Court Opinion

ID: 9630718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:18:21.379073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:34.630308
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
An order is internally inconsistent which permits a child to recover special damages for a so-called wrongful life action, but denies all general damages for the very same tort. While the modest compassion of the majority may be commendable, they suggest no principle of law that justifies so neatly circumscribing the nature of damages suffered as a result of a defendant’s ¡negligence.
As recently as 1980, the Court of Appeal unanimously decided in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 811 [165 Cal.Rptr. 477] that a cause of action exists for a wrongful life tort. This court subsequently denied a petition for hearing. Thus Cur-lender was, and remains, the prevailing law of California. I see no persuasive reason to either abandon its doctrine, or to dilute its effectiveness by limiting recovery to special damages.
Curlender found a breach of duty by the medical laboratory there involved, not only to the parents but to the child yet to be born. It then proceeded to carefully analyze the applicable law, in part, as follows:
“The circumstance that! the birth and injury have come hand in hand has caused other courts to deal with the problem by barring recovery. The reality of the ‘wrongful-life’ concept is that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life. We need not be concerned with the fact that had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all. The certainty of genetic impairment is no longer a mystery. In addition, a reverent appreciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff, however impaired she may be, has come into existence as a living person with certain rights. i
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“In our consideration of whether the child plaintiff has stated a cause of action, we find it instructive to look first to the statutory law of this *241state. Our Civil Code section 3281 provides that ejvery person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages.’ Civil Code section 3282 defines detriment as ‘a loss or harm suffered in person or property.’ Civil Code section 3333 provides: ‘For the breách of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not.’
“In addition, we have long adhered to the principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong committed. ‘Fundamental in our jurisprudence is the principle that for every wrong there is a remedy and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proximately caused by the wrongdoer. Although we recognize exceptions from these fundamental principles, no departure should be sanctioned unless there is a strong necessity therefor. [1i] The general rule of damages in tort is that the injured party may recover for all detriment caused whether it could have been anticipated or not.’ (Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433 [58 Cal.Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173].)
“We have concluded that it is clearly consistent with the applicable principles of statutory and decisional tort law in this state to recognize a cause of action stated by plaintiff against the defendants. To do otherwise would negate and run counter to the course of tort law so nobly chartered and enunciated in the landmark cases such as Dillon v. Legg, Rowland v. Christian, Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., and Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. . . .
“. .. Plaintiffs right to damages must be considered on the basis of plaintiffs mental and physical condition at birth and her expected condition during the .. . life span . .. anticipated for one with her impaired condition. In similar fashion, we reject the notion that a ‘wrongful-life’ cause of action involves any attempted evaluation of a claimed right not to be born. In essence, we construe the ‘wrongful-life’ cause of action by the defective child as the right of such child to recover damages for the pain and suffering to be endured during the ... life span available to such a child and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the impaired condition.
*242“In California, infants are presumed to experience pain and suffering when injury has been established, even if the infant is unable to testify and describe such pain anil suffering. In Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889 [103 Cal.Rptr. 856, 500 P.2d 880], the trial court had failed ¡to instruct the jury on the infant plaintiff’s pain and suffering; our high court reversed the jury verdict that awarded only plaintiff’s medical expenses. It was observed, with respect to pain and suffering, that ‘[a]dmittedly these terms refer to subjective states, representing a detriment which can be translated into monetary loss only with great difficulty. [Citation.] But the detriment, nevertheless, is a genuine one that requires compensation [citations], and the issue generally must be resolved by the “impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence.’” (Id. at p. 893.)” (Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, supra, pp. 829-831.) (All italics in original.)
I conclude, as did the Court of Appeal in Curlender, that a cause of action can be stated and that this handicapped child is entitled to her day in court.
Bird, C. J., concurred.