Court Opinion

ID: 9592918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:17:57.918322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:26.940754
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
1. It should be noted that the analysis undertaken in this case and in the cases cited did not examine the reaches of the Georgia Constitution. It may not be coextensive with the Georgia statute or with the Federal Constitution’s provision regarding search and seizure as construed by the United States Supreme Court from time to time.
The motion to suppress asserted that the weapon was obtained “in violation of the accused’s rights under Article 1, Sec 1, Para. 13 of the Georgia Constitution [1983] and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.” However, at the hearing, the defendant stood on the limitations of the statute authorizing search pursuant to lawful arrest in certain circumstances, OCGA § 17-5-1, and on the Federal Constitution and recent Georgia cases applying federal constitutional principles, especially as articulated in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (101 SC 2860, 69 LE2d 768) (1981). The Georgia Bill of Rights provision was not pursued. The trial court decided the motion on the federal ground without any express ruling or the state statutory ground.
On appeal defendant argues that the Georgia statute is more re strictive than is the Fourth Amendment, as construed by the Unitec States Supreme Court particularly in Belton, and that the motiorB should have been granted on this state-law-based ground. He citel State v. Camp, 175 Ga. App. 591, 593 (1) (333 SE2d 896) (1985) which acknowledged that state statute and Federal Constitution mal set different standards. Although it also pointed out that state constil tutional guarantees are not necessarily the same as the federal, thal independent ground was abandoned in this case as well as in Camp
*183I do not suggest that the thirteenth paragraph of the Constitution of Georgia is more or less restrictive of police or more or less protective of citizens than is the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Cf. Oswell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 35 (351 SE2d 221) (1986). I suggest only that it was not explored as a basis for the motion, and thus we do not consider it.
2. Insofar as State v. Tinsley, 194 Ga. App. 350 (390 SE2d 289) (1) (1990), addresses the federal constitutional claim, it is not relevant to the issue before us. A federal claim is not raised. Whether the search violated the state statute is the question. Tinsley rejects Mobley v. State, 130 Ga. App. 80 (1) (202 SE2d 465) (1973)1 and Rowland v. State, 117 Ga. App. 577 (161 SE2d 422) (1968), as controlling on the state statute issue. It construes the state statute in light of the federal construction of the Federal Constitution in Belton and implicitly finds no violation of the statute.
Another case cited by the majority, Medlin v. State, 168 Ga. App. 551 (2) (309 SE2d 639) (1983), does the same thing. In determining that OCGA § 17-5-1 was not violated, the court measured the search by the federal standard of Belton.
I do not discern in appellant’s brief, or in his argument in the lower court for that matter, any contention or suggestion that the arresting officer make two inquiries or attempt to apply two separate standards before searching. Appellant merely urges, correctly, that the officer must abide by whatever is the most restrictive law applicable to his activities. If the state statute or the State Constitution is more demanding than the Federal Constitution, then he is bound by the former and need not be concerned with the latter because it is automatically subsumed. The thrust of appellant’s argument is that ;ven if Belton, that is, the United States Supreme Court interpreta-ion of the Fourth Amendment in automobile searches, is satisfied, Georgia law must also be satisfied. The Supreme Court in Belton did lot establish a “single standard” for both state and federal law, but ather a single federal constitutional standard which is applicable in til states insofar as the Federal Constitution is concerned. The “disar-ay” it sought to resolve was federal constitutional disarray which had merged from court decisions around the country. It did not, and does Hot, and cannot, prohibit state laws, by state legislative enactments or ■tate common law development, from protecting individual rights Haore stringently. That is the nature of federalism. The policeman Heed only learn and apply one standard, the highest standard com-Helled by our dual system of laws.
*184Decided March 15, 1991.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, James B. McClung, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Since our Court has concluded that compliance with Belton principles meets the strictures of OCGA § 17-5-1, I am constrained to concur in the affirmance of the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 327 (1) (297 SE2d 237) (1982), without analyzing the strictures of OCGA § 17-5-1,2 and dwelling briefly only on the arrest statute and finding it “to be the same as the federal rule,” summarily held that “[a]n arrest and search, legal under federal law, are legal under state law.”

 Overruled on other grounds sub nom. Patterson v. State, 238 Ga. 204 (232 SE2d 233) (1977).

 It is not evident whether the appellant invoked OCGA § 17-5-1 expressly.