Court Opinion

ID: 9491956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:28:39.648702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:02.061457
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Mervyn Clinton Goddard seeks permission from this court to file a “second or successive” motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp.1998). The majority determines that the § 2255 motion Goddard seeks to file is not “second or successive” and dismisses his request for permission. This determination is based upon the erroneous premise that it would be unfair to require a *439movant in Goddard’s position to bring all of the issues collaterally attacking his federal conviction and sentence in his first § 2255 motion along with a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect a timely appeal. Because no such unfairness exists, and because as a practical matter a § 2255 mov-ant already is motivated to bring all such issues in a first motion, I conclude that the § 2255 motion Goddard seeks permission to file is a “second or successive” one. Further, because it is undisputed that Goddard has not shown that the § 2255 motion he seeks permission to file is based on newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law, I would deny Goddard’s request.
I.
Goddard pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp.1998), and two counts of distributing, or aiding and abetting another to distribute, cocaine base, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1969); 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1981). Goddard’s presen-tence report recommended attributing 240 grams of cocaine base to him. Based on that amount and the fact that Goddard previously had been convicted of a felony drug offense, the report stated that a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence applied. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West Supp.1998).
Defense counsel did not challenge the conclusion of the presentence report that Goddard satisfied the conditions necessary to trigger application of the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. However, recognizing that the district court would have discretion to determine the extent of any departure from that mandatory minimum in the event that the court granted the Government’s request for a downward departure based upon substantial assistance, defense counsel offered evidence that Goddard was at most a minor participant in the conspiracy and was not aware of its full scope. Defense counsel argued that Goddard was responsible for, “at best, around 40 or 50 grams, even maybe perhaps 60.” J.A. 109. And, when specifically asked by the court what finding defense counsel wanted the court to make with respect to the amount of cocaine base attributable to Goddard, defense counsel replied, “I guess I’m just looking for about 60.... I think that would be going extremely high.” J.A. 111.
The court accepted defense counsel’s recommendation, finding “that perhaps the Court cannot reasonably place more than 60 grams [with Goddard], although there may be other evidence out there.” J.A. 114. The court noted that accepting the drug amount suggested by defense counsel rather than the estimate in the presentence report did not affect the sentencing guideline calculation because the 60-gram quantity remained sufficient to trigger the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. The court then granted the Government’s substantial assistance motion and, departing from the 20-year mandatory minimum term, sentenced Goddard to ten years imprisonment.
On March 18,1996, Goddard filed a motion seeking collateral relief pursuant to § 2255, maintaining that his attorney’s failure to file a notice of appeal from his conviction and sentence denied him his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court granted Goddard’s motion, vacated the prior judgment, and entered a new judgment in order for Goddard to pursue a timely direct appeal. This court subsequently affirmed Goddard’s sentence.
Thereafter, Goddard filed a second § 2255 motion, alleging that trial counsel performed ineffectively at Goddard’s initial sentencing. The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice, ruling that because Goddard had filed a previous § 2255 motion, the new one was “second or successive” within the meaning of § 2255 as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. As such, the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Goddard’s motion until he received permission from this court to proceed. Goddard subsequently filed the present request with this court.
II.
The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C.A § 2255 to require a movant to obtain permission *440from the relevant court of appeals prior to filing a “second or successive” motion to vacate sentence in the district court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (West Supp.1998).1 Thus, Goddard cannot advance the issues he desires to raise in this motion if it is a “second or successive” one. Accordingly, the disposi-tive issue presented is whether Goddard’s initial § 2255 motion, seeking to obtain a direct appeal, renders the present one “second or successive” within the meaning of the AEDPA.
Although the AEDPA uses the term “second or successive” with respect to both petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.1998) and § 2255 motions, Congress did not define the term. The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the meaning of the term “second or successive” in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998). Rejecting the plain meaning of the phrase “second or successive,” the Court held that a petition or motion is not “second or successive” within the meaning of the AEDPA merely because it is numerically a second (or third, etc.) petition or motion. See id. at 1621-22. Instead, the Court indicated that an earlier petition should not count as the first if counting it as such would unfairly deprive the petitioner of an adjudication of his claim, explaining that “[t]o hold otherwise would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review.” Id. at 1622.2 The reasoning of the Martinez-Villareal Court requires that in determining whether to consider an initial petition as a first petition, a court should analyze whether doing so would unfairly prevent the petitioner from receiving review of his claim employing pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles.
The majority apparently agrees that Martinez-Villareal instructs that in interpreting whether an initial petition or motion should “count” as a first, such that a later petition or motion is “second or successive,” we should be guided by whether counting the first petition or motion would work an unfairness on the petitioner or movant considering pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles. Furthermore, each of the courts of appeals that has addressed the precise question presented here — the meaning of the term “second or successive” in the context of whether an initial § 2255 motion seeking to obtain a direct appeal of a federal criminal conviction and sentence renders a subsequent § 2255 motion “second or successive” — has analyzed the issue by asking whether counting the first motion would be unfair. See Shepeck v. United States, 150 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir.1998) (per curiam) (holding that a § 2255 motion filed after the completion of a direct appeal made possible by relief granted in an earlier § 2255 motion was not “second or successive”); Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 60-61 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that a § 2255 motion filed after the completion of a direct appeal made possible by relief granted in an earlier § 2255 motion was barred as “second or successive”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1807, 140 L.Ed.2d 945 (1998); United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (10th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (same as Shepeck). These courts of appeals have reached different results, however, because they have not all applied that analysis correctly.
*441The majority, relying on Shepeck, and Scott, reasons that if a § 2255 motion seeking to obtain a direct appeal is counted as a first § 2255motion for purposes of determining whether a later § 2255 motion is second or successive, the movant would be placed in a position of having to elect between two untenable choices when filing his initial § 2255 motion. According to the majority, such a movant would be required either to utilize his first § 2255 motion solely to obtain adirect appeal — and thereby lose his right to assert other collateral attacks — or to include all of the issues he could raise — including those attacks properly pursued on direct appeal— in his first § 2255motion. Forcing movants to make this choice would be unfair, the majority continues, because it would compel them to forfeit either the benefits of the assistance of counsel and of the more favorable standard of review available on direct appeal or the ability to pursue their remaining issues.
The Hobson’s choice envisioned by the majority is illusory, however, because a requirement that a movant must pursue all collateral review in his initial § 2255 motion would deprive the movant of neither his Sixth Amendment right to counsel nor the more favorable standard of review available on direct appeal. Nothing requires a movant to pursue issues properly brought on direct appeal in a § 2255 proceeding. Issues properly pursued on direct appeal should be reserved to be raised on direct appeal if relief permitting a direct appeal is granted in the § 2255 proceeding. In addition, no unfairness is worked upon a § 2255 movant by a requirement that he bring all of his collateral attacks, including a claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when counsel failed to perfect a timely direct appeal, in his initial § 2255 proceeding. A movant has no right to counsel or a more favorable standard of review with respect to any of the issues properly presented in his § 2255 proceeding. And, a movant is motivated to bring all such claims in his initial § 2255 motion because if he does not and his claim that he was deprived of his direct appeal because counsel was ineffective in failing to perfect a timely direct appeal is rejected, he will be procedurally barred from asserting the remaining collateral attacks.3
In sum, a § 2255 movant suffers no unfairness from a requirement that he pursue all of his collateral issues in his first § 2255 motion, including a claim that he has been deprived of a direct appeal by ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, such a rule corresponds to present practice because a § 2255 movant presently is motivated to bring all of his collateral attacks in his initial motion rather than risk that he may be procedurally barred from pursuing them later. Therefore, I would hold that a § 2255 motion seeking to obtain a direct appeal counts as a first motion such that a later motion raising claims that could have been advanced in the initial motion is “second or successive.” Accordingly, I would deny Goddard permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.4

. Authorization will be granted by this court only if the second or successive motion is based on:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. Here, as the majority correctly recognizes, it is undisputed that Goddard cannot show that his request for relief is based upon either newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law.

. The Court recognized three such situations: (1) a petition asserting a claim that was previously dismissed because it was unexhausted; (2) a petition filed after a court dismissed an earlier petition for a technical reason, such as failure of the petitioner to pay the filing fee, without reaching the merits; and (3) a petition asserting a claim of incompetency to be executed that was previously unripe because an execution date had not been set.

. Not surprisingly, we routinely review § 2255 proceedings in which a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to perfect a direct appeal is combined with the movant's other collateral issues, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 139 F.3d 895 (4th Cir.1998) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam); United States v. St. Germain, 76 F.3d 376, 1996 WL 43578 (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam).

. Goddard also contends that he can pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this § 2255 motion because this court said that he could in his direct appeal. In addressing Goddard’s argument in the direct appeal that counsel was ineffective, this court stated:
"[A] claim of ineffective assistance should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court rather than on direct appeal, unless the record conclusively shows ineffective assistance.” United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir.1992). Because the record does not conclusively demonstrate ineffectiveness, we decline to address the issue. This issue may be asserted in a § 2255 proceeding should Goddard choose to do so.
United States v. Goddard, 134 F.3d 365, 1998 WL 29260, at *3 (4th Cir.1998) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam). Goddard maintains that *442the last sentence in this quote is the law of the case and that since this court said he could pursue the issue in a § 2255 motion, he can. The Government counters that a statement by the court is not considered to be the law of the case unless it constitutes a decision of the court. See United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir.1993) (noting that law of the case doctrine "forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court”). The Government points out that there was no issue presented in the earlier appeal concerning whether a later § 2255 motion would be considered "second or successive.” Thus, the Government asserts, the statement in our earlier opinion does not control.
As the Government correctly contends, our pri- or decision merely addressed Goddard’s argument that counsel was ineffective and explained in standard language that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly considered in a collateral proceeding, not on direct appeal. We were not called upon to decide whether Goddard could pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a later § 2255 proceeding.