Court Opinion

ID: 9945014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 20:02:38.761103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:19.686857
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 Mesquite Country Club Condominium Homeowners etc. v. Save Oswit Canyon CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MESQUITE COUNTRY CLUB                                                D082762
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. CVPS2203251)

         v.

SAVE OSWIT CANYON, INC.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Carol A. Greene, Judge. Affirmed.
         Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Mark J. Mulkerin, Richard J. Reynolds,
and John R. Horstmann for Defendant and Appellant.
         Capobianco Law Offices, Nino Capobianco, Derek Wallen; Slovak Baron
Empey Murphy & Pinkney, Shaun Murphy; Murphy, Pearson, Bradley &
Feeney, Jeff C. Hsu and Marlin Y. Gillespie for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                 INTRODUCTION
         In August 2022, Respondent Mesquite Country Club Condominium
Homeowners Association (the HOA) sued Appellant Save Oswit Canyon, Inc.,
which is doing business as the Oswit Land Trust, a non-profit corporation
(Oswit). The complaint alleged causes of action for: (1) breach of the
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mesquite Country
Club Condominiums recorded on June 14, 1984 (the CC&Rs) and the 1984
Lease Agreement between the HOA and the Mesquite Golf & Country Club
(as amended by a 1988 settlement agreement and a 2004 judgment) (the

lease); (2) nuisance; (3) nuisance per se; and (4) declaratory relief.1

         Oswit filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure2

section 425.16.3 The trial court denied the motion, and Oswit appealed.
         Oswit contends its protected statements and conduct are the gravamen
of the HOA’s causes of action and that the HOA cannot meet its burden of
showing a likelihood of success on the merits. We disagree and affirm the
order.

1    The complaint also contained a cause of action for trespass, which the
HOA subsequently dismissed, and two additional causes of action against
another defendant, Ramin Saghian.

2    Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.

3    Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute
because a special motion thereunder seeks to strike a “ ‘[s]trategic lawsuit
against public participation,’ ” or SLAPP. (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 882, fn. 2 (Wilson).)
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              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Complaint
      In its complaint filed on August 12, 2022, the HOA explains that it was
designed as an integrated residential golf course community and that about a
third of its 600 condominium units are situated adjacent to an 18-hole golf
course. Palms Partners Capital, LLC (Palms Partners), owned by Saghian,
acquired the Mesquite Golf & Country Club (the Club) and the golf course in
2014. Thereafter, Palms Partners allegedly failed to maintain the golf course
and the Club despite several notices from the HOA regarding deficiencies and
dangerous conditions, which the HOA contends are lease violations and
public nuisances. As a result of Palms Partners’ lack of action, the HOA
describes both the Club and golf course as “not useable.”
      Oswit purchased the golf course from Palms Partners on July 26, 2022.
Palms Partners retained ownership of the Club. According to the HOA’s
complaint, Oswit confirmed in written materials disseminated to
homeowners that it would convert the golf course to a public nature preserve
and botanical garden. The HOA further submits that an attorney for a
principal of Oswit and one of its significant donors, The Prescott Foundation,
stated that the new preserve, to be known as Prescott Preserve, will never
operate as a golf course. The complaint alleges that “[s]ince its purchase of
the Golf Course, it appears that Oswit has completely abandoned the Golf
Course and has stopped all maintenance, landscaping and irrigation,
contributing to its further deterioration.”
B.    The Anti-SLAPP Motion
      Oswit argued in its anti-SLAPP motion that the HOA’s complaint was
intended to stifle Oswit’s protected activity in order to promote a competing
residential development proposal for the property. It maintained that the

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HOA’s demand that the property be used as a golf course was “absurd.” In
support, it pointed to a declaration from Saghian in which he stated that the
golf course was unprofitable during the entire term of Palms Partners’
ownership and that he shut down golf course operations on July 15, 2022
(before Oswit purchased the property).
      According to Oswit, the HOA based its claim for anticipatory breach of
the CC&Rs and the lease on Oswit’s public statements regarding its intention
to dedicate to public use the former golf course property. It pointed to
allegations in the complaint that Oswit disseminated written materials to
HOA members and stated its intentions to violate the CC&Rs and lease.
Further, Oswit filed the Declaration of Jane Garrison, its founder and
president, in support of its motion and, based thereon, explained that it had
“for years made loud and clear its intention to protect land in the Coachella
Valley, and specifically communicated to [the HOA] Board its vision

regarding the failed Mesquite Golf Course.”4 Oswit argued the HOA board
repeatedly stifled Garrison’s efforts to speak with homeowners regarding
Prescott Preserve. It did not specifically contend that the nuisance or
declaratory judgment causes of action arose from protected activity.
      Turning to the second step of the analysis, Oswit maintained the HOA
would not succeed on the merits of any of its claims. On the first cause of
action, Oswit pointed out that neither the CC&Rs nor the lease requires the
property to be operated as a golf course. As to the nuisance claims, Oswit
argued the HOA lacked standing because the homeowners were the real
parties in interest. It otherwise submitted the HOA could not establish
causation because Palms Partners was responsible for the nuisance
conditions and, if anything, Oswit had begun remediation efforts since

4     The admissibility of this evidence will be addressed post.
                                       4
purchasing the property. Because the seventh cause of action sought a
declaration consistent with the other claims, Oswit argued it too failed.
C.    The Anti-SLAPP Order
      Following a hearing, the trial court issued a minute order denying the
anti-SLAPP motion. The court concluded that the anti-SLAPP statute did
not apply because Oswit was “not being sued for talking about converting the
golf course into a nature preserve, but for taking steps to actually make that
conversion occur, and is therefore being sued for conduct rather than speech.”
It cited the holding from Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park) that, “[a]s many Courts of
Appeal have correctly understood, to read the ‘arising from’ requirement
differently, as applying to speech leading to an action or evidencing an illicit
motive, would, for a range of publicly beneficial claims, have significant
impacts the Legislature likely never intended.”
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Evidentiary Objections
      Oswit filed numerous declarations in conjunction with its anti-SLAPP
motion, including the ones referenced ante. The HOA filed written objections
to all of them. The trial court overruled the objections, indicating they all
went to “evidence not considered.” The HOA did not renew its objections on
appeal.
      On the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we are not required to
accept the complaint’s allegations as true if the defendant submits contrary
evidence. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887.) Rather, we may look beyond
the pleadings to consider evidentiary submissions by the parties. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, we may consider the declarations filed by Oswit—particularly
given that the HOA did not renew its objections on appeal. (C.f. Gruber v.

                                        5
Gruber (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 541, fn. 5 [addressing objections to
evidence presented in opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion where the trial
court overruled the objections, and the objecting parties renewed the
objections on appeal].) That being said, as we explain post, the additional

information provided in the declarations does not aid Oswit.5
B.    Legal Principles
      “[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 883–884.)
      “Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First,
‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged
allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant
has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from
protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal
merit.” ’ [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will
strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009 (Bonni).)
      We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) We therefore engage in
the same two-step process that the trial court undertakes in assessing

5     On appeal, Oswit objects to evidence the HOA filed below in support of
its opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion. All of this evidence goes to whether
the HOA met its burden at the second prong of the analysis. Because we do
not reach the second prong, we need not address these objections.
                                       6
an anti-SLAPP motion. (See Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services,
Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.) If the defendant fails to meet its
burden at the first step, we need not address the second step.
C.    Analysis of Prong One Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute
      Oswit contends the trial court erred in concluding its protected conduct
and speech were not the basis for the HOA’s breach of contract, nuisance,
nuisance per se, and declaratory relief claims.
      A defendant satisfies the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by
demonstrating that the allegedly injurious conduct falls within one of four
categories of protected activity described in section 425.16, subdivision (e),
and that the claim asserted by the plaintiff arises from that conduct. (Rand
Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) Section 425.16,
subdivision (e) provides: “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or
oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written
or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
      “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or
forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act

                                        7
underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in
furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere
fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean
the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute.’ ” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) In making this
determination, the court looks at what actions by the defendant supply the
elements of the challenged claim. (Id. at p. 1063.)
      1. Allegations in the Complaint
      In paragraphs 29 through 32 of its complaint, the HOA makes several
allegations against all three defendants in the underlying action, including,
in pertinent part, that they: (1) failed to maintain the golf course in violation
of the lease, thereby creating a “severe safety hazard and health and
environmental nuisance”; (2) failed to maintain the bodies of water on the
golf course, causing them to become stagnant breeding grounds for
mosquitos, moss, algae, and bacteria toxic to humans and wildlife; (3) failed
to maintain the facilities; and (4) refused to comply despite numerous written

demands.6
      As to Oswit in particular, the HOA alleges in paragraph 36 that, “[i]n
written materials disseminated to [HOA] members, among others, Oswit has

6      These last two allegations appear to apply only to Palms Partners and
Saghian, as the “facilities” refer to the Club’s meeting room, the racquetball
courts, and the tennis courts, to which Palms Partners retained ownership
after it sold the golf course property to Oswit. Paragraph 32 alleges that
“[d]espite numerous written demands to Defendants they continue to refuse
to comply” and paragraph 33 asserts that, “[o]n or around July 18, 2022, the
[HOA] again notified Palms Partners of various maintenance issues, and
dangerous and unhealthy conditions and demanded that those conditions and
public nuisances be remedied” (italics added). Although paragraph 32
references all three defendants, the HOA’s use of the word “again” in the next
paragraph suggests that all of the other demands occurred prior to
July 18, 2022, and thus, before Oswit took ownership.
                                        8
confirmed that it will not continue to maintain or operate the Golf Course;
instead, it intends to convert the Golf Course to a public nature preserve and
botanical garden, all in violation of the Lease.” It characterizes Oswit’s
desire to “redevelop” the golf course as a violation of the lease that threatens
irreparable harm to the HOA. In paragraph 37, the complaint references
admissions on August 1, 2022, by an attorney for The Prescott Foundation,
that “ ‘(i) “Prescott Preserve [the new name proposed for the Mesquite Golf
Course] will never be operated as a golf course”, (ii) the conversion of the Golf
Course violates the existing CC&Rs and Lease rights of the [HOA] and thus
“[a]ll HOA communities will need to restate their respective governing
documents” . . . “to reflect the new Recreational Use (which may never
change)”, and (iii) The [] HOA Communities surrounding the Prescott
Preserve will be asked to share in these costs and expenses (short and long
term) [related to the creation of this preserve.]’ ” The HOA further asserts
that because “Oswit is openly soliciting outside donations to fund this
proposed project,” it may not have sufficient funds to complete the project.
This funding uncertainty, according to the HOA’s complaint, “will affect the
value and salability of homes in the Mesquite community.” Relevant to the
claims at issue, the HOA alleges that “[s]ince its purchase of the Golf Course,
it appears that Oswit has completely abandoned the Golf Course and has
stopped all maintenance, landscaping and irrigation, contributing to its
further deterioration.” The HOA claims these acts and omissions, together
with those of the other defendants, threaten irreparable harm to the health
and safety of the HOA residents and threaten to do substantial and
permanent damage to the salability and property values of homes within the
HOA “by turning the Property into a blighted eyesore and health and
environmental nightmare and by discontinuing golf course operations.”

                                        9
      In the first cause of action, the HOA alleges that “Oswit and Palms
Partners have breached and/or anticipatorily breached the Lease and CC&Rs
by failing to maintain and operate the Golf Course and the Facilities,
including in accordance with the standards set forth in the Lease, and/or
announcing an intention not to operate the Golf Course and to convert it to
another use.”
      The second cause of action, which is for nuisance, alleges, among other
things, that through the acts and omissions described ante, all three
defendants “have created conditions and permitted conditions to persist” that
are harmful to the HOA residents’ health and safety; indecent and offensive
to the senses; likely to diminish property values and the ability to sell homes;
and an obstruction to the comfortable use and enjoyment of the property. It
describes the failure to maintain the golf course, stagnation of bodies of
water, and proliferation of bacteria, vectors, and so forth as continuing
nuisances that must be abated.
      In alleging nuisance per se in the third cause of action, the HOA cites
violations of California Health and Safety Code sections 12510 (fire nuisance)
and 2002 (water vector related nuisance) as demonstrating that Oswit and

the others have created ongoing nuisances per se.7
       Finally, in its seventh cause of action, the HOA asserts that “[a]n
actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the [HOA] and
Defendants relating to their rights and obligations under the Lease, the
CC&Rs, the Settlement Agreement and the Judgment, in particular as
relates to Defendants’ obligations to maintain and continue to operate the
Golf Course and to maintain the Property, including the Facilities, in good

7    The HOA also cites a code relevant to mold in structures, which again
appears relevant only to the Club owned by Palms Partners and Saghian.
                                       10
and useable condition” and seeks a declaration of the parties’ rights, duties,
and obligations under the same.
      2. Breach of the CC&Rs and Lease
      We begin with whether Oswit has met its burden on the claim for
breach of the CC&Rs and lease to “show ‘the challenged cause of action arises
from protected activity.’ ” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1240, 1250.) “To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the
plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance of the
contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the
resulting damage to the plaintiff.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) A party to a contract may breach by
nonperformance, repudiation, or a combination of the two. (Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 549–550.) Actual
breach by nonperformance “refers to an unjustified or unexcused failure to
perform a material contractual obligation when performance is due.” (Id. at
p. 550.) Anticipatory breach of contract, on the other hand, “ ‘occurs when the
contract is repudiated by the promisor before the promisor’s performance
under the contract is due.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Oswit argues the HOA’s cause of action for anticipatory breach of the
CC&Rs and lease is based upon Oswit’s public statements regarding its
intention to dedicate the golf course property to public use as Prescott
Preserve. Oswit further contends the alleged breach is based on Garrison’s
speech and related public statements, which it claims were matters of
widespread public interest in Palm Springs. (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(3) & (4).)
Additionally, because her statements occurred at HOA board meetings, Oswit
insists they occurred in public forums under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See
id., subd. (e)(3).)

                                        11
      As an initial matter, nowhere in the complaint does the HOA reference
Garrison’s statements at HOA meetings. “Because the issues to be
determined in an anti-SLAPP motion are framed by the pleadings, we will
not ‘insert into a pleading claims for relief based on allegations of activities
that plaintiffs simply have not identified . . . . It is not our role to engage in
what would amount to a redrafting of [a] complaint in order to read that
document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been
specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have
essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.’ ”
(Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 883.)
Thus, we will not read in allegations regarding statements made at HOA
meetings in order to bring the complaint within the gamut of
subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16. Most of the HOA’s complaint focuses on
Oswit’s actions; namely, its alleged failure to maintain and irrigate the golf
course and keep the water features clear of algae and vectors such as
mosquitoes. Subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16 applies only to “any written
or oral statement” and these are not statements. (Talega Maintenance
Corp. v. Standard Pacific Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 722, 728 (Talega).)
      To the extent the HOA addresses speech in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the
complaint, it argues these paragraphs provide mere context for, and evidence
in support of its claims. At most, these paragraphs could be construed as
reflecting either Oswit’s decision to repudiate the CC&Rs and lease or its

                                         12
confirmation that it was, in fact, breaching the same.8 But the complaint
also makes allegations of actions reflecting breach. Furthermore, the focus of
a cause of action for breach of any agreement is the failure to perform as
promised under the contract. The damages are not based on the breaching
party’s statements of repudiation or breach but on the losses that result from
that party’s failure to provide the benefit of the bargain. Thus, the fact that
Oswit made statements about its intended use of the property as a preserve
does not mean these statements must themselves form the basis of liability.
As the high court explained in Park, “a claim is not subject to a motion to
strike simply because it contests an action or decision that was arrived at
following speech or petitioning activity, or that was thereafter communicated
by means of speech or petitioning activity. Rather, a claim may be struck
only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and
not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which
liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) As the HOA points
out, to hold otherwise would allow a defendant to immunize itself from
liability by talking publicly about its wrongful conduct, then filing an anti-
SLAPP motion against anyone who sued. In this case, the language of the
complaint indicates the HOA did not sue to stop Oswit from talking about
converting the golf course into a preserve. By seeking a judgment that Oswit
was acting in violation of the lease and CC&Rs, as well as declaratory and
injunctive relief, the HOA sought to stop Oswit from actually turning the golf
course into Prescott Preserve.

8     Paragraph 36 references written materials disseminated to HOA
members but does not indicate when this occurred. If it happened before the
time when Oswit’s performance was due under the CC&Rs and lease, then it
may demonstrate a repudiation of the agreements. If after, it may have
confirmed that Oswit had breached the agreements and planned to remain in
breach.
                                       13
      Oswit contends the timing of the HOA’s lawsuit is what is most fatal in
its attempt to avoid anti-SLAPP protection. It highlights that Oswit
purchased the property on July 22, 2022, the HOA made the decision to sue
on July 28, 2022, and the HOA filed suit on August 12, 2022. Because Oswit
submits that it did not and could not destroy or demolish the golf course in
the 21 days between the purchase and filing of the lawsuit, much less the six
days between the purchase and the decision to sue, it asserts the HOA’s claim
for anticipatory breach of the CC&Rs and lease was triggered by Oswit’s
public statements.
      In our view, what this timing reflects is that, although Garrison
acknowledges having been “quite vocal with the [HOA] Board for years as to
[Oswit’s] plans and proposals to create open space natural conservancy which
included the Mesquite Golf Course property” (italics added), the HOA did not
sue until Oswit actually purchased the property. In other words, the HOA
tolerated Garrison’s and Oswit’s public statements of their intentions for
years but did not actually sue until Oswit acted on its intent and
demonstrated that it was going through with its promises to turn the
property into a preserve. Once again, “the mere fact that an action was filed
after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that
activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) And, although Oswit may not have had time to
take many steps towards converting the property after it took ownership, it
immediately made clear its intent to breach the contract and to not pursue
golf course restoration. The complaint alleges that destroying the golf course
would deprive the homeowners of the intended benefits of the lease and
CC&Rs and interfere with their quiet enjoyment of the property. Thus, the

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cause of action was not based on Oswit’s statements themselves.9 Rather,
this speech was evidence of Oswit’s liability for breach of contract and was a
first step in Oswit’s underlying course of conduct of transforming the golf
course into a preserve. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.)
      To the extent Oswit otherwise argues the HOA could not legitimately
claim the property could be restored to a usable golf course or that Palms
Partners was responsible for its present condition, these are factual issues
that go to the HOA’s likelihood of success on the merits on prong two. They
are not relevant to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Talega, supra,
225 Cal.App.4th at p. 728 [at the first stage of the analysis, we review the
parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other supporting documents “only ‘to
determine what conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine
whether the conduct is actionable’ ”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err
in denying Oswit’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the breach of contract claim.
      3. Nuisance and Nuisance Per Se
      Oswit also claims the HOA’s nuisance causes of action are entirely
based on Oswit’s public statements because Oswit did not cause any of the
alleged nuisances as a matter of fact and law. As an initial matter, it appears
Oswit forfeited this contention by not raising it in its anti-SLAPP motion
below. (See Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins.

9      Although the HOA’s subjective intent in filing the lawsuit is not
relevant under the anti-SLAPP statute (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29
Cal.4th 69, 78), it is worth noting that Oswit’s logic does not follow. If the
HOA’s allegations were based on Oswit’s public statements and it filed suit to
chill Oswit’s speech, success in silencing Oswit would not achieve the desired
result of preventing Oswit from turning the golf course into a nature
preserve. This further confirms that the purchase of the property and
initiation of the conversion, not Oswit’s statements about the conversion to a
nature preserve, form the basis for Oswit’s alleged liability.
                                       15
Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564 [generally the “[f]ailure to
raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal”].)
      In providing guidance regarding “the showings and findings required
by section 425.16(b),” our Supreme Court explained that “[a]t the first step,
the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of
protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) The focus is on whether the allegations
supply the elements of a cause of action. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1012.) In other words, Oswit was required to identify the allegations in the
complaint that it believed arose from protected activity and the claims for
relief supported by those allegations. While the anti-SLAPP motion need not
seek to strike the entire cause of action, the movant must still identify the
relevant causes of action. (See id. at pp. 1010–1011.) However, in discussing
prong one in its anti-SLAPP motion, Oswit referenced only the first cause of
action for breach. It made no mention of how the allegations supplied
elements of the nuisance causes of action. Thus, Oswit forfeited its prong one
challenge to these claims.
      Even if we address its arguments on the merits, Oswit has not
overcome its burden of showing the HOA’s nuisance claims arose from
protected activity. “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any . . . public
park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.)
“A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community
or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent
of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Id.,

                                        16
§ 3480.) Every nuisance that is not a public nuisance is a private nuisance.
(Id., § 3481.)
         “ ‘[T]o be considered a nuisance per se the object, substance, activity or
circumstance at issue must be expressly declared to be a nuisance by its very
existence by some applicable law.’ ” (City of Monterey v. Carrnshimba (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1086.) If the use of a property violates the applicable
statute, “ ‘ “no proof is required, beyond the actual fact of their existence, to
establish the nuisance.” ’ ” (City of Dana Point v. New Method Wellness, Inc.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 985, 989.)
         Here, Oswit does not make clear how its allegedly protected activity of
making written and oral statements about converting the golf course into a
preserve supplied the elements of the HOA’s nuisance causes of action. Its
only argument is that the time frame of, at most, 21 days between when it
purchased the property and when the HOA filed suit presented an
insufficient amount of time for it to have caused any of the alleged nuisances.
It claims it “merely purchased the property for its stated public interest and
communicated to the public its intentions to forever protect the property.” As
a result, it contends the HOA must be relying on Oswit’s public statements to
establish that Oswit created the nuisance or permitted nuisance conditions to
exist.
         The problem with this argument is that what Oswit ultimately
challenges is the truth of the HOA’s allegations and the HOA’s ability to
prove Oswit substantially interfered with the HOA’s comfortable enjoyment
of the property. But these are not issues to be decided at prong one of the

                                          17
section 425.16 test.10 At this stage, we consider only whether the claims
alleged in the complaint arise from protected speech or petitioning activity;
“ ‘[w]e do not consider the veracity of [the plaintiff’s] allegations’ [citation] nor
do we consider ‘[m]erits based arguments.’ ” (Sprengel v. Zbylut (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 140, 156.) Although we need not accept the HOA’s allegations as
true (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887), neither must we accept Oswit’s
contrary factual assertion that it did not cause any of the alleged nuisances.
Whether Oswit could have actually caused, or failed to abate, nuisance
conditions during the 21 days it owned the property before the HOA filed
suit, and whether its’ actions could have resulted in conditions that
substantially interfered with the HOA’s enjoyment of the property (see
Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1176 [a successful private nuisance cause of
action requires proof that the defendant interfered with the use and
enjoyment of the property and that said interference was substantial]) are
factual issues to be decided on the merits at a later date. Accordingly, we
conclude Oswit has not met its burden on prong one of the anti-SLAPP
analysis.
      4. Declaratory Relief
      Oswit contends the HOA’s declaratory relief cause of action is
derivative of its claims for breach of contract and nuisance and, therefore,
must also fail. However, because we disagree that Oswit has met its burden
under the anti-SLAPP framework as to the HOA’s first, second, and third
causes of action, by its own admission, its assertions as to the seventh cause
of action must also be found lacking. The “actual controversy” the HOA

10   And indeed, in its anti-SLAPP motion below, Oswit made these
arguments as part of its prong two analysis under the heading “Plaintiff
Must Show It Will Probably Prevail on Its Claims.”
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alleges relates to whether the lease and CC&Rs require Oswit to maintain
and operate the golf course. For the reasons explained above, Oswit may
have conveyed its intent to transform the golf course into a nature preserve,
but this does not convert the statements themselves into the basis for
liability.
                                DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The HOA is entitled to its costs on appeal.

                                                      HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DATO, J.

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