Court Opinion

ID: 9953762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:02:55.435174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.447723
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 In re David C. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re DAVID C.,                                                B330044

 a Person Coming Under the                                     (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                            Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP02000)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 JAZMIN L.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
      Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _____________________

      Appellant Jazmin L. (Mother) argues the juvenile court
erred in terminating her parental rights to her son, David L.,
because the beneficial relationship exception to termination,
described in Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied. We conclude the record does not
demonstrate as a matter of law that David had a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to Mother. We thus affirm the
juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
                        BACKGROUND
      Because the sole issue in this appeal is whether the
beneficial relationship exception applied, we confine our factual
and procedural summary to that issue and begin by describing
the basic legal principles necessary to give that summary context.

      1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
       Mother’s notice of appeal included the juvenile court’s
denial of her section 388 petition. Mother did not make any
arguments concerning this denial in her appellate briefs and thus
has forfeited the issue. (See In re Adrian L. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1 [although notice of appeal included
appeal from order denying section 388 petition, parent forfeited
any claim of error where opening brief presented no argument on
that issue].)

                                2
A.       Applicable Legal Principles
         When a juvenile court cannot safely return a child to a
parent’s custody, the court must set a permanency planning
hearing under section 366.26. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) “ ‘ “[A]t a section 366.26 hearing, the court
may select one of three alternative permanency plans for the
dependent child—adoption, guardianship or long-term foster
care.” [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings,
adoption is preferred because it ensures permanency and
stability for the minors. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, as a
general rule, at a section 366.26 hearing, if the trial court finds
that the child is adoptable, it must select adoption as the
permanent plan and terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds.
(b)(1) & (c)(1).)” (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 205-
206; see Caden C., supra, at p. 631 [under § 366.26, adoption is
“ ‘the norm’ ”].)
         Section 366.26, subdivision (c) states several exceptions to
this rule. Relevant here, the beneficial relationship exception
applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child due to . . . [¶]
. . . [t]he parents hav[ing] maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
         A parent must prove three elements for the beneficial
relationship exception to apply. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 631.) Specifically, a parent must show by a preponderance of
the evidence (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child,
taking into account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “the
child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the
parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would

                                  3
benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating
that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (Id. at p. 636.)
       When the parent has met that burden, “it would not be in
the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and the
court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637.) “Because
terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the
parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume
that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.”
(Id. at p. 633.) “What courts need to determine, therefore, is how
the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—
in effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.)
B.     The Family and Prior Child Welfare History
       Mother and David’s father, David C. (Father), have two
children together, M.L. (born 2016) and David (born 2019). David
also has an older maternal half-sibling, K.L. (born 2012). Father
was incarcerated during portions of the underlying dependency
proceedings and is not a party to this appeal. Neither K.L. nor
M.L. is a subject of this appeal.
       In March 2013, while Mother was a minor and in foster
care, the juvenile court sustained allegations that K.L. was at
risk of harm due to Mother’s substance abuse and history of
“runaway behavior.”2 The court permanently placed K.L. with

      2 The sustained allegations stated that Mother had a five-
year history of drug abuse, indicating that she was using drugs
as early as 12 years old.

                                 4
maternal great uncle, Roberto L., and his wife, D.G., under a plan
of legal guardianship, and in October 2017, terminated
jurisdiction. The record does not indicate why the juvenile court
selected legal guardianship as the permanent plan for K.L.
       In August 2018, the juvenile court sustained allegations
that M.L. was at risk of harm due to Father’s domestic violence
and Mother’s failure to protect, Father’s criminal history of
substance-related convictions, Mother’s history of drug use, and
Mother’s failure to protect sibling K.L. On November 7, 2019, the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
to M.L. Sometime prior to April 13, 2021, Roberto and D.G.
completed their adoption of M.L.
C.    Events Giving Rise to the Petition Concerning David
      On March 4, 2020, when David was approximately six
months old, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) received a referral expressing concern
for David because DCFS had lost contact with Mother after the
court terminated reunification services in M.L.’s case.
      On March 9, 2020, two social workers interviewed Mother.
Mother stated she was not using drugs or alcohol and had been
sober for two years. She explained that when her parental rights
to M.L. had been terminated, her lawyer advised her that she no
longer had to remain in contact with DCFS. During the
interview, a social worker observed David to be alert, smiling,
and bonded with Mother. The social worker arranged for Mother
to take a drug test that day, and Mother tested negative for drugs
and alcohol.
      DCFS’s investigation revealed that during M.L.’s
dependency proceedings, Mother did not drug test or complete
the ordered reunification services, including drug counseling and

                                5
parenting and domestic violence courses. The social worker
assigned to M.L.’s case suspected that Mother continued to
maintain contact with Father despite his violence towards her
and a restraining order against him.
      In April 2020, DCFS attempted to speak with Mother on
several occasions and was unable to reach her or obtain
information about her or David’s whereabouts. DCFS concluded
David was at high risk for future abuse or neglect.
D.     Petition through Disposition
       On April 9, 2020, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to section
300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), alleging David was at substantial
risk of suffering serious harm as a result of Mother’s substance
abuse (count b-1) and her abuse or neglect of sibling M.L. and
half-sibling K.L. (count j-1).
       Mother could not be located and was not present for an
April 14, 2020 detention hearing. The juvenile court ordered
David detained from Mother and that Mother have one hour of
monitored visitation with David at least twice a week.
       On May 6, 2020, the juvenile court issued a protective
custody warrant for David and an arrest warrant for Mother. On
May 13, 2020, Mother was arrested in Calexico while attempting
to re-enter the United States. David was not with her. Mother
reportedly had fled to prevent DCFS from detaining David. She
stated David was in the care of a maternal uncle in Mexicali.
Maternal uncle transported David to the border for DCFS to
retrieve him. During a later interview, Mother told the social
worker that she took David to Mexicali because persons living in
the home where she and David had resided frequently interacted
with the public as part of their automobile repair business and
she was fearful of COVID-19. The owner of the home confirmed

                                 6
Mother took good care of David and left due to David’s young age
and Mother’s concern that he might contract the virus.
       On May 15, 2020, the juvenile court recalled the arrest and
custody warrants. The court placed David with Roberto and D.G.
and ordered monitored visitation for the parents three times a
week for three hours per visit. Roberto and D.G. indicated they
were willing to adopt David and keep the siblings together.
       On July 7, 2020, following Father’s release from jail, DCFS
filed an amended section 300 petition, adding allegations relating
to Mother and Father’s domestic violence (counts a-1, b-2, j-2)
and Father’s substance abuse (counts b-3, j-3).
       DCFS’s jurisdiction and disposition report signed July 7,
2020, indicated that according to Roberto and D.G., since David’s
placement with them on May 15, 2020, Mother visited David
twice for a minimum of two hours each visit.3 Mother’s work
made it difficult to schedule routine visits, and Mother visited
David based on her and the caregivers’ availability. The
caregivers “report[ed] that the visits [went] well and that
[M]other [was] appropriate during her visit with [David].”
      In an interim report filed September 4, 2020, DCFS
reported that Mother had not enrolled in any programs and
evaded DCFS. She missed all five drug tests for the period
June 12, 2020 through August 21, 2020. However, Mother
consistently visited with David on Mondays, Wednesdays, and
Fridays for approximately three hours per visit. The visits went
well.

      3 A social worker interviewed the caregivers on May 27,
2020. Thus, it is likely that Mother’s two visits with David
occurred between May 15 and 27, 2020.

                                7
       On October 21, 2020, DCFS reported Mother’s visits,
scheduled for Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays, were
inconsistent.
       On December 8, 2020, the juvenile court held the
jurisdiction hearing. DCFS reported that Mother was “now
visiting fairly regularly.” The juvenile court sustained the
allegations of inability to provide regular care of David or protect
him due to the parents’ substance abuse and domestic violence
(counts b-1, b-2, and b-3) and dismissed the remainder of the
allegations (counts a-1, j-1, j-2, j-3). DCFS recommended that the
court bypass reunification services for each parent. The parents
objected, and the juvenile court scheduled a contested disposition
hearing for December 15, 2020.
       Mother did not attend the December 15, 2020 disposition
hearing. Her counsel argued that the court should afford Mother
reunification services and observed that Mother “and David are
extraordinarily bonded. She was his primary caregiver for over
half his life and does visit with him regularly.” David’s counsel
stated that, “According to the care[giver], . . . [Mother] does visit.
But it is not consistent. It is whenever she wants.” DCFS argued
neither parent made reasonable efforts to participate in programs
or drug test in M.L’s case. The juvenile court therefore bypassed
reunification services for Mother and Father pursuant to section
361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and removed David from
Mother and Father. The court scheduled a section 366.26
hearing for April 13, 2021. It ordered monitored visitation for
Mother and Father with David for a minimum of three times a
week for two hours per visit and granted DCFS discretion to
liberalize visits.

                                  8
      In a permanency planning adoption assessment signed on
December 24, 2020, DCFS reported Mother visited David 30
times in the prior six months.
E.    Permanency Planning Phase
      1.    In California
       On April 7, 2021, DCFS filed a permanency planning
report, recommending Roberto and D.G. be permitted to adopt
David. DCFS reported that David, approximately 18 months old
at the time of the report, “ha[d] developed a strong attachment to
his caregivers,” who provided him with “a safe, loving, and
nurturing home environment.” He “appear[ed] to be a happy
child, who is comfortable in his surroundings,” and “laugh[ed]
and smile[d] frequently.” As to Mother, DCFS had difficulties
locating her, observed she “[did] not maintain consistent contact
and/or monitored visits with the child, David,” and that David
was not bonded with her.
       DCFS further reported that David’s caregivers planned to
move to Arizona at the end of April 2021. Thus, the juvenile
court continued the section 366.26 hearing to allow for an
Arizona home study and approval pursuant to the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). Throughout the
permanency planning period, which took over two years to
complete, the juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing
several times (including on April 13, 2021, August 10, 2021,
December 14, 2021, April 13, 2022, August 10, 2022,
December 15, 2022, and March 14, 2023), mainly due to delay in
obtaining an Arizona ICPC home study and approval, and
obtaining D.G.’s divorce decree from Mexico concerning a
previous marriage from 1985. The court held six-month review
hearings during this time.

                                9
      On June 2, 2021, DCFS noted that during the reporting
period but before the family moved to Arizona, Mother had
“several monitored visits with David.” However, Mother “was
constantly on her cell[ ]phone and not . . . attentive to David.”
When D.G. brought this to Mother’s attention, Mother became
verbally aggressive and terminated the visit.4
      2.    In Arizona
      As of May 12, 2021, Roberto, D.G., David, and his siblings
had moved to Arizona. On June 2, 2021, DCFS reported David
appeared content and comfortable in the presence of Roberto,
D.G., K.L., and M.L., that “David has a strong bond with [them],”
and that they provided David with a safe and nurturing home.
The caregivers maintained contact with Mother through
telephone calls and text messages when Mother chose to have
contact.
      In a November 22, 2021 status review report, DCFS
reported that a social worker visited David in Arizona on
October 15, 2021. The social worker observed, “David interacted
with both his siblings and caregivers in a comfortable and
positive manner. David did not appear to be afraid of [ ]either of
his caregivers,” and appeared to have a “strong bond” with them
and his siblings. DCFS also reported, “The parents have not
made any efforts to visit the child.”

      4 In a case plan update dated June 10, 2021, DCFS
reported that the caregivers described Mother as visiting David
“every so often.” It is unclear whether this statement refers to
visits before or after David moved to Arizona. However, in
Mother’s opening brief, she describes her first post-move visit
with David as occurring in February 2022. Accordingly, the
“every so often” visits likely occurred prior to the move.

                                 10
        In an April 1, 2022 section 366.26 report, DCFS reported
that according to D.G., “Mother had one visit with David in
February[ 2022,] and David was shy around her.” “[M]other has
not been consistent in her monitored visits with David. Mother
has visited the child, sporadically and inconsistently. . . . [W]hen
[M]other did [visit] with . . . David, she [wa]s not bonded to him.”
DCFS concluded, “Mother does not maintain consistent contact
and/or monitored visits with the child, David; she does not have a
significant bond or relationship with the child. This is evidenced
by a poor lack of engagement around the child.” David “has
developed a strong attachment to his caregivers,” and “appear[ed]
to be happy, clean, and well-dressed during every [social worker]
visit.”
        In a June 10, 2022 status review report, DCFS reported
that according to D.G., in the prior six months, Mother visited
David three times on a Saturday or Sunday from 11:00 a.m. to
3:00 p.m. Mother played with David and his siblings, but
towards the end of the visits Mother became stressed with the
children and ended the visit. In a case plan submitted to the
court on June 13, 2022, DCFS reported, “Mother has been
visiting [David] recently.” DCFS also reported that ICPC home
study had been denied on January 4, 2022, because the
caregivers had not completed required training.
        On July 6, 2022 and November 8, 2022, D.G. reported that
Mother had not had any further visits with David. D.G. also
reported the ICPC home study had been approved, but Arizona
ICPC was unable to confirm this was so. On November 16, 2022,
D.G. stated Mother did not call David, but sometimes when
David’s older sibling called Mother, which occurred

                                11
approximately every two months, David got close to the phone
and spoke with her.
      In a February 24, 2023 section 366.26 report, DCFS stated
that in the past six months, Mother visited David twice. During
the visits, Mother accompanied D.G. as she took David to his pre-
kinder daycare classes. On January 26, 2023, a social worker
spoke with David’s teacher, who indicated David had behavioral
issues and cried when “the grandmother” dropped him off. The
teacher “began noticing these behaviors when his biological
Mother came to drop him of[f] with [D.G.] around December for
[approximately] three times.” David cried a lot for his Mother
and acted up. Also, when he no longer saw his Mother, he
became quiet and would not play. The first time the teacher saw
Mother was in December 2022. DCFS further advised the court
that Arizona would not complete an adoption ICPC until parental
rights were terminated.
      On March 9, 2023, D.G. reported Mother visited David
approximately once a month. There were no concerns reported as
to the visits.
      During a March 14, 2023, six-month review hearing,
Mother requested a written visitation schedule that included
virtual and telephonic visits. Further, Mother indicated there
had been “issues” with other children in the background during
her calls with David. The court ordered a written telephone and
virtual visitation schedule be prepared and that DCFS’s next
report include sufficient information for the court to conduct an
analysis of whether the beneficial relationship exception to the
termination of parental rights applied.
      On May 30, 2023, DCFS reported that according to D.G.,
Mother visited David once a month. “The visits are not part of a

                               12
visitation schedule because [M]other can only travel to Arizona
from California when she gets the days off from work which are
unpredictable. . . . The visits take place during the day at the
caregiver’s home. Mother spends the night at another relative’s
home. Mother takes food and snacks for . . . David and plays
with him. Sometimes they go to the local park if weather
permits. David recognizes [Mother] and usually warms up to her
after a few minutes at the beginning of the visit. Mother stays in
Arizona for one to three days and then drives back to Los
Angeles.” DCFS further reported that the Arizona foster care
home study had been approved on January 23, 2023.
       On June 12, 2023, Mother filed a section 388 request to
change the court’s December 15, 2020 order bypassing
reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing.
Mother had enrolled in an inpatient rehabilitation program for
substance abuse and had completed 18 out of 60 days in the
program. Further, she enrolled in a parenting program and was
“consistent with in-person visitation once per month[,] traveling
to Arizona to spend time with [David].” At a June 13, 2023
hearing, the juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 request.
F.     Termination of Parental Rights
       On June 13, 2023, the juvenile court held the section 366.26
hearing. Mother argued the beneficial relationship exception
applied and precluded termination of her parental rights. She
observed that she had “maintained regular and consistent
visitation with the child monthly,” brought him snacks and
played with him during visits, attended a recent dental
appointment, and that “she and the child share[d] a substantial
positive emotional attachment, such that continuation of the
relationship benefit[ed] the child and termination of parental

                                13
rights would be detrimental.” Mother requested a plan of legal
guardianship. Mother did not submit testimony or evidence in
support of her arguments, and instead relied on the facts set
forth in DCFS’s reports to the court.
       The juvenile court ruled that Mother did not carry her
burden to demonstrate the beneficial relationship exception
applied. In doing so, it observed Mother’s efforts to visit David
were recent, that Mother was more attached to David than he
was to her, and that David had been out of Mother’s care for the
majority of his life. It found David was adoptable, terminated
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, granted prospective
adoptive parent status to Roberto and D.G., and granted them
educational and developmental decision-making rights.
       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
A.     Standard of Review
       As noted above, under Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614, for
the beneficial relationship exception to apply a parent must show
by a preponderance of the evidence (1) “regular visitation and
contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and
(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the
child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a
new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 636.)
       We focus on the second element or prong of the Caden C.
test, as we find it dispositive here. We review that second
element for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640.) “The substantial evidence standard of review takes on a

                                 14
unique formulation where, as here, ‘the trier of fact has expressly
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof
did not carry the burden and that party appeals.’ [Citations.]
‘[W]here the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial,
the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.’
[Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the appellant’s evidence
was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a
character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654,
671.)
B.     The Evidence Does Not Compel the Conclusion that
       Mother and David Shared a Substantial, Positive,
       Emotional Attachment
       In evaluating whether there exists “a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636)—“the focus
is the child,” and courts may consider “a slew of factors, such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) “[C]ourts often consider how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Ibid.) A parent must show “something more than the incidental
benefit a child gains from any amount of positive contact with
[his or] her natural parent.” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 318.) Evidence that a parent is “a mere
‘friendly visitor’ ” is insufficient. (Id. at p. 319.)

                                 15
       Here, Mother failed to adduce sufficient evidence to compel
a finding in her favor that David’s attachment to her was
substantial and positive. Instead, many of the above-described
factors support the juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother and
David did not have such an attachment. Accordingly, Mother
cannot meet her burden on appeal to demonstrate the second
Caden C. requirement as a matter of law. Specifically, by the
time the court terminated Mother’s parental rights, David had
spent more than 80 percent of his young life outside of Mother’s
care. David was eight months old when he was placed with
Roberto and D.G. in May 2020, and he remained out of Mother’s
care for three years before the section 366.26 hearing in July
2023. Further, David’s interactions with Mother did not
demonstrate a substantial, positive emotional attachment. DCFS
originally observed David to be bonded with Mother when he was
approximately six months old. However, about one year later
and before David moved to Arizona, DCFS reported that during
Mother’s visits with David, she “was constantly on her
cell[ ]phone and not . . . attentive to David,” and that they were
not bonded. This assessment did not change thereafter. Rather,
when Mother next visited David in Arizona in February 2022,
which was approximately eight months after she had last seen
him, he was shy around her. During visits in 2023, David
continued to require a few minutes to warm up to Mother. Even
then, there was no evidence that David had a substantial or
positive attachment to her. Indeed, the record contains no
evidence that differentiates Mother from an occasional friendly
visitor.
       Mother argues that David would cry for her after she and
D.G. dropped him off at daycare in December 2022 and would not

                               16
play after she left demonstrates he was bonded to her. We
cannot consider this evidence in isolation from the other facts in
the record, and this evidence alone of David’s difficult transition
time when both Mother and D.G. dropped him off at daycare does
not compel a finding as a matter of law that David had a
substantial, positive attachment to Mother. Nor is Mother’s
argument that she is the only biological parent that David knows
persuasive. (In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.)
       Mother next argues that David’s permanent placement
plan should match the plan of legal guardianship for his older
siblings, K.L. and M.L. The record does not describe why the
juvenile court believed legal guardianship was an appropriate
plan for K.L. As to M.L., although DCFS sometimes describes
Roberto and D.G. as M.L.’s legal guardians, the juvenile court’s
termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to M.L.
indicates the permanent plan was not legal guardianship.
Further, the record includes references to Roberto and D.G.
adopting M.L. In any event, whether K.L. and M.L. were under
legal guardianship has no bearing as to whether Mother had a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment with David.

                                17
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental
rights is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                         WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

                               18