Court Opinion

ID: 9946332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 18:02:44.242131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.084900
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 29 2024
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.    23-15273

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. Nos.
                                                 1:21-cv-00454-JMS-KJM
 v.                                              1:20-cr-00005-JMS-1

PETERSON CABLAY,
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
                Defendant-Appellant.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Hawaii
                   J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 15, 2024**
                                Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

      Peterson Cablay appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing ineffective assistance of

counsel. Cablay asserts his counsel failed at sentencing to argue that he was safety

valve eligible pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018’s amendment to 18 U.S.C.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 3553(f)(1). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

motion raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v.

Juliano, 12 F.4th 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2021). Because the parties are familiar with the

facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our

ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253(a). We

affirm.

      To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be

highly deferential.” Id. at 689. Counsel “is strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment.” Id. at 690. However, “[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point

of law that is fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform basic

research on that point is a quintessential example of unreasonable performance under

Strickland.” Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014).

      The safety valve provision allows the district court to sentence a defendant

convicted of certain crimes “without regard to any statutory minimum sentence” if

the court finds that five statutory criteria are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). A defendant

meets the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if the defendant does not

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have:

              (A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any
                 criminal history points resulting from a 1-point
                 offense, as determined under the sentencing
                 guidelines;

              (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the
                 sentencing guidelines; and

              (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under
                 the sentencing guidelines

        18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).

        Cablay argues that his counsel’s performance at sentencing fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to argue that Cablay was

safety valve eligible. For Cablay to be eligible, the emphasized “and” would need

to be read in the conjunctive, meaning that a defendant is safety valve eligible unless

the defendant has more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point

offense and a prior two-point offense. Today, the case law is settled in our circuit

that § 3551(f)(1) is to be read in the conjunctive. See United States v. Lopez, 998

F.3d 431, 443 (9th Cir. 2021). But at the time of Cablay’s sentencing in 2020, no

circuit court opinion had ruled on the issue. In fact, a three-judge panel in our circuit

stated in an unpublished memorandum disposition that the language should be read

in the disjunctive. See United States v. Manzo, 793 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2020)

(explaining that safety valve relief is not available if the defendant has more than

four criminal history points or a prior three-point offense).

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      To “reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,” we

“evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 689. Given that the meaning of the statute was unsettled at the time of Cablay’s

sentencing, and in light of our decision in Manzo, the district court was correct to

hold that Cablay’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise safety valve

eligibility. See Juliano, 12 F.4th at 940 (“[I]neffective assistance of counsel claims

generally cannot be predicated on counsel’s failure to anticipate changes in the

law.”).

      Because Cablay cannot establish ineffectiveness under the first prong of

Strickland, we need not reach the issue of prejudice. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133

F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1998).

      AFFIRMED.

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