Court Opinion

ID: 9675352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:50:19.404103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:29.635313
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The line of cases, culminating in Vissman v. Koby, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 345 (1958), rests on the erroneous supposition that interpreting an ordinance to impose liability to the public for defects in the sidewalk on the abutting owner would necessarily relieve the municipality of its liability, and thus would improperly absolve it of its duty of care to the public. While such a result would undoubtedly offend the common law and public policy interests, this outcome is neither reasonable or inevitable.
This Ordinaftce is a valid safety Ordinance. The stated purpose of the Ordinance is “for the protection of the public health, safety and welfare.” City of Newport Ordinance 0-83-26. Violation of a safety Ordinance is negligence per se. Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Holsclaw Transfer Co., Ky., 344 S.W.2d 828 (1961); Kidd v. Price, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 565, 567 (1971).
The City notified the appellants the “sidewalk” was “in a state of disrepair” and that the City’s Property Maintenance Code required the damaged portions to be repaired or replaced, and they failed to do so within the time specified. In addition to the written notice sent by the City, the defective area on the sidewalk was circled in red paint by a City Inspector. The effect of the Majority Opinion is to exonerate the appellants from responsibility for this negligence.
The Ordinance does not, in fact or in law, relieve the City of responsibility for the condition of the sidewalk. Its only effect is to make the abutting property owner primarily responsible. Indeed, Section VII of the ordinance specifically provides that “nothing” in the Ordinance “shall be construed to affect ... existing” causes of action. City of Newport Ordinance No. 0-83-26, Section VII. The public policy argument about the danger from shifting the City’s responsibility is so many empty words. The situation is identical to dram shop liability, where the dram shop owner may be additionally liable but the drunk driver is still primarily responsible. Grayson Frat. Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328 (1987).
Under the Ordinance considered herein, properly understood and applied, the City is not relieved of its responsibility for the condition of Newport’s sidewalks. Indeed, a municipal corporation has no authority to immunize itself from common law liability by passing an Ordinance. Rather, the property owner becomes primarily responsible, but the City remains secondarily liable. The City remains liable for any tort liability incurred still has the duty to keep the sidewalk in reasonable repair and remains liable for any tort liability incurred if it is not. The City, of course, has a right to indemnity against the party now primarily responsible because of the duty imposed by the Ordinance.
The Majority Opinion simply serves as a backhand method to grant the property *635owner immunity from the foreseeable consequences of his failure to perform his legal duty imposed by a safety Ordinance. The reason advanced for this in Vissman v. Koby, supra, that to hold otherwise would improperly relieve the City from its common law liability, is a specious argument.
Further, the premise that this safety Ordinance “does not impose any duty” to the travelling public, advanced in Webster v. Chesapeake O. Ry. Co., 32 Ky.L.Rptr. 404, 105 S.W. 945, 946 (1907), and picked up in the Majority Opinion, is purely arbitrary. One might say as easily there is no duty to the travelling public imposed on the car owner by the statutory command to keep brakes in good repair or equip with headlights and turn signals. As we stated in Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City of London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144, 148 (1985):
“The concept of liability for negligence expresses a universal duty owed by all to all. The duty to exercise ordinary care commensurate with the circumstances is a standard of conduct that does not turn on and off depending on who is negligent.”
Stare decisis does not mandate rigid adherence to poorly reasoned precedent. See Hilen v. Hayes, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984). There is no valid reason to grant the property owner immunity from the foreseeable consequences of his failure to perform his legal duty. Because Vissman, supra, rests on a faulty premise, we should overrule this precedent on the issue of the appellants’ potential liability and affirm the Court of Appeals.