Court Opinion

ID: 9704535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:39:01.276853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.369607
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
The majority correctly quotes from my dissent in Jackson v. State, (1995) Ind.App., 657 N.E.2d 131, with regard to the instruction challenged there. In that opinion I did state that the instruction "clearly joined the 'moral certainty' to the matter of defendant's guilt." Slip op. at 7. However, I erred in that opinion by stating that the instruction tied "moral certainty" to the existence of reasonable doubt.
In actuality, the instructions in Winegeart v. State (1994) Ind.App., 644 N.E.2d 180, Jackson, supra, and here, relate "moral certainty" to the determination of guilt. A meritorious argument could be made, therefore, that the instruction, in fact, places a higher burden of proof upon the State than does a correct reasonable doubt instruction.
Nevertheless, what must be drawn from Cage v. Louisiana (1990) 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339, decided only a few short years before the Victor/Sandoval decision, and from Winegeart, supra, is that any use of the term "moral certainty" in a reasonable doubt instruction is likely to mislead the jury with regard to how they should assess the evidence and determine guilt. Such instructions are, therefore, to be strongly discouraged.