Court Opinion

ID: 9945682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 14:02:48.68262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:36.906722
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                           JONI BARTOLOTTA,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                           ALAN BARTOLOTTA,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-645

                            February 28, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Steve D. Berlin,
Judge.

Paul E. Parrish of Parrish Law, P.A., Satellite Beach, for Appellant.

Raleigh W. Greene, IV, and Alexander M. Bottone of Greene & Greene,
Attorneys at Law, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

     Presented in this appeal is a question involving the interpretation of
a marital settlement agreement (MSA) entered over two decades ago. We
interpret the MSA by present day rules. And today's rules require that
we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
                               I. Background
      In 2001, Alan Bartolotta (the Former Husband) petitioned for
dissolution of marriage from Joni Bartolotta (the Former Wife). In an
effort to resolve their legal marital issues, the parties entered into a
written contract—the MSA. The MSA included several provisions
designed to distribute marital assets, discuss the ongoing care of their
two minor children, and settle any personal and joint liabilities. In 2002,
the trial court entered the Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage,
which incorporated the MSA.
      Twenty years later, the Former Wife moved to reopen the
dissolution and to enforce the MSA. The provision she sought to enforce
is located in article V and is entitled "Personal Property." The provision
states the following:
            5.4 HUSBAND'S RETIREMENTS. Husband's retirement
      benefits and entitlements through his 457 plan through his
      employment with Pinellas County Florida shall remain his
      sole property free and clear from any claim of Wife. The
      Florida Retirement System pension/retirement benefits shall
      be equally distributed between the parties by way of QDRO if
      necessary and applicable. If a QDRO will not accomplish
      equal division or the plan administrator will not acknowledge
      such an Order, then the parties agree to rework this
      Agreement in order to carry out their intention(s) for
      distribution of this plan. The Wife's share of the 457 plan has
      been equitably distributed through other assets.
      The Former Wife's motion asserted that the Former Husband began
receiving benefits from his Florida Retirement System (FRS) pension in
2021 but that he had not distributed any benefits to her. The Former
Wife argued that pursuant to provision 5.4, the parties "agreed that
distributions from this retirement plan would be distributed equally,"

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and therefore, she is entitled to half of the FRS benefits paid to the
Former Husband—including those benefits which accrued after the Final
Judgment. The Former Husband, however, argued that provision 5.4
provides that the Former Wife is entitled only to half of the marital
portion of the FRS benefits, which includes only the benefits accrued
while the parties were married.
     In resolving the dispute, the trial court made several
determinations that inform our review. The trial court rejected "offers of
parol evidence," concluding that the MSA "is clear on its face." In this
context, we interpret the trial court's usage of "clear" to mean
unambiguous. Despite this determination, the trial court determined
that the words in the MSA must be understood "as they existed at the
time they were written" by looking toward "various authorities." Those
authorities included the statutory definition of a marital asset as
provided by section 61.075(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and section
61.076(1), Florida Statutes (1993).1 The trial court concluded that the
"plain reading" of the challenged language, "is that the Former Husband
intended to give the Former Wife half of what he had at the time. No
more, no less."
     Whether that meaning may be legally affixed to the parties' MSA is
the issue presently before this court.
                              II. Discussion

     1 Section 61.075(5)(a) provided that marital assets are assets

acquired during the marriage. The section has since been updated and
the definition for marital assets is now provided by section 61.075(6)(a).
      Section 61.076(1) provides that "[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits,
rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension,
profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and
programs are marital assets subject to equitable distribution."

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     We review the issue before us de novo. See Suess v. Suess, 289 So.
3d 525, 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (citing Pipitone v. Pipitone, 23 So. 3d 131,
134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). We turn first to the trial court's conclusion
that the MSA was clear, and therefore, the use of parol evidence to
determine its meaning was unnecessary.
     An MSA is construed like any other contract, meaning parties are
free to enter into an MSA that may impose obligations or restrictions that
would not otherwise be imposed under Florida law. See Herbst v. Herbst,
153 So. 3d 290, 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("[P]arties may enter into
settlement agreements imposing obligations the trial court could not
otherwise impose under the applicable statutes."); Taylor v. Lutz, 134 So.
3d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) ("A marital settlement agreement is a
contract subject to interpretation like any other contract." (quoting
Avellone v. Avellone, 951 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007))). "Where an
agreement's terms are unambiguous, a court must treat the written
instrument as evidence of the agreement's meaning and the parties'
intention"—thus requiring a reviewing court to first look only to the
words in the MSA to decipher the parties' intentions. Avellone, 951 So.
2d at 83 (citing Delissio v. Delissio, 821 So. 2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002)).
     However, "when a contract's terms are incomplete or facially
ambiguous," the meaning of contractual language may be established by
parol evidence. RX Sols., Inc. v. Express Pharmacy Servs., Inc., 746 So.
2d 475, 476 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (citing Newbern v. Am. Plasticraft, Inc.,
721 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)). And "when a contract is rendered
ambiguous by some collateral matter, it has a latent ambiguity, and the
court must hear parol evidence to interpret the writing properly." Id.
(citing Landis v. Mears, 329 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). "[A] latent

                                     4
ambiguity occurs 'where the language employed is clear and intelligible
and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous
evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or
more possible meanings.' " Id. at 477 (quoting Ace Elec. Supply Co. v.
Terra Nova Elec., Inc., 288 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)).
     Here, neither party raised an issue with the trial court's legal
determination that the MSA was clear on its face, nor did they argue that
a latent ambiguity existed such that the court should have considered
parol evidence.2 The Former Wife, however, asserts that the trial court's
interpretation of the plain language of the MSA and its reliance on
sections 61.075(5)(a) and 61.076(1) was erroneous. Two prior opinions of
this court direct our analysis of the instant issue. The first is Herbst.
     In Herbst, the MSA provision at issue determined alimony
payments. 153 So. 3d at 291. It set forth the following: "The Petitioner
agrees to pay the Respondent alimony in the amount of $4,500 beginning
the date of the final judgment and continuing for the life of the Petitioner.
The parties agree that this alimony is non-modifiable." Id. (footnote
omitted). A year after the final judgment of dissolution, the former wife
remarried. Id. After learning of her remarriage, the former husband
stopped paying alimony. Id. Following the former wife's motion to
enforce the alimony provision of the MSA, the trial court determined that
the alimony provision was intended to be permanent alimony governed
by section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2011). Id. Thus, the trial court
concluded that pursuant to section 61.08(8), the alimony terminated
upon the former wife's remarriage. Id. at 292.

     2 Because the issue was not raised, any argument that the trial

court should have accepted parol evidence to ascertain the agreement's
meaning is not preserved for our review.
                                      5
      Writing for this court, Judge Silberman noted that "parties may
enter into settlement agreements imposing obligations the trial court
could not otherwise impose under the applicable statutes. . . . [T]he
agreement's terms will control . . . ." Id. (citing Taylor, 134 So. 3d at
1148). This court concluded that the terms of the alimony provision
unambiguously required the former husband to pay nonmodifiable
alimony until the former wife died. Id. at 293. And because the
provision unambiguously imposed an obligation beyond that which the
trial court could impose under the applicable statutes, the terms of the
MSA controlled over section 61.08(8). Id. Therefore, the trial court erred
by determining the alimony payments ended when the former wife
remarried—a termination date provided by Florida statute. Id.
      Similarly, in Suess, this court held that the trial court wrongly
reached outside the language of the MSA when interpreting its meaning.
289 So. 3d at 530. The parties in Suess entered into an MSA which
provided the following: "Wife will receive 50% of all retirement benefits
from husband (City of Ocala, Ocala Police, and State of Florida)." Id. at
527. About seven years after dissolution, a disagreement arose regarding
the former husband's retirement accounts. Id. The former wife sought
an order enforcing her right to 50% of all retirement benefits that
"accrued during and after the parties' marriage." Id. The former
husband disagreed, arguing that under the terms of the MSA the former
wife was only entitled to fifty percent of the retirement benefits that
accrued during the marriage. Id. at 528. In denying the former wife's
requested relief, the trial court determined that the MSA was clear and
unambiguous. Id. The court concluded that the former wife "was only
entitled to the marital portion of the Former Husband's FRS Pension as

                                      6
defined in section 61.075(7), Florida Statutes (2009),"3 and was therefore
only entitled to half of the benefits earned during the parties' marriage.
Id.
      Writing for this court, Judge Smith opined that the trial court's
reliance on section 61.075(7) in interpreting the MSA was error. Id. at
529. This court reasoned that the retirement provision at issue was clear
and unambiguous, and "no language, express or otherwise, . . .
indicat[ed] that the parties intended for the Former Wife to only receive
fifty percent of the Former Husband's retirement benefits that accrued
during the marriage." Id. at 530. The unambiguous language in the
MSA entitled the former wife "to fifty percent of all the Former Husband's
retirement accounts, including those accrued during and after the
marriage"—an obligation beyond that which the trial court could impose
under the applicable statutes. Id. at 531. Thus, the terms of the MSA
controlled over section 61.075(7). Id.
      Applying Herbst and Suess to the instant case, we conclude that
nothing in provision 5.4, or elsewhere in the MSA, indicates that the
parties intended the Former Wife to only receive half of the benefits
which accrued during the marriage. To the contrary, the language
provides that "Florida Retirement System pension/retirement benefits
shall be equally distributed between the parties . . . ." This language
clearly and unambiguously provides that the benefits—in their entirety—
are to be distributed between the Former Wife and the Former Husband
equally. Because this provision obligates the Former Husband to pay the

      3 Section 61.075(7) prescribes a cut-off date for determining marital

assets to be "the earliest of the date the parties enter into a valid
separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established
by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of
marriage."
                                      7
Former Wife benefits accrued during and after the marriage, the terms of
the MSA control over sections 61.075(5)(a) and 61.076(1). Therefore, the
trial court's reliance upon statutory provisions in construing the MSA's
meaning was error.
                              III. Conclusion
     Although we may surmise that the statutory provision providing
that a pension is a marital asset—in conjunction with the associated cut-
off date for marital assets—was in the drafters' minds when penning the
provision at issue, we are bound by what is actually written in the
agreement to ascertain the parties' intentions. See Emergency Assocs. of
Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So. 2d 1000, 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ("[A]
court is powerless to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable or
advantageous for one of the contracting parties."). On the record before
us, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. In doing so, we do
not address whether a latent ambiguity exists in the parties' contract,
nor do we suggest an outcome.
     Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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