Court Opinion

ID: 9652984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:36:23.540481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:55.548878
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Identity was not an issue in the trial of this case. Alibi was. The trial court instructed the jury that the extraneous offense in question may be considered “in determining the design, scheme, or system of the defendant... and for no other purpose.” 1 The majority, changing the theory on which the case was tried and invoking the mindless cant of some earlier cases would have it that raising the defensive theory of alibi put identity of the accused in issue. Maybe so in some cases, but not in this one.
David Earl Brewer, an admitted thief and convicted felon then on probation at the time of trial, had known appellant intimately for more than three years. Indeed, for some period of time they were in business together.2 Contemporaneously with commission of the offense alleged, Brewer was a “C.I.” — a cooperating individual re*203porting criminal activity to DPS criminal investigator Ralph Byrd.3 Byrd, himself, knew appellant, as did Trooper Stuart Dowell. Admitted to the jury was a statement by Jimmy Spivey tending to incriminate appellant; Spivey, who was well acquainted with appellant, named appellant as the person who brought the suspected trailer to his shop to be painted.4 In short, every material witness, except the owner of the trailer who was never asked, knew appellant on sight. There was never any question of identification. The primary issue was whether Brewer was telling the truth; the subsidiary issue was whether other evidence was corroborative of his story-
In these circumstances identity per se was simply not an issue, “and if the state’s testimony was to be believed, a perfect case was made against the appellant without resorting to proof of extraneous crimes,” Roark v. State, 101 Tex.Cr.R. 401, 276 S.W. 242 (1925). Hafti v. State, 416 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) restates the matter at 825-826:
“Exceptions to the rule [against admitting extraneous offenses] are recognized where the extraneous crime... tends to show intent or identity, when either or both are an issue...
******
The rule appears to be consistent that if the testimony of the state leaves no doubt as to... identity of the defendant, proof of an independent crime is not admissible. Also, where there is positive testimony to support the state’s case, proof of other independent offenses is not admissible. [Citing authorities]”
The extraneous offense was not admissible, then, on the theory of identity. Nunn v. State, 60 Tex.Cr.R. 86, 131 S.W. 320 (1910); cf. Wyatt v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 73, 114 S.W. 812 (1908).
Alibi was definitely an issue, but the extraneous offense still was not committed “in the same vicinity a short while before or after the offense charged,” Griffin v. State, 455 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Newman v. State, 485 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see Ford v. State, 484 S.W.2d 727, 730-731 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
All of this was surely perceived by the trial court for its limiting instruction permitted consideration by the jury “in determining the design, scheme, or system of the defendant... in the connection with the offense.” But, here again, neither the indictment nor the proof put those matters in issue for jury determination. The issue was whether appellant stole the trailer in question at all; whether he took it as part of a design, scheme or system was not. Evidence as to the latter becomes relevant only “where the existence of a plan or system of criminal action is in issue," 23 Tex.Jur.2d 310, § 201, quoted approvingly by the late Presiding Judge Woodley in Jones v. State, 376 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1964) to make the point of distinguishing between “system” and “systematic crime.” As the Court pointed out in Long v. State, 39 Tex.Cr.R. 537, 47 S.W. 363 (1898), at 364:
“... Now, we hold that because an offense has been committed by a defendant in the same manner that the offense charged may have been committed does not constitute this separate offense a part of a system. The fact that two distinct crimes may have been committed in the same way does not... constitute a system, as meant by the authorities treating of this subject.”
*204And it has cautioned, “That a party may be systematically a thief... does not necessarily come within the exceptions above mentioned. To prove system in order to identify a party, or to show intent, is one thing, but to prove systematic crime... is a very different proposition,” Smith v. State, 52 Tex.Cr.R. 80, 105 S.W. 501 (1907) [Emphasis added by the Court while quoting from Smith in Lawrence v. State, 128 Tex.Cr.R. 416, 82 S.W.2d 647, 655 (1933)].
Here, in my view, testimony surrounding the December 1976 theft of a pickup in Louisiana showed no more than systematic crime, falling far short of proving a design, scheme or system.5
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to overruling ground of error one.

. All emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.

. When they parted company Brewer conceded “there was no love lost” between them.

. Byrd testified on crossexamination concerning conversations with Brewer before the offense:
“Q: No, sir, I asked if [Brewer] was lead to believe in your opinion if he would get assistance from your department to get his business straightened out if he would cooperate with you?
A: Yes, sir.”
Accordingly, with respect to a theft charge in Harris County, Byrd reported to the prosecutor there that Brewer had “assisted” Byrd in his work. Notwithstanding at least one prior conviction, Brewer was granted probation.

. Appellant would later testify that he owned the trailer and left it with Spivey for painting.

. The objection voiced by appellant to admitting the testimony focused on this precise point, asserting that it “certainly does not attempt to show through an extraneous offense a method of operation. It’s an attempt to establish guilt in another case, in order to convince the jury that Mr. Wintters is guilty as charged in this case. * * *”