Court Opinion

ID: 9764831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:41:24.194749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.867895
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
This is the second appearance of this case before us. In Bruscato v. Gwinnett-Rockdale-Newton Community Svc. Bd., 290 Ga. App. 638 (660 SE2d 440) (2008), this Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in Vito Bruscato’s wrongful death action against Dr. O’Brien for failing to protect Vito’s wife, also Victor’s mother, from *464Victor’s psychosis, the results of which included the mother’s death at her son’s hand. Today, this majority holds that Dr. O’Brien’s withholding of medication, resulting in the resurgence of Victor’s preexisting psychosis, amounts to a “physical injury” sufficient to ground Victor’s own emotional distress claim. This result eviscerates the longstanding Georgia rule that a plaintiff seeking damages for emotional distress caused by a defendant’s negligence must show that he suffered “physical injury.” The majority also runs afoul of the widely recognized public policy against rewarding wrongdoers when, under the guise of granting relief for his “pain and suffering,” it authorizes Victor Bruscato to profit from the killing of his own mother. For both of these reasons, I dissent.
1. With a single exception marked out by our Supreme Court in Lee v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583 (533 SE2d 82) (2000), Georgia law has always rejected any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from a mere physical impact. Instead, and for more than a century, Georgia law has required that a plaintiff claiming emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence, including medical malpractice, must show either physical injury or monetary loss. See, e.g., Chapman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 88 Ga. 763 (15 SE 901) (1892); OB-GYN Assoc. v. Littleton, 259 Ga. 663 (386 SE2d 146) (1989) (Littleton II) and OB-GYN Assoc. v. Littleton, 261 Ga. 664 (410 SE2d 121) (1991) (Littleton IV) (mother of child who died shortly after birth could bring claim for only that portion of her emotional distress caused by her own physical injuries); Owens v. Gateway Mgmt. Co., 227 Ga. App. 815, 816 (490 SE2d 501) (1997) (lost wages were insufficient to ground emotional distress claim).
Littleton IPs discussion of the impact rule featured its overruling of Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581 (144 SE 680) (1928), which sustained an emotional distress claim by a woman into whose lap a circus horse had defecated. As Littleton noted, Prosser had singled out Christy Bros, as an absurd extension of the impact rule. Littleton II, 259 Ga. at 666 (2), citing Prosser & Keeton, Law of Torts, 5th ed., § 54, p. 364; see also Prosser, 3d ed., § 51, p. 351 (1964). Likewise, although Littleton II was overruled in part by Lee v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, the Lee court noted Littleton IPs overruling of Christy Bros, with approval. Lee, 272 Ga. at 585 (I).
The import of this line of cases is perfectly clear: neither a mere impact nor the mere aggravation of some preexisting mental condition, but only a new physical injury, can authorize a claim for mental distress arising from a defendant’s negligent act. It is nonsensical for this majority to assert that O’Brien’s withholding of medication from Bruscato could result in any new “physical injury” to him; rather, O’Brien’s withholding of medication resulted only in the resurgence *465of Bruscato’s preexisting mental illness, which could never be the legal responsibility of O’Brien or anyone else. When it thus misapplies the ultra-refined techniques of modern biochemistry to the clear and venerable legal rule requiring “physical injury” for emotional distress claims, the majority stages a return to the absurdity of Christy Bros.
The majority also exceeds its authority when it argues against the “physical injury” rule for reasons of policy (the prevention of a flood of litigation, a concern about fraudulent claims, and the difficulty of proving a causal connection between negligent conduct and an emotional distress claim) and for a foreseeability rule. As the Supreme Court held in Lee, however, “the benefits of an impact rule are plain in that it provides a brighter line of liability” as well as “a clear relationship” between a plaintiffs status as a victim of negligence and her right to compensation. (Emphasis supplied.) 272 Ga. at 587 (II). This explicit confirmation of the bright line rule requiring physical injury should foreclose any policy discussion of the question by any judge on this Court. Instead, and until further notice, this majority renders any arguably negligent act causing any observable change in brain chemistry preceding any catastrophic event which any plaintiffs expert later testifies to be the proximate result of the negligent act as authorizing a jury to award any amount its enlightened conscience finds appropriate. I cannot condone this result or the rationale used to reach it.
2. Although the issue has not previously arisen in Georgia, the well-developed rule in other jurisdictions is that public policy bars a wrongdoer’s emotional distress claim arising from his own immoral act. This is so even when, as in this case, the wrongdoer does not possess the mens rea to establish legally sufficient culpability for that act.
In the leading case of Cole v. Taylor, 301 NW2d 766 (Iowa 1981), the Iowa Supreme Court barred a killer’s action against her treating psychiatrist as follows:
[A] person cannot maintain an action if, in order to establish his cause of action, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party, or to maintain a claim for damages based on his own wrong or caused by his own neglect, ... or where he must base his cause of action, in whole or in part, on a violation by himself of the criminal or penal laws.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 768 (II). Any of these categories of wrongfulness, in other words, should be sufficient to bar recovery. Shortly after Cole, moreover, a second *466Iowa decision held that because an arsonist and felony murderer’s proof of diminished capacity provided no basis for avoiding the Cole rule, a trial court should have granted summary judgment to his doctor concerning his tort claim. Veverka v. Cash, 318 NW2d 447, 450-451 (Iowa 1982). Since then, Cole has been recognized as the majority American rule among the few courts to have considered the issue. Feltner v. Casey Family Program, 902 P2d 206, 208 (Wyo. 1995); see also Glazier v. Lee, 429 NW2d 857 (Mich. App. 1988) (applying Cole to bar plaintiffs claim against his psychiatrist in the wake of plaintiffs killing of his girlfriend); Hines v. Bick, 566 S2d 455, 459-462 (La. App. 1990) (same).
It is true that the Cole and other plaintiffs were found guilty of the murder before bringing their tort suits, whereas Bruscato has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial in the killing of his mother. As other courts have held, however, the Cole rationale applies even where a plaintiff may not be held criminally responsible for his conduct. Thus the New York Court of Appeals barred a claim by a fifteen-year-old against a nine-year-old for supplying the former with firecrackers, holding that “[ajlthough the plaintiff may not be held criminally responsible for his conduct, the fact remains that constructing a bomb is prohibited by law.” Barker v. Kallash, 468 NE2d 39, 42 (N.Y. 1984) (citing Cole).
It is also true that “[a]n individual who feloniously and intentionally kills” another person “forfeits the right to take an interest from the decedent’s estate.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 53-1-5 (a). Although this statute expresses the General Assembly’s disapproval of a wrongdoer profiting from his wrongful act, the majority uses it to justify the validity of a tort claim brought by a person who does not possess the requisite mens rea against a decedent’s estate. The statute has no application to Bruscato’s garden variety tort claim, however, because that claim is not an inheritable “interest” under the Probate Code.
In short, even if Bruscato has been legally excused from the consequences of his actions, his defense of mental incompetence necessarily “admits the doing of the act charged.” Brown v. State, 267 Ga. 350, 351 (478 SE2d 129) (1996). Georgia’s public policy against allowing wrongdoers to profit from their wrongful acts expresses the law’s legitimate repugnance at Bruscato’s recovery of any damages, under any theory, for his emotional distress claim. As the Cole court succinctly put the matter: “We reject plaintiffs theories of recovery, not because they cannot be rationalized, but because they cannot be justified.” 301 NW2d at 768 (II).
As previously stated, I also believe that the “physical injury” component of Georgia’s longstanding impact rule bars recovery for any preexisting mental condition which reappears as a result of a *467doctor’s withholding of medication. Because either of these reasons would be sufficient to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, I dissent to both divisions of the majority opinion.
Decided December 1, 2010
Reconsideration denied December 16, 2010
William G. Quinn III, Jerry D. McCumber, for appellant.
Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney, Milton B. Satcher III, Laura C. Marshall, for appellee.