Court Opinion

ID: 9851009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:44.090789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.918662
License: Public Domain

Snell, J.
I respectfully dissent.
1. This is not a prosecution for reckless driving under the statute, section 321.283, Code of Iowa 1962. It is not a prosecution under an ordinance dependent upon statutory or judicial-definition of reckless driving for its validity. To so consider it is to proceed from a faulty premise. It is a prosecution for violating an ordinance of the City of Vinton. This ordinance quoted *869by the majority in Division II does not refer to or attempt to interpret statutory reckless driving. It does establish a standard of care within the City of Vinton but unless it contravenes the statute it is valid.
I do not think the fact that the ordinance may once have had but does not now have a counterpart in the Code is of controlling importance when considered in the light of other statutory provisions.
It is true that the first sentence in the information accused defendant “of the crime of reckless driving- and driving on the wrong side of the street.” The information then particularized the charge by referring to the City ordinance by title, chapter and section number and stating what defendant did to violate the ordinance.
The designation of the offense as reckless driving and driving on the wrong side of the street was immaterial. It is well settled that the offense charged is determined by the statement of facts .and not by the designation given to the offense. State v. Gillett, 92 Iowa 527, 528, 61 N.W. 169; State v. Steinke, 185 Iowa 481, 487, 170 N.W. 801; State v. Burley, 181 Iowa 981, 983, 165 N.W. 190.
II. The majority concedes in Division I that “a finding of reckless driving was fully justified” and in Division IV quotes the trial court’s finding that “in so doing he was in violation of the above city ordinance for which he is on trial.” If the acts of the defendant were such as to constitute reckless driving they were certainly such as to constitute a violation of the ordinance. No one claims otherwise. In Division IV the majority opinion says “It is clear that the city meant to charge defendant with reckless driving.” I do not agree. Under our pronouncements cited, supra, defendant was charged with violating the ordinance. The allegations “by driving his car in a reckless and negligent manner so as to scare a horse and cause it to bolt and in driving on the wrong side of the street” were allegations of the facts constituting the violation of the ordinance. If, as the majority opinion says, a finding of reckless driving was fully justified there is no sound basis for holding the ordinance invalid just because it has no counterpart in the statute. Defendant was not *870convicted for doing that which, is permitted by statute. He was convicted for acts proscribed by statute found to be in violation of the ordinance.
III. The city ordinance is supplemental to but I do not think it is in conflict with the statutes. There is not a thing proscribed in the ordinance that is approved by statute-. Careful and prudent driving as well as reasonable and safe speed are required. The ordinance conforms to the. speed statute, section 321.285, and the control statute, section 321.288. It conforms to the reckless driving statute except for the requirement of “willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” Failure to comply with the provisions of the law of the road, chapter 321, Code of Iowa, is a misdemeanor punishable unless otherwise provided by a fine of not more than $100 or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days. Section 321.482, Code of Iowa. Reckless driving, section 321.283, is also a misdemeanor but section 321.284 fixes the minimum fine at $25.
IV. Section 321.235, Code of Iowa, quoted by the majority in Division II, prohibits a municipality from enacting “any rule or regulation in conflict with” the state laws, but specifically grants authority to enact additional traffic regulations not in conflict therewith.
By its specific terms there is no preemption by the statutes.
Section 321.236, Code of Iowa, provides that local authorities shall have no authority to enact any -ordinance in any way in conflict with, contrary to or inconsistent with, the provisions of this chapter. “However, the provisions of this chapter shall not be deemed to- prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways” from exercising police power in eleven specified particulars none of which specifically covers the ordinance involved here.
It is a well settled rule of construction that in determining the meaning of a statute all provisions of the Act of which it is a part and other pertinent statutes must be considered. (Emphasis added.) Horner v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 253 Iowa 1, 8, 110 N.W.2d 371. Bergeson v. Pesch, infra.
Ve have frequently quoted with approval the rule expressed *871in the Latin phrase “expréssio unins est exclusio alterius.” The express mention of the one thing- implies the exclusion of others. The ordinance before us is not specifically authorized by section 321.236, Code of Iowa, but the rule of implied exclusion is not applicable here. Section 321.235 says specifically that local authorities may adopt additional traffic reg-ulations not in conflict with the chapter. Section 389.40, Code of Iowa, provides:
“Driving or riding. Cities and towns shall have power to restrain and regulate the riding and driving of horses, livestock, vehicles, and bicycles within the limits of the corporation, and prevent and punish fast or immoderate riding or driving within such limits.”
Chapter 235, Laws of the Sixtieth General Assembly, provides :
“Section 1. Section three hundred sixty-eight point two (368.2), Code 1962, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
“ Tt is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Iowa that the provisions of the Code relating to1 the powers, privileges, and immunities of cities and towns are intended to confer broad powers of self-determination as to strictly local and internal affairs upon such municipal corporations and should be liberally construed in favor of such corporations. The rule that cities and towns have only those powers expressly conferred by statute has no application to this Code. Its provisions shall be construed to confer upon such corporations broad and implied power over all local and internal affairs which may exist within constitutional limits. No section of the Code which grants a specific power to cities and towns, or any reasonable class thereof, shall be construed as narrowing or restricting the general grant of powers hereinabove conferred unless such restriction is expressly set forth in such statute or unless the terms of such statute are so comprehensive as to have entirely occupied the field of its subject.’ ”
In Richardson v. City of Jefferson, 257 Iowa 709, 134 N.W.2d 528, we held that as a rule of construction this statute is constitutional.
*872We have in these statutes a broad grant of power and a legislative mandate as to construction.
It is not necessary to put into the statute mention of all the specific ways in which the offense set forth may be committed. “Charging words will ordinarily be held sufficient if their meaning can be fairly ascertained by references to similar statutes * * * or to the dictionary.” 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 24(2), page 71.
Negligent acts may be made the basis for a criminal statute. State v. Wojahn, 204 Ore. 84, 282 P.2d 675. They are made so by section 321.482. See State v. Holling, 247 Iowa 1082, 78 N.W.2d 25, and cases cited therein.
Similarity between a statute and an ordinance does not invalidate the ordinance where there is no conflict. Both may coexist and be effective. City of Des Moines v. Reiter, 251 Iowa 1206, 1209, 102 N.W.2d 363, and authorities cited therein.
V. Volume 62 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, section 143 b(3), pages 291, 292 and 293, says:
“The fact that a municipal corporation imposes regulations additional to those of the state does not necessarily create a conflict. * * *
“If the language of a statute admits of the conclusion that the legislature did not intend its regulations to' be exclusive, the general rule permitting additional supplementary local regulations applies. * * *
“The fact that an ordinance enlarges on the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirements for all cases to its own prescriptions.”
The exact words last quoted also appear in 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, section 165, page 790.
A municipal corporation may not by ordinance lower statutory requirements but additional regulations are specifically authorized.
VI. Defendant could not have been misled by the information. There is similarity but no conflict between the name in the charging part and the correct designation of the offense in the statement of facts. The designation of the offense by reference *873to the particular ordinance violated, supported by the alleged facts, was correct and adequate to sustain a conviction.
VIT. ' Section 762.3, Code of Iowa, quoted infra, requires ordinary and concise language in the statement of the acts constituting the offense. "Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, defines reckless as (a) lacking in caution and (b) careless. Careful is defined as solicitous: marked by care. Prudent is defined as cautious. Under the information the words “reckless driving” were descriptive. The violation would be driving without care or prudence, without regard and precaution for the safety of others and in a manner or speed other than is reasonable and safe.
Section 762.3, Code of Iowa, provides that informations for trial of nonindictable offenses must contain:
“1. The name of the county and of the justice where the information is filed.
“2. The names of the parties, if the defendants be known, and if not, then such names as may be given them by the complainant.
“3. A statement of the acts constituting the offense, in ordinary and concise language, and the time and place of the commission of the offense, as near as may be.”
Section 762.4 provides that the information may be in the following form:
‘.......................... County:
‘The State of Iowa against
‘A........B........, defendant
Before justice.................
(here insert the name of the justice.)
“The defendant is accused of the crime (here name the offense).
“For that the defendant, on the............day of............, A.D. ............, at the (here name the city, town, or township), in the county aforesaid (here state the act or omission constituting the offense as in an indictment).”
Thus in the case at bar we have an information meeting the mandatory requirements of section 762.3 and the permissive requirements of section 762.4.
*874VIII. The case of Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 117 N.W.2d 431, cited by the majority and quoting from loe. eit. 227, did not present an analogous issue and is not relevant here. The quotation is not the holding in the ease. The holding is otherwise. The quotation is merely a statement of what might be the construction of one statute if standing alone. This construction was not adopted because of other statutory provisions. See pages 228 and 229. The case ivas a license- revocation case. It involved the power of the Iowa Motor Vehicle Department to. revoke an operator’s license because of ordinance violations. The case did not involve the right of a city to prosecute under an ordinance. In the case at bar appellant stresses the dire consequences of a conviction for reckless driving. Our reasoning should not be diverted by speculation as to what the Motor Vehicle Department' might attempt as a result of a conviction under an ordinance. That question is. not before us.
IX. In Division IV of the majority opinion it is said “It is clear that the city meant to. charge defendant with reckless driving.” I do not agree. The city charged one offense, i.e., violation of the designated ordinance. The allegation that there were several particulars in which the ordinance was violated did not make the charge void for duplicity nor prevent a finding of guilty based on any one or more of the 'allegations.
X. The need for consistency and uniformity mentioned in Division III of the majority opinion is recognized. The consistency and uniformity required, however, is in the interpretation and enforcement of the statutes and in the prohibition against rules or regulations in conflict therewith. The statutes state specifically that additional regulations not in conflict with the statutes may be adopted and there is nothing requiring that the regulations so adopted by the various cities and towns be uniform. It may be that such uniformity would be desirable but the statute does not so- provide.
I think the conclusions of the majority are contrary to both the provisions and the intent of the statutes.
I would affirm.
Garfield, O. J., and Larson and Rawlings, JJ., join in this dissent.