Court Opinion

ID: 9393435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 14:00:37.203825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.242270
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13799    Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 05/10/2023    Page: 1 of 30

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13799
                           ____________________

        EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        EBERSPAECHER NORTH AMERICA INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:21-mc-00891-RDP
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13799

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
              This appeal involves the limitations on the Equal
        Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) investigatory
        powers. It arises from a district court order enforcing only part of
        an administrative subpoena issued by the EEOC against
        Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), a company that
        manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi,
        Michigan and six other locations across the country.
               An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport,
        Alabama plant—complained to the EEOC that he was fired for
        taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act
        (“FMLA”).       An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with
        discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
        Amendments Act (“ADAAA”),1 listing only the Northport facility
        in the written charge. 2 The EEOC then issued requests for
        information on every employee terminated for attendance-related
        infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the
        nation. When ENA objected to the scope of those requests, the

        1 Enacted in 2008, the ADAAA is an amended version of the 1990 Americans
        with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
        2 While the EEOC never charged ENA with a violation of the FMLA, the
        EEOC’s theory is that ENA discriminated against the employee in violation of
        the ADAAA by firing him for taking FMLA–protected leave which, the EEOC
        asserts, is a “reasonable accommodation” required under the ADAAA.
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        21-13799              Opinion of the Court                       3

        EEOC issued a subpoena and eventually sought judicial
        enforcement in federal district court.
               The district court ordered ENA to turn over information
        related to the Northport, Alabama facility, but refused to enforce
        the subpoena as to information from other facilities, holding that
        nationwide information was not relevant to the EEOC’s charge to
        the Northport facility. The EEOC appeals, arguing that the district
        court abused its discretion in concluding that the charge related
        only to Northport. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that,
        even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility,
        nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.
               As we outline below, the EEOC’s investigatory process is a
        multistep process designed to notify employers of investigations
        into potentially unlawful employment practices. First, an
        aggrieved employee, or the EEOC acting on behalf of an aggrieved
        employee, can issue a charge against an employer. This charge
        serves as notice that the EEOC is investigating the potentially
        unlawful employment practices specified in the charge, and it
        provides the employer the opportunity to comply with the
        investigation and rectify the targeted practices. However, if the
        employer does not voluntarily comply with the investigation, the
        EEOC can then subpoena the charged employer for information—
        but only for information relevant to the investigation of the issue
        set forth in the charge.
             After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we hold that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility—
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                   21-13799

        which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating
        potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific
        facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is
        irrelevant to that charge. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
        order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena.
                                   I.      Background
                ENA, headquartered in Novi, Michigan, manufactures car
        components including heaters, A/C units, and service diagnostic
        tools at seven facilities in four U.S. states. In 2017, a former ENA
        employee at ENA’s Northport, Alabama facility, Joseph White,
        filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that ENA violated the ADA
        by firing him from his job following a series of disability-related
        absences. 3 White alleged that ENA used “a point system to
        discipline employees for absences and tardiness,” including for
        absences protected under the FMLA. According to ENA’s
        employee handbook, employees receive two points for
        unscheduled absences, and ten points within a 12-month period
        result in termination. Per the handbook, ENA is not supposed to
        assign points for excused absences, including FMLA absences, but
        it allegedly did so in White’s case.
              The EEOC investigated White’s complaint and, purportedly
        based on a review of the “employer’s practices and the employee

        3 While White’s original charge alleged discrimination under the ADA, the
        Commissioner ultimately charged ENA with violations of the ADAAA.
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        21-13799               Opinion of the Court                      5

        handbook,” concluded that ENA in Northport, Alabama was
        employing the same allegedly discriminatory practice with other
        employees—assigning points and firing employees for FMLA-
        protected absences. As a result, the EEOC charged ENA with
        unlawful employment practices under the ADAAA.
              (a) The Charge
                In July 2019, an EEOC Commissioner filed a charge stating:
        “I charge the following employer with unlawful employment
        practices. Eberspaecher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street
        Northport, AL 35476.” “[T]he above-named employer . . . has
        violated . . . and continues to violate the [ADAAA] by
        discriminating against employees on the basis of disability with
        respect to qualified leave.” It then listed the alleged unlawful
        discriminatory practices such as “[f]ailing to properly categorize
        qualified absences protected under the ADAAA” and “[u]nlawful
        discipline and termination, and the improper assessment of
        occurrence points wherein an employee’s absence is directly
        correlated to their disability.” The charge specified that the
        allegations were based on a review of the “employer’s practices and
        the employee handbook,” and that “[t]he aggrieved individuals
        include all employees who have, have been, or might in the future
        be adversely affected by the” allegedly unlawful practices.
               Several days later, the EEOC’s Mobile, Alabama office sent
        ENA’s Northport facility a notice of the charge. The notice
        informed ENA that “[t]he circumstances of the alleged
        discrimination are based on Retaliation and Disability, and involve
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               21-13799

        issues of Discipline, Reasonable Accommodation, and Discharge
        that are alleged to have occurred on or about Jan 01, 2017 through
        Aug 02, 2019.” The notice did not suggest that the charge or
        investigation were of a nationwide scope.
              (b) Requests for Information
               The Commission also made its first request for information
        to ENA’s Northport facility around that time. Similar to the notice,
        the initial request for information was directed specifically to the
        Northport, Alabama facility and did not mention nationwide
        allegations or a nationwide investigation. Instead, the EEOC
        requested information solely related to “the allegations of the
        charge.” ENA responded with a position statement and produced
        its companywide attendance policy.
              The EEOC followed up and for the first time asked for
        nationwide data, which it claimed was “relevant to the instant
        charge of discrimination.” The Commission asked ENA to “[l]ist
        each employee discharged from Respondent’s locations
        nationwide for the period from January 1, 2018 to the present, for
        attendance infractions” along with substantial accompanying
        documentation (e.g., information about the employee, the
        separation notice, the person who recommended discharging the
        employee, the person who made the final decision on discharge
        and so forth.). Notably, it did not request information about
        whether the discharged employees were disabled or otherwise
        unable to work for medical reasons.
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        21-13799                 Opinion of the Court                             7

               ENA refused to provide the nationwide information,
        responding that “the underlying Charge [was] specific to the
        Northport, Alabama facility.” ENA and the EEOC went back and
        forth for months, with the EEOC pressing ENA for nationwide
        information about employees it terminated under the attendance
        policy. ENA resisted for several reasons pointing to the charge
        being specific to the Northport facility, the large burden of
        production for nationwide data, and the overbreadth of the
        Commission’s nationwide requests given that the charge was based
        on allegations from a single employee.
               (c) Subpoena
              In August 2020, the EEOC issued the subpoena in question,
        sending it to ENA’s CEO at the corporate headquarters in Novi,
        Michigan. The subpoena required ENA to produce and turn over
        nationwide information about employees that it terminated for
        attendance infractions at any of ENA’s locations. ENA petitioned
        to revoke the subpoena, which the EEOC rejected as untimely.
        The EEOC then filed an application for judicial enforcement of the
        subpoena with the district court.4

        4 At oral argument, the EEOC asserted that it had the authority to reissue a
        new nationwide charge, but, as a “practical matter” it would have involved
        “too many administrative hurdles.” Oral Argument at 4:15, E.E.O.C. v.
        Eberspaecher N. Am., Inc., No-13799 (11th Cir. Aug 10, 2022),
        https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
        recordings?title=&field_oar_case_name_value=eberspaecher&field_oral_ar
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                21-13799

              (d) District Court Enforcement
               In its application for a show cause order from the district
        court to enforce the administrative subpoena, the EEOC framed its
        investigation as an “investigation of a charge of nationwide
        unlawful employment practices.” The EEOC claimed the
        subpoena should be enforced because the charge was a nationwide
        charge; it did “not pertain to a single location.” Accordingly, the
        EEOC argued, among other things, that: (1) the requested
        information fell within the broad construction courts give to
        “relevance” in an EEOC subpoena enforcement action; (2) the
        nationwide information would help it assess whether ENA “failed
        to reasonably accommodate . . . disabled employees” under its
        attendance policy; and (3) if the EEOC concluded that ENA
        violated the ADAAA, the requested information would help it
        “identify specific victims of that unlawful employment practice.”
        ENA countered by arguing that the subpoena was too
        burdensome, indefinite, and had an “illegitimate purpose” in that
        the EEOC sought a “broadened investigation” outside the scope of
        the charge, and that, in any event, the subpoena should be limited
        to the Northport facility based on the plain terms of the EEOC’s
        charge.
             The district court ordered ENA to comply with the
        subpoena “but only as it applies to [ENA’s] Northport facility.”

        gument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_da
        te_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=.
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        21-13799                    Opinion of the Court                                 9

        Citing the charge’s exclusive reference to the Northport facility’s
        address, the district court found that only records that pertain to
        the attendance policy at the Northport facility were relevant to the
        charge. Reasoning that in order to bring a nationwide charge “the
        Commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent within the four corners
        of the charge,” the court held that “[t]he Commissioner herself
        limited the scope of her charge to the Northport facility.” The
        EEOC timely appealed.
                                   II.     Standard of Review
               We review the district court’s decision to enforce an EEOC
        subpoena for an abuse of discretion.5 McLane Co., Inc. v.
        E.E.O.C., 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3, 1170 (2017). “A district court
        abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies
        the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper
        procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact
        that are clearly erroneous.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Marin, 982
        F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). “The
        relevance of documents in an administrative proceeding is a mixed
        question of law and fact, which implies that our standard of review

        5 Citing authority from other circuits, the EEOC and the dissent both argue
        that the district court’s interpretation of the charge is a question of law that is
        entitled to de novo review. But the Supreme Court has made it clear that even
        though “[w]hether a charge is valid . . . is a pure question of law,” “pure
        questions of law embedded in a district court’s decision to enforce or quash a
        subpoena” are nonetheless subject to a “unitary abuse-of-discretion standard.”
        McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1168 n.3 (quotations omitted).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                     21-13799

        of such determinations should look either to legal error or to clear
        error, depending on the circumstances.” E.E.O.C. v. Royal
        Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757, 760 (11th Cir. 2014).
                                      III.    Discussion
                The EEOC argues that the charge was directed at ENA’s
        facilities nationwide or, alternatively, that nationwide data is
        relevant to the EEOC’s investigation even if the charge is directed
        only at the Northport facility. As explained below, we disagree on
        both counts.
               With its enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
        1964, Congress established the EEOC and charged it with
        responsibility for investigating potential unlawful employment
        practices, as defined by Title VII. 42 U.S.C §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5.
               The ADAAA prohibits covered employers, such as ENA,
        from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of
        disability” in the “discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
        ADAAA-prohibited discrimination includes “not making
        reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
        limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
        disability . . . .” 6 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

        6 The FMLA provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of
        12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for one or more of the
        following . . . (D) [b]because of a serious health condition that makes the
        employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.”
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        21-13799                  Opinion of the Court                              11

               Congress gave the EEOC a role in enforcing the ADAAA’s
        workplace protections, incorporating, “[t]he powers, remedies,
        and procedures” of Title VII into the ADAAA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
        (incorporating, as relevant here, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-8, and
        2000e-9, including the multistep charging and investigatory
        procedure used by the EEOC in this case). See generally, E.E.O.C.
        v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285–86 (2002).
               The EEOC’s enforcement procedure begins with the filing
        of an administrative “charge” alleging discrimination, which may
        be filed by or on behalf of an individual, or by a member of the
        EEOC. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(b). The charge must include, among
        other things, “[t]he full name and contact information of the person
        against whom the charge is made, if known,” and a “clear and
        concise statement of the facts . . . constituting the alleged unlawful
        employment practices.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2)–(3). This
        naming requirement is important, as it “serves to notify the
        charged party of the allegations and allows the party an
        opportunity to participate in conciliation and voluntarily comply

        29 U.S.C. § 2612(a). While “the FMLA protects the substantive rights it creates
        by prohibiting an employer from retailing against its employee,” Baston v.
        Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2018), neither White’s original
        charge nor the Commissioner’s charge alleged a violation of the FMLA.
        Instead, the EEOC argues that ENA violated the ADAAA by firing White for
        taking FMLA leave, which they argue was a reasonable accommodation for
        White’s disability under the ADAAA.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13799

        with the requirements of Title VII.” Virgo v. Rivera Beach Assocs.,
        Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1358 (11th Cir. 1994).
                After receiving a charge either from an aggrieved employee
        or a Commissioner, the EEOC must “serve a notice of the
        charge (including the date, place and circumstances of the alleged
        unlawful employment practice) on [the] employer” and “shall
        make an investigation thereof” to determine whether “there is
        reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.” 42 U.S.C.
        § 2000e-5(b). While no statutory provision or regulation requires
        any specific language in making a “nationwide” charge, the EEOC
        knows how to issue broad charges targeting numerous
        employment locations when it suspects nationwide employment
        misconduct and seeks to collect relevant evidence from several
        employment locations. See EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World
        L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 2016) (Fifth Circuit noting that
        an EEOC charge explicitly identified its target as “retail stores and
        facilities nationwide”); EEOC v. Superior Servs., Inc., 56 F.3d 441,
        443 (2d Cir. 1995) (Second Circuit noting that an EEOC charge
        explicitly identified its target as “all . . . facilities in New York”).
               “In connection with any investigation of a charge,” the
        EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access to . . . any
        evidence” that “relates to unlawful employment practices covered
        by [the ADAAA] and is relevant to the charge under investigation.”
        Id. § 2000e-8(a) (emphasis added). As we have noted, “[t]he
        relevance that is necessary to support a subpoena for the
        investigation of an individual charge is relevance to the contested
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        21-13799                  Opinion of the Court                              13

        issues that must be decided to resolve that charge, not relevance to
        issues that may be contested when and if future charges are
        brought by others.” Royal Caribbean, 771 F.3d at 761.
                If an employer refuses to provide the EEOC with
        information the agency seeks as part of an investigation, the EEOC
        may issue an administrative subpoena. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9; 29
        U.S.C. § 161(1); see also McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1167 (explaining that
        “Title VII confers on the EEOC the . . . authority to issue
        subpoenas”). Importantly, the subpoena must “describe with
        sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required”
        and the EEOC shall revoke the subpoena after a petition if “the
        evidence whose production is required does not relate to any
        matter under investigation.” 29 U.S.C. § 161(1). If the employer
        does not comply with the subpoena, the EEOC may seek
        enforcement in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9; 29 U.S.C.
        § 161(2).
               If the charge is valid 7 and the material requested relevant,
        the district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer

        7 A charge is considered “valid” if it is “in writing under oath or affirmation
        and [] contain[s] such information and [is] in such form as the Commission
        requires.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b); E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 67
        (1984). In adherence with the statute, the EEOC has promulgated regulations
        that articulate what each charge should contain. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)
        (requiring that each charge contain, “(1) [t]he full name and contact
        information of the person making the charge . . . , (2) [t]he full name and
        contact information of the person against whom the charge is made, if known
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        14                           Opinion of the Court                          21-13799

        establishes that the subpoena is “too indefinite,” has been issued for
        an “illegitimate purpose,” or is unduly burdensome. McLane, 137
        S. Ct. at 1165 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72
        n.26 (1984)); see also E.E.O.C. v. Tire Kingdom, Inc., 80 F.3d 449,
        450 (11th Cir. 1996). At bottom, this case involves the threshold
        inquiry: whether the “material requested is relevant” to the
        charged misconduct. Because we decide this case at the threshold
        relevance inquiry, we need not consider whether the subpoena was
        “unduly burdensome,” “too indefinite,” or issued for an
        “illegitimate purpose.”
                With these principles in mind, we consider whether the
        district court abused its discretion in enforcing the subpoena only
        as to ENA’s Northport facility. The EEOC makes two arguments
        on appeal. First, it contends that it did, in fact, charge nationwide
        conduct, such that the nationwide subpoena was valid and relevant
        to the charge. Second, in the alternative, the EEOC argues that
        nationwide data is still relevant to a charge solely against the

        . . . , (3) [a] clear and concise statement of the facts . . . constituting the alleged
        unlawful employment practices . . . , (4) [i]f known, the approximate number
        of employees of the respondent employer . . . , [and] (5) [a] statement
        disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment
        practice have been commenced before a State or local agency charge with the
        enforcement of fair employment practice laws . . .”).
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        21-13799               Opinion of the Court                       15

        Northport facility.    For the reasons discussed below, both
        arguments fail.
           (a) Whether the charge is directed only at ENA’s Northport
               facility
               We turn first to the EEOC’s argument that it charged
        nationwide conduct. The EEOC’s regulations require a charge to
        include, among other things, “[t]he full name and contact
        information of the person against whom the charge is made, if
        known.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a). Because only named parties
        that are notified of the allegations have a chance to “participate in
        conciliation and voluntarily comply,” Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1358,
        whether the EEOC charged ENA’s facilities nationwide or only the
        Northport, Alabama facility is an important question—and one
        that turns on the information the EEOC included in the charge.
                 The only employer listed in the charge is ENA’s Northport
        facility, and the charge cannot be fairly read to target companywide
        misconduct. Specifically, the Commissioner’s charge stated: “I
        charge the following employer with unlawful employment
        practices. Eberspa[e]cher North America, Inc. 6801 B 5th Street
        Northport, AL 35476.” (Emphasis added). And as the district court
        properly noted, the EEOC knows how to charge an employer with
        nationwide misconduct, as it has done so before. See, e.g., Bass Pro
        Outdoor World, L.L.C., 826 F.3d at 798 (remarking that the
        Commissioner’s charge explicitly included the language
        “at . . . retail stores and facilities nationwide”). The employer
        charged in this case, therefore, is plainly only ENA’s Northport
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        16                       Opinion of the Court                    21-13799

        facility, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        concluding otherwise. 8
                We are unpersuaded by the EEOC’s attempts to overcome
        the conclusion that it charged only the Northport facility. First, the
        Commission explains that the charge listed ENA’s Northport
        facility (rather than the corporate headquarters) because the
        Birmingham office of the EEOC brought the alleged violations to
        the Commissioner and, therefore, that office was tasked with
        investigating the charge. But the involvement of the Birmingham
        office underscores that the allegedly discriminatory conduct at
        issue occurred at ENA’s Northport facility, strengthening our
        conclusion that the charge targeted only the Alabama plant.
               Second, the EEOC argues that other parts of the charge
        establish that the charge was directed at ENA’s companywide
        practices. For example, the charge was based on a review of the
        employee handbook, which governs ENA’s facilities
        companywide.         And the charge describes “the aggrieved
        individuals” as “all employees” impacted by the allegedly unlawful
        practices. (Emphasis added.)
              The problem with the EEOC’s arguments about the
        handbook and broad definition of aggrieved employees is that they
        presuppose that the charge targets ENA facilities nationwide. To

        8 The dissent points out that the EEOC has the authority to amend a charge
        “to cure technical defects or omissions.” However, as we noted above, the
        EEOC never tried to amend the charge, so this issue is not before the Court.
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        21-13799               Opinion of the Court                       17

        wit: the mention of the employee handbook in the charge comes
        in a sentence reading “[t]hese allegations are based upon a review
        of information regarding the employer, including the employer’s
        practices and the employee handbook.” (Emphasis added.) That
        sentence does not suggest, let alone notify ENA, that the unlawful
        practices identified in the charge were allegedly occurring at all of
        ENA’s facilities. As discussed above, the only “employer”
        mentioned in the charge is the ENA Northport facility. And stating
        that the EEOC also reviewed “the employee handbook” did not
        provide ENA with notice that the charge was alleging
        companywide unlawful practices.
               The EEOC’s argument about the definition of “aggrieved
        individuals” including “all employees” is similarly flawed. As the
        charge itself explicitly notes, “aggrieved individuals” includes “all
        employees” who have been adversely affected by the “unlawful
        employment practices set forth in the foregoing charge.”
        (Emphasis added.) Whether the “foregoing charge” is nationwide
        or Northport-centric, therefore, controls whether “all employees”
        means all ENA employees across the country or just the Northport
        ones. And as discussed above, the charge is best read as directed
        only at the Northport facility.
             Third, the EEOC asserts that it was not required to identify
        ENA’s address, if unknown, and therefore the inclusion of the
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13799

        Northport address is irrelevant. But here, the EEOC did include an
        address—the address for the Northport facility. 9
              Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        holding that EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility.
             (b) Whether companywide data is relevant to a charge specific
                 to the Northport location
                We turn next to the EEOC’s relevance argument. The
        EEOC subpoenaed information on every attendance-related
        termination at all ENA facilities, irrespective of the terminated
        employees’ disability status or potential entitlement to FMLA
        leave. Below, and on appeal, the EEOC contends that, even if the
        charge is directed solely at the Northport facility, the nationwide
        data is still relevant to the charge, given the expansive definition of
        relevance in the Supreme Court’s decisions and the fact that ENA’s
        attendance policy “appears” to apply to all its United States
        facilities. It claims that nationwide information would “allow the
        EEOC to identify any individuals ENA discharged following

        9 The dissent claims that the EEOC“[l]isting the facility address [on the charge]
        merely provides contact information, nothing more.” But, again, the
        regulation calls for “[t]he full name and contact information of the person
        against whom the charge was made, if known.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2). If
        the EEOC intended to charge ENA nationwide, it could have included the
        contact information for other facilities or ENA’s headquarters in Novi,
        Michigan.
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        21-13799                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        disability-related absences.” We disagree that the information is
        relevant to the charge against the Northport facility.10

        10 On appeal, for the first time, the EEOC asserts that nationwide information
        is relevant to a Northport-specific charge because it will provide comparative
        data to help the EEOC determine whether the alleged discrimination is a result
        of specific managers or a broader policy and, based on that determination,
        fashion appropriate relief. The EEOC further asserts that comparing data
        related to all employees discharged for attendance infractions, from all of
        ENA’s facilities, would help the EEOC determine whether ENA's Northport
        facility improperly characterizes disability-related absences as "attendance
        occurrences." But the EEOC failed to raise these arguments below and,
        therefore, the EEOC has waived these arguments on appeal. See Access Now,
        Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2004) (collecting
        cases for the proposition that, generally, arguments raised for the first time on
        appeal will not be considered by this Court); see also E.E.O.C. v. TriCore
        Reference Labs., 849 F.3d 929, 942 (10th Cir. 2017) (“The problem for the
        EEOC is that it did not present these relevance arguments in district court. It
        has thus failed to meet its burden of explaining how [its] request would offer
        information relevant to [the] charge.”).
                 Even if we were to consider it, the EEOC’s argument here is
        unconvincing. Specifically, the EEOC argues that “several” of our sister
        circuits have “reversed district courts that declined to enforce EEOC
        administrative subpoenas seeking information beyond the facility where the
        charge allegations arose, where the charge’s allegations implicated a
        companywide policy.” In support, the EEOC cites to cases from three of our
        sister circuits, appearing to allude that a decision to the contrary would create
        a circuit split. We first note that because the question of whether requested
        information is relevant to an underlying EEOC charge is a fact-specific inquiry,
        we are not creating a circuit split.
                 Regardless, each of these cases are distinguishable. First, the EEOC
        cites to E.E.O.C. v. Kronos Inc., 620 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2010), where the Third
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        20                          Opinion of the Court                       21-13799

                 The relevance of the material requested is linked to the
        scope of the Commission’s charge against the employer. See 42
        U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (“In connection with any investigation of a
        charge,” the EEOC “shall at all reasonable times have access
        to . . . any evidence” that “relates to unlawful employment
        practices covered by [the ADAAA] and is relevant to the charge
        under investigation.” (emphasis added)). Unlike other federal

        Circuit held that a subpoena requesting nationwide information was relevant.
        Id. at 300. But Kronos is distinguishable, as the EEOC there had previously
        issued a notice expanding the charge to include “all facilities in the United
        States and its territories.” Id. at 293. In contrast, the EEOC here issued a single
        charge that specifically identified ENA’s Northport facility but never expanded
        the charge to include any other ENA facilities.
                Next, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. Randstad, 685 F.3d 433 (4th Cir.
        2012), where the Fourth Circuit held that a subpoena requesting statewide
        information was relevant. Id. at 450. But Randstad is also distinguishable, as
        the EEOC there originally sought nationwide information but voluntarily
        “narrowed the geographic scope” of the subpoena to a single state after the
        employer objected to the “nationwide scope of the subpoena.” Id. at 437–39.
        In contrast, the EEOC here is seeking nationwide information and has not
        indicated any plans to voluntarily cut the scope of its subpoena.
                Finally, the EEOC cites to E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 587
        F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2009), where the Second Circuit held that a subpoena seeking
        nationwide information was relevant. Id. at 140. But United Parcel Service is
        distinguishable as well, as the employee there who submitted the charge
        alleged that the company had a “pattern or a practice” of unlawful
        employment actions, which applied nationwide to all company facilities. Id.
        at 137–38. In contrast, and as discussed above, supra, the EEOC’s charge here
        did not suggest that unlawful employment practices were occurring anywhere
        but ENA’s Northport facility.
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        21-13799                Opinion of the Court                        21

        agencies with “plenary authority to demand records” relevant to
        their jurisdiction, “the EEOC’s investigative authority is tied to
        charges filed with the Commission.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 64. The
        EEOC is therefore entitled “only to evidence ‘relevant to the
        charge under investigation’” and may not exercise “unconstrained
        investigative authority.” Id. at 64–65 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)).
        The Supreme Court has broadly construed the term “relevant” to
        mean “virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
        against the employer.” Id. at 68–69. But it also cautioned against
        so “generously constru[ing] the term ‘relevant,’” as to render the
        statutory relevancy requirement “a nullity.” Id.
               “The decision whether evidence sought is relevant requires
        the district court to evaluate the relationship between the
        particular materials sought and the particular matter under
        investigation—an analysis variable in relation to the nature,
        purposes and scope of the inquiry.” McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1167–68
        (quotation omitted). The relevance inquiry is “generally not
        amenable to broad per se rules” but is the “kind of fact-intensive,
        close call[] better suited to resolution by the district court than the
        court of appeals.” Id. at 1168 (quotation omitted).
                As discussed above, the EEOC issued a charge against a
        single facility, based on the complaint of a single employee, about
        a specific kind of attendance-related discrimination: penalizing
        employees for taking FMLA-protected absences. Yet the EEOC
        requested information from every ENA facility in the country on
        all attendance-related terminations regardless of the terminated-
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13799

        employees’ disability-status or entitlement to FMLA leave. Why
        ENA fired other employees at other facilities for any attendance-
        related reason is simply not relevant to whether the Northport
        facility engaged in ADAAA discrimination in administering its
        attendance policy. Holding that such an incredibly broad subpoena
        for such information was “relevant” to the charge against ENA’s
        Northport facility would construe that term so broadly as to render
        it a “nullity.” See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 694.
                Our decision in Royal Caribbean Cruises supports our
        decision here that the EEOC’s demands for nationwide
        information are not relevant to the charged conduct. In that case,
        an employee filed a charge 11 with the EEOC against Royal
        Caribbean, alleging ADA discrimination when it refused to renew
        his contract after a medical diagnosis. 771 F.3d at 759. The EEOC
        ultimately issued an administrative subpoena requesting a “[l]ist
        [of] all employees who were discharged or whose contracts were
        not renewed [from August 25, 2009, through present] due to a

        11 The dissent attempts to distinguish Royal Caribbean by noting that the
        charge there was made by an individual rather than by the Commissioner, as
        is the case here. But the statute establishing the EEOC’s enforcement
        authority allows for a charge to be filed by either “a person claiming to be
        aggrieved[] or by a member of the Commission” and does not otherwise
        distinguish any of the enforcement procedures based on who originally filed
        the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Further, while the operative charge here
        was the Commissioner’s charge, this investigation began after White, an
        individual, filed an EEOC charge alleging discriminatory conduct in violation
        of the ADA, just like the individual in Royal Caribbean. 771 F.3d at 759.
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        21-13799               Opinion of the Court                      23

        medical reason.” Id. (third alteration in original). We explained
        that the subpoena was improperly “aimed at discovering members
        of a potential class of employees or applicants who suffered from a
        pattern or practice of discrimination, rather than fleshing out [the
        complaining employee’s] charge.” Id. at 760–61. Rejecting the
        EEOC’s broad request for information, we held
              The relevance that is necessary to support a subpoena
              for the investigation of an individual charge is
              relevance to the contested issues that must be decided
              to resolve that charge, not relevance to issues that
              may be contested when and if future charges are
              brought by others.

        Id. at 761. We also explained that the EEOC’s arguments in that
        case, much like their arguments on appeal in this case, “amounted
        to simply parroting the Supreme Court’s statement that [relevant
        information was] information [that] ‘might cast light on the
        allegations’ against [Royal Caribbean].” Id. at 761 (quoting Shell
        Oil, 466 U.S. at 69).
               The EEOC appears to be litigating this case much like it did
        in Royal Caribbean. For one, as mentioned above, the EEOC’s
        arguments amount, almost exclusively, to pointing to the broad
        conception of relevance discussed in Shell Oil. But as we noted in
        Royal Caribbean, the Supreme Court also cautioned against
        reading the relevance requirement so broadly as to render it a
        “nullity.” Id. at 760 (quoting Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69).
        Accepting the EEOC’s arguments would do just that.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                21-13799

               We therefore hold that the EEOC’s request for nationwide
        information was not relevant to its charge against ENA’s
        Northport facility. When it issued its original charge against ENA’s
        Northport facility, the EEOC put ENA on notice of the alleged
        discriminatory practices at that one facility and gave ENA an
        opportunity to comply with the investigation and rectify the
        targeted practices. As it targeted the Northport facility, the
        EEOC’s charge did not, however, provide notice of an
        investigation into ENA’s facilities nationwide. No one disputes
        that the EEOC could have amended this charge prior to issuing the
        administrative subpoena to put ENA on notice of a nationwide
        investigation—but the EEOC did not do so.
              Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
        enforcing the EEOC’s subpoena of information only as to the
        Northport facility. We affirm.
              AFFIRMED.
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        21-13799                   WILSON, J., dissenting                               1

        WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
               I disagree that this case presents an opportunity to limit an
        agency’s investigatory powers. This subpoena falls well within the
        Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
        investigatory power, and the charge before us raises no compelling
        reason to disturb the longstanding latitude the Supreme Court has
        afforded EEOC investigations.1
               The Supreme Court has clearly explained, “[a] district
        court’s role in an EEOC subpoena enforcement proceeding . . . is a
        straightforward one.” McLane Co., Inc. v. E.E.O.C., 581 U.S. __;
        137 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2017). “[W]hen a court is asked to enforce a
        Commission subpoena, its responsibility is to satisfy itself that the
        charge is valid and that the material requested is relevant to the
        charge . . . .” Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990)
        (internal quotation marks omitted). The court “should do so
        cognizant of the ‘generous’ construction that courts have given the
        term ‘relevant.’” McLane, 127 S. Ct. at 1165 (alteration adopted).
        “If the charge is proper and the material requested is relevant, the

        1 The interpretation of an EEOC charge is a question of law that we review
        de novo. Cf. Flagship Marine Servs., Inc. v. Belcher Towing Co., 966 F.2d 602,
        604 (11th Cir. 1992); see also E.E.O.C. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols. U.S.A., Inc.,
        639 F.3d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The interpretation of an EEOC charge
        presents a question of law that we review de novo . . . .”); Smith v. Cheyenne
        Ret. Invs. L.P., 904 F.3d 1159, 1164 n.1 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he interpretation
        of the scope of an EEOC charge from the face of the charge itself . . . is best
        viewed as a legal issue reviewed de novo.”).
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        2                      WILSON, J., dissenting               21-13799

        district court should enforce the subpoena unless the employer
        establishes that the subpoena is ‘too indefinite,’ has been issued for
        an ‘illegitimate purpose,’ or is unduly burdensome.” Id.
              Despite the Supreme Court’s generous construction of
        subpoena validity and relevance, the majority opinion constrains
        the EEOC’s investigation on two grounds: first, by limiting the
        geographic scope of the charge to the address listed therein, and
        second, by finding the nationwide information sought irrelevant. I
        address each argument in turn.
                                         I.
                The majority opinion places undue weight on the facility
        address listed on the charge, concluding that it alone restricts the
        geographic scope of the investigation to the Northport Alabama
        facility. While an EEOC charge must include, among other things,
        “the full name and contact information of the person against whom
        the charge is made,” the charge is not required to list an address.
        29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(2). Instead, a respondent’s address must
        only be included “if known,” which suggests that an employer’s
        address is not necessary to complete a valid charge nor is it
        determinative of a charge’s substance. See id.
                The employer charged with unlawful conduct here is
        “Eberspacher [sic] North America, Inc.” (ENA), not Eberspaecher
        Northport, Alabama. The charge does not list the Northport
        facility as the employer, nor does it address the Northport facility
        as if it were a separate legal entity. The only Northport-specific
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        21-13799                 WILSON, J., dissenting                            3

        language included within the charge is the address associated with
        the Northport location. To suggest that the inclusion of this single
        address limits the charge to this single facility turns a blind eye to
        basic notions of corporate structure and a plain reading of the
        charge. ENA, like many corporations, has multiple locations
        nationwide and consequently multiple addresses. ENA is a single
        legal entity with no parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates. 2 Despite
        each facility having a unique address, an address alone does not
        create a separate “entity” or “employer” as the district court and
        majority seem to suggest. Listing the facility address merely
        provides contact information, nothing more. See 29 C.F.R. §
        1601.12(a)(2); see also id. § 1601.12(b) (providing that
        “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a)” a charge is
        sufficient if it identifies the parties, and “may be amended to cure
        technical defects or omissions”).
               Rather than fixate on the address, a far more natural reading
        of the charge reveals that the EEOC sought to investigate a pattern-
        or-practice charge against ENA nationwide. The charge refers to

        2 When asked whether he represents Eberspaecher North America or
        Eberspaecher Northport, the appellee’s attorney replied that he represents
        “Eberspaecher North America, Inc.” because it is “one corporate entity.” Oral
        Argument at 12:50, E.E.O.C. v. Eberspaecher N. Am., Inc., No-13799 (11th
        Cir. Aug. 10, 2022), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
        recordings?title=21-
        13799&field_oar_case_name_value=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5B
        value%5D%5Byear%5D=&field_oral_argument_date_value%5Bvalue%5D
        %5Bmonth%5D=.
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        4                         WILSON, J., dissenting                   21-13799

        ENA’s “unlawful discriminatory practices” and directly references
        ENA’s “practices and the employee handbook” that applies
        nationwide. Further, the charge states that “[t]he aggrieved
        individuals include all employees who have, have been, or might
        in the future be adversely affected by the unlawful employment
        practices set forth in the” charge (emphasis added). As the district
        court reasoned, “the commissioner must . . . stat[e] her intent
        within the four corners of the charge.” It is plainly clear that
        located within the four corners of the charge is the intent to
        investigate ENA nationwide.
                                             II.
               Next, the majority contends that the nationwide data sought
        by the EEOC is irrelevant to the Commissioner’s charge. Although
        the EEOC is limited to accessing relevant information, the
        Supreme Court has held “[t]hat limitation on the [EEOC’s]
        investigative authority is not especially constraining.” E.E.O.C. v.
        Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984). The term “relevant” has been
        construed broadly, and courts “have afforded the [EEOC] access to
        virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations
        against the employer.” Id. at 68–69. An individual charge3 may

        3 In general, the charge “process begins with the filing of a charge with the
        EEOC alleging that a given employer has engaged in an unlawful employment
        practice. A charge may be filed by an aggrieved individual or by a member of
        the Commission.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 62. An EEOC Commissioner may file
        a charge herself if she “has reason to think that an employer has engaged in a
        ‘pattern or practice’ of discriminatory conduct.” Id.
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        21-13799              WILSON, J., dissenting                     5

        be limited to investigating the individual employee’s claim in that
        instance. E.E.O.C. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 771 F.3d 757,
        761–62 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding an individual charge
        improperly overbroad where it sought to discover a potential class
        of employees or applicants who suffered from a pattern or practice
        of discrimination within the company rather than limit the charge
        to the individual employee’s allegation).
               The information related to ENA’s allegedly unlawful
        employment practices nationwide is, under any construction of the
        term, relevant to the EEOC’s investigation. The type and scale of
        information sought here to investigate an alleged discriminatory
        pattern and practice spanning multiple facilities nationwide is
        certainly the type of material “that might cast light on the
        allegations against the employer.” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68–69. I
        see no reason to stifle the broad investigatory power clearly laid
        out by the Supreme Court. Additionally, our logic in Royal
        Caribbean is inapplicable here. In Royal Caribbean, the only
        charge at issue was an individual charge investigating an alleged
        ADA violation by the employer against a single employee. 771 F.3d
        at 759–60. The charge here is the Commissioner’s charge, not Mr.
        White’s individual charge, seeking to discover whether ENA’s
        policy (which applies to all ENA employees nationwide) is
        discriminatory.      Unlike in Royal Caribbean, where the
        companywide information was irrelevant to an individual charge,
        the companywide information sought here by the Commissioner
        is clearly relevant to this companywide investigation.
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        6                     WILSON, J., dissenting              21-13799

        Furthermore, we have previously contemplated the precise case
        before us, as we suggested in Royal Caribbean that “[t]he
        Commission has the ability to file a Commissioner’s charge
        alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination that could support
        a request for [companywide information].” 771 F.3d at 762. As we
        suggested then, and we should hold now, ENA companywide
        information is relevant to the allegation of pattern-and-practice
        discrimination.
              Because I would hold that the EEOC satisfied its
        requirement to create a valid charge seeking relevant information
        and would therefore reverse the district court, I dissent.