Court Opinion

ID: 9685867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:07:44.67736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:32.395563
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                             TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0068-MR

JASON BARRETT                                                              APPELLANT

                   ON APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
V.                HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN, JUDGE
                             NO. 19-CR-00001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                     APPELLEE

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

                                     AFFIRMING

      An Ohio County grand jury indicted Jason Barrett on ten counts of first-

degree sexual abuse for actions perpetrated against his stepdaughter, K.V., a

minor at the time of the sexual abuse.1 K.V.’s mother, Katherine Barrett, was

also indicted on multiple counts of complicity to the sexual abuse.2 Barrett and

Katherine were tried jointly. Before the trial commenced, one count of sexual

abuse against Barrett was dismissed. A jury found both Barrett and Katherine

guilty of all other counts. Barrett was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He

      1 We use abbreviations to identify the victim and her siblings to protect their

privacy.
       2 There are multiple Barretts in this case. To avoid confusion, Jason will be

referred to as Barrett and Katherine will be referred to by her first name.
appealed his conviction to this Court as a matter of right. See KY. CONST. §

110(2)(b). After careful review of the record, we affirm the Ohio Circuit Court.

                                 I. BACKGROUND

      This case involves nine incidents of sexual abuse that occurred between

February 10, 2016, and December 5, 2018. When Barrett committed these

acts, the victim, K.V., was between the ages of 15 and 17. During this period,

K.V. lived in the same household as Barrett, Katherine, her older sister E.M.,

and her three younger siblings. When K.V. was living with Barrett and

Katherine she also had an older boyfriend who lived in Georgetown, Kentucky.

K.V. told her boyfriend about the sexual abuse and showed him some of her

diary entries recalling events surrounding the abuse.

      In December 2018, K.V. wanted to stay with her boyfriend for two weeks

around the holidays. At first Barrett and Katherine said yes but objected when

she wanted to stay longer. Their objection was because she was only 17 years

old. Around the same time, K.V.’s boyfriend reported the sexual abuse to his

teacher on December 6, 2018.

      When K.V.’s boyfriend reported the sexual abuse to his teacher, the

teacher contacted the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. The

aforementioned report led to a welfare check at the Barrett home by deputies

with the Ohio County Sheriff’s Department on December 6, 2018. K.V., fearing

a truthful disclosure would lead to her and her siblings being placed in foster

care, denied that any abuse occurred. The police conducted another interview

                                        2
with K.V. outside of the home on December 7, 2018, where she then told

Detective Katie Pate that she was sexually abused by Barrett.

Detective Pate also interviewed Barrett and Katherine. Barrett admitted to

touching K.V. on the buttocks but claimed it was not sexual. Katherine initially

denied seeing Barrett touch K.V. inappropriately but later admitted seeing him

touch her buttocks. Katherine insisted that the touching was not sexual.

      At trial, K.V. testified to the nine incidents of sexual abuse and read

aloud from her diary entries. Barrett testified in his own defense and denied he

sexually abused his stepdaughter. Katherine testified she never knew or saw

Barrett touch K.V. inappropriately. E.M. testified she shared a room with K.V.

who never told her anything about Barrett sexually abusing her.

      After two days of trial, the jury found Barrett guilty of all nine counts of

first-degree sexual abuse, and Katherine guilty of two counts of complicity to

sexual abuse. The trial court sentenced Barrett to a total of twenty years in

prison. Barrett now appeals to this Court as a matter of right alleging multiple

errors.

                                    II. ANALYSIS

      On appeal, Barrett alleges multiple errors by the trial court warranting

reversal of his conviction. First, he argues the Commonwealth engaged in

flagrant prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor told the jury in closing

argument, “[t]hat presumption of innocence, I would submit to you is gone

because you’ve heard the proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Second, he argues

the trial court erroneously allowed K.V. to read from printed screenshots of her

                                         3
iPad diary. Third, Barrett argues the trial court erred by allowing the

Commonwealth to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another

witness. Fourth, he argues the jury instructions violated his right to a

unanimous verdict. Finally, Barrett argues this Court should overturn his

conviction based on cumulative error. We discuss each argument in turn.

A. The prosecutor’s closing argument was improper but was not flagrant
   prosecutorial misconduct.

         Barrett argues the Commonwealth engaged in flagrant prosecutorial

misconduct during its closing argument. Specifically, he argues that the

flagrant prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor told the jury

that the “presumption of innocence, I would submit to you is gone because

you’ve heard the proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Barrett argues that single

comment was flagrant prosecutorial misconduct and violated his right to a fair

trial.

         “Prosecutorial misconduct is ‘a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act

involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or

assess an unjustified punishment.’” Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d

731, 741–42 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Noakes v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 116,

121 (Ky. 2011)). “If the misconduct is objected to, we will reverse on that

ground if proof of the defendant’s guilt was not such as to render the

misconduct harmless, and if the trial court failed to cure the misconduct with a

sufficient admonition to the jury.” Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81,

87 (Ky. 2010). However, if no objection is made, the Court “will reverse only

                                          4
where the misconduct was flagrant and was such as to render the trial

fundamentally unfair.” Id. (citations omitted).

      No contemporaneous objection was made, and Barrett concedes that this

issue is unpreserved. Because the issue is unpreserved, Barrett requests we

review it for palpable error. See RCr 10.26.

      Barrett argues the Commonwealth committed flagrant prosecutorial

misconduct in its closing argument when the prosecutor told the jury,

      By the way, the presumption of innocence at this point in time
      [sic]. You’ve heard the proof. You’ve heard the evidence. You’ve
      heard this child tell you, in details that I didn’t want to have to get
      into in mixed company, but we have to, to hold these people
      accountable. That presumption of innocence, I would submit to you
      is gone because you’ve heard the proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
      There is no reasonable doubt what happened in this case. Because
      this child told you the truth.

(emphasis added). In support of his argument, Barrett cites to a Washington

Court of Appeals decision that reversed the defendant’s conviction because the

prosecutor made repeated improper comments in closing, including that the

presumption of innocence “kind of stops once you start deliberating.” State v.

Evans, 260 P.3d 934, 938 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). Barrett argues that in

Kentucky “every person accused of committing a crime is entitled to the

presumption of innocence and to have such presumption continue until guilt[]

is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d

690, 695 (Ky. 1996). Overall, Barrett asserts the Commonwealth’s comment

was flagrant prosecutorial misconduct because it was a misstatement of the

law that “seriously dilutes the State’s burden of proof” and “render[ed] the trial

                                         5
fundamentally unfair.” See Evans, 260 P.3d at 939; Brafman v. Commonwealth,

612 S.W.3d 850, 861 (Ky. 2020) (citation omitted).

      Prosecutorial misconduct can occur through an improper closing

argument. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 329 (Ky. 2016) (citing

Duncan v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Ky. 2010)). Any allegation of

misconduct must be viewed in the context of the overall fairness of the trial.

McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at 742 (citing St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.3d

597, 640 (Ky. 2014)). To justify reversal, the Commonwealth’s misconduct

must be “so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Soto v.

Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Stopher v.

Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001)).

      This Court holds that the Commonwealth’s comment in its closing

argument “that presumption of innocence, I would submit to you is gone

because you’ve heard the proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is prosecutorial

misconduct. Prosecutors have wide latitude in closing and are free to draw any

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509

S.W.3d 34, 50 (Ky. 2017) (citations omitted). However, prosecutors do not have

latitude to “shift the burden of proof” or “contravene the presumption of

innocence” during closing arguments. See Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973

S.W.2d 13, 38–39 (Ky. 1998); Grundy v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Ky.

2000). “[T]he presumption of innocence mandates the burden of proof and

production fall on the Commonwealth, any burden shifting to a defendant in a

criminal trial would be unjust.” Butcher v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 3, 10 (Ky.

                                        6
2002). “Every person accused of committing a crime is entitled to the

presumption of innocence and to have such presumption continue until guilt[]

is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695. Further,

the presumption of innocence “remains with the defendant through every stage

of trial, most importantly, the jury’s deliberations,” and it is only extinguished

upon the jury’s determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United

States v. Marin, 31 F.4th 1049, 1055 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kellogg v. Skon,

176 F.3d 447, 451 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d

1053, 1065 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding the prosecutor’s remark that the

presumption of innocence “can be removed by fact, by proof” was improper).

      The Commonwealth, in its closing, went through the jury instructions.

When the prosecutor got to Jury Instruction #3, he did not read it verbatim.

That instruction was as follows:

      [t]he law presumes the defendant innocent of a crime, and the
      indictment shall not be considered evidence or as having any
      weight against the defendant. You shall find the defendant not
      guilty unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone and beyond
      a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. If upon the whole
      case you have reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you
      shall find the defendant not guilty.

The Commonwealth commented on this instruction by saying that “at this

point in time” the presumption of innocence is gone because “you’ve heard the

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The prosecutor followed up that statement

with “there is no reasonable doubt what happened in this case.” The

prosecutor’s comment is improper because it suggests that at closing argument

the defendant is no longer presumed innocent, which is simply not true. Any

                                         7
suggestion otherwise shifts the burden of proof away from the Commonwealth

and on to the defendant. This is also not a reasonable inference from the

evidence because it is a mischaracterization of the jury instruction’s language

and the law. A prosecutor cannot argue that the presumption of innocence is

gone in his or her closing argument because it implies the jury should ignore

the defendant’s presumption of innocence when it begins its deliberations. For

those reasons, this Court finds that the Commonwealth engaged in

prosecutorial misconduct. However, because Barrett did not object, we must

now determine if that prosecutorial misconduct is sufficient to be “flagrant”

prosecutorial misconduct.

      Because this issue is unpreserved, we will reverse only if the conduct

was both flagrant and constitutes palpable error resulting in manifest injustice.

RCr 10.26; Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606, 607 n.4 (Ky.

2006). To determine whether improper conduct is flagrant and requires

reversal, this Court weighs four factors: (1) whether the remarks tended to

mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or

extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the

jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused. Brafman, 612

S.W.3d at 861 (footnotes omitted). We look at the claimed error in context to

determine whether, as a whole, the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. Id.

(footnote omitted).

      Regarding the first part of the test, the Commonwealth’s comment that

the presumption of innocence is gone served to prejudice Barrett. Barrett

                                        8
began the trial from a place of innocence and that innocence stayed with him

throughout the entire trial. Newkirk 937 S.W.2d at 695; Marin, 31 F.4th at

1055. He could only be found guilty if the jury determined that the

Commonwealth had presented enough evidence to overcome that presumption

and had met its burden of proof. The prosecutor suggested however, that the

presumption of innocence was, at the time of closing arguments, gone because

the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrett was guilty. That

comment to a jury of lay people who are not educated in the law invites them to

draw an adverse inference of guilt and indicates that they no longer need to

consider Barrett’s presumption of innocence. This was prejudicial, and this

factor favors Barrett.

      As to the second part of the test, the Commonwealth’s remark was

isolated. The prosecutor made the comment once in his approximately 45-

minute-long closing argument. This Court has held that a few sentences that

were spoken in the middle of the Commonwealth’s 55-minute-long closing

argument were isolated because the comments were not repeated or even

emphasized. Hall v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 383, 399 (Ky. 2022). Since the

Commonwealth’s comment regarding the presumption of innocence was

mentioned only once during its 45-minute-long argument, it was isolated, and

this factor weighs in favor of the Commonwealth.

      The third part of the test favors Barrett because the Commonwealth

deliberately placed the comment in front of the jury. The prosecutor went

through the jury instructions and explained the evidence in support of a guilty

                                       9
verdict. He contradicted the jury instruction language regarding presumption of

innocence when he argued that the “presumption of innocence, I would submit

to you is gone because you’ve heard the proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

There is nothing to suggest that the prosecutor was not acting deliberately

when he placed that comment in front of the jury. See Mayo v. Commonwealth,

322 S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010) (holding that the Commonwealth’s comments

that a “good jury” would find the defendant guilty was deliberately placed in

front of the jury). Further, recently in Sanders v. Commonwealth, an attorney

from the same Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office used similar language in his

closing argument. No. 2022-SC-0084-MR, 2023 WL 4037450, *6 (Ky. Jun. 15,

2023). 3 The foregoing considerations, taken in conjunction with each other,

lead us to conclude it was deliberate and not an accidental misstatement.

      Finally, we must evaluate the strength of the evidence against Barrett.

This case was a two-day trial with six witnesses. A substantial part of the

Commonwealth’s case against Barrett was K.V.’s testimony and her journal

entries.4 K.V. testified to nine separate incidents of sexual abuse by Barrett.

She could not testify to the exact dates on which the sexual abuse occurred,

      3 We acknowledge that in Sanders we held that the prosecutor’s comment

“presumption of innocence is gone” was not misconduct; however, the cases are
factually distinguishable. Sanders, 2023 WL 4037450, at *6. The prosecutor in
Sanders told the jury before and after he said the “presumption of innocence is gone”
that the defendant is presumed innocent unless the jury was satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Id. The prosecutor in Sanders
repeatedly told the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent. Id. This stands in
stark contrast to the case at bar.
      4 This Court holds no error in the trial court allowing K.V. to read the printed

screenshots of her diary entries from her iPad, as will be addressed later.

                                          10
but she recalled the room of the house and the specific circumstances

surrounding each incident of sexual abuse. The defense argued that K.V. lied

about the sexual abuse because she was upset that she could not stay with her

boyfriend. To support the defense’s argument, Barrett testified that he never

inappropriately touched his stepdaughter. Katherine, and E.M. testified to

never seeing Barrett sexually abuse K.V. However, Katherine admitted to seeing

Barrett touch K.V.’s buttocks area and Barrett admitted to touching K.V.’s

buttocks area.

      K.V.’s journal entries corroborated her testimony and discredited the

defense’s theory of the case. Several journal entries contained details that

matched K.V.’s testimony. Further, the entries were dated months before K.V.

asked to stay with her boyfriend and her alleged motive to lie arose. Finally,

one of the journal entries explained that K.V. lied to the police initially because

she was “scared of losing everything” if she and her siblings were taken into

foster care. Considering all the evidence against Barrett, K.V.’s testimony, and

corroborating journal entries, this factor weighs in favor of the Commonwealth.

      Having found two of the four factors weigh in favor of Barrett, “we must

use the general test for whether relief for prosecutorial misconduct is proper:

an examination of the trial as a whole to determine if the improper comments

undermined the essential fairness of [Barrett’s] trial.” Mayo, 322 S.W.3d at 57

(citation omitted) (finding two factors of the flagrant prosecutorial misconduct

analysis in favor of the defendant and two in favor of the Commonwealth). As

stated above, the Commonwealth did not repeat throughout its 45-minute-long

                                        11
closing argument that the defendant’s presumption of innocence is gone.

Before closing arguments, the trial court read the instructions to the jury. The

jury members each also received a copy of the jury instructions to take with

them into deliberations. The Commonwealth’s one improper comment in the

entire closing argument is not likely to have had a great enough impact to

undermine the essential fairness of Barrett’s trial. We hold that the

Commonwealth’s improper comment that the presumption of innocence is gone

did not amount to flagrant prosecutorial misconduct. We cannot conclude that

the Commonwealth’s comment in closing argument was so egregious that it

undermined the essential fairness of Barrett’s trial. Hall, 645 S.W.3d at 400

(citation omitted).

As we have previously explained,

      [A]n unpreserved error may be reviewed on appeal if the error is
      palpable and affects the substantial rights of a party. . . . Even
      then, relief is appropriate only upon a determination that manifest
      injustice has resulted from the error. . . . An error is palpable, only
      if it is clear or plain under current law. . . . Generally, a palpable
      error affects the substantial rights of a party only if it is more likely
      than ordinary error to have affected the judgment. . . . We note
      that an unpreserved error that is both palpable and prejudicial,
      still does not justify relief unless the reviewing court further
      determines that it has resulted in a manifest injustice; in other
      words, unless the error so seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
      or public reputation of the proceeding as to be shocking or
      jurisprudentially intolerable.

Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690 695 (Ky. 2009) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). For all the reasons discussed above, the

Commonwealth’s closing argument comment about the presumption of

innocence is not palpable error.

                                         12
B. The trial court did not err in allowing K.V. to read the printed
   screenshots of her diary entries from her iPad.

      Barrett next argues that the trial court erred in allowing K.V. to read

from printed screenshots of her iPad diary. Barrett concedes this issue is

unpreserved. Because the issue is unpreserved, Barrett requests palpable error

review. See RCr 10.26.

      During a bench conference, the prosecutor alerted the trial court that

K.V. kept dated notes on her iPad, like a diary. The prosecutor wanted to ask

K.V. about her diary entries because he wanted to show the dates she began

writing about the sexual abuse. The dates were important because the diary

entries were written before K.V. was denied her request to stay with her

boyfriend for longer than originally planned. Therefore, the dates disproved the

defense’s theory that she was lying in order to stay longer with her boyfriend.

      The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could not introduce the

diary entries as exhibits, but the prosecutor could ask K.V. about them and

she could read from them. The next day, the trial court reiterated that the

screenshots were not to be admitted as exhibits, but the court ruled that K.V.

could read from them to refresh her memory. After K.V. testified about the nine

incidents of sexual abuse, the Commonwealth’s Attorney asked her about the

screenshots of her diary. The prosecutor instructed K.V. to state the date of the

first diary entry and to read the contents of the diary entry. Then, the

prosecutor instructed K.V. to read the entirety of another diary entry that was

not dated. K.V.’s testimony continued with her reading three more dated diary

entries in their entirety.
                                        13
      Barrett notes the prosecutor never stated what rule of evidence permitted

him to ask K.V. to read the contents of her iPad diary. The trial court, however,

saw the readings as a refreshing of K.V.’s recollection. Barrett argues that two

rules of evidence are implicated in this issue: Kentucky Rule of Evidence

(“KRE”) 612 and KRE 803(5).

      KRE 612 provides:

      [I]f a witness uses a writing during the course of testimony for the
      purpose of refreshing memory, an adverse party is entitled to have
      the writing produced at the trial or hearing or at the taking of a
      deposition, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and
      to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
      testimony of the witness.

Barrett correctly argues that KRE 612 “codifies the common-law rule allowing

any writing to be used to refresh a witness’s memory if necessary.” Martin v.

Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Ky. 2015). “[W]hen that witness refreshes

her memory under this rule, the testimony elicited thereafter ‘is the product of

the refreshed memory, not the writing used to refresh it.’ As a result, the

document itself is not admissible, and the hearsay rule does not apply.” Id.

Barrett argues that the Commonwealth improperly refreshed K.V.’s

recollection. The prosecutor never asked K.V. to read the diary to herself before

reading it aloud to the jury. Barrett argues that a writing cannot be read aloud

and introduced into evidence under the pretext of refreshing the recollection of

a witness. Fisher v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Ky. 2021) (citation

omitted).

      KRE 803(5), on the other hand, states:

                                       14
      Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a
      matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has
      insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and
      accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness
      when the matter was fresh in the witness’ memory and to reflect
      that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record
      may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit
      unless offered by an adverse party.

Barrett argues the prosecutor did not lay the foundation for K.V. to read her

notes into the record under KRE 803(5). Barrett argues K.V. did not have

“insufficient memory” to be able to testify fully and accurately, as she never

expressed any difficulty describing the events.

      The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that neither KRE 612 nor

KRE 803(5) apply because Barrett’s opening statement made K.V.’s diary

entries admissible as prior consistent statements under KRE 801A.

      Under KRE 801A(a)(2),

      [a] statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule . . . if the
      declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined
      concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by
      KRE 613, and the statement is . . . [c]onsistent with the declarant’s
      testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
      against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or
      motive.

See also Murray v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Ky. 2013).

Importantly, “a prior consistent statement is admissible to rebut a charge of

recent fabrication only if the statement was made before the alleged motive to

fabricate came into existence.” Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 858

(Ky. 1997) (citation omitted).

      In his opening statement, defense counsel said the following:

                                       15
      What we want you to do is hear what [K.V.] said and also why she
      said it. What was her aim? Did she have an aim? Did she have an
      agenda? We think she did. We think that agenda was to get out of
      the home to go with this boyfriend. That’s what we believe.

The defense implied in its opening statement that K.V. had a motive to lie

about the sexual abuse. Barrett’s attorney argued K.V.’s motive to lie about the

sexual abuse arose in December 2018 when Barrett and Katherine denied her

request to stay with her boyfriend. We do not know the exact date in December

2018 when Barrett and Katherine denied this request. However, we do know

that her boyfriend told his teacher about the sexual abuse on December 6,

2018, and K.V. did not disclose the sexual abuse to the Cabinet for Health and

Family Services during the initial welfare check on that same day. The defense

argued that K.V.’s desire to stay with her boyfriend was the reason K.V. told

Detective Pate about the sexual abuse during her interview with police on

December 7, 2018.

      During a bench conference, the Commonwealth explained to the trial

court that it was going to introduce the diary entries to rebut the defense’s

theory that K.V. lied about the sexual abuse. Under KRE 801A(a)(2), the diary

entries are consistent with K.V.’s testimony that she was sexually abused and

were offered to rebut the implied charge that K.V. lied about the sexual abuse.

Further, the prior consistent statements were all made before the motive to lie

arose. Even though K.V. did not document every incident of sexual abuse with

a diary entry, the entries she did document were dated before she asked

Barrett and Katherine to stay with her boyfriend in December 2018. We do not

know the date of the last incident of sexual abuse, but we do know the sexual
                                       16
abuse stopped after December 7, 2018, because K.V. no longer lived with

Barrett.

        The first diary entry was dated March 10, 2017. The second diary entry

was undated. We know the second diary entry was composed sometime before

December 2018 because of the contents of the entry and what K.V. did after

writing the diary entry. In the second diary entry, K.V. wrote that Barrett

touched her buttocks area again while she was sleeping, she told her boyfriend

about the incident a week later, and she told no one else. K.V. testified that she

sent screenshots of the diary entry to her boyfriend at least three weeks before

December 6, 2018. When the boyfriend reported the abuse to a teacher on

December 6, 2018, he provided the teacher with screenshots of K.V.’s diary

entries. In addition, we know that the undated diary entry is before December

2018 because the next two diary entries are from June 22, 2018, and June 23,

2018.

        The last diary entry is from December 6, 2018. This diary entry does not

discuss any incident of sexual abuse. Instead, the entry is about how K.V. lied

to the police and case worker about the sexual abuse. K.V. initially told the

police that no sexual abuse occurred because she feared a truthful disclosure

would result in her and her siblings being split up. All the diary entries were

made before December 7, when K.V. told the police that Barrett sexually

abused her. All the diary entries that discuss incidents of sexual abuse were

composed before she asked to stay with her boyfriend. The diary entries qualify

under KRE 801A as prior consistent statements because the entries were

                                        17
composed before the “fabrication or improper influence, or motive arose” in

December 2018.

      Barrett argues that even if the diary entries were prior consistent

statements, the proper foundation was not laid as required by KRE 613. Under

KRE 613(a),

      Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at
      another time a different statement, he must be inquired of
      concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons
      present, as correctly as the examining party can present them;
      and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with
      opportunity to explain it.

The proper foundation was laid because the prosecutor asked K.V. if she was

the one who made the diary entries, and the prosecutor asked for the date of

the diary entries. K.V. stated that she was the one who created the diary

entries and provided some of the dates for the entries. Regarding the undated

diary entry, K.V. recounted the details of the entry before reading it aloud. We

hold that the proper foundation was laid, and K.V.’s diary entries were

admissible under KRE 801A.

      As to Barrett’s argument that the diary entries were prohibited under

KRE 404(b) and KRE 403, we are unconvinced. Barrett argues the entries

contained other uncharged offenses and bad acts prohibited by KRE 404(b).

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible if offered for some

other purpose, such as proof of motive or intent. KRE 404(b)(1). To determine if

the other bad acts evidence is admissible, “the trial court should use a three-

prong test: (1) is the evidence relevant? (2) does it have probative value? (3) is

its probative value substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect?” Leach v.
                                        18
Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Ky. 2019) (citation omitted). For

evidence to be relevant it must be offered to prove material facts in dispute. Id.

Here, to the extent the diary entries included other bad acts, the contents of

the diary entries were offered to prove Barrett’s intent when he inappropriately

touched K.V. and made lewd comments about her body. This evidence is

relevant because it goes to a material fact in dispute of whether Barrett

sexually abused K.V. The diary entries are also probative because the jury

could reasonably infer that the prior bad acts occurred and that Barrett

committed such acts. Id. (citing Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 209, 214

(Ky. 1997)). The probative value is not substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect because the evidence is not being offered to produce an

emotional response that inflames the passions of the jury. Id. The evidence was

offered to rebut the defense’s theory that K.V. lied about the sexual abuse, and

it shows Barrett’s intent to commit the acts. For the same reasons as above,

K.V.’s diary entries did not violate KRE 403.

      Barrett also argues the prosecutor failed to give notice under KRE 404(c).

Defense counsel knew of the diary entries during the bench conference, and

apparently had been provided them in discovery, so there is no violation of KRE

404(c).

      Finally, Barrett argues the diary entries improperly bolstered K.V.’s

credibility. Barrett cites Hoff v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 368 (Ky. 2011), to

support this argument. In Hoff, this Court held that the hearsay statements

were not admissible under KRE 803(4). Id. at 374. K.V.’s diary entries are

                                        19
distinguishable from the statements in Hoff because they were admissible prior

consistent statements under KRE 801A.

      For all those stated reasons, K.V.’s diary entries were admissible under

KRE 801A, and the trial court did not err in allowing K.V. to read from those

entries.

C. The trial court did not commit palpable error in allowing the
   Commonwealth to question Barrett about K.V.’s credibility.

       Barrett argues that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth

to question him on cross-examination about K.V.’s credibility. Barrett concedes

this issue is unpreserved. Because the issue is unpreserved, Barrett requests

palpable error review. See RCr 10.26.

      Barrett argues that during his testimony, the Commonwealth repeatedly

badgered him about K.V.’s motive to lie in her testimony. The line of

questioning that Barrett argues is in error is as follows:

      Commonwealth (“CW”): Now you’re telling this jury that…do you
      remember in June 2018, did you ever read the note she made in
      her iPad on that date, June 22, 2018, about how she told her mom
      about what you’d been doing to her?

      Barrett: That never occurred.

      CW: You don’t remember having a conversation with your wife and
      K.V. …

      Barrett: That never happened.

      CW: … on June 22, 2018, when she told her mom?

      Barrett: That never happened.

      CW: Why would she tell the jury that if that never happened?

      Barrett: I don’t understand why.
                                         20
      CW: You don’t understand why because she has no reason to say
      it, does she?

      Barrett: (No answer) ….

Barrett provides other examples of questioning during his cross examination

where he was asked by the prosecutor to comment on K.V.’s credibility. In one

of those examples, the Commonwealth asked Barrett:

      [You are] the one here sitting here on trial looking at 12, 15 people
      in the face with everything to lose but this child since June 2018
      documenting when [she is] telling her mom way before [you are]
      saying oh she wants to run off to Scott County in December – this
      is in June. This child has no reason to put in there that [she has]
      told her mom and had been documented for over a year before that
      you [were] touching her. You [do not] know any reason for that
      child to state that other than it would be true, do you?

(emphasis added). Barrett argues that the prosecutor’s repeated questioning

about the truthfulness of K.V.’s testimony violated Moss v. Commonwealth, 949

S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997).

      In Moss, this Court held that “[a] witness should not be required to

characterize the testimony of another witness, particularly a well-respected

police officer, as lying.” Id. at 583. We noted that, with a few exceptions, “it is

improper to require a witness to comment on the credibility of another

witness.” Id. (quoting State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I. 1989)). We further

said that “[a] witness’s opinion about the truth of the testimony of another

witness is not permitted. Neither expert nor lay witnesses may testify that

another witness or a defendant is lying or faking. That determination is within

the exclusive province of the jury.” Id. (quoting James, 557 A.2d at 473).

                                         21
      In Graham v. Commonwealth, this Court found no Moss violation because

the Commonwealth did not ask the defendant to call other witnesses liars and

did not put the defendant in an unflattering light by its questioning. 571

S.W.3d 575, 585 (Ky. 2019). During cross-examination, the defendant testified

to the last time he had interacted with the victims. Id. at 584–85. The

defendant testified that the victims became upset that he would not take them

fishing. Id. at 585. The Commonwealth asked the defendant whether it was his

belief that the victims’ behavior was “why [he was] here today” in trial. Id.

Defense counsel objected to the question, and the Commonwealth explained

that the defendant implied the two boys conspired against him because they

were angry at him. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, and the

Commonwealth continued to ask the defendant whether the victims

“concocted” the story. Id. The defendant in response stated he did not know

why the charges were brought against him. Id.

      This Court held it was clear that the version of events the defendant

testified to stood in stark contrast with the testimony of other witnesses, and

the Commonwealth was attempting to clarify the defendant’s testimony. Id. The

defendant presented a motive for the boys to make up a story concerning the

abuse, and the Commonwealth fleshed that out through a line of questions. Id.

The line of questioning in the case at bar is distinguishable from Graham

because Barrett was repeatedly asked why K.V. would say something if it did

not happen. The questioning went beyond simply fleshing out the defense’s

                                        22
theory. The Commonwealth was trying to have Barrett comment on K.V.’s

credibility as a witness.

      The Commonwealth argues its line of questioning in the case at bar was

not improper because the prosecutor did not ask Barrett to state K.V. was

lying. Instead, he asked Barrett what motive K.V. had to give false testimony.

The Commonwealth asked these questions after defense counsel presented the

theory that K.V. conjured the allegations after her parents denied her request

to stay with her boyfriend and after Barrett’s testimony that K.V.’s allegations

“never happened.” The Commonwealth argues that other jurisdictions allow

questioning of a defendant regarding their accuser’s motive to lie and that this

does not cross into improperly asking the defendant if another witness is lying.

See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 41 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1994); State v.

Waholic, 897 A.2d 569, 590 (Conn. 2006) (citations omitted) (“[W]e have

distinguished between improperly asking the defendant to comment on the

veracity of another witness’ testimony and properly questioning the defendant

about his accuser’s motive in testifying against him.”).

      We agree with Barrett that the Commonwealth’s line of questioning was

improper because the prosecutor repeatedly asked Barrett to opine about the

truth of K.V.’s testimony. The Commonwealth did not explicitly ask Barrett

whether K.V. was lying but repeatedly asked Barrett to give a reason why K.V.

would say something if it never happened. This is like the questioning in Moss

because the Commonwealth’s questions were framed in such a way to get

Barrett to call K.V. a liar. Barrett repeatedly denied that certain events

                                        23
happened, and the Commonwealth repeatedly asked why K.V. would testify

that it occurred if it did not happen. Asking Barrett to question whether K.V. is

someone who would testify to something that did not occur placed him in an

unflattering light and attempted to take the determination of K.V.’s

truthfulness away from the jury.

      Although the Commonwealth’s line of questioning was improper it did

not rise to palpable error. “Palpable error will compel us to reverse only where

the error substantially affects the rights of the defendant in a way so obvious

and serious that we find there to be manifest injustice.” Brafman, 612 S.W.3d

at 857 (citation omitted). The defense’s theory of the case was that K.V. lied

about the sexual abuse because Barrett and Katherine did not allow her to stay

with her boyfriend. The Commonwealth’s cross-examination pressed Barrett on

that theory. This Court has not yet found such a Moss violation to rise to

palpable error under RCr 10.26. Parker v. Commonwealth, 482 S.W.3d 394,

406 (Ky. 2016) (citing Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 879 (Ky.

2015)). Likewise, this Court holds that the Commonwealth’s questioning was a

Moss violation, but it did not amount to palpable error.

D. The jury instructions did not violate Barrett’s right to a unanimous
   verdict.

      We now turn to Barrett’s argument that the jury instructions violated his

right to a unanimous verdict. Barrett concedes this issue is unpreserved.

Because the issue is unpreserved, Barrett requests palpable error review. See

RCr 10.26.

                                       24
      Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees that “a defendant

cannot be convicted of a criminal offense except by a unanimous verdict.” Miller

v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Ky. 2009) (citations omitted). “[T]he

Commonwealth must introduce evidence sufficient to prove each offense and to

differentiate each count from the others, and the jury must be separately

instructed on each charged offense.” King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343,

354 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Miller v. Commonwealth, 77 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Ky.

2002)). “[A] trial court is obliged to include some sort of identifying

characteristic in each instruction that will require the jury to determine

whether it is satisfied from the evidence the existence of facts proving that each

of the separately charged offenses occurred.” Harp v. Commonwealth, 266

S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky. 2008). In Johnson v. Commonwealth, we held, “a general

jury verdict based on an instruction including two or more separate instances

of a criminal offense, whether explicitly stated in the instruction or based on

the proof—violates the requirement of a unanimous verdict.” 405 S.W.3d 439,

449 (Ky. 2013).

      Barrett argues his right to a unanimous verdict was violated because the

jury instructions made it impossible for the jury to distinguish the nine counts

of sexual abuse from each other. During trial, the Commonwealth elicited proof

that multiple incidents of sexual abuse occurred. The prosecutor asked K.V. to

provide details surrounding each instance of sexual abuse. To distinguish the

incidents, the prosecutor asked K.V. to describe the room she was in when the

sexual abuse occurred and the surrounding circumstances. K.V. also read from

                                         25
multiple diary entries that she kept during the period of the sexual abuse

incidents. Barrett argues that the prosecutor failed to match K.V.’s testimony

to the diary entries, and that this failure made it impossible for the jury to

distinguish one instance from the others. Further, he argues that the

prosecutor, in his closing argument, reminded the jury that K.V. testified that

the sexual abuse occurred often and that it was almost impossible for her to

tell the jury everything that happened to her. Barrett argues that K.V.’s

testimony that the sexual abuse happened “quite often” allowed the jurors to

return nonunanimous verdicts regarding the specific acts of sexual abuse for

which they found him guilty.

      We do not agree with Barrett’s argument that the jury instructions

violated his right to a unanimous verdict. Unlike the jury instructions in King,

where the jury was presented with multiple instances of sexual abuse for each

instruction, the jury instructions in Barrett’s case included identifying

characteristics that corresponded with an individual instance of sexual abuse.

King, 554 S.W.3d at 350. In King, Jury Instruction #5 read:

      You will find the Defendant, Ronald King, guilty of Sexual Abuse in
      the First Degree under this Instruction and under Count One of
      the Indictment, if and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond
      a reasonable doubt all of the following:

      A. That in Kenton County on or between May 2010 and March
      2013 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he subjected A.S.
      to sexual contact at 414 Garvey Avenue;

      AND,

      B. That at the time of such contact, A.S. was less than twelve years
      of age.

                                        26
Id. This Court held that Jury Instruction #5 violated King’s right to a

unanimous verdict because the victim testified to three separate instances of

inappropriate sexual contact that occurred during the applicable time period

and at the applicable location. Id.

      In the case at bar, Jury Instructions #4-12 set forth each of the nine

counts of sexual abuse against Barrett. Each jury instruction included details

that corresponded to specific circumstances. By way of example, Jury

Instruction #4 stated as follows:

      You will find the Defendant, Jason Barrett, guilty of Sexual Abuse in the
      First Degree under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
      evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

   a. That in this county on or between February 10, 2016 through December
      5, 2018 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he subjected
      [K.V.] to sexual contact when he touched her upper inner thigh with his
      hand for the first time while [K.V.] was laying in her mother’s bed;

      AND

   b. That at the time of such occurrence, [K.V.] was less than 18 years of age;

      AND

   c. That at the time of such occurrence, the Defendant was a person in a
      position of authority;

      AND

   d. That the Defendant came into contact with [K.V.] as a result of his
      position of authority.

      K.V. testified to the specific incident of sexual abuse provided in Jury

Instruction #4. She stated that sometime between February 10, 2016, and

December 5, 2018, Jason sexually abused her for the first time when she was

in her mother’s bed. K.V. testified that she felt someone touch her leg and
                                       27
inner thigh. She testified that the person who touched her leg and inner thigh

was Barrett.

      Each jury instruction between 4 and 12 contained a different set of facts

describing a specific incident of sexual abuse committed by Barrett and

testified to by K.V. Another example is Jury Instruction #6 which instructed

the jury to find Barrett guilty if “he subjected [K.V.] to sexual contact when he

touched [K.V.’s] vagina under her clothing with his hand while she was laying

on her bed on the occurrence where her mother had gone to the store.” K.V.

testified that Barrett touched her vagina under her clothing while she was

laying on her bed. She also testified that this happened when her mother went

to the store. K.V. did not testify to any other sexual abuse that would have fit

within the language of this instruction.

      Upon review of each of the instructions and all of K.V.’s testimony, it is

clear that each instruction described a specific instance of sexual abuse

testified to by K.V. Thus, the jury instructions were not in error and did not

violate Barrett’s right to a unanimous jury verdict.

E. There is no cumulative error

      Finally, Barrett argues his conviction should be reversed due to

cumulative error. Under the cumulative error doctrine, “multiple errors,

although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if their cumulative

effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 313

S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). “Where, as in this case, however, none of the

errors individually raised any real question of prejudice, we have declined to

                                        28
hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of prejudice somehow adds

up to prejudice.” Id. (citing Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 34, 53 (Ky.

2002)).

      In this case, there were two errors. It was improper for the prosecutor to

tell the jury in his closing argument that the “presumption of innocence, I

would submit to you is gone because you’ve heard the proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.” It was also improper for the trial court to allow the

Commonwealth to repeatedly question Barrett about K.V.’s credibility. Neither

of these errors “raised any real question of prejudice.” Id. Accordingly, we hold

there was no cumulative error in this case.

                                 III. CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Ohio Circuit

Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Robert Lee Baldridge
Assistant Attorney General

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