Court Opinion

ID: 9765419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:02:20.569418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.813450
License: Public Domain

NAHMIAS, Justice,
dissenting.
It is true that “[a] trial court’s findings of fact and weighing of those facts in a speedy trial claim generally are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. 598, 601 (592 SE2d 848) (2004) (citing State v. Redding, 274 Ga. 831, 832 (561 SE2d 79) (2002)). See Maj. Op. at 505, 506. “However, where . .. the trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree, the deference owed the trial court’s ultimate ruling is diminished.” Williams, 277 Ga. at 601. As Justice Melton’s dissenting opinion explains, the trial court misapplied the law with respect to two of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), giving no apparent weight to Lattimore’s failure to assert his right to a speedy trial and presuming actual prejudice to the defense case based solely on the five-year delay, without addressing the evidence which suggests that the delay has not actually impaired the defense.
Because both of these factors, when properly applied, would weigh significantly against the conclusion that Lattimore’s speedy trial rights were violated, I believe that this Court should not affirm the trial court’s judgment, and so I respectfully dissent. But I also am not confident that proper application of the factors, along with the other facts in the case, requires the judgment that Lattimore’s speedy trial rights were not violated, as Justice Melton concludes. Instead, I would reverse and remand the case with direction to the trial court to exercise its discretion again after re-weighing the speedy trial factors using the correct legal standards. See Williams, 277 Ga. at 601 (2) (remanding in part for reconsideration of a speedy trial claim due to a factual error in the trial court’s initial order).