Court Opinion

ID: 9735724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:28:40.644694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:01.021705
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
No attorney having a just conception of his true and proper position will willingly unite the character of counsel and witness in the same case, for experience has shown that those who, on repeated occasions, allow themselves to be thus used, are certain to feel most keenly the consequences of their indiscretion. Some courts have excluded such testimony entirely, and this of course not because the source of proof is regarded as unreliable, but because public policy and the integrity and welfare of the profession dictate that no one should be at the same time both advocate and witness for his client.
Our court so stated in Alger v. Merritt, 16 Iowa 121, 128 (1864). Dealing with the same problem in 1936, our court quoted Alger and concluded, “the court has always condemned such practice and deemed it reprehensible.” See Cuvelier v. Town of Dumont, 221 Iowa 1016, 1021, 266 N.W. 517, 519-20 (1936).
In In re Estate of Scanlan, 246 Iowa 52, 64, 67 N.W.2d 5 (1954), the court observed that one of the attorneys testified as a witness, and stated that “although it is not clear that he participated actively in the trial, he should have withdrawn his appearance as attorney.”
These statements and our rules of conduct focus on preventing potential harm to the client because of the conflict inherent in the attorney’s dual role as advocate and witness. See People v. Smith, 13 Cal.App.3d 897, 908-09, 91 Cal.Rptr. 786, 793-94 (1970); ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op., 339 (1975); Ann.Code of Professional Responsibility, 214 (1979); Sutton, The Testifying Advocate, 41 Tex.L.Rev. 477, 481 (1963). The reasoning behind DR 5-101(C) is in fact related to the preservation of the attorney’s role as an independent proponent of argument as opposed to an interested and partisan witness. Enker, The Rationale of the Rule that Forbids a Lawyer to be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 Am.B.Found.Res.J. 455, 463-64 (1977).
The majority asserts that there is no difference between a lawyer’s appearance on his or her own behalf and the situation presented by this case. This holding ignores the fact that Ronwin and National are not identical. National is a corporate entity and Ronwin is a stockholder. Their interests are not entirely the same. As EC 5-18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility points out:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation ... owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, the lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization.
Ronwin’s failure to secure counsel for National who will not also serve as a witness may well prejudice National’s interests during the trial and is clearly violative of this ethical consideration. The practical effect *814of the holding is to elevate Ronwin’s financial interests in appearing “pro se” above those of his client in having effective and unimpeachable counsel.
National advances a second argument based on one of the exceptions to DR 5-101(c)(4) which states that an attorney may serve as advocate and testify, “As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case.” In a situation almost identical to that presented by this case, a New York court found the substantial hardship exception inapplicable. Gasoline Expressway, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., 64 A.D.2d 647, 407 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1978). There, a corporation whose attorney was also its sole shareholder brought an action for recision of an agreement between the corporation and the defendants. The attorney, operating in her capacity as executive officer of the corporation, had negotiated and signed the agreement, and was a necessary witness for the corporation. The defendants moved for the attorney’s disqualification under DR 5-101(B) of the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, which is identical to DR 5-101(C) of the Iowa Code. The corporation contended that its attorney should be allowed to undertake the dual role of attorney and witness under the substantial hardship exception, apparently because of financial considerations. The appellate court noted that, “conclusory allegations concerning the cost of obtaining other counsel ... are totally insufficient” to support a claim of substantial hardship. Id. at 647-48, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
The allegations made by National are similar to those made by the corporate plaintiff in Gasoline Expressway. Such allegations are inadequate to show that “substantial hardship” is the inevitable result of Ronwin’s disqualification. Moreover, the district court’s dismissal of National’s action is keyed more to the corporation’s adamant refusal to use all means available to it to secure another attorney, than to Ronwin’s “distinctive value” to National in this particular suit.
The record reflects the fact that the corporation was put on notice of its attorney’s potential ethical problem at an early stage in the proceedings. In fact, National was aware some six months prior to Dickinsons’ filing of their motion to dismiss that the court was concerned with the conflict between Ronwin’s role as advocate and as witness.
Despite this early knowledge, National made no effort to locate a new attorney. Even after the court disqualified its attorney pursuant to DR 5-101(C), National apparently made no attempt to secure new counsel until after the forty-five day grace period allotted by the court had elapsed. National offers no reasons for its failure to attempt to secure new counsel at an earlier date. Nor does it explain why it is unable to secure a different attorney on a contingent fee basis.
The Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically grant the courts of this state the power to dismiss an action over which they have jurisdiction on their own motion, except in situations involving want of prosecution. Motz v. Motz, 207 N.W.2d 580, 581 (Iowa 1973); Iowa R.Civ.P. 215.1. This court has held, however, that when a trial court exercises restraint in so doing, it may dismiss an action sua sponte in other situations as well. Rush v. Sioux City, 240 N.W.2d 431, 439 (Iowa 1976). Whether a trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of an action is reasonable ultimately depends upon the factual situation.
In this case, it does not appear that the district court’s dismissal of National’s action against Hill was beyond the contemplation of the parties. Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 366 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1985). National had been aware for some six months prior to dismissal that failure to locate new counsel might result in that sanction. It unsuccessfully fought the Dickinsons’ motion to dismiss, filed when it failed to secure a new attorney. The law suit against Hill is posited on the same allegations made against *815the Dickinsons and also depends on the testimony of Ronwin. Given the court’s warning that dismissal would be a possible sanction for failure to comply with the court’s ruling on disqualification, I believe the court was within its discretionary authority to dismiss National’s suit against Hill along with the suit against the Dickin-sons.
For these reasons I would affirm the district court.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS and NEUMAN, JJ., join this dissent.