Court Opinion

ID: 9484330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:48:59.111014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:10.397602
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I believe the extraordinary and unjustified five-year delay between Aguirre’s indictment and trial violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial; therefore, I would reverse the conviction.
I
Aguirre was indicted in the Central District of California on October 27, 1983. At that time, Aguirre was working in Europe, but his family continued to live in Los Ange-les. Sometime before the indictment was filed, Aguirre learned of the need for a “court appearance.” On October 24, 1983, three days before the indictment was filed, Aguirre enlisted the aid of the United States Embassy in London to request additional time to appear in court. Aguirre received no response to this request.
At that time, Aguirre could not have known that charges were pending against him because the indictment had not yet been returned. Furthermore, he could not have known that the indictment was about to be returned because grand jury proceedings are confidential.
About a week later, Aguirre returned to the United States. He settled in Arizona, where he lived and worked under his true identity. He secured employment with the Arizona Department of Revenue, which required that he obtain a security clearance. He obtained the clearance without a problem. Later he held a number of jobs that required him to be bonded and fingerprinted. In addition, he travelled across the U.S.-Mexico border a number of times during the period the warrant was outstanding. Once, he was the subject of a Tucson Police Department investigation, arising out of a New Year’s Eve “altercation.” So, although Aguirre had numerous contacts with law enforcement tracking systems, he was never made aware of the pending indictment until he was arrested crossing the U.S.-Mexico border five years after the indictment was filed.
The government’s attempts to locate Aguirre while he was living openly in this county were feeble and ineffective, at best. The government took no active steps to locate Aguirre after the indictment was filed. The government did not contact any of Aguirre’s relatives or friends who continued to live in Los Angeles after Aguirre moved out of state. It did not attempt to locate him through his social security or federal tax records. It did not even run a simple credit check on Aguirre. See Doggett v. United States, -U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2689, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (“within minutes” a “simple credit check” revealed the location of defendant’s residence and job). In short, the government did nothing more than place “stops” in three law enforcement *1459computer systems and then forgot about the matter for the next five years.
II
The “right to a speedy trial ... is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution.” Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226, 87 S.Ct. 988, 995, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). Accord Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). To determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we must consider (1) whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for that delay; (3) whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Doggett, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2690 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192).
III
As the majority recognizes, the five-year delay between the indictment and trial presumptively prejudiced Aguirre. Doggett, — U.S. at - n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2690-91 n. 1 (“Depending on the nature of the charges, ... courts have generally found postaecusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one year.”) In fact, the delay is extraordinary. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534, 92 S.Ct. at 2194 (characterizing the more than five-year delay in that case as “extraordinary”).
I part company with the majority with respect to the remaining factors. The majority errs by deferring to the district court’s clearly erroneous finding that Aguirre, and not the government, bears responsibility for the delay. The majority also erred in concluding that Aguirre failed to assert his speedy trial right in due course.1
A
The district court found that Aguirre— rather than the government — was responsible for the delay. Although we review such a finding “with considerable deference,” we will not sustain it if clearly erroneous. United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1985).
1
' The district court concluded that Aguirre caused the delay because he failed to present himself to authorities on his return from Europe. But it is clearly established that a “defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty....” Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190 (citing Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37—38; 90 S.Ct. 1564, 1568-69, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970) (“Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to- provide a prompt trial”)
Beyond his failure to deliver himself to authorities for trial on an indictment he was unaware of, Aguirre did nothing to evade the government. He lived openly under his true identity. He voluntarily submitted to government security investigations. On several occasions before his arrest he crossed the U.S.-Mexico border and passed under'the eyes of customs agents without incident. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Aguirre is responsible for the delay is without factual basis and, hence, clearly erroneous.
2
As for the government’s efforts to bring Aguirre to trial, the district court stated that, “I don’t know what more the government can do if they believe from the man’s former lawyer that he has gone overseas. They put out warrants for his arrest, and they wait for somebody who identifies him.... ” Thus, the district court found that the government’s failure to locate and bring Aguirre to trial until five years after his indictment was not the result of its negligence.
The effort made by the government in this case is more lethargic than even its efforts to apprehend the petitioner in Doggett. — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2686. In that case, two police *1460officers set out to arrest Doggett at his parents’ house about a month after an indictment was filed against him. Doggett’s mother told the officers that Doggett had left for Colombia four days earlier. The government then sent word of the outstanding arrest warrant to all United States Customs stations, and to a number of law enforcement organizations. It also placed Doggett’s name in two law enforcement computer networks.
Sometime later, when a federal case agent learned Doggett was awaiting trial in a Panama jail, the agent requested that Panama “expel” Doggett to the United States. Although the Panamanian authorities promised to do so when Doggett’s proceedings had run their course, they simply freed Doggett, who eventually passed unhindered through customs and resettled in the United States. The government finally arrested Doggett six years after his return to the United States, just days after it discovered his address through a simple credit check. Id. - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2689-90.
The disti’iet court in Doggett found that the delay between Doggett’s indictment and arrest “ ‘clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government,’ and that Doggett could not be faulted for any delay in asserting his right to a speedy trial, there being no evidence that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest.” Id. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2690 .(citations omitted). On review before the Supreme Court, the government argued that it had satisfied its duty to pursue Doggett with diligence. The Court rejected that argument, noting that the record contained no evidence to controvert the district court’s finding of government negligence. Id. — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (“The Government gives us nothing to gainsay the findings that have come up to us, and we see nothing fatal to them in the record.”) In its conclusion, the Court characterized the government’s efforts as an “egregious” failure to prosecute Dog-gett. Id.-U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2694.
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the government’s negligence in Doggett does not necessarily constitute a ruling that the government’s efforts in that case were insufficient as a matter of law. It does, however, make it difficult for me to sustain the district court’s finding that the lesser effort in this case satisfied the government’s duty to “pursue [Aguirre] with reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest.” See id. - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2693.
Based on the record and on the Supreme Court’s statements in Doggett, I conclude that the district court clearly erred when it attributed fault for the delay to Aguirre. The government’s failure to make anything more than a perfunctory effort to locate Aguirre amounted to a clear breach of its duty to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to apprehend him.
B
The third factor, “whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial,” Doggett, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2690 (emphasis added), also weighs in Aguirre’s favor. Promptly after Aguirre was arrested, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his right to a speedy trial. Thus, Aguirre asserted his right “in due course” — that is, as soon as he learned he would be tried.
The majority states that Aguirre’s speedy trial claim is undermined because he knew an indictment was pending against him, yet failed to deliver himself to the authorities for trial. Quite to the contrary, the district court did not find that Aguirre was aware that an indictment was pending. The district court found only that prior to Aguirre’s return to the United States,
Aguirre knew that there was a problem, and that he had been told that there was a problem. Whoever told him, I don’t know. But at any rate [there was] some kind of a charge or complaint against him.
Moreover, nothing in the record supports the majority’s conclusion that Aguirre knew that an indictment was pending against him. Aguirre’s last communication with the government occurred days before the indictment was actually filed. The government never informed Aguirre or his family, through the mail or otherwise, that an indictment had been returned against Aguirre. And there is no evidence that Aguirre learned of the in*1461dictment through any other means before his arrest.
The waiver of the right to a speedy trial, like any fundamental right, must be knowing and intelligent. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Where as here, the defendant is unaware of the charge pending against him, it is unfair and nonsensical to require that he demand a speedy trial. Id. at 528 n. 28, 92 S.Ct. at 2191 n. 28. See also Doggett, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 (absent evidence that a defendant knew an indictment was pending before his arrest, a defendant is “not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest”).
Thus, Aguirre’s pre-arrest failure to assert his speedy trial right should not be weighed against him.
C
The fourth and final factor to consider is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice must be assessed in the light of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Aguirre’s challenge goes to the third interest, which the Supreme Court has called the “most serious.” Id.
The resolution of this last factor is dictated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Doggett. There, the Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling that “actual prejudice” is a necessary element of a successful speedy trial act claim. The Court held that “[w]hen the Government’s negligence thus causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review, and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant’s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief.” Doggett, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2694 (citations and footnotes omitted).
As applied to the facts of this case, the holding in Doggett requires that Aguirre’s conviction be reversed. The government’s negligence in this case caused a delay in Aguirre’s trial “[five] times as long as that generally considered sufficient to trigger judicial review.” Id. The presumption of prejudice arising from the delay is not “extenuated,” because Aguirre did not “aequiesce[ ]” in the delay. See id. And the government has failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice that arises in the face of such an extraordinary delay. See id.
III.
The majority acquiesces in a finding that sanctions a “prolonged and unjustifiable delay[ ]” in bringing a defendant to trial. See Doggett, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2693. The Court in Doggett warned that courts must not tolerate such a course:
Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state’s fault and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority. The Government, indeed can hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncommonly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice; the more weight the Government attaches to securing a conviction, the harder it will try to get it.
Doggett, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2693-94.
The Supreme Court remanded this case for our reconsideration in light of Doggett. Applying the teachings of Doggett to the record before us, I reach the inescapable conclusion that Aguirre’s fundamental right to a speedy trial has been violated.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions to reverse Aguirre’s conviction and dismiss the underlying indictment.

. The district court did not reach this issue.