Court Opinion

ID: 9434886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 00:00:37.229492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:56.176376
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60364        Document: 00516844068             Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 22-60364
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                     August 2, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                    ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   Adetokunbo Abosede Brooks,

                                                                                Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.
                     ______________________________

                        Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A028 988 727
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         In view of Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2023), the
   court sua sponte grants rehearing and substitutes the following for the
   opinion previously withdrawn in this matter, Brooks v. Garland, No. 22-
   60364, 2023 WL 3254990 (5th Cir. May 4, 2023).

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60364      Document: 00516844068           Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/02/2023

                                     No. 22-60364

          Adetokunbo Abosede Brooks seeks review of a final decision of the
   Board of Immigration Appeals denying her application for waiver of the
   requirement to file a joint petition for removal of conditions and ordering her
   removed. The only argument she presents for our review is unexhausted
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), and we decline to consider it. Accordingly, the
   petition for review is DENIED.
          Brooks, a native and citizen of Nigeria, lawfully entered the United
   States in 1986 on a six-month visa. Three years later, her status was adjusted
   to that of a conditional permanent resident alien based on her marriage to a
   U.S. citizen. Brooks timely filed a joint petition to have the conditions on her
   permanent resident status removed, and she and her spouse appeared for an
   interview before the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
   concerning the bona fides of their marriage. During his interview, her spouse
   stated that he neither saw nor signed the joint petition, and he formally
   withdrew from the joint application. Soon after, Brooks and her spouse filed
   for divorce, and Brooks filed with the INS an application for waiver of the
   requirement to file the joint petition for removal of conditions, claiming that
   she entered the marriage in “good faith.” In April 1992, the INS denied
   Brooks’ request to waive the filing of the joint petition and formally
   terminated her conditional permanent resident status. The INS then
   commenced deportation proceedings, for which Brooks did not appear, and
   she was ordered removed in absentia in September 1992.
          In 2015, Brooks filed a motion with the immigration court seeking
   reopening of her case, which the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted, because
   she did not receive notice of her original hearing. The IJ then heard several
   days of testimony from Brooks concerning the circumstances of her marriage.
   Upon the hearing’s conclusion, the IJ issued a decision sustaining the charge
   of deportation and upholding the INS’ denial of Brooks’ request to waive the
   filing of the joint petition. In evaluating the credibility of Brooks’ testimony,

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Case: 22-60364         Document: 00516844068               Page: 3       Date Filed: 08/02/2023

                                           No. 22-60364

   the IJ applied the framework outlined by § 101(d)(2) of the REAL ID Act of
   2005, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). Brooks appealed
   the decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed
   the IJ’s decision without opinion in 2022. She then filed a petition for review
   with this court, arguing that the BIA erred in applying the REAL ID Act’s
   credibility framework to the de novo review of her application for relief
   because it was filed prior to the passage of the REAL ID Act.
           Federal law generally proscribes judicial review of any decision or
   action of the Secretary of Homeland Security which is specified to be in his
   or her discretion. 1 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The granting of a hardship
   waiver for an individual who fails to submit a joint petition for removal of
   conditional status is reserved to the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland
   Security and thus generally is not subject to our review. Id. § 1186a(c)(4); see
   Alvarado de Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227, 233 (5th Cir. 2009). However,
   federal law does not preclude “review of constitutional claims or questions
   of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
   appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Whether the BIA, in affirming the IJ’s
   decision, applied the correct statutory framework is a question of law, so we
   have jurisdiction over this issue.

           _____________________
           1
             Brooks briefly argues that this provision, which was passed as part of the Illegal
   Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, should not be applied
   retroactively to her final order of removal from 1992. However, that order is no longer
   final—the IJ’s granting of Brooks’ motion to reopen vacated her 1992 order of removal. Cf.
   Espinal v. Holder, 636 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]his court retains jurisdiction over
   a petition for review so long as the BIA’s grant of reconsideration does not materially
   change, or effectively vacate, the order under review.”); Pena v. Garland, No. 20-60946,
   2022 WL 996574, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (“The BIA has granted a motion to
   reopen . . . . In other words, the BIA vacated the order at issue in this petition for review.”
   (citing Espinal, 636 F.3d at 705–06)). The BIA’s 2022 decision is the final order of removal
   under review, and there is no question that § 1252 applies to that decision.

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Case: 22-60364        Document: 00516844068             Page: 4      Date Filed: 08/02/2023

                                        No. 22-60364

           Even so, the Government may timely object to our consideration of
   arguments that a petitioner failed to exhaust before the BIA. Carreon v.
   Garland, 71 F.4th 247, 254 (5th Cir. 2023); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)
   (granting review of a final order of removal only if “the alien has exhausted
   all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right”). This
   exhaustion requirement is a claim-processing rule, rather than a jurisdictional
   one; as such, it is subject to waiver and forfeiture. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland,
   143 S. Ct. 1103, 1116 (2023). The Government argues in its briefing that
   Brooks did not raise this issue before the BIA—in fact, in her brief in support
   of her appeal to the BIA, she argued that the REAL ID Act’s framework for
   assessing credibility was controlling. Nowhere did she suggest to the BIA that
   her credibility should have been assessed under the pre-REAL ID Act
   framework. Because of Brooks’ failure to raise this issue before the BIA, the
   Government objects to our consideration of it under § 1252(d)(1)’s
   exhaustion requirement. This objection is timely, and we agree with the
   Government that the issue is unexhausted. Accordingly, we decline to reach
   it. 2
           The petition for review is DENIED.

           _____________________
           2
             This decision does not reach whether § 1252(d)(1) is a mandatory claim-
   processing rule; rather, we would enforce the exhaustion requirement in this case even if
   the rule was not mandatory. See Carreon, 71 F.4th at 257 n.11.

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