Court Opinion

ID: 9912790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:19.371297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:54.651938
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Perkins CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B328345

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA414302)
           v.

 MARCUS LYNN PERKINS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
     Marcus Lynn Perkins, in pro. per.; Richard B. Lennon and
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             __________________________________
       Appellant Marcus Lynn Perkins appeals from an order
denying his petition filed under Penal Code section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95).1 After his appointed appellate counsel
filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
attesting she could find no arguable issues, Perkins filed a
supplemental brief. Perkins contended the trial court erred in
finding he failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief because it improperly weighed the credibility of a written
statement he introduced at the hearing, and because the court
considered whether the factual allegations he set forth in his
papers entitled him to relief. Finding no error, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

      A.     Perkins Is Convicted of Murder
      In 2017, Perkins was tried for first degree murder. Among
the instructions given to the jury were CALCRIM Nos. 520, 521,
and 540A. CALCRIM No. 520 provided in pertinent part that
Perkins was not guilty of murder unless he acted with “malice
aforethought”; that there were two types of malice aforethought,
express and implied malice; that he acted with express malice if
he “unlawfully intended to kill”; and that he acted with implied
malice if he “intentionally committed an act; [¶] . . . The natural

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as
1172.6 without substantive change. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) For clarity, we use the current statutory
numbering.
      2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

                                 2
and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human
life; [¶] . . . At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous
to human life; [¶] AND [¶] . . . He deliberately acted with
conscious disregard for human life.” The instruction also
provided that if the jury decided Perkins had committed murder,
it was murder of the second degree, unless the prosecution proved
it was murder in the first degree as defined under CALCRIM No.
521 and/or No. 540A.
        CALCRIM No. 521 provided in pertinent part that Perkins
had been prosecuted for first degree murder under two theories:
“(1) the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and (2)
the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery or
attempted robbery.” It provided also that the jury “may not find
the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless all of you agree
that the People have proved the defendant committed murder.
But all of you do not have to agree on the same theory.”
        CALCRIM No. 540A provided in pertinent part that
Perkins was charged with murder under a theory of felony
murder and that, to prove Perkins guilty of first degree murder
under this theory, the prosecution was required to prove Perkins
committed or attempted to commit a robbery, he intended to do
so, and while doing so or attempting to do so, he caused the death
of another person.
        The jury convicted Perkins of first degree murder and also
found that Perkins committed the murder while he was engaged
in the crime of robbery and that he had personally used a
handgun. Perkins was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole, with an additional four years for using a firearm during
the commission of the crime. He appealed, and we affirmed the

                                3
conviction. (People v. Perkins (May 1, 2020, B289376) [nonpub.
opn.].)

      B.      Perkins Files a Petition
       In 2022, Perkins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
arguing the trial court had instructed the jury on two theories of
first degree murder: murder under the natural and probable
consequences theory and felony murder, and that the jurors were
told they did not need to agree on the same theory to find Perkins
guilty. Perkins claimed that Senate Bill No. 775 “eliminated
natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder,” thus
requiring a reversal of his conviction because the jury was
instructed with a “legally incorrect” theory. After deeming
Perkins’s writ as a request for relief under section 1172.6, the
court appointed counsel for him and ordered the People to file a
response. The People did so, arguing that Perkins was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law because his record of conviction
established he was not prosecuted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Thereafter, Perkins’s counsel
informed the court that she intended to submit on the petition
and concede the matter.
       After learning of his appointed counsel’s intentions,
Perkins successfully asked the trial court to permit him to waive
his right to counsel and to file a reply brief. In January 2023,
acting in propria persona, Perkins filed a reply brief arguing that
“relief is based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (theory) being used in jury instruction CALCRIM 520,
First Degree Murder with malice aforethought to impute malice
based solely on the person’s participation in a crime” and that
“relief is based on an other [sic] theory under which malice was
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in

                                 4
a crime.” He also admitted in his reply brief that the victim’s
daughter testified she “viewed a black male pointing a gun at”
her father, that she “heard several shots fired,” and that she
“identified the petitioner.”
       At the hearing on the petition, the prosecution argued
Perkins was ineligible for relief because “he was the actual
shooter,” and because the jury was not instructed on “aiding and
abetting” or “natural and probable consequences” or given any
“instruction to make the defendant subject to imputed malice
based on the conduct of another person, or merely participating
in a crime.”3
       Perkins countered that the jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 520 which contained the phrase “natural and
probable consequences,” but the court explained that the “natural
and probable consequences” discussed in CALCRIM No. 520 were
part of the instruction on finding implied malice and were not the
same as those discussed in the “natural and probable
consequences” doctrine.4 The court added that in any case, the

         3 The prosecution also contended that the jury was not

instructed on felony murder; the court corrected the prosecution
that the jury was instructed on felony murder but “on a theory
that he was the actual shooter.”
         4 (See People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231

[“Before Senate Bill No. 1437, ‘the natural and probable
consequences doctrine was an exception to the actual malice
requirement’—i.e., the requirement of either express or implied
malice. [Citations.] The name of the doctrine is confusing, since
implied malice also incorporates the idea of ‘natural and probable
consequences,’ but the two concepts are distinct. Whereas
implied malice is based on ‘the “natural and probable
consequences” of a defendant’s own act’ the natural and probable
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

                                       5
jury had found Perkins guilty of first degree murder, so they did
not consider the “implied malice” portion of CALCRIM No. 520,
but instead must have found either that “it was a direct[,] willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder, which includes an intent to
kill, or that it was a felony murder where you were the actual
killer.”
       After further discussion on the law, Perkins asked to
submit a “one page document” that was “an interview of T[.]
Macias” (the Macias statement).5 The Macias statement appears
to be a typewritten statement from the perspective of Macias,
stating that after Macias heard gunshots on the night of the
murder, he saw a green Toyota Corolla turn the corner, and it
was driven by “Sinbad” with “Smokey” as a passenger.6 The
prosecution objected to the court considering this statement,
arguing it was improper at this stage of the proceedings. Perkins
argued that the statement was relevant because it supported the
theory that there were two assailants and that the person who
exited the store and got into the car was not him.

consequences doctrine was ‘a theory of vicarious liability under
which “[a]n aider and abettor [was] guilty not only of the
intended, or target, crime but also of any other crime a principal
in the target crime actually commit[ted] (the nontarget
crime)” ’—including murder—‘ “that [was] a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime” ’ ”].)
      5 The Macias statement does not appear in the record, but

Perkins attaches it to his supplemental brief. It seems to be a
form originating from the Los Angeles Police Department and it
is unclear whether it was included at trial or was otherwise part
of the record of conviction.
      6 Perkins clarified in his brief that “Neither of the two

individuals [Macias] depicted is the appellant.”

                                 6
      The trial court permitted Perkins to lodge this statement
but informed him that it could not consider it at this stage of the
proceedings. It added that the statement might be relevant in an
order to show cause hearing but advised Perkins that “even if the
jury bought this, they would have acquitted you. [¶] So this
doesn’t show that you were convicted as an aider and abettor.”
      The court subsequently denied the petition, finding that the
People had shown, as a matter of law, that Perkins was not
convicted on a theory of murder that was no longer valid.
Perkins timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      A.       Governing Law
       Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), “A person convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, . . . may file a petition with the court that sentenced the
petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . . conviction vacated
and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the
following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner
was convicted of murder . . . following a trial . . . . [¶] (3) The
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because
of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
Section 188, subdivision (a)(3) now provides: “Except as stated in

                                  7
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder,
a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” Section 189, subdivision (e) now
provides in pertinent part: “A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [which
list includes robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the
actual killer.”
       When a defendant files a facially sufficient petition under
section 1172.6, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner, allow briefing from both sides, and hold a hearing
to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)–(c).) If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court
will issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

      B.     Analysis
       The trial court found that Perkins failed to make a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief under section 1172.6.
Perkins argues the court erred in so finding because: (1) the court
engaged in improper weighing of the credibility of the Macias
statement when it advised him that the statement would not be
helpful to him; and (2) the court engaged in improper factfinding
when it determined that “the factual allegations the appellant set
forth in the prima facie hearing were not facts that would have
caused a jury to convict the appellant as an aider and abbettor
[sic]” and would not “show that the appellant was convicted as an
aider and abbettor [sic],” and “that the people ha[d] shown as a
matter of law that the appellant was not convicted on a theory
that is not still valid.” Neither contention has merit.

                                 8
       When Perkins raised the Macias statement at his hearing,
the court informed him the statement was irrelevant at this stage
of the proceedings but could become relevant if the matter were
to proceed to an order to show cause hearing. However, the court
also advised Perkins, who was appearing in propria persona, that
this document would not be helpful to him in such a hearing,
because if the jury had believed the statement, it would have
acquitted him, and that the statement did not demonstrate
Perkins had been convicted as an aider and abettor (if he had
been convicted of aiding and abetting the actual killer instead of
as the actual killer himself, he could potentially be entitled to
relief under section 1172.6). We discern no improper weighing of
credibility in the court’s colloquy with Perkins. Indeed, the court
went out of its way to state that it could not consider the
statement in the proceedings currently before it. It appears
instead that, as a courtesy to Perkins, the court was explaining to
him why the statement would not be helpful in obtaining relief
under section 1172.6. But nothing in the record suggests the
court denied the petition at the prima facie hearing because it
believed or disbelieved the Macias statement.
       The court also did not err in considering whether the
factual allegations that Perkins had set forth entitled him to
relief. That is precisely what the trial court was supposed to do.
As our Supreme Court explained, and as Perkins himself
acknowledges in his brief: in making a prima facie determination
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), “ ‘ “the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971, italics added.)

                                 9
       Finally, Perkins failed to demonstrate the court erred in
finding him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. As Perkins
admitted, he was identified by the victim’s daughter as the
shooter. The jury found Perkins guilty of first degree murder.
From the record provided to us (including jury instructions), we
agree with the trial court’s analysis that the jury could have
reached such a conclusion only under two theories—either the
jury found Perkins acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation as defined in CALCRIM No. 521, or it found under
CALCRIM No. 540A that he committed or intended to commit
robbery and that, in doing so, caused the death of the victim. If
the jury found first degree murder through the first avenue
(CALCRIM No. 521), then Perkins acted with malice. If the jury
found first degree murder through the second avenue (CALCRIM
No. 540A), Perkins has not cited anything in the record to
suggest that he was convicted under any theory other than his
being the actual killer. Moreover, the jury also found Perkins
had personally used a handgun in his crime, and CALCRIM No.
540A “addresses situations where the defendant allegedly
committed the fatal act.” (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th
123, 181, fn. 46.)
       Both theories under which the jury could have found first
degree murder remain valid under the amendments to sections
188 and 189. Perkins is therefore ineligible for relief as a matter
of law under section 1172.6. He fails to raise any arguable
contention that the trial court erred in denying him relief. (See
People v. Hertz (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 770, 780 [appellant has
affirmative duty to show error].)

                                10
                         DISPOSITION
     The trial court’s order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                            CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             BENDIX, Acting P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

                               11