Court Opinion

ID: 9711775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:38:43.594799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.426949
License: Public Domain

BELSON, Associate Judge,
dissenting from the result:
I disagree with the result reached by Chief Judge Rogers and Judge Ferren for two reasons.
First, I disagree fundamentally with their holding that “as a matter of law” H.R. cannot be deemed to have “abandoned” his so-called “opportunity interest” in developing a parent-child relationship with Baby Boy C. Cf. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The relevant facts as found by Judge Virginia Riley, the most salient of which are not disputed, demonstrate that H.R. could readily have grasped his “opportunity interest” but failed to do so despite having received notice of the birth of his son in ample time to “come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.” Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1768, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979).
Second, even if we should assume, ar-guendo, that H.R. had seized his opportunity interest under Lehr and Caban, H.R. still would not be entitled to prevail in his opposition to the adoption of Baby Boy C. by the O. family because the trial court credited the testimony of an expert witness, Allen E. Marans, M.D., that removal of Baby Boy C. from the only family he had ever known would have a “devastating” effect on the child. Even if H.R. should be found a “fit” father (as Dr. Mar-ans assumed he was) who had seized his opportunity interest, the finding of the devastating effect upon Baby Boy C. that would be caused by his removal from the O. family mandates the ultimate finding that a transfer of custody to H.R. would be detrimental to Baby Boy C.’s best interests or, in Judge Ferren’s terminology, would “actually harm” the child. (Opinion of Fer-ren, J., at 1182). Under any view of applicable law advanced in the three opinions of this division, the result reached by the trial court must be affirmed because of this unassailable finding of fact.1
I.
I restate the facts only to the extent necessary to demonstrate two points: 1) as the trial court determined, H.R. failed to grasp the opportunity interest that Lehr and antecedent authority recognized in unwed fathers, despite having received actual notice of the planned adoption one or two days following Baby Boy C.’s birth; and 2) the record fully supports the trial judge’s unqualified finding of the devastating effect upon Baby Boy C. of separation from the 0. family.
H.R. and L.C.’s relationship lasted from April, 1982, when they met in Zaire, through November, 1982, when they stopped seeing each other. L.C. was one week pregnant with Baby Boy C. at the *1193time of their last meeting. Throughout the eight-month period that they were “going together” H.R. was engaged to be married to a Zairian woman, E.R.,2 then living in Paris. H.R.’s marriage to E.R. took place in December, 1983. At that time, E.R. was in Paris and H.R. was in Zaire. The trial court found that H.R. told E.R. about Baby Boy C. in April, 1984, when H.R. joined E.R. in France, eight months after the child’s birth.
L.C. left Zaire in April, 1983, when she was five months pregnant, and gave birth to Baby Boy C. in Washington, D.C. on August 5, 1983. Ten days after Baby Boy C.’s birth, having heard nothing from appellant since her departure from Zaire, L.C. relinquished her parental rights to the Barker Foundation, a licensed child-placement agency, so that Baby Boy C. might be placed for adoption. During this period, both L.C. and Barker wrote to appellant at his university.
Upon her departure from Zaire, L.C. had written appellant H.R. a letter informing him that she was pregnant and that he was the biological father. By letter dated May 31, 1983, when L.C. was at least six months pregnant (and elective abortion no longer an option), Barker notified H.R. that L.C. had been working with Barker “with a view to placing the child she expects in July, 1983, for adoption.” Significantly, the letter invited H.R. to telephone Barker collect if he wished to have any more information. In addition, although the letter did not notify appellant that a specific court proceeding had been initiated concerning the adoption of Baby Boy C. (which, of course, was not so at the time the letter had been mailed and received), the letter referred to “placement for the child,” advice by Barker’s “legal counsel,” that the documents sent with the letter could “not be subpoenaed for use in any other proceeding” (emphasis added), that the forms must be “notarized,” and that the Barker Foundation was “licensed through the Department of Human Services of the District of Columbia.” (quoted in Opinion of Fer-ren, J., at 1145).
Appellant H.R. received this correspondence from Barker within a few days of Baby Boy C.’s birth and approximately one month after graduating from a university with a degree in law. Rather than telephoning Barker for more information, as suggested in Barker’s letter, or contacting American lawyers in Zaire or officials at the U.S. Embassy in Zaire, appellant wrote a letter to L.C. on August 12, 1983, in care of her parents, stating in part that if she later married a racist, she should send the child to him to raise “if life with her husband is impossible.”
Appellant used the mails to write L.C. although they were slow and unreliable. L.C. received his August 12, 1983, letter sometime in mid-September. Appellant also failed to write to Barker or to fill out the forms. Thus, the record supports the trial judge’s finding that, during the crucial weeks following the birth of Baby Boy C., appellant was not seizing his opportunity interest.
Not having heard from appellant, the Barker Foundation placed Baby Boy C. with the 0. family on September 22, 1983. On the same day, the 0. family filed a petition for adoption in the Superior Court.
During October, 1983, appellant received confirmation, through two telephone calls he placed to L.C., that a child had been born, a boy, that L.C. had given up her parental rights to the boy, that Baby Boy C. had been placed in an adoptive home, and that a court was involved. In these telephone conversations, L.C. encouraged him to contact the Barker Foundation. L.C. testified that H.R. supported her decision to put Baby Boy C. up for adoption. In November and December 1983, L.C. wrote appellant two letters describing what she knew of Baby Boy C.’s adoptive placement and expressing her belief that the child was well cared-for.
After receiving these letters, appellant finally made a telephone call to the Barker Foundation. This call was placed on January 17,1984, five and one-half months after Baby Boy C.’s birth and appellant’s receipt *1194of Barker’s May, 1983, letter. In response to a question on cross-examination as to why he waited from August, 1983, until January, 1984, to telephone Barker, H.R. testified: “It is a matter of temperament. I preferred first to examine the situation before making a decision.” By this time, Baby Boy C. had been with the 0. family for four months, and H.R. had not made any effective effort to assume the role of a parent.
There was some disagreement as to what appellant H.R. told Barker about his wishes for Baby Boy C. H.R. testified that he told Barker he wanted to “recuperate” or pick up his son. Appellant also testified that he “requested clarification on the situation” of his child. Barker understood appellant to request only clarification of the forms (and the trial court so found). What is not in dispute is that appellant informed Barker that he would be more likely to receive correspondence addressed to him in care of the Peace Corps in Zaire. At the same time, appellant told Barker that he was expecting to take a trip to France or to Canada shortly, during which he hoped to come to this country to see the child.
Appellant acknowledged that he received a letter sent by Barker on February 6, 1984, concerning the adoption procedures in the United States and testified that it made him determined to fight to gain custody of Baby Boy C. At about the time the letter was sent, appellant called L.C., but did not contact the Barker Foundation either to voice his opposition to the adoption or to fill out the forms. Appellant testified that he did not seek an American lawyer in Zaire because he was soon to leave the country, and that he decided not to consult with the American Embassy in Zaire because “[i]t wasn't necessary” to consult with anyone familiar with U.S. law on adoption. He stated, however, that “I can understand that the court would expect that I could contact an American lawyer.” By this time, the child was over six months old, and H.R. was still taking no effective steps to assert his interest in custody.
In late April, 1984, appellant’s government sent him to Paris, France, to continue his law studies, rather than to Canada. Appellant telephoned L.C. twice in early May, 1984, and informed her of his situation. Appellant testified that during these conversations he asked L.C. to inform the Barker Foundation that he intended to come to the United States to take custody of Baby Boy C. when he had saved enough money. He acknowledged, however, that when he telephoned her to wish her a happy Mother’s Day, he promised her that he would think about consenting to the adoption.
L.C. had a different understanding of their conversation. On May 8, 1984, she wrote Barker a letter in which she stated:
Good news_ [Appellant] is in Paris, planning to try to find a job there or to return to his position in Zaire. He said he wanted to wish me a happy mother’s day.... Tho [sic] he didn’t have much to offer, he felt the best gift he could give was to sign the papers. He either already has or will sign them & send them in.
H.R. was in France approximately six months before contacting an attorney in September, 1984. After his attorney advised him that he must take action if he wished to gain custody of Baby Boy C., appellant wrote a letter to the Barker Foundation, informing Barker for the first time of his Paris address and stating:
I have reflected a lot on this situation and fear that we probably have different points of view concerning what would be considered in the best interests of the child. Since [Baby Boy C.] has been rejected by his mother I do not believe that it is in his best interests that I distance myself from him. On the contrary, having been deprived of the person who would have been a marvelous mother for him, there only remains for him his true father, before any other solution.
Therefore I cannot give my consent to any plan which would result in separating him further from his biological parents.
I regret not being able to accept this full adoption project for the benefit of *1195people who are foreign and unknown to [L.C.], [Baby Boy C.], and myself.

Therefore I am ready to recover the child as soon as you [Barker] feel yourself no longer able to exercise [L.C.’s] rights as she would have exercised them if she still had rights to the child.

(Emphasis added). Although appellant mailed this letter on December 1, 1984, Barker did not receive it until February 6, 1985. As the last paragraph of the letter reveals, H.R. remained ambivalent about assuming his role as a father. Baby Boy C. was over 16 months old when Barker received it, and H.R. was still equivocating about his possible role as a parent.
On February 25, 1985, appellant wrote Barker another letter advising that he had retained an attorney and had admitted paternity. He asked Barker to inform the court that he did not intend to abandon his child to anyone but L.C. In addition, he stated that he would like to gain custody of Baby Boy C. by his second birthday. He proposed that once he gained custody, Mr. and Mrs. 0., appellees, be given visitation rights during vacations.
The trial at which the foregoing facts were elicited also occasioned the testimony of two child psychiatrists. Dr. Allen Elias Marans testified that based on his interviews with Baby Boy C. and the 0. family, he thought that the family was doing an outstanding job of raising Baby Boy C. Dr. Marans concluded that removal of Baby Boy C., then 23 months of age, would be “devastating” to Baby Boy C. Dr. Mar-ans viewed the rapprochement period that Baby Boy C. was then going through as a crucial developmental stage. Removing Baby Boy C. from the only family he had ever known would mean, in Dr. Marans’ view, that “his full potential could never be reached either in the intellectual or emotional range.” Removing Baby Boy C. from his prospective adoptive family would jeopardize his trust of future relationships. Such a change would cause the child to regress, as well. While agreeing that the effect of removing Baby Boy C. from his adoptive home could cause a “permanent scar,” Dr. Marans acknowledged during cross-examination that if Baby Boy C. were to be removed at age three, rather than at twenty-three months, the problems would be more of a nature of “character development” than “gross impairment.” On the subject of returning Baby Boy C. to his natural father, Dr. Marans noted that the “biological tie does not compensate for the nurturing that has taken place.” Dr. Mar-ans concluded that it was in the best interest of Baby Boy C. to remain with his adoptive family.
Dr. Joseph Noshpitz, the expert called by H.R., testified that based upon his interview with the 0. family, he found them “wholesome people by and large, decent people. I have no problem feeling pretty good about them_” Dr. Noshpitz also acknowledged that they were very much in love with Baby Boy C. Dr. Noshpitz also had the opportunity to interview H.R. and E.R. and found them devoted to each other. Dr. Noshpitz thought that if H.R. were granted custody of Baby Boy C. the transfer of custody should not be immediate. Instead, he would recommend a “transfer be made gradually and stepwise over a period of perhaps several years; that there be a process of transition into which all the people involved would have to engage and within which they would have to participate.” Dr. Noshpitz agreed with Dr. Mar-ans concerning the inadvisability of an immediate transfer of custody from the 0. family to H.R. and stated that it would “create great turmoil and great pain, great confusion, and I would not recommend it.” He later agreed that such an immediate transfer to H.R. would “create harm to the child_” Although Dr. Noshpitz advocated a gradual transfer of custody or really a form of joint custody between H.R. and the 0. family, he was unaware of any studies to back up his theory. Dr. Marans, who was present for Dr. Noshpitz’ testimony, testified that he considered Dr. Nosh-pitz’ plan for a gradual transfer of custody “naive.” Dr. Marans further testified that such a joint custody arrangement would be damaging to the child. He stated: “This child needs to be protected from the deluding and undermining impact of having two sets of parents at this time, with all the *1196split loyalties and sense of loss and loss of identity and everything else. That is to me unquestionable.” Dr. Marans reiterated his earlier view that the “best interests of the child are served by this child’s continuing the stable, sensitive working unit that his family represents now....” During cross-examination, Dr. Marans stated that upon learning that he was separated from his natural father who had sought him Baby Boy C. would experience “anger and resentment but not destruction of [his] personality as there would be now.” The court credited Dr. Marans’ testimony.
On September 11, 1986, after holding hearings over an extended period, the court granted the petition for adoption by appel-lees.
The court’s order was accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court’s findings included the following:
Tearing Baby Boy [C.] away from Petitioners’ family and granting Respondent custody would force the child not only to leave the only home he has ever known, but also to adjust to an entirely new home, culture, family, and language. This indeed would be devastating to the child. The damaging effects could not be removed by the experimental and unprecedented gradual transition and custody that Dr. Noshpitz proposes.
Thus, the court found that H.R.’s “refusal to consent to the adoption is contrary to Baby Boy C[]’s best interests” and that “Petitioners and Barker have established by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Baby Boy C[]’s best interests that he remain with Petitioners’ family, and that Petitioners’ petition for adoption be granted.” I point out, parenthetically, that the foregoing quotation answers the concern expressed by Chief Judge Rogers that the trial court misallocated the burden of proceeding or persuasion, at least at the early stages of the hearing. (Opinion of Rogers, C.J., at 1191-1192). It is clear that when Judge Riley considered the entire record, she placed the appropriate burden on petitioners and Barker.3
The court expressly found that in the past appellant’s intentions regarding his seeking custody of Baby Boy C. were ambivalent, a finding clearly supported by the record. The court noted that appellant waited several months before contacting Barker for the first time; that in appellant’s January 17, 1984, telephone call he did not seek custody but only sought clarification of the documents that had been sent (thus rejecting H.R.’s testimony that he refused to consent to adoption in this call); that he did not respond to Barker’s February, 1984, letter; that although appellant stated in his December 1, 1984, letter that he would not consent to the adoption, he did not specifically seek custody until his February 25, 1985, letter, in which he asked for custody before Baby Boy C.'s second birthday, five months later.
The court also found that appellant had never offered to provide financial support for Baby Boy C., except for an ambiguous offer to L.C. in the fall of 1988, and had never inquired into the child’s health and welfare. The court concluded that appellant
did not make any attempt to establish a custodial, personal, or financial relationship with [Baby Boy C.] until, in July 1985, the Court asked him whether he had ever given or offered any gifts to [Baby Boy C.]_ If [appellant] truly were interested in establishing a meaningful relationship with his child, he would not have allowed geographical separation to prevent him from establishing that relationship... .4
*1197In addition, the court concluded: “[T]he efforts of [the] Barker Foundation and the court to contact [appellant] far exceedfed] the procedural protections upheld in Lehr. Through such efforts, [appellant] was contacted, and he received his due-process hearing.” The court observed that appellant had learned of the pregnancy by May, 1983, and of the proposed adoption by August, 1983: by October, 1983, he had confirmed the fact of the child’s birth and the placement with the appellees; and by February, 1984, at the latest, when Barker sent its second letter, he was on notice that the proposed adoption involved a court proceeding, requiring “compliance with specific court-administered procedures.” The court noted that although appellant claimed he did not understand American law on adoption, he could have consulted the American Embassy or the American law firm in Zaire to ascertain his legal rights, something he declined to do. H.R. testified that in Zaire, adoptions involve the courts and government agencies.
The trial judge also concluded that after appellant received Barker’s reply, “he frustrated the Court’s efforts to give him notice of the adoption proceedings by failing to notify Barker of his move from Zaire to France,” an action which he testified he felt he had no obligation to take. In addition, the court observed that although appellant stated that he moved to France to be in a better position to come to this country to obtain custody of his son, he did not come here until fourteen months later when he was ordered to do so by the court. Indeed, the first time appellant applied for entry to the United States was May 15, 1985. H.R. further testified that the idea of going to the United States in late 1983 after learning he had a son did not occur to him. During this time, he did not ask Barker for the name of the court or infer from Barker’s letterhead, which bore a District of Columbia address, that the court might be located in the District of Columbia. Rather, he “insisted that he need not have come forward in this adoption proceeding until he received ‘official notice’ of the proceeding.”
As we discuss in more length below, the salient facts support the trial judge’s ruling that because H.R. did not take the steps that were reasonably available to assert his rights as a father, he did not become entitled to substantial constitutional protection afforded unwed fathers who do so, and that it is in Baby Boy C.’s best interests that he remain with the 0. family.
II.
The Supreme Court has dealt with the extent to which the due process clause affords protection to an unwed natural father’s biological relationship with his child in just a handful of cases. In these cases, “the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).5 In Lehr, the Supreme Court dealt with the procedural due process protection the state must give an unwed father who wishes to develop his *1198“opportunity interest” in a relationship with his child. The father in Lehr had never supported and had rarely seen the two-year-old daughter he claimed as his own, but he had made efforts to locate her and her mother. The father and mother had lived together during the pregnancy and the father had visited the mother and infant in the hospital following the infant’s birth. The mother had never identified him as the father, nor had the father entered his name on the State of New York’s putative father registry. But, one month after the mother and her husband commenced an adoption proceeding, in which the putative father was not a party, the putative father filed a petition for paternity and visitation rights. The state court granted the petition for adoption without considering the petition for paternity. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state court’s action, concluding that the state had afforded the unwed father adequate procedural protection.
The Court emphasized that “ ‘[pjarental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.’ ” Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 260, 103 S.Ct. at 2993 (quoting Caban, supra, 411 U.S. at 397, 99 S.Ct. at 1770) (emphasis removed). The Court also stated:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.
463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993-94 (footnote omitted).
Observing that the “right to receive notice was completely within [the father’s] control,” Id. at 264, 103 S.Ct. at 2995 — he could have mailed a postcard which would have caused his name to be entered on the putative father registry — and that he was presumptively capable of asserting and protecting his own rights, the Court concluded that due process was not offended by the state court’s insistence on strict adherence to the procedural requirements of the statute. Id. at 264-65, 103 S.Ct. at 2994-95. Lehr thus held that the biological father did not have an absolute right to notice and a hearing.6 Having failed to develop a relationship with his child or to communicate his interest in that regard by placing himself on the putative father registry, Lehr was found not entitled to the hearing he sought.
The Court in Lehr compared the factual situation of that case with those presented in the three earlier Supreme Court precedents:
The difference between the developed parent-child relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved in Quil-loin and this case, is both clear and significant. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 [99 S.Ct. at 1768], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he “act[s] as a father toward his children.” Id. at 389 n. 7 [99 S.Ct. at 1766 n. 7]. But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.
Id. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993. As applied to this case, this language supplies the context for the trial judge’s ruling that appellant’s interest here was not entitled to substantial protection under the due process clause because appellant had not in fact *1199come forward to participate in the rearing of his child.
Like the father in Lehr, appellant cannot claim that he has established an actual parent-child relationship with Baby Boy C. In fact, he has never seen his son. Unlike the father in Lehr, however, appellant neither saw L.C. after the first week of her pregnancy, nor contributed to L.C.’s financial support during her pregnancy and the birth of their child. See In re Adoption of Doe, 548 So.2d 741, 745-46 (Fl.1989) (unwed father’s conduct during pregnancy in failing to provide any support to the mother relevant).
I observe that my colleagues would tilt the playing field in H.R.’s favor by framing the question to be whether H.R. “abandoned” his opportunity. (Opinion of Ferren, J., at 1144; Opinion of Rogers, C.J., at 1188). The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has spoken in terms of the unwed father’s affirmative duty to “come[e] forward” to participate in the rearing of his child. Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993; Caban, supra, 441 U.S. at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768.
The record strongly supports the trial judge’s finding that the notice appellant received gave him sufficient information to enable him to come forward in timely fashion to establish a father-son relationship if he was then disposed to do so and to enable him to assert seasonably his legal rights as a natural father.
In sum, I would affirm the trial judge’s rejection of appellant’s attempt to attribute to Barker or the court either his failure to come forward and establish a parental relationship with Baby Boy C. or his failure to assert his legal claims more expeditiously and thereby improve his chances of gaining custody of the child. Rather, I am satisfied that the amount and quality of notice afforded appellant overcame his claims of deprivation of procedural due process.7 See United States v. Priority Products, Inc., 793 F.2d 296, 300-01 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Even in absence of notice required by statute, actual notice of administrative proceeding satisfied due process requirements by notifying shareholder that he could be sued in his individual capacity).
Even assuming that the trial court erred in failing to provide prompt notice of the filing of the petition (itself or through Barker) as required by D.C.Code § 16-306(a) (1989 Repl.), I would conclude that the notice actually afforded appellant by the court, Barker, and L.C. rendered harmless any error involved in failing to comply with the statute. I will return to the statutory notice issue after completing the analysis of appellant’s due process claim.
A chronological analysis of appellant’s course of conduct as it related to his interest in assuming the role of Baby Boy C.’s parent will demonstrate how H.R. failed to grasp his opportunity to assume the role of *1200Baby Boy C.’s father. When Baby Boy C. was born on August 5, 1983, appellant had a strong claim to the opportunity to develop a relationship with his son and to his son’s custody. Only L.C.’s claim was as strong, but she planned to, and subsequently did, relinquish all her parental rights. Not yet having been placed with a family, Baby Boy C. had developed no ties with others which might have served to undercut appellant’s potential relationship with his child. From that time until Baby Boy C. was placed with the 0. family on September 22, 1983, almost seven weeks later, appellant possessed a full opportunity to come forward to commence a relationship with his child. Furthermore, appellant was notified of the plans for adoption through Barker’s May 31, 1983, letter, which he received within days of the child’s birth. There was testimony from Barker that, had appellant come forward at that time, he would have been given custody of Baby Boy C. Appellant, however, failed to respond to Barker, even to the extent of taking up Barker’s offer to make a collect telephone call, or to indicate any interest in custody of the child for himself.
Appellant’s opportunity to assert his parental rights began to wane when the Barker Foundation, not having heard from him, placed Baby Boy C. for adoption. At that point, the 0. family, rather than appellant, began to develop a parent-child relationship with Baby Boy C., and it became stronger as time passed. With the strengthening of the bonds between Baby Boy C. and the prospective adoptive family, appellant’s opportunity to develop a relationship with his child withered. Appellant maintains that he has always professed his strong love for the child, at least to L.C. Even if that is so, he failed to express it in a way that would have established a relationship with the child at a time when bonding was critical.8 During this time appellant undertook none of the normal parental responsibilities that would have helped him develop a relationship with his child. Rather, he communicated with L.C. sporadically. Appellant acknowledges that as late as May of 1984 when Baby Boy C. had been with the O. family for approximately eight months, he told L.C. he would consider consenting to adoption.9
Well into this period of diminishing opportunity, on December 1, 1984, appellant decided to convey to Barker, whom he knew to have legal custody to the child, his definitive refusal to consent to the adoption. This he did by letter, which was not received until February 1985, when Baby Boy C. was eighteen months old. Another letter expressing the same message was received shortly thereafter.
Once the court received word of appellant’s refusal to consent, it extended the interlocutory decree of adoption to allow appellant to appear before it to oppose the adoption. When appellant appeared, he was accorded a full evidentiary hearing. By that time, however, as both Dr. Marans and Dr. Noshpitz testified, the relationship between Baby Boy C. and his adoptive par*1201ents had become so complete that to remove him from the 0. family would be devastating.
Unlike my colleagues on the panel, the trial judge did not find in appellant’s actions, from the time he was given prompt notice of his paternity until the hearing in the Superior Court some twenty-two months later, the “com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of the child,” Caban, supra, 441 U.S. at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768, or the assumption of parental responsibility which would warrant substantial protection of his interest in personal contact with his child under the due process clause.10 Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993. The record supports the trial judge’s ruling.
Judge Ferren’s opinion includes the following finding, joined essentially by Chief Judge Rogers: “Given the communications he did receive, H.R. did all he could reasonably have been expected to do to claim custody of his child.” Judge Ferren goes on to conclude, in part on the basis of the foregoing finding, that H.R.’s “ ‘opportunity interest’ remained intact.” (Opinion of Ferren, J., at 1172). The former of these quoted passages presents two problems. The first is that it is an appellate finding of fact. The second is that it is plainly wrong. H.R. could reasonably have been expected to do many, if not most, of the following:
—At the time of Baby Boy C.’s birth, he could have made the collect phone call that Barker offered in order to confirm that he was a father.
—He could have written Barker directly and posed any questions he had.
—He could have gone to the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa for assistance in learning about the facts and American adoption practices.
—He could have secured the advice of an American attorney in Kinshasa.
—He could have used his Peace Corps contacts or other English-speaking acquaintances to contact Barker or others if communication in English was any problem.
—As events unfolded, he could have kept Barker informed of his address.
—He could have telephoned or written the Embassy of Zaire in Washington for assistance in looking into the matter.
—Knowing that Barker was located in the District of Columbia, he could have contacted the District of Columbia courts for information, and to express interest in custody, if he was, in fact, interested.
—He could have made a firm commitment to Barker to come and assume custody of the child as soon as possible.
—He could have offered and sent support or gifts for the child or the mother before the trial court questioned him on this in July, 1985.
—He could have offered to pay money in support of L.C. during pregnancy, and at the time of birth.
—He could have maintained contact with L.C. after she left Zaire in April, 1983.
Far from doing “all he could reasonably have been expected to do,” H.R. failed to do any of the foregoing.
In observing that the trial court should be sustained in its finding that H.R. failed to grasp his opportunity, I am not unmindful of the difficulties of this ease. Yet, it was for appellant to find some means of initiating a relationship with his son. A clear statement of his intention to assume full custody, a modest contribution to Baby Boy C.’s support, some attempt to visit his child early on or, above all, an effort to assume custody at the earliest possible time manifested by a clear statement of his intention to do so — any of these things would have lent some support to appellant’s claim, as an unwed father, to the *1202rights of a parent. But the virtually complete absence of such beginnings leaves appellant outside of the area in which substantial protection is available to him under the due process clause.11
Appellant’s failures are the more egregious because he is a well-educated person — he had completed law school and was on the way to becoming a member of the legal profession, both in his native Zaire and in France, at the time of the events in question here. He had the ability to know all he needed to know to go about the task of building a relationship with his son and asserting his claim to legal recognition of that relationship. He failed to do so. Thus, it cannot be said that Barker or the trial court thwarted his assertion of his rights or created a conflict between the father’s interest and the best interests of his child.
Returning to the matter of the asserted error of the trial court in failing, on its own or through Barker, to notify H.R. of the filing of the petition for adoption, D.C.Code § 16-306(a) (1989 Repl.), any error involved was harmless for at least two reasons. The first is that H.R. received adequate notice of the adoption proceedings. The second is that, as demonstrated in Part III of this opinion below, the trial court should be affirmed in any event because of the devastating effect upon Baby Boy C. of his being taken from the 0. family.
As I noted earlier in my description of the facts, an important contribution to H.R.’s notification was the Barker letter that informed appellant of the expected birth of Baby Boy C. almost contemporaneously with the birth itself, and which also told appellant generally of plans to place the child for adoption. At the very least, the letter put a legally trained man who had impregnated a woman on notice that he should find out if he was indeed a father. All he had to do to find out was to make a collect telephone call to Barker. Two telephone conversations with L.C. in October 1983, confirmed for appellant, inter alia, the fact of the actual birth of the child, his placement with an adoptive home, and the involvement of a court. A belated telephone conversation with Barker the following January gave appellant more information, and the communications recited at length above then followed.
Under the circumstances, H.R. was not seriously disadvantaged by the lack of immediate notice of the filing of the petition. Indeed, if he had moved forward first with inquiries upon the receipt of the Barker letter at the time of Baby Boy C.’s birth with a clear indication that he wished to take custody of the child, it is most probable that no petition would ever have been filed. A witness for Barker so testified.
Consideration of the obvious purpose of the statutory notice provision also undercuts H.R.’s position. Although D.C.Code § 16-306 calls for immediate notice of the filing of an adoption petition, there is no more than an incidental connection between the statutory notice required under the D.C.Code and the opportunity discussed in Lehr for a father to assert his interest in being a parent to his child. There is no requirement that the petition be filed shortly after birth; often circumstances do not permit that. Nor need the petition be filed promptly after placement of a child with the potential adopting parents. The timing of the filing of the petition is left to the adoptive parents, who presumably would be guided by the adoption agency. Under *1203the statute, the petition could be filed after the father has substantially lost his opportunity to act as a parent. The purpose of the statutory notice requirement is obviously to give the natural parent an opportunity to participate in the adoption proceedings, not to prompt an unwed father to seize his opportunity to act as a parent.
Turning to the purpose of § 16-306, ie., to permit H.R. to participate in the proceedings, patently it was satisfied because H.R. participated fully in lengthy hearings. His only possible complaint about the proceedings, that they did not take place before Baby Boy C. began to bond with the 0. family is, as I have demonstrated, attributable directly to H.R.’s failure to come forward when he could have.
III.
There is a second and independent ground that requires us to affirm the trial court. Under any and all of the theories of how to decide adoption cases set forth in the three opinions of this division, a finding that the child would be “devastated” by reason of being taken away from the adoptive parents and given to a natural parent requires that the child be left with the adoptive parents if they are otherwise qualified. In such a case, as all members of this division recognize, the best interests of the child require that result. Here the trial court made such a finding, and the record strongly supports it. This court commits a serious legal error that may have equally serious human consequences by failing to give effect to this dispositive finding.
The interests of the adoptive parents do not figure directly in the best interests test. It is not their interests, but the child’s that we consider. But where there has been close family bonding, their interests and the child’s are reciprocal, and they suffer similarly from a misapplication of the law. Notwithstanding the strong interest of a natural father in rearing his own son, in a case such as this, where a trial on the merits has produced a dispositive finding that is supported by the record, there is no reason to subject Baby Boy C. and his adoptive parents to the agony and uncertainty of a second trial.
The most likely result of the majority’s vote will be further proceedings in the trial court at which, presumably, further expert testimony will be adduced, probably from the experts who testified before, and possibly from other experts, who will have examined or reexamined members of the 0. family. In what is apparently an effort to alleviate the anxiety and suffering that will be caused by this remand, Judge Ferren’s opinion offers suggestions about the manner in which the proceedings on remand may be approached by the judge who is designated to replace the late Judge Riley. (Opinion of Ferren, J., at 1180-1181). As I understand, it is suggested that before the court decides whether it is necessary to reopen the record, “perhaps Dr. Marans, Dr. Noshpitz, and others (if necessary) who are familiar with the record, could be recalled to help the court evaluate the factual record more thoroughly before the court itself applies the correct legal test.” (Opinion of Ferren, J., at 1181). It is not clear what the experts could do that would assist the court. As Judge Ferren acknowledges, they could not be asked to help the court apply a legal standard. Nor is it suggested how they could factor into their existing testimony a preference in favor of a natural parent which the majority must presume could somehow affect their view of the devastating impact upon the child that a transfer would have. The same passage of Judge Farren’s opinion goes on to suggest that if upon application of the “correct legal test to the evidence as of 1986,” the trial court “were to decide in favor of the adoptive parents, that would end the matter (subject to the right of appeal).” But, the opinion continues, “if the court were to conclude custody should have been awarded to H.R., then the court would have to reopen the proceeding for consideration of developments since 1986.” (Opinion of Fer-ren, J., at 1181). It is not explained why, given the reversal of the trial judge’s order that the majority is entering, the adoptive parents are entitled to treatment preferential to that extended to H.R. My view is that it is not necessary legally to extend *1204this form of solicitude to the adoptive parents (and Baby Boy C.) because the appropriate course for this court is to act on the existing record, heed the strength of the finding that the child would be devastated by his removal from the 0. family, and affirm the ruling of the trial court.
It is not necessary to repeat here the record support for Judge Riley’s finding of the harm which will befall Baby Boy C. if he is taken from the O. family. (See p. 1192, supra, and Opinion of Ferren, J., at pp. 1150 to 1151). Such a removal from the only family he has ever known, according to Dr. Marans, would be “devastating” to Baby Boy C. and would impair his future development. The trial court credited Dr. Marans’ testimony that Baby Boy C. would be seriously harmed by removal from the 0. family. That should end this case.
The postscript to Judge Ferren’s opinion would justify ignoring these dispositive findings of fact on the ground that they were made “in the context of applying the traditional ‘best interest of the child’ standard without consideration of the parental preference or the fitness of the father, H.R.” But it can readily be seen that this matter of “context" has no bearing on the dispositive finding we are addressing. Even if we presume the fitness of the father and acknowledge his preferred status, the ultimate determination that the best interest of the child requires that he remain with the 0. family is mandated by the trial judge’s findings concerning the consequences upon the child of a removal of the 0. family. Judge Riley credited expert testimony that the transfer would be “devastating” to the child, that the child’s removal from his adoptive family’s home would cause a “permanent scar,” and that the child’s “full potential could never be reached either in the intellectual or emotional range” if he were taken from the 0. family.
Judge Ferren’s postscript posits that we cannot properly assume “that the court’s findings, while looking through the prism of one legal test, would be the same when looking through another prism intended to grant presumptive custody to a fit natural father as against strangers.” This position misconstrues the factfinding function. The trial judge in this case was making a straightforward finding of fact when she found that the transfer of the child from the 0. family would be “devastating.” 12 She was not applying a legal test. A judge acting as a factfinder, for example, can make a finding that the arm was broken, the traffic light was red, or that the physician misdiagnosed the patient’s physical or mental illness. The judge then determines the legal consequences of the factfinding. In this case, Judge Riley found factually that the child would be devastated by being taken from the 0. family. Her best interest finding followed inexorably.13 It should be affirmed.
IV.
Although I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority, I agree essentially with them on the test to be applied once an *1205unwed father is found to have diligently pursued his opportunity interest under Lehr. A fit father, including an unwed father who has come forward promptly and undertaken to act as a father, should presumptively be entitled to custody of his child when the mother has relinquished her rights and put the child up for adoption, unless it is demonstrated that the best interests of the child require otherwise. The statutory standard of “best interests” of the child means that the child’s interests are paramount, with a rebuttable presumption that placing the child in the custody of a fit natural father who has come forward and undertaken to act as a father will ordinarily be in the child’s “best interests.”
In this case, H.R. did not earn the presumption. Even if he had, the best interests of Baby Boy C. would nevertheless require that he remain with the 0. family. For the reasons I have given, I dissent.

. For the most part, I agree with Chief Judge Rogers’ statement of the applicable law, and join in her opinion except for its first paragraph and its last two paragraphs, footnotes 12 and 14, and except to the extent it incorporates views set forth in Judge Ferren’s opinion.

. Because the trial court referred to H.R.'s wife as E.R., I will do the same.

. Chief Judge Rogers’ further concerns (Opinion of Rogers, C.J., at 1191-1192) about the manner in which the trial judge weighed the evidence concerning the child’s best interest are entirely met, in my view, by the additional fact that the trial judge made her finding of the devastation that would be visited upon the child by the transfer of custody to H.R. on the basis of the testimony of an expert who presumed that H.R. would be an ideal parent.

. Judge Ferren's recitation of facts, and his postscript as well, fail to take the foregoing conclusion into account when they set forth as fact portions of H.R.’s testimony which are inconsistent with it and were not specifically credited by the trial judge.

. I agree with Chief Judge Rogers’ analysis of Lehr, but differ with her view, contrary to the finding of the trial judge, that “[t]he uncertainties and vagueness about the existence of Baby Boy C. and exactly what the natural mother had done explain to my satisfaction that prior to the time that H.R. should have been notified formally of the adoption proceeding he did not abandon his opportunity interest.” (Opinion of Rogers, C.J., at 1189). The recitation of facts earlier in this opinion makes it clear that H.R. knew enough early on to have acted. For example, in a letter written to L.C. a few days after his child’s birth, H.R. said that if life with her future husband is impossible, L.C. could send the child to him to raise. In any event, if there were uncertainties, H.R. could have resolved them with a telephone call. I add that it is unrealistic to posit, as both Chief Judge Rogers and Judge Ferren do, that H.R.'s obligation to come forward somehow ceased the day the adoption petition was filed.
I also agree with Chief Judge Rogers’ analysis of the development of adoption law in the District of Columbia and its recognition of a parental preference. Her opinion, however, fails to reconcile its acknowledgment of the best interests of the child principle with the trial judge’s clear and fully supported finding of devastation to Baby Boy C. if he should be taken from the only home he has known.

. As discussed below, appellant’s complaint does not relate to the hearing he received, but rather to timely notice. It is clear that, unlike the father in Lehr, appellant received a full hearing, and the court "listen[ed] to his opinion of where the child’s best interests” lay. Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2994.

. The trial court found that appellant had received actual notice of the adoption plans and concluded that this was adequate for due process purposes under the facts of this case. The court's determinations are consistent with the evidence. The cover letter to Barker’s forms which appellant received in August 1983, informed him that the child would be placed for adoption and that adoption was a "proceeding." In October, 1983, shortly after the petition was filed, L.C. informed appellant that she had given up her parental rights and that Baby Boy C. had been placed in an adoptive home where the parents were white and the child's older adoptive brother was racially-mixed. Appellant understood L.C. to say that she had gone before a court to renounce her rights. Therefore, appellant had notice of the substance of the petition for adoption shortly after it was filed.
Furthermore, appellant presented no evidence that the failure to provide him notice of the petition for adoption prevented him from taking advantage of his "opportunity interest.” Indeed, the evidence shows that he did not grasp his opportunity, despite having notice. The trial court found that he did not tell his fiancée that he had fathered a child until many months after the child’s birth. He also testified that he did not come to this country at that time because he did not have enough money to do so, a reason inconsistent with an assertion that his inactivity was the product of lack of notice. H.R. also testified, in any event, that the idea of coming to the United States in the fall of 1983 did not occur to him. Under these circumstances, the actual notice that appellant received satisfied any due process right to notice, and also rendered harmless any failure to give notice required by the adoption laws of the District of Columbia, as discussed below.

. Even though appellant testified that it would have been difficult for him to provide support because of the relatively low salaries in Zaire and the unfavorable monetary exchange rate, the provision of at least some support is important not only to show one’s interest and ability to take care of a child but also to indicate one’s intention to assume full custody.

. Appellant's failure to come forward distinguishes this case from In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987) (when father who had moved out of state learned from receipt of adoption petition that the mother had given up their child for adoption, father immediately filed for legitimation when baby was two months old), and In re Baby Girl M., 207 Cal.Rptr. 309, 688 P.2d 918, 37 Cal.3d 65 (1984) (after father was informed of mother’s relinquishment of their baby, father filed for custody before infant turned one month old). In these cases, the father, upon learning of the child’s birth and the relinquishment of rights by the mother, sought legitimation and custody for himself without hesitation. Both children were still very young infants and there was no evidence that they had developed ties to a prospective adoptive family.
In my view, the decision of a California intermediate court in Jermstad v. McNelis, 210 Cal.App.3d 528, 258 Cal.Rptr. 519 (1989) cited in Judge Ferren's opinion, lends little support to Judge Ferren's broad reading of Lehr. See In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 218 Cal.App.3d 130, 266 Cal.Rptr. 760, 765 (1990) (disagrees with Jerms-tad's broad reading of Lehr), petition for review granted, 269 Cal.Rptr. 74, 790 P.2d 238 (1990).

. The postscript of Judge Ferren’s opinion, at page 1181, would appear to exempt an unwed father from the requirement to “come forward to participate in the rearing of his child” unless he has been given formal notice of a legal proceeding. As I read the Supreme Court authorities, they are dealing on the human level with the behavior that can be expected of the father of a newborn child who is interested in acting as a parent, regardless of notice of a legal proceeding involving the child. See Lehr, supra, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993.

. In addition, H.R. exacerbated the transoceanic difficulties of communication by failing to keep Barker informed of his current address. To impose, as Judge Ferren's opinion would, upon an adoption agency or the court’s continuing duty to inquire under circumstances like those before the court would place an unreasonable burden on the adoption process. It would allow anyone who wished to contest an adoption and was moving from place to place simply to sit back and wait for the court or the agency to locate him. As a result, adoption proceedings could become prolonged and much less certain. In addition, unwed mothers who had relinquished their parental rights could be subjected to continued inquiries that could be emotionally painful. Weighed against these burdens is the simple task of sending a change of address notice to the appropriate parties or making a collect telephone call to Barker. To the extent the majority absolves appellant from any responsibility to keep Barker informed of his whereabouts, I disagree.

. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 86 S.Ct. 1030, 16 L.Ed.2d 102 (1966), cited in Judge Ferren’s postscript at 1177-1178 casts no shadow upon this finding of fact. The “change of law" relating to parental fitness and parental preference within the best interests standard, a change recognized only in Judge Ferren's opinion, could not affect the context within which Judge Riley made her finding of devastation to this child.

. Judge Ferren reasons that if the judge had begun with "a presumption that the child’s best interests lay in the father's custody” we cannot be certain "either that the judge would have found that a transfer would be devastating or, in any event, that it would be so devastating that, on balance, the father should be denied custody_" (Opinion of Ferren, J., at 1182). To the contrary, I submit it is entirely unrealistic to suggest that a finding that the best interests of the child call for transfer to H.R. would be compatible with the judge's acceptance of the testimony of Dr. Marans concerning the devastating and scarring effect of such a transfer of custody. In any event, the parental preference was given effect when the trial judge required the adoptive parents and Barker to prevail by clear and convincing evidence. While in my view it was not necessary to apply a clear and convincing test where an unwed natural father had not seized his opportunity interest, the fact is that Judge Riley did apply such a test, and the adoptive parents prevailed. Her ruling should be affirmed.