Court Opinion

ID: 9901775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 16:01:38.754788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.989077
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1381    Document: 47     Page: 1   Filed: 11/22/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

  WILLIAM E. BARLOW, TWILA L. BARLOW, REAL
  ESTATE DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES, LLC, ET
                        AL.,
               Plaintiffs-Appellants

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-1381
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:13-cv-00396-ZNS, Judge Zachary N. Somers.
                  ______________________

                Decided: November 22, 2023
                  ______________________

     MICHAEL JAMES SMITH, Stewart, Wald & Smith, LLC,
 St. Louis, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also rep-
 resented by STEVEN M. WALD; REED W. RIPLEY, Kansas
 City, MO.

     TAMARA N. ROUNTREE, Appellate Section, Environment
 and Natural Resources Division, United States Depart-
 ment of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-ap-
 pellee.  Also represented by TODD KIM, WILLIAM B.
 LAZARUS.
                  ______________________
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 2                                              BARLOW v. US

     Before TARANTO, STOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
                        Judges.
 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
      This appeal originates from a “rails-to-trails” conver-
 sion in the state of Illinois, where Appellants own property
 adjacent to the railroad line. Appellants sued the govern-
 ment in the United States Court of Federal Claims, seeking
 compensation for alleged takings arising from the opera-
 tion of the National Trails System Act Amendments of
 1983 (“Trails Act”), 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). At the relevant
 time, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that Union
 Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) held in fee sim-
 ple the parcels of land with written instruments, and that
 Appellants failed to establish that they held in fee simple
 the non-instrument parcels. See Barlow v. United States,
 123 Fed. Cl. 186, 198–200, 202 (2015) (“Decision I”); Barlow
 v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 771, 784–86 (2020) (“Decision
 II”). 1 Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims held that
 Appellants had no compensable property interests in the
 contested parcels and that no takings occurred. See Deci-
 sion I at 189, 202; Decision II at 775, 786. Appellants now
 appeal from these decisions. For the following reasons, we
 reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
 with this opinion.
                      I.   BACKGROUND
     Between 1882 and 1883, the Peoria and Farmington
 Railway acquired property through conveyances, transfers,
 and condemnation and constructed the now-abandoned
 railroad line in dispute (the “Railroad Line”). See Decision
 I at 189. In July 2008, Union Pacific, the successor-in-

     1   These decisions also involved other landowners,
 deeds, and properties that are not at issue in this appeal.
 See Decision I at 200–01; Decision II at 782, 785–86.
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 BARLOW v. US                                              3

 interest to the Peoria and Farmington Railway, 2 filed a no-
 tice of exemption from formal abandonment proceedings
 with the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”), which has
 exclusive authority over the construction, operation, and
 abandonment of railroad lines. See id.; J.A. 593. A few
 weeks later, the Illinois Department of Natural Resources
 showed interest in acquiring the Railroad Line for rail-
 banking and interim trail use. See Decision I at 189; J.A.
 594. In November 2008, the STB issued a Notice of Interim
 Trail Use (“NITU”) for the Railroad Line, allowing Union
 Pacific and the Illinois Department of Natural Resources
 to negotiate a railbanking and interim trail use agreement.
 See Decision I at 189; J.A. 593–95.
     On June 13, 2013, Appellants sued the United States,
 alleging Fifth Amendment takings claims by operation of
 the Trails Act with respect to fifty-one parcels of land lo-
 cated along the Railroad Line. See J.A. 64 ¶ 2, 65–66
 ¶¶ 8–10 (Complaint); J.A. 77 ¶ 2, 83 ¶¶ 29–31 (First
 Amended Complaint); J.A. 96 ¶ 2, 107 ¶¶ 49–51 (Second
 Amended Complaint); J.A. 814 ¶ 2, 815–25 ¶¶ 6–48, 825
 ¶¶ 50–52 (Third Amended Complaint); Decision I at 190,
 192; Decision II at 776, 778. Twenty-eight parcels are rel-
 evant to this appeal. See Appellants’ Br. 22–23, 34, 39; 3
 Appellee’s Br. 10–11. Of those parcels, (i) twenty-two were
 conveyed by instruments including the words “right of
 way” (“ROW Agreements”) (parcel numbers 21, 23, 37,
 51–52, 55, 57–59, 74–75, 80, 83, 86, 91–96, 98, 102);

    2    Union Pacific is also the successor-in-interest to
 the Burlington Monmouth & Illinois River Railway Com-
 pany and the Iowa Central Railway Company. See Deci-
 sion I at 189.
     3   The Appellants only list twenty-seven parcels, com-
 bining two parcels (parcel numbers 57 and 58, J.A. 613–14)
 into one. Compare Appellants’ Br. 22–23 with Decision I at
 190 n.2.
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 4                                              BARLOW v. US

 (ii) three were conveyed by instruments including the
 words “for railroad purposes” (“Purpose Agreements”) (par-
 cel numbers 44, 47, 50); and (iii) three are those for which
 Appellants have not produced relevant instruments (parcel
 numbers 33, 87, 90) (“non-instrument parcels”). See J.A.
 608–21, 1209, 1213–14, 1217, 1226–31, 1236–38, 1249,
 1253, 1256, 1260, 1264 (ROW Agreements); J.A. 623–24,
 858 (Purpose Agreements); Appellants’ Br. 22–23, 34, 39;
 Appellee’s Br. 10–11.
     With respect to the ROW Agreements, the parties
 agree that the twenty-two agreements all include similar
 relevant language:
                      RIGHT OF WAY
     In Consideration Of the benefits to be derived from
     the location and building of the BURLINGTON,
     MONMOUTH & ILLINOIS RIVER RAILWAY,
     and ONE DOLLAR to me in hand paid by said Rail-
     way Company, the receipt whereof is hereby
     acknowledged, I do hereby grant and convey unto
     the said BURLINGTON, MONMOUTH &
     ILLINOIS RIVER RAILWAY COMPANY the
     RIGHT OF WAY for said Railway, . . . over or
     across the [description of land].
     And I Promise and Agree To make all proper and
     necessary deeds to convey in fee simple to said Com-
     pany, said RIGHT OF WAY, as soon as said Rail-
     way is located on or across said above described
     premises[.]
 J.A. 618 (emphases added in italics); see Decision I at 196;
 Decision II at 783. 4

     4  Some of the ROW Agreements do not contain the
 same relevant language as described above. See, e.g., J.A.
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 BARLOW v. US                                               5

     With respect to the three Purpose Agreements, the
 agreement governing parcel number 44 recites in relevant
 part:
     [T]he Grantors . . . CONVEY and QUIT-CLAIM to
     the Burlington Monmouth and Illinois River Rail-
     way Company for railroad purposes . . . all interest
     in the following described real estate, to-wit: a
     strip of land[.]
 J.A. 623 (emphases added); see Decision I at 198. And the
 agreements governing parcel numbers 47 and 50 recite in
 relevant part:
     [T]he Grantors . . . Convey and Warrant for rail-
     road purposes to the Burlington Monmouth and Il-
     linois River Railway Company . . . the following
     described real estate, to-wit: A strip of land[.]
 J.A. 624, 858 (emphasis added); see Decision I at 198; Deci-
 sion II at 784–85.
     On November 14, 2014, Appellants filed a motion for
 partial summary judgment on whether takings occurred
 with respect to certain parcels, and the government subse-
 quently cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the
 same parcels, contending no takings occurred. Decision I
 at 192. Appellants again filed a motion for partial sum-
 mary judgment on the same question with respect to addi-
 tional parcels in March 2020, and the government also
 later cross-moved for partial summary judgment on these
 additional parcels. Decision II at 778.

 610. However, this difference in language does not impact
 the outcome, and the parties agreed that the relevant lan-
 guage of the deed is recited above. Appellants’ Br. 23–24,
 Appellee’s Br. 22; see also Decision I at 196; Decision II at
 776–77.
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 6                                              BARLOW v. US

     In deciding both sets of cross-motions for partial sum-
 mary judgment, the Court of Federal Claims denied Appel-
 lants’ motions and granted the government’s motions with
 respect to the parcels for which Appellants produced ROW
 Agreements and Purpose Agreements. See Decision I at
 198–99; Decision II at 784–85. The Court of Federal
 Claims found that undisputed material facts show that Un-
 ion Pacific held these parcels in fee simple when the STB
 issued the NITU. See Decision I at 198–99; Decision II at
 784–85. The Court of Federal Claims also denied Appel-
 lants’ partial summary judgment motion and granted the
 government’s partial summary judgment motion with re-
 spect to the non-instrument parcels at issue in Decision I
 because Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof to
 show that they have cognizable property interests in those
 parcels. See Decision I at 199–200, 202. Accordingly, the
 Court of Federal Claims entered a judgment under Rule
 54(b) in favor of the government. See J.A. 1489.
     Appellants timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
     “Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law
 based on factual underpinnings.” Chi. Coating Co., LLC v.
 United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cita-
 tion omitted). However, summary judgment is “in all re-
 spects reviewed de novo.” Cienega Gardens v. United
 States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
 ted). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only when there
 is no genuine issue of material fact, and all factual infer-
 ences should be viewed in the light most favorable to the
 non-moving party.” Chi. Coating, 892 F.3d at 1169 (cita-
 tions omitted). Additionally, “[t]he nature or scope of a
 compensable property interest in a takings analysis is a
 question of law,” which we review de novo. Casitas Mun.
 Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
 2013) (citation omitted).
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 BARLOW v. US                                                 7

                        III. DISCUSSION
      We have set forth a three-part test to determine
 whether a claimant is entitled to compensation in rails-to-
 trails cases. Chi. Coating, 892 F.3d at 1170 (citation omit-
 ted). “If the railroad company owns the land in fee simple,
 then the Government cannot have committed a taking and
 the analysis ends.” Id. (citing Preseault v. United States,
 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “Second, if the rail-
 road possesses only an easement, the claimant must show
 that the trail use falls outside the scope of the easement.”
 Id. (citation omitted). “Finally, even if the easement per-
 mits using the land as a recreational trail, claimants may
 recover if the easement terminated or was abandoned prior
 to the alleged taking.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]e must
 apply the law of the state where the property interest
 arises”—here, Illinois—in addressing these questions. Id.
 (citations omitted); see also Preseault, 100 F.3d at 1535–36,
 1541–42, 1548–49 (applying state law).
       Under Illinois law, “‘the cardinal and all-important
 rule is to ascertain the intention of the parties,’ as gathered
 from the entire instrument, considering ‘the facts the par-
 ties had in mind, including their situation, the state of the
 property, and the objects to be attained.’” Chi. Coating, 892
 F.3d at 1170 (first quoting Tallman v. E. Ill. & Peoria R.
 Co., 41 N.E.2d 537, 539 (Ill. 1942); and then quoting Mag-
 nolia Petro. Co. v. West, 30 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ill. 1940))
 (cleaned up). Certain words, such as “convey,” create a
 statutory presumption under the Illinois Conveyances Act
 that “a fee simple estate was intended absent limitation to
 a lesser estate by express words or construction of law.”
 Sowers v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 503 N.E.2d 1082, 1085
 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); see 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13. In deter-
 mining whether a deed conveys a fee or an easement to a
 railroad company, Illinois courts look at whether “the
 granting clause conveys a designated strip or piece of land,
 or whether it refers to a right or privilege with respect to
 the described premises.” McVey v. Unknown S’holders of
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 8                                                BARLOW v. US

 Inland Coal & Washing Co., 427 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ill. App.
 Ct. 1981) (citation omitted).
     On appeal, Appellants argue that the Court of Federal
 Claims erred in finding that (i) the ROW Agreements con-
 veyed fee simple estates, see Appellants’ Br. 13; see also id.
 at 16–32; (ii) the Purpose Agreements conveyed fee simple
 estates, see id. at 13; see also id. at 32–36; and (iii) Appel-
 lants did not satisfy their burden to show cognizable prop-
 erty interests in the non-instrument parcels, see id. at 13;
 see also id. at 36–46. We address each argument in turn.
                  A. The ROW Agreements
     Appellants argue that the Court of Federal Claims
 erred in interpreting the ROW Agreements as conveying
 fee simple estates rather than easements limited to rail-
 road purposes. See Appellants’ Br. 13, 16; see also id. at
 16–32. First, Appellants argue that under Illinois law, “the
 Right of Way for said Railway” language in the ROW
 Agreements and the placement of this language in the
 granting clause show the parties’ intent to convey ease-
 ments rather than fee simple estates. See id. at 24, 27; see
 also id. 24–28. Appellants also argue that the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims erred in relying on the words “grant and con-
 vey” to support construing the ROW Agreements as
 conveying fee simple estates. See id. at 29. Further, Ap-
 pellants contend that language outside the granting
 clause—namely, the “over or across” language used to de-
 scribe the right granted with respect to the land, the “Right
 of Way” title, and the habendum clause 5—also indicates
 that the parties meant to convey easements. See id. at

     5   The habendum clause “limit[s] and define[s] the es-
 tate granted,” and “if there is repugnancy between the
 granting clause and the habendum the former must pre-
 vail.” Morton v. Babb, 96 N.E. 279, 281 (Ill. 1911) (citations
 omitted).
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 BARLOW v. US                                               9

 28–30. Lastly, Appellants argue that the extrinsic evi-
 dence, such as subsequent deeds, also supports their inter-
 pretation that the ROW Agreements convey easements.
 See id. at 31.
     The government counters that the Court of Federal
 Claims did not err in interpreting the ROW Agreements to
 convey fee simple estates. See Appellee’s Br. 15; see also
 id. 18–37. First, the government argues that the ROW
 Agreements’ “grant and convey” language created a rebut-
 table presumption that the ROW Agreements are fee sim-
 ple conveyances. See id. at 20–21; see also id. at 18–25.
 The government further argues that Appellants failed to
 rebut the statutory presumption because the ROW Agree-
 ments include no language that expressly limits the grant
 to a right of use. See id. at 25; see also id. 25–37.
     We agree with Appellants. Although the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims did not err in finding that a presumption of fee
 simple estate applies, see Decision I at 196; Decision II at
 783, that presumption was rebutted by other express words
 in the agreement. For example, the ROW Agreements ex-
 pressly convey a “RIGHT OF WAY” as the object of the
 grant in the granting clause. See J.A. 618; Decision I at
 196; Decision II at 783. Such a reference to a right of way,
 specifically in the granting clause, conveys an easement ra-
 ther than a fee simple. McVey, 427 N.E.2d at 217 (citations
 omitted); see also Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. L. Ry.
 Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 43 N.E.2d 993, 995–96 (Ill.
 1942) (finding easement conveyed when grantor
 “grant[ed] . . . the right of way for said railroad”); Branch
 v. Cent. Tr. Co. of Ill., 151 N.E. 284, 285, 287 (Ill. 1926)
 (finding easement conveyed when grantor conveyed “a rail-
 road right of way”); Diaz v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
 of Elgin, 786 N.E.2d 1033, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (ex-
 plaining that “the term ‘right-of-way’ is synonymous with
 ‘easement’”); Dep’t of Pub. Works & Bldgs. for & in Behalf
 of People v. Schmauss, 285 N.E.2d 628, 629–30 (Ill. App.
 Ct. 1972) (finding easement conveyed when grantor
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 10                                                 BARLOW v. US

 “g[a]ve, remise[d], release[d],       convey[ed]    and   quit-
 claim[ed] . . . the right of way”).
     Outside the granting clause, other express words in the
 ROW Agreements also rebut the presumption. First, the
 ROW Agreements’ “RIGHT OF WAY” title demonstrates
 an intention to convey easements. See Penn Cent. Corp. v.
 Commonwealth Edison Co., 512 N.E.2d 118, 120 (Ill. App.
 Ct. 1987) (explaining that deed entitled “Right of Way
 Deed” and referring to a right-of-way in the granting clause
 will be construed to convey an easement). Second, the
 “over or across” and “on or across” language in the ROW
 Agreements is consistent with the description of the right
 of way and shows an intent to convey an easement. See
 McVey, 427 N.E.2d at 217 (finding “over and through” lan-
 guage to indicate an easement); Diaz, 786 N.E.2d at 1042
 (finding easement conveyed because “[c]onstruing [the]
 deed as creating a fee simple” would “render[] the terms
 ‘over and through’ and ‘right-of-way’ meaningless”).
      We also find that the ROW Agreements’ second para-
 graph—the habendum clause—supports our interpreta-
 tion. The government argues that the clause shows the
 intent to convey fee simple estates by reciting that the
 grantors agreed “to make all proper and necessary deeds
 ‘to convey in fee simple.’” Appellee’s Br. 23. However, the
 full sentence states: “And I Promise and Agree To make all
 proper and necessary deeds to convey in fee simple to said
 Company, said RIGHT OF WAY, . . .” J.A. 618; see Deci-
 sion I at 196; Decision II at 783. Interpreting the ROW
 Agreements to mean “that the railroad acquire[d] a fee in
 the easement or right-of-way . . . harmonizes all the
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 BARLOW v. US                                               11

 provisions.” Abrams v. Royse, 569 N.E.2d 1329, 1333 (Ill.
 App. Ct. 1991). 6
      We are not persuaded by the government’s argument
 that the use of the term “right of way” in the ROW Agree-
 ments refers to the land conveyed, not a limitation on the
 interest conveyed. Appellee’s Br. 27; see id. at 26–28. The
 government’s argument fails because the cases are distin-
 guishable. The court in Urbaitis concluded that the “right
 of way” term was “used merely as a shorthand reference to
 the land itself” in the deed at issue because it was located
 “in the conditions clause” of the deed and not “in the actual
 granting clause of the deed.” 575 N.E.2d at 552–53. Be-
 cause the “right of way” language appears in the granting
 clause in this case, Urbaitis is inapposite. See id. at 553–54
 (distinguishing cases based on whether the “right of way”
 language appeared in the granting clause or in another
 part of the deed). The other cases relied on by the govern-
 ment are similarly distinguishable. In both Sowers and
 Chicago Coating, the “right of way” language was in the
 legal description of the land, not in the granting clause of
 the pertinent deed. Sowers, 503 N.E.2d at 1088; Chi. Coat-
 ing, 892 F.3d at 1171–72. Those cases are unlike the pre-
 sent case where the “right of way” language serves to limit
 the conveyance.
     Because we conclude that the Court of Federal Claims
 erred in finding that the ROW Agreements conveyed fee
 simple estates rather than easements, we reverse the

     6   We do not reach Appellants’ arguments concerning
 extrinsic evidence, Appellants’ Br. 31, because we find the
 language in the ROW Agreements unambiguously conveys
 easements. See Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison, 575
 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ill. 1991) (“Absent an ambiguity in the
 deed, the intention of the parties must be discerned solely
 from the language of the instrument, without consideration
 of extrinsic factors.”).
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 12                                                BARLOW v. US

 grants of the government’s motions for partial summary
 judgment as to the relevant parcels and the denials of Ap-
 pellants’ motions for partial summary judgment as to the
 same parcels.
                 B. The Purpose Agreements
     For the Purpose Agreements, Appellants argue that
 the Court of Federal Claims also erred in interpreting
 those agreements to convey fee simple estates. See Appel-
 lants’ Br. 13; see also id. at 32–36. Because the three deeds
 all include expressly declared purposes in the granting
 clause, Appellants argue that they convey easements. See
 id. at 14; see also id. at 33–35. Appellants further argue
 that the Court of Federal Claims mistakenly relied on cases
 discussing deeds that did not include an expression of pur-
 pose in the granting clause. See id. at 35–36.
     We agree with Appellants. As was the case for the
 ROW Agreements, the Court of Federal Claims correctly
 found a rebuttable presumption of a fee simple estate for
 each of the Purpose Agreements based on the Illinois Con-
 veyances Act. Decision I at 198; Decision II at 785. But
 this presumption is rebutted by the language in the grant-
 ing clause of the deeds that restricts the right of the con-
 veyance to a lesser estate, i.e., “for railroad purposes.” See
 Tallman, 41 N.E.2d at 543 (“[W]here there is language, ei-
 ther in the granting clause or in the habendum of the deed,
 limiting the estate conveyed by such granting words to one
 less in extent than a fee, such words of limitation will be
 given effect.”); cf. Urbaitis, 575 N.E.2d at 553 (“It is of con-
 siderable relevance that neither the term ‘right-of-way’ nor
 any other language purporting to limit the estate appears
 in the actual granting clause of the deed. . . . We cannot
 conclude that the incidental use of the term ‘right-of-way’
 in the conditions clause was intended to limit the estate
 granted to a mere easement.”).
    In circumstances similar to the one in this case, courts
 have held that an easement was conveyed. For example,
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 BARLOW v. US                                               13

 in Carter Oil Co. v. Myers, the Seventh Circuit found a deed
 conveyed an easement under Illinois law despite the
 “grant, convey and dedicate” language in part because of
 the limiting language “for the purpose of a public highway”
 in the granting clause. 105 F.2d 259, 260–61 (7th Cir.
 1939). The Seventh Circuit reasoned that to construe the
 deed as granting a fee would “give the maximum effect to
 the words ‘grant and convey,’ and [] completely ignore the
 other terminology of the instrument which to us appears to
 be definitive of its real intent.” Id. at 261. In Magnolia,
 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a similar granting
 clause in the deed, stating “to be used for road purpose,”
 indicated an intent to convey an easement despite also in-
 cluding the phrase “convey and warrant.” 30 N.E.2d at
 25–27.
     The cases relied on by the Court of Federal Claims do
 not persuade us to reach a different conclusion. See Deci-
 sion I at 198–99 (citing cases); Decision II at 784–85 (same).
 These cases are distinguishable and do not require finding
 conveyances of fee simple interests because they involve
 deeds where the limiting language appeared in the recital
 or consideration clause, not in the granting clause. In Penn
 Central, the court found the “‘for the purpose of’ lan-
 guage . . . to be merely expressive of the purpose which mo-
 tivated the grantor to make the conveyance,” and thus did
 “not purport to limit the estate conveyed[.]” 512 N.E.2d at
 120. In Sowers, the court held that “the language of pur-
 pose in the consideration clause cannot be construed to
 limit the estate conveyed.” 503 N.E.2d at 1086. In Keen v.
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., the court
 likewise found that the purpose language was “merely a
 recital of the consideration for the deed” and, therefore,
 “d[id] not purport to be a limitation on the estate con-
 veyed.” 64 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ill. 1945).
     This court’s holding in Chicago Coating is similarly in-
 apposite. There, in addressing the Jones Deed, the court
 held “the right of way,” “for railroad purposes,” and “over
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 14                                             BARLOW v. US

 and across” language did not limit the conveyance of the
 parcel but described the right-of-way the rail line already
 owned. 892 F.3d at 1171–72. Moreover, when discussing
 the Wilkins Deed, the court indicated that the granting
 clause was “devoid of any easement-indicating language,”
 such as “reference to how the land would be used,” and held
 that the deed conveyed the property in fee simple. Id. at
 1173–74.
      Because we conclude that the Court of Federal Claims
 erred in finding the Purpose Agreements conveyed fee sim-
 ple estates rather than easements, we reverse the grants
 of the government’s motions for partial summary judgment
 as to the relevant parcels and the denials of Appellant’s
 motions for partial summary judgment as to the same par-
 cels.
                C. The Non-Instrument Parcels
     For the non-instrument parcels, Appellants argue that
 as a matter of Illinois state law no conveyance documents
 apply, see Appellants’ Br. 38–39, and contend that the
 greatest interests Union Pacific could have obtained were
 easements via adverse possession, see id. at 38. Appellants
 further argue that because they own the fee simple inter-
 ests in land abutting the Railroad Line, they are presumed
 to own fee simple interests in the land within the ease-
 ments. See id. at 41–42.
      The government argues in response that the Appel-
 lants failed to meet their burden of establishing cognizable
 property interests because (i) evidence suggests that the
 conveyance instruments exist, but Appellants failed to pro-
 duce them, see Appellee’s Br. 49–50, and (ii) Appellants
 failed to make the case that Union Pacific acquired the dis-
 puted parcels via adverse possession, see id. at 50–52. Ad-
 ditionally, the government contends that even if
 Appellants established adverse possession, a railroad can
 acquire fee simple interests by adverse possession. See id.
 at 54.
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 BARLOW v. US                                               15

     Here too, we agree with the Appellants. At the outset,
 the parties dispute which party bears the burden of proof
 concerning lost instruments. See Appellants’ Br. 42–44;
 Appellee’s Br. 49–50. Under Illinois law, once it is estab-
 lished that the conveyance instruments were lost, the party
 relying on the contents of the lost instruments—here, the
 government—has the burden to establish their contents by
 clear and convincing evidence. See Whipple v. Carrico, 137
 N.E. 84, 86 (Ill. 1922) (“A party seeking to establish the ex-
 istence and contents of a lost deed . . . must bear the burden
 of making such proof in a clear and conclusive manner.”)
 (emphasis added); Metcalf v. Altenritter, 369 N.E.2d 498,
 500–01 (Ill. App. 1977) (“If the deed were lost or destroyed,
 defendants [who argued deed conveyed title to them] had
 the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
 that it was executed and delivered as required by law.”).
     Applying this framework, Appellants argue that the
 conveyance instruments were lost or destroyed. See Appel-
 lants’ Br. 41. Appellants produced evidence of a diligent
 search, including valuation schedules, written requests,
 and subpoenas to acquire documents related to the Peoria
 and Farmington Railway’s acquisition of use rights, but
 Appellants were unable to locate the conveyance instru-
 ments. 7 See Rankin v. Crow, 19 Ill. 626, 629 (1858) (ex-
 plaining that one “must search every place where there is
 a reasonable probability that it may be found,” before a
 court can admit secondary evidence of the contents of a lost
 or destroyed instrument) (citation omitted); Hawley v.
 Hawley, 58 N.E. 332, 334 (Ill. 1900) (finding proof of loss or

     7    See Appellants’ Br. 39–41; J.A. 583–607 (subpoena
 to Union Pacific); J.A 636–38 (Appellant’s letter and Union
 Pacific’s reply indicating it could not locate the document
 requested for parcel number 33); J.A 625–26 (Union Pa-
 cific’s memo indicating no record of conveyance to the rail-
 road for parcel numbers 87 and 90).
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 16                                                BARLOW v. US

 destruction of documents to be sufficient when a diligent
 search was conducted at the office of the deceased and in
 the safe where he kept such papers). Appellants have thus
 established that the written instruments, if they ever ex-
 isted, were lost or destroyed.
      We further agree with Appellants that the government
 failed to demonstrate the content of the lost deed with clear
 and convincing evidence, see Appellants’ Br. 42–43 & n.18,
 and that the lost instruments are therefore void. When a
 deed is lost, but “there is uncertainty as to description, the
 deed is void.” Chi., Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v.
 Menhall, 42 F. Supp. 81, 82 (E.D. Ill. 1941), aff’d in part,
 modified in part, 131 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1942) (citations
 omitted); Whipple, 137 N.E. at 86 (“There is not sufficient
 proof of the contents of the deed to establish title.”); Shipley
 v. Shipley, 113 N.E. 906, 910 (Ill. 1916) (“In our judgment
 the evidence in this case regarding the material parts of
 this alleged lost deed is not sufficiently clear and convinc-
 ing to sustain the decree.”); see also Alleman v. Hammond,
 70 N.E. 661, 661 (Ill. 1904) (“When the land intended to be
 conveyed cannot be located from the description thereof in
 the deed, the deed is void for uncertainty.”) (citation omit-
 ted). Any parol evidence “regarding a deed’s existence and
 contents must be clear and convincing.” Menhall, 42 F.
 Supp. at 82. Although the government points to the valu-
 ation schedules in an attempt to establish that specific in-
 struments existed as to the conveyance of the parcels, see
 Appellee’s Br. 49–50, those valuation schedules do not
 specify the interests acquired by the railroad, merely not-
 ing the kind of instrument as “contract” for parcel number
 33 and “deed memo” for parcel numbers 87 and 90. J.A.
 599, 604–05. See Superior Oil Co. v. Harsh, 39 F. Supp.
 467, 469 (E.D. Ill. 1941) (“[N]o presumption or inference
 arises from the fact that a paper bearing the word ‘deed’
 was at one time amongst certain records . . . .”), decree
 aff’d, 126 F.2d 572, 573–75 (7th Cir. 1942). Because there
 was no clear and convincing parol evidence establishing the
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 BARLOW v. US                                               17

 contents of the conveyance instruments, they are presumed
 to be void.
      Appellants next argue that where there are no valid
 conveyance instruments, Union Pacific could have at most
 obtained prescriptive easements. See Appellants’ Br. 38;
 see also id. 36–38. We agree. Article 2, Section 13 of the
 Illinois Constitution of 1870 provides that “[t]he fee of land
 taken for railroad tracks, without consent of the owners
 thereof, shall remain in such owners, subject to the use for
 which it is taken.” ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1870); see also
 Branch, 151 N.E. at 288 (same); Chi. & E. Ill. R.R. Co. v.
 Clapp, 66 N.E. 223, 224 (Ill. 1903) (same). Therefore, with-
 out evidence that an express grant took place, the greatest
 interests Union Pacific could have obtained were ease-
 ments.
      Lastly, we agree that the Appellants established that
 they own fee simple interests in the non-instrument par-
 cels because of the centerline presumption. See generally
 Appellant’s Br. 41–42. We, like the Court of Federal
 Claims, recognize that Appellants have “put forward docu-
 ments to show that [they] own the land abutting the dis-
 puted parcels.” Decision I at 199 & n.11; see Ex. M to
 Plaintiffs’ Mot. Partial Summ. J., Barlow v. United States,
 No. 1:13-cv-00396-LKG (Fed. Cl. Nov. 14, 2014) (Dkt. 28-
 3–8) (claim books including deeds for the landowners at is-
 sue). It is further undisputed that these records show that
 Appellants owned the land abutting the Railroad Line. De-
 cision I at 189; see Oral Arg. at 30:39–31:15,
 https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2
 2-1381_02072023.mp3 (government conceding that it was
 incorrect that Appellants “failed to establish as a threshold
 matter that they themselves own the land adjoining the
 [non-instrument] Parcels,” citing Appellee’s Br. 48). In Il-
 linois, the centerline presumption applies, and therefore
 Appellants are presumed to hold fee simple interests in the
 non-instrument parcels by establishing that they own the
 land abutting those parcels. See Prall v. Burckhartt, 132
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 18                                             BARLOW v. US

 N.E. 280, 282 (Ill. 1921) (noting that at common law, “[a]
 deed of an abutting lot passed the title to the center of the
 street—or included the entire street, as the case might be—
 burdened, of course, with the easement.”); see also Castillo
 v. United States, 952 F.3d 1311, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (holding Florida’s centerline presumption of high-
 ways and streets apply to railroads, and noting “[m]any
 other jurisdictions—very much the predominant number
 among those whose law has been cited to us—have applied
 the centerline presumption to railroad rights-of-
 way”); cf. Diaz, 786 N.E.2d at 1039–41 (finding “by virtue
 of the chain of title leading back to [grantor], [abutting
 landowners] have demonstrated that they hold title to the
 right-of-way” formerly used by a railroad). Because we
 hold that Union Pacific can at most obtain easements, not
 fees, due to the voided, lost instruments, the presumption
 that Appellants own fee simple interests to the centerline
 of the railroad corridor is unrebutted. 8
     We also are not persuaded by the government’s citation
 to cases purporting to hold that the railroad can obtain fee
 interests via adverse possession. See Appellee’s Br. 53–54.
 For example, the government’s reliance on Court of Federal
 Claims cases applying laws of other states is misplaced.
 See Appellee’s Br. 53–54 (citing McClurg Fam. Farm, LLC
 v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 1 (2014) (applying Iowa law);
 Hardy v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 1, on reconsideration
 in part, 129 Fed. Cl. 513 (2016), and aff’d in part, vacated

      8  Because we find that the Court of Federal Claims
 erred as to the non-instrument parcels, we need not con-
 sider Appellants’ alternative argument that the denial by
 the Court of Federal Claims of the government’s partial
 summary judgment motion regarding similar parcels with-
 out instruments in Decision II contradicted its grant of the
 government’s partial summary judgment motion in Deci-
 sion I. See Appellants’ Br. 45–46.
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 BARLOW v. US                                              19

 in part, remanded, 965 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (applying
 Georgia law); Rogers v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 387
 (2012) (applying Florida law), aff’d, 814 F.3d 1299 (Fed.
 Cir. 2015)). Because we rely on Illinois state law in finding
 Union Pacific at most obtained easements, these cases are
 unpersuasive.
     For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Federal Claims
 erred in finding that Appellants “have simply not met their
 burden” to show that they owned the non-instrument par-
 cels in fee simple at the time that the STB issued the NITU.
 Decision I at 200. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the
 Court of Federal Claims granting the government’s motion
 for partial summary judgment as to the non-instrument
 parcels and denying the Appellants’ motion for partial
 summary judgment as to the same parcels. Id.
                      IV. CONCLUSION
      We have considered the government’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. We conclude that the
 ROW Agreements and the Purpose Agreements conveyed
 easements to Union Pacific. We also conclude that Appel-
 lants met their burden to show a cognizable property inter-
 est in parcel numbers 33, 87 and 90 and that Union Pacific
 could not have held interests greater than easements in
 these parcels. Accordingly, we reverse the grants of the
 government’s motions for partial summary judgment and
 denials of Appellants’ motions for partial summary judg-
 ment with respect to the twenty-eight parcels at issue and
 remand to the Court of Federal Claims for further proceed-
 ings consistent with this opinion.
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.