Court Opinion

ID: 9372931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:37.666601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.937469
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     THERESA BARACKER,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                            DE-0752-21-0158-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: February 2, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jeffrey A. Dahl, Esquire, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellant.

           Benjamin Fischer, Lakewood, Colorado, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                     Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                       REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction.         For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     REMAND the case to the Denver Field Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant alleged in her appeal that the agency improperly denied her
     participation in its Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA) program, and
     that the denial resulted in her involuntary resignation. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 6 at 4, 9. Specifically, according to the appellant, the agency misled her
     regarding her eligibility to participate in the early retirement progra m and that the
     denial of her eligibility was the culmination of harassment and abuse motivated
     by a confrontation her husband had with one of her supervisors several years
     earlier when her husband worked with the supervisor. Id. at 4-5. The appellant
     explained that the agency had offered various employees, including her, a
     voluntary early retirement, but ultimately denied her participation on the grounds
     that she was an essential employee. Id. at 12. She alleged that the agency had
     engaged in preferential treatment in deciding which employees could participate
     in the early retirement program. Id. After the agency denied her participation in
     the early retirement program, the appellant resigned, and this appeal followed.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 6, 10.
¶3         The administrative judge gave the appellant notice of the elements and
     burdens she must meet to be entitled to a hearing on an involuntary retirement or
     resignation claim. IAF, Tab 3. Both parties responded on the jurisdictional issue
     and the agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.             IAF,
     Tabs 6-7, 13.      Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing,             the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant failed to
     make a nonfrivolous allegation sufficient to overcome the presumption that her
     resignation was voluntary, and he dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 5.
                                                                                        3

¶4        In her petition for review, the appellant argues that her resignation was the
     result of the agency’s improper denial of her participation in its VERA program
     and that the agency treated her unfairly regarding her eligibility for the program .
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-8.         She also contends that the
     administrative judge improperly weighed the evidence to conclude that she did
     not reasonably rely on the agency’s early retirement offer.      Id. at 8-10.   The
     agency has filed a response to the appellant’s petition for review.       PFR File,
     Tab 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5        An involuntary retirement or resignation is tantamount to a removal, and, as
     such, is appealable to the Board.       Aldridge v. Department of Agriculture,
     111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 7 (2009). To overcome the presumption of voluntariness, an
     appellant must show that the retirement or resignation resulted from agency
     coercion, deception, or misinformation. Id., ¶ 8. Where, as here, there is a claim
     that an involuntary action resulted from misinformation, an appellant must show:
     (1) that the agency made misleading statements; and (2) that the appellant
     reasonably relied on the misinformation to her detriment. Id. (citing Scharf v.
     Department of the Air Force, 710 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).           An
     appellant is entitled to a hearing on the issue of Board jurisdiction over an appeal
     of an allegedly involuntary resignation or retirement only if she makes a
     nonfrivolous allegation casting doubt on the presumption of voluntariness.
     Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
     Nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction are allegations of fact which, if
     proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
¶6        In the initial decision dismissing the appeal because the appellant failed to
     make a nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary, the
     administrative judge stated that he was relying “exclusively on the appellant’s
     contentions.” ID at 2 n.3. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative
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     judge improperly considered the agency’s evidence in determining that its offer
     of early retirement was conditional, and not a promise on which the appellant
     could reasonably rely. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-10. In Hessami v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020), the U.S. Court of
     Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) cautioned that, when evaluating
     Board jurisdiction, the Board may not deny jurisdiction by crediting the agency’s
     interpretation of the evidence.    However, the Board need not consider the
     appellant’s allegations “in a vacuum,” and may consider sources such as matters
     incorporated by reference or integral to the claim.     Id. at 1369 n.5.   In his
     analysis, citing the appellant’s sworn allegations, the administrative judge found
     that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of a broken promise or
     a reasonable reliance on a promise made by the agency. ID at 3 -4. In doing so,
     he specifically noted that the appellant disputed the agency’s determination that
     she was an essential employee. ID at 3. In her sworn statement, the appellant
     claimed that she was not identified as an essential employee on the agency’s
     Continuity of Operations plan, but her supervisor was, and the agency
     nevertheless allowed her supervisor to participate in the VERA program. IAF,
     Tab 6 at 12. Thus, the initial decision shows that the administrative judge made
     his decision based on the appellant’s sworn allegations, not the agency’s
     evidence.
¶7        As indicated     above, an    appellant   may rebut the presumption of
     voluntariness by presenting sufficient evidence to show that her resignation was
     based on agency-supplied misinformation. In Baldwin v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶ 26 (2008), for example, the Board found that the
     appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that he resigned due to agency
     misinformation when an agency human resources specialist told Mr. Baldwin that ,
     if he resigned before his removal became effective, “he could still obtain a full
     retirement annuity, provided that he later complete[d] the relevant annuity
     application paperwork.” Baldwin, 109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶¶ 27-28. Nevertheless, the
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     agency crossed out the word retirement on the Standard Form 52 submitted by
     Mr. Baldwin, wrote in resignation, and processed his request as a resignation as
     he was not yet eligible for immediate retirement. Id., ¶¶ 9, 30.
¶8           However, in this matter, unlike the appellant in Baldwin, the appellant did
     not resign due to reliance on agency misinformation concerning her eligibility for
     the VERA program because she resigned after the agency told her she would not
     be eligible for the program. Therefore, she did not rely on an agency assertion
     that she was eligible to retire, as the appellant in Baldwin had. Stated differently,
     even if the appellant was misled, she fails to show that she relied on any
     misinformation to her detriment. Aldridge, 111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 8. She did not
     resign in reliance on the agency’s initial offer of VERA participation as it had
     been withdrawn by the time of her resignation. The appellant may have been
     discouraged or aggrieved about her treatment by the agency concerning the
     VERA program, and the agency’s decision concerning the VERA program may
     well be incorrect, 2 but it has no connection to her decision to resign.
¶9           In her response to the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order, the
     appellant also claimed that she resigned due to a pattern of harassment by her
     second-level supervisor that she blamed on a confrontation between the
     appellant’s husband and her second-level supervisor. IAF, Tab 6 at 4. However,
     the administrative judge did not address the claim in the initial decision and the
     appellant does not raise it on review. Instead, she reiterates her argument that her
     second-level supervisor admitted that he had the ability to offer an early
     retirement to the appellant, but decided, without explanation, not to do so. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 7; IAF, Tab 6 at 4. While this may not be fair, it does not rebut the
     presumption of voluntariness. Miller v. Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310,
     ¶ 32 (2000) (“Dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly
     criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working conditions are generally not so

     2
         We make no assertion concerning the merits of the appellant VERA claim.
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      intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign”); see Searcy v.
      Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 13 (2010) (finding, among other
      things, that a refusal to grant an educational waiver to allow the employee to
      apply for certain vacancies did not create intolerable working conditions).
¶10        As explained below, however, the appellant may challenge the agency’s
      VERA program denial in an appeal before the Board. Thus, we must remand the
      appeal for the administrative judge to hear the appellant’s challenge.

      The Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal of the agency’s decision to
      deny her participation in VERA.
¶11        The administrative judge only addressed the appellant’s involuntary
      resignation claim. See ID.    As noted, however, the appellant also argued below
      that she was improperly denied participation in the agency’s early retirement
      program and she reiterates this argument on review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7.
¶12        In Adams v. Department of Defense, 688 F.3d 1330, 1334-36 (Fed. Cir.
      2012), the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision sustaining the
      appellant’s removal based on the revocation of his security clearance but
      disagreed with the Board’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
      employing agency’s denial of his request to participate in the agency’s voluntary
      early retirement program. The court reasoned that the voluntary early retirement
      benefit is part of the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) under which
      Mr. Adams was covered and the Board has jurisdiction over decisions that affect
      an individual’s rights or interests under FERS. Id. at 1335; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 8414,
      8461(e)(1).   In Dawson v. Department of Agriculture, 121 M.S.P.R. 495, ¶ 16
      (2014), the Board extended the court’s holding in Adams to individuals in the
      Civil Service Retirement System. The Board also clarified that an employee is
      not required to obtain a reconsideration decision from the Office of Personnel
      Management prior to filing a Board appeal of an agency decision. Id., ¶ 17.
¶13        The appellant here made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency denied
      her eligibility for the VERA program by engaging in preferential treatment in
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      deciding which employees could participate in the program. IAF, Tab 6 at 12.
      The agency’s denial significantly affected the appellant’s rights or interests under
      FERS, 5 U.S.C. § 8461(e)(1), and thus is an appealable “administrative action”
      within the Board’s jurisdiction,       Adams, 688 F.3d at 1335-36; Dawson,
      121 M.S.P.R. 495, ¶¶ 16-17. The agency argued below that the appellant failed to
      argue or allege that she applied for an early retirement under the agency’s VERA
      program, but the appellant appears to argue that this was due to the agency’s
      improper decision concerning her eligibility. IAF, Tab 7 at 8, Tab 13 at 5 n.1. If
      the administrative judge determines that the appellant did not submit an
      application for the agency’s VERA program, he should examine whether the
      agency’s conduct in determining that the appellant was n ot eligible for VERA
      program justifies the waiver of any pertinent filing deadline for such benefits.
      See Dawson, 129 M.S.P.R. 495, ¶¶ 19-22 (denying relief because the agency’s
      alleged misconduct did not justify waiver of the filing deadline for VERA
      benefits).
¶14         On remand, the administrative judge shall afford the parties an opportunity
      to submit evidence and argument on the issues set forth in this Remand Order,
      and adjudicate the merits of the appellant’s appeal, as set forth above.

                                            ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the Denver
      Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.