Court Opinion

ID: 9697650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:18.21132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.975769
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
JOYCE, J.:
¶ 1 I do not agree that Appellee was subjected to an investigative detention when he pulled his vehicle to the side of the road and was subsequently approached by a police officer after he activated his overhead lights. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶2 Normally, when an officer effectuates a traffic stop, this is considered an investigative detention. However, in this case, Appellee pulled his vehicle to the side of the road to let the car behind him pass. By his own testimony, Appellee did not pull his vehicle over because his thought it was a police officer behind him. In fact, he contemplated leaving because he did not know who it was that parked behind him. Our courts have found that when an officer approaches an individual sitting in a car, a mere encounter has occurred. See Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567 (Pa.Super.2004) (it was a “mere encounter” when the officer, responding to a report of a domestic dispute and aware that domestic disputes are volatile, approached the vehicle parked directly in front of that address and spoke to the occupants); Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320 (Pa.Super.2000) (when police officers observed defendant in his car, backed up their cruiser to be abreast with defendant’s car, and exited their vehicle to approach him was a mere encounter); Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633 (Pa.Super.2000) (the officers acts of stopping their vehicle next to defendant’s parked vehicle, rolling down their window, gesturing that defendant do the same, and questioning defendant was a mere encounter).1 Thus, the question becomes, when the officers turned on the overhead lights and one officer approached Appellee’s vehicle, did the level of intrusiveness cause the encounter to rise from a mere encounter to an investigative detention?2
¶ 3 “A mere encounter is characterized by limited police presence and police conduct and questions that are not suggestive of coercion. It is only when such police presence becomes too intrusive, the filter-*1221action must be deemed an investigative detention or seizure.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196 (Pa.Super.2002) citing Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa.Super.2000) (emphasis added). Thus, the law recognizes some level of intrusiveness when a mere encounter occurs.
To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person involved. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Reppert, supra, 814 A.2d at 1201-1202 (citation omitted).
¶ 4 To support the contention that the interaction remained a mere encounter the Commonwealth relies heavily on this Court’s recent decision of Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556 (Pa.Super.2004). In Johonoson, the Court reasoned that because the police did not initiate the stop, the mere fact that the overhead lights were used did not elevate the seizure from a mere encounter to an investigatory detention. The Majority, in distinguishing Johonoson, states that the Commonwealth’s reliance on that case is misplaced. The Majority cites to the fact that Mr. Johonoson “was traveling well below the speed limit on a rural road at 3:00 a.m. with his hazard lights activated, [while] Appellee did nothing more than pull his truck to the side of the road in an effort to allow another motorist to pass.” Majority Opinion, at 1219. These factors are irrelevant, though, in the context of a mere encounter because “a mere encounter or request for information, does not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to stop or respond.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 575 Pa. 203, 836 A.2d 5, 10 (2003). Appellee’s driving would only be relevant in determining whether or not the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot so to conduct an investigative detention. Id, Since it is un-contradicted that the police did not initiate the stop, but that Appellee did so of his own accord, Appellee’s driving in this case is of no moment.
¶ 5 Moreover, I note that the portion of that decision which the Commonwealth argues controls the outcome is this case is dictum. The issue of whether the police had illegally seized Mr. Johonoson was found to be waived by the trial court due to the untimely filing of the supplemental suppression motion. This Court affirmed that finding. Despite the fact that the issue was waived, the Johonoson Court opted to conduct an analysis as to whether Mr. Johonoson was subjected to a mere encounter or an investigatory detention, which is the portion of the opinion upon which the Commonwealth relies. Although a dictum does not constitute binding precedent, it is nonetheless entitled to consideration. Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 758 A.2d 1238, 1246 (Pa.Super.2000). I find the dictum in Jo-honoson is persuasive and sound in legal theory so to be applicable to the case at bar. In Johonoson, the Court stated:
Appellant relies almost exclusively on Trooper Perloffs flashing lights as a signal that he was “not free to leave,” thus making the interaction an investigative detention. We recognize that flashing overhead lights, when used to pull a vehicle over, are a strong signal *1222that a police officer is stopping a vehicle and that the driver is not free to terminate this encounter. The same is not necessarily true under the factual circumstances presented here. It is one traditional function of State Troopers, and indeed all police officers patrolling our highways, to help motorists who are stranded or who may otherwise need assistance. Such assistance is to be expected, and is generally considered welcome.
Often, and particularly at night, there is simply no way to - render this aid safely without first activating the police cruiser’s overhead lights. This act serves several functions, including avoiding a collision on the highway, and potentially calling additional aid to the scene. Moreover, by activating the overhead lights, the officer signals to the motorist that it is actually a police officer (rather than a potentially dangerous stranger) who is approaching.
Id. at 562.
¶ 6 In my view, the only viable remaining question is whether Appellee subjectively believed that he was not free to leave when the officer’s turned on the overhead lights after he pulled his vehicle to the side of the road. The Majority posits that this must have been the case because “Officer Nuhfer conceded on cross-examination that Appellee was not free to terminate the encounter once Trooper Koebley activated his overhead lights-” Majority Opinion, at 1219. However, our Courts employ the following objective standard to discern whether a person has been seized: “[Wjhether, under all the circumstances surrounding the incident at issue, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.” McClease, supra, 750 A.2d at 824. The officer’s subjective and factual averment that Appellee was not free to leave is immaterial to making a legal determination as to whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.
¶ 7 A reasonable person who is pulled over on the side of the road and then becomes aware that a police officer has pulled up behind him would be aware that the officer is effectuating his duty to check on the safety and well-being of that motorist. An officer who does not stop to inquire of or render aid to a motorist stopped along the side of a road late at night would be in dereliction of his duty. The use of his overhead lights under these circumstances would not be perceived by a reasonable person as a show of authority, but as a matter of protocol to ensure that oncoming traffic is aware of the officer’s and motorist’s presence on the side of the road or to alert of any other hazard that may exist. Here, while Appellee may have felt that it was a show of authority, this belief is likely symptomatic of his guilty conscience since he was, in fact, driving under the influence, as opposed to what a reasonable person would have believed under similar circumstances.3
*1223¶ 8 In the present case, the only factor that would indicate a seizure was the activation of the overhead lights. In my opinion, this is a limited display of police presence and not so intrusive so to elevate the encounter to an investigative detention. This solitary factor was not accompanied by any other factors that would amount to a show of authority such as a command accompanied by the overhead lights, a drawn weapon, or a multitude of police officers. Accordingly, I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s analysis and conclusion in this case, and, therefore, dissent.

. In McClease, the mere encounter rose to an investigative detention when one of the two advancing officer’s ordered defendant to remain in his car. In Blair, "mere encounter” changed its nature and rose to the level of an “investigative detention” only after Appellant attempted to exit the vehicle and was ordered several times by the officer to remain therein. In Dehart, the mere encounter rose to an investigative detention when, after questioning the defendant and finding out nothing was wrong, they exited their vehicle and began to question him further, particularly when the appellant’s vehicle was blocked from its movement.

. The record reflects that one officer remained in the police cruiser while the other approached Appellee’s truck.

. There are many circumstances which might cause a person to pull to the side of a lightly traveled road in the middle of the night. Perhaps they dropped an item that they wished to safely recover or were having mechanical or physical problems that made it unsafe to continue operating the motor vehicle. Or perhaps the person was drunk, consuming drugs or preparing to dispose of incriminating evidence. Those persons in the former category would not reasonably believe that they were put into a coercive situation when an officer stops to potentially render aid and activates his lights and would be grateful that the officer is doing his job. Those in the latter category, however, will believe that they are under police authority because of their guilty conscience. Fortunately, the standard to determine whether a seizure has occurred is the reasonable person standard, and not the reasonable criminal standard.