Court Opinion

ID: 9643254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:24:00.913028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.889189
License: Public Domain

CRAMER, Justice.
Appellee City of Dallas filed this proceeding to condemn a portion of appellants’ business and residential property. The portion desired by the City is located *1015immediately in front of the brick building at the corner of Dolphin Road and Forney Avenue, and is marked “Condemned” on the plat introduced in evidence as follows: etc. This appeal has been duly perfected from that judgment.
Appellants’ first point is as follows: “Priolo’s profitable grocery and liquor

On the trial before a jury, they found, in substance, (1) that the market value of the part taken was $1,200; (2) that the market value of the remainder not taken was $30,000 before the taking and (3) $28,200 after the taking; (4) that appellants suffered loss of profits in their business as a result of the temporary obstruction of Dolphin Road (S) in amount of $326; and (6) appellants will not suffer loss of profits in the future by reason of the taking of the strip of land condemned.
Judgment was entered, based on the jury’s answers, awarding the condemned property to the City; and awarded appellants $1,200 for the land taken, $1,800 damages to remainder of the property, and $326 temporary damage to the business during construction work by the City on Dolphin Road, — a total of $3,326, plus costs, business is property, and the court’s charge, which limited damages incurred by the remaining property because of condemnation of a portion, to the damage to the land itself, is improper and fails to fully compensate the property owner for damage to his business, as required by the Constitution.”
Appellee’s counterpoint is as follows: “Appellants’ grocery and liquor business is not ‘property’ within the meaning of the eminent domain statutes authorizing the recovery of compensation by any person whose property is taken or damaged under the right of eminent domain, and the trial court did not err in submitting issues to the jury inquiring as to the market value of the remainder of appellants’ land immediately before and after the taking of a portion for street widening purposes.”
*1016The record shows that during the trial Arthur Wolf, a real estate expert witness for appellants, testified in substance that the whole of that part of appellants’ property not taken was worth $32,000 before the taking and $20,000 afterward; that the change in value was the result of loss of the parking space; that future loss of business in the two stores would be perpetual, that is, as long as the business is located there. The estimate was based on amount of business done, amount of business arriving by way of automobiles, otherwise, etc. Such loss was based on the fact that the property, at present time, is a going concern, — a successful business — . Witness had some basis upon which to value the property and the business which he said would have considerable to do with it. A going business like this, with good location and good management, and successful management, are facts that should be taken into consideration in figuring the market value of the property. The next witness, Joe Cole, a real estate salesman specializing in the sale of business opportunities exclusively, qualified as an expert witness and was questioned as to the value of ap^ pellants’ property based, among other elements, on the amount of gross sales and net operating profit during the year 1949, and was also asked whether he knew the fair market value of those businesses in Dallas County in 1949. After the witness answered “Yes,” and after the following objection, to wit, “(Mr. Nichols) : We object to that for the reason that the value of the business is not an element to be considered. It is not the proper measure of damages in this case because the City is not condemning the business and they are not talcing the business and there is no liability on the part of the City — for the value of Mr. Pri-olo’s property as such' — that is the question here — that testimony regarding the value of ■the business is immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent and prejudicial”, the court sustained the objection and excluded the testimony.
In our opinion it was error to sustain such objection. A going business is property. Hart Bros. v. Dallas County, Tex.Com.App., 279 S.W. 1111. Our Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 17, Vernon’s Ann.St., states: “No person’s property shall be taken * * etc. The Legislature could not and did not limit the compensation in this case to the land alone, either by statute or in the City Charter, to less than the Constitution provided for.
The evidence of gross sales, net operating costs, the value of the grocery and liquor store before and after the taking of the land condemned, are not ultimate facts in themselves, but are elements to be considered by the seller or the purchaser of the property; and since the market value of property is the price a seller of property, who desires to sell but who does not have to sell, will take, and a buyer of the property, who desires to buy but does not have to buy, will pay, naturally both parties in arriving at the sales price as between themselves would consider such elements. Such facts constitute material evidence for the jury in passing on the ultimate issue of market value. City of La Grange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 17S S.W.2d 243. It was therefore error to exclude the testimony above referred to and such error necessitates a reversal of the judgment below. It is not necessary for us to pass upon other assignments except to sustain the City’s cross assignments to the submission of the temporary loss of business profits as a separate item of damage, — upon which $326 of the court’s judgment was based, since only permanent damage is recoverable under the facts here.
Nothing we have said conflicts with State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, in which case attention was called to the difference between the elements of damage, evidence of which is admitted for the purpose of enabling the jury to apply the Rule as to damages recoverable for that part of the property not taken. In fact our holdings above followed the Carpenter case strictly. The form of the issues in an eminent domain proceeding as set out in the Carpenter case is the proper form to submit to the jury and should still be the trial court’s guide in such cases.
The property, consisting of land, a building or buildings, and a business es*1017tablishment thereon, is considered as a whole in the ultimate issue as to market value. The court here erred in submitting separately the issue of damage to the land as such, since the ownership of the land, the improvements and business here are all in the same person. The cases of Dallas County v. Barr, Tex.Civ.App., 231 S.W. 453, and Hart Bros. v. Dallas County, Tex.Com.App., 279 S.W. 1111, illustrate the law where ownership of land and business is in different persons. There, Barr, in a separate suit, recovered' for the land, and Hart Bros, in their suit recovered for damages to the business which was held to be property. In such cases the issues were divided to fit the particular interest each party owned. There each party could recover in his suit only for his property.
For the reasons stated, the judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded for another trial, not inconsistent with this opinion.
BOND, C. J., dissents.