Court Opinion

ID: 9925271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:33.305654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.147350
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

HASSAN AHMED SAAD,                                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 362247
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
AMERICAN SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY                                    LC No. 20-010266-NI
and SABER MOHAMED YAFFAI,

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In this first-party no-fault action, plaintiff Hassan Ahmed Saad appeals as of right the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition of his claim for benefits in favor of defendant
American Select Insurance Company (ASIC) based on the lack of standing under MCR
2.116(C)(5) and (C)(10). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Saad initiated this action alleging, as relevant to the issues on appeal, that ASIC had
unreasonably and unlawfully refused to pay personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits to which
he was entitled under the no-fault act and his insurance policy arising out of an October 11, 2019
motor vehicle accident involving Saad and defendant Saber Mohamed Yaffai. Specifically, Saad
sought to recover for unpaid medical expenses for treatment that he had received at the following
five medical providers: 4 Transport, 411 Help, Gravity Imaging, SHP Services, and Spine &
Health. Saad had executed a series of assignments transferring his right to collect or pursue PIP
benefits for services he received from these medical providers. Despite the assignments, Saad
filed suit against ASIC in August 2020, seeking PIP benefits for unpaid medical bills from these
providers.

        ASIC sought summary disposition on the ground that Saad lacked standing to pursue these
claims as a result of the assignments. Saad responded by asserting that the issue was moot because
he had subsequently obtained revocations of the assignments to the above medical providers. Saad
attached the purported revocations from all of the above entities except SHP Services. Of the

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attached revocations, only the revocation from Spine & Health included a date; that revocation
was dated January 24, 2022.

       ASIC argued in reply that Saad could only regain standing as of the date of the revocations.
Further, ASIC argued that, pursuant to MCL 500.3145,1 even if it were assumed that all of the
revocations were executed on January 24, 2022, Saad could only seek recovery for any allegedly
unpaid medical expenses incurred on or after January 24, 2021. Because the bills at issue were for
expenses incurred before January 24, 2021, ASIC maintained that Saad’s claims were time barred
and should be dismissed on summary disposition because she never regained standing to assert
pursue those claims.

        At the hearing on ASIC’s summary disposition motion, ASIC reiterated that to the extent
Saad’s assignments to the medical providers may have been revoked, Saad’s claims were
nonetheless barred by the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145 and Saad was not the real party in
interest—as a result of the assignments—during the time frame in which the allegedly unpaid
medical expenses at issue could have been pursued. Saad argued in response that the revocations
rendered the assignments void ab initio. Saad also argued for the first time that the one-year period
remained tolled because ASIC never provided him a formal denial of benefits.

       The trial court granted ASIC’s motion for summary disposition and dismissed the action.
Saad moved for reconsideration and submitted new revocations that were notarized and dated May
11, 2022. The court denied Saad’s motion and Saad filed a claim of appeal.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

1
    MCL 500.3145 provides in relevant part as follows:
         (1) An action for recovery of [PIP] benefits payable under this chapter for an
         accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of
         the accident that caused the injury unless written notice of injury as provided in
         subsection (4) has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless
         the insurer has previously made a payment of [PIP] benefits for the injury.

         (2) Subject to subsection (3), if the notice has been given or a payment has been
         made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent
         allowable expense, work loss, or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the
         claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1
         year before the date on which the action was commenced.

         (3) A period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the commencement
         of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim
         for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim. This
         subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the
         claim with reasonable diligence.

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        Saad challenges the dismissal of his claims, contending the revocations restored his
standing retroactively to the date that he filed the lawsuit and the one-year-back period remained
tolled because ASIC never provided a written claim denial.

        We review de novo a lower court’s resolution of a summary disposition motion and review
for an abuse of discretion a court’s denial of a reconsideration motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461
Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Woods v SLB Prop Mgmt, LLC, 277 Mich App 622, 629;
750 NW2d 228 (2008). Questions involving the interpretation and application of statutes are
reviewed de novo. Linden v Citizens Ins Co of America, 308 Mich App 89, 91; 862 NW2d 438
(2014).

        Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) is based on the ground that the “party
asserting the claim lacks the legal capacity to sue,” while MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for
summary disposition if “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.”
Under both subrules, a court must consider the pleadings and documentary evidence submitted by
the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5); Wortelboer v Benzie County, 212 Mich App 208, 213; 537 NW2d
603 (1995); Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the
evidence must be evaluated “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” and if
“the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Maiden, 461 Mich at 120.

        Here, there is no indication that any of the medical expenses for which Saad sought recover
were incurred any later than April 1, 2020. Saad filed this lawsuit on August 12, 2020. Generally,
and subject to certain conditions not put in issue by the parties’ arguments, an action for PIP
benefits “may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense,
work loss, or survivor’s loss has been incurred.” MCL 500.3145(1). However, the one-year-back
rule in MCL 500.3145(2) provides that “the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of
the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.” “The
one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault act
to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought.” Joseph v Auto Club
Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 203; 815 NW2d 412 (2012).

        Although it would ordinarily appear that Saad timely filed his lawsuit, he had previously
executed assignments of his rights to pursue his claims for the medical expenses at issue to his
medical providers. “When an assignment occurs, the assignee of a cause of action becomes the
real party in interest with respect to that cause of action, inasmuch as the assignment vests in the
assignee all rights previously held by the assignor.” Wallace v Suburban Mobility Auth for
Regional Transp, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 360537); slip op
at 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As this Court has explained,

       A real party in interest is the one who is vested with the right of action on a given
       claim, although the beneficial interest may be in another. The real-party-in-interest
       doctrine recognizes that litigation should be begun only by a party having an
       interest that will assure sincere and vigorous advocacy and protects a defendant
       from multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action. [Id. at ___; slip op at 3-4
       (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

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       During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, Saad obtained revocations of these
assignments from at least four of the medical providers executed, at the earliest, on January 24,
2022.

        This Court was presented with a virtually identical factual scenario in Wallace. In that
case, the plaintiff

       received medical treatment from various medical providers and executed
       assignments of rights in exchange for the treatment. Plaintiff filed suit within one
       year of the accident, but the medical providers did not. During the lower court
       proceedings[, almost two years after suit was commenced], the medical providers
       revoked the assignments in an apparent effort to save their claims from application
       of the “one-year-back rule,” MCL 500.3145, by transferring those claims back to
       plaintiff. [Id. at ___; slip op at 2.]

        The defendant argued on appeal in this Court that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the
one-year-back rule because the plaintiff’s assignments to her medical providers “divested plaintiff
the right to pursue those PIP benefits” and the medical providers’ claims under the assignments
were already barred by the one-year-back rule by the time they executed the revocations of the
assignments. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. Thus, the defendant argued that the plaintiff “was also barred
by the one-year-back rule from pursuing those claims.” Id.

     This Court concluded that the trial court had erred by denying the defendant’s motion for
summary disposition. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court reasoned:

               In this case, the majority of benefits at issue were assigned to the medical
       providers before plaintiff filed her complaint. Plaintiff executed assignments to C-
       Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation
       between October 2019 and January 2020. Thus, upon execution of these
       assignments, these providers became the real parties in interest to the claims for
       benefits, and only the providers could bring an action to recover said benefits. . . .
       After executing the assignments and during the litigation, plaintiff obtained
       revocations for the assignments from C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select
       Specialists, and Baz Eagle Transportation in January 2022, after she filed her
       complaint.

               While the revocations of the assignments reassigned the providers’ claims
       for benefits back to plaintiff, the revocations occurred more than a year after [the
       defendant] denied the medical providers’ claims for benefits. Plaintiff and the
       providers executed the revocations in January 2022, and these revocations
       transferred the providers’ interests to the claims for benefits back to plaintiff.
       However, by the time plaintiff obtained these revocations, the providers no longer
       had valid claims for benefits by operation of the one-year-back rule. . . . [The
       defendant] denied Sierra Surgical’s claims on January 24, 2020, Select Specialists’
       claims on February 11, 2020, Baz Eagle Transportation’s claims on February 28,
       2020, and C-Spine Ortho’s claims on April 8, 2020. As such, the providers needed

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       to bring an action against [the defendant] within one year of its formal denial, which
       they failed to do.

                                               * * *

                . . . when the transfer of the beneficial interest from the medical providers
       to plaintiff occurred in this case, the medical providers did not transfer an interest
       in a claim to which liability attached. When the medical providers revoked their
       assignments for the benefit of plaintiff to pursue her claims after the litigation
       began, the medical providers could no longer recover their claims by operation of
       the one-year-back rule. See MCL 500.3145. . . .

                                               * * *

               By January 2022, when plaintiff obtained the revocations, each provider’s
       right to collect on these claims for benefits had already been extinguished by the
       one-year-back rule. Thus, there remained no actionable causes of action to give
       back to plaintiff. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying in part [the defendant’s]
       motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims as it relates to the benefits
       plaintiff assigned to C-Spine Ortho, Sierra Surgical, Select Specialists, and Baz
       Eagle Transportation before she filed her complaint. [Id. at ___; slip op at 5-6.]

        Our reasoning in Wallace applies with equal force to this case and is dispositive in
resolving this appeal. When Saad assigned his rights to collect benefits and pursue payment to his
medical providers, the medical providers became the real parties in interest with respect to those
benefits and they were the only parties who could bring an action to recover those PIP benefits.
Id. at ___; slip op at 5. By the time Saad secured assignment revocations from the medical
providers on January 24, 2022, the medical providers were already barred by the one-year-back
rule in MCL 500.3145 from bringing their own claims to recover those benefits because there is
no claim on this record for PIP benefits related to any medical expenses occurred after April 1,
2020, which is well more than one year before January 24, 2022. Accordingly, at the time of the
revocations, the medical providers did not have any viable claims to assign back to Saad. Id. at
___; slip op at 5-6.

       Saad additionally asserts in his appellate brief that “the one year back rule was not
implemented in this case because a denial was never received.” Saad apparently relies on MCL
500.3145(3), which provides that a “period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the
commencement of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim
for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim.” (Emphasis added.)

        Saad fails to further elaborate regarding how he believes the record supports this assertion.
At the motion hearing, Saad’s counsel stated: “I just this morning reviewed my records and have
no form am [sic] denial from American as to these claims.” Based on Saad’s failure to cogently
develop this argument, we deem it abandoned. “It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce
a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either

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to sustain or reject his position.” Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Moreover, to the extent Saad appears to contend that he never received written denial, “a
formal denial [for purposes of the tolling provision in MCL 500.3145(3)] need not be in writing.”
Encompass Healthcare, PLLC v Citizens Ins Co, 344 Mich App 248, 261; ___ NW2d ___ (2022).
The denial must merely be “sufficiently direct.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
test is whether the denial “unequivocally impresse[s] upon the insured that the extraordinary step
of pursuing relief in court must be taken.” Id. at 260 (quotation marks and citation omitted;
alteration in original).

       Here, Saad never claimed he believed ASIC was still considering his claim for PIP benefits.
Indeed, Saad filed suit based on ASIC’s lack of payment, making it difficult to imagine that it had
not been “unequivocally impresse[d]” upon him “that the extraordinary step of pursuing relief in
court must be taken.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Saad has not demonstrated that
he was entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision in MCL 500.3145(3) under these
circumstances.

       Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting ASIC’s motion for summary disposition
or denying Saad’s motion for reconsideration.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                            /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

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