Court Opinion

ID: 9742537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:15:35.54773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.374621
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting: The majority holds that a demand identifying an unspecified and single “Du Page DUI” was sufficient under section 3 — 8—10 to demand speedy trial for multiple DUI charges in multiple cases. By doing so, it ignores the requirements of section 3 — 8—10 and established principles from our supreme court that place the burden on the defendant to make a clear and unequivocal speedy trial demand. I would determine that, because Sandoval failed to comply with the requirements of section 3 — 8—10, the speedy trial period never began to run, and I would reverse the dismissal of the charges. Accordingly, I dissent. The crux of the problem is that Sandoval had multiple DUI charges pending in two separate cases, along with additional charges in each case, yet he demanded a speedy trial for merely a single “Du Page DUI.” As a result, the State could not determine the charges to which the demand was intended to apply without conducting an investigation. By requiring the State to do so, the majority shifted the burden to the State to protect the defendant’s speedy trial rights — a burden that the State does not have under section 3 — 8—10. Section 3 — 8—10 applies the speedy trial protections of section 103 — 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103 — 5(b) (West 2004)) to defendants incarcerated in a Department of Corrections facility. It also provides additional requirements for speedy trial demands, including a statement of the charges pending against the defendant to be tried. 730 ILCS 5/3 — 8—10 (West 2004). In enacting section 3 — 8—10, the legislature acknowledged that a defendant committed to the Department retains a right to a speedy trial on untried charges, but it also recognized that the defendant’s loss of liberty is not based solely upon untried charges and instead is based on a prior conviction. People v. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d 713, 718 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that, when section 3 — 8—10 applies, the defendant bears the burden to file a demand that both complies with section 3 — 8—10 and is sufficient to put the State’s Attorney on notice that the defendant is invoking his or her speedy trial right. See People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 428 (1994); Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 718; People v. Milsap, 261 Ill. App. 3d 827, 831 (1994). The demand must be clear and unequivocal. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 429, citing People v. Howell, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1, 9 (1983). If a proper demand is not made, the 160-day speedy trial period never begins to run. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428-29. In Staten, the supreme court rejected an argument that a defendant’s section 3 — 8—10 speedy trial demand was sufficient when it was incorrectly filed under section 103 — 5(b) and omitted information about the time served, the time remaining on the sentence, and the pending charge. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 421-22. Relying in part on previous cases from this court, Staten established that, because the legislature chose to impose additional requirements on already incarcerated defendants, section 3 — 8—10 places the burden on the defendant to make a demand that complies with the statute, and the State’s knowledge of a defendant’s incarceration does not excuse the defendant from complying. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428, citing People v. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d 869 (1981), and People v. Wentlent, 109 Ill. App. 3d 291 (1982). Thus, overruling the Fourth District’s liberal construction of section 3 — 8—10 and its determination that strict compliance with section 3 — 8—10 was not required, the court in Staten stated: “We do not view as ‘technical’ or ‘meaningless’ the conditions that the legislature has attached to the speedy-trial right of section 3 — 8—10. Although the information required by that section may be for the administrative convenience of the State, the legislature placed the burden on defendants to affirmatively demand speedy trials pursuant to this section. When defendants are serving prison terms for existing convictions at the time they face trial on additional charges, they do not suffer a loss of liberty while awaiting trial on the pending charges. To exercise their statutory right to be tried within 160 days, they need only to comply with section 3 — 8— 10.” Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428. Observing cases holding that a demand filed under section 103 — 5(b), when section 3 — 8—10 was applicable, precluded the 160-day period from beginning to run, the court also stated: “The above authorities recognize that a defendant who claims a violation of a speedy-trial right cannot prevail if the demand for trial fails to comply with the terms of the governing speedy-trial provision. To treat the informational requirements of section 3 — 8—10 as surplusage would be to infringe on the legislative prerogative to set reasonable conditions on an incarcerated defendant’s right to receive a trial within 160 days of the demand. As reflected by the statutes examined in the instant case, the legislature has seen fit to provide different time periods and demand requirements for offenders who are differently situated.” Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 429-30, citing People v. Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (1992), and People v. Jackson, 235 Ill. App. 3d 732 (1992). The court then held that, because section 3 — 8—10 had not been satisfied, the 160-day period never began to run. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 430. The majority does not discuss the defendant’s burden to present a clear and unequivocal demand as required by Staten and instead attempts to merely distinguish cases on the facts. However, those cases, unlike the majority here, followed the supreme court’s reasoning in Staten. For example, in Milsap, a demand was insufficient when it was filed among papers bearing a different case number and the defendant wrote “unknown” for the pending charges. Observing the absence of information about the charges, such as the nature of the charges or the date of the incident leading to them, the Fourth District determined that the demand was insufficient to place the State’s Attorney on notice that the defendant was invoking his right to a speedy trial in a particular case. The court noted that, while it may sometimes be difficult for an incarcerated defendant to obtain the necessary information, the legislature intended section 3 — 8—10 to impose specific requirements for the demand. Milsap, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 832-33. Likewise, the Fourth District recently observed that a defendant “shall include” the charges pending under section 3 — 8—10 and that a failure to provide all charges pending could lead to the conclusion that a demand is insufficient. People v. Gay, 376 Ill. App. 3d 796, 802 (2007). By ignoring where the burden lies, the majority does exactly what Staten disapproved — it treats the requirements of section 3 — 8—10 as surplusage. It further ignores the legislature’s decision to treat differently defendants incarcerated on other charges — defendants who, unlike those directly subject to section 103 — 5, do not lose their liberty while awaiting trial and whose statutory speedy trial rights exist only through the application of section 3 — 8—10. Because section 3 — 8—10 applied, the burden was firmly on Sandoval to comply with the statutory requirements, including providing the charges pending. Although Sandoval did not leave the line for pending charges entirely blank, his demand was ambiguous about which of his many charges he meant it to apply to. Sandoval merely wrote “Du Page DUI” when he had multiple DUI charges and multiple other charges pending, in two separate cases. As a result, he did not provide notice to the State of which of his many charges, including which of his multiple DUI charges incurred on different dates, he was seeking to invoke, nor did he offer a simple means of locating the intended case or cases. The record makes apparent the confusion resulting from Sandoval’s failure to specify the charge or charges to which he sought the demand to apply. The single demand was applied to two separate cases, each with multiple charges, yet the clerk wrote only one case number on the demand. Two separate appeals were also filed involving the single demand, and the briefs in neither appeal referenced the other one. Further, a record search for Sandoval’s name returned multiple cases. The trial court placed the burden on the State to discover the charges that Sandoval intended to reference, stating that the case numbers could be difficult for a defendant to obtain and that the State could have determined the charges at issue with a record search. In the alternative, the trial court noted that the State could have writted in Sandoval to determine his intent. Likewise, the majority states that, “[t]o the extent that Sandoval’s multiple DUI charges left the State wondering which charges were subject to the demand, it was free to inquire further of Sandoval.” 381 Ill. App. 3d at 150. But this ignores that the burden was on Sandoval to begin with to provide a clear and unequivocal demand. The State had no burden to assert Sandoval’s statutory speedy trial right or to undertake an investigation to fill in information that Sandoval had the burden to supply. The flaw in the suggestion that Sandoval could be writted in to determine his intent is further illustrated by the determination that the speedy trial period began to run when the ambiguous demand was first filed. If it is necessary to writ in the defendant to determine the intent of the demand, the demand cannot be said to be clear and unequivocal as required by section 3 — 8—10. Thus, it would seem inappropriate to start the time running when the demand is first made. But the effect of the majority opinion is that the time will run even while the State is attempting to determine the applicable charges. The majority also interprets the State’s argument as one that would require specific case numbers in order to comply with section 3 — 8—10. But case numbers are not necessarily required. I would require only that the demand be sufficient to allow the State to prepare its prosecution without resorting to speculation or significant investigation. I suggest that the standard is analogous to the specificity to which the defendant is entitled in a charging instrument, for purposes of preparing a defense and protection against double jeopardy. A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that provides an identifiable offense. A lack of specificity about the charges can raise due process and double jeopardy concerns. People v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (1998). In the same respect, in order to properly prepare its prosecution, the State must be made aware of any speedy trial issues and when demands for trial take effect. When the defendant’s description of the charges pending is insufficient to allow the State to do so, it fails in its basic requirement of providing notice to the State and cannot start the speedy trial period running under section 3 — 8— 10. It is ironic that, had the court entered an order prohibiting further prosecutions on the information contained in the demand, there would be no way of determining which charge was subject to double jeopardy. Without the required specificity, the order could not pin down that either charge was specified and thus was subject to double jeopardy. The majority resolves the deficiency by disregarding the necessity of specificity, and it arbitrarily applies the principle of double jeopardy by indiscriminately applying it in the plural despite the singular demand. Here, in lieu of case numbers, Sandoval could have provided a description that included items such as the dates of the charges, the locations of the alleged offenses, and the circumstances of the arrests, which would have allowed the State to know which of the charges he intended the demand to apply to, without resort to speculation or calling him into court to clarify his intent. But he did not do so. Instead, he demanded a speedy trial for only a single DUI charge, with no indication of the DUI charge to which he meant the demand to apply. When Sandoval wrote “Du Page DUI” without providing details about which charges the demand applied to, he did not comply with section 3 — 8—10. For the same reasons that the demand failed to meet the requirements of section 3 — 8—10, the State also did not have actual notice of the charges. It simply lacked the information necessary to apply the demand to any given charge, and it was not required to assert Sandoval’s rights for him. As a result, I would hold that the speedy trial period never began to run and that the trial court erred when it dismissed the charges. Because Sandoval’s demand was insufficient under section 3 — 8— 10, it is unnecessary to address the applicability of the local court rule requiring case numbers to be included in speedy trial demands under section 103 — 5(b). However, I observe that, to the extent that it applies to an incarcerated defendant who must make a speedy trial demand under section 3 — 8—10, the rule is consistent with the statutory requirement that defendants provide the charges pending against them.