Court Opinion

ID: 9698837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:01:00.49062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:06.598221
License: Public Domain

ALLBEE, Justice (dissenting).
I am constrained to dissent from division I and the result.
During the early hours of May 13, 1978, eight diesel radiator cores were stolen from a boxcar of the Chicago and North Western Transportation Company at its Council Bluffs yard. Defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of theft in the second degree. Of the eight cores stolen, one was new and seven were rebuilt. Defendant contends that trial court erred in the admission of evidence pertaining to the ostensible value of the rebuilt cores. I agree.
Defendant correctly points out that the storekeeper witness disclaimed knowledge of whether there is within the Council Bluffs community a normal market value for rebuilt diesel radiator cores. In addition, the prosecution failed to offer any evidence that there was indeed no ascertainable normal market value for the rebuilt cores within that community at the time of the theft. Consequently, this court is confronted with the dilemma of whether evidence bearing only upon actual value was relevant when there had been no showing that a normal market value did not exist.
I believe that section 714.3 coupled with our own precedent concisely summarized in State v. Boyken, 217 N.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Iowa 1974), mandate that we adhere to the requirement that normal market value is the measure for determining the value of stolen property unless the evidence discloses that the property has no such market value. Supportive of this view, 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 118, at 619 (1968) comments: “[I]t is well settled that evidence of any other valuation but the market value of stolen property has been held inadmissible unless it is first shown that there is no market value.”
Here, trial court, in admitting the storekeeper’s testimony with respect to value, apparently acted under the impression that there was no market value for rebuilt radiator cores, as that court relied on State v. Strum, 184 Iowa 1165, 169 N.W. 373 (1918). In Strum, however, contrary to this case, direct testimony was given that there was no market value for the items stolen. Accordingly, in Strum, evidence of original cost was admissible for the jury’s consideration in determining the value of the subject property when stolen. Id. at 1167-70, 169 N.W. at 374-75.
Turning now to several specific elements of this court’s opinion, I first note a quotation from the record relied upon to establish that there was evidence of fair market value. What troubles me about the quoted segment is that the question as originally propounded by the prosecutor was changed when it was purportedly restated. This can be seen on examination of the full sequence of questions, objection and answers.
MR. CARR: Okay. Do you, now, have an opinion as to the value of a rebuilt radiator core, such as the seven in question in this case?
MR. LAUBENTHAL: Yes or no, Your Honor, please.
MR. CARR: Do you have an opinion; yes or no?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Just a personal opinion.
MR. CARR: What is your opinion?
*510MR. LAUBENTHAL: Object, Your Honor. There has not been any proper and sufficient foundation laid as regards to the witness to give testimony as regards to the alleged fair and reasonable market value of the seven used radiator cores. There has been no foundation laid if he’s acquainted with the market place as regards to them. As a matter of fact, he indicates he is not so acquainted, and that his particular firm has not gone into the market to buy and sell such matters, and he has not either; and that would be the test of fair and reasonable market of value.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. CARR: You may answer. You stated you have an opinion. My question, now, is what is your opinion of the fair market value of a rebuilt radiator core?
THE WITNESS: Yes. Even though the rebuilt radiator core is somewhat— the life of it is somewhat less than a new one, I would say it would run approximately $25 less than what a new one would. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly, the witness’s value testimony was premised upon solely his personal opinion and not upon any perceptions about its market value.
Next, the court .claims that even if it assumes that the witness did not testify as to market value, his testimony was nonetheless sufficient to establish value because the need for market value testimony was obviated by two factors: the witness’s position as owner of the property and the uniqueness of the property.
As to the first factor, I agree that the general rule is that an owner may be permitted to testify concerning the value of his stolen property without a prior showing of his knowledge of market value. However, as the court points out, this rule is based on a presumption that the owner knows what his property is worth. Under Iowa law and the law of other jurisdictions, the presumption of owner competency is rebuttable, not conclusive. Thus, if the owner admits having no knowledge of market value, where that is the exclusive standard, the presumption should fail. See, e. g., State v. Ireton, 193 Kan. 206, 212-13, 392 P.2d 883, 887-88 (1964) (Fontron, J., dissenting); Cofflin v. State, 230 Md. 139, 142-44, 186 A.2d 216, 218-19 (1962); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 967, 985-87 (1954); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(116), at 434 (1964). In Ryan v. Cooper, 201 Iowa 220, 224, 205 N.W. 302, 303 (1925), this court stated that the general rule of owner competency “only accepts the proof of ownership as prima-facie proof of qualification, in the absence of negative circumstances.” Because the owner witness in Ryan knew only what he had paid for the item in question and cross-examination revealed that he had never otherwise investigated its value, the trial court’s ruling, dismissing the counterclaim for want of proof of value, was upheld. Accord, Anderson Savings Bank v. Hopkins, 195 Iowa 655, 657-58, 192 N.W. 824, 826 (1923) (upholding trial court’s granting motion to strike value testimony of witness who was owner of property but lacked knowledge of its market value). Even assuming that the storekeeper witness did qualify as an owner, as the court finds, I would hold that the presumption of his competency to testify regarding value was rebutted by his admissions of ignorance of market value. By holding otherwise, the court has, in effect, established an invalid conclusive presumption of owner competency.
As to the second factor, I again agree with the general rule that evidence of actual value is sufficient to prove value if there is no regularly established market. I reject the assertion, however, that this court may judicially notice for the first time on appeal that an item has no regularly established market. By taking this view, the court is taking judicial notice of a fact assumed by the trial judge but not made a part of the record. This contravenes the law of this state. See, e. g., In re Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 1971). See also Iowa R.Civ.P. 136(d) (facts of which court is to be asked to take judicial notice to be considered at pretrial conference).
Moreover, I do not believe that the absence of a market for rebuilt radiator cores *511is a matter of common knowledge or capable of certain verification such that it is susceptible of judicial notice. See, e. g., Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transportation, 251 N.W.2d 510, 517 (Iowa 1977); In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1974).
The cases which the court cites as authority for the principle that an appellate court may apply judicial notice to resolve valuation issues involve mainly valuations of household goods. The valuation of household goods in this and other jurisdictions has been subject to less strict proof requirements. The reason for this is two-fold. First, items such as household goods and wearing apparel have market values which are thought to be commonly known. See, e. g., Tubbs v. Garrison, 68 Iowa 44, 48, 25 N.W. 921, 923 (1885). Secondly, evidence of the secondhand market value of particular household items is often difficult to procure. See, e. g., Jeffries v. Snyder, 110 Iowa 359, 362, 81 N.W. 678, 679 (1900).
While these reasons may' provide some justification for taking judicial notice of the absence of market value of household goods, they do not defend the judicial notice taken here. Simply stated, we have no way of knowing whether or not a market for rebuilt diesel radiator cores exists.
What we are faced with here is the prosecutor’s failure to lay foundation for the admission of value evidence other than market value. I am not willing to avoid that failure by the employment of rationale that ignore the mandate of section 714.3 and the teachings of our own cases.
REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, J., join in this dissent.