Court Opinion

ID: 9949191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 01:00:29.08855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:42.713679
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20361           Document: 87-1         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/08/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                  March 8, 2024
                                    No. 23-20361                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                         Clerk

United States of America,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Laqwentis Lakeith Adams,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:21-CR-240-1
                  ______________________________

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
      The district court in this case found that Defendant-Appellant
Laqwentis Lakeith Adams committed five violations of supervised release
and sentenced him to an eight-month imprisonment term, followed by fifty-
two months of supervised release. On appeal, Adams claims the district court
erred by (1) not providing him an opportunity to speak during the revocation
hearing, and (2) imposing a more burdensome condition in its written

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20361            Document: 87-1          Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/08/2024

                                        No. 23-20361

judgment than the court orally pronounced at the hearing. For the following
reasons, we VACATE Adams’s sentence including the challenged
condition, and we REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the district
court should provide Adams with an opportunity to allocute before imposing
a new sentence and should conform its written judgment with its oral
pronouncement, consistent with this opinion.1
                   I.     Factual and Procedural Background
       Adams was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
district court sentenced Adams to 140 months in prison, which was later
reduced to 120 months, and five years of supervised release. He began
serving his term of supervised release in September 2019.
       Between March 2021 and June 2023, Adams’s probation officer2 filed
three reports stating Adams had violated the conditions of his supervised
release in a variety of ways. The June 2023 report stated Adams had tested
positive for and admitted to using cocaine and had failed to follow
instructions to show proof of employment.                       The probation officer
recommended no action in response so that Adams could continue to
participate in outpatient drug treatment. However, the district court ordered
issuance of a summons. The probation officer submitted a petition for
summons, which alleged five violations: (1) possession and use of cocaine in
May 2023, (2) possession and use of marijuana in March 2022, (3) failure to
       _____________________
       1
          On appeal, Adams challenges only his sentence and the condition of his
supervised release requiring him “not [to] use or possess alcohol,” so our decision is
limited to those issues and does not affect any other portions of the district court’s
judgment.
       2
           Adams had at least three different probation officers while on supervised release.

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follow instructions to show proof of employment, (4) failure to provide
requested financial information, and (5) failure to work regularly at a lawful
occupation.
       At a final revocation hearing, Adams pleaded true to the first two
violations and not true to the others. The district court heard testimony from
the probation officer and two defense witnesses. Defense counsel also
proffered testimony from an additional witness and submitted documentary
evidence. Both parties recommended termination of supervised release. The
government recommended a three-month prison term. Defense counsel did
not oppose that recommendation insofar as the court found that “there
need[ed] to be a sanction for the positive drug screens.” Adams was never
offered the opportunity to speak on his own behalf at the hearing.
       The district court found that all of the alleged violations were true.
Because all of the violations were Grade C, the district court stated that the
recommended sentencing range was five to eleven months. The district
court revoked supervised release and imposed an eight-month prison
sentence followed by fifty-two months of supervised release. During the
hearing, the district court stated: “[t]he conditions of supervision under the
recommenced term of supervised release will be the same conditions as those
that were directed in the original judgment.” Defense counsel did not object
to any supervisory conditions related to alcohol or to the fact that Adams was
not given the opportunity to speak on his own behalf. Adams timely
appealed.
                            II.    Jurisdiction
       The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We
have jurisdiction over the district court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Although Adams has been released from
prison since filing this appeal, he is still serving supervised release, so we

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continue to have jurisdiction. See United States v. Lares-Meraz, 452 F.3d 352,
355 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
                             III.    Discussion
   A. Allocution
       Adams first argues that the district court erred by denying him his
right to speak at his revocation hearing (also called “allocution”). See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii), 32.1(b)(2)(E). As Adams concedes, he failed
to preserve this issue by objecting at the hearing, so we review for plain error.
See United States v. Chavez-Perez, 844 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 2016).
       Plain-error review has four prongs: (1) “[the] defendant must
establish that an error was committed,” (2) “the defendant must show that
the error is clear or obvious,” (3) “the defendant must show that the error
affected his substantial rights,” and (4) “the court must determine whether
it should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Jackson, 7 F.4th 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Both parties agree that Adams has established the first three prongs, and we
agree as well. Thus, only the fourth prong is at issue in this case.
       We “ordinarily remand for resentencing if a district court commits
plain error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights by denying the right
of allocution.” Chavez-Perez, 844 F.3d at 543 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). But “reversal is not automatic.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Whether we choose to exercise our discretion
to correct the error “is a highly fact-specific inquiry involving a range of
factors.” United States v. Palacios, 844 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, if a defendant “had a
prior opportunity to allocute, or . . . fails to explain what exactly he . . . would

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have said during allocution that might mitigate the sentence, then the case is
one of those limited class of cases in which we will decline to exercise our
discretion to correct the error.” United States v. Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d 602,
606 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       Adams’s case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas after
his original sentencing, so he had no prior opportunity to allocute in front of
this district court. During the revocation hearing, Adams did not say a single
word to the judge. Those factors alone distinguish this case from others in
which we have declined to exercise our discretion to correct the error, and
they suggest remand is appropriate in this case. See id. at 607 (“[Defendant]
was never given any opportunity whatsoever to speak to the court, which is
unlike any of the cases in which we have declined to exercise our discretion
to correct the error.”); United States v. Figueroa-Coello, 920 F.3d 260, 265–
66 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (remanding when, at the defendant’s first
sentencing hearing, the judge and the defendant never interacted directly
until after sentencing).
       Adams has also provided us with “a sufficiently detailed and specific
description of mitigating facts to be offered at allocution,” which further
counsels in favor of remand. See Figueroa-Coello, 920 F.3d at 266; cf. United
States v. Magwood, 445 F.3d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 2006) (declining to remand
when the defendant “d[id] not furnish any information about what he would
have allocuted to that might have mitigated his sentence”). Adams’s
proffered allocution contains meaningful details that his attorney did not
present to the court, including that Adams had “completed a group
session . . . for drug treatment, and had never missed a day over the course of
a year.”   Notably, Adams’s participation in outpatient drug treatment
influenced his probation officer to initially recommend that no action be
taken in response to the violations alleged in the June 2023 report. Defense

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                                     No. 23-20361

counsel did not mention Adams’s commitment to and successes in drug
treatment at all during his argument at the revocation hearing.3
        Adams also would have told the court about the barriers he faced in
finding work, and how he persisted and recently secured a full-time job where
he was paid by check.4 Although defense counsel submitted some evidence
to that effect, including a letter with a paystub from Adams’s new job, the
court did not hear from Adams about his efforts to overcome the challenges
he faced in obtaining legitimate employment. “The right of allocution exists
because counsel may not be able to provide the ‘same quantity or quality of
mitigating evidence’ as the defendant at sentencing.” Figueroa-Coello, 920
F.3d at 268 (quoting Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606). In this case, Adams
deserved the opportunity to tell the court about his efforts, in his own voice,
before the court determined his sentence.
        In sum, Adams was denied the opportunity to say anything on his own
behalf during his first appearance before this district court. If he had been
given the opportunity to allocute, he would have offered details that directly
mitigated his violations but were not included in his attorney’s argument.
This suggests his allocution likely would have affected the sentence he
received. See Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606 (reversing when defense counsel
“did not give the detail, expression, or expansion” regarding the mitigating
evidence that the defendant would have provided during allocution); cf.

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        3
         Adams’s probation officer testified at the hearing that Adams had been attending
outpatient drug treatment since last year, but defense counsel did not mention drug
treatment at all during his argument to the court. Cf. Avila-Cortez, 582 F.3d at 606
(determining that reversal was appropriate even where counsel “summarily referred” to
mitigating evidence that the defendant would have expounded on in his allocution).
        4
        In response to a perceived misunderstanding of Adams’s proffered allocution,
Adams’s counsel offered the additional detail about his recently secured job in the reply
brief.

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Chavez-Perez, 844 F.3d at 546 (affirming when the defendant’s proffered
allocution did not address the district court’s area of concern at all). We thus
conclude that the district court’s denial of Adams’s right to allocution
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” See Jackson, 7 F.4th at 263. Accordingly, we VACATE
Adams’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing after Adams is given the
opportunity to speak on his own behalf.
   B. Conditions of Supervised Release
       In his second issue on appeal, Adams objects to the condition in the
district court’s written judgment that requires him “not [to] use or possess
alcohol.” The government agrees that the district court erred in including
that condition in its written judgment.
       Adams did not have the opportunity to object to the alcohol-related
condition of supervised release, which was imposed only in the district
court’s written judgment after the hearing. Accordingly, we review this issue
for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th
Cir. 2020) (en banc) (explaining that plain-error review does not apply when
a defendant did not have notice of and an opportunity to object to a condition
of supervision); see, e.g., United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 349
(5th Cir. 2018).
       “The district court must orally pronounce a sentence to respect the
defendant’s right to be present for sentencing.” Diggles, 957 F.3d at 556.
This includes an oral pronouncement of discretionary conditions of
supervised release—i.e., those not mandated under the supervised release
statute. Id. at 559. “Where there is an actual conflict between the district
court’s oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls.” United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 557 (5th
Cir. 2006). A conflict arises when, as compared to the oral pronouncement,

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the written judgment “broadens the restrictions or requirements of
supervised release,” id. at 558, or “impos[es] a more burdensome
requirement,” United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 2006).
       In this case, the district court orally pronounced at the revocation
hearing that Adams would be subject to “the same conditions [on supervised
release] as those that were directed in the original judgment.” The only
alcohol-related condition of supervised release contained in the original
judgment stated: “the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol.”
However, after the revocation hearing, the district court issued a written
judgment that required Adams “not [to] use or possess alcohol.” We agree
with both parties that this alcohol-related condition in the court’s written
judgment conflicts with the court’s oral pronouncement at the revocation
hearing. See United States v. Overstreet, No. 21-30527, 2022 WL 987184, at
*1 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022) (per curiam) (finding a conflict between the oral
pronouncement and written judgment in a case very similar to this one).
                           IV.    Conclusion
       In summary, we VACATE Adams’s sentence including the
challenged condition, and we REMAND for resentencing. On remand, the
district court should provide Adams with an opportunity to allocute before
imposing a new sentence and should conform its written judgment with its
oral pronouncement, consistent with this opinion.

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