Court Opinion

ID: 9706047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:20.348911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.612739
License: Public Domain

ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). In its discussion of Lofton’s claim that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to show an intent to kill and that the evidence regarding intent produced in the preliminary hearing and at trial was insufficient to support the charge, the majority invokes the rules that “there is a presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts” and that “in cases of first-degree murder, the fact that the defendant shot his victim in a vital part raises a presumption of intent.”
The term “presumption” is used in many ways in the law. In the case at bar the court is using the word presumption to describe the process of reasoning that may lead the trier of fact to conclude that intent was present. For other cases using the presumption in a similar manner, see State v. McCarter, 36 Wis.2d 608, 612, 153 N.W.2d 527 (1967); Smith v. State, 69 Wis.2d 297, 305, 230 N.W.2d 858 (1975).
The court is saying that a trier of fact logically and correctly may find the requisite intent from the defendant’s words or conduct, not because the law requires such a finding, but because jurors using ordinary reasoning may determine that the defendant’s words or conduct are inferentially probative of the requisite intent. Thus, in the instant case, we conclude that the evidence *491concerning Lofton’s words and behavior was sufficient to prove intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority opinion should not be interpreted as approving “presumption language” which appears in a number of the Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions defining the element of intent.1 The language of Wis. J. I. —Criminal 1100, First Degree Murder, is typical:
*492“While this intent to kill must be found as a fact before you can find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, it must be found, if found at all, from his acts and his words and statements, if any, bearing upon his intent. You cannot look into a man’s mind to find out his intent. When there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable person intends all of the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his deliberate acts. If one person (assaults another violently with a dangerous weapon) (administers poison) likely to kill, and the person thus (assaulted) (poisoned) dies therefrom, then, when there are no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the legal and natural presumption is that death was intended.”2 (Emphasis added.)
This Court has approved instructions which include the above “presumption language” in a number of cases, but its continued use is open to question.3 First, the language may not satisfy the requirements of sec. 903.03 *493(3), Wis. Rules of Evidence.4 Second, words such as “infer” and “presume,” which describe the jury’s reasoning process, may not be useful in telling the jury what it must do. “. . . [U] tterance of the quoted platitude does no useful purpose, since insofar as the statement has logical validity the jury would know it anyhow.”5
Courts increasingly view the “presumption language” as confusing, unnecessary and prejudicial. The jury may be misled into believing the question before it is whether a reasonable person similarly situated would have had the requisite intent, rather than whether the defendant actually had the requisite intent. The language may be read as relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and shifting the burden to the defendant.6 If the instruction is construed as creating the impression that *494the defendant has the burden of persuasion to disprove an element of a crime, constitutional error may be claimed.7
The majority opinion does not address the issue whether “presumption language” in an instruction on the element of intent is valid, and it should not be interpreted as approving such language.
I have been authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hef-fernan and Mr. Justice Callow join in this concurring opinion.

 According to the Report of the Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions Committee to Wisconsin Criminal Court Judges, dated Sept. 30, 1977, such language appears in the following criminal jury instructions:
1100 1st Degree Murder; Cause not in Issue
1102 1st Degree Murder; Cause in Issue
1105 Attempted 1st Degree Murder
1125 Abortion
1135 Manslaughter; Heat of Passion
1145 Manslaughter; In Exercise of Self-Defense
1195 Assisting Suicide
■1220 Battery
.1225 Battery to a Police Officer
1240 Aggravated Battery
■1265 Abandonment
1302 Highway Obstruction
1316 Giving a False Alarm
1317 Interference with Fire Alarm System
1318 Interference with Fire-Fighting
1319 Interference with Fire-Fighting Equipment
1326 Sale of Pistol to Minor
1350 Possession of Explosives for Unlawful Purpose
1352 Administering a Dangerous or Stupefying Drug
1380 Defamation
1400 Criminal Damage to Property
1404 Arson
1405 Arson to Defraud an Insurer
1408 Arson, Other than a Building
1441 Theft
1453 Theft by Fraud
1473A Extortion (Threat to Acuse of Crime)
1473B Extortion (Threat to Injure)
•1498 Shoplifting

 This instruction concerning “the natural and probable consequences” of acts knowingly done or knowingly committed has become known as a “Mcmn” instruction, taking its name from the case where the giving of the instruction was held to be error, requiring reversal of a conviction even though no objection was raised at trial. Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U. S. 986.

 The Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions Committee to Wisconsin Criminal Court Judges has adopted the following new language as a substitute for the “presumption language”:
“Intent to -must be found as a fact before you can find the defendant guilty of -. You cannot look into a person’s mind to find out his/her intent. You may determine such intent directly or indirectly from all the facts in evidence concerning this offense. You may consider any statements or conduct of the defendant which indicate his/her state of mind. You may find intent to-from such statements or conduct. You are the sole judges of the facts and you must not find the defendant guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to-.”

 Sec. 903.03(3), Wis. Rules of Evidence provides:
“(3) INSTRUCTING THE JURY. Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact established guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

 United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 1966).

 United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Bristol, 473 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Littlebear, 531 F.2d 896, 898 (8th Cir. 1976); McCarty v. United States, 409 F.2d 793, 799 (10th Cir. 1969); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897. See also 1 Devitt and Blackmar’s Federal Jury Practice cmd Instructions, sec. 14.13 (3d ed. 1977).
Cf. State v. Wells, 51 Wis.2d 477, 489, 187 N.W.2d 328 (1971) (dissenting opinion).

 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1976); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).