Court Opinion

ID: 9573148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:48:29.737431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:34.602779
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly dismissed Common Cause’s complaint for in-junctive relief, I disagree with the conclusion in part IV(B) of the majority opinion that this case should be remanded for consideration of Common Cause’s complaint for declaratory relief.
The general purpose of the declaratory judgment provisions of sections 13-51-101 to -115, 6A C.R.S. (1987), and C.R.C.P. 57, is to provide a remedy, where an actual controversy exists, for determining the legal rights, duties, or status of the parties before the controversy escalates into the repudiation of obligations, the invasion of rights, or the commission of wrongs. People ex rel. Inter-Church Temperance Movement v. Baker, 133 Colo. 398, 404, 297 P.2d 273, 277 (1956). Declaratory judgment actions should not be considered unless
“the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. It follows that when neither of these results can be accomplished, the court should decline to render the declaration prayed.”
Id. (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 200 (2d ed. 1941)). Thus, it is not the function of the courts to issue declaratory judgments that would not afford the plaintiff in the action immediate relief. See Taylor v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 182, 183, 330 P.2d 954, 955 (1958).
Common Cause filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on May 24, 1989, requesting that the actions taken by the defendant caucus members in passing the “long appropriations bill” be declared unconstitutional. The general appropriations bill, or “long bill,” became law on April 26, 1989, with an effective date of July 1, 1989. The funds allocated pursuant to the “long bill” have since been disbursed, leaving Common Cause without any form of immediate relief that would justify pursuing a declaratory judgment action. In my view, the problems surrounding the passage of the “long bill” have become moot.
In Crowe v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 289, 439 P.2d 50 (1968), we stated:
[A] judicial tribunal is not required to render a judicial opinion on a matter which has become moot. In this case, a judicial opinion would not serve to terminate any controversy or put to an end any uncertainty.... A case is moot when a judgment, if rendered[,] will have no practical legal effect upon an existing controversy....
Id. at 294-95, 439 P.2d at 53. Were the trial court to fulfill Common Cause’s request on remand and declare the actions of the caucus members in passing the “long bill” unconstitutional, the judgment would have no practical effect on the controversy surrounding the passage of that bill. The matter on which Common Cause requests declaratory relief is therefore moot, and remand to the trial court for further consideration would be a fruitless exercise in my opinion.
In addition, I believe that Common Cause’s prayer for declaratory relief is inadequate. In its complaint, Common Cause requests the court to enter an order declaring only that the caucus members’ conduct in passing the “long bill” was “unlawful and unconstitutional.” Common Cause does not challenge the constitutionality of the “long bill” itself, by seeking a declaration that, based on improper actions by the caucus members, the bill is “null and void.” See Colo. Const, art. V, § 22b. Instead, Common Cause asks the court to review *215the actions of certain legislators prior to the passage of the “long bill” and to declare only that those actions are unlawful. This, in my view, is an improper request.
While it is within the judiciary’s power to review the constitutionality of a piece of legislation already passed, it is beyond the power of the courts to review, and in effect oversee, the actions of individual legislators simply for the purpose of determining the propriety of those actions and nothing more. As stated in In re Senate Resolution No. 4, 54 Colo. 262, 130 P. 333 (1913):
[I]t is not, in our judgment, within the province of this court to say whether or not the general assembly has performed the duties imposed by the constitution. All departments of government stand on an equal plane, and are of equal constitutional dignity. The constitution defines the duties of each. Neither can call the others directly to account for actions within their province; and so it follows, that the judicial cannot say to the legislative department that it has, or has not, preformed [sic] its constitutional duties.
Id. at 271, 130 P. at 336.
It is therefore improper for the judiciary to review the actions of legislators solely for the purpose of determining if those actions were proper or not. While the actions of caucus members must be considered to determine if a violation of the GAVEL amendment has occurred, the request for declaratory relief must be framed in terms of whether the final piece of legislation passed is constitutional or whether it is “null and void,” for this is the remedy expressly afforded by section 22b of the GAVEL amendment.
Common Cause requests only that the actions of individual legislators be declared unlawful. To comply with this request would constitute a judicial encroachment on the legislative process. It is my belief that Common Cause’s complaint is deficient in that it fails to request a judicial declaration as to the validity of the “long bill,” which action is certainly within the judiciary’s power. The proper avenue for relief would have been for Common Cause to request the courts to declare the “long bill” null and void immediately after it was signed into law to prevent its eventual enforcement on the July 1, 1989, effective date. See Lewis v. Denver City Waterworks Co., 19 Colo. 236, 239, 34 P. 993, 994 (1893).
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case in its entirety.