Court Opinion

ID: 9752081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:33:29.870599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:06.388303
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not believe that the legislature intended to authorize trial judges to ignore basic policy decisions made by the legislature with respect to the equitable establishment of child support, or to authorize virtually unlimited discretion as soon as the combined adjusted actual income of the parties exceeds $10,000 per month.
As the Court’s opinion points out, the legislature adopted an Income Shares Model when it enacted Senate Bill 49 in 1989. The Bill Analysis prepared for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee explains the basic concepts of this model in the following language:
The Income Shares model is based on the premise that the child should receive the same proportion of parental income he or she would receive if the parents lived together. Under this model, a basic child support obligation is computed based on the combined income of the parents (replicating total income in an intact household). This basic obligation is then prorated in proportion to each parent’s adjusted gross income. Prorated shares of child care costs and extraordinary medical expenses are added to each parent’s basic obligation.
The economic assumptions underlying this model are based on recent studies estimating expenditures on children as a proportion of household consumption.
The chancellor followed one of these policies when he allocated the share of each parent in accordance with their share of the total income. He apparently ignored, however, the “recent studies estimating expenditures on children as a proportion of household consumption” which underlay the legislature’s approved model, and instead reverted to an *335earlier practice of attempting to determine the needs of a child based upon the custodial parent’s estimated allocation to the child of a portion of fixed expenses of the family. As the Court of Special Appeals cogently observed in Tannehill v. Tannehill, 88 Md.App. 4, 11, 591 A.2d 888 (1991), one of the principal purposes for adopting the guidelines was “to improve the consistency and equity of child support awards.” See also Richardson v. Richardson, 12 Va.App. 18, 401 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1991) (child support guidelines were intended to “decrease the disparity in the amount of awards, which, without the guidelines, range from unreasonably low to unrealistically high”).
I believe the Income Shares Model adopted by the legislature provides informed guidance for the fixing of child support obligations even when the combined adjusted actual income exceeds $10,000 per month, while still granting the discretion referred to in § 12-204(d) of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1991 RepLVol.). The schedule of basic child support obligations, based upon data that the legislature found acceptable, shows that above the poverty level the percentage of parental income dedicated to child-rearing expenses decreases as the parental income increases. I do not agree with the father that the curve which can be plotted from the schedule must be projected to establish child support obligations beyond the limits of the schedule; that argument is contrary to the express intention of the legislature to grant a measure of discretion to the court when incomes exceed the highest income listed on the schedule. But that does not mean that the entire concept of the schedule, or its underlying data, should be jettisoned as soon as the upper limit of the schedule is passed. The legislative objective may be carried forward by using the schedule to establish presumptive maximum and minimum amounts for basic child support.
Specifically, I suggest that the amount calculated in accordance with the schedule for child support when the combined income equals $10,000 per month should serve as the presumptive floor for awards based upon combined *336income in excess of that amount. It makes no sense to hold the parents who would be required to provide $1,040 per month for the support of a child when their combined monthly income is $10,000 would be permitted to pay less if their income were $10,050 per month. Similarly, I believe the presumptive maximum base payment for one child should be 10.4 percent of the combined income of the parents, which is the percentage that the maximum scheduled payment bears to the maximum combined income ($1,040 to $100,000).
As I have noted above, the studies upon which the schedule is based demonstrate that the percentage of combined income of families living together that is dedicated to support of a child decreases as the income increases. Thus, it would hardly be inequitable to the child to establish as a maximum the percentage fixed by the schedule for a lesser amount of combined income. It should be kept in mind, however, that it is the percentage of income that remains as a constant presumptive ceiling—the amount of dollars to be paid for the support of the child obviously increases as the combined income increases.
I certainly would not fault a chancellor for utilizing a projection of the schedule for combined incomes above $10,000 a month as a presumptive child support payment where other factors did not suggest a different amount, but I agree that such a projection is not required. The legislature expressly reserved a considerable range of discretion to the chancellor when the combined monthly income of the parties exceeds $10,000, and thus there is no authority for requiring a mathematical projection. It was, however, the intent of the legislature that this discretion be exercised in a manner consistent with the principles approved by the passage of subtitle 2 of Chapter 12 of the Family Law Article (Child Support Guidelines). Accordingly, the presumptive maximum and minimum support payments should be dictated by those policies.
Applying these principles to this case, the presumptive minimum base payment would be $1,040 (the payment es*337tablished by the schedule for $10,000), and the presumptive maximum would be $1,517 (10.4 percent of combined income of $14,583). Adding $400 of child care expense's to the presumptive maximum figure produces a total of $1,917, and multiplying that amount by 83 percent to arrive at the contribution to be made by the father produces a total presumptive maximum payment of $1,591. The monthly payment ordered in this case was $1,550. Although calculated by a method which I believe is at variance with the approach intended by the legislature, the payment ordered here falls within the range of discretion which I believe the legislature intended to grant to trial judges, and I would therefore affirm the decision in this case.
ELDRIDGE, J., joins in this opinion.