Court Opinion

ID: 9521053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:56:01.37535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:35.303022
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I cannot agree with the majority that the respondent’s conduct in this case warrants disbarment. While each case of attorney discipline presents a unique factual situation and must be decided on its own merits, a degree of uniformity in the application of sanctions is desirable. (In re Andros (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 419.) The facts in this case are similar to those in In re Crane (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 40, and in that case we held that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for three years. In Crane, the respondent was charged with overreaching, charging excessive fees, and breach of the fiduciary duty he owed to his minor clients. We held that since the complainants were minors, who placed an extraordinary degree of trust and confidence in the respondent, that he was under a special duty not to abuse that relationship and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In the instant case, Helen Escobedo is an adult with an eighth-grade education, poor physical health, and a lack of business experience. In both Crane and the instant case, the respondents received large sums of cash without issuing bills or giving receipts. The respondent in Crane was also alleged to have advised his clients to make statements he knew to be false to the court, an additional charge which is not present in the instant case. I believe that, since the facts in these two cases are so similar, the sanctions imposed should also be similar. I agree with the majority that respondent’s prior discipline should not be considered in determining the appropriate sanction, and therefore believe that disbarment in this case is too harsh and that the respondent should have been suspended from the practice of law for three years. GOLDENHE RSH and SIMON, JJ., join in this dissent.