Court Opinion

ID: 9833032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:22:52.471837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:57.967967
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION EOB EEHEAEING.
Appellee now insists that notwithstanding the errors discussed in our opinion on original hearing no other judgment than the one rendered could have been rendered, on the ground that the undisputed evidence shows that the appellee’s immediate vendor, M. B. McDonough, was an innocent purchaser of the land in controversy for value and without notice of defect of title. This question was not so presented in appellee’s brief on original hearing, and we hence did not then review the evidence with a view of its determination. We have now, however, carefully considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel on the point and conclude that we must sustain the contention stated.
M. B. McDonough testified by deposition on his examination in chief, as follows: “My name is Michael B. McDonough; I am sixty years old and live in Chicago, Illinois, and am a real estate agent. I am the same Michael B. McDonough- to whom Chas. E. and Ella C. Bollins conveyed 2,952 acres of land in Lubbock County by deed of October 11, 1901. I bought the property about the latter part of March, 1901. The deed was not made out until later. The conveyance was made on the 3d day of April, 1901. I haven’t the deed in my possession and do not know where it is. The original conveyance was'not put of record, because of the fact that the land in question was leased to a Mr. Burns, which lease did not expire until October 1, 1901, and before that lease expired I sold the land to Mr. Madden, and he objected to the deed of April 3. Something in the acknowledgment did not suit him, and he wanted another deed; so on the 11th day of October, 1901, Mr. and Mrs. Bollins made another deed to me, and I in turn made another deed to Mr. Madden for the purpose of correcting the objections made to the first one. At the time I bought the land I had no knowledge of any claim, and never heard of any adverse claims to Mrs. Rollins’s title. The deed recites the true consideration. I paid them $1,000 in cash, and released a claim for services rendered, which was included as a part of the consideration in addition to the one thousand dollars paid.” The evidence of this witness on cross examination is somewhat voluminous and hence will not be copied. But nothing thereby developed weakens the force of what we have quoted. If anything it adds thereto. The following may be pertinent, viz: that he was in the real estate business and not related to, or the agent or attorney of, any of the parties; that he had known Mrs. Rollins about four years and Mr. Rollins about seven years; that “it was a straight business deal” with him; that he purchased the property for himself and acted for himself alone in the matter; that he knew of the character and value of the land from information furnished by Mr. Rollins and others, and knew Berlin was in possession as subtenant under Mr. Burns, lessee of Mrs. Rollins; that he paid of his own money one thousand dollars in cash and released claim, against Mr. Rollins; that he investigated the title; had abstract and lease of parties in possession and opinion of Mr. *268Lockett, of Austin, Texas, to the effect that Mrs. Rollins’s title was good.
We find nothing in all this that even tends to show that McDonough was other than a purchaser of the land in controversy in good faith, for a valuable consideration and without notice of the latent facts, if permissible to so term them, relied upon as establishing the defect, if any, in the title conveyed to Mrs. Rollins by the deed of San Augustine County of date February 13, 1884. Kor do we find any other evidence of probative force that in our opinion does so. The arguments in behalf of appellant have been read, but the circumstances therein adverted to, such as that McDonough purchased without personal examination, failed to write to or make inquiries of Kerlin, etc., at most but create a suspicion, and are all sufficiently explained consistently with appellee’s contention. It is true that in our opinion on original hearing, in discussing the effect of Kerlin’s alleged possession under a lease from San Augustine County, we said that the question thereby presented was "one of fact for the jury’s determination, whether the circumstances of Kerlin’s possession or claim, if any, under the county lease was of such notoriety or character as to put purchasers upon inquiry or notice.” This was stated, however, because of appellant’s contention that the mere fact of Kerlin’s possession under the county’s lease in legal effect constituted notice and in view of the possible developments on another trial, and not because of any evidence that Kerlin’s claim of possession under the lease was attended by any notoriety or circumstances tending to affect McDonough with notice. As a matter of fact we find nothing-in the evidence of any notoriety or circumstance accompanying said claim of Kerlin’s that even tends to show that M. B. McDonough was put upon inquiry or notice and our view on this subject, as originally expressed, having been since confirmed by our Supreme Court in the case of Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Texas, 138, where it is held, in effect, that an attornment such as shown by Kerlin is a nullity, we see no necessity for a submission of the issue to the jury. We therefore finally conclude on the whole that the undisputed evidence shoAvs that appellee’s vendor was an innocent purchaser of the land in controversy for value and without notice of any defect of title in Mrs. Rollins. Appellee, regardless of notice on his part, acquired all the right and title of McDonough, and it hence follows therefrom, and from our conclusions on original hearing not in conflict herewith, that appellee’s motion for a rehearing should be granted, and the judgment below affirmed.
Motion for rehearing granted, and judgment affirmed.

Affirmed.

Writ of error refused.