Court Opinion

ID: 9913913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:09:02.072882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:33.061936
License: Public Domain

J-S34003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DEVANTE RUMEAL KING                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 731 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 26, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-02-CR-0013382-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                         FILED: December 28, 2023

       Devante Rumeal King appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Upon review, we affirm.

       The trial court set forth the facts of the case as follows:

       [O]n August 6, 2017[,] at approximately 10:41 p.m., [King] and
       his two accomplices, one of whom was his brother, Donald Eugene
       King,[1] went to a residence located at 208 Conestoga Road in
       Penn Hills, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, to rob Kevin Trowery.
       The other accomplice was Dustin Taylor. [King] and his two
       accomplices were seen fleeing the back door of the residence and
       Penn Hills police officers gave chase. [King] was arrested after a
       short pursuit. During the course of the investigation detectives
       recovered surveillance videos of the entire incident. The videos
       disclosed that the victim exited his residence and stood on the
       front porch. [King] and his two accomplices, while wearing masks,
       can be seen running toward the victim. The victim attempted to
       fight off the three actors by raising a small broom which he had
       been using to sweep the porch area. Co-defendant, Donald
____________________________________________

1
  Donald Eugene King’s appeal is also before this Court.             That appeal is
docketed at 409 WDA 2022.
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       Eugene King, shot the victim. The victim fell to the ground and
       the three actors, including [King], beat the victim while he was on
       the ground. Donald Eugene King then fired two more shots into
       the victim’s body. The victim died as a result of multiple gunshot
       wounds. The three actors then entered the victim’s residence.
       They are observed seconds later exiting the residence, still
       wearing masks, and dragging the victim’s body into the residence.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/23, at 1-2.

       Following a joint trial with co-defendant-brother,2 a jury convicted King

of one count each of murder in the second degree,3 robbery,4 conspiracy,5

criminal trespass,6 theft,7 receiving stolen property,8 and burglary–overnight

accommodations—person present.9 On May 26, 2022, the trial court

sentenced King to life imprisonment on the second-degree murder conviction,

and to a consecutive aggregate term of imprisonment of 17½ to 35 years on

the robbery, burglary, and conspiracy convictions. No further penalty was

____________________________________________

2 The third actor, Dustin Taylor, entered a guilty plea in the instant matter and

agreed to testify against the King brothers in exchange for a 12½-to-25-year
sentence followed by 20 years’ probation. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/6/21, at
15.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).

4   Id. at § 3701(a)(1)(i).

5   Id. at § 903.

6   Id. at § 3503(a)(1)(ii).

7   Id. at § 3921(a).

8   Id. at § 3925(a).

9   Id. at §§ 3501(a)(1)(i), (ii).

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imposed on the remaining convictions. King filed a timely notice of appeal

and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. He raises two issues for our review:

          1. Did the court below adequately caution the jury as to the
             evaluation of the accomplice testimony?

          2. Does the felony[-]murder sentencing scheme, in allowing
             intent to commit a dangerous felony to substitute for intent
             to kill and imposing a life sentence with no possibility of
             parole, violate the proportionality guarantees of the Eighth
             Amendment and Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania
             Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

       First, King argues that a portion of the trial court’s instruction on

accomplice testimony was an error of law or abuse of discretion. Specifically,

he claims the court erred in “watering down” the instruction, and that the

charge, therefore, was “not complete.” Appellant’s Brief, at 11, 13.10 Though

acknowledging the court’s considerable discretion in fashioning an instruction,

King claims the court “refused to charge the jury as to the known danger of

an accomplice falsely blaming another person, [and,] under the circumstances

____________________________________________

10 King preserved this issue at the charging conference by objecting to the
omitted language he suggested for accomplice testimony. Co-defendant
Donald Eugene King’s counsel objected to certain adjustments and deletions
the court planned with respect to the suggested standard instruction, and
King’s counsel informed the court that he had the same objections on his
client’s behalf. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/10/21, at 988-89, 991-92. Counsel
objected again at the conclusion of the jury instructions. Id. at 1111-12. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C).

                                           -3-
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of this case, the strongest possible caution with respect to Taylor’s testimony

was appropriate.” Id. at 12-13.11 This claim is meritless.

       When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction:

       [W]e must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is
       fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing its
       jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law
       is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
       consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only
       when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal

citation omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663,

667 (Pa. Super. 2013) (jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if charge

as a whole is inadequate, not clear, or has tendency to mislead or confuse,

rather than clarify, material issue).

____________________________________________

11 The Suggested Standard Jury Instruction for accomplice testimony
provides:

       First, you should view the testimony of an accomplice with
       disfavor because it comes from a corrupt and polluted source.

       Second, you should examine the testimony of an accomplice
       closely and accept it only with care and caution.

       Third, you should consider whether the testimony of an
       accomplice is supported, in whole or in part, by other evidence.
       Accomplice testimony is more dependable if supported by
       independent evidence. [However, even if there is no independent
       supporting evidence, you may still find the defendant guilty solely
       on the basis of an accomplice’s testimony if, after using the special
       rules I just told you about, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
       doubt that the accomplice testified truthfully and the defendant is
       guilty.]

Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.01 (italics and brackets in original).

                                           -4-
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Further, “[a] charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably

misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount

to fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide discretion

in fashioning jury instructions.” Id. (emphasis added).           Additionally, our

Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury Instructions

themselves are not binding and do not alter the discretion afforded trial courts

in crafting jury instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are

guides only.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014).

      The standard charge for accomplice testimony, commonly referred to as

“the corrupt and polluted source charge,” see Commonwealth v. Lawrence,

165 A.3d 34, 44 (Pa. Super. 2017), is “designed specifically to address

situations where one accomplice testifies against the other to obtain favorable

treatment.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 906 (Pa. 2011). The

instruction “directs the jury to view the testimony of an accomplice with

disfavor and accept it only with care and caution.” Id.

      Here, the trial court gave the following jury instruction on accomplice

testimony:

      I have defined accomplice liability to you. I have indicated that a
      person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a
      crime if he or she has the intent of promoting or facilitating the
      commission of that crime, solicits the other person to commit it,
      or aids or agrees or attempts to aid or agree—excuse me, or
      attempts to aid the other person in committing the planning. An
      accomplice is a person who knowingly and voluntarily cooperates
      with or aids another person in committing an offense. When a
      Commonwealth witness is an accomplice, his or her
      testimony has to be judged by special precautionary rules.

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     He or she may testify falsely in the hope of obtaining
     favorable treatment or for some other motive. On the other
     hand, an accomplice may be a truthful witness.

     The special rules that I will give you are meant to help you
     distinguish between truthful and false accomplice testimony. In
     view of Dustin Taylor's testimony, you must decide whether Dustin
     Taylor was an accomplice of the crimes charged. If, after
     considering all of the evidence, you find that he was an
     accomplice, then you must apply the special rules to his
     testimony. Otherwise, you would ignore those rules. Use this
     test to determine whether Dustin Taylor was an accomplice.
     Again, an accomplice is a person who knowingly and voluntarily
     cooperates with and/or aids in the commission of a crime.

     Special rules that apply to accomplice testimony are these:
     First, you should view the testimony of an accomplice with
     disfavor because it comes from a corrupt and tainted
     source; second, you should examine the testimony of an
     accomplice closely and accept it only with care and caution;
     third, you should consider whether the testimony of an
     accomplice is supported in full or in part by other evidence.

     Accomplice testimony is more dependable if it is supported by
     independent evidence. However, even if there is no independent
     supporting evidence, you may still find the Defendant guilty solely
     on the basis of an accomplice’s testimony if[,] after using these
     special rules I’ve just told you about, you are satisfied beyond a
     reasonable doubt that the accomplice testified truthfully and the
     Defendant is guilty.

     Again, the special rules are, first, you should view the
     testimony of the accomplice with disfavor because it comes
     from a corrupt and tainted source. And second, you should
     examine the testimony of an accomplice closely and accept
     it only with care and caution.

     Separate and apart from the fact of whether that witness was an
     accomplice, you should examine closely and carefully and
     receive with caution the testimony of Dustin Taylor if you
     find he has provided testimony with the intent to receive a
     benefit after giving that testimony.

N.T. Jury Trial, 12/10/21, at 1102-06 (emphasis added).

                                    -6-
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      Based on the highlighted language above, we are not persuaded by

King’s argument that the trial judge’s accomplice testimony instruction was

“inadequate, not clear[,] or ha[d] a tendency to mislead or confuse, rather

than clarify, a material issue [for the jury].” Sandusky, supra at 667. The

court’s instruction was not “watered down,” and, on the contrary, clearly

advised the jury that if they found Taylor was King’s accomplice, they were

required to receive his testimony with disfavor because it came from a corrupt

and tainted source who may testify falsely to receive favor.        See Smith,

supra at 906 (“In any case where an accomplice implicates the defendant,

the judge should tell the jury that the accomplice is a corrupt and polluted

source whose testimony should be viewed with great caution.”).

      Moreover, the court gave a detailed instruction on judging the credibility

of witnesses, stating:

      As judges of the facts, you are the sole judges of the credibility of
      witnesses and their testimony. This means you must judge the
      truthfulness and accuracy of each witness’s testimony and decide
      whether to believe all[,] part[,] or none of that testimony.

      The following are some of the factors that you should and may
      consider when judging credibility, deciding who to believe, what
      testimony to believe or not: Was the witness able to see, hear,
      or know the things about which he testified; how well could the
      witness remember and describe the things about which he or she
      testified; did the witness testify in a convincing manner; how did
      he or she look, act, and speak while testifying; was his or her
      testimony uncertain, confused, self-contradictory[,] or evasive;
      did the witness have any interest in the outcome of the case; did
      the witness have any bias, prejudice, or other motive that might
      affect his or her testimony; how well does the testimony of the
      witness square with the other evidence in the case, including the

                                      -7-
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      testimony of other witnesses; was it contradicted or supported by
      other testimony and evidence; did it make sense?

      If you believe some part of the testimony of a witness to be
      inaccurate, consider whether the inaccuracy cast[s] doubt upon
      the rest of his or her testimony. This may depend on whether he
      or she has been inaccurate in an important matter or only a minor
      detail and on any possible explanation. For example, did the
      witness make an honest mistake or simply forget, or did he or she
      deliberately falsify [testimony].

      While you are judging the credibility of each witness, you are likely
      to be judging the credibility of other witnesses or evidence. If
      there is a real irreconcilable conflict, it is up to you to decide which,
      if any, conflicting testimony to believe.

N.T. Jury Trial, 12/10/21, at 1091-94. See Smith, supra at 906 (“If the

evidence is sufficient to present a jury question with respect to whether the

prosecution’s witness was an accomplice, the defendant is entitled to an

instruction as to the weight to be given to that witness’s testimony.”).

Accordingly, we find that the court’s charge was not erroneous. See also

Sandusky, supra.

      After our review, we conclude that the trial court’s instruction properly

directed the jury to view Taylor’s accomplice testimony with disfavor and

accept it only with care and caution.         Accordingly, we find no abuse of

discretion. Baker, supra.

      Next, King argues that the felony murder sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional   under    the   Eighth   Amendment      of   the   United   States

Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This

claim, too, is meritless.

                                        -8-
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       In Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482 (Pa. Super. 2020), this

Court addressed nearly identical arguments, where we noted that in

Commonwealth v. Cornish, 370 A.2d 291 (Pa. 1977), Commonwealth v.

Yuknavich, 295 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1972), and Commonwealth ex rel. Smith

v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1970), our Supreme Court “upheld the

constitutional validity of the felony-murder statute.”          Rivera, 238 A.3d at

502.   See Commonwealth v. Henkel, 938 A.2d 433, 446 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(imposition   of   life   sentence    not    unconstitutional   “cruel   and   unusual

punishment” under United States and Pennsylvania constitutions); see also

Commonwealth v. Middleton, 467 A.2d 841, 846-47 (Pa. 1983) (sentence

of life imprisonment for offense of felony-murder not unconstitutionally

disproportionate; comparison of such sentence with sentences imposed in

Commonwealth for other felonies demonstrated legislature contemplated

seriousness of felony-murder should be matched by equally severe penalty

and sentence for felony-murder comported with range of sentences found

proper in other jurisdictions).      We are similarly bound by this precedent.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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 12/28/2023

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