24 hours before the submission

setting, the parties submit:

   2
     The index in the clerk’s record indicates a date of January 10, 2021” for this document in the
“FILED/SIGNED” column.
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      (a) A nonsuit or a dispositive order signed by all parties; or

      (b) An agreed scheduling order, which must include a confirmed trial
      setting obtained from the Court Coordinator; or

      (c) If the parties cannot agree on a trial setting, a joint report identifying
      the trial dates provided by the Court Coordinator and each party’s
      objections to, or conflicts with, the same.

      This notice is sufficient.

      Appellants devote no direct argument against the original dismissal order, and

have inadequately briefed this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). The issue would

fail in any event because the record contains the dismissal notice and, though the

record is silent as to whether notice was provided, the absence from the record of

affirmative proof that the notice of intent to dismiss was provided establishes no

error apparent on the face of the record. See Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430,

433 (Tex. 2009) (rules require clerk to provide notice of dismissal hearing but no

“affirmative duty to record the mailing of the required notices”); Alexander v.

Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2004).

      The order dismissing the case for want of prosecution recited the parties’

failure to submit anything referred to in (a) through (c) in the letter above and stated:

“given that no other motions were set for hearing prior to the dismissal setting, the

Court finds that the above-numbered and styled case should be dismissed for want

of prosecution.” The order did not specify whether it was dismissing under rule 165a

or the court’s inherent authority, requiring appellants to negate all possible grounds

                                          –4–
for dismissal. See Villareal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630

(Tex. 1999); Keough v. Cyrus USA, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). They have not done so, and the record

does not indicate that appellants took any action to prosecute the case in the nearly

nine months after filing, despite the trial court’s explicit directions in the dismissal

hearing notice.    On this basis, we conclude the face of the record provides

justification for the trial court’s decision to dismiss this case for want of prosecution.

See Alexander, 134 S.W.3d at 852.

      Appellants’ arguments for reinstatement would fail as well. Based on civil

procedure rule 165a(1), they claim that they “intended to appear at the dismissal

hearing but missed the dismissal hearing due to a calendaring mistake.” This

argument has gotten no stronger for its verbatim repetition on appeal.

      Appellants argued below that “calendaring mistakes made unintentionally and

without conscious indifference are always sufficient grounds to meet” their

“accident or mistake” burden. See TEX. R. APP. P. 165a(3). At the hearing on the

motion to reinstate, counsel stated that “[w]e received no notice from the Court of

any intent to have this case dismissed” but in the next sentence admitted “counsel

could not appear for the schedule because we had a calendaring issue.” Counsel

covering the hearing was later “not sure what evidence” they would provide to show

the calendaring mistake, and never went beyond the conclusory statement that there

had been a good faith calendaring mistake that prevented appearance at, or

                                           –5–
performance in advance of, the dismissal hearing. This is insufficient. See Brown

v. Sanders, No. 02-21-00212-CV, 2022 WL 2071782, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

June 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (similar lack of evidence of “counsel’s practices

relating to calendaring or scheduling”); see also Nichols v. TMJ Co., 742 S.W.2d

828, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.) (court need not accept unsupported

conclusory statements). Further, counsel’s affidavit verifying the motion to reinstate

gave no detail and stated only, as relevant, that “[t]he facts stated in the above motion

are within my personal knowledge and are true and correct.” See Henderson v.

Blalock, 465 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); cf.

Rava Square Homeowners Ass’n v. Swan, No. 14-07-00521-CV, 2008 WL 4390437,

at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(explanatory details in affidavit provided basis for relief from dismissal).

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                             /Ken Molberg/
                                             KEN MOLBERG
220061f.p05                                  JUSTICE

                                          –6–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

LAUREN NOVAK AND JUSTIN                        On Appeal from the 471st Judicial
BEISH, Appellants                              District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 471-06291-
No. 05-22-00061-CV           V.                2020.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice
STATE FARM LLOYDS, Appellee                    Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and
                                               Miskel participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee STATE FARM LLOYDS recover its costs of
this appeal from appellants LAUREN NOVAK AND JUSTIN BEISH.

Judgment entered this 5th day of September 2023.

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