Court Opinion

ID: 9585707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:03:08.626241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:12.303813
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Considering the portions of the tenant’s deposition which are quoted in the opinion, a jury could reasonably infer that the tenant lost her footing on the stairs because it was dark. This is enhanced by her response to another question: “Has there been a determination as to what, if anything, you fell on? A. “I don’t know, but it was always poorly lit. The carpet was bad. You know, it did not fit the stairs. And there was also debris.” She explained that the reason she did not know what she stepped on is that it was dark as she was ascending the stairs with her laundry so she could not see what her foot was landing on, and afterwards she was too badly injured to investigate. (There is evidence she had a broken neck, among other injuries.)
She also testified that she did not use the other more distant stairway because it was in as bad condition. The jury could also find that it was the duty of the landlord under OCGA § 44-7-13 to keep the stairway, a common area leading to a laundry facility which was part of the consideration for the rent, lighted. It would be liable for damages. OCGA § 44-7-14. There was evidence that there were light fixtures on the 15 to 20-step stairwell, but they did not have working *606bulbs in them. The tenant’s deposition and the affidavit of a neighbor both state that each of them had notified the management many times of the deficiency and that it was not corrected despite assurances.
Even as an owner or occupier of land, the landlord owes the duty to the invitee to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. OCGA § 51-3-1. But where the relationship between plaintiff and defendant is not that of business proprietor and customer but that of tenant and landlord, the contractual relationship and the particular duty placed on the landlord by statute requires further examination when equal knowledge is shown. The landlord is not as easily discharged from liability. See Richardson v. Palmour Court Apts., 170 Ga. App. 204, 206 (316 SE2d 770) (1984); Grier v. Jeffco Mgt. Co., 176 Ga. App. 158, 159 (335 SE2d 408) (1985). A recognition of the distinctions is noted in Lindsey v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 181 Ga. App. 814 (354 SE2d 13) (1987), and Smith v. Collins, 182 Ga. App. 564 (356 SE2d 530) (1987). This is more in the nature of an alleged tort arising out of a contract and breach of a duty imposed by statute on the contracting party.
Although the tenant does not know what her foot specifically and directly landed on or missed when she placed it, unbalancing her, this does not exclude all proximate cause of her fall. Since there is some evidence that lack of lighting contributed to her fall, for which lighting the landlord and not the tenant is responsible, summary judgment is premature. Shadowood Assoc. v. Kirk, 170 Ga. App. 209, 210 (2) (316 SE2d 487) (1984). The lack of evidence of what physical object her foot landed on or missed does not foreclose a finding of proximate cause from the evidence of the conditions existing at the location, i.e., unlit stairwell in its attendant circumstances.
Here, the issue of proximate cause is unresolved and is not precluded as a matter of law upon the record to date, just as is the issue of contributory negligence, assumption of risk considering the tenant’s choices, and so on.
This case is sufficiently similar to that presented in Richardson, supra, to be treated the same way. It falls within the category of those in which summary judgment is inappropriate upon an application of the following: “ ‘The trial court can conclude as a matter of law that the facts do or do not show negligence on the part of the defendant or the plaintiff only where the evidence is plain, palpable and indisputable.’ [Cit.]” Manheim Svcs. Corp. v. Connell, 153 Ga. App. 533, 534 (265 SE2d 862) (1980).
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley and Judge Benham join in this dissent.
*607Decided November 17, 1988 —
Rehearing denied December 12, 1988
Sharon L. Rowen, for appellant.
McLain & Merritt, Albert J. DeCusati, for appellee.