Court Opinion

ID: 9929925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 19:01:25.176309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:52.812353
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11643    Document: 45-1     Date Filed: 02/05/2024   Page: 1 of 3

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11643
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       SANBAR ISLE, LLC,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL
       IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
USCA11 Case: 23-11643      Document: 45-1     Date Filed: 02/05/2024     Page: 2 of 3

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11643

                      D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61231-AHS
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              This case arises from a dispute over an easement. Sanbar
       Isle, LLC asserts that it is a fee simple owner of 2.57 acres in
       Florida’s Intracoastal Waterway. The United States argues in
       response that it was granted an easement on the property by the
       State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement
       Trust Fund. Believing that easement to be invalid, Sanbar Isle
       brought an action to quiet title under 28 U.S.C. § 2409a against the
       United States and the Board.
              The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of
       Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
       Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted
       the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion but did not consider the Rule
       12(b)(6) motion. Sanbar Isle appeals.
               We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions on a
       Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Odyssey Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified
       Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 1159, 1169 (11th Cir. 2011). Here, the
       district court recognized that any action under § 2409a is “barred
       unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which
       it accrued,” and that this Court has formerly held that this
       limitations period is jurisdictional. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g); F.E.B.
       Corp. v. United States, 818 F.3d 681, 685 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated
USCA11 Case: 23-11643         Document: 45-1         Date Filed: 02/05/2024          Page: 3 of 3

       23-11643                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

       by Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 156 & n.2, 165 (2023).
       Finding that Sanbar Isle failed to file suit within the limitations
       period, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
       matter jurisdiction.
              Two days after the district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal,
       the Supreme Court held that § 2409a(g)’s time-bar provision is
       nonjurisdictional. Wilkins, 598 U.S. at 165. This decision has
       abrogated our precedent to the contrary. Because § 2409a(g) is
       nonjurisdictional, the district court erred in dismissing Sanbar Isle’s
       complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to meet the statute of
       limitations.1 We thus REVERSE the district court’s order granting
       the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, and REMAND for
       further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
       in Wilkins.

       1 The defendants acknowledge that § 2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional under
       Wilkins but argue that we should still affirm because Sanbar Isle’s claim is time-
       barred and thus subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). To be sure, we have
       previously affirmed a district court’s dismissal despite concluding that part of
       the basis for that dismissal was improperly considered under Rule 12(b)(1)
       instead of Rule 12(b)(6). U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 809–
       11, 816 (11th Cir. 2015). But Osheroff did not hold that motions to dismiss
       improperly resolved under Rule 12(b)(1) must be reassessed by this Court
       under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than remanded to the district court. And where, as
       in this case, the parties agree that the district court improperly analyzed the
       motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), we think remand is appropriate.