Court Opinion

ID: 9787354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:10.598897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.173043
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, J.,
with whom WATT, C.J. joins dissenting.
1 I dissent from today's opinion as I did in Scott v. Scott, 2001 OK 9, 19 P.3d 273 regarding a fit parents' fundamental right to the care, custody and control of children in situations involving attempts to alter or to discontinue previously agreed-to or court-ordered grandparental visitation. - Neither Scott nor today's cause can be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on grandparental visitation-Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)-or with it's treatment of subsequent causes.
T2 I write separately to emphasize that:
1) Supreme Court jurisprudence requires, when considering the best interest issue, the trial court accord some special weight to the mother's own determination of her child's best interest and that it presume, as a fit parent, she will act with those interests in mind;1 and 2) to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's post-Trozel jurisprudence signals that imposing a heightened standard on parents who have previously allowed grand-parental visitation is a violation of the parents' constitutionally protected fundamental right to make decisions concerning with whom and when visitation with a non-parent will occur.
13 THE SUPREME COURTS PRONOUNCEMENT IN TROXEL v. GRANVILLE, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT - CONSIDERATION - OF CAUSES INVOLVING GRANDPA-RENTAL VISITATION MANDATE THAT SCOTT v. SCOTT BE OVERRULED AND THAT THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION IN FAVOR OF THE FIT MOTHER BE AFFIRMED.
I 4 This Court visited the issue of grandpa-rental visitation in a modification proceeding in Scott v. Scott, 2001 OK 9, 19 P.3d 273 holding that a parent could alter court-ordered visitation only through a showing of changed circumstances. In reaching it's result the majority distinguished the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on grandparental visitation-Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)-without discussing the opinion's implications.2 In doing so, the majority essentially declared that a parent who voluntarily agreed to grandpa-rental visitation was from that day shorn of parental status and relegated to a station no better than that of a non-parent when seeking to modify a visitation order.
5 Although state law may afford greater rights than those guaranteed by the sovereign, it may not curtail rights guaranteed by federal law or the United States Constitutions*243 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, this Court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the federal constitution and federal law.4 When the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of the United States Constitution, has spoken, the only course for this tribunal is to follow the decree 5-we must pronounce rules of law that conform to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.6
T6 The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of parental rights in determining grandparental visitation in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 LEd.2d 49 (2000). Although Troxel is a plurality opinion, the discussion here is predicated on what a majority of the United States Supreme Court concluded. The judgment was announced by Justice O'Connor who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. Justices Souter and Thomas filed opinions concurring in the judgment and Justices Stevens, Scalia and Kennedy dissented. Justice Souter's reasoning departed from Justice O'Connor's opinion in that he would have facially invalidated the Washington statute in the same manner as the Washington Supreme Court did. Justice Thomas initially noted his reservations about substantive due process jurisprudence generally but concurred in the judgment because the parties did not ask the court to overrule its precedent holding that parents have fundamental rights to raise their children. He also noted that none of the opinions set out a standard of serutiny to which courts should hold nonparental visitation statutes. He urged state courts to apply strict serutiny to these statutes in the same manner as the Washington Supreme Court had.
T7 In short, six Justices agreed that the decision of the Washington Court finding the grandparental visitation statute unconstitutional should be affirmed. Eight Justices agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent's right to raise his or her child without undue interference from government. Five Justices agreed that a fit parent is accorded a presumption that the parent acts in the child's best interests. Four Justices agreed that "special factors" must "justify" the state's intrusion, and that one of those factors is a finding of parental unfitness.
T8 When an opinion is delivered by a divided United States Supreme Court, the rule for determining the holding of the Court is laid down in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) in which the Court said:
"... When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds...."
In a judgment upholding a statute, the narrowest grounds are those which uphold the fewest statutes as constitutional. Conversely, when the rule is applied to striking down a statute, the narrowest grounds are those invalidating the fewest statutes as unconstitutional.7
T9 In Troxel, the majority held Washington's Grandparental Visitation Rights Act8 *25unconstitutional as applied because of its broad seope-allowing any person to petition for visitation at any time. The high court was specifically concerned that the Washington statutory scheme failed to accord a fit parent's wishes any special weight and that it did not recognize a parent's heightened interest in deciding the child's best interest.
€10 The language of the high court in relation to parental decision making is particularly poignant. When describing the issue of parental rights the Supreme Court stated:
"The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court ... 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state ean neither supply nor hinder.'" [at p.2059]
Concerning the presumptions involving admittedly fit parents, the opinion provides:
"Accordingly, so long as a parent cares for his or her children (4.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." [at p.2060]
As to the weight which should be given to a parent's decision on grandparental visitation, the Supreme Court determined that the decision as to whether an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is "for the parent to make in the first instance." The high court explained the deference given to decisions of a fit parent writing:
"And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." [at p.2062]
111 Troxel has been determined to displace traditional "best interests" tests requiring instead that "significant weight" be given to a biological parent's fundamental right to determine the care, custody and control of children. Under the opinion, more traditional standards are replaced with a test in which a fit biological parent will presumptively prevail over a nonparent unless the nonparent presents compelling reasons overcoming the presumption.9
112 In Scott v. Scott, 2001 OK 9, 5, 19 P.3d 273, the majority determined that a party seeking termination of existing court-ordered grandparental visitation had the burden of showing a change in cirenmstances demonstrating that it was in the child's best interest for grandparental visitation to be modified or terminated. The Scott majority determined that Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) was inapplicable because it did not involve an attack on court-ordered grandparental visitation.10 In doing so, it did not cite extant jurisprudence on the issue nor did it consider the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings on the grandparental visitation issue.
€ 13 Courts are divided on whether visitation challenged following either court-ordered or agreed-to grandparental visitation requires that parental decisions on the matter be given the special weight required by Troxel.11 The better reasoned opinions, and *26those with which it appears the Supreme Court would find favor, follow the guidelines established in Troxzel-determining that it is unconstitutional to fail to give a fit parent's decision some special weight and to shift the burden to the parent to avoid the imposition of visitation.12
14 Particularly instructive on modification of grandparental visitation issues following Troxel are causes brought to the high court's attention. The Supreme Court has refused to revisit opinions in which parental decisions are given some special weight in modification proceedings-denying certiora-ri.13 Nevertheless, in Graville v. Dodge, 197 Ariz. 591, 5 P.3d 925, cert. granted, judgment vacated, 588 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 2584, 150 L.Ed.2d 745 (2001), the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the opinion.
115 The Arizona Supreme Court determined in Dodge that a contempt order issued when the father attempted to discontinue court-ordered grandparental visitation did not infringe upon the father's constitutional rights to custody and control of his children. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause specifically for reconsideration in light of Troxel.14 Dodge provides a clear signal that the presumption in favor of a parent's right to decide applies even in modification proceedings. Although Trozel may be characterized as a plurality opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court has determined that it is necessary for inferior courts to follow its guidance on the special weight to be given a fit parent's decision regarding grandparental visitation.15
T16 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, this Court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with respect to the federal constitution and federal law, and we must pronounce rules of law that conform to extant Supreme Court jurisprudence.16 Troxel and its progeny require us to presume that a fit parent will make decisions based on a child's best interest and to give some special weight to that decision. The majority's decision here and in Scott-requiring an admittedly fit parent to show a change of circumstances demonstrating that a discontinuance or alteration in grandparental visitation are in the child's best interest-ignore Trox-el's teachings by impermissibly shifting the burden to the parent.
CONCLUSION
117 Some cases hit closer to home than others. - Deciding whether grandparents should have visitation with their grandehil-dren over the objection of a parent is the type of case that tugs at the heart because one harbors either personal experiences with *27family members as a grandchild blooming under grandparental love and approval or as a grandparent intent on creating the same kind of memories in a child's offspring. For these reasons, the temptation is to allow the heart to rule over the letter of the law. Especially, under cireumstances like those presented here, where the grandfather obviously loves his grandson, has only his best interest at heart, and has done a great deal for the child and the mother both economically and as an emotional support,. Nevertheless, it is the law which governs these emotionally charged cases requiring us to set aside personal feelings and experiences when reaching a decision.
T 18 The erux of this cause is the principle that government should not unduly interfere with the decisions of fit parents in the upbringing and care of their children. We have long and consistently acknowledged the cardinal rule with respect to parents and their offspring-the custody, care and nurturing of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.17 The determination of child visitation directly impacts this fundamental right.18
{19 Absent some powerful countervailing interest, a parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody and management of children is a protected fundamental right.19 Although characterized as a plurality opinion, the controlling case authority here is Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) requiring that this Court and all others give special weight to a fit parent's decision regarding grandparental visitation. A majority of the Supreme Court demonstrated the need to give parents special consideration in making visitation decisions when it granted certiorari in Dodge and remanded specifically for the causes consideration in light of the Troxel opinion.
4 20 The trial court applied Troxel's teachings-giving special weight to a fits parent's decision. I would affirm its order. Further, I would overrule the decision in Scott v. Scott, 2001 OK 9, ¶5, 19 P.3d 273 which stands in contravention to Troxel and its progeny.

. - Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060-62, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).

. The majority's entire discussion of Troxel v. Granville, see note 1, supra, is found in Scott v. Scott, 2001 OK 9, 14, 19 P.3d 273 providing:
"In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court reviewed an order granting grandparent visitation. In the cases of In re Herbst and Neal v. Lee, this Court discussed the requirements for granting grandparent visitation. In all of these cases, the appeal was taken from an initial grant of grandparent visitation. These cases are not applicable in this appeal because here an order refusing to terminated court-ordered visitation is under attack." [Footnotes omitted. Emphasis in original.]

. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 LEd.2d 1201 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980).

. We are bound under the United States Const. art. VIL, cl. 2 and the Okla. Const. art. 1, § 1 to follow the United States Constitution as the supreme law of the land. We are required by 12 O.S. § 2001 2201(A) to take judicial notice of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, { 12, 838 P.2d 1.

. Akin v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 1998 OK 102, % 30, 977 P.2d 1040.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, see note 5, supra.

. In Troxel v. Granville, see note 1, supra, the Court considered RCS 26.10.160(3) providing:
"Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances."

. State v. Wooden, 184 Or.App. 537, 57 P.3d 583 (2002).

. See note 2, supra.

. Jurisdictions not requiring special interest considerations for parental decisions on modification: Currey v. Currey, 2002 SD 98, 18, 650 N.W.2d 273 [Where grandparental visitation arises by agreement, trial court must consider child's best interests rather than constitutionality of visitation statute.]; Rubano v. DiCenzo 759 A2d 959 (2000) [By agreeing to and signing order granting permanent visitation, parental rights became less exclusive and less exclusionary.]; Brinkley v. Flatt, 256 Ga.App. 263, 568 $.E.2d 95, 97 (2002) [Court declined to consider constitutionality of original order.]; In re Guardianship of K.T., 743 N.E.2d 348 (Ind.App.2001) [Modification allowed whenever shown to be in child's best interest.].
Jurisdictions imposing some special weight on parental decisions in modification proceedings: Jackson v. Tangreen, see note 13, infra [Statutory scheme required parental decision be given special weight.]; Kyle O. v. Donald R., 85 Cal. App. 4th 848, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 (2000) [Even where some form of court-ordered visitation ex*26ists, special weight should be given to fit parent's decision.].
See also, Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841, 856 (2002) [Procedural preference placing burden of proof on parents in first instance unconstitutional]; Zasueta v. Zasueta, 102 Cal.App.4th 1242, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 245, 253 (2002) [Placing evidentiary burden on parent to show visitation not in child's best interest unconstitutional]; In re Custody of C.M., 2002 WL 31116773, 74 P.3d 342 (Colo.App.2002) [Not released for publication but holding that in a modification of grandmother's visitation, mother's decision on visitation must be accorded some special weight.]; Ex parte State of Alabama, 826 So.2d 178 (Ala.App.2002) [Rebuttable presumption in favor of grandparent visitation over contrary decision by parent sufficient to render grandparental visitation statute unconstitutional.].

. Kyle O. v. Donald R., see note 11, supra.

. McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, %18, 33 P.3d 506 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 959, 122 S.Ct. 2663, 153 L.Ed.2d 837 (2002); Jackson v. Tangreen, 199 Ariz. 306, 18 P.3d 100 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 351, 151 L.Ed.2d 265 (2001).

. Graville v. Dodge, 197 Ariz. 591, 5 P.3d 925, cert. granted, judgment vacated, 533 U.S. 945, 121 S.Ct. 2584, 150 L.Ed.2d 745 (2001). In Graville, the Supreme Court wrote:
"On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One. Motion of American Association for Retired People for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division One, for further consideration in light of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 LEd.2d 49 (2000)."

. Graville v. Dodge, see note 14, supra. See also, McGovern v. McGovern, note 13, supra; Jackson v. Tangreen, note 13, supra.

. Akin v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., see note 6, supra; United States v. Home Fed. S. & L. Ass'n of Tulsa, 1966 OK 135, 18, 418 P.2d 319.

. Matter of Baby Girl L., 2002 OK 9, ¶33, 51 P.3d 544; Matter of Application of Herbst, 1998 OK 100, ¶0, 971 P.2d 395; McDonald v. Wrigley, 1994 OK 25, ¶9, 870 P.2d 777; Matter of Application of Grover, 1984 OK 20, ¶9, 681 P.2d 81; Matter of Adoption of Darren Todd H., 1980 OK 119, ¶18, 615 P.2d 287; Matter of Leake, 1980 OK 114, ¶8, 614 P.2d 1107; Alford v. Thomas, 1957 OK 218, ¶0, 316 P.2d 188 (1957); Bishop v. Benear, 1928 OK 553, ¶0, 270 P. 569 (1928). See also, Matter of S.B.C., 2002 OK 83, ¶6, 64 P.3d 1080.

. Ex parte State of Alabama v. L.M.S., 826 So.2d 178 (Ala.App.2002).

. - Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 LEd.2d 640 (1981); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 LEd.2d 551 (1972); In re Joshua S., 260 Conn. 182, 796 A.2d 1141, 1155 (2002).