Court Opinion

ID: 9403492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 14:10:24.278739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.608503
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00158-CR

        JOHN ROBERT SIEVERS, JR., Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 8th District Court
               Hopkins County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 2229154

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

           A Hopkins County jury convicted John Robert Sievers, Jr., of the first-degree felony

offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child.1 In accordance with the jury’s verdict, the

trial court sentenced Sievers to life in prison. On appeal, Sievers claims that, because Section

21.02 of the Texas Penal Code permits a jury to return a non-unanimous verdict as to the specific

acts of sexual abuse to support a guilty verdict, it is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in

this case. Sievers has failed to preserve his constitutional claims for our review. As a result, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.         Background

           Because Sievers does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction, we restrict our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the resolution of this appeal.

The indictment against Sievers alleged that he,

           being 17 years of age or older, . . . during a period of 30 or more days,
           intentionally or knowingly commit[ted] two or more . . . acts of sexual abuse
           against a child younger than 14 years of age at the time the acts of sexual abuse
           occurred.

The indictment then alleged a specific instance of indecency with a child by contact and a

specific instance of aggravated sexual assault of a child.

           Before trial, the State filed an unobjected-to motion to amend the indictment. The trial

court issued an order granting the motion, which alleged two additional acts of aggravated sexual

assault of a child.

1
    TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b) (Supp.).
                                                  2
       At trial, the jury was instructed, in pertinent part, that it “must determine whether the

state has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, four elements. The elements are that—”

              1.      the defendant, in Hopkins County, Texas, during a period between
       on or about April 1, 2019, and on or about September 1, 2019, committed two or
       more of the following alleged acts of sexual abuse:

                     The first alleged act of sexual abuse is that the defendant engaged
                     in indecency with a child. Specifically —

                     a.      that on or about April 1, 2019, the defendant intentionally
                             or knowingly caused [S.S.] to engage in sexual contact by
                             touching [S.S.’s] genitals with the Defendant’s hand; and

                     b.      [S.S.] was a child younger than fourteen years old; and

                     c.      the defendant did this with the intent to arouse or gratify his
                             sexual desire.

                     The second alleged act of sexual abuse is that defendant engaged
                     in aggravated sexual assault of a child. Specifically —

                     a.      that on or about June 1, 2019, the defendant intentionally or
                             knowingly caused the sexual organ of [S.S.] to contact the
                             sexual organ of the Defendant; and

                     b.      [S.S.] was a child younger than fourteen years of age.

                     The third alleged act of sexual abuse is that defendant engaged in
                     aggravated sexual assault of a child. Specifically—

                     a.      that on or about August 1, 2019, the defendant intentionally
                             or knowingly caused the anus of [S.S.] to contact the sexual
                             organ of the Defendant; and

                     b.      [S.S.] was a child younger than fourteen years of age.

                     The fourth alleged act of sexual abuse is that defendant engaged in
                     aggravated sexual assault of a child. Specifically—

                                                3
                               a.     that on or about September 1, 2019, the defendant
                                      intentionally or knowingly caused the sexual organ of
                                      [S.S.] to contact the sexual organ of the Defendant; and

                               b.     [S.S.] was a child younger than fourteen years of age.

                               ....

                   With regard to element 1, you need not all agree on which specific acts of
            sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those acts
            were committed. You must, however, all agree that the defendant committed two
            or more acts of sexual abuse.

            Sievers did not object to the language of the court’s charge.

II.         Sievers Failed to Preserve his Constitutional Challenge to Section 21.02

            In his sole point of error, Sievers complains that Section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code 2

is facially unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied in that it permits the jury to return a

non-unanimous verdict as to the specific acts of sexual abuse in support of the jury’s guilty

verdict.

            “Issues of procedural default are systemic and must be reviewed by the courts of appeals,

even when the issue is not raised by the parties.” Leal v. State, 456 S.W.3d 567, 568 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015) (per curiam) (citing Gipson v. State, 383 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

            “‘As applied’ constitutional claims are subject to the preservation requirement and

therefore must be objected to at the trial court in order to preserve error.” Reynolds v. State, 423

2
    Section 21.02(d) states:

            If a jury is the trier of fact, members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which
            specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date when those acts
            were committed. The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is 30
            or more days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(d) (Supp.).
                                                            4
S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 437 n.14

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Although the objecting party need not employ “hyper-technical or

formalistic use of words or phrases” to preserve error, “the objecting party must still ‘let the trial

judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the

judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about

it.’” Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Pena v. State, 285

S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)); see Villareal v. State, 590 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2019, pet. ref’d) (finding “as applied” constitutional challenge to Section 21.02

unpreserved in trial court); Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2010, no pet.) (same).

            Likewise, “a defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a facial challenge to the

constitutionality of a statute.” Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);

see Ibenyenwa v. State, 367 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (facial

constitutional challenge to Section 21.02 unpreserved in trial court); Williams, 305 S.W.3d at

893 (Section 21.02 voidness claim must be preserved in trial court).

            The record reflects that Sievers did not move to quash the original or amended

indictments on any ground. Likewise, Sievers did not urge his jury unanimity argument in an

objection to the court’s charge to the jury3 and did not otherwise make that complaint known to

the trial court. As a result, Sievers has not preserved his Section 21.02 constitutional claims for

our review.

3
    Sievers does not complain of jury charge error on appeal.
                                                            5
III.   Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Jeff Rambin
                                               Justice

Date Submitted:       June 1, 2023
Date Decided:         June 21, 2023

Do Not Publish

                                                 6