Court Opinion

ID: 9909225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 19:01:13.54099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:19.826511
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 12 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PASCUAL SUY SUY,                               No. 21-1224
                                               Agency No.
              Petitioner,
                                               A206-407-730
  v.
                                               MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted December 6, 2023 **
                                Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

       Petitioner Pascual Suy Suy, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal

from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum,

       *    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **   The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

      Suy Suy claimed that he faced economic persecution in Guatemala because

he is an indigenous Mayan, and that he feared returning to Guatemala because of

poverty and gang violence. The IJ found Suy Suy statutorily ineligible for asylum

because he submitted his application outside the one-year deadline. See 8 U.S.C. §

1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2).1 The IJ also found that Suy Suy did not carry

his burden of proving membership in the proposed particular social group

“Guatemalan indigenous persons” because he “provided no identity documents”

confirming that he is either a citizen of Guatemala or Mayan. Notwithstanding this

finding, the IJ concluded that the harm Suy Suy suffered constituted “discrimination,

but not persecution,” so denied Suy Suy’s request for withholding of removal. The

BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]” the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal, and

“affirm[ed]” the denial of CAT protection.

      “We review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it expressly

adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243

(9th Cir. 2019). “We review the agency’s factual findings under the extremely

deferential substantial-evidence standard, under which we treat such findings as

1      Suy Suy does not appeal the agency’s determination that he is statutorily
ineligible for asylum. The issue is therefore waived. See Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder,
594 F.3d 701, 703 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010).

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conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal

quotations omitted).

      “Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence

that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided

unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the

evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Here, the IJ found Suy Suy’s credible

testimony insufficient to prove his membership in the “Guatemalan indigenous

persons” particular social group and noted the lack of corroborating identification

documents. The IJ erred by failing to allow Suy Suy “an opportunity to either

provide that corroboration or explain why he [could not] do so.” Ren v. Holder, 648

F.3d 1079, 1090–92 (9th Cir. 2011). This error is harmless, however, because the

agency ultimately determined that, even if Suy Suy established membership in his

proposed social group, he still failed to show a nexus between his fear of persecution

and his membership in that group. Cf. Bhattarai v. Lynch 835 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th

Cir. 2016).

      Moreover, substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Suy

Suy failed to demonstrate a “clear probability” of future persecution.2 See Aden v.

2      There is an intra-circuit split concerning the standard of review applicable to
the agency’s determination that a “particular set of facts does or does not rise to the
level of persecution.” See Fon v. Garland, 34 F.4th 810, 816 (9th Cir. 2022) (Graber,

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Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2021). We have emphasized that

persecution “is an extreme concept that means something considerably more than

discrimination or harassment,” Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.

2021), and have cabined relief on the basis of economic deprivation to these

“extreme” circumstances. See, e.g., Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th

Cir. 2004) (finding persecution where the government individually targeted,

harassed, and attacked petitioner making it “virtually impossible for [petitioner] to

earn a living”). While “substantial economic deprivation that constitutes a threat to

life or freedom can constitute persecution,” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182,

1186 (9th Cir. 2006), Suy Suy’s concerns about finding work and his fear of living

in poverty do not “rise to the level of persecution.” See Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364

F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004). Suy Suy testified that he worked in the fields for

three months of the year and found other work during the remaining months, which

supports the determination that the harm he fears is “not the type of economic

deprivation that rises to the level of persecution.” See Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d

J., concurring); id. at 820 (Collins, J., concurring); compare Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986
F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2021) (de novo) with Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990
F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021) (substantial evidence). We need not resolve this
issue, however, because no matter the standard of review, Suy Suy has not
established a clear probability of future persecution.

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1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003); He v. Holder, 749 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding

no persecution where applicant “was able to continue working”).3

      Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because

Suy Suy failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. Suy Suy

presented Country Conditions reports to support his argument that the Guatemalan

government cannot control violence and acquiesces in the persecution of its citizens.

But “[g]eneralized evidence of violence and crime is insufficient to establish a

likelihood of torture.” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023). Suy Suy

provided no “particularized and non-speculative risk of torture.” Id. The Country

Conditions reports were “insufficient to show that individually” Suy Suy would

more likely than not be tortured if removed to Guatemala. See Dawson v. Garland,

998 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2021).

             PETITION DENIED.

3    This is not to say a finding of persecution requires “an absolute inability to
support oneself or one’s family.” Gormley, 364 F.3d at 1178.

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