Court Opinion

ID: 9371213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 19:00:27.270906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.102537
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30210     Document: 00516646912         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/15/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                            FILED
                                                                    February 15, 2023
                                  No. 21-30210                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk

   Andrea Armstrong, Executrix of the Estate
   of Glenn Ford,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Don Ashley; Gary Alderman; Gary Pittman; Everett T.
   Rushing; Billy Lockwood; Frank Datcher; Glynn
   Mitchell; Rodney Price; the City of Shreveport; Caddo
   Parish District Attorney James Stewart; the Estate of
   George McCormick,

                                                        Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 5:15-CV-544

   Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
         Isadore Rozeman was shot and killed in his jewelry shop in 1983, and
   Glenn Ford was sentenced to death for the crime. Thirty years later,
   Louisiana vacated Ford’s conviction because new evidence identified the real
   murderer. After his release from prison, Ford filed this § 1983 suit seeking
   damages from police officers, prosecutors, and the local government for
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   suppressing, fabricating, and destroying evidence.         Ford died shortly
   thereafter, leaving Armstrong as the executrix of his estate. In 2021, the
   district court dismissed Armstrong’s amended complaint in its entirety based
   on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) as to some defendants and 12(c) as to others.
   The district court correctly dismissed nearly all of the claims, including a
   constitutional malicious prosecution claim, which, at the time suit was filed,
   was not cognizable in the Fifth Circuit. See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d
   939, 953–54 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). But this year, the Supreme Court held
   that such claims do in fact emanate from the Fourth Amendment. See
   Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Nevertheless, the district
   court properly dismissed the constitutional malicious prosecution claim for
   the same reasons it dismissed Armstrong’s Louisiana malicious prosecution
   claim.
            Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
                                 I. Background
            Ford was quickly arrested and charged with Rozeman’s murder. He
   was convicted of capital murder, and his conviction and sentence were
   affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Ford, 489 So. 2d 1250, 1257 (La. 1986).
            In 1992, Ford sought state post-conviction relief on the grounds that
   his counsel was ineffective, exculpatory evidence was suppressed, and he was
   actually innocent. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief. Ford next
   filed a federal habeas corpus petition in 2012. See Ford v. Cain, No. 5:12-cv-
   00350 (W.D. La. filed Feb. 4, 2012).
            While that petition was pending, the State moved to vacate Ford’s
   conviction and sentence based on “credible evidence” that “Ford was
   neither present at, nor a participant in, the robbery and murder of Isadore
   Rozeman.” Ford was released from prison on March 11, 2014. In a joint
   motion to dismiss his federal habeas petition, Ford explained that state filings

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   “indicated that an individual named Jake Robinson confessed to an informant
   for the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office that he—not Mr. Ford—shot and killed
   Isadore Rozeman.” Ford v. Cain, No. 5:12-cv-00350, ECF. No. 62 (W.D. La.
   Mar. 14, 2014).
           Later that same year, Ford filed a state court petition seeking
   compensation under La. Rev. Stat. 15:572.8 for his wrongful conviction.
   See State v. Ford, 193 So. 3d 1242 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2016). The state court
   denied relief because Ford could not prove “factual innocence,” that he did
   not “commit any crime based upon the same set of facts used in his original
   conviction.” La. Rev. Stat. 15:572.8(B). The court found that Ford,
   though not the triggerman, was intimately involved with Rozeman’s robbery
   and murder.
           Specifically, there was “overwhelming evidence of Ford’s knowledge
   of and involvement in the criminal activity that day and night: his
   participation in selling the stolen property from the robbery; his acting as a
   lookout; meeting with Jake Robinson and Henry Robinson before and after
   the crime; and his attempts to procure buyers for the probable murder
   weapon.” Ford, 193 So. 3d at 1254. Because he “failed to disprove that he
   committed the crimes of possession of stolen goods, accessory after the
   fact[,] and being a principal to the armed robbery,” Ford was denied
   compensation. 1 Id.

           1 Two concurring judges noted that based on Ford’s involvement with the armed
   robbery leading to Rozeman’s murder, Ford could likely have been convicted for felony
   murder under Louisiana law as it stood in 1983, which was punishable by life without parole.
           What this means is that Ford arguably committed second degree murder
           arising out of the facts of this case. Had he actually been convicted of that
           crime, in a petit jury trial conducted in accordance with the Sixth
           Amendment to the United States Constitution, Ford would have never
           been released from prison.

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           While his compensation case was pending, Ford filed this lawsuit in
   March 2015. Ford died three months later, and the executrix of his estate,
   Andrea Armstrong, was substituted.                  Eleven defendants named in the
   Complaint are parties to this appeal. Armstrong does not appeal the district
   court’s dismissal of other defendants. Eight of the appellee–defendants,
   collectively the “Law Enforcement Defendants,” are current or former
   Shreveport Police officers. 2 The ninth appellee is the estate of George
   McCormick, Caddo Parish’s former coroner. The final two appellees are the
   City of Shreveport and current Caddo Parish District Attorney James
   Stewart.        Armstrong alleged that the Law Enforcement Defendants
   suppressed or destroyed exculpatory evidence, such as investigative reports
   corroborating Ford’s story and implicating other suspects, and fabricated
   testimony implicating Ford. Armstrong also asserted Monell 3 claims against
   Shreveport and the Caddo Parish DA 4 based on unconstitutional
   investigative practices.
           The Caddo Parish DA and McCormick’s estate filed Rule 12(b)(6)
   motions. Granting both motions, the district court found that Armstrong
   failed to establish an official policy or custom of the DA’s office as required
   for Monell liability, and the claims against McCormick were barred by
   absolute immunity.

   Ford, 193 So. 3d at 1258 (Drew, J., concurring in the Opinion on Rehearing Grant); accord
   id. at 1256–57 (Brown, C.J., concurring in the Opinion on Rehearing Grant).
           2
             Those appellants are Ashley, Alderman, Pittman, Rushing, Lockwood, Datcher,
   Mitchell, and Price.
           3
               Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978).
           4
              “Louisiana law does not permit a district attorney’s office to be sued in its own
   name.” Hudson v. City of New Orleans, 174 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, when
   attempting to sue a Louisiana DA’s office under Monell, the current DA, rather than the
   office, is the proper defendant. Id. Any former DA’s actions at the time of Ford’s
   prosecution are imputed to the current DA for purposes of Monell.

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             The Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport answered the
   Complaint on December 3, 2015. The Law Enforcement Defendants then
   filed a separate Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which the court denied as untimely.
   The Law Enforcement Defendants’ appeal of this order was dismissed for
   lack of jurisdiction. Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2019).
             The Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport then moved for
   judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) in April 2019. 5 The district court
   ordered Armstrong to file a Rule 7(a) reply. 6 After Armstrong did so, the
   Law Enforcement Defendants and Shreveport re-urged their Rule 12(c)
   motions. The district court granted the Rule 12(c) motions in part on April 1,
   2021. 7
             The district found that Armstrong had not plausibly pled Monell
   claims against Shreveport because she did not identify a particular
   policymaker or explain how the City was made aware of its employees’
   alleged misconduct. The court also held that Armstrong’s claims against the
   Law Enforcement Defendants failed because Armstrong did not plausibly
   allege any individual officer’s violation of Ford’s constitutional rights.
             Armstrong timely appealed.

             5
              Because the district court denied the Law Enforcement Defendants’
   Rule 12(b)(6) motion on procedural rather than substantive grounds, the district court was
   free to consider the adequacy of the pleadings afresh upon a procedurally proper Rule 12(c)
   motion. See Armstrong, 918 F.3d at 423.
             6
             Rule 7(a) lists the only seven pleadings that are allowed. The seventh is “a reply
   to an answer,” “if the court orders one.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). When ordering the reply
   here, the district court instructed Armstrong to address specifically the defendants’
   qualified immunity defenses.
             7
             The district court denied the Rule 12(c) motions insofar as they required the court
   to decide claims of respondeat superior liability and indemnification against Shreveport
   under Louisiana law. The district court entered partial final judgment under Rule 54(b),
   and dismissed the indemnification claim against Shreveport without prejudice to
   reinstating it if its judgment is reversed on this appeal.

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                         II. Standard of Review
          This court reviews the grant of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions
   de novo. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 2010). In conducting
   that review, the court accepts all well-pled facts as true, drawing “all
   reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Harmon v. City of
   Arlington, Texas, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Morgan v.
   Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). But the court does not
   “presume true a number of categories of statements, including legal
   conclusions; mere labels; threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
   action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of further factual
   enhancement.” Id.
                               III. Discussion
          There are two groups of defendants. The first includes the Law
   Enforcement Defendants and the coroner, and the second consists of the
   local entities and the District Attorney facing allegations of Monell liability.
   We discuss first the Law Enforcement Defendants and coroner, then
   questions of Monell liability, and then Armstrong’s constitutional and
   Louisiana malicious prosecution claims, and last, Armstrong’s additional
   federal and state claims.
   a. The Law Enforcement Defendants
          Qualified immunity protects the Law Enforcement Defendants so
   long as their individual conduct did not violate clearly established
   constitutional rights. See Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163. When a defendant
   asserts qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to plead facts that
   show why immunity is inapplicable. See Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d
   475, 483 (5th Cir. 2012). Armstrong’s pleadings of conclusory statements,
   naked assertions, and threadbare recitals fail to plausibly show violations by
   these defendants of Ford’s clearly established constitutional rights.

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           i. Due process claims
           Armstrong alleges that the Law Enforcement Defendants suppressed
   thirteen exculpatory police reports. 8 Armstrong describes each report in
   some detail in her amended complaint and Rule 7(a) response. But other
   than providing ample descriptions of their contents, Armstrong’s assertions
   about constitutional violations surrounding the reports are formulaic. A
   pleading’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above
   the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
   complaint are true.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct.
   1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted). But conclusory assertions, including
   “conclusory allegation[s] of agreement at some unidentified point,” do not
   qualify as well-pled factual allegations.             Id. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
   Moreover, well-pled facts that are “merely consistent with” an entitlement
   to relief, that is, equally suggestive of legal and illegal conduct, do not suffice.
   Id. The complaint must allege facts “plausibly suggesting” illegal conduct
   such that the allegations are no longer in “neutral territory.” Id.; see also
   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (“Where a
   complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,
   it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
   relief.”) (quotation omitted)).

           8
              The “suppressed” reports consisted of a report suggesting Mr. Rozeman was
   killed after 2:30pm; a report documenting a conversation between one of the defendants
   and a witness who said he saw a “black man” that was not Ford near Rozeman’s shop at
   the time of the murder; several reports identifying alternate suspects; a report documenting
   interviews with children; a report documenting interviews with witnesses Norma Roach
   and Jean Whatley; a report documenting the defendants’ interviews with children; two
   reports documenting an interview and photo line-up with witness Michael Thornton; a
   report documenting another witness’s photo identification attempts; a report describing
   Jake and Henry Robinson as “the two prime suspects”; and another report with additional
   information on Jake and Henry Robinson.

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          The first of the thirteen allegedly “suppressed” reports described
   Rozeman’s murder as occurring late in the day, a time for which Armstrong
   had an alibi. Armstrong asserts that the Law Enforcement Defendants
   “knowingly and deliberately failed to provide these reports to Mr. Ford, his
   defense attorneys, or prosecutors,” and that Ford would have used the
   reports to impeach witnesses.        This language is found throughout
   Armstrong’s complaint and Rule 7(a) Reply and is repeated for all of her
   claims of “suppression.”      Additionally, for every report but the first,
   Armstrong includes language accusing all or a subset of the Law Enforcement
   Defendants of “communicating” with each other about “the existence of
   this information and the problem it posed for their plan to implicate
   Mr. Ford.”
          The district court correctly found that these conclusory allegations of
   suppression do not pass muster under governing law. A pleading that only
   contains “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic recitation of the
   elements of a cause of action” does not meet the standards of Rule 8(a)(2).
   Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,
   127 S. Ct. at 1959). Armstrong’s pleadings consist almost entirely of such
   formulaic recitations. She could have identified each witness Ford would
   have impeached with the reports, which testimony the jury likely would have
   discredited, and which defendant was responsible for suppressing each
   report. But based upon nothing more than Armstrong’s barebones recitals,
   these ill-pled claims of suppression by the named defendants are factually
   insufficient.
          Armstrong’s only non-conclusory factual allegation of suppression is
   that Ford and his counsel did not receive the reports during Ford’s trial. But
   this fact is fatal to Armstrong’s claim, because it is just as consistent with
   Brady violations solely accomplished by prosecutors as it is with police

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   suppression. 9 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, 127 S Ct. at 1964 (holding an
   antitrust complaint did not plausibly state a claim because it was just as
   consistent with (lawful) parallel conduct as with (unlawful) agreement in
   restraint of trade).         Armstrong’s allegations do not distinguish the
   perpetrators.
           Armstrong argues that “this Court has held that allegations far less
   detailed than Plaintiff’s suffice to state a due process claim in wrongful
   conviction cases.” To the contrary, the cases she cites illustrate the greater
   specificity that attends successful suppression claims. For example, in Burge
   v. St. Tammany Parish, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999), a wrongfully convicted
   suspect substantiated a Brady claim against a specific police officer by, among
   other things, presenting testimony from a fellow officer that the defendant
   had deliberately hidden exculpatory evidence. See id. at 461; see also Brown v.
   Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding sufficiently specific
   allegations that a lab technician concealed the exculpatory results of blood
   tests); Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a fabrication
   claim adequate which detailed that defendant “repeatedly altered the light
   settings on the camera with each picture in an effort to make Good’s
   photograph better match the ‘dark tan’ skin tone of the suspect in the police
   sketch”).
           Armstrong also argues that because she alleges the suppression of
   numerous items of evidence, less detail should be required as to the particular
   mechanics by which each item was suppressed. Armstrong principally cites

           9
              “The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that a criminal prosecutor’s
   failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant violates a defendant’s right
   to a fair trial. A police officer’s deliberate concealment of exculpatory evidence violates
   this same right, and can give rise to liability under § 1983.” Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231,
   237–38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196–97
   (1963) and Geter v. Fortenberry, 849 F.2d 1550, 1559 (5th Cir. 1988)).

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   Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016), which faulted the lower
   court’s resolution of a Brady claim for “evaluat[ing] the materiality of each
   piece of evidence in isolation rather than cumulatively.” Id. at 394. The
   Supreme Court’s statement is binding but inapposite, because the critical
   issue here is not the materiality of the reports, but why Ford’s counsel did
   not receive the reports before trial. Without pleading details about how and
   by whom each of the reports was suppressed, Armstrong cannot rely on the
   numerosity of the reports (irrespective of their materiality) to cure those
   deficiencies and seek damages.
           ii. Fabricated evidence claims
           Armstrong alleges that two of the Law Enforcement Defendants,
   Ashley and Alderman, fabricated evidence by obtaining false statements
   incriminating Ford from Marvella Brown, Donnie Thomas, and Chandra
   Nash.
           The Marvella Brown Statement is the most substantial of
   Armstrong’s fabrication allegations. Armstrong alleges that “Defendants
   Ashley and Alderman fed information about the murder to Ms. Brown in
   order to frame Mr. Ford for the crime.”             In this allegedly fabricated
   statement:
           Ms. Brown said that Mr. Ford had arrived at her apartment
           around noon on the day of the Rozeman murder and left with
           the Robinsons, only to return with a sack containing jewelry. In
           this fabricated statement, Mr. Ford carried a .22 pistol and Jake
           Robinson had a .38 revolver.
   Armstrong then alleges that this statement was used against Ford at his trial.
   Moreover, Armstrong alleges that “Marvella Brown later acknowledged that
   Defendants Ashley and Alderman had fabricated aspects of this statement”;
   “[i]n May 1984, Marvella Brown recanted her statement to Defendants
   Ashley and Alderman”; and “Ms. Brown’s recantation was documented in

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   a police report dated May 6, 1984.”
           Brown’s alleged “recantation” is a factual assertion that Ashley and
   Alderman fabricated this statement. Yet the Amended Complaint and Reply
   provide no details about the alleged “recantation,” other than that it
   happened, that it involved “aspects” of her statement, and was documented
   in a police report. No doubt that is because the details of the recantation are
   fatal to Armstrong’s fabrication claim. The police report notes that Brown
   visited Alderman and claimed that “she had made a mistake” about Jake
   Robinson being at her house on the day of the murder. 10 But Brown did not
   discuss Ford, nor does the report suggest that she recanted the statements
   that (1) Ford had returned with a sack of jewelry, (2) Ford arrived at her
   apartment around noon on the day of the murder and left with the Robinsons,
   and (3) Ford carried a .22 pistol. If fabrication occurred, Armstrong does not
   allege how it was material or harmful to Ford’s case.
           Viewed in the context of the May 6, 1984, police report, Armstrong’s
   assertion that Ashley and Alderman fabricated Brown’s testimony does not
   undermine her statements about Ford and is conclusory as to the officers’
   unconstitutional conduct against Ford. Because the allegations do not
   “plausibly suggest” that fabrication actually occurred as to the incrimination
   of Ford, the district court properly dismissed this claim. Twombly, 550 U.S.
   at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.

           10
              This police report was attached to the Law Enforcement Defendants’ Rule 12(c)
   motion as an exhibit. Because this report is central to the allegations in the Complaint and
   Reply, this court may consider it. See Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th
   Cir. 2003) (when ruling on a Rule 12 motion, a court may consider “documents that are
   referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim”). This is not
   a case like Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, where the plaintiff’s “complaint expressly
   reject[ed] those elements of the police report that conflict[ed] with her account.” 879 F.3d
   613, 620 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018).

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          Regarding Donnie Thomas, Armstrong’s allegations are as follows:
          Donnie Thomas had been arrested by Defendant Pittman in
          connection with the possession of some jewelry which had been
          stolen from Mr. Rozeman’s shop the month before he was
          killed.
          At some point after Defendant Pittman arrested Donnie
          Thomas and prior to February 2, when Defendants Ashley and
          Alderman spoke with Thomas, Defendants Pittman, Ashley
          and Alderman communicated together and came up with a plan
          to use Thomas and his connection to Rozeman in order to
          fabricate evidence to implicate Mr. Ford in the Rozeman
          murder.
          Defendants Ashley and Alderman then spoke with Thomas,
          and claimed that Thomas gave a statement to them that
          implicated Mr. Ford in Rozeman’s murder.
          This statement, in a similar manner to the purported statement
          from Marvella Brown, was fed to Mr. Thomas by Defendants
          Ashley and Alderman to frame Mr. Ford. And in a similar
          manner as they did with the Brown statement, Defendants
          suppressed the fabrication of the Thomas statement.
   These allegations are devoid of supporting factual detail that could render
   them plausible. Armstrong does not explain how the statement implicated
   Ford, or why she believes it to be fabricated, or how the statement was used
   against Ford. The district court properly dismissed this claim because it lacks
   “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
   plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
          Armstrong’s allegation that Chandra Nash’s statement was largely
   fabricated is barebones. She alleges:
          [B]ecause the report [discussing Chandra Nash’s statement]
          was suppressed, one or more of Defendants Ashley, Alderman,
          Price, Mitchell, Datcher, Lockwood, Pittman, and Rushing

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          were able to coerce or otherwise convince Chandra Lisa Nash
          to change her story, fabricating a false statement from her that
          purported to identify Mr. Ford as being near the scene of the
          crime close in time to the murder, which was used against
          Mr. Ford at his criminal trial.
   Armstrong does not identify which of the eight Law Enforcement Defendants
   fabricated Nash’s statement and does not provide any factual detail plausibly
   suggesting that Nash’s statement was in fact fabricated. Based on her failure
   to name a perpetrator and the conclusory allegation of fabrication, the district
   court properly dismissed this claim.
          iii. Fingerprint evidence
          Armstrong also alleges that Sgt. Lockwood, the Law Enforcement
   Defendant who obtained and analyzed the relevant fingerprint evidence,
   destroyed exculpatory fingerprint evidence, fabricated incriminatory
   fingerprint evidence, and also suppressed evidence that other suspects
   shared the “whorl” pattern print found on the bag.
          A Due Process Clause claim for destruction of evidence (or failure to
   preserve evidence) requires a showing that evidence was destroyed and that
   the government official acted in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood,
   488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988) (holding that “unless a criminal
   defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
   potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of
   law”); United States v. Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The
   destruction of evidence alone does not constitute a due process violation; the
   defendant must also show bad faith on the part of the government officials.”).
   Although Armstrong makes conclusory references to Lockwood’s
   “destruction of evidence,” her factual allegations concern a failure to
   preserve evidence, rather than destruction. Specifically, Armstrong alleges
   that Lockwood “fail[ed] to take a photograph of the fingerprint he

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   supposedly developed,” did “not properly preserv[e] the paper bag as
   evidence,” “failed to document and preserve where the print was allegedly
   found on the paper bag,” and used an improper “method . . . to process the
   bag for prints.” And Armstrong’s only allegation of bad faith is that “[t]his
   destruction of evidence was done in bad faith by Defendant Lockwood
   because he was not interested in pursuing a legitimate investigation designed
   to reveal the truth, which would have exculpated Mr. Ford.”
           Because Armstrong provides no facts supporting her conclusory
   allegation of bad faith, which, as an allegation of subjective intent, need not
   be accepted as true, her “destruction” claim against Lockwood is
   insufficiently pled. Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1164 n.2
   (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949). And
   Armstrong cites no authority suggesting that a plaintiff can state a claim for
   “destruction” of evidence by merely pointing to potentially useful evidence,
   claiming it was improperly preserved, and then alleging bad faith without
   factual support. 11 Instead, the thrust of the Court’s reasoning in Youngblood
   is that courts should weed out such claims because of the difficulty of
   “imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and
   to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance
   in a particular prosecution.” 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337.
           Armstrong’s fabrication allegations against Lockwood consist of the

           11
             Armstrong argues that because “Lockwood would have known the fingerprint
   was exculpatory, . . . a bad faith allegation is not required.” This rule conflicts with
   Youngblood, and neither of Armstrong’s cited cases is apposite. California v. Trombetta,
   467 U.S. 479, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984), was decided before Youngblood and, regardless,
   announces no such rule. See id. at 488–89. United States v. Swenson, 894 F.3d 677 (5th Cir.
   2018), simply announced the normal rule for Brady violations involving the withholding or
   suppressing of evidence. Id. at 683. It did not address claims for failure to preserve
   evidence.

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   following:
          Because Defendant Lockwood had deliberately destroyed the
          underlying forensic evidence, . . . he was free to fabricate false
          fingerprint evidence against Mr. Ford, because there was no
          remaining physical evidence that could contradict him. Thus,
          Defendant Lockwood fabricated false evidence against
          Mr. Ford by claiming that he had found, processed and
          observed a latent fingerprint on the paper bag that had a whorl
          pattern that implicated Mr. Ford. In fact, Defendant
          Lockwood later admitted that he had not seen the center of the
          fingerprint, making any attempt to classify the fingerprint as a
          whorl pattern and to link it to Mr. Ford on that basis totally
          baseless. Instead, Defendant Lockwood simply made up this
          piece of supposed evidence in order to wrongly implicate
          Mr. Ford.
   Armstrong alleges that Lockwood “claim[ed]” to have found a print that
   implicated Ford, and “simply made up this piece of supposed evidence.”
   Armstrong’s failure to allege how or where Lockwood made this “claim” is
   fatal. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (claim must present
   “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” an entitlement to relief).
   To the extent that Armstrong’s claim refers to Lockwood’s testimony at
   trial, it is barred by absolute immunity. See Mowbray v. Cameron Cnty., Tex.,
   274 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]itnesses are entitled to absolute
   immunity against § 1983 suits based on their testimony in a criminal trial.”).

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           Finally, Armstrong alleges that:
           Defendants suppressed exculpatory evidence that any whorl
           pattern fingerprint on the paper bag, as claimed by Defendant
           Lockwood, likely came from another source. Whorl patterns
           are found on approximately 35% of people. One or more of
           Defendants Ashley, Alderman, Price, Mitchell, Datcher,
           Pittman, Lockwood, and Rushing were aware that three other
           suspects had whorl pattern fingerprints, but knowingly and
           deliberately failed to provide this information to Mr. Ford, his
           defense attorneys, or prosecutors in advance of or during
           Mr. Ford’s criminal trial. This suppression was especially
           detrimental to Mr. Ford because the State argued at trial that
           no other suspect had whorl-patterned fingerprints.
           This allegation suffers from the same problem as the suppression
   allegations previously discussed. Armstrong’s factual allegations, taken as
   true, are equally consistent with prosecutorial Brady violations as with police
   suppression. Armstrong’s account thus “stays in neutral territory” and
   cannot satisfy Rule 8’s requirements. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at
   1966.
           Armstrong’s allegation also suffers from the distinct problem of group
   pleading: she simply faults the eight Law Enforcement Defendants as a group
   without factual material suggesting that any particular defendant suppressed
   evidence. Armstrong’s allegation is independently insufficient for that
   reason since a § 1983 plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official
   defendant, though the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
   Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; cf. Southland Sec.
   Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e
   do not construe allegations contained in the Complaint against the
   ‘defendants’ as a group as properly imputable to any particular individual
   defendant unless the connection between the individual defendant and the
   [illegal conduct] is specifically pled.”). The district court thus properly

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   dismissed claims relating to the fingerprint evidence.
          iv. Claims against the coroner
          George McCormick, as the coroner of Caddo Parish at the time of
   trial, testified for the prosecution as an expert witness on forensic pathology.
   But McCormick never examined Rozeman’s body, and he was not the
   coroner at the time of Rozeman’s murder. Armstrong sued him in his
   personal capacity, and after McCormick died, continued the suit against
   McCormick’s estate.
          Almost all of Armstrong’s allegations concerning McCormick relate
   to his testimony. She asserts that he “delivered opinions on two crucial
   issues: the gunman’s dominant hand and the victim’s time of death.” She
   alleges he fabricated evidence that the murderer was left-handed (which
   would implicate Ford but not the Robinson brothers), and that the murder
   happened earlier in the day. She also alleges that McCormick “testified that
   ‘it was his expert opinion that a duffel bag was placed over Mr. Rozeman’s
   head to muffle the gunshot and to shield the murderer from blood spatter.’”
   (alterations omitted). Finally, she alleges that another forensic pathologist
   demonstrated the fabrication of these claims during post-conviction
   proceedings. The only other allegation against McCormick is the conclusory
   statement that “[h]e was involved in the unlawful investigation and
   conviction of Plaintiff.”
          Claims against McCormick predicated on his trial testimony are
   barred by absolute immunity. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326,
   103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983) (“witnesses are absolutely immune from damages
   liability based on their testimony” and even when “government officials . . .
   testify about the performance of their official duties”).         Accordingly,
   Armstrong’s claims related to McCormick’s testimony were properly
   dismissed.

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          Armstrong argues in response that because “McCormick fabricated
   false testimony before trial,” she seeks to hold him liable for that. She points
   out that government officials do not get absolute immunity for “fabricat[ing]
   evidence concerning an unsolved crime.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 370
   n.1, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1507 n.1 (2012) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
   259, 272–76, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2615–17 (1993)). And fabrications are not
   immunized just because the fabricator later presents the false evidence in
   testimony. See, e.g., Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 958 & n.107 (5th Cir.
   2003), abrogated in part by Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022).
          This argument is meritless.         Armstrong is correct that pre-trial
   evidence of fabrication independent from preparing and delivering testimony
   is not immunized by later testimony. For example, in Buckley, the defendant
   was not immune when he fabricated evidence and made defamatory public
   statements in order to get a grand jury to indict a suspect. 509 U.S. at 262–
   64, 113 S. Ct. at 2609–11. And in Castellano (the primary case Armstrong
   relies on), the defendant police officer was not immune when he solicited
   false witnesses and altered tape recordings that were later submitted into
   evidence. 352 F.3d at 943, 958. But Armstrong’s allegations do not approach
   that level of specificity. The only well-pled allegations are that McCormick
   fabricated “evidence” as to the murderer’s handedness and the victim’s
   time of death, the “evidence” being McCormick’s trial testimony. Were
   these allegations sufficient to overcome witness immunity, witnesses would
   rarely receive immunity from suit. Armstrong cites no authority for such a
   radical constriction of Briscoe’s witness immunity. Therefore, the district
   court properly dismissed her claims against McCormick.
   b. The City of Shreveport
          Armstrong asserts a number of claims against the City under
   Section 1983. None is sufficiently pled. First, she claims the City “had an

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   official policy of pursuing police investigations using unconstitutional
   methods, including failing to disclose police reports containing exculpatory
   evidence,” coercing witnesses, fabricating and suppressing evidence, and
   using unreliable identification methods. Her pleadings allege “a systematic
   pattern of withholding of exculpatory information, fabrication of evidence,
   coercion, and other illegal tactics, the sum total of which completely
   corrupted the investigative process.” The Monell standards for imposing
   liability on municipal entities must be satisfied.
          To find the City of Shreveport liable under Monell, Armstrong must
   identify a policymaker and identify an official city policy that was the moving
   force behind the alleged constitutional rights violation. See Rivera v. Houston
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Monell, 436 U.S.
   at 694, 98 S. Ct. at 2037. An “official policy” means:
          1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is
          officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's
          lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers
          have delegated policy-making authority; or
          2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or
          employees, which, although not authorized by officially
          adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled
          as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal
          policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must
          be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to
          an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making
          authority. Actions of officers or employees of a municipality
          do not render the municipality liable under § 1983 unless they
          execute official policy as above defined.
   Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
          Armstrong does not allege that an officially promulgated policy
   instructed police to investigate using unconstitutional methods. See Webster,

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   735 F.2d at 841. Therefore, she had to rely on a custom or practice “so
   common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
   municipal policy,” and “[a]ctual or constructive knowledge of such custom
   must be attributable” to the policymaker. Id.; see also Davidson v. City of
   Stafford, Tex., 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2017) (“A pattern requires
   similarity, specificity, and sufficiently numerous prior incidents.”). As
   quoted above, Armstrong pled custom or practice and pattern in a conclusory
   fashion without meaningful factual content. Although Armstrong also alleges
   that “persons with final policymaking authority for the Shreveport Police
   Department participated personally in the misconduct described in this
   Complaint,” this, too, is barren of factual support and wholly conclusory. See
   Davidson, 848 F.3d at 395 (discussing liability when “a policymaker performs
   the specific act that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim”).
          Second, Armstrong argues that Shreveport failed to adequately train,
   supervise, and discipline its officers. To survive dismissal on this claim,
   Armstrong must plead “that (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or
   train the subordinate officer; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to
   train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff’s rights, and (3) the failure
   to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.” Davidson, 848 F.3d
   at 397. A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by demonstrating either
   that (a) the “municipality had notice of a pattern of similar violations,” or
   (b) “the constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of a
   particular failure to train.” Id.
          Armstrong asserts that Shreveport police officers received subpar
   training across the board, but this general conclusion is not enough to imply
   or state that policymakers acted with deliberate indifference. As already
   discussed, she fails to allege a pattern of similar violations, let alone
   Shreveport’s notice of such a pattern, except in wholly conclusory terms.
   And she does not point to a “particular failure to train” that could render a

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   constitutional violation highly predictable. Id. This Monell claim based on
   failure to train, supervise, and discipline fails for lack of factual allegations
   that support a finding of deliberate indifference. 12
   c. Caddo Parish DA James Stewart
           In the alternative, Armstrong argues that Monell liability may be
   imposed on prosecutors in the Caddo Parish District Attorney’s Office
   because they allegedly suppressed exculpatory evidence pursuant to a policy
   or custom. James Stewart, the current Caddo Parish District Attorney,
   stands in as the official defendant.
           This claim fails for reasons similar to those that stymie Armstrong’s
   Monell claim against Shreveport. Armstrong’s allegations of a formal policy
   and direct policymaker involvement are again entirely conclusory.
           [T]he District Attorney, through its final policymakers,
           maintained a policy, custom, or pattern and practice of
           condoning corruption, that included widespread prosecutorial
           misconduct, including by failing to supervise, discipline, and
           train its prosecutors. . . .
           Further, upon information and belief, persons with final
           policymaking authority for the District Attorney participated
           personally in the prosecution of Plaintiff.
           Armstrong’s allegations of an unlawful custom or practice include the
   same formulaic allegations made against Shreveport:
          Despite actual and constructive notice, the District Attorney
          had a custom, pattern and practice of promoting, facilitating,

           12
             The district court also dismissed Armstrong’s state-law claim that the City of
   Shreveport and the Parish of Caddo are vicariously liable under the theory of respondeat
   superior. This claim fails if there is no underlying tortious conduct. 12 William E.
   Crawford, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Tort Law § 9.11D (2000).
   Here, there was none, as this opinion explains.

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           or condoning improper, illegal, and suppression of exculpatory
           and impeachment evidence, and failed to adequately supervise,
           discipline and train its prosecutors.
   With this claim, however, Armstrong lists nine cases over a 24-year period as
   examples where exculpatory evidence was suppressed by the District
   Attorney’s practices. But nine constitutional violations over a 24-year period
   and thousands of prosecutions are hardly sufficient to show a municipal
   custom. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360
   (2011) (four Brady violations over a ten-year period insufficient to apprise a
   District Attorney of the need for additional Brady training).                    A more
   fundamental problem, noted by the district court, is the mischaracterization
   of these nine cases, none of which found a Brady violation. See, e.g., State v.
   Palmer, 344 So. 2d 964, 968 (La. 1977) (finding that the latent fingerprint
   evidence withheld “was not favorable or exculpatory evidence to which the
   defense was entitled”). 13 This proffered litany cannot constitute a plausible
   allegation that the Caddo Parish DA’s office had a custom of suppressing
   exculpatory evidence. See Davidson, 848 F.3d at 396.
           As with her Monell claim against Shreveport, Armstrong also alleges
   failure of the DA’s office to adequately train, supervise, and discipline. Just
   as nine inapposite cases cannot show an unconstitutional custom or pattern,
   they are insufficient to place the District Attorney on notice as a means to
   show deliberate indifference. The district court thus properly dismissed

           13
              Armstrong faults the district court for “looking beyond the pleadings.” But
   doing so was proper because the cases were “referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and
   are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 536. Armstrong also argues that
   these cases should have put the District Attorney on notice even though the courts found
   no Brady violations. That is incorrect. In Palmer, for example, the District Attorney’s
   office had no obligation to disclose immaterial, non-exculpatory evidence, so that case
   would have done nothing to alert him to any problem.

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   Armstrong’s Monell claims against DA Stewart. See id. at 397.
   d. Malicious Prosecution
          The Supreme Court recently held that litigants may bring a Fourth
   Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Thompson v. Clark,
   142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022). The Court identified three minimum elements
   to common law malicious prosecution claims, “(i) the suit or proceeding was
   ‘instituted without any probable cause’; (ii) the ‘motive in instituting’ the
   suit ‘was malicious,’ which was often defined in this context as without
   probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice;
   and (iii) the prosecution” terminated in favor of the accused. Id. at 1338
   (citing T. Cooley, Law of Torts 181 (1880)). The Supreme Court did
   not, however, lay out a comprehensive list of the elements for a Fourth
   Amendment malicious prosecution claim, and largely left the question of
   elements to the lower courts. Thus, the Court declined to decide “whether
   a plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious
   prosecution must establish malice (or some other mens rea) in addition to the
   absence of probable cause.” Id. at 1338 n.3.
          Nonetheless, two elements are required under Thompson. The first is
   that “[b]ecause a [Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution] claim is
   housed in the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff also has to prove that the
   malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure of the plaintiff.” Id. at 1337 n.2;
   see, e.g., Jones v. York, 34 F.4th 550, 564 n.8 (7th Cir. 2022). The second is
   that the traditional favorable termination element of a common law malicious
   prosecution claim “does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal
   prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.”
   Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.
          The circuit courts have divided on identifying the elements of a
   Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. One fundamental question

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   in each circuit has been whether all common law malicious prosecution
   elements must be met, or whether, in the Fourth Amendment context, malice
   is unnecessary given that “[t]he Fourth Amendment inquiry is one of
   ‘objective reasonableness’ under the circumstances, and subjective concepts
   like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.” Brooks v.
   City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting
   Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 n.5 (1989)). See
   also Nieves v. McSweeney, 241, F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); Gallo v. City of
   Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 1998). Following Thompson, the
   circuit split remains in place.
           Before this court’s en banc decision in Castellano v. Fragozo, our
   circuit had determined that “the elements of the state-law tort of malicious
   prosecution and the elements of the constitutional tort of ‘Fourth
   Amendment malicious prosecution’ are coextensive.”                  Gordy v. Burns,
   294 F.3d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d
   939 (5th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Castellano, 352 F.3d at 961 (Jones, J.,
   concurring). Consequently, plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit had to prove six
   elements to prevail on a constitutionalized malicious prosecution claim.
   Gordy, 294 F.3d at 727. The elements included “(1) the commencement or
   continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the
   present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original
   proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff;
   (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and
   (6) damages.” Id. 14 Given Thompson’s clear recognition of the constitutional
   tort of malicious prosecution, overruling our precedent in Castellano, the rule

           14
             In Texas, actual innocence was also required. But as discussed, Thompson holds
   that no affirmative indication of innocence is necessary to prove a Fourth Amendment
   malicious prosecution claim. Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.

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   iterated in Gordy is reinstated and parties asserting a Fourth Amendment
   malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must prove the above elements, in
   addition to the threshold element of an unlawful Fourth Amendment
   seizure. 15 See Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1337 n.2.
           But we do not remand for a determination of whether Armstrong’s
   constitutional claim is sufficiently pled because the district court considered
   and rightly dismissed Armstrong’s Louisiana malicious prosecution claim,
   which requires the same six elements as enumerated in Gordy. See Lemoine
   v. Wolfe, 168 So. 3d 362, 367 (La. 2015). Both claims fail to meet at least
   elements (2) and (5). Because Armstrong has not plausibly alleged that the
   defendants suppressed, fabricated, or destroyed evidence, she has not
   plausibly alleged that the defendants were the cause of Ford’s prosecution.
   Moreover, Armstrong has not plausibly alleged facts showing the malice of
   any defendant. Accordingly, both her constitutional and her Louisiana
   malicious prosecution claims were properly dismissed.
   e. Conspiracy
           In addition, Armstrong alleges that “the Law Enforcement
   Defendants and McCormick, acting in concert with other co-conspirators,
   known and unknown, reached an agreement among themselves to frame
   Plaintiff for a crime he did not commit and thereby to deprive him of his
   constitutional rights.” In a similar vein, Armstrong’s suppression allegations
   often state that the Law Enforcement Defendants all “agreed to suppress”
   the various reports. “In order to prevail on a section 1983 conspiracy claim,
   a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state

           15
             Importantly, because an unlawful seizure is the threshold element, see Thompson,
   142 S. Ct. at 1337 n.2, if the prosecution is supported by probable cause on at least one
   charge, then a malicious prosecution claim cannot move forward.

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   action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by
   a party to the conspiracy.” Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187
   (5th Cir. 1990). Armstrong’s conspiracy claim was properly dismissed
   because she has not plausibly pled any underlying constitutional deprivation
   by the defendants. See Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (“No deprivation, no § 1983 conspiracy.”).
   f. Failure to Intervene
          Armstrong also alleges that “one or more of the individual Law
   Enforcement Defendants or McCormick stood by without intervening to
   prevent the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, even though they had
   the opportunity to do so.” A failure to intervene claim against a police officer
   requires that the officer (1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an
   individual’s constitutional rights; (2) is present at the scene of the
   constitutional violation; (3) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the
   harm; and (4) chooses not to act. Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th
   Cir. 2013). The district court correctly found that “the claim lacks detail as
   to which of the Defendants did what, whether any Defendant knew of the
   misconduct, or who was present at the commission of the misconduct.”
   Armstrong’s claim does not reference the specific conduct of any particular
   defendant as constituting failure to intervene. The district court properly
   dismissed this claim.

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   g. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
          Armstrong also brought a state-law claim for intentional infliction of
   emotional distress.     Such a claim requires (1) that the conduct of the
   defendant was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress
   suffered by the plaintiff was severe; and (3) that the defendant desired to
   inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would
   be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct. White v.
   Monsanto Co., 585 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (La. 1991).
          Just as Armstrong fails to adequately plead bad faith (for her
   destruction-of-evidence claim) or malice (for her malicious-prosecution
   claim), she also fails to adequately allege extreme and outrageous conduct.
   “The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
   as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
   atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. Armstrong’s
   allegations do not go that far. Nor does she allege facts suggesting that the
   defendants “desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe
   emotional distress would be certain.” Id. This claim was properly dismissed.
   h. Negligence
          Rounding things out, Armstrong brought a traditional negligence
   claim. Louisiana uses the typical reasonable-person standard to assess an
   individual’s liability for negligence. See Lawrence v. Sanders, 169 So. 3d 790,
   795 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2015) (“Duty is defined as the obligation to conform to
   the standard of conduct associated with a reasonable person in like
   circumstances.”); La. Civ. Code Art. 2315. For the same reasons that
   Armstrong did not adequately plead constitutional violations due to the
   defendants’ suppression, fabrication, and destruction of evidence, she also
   fails to plead sufficient factual matter to show that they violated the standard

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                                          No. 21-30210

   of care of a reasonable officer. 16 The district court thus properly dismissed
   this claim.
                                    IV. Conclusion
           Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

           16
             Louisiana’s state qualified immunity statute would also likely stand in the way of
   Armstrong’s recovery on her state-law claims. See La. Rev. Stat. § 2798.1(B)
   (“Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon
   the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or
   discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers
   and duties.”); Rombach v. Culpepper, 2021 WL 2944809, at *9 (5th Cir. Jul. 13, 2021)
   (unpublished) (in § 1983 and Monell suit, affirming dismissal of pendant state-law claims
   based on § 2798.1).

                                                28