Court Opinion

ID: 9738282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:47:59.064974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.224310
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting: I would affirm defendant’s conviction and thus I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the testimony from the two dismissed cases as other-crimes evidence in the remaining case. In taking this action, the trial court did not become an advocate on behalf of the prosecution but instead simply commented upon the evidence before it and gave defendant the opportunity to present rebutting evidence, which he did. The evidence on the other charges was introduced as part of an agreed-upon single trial and was properly before the court to consider. The trial court was not precluded from considering the evidence in a different light simply because the prosecution did not request it to do so. See Hicks, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 646. Here, the trial court found that the evidence from the other two reckless driving cases was other-crimes evidence relevant to establish defendant’s intent and motive in the remaining case. As in Hicks and Walter, I do not believe that the trial court abandoned its role as judge in considering the evidence in this manner. Furthermore, unlike in Kuntz and R.S., the trial court’s actions in this case did not result in the introduction of evidence not already before it. The evidence presented regarding the October cases had already been introduced prior to the trial court’s ruling, as part of an agreed-upon single trial. Thus, the evidence of defendant’s conduct was already before the trial court to consider, and the trial court did not have to take the affirmative step of admitting the evidence sua sponte. Instead, the trial court in the present case merely commented upon the evidence that had already been introduced at trial, and it reminded defendant that he was entitled to present any rebutting evidence. I do not believe that such a comment reflected that the trial court abandoned its role as judge and became an advocate for the prosecution. Notably, defendant offers no support for his assertion in his appellate brief that, although the cases were tried together, “it was understood that each case would be considered separate and distinct from one another.” If the parties had, in fact, reached such an agreement, it is not contained within the record. Instead, the bystander’s report simply indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court “would hear all three cases together.” Therefore, based upon my review of the record, it is apparent that the trial court conducted a single trial of all three cases. See People v. Lopez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 817, 819 (2006) (noting that appellant has burden of providing sufficiently complete record to support claims of error and that any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against appellant). By agreeing to a single trial on all of the cases, defendant cannot now complain that the trial court heard evidence of defendant’s conduct in the other cases. See People v. Gresham, 104 Ill. App. 3d 81, 87 (1982) (holding that defendant’s failure to file a motion to sever waives objection to single trial on multiple charges). Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that we are presented with circumstances similar to those present in Lang. In addition to the obvious factual distinctions between this case and Lang, I do not believe that this case presents the same policy concerns that were addressed in Lang. Specifically, I do not believe that the trial court’s conduct “undermined the perceived fairness of the defendant’s trial.” 384 Ill. App. 3d at 261. In sua sponte considering the testimony from the two dismissed cases as other-crimes evidence, the trial court did not help the prosecution establish its case. Instead, the trial court’s sua sponte statements on how it intended to consider the evidence already before it were appropriate in fulfilling its role to see that justice was done. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, I do not believe that the trial court’s conduct constituted an abuse of discretion. Therefore, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.