Court Opinion

ID: 9962590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:13:51.587575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:07.281483
License: Public Domain

J-S42042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TYHEEM MELTON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 549 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 27, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0006840-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED APRIL 23, 2024

       Appellant, Tyheem Melton, appeals pro se from the order denying his

petition seeking review of the legality of his sentence filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Specifically, he argues that based on

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),2 the court improperly

imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

       This Court previously summarized the underlying facts as follows:

       In 2012, Appellant, who was prohibited from possessing a firearm
       based upon a prior conviction, brandished a semiautomatic
       weapon and fired multiple shots at a rival drug dealer at a bar
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.

2 In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that any fact that
increases the penalty imposed for a crime is an “element” that must be
submitted to the fact-finder and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S.
at 103.
J-S42042-23

       where the two both engaged in their trade. The rival was killed,
       as was an innocent bystander. Appellant absconded and evaded
       arrest for two years until he was detained in Tennessee in 2014.

       Upon return to Philadelphia, Appellant negotiated an agreement
       pursuant to which he entered nolo contendere pleas to two counts
       of third-degree murder and possession of a firearm prohibited in
       exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and an
       aggregate sentence no lower than twenty to forty years, but with
       the Commonwealth's abstention from invoking the statute
       requiring a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
       parole for the second murder conviction. The trial court accepted
       the plea and on November 23, 2016, imposed two concurrent
       terms of twenty to forty years for the murder convictions and a
       consecutive five to ten years for the firearms conviction.

Commonwealth v. Melton, 2021 WL 2948441, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum) (internal citation omitted).

       Following PCRA proceedings resulting in the reinstatement of his post-

sentence and direct appeal rights, on August 24, 2020, Appellant filed a post-

sentence motion to withdraw his plea or, in the alternative, reconsideration of

his sentence. He subsequently withdrew his request to withdraw his plea, and

the court denied his motion for reconsideration.         This Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 14, 2021. Id.

       Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was

ineffective and that his plea was unlawfully induced.    The court appointed

PCRA counsel, who subsequently filed a Turner/Finley3 no-merit letter and a

motion to withdraw. The PCRA court issued its Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice and

____________________________________________

3 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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Appellant filed a pro se response asserting a new claim that he was serving

an illegal mandatory minimum term of incarceration. Counsel responded to

Appellant’s new claim with a supplemental Turner/Finley letter.

      On January 27, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Appellant

filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

      Does not the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne
      v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and its progeny,
      Commonwealth         v.   Newman,      99   A.3d   86    (2014),
      Commonwealth v. Wately, 81 A.3d 108, 117 (2013),
      Commonwealth v. Valentine, 2014 Pa. Super. 3420 (2014),
      and Commonwealth v. Wolf, 121 A.3d 433 (Pa. 2016),
      constitute illegal sentencing claims that any fact that, by law,
      increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be
      submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt?

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

      Appellant avers that his “case falls within th[e] narrow class of cases

considered to implicate illegal sentences” as discussed in Alleyne and its

progeny.   Id. at 2.      Without explicitly stating that he was sentenced to a

mandatory minimum, he contends that the “question for determination in this

case is whether a fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or

whether Pennsylvania’s sentencing factors are to be determined by the trial

court by a preponderance of evidence that qualify as an ‘element’ or

‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.”     Id. at 3.   Following our review, we

conclude that the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition.

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       In reviewing a PCRA court’s decision,

       Our standard of review . . . requires us to determine whether the
       PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and
       whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error. The scope
       of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
       evidence of record, which we view in the light most favorable to
       the party who prevailed before that court.

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020) (internal

citations omitted).

       Here, Appellant vaguely argues that he is serving an illegal mandatory

minimum sentence. Although he does not specify which offense, he appears

to believe the court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 for his firearms offense.4 Section 9712 requires a mandatory

minimum sentence of five years where a defendant is convicted of a “crime of

violence” while in possession of a firearm.      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a).     A

mandatory minimum sentence under Section 9712 is invalid because this

Court found Section 9712 unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Valentine,

101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. 2014).

       The record clearly demonstrates, however, that the court did not impose

a mandatory minimum sentence. Initially, the Commonwealth filed a notice

of intent to seek a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 9712

____________________________________________

4 Appellant also suggests that he was sentenced under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1,

a statute governing certain drug offenses committed with firearms. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9712.1. This suggestion is incorrect because Appellant was not
convicted of a drug offense.

                                           -4-
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and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 (sentences for second and subsequent offenses).5

See    Notice    of   Mandatory       Minimum    Sentence   Case,   filed   7/9/15.

Subsequently, however, Appellant negotiated a plea agreement in which the

Commonwealth agreed not to seek a mandatory minimum sentence.                  See

N.T., Plea Hearing 11/23/16, at 35-36. The trial court made no mention of

the applicability of Section 9712 or Section 9714 during the plea and

sentencing hearing.

       During sentencing, the court noted the standard sentencing guidelines

for each offense – 186 to 240 months for third-degree murder and 48 to 60

months for the firearms offense. Id. at 40. There were extensive arguments

concerning the judge’s discretion in imposing the sentence. Id. at 42-54, 68-

81.   Defense counsel requested a sentence at the bottom of the standard

sentencing guidelines and for concurrent sentences on the third-degree

murder offenses.      Id. at 54. As for the firearms offense, defense counsel

conceded that the trial court could impose a consecutive sentence. Id. The

Commonwealth recommended the maximum sentence for each offense. Id.

at 78. None of these proceedings suggest in any way that the court imposed

a mandatory minimum sentence.

____________________________________________

5 Section 9714 requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years where a

defendant has been previously convicted of two or more crimes of violence.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714(a)(2). This statute remains in effect.

                                           -5-
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     Nor did the court’s explanation of Appellant’s aggregate sentence of 25

to 50 years suggest that it imposed a mandatory minimum sentence. The

court reasoned:

     When I consider all of these factors, I will note that this is an
     unusual situation where the sentencing guidelines, the
     maximum sentence that could be imposed by law are
     actually the standard range sentences for all three of these
     charges, and considering everything, I think that’s appropriate to
     impose those sentences.

     However, I will permit the two homicide sentences to run
     concurrent to each other, and that will achieve an aggregate
     sentence of 25 to 50 years, which I think is fair under all these
     circumstances.

     So for all those reasons, on the charge of third-degree murder,
     victim, Crystal Shadding, Count One, I’m going to impose the
     standard range sentence equal to the maximum sentence of 20
     to 40 years in state prison. Any mandatory costs will be added as
     well.

     For the murder of Troy Wimberly, Count Seven, I’ll impose the
     maximum sentence of 20 to 40 years in state prison, which, as I
     said, is a standard range sentence.

     On the gun charge, I’ll impose the maximum sentence of five to
     ten years.

Id. at 86-87 (emphasis added). The court’s repeated references to “standard

range sentence” demonstrates that it imposed the maximum sentence

available under the standard sentencing guidelines, not a mandatory

minimum sentence.

     Several other facts confirm the same point. Appellant signed a written

nolo contendere plea colloquy containing the following handwritten note under

the “plea bargain or agreement” heading: “There is no plea bargain of any

                                    -6-
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kind, except [Appellant] will be sentenced to no less than a 20 year minimum

& max to be set by judge.”        Written Nolo Contendere Plea Agreement,

11/23/16. Additionally, Appellant’s sentencing order does not indicate that he

received a mandatory minimum sentence.            Nolo Contendere Sentencing

Order, 11/23/16. Lastly, Appellant was sentenced nearly two years after this

Court held Section 9712 unconstitutional in Valentine. Given this chronology,

we have no reason to suspect that the court intended to impose a sentence

that flew in the face of Valentine instead of a valid standard range sentence

available under the guidelines.

      In sum, we find that Appellant was not sentenced to a mandatory

minimum and therefore is not entitled to relief under Alleyne. Accordingly,

the trial court did not err in dismissing his PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 4/23/2024

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