Court Opinion

ID: 9931655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 17:00:52.724206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:15.351903
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1090     Document: 010110997613      Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       February 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  HARIT UMESH VORA,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-1090
                                                (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00572-CNS-MDB)
  KEITH DIONNE, Casma Therapeutics,                           (D. Colo.)
  CEO; MARK LEVIN, Third Rock
  Ventures, Founder,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Harit Umesh Vora appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against

 defendants Keith Dionne and Mark Levin for lack of personal jurisdiction.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1090    Document: 010110997613        Date Filed: 02/09/2024      Page: 2

 I.    Background

       Mr. Vora was formerly employed by Casma Therapeutics, Inc., in

 Massachusetts. After his employment ended, he moved to Colorado. He then sued

 two individuals associated with Casma Therapeutics in federal district court in

 Colorado. He asserted claims related to his former employment and to subsequent

 alleged conduct by defendants.

       Defendants moved to dismiss Mr. Vora’s action under Federal Rule of Civil

 Procedure 12(b)(2), arguing the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over

 them. They asserted that they are Massachusetts residents who own no property in

 Colorado, have no personal residence or business office in Colorado, and conduct no

 regular business in Colorado. A magistrate judge recommended that the motion be

 granted (“Recommendation”).

       Mr. Vora filed timely objections to the Recommendation. The district court

 concluded his objections primarily addressed the merits of his claims. And although

 Mr. Vora included some references to the Recommendation’s jurisdictional analysis,

 it found his objections were not sufficiently specific to trigger de novo review.

 Discerning no clear error in the Recommendation’s comprehensive and well-reasoned

 analysis, the district court adopted it and dismissed Mr. Vora’s action without

 prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

 II.   Discussion

       We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Vora’s action for lack

 of personal jurisdiction. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir.

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 2011). Because he proceeds pro se, we liberally construe Mr. Vora’s filings, but we

 do not act as his advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir.

 2013).

          A.    Firm Waiver Rule

          Defendants contend that Mr. Vora waived appellate review by failing to object

 to the Recommendation with sufficient specificity. We have adopted a firm waiver

 rule under which a party’s failure to timely object to a magistrate judge’s

 recommendation results in a waiver of appellate review of both factual and legal

 questions. See Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010). Not

 only must a party make a timely objection to preserve appellate review, his

 objections must also be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court’s attention on

 the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute.” United States v. One Parcel of

 Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).

          Defendants initially argue that Mr. Vora’s objections focused entirely on the

 merits of his claims. But they acknowledge that he did also address personal

 jurisdiction. Based on our liberal review of Mr. Vora’s objections, we conclude they

 were sufficiently specific to avoid a waiver of appellate review of the district court’s

 dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. While it is true that Mr. Vora organized

 his objections based upon his claims and that most of his objections related to the

 merits of those claims, he also addressed the Recommendation’s jurisdictional ruling.

          Mr. Vora made the following assertions in his objections, which we construe

 as related to the personal jurisdiction analysis in the Recommendation:

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    • Defendants’ alleged tortious interference “carried over” into Colorado.

       R., Vol. 2 at 7, 8 1; see also id. at 13-14.

    • The fiduciary shield doctrine cannot protect defendants from an exercise of

       personal jurisdiction by the district court. See id. at 8.

    • His former employment relationship with defendants satisfied due process and

       the Colorado long-arm statute. See id. at 8-9.

    • Statements made in Colorado, or to him in Colorado, by a person other than

       the defendants supported jurisdiction in Colorado. See id. at 9, 21.

    • Enforcement of a noncompete provision by defendants resulted in sustained or

       minimum contacts with him in Colorado, impacting his ability to seek

       employment and his professional standing in Colorado. See id. at 11.

    • His inability to find work in Colorado has a significant bearing on jurisdiction.

       See id. at 16.

    • Although defendants do not occupy Colorado, their contractual obligations

       span the United States, “suggesting national personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 11.

    • A “Forum Selection Clause” in a contract between him and defendants may

       weigh on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 15, 17-19.

    • Patent assignments by him to defendants occurred in Colorado. See id. at 17.

       1
         In his objections, Mr. Vora sometimes referred to “the 10th district,” R. at 7,
 8, which we take to mean Colorado.
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    • The magistrate judge failed to apply the Supreme Court’s five-factor test to

       determine whether traditional notions of fair play are applicable in this case.

       See id. at 21.

       Because these objections were not lacking in specificity, we decline to apply

 the firm waiver rule to conclude that Mr. Vora entirely waived review of the

 jurisdictional issue on appeal. This is not a case where an appellant made only a

 general objection, or made an objection irrelevant to the pertinent ruling, yet attempts

 to challenge that ruling on appeal. See, e.g., One Parcel of Prop., 73 F.3d at 1060 &

 n.2. Moreover, that Mr. Vora’s contentions may have lacked merit does not mean

 that they also lacked the necessary specificity to preserve appellate review.

       We note, however, that Mr. Vora cannot raise on appeal issues that he did not

 include in his objections to the Recommendation. See Port City Props. v. Union Pac.

 R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1190 nn.1-2 (10th Cir. 2008).

       B.     Personal Jurisdiction

       As the plaintiff, Mr. Vora bore the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.

 See Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1239. Because Colorado’s long-arm statute extends

 jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Constitution, the district court

 considered whether its exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants would

 comport with the requirements of federal due process. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v.

 Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 903 (10th Cir. 2017). Mr. Vora did not contend

 that defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts” with Colorado resulting in

 general jurisdiction over them. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks
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 omitted). The court therefore focused on the question whether it had specific

 jurisdiction over defendants based on minimum contacts. See id.

       Mr. Vora had to show (1) that defendants “purposefully directed” their

 activities at residents of Colorado, and (2) that his injuries arose out of defendants’

 Colorado-related activities. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Purposeful

 direction requires actions by a defendant that “create a substantial connection with

 the forum state.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1092

 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, courts have been

 unwilling to allow states to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants where

 the defendant’s presence in the forum arose from the unilateral acts of someone other

 than the defendant.” Id.; see also Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc.,

 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (“The purpose of this requirement is to ensure

 that a defendant will not be subject to the laws of a jurisdiction solely as the result of

 random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another

 party or a third person.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

       The district court held that Mr. Vora failed to establish that defendants had

 sufficient contacts with Colorado to satisfy the requirements for specific jurisdiction.

 It therefore dismissed his action without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction

 over defendants.

       Mr. Vora’s pro se appeal brief is difficult to decipher, but liberally construing

 it we conclude that he challenges the district court’s jurisdictional ruling. He appears

 to argue, as he did in his objections to the Recommendation, that personal

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 jurisdiction is supported by: (1) the transfer of intellectual property, see Aplt. Br. at

 6, 7; (2) his ongoing communications with defendants, see id. at 7; (3) his previous

 employment relationship, see id.; and (4) the defendants’ alleged tortious

 interference, see id.

        The district court rejected Mr. Vora’s contention that his relocation from

 Massachusetts to Colorado, his previous employment by defendants in

 Massachusetts, his transfer of intellectual property to defendants, and their continued

 contacts with him were sufficient to demonstrate that defendants had minimum

 contacts with Colorado. The court held that “[n]one of these activities purportedly

 giving rise to the harm alleged by Mr. Vora . . . appears to have been directed at

 Colorado, and the mere fortuity that [he] resides in Colorado is insufficient to create

 personal jurisdiction.” R., Vol. 1 at 180.

        Mr. Vora fails to show error in this holding. For the court to have personal

 jurisdiction over defendants, he cannot be the only link between defendants and

 Colorado. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). “To be sure, a

 defendant’s contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or

 interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant’s relationship with a

 plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at

 286. Rather, a defendant’s relationship with the forum state “must arise out of

 contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum state.” Id. at 284 (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

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        Mr. Vora also appears to assert that defendants’ alleged tortious interference

 resulted in them having purposeful minimum contacts with Colorado. 2 We construe

 this contention as asserting that Mr. Vora’s place of injury in Colorado supports

 personal jurisdiction. He is correct that the place of injury can be relevant to

 personal jurisdiction. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct.

 1017, 1031-32 (2021). But unlike the defendant in Ford Motor Co., defendants here

 do not have “a veritable truckload of contacts” with the forum state. Id. at 1031; see

 also id. at 1026 (noting defendant’s concession it had purposefully availed itself of

 the privilege of conducting business in the forum states). And Mr. Vora also fails to

 develop his tortious-interference argument sufficiently to demonstrate that defendants

 established minimum contacts in Colorado. He does not point to any facts, see Aplt.

 Br. at 7, much less facts showing that his alleged injury in Colorado is any less

 attenuated and fortuitous than defendants’ other limited contacts that resulted from

 Mr. Vora’s unilateral decision to relocate to Colorado. He therefore fails to show

 error in the district court’s jurisdictional holding on this basis.

        2
          There is some question whether Mr. Vora properly raised this contention in
 the district court. See Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distribs., Inc., 686 F.3d 1144,
 1150 (10th Cir. 2012) (“An issue is preserved for appeal if a party alerts the district
 court to the issue and seeks a ruling.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. Vora
 never mentioned “tortious interference” in his response to defendants’ motion to
 dismiss. Although he did refer to “blacklisting,” R., Vol. 1 at 114, and the magistrate
 judge noted that assertion, id. at 172, the judge did not discuss it in the jurisdictional
 analysis. And while Mr. Vora did assert tortious interference in his objections to the
 Recommendation, a party may not raise an issue for the first time in objections. See
 Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (declining to address
 argument first made in objections to magistrate judge’s recommendation). Despite
 this uncertainty, we choose to address this issue.
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 III.   Conclusion

        We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Allison H. Eid
                                            Circuit Judge

                                           9