Court Opinion

ID: 9677938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:06:15.85347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:00.389329
License: Public Domain

KELLER, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which McCORMICK, P. J., and HOLLAND and WOMACK, JJ., joined.
Because the plurality’s holding misconstrues the nature of the remedy for legally insufficient evidence, imposes procedural default requirements that are not supported by the caselaw, and creates a potential dilemma for the State, I must dissent.
A claim of legally insufficient evidence is a claim that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been violated by a conviction that is without sufficient eviden-tiary support to be considered a rational decision. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “[Rjemedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). With regard to Due Process rights we have recognized that the remedy should be tailored “to neutralize the taint” of the constitutional violation. Cook v. State, 940 S.W.2d 623, 628 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 75, 139 L.Ed.2d 35 (1997)(finding that a reversal, new trial, and exclusion of certain evi*786dence, rather than dismissal, was sufficient to neutralize the taint of prosecutorial misconduct that resulted in a due process violation).
In the area of legal sufficiency, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for narrow tailoring. The standard for legal sufficiency is one that is highly deferential to the verdict of the factfinder. The fact-finder’s determination is upheld if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The Supreme Court explained that the standard was narrowly drawn to protect a defendant’s Due Process rights while impinging as little as possible upon the factfinder’s discretion:
This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon “jury” discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.
Id. (emphasis added). That the Supreme Court has narrowly drawn the legal sufficiency standard to effectuate due process protections suggests that the remedy for a finding of legally insufficient evidence should likewise be drawn narrowly.
A narrowly drawn remedy for legally insufficient evidence would disturb a fact-finder’s verdict only to the extent necessary to protect the defendant from an unjust conviction. If, in a given case, the evidence were legally insufficient to establish the defendant as the perpetrator, then an acquittal would be the only remedy that would adequately protect the defendant whose guilt the State has failed to prove. However, if the evidence were legally insufficient merely as to one element, and the defendant would still be guilty of a lesser-included offense without the element in question, then the narrowly tailored remedy would be a reformation to the lesser-included offense rather than an acquittal. That remedy would accord the greatest respect possible to the factfinder’s determination while fully protecting the defendant’s due process right not to be convicted of an offense that is insufficiently supported by the evidence.
In the present case, the jury convicted appellant of serious, bodily injury to a child. The evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction in every respect except for the seriousness of the injury. Under the law, bodily injury to a child is a lesser-included offense to serious bodily injury to a child. The former contains all the elements of the latter except that bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury is required. See Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a)(1) & (3), (e), (f). In finding that appellant committed serious bodily injury, the jury necessarily found that appellant committed bodily injury. Hence, the remedy that would afford the greatest respect possible to the jury’s verdict while protecting appellant’s Due Process right would be reformation of the convicted offense of serious bodily injury to a child to the lesser-included offense of bodily injury to a child.
Because reformation is the narrowly tailored remedy in the present case, that remedy is required unless the Court of Appeals lacked authority to afford the remedy. As the plurality concedes, however, this Court has already recognized that the courts of appeals possess the authority to reform a convicted offense to a lesser-included offense in the face of a sufficiency challenge regarding an aggravating element in the convicted offense. Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)(evidence insufficient to show possession of 400 grams or more *787of methamphetamine but sufficient to show possession of 28 grams or more; judgment reformed to reflect conviction of possession of 28 grams or more of methamphetamine). The plurality contends that the Court of Appeals’ authority to reform the conviction may be invoked only if the State had, at trial, requested a jury instruction concerning the lesser-included offense. Such a contention, however, is really a claim that the State procedurally defaulted the remedy (i.e. failed to preserve error) rather than a claim that the Court of Appeals actually lacked the authority to reform the conviction.
But preservation of error concepts have no place in the present context. There is no error to be preserved — reformation is not the State’s remedy; it is appellant’s remedy. Appellant is the party complaining of the conviction and asking for a remedy. For the type of legal insufficiency claim advanced, reformation is the remedy available because it is the remedy that disturbs the jury’s verdict the least while protecting appellant’s interests. In the same way that a new punishment hearing is the remedy for reversible errors in the punishment phase of trial, see Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 44.29(b), reformation to a lesser-included offense (and a new punishment hearing as a result) is the remedy for the type of error before us.
Moreover, procedural default concepts are generally absent from evidentiary sufficiency issues as they relate to elements of an offense. We do not require a defendant to request a directed verdict to preserve a sufficiency claim on appeal. And we do not require the State to object when the jury instructions impose more requirements for conviction than the law requires; appellate courts review evidence in accordance with the hypothetically correct charge rather than the charge actually given. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 236-240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
In fact, a straightforward application of Malik to the present case shows that the legal sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the lesser-included offense instead of the charged offense. Malik held that “sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case”:
Such a charge would be one that accurately sets out the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.
Id. at 240. In a footnote, we stated that: “This list is not necessarily exhaustive.” We have held that a trial court commits error if it submits in the jury charge a theory of liability that is not supported by sufficient evidence. Montes v. State, 724 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)(inclusion of the law of parties was error because there was no evidence of anyone other than the defendant participating in the offense). And, Malik recognized that an offense should never be submitted to the factfinder when there is legally insufficient evidence to support it. 953 S.W.2d at 237. From these observations it follows that the hypothetically correct jury charge would not include an element of an offense that is supported by legally insufficient evidence. If removing the element with insufficient evidentiary support results in downgrading the charged offense to a lesser-included offense, then the lesser-included offense is the greatest offense that may be included in the jury charge and for which the State may seek a conviction. That the jury charge may incorrectly reflect a greater offense is immaterial; the hypothetically correct jury charge would reflect the correct offense (i.e. the lesser-included offense).
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require courts of appeals to render judgment except when remand is necessary:
When reversing a trial court’s judgment, the court must render the judgment that *788the trial court should have rendered, except when:
(a) a remand is necessary for further proceedings; or
(b) the interests of justice require a remand for another trial.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.3. When, at trial, it appears that the evidence is insufficient to support the charged offense but sufficient to support a lesser-included offense, the trial judge should direct a verdict in favor of the defendant on the charged offense and submit the lesser-included offense to the jury. Because a request or objection is not required to preserve a legal insufficiency claim, the trial judge’s obligation to direct a verdict of acquittal exists whether or not the defendant requests such action. In a situation where the evidence is legally insufficient to support the charged offense, but sufficient to support a lesser-included offense, and the trial judge fails to direct the jury to proceed only upon the lesser-included offense, and the jury convicts on the charged offense, the judgment the trial court “should have rendered” is a conviction upon the lesser-included offense. Because the punishment ranges for greater and lesser offenses ordinarily differ, after reforming the conviction to a lesser-included offense, a court of appeals must ordinarily remand the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing, in accordance with Rule 43.3(a).
The plurality contends that permitting reformation would result in the State gaining all the benefits of a “go for broke” trial strategy with none of the risks while the defendant carries all of the risks with none of the benefits. The plurality’s reasoning is flawed. First, legal sufficiency claims are not subject to gamesmanship. A legal sufficiency review is “a final, due process safeguard ensuring only the rationality of the factfinder.” Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Appellate requirements for legal sufficiency are independent of the parties’ strategies in choosing jury instructions. See Malik, generally.
Second, permitting reformation absent a request would not result in a windfall benefit to the State. On the contrary, the State assumes a disproportionate share of the risks that attend the failure to request a lesser offense. If the evidence supporting the aggravating element of the charged offense is weak but legally sufficient, both sides carry equivalent risks. The State risks the possibility that the jury will acquit of the charged offense when the jury might have convicted of the lesser-included offense if it had been submitted. And if an acquittal is entered, the State has no further recourse. See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)(defen-dant’s option to go to the jury and “end the dispute then and there with an acquittal”). The defendant risks the possibility that the jury will convict on the charged offense rather than acquit when, again, the jury might have convicted on the lesser included offense if it had been submitted. Likewise, because, in this scenario, the evidence was legally sufficient (albeit weak), the defendant has no recourse because the conviction will be affirmed on appeal. On the other hand, if the evidence is legally insufficient to support the aggravating element of the charged offense, the State bears all the risks while the defendant bears none of the risks. If the jury decides that the evidence is indeed insufficient, then the defendant obtains an acquittal, from which the State has no recourse. But even if the jury convicts on the charged offense, the defendant is guaranteed a reformation to the lesser-included offense on appeal. Under the insufficient evidence scenario, the defendant is never in danger of being finally convicted of the charged offense. He can gamble that the jury will acquit, and even if he loses that gamble, he can settle for a lesser-included offense (via reformation on appeal).
*789Under the plurality’s approach, however, the insufficient evidence scenario carries no gamble at all; the defendant automatically wins. The jury may acquit the defendant, but even if it does not, an appellate court will do so.
Perhaps one could espouse a combination approach: that is, perhaps the parties are uncertain whether or not the evidence is sufficient. Under that scenario, the State runs the risk that the evidence is legally insufficient while the defendant runs the risk that the evidence is legally sufficient. Under a reformation without request approach, the defendant still benefits because the risks are equivalent when the evidence is sufficient and the risks favor the defendant when the evidence is insufficient. But, a combination approach is incompatible with the plurality’s reasoning. The plurality expects the state to “evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support the [lesser-included offense] charge.” Plurality op. at 782. Moreover, even if the plurality had not explicitly stated its expectation, its holding would have the same effect as will be discussed below.
This discussion brings up an important question: why must the State shoulder the consequences for failing to request a lesser-included offense? When neither party requests a lesser-included offense, both are responsible for the failure to submit one. A defendant who is convicted under those circumstances has lost. If the defendant is the losing party, then logically, he should bear the consequences of the failed gamble. Theoretically, one could argue that a defendant who fails to request a lesser-included offense and is convicted of the charged offense has forfeited his right to an acquittal of the charged offense, on the ground that the evidence shows only the lesser offense, because he could have, but chose not to, request an instruction on the lesser offense. That a defendant could procedurally default a legal sufficiency claim by failing to request relief at the trial level is not an unheard of concept. The federal courts have held with virtual uniformity that review of a criminal defendant’s claim of legally insufficient evidence is adversely affected by a defendant’s failure to move for judgment of acquittal at the trial level. United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Allen, 127 F.3d 260, 264 (2nd Cir.1997); United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 466-467 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 454, 139 L.Ed. 389 (1997); United States v. Stevens, 817 F.2d 254, 255 n. 1 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1851, 140 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1998); United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 265 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Clark, 646 F.2d 1259, 1267 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 516-517 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Guerrero, 517 F.2d 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067, 1072 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013, 108 S.Ct. 715, 98 L.Ed.2d 665 (1988). But see United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 955-956 (D.C.Cir.l998)(expressing uncertainty concerning the difference between standard of review for a preserved claim versus an unpreserved claim). I point to these authorities not to show agreement with their holdings — the D.C. Circuit (Spinner) has pointed out some legitimate conceptual difficulties with the federal approach — but to illustrate that the failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction could be viewed as the defendant’s fault (or responsibility) rather than that of the State.
Finally, the plurality’s holding places the State in a potential quandary. Under the plurality’s approach, if the State fails to request a lesser included offense instruction and the defendant is acquitted of the greater offense, the defendant will be acquitted, and the State will be barred by Double Jeopardy principles from retrying the defendant upon the lesser-included offense. See Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d *790812 (Tex.Crim.App.l990)(subsequent trial upon lesser-included offense found to be jeopardy barred). But, if the State requests the lesser-included offense, and appellant receives a conviction upon the lesser offense, an appellate court may find reversible error flowing from the submission of the lesser offense. Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)(To submit a lesser included offense, State must satisfy the Royster-Rousseau test and show that some evidence in the record exists that would permit a jury rationally to find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense). In some cases, when attempting to decide whether to request a lesser-included offense, a prosecutor may be in the position where either course (to request or not to request) may potentially result in reversible error.
The legal sufficiency review is a final, due process safeguard designed to prevent unjust convictions. The remedy for a finding of legal insufficiency should be tailored to protect a defendant’s due process right not to be convicted upon insufficient evidence while at the same according as much respect as possible to the factfinder’s verdict. This Court should not impose procedural default requirements that encourage gamesmanship and prevent effectuating the purposes for which the legal sufficiency review was designed. When an appellate court’s finding of legal insufficiency vitiates only an aggravating element of an offense that distinguishes it from a lesser-included offense, the appropriate remedy is to reform the judgment to reflect the lesser-included offense, and — assuming the punishment range for the lesser-included offense differs from that of the charged offense — remand for a new punishment hearing. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to reform the verdict to reflect the lesser-included offense that is supported by the evidence.
I respectfully dissent.