Court Opinion

ID: 9630557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:14:07.605922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:40.676383
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and I would affirm Anderson’s convictions. In my opinion, the trial court did not err either by denying Anderson’s request for a continuance or by preventing defense counsel from questioning the child victim about her prior sexual history. Ac*143cordingly, I write separately to express my views concerning Parts I and II of the majority opinion. Although I concur with the majority’s Part IV conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion for a new trial, I disagree with the majority’s gratuitous discussion concerning the release of witnesses under subpoena. Accordingly, I write separately concerning the Part IV issues to express my opinion that the Commonwealth had the authority under our rules of procedure to release Dr. Cunningham from its subpoena.
I. CONTINUANCE
Continuances are the bane of a trial court’s efforts to maintain a current trial calendar, and, if freely granted, will quickly lead to an unmanageable backlog of cases. Although the majority appears to believe otherwise,1 trial courts have only a limited number of available trial dates, and postponements can wreak havoc on a trial court’s calendar. The reshuffling required by an eve-of-trial continuance typically ere-ates a “domino effect” which sacrifices at least two trial dates — the original trial date, which can no longer be reassigned, and the date to which the continued matter is rescheduled — and delays justice for other litigants before the court.
Recognizing that this Court has no business micro-managing docket control in the trial courts, we have held that “[i]t is fundamental for a judge to have the right to decide when it is appropriate to grant a continuance in any given case.”2 Accordingly! “[t]he granting of a continuance is always in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and unless it appears that he has abused that discretion, his determination will not be disturbed on appeal.”3 These principles are embodied within RCr 9.04, which governs the granting of continuances:
The court, upon motion and sufficient cause shown by either party, may grant a postponement of the hearing or trial. A motion by the defendant for a postponement on account of the absence of *144evidence may be made only upon affidavit showing the materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has been used to obtain it. If the motion is based on the absence of a witness, the affidavit must show what facts the affiant believes the witness will prove, and not merely the effect of such facts in evidence, and that the affiant believes them to be true. If the attorney for the Commonwealth consents to the reading of the affidavit on the hearing or trial as the deposition of the absent witness, the hearing or trial shall not be postponed on account of the witness’s absence. If the Commonwealth does not consent to the reading of the affidavit, the granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial judge.4
I strongly disagree with the majority’s belief that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Anderson’s continuance motions. After engaging in its own factfinding, and without regard to the contrary beliefs of the trial court, the majority finds that the criteria outlined in Eldred v. Commonwealth5 warranted a continuance. This appellate “Monday-morning quarterbacking” flies in the face of the discretion we allegedly give trial courts in such matters and appears to authorize a sixty-day “freebie” continuance in any criminal case. In my opinion, a careful review of the record refutes counsel’s unsubstantiated claims that Anderson suffered prejudice from tardy discovery.
In Eldred, this court identified seven factors which trial courts should consider when determining, in the exercise of their discretion, whether sufficient cause exists to grant a continuance.6 In one paragraph of conclusory statements without supporting analysis or even a passing mention of the appropriate standard of review, the majority finds that all of the Eldred factors supported a continuance. While a couple of these factors are largely objective (e.g., the length of delay and whether there have been any previous continuances), the remainder of the factors involve value judgments by the trial court, and we should not disturb those judgments unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence.7
I believe the majority’s findings as to the Eldred factors are inappropriate given the standard of review and also highly suspect. In Eldred, the Court instructed trial courts to consider “the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court.”8 Today’s majority ignores all but the first of these when stating, without any indication from the record that the Court’s calendar would accommodate the proposed continuance, “a two-month continuance would not have been a substantial inconvenience to any of the parties.” The majority’s findings concerning Eldred factors (4), (5), and (6) explicitly repudiate the appropriate standard of review by engaging in a new type of “one may argue ...” review, address a factor which is relevant only when the continuance is requested in connection with trial counsel’s request to withdraw,9 and remove any doubt that the *145anointed result is driving the analysis by labeling a serious, but unexceptional-in-terms-of-preparation-required, child sex abuse case as “complex.” The majority concludes by decreeing, with no more support than Appellant’s naked allegation, that “the defendant clearly suffered prejudice from the denial of the continuance.” Each of these conclusions flies in the face of the discretion this Court allegedly gives trial courts.
I find the trial court’s denials of Anderson’s motions to continue proper because I do not believe Anderson demonstrated “sufficient cause” to justify the continuances. The crux of Anderson’s pretrial motion for continuance was the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s alleged failure to provide Dr. Bates’s report to defense counsel in a timely fashion. However, the Commonwealth supplied the report to defense counsel within the time constraints outlined in the trial court’s supplemental discovery order, and the report was faxed to defense counsel the same day that it was received by the Commonwealth’s Attorney — ten days prior to the scheduled trial. Although defense counsel asserts that the faxed copy provided to the defense was not legible, counsel found Dr. Bates’s findings clear enough to describe them to the Court five (5) days before trial when first moving for a continuance.
Anderson’s trial counsel argued that an intervening out-of-town, three-day training seminar prevented her from reviewing the report until four days before the trial. Although the trial court initially heard the defense motion for supplemental discovery and orally ruled in favor of the defense four months before trial and entered a written order a full month before trial, defense counsel first raised this scheduling conflict in connection with Anderson’s pretrial motion for a continuance. Neither trial nor appellate counsel has ever articulated any reason why trial counsel could not prepare for this evidence between the end of the conference and the beginning of the trial. While Appellant asserts that he needed additional time to secure an expert witness to contradict Dr. Bates’s results, we cannot help but notice that the defense made no effort to contact or subpoena Dr. Cunningham, who had already expressed his contrary findings in writing.
Nor do I believe that Appellant demonstrated “sufficient cause” to justify a continuance on the basis of the Commonwealth’s tardy disclosure of C.S.B.’s medical records. Defense counsel informed the trial court on the record that she had reviewed these documents, and the court permitted counsel to recall witnesses and cross-examine them regarding matters found within these documents.
II. RAPE SHIELD LAW
The practical effect of today’s majority opinion is that the protection of Kentucky’s “Rape Shield Law” is no longer available to young victims! Regardless of the majority’s lofty declaration that they stand by the “sound principle” that the victim “does not become the party on trial through the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the charge made,” the majority concludes that the trial court erred by failing to allow defense counsel to question C.S.B. regarding her past sexual behavior. In order to reach this result, the majority creates a new exception to KRE 412 — the age of the victim — which paves the way for the widespread admission of immaterial and irrelevant evidence of children’s past sexual behavior whenever any physical findings support the child victim’s account.
*146KRE 412 incorporates the sound policy reasons supporting the reciprocal Federal Rule10 and balances competing interests by “protect[ing] alleged victims of sex crimes against unfair and unwarranted assaults on character without depriving criminal defendants of evidence needed for a proper defense against charges involving such crimes.” 11 KRE 412, therefore, generally prohibits evidence of an alleged sex crime victim’s past sexual behavior unless the evidence meets one of the three exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of the rule. In my opinion, evidence that C.S.B. told a nurse that she had previously had sex with another boy does not fall within an exception.
Anderson’s trial counsel argued to the trial court that the evidence was admissible under KRE 412(b)(1) as “evidence of past sexual behavior with a person other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury.” 12 Although KRE 412(b)(l)’s “source of semen or injury” exception was the only basis upon which the defense argued for the admission of this evidence, the majority sidesteps this question of first impression 13 and instead finds this evidence admissible under KRE 412(3)’s residual exception for “any other evidence directly pertaining to the offense charged.”14 Relying on Barnett v. Commonwealth,15 which interpreted the exception’s broader statutory predecessor,16 the majority con-*147eludes that the evidence of C.S.B.’s prior sexual activity “is relevant to provide an explanation for why she had a loose vaginal opening, and rebut the inference of guilt” and therefore “is directly 'pertaining to the offense charged,’ as required by KRE 412(b)(3).” The majority’s reliance upon the KRE 412(b)(3) exception and Barnett is misplaced.
Anderson never alleged in the trial court that the residual exception offered an avenue for the introduction of this evidence, and the only issue before the trial court was whether this evidence was admissible under KRE 412(b)(l)’s exception for “source of semen or injury.” By finding the evidence admissible under KRE 412(b)(3), the majority not only divorces its holding from the issue before the trial court, but also ignores KRE 412(b)(l)’s limitation on the nature of admissible source evidence. The Barnett Court interpreted a prior statute which allowed the admission of “evidence directly pertaining to the act on which the prosecution is based” whenever the trial court found such evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial or inflammatory.17 Although the exception in our prior statute was broad enough to encompass source evidence,18 KRE 412(b)(1) has narrowed the scope of admissible source evidence to situations where “there is evidence of a connection between the past behavior and a specific injury suffered in the events involved in the case. Otherwise the exception might undermine the exclusionary purpose of the general rule.” 19
I do not believe KRE 412(b)(1) offers an avenue for the introduction of this evidence, and I would note that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a similar physical condition, a “stretched hymen,” did not constitute an “injury” for purposes of the reciprocal federal rule.20 The Eighth Circuit recognized *148the balancing of interests present in the federal rule when rejecting a broad construction of “injury”:
We recognize that a compelling argument ... is that it defies principles of relevancy to allow past sexual behavior evidence to rebut evidence of a physical consequence that constitutes an injury (for example, evidence that the defendant broke the complainant’s nose), while prohibiting it for evidence of a physical consequence that does not constitute an injury (for example, evidence that the defendant caused a stretching of the complainant’s hymen). The defendant’s need to introduce source evidence is equally strong regardless of what type of physical consequence the prosecution contends the defendant caused when he allegedly raped the complainant. Morever, it can be argued that the type of physical consequence in issue has no bearing on the probative value of the past sexual behavior evidence.
We think that while these evidentiary concerns have persuasive force when viewed in an isolated context, they do not withstand the fact that when Congress created the injury exception to Rule 412, it decided to exclude past sexual behavior evidence in numerous situations where these same evidentiary concerns would dictate that the evidence be admitted. When Congress enacted the injury exception to Rule 412, it had to weigh competing interests: On one hand, the defendant’s need to introduce relevant evidence; on the other hand, the complainant’s interest in not having her sexual history publicly disclosed and society’s concomitant interest in having rapes reported and effectively prosecuted. In balancing these interests, Congress faced a range of alternatives. At one end of the continuum, Congress could have done nothing and allowed the admission of past sexual behavior evidence to rebut the prosecution’s physical fact evidence whenever the probative value of the past sexual behavior evidence was not substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect....
Congress chose, however, to enact the Rule 412 injury exception and prohibit past sexual behavior evidence in numerous situations where such evidence would be highly probative. Admittedly, by distinguishing between physical consequences that are injuries and those that are not, Congress did not select a point based solely on relevancy considerations at which to draw the line of admissibility.21
Although that fact that KRE 412(b)(1) is worded identically to its federal counterpart suggests that we have reached a similar conclusion regarding the competing interests, the majority finds that a different exception entirely authorizes the introduction of evidence relevant to demonstrate the source of any physical manifestation of child sexual abuse. The majority thus finds such evidence admissible on the basis of a residual exception despite a specific exclusion for source evidence which limits itself to source evidence relating to semen and injuries. This is not the “sparing and careful” use contemplated for KRE 412(b)(3)’s exclusion:
KRE 412(b)(3) authorizes the use of evidence of past sexual behavior of a victim when it is “directly pertaining to the offense charged.” The drafters of the new rule provided the following explanation for this exception: “It recognizes the difficulty of anticipating every possible circumstance in which evidence of prior sexual conduct may have a nee-*149essary and proper role in a case other than as evidence of an alleged victim’s character.” In other words, it is a safety valve that is to be administered “carefully and sparingly without violating the objective of protecting against unwarranted attacks on the character of an alleged victim.”22
Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence of C.S.B.’s prior sexual conduct does not have “a necessary and proper role,” and I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that KRE 412(b)(3) contemplates a broader exception for source evidence than the one specifically outlined in KRE(b)(l).
The majority’s erroneous construction of the KRE 412(b)(3) exclusion appears to stem from its application of the holding in Barnett to the factually distinct situation now before us. In Barnett the “examining physician ... testified to findings of chronic sexual contact and, without exception, identified appellant as the perpetrator of such contact.”23 The Barnett majority found the proffered evidence admissible largely because it cast doubt upon the physician’s identification of Barnett — an identification the Court characterized as a “branding”:
Omission of the evidence concerning the ongoing sexual activity between the complaining witness and her brother was devastating to appellant in light of the testimony of the examining physician who expressed findings of chronic sexual contact and, without objection, identified appellant as the guilty party. The possibility that the victim had engaged in ongoing sexual contact with her sibling was not revealed to the physician during his examination and interview of the victim. This revelation may have caused the physician to qualify or omit his branding of appellant as the assailant,24
Here, the examining physician, Dr. Bates, testified that C.S.B. had a “loose vaginal opening,” but did not make a finding of frequent sexual activity or attribute such condition to sexual intercourse with the Appellant. Further, Anderson produced no evidence demonstrating that the conduct suggested in the statement upon which Anderson wished to cross-examine C.S.B. could have produced these physical findings. As in Violett v. Commonwealth, 25 “there is no direct connection between the evidence of prior sexual activity that directly challenged medical testimony introduced at trial. In that respect, it is clearly distinguishable from Barnett ....”26 The trial court properly refused to allow defense counsel to question C.S.B. about her alleged prior sexual history.
III. RELEASE OF WITNESS
I concur with the majority’s Part IV conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Anderson’s motion for a new trial, but I write separately to address the majority’s misconception that only trial courts may release witnesses from subpoena.
In reality, the circuit court clerk does not subpoena witnesses. While the clerk technically issues the subpoena for a wit*150ness,27 in actual practice, the clerk merely signs the subpoena in blank and gives it to the requesting attorney. The attorney then fills in the blanks and secures service of the subpoena.28 Accordingly, it is the parties — not the clerk — who, through their attorneys, subpoena witnesses.
The information on a subpoena includes the name of the requesting attorney, together with his or her telephone number,29 and often a request for the subpoenaed witness to call the attorney. A subpoena “commands [the] person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place and/or the party therein specified.”30 It is for these reasons that “[a] party who has caused a subpoena to be issued may excuse the witness served from appearing pursuant to its subpoena.” 31
If Appellant desired the attendance of Dr. Cunningham at trial, he had the right to secure his attendance by having a subpoena issued and served upon him. Appellant’s right to do so satisfied his right to compulsory process,32 and he did not have the additional right to rely upon subpoenas issued and served by the Commonwealth. Since Dr. Cunningham was subpoenaed as a witness only by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth was authorized to release him from its subpoena.
For the above-mentioned reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the judgment of the Wayne Circuit Court.
GRAVES, WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissent.

. The majority's rhetoric is telling. See Majority Opinion at 63 S.W.3d 135, 138 (2001) (“[Tjhis case was barely a year old when the trial began ....” Id. (emphasis added)). Furthermore, the majority's characterization of a sixty-day continuance as "minimal” on the basis of language from Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994) ignores no less than four passages from that opinion which base that characterization, as well as the final result, on the fact that Eldred was tried as a capital case. See Id. at 699 ("We also note that Appellant’s case was a capital case, with the death penalty possible, which makes the case qualitatively different.” Id.)-, Id. ("The length of delay in this case was only sixty days, which is rather minimal, particularly in a death penalty case." Id. (emphasis added)); Id. ("Second, the continuance was the first sought by anyone, which distinguishes ... most other death penalty cases, where numerous continuances are the rule rather than the exception.” Id.)-, Id. at 700 ("This case was a death penalty case, which factor alone makes it more complex.” Id.).

. Brutley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1998).

. Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 663 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1983). See also Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 258, 265 (1999) ("Whether to grant a continuance is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id.)-, Pickard Chrysler, Inc. v. Sizemore, Ky. App., 918 S.W.2d 736, 740 (1995) ("It is well established that a motion for postponement of trial lies within the sole discretion of the trial court.” Id.)-, Dishman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 335, 340 (1995) ("The trial judge has broad discretion in either granting or refusing a continuance. A reviewing court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the trial court abused its discretion in the denial of a continuance. In order to obtain a continuance, a criminal defendant must show sufficient cause." Id. (citations omitted)).

. RCr 9.04.

. Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994).

. Eldred v. Commonwealth, supra note 5 at 699.

. See Thurman v. Meridian Mutual Ins. Co., Ky., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (1961).

. Eldred v. Commonwealth, supra note 5 at 699.

. Id. at 700 n. 2 (“There is no issue in this case concerning Appellant’s counsel, or any potential substitute counsel, as would arise if there were an attempt to withdraw by counsel on the eve of trial as a result of a breakdown *145of communications between counsel and client.” Id.).

. See 2 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 412.02[4] (2nd Ed.2001):
[T]he rationale underlying [FRE 412] is to prevent the victim, rather than the defendant, from being put on trial. The low incidence of reports of rape ... was felt to stem from the victim's reluctance to be cross-examined about her sexual past as was permitted under the common-law approach.

Id.

. 1992 Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Committee Commentary to KRE 412. See also Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 361, (1992) (“The purpose ... [for] generally prohibiting evidence of prior sexual conduct of a complaining witness is to insure that the witness does not become the party on trial through the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the charge made.” Id.).

. KRE 412(b)(1).

. See Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.30 at 110 (3rd Ed.1993) ("Kentucky’s preexisting rape shield law contained no such provision, and there is no Kentucky case law suggesting what might or might not be admissible under this exception” Id.).

. KRE 412(b)(3).

. Ky., 828 S.W.2d 361 (1992).

. KRS 510.145 (repealed by adoption of KRE 412):
(1) As used in this section, "complaining witness” means the alleged victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to the provisions of this section.
(2) In any prosecution under KRS 510.040 through 510.140, or for assault with intent to commit, attempt to commit, or conspiracy to commit a crime defined in any of these sections, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' prior sexual conduct or habits is not admissible by the defendant.
(3) Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection (2) of this section, evidence of the complaining witness' pri- or sexual conduct or habits with the defendant or evidence directly pertaining to the act on which the prosecution is based, may be admitted at the trial if the relevancy of such evidence is determined in the following manner:
(a) A written motion shall be filed by the defendant with the court no later than two (2) days prior to the day of trial, or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, stating that the defendant has an offer of relevant evidence of prior sexual conduct or habits of the complaining witness.
*147(b) A hearing on the motion shall be heard in the judge’s chambers. If, following the hearing, the court determines that the offered proof is relevant and that it is material to a fact in issue, and that its probative value outweighs its inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the court shall admit the offered proof, in whole or in part, in accordance with the applicable rules of evidence.

Id.

. See KRS 510.145 (repealed by adoption of KRE 412).

. Lawson, supra note 13 at § 2.30 at 110 n. 260 ("Kentucky's preexisting statute had a broadly stated exception (i.e., "evidence directly pertaining to the act”) that could have been construed to cover source of semen or injury.” Id.).

. Richard H. Underwood and Glen Weissen-berger, Kentucky Evidence: 2001 Courtroom Manual Ch. 412 at 150 (Anderson Publishing Co.2000) (emphasis added).

. See United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 605 (8th Cir.1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1068, 108 S.Ct. 1033, 98 L.Ed.2d 997 (1988):
[W]e conclude that the evidence regarding S.A.’s hymen did not establish the existence of an "injury.” The witnesses expressly disavowed finding any evidence of tears to S.A.’s hymen, cuts, scratches, bruises, blood, injury to the vaginal canal, tears that may have healed, or scars. Such findings would demonstrate infliction of an injury. The absence of all these indicia, however, strongly suggests that while the condition of S.A.’s vaginal area might have changed, she was not injured. The testimony, in sum, indicated that S.A.’s hymen was not intact; it had been stretched; her vaginal orifice was widened. Even if this physical condition was the result of sexual intercourse, it is not an injury. Unlike a situation where the evidence indicates, for example, that sexual intercourse caused a tearing or bruising of the hymen or unusual bleeding, the evidence concerning S.A.'s hymen, while it may describe a physiological accommodation, falls short of establishing an injury so as to trigger the applicability of Rule 412’s injury exception.

Id.

. Id. at 606-7.

. Lawson, supra note 13 at § 2.30 at 113.

. Barnett v. Commonwealth, supra note 15 at 362. The Barnett majority found the portion of the examining physician’s testimony which identified the Appellant as the perpetrator significant enough to mention it twice in a six (6) paragraph opinion and to note both times that the evidence was admitted "without objection.”

. Id. (emphasis added).

. Ky., 907 S.W.2d 773, 776 (1995).

. Id. at 776.

. See RCr 7.02(1) ("A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk Id.).

. See Id. ("The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed but otherwise in blank, to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served.” Id.)-, RCr 7.02(2) ("A subpoena for an unmarried infant ... shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend with the infant for the purpose of the infant giving testimony at a time and place for the party therein specified." Id. (emphases added)); RCr 7.02(4) ("A subpoena may be served by any officer by whom a summons might be served.” Id).

. See RCr Appendix of Official Forms, Form 6, Court of Justice Form AOC-025 (Subpoena) (hereinafter "Form AOC-025 (Subpoena)”).

. CR 45.01; RCr 7.02(1) (A subpoena "shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein.” Id); RCr 7.02(3); Form AOC-025 (Subpoena) ("5. □ To testily in behalf of_” Id).

. L. Abramson, Kentucky Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 23.16 (3d ed. WEST) ("Because the subpoena contains the name of the party seeking the testimony, the party appears to be able to waive the presence of the witness.” Id. n. 1).

. See State v. Sepcich, 473 So.2d 380, 386 (La.Ct.App.1985) ("The defendant’s right to compulsory process is the right to request subpoenas for witnesses and the right to have the requested subpoenas issued by the court. However, a defendant cannot claim that he was denied the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf where he does not seek to subpoena the witnesses.” Id. (citations omitted); Dean v. Commonwealth, 30 Va.App. 49, 515 S.E.2d 331 (1999).