Court Opinion

ID: 9704647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:41:46.82116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.868887
License: Public Domain

HURD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds the trial court erred in changing custody to Frederick, knowing that physical custody would be in the paternal grandmother, all without finding that Linda was unfit.
The trial court did not grant Frederick’s request that his mother be granted physical custody of Jennifer. Rather, the trial court vested custody in Frederick under circumstances where, with Frederick’s approval, his mother will be largely responsible for the day-to-day care of Jennifer. Under the trial court’s decision the paternal grandmother has no more custody than a governess entrusted with the care and supervision of a child.
“Custody,” as it relates to children, embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child. These parental rights include the right to the child’s earnings and service, SDCL §§ 25-*6475-7 and 25-5-11; the right to determine the child’s residence, SDCL 25-5-13; the right to inherit from the child’s estate, SDCL §§ 29-1-6 and 29-1-16; and the right to make decisions regarding the child’s care, protection, discipline, health, education and religion.
The trial court granted no custody or parental rights to Frederick’s mother and thus did not violate the rule set forth by this court in Blow v. Lottman, 75 S.D. 127, 59 N.W.2d 825 (1958), that:
By nature and under the common law and by virtue of statutory provisions, SDC 14.0303 [SDCL 25-5-7] and 14.0506 [SDCL 30-27-23], a parent has a preferred legal right to custody of his or her own children.
See also: Langerman v. Langerman, 321 N.W.2d 532 (S.D.1982).
Based upon a cold record, the majority holds the trial court, which had the considerable benefit of personal observation and evaluation of the witnesses, clearly abused its discretion in concluding Frederick sustained his burden of showing the best interest of Jennifer required modification of custody.
I recognize the importance of sibling relationships. Absent good reason, siblings should not be separated. See: People in the Interest of G.H., 390 N.W.2d 54 (S.D.1986). Here, the trial court had no jurisdiction to award custody of Jennifer’s half-sister to Frederick. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded the best interests of Jennifer required custody to be vested in Frederick. This conclusion is supported by evidence of the quality of time spent by Frederick with Jennifer, the significant improvement in her school work while in Mitchell, and the availability of Frederick’s mother to provide day-to-day love and care for the child. Thus, this court should not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trial court as to the best interest of Jennifer.
I would affirm.