Court Opinion

ID: 9618518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:13:18.510018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:30.084823
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the majority has misapplied Varn v. Varn, 242 Ga. 309 (248 SE2d 667) (1978) and its progeny in concluding that appellee herein did not waive his right to seek modification under OCGA § 19-6-19 of his obligation to pay alimony for the support of his minor children.
In this case, the agreement provided as follows: “The parties expressly waive their right to petition for any modification of any of the terms of this agreement.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority correctly concludes that while the child’s right to seek increases in the amount of alimony to be paid for child support may not be waived, an obligated parent may waive the right to seek a downward modification of such alimony. Compare Livsey v. Livsey, 229 Ga. 368 (191 SE2d 859) (1972) with Forrester v. Buerger, 241 Ga. 34, 35 (244 SE2d 345) (1978).
However, the majority then purports to follow Varn in determining that the language relied upon by appellant herein was not sufficient to waive appellee’s right to seek a decrease in his child support obligation because the agreement “neither referred specifically to the right to seek modification of the alimony award, nor described appel-lee’s right of modification as ‘statutory.’ ” (Majority opinion, p. 443.) Thus, it would seem that the majority is holding that in order for a waiver to be effective, the language of the agreement must specify exactly what right of modification is waived. However, in Geraghty v. Geraghty, 259 Ga. 525 (385 SE2d 85) (1989), we found language providing that the parties “ ‘waive their Statutory right to a modification now and forever’ ” to be sufficient. There was no mention in Geraghty *445of either “alimony” or “child support.” And, of course, OCGA § 19-6-19 provides the procedure for modification of either alimony for the support of children or alimony for the support of a spouse. Geraghty, supra, 526, distinguished Brenizer v. Brenizer, 257 Ga. 427 (360 SE2d 250) (1987). In Brenizer, this Court found the waiver language insufficient because of the absence from the agreement of the word “waiver” and the lack of any reference to the “right of modification.” In this case, the parties did “waive their right to petition for any modification. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) This language would clearly be sufficient under Geraghty and Varn.
Decided June 5, 1995.
Rountree & Souther, George M. Rountree, for appellant.
Leaphart & Johnson, J. Alvin Leaphart, for appellee.
The majority cites Williams v. Goss, 211 Ga. App. 195 (438 SE2d 670) (1993); Arnau v. Arnau, 207 Ga. App. 696 (429 SE2d 116) (1993); and Owen v. Owen, 195 Ga. App. 545 (394 SE2d 580) (1990) as illustrative of the right of a party to file a petition for modification of some provision of a divorce decree other than one providing for alimony. However, this really begs the question because all of the cases cited by the majority involve the modification or termination of child custody or visitation and the right to initiate the underlying proceeding in each case arose from the statutory provisions of Chapter 9, Title 19 of the Office Code of Georgia Annotated. If the majority’s premise were correct, this Court in Geraghty would not have found the waiver of the “statutory right to a modification” to be sufficient. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Varn, this Court stated: “We do not intend to adopt any ‘magic words’ test.” Varn v. Varn, supra at 311. However, in reaching the result it does today, the Court has indeed adopted the “example” set forth in footnote 1 of Varn as the “magic words” which must be used to effect a waiver of the statutory right to seek modification. Because the Court is doing what it said it would not do in Varn, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.