Court Opinion

ID: 9660542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:15:27.61764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.349705
License: Public Domain

R. Baker, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the reinstatement of child support for the adult child was in error and must be reversed. I also agree to affirm the award of attorney’s fees. However, I dissent from the majority’s opinion on two points. I would not hold that the trial court erred in: (1) ordering Gregory to pay $300 per month to Breanne as long as she attends college as a full-time student, away from home; and (2) directing the court to determine on remand the source of funds from which Linda may have paid any of Breanne’s medical payments. First, the majority’s opinion ignores the existence of Gregory’s obligation to pay “expenses associated with attending college.” The parties’ settlement agreement addressed appellant’s financial obligation for the time the parties’ two daughters attend college. It reads: Defendant is to be actively involved in the selection of colleges for the children to attend. Defendant agrees to pay for books, tuition and expenses associated with attending college, which are not covered by scholarship funds, for the children. Payments are to be made directly to the provider or to the child, upon presentation to the Defendant of a statement setting out the expense involved. (Emphasis added.) The majority acknowledges that the trial court found that Gregory had agreed to pay for “some other expenses” in addition to Breanne’s tuition and books not covered by scholarship funds yet concludes that “[t]here is simply no provision in the agreement for such an allowance.” I cannot reconcile that conclusion with the plain language of the agreement providing for payment of “expenses associated with attending college.” Neither can I accept the majority’s statement that there is “no evidence to support this award other than Linda’s testimony.” The majority acknowledges that Linda’s testimony supports the award, but does not credit her testimony. This is a credibility determination in which we should defer to the trial court. In cases involving child custody and related matters such as support, we review the case de novo, but we will not reverse a trial judge’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Deluca v. Stapleton, 79 Ark. App. 138, 84 S.W.3d 892 (2002). Although there is evidence to support it, a finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Smith v. Parker, 67 Ark. App. 221, 998 S.W.2d 1 (1999). Because the question of whether the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we give special deference to the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the witnesses and their testimony. Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002). A review of the trial court’s order indicates that in addition to the $300 each month, the reinstatement of child support was intended to enforce the divorce-decree provision requiring appellant to pay college expenses for Breanne. The order provides that Gregory Rogers will pay child support for Breanne “until she receives her undergraduate degree” and that “Breanne Rogers, an adult child, is disabled, and . . . has special needs because of her academic pursuits.” The court ordered Gregory Rogers to pay for books and tuition, not covered by scholarship funds, “in addition to child support for Breanne Rogers, and the sum of $300 on or before the 1st day of each month, so long as she attends college as a full-time student, away from her home, with said payments to be paid directly to Breanne Rogers.” These statements indicate that the child support was intended to address Gregory Rogers’ financial obligation to provide college expenses pursuant to the divorce decree. Nevertheless, reinstating child support for the oldest child was not an appropriate means to enforce the decree. Therefore, I would remand on the issue of college expenses and instruct the trial court to determine Breanne’s “expenses associated with attending college” and order those be paid in accordance with the decree. Second, I dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion directing the court to determine on remand the source from which Linda may have paid any of Breanne’s medical expenses. The majority instructs the trial court to determine whether Linda used her personal funds or if any payment was made from the insurance settlement awarded to Breanne for her injury. The majority’s reason for this requirement is the divorce decree’s provision that Gregory would carry medical insurance on the minor children and that each party would be equally responsible for the children’s medical bills “not covered by insurance.” The majority suggests that because the phrase “not covered by insurance” does not designate “the type of insurance,” the parties specifically contemplated in their original agreement that insurance from any source for any reason would relieve Gregory from his obligation. I disagree with that premise. Nothing in this record indicates that any part of Breanne’s settlement was designated for medical payments. She incurred the injuries and bills while still a minor. Appellant is still equally liable for medical bills not covered by his insurance. However, I would remand on this point because there is no finding that appellee paid the bills prior to the hearing. Therefore, I would remand for the court to consider whether appellant should be required to reimburse appellee or to pay the medical providers directly. For the forgoing reasons, I would remand on the issues of college expenses and medical bills. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion on those issues. Stroud, C.J., joins.