Court Opinion

ID: 9953576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:00:27.383773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.930881
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LISANDRA Y. MONTE,                              DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        NY-0752-22-0106-I-1

             v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: March 21, 2024
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Alan E. Wolin , Esquire, Jericho, New York, for the appellant.

      Krista M. Irons , Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed her removal from Federal service. On petition for review, the appellant
argues that the administrative judge erred by rejecting her constructive
suspension claim and by concluding that the removal penalty was within the
tolerable limits of reasonableness. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one
only in the following circumstances:        the initial decision contains erroneous
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review.   Therefore, we DENY the petition for review.          Except as expressly
MODIFIED to find that the agency proved the charge of failure to follow
instructions and to vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the agency
proved the charge of failure to maintain regular attendance, we AFFIRM the
initial decision.

                    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      Although not raised by either party on petition for review, it appears that
the administrative judge did not render a finding regarding the fourth charge,
failure to follow instructions. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 16, Initial Decision
(ID) at 4-6.    However, the record is sufficiently developed such that we can
evaluate whether the agency has proven this charge. To prove a failure to follow
instructions charge the agency need only show that: (1) the employee was given
proper instructions; and (2) she failed to follow them, regardless of whether the
failure was intentional or unintentional.        Powell v. U.S. Postal Service,
122 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 5 (2014). This charge contained a single specification and
concerned the appellant’s failure to respond to an August 20, 2021 administrative
inquiry letter instructing her to report to duty or to provide documentation
substantiating her absences and a September 9, 2021 administrative interview
                                                                                    3

letter directing her to attend a conference call with agency officials. IAF, Tab 6
at 5, 13-14. The appellant argued below that this charge should not be sustained
because she never received either letter and, thus, was not aware that she was
required to respond to the letters. IAF, Tab 14, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)
(testimony of appellant).
      The administrative judge declined to credit the appellant’s testimony on
this point, concluding that her testimony was inherently improbable because it
directly conflicted with the agency’s documentary evidence, including numerous
mail tracking records confirming receipt of its letters at the appellant’s address of
record. ID at 5 (citing Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458
(1987) (finding a number of factors relevant to credibility determinations ,
including evidence which contradicts or is consistent with a witness’s version of
events and the inherent improbability of a witness’s version)). Specifically, the
administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s claim that the U.S. Postal
Service lost all five copies of the letters that formed the basis for the failure to
follow instructions charge, sent via first class mail, priority mail, and certified
mail to the appellant’s acknowledged address of record, was beyond belief. ID
at 5; IAF, Tab 6 at 28-36, Tab 10 at 18-20; HCD (testimony of appellant).
      The proposing and deciding officials also confirmed in their testimony that
five copies of the letters were sent and confirmed as delivered by various delivery
methods to the appellant’s address of record. HCD (testimony of the deciding
official); id. (testimony of the proposing official).       The appellant has not
challenged these findings on review, and we credit the administrative judge’s
demeanor-based credibility findings. Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs ,
838 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Board must give
“special deference” to an administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility
determinations); Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (finding that the Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s
credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the
                                                                                4

observation of the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may
overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for
doing so).     Accordingly, we modify the initial decision to conclude that the
agency proved the single specification and the charge of failure to follow
instructions by preponderant evidence.
      Regarding the failure to maintain regular attendance charge, the
administrative judge concluded that the agency met its burden of proving the
single specification of this charge. ID at 4-5. A charge of failure to maintain
regular attendance is essentially a charge of excessive absences. See Combs v.
Social Security Administration, 91 M.S.P.R. 148, ¶¶ 11-13 (2002). To establish a
charge of excessive absences, the Board has held that the following criteria must
be met: (1) the employee was absent for compelling reasons beyond her control
so that agency approval or disapproval of leave was immaterial because she could
not be on the job; (2) the absences continued beyond a reasonable time, and the
agency warned the employee that an adverse action could be taken unless she
became available for duty on a regular full-time or part -time basis; and (3) the
agency showed that the position needed to be filled by an employee available for
duty on a regular, full-time or part-time basis. Savage v. Department of the Army,
122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 30 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Pridgen v. Office
of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25 (2022); Cook v. Department
of the Army, 18 M.S.P.R. 610, 611-12 (1984). However, the Board clarified in
Savage that when periods of absence without leave (AWOL) are included within
an agency’s charge of excessive absences, the Board will not consider those
periods under the standard set forth in Cook and instead will only consider them
as an AWOL charge. See Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 32 (2015).
      As in Savage, the dates for which the appellant was charged with a failure
to maintain regular attendance completely overlap with the dates that she was
charged with AWOL, and thus the charge is entirely duplicative of the AWOL
charge.      IAF, Tab 6 at 4-5, 11-13, 37-40.      Accordingly, we vacate the
                                                                                  5

administrative judge’s finding affirming the failure to maintain regular attendance
charge, and we give this charge no further consideration.      ID at 4-5; Savage,
122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 32.
      We nevertheless still conclude that the removal penalty is appropriate. The
Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency
considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within
tolerable limits of reasonableness.       Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant
to penalty determinations and observing that the Board’s review of an
agency-imposed penalty is essentially to assure that the agency conscientiously
considered the relevant factors and struck a responsible balance within tolerable
limits of reasonableness).   The Board will give due weight to the agency’s
primary discretion in matters of employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing
that the Board’s function is not to displace management responsibility but to
assure that managerial judgment has been properly exercised. Id. at 302.
      When, as here, the Board sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges,
and the agency either indicates that it would have imposed the same penalty based
on the sustained charges, or does not indicate to the contrary, the Board’s role is
not to independently determine the penalty but to decide whether the agency’s
choice of penalty is appropriate. Negron v. Department of Justice, 95 M.S.P.R.
561, ¶ 32 (2004) (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir.
1999)); see Blank v. Department of the Army, 85 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 9 (2000)
(explaining that when not all of the agency’s charges are sustained and the agency
has not indicated it desires a lesser penalty under this eventuality, the Board may
presume that the agency desires the maximum reasonable penalty and must
examine whether the agency-imposed penalty is within the maximum limits of
reasonableness), aff’d, 247 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001).        The Board cannot
“substitute its will” for that of the agency, which is entrusted with managing its
workforce. Negron, 95 M.S.P.R. 561, ¶ 32 (quoting Lachance, 178 F.3d at 1258).
                                                                                  6

Rather, the Board “may mitigate an unreasonably severe agency penalty to bring
the penalty within the bounds of reasonableness.”         Id. (quoting Lachance,
178 F.3d at 1258). Nothing in the record indicates that the agency desires a lesser
penalty if not all of the charges are sustained.    We must therefore determine
whether the removal penalty is within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.
      In evaluating the reasonableness of a penalty, the Board will consider, first
and foremost, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its relation to the
employee’s duties, positions, and responsibilities, including whether the offense
was intentional or was frequently repeated.     Saiz v. Department of the Navy,
122 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 11 (2015).        Moreover, agencies are entitled to hold
supervisors to a higher standard than nonsupervisors because they occupy
positions of trust and responsibility.       Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service,
116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010).       As the administrative judge observed, the
deciding official specifically identified the applicable Douglas factors, including
the appellant’s lack of past discipline and her 15 years of service. ID at 7; IAF,
Tab 6 at 5; HCD (testimony of the deciding official).       The deciding official
testified that these mitigating factors nevertheless did not outweigh the
seriousness of the appellant’s unscheduled absences and her failure to request
leave for over 9 months, particularly in light her role as a supervisor who was
expected to set an example for subordinate employees. ID at 7; HCD (testimony
of the deciding official). Consequently, he concluded that he had lost confidence
in the appellant and that given the egregiousness of her misconduct, there were no
alternatives to removal. HCD (testimony of the deciding official).
      Additionally, the Board has regularly found that the sustained offenses are
serious and has upheld the penalty of removal for similar instances of
misconduct. See Thom v. Department of the Army, 114 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶¶ 2, 7
(2010) (upholding a removal penalty for 1 month of AWOL, despite considering
the appellant’s medical conditions as a mitigating factor); Hernandez v.
Department of Agriculture, 83 M.S.P.R. 371, ¶¶ 2, 9 (1999) (finding that failure
                                                                                      7

to follow instructions is a serious charge); Wilkinson v. Department of the Air
Force, 68 M.S.P.R. 4, 7 (1995) (acknowledging that a failure to follow leave
requesting procedures can be a serious act of misconduct); Maddux v. Department
of the Air Force, 68 M.S.P.R. 644, 645-46 (1995) (upholding the appellant’s
removal for 21 consecutive calendar days of AWOL, despite 20 years of Federal
service); Hawkins v. Department of the Navy, 49 M.S.P.R. 501, 503, 507 (1991)
(finding that the penalty of removal was reasonable for 16 days of AWOL for an
appellant with no prior discipline and 6 years of service). Based on the specific
facts of this case, we conclude that the agency’s chosen penalty is within the
tolerable limits of reasonableness.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

2
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                  9

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     10

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 3   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439
3
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              11

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.