Court Opinion

ID: 9491169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:05:40.786415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:33.283543
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In enacting the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub.L. No. 95-297, 92 Stat. 322 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841) (hereinafter PMPA), “Congress did not intend to intrude courts into the marketplace.” Sandlin v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc., 900 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th Cir.1990). Rather, Congress enacted the PMPA “to equalize the ... disparity in bargaining power” between gasoline station franchisors and franchisees. Doebereiner v. Sohio Oil Co., 880 F.2d 329, 331 (11th Cir.1989) (citing S.Rep. No. 95-731 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873), amended on rehearing, 893 F.2d 1275 (11th Cir.1990). Regrettably, this court’s opinion thwarts the intent of Congress by effectively tipping the bargaining scales in favor of the franchisee, and thrusting courts (at least in this circuit) into the franchise relationship.
To be sure, the question of whether a franchisor’s offer to sell is “bona fide” as required by the PMPA, see 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D), addresses the fairness of the franchisor’s treatment of the franchisee under an objective standard. See Sandlin, 900 F.2d at 1481. By requiring a “bona fide offer to sell,” Congress undoubtedly intended to protect the franchisee from an unreasonably high offer price which would preclude the franchisee’s purchase of the business and frustrate the franchisee’s expectation of continuing the franchise relationship. See id. at 1482 (defining fair market value as “the highest price a willing buyer would pay”) (emphasis added). Yet there can be little doubt that Congress’ did not use the term “bona fide,” with its notions of subjective good faith, see Roberts v. Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir.1984), to place the franchisor at an obvious disadvantage. Rather, Congress’ use of the term “bona fide” suggests that courts afford “some degree of deference” to a franchisor’s valuation of its property. Slatky v. Amoco Oil Co., 830 F.2d 476, 485 (3d Cir.1987) (en banc) (emphasis added). Otherwise, the PMPA would afford no protection to the franchisor’s legitimate property rights and economic interests. While in this case the court’s opinion gives lip service to Amoco’s legitimate rights and interests, it effectively ignores them. Surely this was not Congress’ intent.
This court’s decision turns solely upon the disparity between Amoco’s final independent appraisal of $132,000 and Rhodes’ independent appraisal of $77,500. Twenty-three years of law practice taught me, however, that independent appraisers will typically appraise the value of property consistent with their clients’ wishes, using the method of appraisal which most benefits their clients’ interests. This is so because “the word ‘value’ almost always involves conjecture, a guess, a prediction, a prophecy.” Amerada Hess Corp., v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir.1975) (internal quotations omitted). “[Tjhere is no universally infallible index of fair market value. All valuation is necessarily an approximation.” Id. After today, I can envision few cases in this circuit where a disgruntled franchisee will be unable to generate an appraisal sufficiently disparate from the franchisor’s to require a jury trial, despite the ongoing objective good faith efforts of the franchisor to reach an agreement. Thus, a franchisor will “rarely rest comfortably” that its offer to sell is “bona fide.” Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485. Because I believe based on the law and facts of this case that the appraisers’ difference of opinion alone is insufficient to require a jury determination as to whether Amoco’s offer to sell was “bona fide,” I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Amoco. Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
The relevant facts are undisputed and are set forth in detail in the district court’s opin*1376ion. Rhodes v. Amoco Oil Co., 955 F.Supp. 1288, 1289-90 (D.Kan.1997). This court, however, chooses to ignore most of those facts, namely all of those facts relating to the parties’ negotiations over the course of eleven months, focusing instead “only on Amoco’s final offer.” Because this court’s opinion brushes aside as of no “concern” and “not persuasive,” facts which bear directly upon the question of whether Amoco’s offer to Rhodes was “bona fide,” I shall briefly summarize them here.
Rhodes acknowledges that in the Spring of 1993, Amoco, in compliance with the PMPA, made a good faith decision in the normal course of business to sell all of its service stations in the Wichita metropolitan area. Amoco retained David Hopkins, an experienced certified independent appraiser, to appraise the Wichita area stations. In accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Hopkins prepared fair market value appraisals based on the highest and best use for each of Amoco’s dealer-operated service stations in the Wichita area. Hopkins initially appraised the subject property at $180,477. Relying upon Hopkins’ appraisal, Amoco offered to sell the property to Rhodes in the Spring of 1994 for $180,000.
Dissatisfied with Amoco’s offer, Rhodes hired his own appraiser, Roger Turner, who, like Hopkins, is an experienced certified independent appraiser. Using the sales comparison approach, Turner appraised the fair market value of Amoco’s property at $77,500. Based upon Turner’s appraisal, Rhodes made a counteroffer to Amoco in the Summer of 1994 of $77,000. Rhodes also requested that Amoco extend his lease one month pending negotiations. Amoco agreed to extend the lease, but, within the month, rejected Rhodes’ counteroffer as based upon a “flawed” appraisal. Amoco, however, lowered its initial offer of $180,000 to $158,000, while also proposing several alternative sale structures. During this same period, Amoco continued to extend the lease to accommodate Rhodes.
In the Fall of 1994, Rhodes wrote Amoco and asserted “several problems” with Hopkins’ initial appraisal. In response, Amoco advised Rhodes that it would secure a revised appraisal from Hopkins early the next year. At the same time, Amoco again extended Rhodes’ lease. In February 1995, Amoco submitted to Rhodes a revised appraisal and new offer to sell — this time for $132,000. Rhodes rejected Amoco’s new offer, and instead offered to purchase the property for $90,000. When Amoco rejected Rhodes’ counteroffer and refused to extend the lease beyond April 1995, Rhodes filed suit. Relying on the foregoing facts, the district court held that Amoco’s $132,000 offer was “objectively reasonable as a reflection of fair market value,” and granted its motion for summary judgment. Rhodes, 955 F.Supp. at 1293.7
II.
This court correctly observes that an objective standard governs the determination of whether a franchisor’s offer to sell is bona fide under the PMPA. See Sandlin, 900 F.2d at 1481. In Sandlin, we set aside a jury verdict in favor of the franchisee in part because the franchisor’s offer to sell fell within the range of independent appraisals. We held that there was “no evidence to be found from which the jury could conclude that ... [the franchisor’s] written offer to sell the premises for $216,000 was not bona fide.”-Id. at 1482. We stated that an offer is objectively reasonable and thus bona fide where it is “a reflection of fair market value.” Id. We defined fair market value as “the highest price a willing buyer would pay.” Id.
*1377In other words, “the objective reasonableness test does not measure whether the franchisor’s offer was actually at fair market value but rather whether the offer approached fair market value.” LCA Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 916 F.2d 434, 439 (8th Cir.1990) (emphasis added); accord Ellis v. Mobil Oil, 969 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.1992) (To'be objectively reasonable, franchisor’s offer must “approach fair market value.”); Slatky, 830 F.2d at 485 (same). In Slatky, the Third Circuit explained:
There may be a range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market value. Were we to mandate that courts determine whether the distributor’s offer actually was at fair market value, distributors could rarely rest comfortably that their offer would eventually be determined by the court to be fair market value.
Id.8
Thus, because Congress in enacting the PMPA sought to balance the competing interests of the franchisor and franchisee, an offer is bona fide under the PMPA if it falls within the “range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market value.” Id. Consistent with congressional intent, this approach is designed to guarantee an offer price to the franchisee based upon the realities of the marketplace and protect the franchisee’s expectation of continuing the franchise relationship, while preserving the franchisor’s legitimate property rights and economic interests. See S.Rep. No. 95-731, at 18-19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 876-77. Moreover, it relieves the fact finder from the exacting task of placing a precise value upon the property — a task which would amount largely to impermissible guesswork.
Unfortunately, this court’s opinion does little to further these aims. Admittedly, a difference of opinion between independent appraisers is an important factor which a court must consider in determining whether a particular offer is bona fide under the PMPA. See LCA Corp., 916 F.2d at 439 (whether an offer is bona fide must be decided on a case-by-case basis). The dispute in this case, however, involves little more than a swearing match between independent appraisers over the proper method by which to determine the. fair market value of the service station property. ■
The court’s opinion infers that Amoco retained some fly-by-night appraiser whose appraisal is flawed “through sloppiness or mere error.” I take issue with that inference. Rhodes stipulated that Amoco’s appraiser has appraised more than 3,000 petroleum marketing properties over eighteen years and performed appraisal services for more than 100 different clients including major oil companies, smaller oil companies, and jobbers. As I have explained, an appraisal is necessarily an , estimate of the fair market value of property. Like so many legal concepts, experts do not disagree on the definition of fair market value. Problems arise only when those experts attempt to apply that definition to a particular case. Disagreement among appraisers is the norm. See Stephen J. Alfred, Fair Market Value Concept, 14 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 173, 175 (1963).
Even accepting that Rhodes final offer of $90,000 was within the “range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market value,” I find no evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that Amoco’s $132,000 offer was not also within that range. Over the course of eleven months and at least seven lease extensions, Amoco made three offers to sell the property to Rhodes in the respective amounts of $180,000, 158,000, and $132,000. Amoco also apparently proposed alternative sale structures to Rhodes in an attempt to reach an agreement. During that same period, Rhodes made two counteroffers in the amounts of $77,000 and $90,000. Unfortunately, the parties could not reach an agreement.
*1378This court’s opinion makes much ado over the 70% difference between Amoco’s $132,000 appraisal and Rhodes $77,500 appraisal. The court’s analysis is misguided for two reasons. First, the PMPA speaks in terms of offers, not appraisals. Rhodes countered Amoeo’s final offer of $132,000 with an offer of $90,-000, yielding a difference of 46%, not 70%. Second, one need not have a degree in statistics to understand that where the appraised value of property is relatively low, as in this case, a slight difference in appraised value will yield a relatively large percentage difference. Conversely, where the appraised value of property is relatively high, a large difference in appraised value will yield a relatively small percentage difference. Thus, analyzing the problem in terms of the “magnitude of the difference” is misleading. For instance, if one appraiser valued a piece of property at $680,000 and another appraiser valued the same property at $400,000, the percentage difference in the appraisals would still be 70%. Yet, when compared with the difference between $132,000 and $77,500, the difference between $680,000 and $400,000 gives one much more reason to pause.
Despite the implications of the court’s opinion, the PMPA does not require that the parties reach agreement, or that the franchisor meet the franchisee’s price. Rather, the PMPA requires only that the franchisor make “a bona fide offer to sell” to the franchisee. The parties’ appraisers, both using widely accepted techniques for calculating a property’s fair market value, reached disparate values. A difference of opinion, however, does not alone create a material issue of fact for trial. Sandlin, 900 F.2d at 1482. The evidence before the district court clearly demonstrated that Amoco’s asking price viewed objectively fell within the “range of prices with reasonable claims to being fair market value.” Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact which prevented the district court from granting Amoco’s motion for summary judgment. In this case, Amoco complied with the PMPA. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. Under 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D), a franchisor is required to tender a bona fide offer to sell the premises within 90 days after notifying the franchisee of nonrenewal. In the district court, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant’s first offer of $180,000 made within the 90-day period was not bona fide. Because of the parties' ongoing negotiations, the court rejected Plaintiff's argument:
Plaintiff's argument, if valid, would mean that if a franchisor and franchisee cannot agree on a selling price within the 90-day period, but instead continue negotiations, then the franchisor's initial offer will be deemed not bona fide as a matter of law. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result....
Rhodes, 955 F.Supp. at 1290. On appeal, Plaintiff has abandoned his argument that Defendant's initial offer of $180,000 was not bona fide, and now asserts only that Defendant's final offer of $132,000 was not bona fide.

. In Slatky, Amoco's in-house appraisers valued the service station property with improvements at $276,300. Slatky's appraiser, however, valued the same property at $158,200. Amoco offered to sell the property with improvements to Slatky for $306,000. At bench trial, even Amoco's independent appraiser valued the property at $31,000 less than Amoco's offer. "In the face of an apparent congruence of independent appraisers that Amoco's estimate was considerably too high,” the appellate court remanded the case so the district court could state precisely why it had found that Amoco’s offer was objectively reasonable. 830 F.2d at 486.