Court Opinion

ID: 9904834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 23:14:07.596922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.884951
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:                    No. 85271-0-I

JAMES KIM,                                           DIVISION ONE

                        Appellant,                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

And

KUM KIM (A/K/A: SARAH JUNG),

                        Respondent.

        HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — James Kim appeals from the trial court’s denial of his

petition to modify a spousal maintenance order. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                            FACTS

        Kim’s marriage to Sarah Jung 1 was dissolved on May 3, 2004.                          The

dissolution court found, based on an agreement of the parties, that “[t]here is a

need for spousal maintenance in the amount of $3,000.00 per month for basic

living expenses” and ordered Kim to pay that amount until Jung’s remarriage, when

the monthly amount would decrease to $2,000.00.

        In April 2022, Kim filed a petition to modify the spousal maintenance order.

He alleged that his “income decreased significantly since 2003 to under $72,000

         1 The record indicates that Jung changed her name from Kum Kim to Sarah Jung at some

point subsequent to the 2004 dissolution and James Kim recognized the name change by including
it as an AKA designation in the caption of his petition to modify spousal maintenance. Accordingly,
we refer to the respondent by her current last name.
No. 85271-0-I/2

in 2021” and his “[c]urrent business income over the past 3 months is

approximately $16,000.”

       In November 2022, Jung filed a response to Kim’s modification petition and

asked that it be denied. The trial court subsequently entered an order indicating

that “[b]ased on the evidence provided, [it] d[id] not have sufficient information to

move forward with this matter.” It issued a revised case schedule and directed the

parties to comply with King County Local Family Law Rules (LFLR) 10 and 14,

which require, among other things, that the party petitioning for a modification of

spousal maintenance file and serve a financial declaration and certain financial

documents.

       In February 2023, Kim filed a trial memorandum in which he represented

that his historical income, as a sole legal practitioner, was as follows:

              2003 $78,008.00
              2004 $65,690.00

              2017   $34,587.00
              2018   $43,066.00
              2019   $91,789.00 Includes $2550 for non-legal service
              2020   $64,533.00
              2021   $71,683.00

Kim also filed copies of his 2017, 2018, and 2019 tax returns and documentation

concerning a $350,000.00 loan from the Small Business Administration.

       The matter proceeded to a trial by affidavit before a commissioner. The

commissioner concluded that Kim did not satisfy his burden to show a substantial

change of circumstances and denied his petition. Kim moved for revision, which

the trial court denied; the court also clarified that the commissioner’s ruling did not

preclude Kim from “seeking modification based on evidence not previously

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available or if circumstances change further.”

       Kim timely appealed.

                                      ANALYSIS

       Kim contends that the trial court erred on revision by denying his

modification petition. We disagree.

       “In the absence of a provision in a separation agreement to the contrary,

maintenance . . . may be modified . . . only upon the showing of a substantial

change of circumstances that was not within the contemplation of the parties at the

time the decree was entered.” In re Marriage of Ochsner, 47 Wn. App. 520, 524,

736 P.2d 292 (1987); RCW 26.09.170(1). A “change of circumstances” refers to

“the financial ability of the obligor spouse to pay vis-à-vis the necessities of the

other spouse.” Id. “The determination whether a substantial and material change

has occurred which justifies modification of maintenance . . . is within the discretion

of the trial court.” Id. at 524-25.

       Here, based on Kim’s notice of appeal, our review in this case is limited to

the superior court’s decision on revision which expressly adopted the

commissioner’s decision denying Kim’s modification petition. In re Marriage of

Fairchild, 148 Wn. App. 828, 831, 207 P.3d 449 (2009). In reviewing that decision,

we do not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

In re Marriage of Rich, 80 Wn. App. 252, 259, 907 P.2d 1234 (1996). Instead, we

reverse only if the trial court’s decision was “entered on grounds either manifestly

unreasonable or clearly untenable.” Ochsner, 47 Wn. App. at 525.

       The trial court had a tenable basis to conclude that Kim failed to show a

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substantial change of circumstances. There was evidence that Kim’s income in

2021 was comparable to his income in 2004—and, indeed, significantly higher in

2019. Although Kim argued that it had decreased when adjusted for inflation, as

the trial court noted, that argument “cuts both ways given that the amount of

maintenance is not rising with inflation either.” The trial court also observed Kim

did not identify any evidence of his expenses around the time of the original decree.

Notably, Kim relied on RCW 26.09.170(9)(a) in the trial court, but that statute

governs periodic adjustments to child support, which, unlike modifications to

spousal maintenance, do not require a showing of a substantial change of

circumstances. 2 Whether because of this misdirected reliance on an inapplicable

statute or some other reason, Kim did not fully develop the record with regard to

the asserted change in his ability to pay maintenance. Also, despite the trial court’s

directive that the parties comply with LFLR 10, the record does not include Kim’s

tax returns for the prior two years as required by LFLR 10(b)(2), or any account

statements from financial institutions as required by LFLR 10(b)(4). Furthermore,

Kim speculated that Jung was financially stable and no longer needed

maintenance, but this was disputed.              And, while the trial court found Jung’s

financial declaration “suspect,” it correctly noted that it was Kim’s burden, not

Jung’s, to prove a substantial change in circumstances justifying modification. In

re Marriage of Arvey, 77 Wn. App. 817, 820, 894 P.2d 1346 (1995).

        Kim contends, with regard to his historical expenses, that it would be

“unreasonable to expect someone to keep such records for . . . 18 years.” But the

        2 As the trial court pointed out, that statute does not apply here, and Kim does not rely on

it now on appeal.

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trial court did not suggest that evidence of historical expenditures could only take

the form of records. Kim also argues that “[h]ad the court properly viewed the

evidence . . . , it would have determined that there was sufficient evidence showing

a substantial change in circumstances even without his expenses in 2004.”

However, he cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court was required

to find a substantial change of circumstances despite its determination that the

record was deficient with regard to Kim’s historical expenses, which inform whether

there has been a substantial change in his ability to pay. Nor does Kim cite any

authority that would have required the trial court to accept his financial declaration

at face value, particularly in light of Jung’s response declaration wherein she

attested that Kim had enough income to afford luxury cars and golf memberships.

See Harrison v. Whitt, 40 Wn. App. 178-79, 698 P.2d 87 (1985) (“Where evidence

is conflicting, the trier of fact may believe the testimony of some witnesses and

disbelieve the testimony of others.”). Kim essentially asks us to reweigh the

evidence and find it more persuasive than the trial court did, but we decline to do

so. See Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009) (“We

defer to the trial court’s determinations on the persuasiveness of the evidence.”).

       Kim next contends the trial court erred by failing to consider the statutory

maintenance factors set out in RCW 26.09.090. But those factors are considered

only after the party seeking modification has shown a substantial change of

circumstances. See In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 347 n.4, 28 P.3d

769 (2001) (“[O]nce the court finds that changed circumstances warrant a

modification, the issues of amount and duration are the same as in the original

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dissolution.”). Kim fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred when it denied his

modification petition.

       As a final matter, Kim notes that, before trial, he moved for an order finding

Jung in default on three separate occasions and each motion was denied. Kim

devotes much of his briefing to arguing that Jung should have been found in

default. But the orders denying Kim’s motions for default were not designated in

Kim’s notice of appeal and are reviewable only if they prejudicially affected the

decision designated in the notice, i.e., the denial of Kim’s modification petition.

RAP 2.4(b). The orders prejudicially affected that ruling on the petition only if it

“would not have happened but for” the denials of his motions for default. Right-

Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 146 Wn.2d 370, 380, 46

P.3d 789 (2002).

       Here, because Kim served Jung by mail, Kim would have needed to prove

his entitlement to a modification even if Jung had been found in default.

CR 55(b)(3). Kim does not show that he would have done so, particularly in light

of the trial court’s interlocutory ruling that it did not have sufficient information to

proceed based on the materials Kim filed with his petition. Kim attempts to draw

a link between the denial orders and the denial of his modification petition by

asserting that the former “presumably led to the trial court’s apparent tacit bias

against [him]” during the modification trial. But we “presum[e] that a trial judge

properly discharged [their] official duties without bias or prejudice,” and “[t]he party

seeking to overcome that presumption must provide specific facts establishing

bias.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004)

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(emphasis added). Kim does not address, much less overcome, this presumption;

he speculates the trial court was biased based on its rulings, but judicial rulings

alone, even those that turn out to be erroneous, “almost never constitute a valid

showing of bias.” Id.; Bus. Servs. of Am. II, Inc. v. Wafertech LLC, 159 Wn. App.

591, 600, 245 P.3d 257 (2011) (error of law is not evidence of a trial judge’s actual

or potential bias). Kim fails to show that the trial court’s decision to deny his

modification petition was prejudicially affected by the denial orders and, thus, we

do not reach them. 3 Cf. Franz v. Lance, 119 Wn.2d 780, 782, 836 P.2d 832 (1992)

(timely appeal from order imposing sanctions brought underlying judgment up for

appeal where sanctions award would “stand or fall” based on the judgment).

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

         3 To the extent Kim argues the trial court erred by not revising the denial orders, that

argument fails because Kim did not timely seek revision of those orders. See RCW 2.24.050
(establishing demand for revision must be made within 10 days from the entry of the order or
judgment of the court commissioner).

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