Court Opinion

ID: 9494150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:42.482085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:14.960021
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in all of Judge Ferguson’s opinion for the Court,1 except for Parts III.B a, b, c, and d, which I regard as dicta. I write separately only to correct the mistaken assertion that Part III.A of Judge Kozinski’s opinion represents a “holding” of the Court.
Judge Kozinski states: “Accordingly, we hold that the determination that a particular search did (or did not) occur within the curtilage must be reviewed de novo on appeal.”2 Op. of Kozinski, J., at 913; see also id. at 909 n. 1. While some may find his musings to be interesting, they are of no moment because they have no effect on our disposition of the case. Thus, while I disagree with his overly-broad reading of Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), it would serve no useful purpose to debate the issue in this case.
Judge Kozinski’s musings about the standard of appellate review of curtilage determinations are dicta because the Court has not reviewed any curtilage determination.3 Rather, in its disposition, the Court remands the case to the district court for it to make that determination in *920the first instance. See op. for the Court at 898, 901, 909. We have not reviewed the curtilage issue under any standard of review. Thus, because Judge Kozinski’s announcement of his preferred standard of review of curtilage issues is unnecessary to our disposition of the case, it is dictum. See Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.1995) (adopting Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “dictum” as “an observation or remark ... not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination”) (ellipsis in the original); Id. (holding that statements “not necessary to the decision” of the case “have no binding or precedential impact”).
Judge Kozinski does not contend that his standard of review pronouncements are not dicta according to any accepted definition of the term. He does not even attempt to argue that his statements regarding the standard of review for curtilage determinations are necessary to our decision in this case. They transparently are not. Instead, he disagrees with our Circuit’s definition of “dictum,” which reflects the centuries-long development of the common law.4 He criticizes the accepted approach as “difficult” because “judges often disagree about what is and is not necessary to the resolution of a case.” Op. of Kozinski, J., at 914. I submit, however, that the standard he would have us adopt would be fraught with even more difficulty. He would shift to the wholly subjective and completely unworkable standard of “deliberate” and “due consideration” versus “casual.” Id. at 915-16. He does not inform us on which side of the line “considered, but not duly considered” or “semi-casual” would fall. This is no standard at all.
Judge Kozinski’s reliance on the “necessarily decided” rule for invoking collateral estoppel, see. id. at 915, is equally flawed. Obviously, one of the primary preconditions for the invocation of collateral estoppel is that the issue was, in fact, decided in the prior proceeding. But applying the same test-whether an issue has “undeniably” been decided-to a legal issue to distinguish between dictum and a holding would, in fact, completely obliterate any distinction between dicta and holdings. A panel can “undeniably” decide any question of law, whether or not it is related to any issue in the case and whether or not it is necessary to the disposition of the case.5
Finally, Judge Kozinski’s reliance on out-of-circuit authority is misplaced. United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.1990), involved the “approv[al] or disapproval of an] aspect of trial court procedure.” Id. at 540. It thus involved the exercise of that court’s supervisory authority over the trial courts in that circuit. Whatever the merits of extending the force of dicta in such circumstances, here, of course, no such exercise of our supervisory authority is involved. By definition, any rule on the standard of appellate re*921view speaks only to future panels of this Court. Thus, Oshatz’s reasoning has no application here.
Judge Kozinski’s reliance on United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.1988), is even more puzzling. Judge Kozinski’s ruminations about the standard of appellate review for curtilage issues meet every definition of “dictum” quoted in that case.6 See id. at 292. Moreover, it even meets Judge Posner’s “pragmatic definition of dictum.” Op.- of Kozinski, J., at 916. For, as Crawley observes, first among the “many” “reasons there are against a court’s giving weight to a passage found in a previous opinion” “is that the passage was unnecessary to the outcome of the earlier case ....” Id. (emphasis added).
The fact that Judge Kozinski’s pronouncement is joined in by a majority of the en banc court does not affect this analysis. By definition, dictum is an unnecessary statement made by the majority; unless a statement is made by a majority, there is no need to engage in an analysis of whether that particular statement is dictum or a holding. Thus, while the en banc court has the authority to overrule the holding of a three judge panel, it can do so only in a holding necessary to the disposition of the case. If it were otherwise, the en banc court would be acting as a legislature and not as a court. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 & n. 14, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (noting that “[t]he rule against advisory opinions was established as early as 1793” and that it “has been adhered to without deviation”). Finally, an ipse dixit labeling a statement as a “holding” does not make it so.
Because they are, in fact, dicta, subsequent panels are not bound either by Judge Kozinski’s self-proclaimed “holding” or by his purported “overruling” of our prior cases. As Judge Ferguson observes, we must “leave for another panel the question of resolving what standard of review this Court applies to curtilage determinations.” Op. for the Court at 901.

. Judge Ferguson’s opinion is the opinion of the Court because it is the opinion on which our mandate-our disposition of the case-is based. Nothing in Judge Kozinski's opinion, not even that part (Part III.A) joined in by five other members of the en banc court, affects our disposition of the case.

. In an accompanying footnote, Judge Kozin-ski purports to "overrule” our consistent line of cases, starting with United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1993), which holds that a district court’s determination whether an area is within the protected curtilage of a home is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See op. of Kozinski, J., at 913 n. 4.

. In fact, the district court did not make any curtilage determination at all. See op. for the Court at 898, 901; op. of Kozinski, J., at 911.

. Judge Kozinski has, however, agreed with the accepted definition of "dictum" in the recent past. See Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir.1997) (characterizing three prior cases as "dicta" because "the earlier cases had no occasion to decide” the issue). Likewise, we have "no occasion to decide" the standard of review issue in this case.

. Judge Kozinski’s discussion of Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 542 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), and other, similar cases, see op. of Kozinski, J., at 914-15 & n. 6, confuses alternative holdings with dicta. Of course, they are not the same. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949) ("where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum”) (citing cases). He does not contend that his pronouncements in this case are an alternative holding.

. All of these definitions share a common theme: "a statement ... that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical foundations of the holding;” "argument unnecessary to the decision;” "a remark ... concerning some rule ... that is not necessarily essential to the decision and lacks the authority of adjudication;” "a statement not ... necessary for its decision.” Crawley, 837 F.2d at 292.