Court Opinion

ID: 9566679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:57.867215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:54.290898
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority's interpretation of sections 17-27-*644103(3), -114, 8A C.R.S. (1986), goes beyond the plain meaning of the statute and is not consistent with accepted rules of statutory construction. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986); Colorado Dep’t of Social Serv. v. Board of County Comm’rs of Pueblo County, 697 P.2d 1 (Colo.1985). The requirement of a hearing is not part of the statutory scheme and casts an additional burden on the courts and the correctional system.
Vincent Wilson was charged with second-degree burglary of a dwelling, section 18-4-203, 8 C.R.S. (1973 & 1983 Supp.), and theft, section 18-4-401, 8 C.R.S. (1973). The prosecution later amended the information to include a third count, second-degree burglary of a building, section 18-4-203, 8 C.R.S. (1973 & 1983 Supp.). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wilson pled guilty to count three, and the first two counts were dismissed.
After a full hearing, Wilson’s request for probation was denied and he was sentenced to community corrections for a period of two years and one year of parole. He signed a statement acknowledging that he understood the conditions of his placement, including the condition that if he left the facility without authorization felony escape charges would be filed against him.
On August 28, 1984, a warrant was issued for Wilson’s arrest following his unauthorized absence from the community corrections facility. He was subsequently apprehended and confined in the Denver County jail. A hearing was held in Denver District Court to determine whether Wilson violated the conditions incident to the community corrections program.
At the hearing, which was attended by Wilson and his counsel, the prosecution presented a probation report alleging that the defendant failed to return to the corrections facility on August 24,1984, and made no effort to contact his probation officer until he was apprehended on September 6, 1984. The court concluded that Wilson had violated the terms of his placement in community corrections by failing to return, see sections 17-27-108, -114, and resentenced him to the department of corrections for two years plus one year of parole, the original sentence imposed on Wilson, see section 17-27-103(3).
Under the plain language of sections 17-27-103(3), -114, the defendant had no statutory or due process right to an evidentiary hearing and the court did not err in denying him an opportunity to present evidence contesting the probation officer’s report. Section 17-27-103(3) states in pertinent part:
The corrections board has the authority to accept, reject, or reject after acceptance the placement of any offender in its community correctional facility or program pursuant to any contract or agreement with the department or a judicial district. If an offender is rejected by the corrections board after initial acceptance, the offender shall remain in the facility or program for a reasonable period of time pending receipt of appropriate orders from the sentencing court or the department for the transfer of such offender. The sentencing court is authorized to make appropriate orders for the transfer of such offender to the department and to resentence such offender and impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed without increasing the length of the original sentence.
(Emphasis added.) See section 17-27-113(2). The section gives the corrections board the authority to reject the placement of any offender in its community corrections facility. It makes no provision for a hearing to review the board’s decision to reject an inmate. When the board rejects an offender, the court must transfer him from community corrections and determine whether to impose the original sentence or some lesser penalty.
Section 17-27-114 states:
(1) Where the administrator of a community correctional facility or any other appropriate supervising authority has cause to believe that an offender placed in a community correctional facility has violated any rule or condition of his placement in that facility or any term of his postrelease supervision under section *64517-27-105 or cannot be safely housed in that facility, the administrator or other authority shall certify to the appropriate judicial or executive authority the facts which are the basis for his belief and execute a transfer order to any sheriff, undersheriff, deputy sheriff, police officer, or state patrol officer which authorizes said sheriff, undersheriff, deputy sheriff, police officer, or state patrol officer to transport the offender to the county jail in the county in which the facility is located where he shall be confined pending a determination by the appropriate court or executive authorities as to whether or not the offender shall remain in community corrections. Offenders so confined may apply for bond only where they have been confined due to an alleged violation of a condition of the pos-trelease supervision contemplated by section 17-27-105.
(2) If the sentencing court determines that the offender shall not remain in community corrections, the court is authorized to make appropriate orders for the transfer of such offender from the county jail to a correctional facility and to resentence such offender and impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed without increasing the length of the original sentence.
Section 17-27-114, like section 17-27-103(3), does not expressly provide for an evidentiary hearing to review allegations that an offender has violated any rule or condition of his placement. Under the plain language of the statute, the appropriate court or executive authorities must decide, based solely upon the facts certified by the administrator, whether the offender shall remain in community corrections or be resentenced to serve at a corrections facility.
The General Assembly’s decision not to provide for an evidentiary hearing prior to the removal of an offender from a community corrections facility is manifested by its express exclusion of article 27, title 17, from the provisions of the State Administrative Procedure Act, article 4, title 24, 10 C.R.S. (1982 & 1987 Supp.) (Act).1 Section 24-4-105, 10 C.R.S. (1982 & 1987 Supp.), of the Act, specifies the procedures to be employed in agency adjudicatory hearings. The General Assembly’s exclusion of article 27, title 17, from the procedural requirements of section 24-4-105 indicates that it considered whether an evidentiary hearing should be accorded an offender prior to his removal from a community corrections facility. The failure of title 17 to expressly provide for a hearing, identify its procedural requirements, and state the appropriate burden of proof, suggests that the General Assembly decided not to provide the offender with a statutory right to an adversarial or evidentiary hearing. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Continental Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.1977) (statutes are to be given such effect that no clause, sentence, or word is rendered superfluous, contradictory, or insignificant); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986) (same).
An offender also has no due process right to an evidentiary hearing before he is removed from a community corrections facility. Only a limited range of interests fall within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Protected liberty interests may arise from two sources, the due process clause and state law. Id. Under the due process clause, “‘[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise viola-tive of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.’ ” Id. at 468, 103 S.Ct. at 869 (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976)); see Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law, ch. 15, sec. III, at 566 n. 27 (2d ed. 1983).
*646The due process clause does not require a hearing prior to Wilson’s removal from the community corrections facility. He received a fair trial and a full hearing both when he was sentenced and when the original sentence, reduced by the time he served in the community corrections program, was reimposed. Therefore, his transfer does not trigger the due process clause. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 1742 (state prisoner transferred from prison in Hawaii to maximum security prison in California not entitled to hearing); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 236, 96 S.Ct. at 2544 (prisoner transferred to different prison facility not entitled to hearing).
Colorado law does not create a constitutional right to a hearing. To establish a protected liberty interest under state law, an inmate must show “that particularized standards or criteria guide the State’s decisionmakers.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747. If the decisionmaker can deny the requested relief for no reason or for any reason at all, the state has not created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Id.
Under Colorado law, the administrator of the community correctional facility has broad discretion concerning the grounds for rejecting an offender. Section 17-27-103(3) gives the correctional board apparently unlimited authority to reject an offender after his acceptance. Section 17-27-114(1) permits resentencing of an offender when he has violated any rule or condition of his placement. In this case, the statement signed by Wilson specified a number of standard conditions of his placement and stated that he must “comply with any other conditions required by the court or [the] probation officer.” The document also set forth that “the defendant may be transferred through all phases of Community Corrections at the discretion of the Probation Department, including residential to non-residential.” In my view, the broad discretion granted to the authorities in this case does not invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority, however, implies that internment in a community corrections facility creates a conditional liberty right under the fourteenth amendment that like probation requires a hearing before it is revoked. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). In my view, commitment in a community corrections facility is a form of incarceration and is distinguishable from probation.
Community correctional facilities provide a sentencing option to courts for a defendant who was convicted of or who received a deferred sentence for a qualifying felony or misdemeanor. § 17-27-101, -102(4), 8A C.R.S. (1987 Supp.). Unlike the revocation of probation, a defendant is entitled to time served in a community corrections facility on direct sentence if he is later rejected from the facility. People v. Washington, 709 P.2d 100 (Colo.App.1985); People v. Nix, 44 Colo.App. 195, 610 P.2d 1088 (1980); see People ex rel. VanMeveren v. District Court, 195 Colo. 34, 575 P.2d 4 (1978) (commitment to a community corrections facility is a sentencing medium that is more severe than probation, but not as harsh as incarceration); People v. Radar, 652 P.2d 1085 (Colo.App.1982) (same). Moreover, an offender interned in a community corrections facility is still considered to be in custody, People v. Brown, 695 P.2d 776 (Colo.App.1984), and the failure to return to the facility is punishable as an escape under section 18-8-208, 8B C.R.S. (1986). People v. Lucero, 654 P.2d 835 (Colo.1982); § 17-27-108, 8A C.R.S. (1986). In my view, the court of appeals decision that Wilson had no right to an adversarial or evidentiary hearing is correct and should be affirmed.
Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOL-LACK joins in this dissent.

. Section 17-27-112 provides: "The provisions of this article shall not be subject to the ‘State Administrative Procedure Act,’ article 4 of title 24, C.R.S.”