Court Opinion

ID: 9466432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:15:26.244421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:43.606072
License: Public Domain

WILKEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This case is a wonderful illustration of why many people think transport in the United States should be deregulated and the ICC simply go out of business. The ICC position is uneconomic and unreasonable, therefore “arbitrary and capricious” within the agreed standard of our review.
I.
All that the bus companies want is to engage in their primary line of activity, carrying passengers. Historically and practically, incidental to the carriage of passengers has been the transportation of baggage and small packages, classified as “express.” The bus companies have no desire to be in the freight hauling business; hence, the bus companies are willing to put a limit of actual value of $500 on the express which they accept, and are perfectly willing to leave the business for packages of $501 and upward in value to the licensed motor freight carriers.
The buses are common carriers. The question is: common carriers of what? The buses say they are common carriers of passengers only under old § 208(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act,1 to which the carriage *887of “express” is incidental. It is indicative that the incidental authority to carry express has been granted by the terms of the statute using the word “express,” and that is not an incidental authority to carry “property.” “Property” is properly shipped by motor freight carriers, which are regulated under old § 216 of the Act.2
Historically, the buses have placed limits on the size and weight of the “express” which they would accept, because of the recognized limited space on their vehicles. No objection has ever been raised by the ICC to these limitations. They are clearly limitations of acceptance. Similarly, the buses now wish to place a limit on value, as they always have,3 because of the limited security facilities of the bus terminals. The ICC has not found that the concern of the buses over the security facilities at their terminals is misplaced.
II.
My disagreement with my two colleagues is on Rule 5, not Rule 15. The ICC rejected the proposed modification of Rule 54 for basically two reasons: (A) the Commission felt that there was no reason to limit the value of express packages; and (B) even if there should be a limit in value, the proposed rule could not be uniformly applied or enforced.
A. With regard to the first conclusion, giving any weight at all to whose business operation is under consideration, the NBTA has given sufficient reasons justifying a limitation on the value of express packages. First, there is the problem of security. Express traffic is loaded onto buses from busy passenger platforms simultaneously with passenger baggage. This process occurs in reverse at destination points. At both times there is no way of keeping the express (and passenger baggage) separate from passengers and members of the general public. There is also necessarily some period of time during which the express shipments must remain on the busy platforms before they can be moved to interior storage areas.5 The chances of theft at *888these various points are obvious, and are only increased and accentuated as the value of the packages transported increases, and as more criminals are attracted by this higher-value cargo. Additionally, as the chances of theft increase, there is enhanced risk to passengers of being harmed either as a theft is taking place, or as an owner or officer of the law is attempting to apprehend a thief.
These security problems exist at all bus terminals, but are particularly acute at those bus stops operated by commission agents, who in fact operate the vast majority of bus stops.6 Commission agents are independent businessmen who generally operate a bus stop as a sideline to their principal occupation. As such they cannot become as involved as a full-time employee, and can only devote a portion of their time and attention to their bus business. It is hard to believe these people would be able to provide the type of security which would be required if items of unlimited value were carried in express service.
The carriage of express by passenger buses is in contrast to the business of freight carriers. These carriers may operate behind fences, steel doors, and barbed wire, and may lawfully exclude from their premises members of the general public — an option not available to passenger carriers.
Secondly, a rule requiring buses to carry express without limit as to value would tend to prevent the bus lines from maintaining express service as merely “incidental” to passenger service. As the Commission has held, carriage of express by intercity buses is intended to remain subordinate to the carriage of passengers, and should not be allowed to interfere with or become a burden upon passenger service.7 If express of unlimited value were carried, no doubt there would have to be special.handling and hand-to-hand documentation, which would tend to interfere with and delay scheduled passenger service. Likewise, increased security measures such as fences and gates would impede and interfere with the unencumbered transportation of passengers. This cannot be the result desired by either the Commission or the bus lines.
The Commission has argued, and my colleagues agree, that if the passenger carriers are concerned that carriage of higher-value parcels will result in higher costs for claims and security, they can simply raise the rates applicable to those parcels. There are several responses to this argument. First, as has just been pointed out, the increased security measures and special handling required would tend to interfere with passenger service and prevent the express service from being maintained, as required, as “incidental” to passenger service. Secondly, there is no Commission finding of the economic consequences, if the rates were increased sufficiently to cover increased security and liability costs. Presumably the bus lines have evaluated the possible revenues and costs, and their business judgment is that the carriage of high value express cannot be worth the extra expense. Finally, in any event, increasing the applicable rates would not eliminate the enhanced risk to passengers from increased levels of criminal activity at bus terminals. Compensation for losses due to crime rarely is preferable to avoiding the crime itself. It is a commentary on the Commission’s logic that it seems to reason the opposite.
*889In addition to the possibility of raising rates, my colleagues add the suggestion that the bus lines could “limit their liability through the use of released or declared value.” 8 First, this does not confront the danger and undesirability of enhancing platform pilferage. Second, this ignores the fundamental position of the bus lines: they are in the passenger carrying business, not that of carrying “property.” “Express” is, and statutorily is supposed to be, strictly a sideline; the bus lines don’t want to carry high value express for several good reasons, whether their liability is limited by released or declared value or not. And, why should the bus lines be compelled to do so? The Commission has no answer to this.
In contrast, the bus lines point out, correctly, that there is a statutory basis for their position that the goods which they carry may be limited as to value. 49 U.S. C.A. § 10922(c)(4) (West Pamph. 1979)9 states that “a certificate ... to transport passengers may include authority to transport . . . express . . ..” (emphasis added). Congress specifically used the term “express” rather than the broader and more inclusive term “property” to describe what the bus lines could carry. The term “property” was used to describe what the freight lines would carry.10 Since the term “express” has historically referred to parcels of small size, weight, and value, the use by Congress of that term, rather than the broader term “property,” is strong support for their argument, with which I agree, that bus lines may not be forced to carry parcels of unlimited value.
In a related argument, the Commission claims that bus lines have the same common carrier duties, with regard to goods carried, as freight lines.11 Although not articulated, the Commission seems to believe that this duty arises out of former § 216(b) of the Interstate Commerce Act.12 The bus lines reply that their common carrier duties arise instead out of former § 216(a) of that Act.13 It seems clear that the bus lines are correct on this point.
B. The Commission contends that, even if there should be a limit on value, the proposed rule could not be uniformly applied or enforced. It states that under the proposed rule the value of a specific shipment could be determined differently by different carriers, depending upon whether manufacturer’s cost, wholesale price, retail price, invoice price, or even agreed value were used. The response of petitioner’s brief is a practical answer:
[T]he value of an article to be accepted for transportation will be determined by the shipper, who will be asked by the carriers to state the article’s actual value. If the value exceeds $500.00, the article will be refused, and, if it does not exceed $500.00, it will be accepted.
As is pointed out by petitioner,14 this has been the traditional method for determining value. There is no reason why it cannot continue to operate in the future, if it has in the past, despite my colleagues’ expressed yearning for “an objective standard.” 15
*890III.
The ultímate question here is whether the particular tariff provision is reasonable.16 In an excess of regulatory zeal, the ICC has said No, the bus lines have never placed acceptance of express packages on the basis of actual value, so they can’t do it now; and, our ICC decisions have never talked about “value” as related to express, (even though the carriers have used it), so they can’t use “value” as a condition of acceptance now; and, even though the bus lines are authorized as passenger carriers, not property carriers, with only incidental authority to carry “express,” the ICC can compel the passenger carriers to carry express of unlimited value.
To my mind all of this is wrong and has no relevance to whether the tariff provision is reasonable. The ICC has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in asserting its purported regulatory authority, when it could have performed its public function much better by accepting the bus lines’ determination of what express they could carry incidental to their passenger business, and thus let the bus lines get on with improving their passenger service without an extraneous burden being thrust upon them. I respectfully dissent.

. “ . . .A certificate for the transportation of passengers may include authority to transport in the same vehicle with the passengers, newspapers, baggage of passengers, express, or mail, or to transport baggage of passengers in a separate vehicle.” Formerly 49 U.S.C. § 308(d), recodified in different language but *887without substantive change at 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(c)(4) (West Pamph. 1979) (emphasis added).

. See former 49 U.S.C. § 316(b), the substantive meaning of which was not changed when the Interstate Commerce Act was revised and recodified (see Act of 17 October 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-473, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466, recodified at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10701, 10702, 11101 (West Pamph. 1979)).

. I am puzzled by the approach my colleagues take in regard to the concept of value in regard to the incidental services provided by passenger carriers. While it may be true that Commission decisions emphasize the volume, weight, size, or method of handling the incidental shipments involved, yet value has always been a component and limiting feature of the passenger carrier’s incidental services. As the majority opinion recognizes, the $250 limit for released or declared value has always been a feature associated with the incidental express service. Now the passenger carriers want to limit their acceptance of express to $500 actual value. As a practical business matter, if the carriers want to do this, why shouldn’t they?
Apparently the only answer that the ICC and my two colleagues can give is that (1) value has never been discussed in the cases; and (2) value has always been talked of in terms of released or declared value. The argument that something has never been done before has always seemed to me to be an argument with zero merit, but it is typical of the regulatory mentality. Value, whether actual, released, or declared is admittedly a condition of acceptance. If the passenger carriers only want to be in the business of taking express packages with an actual value of $500 or less, the public is informed of this, and motor freight carriers exist who are eager to carry packages of $501 and upward in value, why shouldn’t the passenger carriers be in the business in which they want to engage? The passenger carriers, who presumably know their own business better than the ICC, think this is a reasonable business arrangement consonant with their primary obligations as passenger carriers. Danger or even inconvenience to the public is nonexistent, particularly when the motor freight carriers are available, and only the regulatory mentality would deny the passenger carriers their desired reasonable method of handling express packages.

. Consequently, Rule 5 would read, “No single Shipment will be accepted for transportation which exceeds five hundred ($500.00) dollars in Value . The parties agree that the term “Value” means actual value.

. Likewise, express is carried on a space-available basis, and if passenger baggage has taken all the space on a particular bus, the express *888must wait, with the consequent sitting and movement back and forth to a storage area.

. See J.A. at 90-91, where Greyhound Lines, Inc., indicates that in 1976, 2,215 of its 2,352 regular route bus facilities were operated by commission agents. (The remainder were carrier-operated.) Greyhound indicates that these commission agents engaged in the following businesses: 291 — service stations, 232 — restaurants, 164 — drug stores, 140 — grocery /variety stores,. 126 — hotels or motels, 44 — taxicab stands, 30 — newspaper stands, 26 — travel agencies, 14 — auto parts, 9 — dry cleaners, 8— feed stores, 7 — hobby shops, 5 — post offices, 4 — barber shops, etc.

. See Continental Southern Lines, Inc., Ext.— Pup Semitrailers, 88 M.C.C. 547, 549-50 (1961), wherein the Commission was interpreting what is currently 49 U.S.C.A. § 10922(c)(4) (West Pamph. 1979).

. Majority op.-of 198 U.S.App.D.C., 884 of 613 F.2d.

. Formerly 49 U.S.C. § 308(d), which was § 208(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act.

. See former 49 U.S.C. § 316(b), the substantive meaning of which was not changed when the Interstate Commerce Act was revised and recodified (see Act of 17 Oct. 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-473, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466).

. See Joint Brief for Respondents at 30-31.

. 49 U.S.C. § 316(b) (repealed by Act of 17 Oct. 1978, Pub.L. No.95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1466, replaced by 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10701, 10702, 11101 (West Pamph. 1979)).

. 49 U.S.C. § 316(a) (repealed by Act of 17 Oct. 1978, Pub.L. No.95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1466, replaced by 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10701-10703, 11101 (West Pamph. 1979)).

. Brief for Petitioner at 23.

. Majority op. - of 198 U.S.App.D.C., 886 of 613 F.2d. What the carriers and their customers have found practical in the past in regard to valuation doubtless will be practical in the future. At all events, if the Commission’s rejection of the filed tariff stands, as the majority opinion so affirms, the carriers will be right back to their “unobjective standard” of valuation which they have been applying these many years.

. See 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10701(a), 11101 (West Pamph. 1979) and the statutory sections from which these sections are derived (i.e., old 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(a) and (b)). As noted above, the new Interstate Commerce Act was not intended to effect a substantive change in the old Interstate Commerce Act. See Act of 17 Oct. 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-473, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466.