Court Opinion

ID: 9372971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:53.622322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.188622
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DARLYN C. SCOVELL,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-16-0355-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: January 31, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Daphne E. Barbee, Esquire, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the appellant.

           Ellen Johnston, Washington Navy Yard, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained the agency’s chapter 75 removal action. Generally, we grant petitions
     such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains
     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except to MODIFY the
     administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s claim that the agency violated
     her due process rights, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency removed the appellant from her position as a GS-6 Lead Child
     Development Program Technician for a pre-kindergarten child development
     center based on her failure to follow the following instructions on child guidance
     techniques:
           15.3.b. The child guidance policy shall be designed to assist the
           child in developing self-control, self-respect, and respect and
           consideration for the rights and property of others. Clear behavioral
           limits for children shall be established based on positive guidance
           (what to do vice what not to do) and redirecting children toward
           desired activities.
           15.3.e. Restricting the child’s movements or placing the child in a
           confined space as a form of punishment is prohibited.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 12-14, 37, Tab 9 at 90-91, Tab 10 at 30. 2

     2
       The agency charged the appellant with violating the Office of the Chief of Naval
     Operations Instruction 1700.9e, Chapter 15.3, Child Guidance Techniques, sections b
     and e. IAF, Tab 8 at 37, Tab 9 at 90-91. Chapter 15 provides guidance and requires
     training on child abuse prevention precautions, including discipline techniques, and
     mandates the implementation of a child guidance policy and a touch policy. IAF, Tab 9
     at 83-95.
                                                                                             3

¶3         In support of the charge, the agency relied in part on a video recording
     showing the appellant interacting with a child in her classroom on September 30,
     2015. IAF, Tab 8 at 37-38, Tab 13 (video). The agency specified that the video
     showed the appellant wrapping her arms and legs around the child, restraining
     him on her lap for approximately 10 minutes, and “pulling him by the arms and
     legs” when he repeatedly attempted to escape her grasp. IAF, Tab 8 at 37-38.
     The agency also stated that an agency Incident Determination Committee (IDC)
     concluded that her case met the criteria for physical abuse of a child. Id. at 38.
¶4         In reply to her proposed removal, the appellant acknowledged that she
     should have used different techniques to redirect the child’s attention; however, it
     was unclear from her response whether she believed that her conduct violated the
     agency’s Child Guidance and Touch Policy (Touch Policy). 3 Id. at 31-32; IAF,
     Tab 9 at 95. The appellant also argued that there were mitigating factors, she was
     a “good candidate for rehabilitation and re-education,” and she was not charged
     with corporal punishment. IAF, Tab 8 at 31-32. As to the IDC determination,
     she stated that the committee met in a closed-door session to consider an
     allegation of child abuse made against her, and she received no due process in
     that proceeding. Id. at 30. She also stated that the committee did not speak to
     her, she had no opportunity to confront her accusers or view the evidence
     presented against her, and the determination was not yet final. Id.
¶5         The deciding official sustained the appellant’s removal, stating that there
     was credible evidence that she violated the agency’s “no touch” policy by

     3
       To this end, the appellant made the following statements in her written reply:
     (1) “Nothing in the record, or in my memory, indicates that I could be terminated for a
     minor violation of the Touch Policy”; (2) “my behavior was consistent with, not in
     violation of the agencies Child Guidance and Touch Policy”; (3) “Termination is an
     extreme reaction to a minor (yet real) violation of the Touch Policy by an otherwise
     outstanding and trustworthy employee”; (4) “My actions, as far as I can tell, fall
     squarely in line with the definition of appropriate touch, per the written policy given to
     me”; (5) “I do not disagree that on September 30, 2015 I restrained a child, consistent
     with our Touch Policy.” IAF, Tab 8 at 30-32 (grammar and punctuation in original).
                                                                                       4

     intentionally “restricting the child’s movements or placing the child in a confined
     space as a form of punishment.” Id. at 12-13, 25. He considered her 14 years of
     Federal service, acceptable performance rating, performance, and lack of prior
     discipline, but he found no potential for rehabilitation due to the nature of her
     offense. Id. at 13, 25-27. The deciding official also stated that his decision was
     not based on the results of the IDC determination. Id. at 12.
¶6         The appellant filed an appeal with the Board arguing that the agency
     violated her right to due process, committed harmful error, and subjected her to
     unlawful discrimination based on her race (Filipino Chinese) and color (brown).
     IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 25 at 10, Tab 29 at 2.         After holding a hearing, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the removal.         IAF,
     Tab 36, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 28.   She found that the agency proved the
     charge as specified and the appellant failed to prove her claims alleging due
     process violations, harmful error, and discrimination.          ID at 12-20.   The
     administrative judge also found nexus and sustained the penalty of removal. ID
     at 20, 28.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review wherein she argues, among
     other things, the following: (1) the agency failed to prove its charge; (2) the
     administrative judge made erroneous rulings regarding one of her proffered
     witnesses; (2) her removal was precipitated by discrimination on the basis of her
     race and color; (3) the agency violated her due process rights; and (4) the penalty
     of removal was unreasonable under the circumstances. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 3-33. The agency has responded in opposition to her petition, and
     the appellant has replied thereto. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                                        ANALYSIS
     We discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
     agency proved its charge.
¶8         The appellant argues that the agency failed to prove its charge of failure to
     follow instructions.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-13.      To this end, she asserts the
                                                                                         5

      following:   (1) her actions were both appropriate and consistent with agency
      instructions and guidance; (2) the administrative judge failed to consider all of
      the evidence in the record; and (3) the administrative judge mischaracterized
      certain evidence, including the video recording of the incident. Id. We find that
      these assertions do not provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      well-reasoned findings.     ID at 6-12; see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
      judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health
      & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same); see also Marques v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984)
      (explaining that an administrative judge’s failure to discuss all of the evidence of
      record does not mean that the evidence was not considered), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062
      (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).     Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency proved its charge by
      preponderant evidence.

      We discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s evidentiary rulings.
¶9          The appellant contends that the administrative judge abused her discretion
      in “limiting and disregarding” the testimony of one of her witnesses, Dr. K. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 24-28.     Specifically, she argues that the administrative judge
      abused her discretion by (1) limiting the scope of Dr. K.’s testimony prior to the
      hearing, i.e., precluding her from testifying about the appellant’s lack of intent to
      abuse a child, and (2) limiting the scope of Dr. K.’s testimony during the hearing.
      Id. at 24-28; PFR File, Tab 4 at 13. The appellant also seemingly argues that the
      administrative judge did not ascribe sufficient weight to Dr. K .’s testimony that
      the appellant’s interactions with the child did not violate agency instructions.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-28. We find these assertions unavailing.
¶10         An administrative judge has broad discretion to regulate the course of the
      hearing and to exclude evidence and witnesses that have not been shown to be
                                                                                          6

      relevant, material, and nonrepetitious.        Thomas v. U.S. Postal Service,
      116 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 4 (2011); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8), (10). To obtain reversal
      of an initial decision on the basis of the exclusion of a witness, the appellant must
      show that a relevant witness or evidence, which could have affected the outcome,
      was disallowed.      See Thomas, 116 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 4.              Regarding the
      administrative judge’s prehearing ruling, the record indicates that, following the
      parties’ prehearing conference, the administrative judge issued an order wherein
      she limited the scope of Dr. K.’s testimony on the basis of relevance.          IAF,
      Tab 29 at 4-5. Specifically, she indicated that Dr. K. could not testify regarding
      whether the appellant intended to abuse the child, reasoning that the agency was
      not required to prove intent to abuse. 4     Id. at 4.     The administrative judge
      explained that, if either party objected to her order, they could file a written
      objection within 6 days.      Id. at 8.     The appellant did not object to the
      administrative judge’s prehearing rulings concerning Dr. K.; accordingly, she is
      precluded from doing so on petition for review.          See Tarpley v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 579, 581 (1988) (stating that an appellant’s failure to timely
      object to rulings on witnesses precludes the appellant from doing so on petition
      for review). Moreover, we find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      prehearing limitation of the scope of Dr. K.’s testimony on the basis of relevance.
      See Thomas, 116 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 4.
¶11         Regarding rulings made during the hearing, the appellant appears to be
      challenging the administrative judge’s statement that she did “not need [Dr. K.] to
      testify with respect to whether she perceived the [a]ppellant’s actions to be child
      abuse.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 24, 26; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 162 (statement of
      the administrative judge). The appellant did not object to this ruling during the
      hearing.   See Whitehurst v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 M.S.P.R. 486, 491
      (1990) (explaining that an appellant is obliged to preserve for the Board’s review
      4
        She also precluded Dr. K. from testifying about whether the agency afforded the
      appellant due process and proper procedure. IAF, Tab 29 at 4 -5.
                                                                                             7

      objections to the administrative judge’s conduct of the hearing and cannot wait
      until after the adjudication is complete to object for the first t ime to the
      administrative judge’s hearing-related rulings). In any event, we find no error
      with this ruling. As set forth in the initial decision, the question of whether the
      agency proved its charge did not require any particular technical expertise;
      indeed, even assuming that Dr. K.’s expert opinion reflected a generally accepted
      approach to childcare, the agency was free to make its own instructions regarding
      the permissible behavior of its employees.           ID at 10-11.      The appellant’s
      remaining evidentiary contention, i.e., that the administrative judge did not
      ascribe sufficient weight to Dr. K’s testimony, does not provide a basis to disturb
      the initial decision     because it constitutes       mere disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s explained factual findings and legal conclusions therefrom.
      See Riggsbee v. Office of Personnel Management, 111 M.S.P.R. 129, ¶ 11 (2009)
      (explaining that an appellant’s mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s
      explained factual findings and legal conclusions therefrom does not provide a
      basis to disturb the initial decision); see also Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106. Thus, a
      different outcome is not warranted.

      We find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      appellant failed to prove her claim of discrimination.
¶12         The appellant reasserts her affirmative defense of disparate treatment
      discrimination based on her race (Filipino Chinese) and color (brown). 5 PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 30-33, Tab 4 at 14-15.           We find her contentions in this regard
      unpersuasive; indeed, the administrative judge thoroughly considered the record
      as a whole and found that the appellant failed to show by preponderant evidence
      that discrimination was a motivating factor in her removal.           ID at 17-19; see

      5
        Although the appellant was not notified of the correct standards and burdens of proof
      applicable to this affirmative defense before the hearing, the initial decision set forth
      the applicable standard, thereby providing her with notice and an opportunity to meet
      her burden on review. See Sabio v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 124 M.S.P.R. 161,
      ¶ 6 n.2 (2017).
                                                                                                8

      Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22 (explaining
      that an appellant may prove a claim of discrimination based on race or color
      under    the    motivating    factor   standard,   i.e.,     by proving   that   prohibited
      discrimination played “any part” in the contested action).
¶13           We find that the appellant’s conclusory arguments on review merely express
      disagreement with the administrative judge’s weighing of the evidence.                 For
      example, the appellant states that she overheard her Caucasian supervisor say
      negative things about Filipinos and that another Filipino employee said that her
      supervisor mentioned the large number of Filipinos working there and stated that
      most are uneducated.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 31.         She also avers that all of her
      accusers were Caucasian, including her supervisor and the proposing and dec iding
      officials.     Id. The administrative judge observed the testimony of the agency
      officials and the appellant on these points, but she found insufficient evidence to
      infer a discriminatory motive.         ID at 18-19.        We find that the administrative
      judge’s demeanor-based credibility determinations deserve deference from the
      Board. 6 Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed.
      Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility determinations, “[e]ven if demeanor is not explicitly
      discussed”); Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir.
      2002).
¶14           The appellant also reasserts that other employees were treated more
      leniently when they engaged in similar misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 30-33.
      She argues that the agency did not discipline one of her Caucasian coworkers who

      6
         Further, the agency’s investigation into the appellant’s classroom conduct was
      initiated by a parent, not an agency employee, complaining that her ba bysitter had
      observed the appellant doing something objectionable to a different child. ID at 3. The
      appellant’s supervisor and the Director responded to the parent complaint by watching
      the video recording of the appellant’s classroom and saw nothing wr ong with the
      conduct complained about; however, they observed the conduct underlying this removal
      action. Id.
                                                                                            9

      worked at the same child care center for the same supervisor and purportedly
      engaged in similar conduct with the same child on the same day. Id. at 31-32.
      She also argues that the agency did not remove or discipline other non -Filipinos
      for engaging in similar or more serious conduct. Id.
¶15         In her initial decision, the administrative judge concluded that the alleged
      comparator employees were not similarly situated because they had different
      supervisors, engaged in conduct that was not substantially similar to the
      appellant’s misconduct, or were not subject to the same standards as the appellant
      when the incidents occurred. ID at 19, 22-25. For example, the administrative
      judge found that the appellant’s Caucasian coworker was not a lead teacher like
      the appellant and that she had not restricted the child’s movements in a manner
      similar to that of the appellant. 7 ID at 19. We discern no basis to disturb any of
      these findings. See Ly v. Department of the Treasury, 118 M.S.P.R. 481, ¶ 10
      (2012) (explaining that, for an employee to be deemed similarly situated for
      purposes of an affirmative defense of discrimination based on disparate treatment,
      all relevant aspects of the appellant’s employment situation must be “nearly
      identical” to that of the comparator employee). Accordingly, we agree that the
      appellant failed to prove her claim of discrimination. 8

      7
        The administrative judge also considered the appellant’s testimony that the agency did
      not discipline two Caucasian teachers for conduct that included threatening to cut a
      child’s throat and lifting a child by his arm and sweeping him off his feet and pla cing
      him in a seated position. ID at 25. The administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      testimony concerning these incidents, which the appellant allegedly witnessed, was not
      credible. Id. Although the appellant disputes this finding on review, PF R File, Tab 1
      at 22, we discern no basis to disturb it, see Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
      8
        Because the appellant failed to show that the agency’s action was motivated by
      discrimination, she necessarily failed to prove “but-for” causation. See Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 22 (explaining that to obtain full relief, including status quo ante
      relief, an appellant must prove that discrimination was a but-for cause of the
      employment outcome).
                                                                                            10

      We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to
      prove a due process violation; however, we modify a portion of her analysis of
      this claim.
¶16         The appellant contends that the administrative judge erred in finding that
      she failed to prove a due process violation.             PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-15.
      Specifically, she asserts that the deciding official improperly considered section c
      of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST)
      1700.9e, Chapter 15.3, Child Guidance Techniques , because the notice of
      proposed removal referenced only sections b and e of the same. 9 Id.; IAF, Tab 8
      at 37.    OPNAVINST Child Guidance Techniques 15.3.c. prohibits corporal

      9
        Additionally, the appellant contends that the agency violated her due process rights by
      failing to timely provide her with various information, i.e., (1) a DVD video recording
      of the incident underlying the charge, (2) documents pertaining to the IDC
      determination, and (3) documents pertaining to prior incidents involving the appellant
      being AWOL and sleeping in the classroom. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-20. For the reasons
      set forth in the initial decision, we find the appellant’s assertions regarding the DVD
      unavailing. ID at 13-14. Regarding the IDC documents, as discussed in the initial
      decision, the appellant’s union representative testified that he had received IDC
      documents from the appellant before the submission of her reply to the notice of
      proposed removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-20; ID at 15; HT at 116-17 (testimony of the
      appellant’s union representative); see Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. Last, regarding the
      documents pertaining to the prior incidents involving the appellant, the record supports
      the administrative judge’s conclusion that the deciding official did not consider these
      incidents in assessing the appropriate penalty; thus, these documents did not constitute
      material information. ID at 16-17; IAF, Tab 8 at 13; HT at 30 (testimony of the
      deciding official); see Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368,
      1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that a deciding official violates an employee’s due
      process rights when he relies upon new and material ex parte information as a basis for
      his decisions on the merits of a proposed charge or the penalty to b e imposed).
      The appellant also briefly argues that the deciding official partook in improper ex parte
      communications with a “Mr. Perez,” asserting that she was unaware of the involvement
      of this individual until the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 30, Tab 4 at 12-14. A review of
      the hearing transcript reveals that the name “Mr. Perez” came up only once during the
      hearing, i.e., when the deciding official stated during cross examination that a
      “Mr. Perez” had also reviewed the record and agreed that removal was appropriate. HT
      at 59 (testimony of the deciding official). The appellant’s counsel did not inquire any
      further regarding the identity or involvement of this individual and the record provides
      no clarity regarding the same. Thus, we find the appella nt’s vague assertion regarding
      this purported ex parte communication unavailing.
                                                                                          11

      punishment, which is defined as spanking, hitting, punching, slapping, pinching,
      shaking, or any other form of physical punishment. 10 IAF, Tab 9 at 90-91.
¶17         Pursuant to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decisions in
      Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Stone
      v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
      1999), a deciding official violates an employee’s due process rights when he
      relies upon new and material ex parte information as a basis for his decisions on
      the merits of a proposed charge or the penalty to be imposed. I n determining
      whether a due process violation has occurred, there is no basis for distinguishing
      between ex parte information provided to the deciding official and information
      personally known to him, if the information was considered in reaching the
      decision and not previously disclosed to the appellant. Lopes v. Department of
      the Navy, 116 M.S.P.R. 470, ¶ 10 (2011).            Ward, Stone, and their progeny
      recognize, however, that not all ex parte communications rise to the level of due
      process violations; rather, only ex parte communications that introduce new and
      material information to the deciding official are constitutionally infirm. See, e.g.,
      Wilson v. Department of Homeland Security, 120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶ 8 (2014), aff’d,
      595 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In Stone, the Federal Circuit identified the
      following factors to be used to determine if ex parte information is new and
      material: (1) whether the ex parte information introduced cumulative, as opposed
      to new, information; (2) whether the employee knew of the information and had
      an opportunity to respond; and (3) whether the communication was of the type
      likely to result in undue pressure on the deciding official to rule in a particular
      manner.    Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.        Ultimately, the Board must determine
      “whether the ex parte communication is so substantial and so likely to cause
      prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation
      of property under such circumstances.”        Id.   Due process, however, is not a
      10
        Section 15.3.c also states, in pertinent part, that the use of corporal punishment is
      grounds for immediate dismissal. IAF, Tab 9 at 90.
                                                                                         12

      technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
      circumstances; rather, it is a flexible concept that calls for such procedural
      protections as the particular situation demands. See, e.g., Gajdos v. Department
      of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 361, ¶ 18 (2014).
¶18         The administrative judge considered the appellant’s argument that the
      deciding official had improperly considered section c even though she had not
      been charged with a violation of that specific provision.           ID at 15.     The
      administrative judge found the argument unavailing, reasoning that, although the
      deciding official may have personally believed that the appellant’s conduct
      amounted to corporal punishment under section c, he “did not consider [whether
      the appellant had engaged in corporal punishment] in rendering his [removal]
      decision.”   Id.   We disagree with this finding.      Here, the hearing transcript
      indicates that the deciding official testified that he believed that the appellant had
      violated section c because, based on his review of the video, he thought that the
      appellant had shaken the child by “grabb[ing] him and pull[ing] him back into
      her.” HT at 40 (testimony of the deciding official). Later in his testimony, the
      deciding official acknowledged that he had, in fact, taken his finding regarding
      corporal punishment into consideration in deciding to remove the appellant. HT
      at 47 (testimony of the deciding official).          Accordingly, we vacate the
      administrative judge’s finding that the deciding official did not consider section c
      in deciding to remove the appellant from her position; nevertheless, for the
      following reasons, we agree with her conclusion that the appellant failed to show
      that the agency violated her due process rights.
¶19         First, the appellant was generally aware of the policies that she was alleged
      to have violated; indeed, the agency’s notice of proposed removal generally cited
      “OPNAVINST 1700.9E, Chapter 15” as a reference.                 IAF, Tab 8 at 37.
      Additionally, the proposing official’s Douglas factors worksheet, which the
      appellant referenced in her written reply, alleged that the appellant had
      “[v]iolated . . . OPNAV 1700.9e; Chapter 15 Section 3 — Child Abuse and
                                                                                         13

      Neglect.” Id. at 31; IAF, Tab 9 at 7. In addition to referencing the OPNAVINST,
      the notice of proposed removal also specifically referenced the agency’s Touch
      Policy. IAF, Tab 8 at 37. The proposing official’s Douglas factors worksheet
      also referenced this policy. 11 IAF, Tab 9 at 9.     This policy, like section c of
      chapter 15 in the OPNAVINST, prohibits corporal punishment.                Id. at 95.
      Specifically, it states as follows: “A child will not be punished by . . . shaking or
      other corporal punishment.”     Id.   It also sets forth “the definition of what is
      considered appropriate touch and inappropriate touch,” with examples provided.
      Id. The definition of inappropriate touching includes “corporal punishment.” Id.
¶20         Second, the notice of proposed removal identified the specific conduct that
      the agency determined to be in violation of the aforementioned policies; indeed, it
      stated as follows: “[Y]ou were witnessed on video . . . physically restraining a
      child for approximately 10 minutes.” IAF, Tab 8 at 37. It further explained that
      the appellant was seen “pulling [the child] by the arms and legs” and “wrapping
      [her] own arms and legs around him on [her] lap to restrain him.” Id. at 37-38.
¶21         Third, the appellant provided a specific response to the agency’s allegations
      concerning her conduct; indeed, in her written reply, she described her conduct as
      follows: “He then wiggled off, crawling away from me. I leaned forward, pulled
      him back towards me, and held him close to my body – I gave him a big hug.” Id.
      at 29. Notes from the appellant’s oral reply reflect that she stated, “I was trying
      to hold him, but he was resisting. . . . He’d get up; I’d hold him again. . . . He
      kept wiggling. . . . I was not punishing the child at all.” Id. at 33-34. She also
      indicated her understanding that she was “alleged to have temporaril y breached
      the ‘touch policy.’”    Id. at 30.    She specifically addressed this policy and
      seemingly asserted that her actions constituted appropriate touch pursuant to the

      11
        Specifically, the worksheet stated as follows: “Each employee signs a ‘Touch Policy’
      which specifically states both appropriate and inappropriate actions with children.”
      IAF, Tab 9 at 9.
                                                                                         14

      same. 12 Id. at 30-32; see IAF, Tab 9 at 95 (indicating that appropriate touch
      includes hugs and lap sitting).     She acknowledged in her written reply that
      “[i]nappropriate touch includes such behavior as . . . corporal punishment.” IAF,
      Tab 8 at 32. She also argued in her oral reply that, under the Touch Policy, it is
      appropriate to “hold children firmly,” and she suggested that her conduct did not
      constitute inappropriate touch. Id. at 34; see also HT at 266 (testimony of the
      appellant acknowledging that she stated in her reply that she did not violate the
      Touch Policy).
¶22         In light of the foregoing, to the extent that the agency’s notice of proposed
      removal failed to explicitly cite to section c, we find that the oversight was not so
      substantial and so likely to cause prejudice as to deprive the appellant of due
      process.   See Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77 (explaining that “not every ex parte
      communication is a procedural defect so substantial and so likely to cause
      prejudice that it undermines the due process guarantee”). Indeed, as discussed
      above, the record showed that the appellant was notified of the conduct that the
      agency found objectionable and of the policies that she was alleged to have
      violated. See Harding v. U.S. Naval Academy, 567 F. App’x 920, 924 (Fed. Cir.
      2014) (finding that the agency did not violate the appellant’s due process rights
      when the proposal notice charged her with being under the influence of illegal
      drugs but the deciding official found that she had engaged in illegal drug use
      because the appellant “could not reasonably have [been] misled” about the reason
      for the proposal as the narrative portion of the proposal notice referenced illegal
      drug use); 13 see also Wilson, 120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶¶ 10-12 (finding no due process
      violation when the appellant, in responding to the proposed action, made a

      12
        However, as discussed above, the appellant also seemingly acknowledged a “minor”
      violation of the policy. IAF, Tab 8 at 31.
      13
        The Board has found that it may rely on unpublished decisions of the Federal Circuit
      when, as here, it finds the court’s reasoning persuasive. E.g., Vores v. Department of
      the Army, 109 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 21 (2008), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 883 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
                                                                                       15

      “specific and significant” response to an aggravating factor even though it was
      not cited in the proposal notice). Thus, although we agree with the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that the agency did not violate the appellant’s due process
      rights, we modify the basis for this finding.

      We agree that the penalty of removal was reasonable under the circumstances .
¶23           The appellant raises a series of arguments regarding the penalty of removal.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-24. To this end, she avers the following: (1) the agency
      failed to engage in progressive discipline; (2) the agency failed to consider her
      rehabilitative potential; and (3) she was charged with failure to follow
      instructions, not child abuse, and numerous other employees who have been
      similarly charged have not been removed from their positions. Id.
¶24           When, as here, the agency’s charge is sustained, the Board will review an
      agency imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the
      relevant factors and exercised discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness.
      Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11 (2010); Douglas v.
      Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).             In making this
      determination, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion
      in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s
      function is not to displace management’s responsibility, but to ensure that
      managerial judgment has been properly exercised. Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11;
      Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. The Board will modify an agency-imposed penalty
      only when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or the
      penalty clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407,
      ¶ 11.
¶25           Here, the administrative judge applied the proper legal standard and
      concluded that the agency’s selected penalty of removal was not unwarranted
      under the circumstances and was within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness.
      ID at 20-28; see Ellis, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11. In so doing, she reasoned that the
      deciding official had considered the relevant Douglas factors. ID at 20-21; see
                                                                                    16

Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301; see also Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305-06.             She also
reasoned that the appellant’s conduct was “serious” in nature and “made more
serious by the fact that [she] is a lead teacher with responsibility for overseeing
and mentoring other classroom teachers.” ID at 21; IAF, Tab 10 at 10.              She
thoroughly considered the appellant’s claims regarding progressive discipline,
rehabilitative potential, and disparate penalties, 14 but she found each claim
unavailing.   ID at 21-28.    For example, regarding rehabilitative potential, the
administrative judge reasoned that the appellant had testified at the hearing that
she believed that her interaction with the child was proper and that, if faced with
the same circumstances again, she would engage in the same conduct.                 ID
at 27-28; HT at 283 (testimony of the appellant). The administrative judge also
recounted the deciding official’s testimony that, given the nature of the
appellant’s offense, he had concerns about placing her back in a classroom
setting.   ID at 26-27.      Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the
administrative judge’s conclusion that the penalty of removal was reasonable
under the circumstances. See Green v. Department of the Navy, 61 M.S.P.R. 626,
636 (explaining that the Board has found that failure to follow instructions may
be sufficient cause for removal), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table).

14
   After the initial decision in this case was issued, the Board ov erruled some of its
prior precedent governing the analysis of claims of disparate penalties when weighing
the reasonableness of a penalty and clarified that it should not weigh the relative
seriousness of various offenses to determine if the agency treated employees who
committed different acts of misconduct differently; rather, the relevant inquiry is
whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated employees who engaged in the
same or similar offenses differently. Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15,
¶¶ 14, 17. Applying this standard here, we conclude that the appellant’s arguments both
before the administrative judge and on review do not show that the agency knowingly
and unjustifiably treated any employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses
differently.
                                                                                           17

      We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments; however, we find them
      unavailing.
¶26            We have considered the appellant’s remaining assertions; however, we find
      that none of these assertions provide a basis to disturb the initial decision . For
      example, the appellant reasserts that the agency committed harmful procedural
      error.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-30.       We find, however, that the appellant’s
      arguments do not warrant disturbing the administrative judge’s conclusions
      concerning this claim. ID at 16-17.
¶27            Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision as modified.

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 15
               The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.
               Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      15
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        18

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that su ch action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                19

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     20

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 16   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

16
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              21

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.