Court Opinion

ID: 9628308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:16:36.611558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:03.499607
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. When workmen file claims for Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Disease benefits within the limitation period, and the claims flounder in the district and appellate courts for over three years and lose their way, our duty is not to rely upon the obvious erroneous legal argument relied upon by the workmen’s attorneys. Our duty is to search for a viaduct over which workmen can walk into the courtroom to seek a determination of their claims on the merits. Plaintiffs were employed by defendant from June to October, 1975. Their claims were barred if suit was not filed by October, 1976. Sections 52-l-31(A) and 52-3-16, N.M.S.A.1978. On July 20, 1976, within the statutory time, plaintiffs filed amorphous claims under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act. See, Ortega v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 91 N.M. 31, 569 P.2d 957 (Ct.App.1977), Sutin, J., dissenting. Any competent attorney knows how to draw a simple compensation claim. These claims were dismissed “without prejudice” on December 23, 1976, after the statutory period had passed. Plaintiffs filed the present action on January 13, 1977. However, plaintiffs appealed the judgment. The first claims were filed within the statutory period. When these claims were filed, the statutory period of limitation was tolled during their pendency since commencement of an action arrests the running of the applicable statutory period. When plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed without prejudice on December 23, 1976, they were not dismissed because the district court was without power to adjudicate the claims, but solely for the reason the claims were improperly stated and were joined with other common law claims and with one of products liability; that non-jury claims could not be joined with jury claims. The statutory period was tolled from July 20, 1976 to December 23, 1976, a period of five months thereafter. The claims filed on January 13, 1976 were not untimely. “The purpose of the requirement that a suit be brought by the claimant within one year after the accident under the penalty of barring his recovery is of a three fold nature; (1) to enable the employer to determine when his potential liability for an accident would cease; (2) as a matter of public policy to prevent suits based on stale claims where the evidence might be destroyed or difficult to produce; (3) to fix a statute of repose giving rise to a conclusive presumption of waiver of his claims on the part of an employee where he fails to bring his suit within the fixed period.” When none of the foregoing reasons for barring plaintiffs’ claims covered the lapse of the statutory period, a second proceeding brought in a court of competent jurisdiction would prevent the running of the ordinary statute of limitations or the statutory period. The conclusion is that plaintiffs substantially complied with the statutes so as to keep alive their claims up to the time the claims were filed the second time, notwithstanding more than one year elapsed from the date of the accident to the date of filing the claims. Harris v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 200 La. 445, 8 So.2d 289 (1942); Nini v. Sanford Brothers, Inc., 276 So.2d 262 (La.1973); Jarka v. Falleen Drop Forge Company, 352 Mich. 620, 90 N.W.2d 699 (1958). This rule is not applicable when a workman’s attorney voluntarily dismisses the claim. DeMars v. Robinson King Floors, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 501 (Minn.1977). It has also been held that an employer waives the applicability of the statutory period by failure to file and submit a Form 7 settlement agreement for approval. Apple v. State Insurance Fund, 540 P.2d 545 (Okla.1975). Furthermore, plaintiffs’ first claims were dismissed by this Court on September 6, 1977. The period during which the statute is tolled includes the time consumed in an appeal. Myers v. County of Orange, 6 Cal.App.3d 626, 86 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1970); Board of Ed. of Miami Trace Local Sch. Dist. v. Marting, 185 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1962); Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861 (1947). The statutory period was tolled from the date of the judgment until determined on September 6, 1977. The statutory limitation period had not expired on the original claim. To preserve plaintiffs’ rights, how simple it would have been for plaintiffs to obtain consent of the court to file an amended claim, limited to Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Disease benefits. The other six counts, if meritorious, could have been re-filed as a separate action within the limitation period. How simple it would have been to request a severance. In the present appeal, how simple it would be to declare that the fixed statutory period had not expired. In Swallows v. City of Albuquerque, 61 N.M. 265, 298 P.2d 945 (1956), plaintiff’s claim was prematurely filed. On appeal, the claim was dismissed. Thereafter, the workman commenced a new action. The court held that the new action commenced more than one year after failure or refusal of the employer to pay compensation was barred by limitations. No claim had been filed within the statutory period. In the course of the opinion, the court said: * * * If one does not protect himself and his rights under the law as written it is his misfortune * * *. [Emphasis added.] • To me, it is not judicious, wise, reasonable or fair to say that workmen themselves, unlearned in the law, must suffer the pangs of outrageous misfortune because their lawyers did not protect their rights prior to a hearing on the merits. Workmen protect their rights when they employ lawyers. The only alternative is to sue the lawyers for legal malpractice. This procedure has never been used, save once. The better way to protect workmen is to rule that when an appeal is taken upon a matter of law, the statutory limitation period is impliedly tolled. Hoover v. Galbraith, 7 Cal.3d 519, 102 Cal.Rptr. 733, 498 P.2d 981 (1972). We should not blindly allow a statutory period of limitation to be used as a sword rather than a shield against stale claims. Some appellate judges believe that litigation should end when cases are appealed more than once; that the punishment should be inflicted upon the clients, not the lawyers; that justice is just a passing fancy when the rights of persons have been erroneously discharged. Statutes and rules of law are often rigidly followed because the function of the reviewing court is to see that justice is done according to law in the cases brought before it. The test for formal legal rationality should not be strict compliance with the law, but whether the determination made is fair and just according to law. True, the legislature has been in regular session on many occasions since Swallows was decided and has not seen fit to amend the statute “for good and cogent reasons. See, Selgado v. New Mexico State Highway Department, 66 N.M. 369, 371, 348 P.2d 487 (1960). But this does not mean that appellate courts must “walk the plank” when relief can be found for workmen by application of concepts of “tolling” and “waiver.” To do “justice according to law” may be an “objective” mood that pervades one court and a “subjective” mood in another. But when the statute grants the right of workmen to assistance for the protection of families, we should not allow that right to be severed for the protection of an employer when none of the employer’s rights have been prejudiced. This case should be reversed.