Court Opinion

ID: 9579826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:58.964009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:48.850602
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring in result.
Kuntz v. State Highway Com’r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987), held that a person arrested for DUI has a limited statutory right to consult with a lawyer before deciding whether to submit to a chemical test. I agreed with the majority that there appeared to be no valid reason why Kuntz should not have been permitted to call his attorney before deciding whether or not to submit to the test. I nevertheless dissented because I did not agree that the violation of a statutory right should work on exclusion of the refusal so as to reverse the revocation of the license. Kuntz, supra, at 291 (Vande Walle, J., dissenting).
Since that opinion, a majority of our Court has refused to extend the holding to a case in which the driver submitted to a test, without objection, after having requested to call an attorney and being told he could call an attorney after the test. The majority observed that Kuntz did not involve suppression of evidence in an administrative hearing and limited Kuntz to its narrow issue, i.e., what constitutes a refusal to submit to the *262test. Holte v. State Highway Com’r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D.1989).
Subsequently, the Legislature has not amended the statute in this regard. Compare Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.1985) [1984 legislative amendment eliminated statutory right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing]. Presumably it has acquiesced in the holding of the majority in each instance. City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D.1994). As a result of legislative inaction and because this procedure is statutory, I have recognized the limited holding of the majority in Kuntz. See, e.g., Baillie v. Moore, 522 N.W.2d 748 (N.D.1994). Evans v. Baches, 437 N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D.1989) [Vande Walle, J., concurring in result].
The majority in Kuntz relied on section 29-05-20, NDCC, to construct the statutory right to call a lawyer before submitting to the test. If, indeed, that section, which had its origin in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1877, gives the driver a right to consult a lawyer prior to agreeing or refusing to submit to the test, in an administrative proceeding, I believe the direct statement of the Legislature in section 39-20-01, NDCC, which is concerned specifically with children taken into custody for driving under the influence, must be given more weight.
The statute plainly states that neither the law enforcement officer’s effort to contact the parents, or any consultation with the parent, may be permitted to interfere with administration of the test. But, I read those words as I do the majority’s words in Kuntz, i.e., the right to consult with a lawyer before deciding to take the test “is a qualified right which cannot be used to materially hamper the process of administering the chemical test” and that “[i]f the person arrested is unable to reach an attorney by telephone or otherwise within a reasonable time,” the person “can be required to elect between taking the test and refusing it without the aid of an attorney.” Kuntz, supra, at 290. See also Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.1974) [individual may reconsider a refusal to take test when request does not interfere with test].
Although the statutory language specifies that the failure to contact the parents and the consultation cannot interfere with the test, that language cannot relieve the officer of the duty to explain to the parents when, as here, the parent is actually contacted. Nor is the contact requirement simply to let the parent know where the child is and what the child is charged with. I agree with the majority that the requirement that the officer explain to the parent the implied consent testing requirements is for a purpose, i.e., so the parent may, in turn, consult with the child.1 Any other construction makes the requirement meaningless and the statute could as well require the officer to explain to the parent the Rule in Shelley’s Case.
While the specific requirement for children might be construed to conflict with section 39-20-05(3), NDCC, it is a specific provision that prevails over the more general provision in 39-20-05(3). E.g., Matter of Estate of Laschkewitsch, 507 N.W.2d 65 (N.D.1993).
Unlike Kuntz, the requirement that the officer notify the parent is specific and made a part of the chapter on chemical tests for intoxication. The Legislature has not rejected the majority’s conclusion in Kuntz that the refusal to take the test without the qualified opportunity to consult a lawyer is not a refusal upon which to revoke a license. Because I see no material distinction between Kuntz and this case insofar as the remedy is concerned, I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion.

. The requirement that the parent be notified of the implied consent testing requirements and given the opportunity to consult with the child may seem ineffective in view of our decision in In Interest of J.D.Z. 431 N.W.2d 272 (N.D.1988) [presence of child's parents during questioning by officer was not adequate representation of child's interests]. Furthermore, under Kuntz v. State Highway Com’r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987), the child would also be entitled to the qualified right to consult a lawyer before agreeing or refusing to take the test. The parent might advise the child to contact a lawyer for that purpose. However, the fact the parent advised the child not to submit to the test without a lawyer would not invalidate the refusal absent a request by the child to consult a lawyer, notwithstanding we carefully scrutinize a child’s waiver of constitutional and statutory rights. See 67 N.D.L.Rev. 527 (1991).