Court Opinion

ID: 9906425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 01:07:39.681618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:22.450374
License: Public Domain

12/01/2023

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT KNOXVILLE
                           Assigned on Briefs November 28, 2023

              STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DUANE R. DOXTATER

               Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County
 Nos. S67,821; S68,009-011; S73,301-303; S73,562 James F. Goodwin, Jr., Judge

                               No. E2023-00261-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Duane R. Doxtater, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his effective ten-
year probationary sentence for multiple convictions stemming from two separate global
guilty plea agreements. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his
probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement.
Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT,
JR., and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Brennan M. Wingerter, Assistant Public Defender – Appellate Director, Tennessee District
Public Defenders Conference (on appeal), Franklin, Tennessee; and Andrew J. Gibbons,
District Public Defender, Wesley A. Mink, Assistant District Public Defender, and George
Todd East (at revocation hearing), Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Duane R.
Doxtater.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Raymond J. Lepone, Assistant
Attorney General; Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General; and P. Michael Filetti,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                      I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      The Defendant’s effective ten-year sentence in this probation revocation case stems
from his multiple convictions in eight cases. The record, which includes uniform judgment
documents and guilty plea paperwork, reflects that the Defendant entered two global guilty
pleas—the first on February 2, 2018, and the second on April 8, 2021.

                                A.      February 2, 2018 Guilty Plea

       On April 25, 2017, in case number S67,821, the Sullivan County grand jury returned
an indictment against the Defendant, charging him with three counts of statutory rape. See
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506. On May 9, 2017, in case numbers S68,009 through
S68,011, the Sullivan County grand jury returned two indictments and one presentment
against the Defendant, charging him with the following offenses: theft of property valued
at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000; vandalism of property valued at more than $1,000
but less than $2,500; evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle; evading arrest;
speeding; running a red light; operating a vehicle with no valid driver’s license; and escape.
See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-408, -16-603, -16-605; 55-8-104, -8-149, -8-152,
50-301. Thereafter, on February 2, 2018, the Defendant entered a global guilty plea
agreement resolving all four cases—two counts of statutory rape were dismissed, and he
otherwise pleaded guilty as charged to all counts. Per the terms of the agreement, the
Defendant received an effective six-year sentence to be served at thirty percent as a Range
I, standard offender for these convictions, and he would “apply” for probation. 1 The
judgment forms reflect that on February 9, 2018, the Defendant’s remaining sentence was
suspended and that he was given credit for time served. 2

                                   B.      April 8, 2021 Guilty Plea

        Before the expiration of the Defendant’s six-year sentence, the Sullivan County
grand jury returned a presentment against the Defendant on September 23, 2020, charging
him in case number S73,562 with aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, domestic
vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or less, and two counts of assault. See Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 39-13-101, -13-102, -13-111, -14-408. On October 7, 2020, the Sullivan County
grand jury, in case numbers S73,301 through S73,303, returned three presentments against
the Defendant, charging him with the following offenses: three counts of failure to provide
proof of financial responsibility, two counts of driving on a suspended license, one count
of driving on a revoked license, one count of unlawful removal of a registration decal or
plate, one count of failing to display a certificate of vehicle registration upon demand, and
one count of violating the bumper law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-4-108, -4-129, -9-

       1
           The plea agreement noted that the escape conviction required mandatory service of sixty days.
       2
       We note that the judgment forms indicate that the Defendant was originally placed in the
Community Corrections Program relative to this six-year sentence.

                                                   -2-
215, -12-139, -50-504. On April 8, 2021, the Defendant entered a global guilty plea
agreement resolving all four cases—he pleaded guilty to all counts as charged, with the
agreement that the conviction for domestic assault would merge with the aggravated
domestic assault conviction. Per the terms of the agreement, he received an effective four-
year sentence to be served at thirty percent as a Range I, standard offender, which was to
be suspended to supervised probation. This four-year sentence was to be served
consecutively to the remainder of the Defendant’s effective six-year sentence in cases
S67,821 and S68,099 through S68,011. The judgment forms reflect that the Defendant was
given credit for time served and that as a condition of his probation, he was not to possess
or use alcohol or illegal drugs.

                         C.     Probation Revocation Proceedings

        On July 1, 2022, the Defendant’s probation officer, Carlos Payne, filed a probation
violation affidavit, seeking a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest. The affidavit listed all
eight case numbers and stated that the Defendant received a total effective sentence of ten
years and was granted probation on June 10, 2019. The warrant alleged that the Defendant
violated the rules on his probation on or about June 25, 2022, based upon the following
behavior: “The offender travelled to Virginia Beach, [Virginia,] without the permission of
his [p]robation [o]fficer and was arrested by the Virginia Beach [p]olice for driving without
a license[;] resisting arrest or obstruct[ing] justice-threat or force[;] driving under the
influence with child[;] and gross, wanton, or reckless care for child.” Specifically, the
warrant provided that the Defendant violated Rule 1 of his probation by failing to obey the
law; Rule 5 by failing to get permission from his probation officer to leave the State; Rule
8 by using intoxicants; Rule 10 by violating the special conditions of his probation,
specifically, “no alcohol”; and Rule 14 by engaging in assaultive, abusive, threatening, or
intimidating behavior, as well as in behavior that poses a threat to others. Based upon the
affidavit, the trial court issued a warrant for the Defendant’s arrest, and the Defendant was
taken into custody on September 6, 2022.

       The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on February 15, 2023. At the
outset of the hearing, defense counsel noted that the violation of probation warrant was
“based upon events out of Virginia which [the Defendant pleaded] guilty to, [pleaded] no
contest to, was the understanding.” Defense counsel then said that the Defendant would
“enter a technical plea of guilty to” violating his probation “because of the conviction in
Virginia.” Upon questioning by the trial court, the Defendant pleaded guilty to the “July
1, 2022[ v]iolation [w]arrant[.]” Defense counsel also stipulated that the trial court could
“consider the facts in the warrant as the basis for the plea[.]” The trial court then accepted
the Defendant’s plea and revoked the Defendant’s probation.

                                            -3-
         The trial court stated that it would proceed with a hearing to determine the
consequences of the Defendant’s revocation of probation. The trial court next noted that
it had received a February 14 report “showing that [the Defendant] was evaluated for the
TN-ROCS Program.”3 The defense then called the Defendant’s sister, Kayla Doxtater, to
testify.

       Ms. Doxtater stated that the Defendant had three children and was “a wonderful
dad,” who engaged in lots of activities with his children. According to Ms. Doxtater, the
Defendant “started trying to do better for his life” after his third child was born and he was
released from jail. Ms. Doxtater estimated that the Defendant’s third child was about one-
year old. She testified that the Defendant worked “every single day” to support his children
and that he had considered seeking additional schooling. She also opined that the
Defendant’s receiving treatment for his alcohol problem “would really help him.” Ms.
Doxtater explained that when the Defendant drinks alcohol, he becomes “a whole different
person” and that “every single time that he gets intoxicated, . . . he does have an issue.”

       The Defendant then testified. According to the Defendant, his third child was born
in December 2021. He said that his children were his “number one priority,” that he spent
as much time as possible with them, and that he provided financial assistance for them.
Regarding his employment, the Defendant stated that prior to his arrest, he was working
“the best job” he had ever had, making twenty-five dollars an hour with a moving company.
The Defendant’s boss would pick him up for work, so he did not have to drive. He would
be able to return to work if released into the community.

       The Defendant said that he had an “occasional[]” drinking problem, explaining that
it was “not as bad as it used to be” and that he now knew “when to stop.” The Defendant
indicated that he could comply with the conditions of any inpatient treatment program. The
Defendant acknowledged that he had participated in previous programs, but he said that he
did not want to participate in those prior programs “as bad as [he does] now.”

        3
          This report is not a part of the record on appeal. According to the State’s website, the Tennessee
Recovery Oriented Compliance Strategy (“TN-ROCS”) Program “is a court diversion strategy that serves
justice-involved adults who have mental illness, co-occurring disorders, or substance abuse disorders and
who have low to medium risk factors for re-offending and medium to high needs for substance abuse and
mental health services.” Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, TN-
Recovery Oriented Compliance Strategy, https://www.tn.gov/behavioral-health/substance-abuse-
services/criminal-justice-services/tn-rocs.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2023). The TN-ROCS model
“provides an option for judges to address the needs of defendants who do not meet criteria for recovery
court.” Id.

                                                   -4-
       The Defendant was then asked about the details of the June 25, 2022 incident in
Virginia Beach that precipitated the filing of the violation warrant. The Defendant said
that his boss was initially driving the vehicle, but because it was nighttime and his boss
“only [had] vision in one eye[,]” he took over driving. The Defendant stated that he initially
thought he was pleading no contest to the charges in Virginia, but when he entered the
courtroom, his lawyer informed him that he could no longer plead no contest and that he
would have to plead outright “to get out that day[.]” The Defendant indicated that he
pleaded guilty that day in order to be released. According to the Defendant, none of his
convictions for those offenses in Virginia were felonies, and he did not have any
probationary sentence in Virginia after service of forty-eight hours for the DUI conviction.

       On cross-examination, the Defendant was asked if he was “sanctioned by probation”
for “picking up a misdemeanor offense” in 2019, though his probation officer did not seek
a violation. The Defendant acknowledged that he was sanctioned in 2019 for a driving on
a suspended license charge. In addition, he admitted that he was sanctioned by probation
for failing a drug test in September 2021 by testing positive for buprenorphine and
marijuana.

        Regarding the Virginia Beach incident, the Defendant indicated that it was his
boss’s five-year-old child that was in the vehicle at the time of arrest. The Defendant said
that while he was trying to find a parking spot, he attempted to avoid the headlights from
the vehicle behind him by mistakenly turning down a one-way street before being pulled
over by the police. According to the Defendant, the police did not have him perform any
field sobriety tests or require him to submit to a blood test. The Defendant said that after
being pulled over, he “started looking for [his] vape,” and the officers “thought [he] must
be trying to reach for a weapon.” The Defendant denied that he was resisting arrest or that
he was under the influence of anything, despite his having pleaded guilty to those offenses.
The Defendant explained that he took his prescribed buprenorphine that day and was not
using alcohol.

       At the conclusion of the proof, the Defendant requested community release that
included an “inpatient opportunity for professional treatment.” Defense counsel noted that
the Defendant had started “accepting responsibility” and that he was “a young man” with
three children to raise. The State did not present any additional proof or make any
argument.

       In issuing its ruling, the trial court found that this was the Defendant’s third
probation violation and “each time he has picked up new charges[] while on probation.”

                                            -5-
The trial court stated that it was “looking at this third violation warrant.” 4 The trial court
noted that despite the Defendant’s denial of his guilt for the Virginia offenses, he,
nonetheless, pleaded guilty to those offenses. The trial court observed that the Defendant’s
third child was six months old in June 2022 at the time of the Virginia offenses and stated,

        So, I have to wonder if all this talk about him turning his life around and
        wanting to be there and straightening up because of this child, is because he
        wants to get out of jail. Because for the first six months of her life, he sure
        hadn’t straightened up and done the right thing.

The trial court further noted that the Defendant had left the jurisdiction without permission.
In addition, the trial court remarked that while the Defendant had a “pretty good job,” he
had not taken any initiative to seek treatment or change his ways, stating, “He’s still out
here drinking, ripping and running, committing a DUI with . . . a child in the car[.]”

       The trial court said it had “considered the TN-ROCS Program” but did not think the
Defendant was “ready for that” “at this time” as it was not “in his best interest.” The trial
court also said that it “would consider Community Corrections” but that it did not “have
that option available” because the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) “hasn’t
seen fit to provide a county, the size of Sullivan County, with a Community Corrections
Program since 2019.” The trial court then commented, “We’ve tried straight probation,
we’ve effectively tried split confinement because he’s had to, on previous violations, he’s
had to serve some time in jail and then be placed back on probation and none of it has
worked.” The trial court revoked the Defendant’s effective ten-year sentence in full and
ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the TDOC.

       The trial court entered an order to that effect, fulling revoking the Defendant’s
probation and giving him credit for time served. The Defendant filed a timely, albeit
premature, notice of appeal. The case is now before us for our review.

                                          II.     ANALYSIS

      On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve
the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in confinement. Specifically, the
Defendant contends that (1) the trial court failed to consider whether execution of the

        4
          At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court stated that it was going to file a
document with the clerk so that it would be a part of the technical record on appeal, presumably referring
to this warrant. However, the record on appeal does not include this warrant or any other prior probation
violation warrants or revocation orders.

                                                  -6-
original sentence would serve the ends of justice and be in the best interests of the
Defendant, his three children, or the public; and (2) the trial court reached an illogical
conclusion when it said it “would consider Community Corrections” if that were still an
option in Sullivan County, but at the same time, said that the Defendant was not “ready”
 for the TN-ROCS Program. The Defendant requests we reverse the revocation order and
allow him to enter the TN-ROCS Program at a suitable inpatient treatment facility with
intensive community-based supervision.

       The State responds that the trial court made adequate findings for the record and did
not abuse its discretion by ordering the Defendant to serve his original sentence as an
appropriate consequence of revocation after finding that this was the Defendant’s third
violation of probation, that the Defendant had committed new crimes with a child in the
car, and that the Defendant had previous opportunities for alternative relief that did not
work. Relative to the trial court’s statements regarding the TN-ROCS and Community
Corrections Programs, the State contends that the trial court did not reach an illogical
conclusion by refusing, after consideration, to place the Defendant in one program simply
because another potentially more suitable program was unavailable.

        Appellate courts review a trial court’s revocation of probation decision for an abuse
of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial court places
sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the
consequences on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A
trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical
conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies
reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d
436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). If a trial court fails to state its findings and reasoning for the
revocation on the record, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review if the record is
sufficiently developed, or the appellate court may remand the case for the trial court to
make such findings. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316,
324 (Tenn. 2014)).

        Probation revocation is a two-step consideration requiring trial courts to make two
distinct determinations as to (1) whether to revoke probation and (2) what consequences
will apply upon revocation. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 757. No additional hearing is required
for trial courts to determine the proper consequences for a revocation. Id. The trial court’s
findings do not need to be “particularly lengthy or detailed but only sufficient for the
appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of the revocation decision.” Id. at 759
(citing State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705-06 (Tenn. 2021)).

                                              -7-
        “The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges as the trial
judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced before the trial judge.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-311(d)(1). “If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant has violated the conditions of probation and suspension of sentence, then
the court may revoke the defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence, in full or in
part, pursuant to § 40-35-310.” Id. Notwithstanding subdivision (d)(1), the probation
statute provides for two categories of probation violations, technical and non-technical,
with differing penalties for both. State v. Walden, No. M2022-00255-CCA-R3-CD, 2022
WL 17730431, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2022).

       The following are classified as non-technical violations: a defendant’s commission
of a new felony or a new Class A misdemeanor, a zero tolerance violation as defined by
the department of correction community supervision matrix, absconding, or contacting the
defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
311(e)(2). Once a trial court determines that a defendant has committed a non-technical
violation of probation, the trial court may: (1) order confinement for some period of time;
(2) cause execution of the sentence as it was originally entered; (3) extend the defendant’s
probationary period not exceeding one year; (4) return the defendant to probation on
appropriate modified conditions; or (5) resentence the defendant for the remainder of the
unexpired term to a sentence of probation. See id. §§ 40-35-308(c); -310; -311(e)(2).

        Here, the trial court’s application of the first step of Dagnan is not in dispute. At
the revocation hearing, the Defendant pleaded guilty after questioning by the trial court to
the allegations contained in the July 1, 2022 probation violation warrant as they pertained
to the Defendant’s behavior in Virginia on June 25, 2022. Defense counsel also stipulated
that the trial court could “consider the facts in the warrant as the basis for the plea[.]” The
Defendant admitted at the revocation hearing that he had pleaded guilty outright to the
offenses in Virginia. Although the Defendant denied his underlying guilt for those offenses
and claimed he initially thought he was entering a no contest plea, the Defendant’s
stipulation to the allegations contained in the probation violation warrant alone supports
revocation. See State v. Brewster, No. E2021-00793-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2665951, at
*4 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2022) (citing cases), no perm. app. filed.

        Turning our attention to the trial court’s reasoning for ordering incarceration as a
consequence of revocation, the second step of Dagnan, the Defendant argues that the trial
court failed to consider whether execution of the original sentence would serve the ends of
justice and be in the best interests of the Defendant, his three children, or the public. In
issuing its ruling, the trial court noted that this was the Defendant’s third violation of

                                             -8-
probation warrant5 and that the Defendant continued to “pick up new charges[] while on
probation.” The Defendant first violated his six-year sentence by picking up numerous
new charges that resulted in his April 8, 2021 guilty plea and an extension of his suspended
sentence by an additional four years. At the revocation hearing, the Defendant also
admitted that he was sanctioned in 2019 for a driving on a suspended license charge and in
September 2021 for failing a drug test. The trial court commented that despite the
Defendant’s claims of turning his life around and wanting to be a good father and provider,
the Defendant’s third child was six months old at the time of the Virginia offenses, which
involved the presence of a five-year-old child in the vehicle. The trial court observed that
the Defendant left the state without the permission of his probation officer. In addition,
the trial court remarked that though the Defendant had a “pretty good job,” he had not taken
any initiative to seek treatment or change his ways, stating, “He’s still out here drinking,
ripping and running, committing a DUI with . . . a child in the car[.]” The trial court further
specifically stated that placement in the TN-ROCS Program would not be in the
Defendant’s best interest.

       As noted above, the trial court’s findings do not need to be “particularly lengthy or
detailed but only sufficient for the appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of the
revocation decision.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d. at 759 (citing Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705-06).
To impose the Defendant’s proposed standards would go beyond the requirements of
Dagnan and necessitate a trial court include specific phraseology in its ruling, which we
will not do. The record in the present case reflects that the trial court appropriately
analyzed the evidence and made findings regarding the facts and circumstances as they
informed its decision regarding the appropriate consequence for the violation.

       Moreover, a trial court may, in determining the appropriate consequence for a
probation violation, consider “the number of revocations, the seriousness of the violation,
the defendant’s criminal history, and the defendant’s character.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d. at
759 n.5. In rendering its decision to revoke the Defendant’s probation in full, the trial court
considered the Defendant’s past criminal history, including his multiple violations of his
past probationary sentences, and noted that the Defendant’s previous opportunities for
alternative relief did not work. These facts indicate that measures less restrictive than
confinement were unsuccessful for the Defendant and reflect poorly on the Defendant’s
potential for rehabilitation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(C) and (5).

        5
           Though the violation warrant was not made a part of the record as the trial court indicated it would
be, it is the Defendant’s responsibility to make sure there is an adequate record on appeal. See Tenn. R.
App. P. 24(b).

                                                    -9-
        The Defendant also argues that the trial court reached an illogical conclusion when
it said it “would consider Community Corrections” if that were still an option in Sullivan
County but that the Defendant was not “ready” for the TN-ROCS Program. According to
the Defendant, given these statements by the trial court, there was no logical reason why
the trial court refused to send the Defendant to the available option of TN-ROCS. First,
we note that the February 14 TN-ROCS Program report is not a part of the record on appeal.
It is an appellant’s responsibility to provide a full and fair record of what transpired in the
trial court, including the components relied upon by the trial court in determining the
sentence; this burden clearly rests upon the appellant. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b).
Moreover, the trial court merely mentioned that it would consider placement in the
Community Corrections Program if such were available. And we agree with the State that
the Defendant is not entitled to placement in one program, which the trial court considered
and found the Defendant unsuitable, simply because another potentially more appropriate
program was unavailable.

       Finally, we observe that though the Defendant requests placement in TN-ROCS
Program to receive inpatient treatment for substance abuse, the Defendant denied having a
significant drinking problem at the revocation hearing, describing any problem as
occasional, and saying that it was “not as bad as it used to be” and that he now knew “when
to stop.” The Defendant also acknowledged that he had participated in previous programs
and that he failed a drug test in September 2021 for buprenorphine and marijuana. Despite
the purported occasional nature of this problem, the Defendant said that he did not want to
participate in those prior programs “as bad as [he does] now.” The record shows that either
the Defendant’s substance abuse problem is not as serious as his record suggests or he is
downplaying the seriousness of his problem. Either conclusion supports the trial court’s
determination regarding the Defendant’s unsuitability for placement in the TN-ROCS
Program.

        Due to the non-technical nature of the violation given the Defendant’s commission
of new Class A misdemeanor offenses in Virginia, the trial court was statutorily authorized
to order the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-311(e)(2). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion when
it ruled that the Defendant was no longer a good candidate for probation and should serve
the remainder of his effective ten-year sentence in the TDOC.

                                            - 10 -
                                  III.   CONCLUSION

        Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief, and the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.

                                                   ______________________________
                                                   KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

                                          - 11 -