Court Opinion

ID: 9470585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:10:12.308151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:59.635256
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all of part B of Judge Tuttle’s excellent opinion, and in most of what is stated in part A. I agree, for the reasons stated by Judge Tuttle, that there was a conflict of interest between White and his retained counsel the Brumfields, and that the conflict was of such a nature that White’s conviction is subject to being set aside, regardless of whether actual prejudice is shown, if White did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the conflict. I also agree that the record before us falls short of affirmatively and unequivocally establishing that White was fully aware of the various precise, concrete ways in which he might be harmed by the Brumfields’ representation of him in the face of their conflicting interests, and that the trial court’s colloquy with White fell slightly short, in this respect, of the full treatment envisaged by United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir.1975). On the other hand, the record does plainly establish that White was aware of the nature and factual basis of the conflict, and of what his alternatives were, and that he voluntarily, and without having been “leaned on,” -affirmatively and unequivocally resisted any suggestion that the Brumfields be replaced and elected to continue with them. Government counsel stated on the record, in White’s presence, that the Brumfields were “targets” of the investigation into White’s escape, and that this in fact presented “an actual conflict” of a “grave nature.” Brumfield informed the court, in White’s presence, that he had “explained to him [White] the difficulty that is presented to us in defending him” in light of the conflict. White answered affirma*512tively when asked by the court, “[D]o you understand the nature of the conflict,” and was given the opportunity to ask questions. While it may be that White did not understand how he could be harmed by the Brumfields’ conflict-burdened representation of him; there is nothing in the record which tends to establish such a lack of understanding. In light of the record and the substantial efforts made by the trial court (and the government) to protect White and comply with Garcia in this regard, I would not hold as a matter of law that White’s waiver was not knowingly made. I would, rather, remit White to his post-conviction remedies.* If pursuant thereto White establishes, by testimony under oath and subject to cross-examination and possible rebuttal, that he was unaware of one or more of the precise, concrete ways in which he was subject to material harm by virtue of the Brumfields’ conflict-burdened representation of him, and would not have continued with the Brumfields had he been adequately informed in that regard, then White’s conviction should be set.aside. But on this record we should not simply assume, as a matter of law, that such is the case. I therefore respectfully dissent from the present reversal of White’s conviction.**

 Or, alternatively, remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on this question.

 While the district court doubtless had discretion to disqualify the Brumfields despite a proper waiver by White, United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.1980), this does not mean that White could not waive the conflict. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276-77. In my opinion this record falls short of establishing an abuse of discretion of which White is in a position to complain, absent a showing that his affirmative, voluntary, and apparently knowing request to be permitted to continue with his retained counsel, after being informed of the conflict, was not in fact knowingly made. Cf. Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 121-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 86, 74 L.Ed.2d 81 (1982) (disqualification of judge).