Court Opinion

ID: 9418623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:34:14.067008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:07.155174
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Stone,
dissenting.
I think the judgment below should be affirmed. I cannot agree that a condition in a commercial letter of credit, that drafts are to be drawn against merchandise “ shipment . . . from Java by Steamer or Steamers to Philadelphia ” is satisfied by a shipment “ from Java to Port Said, option New York,” even though the cargo ultimately reaches Philadelphia. I had supposed, as the opinion below seems to me to show, that the character of a shipment is fixed at the time it is made, and hence that language in a mercantile contract indicating that a shipment is to be made from one point to another could only mean that the point of destination is to be known and specified at the time of shipment. Hannson v. Hamel & Horley, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 36; Landauer & Co. v. Craven & Speeding Brothers, [1912] 2 K. B. 94; Mora y Ledon v. Havemeyer, 121 N. Y. 179; Iasigi v. Rosenstein, 141 N. Y. 414, 417.
But even if this were doubtful as a general proposition, there would seem to be no room for doubt in the present *475case. Here the letter of credit specified that drafts when presented should be accompanied by “ copy of ocean bill of lading covering shipment Java to Philadelphia.” Obviously such a bill of lading would be impossible unless the shipment were continuously destined for Philadelphia. It is true that, for the convenience of the seller, the bank, at the buyer’s direction, later waived physical presentation of a copy of the ocean bill of lading. But the record does not show that the bank had any reason to suppose that the requirement had originally been inserted in the letter of credit by mere inadvertence; so far as it was aware, there was still to be an “ ocean bill of lading covering shipment Java to Philadelphia,” but the seller was to be excused from presenting it. The clause “ shipment . . . from Java by Steamer or Steamers to Philadelphia ” was not waived and its meaning, on the date of presentation of the draft remained the same as when the credit was issued. The provision in the letter of credit that “ conditions embodied in this credit must be adhered to, otherwise payment will not be effected,” only expresses the rule, with which we all agree, that liability upon a mercantile contract may be established only by strict compliance with its conditions. Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213; Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188; Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 455.
Me. Justice McReynolds, Me. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Sanford join in this dissent;