Court Opinion

ID: 9641233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:25:56.286122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.903346
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution does not prohibit a state from granting privileges to specified classes of persons where sufficient reason exists; but where advantages are conferred upon some, the state must justify its denial to others by reference to a legitimate ground for distinction. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 *131F. Sup. 331, 338 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600; Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 189, 198 A. 746. Any classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989. Thus, in the present ease, the proper inquiry for this court is whether there are any differences between probationers whose liberty is threatened by revocation and parolees whose liberty is threatened by revocation which could justify the legislature in allowing bail pending a revocation hearing for one group but not for the other.
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated: “Despite the undoubted minor differences between probation and parole, the commentators have agreed that revocation of probation where sentence has been imposed previously is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole. See, e.g., Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241-1243 (1971); Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 175, 198 n.182 (1964).” (Emphasis supplied.) Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656. The majority have restricted the meaning of “constitutionally” in that statement to “for due process purposes” by indicating that the court’s specific citations of authority in support of that statement are primarily concerned with due process rights. The use of the introductory signal, “See, e.g.,” preceding the authorities cited, however, signifies that *132the court also based its statement upon the views of other commentators, and that the articles cited are but examples of those views. Several noteworthy articles published contemporaneously with those cited discuss at length the inability to distinguish between probation and parole revocation under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Cohen, “Due Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings,” 42 U. Colo. L. Rev. 197, 225-28; comment, “Revocation of Probation and Parole in Nebraska — A Procedural Antithesis,” 48 Neb. L. Rev. 220, 242-47.
The majority opinion states that “substantial” differences exist between the status of probationers and parolees. It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the differences to be minor. The first “difference” pointed out by my brethren is that a parolee is not subject to judicial control whereas a probationer is. That is undoubtedly true. If bail were to be accorded to a parolee, however, the courts and not the parole board would make the relevant determination. The second “difference” suggested is that “ [p] robation is granted because the sentencing court is of the opinion that confinement is not necessary for the protection of the public and probation provides a better chance of rehabilitation, whereas parole is technically a custody status.” Despite the fact that a parolee is technically in the custody of the parole board, the paramount consideration in granting either parole or probation is the determination whether the parolee or probationer would constitute a threat to the welfare of society.1 Each *133case essentially requires a determination that the convicted person is a “good risk.” Van Dyke, “Parole Revocation Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel,” 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1215, 1243. “Although the granting of limited freedom to the convicted person is made by different decision-makers, the effect is the same: . . . [he] remains subject to the power of the state and can be ordered back to prison should he violate the conditions under which he has been released.” Id., 1240.
In Connecticut, strong similarities exist between the position of a parolee and that of a probationer. Bach has been convicted of a crime and is subject to the strict control of a governmental official. General Statutes §§ 53a-30 (a), 54-126. The parolee must always spend time in a correctional institution, while the probationer may be incarcerated prior to probation. General Statutes §§ 53a-28 (b) (c), 53a-39. Both are subject to the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision. General Statutes §§ 54-132-54-138. If either is charged with violating parole or probation, the proof required to revoke is substantially less than that required in a criminal trial. State v. Roberson, 165 Conn. 73, 327 A.2d 556. During the period of parole or probation either may be completely discharged upon a showing of “good cause” or that he “will lead an orderly life.” General Statutes §§ 53a-33, 54-129.
*134The only real distinction in status between a probationer and parolee alluded to by the majority is that different persons administrate the systems under which their liberty is determined. In order for a difference in status to provide grounds for a difference in treatment, the difference must have a substantial relation to the object of the legislation. See, e.g., F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, supra. My colleagues have simply asserted that the differences “provide a rational basis for distinguishing between probation violators and parole violators insofar as the availability of bail is concerned.” They are saying in essence that the fact that parolees and probationers are liberated by different agents of the state provides a rational ground for allowing bail for one and not for the other.
“Red things may be associated by reason of their redness, with disregard of all other resemblances or of distinction. Such classification would be logically appropriate. Apply it further: make a rule of conduct depend upon it and distinguish in legislation between red-haired men and black-haired men and the classification would immediately be seen to be wrong; it would only have arbitrary relation to the purpose and province of legislation.” Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 382, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 L. Ed. 691. The fact that parole and probation systems have different administrators has only arbitrary relation to legislation which would allow bail to one group and deny it to another.2 Administra*135tive efficiency cannot justify abridgment of basic constitutional rights. United States v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir.).
The primary purpose of bail is to ensure the future presence of the person at the time when his presence is required. See, e.g., 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bail and Recognizance, § 4. A relevant consideration in deciding whether to grant bail, particularly in the case of post-conviction bail, is whether the freedom of the person convicted would constitute a threat to the welfare and safety of society. That determination is one for the trial court to make on the facts of each case. There are no differences between parolees and probationers which would justify the legislature in making the determination that society needs protection from parolees but not from probationers, when both have previously been considered “good risks.”
“Therefore, although neither the probationer nor the parolee has an Eighth Amendment right to bail pending revocation hearings, we find that if one group may be so privileged, then so must the other, and that the pertinent Illinois statutes so read,” said the court in the case of United States ex rel. Dereczynski v. Longo, 368 F. Sup. 682, 689, (N.D. Ill., E.D.) aff’d 506 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir.). That case presented facts almost identical to those of the present case. The pertinent Illinois statutes allowed bail for probationers but were silent as to the right to bail of parolees. Relying upon Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, the court held (p. 688): “We are mindful of maintaining proper respect for the legislature as a coordinate branch of government, and proper judicial restraint requires a presumption of constitutionality of . . . [the parole *136statutes]. Since this section is silent on the right to bail, we construe . . . [it] to be the analogue to . . . [the probation statute], and construe it to say that the court may admit the offender to bail pending the hearing.”
It is not unreasonable, considering the presumption of constitutionality and the lack of an express parolee bail provision, to construe § 5á-127 to be the analogue of § 53a-32. I would, therefore, find no error in the trial courts’ decisions.

 General Statutes § 53a-29 states that a court may sentence a person to probation if it believes that “(1) Present or extended institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public; (2) the defendant is in need of guidance, *133training or assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and (3) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.”
General Statutes § 54-125 indicates that the parole board may grant parole if “(1) it appears from all available information, including such reports from the commissioner of correction as such panel may require, that there is reasonable probability that such inmate will live and remain at liberty without violating the law and (2) such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.”

 “Fictions of 'custody’ and the like that have been created by statute or court decisions cannot change the reality of a parolee’s conditional freedom and cannot affect the constitutional protections surrounding his interest in that conditional freedom.” Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 98 n.2 (6th Cir.) (opinion of Celebrezze, J., dissenting).