Court Opinion

ID: 9795254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:23:53.197484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:23.868262
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI, Justice,
dissenting.
Disbarred attorney Jon Wiederholt seeks, for a second time, reinstatement to the Alaska Bar Association. After a two-day hearing, the Area Hearing Committee1 unani*794mously recommended his reinstatement. The matter then proceeded to consideration by the Disciplinary Board,2 which put questions to Mr. Wiederholt and heard argument by counsel. A divided Disciplinary Board recommended against reinstatement.3 The matter now proceeds to this court for final decision. Because I would grant the petition for reinstatement, I dissent from to day’s summary denial.
Wiederholt was disbarred in July 1994.4 He sought reinstatement in June 1999.5 The Hearing Committee recommended against reinstatement on the grounds that Wieder-holt had not shown himself to be morally fit to be readmitted and that his readmission would be detrimental to the bar, the administration of justice, and the public interest.6 The board unanimously agreed.7 We agreed with the board and denied reinstatement.8
Our decision denying reinstatement to Wiederholt, after noting the seriousness of the conduct that resulted in disbarment, relied heavily on two factors — Wiederholt’s lack of remorse for his acts and his failure to take remedial measures recommended by both the board and this court — in concluding that he had not demonstrated moral fitness for reinstatement.9 Moreover, in assessing whether he had proven that his reinstatement would not be detrimental to the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest, we relied on factors that demonstrated his own understanding of the harm he had caused and his personal response to his acts and his resulting disbarment. We upheld the board’s findings that “Wieder-holt’s lack of remorse, lack of consciousness concerning his past wrongdoing, failure to accept responsibility for his actions, and his tendency to justify and minimize his past behavior provide strong evidence that he could again engage in similar activity in the future.”10
Our decision was originally issued on April 27, 2001 and, after a petition for rehearing,11 was re-issued in June 2001. On February 27, 2002 Wiederholt petitioned a second time for reinstatement.
The question whether the Disciplinary Board should give any deference to the findings of the Hearing Committee is a close one. Bar Rule 10 gives the board the power to *795“review and modify the findings of fact” of the Hearing Committee, which suggests that it is not required to defer to the Hearing Committee with regard to findings. But the Hearing Committee saw and heard all of the witnesses while the Disciplinary Board did not.12 Because this court reviews the board’s recommendations de novo, and because the board saw and heard none of the witnesses except Wiederholt, I am not inclined to give to the board’s factual findings the “great weight” we customarily give to them,13 to the extent that they are based on an assessment of witness credibility.
My conclusion that Wiederholt’s petition should be granted rests heavily on (1) Wied-erholt’s striking change in attitude toward his offenses, toward their effect on others (including his clients, opposing counsel, the bar association, and the administration of justice), and toward his responsibility to change his conduct and make up for it; (2) the concrete steps that Wiederholt has undertaken to acknowledge his culpability and to reform himself so as to not present a danger of violating ethical standards in the future; (3) the remarkable efforts he has made to contribute to his community, which appear to have given him insights that he was simply in capable of in 1994 and 1999; and (4) several fundamental flaws in the Disciplinary Board’s decision. It is true that he moved with almost unseemly haste in petitioning for reinstatement a second time, but my review of the transcripts of the evidentia-ry hearing before the Area Hearing Committee and of the hearing before the Disciplinary Board firmly convinces me that he meets the standards that we have previously set. While the appearance might have been better for Wiederholt had he taken longer to bring his case for reinstatement, he should be reinstated if he meets the standards. I believe that he does.
The following paragraphs set out just the most important evidence that supports the four principal rationales for reinstating Wied-erholt mentioned in the previous paragraph. They do not purport to cover all of that evidence.
1. Changes in attitude
Wiederholt’s testimony before the Hearing Committee in October 2002 offered a stark contrast to his earlier appearances in the 1990’s:
• Near the outset of his testimony before the Hearing Committee, Wiederholt noted that his “personal arrogance and pridefulness” were largely responsible for his conduct and his “inability to accept unqualified responsibility for that conduct.”
• Near the end of his testimony, Wieder-holt stated: “I am desperately ashamed of the person that required the Bar’s response some ten years ago. I am ashamed of the legacy that, in some sense, I will leave imprinted forever on volumes of court report[s]. I’m ashamed of the ... notoriety that just my name takes with ... the Bar Association.”
Wiederholt’s attitudinal changes extended to his views of opposing counsel:
• “One of the things lawyers are supposed to do is not make situations worse, ... whether for their clients or needlessly for opposing counsel.”
• He characterized his acts in the MV Constructor matter, in which he had engaged in discovery violations, as “obstreperous” and condemned “the method by which I made life difficult for opposing counsel.”
• Wiederholt characterized his actions with regard to the incident with Mr. Maloney (opposing counsel with whom he was involved in an altercation and whom he kicked): “I had a petulant, childlike, unprofessional response to a matter that could have been defused, or certainly handled a great deal more professionally, and with more personal detachment. ... It was wrong then, it remains *796wrong now. And I have no justification for it beyond [a] childish, petty sort of response to a confrontation.”
Wiederholt’s attitude toward the bar association was markedly different than in his earlier proceedings:
• In the 1999 proceedings, when Mr. Van Goor of the bar association asked Wied-erholt if he had apologized to his former client, Mr. Metcalf (the victim in a forgery matter), Wiederholt responded that he doubted that any apology would have been accepted. In 2002, Wiederholt raised that answer without prompting before the Hearing Committee and then added, “And I was wrong in that regard, too.”
• Far from disparaging or attacking Mr. Van Goor as he had done in the earlier proceedings, Wiederholt directly apologized to him after earlier stating, “I can look to[,] I think[,] Mr. Van Goor, and[,] I think[,] the Bar, as ... an ally, if I’ll give them that opportunity, and, as a recovering arrogant, prideful person, I think that I have resources, that I don’t have to do it all on my own.”
2. Concrete steps
In a number of ways, Wiederholt acted concretely both to acknowledge his culpability and to reform himself:
• He apologized to each of the persons that he had offended or victimized in the incidents that brought him before the bar association.
• He arranged for and participated (for approximately 18 months as of the time of the hearing) in a program of monthly psychiatric counseling with the psychiatrist who had first evaluated Wiederholt at the Bar Association’s request in 1990 and 1991. The psychiatrist testified that, in his opinion, Wiederholt is truly changed, understands that his actions that led to his disbarment were wrong, and does not present a danger to reof-fend.
• He continued to counsel monthly with Dr. Gilchrist, his pastor, following Wied-erholt II, and for the period that Gilchrist was out of the country, he met with Chris English, a counselor on the staff of his church who was recommended by Gilchrist.
• While not all of the evidence was new, there was testimony from several members of the bar that Wiederholt had sought guidance from them and had genuinely appeared to change as a result of the entire experience. Terry Aglietti, for example, testified that “in Mr. Wied-erholt’s case the practice of law in his younger days brought out the worst elements in his personality. I don’t see that in him now. I mean it’s tragic that all these things had to happen in order for him to learn that there’s a better person inside of him than the person that was doing those things. But I believe that that has happened, and I believe that he would be a valuable addition to the legal community.” Later the same witness stated, “I think that Mr. Wiederholt had an epiphany at some point where things sort of shifted in his mind. And whether that was the result of the cumulative effect of the various proceedings that he had gone through, or something that his minister said to him, something that Mr. Erwin said to him — I don’t know. -But I believe that the glasses through which Mr. Wieder-holt views the world, lawyers, and the practice of law, are a lot different prescription than they were when he committed the acts for which he was disbarred.”
3. Community Contributions
Wiederholt made very significant contributions to the community to compensate for the wrongs he had committed. These contributions appear to have significantly improved his outlook on life.
• Most significantly, he obtained training and certification as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT),14 volunteered his *797services, became heavily involved in that activity, was promoted to an EMT II, moved his residence to be closer to the area where he served and, according to the testimony offered by several people, has rendered invaluable service to the provision of emergency services in his community. A co-worker testified to the personal sacrifices that Mr. Wiederholt made routinely in the course of responding to calls and noted that “[o]ur patients have shown nothing but trust for him.... He has a very gentle, tender, caring way to help them get through a very traumatic time for them.” She testified about a twelve-year-old boy who was badly injured in a jet ski accident and who was hospitalized for almost two months. Wiederholt visited him regularly in the hospital after being involved in his rescue. Wiederholt estimated that he had devoted 2000-2500 hours to EMT activities15 and he stated that “in no small measure I’m hoping that ... it gives me a chance to pay back significantly ... I’m hoping that in some sense it ... may right a wrong.”
• It appeared that Wiederholt had been deeply affected by his EMT work, and he seemed to draw from it important lessons on how one should conduct oneself in the practice of law. For example, referring to “the most valuable thing it has taught me,” he acknowledged that “one of my greatest failings [as an attorney] was my inability to see in the vast scheme the relative insignificance of ... battles, and in my case vicious battles, with opposing counsel .... I mean, one of the things I think lawyers have to do is be good caregivers.” Analogizing to EMTs, he referred to “legal EMTs” and concluded that, in trying to solve a client’s problems, the lawyer has a responsibility not to make a situation worse.
• Other volunteer efforts that represented constructive community activities included the following: Wiederholt, performing the role of Scrooge in Dickens’s A Christmas Carol, assisted his pastor in illustrating points for the sermon on each of the Sundays in Advent; he also performed the role in a classroom at the request of a teacher regularly over a number of years; he volunteered with Special Olympics.
4. Fundamental flaws in the Disciplinary Board’s decision
• The Disciplinary Board found that the only reason Wiederholt sought counseling, apologized to his victims, or otherwise showed remorse was because he believed it was the only way to become reinstated. At the outset, it seems problematic for the board to find fault with an applicant for doing precisely what this court held that he must do in order to be reinstated: seek counseling and apologize to his victims. And because our prior decision relied so heavily on Wiederholt’s lack of remorse, it is to be expected that he would try to demonstrate his changed attitude in his petition for reinstatement. At a more fundamental level, I believe that the evidence supports the Hearing Committee’s conclusion that Wiederholt experienced a genuine and profound transformation in his outlook toward the profession and his responsibilities to it, to society, and to his clients. Part of that transformation involved his realization of the harms he had caused to others and his genuine remorse for causing that harm.
• The Disciplinary Board relied on a 1992 diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder and related expert testimony to the effect that persons suffering from this disorder were “not likely to change significantly.” That testimony also included the generalization that such persons “may terminate therapy prematurely.” But the psychiatrist who offered the diagnosis and related testimony in 1992 testified in 2002 that Wiederholt had subsequently counseled faithfully with him for sixteen months. He also testi*798fied, in the words of the Area Hearing Committee, that Wiederholt had undergone “a substantial amount of maturing and growth,” and said he “has seen a major change in [Wiederholt].” He believed that “Mr. Wiederholt really is remorseful for his misconduct, and knows that what he did was wrong.” This same expert, who in 1992 noted that persons suffering from Wiederholt’s disorder were unlikely to change significantly, testified in 2002 that Wiederholt’s attitude had “changed substantially, and I don’t see it changing again.... I think he’s found a way of life that’s really very comfortable for him.” Finally, he testified that Wiederholt no longer needed counseling. Moreover, the board heard no expert testimony, or any testimony at all, to the contrary.
In these circumstances, it seems highly questionable for the board to rely on a generalized statement that persons with a particular disorder “are not likely to change significantly” when the author of that statement flatly testifies ten years later that the person in question has changed significantly. The board on a number of occasions even cited Wieder-holt’s actions in attempting to comply with this court’s decision in Wiederholt II as evidence of his personality disorder. While such an approach seems questionable to begin with, it seems particularly inappropriate given the expert’s uneontradicted opinion that Wiederholt has, in fact, changed. Thus, for example, the board faulted Wiederholt for starting counseling the month after our opinion in Wiederholt II and for apologizing to his victims, finding that in doing so he acted “consistent[ly] with the personality disorder ascribed to him.” The board entirely ignored the expert’s opinion that Wiederholt had changed in the ten years that had passed since the time of his original diagnosis.
The unfairness of this approach can be seen in the board’s third conclusion of law. In applying the fifth Pier16 factor, the board concluded: “Other than his conduct relating to attempting readmission to the practice of law, there is no evidence of general misconduct since [Wiederholt’s] disbarment.” In other words, the board somehow found Wied-erholt’s immediate commencement of counseling and his apologies to his victims — which this court criticized him for failing to do in Wiederholt II — to be “general misconduct.” Such a perverse conclusion can follow only because the board ignored the expert’s uncontradiet-ed opinion that Wiederholt had changed in the ten years that intervened between his original diagnosis and his current testimony. (Indeed, even absent this transformation, it is inexplicable to cite a party’s efforts to comply with our decision as evidence of a personality disorder.)
• Finally, the board erred in concluding that the Hearing Committee recommended reinstatement only upon conditions and in concluding that Wiederholt refused to accept any conditions on his reinstatement. These issues were confused by uncertainty over what the law allows. Viewing the parties’ positions in that context, it is clear that Wiederholt did not refuse to accept conditions.
Wiederholt, his counsel (Canterbury), and counsel for the bar association (Van Goor) all believed that this court would not allow conditions to be placed on reinstatement if they had not been included in the Order of Disbarment. In fact, it was Van Goor who forcefully made this point in his opening argument and reiterated it under questioning from the board. Van Goor stated, “I will tell you that based on the Cavanaugh case, unless that reinstatement was a part of the original disbarment order, the Court will not approve it.” Any ambiguity on Canterbury’s part was likely due to the fact that Van Goor had argued forcefully that no conditions could be imposed.
*799Returning to the two errors that the board made regarding conditions, the first was in characterizing the Hearing Committee as being equivocal about reinstatement because it recommended conditions upon reinstatement. But a review of the Hearing Committee’s recommendation reveals no reservations in its recommendation. It is clear, forthright, and direct. The committee found by clear and convincing evidence that Wiederholt possesses the requisite moral qualifications to practice law, and it found by the same high standard that “he will not repeat his misconduct in the future.”
The board’s second error was in mistakenly concluding that Wiederholt objected to conditions upon his reinstatement. This conclusion is contradicted by the transcript of the hearing. The primary condition at issue was the recommendation that Wiederholt meet quarterly with a mentoring panel. Wiederholt agreed to continue meeting with a mentoring panel even though the Area Hearing Committee explicitly noted that this condition was not a recommendation of supervised practice. Wiederholt even agreed to a condition of supervised employment, a condition expressly rejected by the committee (though he noted that it would be difficult to obtain employment under a supervising attorney given his history of disbarment). Finally, Canterbury told the board that Wiederholt would not argue that this court lacks authority to impose supervision. While neither Wiederholt nor Canterbury explicitly asked the board to reinstate him with conditions, it appears that all parties were acting under the belief that this court would not allow reinstatement under conditions. When pressed about whether Wiederholt would contest the conditions, both he and his counsel indicated that they would not. It is not reasonable to expect anything more given the context of this discussion. In my estimation, the board unfairly characterized Wiederholt’s comments as a refusal to accept reinstatement with conditions. This is particularly so in the context of a hearing in which bar counsel forcefully argued that conditions could not be imposed in any event.
The primary thrust of the bar association’s opposition to the petition for reinstatement, which view was adopted by the majority of the Disciplinary Board, was that insufficient time had elapsed between our decision in Wiederholt II and Wiederholt’s second petition for reinstatement. It is a short period.17 On first glance, one may well look skeptically at Wiederholt’s case. But for two reasons I believe that the time issue is not fatal to Wiederholt’s petition.
First, I believe that looking only to the time period between publication of our opinion denying reinstatement and the filing of the second petition for reinstatement is artificial. Our opinion was issued two years after the first petition was filed. During the time after the first petition was filed but before our decision on it was published, Wiederholt decided to pursue EMT training, completed the training, and began his volunteer career. About the time that the decision came out, Wiederholt was in the process of obtaining his advanced EMT certification and beginning his work with the EMT service of the Mat-Su Borough. In concluding that “not enough time has passed,” the board literally looked to the eight-month period from June 2001 (the date of the re-issued Wiederholt II opinion) to February 2002 (the date of the second petition for reinstatement). But this approach ignores the period between June 1999, when the first petition was filed, and the date of publication of Wiederholt II. Substantial changes were taking place in Wiederholt’s life during that lengthy period.
Second, and more importantly, after a review of the testimony, I have concluded that Wiederholt has met the high standards that *800we determined in Wiederholt II that the law imposes for reinstatement. Other than allowing the board (and this court) to consider “the time elapsed since the original discipline,”18 those standards do not prescribe any particular waiting period.19 Almost ten years have elapsed since the original discipline in this case was imposed. Because Jon Wiederholt has met the standards for reinstatement, I believe that his petition for reinstatement should be granted.

. The Hearing Committee consisted of attorneys Clay A. Young (chair) and Larry D. Wood and *794non-attorney Debra Anderson.

. The Disciplinary Board consisted of Lori Bod-well (presiding), public member Sheila Selkregg, and attorneys Matthew Claman, Robert Johnson, Jonathon Katcher, Keith Levy, Lawrence Ostrov-sky, and Daniel Winfree.

. The board's principal recommendation was joined by five members: Bodwell, Selkregg, Katcher, Levy, and Winfree. Two members, Johnson and Ostrovsky, concurring separately, stated that they looked only to the time between this court’s decision denying reinstatement and the date that Wiederholt filed his second petition for reinstatement. Claman dissented, stating that he would grant reinstatement with conditions.

. In re Wiederholt, 877 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994) (iViederholt I).

. In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 24 P.3d 1219 (Alaska 2001) (Wiederholt II).

. Id. at 1222.

. Id.

. Id. at 1235.

. We concluded the section concerning moral fitness in this way:
The record supports the board’s conclusion that Wiederholt has not proven his moral fitness by clear and convincing evidence. Wied-erholt's testimony, in which he blames this court and the Alaska Bar Association for his problems and attempts to justify and minimize his actions, shows that he fails to understand the extent and significance of his previous misconduct.
Id. at 1231.

. Id. at 1232.

. Wiederholt, while "accepting] the conclusions set forth in the Opinion,” asked us to strike certain language and remand for further evidentiary findings. In re Wiederholt, Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing, S-9171 (May 2, 2001). We did strike the disputed language but otherwise provided no relief.
This is not a major point, but I mention it and note Wiederholt's "acceptance” of our conclusions because the Disciplinary Board gave great weight to the short period of time that elapsed between our decision denying reinstatement and Wiederholt’s second petition for reinstatement. In fact, that period was ten months, not seven and one-half months, as argued by counsel for the Bar Association.

. Only Wiederholt appeared before the board, and only for the purpose of answering questions that the board might have. The board did not view his full testimony and, of course, neither saw nor heard any of the seventeen other witnesses who appeared before the Hearing Committee.

. Wiederholt II, 24 P.3d at 1222.

. In relation to the "timing” issue discussed below, it is noteworthy that Wiederholt commenced -his EMT activities after his first petition for reinstatement was filed. He enrolled in the EMT course at the University of Alaska, Anchorage, in August 1999 and began volunteering as an EMT in January 2000.

. While the great majority of the time was volunteered, the Mat-Su Borough paid $7/hour for time when EMTs were actually on a "ran” and, shortly before the hearing, had begun to pay for shifts,

. In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297 (S.D.1997). In Pier, the Supreme Court of South Dakota summarized the required considerations for reinstatement in various jurisdictions. The fifth “Pier factor” is the petitioner's conduct following the discipline. Id. at 301. This court adopted Pier in Wiederholt II, 24 P.3d 1219, 1224-25 & n. 27 (Alaska 2001).

. It was exactly ten months from issuance of the first opinion on reinstatement to filing of Wieder-holt’s second petition for reinstatement. See supra note 11. But because of the time that the process requires, the first opinion itself was issued almost two years after the petition was filed.

. Wiederholt II, 24 P.3d at 1225.

. We have since adopted a two-year waiting period after a failed petition for reinstatement and the filing of a subsequent petition, Alaska Bar Rule 29(b), but all parties agree that the new rule does not apply to this case.