Court Opinion

ID: 9579656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:12.190601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:39.248132
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur as to the broadening of the test to determine public duty liability. I dissent as to the result. I do not believe that summary judgment was improvidently granted under these circumstances. Whether utilizing the bright-line test adopted in Hagen v. City of Sioux Falls, 464 N.W.2d 396, 399 (S.D.1990), or the broader test now set forth in this opinion, Tiptons have not shown that either the town or the county assumed a special, rather than public duty.
Tiptons set forth their evidence and arguments concerning the Cracraft factors for the trial court’s consideration. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.1979). The trial court, without specifying which test it utilized, granted summary judgment. We assume that the prevailing law was followed and the bright-line test of Ha-gen was used. However, we have had the opportunity to review both the evidence and the arguments concerning the Cracraft factors. There is no need for additional hearings.
The majority concedes that the ordinance and state law do not contain language which would create a special duty. In reviewing the evidence, it is clear that no one relied upon any representations or conduct by these public officials.
Instead, the majority argues that there is a material issue as to these public officials’ actual knowledge of a dangerous condition created by the presence of these wolf-dog hybrids. In order to prove actual knowledge on the part of these public officials, this Court has had to take judicial notice that wolves are commonly known1 to have dangerous propensities. This Court, as well as the trial court, certainly has the authority to take judicial notice of certain facts “not subject to reasonable dispute.” SDCL 19-10-2.
The majority is taking judicial notice of a general character trait, or reputation, not of an individual animal, but rather an entire *789species of animal. Beyond that, the majority is saying not only is the entire species dangerous, but any hybrid of that species should be considered dangerous. I respectfully suggest that is too big a leap.
The gist of my dissent is this. We should not take judicial notice of a fact which is subject to considerable debate and whose source and accuracy cannot be determined. SDCL 19-10-2(2).
We are dealing with character or reputation evidence. I believe it was the late Professor Irving Younger who commented that character or reputation evidence is probably the weakest and least persuasive type of evidence available to the trial lawyer. Typically, when this type of evidence is offered, it is applied to an individual, rather than a group. I am uncomfortable applying a general character trait, or reputation to a group, even if it is merely a member of the dog family.
Additionally, “common knowledge” is an elusive thing. What might be “common knowledge” to the zoologist, may not be “common knowledge” to a street-cop or city auditor. I believe that to be the case in this instance. Where is the strong evidence that these public officials knew or should have known that wolves, and by genetic association, all wolf-dog hybrids are per se dangerous? A careful review of the evidence submitted to the trial court, and reviewed by this Court reveals that Tiptons’ evidence on this issue consisted of the trial lawyer’s personal opinion, as opposed to expert or lay opinion, treatise evidence, or factual evidence.
Now, this Court takes judicial notice of what it terms “common knowledge” of the wolf species’ propensity to be dangerous. But before doing so, we should examine this generalized character trait evidence and its source.
As we have struggled with this case, some of the information we reviewed discussed the history of the wolf. This issue concerning the wolfs propensity for aggression is hotly debated. Talk to a western rancher and the wolf most likely has the common reputation of a vicious, carnivorous beast, to be shot on sight. Yet, zoologists and others take the view that wolves are more wary towards humans than they are dangerous.2 Alderton, David, Dogs, Dorling Kindersley, New York, NY, (1993) p. 10. They currently are protected by Congress as an endangered species. 43 Federal Register 9612; March 9, 1978. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service reports indicate that “[tjhere have been no known gray wolf attacks on humans in modern times in North America.” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1974, Publication #576-782.
In our reading, the literature points out that much of our fear of wolves comes from fable, myth and oral tradition.
Fear of real wolves occasionally bordered on hysteria. Wolves did kill travelers and they did occasionally transmit a terrible disease, always fatal, for which there was no cure: rabies. The wolf threatened a peasant’s spiritual world by exhuming bodies, and hungry wolves standing in stark tableaus on piles of the dead during the Black Plague were a chilling reminder of what little separated peasants from a life of scavenging.
Lopez, Barry, Of Wolves and Men, Charles Sehribner’s Sons, New York, N.Y. (1978), p. 208.
George Washington once noted that both “feral dogs” and wolves “retarded the growth of the sheep industry.” Ibid, p. 172. Yet, colonists of that time ascribed almost all canine attacks to the wolf. Why? Because the wolf, not the dog, “wore the cloak of evil and few could tell the difference between their tracks.” Ibid, p. 173.
It can be precarious to confuse public perception with fact, particularly when that perception is based in part on myth, fable and *790oral tradition. I believe that to be the case in this instance.
I am not here to defend either the wolf or these wolf-dog hybrids.3 But, the fact is, that whether before the trial court, or this Court, Tiptons were unable to produce expert or lay opinion evidence, treatise evidence, or factual evidence that wolf-dog hybrids have a commonly held, and accepted reputation for viciousness.
Additionally, it is not as if the public officials did nothing. They were concerned about the presence of wild animals in the town limits. Inspections were made of the cages prior to the incident, and as conceded by the majority, the animals were found to be well-caged. Further, the public officials found that there was no history of the animals running-at-large. There was no history of prior vicious behavior. The city attorney was consulted and the existing ordinance reviewed. As a result, a new ordinance was drafted and presented for enactment which would have prohibited the presence of “wild” animals. What else would the majority have them do? Under all of the circumstances, these public officials acted reasonably, weighing the safety of the public with the personal property rights of the animals’ owner.
The bottom line is that there is no need for the expense of additional hearings. We have the evidence before us which allows us to make this decision. It is clear that it is not “common knowledge” to a county sheriff, chief of police or city auditor that wolf-dog hybrids are per se dangerous.
I would affirm the trial court.

. "Common knowledge” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition (1990), p. 276 as: Refers to what court may declare applicable to action without necessity of proof. It is knowledge that every intelligent person has, and includes matters of learning, experience, history and facts of which judicial notice may be taken.... See also Judicial notice.

. Grolier's Multimedia Encyclopedia, 1995 reports that:
Although the wolf is still cast as a blood thirsty villain in folklore and children’s stories, the public image of the wolf is improving; .... Several scientific studies have disclosed the wolf's role in natural ecosystems and have done away with some of the misconceptions that have surrounded this colorful and complex animal for centuries.

. I concede these are wild animals. Neither state law nor the Town ordinance prohibited the owning of wild animals. But wild is not synonymous with inherently dangerous. Further, X believe it incumbent that owners of wild animals must take special care in their handling. I disagree however, in establishing the principle that knowledge of the existence of a wild animal within a community, even though well-caged, imputes actual knowledge of a dangerous condition to all public officials.