Court Opinion

ID: 9406555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-01 06:00:21.09206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.379851
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JUSTIN LEE PAYTON,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        AT-0752-15-0696-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: June 30, 2023
                 Agency.

                THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ross Nabatoff, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Susan E. Gibson, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                         2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner ’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).              After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the pet itioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     clarify the analysis applicable to the appellant’s claim of disparate penalties , we
     AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND

¶2         The agency removed the appellant from his Deputy U.S. Marshal position,
     which is a law enforcement officer position, based on the charges of conduct
     unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal (2 specifications), criminal misconduct
     (2 specifications), and lack of candor (3 specifications).       Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 28, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, Tab 5 at 14. All three charges stem
     from the events that occurred during an off-duty boating trip on July 28, 2012.
     ID at 2; IAF, Tab 5 at 89-103. Charge one alleged that the appellant engaged in
     inappropriate behavior unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal. ID at 2; IAF, Tab 5
     at 90-96.   The agency specified as follows:       (1) the appellant gave alcoholic
     beverages to a 15-year-old child; and (2) he inappropriately touched her. ID at 2;
     IAF, Tab 5 at 90-96.      Charge two alleged criminal conduct based upon the
                                                                                         3

     appellant’s subsequent guilty plea to the misdemeanor of disorderly intoxication. 3
     ID at 2; IAF, Tab 5 at 96. Finally, charge three alleged that the appellant lacked
     candor when he provided statements denying that he inappropriately touched the
     minor, commented that she was “hot,” and gave the minor alcohol (Corona beers).
     ID at 2, 11; IAF, Tab 5 at 97-101.
¶3        The appellant filed an appeal with the Board disputing that the agency
     proved the charged misconduct. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 17 at 6-7. The appellant also
     argued that the penalty was unreasonable and raised a claim of disparate
     penalties. IAF, Tab 17 at 6-7. After holding the appellant’s requested hearing,
     the administrative judge sustained all three charges and affirmed the agency’s
     removal action. ID at 10-11, 16. In reaching his decision, the administrative
     judge found that there was nexus between the appellant’s proven misconduct and
     the efficiency of the Federal service, that the appellant failed to prove his claim
     of disparate penalties, and that the removal penalty was reasonable. ID at 11-16.
¶4        The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition
     for review, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s credibility
     determinations and his finding that the agency proved the charges of conduct
     unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal and lack of candor. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-18.
     The appellant also disputes the administrative judge’s findings on nexus, and he
     reasserts his disparate penalties claim, challenging the reasonableness of the
     removal penalty. Id. at 18-23.

     3
       Charge two originally contained an additional specification struck by the
     administrative judge during the prehearing conference. ID at 2 n.1.
                                                                                          4

     The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved the charge of
     conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal. 4
¶6         A general charge such as conduct unbecoming does not require specific
     elements of proof. It is established by proving that the employee committed the
     acts alleged in support of the broad label.         See Canada v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 9 (2010).           The administrative judge
     sustained the charge of conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal as specified,
     based on explicit credibility findings from his observation of the witnesses’
     testimony at the hearing.      ID at 6-11.     The administrative judge found the
     agency’s witnesses more credible than the appellant’s denial that he committed
     the acts specified in the charge. ID at 4-11. In support of his finding that the
     appellant was not credible, the administrative judge credited the testimony of two
     witnesses, both of whom were wives of U.S. Secret Service Special Agents, that
     they saw the appellant give beer to the minor. ID at 10. The administrative judge
     also credited the testimony of a Special Agent (the minor’s step-father) and the
     wife of another Special Agent that they saw the appellant inappropriately
     touching the minor on her inner thigh and/or in an intimate area under her shorts.
     ID at 4-5, 11. The administrative judge found that this testimony was credible
     evidence that the appellant engaged in conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S.
     Marshal as specified by the agency. ID at 11.
¶7         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred in
     sustaining the specifications of this charge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. He challenges
     the administrative judge’s credibility findings by arguing that the minor’s hearsay
     statement to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigator is the only proof
     that he gave her Corona brand beers as specified in the charge, and her statement
     should not be credited over his sworn denial that he committed the specified

     4
       On review, the appellant does not dispute the administrative judge’s finding that the
     agency proved the charge of criminal misconduct based on his no contest plea to a
     second degree misdemeanor of disorderly intoxication.
                                                                                       5

     misconduct. Id. at 6. The appellant further argues that the administrative judge
     ignored the agency’s failure to prove that he gave the minor Corona beers and
     that several people in the group said that they did not see him give her alcohol.
     Id. at 5-10.
¶8           Concerning the administrative judge’s consideration of the minor’s
     statement to the OIG, which the appellant argues is impermissible hearsay
     evidence, it is well settled that relevant hearsay evidence is admissible in Board
     proceedings and the assessment of the probative value of hearsay evidence
     necessarily depends on the circumstances of each case. See Crawford-Graham v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 99 M.S.P.R. 389, ¶ 20 (2005); Borninkhof v.
     Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 83-84 (1981). Moreover, the essence of
     the charged misconduct is that the appellant provided the minor with alcohol.
     The dispositive issue is not the brand of beer, and the administrative judge did not
     rely solely on the minor’s statement in finding that the agency proved the charge.
     The administrative judge credited the testimony of two witness es, both of whom
     were wives of U.S. Secret Service Special Agents, that they saw the appellant
     give beer to the minor. ID at 10. To the extent that the appellant is arguing that
     the administrative judge failed to consider evidence that not everyone in the
     group observed him give alcohol to the minor, the administrative judge ’s failure
     to mention all of the evidence of record does not mean that he did not consider it
     in reaching his decision. Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services,
     22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
¶9           The appellant also argues on review that, in finding that he inappropriately
     touched the minor, the administrative judge ignored inconsistencies in the
     testimony of the agency’s witnesses concerning “the seating arrangement at the
     restaurant” and their descriptions of where they observed his hand on the minor’s
     body.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-15.       We find that the minor inconsistencies
     identified by the appellant are insufficient to render incredible the testimony of
     the witnesses credited by the administrative judge in finding that the agency
                                                                                        6

      proved the charged misconduct as specified. See Thomas v. U.S. Postal Service,
      116 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 5 (2011) (holding that minor inconsistencies do not
      necessarily render a witness’s testimony incredible). The Board must defer to an
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations when, as here, they are based,
      explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a
      hearing. See Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
      2002).
¶10        The administrative judge credited the agency’s three witnesses who
      testified, inter alia, that they saw the appellant give the minor beer and touch her
      inner thigh or higher. ID at 6. The administrative judge found, among other
      things, that it was inherently improbable that these witnesses would make up
      these types of allegations, considering that they socialized regularly with the
      appellant and had no apparent animosity toward him. Id. We have considered the
      appellant’s arguments on review, but we find that there are not “sufficiently
      sound” reasons on this record to overturn the administrative judge’s findings that
      the appellant was not credible when he denied giving beer to the minor and
      inappropriately touching her thigh. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. Accordingly,
      we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved both specifications
      of the conduct unbecoming charge. ID at 10-11.

      The administrative judge properly found that the agency proved the lack of
      candor charge.
¶11        The administrative judge found that the agency proved the lack of candor
      charge as specified because the appellant falsely told an investigator from the
      agency’s OIG that he did not inappropriately touch the minor, he never said that
      the minor was “hot,” and he did not give the minor alcoholic beverages, despite
      preponderant evidence that he did so. ID at 4-6, 11. The administrative judge
      further found that the appellant unequivocally denied inappropriately touching the
      minor when he was interviewed by local police. ID at 5. The administrative
      judge found that the appellant’s denials were not credible, considering, among
                                                                                              7

      other things, that the minor informed the OIG investigator that the appellant
      repeatedly put his hand on her thigh, although she kept removing it, and that he
      had been giving her Corona beer to drink. ID at 7-8. The minor also told the
      investigator that the appellant told her that she was “hot” on a prior boat trip. ID
      at 5, 8. Although the minor did not testify at the hearing and her statement was
      unsworn, the administrative judge considered this evidence in addition to the
      highly credible hearing testimony provided by the adults who witnessed the
      specified misconduct and contradicted the appellant’s version of events. 5             ID
      at 4-11. The administrative judge also considered it particularly damaging to the
      appellant’s credibility that he sent text messages to a Secret Service agent and a
      Supervisory U.S. Marshal, before their group boating trip, indicating that he was
      sexually interested in 14- to 16-year-old girls. 6 ID at 9.
¶12         The appellant further argues on review that the administrative judge’s
      analysis of the witnesses’ testimony did not conform to the Board’s requirements
      in Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987); however, we
      find that the administrative judge thoroughly set forth the evidence and properly
      applied the Hillen analysis in making his well-reasoned, demeanor-based

      5
        In Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17 (2016), the Board
      clarified that a charge of lack of candor requires proof of the following elements:
      (1) that the employee gave incorrect or incomplete information; an d (2) that he did so
      knowingly. Here, although the administrative judge did not explicitly apply the second
      prong of Fargnoli in assessing this charge, he made comprehensive credibility
      determinations sufficient to satisfy the same. E.g., ID at 6-10. In light of these
      determinations, his failure to explicitly rely on Fargnoli does not provide a basis for
      remanding the matter. Cf. Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 18 (remanding for further
      analysis on the lack of candor charge when the administrative judge made no findings
      as to whether the appellant knowingly gave incorrect or incomplete information).
      6
        The appellant characterizes his text message as a joke and considers it “ludicrous” that
      the administrative judge considered this evidence in sustaining the charge. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 15. We find that the administrative judge properly considered the appellant’s
      text message about his sexual interest in young girls as a relevant factor in determining
      his credibility. See Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987)
      (listing the inherent probability of a witness’s version of events as one of many factors
      to be considered in making a credibility determination) .
                                                                                         8

      determination that the agency’s witnesses were more credible than the appellant.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 11, 17-18; ID at 6-10. We discern no reason to reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our assessment of the record evidence for that of the
      administrative judge. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301 (finding that the Board must
      defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based
      on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing); Crosby v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.
      Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

      The appellant has failed to establish that the administrative judge erred in finding
      that the agency established nexus between his off-duty misconduct and the
      efficiency of the service.
¶13         In addition to the requirement that the agency prove its charges, the agency
      also must prove that there is a nexus to the efficiency of the service, i.e., a clear
      and direct relationship between the articulated grounds for an adverse action and
      either the appellant’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactorily or some other
      legitimate Government interest.        Hoofman v. Department of the Army,
      118 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 16 (2012), aff’d, 526 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2013). An
      agency may show nexus between off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the
      service by three means:      (1) a rebuttable presumption in certain egregious
      circumstances; (2) preponderant evidence that the misconduct adversely affects
      the appellant’s or coworkers’ job performance or the agency’s trust and
      confidence in the appellant’s job performance; or (3) preponderant evidence that
      the misconduct interfered with or adversely affected the agency ’s mission. Id.
¶14         On review, the appellant argues that there is no nexus between the
      efficiency of the service and his off-duty criminal misconduct charge. He bases
      his argument on the erroneous presumption that the agency failed to prove the
      remaining charges of lack of candor and conduct unbecoming . PFR File, Tab 1
                                                                                        9

      at 18-20. In finding that the agency met its burden on nexus, the administrative
      judge found that nexus should be presumed for the appellant ’s proven lack of
      candor and that his proven criminal conduct is antithetical to the agency ’s law
      enforcement mission, especially considering that the appellant is a law
      enforcement officer.    ID at 12.   The administrative judge also found nexus
      between the proven misconduct and the efficiency of the service because:
            The appellant, as a law enforcement officer, carried a firearm and
            was responsible for executing arrest warrants, handling prisoners,
            protecting judges, and investigating and apprehending fugitives. He
            also has a role to play in enforcing the Adam Walsh Act, which deals
            with sex offender registries. Finally, the victim in this case was the
            minor step-daughter of a Secret Service agent, and the appellant’s
            actions jeopardized his relationships with another Federal law
            enforcement agency with which the appellant was required to work
            and interact.
      Id.
¶15         To the extent that the administrative judge found that the agency established
      nexus under the second prong of Hoofman by showing that the appellant’s proven
      misconduct adversely affected management’s trust and confidence in his job
      performance, we agree.     See Hoofman, 118 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 16; Prather v.
      Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 137, ¶¶ 32-33 (2011) (finding that the
      appellant’s off-duty sexual conduct with vulnerable women adversely affected the
      agency’s trust and confidence in his ability to perform his job as a criminal
      investigator); Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶ 28 (2000)
      (finding that the appellant’s lack of candor strikes at the very heart of the
      employee-employer relationship and, thus, directly affects the efficiency of the
      service), aff’d, 278 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Honeycutt v. Department of
      Labor, 22 M.S.P.R. 491, 494 (1984) (finding nexus for off-duty arrest for
      first-degree assault and public drunkenness given the sensitive and trustworthy
      nature of the appellant’s duties), aff’d, 770 F.2d 181 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has failed to establish that the
                                                                                       10

      administrative judge erred in finding that the agency established nexus between
      his proven misconduct and the efficiency of the service.

      The appellant has failed to establish that the administrative judge erred in finding
      that he did not prove his claim of disparate penalties and that the removal penalty
      was reasonable; however, we modify the initial decision to clarify the legal
      standard applicable to a claim of disparate penalties.
¶16        The remaining issue for consideration is whether the penalty of removal is
      reasonable under the circumstances. When, as in this appeal, all of the charges
      are sustained, the Board will review the agency-imposed penalty only to
      determine if the agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised
      management discretion within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. Pinegar v.
      Federal Election Commission, 105 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 53 (2007); Douglas v.
      Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981). The Board will modify a
      penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant Douglas
      factors or that it clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in determining the
      penalty. See Pinegar, 105 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 53; Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306.
¶17        After the initial decision in this case, the Board reinstated its former law
      governing the analysis of disparate penalties claims. Singh v. U.S. Postal Service,
      2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 9. In Singh, the Board held that it should not weigh the relative
      seriousness of various offenses to determine if the agency treated employees who
      committed different acts of misconduct differently; rather, the relevant inquiry is
      whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated employees who engaged
      in the same or similar offenses differently. Id., ¶¶ 14, 17 (overruling Portner v.
      Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 365 (2013), and Boucher v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640 (2012)).
¶18        On review, the appellant reasserts the disparate penalties claim that he made
      before the administrative judge, arguing that the removal penalty is not
      reasonable because other individuals who have pled guilty to alcohol -related
      criminal violations and incurred multiple administrative penalties have not been
                                                                                        11

      terminated by the agency. 7 PFR File, Tab 1 at 21. He argues that he should not
      have been removed based solely on his misdemeanor conviction of disorderly
      intoxication as specified in the criminal misconduct charge.       Id.   We are not
      persuaded by the appellant’s argument because it is based on a false premise that
      the agency failed to prove the remaining charges concerning his lack of candor
      and his conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal.           ID at 14.    Indeed, the
      appellant has not identified any similarly situated comparator employees who
      were charged with the same or similar three instances of misconduct . Thus, he
      has necessarily failed to show that the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated
      employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently. See Singh,
      2022 MSPB 15, ¶¶ 14, 17.
¶19        We further find that the removal penalty is well within the bounds of
      reasonableness for the sustained misconduct. The appellant in this case was a law
      enforcement officer, and it is well settled that law enforcement officers may be
      held to a higher standard of conduct than other Federal employees.         See, e.g.,
      Prather, 117 M.S.P.R. 137, ¶ 36. The record reflects that the deciding official
      considered the relevant Douglas factors in deciding on the removal penalty,
      including but not limited to the appellant’s 10 years of service, the nature and
      seriousness of his misconduct considering his law enforcement position, and his
      4 prior disciplinary actions indicating a pattern of off-duty misconduct and no
      rehabilitation potential. IAF, Tab 5 at 17-21, 104-06.

      7
        The appellant identified the following as alleged comparator employees who were not
      removed for alcohol-related offenses: (1) an employee who was previously suspended
      for misuse of a credit card and for failing to report damage to a Government-owned
      vehicle and was pending decision on a proposed 30-day suspension for driving while
      intoxicated (DWI); (2) an employee who was reprimanded, although his prior record
      included a 30-day suspension for DWI, a second DWI, and a misdemeanor conviction
      for chemical dependency and fleeing the scene of an accident; and (3) an employee
      whose removal was proposed and had a prior DWI and misdemeanor for failing to
      consent to a blood-alcohol test. ID at 13; PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-23.
                                                                                           12

¶20         The administrative judge found that the appellant expressed no remorse for
      his misconduct and agreed with the deciding official’s conclusion that the
      appellant had no potential for rehabilitation.       ID at 16.     The administrative
      judge’s findings about the appellant’s propensity for rehabilitation are necessarily
      intertwined with issues of credibility and an analysis of his demeanor at the
      hearing, and they deserve deference from the Board. See Purifoy v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016).           We find that the
      appellant’s arguments on review do not establish any error in the administrative
      judge’s finding that the removal penalty was reasonable for his proven
      misconduct. Accordingly, we deny his petition for review.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropr iate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law appl icable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        13

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                14

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     15

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction ex pired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                16

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.