Court Opinion

ID: 9566173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:39.281057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:58.047527
License: Public Domain

Carley, Chief judge,
dissenting.
In my opinion, appellee-defendants’ motion to dismiss was correctly granted, although not for any of the reasons that the trial court gave for doing so. Therefore, I would affirm under the principle of “right for any reason” and must respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of what I perceive to be a correct ruling by the trial court.
I agree with the majority that, in certain circumstances, a party may seek not only cancellation of a foreclosure sale, but also appropriate damages based upon the wrongful conduct of the defendant. However, in this case, appellant seeks to recover on the basis that appellees’ wrongful foreclosure was an intentional infliction of emotional distress upon her. “The law of this state recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. [Cits.] In order to sustain a cause of action, a plaintiff must show that ‘defendant’s actions were so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.’ [Cit.] . . . [P]reparation and filing of legal pleadings [can] not reasonably be characterized as ‘humiliating, insulting, or terrifying’. . . . [Appellant’s] allegations concerning wrongful foreclosure of [her property] as a basis for intentional infliction of emotional distress upon [her] personally are analogous to the filing of legal pleadings. . . . The alleged wrongful foreclosure was not, as a matter of law, an event so humiliating, insulting, or terrifying so as to have come within the ambit of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” East River Savings Bank v. Steele, 169 Ga. App. 9, 10 (311 SE2d 189) (1983). It necessarily follows that, as a matter of law, appellant has no viable claim against appellees for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the wrongful foreclosure and that, contrary to the majority, the trial court correctly granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Judge Birdsong and Judge Pope join in this dissent.