Court Opinion

ID: 9679721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:03:43.471726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:18.806138
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
concurring opinion.
I concur in the principal opinion. I agree with its analysis of the language of section 379.203.1. But, as so interpreted, I question the wisdom of the statute.
The statute requires coverage of “bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death.” The principal opinion reads this phrase to include sickness or disease, whether bodily or mental. The Court’s decision is in line with contemporary notions of the relationship of the mind to the body.
But consider this: If Derousse and others like her have suffered an injury, sickness or disease, then surely we want them to get well. If the injury is a sickness or disease of the mind, and it is compensable, will the prospect of compensation help them get well?
What Derousse experienced — a body landing on the hood of her car — undoubtedly was shocking and upsetting. A person heals from this injury by the mind’s marvelous ability to forget. When the memory of an awful event fades, the person gets better.
But litigation with the goal of being compensated for the injury requires or encourages the victim to keep the memory fresh. Is that good public policy?
The policy implications of today’s decision, of course, are beyond the scope of this Court’s interpretation of the statute. One could speculate that the General Assembly, when it wrote section 379.203.1 many years ago, never meant to cover sickness or disease unless it was “bodily.” But all we know is what words the legislators’ bodies put on paper, for which their bodies expressed their votes. Who knows what was in their minds?
Perhaps it would be wise for today’s legislators to put their minds to this matter.