Court Opinion

ID: 9792014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:06.00868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.145023
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
specially concurring:
I reluctantly concur with the result reached by the majority because it comports with the rule recently established by this court in State v. Rabun. I did not participate in the Rabun decision, however, and I do not agree with its rationale.
By its explicit terms, rule 1.3 applies to extend time limits by 5 days only when an event is measured “after service of a notice or other paper and such service is allowed and made by mail.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, rule 1.3 applies to extend the time in which to file an opening brief, provided in rule 31.13(a), as "within 25 days after the mailing of the notice as provided for by Rule 31.10”;, it also applies to extend the time to file a motion for reconsideration in an appellate court, provided in rule 31.-18(b), as “within fifteen days after the clerk has mailed notice that a decision has been rendered.” (Emphasis added.) In these cases, the time limits are specifically calculated from the date of service or notice and the 5-day time extension of rule 1.3 properly applies.
This court’s application of rule 1.3 to extend the time to file a notice of criminal appeal is contradicted by the clear wording of rule 31.3:
The notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 20 days after the entry of judgment and sen-tence____
(Emphasis added.) The same rule creates two exceptions when entry of the judgment will not constitute the “benchmark” from which the time to appeal will run. See comment to rule 31.3. For cross-appeals, the notice must be filed within 20 days after service of the notice of appeal; for delayed appeals, the notice must be filed within 20 days after service of an order granting a delayed appeal. See rule 31.-3(a), (b). The inclusion of the two exceptions denoting “service” as the benchmark distinguishes this rule from the other rules to which this court has applied the 5-day time extension of rule 1.3 to times prescribed from the running of an event. See State v. Savage, 117 Ariz. 535, 573 P.2d 1388 (1978) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 32.9(c)); Duran v. State, 113 Ariz. 135, 547 P.2d 1049 (1976) (applying rule 1.3 to extend the time limits of rule 10.2). The distinction between the wording of the rule and its exceptions also indicates, as the court of appeals pointed out in Ra-bun, that “the drafters of Rule 31.3 clearly appreciated the distinction between ‘entry’ and ‘service’ of a judgment.” State v. Rabun, 162 Ariz. 260, 782 P.2d 736 (App.), rev’d, 162 Ariz. 261, 782 P.2d 737 (1989).
Here, the state filed a direct appeal not within the above exceptions. The “bench*108mark” from which the time to appeal began to run was the entry of the order granting suppression, not 5 days from its service, under the clear terms of rule 31.3. If Rabun had not held otherwise, I would have found the state’s appeal in this case to be untimely filed.
Given that Rabun has now established a contrary rule, however, I believe that rule 31.3 should be amended to reflect that entry of judgment is no longer relevant to jurisdictional time limits for filing a notice of appeal. The rule should be reworded to reflect that service is now the benchmark in all criminal appeals, and that those portions of the exceptions set forth in rule 31.3 denoting service as the benchmark are now superfluous.