Court Opinion

ID: 9853188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:44:09.671543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:42.434999
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I agree with the superior court’s analysis that the procedural requirements of the laws of this state give Georgia superior courts only appellate jurisdiction of claims such as appellant’s, I must respectfully dissent.
The Georgia Fair Employment Practices Act of 1978, OCGA § 45-19-20 et seq., states as one of its general purposes “[t]o provide for execution within public employment in the state of the policies embodied in Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 241), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 103), . . . the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (81 Stat. 602), . . . and the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 355)____”
An administrative review procedure, including a full hearing before a special master, is provided for any such claim. OCGA §§ 45-19-36; 45-19-37; 45-19-38.
Once such a claim has been resolved by the Special Master, the proceedings provided by OCGA § 45-19-;39 are appellate review by the superior court of the actions of the special master. As stated in subsection (b) “[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the special master as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm ... or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the final order if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. ...” The possible bases for such a reversal are then set out.
That a claimant will have to comply with both state and federal administrative procedures, when the complaint originates in the federal agency in order to assert the federal Title VII claims before a state court does not preclude the assertion of those rights in state court, as asserted by the majority. As stated in Yellow Freight System v. Donnelly, 494 U. S. 820 (110 SC 1566, 108 LE2d 834) (1990): “Petitioner argues that it is anomalous to contemplate reference to a state agency, followed by review in the federal agency, as a condition of proceeding with litigation in state court. Petitioner’s ‘anomaly,’ however, is merely a consequence of Title VII’s dual-track method of procedure. The first hiatus is designed to give state administrative agencies an opportunity to invoke state rules of law. The action by the EEOC, in contrast, is a predicate for litigation based on the federal statute. When the right to sue under Title VII arises, the fact that both a state agency and the EEOC have failed to resolve the matter does not affect the question of what judicial forum should or may entertain the action. Congress employed a similar scheme in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, in which complaints *58must be screened through both state and federal agencies, although concurrently, before an action may be brought ‘in any court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 825.
Decided March 19, 1993.
Stanford, Fagan & Giolito, Debra Schwartz, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Jeffrey L. Milsteen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William, G. Cromwell, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
The making of such a review in our courts of an appellate nature after providing full opportunity for hearing and factfinding is within the state’s appropriate power to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its own courts and the character of controversies which may be addressed and does not close our courts to federal claims. See McKnett v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 292 U. S. 230, 233 (54 SC 690, 78 LE 1227) (1934); Board of Regents v. Cohen, 197 Ga. App. 463 (398 SE2d 758) (1990).