Court Opinion

ID: 9532304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:20:09.145832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:43.617561
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Bowen, C. J.
Dissenting opinion in which Cooper, J., concurs.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case.
At the close of appellants’ case in chief the appellees moved the court for a directed verdict as shown by the record as follows:
“Plaintiff presents evidence and now rests and at the conclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence, defendants by their attorney move the court for a directed verdict, which reads as follows: (Here insert), and *539upon plaintiffs’ complaint herein, reserving the right to introduce evidence in the event the motion is overruled and now the plaintiffs join in said motion for a directed verdict. The Court now sustains the motion of the defendants for a directed verdict upon plaintiffs’ complaint herein. . . .” (my emphasis)
The motion for a directed verdict which was inserted by reference in such record contained the following specifications:
“The defendants move for a directed verdict for the reason that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the essential element of their case in chief which is a demand upon the defendants for possession of the property described in the complaint.”
The majority opinion seems to be grounded on the conclusion that since the appellants joined in appellees’ motion for a directed verdict that the court was thereby clothed with the functions of the jury and had a right to make its decision on the issues presented, and that in order to present a question on appeal it was necessary for the appellants to have brought up the evidence in the record. In one of the principal cases relied upon in the majority opinion, Harris v. Cleveland,, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company (1899), 153 Ind. 475, 55 N. E. 222, the motion for a directed verdict was based upon the grounds that there was no evidence (my emphasis) which would entitle plaintiffs to recover, which is a far different situation from the motion presented in the case at bar.
The law is well settled in this state that by claiming an interest in the subject matter of a replevin action the defendant may waive the necessity of a demand and thereby, as a matter of law, make it unnecessary for the plaintiff to make a formal demand as a prerequisite of such an action, and in such a case the failure to prove such an alleged demand is entirely im*540material to the plaintiff’s right to recover. In the instant case the' appellants in their complaint stated that they owned the property which they sought to recover and alleged that they were entitled to the immediate possession. The appellees denied this. Appellees thereafter executed and delivered a redelivery bond which, under the law, constituted affirmative conduct asserting ownership. Therefore, under the. record in this case, the failure to prove an alleged demand on the part of the plaintiffs would be entirely immaterial to the plaintiffs’ right to recover. Butler v. Wolf Sussman, Inc. (1943), 221 Ind. 47, 46 N. E. 2d 243; Allen B. Wrisley Distributing Co. v. Serewicz, 145 F. 2d 169 (CCA 7th, 1944) ; Morgan et al. v. Wattles et al. (1879), 69 Ind. 260; Thompson v. Thompson (1902), 11 N. D. 208, 91 N. W. 44.
In view of the holdings in this state making it necessary for the plaintiff to prove an alleged demand, under the circumstances shown by this record, and in view of the fact that the record shows in the instant case that we have a situation where the defendants have filed a limited or qualified motion for a directed verdict reserving the right to introduce additional evidence, in which motion the plaintiffs joined, the question presented to the court below was a question of law based upon the single theory set forth in defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. Any- other conclusion would do violence to the many holdings of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of Indiana that only matters which are properly presented to the trial court may be decided by the courts of review on appeal.
In principle we are confronted with a somewhat similar situation to the one involved -in the holding of the Supreme- Court in Galesburg Coulter Disc Company v. Hunter (1935), 208 Ind. 330, 196 N. E. 94. In this case the Supreme Court pointed out that a situation may *541exist where, even though the parties do not file an agreed ease on a reserved question of law under the statute, nevertheless, the circumstances and issues may exist based on the parties’ motion to the court so that there is a single issue to be determined by the trial court. As set forth in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §344, p. 276, the law is generally well settled that a simultaneous motion by both parties for a directed verdict operates as a waiver of submission of any question of fact for the jury but it does not apply where a contrary intention is manifest. A contrary intention is manifest in the instant case by reason of the fact that the appellees, in moving for a directed verdict, reserved the right to introduce additional evidence. As shown by the record in this case and the decisions set forth herein, the failure to prove an alleged demand on the part of the plaintiffs was entirely immaterial to their right-to recover. Therefore, when we examine the appellees’ motion for a directed verdict in .which appellants joined, we find that the record shows that the appellees elected to present to the trial court for its consideration the single theory presented by such motion for a directed verdict that as a matter of law the plaintiffs were required to prove as an essential element of their case in chief that they had made a demand upon the defendants for possession of the property described in the complaint.
In sustaining such motion, in my opinion, the trial court was in error, and for that reason I feel that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. ■
Note. — Reported in 142 N. E.. 2d 474. •