Court Opinion

ID: 9740306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:32:14.471057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.389864
License: Public Domain

Levin, P. J.

(concurring).

I
Some of the statements contained in the hospital records which defendants sought unsuccessfully to have admitted into evidence in this case are similar to the statements declared to be admissible in *548Gile v Hudnutt, 279 Mich 358, 367 (1937).1 Other statements contained in these records—in contrast with the self-serving statements by a plaintiff’s decedent held not to be admissible in Kelly v Ford Motor Co, 280 Mich 378, 387 (1937), and Sadjak v Parker-Wolverine Co, 281 Mich 84, 87 (1937)—con-stitute admissions by a party opponent.2
Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court and our Court have on so many occasions declared or intimated that a hospital record reflecting "history” or "diagnosis” is not admissible under the business-entry exception to the hearsay rule3 that I am persuaded that the trial judge probably did not err in refusing to admit these records into evidence.
So that trustworthy evidence of probative value is not denied admission, it would be appropriate to re-examine existing precedent. See McCormick on Evidence (2d ed), §313, pp 731-732; see, also, *549earlier discussion in the first edition of this treatise, § 290, pp 611-612; Jones on Evidence (6th ed), § 12.12, pp 362-364; Osberry v Watters, 7 Mich App 258, 263 (1967).
II
I also have reservations concerning the constitutionality of the second sentence of 1970 PA 118:
"In civil cases, trials shall be by a jury of 6. A verdict shall be received when 5 jurors agree.” MCLA 600.1352; MSA 27A.1352.
The provision in our present Constitution permitting the Legislature to "authorize a trial by a jury of less than 12 jurors in civil cases”4 continues the substance of a like provision found in the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908.5 Before the adoption of the 1963 Constitution, the Legislature exercised this authority by providing for six-man juries in cases to be tried in municipal courts and justice courts.6 The requirement that a jury act unanimously7 was not, however, affected.
It was not until the adoption of the 1963 Constitution that the long-standing "the right of trial by jury shall remain”8 was modified by providing for *550less than a unanimous verdict to the following extent: "in all civil cases tried by 12 jurors a verdict shall be received when 10 jurors agree”. (Emphasis supplied.) Const 1963, art 1, § 14. The address to the people states that this change would permit verdicts in civil actions when ”at least 10 jurors agree”. (Emphasis supplied.)9
This constitutional modification of the unanimity requirement is self-executing and does not appear to authorize legislative action.
If this constitutional provision—providing for receipt of a verdict when 10 of 12 jurors agree— also means that a verdict shall be received when 5 of 6 jurors agree,10 then, instanter, upon the effective date (January 1, 1964) of the 1963 Constitution verdicts should have been received in municipal and justice courts when five of six jurors agreed. 11
Whatever the meaning of this constitutional provision, the Legislature could not change, enlarge, or modify that meaning.
The Michigan Supreme Court has implemented the second sentence of this legislation by court rule providing that a verdict shall be received in a civil case when five of six jurors agree.12 Whether the Supreme Court’s non-decisional action in pro*551mulgating a court rule precludes lower courts from considering on the merits an attack on the constitutionality of legislation implemented by the rule need not now be decided.13 In this case the *552verdict actually rendered against the defendants was unanimous, and, therefore, they cannot reasonably claim that they were prejudiced by the judge’s charge that a verdict would be received when five of six jurors agreed.

 In Gile the hospital records held admissible included the "remarks” that the patient was "admitted to the hospital, carried in. Bleeding from mouth, pulse very weak. Color cyanotic.” In the instant case the hospital records made over a number of occasions included the following concerning plaintiff Fisher: "broke down in tears”, "is quite tense and nervous”, "has put on 20 pounds”, "tearful and anxious”, "depressed and agitated”, "tearful as usual”.

 Both Kelly and Sadjak were workmen’s compensation cases in which the plaintiff offered hospital records containing statements by the deceased workman attributing his injuries to on-the-job accidents. Similarly, see Case v Vearrindy, 339 Mich 579, 581-582 (1954). Here the defendant offered records containing statements of the plaintiff to her doctor such as, "She comments on her difficulty in talking to people, including physicians”. "She has begun to worry about the possibility of cancer.” "She has withdrawn herself from social contact.” "She is worried about intermittant headaches, burning sensation in the lower extremities, relieved by aspirin. Examination today is essentially negative.” Cf. Osberry v Watters, 7 Mich App 258, 262-263 (1967).

 See In re Nickel’s Estate, 321 Mich 519, 523 (1948); Osberry v Watters, supra, pp 262-263; Bryson v Stone, 33 Mich App 512, 525 (1971); Bond v Greenwood, 34 Mich App 41, 43 (1971); Boudrie v Seven-Up Bottling Co of Detroit, 40 Mich App 686, 688 (1972); Cf. Gile v Hudnutt, 279 Mich 358, 367 (1937); Harrison v Lorenz, 303 Mich 382, 390 (1942).

 Const 1963, art 4, § 44. As to criminal cases, see the recently adopted amendment to Const 1963, art 1, § 20 permitting a jury to "consist of less than 12 jurors in prosecutions for misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year”.

 See Const 1850, art 4, § 46; Const 1908, art 5, § 27.

 See, e.g, MCLA 730.23; MSA 27.3773; 1911 PA 299, §23; MCLA 730.412; MSA 27.3935(12); 1951 PA 179, § 12; MCLA 600.7029; MSA 27A.7029; 1855 PA 173, §107; MCLA 774.13; MSA 28.1204; R S 1846, ch 94, § 9; 1861 PA 76; 14 Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice, § 124.44, p 590.

 McRae v The Grand Rapids L & D R Co, 93 Mich 399, 401, 405 (1892).

 Const 1908, art 2, § 13; Const 1850, art 6, § 27; Const 1835, art 1, § 9, the latter providing that the right "shall remain inviolate”.

 See 1 MCLA, p 623; 1 MSA, p 359.

 Some state constitutions provide for receipt of a verdict when "5/ 6ths” agree. See discussion, 53 Am Jur, Trial, § 1006, pp 697-699, and pocket part.
See, generally, The Chicago & M L S R Co v Sanford, 23 Mich 418, 423-434 (1871), and Annos 43 LRA 3, LRA 1917 A 91, Ann Cas 1916 E 500.

 It appears that the first act providing for the receipt of a verdict when 5 of 6 jurors agree was the act establishing the district court. 1968 PA 154, MCLA 600.8353; MSA 27A.8353. Similarly, see 1971 PA 158, MCLA 600.7058; MSA 27A.7058, so providing for municipal courts.

GCR 1963, 512.1 (rendering verdict); GCR 1963, 516.6 (instructions to jury) and SJI, No 1.05.

 Cf. Meek v Centre County Banking Co, 268 US 426, 434; 45 S Ct 560; 69 L Ed 1028 (1925); Guastello v Citizens Mutual Insurance Co, 11 Mich App 120, 134 (1968).
Judge Albert B. Maris, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, recently alluded to the question in testimony prepared for delivery to the House Judiciary Committee in connection with its consideration of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence:
"It has been suggested by some that the rules of evidence go beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court in that they impinge on substantive rights of litigants in violation of the enabling act, 28 USCS 2072, and therefore, pass beyond the area of procedure. As to this I can only say that the ad hoc committee which recommended the project, the advisory committee which prepared the rules and our standing committee which reviewed them all are fully satisfied that rules of evidence are, by their nature and operation basically procedural, and, therefore, within the rule-making power of the Court. Moreover, the advisory committee in drafting the rules and our standing committee in considering them took great care to make sure that no provisions which might fairly be characterized as substantive were included. The distinction between what is substantive and what is procedural from the Federal rule-making standpoint is, of course, as the Court pointed out in Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460 [85 S Ct 1136; 14 L Ed 2d 8 (1965)], quite different from that which may be applicable in other contexts. And we would be the last to claim infallibility in our application of this distinction. But if any of the rules of evidence do, in fact, alter substantive rights in violation of the enabling act the Supreme Court may be relied upon, when the question is brought before it judicially, so to hold and to strike down the offending provision. For as Chief Justice Stone said in the opinion of the Court in Mississippi Publishing Corp v Murphree, 326 US 438, 444 [66 S Ct 242, 246; 90 L Ed 185, 191 (1946)], 'The fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended by the advisory committee does not foreclose consideration of their validity, meaning or consistency’. Indeed in the case of Meek v Centre County Banking Co, 268 US 426 [45 S Ct 560; 69 L Ed 1028 (1925)], the Court did actually strike down as invalid one of the general orders in bankruptcy which it had promulgated under the rule-making authority granted to it by Section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898. In my opinion such action by the Court was wholly proper and I think that rule making by the Court could not, as a practical matter, function on any other basis. For if the Court were required to determine in vacuo by a kind of advisory opinion and without the aid of counsel in the setting of litigation that every procedural rule which it adopts is valid from every standpoint, rule making as we know it could hardly proceed.”