Court Opinion

ID: 9530399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:33.277051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:05.910024
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: A criminal defendant’s constitutional right to appeal cannot and should not be defeated by such a technical rule as that advanced in People v. Boston, 27 Ill. App. 3d 246, 327 N.E.2d 40.1 believe this court was in error in the Boston decision and that the opinion should no longer be followed. As stated in Boston, it is true that the courts of this State have applied a similar rule in civil cases. However, there are important and obvious reasons for recognizing a distinction in a criminal appeal. Where a party’s actual liberty is at stake, the adversary character of the action must, yield to the interests of the defendant and society in the accurate and thorough determination of guilt or innocence. Formalities which serve no legitimate purpose should not be afforded such a liberal construction as to defeat constitutional rights. In People v. Krug, 38 Ill. App. 3d 383, 347 N.E.2d 807, this court made substantial inroads to the ruling stated in Boston through the following remarks: “In the instant case, the judge ruled upon defendant’s petition for probation at the sentencing hearing and entered a lengthy recitation in the docket minutes of his ruling that the probation be conditioned upon periodic imprisonment. Subsequently a written probation order was filed containing the terms and conditions of that probation. This subsequent order in no way affected the judgment of guilt or the length of probation or periodic imprisonment. Had defendant sought to challenge the terms of the written probation order on this appeal, we would be faced with a more difficult problem. But here the judgment and sentence were final as to all but the ministerial incidents of probation and that judgment was clearly indicated upon the written record prior to the filing of the notice of appeal. We believe that defendant has appealed from a final appealable order and that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.” (38 Ill. App. 3d 383, 385.) See also People v. Willett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 545, 358 N.E.2d 657. By the preceding comments this court held that where the terms and conditions of probation are explicitly indicated and subsequently adopted in a written probation order, a notice of appeal is proper even though it precedes the filing of the written order. Likewise, in this case “the judgment and sentence were final as to all but the ministerial incidents” of conditional discharge when the trial court requested the state’s attorney to prepare a written order incorporating the announced terms. As in Krug, a different and more difficult problem would be presented if the contentions on appeal related directly to aspects of the subsequently filed written order not orally stated by the court. But in both Krug and here the explicit terms and conditions of the trial court’s orally announced sentence served as the basis for the written order. The majority’s blind obedience to rigid technicalities could possibly be rationalized if defendant’s motion for filing a late notice of appeal were granted. This would reach an equitable result where the trial court has been primarily responsible for the confusion engendered and where the defendant has apparently been misled by the effect of the trial court’s oral recitation. The refusal to grant such a motion under the facts presented in this case is at best unreasonable.