Court Opinion

ID: 9559442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:29:18.173849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:03.555178
License: Public Domain

Price, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion the decision in this case is an illustration of the familiar saying that “hard cases make bad law.”
I will concede — for the sake of argument — that the statement *222in the accident report — “no improper driving indicated” — should not have been admitted, and that instruction No. 11 should not have been given — but, under the undisputed facts of this case, I am unable to say that either of the “errors” could have prejudicially affected the result. Harmless error is one thing — prejudicial error is another — and for the latter only should reversal be ordered. (Home Ins. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 316, 319, 320, 369 P. 2d 338, and cases cited.) Under the provisions of G. S. 1949, 60-3317, this court is directed to disregard all mere technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining where it appears, upon the whole record, that substantial justice has been done by the judgment or order of the trial court.
No one contends this this six-year-old boy was guilty of contributory negligence so as to bar recovery by his parents. There was only one issue in the case, and it was whether defendant was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the boy’s death. Plaintiff’s evidence contained nothing to establish that he was. All of the evidence in the case was such that the jury returned the only verdict that in all honesty it could return. Any possible “damage” that might have resulted from the giving of instruction No. 11 most certainly was cured by instructions Nos. 17 and 18, both of which are set out in full in the opinion written for the court. In fact, at the hearing on the motion for a new trial counsel for plaintiffs commented that notwithstanding the court had, for all practical purposes, “instructed a verdict for the plaintiffs,” the jury “apparently found this man free from negligence.” In denying the motion the trial judge stated:
“. . . but I think, gentlemen, what you are faced with in this case is a case where the jury simply found no negligence on the part of the defendant and, frankly, the Court must concur with the jury’s findings. Now to argue otherwise in a situation like this, would be to say that no one can use a street where children are playing in a yard adjacent to the street. Now I think this is a plain case of no negligence. Jury so found. Motion for new trial is overruled.”
I agree with the foregoing comment. The situation presented here is one of frequent occurrence to all drivers on city streets. The result was tragic, of course, but the law requires more than that to impose liability. I would affirm the judgment.
Parker, C. J., and Schroeder, J., concur in the foregoing dissent.