Court Opinion

ID: 991501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:37:53.533036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:44.523568
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOHN M. SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BARBARA A. MORGAN, Individually
                                                                      No. 96-1445
and as Solicitor for the Second
Judicial Circuit of the State of
South Carolina,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-95-513-1-6)

Submitted: November 26, 1996

Decided: February 21, 1997

Before HALL, ERVIN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

B. Michael Brackett, ROGERS TOWNSEND & THOMAS, P.C.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Vinton D. Lide, Michael S.
Pauley, LIDE, MONTGOMERY, POTTS & MEDLOCK, P.C.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

John Smith appeals the district court's orders dismissing his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) civil complaint under F ED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6),
based on prosecutorial immunity, and denying his motion for recon-
sideration. Barbara Morgan, the South Carolina state prosecutor
accused of violating Smith's civil rights, answered Smith's complaint
asserting both absolute and qualified immunity. Smith challenges the
district court's determination that Morgan was immune from suit by
prosecutorial immunity. Finding no reversible error, we affirm both
orders of the district court.

Smith claims that Morgan violated his civil rights by seeking and
obtaining an indictment against him for obstruction of justice. The
indictment was later dismissed; however, Smith asserts that Morgan
maliciously sought the indictment without probable cause and
defamed him by making an extra-judicial statement concerning the
indictment's dismissal. Smith is not entitled to relief.

In reviewing the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we con-
sider whether the complaint, accepting the allegations as true, allows
a recovery. Waterford Citizens' Ass'n v. Reilly , 970 F.2d 1287, 1290
(4th Cir. 1992). For important public policy reasons, the Supreme
Court held in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), that absolute
prosecutorial immunity is essential for activities intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler, 424 U.S. at
430. Prosecutors must often make decisions that could produce a col-
orable cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights, and
defending these decisions could impose unique and intolerable bur-
dens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds of indict-
ments and trials. Id. at 425-26. Thus, the Supreme Court specifically
held that "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's
case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under

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§ 1983." Id. at 431. Further, the Court noted that there are other ways
to punish prosecutorial misconduct, such as professional disciplinary
action and criminal prosecution. Id. at 429. Consequently, the district
court did not err in finding Morgan's actions protected by prosecu-
torial immunity.

Finally, to the extent that Smith alleges that Morgan defamed him,
even assuming the correctness of his allegations, Smith is not entitled
to relief. Section 1983 can not be used as a vehicle to assert a defama-
tion claim, because personal reputation alone is not a liberty interest
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 712 (1976); see also Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 231-
234 (1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the orders of the district court. Addition-
ally, we deny Smith's motion to file a supplemental appendix. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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