Court Opinion

ID: 9896632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:07:22.210903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:11.057988
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 230059-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                            NOTICE
 Decision filed 11/13/23. The
                                                                                 This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be                 NO. 5-23-0059
                                                                                 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Peti ion for                                                    not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                  IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                       under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Vermilion County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 13-CF-185
                                                )
TIMOTHY DAVIS,                                  )     Honorable
                                                )     Mark S. Goodwin,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Boie and Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1       Held:        Where the trial court questioned the venire in compliance with Rule 431 and where
                      the record need not reflect the jurors’ oath verbatim, the court did not err in
                      dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition arguing to the contrary. As any
                      argument that the court erred would lack merit, we grant defendant’s appointed
                      appellate counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶2       Defendant, Timothy Davis, appeals the trial court’s order summarily dismissing his

postconviction petition. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate

Defender (OSAD), has concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the trial

court erred in dismissing defendant’s petition. Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as

counsel along with a supporting memorandum. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551

(1987). OSAD has notified defendant of its motion, and this court has given defendant an

opportunity to file a response, which he has done. However, after considering the record on appeal,

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OSAD’s motion and supporting brief, and defendant’s response, we conclude that this appeal

presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶3                                   BACKGROUND

¶4     Following a jury trial in 2014, defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated

criminal sexual abuse of his stepdaughters S.T. and D.B., and one count of predatory criminal

sexual assault of a child involving S.T. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent 5-year prison

terms for each count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, consecutive to a 12-year term for

predatory criminal sexual assault.

¶5     On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other

crimes he committed and testimony improperly bolstering S.T.’s and D.B.’s credibility. He also

argued that the trial court did not inquire into his claims that counsel was ineffective. The Fourth

District rejected defendant’s evidentiary arguments but remanded for a preliminary Krankel

hearing on defendant’s ineffective-assistance claims. People v. Davis, 2016 IL App (4th) 140603-

U, ¶¶ 96-98, 105-06 (citing People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)).

¶6     On remand, the trial court held a hearing with defendant and his original trial counsel. The

trial court found that defendant’s claims all involved trial strategy and thus rejected them without

appointing new counsel. Defendant appealed, where the State conceded that the trial court had not

addressed some of defendant’s claims. The Fourth District remanded for a new Krankel hearing.

People v. Davis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170151-U, ¶¶ 22, 35. On remand for the second inquiry, the

court asked trial counsel about the two matters, then concluded neither had merit. The Fourth

District affirmed. People v. Davis, 2019 IL App (4th) 180381-U, ¶¶ 25-37.

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¶7     On June 23, 2022, defendant filed a petition for postjudgment relief pursuant to section 2-

1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)) arguing that the trial court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because it failed to ensure that the jury was impartial. He

claimed that the jury did not unanimously agree to be impartial where the record did not reflect

individual answers to certain questions during voir dire. Citing People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959,

defendant also argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the jury was not properly sworn.

The trial court denied defendant’s petition. Defendant filed an appeal, but voluntarily dismissed

it.

¶8     Defendant then filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)) raising claims similar to those in his 2-1401 petition. He

argued that his jury was not shown to be impartial where the trial court did not require some of the

individual jurors to verbally answer certain questions about whether they could be fair, and where

the record did not show to what oath the jury was sworn. He further argued that appellate counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise these issues on direct appeal. The trial court summarily

dismissed the petition and defendant timely appealed.

¶9                                      ANALYSIS

¶ 10   OSAD concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the trial court erred

by dismissing the postconviction petition because defendant’s claims clearly lacked merit. OSAD

further concludes that there is no question that the dismissal was procedurally proper. We agree.

¶ 11   First, there is no reasonable argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition.

The Act provides a mechanism by which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction

resulted from a substantial denial of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2022);

People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 253 (2008). The first issue defendant raised in his postconviction

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petition was that the record did not demonstrate that the jury was impartial because the trial court

did not require some of the venire members to specifically answer questions about whether they

could be impartial.

¶ 12   Both the federal and Illinois constitutions guarantee every criminal defendant the right to

a fair trial before an impartial jury. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶¶ 33-35 (citing U.S. Const., amends.

VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13). This guarantee includes the right to an adequate voir

dire to identify and exclude unqualified jurors. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1992);

People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76 (2000).

¶ 13   To effectuate this right, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431 provides as follows:

              “(a) The court shall conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting

       to them questions it thinks appropriate, touching upon their qualifications to serve as jurors

       in the case at trial. The court may permit the parties to submit additional questions to it for

       further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate and shall permit the parties to supplement

       the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for a reasonable period

       of time depending upon the length of examination by the court, the complexity of the case,

       and the nature of the charges. Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of

       law or instructions. The court shall acquaint prospective jurors with the general duties and

       responsibilities of jurors.

              (b) The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that

       juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed

       innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted

       the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant

       is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant

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          does not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective

          juror shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the defendant objects.

                The court’s method of inquiry shall provide each juror an opportunity to respond to

          specific questions concerning the principles set out in this section.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff.

          July 1, 2012).

¶ 14      The principles identified in paragraph (b) are known as the Zehr principles. See People v.

Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984). The rule requires that the trial court “shall ask” potential jurors

whether they understand and accept those principles. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607

(2010).

¶ 15      Contrary to defendant’s contention, however, the rule does not require that prospective

jurors give individual answers. “The questioning may be performed either individually or in a

group, but the rule requires an opportunity for a response from each prospective juror on their

understanding and acceptance of those principles.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 16      Moreover, the factual premise of defendant’s argument is incorrect. When asking some

general questions about prospective jurors’ ability to be fair, the trial court questioned the entire

panel and provided an opportunity for venire members to raise their hands. However, when

covering the Zehr principles, the trial court asked each prospective juror individually if he or she

understood and accepted each principle and required each venire member to answer individually.

Thus, this issue is plainly without merit.

¶ 17      Defendant’s second contention in the petition was that the record did not include a verbatim

recitation of the oath given the jurors. Defendant cited Moon for this proposition.

¶ 18      In Moon, the court found plain error where undisputed evidence showed that the jury was

administered the voir dire oath, rather than the trial oath, before trial. Although the court there

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noted that the transcript did not include a verbatim recitation of the oath the jurors received, the

court never held that this was required. The issue was ripe for adjudication because the parties

stipulated that the clerk erroneously swore the jury with the voir dire oath, and defendant provided

affidavits to that effect from two public defenders who were in the courtroom on unrelated matters.

Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 9. Defendant here provides no such factual support.

¶ 19   Finally, OSAD asserts that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the trial court’s

dismissal of the petition was procedurally improper. It notes that the trial court may summarily

dismiss a postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit only within the first 90

days after filing. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2022). The trial court must make its determination

without any input from the State. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Here, defendant

filed his petition on December 8, 2022, and the trial court summarily dismissed it in a written order

on January 18, 2023, well within the 90-day time period. Moreover, the record does not show that

the trial court received any input from the State. The trial court therefore complied with the Act

in summarily dismissing the petition, and any contrary argument would be frivolous.

¶ 20   In his response, defendant refers to his affidavit accompanying the petition in which he

avers that he “never heard the jury be informed after it was impaneled ‘to swear or affirm to well

and truly try the matter at issue and render a true verdict according to the law evidence.’ ” There

are two fundamental problems with this.

¶ 21   First, defendant’s self-serving statement that he did not hear the jurors sworn does not

prove that it did not happen. This is far different from Moon, where two impartial witnesses

averred that they heard the jury receive the wrong oath.

¶ 22   Second, defendant’s affidavit refers to a specific formulation. The Moon court specifically

declined to impose a specific formula for jury oaths, noting that the issue was one of substance

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rather than form. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶¶ 86-87. The jury could have been informed of the

substance of its duties without hearing the exact words defendant quotes, which in any event are

nonsensical. There is no such legal concept as “law evidence.” In other words, that defendant did

not hear the precise words he quotes is of no significance whatsoever.

¶ 23   Defendant further complains that appellate counsel did not address his argument that the

alternate jurors were not sworn. The record provides no support for this contention. It is unclear

whether the statement “Jurors sworn” also included the alternate jurors. Defendant has the burden

of persuasion on this issue (Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 613) so we will not presume error from a

silent record. In any event, the record shows that the trial court dismissed the lone alternate juror

prior to deliberations.

¶ 24                                 CONCLUSION

¶ 25   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 26   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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