Court Opinion

ID: 9701992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:48:03.049169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.941670
License: Public Domain

RUDMAN,
Justice, with whom CLIFFORD, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The court has based its decision on Margaret Barrera’s apparent authority to bind Inverness. As the court notes:
“[Ajpparent” authority is “that which, though not actually granted, the principal knowingly permits the agent to exercise or which he holds him out as possessing.” Apparent authority exists only when the “conduct of the principal leads a third person to believe that a given party is his agent.”
Libby v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 979, 982 (Me.1982) (citations omitted). The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency defines apparent authority as “the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other’s manifestations to such third persons.” Restatement (Second) of the. Law of Agency § 8 (1958). Such authority “is created as to a third person by written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him.” Id. § 27. Apparent authority can, therefore, be created only by the principal’s manifestation to a third party. “Until there has been a communication [from the principal] to a particular person, and until that person learns facts from which he reasonably infers that the agent is authorized, there is no apparent authority_” Id. cmt. b. “The agent’s representations of authority to a third person, standing alone, are insufficient to create apparent authority in the agent to act for the principal.” Moreau v. James River-Otis, Inc. 761 F.2d 6,10 (1st Cir.1985). “Apparent authority exists only to the extent that is reasonable for the third person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized.” Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency, § 8 cmt. c. (emphasis added).
Angela did not see nor was she provided the promotional material to which the court refers prior to her engaging Barrera to pierce the cartilage of her ears. Williams testified that Barrera’s kiosk bore the sign “Inverness” indicating that earrings made by Inverness were sold at the kiosk and offered testimony that the release, she saw and signed after her ears were pierced, bore the word “Inverness.” To establish apparent authority Williams had the burden to offer proof that Inverness by its conduct would cause a reasonable person to believe that Barrera was acting on Inverness’s behalf. On the meager evidence offered by Williams one could neither actually nor reasonably believe that the purported agent (Ms. Barrera) had authority to act on behalf of the principal (Inverness). The court erred in submitting the issue of apparent authority to the jury.
The trial court further erred by directing the jury to consider Williams’s additional claims based on strict liability, breach of expressed warranty, and breach of implied warranty.
“Strict products liability attaches to a manufacturer when by a defect in design or manufacture, or by the failure to provide adequate warnings about its hazards, a product is sold in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.” Pottle v. Up-Right,
*1249Inc., 628 A.2d 672, 674-75 (Me.1993). Williams alleges a failure to warn. Such a duty arises when the manufacturer knew or should have known of a danger sufficiently serious to require a warning. Id. When such duty to warn exists, the warning must advise the user of the risks associated with its product and offer the user specific directions of the products safe use. Id. The manufacturer’s failure to provide an adequate warning must be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs injury. Id. Williams offered no testimony that she saw the warnings provided to Barrera or that the warnings were inadequate.
To prove a case based on breach of an expressed warranty one must offer evidence of an express warranty. To the extent there is to be an express warranty it is found in the release, which release Williams failed to read. A claim based on a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability must be based on evidence that the device was used in the manner for which it was intended. Williams offered no evidence that Inverness’s product was not “fit for the ordinary purposes” for which it was purchased. Lorfano v. Dura Stone Steps, Inc., 569 A.2d 195, 197 (Me.1990). The record is devoid of evidence that the Inverness product was defective if used, as it was intended to be used, to pierce ear lobes. I would vacate the judgment entered by the trial court and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Inverness.