Court Opinion

ID: 9461139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:07:00.795967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:54.838711
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Circuit Judge
(concurring). •
Subsequent to the decision in Cara-velle I, the Supreme Court reminded us that the statute is “wholly neutral” in requiring respect for those who oppose a union as well as for those who favor one. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278, 94 S.Ct. 495. That reminder did not purport to change the law and, therefore, does not justify a refusal to accept Caravelle I as the law of this ease.
I think Judge Kiley is correct in his interpretation of Caravelle I as holding that an employee-relative may be “special” in the sense that he does not share with his co-workers a common interest in the terms and conditions of their employment, and yet not be sufficiently special for the Board to find that he enjoys a “special status” as that term has heretofore been used. I am not at all sure that this special new category will be identifiable by any standard other than probable opposition to the union at election time1 — which is obviously an impermissible standard under Savair— but my doubts about the impact of Car-avelle I must be subordinated to my duty to respect it. Notwithstanding those doubts, I therefore concur in Judge Kiley’s well considered opinion.

. Judge Kiley correctly describes Garavelle I as having fashioned an “exjmnded community of interest standard.” The original “community of interest” standard was developed prior to the enactment of the Taft Hartley Amendment mandating neutrality at election time.