Court Opinion

ID: 9884693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:08:42.848989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:40.124515
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the majority that Gassler’s petition for postconviction relief is time barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2008). And I join Part I of the majority opinion, in which the majority concludes that Gassier is not entitled to have his petition for postconviction relief considered under the newly discovered evidence exception to the statutory time bar. But I disagree with the majority insofar as it concludes that the postconviction court should have also considered whether Gas-sler’s petition met the interests of justice exception in section 590.01, subdivision 4. In my view, when a petition alleges that it falls within one of the four specific exceptions set forth in subdivision 4(b), the residual interests of justice exception cannot apply.
Minnesota Statutes § 590.01, subdivision 4(a), requires that any petition for posteon-viction relief be filed no more than 2 years after the date of “the entry of judgment of conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed” or “an appellate court’s disposition of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Subdivision 4(b) of that section creates five exceptions to this 2-year statute of limitations. The two provisions of subdivision 4(b) that are relevant to this case are as follows:
(2) the petitioner alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence, including scientific evidence, that could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the two-year time period for filing a postconviction petition, and the evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial, is not for impeachment purposes, and establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted;
...; or
(5) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.
Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b). The statute goes on to provide in subdivision 4(c) that “[a]ny petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (b) must be filed within two years of the date the claim arises.” Id., subd. 4(c).
There is no dispute that Gassler’s petition was untimely unless he satisfies one of the subdivision 4(b) exceptions. Gassier argues that his petition satisfies two of the exceptions — the newly discovered evidence exception and the interests of justice exception. I agree with the majority that Gassier does not satisfy the newly discovered evidence exception. But, because the basis for Gassler’s petition falls squarely within the parameters of the newly discovered evidence exception, he cannot avoid the strict requirements of that exception by merely arguing that his is an interests of justice petition.
The legislature has carefully detailed the requirements a petitioner must meet to receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in subdivision 4(b)(2). As the majority acknowledges, to satisfy this exception the petitioner must: (1) allege the existence of newly discovered evidence, including scientific evidence; (2) show that the evidence could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence by the petitioner or petitioner’s attorney within the 2-year time period for filing a postconviction petition; (3) show *589that the evidence is not cumulative to evidence presented at trial; (4) show that the evidence is not for impeachment purposes; and (5) show that the evidence establishes by a clear and convincing standard that the petitioner is innocent of the offense or offenses for which the petitioner was convicted. Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(2). The majority properly concludes that Gassier has not established by “clear and convincing evidence” that he was innocent of the offense for which he was convicted and finds his failure to meet this prong disposi-tive.
But the majority then thwarts the legislature’s very specific and detailed instructions about the circumstances in which a new trial should be granted when it allows Gassier a second chance to make out his case for a new trial under the more generic interests of justice exception. I would treat the interests of justice exception as a residual exception, intended to cover situations not covered by the other four exceptions of subdivision 4(b), not as a means by which petitioners may circumvent the more specific requirements of the other statutory exceptions.
While we have not had the opportunity to construe the interaction between the exceptions in section 590.01, subdivision 4, our precedent construing an analogous provision — Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 — confirms my analysis. Rule 60.02 provides that a court “may relieve a party or the party’s legal representatives from a final judgment (other than a marriage dissolution decree), order, or proceeding” for the following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.03;
(c) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The rule further provides two different limitations periods depending on which statutory provision is invoked. It provides that such a motion “shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (a), (b), and (c) not more than 1 year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.
Our case law interpreting Rule 60.02 makes clear that a party moving to set aside a judgment based on newly discovered evidence may not avoid the 1-year statute of limitations that applies to the'newly discovered evidence exception under (b) by invoking the catch-all provision under (f). See Anderson v. Anderson, 288 Minn. 514, 518, 179 N.W.2d 718, 722 (1970) (“Rule 60.02(6) is a residual clause to cover any unforeseen contingency and it is exclusive of clauses (1) through (5).”). Instead, we have held that a party seeking relief must base their motion under the specific exception that applies. See Chapman v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 454 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Minn.1990) (“Clause (f) has been designated as a residual clause, designed only to afford relief in those circumstances exclusive of the specific areas addressed by clauses (a) through (e).”); Sommers v. Thomas, 251 Minn. 461, 466-67, 88 N.W.2d *590191, 195 (1958) (“Clause (6)1 is couched in very broad terms. It gives to the court the power to relieve a party of a final judgment in the exercise of its sound discretion, subject only to two limitations: (1) the motion for relief must be made within a reasonable time and (2) relief may not be had under clause (6) when the grounds for granting it fall properly under clauses (1), (2), or (3), to which the one-year limitation applies.”). Only in situations not covered by one of the other five exceptions do we consider whether relief might be justified under the catch-all provision of clause (f). See Chapman, 454 N.W.2d at 924.
Our Rule 60.02 in turn closely parallels Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Similar to our Rule 60.02, the catch-all exception found in Rule 60(b)(6) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” The federal courts interpret this catch-all provision as applying only when the motion “is not premised on one of the grounds for relief enumerated in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5).” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 & n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988); see also Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 278 (1st Cir.1993) (“[PJlaintiffs’ attempt to garb their motion in the raiment of clause (6) runs aground on the bedrock principle that clause (6) may not be used as a vehicle for circumventing clauses (1) through (5).”); Matter of Dakota Cheese, 923 F.2d 576, 577 (8th Cir.1991) (explaining that, because motion was based on newly discovered evidence, it was governed by the 1-year limitation period of Rule 60(b)(2) and concluding the parties could not characterize it as arising under Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid the limitation period). As explained in Moore’s Federal Practice, “[i]f the reasons offered for relief from judgment could be considered under one of the more specific clauses of Rule 60(b)(l)-(5), those reasons will not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” 12 James Moore, Federal Practice § 60.48[2] (3d ed.2010).
In my view, the exceptions to the time bar in the postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, operate in the same way as the exceptions to the time bar in our Rule 60.02 and to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). I would adhere to the cases interpreting these similar rules and construe the exceptions in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, as mutually exclusive.3
*591The majority reaches the opposite conclusion, arguing that because the legislature used “or” in the statute, the exceptions must be read disjunctively. But the cases the majority cites to reach its conclusion do not involve similar statutory provisions. See Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 385-88 (Minn.1999) (analyzing whether the word “or” should be read disjunctively or conjunctively in the context of a statute addressing “professionals requesting or seeking” certain privileged information and concluding that it should be read conjunctively in the context of the statute in question); Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass'n 230 Minn. 353, 359-60, 41 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1950) (interpreting the “or” disjunctively in a statute addressing pensions and benefits paid “under or in accordance with any prior act or acts”) (internal quotation marks omitted). These cases therefore shed no light on the question presented here.
Moreover, the dispute is not over whether “or” is read as disjunctive or conjunctive in Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, as the majority suggests. Rather, the dispute is over whether Gassier may avoid the stringent requirements of the newly discovered evidence exception of subdivision 4(b)(2) by arguing that his newly discovered evidence gives him the right to petition for a new trial “in the interests of justice” under subdivision 4(b)(5).
Unlike the majority, I read the five exceptions to the 2-year statute of limitations to each address a distinct factual situation in which the postconviction court is instructed to hear a petition for postcon-viction relief despite the fact it was not brought within the statutory time frame. The first four exceptions are each narrowly tailored to a particular factual scenario. The final exception is designed to cover any other factual situation that might come up that would demand relief but is not already covered by one of the other four exceptions. As the majority acknowledges, relief will be merited under subdivision 4(b)(5) only in exceptional cases. See supra at 585; cf. Valencia v. Markham Coop. Ass’n, 210 Minn. 221, 226, 297 N.W. 736, 738-39 (1941) (explaining that a new trial will be granted in “the interests of justice” only in “exceptional cases”). Petitioners should not be permitted to circumvent the specific requirements of one of the other four exceptions by making out a case under the fifth, general exception. Cf. Wesco Prods. Co. v. Alloy Auto. Co., 880 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.1989) (“Inherent in the structure of Rule 60(b) is the principle that the first three clauses and the catchall clause are mutually exclusive.... The rationale underlying this principle is that the one year time limit applicable to the first three clauses of Rule 60(b) would be meaningless if relief was also available under the catchall provision.”). We must give effect to all of the provisions in the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2008) (noting that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective”). We can only do this if the interests of justice exception means something different than what is already covered by the other exceptions in the statute. Because Gassler’s petition sets forth a claim of newly discovered evidence, the exception in subdivision 4(b)(2), I would hold that he was not entitled to review under the interests of justice exception in subdivision 4(b)(5).

. The numbering of the provisions is from the earlier version of Rule 60.02. Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (1988) (amended Dec. 20, 1993).

. We have looked to the interpretation of Rule 60(b) in the past in interpreting our own Rule 60.02. See Newman v. Fjelstad, 271 Minn. 514, 521-22, 137 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1965); Sommers, 251 Minn. at 467 n. 10, 88 N.W.2d at 195 n. 10. Moreover, because habeas proceedings are treated as civil matters, Rule 60(b) has been applied in the habeas context. See 12 James Moore, Federal Practice § 60.02[2] (3d ed.2010) (discussing application of Rule 60(b) to habeas proceedings and noting that its application in this context may be modified by the special requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). We have recognized in the past that our postconviction proceedings are similar in some respects to habeas proceedings. See Townsend v. State, 646 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn.2002) (discussing the similarities between a habeas petition and a petition for postconviction relief and holding that the district court did not err in construing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a petition for postconviction relief). The interpretation of Rule 60(b) therefore is helpful to the issue presented in this postconviction case.

.The majority suggests that I find Minn.Stat. § 590.01 ambiguous and that I improperly rely on Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 to resolve this ambiguity. The majority is mistaken. I do not find the statute to be ambiguous. On the contrary, I believe the statute is plain on its face. I look to Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) not to resolve an ambiguity, but rather I use them as illustrations of *591similar rules that courts (ours and the federal courts) have interpreted in a similar manner based on their plain meaning. See 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864 (2d ed.1995) (explaining that the case law ''establishfes] that clause (6) and the first five clauses are mutually exclusive and that relief cannot be had under clause (6) if it would have been available under the earlier clauses” and concluding that “[t]his reading seems required also by the language of the rule.”).