Court Opinion

ID: 9847321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:45.031497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:07.221405
License: Public Domain

*738ROSE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
Under the plain and unambiguous language of our construction-lien statutes, §§ 29-1-201 through 29-2-109, W.S.1977, Union Manufacturing and Supply Company, Inc. (Union) qualified as a contractor and timely perfected its construction liens within the prescribed 120-day period. In addition, Union acted in accordance with every authority of which I am aware by sending pre-lien notices of its claims only to the property owner actually obligated on the construction contract. Therefore, I would have reversed the summary judgments entered in this case by the district court.
CONTRACTOR OR MATERIALMAN
As discussed in the majority opinion, Union timely filed its lien statements with the county clerk only if it qualified as a contractor, entitled to the extended filing period afforded by § 29-2-106(a).1 Our construction lien statutes precisely define “contractor” and related terms. Section 29-l-201(a), W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided, as used in this title:
“(i) ‘Contractor’ means:
“(A) A person employed by and contracting with an owner to improve an owner’s property * * *
* * * * * *
“(iii) ‘Improve or improvement’ means:
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“(B) Any work performed or material furnished for the permanent change of any real property; * * * ”
To know whether a person is a contractor, it obviously is necessary to consult the statutory definition of “improve,” since that term appears in the definition of “contractor.” I am at a loss to understand how the majority can hold that the statutory definition of “improve or improvement” does not relate to or affect the statutory definition of “contractor.” The meaning of “contractor” depends upon the meaning of “improve.”
According to the plain, unambiguous language of § 29-l-201(a)(i)(A) and (a)(iii)(B), a contractor is one who enters into an agreement with an owner to perform work or furnish material for the permanent change of the owner’s real property. Where the legislature expresses its intent this clearly in the language of the statute, we must give effect to that intent. We collected our holdings with respect to this rule in Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, 1184, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 (1981):
“The primary objective in ascertaining the meaning of a law is legislative intent; and, if such intent is expressed clearly and without ambiguity in the language of the statute, such intent muát be given effect. Intent must be found in the language of the statute itself. Oroz v. Hayes, Wyo.1979, 598 P.2d 432, 434. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory construction; and the court has no right to look for and impose another meaning. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo.1976, 551 P.2d 687, 698. The plain, ordinary and usual meaning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of clear statutory provisions to the contrary. State v. Stern, Wyo.1974, 526 P.2d 344, 346. Courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions. Lo Sasso v. Braun, Wyo. 1963, 386 P.2d 630, 632. Courts will not *739usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said. Barber v. State Highway Commission, 1959, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723.” (Emphasis added.)
Through precisely defined terms, the legislature has indicated its intent to include among contractors those persons who contract with the owner to furnish material for the permanent change of the owner’s real property. The significant feature which distinguishes the contractor from the mate-rialman (who also furnishes materials under contract, § 29-l-201(a)(vi)2) is the fact that the contractor deals directly with the property owner. Section 29-l-201(a)(i)(A).
Ignoring our well-established rules concerning the ascertainment of legislative intent, the majority turn to the judicial definitions of “contractor” and “materialman” developed in American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, Wyo., 585 P.2d 845 (1978). We decided that case, however, under our previous construction-lien statutes, which included no definitions of the terms “contractor,” “subcontractor” or “materialman.” We attempted, therefore, to construe the statutory meaning of those terms according to their usage in the building trade. Since our present lien laws precisely define these crucial terms, we no longer need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Campbell v. Ridenour, supra.
By amending the construction-lien statutes in 1981, the legislature rejected our definitions of “contractor” and “material-man” used in American Buildings Company v. Wheelers Stores, supra, and restored the law of construction liens announced by this court in Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., 52 Wyo. 393, 75 P.2d 378, 113 A.L.R. 1377 (1938). Jordan presented a factual situation remarkably similar to the instant case. There, the lumber company, pursuant to a contract with the property owner’s lessee, had furnished only building materials for the improvement of the property. Receiving no payment, the lumber company filed a claim of lien 114 days after delivering the last materials to the project. The owner argued that the lumber company did not qualify as an original contractor and, therefore, was required to file its lien statement within 90 days under § 66-508, W.R.S.1931,3 the predecessor of § 29-2-106(a), supra n. 1. The court rejected that argument saying:
“It is said that the lumber company must be regarded as included within the words of the quoted statute, ‘and every other person’; that one who supplies only material for a building cannot be regarded as an original contractor * * *. These contentions, also, we are obliged to say are without merit.
“In Ambrose Mfg. Co. v. Gapen, 22 Mo. App. 397, the court said:
“ ‘It is contended by appellants that the term original contractor, as used in the statute, has reference solely to those who may do service, by way of work, labor, or superintendence, upon the building.
“ ‘The point is not well taken. It has been specially ruled by our supreme court, that a material man may be an original contractor, and that he is, in fact, such contractor, if he furnish the material on a contract with the owner. Hearne v. Ry. Co., 53 Mo. 324.’
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“The decision in the Hearne Case was rendered in 1873 and some time before our mechanics’ lien law was adopted by the territorial Legislature. The principle *740would seem applicable that a statute borrowed from the legislation of another state will be presumed to have been adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state. [Citations.]” (Emphasis added.) 75 P.2d at 384-385.
The definitions section of our current construction-lien law reflects the legislature’s approval of the result in Jordan.
I would have held that one who furnishes materials for the permanent change of real property, under a contract with the owner of such property, is a contractor entitled to 120 days within which to perfect his lien under §§ 29-l-201(a) and 29-2-106(a). Accordingly, Union qualified as a contractor in furnishing construction materials under its agreement with the owner and timely filed its lien statements with the county clerk.
NOTICE OP INTENT TO FILE A LIEN
The majority deny appellant the right to enforce its construction liens on the additional ground that the notices of intent to file such liens were sent to the contracting property owner and not to the persons who owned the property at the time of notification. This holding places Wyoming squarely in opposition to every ease on point of which I am aware. Furthermore, Davis v. Big Horn Lumber Co., 14 Wyo. 517, 85 P. 980 (1906), the case cited by the majority as controlling, deals with recorded lien statements and has absolutely nothing to do with the notice of intent to file a lien at issue in the instant case.
Section 29-2-107, W.S.1977, requires a lien claimant to notify the property owner of a claim prior to the actual filing of a lien statement:

“Notice of intention to file lien.

“Before filing a lien pursuant to this chapter every person shall give ten (10) days notice to the owner or his agent in writing of any claim against a building or an improvement or for materials furnished stating the amount of any claim and from whom it is due.”
This pre-lien notice serves to warn the owner obligated on the construction contract against paying the original contractor while outstanding claims exist in favor of laborers and materialmen, Kirby Building Systems, Inc. v. Independence Partnership No. One, Wyo., 634 P.2d 342, 346 (1981); Jordan v. Natrona Lumber Co., supra, 75 P.2d at 386. In addition, the ten-day notice affords the owner an opportunity to discharge the debt and prevent the perfection of a lien against the property, R.L. Sweet Lumber Company v. E.L. Lane, Inc., Mo., 513 S.W.2d 365, 76 A.L.R.3d 596, 603 (1974).
To accomplish these purposes, the notice of intent to file a lien must inform the owner of the property who entered into the construction contract, since only such owner has a contractual obligation to pay the claimant. Courts uniformly have held to this effect, as the A.L.R. Annotation, “Who is the ‘owner’ within mechanic’s lien statute requiring notice of claim,” 76 A.L.R.3d 605, 622-623, observes:
“Thus, in regard to a prelien notice, such as* "a notice of intention to claim a lien, it is held that notice is properly given and is required to be given to the owner at the time the contract was made, or the work commenced or the materials furnished; and notice to a subsequent owner particularly one who becomes such after the completion of the work or the furnishing of the materials for which the lien is claimed, is not required *
The annotation cites no cases which hold for the contrary position adopted by the majority.
The “general rule” has been distilled by Missouri appellate courts interpreting a pre-lien notice statute identical to ours in all aspects pertinent here:
“ * * * The general rule is that the notice must be given to the one who owned the property at the time the contract for the improvement was made. [Citations.] And it has been held that, if the property is conveyed while the improvement is in progress, a notice to the grantee is not necessary. [Citations.]” P.M. Bruner Granitoid Co. v. Klein, 100 Mo.App. 289, 73 S.W. 313 (1903).
*741The court in Edward McLundie & Co. v. Mount, 145 Mo.App. 660, 123 S.W. 966, 967 (1909), approved this rule even though the contracting owner no longer had an interest in the property which would require his joinder in the subsequent foreclosure action.
This general rule comports with the definition of “owner” set out in our construction-lien statutes. Section 29-1-201(a)(v)(A) provides:
“(v) ‘Owner’ as used in this act means: “(A) With respect to construction liens: any person with a legal or equitable interest in the property to be changed, altered or improved, for whose use or benefit any improvement shall be made or any materials furnished; * * *” (Emphasis added.)
This statute contemplates that the owner is one who holds an interest in the property at the time that action is taken to improve the property.
The majority ask,
“ * * * [W]hy should Baird [the contracting property owner] care if a lien is placed on the property of appellees Walters or Valaseks?”
Baird should care, obviously, because the perfection of the construction liens will place Baird in breach of the statutory covenants in its warranty deeds.4 See Bakken v. Price, Wyo., 613 P.2d 1222, 1229-1230 (1980). The pre-lien notices gave Baird a final opportunity to pay the contractor and avoid the filing of the liens.
It is true that the perfection and enforcement of the liens affect the interests of the current property owners. However, their dilemma would not have been eased by the receipt of pre-lien notices. They had closed their transactions with Baird two full months before the pre-lien notices were sent. It is doubtful that they were in a position at that time to withhold payments to Baird, as the majority suggest. The current owners’ remedies lie against Baird, as grantor by warranty deeds, after the lien statements have been recorded. While pre-lien notice to the current, as well as the contracting, owner would be courteous and desirable, a claimant should not be denied enforcement of his lien when, in compliance with universal authority, he has notified the entity against whom the claim for nonpayment is made.
I would have reversed the summary judgments entered by the district court and remanded this case for trial.

. Section 29-2-106(a), W.S.1977, provides:
"(a) Every contractor shall file his lien statement within one hundred twenty (120) days and every other person shall file within ninety (90) days:
"(i) After the last day when work was performed or materials furnished under contract; or
"(ii) From the date the work was substantially completed or substantial completion of the contract to furnish materials, whichever is earlier; or
"(iii) With respect to an employee or subcontractor, after the last day he performed work at the direction of his employer or contractor.”

. Section 29-1-20l(a)(vi) provides:
"(vi) ‘Subcontractor’ or ‘materialman’ means a person other than a contractor performing work or furnishing materials to an owner or a contractor under contract * *

. Section 66-508, W.R.S.1931, provided in part: “It shall be the duty of every original contractor, within four months, and every subcontractor, and every journeyman and day laborer and every other person seeking to obtain the benefits of the provisions of this article, within ninety days after the indebtedness shall have accrued, to file in the office of the register of deeds of the proper county, a just and true account of the demand due him, her, or them, after all just credits shall have been given, which is to be a lien upon such building or improvements * *

. By virtue of its warranty deeds, Baird covenanted that the conveyed properties were free from encumbrances and that the grantees would enjoy quiet and peaceful possession of the premises. Section 34-2-103, W.S.1977, provides:
"Every deed in substance in the [standard warranty deed] form [§ 34-2-102], when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, with covenants on the part of the grantor, (a) that at the time of the making and delivery of such deed he was lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises therein described, and had good right and power to convey the same; (b) that the same were then free from all incumbrances; and (c) that he warrants to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, the quiet and peaceful possession of such premises, and will defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same. And such covenants shall be obligatory upon the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, as fully, and with like effect as if written at length in such deed.”