Court Opinion

ID: 9721249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:53:17.420767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.348643
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.
¶ 85. (dissenting). Justice Bradley's dissent ably demonstrates that the ministerial exception does not apply under our existing case law. I join it in full. I write separately, however, because our case law is, troublingly, untethered from the governing statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (2007-08).1
¶ 86. Governmental immunity has its roots in the common law. This court abrogated the prior rule of immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). We made clear that in regard to municipalities, going forward, "the rule is liability — the exception is immunity." Id. at 39. We outlined an exception to immunity, however, stating that a government body is not liable for actions done "in the exercise of its legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions." Id. at 40. If the legislature disagreed with this new approach, we noted, "it is, of course, free to reinstate immunity." Id.
¶ 87. In the year following our decision in Holytz, the legislature waded into this area in a comprehensive way for the first time. It created a new statute essentially codifying our language in Holytz. The current version of the statute provides as follows:
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency thereof for the *79intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire company or against its officers, officials, agents or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).
¶ 88. The context of this statute's adoption and its plain language suggest that liability should be the rule, and that suits are generally barred under only two circumstances.2 First, the statute bars suits against the listed governmental bodies "for the intentional torts of [their] officers, officials, agents or employees." Second, it bars suits against the listed'governmental bodies and employees "for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
¶ 89. Reading this statute, one might surmise that, where the claim did not involve an intentional tort, our cases would center on whether the allegedly harmful acts were legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial in nature. Yet, this is not the reality.
¶ 90. In the years following the legislature's proclamation in 1963, this court has interpreted this subsection to mean that the listed government officials are entitled to immunity for any acts that involve "the exercise of discretion and judgment." Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶ 21, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 *80N.W.2d 314. Now, instead of adhering to the letter and spirit of the statute — which specifies exceptions to the rule of liability, we have created a series of common law exceptions to immunity. See majority op., ¶¶ 21-24. This court has recognized that its current doctrines in this area are, in effect, public policy judgments; they are the product of the court's attempt to balance competing societal interests. Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶ 23-24. We seem to have dispensed with the notion that the text of the statute should be our guide. Something here is amiss.3
¶ 91. Seven years ago, Justice Prosser issued a call for this court to reexamine its jurisprudence in this area.4 See Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 *81WI 60, ¶¶ 75-82, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (Prosser, J., dissenting).5 I now join this call. My concern is rooted in the rule of law. The legislature has chosen to address the issue of governmental immunity directly. When the legislature has spoken, our obligation is to follow its intentions as expressed in the Wisconsin Statutes. Our current case law has strayed from this constitutional duty.
¶ 92. In short, though I agree with Justice Bradley's dissent that liability here is not warranted under our existing case law, I am not satisfied that our cases faithfully interpret § 893.80(4), and urge my colleagues to reconsider our jurisprudence to more closely align it with the legislative mandate.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.

 I say "generally" because the legislature has granted immunity in other specific factual scenarios. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 301.46(7) (granting immunity "for any good faith act or omission regarding the release of information" concerning sex offenders under that section); Wis. Stat. § 30.2026(5) (granting immunity "for acts or omissions that cause damage or injury and that relate to the construction, maintenance, or use of any artificial barrier" authorized by § 30.2026(1)).

 The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin also recognized this in Baumgardt v. Wausau Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 2d 800 (WD. Wis. 2007). Judge Crabb observed:
On its face the immunity granted under [Wis. Stat. § 893.40(4)] appears limited. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) (first setting forth test now codified in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and noting "the rule is liability — the exception is immunity"). However, in a curious and expansive exercise of statutory construction, the Wisconsin courts have interpreted § 893.80(4) to mean that government officials are entitled to immunity for "any act that involves the exercise of discretion and judgment." Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶ 21, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314 (2002). Currently, there are four narrow categories of non-discretionary acts to which immunity does not apply: "(1) ministerial duties imposed by law, (2) duties to address a known danger, (3) actions involving professional discretion, and (4) actions that are malicious, willful, and intentional." Scott v. Savers Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶ 16, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (2003). Thus, it appears that immunity is now the rule in Wisconsin rather than the exception.
Id. at 809 (emphasis added).

 This call to reexamine our approach was echoed in a concurrence written by Justice Bablitch and joined by Justice *81Crooks. See Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2003 WI 60, ¶¶ 61-64, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715 (Bablitch, J., concurring).

 See also Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶¶ 59-172, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Bablitch and Crooks).