Court Opinion

ID: 9907868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:09:24.596827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:58.084649
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester County Office of the Coroner, :
                  Appellant           :
                                      :
      v.                              : No. 242 C.D. 2023
                                      :
Terence Keel and the University of :
California-Los Angeles Institute for :
Society and Genetics, Biostudies Lab : Argued: November 9, 2023

BEFORE:            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                   HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                   HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                 FILED: December 7, 2023

         The Chester County Office of the Coroner (Coroner) appeals from the March
1, 2023 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) affirming
a Final Determination of the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR), which
held that autopsy and toxicology reports are not exempt from disclosure under
Section 708(b) of the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 or Article XII-B of The County
Code, commonly known as the Coroner’s Act.2 After review, we affirm the trial
court.

                                             I. Background
         On June 27, 2022, Terence Keel and the University of California-Los Angeles
Institute for Society and Genetics, Biostudies Lab (Requesters), submitted a RTKL

         1
             Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. § 67.708(b).

         2
        Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, added by the Act of October 24, 2018, P.L.
931, No. 154 (Act 154), 16 P.S. §§ 1201-B-1252-B.
request (Request) to the Coroner seeking autopsy and toxicology reports for 17
decedents. The Coroner denied the request on August 2, 2022, citing Section 705 of
the RTKL,3 which establishes that an agency is not required to create a record, and
Section 708(b) of the RTKL,4 which establishes several categories of information
that are exempt from public access. Requesters appealed to the OOR.
       In support of its position denying the Request, the Coroner submitted an
affidavit from Jesse Poole-Gulick (Poole-Gulick), a deputy coroner, who stated that
three individuals identified in the Request could not be identified. Verification of
death forms disclosing the manner and cause of death were available for the
remaining individuals identified in the Request. Poole-Gulick advised that autopsy
and toxicology reports were considered private records of a decedent that contained
“highly sensitive and private information.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 56a. The
Coroner would release such records to “next of kin” or in response to a “lawfully
issued subpoena[.]” Id. Otherwise, the requested records were exempt from
disclosure pursuant to Section 708(b)(20) of the RTKL, which specifically excludes

       3
           65 P.S. § 67.705.

       4
        Section 708(b) of the RTKL excludes 30 categories of information from public access.
Relevant to the instant appeal, Section 708(b)(20), 65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(20), exempts

                [a]n autopsy record of a coroner or medical examiner and any
                audiotape of a postmortem examination or autopsy, or a copy,
                reproduction or facsimile of an autopsy report, a photograph,
                negative or print, including a photograph or videotape of the body
                or any portion of the body of a deceased person at the scene of death
                or in the course of a postmortem examination or autopsy taken or
                made by or caused to be taken or made by the coroner or medical
                examiner. This exception shall not limit the reporting of the name of
                the deceased individual and the cause and manner of death.

65 P.S. § 67.708(b)(20).

                                                 2
the release of autopsy records. Poole-Gulick further advised that the requested
records were exempt from disclosure because they related to criminal and non-
criminal investigations, and they were protected records under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).5 Poole-Gulick asserted that
the Coroner was not required to release any information beyond the verification of
death form.
        The OOR issued its Final Determination on September 30, 2022. At the
outset, the OOR noted that the Coroner failed to demonstrate that it was a covered
entity under HIPAA. Therefore, the OOR concluded that the Coroner’s autopsy and
toxicology reports were not exempt from disclosure under HIPAA.6 The OOR also
stated that the Coroner provided no legal authority for restricting access to autopsy
reports beyond the decedent’s next of kin or in response to a subpoena.                                In
concluding that the requested records were not exempt from disclosure under the
RTKL, the OOR cited Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2009),
in which our Supreme Court held that autopsy reports were one of the official records
of a coroner’s office that must be deposited with the prothonotary for inspection by

        5
            42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6.

        6
         HIPAA regulations generally prohibit covered entities from using or disclosing protected
health information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). Covered entities under HIPAA are limited to
health plans, health care clearinghouses, health care providers, and the business associates thereof,
where provided. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a)-(b). A health plan under HIPAA is an individual or group
plan that provides or pays the cost of medical care. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Health care provider is
defined as a provider of services, including hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, and nursing facilities,
a provider of medical or health services, including diagnostic and physical therapy services, and
any other person or organization that furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course
of business. Id. Finally, a health care clearinghouse under HIPAA means a public or private entity,
including a billing service, repricing company, community health management information system
or community health information system, and “value-added” networks and switches. Id. At first
blush, these definitions do not appear to encompass a coroner’s office.

                                                    3
the public, pursuant to former Section 1251 of the Coroner’s Act.7 The OOR also
relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in Hearst Television, Inc. v. Norris, 54 A.3d
23 (Pa. 2012), that a coroner could not exercise discretion over the release of official
records required by former Section 1251, and that a coroner’s official records could
be obtained upon payment of the fee provided for in former Section 1236.1(c) of the
Coroner’s Act.8
       The OOR did not address the specific exemptions cited by Poole-Gulick,
noting that Section 3101.1 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.3101.1, provides the RTKL
“shall not apply” when any of its provisions regarding access conflict with any other
federal or state law. The OOR acknowledged that former Section 1251, which
formed the basis for the Supreme Court’s holding in Hearst, had been repealed by
Act 154; however, both former Section 1251 and new Section 1236-B of the
Coroner’s Act9 required that the official records and papers of a coroner’s office be
deposited with the prothonotary. The only substantive difference between the two
provisions is that Section 1236-B only applies to counties of the third through eighth
class. Thus, the OOR held that case law interpreting former Section 1251 applied to
an analysis of Section 1236-B. As autopsy reports were official records of a
coroner’s office, the Coroner was required to deposit such reports with the

       7
         Former Section 1251, which was repealed by Act 154, provided that “[e]very coroner,
within [30] days after the end of each year, shall deposit all of his official records and papers for
the preceding year in the office of the prothonotary for the inspection of all persons interested
therein.” Formerly 16 P.S. § 1251.

       8
         Former Section 1236.1(c) was added to the Coroner’s Act by the Act of November 29,
1990, P.L. 602, formerly 16 P.S. § 1236.1(c), and was repealed by Act 154.

       9
           16 P.S. § 1236-B.

                                                 4
prothonotary. The OOR also held that toxicology reports were an official record of
the Coroner that should have been deposited with the prothonotary.
      The OOR rejected the Coroner’s construction of Section 1252-B of the
Coroner’s Act, 16 P.S. § 1252-B, which establishes the fees to be charged and
collected for providing an autopsy report, toxicology report, inquisition or coroner’s
report, and cremation or disposition authorization. Section 1252-B also provides for
the collection of “other fees as may be established from time to time for other
reports or documents requested by nongovernmental agencies in order to
investigate a claim asserted under a policy of insurance or to determine liability
for the death of the deceased[.]” 16 P.S. § 1252-B (emphasis added). The Coroner
argued that the bolded language limited the production of documents identified in
Section 1252-B to nongovernmental agencies investigating an insurance claim or
determining liability for a decedent’s death. The OOR disagreed, deeming this
provision a “catch-all” that was limited to records required by nongovernmental
agencies for the specified purposes – it did not affect an individual’s ability to
request autopsy or toxicology reports from a coroner. R.R. at 302a. In drafting
Section 1252-B, the General Assembly (GA) created “a process where specific fees
are paid to obtain specific reports from coroners, without limitation.” Id. at 303a.
      The OOR noted that the Coroner failed to deposit its officials records and
papers with the prothonotary, despite the clear language of Section 1236-B and the
controlling legal precedent. The OOR opined that a finding of bad faith by a
reviewing court, and the imposition of sanctions and penalties to offset Requesters’
costs, would be appropriate under the facts presented, as it would provide the access
to coroner records “envisioned by the [GA]” and affirmed by the Supreme Court,
and would “discourage other agencies from acting similarly in violation of the public

                                          5
interest.”10 Id. at 306a. Accordingly, the OOR granted Requesters’ appeal and
directed that the Coroner provide copies of the requested autopsy and toxicology
reports upon receipt of the fees established in Section 1252-B.
       The Coroner appealed the OOR’s Final Determination to the trial court, which
denied the appeal on March 1, 2023. The trial court opined that the Supreme Court’s
holding in Penn Jersey that autopsy reports were official records of a coroner’s office
remained “valid and undisturbed.” R.R. at 389a. While a conflict existed between
the RTKL and the Coroner’s Act with regard to the release of autopsy and toxicology
reports, Section 3101.1 of the RTKL made it clear that, in the case of a conflict
between the RTKL and another statute, the RTKL did not apply. Thus, the trial court
concluded that the Coroner’s Act controlled the release of the requested records.
Under this same analysis, the trial court dismissed the Coroner’s argument that the
requested records were exempt under the medical records exception in Section
708(b)(5) of the RTKL.11 The trial court agreed with the OOR that the Coroner had
not demonstrated that the requested records were governed by HIPAA or a similar
privacy law.

       10
            Section 1304(a) of the RTKL provides that, where a court reverses the final
determination of an appeals officer or grants access to a record after a request for access was
deemed denied, the court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation if the court
finds that the agency denied access to a public record willfully, with wanton disregard, or in bad
faith, or where the agency’s denial was not based on a reasonable interpretation of the law. 65
P.S. § 67.1304(a). Section 1304(b) permits an award of sanctions if the court finds that the legal
challenge was frivolous. 65 P.S. § 67.1304(b). Section 1305(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1305(a),
authorizes the imposition of a civil penalty of not more than $1,500 if an agency denies access to
a public record in bad faith.

        The OOR does not have the authority to impose costs, fees, or penalties. Off. of the Dist.
Att’y of Phila. v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1140 (Pa. 2017).

       11
         The trial court also suggested that Section 708(b)(5) only applied to the release of a living
person’s medical records, given that coroner records are covered by a separate exemption.

                                                  6
       Citing Hearst, the trial court rejected the Coroner’s argument that it had
discretion when responding to records requests. The trial court acknowledged that
the provisions of the Coroner’s Act analyzed in Hearst and Penn Jersey were
repealed by Act 154; however, the trial court did not consider the Act 154
amendments to the Coroner’s Act to be “significant or dispositive.” Id. at 390a. The
trial court noted that a comment to Section 1252-B provided by the Local
Government Commission (Commission)12 states that Section 1252-B is analogous
to former Section 1236.1(c), “except that the fees for reports have been increased.”
In addition, an earlier version of Senate Bill 1005 (SB 1005), which became Act
154, contained language specifying that Section 1236-B, requiring the coroner to
deposit official records with the prothonotary, should not be construed as authorizing
the disclosure of a record exempt from access under the RTKL. This language was
removed from the enacted version of SB 1005. Thus, while the GA had the
opportunity to address exemptions under the RTKL and the Coroner’s Act, it “chose
not to do so.” Id. at 391a. Ultimately, the trial court held that language pertaining
to requests from nongovernmental agencies did not change the public nature of
autopsy reports or grant the Coroner discretion where the Supreme Court had
“already determined there is none.” Id. Therefore, the trial court affirmed the OOR.

       12
          The Commission was established by the Act of May 29, 1935, P.L. 244, No. 102 (Act
102), with the stated purpose of studying and reporting on the functions of local government. It is
comprised of five members of the Pennsylvania State Senate and five members of the Pennsylvania
House of Representatives. One of the Commission’s functions and responsibilities is to “[p]rovide
a summary of acts signed into law by the Governor for distribution to Members of the Legislature
and to other interested parties.”
See http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/download.cfm?file=/Reports/Other/lgc_brochure.pdf (last visited
Dec. 6, 2023).

                                                7
The trial court did not address whether the Coroner denied the Request in bad faith
or impose sanctions and penalties, as suggested by the OOR. This appeal followed.13
                                                  II. Issues
        On appeal, the Coroner argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the
requested autopsy and toxicology reports were not exempt from disclosure, that the
trial court failed to properly consider the Act 154 amendments to the Coroner’s Act,
and that the trial court improperly relied on Hearst and Penn Jersey.14
                                           III.     Discussion
        Before we address the issues raised by the Coroner, it is helpful to summarize
the relevant statutory provisions and legal precedent that will inform our analysis,
the latter of which includes this Court’s recent decision in Allegheny County v.
Hailer, 298 A.3d 476 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).                       As always, “[t]he object of all
interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention
of the [GA].” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In the absence of a demonstrated constitutional
infirmity, courts must generally apply the plain terms of a statute, as written. Lower
Swatara Twp. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 208 A.3d 521, 530 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Where
the plain language in a statute is unambiguous, we must apply that language “without
employing familiar canons of construction and without considering legislative
intent.” Dubose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634, 643 (Pa. 2017).                          The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, as

        13
            Our review of the trial court’s decision is limited to whether the findings of fact are
supported by competent evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law, or whether
the trial court abused its discretion in reaching a decision. Pysher v. Clinton Twp. Volunteer Fire
Co., 209 A.3d 1116, 1119 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

        14
           In its principal brief, the Coroner suggests that the trial court erred in failing to recognize
its prior rulings, which allegedly align with the Coroner’s position. As this Court is not bound by
those decisions, our analysis in the instant appeal will not consider or address them.

                                                    8
well as the specific context in which the language is used and the broader context of
the statute as a whole. Roethlein v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 81 A.3d 816, 822
(Pa. 2013). We must not interpret statutory words in isolation but must read them
with reference to the context in which they appear. Id. Moreover, we must presume
that the GA “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution[,] or
unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).
                                A. Statutory Authority
                                       1. RTKL
      Under Section 305 of the RTKL,15 records in the possession of a
Commonwealth agency are presumed to be public unless they are exempt under
Section 708(b) of the RTKL, protected by a privilege, or exempt under any other
federal or state law or regulation or judicial order or decree. Section 708(b)(20) of
the RTKL exempts from disclosure a coroner’s autopsy records, including
audiotapes, photographs, and video recordings. The name of the deceased and the
cause and manner of his or her death may be reported. Per Section 3101.1 of the
RTKL, however, the RTKL “shall not apply” when any of its provisions regarding
access conflict with any other federal or state law. 65 P.S. § 67.3101.1 (emphasis
added). Therefore, Section 708(b)(20) of the RTKL restricts access to a coroner’s
autopsy records, unless access is otherwise provided by law.
                                   2. Coroner’s Act
      Section 1236-B of the Coroner’s Act provides that, in counties of the third
through eighth classes, “every coroner, within 30 days after the end of each year,
shall deposit all official records and papers for the preceding year in the Office of
the Prothonotary for the inspection of all persons interested therein.” 16 P.S. § 1236-

      15
           65 P.S. § 67.305.

                                          9
B (emphasis added). Section 1252-B of Coroner’s Act mandates that the coroner
“shall charge and collect” a fee, as specified, for providing an autopsy report,
toxicology report, inquisition or coroner’s report, and cremation or disposition
authorization, as well as “other fees as may be established from time to time for
other reports or documents requested by nongovernmental agencies in order to
investigate a claim asserted under a policy of insurance or to determine liability
for the death of the deceased . . . .” 16 P.S. § 1252-B (emphasis added).
                                      B. Case Law
                                      1. Penn Jersey
      Penn Jersey concerned whether an autopsy report was one of the official
records that former Section 1251 of the Coroner’s Act16 required a coroner to deposit
with the prothonotary within 30 days after the end of each year. Because conducting
autopsies was one of a coroner’s official duties, the Supreme Court held that the
resulting autopsy reports constituted “official records and papers” within the
meaning of former Section 1251. Penn Jersey, 962 A.2d at 637. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that such records could reveal a decedent’s “potentially privileged”
medical history, as well as graphic autopsy photographs. Id. Although it recognized
the legitimate privacy concerns related to disclosure of such information, the
Supreme Court noted that trial courts were “adequately equipped and authorized to
protect autopsy reports from disclosure based on ‘judicial discretion and necessity’
under appropriate circumstances.” Id. Where, for example, an autopsy report
contained graphic photographs or privileged information, anyone with standing “to
protect an interest in such material” could seek relief from the trial court. Id.

      16
           Formerly 16 P.S. § 1251.

                                          10
                                       2. Hearst
      In Hearst, our Supreme Court reviewed whether former Sections 1236.1(c)
and 1251 of the Coroner’s Act granted a coroner discretion over the release of
coroner records. Former Section 1236.1(c) of the Coroner’s Act relevantly provided
as follows:

      (c) The coroner may charge and collect a fee of up to one hundred
      dollars ($100) for each autopsy report, up to fifty dollars ($50)
      for each toxicology report, up to fifty dollars ($50) for each
      inquisition or coroner’s report and such other fees as may be
      established from time to time for other reports and documents
      requested by nongovernmental agencies.

Formerly 16 P.S. § 1236.1(c).
      Former Section 1251 of the Coroner’s Act, also repealed by Act 154, required
every coroner to deposit all “official records and papers for the preceding year in the
office of the prothonotary for the inspection of all persons interested therein.”
Formerly 16 P.S. § 1251. The Hearst Court interpreted this language to require the
deposit of all official coroner records and papers with the prothonotary within 30
days after the end of each year. Hearst, 54 A.3d at 25. For those unwilling to wait
until after the end of the year, former Section 1236.1(c) established a fee schedule
for obtaining the same records. Id. at 33.
                                        3. Hailer
      Hailer concerned a request for autopsy and toxicology reports possessed by
the Allegheny County Office of the Medical Examiner (ME). The OOR, citing
Hearst, issued a final determination directing the release of the requested reports
upon payment of the appropriate fee. The Allegheny County Court of Common
Pleas (Allegheny County trial court) reversed, in part, because the Hearst Court
analyzed statutory provisions that were repealed by Act 154. Additionally, the new

                                          11
provisions of the Coroner’s Act contained language that did not appear in those
which had been repealed.
      The Allegheny County trial court construed newly-enacted Section 1252-B,
providing for the imposition of fees for requests “by nongovernmental agencies in
order to investigate a claim asserted under a policy of insurance or to determine
liability for the death of the deceased[,]” to mean that a coroner must review whether
the requester was a nongovernmental agency and whether the information sought
was for the purpose of investigating an insurance claim or to determine liability for
the death of a decedent. Therefore, the requesters in Hailer could only obtain the
autopsy and toxicology reports if they qualified as a nongovernmental agency
seeking to determine liability for the decedent’s death. The requesters had not
asserted they were investigating an insurance claim, and the trial court considered
the determination of liability for the death of a decedent to be an issue typically
decided by a court. As a result, the Allegheny County trial court held that the
requesters were not entitled to the autopsy and toxicology reports.
      This Court reversed based on the plain language of Section 1252-B, which
states that the coroner “shall charge and collect” a specific fee for autopsy reports,
toxicology reports, inquisition or coroner’s reports, and cremation or disposition
authorizations. 16 P.S. § 1252-B. Section 1252-B was simply a fee schedule that
established the costs to be collected by a coroner’s office when providing copies of
its records. Furthermore, Section 1252-B provides that the coroner “shall charge
and collect . . . other fees[,]” as established, “for other reports or documents
requested by nongovernmental agencies in order to investigate a claim asserted
under a policy of insurance or to determine liability for the death of the deceased.”
Id. We declined to construe Section 1252-B as limiting the receipt of coroner records

                                         12
to nongovernmental agencies that seek records to investigate an insurance claim or
to determine liability for the death of a decedent. Instead, this language required
that the coroner “‘charge and collect’ other fees that have been established for
nongovernmental agency requests relating to those discrete types of inquiries.”
Hailer, 298 A.3d at 481. Section 1236-B of the Coroner’s Act supported our
interpretation of Section 1252-B, “as coroner records and papers in counties of the
third through eighth class are publicly accessible ‘within 30 days after the end of
each year’ following the deposit of such records ‘in the Office of the Prothonotary
for the inspection of all persons interested therein.’” Id.
      Our conclusion in Hailer was bolstered by the legislative history of Section
1252-B, which revealed that SB 1005, at one point, contained language stating that
Section 1252-B “may not be construed as authorizing disclosure of a record exempt
from public access” under the RTKL.17            This language was removed from
subsequent versions of SB 1005, which we considered a “strong indicator that the
[GA] intended that coroner records would be publicly accessible, provided the
appropriate fee was paid.” Id. at 482. Also stricken from SB 1005 was language in
Section 1236-B that would have relevantly provided that “[e]xcept as provided under
this article, public disclosure of a coroner record shall be in accordance with the
[RTKL.]”18 Based on the above analysis, we concluded that the requested autopsy

      17
          See SB 1005, Printer’s No. 1782, at 85-86, May 22, 2018.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2017
&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=1005&pn=1782 (emphasis added) (last visited
Dec. 6, 2023).

      18
          See SB 1005, Printer’s No. 1782, at 84, May 22, 2018.
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=PDF&sessYr=2017
&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=1005&pn=1782 (emphasis added) (last visited
Dec. 6, 2023).

                                          13
and toxicology reports were accessible upon payment of the fee established in
Section 1252-B. We did not address the “continued viability of Hearst.” Id.
                                   C. The Coroner’s Appeal
      Turning to the instant appeal, the Coroner argues that the Act 154 amendments
to the Coroner’s Act prohibit the release of autopsy and toxicology reports. The
Coroner maintains that the single page verification of death form containing a
decedent’s manner and cause of death satisfies the Coroner’s obligation under
Section 1236-B of the Coroner’s Act to deposit official records with the
prothonotary. Autopsy and toxicology reports, the Coroner maintains, are subject to
privacy protections under HIPAA and are exempt from disclosure under the RTKL.
      The Coroner also argues that Penn Jersey and Hearst are no longer controlling
precedent, as they analyzed provisions repealed by Act 154. Hearst, according to
the Coroner, is no longer relevant because Section 1252-B restricts the release of
information to nongovernmental agencies investigating insurance claims or
determining liability for the death of a decedent. By way of additional support, the
Coroner points to provisions in the Coroner’s Act that require the retention of tissue,
organs, blood, bodily fluids or gases, or other specimens necessary to establish and
defend against challenges to a decedent’s cause and manner of death,19 or that permit
the retention of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) specimens “for diagnostic,
evidentiary[,] or confirmatory purposes.”20 The Coroner contends that providing the
public “this sort of confidential information is not appropriate under any common
sense analysis[.]” Coroner’s Br. at 27.

      19
           Section 1202-B of the Coroner’s Act, 16 P.S. § 1202-B (Definitions).

      20
           Section 1219-B(d)(1) of the Coroner’s Act, 16 P.S. § 1219-B(d)(1).

                                               14
      The Coroner does not deny that the Commentary provided by the Commission
recognizes that a proposed, and deleted, amendment to SB 1005 would have
specified that Section 1252-B did not authorize the release of records exempt from
access under the RTKL. The Coroner suggests, however, that such an amendment
was unnecessary because Section 1252-B already contained language restricting
access to nongovernmental agencies investigating insurance claims or determining
liability for the death of a decedent.
      Requesters argue in response that Hailer controls our disposition here, as
Hailer concerned a “virtually identical request for records and virtually identical
legal argument . . . opposing disclosure.” Requesters’ Br. at 6. In light of Hailer,
Requesters suggest that the Coroner’s continued appeal in this matter merits an
award of reasonable attorney fees and costs of litigation or the imposition of
sanctions, as provided for in Section 1304(a)-(b) of the RTKL.
      In its reply brief, the Coroner contends that Hailer is not controlling precedent,
as Hailer did not address whether official records under Section 1236-B are
“different” from the autopsy reports, toxicology reports, inquisition or coroner’s
reports, and cremation or disposition authorizations mentioned in Section 1252-B.
Coroner’s Reply Br. at 6. In this respect, the Coroner vigorously maintains that the
various reports itemized in Section 1252-B should not be considered the official
records and papers required to be deposited with the prothonotary under Section
1236-B. Finally, the Coroner denies that its failure to withdraw this appeal in the
wake of Hailer renders its appeal frivolous.
      The Coroner’s argument regarding Section 1236-B is wholly unpersuasive, as
it ignores the plain language in that provision, which is nearly identical to its
predecessor, former Section 1251, with the exception that Section 1236-B only

                                          15
applies to third through eighth class counties. The Commentary prepared by the
Commission states that new Section 1236-B “[r]eflects [former] Section 1251, but
[Section 1236-B] is restricted to counties of the third through eighth class.”21 The
Coroner’s argument also fails to acknowledge the basis for the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Penn Jersey that autopsy reports are official records of a coroner’s
office. In Penn Jersey, the Supreme Court recognized that a coroner’s official duties
included conducting autopsies. As a result, it held that autopsy reports constituted
an official record and paper of the coroner’s office. Act 154 did not strip the Coroner
of its duty to conduct autopsies. In point of fact, Section 1219-B(a) of the Coroner’s
Act explicitly provides that where a coroner cannot “determine the cause and manner
of death, the coroner shall perform or order an autopsy on the body.” 16 P.S. §
1219-B(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Penn Jersey
remains sound.
      In Hailer, this Court considered, and rejected, the Coroner’s argument that
Section 1252-B restricts the release of the specified reports to nongovernmental
agencies either investigating insurance claims or determining liability for a
decedent’s death. The Coroner’s argument that “official records” under Section
1236-B is limited to the cause and manner of death, and that the reports mentioned
in Section 1252-B are not reflective of a coroner’s official acts, is not supported by
any provisions in the Coroner’s Act or the legislative history of Act 154. It is
noteworthy that the only information deposited with the prothonotary by the Coroner
– a decedent’s manner and cause of death – corresponds to that which is authorized
by Section 708(b)(20) of the RTKL. Per Section 3101.1 of the RTKL, however, the

      21
         See Commission Act 154 Section-by-Section Commentary, Oct. 24, 2018, page 14.
http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/download.cfm?file=/Reports/countyCode/Act_154_of_2018_Comme
ntary_10-24-2018.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2023).

                                          16
limitation in Section 708(b)(20) “shall not apply”22 and gives way to the right of
access established in Section 1236-B of the Coroner’s Act. The absence of legal
authority supporting the Coroner’s argument suggests not so much a reasoned
interpretation of Sections 1236-B and 1252-B as an attempt to justify the Coroner’s
past practice, which utterly ignores the scope of access provided by the Coroner’s
Act.
       As the trial court noted, a comment to Section 1252-B prepared by the
Commission indicates that Section 1252-B is analogous to former Section 1236.1,
except that the fees for reports have been increased. This comment appears in a
Section-by-Section Commentary (Commentary) the Commission prepared
following Act 154’s enactment.23 The Commission also drafted an Executive
Summary of Act 154, which similarly reflects that Section 1252-B “contains the fee
schedule previously in Section 1236.1 (Requests for Examinations and Reports).
The fees for reports as set forth in [Section 1252-B] have been increased . . . to permit
a greater recovery of the actual costs of the services.”24
       Both former Section 1236.1(c) and current Section 1252-B provide for the
collection of “other fees as may be established from time to time for other reports
and documents requested by nongovernmental agencies.”25 Act 154 simply clarified

       22
            65 P.S. § 67.3101.1 (emphasis added).

       23
           See Commission Act 154 Commentary, Oct. 24, 2018, page 14.
http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/download.cfm?file=/Reports/countyCode/Act_154_of_2018_Comme
ntary_10-24-2018.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2023).

       24
          See Commission Act 154 Executive Summary, Oct. 24, 2018, page 7.
http://www.lgc.state.pa.us/download.cfm?file=/Reports/countyCode/Act_154_of_2018_Executiv
e_Summary_10-24-2018.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2023).

       25
            Formerly 16 P.S. § 1236.1(c); 16 P.S. § 1252-B.

                                                17
the purposes for which a nongovernmental agency might request “other reports and
documents[.]” One of the presumptions to be used in ascertaining legislative intent
is that “when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the
[GA] in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction
to be placed upon such language.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4). Section 1252-B is
essentially identical to former Section 1236.1(c), which the Hearst Court held was a
fee schedule for obtaining the specified coroner records, should a requester not wish
to wait until the records are deposited with the Prothonotary. The Coroner has not
presented a compelling argument for construing Section 1252-B in any other
manner.
      Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
affirming the OOR, as production of the requested records only requires payment of
the fees set forth in Section 1252-B of the Coroner’s Act.
                                     D. Sanctions
      Section 1304(a) of the RTKL provides that, where a court reverses the final
determination of an appeals officer or grants access to a record after a request for
access was deemed denied, the court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs
of litigation if the court finds that the agency denied access to a public record
willfully, with wanton disregard, or in bad faith, or where the agency’s denial was
not based on a reasonable interpretation of the law. 65 P.S. § 67.1304(a). Section
1304(b) permits an award of sanctions if the court finds that the legal challenge was
frivolous. 65 P.S. § 67.1304(b). A requester seeking sanctions bears the burden of
proving that an agency acted in bad faith. Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Corr., 185 A.3d 1161, 1171 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Evidence of bad faith is necessary

                                         18
to impose fees and costs on that basis. Bagwell v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 103 A.3d 409,
421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
       Instantly, Requesters seek fees, costs, and/or sanctions based on the Coroner’s
failure to withdraw its appeal after this Court issued its decision in Hailer.26
Although the Coroner presents a somewhat tortured argument that “official records”
deposited with the prothonotary pursuant to Section 1236-B of the Coroner’s Act are
not the same documents as the reports specified in Section 1252-B’s fee schedule,
the Coroner’s failure to withdraw its appeal does not rise to the level of bad faith.
While the Coroner declined to produce the requested records based on its
interpretation of the Coroner’s Act, the Coroner did disclose the cause and manner
of death for the individuals identified by Requesters, as authorized by Section
708(b)(20) of the RTKL. Therefore, we conclude there is no basis for awarding
attorney’s fees, costs of litigation, or sanctions in this matter.
                                       IV.     Conclusion
       Section 1252-B of the Coroner’s Act, 16 P.S. § 1252-B, establishes the costs
to be collected by a coroner’s office when providing copies of autopsy reports,
toxicology reports, inquisition or coroner’s reports, and cremation or disposition
authorizations. Section 1252-B also provides that the coroner “shall charge and
collect . . . other fees[,]” as established, “for other reports or documents requested
by nongovernmental agencies in order to investigate a claim asserted under a policy
of insurance or to determine liability for the death of the deceased.” Id. As a result,
the trial court did not err in affirming the OOR’s Final Determination that directed
the Coroner to provide copies of the requested autopsy and toxicology reports upon

       26
            As noted earlier, the OOR suggested that sanctions might be appropriate, given the
Coroner’s failure to deposit its officials records and papers with the prothonotary; however, the
trial court’s opinion, made no findings in that regard.

                                               19
receipt of the fees established in Section 1252-B. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court. We decline to impose attorney’s fees, costs of litigation, or sanctions as
provided in Section 1304 of the RTKL for the reasons set forth in the foregoing
opinion.

                                      __________________________________
                                      ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                        20
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Chester County Office of the Coroner, :
                  Appellant           :
                                      :
      v.                              : No. 242 C.D. 2023
                                      :
Terence Keel and the University of :
California-Los Angeles Institute for :
Society and Genetics, Biostudies Lab :

                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2023, the March 1, 2023 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge