Court Opinion

ID: 9560733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:35.754052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:08.967673
License: Public Domain

Koontz, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this appeal is controlled by our en banc decision in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992). On the facts of the present case, in my view, a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanations for striking the two African-American jurors in question. As such, these explanations do not rebut the prima facie showing of discriminatory intent in striking these jurors.
I can discern no valid non-racial basis to strike an African-American woman who is twenty-eight years old and has no children while not striking a woman of another race who is twenty-three years old and has no children. Similarly, I can discern no valid non-racial objection to an African-American juror wearing a Virginia State Varsity jacket to a court proceeding. Although the prosecutor may have had a non-racial explanation for striking these jurors, he provided none. Moreover, the trial judge required none from him. Under such circumstances, neither the prosecutor’s sincerity nor the trial judge’s credibility determination are matters of our concern in this appeal. In short, Winfield does not address the issue presented by this appeal.
The condemnation of racial discrimination in the jury selection process is not a matter in dispute by the judges of this Court in this or our prior cases. We are in total agreement in the absoluteness of that condemnation. The struggle, evident from the separate scholarly dissenting opinions written by Judges Benton, Barrow and Elder, is not, and need not be, to ensure the viability of that condemnation. Rather, we struggle to find an appropriate balance between the protection of the constitutional rights of members of an identifiable racial segment of our heterogeneous society in the jury selection process and a standard of appellate review that does not sacrifice the stability of the judicial system that is fostered, in large part, by according great deference to the findings of fact and credibility determinations made by the trial court.
*564I make no attempt here to articulate how that balance is to be achieved in every case. I write separately only to emphasize that a challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), requires a meaningful review by the trial court of the explanations given by the prosecutor when protected members of the accused’s race are excluded from jury service in a particular case. Where the record does not support the conclusion that a meaningful review of the prosecutor’s explanation was conducted by the trial court, the prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury selection process mandates a reversal and remand for a new trial. At a minimum, a meaningful review requires that the explanation given by the prosecutor for finding a member of one race objectionable is equally applied to a member of another race.
In the present case, the record does not support a conclusion that the trial court conducted a meaningful review of the accused’s Batson claim. Accordingly, I would reverse the conyiction and remand for a new trial.