Court Opinion

ID: 9702505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:14:16.99445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.114926
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting). In all deference to my brothers who are sophisticated, and learned men, and to the able circuit judge whose credentials are equally well established, I find it impossible to agree that this little girl should be taken from the breast of her mother.
The opinion of former Chief Justice Carr proceeds from the assumption that we are reviewing a custody order, routinely made and entered. This questionable order with its punitive appearance should not block our view of what transpired before it found its way into the record. What seems to be forgotten is that the child was apparently happy, content, and well adjusted with her mother and stepfather in California before abduction and return by the father, conceding, of course, that her mother should not have taken her there without court permission. Both parents, obviously distrustful of legal procedures in coping with such a sensitive matter, exercised self-help for which contempt could lie.
But I see neither the flaunting of authority by both parents nor the procedural niceties of former Chief Justice Carr as controlling. As to these points, I agree with Judge Bowles’ appraisal as stated in his opinion:
“Further, it is clear that a contempt does not deprive a mother of custody where she is otherwise a fit. person. (Kaiser v. Kaiser, 352 Mich 601, Bowler v. Bowler, 351 Mich 398, Lotz v. Lotz, 327 Mich 577, and Lewis v. Lewis, 338 Mich 197, 200.)
“As indicated upon argument, the court does not believe that the procedural issue of burden of proof is determinative. That is, whether or not the case *651be viewed from the standpoint, arguendo,' of- legal custody in the mother with the burden of proof to be imposed upon the father; or with legal custody properly in the father under the second decree (the mother having failed to appeal the entry of snch a decree), the burden of proof to be imposed upon the mother to show a substantial change of circumstances, the disposition to be hereinafter set forth, would be the same.
“This case, as most cases, finds it's resolution in the facts themselves, in the judgment of the court. On the basis of that which was duly adduced in open court, would Donna’s welfare be better served by being with her mother in California or with her father in Detroit with her maternal grandmother, Mrs. Macek, assisting in such care and control?"
“Certainly the court accepts the general thesis that the presumption of law giving a preference to a mother, particularly, with children of tender years, is based upon reason and common experience; mothers are attentive to the special needs of their offspring, with a more intimate and direct concern for their welfare arising partly from the physiology of birth and their presence in the home; but this is not an unalterable rule and must yield to the particular facts in a given case. Similarly, one must accept the thesis of the expert called by Sandra, Dr. Hunter H. Comly, that if there are stable interpersonal relations in the home of the mother and favorable community climate, the fact of a bi-racial marriage alone should not defeat the mother’s claim.” (Emphasis supplied.)
However, I would reach opposite results in this review de novo, giving the trial judge’s findings all due weight. First I would indulge the statutory presumption that upon the separation of husband and wife having minor children the mother shall be entitled to the care and custody of all such children under the age of 12 years. CL 1948, § 722.541 (Stat Ann 1957 Rev § 25.311). A proper construction of *652such statute is contained in the recent case of Paton v. Paton, 363 Mich 192, 199:
“While it is to he noted that this section of the statute is not compulsory but is subject to the discretionary power of the chancery court to safeguard the best interests of the child in a proper case, the recommendations of the legislature in that regard are not to be lightly disregarded. Fuller v. Fuller, 249 Mich 19; Lair v. Lair, 355 Mich 10.
“It is to be noted that the construction of this custody statute has been previously before this Court. The cases are collected in Eichholtz v. Eichholtz, 319 Mich 42, where this Court held that only when the mother is not of a good moral character, or where conditions exist in her home which would make it unfit for the child, may the Court well ignore the provisions of the statute and give the father custody of a child under 12.”
Insofar as I have been able to determine the almost universal practice of courts in such proceedings is to enforce this policy presumption that a girl child, in particular, ought to grow up with her own mother. The reasons are obvious: love, understanding, sex training, and protection, among others. Instances in which a child of tender years, especially a female child, is taken from her mother are rare. Usually there is a substantial showing of either physical cruelty, habitual drunkenness, gross neglect, or moral depravity. Neither is suggested here.
This child should be returned to her mother. Unquestionably, there she will have full-time care. There will be no shunting from father to grandmother and back to father again. From all appearances, life with her mother and stepfather in California will be based upon a bedrock of parental love and cooperation, something hitherto denied her. Her stepfather is a surgeon in a wholesome community where experiences in democratic living are *653promising. There is a substantial home sustained by ■adequate income. All this and a full-time mother, ¡too.
A report to the friend of the court from California authorities, who apparently made a thorough investigation of the matter, indicates strongly that. Donna’s best interest lies with her mother. It is quoted, in part, as follows:
“We have looked at the house. It is a 3-bedroóm, 2-bath home which has a guest bedroom off the garage. The house has a family room. It is located on a quiet street and there are sidewalks for the children. As we mentioned in our previous letter, the housekeeping standards are excellent and the house is most attractive and livable.
“We found Dr. Baugh to be of medium height, slightly stocky, and of colored- race. We were impressed with his very fine mind, and it is our feeling he is a man who does not make decisions lightly. He feels a very keen responsibility to Donna and assured me he would do everything he could to be a good father to her. He said that he would love her, care for her, see that her physical and spiritual needs were met, and that he would help discipline her when necessary. We understand he has signed an affidavit for the court concerning this. Dr. Baugh is in the process of becoming a Catholic. They both attend the Catholic Church. If Donna returns, she will be educated in Catholic schools. * * *
“We talked with Mrs. Lulu Mae Clemens, director of health education of the Riverside county schools, who is a next door neighbor of the Baughs. She said the entire neighborhood was most upset when Donna was taken and all felt compassion for Mrs. Baugh. She believes Dr. and Mrs. Baugh to be very good parents and spoke highly of both of them. Mrs. Clemens said that Dr. Baugh and Mrs. Baugh seem to same [have] an excellent relationship and have adjusted to their situation. She mentioned that Donna is an exceptionally bright child and has an *654■extensive vocabulary and that she feels this reflects the care and training of Mrs. Baugh.”
The care and training of Donna should be committed to her mother. The fears which form the .muted thread of this whole proceeding are patently groundless insofar as the present is concerned. If problems should develop in the future, corrective measures can be taken at that time.
I vote to reverse.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with 'Smith, J.
Adams, J., took no part in the decision of this case.