Court Opinion

ID: 9643187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:21.706056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.024092
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority fails to apply the principles set forth in Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), does not account for changes in the controlling statute as interpreted by this Court in Garcia v. State, 747 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) and State v. Carter, 810 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Crim.App.1991), and fails to distinguish Heard v. State, 665 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Crim. App.1984), all of which compel a reversal in this case, I dissent.
I.
In Fisher, 887 S.W.2d at 52, the defendant, like appellant here, also complained that the instruction allowed the jury to convict on a *686theory not pled in the indictment. Although Fisher presented a sufficiency of the evidence issue, its holding was premised upon an understanding of the relationship between the indictment, a defendant’s expectations about what he would be tried for, the jury instructions, and ultimately the appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The Court explained that
[wjhere the indictment facially alleges a complete offense (either initially or after amendment), the State is bound by the theory alleged in the indictment, as is the reviewing court in its sufficiency analysis.
Id. at 57. A proper instruction incorporates the specific theory alleged in a facially complete indictment and no other. See id. A proper instruction may not broaden the basis upon which the State can obtain a conviction, beyond that alleged in a facially complete indictment. See id. Moreover,
[w]here the indictment does not facially allege a complete offense (either initially or after amendment), the State may attempt to prove (and the defendant is deemed to be on notice of) any theory of the offense that is consistent with the incomplete indictment and the controlling penal provision examined together. Accordingly, the instruction may broaden the State’s theory as set forth in the incomplete indictment so long as the instruction remains consistent with the allegations that are contained in the indictment and with the controlling penal provision.
Id. at 57-58.
While these principles were outlined specifically in connection with a reviewing court’s sufficiency analysis, they reflect a fundamental understanding of the structure of a criminal case, from its inception by indictment or information through appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See Thomason v. State, 892 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (applying Fisher principles to hold that State is committed to theory of prosecution alleged in indictment complete on its face).
II.
With these principles in mind, the first question in determining whether the jury instruction improperly authorized conviction on a theory not alleged in the information is whether the information alleged a facially complete offense. The controlling statute, article 6701Z — 1, provided at the time of the instant offense that “[a] person commits an offense if the person is intoxicated while driving or operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.ANN. art. 6701Z-l(b) (Vernon Supp.1989). The statute further provided that
“Intoxicated” means:
(A) not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of two or more of those substances into the body; or
(B) having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more.
Id. at 6701Z-l(a)(2)(A), (B). These provisions were interpreted in Garcia v. State, supra, where the Court held an information should have been quashed at the defendant’s request because the State failed to specify therein the specific substance by which the defendant had become intoxicated. The Court explained that “the type of intoxicant used i.e., alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, or a combination of two or more of these substances, becomes an element of the offense” and therefore must be specifically alleged in the charging instrument. Garcia, 747 S.W.2d at 381 (emphasis added).1
*687Later, in Carter, supra, the Court noted that an offense under article 6701i-l(a)(2)(A) may be established by proving the defendant drove or operated a motor vehicle while not having the normal use of his mental or physical faculties due to ingestion of either: (1) alcohol; (2) a controlled substance; (3) a drug; or (4) a combination of two or more of those substances. Carter, 810 S.W.2d at 200. An information which failed to allege which type of intoxicant the State would seek to prove at trial was defective in the face of a motion to quash. Id.
Although in a procedurally different posture than the instant case, Garcia and Carter both stand for the proposition that since article 6701Í — 1(a)(2)(A) now specifically defines the ways in which a person can become “intoxicated”, the specific manner of intoxication has likewise become an element of the State’s case.
The information in the instant case alleged in relevant part that appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place “while intoxicated, in that [appellant] did not have the normal use of his mental and physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, into [appellant’s] body[.]” This information alleges a complete offense by alleging that appellant operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and by specifying the manner of intoxication as “the introduction of alcohol.” The applicable statute sets forth four specific ways by which a defendant can become “intoxicated.” Carter, supra. The manner of intoxication is an element of the offense. Id. Here, the State pled one of those four manners of intoxication. As the information alleges a facially complete offense, the State is bound to the elements pled, and the instructions may not expand upon the specific allegations in the indictment. Fisher, supra.
The instructions tracked the language of the information, but also instructed the jury that if appellant’s use of Klonopin2 made him more susceptible to alcohol, and he became intoxicated from recent use of alcohol, he would be in the same position as if intoxication had been produced by use of alcohol alone. The application paragraph, in pertinent part, instructed the jury that appellant would be guilty if he
did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties by reason of introduction of alcohol into his body, and while so intoxicated, by reason of the introduction of alcohol into his body, either alone or in combination with Klonopin, ... did then and there drive or operated a motor vehicle in a public place[.]
(emphasis added). In contrast to the information’s allegation of intoxication by alcohol alone, the instruction alleges a drug/aleohol combination theory. The instruction erroneously expanded on the allegations in the facially complete indictment.3
III.
The majority relies entirely on Heard v. State, supra, in support of its holding; however, reliance on that case is misplaced, as it was decided under a previous version of the controlling statute. Under the version of article 6701i-l(a)(2)(A) at issue in Heard, an offense was committed if a person was driving while “intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor”. Tex.Rbv.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6701i-l(b) (Vernon Supp.1981). The term “intoxicated” was not defined. In Heard the information alleged intoxication by alcohol alone. Heard, 665 S.W.2d at 489. Like appellant, the defendant in Heard her*688self introduced evidence that her intoxication may have been caused by liquor in combinar tion with prescription drugs. The trial court instructed the jury that it could convict the defendant upon finding her intoxication was due to liquor alone or a combination of liquor and drugs. The Court upheld the instruction, reasoning that
[the] combination of liquor and drugs which would make an individual more susceptible to the influence of the liquor was in effect, equivalent to intoxication by liquor alone.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
Based upon Heard, the majority concludes in the instant case that the “susceptibility” theory is really just another way of permitting a finding of intoxication by alcohol alone. Even though the instruction speaks in terms of intoxication by alcohol “either alone or in combination with Klonopin”, the majority seems to reason that by virtue of the susceptibility language, the instruction presents an alcohol alone theory. While such reasoning might have made sense at the time of the Court’s opinion in Heard since at that time there was no separate statutory category for a combination of drugs and alcohol, it is not consistent with the current version of the statute. The “combination of liquor and drugs which would make an individual more susceptible to the influence of the liquor”, Heard, supra, is not equivalent to intoxication by liquor alone under the amended statute which specifically provides for four separate means of intoxication, including a combination theory. Such instruction, under any reading of the controlling version of the statute, falls under a combination category, not the alcohol alone category.
The instruction in the instant case allowed the jury to convict appellant if it found he was intoxicated by his use of either alcohol alone or by a combination of alcohol and Klonopin, improperly expanding on the allegations set forth in the information, and authorizing a conviction on a theory not alleged in the charging instrument. This amounted to error in the charge. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded. See Al-manza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim. App.1984).
For these reasons, I dissent.
CLINTON and BAIRD, JJ., join.

. The majority concludes that Garcia is not controlling because there the Court held that “in the face of a timely motion to quash, a charging instrument in any DWI prosecution must specify the type(s) of intoxicant allegedly used by the defendant", but here "appellant made no such motion to quash.” Maj. op. at 685. This distinction is irrelevant, however, in light of the facts of the instant case. In Garcia, the information simply alleged that the defendant operated a motor vehicle "while intoxicated.” Garcia, 747 S.W.2d at 380. The information was facially defective for its failure to allege any intoxicant, and therefore a proper subject for a motion to quash, as we so held. Id. at 381. By contrast, the information in the instant case was not defective, as it specifically alleged the means of intoxication as "alcohol.” This Court has never required a defendant to object to a facially good indictment or information in order to preserve charge error.
*687Moreover, the majority chooses to ignore the portion of the Court’s holding in Garcia in which the Court stated that under article 6701Í — 1(b) as it is now written, the type of intoxicant used is "an element of the offense” and therefore the State "must allege the intoxicant singularly, or in disjunctive combination.” Id. It is the State’s job to decide what to allege in its charging instrument; it is not up to the defendant to tell the State what to allege via motions to quash facially complete indictments or informations.

. Klonopin is denoted as "clonazepam” in Schedule IV of the Controlled Substances Act. TexHealth & Safety Code Ann. § 481.035.

. The State can in the future avoid the problem of an unknown intoxicant by pleading the various means of intoxication in the alternative. As this Court emphasized in Carter, the State may specifically allege any or all of the statutorily-defined types of conduct regarding an offense. Carter, 810 S.W.2d at 199.