Court Opinion

ID: 9383144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 18:00:36.240532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.907219
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60227    Document: 00516692912       Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/29/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                              ____________
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                                No. 22-60227
                              Summary Calendar                          FILED
                              ____________                        March 29, 2023
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
   Omar Khayyam Humphrey,                                               Clerk

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                    versus

   Pelicia Hall, Commissioner of Mississipi Department of Corrections
   (MDOC); Joe Errington, Superintendent; Joshua Csaszar,
   Warden; Joseph Cooley, Director/Investigator II of Administrative
   Remedy Program South Mississippi Correctional Institution; Regina Reed,
   Deputy Warden; Penny Bufkin, Director of Security Threat Group South
   Mississippi Correctional Institution; James Cooksey, Director of
   Corrections Investigation Division (CID) South Mississippi Correctional
   Institution; Sheneice Hartfield-Evans, Captain Area 2 South
   Mississippi Correctional Institution; Roylandia McBride, Correction
   Officer South Mississippi Correctional Institution; Andrew Mills, Chief
   of Security South Mississippi Correctional Institution; Adrian Keys, K-9
   Unit Officer and John Does South Mississippi Correctional Institution;
   Richard Pennington, MDOC Director of Administrative Remedy
   Program (ARP) MSP,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Southern District of Mississippi
                           USDC No. 1:19-CV-362
                 ______________________________
Case: 22-60227         Document: 00516692912             Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/29/2023

                                          No. 22-60227

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Omar Khayyam Humphrey, Mississippi prisoner # R3755, an inmate
   confined at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI), appeals
   the summary judgment dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit asserting
   a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Humphrey briefs no argument
   challenging the district court’s denial of his request for injunctive relief in the
   form of a transfer, the dismissal of his claims against SMCI medical staff for
   failure to state a claim, the dismissal of his claims against all of the SMCI
   defendants save Mississippi Department of Corrections Commissioner
   Pelicia Hall due to his failure to exhaust under § 1997e(a), the dismissal of his
   claims against Commissioner Hall in her official capacity as barred by the
   Eleventh Amendment, or the dismissal of his claims against her in her
   individual capacity seeking compensatory damages for lack of any physical
   injury under § 1997e(e). Consequently, he has abandoned such arguments.
   See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Brinkmann
   v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Only
   Humphrey’s challenge to the dismissal of his claim for punitive damages
   against Commissioner Hall in her individual capacity alleging that she was
   deliberately indifferent to the conditions caused by understaffing at SMCI
   has been properly preserved on appeal and is subject to this court’s review.
          We review the summary judgment dismissal of that claim de novo.
   Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011).
   Because the defendants asserted the defense of qualified immunity, the usual
   summary judgment burden is altered; after the defense was pleaded, the
   burden shifted to Humphrey to show that the defense was unavailable. King

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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   v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016). In determining whether
   qualified immunity applies, the court reviews: (1) whether the plaintiff has
   alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right
   was clearly established at the time of the violation. Brumfield v. Hollins,
   551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).
          Summary judgment dismissal was proper because Humphrey failed to
   establish that Commissioner Hall violated his constitutional rights. The
   summary judgment evidence did not show that Commissioner Hall was
   deliberately indifferent to the conditions caused by understaffing at SMCI.
   Rather, Humphrey’s own allegations, testimony, and summary-judgment
   evidence showed that Commissioner Hall was not indifferent to the staffing
   problem, instead was taking active measures to abate it by requesting more
   money from the state legislature to increase officers’ starting salaries, which
   request was denied, and by creating a training program for potential recruits.
   Humphrey does not challenge the district court’s conclusion on this point,
   arguing only that Commissioner Hall’s attempt to request more funding did
   not excuse her from failing to maintain a minimum level of safety. However,
   he misapprehends the showing required to establish a constitutional
   violation. Even if her response was not perfect or adequate, the relevant
   inquiry is whether she was aware of a known risk of harm, then disregarded
   that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844-45 (1994); Cleveland
   v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019). As the district court determined,
   because Humphrey did not point to any evidence showing that additional
   staffing or funding was available and Commissioner Hall failed to put it to use
   or that she exhibited deliberate indifference in making, or failing to make,
   a policy to address the issue, he failed to show a violation of his Eighth
   Amendment rights, and summary judgment was appropriate. See Farmer,
   511 U.S. at 837, 844-45, 847; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991);
   Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 676.

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                                    No. 22-60227

          Humphrey next argues that the district court erred in denying his
   motion for the appointment of counsel. We review the denial of appointment
   of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 126
   (5th Cir. 2007). “A civil rights complainant has no right to the automatic
   appointment of counsel.” Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.
   1982). Appointment is warranted only upon a showing of exceptional
   circumstances. Id.
          The district court correctly determined that Humphrey’s claims were
   not overly complex and that his numerous pleadings and presentation of his
   claims demonstrated that he was capable of investigating and presenting his
   case with clarity. See Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213. Moreover, the case was
   resolved on summary judgment and did not involve any conflicting testimony
   requiring a skilled legal professional. See id. Although Humphrey argues that
   he needed appointed counsel to satisfy the requirements to obtain class
   certification given that his pro se status automatically disqualified him from
   meeting the adequacy-of-representation element, his request for class
   certification did not automatically entitle him to appointed counsel. See
   Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 213. Moreover, as discussed below, Humphrey failed to
   meet other prerequisites for such certification. He has not demonstrated any
   abuse of discretion on the district court’s part in denying his request for
   counsel. See Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 126; Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 212-13.
          Next, Humphrey challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
   for discovery, seeking documents or notes Commissioner Hall possessed
   relating to her participation in a panel on prison reform in which he asserts
   that experts opined that the Mississippi prison system is fundamentally
   flawed and that gangs were running prisons. This court reviews the denial of
   discovery requests for an abuse of discretion. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
   v. DataTreasury Corp., 936 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2019). Even if a district

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                                      No. 22-60227

   court abuses its discretion in denying discovery, this court will not overturn
   the ruling unless it substantially affects the rights of the appellant. Id. at 256.
          Here, the district court implicitly determined that the documents that
   Humphrey sought were not relevant to his claims. Humphrey’s mere desire
   to have the requested information is insufficient to show an abuse of
   discretion on the district court’s part. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
   936 F.3d at 255-56. Even assuming that the documents he sought existed and
   contained the conclusions he describes, they would tend to show only that
   Commissioner Hall was aware of the understaffing issue, which information
   was already contained in the numerous articles Humphrey submitted in
   support of his motion for summary judgment, meaning that the documents
   were cumulative of the information he already possessed. Humphrey does
   not assert that the documents had any bearing on Commissioner Hall’s
   attempts to relieve the understaffing problem, as also described in the articles
   he submitted, or would support an assertion that she exhibited deliberate
   indifference in failing to take steps to address the issue. Thus, he cannot
   show that the denial of the requested documents prejudiced him or affected
   his substantial rights. See id. at 256.
          Humphrey additionally argues that the district court erred in denying
   his motion for class certification. As noted above, he complains that because
   the district court denied him appointed counsel, it deprived him of the ability
   to meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) by forcing him to
   proceed pro se, automatically disqualifying him from being able to
   demonstrate the requisite adequacy of representation.
          We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.
   Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,
   380 (5th Cir. 2007). Class certification requires plaintiffs to satisfy four
   requirements under Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity, meaning that the class must

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   be “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”;
   (2) commonality, meaning that there must be “questions of law or fact
   common to the class”; (3) typicality, or that the claims or defenses of the
   representative parties must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the
   class”; and (4) adequacy of representation, meaning that the representative
   parties must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 1 Fed.
   R. Civ. P. 23(a); see In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 414-15
   (5th Cir. 2004).
           Humphrey’s request for class certification fails at the first hurdle
   because he has not demonstrated the requisite numerosity. He identified a
   putative class of 12 inmates, each of whom was identified by name and each
   of whom were housed in the same prison. Joinder of the 12 named inmates
   was not impracticable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Further, as the district
   court determined, even construing his pleadings as raising the argument that
   the 12 named members were representatives of the class of all non-gang
   members at SMCI, by his own estimate, the putative class would be
   composed of 20 non-gang-member inmates, 12 of whom had already been
   identified and all of whom were housed at SMCI, meaning that the remainder
   could be located with relative ease. Joinder of such a small number of inmates
   housed in the same location was thus not impracticable, and the district court
   did not err in determining that numerosity was not established. See Ibe
   v. Jones, 836 F.3d 516, 528 (5th Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); see also
   Ward v. Kelly, 476 F.2d 963, 964 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. In re: TWL Corp.,
   712 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 2012).

           _____________________
           1
            In addition to meeting these four prerequisites, plaintiffs must meet one of the
   additional requirements listed under Rule 23(b), which issue need not be reached here as
   Humphrey’s motion for class certification fails to meet the initial requirements of Rule
   23(a). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

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                                    No. 22-60227

          Humphrey briefs no argument challenging the district court’s findings
   with respect to numerosity. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224-25; Brinkmann,
   813 F.2d at 748. Inasmuch as he now asserts that, had he been appointed
   counsel, he could have proved that there are 1,200 to 1,300 non-gang-
   affiliated inmates at SMCI, which would have been sufficient to satisfy
   numerosity, the argument was not raised before the district court, and this
   court will not consider it. See Martinez v. Pompeo, 977 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir.
   2020); see also Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir.
   1999). Because Humphrey fails at the first step by failing to demonstrate
   numerosity, he cannot establish an abuse of discretion on the district court’s
   part in denying his motion for class certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a);
   see also Regents of Univ. of Cal., 482 F.3d at 380. We therefore need not reach
   his remaining arguments challenging the district court’s findings as to the
   other Rule 23(a) factors. See Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobile, Corp.,
   461 F.3d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 2006).
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.

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