Court Opinion

ID: 9929029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:11:53.254269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:33.450813
License: Public Domain

22                         February 1, 2024                          No. 2

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                  PAUL ALLEN BLAIN,
                   Petitioner on Review,
                             v.
                        Brad CAIN,
                     Superintendent,
            Snake River Correctional Institution,
                  Respondent on Review.
         (CC 19CV43702) (CA A175317) (SC S070528)

     En Banc
   On petition for review filed November 1, 2023;* consid-
ered and under advisement January 23, 2024.
   Jedediah Peterson, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, filed
the petition for review.
     No appearance contra.
     PER CURIAM
     The petition for review is denied.
James, J., concurred and filed an opinion, in which Masih, J.,
joined.

______________
   * Appeal from Malheur County Circuit Court, J. Burdette Pratt, Judge. 327
Or App 584, 536 P3d 623 (2023).
Cite as 372 Or 22 (2024)                                     23

        PER CURIAM
        The petition for review is denied.
        JAMES, J., concurring.
          In this post-conviction case, petitioner alleges that
his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate and inef-
fective under both the state and federal constitutions for fail-
ing to file a motion to suppress the warrantless search and
seizure of garbage from the garbage bin at his residence. At
the time, prevailing Oregon law held that no privacy inter-
est remained in garbage set out for pick up. State v. Howard,
342 Or 635, 641, 157 P3d 1189 (2007). However, five months
before counsel’s decision not to file a motion to suppress in
this case, this court had granted review in State v. Lien, 364
Or 750, 441 P3d 185 (2019). Ultimately, our decision in Lien
overruled Howard, holding that Oregonians retain their
Article I, section 9, privacy interests in garbage that has
been placed within a closed, opaque container and put out at
curbside for collection. Id.
          The Court of Appeals did not address whether coun-
sel’s performance was deficient, instead reasoning that peti-
tioner could not show prejudice because, “[h]ere, the evidence
shows that the state’s plea offer, which included dismissing
some charges and not seeking an upward departure sen-
tence on the pleaded charges, would have been withdrawn if
petitioner had filed a motion to suppress.” Blain v. Cain, 327
Or App 584, 588, 536 P3d 623 (2023).
           Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel. The
right to counsel under Article I, section 11, is the right to
adequate counsel. State v. Langley, 314 Or 247, 258, 839 P2d
692 (1992), adh’d to on recons, 318 Or 28, 861 P2d 1012 (1993).
The adequacy of counsel is a contextual inquiry, dependent
upon the “nature and complexity of the case.” Johnson v.
Premo, 361 Or 688, 701, 399 P3d 431 (2017). As such, con-
stitutionally minimum adequate counsel may require a par-
ticular investigation, see, e.g., Richardson v. Belleque, 362
Or 236, 257, 406 P3d 1074 (2017); certain motion practice,
see, e.g., Peiffer v. Hoyt, 339 Or 649, 653, 125 P3d 734 (2005)
(accepting that adequate counsel may require the filing of
24                                                Blain v. Cain

a motion to suppress, but holding that counsel was not so
obligated in the context of that case); the raising of certain
defenses, see, e.g., Lichau v. Baldwin, 333 Or 350, 354, 39
P3d 851 (2002); or other actions by counsel, depending upon
the case.
         We have implicitly recognized some limits on what
can be conditioned in a plea offer. For example, it is axi-
omatic that a prosecutor cannot condition a plea offer on
defense counsel not advising the defendant about the con-
tents, or advisability, of the offer. See e.g., Lyons v. Pearce,
298 Or 554, 567, 694 P2d 969 (1985) (“One function a crim-
inal defense attorney performs for a client is to disclose the
consequences of a guilty plea and conviction.”). But whether
a plea offer can require that defense counsel abrogate some
other essential aspect of the defense function is a more open
question, with little treatment in caselaw to date. Although
we have yet to take up the issue, at least one other court
has opined that the prosecutorial practice of conditioning
plea offers on defense counsel not taking some action may
“infringe[ ] the right to counsel.” See, e.g., State v. Zhao, 157
Wash 2d 188, 204, 137 P3d 835, 843 (2006) (Sanders, J., con-
curring) (expressing concern about “the policy of the Pierce
County Prosecutor’s Office to deny plea bargains to accused
sex offenders who interview their alleged victim” and dis-
cussing cases).
         The uncertain legality of conditional plea offers is
further complicated in the context of post-conviction relief.
For example, if the standard for minimally adequate counsel
under Article I, section 11, required a particular investiga-
tion, but a prosecutor’s plea offer was conditioned on counsel
not performing that investigation—effectively conditioning
the plea on a defense attorney providing constitutionally
inadequate counsel to their client—it is odd to rationalize,
as did the Court of Appeals, how that same plea offer, which
may have been instrumental in bringing about the deficient
performance, could itself immunize that deficient perfor-
mance from a remedy by establishing a lack of prejudice.
        Despite those concerns, I concur in our decision
to deny review in this case. Petitioner’s arguments to this
court focus primarily on the performance of counsel, not
Cite as 372 Or 22 (2024)                                      25

on the treatment of prejudice by the Court of Appeals. The
issue of whether plea offers conditioned upon defense coun-
sel not performing some function violates the right to coun-
sel guaranteed under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution will arise again, either on direct appeal or in
the context of post-conviction, and when fully challenged
and briefed, would be a proper subject for this court’s review.
          I respectfully concur in the denial of the petition for
review.
          Masih, J., joins in this concurring opinion.