Court Opinion

ID: 9627882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:58:07.298633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:51.982562
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.*
(dissenting)—I concur with the majority's view that the contractual term "operation" must have a different meaning than the term "flight" as used in the insurance contract in question.
However, in the context of the special risk insurance contract involved in this proceeding, I am confident that the intended meaning of the phrase "for the operation involved" had to mean more than merely operating or "driving" the aircraft as defined by the court's opinion. I believe that phrase should be construed to include (1) a "flight" (2) under particular procedures (in this case visual flight rules (VFR) as defined by Federal Aviation Adminis*549tration regulations) (3) from one point to another (4) for particular purposes (passengers, etc.), and (5) in a particular type of aircraft (single engine land, reciprocating engine, etc.).
It is undisputed that Strathy was licensed and certified to fly passengers under visual flight rules in the type of aircraft involved in this tragedy and thus that coverage was in effect when the "operation" commenced. Further it appears to be undisputed that after takeoff Strathy encountered, either deliberately or negligently, instrument flight conditions for which he was not licensed, and that as a result the aircraft crashed into the mountains which were obscured by clouds.
Regardless of whether Strathy's own negligence or his deliberate disregard for available alternatives after takeoff led him into the clouds, should the liability coverage of the policy which was in effect at the time of takeoff, as to a VFR flight operation, be turned on and off as the pilot errs or as changes in his intentions dictate? Recognizing that different jurisdictions have reached opposing results I nonetheless favor, on public policy grounds, the result and reasoning of National Ins. Underwriters v. King Craft Custom Prods., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1974); Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977); and United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Marr's Short Stop of Tex., Inc., 680 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1984).
I would hold appellants are entitled to coverage as a matter of law. I therefore dissent.
Review granted by Supreme Court July 1, 1987.