Court Opinion

ID: 9755522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:41:13.598919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:08.443803
License: Public Domain

GARRISON, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with the principal opinion except that portion concluding that the trial court’s denial of Catalina’s Motion For Re-mittitur should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent with regard to that portion of the opinion.
I agree with the general principles reviewed in the principal opinion concerning interference with a jury’s determination of damages. Thus, in a wrongful death case, the jury has extraordinarily wide discretion in awarding damages, and the trial court has great discretion in approving a verdict or setting it aside as excessive. Letz v. Turbomeca Engine Corp., 975 S.W.2d 155, 174 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). An appellate court will interfere only when the verdict is so grossly excessive that it shocks the conscience of the court and convinces the court that both the jury and the trial court abused their discretion. Id.
There are generally two situations in which the issue of excessiveness of the verdict arises: (1) where the verdict is simply disproportionate to the proof of injury and results from an honest mistake by the jury in assessment of the evidence, and (2) where the verdict’s excessiveness is engendered by trial misconduct and thus results from the bias and prejudice of the jury. Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca, 963 S.W.2d 639, 655 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). A verdict under the first scenario may be corrected by an enforced remittitur and does not require a retrial, while a verdict of the second variety is prejudiced and can only be remedied with a new trial. Id. Here, Catalina disputes the denial of its Motion For Remittitur which was founded on the allegations that: (1) There was no evidence of economic loss presented; (2) there was no evidence of medical or funeral bills presented; (3) the issue of aggravating circumstances was not submitted to the jury; (4) the jury was specifically instructed not to consider Plaintiffs grief and bereavement; (5) the verdict does not comport with the damages evidence; and (6) the verdict does not comport with verdicts and settlements in other wrongful death cases in Missouri over the course of the last fifteen (15) years. Catalina now argues that not only was the verdict excessive, but it was also the result of trial court error in erroneous*395ly admitting evidence, and by an argument that prejudiced the jury against it.3 That theory, however, is foreign to the motion for remittitur at issue here.
The doctrine of remittitur is intended to produce equitable compensation and to eliminate the retrial of lawsuits. Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 49 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). Remittitur is appropriate if, after reviewing the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict, the court finds that the jury’s verdict is excessive because the amount of the verdict exceeds fair and reasonable compensation. Section 537.068, RSMo 2000; Fust, 913 S.W.2d at 49. Said another way, “[wjhere the jury errs by awarding a verdict that is simply too bountiful under the evidence, injustice may be prevented by ordering a remittitur.” Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 175. There is, however, no exact formula to determine whether a verdict is excessive, and each case must be considered on its own merits. Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 657.
Damages in a wrongful death case are governed by § 537.090, RSMo 2000, which provides that in every such action:
[T]he trier of the facts may give to the party or parties entitled thereto such damages as the trier of the facts may deem fair and just for the death and loss thus occasioned, having regard to the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the death, funeral expenses, and the reasonable value of the services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel, training, and support of which those on whose behalf suit may be brought have been deprived by reason of such death and without limiting such damages to those which would be sustained prior to attaining the age of majority by the deceased or by the person suffering any such loss. In addition, the trier of the facts may award such damages as the deceased may have suffered between the time of injury and the time of death and for the recovery of which the deceased might have maintained an action had death not ensued. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the death may be considered by the trier of the facts, but damages for grief and bereavement by reason of the death shall not be recoverable.
Accordingly, compensatory damages may be awarded based on the pecuniary losses suffered by reason of the decedent’s death, funeral expenses, loss of services, consortium, companionship and comfort, and the pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to his death. Letz, 975 *396S.W.2d at 176. In computing the loss of consortium for the loss of a parent for a child, factors such as the physical, emotional, and psychological relationship between the parent and child must be considered. Coggins v. Laclede Gas Co., 37 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Mo.App. E.D.2000); Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 657. In evaluating whether an award is excessive, the reviewing court should consider the evidence in the case and the verdict in light of the following factors: (1) loss of income, present and future, (2) medical expenses, (3) decedent’s age, (4) the nature and extent of the injuries, (5) economic factors, (6) awards given and approved in comparable cases, and (7) the superior opportunity for the jury and trial court to appraise decedent’s injuries and other damages. Coggins, 37 S.W.3d at 343, citing Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 657.
In this case, it is obvious that Plaintiffs were close to decedent, have felt his loss in many painful ways, and have suffered tremendous damage by his death. Catalina argues, however, that although here there was graphic evidence of decedent’s physical condition following the incident that caused his death, there was no evidence that he suffered between the time of the injury and the time of death. It also argues that there was no direct evidence of any economic loss suffered by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not dispute those contentions. The jury was correctly instructed not to consider grief and bereavement, and, significantly, no issue of aggravating circumstances was submitted to the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, Plaintiffs’ attorney vigorously argued that the jury should compensate them for their loss by awarding $10 million.
Along with consideration of the evidence, it is also necessary to consider compensatory awards in other death cases. Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 176. In Letz, the appellate court reviewed wrongful death awards in Missouri from 1986 until the date of that case (1997), finding that most damage awards had ranged from about ten thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars, with a few cases affirmed on appeal in the one to two million dollar range. Id. at 176-77. The court noted one case, Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. banc 1996), involving a $5 million judgment for compensatory damages in a case involving the wrongful death of three family members including the parent who was the principal source of income. The court noted that there was then no reported Missouri cases disclosing a jury verdict compensating a plaintiff for a wrongful death case in a sum approaching $5 million. Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 177.
Letz involved the death of a twenty-year-old mother of two young boys. The suit for wrongful death filed by her sons and mother resulted in a jury verdict of $70 million. Significantly, the issue of aggravating circumstances was submitted to the jury in Letz, and under the procedure at that time, a single verdict covering both compensatory and aggravating circumstances was returned. The appellate court, therefore, undertook to determine, for the purposes of a motion for remittitur, how much of the verdict was for compensatory damages and how much was for aggravating circumstances/punitive damages. After considering other Missouri verdicts for wrongful death, the close relationship between the decedent and the plaintiffs, the conscious physical pain suffered by the decedent after her injury but before her death, and the testimony of an expert that the economic loss suffered by decedent’s sons by reason of her death was $798,643, the court concluded that “a compensatory award for the death of [decedent], if separately delineated, would not have exceeded $2.5 million.” Id. at 177. The court reasoned, therefore, that the remaining $67.5 *397million of the judgment was for aggravating circumstances. It ordered that if the plaintiffs entered a remittitur of $41 million of the judgment, the judgment would stand affirmed for $29 million, representing $2.5 million in compensatory damages and $26.5 million in punitive damages. Id. at 180.
Barnett, decided the same day as Letz, involved the wrongful death of a forty-year-old husband and father of two. A remittitur was ordered by the trial court on the jury verdict of $175 million for compensatory damages and $175 million for punitive damages, to $25 million for the compensatory damages, and $87.5 million for the punitives. On appeal, the court noted evidence that demonstrated that the lost past and future earnings, benefits and household services related to decedent’s death amounted to $649,080, and that decedent had suffered conscious pain before his death. It concluded that the $25 million compensatory damage award ordered by the trial court remained excessive, found that $8.5 million was an appropriate compensatory damage award, and ordered remittitur accordingly. 968 S.W.2d at 658.
Since the Letz and Barnett cases, there have been other wrongful death verdicts in Missouri. Those that have been the subject of appellate review, although not always on the issue of damages, include: Havrum v. United States, 204 F.3d 815 (8th Cir.2000)(a judgment in a court tried case for $450,000 for the death of plaintiffs husband); Rinehart v. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.App. W.D.1998)(death suit for mother of three resulting in judgment for $350,000); Linton v. MHTC, 980 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App. E.D.1998)(verdicts of $250,000, $500,000 and $1,500,000 for the deaths of three persons).
Another noteworthy case is Coggins. In that wrongful death suit, the plaintiffs were the parents of the twenty-year-old decedent, their only child, who lived with them and with whom they had a close relationship. The evidence demonstrated that the decedent died as a result of an explosion caused by a natural gas leak, but survived with burns over nearly his entire body for eighty days, sixty-three of which were spent in a hospital burn unit. Suffice it to say that .the Coggins opinion recounts evidence demonstrating the profound pain and medical procedures endured by decedent prior to his death. 37 S.W.3d at 343. The jury returned a verdict of $4,380,000 as compensatory damages for the death which was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 343-44.
Considering the fact that Plaintiffs are entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated for their tremendous loss, I believe that there was an abuse of discretion by the jury and trial court, and that the judgment entered on the jury verdict was excessive by at least $10 million. In arriving at that opinion, I have considered other wrongful death verdicts in Missouri, the obvious and devastating loss suffered by Plaintiffs, the fact that there was no direct evidence of economic loss, there was no evidence of conscious pain prior to decedent’s death, the fact that aggravating circumstances was not an issue in this case, and the fact that no damages are to be awarded in such cases for grief and bereavement. I believe it is also significant that the amount of the jury’s verdict exceeded by $5 million the amount Plaintiffs’ attorney had argued should be awarded. (In Coggins, the appellate court noted, in affirming the denial of remittitur, that the award was less than the amount requested by plaintiffs’ counsel. 37 S.W.3d at 343).
It has been said that “no system is perfect and on occasion a jury will reach an incorrect result in the eyes of all reasonable persons. ‘[A] jury is not free to award any sum it might choose, however, *398large or small, whether from anger, sorrow, prejudice, mistake, or other improper cause.’ ” Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 661-62, citing Cates v. Eddy, 669 P.2d 912, 920 (Wyo.1983). In my opinion a substantial remittutur in this case is compelled by the goal of providing fair, reasonable, and equitable compensation for a compensable loss, but not that which is so excessive as to constitute an injustice. In reaching that conclusion, I do not minimize or disregard the tremendous loss suffered by Plaintiffs, but do so with the realization that no amount of compensation could be considered by them as “adequate,” and that the goal for fairness in our system applies to both sides of such controversies.

. One of Catalina’s arguments under this point is that Grandrich's counsel invoked the sympathy of the jury and invited the jury to award damages for grief and bereavement when he told of the loss of his own son and argued that the figure requested by plaintiff’s counsel — $10 million — was not enough. Although not referred to in Catalina’s brief, it is noted that this argument was followed by Plaintiffs' final portion of their closing argument in which their attorney argued to the jury that "if it were me and I had to make the decision, I would fill in on that first line Fosters for certain. And I would fill in on the second line Grandrich, because you can’t find against both.” This referred to the procedure, followed by the jury, of finding for Plaintiffs against Catalina, but for Grandrich on Plaintiffs’ claim. Catalina’s argument concerning the comments by Grandrich's " counsel indicates a claim of trial misconduct with resulting bias and prejudice by the jury. An excessive verdict resulting from jury bias and prejudice requires a showing of trial court error or misconduct of the prevailing party. Letz, 975 S.W.2d at 175; Barnett, 963 S.W.2d at 657. The remedy for an excessive verdict based on that ground is a new trial. Id. There is no issue on this appeal about the denial of a motion for new trial. Additionally, the argument referred to was not objected to, and Catalina makes no claim of misconduct by Plaintiffs' counsel in this regard.