Court Opinion

ID: 9449256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 14:09:02.269117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:56.747518
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0775-MR

JOHN P. ASKIN                                                      APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE ANGELA MCCORMICK BISIG, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 19-CI-001063

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME                                             APPELLEE

                               OPINION
                         AFFIRMING AND ORDER
                       DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; KAREM AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: John P. Askin appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

granting of summary judgment to the University of Notre Dame du Lac (“Notre

Dame”) and its dismissal with prejudice of his complaint against the University.

Askin suffers from a brain disease, chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”),

which he contends is the result of multiple concussions he suffered while playing
football for Notre Dame as a student athlete in the 1980s. He brought a personal

injury suit against Notre Dame and the National Collegiate Athletics Association

(“NCAA”). The circuit court granted summary judgment to Notre Dame on statute

of limitations grounds and denied it to the NCAA. Having carefully reviewed the

record, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Notre Dame.

             Notre Dame has moved to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that the

NCAA was not named as a party. The motion is denied because Notre Dame has

failed to show it has standing to make this motion on behalf of the NCAA.

                       Factual and Procedural Background

             Askin was an offensive lineman for the Notre Dame football team

from 1982 to 1986. During that time, he suffered numerous concussions at

practices and games. In his deposition testimony, Askin recalled suffering mild

concussions on a weekly basis. He also suffered more serious concussions. On

one occasion, which is documented in Notre Dame’s medical records, he was

knocked unconscious and sent to the hospital for a CT brain scan. He returned to

practice several hours later that day at the insistence of the coach.

             After leaving Notre Dame, Askin signed short NFL contracts with the

Cleveland Browns and the New England Patriots. He suffered a back injury and a

knee injury, which ended his professional career. He went on to work as a regional

manager for an insurance company and then for BB&T Bank in Louisville.

                                          -2-
             Over time, Askin, who suffers from rheumatoid arthritis, experienced

increasing orthopedic pain and joint instability. In 2009, when he was forty-five

years of age, his deteriorating physical condition caused him to resign his position

at BB&T Bank. He qualified for Social Security disability benefits for orthopedic

injuries and received additional benefits through his employer’s policy issued by

The Hartford Insurance Company.

             In 2012, Askin began treatment with Dr. Darel Barnett, a pain

management physician. According to Dr. Barnett’s notes from an office visit on

January 9, 2013, Askin “relates his low back, neck pain and headache pain to

trauma from playing football.”

             Dr. Barnett prescribed MS Contin (morphine) and oxycodone. By

2013 and 2014, Askin was experiencing headaches and cognitive problems,

including short-term memory loss. He had difficulty remembering names and

performing everyday activities. According to Askin, he became addicted to opiates

while in Dr. Barnett’s care, and his addiction was responsible for causing these

symptoms.

             At around this time, Askin began to receive correspondence regarding

the NFL concussion settlement. From these mailings, as well as extensive media

coverage of the negotiations, he became aware that there was an alleged link

between football-related head injuries and long-term cognitive problems. He

                                         -3-
turned over solicitations from attorneys about the concussion litigation to his own

attorney. He also began to receive daily phone calls on the subject from various

law firms.

             Of particular significance to this lawsuit are the interactions between

Askin and Oliver Olson, APRN, his pain management nurse. At a regular office

visit on September 24, 2014, Olson’s discussion summary stated in part as follows:

             He [Askin] reports problems with memory noting that his
             wife often will become frustrated that she has asked him
             to do a task or told him something specific that requires
             repeated reinforcement. I discussed with him about
             compensation/litigation with NFL. He reports that he is
             required to obtain brain scan by October. I discussed
             with him the rationale why this is important and
             encouraged him to get this done in a timely manner. Our
             office will provide support and help in any capacity
             possible.

Olson also noted, “I have encouraged the patient to continue litigation for former

NFL players.”

             On October 10, 2014, Askin saw Olson again and reported that he was

experiencing tremors in his left hand and whole body tremors while sleeping.

During this visit with Olson, Askin filled out an insurance questionnaire for The

Hartford for purposes of retaining his disability insurance. The questionnaire

contained the following question: “Have you suffered a severe Cognitive

Impairment that renders you unable to perform common tasks, such as using the

phone, money management or medication management?” Askin checked the “yes”

                                         -4-
box and wrote: “Concussions in football – College & NFL[;] memory going.”

Although Askin acknowledges writing this response, he claims Olson told him

how to fill out the form to ensure he continued receiving insurance coverage and

because Askin was under the influence of morphine and oxycodone at that time.

He testified that he has no recollection of completing the form.

             Olson filled out an accompanying form for The Hartford, which Askin

also signed, entitled “Attending Physician’s Statement of Continued Disability” in

which he checked the “yes” box for the question asking, “Does the patient have a

psychiatric/cognitive impairment?” He wrote that Askin showed “early signs of

chronic traumatic encephalopathy[;] mild impairment at this point. Evaluation

pending. Etiology: retired NFL football player, lineman.” Olson testified that he

believed Askin should be considered for the NFL settlement and that Askin had

shown him a mailing from the NFL which required him to undergo a neurological

evaluation in order to be considered for the settlement. Olson explained that in

filling out the form he was not providing a diagnosis, that he had not performed

any kind of extensive evaluation and he would not have spoken to Askin about

brain damage. He also opined that checking the box “yes” was likely premature,

which was why he included the phrase “evaluation pending” on the form.

             Meanwhile, Askin grew concerned about the effects of his opioid use

and feared that his addiction would kill him. His friends and family were also

                                         -5-
alarmed by his opioid use and its effect on him. His wife testified that it made him

very irrational and unstable; a friend testified that his speech was slurred, and he

had difficulty conducting a coherent conversation; another friend observed he

seemed heavily medicated.

             Around 2015, Askin stopped taking opioids and overcame his

addiction. As a result, Dr. Barnett discharged him as a patient and also discharged

Nurse Olson. Askin began to pursue a medical malpractice action against Dr.

Barnett. Askin’s friends observed him return to his former self, describing him as

very coherent and able to have a normal conversation without slurring his words or

seeming impaired. From 2015 through 2017, Askin handled his family’s bills,

refinanced the family home, and drove his daughters and their volleyball

teammates on lengthy road trips. His mortgage banker and his friends observed

that he seemed mentally acute and normal.

             Askin also sought a new pain management doctor and retained

medical malpractice attorneys to investigate Dr. Barnett’s conduct. Nurse Olson

referred Askin to Dr. Blaine Lisner, a neurologist and neurosurgeon at Dynamic

Healthcare where Nurse Olson had started working. Olson made the referral

specifically for Askin’s low back pain and knee pain. Askin also wanted Dr.

Lisner’s opinion as to whether Dr. Barnett had overprescribed narcotic pain

medication and then improperly fired him as a patient. At his visit with Dr. Lisner,

                                          -6-
which occurred in August 2016, Askin told the doctor about the NFL settlement’s

future benefits and his fears about his future based on what other former NFL

players were experiencing.

            Lisner’s office note from the visit states as follows:

            Pt. is a 53 y/o white male with cognitive declining after
            several years of playing professional and college football
            and high school football. He played > 15 years and
            suffered several episodes which included trauma to the
            head with confusion and more than one time he had loss
            of consciousness for a few minutes. . . .

            Patient states he began noticing cognitive problems with
            facial recognition and names. This began about ten years
            ago with “forgetting” names and forgetting things, such
            as lights on, the stove on, and other activities of daily
            living. Pt. states when driving he may forget locations
            from remote memories but a recent one (one week or
            less) may also be forgotten. Pt. now seeks to be added
            under a settlement regarding concussions.

            At the August 2016 appointment, Dr. Lisner administered a

neurocognitive screening exam called a SLUMS test. Askin scored within the

national average. Dr. Lisner recommended to Askin that he undergo full

neuropsychological testing and a brain scan over the next six to twelve months and

wrote prescriptions for a brain MRI, an EEG, and a full neuropsychological

evaluation. The prescription for the EEG referred to “neurocognitive deficits,

possible seizures, several concussions.”

                                           -7-
             Askin believed he passed the SLUMS test with a very high score and

that the results showed he was perfectly normal. He did not follow up with Dr.

Lisner’s recommendations and did not have the other prescribed tests performed.

             On December 16, 2016, Askin consulted his rheumatologist, Dr.

Steven Stern, about increasing body aches and knee pain. He also expressed

concerns about a brain injury. The doctor’s note states: “He was a professional

football player in his younger years and is concerned about brain injury he may

have sustained during this time.” Askin told Dr. Stern that he would likely have a

brain scan eventually and that he was afraid what a scan might reveal. Dr. Stern

suggested that Askin consult the University of Louisville sports medicine doctors

as they would have the most experience in that field, but Askin did not do so.

             In April 2017, Askin saw primary care provider Kali Edwards, APRN,

who wrote that Askin was contacted by the NFL and “for a settlement amount

needing to see a neurologist and have MRI of head for all the concussions he had

during the NFL play time[.]” Also in April 2017, Askin also told The Hartford that

he was unable to have an IME because he was having a brain scan for the NFL

settlement. He did not, however, undergo the brain scan at that time.

             In January 2017, he emailed several of his former teammates

regarding a Wall Street Journal article about congressional hearings into the links

between football concussions and mental illness, commenting “this thing is a lot

                                         -8-
bigger than what we know. More evidence comes out every day. Says a lot of

older players fall into depression, along with memory loss. No one knows what

our brains will be like 20 years from now.”

             In late 2017 or early 2018, Askin began to experience episodes of

biting his tongue at night, resulting in pain and bleeding. He also experienced

migraines, seizures, uncontrolled anger, and worsening depression. He began

having trouble putting together sentences and having a coherent conversation, and

he began repeating himself.

             He returned to Dr. Lisner in February 2018. Dr. Lisner noted that

Askin continued to have cognitive and memory problems. Lisner wrote that he

was certain this was the result of multiple concussions. He ordered an MRI scan of

Askin’s brain which indicated abnormality. He referred him to a specialist for

neurocognitive testing, which indicated acute and severe impairment in memory

and cognition. Based on these results, Dr. Lisner diagnosed Askin with Major

Neurocognitive Disorder at a moderate level of severity and CTE caused by

repetitive brain trauma in football.

             On February 15, 2019, Askin filed suit against Notre Dame and the

NCAA. The complaint raised claims against both defendants for negligence,

fraudulent concealment, constructive fraud, and punitive damages. Notre Dame

moved to dismiss on the grounds that Askin’s claims were untimely, and the

                                        -9-
discovery rule did not apply to toll the statute of limitations. The circuit court

denied the motion, finding that the discovery rule could apply to Askin’s cause of

action depending upon the facts which emerged during discovery. The circuit

court granted Notre Dame’s motion to limit initial discovery to issues related to the

statute of limitations. The parties conducted discovery for approximately one year.

After conducting a hearing, the circuit court granted Notre Dame’s motion for

summary judgment and dismissed Askin’s claims against Notre Dame with

prejudice. The circuit court denied a motion for summary judgment brought by the

other defendant, the NCAA. This appeal by Askin followed.

                                 Standard of review

             In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our inquiry focuses on

“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any

material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996); Kentucky Rules of

Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. The trial court is required to view the record “in a

light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and

all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service

Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). On the other hand, “a party

opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat it without

presenting at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue

                                         -10-
of material fact for trial.” Id. at 482. “Not every issue of fact or conflicting

inference presents a genuine issue of material fact that requires denial of a

summary judgment motion.” Grass v. Akins, 368 S.W.3d 150, 153 (Ky. App.

2012). “An appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision on summary

judgment and will review the issue de novo because only legal questions and no

factual findings are involved.” Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699,

705 (Ky. App. 2004).

                 The statute of limitations and the discovery rule

             The parties agree that the pertinent statute of limitations provides that

“[a]n action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff . . . shall be commenced

within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued[.]” Kentucky Revised

Statutes (KRS) 413.140(1)(a). The discovery rule applies “when the complained

of injury is not immediately discoverable,” and alleviates “the unfairness inherent

in charging a plaintiff with slumbering on rights not reasonably possible to

ascertain.” Wilson v. Paine, 288 S.W.3d 284, 286 (Ky. 2009). Under the

discovery rule, the limitations period begins to run “on the date of the discovery of

the injury, or from the date it should, in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence,

have been discovered.” Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. 1971).

Furthermore, the plaintiff must know not only that he or she has been injured, but

by whom. Thus, “[a] cause of action will not accrue under the discovery rule until

                                         -11-
the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have

discovered not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been

caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville

Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (citation omitted).

                                      Analysis

             The circuit court held that the limitations period began to run by at

least October 2014 because Askin was put on notice by that date that he might

suffer from football-related CTE. The circuit court relied primarily on the

statements made by Askin and Nurse Olson in the disability insurance

questionnaires signed and submitted to The Hartford in October 2014.

             Quite simply, a medical professional’s direction to a
             former football player to state on an insurance form that
             he has severe cognitive impairment as a result of
             concussions from playing football, as Askin did at
             Olson’s instruction in 2014, is sufficient to “excite
             suspicion” that he suffers from football-related CTE.
             Likewise, Olson’s assertion on the 2014 Attending
             Physician Statement, signed by Askin and submitted in
             conjunction with the insurance questionnaire, that Askin
             had “early signs of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy”
             with a noted etiology of “retired NFL football player,
             lineman” was likewise more than sufficient to trigger a
             duty for Askin to exercise ordinary care and diligence by
             investigating whether he in fact suffered from football-
             related CTE. Put simply, no reasonable juror could find
             that Askin lacked actual or constructive knowledge of his
             claim after these two unequivocal 2014 statements by
             Askin and his medical provider that he suffered football-
             related CTE.

                                        -12-
             The circuit court rejected Askin’s argument that Olson was not

providing a diagnosis in completing the forms, that his conclusions were premature

and related solely to Askin’s interest in participating in the NFL settlement, and

that he instructed and influenced Askin to complete the forms. The circuit court

held that even if these assertions are considered in the light most favorable to

Askin, they do not overcome the fact that a medical professional in 2014 instructed

Askin to submit the forms stating he had football-related CTE. “At a minimum,

the receipt of such an instruction from a medical professional, even if premature or

motivated by other reasons, was more than sufficient to put Askin on notice of a

need to investigate the potential that he had football-related CTE.”

             By contrast, the circuit court denied the NCAA’s motion for summary

judgment because the NCAA had agreed to enter into a tolling agreement in

separate litigation which required it to establish that Askin’s claims accrued before

2011. It held that because of the tolling of such claims “Askin’s actual or

constructive knowledge of his injuries in 2014 does not operate to bar his claims

against the NCAA even though those claims were not filed until 2019.”

             Askin argues that any symptoms he was experiencing in 2014 were

attributable to his opioid addiction, whose symptoms mimic those of CTE. He

contends that his addiction made it impossible for him to understand the

implications of the NFL settlement and the statements on the insurance forms.

                                         -13-
After he overcame his addiction in 2015, he claims his symptoms ceased and that

the SLUMS test administered by Dr. Lisner confirmed to his mind that he was

mentally well. He further contends that he could not have had constructive

knowledge of latent brain disease until he had medically-diagnosed symptoms

attributable to latent brain disease and received a competent neuropsychological

and neurological diagnosis that his disease was caused by trauma in football.

             Even if we accept, arguendo, Askin’s claim that his opioid addiction

rendered him incapable of understanding what he was writing on the insurance

forms in October 2014, by his own admission he had overcome his addiction by

the time he consulted Dr. Lisner in August 2016. Although Dr. Lisner did not

immediately diagnose him with a brain disease, his office notes plainly stated that

Askin suffered cognitive decline after several years of playing football, that he had

suffered head trauma, that he had begun noticing cognitive problems and memory

loss over the past ten years and that he wanted to be added to the concussion

settlement. Although Askin describes the office note as full of inaccurate

statements, Lisner could only have obtained the information in the note from Askin

himself. Dr. Lisner administered the SLUMS test and told Askin that his result

was in the normal range, but he also recommended that he undergo three different

tests and gave him prescriptions for these tests. “An injured party has an

affirmative duty to use diligence in discovering the cause of action within the

                                        -14-
limitations period. Any fact that should excite his suspicion is the same as actual

knowledge of this entire claim.” Fluke Corp. v. LeMaster, 306 S.W.3d 55, 64 (Ky.

2010). Askin himself admitted to Dr. Stern that he was afraid of getting the tests

for fear of what they might reveal about his mental condition. There is no question

of material fact, based on the overwhelming evidence in the record, that Askin had

been placed on notice that he might be suffering from a brain disease caused by the

concussions he suffered playing football for Notre Dame.

             Askin concedes that he may have been placed on notice of harm, but

that the discovery of harm must be distinguished from the discovery of injury. He

contends that the circuit court mistakenly equated facts that might have put him on

notice of harm to facts that actually did put him on notice that Notre Dame had

caused him to develop CTE. Askin argues that he could not have had constructive

knowledge of latent brain disease until (a) he had diagnosed symptoms attributable

to latent brain disease and (b) received a competent neuropsychological and

neurological diagnosis that his disease was caused by trauma in football.

             But a formal medical diagnosis is not required to fulfill the notice of

injury prong of the discovery rule and the two cases upon which Askin relies do

not stand for this proposition. The first case, an unpublished opinion from the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, involved a plaintiff who received a pelvic mesh

implant and subsequently suffered years of pain and other symptoms. Cutter v.

                                        -15-
Ethicon, Inc., No. 20-6040, 2021 WL 3754245 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2021). She

ultimately filed a complaint raising claims of negligence and products liability

against the manufacturer of the implant, who invoked the statute of limitations to

bar her suit. The appellate court held that the discovery rule applied because her

physicians never attributed the plaintiff’s symptoms to a flaw in the mesh or told

her the mesh itself was defective; rather, her physicians attributed her symptoms to

scar tissue, to the mesh rolling up and to her body not accepting the implant. The

appellate court held that a patient has a right to rely on her physician’s knowledge

and skill and that even if she diligently investigated the harm she was suffering, her

physicians’ opinions could have led her reasonably to believe that the symptoms

were due to a problem with her body rather than with the manufacture of the mesh.

By contrast, Askin’s symptoms were never misdiagnosed by his physicians. He

himself ascribed his cognitive and memory problems to his opioid addiction, but

there is no evidence that he ever relied on a medical diagnosis for this belief.

“‘Belief’ is not evidence and does not create an issue of material fact.” Humana of

Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. 1990). “A party’s subjective beliefs

about the nature of the evidence is not the sort of affirmative proof required to

avoid summary judgment.” Haugh v. City of Louisville, 242 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Ky.

App. 2007). Indeed, the medical professionals Askin consulted seemed prepared

                                         -16-
to attribute his symptoms to the concussions he suffered playing football or urged

him to investigate this possibility.

             The other opinion upon which Askin relies was rendered by the

Supreme Court of Ohio. Liddell v. SCA Serv. of Ohio, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 1233

(Ohio 1994). It involved a police officer who inhaled smoke from a burning

garbage truck while assisting others at the scene of the fire. He did not know the

smoke was toxic. Seven years later he was diagnosed with cancer in his nasal

cavity. The appellate court held that he did not, and could not, discover his injury

until after the two-year statute of limitations governing bodily injuries had expired.

The court noted that if he had attempted to bring a cause of action for negligence

right after the fire occurred, any claim for damages would have been strongly

opposed on the grounds that it was too speculative. The court concluded “that

when an injury allegedly caused by exposure to toxic chlorine gas does not

manifest itself immediately, a cause of action for that injury arises upon the date

the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority that he has been injured

by exposure to the gas, or upon the date on which, by exercise of reasonable

diligence, he should have discovered that he has been so injured, whichever

date occurs first.” Id. at 1239 (emphasis supplied). The Liddell opinion is

completely in accordance with our own case law in not requiring a formal

diagnosis for a cause of action to accrue. Askin failed to exercise reasonable

                                         -17-
diligence in seeking a timely diagnosis of his condition, choosing not to undergo a

brain scan although Nurse Olson and Dr. Lisner both recommended that he do so.

             Next, Askin argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his fraud

claim against Notre Dame. The circuit court reasoned that the five-year limitations

period for fraud did not apply because the real object of Askin’s complaint was the

claim that he suffered personal injury in the form of football-related CTE. The

circuit court relied on Carr v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, 344

S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ky. 1961), which holds that it is the “object rather than the form

of the action which controls in determining the limitation period.” Thus, “where a

statute limits the time in which an action for ‘injuries to the person’ may be

brought, the statute is applicable to all actions the real purpose of which is to

recover for an injury to the person, whether based upon contract or tort[.]” Id.

             Askin argues that his fraud claim is separate and independent because

it is based on his allegations that Notre Dame failed to warn and fraudulently

concealed its own knowledge that repeated mild concussions from helmet to

helmet hits cause latent brain disease. But the real object of his action was to

recover damages for personal injury, not for some other injury stemming purely

from the purported fraud. The circuit court correctly ruled that the one-year statute

of limitations applied to the fraud claim.

                                         -18-
             Finally, Notre Dame argues that the appeal should be dismissed

because Askin failed to name a necessary party, the NCAA, a co-defendant below.

In its order entered on June 22, 2022, the circuit court granted Askin’s motion to

make its order granting summary judgment to Notre Dame and denying it to the

NCAA, entered on June 2, 2022, final and immediately appealable, pursuant to CR

54.02. Askin served a copy of the motion seeking to make the judgment final and

appealable as to Notre Dame on the NCAA. The NCAA did not file any response

to the motion, nor did it seek to challenge the June 22, 2022 order.

             Notre Dame suggests that the NCAA could have an unspecified

interest that would be affected by our decision in Askin’s appeal and consequently

the appeal should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The NCAA received

notice and was given the opportunity to oppose Notre Dame’s motion to make the

judgment final and appealable under CR 54.01, but did not do so. “[A] party

generally may assert only his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of third

parties not before the court[.]” Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center,

P.S.C., 664 S.W.3d 633, 648 (Ky. 2023). Notre Dame does not explain how it has

standing to seek dismissal on the NCAA’s behalf. Its motion to dismiss this appeal

is denied.

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the grant of summary judgment

to Notre Dame and deny its motion to dismiss this appeal.

                                        -19-
            ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: _July 28, 2023_____
                                     JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:               BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Bruce Miller                     Stephen J. Mattingly
Norma C. Miller                     R. Kenyon Myer
Louisville, Kentucky                Louisville, Kentucky

David D. Langfitt (pro hac vice)    Matthew A. Kairis (pro hac vice)
Gladwyne, Pennsylvania              Dallas, Texas

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR                   ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:                          APPELLEE:

J. Bruce Miller                     Stephen J. Mattingly
Louisville, Kentucky                R. Kenyon Myer
                                    Louisville, Kentucky

                                   -20-