Court Opinion

ID: 6466622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-26 14:04:57.765855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:53:41.324573
License: Public Domain

MOTION FOR REHEARING. Per Curiam. The defendant in this cause files a motion for rehearing, and urges a further alleged error on the trial below. The new contention is that the court, at a time when the jury was deliberating, made to and received communications from them in the absence of the defendant; also that the proceedings respecting the appointment of an interpreter to the jury were held in the absence of the defendant from the court-room. The first question to determine on this contention is whether the facts shown in the record sustain the position argued. If, in fact, the defendant was in the court-room when such proceedings were taken, and such communication was not so held in his absence, then defendant’s motion must be denied. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the record, which is as follows: “Territory v. Jasper Thomason. (Murder. Ho. 757.) “At the same regular term of said district court, on the eighth day of December, A. D. 1885, the same being the eighteenth day of said term, the following among other proceedings were had and entered of record: The trial of this cause proceeds, and again come the parties, the defendant being present by counsel as well as in his own proper person, the arguments of counsel are heard, and, on receiving the instructions of the court, the jury retire to consider of their verdict, in the custody of a sworn bailiff; and the jury request that they may be furnished with an interpreter, and the court, upon investigation, finding it necessary that an interpreter be furnished in order that the jury may communicate with each other, appoints E. Y. Chaves as such interpreter, who is specially sworn to interpret between the members of the jury in this cause, and to keep secret their communications and investigations. Now again come the parties, the defendant being present by counsel as well as in his own proper person, and comes also the jury;” (and the record recites the return, at that point in the trial, of the verdict.) This is the record as shown on four of the transcripts. The same proceedings are also shown in the bill of exceptions at page 88, as follows: “And thereupon the jury retired to consider their verdict. It was afterwards shown to the court that there were both Spanish and English speaking persons on the jury, and that they were unable to communicate with each other, and the jury requested the court to furnish them with an interpreter. The defendant objecting to this being done, the request was at first denied, but afterwards, the request being renewed, with the statement that an interpreter was absolutely necessary, the official interpreter was sworn,” etc. It is evident that these recitals both refer to the same transaction, and should be construed together, as they contain all the proceedings upon the contention involved. Counsel for defendant places special emphasis on the use of the word “afterwards.” That word is used simply to denote that the request for an interpreter was later in time than the retirement; but does it therefore follow that the request came from the jury while deliberating in their room separate and apart from the court, rather than in open court, in presence of the defendant? As a matter of fact, the room in which jurors deliberate is often adjoining and immediately opening into the court-room, and it frequently occurs, especially when the evidence is manifestly clear and convincing, and so the return of the jury is apparently a matter of very short time, that the prisoner remains in the court-room under the custody of the sheriff, and it may well be concluded that such-was the case in this instance. The record really affirmatively discloses that the defendant was in court in person until after all the proceedings respecting the interpreter were taken. The instruction of the jury, the request for an interpreter, the fact of his being sworn, are, by a fair reading of the record, shown, as we think, to be one continuous act in presence of the defendant in open court. The record affirmatively shows the presence of the defendant when the instructions were given. There can be no presumption that he then retired; and that he did not, in fact, do so, but remained in person in court during all the proceedings respecting an interpreter, is apparent from the recitals in the record, especially in view of the statement therein “that the defendant objected to this being done.” The motion for new trial presented for the consideration of the court below has been carefully examined. It nowhere states that the court communicated with the jury, either by message or otherwise, at a time when the jury was deliberating, separate and apart from the court. Neither does it state the interpreter was appointed and sworn by the court, and sent to- the jury, either in the absence of the jury from the court-room, or in the absence of the defendant. If, in fact, the court had received a message from the jury while they were deliberating in some other place, asking for an interpreter, and the court had, in the absence of the defendant, considered such message, and determined to grant their request, and had then, in defendant’s absence, selected such interpreter, and caused him to be sworn and sent to the jury, such a proceeding would, beyond all doubt, have so deeply impressed the learned counsel who so ably represents the defendant that it would have been made a ground in the motion for a new trial in the court below. The absence of such a cause in the motion confirms the view we have taken respecting the construction of the record on the point involved in this motion. Upon a careful reconsideration, the motion for rehearing must be denied, and it is so ordered.