Court Opinion

ID: 9467280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:44:19.331419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:16.004040
License: Public Domain

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I am in complete agreement with the thorough, well reasoned opinion of Judge Moore. However, in view of the able and forceful opinion of our dissenting colleague, I believe that I should set forth in some detail certain further observations concerning the trial court’s exclusion of the so-called stipulated material facts.
*78As an initial matter, I agree with the dissent’s characterization of Eastern’s primary defense at trial, that any negligence on the part of Eastern’s management, its ground employees, or the crew of E--66 did not play a substantial causative role in the crash. Of course, although the jury’s verdict for plaintiffs is inconsistent with a finding that any negligence on the part of the Government was the sole proximate cause of the disaster, the jury in reaching the plaintiffs’ verdict could have found that the Government was negligent and that this negligence was a substantial causative factor in the crash. I do not read the dissent to suggest, nor did Eastern contend at trial, that such a finding of concurrent causation, given the facts of this case, either would be an impermissible inference for the jury to draw or would be contrary to settled case law. See, e. g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931, 88 S.Ct. 295, 19 L.Ed.2d 292 (1968) (Government’s negligent failure to provide up-to date weather information to crew of plane attempting landing approach held to be proximate and concurrent cause of resulting accident).
Turning now to the issue of the trial court’s exclusion of the so-called stipulated material facts, Eastern’s argument at first blush appears to be as follows: that a certain bundle of facts existed in this case, which were agreed to by plaintiffs and Eastern, but disputed by the Government; that the trial court permitted plaintiffs to read to the jury, as stipulated facts, facts from this bundle; and that when Eastern subsequently attempted to avail itself of this same privilege, it was stymied by the adverse ruling of the trial court. In essence, Eastern appears to allege some violation of “fundamental fairness” brought about by the trial court’s abrupt switching of the rules after plaintiffs had presented their case.
My examination of the underlying facts, however, indicates that the trial court, rather than treating two apparently similar sets of facts differently, merely refused to afford similar treatment to two apparently different sets of facts. As already noted by Judge Moore, all but three of the facts which plaintiffs requested be stipulated were admitted, without reservation or qualification, by the plaintiffs, by Eastern, and by the Government. Although the Supplementary Stipulation identified the remaining three facts as “in dispute,” a closer look at the background of these three “exceptions” leads me to conclude that two of these facts were mischaracterized as being in dispute, and that the third would not have been treated as stipulated but for Eastern’s failure to make an objection at trial to plaintiffs’ request.
The two allegations which the Supplementary Stipulation mischaracterized as “in dispute,” together with the relevant responses of both Eastern and the Government, are reproduced in full in the margin.1 Surely, the only sense in which the Government “disputed” these allegations was in attempting to limit the Government’s admissions to the plainly literal language of the statements propounded by the plaintiffs. Whatever the latent implications were that the Government perceived lurking in these statements which prompted it to hedge its admissions, the Government at least admitted the literal truth of these allegations, and nothing suggests that the plaintiffs alleged these facts to establish *79anything more than their literal truth. We would have to avert our gaze from reality to maintain that the classification of these facts in the Supplementary Stipulation as being “in dispute” accurately reflects the positions of the three original parties to this lawsuit.
The remaining allegation 2 follows a truly unusual course. When this allegation first appeared as Stipulation 41a in the Third Stipulation of Facts, all parties agreed that it was a true statement. (App. p. A51). When the exact same words were repeated as Allegation 26a in plaintiffs’ pre-trial brief, both Eastern and the Government denied that it was a true statement.3 (App. p. A102; p. A122; p. A127). By the time the Supplementary Stipulation was executed, only Eastern persisted in its denial of this statement. (App. p. A145(b)). Finally, when plaintiffs’ counsel sought to have this statement read to the jury as a stipulated fact, counsel for Eastern made no objection. (App. p. 759). Under these circumstances, I would conclude that at a minimum Eastern failed to prove that this allegation was not admitted by the Government at the time the plaintiffs requested that it be stipulated. Furthermore, not only did Eastern fail to call the trial court’s attention to the fact that the Government, on one prior occasion, had denied this statement, but Eastern also failed to object on the transparently obvious ground that its own denial of this statement presumably still continued in effect. As a consequence, Eastern should not now be heard to complain that this statement was improperly treated as stipulated.
To my mind, therefore, these three “exceptions” are actually not “exceptions” at all. Every fact treated as stipulated at plaintiffs’ request properly may be regarded as facts upon which all three original parties to the lawsuit either were in agreement, or to which they waived previous objections.4 Thus, the heart of Eastern’s argument, as accurately presented by the dissent, may be addressed: that apparently different sets of facts (/. e., those upon which plaintiffs and Eastern agreed, but upon which the Government did not agree) really are not different at all, because the distinguishing factor (/. e., the Government’s acquiescence or non-acquiescence) has become irrelevant due to the Government’s intervening decision to settle with the plaintiffs and its resulting withdrawal from continued participation in the lawsuit. Respectfully, I must disagree with this argument, and so, with my dissenting colleague’s acceptance of it.
One could hardly quarrel with the dissent’s observation that where parties agree among themselves to certain facts, those facts properly are regarded as stipulated and will be binding upon the parties. Nevertheless, I would submit that if the development of this case is kept in perspec*80tive, the trial court’s refusal to treat facts “agreed to” between plaintiffs and Eastern as stipulated is readily explainable and fully justified. Both the explanation and the justification become apparent once the necessary effects on the plaintiffs’ trial strategy of the Government’s presence (and subsequent absence) as a defendant in the case are recognized.
Initially, the plaintiffs instituted this lawsuit against both Eastern and the Government on a joint tortfeasors’ theory of liability. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the very nature of a joint tortfeasors’ theory of liability partially alters the usual adversarial relationship between the plaintiff and each individual defendant. Normally, a plaintiff who aggressively presents his case against a single defendant will not thereby confer any unintentional benefits on any other defendant. Where a plaintiff proceeds under a joint tortfeasors’ theory of liability, and thus is required simultaneously to present his case against numerous defendants, this is not so. A plaintiff in such a situation must walk a tactical tightrope; if he presents too strong a case against one defendant, he runs the risk of exculpating the remaining defendants.
In the pre-trial stages of this litigation, plaintiffs expected to find themselves walking such a tightrope, and planned their trial strategy (including the formulation of allegations) to be consistent with a joint tort-feasors’ theory of liability. However, on the scheduled starting date of the trial a “dramatic change of circumstances” occurred: the Government decided not to contest its liability to the plaintiffs, and consequently withdrew from further participation in the trial. From this point forward, the plaintiffs literally had no case against the Government. Nevertheless, the dissent apparently would require the trial court to ignore this necessary result of the Government’s actions by forcing the plaintiffs to continue to adhere to their allegations of Government negligence long after the only reason for making such allegations (/. e., the Government’s presence at trial as a defendant) had disappeared.
In support of Eastern’s position the dissent maintains that, by withdrawing, the Government has made irrelevant its previous denials of plaintiffs’ allegations of Government negligence. I would agree, but would take this observation one step farther: by withdrawing, the Government also has made plaintiffs’ allegations of Government negligence irrelevant. Plainly, the Government’s withdrawal transformed this litigation into a contest solely between plaintiffs and Eastern. The trial court’s denial of Eastern’s request to treat certain facts, which would have conclusively established the Government’s negligence, as stipulated, merely recognized the logical effect of the Government’s withdrawal upon the positions of the parties who actually proceeded to trial. I fail to see, given the Government’s unexpected last-minute withdrawal, how fairness is served by freezing plaintiffs into their pre-trial strategic posture. To the contrary, both fairness and common sense support the decision of the trial court on this matter.5
*81Several other minor points remain to be addressed. The charge given by the trial court concerning the respective duties of the pilot and the air traffic controllers was wholly proper. Contrary to the dissent’s position, a jury so charged could have found, provided they believed that the pilot and crew of E-66 conducted themselves reasonably in light of the weather conditions they could have perceived,6 that the air traffic controllers’ failure to perform their duties was the sole proximate cause of the accident. I would also take exception to the dissent’s characterization of the res ipsa loquitur charge. The plain language of this charge seems clearly to instruct the jury that they could not apply the res ipsa doctrine against Eastern unless they had first ruled out the possibility that the accident had been caused by factors beyond Eastern’s control.7 Finally, the curative instruction given by the trial court, concerning the respective treatment the jury was to give “live” and deposition testimony, conveys substantially the same information as the charge requested by Eastern.8 Inasmuch as Eastern’s proposed charge did not make mention of the finer points of F.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3)(B), the trial court did not commit error, prejudicial or otherwise, by failing to include such information in the instructions to the jury.
In conclusion, although I do not claim that this was a perfect trial, I agree with Judge Moore that whatever errors may have occurred did not affect the substantial rights of Eastern. Accordingly, I join in his *82affirmance of the judgment of liability entered against Eastern in the court below.

. “14. Eastern 66 was being piloted by the co-piiot during the approach and up to the initial impact of the crash.” (App. p. A100) [Eastern] “14. Admitted.” (App. p. A121) [Government] “14. Admitted, except that the pilot remained in final authority and had full responsibility for the safety of the flight pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 91.3, 121.533.” (App. p. A126)
“17. On June 24, 1975, during the flight and at the time of the crash, all of Eastern 66’s jet engines were operating properly.” (App. p. A101)
[Eastern] “17. Admitted.” (App. p. A12I) [Government] “17. Admitted, except that it is denied that the pilot and/or co-pilot were operating the engines properly with respect to a proper positioning of the thrust levers at various states of the approach.” (App. p. A126)

. “26. On June 24, 1975, at Kennedy Airport, the instrument landing system (ILS)
(a) for Runway 22Left was operating properly with the published restriction that the glide slope was unusable below 200 feet mean sea level;” (App. p. A102)

. The Government’s denial is all the more puzzling in view of its admission (App. p. A126) of the following two allegations:
“23. On June 24, 1975, landing aids associated with Runway 22L were:
a. high intensity runway lights;
b. a high intensity approach lighting system with sequence flashing lights;
c. an ILS localizer;
d. an ILS glide slope;
e. a middle marker;
f. an outer marker.”
“24. During the flight and at the time of the crash of Eastern 66, the landing aids associated with Runway 22L were operating properly.”
Allegation 26a seems to be a logical extension of Allegations 23 and 24. This apparent relationship was not ignored by Eastern: it admitted 23, but denied both 24 and 26. (App. pp. A121-22)

. At this point, I emphasize Judge Moore’s observation that plaintiffs were willing to permit Eastern to treat facts of a similar nature (i. e., those upon which all three original parties to the lawsuit had agreed) as stipulated. Eastern, however, apparently adopted an “all or nothing” position. Therefore, to the extent that certain facts that Eastern sought to have stipulated may have been of an identical nature to those stipulated at plaintiffs’ request, any failure to treat such facts as stipulated is traceable to the intransigent position adopted by Eastern on this issue.

. The dissent implies that the trial court’s decision somehow has enabled the plaintiffs to escape shouldering their full burden of proof at trial. In so doing, the dissent appears to misstate the burden of proof the plaintiffs would have had to meet had the case gone to trial with both Eastern and the Government as defendants. In such a situation, the plaintiffs would have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that conduct on the part of both Eastern and the Government had been negligent, and that the negligence of each defendant had been a substantial proximate cause of the disaster. In accomplishing this, however, the plaintiffs would not have had to anticipate and rebut any affirmative defenses available to either defendant. If either defendant had sought to absolve itself of liability on the ground that the negligence of the other defendant was the sole proximate cause of the disaster, each defendant would have borne the burden of establishing each element of its affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In other words, the same allocation of burden of proof prevails as in the case of a plaintiff proceeding against a single defendant.
It is true that if both defendants in this case had proceeded to trial, each could have expected plaintiffs’ help in introducing evidence (of the other defendant’s negligence) to serve as the foundation upon which each could begin the construction of an affirmative defense, and *81the trial court’s decision merely recognizes that such aid is forthcoming only because of the inherent nature of a joint tortfeasors’ situation. Although such aid properly could be characterized as a windfall to each defendant in such a situation, the same characterization is a most inappropriate way of describing a ruling that places the burden of introducing evidence to establish all elements of an affirmative defense upon the defendant who is asserting it.
On a related point, I do not read Judge Moore’s opinion to suggest that no prejudice results if a defendant is given the opportunity to prove facts that properly should have been treated as stipulated. In fact, Judge Moore specifically stated that the trial court’s exclusion of these so-called stipulated facts was correct, a conclusion with which I completely agree. The fact that Eastern was permitted to, and did, introduce at trial evidence of the Government’s negligence merely dispels the notion that the trial court deprived Eastern of the right to assert an available defense. As the presentation of Eastern’s case at trial demonstrates, the trial court’s ruling went no further than holding that certain topics that are appropriate topics for proof at trial were, under the circumstances of this case, inappropriate subjects for stipulation.

. The trial court reinforced this concept in another portion of its charge to the jury (in language which the court took almost verbatim from Eastern’s requested charge):
Negligence requires both a foreseeable danger of injury to another and conduct unreasonable in proportion to the danger. Eastern Air Lines is not liable to the plaintiffs for the consequences of its acts or omissions unless the risk of injury to the plaintiffs was reasonably foreseeable....
If a reasonably prudent person could not foresee any injury as a result of his conduct, or if his conduct was reasonable in light of what he could foresee, there is no negligence. On the other hand, if a reasonably prudent person could foresee injury as a result of his conduct, and if his conduct was unreasonable in the light of what he could foresee, there is negligence.
App. pp. 2941-2.

. In concluding the res ipsa charge, the trial court specifically instructed the jury:
However, as I have already told you, this is an inference [of Eastern’s negligence] you may draw [using the res ipsa doctrine] but are not required to draw and, in any event, cannot draw if, taking into consideration all of the evidence in the case, you conclude that the accident was not due to any negligence on [Eastern’s] part.
App. p. 2931 (emphasis added).

. In essence, Eastern requested the court to charge the jury that they should draw no adverse inferences from the fact that a witness testified by deposition, and that such deposition testimony should be given no less weight than testimony offered by live witnesses. App. p. 3241.
Judge Moore’s opinion already sets forth the relevant portion of the charge actually given to the jury. I fail to grasp why an instruction to the jury that deposition and live testimony are to be considered, judged as to credibility, and weighed on a strictly equal basis fails to preclude any possibility that the jury will draw adverse inferences from, or attach less weight to, deposition testimony.