Court Opinion

ID: 9481458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:19:28.679847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:19.618742
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that we must vacate the sentence and remand the case. The district judge failed to give notice of his intent to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines as required by United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir.1989). However, because we have vacated the sentence on this basis, we need not decide any other issues raised on this appeal. Brady’s allegations of error should be considered in the first instance by the district judge, who will now have the benefit of briefing and argument by both parties. Therefore, I write separately.
Instead of simply vacating the sentence and remanding the case, the majority rules *855on all of the district judge’s future sentencing decisions. These rulings are premature. The sentence has been vacated, and thus the district judge’s denial of the sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his decision to sentence consecutively, and his grounds for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines need not be decided. With notice and the presentations by counsel, he may well enter a different sentence. By ruling on a sentence that has not yet been imposed, the majority runs the risk of-reaching erroneous conclusions based on incomplete information.
For example, the decision whether to sentence Brady concurrently or consecutively rests on a number of factors, including the offense level and sentence adjustments. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §§ 3D1.1-3D1.5, 5G1.2 (Nov.1990) (U.S.S.G.). Despite this fact, the majority hypothesizes that any consecutive sentencing is “a drastic departure from the Guidelines and an unreasonable sentence.” I believe, however, that we should refrain from speculating about future sentences, and should review the district judge’s new sentencing decision, including any upward departure, only when it is before us.
A second and more unfortunate unnecessary excursion centers on the majority’s theme that “the Guidelines [do not] permit a court to reconsider facts during sentencing that have been implicitly rejected by a jury’s not guilty verdict.” However, this position is contrary to statute, the Sentencing Guidelines, and to the position taken by all other circuits ruling on the issue.
Before the Sentencing Guidelines were enacted, a sentencing judge was permitted to consider a wide range of evidence, “in order to tailor the punishment to the criminal rather than to the crime.” United State v. Morgan, 595 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir.1979). Such relevant evidence included information concerning crimes for which the defendant had been acquitted. Id. at 1136-37; see also United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir.1973). Facts relevant to sentencing need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), therefore a jury finding that the prosecution has not proven facts beyond a reasonable doubt does not bar the judge from reconsidering these facts during sentencing. See United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1989) (Mocciola) (pointing out different standard of proof).
There is no evidence that Congress intended the Sentencing Guidelines to alter existing law by limiting the scope of evidence available to a judge during sentencing. In fact, the language of the applicable statute compels the opposite conclusion. Section 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court ... may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. This statute was in effect prior to the Sentencing Guidelines and was incorporated, without changes, into the Sentencing Reform Act. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, Title II § 212(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). As the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines point out, “[t]he recodi-fication of this 1970 statute ... makes it clear that Congress intended that no limitation would be placed on the information that a court may consider in imposing an appropriate sentence under the [Guidelines].” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, comment, (backg’d.); see also id. § IB 1.4 (following congressional mandate, by providing that “[i]n determining ... whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and .conduct of the defendant” (emphasis added)).
This position seems clear to a reader, but the majority sees it differently. Without citing any authority, the majority carves out an exception to the statute and the Sentencing Guidelines, .and indeed does not explain why we are not bound by their terms. In doing so, the majority creates an unnecessary intercircuit conflict. The Fifth Circuit has found “without merit” the argument that by considering facts under*856lying a crime for which a defendant was acquitted, the judge “overrode the jury’s determination of a fact issue.” United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1989). Instead, the court held that “[ajlthough the jury may have determined that the government had not proved all of the elements of the [charged] offense beyond a reasonable doubt, such a determination does not necessarily preclude consideration of underlying facts of the offense at sentencing.” Id. Six other circuits agree. United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.1990) (judges may consider prior misconduct despite the defendant’s acquittal on charges arising out of that misconduct); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 179-82 (2d Cir.) (Guidelines have not changed principle that sentencing factors need only be proven by preponderance of the evidence), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 127, 112 L.Ed.2d 95 (1990); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 389-90, 112 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 16-17 (facts underlying prior acquittal may be considered by sentencing court); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir.1989) (judge may enhance sentence for conduct that did not result in conviction); United State v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir.1989) (Commission intended that courts should continue to consider conduct for which defendant acquitted).1 Not one circuit, until now, is to the contrary. Why should the Ninth Circuit be different?
The majority explains its disagreement with all the other circuits ruling on the issue by arguing that permitting the judge to reconsider disputed facts during sentencing enables the judge to “punish[ ] the defendant for an offense for which he or she ha[s] been acquitted.” This is untrue. The judge’s sentencing discretion is limited by the statutory maximum of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, as well as by the rigorous standard of review applied to evaluate guideline departures. See United States v. Lira-Barraza, 897 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.) (departure must satisfy five step analysis), reh’g granted en banc, 909 F.2d 1370 (1990). In this case, if on remand the district judge imposes the statutory maximum sentence on the voluntary manslaughter count (120 months), this sentence will still fall below the Sentencing Guidelines’s minimum sentence for second degree murder (135 months). See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.2, 2A1.3.
The majority’s stated reason for abandoning precedent is that “the maximum sentences prescribed by the statutes were formulated in a time when a defendant was eligible for parole.” Although an accurate statement, this does not justify limiting the scope of information available to the district judge during sentencing. The Sentencing Reform Act explicitly provides that a judge may depart upward from the Sentencing Guidelines, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), and authorizes the judge to consider any relevant evidence in making this decision. Id. § 3661. Therefore, there is no basis for the majority’s conclusion that by eliminat*857ing parole, Congress implicitly limited the judge’s ability to sentence up to the statutory maximum. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (suggesting that the Sentencing Reform Act may result in higher sentences by observing that “in many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense”).2
We have properly cautioned that absent some good reason to do so, we should resist the creation of intercircuit conflicts. United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1078, 108 S.Ct. 1057, 98 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1988). I see no justification for its creation here— especially in a Sentencing Guidelines case where national uniformity is an apparent goal. See Department of Health & Human Services v. FLRA, 894 F.2d 333, 334 n. 1 (9th Cir.1990) (intercircuit conflicts should be avoided, especially where federal law calls for uniformity).
Under the circumstances of this case, we would be far better advised to vacate the sentence and remand without reaching unnecessary issues. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.

. In footnote 11, the majority attempts to distinguish United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.1990), and United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736 (4th Cir.1990), by arguing that in these cases "the district court relied on undisputed facts, not on facts rejected by a jury’s not guilty verdict.” This narrow reading ignores the reasoning underlying both opinions. Both cases explicitly endorse this dissent’s position that because of different standards of proof, conduct not resulting in a guilty verdict may be used to enhance a sentence.
For example, in Isom the Fourth Circuit stated that "[a] verdict of acquittal demonstrates only a lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not necessarily establish the defendant's innocence.” Isom, 886 F.2d at 738. The court concluded that conduct not resulting in a conviction could be the basis for a sentence enhancement as long as those facts “meet the reliability standard.” Id. at 739, quoting Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d at 749. Similarly, in Fonner, the Seventh Circuit stated unequivocally that ”[n]othing in either the guidelines or the Constitution prevents a judge from taking account of conduct in which the defendant engaged, whether or not an acquittal prevents the imposition of criminal penalties directly on that conduct.” Fonner, 920 F.2d at 1332. The Seventh Circuit expressed agreement with the other circuits cited by this dissent. Id. at 1333 (”[J]udges may consider prior misconduct despite the defendant’s acquittal on charges arising out of the misconduct. Six courts of appeals have so held.”).

. The majority also argues in footnote 12 that its holding does not depend on standard of proof, but merely involves the judicial decision to “define one more category of facts that cannot be used by a district court in imposing sentence." However, the cases cited by the majority provide no support for the remarkable assertion that an appellate court may, on its own initiative, limit the information available to the sentencing judge. Rather, they involve situations where the Guidelines, statute, or the Constitution, bar considering certain facts as the basis for a sentence enhancement.
In United States v. Enriquez-Munoz, 906 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.1990), we held that a sentencing judge may not depart upward from the Guidelines on the grounds that the defendant was motivated by greed. We reasoned that “profit is a primary motivating factor in many if not most types of crimes____ When it [drafted the Guideline] the Commission undoubtedly had in mind the fact that people frequently engage in criminal conduct for profit.” Id. at 1361-62. For similar reasons, we have held that sentencing judges may not depart on the basis of the defendant’s need for psychiatric treatment, or because of the possibility of deportation. United States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1990) (because Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to consider "rehabilitation” and providing defendants with "needed ... medical care, or other correctional treatment,” the need for psychiatric assistance was not a factor overlooked by the Commission); United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir. 1990) ("When setting the offense level for entry after deportation, the Sentencing Commission would certainly have been aware of the practice of promptly deporting aliens after they serve such sentences.”). These decisions follow directly from the sentencing statute, which authorizes Guidelines departures only when the case involves atypical circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (circumstance must be one that was "not adequately taken into consideration.”); see also U.S.S.G. § lA4(b), p.s. (judge should depart from Guidelines only in rare, atypical cases); § 5K2.0, p.s. (discussing grounds for departure).
The other two cases cited by the majority also do not establish that we have the authority to limit the information available to sentencing judges. In United States v. Alvarez-Cardenas, 902 F.2d 734 (9th Cir.1990), we held that the possibility of deportation could not be the basis for a downward departure, because deportation "does not speak to the offense in question, nor does it speak to the offender’s character." Id. at 737. This exclusion of irrelevant information finds support both in the sentencing statute, and in the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (directing courts to consider evidence relevant to the "background, character and conduct of the defendant”); 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (same); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) & (e) (listing factors irrelevant to sentencing). Finally, in United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 591-92 (9th Cir.1990), we held that a judge must determine whether a defendant has accepted responsibility for his offense without considering the defendant’s pre-plea conduct. We stressed that this interpretation of section 3E1.1 was necessary to avoid an unconstitutional application of the Guidelines. Id. at 592.
In contrast to the information excluded in previous cases, the evidence at issue here — Brady’s state of mind — is both relevant to Brady’s "character and conduct” and a factor which makes this case atypical. See U.S.S.G. § lA4(b), p.s. Nor is there any constitutional impediment to considering this information. Therefore, this case stands in stark contrast to previous Ninth Circuit cases where we have disallowed sentence enhancements when necessary to comply with the Guidelines, statute, or the Constitution. Thus, the majority has no precedent for its created theory that our court can restrict the district court from considering the information at issue.