Court Opinion

ID: 9939953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:09:40.857259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.183432
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2240-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KWABENA OHENE-BONSU,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted January 18, 2024 – Decided February 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 20-01-0140.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Rochelle Mareka Amelia Watson, First
                   Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
                   the brief).

                   Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, of
                   counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal
                   Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Defendant Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu appeals from a November 5, 2021

conviction for fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license

suspension in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:40-26(b).           We reject defendant's

assertions that his conviction should be vacated because it was predicated on an

unconstitutional motor vehicle stop and affirm the trial court's December 10,

2020 denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

        We derive the material facts from the December 10, 2020 evidentiary

hearing at which Fort Lee Police Officer Nicole Busanic and Palisades Interstate

Parkway (PIP) Sergeant Gregory Kimbro testified.

        On October 15, 2019, 1 around 7:58 a.m., Busanic was monitoring traffic

conditions near the George Washington Bridge and observed defendant's vehicle

"riding the shoulder" in what she believed was an attempt to avoid traffic.

Busanic activated the patrol car's lights and initiated a motor vehicle stop. Upon

approaching the vehicle, Busanic requested defendant's driver's license,

registration, and insurance card. Defendant produced a New Jersey driver's

license bearing the name Kwabena Osei-Bonsu. Busanic issued a summons to

1
    We note that defendant's brief indicates the events in question took place on
    October 19, 2019. We use the date set forth in the judgment of conviction.
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                                         2
Kwabena Osei-Bonsu for improper passing and advised defendant he was free

to leave.

      Approximately thirty minutes later, Kimbro was driving a marked police

vehicle and observed defendant's car "drive over the solid line on the right

shoulder and then continue to drive on the solid – over the solid line on the

shoulder." He also saw that the license plate frame on the vehicle obstructed the

writing on the plate. Kimbro slowed down to allow defendant's car to pass him

in order to determine how many passengers were in his vehicle, activated his

overhead lights to alert defendant to pull over, positioned his vehicle behind

defendant's and then stopped. Although Kimbro's patrol vehicle was equipped

with a dashboard camera, the system did not begin recording until Kimbro

turned on the vehicle's patrol lights and ordered defendant to pull his car over to

the side of the roadway.

      When both vehicles were stopped, Kimbro approached and asked

defendant for his license, registration, and insurance card. While waiting for the

documents, Kimbro detected an odor of suspected burnt marijuana emanating

from inside the vehicle. Defendant handed Kimbro a driver's license bearing the

name Kwabena Osei-Bonsu with a birthdate of March 7, 1989. According to

Kimbro, when he asked defendant to step out of the vehicle, he "reeked of weed"

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and had a work identification and two summonses from Fort Lee in his hand that

he tried to give Kimbro.

      Based upon the smell of suspected marijuana, Kimbro searched the

vehicle and found what he believed to be a mostly burnt, hand-rolled marijuana

cigar as well as loose marijuana. The second PIP officer who arrived at the

scene to provide back-up support observed a wallet in plain view on the front

passenger-side seat which, upon examination, contained a second New Jersey

driver's license, credit cards, a college identification, a blood center card, and a

benefits card all bearing the name Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu.

      Defendant asserted the second driver's license found in the wallet

belonged to his twin brother.       However, the second driver's license had

defendant's birthdate listed as January 1, 1991, making it impossible that the two

licenses were those of twins, since the birthdate differed from the first driver's

license produced. Additionally, Kimbro testified that the photograph on the

license defendant first gave him did not resemble defendant "in any way, shape,

or form" and the photograph on the second license looked like defendant.

      Kimbro gave defendant a PIP personal information form to fill out to

accurately identify himself.      After being handed the form and prior to

completing it, defendant told Kimbro, "Officer, I f---ed up. Can I talk to you?"

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The officer told defendant to continue filling the form out. Defendant wrote on

the form that his last name was Kwabena, first name Bonsu and initially listed

his date of birth as March 7, 1989, though he subsequently crossed out March

and wrote January before orally reverting to March when he went over the form

with Kimbro.

      When Kimbro entered the information defendant provided on the form

into the computer for a records check, no record came back. However, when

Kimbro called headquarters and provided the information on both driver's

licenses, one for Kwabena Osei-Bonsu and the other for Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu,

Kimbro was advised that defendant, Kwabena Ohene-Bonsu, had a suspended

license for driving while intoxicated. Kimbro then placed defendant under

arrest.

      Under indictment No. 20-01-0140, defendant was charged with fourth-

degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension, N.J.S.A.

2C:40-26(b), and fourth-degree obtaining the personal identifying information

of another to assume that person's identity without authorization and with the

purpose to avoid prosecution for a crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(4). Defendant

also received summonses for violating PIP regulations 411.1(k) and 411.1(w),

as well as possession of a controlled substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4);

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possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use, N.J.S.A. 2C:36 -2; and

two counts of hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4).

      Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the charges,

claiming the second motor vehicle stop was unlawful. After the December 10,

2020 evidentiary hearing, 2 the court ruled orally and found Kimbro "had a

reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that [defendant] had committed

a motor vehicle offense and that the stop was proper." The court found Kimbro's

testimony that defendant was "going into the shoulder and driving over the line

into the shoulder and continuing to drive in the shoulder" was credible. The

court further found although defendant's alleged driving infraction was not

captured on Kimbro's dashboard recording system, the lack of video was legally

irrelevant in light of Kimbro's testimony.

      The court concluded Kimbro's stop of the vehicle was lawful based upon

Kimbro's observation of defendant's vehicle driving over the solid line onto the

shoulder of the roadway. The court also determined the officers had probable

cause to search defendant's vehicle based upon the smell of suspected marijuana

emanating from the vehicle and from defendant's person when he exited the

2
   By consent of the parties, the evidentiary hearing also addressed the
voluntariness of defendant's statements during the motor vehicle stop. No
appeal was filed as to the admissibility of defendant's statements.
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vehicle. The trial court found that it was reasonable to search defendant's wallet,

which was in plain view, to determine whether he had any controlled dangerous

substances inside.    Thus, the court entered a memorializing written order

denying defendant's motion to suppress.

      At the conclusion of the November 3 and November 5, 2021 trial, the jury

found defendant guilty of operating a motor vehicle during a period of license

suspension and not guilty of obtaining the personal identifying information of

another. On February 3, 2022, the court sentenced defendant to the mandatory

minimum term required by N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) of 180 days incarceration, in

addition to required fines and penalties.

      Defendant appeals, raising only one argument:

            THE MOTOR VEHICLE STOP WAS UNLAWFUL
            BECAUSE THE PIP REGULATION ON WHICH THE
            STOP WAS BASED IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
            OVERBROAD.

      Our review of a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress is

limited. State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021). "Generally, on appellate

review, a trial court's factual findings in support of granting or denying a motion

to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings are supported by sufficient

credible evidence in the record.'"     State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)

(quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).

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       The reviewing court "ordinarily will not disturb the trial court's factual

findings unless they are 'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand

intervention and correction.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022)

(quoting Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425) (internal quotation marks omitted). However,

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Radel,

249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022).

       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect the right of individuals from

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I,

¶ 7.   The reasonable suspicion required to make a stop under the Fourth

Amendment "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a

showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [but] the Fourth

Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for

making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Additionally,

"[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an 'inchoate and

unparticularized suspicion or "hunch"' of criminal activity."      Id. at 123-24

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

       Similarly, the New Jersey Constitution requires "something less than the

probable cause standard needed to support an arrest." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J.

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673, 678 (1988); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 (1998). The officer must

"'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the intrusion." Thomas, 110

N.J. at 678 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). This is an objective standard. Ibid.

      We are compelled to highlight at the outset that defendant does not dispute

the lawfulness of the first stop accomplished by Busanic on October 15, 2019.

Defendant was charged with driving with a suspended license in connection with

both stops. Therefore, even if we were to find the second stop of defendant's

vehicle by Kimbro did not comport with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the

conviction for driving with a suspended license would not be constitutionally

infirm based upon the lawfulness of the first motor vehicle stop.

      Nonetheless, we turn to defendant's sole argument in his amended brief

that the motion to suppress evidence obtained by Kimbro during the second stop

should have been granted because PIP 411.1(k) is unconstitutionally overbroad.

The State posits on appeal that defendant was stopped for and charged with

violating both PIP 411.1(k) and (w). 411.1(k) provides that "no person shall

cause or permit a motor vehicle to cross a solid longitudinal traffic line, except

when directed to do so by an employee of the commission." Under 411.1(w),

"no person shall drive a vehicle carelessly, or without due caution and

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                                        9
circumspection, in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger, a person

or property."

      Defendant for the first time on appeal argues the trial court improperly

failed to consider the constitutionality of the second stop through the lens of the

overbroad application of PIP 411.1(k). We consider issues raised for the first

time on appeal only if plain error is established. R. 2:10-2. Based upon our

careful review of the proofs at the December 10, 2020 evidentiary hearing in

tandem with prevailing law, we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate

plain error.

      The proofs at the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress,

at which defendant did not testify, established that Kimbro had reasonable and

articulable suspicion that defendant had violated PIP regulation 411.1(k) and

(w), with which he was charged. Among the trial court's factual findings were

that Kimbro testified credibly as to his observation of defendant's vehicle

driving over the solid line on the right shoulder of the roadway and continuing

to drive on the shoulder until he moved back into a driving lane. We decline to

disturb the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations as they

are supported by the record at the evidentiary hearing.

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      Kimbro's testimony supports the conclusion that the stop was lawful since

he had reasonable suspicion defendant had committed a traffic infraction based

on his personal observation of defendant's vehicle crossing the solid yellow line

and continuing to drive on the shoulder in violation of both PIP regulations.

Observation of traffic violations can form the basis of reasonable and articulable

suspicion to stop a vehicle. State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017).

      Defendant criticizes the lack of detail in Kimbro's testimony as to

precisely how long the defendant was driving over the solid yellow line and

argues that PIP regulation 411.1(k) was unconstitutionally applied to defendant

based upon a "de minimis" violation.        We conclude Kimbro's observation,

deemed credible by the trial court, that defendant drove over the line and

continued to do so constitutes sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion of

a violation of PIP regulations 411.1(k) and (w).

      Ultimately, we reject defendant's argument that the stop was violative of

the Fourth Amendment because the regulation which formed the basis for the

stop was unconstitutionally overbroad. Kimbro's testimony establishes he had

reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that defendant was in violation

of PIP 411.1(k) and (w) when he initiated the motor vehicle stop. The stop was,

therefore, consistent with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the trial court

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did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence garnered from

the resulting search.

      Affirmed.

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