Court Opinion

ID: 9951860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 14:08:39.203122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:20.437342
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0633-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AUSTIN CLARK,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided March 19, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Atlantic County, Indictment Nos. 13-12-3187
                   and 14-12-3442.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   William Reynolds, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (John Joseph Santoliquido,
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Austin Clark appeals from a Law Division order denying his

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm.

      An Atlantic County grand jury returned two indictments charging

defendant with a number of offenses arising from separate incidents. Defendant

pled guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery, one count of second-degree

conspiracy to commit robbery, and one count of carjacking. Pursuant to his

negotiated plea agreement, the trial judge sentenced defendant to concurrent ten-

year terms in prison on the two robbery counts, concurrent to a five-year term

for conspiracy. The judge also sentenced defendant to a consecutive fifteen -

year term for carjacking. Thus, defendant's aggregate term was twenty-five

years, subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to

the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

      Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR. He argued that his attorney

provided him with ineffective assistance because he failed to adequately argue

that defendant's age at the time of the offenses 1 should be considered by the trial

judge in determining an appropriate sentence. Defendant argued that even

1
  Defendant was nineteen years old when he committed the offenses in June
2013.
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though a defendant's age was not a statutory mitigating factor at the time of

sentencing,2 his attorney should have provided the trial judge with expert

testimony and studies explaining why his youth warranted a lesser sentence than

that set forth in the negotiated plea.

      Following oral argument, the PCR judge rendered a comprehensive

written decision, concluding that defendant did not satisfy the two -prong test of

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which requires a showing

that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient

performance, the result would have been different. The PCR judge reviewed the

sentencing transcript and found that defendant's attorney did bring defendant's

age to the sentencing judge's attention and argued for a reduced sentence.

      While the attorney did not bring in an expert, he argued that "like many

young men[,] [defendant's] brain hasn't matured yet. And that's true. They say

that men's brains don't mature physically, the frontal lobes, until they're [twenty-

five], when they [sic] are a million reasons for that, I believe. But that's who

we're dealing with now." The attorney referred to defendant as "a kid who is,

2
  N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), which became effective on October 19, 2020, defines
a mitigating circumstance when "[t]he defendant was under [twenty-six] years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense." Our Supreme Court has
held that this sentencing provision is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 96-97 (2022).
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you know, barely an adult when these offenses took place." He told the trial

judge his client was a "bright kid" and named the grammar and high schools he

attended in the area.

      Under these circumstances, the PCR judge found that even though this

line of argument was ultimately not successful, defendant's attorney adequately

presented his age-based contention to the trial judge. In addition, defendant

failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the sentencing would have been

different if defense counsel had presented expert testimony on this subject. As

noted above, defendant received the minimum term of imprisonment for the two

robbery charges and the conspiracy charge, and a sentence at the lower-end of

the range for carjacking. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, defendant argues that he was "entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on his claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

advocate adequately at sentencing." We disagree.

      When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief.

State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific

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facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision."

State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an

evidentiary hearing and the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions

that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321

N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).         Rather, trial courts should grant

evidentiary hearings and make a determination on the merits only if the

defendant has presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance, material

issues of disputed facts lie outside the record, and resolution of the issues

necessitates a hearing. R. 3:22-10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).

We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing for abuse of discretion. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.

      To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant is obliged to show not only the particular manner in which counsel's

performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced him.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). There is a

strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not presumed, Fritz,

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                                         5
105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel

undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 659 n.26 (1984).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition substantially

for the reasons detailed at length in the PCR judge's written opinion. We discern

no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration of the issues, or in her

decision to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We are satisfied

that defense counsel's performance was not deficient, and defendant failed to

sustain his burden of demonstrating prejudice as required by the Strickland test.

      Affirmed.

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