Court Opinion

ID: 9410447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 14:05:42.971696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.041479
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 14, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-1203-MR

JOSEPH MICHAEL GOATLEY; AND
CLASS A LAWN AND LANDSCAPE, INC.                                  APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE ERIC J. HANER, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 16-CI-006391

RAYMOND CHARLES BISCHOFF                                             APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT,
JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: The seminal issue in this case is whether punitive damages

were rightly assessed against a person who refused for many years to return a

muscle car to its rightful owner after repeated demands. Finding no error, we

affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND

             The litigation in this case spans almost seven years and culminated in

a bench trial where the Trial Court ordered the return of a vintage car and its parts

to its owner and further assessed $15,000.00 in punitive damages against the

tortfeasor. There are two issues raised on appeal: (1) whether awarding punitive

damages was erroneous; and (2) whether proposed findings of fact and conclusions

of law should have been stricken for citing to an unofficial transcript rather than

the official video record.

             The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Judgment contain significant factual findings. Neither party disputes those

findings on appeal; thus, we reproduce them here, omitting certain details that are

not essential to the claims on appeal, and altering the formatting and removing

citations for readability:

             Raymond Charles Bischoff (hereinafter “Bischoff”) is a
             retired real estate investor and Vietnam veteran. Joseph
             Michael Goatley (hereinafter “Goatley”) is a landscaper
             and owner of Class A Lawn and Landscaping (“Class
             A”).

             When Bischoff was eighteen years old, he purchased a
             1966 SS Super Sport, 398 Chevelle muscle car (“1966
             Chevelle SS”). After being honorably discharged from
             the military, Bischoff began restoring cars and
             accumulating engines and automobile parts for his 1966
             Chevelle SS. He stopped driving the 1966 Chevelle SS
             around 1974, when the car had approximately 47,000
             miles on it; he kept the car so that he could restore it one

                                          -2-
day. He later purchased a 1967 Chevelle and held onto
both vehicles for his entire adult life while accumulating
parts that could be used to restore the vehicles.
Bischoff experienced difficult economic times when the
recession hit in 2008, finding himself unable to make
timely payments on his various real estate investments.
Bischoff had borrowed money against his family farm in
order to invest in real estate and found himself facing
foreclosure of the farm. Bischoff had stored his 1966
Chevelle SS, 1967 Chevelle, and their accompanying
parts (the “Property”) on the family farm for years.

Bischoff’s friend of more than 20 years, Edward Neutz
(“Mr. Neutz”), owns a moving and storage company. At
the time Mr. Neutz discovered Bischoff’s family farm
was being foreclosed on, Mr. Neutz offered to store
Bischoff’s vintage cars, the 1966 Chevelle SS and the
1967 Chevelle, for free. Bischoff did not accept his
friendly favor from Mr. Neutz because Goatley had
already offered to help him store the Property at Class A.

Goatley and Bischoff have been friends for years.
Goatley has a hobby of buying, fixing up, and restoring
muscle cars; a hobby that started as a father and son
activity when Goatley was a high school student.
Goatley focuses on cars made during the “muscle car
era,” between 1962 and 1972. Goatley has had a
particular interest in the 1966 Chevelle because it was the
car his father owned when his mother was pregnant with
him. Goatley wanted to restore a 1966 Chevelle with his
father.

Mike McDonald (“Mr. McDonald”), a friend of both
Bischoff and Goatley, told Goatley about Bischoff’s
foreclosure predicament and his two vintage cars.
Goatley knew Bischoff was experiencing financial
difficulty when his family farm was being foreclosed on,
stating, “I’m sure he was under duress and stress at that
time.” Mr. McDonald communicated between Bischoff

                            -3-
and Goatley regarding storage of the Property; in fact, he
testified that Goatley “helped” Bischoff.
Goatley’s personal motivation for agreeing to store
Bischoff’s Property was for the “opportunity to own the
1966 Chevelle SS.” Bischoff’s 1966 Chevelle SS piqued
Goatley’s interest. However, Goatley agreed to store
Bischoff’s property before telling Bischoff that he was
interested in owning the 1966 Chevelle SS; Goatley
offered to purchase the vehicle for $30,000 when he was
on Bischoff’s farm after already volunteering to help him
move his Property, but Bischoff refused to sell. Goatley
knew Bischoff was not ready to sell.

Bischoff instead told Goatley that he would be the first
person he spoke to if he became interested in selling the
1966 Chevelle SS. Bischoff never agreed to trade, sell,
or convey his 1966 Chevelle SS to Goatley in exchange
for storing his Property, and never acknowledged any
such agreement. Bischoff was only willing to give
Goatley the opportunity to purchase the vehicle once he
had it restored and was ready to sell it.

Goatley admitted he never told Bischoff he would charge
him for storing his property or sent Bischoff an invoice
for storage.

Bischoff had an offer from his friend, Mr. Neutz, to store
his Property for free when his farm was being foreclosed
on. Bischoff believed Goatley was similarly helping him
out as a friend by storing his Property. Goatley never
told Bischoff he intended to charge him for storage, in
trade or otherwise. Bischoff testified he would not have
stored his Property with Goatley if there was going to be
a charge for doing so, or if he had to give Goatley his
1966 Chevelle SS in exchange.

Goatley never introduced evidence of any negotiated
terms supporting the existence of the alleged verbal
promise by Bischoff, such as the amount of rental fees,
the method of payment, the term of storage, the size of

                            -4-
the warehouse or storage facility agreed upon, or access
to the stored items. Goatley failed to prove that Bischoff
owed him any sum of money for storing his Property
because there was no verbal or written contract for
Bischoff to compensate Goatley and Class A for storage.

Mr. McDonald, along with Goatley and several other
men, helped move Bischoff’s Property from the farm to
Class A over multiple days as a friendly favor to
Bischoff. Donald Gray Browning (“Mr. Browning”), a
decades-long friend of Goatley, also helped move
Bischoff’s Property for a couple of days, alongside other
workers.

While storing Bischoff’s Property, Goatley had, on
multiple occasions, sought Bischoff’s permission to use
or sell certain items of Property. Goatley recognized the
Property was not his to give away, sell, or let another
person use. Goatley admitted that Bischoff is the rightful
owner of all the Property stored at Class A. Goatley
knew Bischoff had not conveyed him the title to any of
his Property, including the 1966 Chevelle SS,
understanding Bischoff only gave him the title to that
vehicle “to hold in safekeeping.”

[In 2016,] Bischoff made repeated texts, phone calls, and
faxes, attempting to coordinate the return of his Property
from Goatley and Class A for a period of more than six
months. During this time, when it became clear that
Goatley did not intend to return the 1966 Chevelle SS,
Mr. Neutz called Goatley to serve as an intermediary.
Goatley told Mr. Neutz he would not return the 1966
Chevelle SS but would purchase it for $30,000 because
the engine block and VIN number matched the vehicle.

After more than six months of unsuccessful attempts to
communicate, Bischoff contacted local law enforcement
for assistance. Goatley had avoided Bischoff and refused
to talk to him. Bischoff felt he had no other choice but to
call the police to get his property back.

                            -5-
Goatley was across town and not present when Bischoff
went to Class A with a police officer to collect his
Property. The police officer spoke with a Class A
employee, Rebecca Chandler (“Ms. Chandler”), who
called Goatley, to request Bischoff’s Property. The only
statement Bischoff made to Ms. Chandler was that he
wanted to get his belongings. Despite his efforts,
Goatley and Class A refused to allow him to get his
property. Ms. Chandler said she “couldn’t allow”
Bischoff to collect his Property because she “never lets
anyone touch anything on the property without Mr.
Goatley’s approval.” Ms. Chandler instead wrote down
the number to Goatley’s attorney. The police officer then
told Bischoff, “Here, she talked to him on the phone and
need to call him up, talk to him.” Bischoff followed the
police officer’s suggestion and sought legal counsel and
filed this lawsuit. It was only after Bischoff filed this
lawsuit, and after Bischoff’s counsel had deposed
Goatley, that Goatley agreed to allow him to pick up his
property.

Mr. Neutz went with Bischoff to pick up the Property
from Class A (the “November Pickup”). It took Mr.
Neutz and Bischoff approximately one hour to load the
parts into a 26-foot truck.

Goatley stored other property in the same building as
Bischoff’s Property at Class A, and even completed
restorations where the 1966 Chevelle SS was stored. Mr.
Browning was working on the restoration of another
1966 Chevelle at Class A in August 2017, around the
time of Goatley’s deposition in this matter. Goatley also
currently has an unrestored white 1966 Chevelle at Class
A. Other items of Bischoff’s Property were stored
behind other equipment and trailers.

Goatley has not returned the 1966 Chevelle SS or any of
the parts needed to restore it. Goatley admitted he still
has and can return, if ordered, the 1966 Chevelle SS and

                           -6-
                396 engine block, bumpers, bumper brackets, a hood,
                some cylinder heads, and a crank for the vehicle.

                Bischoff picked up certain items of Property during the
                November Pick Up and made a record of those returned
                items. Goatley would not allow Bischoff to get all his
                Property. Goatley admits he has certain unreturned
                items, consisting of the 1966 Chevelle SS and its
                parts . . . .

                Goatley testified that in order to satisfy Bischoff’s
                alleged obligation, he retained the 1966 Chevelle SS and
                its parts and title. Goatley did not give Bischoff these
                items of Property back when Bischoff went to Class A
                with the police.

Opinion at 1-7.

                                         ANALYSIS

                Goatley raises two issues on appeal: whether the Trial Court erred by

assessing punitive damages; and whether the Trial Court erred by denying a

motion to strike Bischoff’s proposed findings of fact. Because the appeal arises

from a bench trial, we do not set aside the factual findings unless clearly erroneous,

which happens when they are unsupported by substantial evidence. CR1 52.01;

Goshorn v. Wilson, 372 S.W.3d 436, 439 (Ky. App. 2012). We give deference to

the circuit court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence,

even if we would reach a contrary conclusion, because the circuit court “had the

opportunity to observe, scrutinize, and assess the credibility of witnesses.” Bishop

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -7-
v. Brock, 610 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Ky. App. 2020). We review de novo any “legal

determinations and conclusions from a bench trial[.]” Goshorn, 372 S.W.3d at 439

(citing Gosney v. Glenn, 163 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Ky. App. 2005)).

              Neither party claims any error with the Trial Court’s factual findings,

and we have reviewed the trial and find the factual findings are supported by

substantial evidence. We now conduct our de novo review of Goatley’s claims that

the Trial Court’s legal determinations and conclusions were erroneous.

   I.       Punitive Damages.

              Goatley first argues that the Trial Court erred by assessing punitive

damages. His argument is two-fold. First, Goatley claims that the Trial Court did

not find that Goatley engaged in oppressive, wanton, malicious, or grossly

negligent acts supporting punitive damages. Second, Goatley claims the Trial

Court did not utilize the correct burden of proof, which is clear and convincing

evidence.

              Regarding punitive damages, the Trial Court concluded as follows:

              The Court finds that Bischoff is entitled to recover
              punitive damages against Goatley. In an action for
              conversion, if the injury complained of is the result of
              deliberate and intentional wrongdoing, gross negligence,
              or recklessness on the part of the defendant, then punitive
              damages are recoverable. See Hensley v. Paul Miller
              Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (Ky. 1974); [Motors
              Ins. Corp. v.] Singleton, 677 S.W.3d [309,] 315 [(Ky.
              App. 1984)]. As noted above, Bischoff has proven that
              Goatley deliberately and intentionally interfered with his

                                          -8-
             rights to possess, enjoy, and use his 1966 Chevelle SS, its
             parts, and its title based on false claims that he agreed to
             sell the 1966 Chevelle SS to him and that he is now
             entitled to storage fees for holding his property. Those
             facts meet the test for punitive damages. Based on the
             evidence in the record concerning the harm done to
             Bischoff, the Court finds that he is entitled to recover
             $15,000 in punitive damages, which is equal to half of
             the amount that Goatley offered to purchase the 1966
             Chevelle SS.

             ...

             (2) Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant punitive
             damages in the amount of $15,000.00 which is equal to
             half the amount that Defendant offered Plaintiff to
             purchase the 1966 Chevelle SS, to punish Defendant for
             his intentional, deliberate and ongoing wrongful
             withholding of Plaintiff’s property without any right or
             entitlement to do so.

Order at 10, 12. The Trial Court also summarily denied a motion to alter, amend,

or vacate the punitive damages award.

             As previously noted, because this case involved a bench trial, we

review factual determinations for clear error and substantial evidence, but we

review legal determinations and conclusions de novo. A punitive damages claim

can include both factual findings and legal conclusions, however, and, depending

on the claim raised, may also involve the finder of fact’s discretion. Accordingly,

we must parse out the underlying claim to determine the metes and bounds of our

appellate review.

                                         -9-
                The threshold issue of whether to assess punitive damages is a mixed

question of law and fact that ultimately involves some discretion. Whether to grant

punitive damages ultimately “requires consideration of not only the nature of the

defendant’s act, but also the extent of the harm resulting to the plaintiff.” Owens-

Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ky. 1998) (citing

Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Ky. 1984)). The facts supporting a

punitive damages claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and to

be legally sufficient to justify a punitive damages award, those facts must

demonstrate fraud, oppression, malice, or gross negligence. As our Supreme Court

has summarized:

                Pursuant to KRS[2] 411.184(2), punitive damages are
                available if a plaintiff proves by clear and convincing
                evidence that a defendant acted with fraud, oppression, or
                malice. Punitive damages are also available if gross
                negligence is shown.

Yung v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 563 S.W.3d 22, 65 (Ky. 2018) (citing Williams v.

Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 262-65 (Ky. 1998)).

                If there is clear and convincing evidence that demonstrates fraud,

oppression, malice, or gross negligence, then the ultimate decision to grant

punitive damages becomes a discretionary function. Moore v. Bothe, 479 S.W.2d

634, 635 (Ky. 1972) (“It is the general rule of this Commonwealth that punitive

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -10-
damages are not recoverable as a matter of right and that the award of such

damages rests within the discretion of the jury.”). Cf. Wittmer v. Jones, 864

S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993) (holding that in the context of an Unfair Claims

Settlement Practices Act violation, “The jury’s decision as to whether to award

punitive damages remains discretionary because the nature of punitive damages is

such that the decision is always a matter within the jury’s discretion.”).

             If the trier of fact exercises its discretion and grants punitive damages,

then any claims relating to excessive amounts or levels of punitive damages is

subject to a de novo review. See, e.g., Ragland v. DiGiuro, 352 S.W.3d 908, 916-

17 (Ky. 2010) (“For these and other reasons, constitutional challenges to punitive

damage awards are reviewed de novo.”); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman

Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432-40, 121 S. Ct. 1678, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2001)

(stating that the level of punitive damages does not constitute a factual finding).

             Accordingly, on the threshold issue of whether punitive damages

should have been assessed, we are reviewing three elements with multiple

standards of review: (1) whether the factual findings are clearly erroneous, which

we review for substantial evidence; (2) whether those facts constituted clear and

convincing evidence that support a finding that the defendant acted with fraud,

oppression, malice, or gross negligence, which we review de novo; and (3) whether

the ultimate decision to award punitive damages was within the realm of

                                         -11-
permissible decisions, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

Oberst v. Mounts, No. 2019-CA-0136-MR, 2021 WL 1163912, *4 (Ky. App. Mar.

26, 2021) (“Here, the trial court, acting as the trier of fact at the bench trial,

declined in its discretion to award punitive damages, and we will not second guess

the trial court’s discretion on this issue.”).

              Goatley’s claim falls into the threshold category, namely that Bischoff

allegedly did not prove by clear and convincing evidence an entitlement to punitive

damages. Accordingly, we confine our review to the aforementioned three

elements.

              First, regarding the factual findings, we have already determined that

they are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we move to the second element

in the analysis.

              Goatley claims on this second element that there was no proof that he

acted with fraud, oppression, malice, or gross negligence. He argues that the proof

only showed that he committed the intentional tort of conversion, which would not,

in and of itself, support a punitive damages claim. This argument on its face has

some merit. Indeed, “[t]he principles governing when punitive damages should be

permitted . . . have proved somewhat elusive and difficult to define.” Fowler v.

Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1984). This difficulty arises because

“Kentucky law does not limit punitive damages to specific torts.” PBI Bank, Inc.

                                           -12-
v. Signature Point Condominiums LLC, 535 S.W.3d 700, 726 (Ky. App. 2016).

Notably, however, punitive damages may be awarded when the underlying tort is

conversion, even though that tort is an intentional tort. See, e.g., Hensley v. Paul

Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. App. 1974). Indeed, we necessarily look

past the intentionality of the tort itself for punitive damages purposes, as “[t]he

threshold for the award of punitive damages is misconduct involving something

more than merely the commission of the tort.” Fowler, 683 S.W.2d at 252.

Punitive damages should “punish and discourage certain types of bad behavior[,]”

and they should “deter future wrongdoing, and express . . . moral condemnation.”

Yung, 563 S.W.3d at 64 (citations omitted). In other words, the intentional

tortfeasor can act with intentionality in the tortious act while simultaneously acting

in a fraudulent, oppressive, malicious, or grossly negligent way toward the rights

of the victim.

             For example, in Hensley, 508 S.W.2d at 762, a case also involving

conversion of an automobile, our former Court of Appeals held that the intentional

tortfeasor acted “in such a way as would indicate a gross neglect or disregard for

the rights of” the property owner. There, the tortfeasor intentionally sold the

property owner’s vehicle and all personal property therein within two hours of the

property owner leaving his vehicle at the dealership and taking another car for a

test drive. The tortfeasor did not wait to see if the property owner could obtain a

                                         -13-
loan to purchase the new vehicle. Such facts constituted at least gross negligence

toward the rights of the victim and permitted the imposition of punitive damages.

             Similarly, in Motors Insurance Corporation v. Singleton, 677 S.W.2d

309, 315 (Ky. App. 1984), another case involving conversion of an automobile,

punitive damages were permitted against an insurance company:

             [While] on notice as to the circumstances of the
             Singletons’ purchase of the Corvette, and on notice that
             they had been deprived of its possession, that they had
             demanded its return and were refused, that they had sued
             both it and [the automobile dealer] and were thereby
             attempting to recover it or its value, nevertheless [the
             insurance company] deliberately and intentionally
             completed the conversion by selling it and reaping a
             profit. These facts certainly meet the test for punitive
             damages set forth in [W.] Prosser[, Torts § 2 (4th ed.
             1971)] and in Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., supra.
             We agree with the Singletons that such flagrant action by
             [the insurance company] deserves the sting of punitive
             damages . . . .

             Here, the Trial Court found punitive damages could be assessed

because “Bischoff has proven that Goatley deliberately and intentionally interfered

with his rights to possess, enjoy, and use his 1966 Chevelle SS, its parts, and its

title based on false claims that he agreed to sell the 1966 Chevelle SS to him[.]”

(emphasis added). This finding of fact and conclusion of law meets the Hensley

and Singleton fraud, oppression, malice, or gross negligence standard.

             The clear and convincing evidence adduced at trial, and delineated in

the Trial Court’s findings of fact, showed that Goatley’s acts had an underlying

                                         -14-
evil motive toward Bischoff and a gross neglect or disregard for Bischoff’s rights.

Goatley’s misconduct was outrageous in character as he repeatedly refused to

return Bischoff’s property. Cf. Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690

S.W.2d 382, 389 (Ky. 1985). Bischoff unsuccessfully spent six months

communicating with Goatley about returning the vehicle and parts. Bischoff then

went with a police officer to Goatley’s business to attempt to collect his property,

and Bischoff’s efforts to obtain his personal property were still rebuffed. Goatley

also talked with Bischoff’s intermediary, Neutz, and communicated that Goatley

“would not return the 1966 Chevelle SS but would purchase it for $30,000[.]”

Opinion at 5.

             In fact, it was not until Bischoff obtained legal counsel, filed a

lawsuit, and deposed Goatley that Goatley even allowed Bischoff to obtain all of

Bischoff’s other property that was being stored. Goatley still refused to return the

1966 Chevelle SS or any of its parts to Bischoff. As of the date of the bench trial,

many years after the lawsuit’s initiation, Goatley was still maintaining control of

the 1966 Chevelle SS and its parts.

             The clear and convincing evidence showed a gross neglect or

disregard for Bischoff’s property rights. If Goatley believed he had a valid

contractual claim to purchase the vehicle, he could have returned it to Bischoff and

filed his own lawsuit seeking specific performance and/or compensatory damages.

                                         -15-
But Goatley did not even believe he had that much, as he argues in his Appellant’s

brief that “Bischoff had just agreed to negotiate the sale of this vehicle at some

point in the future . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Bischoff’s multiple and repeated

requests for the return of his property should have made it clear to Goatley that

either the negotiations had failed, as Bischoff did not accept Goatley’s offer of

$30,000.00 to purchase the vehicle, or that Bischoff was not yet ready to sell the

vehicle. Instead, Goatley spent years acting intentionally and outrageously toward

Bischoff with a gross neglect of Bischoff’s property rights. Goatley “deserves the

sting of punitive damages[.]” Singleton, 677 S.W.2d at 315. The Trial Court

properly held that the facts met the legal test for awarding punitive damages.

             Goatley further argues that the Trial Court did not properly apply the

clear and convincing evidence standard. He notes that the Trial Court did not use

the words “clear and convincing evidence” in its Opinion. We find no basis for

error when the burden of proof is not specifically noted in an order and judgment.

Appellate courts routinely review orders and judgments under the proper burdens

of proof, including the clear and convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., Norwich

v. Norwich, 459 S.W.3d 889 (Ky. App. 2015) (reviewing de novo trial court’s

judgment following bench trial to determine if ruling on fraud claim was supported

by clear and convincing evidence); Bishop v. Brock, 610 S.W.3d 347 (Ky. App.

2020) (reviewing de novo trial court’s judgment following bench trial to determine

                                         -16-
if ruling on adverse possession claim was supported by clear and convincing

evidence); Vick v. Elliot, 422 S.W.3d 277 (Ky. App. 2013) (same). We have

thoroughly reviewed the Trial Court’s ruling here and find it was supported by

clear and convincing evidence. Thus, no reversible error occurred, and we affirm

the award of punitive damages in this case.

   II.    Motion to strike proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

             Finally, Goatley argues the Trial Court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion to strike Bischoff’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law submitted after the bench trial. Bischoff created a transcript of the bench trial

and cited to the transcript rather than the official video record. Goatley moved to

strike the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, noting that the official

video record is the proper citation source. Goatley alternatively requested that if

the motion to strike were not granted, Bischoff “be required to resubmit the

pleading with citations to the official record[.]” The Trial Court denied the motion

and ordered Bischoff to refile with citations to the video record. Bischoff promptly

complied.

             Goatley argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred by not applying

the then-applicable appellate rules of procedure and striking Bischoff’s proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law. See CR 98; Miller v. Armstrong, 622

S.W.3d 661 (Ky. App. 2021). We disagree.

                                         -17-
             First, those rules are inapplicable to proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law submitted at the circuit court level. Second, “[t]he settled rule

of appellate procedure is that a party is estopped from complaining of an error

which he invited.” Wathen v. Mackey, 300 Ky. 115, 187 S.W.2d 1000, 1004

(1945). Goatley requested the alternative relief, and the Trial Court granted it.

Goatley cannot now claim error with his own requested relief. Cf. Rankin v.

Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 227, 235 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003)) (“When a defendant by his own

action accepts the trial court’s curative action as adequate by not requesting

additional curative measures, the defendant cannot complain that the trial court

erred.”).

             Accordingly, no reversible error occurred when the Trial Court

granted Goatley’s alternative relief.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For many years, Goatley denied Bischoff the right to possess and

enjoy Bischoff’s personal property in an effort to get Bischoff to sell the property

to Goatley. These actions as they related to Bischoff’s rights went above and

beyond the intentional tort of conversion. The Trial Court properly held that

punitive damages were assessable under these facts. Likewise, the Trial Court did

not err by granting Goatley’s alternative request in his motion to strike.

                                         -18-
           Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Trial Court’s Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.

           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

David B. Blandford                    R. Kenyon Meyer
Michael A. Augustus                   Elizabeth H. Lawrence
Louisville, Kentucky                  Louisville, Kentucky

                                    -19-