Court Opinion

ID: 9514506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:59.691119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.415017
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Circuit. Judge
(concurring in part, , dissenting in part)
[¶ 50.] I concur and join the special writing of Justice Gilbertson on Issue Two. Although the Legislature could have preempted Petitioners’ ch. 3-18 rights had it dictated how the appropriation should be spent, it declined to preempt those rights when it left the distribution within the sole discretion of the Regents. See Rapid City Educ. v. Rapid City Area School, 376 N.W.2d 562 (S.D.1985); AFSCME Local 1922 v. State, 444 N.W.2d 10, 14 (S.D.1989). In the absence of a preemptive appropriation, the second clause of § 31 was general' legislation which changed Petitioners’ ch. 3-18 right to negotiate wages. I dissent from that portion of Issue Four which concludes that the appropriation for salary raises can be severed from the Legislature’s “condition” on that appropriation.
ISSUE FOUR
[¶ 51.] Issuance of a writ of prohibition.
[¶ 52.] On the issue of severability, I agree that the partial invalidity of § 31 does not render the entire general appropriations bill void or affect the validity of other appropriations. However, I respectfully disagree that an appropriation for raises and an express condition on that same appropriation can be severed.
[¶ 53.] As the majority notes, the rule generally applicable to all legislative acts is that severability should occur “if [the remainder] can stand by [itself] and if it appears that the legislature would have intended the remainder to take effect without the invalidated section.” Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 768 (S.D.1985) (citing Hogen v. South Dakota *398State Board of Transportation, 245 N.W.2d 493 (S.D.1976)). Thus, the dispositive question is one of legislative intent.
[¶ 54.] In State v. Wilder, 73 S.D. 330, 42 N.W.2d 891 (1950), we articulated the test to determine whether invalid portions of appropriations bills may be severed. We noted:
“[I]f they are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus, dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.”
Wilder, 73 S.D. at 341, 42 N.W.2d at 897 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 55.] Here the majority expressly acknowledges that the last clause of § 31 was intended as a “condition or limitation on the expenditure of these funds.” Supra at ¶ 32. Wilder requires that “all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall.” 73 S.D. at 341, 42 N.W.2d at 897. Because § 31 is a “condition or limitation on the expenditure of the funds,” I believe we have no choice but to invalidate the conditional and mutually connected appropriation for the raises. Because both conditions of § 31 are explicit, we certainly should not assume that the Legislature would have passed the same raise in the same amount without either condition. Therefore, I cannot join in an order which will require that the raises be distributed after collective bargaining when the Legislature expressly conditioned the appropriation to reach the opposite result.
[¶ 56.] The majority concludes that the Legislature would have passed this specific salary increase without the collective bargaining condition. It does so by relying on the burden of proof where a party fails to establish legislative intent. The majority also utilizes four underlying conclusions. The four underlying conclusions are:
Second, based upon their affidavits in the record, several legislative leaders have indicated they were aware of the Regents’ problems with salary competitiveness and of the Regents’ plan for addressing these problems long before the 1998 legislative session. Despite pre-session discussions of the plan with these leaders, the Regents entered into the session with no proposal for altering or abrogating the existing collective bargaining rights of their employees. Thus, it is clear that, at the outset, collective bargaining was not the major concern of the Regents or of the legislative leadership in addressing salary competitiveness.
Third, according to the record, despite various committee hearings and subcommittee meetings on the salary competitiveness funding plan during the session, the unconstitutional clause on collective bargaining was only added to the appropriations bill on the eve of the last day of the regular session when the bill was passed. Thus, it is also clear collective bargaining was not the prevailing concern in addressing salary competitiveness during the duration of the legislative session
Fourth, while some legislators have indicated section 31 of the appropriations bill was a key component in passing the Regents’ salary competitiveness funding plan, other legislators have stated they were unaware of section SI and have recently been surprised to learn of its inclusion,11
Fifth, even those legislators who have stated section 31 was a key component in passing the Regents’ salary plan have also stated the provision was not intended to *399amend, previous legislative enactments. This makes clear that the Legislature’s primary concern in enacting section 31 was to preserve the Regents’ ultimate discretion over the manner of distributing salary increases, not to alter or abrogate any collective bargaining rights under existing law.
Supra ¶¶ 34-37 (emphasis added). In my judgment neither the majority’s burden of proof analysis nor these conclusions support severance.
[¶ 57.] First, we should not, resort to a burden of proof analysis on legislative intent because the language of § 31 is unambiguous. This Court has “repeatedly stated that when the terms of a statute are clear, certain and unambiguous in their meaning, it is the function of the court to give them effect and not to amend the statute to avoid or produce a particular result.” Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799, 802 (S.D.1980) (citing Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458, 285 N.W. 443 (1939)). “Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise,” judicial inquiry into the meaning of a statute is complete once the Court finds that the terms of the statute are unambiguous. Burlington No. R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S, 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, 95 L.Ed.2d 404, 412, (1987) (citations omitted).
[¶ 58.] Here, the language of § 31 is clearly conditional. Salary increases were to ■ be made at the discretion of the Board of Regents without collective bargaining. The majority itself notes that the collective bargaining restriction was “intended as a condition or limitation on the expenditure of [the] funds [appropriated for salary increases.]” Supra at ¶ 32. Because the clear language of § 31 conditioned the appropriation, we should not consider who carried the burden of proof of extrinsic evidence on legislative intent.
[¶ 59.] In conclusion three, the majority also permits severance because it erroneously concludes that collective bargaining was not the Legislature’s “prevailing concern.” The majority discerns an absence of concern because the Regents’ salary plan was discussed at various times, but § 31 was not added until the eve of the last day of the legislative session.
[¶ 60.] However, the timing of an amendment has no relationship to the Legislature’s level of concern over that amendment. The legislative procéss deliberately involvés a long series of opportunities for public hearings, discourse and debate. That process is designed to raise new issues and to develop compromises and amendments as the pfocess continues. New concerns routinely develop throughout that process. This is especially true with appropriation matters where expenditure requests and revenue projections are not finalized until the end of the legislative session. The “prevailing concerns” of the Legislature are certainly not limited to those developed at the beginning of the session. Absent a survey of the entire Legislature, we should not adopt a rule of construction that a late amendment expresses any less a concern than an early amendment. If anything, a late amendment may be more indicative of its importance to the passage of legislation as it represents the final position of the Legislature after consideration and debate.12 Therefore, although § 31 may have been added on the eve of the last day, I find no record evidence to support the majority’s conclusion that the timing of this amendment indicates it was not a prevailing concern of legislators in appropriating salary increases.
[¶ 61.] Additionally, the foundation for conclusions two, four, and five consists of inadmissible, after-the-fact affidavits of legislators purportedly expressing their motives and legislative intent. Consideration of those affidavits is improper for two reasons: First, as mentioned above, there is no need to look beyond the clearly conditional language of the amendment. Second, even if we *400look beyond the text of the plain language to ascertain legislative intent, we should not rely upon inadmissible evidence.13
[¶ 62.] With respect to extrinsic evidence of legislative intent, we have generally stated that although:
the true intent of the Legislature must be ascertained primarily from the language of the statute itself, without resort to extraneous devices, State Theatre Co. v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1979), ... other considerations may be included ... [such as the act’s] title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence, ... because the Legislature must have resorted to [these] same means to arrive at its purpose.
Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d at 802 (quoting Elfring, 66 S.D. at 462, 285 N.W. at 445). However, these “other considerations” have never included after-the-fact affidavits of individual legislators. In fact, we have specifically cautioned against consideration of such evidence:
Views of individuals involved with the legislative process as to intent have not received the same recognition from this Court. We held such individual testimony of no assistance in State v. Bushfield, 69 S.D. 172, 176, 8 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1948) for two reasons: (1) it is the intent of the legislative body that is sought, not the intent of the individual members who may have diverse reasons for or against a proposition and (2) it is “universally held” that “evidence of a ... draftsman of a statute is not a competent aid to a court in construing a statute.” The case now before us shows the wisdom of this prior holding.
Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d at 499 n. 7.
[¶ 63.] Other respected authorities confirm that after-the-fact testimony of legislators regarding the intent of legislation and the testimony of legislators opposed to the legislation are inadmissible. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 48.16 (5th ed) (citing numerous jurisdictions). Legislative testimony on motive is also inadmissible.
References to the motives of members of the legislature in enacting a law are uniformly disregarded for interpretive purposes except as expressed in the statute itself. The reasons which prompted various members to enact the law may be varied, conflicting and difficult to determine, and they may be unrelated to any consideration about the meaning of the statute.
Id. at § 48.17.
[¶ 64.] Our neighboring states agree. See Ruthven Consol, v. Emmetsburg Community, 382 N.W.2d 136, 140 (Iowa 1986) (“In common with most states we will not consider a legislator’s private interpretation of the statute, even if the legislator was actively involved in drafting and enacting the legislation.”); Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 392 N.W.2d 558, 569 (Minn.App.1986) (“Subsequent testimony by individual legislators regarding legislative intent is inadmissible in construing a statute.”); Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 202 N.W.2d 140 (N.D.1972) (Courts refuse to consider testimony of legislators as to the intent of the legislature.); Independent Producers Marketing Corp. v. Cobb, 721 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1986) (“Affidavits by legislators or other persons involved in the enactment of a statute are not a proper source of legislative history.”); Shepoka v. Knopik, 201 Neb. 780, 272 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1978) (Testimony as to intention of a resolution was “clearly inadmissible” at trial.) Because conclusions two, four, and five are so heavily based on this inadmissible evidence, I cannot join in those conclusions.
[¶ 65.] I also cannot join the majority decision to sever because the admissible extrin*401sic evidence14 of legislative intent reveals that the provision regarding ch. 3-18 is inextricably tied to the first part of § 3Í and to the appropriation for the salary raises. The record reflects that before the legislative session, the Governor proposed cutting 30 positions from various universities to free up $1,613,960 in general funds. The Governor then proposed to give this $1.6 million back to the Regents to allow them to adjust salaries according to the Regent’s merit-based and competitive salary augmentation program. State of South Dakota Governor’s Budget Report Fiscal Year 1999, Summary of Recommended Budget Adjustments, p. 7.
[¶ 66.] The minutes of the Joint Appropriations Committee show that from the outset of the legislative session the Legislature had differing plans for the $1.6 million. In January, the Senate Majority Leader proposed an amendment that would have used the $1.6 million to enhance other state employee salaries. Minutes, South Dakota Joint Appropriations Committee, p. 2 (Jan. 23, 1998). The amendment was received favorably by the Committee. Id. at 3. However, the Regents requested more time to discuss the amendment’s ramifications on their budget. Id. In the days following, the Regents attempted to regain the $1.6 million that would have been lost had that amendment become a part of the general appropriations bill. See Memorandum from Robert Perry to Members of the Joint Appropriations Committee (Jan. 27, 1988).
[¶ 67.] In this effort the Regents did two significant things. First, they assured the Legislature of their desire to institute the market and merit-based salary increases. Second, they noted that the main hindrance to implementing their proposed plan was the negotiations with COHE. See Letter from Robert Perry to Rep. Richter (Jan. 29 1998).15
[¶ 68.] In early February, the Regent’s budget came up for further discussion. The House Majority Leader noted his support for the $1.6 million allotment to the Regents, but then indicated that he wanted the committee to change the funding methods and “noted they should start with a base, then reward efficiencies.” (The Regent’s Plan). Minutes, South Dakota Joint Appropriations Committee, p. 1 (Feb. 4, 1998)(emphasis added). Much of the remaining committee minutes concerning the Regent’s budget also referenced the desire to reward efficiencies and promote competition at the various universities. See generally, id. at 1-6. Therefore, contrary to the majority’s conclusions, both the Legislature and the Regents were concerned throughout the legislative session that the raises would be spent according to the Regents’ proposed salary program. Furthermore, neither intended that collective bargaining would change the Regent’s plan.
[¶ 69.] Moreover, even if we now adopt a rule permitting admission of after-the-fact affidavits of the legislators, a preponderance of such evidence refutes conclusions two, four, and five. The affidavits of the Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee affirm that the $1.6 million was a point of contention among legislators and that many felt it “could be better utilized elsewhere.” Affidavit of Sen. Frederick at ¶ 10 (May 19, 1998) (hereinafter Frederick); Affidavit of Rep. Richter at ¶ 12 (May 19, 1998) (hereinafter Richter). Moreover, both noted that “at the same time ... there were other proposed uses for the $1,613,960 ... [including] a request to utilize those moneys to increase the general salary package for other state employees.” Richter at ¶ 11; *402Frederick at ¶ 9. Most importantly, the Senate Chairman commented:
A key component, and critical to my support of the [Regent’s] proposal, was a proposed amendment to the general appropriations bill which subsequently became Section 31 of Senate Bill 242. The purpose of this amendment was to make clear that it was the Legislature’s intent that funds for salary increases of noncareer service act employees of the Board of Regents contained in the general appropriations bill were not to be distributed across the board [as Petitioners desire] or in any manner inconsistent with the Regents’ discretion which was conveyed to the Joint Appropriations Committee through its proposed salary competitiveness funding plan.
Frederick at ¶ 12 (emphasis added); see also, Richter at ¶ 14. In light of the Regent’s concerns and the Senate Chairman’s statements, this appropriation for salary raises was clearly tied to both conditions in § 31. The Legislature clearly intended that the raises would be distributed under the Regents’ plan without collective bargaining. It simply makes little sense to conclude that the Legislature intended the Regents to go through the idle art of collective bargaining before implementing the salary plan the Regents and the Legislature had already approved.
[¶70.] Because I agree with the majority that “clearly the last clause of § 31 was intended as a condition or limitation on the expenditure of these funds,” I do not believe that the appropriation can be severed from its “condition or limitation.”
[¶ 71.] I concur with the majority’s denial of Petitioners’ request to distribute the raises in accordance with Petitioners’ existing salary schedule. Petitioners’ other arguments have no merit under our established precedent.

. The majority’s reliance on the affidavit of a legislator as support for this conclusion is misplaced for additional reasons. Although the majority refers to "some legislators,” there was only one affidavit from a legislator that made reference to being surprised by the inclusion of § 31 in the general appropriations bill. Moreover, this legislator was absent from the committee meeting when the amendment was added. He also stated that he was not aware of the amendment. If inadmissible affidavits of legislators are to be admitted, this evidence should not detract from the clarity of intent expressed by the legislators who were involved with the amendment. We have previously rejected statements of intent proffered by participants who were absent from the relevant committee meeting. Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493, 499 n. 7 (S.D.1993).

. For example, the Continental Congress did not begin its session with a draft of the Declaration of Independence. After Jefferson submitted his draft of the Declaration, the Congress, in the waning days and hours before the final vote and as a result of heated debate (and much to Jefferson’s consternation) made numerous revisions to the Declaration. Many of the revisions changed the intent of the various parts of the Declaration and had a significant bearing on its passage. See Willard Sterne Randall, Thomas Jefferson: A Life, 269-276 (1993).

. The majority states that it considered the affidavits only to address the Regents' contentions. Supra at ¶ 34 n. 6. There are two problems with this explanation. First, SDEA and COHE are the parties seeking the writ from this Court. They were also the first to introduce a legislator's affidavit regarding intent. Second, regardless of who submitted the affidavits, after-the-fact testimony of individual legislators regarding legislative intent is inadmissible. The majority's analysis of alleged legislative intent to permit severance is heavily based on those affidavits. Under our cases, only the clear and unambiguous expression of intent found in the text SB 242, as well as intent expressed through admissible legislative history, should be considered.

. Again, this is assuming that there is even a need to consider extrinsic evidence given the clearly conditional language of § 31.

. Despite this admissible evidence of raising the collective bargaining issue in the early days of the session, the majority concludes that the issue was not submitted at the outset. See supra at n. 7. The majority also concludes that the collective bargaining amendment was "hasty action," "summarily taken” at the “midnight hour.” Id. I respectfully submit these conclusions fail to consider public knowledge of the day-to-day workings of the appropriations committees (the committees regularly work at night, and they do not finalize the bill until the last days of the session). The majority's conclusions, on this record, begin to usurp the Legislature's exclusive power to determine its internal rules and procedure.