Court Opinion

ID: 9521906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:14:50.726645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:25.065619
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion, since the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Noel an excessive attorney fee. The trial court abused its discretion by treating the dissolution as a contested matter and by relying solely on the Hammond Bar Association Fee Schedule to arrive at Noel’s attorney fee as a reasonable attorney fee.
*1061The record clearly shows that the property settlement agreement was agreed upon between the parties. The dissolution of the marriage was not contested by either the husband or the wife. Therefore, there is no justification for the trial court to conclude: “Now there’s no question that this matter cannot be approached as a simple non-contested divorce; ” The contested position taken by the trial court to determine a reasonable attorney fee is based solely on pre-trial discovery procedures and the fact that a third attorney who is not of record prepared the agreed property settlement. A dispute created by the wife’s attorney over the amount of attorney fees due her can not under any circumstances constitute a contested dissolution. If this were true, the attorneys and not the parties to the dissolution would decide whether a dissolution was contested or uncontested. The attorneys would be able to increase the amount of their fee by merely creating a dispute on the amount of their fee which was never intended by any bar fee schedule or any code of professional responsibility. When the trial court was determining the issue of attorney fees to be awarded Noel, it abused its discretion by treating the Greiner dissolution as a contested matter.
In its reliance upon the Hammond Bar Association Fee Schedule and in making the award of attorney fees, the trial court stated:
“There’s also evidence to show that the approximate value of the property settlement agreement of the wife is $135,-000.00 . . . . [Cjertainly the issue of attorneys fees is strongly contested by both parties. However, the primary reason we have the situation is that a third attorney not retained, or not of record in this case, prepared a property settlement agreement. And while the fact is to be commended that these parties were able to reach an agreement as to a division of property, the fact is that the agreement did not provide or make any reference, and of course could not make any reference, to the amount of attorneys fees to be paid. . . . [I]f the parties were dissatisfied with counsel it appears to the Court that the best course would have been to discharge the counsel of record then no issue of anything beyond hourly rate could have been considered in granting reasonable compensation for any services already performed. Some federal decisions notwithstanding bar schedules are of particular assistance to the Court in those matters where the Court must set a fee, and of course this is not only in domestic relations matters but in estates and even in pauper counsel fees. As Mr. Enslen has stated these schedules are not absolute, but on the whole they represent a reasonable, what a reasonable fee may be. However, they should be viewed in light of each particular case and the Court has done so in this case. And on the basis of the facts as the Court finds them to be and as presented in evidence, the Court finds a reasonable attorney fee to be Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Dollars which is hereby assessed against the defendant to be reduced by the sum of Four Hundred Dollars previously paid . . . .”
These remarks by the trial court clearly indicate that: (1) the trial court considered the amount of the property settlement; (2) the trial court was disturbed that a third attorney not of record had drawn up the property settlement agreement for the parties; (3) the trial court felt that had Noel been discharged prior to trial only hours and hourly rates would have been pertinent to an assessment of reasonable attorney fees; and (4) the trial court believed that bar schedules, “notwithstanding” federal decisions, “represent . . . what a reasonable fee may be . .”
The trial court did rely solely on the Hammond Bar Fee Schedule to determine what would be a reasonable attorney fee for Noel since: (1) except with reference to the fee schedule, the amount of the property settlement is irrelevant; (2) the $400.00 odd figure is directly reflected in the flat divorce fee in the fee schedule; and (3) only with reference to a percentage basis could a $12,400.00 attorney fee be justified under *1062the evidence in the record.1 Even though the $12,400.00 attorney fee awarded to Noel was considerably less than the $25,000.00 that she requested, it greatly exceeds the $4,000.00 or $5,000.00 attorney fee which was supported by the evidence. The trial judge may have “compromised” somewhat from the Hammond Bar Fee Schedule, but it is clear that he solely relied on the schedule for the concept of reasonableness. This was reversible error.
“Even assuming the schedules are not illegal per se, there still remains substantial dissent among members of the bar as to the question of reasonableness. Opponents of fee schedules argue that they are most often used when there is no reasonable justification for a large fee. . [TJhey are not based on time as they purport to be.” (Emphasis added.) The Antitrust Division v. The Professionals — “No Bidding” Clauses and Fee Schedules, 48 Notre Dame Law. 966, 972 (1973).
There was no reasonable justification for such an excessive attorney fee in this uncontested dissolution. The reliance by the trial court upon the Hammond Bar Association Fee Schedule was an abuse of discretion and resulted in an excessive attorney fee.2
The evidence in the record clearly shows that Noel did not prepare a property settlement for consideration of the wife, her client; furthermore, Noel advised the wife not to agree to accept the property settlement that she and her husband had worked out together. Thus, Noel refused to accept any professional responsibility for the agreed property settlement of $135,000.00 to the wife. The dissolution of the marriage was not contested by either the husband or the wife.
The only evidence which would tend to justify Noel’s demand for a $25,000.00 attorney fee is the Hammond Bar Association Fee Schedule. Paul Huebner testified that most attorneys followed the recommended bar schedules. Fifteen percent of the property settlement for and on behalf of the wife would be recommended in this case. Fifteen percent of $135,000.00 would equal $20,000.00. He further testified that the attorney fee could be lower or higher when tested by steps of resistance; the attorney’s role in representing the woman is higher in degree of skill and care than for an attorney representing the husband. He stated that the fee should be $25,000.00 based on the substantial properties involved and the difficulty in representing the wife.
Noel testified that she had worked 91 hours from the beginning to the end of the uncontested dissolution. This 91 hours did not include time spent in court and depositions. In addition, to the 91 hours, she claimed one and one-half days of depositions and hearing, two days in court, and “then last Friday and today . . . [It] does not represent time after last Friday." She further asserted that there would be additional “worry time,” but she did not know how much — it would certainly not be another 91 hours. This testimony was her justification for petitioning for an attorney fee of $25,000.00.
*1063Thomas Dumas, a Lake County attorney, testified that by taking 100 hours plus six and one-half days of court time (21 hours) times $40.00 an hour equals $4,840.00. He further testified that the fee should be $5,000.00 and commented that this was not “a bad fee” for a wife’s attorney “in a divorce of this size.”
Lowell Enslen, an expert witness from the Hammond Bar, testified that a “(lawyer’s fees . . . are based upon many criterions, .' . . novelty or uniqueness, . results, . . . ability of lawyer, . . . ” and loss of other employment. This being an uncontested case, except for litigation of attorney fee, the fee chargeable to the husband should be $4,000.00 to $5,000.00, closer to $5,000.00. He further testified that results are important. In this regard, he stated that where the husband and wife have gone to a third attorney without knowledge of either counsel, the number of hours spent by the attorneys for the husband and wife would be diminished.
The Hammond Bar Association Schedule of Minimum- Fees was admitted into evidence over the husband’s objection. It showed that $35.00 per hour was recommended as a minimum hourly fee in 1971. .It further showed that a divorce should be charged at $400.00 plus a per diem' after one-half day in court and that fifteen percent of the net value of the property settlement could be added to the $400.00 to constitute a reasonable attorney fee.
The evidence only supports a fee of between $4,000.00 and $5,000.00 which is based upon Noel’s hours. This does not mean that an hourly fee arrangement is the only acceptable method of determining a reasonable attorney fee. What it does mean is that absent a clear understanding, any amount beyond such concrete indices as hours must be substantiated by clear evidence of the uniqueness, results, difficulty, and special responsibility required to handle the legal problems involved. There is a void of such evidence in the record before this Court. Therefore, the award to Noel of a $12,400.00 attorney fee was excessive and an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. Kindel, Admr. v. French (1921), 190 Ind. 595, 131 N.E. 227. The $12,400.00 attorney fee cannot be rationalized on the premise of judicial notice of reasonableness because the attorney fee is unreasonable according to the evidence in the record. In Re Lockyear (1974), 261 Ind. 448, 305 N.E.2d 440.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the award of attorney fee to Noel with instructions to re-determine, consistent with this opinion, the award of attorney fee to Noel.

. Greiners cite us to Barelli v. Levin (1969), 144 Ind.App. 576, 247 N.E.2d 847, in which contingent fees in divorce cases are denounced as against public policy. I would agree with Noel that the fee award was not based upon a contingent fee agreement between she and Thelma Greiner. But, I do note that the size of the fee requested by Noel was directly related to the size of the marital estate. The trial court’s award related to the size of the property settlement. Considering assets, without an accompanying showing of legal services provided, is also against public policy because the attorney fee should not be contingent upon the amount of the property settlement. Barelli v. Levin, supra.

. Goldfarb does not imply that the legal profession may not regulate its own internal affairs. But, implicit within the Goldfarb holding is the proposition that attorneys have special obligations to the public which go beyond what may be the standard of conduct of ordinary businessmen. See 25 Drake L.Rev. at 772 (1976). The Goldfarb decision was based on the Sherman Act. Indiana has enacted a parallel statute which would govern intrastate commerce. Thus, I believe that the Goldfarb holding would apply to this case. See IC 1971, 24-1-2-1, § 23-116 (Bums Code Ed.).