Court Opinion

ID: 9410670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 05:00:37.537286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:59.304091
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 21-3162
ARTHUR GRADY,
                                                Petitioner-Appellant,
                                 v.

CHARLES TRUITT,
                                               Respondent-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
           No. 20-cv-02530 — Mary M. Rowland, Judge.
                     ____________________

       ARGUED JULY 12, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 20, 2023
                 ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit
Judges.
   WOOD, Circuit Judge. A state-court jury convicted Arthur
Grady of first-degree murder after a fatal shooting. At the
same time, in response to a special-verdict form, the jury
found that the State had not proved that Grady was the trig-
german. Contending that the special-verdict finding negated
the State’s sole theory of guilt, Grady seeks a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). He does so through the lens
2                                                   No. 21-3162

of ineﬀective assistance of counsel, because his direct-appeal
lawyer raised only two issues on appeal, both of which Grady
regards as significantly weaker than the inconsistent-verdict
argument. But a careful look at the record satisfies us that the
state appellate court’s rejection of this contention was not an
unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). We therefore aﬃrm the district court’s denial of
Grady’s petition.
                                I
    We rely on the state court’s account of the facts, as we see
nothing to disturb the usual presumption of correctness. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In 2009, Grady and his roommate Aa-
ron Bronson ran into the victim at a casino in Indiana. Later
in the evening, they went to the victim’s Chicago home, where
he was shot and killed just outside. People v. Grady, 2019 IL
App (1st) 163012-U ¶ 3. Bronson cooperated with the state
and gave one account of how the victim died; Grady’s story
was significantly diﬀerent.
    Grady testified that on the night of the shooting, he briefly
stopped at the victim’s roulette table to investigate a commo-
tion; he and Bronson then decided to leave the casino. He got
into Bronson’s truck and quickly fell asleep as Bronson drove.
When the truck suddenly stopped, he was jostled awake. He
then saw Bronson get out of the truck and approach someone
on the sidewalk. Grady heard two gunshots, moved to the
driver’s seat, and drove the truck in reverse down the street.
He parked the truck two blocks away. Realizing he did not
have his cell phone, he decided to walk to a gas station to
make a call; when he got there, the police detained him
briefly. He later went home to sleep and was arrested the next
afternoon.
No. 21-3162                                                    3

    Bronson’s account diﬀered in a few crucial respects,
though it was largely consistent with Grady’s. Bronson swore
that he did not shoot the victim. He recalled that Grady ap-
proached him at the casino and suggested that they rob the
victim and his friends, who Grady believed had won $30,000
at roulette. Bronson agreed, and they followed the victim
from the casino to his Chicago home in Bronson’s truck. When
the victim got out of his car, Grady left the truck and ap-
proached the victim, who knocked Grady to the ground after
a brief struggle. Bronson said that he was the one who then
reversed the truck, heard gunshots, and left. At that point
Bronson returned to the apartment that he and Grady some-
times shared. Around 6:00 a.m. Grady returned, told Bronson
that he had lost his phone and gun (which he worried might
have his fingerprints) and went out again to find them.
   By the time the police were able to respond to the shoot-
ing, the victim was dead. Searching the scene, they found
Grady’s cell phone, which they used, along with surveillance
video from the casino, to track him down and arrest him.
They also searched Grady’s apartment, where they discov-
ered a gun. An expert witness later testified that it was the
weapon that was used in the shooting.
    At trial, the State pursued two theories of Grady’s criminal
liability. It devoted almost all its attention to the theory that
Grady personally shot the victim during a botched robbery
attempt, with Bronson aiding him as the driver. But the trial
judge also instructed the jury that Grady could be convicted
of first-degree murder if he or “one for whose conduct he is
legally responsible” killed the victim. The judge explained to
the jury that Grady was legally responsible for the conduct of
a person whom Grady aided or assisted in the planning or
4                                                   No. 21-3162

commission of an oﬀense like armed robbery. During closing
argument the State followed up: “Even if you don’t believe
[Grady was] the shooter … he is guilty of first degree murder.
Guilty because he played a role.” The jury convicted Grady of
first-degree murder. But in answering a special verdict that
was needed for a proposed sentencing enhancement, it found
that the State did not prove that Grady had personally dis-
charged the firearm that killed the victim. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(d)(iii). The court sentenced Grady to 60 years’ impris-
onment. Bronson, in contrast, received a sentence of only 24
years, presumably thanks to his cooperation.
    On direct appeal, Grady unsuccessfully argued (through
counsel) that the trial court wrongly sentenced him to 60 years
in light of his minimal criminal history, potential for rehabili-
tation, and Bronson’s 24-year sentence. Acting pro se, he then
tried a state postconviction petition that, as relevant here, al-
leged ineﬀective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to
argue that the evidence was insuﬃcient to convict him of the
murder. Grady argued that the State’s theory was premised
on Bronson’s testimony that Grady was the shooter, yet the
special verdict declining to find that Grady pulled the trigger
necessarily meant that the jury had rejected Bronson’s ac-
count. The state circuit court summarily dismissed Grady’s
petition. People v. Grady, 2019 IL App (1st) 163012-U ¶ 1.
    Moving on to his state postconviction appeal, Grady, with
the aid of counsel, focused on his claim that direct-appeal
counsel was ineﬀective for “failing to challenge the suﬃciency
of the evidence.” The evidence at trial fell short, he contended,
for three related reasons. First, the “police stopped Grady mo-
ments after the shooting and found neither a weapon nor rob-
bery proceeds on him.” Second, “the key evidence against
No. 21-3162                                                    5

him was the significantly impeached” and “self-serving testi-
mony of” Bronson, who had ample reason to lie. Third, no fo-
rensic or eyewitness testimony established that Grady was the
shooter, and the State’s case relied on “inferences from minor
circumstantial evidence.” Grady added that counsel’s “erro-
neous strategy [was] especially noticeable given that Grady’s
jury expressed doubt about the evidence, asking multiple
questions over the course of … deliberation, at the conclusion
of which it rendered a split verdict finding Grady guilty of
murder but finding that the allegation that Grady personally
discharged a weapon had not been proven.”
     The Illinois Appellate Court aﬃrmed the dismissal after
concluding that the evidence presented against Grady was
“overwhelming” and thus more than suﬃcient for a guilty
verdict. The court added that because a suﬃciency challenge
to the evidence would not have had a reasonable probability
of success on appeal, Grady could not demonstrate the neces-
sary prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
692 (1984). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Grady’s peti-
tion for leave to appeal. People v. Grady, 140 N.E.3d 266 (Table)
(Ill. 2020).
    Grady then petitioned for federal collateral relief pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argued that his counsel on direct ap-
peal had been ineﬀective for failing to raise a suﬃciency chal-
lenge based on the alleged discrepancy between the general
verdict of guilt and the special-verdict finding. He reasoned
that pulling the trigger was an “essential element” of his mur-
der conviction, given the State’s decision at trial eﬀectively to
limit itself to the theory that Grady was the shooter. On that
assumption, he contended, it was “metaphysically impossible
to reconcile” the jury’s verdicts. At a minimum, he said, this
6                                                 No. 21-3162

theory was far stronger than the ones state appellate counsel
had chosen to raise. (Grady’s petition included other claims,
but they were not certified for appeal.)
    Applying the “doubly deferential” standard of review to
ineﬀective-assistance claims under section 2254, see Knowles
v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009), the district judge de-
nied the petition. She reasoned that Grady’s insuﬃcient-evi-
dence claim had no merit under Illinois law, which allows for
a person charged as a principal to be convicted upon evidence
that the person was an aider or abettor. See 720 ILCS 5/5-2;
Ashburn v. Korte, 761 F.3d 741, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). The judge
concluded that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably ap-
plied Strickland in ruling that direct-appeal counsel compe-
tently declined to argue a doomed position—namely, that the
special verdict meant that the murder conviction lacked suﬃ-
cient evidence. The judge did, however, issue a certificate of
appealability because, she said, reasonable jurists could diﬀer
on whether the state appellate court adequately addressed the
implication of the inconsistent verdicts under Strickland. We
appointed Kelly Mannion Ellis, of the firm of Winston &
Strawn, to act as appellate counsel in this court, and we thank
her for her service to her client and the court.
                              II
    On appeal, Grady maintains that the special verdict ne-
gated an essential element of the State’s theory of the mur-
der—that Grady was the shooter—and that the State’s evi-
dence was thus insuﬃcient as a matter of law. This is a hard
road to travel. We are empowered to grant relief only if the
state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
No. 21-3162                                                      7

Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);
see also Saxon v. Lashbrook, 873 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir. 2017).
Worse (from Grady’s standpoint), federal collateral review of
ineﬀective assistance claims is “doubly deferential,” because
federal courts must give “both the state court and the defense
attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Minnick v. Winkleski, 15
F.4th 460, 468 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12,
15 (2013)).
    As a threshold matter, the State contends for the first time
on appeal that Grady’s claim that appellate counsel was inef-
fective for failing to raise an inconsistent-verdicts challenge is
procedurally defaulted, because he did not fully present it in
the state postconviction proceedings. Rather, the State insists,
Grady’s claim focused on his appellate counsel’s failure to ar-
gue that the State’s case was insuﬃcient because it relied on
the “impeached and self-serving testimony” of Bronson, “in-
ferences from minor circumstantial evidence,” and the ab-
sence of robbery proceeds.
    The State may be correct that Grady’s claim is procedur-
ally defaulted. To preserve a claim for federal collateral re-
view, a petitioner must “fairly present the operative facts and
legal principles controlling the claim” through a full round of
state-court review, with the factual and legal substance re-
maining “essentially the same” when the petitioner moves to
federal court. Blackmon v. Williams, 823 F.3d 1088, 1100
(7th Cir. 2016). Here, however, the focus of Grady’s argument
has shifted. At the post-conviction stage, he stressed the lack
of evidence at trial. He mentioned the inconsistent verdicts,
but only to emphasize weakness in the evidence, rather than
to argue that the inconsistency itself established that the mur-
der conviction is flawed. Now Grady is saying that as a matter
8                                                     No. 21-3162

of Illinois law, the jury’s special verdict negates an essential
element of Illinois first-degree murder, and thus the guilty
verdict cannot stand.
    These are two diﬀerent, albeit related, points, as the Su-
preme Court itself recognized when it cautioned courts
against confusing suﬃciency-of-the-evidence review with
“the problems caused by inconsistent verdicts.” United States
v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984); see also People v. Rosalez, 2021
IL App (2d) 200086, ¶ 171) (“A suﬃciency challenge is inde-
pendent of any interplay between the general verdict and the
special interrogatory.”).
    But procedural default is not a jurisdictional argument,
and so it can be lost if a litigant does not raise it properly. That
is what happened here. Procedural default is an aﬃrmative
defense, Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 515 (7th Cir. 2004),
but the State did not raise it until its appellate brief in this
court. The State had thus waived the right to rely on that de-
fense. It knew that Grady had argued in the district court that
the jury “render[ed] inconsistent verdicts that were meta-
physically impossible to reconcile.” In the face of this clear
reference to the inconsistent-verdict point, the State did noth-
ing more than briefly acknowledge the argument. It did not
mention procedural default. And this is not because the State
was unaware of procedural default. In the district court, it ar-
gued that Grady procedurally defaulted a diﬀerent claim (one
not certified for appeal). We have ruled that raising the de-
fense of default for one claim but not for another evinces an
intent to waive the omitted one. Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d
660, 669 (7th Cir. 2012). In short, we will reach the merits of
Grady’s argument.
No. 21-3162                                                     9

    Unfortunately for Grady, his argument founders at this fi-
nal stage. The first problem is that inconsistent verdicts are
generally not in themselves suﬃcient to justify federal collat-
eral relief. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 69. The reason, Powell ex-
plained, is that seemingly inconsistent verdicts can favor ei-
ther the defense or the government, but only the defense can
take an appeal; the government normally cannot because of
double-jeopardy constraints. This asymmetry “militates
against review of such convictions at the defendant’s behest.”
Id. at 65.
   Second, in this particular case, the state court reasonably
ruled that direct-appeal counsel was not deficient for declin-
ing to advance an inconsistent-verdict challenge, because the
omitted argument was meritless as a matter of state law. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). At the time of Grady’s trial, Illinois law
provided that defendants could not challenge convictions
solely on the basis that they were inconsistent with acquittals
on other charges. People v. Jones, 797 N.E.2d 640, 647 (Ill. 2003)
(adopting Powell rule). Illinois courts have since recognized
that this rule applies to “personal discharge” interrogatories
such as the one in Grady’s case. See People v. Alexander, 2017
IL App (1st) 142170, ¶ 38. Under Powell and Jones, Grady’s in-
consistent-verdicts theory would not have had a “reasonable
shot” of succeeding. Walker v. Griﬃn, 835 F.3d 705, 709 (7th
Cir. 2016). Thus, it was reasonable for the state court to con-
clude that Grady could not show either defective perfor-
mance or prejudice for purposes of Strickland.
   Grady responds that the inconsistent-verdicts argument
was nonetheless more promising than the points appellate
counsel did raise. A competent appellate lawyer, he urges,
would have tried to take advantage of an exception to Powell
10                                                   No. 21-3162

(and presumably Jones) that some federal courts have recog-
nized. This exception allows acquittal where a special-verdict
finding negates an essential element of an oﬀense. E.g., United
States v. Randolph, 794 F.3d 602, 612 (6th Cir. 2015). But neither
the Illinois courts nor this court (let alone the Supreme Court)
has adopted this approach.
    Finally, even if there were such an exception, it would not
help Grady. Illinois courts have held that personal discharge
of a firearm is not an element of first-degree murder under
Illinois law. Alexander, 2017 IL App (1st) 142170, ¶ 47. While
the State’s primary theory at trial was that Grady was the
principal and Bronson the accomplice, the prosecution did
just enough to preserve an accountability theory under which
the jury could find Grady guilty of murder if he aided and
abetted Bronson. It so argued at closing; the trial court in-
structed the jury that it could consider that theory; and Grady
lodged no timely objection. With that much in place, we can
see how the two verdicts can be reconciled. The jury could
have credited most of Bronson’s evidence, while at the same
time drawing the line at his eﬀort to convince them that he
did not fire the fatal shots. Ample evidence showed that
Grady and Bronson were accomplices. The jury may simply
have thought that Bronson was the triggerman and Grady
was guilty as an accomplice. That reconciles its finding that
Grady did not shoot the victim with its finding of his ultimate
guilt. There is no reason to think that this reconciliation was
not apparent to appellate counsel—or at least so the Illinois
Appellate Court reasonably could have concluded.
   We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court
denying Grady’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.