Court Opinion

ID: 9657251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:18:11.357801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:42.471463
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in result in part and dissenting in part).
Although I maintain my belief that SDCL 23A-27-38 is unconstitutional for reasons expressed in Justice Henderson’s dissent in Robinson I, I concur in the result of this part of this case on the basis that Robinson’s current challenge to the constitutionality of SDCL 23A-27-38 is pre*252mature. If Robinson wants and needs “psychiatrically indicated” treatment for his mental illness, and such treatment is denied, he has available remedies. Robinson seeks release, not treatment, and he has not yet established grounds for either.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court’s Instruction # 14 ■ improperly required Robinson to prove his insanity by clear and convincing evidence under SDCL 22-5-10. This is plain error. This statute is unconstitutional and requires reversal as plain error. SDCL 23A-44-15 provides “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of a court.” State v. Breed, 399 N.W.2d 311 (S.D.1987); State v. Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111 (S.D.1981).
The fatal constitutional defect of SDCL 22-5-10 is that it places upon the defendant “the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.” The State cannot constitutionally require a defendant to do more than raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity, i.e., the defendant’s burden of persuasion cannot exceed raising “a reasonable doubt.” It is an unconstitutional invasion of the presumption of innocence to exceed this point. S.D. Const, art. VI, § 2.
The State must prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Most serious crimes contain an element which overlaps sanity. Therefore, if the defendant raises a reasonable doubt as to his sanity, it becomes constitutionally inconsistent and impossible for the State to prove the overlapping element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Therefore, the statute poses a very great danger for jury confusion and for conviction by less than beyond a reasonable doubt and is unconstitutional. S.D. Const, art. VI, § 2.