Court Opinion

ID: 9789148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:28:56.207172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.024680
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 18 There is no question but what the language of the 1996 Amended Order is problematic. Given the history and context of this case, it surely seems likely that the parties intended the seven-year alimony term to commence in 1993 rather than 1996. That said, it is inarguable that the plain language of the 1996 Amended Order provides that the term commence in 1996.
¶ 19 What baffles me about this ease is that we have a trial judge who is a stranger to the case and its procedural twists and turns guessing about what was intended— and then this court second-guessing that guess — while the judge who actually presided over the case and entered the initial decree sat in chambers down the hall at the courthouse in Provo. Apparently this is due to the peculiar assignment practice of the Fourth District that results in cases shifting from one judge to another as the judges’ assignments periodically change — from civil, to criminal, to domestic — rather than the initially assigned judge remaining responsible *312for a case throughout its life. Although the Fourth District’s approach might generally work, it needs to be tempered so that, as in this case, when the insight of the initial judge might be helpful, the case finds its way back to him or her as a matter of course. In other words, administrative routine cannot take priority over the necessity of doing justice in a particular ease.
¶ 20 In my mind, it was error for Judge Stott to decide the question rather than transfer the case to Judge Davis, who originally presided over the parties’ divorce and entered the 1996 Amended Order. Given his firsthand knowledge of the case, I would vacate the order appealed from and remand the case with instructions to transfer the Order to Show Cause to Judge Davis. I also suggest the judges of the Fourth District consider amending their case assignment protocol so that once a judge has entered a judgment in a case, the case is permanently his or her responsibility thereafter.