Court Opinion

ID: 9688528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:54:28.270697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:39.967385
License: Public Domain

Gillespie, J.,
Dissenting:
I disagree with my associates with reluctance. What is here said is done so with deference.
According to my views, the case involves a fundamental question relating to the administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Act that transcends individual considerations. What I mean is that we have to all *392practical purposes abolished the substantial evidence rule in compensation cases, at least in cases involving heart attacks.
The question in the case before the Commission was whether there was causal connection between the obligations of Hicks’ employment and the attack which resulted in his death. This Court is committed to the rule that the exertion does not have to be unusual. This does not mean that causal connection may be taken for granted. Larson, Section 38.83. In the same section of his work, Professor Larson says that, “As the unusual-exertion requirement becomes more and more weakened by exceptions and interpretations, the burden of keeping this class of cases within proper bounds falls squarely on the shoulders of the expert medical witness and the expert triers of fact.”
In Mississippi Workmen’s Compensation, Dunn, Section 48, et seq., there is a good analysis of our cases involving coronary occlusion with myocardial infarction up to the year 1957 when that work was published. It is there said that, “The result of the typical conflict in medical opinion is that the issue of causal connection in such cases is said to be one for the medical experts and the Commission as triers of the facts, and when there is a conflict of qualified and substantial medical testimony, the decision of the Commission, for or against an award, is final and must be affirmed on review. ’ ’ Id. Section 53. In Cole v. Superior Coach Corporation, 106 So. 2d 71, decided four months ago, we reiterated the rule relating to medical questions and the Commission’s function as the trier of the facts. In that case, not involving a heart attack, this Court said:
“The Commission is the trier of fact. It will be affirmed when there is substantial, evidence supporting its decision. The medical testimony cannot be reconciled. The Commission' had the right to evaluate it, and to accept that of appellee. The medical question is not an *393uncomplicated one. The issues with reference to an alleged injury of this type are properly within the province of medical experts. In all hut the simple and routine cases (and this is not in that category), it is necessary to establish medical causation by expert testimony. Where- there is a conflict in such evidence, its evaluation and credibility, with reference to the existence, nature and etiology of an injury or disease, are issues for the Commission acting upon such medical testimony. 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation (1952), Sections 79.50-79.54.”
Two physicians, general practitioners, were of the opinion that Hicks’ employment was a contributing cause. The other physicians, specialists in cardiovascular diseases, were of the opinion that the work he was doing did not contribute to the attack from which he died. The case comes squarely within the rule stated in Cole v. Superior Coach Corporation, and if we are to follow our own rule, this case should be affirmed. I am unable to see the applicability of any of the cases cited in the majority of the cases. I do not disagree with the rules of law stated in those cases. One question is involved. It is causal connection. It is one of fact. The evidence was conflicting. The Commission resolved the conflict in favor of appellees. Nothing else can be made of this record. According to Larson, Dunn, and our own rules, the case should be affirmed.
The majority opinion does not solve the delimma of the heart cases. Reference is made by the majority to some statements by text writers on administrative law and seem to commit this Court to a rule that the Court should reverse findings of fact which are “clearly erroneous.” “Clearly erroneous” has been held to mean without substantial evidential basis. See cases, Words & Phrases, Yol. 7. I respectfully submit that this phrase adds nothing by way of providing a standard for resolving compensation cases. What is done in this case *394is clearly at variance with Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, Section 80.00, et seq.
The factual question decided hy the Commission and overturned by the majority is purely a medical one about which the best physicians seem to disagree. As far as I am concerned, I do not feel qualified to say that the medical theory of experts in cardiovascular diseases is ‘ ‘ clearly erroneous ’ ’ and that the medical theory of general practitioners is clearly right. That is exactly what the majority has done in this case.
McGehee, C. J., and Roberds, J., join in this dissent.
ON MOTIONS
Ethridge, J.
 Appellee’s motion for attorney’s fee is.sustained in the amount of one-third of appellee’s recovery, for all legal services rendered. Her motion for six per cent interest from the due date of each weekly installment of compensation until paid is also sustained. Statutory damages of five per cent are allowed on the total amount of weekly installments accrued and unpaid from the date of the judgment of the circuit court to the date of the judgment of affirmance here. Miss. Code 1942, Sec. 1971.
Motions for allowance of interest, damages, and attorney’s fee sustained, as specified.
Roberds, P. J., and Hall, Holmes and Gillespie, JJ., concur.