Court Opinion

ID: 9940353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 01:02:00.925055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:47.794241
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 In re A.S. CA1/2

                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION TWO

 In re A.S. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
 SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                            A168584
 v.
                                                               (Sonoma County
 P.S.,
                                                               Super. Ct. Nos. 6459, 6460)
          Defendant and Appellant.

         Paulina S. appeals the termination of her parental rights concerning
her now four-and-a-half-year-old daughter A.S. and now three-year-old son
G.S.
         She raises a single issue on appeal. She asserts that during a hearing
at which the juvenile court scheduled a second hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 (after having granted reconsideration of its
initial section 366.26 ruling terminating her parental rights), the juvenile
court gave her “false legal assurances” it would not terminate her parental
rights but then did so at the second section 366.26 hearing. She asserts this

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prejudiced her, because she did not attend the new section 366.26 hearing
and had she done so, she could have presented evidence to establish the
existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship and prevent the
termination of her parental rights (see generally In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).
      Mother’s sole claim of legal error is not supported by the record. We
will affirm the order terminating her parental rights.
                             BACKGROUND
      A.S. and G.S. were removed from mother’s custody at ages two years
and ten months, respectively, because of severe domestic violence perpetrated
against mother by G.S.’s father for at least ten months that resulted in his
arrest. Both he and mother struggled with methamphetamine use, although
at the time mother claimed to have been sober for over two years. The
children were placed together in the home of mother’s sister and brother-in-
law where they would remain throughout the proceedings. The juvenile court
sustained allegations the children were at risk due to mother’s inability to
protect them from exposure to domestic violence and serious emotional
damage and inability to provide for their support. Mother received 14
months of reunification services but was unable to reunify with her children,
principally because she had not consistently engaged in services and had
stopped submitting to drug testing.
      The court held a section 366.26 hearing on June 15, 2023, at which
point the children were ages four and two. The section 366.26 report filed by
the Sonoma County Human Services Department (“the Department”)
recommended terminating parental rights to free the children for adoption by
their aunt and uncle. The couple was committed to raising them, and the

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children had been doing extremely well in their relatives’ care and had
become emotionally attached to them.
      Mother was not present at the section 366.26 hearing. Mother’s
counsel stated she had no direction from mother, and asked for a continuance
so she could confer with mother “as to whether or not she would object” to the
termination of her parental rights “given that she does satisfy, at least under
Caden C., she’s had consistent and regular visitation,” but “I don’t know the
bond.” A question was raised as to whether mother had received proper
notice of the hearing, following which the court announced its intention to
proceed, adopted the findings and orders, terminated her parental rights over
both children, ordered adoption as the permanent plan and calendared a
permanent plan hearing.
      Ten days later, mother filed a written motion for reconsideration
asking the court to reconsider its order and set the matter for a contested
section 366.26 so that she could put on unspecified evidence, arguing she did
not receive proper notice of the hearing.
      The court calendared mother’s reconsideration motion for a hearing,
which took place on July 6, 2023, and mother attended. This is the hearing
at which the juvenile court made comments that are the basis of mother’s
appeal, and so we summarize it in some detail to provide context.
      The July 6, 2023 reconsideration hearing opened with the court asking
mother about her present relationship with her sister (the children’s
caregiver) and some recent conflict between them. Mother explained their
conflict had been resolved and that she had resumed supervised visitation
with the children.

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      The court then turned to the subject of mother’s reconsideration
motion, and in the following quoted portions of the record we italicize the
comments to which mother now objects:
      “THE COURT: All right. So you’ve been in this process now for quite a
while and you’re asking me to reconsider what should happen with your
children. [¶] Now as your attorney will tell you, . . . , legally I cannot return
your children to you. That is not within what the Legislature says I can do at
this hearing. [¶] So the Legislature said there’s only three things that I can
do. I can free the children for adoption, I can have the children in a
guardianship or they can be in foster care until they turn 18. [¶] Being in
foster care is usually not a good option, especially for younger children. The
law states that I have to start at adoption. And only if I rule out adoption can
I move to a guardianship.
      “So for the adoption, the question is, are your children adoptable? You
did—you raised good children, so your children are loving, kind kids, so
there’s no shortage of people that would like to adopt them. [¶] So that’s
there, they’re adoptable. [¶] . . . I think your sister is willing to adopt. Again,
legally you can’t have the children, so your sister’s willing to adopt, your
children are adoptable and adoption is the best plan.
      “So in order to free your children for adoption, I have to terminate your
parental rights but note the words I used. I have to terminate your parental
rights, but you are mom. I can’t—I can’t change that. I wouldn’t want to
change that. [¶] You’re mom, you’re always going to be mom, but legally your
children can be adopted and the auntie can also be a mom. That’s the adopted
mom. You have the adopted mom. You have the biological mom. So you’re
both mothers. I can’t and wouldn’t terminate your right that you’re mother
because you are. There’s no doubt about that. [¶] But the law requires that if

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your children are adoptable, someone wants to adopt them, I have to go down
that road, absent a legal exception, and we don’t see any here.
      ‘So that’s kind of where we are. I know that’s not what you want it to
be, but legally, that’s what I have to do.”
      The court solicited the views of counsel for the minors and the
Department, both of whom supported terminating parental rights to allow
the adoption to go forward.
      The court then told mother, “So . . . that’s where we are,” told mother
she could confer with her counsel “and I will listen to you,” and that “I would
listen to witnesses that you want me to hear.” The court reiterated that its
three options were either adoption, guardianship or foster care, and
reiterated that “but again, legally, I have to go with adoption unless there’s
some reason I can’t and I don’t know of any reasons why I can’t and because I
can, the Legislature says I must.”
      The court then instructed mother’s counsel to confer with her and a
brief recess was taken.
      After the recess, mother’s counsel raised the reconsideration motion
and reiterated that mother had not received notice of the prior hearing. The
court indicated it had granted the motion (“We’ve moved past that”).
Mother’s counsel was then asked about mother’s wishes and a colloquy
ensued about holding an evidentiary hearing1:
      “THE COURT: What does mom want to do?
      “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Mom would like a 26, contested 26 hearing
where she can put on evidence.
      “THE COURT: What evidence does she want to put on?

      1   We italicize portions of this colloquy.

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       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: I believe the evidence will show she has
been consistently visiting the children, which is one of the elements for, you
know, for a 26, all right. [¶] In terms of we’re going for the parent bond
exception, all right?
       “[THE COURT]: Okay. And how often does your client visit with the
children?
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: I believe weekly.
       “THE COURT: And for how long?
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: A long time.
       “THE COURT: We look at how young the children were when they
came into the system. I would love to hear from mother about the bond that
she has with her children and if we should or should not terminate that bond
by terminating her parental rights. [¶] Do you have questions for the social
worker?
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: I would think so.
       “THE COURT: I don’t know. You’re the one contesting the case.
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Well I think—the answer is yes, she would
like to have a voice. She feels like—
       “THE COURT: I am just asking. I am already granting the hearing.
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Are we having the hearing now or going
forward?
       “THE COURT: I am granting. I am going to set a hearing. I need to
figure out how much time I need for the hearing. I know mom wants to
testify.
       “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Mom wants to testify.”
       Mother’s counsel stated she didn’t know what evidence mother would
want to present, including whether mother would ask the social worker to

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testify, and thus was unable to give a time estimate for the contested
hearing. Accordingly, the court calendared it for a one-half day hearing 11
days later, on July 24th, 2023.
        Mother did not attend the second section 366.26 hearing on July 24. At
that subsequent hearing, the court stated it had granted her motion for
reconsideration and had been “looking forward to hearing from mom today
about her position as to the level and nature of the visits.”
        Mother’s counsel reported he had not been able to contact mother,
acknowledged she had been present and noticed for the hearing and did not
know why she was not present. The social worker was present but not called
as a witness. After brief comments from counsel for the minors and counsel
for the Department, and no further comments from mother’s counsel, the
juvenile court adopted findings and orders a second time terminating
mother’s parental rights and ordering adoption as the children’s permanent
plan.
                                  DISCUSSION
        Mother now timely appeals, arguing that the juvenile court committed
legal error by falsely assuring her at the July 6, 2023 reconsideration hearing
that it would not terminate her parental rights but then did so at the
subsequent section 366.26 hearing, which she contends prejudiced her
because “had [she] been present, she could have proved the affirmative
defense to terminating [her parental] rights” under Caden C.2 The parties
agree mother satisfied the regular visitation element of this exception. And
mother contends that “with additional testimony, [she] could have proved”

        We presume the parties’ familiarity with the elements of the
        2

beneficial parent-child exception, which is accurately discussed in the
briefing.

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the other two elements as well, which examine the nature and strength of the
children’s attachment to her and the potential detriment of severing that
relationship.
      Mother’s claim of legal error is not supported by the record.
      The court did not assure her it would not terminate her parental rights.
It repeatedly told her that it intended to do so unless she persuaded it to do
otherwise. The court said so in a preface to the very comments she now
challenges as having misled her. It began those comments by telling her: “So
in order to free your children for adoption, I have to terminate your parental
rights but note the words I used. I have to terminate your parental rights, but
you are mom. I can’t—I can’t change that.” It then told her that even though
it couldn’t and wouldn’t terminate her “right” as a “biological mom,” “absent a
legal exception” it would have to order adoption as the children’s permanent
plan. After mother conferred with her counsel and then asked for an
evidentiary hearing, the court again told her that it would be deciding
whether to terminate her parental rights, explaining: ”I would love to hear
from mother about the bond that she has with her children and if we should
or should not terminate that bond by terminating her parental rights.” In
context, the comments mother points to as an assurance the court would not
terminate her parental rights were simply an expression of the court’s
recognition of her status as a biological parent.
      The unstated premise of mother’s argument also is not supported by
the record. Her appellate claim, although not expressly stated, is that the
juvenile court misled her into believing that it was unnecessary for her to
attend the second 366.26 hearing held on July 24, 2023, and put on any
further evidence to avoid the termination of her parental rights, and
therefore she did not attend that second hearing.

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      In the first place, any such assumption on mother’s part was
unreasonable. She asked for a do-over of the section 366.26 hearing, because
she had not attended the first one. The whole point of her request was to
enable her to contest the termination of her parental rights including by
putting on evidence. Her reconsideration motion stated she “wanted to have
the opportunity to present evidence and contest the ruling” terminating her
parental rights. Thus her motion asked “the court to reconsider its order and
put the matter on for a contested .26 hearing.” Her motion elaborated: “if
[mother] had been properly noticed and appeared [at the initial section
366.26 hearing], she would have contested the termination and a date [would
have been] set for a contested 366.26 hearing. Given that a little over a week
has passed, the court could grant this motion for reconsideration and set a
calendar date which would be the same time more or less as if the court had
set it last week.” The motion concluded by asking the court to “reconsider its
previous denial of Mother’s request for a contested hearing pursuant to
section 366.26.”
      Mother’s unstated premise that she assumed it would be unnecessary
for her to attend the July 24 hearing is also defied by the record. After the
court made the comments that supposedly misled her, she conferred with her
lawyer off the record and then her lawyer told the court—twice—that mother
wanted a contested section 366.26 hearing to put on evidence. In response the
juvenile court told mother it wanted her to testify, and also repeatedly said it
knew mother wanted to testify. It was on that basis the juvenile court
granted counsel’s request for a contested evidentiary hearing and scheduled a
half-day hearing. At no time did mother or her counsel express any
misunderstanding about the scope of the contested hearing the court had

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calendared. On the contrary, as explained, they were the ones who requested
it.
      Because the record does not support mother’s claim of legal error, we
could end our analysis there. But given the weighty interests at stake when
a juvenile court terminates parental rights, interests that mother stresses
throughout her briefing and with which we agree, we also comment briefly on
additional reasons we must affirm the court’s order terminating parental
rights.
      One is that, even if we agreed the record showed that the court gave
mother false promises it would not terminate her parental rights at the
July 24 hearing, mother hasn’t presented us with any legal basis to disturb
the order terminating her rights. She does not cite or discuss any legal
authority authorizing an appellate court to reverse an order terminating
parental rights on such a basis. The precise nature of the claimed error is not
even clear: for example, she makes no claim that her due process rights were
in any way impaired by what transpired at the July 6 reconsideration
hearing, she requested the July 24 hearing, and she had actual notice of the
hearing because she was present in court when the matter was scheduled.
The absence of any legal authority supporting mother’s bid for reversal
compels us to affirm the court’s orders. That is because “[i]n order to
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some
cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ”
(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142,
146.) “Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority
other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for
appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.)

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      Mother also has failed to persuade us she was prejudiced by the court’s
comments at the July 6 hearing. She was represented at all times by counsel
who presumably advised her of the need to present evidence to contest the
termination of her parental rights, because that is what her lawyer requested
after conferring with her off the record. That alone renders any error in the
court’s prior comments harmless. In addition, despite mother’s voluntary
absence from the second hearing, the social worker, as noted, was present
and available to testify at the July 24 hearing. And finally, we have reviewed
the record and conclude that it would not support a finding in mother’s favor
on the parental benefit exception. (See In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526,
531.) The record does not show mother’s relationship with the children was
anything “more than a mere friend or playmate” (In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230). Mother clearly loves her children but the record
does not show that, by the time of the termination hearing, either child had a
“substantial, positive emotional attachment” to her or that it would be
harmful to sever their relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 632-633; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 854.) Extended discussion
is unnecessary. Mother’s assertion she could adduce additional evidence to
satisfy the exception is unexplained and contrary to the record.
                               DISPOSITION
      The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

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                                         STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MAYFIELD, J. *

In re A.S. (A168854)

     * Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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