Court Opinion

ID: 9662375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:07:26.55275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.994114
License: Public Domain

*685Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The defendant, on probation for indecent liberties with a child and sexual perversion, was found by the hearing examiner to have violated the terms of his probation by committing an act of sexual perversion upon his five-year-old stepson. Three issues are raised as to the hearing conducted.

Admission of hearsay testimony.

Evidence adduced at the defendant’s revocation hearing included hearsay statements offered by the defendant’s probation officer and defendant’s wife, mother of the five-year-old stepson of defendant. Both testified that the five-year-old boy had told them that “daddy put his ding dong in my butt” and that “daddy spit on himself” during the act. Defendant’s wife testified that such method of self-lubrication was a custom and idiosyncrasy of defendant. Corroborating evidence was as to redness and soreness in the boy’s rectal area and difficulty with bowel movements following the alleged incident. The defendant complains that the testimony of the boy’s mother and defendant’s probation officer should not have been admitted into evidence. The majority holds the statement by the boy to his mother, the day after the alleged assault, to be admissible as an “excited utterance” under the statute.1 The writer agrees that even at the time of formal trial the statement made by the child to his mother was admissible “. . . as a part of the res gestae or as described in the newly adopted code of evidence as an excited utterance.” 2 However, as to statements made by the child to both his mother and the *686probation officer, the writer would add that a probation revocation hearing “. . . need not be a formal trial-type hearing and that technical rules of evidence need not be observed.” 3 As the United States Supreme Court has said, “. . . there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” 4 The writer would hold that the statements of the five-year-old boy to his mother and the probation officer were admissible at the probation revocation hearing.

Locale of revocation hearing.

In the Morrissey Case, above cited, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a paroled prison inmate, accused of violating the conditions of his parole, is to be afforded a probable cause hearing to be conducted “. . . at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as convenient after arrest . ...” 5 Subsequently, in Scarpelli,6 the nation’s high court dealt with “. . . the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away” for the Morrissey-mandated place-of-violation preliminary hearing for out-of-state parolees. Scarpelli made clear that “. . . we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, deposi*687tions, and documentary evidence.” 7 Since Scarpelli,8 the state department of health and social services has conducted preliminary hearings in the supervising state for out-of-state parolees and probationers, requesting the supervising state to conduct such probable cause hearing or, if it refuses, sending one of its examiners to conduct such hearing. With the complainants, mother and child, having moved to Wisconsin, the probable cause hearing as to probation violation in the case before us was held in this state, not in Tennessee where the alleged sexual assault took place. The defendant does not claim that, under Morrissey, he was entitled to have the probable cause hearing held in Tennessee. He contends rather that, with the probable cause hearing having been held in Wisconsin, he was entitled to have the final revocation hearing shifted from this state to Tennessee.
The narrow issue here presented is whether this hearing examiner, on this record and under these circumstances, was constitutionally required to move the final revocation hearing from this state to the state of Tennessee. On this record and under these circumstances the writer would hold that he was not required so to do. The majority opinion of this court states that: “Prior to the full hearing, defendant through his counsel demanded that the place of the hearing be transferred to Humboldt, Tennessee . . . .” That does not completely describe what the hearing examiner was requested to do. At the time *688of the final revocation hearing, defendant’s counsel then informed the hearing examiner that “certain requests were made” by the defendant in a letter, dated January 12, 1973, addressed to the administrator of the division of corrections. Defendants’ counsel stated: “Among the requests in that letter were that the administrative hearing be transferred to Humboldt, Tennessee, the place of the alleged violation of probation; secondly, that if that request be denied, procedure be established for taking depositions of material witnesses within the State of Tennessee . . . .” What is now termed a “demand” was then termed a “request,” and, equally important, a request framed in the alternative. It was an “either-or” request, giving the department and its hearing examiner an option to (1) transfer the place of hearing; or (2) establish án alternative procedure for the taking of depositions from witnesses in Tennessee.
Exactly as his “either-or” request suggested, this defendant, with the preliminary hearing having been held in this state, was entitled either to have the final hearing transferred to Tennessee, or to what Scarpelli terms “adequate alternative to live testimony.” 9 The defendant requested that the alternative procedure be that of the taking of depositions from witnesses in Tennessee. This is an alternative to the taking of live testimony authorized in appropriate cases by Scarpelli.10 With the nature of the testimony to be taken by deposition not identified,11 *689the administrator of the division of corrections responded to defendant’s letter of request by stating that, if it is shown at the time of the hearing that the testimony of the proposed witnesses “. . . could not adequately be presented by affidavit, . . .” the hearing examiner “. . . will recess the hearing and undertake the necessary steps to either hold a hearing in Humboldt, Tennessee, or take depositions of the material and essential witnesses.” 12 Scarpelli lists “affidavits” as well as “depositions” as available “conventional substitutes for live testimony” in parole or probation revocation hearings.13
So the issue here further narrows as to whether this defendant was deprived of a constitutional right when he was given the opportunity to present evidence of defense witnesses by affidavit, rather than by deposition, as he had requested. There is a difference between submitting an affidavit and taking a deposition, but the writer does not see that difference as having constitutional dimensions. Here the defendant did submit affidavits from his proposed witnesses: His mother, his sister-in-law and two friends. All corroborated his direct testimony that he was elsewhere at the time when his stepson said that he was sexually assaulted. The evidence submitted by defendant in affidavit form was received by the hearing examiner and considered by the hearing examiner on the basic issue of credibility as to the statement made by the child and as to the denial made by the defendant. The hearing examiner found the statement by the child to *690have been made and to be “spontaneous in nature,” and to be believed over and against the testimony by the defendant and affidavits corroborating his testimony.
The defendant requested the right to take depositions of out-of-state witnesses. The defendant was given the right to present affidavits from such out-of-state witnesses. No issue as to right to confront witnesses arises from accepting affidavits rather than depositions. That right is the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 14 Here it was the examiner and probation department that lost the right to challenge, check or cross-examine the defendant’s friends and relatives as to what they stated in their affidavits. If the department had acceded to the first of defendant’s two alternative requests and moved the final hearing to Tennessee, it would have been the mother and probation officer whose affidavits or depositions could, under Scarpelli, have been introduced as the “conventional substitutes for live testimony” of such complaining witnesses. Then, but only then, could this defendant claim that he was denied an “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation with adverse witnesses. In the case before us, the defendant was not denied the right to present witnesses or documentary evidence. He and his hearing counsel had contacted the mother, sister-in-law and two friends who had, defense counsel informed the examiner, agreed to attend the hearing in Wisconsin and testify. When this entirely reasonable expectation that they would attend and testify was disappointed, the hearing examiner agreed to reconvene the hearing if the *691witnesses could be produced in the next two weeks. In the alternative, the hearing examiner agreed to accept and consider affidavits from the absent witnesses. Such affidavits were produced by the defendant and accepted and considered as evidence by the examiner. On this record and under these circumstances, the writer finds no denial of a constitutional right in the accepting of the testimony at the hearing in the form of affidavits submitted by the defendant rather than, as he had earlier requested, in the form of depositions taken.

Admissibility of polygraph testing.

When the defendant’s wife complained to the state department as to the alleged sexual assault committed by the defendant against her five-year-old son, the probation officer requested her to submit to a polygraph examination to be conducted by the polygraph examiner for the Kenosha police department. The polygraph examiner’s report-was that no deception response was indicated by the wife’s answers to relevant questions asked as to the child’s having told her that he was sexually violated by the defendant. Defendant’s counsel at the revocation hearing objected to the admissibility of the examiner’s report stating: “I appreciate the reasons why it was done. But I still assert that those reasons don’t make — don’t make the evidence of any value in deciding of the questions at hand.” The majority agrees, holding that it was error to admit the result of a polygraph test submitted to by a complaining witness, at the request of the state department, in a probation revocation situation.
In the Stanislawski Case,15 this court set forth the requirements for admissibility of testimony concerning polygraph tests in a criminal case at time of trial. Conditions for admissibility were also prescribed as to poly*692graph tests taken by a principal or complaining witness.16 The majority adapts and applies the Stanislawski rule to the admissibility of polygraph tests given by a complaining witness prior to a probation revocation hearing. It would require for admissibility: (1) A written consent to the admission of such test by the probationer or his attorney; (2) admissibility to be subject to the discretion of the hearing examiner; and (3) the right to cross-examine the polygraph examiner respecting the examiner’s qualifications and training. In the case before us, the hearing examiner did exercise his discretion as to admitting the test results, and, with the identity of the polygraph tester known, subpoenaing such examiner would have given the right to examine him as to his qualifications. However, the advance written consent of the probationer or his attorney was not secured.
The writer would make advance written consent of a probationer and the department as to admissibility of polygraph testimony applicable only to a test taken by such probationer. The writer would not make the consent of the probationer a prerequisite for admissibility of a polygraph test administered to a complaining witness at the request of the state department. The Stanislawski rule was taken from the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court in its Valdez Case.17 When the Arizona court was asked to apply its Valdez rule to probation revocation hearings, it declined, holding: “A hearing on revocation *693of probation is not subject to the limitations of a formal trial.”18 The writer would follow the lead of the court that authored what became our Stanislawski rule. Particularly so, because, as to probation revocation hearings, our court has held that such hearing is “ ‘. . . not a trial in the traditional sense, . . .’ ” and “ ‘. . . [b]y its very nature . . . does not envision strict observance of technical rules of law and procedure accorded a judicial proceeding.’ ”19 Our court has held that, at a probation revocation hearing: “ ‘Any relevant information, even though in the form of letters, reports of parole officers, and similar matter, which may aid the board in making its determination, may be considered. . . .’ ” 20 With that the standard to be met as to evidence admissible at a probation revocation hearing, the writer would find it met by the admission of the polygraph test here, taken by the complaining witness at the request of the state department.
The requirement of advance written consent of the probationer or his attorney for admissibility, will have a chilling effect on the testing of the credibility of persons registering complaints against those on probation and under supervision of the state department. The majority opinion states that it was here certainly proper for the state department to have the polygraph test taken by the mother of the child involved to test her veracity. However, to commend the department for having its representative have the test given and to prohibit the department hearing examiner from considering the results of the test is to ask the left hand to do what the right hand *694is not to know about. The predictable result of nonadmis-sibility without advance written consent of the probationer will be to discourage the testing of the reliability of complainants by polygraph examinations, since the result of the testing cannot be used without probationer’s consent in reaching the determination as to whether probation has been violated. The writer would move in the opposite direction to encourage the department, when a complaint is lodged as to probation-violating conduct involving commission of a criminal act by a probationer, to urge the person making the complaint to submit to a polygraph test as to truthfulness and veracity. The commendable practice of such testing of the credibility of complainants against probationers is not advanced or served by holding that the results of such polygraph tests given to complaining witnesses are not admissible at probation revocation hearings unless there has been an advance written consent to the testing by the defendant. Polygraph testing of complainants by the state department, with the results admissible for corroborative or impeachment of their testimony at probation revocation hearings, ought be encouraged, not discouraged, by this court.
The writer would affirm, and is authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissenting opinion.

 Sec. 908.03 (2), Stats.

 Love v. State (1974), 64 Wis. 2d 432, 442, 219 N. W. 2d 294, holding admissible at time of trial the mother’s testimony as to what her three-and-one-half-year-old daughter told her the morning after an alleged sexual assault.

 State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549, 185 N. W. 2d 306.

 Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U. S. 471, 489, 92 Sup. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484.

 Id. at page 485.

 Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U. S. 778, 93 Sup. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656.

 Id. at page 783, footnote 5.

 The decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, footnote 6, was handed down by the United States Supreme Court on May 14, 1973. The defendant’s preliminary hearing was held in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on December 21, 1972. The defendant’s final revocation hearing was conducted on January 31, 1973. The state contends that at the time the defendant’s preliminary hearing was held, there was no constitutional mandate that required the state of Wisconsin to conduct the preliminary hearing in another state. Since Scarpelli clarified but did not modify the Morrissey holding, we do not see the issue of applicability of Scarpelli as controlling here.

 Id. at page 783, footnote 5.

 Id. at page 783, footnote 5.

 Defendant’s Exhibit 1, letter to defendant’s attorney sent by Sanger B. Powers, administrator, division of corrections, department of health and social services, stating in part: “As you do not specify in your letter the identity of the witnesses or the nature of their expected testimony, it is impossible to determine whether their testimony is necessary in order to provide Mr. Harris a fair and impartial determination of the issue. Also you do not specify why it would be impossible to introduce the testimony of the Tennessee witnesses by affidavit.”

 Id., the letter of the administrator concluding: “I have been advised by Mr. Schneider [the hearing examiner] that if it is shown at the hearing that the testimony of the proposed Tennessee witnesses is essential to a fair determination of the issue, and that their testimony could not adequately be presented by affidavit, he will recess the hearing and undertake the necessary steps to either hold a hearing in Humboldt, Tennessee, or take depositions of the material and essential witnesses.”

 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, footnote 6, at page 783 (footnote 6).

 See: Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, footnote 4, at page 489, referring to “. . . the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
See also: Gaertner v. State (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 159, 166, 150 N. W. 2d 370, this court holding: “While in a popular sense we say an accused has a right to face his accusers, we mean ‘witnesses against him.’ ”

 State v. Stanislawski (1974), 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N. W. 2d 8.

 Id. at page 748, this court holding: “As to polygraph tests taken by a complaining or principal witness, . . . the graphs and expert testimony related thereto are admissible, on the issue of credibility, for corroborative or impeachment purposes, only if the same four qualifications are met: (1) Written stipulation of prosecutor, defense counsel and person taking the test as above required; (2) admission of testimony discretionary with trial court as above provided; (8) opposing party to have a right to cross-examine as above noted; and (4) jury to be instructed as provided above.”

 State v. Valdez (1962), 91 Ariz. 274, 371 Pac. 2d 894.

 State v. Goodloe (1971), 107 Ariz. 141, 142, 483 Pac. 2d 556, citing State v. Crowder (1968), 108 Ariz. 264, 440 Pac. 2d 29; State v. Maxwell (1965), 97 Ariz. 162, 898 Pac. 2d 548.

 State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, supra, footnote 3, at page 549, quoting Johnson v. Stucker (1969), 203 Kan. 253, 453 Pac. 2d 35, 42, certiorari denied, 396 U. S. 904, 90 Sup. Ct. 218, 24 L. Ed. 2d 180.

 Id. at page 549.