Court Opinion

ID: 9898236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:20.515513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:58.851354
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:
                                                         No. 83074-1-I
ELODIE YOHANNA ARDES-GUISOT,
                                                         DIVISION ONE
                        Appellant,
                                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                and

STEPHANE BLAISE BONFILS,

                        Respondent.

        HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Elodie Yohanna Ardes-Guisot appeals from a

dismissal of dissolution proceedings based on the doctrine of forum non

conveniens.      Because Ardes-Guisot fails to demonstrate that the trial court

abused its discretion, we affirm.

                                            FACTS

        Elodie Yohanna Ardes-Guisot and Stephane Bonfils began living together

as a couple in October 2009, in Paris, France. They married on March 7, 2011,

in the state of Nevada.          The parties appear to agree that they maintained

separate households by May 2016, 1 and that Bonfils petitioned a French court for

divorce in April 2018. However, the parties dispute whether those proceedings

         1 Ardes-Guisot alleges that she moved from Bonfils’ home in Seattle to New York after

incidents of domestic violence in late May 2016, while Bonfils counters that Ardes-Guisot never
lived with him in Seattle. He asserts that Ardes-Guisot resided in her Paris apartment during the
time in question and only visited him in Washington in May 2016 to obtain his signature on her
application for a work permit.
No. 83074-1-I/2

have been resolved. 2 On November 25, 2020, Ardes-Guisot filed a petition for

dissolution of the marriage in King County Superior Court.

                                           ANALYSIS

        Ardes-Guisot assigns error to the court’s dismissal of her petition based

on forum non conveniens. 3 However, she also asserts the court erred in its

conclusion that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the parties and the

procedure by which it addressed the various questions presented. 4 As such, we

will first clarify the concepts at issue in this case before reaching the merits of the

appeal.

I.      Jurisdiction

        Jurisdiction refers to “the power of a court to hear and determine a case.”

In re Marriage of Buecking, 179 Wn.2d 438, 447, 316 P.3d 999 (2013). Without

jurisdiction, the “‘court cannot proceed at all in any cause.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998)

(quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514, 19 L. Ed. 264 (1868)); see also

Pastor v. 713 SW 353rd Place, 21 Wn. App. 2d 415, 423, 506 P.3d 658 (“If a

        2   Bonfils maintains that the divorce proceedings in France are ongoing while Ardes-
Guisot alleges in her opening brief that those proceedings were dismissed in the “French Family
Court” on November 5, 2021.
          3 Latin for “an inconvenient forum.”
          4 Ardes-Guisot also challenges the court’s acceptance of certain evidence, failure to take

judicial notice of her assertions regarding domestic violence, and failure to conduct an evidentiary
hearing. She further asserts that much of Bonfils’ evidence was forged or otherwise fraudulent.
Because the threshold issue of forum non conveniens was dispositive, the court did not err in
declining to consider evidence related to the merits of the case.
          As to the claims of fraud and forgery, the proper vehicle for such a challenge would have
been a motion to vacate the dismissal order on that basis under CR 60. Under our Civil Rules,
the trial court may relieve a party from a final order based on “[f]raud . . . misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party.” CR 60(b)(4). Because the record does not demonstrate
that Ardes-Guisot pursued this remedy in the trial court, we will not entertain this argument for the
first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a).

                                               -2-
No. 83074-1-I/3

tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the implication is that it does not have

authority to decide the claim at all or order any type of relief.”), review denied,

200 Wn.2d 1005 (2022). “‘Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law’” and,

when it is absent, the only remaining function of the court is to announce that fact

and dismiss the case. 5 Id. The party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of

establishing its requirements “by prima facie evidence.” In re Marriage of Yocum,

73 Wn. App. 699, 703, 870 P.2d 1033 (1994).

        Jurisdiction is comprised of two components: jurisdiction over the person

and jurisdiction over the subject matter. Buecking, 179 Wn.2d at 447. A court

exercises personal jurisdiction in a number of ways, including the following

bases: consent, domicil, residence, presence, appearance in an action, and/or

doing business in the state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27

(1971). RCW 4.28.185, our state’s long-arm statute, may subject a nonresident

defendant to the jurisdiction of our courts if the provisions of the statute and due

process requirements are both satisfied. Yocum, 73 Wn. App. at 702. This is

referred to as “long-arm” jurisdiction. Oytan v. David-Oytan, 171 Wn. App. 781,

798, 288 P.3d 57 (2012). To find if these requirements are satisfied, the court

focuses on the nature and extent of “the defendant’s relationship to the forum

        5 Ardes-Guisot additionally argues that her right to due process was violated when the

trial court dismissed her case without considering the merits and cites to the unpublished case, In
re Dependency of A.K.I., noted at 163 Wn. App. 1017 (2011). In A.K.I., the court ruled that the
mother’s due process rights were violated when the trial court terminated her parental rights
based, in part, on her mental health conditions, despite the fact that she was not notified that her
mental health status would be considered as a basis for termination.
         Independent from the fact that this is not a dependency case and the rights at issue are
vastly different, A.K.I. is not controlling here because Ardes-Guisot has been provided with notice
and opportunity to be heard on the issue of jurisdiction. Because she fails to provide argument
on this issue under the proper legal framework, we decline to further analyze this challenge.
RAP 10.3(a)(5), (6).

                                               -3-
No. 83074-1-I/4

[s]tate.” Duell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., __ Wn. App. 2d. __, 530 P.3d 1015, 1019

(2023) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., __ U.S. __, 141

S. Ct. 1017, 1024, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021)). The long-arm statute requires an

analysis of the specific individual’s contacts with the forum state, as well as the

nature and quality of those interactions. Oytan, 171 Wn. App. at 802. 6

       As it pertains to dissolution actions specifically, the long-arm statute

provides, in relevant part:

       (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
       who in person or through an agent does any of the acts in this
       section enumerated, thereby submits said person . . . to the
       jurisdiction of this state as to any cause of action arising from the
       doing of any of said acts:
       ...
       (f) Living in a marital relationship within this state notwithstanding
       subsequent departure from this state, as to all proceedings
       authorized by chapter 26.09 RCW, so long as the petitioning party
       has continued to reside in this state or has continued to be a
       member of the armed forces in this state.

RCW 4.28.185.

       Ardes-Guisot argues that the trial court erred in failing to assume personal

jurisdiction over Bonfils through the long-arm statute. However, she provides no

relevant authority for her argument that Washington may exercise personal

jurisdiction over an out-of-state spouse simply because the other spouse resides

in Washington. 7 Further, although she is accurate that the long-arm statute is

unnecessary if the nonresident party consents to jurisdiction, she does not

       6 At issue in Oytan was the phrase “living in a marital relationship within this state,” and

there, the court found a distinction between residency and the act of living in a marital
relationship. 171 Wn. App. at 799. It reasoned that, because marital arrangements differed and
long-distance relationships were common, a fact-specific inquiry is necessary. Id. at 800-01.
However, the petitioning party must be a resident of the state, whereas the respondent must
merely have been previously living here in a marital relationship. Id. at 800.
         7 Ardes-Guisot also does not provide evidentiary support for her assertion that she

resided in Washington at the time of her petition for dissolution in King County.

                                              -4-
No. 83074-1-I/5

provide evidence in support of her assertion that Bonfils has so consented and

the record shows otherwise as Bonfils moved to dismiss the case for lack of

personal jurisdiction, clearly indicating his lack of consent.

        Regardless, the trial court dismissed the case on the basis of forum non

conveniens and only made a single passing reference to personal jurisdiction in

its final order, therefore we do not consider Ardes-Guisot’s challenge regarding

personal jurisdiction. 8

II.     Forum non Conveniens

        Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which is distinct from the

concept of personal jurisdiction, courts have the discretion to decline jurisdiction

when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice would be better

served if the action were brought and tried in another forum. In re Marriage of

Owen, 126 Wn. App. 487, 503-04, 108 P.3d 824 (2005). 9 Because a motion to

dismiss for forum non conveniens requires a fact-specific analysis of the case,

we review decisions based on this doctrine for an abuse of discretion. Sandhu

        8 The trial court’s only reference to personal jurisdiction was a comment in Conclusion of

Law 2, which stated that “even if this court in Washington had any jurisdiction in this case (which
it concludes it does not) France, not Washington would be the convenient forum.” (Emphasis
added.)
          9 Ardes-Guisot references Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wn.2d 124, 338

P.2d 747 (1959) in support of her argument that forum non conveniens is not part of the law in
Washington. Lansverk was explicitly overruled, in relevant part, by Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn.2d
360, 371, 526 P.2d 370 (1974), which held that forum non conveniens is “an inherent
discretionary power of the courts.”
          Ardes-Guisot also references Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct. 252,
70 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1981) to aver that, before a trial court is permitted to exercise forum non
conveniens, an adequate alternative forum must be available that may exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant. She alleges that an adequate forum is not available because the French court did
not have jurisdiction over her or Bonfils, as they were both residing in the United States.
However, the trial court here determined that Ardes-Guisot consented to the applicable
jurisdiction in France as evidenced by her conduct of participating in the proceedings. The court’s
finding in this regard is unchallenged, therefore it is a verity on appeal. See In re Marriage of
Petrie, 105 Wn. App. 268, 275, 19 P.3d 443 (2001).

                                               -5-
No. 83074-1-I/6

Farm, Inc. v. A&P Fruit Growers, Ltd., 25 Wn. App. 2d 577, 588, 524 P.3d 209,

217 (2023). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds,” including those that are

unsupported by the record. Id. The reviewing court “‘may not find abuse of

discretion simply because it would have decided the case differently—it must be

convinced that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court.’” Gilmore v. Jefferson County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area, 190 Wn.2d 483,

494, 415 P.3d 212 (2018) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420, 427, 403 P.3d 45 (2017));

see also In re Parenting & Support of C.A.S., 25 Wn. App. 2d 21, 26, 522 P.3d

75 (2022) (“A decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of

acceptable choices considering the facts and applicable legal standard.”).

       Here, Ardes-Guisot fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its

discretion. She does not assign error to any of the trial court’s factual findings,

which makes them verities on appeal and limits the review of this court to

determining whether the trial court’s unchallenged findings support its

conclusions of law. In re Marriage of Petrie, 105 Wn. App. 268, 275, 19 P.3d 443

(2001). The only reasoning that she provides for filing an adjacent dissolution

proceeding in King County is that it was the last place where she and Bonfils

resided as a couple, an allegation that Bonfils disputes.

       The court expressly found that Ardes-Guisot was actively participating in

the ongoing dissolution proceedings in France, as evidenced by her request for

interim measures in the French court, including seeking spousal support and

                                       -6-
No. 83074-1-I/7

attorney fees, as well as an investigation into Bonfils’ assets. The trial court

found that the dissolution proceeding in France was well developed and that

Ardes-Guisot had accepted jurisdiction in France through her conduct. These

unchallenged findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law. Ardes-Guisot

fails to provide any explanation of why a parallel dissolution action should

commence in Washington; the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to reach the merits of Ardes-

Guisot’s claims. 10

III.    Attorney Fees

        Ardes-Guisot requests attorney fees under RAPs 14.2 and 18.1. RAP

14.2 provides that the appellate court will award costs to the party that

“substantially prevails on review.” Because Ardes-Guisot does not prevail on

appeal, she is not entitled to costs under this rule. Further, RAP 18.1 allows a

party “to recover reasonable attorney fees or expenses” if “applicable law grants”

them the right to such fees, and they have devoted a section of their brief to this

request. RAP 18.1(a) and (b). Ardes-Guisot does not provide reference to any

applicable law that would grant her fees on this basis. “Where no authorities are

cited in support of a proposition, we are not required to search out authorities, but

may assume that [the party], after diligent search, has found none.” Helmbreck

        10 Ardes-Guisot also raises the doctrine of lis pendens to argue that both parties resided

in the United States during the time of the dissolution proceedings in France. However, the
“purpose of lis pendens is to give notice of pending litigation affecting the title to real property”
such that “anyone who subsequently deals with the affected property will be bound by the
outcome of the action to the same extent as if [they] were a party to the action.” United Sav. &
Loan Bank v. Pallis, 107 Wn. App. 398, 405, 27 P.3d 629 (2001). As the case before us pertains
to whether Washington is the proper forum for dissolution proceedings, this argument is
unpersuasive.

                                                -7-
No. 83074-1-I/8

v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d 41, 57, 476 P.3d 589 (2020). Accordingly, she is not

entitled to attorney fees and expenses under RAP 18.1.

      Finding no error, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

                                     -8-