Court Opinion

ID: 9575555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:14:45.358278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:23.055537
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, P. J.,
concurring.
Because Oregon does not recognize a good faith exception to the warrant requirement, I am compelled to agree with the majority that the arrest of Tracy was unlawful. Because the trial court applied the wrong burden of proof, I also agree that we must remand for a finding regarding whether defendants’ consents to search their motel room and car were voluntary. However, under the circumstances of this case, I believe that handcuffing Eugene was a reasonable step to protect Rhodes and his fellow officers from serious physical injury. Consequently, I do not believe that the cuffing constituted illegal police activity that should be considered in determining whether the consents were voluntary.
The majority, citing State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 747 P2d 991 (1987), properly frames the issue as “whether *160Rhodes’ action in handcuffing Eugene was reasonable under the circumstances.” 120 Or App at 157. However, in what appears to me to be a muddled and misdirected analysis, the majority opinion anomalously holds that the handcuffing was unreasonable and, therefore, constituted a seizure in violation of Article I, section 9, because Rhodes failed to adhere to the procedure outlined in ORS 131.625. 120 Or App at 158. Under that reasoning, whenever an officer lawfully encounters a person and reasonably believes that the person poses a threat to the safety of the officer or others, the steps that the officer can take for protection are limited by ORS 131.625. That is simply not the law.
The majority bases it holding on State v. Morgan, 106 Or App 138, 806 P2d 713, rev den 312 Or 235 (1991). There, the police received a report that someone had taken a person from a car at gunpoint. Defendant, who was driving a car that matched the description of the vehicle in the report, was stopped and ordered to leave the car. He was frisked, handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. After acknowledging that State v. Bates, supra, permits an officer to take reasonable steps for his or her own protection, we held that
“once defendant was taken out of the car and frisked, any concern about immediate danger dissipated, especially in light of [the officer’s] description of defendant as ‘polite and cooperative.’ On these facts, we find that when defendant was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, he was arrested within the meaning of ORS 133.005(1).” 106 Or App at 142. (Emphasis supplied.)
The striking factual differences between Morgan and this case compel the conclusion that, here, the officers’ concern for their safety had not dissipated when Eugene was handcuffed. In Morgan, the defendant was removed from his car and placed in a secure area — the back of a patrol car — that was not in immediate proximity to the officers. Eugene, on the other hand, remained in close proximity to the officers within the confines of a small motel room where a weapon could have been hidden and easily retrieved, especially in light of the fact that the officers were primarily focused on arresting Tracy. In addition, unlike the defendant in Morgan, Eugene was never frisked for weapons before he was handcuffed. Under the facts of this case, I do not believe that we *161can say in good conscience that the officers’ concern for their safety had dissipated by the time Eugene was handcuffed.
The primary flaw in the majority’s analysis is that it fails to analyze the issues in the correct order. In State v. Morgan, supra, we held that the defendant was illegally arrested only after we had concluded that the handcuffing was an unreasonable officer safety measure. If we had instead determined that the cuffing was a reasonable safety precaution, then we never would have decided whether the handcuffing amounted to an illegal arrest because police conduct that is justified on the basis of safety concerns never constitutes an “unreasonable” search or seizure under Article I, section 9. State v. Bates, supra, 304 Or at 524. See also State v. Redmond, 114 Or App 197, 834 P2d 516 (1992) (warrantless seizure of weapons from defendant’s person upheld as reasonable safety measure); State v. Kemp/Haworth, 112 Or App 522, 831 P2d 37 (1992) (warrantless seizure of rifle and search of front passenger area of car were reasonable steps for officer’s protection); State v. Anfield, 100 Or App 692, 788 P2d 480, aff'd 313 Or 554, 836 P2d 1337 (1992) (warrantless seizure of bag sustained as reasonably necessary to ensure officer’s safety); State v. Schellhorn, 95 Or App 297, 769 P2d 221 (1989) (warrantless seizure of purse justified as reasonable safety precaution). Consequently, the handcuffing of Eugene is not a “seizure” that offends Article I, section 9, if it is justifiable as a reasonable safety measure.1 Our initial focus therefore should be on whether the handcuffing was permissible under State v. Bates, supra. If it was, then the officers did not violate the constitutional protections embodied in Article I, section 9. If it was not, only then do we decide whether the handcuffing amounted to an illegal arrest.
In State v. Bates, supra, the Supreme Court held that Article I, section 9, permits a police officer
“to take reasonable steps to protect himself or others if, during the course of a lawful encounter with a citizen, the officer develops a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific *162and articulable facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to the officer or to others then present.” 304 Or at 524. (Emphasis supplied.)
On judicial review, our inquiry is limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the officer’s action was taken. 304 Or at 525. See also State v. Faccio, supra, 114 Or App 112, 115-16, 834 P2d 485 (1992).
It is indisputable that Rhodes did lawfully encounter Eugene in the motel room. The arrest warrant authorized the officers to arrest Tracy Teixeira. ORS 133.140(2). Because Teixeira was the registered guest in room 110, the officers had probable cause to believe that she was there. See State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 605 P2d 646, cert den 449 US 846 (1980). The officers were authorized to go to that room and arrest her.
It is also incontrovertible that the circumstances confronting Rhodes supported a reasonable suspicion, based on particularized facts, that Eugene might pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury to him and his fellow officers. As the trial court found:
“[Officer Rhodes] was in [the motel] room, he had arrested Mrs. Johnson, there was also another, unsecured person in the room. And though the attendant described it as large, we all know a motel, it was a single room and everybody was in the same space. And [Eugene] had his hand under the pillow. I’m not saying there was anything in and of itself that suggested that [Eugene] was doing anything with his hand, but it certainly raises concern for the officer.
“And in particular this officer had information from a fellow officer, after he concluded what the identity was of [Eugene], to know that [he] had had a prior police contact that involved weapons taken off [him]. So I think [Rhodes] certainly had specific and articulable reasons to be concerned for his safety.”
In addition to those observations, I note that the officers were executing a felony drug-possession arrest warrant, which is an inherently highly dangerous operation. Indeed, Rhodes testified at trial that he found weapons on drug arrestees “anywhere from 25 percent of the time to maybe 40 percent of the time.” Moreover, as discussed previously, the warrant *163was being executed in a motel room where a weapon could have been easily concealed and retrieved by Eugene, especially when the officers’ attention was focused on arresting Tracy. I believe that there were specific and articulable facts supporting Rhodet ’ suspicion that Eugene may have posed an immediate threat to Rhodes and his fellow officers. I would hold that, in these circumstances, handcuffing Eugene was a reasonable protective measure.
Eugene argues, and the majority seems to agree, that it would have been more reasonable to frisk him rather than handcuff him. Bates, however, does not require that the officers choose the most reasonable alternative; it only requires that the steps taken are reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, they were. In any event, as the state points out in its brief, handcuffing a person may have distinct advantages over frisking him:
“Handcuffing does not involve the officer running his or her hands over the subject’s body; thus it may be more palatable when the officer and the subject are of different sexes. A good thorough frisk takes time and, because dangerous hypodermic needles commonly are encountered on drug users, a frisk subjects the officer to the risk of being punctured and infected. Handcuffing, on the other hand, can be done quickly and involves little risk of encountering needles. A suspect, once frisked, remains a threat: He may attack with his hands or — particularly in the confines of a small room where the officers’ primary attention is on arresting someone else — he may grab an officer’s gun. A handcuffed person is substantially disabled from doing these things.”
I recognize that an arrest is a significant invasion of a person’s liberty and, as such, constitutes a “seizure” of the person under Article I, section 9. See State v. Gerrish, supra n 1. When it appears that such a seizure may have occurred, it is incumbent upon us to ensure that it was permissible. However, once we decide that the deprivation of a citizen’s liberty is justifiable as a reasonable officer safety precaution, our inquiry is at an end and any seizure that may have resulted from the officer’s conduct will not be found to have violated the Oregon Constitution. Thus, in balancing the individual’s right to be free from restraint against the officer’s right to take reasonable steps to protect himself and *164others in the performance of his duties, Oregon courts come down on the side of the officer. As the Supreme Court noted in Bates:
“[I]t is not [the function of the courts] to uncharitably second-guess an officer’s judgment. A police officer in the field frequently must make life or death decisions in a matter of seconds. There may be little or no time in which to weigh the magnitude of a potential safety risk against the intrusiveness of protective measures. An officer must be allowed considerable latitude to take safety precautions in such situations. Our inquiry is therefore limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that the decision was made.” State v. Bates, supra, 304 Or at 524.
Because handcuffing Eugene was a reasonable step to protect Rhodes’ and his fellow officers’ safety, I conclude that any “seizure” of Eugene that may have occurred was not “unreasonable” within the meaning of Article I, section 9.1 believe that the majority has erred in holding to the contrary.

 I recognize that an arrest or a stop significantly restricts a citizen’s liberty and constitutes a “seizure” of the person under the Oregon Constitution. State v. Gerrish, 311 Or 506, 510, 815 P2d 1244 (1991). I do not decide, however, whether Eugene was in fact placed under arrest when he was handcuffed.