Court Opinion

ID: 9488807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:55:54.181785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:06.474733
License: Public Domain

RYAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the district court did not err in the sentences it imposed on the defendants, I write separately to explain my view.
When “no specific federal sentencing guideline applie[s]” to a particular statute, a court is directed by the Guidelines Manual to apply the “most analogous guideline.” United States v. Gray, 982 F.2d 1020, 1021 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Holmes, 975 F.2d 275, 278-79 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 934, 113 S.Ct. 1322, 122 L.Ed.2d 708 (1993). Because the majority concludes that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 “applies” directly to the crime at issue here, it reasons that the question is not which guideline is most “analogous,” under U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, but rather which is most “applicable,” under U.S.S.G. § lB1.2(a). While confessing that I find any difference between searching for the guideline that is most “applicable” and that which is most “analogous” to be abstruse, at best, I *115have nonetheless concluded that because here, neither section 2B1.1 nor U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 provides language precisely describing 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) in all its particulars, the court’s obligation is to find which of these two is most analogous. See United States v. Smertneck, 954 F.2d 264, 265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 838, 113 S.Ct. 101, 121 L.Ed.2d 61 (1992).
In Smertneck, the defendant was charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6), which provides that it is unlawful “to possess any three-neck round-bottom flask ... specially designed or modified to manufacture a controlled substance.” Id. at 264. The defendant admitted to transporting such flasks to his home, where he operated a methamphetamine laboratory. Since no guideline specifically pertained to this statute, the parties argued over which guideline governed. In an approach I believe is instructive, the court, rather than looking directly to the guidelines, considered which statute was most like the crime committed by the defendant:
The primary thrust of appellant’s argument is that guidelines for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 863 are the most analogous offense guidelines.... [Section] 863 deals with use, sale or trafficking of drug para-phernalia_ Dissimilarly, 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) is directed to the possession of a chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. The former statute makes illegal the use, sale or trafficking of things used to consume or experience controlled substances. The latter statute makes illegal the possession of things used to create controlled substances. The thing possessed by Mr. Smertneck was a three-neck flask, which Mr. Smertneck admitted he possessed with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance, not to experience a controlled substance.
Id. The Smertneck court accordingly affirmed the district court’s use of the guideline prescribed by Appendix A to apply to 21 U.S.C. § 841(d).
At issue here is 18 U.S.C. § 922(u), which was enacted as part of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub.L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). As is well-known, the purpose of the Brady Act, as a general matter, was to address the proliferation of firearms; since many firearms involved in crimes are stolen firearms, one provision of the Brady Act was to punish the theft of firearms from federally licensed dealers. See H.R. Rep. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1993, p. 1984; see also 140 Cong. Reo. S9503 (daily ed. July 22, 1994) (statement of Sen. Kerrey); 137 Cong. Reo. S8934 (daily ed. June 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Stevens); 137 Cong. Rec. H2851 (daily ed. May 8, 1991) (statement of Rep. Stokes). To that end, section 922(u) provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for a person to steal or unlawfully take or carry away from the person or the premises of a person who is licensed to engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, any firearm in the licensee’s business inventory that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(u). Section 922(u), then, does not punish any type of theft conduct except for that which has as its purpose the obtaining of firearms from licensed dealers. It does not criminalize the taking of a firearm, for example, from a private residence, where the taking of the firearm is an adjunct to, say, the taking of the silverware. Employing the Smertneck court’s approach, one readily observes that the gravamen of section 922(u) is the involvement of a firearm, not the fact of the theft; the statute’s focus is not on the theft conduct itself, but only on that conduct insofar as it pertains to firearms.
This focus section 922(u) shares with all the other section 922 crimes. Appendix A to the guidelines explicitly provides that violations of all subsections of section 922 which preexisted the Brady Act are to be punished under section 2K2.1; while not, by its terms, directly addressing thefts, section 2K2.1 addresses the primary objective of the type of theft criminalized in section 922(u), that is, stealing firearms. In light of the identity in purpose between section 922(u) and the other subsections of section 922, it seems to me to be an obvious conclusion that the guideline pertaining to those other subsections — sec-*116tíon 2K2.1 — is the guideline most analogous to section 922(u).
The majority would not employ the Smert-neck approach, and would not select the most analogous, or most applicable, guideline by selecting the guideline associated with the statute most analogous to the statute charged. It would, instead, compare the charged conduct to the language of the guidelines, and determine which guideline most resembles the charged conduct. In that regard, the majority emphasizes the indictment language, to the effect that the defendants “did steal, unlawfully take, and carry away from the premises of Homestead Hardware seven firearms.” The problem with that approach is found when, as in this case, neither guideline suggested by the parties bears a perfect resemblance to the charged conduct. The majority opinion selects section 2B1.1, because, it explains, what is important are the verbs in the indictment language, that is, the stealing, taking, and carrying away, and section 2K2.1 does not explicitly address those verbs. There is no suggestion by the majority, however, that the breadth of section 2K2.1 excludes its application to theft conduct.
I find the majority’s approach unsatisfactory, since here, the undisputed legislative purpose of section 922(u) — the punishment of firearms offenses — makes plain that the nouns, rather than the verbs, are quite important. Although section 2B1.1 allows for a one-level enhancement when a firearm is stolen, it plainly does not contemplate a crime of which the central distinguishing factor is the involvement of firearms. Section 2K2.1, on the other hand, does contemplate such a crime. As already discussed, in my view, the legislative history makes plain that firearms, not thefts, are the essence of section 922(u).
Further support for selecting section 2K2.1 rather than the lesser penalty imposed by section 2B1.1 is found in a consideration of the statutory penalty specified by Congress for violations of section 922(u). The penalty provision for section 922(u), found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(i)(l), reads as follows: “A person who knowingly violates section 922(u) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” This is an enhanced penalty provision, allowing for greater penalties than those normally available for violations of section 922. United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 610 n.7 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (Phillips, J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 797, 133 L.Ed.2d 745 (1996). The fact that section 924(i)(l) prescribes an enhanced penalty for violation of section 922(u), compared to certain other section 922 infractions, clearly indicates that Congress viewed this crime as potentially more serious than the other section 922 offenses, not less so. Application, therefore, of section 2B1.1, which would result in a lower sentence than section 2K2.1 would prescribe for other section 922 offenses, contradicts this clear congressional message, and again counsels against the wisdom of selecting section 2B1.1.
Finally, unlike the majority, I believe that the recent actions of the United States Sentencing Commission also counsel in favor of applying section 2K2.1 to the crimes at issue here. As the majority notes, generally, a guidelines clause which increases a penalty and which is enacted subsequent to the offense conduct cannot govern a defendant’s sentence without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Tisdale, 7 F.3d 957, 965 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1201, 127 L.Ed.2d 549 (1994); Holmes, 975 F.2d at 278. Nonetheless, it is appropriate for a court to take subsequent action by the Sentencing Commission into account, “[s]o long as the court makes clear its understanding that a subsequently enacted guideline does not govern,” but is only used for guidance and information of what sentence the guidelines prescribed at the time of the offense conduct. Tisdale, 7 F.3d at 967.
The Sentencing Commission is empowered by statute to create new sentencing guidelines and modify existing guidelines on an annual basis. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). On January 9, 1995, the Sentencing Commission issued a notice of a proposed amendment to the sentencing guidelines,' dealing, in part, with the appropriate guideline for 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). The notice first notes that “[c]ur-rent law ... proscribes ... stealing from the *117person or premises of a licensee any firearm in the business inventory.” 60 Fed.Reg. 2430, 2489 (1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(u)). It further notes that “18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (theft from dealer) as well as 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(s) and 922(t) (Brady bill provisions) are not listed in the Statutory Index” to the guidelines. Id. The notice then discusses the two possible applicable guideline provisions under discussion in this case, and draws attention to the obvious disparity:
Guideline 2K2.1 covers offenses involving stolen firearms. These offenses are subject to a base offense level of 12....
Guideline 2B1.1 governs general theft offenses, including offenses of goods traveling in interstate commerce and offenses within the special federal maritime or territorial jurisdiction or within Indian territory. Guideline 2Bl.l(b)(2)(A) provides for a one-level increase ... if a firearm or destructive device was taken, compared with a base offense level 12 under § 2K2.1.
Id. at 2439-40. It proposes the following solution:
Two options are proposed to address the disparity in § 2B1.1 and § 2K2.1 penalties. Option 1 amends § 2B1.1 to include a cross reference to § 2K2.1. Option 2 amends § 2B1.1 to recommend an upward departure.
Id. at 2440. The notice then gives detañed instructions for the appropriate amendments, all of which boü down to making 12 the base offense level for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(u). Id. On May 10, 1995, the Commission submitted its amendments to Congress, adding section 922(u) to the statutory provisions covered by section 2K2.1. 60 Fed.Reg. 25074, 25075, 25084 & 25089 (1995).
The majority opinion rejects the recent guidance provided by actions of the Sentencing Commission, out of the belief that the recent amendments “appear[ ] to be designed to make a substantive change.” I find no support for such a suggestion in' the text. Instead, I read the amendments as a simple clarification that a base offense level of 12, not 4, is the appropriate punishment for a violation of section 922(u). As already discussed, Congress, in enacting the statute, made clear that the punishment was to be at least as severe as other section 922 offenses, if not more so. There is nowhere an indication that the more lenient penalty was ever contemplated or intended.
In sum, it is my view that punishing section 922(u) offenses as theft offenses far undervalues the seriousness of the crime, as it was conceived by Congress, and drastically mistakes the congressional purpose in criminalizing the conduct. I would affirm the district court’s sentence, and must therefore respectfidly dissent.