Court Opinion

ID: 9931225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:17:04.601054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:56.656245
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                    2024 WY 18

                                                   OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                           February 8, 2024

  RONALD PINTHER,

  Appellant
  (Plaintiff),

  v.
                                                         S-23-0133
  AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY AND
  CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY;
  AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE
  COMPANY; and PHILIP MAGGARD,

  Appellees
  (Defendants).

                   Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County
                       The Honorable Steven K. Sharpe, Judge

Representing Ronald Pinther:
      Bernard Q. Phelan, Phelan Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr.
      Phelan.

Representing American National Property and Casualty Insurance Company and
American National Insurance Company:
      Amanda F. Esch and Catherine M. Young, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne,
      Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Young.

Representing Philip Maggard:
      Robert C. Jarosh and Erin E. Berry, Hirst Applegate, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
      Argument by Ms. Berry.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, Ronald Pinther, a former insurance agent representing American
National Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ANPAC) and American National
Insurance Company (ANICO), filed this lawsuit against ANPAC, ANICO, and another
ANPAC and ANICO agent, Philip Maggard. Against ANPAC and ANICO, Mr. Pinther
asserted claims of breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel, civil conspiracy, and age discrimination.
Against Mr. Maggard, he asserted claims for tortious interference with contract and civil
conspiracy. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims against ANPAC
and Mr. Maggard. 1 Mr. Pinther appeals, and we affirm.

                                                 ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Pinther offers one issue for review—whether the district court erred when it
granted summary judgment. We separate Mr. Pinther’s issue into five:

                1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
                   Mr. Pinther’s breach of contract claim against ANPAC?

                2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
                   Mr. Pinther’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith
                   and fair dealing against ANPAC?

                3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
                   Mr. Pinther’s fraudulent inducement claim against
                   ANPAC?

                4. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
                   Mr. Pinther’s tortious interference with contract claim
                   against Mr. Maggard?

                5. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on
                   Mr. Pinther’s civil conspiracy claims against ANPAC and
                   Mr. Maggard?

1
  The district court also granted summary judgment on all claims against ANICO, except for Mr. Pinther’s
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parties later stipulated to the dismissal
with prejudice of that claim and it was dismissed. None of Mr. Pinther’s claims against ANICO are at issue
in this appeal.

                                                      1
                                         FACTS

[¶3] ANPAC and ANICO are two members of American National—a group of
companies that provide insurance products. ANPAC sells property and casualty insurance,
and ANICO sells life insurance and annuities.

[¶4] In 2011, Mr. Pinther applied to be an insurance sales agent for ANPAC and ANICO
in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Jim Gniady was an American National multiple line general
agent, whose responsibilities included recruiting and training new sales agents in the
region. During the application process, Mr. Gniady gave Mr. Pinther a recruiting brochure.
The brochure summarizes various benefits available to its insurance agents, including
“Retirement Compensation.” In this section, the brochure states:

             American National
             All first-year and renewal commissions are vested and payable
             to you the day you start with American National, and continue
             as long as renewal commissions are paid, which is generally 10
             years. There is no retirement age.

             ANPAC®
             Lifetime annuity, either single life or joint survivor based on
             lifetime loss ratio, length of service, and average compensation
             over the last 60 months.

             Minimum age for eligibility is 55 with at least 5 years of
             service and over 750 property and casualty units in force.

Each page of the brochure states, in capital letters, “FOR RECRUITING PURPOSES
ONLY.”

[¶5] ANPAC and ANICO independently agreed to engage Mr. Pinther as an agent for
their respective companies and each company entered into a separate agent agreement with
Mr. Pinther. The ANPAC Agent Agreement (the ANPAC Agreement) specifies, “This
Agreement, with the attached Schedules and Supplements, constitutes the sole agreement
and supersedes all prior Agreements between you” and ANPAC. It provides that either
party may terminate the agreement “without cause at any time by giving written notice to
the other party at least thirty (30) days prior to the date fixed for termination.”

[¶6] The ANPAC Agreement outlines “Post-Termination Procedures” and provides that
qualified agents will be paid “as specified in the Post-Termination Compensation
Schedule,” which “is attached and incorporated.” The Post-Termination Compensation
Schedule contains a formula for calculating monthly post-termination payments. The
parties dispute whether the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule was attached to the

                                            2
ANPAC Agreement when Mr. Pinther signed it. Mr. Pinther claims it was not attached
and it was never separately given to him. ANPAC argues that regardless of whether the
Post-Termination Compensation Schedule was attached, the dispute is not material.

[¶7] Mr. Gniady testified that from the beginning Mr. Pinther’s performance was
disappointing both in terms of the number of policies he wrote and the quality of service
he provided. Mr. Gniady received complaints from ANPAC’s underwriting department
because Mr. Pinther submitted applications on properties that were unacceptable risks and
incorrectly wrote auto policies as “pleasure use” policies, resulting in inappropriate
coverage. In addition, customers complained about Mr. Pinther. As the number of
customer complaints about Mr. Pinther continued to increase, Mr. Gniady started
documenting those complaints. Mr. Gniady asked his assistant general agent, Mr.
Maggard, 2 to report complaints received about any American National agents in the region,
including Mr. Pinther, and Mr. Maggard complied. Eventually, Mr. Gniady made ANPAC
(and ANICO) aware of his concerns with Mr. Pinther’s performance.

[¶8] ANPAC chose to terminate its agreement with Mr. Pinther. On December 12, 2018,
ANPAC sent Mr. Pinther a letter notifying him that his ANPAC Agreement would be
terminated, effective January 17, 2019. 3 After Mr. Pinther’s agency agreement was
terminated, ANPAC paid post-termination compensation in accordance with its Post-
Termination Compensation Schedule.

[¶9] Mr. Pinther filed this lawsuit, asserting claims against ANPAC and ANICO for
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent
inducement, promissory estoppel, civil conspiracy, and age discrimination. He also
asserted claims for tortious interference with contract and civil conspiracy against Mr.
Maggard. ANPAC, ANICO, and Mr. Maggard moved for summary judgment on all
claims. The district court granted the motion with respect to ANPAC and Mr. Maggard.
Mr. Pinther appeals the district court’s ruling on his breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement, and civil conspiracy claim
against ANPAC and his tortious interference with contract and civil conspiracy claim
against Mr. Maggard.

2
  At all times relevant to this dispute, Mr. Maggard owned and operated an American National insurance
agency in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He was an assistant general agent, which meant he had additional duties
including training and recruiting agents in his area.
3
  ANICO also terminated its agency agreement with Mr. Pinther.

                                                  3
                                       DISCUSSION

[¶10] Before turning to the issues, we address the threshold question of whether Wyoming
or Missouri law applies in this matter. We conclude that Missouri law applies to the
contract issues and Wyoming law applies to the tort issues.

[¶11] The ANPAC Agreement provides that the agreement’s “validity, construction, and
performance . . . shall be controlled by and construed under the laws of the State of
Missouri.” Wyoming courts will enforce such “choice-of-law provisions and apply foreign
law when doing so is not ‘contrary to the law, public policy, or the general interests of
Wyoming’s citizens.’” Finley Res., Inc. v. EP Energy E&P Co., L.P., 2019 WY 65, ¶ 9,
443 P.3d 838, 842 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Res. Tech. Corp. v. Fisher Sci. Co., 924 P.2d 972,
975 (Wyo. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law to claims of breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel where contract stated it “shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania”)). Whether Mr. Pinther’s claims are governed by the contract’s choice of
law provision depends on the scope of the language, the parties’ intent, and the substance
of the factual allegations.

[¶12] The ANPAC Agreement states that its “validity, construction, and performance
. . . shall be controlled by and construed under the laws of the State of Missouri.”
(Emphasis added.) Like Wyoming, Missouri looks to the language of the choice of law
provision to determine whether the parties intended extra-contractual claims to be governed
by the contract. See Farmers Exch. Bank v. Metro Contracting Servs., Inc., 107 S.W.3d
381, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (while contractual choice of law provision “would govern
in the underlying contractual dispute between the parties as to the breach of the . . . notes,
it does not extend to the postjudgment dispute here . . .”). In a parallel analysis in
Jitterswing v. Francorp, the Missouri Court held a narrow forum selection clause did not
extend to a tort claim:

                      However, the existence of a forum selection clause in a
              contract that requires contractual disputes to be litigated in a
              specific forum, does not require tort claims between the same
              parties to be litigated in that forum absent precise language to
              that effect. Service Vending Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93
              S.W.3d 764, 768 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002). Further, a forum
              selection clause in a contract does not control the site for
              litigation of a tort claim simply because the dispute that
              produced the tort claim would not have arisen absent the
              existence of a contract. Id. at 769.

Jitterswing, Inc. v. Francorp, Inc., 311 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). Later in
Thieret Family v. Delta Plains Services, the court contrasted the narrow clause in

                                              4
Jitterswing with the broadly drafted language in Thieret to determine whether a forum
selection clause governed extra-contractual claims:

                     In Jitterswing, we held that the following forum
             selection clause in the parties’ franchise development program
             agreement did not apply to the plaintiff’s statutory tort claim
             for the practice of law without a license . . . : “[T]he parties
             agree that any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be
             resolved in the state or federal courts, within the state of
             Illinois, and each party expressly consents to jurisdiction
             therein.” 311 S.W.3d at 830.

                                        .    .    .

             [T]he forum selection clause in Jitterswing was much narrower
             than that in this case, as the Jitterswing clause only governed
             “any dispute arising under this Agreement.” Id. Thus, we held
             that this clause “was not specific enough to encompass the tort
             claim for the practice of law without a license.” Id. at 831. In
             contrast, the Forum Selection Clause in this case governs
             “[a]ny lawsuit or litigation arising under, out of, in connection
             with, or in relation to this Agreement, any amendment hereof,
             or the breach hereof . . . .” Thus, because the Forum Selection
             Clause not only encompassed claims “arising under” the
             subject agreement (like in Jitterswing), but also included
             claims “[arising] out of,” “in connection with,” or “in relation
             to” the subject agreement, its reach is far greater than the forum
             selection clause in Jitterswing. Accordingly, we conclude that
             even if Appellants’ fraudulent inducement claims do not “arise
             under” the Finance Agreements, they certainly “[arise] out of,”
             are “connect[ed] with,” and “relat[e] to” the Finance
             Agreements. In short, we find that this language in the Forum
             Selection Clause was broad enough to encompass Appellants’
             common law fraudulent inducement claims under the specific
             facts of this case.

Thieret Fam., LLC v. Delta Plains Servs., LLC, 637 S.W.3d 595, 606–07 (Mo. Ct. App.
2021) (emphasis omitted).

[¶13] Mr. Pinther’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing concern the “validity, construction, and performance” of the ANPAC
Agreement and, pursuant to the agreement, Missouri law applies. The narrow language of
the ANPAC Agreement does not encompass Mr. Pinther’s claims for fraudulent

                                             5
inducement, tortious interference with contract, or civil conspiracy. 4 These claims do not
arise out of the contract, and the law of the state with the most significant relationship to
the transaction and parties governs. To determine the most significant relationship to a tort
issue, courts look to:

               (a)    the place where the injury occurred,
               (b)    the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
               (c)    the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
               incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
               (d)    the place where the relationship, if any, between the
               parties is centered.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (Am. Law Inst. 1971). Here, Mr. Pinther
was given the brochure in Wyoming, signed the ANPAC Agreement in Wyoming, and
performed his work in Wyoming. The complaints and reporting of complaints arose from
his activities in Wyoming. Wyoming law applies to Mr. Pinther’s claims for fraudulent
inducement, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] Notwithstanding the application of Missouri law to some claims and Wyoming law
to others, “Wyoming law applies to procedural matters including the standard of review.”
LFP Consulting, LLC v. Leighton, 2024 WY 12, ¶ 8, — P.3d —, — (Wyo. 2024) (citing
Denbury Onshore, LLC v. APMTG Helium LLC, 2020 WY 146, ¶ 24, 476 P.3d 1098, 1105
(Wyo. 2020)). A district “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” W.R.C.P. 56(a). “We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo and may affirm on any basis in the record.” W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Black
Dog Consulting Inc., 2023 WY 109, ¶ 7, 538 P.3d 973, 975–76 (Wyo. 2023); Gates v.
Mem’l Hosp. of Converse Cnty. - Advanced Med. Hometown Care by & through Bd. of
Trustees of Mem’l Hosp. of Converse Cnty., 2023 WY 77, ¶ 14, 533 P.3d 493, 498 (Wyo.
2023); Primrose Ret. Cmtys., LLC v. Ghidorzi Constr. Co., LLC, 2023 WY 15, ¶ 8, 523
P.3d 1219, 1224 (Wyo. 2023).

               We review a summary judgment in the same light as the district
               court, using the same materials and following the same
               standards. We examine the record from the vantage point most
               favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that
               party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be
               drawn from the record. A material fact is one which, if proved,

4
 ANPAC does not dispute that Wyoming law could apply to the fraudulent inducement claim. Mr. Maggard
only cites Wyoming law.

                                                 6
              would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential
              element of the cause of action or defense asserted by the
              parties.

W. Am. Ins., ¶ 7, 538 P.3d at 975–76 (quoting Gates, ¶ 14, 533 P.3d at 498–99).

I.     Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s breach
       of contract claim against ANPAC?

[¶15] Mr. Pinther contends that the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule was not
attached to the ANPAC Agreement, and he did not sign the Post-Termination
Compensation Schedule. As a result, he asserts it violates the statute of frauds and is
unenforceable. He also argues that he had the right to receive commissions as described
in the recruiting brochure after the contract was terminated.

[¶16] We first address the argument that the statute of frauds bars application of the Post-
Termination Compensation Schedule. Under Missouri law, to be enforceable, contracts
that are to be performed over more than a year must be in writing and signed by the parties:

              No action shall be brought . . . upon any agreement that is not
              to be performed within one year from the making thereof,
              unless the agreement upon which the action shall be brought,
              or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and
              signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other
              person by him thereto lawfully authorized . . . .

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 432.010 (West 2023).

[¶17] “Whether a writing satisfies the statute of frauds is a question of law.” Pecos I, LLC
v. Meyer, 655 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Cook, 167 S.W.3d
258, 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)).

              “In Missouri, matters incorporated into a contract by reference
              are as much a part of the contract as if they had been set out in
              the contract in haec verba.” [Dunn Indus. Group, Inc. v.] City
              of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d [421,] 435 n.5 [(Mo. 2003)]. This
              is true as long as the intent to incorporate is clear and the
              incorporating contract makes a plain, explicit reference to and
              adequately identifies the incorporated document. See State ex
              rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 810–11 (Mo. banc 2015).

Bridgecrest Acceptance Corp. v. Donaldson, 648 S.W.3d 745, 752 (Mo. 2022), as modified
(Aug. 30, 2022). Missouri courts have long held that “where the terms of an agreement

                                             7
are supplied by an unsigned document, the signatures of the party to be charged may be
found in a separate writing, provided that one document expressly or explicitly incorporates
the other by reference.” Arnold v. Broadmoor Dev. Co., 585 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (citing Aurora Water Co. v. City of Aurora, 129 Mo. 540, 31 S.W. 946 (1895);
Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Consol. Prods. Co., 81 F.2d 182, 187–88 (8th Cir. 1936));
see also Pecos I, 655 S.W.3d at 589 (“When separate documents are relied on to establish
the existence of an agreement, they must be connected by express reference to one another
or by clear implication established through their respective contents.” (quoting Mayer v.
King Cola Mid-Am., Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983))); Intertel, Inc. v.
Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 204 S.W.3d 183, 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he
parties to a contract may incorporate contractual terms by reference to a separate,
noncontemporaneous document, including a separate agreement to which they are not
parties, and including a separate document which is unsigned.” (quoting 11 Samuel
Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 30.25, at 232–34 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th
ed. 1990))).

[¶18] The language of the ANPAC Agreement states, “The Post-Termination
Compensation Schedule is attached and incorporated herein.”         This language
unambiguously incorporates the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule and the fact
that the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule was not separately signed does not
cause it to run afoul of Missouri’s statute of frauds.

[¶19] Mr. Pinther next argues that even if the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule
was incorporated into the ANPAC Agreement, it does not apply to him not only because it
was not attached, but also because he did not receive a copy of the schedule. 5 We assume,
for the purposes of our summary judgment analysis, that Mr. Pinther did not receive the
Post-Termination Compensation Schedule. Whether or not Mr. Pinther received it is not

5
  He submits that the language contained in the recruiting brochure ought to govern his post-termination
compensation from ANPAC. He further argues that his compensation could only be forfeited if he had
committed an act that materially prejudiced ANPAC.
        The ANPAC Agreement states:
                 COMPENSATION AFTER TERMINATION
                 Payments will be made monthly to qualified Agents as specified in the
                 Post-Termination Compensation Schedule. If you [the Agent] have
                 violated any of the provisions of this Agreement or acted to prejudice
                 materially the interests of [ANPAC] at, before, or after termination of this
                 Agreement, you shall forfeit all commissions and all other compensation
                 due or to accrue under this or any previous Agreement between you and
                 [ANPAC].
To make this argument, Mr. Pinther disregards the first sentence and focuses on the second. Mr. Pinther’s
reliance on this language, and his argument that it does not apply to him, do not advance his cause. This
portion of the ANPAC Agreement identifies the circumstances under which no post-termination
compensation will be paid. There is no dispute that Mr. Pinther has received compensation calculated under
the terms of the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule, as described in the first sentence.

                                                    8
dispositive. “Missouri has long recognized that a person signing an agreement has a duty
to read it.” Lopez v. GMT Auto Sales, Inc., 656 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 2022)
(quoting Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Bittner, 920 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
“Missouri law presumes that a party had knowledge of the contract he or she signed; and
those who sign a contract have a duty to read it and may not avoid the consequences of the
agreement on the basis that they did not know what they were signing.” Id. at 321 (quoting
Bertocci v. Thoroughbred Ford, Inc., 530 S.W.3d 543, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)). The
document, attached or not, was incorporated by express reference to the agreement signed
by Mr. Pinther. “Matters incorporated into contract by reference are as much a part of the
contract as if they had been set out in the contract in haec verba.” Intertel, 204 S.W.3d at
196 (citing Lacey v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 131 S.W.3d 831, 839
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004), as modified (Apr. 27, 2004)). The Post-Termination Compensation
Schedule is part of the Agreement and Mr. Pinther is presumed to have knowledge of it.
His contention that he did not receive it is immaterial.

[¶20] The ANPAC Agreement, including the incorporated Post-Termination
Compensation Schedule, governed Mr. Pinther’s compensation after his relationship with
ANPAC had been terminated. There is no dispute that Mr. Pinther has received
compensation calculated pursuant to that schedule. The district court properly granted
summary judgment on his breach of contract claim against ANPAC.

II.    Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s claim
       for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against ANPAC?

[¶21] Mr. Pinther argues that ANPAC breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Mr. Pinther alleges ANPAC acted in bad faith by failing to inform him of
complaints against him, and “secretively enlist[ing] the help of the Maggards to build a file
against” him “to ‘justify’ the without cause termination” of his ANPAC Agreement.

[¶22] In Missouri, when contracts between insurance companies and their agents provide
that the relationship can be terminated without cause upon written notice, “whether labeled
an independent contractor or employee, the [insurance company-agent] relationship and
termination of it is governed by general principles enunciated in [Missouri’s] at-will
doctrine cases.” Bishop v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 129 S.W.3d 500, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
Under Missouri’s application of the at-will employment doctrine, “the reason for an
employee’s termination is inconsequential and irrelevant, unless the firing violates a statute
or public policy.” Bishop, 129 S.W.3d at 506 (citing Emerick v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
756 S.W.2d 513, 522 (Mo. 1988); Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Mo. 1985); Costello
v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 697 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).

              “Missouri law concerning at will employees may not be
              circumvented by an employee who alleges a contract of good
              faith and fair dealing between the employer and employee.”

                                              9
              Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine, 694
              S.W.2d 822, 824[2] (Mo. App. 1985).

              . . . [T]he Missouri employment at-will doctrine expressly
              prohibits any consideration of the implied covenant of good
              faith and fair dealing (inherent in all contracts) when an
              employer is sued for terminating the employee. This follows
              because the implied covenant cannot be used to contradict or
              override the express employment terms contained in a contract,
              i.e., that an employee can be terminated for any cause. When
              a contract does not provide a definite period for employment
              and fails to include provisions related to reasons for
              termination, the good faith and fair dealing covenant cannot be
              implied to supersede the express agreement that the employee
              can be fired without cause.

Bishop, 129 S.W.3d at 506.

[¶23] In Bishop, Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (Shelter) terminated its agency
contract with one of its agents. Bishop, 129 S.W.3d at 502. The agent sued Shelter,
alleging, among other things, a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id. On appeal, the agent argued “that although [Shelter] would ordinarily have
had the right to terminate his contract for cause, or for no cause, without incurring liability,
[the agent] could avoid that rule by alleging facts, which if proven, would establish
[Shelter] breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. at 506. The court
held that the agent’s “argument runs counter to Missouri law.” Id. See also Kelly v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 517, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“there can be no
claim for the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the termination
of an at-will employment relationship”).

[¶24] Here, as in Bishop, the ANPAC Agreement provides that either party can terminate
it without cause upon 30-days’ written notice. A claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot lie in these circumstances. The district court properly granted
summary judgment on this claim.

III.   Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s
       fraudulent inducement claim against ANPAC?

[¶25] Mr. Pinther argues that there are sufficient disputed facts to submit his fraudulent
inducement claim against ANPAC to a jury. In order to prevail on a claim for fraudulent
inducement, Mr. Pinther must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that 1) ANPAC
made a false representation intending to induce action by Mr. Pinther; 2) Mr. Pinther
reasonably believed the representation to be true; and 3) Mr. Pinther suffered damages in

                                              10
relying on the false representation. Positive Progressions, LLC v. Landerman, 2015 WY
138, ¶ 23, 360 P.3d 1006, 1015 (Wyo. 2015). “Clear and convincing evidence is the ‘kind
of proof which would persuade a trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly
probable.’” Id. (quoting Alexander v. Meduna, 2002 WY 83, ¶ 29, 47 P.3d 206, 216 (Wyo.
2002)). While clear and convincing evidence generally is not required to withstand a
motion for summary judgment,

                      [w]hen determining if a genuine issue of material fact
              exists regarding a claim of fraud, [the court] must bear in mind
              the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support
              liability. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “the
              [court] must view the evidence presented through the prism of
              the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson v. Liberty
              Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91
              L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]here is no genuine issue if the
              evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient
              caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find
              [fraud] by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. See also
              Richardson v. Hardin, 5 P.3d 793, 797 (Wyo. 2000).

Lee v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., 2003 WY 92, ¶ 12, 74 P.3d 152, 158 (Wyo. 2003).

[¶26] Mr. Pinther asserts that he was fraudulently induced into entering the ANPAC
Agreement by the recruiting brochure which said, “All first-year and renewal commissions
are vested . . . and continue as long as renewal commissions are paid . . . . There is no
retirement age.” This statement appears in the brochure under a subheading entitled
“American National.” 6 Immediately following this paragraph, is a separate subheading
entitled “ANPAC®.” Under the ANPAC subheading, retirement benefits are described as
compensation that takes the form of a “[l]ifetime annuity, either single life or joint survivor
based on lifetime loss ratio, length of service, and average compensation over the last 60
months.”

[¶27] The language that Mr. Pinther relies on addresses the retirement benefits offered by
ANICO, not ANPAC. The recruiting brochure language for ANPAC is consistent with the
Post-Termination Compensation Schedule incorporated in the ANPAC Agreement.

[¶28] The recruiting brochure unambiguously states that it is “for recruiting purposes
only,” and the ANPAC Agreement provides that it is “the sole agreement and supersedes
all prior Agreements” between Mr. Pinther and ANPAC. The district court properly
determined that Mr. Pinther cannot establish that the statements in the recruiting brochure

As discussed supra, ANPAC and ANICO are separate companies and Mr. Pinther separately contracted
6

with each of them.

                                              11
were false or that he reasonably relied on the ANICO retirement sections to the exclusion
of the ANPAC retirement sections of the brochure.

[¶29] Even if Mr. Pinther could prove a misrepresentation based upon the recruiting
brochure’s language, once he received the ANPAC Agreement, he could no longer rely on
the mistaken belief that the brochure governed his agreement with ANPAC. The ANPAC
Agreement put Mr. Pinther on notice that post-termination payments would be based on
the Post-Termination Compensation Schedule. See Fleig v. Est. of Fleig by & through
Fleig, 2018 WY 30, ¶ 12, 413 P.3d 638, 642–43 (Wyo. 2018) (“‘One who signs a contract
generally cannot avoid it on the ground that he did not attend to its terms, or did not read
it, or supposed that it was different in its terms, or that he took someone’s word as to what
it contained.’ Further, when a signed contract incorporates by reference another document,
that document becomes part of the contract even when it is not separately signed.”
(citations omitted)). 7

[¶30] The district court properly concluded that Mr. Pinther could not establish a
fraudulent inducement claim against ANPAC. See Dewey v. Wentland, 2002 WY 2, ¶¶ 17–
18, 38 P.3d 402, 411 (Wyo. 2002) (affirming summary judgment on fraudulent inducement
claim where plaintiffs could not establish reliance upon a misrepresentation when their
inspection of the property revealed contradictory facts); White v. Ogburn, 528 P.2d 1167,
1171 (Wyo. 1974) (dismissing fraudulent misrepresentation claim because plaintiffs
“could not blind themselves to observe the readily available facts and place reliance upon
. . . alleged misrepresentations without making a diligent inquiry of these facts”).

IV.     Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s tortious
        interference with contract claim against Mr. Maggard?

[¶31] Mr. Pinther asserts that his claim against Mr. Maggard for tortious interference with
contract should be decided by a jury. He argues that Mr. Maggard and his wife were in
competition with Mr. Pinther, and Mr. Maggard’s reports of customer complaints
interfered with Mr. Pinther’s ANPAC Agreement.

[¶32] “It has long been the rule in [Wyoming] that a claim for intentional interference with
contract cannot survive if it involves an assertion that an agent for one party to the contract
interfered with it.” Excel Constr., Inc. v. HKM Eng’g, Inc., 2010 WY 34, ¶ 21, 228 P.3d
40, 46 (Wyo. 2010). “[R]eason dictates that an action of wrongful interference directed
against an employee or an agent of one of the parties to the contract must merge into any

7
 Under Missouri law, the result would be the same. See DiSalvo Properties, LLC v. Hall, 616 S.W.3d 502,
507 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (Missouri elements of fraudulent inducement include false representation and
plaintiff’s reliance on the representation); Scott Salvage Yard, LLC v. Gifford, 382 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2012) (same).

                                                   12
action for breach of the contract because the act of the agent must be attributed to the
principal.” Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Sav. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 641 (Wyo. 1990). 8

[¶33] Mr. Pinther argues that because one could infer “cut-throat-competition emerges
among agents,” his tortious interference claim should survive summary judgment. He
contends that Mr. Maggard had a motive to eliminate competition for his own gain and
benefitted from Mr. Pinther’s termination. 9 Mr. Pinther’s unsubstantiated theories about
Mr. Maggard’s motive for reporting complaints are not relevant. When reporting
complaints about Mr. Pinther, Mr. Maggard was acting at the request of his supervisor, Mr.
Gniady. Mr. Pinther has produced no facts to the contrary. Mr. Maggard’s actions are
imputed to ANPAC and cannot form the basis for a separate tortious interference with
contract claim. See Excel, ¶ 21, 228 P.3d at 46; Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407
S.W.3d 579, 602 (Mo. 2013).

[¶34] The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Mr. Maggard on Mr.
Pinther’s claim for tortious interference with contract.

V.      Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s civil
        conspiracy claims against ANPAC and Mr. Maggard?

[¶35] Mr. Pinther rests his civil conspiracy claims on a purported agreement between Mr.
Gniady and Mr. Maggard “to build a file of alleged complaints about [him] without his
knowledge thereby preventing him [from] either refut[ing]or address[ing] them.” On
appeal, he argues there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged conduct
was wrongful.

[¶36] To state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must state an underlying cause of
action in tort. Action Snowmobile & RV, Inc. v. Most Wanted Performance, LLC, 2018
WY 89, ¶ 16, 423 P.3d 317, 324 (Wyo. 2018). See also Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240,
245 (Mo. 1996) (“In Missouri, if tortious acts alleged as elements of a civil conspiracy
claim fail to state a cause of action, then the conspiracy claim fails as well.” (citing Williams
v. Mercantile Bank of St. Louis NA, 845 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993))); Hibbs v.
Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296, 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (“If the underlying wrongful act alleged
as part of a civil conspiracy fails to state a cause of action, the civil conspiracy claim fails

8
  Missouri law is similar. In Missouri, “[a]n action for tortious interference with a business expectancy will
lie against a third party only. Where the individual being sued is an officer or agent of the defendant
corporation, the officer or agent acting for the corporation is the corporation for purposes of tortious
interference.” Farrow v. Saint Francis Med. Ctr., 407 S.W.3d 579, 602 (Mo. 2013) (quoting Zipper v.
Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)); see also Nickel v. Stephens Coll., 480 S.W.3d
390, 399 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
9
  The facts in the record belie Mr. Pinther’s assertions. It is undisputed that during Mr. Pinther’s time as an
agent, Mr. Maggard received commissions associated with Mr. Pinther’s book of business and that these
commissions decreased when Mr. Pinther’s ANPAC Agreement was terminated.

                                                     13
as well.” (quoting Envirotech, Inc. v. Thomas, 259 S.W.3d 577, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008))).
Wyoming and Missouri law yield the same outcome. As discussed above, none of Mr.
Pinther’s tort claims against ANPAC and Mr. Maggard survived summary judgment. As
a result, there is no basis for his civil conspiracy claims. 10 The district court properly
granted summary judgment on Mr. Pinther’s civil conspiracy claims against ANPAC and
Mr. Maggard.

                                            CONCLUSION

[¶37] There are no genuine issues of material fact regarding any of the claims asserted by
Mr. Pinther. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of ANPAC
and Mr. Maggard. Affirmed.

10
  Mr. Pinther asserted claims against ANPAC for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
for fraudulent inducement. Those claims do not survive summary judgment. Supra ¶¶ 21–30. Mr. Pinther’s
sole claim (other than for civil conspiracy) against Mr. Maggard was for tortious interference with contract.
That claim, too, fails as a matter of law. Supra ¶¶ 31–34.

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