Court Opinion

ID: 9833794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:02:05.731965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:06.835687
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing..
This appeal was determined adversely to appellant on the ground upon which it elected to prosecute same, as clearly stated in its brief, to wit, “The appeal therefore involves only the single question as to whether the contract is assignable or nonassignable,” and as thus gauged the court confined its investigation to the assignability of the contract for the alleged violation of which the equitable relief was sought by appellant, which resulted in the judgment of the lower court being affirmed. Appellant by its motion now contends that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee’s exceptions to its petition, and on that ground denying it the equitable relief sought, .and that this court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court, because appellant in its pleading alleged “that shortly after plaintiff corporation was formed plaintiff, acting through one of its agents, W. W. Walker, called for the defendant to execute a new contract to eliminate any possible question that might arise, * * * whereupon the defendant informed said agent that he had one contract held by the plaintiff and that the same was sufficient to bind him in his employment for plaintiff, and that he ratified and confirmed said contract as belonging to the plaintiff and as the contract he was working under for the plaintiff, • * * and that plaintiff shows that such limitation and restrictions and agreements, placed in the said contract were reasonable and necessary, * * * and the defendant, either for himself or some other person, is attempting to divert the trade within said route and. within five blocks thereof from plaintiff to himself or to some other person for whom he is now working,” which, with the other allegations of its petition reflected in the original opinion, was sufficient to constitute grounds for the relief sought. No. one of appellant’s three propositions on which its appeal was predicated embraces the above proposition. Therefore, unless same presents fundamental error, it cannot be considered.
In sustaining special exceptions Nos. 1 and 9, presenting in effect the same ground of exception, viz., that even if appellant was the owner and holder of the contract involved by purchase said contract was a personal one with J. B. Williams, the other contracting party, and not with appellant, and was not assignable, the allegations of appellant’s original and supplemental petition were before the court, and the effect was the same as if a general demurrer had been sustained ; appellant’s right to maintain its cause of action being thereby determined solely upon the question of the assignability of the contract. In so far as this question *111was decided upon the language of the contract, the court was not in error, but a different proposition is presented by the pleadings alleging the adoption of the contract after its alleged assignment as a contract between appellant and appellee, as employer and employee, that the limitation, restrictions, and agreements placed in said contract were reasonable and necessary, and that appellee, either for himself or for some other person, was attempting to divert the ice trade built up by appellant within the territory described in said contract, to himself or to some other person for whom he was working, and in violation of the terms of said contract. These allegations were sufficient to show that, although the contract was not within its terms assignable, an attempt had been made to assign it to appellant by an original party to the contract; that appellant asserted the right to the benefit and protection of the terms and provisions of said contract on the ground that same had been adopted by appellant and appellee as the contract under which appellee entered and remained in appellant’s service until he voluntarily left same; that the limitations, restrictions, and agreements containéd in said contract on which appellee based his claim that same was not assignable, were reasonable and necessary; and that appellee was attempted to divert the ice trade within the route theretofore assigned to him and within five blocks thereof from appellant to himself or to some other person, in violation of the terms of said contract. Therefore, it is apparent that the court erred in sustaining special exceptions Nos. 1 and 9 and dissolving the.restraining order theretofore granted, as appellant was entitled to a hearing on the merits of the issues of fact presented by its pleadings. The allegations that “such limitations and restrictions and agreements placed in said contract were reasonable and necessary” applies with equal force with reference to the restriction and limitations being reasonable and necessary within the designated territory, as well as within five blocks or squares of the ice route detailed to him by appellant under the terms of said contract. In other words, whether it is alleged that appellee violated the restrictions and limitations contained in said contract as to the ice route detailed to him and which he worked under his employment with appellant, or violated same within five blocks or squares of said route, the burden would rest on appellant in either case to establish that the limitation and restrictions placed upon appellee’s right to conduct the ice business in his own right, or in the service of any other person, firm, or corporation, in the prohibited district, was reasonable and necessary to secure to appellant the enjoyment of the good will of its business and protection in its ice trade during the period of time ap-pellee was prohibited from so engaging in said business. City Ice Delivery Co. v. Evans (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 87; Bettinger v. N. Ft. Worth Ice Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 278 S. W. 466; Tex. I. & C. S. Co. v. McGoldrick (Tex. Civ. App.) 284 S. W. 615.
The validity of the covenant in question, both as to the assigned and adjoining territory, depends upon its terms being necessary for the preservation of both the business and good will of the appellant after the termination of the employment, and if such covenant imposed a greater restraint on the appellee than was necessary to secure such protection, to that extent same is unenforceable as being contrary to public policy. The necessity for the covenant, as well as its reasonableness, must rest upon the services rendered by appellee to appellant under his employment, in the conduct of its business, and be confined to the territory in which appellee operated in the performance of his duties as such employee. In the enforcement of .such covenants, courts will diligently and with a jealous care inquire into the necessity for and the reasonableness of same to the end that those who through necessity must labor to earn a livelihood will not be placed at the mercy of those who do not so have to toil, for otherwise a condition of industrial servitude might be developed. The right to labor is inherent, being enjoined by the very existence of the human family, and the freedom of the laborer to put forth his best efforts to justly enlarge his sphere of operation, usefulness, and income, should never be interfered with or restricted save and except by that which is within and for the public good,. or within a sound public policy. Therefore, full and satisfactory proof should be required of the litigant having the burden of proof to establish the necessity for, and the reasonableness of, covenants' restricting such inherent right to labor.
The allegation that “such limitation and restrictions and agreements placed in said contract were reasonable and necessary” applied to the assigned territory, while perhaps subject to a special exception because the facts constituting the necessity for and the reasonableness of the limitations, and restrictions, were not alleged, yet same was not subject to any one of the special exceptions presented, and certainly not to a general exception.
Because of the fundamental error committed as here pointed out, appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment heretofore entered affirming the judgment of the lower court is set aside, and this cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court.