Court Opinion

ID: 9961848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 23:00:52.928099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:03.536907
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 19 2024
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

L.M.,                                             No. 23-241
                                                  Agency No.
               Petitioner,                        A075-543-647
    v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

               Respondent.

                       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                           Board of Immigration Appeals

                          Argued and Submitted April 3, 2024
                              San Francisco, California

Before: M. SMITH, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.
Dissent by Judge M. SMITH.
         L.M.1, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an order of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) (collectively, the “Agency”) denying his applications for

         *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1
  We grant L.M.’s unopposed motion to proceed under a pseudonym (Dkt. No. 49)
and refer to petitioner by his initials. The Clerk’s office will update the docket and
the parties shall use the initials in any future filings.
adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 and for deferral of removal under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA streamlined the appeal, 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), and affirmed without opinion, we review the IJ’s decision

directly. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2003).

      1. L.M. contends the IJ improperly rejected the opinion testimony of his

expert witness, Dr. Slack, in assessing his application for CAT relief. An IJ is

required to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,” 8

C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3), and “give reasoned consideration to the potentially

dispositive testimony of” an expert witness, Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 773 (9th

Cir. 2011). However, an IJ is not required to accept an expert’s opinion. “If the

[Agency] rejects expert testimony, it must state ‘in the record why the testimony is

insufficient to establish the probability of torture.’” Castillo v. Barr, 980 F.3d

1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Cole, 659 F.3d at 772). For example, “the

Agency may reject credible testimony if it is contradicted or ‘outweighed by other

more persuasive evidence.’” Velasquez-Samayoa v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1149, 1157

(9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357,

373 (2021)).

      Velasquez-Samayoa and Castillo held that the Agency erred when it rejected

testimony of qualified experts simply because the testimony was not corroborated

by additional evidence in the record, specifically country condition reports.

                                         2                                      23-241
Velasquez-Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1157 (“The mere fact that [the expert] testimony

is not corroborated by country conditions evidence is not alone a valid reason for

rejecting that testimony—expert testimony can itself provide evidence of country

conditions.”); Castillo, 980 F.3d at 1284 (“If an expert’s opinion could only be

relied upon if it were redundant with other evidence in the record, there would be

no need for experts.”). However, if an “expert’s testimony rests on a specific

premise that, if true, would be expected to be corroborated by” other record

evidence but was not, an IJ may explain as much in rejecting the testimony.

Velasquez-Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1157.

      Here, the IJ found Dr. Slack qualified as an expert on “country conditions in

Mexico, violence in Mexico, and violence against deportees in Mexico.” He

“accept[ed] the factual information [Dr. Slack] provided based on his research,”

but gave no weight to “the probability assessments on issues such as the likelihood

of harm or danger” or to his “opinion as to the likelihood of torture.” The IJ’s

reason for doing so was because “there is no statistical information to place such

predictions in context.” The IJ faulted the lack of “[a]ccurate quantitative statistics

on outcomes, for example how many non-citizens that are returned to Mexico” are

harmed and evidence on the “prevalence” of torture among removed non-citizens

with the same type of criminal history as L.M.

                                         3                                     23-241
      However, as Dr. Slack testified, those kinds of “accurate quantitative

statistics” do not exist because of the very nature of the criminal activity at issue.

Dr. Slack used statistics that were available for his regression analysis, conducted

empirical studies, and engaged in ethnographic research—the “principal research

method” and “gold standard” for this area of study. He conducted the type of

comparative analysis the IJ found was missing, assessing risk characteristics as

compared to the broad group of removed non-citizens. This type of expert

testimony is—according to this record— the best available information on these

issues; the lack of quantitative statistics was perhaps a reason to discount the

weight of Dr. Slack’s testimony, but not to reject it entirely. See Castillo, 980 F.3d

at 1284.

      The IJ’s rejection of Dr. Slack’s testimony was legal error under Velasquez-

Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1156–57, and Castillo, 980 F.3d at 1283–84. We remand for

further consideration of this testimony as it pertains to L.M.’s application for CAT

protection. See Velasquez-Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1157–58.

      2. L.M. argues the IJ also erred in failing to consider other “evidence

relevant to the possibility of future torture,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3), including

various aspects of Dr. Slack’s factual testimony relevant to the likelihood of torture

and L.M.’s ability to safely relocate, evidence about ongoing threats against L.M.,

and evidence of widespread corruption and human rights violations that increase

                                          4                                     23-241
the risk to L.M. He also contends the IJ erred in his aggregation analysis by failing

to consider all sources of risk and their overlapping nature in the aggregate. See

Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015), abrogated on

other grounds by Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021). Our consideration

of those arguments would be premature in light of our remand for further

consideration of Dr. Slack’s opinion testimony, because on remand, the Agency

will be required to consider all relevant evidence in the aggregate. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(3); Velasquez-Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1158.2

      3. Under 8 U.S.C § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction over the IJ’s

discretionary denial of L.M.’s request for a waiver of inadmissibility. L.M. has not

raised a cognizable legal or constitutional question over which we retain

jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D). We dismiss that portion of the petition.

      4. L.M. also challenges the BIA’s summary affirmance procedure. But we

have previously held that the procedure does not violate due process. Falcon

Carriche, 350 F.3d at 848; Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1078-79

(9th Cir. 2004). “To the extent that [the petitioner] challenges the BIA’s decision to

streamline [his] particular case, that argument collapses into our review of the

2
 We agree with the IJ that absent Dr. Slack’s opinion testimony, the record does
not compel the conclusion that L.M. suffered past torture by a private actor that the
Mexican government was unwilling or unable to control. See Bringas-Rodriguez v.
Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 2017).

                                        5                                      23-241
merits of [his] case.” Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004).

      PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, and

REMANDED.3

3
  Each party shall bear its own costs. See Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4). The motions to
stay removal (Dkt. Nos. 4, 12) are denied as moot.

                                        6                                   23-241
                                                                             FILED
L.M. v. Garland, 23-241                                                      APR 19 2024
                                                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      I concur in parts 3 and 4 of the majority’s reasoning. However, I respectfully

dissent as to parts 1 and 2. In my view, even if the IJ did err in this case by failing

to state certain magic words, remand would be futile.

      As the majority notes, an agency is required to consider expert testimony

relevant to the possibility of future torture. Velasquez-Samayoa, 49 F.4th at 1156.

However, it is not required to accept an expert’s opinion. Id. at 1156–57. For

example, an agency may reject testimony if it is “outweighed by other more

persuasive evidence.” Id. at 1157 (cleaned up).

      The IJ here clearly considered Dr. Slack’s testimony, having discussed it at

length in his order denying CAT relief. What he did not do was accept Dr. Slack’s

conclusion that Petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured. That decision

makes sense when considering the record as a whole, which is what the IJ was

required to do when making the more-likely-than-not determination. See 8 C.F.R. §

208.16(c)(3) (requiring consideration of “all evidence” relevant to torture in the

record). And despite not saying so outright, it is apparent from the order that the IJ

thought other evidence in the record outweighed certain of Dr. Slack’s opinions.

      At bottom, the IJ reviewed numerous pieces of evidence, including Dr. Slack’s

testimony, and was entitled to conclude that some pieces of evidence outweighed

others, and to reach a conclusion based on the record as a whole. On remand, I
suspect that the IJ will point to evidence in the record such as the above, use the

magic words (“This evidence outweighs that evidence”), and ultimately deny relief.

Because we are not required to “convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-

pong game,” Vista Hill Found., Inc. v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 556, 566 n.9 (9th Cir. 1985)

(quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969)), I would

decline to remand in a case such as this, where remand would “be an idle and useless

formality.” Id.