Court Opinion

ID: 9556996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 13:03:59.615389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:51.127011
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                  Decided: August 21, 2023

                   S23A0559. HENDERSON v. THE STATE.
                     S23A0720. MASON v. THE STATE.

       PINSON, Justice.

       After a joint trial, Demetre Mason and Frankland Henderson

were convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with

the shooting deaths of Sonia Williams and Shaniqua Camacho. 1

       1 The shootings occurred in the early morning hours of May 19, 2014. On

August 26, 2014, a DeKalb County grand jury returned an indictment against
Mason, Henderson, and five co-defendants: Michael Jenkins, Malcolm Brown,
Jaimee Harrell, Katrina Shardow, and Traon Turk. Mason and Henderson
were each charged with malice murder of Williams (Count 1), felony murder of
Williams predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault of
Williams (Count 3), malice murder of Camacho (Count 5), felony murder of
Camacho predicated on aggravated assault (Count 6), aggravated assault of
Camacho (Count 7), armed robbery (Count 17), hijacking (Count 19), and vio-
lations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (“Gang Act”) and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act predicated on those
charges (Counts 4, 8, 18, 20, and 21). The trial court ordered that Mason, Hen-
derson, and Jenkins be tried separately on Counts 1-8 (the malice murder, fel-
ony murder, aggravated assault, and Gang Act charges), and severed the re-
maining counts and defendants. The remaining counts against Mason and
Henderson were later nolle prossed.
      The case proceeded to a jury trial from April 16 to 26, 2018. Mason and
      On appeal, Mason contends that the evidence was not suffi-

cient to support his convictions for malice murder, and that the trial

court should have held a hearing to determine whether evidence

that, a month before the murders, Mason stole a handgun that was

used in the shootings was admissible under Rule 403. But the evi-

dence was sufficient as a matter of due process to sustain his convic-

tions, and the trial court properly applied Rule 403 to the evidence

that he stole the handgun. So we affirm Mason’s convictions and

Henderson were convicted on all counts. Jenkins was convicted of the aggra-
vated assault and Gang Act charges, but the jury deadlocked on the malice
murder and felony murder charges. His case is not part of this appeal.
       On June 14, 2018, Mason and Henderson were each sentenced to life in
prison without parole for each of the two malice murder counts, to be served
concurrently, and 15 years in prison for each of the two Gang Act counts, to be
served consecutively, for a total sentence of life plus 30 years. The remaining
counts merged for sentencing or were vacated by operation of law.
       Mason timely moved for a new trial through new counsel on July 5, 2018,
and amended that motion on September 12, 2022. After a hearing, the trial
court denied the motion on December 2, 2022. Mason filed a timely notice of
appeal on December 19, 2022.
       Henderson filed a premature motion for new trial on May 29, 2018, be-
fore the trial court issued the final sentencing order. That motion ripened upon
entry of the final disposition on June 14, 2018. See Southall v. State, 300 Ga.
462, 464-468 (1) (796 SE2d 261) (2017). Henderson later amended the motion,
through new counsel, on September 13, 2022. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion on December 2, 2022. Henderson filed a timely notice of ap-
peal on December 22, 2022. Henderson’s case and Mason’s case were both dock-
eted to the April 2023 term of this Court and submitted for decisions on the
briefs. The cases have been consolidated for appeal.
                                       2
sentence.

        In a separate appeal, Henderson raises six claims. He contends

that the admission at trial of Mason’s out-of-court statement to po-

lice violated Henderson’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of

the Sixth Amendment; the trial court should have given an instruc-

tion limiting how the jury could consider Mason’s out-of-court state-

ment; the testimony of one witness for the prosecution, who he

claimed was an accomplice, was insufficiently corroborated; the trial

court should have excluded as hearsay testimony about statements

from an associate of Henderson and Mason, because there was in-

sufficient evidence to show that the statements were made in fur-

therance of a conspiracy so as to fall within a hearsay exception; the

trial court abused its discretion in denying Henderson’s motion to

sever his case; and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

photos of Henderson making gang signs without proper authentica-

tion.

        Each of Henderson’s claims fails. Admitting Mason’s out-of-

                                   3
court statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause under Bru-

ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (88 SCt 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968),

because it did not, standing alone, directly implicate Henderson. See

Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 110-111 (2) (b) (856 SE2d 302) (2021). It

was not plain error to fail to give a limiting instruction about Ma-

son’s out-of-court statement, because the absence of the instruction

is unlikely to have affected the outcome of the trial. No corroboration

was needed for the testimony of the witness Henderson claims was

an accomplice, because there was ample evidence from which the

jury could find that she was not an accomplice. The out-of-court

statements of Henderson’s associate were properly admitted under

the hearsay exception for statements in furtherance of a conspiracy

because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Henderson and

his associate conspired to commit the murders and to participate in

a criminal street gang. The trial court was not required to sever Hen-

derson’s trial, because there was little possibility of confusing evi-

dence or law, there were no antagonistic defenses, and the evidence

                                  4
admitted at the joint trial that might not have been admitted if Hen-

derson was tried alone was not prejudicial enough to show a denial

of due process. And, finally, the photos of Henderson making gang

signs were not admitted in error because they were authenticated

by a police investigator who was familiar with them.

     1. Recounted in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the ev-

idence at trial showed the following.

     (a) In May 2014, Mason and Henderson were living on Maypop

Lane in DeKalb County with Michael Jenkins, Jaimee Harrell,

Katrina Shardow, Malcolm Brown, Frederick Rosenau, and Brandi

Singleton. All except Singleton were members of the Nine Trey

Gangsters, a subset of the Bloods gang. Singleton was not a gang

member, but she was familiar with the gang and was in a sexual

relationship with Brown. The highest ranking gang member in the

house was Rosenau, followed by Brown, followed by Harwell. Below

Harwell were Mason, Henderson, and Jenkins, who were all of the

same rank.

                                  5
     On the night of May 18 to 19, 2014, Mason brought his girl-

friend, Williams, and Williams’s friend, Camacho, to the house. Wil-

liams had been there once before, and she and Brown did not get

along. On this occasion, Mason, Williams, Camacho, Singleton,

Rosenau, and Brown all went to an upstairs bedroom. Brown asked

Mason why he kept bringing Williams over, since Williams had “too

much mouth.” Brown began pulling at Williams’s clothing, hair, and

body. Williams objected and told Brown that he was “acting like a

b***h.” Brown replied, “Oh, I’m acting like a b***h.” Brown then left

the room and went downstairs. Mason tried to leave with Williams

at that point, but Rosenau told him they “[weren’t] going to leave

like that.”

     Downstairs, Brown told Harwell and Shardow to “[g]o get” Wil-

liams. Brown then returned to the bedroom with Harwell and Shar-

dow, along with Henderson and Jenkins. Harwell moved aggres-

sively toward Williams and threatened her. Williams responded

that Harwell “wasn’t going to touch her.” Harwell hit Williams in

                                 6
the face, and then Harwell and Shardow both began beating Wil-

liams. Brown encouraged the beating. Mason did not intervene.

     After about ten minutes, Harwell and Shardow let Williams get

up. Williams was “screaming and cursing” and asking Mason why

he had not helped her. Harwell and Shardow then picked her up and

dragged her down the stairs. Williams did not want to leave without

her shoes and her purse, but Harwell and Shardow threw her out

the front door. At that point, Camacho, Williams’s friend, tried to

retrieve Williams’s belongings and to leave with Williams, but Har-

well held onto Williams’s purse. Camacho told everyone it was “nice

to meet them” and was allowed to leave.

     Outside the house, Williams had not left the property. She was

pounding and kicking at the front door, screaming that she would

“bring some GDs”—meaning Gangster Disciples, a gang that was

not friendly with the Bloods—to “come and shoot up the place.”

Brown told Mason, “You need to control your b****h.” Brown said

that if Williams brought a group of Gangster Disciples to the house,

there would be a problem. Eventually Williams stopped shouting

                                 7
and pounding on the door, and she and Camacho left.

     Brown ordered Mason, Henderson, and Jenkins to go find the

two women. Brown confirmed that the three were armed, and in-

structed them, “Make sure that y’all do what y’all need to do and

make sure that [Mason] does what he need to do because he acting

like he in love.” The three men, all carrying guns, left in a car. Brown

stayed back at the house, but he was in communication with the

three while they were out, urging them to find Williams and

Camacho and asking to be kept apprised of what Mason, in particu-

lar, was doing.

     Five or ten minutes later, the three men returned. Henderson

reported to Brown: “Yeah, we did that. They flatlined. It’s over with.”

Brown asked several times if Henderson was sure that nobody would

“come back to this door,” and Henderson kept repeating that “they

flatlined” and “it was over with.”

     Brown instructed everyone to delete any pictures they had with

Williams on Instagram. Harwell and Shardow riffled through Wil-

liams’s purse and then burned it. The following day, Harwell and

                                     8
Singleton threw away some of Williams’s other belongings at an el-

ementary school down the street.

     (b) At 4:14 a.m. on May 19, 2014, Alyssia Smith, who lived near

the house on Maypop Lane, was awakened by the sound of gunfire.

Smith checked to make sure her children were safe and then went

back to bed. The next morning, as she was walking to her car, Smith

noticed two female bodies on the ground. Smith told her fiancé, and

they called 911.

     The responding officers identified the victims as Williams and

Camacho. A medical examiner later determined that both women

had died from multiple gunshot wounds. A .40-caliber bullet and a

.38-caliber bullet were recovered from Williams’s body. Officers also

found seven spent Federal .40-caliber Smith & Wesson shell casings

near the bodies.

     Investigating officers obtained Williams’s phone number from

her family and requested her phone records. The records showed

that on May 18 and May 19, Williams’s phone was in contact multi-

ple times with a phone number ending in -5686. Officers learned

                                   9
that the subscriber associated with the -5686 number was Mason.

Officers also learned that on May 19—the day after the murders—

the 5686 account was canceled and a new number was assigned to

the same phone.

     Mason became a suspect. On May 30, he was arrested at the

Maypop Lane home. A search of the home revealed a red bandana,

a red notebook containing a written oath, and a number of electronic

devices, including Mason’s phone. Officers then got a search warrant

for Mason’s phone and learned that Mason had exchanged a series

of text messages on May 19 with someone named “Turk.” Among

those messages were an incoming text from Turk that read, “Who

was it”; a reply from Mason’s phone saying, “She had to go Blood. I

bust that a** four times each on Blood on DaMobb”; a message from

Turk asking, “With what strap”; and Mason’s answer, “Mine.”

     Officers interviewed Mason. The interview was recorded, and

some of it was played for the jury. Mason initially claimed that he

had been in Florida on the night of the murders. But when police

                                10
confronted him with his text message exchange with Turk, his state-

ment changed. Mason told police that he was ordered by Brown to

kill Williams and Camacho. Mason denied actually shooting the vic-

tims, but admitted he was at the scene as the driver.

     Separately, a few days before Mason’s arrest, Singleton came

forward and told police what happened at the Maypop Lane home

on the night of the murders. Based on the information from Single-

ton, officers got arrest warrants for Henderson, Jenkins, and Brown.

About two months after Singleton spoke to police, Mason called her

and asked her not to testify in court.

     (c) At trial, the jury heard evidence about one of the murder

weapons. No weapon was ever found, but Mason told police in his

interview that one of the guns used in the shooting was stolen from

Douglas County. A trial witness, Amber Diamond, testified that in

April 2014 (about a month before the murders), she, Mason, and two

other men—including co-indictee Traon Turk—had stolen a gun and

ammunition from her ex-boyfriend’s house in Douglas County. The

ex-boyfriend, Teddy Brucker, also testified at trial and confirmed

                                  11
that his .40-caliber Ruger handgun was stolen from his Douglas

County home in April 2014.

     Ballistics evidence connected Brucker’s gun to the murders.

Brucker testified that he reported the theft of his gun to police. He

also explained that when he bought the gun, it came with a pre-fired

spent shell casing that could be used for comparison purposes.

Brucker said he turned that spent shell casing over to police. Offic-

ers later compared that casing to the spent shell casings that were

recovered at the crime scene, and determined that they were fired

from the same weapon.

     (d) Investigator Waine Pinckney, who was qualified as an ex-

pert in street gangs, testified extensively at trial.

     Pinckney first explained generally about gang structure and

culture. He said that within the larger Bloods gang were a number

of subsets, including the subset involved in this case, the Nine Trey

Gangsters. Nine Trey Gangsters, like other subsets of the Bloods,

use the color red, and members sometimes signal their affiliation

with a red “flag,” typically a bandana worn on the wrist or neck, or

                                   12
in the left pocket. The gang has a distinct organizational structure.

At the top is the “OG” or “godfather.” Below that are several “floors,”

or levels of rank, known as the “fifth floor,” “fourth floor,” and so on.

And below the floors are captains, sergeants, and foot soldiers. It is

understood within the gang that a lower-ranking member must fol-

low orders from a higher-ranking member.

     Pinckney also testified about the evidence of gang involvement

in this case. He noted that Mason had tattoos that indicated his in-

volvement in the Bloods, including a five-pointed star and the letters

M-O-B, which stood for “member of Blood.” Photos of Mason showed

him wearing a red bandana and making the gang sign “C-K,” which

stands for “Crip killer,” referring to a rival gang of the Bloods. Other

photos showed Henderson making Blood gang signs. In addition,

notebooks recovered from inside the Maypop Lane home contained

gang terminology and records of gang members’ attendance at meet-

ings and payment of dues. Another notebook from the house con-

tained a written oath swearing loyalty to the Nine Trey Gangsters;

a similar oath was found in Mason’s cell phone. Text messages from

                                   13
Mason’s phone shared gang information, including rules for mem-

bership.

     Based on all of that evidence, Pinckney concluded that Mason

and Henderson were members of the Nine Trey Gangsters subset of

the Bloods. Pinckney further concluded that the way that the crime

was committed—with Brown ordering Mason, Henderson, and Jen-

kins to carry out the killings—indicated that it was a gang activity.

     No defendant testified at trial.

                        Case No. S23A0720

     2. Mason contends that the evidence at trial was constitution-

ally insufficient to support his convictions for malice murder. See

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61

LE2d 560) (1979). We evaluate a due process challenge to the suffi-

ciency of the evidence by viewing the evidence presented at trial in

the light most favorable to the verdicts, and asking whether any ra-

tional trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Pea-

cock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 714 (2) (b) (878 SE2d 247) (2022). “We

                                 14
leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the

evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be

derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2) (a) (873

SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     A person is guilty of malice murder if “he unlawfully and with

malice aforethought, either express or implied, causes the death of

another human being.” OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). See also Welch v. State,

306 Ga. 470, 473 (1) (831 SE2d 761) (2019). A jury may find a de-

fendant guilty of malice murder if the evidence shows beyond a rea-

sonable doubt either that he directly committed the crime or that he

was a “party thereto.” OCGA § 16-2-20 (a). A person is a party to a

crime if, among other things, he aids or abets in its commission. Id.

§ (b) (3). See also Carter v. State, 314 Ga. 317, 319 (2) (a) (877 SE2d

170) (2022). “[P]roof of a shared criminal intent with the actual per-

petrator is necessary to establish that one is a party to the crime,”

Sams v. State, 314 Ga. 306, 310 (2) (875 SE2d 757) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted), and the jury may infer a shared criminal

intent from the defendant’s “presence, companionship, and conduct

                                  15
before, during, and after the offense,” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 214,

232 (3) (875 SE2d 737) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     The evidence here was sufficient to support Mason’s convic-

tions for malice murder. Mason admitted that he was at the scene of

the shootings. He was connected to one of the murder weapons

through his statement to police, ballistics evidence, and the testi-

mony of Amber Diamond and Teddy Brucker. His text messages to

Turk showed him bragging about the murders after the fact. And

Singleton’s testimony narrated how Brown ordered Mason, Hender-

son, and Jenkins to carry out the murders. Given that evidence, a

rational jury was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Mason shot at least one of the victims and that he was a party to the

shooting of the other victim. And even if Mason was merely the

driver and did not personally shoot either victim, as he told police,

the jury could find that he shared a criminal intent with the shoot-

ers, particularly given his messages to Turk claiming that “She had

to go” and “I bust that a** four times.” See, e.g., Meadows v. State,

316 Ga. 22, 24-25 (2) (885 SE2d 780) (2023) (evidence sufficient to

                                 16
support conviction for malice murder when evidence showed that

the defendant arranged to meet the victim at a certain location and

went to that location with the victim and a third man, the victim

was shot by either the defendant or the third man, the defendant

fled the scene, and the defendant owned a gun consistent with the

murder weapon); Jones, 314 Ga. at 232 (3) (evidence sufficient to

support conviction for malice murder as party to the crime when ev-

idence showed that the defendant belonged to a street gang and had

a motive to kill the victim, was present at the scene of the shooting,

and was in contact with the shooter before and after the crime). This

claim therefore fails.

     3. Mason also contends that the trial court should not have ad-

mitted evidence about Mason’s alleged theft of the .40-caliber hand-

gun a month before the murders. In Mason’s view, the trial court

failed to ensure that the probative value of the theft was not sub-

stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See OCGA § 24-4-403

(“Rule 403”). We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse

of discretion. See Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 653, 655 (2) (827 SE2d 254)

                                 17
(2019).

     Relevant evidence, although generally admissible, see OCGA

§ 24-4-402, may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” See OCGA § 24-4-

403. But the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is “an extraordi-

nary remedy that should be used only sparingly.” Wilson v. State,

315 Ga. 728, 738 (8) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The “major function” of the rule is to “exclude matter of

scant of cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the

sake of its prejudicial effect.” Hood v. State, 299 Ga. 95, 103 (4) (786

SE2d 648) (2016) (cleaned up).

     Mason argues on appeal that the trial court should have con-

ducted a “hearing” to determine whether the alleged theft of the

handgun satisfied Rule 403. But nothing in the rule or our case law

requires a hearing; the role of the trial court in applying Rule 403 is

simply to “undertake in each case a considered evaluation of the

proffered justification for the admission” of evidence and then “make

an independent determination” whether the evidence satisfies the

                                  18
rule. State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 737 (3) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (cita-

tion and punctuation omitted). And here the trial court did just that.

When Mason tried to exclude the handgun theft, the trial court ruled

that “any prejudice to [Mason] is far outweighed by the relevance

that the issue may determine this evidence [of the alleged handgun

theft] to have.” Although the trial court did not use the exact word-

ing of Rule 403, its finding reflected the “considered determination”

that the trial court had to make. See id.

     And that determination under Rule 403 was not an abuse of

the trial court’s discretion. Evidence that Mason stole the handgun

was certainly probative, because it directly connected Mason to the

murder weapon. See Jordan v. State, 313 Ga. 841, 845-845 (2) (b)

(874 SE2d 67) (2022) (evidence that machine gun and ammunition

were stolen four months before murder, that they were the same

caliber used in the murder, and that the defendant’s known associ-

ate lived next door to where the burglary occurred, satisfied Rule

403); Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 225, 233 (4) (869 SE2d 461) (2022)

(photo of defendant holding a type of gun that could have been used

                                 19
in the charged crime a week before the shooting satisfied Rule 403).

As to prejudice, evidence of the theft may have been prejudicial to

Mason—as all incriminating evidence is, see Morgan v. State, 307

Ga. 889, 897 (3) (c) (838 SE2d 878) (2020) (noting that inculpatory

evidence is “inherently prejudicial”)—but the question is whether

there was a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially out-

weighed probative value. Unfair prejudice generally refers to the

tendency of evidence to “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a

ground different from proof specific to the offense charged,” or to

“suggest decision on an improper basis.” Old Chief v. United States,

519 U.S. 172, 180 (II) (B) (1) (117 SCt 644, 136 LE2d 574) (1997)

(citation and punctuation omitted). See also Wilson, 315 Ga. at 738

(8). Here, unfair prejudice could have resulted if evidence of the

handgun theft led the jury to believe that Mason had an immoral

character or a propensity to commit crimes, and to convict him on

that “improper basis.” But that possibility is small given the ample

evidence that authorized the jury to convict Mason for permissible

reasons. And again, the probative value of the handgun theft was

                                 20
substantial: it related directly to the crime Mason was charged with

committing. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the evidence. 2

                             Case No. S23A0559

      4. Henderson advances two related claims of error about Ma-

son’s recorded out-of-court statement to police, an edited version of

which was played at their joint trial. First, he claims that admitting

the edited statement violated his Confrontation Clause rights under

Bruton. Second, he claims that even if admitting the statement did

      2 In his brief, Mason also cites OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”),

which limits the admissibility of evidence about a defendant’s other bad acts.
It is not clear from the trial transcript whether the handgun theft was prof-
fered or admitted as Rule 404 (b) evidence. Mason initially sought to prevent
the State from introducing the handgun theft under Rule 404 (b) on the ground
that the State had not filed the necessary pretrial notice. See OCGA § 24-4-404
(b) (requiring the prosecution to “provide reasonable notice to the defense in
advance of trial . . . of the general nature of any [Rule 404 (b)] evidence”). But
the State argued that the theft of the handgun was intrinsic evidence, not sub-
ject to Rule 404 (b), and the trial court suggested it agreed. Then, the trial
court—in denying Mason’s motion in limine—found that “under 404 (b) and
the balancing act [sic], any residual or any prejudice to [Mason] is far out-
weighed by the relevance that the issue may determine this evidence to have.”
But we need not decide whether the evidence properly came in under Rule 404
(b) or as intrinsic evidence, because Mason’s arguments on appeal are limited
to the question whether the trial court properly applied Rule 403.
                                       21
not violate his rights under Bruton, admitting the statement with-

out instructing the jury to consider the statement only against Ma-

son violated his Confrontation Clause rights.

     (a) The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guaran-

tees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the wit-

nesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right is ordinarily

satisfied by allowing the defendant to cross-examine a witness

whose testimonial statements are admitted against him. See United

States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558-559 (II) (108 SCt 838, 98 LE2d

951) (1988); State v. Gilmore, 312 Ga. 289, 292-293 (2) (b) (862 SE2d

499) (2021).

     But joint criminal trials introduce a complication. In a joint

trial, the State may seek to present an incriminating out-of-court

statement of a co-defendant. The complication? The co-defendant

whose statement is introduced has, and often will assert, the right

under the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause not to tes-

tify. See, e.g., Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 140 (2) (859 SE2d 79)

(2021). But if the co-defendant asserts that right, the defendant who

                                 22
is implicated by the statement would be unable to cross-examine the

witness who would testify against him—a clear-cut violation of the

defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. See id.

     The longstanding “solution” to this Fifth Amendment-Sixth

Amendment conflict is a limiting instruction: The trial court admits

the co-defendant’s statement but instructs the jury to consider it

only against the co-defendant. With that instruction in place, the co-

defendant “ordinarily . . . is not considered to be a witness ‘against’

[the] defendant,” Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. __, __ (II) (143

SCt 2004, 2012, __ LE2d __) (2023) (quoting Richardson v. Marsh,

481 U.S. 200, 206 (II) (107 SCt 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987)), so the

Confrontation Clause does not apply, and the statement may be ad-

mitted.

     But it is not quite so simple. This limiting-instruction fix puts

a great deal of faith in the jury’s ability to consider the co-defend-

ant’s statement against the co-defendant, but to ignore it entirely

when considering the guilt or innocence of the defendant. To be sure,

                                  23
jurors are instructed all the time in our legal system to compart-

mentalize in this way—to consider certain evidence only for specific

purposes, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 311 Ga. 455, 462 & n.6 (3) (a) (858

SE2d 462) (2021) (jury instructed to consider evidence of defendant’s

other acts only to show intent), or to disregard evidence that they

were not supposed to hear, see Meadows, 316 Ga. at 26 (4) (a) (jury

instructed to disregard prosecutor’s remark that gun used in shoot-

ing was not presented as evidence at trial); Gude v. State, 313 Ga.

859, 869-870 (5) (874 SE2d 84) (2022) (jury instructed to disregard

detective’s opinion that defendant’s alleged action was “cold”). And

it is “the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow

their instructions.” Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206 (II). But only “al-

most.” In Bruton, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that when the

out-of-court statement of a co-defendant who “stands accused side-

by-side with the defendant” is “powerfully incriminating” against

the defendant in a joint trial, the “risk that the jury will not, or can-

not, follow” a limiting instruction is too great. 391 U.S. at 135-136.

In such cases, a limiting instruction is not an “adequate substitute

                                   24
for [the defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination,” and

so the admission of the co-defendant’s statement can violate the de-

fendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Id. at 126, 137.

     The Bruton rule, however, has proved narrow. In Richardson,

the Court clarified that Bruton does not apply to a statement that

“[i]s not incriminating on its face, but bec[omes] so only when linked

with evidence introduced later at trial.” Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208

(II). The Court reasoned that when a jury has to link such a state-

ment with other evidence and then “infer” guilt, “it is a less valid

generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to

disregard the evidence.” Id. And in Samia, the Court held that the

Confrontation Clause “[i]s not violated by the admission of a nontes-

tifying codefendant’s confession that [does] not directly inculpate the

defendant and [i]s subject to a proper limiting instruction.” Samia,

143 SCt at 2018 (no Confrontation Clause violation when an officer

testified that Samia’s co-defendant confessed about “a time when the

other person he was with pulled the trigger” and otherwise referred

to an “other person,” and the trial court instructed the jury that the

                                  25
co-defendant’s confession should be considered only against the co-

defendant).

     This recent holding aligns with our Court’s prior precedent ap-

plying Bruton. We have consistently held that Bruton excludes only

a statement of a non-testifying co-defendant that, standing alone,

“directly inculpates” the defendant, Simpkins v. State, 303 Ga. 752,

755 (II) (814 SE2d 289) (2018) (quoting Thomas v. State, 300 Ga.

433, 439 (2) (a) (3) (796 SE2d 242) (2017)), but not an out-of-court

statement that does not incriminate the defendant unless “linked

with other evidence at trial,” Simpkins, 303 Ga. at 756 (II) (citation

and punctuation omitted); see Pender, 311 Ga. at 110-111 (2) (b)

(statements that became incriminating about defendant only when

linked with other evidence about defendant’s involvement in the

crimes did not violate Bruton). That means that “[t]he fact that the

jury might infer from the contents of the co-defendant’s statement

in conjunction with other evidence, that the defendant was involved

does not make the admission of the co-defendant’s statement a vio-

lation of the Confrontation Clause.” Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797,

                                 26
803-804 (2) (505 SE2d 731) (1998), disapproved on other grounds by

Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 (883 SE2d 317) (2023). So, for instance,

a statement that refers to the declarant and “another individual”

committing the crime does not violate Bruton’s rule, see Simpkins,

303 Ga. at 756 (II), but a statement that refers to the defendant by

nickname, refers to all other individuals by name, makes clear that

one name has been redacted, and refers to the crime as having been

committed by “someone” or “others” or “they,” could, see Hanifa, 269

Ga. at 804 (2).

      (b) Turning to Henderson’s claims, we start with his Bruton

claim. Particularly in the light of Samia, that claim fails. 3 Before

trial, the State and trial counsel worked together to cut from Ma-

      3 The State contends that this claim should be reviewed only for plain

error because it was not preserved for appellate review: although Henderson
objected to the admission of Mason’s out-of-court statement at trial, he did not
object on the same basis that he does now. The State further contends that
Henderson’s claim fails under plain-error review because it was affirmatively
waived, because Henderson did not renew his objection despite having several
opportunities to do so. But we need not decide whether the claim was pre-
served, not preserved, or even affirmatively waived because, for the reasons
given in the text, the claim fails under either ordinary appellate review or plain
error review.
                                       27
son’s recorded statement any mention of his co-defendants (Hender-

son and Jenkins) by name or nickname. What was left cannot be said

to have “directly inculpated” Henderson, see Samia, 143 SCt at

2018. As relevant here, Mason said that someone pointed a gun at

him and “threatened for them to do it and me to drive.” And he said

that “we had to go find” the two women, “we jumped in the car,” and,

later, “[t]hey pulled behind me, there were like where the f**k y’all

goin, turn back around . . . they told me to get out of the car, we got

out of the car and then boom it happened.” So Mason described him-

self and a number of unspecified other people carrying out the mur-

ders, referring to “we,” “us,” “they,” or “them.” But nothing in the

statement itself indicated that one of those other people was Hen-

derson in particular, as opposed to any of the other gang members

mentioned in the course of the trial (or, indeed, anyone else). Espe-

cially compared to the co-defendant’s confession in Samia—which

described only a single “other person” and thus could be more readily

understood to refer to Samia specifically—Mason’s statement was

                                  28
not directly inculpatory of Henderson to the degree required to es-

tablish a violation of the Bruton rule. That the jury could have in-

ferred that Mason was referring to Henderson based on Singleton’s

testimony and the fact that Henderson was a co-defendant is not

enough to violate his Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton. See

Morris v. State, 311 Ga. 247, 255 (3) (857 SE2d 454) (2021) (no Bru-

ton violation when co-defendant’s out-of-court statement “only in-

criminate[d] [defendant] when combined with other evidence pre-

sented at trial”); Pender, 311 Ga. at 110-111 (2) (b); Simpkins, 303

Ga. at 756 (II); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 803-804 (2). Henderson’s Bruton

claim fails on the merits.

     (c) Henderson has a second Confrontation Clause claim. He

contends that even if admitting the statement did not violate his

rights under Bruton, it still violated his Confrontation Clause rights

because the jury was never instructed to consider the statement only

against Mason.

     Henderson did not ask for a limiting instruction at trial, so we

review this claim only for plain error. See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); Ash

                                 29
v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 791 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 150) (2021). To show

plain error, a defendant has to show not merely error, but that the

error (1) was not affirmatively waived, (2) was obvious beyond rea-

sonable dispute, and (3) affected the appellant’s substantial rights,

which ordinarily means showing that the error affected the outcome

of the trial. See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272-273 (4) (882 SE2d

227) (2022). If those three requirements are satisfied, an appellate

court has the discretion to remedy the error only if the error “seri-

ously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. at 273 (4) (cleaned up).

     We agree that not giving a limiting instruction was error. As

we recounted above, the longstanding practice of admitting a non-

testifying co-defendant’s statement or confession in a joint trial

avoids Confrontation Clause problems only because the trial court

instructed the jury to consider it only against the co-defendant. See

Samia, 143 SCt at 2018; Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211 (II); Colton v.

State, 292 Ga. 509, 511 (2) (739 SE2d 380) (2013) (“[a] co-defendant’s

                                  30
statement meets the Confrontation Clause’s standard for admissi-

bility when it does not refer to the existence of the defendant and is

accompanied by instructions limiting its use to the case against the

confessing co-defendant”) (citation and punctuation omitted; empha-

sis added). Without that instruction, a co-defendant who makes a

testimonial statement or gives a confession that incriminates the de-

fendant remains a “witness against him,” and absent a chance to

cross-examine the co-defendant, the defendant’s Confrontation

Clause rights are violated. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 51-53 (III) (A), 68 (124 SCt 1354, 158 LE2d 177) (2004) (an out-

of-court statement is a statement from a “witness” against the de-

fendant—and thus subject to the Confrontation Clause—when it is

“testimonial” in nature, which includes statements made during po-

lice interrogations); Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 331-332 (2) (528

SE2d 800) (2000) (violation of Confrontation Clause to admit co-de-

fendant’s out-of-court statement without limiting instruction even

when defendant’s name was redacted); Hanifa, 269 Ga. at 801-802

(2).

                                 31
     But Henderson has not shown plain error because he has not

shown that the lack of instruction likely affected the outcome of the

trial. First, even without Mason’s out-of-court statement, the evi-

dence against Henderson was quite strong. Singleton’s narrative

testimony described in detail how Henderson, Mason, and Jenkins

armed themselves and left the house to look for the victims, and

how, when they returned, Henderson repeatedly assured Brown

that the victims had “flatlined.” Singleton’s story was corroborated

in part by Mason’s text messages to Turk. And Investigator Pinck-

ney gave his expert opinion that Henderson was a member of the

gang. Compared to that evidence, Mason’s statement was unlikely

to have carried as much weight. For one thing, the statement did not

obviously implicate Henderson: not only did Mason not mention

Henderson by name or nickname, but his references to “they” and

“them” reasonably could have referred to any of the other gang mem-

bers who were known to the jury and were known to be involved in

the killings. Moreover, the jury might have afforded less weight to

Mason’s statement if it believed the statement was self-serving and

                                 32
designed to minimize Mason’s own culpability. See Samia, 143 SCt

at 2014 (II) (B) (noting that “jurors may cast a critical eye on accom-

plice testimony—and, in particular, self-serving accomplice testi-

mony . . . that accuses another of the most culpable conduct”). That

is especially likely here, where Mason’s statement to police (in which

he contended he was only the driver) was contradicted by his text

messages to Turk (in which he boasted of committing at least one

killing himself with his own gun).

     Given the otherwise strong case against Henderson, the admis-

sion of Mason’s statement was unlikely to have affected the outcome

of the trial, so Henderson’s claim of plain error fails. See Morris, 311

Ga. at 256 (4) (assuming without deciding it was error to admit co-

defendant’s out-of-court statement without a limiting instruction,

the error likely did not affect the outcome of trial given that the

statement did not directly identify the defendant and there was

other substantial evidence of guilt); Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 250

(16) (794 SE2d 67) (2016) (defendant did not show harm required for

plain error from admission of testimony about the defendant’s gang

                                  33
membership that may have violated the Confrontation Clause, in

light of substantial other evidence of the defendant’s gang member-

ship).

     6. Next, Henderson contends that there was not sufficient evi-

dence to corroborate the testimony of Brandi Singleton, who he con-

tends was an accomplice to the crimes. See OCGA § 24-14-8 (the tes-

timony of a single witness is not sufficient to establish a fact when

the witness is an accomplice); Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 326 (1)

(877 SE2d 202) (2022) (“[A] jury may not rely solely on an accom-

plice’s testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s

felony conviction. Instead, the existence of any such fact must also

be supported either by the testimony of an additional witness or by

other, independent evidence that corroborates the accomplice’s tes-

timony.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) At trial, Singleton testified about her relationship to the

Nine Trey Gangsters. She said that she was not a member of the

gang, but that she had family who were members and so she was

familiar with the gang’s culture. She came to stay at the Maypop

                                 34
Lane house voluntarily and was in a sexual relationship with

Brown. But she soon grew uncomfortable, and on the night of the

murders she was trying, unsuccessfully, to get away. Several times

that night, she texted with a man she described as her boyfriend (not

Brown) because she wanted to leave. She did so in secret because

she was afraid Brown would beat her up or kill her. She continued

to text her boyfriend in the days after the murder. During that time

she was not able to leave on her own because Brown kept a close

watch on her: he took her phone, and he would not let her leave the

house unless a member of the gang was with her. One time that Sin-

gleton was allowed to leave the house with a gang member was the

day after the murders, when she went with Harwell to throw away

Williams’s belongings. Singleton testified that during that excursion

she was nervous and “texting to get away.”

     Eventually, Singleton escaped by texting her boyfriend’s

mother and asking the mother to send her a text pretending that

something was wrong with Singleton’s son and asking Singleton to

come to the hospital. When Singleton received that text, she used it

                                 35
as a pretext to get a ride to the hospital, where she met her boy-

friend’s mother and went with her instead of back to the Maypop

Lane house.

      The trial court’s instructions to the jury included these

charges:

     The testimony of [an] accomplice alone is not sufficient to
     warrant a conviction. The accomplice’s testimony must be
     supported by other evidence of some type and that evi-
     dence must be such as would lead to the inference of the
     guilt of the accused independent of the testimony of the
     accomplice.

     [...]

     The sufficiency of the supporting evidence of an accom-
     plice is a matter solely for you, the jury, to determine.
     Whether or not any witness was [an] accomplice is a ques-
     tion for you, the jury, to determine from the evidence in
     this case.

     (b) “The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to

establish a fact.” OCGA § 24-14-8. But there is an exception to that

general rule: in felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice,

“the testimony of a single witness shall not be sufficient,” id. (em-

phasis added), and “a jury may not rely solely on an accomplice’s

                                 36
testimony to find any fact necessary to sustain a defendant’s convic-

tion,” Payne, 314 Ga. at 326 (1). Whether or not a witness was an

accomplice to the crime is a question for the jury to decide, as are

any issues of credibility that might affect that finding. See Copeland

v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 48 (2) (875 SE2d 636) (2022). If the evidence at

trial would authorize a properly instructed jury to find that a wit-

ness was not an accomplice, that finding “eliminate[s] the need for

corroboration under OCGA § 24-14-8,” and the witness’s testimony

alone is sufficient. Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). This is

true even if there is conflicting evidence as to whether the witness

was an accomplice, see Johnson v. State, 311 Ga. 221, 225 (857 SE2d

463) (2021) (“Despite some evidence to the contrary presented at [the

defendant’s] trial, a properly instructed jury could have found that

[a witness] was not an accomplice, and corroboration of his testi-

mony therefore was not required.”), and even if the only evidence

that a witness is not an accomplice is the witness’s own testimony,

see Fisher v. State, 309 Ga. 814, 819 (2) (848 SE2d 434) (2020)

(properly charged jury was authorized to believe witness’s testimony

                                 37
that he had no prior knowledge of crime, and thus to determine that

witness was not an accomplice, which eliminated the need for cor-

roboration).

     Here, Singleton was the only witness testifying to much of

what happened at the house on Maypop Lane, but ample evidence

authorized the jury to conclude that Singleton was not an accom-

plice. She testified that she was not a member of the gang. She tes-

tified extensively about her fear of the gang, and of Brown specifi-

cally. She talked about how Brown controlled her movements and

communications. And she detailed her days-long effort to get away,

even while she had left with Harwell to throw away Williams’s be-

longings. All of that authorized a conclusion that Singleton did not

have a “shared criminal intent” with the defendants. See Sams, 314

Ga. at 310 (2); Johnson, 311 Ga. at 225; Fisher, 309 Ga. at 819 (2).

And the jury was properly charged with the pattern jury instruc-

tions on accomplice corroboration, including the charge that

“[w]hether or not any witness was an accomplice is a question for

you, the jury, to determine for the evidence in this case.” See

                                38
Copeland, 314 Ga. at 48 (2) (noting that that instruction was cor-

rect). Given the proper instruction and the ample evidence support-

ing a finding that Singleton was not an accomplice, no corroboration

under OCGA § 24-14-8 was necessary. This claim thus fails.

     7. Henderson contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by allowing Singleton to testify about certain things that Malcolm

Brown said on the night of the murders. The trial court admitted

Singleton’s testimony, over counsel’s objection, under OCGA § 24-8-

801 (d) (2) (E) (“Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)”), which is the hearsay exception

for statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy. Henderson now

contends that the testimony should have been excluded because

there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy. He identifies ten of

Brown’s remarks that, in his view, were admitted in error: (1) his

comment to Mason that Williams had “too much mouth”; (2) his sar-

castic retort to Williams that “Oh, I’m acting like a b***h”; (3) his

direction to Mason to “control your b***h”; (4) his direction to the

defendants to find Williams and Camacho; (5) his direction to make

sure the defendants had guns; (6) his direction to “make sure that

                                  39
y’all do what y’all need to do and make sure [Mason] does what he

need to do because he acting like he in love”; (7) his request to the

defendants to “make sure you let me know what [Mason] does”;

(8) his instruction that “y’all need to find them”; (9) his question,

“what is [Mason] doing”; and (10) his instruction, “they on foot.”

     Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). Hearsay is

generally inadmissible, but it may be admitted if any of several stat-

utory exceptions applies. See id. § 802; Mosley v. State, 307 Ga. 711,

716 (3) (838 SE2d 289) (2020). One of those exceptions is Rule 801

(d) (2) (E), which allows for the admission of “[a] statement by a co-

conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the

conspiracy, including a statement made during the concealment

phase of a conspiracy.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). See Kemp v.

State, 303 Ga. 385, 392 (2) (b) (810 SE2d 515) (2018). To introduce

hearsay under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E), the State must show by a pre-

                                 40
ponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the con-

spiracy included both the declarant and the defendant against whom

the statement is offered, and that the statement was made during

the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Stafford v.

State, 312 Ga. 811, 822 (5) (a) (865 SE2d 116) (2021); Kemp, 303 Ga.

at 392 (2) (b).4

      As with admissibility rulings generally, we review a trial

court’s ruling to admit evidence under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) for an

abuse of discretion. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 20 (3) (838 SE2d

808) (2020). As part of this review, we accept a trial court’s factual

findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Kemp, 303 Ga. at 393

(2) (b). And we have noted before that a trial court’s determination

“whether a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy” is a

factual finding reviewed for clear error. Id. Further, in reviewing

that determination, “[w]e apply a liberal standard.” Id.

      A conspiracy is “an agreement between two or more persons to

      4 Although conspiracy is itself a crime, see OCGA § 16-4-8, a conspiracy

need not be separately charged for a statement to be admissible under Rule
801 (d) (2) (E). See OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E); Kemp, 303 Ga. at 392 (2) (b).
                                      41
commit a crime.” Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 752 (2) (a) (827 SE2d

879) (2019). When, as here, a defendant is charged under the Street

Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (“Gang Act”) with committing a

crime in furtherance of the purposes of a criminal street gang, he

may be part of two conspiracies: the immediate conspiracy to commit

the crime, and the “larger criminal conspiracy” to participate in the

gang. Chavers v. State, 304 Ga. 887, 893 (3) (823 SE2d 283) (2019);

Kemp, 303 Ga. at 393 (2) (b) (i). This is because a criminal street

gang is essentially “a general conspiracy among several individuals

to commit crimes.” Kemp, 303 Ga. at 394 (2) (b) (i). See also OCGA §

16-15-3 (3) & (1) (J) (a “[c]riminal street gang” is “any organization,

association, or group of three or more persons associated in fact,

whether formal or informal, which engages in criminal gang activ-

ity,” and “[c]riminal gang activity” includes, among other things, any

crime involving violence or the possession or use of a weapon); Kemp,

303 Ga. at 394 (2) (b) (i) (to show a violation of the Gang Act, the

State must prove the existence of a criminal street gang and “the

commission of a specific criminal act intended to further the gang’s

                                  42
criminal purposes”). And because a criminal street gang is a kind of

general conspiracy, “[m]anagement of or participation with others in

that criminal street gang activity necessarily implies knowledge of

the gang’s criminal activities and a specific intent to further its crim-

inal purposes.” Rodriguez v. State, 284 Ga. 803, 807 (1) (671 SE2d

497) (2009). So if a person is a member of a criminal street gang, his

statements in furtherance of the gang’s criminal purposes are con-

sidered statements in furtherance of the “larger conspiracy”—and

thus could be admissible under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E), assuming the

rule’s other requirements are satisfied.

     Most of Brown’s remarks that Henderson now challenges were

clearly in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder Williams and

Camacho and, by extension, of the “larger conspiracy” to participate

in the Nine Trey Gangsters. The State presented ample evidence

that Brown and Henderson were members of the Nine Trey Gang-

sters, including Singleton’s testimony, Investigator Pinckney’s ex-

pert opinion, and the photos of Henderson making gang signs. The

State also presented evidence that killing Williams and Camacho

                                   43
furthered the gang’s purposes: Singleton and Mason said Brown, a

high-ranking member, ordered Henderson, Mason, and Jenkins, all

lower-ranking members, to kill Williams and Camacho, and Single-

ton and Pinckney both explained this was because Williams was

threatening to bring Gangster Disciples, a rival of the Bloods, to the

house. Many of Brown’s statements challenged here were direct in-

structions to Henderson and his co-defendants to carry out that kill-

ing: to arm themselves, find the women, and “do what y’all need to

do.” And other statements were requests for confirmation that Ma-

son was following those instructions. All of those remarks easily

meet the “liberal standard” that applies in determining whether a

hearsay statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy. See Kemp, 303

Ga. at 393 (2) (b); Chavers, 304 Ga. at 893 (3) (declarant’s statements

targeting someone to be beaten or killed and telling a fellow gang

member that the victim did not know “how real the s**t is about to

get,” together with evidence that defendant was critical of the victim

and spoke about killing violators of gang rules, that declarant and

defendant were in gang, and that declarant met with defendant just

                                  44
before defendant killed victim, showed that declarant and defendant

conspired to murder victim and that they were part of “larger crim-

inal conspiracy” to participate in the gang) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

     Certain of Brown’s statements arguably were not in further-

ance of any conspiracy. His remark that Williams had “too much

mouth” and his sarcastic retort to Williams that “Oh, I’m acting like

a b***h” were unrelated either to the murders or to participation in

the Nine Trey Gangsters. But those statements were not hearsay,

because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matters as-

serted. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). Because they were not hearsay,

they did not need to qualify for a hearsay exception to be admissible,

and Henderson does not object to Brown’s statements on any other

basis.

     Because each of the statements Henderson challenges was ei-

ther in furtherance of a conspiracy and thus admissible under Rule

801 (d (2) (E), or not hearsay at all, his claim that these statements

were inadmissible hearsay fails.

                                   45
     8. Henderson contends that the trial court should have granted

his pretrial motion to sever his trial from the trials of his co-defend-

ants. We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discre-

tion. See Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 736 (4) (864 SE2d 85) (2021).

     When two or more defendants are indicted jointly for a capital

felony where the death penalty has been waived, for a non-capital

felony, or for a misdemeanor, the defendants can be tried together

or separately in the discretion of the trial court. See OCGA § 17-8-4

(a). A trial court has “broad discretion” to grant or deny a motion for

severance. Sillah v. State, 315 Ga. 741, 750 (3) (883 SE2d 756)

(2023). When ruling on the motion to sever, a trial court should con-

sider three factors: “(1) the likelihood of confusion of the evidence

and law; (2) the possibility that evidence against one defendant may

be considered against the other defendant; and (3) the presence or

absence of antagonistic defenses.” Collins, 312 Ga. at 735 (4) (cita-

tion and punctuation omitted). To show that severance is required,

the defendant must do more than point to the presence of antagonis-

tic defenses or the possibility that he has a better chance of acquittal

                                  46
in a separate trial. See id. Rather, he must show that “a joint trial

was so prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due pro-

cess.” Hurston v. State, 310 Ga. 818, 826 (3) (a) (854 SE2d 745)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, the first and third factors weighed against severing the

trials. The jury was not likely to be confused about the evidence or

the law because all three co-defendants—Henderson, Mason, and

Jenkins—were accused of the same conduct, and the State argued

that they acted together in committing the crimes. See Sillah, 315

Ga. at 750 (3) (severance not necessary when, among other things,

“the law and evidence were substantially the same for all of” the

gang-member co-defendants); Collins, 312 Ga. at 736 (4) (confusion

of evidence and law unlikely because “the three co-defendants were

charged with the same offenses stemming from the same incident

with largely the same evidence”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

For the same reason, there were no antagonistic defenses at trial.

The three co-defendants were accused of the same conduct, and none

of their defenses were inconsistent or relied on blaming one another.

                                 47
See Collins, 312 Ga. at 737 (4) (severance not required when there

was “sufficient evidence of a common scheme or plan to commit a

criminal offense”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     The second factor is closer. The State’s case against Henderson

was not quite as strong as its case against Mason, both as to the

murders and as to membership in the gang. Some of the evidence

against Mason, like his text messages with Turk or the gang-related

information from his phone, might not have been admitted at a trial

of Henderson alone. And it is conceivable that some of that evidence,

particularly about Mason’s gang connections, might have been im-

puted to Henderson.

     But that is not enough to require severance. “[T]he fact that

the evidence as to one of the co-defendants is stronger does not de-

mand a finding that the denial of a severance motion is an abuse of

discretion” when, as here, “there is evidence showing that the de-

fendants acted in concert.” Smith v. State, 308 Ga. 81, 86-87 (2) (839

SE2d 630) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA

§ 16-2-20 (explaining party-to-the-crime liability). And the State

                                 48
presented independent evidence that Henderson was a gang mem-

ber (Singleton’s testimony, Investigator Pinckney’s expert opinion,

the photos of Henderson making gang signs) and that he was in-

volved in the murders (Singleton’s testimony), all of which still

would have been admissible had Henderson been tried alone. Given

all of this, even if Henderson may have had a better chance of ac-

quittal in a solo trial, he has not shown that his “joint trial was so

prejudicial as to amount to a denial of his right to due process.”

Hurston, 310 Ga. at 826 (3) (a). See Collins, 312 Ga. at 735 (4). The

trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to

sever.

     9. Finally, Henderson contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting photos of Henderson making gang signs be-

cause they were not properly authenticated. Authentication is re-

viewed for abuse of discretion. See Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 872, 880

(4) (874 SE2d 73) (2022).

     During Investigator Pinckney’s testimony, the State sought to

introduce photos that showed Henderson making gang signs, either

                                 49
alone or with his co-defendants. Pinckney initially testified that he

recognized the photos as coming from “a social media account,” that

some came from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in

North Carolina, and that he recognized the people in them. Defense

counsel objected that there was a lack of foundation and identifica-

tion for the photos. Pinckney then testified that he recognized the

photos and that he recognized the people in them.

     Evidence like photos may be authenticated with evidence “suf-

ficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.” OCGA § 24-9-901 (a). Authentication may be

achieved through any means that satisfies that statutory standard.

See Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 475 (5) (837 SE2d 362) (2019).

That can include the “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that

a matter is what it is claimed to be.” OCGA § 24-9-901 (b) (1). See

McCammon v. State, 306 Ga. 516, 522-523 (3) (832 SE2d 396) (2019).

When authenticating evidence, the proponent must “present evi-

dence sufficient to make out a prima facie case that the proffered

evidence is what it purports to be.” McCammon, 306 Ga. at 523 (3)

                                 50
(citation omitted). Once that prima facie case is established, the ev-

idence is admitted, “and the ultimate question of authenticity is de-

cided by the jury.” Id. (citation omitted). These rules apply to elec-

tronic documents the same as they do to any others. See Nicholson,

307 Ga. at 475 (5).

     The photos here were authenticated by Investigator Pinckney,

who testified that he was familiar with them and with the people in

them. See OCGA § 24-9-901 (b) (1); McCammon, 306 Ga. at 522-523

(3). That established a prima facie case of authenticity that allowed

the photos to be admitted. See OCGA § 24-9-901 (a); McCammon,

306 Ga. at 523 (3). The ultimate question of authenticity was then

for the jury. See McCammon, 306 Ga. at 523 (3). Thus, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photos, and so this

claim fails.

     Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  51