Court Opinion

ID: 9586565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:54.669272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:43.364383
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
concurring specially.
I write separately because I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of the hearing requirement under Superior Court Rule 31.3. Concerning the interplay between Rules 31.2 and 31.3, the Court of Appeals in Grogan v. State, 192 Ga. App. 234, 236 (384 SE2d 441) (1989) held:
Thus, the Rules construed in harmony contemplate that “generally” the mandated hearing will appropriately be held before trial, for obvious reasons of fairness and economy. We conclude any review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion must be analyzed in that light and with that object in view. .
This is consistent with the purpose of the rule which is:
“‘“[T]o provide a criminal defendant with fair and ade-‘ quate notice of the State’s intention to utilize evidence of prior similar transactions so that questions as to the admissibility of such evidence can be resolved before trial.” ’ ” Id.
In so stating, the Court of Appeals recognized that in view of the trial court’s discretion the hearing need not be held before the trial is scheduled but should be concluded before the presentation of evidence. This was not done in Grogan where, as here, the hearing was conducted after the state had rested its case.
The majority correctly notes the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the conviction in Grogan was based not so much on its interpretation of the rule as on the lack of similarity between the previous event and the one for which Grogan was being tried. But of what value is the establishment of two rules of procedure, one requiring a pre-trial hearing when the “similar transaction” is of debatable relevance, as in Grogan, and another in the case before us, where the relevance is clear? How is that consistent with the stated purpose of the rule in the first place? What does it do but create another issue to be resolved on appeal: whether the defendant was harmed by the untimely inquiry?
*146Decided May 2, 1990.
L. David Wolfe & Associates, Susan E. Teaster, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Richard E. Hicks, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Andrew S. Ree, for appellee.
I concur in the judgment because reversal is not required under these facts. I would hold, however, delaying the 31.3 hearing until the end of the state’s evidence amounts to an abuse of discretion absent the consent of the defendant.6
I am authorized to state that Justice Weltner joins in this special concurrence.

 Such discretion would be exercised properly by any means which provided the defendant with adequate knowledge of the nature of the similar transactions before presentation of the state’s case, although a trial court appropriately might reserve a final decision on admissibility of those similar transactions until the conclusion of the state’s evidence, “contingent upon a proper foundation being laid,” (see Grogan at 237, discussing Flournoy v. State, 186 Ga. App. 774 (368 SE2d 538) (1988)), or for other legitimate reasons.