Court Opinion

ID: 9411063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 18:04:41.58334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.585619
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/24/23 York v. Brambila CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    HANNA YORK,
                                                                                          F084380
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 20CECG03562)
                    v.

    RODOLFO ALEJANDRO BRAMBILA,                                                        OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Mark E. Cullers,
Judge.
         Rodolfo Alejandro Brambila, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         Hanna York, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Rodolfo Alejandro Brambila, a self-represented inmate at the Fresno County jail,
appeals the trial court’s grant of Hanna York’s petition for a civil harassment restraining
order against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.1 Brambila contends:
(1) York is precluded from seeking a civil harassment restraining order because her

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
employer obtained a workplace violence restraining order based on the same conduct;
(2) the trial court improperly denied his request to conduct discovery; (3) the trial court
granted an excessive number of continuances; and (4) the restraining order was
improperly issued as it is not supported by substantial evidence, the trial court improperly
limited his cross-examination of York, and it is constitutionally overly broad. Finding no
merit to Brambila’s contentions, we affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petition for Civil Harassment Restraining Order
       On December 11, 2020, York, an instructor at Fresno City College, filed a request
for a civil harassment restraining order seeking protection from Brambila, who was a
student of hers. York sought to protect herself, her husband, and her then five- and three-
year old daughters. In a declaration attached to the request, York asserted Brambila
contacted her via text message on November 23, 2020, asking to meet her in person (the
November 23 incident). When she informed him that she would not meet with him, he
responded, “I’m about to do something drastic and you’re the only person who can help
me.” York stopped communicating with him and when he did not get a response,
Brambila texted she was “an okay teacher, but a horrible friend.”
       On December 1, 2020 (the December 1 incident), York was sitting at her dining
room table when she noticed Brambila walking to her front door. York “was extremely
surprised” because she had no idea how he knew where she lived. She ran to the door to
make sure it was locked and stood there. She heard the security door open and a knock
on the door. She did not answer or make a sound, but then noticed the doorknob jiggling
and heard several more knocks. York asked Brambila to leave immediately. She told
him he was not invited and it was inappropriate to come to her home. Brambila pleaded
with her to open the door, saying he just wanted to talk to her. Once Brambila left and
drove away, York ran to a neighbor’s home to use their phone to call police, as hers was

                                              2.
broken. When the police showed up, they told her they could not do anything because
Brambila had left.
       On December 10, 2020 (the December 10 incident), York was in the shower when
her husband told her Brambila’s empty car was parked down the street. Her husband
went out to the front yard and called police dispatch, while York went into the backyard
to check on her daughters. Once outside, York noticed two wooden planks leaning
against the gate that were out of place; she had a feeling something wasn’t right. As she
walked toward the planks, Brambila came out from behind them, holding a handgun in
his right hand. York immediately started yelling for her husband and for Brambila to
leave the yard. After Brambila raised the gun and stepped toward her, York lunged at
him to try to keep him from firing the gun or heading towards her daughters. They began
to tussle—when York pulled at the bandana Brambila was wearing across his face, he bit
her hand and pushed her backward towards the ground. They fell with York on her back
and Brambila on top of her, pinning her wrist to the ground with his left hand while she
was holding onto his bandana.
       At that point, York’s husband entered the backyard, but stopped when Brambila
pointed the gun at him. York pleaded with Brambila to leave. Brambila kept saying he
was not going to hurt her, but he was going to get justice. A short time later, two
neighbors showed up to intervene; they tried to get Brambila to leave, but he would not.
Brambila stayed on top of York until the police arrived and negotiated with him to drop
his weapon and release her. Brambila was arrested for assault with a firearm,
kidnapping, false imprisonment with violence, criminal threat, stalking, and carrying a
concealed and loaded firearm. An emergency protective order was issued protecting
York and her husband. York sustained minor injuries—bruises and bite marks—due to
Brambila’s actions.

                                             3.
       Before the December 10, 2020 incident, York told two Fresno City College deans
of the developing situation; an investigation was pending, and the deans had reached out
to Brambila. York asserted she and Brambila were nothing more than teacher and
student. York requested personal conduct and stay away orders.
       A temporary restraining order was issued on December 14, 2020, which protected
York and her family from Brambila. Brambila was ordered to stay away from them, their
home and their jobs, workplaces, and schools. A hearing was set for March 15, 2021.
Continuances of the Hearing and the Requests for Admission
       Brambila submitted a request to personally attend the March 15, 2021 hearing, and
asked that the hearing be continued to April 2021. The trial court denied the
transportation request but approved his appearance via CourtCall. Brambila was not
present at the March 15, 2021 hearing. York also requested a continuance. The trial
court continued the hearing to April 26, 2021.
       On April 20, 2021, York filed a witness list and exhibit list for the trial. The
exhibit list included three photos that were attached to York’s request for civil
harassment restraining order and text messages between York and Brambila.
       On April 22, 2021, Brambila filed a proof of service which stated three sets of
requests for admissions had been served on York’s attorney by mail on April 17, 2021.
The requests, which were attached to the proof of service, were directed at York, her
husband, and the neighbor referred to in York’s declaration. The next day, Brambila
filed a request to continue the April 26, 2021 hearing because he was awaiting responses
to the requests of admission.
       According to the minute order of the April 26, 2021 hearing, which Brambila
attended, the trial court granted a one-time extension to seek advisory counsel and
continued the hearing to June 7, 2021. On May 13, 2021, Brambila filed a witness list
and a motion for judicial notice.

                                             4.
Brambila’s Response to the Request
       Brambila filed a response to York’s petition on May 20, 2021, objecting to the
requested orders. With respect to the December 10 incident, Brambila asserted he told
York he just wanted to talk to her, and he never made any threats. Brambila claimed
York lunged at him unprovoked, he bit her in self-defense, and he restrained her on the
ground until police arrived to prevent her from assaulting him. He further claimed the
children were not in the backyard during the attack.
       Brambila stated York exaggerated the December 1 incident, as he simply went to
York’s home to talk to her, and he left when she refused to see him. Brambila knew
where she lived because they had exchanged text and email messages, as well as
correspondence on which she wrote her address. With respect to the text messages
exchanged on November 23, Brambila claimed they texted each other on multiple
occasions, he did not threaten York, and York misquoted the messages. Brambila
contended the incidents failed to meet the statutory requirements for issuance of a civil
harassment restraining order.
The Motion to Strike and Further Continuances
       On June 1, 2021, Brambila filed a motion to strike portions of York’s declaration
that described the November 23 and December 1 incidents on the grounds they were
irrelevant and immaterial as they did not show harassment as defined by section 527.6.
Brambila examined each incident in isolation and asserted they did not constitute
harassment as defined in section 527.6.
       At the June 7, 2021 hearing, the trial court denied the motion to strike. Both York
and Brambila requested a continuance of the restraining order hearing. York’s attorney
needed additional time to subpoena police reports, while Brambila’s housing pod had
been placed on quarantine due to Covid-19. The trial court granted the requests and
continued the trial to September 20, 2021.

                                             5.
       On June 10, 2021, Brambila filed an objection to the text message on York’s
exhibit list, stating he had not received a copy of the exhibit from York and the messages
were irrelevant given his motion to strike the November 23 incident.
The Demurrer
       On September 16, 2021, Brambila filed a demurrer to York’s petition. He asserted
the action was “res judicata” as State Center Community College District (SCCCD)
obtained a workplace violence restraining order against him based on the same three
incidents, which included personal conduct and stay away orders and identified York and
her family as protected persons (the SCCCD action). Brambila argued the SCCCD action
barred York from seeking a civil harassment restraining order. Brambila asked the trial
court to take judicial notice of documents in the SCCCD action, including the petition
and workplace violence restraining order, which were attached to the request.
       Brambila was unable to be transported to the September 20, 2021 hearing as the
inmates were in quarantine due to Covid-19. Consequently, the trial court continued the
hearing to December 6, 2021. Brambila subsequently filed a written objection to the
three-month continuance, arguing there was not good cause for a continuance of that
duration, and asked the court to set the hearing for the first week of November 2021.
The December 6, 2021 Hearing
       Brambila was personally present at the December 6, 2021 hearing. An attorney
appearing for York’s counsel requested a continuance because York’s counsel was in an
out-of-town jury trial. Over Brambila’s objection, the trial court granted the request,
found there was good cause for the prior continuances, and continued the hearing to
February 14, 2022.
       Brambila then mentioned the demurrer and accepted the trial court’s offer to
address it. Brambila argued York’s petition could not proceed because a judgment was
granted in March 2021 in the SCCCD action. The trial court overruled the demurrer,

                                             6.
explaining York was not prohibited from obtaining a personal restraining order because
SCCCD and York obtained a workplace violence restraining order, as the workplace
violence restraining order was applicable only to the employee’s workplace, not her
home, and courts have held an employee can seek her own order against harassment at
her home under section 527.6, citing City of Los Angeles v. Animal Defense League
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 606, 625‒627.
The Motion for Sanctions
       On February 3, 2022, Brambila filed a motion for sanctions because York failed to
produce electronic information he requested pursuant to section 1987. Brambila asserted
he served York’s attorney with a request to produce York at the December 6, 2021
hearing, and for her to bring electronically stored information in her possession and
control, specifically Zoom class sessions for the Fall 2020 semester and a December 8,
2020 Zoom session with Dean Henderson, but she did not appear at the hearing or
produce the information. Brambila asserted he invited York’s attorney to meet and
confer with him at the Fresno County jail, but he never appeared.
The Hearing
       The hearing on York’s petition was continued from February 14, 2022, to
April 25, 2022, because York tested positive for Covid-19 and Brambila was in Covid-19
quarantine at the jail. Brambila subsequently filed a written objection to the length of the
continuance, arguing it was unreasonably long and an abuse of the court’s discretion.
       Brambila, York, and York’s attorney were present at the April 25, 2022 hearing.
The trial court first addressed Brambila’s motion for sanctions. The trial court explained
sanctions were inappropriate because there had not been a finding that York or her
attorney misused the discovery process as defined in section 2023.010. After further
argument from Brambila and York’s attorney, the trial court stated there is “no discovery
in a civil [harassment] case,” and York and her attorney were not required to produce

                                             7.
anything for trial on Brambila’s request. The trial court asked Brambila if there was any
discovery he had requested that he had not received. Brambila responded, “the electronic
information in the form of the Zoom meetings,” which he said was relevant to York’s
credibility. The trial court then stated it was going to deny the motion and proceed with
the hearing.
       Before beginning the hearing on York’s petition, the trial court asked Brambila if
he understood he had a right against self-incrimination and anything he said, “can and
will be used against you and at any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.” Brambila
responded, “Yes, I do. I do not intend to testify today.”
       York testified on her behalf. Brambila was a student in her spring and fall 2020
voice classes. York described the December 1 incident. Brambila came to her front
door, immediately opened the security screen, and tried her front door as he knocked on
it. She waited at the front door to see if he would leave, but when she realized he was not
leaving, she stood closer to the window and asked him to leave. York’s children were
home, but her husband wasn’t. York could not say how long the incident lasted as “it
was very frightening,” but she believed it was about 10 to 15 minutes. York watched
Brambila walk to his vehicle, which was parked two houses down, and get inside. She
believed Brambila was texting; she heard the phone buzz a couple times, but she couldn’t
see who it was because the screen was broken. She saw Brambila get out of his car and
walk toward her home, but she had closed the blinds to show she was not interested in
talking to him. Eventually he left of his own accord and York ran to the neighbor across
the street to call the police.
       York also described the December 10 incident. Her husband left for work at about
8:00 a.m. and she got into the shower. Within minutes, her husband came back inside
and told her Brambila’s vehicle, which she had described to him from the previous
incident, was on the street and he was calling the police. York continued getting ready

                                             8.
for the day. York went outside at the request of one of her daughters; her daughters were
jumping on their trampoline. York walked to the side of the house and saw several
boards placed where the trash cans normally were that were in a “very odd position,”
which alerted her that something was not right.
       York walked down the side of the house, as she feared for her children’s
protection and safety; she was concerned Brambila might be there due to the December 1
incident and because he was not in his car when her husband saw it. Brambila was at the
end of the yard inside the gate. York thought, “[h]ow dare he be in my yard with my
children.” When Brambila stepped out toward her, she yanked down the bandana that
was over his face and started yelling for him to leave the yard. Brambila “made very
clear quickly that he had a weapon,” as he pulled it out and pointed it in her general
direction. York believed Brambila was going to kill her.
       As Brambila came toward her, York felt very threatened with her children in the
yard, although she did not know where they were because she never looked back. York
was ready to defend her children and to keep him from getting near them. She believed
her children witnessed some of the incident through the house’s sliding glass door.
       Brambila sought to keep his gun hand free and put his arm around her. York was
clawing at his face when Brambila bit her. She was screaming for her husband to call the
police. Her husband, who was in the front yard, came to the back gate, but it was locked
from the inside. York was concerned he would be shot.
       York and Brambila eventually ended up in the backyard where they fell to the
ground, with York face up on her back. Brambila was pressing her right arm to the
ground while she was holding onto his bandana, which was hanging around his neck.
The gun was always visible to York in Brambila’s right hand, which was gloved; he did
not point it at her indefinitely, but he “kept it very present.” Brambila was laying on top

                                             9.
of her with his back on her. York’s husband came into the backyard through the garage
and when he attempted to approach Brambila, Brambila raised the gun to him.
       York heard a voice she did not recognize coming from the back door of her
garage, which she found out later belonged to a neighbor. Brambila was saying things
like, “Oh, what time is it?” and that he was not invited to the final exam of the class. The
neighbor tried to engage Brambila and encouraged him to let her go, but he would not.
Brambila continued to sit on her and restrain her for almost 20 minutes until the police
came into the backyard.
       York identified three pictures taken of her directly after the incident, which were
entered into evidence. They showed the bite mark on her left thumb, and scrapes and
grass on her right hand from Brambila pressing her hand into the ground for a long period
of time. She did not invite Brambila to her house on December 1 or 10, or consent to his
behavior. Even though it had been 14 months since the incident and Brambila was in
custody, York feared him because he willingly came to her home when (1) she asked him
not to come, (2) she previously expressed that she was not comfortable meeting with him
in person, (3) she told him on December 1 she was not willing to engage with him in
person at her home, and (4) he returned on December 10 with what she believed was “the
intent to force [her] to have a conversation with him,” with her using the word
“ ‘conversation’ sarcastically.”
       After his arrest, York learned from police that he had a “capture kit in his vehicle”
and “was wearing supposedly homemade body armor.” A small hand-made ladder was
found in the yard, which she assumed he used to get into the backyard. York was asking
for a civil restraining order against Brambila for the longest possible period because she
feared him, and she wanted it to include her children and husband.
       Brambila cross-examined York. Brambila first asked about the December 1
incident. The trial court sustained a relevancy objection to Brambila’s question of

                                            10.
whether it was normal for people to ring her doorbell unsolicited. York confirmed her
testimony was that it was highly unusual for Brambila to knock on her door because she
did not wish to meet with him at her home, and stated she conveyed that in the November
23 text conversation.
       Text messages between Brambila and York from July 8, 2020, through
December 1, 2020, were admitted into evidence. When Brambila asked her which text
message showed she told him she did not want to talk to him at her home, York admitted
she did not state that directly; rather, she clarified she would not talk to him in person
unless she had an office and space for that. York read the November 23 text conversation
into the record. Brambila wanted to talk to her in person, but York responded that she
“cannot meet in person.” She encouraged Brambila to talk to a counselor or doctor, but
he did not want to because he wasn’t sure they could help, and he didn’t want to talk to
strangers. York told him she felt “like what you’re doing is pressuring me to do
something I don’t feel comfortable with, especially since you are my student and I work
for an institution that asks me to follow certain steps to help students when they are in
need.” She told him, “I’ll talk to you but I just can’t meet.”
       York did not recall providing her address to Brambila. She confirmed she wrote
him a letter around July 7, 2020, to return a check and the envelope had her return
address on it, though she did not recall if it was her home address. York’s attorney
interjected that he did not see the nexus between sending an address in the mail and an
invitation to come to your home. The trial court made clear it was “not concerned with
what happened on December 1st,” and it was “more concerned about what happened on
December 10th.” While York’s attorney objected to the letter as an exhibit, the trial court
stated what happened on December 1 was “of no moment” as much as what occurred on
December 10. Brambila asserted he was merely using the letter to show she provided
him with her address to contradict her testimony on this point.

                                             11.
       The trial court wished to move on to December 10, as that event was “more
relevant to the Court’s inquiry in this case.” Brambila responded he was addressing the
December 1 incident because York’s attorney asked about it. The trial court stated it
would allow him to finish. Brambila then asked some questions about the November 23
text messages, but an objection was sustained on relevancy grounds. Brambila asked
York if he stated a purpose for the text conversation; York responded, “Not directly, no.”
When the trial court asked him the question’s relevance, Brambila responded
section 527.6 required a course of conduct that had no purpose, and he was trying to
show there was a purpose for the conversation which was stated in the text messages.
       York confirmed the December 1 incident did not involve her husband and while
her children were in the front room with her, Brambila never asked about them or
mentioned them. York ran a private voice studio, but when Brambila asked if he was
enrolled in the classes, the trial court found this was “getting far off field” and was
“totally irrelevant.” York confirmed she did not have any physical contact with Brambila
during the December 1 incident. Brambila indicated the purpose of the visit was to speak
with her, and Brambila did not threaten her with physical violence, although he tried to
open the locked door.
       Brambila asked a series of questions to which objections were sustained on
grounds of relevance, lack of foundation, and being argumentative. York denied she
asked her employer to file the workplace violence restraining order petition on her behalf,
although she was aware her employer had done so and submitted a declaration in support
of it. Brambila told the trial court he wanted to ask York about inconsistencies between
that declaration and the declaration she submitted in this proceeding. York confirmed she
stated in the declaration for the workplace violence restraining order that Brambila
assaulted her, while in the declaration for the present case, she stated she assaulted him
by gouging at his face and eyes.

                                             12.
       At this point, the trial court told Brambila that while he chose to represent himself,
he was held to the same standards as any attorney, and it was disingenuous to claim York
assaulted him if he was conceding he was in her backyard with a gun. Brambila denied
making any concessions. York’s attorney stated he would stipulate to the court taking
judicial notice of the SCCCD filing, which Brambila accepted. The trial court stated it
wanted to return to the December 10 incident, and whether Brambila was in the backyard.
       York confirmed her children were in the backyard before she went out there and
she did not mention them during the altercation with Brambila. The trial court asked
Brambila if he was stipulating he was in the backyard; Brambila responded he was not
stipulating to anything and he was using York’s testimony of the incident. The trial court
believed it was clear “this is a lot of game playing with the Court,” but it would let the
questioning go on for a little bit longer and then shut it down. York testified her
statement did not mention where the children were because she did not look back after
she walked down the side yard.
       Brambila wanted to produce a graph “to clarify the incident for the Court,” which
he said showed where individuals were located. The trial court asked where he was
located; Brambila responded he didn’t care to say, as he would not be testifying. The
trial court responded then the graph was irrelevant. Brambila wanted to invoke his
federal and state constitutional rights against self-incrimination. The trial court stated
that was fine, but then the graph was irrelevant. Brambila stated he would do it through
questioning instead.
       York confirmed the walkway on the side of the house was narrow and when she
saw Brambila, she did not look back. When Brambila asked how she could then be
aware her children were present, the trial court interjected that it did not see the
relevance. Brambila stated he was trying to show the children were not a concern during
this incident, or any other incident. The trial court responded the children did not need to

                                             13.
be present when the assault occurred to need protection, and they and York’s husband
needed protection if they were in her home or on her property. The trial court told
Brambila it would give him 10 more minutes.
        Brambila asked York about the bandana he was wearing and tried to elicit
testimony from her to show he was wearing it because of Covid-19. Because Brambila
was not testifying, the trial court found such questions irrelevant. York confirmed
Brambila never verbally threatened her during the December 10 incident or said he was
going to harm her or members of her family, and instead said he did not intend to harm
her. York also confirmed Brambila told her why he was pinning her wrist to the ground,
but when asked what he said, York’s attorney objected it was irrelevant and lacked
foundation, as how would Brambila know what he said to her if he was not the person
attacking her. Brambila asserted what he said was “absolutely important” to show intent.
When the trial court stated it was irrelevant, he asked whether self-defense was irrelevant.
The trial court asked if he was alleging he had the gun for self-defense; Brambila
responded he was not testifying. The trial court stated he would have to testify to allege
that and gave him five more minutes.
        Brambila attempted to elicit testimony that York assaulted him, but the trial court
stated that was irrelevant as he would have to testify to allege self-defense. Brambila
asked York if she made a statement to the police about the position of the gun. When
York’s attorney objected based on relevance, Brambila stated he wanted to show York
was not assaulted with a firearm, as it was never pointed at her, and York told police the
gun was off to one side and was not pointed at her. The trial court asked York if she
recalled making that statement. York stated she recalled “struggling with this bit of
information” when she testified, but “[t]he gun was in his right hand and when I first saw
it I felt that it was pointed at me.” She recalled telling the police the gun was off to the
side.

                                             14.
       Brambila asked York if she told the police that she gouged at his eyes. The trial
court asked him why that was being offered. Brambila responded it had to do with
York’s assault of him. The trial court responded that was irrelevant unless he was
testifying, and his time was up. Brambila objected, saying he had more questions. The
trial court stated he needed to ask relevant questions, he asked maybe five relevant
questions in about 20 minutes, and the court had “a duty and an obligation to make sure
these proceedings go efficiently and expeditiously.”
       York confirmed she was familiar with the neighbor who appeared on the scene.
Brambila then started to ask whether she heard him say, “I’m restraining you and you’re
hitting and kicking me,” when the trial court asked if he was raising self-defense, as then
it was irrelevant. Brambila responded it came out of the police report. The trial court
found Brambila was wasting the court’s time, as he was purposely and in bad faith
conducting the cross-examination, he was not listening to the objections raised, and he
had not followed the rules of evidence. The trial court further found Brambila was
attempting to assert a defense while telling the court he was not taking the stand and
subjecting himself to cross-examination. For those reasons, the trial court exercised its
power to cease the cross-examination.
       Brambila responded he was a pro per and trying to do his best. The trial court
repeated he was held to the same standards as attorneys and stated it allowed him to go
on for nearly 45 minutes, he hardly asked any relevant questions, and the only issues in
the case were whether he was in the backyard uninvited, had a weapon, and assaulted
York. The trial court added it understood Brambila was denying all that. Brambila stated
his questioning had to do with that last point about the assault. The trial court explained
it did not matter whether York was protecting herself and assaulted him, as she had a
right to do so to get him out of the backyard if he was there uninvited.

                                            15.
       York’s attorney was prepared to rest. The trial court asked Brambila if he wanted
to add anything. Brambila argued none of the incidents in the petition met the statutory
requirements for harassment and there was no course of conduct other than his desire to
speak with York. He asserted he never made verbal threats during the December 10
incident, there was no physical assault or assault with a firearm, there was no history of
violence between he and York, and he simply wanted to speak with her. Brambila asked
the trial court, if it issued the restraining order, to not prevent him “from exercising his
constitutionally significant interest of his education,” as none of the events had anything
to do with Fresno City College or its staff.
       The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that York “has been
subjected to unlawful violence and a credible threat of violence and annoyingly willful
[course] of conduct directed at her that seriously alarms, annoys, and harasses her and
serves no legitimate purpose and the conduct by its nature would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and that she has so suffered.” The trial
court further found York would suffer great irreparable harm if an order is not issued
because of the “reasonable probability that unlawful violence will occur in the future.”
The trial court made the order effective for the maximum period of five years. The trial
court read the terms of the restraining order to Brambila in open court, which included
personal conduct and stay-away orders that protected York and her family.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Res Judicata
       We begin with Brambila’s claim the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to
York’s petition on the ground the doctrine of res judicata barred her from seeking a civil
harassment restraining order. He argues res judicata applies because the SCCCD action
and the present action involved the same three incidents and York was in privity with
SCCCD.

                                               16.
       “ ‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits.
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a
second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.’ ” (Mycogen Corp.
v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 (Mycogen).) “Under the doctrine of res
judicata, if a plaintiff prevails in an action, the cause is merged into the judgment and
may not be asserted in a subsequent lawsuit.” (Ibid.) Whether the doctrine of res
judicata applies is a question of law subject to de novo review. (City of Oakland v.
Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 228.)
       “Three elements must exist for res judicata (or claim preclusion) to apply:
‘ “(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present
proceeding is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in
the present proceeding or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior
proceeding.” ’ ” (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department of Conservation
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1219.)
       “California law defines a ‘cause of action’ for purposes of the res judicata doctrine
by analyzing the primary right at stake: ‘[A] “cause of action” is comprised of a
“primary right” of the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a
wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.’ … ‘ “[I]f two actions
involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the
same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different
theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting
recovery. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘On the other hand, different primary rights may be
violated by the same wrongful conduct.’ ” (Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp.

                                             17.
Appeals Bd. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170; see Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at
p. 904 [“California’s res judicata doctrine is based upon the primary right theory”].)2
       Res judicata, or claim preclusion, does not bar York’s action for a civil harassment
restraining order under section 527.6 because it is not the same cause of action as asserted
in the SCCCD action. The SCCCD action sought a workplace violence restraining order
pursuant to section 527.8, which enables “[a]ny employer, whose employee has suffered
unlawful violence or a credible threat of violence from any individual, that can
reasonably be construed to be carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace,” to
“seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing on behalf of the employee
and, at the discretion of the court, any number of other employees at the workplace, and,
if appropriate, other employees at other workplaces of the employer.” (§ 527.8,
subd. (a).) In this action, York sought relief under section 527.6, which authorizes a
“person who has suffered harassment” (§ 527.6, subd. (a)(1)) to obtain an injunction
against the harassing conduct.
       The two causes of action are not the same because they address different primary
rights. The primary right at issue in the SCCCD action was the employer’s right to
maintain a workplace free of violence. (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1423 [“section 527.8 was enacted to allow employers to seek protections
comparable to those offered under section 527.6 to enjoin workplace threats or acts of
violence against employees”]; Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 334
[the Legislature enacted § 527.8 “to address the growing phenomenon in California of
workplace violence by providing employers with injunctive relief so as to prevent such

2      Brambila raises other theories for determining whether the two causes of action
are identical. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that California courts apply the
primary rights theory to determine if the two proceedings involve the same cause of
action. (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 797-798; Mycogen,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 904.)

                                            18.
acts of workplace violence”].) In contrast, the primary right at issue in a civil harassment
restraining order proceeding is an individual’s right to enjoin “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence” or conduct that “seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses” that
individual. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3); Grant v. Clampitt (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 586, 591
[§ 527.6 “was enacted to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and
privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution”].)
         Thus, although the two causes of action are based on the same set of underlying
facts, they involve different primary rights—the employer’s right to maintain a violence-
free workplace versus an individual’s right to be free from harassment. Since the causes
of action are not the same, res judicata does not bar the present action and the trial court
did not err in overruling Brambila’s demurrer on this ground.
II.      The Civil Harassment Restraining Order
         We next turn to Brambila’s claims concerning the issuance of the restraining
orders. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support issuance of the restraining
order because there was no evidence showing a threat of future violence, the trial court
erred in limiting his cross-examination of York, and the restraining order was overly
broad.
         A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
         Section 527.6, which governs civil harassment restraining orders, authorizes the
trial court to issue both temporary and permanent restraining orders to “[a] person who
has suffered harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (a).) “ ‘Harassment’ ” is defined to include
three different types of conduct: (1) “unlawful violence”; (2) “a credible threat of
violence”; or (3) “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person
that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate

                                             19.
purpose.”3 Although not expressly provided in section 527.6, case law has established
that “[a]n injunction restraining future conduct” under that statute “is only authorized
when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.” (Harris v. Stampolis
(2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499 (Harris), citing Russell v. Douvan (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 399, 402–403 (Russell).)
       “A temporary restraining order may be issued with or without notice, based on a
declaration that, to the satisfaction of the court, shows reasonable proof of harassment of
the petitioner by the respondent, and that great or irreparable harm would result to the
petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) Such a temporary restraining order “shall remain in
effect, at the court’s discretion, for a period not to exceed 21 days, or, if the court extends
the time for hearing under subdivision (g), not to exceed 25 days, unless otherwise
modified or terminated by the court.” (Id., subd. (f).) “Within 21 days, or, if good cause
appears to the court, 25 days from the date that a petition for a temporary order is granted
or denied, a hearing shall be held on the petition.” (Id., subd. (g).) At the ensuing
hearing, “the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an
independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful
harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (Id., subd. (i).)
       “We review issuance of a protective order for abuse of discretion, and the factual
findings necessary to support the protective order are reviewed for substantial evidence.”
(Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226, disapproved on other grounds by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 (O.B.).) “Whether the facts are legally

3      As to the third prong, the statute also requires the court to find that “[t]he course of
conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

                                              20.
sufficient to constitute civil harassment within the meaning of section 527.6 is a question
of law reviewed de novo.” (Parisi, at p. 1226.)
       Since the trial court must make its findings by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court “is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the
fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence,
and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at
pp. 1011–1012.) In deferring to the trier of fact’s determinations as to the credibility and
weight of the evidence, we disregard evidence contrary to the judgment. (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582.)
       B.     Substantial Evidence Supports Grant of Restraining Order
       Brambila does not seriously contest that his December 10 physical assault on York
amounted to “unlawful violence” within the meaning of section 527.6, which defines the
term as “any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal
Code, but does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(7).) In his declaration attached to his response to York’s request for a
restraining order, Brambila conceded that he bit York’s hand and restrained her after they
fell on the ground. While Brambila claimed he did so in self-defense, Brambila did not
offer any evidence of this at the hearing.
       To the contrary, York’s testimony established that Brambila hid in her backyard
and when she approached his hiding place, he came out and she yanked down the
bandana he was wearing over his face and yelled for him to leave. When he made clear
he had a weapon, which he pointed in her general direction, York clawed at his face, and
he bit her. They continued to struggle and when they fell to the ground, Brambila sat on

                                             21.
top of her and pinned her arm to the ground, leaving scratches on her hand, until police
arrived. The incident was not instigated by York, as Brambila claims, but rather by
Brambila’s uninvited presence in the backyard armed with a weapon. “[T]he testimony
of a single witness, even a party, may alone constitute substantial evidence.” (Chase v.
Wizmann (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244, 257.) Here, York’s testimony establishes Brambila
subjected her to unlawful violence during the December 10 incident.
       Brambila’s primary argument is that York failed to establish any risk of future
harm. As we have already noted, a finding that Brambila harassed York within the
meaning of section 527.6 does not mean that a civil harassment restraining order
automatically issues. (Russell, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 401; Harris, supra,
248 Cal.App.4th at p. 499.) Rather, “[a]n injunction restraining future conduct is only
authorized when it appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.” (Harris, at
p. 499.)
       Here, the trial court specifically found York would suffer “[g]reat irreparable
harm” if a restraining order was not issued “because of [the] reasonable probability that
unlawful violence will occur in the future.” The evidence fully supports the trial court’s
finding. Even if the trial court focused on the December 10 incident of physical violence,
there was abundant evidence this incident was the culmination of the two prior events—
the exchange of text messages on November 23, in which Brambila insisted on talking to
York in person, and the December 1 incident in which he came to her home uninvited
and demanded to talk to her. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 189‒190 [court
may “consider any evidence showing a likelihood of future harassment, including
evidence of conduct that might not itself constitute harassment”].)
       The evidence demonstrates Brambila was obsessed with speaking with York in
person and this obsession escalated over the course of a few weeks leading to the
December 10 assault. Brambila insists his actions were innocent, as he only wanted to

                                            22.
speak with her, and York overreacted. But given Brambila’s refusal to accept that York
did not want to talk to him in person, which continues in this appeal, and his lack of
insight into the effect his actions had on York, as well as the criminality of his actions,
the trial court reasonably could find the unlawful violence was likely to recur. Moreover,
Brambila insists he wants to continue his education at Fresno City College, making it
likely he would continue to encounter York. Under these circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the trial court’s finding of future harm.
       C.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Limiting Cross-Examination
       In a convoluted argument, Brambila asserts the trial court made inconsistent
findings concerning the materiality of the November 23 and December 1 incidents.
Brambila complains that while the trial court denied his motion to strike these incidents
from the petition, which he brought on the ground the incidents did not constitute
harassment within the meaning of section 527.6, the trial court later discounted these
incidents at the hearing when it repeatedly told him it was more interested in hearing
testimony about the December 10 incident and cut off his cross-examination concerning
the prior incidents.
       The prior incidents were not necessary to determine whether harassment occurred
since, as we have explained, the December 10 incident of unlawful violence was
sufficient to establish harassment under section 527.6. However, as Brambila asserts and
as we discussed above, the prior incidents were relevant to determine future threat of
harm. Because the incidents were relevant to determine whether the requirements of
section 527.6 were established, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike
these allegations from the petition.
       Brambila’s real complaint is that the trial court limited his cross-examination of
York concerning the November 23 and December 1 incidents, which he asserts violated

                                             23.
his constitutional and statutory due process rights. He claims the trial court repeatedly
rushed his questioning of York and discounted his cross-examination.
       A trial court is required to “exercise reasonable control” over the mode of
questioning witnesses to make the interrogation as rapid, distinct, and effective as
possible to ascertain the truth and to protect witnesses from undue harassment or
embarrassment. (Evid. Code, § 765, subd. (a).) This includes the “broad discretion …
to keep cross-examination within reasonable bounds.” (People v. Jones (1962)
207 Cal.App.2d 415, 421‒422; Dollinger v. San Gabriel Lines (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d
705, 710‒711.)
       “ ‘A trial court has a clear duty to supervise the conduct of the trial to the end that
it may not be unduly protracted and that other litigants too may have their day in court.
In carrying out this duty the court may confine cross-examination within reasonable
limits and may curtail cross-examination which relates to matters already covered, or
which are irrelevant. These are matters clearly within the court’s discretion and only a
manifest abuse thereof will require a reversal.’ ” (Dollinger v. San Gabriel Lines, supra,
205 Cal.App.2d at pp. 710‒711; McClure v. Donovan (1949) 33 Cal.2d 717, 736 [trial
court has considerable latitude concerning the length of examination of witnesses,
especially in a non-jury case].)
       Brambila has not shown the trial court abused its discretion. Contrary to
Brambila’s assertion, the trial court allowed him to cross-examine York about both the
November 23 and December 1 incidents. Brambila does not dispute that many of his
questions were irrelevant or otherwise improper, as the trial court determined in its
unchallenged evidentiary rulings. The court ended Brambila’s time for cross-
examination only after he persisted, in the face of repeated admonitions, in asking
irrelevant questions. Brambila’s conduct reasonably could have led the court to

                                             24.
determine that allowing additional time for cross-examination would not yield material
evidence.
       Brambila points to instances where the trial court stated it was more concerned
with the December 10 incident, which he claims shows the trial court arbitrarily limited
the cross-examination. The trial court’s first statement in this regard occurred after
Brambila asked York numerous questions about the December 1 incident and the
November 23 text messages, as well as about York sending him a letter with her address
on it. When York’s counsel made an offer of proof concerning the letter, the trial court
stated it was making “clear to both parties” that it was not concerned with what happened
on December 1 and was more concerned about what happened on December 10. The
trial court further explained that it was “of no moment” what happened on December 1
“as much as in weighing all the circumstances of what’s occurred on December 10th.”
       The court and Brambila then discussed the letter’s relevance, with Brambila
asserting it showed she provided him with her address, which contradicted her statement
she did not give him her address. The trial court stated it understood, but it “wish[ed] we
would move onto December 10th and the events of that date as being more relevant to the
Court’s inquiry in this case.” Nevertheless, when Brambila told the court he was
addressing the December 1 incident because York was asked about it on direct
examination, the trial court stated it would allow Brambila to “finish.”
       Brambila then had York confirm he was an “A student” and asked if it would be
unthinkable for an “A student” to unexpectedly drop a class. After the trial court
sustained a relevance objection, Brambila began to explain he was addressing a phrase in
the November 23 text messages. The trial court stated it understood, but “we’re here on a
restraining order alleging that you assaulted her and pulled a gun on her. All right.
That’s why we’re here so either that happened or it didn’t happen.” When Brambila
responded that he was “getting to that,” the trial court stated, “Okay. So let’s move on.”

                                            25.
       Brambila then continued to ask questions about the November 23 text messages
and December 1 incident. After Brambila asked a series of questions comparing York’s
declaration filed in the SCCCD action with her declaration in the present action, the
parties stipulated to the trial court taking judicial notice of the SCCCD filings. The trial
court then stated: “Let’s move on, Mr. Brambila. We spent way too much time on this
as far as it is. I would like us to return to the December 10th incident and were you or
were you not in the backyard.”
       These excerpts do not show that the trial court limited Brambila’s questions
concerning the November 23 and December 1 incidents. Rather, after Brambila asked
many irrelevant questions, the trial court encouraged Brambila to focus on the December
10 incident, which it properly viewed as the central issue. The trial court nevertheless
allowed Brambila to ask about the earlier incidents. The record simply does not support
Brambila’s interpretation of the court’s statements.
       Brambila asserts the trial court continually rushed and bullied him. He claims the
trial court violated its duty under Canon 3(B)(4) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics,
which requires the judge to “be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,” and
Canon 3(B)(8), which requires the judge to “manage the courtroom in a manner that
provides all litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly adjudicated in
accordance with the law.” We have reviewed the transcript of the hearing which shows
the trial court was patient with Brambila and granted him ample opportunity to present
his case. This is not a situation, as in Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 719, 725, 733, which Brambila relies on, where the trial court did not
permit live testimony or cross-examination of the petitioner. Brambila was given a full
opportunity to present his case and present relevant oral testimony. (Schraer, at p. 733
[in § 527.6 proceeding, “relevant oral testimony must be taken from available
witnesses”].)

                                             26.
       In sum, Brambila has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in controlling
the proceedings, including his cross-examination of York.
       D.     The Restraining Order Is Not Overbroad
       The restraining order requires Brambila to stay at least 100 yards away from York
and her family, as well as 100 yards from York’s home, job, and workplace. Brambila
asserts this is overly broad because there was no showing the harassment was related to
Fresno City College and the order effectively denies him the right to attend school and
prevents him from continuing his education.
       Brambila claims education is a constitutionally significant interest which the
restraining order infringes on, but he does not cite any authority to support this claim. He
asserts the Legislature has indicated education is constitutionally significant because an
entire article is dedicated to education in the California Constitution. He specifically
cites to section 1 of article IX of the California Constitution, which provides: “A general
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights
and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”
       While every child has a legal right to attend a public school (Campaign for Quality
Education v. State of California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 896, 906‒907), Brambila does
not cite any authority that this right extends to adult college students. Section 1, article
IX of the California Constitution does not establish such a right; that section creates a
duty to encourage promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural
improvement, but it is “ ‘general and aspirational’ ” and does not provide “how the
Legislature is to achieve its goal except to use ‘ “all suitable means.” ’ ” (Campaign for
Quality Education, at p. 908.) Moreover, the restraining order does not prevent Brambila
from attending college; rather, it requires him to stay 100 yards away from York’s
workplace. To the extent that prevents him from attending Fresno City College,

                                             27.
Brambila does not cite any authority there is a constitutional right to attend a particular
college.4
       Because Brambila fails to cite any legal authority to support his assertion that the
restraining order is constitutionally overbroad, we disregard his argument. (City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 [“we may disregard conclusory
arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to adopt”]; Keyes
v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655‒656 [matters not properly raised or that lack
adequate legal discussion will be deemed forfeited].)
III.   The Continuances of the Hearing on the Petition
       Brambila asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it granted six
continuances of the hearing on York’s petition. Brambila argues: (1) the number and

4      Brambila has filed a motion under rule 8.252(c) of the California Rules of Court
asking us to consider additional evidence that was not presented in the trial court, namely,
a Fresno City College campus map and his declaration, in which he states that he is a
Fresno City College music student in good standing majoring in music voice, he has
completed half the requirements toward an associate’s degree in music voice, and
because virtually every music voice class is taught in a single building it would be
impossible to attend class and stay 100 yards away from York. Brambila asserts the
evidence is relevant to show the restraining order prevents him from attending class and
thus infringes on his constitutional right to an education.
        We deny the motion. Although section 909 permits an appellate court to take
additional evidence for the purpose of making independent factual findings, this authority
“ ‘is to be used sparingly and has been narrowly construed.’ ” (In re L.B. (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1423, fn. 1.) “Absent exceptional circumstances, no such findings
should be made.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) Brambila does not attempt
to establish, nor do we find, that this case presents such an exceptional circumstance.
Moreover, decisions limiting the use of the power to take new evidence involved attempts
to introduce evidence that existed at the time of trial. (In re L.B., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1423, fn. 1.) This reason for declining to accept new evidence on appeal applies
here, as the evidence Brambila asks us to consider was available at the time of the
hearing on York’s petition.

                                             28.
duration of the continuances were unreasonable; (2) the continuances violated the
expeditious nature of a section 527.6 action; (3) there was no showing of good cause; and
(4) the temporary restraining order was improperly extended far beyond the maximum
duration indicated in section 527.6. He contends the continuances resulted in a
miscarriage of justice because absent the continuances, the restraining order would have
issued a year and half earlier and therefore would expire that much earlier. Brambila
asserts the resulting extension of the restraining order prevents him from attending school
that much longer, thereby trampling on his “constitutionally significant interest to his
education.” He asks us to “back-date” the trial court’s order granting the restraining
orders to March 15, 2021, which he asserts is the date the order would have taken effect
had the continuances not been granted.
       Whether to grant a continuance is committed to the trial court’s discretion and its
ruling will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. (Forthmann v.
Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984–985; Larson v. Solbakken (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d
410, 429.) The trial court must exercise its discretion considering the interests of all
involved and “should exercise liberality in granting a continuance to obtain the presence
of material evidence and to prevent miscarriages of justice.” (Larson, at p. 429.) The
reviewing court may find an abuse of discretion “if the record indicates [the continuance]
resulted in probable or possible prejudice to a party.” (Ibid.)
       We need not discuss whether there was good cause to grant the multiple
continuances because the record does not disclose any resulting prejudice to Brambila.
Brambila claims he is prejudiced because he will be deprived of his constitutional right to
an education for a longer period due to the effective one-and-a-half-year extension of the
five-year restraining order. But as we have discussed above, he has not cited any
authority establishing a constitutional right to an education at the college of his choosing.

                                             29.
At best, the restraining order prevents him from attending Fresno City College—it does
not prevent him from pursuing an education at another college.
       In any event, because Brambila was incarcerated throughout these proceedings, he
could not attend school. Even if he is released from custody before the restraining order
expires in April 2027, York may renew the restraining order for a maximum of five
additional years without a showing of further harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (j)(1).) Thus,
it is not the so-called extension of the restraining order that impinges on any right
Brambila may have to attend Fresno City College, but rather his harassment of York that
prohibits him from having contact with her.
       Brambila asserts the remedy for the improper continuances is for us to “back-date”
the restraining order to March 2021. While the trial court ruled at the December 6, 2021
hearing that there was good cause for the continuances, Brambila did not ask the trial
court to reduce the length of the restraining order due to the many continuances.
Brambila’s failure to raise this specific issue below forfeits it on appeal. (Howitson v.
Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489 [“the failure to raise an issue in the
trial court typically forfeits on appeal any claim of error based on that issue”]; Ochoa v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3 [“arguments not
asserted below are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal”].)
IV.    The Discovery Ruling
       Finally, Brambila contends the trial court erred in barring his two requests for
discovery: the requests for admissions and the request for electronic information.
       The record shows that Brambila served requests for admissions on York’s attorney
by mail on April 17, 2021, which were directed at York, her husband, and her neighbor.
Brambila requested a continuance of the April 26, 2021 hearing because he was awaiting
responses to the requests, and the trial court continued the hearing to June 7, 2021.
Although Brambila apparently did not receive responses, the record does not show that he

                                             30.
requested court intervention with respect to them,5 such as by filing a motion to have the
truth of the matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as allowed by section
2033.280, subdivision (b), or otherwise raise the failure to respond in the trial court.
Because there is no trial court ruling to review with respect to the requests for admission,
Brambila has not shown any trial court error with respect to the requests.
       With respect to the electronic information, the record shows Brambila filed a
motion for sanctions on February 3, 2022, in which he asserted he served York’s attorney
with a request to bring electronically stored information, namely, Zoom class sessions
and a Zoom meeting with Dean Henderson, to the December 6, 2021 hearing, but the
information was not provided. Brambila further asserted he invited York’s attorney to
meet and confer with him at the Fresno County jail, but the attorney did not appear or
respond. In the motion, Brambila requested, among other things, monetary sanctions
under section 2023.010 for misuse of the discovery process, and to terminate the
temporary restraining order and stay the proceedings until York produced the requested
materials.
       The trial court denied the motion at the outset of the April 25, 2022 hearing on
York’s petition, stating there had not been a finding of misuse of the discovery process as
defined in section 2023.010, and there is no discovery in a civil harassment case. The
trial court also asked Brambila why he wanted the electronic information; Brambila

5      Brambila asserts he raised York’s failure to respond to the requests for admission
and made an oral motion for sanctions at the April 26, 2021 hearing, which the trial court
denied on the ground discovery was not available. While Brambila points to the minute
order of the hearing to support his assertion, the minute order does not show that
Brambila raised any issue with respect to the requests for admission, and there is no
transcript of the hearing. In any event, the trial court would be justified in denying any
motion to compel or for sanctions made at that time, as the time to respond to the requests
had not expired. (§ 2033.250, subd. (a) [responding party has 30 days after service of the
requests for admission to serve the response on the requesting party].)

                                             31.
responded it spoke to York’s credibility. The trial court then stated it was going to deny
the motion and proceed with the hearing.
       Section 527.6 establishes a quick and truncated procedure for the limited scope of
preventing harassment in contrast to normal injunctive procedures that allow time for
investigation, pleadings, and discovery, followed by an opportunity for a full trial. (Byers
v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 811; Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986)
180 Cal.App.3d 612, 619‒620, fn. 8 [§ 527.6 “significantly changed the ordinary
procedures and requirements in actions for injunctive relief by altering the provisions
relating to pleading, temporary restraining orders, undertakings, attorney’s fees,
discovery and trial”].) The statute is designed to adjudicate claims of harassment in an
expedited fashion, normally on a schedule lasting no more than 25 days from either the
grant of a temporary restraining order or the filing of the petition. (§ 527.6, subd. (g); see
Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 649.)
       While section 527.6, subdivision (i) requires the court to “receive any testimony
that is relevant” at the hearing, “[t]here is no provision under section 527.6 allowing for
discovery, and in any case, under the civil harassment scheme there is insufficient time in
which to conduct discovery.” (Thomas v. Quintero, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 650,
fn. 11.) In addition to the short timeframe, discovery involving restraining orders in
response to harassment would undercut the statute’s efforts to protect victims from
unwanted contact by the restrained person.
       Brambila asserts the trial court erred in barring discovery. He argues that the
Code of Civil Procedure allows discovery in section 526.7 actions and neither Thomas v.
Quintero nor Byers v. Cathcart held, not that discovery is unavailable in such actions, but
rather that discovery could not usually be completed because the hearings occur so
quickly. Brambila contends that since time is the only issue with respect to whether

                                             32.
discovery is available, there was more than enough time for discovery in the present
action due to the many continuances.
       The trial court’s denial of the sanctions motion was well within its discretion.
(Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 430 [trial court’s order on
motion for sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Brambila did not seek to compel
production of the electronic information until February 2022. By the time the trial court
heard Brambila’s motion in April 2022, time was an issue as it had been 14 months since
the temporary restraining order issued. To compel York to produce the requested
information would have required yet another continuance of the proceedings, which
Brambila had been continually objecting about. The trial court inquired of the
significance of the information Brambila sought and determined it did not justify further
delay of the proceeding. Having correctly recognized discovery is not contemplated by
the summary proceeding established by the civil harassment statute, the trial court
properly denied Brambila’s motion.
       Moreover, Brambila has failed to demonstrate it is reasonably probable the
outcome of the hearing would have been more favorable to him had the trial court
granted his discovery motion. (Conservatorship of Maria B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
514, 532‒533 [appellant bears burden to make affirmative showing the trial court
committed error and that error resulted in a miscarriage of justice].) Brambila told the
trial court he wanted the Zoom materials to attack York’s credibility, a claim he reasserts
on appeal, but he fails to explain how they would achieve that. Moreover, he was able to
attack her credibility at the hearing. Given that Brambila did not deny his presence in
York’s backyard and did not testify, Brambila has failed to show it is reasonably probable
the trial court’s decision would have been more favorable to him had the trial court
granted his discovery motion. (MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1045.)

                                            33.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order granting York’s request for civil harassment restraining orders pursuant
to section 527.6 is affirmed. York is entitled to her costs on appeal.

                                                             DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SMITH, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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