Court Opinion

ID: 9605289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:33:11.090873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:27.103263
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in Justice Richardson’s dissent which focuses on the trial court’s finding that defendant’s release would pose a threat to society. In addition, I believe that the court said all that it needed to say on the issue of “likelihood of flight.” For convenience I repeat its statement of reasons with respect to this issue below.1 Clearly this is more than adequate to permit meaningful review.
What, in truth, the majority demands is not the type of finding on which meaningful review may be based—a finding of ultimate fact—but a recital of the evidentiary bits and pieces on which the finding of ultimate fact is based. That, however, is not what we were talking about in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12]. What we found lacking in that case is precisely what this record contains: a finding of ultimate fact “to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and the ultimate decision or order.” (Ibid.)
The ultimate decision in this case was, of course: “Bail denied.” Had the court said nothing else, it would have erred. I think it probably would also have erred had it merely said: “Bail denied—likelihood of flight.” It gave, however, several reasons for its denial, among others a statement that because of the severity of the sentence the defendant was likely to flee. That is a finding of fact which supports the decision. We can meaningfully review it by going through the record and determining whether there is evidence to support the finding—as *210we do in almost every other case where a finding is attacked for insufficiency.2 Indeed, that is precisely what the majority appears to have done in this case when it declared itself “reluctant to find that the trial court abused its discretion. ...” (Ante, p. 203.)
I would deny the writ.
Broussard, J., concurred.

“I do find and I am persuaded that there is some substantial flight risk at this point in time, [fl We’re in a different ballgame now. He knows he’s been sentenced to prison for a substantial period of time and I think he, in good faith, and probably with some reason, perhaps, was hopeful that was not going to be the judgment of the court, and maybe anticipated up to this point in time that that wouldn’t be the judgment, but that question has been resolved now, and he knows exactly what the judgment of the court is, and I think that makes—changes the situation substantially, and I’m persuaded that he wouldn’t give much pause to flee, because I’m sure he’s not at all happy about the prospect of spending some time in prison, even though he’ll be, if not literally, at least to some extent, in the company of Big Frank, his mentor, the one he admires so much.”

There are special situations where a statute mandates that the trial court go beyond findings of ultimate fact. One which comes to mind is the granting of a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657; Scala v. Jerry Witt & Sons, Inc. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 359 [90 Cal.Rptr. 592, 475 P.2d 464].) The reasons for that requirement, explained at length in Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 112-116 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315], are, of course, not present here.