Court Opinion

ID: 9661511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:35.911249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.093965
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice NOBLE.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The parties to this writ petition and the majority of this Court have confused a statutory element of proof as a requirement for standing. In the paternity chapter, standing must be determined pursuant to KRS 406.021. If a party has standing, then and only then, does the presumption statute, KRS 406.011, have relevance as setting forth certain elements of proof that must be established to rebut the presumption that a child born during a marriage is the child of the husband. Specifically, the one making the claim of paternity who is not a husband must establish that the child is born out of wedlock. One does not have to prove an element in order to have the right to plead it. The right to make a claim is a great deal broader than what one must prove to establish that claim.
Standing requires a personal interest, often referred to as a “substantial” interest in the subject matter of the suit, not a “mere expectancy.” For this reason, sub-stantiality of an interest must be determined by its direct relationship to the *607claimant. Ashland v. Ashland F.O.P. #3, 888 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Ky.1994). “Standing to sue” means that a party has “a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy....” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). “Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court; it is the right to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication by judge or jury.” Blank’s Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed.1990). Further, standing must be viewed as the power to hear and decide cases, and “does not concern the ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the action.” Weiner v. Bank of King of Prussia, 358 F.Supp. 684 (E.D.Pa.1973); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a ... court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.... In other words, when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.). A plaintiff must have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome to ensure concrete adverseness.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1405 (6th ed.1990).
In Kraus v. Kentucky State Senate, 872 S.W.2d 433, 439 (Ky.1993), this Court opined, “We believe that standing to sue means that a party has a sufficient legal interest in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain some judicial decision in the controversy. As noted by the Court of Appeals, it is the right to take the initial step that frames legal issues for ultimate adjudication.” Likewise, in Stevens v. Stevens, 798 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Ky.1990), we stated, “The requirement of standing is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a real and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation.”
Beyond doubt, JGR has shown that in the Family Court case. He alleged that he was the father of the child and claimed that a genetic test proved this. This is a personal claim about his fatherhood showing a substantial interest in the controversy. He also cited KRS 406.051 as conferring jurisdiction, which specifically references children “born out of wedlock.” “It is axiomatic that in such circumstances, every well-pleaded allegation of the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made.” Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.App.1987). As Chief Justice Lambert wrote previously in City of Louisville v. Stock Yards Bank & Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327 (Ky.1992),
[I]t is neither the province of the trial court nor of this Court to consider whether Appellant may be able to prove its allegations or ultimately prevail. On review, this Court will confine itself to a determination of whether the matters alleged in the complaint establish appellant’s standing to bring the action or whether it is without a “substantial interest” in the subject matter of the controversy.
Id. at 328 (citations omitted).
Because feelings about the issue of paternity and marriage run strong among the members of the Court, we have jumped over the hurdle of proper pleading and procedure to the evidentiary merits of this case when we have no business doing so. We, as an appellate court, even on writ procedures appealed from the Court of Appeals, are not finders of fact.
JGR filed the petition in this case under various statutory provisions, including KRS 403.150, the divorce statute, and the *608child custody statutes he references, KRS 403.400 and KRS 403.620 (the UCCJA), which have been repealed and replaced by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). However, he also alleged paternity court jurisdiction over this case by citing KRS 406.051, which specifically refers to “children born out of wedlock” and which incorporates the entire paternity chapter. He further specifically alleged, “Paternity has not yet been established, however, DNA test results confirm the paternity of the Petitioner.”
The Motion to Dismiss which is the basis for this writ petition is framed around the issue of whether JGR has standing to bring this action. The Memorandum in Support states two standing issues: that JGR has no standing to seek custody and support; and that he has no standing to seek a determination of paternity. It should be noted, however, that this petition was filed in a Family Court jurisdiction. The guiding concept of Family Court is “One judge, one family.” Both custody and paternity are included in Family Court subject matter jurisdiction. Consequently, all issues to be heard may be filed in one petition, as JGR did here.
As to JGR’s custody and support claims, they clearly are premature. At the point of pleading, there was no legal determination that he is the father of the child, which is required as he was not married to the mother when the child was born. On the other hand, his right to proceed under the paternity statutes is ripe. If JGR were found to be the father under the paternity statutes, the Family Court could address the custody and support claims seriatum. In the Family Court jurisdictions, there is nothing inappropriate about pleading all possible claims in one petition. Indeed, it may be necessary to avoid res judicata.
This is but one example of evolving legal questions that arise when a new type of court is instituted. At present in Kentucky, Circuit Courts hear custody and support actions, District Courts hear paternity and dependency/neglect actions, and Family Courts hear all these areas. The paternity statutes allow District Courts to determine custody and support in a paternity case. Of necessity, a petition in Family Court must cover all possible claims, though the various claims may be decided in the order required by law, which would clearly help avoid piecemeal litigation in Family Court jurisdictions. JGR’s petition may be understood more clearly in this light.
Since standing is determined solely from the allegations of the petition, with all factual assertions taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the party against whom a motion to dismiss is made, the only relevant question is whether JGR has alleged matters in the complaint sufficient to establish his standing in paternity, since his standing as to custody and support cannot ripen unless he is the legal father of the child. Whether he could prevail is not the question before us, and would indeed be impermissible fact-finding.
“In regard to pleadings, Kentucky has always followed the notice pleading theory which only requires a short and plain statement of claim demonstrating that relief is warranted and necessary.” Equitania Ins. Co. v. Slone & Garrett, P.S.C., 191 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Ky.2006). In scrutinizing whether a pleading yields standing, “We no longer approach pleadings searching for a flaw, a technicality upon which to strike down a claim or defense, as was formerly the case at common law. Whereas the old common law demur searched the pleadings for a reason to dismiss, now a Motion to Dismiss is directed at the substance of the *609pleading.” Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky.1989) (citations omitted). In McCollum v. Garrett, 880 S.W.2d 530 (Ky.1994), this Court affirmed that the sufficiency of the pleadings should be resolved by a commonsense reading so as to do substantial justice. To that end, all that is necessary is that a pleading sufficiently identify the basis of the claim. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Williams, 768 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Ky.1989).
Without addressing the fact that the pleadings alone must be considered to determine standing, JNR jumps straight to the evidentiary merits of the claim, as has the majority. In the paternity chapter, standing must be determined pursuant to KRS 406.021, which defines who may bring a paternity action and lists a “putative father.” Cf. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 355-56 (Ky.2003) (determining standing by reference to the statute announcing who may bring a custody action). “Putative father” is not defined in the statutes, but is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 1237 (6th ed.1990) as “[t]he alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock.” JGR has alleged that he is the father of a child born out of wedlock in his jurisdictional claim, and specifically asserts his personal, substantial interest in the case. He thus has standing.
If a party has standing, then and only then, does KRS 406.011 require certain elements of proof that must be established to rebut the presumption that a child born during the marriage is the child of the husband. Obviously, the right to make a claim is a great deal broader than what one must prove to establish the claim. One does not have to prove an element of a claim to have the right to plead it. Discovery and subsequent motions can address the evidentiary sufficiency of the claim. Doing anything else is to “use standing to slam the courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the merits.” Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970) (Brennan, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In saying that JGR must specifically plead that the child in question is a child “born out of wedlock,” the majority is mistaken, because he clearly gave adequate notice of such by citing KRS 406.051. In saying that he lacks standing because he did not specifically plead that the marital relationship between the wife and husband ceased ten months before the child’s birth, the majority is requiring him to meet a standard of proof before he will be allowed to proceed. In saying that there is no evidence that the marital relationship ended ten months before the child’s birth, this Court goes too far into the realm of advisory opinions. The stance of this case at the time the writ petition was filed is that no evidence of any kind had been admitted. The attachments to the writ pleadings and other supplements all go to evi-dentiary matters that are the province of the trial court, not an appellate court. Obviously, even if this Court takes the view that the pleadings are inadequate to establish standing, there is no evidence to consider and we should not be giving advisory opinions as to whether JGR could rebut the presumption.
I do not subscribe to the majority view that JGR’s pleading is so inadequate that it fails to identify the basis of his claim, and would find that he has standing to bring his paternity claim. Clearly, JNR understood that JGR was seeking a paternity determination as the court motions and this writ proceeding demonstrate. While it may be true that in order to be adjudicated the father of the child, he must prove either that marital relations between *610the wife and husband ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child or provide other sufficient proof as was allowed in Montgomery v. McCracken, 802 S.W.2d 943 (Ky.App.1990), where a putative father was nonetheless declared the father of a child even though the mother married another man seven months before the child’s birth; and in Bartlett v. Com. ex rel. Calloway, 705 S.W.2d 470 (Ky.1986), where the child was born during the marriage, but evidence of HLA testing, a similar genetic characteristic, providing support and other testimony was found sufficient to say that the putative father was the father, that is not relevant at this point in the proceedings. We do not know what that proof would be. These cases state the status of the law as to access as it has been in Kentucky for over twenty years, and reflect as Justice Leibson wrote,
Truth and justice are irrevocably bound. They are Siamese twins sharing a single heartbeat. Neither can survive very long without the other. When the advances of science serve to assist in the discovery of the truth, the law must accommodate them. The law can not pick and choose when truth will prevail.
Id. at 473. There is no need to reverse these common sense cases. Doing so is an affront to stare decisis, and is being done because the majority is addressing the propriety of proof rather than whether JGR has the right to offer it.
Certainly, we do not know what JGR might be able to produce as evidence. It is conceivable that the mother might confirm that marital relations had in fact ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child when called to the stand, despite what may have been said earlier or what is being said now. Other proof is apparently available, specifically DNA testing. JGR clearly has a due process right to at least be heard, because he has standing. We must not advise as to whether he could succeed.
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to allow JGR to proceed with the paternity action so that it may determine the sufficiency of his proof.