Court Opinion

ID: 9741445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:55:47.263132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.155504
License: Public Domain

B. A. Jasper, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Today, the lead opinion applies the doctrine of anticipatory breach to a land contract foreclosure proceeding and thus permits the circuit court to accelerate the installment payments not yet due under the parties’ contract to purchase real estate in Genesee County.
The foreclosure of land contracts is governed by statute. See MCL 600.3103 et seq.; MSA 27A.3101 et seq. Under Chapter 31 of the Revised Judicature Act, there is no provision for the doctrine of anticipatory breach. On the contrary, the act provides that a complaint in foreclosure "shall be dismissed upon the defendant’s bringing into court, at any time before the judgment of sale, the principal and interest due, with costs”. See MCL 600.3110; MSA 27A.3110. It follows, therefore, that although there is a breach, or even an anticipatory breach, of a land contract, the defendant may cure this breach at any time by paying the principal, interest, and costs into court before judgment is finally entered.
The long-standing rule in Michigan has been that absent an acceleration clause in the parties’ land contract, the circuit court lacks the authority *571to decree the entire contract price due. See Lutz v Dutmer, 286 Mich 467, 488; 282 NW 431 (1938); Brown v Mudge, 242 Mich 324; 218 NW 687 (1928); Cady v Taggart, 223 Mich 191, 195; 193 NW 848 (1923); Benincasa v Mihailovich, 31 Mich App 473, 478; 188 NW2d 136 (1971). The reason for this rule is that "[t]o require a sale to satisfy payments to become due in the future would be to declare a forfeiture, which under repeated decisions of [the Supreme] [C]ourt a court of equity may not do”. Cady v Taggart, supra, p 195.1 To date, actions under Chapter 31 of the Revised Judicature Act are still "equitable in nature”. MCL 600.3180; MSA 27A.3180.
The anticipatory-breach exception now advanced by the lead opinion has never before existed in either law or equity in land contract foreclosure proceedings in Michigan.2 Therefore, unless or until the Supreme Court or Legislature decide to carve out such an exception in land contract foreclosure proceedings, I cannot follow the lead opinion’s view. See and compare Dumas v Helm, 15 Mich App 148, 151-152; 166 NW2d 306 (1968), lv den 382 Mich 759 (1969), where this Court held that, notwithstanding a plaintiff’s investment in property, a defendant has a right to declare the *572total unpaid balance due if the contract contains an acceleration clause because a court of equity can neither enlarge nor abridge legal rights created by statute.
Accordingly, I would hold that the circuit court erred in accelerating the installments not yet due under the parties’ land contract.

 Forfeiture proceedings are also governed by statute. See MCL 600.5726 et seq.; MSA 27A.5726 et seq. However, an executory contract, which must provide for such forfeiture, "shall not include any accelerated indebtedness by reason of breach of the contract”. MCL 600.5726; MSA 27A.5726. Plaintiffs action is not one to forfeit the land contract.

 The lead opinion cites three Supreme Court cases to support the proposed anticipatory-breach exception to the rule that the circuit court lacks authority to accelerate future installment payments under a land contract which does not have an acceleration clause. However, none of these three cases involved the foreclosure of a land contract. See Mott v Penoyar, 153 Mich 273; 116 NW 1110 (1908) (breach of timber contract); Obenauer v Solomon, 151 Mich 570; 115 NW 696 (1908) (breach of timber sale contract); Hosmer v Wilson, 7 Mich 294; 74 Am Dec 716 (1859) (breach of labor and materials contract).