Court Opinion

ID: 9749909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:03:53.37186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:59.818278
License: Public Domain

KLINE, P. J., Dissenting.
“In law, as in life, lines have to be drawn. But the fact that a line has to be drawn somewhere does not justify its being drawn anywhere. The line must follow some direction of policy, whether rooted in logic or experience.” (Pearce v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service (1942) 315 U.S. 543, 558 [86 L.Ed. 1016, 1025, 62 S.Ct. 754] (dis. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) The constrictive standard followed by the majority in this case draws an arbitrary line that serves no sound policy and defies both logic and experience.
The majority says, in effect, that the benefit of requiring a trial court to confirm whether it genuinely intended to impose a year or more of state prison time is not worth the 15 minutes it would take to do so—even where, as here, the trial court not only failed to state reasons for the sentence imposed, as required by statute (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd, (c)), but also revealed both a desire to accord leniency and a misunderstanding of its sentencing authority.1 It is only when an appellate court is subjectively satisfied reconsideration would “probably” result in a lesser sentence that remand for resentencing is required. This grudging conception of the role of appellate courts in the criminal sentencing process cannot be squared either with the determinate sentence law or the due process clauses of the California Constitution.
In my concurring opinion in People v. Gutierrez (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1634, 1641 et seq. [278 Cal.Rptr. 748], I explained at length why a trial court’s failure to state reasons for a sentence choice requires a remand for resentencing “if there is a ‘reasonable possibility that a statement of reasons would have altered the trial judge’s conclusion or revealed reversible error.’ ”2 (Id., at p. 1645, quoting People v. May (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 836, 839 [270 Cal.Rptr. 690], review den.) I need not reiterate that explanation.
My colleagues dispute my analysis on the ground that the cases I rely upon “have mistakenly adopted a test for prejudice which was devised for *1690capital cases, and which is equivalent to the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable to deprivations of federal constitutional rights.” (Maj. opn., ante at p. 1685, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) The majority’s distinction is both irrelevant and inaccurate. First, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the “no reasonable possibility” standard depends neither on the holdings in capital cases nor on the federal Chapman standard, but on a commonsense recognition that it is subversive of justice and substantive policy to sanction a class of error which, by its nature, insulates itself from appellate review.
The majority commits a further mistake when it implies that the rule applied in capital cases is inappropriate for noncapital sentencing because of the obvious difference in the severity of the penalty and the nature of the rights affected by the outcome. The severity of the penalty is analytically unimportant because it cuts both ways. In civil cases involving no deprivation of liberty whatsoever, let alone the death penalty, the failure to provide a statement of decision where such an explanation is required is reversible per se. (Miramar Hotel Corp. v. Frank B. Hall & Co. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1126, 1129-1130 [210 Cal.Rptr. 114].) This strict rule is justified not only by the importance of the requirement that reasons be stated, both to the parties and reviewing courts, but because appellate insistence upon adherence to the legislative mandate that reasons be stated “impose[s] no substantial burden upon trial courts.” (Id., at p. 1129.) No reason appears why appellate courts should be more indulgent of the failure to state reasons for lengthening a prison term than they are for the failure to explain a ruling in a slip-and-fall case.
The majority wanders still further afield in its reliance upon cases involving review of a jury’s decision to impose the death penalty. (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 1686.) A better analogy is presented by cases in which a capital defendant challenges the trial court’s failure to state reasons for denying an automatic motion to modify the jury’s penalty verdict. As noted in Gutierrez, however, those cases are inconclusive in the present context both because they reach inconsistent results and because the sentencing procedure in death cases is markedly different from that in noncapital cases. (227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1647, citing People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 962-963 [258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330]; People v. Brown (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1247, 1263-1264 [248 Cal.Rptr. 817, 756 P.2d 204], revd. on other grounds in California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 200-201 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 792-795 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].)
*1691As I pointed out in Gutierrez, the imposition of limits and controls on trial court discretion is one of the chief purposes of the determinate sentencing law. The requirement that the trial court state reasons for its “sentence choice” is one of several statutory mechanisms for controlling judicial discretion in sentencing. (.People v. Gutierrez, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 1641.) “The Legislature undoubtedly believed that such a statement would (1) help to ensure meaningful review; (2) act as a guard against careless decisions; (3) encourage the trial judge to make sentencing choices systematically, in full recognition of the applicable considerations; and (4) ‘presence] public confidence in the decision-making process by helping to persuade the parties and the public that the decision-making is careful, reasoned and equitable.’ [Citations.]” (Id., at pp. 1641-1642.) The majority relieves trial judges of the need to comply with the statutory mandate on the basis of a highly speculative and subjective assessment as to whether compliance would likely result in a more lenient sentence, an issue unrelated to the reasons the Legislature required a statement of reasons. Compelling a trial judge to discharge the statutory responsibility to state reasons for a sentence choice may be thought unjustified where it would not likely make a difference in the sentence; but doubts about the effect of trial court compliance with the law cannot be resolved against the defendant without frustrating or compromising important legislative goals.
I believe it is neither fair nor wise to speculate whether the trial judge in this case would impose a lesser sentence if the matter were remanded, and I have no opinion whether he ought to do so. It is enough for me that a lesser sentence is possible, in that (1) the offenses described in counts 1 and 2 were committed on the same day, suggesting a “single period of aberrant behavior” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 425(a)(3); see People v. Robinson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 609, 614 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 88], review den. [remand required where facts suggested single period; error not “clearly harmless”]); (2) the court stated that “this isn’t an aggravated offense”; (3) the court described at least one of the offenses as a “garden variety” robbery; and (4) the court indicated an intent to be lenient; though, as the court was seemingly unaware, the enhancement the court purported to strike was statutorily proscribed.3
*1692II.
The majority’s restrictive standard is problematical not only because it defeats the purpose of the sentencing statutes and conflicts with the better reasoned cases interpreting those laws, but because it creates a constitutional problem.
The imposition of penal sanctions clearly implicates rights protected under the due process clauses of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a); id., § 15). The California Supreme Court has held “that the due process safeguards required for protection of an individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in the context of the principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a substantive element of one’s liberty. [Citation.] This approach presumes that when an individual is subjected to deprivatory governmental action, he always has a due process liberty interest both in fair and unprejudiced decision-making and in being treated with both respect and dignity. Accordingly, it places front and center the issue of critical concern, i.e., what procedural protections are warranted in light of governmental and private interests.” (People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 268 [158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622].)
“[Identification of the dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) the governmental interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Citations.]” (25 Cal.3d at p. 269.)
Applying the foregoing principles, the Supreme Court had little difficulty in People v. Ramirez, supra, in holding that the Director of Corrections could not exclude an inmate from the California Rehabilitation Center, which resulted in a state prison sentence, without, among other things, providing the inmate a statement of the grounds for excluding him, “access to the information the Director considered in reaching his decision, and notice of the right to respond.” (25 Cal.3d at p. 275, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in In re Jackson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 501 [233 Cal.Rptr. 911, 731 P.2d 36], the court upheld prison procedures for administratively adjudicating disciplinary charges based on confidential information because Department of Corrections regulations required a hearing officer to personally make a finding on *1693the informant’s reliability and truthfulness. The court observed, however, that due process requirements were met only if the disciplinary record “contain[s] information (confidential or otherwise) from which a reviewing court can conclude the hearing officer actually made a reliability and truthfulness determination, and that the determination is supported by evidence. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 516, italics added.)
If due process dictates that a state prison inmate excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) or subjected to discipline must be provided a statement of reasons—even though such a statement is not required to be given by statute—how can an individual be denied a statement of the reasons for a consecutive sentence imposing additional prison time— which is required by statute? The private interest affected, personal liberty, is of the highest order. The risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest is bound to be diminished if the court is required to reveal the basis of the deprivation; a requirement that does not necessitate “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” but merely rigorous appellate enforcement of an existing statutory requirement. The “dignitary interest” in informing a criminal defendant of the reasons for his sentence should be obvious. “ ‘The very essence of arbitrariness is to have one’s status redefined by the state without an adequate explanation of its reasons for doing so. . . . [T]he respect for individual autonomy that is at the foundation of procedural due process imposes a distinct obligation upon the government to explain fully its adverse status decision.’ [Citation].” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Finally, no governmental interest is served by permitting a trial judge to dispense with the need to state reasons for a “sentencing choice.” On the contrary, enforcement of this requirement is essential not only to permit meaningful judicial review and prevent careless sentencing, but to preserve public confidence that criminal sentencing is “careful, reasoned and equitable.” (People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437, 450 [229 Cal.Rptr. 131, 722 P.2d 905].)
It is irrelevant to the due process analysis adopted by our Supreme Court whether imposition of the duty to provide a statement of reasons will likely result in a more favorable determination. As stated in Ramirez, even in cases in which giving the inmate a statement of the grounds for excluding him or her from CRC and an opportunity to respond “is unlikely to affect the outcome of the decision, it nevertheless promotes important dignitary values that underlie due process. . . . ‘Only through [oral] participation can the individual gain a meaningful understanding of what is happening to her and why it is happening. Moreover, providing the opportunity to react—to register concern, dissatisfaction, and even frustration and despair—is the best method to promote the feeling that, notwithstanding the substantive *1694result, one has been treated humanely and with dignity by one’s government.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramirez, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 275.)
I agree with my colleagues that the judgment of conviction must be affirmed. For the foregoing reasons, however, I would remand the matter for resentencing.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 4, 1994, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 14, 1994. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The court’s erroneous understanding is described, post, at p. 1691, fn. 3.

I also explained why, if not bound by existing case law, I would make error of this type reversible per se. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1646-1649.)

The trial judge stated that he was striking the “arming clause” of the subordinate offense charged in count 1 under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), as a matter of “grace [or] discretion,” apparently because the codefendant merely displayed the weapon and the absence of any indication appellant “knew or had some previous knowledge that he was going to use the weapon as he did.” As the Attorney General concedes, the trial court lacked discretion to impose this enhancement, because the subordinate offense of robbery, with an “arming clause” pursuant to section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), is not a “violent felony” within the meaning of section 667.5.