Court Opinion

ID: 9555136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 21:00:47.119667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:25.500400
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 23a0173p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                             ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                             │
                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                              >        No. 22-5462
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 NICKLESS WHITSON,                                           │
                                Defendant-Appellant.         │
                                                             ┘

 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
                  No. 3:12-cr-00013-2—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.

                              Decided and Filed: August 10, 2023

             Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

                                      _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Dumaka Shabazz, Molly Rose Green, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Cecil W. VanDevender, Philip H. Wehby,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.

        MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which WHITE, J., joined. SUTTON,
C.J. (pp. 14–17), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In 2011, Nickless Whitson participated in
two Hobbs Act robberies. He was charged with and convicted of eight crimes at trial and
sentenced to 1,252 months of incarceration. After several appeals, through which four of his
convictions were vacated, he was resentenced in May of 2022 to 360 months of incarceration.
 No. 22-5462                         United States v. Whitson                              Page 2

Whitson contends that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argues
that the district court made four errors: first, it speculated that Whitson’s difficult upbringing
made him more likely to reoffend, in spite of evidence to the contrary; second, it failed to make
an “individualized assessment” of Whitson’s background; third, it impermissibly required
Whitson to admit his guilt in order to consider fully evidence of his rehabilitation while
incarcerated; and fourth, it did not properly weigh the evidence of his rehabilitation. We
conclude that the district court committed plain error by requiring Whitson to admit his guilt in
order to consider fully the evidence of his rehabilitation. We therefore VACATE Whitson’s
sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       In 2011, Nickless Whitson led and participated in two Hobbs Act robberies with co-
conspirators in an attempt to obtain drugs and cash. In both robberies, there were victims: in the
first, the group tied up a woman, threatened to kill her, and kicked her in the face; in the second,
the group restrained a couple, threatened to burn the woman alive, and shot the man in the chest,
causing life-threatening and debilitating injuries. Whitson was initially convicted of eight crimes
for his involvement in these robberies and sentenced to 1,252 months’ incarceration. R. 1004
(Judgment at 1–2) (Page ID #5003–04). Among his convictions were two counts of conspiracy
to commit Hobbs Act robbery, one count each of aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm
in connection with a drug-trafficking crime and in connection with a crime of violence under
§ 924(c), respectively, and one count each of brandishing a firearm in connection with a drug-
trafficking crime and in connection with a crime of violence under § 924(c), respectively. Id. at
1 (Page ID #5003).

       On appeal, we vacated two of his § 924(c) convictions for violating the Double Jeopardy
Clause. United States v. Whitson, 664 F. App’x 503, 507 (6th Cir. 2016). By agreement of the
parties, the district court vacated the two § 924(c) convictions for brandishing a firearm or aiding
and abetting possession of a firearm in connection with a drug-trafficking crime. R. 1047 (2d
Am. J. at 1) (Page ID #5271). When the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Davis, 139
S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of
violence, Whitson filed a § 2255 motion arguing that his two remaining § 924(c) convictions
 No. 22-5462                         United States v. Whitson                             Page 3

should be vacated because they relied on conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery as predicate
crimes of violence. Whitson v. United States, No. 3:18-cv-00833, R. 1 (§ 2255 Mot. at 5) (Page
ID #5). The district court granted his § 2255 motion on this ground. Whitson v. United States,
No. 3:18-cv-00833, R. 45 (Mem. Op. at 13–15) (Page ID #716–18). Whitson was therefore
resentenced on the four remaining convictions in 2022, after spending more than ten years in
federal prison. R. 1259 (3d Am. J. at 1).

       By all accounts, since his conviction in 2011, Nickless Whitson has changed his life. He
has participated in numerous educational programs while incarcerated, amounting to nearly three
hundred hours of study. R. 1255 (Def. Sent’g Mem. at 6–7) (Page ID #6048–49). He has
maintained employment as a cook in the prison facility for the past five years, obtaining
outstanding work performance ratings. Id. at 7 (Page ID #6049). He has become a leader of his
faith community in prison. Id. at 8 (Page ID #6050). He is a mentor to other incarcerated men.
R. 1255-5 (Letters of Support at 8–10) (Page ID #6129–32). He has not received a single
disciplinary infraction in the more than ten years he has been incarcerated. R. 1255 (Def. Sent’g
Mem. at 6) (Page ID #6048). And he has rebuilt his relationship with members of his family. Id.

       Whitson’s lawyer presented this evidence to the district court at resentencing and
requested a downward variance to 240 months from the guideline range of 360 to 1042 months,
based on his traumatic upbringing and his rehabilitation. The government requested a within-
guidelines sentence of 420 months. The district court considered Whitson’s rehabilitation as part
of the § 3553(a) factors, stating that his rehabilitation would “inure[] substantially to [his]
benefit.” R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 84) (Page ID #6265). But the district court also expressed
its belief that there could be no true rehabilitation without remorse, and there could be no
remorse without an admission of guilt. The district court explicitly stated that:

       [F]rom the beginning, his position was that he was not guilty. . . . and I
       understand that, that, you know, he’s never had anything but a not guilty plea, so
       he’s going to avoid saying anything that’s an admission. And an admission is
       necessarily [sic] to express remorse. It really is. . . .
       The remarks about remorse were too general. And Mr. Whitson is entitled, for
       whatever reason, because he’s taking the position he’s not guilty or, in a sense,
       he’s still sort of protecting his legal rights in some sense. He can do that. But if
 No. 22-5462                                 United States v. Whitson                                          Page 4

         he’s doing that, he’s not showing remorse. There wasn’t one ounce of empathy
         for the people that were brutalized here.
         And I mentioned that he will receive a better sentence than he would have got
         without some of this progress that he has made. But he’ll get less than he would
         have if he had expressed remorse. And that’s just the result of the position he
         takes and has taken about, you know, basically declining to go there, declined to
         go there with these—with these crimes, with these victims.

R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 85–87) (Page ID #6266–68). The district court reasoned that because
Whitson had not admitted to the offense conduct and specifically expressed remorse for the
victims of his Hobbs Act robberies, the court could not deem Whitson to have been rehabilitated.
Id. at 85–86 (Page ID #6266–67). The court proceeded to weigh the other § 3553(a) factors and
ultimately imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 360 months. Id. at 100 (Page ID #6281).
Whitson’s attorney objected that he did not “believe the Court properly gave enough weight to
his history and characteristics, including the changes that he has made.” R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g
Tr. at 102) (Page ID #6283). On appeal, Whitson challenges the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence.

                                                  II. ANALYSIS

A. Procedural Reasonableness

         Whitson argues that the district court considered an impermissible factor in imposing his
sentence: his failure to admit guilt.1 This is best categorized as a procedural error. United States

         1
          The dissent contends that Whitson did not raise a Fifth Amendment argument in his brief on appeal,
pointing out that the table of contents and summary of the argument are devoid of the phrase “Fifth Amendment,”
and concluding that there was no argument with which to engage. But see United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154,
158–59 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that defendant had not waived his Fifth Amendment argument when he cited
cases in which courts considered the precise Fifth Amendment argument he wished to make on appeal and held in
the defendants’ favor). But the table of contents, the issues presented, the summary of the argument, and the
headings of Whitson’s brief state clearly Whitson’s contention that the district court “impermissibly expected Mr.
Whitson to make certain specific expressions of remorse.” Appellant Br. at ii, 3, 14, 21. The specific expression of
remorse the district court expected from Whitson was an admission of guilt, as Whitson made evident by pointing
specifically to the district court’s statements that “rehabilitation is ‘dependent on admitting this and showing a desire
to make it right with the specific victims’ and ‘an admission is necessar[]y to express remorse.’” Appellant Br. at
22. Whitson argues that the district court relied on his “silence” to determine that he was not remorseful and thereby
not rehabilitated, and then quotes Ketchings v. Jackson, 365 F.3d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 2004), for its proposition that
the Fifth Amendment right extends to the sentencing phase of trial. Id. at 22–23. Ketchings is a Sixth Circuit case
concluding that a sentencing court may not penalize a defendant for their failure to admit guilt because it violates
clearly established federal law involving the Fifth Amendment. 365 F.3d at 512, 514. It is sufficiently clear to us
that Whitson has argued that the district court’s expectation that he make a “specific expression of remorse”—that
 No. 22-5462                                 United States v. Whitson                                          Page 5

v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 809 (6th Cir. 2016).                          Judges may consider a defendant’s
remorsefulness or lack thereof when determining an appropriate sentence. See In re Cook,
551 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). But they may not require a defendant to
relinquish their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or punish them for refusing to
do so. Ketchings v. Jackson, 365 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2004); Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 809. And while
courts may consider the presence or absence of remorse at sentencing, they may not “cloak[] an
impermissible sentencing factor . . . in a permissible one” or “punish [defendants] for exercising
[their] Fifth Amendment right[s] against self-incrimination.” Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 811.

         There is a fine line between consideration of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility as
relevant to § 3553 and penalizing a defendant for maintaining their right to avoid self-
incrimination, and in this case the district court fell on the wrong side of that line. In Ketchings,
this court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s holding that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination continues through the sentencing phase of a trial. 365 F.3d at 512. We
granted habeas relief to a Michigan state prisoner who did not admit to his offense of conviction,
reasoning that the sentencing-court transcript showed that the sentencing court was not “merely
addressing the factor of remorsefulness in the context of defendant’s rehabilitative potential.” Id.
at 513. At sentencing, the state trial judge explicitly stated that “if you don’t think you did
anything wrong to start with and you don’t accept what a jury says . . . [h]ow can you be
rehabilitated? . . . [Y]ou can’t be rehabilitated if you say you didn’t do anything.” Id. We held
that referring negatively to the defendant’s “continued assertion of his belief in his innocence”
and implying that the defendant “would be sentenced more leniently if he . . . gave up his Fifth
Amendment privilege to refuse . . . to admit guilt” violated the Fifth Amendment and that the
Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent
when it found no error and declined to vacate the resulting sentence. Id. at 513–14 (quotation
omitted)). We further held that, because the defendant had given a lengthy statement expressing
remorse without admitting to the offense of conviction, the sentencing judge had not “concerned

expression being an admission of guilt—was impermissible because it is precluded by the Fifth Amendment. The
fact that the United States failed to address the argument in its brief is irrelevant, as we have never held that a party
waived an argument simply because its opponent failed to respond to it. And the fact that Whitson did not raise the
argument again in his reply is a feature of the government’s failure to address it, for reply briefs respond only to the
arguments put forth by the appellee in its principal brief. See United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 401 (6th Cir.
2002).
 No. 22-5462                          United States v. Whitson                              Page 6

himself only with remorsefulness,” but had partially based the defendant’s sentence on his
refusal to admit guilt.

        We are faced with a remarkably similar situation here. R. 1264 (Sent’g H’rg Tr. at 85–
87) (Page ID #6266–68). The district court explicitly stated that it would not consider Whitson
adequately remorseful and thus rehabilitated unless he admitted to the conduct for which he was
convicted, just as the sentencing court did in Ketchings. Id.; see Ketchings, 365 F.3d at 513.
And even more explicitly here than in Ketchings, the district court stated that had Whitson
“expressed remorse” in the way that the district court wished—by admitting to criminal conduct
and apologizing directly to the victims, thereby relinquishing his Fifth Amendment right to
refuse to self-incriminate––he would have received a shorter sentence. R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr.
at 87) (Page ID #6268) (“[H]e’ll get less than he would have if he had expressed remorse. And
that’s just the result of the position he takes and has taken about, you know, basically declining to
go there, declined to go there with these—with these crimes, with these victims.”).

        The district court considered Whitson’s failure to admit guilt determinative of whether
Whitson was remorseful and thus rehabilitated, though Whitson, like the defendant in Ketchings,
made statements of remorse that would not imperil his pending postconviction petitions.
Whitson, in a letter to the court before his resentencing, stated that “I wait patiencely [sic] daily
to be given the chance to right my wrongs from my past. My past irrational decisions has [sic]
hurt my family and community. . . . I have never . . . had the chance to look those whom I have
wronged in the past in the eyes as a man and ask them for their forgiveness.” R. 1255-3
(Whitson Sent’g Letter at 9) (Page ID #6109). He expressed that he wanted a “chance to right
[his] past wrongs.” Id. at 10 (Page ID #6110). In his allocution, he expressed that he wished he
could change “all of this” and “take a different route,” and that he had determined to use his time
in prison “to educate [him]self and try to make amends to anybody [he] ha[d] ever wronged.” R.
1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 58–60) (Page ID #6239–41). While Whitson’s lawyer noted that
Whitson had not apologized directly to the victims and expressed remorse in the way the district
court wished, counsel represented “that’s because he had a good attorney who told him while this
is going on, you can’t talk to anybody about any aspect of this case. You don’t know what one
single statement could bring enhancements, could doom your appeal. . . . That is why he has not
 No. 22-5462                                 United States v. Whitson                                         Page 7

outlined this.” Id. at 67 (Page ID #6248). The district court acknowledged that Whitson’s
statements expressed remorse, but stated its belief that they were insufficiently specific and that
without an “admission,” it refused to consider Whitson remorseful and therefore considered his
evidence of rehabilitation “really undercut.”2 Id. at 84, 85 (Page ID #6265, 6266).

         The district court was required to base Whitson’s sentence on permissible factors. See
United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539, 545 (6th Cir. 2009) (“When the sentencing court considers
an impermissible factor in calculating a defendant’s sentence, a reviewing court will vacate and
remand for resentencing.”). “In general, we have found reversible error where a district judge
relies on a factor that is neither enumerated in nor consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines or
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 808.

         Here, the district court quite clearly considered Whitson’s refusal to admit guilt when
fashioning his sentence. The court stated in the sentencing hearing that Whitson’s decision not to
admit guilt negatively impacted the court’s assessment of his rehabilitation. And it further stated
that Whitson would receive a longer sentence than he would have if he had expressed remorse in
the way that the court wished—which was by admitting guilt. R. 1262 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 87)
(Page ID #6268). It is quite clear that the district court used Whitson’s exercise of his Fifth

         2
             Whitson’s expressions of remorse and acknowledgement that he made mistakes and the differences
between the district courts’ statements distinguish this case from United States v. Daneshvar, 925 F.3d 766 (6th Cir.
2019). In Daneshvar, the district court “explained that the real issue” was not that the defendant had decided to go
to trial, it “was that [the district court] ‘ha[d] not seen anything where the doctor . . . says I made a mistake, I was
wrong, I should be punished. Nowhere have I seen that.’” Id. at 789 (second alteration in original). We held that
the district court had not considered Daneshvar’s decision to go to trial, but instead considered Daneshvar’s remorse,
or lack thereof, in determining his sentence, and that this was not plain error. Id. at 788. The Daneshvar court also
reasoned that “[Daneshvar’s] continued efforts to deny his involvement demonstrated a failure to take responsibility
for his crime and a lack of remorse for the harm he had caused. The judge could have reasonably concluded that
[Daneshvar]’s dishonesty regarding important pieces of evidence indicated that he had not fully accepted
responsibility for his participation in the conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.3d 867, 884 (6th
Cir. 2012)) (alterations in original). Here, there is no suggestion that Whitson made protestations of innocence or
misrepresentations about evidence before the sentencing court; he simply did not admit his guilt in his colloquy.
And the statement the district court was requiring Whitson to make was not an acknowledgement that he had made a
mistake and should be punished, because Whitson had already made statements to that effect. See R. 1255-3
(Whitson Sent’g Letter at 9) (Page ID #6109); R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 57–61) (Page ID #6238–42)
(acknowledging the mistakes he made and expressing that he was grateful for having been prosecuted and sent to
prison); see also id. at 76–77 (Page ID #6257–58) (discussing how Whitson sought a still-lengthy sentence of twenty
years and not time served). Instead, the district court in this case made clear that it was unsatisfied without an
express admission of guilt. R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 84) (Page ID #6265).
 No. 22-5462                                 United States v. Whitson                                         Page 8

Amendment right against self-incrimination as a factor in determining his sentence.3 And we
have held that a district court may not consider a defendant’s failure to take the stand as a factor
because it “effectively punish[es] [the defendant] for exercising [their] Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.” Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 808. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the government “may not impose substantial penalties” on an individual because they have
exercised their Fifth Amendment rights. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977);
see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
435 (1984) (“[I]f the State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that the invocation of the
[Fifth Amendment] privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the
classic penalty situation.”). Considering a defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights by
refusing to self-incriminate as a factor in their sentence is likewise impermissible. A defendant
must “suffer no penalty” for remaining silent. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981).
Using a defendant’s refusal to self-incriminate to discount his propounded evidence of his
rehabilitation and remorse, and then imposing a longer sentence on that basis, must constitute
impermissible punishment under our precedent and under the Supreme Court’ s precedent.

         The district court penalized Whitson when it required that he admit guilt in order for the
court to consider fully evidence of his rehabilitation—evidence that the Supreme Court has
stated is “highly relevant” to several of the § 3553(a) factors, is “plainly [] relevant to ‘the
history and characteristics of the defendant,’” and provides “the most up-to-date picture” of those
characteristics, Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491–92 (2011) (quoting § 3553(a)(1)).
This is penalizing the defendant. The district court is required to consider the § 3553(a) factors.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“[T]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider” the 3553(a) factors (emphasis added)). To discount evidence “plainly [] relevant”
to those factors because a defendant has declined to admit guilt and to impose a longer sentence

         3
           This is distinct, as well, from United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.3d 867 (6th Cir. 2012). In Mitchell, a panel
of this court affirmed a district court’s sentence, concluding that a district court did not give an unreasonable amount
of weight to the defendant’s “failure to take responsibility for his actions and his lack of remorse.” Id. at 884. The
dissent quotes from Mitchell as if to suggest that it has particular relevance to this case, but the district court in
Mitchell found that the defendant’s dishonesty on the witness stand showed that he was not remorseful and had not
accepted responsibility for his offense of conviction, and imposed a harsher sentence on that basis. Id. Mitchell
therefore has no bearing on whether a district court may consider a defendant’s refusal to self-incriminate as a factor
in fashioning their sentence.
 No. 22-5462                            United States v. Whitson                                   Page 9

on a defendant on that basis constitutes impermissible punishment. The district court knew that
Whitson was in the midst of an appeal of his § 2255 proceedings and had been instructed by his
attorney not to admit to committing the crimes to avoid imperiling that appeal, and the court also
knew that Whitson’s right against self-incrimination extended to sentencing. R. 1262 (Sent’g
Hr’g Tr. at 67) (Page ID #6248). The district court should not have penalized him for refusing to
abandon his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by discounting his evidence of
rehabilitation and explicitly issuing a longer sentence for that reason. In doing so, the district
court impermissibly used Whitson’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights to determine his
sentence, which was procedurally unreasonable.

        The dissent rightly notes that we, along with our sibling circuits, distinguish between
generally permissible denied benefits and impermissible punishment in this context. See Diss.
Op. at 16 (collecting cases); see also United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154, 161 (6th Cir. 1993)
(characterizing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which provides for a reduced offense level upon acceptance of
responsibility, as offering a benefit that may be denied to a defendant who does not plead guilty
without violating the Fifth Amendment).             Many provisions in our sentencing laws offer
incentives, or rewards, for accepting responsibility, assisting government investigations, and
revealing offense details, including U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1, 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The
Supreme Court has “squarely held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering
substantial benefits in return for the plea,” and has stated that “not every pressure or
encouragement to waive . . . a right[] is invalid.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218, 219
(1978). It is therefore uncontroversial in this circuit that denying a defendant a sentencing
benefit because they have declined to self-incriminate is permissible.

        The dissent is wrong, however, to suggest that this is a case of a denied benefit. Diss. Op.
at 16–17. It attempts to recast our opinion as holding that the district court erred by refusing to
award Whitson his requested variance—a benefit—based on his failure to admit guilt. But that is
frankly inaccurate.4 At issue is the district court’s discounting of Whitson’s evidence of remorse
and rehabilitation, not its decision to deny Whitson a variance, though it may have incidentally

        4
          The dissent’s ominous assertion that our reasoning “threatens to sweep away key pillars of federal
sentencing,” Diss. Op. at 17, relies on its inaccurate characterization of our holding.
 No. 22-5462                          United States v. Whitson                              Page 10

had that effect. The district court was entitled to consider Whitson’s demeanor and his words
and determine whether Whitson’s statements of remorse were genuine in light of all the
circumstances. But the district court was not entitled to discount evidence of the defendant’s
remorse or rehabilitation—evidence plainly encompassed by the § 3553(a) factors, which a
district court “shall consider” in a sentencing proceeding—because Whitson refused to self-
incriminate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It is this failure to consider fully the evidence as to the
§ 3553(a) factors because Whitson had not admitted guilt, as well as the imposition of a longer
sentence on that basis, that constitutes the impermissible punishment, not the fact that the
sentence the district court imposed had the effect of denying a variance. Had the district court
sentenced Whitson to 359 months and made the very same statements, we would reach the same
conclusion.

       Whitson’s counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection that the district court had
violated Whitson’s Fifth Amendment rights, and therefore we must review the district court’s
decision not for abuse of discretion but for plain error. A plain error must be “clear or obvious”
under current law, United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 379 (6th Cir. 2005), and not “subject to
reasonable dispute.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). A defendant must show
“(1) error (2) that ‘was obvious or clear,’ (3) that ‘affected defendant’s substantial rights’ and (4)
that ‘affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United
States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gardiner,
463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). Our decisions in Ketchings and Cabrera make perfectly clear
that it violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights to penalize them for exercising their right to
refuse to self-incriminate. Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 811–12. As we emphasized in Cabrera, the right
against self-incrimination is a “fundamental trial right of criminal defendants,” and violating “a
bedrock protection of the Fifth Amendment is not ‘subject to reasonable dispute.’” Id. (first
quoting McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2005), and then quoting
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). And in Cabrera, we explicitly held that a defendant’s silence is an
impermissible sentencing factor.      Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 812.        In Ketchings, we analyzed
analogous facts in the context of a § 2254(d) motion for habeas corpus relief and concluded a
state court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law when it
approved a sentence where there was significant evidence—as there is in this case—that the
 No. 22-5462                          United States v. Whitson                               Page 11

sentencing judge improperly took the petitioner’s failure to admit guilt into account at
sentencing. 365 F.3d at 514. In that case, the petitioner had to overcome the high bar and great
deference we accord to the state courts when reviewing their decisions upon a petition for habeas
relief. It was clearly established as early as 2004 that a sentencing judge may not penalize a
defendant at sentencing for refusing to admit guilt. And we held that it was plain error to
consider a defendant’s silence as a sentencing factor in 2016. Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 811. The
district court’s error was therefore obvious or clear.

       It is clear from the sentencing transcript that consideration of Whitson’s exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights directly affected the length of the sentence the district court imposed
upon him, R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 87) (Page ID #6268), and therefore affected Whitson’s
substantial rights and the fairness of his sentencing. See United States v. Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853,
857 (6th Cir. 2020) (“An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is ‘a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’”
(quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted))). As a result, we conclude that the district court plainly erred by requiring an
admission of guilt from Whitson in order to consider fully his evidence of rehabilitation.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

       Whitson also challenges his sentence on the basis that the district court impermissibly
speculated that Whitson’s troubled upbringing made it more likely that Whitson would reoffend.
Whitson characterized this challenge as procedural, but he objected in court and in his appellate
brief that the district court did not properly “weigh and consider” Whitson’s traumatic
background. Appellant Br. at 16. He also challenges the weight that the district court gave the
evidence of his rehabilitation. Appellant Br. at 25. Challenges to the weight given to a particular
sentencing factor are challenges to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, rather than
procedural reasonableness. See United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). A
within-guidelines sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389.
We review claims of substantive reasonableness for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 2019).
 No. 22-5462                         United States v. Whitson                            Page 12

        Whitson takes issue with the district court’s statements suggesting that his troubled
upbringing might have resulted in “ingrained” “antisocial behavior” making it impossible for
him to rehabilitate. R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 88) (Page ID #6269). The district court also
suggested that if Whitson was really capable of rehabilitation, he would have changed after one
of his other felony convictions and before the Hobbs Act robberies for which he was being
sentenced. Id. at 89 (Page ID #6270). Whitson argues that these statements show the district
court was relying on an unfounded speculation that his upbringing made it more likely that he
would continue to reoffend. Appellant Br. at 16–17. As a result, Whitson contends that the
district court did not appropriately weigh his background and history. His challenge on this basis
relates closely to his objection that the district court did not properly weigh the evidence of his
rehabilitation.

        The government suggests that evidence supports the district court’s finding that
Whitson’s traumatic childhood might increase his risk of recidivism. Indeed, Whitson’s own
sentencing memorandum argued that childhood stressors have long-term effects that may lead to
personality disorders, delinquency, and violence. R. 1255 (Def. Sent’g Mem. at 14–15) (Page ID
#6056–57). Though it may perhaps be true that evidence of a troubled childhood presents a
“double-edged sword” at an initial sentencing because a court cannot at that stage of the
proceedings know whether a defendant is capable of change, upon resentencing under the
circumstances presented here such concerns cannot bear the same weight.            Since Nickless
Whitson was convicted in 2011, he has changed his life drastically. This remained true when he
believed his sentence would be for 1252 months, or 104 years—an effective life sentence. It
remained true when, after his first resentencing, he believed his sentence would be 652 months,
or fifty-four years. Though a court at an initial sentencing may perhaps reasonably question
whether a defendant’s troubled upbringing will prevent them from conforming their behavior,
Whitson has demonstrated for over eleven years that despite his upbringing and despite the risk
factors in his childhood that made positive outcomes in adulthood more difficult to achieve, he is
able to conform. R. 1264 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 68–70) (Page ID #6249–51) (discussing the adverse
childhood experiences (“ACEs”) that Whitson endured and that can lead to negative outcomes in
adulthood); R. 1255-6 (Adverse Childhood Experiences in Tenn. at 2–3) (Page ID #6140–41)
(explaining the concept of ACEs). The abundant evidence that Whitson has produced indicating
 No. 22-5462                              United States v. Whitson                         Page 13

that he has been able to behave, has not engaged in violence, and has respected the many rules
and restrictions of prison life renders unreasonable the district court’s general and otherwise
unexplained concern that Whitson’s troubled childhood suggests he is not capable of moderating
or changing his behavior. The district court’s statements at sentencing—including its belief that
rehabilitation is not possible without an admission of guilt—further indicate that the district court
discounted the evidence of Whitson’s rehabilitation.

        Because we have concluded that the sentence is procedurally unreasonable, however, we
do not decide whether the district court’s sentence is substantively unreasonable.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

        It was plain error for the trial court to require Whitson to admit his guilt in order to
consider fully the evidence of Whitson’s rehabilitation and remorse. Supreme Court and Sixth
Circuit precedent dictate that defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights continue into the sentencing
phase of trial. And Sixth Circuit precedent clearly holds that a defendant’s silence is not a
permissible sentencing factor and that courts may not require defendants to relinquish their Fifth
Amendment rights and admit to their offense conduct in order to be considered remorseful and
thus to be considered rehabilitated. We therefore VACATE Whitson’s sentence and REMAND
to the district court for resentencing.
 No. 22-5462                         United States v. Whitson                            Page 14

                                      _________________

                                            DISSENT
                                      _________________

       SUTTON, Chief Judge, dissenting. Nickless Whitson led two violent home-invasion
robberies, prompting multiple convictions.      Over the course of a sentencing hearing that
stretched more than three hours and 100 transcript pages, the district court properly calculated a
Guidelines range of 360 to 1,020 months, heard argument by the parties, and received testimony.
Whitson’s was a “tough case,” the court acknowledged, with “a variety of nuanced factors.”
R.1264 at 107. Based on a balancing of the § 3553(a) factors and Whitson’s evidence of
rehabilitation, it imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. But absent a showing
of remorse through an admission of responsibility or an apology to the victims, the court
explained, it would not lower the sentence further.

       That decision did not violate Whitson’s Fifth Amendment rights. Whitson, to start, never
raised any such claim in the district court or in our court. Not once before the district court did
Whitson mention the Fifth Amendment or invoke his right to remain silent. See Maness v.
Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975) (explaining that the right is not “self-executing” and “can be
affirmatively waived[] or lost by not asserting it in a timely fashion”). Nor did Whitson object
on Fifth Amendment grounds when given the opportunity following the court’s imposition of the
360-month sentence.

       In our court, his briefs claim only that the district court engaged in impermissible
speculation and erroneous fact-finding, not constitutional error. Appellant’s Br. 21 (faulting the
court for “expect[ing] [him] to make certain specific expressions of remorse and rel[ying] on an
unsubstantiated theory that rehabilitation requires certain admissions”). The headings in the
table of contents refer only to prohibited “speculat[ion]” regarding Whitson’s upbringing and
likelihood of reoffending, failure to make an “individualized assessment” of his background,
reliance on an “unsubstantiated theory” of rehabilitation leading to an improper “expect[ation]”
of remorse, and insufficient “weigh[t]” given to his “rehabilitation.” Id. at i–ii. The summary of
argument says nothing about the Fifth Amendment. And the rest of the body of the brief returns
 No. 22-5462                         United States v. Whitson                            Page 15

that silence with still more silence. The most one could say is that a block quote, used to support
a factual argument, mentions the Fifth Amendment by happenstance. Whitson’s reply brief
reverberates with still more silence. The government, no surprise, never engages with any Fifth
Amendment argument because there was nothing to engage.

       By any measure, Whitson forfeited, if not waived, this constitutional challenge to his
sentence. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United
States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006). It is no small matter when courts resolve
appeals on grounds never presented below, never raised in the briefs on appeal, and never argued
on appeal. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1578 (2020) (reversing a court for
resolving a case based on arguments not presented by the litigants).

       Plain error at a minimum applies to these serial forfeitures. United States v. Mullet,
822 F.3d 842, 848 (6th Cir. 2016). Because no case in this circuit precludes a court from
considering a defendant’s failure to admit responsibility in denying him a further sentencing
benefit, any error cannot be plain. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. That should end the matter.

       Still, I would be deeply skeptical even of a preserved and argued Fifth Amendment claim
in this setting. A court, it is true, may not “punish” a defendant for exercising a constitutional
right. See United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 812 (6th Cir. 2016); Ketchings v. Jackson,
365 F.3d 509, 512–14 (6th Cir. 2004). But a court may reward a defendant for breaking his
silence or foregoing a trial—for sacrificing, in short, his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
United States v. Clemons, 999 F.2d 154, 160–61 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming the constitutionality
of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction). While sentencing rewards might “affect how
criminal defendants choose to exercise their constitutional rights,” “not every pressure or
encouragement to waive . . . [a right] is invalid.” United States v. Cordell, 924 F.2d 614, 619
(6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978)).

       This distinction between punishments and rewards conspicuously applies when a district
court balances the § 3553(a) factors. A court, for example, may consider a defendant’s refusal to
participate in a psychosexual evaluation when deciding whether to grant a sentencing reduction
for a lack of “future dangerousness.” United States v. Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547, 550–52 (6th Cir.
 No. 22-5462                          United States v. Whitson                          Page 16

2007). Or a court may weigh a defendant’s failure to accept responsibility “in considering the
[other] § 3553(a) factors” and denying a sentencing benefit. United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.3d
867, 884 (6th Cir. 2012). Or a court may consider a defendant’s refusal to admit that he “made a
mistake” in weighing “remorse.” United States v. Daneshvar, 925 F.3d 766, 788–89 (6th Cir.
2019); see also United States v. Williams, 520 F. App’x 420, 425–26 (6th Cir. 2013); Pollard v.
Macauley, No. 19-2498, 2020 WL 3499215, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 2020) (order); Trotter v.
Berghuis, No. 17-2530, 2018 WL 11447868, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2018) (order); Witt v.
Prelesnik, No. 92-2354, 1993 WL 473696, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 1993) (order).

       Every circuit recognizes the distinction between sentencing rewards and punishments.
See, e.g., United States v. Rosario-Peralta, 199 F.3d 552, 570–71 (1st Cir. 1999); United States
v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 105–06 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 805–06
(3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1081–87 (4th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Preciado-Delacruz, 801 F.3d 508, 511–12 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Cojab, 978 F.2d
341, 343–44 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. McQuay, 7 F.3d 800, 802–03 (8th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Portillo-
Valenzuela, 20 F.3d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011–12
(11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477–78 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(en banc).

       The district court’s decision falls on the permissible side of this punishment/reward line.
At the sentencing hearing, Whitson asked for a downward variance from the 360- to 1,020-
month Guidelines range based on his rehabilitation.         The court acknowledged Whitson’s
exemplary prison conduct and rewarded him, selecting a sentence at the bottom of his Guidelines
range. But that conduct by itself did not warrant still more relief, the court thought. The court
reasoned that Whitson’s failure to admit his crimes or apologize to his victims demonstrated a
lack of remorse, weakening his claim of full rehabilitation. When weighed against the severity
of Whitson’s conduct and his extensive criminal history, the court explained, this incomplete
rehabilitation did not support a still-lower sentence.

       The court’s refusal to reward Whitson by varying below the bottom of the Guidelines
range was not a punishment for his exercise of a constitutional right.         The court indeed
 No. 22-5462                        United States v. Whitson                            Page 17

emphasized Whitson’s “entitle[ment] . . . [to] tak[e] the position he’s not guilty,” R.1264 at 86–
87, and it confirmed that “Whitson will get credit for rehabilitation,” id. at 84. The court’s
consideration of remorse tracked “well established” sentencing practices. In re Cook, 551 F.3d
542, 551 (6th Cir. 2009). Our case law emphatically permits such considerations in denying a
sentencing benefit, as the court did here. See Mitchell, 681 F.3d at 884; Daneshvar, 925 F.3d at
789; Williams, 520 F. App’x at 425–26.

       It makes no difference that Whitson refused to demonstrate remorse to avoid an
admission that might have proved detrimental in a future proceeding. Every defendant convicted
at trial faces a similar dilemma. If remorse came cheap, it would have trifling worth as an
indicator of rehabilitation. And the “exercise of Fifth Amendment rights need not be cost-free.”
United States v. Alsante, 812 F.3d 544, 548–50 (6th Cir. 2016); see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24,
41 (2002) (The “criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations
requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow.” (quotation omitted)).

       One final problem looms. If applied elsewhere, this reasoning threatens to sweep away
key pillars of federal sentencing. Sentencing teems with reductions for accepting responsibility,
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, assisting government investigations, id. § 5K1.1, and revealing offense details,
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Under the majority’s view, these provisions “requir[e] an admission of
guilt” from a defendant and thus violate the Constitution. Op. at 11. Under the Supreme Court’s
view, however, “not every pressure or encouragement to waive . . . [a right] is invalid.” Corbitt,
439 U.S. at 218.

       I respectfully dissent.