Court Opinion

ID: 9628137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:09:04.340634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:58.325681
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons expressed by Justice Dimond in his concurring opinion I agree that the penalties to be exacted under AS 45.50.-551(b) may be regarded as civil rather than criminal. However, I believe that O’Neill has the right to a civil jury trial because of the claim for monetary penalties.
The question whether there is a right to a civil trial by jury in this case is raised, but not briefed very well, in O’Neill’s opening brief. The state’s brief on this point is adequate, however, and O’Neill’s reply brief addresses it with reference to some authorities. On balance I believe that the briefing *539is sufficient so that the point should not be considered waived.
Article I, section 16 of the constitution of Alaska provides, in part:
In civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law.
In Loomis Electronic Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1976), we interpreted this provision as affording a right to trial by civil jury to one accused of a discriminatory hiring practice. The statute involved in Loomis required the court to enjoin any illegal discriminatory act and allowed such “other relief, including the payment of money, that is appropriate.” AS 22.10.020(c). The court in Loomis construed the statutory language to encompass both compensatory and punitive damages and noted that these remedies were of the sort traditionally tried before a jury at common law. The court stated:
[Wjhere part of the relief sought is compensatory and punitive damages, we believe that Art. I, Sec. 16, of the Constitution of Alaska guarantees the parties the right to a jury trial. [Footnote omitted].
Id. at 1344. The court also noted with approval the observation “that the right to a jury trial ‘cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as “incidental” to the equitable relief sought.’ ” Id. at 1344 n. 15 quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 at 196, n. 11, 94 S.Ct. 1005 at 1009 n. 11, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 at 267 n. 11 (1974).
I do not think that the result in Loomis would have been any different if only punitive damages had been sought. Likewise, I can see no meaningful distinction between punitive damages and a civil penalty. Therefore I think Loomis controls, and O’Neill is entitled to a civil jury trial.
In reaching this conclusion I do not challenge the majority’s statement that the Alaska Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act “stands as a sentinel against unethical and unscrupulous conduct,” (opinion p. 523) or the salutary purposes of the Act. However, any statute is capable of being abused, especially where its language is broad and the plaintiff has the resources of the government. The right to a trial by a jury is a safeguard against the possibility of abuse. I do not think it should be abandoned here.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand and put the state to an election. If the state persists in its request for monetary relief, a new trial before a civil jury is necessary; if it chooses to pursue only in-junctive relief, the trial which was terminated at the close of the state’s case may be continued before a judge sitting without a jury, unless the judge decides to order a new trial under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 63(c).