Court Opinion

ID: 9545224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:08:32.272311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:19.791879
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting)—Since 1911, the State of Washington has had a program of industrial insurance to provide "sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in their work, and their families and dependents . . . regardless of questions of fault." RCW 51.04.010. The 1911 statute provided for coverage only in cases where the workman was "injured in extra hazardous work." Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 1, p. 345. In the intervening years until 1971, the definition of "extrahazardous work" was continually changed and expanded. In 1971, the legislature abandoned the idea of extrahazardous work and declared there was "a hazard in all employment . . . and it is the purpose of this title to *410embrace all . . . employments which are within the legislative jurisdiction of the state." Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 289, § 2, p. 1543; RCW 51.12.010. The legislature at the same time also listed those "employments which shall not be included within the mandatory coverage" of the act. RCW 51.12.020.
Prior to 1971, to be covered under industrial insurance, one had to be (1) a workman/employee and (2) engaged in extrahazardous employment as defined by the legislature. After 1971, one had to be (1) a workman/employee and (2) not in an excluded employment. Since 1911, employers and workmen/employees have been defined in the statute Ccompare RCW 51.08.070 with 51.08.180-.185) and except for the provisions of RCW 51.32.030 only workmen/employees have been covered. See RCW 51.32.010, .015.
Thus, while the 1971 amendment includes the occupation in which plaintiff was engaged, RCW Title 51 does not automatically cover an individual working in that occupation unless (a) he is a workman/employee under the provisions of RCW 51.08.180-.185, or (b) he is covered under the provisions of RCW 51.32.030. In their essential parts, the definitions of employer and workman/employee have not changed since 1911. The plaintiff insists, and the trial court agreed, that, since the employment is covered, anyone engaged in that employment is also automatically covered. This is not so. Since 1911, the act has distinguished between covered employment—i.e., the occupation—and covered workmen/employees. The 1971 amendments did not change this distinction. The shift from only extrahaz-ardous occupations being covered to all occupations being covered but for specified exceptions is irrelevant to the disposition of this case.
Prior to 1971, the employment in which plaintiff was engaged was classified as extrahazardous. This classification alone would not have provided coverage for plaintiff unless he was a workman/employee or, as an employer, he met the requirements of RCW 51.32.030.
*411Thus, two questions are posed: (1) Was plaintiff an employer or an employee for purposes of coverage by industrial insurance? and (2) If an employer, as an employer did he qualify for coverage under RCW 51.32-.030?
Plaintiff asserts he was a "workman" engaged in covered employment at the time of his injury and the majority agrees. While concededly he was working in a covered employment, it lyas as an employer rather than as a workman/employee. Plaintiff was a corporate officer of the employer. Since 1911, if a person is a corporate officer of an employer the qualification for coverage does not come under the provisions of the act as an employee/workman (RCW 51.08.070; 51.08.180-.185; 51.32.010-.015), but rather as a corporate officer under RCW 51.32.030.
Plaintiff is a corporate officer who, at the time of his injury, was working in a covered occupation. If plaintiff was entitled to benefits, it was only as a corporate officer and not as a workman/employee. In that capacity—as a corporate officer—he would have been qualified for coverage under RCW 51.32.030 "as and under the same circumstances and subject to the same obligations as a workman: Provided . . . the director, prior to the date of the injury, has received notice in writing of the fact that such employer is being carried upon the payroll ..." RCW 51.32.030. But see Laws of 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 323, § 14, p. 1239.
The majority first argues that, even though the statute expressly requires "notice in writing of the fact that such employer is being carried upon the payroll prior to the date of the injury as the result of which claims for a compensation are made" (RCW 51.32.030), since there was no evidence adduced by the State that the employer did not notify the Director of the Department of Labor and Industries somehow the department has failed to meet its burden of proof. I would think it elementary from the statute that a claimant has the burden of proof to enter evidence showing he had given written notice to the director and was *412entitled to coverage. Jussila v. Department of Labor & Indus., 59 Wn.2d 772, 370 P.2d 582 (1962). If he fails to do so, the claim falls. RCW 51.32.030. See also RCW 51.52.050 (Laws of 1975, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 58, § 1, p. 305); RCW 51.52.102; RCW 51.52.115; O'Toole v. Department of Labor & Indus., 182 Wash. 202, 46 P.2d 388 (1935); La Vera v. Department of Labor & Indus., 45 Wn.2d 413, 416, 275 P.2d 426 (1954) (Grady, J., concurring); Sayler v. Department of Labor & Indus., 69 Wn.2d 893, 421 P.2d 362 (1966); Scott Paper Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 73 Wn.2d 840, 440 P.2d 818 (1968).
The notion that the Department must prove a negative and that it must show the plaintiff did not follow the statute was never argued by the plaintiff and is raised for the first time by the majority. The cases cited by the majority do say "one sustains the burden of proving that a decision of the joint board is erroneous when one demonstrates that there is not sufficient evidence to support it." Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 34 Wn.2d 498, 504, 208 P.2d 1181 (1949). Here, however, no effort was made by plaintiff to show there was not sufficient evidence to support the board—and for good reason. The evidence supporting the ruling of the director and the board is that plaintiff failed to prove or even allege the essential point: that he had given written notice to the director he was on the payroll prior to the date of injury. Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra.
In the record before the hearing examiner, it was stated by plaintiff he understood he was not covered. It was stipulated that at the time of the accident neither Hart Construction Company nor plaintiff had notified the Department of an election for him to be covered by industrial insurance and that in fact they elected that plaintiff not be covered. Furthermore, in his written argument to the board, plaintiff specifically rejected the relevancy of the failure by plaintiff to follow the written notice proviso.
How does an employer elect that it does or does not wish to be covered? There is only one way: by advising or failing *413to advise the Department "in writing of the fact that such employer is being carried upon the payroll prior to the date of the injury as the result of which claims for a compensation are made." RCW 51.32.030.
Prior to 1917, a corporate officer could elect to be covered simply by being carried on the payroll "at a salary or wage not less than the average salary or wage named in such pay roll." Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 3, p. 346, 348. Since 1917, an employer canndt be covered unless he is on the payroll and unless the Department is notified of this fact in writing. RCW 51.32.030. When plaintiff concedes and the trial court finds no election had been made, it follows that the Department was not notified in writing that plaintiff was on the payroll. It is all rational and straightforward in contrast to the tortured and convoluted analysis of the majority.
The majority dismisses Farr v. Department of Labor & Indus., 125 Wash. 349, 216 P. 20 (1923), (1) because it does not support the position of the Department and (2) since the Department allegedly interpreted Farr erroneously we need not be forced "into either an illogical or unrealistic straightjacket which requires us to accept the unanalytical and unreasoned conclusion the Department attributes." These reasons lose substance when tested against the above analysis. Farr, stating the undisputed language of the statute, squarely holds that, if there is no notice by the employer that he is on the payroll, then no relief shall be granted. No notice was given here and the statute, and thus Farr, should be followed. To suggest, as the majority seems to, that Farr which upheld the plain language of the act should not be followed does indeed have this court move into a new era of judicial legislation.
But in its struggle to resist the obvious, the majority makes a second contention: Since the proviso does not repeat the language of the enacting clause, somehow it does not make a reference to the enacting clause. This analysis is totally unconvincing. Using the strained logic of the majority, since the term "such employer" has no modifier, it can *414hardly refer to anything in the enacting clause since that clause refers to "individual employer or any member or officer of any corporate employer." But this is too much even for the majority and it calls upon that favorite phrase when rational argument disappears—"common sense" to "dictate" that the term "'such employer'" must refer to "'individual employer.'"
It does far less violence to common sense to look to the purpose of the entire statute, RCW Title 51. RCW 51.08-.070 clearly states the term "employer" includes persons alone and as part of the corporate structure. The entire premise of the statute is built around the idea that workmen/employees are automatically covered but that unless they qualify under RCW 51.32.030 employers are not. Under the majority's reading of the statutes, however, every corporate officer in the state would be considered a workman and be automatically covered under RCW Title 51 while the individual employer would not be covered if he failed to notify the Department in writing that he was on the payroll. This wipes out much of the elaborate definition of employer (RCW 51.08.070) and makes RCW 51.32.030 appear as an elaborate charade. This result is hardly consonant with any reasonable determination of legislative intent. Can it reasonably be contended the legislature intended to treat the corporate officers of the Boeing Company and the Weyerhaeuser Company as workmen/employees under RCW 51.08.180-.185? The question answers itself.
The rationale for the proviso was clearly set forth by the hearing examiner in his proposed decision and order:
The enacting portion of RCW 51.32.030 has been part of the Workmen's Compensation Act since its inception (Laws of 1911, Ch. 74, Sec. 3). Under this provision, individual employers and officers, members of a corporate employer, were not entitled to benefits under the Act unless they were carried on the payroll in the prescribed manner. There was no express requirement that premiums be paid to the Department on the injured person's pay prior to an injury, or for that matter, that the *415employer even have an active account with the Department prior to the injury. Nor was it even required that the payroll be in written form. Furthermore, even where the employer had an active account with the Department, and was therefore paying premiums, his payment to the Department was simply based upon the total number of men engaged in a particular class of hazardous work rather than listing each individual by name upon whom a premium was being paid. Upon injury of a corporate officer or member, there would be presented the problem of identification and verification as to whether or not such person was one of those upon whom a premium was in fact being paid.
As it stood upon enactment, it is apparent that the statute posed difficult, if not impossible, administrative problems for the Department. In 1917, the legislature added the proviso portion of the statute (Laws of 1917, Ch. 120, Sec. 1). The Senate Journal of 1917 discloses that the proviso (Senate Bill 317) was introduced at the Department's request. It completely remedies the aforementioned omissions and defects of the enacting clause standing alone. It would be illogical to suppose that the legislature intended such remedy to apply only to "individual employers" and thereby leave the statute still defective from the standpoint of its administration as to members and officers of corporations.
While we should be mindful of the need to protect injured workmen/employees, we should not ignore the overall intent of the statute and by judicial fiat overturn more than 66 years of legislation and declare corporate officers are now workmen/employees.
While I share the concern for plaintiff implicit in the opinion of the majority, the fact is that he and the other officers and shareholders of the corporation—three in number—made a considered choice not to pay industrial insurance premiums, and plaintiff is suffering the consequences. Coverage for plaintiff was easily obtainable and a reasonable review of the statutes plus a reading of Farr would have shown the way.
I agree RCW Title 51 should be liberally construed. RCW 51.12.010. There is a difference, however, between *416construction and destruction. We should not do violence to that statute and the legislative scheme contained therein by adopting the strained and unreasonable interpretation of the majority.
Hamilton, Utter, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.