Court Opinion

ID: 9394964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 18:02:27.414667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.345609
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/16/23 P. v. Lozano CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                                B316659

            Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Los Angeles County
                                                                             Super. Ct. No. LA044143)
            v.

  PHILLIP LOZANO,

            Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Martin L. Herscovitz, Judge. Affirmed.
      Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene
Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                   _________________________
      Defendant and appellant Phillip Lozano was convicted of
second degree murder in 2007. Lozano now appeals from an
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
concluded that Lozano was not eligible for resentencing because
he was a direct aider and abettor who acted with express and
implied malice. Lozano argues that the trial court’s findings are
not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm
the denial of Lozano’s petition for resentencing.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The underlying offense2
      In October 2003, Lozano and codefendant Glenn Terrell
arrived unannounced at the apartment of Enrique Briseno.
Briseno lived with his mother, Dora Amaya. Briseno and Lozano
had known each other for many years, and Briseno considered
Lozano a friend. Briseno also knew Terrell because they had
previously bought and sold marijuana from each other.

      1
        All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
       Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We therefore refer to the law formerly
codified at section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 for the remainder of
this opinion.

      2
        We take our statement of facts from evidence admitted at
the 2007 trial, specifically Lozano’s recorded police interview, the
trial testimony of the surviving victim, and the testimony of the
medical examiner who conducted the second victim’s autopsy.

                                 2
        Lozano told police that he and Terrell planned to go to
Briseno’s home to ask him to loan Terrell money, and Terrell
planned to punch Briseno and take his marijuana if he
refused. Lozano and Terrell brought Terrell’s gun with them, but
left it in the car when they went inside.
        When they arrived at the apartment, Lozano and Terrell
told Briseno they wanted to buy a pound of marijuana. Briseno
told them he did not have the requested amount of marijuana for
sale, but invited them inside to smoke. Briseno, Lozano, and
Terrell went into Briseno’s bedroom, where they sat and smoked
marijuana. A few minutes later, Terrell stood up, sprayed
Briseno in the face with pepper spray, and stabbed him multiple
times with an ice pick. Although Lozano saw Terrell stab
Briseno, causing bleeding, he remained seated and did nothing.
Briseno heard Lozano say something like, “What are you doing?
That’s enough.”
        Amaya then appeared at the door of Briseno’s bedroom.
She yelled at Terrell to stop stabbing Briseno. Briseno told his
mother to run. Terrell followed Amaya out of the bedroom and
into the living room, where he repeatedly stabbed her. Briseno,
who felt “paralyzed” and could not move, heard his mother in the
living room screaming “ ‘stop.’ ” At some point, Lozano also went
into the living room, and Briseno heard Lozano say, “Let’s go
already.” Lozano recalled telling Terrell that the stabbing of
Amaya was not “supposed to happen,” and, “I can’t do this.”
        While Terrell stabbed Amaya, Lozano returned to Briseno’s
bedroom. He asked Briseno for money and searched through
Briseno’s pants. Lozano took a three-ounce bag of marijuana
from Briseno’s room and left.

                                3
      The knife Terrell was using to stab Amaya broke, so when
Lozano returned to the living room, Terrell told Lozano to help
him and get him “something.” Lozano went to the kitchen,
retrieved a “barbecue fork” from the counter, and gave it to
Terrell. Lozano told police that he knew Terrell was going to stab
Amaya with the fork.
      While Terrell stabbed Amaya with the fork, Lozano left the
apartment and put the marijuana in his car. According to
Lozano, Amaya was “most definitely alive” when he left the
apartment. Terrell came out soon after, and Lozano and Terrell
drove away. The police subsequently found Amaya face down
with a “carving fork” in her back. Later that same day, police
arrested Lozano and Terrell at Terrell’s residence.
      At trial, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy
on Amaya testified that she had multiple stab wounds. He
opined that a knife wound that had penetrated one of Amaya’s
lungs was the fatal wound. According to the medical examiner,
although the wound was fatal, it was “most unlikely” Amaya died
instantly. Instead, death from the wound “could occur within a
time frame of 15 to 30 minutes.”
II.   Lozano’s conviction, sentence, and direct appeal
      In 2006, Lozano and Terrell were charged with the murder
of Amaya (§ 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder of Briseno (§§ 664,
187, subd.(a)), first degree residential robbery of Briseno
(§ 211), and attempted first degree residential robbery of Amaya
(§§ 664, 211).
      In 2007, a jury found Lozano guilty of second degree
murder of Amaya and of first degree robbery of Briseno. It
acquitted Lozano of the other charges. Among other things, the
jury was instructed on aiding and abetting and felony murder.

                                4
The court sentenced Lozano to 15 years to life in prison. We
affirmed Lozano’s conviction on direct appeal in People v. Lozano
(Dec. 18, 2008, B201001) [nonpub. opn.].
III. Lozano’s petition for resentencing and evidentiary
       hearing
       In January 2019, Lozano filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel
for Lozano, ruled that Lozano established a prima facie case of
eligibility for relief, and issued an order to show cause.
       After briefing by both parties, the trial court—the same
judge who presided over the original trial—held an evidentiary
hearing. The trial court did not consider new evidence, but relied
on the trial transcript, preliminary hearing transcripts, the trial
exhibits, and a recording of Lozano’s statement to the police. The
trial court found the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Lozano acted as an aider and abettor in the murder of
Amaya, and that he harbored both express and implied malice.
The court therefore denied Lozano’s petition for resentencing.
       Lozano filed a timely notice of appeal.
                             DISCUSSION
       Lozano’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically,
Lozano claims there is insufficient evidence of both express and
implied malice. As we explain below, there is substantial
evidence that Lozano aided and abetted the murder of Amaya
with implied malice. We therefore need not reach the question of
whether Lozano acted with express malice.
I.     Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine

                                 5
as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if he or she could no longer be convicted of
murder under amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant
commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a
declaration that, among other things, he or she could not
presently be convicted of murder under the current law. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If the trial court receives a petition
that establishes a prima facie case for relief, it must appoint
counsel for the petitioner, if requested. The trial court also must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
(Ibid.; § 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing, it is the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Strong, at pp. 708-709; People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).) If the trial court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and 189, the

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petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, at
pp. 708-709; Vargas, at p. 951.)
II.    Standard of review
       We review the trial court’s findings for substantial
evidence. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022
(Owens).) Under this standard, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements).) We do not
resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. (Owens, at
p. 1022.) Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence
and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (People
v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) Before we may set aside a trial
court’s order, it must be clear that “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient evidence to support [it].” ’ ” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
III. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
       finding that Lozano is ineligible for relief because he
       was a direct aider and abettor who acted with malice
       Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if
someone kills with ‘no considerable provocation ... or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).” (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 844.) “The primary difference between express

                                  7
malice and implied malice is that the former requires an intent to
kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968,
976.)
        An aider and abettor’s “guilt is based on a combination of
the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts
and own mental state.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,
1117, original italics.) “A person aids and abets the commission
of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of
committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime,
(iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the
commission of the crime.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d
1158, 1164.)
        For aiding and abetting liability on a theory of express
malice murder to be imposed, the direct aider and abettor must
share the actual perpetrator’s intent to kill. (McCoy, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 1118 & fn. 1 [“the aider and abettor must know
and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator”].)
        For aiding and abetting liability on a theory of implied
malice murder to be imposed, a direct aider and abettor must, by
words or conduct, aid the perpetrator’s commission of a life-
endangering act with the “knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life,” and the aider and better must act “in conscious
disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, 713 (Powell), italics omitted.) In other words,
under current law, “a direct aider and abettor of the killing who
knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of another and
acted with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty of second

                                 8
degree murder.” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972,
979.) While Senate Bill 1437 eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder based on
imputed malice, implied malice remains a valid theory of second
degree murder liability for an aider and abettor. (Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 850; Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298
[Senate Bill 1437 maintained the viability of murder convictions
based on implied malice, “and the definition of implied malice
remains unchanged”].)
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court order, the record contains substantial evidence that Lozano
aided and abetted the killing of Amaya with implied malice.
Lozano aided Terrell in an act dangerous to human life and with
a conscious disregard for Amaya’s life. (Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at p. 713; McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1122.)
According to Lozano’s statements to police, he watched Terrell
repeatedly stab Briceno. Then he saw Terrell stabbing Amaya.
When the knife Terrell was using to stab Amaya broke, Terrell
told Lozano to help him and get him “something,” so Lozano
found a carving fork and handed it to Terrell. Lozano knew
Terrell would use the fork on Amaya, as evidenced by his
statement: “I knew … he had to stab her with that. He wasn’t
just going to hold it.” Lozano also knew Amaya was still alive
when he left the apartment, yet he left without trying to stop the
attack or otherwise assist Amaya. In sum, there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Lozano aided
and abetted the killing of Amaya with implied malice. (See
Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713; People v. Glukhoy (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [“It is well settled that the presence at
the scene of the crime and failure to prevent it, companionship

                                 9
and conduct before and after the offense, including flight, are
relevant to determining whether a defendant aided and abetted
in the commission of the crime”].)
       Lozano argues his statement to police that he retrieved the
fork for Terrell because he feared for his own life established his
lack of intent to kill Amaya. He also points to evidence that
when he first saw Terrell stabbing Amaya, he told Terrell that
the stabbing was “not supposed to happen.” However, on appeal
we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the trial court’s
credibility determinations. Moreover, even unintentional deaths,
or deaths that happen after a defendant makes a statement of
discouragement to the perpetrator, may support a finding of
direct aiding and abetting with implied malice. (Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 300–301 [statement by defendant to
perpetrator not to kill victim where there is evidence that
defendant continued to “facilitat[e] the assault despite being
aware of the risk [victim] would be killed” did not negate
evidence of implied malice]; People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela)
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502 [implied malice murder theory
valid where death is accidental].) Irrespective of Lozano’s after-
the-fact statements regarding his fear, or that he told Terrell the
attack was not what they planned, the evidence remained that
Lozano witnessed Terrell in the process of stabbing Amaya, then
he retrieved the carving fork and gave it to Terrell with the
knowledge that Terrell would use the fork to continue the attack.
This was substantial evidence that Lozano was a direct aider and
abettor who knew his conduct endangered Amaya’s life and he
acted with conscious disregard for life.
       Lozano further contends the medical examiner’s opinion
that the fatal wound was a knife wound rendered his act of

                                10
handing the fork to Terrell “inconsequential,” and establishes
that he did not act with malice. We are unpersuaded. When
Lozano handed the fork to Terrell, he did not know which wound
would be fatal. However, he knew that Terrell had already
repeatedly stabbed Amaya and would use the fork to continue
stabbing Amaya. An act that generally contributes to harming
the victim, even if it does not cause the fatal injury, may support
a finding of second degree implied malice murder. (People v.
Schell, (2022) 84 Cal.App. 5th 437, 442–443 [finding evidence
sufficient where defendant was one of at least eight gang
members who participated in assault, defendant knew he was
aiding in the attack, he knew others were using dangerous
weapons in the attack, and he intended to stop the victim from
escaping].)
       We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Lozano directly aided and abetted Amaya’s killing
with implied malice. We need not reach the issue of express
malice. The trial court properly denied Lozano’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.

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                           DISPOSITION
    The trial court order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                 ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                EGERTON, J.

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