Court Opinion

ID: 9582623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:29:34.432303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:03.034754
License: Public Domain

Stukes, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I regret to have to dissent but I am convinced that the verdict should have been directed for the defendant. In this view, the question of the qualification of the juror would not be reached.
I think that the only inference of which the evidence is susceptible is that the decedent entered the highway from a private driveway and got into the path of defendant’s car in violation of Sec. 46-424 of the Code of 1952 which is as plain and mandatory as can be:
“The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from a private road or driveway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such highway.”
Incidentally, the collision occurred on State highway 105, not a farm-to-market road. The State Highway map shows that it leads southeast from Gaffney.
This violation of the statute by the decedent, from which recklessness and wilfulness may be inferred, was the proximate cause of the collision, not the speed of defendant or his veering to the left in a last effort to avoid the car of the decedent which blocked his side of the highway. The evidence of the skid marks shows that defendant made timely application of his brakes, as he testified, in a vain effort to stop; and his car was new, having just received its 3,000-mile checkup. It is illogical to say that his speed proximately caused the wreck; conceivably, even greater speed would have avoided it because thereby he would have passed the driveway before decedent’s emergence from it. It might as well be said that there would have been no collision had defendant remained at home and stayed off the highway. Granting his excessive *71speed, it would not have resulted in injury to decedent if the latter had complied with the statute and yielded the right of way.
Apart from the foregoing, there is another consideration which brings the same result of reversal: If it be conceded that defendant’s wilful and reckless speed and/or his driving to the left of the highway was a proximate cause of the collision, decedent’s failure to yield the right of way, in violation of the statute, constituted wilfulness and recklessness and was a contributing proximate cause, which bars recovery for his death. It needs no citation of authority that contributory wilfulness and recklessness is a defense to wilfulness and recklessness.
The case of Lawter v. War Emergency Co-operative Ass’n, 213 S. C. 286, 49 S. E. (2d) 227, is, I think, clear authority for my conclusion, rather than that of the leading opinion. In it verdict was directed for the defendant on account of the failure of plaintiff’s intestate to comply with the statute regulating the entrance from another highway into a favored highway, although it was less stringent in its requirements than the statute applicable to the present case. The statute involved in the Lawter case is now Sec. 46-423, Code of 1952, as follows:
“The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from the through highway or which are approaching so closely on such through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but such driver having so yielded may proceed and the driver of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on such through highway shall yield the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through, highway.”
The important difference in the statutes is readily seen. The last clause of the statute just quoted, “but such driver having so yielded may proceed” etc., is not included in the' presently applicable statute.
*72The courts of North Carolina and Virginia have applied statutes similar to that which governs here with the result that I think is required in the instant case.
The holding of Garner v. Pittman, 237 N. C. 328, 75 S. E. (2d) 111, 117, is shown in the following excerpts from the opinion by now Chief Justice Winborne:
“Moreover, the operator of an automobile traveling upon a public highway in this State is under no duty to anticipate that the driver of an automobile entering the public highway from a private road or drive will fail to yield the right of way to all vehicles on such public highway, as required by the statute, G.S. § 20-156 (a), and, in the absence of anything which gives or should give notice to the contrary, he is entitled to assume and to act upon the assumption, even to the last moment, that the driver of the automobile so entering the public highway from a private road or drive will, in obedience to the statute, yield the right of way. * * * Plaintiff contends, however, that there is evidence tending to show that the speed of the Sipe automobile was fifty miles per hour, reduced to 30 or 35 miles per hour, and, therefore, under the circumstances, unlawful. Even so, it is clear from the evidence that its speed would have resulted in no injury or damages to plaintiff but for the negligent act of defendant Pittman * * The Virginia statute follows:
“The driver of a vehicle entering a public highway from a private road or driveway shall, immediately before entering such highway, stop, and upon entering such highway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on such public highway.” Code 1950, § 46-240.
The following is quoted from Temple v. Moses, 175 Va. 320, 8 S. E. (2d) 262, 266, which applied the foregoing statute in that case as I would ours here:
“Temple could not excuse the violation of his statutory duty by relying upon a presumption that a car operated upon the highway was being driven at a careful and prudent speed. The law requires such stop, and common sense, reasonable caution and prudence dictate that the driver of the stopped *73vehicle, before entering the main artery of travel, shall look, and not enter into the public highway without seeing that such movement can be made with safety.”
The facts in Temple v .Moses and those of the instant case are practically identical. As indicated in the quotation from the opinion, it was there contended, as here and as also in the North Carolina case, that defendant’s excessive speed was the proximate cause of the collision. The contention was held to be untenable.
Plaintiff cites our case of Green v. Sparks, 232 S. C. 414, 102 S. E. (2d) 435, 438, which involved entry by the defendant into a highway from a private driveway. His duty under Code sec. 46-492 was defined as follows in the exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Moss: “It was the duty of the appellant, when he was backing out of the driveway into the highway to be vigilant, watchful and to anticipate and expect the presence of other vehicles upon said highway. It was his duty to ascertain whether the highway was clear so that he could enter the same without interfering with the use thereof by vehicles approaching on such highway.” Whether defendant violated the statute and such was the proximate cause of the collision was held to be a jury issue despite his testimony that he stopped his car when it occupied not over five feet of the paved highway, leaving about fifteen feet for plaintiff to pass, and that upon seeing plaintiff he moved his car back into the driveway. There an issue of fact was, Did the defendant yield the right of way in compliance with the statute ? Here there is no question under the evidence but that plaintiff’s intestate did not yield the right of way or make any effort to do so. I think that plaintiff has no support in Green v. Sparks.
This decision will be an important precedent. All deplore the many highway accidents and deaths. It is common knowledge that a frequent cause is negligent entry upon a. highway from a private road or driveway. Code sec. 46-492 is a legislative remedy; it should be enforced. Further concern of the legislature is evidenced by its Act No. 621 of 1956, 49 *74Stat: 1594, providing for controlled-access highways, of which the opening paragraphs of the preamble are as follows:
“Whereas, the General Assembly finds that traffic accidents are occurring on the public highways of the State in an ever increasing number, resulting in an irreparable loss of life, limb and property, and
“Whereas, many of such accidents are caused by vehicles entering the main through highways from private drives and side roadsetc.
I would reverse and remand the case for entry of judgment for the defendant.