Court Opinion

ID: 9849454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:26.101276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:25.095867
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court erred by denying Georgia Power’s motion to dismiss Stowers’ appeal of the special master’s award because Stowers failed to file an appeal requesting a de novo jury trial on the value of his property within ten days of the award as required under OCGA § 22-2-112.
After Georgia Power filed a condemnation petition requesting appointment of a special master pursuant to OCGA § 22-2-102, the special master filed the award on September 27, 2005. Within ten days of the award, on October 7,2005, Stowers filed a timely pleading captioned “Exceptions to the Award of the Special Master and Motion to Dismiss Complaint for Condemnation” in which he objected to the *699special master’s rulings on various evidentiary issues and raised other legal issues. The concluding paragraph of the pleading stated:
WHEREFORE, Condemnee respectfully requests that this Honorable Court dismiss the Condemnation Complaint, or in the alternative, to reject and overrule the report of the Special Master, appoint a new Special Master to hear this matter and refer this matter to such new Special Master for further proceedings in accordance with the Court’s rulings.
On October 24, 2005, 27 days after the award, Stowers filed a pleading captioned “Condemnee’s First Amendment to Exceptions to the Award of the Special Master.” In this pleading, Stowers stated that he had inadvertently filed the wrong version of his pleading and omitted the last page. The omitted page contains the caption “Appeal,” and states “Condemnee hereby appeals the value award of the Special Master to a jury sitting in this court.” This page contains counsel’s signature dated October 6, 2005, and appears to be a separate pleading rather than an omitted last page. Stowers’ counsel concedes that the appeal pleading was not served or filed until 27 days after the special master’s award.
Georgia Power moved to dismiss Stowers’ appeal of the special master’s value award because it was not filed or served within ten days after the award was filed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss concluding that OCGA§ 22-2-112, which provides for appeals from the amount of the' award within ten days of the award, “allows for a generic filing to invoke the appeal jurisdiction of the Superior Court.” Accordingly, the trial court ruled that the exceptions to the special master’s award, filed by Stowers within ten days after the award, preserved his right to also appeal from the value of the award. Because the statutes governing special master awards and our case law interpreting those statutes require specificity when a party seeks redress from a special master’s condemnation award in superior court, the trial court erred by sanctioning a “generic” appeal and by denying Georgia Power’s motion to dismiss.
“The special master method of condemnation is intended to be an expeditious method of arriving at the just and adequate compensation to be first paid to a citizen before his interest in property may be condemned.” Wiggins v. City of Macon, 120 Ga. App. 197, 198 (1) (169 SE2d 667) (1969). “The primary duty of the special master is to ascertain the value of the property sought to be condemned and the consequential damages or benefits, if any, with the authority to hear and determine any legal objections raised by the parties.” Leach v. Ga. Power Co., 228 Ga. 16, 21 (4) (183 SE2d 755) (1971). OCGA *700§ 22-2-103 provides that a special master’s “relation and accountability to the court shall be that of an auditor or master in the general practice existing in this state.” Our courts have interpreted this Code section to mean that a party may obtain judicial review of legal issues not pertaining to value by filing exceptions to the special master’s rulings in superior court. Leach v. Ga. Power Co., supra, 228 Ga. at 21 (4); Beck v. Cobb County, 180 Ga. App. 808, 811 (350 SE2d 818) (1986); Wiggins v. City of Macon, supra, 120 Ga. App. at 199 (1).
A party’s right to appeal the special master’s valuation of the property is governed by OCGA § 22-2-112, which provides: “In case any party is dissatisfied with the amount of the award, he or she may, within ten days after the award is filed, enter in writing an appeal from the award to the superior court of the county where the award is filed.” In Nunnery v. Dept. of Transp., 128 Ga. App. 221, 222 (1) (196 SE2d 171) (1973), we held that the only requirements of a notice of appeal under this section “are that it be in writing, timely filed, and that it express dissatisfaction with the compensation.” We also noted that “[i]t has long been established in our law that the substance of a legal pleading determines its nature, not what it is denominated.” (Citation omitted.) Id. Thus, although the property owner filed a document denominated an answer in superior court, we treated it as an appeal because it stated that “plaintiff has not offered just and adequate compensation,” contended that “the true value is $30,000,” and demanded “a jury trial to determine the true market value of his property, and all damages resulting in plaintiffs declaration of taking, and a verdict of $30,000 for the value of said property and consequential damage to his golf course.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id.
Georgia Power contends that, unlike the property owner in Nunnery, supra, the substance of the exceptions document filed by Stowers fails to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 22-2-112. As the exceptions document was timely filed and in writing, the only issue is whether it expressed appropriate dissatisfaction with the compensation. A review of the document shows that it does not. It lists 41 exceptions to the special master’s award that are based on legal arguments about the admissibility of evidence, whether Georgia Power met its burden of proving public necessity, constitutional claims, the neutrality of the special master, and other procedural matters. There is no claim in the document that the amount of the compensation was inadequate.
Stowers argues that his 18th exception should be construed as an expression of his dissatisfaction with the amount of the special master’s award. In this exception, Stowers states “Condemnor failed to establish the value of consequential damages or benefit to the remainder, and the Special Master erred in making an award in the absence of such a showing.” In this exception, Stowers contends that *701there was no evidence to support the special master’s award, so this is a legal argument with regard to the sufficiency of the evidence. It does not assert that the special master should have awarded a different amount, nor does it request a de novo jury trial on the amount of compensation. OCGA § 22-2-112 provides for an appeal and a jury trial as to the value of the property when a “party is dissatisfied with the amount of the award.” As the exceptions document filed by Stowers did not express dissatisfaction with the amount of the award, it cannot be fairly construed as an appeal under OCGA § 22-2-112. As aresult, Stowers waived his right to appeal the amount of the special master’s award. See Beck, supra, 180 Ga. App. at 811 (party’s appeal of special master’s award failed to preserve exceptions to legal rulings made by special master). The “amendment” Stowers filed 27 days after the special master’s award was filed did not resurrect his right to appeal the amount of the award. See Atwood v. Sipple, 182 Ga. App. 831, 833 (1) (357 SE2d 273) (1987) (defendant could not amend appeal to assert exceptions to special master’s award when the timely filed appeal of value “did not perform the office of the requisite exceptions in the first place”).
Decided December 1, 2006.
Smith, Gilliam, Williams & Miles, John H. Smith, Matthew T Smith, Roger B. Hatcher, Jr., Troutman Sanders, Donald W. Janney, Lynette E. Smith, for appellant.
Flint & Connolly, Douglas H. Flint, Lawrence O. C. Anderson, for appellee.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying Georgia Power’s motion to dismiss the untimely appeal filed on October 24, 2005, and the special master’s award is conclusive with regard to the amount of compensation.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington joins in this dissent.