Court Opinion

ID: 9391945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 18:08:56.317019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.642872
License: Public Domain

J-A02041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRANDON OBRYAN BOWERS                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 744 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 29, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-43-CR-0001023-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED: MAY 3, 2023

       Appellant, Brandon Obryan Bowers, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on December 29, 2021, as made final by the denial of his

post-sentence motion on June 10, 2022, following his jury trial convictions for

simple possession of narcotics, possession with intent to deliver narcotics,

recklessly endangering another person, and criminal use of a communication

facility.1 We affirm.

       We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows.   On July 15, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint

alleging that, on July 12, 2019, Appellant delivered fentanyl to Michael

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705,
and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), respectively.
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Herndon (the decedent) who ultimately overdosed and died.2            Following a

three-day trial, on November 18, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of the

aforementioned crimes.        On December 29, 2021, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years of imprisonment, consecutive

to any sentence Appellant was already serving. On January 3, 2022, the trial

court filed an amended sentencing order merging the sentences imposed for

simple possession of narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to

deliver. This timely appeal resulted.3

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

        I.    Did the trial court err in permitting Officer Jesse DiPietro to
              testify in the capacity as an expert witness and render an
              expert opinion when he had not been so qualified?

       II.    Did the trial court err in depriving Appellant of the right to
              cross-examine Officer Jesse DiPietro related to his training
              and experience in the field of narcotics when he testified in
              the capacity as an expert witness and rendered an expert
              opinion?

____________________________________________

2    In addition to the crimes for which Appellant was convicted, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant with third-degree murder, involuntary
manslaughter, and drug delivery resulting in death. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2502(c), 2504(a), and 2506(a), respectively.         The jury, however,
ultimately acquitted Appellant of these homicide-related offenses.
3 On January 7, 2022, the trial court granted Appellant’s extension request to
permit the filing of a post-sentence motion after the receipt of the trial
transcripts. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on March 21, 2022.
The trial court denied relief by order entered on June 10, 2022. Thereafter,
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 21, 2022. On June 23, 2022,
the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied
timely on July 7, 2022. On August 15, 2022, the trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

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     III.   Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to
            introduce evidence related to the possession and
            distribution of marijuana to an unknown party as the same
            was irrelevant, overly prejudicial and the Commonwealth
            failed to file proper notice under [Pa.R.E.] 404(b)?

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (complete capitalization omitted).

      Appellant’s first two issues pertain to the admission of testimony by

Commonwealth trial witness, Officer Jesse DiPietro and, thus, we will examine

them together. First, Appellant argues that Officer DiPietro testified in the

capacity as both an expert and lay witness when the Commonwealth elicited

him “to render an expert opinion even though he had not been identified as

such or qualified in that capacity.”      Id. at 20.     Appellant claims that

Pennsylvania courts have routinely held that expert testimony is required to

decipher for a jury “coded and encrypted language utilized by drug

traffickers.” Id. at 19 (citation omitted). Appellant cites an exchange at trial,

wherein the Commonwealth questioned Officer DiPietro about his training and

experience with drug investigations and observations regarding the use of

code or slang narcotics terms and the average length of drug sale

conversations. Id. at 20-23. Although Officer DiPietro was not offered as an

expert, Appellant argues that the officer “gave an opinion based upon his

training that he believed that the communications between Appellant and [the

victim] were consistent with the sale and delivery of narcotics.” Id. at 33.

      In his second issue presented, Appellant contends that the trial court

compounded its initial error by denying Appellant the opportunity to

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cross-examine Officer DiPietro “as to his training, experience, qualifications,

and/or expert opinion.” Id. at 41. Appellant claims, therefore, that his right

to confront and cross-examine Officer DiPietro regarding his qualifications as

an expert was also violated.   Id. at 41-45.

      Our Supreme Court has previously determined:

      An appellate court generally reviews a trial court's decisions
      regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
      Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1027 (Pa. 2012)
      (“An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an
      appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
      requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such a lack of support so as to be
      clearly erroneous.”) (citations and quotations omitted). [When
      the examination or interpretation of our evidentiary rules involves
      a question of law our] standard of review is de novo and our scope
      of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139,
      1176 (Pa. 2012). When interpreting our rules of evidence, we
      must ascribe to the words of these rules their plain and ordinary
      meaning. Id. (citation omitted).

      [Pennsylvania] Rule [of Evidence] 701 permits lay witnesses to
      provide opinion testimony only if such testimony meets three
      limiting criteria:

         Pa.R.E. 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

         If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the
         form of an opinion is limited to one that is:

         (a) rationally based on the witness's perception;

         (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony
         or determining a fact in issue; and

         (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
         knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

      Pa.R.E. 701. The first and second criteria outlined in the rule are
      self-explanatory, in that they simply require that a [lay] witness's
      opinion testimony be based upon personal knowledge and be
      helpful to the jury in understanding the witness's testimony or a

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     fact at issue. The final limiting criteria precludes lay witness
     opinion testimony based upon scientific, technical, or other
     specialized knowledge that falls within the realm of expert opinion
     testimony as outlined by Rule 702, which provides as follows:

        Pa.R.E. 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses

        A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
        experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
        an opinion or otherwise if:

        (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
        knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
        layperson;

        (b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
        knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
        evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

        (c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the
        relevant field.

     Pa.R.E. 702. [Our Supreme Court has] explained that “expert
     testimony is permitted only as an aid to the jury when the subject
     matter is distinctly related to a science, skill, or occupation beyond
     the knowledge or experience of the average layman.”
     Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa. 1988)
     (citation omitted). [Our Supreme Court has] also recognized that
     the standard for qualifying as an expert is a liberal one and the
     witness need only have “‘any reasonable pretension to specialized
     knowledge on the subject matter under investigation’” and the
     weight to be given to the expert's testimony is for the factfinder.
     Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 546 A.2d 26, 31 (Pa. 1988),
     quoting Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d
     914, 924 (Pa. 1974) (additional citation omitted); see also
     Comment, Pa.R.E. 702. [Moreover,] “expertise, whether acquired
     as a result of formal education or by experience, is expertise.”
     Commonwealth v. Auker, 681 A.2d 1305, 1317 (Pa. 1996).

                          *            *            *

     In [Commonwealth v.] Huggins, [68 A.3d 962 (Pa. Super.
     2013),] the Superior Court considered whether Rules 701 and 702
     precluded a police officer from testifying as both a lay and expert
     witness. Huggins, 68 A.3d at 966, 974. The [Huggins] court
     ultimately held that the plain language of these rules “do not

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      preclude a single witness from testifying, or offering opinions, in
      the capacity as both a lay and expert witness on matters that may
      embrace the ultimate issues to be decided by the fact-finder,” so
      long as the jury is properly instructed to avoid confusion. Id. at
      967, 974. In reaching this conclusion, the panel referenced
      federal case law highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing
      between an officer's lay and expert testimony:

         We have explained that a law enforcement officer's
         testimony is lay opinion if it is limited to what he observed
         ... or to other facts derived exclusively from a particular
         investigation .... On the other hand, an officer testifies as
         an expert when he brings the wealth of his experience as an
         officer to bear on those observations and makes connections
         for the jury based on that specialized knowledge.

      Id. at 969, quoting United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702,
      709 (7th Cir. 2012) (additional quotations and citations omitted).
      The panel also acknowledged that distinguishing between an
      officer's expert and lay testimony “is often far from clear” when
      that officer possesses specialized knowledge and was also
      personally involved in [investigating] the facts underlying the
      case. Id. It explained that “‘the inferences officers draw when
      observing and responding to situations cannot always be
      separated from the expertise they bring to evaluate those
      situations. Their observations are guided by experience and
      training and thus, at least some of their fact testimony will be
      influenced by specialized knowledge.’” Id. quoting Christian, 673
      F.3d at 708.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 889–891 (Pa. 2020) (original

brackets omitted).

      In Commonwealth v. Rose, 172 A.3d 1121 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing

United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2015), this Court

further recognized that law enforcement officers should be qualified as experts

when interpreting intercepted conversations that use “slang, street language,

and the jargon of the illegal drug trade.” Rose, 172 A.3d at 1130 (citation

omitted). Whereas, an ”officer's lay opinion is admissible only when the law

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enforcement officer is a participant in the conversation, has personal

knowledge of the facts being related in the conversation, or observed the

conversations as they occurred.”     Id. (citation omitted).   When a witness

testifies in dual capacities, the trial court must exercise “its gatekeeping

function” to “minimize any juror confusion” by directing the Commonwealth

“to delineate between” the witness’ “expert and fact-based opinions[,]”

permit “rigorous cross-examination” of the proffered witness “regarding his

expertise and the substance of his testimony” and issue “cautionary

instructions throughout trial.”   Huggins, 68 A.3d at 974.

      Finally, we note:

      It is well settled that the test to be applied when qualifying an
      expert witness is whether the witness has any reasonable
      pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under
      investigation.    Such knowledge need not be obtained through
      formal education but may have been acquired by other training or
      experience.      Moreover, a defendant's right of confrontation
      includes the right to cross-examine witnesses about possible
      motives to testify.

                           *           *           *

      The scope of cross-examination is a matter within the discretion
      of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
      discretion.

Commonwealth v. Saunders, 946 A.2d 776, 785–786 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(cleaned up); see also Commonwealth v. Baez, 720 A.2d 711, 727 (Pa.

1998) (“The qualification of an expert witness is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for a clear abuse of

discretion.”).

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      Here, applying the foregoing legal precepts, we agree with Appellant

that the trial court erred in concluding that the challenged portion of Officer

DiPietro’s testimony was offered and admitted solely as lay opinion.       The

Commonwealth questioned Officer DiPietro at length about his expertise in

“drug interdiction,” his work with the Attorney General Mercer County Drug

Task Force, and his special training in narcotics investigation including drug

identification, lingo, and packaging.      N.T., 11/16/2021, at 240-245.

Moreover, while Officer DiPietro was called upon primarily as a fact witness to

testify regarding his investigation of the charged crimes, we have little doubt

that Officer DiPietro summoned the wealth of his experience in law

enforcement when he explained for the jury the nature of the drug trafficking

exchanges that occurred in this case as well as the meaning of certain coded

words used in exchanges between Appellant and the decedent. As to those

aspects of Officer DiPiero’s testimony, there is no dispute that he was not a

participant in the text messages, had no personal knowledge of the facts being

related in the conversation, and/or did not observe the conversations as they

occurred. Instead, Officer DiPietro was asked to provide his insights gained

through his occupational training and experience, not within the average

layperson’s knowledge as required under Rule 702(a), to describe encrypted

jargon used in narcotics’ sales. See Rose, 172 A.3d at 1131 (Witness “should

have been qualified as an expert in order to testify to the meaning of any of

the particular words within the conversations.”).     As such, the trial court

should not have permitted Officer DiPietro to testify as an expert, or as a

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witness testifying in dual capacities.4 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial

court misapplied the law and abused its discretion in permitting Officer

DiPietro to testify as an expert witness regarding the content of Appellant’s

text messages with the decedent without first securing the proper formalities

from the Commonwealth, allowing Appellant to fully cross-examine the

witness regarding his training and experience, and then properly guiding and

instructing the jury.

       Having determined that the trial court abused its discretion, we next

turn to whether the error was harmless. See id., citing Commonwealth v.

McClure, 144 A.3d 970, 975–976 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“In the event of an

erroneous admission of evidence, a verdict can still be sustained if the error

was harmless.”). “Harmless error exists if the [Commonwealth] proves either:

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis;

or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other

untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously

admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence

of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so

insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the

____________________________________________

4  The Commonwealth is required to disclose expert opinions during pretrial
discovery and inspection. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(e). The trial court may
order “an expert whom the attorney for the Commonwealth intends to call in
any proceeding” to prepare a report. Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(b). The trial
court is also required to properly instruct the jury to avoid confusion when a
witness testifies in a dual capacity as a fact and expert witness. Huggins, 68
A.3d at 974. Here, there is no dispute that these requirements were not met.

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verdict.” Commonwealth v. Burno, 154 A.3d 764, 787 (Pa. 2017) (citation

omitted).

      In this case, in addition to the text messages between Appellant and the

decedent, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of two individuals,

Michelle Jordan (Jordan) and Travis Pratt (Pratt), who were living with

Appellant at the time of the alleged narcotics delivery. Jordan testified that

Appellant appeared agitated when he learned that the decedent suffered a

fatal overdose the night before. N.T., 11/17/2021, at 21. Appellant admitted

to Jordan that the text message he sent to the decedent referred to fentanyl

and that he was nervous that the message was incriminating.         Id. at 24.

Appellant asked Jordan to help him manufacture an alibi and an excuse for

the text messages. Id. at 28-34. Jordan testified that Appellant asked her

to “help him figure out how to erase” the text messages, because he was

“concerned he would get in trouble … for providing [the decedent] the drugs.”

Id. at 39-40. Appellant “wanted [Jordan] to tell the police that when he saw

[the decedent] that night, the night that [he] passed away, [] that [Appellant]

was dropping off headphones.”      Id. at 44.    Jordan further testified that

Appellant stated that “he’d given [the decedent] more [fentanyl] in the past

and nothing like this ha[d] ever happened.” Id. at 39. Jordan confirmed that

Appellant had fentanyl on the night the decedent died, because she and

Appellant used it. Id. at 58-59. Likewise, Pratt testified Appellant told him

that the police confiscated his cellular telephone, Appellant gave the decedent

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“stuff” the day before he died, Pratt believed the term “stuff” referred to

narcotics, and Appellant exclaimed to Pratt, “I’m fucked.” Id. at 106-107.

       The Commonwealth additionally presented the testimony of Matthew

Thompson (Thompson). In 2020, Thompson “frequented the same hotel” as

Appellant and testified that Appellant admitted that he killed the decedent.

N.T., 11/18/2021, at 39-41. Thompson further testified that Appellant asked

him to kill Jordan and Pratt for $10,000.00 for “giving the police information.”

Id. at 41-42.

       Finally, we note that the Commonwealth also presented the testimony

of Detective Michael Songer (Detective Songer), in his capacity as a narcotics

expert.5 Id. at 57-68. Detective Songer testified that the text messages at

issue contained “drug lingo communication[s]” wherein Appellant “texts [the

decedent] and tells him that he had some fire gray that he wanted him to try.”

Id. at 65.     Detective Songer explained that “[g]ray is what is commonly

referred to as fentanyl … just based upon the color.” Id. “[I]f it’s higher

potency or better quality, then it’s referred to as fire.” Id.

       Based on this overwhelming evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s

error in permitting Officer DiPietro to testify as a lay witness regarding the

meaning of the text messages was harmless.         The error was de minimus,

cumulative of other untainted evidence, and the prejudicial effect of the error

was insignificant by comparison to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
____________________________________________

5The trial court accepted Detective Songer as an expert and Appellant did not
object. N.T., 1/18/2022, at 62.

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Furthermore, we note that the trial court instructed the jury to weigh the

evidence and make its own credibility determinations. See N.T. 11/18/2021,

at 139-145.    We presume the jury followed the court’s instructions.     See

Rose, 172 A.3d at 1131 (citation omitted). As such, we discern that Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his first two issues as presented.

      Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Detective

Songer to testify regarding the distribution of marijuana to an unknown

individual. Appellant’s Brief at 45-58; see also id. at 53 (“Detective Songer

was permitted to give an expert opinion that the day prior [to decedent’s

death], that [Appellant] had picked up a ‘zip’ i.e. ounce of marijuana to give

to an unknown individual.”).       Appellant first contends that the testimony

pertaining to the distribution of marijuana to an unknown individual

constituted a prior bad act under Pa.R.E. 404(b). Id. Appellant next posits

that the Commonwealth was required, but failed to, give proper notice that it

was presenting Rule 404(b) testimony. Id. at 47-50.

      The text message at issue stated:

      I stopped yesterday. Nobody home. I had some fire gray I
      wanted you to try. I went over tonight for a zip for someone. But
      not getting any more until tomorrow after work. I barely have
      any. I have maybe a 30 for the next 24 hours, and I need a g for
      24 hours, so it’s gonna be a rough one until after work, brother.
      I’m sorry.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/2022, at 6.

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       As previously stated, we review the admission of evidence for an abuse

of discretion. “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to

prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the

person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). We have

previously determined:

       Evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose of
       demonstrating a criminal defendant's propensity to commit
       crimes. Nevertheless, evidence may be admissible in certain
       circumstances, where it is relevant for some other legitimate
       purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant's
       character. Specifically, other crimes evidence is admissible if
       offered for a non-propensity purpose, such as proof of an actor's
       knowledge, plan, motive, identity, or absence of mistake or
       accident.[6] When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of
       prior crimes is admissible if its probative value outweighs its
       potential for unfair prejudice.

       Unfair prejudice means a tendency to suggest decision on an
       improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty
       of weigh[]ing the evidence impartially.

          Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful
          to the defendant. This Court has stated that it is not
          required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts
          from the jury's consideration where those facts are relevant
          to the issues at hand and form part of the history and
          natural development of the events and offenses for which
          the defendant is charged. Moreover, we have upheld the
          admission of other crimes evidence, when relevant, even
          where the details of the other crime were extremely
          grotesque or highly prejudicial.

____________________________________________

6 “Additionally, evidence of prior crimes and bad acts may be admitted where
the acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of
the case and were part of its natural development.” Commonwealth v.
Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing Commonwealth v.
Powell, 956 A.2d 406 (Pa. 2008).

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Commonwealth v. Green, 271 A.3d 393, 402 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal

citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 329 (Pa. 2022).

      Pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3), before presenting prior bad act evidence,

“[i]n criminal cases, the prosecution must provide reasonable written notice

in advance of trial so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it, or

if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the specific nature,

permitted use, and use of any such evidence[.]”        Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3).    The

purpose of this rule “is to prevent unfair surprise, and to give the defendant

reasonable time to prepare an objection to, or ready a rebuttal for, such

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 404, Comment. Where the Commonwealth has provided

the defendant with discovery containing evidence of the prior bad acts, the

defendant has sufficient notice of the proffered evidence prior to trial. See

Commonwealth v. Lynch, 57 A.3d 120, 126 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing

Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 118, n.2 (Pa. 2001).

      On this issue, the trial court determined:

      The full text message was shown to the jury to enable the jury to
      fully understand the context of the communication between
      Appellant and the deceased.       Any reference to Appellant’s
      providing drugs to a third party was stated in passing as it was
      neither the focus of the message nor the Commonwealth’s
      purpose for introducing this particular message.             The
      Commonwealth did not introduce the evidence to prove
      Appellant’s criminal propensity as prohibited by Pa.R.E. 404(b),
      but to establish Appellant communicated about and supplied the
      deceased with drugs.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/2022, at 7.

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     Upon review of the certified record and applicable law, we discern there

was no abuse of discretion. Initially, we note that the text message at issue

was provided during discovery, so we reject Appellant’s contention that he did

not have proper notice.   Next, we observe that the text message at issue

showed a close relationship between Appellant and the decedent wherein

Appellant brought a sample of fentanyl to the decedent and did so without

solicitation. The text message revealed an established association, a motive

for Appellant to obtain an additional supply of fentanyl to deliver to the

decedent, and a plan to meet for an exchange. Moreover, Detective Songer

testified that the subsequent responses to the above cited text message

revealed that the decedent “was confused about what [drugs] he thought

[Appellant] had” for sale.    N.T., 11/18/2021, at 67.     In one response,

Appellant asked the decedent if he wanted marijuana.          See id. at 66

(“[Appellant] replied back, bud with a question mark. ‘Bud’ would be slang

for marijuana, for marijuana buds, and he asks [the decedent], you want to,

with a question mark.”). The decedent responded that he could not smoke

marijuana. Id. at 66-67. Detective Songer, therefore, interpreted the text

message at issue to mean that Appellant possessed marijuana available for

delivery, but did not have enough fentanyl for the decedent and that he would

not be able to get any more for 24 hours. Id. at 72. Thus, the portion of the

text relating to the sale of marijuana to an unknown person was part of a

chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case and was part

of its natural development. Furthermore, this evidence was not introduced to

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show Appellant had a general propensity to sell narcotics.             Rather, the

Commonwealth sought to clarify that the decedent requested, and ultimately

received fentanyl but not marijuana, from Appellant. The admitted evidence

was relevant to the question of whether Appellant delivered drugs to the

decedent which resulted in his death.7         Accordingly, for all of the foregoing

reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claim on appeal.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2023

____________________________________________

7 We note, however, that the jury acquitted Appellant on all charges related
to the decedent’s death. Thus, it appears that the jurors believed that
Appellant delivered drugs to the decedent, but were unable to conclude that
the fatal overdose resulted from that delivery.

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