Court Opinion

ID: 9928368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:04:34.234492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:10.513235
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  Jan 31 2024, 9:38 am
      OPINION ON REHEARING
                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Thomas P. Keller                                           Theodore E. Rokita
      South Bend, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
                                                                 Steve J. Hosler
                                                                 Deputy Attorney General
                                                                 Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Stevie Bradley,                                            January 31, 2024
      Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 22A-CR-2317
              v.                                                 Appeal from the St. Joseph
                                                                 Superior Court
      State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable John M.
      Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Marnocha, Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 71D02-2109-F1-000020

                                      Opinion by Judge Felix
                                       Judge Crone concurs.
                             Judge Brown dissents with separate opinion.

      Felix, Judge.

[1]   The State has filed a petition for rehearing from our opinion in which we

      vacated Stevie Bradley’s convictions because Bradley was not brought to trial

      within 70 days pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B) (repealed and replaced

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024                    Page 1 of 7
      Jan. 1, 2024). See Bradley v. State, 223 N.E.3d 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). In its

      petition, the State contends that our holding that a defendant’s Criminal Rule

      (“C.R.”) 4(B) early trial request is tolled when a trial court sua sponte initiates

      competency proceedings for the defendant is erroneous. For the reasons

      discussed below, the State’s assertions are not meritorious. We affirm our prior

      opinion in all respects.

[2]   In its appellee brief, the State argued that the delay caused by the trial court sua

      sponte initiating competency proceedings was “not chargeable to the State.”

      Appellee’s Br. at 12 (citing Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (Ind. 2011)).

      In its petition for rehearing, the State argues for the first time that Bradley’s

      C.R. 4(B) early trial request was extinguished. Appellee’s Pet. Reh’g at 5–6.

      The State recognizes that “it did not clearly make this point in its Brief.”

      Appellee’s Pet. Reh’g at 5 n.1. “It is axiomatic that an issue not briefed or

      urged in the original briefs on appeal generally cannot be raised for the first time

      in a petition for rehearing.” In re Est. of Hurwich, 109 N.E.3d 416, 417 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2018) (quoting Strong v. Jackson, 781 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2003)). Nonetheless, we will address the State’s argument.

[3]   Delays and continuances generally extend (i.e., toll, pause, suspend) the 70-day

      early trial period as set forth in C.R. 4(B)(1) and (F) (repealed and replaced Jan.

      1, 2024). For example, any delay caused by a defendant’s request for a

      competency evaluation extends the 70-day early trial period. See Curtis v. State,

      948 N.E.2d 1143, 1150 (Ind. 2011) (citing Baldwin v. State, 274 Ind. 269, 411

      N.E.2d 605, 606 (1980)). Likewise, State actions such as dismissing all charges

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024   Page 2 of 7
      toll the early-trial clock. Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ind. 1997) (citing

      State ex rel. Turner v. Hancock Cir. Ct., 270 Ind. 320, 385 N.E.2d 447, 448 (1979)).

      However, a defendant’s early trial motion may be deemed extinguished or

      waived if the defendant acts inconsistently therewith, including when a

      defendant abandons a prior early trial motion, Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d

      1186, 1192–93 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Minneman v. State, 441 N.E.2d 673, 677

      (Ind. 1982)) trans. denied, 209 N.E.3d 1175 (Ind. 2023), or when a defendant

      does not object to the trial court setting trial beyond the 70-day early trial

      period, Hahn v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Goudy,

      689 N.E.2d at 691).

[4]   Here, Bradley did not abandon or otherwise act inconsistently with his early

      trial motion; in fact, Bradley frequently reminded the trial court of his request.

      Bradley also did not request a competency evaluation for himself, so the

      resulting delay is not chargeable to him. See Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1150 (citing

      Baldwin, 411 N.E.2d at 606). The trial court initiated competency proceedings

      sua sponte. When a trial court sua sponte orders a competency evaluation for a

      defendant, the early trial period is tolled and the delay is chargeable to neither

      the State nor the defendant. See Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B)(1), (F) (repealed and

      replaced Jan. 1, 2024); Curtis, 948 N.E.2d at 1150 (citing Baldwin, 411 N.E.2d at

      606).1 Once the competency evaluation is complete and the 70-day early trial

      1
        In its petition for rehearing, the State argues that it “did not do anything to delay [Bradley’s] trial.”
      Appellee’s Pet. Reh’g at 9. We are not casting blame, and as our Supreme Court noted in Curtis v. State, “the
      focus of Criminal Rule 4 is not fault; it is to ensure early trials.” 948 N.E.2d at 1151.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024                 Page 3 of 7
      period resumes, the State must fulfill its affirmative duty to bring the defendant

      to trial. See Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1037 (Ind. 2013) (citing Cundiff v.

      State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012)).

[5]   Regarding its affirmative duty, the State contends that tolling the 70-day early

      trial period when a trial court sua sponte orders a competency evaluation

      “creates an incentive for defendants to act out to trigger competency questions

      to gain a potential windfall under Rule 4(B) and potentially discourage trial

      courts from addressing competency concerns.” Appellee’s Pet. Reh’g at 8. In

      this case specifically, the State asserts that “[t]olling the 70-day period and

      requiring the State to assemble potential jurors, subpoena witnesses, and

      otherwise prepare within an eight-day period without warning is functionally

      impossible.” Appellee’s Pet. Reh’g at 8.

[6]   In making these arguments, the State overlooks the plain language of C.R.

      4(B)(1) (repealed and replaced Jan. 1, 2024), that was in effect at all times

      relevant to this case: If there “was not sufficient time to try [the defendant]

      during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court

      calendar . . . the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance

      as set forth in” C.R. 4(A) (repealed and replaced Jan. 1, 2024). That is, when

      Bradley’s early trial period clock resumed with eight days remaining, the State

      should have filed a motion to continue the trial if it was “functionally

      impossible” for the State to bring Bradley to trial within those eight days. The

      State chose not to do so. Similarly, the trial court could have “take[n] note of

      congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, and upon so

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024   Page 4 of 7
      finding” could have ordered a continuance that would not have been chargeable

      to the State. See Crim. R. 4(B)(1) (repealed and replaced Jan. 1, 2024). The

      trial court did not do so.2

[7]   While we grant this petition to address the State’s argument, with these

      comments, we affirm our original opinion.

      Crone, J., concurs.

      Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion.

      2
       The State maintains that “the trial court continued Bradley’s trial” to May 4, 2022, because of “court
      congestion” and that Bradley “failed to meet his burden of rebutting the trial court’s finding.” Appellee’s Pet.
      Reh’g at 10. As explained in more detail in our original opinion, the record simply does not support the
      State’s argument.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024                   Page 5 of 7
       Brown, Judge, dissenting.

[8]    Upon further reflection, I believe this Court should affirm the trial court’s

       judgment. Ind. Criminal Procedure Rule 4(B), prior to January 1, 2024,

       provided that:

               If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall
               move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
               trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such
               motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on
               his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where
               there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70)
               calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.

[9]    As the majority noted in its opinion on rehearing, a defendant’s early trial

       motion may be deemed extinguished or waived if the defendant acts

       inconsistently therewith, including when a defendant abandons a prior early

       trial motion. Finnegan v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1192-1193 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (citing Minneman v. State, 441 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. 1982), reh’g denied),

       trans. denied. “The law requires the movant to maintain a position which is

       reasonably consistent with the request he has made.” Minneman, 441 N.E.2d at

       677.

[10]   The record reveals that the circumstances leading to the trial court vacating

       Bradley’s trial on November 29, 2021, and ordering a competency evaluation,

       resulted from Bradley’s actions. At a hearing on March 15, 2022, the court

       stated that it believed “an adequate record” had been made “that there might be

       some competency issues.” Second Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 5.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024   Page 6 of 7
On July 19, 2022, the court stated that it vacated Bradley’s previous trial over

concerns about his competency and the decision had been “based on in-court

and remote conduct by Mr. Bradley,” “based on a jail e-mail that was received

that was filed in this case indicating Mr. Bradley had a psychiatric history and

there were some issues with respect to medication,” and Bradley “at that point

in time, refused to be transported.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 5. I

would conclude that Bradley’s actions leading to questions about his

competency were inconsistent with his motion for an early trial and that the

resulting delay was chargeable to him. I would therefore affirm the trial court.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 22A-CR-2317 | January 31, 2024   Page 7 of 7