Court Opinion

ID: 9394692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:03:18.043871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.054012
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: May 16, 2023

                             S23A0264. WARD v. MEDINA.

       PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

       A habeas court granted relief to Jonathon Medina on the

grounds that his guilty plea was involuntary and trial counsel was

ineffective. The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of

Corrections, Timothy Ward,1 appeals the habeas court’s order,

challenging each of those grounds. Because we conclude that the

habeas court did not err in granting relief to Medina on his

involuntary-plea claim, we affirm the habeas court’s decision on that

ground without addressing that court’s rulings on Medina’s

ineffective assistance claims.

       1. The record of the underlying proceedings.

      The correctional facility that maintains custody of Medina is a private
       1

company and the warden of that facility is an employee of that company.
Commissioner Ward intervened as a party respondent in the case.
     (a)   The plea

     In October 2016, Medina was charged with five counts of armed

robbery for one robbery involving five different victims (Counts 1-5),

as well as five counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

against those victims (Counts 6-10). Medina proceeded to trial in

March 2017. Just before the start of trial, the trial court held a

hearing on Medina’s motion to suppress. When that motion was

denied, trial counsel and Medina discussed the possibility of

pleading guilty.

     After the jury was selected and opening statements were given,

Medina informed the trial court that he and the State had entered

into a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to all of the

charged counts in exchange for the State withdrawing its recidivism

notice.

     The trial court and the prosecutor had the following discussion

about the sentencing range:

     Prosecutor: As to each Armed Robbery, the maximum is
     life in prison, with five of them, it’s five lifes; 20 years each
     for Aggravated Assault, there’s five of them, that’s 100

                                    2
     years. So, it’s —

     Court: It’s what or life?

     Prosecutor: Ten to twenty, or life.

     Court: Ten to twenty, or life.

     Prosecutor: Or, one to twenty on the Armed Robberies,
     which would be — the maximum would be five lifes, plus
     100 years.

The prosecutor corrected himself, noting that the stated sentencing

range of “one to twenty” referred to the aggravated assault counts.

When asked, the prosecutor said that the aggravated assault counts

would not merge into the corresponding armed robbery counts.

Medina confirmed to the court that he understood that the State was

not making a sentencing recommendation and that he would accept

the sentence imposed.

     The prosecutor then proffered his opening statement as a

factual basis for the plea, stating that, although Medina was not

present for the actual crime, he planned the robbery of his former

employer and selected the assailants who used guns to take property

and cash from the business and its employees. Following the factual

                                  3
proffer, there was a bench conference in which trial counsel said to

the court,

     I don’t know if you can or would, but [Medina] was just
     asking me in terms of this being a blind plea, non-
     negotiated, the State made no recommendation, he
     wanted some way of gauging —

The court replied, “No, you don’t even get to gauge” the trial court’s

intentions as to sentencing. After a brief exchange about whether

counsel could tell Medina anything else about the expected sentence,

the prosecutor said, “What I do know is it’s not going to be worse

than what he’d get at trial. I would assume it would be better.” The

trial court agreed, saying “I would assume it would be better than

what he would get at trial for acceptance of responsibility, if that’s,

in fact, what he truly does in a moment. I just don’t know.” Trial

counsel said he would convey this information to Medina.

     Following the bench conference, there was a lengthy discussion

between Medina and trial counsel, after which trial counsel

announced that Medina was ready to proceed with a plea. During

the plea colloquy, the prosecutor asked Medina questions confirming

                                  4
that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that he could

read and write, that he had read the indictment, and that he did not

have any questions about the charges. When the prosecutor asked

Medina whether he wanted to plead guilty, Medina said that he

needed another five minutes.

      The trial court denied Medina’s request, stating that Medina

just had an extended conversation with counsel, Medina’s speedy

trial demand had imposed constraints on the court, a jury and

witnesses were ready and waiting, and the trial court was unwilling

to delay proceedings any further. Medina began to say, “I want to

ask my attorney —” before the trial court cut him off and said, “No,

sir. No, sir. We’re here today. It’s your choice.” Medina responded,

“I’ll go ahead.” The trial court told Medina, “It’s up to you. If you

don’t want to plea, you don’t want to plea.” The trial court directed

the prosecutor to proceed, and the prosecutor again asked Medina,

“Are you deciding to plead guilty?” Medina did not respond.

     The trial court found that Medina was delaying and asked

Medina to sit so the first witness could be called. The court then said,

                                   5
“He’s indicated he wants to plea, but then he sits there silent and

does nothing” and, after again asking Medina to have a seat, said,

“He’s not responding to lawful commands, either.” The court told

Medina that he was free at any point to enter a plea, but “standing

there mute and not responding” was not merely declining to enter a

plea but was “delaying the proceedings.”

     The court stated that it would proceed with a jury trial since

Medina did not show a “clear desire to plea” and directed the jury to

be brought in and the prosecutor to call his next witness. After

confirming that the prosecutor was ready for the jury, the court

asked trial counsel if the defense was ready, and trial counsel said

that Medina still wanted to plead guilty. The trial court agreed to

continue with the plea hearing and called Medina back to the

podium. The prosecutor again asked Medina if he wanted to plead

guilty, and Medina answered affirmatively. The prosecutor reviewed

the rights Medina would be waiving by pleading guilty and that his

guilty plea might adversely affect his probation. The prosecutor

again explained to Medina the sentence exposure:

                                 6
     [T]he maximum possible punishment for the offenses for
     which you are charged is five lifes, plus 100 years. The
     minimum possible punishment is ten years in prison, and
     that is to be served day-for-day, that is the best that could
     happen to you, and the worst that could happen to you is
     five lifes, plus 100 years.

The prosecutor asked whether Medina understood this sentencing

range and whether he still wanted to plead guilty. Medina answered

affirmatively to both questions.

     When asked, Medina also confirmed that he understood that

the trial court had the discretion to impose any sentence within the

discussed range and impose conditions as part of any probation,

including that he pay restitution and that he cooperate with law

enforcement and testify against his co-defendants. Medina said he

would be willing to abide by those conditions.

     Medina also said that he had talked to his attorney about his

sentencing   range,    he   was    satisfied   with   his   attorney’s

representation, and he did not need any more time to talk to his

attorney before entering his plea. Medina repeated that he wanted

to enter a guilty plea and admitted his involvement in the crimes.

                                   7
     Later in the hearing, Medina asked for a sentence of 20 years,

to serve 10, based on his acceptance of responsibility. The trial court

stated that Medina had not accepted responsibility because the

judge had to “extract” from him admissions to basic facts about his

involvement, he entered the plea only to avoid a mandatory life

sentence, his body language suggested he was “irritated” by the

process, and he never apologized. The court entered a sentence on

all ten counts, imposing a total sentence of 50 years, to serve 30.

     (b)   Habeas proceedings

     In 2021, Medina filed the habeas petition in this case. Medina

argued that the trial court should have merged his aggravated

assault counts (Counts 6-10) with the armed robbery counts (Counts

1-5) because they were part of the same transaction. Medina also

argued that his guilty plea was involuntary because (1) the trial

court indicated that Medina would likely receive a harsher sentence

if he were convicted at trial and (2) the court, the prosecutor, and

trial counsel misrepresented his sentencing exposure by over 100

years, as they failed to take into account that the aggravated assault

                                  8
counts merged into the armed robbery counts. Medina also asserted

that trial counsel was ineffective on various grounds.

     At the habeas hearing, Medina testified that he “remember[ed]

the Judge saying something to the order of, you know, if I didn’t

plead out it would be — it would be — she would assume [his

sentence] would be better if I plead out for accepting — for accepting

responsibility.” Trial counsel testified that, prior to trial, he

discussed with Medina the sentencing range for each offense, but

could not remember whether they discussed whether the aggravated

assault counts would merge with the armed robbery counts. Trial

counsel testified that, unless there was something showing that an

aggravated assault was a separate, independent act from an armed

robbery, he would normally argue that the two offenses merged.

Counsel acknowledged that he failed to do so in this case.

     Following the hearing, the habeas court granted relief to

Medina. In addition to concluding that Medina’s aggravated assault

counts merged with the armed robbery counts, the habeas court

concluded that Medina’s plea was involuntary.

                                  9
     2. The Commissioner’s claims of error

     The Commissioner does not contest the habeas court’s grant of

relief as to Medina’s merger claim, but argues that no further relief

was warranted. As relevant here, the Commissioner argues that

neither the trial court’s inference that Medina would face a lesser

sentence if he pled nor the misstatements about Medina’s sentence

exposure establish that Medina’s guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily entered. The Commissioner addresses the factors

separately, but the habeas court considered these factors together,

concluding that Medina’s guilty plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily entered when he faced “an inflated maximum sentencing

exposure and the presiding judge’s inference that he would receive

more favorable treatment by entering the plea.” We see no error in

the habeas court’s conclusion that these two circumstances together

rendered Medina’s guilty plea involuntary, so we affirm.

     “In reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for habeas

corpus, this Court accepts the habeas court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

                                 10
independently apply the law to the facts.” Dozier v. Watson, 305 Ga.

629, 629-630 (827 SE2d 276) (2019). To be entitled to habeas relief,

a petitioner has the burden of showing that his constitutional rights

— either under the United States or Georgia Constitutions — were

violated. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Hines, 305 Ga. 7, 9 (2) (823 SE2d 306)

(2019); Holt v. Ebinger, 303 Ga. 804, 807 (814 SE2d 298) (2018). And

a guilty plea may be set aside as constitutionally invalid if the

petitioner can show that it was not knowingly or voluntarily made.

See Kennedy, 305 Ga. at 9 (2).

     Determining whether a plea was validly entered requires a

consideration of “all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (90 SCt 1463, 25 LE2d

747) (1970); see also Shepard v. Williams, 299 Ga. 437, 439 (1) (788

SE2d 428) (2016) (concluding that the habeas court correctly

considered the totality of the circumstances in evaluating validity of

guilty plea). 2 The focus of any inquiry into the validity of a guilty

     2 Because a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, there
is no merit to the Commissioner’s argument that the habeas court erred in

                                     11
plea is “to determine whether the defendant actually does

understand the significance and consequences of a particular

decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” Shepard, 299 Ga.

at 439 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     A guilty plea may be invalid when it is induced by threats,

misrepresentations, or improper promises. See Brady, 397 U.S. at

755; see also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (82 SCt

510, 7 LE2d 473) (1962) (“A guilty plea, if induced by promises or

threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.”).

A guilty plea is invalid if a trial court threatens a defendant, either

explicitly or implicitly, “that his sentence will be harsher if he rejects

a plea deal and is found guilty at trial.” Kennedy, 305 Ga. at 9-10 (2)

(emphasis in original) (citation and punctuation omitted). But if a

trial court merely advises a defendant that his “sentence may be

harsher” if he goes to trial, the statement does not necessarily

constitute a threat and so does not, without more, render a plea

considering multiple circumstances in determining the voluntariness of
Medina’s plea.
                                   12
involuntary. Id. at 10 (2) (emphasis in original) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

     Consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent, we

have concluded that certain guilty pleas are involuntary when they

were induced by affirmative misrepresentations. See, e.g., State v.

Patel, 280 Ga. 181, 183 (626 SE2d 121) (2006) (affirming habeas

court’s order permitting defendant to withdraw guilty plea where

defendant entered a nolo contendere plea based on trial counsel’s

affirmative misrepresentations that such a plea would not have

collateral consequences on defendant’s ability to participate in

federal health programs); Petty v. Smith, 279 Ga. 273, 274-277 (612

SE2d 276) (2005) (defendant’s guilty plea to both felony murder and

aggravated assault based on same conduct was involuntary where it

was induced by trial counsel’s “giving of misleading advice through

the failure to do basic research” that would have discovered the

aggravated assault count merged and this prejudiced defendant

because he received a sentence on a count that could not have been

legally imposed had he proceeded to trial and been convicted);

                                13
Rollins v. State, 277 Ga. 488 (591 SE2d 796) (2004) (holding that

habeas petitioner was entitled to withdraw guilty plea where trial

counsel affirmatively misled defendant that First Offender Act

guilty plea would not negatively impact her immigration status or

her ability to become an attorney); Gay v. State, 342 Ga. App. 242,

244-245 (803 SE2d 113) (2017) (holding that defendant’s non-

negotiated guilty plea was involuntary where trial court’s

affirmative misstatement about sentencing range for armed robbery

gave defendant the impression that the court was not inclined to

sentence him to life imprisonment, which it did). But where the

defendant fails to show that he pleaded guilty on account of a

misrepresentation, his guilty plea is valid. See Gomez v. State, 300

Ga. 571, 573 (797 SE2d 478) (2017) (defendant failed to show that

he would not have pleaded guilty had he known he would have had

to serve 42 years in prison before being eligible for parole, rather

than “30 years or so” as explained by trial counsel, where the court

was entitled to discredit his testimony in this respect and the record

showed defendant was aware he was “facing a maximum sentence

                                 14
of life without any possibility of parole” if convicted at trial

(emphasis in original)).

     As stated above, when considering a habeas court’s grant or

denial of habeas relief, we review that court’s factual findings for

clear error and independently apply the law to the facts. This is not

a novel proposition, for we have used a similar standard of review

when evaluating determinations about whether a defendant’s

constitutional rights have been violated. See, e.g., Torres v. State,

314 Ga. 838, 848 (2) (e) (ii) (878 SE2d 453) (2022) (in determining

voluntariness of as a matter of constitutional due process, “we accept

the trial court’s finding[s] on disputed facts and credibility of

witnesses unless clearly erroneous but independently apply the law

to the facts,” but “[w]here controlling facts are not in dispute . . . our

review is de novo.” (citation omitted)); Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 508,

510-511 (2) (842 SE2d 5) (2020) (“Ineffectiveness claims involve

mixed questions of law and fact, and a trial court’s factual findings

made in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly

                                   15
erroneous, whereas conclusions of law based on those facts are

reviewed de novo.” (citations and punctuation omitted)). Of course,

although questions of constitutional guarantees are guided by legal

principles for which a de novo standard is applied, these questions

are often dependent on factual predicates that can (and should) be

decided only by lower courts (and not appellate courts) after

evidentiary development. See, e.g. Oubre v. Woldemichael, 301 Ga.

299, 307 (2) (b) (800 SE2d 518) (2017), disapproved of on other

grounds by Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 (883 SE2d 317) (2023)

(remanding to the habeas court to analyze in the first instance and

consider   “particular   factual   questions”   whether   defendant’s

statement to co-defendant was the result of police coercion, because

“coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to a finding that a

confession is involuntary within the meaning of the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,”); State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 4

(2) (779 SE2d 248) (2015) (“A trial court’s conclusion that a traffic

stop was unreasonably prolonged may often be a fact-intensive

determination, but it is ultimately a holding of constitutional law

                                   16
that we review de novo.”); see also United States v. Shamsid-Deen,

61 F4th 935, 945 (11th Cir. 2023) (noting federal appellate precedent

from variety of cases, including federal habeas petitions, that legal

conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual findings for clear error,

and that the Eleventh Circuit has “consistently held that” a district

court’s decision regarding the validity of a waiver of a constitutional

right, which presents a mixed question of law and fact, is subject to

de novo review). As relevant here, the habeas court’s conclusion

about voluntariness was based on a factual predicate that the plea

was induced by affirmative misstatements — and, in other contexts

considering the voluntariness of a defendant’s action, we have

reviewed conclusions about improper inducement for clear error.

See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 292 Ga. 214, 215 (2) (735 SE2d 767)

(2012) (trial court’s determination that defendant’s custodial

statement was freely and voluntarily given and not induced by the

“hope of a light sentence” was not clearly erroneous); Amadeo v.

State, 243 Ga. 627, 628 (1) (255 SE2d 718) (1979) (noting that

whether defendant’s statement was induced by hope of benefit was

                                  17
a “close question” and concluding that trial court’s resolution of the

issue was not clearly erroneous).

      Here, the totality of the circumstances supports the habeas

court’s findings and conclusion that Medina’s plea was involuntary.

Medina’s plea did not include an agreement as to a recommended

sentence, and Medina was repeatedly told that the trial court could

sentence him to the maximum sentence for each offense. The trial

court also conveyed to Medina, through his counsel, that the court

“assumed” Medina would receive a lighter sentence if he pleaded

guilty and accepted responsibility than if he were convicted at trial.

By itself, this would not have rendered Medina’s plea involuntary,

because the statement, at most, indicated that Medina’s sentence

might be harsher if he went to trial. See Kennedy, 305 Ga. at 9-10

(2). But this comment by the trial court, when viewed along with the

fact that Medina was affirmatively misled about the maximum

sentence he faced, precludes us from second-guessing the habeas

court’s conclusions. Not only was Medina informed that he likely

would face a harsher sentence if he were convicted at trial, he was

                                    18
told that sentence potentially could be multiple life sentences, plus

100 years — 100 years more than he in fact faced, given that the

aggravated assault counts should have merged into the armed

robbery counts. See Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700 SE2d

399) (2010) (convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon merged with armed robbery counts when part of same

transaction).

      The Commissioner does not challenge the fact that Medina was

misadvised about his sentence exposure. Indeed, the Commissioner

does not even challenge the habeas court’s conclusion that the

aggravated assault counts should have merged. Instead, the

Commissioner        suggests     on    appeal     that    this    significant

misrepresentation was somehow mitigated by the fact that it

occurred before the factual basis for the guilty plea was established. 3

      3In his appellate brief, the Commissioner suggests that it was unclear
whether the aggravated assault counts would merge because the factual basis
had not been established. But the guilty plea colloquy was conducted after
opening statements had already been given. By this point, the prosecutor was
well aware of what the evidence would establish at trial; indeed, the
prosecutor’s opening statement was proffered as the factual basis for the plea.
                                      19
But the record does not bear that out; and in any case, the error was

never corrected. The record shows that the State initially misstated

the maximum sentence before proffering a factual basis, and then

there was much discussion about Medina wanting to know if he

could “gauge” or get a sense of the sentence the court would impose.

After learning that he could not get such an indication, Medina

became unresponsive to the trial court’s instructions, leading the

court to believe that Medina was not expressing a “clear desire to

plea.” When the trial court began to bring the jury in to proceed with

the trial, Medina said he wanted to plead guilty, at which point the

prosecutor again misadvised Medina about the maximum sentence,

stating

     [T]he maximum possible punishment for the offenses for
     which you are charged is five lifes, plus 100 years. The
     minimum possible punishment is ten years in prison, and
     that is to be served day-for-day, that is the best that could
     happen to you, and the worst that could happen to you is
     five lifes, plus 100 years.

     The    Commissioner       does       not       assert    that   these

misrepresentations    were   ever      corrected.     The    Commissioner

                                  20
correctly points out that the habeas court did find that trial counsel

and Medina discussed the sentencing ranges for armed robbery and

aggravated assault. But the habeas court also found that trial

counsel did not have any recollection of discussing whether the

aggravated assault counts merged. Simply put, Medina was wrongly

told that he faced the prospect of five life sentences plus an

additional 100 years if convicted at trial, and was never told

otherwise.

     The habeas court concluded that these misrepresentations

(combined with the trial court’s statement noted above) induced

Medina into pleading guilty, and that finding is not clearly

erroneous. The habeas court found, and the plea colloquy shows,

that Medina was hesitant to admit guilt and was very concerned

about the sentence he could receive. The trial court even found that

Medina did not express a clear desire to plead guilty based on his

uncooperative attitude and attempt to delay the proceedings. The

plea colloquy further shows that Medina was more clear in his desire

to plead guilty, and no longer delayed the plea proceedings, only

                                 21
after hearing the prosecutor misstate Medina’s sentence exposure

for a second time, saying that the best sentence he could receive was

“ten years in prison . . . to be served day-for-day” while the worst

sentence was “five lifes, plus 100 years.” Given this evidence, we

cannot say that the habeas court’s conclusion — that the sentencing

exposure misstatements (combined with the trial court’s statement

that going to trial would likely result in a more severe punishment)

induced Medina to plead guilty — was clearly erroneous. See Upton

v. Johnson, 282 Ga. 600, 602 (652 SE2d 516) (2007) (“When there is

evidence to support the habeas corpus court’s factual findings, those

findings cannot be found to be clearly erroneous.”). The precedent

discussed above, and especially Petty, 279 Ga. at 274-277, supports

the habeas court’s conclusion that the guilty plea was involuntary.

We therefore affirm.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 22