Court Opinion

ID: 9575210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:25.768473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.632856
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting in part.
Believing so much of the Court’s opinion that holds it is not necessary for a kidnapping indictment to specify the felony referred to in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a)(2) is an unwise departure from our applicable precedents, I dissent only from that portion of the opinion.
G.S. 14-39(a) requires that the state prove as an essential element of kidnapping that the “confinement, restraint or removal” of the victim is for the purpose of:
(1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or
*439(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a) (1981). In this case the theory of the indictment was that defendant removed the victim “for the purpose of committing a felony: Rape or Robbery . . . .” The indictment thus called into play subsection (2) of section (a) of the kidnapping statute.
This Court recognized, in an opinion by the Chief Justice: (1) unless a “short form” has been authorized by the legislature, indictments must allege all elements of the crime “accurately and clearly”; (2) the legislature has not authorized a short-form indictment for kidnapping; therefore (3) “the general rule governs the sufficiency of the indictment to charge the crime of kidnapping.” State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 259, 307 S.E. 2d 339, 350 (1983).
In State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 269, 237 S.E. 2d 834, 839 (1977), this Court held, at least by implication, that a kidnapping indictment must specify the particular felonious purpose which the abduction was meant to facilitate. In Dammons a kidnapping indictment charged that defendant removed the victim for the purpose of committing “a felony, to wit: Assault With a Deadly Weapon, With Intent to Kill, Inflicting Serious Injury, for the purpose of doing serious bodily injury to her, and for the purpose of terrorizing her.” This Court unanimously held that it was reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury that they could convict defendant if they found he removed her for the purpose of sexually assaulting her. The Court said: “While this theory of the case might be supported by the evidence, it is not charged in the indictment.” 293 N.C. at 272-73, 237 S.E. 2d at 841. Had the indictment in Dammons been sufficient without specifying the felonies and had this language so specifying them been mere surplusage, it would not have been error for the trial court to instruct on a felonious purpose not charged in the indictment but supported by the evidence.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (1981) makes it a crime to “break or enter any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny *440therein. . . .” As the majority recognizes, in prosecutions under this statute and in common law burglary prosecutions this Court has consistently held the indictment must specify the particular felony which defendant intended to commit when he entered the building. State v. Norwood, 289 N.C. 424, 222 S.E. 2d 253 (1976); State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 141 S.E. 2d 27 (1965). With regard to a prosecution under G.S. 14-54, this Court said: “Felonious intent, an essential element of the felony defined in G.S. 14-54, ‘must be alleged and proved, and the felonious intent proven, must be the felonious intent alleged, which, in this case, is the “intent to steal.” ’ State v. Friddle, 223 N.C. 258, 25 S.E. 2d 751, and cases cited.” State v. Jones, 264 N.C. 134, 136, 141 S.E. 2d 27, 29 (1965).
There is no difference in principle between the necessity to allege the specific felony in prosecutions under G.S. 14-54 and prosecutions under subsection (2) of section (a) of the kidnapping statute.
An essential element of the crime of kidnapping as defined by subsection (2) of section (a) of the statute, just as in G.S. 14-54, is not that defendant have a purpose, or intent, to commit any felony generally. An essential element in both statutes is that defendant have the “purpose,” or “intent” to facilitate the commission of, or to commit, some specified felony. The majority would concede that at trial it will be necessary for the state to prove in a kidnapping case that defendant had a purpose of facilitating the commission of some specified felony. It will not be enough to prove that he had a purpose of facilitating the commission of some unspecified felony. Further, the trial court must instruct the jury that in order to convict the defendant it must find beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, that defendant’s purpose was to facilitate the commission of some specified felony. Indeed, in State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. at 274, 237 S.E. 2d at 841, we held it error for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could convict defendant if it found, among other things, that he removed the victim “for the purpose of facilitating the commission of any felony . . . .”
Proof, in a kidnapping case, that defendant’s purpose in removal was to facilitate the commission of some specified felony is necessary because it is this purpose that constitutes one of the essential elements of the crime if it is prosecuted under subsec*441tion (2) of section (a). To fail to prove at trial the specific felony which the removal was designed to facilitate would amount to failure to prove an essential element of the offense. Likewise, failure to allege the specific felony in the indictment is to fail to allege an essential element. In kidnapping indictments, failure to allege an essential element is fatal. State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 307 S.E. 2d 339.
Failure in a kidnapping indictment brought under subsection (2) of section (a) to allege the specific felony which the removal was meant to facilitate is to fail adequately to inform defendant of the crime charged against him. A defendant, without the benefit of this allegation, would be hard pressed adequately to prepare a defense, especially if the defense turned on the absence of that element defined by subsection (2).
The result will be that in almost every case in which this element is not alleged in the indictment, defendant will move for a bill of particulars to require the state to reveal the element. This, inevitably, will add further paperwork and contribute to further delay of trials in a court system already well burdened with these attributes. On the other hand, it is no real impediment to the prosecution to insist that the element be alleged in the indictment. In cases where the purposes facilitated by the victim’s removal are uncertain, or multiple, the state may simply allege all possible purposes in the conjunctive. It need at trial prove only one.
For these reasons I would vote to arrest judgment in the kidnapping case on the ground that the kidnapping indictment was fatally defective in that it alleged an essential element of the crime in the disjunctive. State v. Helms, 247 N.C. 740, 102 S.E. 2d 241 (1958). I would grant leave to the state to send a new bill to the grand jury in the kidnapping case. Id. Since all charges will have to be retried in any event, the state’s interests in this case would not be prejudiced by such a holding.