Court Opinion

ID: 9959389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 17:01:02.849359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:29.481924
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 11 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LELAND TODICHEENEY,                             No.    22-16042

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-08003-MTL

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN
RELOCATION, an administrative agency of
the United States,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted November 7, 2023
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and SEEBORG,** District
Judge. Dissent by Judge COLLINS.

      Leland Todicheeney appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to the Office of Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) affirming the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Richard Seeborg, Chief United States District Judge
for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
ONHIR’s denial of his application for relocation benefits. We review de novo the

district court’s grant of summary judgment. Brunozzi v. Cable Commc’ns, Inc., 851

F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). We review the ONHIR’s decision to determine if it

was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or

unsupported by substantial evidence.” Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi Relocation Comm’n,

878 F.2d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and issue a limited remand.

      Todicheeney is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation who grew up in

the Fingerpoint Valley in the Teestoh Chapter area. After court-partitioning

pursuant to the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act of 1974, Todicheeney and his family

were required to relocate from their land. Todicheeney is entitled to relocation

benefits under the Settlement Act if he can show he (1) resided on Hopi court-

partitioned land on December 22, 1974, and (2) was a “head of household” on or

before July 7, 1986. See 25 C.F.R. § 700.147(a), (e). Only the second question—

whether Todicheeney qualified as a “head of household”—is contested on appeal.

A single applicant can constitute a head of household if the applicant shows he

“actually maintained and supported” himself. Id. § 700.69(a)(2). Earnings of

$1,300 per year are sufficient to make out a prima facie showing of self-support.

The $1,300 threshold is not an absolute rule, and an applicant who makes less than

$1,300 may still qualify as self-supporting based on other evidence.

                                          2
      In 2009, Todicheeney applied for relocation benefits. The ONHIR denied

Todicheeney’s application, finding he was not a “head of household” when he

moved off the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) in June 1980 because he was not self-

supporting as of that date. The ONHIR noted Todicheeney’s Social Security

earnings statement did not show earnings of $1,300 per year until many years after

he moved off the HPL. Todicheeney appealed the ONHIR’s determination. The

Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) who heard Todicheeney’s appeal found

Todicheeney failed to meet his burden to show he was a self-supporting head of

household prior to June 1980 and, therefore, failed to establish his entitlement to

relocation benefits. Todicheeney then filed the instant suit against the ONHIR in

district court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court

granted summary judgment to the ONHIR and affirmed the agency’s

determination.

      The IHO denied Todicheeney relocation benefits largely because of

Todicheeney’s failure to provide documentary evidence supporting his claimed

wages working for Emmett Kindle, a federal contractor, and after finding

Todicheeney’s testimony, along with the testimony of his two witnesses, not

credible. In so doing, the IHO made several errors. First, the IHO erred when he

refused, without explanation, to credit Todicheeney’s testimony, or the testimony

of Todicheeney’s sister or uncle, that Todicheeney had several income streams

                                          3
during the relevant years in addition to his work for Kindle. See Cal. Energy

Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2009) (agency

action is arbitrary and capricious where the agency fails to “consider an important

factor or aspect of the problem”). The IHO heard testimony about how

Todicheeney (1) earned significant income from herding sheep and (2) earned

other income from hauling wood and water for neighbors during the relevant years.

Todicheeney testified he would earn $200 to $300 per month by sheepherding in

different areas of the Reservation (including in places like Greasewood, Dilkon,

and Forest Lake) and would herd sheep for up to six months out of the year.

Todicheeney also testified he earned between $20 and $50 hauling wood and water

for neighbors approximately every two weeks when they received their checks.

Cheryl Todicheeney corroborated this testimony.

      Nevertheless, the IHO did not credit any testimony from Todicheeney or

either witness that Todicheeney made any income sheepherding or performing odd

jobs. The IHO held that because “there [was] no documentation to support

applicant’s claims of income earned more than 30 years ago, [his] oral

recollections about any money he earned [was] fundamentally flawed and wholly

incredible.” To the extent the IHO declined to consider testimony regarding

Todicheeney’s sheepherding or work for neighbors solely based on a lack of

corroborating physical documentation and without providing specific, non-

                                         4
conclusory reasons as to why that testimony was not otherwise credible, this was

error. The IHO should have calculated how much income Todicheeney earned

from these sources of income and factored this result into his analysis of whether

Todicheeney was self-supporting. Indeed, the ONHIR may accept undocumented

income when determining whether the $1,300 threshold was met given that

individuals on the HPL often work odd jobs to support themselves and for which

no documentation exists. See, e.g., O’Daniel v. ONHIR, No. 07-354-PCT-MHM,

2008 WL 4277899, at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2008). The IHO did not explain why

the fact Todicheeney earned certain types of undocumented income “more than 30

years ago” should be counted against him in this instance, but that is precisely what

he did when he found Todicheeney “not a credible witness about any of his

claimed employment or earnings” because “no records exist.”

      Second, while the IHO has discretion to discount claimed earnings about

informal work where he finds relevant testimony not credible, the IHO must offer

specific explanations for such findings and then explain how that incredibility

bears on the relevant claimed income. See Ceguerra v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When the decision of an ALJ rests on a

negative credibility evaluation, the ALJ must make findings on the record and must

support those findings by pointing to substantial evidence on the record.”). Several

of the IHO’s negative credibility findings in this case were not supported by

                                         5
substantial evidence. The IHO, for instance, declined to find Todicheeney earned

income sheepherding or working odd jobs on the reservation because he found

other testimony about Todicheeney’s work for Kindle inconsistent or unreliable

but without explaining why Todicheeney’s testimony about sheepherding and odd

jobs was not credible. Similarly, the IHO discounted all of Cheryl Todicheeney’s

testimony about “any amounts of money [Todicheeney] earned from any of his

activities helping neighbors,” but never explained why Cheryl’s testimonial

inconsistencies about Todicheeney’s work for Kindle meant she was not credible

as to Todicheeney’s non-Kindle-related income streams.

      The IHO discounted (to $0) Todicheeney’s claimed income from working

for Kindle based on the absence of otherwise expected documentation, testimonial

inconsistencies, and Todicheeney’s failure to reference this employment for Kindle

in his benefits application. The IHO reasoned that because Kindle was a federal

contractor, Todicheeney’s earnings from this work should have been—but were

not—reflected in his Social Security earnings statements. These may have been

valid reasons to discount Todicheeney’s claimed income from Kindle. That said,

the IHO should have also considered the possibility Todicheeney’s work for

Kindle was not part of Kindle’s federal contract but instead was the type of

informal work common on the HPL. This is particularly so given Todicheeney’s

testimony to the IHO that he never did “any paperwork” to document his work for

                                         6
Kindle at the time of his employment. The IHO should have also considered that

while Todicheeney did not specifically mention working for Kindle on his benefits

application, he was wholly reliant on his sister, Cheryl, to interpret and fill out his

application.

      Third, the IHO failed to consider consistent testimony from Todicheeney

and his sister about how Todicheeney lived apart from his parents in his own

hogan or on job sites for a significant portion of each year. The IHO found in his

“Conclusions of Law” that Todicheeney “remained a dependent minor, living with

his parents” in June 1980. Cheryl Todicheeney, though, testified that her brother

lived apart from their parents for a number of months each year. Todicheeney

confirmed in his testimony he lived “next door” to his parents. The IHO

mischaracterized Cheryl’s testimony when he found she testified that Todicheeney

lived with his parents without considering her testimony that he lived apart from

his parents for a large portion, excluding winters, of each year. Whether

Todicheeney lived independently from his parents is relevant to whether he was

self-supporting (regardless of whether his income exceeded $1,300 per year), and

the IHO should have considered testimony offered on this point.

      We therefore remand the case to the district court with instructions to

remand the case to the agency so that the IHO may consider how much money

Todicheeney earned from sheepherding and completing odd jobs for neighbors

                                           7
during the relevant years. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744

(1985) (“[I]f the agency has not considered all relevant factors . . . the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional

investigation or explanation.”). The IHO should also consider whether there is an

evidentiary basis to credit Todicheeney with earning some income from Kindle—

even if not $600 per month—to the extent this work may have been informal,

undocumented work not officially part of Kindle’s federal contract. Finally, the

IHO should consider the fact Todicheeney lived in a separate structure from his

parents for significant periods of time during the relevant years and factor that

evidence into determining whether, independently of any income-related

determination, Todicheeney was self-supporting. We express no view as to the

proper outcome on remand.

      VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.

                                           8
                                                                           FILED
Leland Todicheeney v. Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation, No. 22-16042
                                                                                  APR 11 2024
COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                                U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

      In setting aside the decision of the Independent Hearing Officer (“IHO”) that

Appellant Leland Todicheeney was not entitled to relocation benefits from the

Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (“ONHIR”), the majority repeatedly

disregards the applicable deferential standard of review that applies to such

administrative determinations. Because the IHO’s decision applied the correct

legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence, I would affirm the district

court’s judgment upholding that decision. I respectfully dissent.

                                          I

      Under §§ 14 and 15 of the Navajo Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974, Pub

L. No. 93-531, 88 Stat. 1712 (Dec. 22, 1974), as amended (the “Settlement Act”),1

the ONHIR is authorized to make certain monetary payments to a Navajo or Hopi

“head of household” who relocates, after the partition of the area previously jointly

used by the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe, from land that has been partitioned

to the other tribe. Under the applicable regulations (which neither side challenges

here), a “single person” may constitute a “household” if he or she “at the time [of]

1
 This statute is no longer classified to the current version of the United States
Code. The current version of the statute is available on the website of the
Government Publishing Office at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-
13674/pdf/COMPS-13674.pdf.
his/her residence on land partitioned to the Tribe of which he/she is not a member

actually maintained and supported him/herself or was legally married and is now

legally divorced.” 25 C.F.R. § 700.69(a)(2) (emphasis added).2 That single person

would then obviously be the “head” of that one-person household. Id. § 700.69(b).

In fixing the point in time at which this latter determination is to be made, the

regulation specifies that “the individual must have been a head of household as of

the time he/she moved from the land partitioned to a tribe of which they [sic] were

not a member,” id. § 700.69(c), which date cannot be later than July 7, 1986, id.

§ 700.147(e). The regulations further state that, to be eligible for any benefits, any

persons claiming to be a “head of household” must have been “residents on

December 22, 1974”—the date of enactment of the Settlement Act—“of an area

partitioned to the Tribe of which they were not members.” Id. § 700.147(a). And,

finally, the regulations also specify that “[i]ndividuals are not entitled to receive

separate benefits if it is determined that they are members of a household which

has received benefits.” Id. § 700.147(d).

      Here, there is no dispute that, on December 22, 1974, Todicheeney was a

Navajo resident of a portion of the joint use area that was partitioned to the Hopi

Tribe (“Hopi Partitioned Lands” or “HPL”). It is also undisputed that the date on

2
 As shown, the regulation is actually missing the word “of,” but I agree with
Todicheeney (whose brief unwittingly adds the “of” without brackets) that the
word should be there and that its omission was a scrivener’s error.

                                            2
which Todicheeney moved from the HPL was June 1980. His parents relocated at

the same time, and they “were certified eligible for relocation benefits.”

Accordingly, Todicheeney would be eligible for benefits only if, rather than being

a member of his parent’s household, he instead “actually maintained and

supported” himself as of June 1980.

      As ONHIR states in its answering brief, “ONHIR has accepted that an

individual applicant establishes a prima facie case that the applicant is self-

supporting upon a showing that the applicant has earned $1300 in a year prior to

moving to the land of the other Tribe as part of a subsistence way of life on the

HPL.” As summarized by the IHO, Todicheeney’s claim that he met the $1,300

annual income level was based on the following two categories of claimed income:

(1) for 10 years beginning in 1978, he assertedly worked for Emmett Kindle

“doing brush pilings” for three months each fall, earning $300 every two weeks;

and (2) he performed work “helping elderly neighbors with their livestock and

hauling water and wood for which he was paid $300.00 per month.” The IHO

concluded that, based on the record evidence, Todicheeney had failed to

substantiate his claimed income; that he was not a “self-supporting head of

household” as of June 1980; and that he was instead a “dependent” who was

“living with his parents.”

                                           3
                                        II

      We review the IHO’s determination that Todicheeney was not self-

supporting only for substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(citation omitted). And where there are two permissible readings of the evidence,

we cannot reject the agency’s view and substitute our own. INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405

(1962). In my view, the IHO’s conclusions here are supported by substantial

evidence.

                                        A

      In particular, the IHO permissibly concluded that the witness testimony that

Todicheeney offered in support of his claimed work for Kindle was lacking in

credibility. As the IHO explained, the work allegedly done for Kindle related to

Kindle’s status as a “Federal contractor,” and Kindle therefore would have been

required to maintain a variety of written records, and such income would have

shown up in Todicheeney’s record of earnings with the Social Security

Administration. The absence of such records, the IHO concluded, suggested that

the work never occurred. The IHO also noted that this work would have been the

most significant income Todicheeney had during the relevant time period, and yet

                                         4
it was not mentioned anywhere on his benefits application, which referenced only

the occasional work he did from “1977–78” as a “Handyman, Sheepherder, etc.”

The IHO also concluded that the supporting testimony of Leroy Yazzie—an uncle

who allegedly worked together with Todicheeney for Kindle—was not credible

because (1) he too lacked any of the documentation that should have been

generated by Kindle, as a federal contractor; and (2) Yazzie’s “description of the

work and the locations at which he and [Todicheeney] supposedly worked”

differed materially from Todicheeney’s testimony. Likewise, the IHO concluded

that Todicheeney’s sister’s testimony about his employment was not credible

because she gave inconsistent testimony about the particular years and length of

time that Todicheeney worked for Kindle. I might have weighed any or all of

these points differently if I had been the trier of fact. Indeed, were I the trier, I

probably would not give much weight to the fact that Todicheeney mentioned

more work locations than Yazzie did, nor would I attach much significance to what

seem to me to be arguably understandable discrepancies about the exact dates and

timeframes concerning events that occurred 30 or more years before the hearing.

But, considered as a whole, the IHO’s articulated reasons are based on a

permissible reading of the record evidence, and they are sufficient to support the

IHO’s conclusions. As such, those conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence and cannot be set aside.

                                            5
      In finding that the IHO erred on this score, the majority states that the IHO

did not adequately consider (1) “the possibility Todicheeney’s work for Kindle was

not part of Kindle’s federal contract but instead was the type of informal work

common on the HPL”; and (2) the possibility that the Kindle work was omitted

from Todicheeney’s application because “he was wholly reliant on his sister,

Cheryl, to interpret and fill out his application.” See Memo. Dispo. at 6–7. But

these are simply potential arguments as to why the IHO should have weighed the

evidence differently and should have drawn different inferences and conclusions.

As such, they provide no basis for setting aside the IHO’s determination. See

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1; Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. at 405. Indeed,

given that Todicheeney’s own testimony was that the work he did for Kindle was

under a Forest Service contract and that Forest Service officials would “come

around” to “check” the work and “saw what we were doing,” the majority’s

remand with instructions to consider a contrary hypothesis is simply unfathomable.

And to the extent that the majority suggests that the IHO was affirmatively

required to specifically mention these competing explanations in his written ruling,

there is no support for such a view. As the majority itself notes, all that is required

on this score is that the agency make adequate findings for the conclusions it draws

and that those findings be supported by substantial evidence. See Memo. Dispo. at

5. For the reasons I have explained, that standard is met here.

                                           6
                                          B

      Substantial evidence also supports the IHO’s conclusion that Todicheeney

did not establish self-sufficiency based on the occasional work he did for

neighbors. As noted, the IHO had made a general adverse credibility

determination as to Todicheeney, his sister, and Yazzie, and he also noted that

there was a lack of any supporting documentation as to this further alleged source

of income. Once again, these determinations are based on a permissible reading of

the evidence, and we therefore cannot set them aside.

      In reaching a contrary conclusion, the majority states that the IHO was

required to make separate credibility determinations with respect to these two

distinct claimed categories of income. See Memo. Dispo. at 3–6. The majority

points to nothing that supports such a rule, which seems contrary to the well-settled

(and common-sense) maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.” Enying Li v.

Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “material

inconsistencies in testimony regarding one claim support an adverse credibility

determination on another claim”). Whether and how to apply such considerations

in weighing credibility is for the trier of fact. Here, it was not unreasonable for the

IHO, without further explanation, to decide to discount the witnesses’ testimony

across the board in light of what even the majority grudgingly concedes “may have

been [a] valid” discounting of the claim that Todicheeney had performed work for

                                           7
Kindle’s federal contract. See Memo. Dispo. at 6.

      The majority suggests that the IHO may have rejected this additional

claimed category of income “solely” because there was no documentation to

support it, but that is not a reasonable reading of the IHO’s decision. See Memo.

Dispo. at 4 (emphasis added). As I have explained above, that decision clearly

relied on both the view that the witnesses were not credible and that there was a

lack of supporting documentation. Todicheeney’s claims that the IHO committed

legal error by assertedly applying such a per se rule fail for the same reason.

                                          C

      Finally, the majority suggests that, “regardless of whether [Todicheeney’s]

income exceeded $1,300 per year,” the IHO should have considered whether

Todicheeney was self-supporting by “liv[ing] apart from his parents in his own

hogan or on job sites for a significant portion of each year.” See Memo. Dispo. at

7 (emphasis added). Nowhere in his opening brief did Todicheeney claim that he

had established self-support even if he did not earn $1,300 a year. Any such

contention is therefore forfeited. See Independent Towers of Wash. v. Washington,

350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).3

3
  The majority properly does not rely on Todicheeney’s argument, based in part on
multiple extra-record documents, that the IHO’s decision in this case is, in some
relevant sense, irreconcilable with the IHO’s decision in other cases. As the above
discussion shows, each case turns on the specific facts and arguments in the
administrative record of that case. In all events, Todicheeney has not shown any

                                          8
                                  *       *        *

      For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

basis for setting aside the IHO’s decision here.

                                          9