Court Opinion

ID: 9672870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:02:01.312869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.795864
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, P. J.
(dissenting). I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that MCLA 726.11; MSA 27.3561, does not allow recorder’s court to exercise jurisdiction in the instant case.
My colleagues first accept People v Ewald, 302 Mich 31; 4 NW2d 456 (1942), as authority for the proposition that the exclusive jurisdiction of recorder’s court does not extend to the issuance of a search warrant, a proceeding for the discovery of *485crime. There is support for this interpretation, if the statements in Ewald, supra, are read without reference to the particular circumstances of that case. As I stated, obviously unpersuasively, in my dissent in People v Moss, 68 Mich App 614, 618; 244 NW2d 1 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 836 (1977):
"The statement in People v Ewald, 302 Mich 31; 4 NW2d 456 (1942), that proceedings for the discovery of crime are not prosecutions and proceedings for crimes within the meaning of the recorder’s court jurisdiction statute does not require a different result. Ewald involved the authority of a one-man Wayne County grand jury, conducting an investigation into crimes in Detroit, to issue an arrest warrant for a crime committed within the city. The recorder’s court jurisdiction statute contains a specific proviso preserving the authority of the grand jury to inquire into and make accusation of crimes committed within the city. The instant case does not involve the authority of a grand jury, one-man or otherwise.”
The issuance, execution and return of the search warrant here was merely the first step of what presumably was anticipated to result in an arrest and criminal prosecution. It does not seem logical to me to say that because no arrest ensued after the warrant was returned to recorder’s court, that court lost any jurisdiction it might otherwise possess to dispose of the seized funds.
I consider People v Rosa, 382 Mich 163; 169 NW2d 297 (1969), to be ample authority for the trial judge’s actions here. That this is so is made clearer by a reading of this Court’s rationale in People v Rosa, 11 Mich App 157; 160 NW2d 747 (1968).
"Under the terms of this jurisdiction delimiting statute, in order for the recorder’s court to have authority *486to return the cash, it must first be decided that a circuit court also would have the authority to make disposition in a criminal case of cash obtained under identical circumstances.
"In People v Williams (1961), 363 Mich 281, seized personal property and cash were claimed by third parties after the information in the case had been quashed. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held the remedy, if any, in the Williams Case was 'on the civil side of the court.’ That holding, however, was largely based on a 'lack of proper party in interest, neither affiant nor petitioner being party to criminal action in which petition is filed.’ In cases brought by the accused parties for the return of illegally seized property the return has been ordered. People v Krol (1943), 304 Mich 623, People v Marxhausen (1919), 204 Mich 599 (3 ALR 1505); also see 20 MLP, Searches and Seizures, § 1, p 228 et seq. It is apparent that such return can be ordered by circuit courts in such cases, therefore, under the statutes, recorder’s court can also order such returns.
"The question is now raised as to what return procedures would be compatible with the 4th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which was made fully applicable to the States by Mapp v Ohio (1961), 367 US 643 (81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933). The people argue that recorder’s court is not the appropriate tribunal in which to try complicated questions of title. A similar illegal seizure of cash was faced and decided under the principles of the 4th Amendment in Berkowitz v United States (CA 1, 1965), 340 F2d 168 (8 ALR3d 463). It was stated in that opinion that the basic concept of our American system incorporated in the 4th Amendment is that men have the right to be left in possession of their property unless valid authority for disturbing that possession can be shown to be based upon law. No complicated questions of title will be faced, as all that need be decided concerning seized property is the superior right of possession as between the seizing authority and the one from whom the property was seized. As pointed out in Berkowitz, this does not mean that an accused is entitled to receive possession of contraband of which the mere possession *487is per se contrary to public policy. In the case of the seizure of noncontraband property, public policy against the unconstitutional seizure of property is so strong as not to allow undue vexation or delay in recovering property wrongfully seized.”
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Rosa, supra, cannot withstand analysis. They urge that the motion below raised two questions for consideration: (1) who has the paramount right to possession of the monies, Mr. Garrett or the city; and (2) was Mr. Garrett the owner of the monies at the time of its seizure? Each question relates to the other; however, neither is really determinative, for the reason, unobserved by my colleagues, that the city in oral argument admitted it has no valid claim whatever to the monies nor has it any knowledge of anybody other than the petitioner who lays claim to them. It is also worthy of note that in Rosa, as here, there were no criminal proceedings pending. The charges in Rosa had been dismissed well before the motion was made for return of the monies.1
In sum, the majority seems to strive for an unduly restrictive interpretation of recorder’s court jurisdiction for no compelling reason. Why should this petitioner be forced at his expense to commence a civil action and seek relief in another forum? I agree, and I find nothing in Rosa to dispute, that circuit court has primary jurisdiction to try title questions, but it seems unnecessary to require petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction *488where, as here, no government agency claims any interest in the funds and no other individual asserts a contrary right to possession. I would affirm.

 At the oral argument in this cause, counsel for the city, in response to the Court’s inquiry, stated it to be his position that if, in Rosa, two years had lapsed from dismissal of the charges to the time of the motion, recorder’s court would still have jurisdiction to return the funds. However, if, in this case, petitioner had brought his motion simultaneously with the return of the search warrant, recorder’s court could not exercise jurisdiction. It is this inconsistency which troubles me.