Court Opinion

ID: 9945738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:09:36.382879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.049187
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2797-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN B. RODNER,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued February 12, 2024 – Decided February 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. MA-2022-18.

                   Judith Ellen Rodner argued the cause for appellant.

                   Stephen Anton Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney
                   General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen Anton Pogany,
                   on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Stephen B. Rodner appeals from his conviction for failure to

yield the right of way, N.J.S.A. 39:4-90, after a trial de novo in the Law

Division. Based on our review of the record and applicable legal principles, we

affirm.

      We summarize the facts developed in the record. Defendant was involved

in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Blanchard Road and North

Wyoming Avenue in South Orange and was issued a summons for failure to

yield the right of way, N.J.S.A. 39:4-90. Defendant pleaded not guilty, and a

trial was held in South Orange Municipal Court. South Orange Police Officer

Jose Albino testified as the State's only witness. Defendant did not testify or

call any defense witnesses.

      Officer Albino testified he responded to the motor vehicle accident and

observed that one of the vehicles involved in the accident, a Ford, was

overturned on private property. Officer Albino determined that defendant's

vehicle, a Subaru, was making a left turn from Blanchard onto North Wyoming,

when it collided with the Ford which was traveling southbound on North

Wyoming. The impact caused the Ford to veer left, overturn, strike a tree, and

come to rest on the lawn of a nearby residence. Blanchard is controlled by a

stop sign at its intersection with North Wyoming. North Wyoming is a two-way

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road separated by a double yellow line and does not have a stop sign at its

intersection with Blanchard.

      According to Officer Albino, defendant stated he "stopped at the stop sign,

came out, and his vision may have been obstructed." Defendant initially stated

he was coming out of Blanchard to make a right onto North Wyoming but was

"confused," and his view of the intersection was obstructed by a truck that was

parked to his left along the shoulder of North Wyoming. Defendant later

recalled he was making a left turn onto North Wyoming, not a right.

      Officer Albino observed the truck defendant identified as the one

obstructing his vision and determined it was parked legally on the shoulder of

North Wyoming. Officer Albino stood at the corner of Blanchard and North

Wyoming and concluded there were no visual obstructions, including the parked

truck, that would have prevented a person turning left from Blanchard onto

North Wyoming from seeing clearly at the intersection.

      Based on his personal observations at the scene, Officer Albino concluded

defendant's vehicle entered North Wyoming without having the right of way and

hit the Ford traveling southbound on North Wyoming after the Ford had already

entered the intersection. Specifically, Officer Albino testified "[b]ased upon the

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crash investigation, . . . the Ford was in the lane of travel prior to [defendant]."

Officer Albino testified:

            [t]he facts of the crash report indicate . . . that the Ford
            was already in the lane of travel southbound on
            Wyoming as it was more of a sideswipe. When you do
            the accident investigation, if [defendant] was in fact in
            the intersection prior to [the collision] . . . that would
            have been a T mark and it would not have sent the Ford
            into the left off the road into the tree causing the
            turnover.

                   Therefore, factually, with the construction going
            on of the accident itself, if it[ is] a sideswipe which is
            what we saw . . . with the accident investigation, that
            would mean that the Ford . . . was in that intersection
            prior to the Subaru which is [defendant's] vehicle.

      At the conclusion of the trial, the municipal court judge found the State

proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-90, imposed

a $157 fine, and assessed court costs of $33. Defendant appealed his conviction

to the Law Division. On March 16, 2023, the court heard oral argument. On

April 6, 2023, the court issued a thorough and well-reasoned written opinion

finding defendant guilty following de novo review and imposing the same

sentence. The court gave great deference to the municipal court judge's finding

that Officer Albino's testimony was "absolutely credible and forthright." After

reviewing the record and the testimony of Officer Albino, the court found:

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     [b]ased upon the evidence presented at trial, including
     Officer Albino's testimony and [defendant's] statements
     against interest relayed to Officer Albino, the State has
     proven beyond a reasonable doubt, by direct and
     circumstantial evidence and through the logical
     inferences that this court is able to draw therefrom that
     [defendant]       approached     the    intersection   of
     Wyoming . . . and Blanchard . . . where he had a stop
     sign and had the duty to yield to the traffic on
     Wyoming . . . he stopped at the stop sign and then
     proceeded into the intersection, failed to properly yield
     the right of way to a vehicle already traveling on
     Wyoming . . . and struck said vehicle. This court
     finds . . . that the State has established by sufficient
     credible evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that
     [defendant] is [guilty] de novo of violating N.J.S.A.
     39:4-90.

Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:

     POINT I: THE MUNICIPAL COURT INTERFERED
     WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL, USURPING
     THE PROSECUTION'S ROLE AND PREVENTING
     PROPER       CROSS-EXAMINATION;       THE
     MUNICIPAL COURT INITIATED, ENDORSED
     AND RELIED UPON IMPROPER EXPERT
     TESTIMONY FROM A POLICE OFFICER; THE
     MUNICIPAL     COURT    SUPPORTED      THE
     TESTIFYING POLICE OFFICER'S USE OF WRONG
     LEGAL DEFINITIONS; THE MUNICIPAL COURT
     IMPROPERLY      USED    WRONG       LEGAL
     DEFINITIONS IN RENDERING ITS DECISION;
     THE MUNICIPAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
     CREDIBLE EVIDENCE, CREDITED DUBIOUS
     TESTIMONY AND DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT
     EVIDENCE TO FIND DEFENDANT GUILTY.

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            POINT II: THE REVIEWING COURT ERRED BY
            CONTINUING TO CREDIT THE POLICE
            OFFICER'S TESTIMONY AS EXPERT AND
            CREDIBLE; THE REVIEWING COURT APPLIED
            THE    WRONG     LEGAL   STANDARD    IN
            [DETERMINING] DEFENDANT'S GUILT; THE
            REVIEWING COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE
            BIAS AND IMPROPRIETIES OF THE JUDGE ON
            THE INTEGRITY OF THE TRIAL WHEN MAKING
            ITS DECISION.

      When the Law Division conducts a trial de novo on a record previously

developed in the municipal court, our review is limited. State v. Clarksburg Inn,

375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). The Law Division is "bound to give

'due, although not necessarily controlling, regard to the opportunity of a

[municipal court judge] to judge the credibility of the witnesses.'"        Ibid.

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964)). We

determine whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to

support the Law Division's conclusions. Ibid.

      Moreover, when the Law Division concurs with the municipal court, the

two-court rule applies. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily

should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility

determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional

showing of error." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).

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      We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's written

opinion.   The court deferred appropriately to the municipal court judge's

credibility findings and determined after de novo review of the record the State

proved beyond a reasonable doubt defendant was guilty of failure to yield . We

are satisfied there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the

court's conclusions. We add the following comments.

      We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that Officer Albino

provided impermissible expert testimony. In State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187,

197-99 (1989), our Supreme Court upheld the admission of lay opinion

testimony offered by a police officer about the point of impact between two

vehicles based on the officer's personal observations of the accident scene,

including the areas of damage to the vehicles and damage to a grassy shoulder.

As the Court stated, "[c]ourts in New Jersey have permitted police officers to

testify as lay witnesses, based on their personal observations and their long

experience in areas where expert testimony might otherwise be deemed

necessary." Id. at 198. The Court made clear that only in rare cases will

determining the point of impact of a collision "involve such complicated

technical and scientific evidence" that an accident reconstruction expert would

be required. Id. at 199.

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      In this case, Officer Albino testified, based on his personal observations

of the damage to the passenger side of the Ford and the position of the Ford

when he arrived on the scene, that defendant's vehicle sideswiped the Ford while

attempting to make a left turn into the intersection. Based on these observations,

he determined the point of impact indicated the Ford entered the intersection

before defendant's vehicle. The court properly determined Officer Albino's

testimony was not expert testimony and considered the testimony as lay opinion

testimony that was based on the officer's personal observations at the scene.

      Defendant's claim that the State failed to produce discovery because it did

not identify the witnesses it planned to call at trial lacks merit. Rule 7:7-7(b)(7)

requires that defendants be provided with the "names, addresses, and birthdates

of any persons whom the prosecuting attorney knows to have relevant evidence

or information, including a designation . . . as to which of those persons the

prosecuting attorney may call as witnesses." (emphasis added). The Rule does

not compel the State to disclose what witnesses it will call at trial, nor does it

require the identification of witnesses that will not be called at trial. The State

opted to rely solely on the testimony of Officer Albino and was not required to

call additional witnesses.     Defendant does not identify any evidence or

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information the State failed to disclose in discovery, and defendant was aware

of the identities of the witnesses he contends the State failed to call at trial.

      Defendant's contention that the municipal court judge improperly

interfered with the conduct of the trial is not convincing. Pursuant to N.J.R.E.

614(b), "[t]he court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness."

In State v. Medina, 349 N.J. Super. 108, 130-132 (App. Div. 2002), we held,

"[t]rial judges are vested with the authority to propound questions to qualify a

witness's testimony and to elicit material facts . . . ." Significantly, we noted

there was no danger of the judge improperly influencing a jury because it was a

bench trial. Ibid. Here, the municipal court judge asked questions during

Officer Albino's testimony to elicit information he believed he needed as the

fact finder. The municipal court judge did not improperly interfere with the trial

by doing so.

      Defendant's claim that the municipal court judge denied his right to

conduct proper cross-examination is not supported by the record. There were

numerous objections the judge was required to address during the examination,

and the court also sought to clarify certain questions posed by counsel. Counsel,

however, was given all the time she needed to conduct the examination and was

permitted to continue her thorough cross-examination until she was satisfied it

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was completed. The municipal court judge did not curtail defendant's right to

cross-examination.

      To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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