Court Opinion

ID: 9697000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:03:23.751597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.470072
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. I outlined my views on our treatment of safety statutes in negligence cases in a concurrence in Marzec-Gerrior v. D.C.P. Industries, Inc., 164 Vt. 569, 572, 674 A.2d 1248, 1250 (1995), a case in which the appealing party did not object to the relevant parts of the jury charge. This case reinforces my view that “any alternative to the current approach is better.” Id. at 576, 674 A.2d at 1252. The heart of plaintiff’s theory of the case is that defendant violated a statutory rule of the road, and this violation was negligence that caused the accident and plaintiff’s injury. Plaintiff objected to the portion of the charge regarding the effect of a violation of a safety statute, and sought a credible alternative. I would hold that the court should have charged plaintiff’s alternative and dissent from the decision to *586affirm the judgment entered on defendant’s jury verdict.
In relevant part, the court first instructed the jury as follows:
The legal standard of care required of motorists on the public highway is unvarying at all times; that of a reasonably prudent person. That’s the standard. But experience has led the courts to adopt and the legislature to enact certain safety rules of diligence which are intended to standardize the rights and duties of users of the highways. But these rules and statutes are not absolute in all circumstances, they are merely guides to the main issue of whether or not a motor vehicle operator’s conduct met the standard of a reasonably prudent person. But you can understand and apply these safety rules as you consider they are appropriate under the circumstances in your determination of whether or not the person’s conduct has met the standard of the reasonably prudent person.
After describing the applicable statutory rules of the road, the court then returned to their effect and added:
Now, I repeat: these safety rules are for your guidance. You are not bound to consider them. They are not binding upon you. You may give them weight in considering whether or not an operator’s conduct met the standard of care of a reasonably prudent person.
Not surprisingly, plaintiff’s counsel, whose case depended upon persuading the jury that defendant violated one of the safety statutes, found this use of the safety statutes to be inadequate. In objecting to the jury instructions, he said:
The safety statute was given a little bit different than what was expected. My understanding of the law is, it creates a rebuttable presumption, but it is binding on the jury if you violate a safety statute. I think that your charge said that they are not binding.
The court refused to change its language, but the jury did not find the court’s explanation sufficient. After deliberating for a period, the jury returned with questions:
One. What law if any says about a vehicle on the wrong side of the road facing traffic either partially in the road or on the shoulder? Two. Wfliat law if any says about cautionary lights, e.g., flashers or rotating lights such as on a plow?
Plaintiff’s counsel again asked the court to respond that violation of a safety statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The court refused and reread the earlier instructions adding only that no safety statute covered either of the situations outlined in the questions.
As plaintiff points out, the most serious deficiency in the charge is that the jury is instructed that it may simply ignore the safety statute— “you are not bound to consider them” — for the wrong reason or no reason at all. See id. at 575, 674 A.2d at 1252. It is one thing to ignore evidence which the jury may find is not significant; it is quite another to ignore a statute that defines how drivers and others must conduct themselves on our public highways.
I expressed my view in Marzec-Gerrior that administering a bursting bubble presumption so that the jury is told nothing about the safety statute makes the safety statute meaningless in civil cases and is inconsistent with our precedents. I do not believe that creating a bursting bubble presumption is consistent with the proper effect of the violation of a safety statute in a civil negligence *587action as explained in Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 113, 141 A. 593, 594 (1928). Indeed, I question whether it makes sense to apply presumption jurisprudence to a determination of negligence, because the presumed “fact” is actually a conclusion of law or a mixed conclusion of fact and law. See 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5134, at 657 (1977).
Motion for reargument denied January 13, 2000.
In any event, I note that virtually every commentator and most jurisdictions agree that some instruction to the jury on a presumption is necessary. See id. § 5127, at 615; 2 McCormick on Evidence § 344, at 467 (4th ed. 1992). Our precedents require that the jury be told of the presence of an applicable safety statute. See Campbell v. Beede, 124 Vt. 434, 438-39, 207 A.2d 236, 240-41 (1965). The issue is what the jury should be told.
Every alternative instruction to the jury has strengths and weaknesses. See 2 McCormick on Evidence § 344, at 467-69. Although I favor a negligence per se rule as adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see Marzec-Gerrior, 164 Vt. at 575-76, 674 A.2d at 1252, the alternative sought by plaintiff in this case is far better than what was charged, or what we have typically affirmed. A number of states have adopted plaintiff’s alternative. See Thornton v. Pender, 377 N.E.2d 613, 621 (Ind. 1978); Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276-79 (Mich. 1976); Waugh v. Traxler, 412 S.E.2d 756, 759-60 (W. Va. 1991). It is exactly the alternative required by Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. at 113, 141 A. at 594.
Whether or not we adopt a rule that explains the safety statute to the jury as a rebuttable presumption, we should not affirm the charge given in this case. Plaintiff had two objections to the charge — it didn’t explain the rebuttable presumption, and it allowed the jury to ignore the rules of the road for any reason. The latter objection was clearly correct. Especially given the nature of the state policy interests in uniform rules of the road, we cannot support an instruction that allows the jury to ignore automotive safety statutes for no reason at all. Such an instruction allows the jury to determine the applicable law, or to ignore the actual law and apply its own view of what the law should be. In either case, the jury is acting outside its proper role as the fact-finder, applying the facts to the law given to it by the judge. We should at least insist that the charge state that violation of a safety statute is evidence of negligence, as required by Gilbert v. Churchill, 127 Vt. 457, 461, 252 A.2d 528, 530 (1969).
This case represents an important opportunity to pull our law on safety statutes in negligence cases from the chaos that now surrounds it. I dissent from the continuing endorsement of that chaos.