Court Opinion

ID: 9754956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:19:34.12679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:01.011942
License: Public Domain

DUFRESNE, Active Retired Justice1
(concurring).
In the summer of 1960, the defendant, Leo Carrier, was prosecuted in a civil complaint for being the father of the prospec*1052tive child of Donna Arsenault, the plaintiff, pursuant to the then existing bastardy statutory provisions (19 M.R.S.A., §§ 251-262). For the sum of seven hundred and fifty ($750.00) dollars, which the present plaintiff acknowledged receiving in full settlement of the case, a docket entry was recorded on August 30, 1960 which read: “Neither party. No further action for same cause, by agreement of counsel.”
The plaintiff, in her present complaint against the same Leo Carrier under date of May 8, 1974, notwithstanding the reference settlement of the ease, now seeks a paternity determination respecting her minor child, Tony Arsenault, born January 20,1961, pursuant to our Uniform Act on Paternity (19 M.R.S.A., §§ 271-287), praying simultaneously for an order of support of the child, together with an allowance of reasonable counsel fees.
To counteract the defendant’s affirmative defense that the subject matter of the present complaint had been previously adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction (res judicata), the plaintiff sought by motion permission to intervene for the benefit of her minor child, alleging
“that the child is entitled to be heard in this action as rights are available to said child exclusive of the right of the Plaintiff, even though the Plaintiff is contributing to the support of said child,”
and praying
“that some suitable person may be appointed as guardian ad litem for said child, including the Plaintiff, so that said cause of action may be finalized so that the child may have the benefit of the provisions of T. 19 M.R.S.A. § 272 et seq.” We note that the plaintiff was in viola-
tion of Rule 24(c), M.R.Civ.P., which provides that the motion to intervene “shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.” It is obvious, however, that the plaintiff was attempting to present, with her complaint for relief as mother of the child, as an alternative remedy, the minor child’s identical complaint for the same relief, should the defendant’s affirmative defense of res judicata prove insurmountable in her own action. It would have been better practice if the plaintiff had, as provided by the rule, accompanied her motion to intervene by a separate complaint in the name of the child “pro ami.” Thus, there is but one complaint in this case, and that is, that of the mother in her own right. We may, however, construe the granting of the motion to intervene as an allowance of the joinder of the minor child as plaintiff, through his mother as guardian ad litem, to prosecute the mother’s complaint pursuant to Rule 20, M.R.Civ.P.
Realizing the omission, counsel for the plaintiff sought to have the judgment of dismissal of “this complaint” as to both the plaintiff in her own right and also as guardian ad litem for Tony Arsenault amended
“so as to allow the Plaintiff [to] frame a Complaint which will state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff may not do so because of the defense of res adjudicata.”
This motion to amend the judgment was denied, the Justice below ruling that the affirmative defense of res judicata barred any relief.
I agree that there was error in this adjudication. But, with due respect to the majority of my colleagues, I do believe that the plaintiff is entitled to a resolution of the prime issue in this case, whether the plaintiff mother is barred from relief in her own right to seek support for her child from the putative father, because of her previous settlement of the case. I believe that she has, not only the right, but under certain circumstances the duty, to prosecute the father of her minor child to obtain the necessary support for such person incapacitated on account of his nonage, any previous release of the father from his duty to support his bastard child until majority without express legislative sanction and without court approval being against public policy.
Our former bastardy statute, this Court has said in Roy v. Poulin, 105 Me. 411, 74 A. 923 (1909),
*1053“converts an existing moral obligation of the father into a legal obligation, enforceable like any other legal obligation upon the obligor . . . The father of an illegitimate child is certainly under a moral obligation to assist the mother in its maintenance. Our statute makes the obligation legal and enforceable. The moral duty is made a legal one, . .”
The Legislature in unmistakable terms has equated the legal duty of the father of the bastard child to that of the father of the child born in wedlock.
“The father of a child which is or may be born out of wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother’s pregnancy and confinement and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses of the child and reasonable counsel fees, for the prosecution of paternity proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied) 19 M.R.S.A., § 271.
Under section 272 of the Paternity Act, not only may paternity be determined upon the complaint of the mother, child or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child, but, if paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to the laws of this State, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same or other proceedings by the mother, child or the public authority which has furnished or may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support or funeral expenses, and by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they have furnished the samé.
Having in mind the broad powers of enforcement enacted by the Legislature to compel the natural father of a bastard child to meet his statutory obligations towards his child, for whose welfare such comprehensive legislation was prescribed, it is no wonder that this Court in Thut v. Grant, Me., 281 A.2d 1 (1971) ruled that both complaints, by the mother in her own right and by the mother as next friend of her minor child born out of wedlock and on his behalf, could stand together in a joint complaint.
I do recognize as this Court did in Thut, supra, that under the common law of this State the putative father owed no duty of support to his illegitimate child nor any duty to assist the mother of such child in such support. The duty imposed is wholly statutory. Id. at page 3. The former bastardy law imposed the legal duty of support on the putative father and the present paternity law continued the same, expanding, however, the class entitled to the enforcement thereof.
Whatever may have been the law prior thereto, the Legislature of 1959 provided the same flexibility to a decree of support of a child born out of wedlock under the old bastardy law as was the case of decrees of the divorce court respecting support of children of divorced parents.
“The court, upon petition of either the mother or the adjudged father, and upon hearing, limited to the issue of proper maintenance, may alter, amend or suspend any such order, or make a new order in lieu thereof, when it appears that justice so requires. The court may order the adjudged father to pay to the court for the mother sufficient money for the prosecution or defense of such petition. * Public Laws, 1959, c. 39.
The Paternity Act continues the same flexibility in section 275 where it is stated that “[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support.”
We said in White v. Shalit, 136 Me. 65, 1 A.2d 765 (1938) that “[tjhere can be no final judgment as to infant children, in a divorce case. * * * Minor children of 'divorced parents are wards of the court. * * * Theirs are new legal statuses. * * * Due attention may be given to agreements between the parties, but control of the court is not abrogated.”
Again, this Court stated in Greenwood v. Greenwood, 113 Me. 226, 229, 93 A. 360, 361 (1915):
*1054“The State has an interest in the welfare of the child, and in all divorce proceedings that welfare is held to be superi- or to the wishes of the parent, and governs the court in its decrees as to custody and maintenance. This jealous regard for the rights of the child should look askance at contracts between parents attempting to shift the legal responsibility. The relation between husband and wife is one thing; that between parent and child is quite another.”
This strong state policy favoring the promotion of adequate child support in the case of children of divorced parents, anchored upon the standard of what is in the best interest and welfare of the child, is equally applicable in the case of children born out of wedlock. As we said in Pendexter v. Pendexter, Me., 363 A.2d 743, 748 (1976), “it is most important that the judicial process within delegated legislative authority be given such flexibility as will allow implementation of the State’s role of parens pat-riae in promoting the best interests and welfare of minor children,” especially, I may add, in dealing with proceedings in which the support of children born out of wedlock is involved.
Notwithstanding the statement in Thut, supra, at page 6, that under the old bastardy statutes the child born out of wedlock was merely the indirect beneficiary of rights afforded to his mother, because he had no right to enforce them except in an action brought by his mother under her own right, such indirect benefit, nevertheless, is the major purpose of such legislation. While bastardy statutes provide relief to the mother in payment for her expenses of delivery, nursing, medicine and medical attendance during the period of her sickness and convalescence, together with moneys in aid to maintain the child, in fact the child is the prime beneficiary, as the filiation decree with support order is ultimately for his benefit. See State v. Bowen, 80 Wash.2d 808, 498 P.2d 877 (1972); Fox v. Hohenshelt, 19 Or.App. 617, 528 P.2d 1376, 1380 (1974).
The parents of an illegitimate child cannot bind themselves to avoid the duty of support which the law imposes upon them for the benefit of the child, except as authorized by the Legislature, upon approval of the court. Section 283 of the Uniform Act on Paternity so provides. Such was merely declaratory of existing law. In the instant case, the record reveals that the mother’s 1960 bastardy proceeding terminated with the docket entry: “Neither party. No further action for same cause, by agreement of counsel.” The child was not represented in the action by guardian ad litem and the settlement was not approved by the court.
It is true that the old bastardy statute (19 M.R.S.A., § 258) gave veto power to the overseers of the poor of the town interested in the support of the mother or child over any settlement between the parties. I do concede that this Court said in Cook v. Cook, 132 Me. 119, 121, 167 A. 852, 853 (1933), that “[ujntil and unless such written objection is made [by the overseers of the poor of the town interested in the support], the parties have an absolute right to make a settlement on their own terms, . . . ” This reference by the court to an unfettered right in the parties to release the putative father from his obligation of support toward his bastard child, in the context of the issue before the court in that case, must be viewed as gratuitous and mere dictum. It loses whatever legal efficacy it might have had at the time of its pronouncement, when one considers the progressive legislative development of a strong public policy of promoting adequate support of children born out of wedlock, even to the extent that it equate that of children of divorced parents as evinced by the 1959 legislation.
The authorities generally agree that contracts between the mother and natural father of a child born or to be born out of wedlock, even when the latter’s relationship is only putative, are void as being against public policy, except when approved by a court of competent jurisdiction, and do not bar a subsequent action for support of the child either by the mother or the minor child through proper representation. See. Mayfield v. Commonwealth ex rel. Phelps, *1055546 S.W.2d 433 (Ky., 1977); Everett v. Everett, 57 Cal.App.3d 65, 129 Cal.Rptr. 8 (1976); Fox v. Hohenshelt, 19 Or.App. 617, 528 P.2d 1376 (1974); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash.2d 808, 498 P.2d 877 (1972); Walker v. Walker, 266 So.2d 385 (Fla.App., 1972); Lawrence v. Boyd, 207 Kan. 776, 486 P.2d 1394 (1971); Reynolds v. Richardson, 62 Tenn.App. 269, 462 S.W.2d 233 (1970).
Cases such as Means v. Hoar, 110 Me. 409, 86 A. 772 (1913) and Gendron v. Hovey, 98 Me. 139, 56 A. 583 (1903), which give full force and effect to the instant docket entry of “ ‘neither party, no further action [for the] same cause’ ” as an absolute bar to subsequent litigation, are not controlling in an area where public policy prohibits the same. The plaintiff undoubtedly would be barred to relitigate issues already adjudicated, which are solely of her own concern, such as her expenses for the pregnancy, but, where the child’s support is involved, she cannot make a binding agreement which would divest the court of jurisdiction therein, even at her own suit, unless the agreement were approved by the court.
So far as the minor child’s independent right to enforce the duty of support against his natural father, even though he be the fruit of an extra-marital relationship, I agree fully with my colleagues that such right does exist.
The argument that the putative father may be the target of a multiplicity of suits is not persuasive, since the rules of civil procedure are made applicable in so far as they may appropriately apply to any action of support or paternity under the Paternity Act. 19 M.R.S.A., § 286. Intervention and joinder to get all the parties and all the issues before the court would be available.
The mother’s release of the defendant in the instant case is no bar to relief for the benefit of the child on the issue of paternity or support. In Buzzell v. Buzzell, Me., 235 A.2d 828 (1967), we said that
“it has been almost universally held that a determination with respect to paternity in such a case [divorce case], the child not being a party, is not binding upon the child in any later action brought by him or in his behalf involving his legitimacy or rights of inheritance.”
The same rule applies in any subsequent litigation in the name of the child where the bastard child was not represented in previous bastardy proceedings between the parents.
There is no privity between parent and child in regard to their personal rights, and their separate action to enforce their respective rights will not be a bar, when reduced to judgment, against the other’s rights to maintain his or her own action under the doctrine of res judicata. See Bernard v. Merrill, 91 Me. 358, 40 A. 136 (1898).
Furthermore, a minor child may prosecute his own action by next friend and as next friend the person authorized to represent the minor has full authority to settle or discharge a right of action on behalf of the minor and to consent to an entry of the appropriate judgment, provided the court is sufficiently informed of the case to act intelligently in the matter and approves the settlement. See Ayer v. Androscoggin and Kennebec Railway Company, 131 Me. 381, 163 A. 270 (1932).
I agree with the Court below that it had the power to appoint, as it did, the mother as guardian ad litem to represent the interests of her minor child in her pending action. Maine National Bank v. Petrlik, Me., 282 A.2d 660 (1971).
I reiterate the language of Pettengill v. Gilman, 126 Vt. 387, 232 A.2d 773 (1967), as approved in the reference case:
“The law’s careful concern for the representation of an infant in court is equally protective of the manner in which his rights are to be determined.
“It has been generally held that the authority of counsel and guardian appointed to represent a minor in litigation does not include the power to submit his case on conceded facts. This general rule applies unless it appears the facts agreed upon are to the advantage of the infant, or at least do not jeopardize the infant’s rights. Except where the court is satis*1056fied these safeguards prevail, facts which might be the subject of concession on the part of adults should be proved when asserted against infants.”
From this record, it does not appear that the plaintiff is in conflict of interest with her minor son and that his interest in his mother’s claim for his support from the defendant will be jeopardized by her representation. However, on remand, it may be that the defendant may wish to move the court for a formal joinder of the minor son as plaintiff to set at rest any future litigation beyond the instant one.
I concur in sustaining the appeal.

. Mr. Justice Dufresne sat at oral argument and participated in consultation while he was Chief Justice, and, on order of his successor, Mr. Chief Justice McKusick, was empowered and authorized to continue his participation in the case in his capacity of Active Retired Justice.