Court Opinion

ID: 9928798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:46.1508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:44.597373
License: Public Domain

J-A21042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 FRANCIS HAZINSKY                        :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :    No. 2124 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 14, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0002346-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                    FILED JANUARY 31, 2024

      Appellant, Francis Hazinsky, appeals nunc pro tunc from the aggregate

judgment of sentence of 24 to 60 months’ incarceration, followed by 48

months’ probation, imposed after he pled guilty to one count each of

possession of child pornography, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d), and criminal use of a

communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a). On appeal, Appellant challenges

the court’s application of a sentencing guideline enhancement, as well as

other, discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

      A detailed recitation of the facts of Appellant’s case is unnecessary to

our review of his sentencing claims. We need only note that a search warrant

was served at Appellant’s home and technology was seized, revealing “50

unique videos, equivalent to 2,500 images of child pornography.” Trial Court

Opinion (TCO), 2/2/23, at 2 (citation to the record omitted).             The

Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with 50 separate counts for
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possession of child pornography, and 50 separate counts for criminal use of a

communication facility.

      On January 4, 2021, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to one count

of possession of child pornography and one count of criminal use of a

communication facility.    The Commonwealth nol prossed the remaining 98

charges. Notably, at the plea proceeding, the Commonwealth and Appellant’s

trial counsel agreed that the Affidavit of Probable Cause set forth the factual

basis for Appellant’s plea. See N.T. Plea, 1/4/21, at 10. In the Affidavit of

Probable Cause, the affiant explicitly stated that the search of Appellant’s

computer “revealed over 25 unique images and over 50 unique videos

equivalent to over 2,500 images under state law, all depicting child

pornography.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 7/29/20, at 3.

      Appellant’s case proceeded to sentencing on June 14, 2021. There, the

Commonwealth

      submitted sentencing guidelines to the court that included an
      “Enhancement” element[,] which increased the standard range
      [for Appellant’s possession of child pornography offense] from 12-
      24 months to 30-42 months. [Appellant’s] counsel did not object
      to the enhanced guidelines. The court sentenced [Appellant],
      after considering those very guidelines along with the presentence
      information in support of [Appellant], to a mitigated range of 24-
      60 months[’ incarceration,] and 48 months[’] consecutive
      probation.

Appellant’s Brief at 15.

      Appellant did not file a timely post-sentence motion, or a direct appeal.

Instead, on February 6, 2022, Appellant (via newly-retained counsel) filed a

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

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9546, seeking the reinstatement of Appellant’s post-sentence motion rights.

According to Appellant, “[a]fter discussions with [the Commonwealth], it was

stipulated that [Appellant’s] PCRA [petition] was of merit and that the court

would permit the filing of a motion to modify/reconsider sentence….” Id. at

16.   On April 27, 2022, the court entered an order stating that, “upon

stipulation of the parties, [Appellant] is granted the right to file a Post[-

]Sentence Motion to modify/reconsider the sentence within ten (10) days of

the filing of this Order.” Order, 4/27/22, at 1.

      On May 5, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider

his sentence. Therein, Appellant raised, for the first time, that “there appears

to be a discrepancy in the Sentencing Guidelines that were submitted to the

court….” Post-Sentence Motion, 5/5/22, at 5 ¶ 4. Appellant explained: “As

the guidelines form states, with an [offense gravity score] of ‘9’ and a [prior

record score] of ‘0[,’] the standard guidelines should have been 12-24

months, not the 30-42 [months] that are listed.” Id. Appellant contended

that because of this “discrepancy,” the court “was inadvertently directed to a

higher range of sentencing than it should have been.”      Id. Appellant also

claimed the court failed to consider certain mitigating factors, such as

Appellant’s health issues and the fact that, as a result of his plea, Appellant

“is now required to register with the [Pennsylvania] State Police … for fifteen

(15) years upon his release from incarceration.” Id. at ¶ 3(c). Accordingly,

Appellant asked the court to reconsider and modify his sentence.

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     The Commonwealth filed a responsive brief. In regard to Appellant’s

challenge to the guideline enhancement, the Commonwealth explained:

     The Commonwealth properly applied the sentencing enhancement
     to the Possession of Child Pornography charge in this case. Under,
     42 Pa.C.S. § 9720.5(a), there is a sentence enhancement in
     accordance with the charge of Sexual Abuse of Children (18
     Pa.C.S. § 6312) when aggravating circumstances include
     variations such as “the age of the child or a determination of
     prepubescence, the number of images possessed by the
     defendant, if the child depicted is known to the defendant and the
     nature and character of the abuse depicted in the images.”
     According to 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e)(1), when an offender has
     violated 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312 and possessed more than 500 images,
     18 months can be added to the lower and upper limit of the
     standard range for the sentence recommendation.

     In this case, [Appellant] pled guilty to one count of Possession of
     Child Pornography and one count of Criminal Use of
     Communication Facility. As part of his plea, [Appellant] also
     stipulated to the affidavit of probable cause[,] which states
     [Appellant] possessed over 2,500 unique images of child
     pornography, well over the 500 image quota for an 18[-]month
     enhancement.

     The case is distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Christman,
     225 A.3d 1104 (Pa. Super. 2019), which holds that the number of
     images for separate charges cannot be totaled to meet the criteria
     for a higher sentence enhancement, because in that instance, no
     such combination took place. Unlike in Christman, in which
     “there was no single violation for which defendant possessed more
     than 50 images[,”] the single Child Pornography charge in this
     case includes all of the discovered photos and videos. Id. at 1109.
     The Court had also noted that the Commonwealth could have
     solved the combination issue by reducing the number of charges
     and increasing the number of videos per charge--the exact action
     that took place in this case. Id. at 1110. Thus, the application of
     the 18[-]month enhancement for the stipulated 2,500 unique
     images was proper in this case.

Commonwealth’s Response to Use of Guideline Enhancements, 7/11/22, at 3.

Additionally, the Commonwealth observed that the sentencing court was

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aware of the mitigating circumstances of Appellant’s medical condition and his

registration requirement at the time it fashioned his sentence. Id. at 3-4.

Accordingly, the Commonwealth requested the court deny Appellant’s post-

sentence motion.

       On July 21, 2022, the court issued an order denying Appellant’s post-

sentence motion. He filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal on August 12,

2022, and he also complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court filed

a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 2, 2023. Herein, Appellant

states two issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court commit error and abuse its discretion when
       it applied the sentencing enhancement of 204 Pa. Code
       303.9(a)(3)[1] to the charge of possession of child pornography
____________________________________________

1 That provision states, in pertinent part:

       (a) (1) Basic sentence recommendations. Guideline sentence
       recommendations are based on the Offense Gravity Score and
       Prior Record Score.          In most cases, the sentence
       recommendations are found in the Basic Sentencing Matrix (§
       303.16(a)). The Basic Sentencing Matrix specifies a range of
       sentences (i.e.--standard range) that shall be considered by the
       court for each combination of Offense Gravity Score (OGS) and
       Prior Record Score (PRS).

                                           ***

       (3) Enhancement sentence recommendations. Guideline sentence
       recommendations may include sentence enhancements, which
       provide increases to the basic sentence recommendations when
       an enhancement factor identified by the Commission is present.
       Enhancement sentence recommendations are described in §
       303.10. The application of an enhancement is determined by the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       when it aggregated all 2500 images to the one (1) count to which
       [Appellant] pled guilty?

       2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or commit error
       when it failed to apply those same mitigating factors to
       [Appellant’s] motion to reconsider sentence that it had found in
       its original sentencing of [A]ppellant after being informed it had
       incorrectly used an enhancement guideline?

Appellant’s Brief at 10.

       Appellant’s issues implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Christman, 225 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(considering Christman’s challenges to the court’s application of the

sentencing guideline enhancement of 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(l)(1) as

implicating the discretionary aspects of his sentence); Commonwealth v.

Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 716 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“A claim [that] the trial court

failed to consider mitigating circumstances is a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentence.”) (citation omitted).

       Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
       entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
       Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
       challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
       this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

          We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
          [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
          Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
          preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
          modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
____________________________________________

       court at sentencing, based on a preponderance of the evidence
       that the enhancement factor is present. Sentence enhancements
       can either be mandated by statute or directly adopted by the
       Commission.

204 Pa. Code § 303.9(a)(3).

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         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
         (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
         appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
         Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

      Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
      appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
      are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
      the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
      794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
      2003).

      The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
      be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
      925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
      exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
      that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
      with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
      to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
      Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

      Here, Appellant has met the first two requirements for obtaining review

of his discretionary-aspects-of-sentencing claims. He has also included a Rule

2119(f) statement in his appellate brief, wherein he argues, in totality:

      The trial court improperly applied a sentencing guideline
      enhancement under 204 Pa. Code [§] 303.9(l)(1) to the charge of
      possessing child pornography when it aggregated all of the 2,500
      images pertaining to the original 50 counts (50 videos) charged
      to the one (1) count that [Appellant] pled guilty to in direct
      contradiction to the case of … Christman, … committing error and
      abusing its discretion [and] raising a substantial question for
      appellate review.

Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly

applied a sentencing guideline enhancement presents a substantial question

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for our review.        See Christman, 225 A.2d at 1107 (concluding that

Christman’s claim that the court improperly applied a sentencing guideline

enhancement presents a substantial question for our review). Thus, in terms

of Appellant’s first issue on appeal, he has met the requirements for us to

review the merits of his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.2

       In doing so, we are mindful that,

       [s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
       the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
       appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
       abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
       Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
       that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
       its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       Instantly, Appellant contends that the court erred by applying an 18-

month sentencing guideline enhancement under 204 Pa. Code § 303.9. See

Appellant’s Brief at 12. At the outset, we observe that the legislature removed

the at-issue sentencing enhancements from section 303.9(l)(1), and set them

forth in section 303.10(e), effective January 1, 2021. Thus, at the time of

Appellant’s sentencing in June of 2021, the guideline enhancements applicable

to an offense of possession of child pornography, based on the number of

images possessed, were set forth in 204 Pa. Code § 310(e), as follows:

____________________________________________

2 Clearly, Appellant fails to mention his second issue in his Rule 2119(f)
statement. We address Appellant’s omission in this regard, infra.

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     (e) Sexual Abuse of Children Enhancement, as required by 42
     Pa.C.S. § 9720.5.

        (1) When the court determines that the offender violated 18
        Pa.C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children) and
        that the offender possessed more than 50 images, the court
        shall consider the sentence recommendations described in
        subsection (e)(4). For purposes of this enhancement, the
        number of images is defined as follows:

           (i) Each photograph, picture, computer generated
           image, or any similar visual depiction shall be
           considered to be one image.

           (ii) Each video, video-clip, movie, or similar visual
           depiction shall be considered to have 50 images.

                                    ***

        (4) The enhancement related to the number of images
        possessed by the offender or the nature and character of
        the abuse depicted provides the following:

           (i) When applying enhancement based on the number
           of images possessed by the offender, if the offender
           possessed more than 50 images to 200 images, 6
           months are added to the lower limit of the standard
           range and 6 months are added to the upper limit of
           the standard range; if the offender possessed more
           than 200 images to 500 images, 12 months are added
           to the lower limit of the standard range and 12 months
           are added to the upper limit of the standard range; if
           the offender possessed more than 500 images, 18
           months are added to the lower limit of the standard
           range and 18 months are added to the upper limit of
           the standard range;

204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e).

     In this case, the trial court applied an 18-month enhancement based on

its finding that Appellant possessed more than 500 images of child

pornography.   In challenging that decision, Appellant explains that he was

initially charged with 50 counts of possessing child pornography, with each

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count purportedly premised on his possession of one video. Therefore, under

section 303.10(e)(1)(ii), each count of possession of child pornography with

which Appellant was originally charged would equal 50 images of child

pornography. Appellant contends that when he decided to plead guilty to one

count of possession of child pornography, “[i]t was [his] understanding that

his plea to [that] one (1) count was for one (1) video[,]” or 50 total images.

Appellant’s Brief at 15. He stresses that in Christman, this Court “found that

since ‘there was no single violation for which [Christman] possessed more

than 50 images, … the sentencing enhancement set forth in section

303.9(l)(1)[, i.e., the prior version of section 303.10(e)(4)(i),] does not

apply.’”   Id. at 18 (quoting Christman, 225 A.3d at 1109).        Accordingly,

Appellant insists that under Christman, his single count of possession of child

pornography equated to 50 images and could not trigger the 18-month

sentencing enhancement under section 303.10(e)(4)(i).

      We disagree. Initially, we discuss our decision in Christman. There,

Christman pled guilty to 11 counts of possession of child pornography based

on his possession of 11 videos. Christman, 225 A.3d at 1106. At sentencing,

the trial court applied the 18-month sentencing enhancement by “considering

the total number of images [Christman] possessed at all 11 counts (i.e., 550

images)[,]” although “each of the 11 videos possessed by [Christman] …

constitute[ed] 50 images pursuant to section 303.10(e)(ii).”       Id. at 1108

(emphasis in original). In challenging the court’s application of that guideline

enhancement on appeal, Christman argued that, “since the Commonwealth

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charged him separately for each video, the court was required to consider only

the number of images pertaining to each count (i.e., 50 images).”       Id. at

1108-09.

      We agreed with Christman, pointing to “the explicit language of section

303.10(e)(3), which states: ‘Sexual Abuse of Children Enhancement shall

apply to each violation which meets the criteria above.’” Id. at 1109

(quoting 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(e)(3)) (emphasis added in Christman). We

concluded that, “[p]ursuant to this provision, it is clear that the court must

examine each conviction to determine if it meets the requirement that the

offender possessed more than 50 images before the guideline enhancement

may be applied.” Id. Because “at each of [Christman’s] 11 counts, he was

convicted of possessing one video, or 50 images[,]” we conclude that “there

was no single violation for which he possessed more than 50 images,” and

the sentencing enhancement should not have been applied. Id. (emphasis in

original).   Notably, in closing, we observed that “the Commonwealth has

discretion in how it charges criminal offenders[,]” and in Christman’s case, it

“could have reduced the number of charges, and increased the number of

videos underlying each charge, thus triggering application of the sentencing

guideline enhancement.” Id. at 1110.

      In this case, Appellant acknowledges that his trial/sentencing counsel

negotiated his plea agreement “to reduce all 50 counts … to one (1) count” of

possession of child pornography. Appellant’s Brief at 14. Although Appellant

claims that “[i]t was [his] understanding that his plea to one (1) count was

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for one (1) video[,]” id. at 15, he recognizes that the Commonwealth did not

specify, in the charging documents, any “video image totals” pertaining to

each count. Id. at 19. Appellant also admits that, at the plea hearing, his

attorney agreed that the factual basis for Appellant’s single count of

possession of child pornography was the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which

states that Appellant possessed 2,500 total images of child pornography. Id.

at 14.

         Given this record, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s reliance

on Christman is unavailing, and his challenge to the application of the

guideline enhancement is meritless. The court explained:

         The present case is distinguishable from Christman because
         here, the single charge pled to by [Appellant] encompasses all the
         discovered photos and videos. In Christman, the defendant was
         charged with numerous charges but none of the individual charges
         were for possession of more than 50 images. [Christman, 225
         A.2d at 1109]. The [C]ourt in Christman indicated that the
         prosecution could have avoided this problem by reducing the
         number of charges and adding more videos to each charge. Id.
         at 1110. Sentencing enhancements can become available by
         reducing the number of charges and increasing the number of
         photos or videos per charge. Id.

         Here, the prosecution followed the action described in the
         Christman case and consolidated the charges and increased the
         number of images per charge. [Appellant] pled guilty to one count
         of [p]ossession of [c]hild [p]ornography and one count of
         [c]riminal [u]se of a [c]ommunication [f]acility. [Appellant]
         stipulated that he possessed over 2,500 images of child
         pornography. The number of images stipulated to exceeds the
         threshold requirement for [the] sentencing enhancement. Thus,
         the application of the 18-month enhancement was proper.

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TCO at 4. We agree that the trial court acted in accordance with Christman

in the present case.3 Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue is meritless.

       Next, Appellant avers that the trial court failed to properly apply

mitigating factors in fashioning his sentence. However, his entire argument

is premised on the false conclusion that “the trial court incorrectly applied an

enhanced guideline[,] which is contrary to law.” Appellant’s Brief at 23. More
____________________________________________

3 To the extent that Appellant contends he did not understand the implications

of his pleading guilty to this single count of possession of child pornography
premised on the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, his issue is
ultimately an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that cannot be litigated
on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013)
(reaffirming the prior holding in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa.
2002), that, absent certain circumstances, claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be deferred until collateral review under the PCRA). Although
Appellant recognizes that the thrust of his argument sounds in ineffective
assistance of counsel, see Appellant’s Brief at 20, he claims that the PCRA
court effectively ruled that his plea/sentencing counsel acted ineffectively in
failing to properly advise Appellant about the sentencing enhancement. See
Appellant’s Brief at 20. The record does not support this claim. In Appellant’s
PCRA petition, he alleged that his trial/sentencing counsel was ineffective
because he “[f]ailed to file any post[-]sentence motions to challenge the
validity of his plea and/or the aspects of his sentence including
reconsideration; … [f]ailed to file an appeal; … [a]llowed without objection
written testimonials from [the] Commonwealth at sentencing; … [and f]ailed
to properly advise [Appellant] of his potential plea consequences and thus
[Appellant’s] plea was not knowing and voluntary.” PCRA Petition, 2/16/22,
at unnumbered 2 ¶¶ 7. Clearly, Appellant did not allege any ineffectiveness
claim explicitly pertaining to the application of the sentencing guideline
enhancement; instead, he only asserted this issue for the first time in his post-
sentence motion. Thus, the PCRA court’s entering the order reinstating
Appellant’s post-sentence motion rights, without any explanation for its
decision to do so, cannot be interpreted as a substantive finding that
Appellant’s counsel acted ineffectively in regard to the sentencing guideline
enhancement, especially where Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth
stipulated to the reinstatement of his post-sentence motion rights. See
Appellant’s Brief at 9.

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specifically, Appellant rather confusingly argues that because the court

ultimately imposed a mitigated-range sentence under the enhanced-guideline

range, he is entitled to a mitigated-range sentence under the non-enhanced,

standard-guideline range because the sentencing enhancement should not

have been applied at all.

      Initially, we note that Appellant did not set forth this claim in his Rule

2119(f) statement and, therefore, he has failed to establish that a substantial

question exists to warrant this Court’s review. Nevertheless, even if Appellant

had demonstrated a substantial question for our review, we would deem his

argument meritless.         For the reasons set forth supra, the guideline

enhancement was properly applied.         The trial court clearly considered

mitigating circumstances in fashioning Appellant’s sentence under those

enhanced guidelines.      Namely, the court took into account “letters about

[Appellant’s] character from family and friends and information about [his]

medical diagnosis through letters and testimony from [Appellant’s] father.”

TCO at 5. Additionally, “[t]he court was aware that [Appellant] was required

… to register as a sex offender with the State Police as part of the terms of

the guilty plea.”   Id.   Based on these circumstances, the court imposed a

mitigated-range term of incarceration under the enhanced sentencing

guidelines. Therefore, even had Appellant properly raised this issue in his

Rule 2119(f) statement, we would conclude that no relief is due.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 1/31/2024

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