Court Opinion

ID: 9530468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:06.241793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.396655
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): I am unable to agree that the jury’s answers to the special questions are so inconsistent with the general verdict as to compel a judgment to be entered thereon in favor of the defendant.
In considering this question we must bear in mind the often-repeated rule of this court that a general verdict imports a finding in favor of the prevailing party upon all the issues in the case not inconsistent with the special findings, and nothing will be presumed in favor of the special findings. They shall be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. If there are ambiguous special findings, then they should be given an interpretation that will sustain the general verdict. (Kitchen v. Lasley Co., 186 Kan. 24, 29, 348 P. 2d 588; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P. 2d 142; King v. Vets Cab, Inc., 179 Kan. 379, 384, 295 P. 2d 605; 56 A. L. R. 2d 1249; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P. 2d 909; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P. 2d 647; Davis v. Kansas Electric Power Co., 159 Kan. 97, 108, 152 P. 2d 806; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 474, 227 P. 2d 153; MacElree v. Wolfersberger, 59 Kan. 105, 52 Pac. 69.)
In considering answers of the jury to the special questions, the court is not permitted to isolate one answer and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to *566inconsistency and another to harmony with the general verdict, the latter is to be adopted. In order to sustain a motion for judgment on the findings it is not sufficient that there be some inconsistency among the findings; they must be so contrary to the general verdict as to clearly compel the court to overthrow the verdict and render a contrary verdict as a matter of law. (Creten v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Rld. Co., 184 Kan. 387, 400, 337 P. 2d 1003; Sparks v. Guaranty State Bank, 182 Kan. 165, 168, 318 P. 2d 1062; Snyder v. City of Concordia, 182 Kan. 268, 320 P. 2d 820; Dick’s Transfer Co. v. Miller, 154 Kan. 574, 119 P. 2d 454; Lee v. Gas Service Company, 166 Kan. 285, 288, 201 P. 2d 1023.)
It is another well-established rule in this state that a general finding in the nature of a conclusion must yield to contrary specific and detailed findings on a. particular point in issue. In Hultberg v. Phillippi, 169 Kan. 610, 220 P. 2d 208, we were confronted with a similar situation. One of the special questions to the jury and the answer thereto follows: “7. Did Mrs. Hultberg [plaintiff], by her own negligence, contribute to her injury? Answer: Yes.” In that case the defendant contended that the answer definitely settled the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence and barred recovery. We said: "We cannot agree. In the first place, the question calls for the conclusion of the jury as a matter of law rather than a finding on a specific question of fact. It is definitely general in character and is purely in the nature of a conclusion. Such general finding or conclusion, if contradicted by detailed findings, cannot prevail, but is controlled by and must yield to the special or derailed findings of ultimate facts. (Harrison v. Travelers Mutual Cas. Co., 156 Kan. 492, 134 P. 2d 681.)” We further stated in that case that the jury’s findings as to specific facts clearly established negligence on the part of the defendant and absolved plaintiff from any contributory negligence which would bar her recovery, and under the rule the conclusion contained in answer No. 7 must yield to the detailed findings of such specific facts.
This same rule was reiterated in Scott v. Bennett, 181 Kan. 410, 414, 312 P. 2d 224, wherein we held that where the answer to a special question is general in nature, calling for a conclusion, if contradicted by special or detailed findings cannot prevail but is controlled by and must yield to detailed findings of ultimate facts. We further stated that one may be guilty of negligence and still not be barred from recovery unless such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and damage sustained.
*567Mindful of the foregoing rules of law, let us analyze the answers to the special questions so as to harmonize them, if possible, with the general verdict. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the answers to the special questions notwithstanding the general verdict concedes, for that purpose, that the answers are supported by evidence. (Cain v. Steely, supra.)
The answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2 found that the plaintiff looked before entering the intersection when seventy-five to 100 feet from the center thereof. It is noted the jury did not find that she saw defendant or that defendant was in view at the time she looked or at the time she entered the intersection. Certainly, no negligence is found by the answers to these two questions.
The answer to question No. 3 that plaintiff could have stopped in fifty-two feet just prior to the collision is meaningless. It is not disclosed that she saw defendant or was aware of the fact that he would disregard the law and fail to yield the right of way and enter the intersection at a high rate of speed without having his car under control, as disclosed by the answer to question No. 4. She had a right to rely on the rule of law that others using the streets and entering the intersection would obey the law. In Reda v. Lowe, 185 Kan. 306, 312, 342 P. 2d 172, we said: “The operator of an automobile on a public highway may assume others using the highway will observe the laws of the road and he is not guilty of contributory negligence in such assumption unless and until he has knowledge to the contrary. (Fry v. Cadle, 171 Kan. 14, 229 P. 2d 724.)”
By the answer to question No. 4 the jury clearly established that the defendant, Johnson, was guilty of three separate acts of negligence — excessive speed, not having his car under control and failing to yield the right of way — and that such acts of negligence were the proximate cause of the collision. The answer is definite and certain, specific and in accord with the general verdict.
Question No. 5 was injected into the lawsuit by the trial court. It is poorly framed and calls for a conclusion. The jury was confused and did not answer it at first. The court required the jury to return to the jury room and answer the question. It is misleading in that it did not ask what acts of negligence, if any, the plaintiff was guilty of or whether such negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of the collision. It is clear that the answer to question No. 5, being in the nature of a conclusion, must give way to the specific and definite answer regarding the negligence of the defendant, *568which was the proximate cause of the collision, as disclosed by the answer to question No. 4. It seems clear to me that while the jury found plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the collision, by its general verdict it found that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the collision and by its answer found that the sole proximate cause was the negligence of defendant as specified. (Bateman v. Crum, 186 Kan. 1, 5, 348 P. 2d 639.)
I feel that the majority opinion in the instant case is in direct conflict with our very recent cases of Bateman v. Crum, supra; Scott v. Bennett, supra, and Hultberg v. Phillippi, supra, where in my opinion the identical questions were at issue. I believe that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on the general verdict. Surely this court cannot supplement the jury’s answer to special question No. 5 and in view of the general verdict hold as a matter of law that plaintiff’s contributory negligence was a proximate cause of the collision.