Court Opinion

ID: 9666271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:09:45.498006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:25.866074
License: Public Domain

GRAVES, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
KRS 421.350 authorizes a procedure to allow the testimony of a child witness to be taken in a room other than the courtroom and be televised by closed circuit equipment in the courtroom. This procedure was approved in Commonwealth v. Willis, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 224 (1986). In Danner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 963 S.W.2d 632, 634 (1998), we held that in deciding whether to allow a child victim of illegal sexual activity to testify through closed circuit television or taped video, “the trial court must have a wide discretion to consider the age and demeanor of the child witness, the nature of offense, and the likely impact of testimony in court or facing the defendant.” (quoting Willis, supra.)
*895Here, the trial court employed a hybrid of KRS 421.350. In chambers, the trial court stated that L.P. was twelve (12) years old at the time of the incident, and that she would be permitted to testify in front of the jury with Appellant in the judge’s chambers, where he could watch and hear the proceedings on the monitor with unlimited access to his attorney. This method was favorable to Appellant because the child actually had to testify in front of the jury. Appellant was able to write comments on a legal pad and give notes to his attorney — in other words, he was able to freely consult his attorney. The trial court admonished the jury that the lack of Appellant’s presence in the courtroom was mandated by statute and that no inference of guilt should be made. Because of Appellant’s multiple crimes against L.P. over a prolonged period of time, there was a compelling need that L.P. not face Appellant. Appellant heard all of the testimony and had unlimited consultation with his attorney for the purpose of cross-examination. Appellant fully cross-examined L.P. and was not denied his right of confrontation. Under the totality of these circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion in using a hybrid method which protected Appellant’s constitutional rights.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction for rape.
LAMBERT, C.J., and WINTERSHEIMER, J., join in this dissent.