Court Opinion

ID: 9592209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:42.007066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:00.977323
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, C. J.
(dissenting) — I would -affirm the trial court in its decision in these actions. That decision was based upon a finding that a presumption of undue influence on the part of Lewie Williams, participated in by his secretary, Marie Afflerbaugh, was not rebutted by the proponents of the will. In finding that such a presumption was raised, the trial court took into account the following factors:
(a) the age and physical condition of the testator;
(b) the extremely close fiduciary and confidential relationship existing between the testator and Lewie Williams and between the testator and Marie Affler-baugh;
(c) the opportunity on the part of said persons to exercise undue influence;
(d) the participation and assistance of Lewie Williams in the procuring and making of the will and the making of the codicil;
(e) the unnaturally large proportion of the estate received by Lewie Williams and Marie Afflerbaugh;5
(f) Mr. Williams’ knowledge of, the size and value of decedent’s estate; '
(g) lack of independent advice;
(h) the testator’s lack of knowledge and understanding of the effect of paragraph 19 of his last will and testament.
There are findings of fact which, to my mind, are significant, but which are not contained in the majority opinion. The trial court found, for example, that in the preparation of the will and codicil, Mr. Lewie Williams acted as attorney for Guy L. Smith. The witnesses for the will of *159September 22, 1961, were procured by and through the office of Lewie Williams. Lewie Williams retained custody of these instruments from the time of their execution until they were filed herein for probate.
The court also found that Lewie Williams and Marie Sharp Afflerbaugh had a good opportunity to exercise undue influence over Guy L. Smith inasmuch as Mr. Smith turned over the management of his business affairs to them by degrees from 1961 to nearly complete management in late 1962, and continuing to his death.
Other significant findings were as follows:
At no time mentioned herein, including September 22, 1961 and January 30, 1962, did the testator know, appreciate or understand the significance of Paragraph Nineteenth of his will providing for bequest of the residue of his estate to Lewie Williams and Marie Sharp Affler-baugh. Although the will of September 22,1961 was read to the decedent by Dr. Marshall Jones, there is no evidence that there was any discussion at any time between the testator and any other person relative to said Paragraph Nineteenth which would show that Guy L. Smith knew, appreciated and understood the effect of said Paragraph Nineteenth of his last will and testament and codicil.
Marshall Jones, M. D., was told by Mont Clair Spear [an associate of Lewie Williams] in advance of his witnessing the will of September 22, 1961 that Guy L. Smith was a widower without children or family. Neither Dr. Jones nor either of the other two witnesses to the will of September 22, 1961 had ever met Guy L. Smith before September 22, 1961 and none of the witnesses ever saw Mr. Smith again.
Guy L. Smith received no legal or business management advice concerning the terms, provisions and execution of his will of September 22, 1961 nor of his codicil of January 30, 1962, other than that which he received from Lewie Williams.
The rule laid down and followed by the majority, as I understand it, is that although a presumption of undue influence arises when an attorney draws a will under the terms of which he is a substantial beneficiary, if evidence *160is introduced showing that the testator might logically have chosen to make the attorney such a beneficiary, the presumption disappears; and the opponents of the will must introduce other clear, cogent and convincing evidence of undue influence if they are to prevail. I will concede that such evidence was not produced here, and that if this is the proper rule, the judgment should be reversed.
But I do not think that this should be the rule in a case involving an attorney-client relationship and none of the cases cited in the majority opinion hold that it is. By drawing the will himself, instead of directing Mr. Smith to see another attorney when the desire to make him a beneficiary was expressed, the appellant made it impossible to obtain disinterested testimony concerning Mr. Smith’s intent. No one knows whether that intent, assuming the will expressed it, originated in the mind of Mr. Smith or was implanted there by his attorney. There was no testimony from any witness that Mr. Smith ever expressed to anyone an intention to make his attorney the chief beneficiary of his estate or to make him a beneficiary at all. Had the will been drawn in the office of a disinterested attorney, the true state of Mr. Smith’s intentions and understanding of the terms of the will could have been brought out at the trial of this case by direct testimony. In fact, this litigation probably would have been avoided altogether.
As the case now stands, this failure to advise the client to obtain the advice of another attorney appears as a suspicious circumstance. The fact that the secretary was given a legacy greater than any legacy to a natural heir is another suspicious circumstance. The fact that the appellant asked a doctor, rather than another lawyer (who might have explained its terms), to read the will to the client; the fact that a doctor who did not know the client, rather than one of several doctors who did know him, was asked to witness the will, the fact that the appellant secured the signatures of three witnesses (none of whom knew the client), rather than the two required by law, — all of these facts, while they may be .consistent with an innocent purpose, are nevertheless not inconsistent with a guilty purpose.
*161The majority make much of the intimate friendship between the testator and his attorney. It is true that they had been friends since college days, but the record does not show a great intimacy developed until after the death of Mr. Smith’s wife, which left him deeply bereaved and lonely. No provision had been made for the appellants in any previous will of the Smiths, although Williams had drawn wills which they executed in 1958 and 1960. And yet in the first will of Mr. Smith drawn after the death of his wife, which he executed in the fall of 1961, the attorney was made the principal beneficiary, and the heirs who had previously been consistently named as contingent beneficiaries were relegated to second place. Yet there was no evidence that his relations with these natural heirs had deteriorated after the death of his wife or had changed in any manner.
I mention all these factors, not as showing conclusively that the attorney unduly influenced the testator, but as showing that he may have; and I deem it extremely significant that whether such influence was exerted is a matter which is within the sole knowledge of the appellants. If such influence was exerted, it is most likely that the secretary participated or acquiesced in it. The opportunity was there; the means of proving that the exercise of such influence did occur is not available to the respondents; but the means of proving that it did not occur was readily available to the appellants at the time the will was executed and again when the codicil was executed.
In my opinion, public policy should dictate that an attorney not be permitted to take a substantial legacy under a will which he has drawn unless the testator was advised by a disinterested attorney. I do not mean this rule to apply when the attorney is merely named executor or trustee. I do not think it is necessary to resort to the legislature for the enunciation of such a policy. This cou^t is responsible for the ethics of the legal profession, and it is its duty to police its officers and to protect the image of the profession. It may be that, to the courts, there is nothing *162apparently questionable about the circumstances under which this will was drawn; but to the layman, I cannot help but imagine that they are indeed suspect.
I do not think it necessary to reiterate that the lawyer’s actions in relation to his clients, as well as to the courts, should be above suspicion. Where he engages in an act which arouses a suspicion that he may have. overreached his client, especially where as here, such an act could easily be avoided without any significant loss to. him, the courts should not place any hint of a stamp of approval on that act.
Canon of Professional Ethics 11 provides: “The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.”
I do not say that the attorney in this case violated that canon or that I even suspect that he did. But I do say that he may have done so, and that he voluntarily placed himself in a position where, although no one could prove that he did overreach his client, he could not prove that an unusual benefit bestowed on him by that client was not the result of undue influence. Because the reputation of the profession suffers when there is such an exercise of bad judgment by one of its members, he should not be allowed to profit as a result.
The classic and perhaps most often quoted statement in legal literature of the high obligations of a fiduciary is to be found in Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1 (1928):
Many forms of conduct permissible in a work a day world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the “disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 444). Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries *163been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
The Meinhard case involved not an attorney dealing with an aged client, but a real estate investor whose conflict of interest position vis-a-vis a co-investor was under scrutiny. There can be no question that this court considers the bar in this state to be bound by the “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive” — not by the “morals of the marketplace.” See In re Lovell, 41 Wn.2d 457, 458, 250 P.2d 109 (1952).
I realize that in my view of this case, I am assigning secondary importance to the intent of the testator and primary importance to the ethics of the profession; but I do not think that the harm done in thwarting the will of the testator in a matter of this kind is as great as the harm to be done in encouraging to any degree the kind of practice which resulted in this litigation.
Many courts have held that, where the attorney who drafted a will would receive a substantial benefit thereunder, a presumption of undue influence arises. Among the cases are In re Lances’ Estate, 216 Cal. 397, 14 P.2d 768 (1932); In re Romaine’s Will, 113 N.J. Eq. 477, 167 Atl. 683 (1933); (affirmed on opinion below in 115 N.J. Eq. 172, 170 Atl. 16 (1934)); In re Erickson’s Estate, 140 Cal. App. 520, 35 P.2d 628 (1934); In re Bartles’ Will, 127 N.J. Eq. 472, 13 A.2d 642 (1940), (modified on rehearing in 129 N.J. Eq. 280, 19 A.2d 17 (1941)); In re Brown’s Estate, 165 Ore. 575, 108 P.2d 775 (1941); In re Lobb’s Will, 173 Ore. 414, 145 P.2d 808 (1944).
I would go further and say that the presumption is all but irrebutable.6 In taking this view, I frankly state that I am not relying on precedent but on my opinion, as a lawyer and judge, that a sound public policy requires that the courts should not permit their officers to profit where there is the slightest suspicion that they may have overreached *164their clients, especially in a case such as this where that suspicion could so easily have been avoided.
I would affirm the trial court.
Hale, J., concurs with Rosellini, C. J.
May 19, 1966. Petition for rehearing denied.

Specific bequests totaled $120,000. The residue of the estate, bequeathed to the lawyer and his secretary, exceeded $150,000 in value.

In Canada and England, proof of independent advice is always required in the case of a gift from a client to his attorney. See footnote, p. 282, Zvolis v. Condos, 56 Wn.2d 275, 352 P.2d 809.