Court Opinion

ID: 9764974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:11.29777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.777546
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,
with whom KERN, NEBEKER and HARRIS, Associate Judges, join, concurring:
I concur and wish to add a few comments to the court’s holding that the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act) D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § 1-146(a) forbids successive enactments of substantially identical temporary legislation directed at a single emergency. The statute provides that emergency acts “shall be effective for a period of not to exceed ninety days.”1 (Emphasis added.) That certainly seems plain enough. The emergency acts are not effective beyond the ninety-day period. The provision of the Home Rule Act admits of only one reading in the context of the statutory and constitutional scheme.
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution commands Congress
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . as may, by Cession of the particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States .
*1365In the Home Rule Act, Congress indicated at several points that there was no intention to cede this ultimate authority to the District of Columbia, expressly reserving the right to legislate for the District at any time, including the amendment or repeal of acts passed by the Council, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-126,2 subject only to the safety valve granted to deal with emergencies on a temporary basis. To safeguard this power, Congress provided that most permanent acts of the District Council must be transmitted to Congress for a 30-day review period, § 1-147(c)(1). Congress spelled out detailed procedures for concurrent resolutions of disapproval by both Houses during the review period. § 1-127.3 Its careful attention to the preservation of its oversight role reflects both its responsiveness to the Constitutional mandate and its legitimate interest in the unique national and international considerations in the government of the federal city. Adoption of the position urged by the District would lead to two results which Congress clearly could not have intended.
First, repeated enactments of numerous “emergency” measures would effectively result in permanent legislation in force in the District of Columbia which had never been subjected to Congressional review, a result directly in contravention of the requirements of the Home Rule Act (§ 1-147(c)(1). The District’s argument that Congress’ retention of legislative power permits it to step in at any time and amend or repeal an emergency act ignores the fact that in the Home Rule Act, Congress expressly has chosen to exercise its oversight authority over permanent legislation through the 30-day layover provision. To conclude that emergency legislation may be indefinitely used successively would be to permit the Council to avoid the constitutionally required supervision of Congress if by a two-thirds vote of the Council. This is in fundamental conflict with the Home Rule Act and the Constitution.4
A second unwarranted consequence of the District’s position is that, as a practical matter, a substantial body of laws in force in the District might be effectively insulated from both Congressional and judicial scrutiny. Taken altogether, the District’s position results in the proposition that the Council can pass successive emergency acts ad infinitum, constrained only by the necessity of obtaining a two-thirds vote every 90 days and the possibility that Congress might step in sua sponte and overrule the emergency legislation. Furthermore, says the District, the Council’s finding of an *1366emergency would not be subject to court review.5
I agree with our dissenting colleagues that in deciding this case the court should first examine the construction which the Council has placed on the Act of Congress we are interpreting.6 In doing so, however, we should not take a narrow approach, ignoring the vast amount of documentary history before us of the Council’s utilization of the Emergency Legislation.7 After all, in deciding a case of this nature we “need not be blind to what all others know.” Cullinane v. Geisha House, Inc., D.C.App., 354 A.2d 515, 518 n.12 (1976).8 It is only fair to the Council that the broad spectrum of its actions on emergency legislation available to us in this record be examined lest we obtain a false picture from a restricted inspection.
In this court, in this case, the parties have stipulated to 84 instances of the successive use of emergency powers. A perusal of the stipulation filed with this court relating to these 84 instances shows the Council has been utilizing emergency legislation to deal with such dubious social emergencies as: regulations relating to ice cream vendors, public alley closings, rental vehicle tax, merit personnel legislation, senior citizen residences sales tax on meals exemptions, and household and dependent care services deduction. In some instances, there have been emergencies declared on the same problem every three months for a period of two and three years.
In a characteristically learned opinion, then Corporation Counsel John R. Risher, Jr. stated not long ago that “while prior to consideration of a proposed act as an emergency measure, the Council as a matter of practice adopts a resolution containing findings purporting to establish the necessary emergency circumstances, often these findings on their face reveal the absence of ‘emergency circumstances,’ and that the proposed act[s] are not the proper subjects for enactment as emergency measures.” Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, The Emergency Legislation Authority of the Council, 1 Op.C.C.D.C. 457, 9 (1977) (emphasis added).
Corporation Counsel Risher had this to say on the subject of repeated enactment of emergency legislation on the same problem
I submit that . . . enacting a fourth bill on basically the same problem on an emergency basis tends to circumvent the intent and purpose of the authority delegated in section 412(a)9 provisions. As I view section 412(a), it was designed to give the Council power to meet certain crises head on, and thus avoid the lengthier process involved in permanent legislation which cannot become effective until it is first presented to Congress and a period of thirty legislative days have expired. However, section 412(a) is in this instance being used to continue the effectiveness of “permanent” legislation on an “emergency” basis, a device which strikes me as an obvious circumvention of the Charter. For these reasons, and the further reason that I do not believe that the Mayor as the Chief Executive should become a party to such procedures, it is my recommendation that the act not be approved. [Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, Emergency Cooperative Regulation Act of 1976, 1 Op.C.C.D.C. 424, 2 (1978) (emphasis added).]
In a subsequent opinion, then Acting Corporation Counsel Louis P. Robbins felt *1367obliged to return to the same theme. In commenting on housing legislation then being proposed, he said
The second factor is the substantial likelihood that EA 2-133 will be extended by another emergency act if Bill 2-333 is sent to Congress for the 30-day layover period. In that event, we would be called upon to remind you that this Office considers successive emergency acts to be presumptively invalid. See Mr. McCally’s Memorandum to you dated April 27, 1978. This presumption will attain greater force if the Council again declines to carefully establish a factual basis for such an emergency declaration. [Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, First Emergency Housing Discontinuance Regulation Act of 1978, 3 Op.C.C.D.C. 258 (July 27, 1978) (emphasis added).]
It was doubtless utilization such as this of the emergency acts that led former Corporation Counsel Risher to make the prescient observation that
the continued abuse of the emergency legislation authority will inevitably lead to judicial invalidation and, perhaps, a precedent which restricts the District’s emergency legislation authority. [Opinion of the Corporation Counsel, The Emergency Legislation Authority of the Council, 1 Op.C.C.D.C. 457, 9 (1977) (emphasis added).]
It is evident that to construe the Home Rule Act as permitting indefinite successive utilization of emergency legislation on the same problem would enable the Council to avoid the Congressional supervision which is crucial to the statutory scheme. It would be, effectively, a basic amendment of the Home Rule Act.
Another reason I am motivated to write, however, is to state my disagreement with views in the dissenting opinion on the scope of our review in this case, which I hope do not later obtain currency. I might say preliminarily that in several previous cases, we have exercised our jurisdiction to decide whether the Council exceeded its authority by passing legislation which arguably violated the specific limitations contained in the Home Rule Act. D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-147(a). E. g., Bishop v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 997 (1980) (en banc) (tax on unincorporated professionals prohibited); Capitol Hill Restoration Society, Inc. v. Moore, D.C.App., 410 A.2d 184 (1979) (Council’s grant of appellate court jurisdiction in certain noncontested cases impermissibly altered court’s jurisdiction); McIntosh v. Washington, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 744 (1978) (Firearms Control Regulations Act).
The dissent says that principles of separation of powers and of statutory construction require deference to the Council’s interpretation of its power under the Home Rule Act. Specifically, it draws an analogy to a state court (this court) reviewing the validity of a state legislature’s (the Council’s) action (the emergency legislation) under the state constitution (the Home Rule Act). This analogy is of questionable usefulness and in any event is misapplied. In most of the cases cited by the dissent, the courts rejected a particular reading or application of the legislature’s action to save it under the constitution. See e. g., United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 91 S.Ct. 1294, 28 L.Ed.2d 601 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960); Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 57 S.Ct. 816, 81 L.Ed. 1143 (1937). In these cases, the principle of presumptive validity of a legislative action is applied when it is the action itself which is declared to be ambiguous and given a constitutionally saving construction. That is not the case here. In this case, it is the Home Rule Act — the “constitutional” analog — which is found by the dissent to be ambiguous. It attempts to apply the analogy in reverse, i. e., to construe the “constitution” (the Home Rule Act) to save the legislature’s action. Deference to the legislative body is not appropriate, however, when the issue is interpretation of the “constitution.”
Our dissenting colleagues draw attention to the statement in United States v. Nixon, *1368418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), that the interpretation of its powers by any branch is to be given great respect (id. at 703, 94 S.Ct. at 3105). It would have been instructive to continue on with that passage of the Supreme Court’s opinion:
Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 [2 L.Ed. 60] (1803), that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. at 177 [2 L.Ed. 60],
******
Our system of government “requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch.” Powell v. McCormack, supra [395 U.S. 486] at 549, 89 S.Ct. 1944, at 1978 [23 L.Ed.2d 491]. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. [186] at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, at 706 [7 L.Ed.2d 663], the Court stated:

“Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.”

Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the “judicial Power of the United States” vested in the federal courts by Art III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. The Federalist, No. 47, p. 313 (S. Mittell ed. 1938). We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court “to say what the law is” with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. Marbury v. Madison, supra, 1 Cranch at 177 [2 L.Ed. 60]. [United States v. Nixon, supra at 703-05, 94 S.Ct. at 3105 (emphasis added).]
It seems to me the fundamental difference between the majority and dissenting view in this case is there discussed. The dissenting opinion here is preoccupied with a doctrine of deference; and the majority view is concerned principally with the proposition that, in the final analysis, it is “the province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is . . . the historical doctrine of Marbury v. Madison.10
Deference to the legislature is appropriate when a legislative action is capable of two readings, one of which would invalidate it and one of which would uphold it. See Flemming v. Nestor, supra, 363 U.S. at 617, 80 S.Ct. at 1376. But when the meaning of a statute is questioned it is the duty of the courts, not the legislature, to resolve the issue. In the past, this court did not display any particular reluctance in declaring an Act of Congress unconstitutional. To illustrate, in Estate of French, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 621 (1976),11 this court declared unconstitutional an Act of Congress popularly known as the Mortmain statute, on the ground that it created an unreasonable classification and had no rational legislative purpose, (id. at 624-25). I call that a rather strong holding. I see no reason why the court should now be reticent in dealing with actions of the City Council.
If we were to derogate the traditional role of the court in the early stages of this new government, it would bode ill for the expectation of a confident, able, indepen*1369dent judiciary in this jurisdiction. One hardly needs to labor the importance of an independent judicial branch. Without independence, the judiciary would be merely an appendage of the other two branches. There most certainly should be no meddlesome interference with the other branches of government, but when it comes to interpreting acts of Congress this court should carefully weigh but not defer to the viewpoint of the executive or legislative branches. Not only is the judiciary best equipped to perform the function, but this is perhaps the court’s most important responsibility. In the long run, the steady manifestation of the highest traditions of the judiciary will turn out to be profoundly in the best interest of the government, and hence the community.

. In SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978), the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in interpreting a statute with substantially similar language. There the Court held that the Securities and Exchange Commission could not order successive suspensions of trading under a statute permitting it “summarily to suspend trading in any security . for a period, not exceeding ten days. . . Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 1708 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 781 (emphasis in original)).

. The complete text of this section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act the Congress of the United States reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District, by enacting legislation for the District on any subject, whether within or without the scope of legislative power granted to the Council by this Act, including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the District prior to or after enactment of this Act and any act passed by the Council. [D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-126.]
Similarly, the purpose section of the statute provides in part:
Subject to the retention by Congress of the ultimate legislative authority over the Nation's Capital granted by article I, section 8, of the Constitution, the intent of Congress is to delegate certain legislative powers to the government of the District of Columbia; authorize the election of certain local officials by the registered qualified electors in the District of Columbia; grant to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia powers to local self-government; to modernize, reorganize, and otherwise improve the governmental structure of the District of Columbia; and, to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the constitutional mandate, relieve Congress of the burden of legislating upon essentially local District matters. [D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-12i(a) (emphasis added).]

. If, as a result of several years’ experience, the conclusion has been reached by the Council that the statutory ninety (90) day emergency period is not long enough to conclude that particular legislative process, this is essentially a problem for presentation to Congress and not the court.

. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, supra.

. I doubt the merit of this contention if, for example, the finding on its face reveals the absence of genuine emergency circumstances.

. I do not agree, however with the second step, viz., the deference doctrine, which the dissent espouses.

. See Stipulation, filed November 21, 1979, by counsel for all parties.

. Cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1226 (1976), quoting Burr v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.2d 612, 624 (5th Cir. 1963).

. D.C.Code 1979 Supp., § l-146(a).

. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

. Appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 434 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 280, 54 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977).