Court Opinion

ID: 9766086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:49.891886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.376117
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice CAPPY
concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority’s analysis and conclusion that a police officer, who suffers an injury in the course of his duties, may collect benefits pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act in addition to Heart and Lung Act compensation. I dissent, however, from the majority’s analysis and conclusion that police officers cannot retain workers’ compensation benefits received for the loss of earning from concurrent employment. Rather, I believe that the mandates contained in the Statutory *609Construction Act lead to the opposite conclusion and that police officers may retain those workers’ compensation benefits.
The Heart and Lung Act provides in relevant part that: “During the time salary for temporary incapacity shall be paid by the ... city ... any workmen’s compensation, received or collected by any such employe for such period, shall be turned over to the ... city....” 53 P.S. § 637(a). Based on this portion of Section 637(a), the majority determines that the “clear language” contained in the statute requires that police officers turn over all workers’ compensation benefits — even those received for the loss of earning from concurrent employment, such as in this case, benefits received by Officer Annunziata for his loss of earning from his employment as a guard and maintenance worker.
This approach treats those police officers whose only employment is service as an officer in exactly the same way it treats those police officers who work one or more additional non-service related jobs to make ends meet. By treating these police officers the same, regardless of their different employment situation, the majority’s approach fails to give effect to the Workers’ Compensation Act by depriving police officers who work multiple non-service jobs of any benefits for the loss of earnings from their concurrent employment.
As its opinion shows, the majority is not unaware of or uncaring of this result. Indeed, the majority readily acknowledges that “it is apparent that the General Assembly in drafting the Heart and Lung Act did not consider the effect of concurrent employment” and that it is “not unmindful of the harshness of this result,” yet the majority laments that “we cannot see any way around the word ‘any’,” Majority Opinion, 575 Pa. at p. 607, 838 A.2d at p. 606 and that “our hands are tied.” Majority Opinion, 575 Pa. at p. 608, 838 A.2d at p. 606.
The Statutory Construction Act, however, provides relief for the majority’s understandable concern and for the “harshness” faced by police officers working multiple jobs. Specifically, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(a) states that “[sjtatutes or parts of statutes *610are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things.” In fact, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932(b) mandates that “[statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute.” See Kelly v. City of Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 459, 115 A.2d 238, 245 (1955) (statutes in pari materia should be construed concurrently whenever possible and if they can be made to stand together, effect should be given to both as far as possible); see also Lewis v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 568 Pa. 105, 793 A.2d 143, 149 (2002); Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford School District, 552 Pa. 245, 714 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1998).
Here, both the Heart and Lung Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act relate not only to the same person, but also to the same thing — compensation for a work-related injury. Thus, the two statutes are in pari materia. Moreover, the Legislature clearly intended the two statutes to be construed together in a consistent fashion by the fact that the Heart and Lung Act, by its terms, specifically recognizes a police officer’s concurrent receipt of benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Thus, pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, this Court is mandated to construe the statutes together and to give effect to both of these statutory enactments, if possible. The majority, however, fails to do so. Giving effect to the two statutes is clearly possible in the situation regarding concurrent employment. Indeed, without so stating, the Commonwealth Court did just this in construing the Heart and Lung Act.
Specifically, the Commonwealth Court’s approach requiring officers to return workers’ compensation benefits received for police employment to the employer, but allowing officers to retain benefits received for loss of concurrent employment, gives effect to both statutes, is consistent with the policies underlying both statutes, and is eminently fair. It gives no windfall to police officers and yet takes into account any concurrent employment and recognizes the loss in earning power regarding the other non-service related employment due to the injury occurring while on duty as a police officer. *611For these reasons, I concur in and dissent from the majority’s decision today and would affirm the Commonwealth Court.
Justice LAMB joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.